Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? (Studies in Asian Security) [Illustrated] 0804772177, 9780804772174

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Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security

se rie s e ditor s Muthiah Alagappa East-West Center Amitav Acharya American University

Alastair Iain Johnston Harvard University

David Leheny Princeton University

T. V. Paul McGill University

Randall Schweller Ohio State University

inte rnational board Rajesh M. Basrur Nanyang Technological University

Stephan M. Haggard University of California, San Diego

Barry Buzan London School of Economics

G. John Ikenberry Princeton University

Victor D. Cha Georgetown University

Takashi Inoguchi Chuo University

Thomas J. Christensen Princeton University

Brian L. Job University of British Columbia

Stephen P. Cohen The Brookings Institution

Miles Kahler University of California, San Diego

Chu Yun-han Academia Sinica

Peter J. Katzenstein Cornell University

Rosemary Foot University of Oxford

Khong Yuen Foong University of Oxford

Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University

Byung-Kook Kim Korea University

Sumit Ganguly Indiana University, Bloomington

Michael Mastanduno Dartmouth College

Avery Goldstein University of Pennsylvania

Mike Mochizuki George Washington University

Michael J. Green Georgetown University; Center for Strategic and International Studies

Katherine H. S. Moon Wellesley College Qin Yaqing China Foreign Affairs University

Christian Reus-Smit Australian National University

Etel Solingen University of California, Irvine

Varun Sahni Jawaharlal Nehru University

Rizal Sukma CSIS, Jakarta

Wu Xinbo Fudan University

Studies in Asian Security a series sponsored by the east-west center Muthiah Alagappa, Chief Editor Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center The Studies in Asian Security book series promotes analysis, understanding, and explanation of the dynamics of domestic, transnational, and international security challenges in Asia. The peer-reviewed publications in the Series analyze contemporary security issues and problems to clarify debates in the scholarly community, provide new insights and perspectives, and identify new research and policy directions. Security is defined broadly to include the traditional political and military dimensions as well as nontraditional dimensions that affect the survival and well being of political communities. Asia, too, is defined broadly to include Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia. Designed to encourage original and rigorous scholarship, books in the Studies in Asian Security series seek to engage scholars, educators, and practitioners. Wide-ranging in scope and method, the Series is receptive to all paradigms, programs, and traditions, and to an extensive array of methodologies now employed in the social sciences. * * * The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue. Established by the U.S. Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options. The Center is an independent, public, nonprofit organization with funding from the U.S. government, and additional support provided by private agencies, individuals, foundations, corporations, and governments in the region.

Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security from pacifism to reali sm?

Paul Midford

sponsore d by the east-we st ce nte r S t a n f o rd U n i ve r s i t y P r e s s • S t anfo rd, Califor nia

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2011 by the Board of  Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University.  All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Midford, Paul.   Rethinking Japanese public opinion and security  :  from pacifism to realism? / Paul Midford.    p. cm. — (Studies in Asian security)   Includes bibliographical references and index.   ISBN 978-0-8047-7216-7 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-8047-7217-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)   1. National security—Japan—Public opinion.  2. Japan—Military policy— Public opinion.   3. Public opinion—Japan.   I. Title. II. Series: Studies in Asian security. UA845.M455 2011 355'.033052—dc22 2010029234 Typeset by Thompson Type in 10.5/13.5 Bembo

To the memory of my father, Dr.Thomas Arthur Midford

Contents

List of Illustrations Preface List of Abbreviations A Note on Japanese Transliteration and Names

xi xiii xvii xviii

  1 Introduction

1

  2 Public Attitudes, Opinion, and the Conditions for Policy Influence

9

  3 Views on the Utility of Military Force and America’s Use of Force

30

  4 Reassessing Public Opinion during the Cold War

49

  5 The First Gulf  War

68

  6 International Peacekeeping and the U.S. Alliance in the 1990s

82

  7 Japanese Public Opinion and Responses to 9-11 and the Afghan Invasion

110

  8 The Iraq War and the SDF

125

  9 Reversing Course: An Iraq Syndrome in Japan

146

10 Conclusions

171

Notes Index

193 237

Illustrations

Figures 2.1 Public attitudes, measurable opinion, and policy outcomes 2.2 Japanese public opinion indifference slopes regarding the utility of military force and strategic policy placement 3.1 Fear of entrapment 3.2 Trust in America 9.1 Yomiuri Shimbun annual poll question on constitutional reform 9.2 Support for extending the MSDF Indian Ocean refueling deployment

13 27 42 45 158 165

Tables 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10

Legitimate reasons for going to war Effective means for combating terrorism Utility of U.S. attack on Afghanistan for preventing terrorist attacks The utility of military force for combating terrorism Has the Iraq occupation (war) contributed to the war on terrorism? The impact of the Iraq invasion on reducing the WMD proliferation threat WMD as a legitimate reason for invading Iraq Overseas SDF operations for international cooperation and assistance American foreign policy and world peace Changing views of the United States

32 35 35 35 36 37 37 40 44 46

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3.11 The war on terrorism and the Iraq War and perceptions of the United States 3.12 The most important influence on your image of America 3.13 Feelings about Americans, U.S. government, and foreign policy 3.14 Guiding motivations behind U.S. foreign policy 4.1 Japan’s alignment in international politics 4.2 Voter views on alignment in Osaka and Izumo, 1957 4.3 Does Japan need military forces? 4.4 Support for a military buildup 4.5 Effectiveness (ko¯kka) of various means for Japan’s security 4.6 Voters’ perception of their influence on government decisions 5.1 Opinions on dispatching the SDF overseas 6.1 Opinions about deploying the SDF overseas 6.2 Japan’s participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations 6.3 Japan’s cooperation with the U.N. PKO mission in Cambodia 6.4 SDF’s most important role up to now and in the future 6.5 Support for SDF participation in overseas disaster relief 6.6 Primary, secondary, and future SDF roles 7.1 Should Japan cooperate with the U.S. response to 9/11? 7.2 How should Japan cooperate with international efforts against terrorism? 7.3 Evaluation of the Japanese government’s response to 9/11 7.4 Evaluation of MSDF counterterrorism deployment to the Indian Ocean 7.5 Position on extending the Indian Ocean dispatch 8.1 Support for potential U.S. attack on Iraq 8.2 Support for the U.S. invasion of Iraq versus Afghanistan 8.3 Reasons for supporting and opposing the U.S. invasion of Iraq 8.4 Was the Iraq War justified? 8.5 Reasons for supporting Koizumi’s Iraq War statement 8.6 Support for plan to dispatch SDF to Iraq 8.7 Support for the SDF dispatch to Iraq 8.8 Support for extending the SDF deployment in Iraq 8.9 Support for continued SDF deployment in Iraq in the wake of attacks

46 47 47 48 57 58 59 59 61 65 71 84 85 93 97 102 107 112 113 117 121 122 126 126 127 128 129 133 137 138 139

Preface

During an early morning panel on Japanese foreign policy at the 2003 annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) in New York City, I was struck by several claims made there that Japanese public opinion was becoming hawkish on security, even to the point of getting out in front of the conservative ruling LDP, then led by hawkish Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro¯. These claims provoked me to wonder whether they were true. I started looking for answers, and soon I realized three things. First, I discovered an embarrassment of riches in polling data, especially Japanese-language data. Second, I found that, although it is common for academic works on Japanese foreign policy to cite a poll result or two here and there, there was exceptionally little scholarly research, even in Japanese and especially in English, on Japanese public opinion and its influence on security policy. Finally, I saw that Koizumi’s bold plans, and the equally bold predictions of pundits, for the Japanese military to begin playing a significant (read “combat”) role in international security were going largely unfulfilled. Fortuitously, several months after the meeting I received an invitation from friend and colleague Robert Eldridge to join a project he was organizing on Japanese public opinion and the war on terrorism. He had received a Humanities and Social Science Grant ( Jinbun Shakai Kagaku Joseikin) from the Suntory Foundation and was assembling a group of expat American scholars (plus a Japanese scholar) based in Japan to examine this topic. Robert and I eventually published the results of this project in our coedited volume with Palgrave Macmillan in 2008: Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism. I

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would like to thank Palgrave for allowing me to include over a dozen pages from my contributions to this volume in Chapter 2 of this book. I owe Robert a big debt of gratitude, not just for arranging our funding but for being an inspiration, an outstanding colleague, and a good friend. I would also like to thank the Japan Data Archive at the Roper Center, the University of Connecticut at Storrs, for providing me access and assistance during my visit (funded by the Suntory Foundation) to the Archive in March 2004. I would especially like to thank Roper Center associate director Lois Timms-Ferrara and archivist Cynthia Teixeira for extending a warm welcome and much assistance. Another important step along the way toward completing this book was a short monograph I published with the East-West Center in Washington’s Policy Studies series in late 2006 entitled Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism: Implications for Japan’s Security Strategy. I am grateful to Dr. Muthiah Alagappa for the insightful comments and encouragement he provided during that project, as well as during the initial review of this manuscript by him and by the rest of the editorial board of the Asian Security Series at Stanford University Press. I would also like to thank Jeremy Sutherland for his able editorial assistance. While working on both these volumes I was invited by Wilhelm Vosse of the International Christian University (ICU) of Japan and Andrew Appleton of Washington State University to participate in a seminar in Honolulu in early summer 2006 focusing on how Japanese public opinion responds to threats and globalization by using the data from their innovative joint research, the Survey on Attitudes and Global Engagement (SAGE). I learned a lot from this seminar and the exceptionally valuable SAGE data (which are analyzed in Chapter 3), and in the years since I have benefited from Wilhelm’s insightful comments, collaboration on related projects, and friendship. In summer 2007 I received a short-term research fellowship from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), allowing me to be a visiting scholar from June to August 2007 at Osaka University’s School for International Public Policy (OSIPP). During that time I was able to complete the first draft of this manuscript. I am very grateful to JSPS for this funding and also to Professor Kurusu Kaoru for serving as my academic sponsor and for all the kind assistance and advice she provided. In summer 2008 I received a grant from the Sasakawa Scandinavian Foundation to fund a visiting research position at the Japanese Institute for International Affairs (JIIA). Although my main research during this period was for a forthcoming book on Japan’s leadership in promoting East Asian security multilateralism, this grant and my



preface

xv

time in residence at JIIA nonetheless afforded me an opportunity to clean up some final loose ends in my research for this book. For this, as well as for support of my other project, I am grateful to both the Sasakawa Scandinavian Foundation and JIIA, especially then JIIA President Sato¯Yukio. There are two other individuals to whom I owe especially big intellectual debts. The first is someone I never met, the late Dr. Douglas H. Mendel Jr., a former U.S. military officer fluent in Japanese, who during the U.S. occupation helped conduct the first scientific opinion survey in Japan. Later he completed a doctoral dissertation at the University of Michigan on Japanese public opinion and foreign policy, which in turn became the basis for his 1961 work, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy, the first and only full-length academic study published in English about public opinion as a causal factor influencing Japanese foreign policy before this book. Following his pioneering book, Mendel continued to be a prolific scholar on Japanese public opinion and foreign policy (and several related topics) until his early passing at the age of 57 in 1978. In the years that followed, no one took up Mendel’s research agenda until the first decade of this century when there was a revival of interest in Japanese public opinion. I also owe a big intellectual debt to Robert Y. Shapiro, a professor of political science at Columbia University and a leading expert on American public opinion. Bob generously agreed to sponsor a research project for me in the mid-1990s focusing on a comparison of public opinion in Japan and the United States while I was at Columbia. In the process he introduced me to the literature, theories, debates, and methods of American public opinion scholarship, and he has continued to offer valuable insights since then. The study I wrote then subsequently influenced many of the approaches I take in this book and formed the early basis for Chapters 5 and 6. I owe an exceptionally large debt of gratitude to Noguchi Kazuhiko, one of Japan’s best up-and-coming scholars of international politics, whom I first met in the late Sakanaka Tomohisa’s seminar on security studies at Aoyama Gakuin University in the early 1990s, for generously double-checking the transliterations of every Japanese word in this manuscript and offering valuable substantive comments along the way. I would like to thank Wada Shuichi, my oldest friend in Japan, for much of my early education on Japanese politics and more recently for organizing a revival of our G-13 benkyo¯kai in early summer 2007, where I presented several early chapters of this book, and for the insightful comments he gave me then. I also very much appreciate the comments my long-standing Columbia friend, Toya Minae, offered me at that meeting.

xvi

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I would like to thank Andrew Oros for the useful comments he offered during a panel at the 2004 meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), where I presented the earliest draft of this book’s main argument. I am indebted to Izumikawa Yasuhiro for valuable discussion and inspiration regarding the links between public opinion during the Cold War and some aspects of realism. I would like to thank Ola Listhaug, my senior colleague at the Norwegian University for Science and Technology (NTNU) for the support and encouragement he offered me for this project and for carrying out my responsibilities for running the NTNU Japan Program. I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their extremely valuable comments, which helped me greatly improve this book. I would like to thank Geoffrey R. H. Burn, Director and Editor of Security Studies; Jessica Walsh and Carolyn Brown of Stanford University Press for crucial assistance in making publication of this book possible; and Margaret Pinette for copyediting. I would like to thank Routledge Press for allowing me to use seven pages in Chapter 9 from a chapter I published in Marie Soderberg and Patricia A. Nelson, eds., Japan’s Politics and Economics: Perspectives on Change. Finally, I would like to thank countless others who helped me in various ways during this project. Of course, any errors contained in this book are solely my responsibility. Finally, I am forever indebted to my father, Dr. Thomas Arthur Midford, a 1961 Stanford PhD in physics, for instilling in me a respect and love of research and science, and for so much more. The only regret I have about this work is that it comes six years too late for my father to see. It is to his memory that I dedicate this book.

Abbreviations

ASDF Air Self-Defense Forces DPJ Democratic Party of Japan DSP Democratic Socialist Party GSDF Ground Self-Defense Forces JCG Japanese Coast Guard JCP Japanese Communist Party JDA Japanese Defense Agency JSDF Japanese Self-Defense Forces JSP Japanese Socialist Party LDP Liberal Democratic Party MSDF Maritime Self-Defense Forces NTV Nippon Television PKF Peacekeeping Forces PKO Peacekeeping Operations PMO Prime Minister’s Office ROEs Rules of Engagement SDF Self-Defense Forces UNPCC United Nations Peace Cooperation Corps WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

A note on Japanese Transliteration and Names

Regarding the transliteration of Japanese words and names, I have followed the Hepburn Romanization standard for transliterating Japanese words and use macrons for long vowels (that is, “o¯” for denoting “ou” and “u¯” for denoting “uu”). However, I have made exceptions when citing English-language sources that do not use macrons or spell out long vowels. Thus, when citing the Japanese press agency Kyo¯do¯ Tsu¯shin from a Japanese language source I use macrons, but when citing this press agency from an English source, such as the Japan Times, I follow the original rendering from that source (Kyodo Tsushin, or more commonly just Kyodo). I have generally written surname followed by given name for Japanese people, as per Japanese convention. However, I make an exception for Japanese (mostly scholars) who publish in English. Thus, I write Yasuhiro Izumikawa instead of Izumikawa Yasuhiro when discussing his works written under the former name. I also put the surname after the given name when citing Japanese books and articles in endnotes.

Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security

1

Introduction

Defense of Japan versus Overseas Force Projection While Japan has long demonstrated a commitment to militarily defending national territory, its refusal to “become a military power” that uses physical coercion overseas for foreign policy objectives has been a hallmark of Japan’s postwar military posture of defensive defense (or senshu bo¯ei).1 Indeed, Japan’s first formally announced postwar foreign policy doctrine, the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977, which became the primary pillar of its deep economic and political engagement with the rest of East Asia, is first and foremost a promise not to become a military power capable of projecting force overseas.2 However, Japan’s strong support for the George W. Bush administration’s “war on terrorism” and its willingness to support this war by deploying naval (and brief ly air) forces to the Indian Ocean and ground, air, and naval assets to Iraq and surrounding countries for several years has raised questions about whether Tokyo is abandoning its postwar defensive defense posture and becoming a “normal” great power, willing to use military force overseas for foreign policy objectives. Noting that “many Japan watchers—not only foreign, but also domestic— were taken aback at both the speed and the substance”3 of Japan’s reaction to the war on terrorism, Christopher Hughes suggests Japan’s “participation in the Afghan campaign and Iraqi reconstruction has set vital precedents for JSDF [ Japanese Self Defense Forces] dispatch” that could presage Japan being “drawn in radical new directions.”4 More boldly, other observers claim Tokyo has already crossed its security “Rubicon”5 or believe that Japan is emerging as the “Britain of Asia,” an ally willing to fight alongside U.S. forces just as Britain does.6 Richard Samuels argues that “the Japan of old is transforming itself into an increasingly muscular nation, one less hesitant to use force.”7 Still others suggest that Japanese public opinion is becoming increasingly nationalistic and that this is driving the country to play a more active military role overseas.8 Even before the war on terrorism, scholars were starting to note a shift toward realism in Japan.9 Michael Green argued as early as 2001 that Japan

2

introduction

is “reluctantly” embracing increased realism in its foreign policy. Daniel Kliman, writing after the start of the war on terrorism, suggests that Japan’s “creeping realism” is becoming a no-holds-barred realism that seemingly has more in common with American offensive realism than with the more restrained realism practiced in most other advanced industrial democracies: “In the mid to long term, scholars will no longer employ moderating adjectives to describe Japan’s national strategy.” American-based observers thus often imply that Japan’s new realism is slowly converging with American realism.10 However, these observers usually fail to note that American realism has been a moving target and that it became increasingly offensive if not revisionist in character, morphing under the George W. Bush administration into neoconservatism. Given that Japan has long demonstrated a commitment to defend national territory, claims about Japan emerging as a “normal nation” imply a shift toward exercising strategically offensive military power overseas. Overall, these claims about “becoming a normal power” have an open-ended quality to them. Little attempt is made to identify the limits of this new realism.

Does Public Opinion Have a Role? The claim that democratic Japan is undergoing a fundamental shift in its grand strategy as the country emerges as a “normal” military power willing to deploy military force overseas raises the question of whether public opinion is causing this shift or preventing it, or whether public opinion even matters in Japanese policy making. More fundamentally, is Japanese public opinion coherent, stable, and inf luential? Is it an independent variable in the policy-making process or a dependent variable ref lecting elite manufactured policy? If Japanese public opinion is coherent, stable, and inf luential, what are its attitude structures, and how are these ref lected in Japan’s foreign policy? Finally, have the answers to these questions changed over time, or have the nature and role of public opinion been stable in postwar democratic Japan? Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security argues that behind Japan’s postwar defensive defense posture lay the reality of a democratic Japan where this posture was backed by public opinion, the opinion of a public who were often distrustful of the state’s ability to control or wisely wield the sword. As I argue in later chapters, Japanese public opinion was never pacifist or as opposed to all forms of military power as has often been claimed. Consequently, its recent evolution does not live up to the radical transformation many analysts see.



introduction

3

Many observers hail recent changes in Japanese security policy as marking the emergence of a more muscular and reliable ally,11 while others see this as a dreaded counterrevolution, heralding a return to 1930s-style aggressive militarism.12 Behind both views lay, in various guises, an elitist perspective of public opinion in Japan as unstable, moody, incoherent, or self-indulgently idealistic, moldable by self-interested elites, or, at best, irrelevant. This view stems in part from traditional ideas about the relationship between elites and the masses, ideas captured in the Meiji-era slogan of kanson minpi, or “revere the bureaucrats, despise the people.” Even in contemporary Japan, policy elites sometimes dismiss the idea that politicians should listen to public opinion as “mobocracy,” or shugu¯seiji.13 In part this view emerges from an elitist school in the American study of public opinion, the so-called Almond Lippmann consensus, which is discussed in Chapter 2 and tested in the rest of the book. In part, it ref lects a self-indulgent smugness, or pervasive insecurity, among policy elites, regardless of nationality, including us academics, about the necessity of elite leadership for guiding mass opinion. One of the main findings of this book is that this elitist view of Japanese foreign policy is largely wrong. Japanese public opinion toward security is stable and coherent and evolves in intelligible and generally rational ways.

Why Japanese Public Opinion Matters This study finds that Japanese public opinion matters. Regarding the main focus of this book, the public remains overwhelmingly opposed to deploying the Japanese military overseas for combat operations. The ambivalent and conditional support that Japanese public opinion gave to deployments to the Indian Ocean and Iraq ref lects not a change in public opinion but rather the extremely modest and noncombat nature of these deployments. Rather than hawkish elites molding public opinion, public opinion has molded and constrained the overseas deployment plans of hawkish elites. Although much recent research has pointed to pacifist norms and antimilitarist political culture as a major constraint and inf luence on policy,14 very little has been published in English regarding Japanese public opinion as an independent variable affecting security policy since the 1970s.15 Given the tendency to dismiss public opinion already discussed, the omission of public opinion from studies of Japanese foreign policy is not surprising. Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security intends to fill this void. Although this book is primarily about how public opinion inf luences foreign policy in Japan, it also contributes to the nascent field of comparative

4

introduction

public opinion. As Ole Holsti observes, there is an unfulfilled need to place research about U.S. public opinion in “a broader comparative context.” This is especially important in terms of the “opinion-policy linkage,” which is “by far the least well developed of the areas of public opinion research.”16 In many ways this volume parallels Richard Sobel’s 2001 study examining how U.S. public opinion constrains U.S. overseas intervention, thereby helping to elucidate the impact of public opinion in democratic decision making regarding the projection of military force overseas. In one respect this book goes beyond that study by heeding Sobel’s call for future case studies “focusing on important distinctions: the types of involvement, from humanitarian relief to military conf lict.”17 The sharp and enduring distinction the Japanese public draws between humanitarian and reconstruction missions on the one hand and combat missions on the other is one of the central findings of this book. This study also has broader significance for a second reason: International public opinion regarding the war on terrorism, the use of military force, and attitudes toward the United States has been grabbing headlines and generating large multinational comparative opinion surveys, such as the Pew Center for the People and the Press polls and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs polls, the results of which often make headline news in the United States and elsewhere.18 The burning question for American policy makers and the public at large after 9/11 has been, “Why do they hate us?” Anomalously, Japan has often been omitted from these surveys, and this book aims to bring Japan back into the debate. Although there is very little “hatred” of the United States in Japan, Japanese public opinion has often reacted in highly negative ways to the war on terrorism. Thus, in addition to shedding light on how public opinion affects Japan’s security strategy, this book also offers insights into how Japanese public opinion toward the United States and its war on terrorism diverges or converges with that found elsewhere. Japan is important for understanding global public opinion because of its distinctive mix of generally favorable views of the United States combined with strong opposition to the war in Iraq and skepticism about the use of military power to prosecute the war on terrorism or, more generally, as a foreign policy instrument. Japanese public opinion also matters in this larger context because Japan is the world’s third largest economy, a leading industrial and mature democracy, one of the world’s oldest non-Western democracies, and a leading East Asian democracy. Finally, this book is also relevant for the debate in Washington about what the United States can expect from Japan as an ally. As noted above, many



introduction

5

observers see Japan emerging as a “normal” military power that will play a more significant role as a supporter of U.S. military operations throughout the world, if not as the “Britain of Asia.” This view assumes that a decline in so-called Japanese pacifism has corresponded to a rise in the ability of hawkish elites to inf luence public opinion and more generally have their way in policy making. This perspective has inf luenced Washington policy elites to place greater military demands on Japan. During a visit in early 2007, then Vice President Dick Cheney called on Japan to “play a greater role in Iraq and Afghanistan to support the US-led war on terrorism.” This call came after the withdrawal of the GSDF (Ground Self-Defense Forces) from Samawah the previous summer following a two-year-plus deployment and on top of a then-continuing three-year-plus ASDF (Air Self-Defense Forces) transport mission between Kuwait and Iraq (this mission ended in early 2009) and a then-ongoing multiyear MSDF (Maritime Self-Defense Forces) rear-area logistical support deployment in the Indian Ocean.19 Similarly, a “new Armitage report,” issued in 2007, echoed the famous 2000 Armitage report call for Japan to emerge as the “Britain of Asia” by suggesting that Japan now seeks to play a global military role. Specifically, the 2007 report “encourages Washington to support Tokyo as a growing global power.”20 Given this perspective, it is not surprising that many in Washington were blindsided by developments in 2007, when Japan, inexplicably from their view, stopped marching toward “normal nation” status and started pulling back from its overseas military support for the United States. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo¯ led the ruling LDP (Liberal Democratic Party)–Ko¯mei ruling coalition to disastrous defeat in the July 2007 upper house election by making this election a referendum on constitutional reform, especially the warrenouncing Article 9, and on promoting a greater overseas military role.21 After the LDP-led coalition lost control of the upper house as a result of this massive defeat, Abe resigned, and his successor Fukuda Yasuo abandoned Abe’s ambitions for a larger international military role and struggled to overcome domestic opposition to maintaining even a reduced level of noncombat support for the U.S. war on terrorism. In turn, Fukuda’s successor, Aso¯ Taro¯, although a hawk like Abe, continued Fukuda’s policy of avoiding constitutional reform and deployments to conf lict zones like Afghanistan. Observers in Washington were blindsided by these developments because they underestimated the inf luence of Japanese mass opinion and misunderstood the recent evolution in public attitudes that underlies this opinion.

6

introduction

Organization Following this introduction to the theme of this book, the remainder of this volume is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 2 presents two competing theories of public opinion and its inf luence on policy, elitism, and pluralism, and it shows how these two theories are tested in this book. The rest of the chapter outlines Japanese public attitudes toward security; introduces a model of elite inf luence on public attitudes based on demonstration effects; outlines several hypotheses about the conditions under which measurable public opinion is likely to inf luence, or not inf luence, policy; and explains the methodology used in this book. Chapter 3 presents survey data measuring Japanese mass attitudes about the utility of military force in the abstract and in a number of real-world contexts, results that are consistent with the attitudinal defensive realism outlined in Chapter 2. This chapter also examines Japanese public perceptions of the U.S. ally, as refracted through the public’s underlying security attitudes. Two aspects of public opinion toward the United States are identified as key, fear of entrapment in U.S. wars and trust or mistrust of the United States. Chapter 4 reevaluates the extent to which Japanese public opinion was pacifist during the Cold War versus the extent to which mistrust of the state combined with fear of entrapment in American wars conspired to limit support for the SDF (Self-Defense Forces) and the U.S. alliance. It also shows how the gradual dissipation of mistrust of the state and the end of the Vietnam War caused the public to become more supportive of the U.S. alliance and more accepting of the SDF as a valued disaster-relief organization with additional value for territorial defense. This chapter also shows the inf luence public opinion had in limiting elite attempts to dispatch the SDF overseas or expand defense spending. Chapter 5 provides a case study of the first Gulf War in 1990–1991 that tests the inf luence of public opinion on elite plans to dispatch the SDF overseas for a combat-related mission and finds that public opinion played a decisive role in quashing the planned dispatch. Chapter 6 includes a case study, examining the inf luence of public opinion in shaping the nature and limits of new legislation allowing SDF units to be dispatched overseas for the first time to participate in U.N. peacekeeping. The rest of this chapter considers how public opinion reacted to and inf luenced actual overseas deployments, its response to and inf luence on the 1997 U.S.–Japan Revised Defense Guidelines and the related 1999 Surrounding Areas Emergency



introduction

7

Measures Law, and how the public was inf luenced by North Korea’s test launch of a Taepodong missile over northern Japan in August 1998. Case studies in Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrate the constraints that public opinion set on SDF overseas dispatches to support U.S. combat missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, constraints that proved more robust and limiting than most observers anticipated. Chapter 9 considers whether an Iraq syndrome emerged in Japanese public opinion after the withdrawal of Japanese ground forces from Iraq in July 2006 and the implications for Japan’s international security role. The concluding chapter reviews the longer-term patterns of stability and evolution in Japanese public opinion toward security and spells out the implications for Japan’s evolving security strategy, its alliance with the United States, and the study of public opinion and its impact on the foreign policies of advanced democracies.

Conclusions Does Japanese public opinion matter? Does Japanese opinion tell us something about global public opinion or at least opinion in other advanced industrial democracies? Does Japanese mass opinion matter for Japanese policy? Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security argues that Japanese public opinion matters in the context of comparative global opinion as a major advanced industrial democracy, as the oldest East Asian democracy, and as one of the oldest non-Western democracies. The primary goal of this book is to demonstrate that Japanese public opinion matters because it has a significant inf luence on Japanese foreign and security policies. Japanese public opinion is inf luential because it is stable, coherent, and, regarding beliefs about the utility of military force, not easily or quickly swayed by elite attempts to inf luence it. Japanese public opinion matters because, despite the image of Japan as a “one-party democracy,” competition has been the reality of postwar Japanese democracy.22 Of course, as the degree of political competition waxes and wanes over time, so will the inf luence of public opinion. Nonetheless, even in the late 1950s, when LDP dominance was at its height, its attempts to pursue a more activist military role overseas were stif led by public opinion. As will be demonstrated in the case study chapters dealing with the Gulf War, overseas deployments within the context of U.N. peacekeeping, and the Afghan and Iraq wars, Japanese public opinion again thwarted the ambitious plans of LDP leaders, this time the plans of hawkish leaders such as Koizumi Jun’ichiro¯ and Abe to have Japan begin playing a military role in international politics.

8

introduction

Public opposition to Koizumi’s and Abe’s hawkish foreign policy agendas in turn played a crucial role in weakening the LDP’s five-decades-long rule and in providing the opposition DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) with the political momentum they needed to oust the LDP-led coalition from power in Japan’s historic August 2009 lower house election.23 The results of this historic election reinforced the lesson, if any reinforcement was needed, that Japanese politicians defy public opinion at their peril.

2

Public Attitudes, Opinion, and the Conditions for Policy Influence Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security tests the hypothesis that public attitudes toward security largely explain measurable public opinion on security issues and significantly inf luence policy in Japan. The main competing hypothesis claims that public attitudes toward security largely result from ruling-elite molding. Thus, ruling-elite molding is the independent variable in this competing hypothesis. A secondary competing elitist hypothesis tested in this book is that public attitudes are so unstable as to be incoherent and uninf luential if not nonexistent. This chapter develops the theoretical argument of this book in three ways. First, it reviews the existing debates regarding the nature and inf luence of public opinion in the United States between elite and pluralist schools and considers the parallel but still underdeveloped debate in Japan. Second, it outlines public attitudes toward security and presents a theory of long-term elite inf luence on these attitudes through demonstration effects. Finally, this chapter identifies the conditions under which public opinion matters most, and matters least, in Japan.

The Elitist versus Pluralist Debate As a leading and mature democracy, Japan is important for shedding light on the role of public opinion versus elites in policy making throughout the democratic world, with potential significance for the United States and elsewhere. Indeed, Japan is important because, as Ole Holsti notes, there is a real paucity of comparative case studies outside the United States.1 The debate between what will be called here elitists versus pluralists is the most important for understanding the role of public opinion in democratic states. The U.S.-Centered Debate American advocates of the elitist school argue that public opinion is often unstable, uninformed, moody, and even incoherent.2 Public opinion, according to the famous findings of Philip E. Converse, is composed of “nonattitudes.”3 Public opinion is, in short, a factor that, if allowed to be inf luential,

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threatens the rational, consistent, and coherent foreign policy of any democracy. In 1958 then Vice President Richard Nixon well summarized the elitist view when he wrote, “If we indulge in the kind of thinking which assumes that foreign policy decisions should be made on the basis of public opinion polls we might as well decide now to surrender our position of world leadership to the communists.”4 Fifty years later then Vice President Dick Cheney reiterated this perspective. Responding to poll results showing that two-thirds of Americans thought the Iraq War had not been worth the cost, Cheney said “So? . . . I think you cannot be blown off course by f luctuations in public opinion polls.”5 If public opinion is moody, unstable, and often incoherent, the silver lining for elitists is that public opinion is also malleable and subject to manipulation to the point that it usually does not threaten to become inf luential.6 Like Nixon and Cheney, elitists embrace the “guardian model” of representation, seeing public opinion as something leaders can afford to and ought to ignore in the best interests of the nation.7 Pluralists, on the other hand, view collective public opinion as stable and based on rational and coherent attitudes that respond in intelligible and often predictable ways to new information.8 “The Rational Public,” according to Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, is a collective phenomenon of large numbers possessing certain “emergent properties” that give it something approaching “wisdom.”9 In other words, public opinion in this view is more than the sum of its parts. In reacting to policies or events, individuals sometimes make random errors. However, at the level of collective opinion, these random errors usually cancel each other out, causing collective opinions to have greater coherence and stability, if not wisdom, than that generally found at the individual level. The only threat pluralists see to the rational public comes when elites have the ability to manipulate the information the public receives. In a democracy with a competitive marketplace of ideas manipulation of information should be difficult and rare.10 Other recent pluralist research casts doubt on elite opinion and has discovered cases where elite opinion is led by the mass public rather than the other way round.11 Elite opinions can be undermined by exposure to faulty information, leading to opinions that are less informed than if they had not had such exposure, and elites are often more subject to faulty information exposure. For example, elites are more likely to be exposed to closed-door briefings where information that has not been vetted in the public marketplace of ideas is presented as having privileged credibility, credibility that, ironically, is tied precisely to the fact that it has not been made public.12 Ironically, those members of the mass public who have the least information



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11

are the least susceptible to manipulation because they respond to their relative lack of information by constructing opinions that are consistent with their basic attitudes.13 For all these reasons pluralists assert that public opinion can inf luence policy.14 Pluralists embrace V. O. Key’s “dikes” model, whereby the public sets limits, channeling policy, like water, in certain directions and away from others.15 Public opinion is most likely to matter regarding high-salience issues such as overseas deployments of the military or new weapons systems but less so for low-salience issues such as a new multilateral initiative. Although pluralists have generally argued that the public constrains, but does not make, policy, recent research suggests that the inf luence of public opinion is growing and can now set policy at times.16 Politicians who act in accordance with pluralist theory are likely to embrace a “delegates” model of representation whereby public support is both desirable and necessary for policy success.17 The Japanese Debate Not surprisingly, this contest between elitists and pluralists has been played out not only in the United States, but in Japan as well.18 Miyatake Michiko traces the concept of public opinion in Japan back as far as 1415, but she observes that the term public opinion came into common use in the political sense only at the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate and early years of the Meiji Restoration from the late 1860s. There were variations, however, in how the term was used. One view saw public opinion as providing justification for political decisions, while another viewed public opinion merely as the summation of feelings at the time in a community (popular sentiments, talk of the town). Those adhering to the former perspective tended to use kanji (Chinese characters) that implied the elitist view and read them as “yoron,” while the latter, pluralist view used slightly different kanji with the reading “seiron” or “seron.” In the postwar reforms of Japanese language and kanji usage, the two sets of kanji have been dropped in favor of one. Today, “yoron” is the most common reading of the wording, but “seron” is also heard. In either case, usually the difference in reading is done without an awareness of the original distinct meanings associated with each reading.19 Regardless of the term used, in Japan the elitist view has tended to predominate. To take a recent example, Tomohito Shinoda argues that the Japanese media is remolding Japanese public opinion to be more “realistic.”20 Similarly, the elitist “nonattitudes” hypothesis was expressed by a midlevel diplomat interviewed by the author when he claimed that “foreign policy issues simply do not register” with the Japanese public.21 The elitist

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perspective has also predominated in Western studies of Japanese politics.22 However, the elitist view has not gone unchallenged by scholars with a pluralist perspective.23 This book’s focus on Japanese public opinion toward security offers a good opportunity to test the competing predictions of the elitists and the pluralists, even though the elitists can be said to have the “home-court advantage,” as the predominant paradigm. This means if pluralist predictions about public opinion, namely that it is stable, coherent, and inf luential in the medium to long term, if not always in the short term, are confirmed by this study, then the pluralist perspective will emerge with greatly enhanced credibility, and the elitist perspective will emerge with greatly reduced credibility.24 In this sense, the findings of this volume have significance for other advanced democracies beyond Japan. In the contemporary context of Japanese politics, this debate takes on additional significance. The tenure of one of Japan’s most inf luential prime ministers in the postwar era, Koizumi Jun’ichiro¯, 2001–2006, raises new questions about the relationship between public opinion and elites. An exceptionally stubborn and skilled politician, Koizumi claimed to lead rather than to follow public opinion, demonstrating a guardian view of representation. Public opinion, in his view, would inevitably endorse his policies. “People who were once against the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and UN peace-keeping operations are now in favor of them. The deployment to Iraq will be just the same.”25 Later, Koizumi advised his successor, Abe Shinzo¯, “Don’t worry about the [cabinet] support rate. . . . It is important to have insensitivity.”26 Yet, as demonstated in Chapter 8, even Koizumi had to adjust his policies in the face of public opposition.

Stability and Change in Public Attitudes Japanese public attitudes toward security have two primary dimensions: trust in the state’s ability to control and wisely wield the military and attitudes about the utility of military power.27 The public’s attitude toward the state’s ability to control and wisely wield the sword can take two fundamental values: trust or mistrust of the state. However, this is really a continuous variable with various possible intermediate values. The public’s attitude about the utility of military force can take three fundamental values: Military force has no utility, has utility only for homeland defense, or also has utility for pursuing policy objectives abroad. The hypothesized role of public attitudes in producing measurable public opinion and policy outcomes is depicted in Figure 2.1. With public attitudes



public attitudes and policy influence

Elites

Real-world developments

Public attitudes toward security

Trust of the state’s control of military

Utility of military force

Policy opinions

Survey wording

13

Perceptions of the US

Measurable opinion

Policy outcomes

figure 2.1 Public attitudes, measurable opinion, and policy outcomes.

toward security as the independent variable, measurable public opinion becomes the dependent variable. Perceptions of the United States, Japan’s only ally, specifically about America’s behavior and trustworthiness, are an important intermediate variable that inf luences the way in which public attitudes toward security translate into policy preferences. In turn, public attitudes toward security inf luence the way in which the public perceives the United States and its actions. It is important to distinguish between policy opinions and measurable opinion because many policy opinions (for example, regarding whether Japan should use military force to promote democracy) exist without ever being measured in an opinion poll. Similarly, measurable opinion is inf luenced by the instrument used to measure it. Most significantly, question wording and the number of choices offered respondents will inf luence the results, results that may more or less ref lect actual policy opinions. When considering the public’s inf luence on policy, measurable opinion becomes the crucial intermediate variable between public attitudes and policy outcomes. As discussed in the following paragraphs, elites attempt to inf luence policy outcomes directly as well as indirectly by inf luencing the public’s attitudes via demonstration effects and other means. At the same time, measurable opinion also inf luences elites directly. As outlined subsequently, stable opinion majorities opposing a particular policy are especially inf luential as they potentially threaten elites with loss of power at election time.

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Attitudes during the Cold War Although it has been common to use the term pacifism to describe the Japanese public’s attitudes about foreign policy, at the core, Japanese attitudes about the military originate from what Thomas Berger identifies as a “culture of anti-militarism,” rather than from pacifism per se.28 Nonetheless, this book conceptualizes antimilitarism not as a political culture but rather as cognitive mistrust of the state and the military. Because of the widespread belief that the military hijacked the state and led Japan into a devastating and even irrational war, distrust of the military and the state’s ability to control it has been deep seated. Consequently, the mainstream of Japanese public opinion ranged from opposing any military role for the SDF, to favoring as constrained a military role as possible; very few favored a significant expansion of the SDF’s military role. Support for incremental increases in security roles and missions developed slowly. For many, support for SDF’s continued existence was predicated on the assumption that its primary role would be nonmilitary domestic disaster relief. Because distrust of the state and the military was high and perceptions of external threat were low, national defense was seen as a mission of secondary importance. Beyond this core of distrust of the military and the state grew three broader antimilitarist and seemingly pacifist-like attitudes.29 These broader attitudes inform the second primary dimension of public beliefs toward security: beliefs about the utility of military force. First, because of the experience of the Imperial Japanese Army fighting a war of expansion in the name of national defense, offensive and defensive wars were considered hard to distinguish, and military force was considered essentially lacking in utility.30 Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapter 4, even at the height of antimilitarist distrust there was substantial public support for territorial defense. Second, a lightly armed Japan that was not tightly allied with the United States was seen as the best way to ensure Japan’s national security.31 A lightly armed Japan was believed the best way to discourage others from targeting or attacking the nation. This attitude meant that the more Japan armed itself or involved itself with supporting U.S. military power, the more likely it was to provoke military responses from others. Finally, dispatching the SDF overseas for any purpose was believed to endanger civilian control and likely to provoke other nations, especially those in East Asia with memories of Japan’s invasion and occupation.



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One important caveat to this argument is that despite the strength of antimilitarist distrust many of the public’s security attitudes were not necessarily inconsistent with some forms of realism, especially defensive realism. One set of attitudes often identified as antimilitarist or pacifist can be related to realist logic about entrapment by allies in wars that are not in one’s interest:32 The public has feared entrapment in U.S. wars that are not in Japan’s interest.33 The rise and fall of this fear over time has alternatively discouraged or encouraged development of Japan’s military capabilities and overseas SDF deployments. The attitude that a lightly armed Japan that avoided bellicose or aggressive behavior would avoid provoking others to see Tokyo as a threat is consistent with a security dilemma logic34 and the tendency of states to balance against those viewed as harboring aggressive intentions.35 Given the historical legacy of Japan’s invasion and occupation of much of Asia up to 1945, a large segment of the public believed that full rearmament risked provoking other Asian states to counterbalance Japan, economically as well as militarily.36 Nonetheless, the solution proposed by many Japanese antimilitarists, namely lightly armed neutrality,37 went beyond what any form of realism, including defensive realism, would support. This ref lected the belief that the primary threat to national security comes from provoking others through overarmament or aggressive behavior and that military weakness will not provoke others to exploit the state. Nonetheless, such beliefs are digressions from realism rather than indicative of pacifism per se because these attitudes did not include the core pacifist belief that war could be abolished and that Japan therefore did not need, or should not have, a military.38 After the Cold War While antimilitarist distrust of the state never achieved unchallenged dominance, this attitude exerted great inf luence during the Cold War and even the post–Cold War decade of the 1990s and up to the present. Nonetheless, over time, elite efforts to reassure the public about civilian control of the military (discussed in the following pages) produced changes in public attitudes toward security. The Japanese public has gradually come to have more trust in the state’s ability to control and wisely employ the SDF. Moreover, since the late 1990s lingering mistrust of civilian control has encountered the counterweight of increased threat perceptions of North Korea and, to a lesser extent, China. In particular, as discussed in Chapter 6, the August 1998 North Korean missile test over northern Japan created the

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perception, long absent, in the eyes of many Japanese that Japan might be targeted by others. Revelations about North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens from coastal regions of Japan also contributed to the perception that a failure to guard national territory or deter threats can lead to others targeting the state and its citizens. This has caused a large segment of public opinion to perceive the value military power for deterrence and defense, in addition to seeing the danger of provoking others by being overly aggressive. Consequently, the ebbing of antimilitarist distrust has revealed the public attitude that military force has utility for territorial defense but essentially nothing else. In other words, military power is seen as having utility for defending against the North Korean threat or a potential China threat but not for promoting democratization or human rights in other countries (even in North Korea), or for suppressing terrorism or proliferation of WMDs (weapons of mass destruction). What Michael Green labels as Japan’s “Reluctant Realism”39 consists of several beliefs that reveal the gradual emergence of defensive realist attitudes as antimilitarist distrust has receded. First, wars can be distinguished according to whether they are for the sake of territorial defense against an actual or imminent threat versus strategically offensive wars for broader and more ambitious objectives; the former are judged to be justified, the latter are not. As discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, Japanese opinion reacted differently to the invasion of Afghanistan, which was seen by many as an inevitable act of self-defense by the United States, than it did to the invasion of Iraq.40 Second, war is an ever-present possibility, and therefore Japan must prepare by maintaining a military.41 According to the well-known political commentator Funabashi Yo¯ichi, “A form of realism is spreading, especially among the young, that because there is danger and instability in the world, for the sake of maintaining peace and stability it is necessary to maintain deterrent power, and therefore military power is essential.”42 As discussed in Chapter 6, by voting to enact a legal framework for dealing with a generic foreign attack in 2003, the approximately 80 percent of Diet members that so voted thereby signaled acceptance of this essential tenet of realism. This vote was backed by a large and stable mass opinion majority. Third, if Japanese public opinion can be characterized as realist, it can also be characterized as defensive realist because it is skeptical about the utility of strategically offensive military power. Holding beliefs that correspond to a “defense-dominant” view of military force, a widening and decisive swath of the Japanese public believes military power has value, but only for territorial defense. As demonstrated in subsequent chapters, Japanese public



public attitudes and policy influence

17

opinion is skeptical about the utility of military force for fighting terrorism, countering WMD proliferation, or promoting democracy.43 Finally, coexisting with this belief is high and stable support for the dispatch of the SDF overseas for humanitarian and reconstruction projects. This ref lects support for the “internationalization” of what many Japanese have regarded the SDF as being: a disaster relief organization. Ironically, support for SDF overseas dispatches ref lects the belief that nonmilitary solutions have the highest utility for conf lict resolution and tamping down terrorism. This belief in the stabilizing value of noncombat humanitarian and reconstruction missions ref lects a persistent element of developmentalist or liberal optimism in Japanese security attitudes. Although Japanese have increasingly come to view military power as having utility for national defense, they generally continue to see material advancement as more important for promoting international peace and stability, at least in the long run. Liberal views regarding the use of force overlap with those of realists in complex ways and therefore are not compared or tested in this volume. Just as we can distinguish between offensive and defensive realists, we can distinguish between interventionist and noninterventionist liberals (or offensive and defensive liberals). Interventionist liberals support using military power to promote democracy and human rights and often end up advocating policies that overlap with offensive realism. Noninterventionist liberals, on the other hand, oppose using military power to promote democracy or human rights overseas but see military power as necessary for national defense. However, noninterventionist liberals also see material advancement and democratization gradually reducing the need for military power to guard national security, a long-term optimism that sets them apart from defensive realists.44 This book argues that Japanese public opinion in the aggregate is increasingly approximating defensive realist attitudes about the utility of military power combined with persistent long-run liberal or developmentalist optimism that economic development can minimize, although not eliminate, conf lict and instability. Deteriorating relations with an economically rising China has, however, tempered this optimism with regard to that country.45 Nonetheless, this new pessimism toward China has not yet infected views about the stabilizing effects of economic advancement overall, especially toward underdeveloped regions. A Demonstration Effects Model of Elite Influence Although this book finds that public attitudes have an important and independent inf luence on Japanese policy, this does not mean that elites have no

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inf luence on public attitudes regarding foreign policy. Elite inf luence over mass opinion, when it occurs, is gradual and not uniform across issue areas. For example, elite attempts to inf luence the public have been relatively effective at promoting the gradual erosion of antimilitarist mistrust of the state and military. Using empirically iterated demonstration effects, the state and elites have gradually demonstrated to the public a capacity to successfully control and manage a greater and greater range of military activities without experiencing a reversion to 1930s militarism, when civilian control and nascent democracy broke down, and the military committed the nation to an unwinnable and disastrous war. This reassurance strategy, which is the domestic analogue of the reassurance strategy aimed at neighboring Asian nations, has thus entailed a gradual step-by-step expansion of Japan’s military and its missions over the course of more than fifty years.46 For a reassurance strategy to be successful, it must have three characteristics. First it must send costly signals that involve real cost or risk. Second, these costly signals must benefit the perceiver, either materially or by affirming his or her values. Finally, these signals should be iterated many times over a prolonged period.47 Peter Woolley’s study of the gradual expansion in the roles and missions of the MSDF offers an excellent description of how this demonstration effect–based reassurance strategy works. A plan for expanded naval operations is proposed, and this generates domestic controversy, but eventually the mission is accepted and slips into obscurity as the MSDF incrementally grows into its new beneficial mission with professionalism and without incident.48 In this way, the Japanese state reassures domestic public opinion and Asian nations that the MSDF (and other branches of the SDF) can assume greater security roles without triggering a return to 1930s-style militarism. The development of the GSDF as a de facto domestic disaster relief organization that then went international in the 1990s is another example of reassuring the public through iterated costly and risky, but beneficial, acts over a prolonged period. Woolley concludes that “public opinion was just as likely to have ref lected the development of missions by the JSDF as it was to have limited the JSDF.”49 In this view, the impact of public opinion, if any, is to slow policy change. In sum, the public’s distrust of the state’s ability to control and wisely use the military has proven to be a soft and somewhat malleable attitude, one that has slowed down security policy change but has not stopped it. Nonetheless, in areas where elite molding runs into robust public attitudes, it is largely ineffective. As discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, elite attempts



public attitudes and policy influence

19

to build support for the Japanese military engaging in overseas combat operations during the Koizumi and Abe administrations ended in failure, as had earlier attempts, discussed in Chapter 5, to build public support for dispatching the SDF to Saudi Arabia before the first Gulf War. Support for constitutional revision collapsed in 2007 and 2008 once it became linked to SDF participation in overseas combat. Thus, elite attempts to inf luence public attitudes regarding the use of force, especially to view strategically offensive military power as having utility for promoting the national interest, have failed. The differing results between these two attempts at inf luence ref lect the varying robustness of these two attitudes—antimilitarist mistrust is relatively malleable whereas attitudes regarding the utility of military force are more robust. This difference also ref lects the availability of opportunities for inf luence. Elites have been unable to demonstrate the utility of strategically offensive military power, thereby failing to challenge the public’s skepticism.

Academic Realism versus Attitudinal Realism in Japanese Public Opinion Defensive and offensive realism are schools of thought within academic realism and have never been applied to the study of attitude structures in mass opinion. Nonetheless, this book argues that the descriptors of defensive and offensive realism provide significant descriptive inference regarding the Japanese public’s attitudes toward the use of force. Aggregate public attitudes toward security are realist in the sense that they recognize war as an ever-present danger that necessitates Japan maintaining a military. They are defensive realist because they combine this realism with a defense-dominant view of international security and the effectiveness of military force. Military power is perceived to have utility for defending national territory, but not when used offensively to promote political goals abroad. The differences between academic defensive and offensive realism stem in large part from differing views regarding the balance of offensive versus defensive military technology, but also from differing views about other variables related to the efficacy of offensive versus defensive military action, such as the presence or absence of first-move advantages, the ease of conquest, and the cumulativity of resources (that is, the degree to which conquest pays).50 Defensive realists contend that military technology and these related variables generally favor the defense and consequently assert that the state should generally pursue a defensive military doctrine. By contrast, John

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Mearsheimer, the acknowledged dean of offensive realism, summarizes the view of this school by claiming “the international system creates powerful incentives for aggression.”51 Underlying this view is the belief that the balance of military technology and related factors often favor the offense. Although this book distinguishes between the Japanese public’s defensive realist attitudes and academic defensive realism, it is also important to note the similarities between the two. Defensive realist attitudes in Japanese public opinion resemble academic defensive realism in that the latter asserts that defensive military postures are usually optimal for achieving security while strategically offensive military operations will often fail. By contrast, academic offensive realism holds that strategically offensive military action often contributes to security. As Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 show, some Japanese elites have offensive realist attitudes regarding the utility of strategically offensive military action. Although academic defensive and offensive realism specify distinct variables such as military technology, first move advantages, ease of conquest, and cumulatively of resources, for the purposes of analyzing mass attitudes toward security, attitudinal defensive realism subsumes these variables into the more general concept of utility.52 I therefore define attitudinal defensive realism as the belief that the utility of military power is limited to defense of national territory in the face of imminent threats.53 By contrast, I define attitudinal offensive realism as the belief that strategically offensive military power has utility for pursuing a wide range of state interests beyond defense of national territory.54 These can include traditional security objectives such as suppressing hostile states, terrorist networks, or weapons of mass destruction proliferation or so-called offensive liberal or neoconservative objectives such as promoting the spread of democracy.55 The common denominator is that offensive military action is seen as having utility for advancing national interest,56 however that might be justified.57

When Is Public Opinion Inf luential—or Not? Public attitudes determine public opinion. But when and how does measurable public opinion affect policy outcomes, and when does measurable opinion not matter? The following eight hypotheses identify conditions under which public opinion will inf luence policy outcomes in democracies generally and in the Japanese democratic context in particular: the presence of large and stable public opinion majorities, the presence of political competition, united opposition in the legislature when the next election is near,



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recent examples of retrospective voting by the public, divisions in the ruling side, concerns about whether supporting an unpopular measure will harm other policy priorities, when a new policy is proposed or an old one has perceptible costs, and when consensus norms are present. 1. When Large and Stable Opinion Majorities Exist When opinion majorities are well over 50 percent, persist and are not much affected by changes in survey question wording, these majorities will have the greatest impact on policy. Opinion pluralities, or those that are changeable in the face of new question wording or short-term developments, will not have much impact on policy. Large and stable opinion majorities will inf luence policy in several ways: by emboldening and mobilizing politicians supported by such majorities while restraining, immobilizing, or demoralizing politicians opposed by stable opinion majorities. These dynamics operate at the interparty level; but, just as often in Japan, they have also operated at the intraparty level, especially within the faction-ridden LDP. Although factions have noticeably weakened since the introduction of a new single-seat plurality district system for selecting 300 (out of 480) seats in the lower house in 1996, factions and other intraparty actors still wield significant inf luence (see the discussion under political competition in the following section). Both interand intraparty policy opponents become more inf luential as a stable opinion majority forms against a proposal. 2. When There Is Political Competition Many observers view Japan as a nation with a seemingly oxymoronic “oneparty dominant democracy,” a “pseudo-democracy” where the LDP has ruled almost continuously since 1955.58 According to this view, there is little political competition in Japan. Yet, the reality of LDP dominance is frequently exaggerated. LDP rule has been precarious, often based upon extremely narrow majorities, as was the case in the 1970s.59 Moreover, since 1989, the LDP has not controlled the upper house of the National Diet, effectively preventing the party from passing normal legislation on its own.60 This reality, reinforced by a decline in the LDP’s core voter base, its inability to obtain a one-party majority in most recent lower house elections (2005 being a notable exception), and its increasing reliance on support from its coalition partner, Ko¯mei, beginning in the late 1990s, for electing LDP candidates, suggests a much more competitive political environment than the

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image of a “one-party dominant democracy” would suggest, one in which the LDP constantly struggles to hang onto power. Under such conditions, it cannot easily ignore stable opinion majorities. More importantly, the label of one-party dominance masks the crucial role played by political competition within the LDP, competition that has important policy implications. Through most of its history the LDP has been more a collection of competing factions than a coherent political party. Indeed, J. A. A. Stockwin has referred to traditional LDP factions as “parties within a party.”61 Although factions have not normally held consistent policy positions, policy positions have at times inf luenced competition among them. More importantly, the tendency for factions to polarize around so-called mainstream (shuryu¯ha) and “anti-mainstream” (hanshuryu¯ha) groupings has often involved differences over policy. Indeed, the alternation of these two groups in power has sometimes had effects on policy comparable to those stemming from a change of party. To take a recent example, the shift of mainstream and antimainstream sides between the premiership of Obuchi Keizo¯ and that of Koizumi (via the transitional figure of Mori Yoshiro¯) had far-ranging effects on domestic and foreign policies. Through internal competition and occasional alternations of power between mainstream and anti-mainstream groups, the LDP was simultaneously able to play the roles of both ruling and opposition parties. Indeed, until the mid-1990s, Japan’s multiseat constituency system, by encouraging rival LDP factions to run candidates against each other in the same districts, often gave voters the opportunity to vote against the mainstream factions controlling the government while still voting for the LDP (that is, by voting for antimainstream LDP candidates). The new electoral system, under which only a single LDP candidate runs in each lower-house election district, has eroded the LDP’s ability to play opposition as well as ruling side, especially at the local level. Nonetheless, this dynamic has continued to some extent at the national level, with clear policy as well as factional and mainstream versus antimainstream competition between Obuchi and Koizumi in the late 1990s and Koizumi’s subsequent strategy of running against the LDP, symbolized by his famous promise to “destroy the LDP” ( Jiminto¯ o bukkowasu).62 Although the introduction of 300 single-seat plurality districts in the lower house in 1996 weakened internal LDP factions, especially after Prime Minister Koizumi came to power,63 factions and other internal party actors can nonetheless still wield significant inf luence, especially when they have



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an opinion majority on their side. As discussed in Chapter 7, senior members of the Hashimoto faction used their inf luence and a public opinion majority to repeatedly kill proposed dispatches of an Aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan between fall 2001 and fall 2002. The LDP’s precarious, if long, hold on power, combined with fierce internal competition within the LDP and the sensitivity of its key coalition partner, Ko¯mei, to public opinion, has meant that political competition has been the rule rather than the exception in Japanese politics. Nonetheless, political competition is a variable, not a constant. As discussed further in the following section, during periods when political competition has appeared to wane, such as when the main opposition party stumbles, the government has shown greater willingness to defy opinion majorities. 3. When a United Diet Opposition Has the Support of a Stable Opinion Majority If the ruling party can coax one or more opposition parties, especially the largest opposition party, to support its policies, it can usually pursue these policies with little concern for public opinion. To take an example from another parliamentary democracy, Tony Blair had little reason to worry about British public opposition to supporting the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 because the leading opposition party, the Conservatives, also supported the war. On the other hand, when the opposition unites and has the support of a stable opinion majority, it has the opportunity exploit this opposition to gain at the expense of the ruling coalition. As Kurt Gaubatz explains, it is the potential for public opinion to be exploited by the opposition that motivates the ruling side to concern itself with voter backlash, especially when an election is near.64 4. When an Election Is Near Governing party leaders are more sensitive to public opinion when an election is near, especially one for the more powerful lower house. The opposition’s use of public opinion to win seats at the government’s expense is most likely to be effective when memories of defying public opinion are fresh. On the other hand, when the next election, especially for the lower house, is a distant prospect, governing party leaders can more easily afford to defy public opposition.

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public attitudes and policy influence

5. When the Public Has Recently Engaged in Restrospective Voting When the public has recently punished, or appeared to punish, the governing party or parties at the polls for pursuing a particular policy, politicians are likely to avoid again defying public opinion in general, and on that issue in particular, for a long time, even if an election is not near. As discussed in Chapter 9, the LDP’s retreat from promoting constitutional reform after the July 2007 upper house election stemmed from the belief that Abe’s promotion of constitutional reform was a large reason for the LDP’s historic defeat in that election. By contrast, when the public has not engaged in retrospective voting recently, politicians are likely to increasingly discount the likelihood of such voting. 6. When the Ruling Coalition Worries about the Consequences of Defying a Stable Opinion Majority for Other Important Issues Even when the opposition is not united, if important pieces of legislation, especially those in the same or a related issue area, are coming up for Diet consideration, coalition leaders have to worry about an opinion backlash derailing these other bills. This is especially true when the presence of a stable opinion majority coincides with divisions within the ruling coalition. As discussed elsewhere, the Koizumi administration’s desire to beef up its deployments in the Indian Ocean in the first half of 2002 in support of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan was checked by an even greater desire to see the quick enactment of an Emergency Legal Framework bill for responding to armed attack on Japanese territory. Opponents within the LDP and Ko¯mei exploited this situation to block beefed-up deployments. Ironically, the LDP’s quest to revise the constitution renders opinion majorities more inf luential. Because constitutional revision is a long and difficult process requiring a two-thirds majority of the Diet plus a majority vote in a national plebiscite, the LDP and the government face an especially strong incentive not to defy stable opinion majorities. Bucking such majorities on security issues significantly increases the risk that constitutional reforms, especially those pertaining to Article 9, will fail to achieve a two-thirds majority in the Diet or will fail to achieve a simple majority in a national referendum. 7. When a New Policy Is Proposed or an Old Policy Has Perceptible Costs The inf luence of an opinion majority is at its height when a new policy is being formulated, especially one that requires Diet action. Mass opinion



public attitudes and policy influence

25

usually has less inf luence when it comes to repealing an old policy, especially one that will continue without any input from the Diet. However, in the wake of strong retrospective voting clearly tied to a current policy, the ability of an opinion majority to repeal a law grows. Policies that require Diet approval to be extended are more susceptible to public opinion than those requiring no Diet action to continue. However, if the current policy is not imposing salient costs and can be buried in obscurity, it becomes easier to weaken or “demobilize” an opposing opinion majority. 8. When Consensus Democracy Norms and Institutions Are Present Consensus democracy norms encourage the view that simple majority votes are insufficiently broad to have democratic legitimacy. These norms therefore encourage broad supermajorities.65 These norms enhance the role of public opinion, especially the views of vocal minorities and their representatives in the Diet. Peter J. Katzenstein sees Japan “as a non-majoritarian political community,” where “minorities have considerable veto power.”66 Similarly, Thomas Rohlen argues that “the Japanese preference is to avoid majority rule.”67 “The public need not unanimously approve of policies,” according to Davis Bobrow, but “the great majority has to find them acceptable” with “the avoidance, or at least isolation, of dissent.”68 Akio Watanabe observes that the “ideal mode of decision making for the Japanese is one in which as many people as possible are duly consulted and not a single dissentient voice remains at the time of the final decision.”69 Public opinion research suggests that Japanese are overwhelmingly opposed to pure majoritarian rule in the Diet. When Asahi Shimbun asked respondents in late June 2007 whether they thought it was appropriate for the ruling side to ram bills quickly through the Diet based upon force of numbers, 70 percent responded that this is not appropriate, versus a mere 17 percent who thought this was fine as long as it was based on majoritarian rule. Strikingly, approximately half of LDP and Abe administration supporters found such majoritarian tactics to be inappropriate.70 The Abe cabinet’s aggressive use of this unpopular majoritarian tactic in the spring of 2007 may thus be one reason for the historic loss suffered by the LDP in that year’s subsequent upper house elections. Consequently, the LDP has usually found it advantageous to avoid ramming legislation through the Diet even when it has enjoyed a single-party parliamentary majority. Instead, as T. J. Pempel notes, cabinets have often followed “the norm of cross-party consensus building. Usually, the LDP [tried] to ensure support for its proposals by at least one, and often more,

26

public attitudes and policy influence

opposition parties,”71 or what is sometimes known as a strategy of “partial coalition” with at least one opposition party.72 On national security issues in particular, there is often a strong incentive for the ruling side to reach out to the opposition to achieve a wide consensus. For example, in 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi, despite having a secure majority for enacting landmark emergency legal framework legislation, nonetheless chose to reach out to the opposition DPJ. In exchange for the Democrats’ support, Koizumi agreed to several DPJ amendments to the bill. This compromise ref lects the political advantages of obtaining a supermajority in Japan, especially as concerns potentially polarizing security issues. Such dynamics discourage a ruling party from attempting to ram legislation through the Diet against the wishes of an opinion majority. The Consequence: Policies Are Crafted to Avoid Provoking the Opposition of a Stable Opinion Majority For all these reasons, Japanese cabinets actively tailor policies that avoid provoking the emergence of stable opposing opinion majorities. Using polls and other means, the government attempts to anticipate the reaction of voters. According to Watanabe, “Policy means accommodation before anything else. What is most required of political leaders . . . is not the power to decide but the power to compromise.”73 As Bobrow puts it, as “a party alert to electoral support,” the LDP “will go to some pains to avoid defying public opinion. . . . Polls enter into ‘defiance avoiding’ because . . . [ruling politicians] . . . have reasons to avoid bold, visible actions that run counter to them.”74 When the ruling side wants to push policies that are unpopular, including those related to defense, it may go as far as to aim for voters’ indifference point, where support and opposition is evenly divided; or an unstable plurality or even a slim policy opposing majority. Japanese cabinets avoid policies that go beyond this, and when a clear opposing majority emerges they back down. The logic of this dynamic is depicted in Figure 2.2. Line A depicts the Cold War–era indifference (or constraint) slope for voters ranged between offensive and defensive uses of military power, while line B depicts the voter indifference slope during the post–Cold War decade of the 1990s and the current era of unipolarity. The different slopes of the two lines ref lect an expanded belief in the utility of defensive military power after the Cold War. Although the utility of defensive military power does not perfectly capture this dimension, slope B also ref lects a greater tolerance for overseas dispatches of the SDF for disaster relief and humanitarian reconstruction



public attitudes and policy influence

27

Utility of offensive military power Iraq deployment Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Law Fall 1990 UNPCC bill Fall 1991 PKO bill 1992 PKO Law Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law 2004 post-tsunami dispatch

Aims of hawkish elites 0 Pacifism

A: Cold War

B: Post 1991

Utility of defensive military power

figure 2.2 Japanese public opinion indifference slopes regarding the utility of military force and strategic policy placement.

missions. By contrast, the public’s recognition of the utility of strategically offensive military power has essentially remained unchanged and very modest. The Xs in the diagram represent various government policies, which are discussed in subsequent chapters. Hawkish elites have attempted to push outward the frontier of politically possible security policies. However, they have been constrained by public opinion, with proposals outside the indifference slope of public opinion either being defeated (for example, the fall 1990 proposal to dispatch the SDF to Saudi Arabia just before the first Gulf War) or leading to a significant electoral backlash for the ruling side, as happened in the July 2004 upper house election. Thus, hawkish elites have aimed to place their bills right on the indifference curve of public opinion, achieving policies that are as hawkish as possible while not provoking a stable opposing opinion majority. By contrast, policies well within the indifference curve of public opinion, such as the 2004 post-tsunami disaster relief operations carried out by the SDF in Southeast Asia, have enjoyed wide popular support.

Methodology This study examines the nature and inf luence of public opinion by using qualitative methods, especially chronological case studies, following the advice of Ole Holsti: “There is no alternative to carefully crafted case studies” for “testing competing hypotheses about opinion-policy linkages.”75

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public attitudes and policy influence

Within these chronological case studies, presented in Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, this book uses two qualitative methods: congruence procedures supplemented by process tracing. Following Richard Sobel’s work on the impact of public opinion on U.S. foreign policy, this book looks for congruence and incongruence between public opinion as measured by media and government polls and security policies. Congruence indicates public inf luence over policy if policy changes follow measurable opinion, or vice versa if measurable opinion comes to support policy ex post facto, while incongruence demonstrates a lack of public inf luence over policy. Process tracing involves looking at how policy elites understood and responded to, or attempted to shape, public opinion based on media accounts, public statements, elite interviews and private statements.76 Overall, this study uses a qualitative approach known as triangulation, examining several different forms of data, including quantitative data, utilizing deductive inferences and rich case-study knowledge to initially establish causation via congruence procedures and then using process tracing to cross-check these inferences.77 As a further methodological check on the validity of this book’s findings, each case study chapter uses counterfactual plausibility probes, analyzing what would happen if public opinion were pacifist, offensive realist, or simply uninf luential.78 The remainder of this book begins by presenting data measuring underlying attitudes about the use of force from the Survey on Attitudes and Global Engagement (SAGE) survey in Chapter 3, results indicating the presence of defensive realist attitudes. It then presents media, corporate, and government survey data that shed light on Japanese public attitudes toward real-world uses of offensive military power overseas to suppress terrorist networks and WMD proliferation, results that also point to defensive realist attitudes. Chapter 3 also demonstrates that entrapment fears in U.S. conf licts overseas are an important inf luence on Japanese public opinion, one that varies in intensity over time. The following chapters covering the Cold War and several post–Cold War case studies build on the base of data presented in Chapter 3, showing patterns of opinion consistent with persistent defensive realism and declining antimilitarist attitudes over sixty years and across various real-world political events. Caveats Two caveats are in order regarding the arguments I make in this volume. First, the conclusions I am drawing focus at the aggregate level of opinion as



public attitudes and policy influence

29

measured by opinion polls. I am not claiming that all or even most Japanese hold beliefs that approximate “defensive realist” views. Rather, Japanese opinion is composed of distinguishable groups: some pacifists, many antimilitarists, two groups who are in decline yet continue to exert inf luence; a small group of hawks, who are relatively sanguine about the utility of military force; and centrists. It is the aggregated attitudes of all these groups that this book claims approximates attitudinal defensive realism. Nonetheless, the broad outlines of attitudinal defensive realism are consistently embraced by overwhelming majorities: belief in the necessity of having a military for the sake of territorial defense, skepticism about offensive military power, and opposition to SDF involvement in overseas combat. Second, the key variable for policy inf luence in this study is the presence or absence of stable opinion majorities. This is what politicians most often look at, and this is the result that is therefore most politically inf luential in the policy process. Top-line aggregated election results are, of course, the single most important means for mass opinion to inf luence policy. By contrast, this study does not place much emphasis on second-line demographic polling results or third-line results correlating views on, say, the economy, with those on overseas military deployments. Beyond the greater political significance of top-line results in the policy process there is another practical reason for this focus: Second-line results are available only inconsistently, and third-line results are almost impossible to obtain from Japanese pollsters. Moreover, the methods used in this study, namely relying on real-world policy-context media polls and only a few polls focused on revealing underlying attitudes, necessarily limits the precision of some of the inferences that can be drawn from this study. Although more than fifty years of real-world context media polling data allow this study to draw some very robust conclusions about attitudinal defensive realism, such as strong skepticism about offensive military power and opposition to SDF involvement in overseas combat operations, other finer-grained inferences remain more tentative and should be the subject of future research.

3

Views on the Utility of Military Force and America’s Use of Force Robert Kagan famously observed that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”1 Japanese are Venusians at least to the same extent as Europeans. Across several dimensions, the world Japanese citizens see is very different from the one their American counterparts perceive. This is not to say that Japanese public opinion is pacifist. The Japanese public is on the same planet as the American public when it comes to defending national territory: Both share a belief in the utility of military force for homeland defense. Nonetheless, Japanese public opinion has very different attitudes about the utility of strategically offensive military force and about the U.S. role in the world. Whereas Americans have been optimistic about the potential for strategically offensive military power to suppress terrorism and WMD proliferation, and to some extent to promote democracy and human rights, Japanese have been consistently skeptical about the utility of military force for accomplishing these objectives. This skepticism, as discussed elsewhere in this book, has its roots in Japan’s ultimately disastrous use of offensive military power to promote foreign policy goals in China and elsewhere in East Asia in the 1930s and 1940s. Nothing that has happened since has provided sufficient counterevidence to undo the lessons learned then. Japanese also remain far more skeptical about the utility of possessing nuclear weapons than Americans do, a position that has consolidated over time rather than diminished, despite the growing North Korean nuclear threat. Whereas Americans overwhelmingly view their country as a force for international peace and stability, the Japanese public, while appreciative of the U.S. alliance and its value for ensuring the defense of Japanese territory, are skeptical about the nature of U.S. global inf luence. The Japanese public’s skepticism about the utility of strategic offensive military power has led them to be very dubious about numerous American military conf licts, from the Taiwan Straits crises of the 1950s to the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s, and again during the Gulf War and especially the 2003 Iraq invasion. Beyond doubting the utility of strategic military power, the Japanese public has also



views on military force

31

tended to see U.S. military interventions as driven by misunderstandings of foreign culture or by narrow and self-centered reasons. On the other hand, when the United States has eschewed strategic offensive military operations in favor of defending allies and deterring threats, the Japanese public has become more positive about the United States and its global role. This distinctive world outlook of the Japanese public matters because democratic Japan is the world’s third largest economy, a leading aid donor and defense spender, a global manufacturing and technological leader, and a leading U.S. ally. What Japan decides it must or must not do on the world stage has a huge impact on U.S. and global security. Opinion polls can help us to understand the Japanese public’s distinctive world outlook. The rest of this chapter sets the context for the case study chapters that follow by presenting survey data on the public’s underlying attitudes toward the utility of military force. Along the way it presents evidence that elites recognize that their range of choice in security policy is limited by the Japanese public’s attitudes, attitudes characterized as defensive realist. The first section presents data from SAGE, an academic survey that measured the Japanese public’s attitudes toward generic justifications for using military force. The following sections present Japanese media poll results regarding the utility of military force for promoting a variety of security objectives, most notably suppressing terrorist organizations and WMD proliferation. The next section examines Japanese opinion regarding a hypothetical preventive strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities and whether Japan should develop nuclear weapons. The final section examines how the Japanese public’s security attitudes affect perceptions of the United States and its foreign policy, by focusing on two dimensions, fear of entrapment and trust of the United States.

Underlying Attitudes toward the Utility of Military Force Overall, as the SAGE survey demonstrates, the Japanese public is skeptical about the value of military power for almost any purpose exception national territorial defense. This poll is, to this author’s knowledge, the closest any survey in Japan has come to asking respondents about the utility of military force for various purposes in the abstract (free of specific real-world context). The results from this question set are presented in Table 3.1. While this question asks about the legitimacy of various types of war, it is reasonable to assume, albeit with some uncertainty, that most respondents would tend to link utility with legitimacy (also see the following discussion).

32

views on military force table 3.1 Legitimate reasons for going to war

Legitimate

Prevent human rights abuses in other countries Prevent genocide in another country When another country is suspected of harboring terrorists When attacked

Somewhat legitimate

Not very legitimate

Not legitimate

32.9%

33.0%

20.3%

13.9

36.8

25.0

18.8

7.6

29.8

34.8

22.5

47.8

30.3

7.9

9.0

8.8%

source: Data from ICU-WSU, SAGE Poll, accessible at www.wsu.edu/pols/sage/data.htm Japanese language survey question number 16.

With this caveat in mind, Table 3.1 supports the main claim of this book, namely that Japanese public opinion has come to view military force as having positive utility for defending national territory while remaining deeply skeptical about the utility of offensive military force for almost any objective. With the partial exception of preventing genocide in another country, solid majorities oppose going to war to promote human rights in other countries or going to war when another country is suspected of harboring terrorist suspects. By contrast, 78.1 percent of Japanese believe that going to war when attacked is legitimate. This suggests Japanese see military force as having value for national defense but not for much else, and it directly supports the attitudinal defensive realist hypothesis of this book. Majorities do not see strategically offensive military power as appropriate for realizing objectives ranging from promoting human rights to suppressing terrorism or WMD proliferation. The only partial exception is that tactically offensive military action in direct response to an attack is seen as relatively justified. The response of Japanese public opinion to the invasion of Afghanistan, as discussed in Chapter 7, supports this interpretation, although opinion was more or less evenly divided about this attack. Also, as shown in the following pages, Japanese opinion was skeptical about the utility of this invasion for suppressing terrorist attacks. This question battery, although unique in the context of Japanese polling, does have several significant limitations. While it measures the legitimacy of going to war for various reasons in the abstract, it is hard to translate this into support for actual policy options. In particular, there are good



views on military force

33

reasons to view skeptically the hypothesis that the Japanese public would demonstrate comparable support for these various reasons for war if it were made clear that the initiator of such a war would be Japan itself or that Japanese troops would participate. First, as in other countries, casualty aversion should suppress support for initiating war. Second, lingering antimilitarist mistrust of the military and the state’s ability to control and wisely wield the sword should suppress support even more. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, skepticism about the utility of offensive military force for policy goals as revealed in polling results presented in the following discussion suggests that support would be significantly lower had the question been framed in terms of utility or effectiveness, rather than legitimacy. Most elected Japanese politicians appear to be well aware of Japanese public attitudes regarding the utility of offensive military power, especially in the case of the SDF. According to Harada Yoshiaki, then a senior LDP lower house member and former head of the lower house committee on foreign affairs, “The public is very much against the use of military force by the SDF overseas. . . . They will not support use of military force for offensive purposes.”2 Ko¯ no Taro¯, an LDP lower house member and an expert on security, agreed: “The public doesn’t support sending the SDF overseas if there is fighting going on.”3 This position of the public has also been ref lected in military procurement decisions that have eschewed procuring offensive weaponry. For example, in 2004, a proposal to develop Japan’s first long-range surfaceto-surface missile was dropped from the pending defense buildup plan. Then Minister for Defense Ishiba Shigeru subsequently claimed that he had personally opposed acquiring long-range offensive missiles or Tomahawk cruise missiles because of public opposition.4 Ko¯mei also played a crucial role in quashing the proposal to develop offensive missiles.5 Promoting Human Rights and Democracy As the results in Table 3.1 suggest, an absolute majority of Japanese does not believe that preventing human rights abuses in another country is a legitimate reason for going to war. Only when the question is framed as preventing genocide does a razor-thin majority of 50.7 percent consider this a legitimate reason for going to war. On the related question of going to war to promote democracy, there is little evidence, and it is mostly negative: the lack of polling questions on this issue. Given that the failure to find WMD led the George W. Bush administration to subsequently place greater emphasis on democracy promotion

34

views on military force

as a reason for invading Iraq, the fact that Japanese pollsters have not asked Japanese whether they support the use of force to promote democracy is telling.6 This omission suggests that the claim that military force should be used to promote democracy is beyond the pale of debate in Japan. Indeed, Japanese pollsters do not generally ask about promoting human rights as a reason for going to war. According to Ko¯no Taro¯, “They [the public] do not support using military force to support democracy.”7 Combating Terrorism Supporting these findings are the responses to another question asked by the SAGE survey and presented in Table 3.2. Asked what is the most effective means for combating terrorism, military intervention finished dead last as the most effective means, and by a wide margin. Asked about the second most effective means for combating terrorism, military intervention, although ahead of responding through the United Nations, statistically tied with economic means and fell well short of diplomatic means. Overall, a large majority of Japanese rejected military intervention as an effective primary or secondary means for dealing with terrorism, far below the combined totals for the other answer options. In the context of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, media polls have asked Japanese respondents about the utility of offensive military action for suppressing terrorism. As Tables 3.3 and 3.4 make clear, Japanese are skeptical about the utility of offensive military power for combating terrorism. The October 2001 Asahi poll results depicted in Table 3.3 suggest a large plurality bordering on a majority thought the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan would not be effective in preventing future terrorist attacks, this despite the comparably favorable view of this war in Japan. Similarly, Table 3.4 confirms that Japanese are far more skeptical of the effectiveness of military force in routing out terrorism than are Americans. The results from Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 support the hypothesis that Japanese opinion does not see military force as an effective means for combating terrorism. The October 2004 poll results depicted in Table 3.5 suggest that Japanese respondents are more skeptical than British respondents or Korean respondents regarding the contribution that the war in Iraq has made to the “war on terrorism.” Japanese respondents were also more skeptical than Canadian respondents, 51 percent of whom answered that the Iraq occupation and invasion contributed to the war on terrorism, but less skeptical than French, Spanish, or Mexican respondents: Eighty percent, 73 percent and 74 percent of these



views on military force

35

table 3.2 Effective means for combating terrorism. “What is the most effective means Japan can take to respond to international terrorism? Choose which of the following means, 1-4, are effective as primary and secondary means”

Primary Means

Military intervention Economic intervention Create new alliance relationships through diplomatic means Respond through the United Nations

Secondary means

Combined

5.9% 22.2 38.6

31.8% 31.0 37.2

37.7% 53.2 75.8

64.4

17.0

81.4

source: Data from question number 33, Japan questionnaire, SAGE Survey, sponsored by ICU-WSU, SAGE Poll, accessible at www.wsu.edu/pols/sage/data.htm.

table 3.3 Utility of U.S. attack on Afghanistan for preventing terrorist attacks. An October 2001 Asahi Shimbun poll: Will the U.S. military attack on Afghanistan be effective in preventing future terrorist attacks? Will be effective Will not be effective Don’t know/no answer

36% 49 15

source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, October 16 (morning edition), 2001: 4.

table 3.4 The utility of military force for combating terrorism. A November 2001 Yomiuri Shimbun poll: How effective will military force be at routing out terrorism?

Japan

United States

Very effective Somewhat effective Aggregate effective Little effect No effect Aggregate not effective Don’t know/no answer

9.5% 21.1 30.6 33.3 24.1 57.4 12.0

30.7% 56.9 87.6 8.3 3.7 12.0 0.4

source: Data from Yomiuri Shinbunsha Seron Cho-sabu, Nihon no Seron: 343, 345–346.

respondents, respectively, answered that the Iraq invasion and war had not contributed to the war on terrorism.8 This skepticism of the utility of military force for combating terrorism finds expression even among Japan’s defense elites. Katayama Yoshio, head of research at the Defense Ministry–affiliated National Institute of Defense

36

views on military force table 3.5 Has the Iraq occupation (war) contributed to the war on terrorism? An October 2004 cross-national poll that Asahi Shimbun participated in asked whether the “Iraq occupation (war) contributed to the war on terrorism.”



Japan

Contributes very much Contributes somewhat Aggregate contributes Does not contribute Does not contribute at all Aggregate does not contribute

6% 36 42 43 11 54

Republic of Korea United Kingdom

18% 30 48 37 11 48

32% 20 52 21 19 40

source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, October 18, 2004 (morning edition): 9.

Studies, argues that “terrorism is a non-military affair, and while in dealing with terrorism there may be some roles for the military, those will be at the tactical level. The overall approach for dealing with terrorism will, however, be part of efforts to preserve public order.”9 Likewise, well-known commentator Kato¯ Shuichi argued, “While terrorism might be reduced somewhat with the fall of the Taliban, the number of attacks might not drop off. Perhaps they might even increase. There has not been a convincing discussion on this at all.”10 Suppressing WMD Proliferation Tables 3.6 and 3.7 suggest that Japanese mass opinion has from the beginning been skeptical about the utility of military force for preventing the proliferation of WMD. The gradual increase over time in the view that WMD were not a legitimate reason for invading Iraq no doubt ref lects the failure to find them. Nonetheless, the lopsided majority citing this as an illegitimate reason as far back as June 2003 suggests that most Japanese never saw suppressing WMD proliferation as a legitimate reason for attacking Iraq, even if Iraq had in fact been in possession of these weapons. Preemption and Nuclear Weapons In early October 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test, a development that many observers had predicted beforehand would have a dramatic impact on Japan. Soon after the test, a Nippon TV (NTV) poll asked respondents whether it would be a good thing if the U.S. military bombed North Korean nuclear facilities to stop that country from developing nuclear



views on military force

37

table 3.6 The impact of the Iraq invasion on reducing the WMD proliferation threat. Will the Iraq invasion reduce the WMD proliferation threat? WMD proliferation will lessen Will have no effect WMD proliferation threat will increase

16.5% 57.8 15.4

source: Data from Yomiuri Shimbun, April 21, 2003 (morning edition): 2.

table 3.7 WMD as a legitimate reason for invading Iraq. Asahi Shimbun: America invaded Iraq because that nation was developing/possessing weapons of mass destruction. Do you believe this was a legitimate reason for the invasion?

Jun 03

Jul 03

Feb 04

Mar 04

A legitimate reason Not a legitimate reason Don’t know/no answer

29% 57 14

25% 60 15

22% 65 na

19% 66 na

source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, June 30, 2003; July 22, 2003; July 23, 2003 (morning editions): 4; and March 17, 2004 (morning edition): 4.

weapons. In response, a mere 27.2 percent thought this would be a good idea, versus a large majority of 61.3 percent who responded that this would not be a good idea and 11.4 percent who didn’t know or didn’t answer. In light of survey results presented in other chapters and the preceding discussion, it is reasonable to presume that support for preemption would be even lower if the question had asked about Japan attacking North Korea’s nuclear facilities.11 The same poll also asked whether Japan should acquire nuclear weapons if North Korea has them. In response, an overwhelming 80.1 percent answered no, versus a mere 13.9 percent who answered yes and 6 percent who were unsure. A TV Asahi poll, taken at approximately the same time, asked a similar question and reached similar results. When asked whether Japan should develop nuclear weapons or maintain its three nonnuclear principles, an overwhelming 82 percent responded that Japan should uphold its nonnuclear principles, versus 10 percent who responded that Japan should acquire nuclear weapons and 8 percent who were undecided. Another question in the same poll asked whether it was problematic for the ruling parties to debate the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. In response, a plurality of 46 percent responded that it was problematic to have such a debate, versus 39 percent who thought there was no problem with holding such a debate.12

38

views on military force

These results show that the fall 2006 debate among prominent LDP politicians, including members of Abe’s cabinet such as then Foreign Minister Aso¯ Taro¯, about whether Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, did not translate into or ref lect growing public support for nuclear weapons, as the public has become much less tolerant of acquiring nuclear weapons than it was in the 1960s and 1970s.13 More generally, these results suggest the public was not especially tolerant of the debate itself, which might explain why the nuclear weapons debate did not reemerge among prominent ruling politicians following North Korea’s second and more successful nuclear test in the spring of 2009. Given the timing of these polls, just after the North Korean nuclear test, and Japanese threat perceptions toward North Korea and its nuclear weapons program, we would expect that support for preemption or acquiring nuclear weapons would be higher than normal. Therefore, the overwhelming opposition recorded against preemption and particularly against acquiring nuclear weapons is especially significant and calls into question the claims of some Japanese defense policy observers that the Japanese public’s nuclear allergy has “weakened in recent years.”14 Among the various barriers to Japan developing nuclear weapons or engaging in preemption, these results suggest that public opposition in democratic Japan counts as among the most important. Certainly, the public’s overwhelming opposition to acquiring nuclear weapons appears to have encouraged a corresponding majority of Diet members to oppose Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. According to a 2004 Kyo¯ do¯ Tsu¯ shin survey, 78.5 percent of Diet members asserted that Japan should not revise its three nonnuclear principles.15 Regarding preemption and acquiring offensive weapons such as cruise missiles, Daniel Kliman found that, for LDP and DPJ politicians alike, “advocating preemption is not politically profitable. Vigorously supporting preemption and the acquisition of cruise missiles might alienate constituents.”16 The tendency of many analysts to overemphasize the role of elites and underestimate the role of public opinion in Japanese policy making may help explain why many have been too quick to predict that Japan will acquire nuclear weapons. For example, political commentator Tachibana Takashi, based on an analysis of the views of Abe and his associates, suggested that there was a good chance that Japan would move to develop nuclear weapons under Abe. Like other unfulfilled predictions, this one had an elitist bias because it assumed that the Japanese public would go wherever Abe chose to take them.17



views on military force

39

Belief in Nonmilitary Approaches Ironically, support for SDF overseas dispatches for humanitarian and reconstruction missions ref lects the belief that nonmilitary solutions have the highest utility for conf lict resolution and tamping down terrorism. This view is ref lected in a comment by LDP lower house member Ko¯ no Taro¯, who claimed that “fighting poverty and inequality are more effective means for combating terrorism than using military power.”18 Although there is little polling data directly relevant to this claim, it follows logically from the evidence presented in the preceding discussion. Japanese support SDF overseas dispatches for humanitarian and reconstruction missions while simultaneously expressing skepticism about the utility of military force for combating terrorism or WMD proliferation. Taken together, these results suggest that the Japanese public views nonmilitary approaches to resolving these conf licts as more effective. And because SDF operations in Iraq, East Timor, Cambodia, and elsewhere have all entailed nonmilitary reconstruction and humanitarian relief operations, this leads to the ironic conclusion that the Japanese public supports SDF overseas dispatches precisely because they believe in the superiority of nonmilitary solutions for conf lict resolution. Table 3.8, which reports the results of a June 2004 Yomiuri poll, ref lects both the finding that Japanese believe nonmilitary solutions to international conf licts to have the highest utility and a continued reluctance to involve the SDF in overseas military conf licts. Emergency relief operations in the event of a natural disaster are the only mission that enjoys overwhelming support. Peacekeeping operations based on a U.N. resolution after a conf lict has ended are the second most popular form of overseas dispatch but still enjoy far less than majority support, apparently because of a residual implication of military force. Humanitarian relief operations outside of a peacekeeping operations (PKO) framework, such as those the GSDF performed in Iraq, is almost as popular an option but only half as popular as post-disaster relief operations, providing a good indicator of the extent to which close proximity to combat reduces the popularity of humanitarian relief operations (that is, around 40 percent). Again, only a small minority of about 16 percent support the prospect of SDF involvement in overseas combat, even if included in a U.N. mandate. In the context of other stable opinion majorities, what is most striking about this finding is that sending the SDF overseas to engage in combat, even under a U.N. mandate, is almost as unpopular as acquiring nuclear weapons!

40

views on military force table 3.8 Overseas SDF operations for international cooperation and assistance. June 2004 Yomiuri Shimbun poll question 6: “Since the enactment of the 1992 UN peace-keeping operations cooperation law, in other words the PKO cooperation law, the SDF has gone overseas in various forms of international cooperation and assistance. If the SDF participates in overseas activities, what sorts of activities do you think they should perform? Choose as many as you wish from the following list.”

Emergency relief operations in the event of a natural disaster PKO operations based on a U.N. resolution after a conf lict has ended Even outside of PKO, humanitarian relief operations such as those the GSDF is performing in Iraq Participation in a multilateral army based on a U.N. resolution Other There is no need to participate in overseas operations. No answer

78.4% 41.8 39.1 15.9 0.1 4.9 2.6

source: Data from Yomiuri Shimbun, June 3, 2004 (morning edition): 24.

Purely humanitarian overseas deployments without any hint of involvement in armed conf lict have come to enjoy overwhelming support from Japanese public opinion. After a massive tsunami devastated long stretches along the west coasts of Indonesia and Thailand and the east coasts of Sri Lanka and India, Japan mobilized the SDF to provide humanitarian relief to aff licted regions. This deployment enjoyed overwhelming public support, so much so that it became the first SDF overseas deployment to win the support of the Japanese Communist Party ( JCP). Party chairman Shii Kazuo expressed approval for this deployment and for any subsequent deployments of a similar nature, provided they were “limited to pure humanitarian assistance for large-scale natural disasters.”19 As with previous humanitarian dispatches of the SDF overseas, proponents of allowing the SDF to participate in overseas combat were quick to try to exploit public support to expand SDF overseas operations toward combat roles.20 According to one observer, “The relatively uncontroversial deployment of the SDF to the tsunami-affected areas represents a further sign that Japan is slowly but surely treading the path towards becoming a ‘normal country.’ ”21 Public approval for the tsunami dispatch encouraged the government to resubmit an amendment to the 1954 SDF law that would elevate overseas operations to the status of a “primary duty” (honrai ninmuka) alongside homeland defense.22 This amendment was eventually passed in late 2006, together with legislation elevating the Japanese Defense Agency to ministry status. Nonetheless, the delay in getting this amend-



views on military force

41

ment approved, along with the widespread opposition to allowing the SDF to engage in overseas combat, as discussed in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, suggests that the Japanese public has, contrary to the predictions of pundits, proven very resistant to this tactic of piggybacking unpopular overseas combat missions on popular humanitarian operations. Support for SDF overseas humanitarian operations does not translate into support for a larger military role overseas.

Views of the U.S. Ally Public views of the United States as Japan’s only ally and the global hegemon (or as one of two superpowers during the Cold War) is a crucial background variable that, filtered through the Japanese public’s attitudes toward the utility of military force, inf luences Japanese public opinion toward security policy. Changes in fear of entrapment and trust in the United States are the two most important dimensions of these public perceptions. Fear of Entrapment The Japanese public’s fear of entrapment in American wars has been a variable that, when heightened, can exacerbate the public’s antimilitarist distrust of its own government and lead the public to be even more skeptical about limited expansions in the SDF’s capabilities or missions than it would otherwise be. As Yasuhiro Izumikawa explains, “When Japanese people felt entrapment fear, they naturally hoped to alleviate it by resisting to strengthen its military or increasing its alliance commitments to the United States.”23 The centrality of this fear of entrapment in Japanese public opinion during the Cold War and its frequent conf lation with “pacifism” are discussed at greater length in the next chapter. The purpose of this section is to indicate how the rises and falls in Japanese public concern about entrapment in U.S. wars may inf luence public opinion regarding other security issues and to show how fear of entrapment has varied over time. Frank Klingberg and other scholars of U.S. public opinion argue that the U.S. public goes through cycles or moods of extroversion and introversion that affect Americans’ receptiveness to overseas interventions.24 Although this study finds no similar introversion/extroversion cycle in Japanese public opinion per se, rises and falls in the fear of entrapment in U.S. wars play a similar role. Rises in entrapment fears make the public even more cautious about any security initiative, especially one involving overseas SDF deployments, because of the perceived heightened risk of entrapment in war.

42

views on military force 50 45 40

Percentage

35

No risk

30 25 20 15

Risk

10 5 0

1969 1975 1978 1981 1984 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 Year figure 3.1 Fear of entrapment. Data from Naikakufu, “Jieitai ni kansuru yoron cho¯ sa,” 1969 to 2006, surveys conducted every three years. Survey questions and results can be retrieved from www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index-all.html.

As Figure 3.125 makes clear, fear of entrapment in war has varied greatly overtime. During the 1960s this fear was high due to the Vietnam War, as was antimilitarist distrust. Although the survey data presented in Figure 3.1 go back to only 1969, earlier survey results underline how powerful entrapment fears were in the mid-1960s. In answer to an August 1965 Asahi Shimbun poll, 60 percent of respondents feared that Japan might become entrapped in the Vietnam War, versus only 19 percent who did not fear so.26 Of the 57 percent in a 1970 survey conducted by Central Research Services who opposed the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Japan, the largest number, 31 percent, cited entrapment fears as their main reason.27 Fear of involvement in war then declined due to the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the initiation of détente with the Soviet Union. It was during this period that the United States and Japan were able to initiate concrete military cooperation with the conclusion of the First U.S.–Japan Defense Guidelines between 1975 and 1978. Subsequently, renewed Cold War tensions in the late 1970s and early 1980s increased fear of entrapment again, although entrapment fears declined sharply in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the Cold War wound down. Although they probably spiked again brief ly during the Gulf Crisis and War (the modest uptick in Figure 3.1



views on military force

43

appears to be inf luenced by the late date of the poll in 1991), the overall post–Cold War decline facilitated the enactment of the U.N. PKO bill in 1992 and the dispatch of the SDF overseas for the first time for reconstruction and humanitarian missions. The renewed fear of entrapment in war from 2000 undoubtedly ref lects the emergence, for the first time, of an external threat, North Korea, that was explicitly targeting Japan. As such, this undoubtedly reduces the extent to which fear of entrapment after 2000 corresponds to fear of entrapment in an American war not in Japan’s interest versus fear of being attacked directly. Nonetheless, fear of entrapment, as discussed in subsequent chapters, appears to have been stoked by the revised U.S. Defense Guidelines of 1997 and subsequent Japanese enabling legislation, by the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, and especially by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Although Koizumi was able to partially overcome the public’s fear of entrapment in a U.S. war in the case of Iraq, by largely isolating the SDF from combat and focusing on humanitarian and reconstruction missions, the subsequent fall in support for virtually all overseas deployments and the near collapse of support for constitutional revision, hypothesized as an “Iraq syndrome” in Chapter 9, appears to derive in no small part from this heightened fear of entrapment in U.S. wars. Trust in the United States America’s use of force for reasons that are viewed with skepticism by most Japanese, in light of their attitudes regarding the utility of military force, has not only exacerbated fears of entrapment in U.S. wars. Polling data over the last several years suggest that this has also inf luenced Japanese views of the United States as a trustworthy ally. Like that of publics elsewhere, Japanese opinion has grown less trusting and more skeptical of American power and the role that it plays in the world. When asked about America’s post–9/11 security policy almost one year after the event, Japanese responses were less than supportive. An Asahi Shimbun poll conducted in late August 2002 found that only 23 percent of respondents believed that America’s post–9/11 policies had had a favorable impact on global security, versus 50 percent who believed these policies had had a negative impact.28 Table 3.9 shows that, eighteen months after the initial invasion of Iraq, a majority of Japanese continued to believe that America’s “actions” did not contribute to world peace, although the margin had narrowed significantly as those with a positive view almost doubled, while those with a negative view grew only slightly. Comparing the results from Table 3.9 with the

44

views on military force table 3.9 American foreign policy and world peace. October 2004 Asahi Shimbun poll: “Do you think America’s actions contribute to world peace?”



Japan

Greatly Somewhat Aggregate agree Disagree somewhat Emphatically disagree Aggregate disagree

5% 39 44 39 14 53

Republic of Korea

Canada

3% 44 47 42 7 49

13% 33 46 27 25 52

source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, October 18, 2004 (morning edition): 8.

2002 Asahi poll discussed in the preceding section should be done cautiously, however, because different question wording might have inf luenced the outcome. Respondents might have a more critical view of “American policies” than of “American actions since 9/11.” The former probably imply U.S. foreign policy, while the later could implicate a broader set of actions, including nongovernmental actions. Figure 3.2 shows a significant decline in the willingness of Japanese to trust, in a general context, America. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and despite the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, trust in the United States peaked, with an absolute (if small) majority trusting the United States. This effect, albeit diminished, continued into 2002. However, by December 2003, mistrust had clearly surpassed that found in December 2000, the last pre–9/11 Yomiuri poll to ask this question. Unlike the December 2000 poll, a plurality had come to express distrust in the United States. This trend continued and deepened significantly in 2004, with a big jump in the percentage of Japanese respondents expressing distrust in the United States and a continued slow decline in the number expressing trust in the United States. Consequently, an absolute majority claimed to distrust the United States. The timing of the 2003 and 2004 results suggests the inf luence of the Iraq War in increasing mistrust of the United States. These results also provide side evidence supporting the point made in the previous discussion, namely that Japanese public opinion was relatively understanding of the invasion of Afghanistan but highly critical of the war in Iraq. In other words, Japanese mass opinion distinguished these two wars as justified and unjustified respectively, and this judgment affected their propensity to trust the United States. The mistrusting majority continued essentially



views on military force

45

70 60 Trust 50 40 Distrust

30 20

Don’t know

10 0 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004 2005 figure 3.2

2006

2007

2008

Trust in America source: Yomiuri Shimbun, December 29, 2000 (morning edition): 24; November 30, 2001 (morning edition): 26; December 5, 2002 (morning edition): 26; December 12, 2003 (morning edition): 14; December 16, 2004 (morning edition): 14; December 15, 2005 (morning edition): 16; December 16, 2006 (morning edition): 14; December 14, 2007 (morning edition): 12; December 18, 2008 (morning edition): 14.

unchanged in 2005, but declined slightly in 2006, perhaps because of the victory of Democratic Party foes of the Iraq War in the U.S. midterm elections. However, this mistrusting majority grew again in 2007 and 2008, ref lecting continued distrust due to the continuing Iraq War, but also increasingly due to bilateral differences over U.S. engagement of North Korea.29 Table 3.10 reports the results of a cross-national poll from October 2004 that asked respondents whether their view of America had changed in the past three years. Overwhelmingly, by a margin of 74 percent to 17 percent, Japanese respondents reported that their view of America had changed for the worse. The majority claiming their view had worsened exceeded majorities or pluralities reaching the same conclusion in South Korea, the United Kingdom, and France. A Global Market Insite (GMI) poll conducted at about the same time asked specifically how the war on terrorism and the Iraq War had affected respondents’ views of the United States. The results, as depicted in Table 3.11, show an even greater shift toward more negative views of the United States and suggest that the war on terror and the Iraq War are the core reasons for

46

views on military force table 3.10 Changing views of the United States. Asahi Shimbun: “Has your view of America changed over the past three years?”

Japan

It has improved. It has somewhat improved. Aggregate improved Has not changed It has somewhat worsened. It has greatly worsened. Aggregate worsened

2% 15 17 5 53 21 74

Republic of Korea

2% 23 25 — 49 18 67

United Kingdom

France

3% 11 14 33 27 18 45

2% 12 14 13 39 31 70

source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, October 18, 2004 (morning edition): 9.

table 3.11 The War on Terrorism and the Iraq War and perceptions of the United States. Has your view of America changed significantly as a result of the U.S. War on Terror and the war in Iraq? Aggregate positive change No change Aggregate negative change Net change for worse

6.8% 22.1 71.1 64.3

source: Data provided to the author by GMI (Global Market Insite, Inc.). Poll included 1,000 Japanese respondents; polling results were released October 21, 2004. The margin of error is ±3 percent. For more on this poll, see www.gmi-mr.com/about-us/news/archive.php?p=20041021. Press release was retrieved on February 2, 2005.

these more negative views. An Asahi Shimbun poll conducted at about the same time reached comparable results, with a net shift of 57 percent toward a more negative view of America’s role in the world since 2001.30 Another question from the same GMI poll asked respondents about the most important inf luence on their image of America. The results, as shown in Table 3.12, support the above interpretation as a clear plurality identify U.S. foreign policy, including the war on terrorism and the Iraq War as the primary inf luences on their image of the United States. Table 3.13 presents data from another question in the same GMI survey, comparing feelings toward U.S. foreign policy, which again are overwhelmingly negative, with those toward the American people and system of government. The results show that feelings toward the American people remain overwhelmingly positive, but they also suggest that dislike of American foreign policy may be affecting feelings about the American system of gov-



views on military force

47

table 3.12 The most important influence on your image of America. “What is the most important influence on your image of America?”

Top four responses

American foreign policy, including War on Terror and the Iraq War My country’s news and media depiction American music and movies American products Aggregate of other listed responses* Other nonlisted responses

35.0% 28.8 25.8 2.7 5.3 2.4

* Includes American tourists, novels, overseas humanitarian aid, and American participation in international organizations. source: Data provided to the author by GMI (Global Market Insite, Inc.). Poll included 1,000 Japanese respondents; polling results were released October 21, 2004. The margin of error is ±3 percent. For more on this poll, see www.gmi-mr.com/gmipoll/release.php?p=20041021. Press release was retrieved on February 2, 2005.

table 3.13 Feelings about Americans, U.S. government, and foreign policy. “How would you describe your feelings toward the following?”

Aggregate positive Aggregate negative Don’t care

American people

78.4% 16.2 5.4

U.S. system of government

29.3% 60.5 10.2

U.S. foreign policy since 2000

18.5% 72.9 8.6

source: Data provided to the author by GMI (Global Market Insite, Inc.). Poll included 1,000 Japanese respondents; polling results were released October 21, 2004. The margin of error is ±3 percent. For more on this poll, see www.gmi-mr.com/about-us/news/archive.php?p=20041021. Press release was retrieved on February 2, 2005.

ernment, producing a clear majority who had negative feelings about the American system of government. In short, America’s use of force for reasons most Japanese view skeptically appears to be generating further skepticism about the American system of government that produces these policies. Finally, other results from the same GMI poll, as depicted in Table 3.14, suggest that Japanese skepticism about America’s use of force is producing increasing distrust of American motives, as over 60 percent of Japanese respondents argue that self-interest and empire building lie behind U.S. foreign policy. By contrast, just under a fifth of Japanese are willing to credit the defense and expansion of freedom and democracy as the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy. Strikingly, almost as many Japanese believe that U.S. foreign policy is based on confusion and a misunderstanding of foreign cultures. In other words, eight in ten Japanese distrust either America’s

48

views on military force

table 3.14 Guiding motivations behind U.S. foreign policy. “When thinking about the United States foreign policy, do you think it is guided by . . . ”

Japan

G8 average

Self-interests and empire building The defense and expansion of freedom and democracy Confusion and a lack of understanding of other cultures

62.7% 19.1 18.2

67% 14 19

source: Data provided to the author by GMI (Global Market Insite, Inc.). Poll included 1,000 Japanese respondents and 1,000 respondents in each of the following G-8 countries: Canada, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Polling results were released October 21, 2004. The margin of error is +/- 3 percent. The reported G8 averages are rounded to the closest whole number. For more on this poll, see www.gmi-mr.com/about-us/news/archive.php?p=20041021. Press release retrieved on February 2, 2005.

motives or its understanding of the world. Strikingly, the large majority who believe that American foreign policy is guided by self-interest and a desire for empire building betray realist skepticism for the idealistic justifications that great powers give for their use of force overseas.

Conclusions The survey data presented in this chapter reveal the Japanese public’s distinctive world outlook regarding the utility of military force and America’s global role. Seemingly from Venus compared with Americans, Japanese are nonetheless collectively defensive realists in their attitudes toward security. They believe in the utility of military force for homeland defense but not for strategically offensive uses of military power such as suppressing WMD proliferation or terrorist networks or for promoting democracy and human rights. The Japanese public are also overwhelmingly skeptical about the utility of acquiring nuclear weapons for national defense. Finally, this chapter shows that Japanese public opinion is skeptical about America’s global role, especially when this role goes beyond the traditional objectives of defending allies and deterring threats. America’s use of military force for purposes viewed skeptically by the Japanese public increases distrust in the United States and entrapment fears. Fear of entrapment in U.S. wars has varied greatly over time, corresponding to the waxing and waning of U.S. interventionism. Rises in entrapment fears make the Japanese public more opposed to SDF overseas deployments and other policies that could increase the risk of entrapment. The next chapter explores the development of public attitudes toward security and perceptions of the United States during the course of the Cold War.

4

Reassessing Public Opinion during the Cold War

This chapter traces the evolution of the Japanese public’s attitudes toward security from the end of the Pacific War through the Cold War and considers the inf luence that public opinion had during this period. It begins by identifying several dimensions of antimilitarist distrust of the state and the military and shows how antimilitarist distrust gradually diminished over time. Next, this chapter considers the public’s fear of entrapment in American wars, perceptions of alignment and America’s international role, and how public concern about the American ally declined in the mid-1970s following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, thereby easing the way for greater security cooperation. The next section presents evidence pointing to the Japanese public’s nascent defensive realist attitude regarding the utility of military force despite continued strong antimilitarist distrust. The following section looks at opinion toward overseas dispatch of the SDF for noncombat operations, opinion that changed as the public’s antimilitarist distrust gradually declined. The final section examines the inf luence of public opinion and points to several key cases where public opinion exercised inf luence over security policy. Regarding this chapter’s counterfactual benchmarks, if the public had essentially been pacifist, Japan would have not established the SDF in the 1950s and would have limited itself to maintaining a police force plus a paramilitary police force sufficient for maintaining domestic law and order and basic security at important domestic installations; the paramilitary force would resemble the lightly armed Police Reserve, or Keisatsu Yobitai, established in 1950. Japan would also maintain a coast guard sufficient for dealing with piracy, illegal fishing, or other law-and-order issues in its territorial waters but insufficient to deter, much less defend against, a foreign navy. Japan would not allow U.S. bases on its territory and would probably not maintain a U.S. alliance, preferring neutrality. If Japanese opinion was characterized by attitudinal offensive realism, or if it was uninf luential and hawks therefore had free reign, Japan would have agreed in the late 1950s, while renegotiating the U.S.–Japan treaty of

50

public opinion during the cold war

alliance, to participate in the defense of Korea and especially Taiwan. Japan would have joined South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and other U.S. allies in sending combat (or at least noncombat) troops to Vietnam and would have sent the SDF overseas to participate in the full range of U.N. peacekeeping operations, including those involving the use of force. Japan would not have refrained from developing bombers, offensive missiles, fullcapability aircraft carriers (which Japan had pioneered in the early twentieth century), or other power projection capabilities.

Public Attitudes Pacifist Attitudes? Japanese public opinion during the Cold War was never especially pacifist. While pacifism was one element in public opinion, as it is in almost every Western democracy, antimilitarist distrust of the state’s ability to wield the sword was a far more important opinion group. As introduced in Chapter 2, what often was labeled as pacifism in fact consisted of opinions that were in many ways consistent with realism. Most notably, a large segment of public opinion feared entrapment in American wars that were seen as not in Japan’s interest at best and as foolish at worst. There was also a perception, consistent with defensive realism, that overly hawkish defense policies risked provoking others. Nonetheless, Japanese public opinion departed from realism by mostly focusing on the risk of provoking others while not placing much emphasis on the role of military deterrence for discouraging others from exploiting the state or its citizens. To be sure, antimilitarist distrust of the state poses a challenge to orthodox realism. Realism, with its unitary actor assumption, has a hard time explaining how a people could distrust their own state as their defender. On the other hand, realism expects that states will often behave in predatory and aggressive ways, in the process bringing much destruction onto their own people as well as others.1 Some also recognize that unbalanced power domestically can be potentially as damaging as unbalanced power internationally.2 Consequently, if we relax the unitary actor assumption, it is not hard for realists to see how the citizens of a state might come to distrust their own state almost as much, if not as much or more, than others. In short, antimilitarist distrust of the state, at least as it existed in Cold War Japan, was more of a digression from realism rather than a paradigmatic challenge. With the exception of Socialist Party elites, who were out of touch even with many of their own voters (see the following discussion), and the relatively



public opinion during the cold war

51

small purely pacifist segment of the Japanese electorate, many Japanese voters who at times supported Socialist, Communist, or other politicians opposed to the SDF and the U.S. military alliance did so as a way of constraining the military and preventing entrapment in wars they did not believe to be in the national interest, rather than because they believed in a world where war could be abolished by the force of positive example or revolutionary change. Antimilitarist Distrust A large portion of the Japanese public mistrusted the state’s ability to judiciously wield the sword and its ability to maintain civilian control over the military. These two concerns were at the heart of antimilitarist distrust of the state. Above all, ordinary Japanese were deeply suspicious of the military. As Richard Samuels puts it, “Clearly the balance of public opinion valued protection from overprotection by their military.”3 Recently, Ito Joichi, an Internet entrepreneur and venture capitalist born in 1966, summarized the view of his parent’s generation: “My parents’ generation still does not trust the military. The pacifist [sic] stance of that generation comes in great part from the mistrust of the Japanese military.”4 A third element of antimilitarist distrust was the fear that the same politicians who advocated lifting the restrictions on the use of military force by the state were also opponents of democratization and postwar reforms. “Normalizing” Japan’s military was not seen just as risking embroiling Japan in another costly and foolish war but also as threatening the survival of postwar democracy, civil liberties, and other reforms.5 The fact that the prewar military effectively overthrew Japan’s prewar democracy in the 1930s only deepened this concern. Prime Minister Kishi Nobosuke’s use of majoritarian tactics to quickly ram the revised U.S.–Japan Security Treaty through the Diet in 1960, combined with his failed attempts strengthen surveillance and other police powers that reminded voters of prewar political repression, crystallized this perceived link between a proactive security policy and the rollback of postwar democracy.6 Opinion polls during the Cold War clearly demonstrated the presence of antimilitarist distrust among the majority of Japanese respondents. A Mainichi Shimbun poll published in October 1971 found that 63 percent of respondents thought that Japanese militarism had revived (3 percent), that it is reviving (21 percent), or that the revival of Japanese militarism is possible (39 percent), versus 28 percent who thought Japanese militarism cannot revive and 9 percent who answered otherwise. A Yomiuri Shimbun poll

52

public opinion during the cold war

published the same month found that 49.8 percent thought that militarism has revived (7.3 percent) or is reviving (42.5 percent), versus 31.4 percent who thought militarism is not reviving and 18.8 percent who answered otherwise. An Asahi Shimbun poll published in January 1972 found that 24 percent of respondents thought Japanese militarism is reviving, versus 53 percent who did not and 23 percent who answered otherwise. However, of this 53 percent, 17 percent (of overall respondents) answered that the revival of militarism is possible, when presented with this answer choice.7 A majority of the public also worried about civilian control. When asked about the adequacy of civilian control in a Yomiuri Shimbun poll published in June 1973, 31 percent answered that the present level of civilian control is adequate, versus 54.2 percent who answered that it is inadequate and 11.3 percent who answered that discussing civilian control is meaningless because the SDF is unconstitutional.8 Meanwhile, a May 1972 Mainichi Shimbun poll found that 16 percent of respondents thought that civilian control could be maintained in the future, versus 18 percent who thought it could not and a lopsided majority of 57 percent who expressed uncertainty about whether control could be maintained or not (and 9 percent who answered otherwise or did not answer). Interestingly, LDP and Socialist Party supporters paralleled each other in expressing distrust or uncertainty about the prospects for civilian control. Twenty-six percent of LDP supporters thought civilian control could be maintained, versus 11 percent who thought it could not and 56 percent who were uncertain; the respective responses by Socialist party supporters were 11 percent, 27 percent, and 55 percent, respectively.9 Other indicators of antimilitarist distrust were the overwhelming majorities that opposed amending Article 9 so that Japan could legally possess an army. Asahi Shimbun and Shu¯kan Asahi polls asking this question found that, over the course of the 1960s, those supporting revising Article 9 for this purpose dropped from just over a quarter of all respondents down to just under a fifth.10 In light of overwhelming support for Japan actually possessing a military, one can speculate that the insecure constitutional position of the SDF was seen as an additional form of civilian control, especially in light of the previous Meiji Constitution of 1889, Article 11 of which had put the military effectively beyond the reach of civilian control.11 The Japanese public appeared to fear change in military policy above all else. While they were becoming comfortable with the SDF status quo as a disaster relief organization, change seemed to threaten a reversion to militarism, a prospect that was seen as a threat to other countries as well as Japan. Thus, a June 1971 Mainichi Shimbun poll found that a plurality of



public opinion during the cold war

53

41 percent of respondents thought the then current fourth defense buildup plan would threaten other countries, versus 37 percent who did not and 22 percent who were not sure. By contrast, when the same poll asked whether the SDF posed a threat to other countries, a majority of 54 percent answered that the SDF did not pose a threat, versus 27 percent who did think they posed a threat and 19 percent who answered otherwise.12 Positive views of the current SDF thus coexisted with fears about what it could become. An editorial in Yomiuri Shimbun in 1961, addressing the issue of whether the ban on overseas dispatches of the SDF should be lifted to allow participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions, expressed this fear: “If the constitution is revised so that troops may be sent abroad there is no knowing when the rightist forces will strengthen their inf luence and embark on aggression instead of dispatching troops [for noncombat missions].”13 Nonetheless, even during the Cold War a large majority of Japanese thought a military was necessary. Repeated Asahi polls conducted in the 1950s found consistent majorities, sometimes approaching a two-thirds majority, claiming that Japan needs armed forces. Strikingly, even many opponents, when queried further, acknowledged that Japan needed armed forces, although not necessarily these armed forces, that is, the SDF (see the following discussion).14 In the June 1971 Mainichi Shimbun poll discussed in the preceding paragraphs, 71 percent of respondents stated that the SDF is necessary, with 14 percent answering that it is needed to defend against external aggression, 24 percent that it is needed for preservation of public order, and 22 percent that it is needed for disaster relief operations. A poll repeatedly conducted by the prime minister’s office (hereafter PMO) found that 15 percent of respondents thought the SDF should concentrate on national defense in 1965, with this number rising to 24 percent by 1968. At the same time, those believing the SDF should concentrate on preserving public order increased from 16 percent in 1965 to 19 percent in 1968. By contrast, those answering that the SDF should concentrate on disaster relief work fell from 40 percent in 1965 to 37 percent in 1968, and those believing that the SDF should concentrate on public welfare work declined from 12 percent to 10 percent.15 Although there was overwhelming agreement that the SDF was needed, disaster relief was seen as its most important role. Over time, the popularity of this mission in the public’s eye would only grow. In part, this reflected low perceptions of external threat, with only small minorities (ranging from 3 percent to 32 percent) expressing anxiety about foreign threats in Asahi Shukan, Mainichi Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun, and Sankei Shimbun polls conducted in the late 1960s.16 Nonetheless, a plurality recognized

54

public opinion during the cold war

an external attack as a theoretical possibility, with 47 percent of respondents in a May 1972 Mainichi Shimbun poll responding that an external attack was possible (43 percent) or even likely (4 percent), versus 39 percent who thought an external attack unlikely, 8 percent who considered it inconceivable, and 6 percent who did not answer or answered otherwise.17 While the Soviet Union was generally identified as the most likely external threat, a January 1969 Asahi Shimbun poll18 and an April 1978 Yomiuri Shimbun poll found that the United States was identified as the second most likely potential threat. In the 1978 Yomiuri poll, 52.7 percent identified the Soviet Union as posing a threat to Japan, versus 10.8 percent who identified the United States, 10.5 percent who identified China, and 8.6 percent who identified North Korea as threats.19 As suggested in Chapter 2, antimilitarist distrust of the state’s ability to wield the sword matters most when the perceived threat of the state again losing control of its military is stronger than the perceived threat posed by other countries. As long memories of the army’s 1930s hijacking of the state remained vivid and perceptions of foreign threat remained minimal, antimilitarist distrust of the state predominated. Fear of Entrapment Large portions of the public believed Japan was relatively safe from external threats but worried about what they saw as an aggressive American ally. Stemming from domestic distrust of the Japanese state’s ability to control its military and prevent it from again acting aggressively, a large portion of public opinion thought it natural to reassure other Asian nations that Japan would not again acquire the intentions or ability to threaten them. At the same time, they saw American strategy in Asia as unnecessarily provocative, especially until the end of the Vietnam War in 1975.20 Consequently, heightened fear of entrapment led the public to respond, as Izumikawa explains, “by resisting to strengthen its military or increasing its alliance commitments to the United States.”21 Antimilitarist mistrust of the state’s ability to control and wield the military met entrapment fears over the issue of “joint [read “U.S.”] command” of the Japanese military during wartime. Antimilitarist mistrust and entrapment fears conspired to make this politically impossible for Japan, the only major American ally to lack a “joint command” agreement.22 A June 1953 Asahi Shimbun survey revealed that significant portions of the Japanese electorate viewed rearmament as increasing the danger of entrapment in wars and other situations not in Japan’s national interest. The question asked whether strengthening Japan’s Safety Force (the name at that time for the Japanese military) would primarily benefit Japan, the United



public opinion during the cold war

55

States, or both. Only 10 percent of respondents thought this would primarily benefit Japan, while 39 percent thought it would primarily benefit the United States and 28 percent thought this would benefit both countries; 23 percent were unsure. Even combining the 10 percent who cited Japan as the primary beneficiary with the 28 percent citing both countries as jointly benefiting, for a combined total of 38 percent, at best, achieves only a statistical dead heat against the 39 percent citing the United States as the primary beneficiary. While this fear of entrapment was especially strong among Socialist Party supporters, with 58 percent claiming strengthening Japan’s military would primarily benefit the United States, 34 percent of conservatives also answered this way, suggesting that fears of entrapment transcended ideological cleavages. Most of those answering that rearmament would aid the United States also supported a neutralist foreign policy and the withdrawal of U.S. bases from Japanese soil. Another question in the same Asahi survey made clear that this fear of entrapment was not especially sensitive to the economic burdens of rearmament: When asked whether Japan should increase its defense effort because the United States is providing more military assistance, respondents opposed this idea 40 percent to 27 percent.23 During the ratification debate regarding the revised U.S.–Japan Defense Treaty of 1960, the issue of entrapment again became salient. The treaty contained a “Far East” clause, stipulating that the United States could use its military bases in Japan to “maintain stability in the Far East.” Under questioning from opposition party politicians in the Diet in February 1960, Kishi stated that the “Far East” would include Quemoy and Matsu, small Taiwan-controlled islands just off the coast of the People’s Republic of China, islands the U.S. Navy had defended from mainland attack several times in the mid-1950s. Kishi’s answer stoked the fear that Japan might get entrapped in an American war. Consequently, opposition to the new treaty surged. A PMO poll in July 1959 found 15 percent of Japanese supporting the new treaty, versus 10 percent who opposed it.24 Using a different question, a Yomiuri Shimbun poll conducted in late September showed that the support rate for the new treaty had risen to 21 percent.25 However, by March 1960, after the Quemoy and Matsu issue arose, a new Yomiuri poll was showing 28 percent of Japanese opposing the new treaty, versus 21 percent who supported it, with the remainder undecided.26 Similarly, fear of entrapment was an important factor behind overwhelming Japanese opposition to the Vietnam War. According to an early August 1965 Asahi Shimbun poll on the Vietnam War, 75 percent disapproved of U.S. bombings of North Vietnam, while a mere 4 percent approved. Asahi

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itself attributed this to fears that Japan might be drawn into the war; indeed, in answer to another Asahi question, 60 percent of respondents feared the Vietnam War might engulf Japan, versus 19 percent who did not fear so.27 The importance of entrapment fears from the early 1950s till the early 1970s suggests that one important reason for the increasing popularity of the U.S. alliance from the early 1970s onward was the removal of the most salient reason for this fear. From the 1950s till the early 1970s, the United States was involved in hot wars in Korea and Vietnam, tense confrontations over Quemoy and Matsu, and numerous other smaller military incidents, such as the U-2 shoot down over the Soviet Union in 1960. By 1975, however, the United States had ended its strategy of actively using military power to contain, if not roll back, Communist inf luence in East Asia. The early 1970s should thus be seen as a turning point that produced improved public perceptions of the alliance and perhaps even lessened opposition to building Japan’s own capabilities.28 Socialist and Communist politicians (not to mention some conservatives) could no longer point to Vietnam, Quemoy, and Matsu to dramatize the danger of being dragged into a war by the United States. The coincidence of the U.S. drawdown in Asia with a Soviet buildup in the region was undoubtedly another factor that contributed to a significant shift in Japanese opinion, a shift characterized by a move from fear of entrapment toward some measure of fear of abandonment rather than from pacifism toward realism. Related to fears of entrapment were concerns about U.S. bases in Japan. The bases themselves of course could become a principle vehicle for entrapment if the U.S. use of them encouraged the Soviet Union or perhaps China to attack these bases. The bases were also associated in the minds of many Japanese with various negative side effects such as potential accidents, noise, crime, social vices, and the like. Mendel tracked the growth of opposition to U.S. bases from a minority to an absolute majority between 1950 and 1958.29 A Mainichi Shimbun poll published in May 1972 asked respondents whether they found U.S. bases to be frightening or unpalatable ( fukai). In response, 62 percent found U.S. bases to be very (19 percent) or somewhat (43 percent) frightening or unpalatable, versus 33 percent who found the bases not very (27 percent) or not at all (6 percent) frightening or unpalatable; 5 percent had another or no answer.30 Alignment, Perceptions of America’s Role Despite real entrapment fears, Japanese citizens usually preferred alignment with the United States to any other policy alternative, although gener-



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57

table 4.1 Japan’s alignment in international politics. Asahi: “Should Japan be pro-American, pro-Soviet, or neutralist?”

1950

1953

1959

Pro-American Pro-Soviet Neutralist Other, don’t know

55% 0 22 23

35% 1 38 26

53% 1 17 29

source: Data from Asahi Evening News, October 9, 1959, as cited by Douglas H. Mendel Jr., The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1961): 43.

ally not by overwhelming margins. As Table 4.1 indicates, except for 1953, absolute majorities in an Asahi Shimbun poll supported alignment with the United States over neutrality, with no more than 1 percent of respondents supporting alignment with the Soviet Union. Overwhelming reluctance to align with the Soviet Union appeared to ref lect bitter memories of the Soviet surprise attack in August 1945, the unresolved Northern Territories issue, and perhaps even memories of the Russo–Japanese war of half a century earlier. Neutrality was the strongest competitor to alignment with the United States. Strikingly, in 1953, a year after the recovery of independence, a small plurality of Japanese favored neutrality over alignment with the United States. However, this appears to be a one-time and temporary dip in support for alignment with the United States following the end of the occupation. Mendel attributes this finding to optimism following the death of Stalin that the Cold War would soon end.31 Certainly, by 1956, if not earlier, a plurality of Japanese again preferred alignment with the United States over neutrality. A U.S. Information Agency (USIA) poll conducted in 1956 asked Japanese whether their country should be on the side of the communist powers, the noncommunist powers, or neither. Forty-six percent opted for alignment with the noncommunist West; 29 percent were for neutrality; 23 percent were not sure; and 2 percent opted for alignment with the communist powers.32 A poll conducted by Mendel in 1957, and depicted in Table 4.2, shows greater support for alignment with the United States among rural respondents (from Izumo, Shimane prefecture) than among urban ones. Even in Osaka, at the time one of the Socialist Party’s strongest bastions, a plurality preferred alignment with the United States to neutrality. Despite concerns about U.S. foreign policy being too aggressive, especially in Asia, pluralities, if not majorities, of the public continued to support the U.S. alliance. In a May 1972 Mainichi Shimbun poll,

58

public opinion during the cold war table. 4.2 Voter views on alignment in Osaka and Izumo, 1957.



American bloc Communist bloc Neutralist bloc Other, don’t know

Osaka (N = 455)

Izumo (N = 457)

39% 2 28 31

51% 0 20 29

source: Data from Douglas H. Mendel Jr., The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1961): 45, author’s polling.

for example, 48 percent of respondents said the U.S. alliance was useful for Japanese security, versus 25 percent who said it was not useful and 14 percent who said it endangered Japanese security.33 Clearly, there was significant skepticism about America’s global and regional role. When asked who was most at fault in the Vietnam War in 1965, 33 percent of Japanese respondents answered that the United States was most at fault in Vietnam, versus 8 percent who thought the Vietcong were to blame.34 When asked whether a strong American military presence around the world increases the chance of peace or war, a Newsweek poll found 27 percent of Japanese respondents answering that this increases the chances for peace, versus 52 percent answering that it increases the chance of war and 17 percent volunteering the answer that a strong U.S. military presence had neither effect.35 Nascent Attitudinal Defensive Realism Nascent attitudinal defensive realism was evident and widespread in Japan even before the end of the occupation. As Table 4.3 makes clear, from September 1950 through August 1957, in answer to a question by the left-leaning Asahi Shimbun and a similar question by Central Research Services in 1956 and 1957, clear and growing majorities claimed that Japan needed to possess military forces. In 1956 and 1957, those asserting that Japan needed military forces approximated a two-thirds majority. The Asahi poll found that even most opponents of Japan possessing military forces, when queried further, expressed support for a limited self-defense force.36 Similarly, in the August 1957 Central Research Services poll, only 9 percent favored abolishing the SDF, while almost twothirds of self-described neutralists favored having some native defense force.37 Although the Socialist Party advocated unarmed neutrality, or churitsu hibuso¯, these results suggest that the unarmed part of this slogan was espe-



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table 4.3 Does Japan need military forces?

Yes

No

Other, don’t know

September 1950 February 1952 May 1954 October 1956 August 1957

54% 56 52 66 64

28% 26 30 19 19

18% 18 18 15 17

source: Data from Douglas H. Mendel Jr., The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1961): 69.

table. 4.4 Support for a military buildup. Support for a “gradual increase,” “expansion,” or “rearmament” of the SDF

January 1953 January 1956 August 1957

Approve

Oppose

Don’t know

50% 37 31

20% 42 42

30% 21 27

source: Data from Douglas H. Mendel Jr., The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1961): 70, who presents results and from Asahi Shimbun and Central Research Services using questions that include the phrases “gradual increase,” “expansion,” and “rearmament” respectively in 1953, 1956, and 1957.

cially unpopular with the Japanese public and even with many supporters of the Socialist Party. Indeed, in retrospect it appears that many observers uncritically projected onto voters the openly pacifist positions of Socialist party elites, assuming that voters who supported the Socialists were also pacifists who rejected all forms of military power. Given the elitist tendencies evident in the study of Japanese public opinion, this conf lation is perhaps not surprising. The findings here suggest a Socialist Party often out of touch with even significant parts of its own base, an unsurprising finding given the weak voice of elected Socialist Diet members within the party. Decision making in the JSP was based on a “convention-first” rule under which delegates to the party’s annual convention would establish party policy, thereby limiting the inf luence of elected Diet members who were more directly exposed to public opinion.38 Elitism was not only a disease of conservatives. Near universal recognition of the need for armed forces of some kind did not translate into support for building up Japan’s quite modest 1950s-era military capabilities. As Table 4.4 shows, the small minority opposing a military buildup of the SDF in 1953 had grown into a large plurality by August 1957.

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Instead of building up the SDF, support for the SDF status quo grew over time. For example, an Asahi Shimbun poll published on New Year’s Day 1978 found 23 percent supporting a strengthening of the SDF, versus 54 percent who wanted it to continue as is, 10 percent who wanted to reduce the SDF, and 5 percent who wanted it abolished. This poll, ref lecting the continuation of the trends we saw in the 1950s, suggests extremely low and declining support for abolishing the SDF, minimal support for reducing its size, reduced support for building up the SDF, and a clear and commanding majority supporting the SDF status quo. Overall, more than three in four Japanese favored either maintaining or strengthening the SDF.39 Given the minimal size and strength of the SDF and that Japan could afford to do much more, one could consider satisfaction with the status quo unrealistic if not unrealist. However, it appears to have ref lected the belief that the status quo of minimal SDF armament combined with perceptions of low external threat and the U.S. alliance had worked well for Japan’s defense. These results also ref lected the importance of balance-of-threat and related reassurance logic in the nascent attitudinal defensive realism evident among the Japanese public. According to Mendel, “Assuming, as do most Japanese opponents of rearmament, that Japan faces no direct attack, the Self-Defense Force appears to endanger peaceful relations with neighboring states.” “What threatens Japan?” Mendel was repeatedly asked when interviewing several Socialist Diet members in the late 1950s and early 1960s. According to him, these members answered their own question: “Only American insistence on our rearmament, which antagonizes Russia, China, and even South Korea!”40 Of course, by focusing only on the potential for Japan to provoke others, Japan’s antimilitarist public minimized the possibility that others would exploit Japan’s military weakness. Despite, or perhaps because of this, Japan showed a surprising willingness to tolerate exploitation by one of its former colonies, South Korea. In 1953, South Korea unilaterally proclaimed the “Rhee line,” a line that enclosed a large swath of the Sea of Japan well beyond the internationally recognized three-mile territorial limit and stretching close to Japan’s west coast. Japanese fishing boats crossing the Rhee line were subject to seizure by South Korean naval vessels, with their crews being arrested. Several dozen Japanese fishermen found themselves languishing in South Korean prisons for many months as a result. Japan did not authorize its coast guard or the MSDF to use force to stop the Koreans from enforcing the Rhee line. Strikingly, public opinion was overwhelmingly opposed to Japan using force to stop Seoul’s seizure of Japanese fishing boats. Only about 8 percent to 11 percent of Japanese were



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table 4.5 Effectiveness (ko-kka) of various means for Japan’s security.

Military power Economic cooperation Diplomatic means

Effective

Not effective

40% 75 75

46% 11 10

source: Data from Mainichi Shimbun, May 3, 1972 (morning edition): 12. Multiple answers were allowed.

willing to countenance the use of force in response to Seoul’s unilateral enforcement of the Rhee line. The overwhelming majority of respondents supported various forms of diplomacy instead.41 This recognition appears to ref lect the view that the Rhee line posed a small-scale and limited threat to Japan and largely ref lected lingering Korean mistrust from Japanese colonialization of their peninsula rather than a larger security threat. Thus, opposition to using military force to settle this dispute appeared to ref lect opposition to using military power for offensive purposes beyond national territory—in short, for anything beyond territorial defense. Although there is not much polling data from the Cold War period that asks questions related to the utility of offensive versus defensive military power, a question asked in an August 1965 Asahi poll about the Vietnam War indicates skepticism about the effectiveness of offensive military power for conquering other countries. When asked about the likely impact of a Vietcong victory in South Vietnam, 42 percent thought a Vietcong victory would not lead to communist take-overs in other Asian countries, versus 17 percent who thought such a victory would have this affect.42 Overall, military power was seen as less effective than other means for ensuring Japan’s national security. In a Mainichi Shimbun poll published in May 1972, Japanese respondents were asked about the effectiveness of various means for ensuring national security; the results are depicted in Table 4.5. A plurality thought military power was not effective for ensuring national security, while overwhelming majorities thought economic cooperation (usually denoting trade and foreign aid) and diplomatic means were effective for promoting national security. Ref lecting a nascent attitudinal defensive realism about the utility of military force, a June 1973 Yomiuri Shimbun poll found support for limiting the SDF’s defensive role to Japanese territory or immediately surrounding

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areas. Of those responding to the poll, 42.9 percent said that SDF operations should be strictly limited to defense of territorial waters and airspace; 22.6 percent thought the SDF should maintain control of sea and air space around the Japanese islands. Only 1.8 percent thought the SDF should be able to conduct maritime escort operations without limit, and 6.5 percent thought there was no need to limit SDF activities.43 Summarizing his 1989 study of Japanese public opinion on foreign affairs, Bobrow finds “stable skepticism about the utility of the military instrument.”44 Overseas Dispatch of the SDF Long before the Gulf War, the issue of dispatching Japanese personnel overseas had been slowly welling to the surface in Japanese politics, despite a 1954 nonbinding upper house resolution opposing overseas dispatch for any reason.45 In fact, MSDF ships had gone overseas for unarmed nautical “training” and Antarctic exploration, and SDF officers had been dispatched to overseas embassies.46 As early as 1952, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau had ruled that SDF overseas dispatch for noncombat operations would be constitutional but that an enabling law would be necessary.47 During the Vietnam War, the Kaya-Kishi faction in the LDP advocated sending SDF personnel to South Vietnam in a noncombat capacity, but public opinion rendered this impossible.48 Although generally a skeptic about the inf luence of public opinion on Japanese foreign policy, Thomas Havens nonetheless acknowledges that public opinion had a constraining effect on policy: “The combined weight of public opinion expressed in attitude surveys, rallies, letters to editors, and the media probably set limits on how far the government could go in materially supporting the United States forces in Vietnam.”49 When first asked, in 1965, whether they supported the SDF’s dispatch overseas in order to cooperate with the United Nations in some way, a PMO poll found that 55 percent of Japanese expressed opposition versus less than 10 percent who approved.50 Because of such lopsided opposition, a bill drafted in the 1960s permitting the SDF to participate in U.N. peacekeeping (similar to the one submitted twenty-six years later) was never submitted to the Diet.51 Twenty-one years later, in another PMO poll conducted in October 1986, respondents were asked whether Japan should cooperate with U.N. peacekeeping operations in disputed areas such as the Middle East or Cyprus by dispatching personnel and equipment and extending financial aid within the limits of domestic legislation. In response, 39.2 percent said Japan should do so, versus 25.3 percent who replied to the contrary and 34.6 percent who



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63

were unsure. Although not asked specifically about the participation of the SDF in peacekeeping, the willingness of a plurality to consider dispatching personnel to conf lict zones (and the uncertainty of another third) suggests that as early as 1986 a significantly larger portion of Japanese were relatively open to considering this prospect.52 The presence of a plurality in support and, more importantly, the absence of an opposing majority made it politically safe for the LDP government to enact legislation in September 1987, the so-called Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japanese Disaster Relief Teams, which allowed the dispatch of Japanese government personnel overseas to participate in disaster relief operations. Based on this and other legislation, Japan dispatched small numbers of civilians to Afghanistan and Pakistan in June 1988 and to the U.N. Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group in August 1988. The Foreign Ministry’s 1989 Diplomatic Bluebook states clearly the government’s intention to send more personnel abroad but noted the importance of obtaining public support first.53 Although the 1987 law allowed for the dispatch of individual SDF members in principle, none were dispatched due to concern in the LDP about a lack of public support. An August 1989 PMO poll, repeating the same language used in the 1965 poll, found that a mere 22 percent of respondents supported the possibility of SDF participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, versus a plurality of 46 percent who were opposed and 30 percent who were unsure.54 Thus, in the course of twenty-four years the public had become more open to the idea of dispatching personnel overseas to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations, with a plurality supporting this. Nonetheless, a large plurality continued to oppose SDF participation.55 Most significantly, however, an overwhelming majority of 72 percent supported overseas dispatches of the SDF for “disaster relief activities,” the SDF’s main domestic role.56 Thus, a year before the outbreak of the first Gulf War, the public, while suspicious of SDF participation in peacekeeping operations, was nonetheless already quite comfortable with the idea of the SDF playing a humanitarian and disaster relief role overseas. Subsequent LDP governments would gradually come to understand that they could gain public acceptance for SDF deployments overseas by largely limiting these dispatches to humanitarian and reconstruction-like missions.

Did Public Opinion Matter? Did Japanese public opinion toward security matter during the Cold War? As we saw in the previous section, large opposing opinion majorities were

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inf luential in preventing LDP politicians from dispatching the SDF to Vietnam for even noncombat roles and in quashing a bill that would have allowed SDF participation in U.N. PKO. On the other hand, there were many skeptics, prominent among them one of America’s first ambassadors to the newly independent and supposedly democratic Japan, Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II. MacArthur told Mendel, in a December 1957 interview, to “forget about what the mass public tells you in your opinion polls, because the men in Japan who really count are all on our side.”57 A noted historian of Japan’s connection to the Vietnam War, Thomas Havens also expresses skepticism about the inf luence of public opinion, citing “an ingrained resistance to become politically committed, an outlook inherited from pre-modern ideas about the proper roles of officials and citizens,” as well as the results of “child-rearing and other forms of cultural conditioning.” Consequently, in what he describes as “a culture of one-party rule,” LDP leaders such as Prime Minister Sato¯ could safely “downplay,” if not ignore, public opposition.58 More recently, Kenneth Pyle, looking back at the Cold War in his book Japan Rising, claims that “working closely with business leaders, conservative politicians and bureaucrats managed Japan’s neo-mercantilist foreign policy with little intrusion from public opinion.”59 Similarly, Kiichi Fujiwara, a professor of political science at the University of Tokyo, maintains “that under the so-called 1955 setup . . . public opinion had little impact on foreign policy.”60 Although dominant, the elitist perspective has not gone entirely unchallenged. John Emmerson, writing in the early 1970s, noted the salience and inf luence of public opinion on defense policy: “The voice of public opinion being louder in Japan [on defense issues] than in most democracies, the Japanese leadership was never insensitive to the effect on the public of its decisions and actions.”61 Similarly, Prime Minister Yoshida, although initially skeptical of the prospects for democracy in Japan,62 eventually came to have greater respect for the wisdom and inf luence of Japanese public opinion. Discussing the prospects for revising Article 9 so Japan could normalize its military, Yoshida observed, “Obviously there exists no reason why revision should not come in the long run [so long as the Japanese people are] watchful and vigilant. . . . The actual work of revision would only be undertaken when public opinion as a whole has finally come to demand it.”63 Clearly, the Japanese public itself was, from the outset, rather pessimistic about its inf luence over policy. Mendel, in polling he conducted in Osaka and Izumo in 1953 and 1957, asked respondents to evaluate how much inf luence citizens have on government decisions. The results, depicted in Table 4.6,



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table. 4.6 Voters’ perception of their influence on government decisions. “How much power do you think average Japanese like yourself have to influence government decisions?”

1953

1957



Osaka

Izumo

Osaka

Izumo

Great Little None Don’t know

12% 35 34 19

15% 27 24 34

13% 58 10 19

18% 42 14 26

source: Data from Douglas H. Mendel Jr., The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1961): 37–38. Author’s polling.

show significant pessimism, yet growing optimism, about the inf luence of average voters on government policy. Given the pessimistic bias in Mendel’s scale, with “great” being juxtaposed against “little” or “none,” the results might exaggerate the extent of pessimism among the Japanese public. If “little” had been “some,” it seems plausible that something close to a plurality might have answered that citizens have great or some inf luence on government decisions. Nonetheless, the decrease in those thinking public opinion has no inf luence is striking, although the increase in those thinking public opinion has “great” inf luence is modest.64 Private testimony from Japanese elites suggests that public opinion mattered greatly to them. When Mendel asked LDP politicians about whether public opinion mattered, several answered, “Why else would we soft-pedal rearmament and your military bases?”65 Indeed, it mattered enough for them to spend significant political capital with their primary patron and protector, the United States, by asking for electoral favors. For example, in 1969 Wakaizumi Kei, a top foreign policy aide to prime minister Sato¯, pressed the Nixon administration to quickly announce plans to close U.S. missile bases in Okinawa. In a private memorandum to Henry Kissinger dated November 10, 1969, Wakaizumi wrote, “Mr. Sato¯ would deeply appreciate it if Mr. Nixon could consider the particular question of closing down of the Mace B missile bases in Okinawa . . . if the Pentagon could rather quickly announce . . . the plan of closing down the Mace B bases in Okinawa, say within the next 18 months or so, this would no doubt have a greatly favorable impact upon the public opinion at home in Japan. Furthermore, if this kind of announcement could be made before the end

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of this year, it would be a tremendous help for the Sato¯ Government and his Liberal Democratic Party; for we are almost certainly going to have a crucial general election next January.”66 On another occasion Wakaizumi warned the Nixon administration of the dire consequences for the ruling LDP if the nuclear side agreement regarding the reversion of Okinawa (allowing for the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to Okinawa in the event of a crisis) were to become public. According to Wakaizumi, “If the contents become known, not only would Prime Minister Sato¯’s cabinet split, but the LDP, an ally of America, would face a major challenge at the next general election.”67 After the Nixon administration complied with most of his wishes and Sato¯ got the reversion agreement he wanted, he told confidants that the LDP’s December 1969 election victory had been due to the Okinawa agreement.68 Toward the end of the Cold War, another powerful and popular prime minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, tried to overturn the 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) limit on defense spending. This had been an important “hadome,” or brake, seen as enhancing the effectiveness and credibility of civilian control and on the use of the military by the civilian leadership itself. Nakasone used a fait accompli strategy to try to mold public opinion in favor of eliminating the 1 percent of GDP limit. This fait accompli strategy, according to Glenn Hook, has generally been effective: “We must also note how many people are prepared to give post-factum support to government policies. . . . This tendency to give post-factum legitimacy to the government’s security policies marks a level of success on the part of the government in trying to shape popular opinion on security issues.”69 With much difficulty, Nakasone was eventually able to engineer three defense budgets that ever so slightly exceeded the 1 percent of GDP ceiling. He did so in the face of overwhelming opposition, with approximately 70 percent of Japanese opposing any increase in military spending according to the government’s own survey data and 78 percent specifically opposed to exceeding the 1 percent of GDP limit, according to a Mainichi Shimbun poll.70 After winning a large election victory fought on other issues in 1986, Nakasone succeeded in “officially” abolishing the 1 percent of GDP limit on defense spending and achieved three budgets that ever so slightly breached this limit. Nonetheless, after he left office, and in the wake of the LDP’s loss of control of the upper house in 1989, subsequent LDP leaders retreated back behind the 1 percent of GDP limit on defense spending. Fear of the public’s reaction was an important reason for this retreat, as “many” LDP politicians feared the “electoral implications for the party.”71



public opinion during the cold war

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Since Nakasone, no prime minister, no matter how hawkish, has, as of the writing of this book, ever challenged the de facto 1 percent of GDP defense ceiling.72 Consequently, since Nakasone’s tenure Japan’s annual defense budgets have ranged between stagnation and decline, with procurement budgets for new weapons falling sharply as a consequence. Nakasone’s attempt to engineer a fait accompli abandonment of the 1 percent ceiling on defense spending, despite his great popularity and political skill, ended in failure.

Conclusions During the Cold War, Japanese public opinion, based on the experience of the Pacific War, was suspicious of the state’s ability to judiciously wield the sword or control the military. Antimilitarist distrust, in the context of low threat perceptions toward the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Korea, and other powers, dominated over concerns about deterring foreign threats. Nonetheless, only a tiny minority of the public actually supported unarmed neutrality. Over time, the public became more confident in civilian control and favorably disposed to the SDF due to their valuable disaster relief operations. Consequently, antimilitarist distrust of the state gradually declined, and the government was able to gain support for a gradual and incremental expansion of SDF security roles, a process that demonstrated the ability of the state to effectively and judiciously wield the sword. Another factor limiting support for expanding the SDF’s military roles was fear of entrapment in American wars, a fear that was especially strong from the early 1950s through the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. However, with the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina the inf luence of entrapment fears remained low for the rest of the Cold War. Although the public gradually became more accepting of military power as necessary for national defense, there was no movement toward embracing offensive uses of military power. However, the growing popularity of the SDF’s domestic disaster relief operations made the Japanese public more receptive to the idea of making this domestic disaster relief organization go international, a development that was to have a large inf luence on Japan’s security policy beginning with the first Gulf War in 1990–1991.

5

The First Gulf   War

The Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990 and the Persian Gulf War of January– February 1991 provided the first political stress test of the Japanese public’s attitudes toward sending troops overseas since the end of the Pacific War in 1945. For the first time since Japan regained independence in 1952, the nation was openly pressured by the United States to dispatch Japanese personnel overseas to participate in a multilateral military operation, namely the U.S.–led multilateral army assembling in Saudi Arabia to oppose the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Japanese government and the ruling LDP responded by proposing a “U.N. Peace Cooperation Corps” (UNPCC) bill before the National Diet in October 1990. SDF and other personnel would be members of what the bill called the “U.N. Peace Cooperation Corps (UNPCC).” However, the Japanese public did not support this plan, forcing it to ultimately be scrapped. This political drama lay bare, for the first time in a generation, the large gap between Americans and Japanese in the way they view the utility of strategically offensive military force. This chapter is thus a case study examining how the public responded to this proposal and how they inf luenced politicians and policy. It shows how the Japanese public’s distinctive views on the utility of military force and the U.S. role internationally led it to consistently oppose the dispatch of the SDF overseas for combat or any operations connected to combat. The LDP’s attempts to persuade the public failed, and the party was ultimately compelled by broad and stable public opposition to abandon the planned dispatch of the SDF to Saudi Arabia. In short, this chapter shows the public’s inf luence and skepticism regarding the utility of projecting military power overseas. Subsequent efforts to dispatch ASDF transports to the Middle East to evacuate refugees during the Gulf War similarly failed. On the other hand, the government’s dispatch of minesweepers following the official end of hostilities proved to be both politically possible and popular with the public. The reasons for the contrasting success of the minesweeper deployment will be analyzed at the end of the chapter.



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The U.N. Peace Cooperation Corps Bill A conf luence of real and imagined U.S. pressure and hawks within the LDP, most notably then LDP Secretary General Ozawa Ichiro¯, produced legislation for dispatching the SDF to Saudi Arabia. The idea of the bill was first broached on August 29, 1990, nearly a month after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. During a press conference that then Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki held to announce a $1 billion package of measures to aid the coalition forces in the Gulf, Kaifu mentioned the proposed bill. According to Kaifu, the purpose of this bill was to enable Japan, acting “within the framework of the Constitution,” to “perform its duties appropriately with regard to cooperating in United Nations’ activities for keeping and maintaining peace.”1 However, at that time, Kaifu ruled out the direct involvement of the SDF.2 By the time the Peace Cooperation Bill was formally introduced in the Diet on October 16, however, Kaifu and the LDP had reversed course on the issue of SDF participation. As submitted to the Diet, the UNPCC bill authorized the SDF to provide noncombat rear-area logistical support for the U.S.–led multilateral army assembling there, albeit with the caveat that the SDF would withdraw in the event of hostilities. In addition to providing such support, the bill authorized several other overseas missions for the SDF: (1) Police cease-fires; (2) supervise administrative affairs; (3) police elections; (4) construct transportation and communications infrastructure; (5) provide medical and transportation services; (6) conduct civilian relief activities; and (7) repair damaged infrastructure. In terms of personnel, the bill authorized the government to dispatch SDF units or individual soldiers overseas as well as personnel from the JCG and other related agencies.3 Corps members were barred from combat roles. The bill did allow members to carry sidearms, however, but strictly limited the use of these weapons to immediate individual self-defense; the right of SDF units or the UNPCC as a whole to use force, even in selfdefense, was disallowed.4 These roles appeared to implicate the SDF in overseas military operations. The idea of actually dispatching the SDF overseas, even for nonmilitary purposes, remained unfamiliar to the Japanese public and generated considerable suspicion, especially during a militarized crisis. It reminded many Japanese of their state’s reputation for being incapable of controlling a military, especially when deployed overseas. Consequently, the bill reignited antimilitarist suspicion about the reemergence of an aggressive disposition toward the use of military power.

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Although often reputed to be marginal and ineffectual, the opposition parties raised an insurmountable challenge to ruling LDP policy elites. The Socialist Party, led by its charismatic female leader Doi Takako, successfully highlighted the precedent of sending Japanese troops overseas for the first time since World War II, drawing a causal connection between dispatching troops overseas and a repeat of Japan’s very salient experience of devastation and defeat during World War II. Socialist politicians made antimilitarist distrust and Asian mistrust of the Japanese state’s ability to wield the sword the centerpiece of the party’s campaign against dispatching the SDF overseas.5 In an interview with Mainichi Shimbun, Socialist Party Secretary General Yamaguchi Tsuruo claimed that the UNPCC bill, by deploying the SDF overseas, would raise “the fear of once again repeating . . . the nightmare” of Japanese militarism.6 The Socialists thus provided the general public with a competing source of information and a competing interpretation of the UNPCC bill to that provided by the government and the LDP. Even some within the LDP shared these misgivings. Goto¯ da Masaharu, former head of Japan’s Defense Agency and former chief cabinet secretary under former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, expressed his opposition to sending the SDF to Saudi Arabia in a front page Mainichi Shimbun interview. According to Goto¯ da, “If Japan uses this as an opportunity to start sending troops to other countries . . . the door will be opened for Japan to become a military superpower.’’ Goto¯ da added, ‘’Japan does not have a historical foundation for civilian control [of the military] like England and the United States.’’7 Shortly thereafter, in a weekly magazine, Goto¯ da again expressed his opposition to any change in constitutional interpretation regarding SDF dispatch overseas, because then “all restraints would disappear.”8 According to Nakatani Iwao, Goto¯ da was suggesting that if Tokyo removed its familiar restrictions on sending troops overseas, Japan would “go wild” (Bo¯ so¯ suru).9 The First Wave of Opinion Polls The UNPCC was debated for three weeks and then abandoned on November 8 because of an evident lack of support within the Diet, even among many members of the ruling LDP. This lack of support stemmed from the formation of a large and stable opinion majority opposing the bill and especially overseas dispatch of the SDF. Several opinion polls conducted between mid-September and mid-October revealed the presence of this opposing opinion majority.



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table 5.1 Opinions on dispatching the SDF overseas. What do you think about dispatching the SDF overseas? It is not necessary to dispatch the SDF. As much as possible, the SDF should be dispatched under the condition that they carry no weapons. The SDF should be dispatched overseas carrying weapons. No answer/don’t know

48.5% 28.4 10.9 12.1

source: “Kaifu naikaku shijiritsu, hatsu no teika,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 15, 1990: 1, 7.

The first of these polls, conducted by Asahi Shimbun on September 19–20, a few weeks before the UNPCC bill was formally introduced and well before the government began its efforts to sell the bill to the public and the Diet, found overwhelming opposition: Sixty-seven percent opposed sending the SDF overseas, versus a mere 19 percent who supported the idea. At the same time, this poll found that a plurality of 40 percent thought Japan’s response to the Gulf Crisis had been “too weak,” versus 33 percent who thought it had been appropriate and 7 percent who thought it had been too strong. Clearly, a significant segment of the Japanese public wanted Japan to play a larger role, but one that would not involve sending the SDF to the Gulf.10 Vigorous efforts by Prime Minister Kaifu and his government in early October 1990 to sell the bill may have made a dent in this opposition. A poll conducted by the centrist Nihon Keizai Shimbun (hereafter, Nikkei) from October 5 to 8, and depicted in Table 5.1, found that opposition had dropped to 48.5 percent. However, this drop in measurable opposition may have resulted, at least in part, from different question wording. Most significantly, the Nikkei poll differed from the Asahi poll in that it offered three answer choices instead of two: Dispatch the SDF with weapons, dispatch without weapons, and oppose dispatch under any circumstance. Indeed, when the two categories of opposition in any form and support on condition that SDF members carry no weapons are added up, the total reaches nearly 77 percent, an overwhelming majority opposed any dispatch that implied combat. Despite the apparent volatility created by variations in question wording and form, the responses to this question revealed opposition to dispatching the SDF overseas to be broad based. Almost 40 percent of LDP supporters expressed opposition to overseas dispatch, versus approximately 35 percent who expressed support for dispatch without weapons and approximately 15 percent who supported dispatch with weapons. This result revealed that the

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LDP risked paying a significant price even among its own supporters for pushing the UNPCC bill.11 Politicians React As the public’s opposition to the UNPCC bill became manifestly clear through this first wave of opinion polls, the bill’s prospects began to fade. First, the dovish Ko¯ mei party came out against the bill. Ko¯ mei, which is closely tied to the So¯ka Gakkai Buddhist sect (also dovish), held the balance of power in the upper house of the Diet. Without support from Ko¯mei, the LDP could not pass the bill in the upper house with all other opposition parties voting against it. A Nikkei poll had revealed that well over half of Ko¯mei members opposed sending the SDF overseas under any circumstances. More surprising than the pacifist-leaning Ko¯ mei’s announcement was an announcement at about the same time by the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), a relatively hawkish centrist opposition party, that it too would oppose the bill. Perceptible public opinion, including constituent feedback as well as published opinion polls, appears to have decisively inf luenced the decisions of Ko¯ mei and the DSP to oppose the bill.12 With public opposition to the UNPCC bill now clear, anxiety among even LDP leaders became evident. The leader of the largest faction within the LDP, the Takeshita faction, and former Defense Agency Director Kanemaru Shin was especially cautious, arguing on October 15 that the bill should not be pushed through the Diet unless the understanding of public opinion could first be realized.13 Within a few days this caution had morphed into open opposition by several senior LDP leaders. On October 21, the same day the media broke the story about former Nakasone Cabinet Chief Secretary Goto¯da’s outspoken opposition to the UNPCC bill (discussed in the preceding section), LDP faction leader, former Deputy Prime Minister (and future Prime Minister) Miyazawa Kiichi came out against changing the interpretation of the Constitution for the sake of the UNPCC bill, thereby implicitly expressing his opposition to the bill itself.14 Two days later, other LDP leaders, including former prime ministers Fukuda Takeo and Suzuki Zenko¯ , expressed similar, if less outspoken, reservations about overseas dispatch of the SDF.15 A Second Wave of Polls Following these initial reactions, a second wave of opinion polls revealed continued if not growing opposition to the UNPCC bill. An opinion poll



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published on October 23 by Mainichi Shimbun, reputed at that time to be the most leftist of Japan’s four major national dailies, revealed that a lopsided majority 53 percent of respondents opposed sending SDF troops abroad, versus a mere 13 percent, mostly male, who favored overseas dispatch. A large percentage of respondents, 33 percent, were undecided.16 The Mainichi poll also revealed that the unpopularity of the UNPCC bill had cut into Kaifu’s relatively high (by the standards of Japanese prime ministers) popularity ratings. Between September and October, Kaifu’s disapproval rating increased 19 percent, hitting a high of 36 percent. By contrast, his approval rating fell 6 percent in September to 35 percent—the first time since the formation of his cabinet thirteen months earlier that his disapproval rating exceeded his approval numbers.17 The Mainichi poll indicated a link between Prime Minister Kaifu’s growing unpopularity and public disapproval over the UNPCC bill: Among those who answered that they did not back the Kaifu cabinet, 76 percent said they opposed sending the SDF overseas. By contrast, among supporters of the Kaifu cabinet, only 36 percent opposed dispatching the SDF.18 Overall, the Mainichi poll results suggest that the UNPCC bill had become increasingly unpopular since the Nikkei poll two weeks earlier and that Kaifu’s efforts to sell the bill were no longer effective.19 A Yomiuri Shimbun poll published on October 25 confirmed a noticeable drop in approval for the Kaifu cabinet. Significantly, this poll revealed that, among respondents expressing disapproval, defense policy was given as a reason by 33.4 percent of participants, up from 13.8 percent a month earlier. Of respondents, 36.8 percent expressed disapproval of Kaifu’s diplomatic policy, up from 25.0 percent a month earlier. All other reasons selected by respondents for nonsupport declined from the month before.20 Finally, on November 3–4, just days before the UNPCC bill was abandoned, an Asahi Shimbun poll found that 58 percent of respondents opposed the UNPCC bill, versus 21 percent who expressed support. Dispatching the SDF overseas during a crisis seemed to be a major reason for opposition: Seventy-eight percent opposed overseas dispatch during a crisis, versus 15 percent who supported and 7 percent who were undecided.21 Finally, the Asahi poll revealed a very attentive general public: Eighty-two percent claimed that the Gulf crisis was of interest, versus 14 percent of respondents who claimed no interest.22 Politicians Retreat As the results from the second wave of polls showed consistent if not growing public opposition to the UNPCC bill, anxiety within the ruling LDP

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only grew. One indication was that LDP leaders began to blame the bill for the Kaifu cabinet’s falling popularity.23 Another indication was the way the LDP fought a by-election held in Aichi prefecture (that is, the Nagoya region) in late October. Whereas the Socialist candidate ran on opposition to the UNPCC bill, mentioning it at every stop, the ruling LDP candidate ran away from the bill, failing to mention it and focusing instead on attracting more government spending (pork) for the region. Although the LDP candidate won, his aides blamed the UNPCC bill for turning what should have been a very easy victory into a very tight contest.24 By late October, many LDP members had become reluctant to go on record supporting the bill and the dispatch of the SDF overseas. A late October opinion poll of lower house members conducted by the Asahi Shimbun found less than half of LDP lower house members expressing “active support” for the UNPCC bill and all opposition lawmakers opposing the measure. Adding LDP opponents to the opposition totals, 56 percent of all Diet members expressed opposition to the bill.25 Many junior LDP Diet members were especially worried about an electoral backlash if they voted for the UNPCC bill given the formation of a clear opposing opinion majority.26 One member of the LDP, who considered himself to be a hawk on defense issues and who had many defense-related industries in his district, had this to say about supporting the UNPCC bill: “I would have been worried about voting yes. Voters paid attention to this issue very closely, and they were against the dispatch of Jieitai overseas.”27 In the face of Ko¯ mei’s opposition and growing opposition within the LDP, the UNPCC bill was dropped in early November 1990. The LDP leadership decided not to even schedule a vote in the lower house, for fear that many LDP members would abstain from voting, thereby embarrassing the party.28 Public Influence Versus Elite Divisions Arguing from an elitist perspective, one might be tempted to claim that elite divisions, rather than public opinion per se, defeated the UNPCC bill. Public opinion, in this view, might merely ref lect elite divisions. To be sure, elite divisions on the issue of dispatching the SDF overseas ran deep and long preceded the debate on the UNPCC bill, as discussed in Chapter 4. To take a relatively recent example, in 1987 Goto¯ da, as chief cabinet secretary, had opposed Prime Minister Nakasone’s plan to send minesweepers to the Persian Gulf to help protect Western shipping during the Iran–Iraq War. At the time he privately warned that overseas dispatch of the SDF could cause



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Japan to slide back into militarism. His opposition was the primary reason that Nakasone’s plan failed.29 In addition to Goto¯ da, other prominent LDP leaders, including former prime ministers Fukuda and Miki, and faction leaders such as Miyazawa Kiichi had long expressed their opposition to any expansion of the SDF’s role or its overseas dispatch. Nonetheless, when the UNPCC bill was introduced in early October, not a word of dissent could be heard from among the LDP ranks; even Goto¯da was silent. Under the force of party discipline, the LDP presented a united front of support. It was only under the combined weight of the bill’s dimming prospects and continued strong public opposition that party discipline cracked. Public opposition not only provoked the centrist opposition parties to oppose the UNPCC bill, thus sealing its fate, but even produced the spectacle of open revolt within the LDP’s own ranks. Thus, the case of the UNPCC bill’s defeat demonstrates (1) consistent and stable public opposition ref lecting preexisting attitudes; (2) a failure of government and LDP efforts to remake public opinion on overseas dispatch; (3) a correlation between measurable public opposition and the bill’s subsequent defeat (withdrawal) in the Diet; (4) legislators worrying that voting for the bill might damage their reelection prospects; and (5) a breakdown in LDP party discipline under the weight of strong public opposition. This case thus supports the contention of pluralists that public opinion can be stable, comprehensible, and inf luential. In a counterfactual world in which public opinion did not matter and offensive realist hawks had their way, the SDF would have been dispatched to Saudi Arabia to provide rear-area logistical support for U.S. forces, if not actual combat support. On the other hand, had Japanese opinion been pacifist instead of defensive realist and inf luential, Japan would have only condemned the invasion and imposed sanctions on Iraq; it would not have supported U.S. or allied military deployments related to Desert Shield.

The ASDF Dispatch Plan The failure of the UNPCC bill is thus an important example of an elected Japanese government retreating from a desired foreign policy initiative in the face of a large and stable opposing opinion majority. Another example followed shortly thereafter during the Gulf War. Following the outbreak of the war in early 1991, Japan found itself facing new American demands to contribute to the war effort. In response, on January 24, Japan offered an additional $9 billion in assistance to the U.S.–led coalition, on top of the

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$4 billion it had pledged the previous autumn, thereby making Japan one of the leading financiers of the war. Second, and of greater significance for Japan itself, Kaifu authorized a plan to dispatch 5 C-130 ASDF transport aircraft and 200 ASDF personnel to the Middle East to evacuate war refugees. The government claimed that no Diet approval was needed, citing Article 100, section 5, of the SDF law, which allowed the SDF to “transport state guests” and “others” as mandated by cabinet ordinance.30 Both of Kaifu’s proposals proved to be controversial. Opposition parties, especially the Socialists, criticized the $9 billion contribution for violating at least the spirit of Japan’s constitution because the funds would be used to underwrite the conduct of war. They particularly objected to the use of the $9 billion to pay for weapons or munitions. Japan, the Socialists maintained, should be neutral and contribute no more than humanitarian assistance for civilian victims and diplomatic efforts to settle the conf lict. As discussed further in the following pages, conditions were eventually attached to this $9 billion contribution.31 Opposition parties also criticized the plan to dispatch transport planes to the Middle East, returning to their argument of the previous autumn that the dispatch of the SDF overseas for any reason would be unconstitutional. The centrist Ko¯ mei was particularly insistent that the overseas dispatch of ASDF transports, even to evacuate refugees, required Diet approval. The opposition parties pointed to a statement by a Defense Agency vice minister in September 1987 that in order to dispatch ASDF planes overseas to rescue Japanese nationals, the SDF law would have to be amended.32 Two weeks after the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War, in the middle of the air campaign, Asahi Shimbun conducted a poll on the Gulf War. When asked whether they supported the American-led attack, Japanese opinion split evenly, with 42 percent expressing support and 42 percent opposition to the attack; 16 percent responded “don’t know” or gave no answer. The Japanese public was more supportive of giving financial assistance to the American war effort than they were of sending ASDF planes to the region to evacuate refugees. Only 33 percent supported sending the planes, versus 55 percent who were opposed; 12 percent answered “don’t know” or gave no answer. By contrast, 39 percent of respondents supported the government’s decision to give the U.S.–led multilateral army an additional $9 billion, versus 44 percent who opposed (and 17 percent who answered “other” or gave no answer). This suggests that antimilitarist distrust and fear of entrapment in an American war rather than pacifism, explains the public’s reaction. While one segment of those opposed to this measure was undoubtedly



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motivated by a pacifist opposition to all war, the balance of opinion data presented hitherto suggests that fear of entrapment in a war not seen to be in Japan’s interest probably motivated a large segment of those expressing opposition to making a financial contribution to the war effort.33 One might conclude that this result ref lects an unrelated penny-pinching miserliness. However, another question on how this money was to be used suggests that fear of entrapment lay at the heart of the matter: Sixty-two percent of respondents thought the donation to Desert Storm should be given on condition that it not be used for “weapons or bombs,” versus 27 percent who thought that this condition was not necessary and 11 percent who answered “other” or gave no answer.34 Complementing fear of entrapment, antimilitarist distrust of civilian control, and the state’s ability to judiciously use the military were also major factors motivating opposition to sending ASDF planes to the Middle East. When asked if the dispatch of SDF planes would “make you worry about future dispatches overseas for the sake of using military force,” 58 percent said yes, versus 30 percent who said no (12 percent had another answer or gave no answer). These numbers closely resemble the spread for opponents and supporters of sending the ASDF aircraft, suggesting that fear of future dispatches leading to the use of military force was a good predictor of a respondent’s position on overseas dispatch of the SDF even for nonmilitary humanitarian efforts. One factor inf laming this fear was skepticism about the decision-making process for dispatching the planes. An overwhelming majority, 76 percent, responded that basing this decision on a cabinet order instead of on a revision of existing law in the Diet was problematic, versus a mere 14 percent who thought this was not problematic (and 10 percent who fell into the “don’t know” or “no answer” category).35 In sum, public opinion was evenly split to slightly opposed to contributing $9 billion to the U.S.–led coalition, but a clear majority opposed the use of this money to buy arms or bombs. A larger majority opposed the dispatch of ASDF planes. In two out of these three cases, as Asahi Shimbun’s early February poll revealed, there were clear majorities opposing Kaifu’s original proposals. In the weeks that followed, Kaifu was forced to drop one of these proposals (the dispatch of the ASDF transports) and to modify the other to bring it more in line with public opinion by attaching conditions to the $9 billion. Thus, as with the case of the UNPCC bill, simple correlational analysis reveals public opinion to be determining policy. The government proposed policies, learned that strong majorities opposed them, and then had to modify those policies to bring them more in line with public opinion.

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Process tracing suggests that, beyond mere correlation, public opinion was the causal factor behind these policy shifts. Unlike the UNPCC bill, there was little open dissension within LDP ranks. However, like the UNPCC bill, the centrist Ko¯ mei party, which held the balance of power in the upper house, played a crucial role. Again, Ko¯ mei felt a need to respond to the strong antimilitarist beliefs of its voters and to fend off competition from the Socialist Party, who was more stridently antimilitarist if not pacifist.36 Indeed, the party’s public image as a dovish party was at stake. As William Heinrich Jr. notes: “Having successfully prevented the LDP from including the SDF in the UN Peace Cooperation Corps, the party was not about to renege and allow SDF personnel to go the Gulf in the midst of a war.”37 Ko¯mei also successfully used its pivotal role in the upper house to force Kaifu and the LDP to place restrictions on how the $9 billion would be spent; specifically, the money could not be used to purchase weapons or ammunition. Ko¯ mei also forced the LDP to take some of the money used for the $9 billion out of the SDF’s procurement budget, an added bonus for Ko¯mei’s antimilitarist credentials.38 Ko¯mei was able to further leverage its pivotal position in the upper house to force the LDP to scrap its plan to dispatch ASDF transport planes to the Middle East. Although the decision to dispatch planes had been made without consulting the Diet, Ko¯ mei, backed up by the Socialists and by overwhelming public opinion, held that extending the scope of the SDF Law in this way, on the basis of a cabinet decision alone, was deeply troubling and a violation of the Diet oversight provisions (Article 76) of the SDF Law. Although the use of a cabinet order had been an LDP strategy for avoiding another bruising Diet fight over overseas dispatch, Ko¯ mei refused to support the $9 billion contribution to the Desert Storm coalition unless Kaifu scrapped the ASDF transport plane dispatch. Ko¯ mei’s successful use of double (or even triple) leverage in the upper house, tying several concessions to one vote on the $9 billion contribution, was facilitated by broader public opinion beyond its own base because there is evidence that some LDP members were reluctant to support the ASDF dispatch in the face of clear public opposition.39 In a counterfactual world in which public opinion did not constrain offensive realist hawks, Japan would have dispatched the ASDF transport planes to the Middle East to evacuate refugees, if not provide logistical support for the multinational coalition. Moreover, the $9 billion contributed to the Gulf War effort would have come with no strings attached and would not have come at the price of a reduction in Japan’s own defense budget. On the other



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hand, had public opinion been pacifist and inf luential, Japan would not have contributed $9 billion to the war effort, and Tokyo would have adopted a policy of neutrality in response to the outbreak of the Gulf War. The Minesweeper Dispatch After the Gulf War had formally ended in April 1991, the Japanese government made a third attempt to dispatch the SDF to the Middle East. Over 700 lethal Iraqi mines littered the northern end of the Persian Gulf and needed to be cleared before tanker traffic could resume to Kuwait, Iraq, and parts of Iran and Saudi Arabia. As Japanese shipping was directly affected, the Defense Agency, the Foreign Ministry, and the Kaifu cabinet saw a justification for dispatching minesweepers under Article 99 of the SDF Law, which permits the dispatch of MSDF ships to clear mines on international waters (ko¯kai). Although this article had originally been included in the SDF law in 1954, so as to allow the SDF to deal with mines remaining in its coastal waters from World War II, then Prime Minister Nakasone suggested in 1987 that the scope of the term international waters be expanded to include more distant waters, such as the Persian Gulf. On April 24, after the U.N. Security Council had declared an end to hostilities, the Kaifu cabinet announced a plan to send a minesweeper f lotilla to clear waters off Kuwait of Iraqi mines. Kaifu dispatched four minesweepers, two support ships, and 511 MSDF personnel to the Persian Gulf to clear mines. Within three days of Kaifu’s announcement, the ships left port on April 27, arriving in the Persian Gulf a month later. A week after that, the f lotilla joined the participants of Desert Storm in minesweeping operations.40 The minesweeper dispatch was bitterly attacked by the Socialists, although notably not by Ko¯mei nor by the Democratic Socialist Party. The Socialists argued that sending minesweepers to distant shores for the first time violated the original intent of Article 99 of the Self-Defense Forces law and was a grave violation of Article 9 of the Constitution. Ko¯mei, on the other hand, cautiously welcomed the dispatch as appropriate because it involved neither the lethal use of force nor deployment to a war zone.41 After the experience of the UNPCC bill and the failed effort to dispatch ASDF transport planes to the Middle East to rescue refugees, the LDP and the Kaifu cabinet expected an outcry from the Japanese public when they announced the decision to dispatch minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. As Heinrich notes, “public support for dispatching the minesweepers was wholly unanticipated.”42

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Yet, when Asahi Shimbun asked, on April 21–22, 1991, about government plans to dispatch the minesweepers (that is, before the dispatch), 56 percent agreed with the dispatch, versus 30 percent who disagreed (14 percent answered “other” or gave no answer).43 Similarly, a Fuji-Sankei Communications Group poll found 77 percent of respondents supporting the dispatch, whereas the Public Policy Forum, a private think tank, uncovered 62.6 percent support for the dispatch. Many Japanese were apparently willing to support this dispatch, even though they believed it was constitutionally problematic: Forty-six percent found it problematic, versus only 33 percent who found it not so.44 Following the dispatch of the minesweepers, measurable support for their dispatch continued and even increased. A Mainichi Shimbun poll conducted on June 7–9, 1991, asked respondents if they supported the minesweeper dispatch: Sixty-one percent gave it support or cautious support, versus 33 percent who were opposed or cautiously opposed; 6 percent had another answer or gave no answer.45 A new Asahi Shimbun poll conducted just after the Mainichi poll, on June 9–10, 1991, found more support for the minesweeper dispatch than when this question had been first asked in Asahi’s April poll. Sixty-five percent of respondents answered that the dispatch was a “good idea,” versus 24 percent who answered that it was not a good idea and 11 percent who had no idea at all.46 Many observers see this as a shift in Japanese public opinion induced by American criticism and Japanese government attempts to mold opinion by exploiting this criticism.47 Rather, the minesweeper dispatch enjoyed popular support because it had an important demonstration effect. It demonstrated that the Japanese military could go overseas to conduct noncombat operations with undeniable humanitarian as well as commercial value that did not take place in the context of a war yet were operations that undeniably required military expertise. As an objective, clearing the mines from waters off Kuwait and Iraq was simply unobjectionable. In effect if not form, the minesweeper dispatch resembled the domestic disaster relief operations that are the backbone of public support for the SDF at home. This salient example, complete with television and other media images of the minesweepers eliminating threats to peaceful shipping in the Persian Gulf, created important images of a new type of overseas dispatch, one that began to break “the historical link between overseas dispatch of Japanese military forces and their participation in aggressive wars.”48 Thus, the minesweeper dispatch built trust in the SDF’s ability to perform professionally and with discipline overseas and established the idea that overseas dispatch could be delinked from combat.



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Counterfactually, the minesweeper dispatch may have been the one time that Kaifu and the LDP could have f louted public opinion and gotten away with it, at least temporarily. Like the discarded ASDF plane dispatch, the minesweeper dispatch relied on a cabinet order, not Diet legislation. And with funding for the U.S.–led coalition already safely through the Diet, it is doubtful whether Ko¯mei could have found another hostage by which to thwart the dispatch. Moreover, following the announcement of the dispatch and an Asahi Shimbun poll revealing significant public support, Ko¯mei, ref lecting public opinion, announced its support for the minesweeper dispatch. Only the Socialists and Communists opposed the dispatch. This case demonstrated for the first time that the public would support an SDF overseas dispatch under some circumstances, although the range of justifiable reasons remained unclear. This is clearly a different outcome from a counterfactual world in which Japanese public opinion was inf luential and pacifist. Although the correlation between public opinion and policy outcomes regarding the minesweeper dispatch appears to be coincidental rather than anticipated, this also suggests that elites did not see public opinion as easily moldable. Rather, elites appeared to have lacked a clear map of public opinion regarding overseas dispatch, being uncertain of what the public would and would not tolerate. If the UNPCC bill and the ASDF plane dispatch can be thought of as probes that turned up public opposition, then the minesweeper dispatch was the first probe that turned up public support, thereby greatly inf luencing the shape of the subsequent U.N. peacekeeping debate, with hawks arguing that the minesweeper dispatch proved that the public had come to support SDF deployments overseas for a range of military missions. The next chapter addresses this debate.

6

International Peacekeeping and the U.S.  Alliance in the 1990s The distinctive worldview of the Japanese public (distinctive at least from an American perspective) regarding the utility of military force and the global role of the United States continued to inf luence and channel Japanese policy in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The LDP made renewed attempts to send the SDF overseas following Tokyo’s failure to send its military to Saudi Arabia for noncombat rear-area logistical support operations. This first half of this chapter is thus a case study focusing on the interaction between the LDP government and public opinion following the dispatch of MSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf at the end of the Gulf War and attempts to enact a law allowing SDF overseas dispatches for participation in U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. This case study also includes Japan’s early overseas dispatches of the SDF to U.N. peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, and the Golan Heights. The rest of the chapter focuses on the revised U.S.–Japan defense guidelines of 1997, which called for the SDF to provide rear-area logistical support for U.S. military operations in regional conf licts affecting Japan, and on the impact of the 1998 “Taepodong shock” on Japanese public opinion. In the process this chapter shows the inf luence of public opinion, especially its attitudinal defensive realism.

Toward a Peacekeeping Law On November 9, 1990, as the war clouds of Desert Storm were gathering in the Middle East, the Kaifu cabinet formally withdrew the UNPCC bill, bowing to consistent and overwhelming public opposition to dispatching the SDF overseas. However, the LDP, led by Party Secretary General Ozawa Ichiro¯ , a leading party hawk and one of the prime movers behind the UNPCC bill, obtained a compromise agreement with the centrist Ko¯mei and Democratic Socialist Parties committing these parties to support a new bill on Japanese participation in U.N. peacekeeping. Under the “three-party agreement,” a new peacekeeping organization was to be set up without any links to, or participation by, SDF personnel.1 However, the imminent recess



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of the Diet due to the new emperor’s coronation and other higher legislative priorities prevented the rapid introduction of a bill based on this agreement. The legislation that eventually resulted in the spring of 1992 was a far more modest bill for overseas dispatch of the SDF than the failed UNPCC bill of fall 1990. Nonetheless, the new law permitted SDF overseas dispatch to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Although the success of this legislation has been attributed to the “manipulation” of public opinion by Japanese elites using American “gaiatsu” (foreign pressure) and other means,2 in fact public opinion changed little during this period. What changed were elite proposals. Drafting of the peacekeeping bill began in March 1991, when the PMO presented a preliminary outline of a PKO bill in line with the November 1990 three-party agreement. This draft appeared to be designed to highlight what the government perceived as deficiencies with the interparty agreement, especially the clause mandating that an organization separate from the SDF should be set up and charged with peacekeeping. The government’s draft highlighted the legal problems involved in creating a separate organization. In particular, it claimed that corps members would face the legal paradox of being civilians in Japan but uniformed military personnel abroad. In general, the proposal seemed to lean toward the participation of SDF members, or at least reserve SDF members.3 In June, the LDP reached an agreement with Ko¯ mei and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) to abandon the notion of a separate organization and to use the SDF. The decision to use the SDF instead of creating a separate organization appears to have been inf luenced by a seeming shift in public opinion. As discussed in the previous chapter, dispatching the MSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the end of the first Iraq War proved to be unexpectedly popular. The demonstration effect of the SDF going overseas to benignly and professionally remove threats to peaceful commerce while under secure civilian control appears to have had a reassuring effect on Japanese public opinion.4 Consequently, public opinion seemed to shift toward supporting SDF deployments overseas, providing LDP hawks such as Ozawa with an opportunity. A June 1991 Asahi poll seemed to give clear evidence that Japanese public opinion on overseas dispatch of the SDF was shifting. When asked the same question that had been asked in December 1990, namely, in the case of a Middle East–type international crisis that affects Japan, how the country should respond, 19 percent said the SDF should be dispatched. This represents a 10 percent increase from the 9 percent who gave this answer in early

84

international peacekeeping table 6.1 Opinions about deploying the SDF overseas. “What do you think of deploying the SDF overseas?”

The SDF should not be deployed overseas May deploy to render nonmilitary assistance, such as disaster relief Would recognize a military role under U.N. command, such as participation in a U.N. PKO army May participate in military activities such as the Gulf War multilateral army Other answers/no answer

21% 46 23 5 5

source: Asahi Shimbun, June 19, 1991 (morning edition): 1, 4.

December 1990. Other answers, such as “only provide financial assistance” or “only pursue diplomatic efforts,” declined. The only other category that increased was “other/don’t know.”5 On the other hand, the Asahi poll posed a new question, asking respondents what they thought of deploying the SDF overseas in general. The results appear in Table 6.1. The key finding was that 46 percent, a clear plurality, favored overseas dispatch for nonmilitary assistance, such as disaster relief, which seemed to mark a significant shift in Japanese public opinion after the Gulf War.6 The other key result was that Japanese respondents were more trusting of U.N. command of SDF troops than of Tokyo’s command, clear evidence that antimilitarist mistrust of the state’s ability to wield the sword persisted, despite the favorable afterglow of the MSDF’s popular minesweeping dispatch to the Persian Gulf. Moreover, only a tiny minority of 5 percent thought the SDF should participate in a Gulf War–type multilateral army. Other questions in the Asahi poll reinforced this impression of a significant shift in public opinion regarding participation in U.N. peacekeeping. As Table 6.2 indicates, a clear plurality, 42 percent, again supported participation, but only in unarmed activities. Another 12 percent thought that Japanese should participate in cease-fire monitoring while carrying weapons for personal protection. Only 17 percent answered that Japanese personnel should participate in a U.N. “peacekeeping army” as “an armed group,” the same percentage who thought that Japan should not participate in any of these activities. Similarly, when asked in a follow-up question if they favor SDF participation in these peacekeeping operations “in some form,” 50 percent favored participation, versus 40 percent who opposed and 10 percent who answered “other” or gave no answer. These results suggest that Japanese opinion favoring overseas dispatch of the SDF for nonmilitary



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table 6.2 Japan’s participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. “U.N. peacekeeping operations, in other words PKO, include activities by a peacekeeping army, a cease-fire monitoring group, and an election-monitoring group. What do you think about Japan’s participating in these U.N. activities?” Should limit participation to election-monitoring groups, and so on, that are unarmed Carrying weapons for personal protection, should participate in cease-fire monitoring groups As an armed group, should participate in a peacekeeping force [army] Should not participate in any of these activities Other/No Answer

42% 12 17 17 12

source: Asahi Shimbun, June 19, 1991 (morning edition): 1, 4.

participation in U.N. peacekeeping was robust because it was not greatly inf luenced by changes in wording.7 This also appears to support the conclusion that this robust opinion was a new feature resulting from the experience of the Gulf War. Do these results suggest a major shift in public opinion? Most dramatically, when compared to the findings during the UNPCC debate in the fall of 1990, one can easily see a big shift from a clear majority opposing the overseas dispatch of the SDF to a near majority of around 45 percent to 50 percent favoring dispatch for nonmilitary purposes, such as humanitarian assistance. Some suggest that Japanese elites, using American criticism or “gaiatsu,” were able to push public opinion toward supporting overseas deployments of the SDF.8 Such a conclusion is misleading, however, because the UNPCC bill entailed dispatching the SDF to a potential war zone to provide rear-area logistical support for the U.S. military. During the Gulf Crisis in the fall of 1990, Japanese pollsters generally did not ask about dispatching the SDF overseas for nonmilitary humanitarian assistance operations. As a counterfactual speculation, we can surmise that had pollsters asked about overseas dispatches of the SDF for nonmilitary humanitarian and disaster relief missions during the Gulf Crisis, this option would have attracted significantly greater support, perhaps even approaching the 40 to 50 percent who supported this option following the Gulf War. Nonetheless, the outbreak of the Gulf War appears to have suppressed support for humanitarian dispatches. A PMO poll conducted in February 1991 found a mere 54 percent supporting SDF participation in overseas humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities, versus 72 percent expressing support when the same question was asked in 1989.9 Evidence of a reduced

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support for humanitarian dispatches during the Gulf War also emerges with a differently worded question in a Nihon Keizai Shimbun poll conducted in November 1990 and again in March 1991. In November 1990, 43.7 percent supported allowing the SDF to cooperate in “nonmilitary aspects of UN peace-keeping operations,” with support beginning to rebound following the war, as 47.2 percent of respondents expressed support for the same option in March 1991.10 Japanese citizens apparently did not buy the government’s claim in the fall of 1990 that an SDF dispatch to join the multilateral army in Saudi Arabia was a “nonmilitary dispatch” because they would provide only nonlethal logistical support and would supposedly f lee if hostilities broke out or were imminent. This skepticism also may explain why measurable Japanese public opinion opposed the dispatch of ASDF planes to the Middle East for a humanitarian mission (evacuating refugees) during the Gulf War. Japanese public opinion appeared ready to support SDF overseas dispatch on two conditions: not only that an SDF role be limited to humanitarian and nonmilitary activities but also that it not occur in the middle of a conf lict or war zone. Post–minesweeper dispatch polling thus suggests a resurgence of the prewar silent majority willing to countenance nonmilitary disaster and humanitarian dispatches of the SDF overseas. Moreover, the strong support that the minesweeping dispatch itself received appears to have temporarily moved public opinion somewhat beyond its long-term equilibrium view favoring SDF deployments overseas for nonmilitary purposes only. It is therefore plausible that elites overreacted to these polls and the strong support that the minesweeper dispatch received as signaling that the public would now accept overseas military activities by the SDF.11 This appears to explain the shift in the PKO bill’s content that occurred in June 1991, as these seemingly favorable polling results were published.

Introducing the PKO Bill to the Diet When the PKO bill was introduced in the Diet in September 1991, it contained language permitting SDF members and units to participate in U.N. peacekeeping. It also allowed them to carry sidearms for personal protection. Although individual members could decide, on their own, to use their weapons for personal self-defense, they were barred from using force as “a unit.” The bill permitted participation in the full range of peacekeeping operations, including what the Japanese defined as “main-duty” peacekeeping operations. These included monitoring compliance with a cease-



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fire; being stationed in, and patrolling, a buffer zone; weapons inspection; collection or storage of abandoned weapons; assistance in prisoner-of-war exchanges; and assistance in designating cease-fire lines. These operations were regarded as a distinct set of measures conducted by a peacekeeping “force” or “army,” (“gun”) and were given the acronym PKF.12 By contrast, transportation, construction, medical services, and other rear-support or logistical operations were regarded as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and distinct from PKF. The bill also allowed SDF units to deploy overseas for disaster relief and humanitarian operations, even those not specifically covered by a U.N. mandate. Unlike the UNPCC bill of the previous year, however, the new PKO bill limited participation to U.N. peacekeeping missions authorized by the U.N. Security Council, thus excluding participation in multilateral military forces merely sanctioned by the United Nations, such as the U.S.–led multilateral force of the Gulf War. In this respect, the PKO bill was a far less ambitious and scaled-back version of the UNPCC bill. Nonetheless, the new bill proved to be very controversial. Although the bill was back by the LDP and Ko¯ mei, and partially backed by the DSP, it was ferociously attacked by the Socialists as unconstitutional. Repeating the UNPCC experience, they objected to SDF members carrying weapons and serving in conf lict zones. Although supporting the bill, some Ko¯ mei members raised questions about these issues as well.13 After much detailed questioning and fierce debate on these issues, the LDP and the government agreed to scale back the bill, spelling out what became known as the Five Conditions for Japanese participation in a U.N. PKO mission. Ko¯ mei was the driving force behind these five conditions. First, agreement on a cease-fire must have been reached among the parties to the conf lict; second, the parties to the conf lict, including the territorial state(s), must have given their consent to the deployment of peacekeeping forces and Japan’s participation in such forces; third, the peacekeeping forces must maintain strict impartiality; fourth, should any of the above requirements cease to be satisfied, the government of Japan must withdraw the SDF; and fifth, the use of weapons must be limited to the minimum necessary to protect an individual’s life. However, these conditions remained informal rather than being written into the bill.14 Moreover, both the LDP and especially Ko¯ mei opposed an amendment that the DSP had been promoting since the PKO bill’s introduction in September, namely requiring that every dispatch of the SDF receive prior Diet approval. The LDP and Ko¯ mei instead favored the weaker language in

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the bill that required the government only to report to the Diet about the dispatch. This divergence created tension between the DSP and the other two supporters of the bill.15 In early November 1991, the Asahi Shimbun conducted its first survey of opinions on the PKO bill introduced in late September. Repeating the same question asked in June, namely about overseas dispatch of the SDF, 50 percent supported deployment for the sake of nonmilitary assistance, such as disaster relief, a 4 percent increase from the June finding. Support for an SDF military role under U.N. command dropped by 4 percent to 19 percent, and support for SDF participation in a Gulf War–style multilateral coalition almost vanished, dropping from 5 percent to 2 percent. On the other hand, opposition to all SDF deployments overseas rose from 21 percent to 24 percent.16 In all, the results for this question suggest significant shrinkage in the small minorities supporting a military role for the SDF overseas, with some respondents migrating from the two military options toward supporting noncombat overseas dispatches, combined with a modest increase in opposition to any form of overseas deployment for the SDF. The afterglow of the successful minesweeper dispatch was fading. Nonetheless, overall the results showed continuity more than anything else. On the other hand, there was a sharp divergence between support for SDF deployment overseas for nonmilitary activities and support for the actual PKO bill. When asked about the PKO bill, specifically provisions permitting the SDF to participate in military activities as part of a U.N. peacekeeping force (army, or PKF) in conf lict zones while carrying light arms, only 33 percent agreed, whereas 58 percent opposed (9 percent had another answer or gave no answer).17 Thus, few of those supporting SDF participation in nonmilitary assistance such as disaster relief were willing to countenance participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities that might even hint at the use of force. This indicates that Japanese public opinion had changed little since the UNPCC debate of a year before, despite a small and temporary jump in support for overseas deployments of the SDF in the immediate aftermath of the MSDF minesweeper deployment to the Persian Gulf. The PKO bill of November 1991 was only about 10 percent more popular than its predecessor, the UNPCC bill, had been. Given that the new bill was not being debated in the shadow of a looming war in the Middle East and that it limited overseas deployments to U.N. peacekeeping missions and humanitarian relief (as opposed to a U.N.–sanctioned multilateral force such as Desert Storm or Desert Shield) and required that a cease-fire be in place, this 10 percent



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increase is likely indicative of a more benign international environment and a watered-down bill rather than a change in public opinion per se. Despite watering down the PKO bill in an attempt to make it more acceptable to public opinion, the LDP and Ko¯ mei’s efforts were not enough to prevent the formation of an opposing opinion majority. The Asahi poll results, especially the headline result of the public opposing the contents of the PKO bill by a ratio of 55 percent to 33 percent, emboldened bill opponents, the Socialists and the JCP, while discouraging the pro-PKO bill coalition, especially Ko¯ mei. The responses of senior LDP leaders to the Asahi poll suggest an elitist bias in how they viewed public opinion. LDP Secretary General Watanuki Tamisuke reacted by claiming that “the public still does not understand the contents (of the bill).” The head of a small LDP faction was even clearer in suggesting that public opinion was unstable if not remoldable: “At the time of the minesweeper dispatch as well, many were opposed in the beginning [sic].”18 Other less senior LDP members were more pessimistic, however, implicitly viewing public opinion as hard to inf luence yet important for policy success. Funada Hajime, head of the LDP’s Policy Research Council’s Diplomatic Affairs Committee, characterized the polling results as “harsh numbers,” while the deputy head of the Watanabe faction suggested that the lack of public support would at least slow down the PKO bill: “This problem is going to take a while.” The chairman of the lower house Special Ad Hoc Committee on International Peace Cooperation, the committee with jurisdiction over the PKO bill, hinted at an awareness that public opposition stemmed from opposition to involvement in combat when he noted that “the condition limiting participation in PKF to areas removed from combat has not registered [with the public].”19 The Miyazawa cabinet tried to minimize the demoralizing effect of the Asahi polling results on the pro-PKO bill coalition by insisting, in the words of Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato¯ Ko¯ ichi, that the opposing opinion majority merely resulted from “insufficient government PR.” More substantively, he asserted that PKO still “had an (old) military like image.” Kato¯ also claimed that the government would strive to overcome this image in the Diet debate and at the same time demonstrate “civilian control.” Dismissing public opposition as resulting from a lack of information if not ignorance also suggests an elitist-like response, although Kato¯ ’s remarks also showed an appreciation for the role of antimilitarist mistrust in motivating many in the majority opposed to the bill.

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The reactions of the other two members of the pro-PKO bill coalition, the DSP and Ko¯ mei, indicated more of a pluralist-like respect for the inf luence of public opinion on policy because both saw the necessity of changing the contents of the bill to meet the attitudes of the public. The head of the DSP celebrated the Asahi poll results showing that the public “supports the party’s position” in favor of prior Diet approval of any PKO dispatch. By a margin of 76 percent to 15 percent, respondents answered that prior Diet approval of any overseas dispatch was necessary, versus a mere 15 percent who thought a report to the Diet would be sufficient and 9 percent who did not answer or were not sure.20 For the DSP, LDP and Ko¯ mei acceptance of their prior-approval amendment was key for winning over the public. A senior Ko¯mei leader, however, took issue with this claim, asserting that “whether to have prior Diet approval or a report to the Diet is not the issue, but if the five conditions for participation are written into law these [polling] numbers will change.”21 In other words, Ko¯mei interpreted the polling results as signaling that the public opposed any overseas dispatch that involved combat or implicated military-connected operations. Thus, the response of the LDP’s key partner in passing the PKO bill was to modify the bill to respond to public concerns, whereas the dominant reaction of the LDP was that further “education” efforts would swing public opinion their way. These differences in how to respond to public opposition foreshadowed pending difficulties in the LDP–Ko¯ mei ad hoc coalition as Socialist and Communist opposition became more energized in response to clear evidence of public opposition. The secretary general of the Socialist Party argued that the Asahi poll results meant that the government needed to rewrite the bill from scratch and “make an international contribution based upon the peace constitution.” The Socialists’ renewed energy in opposing the PKO bill caused it to become bogged down by controversy and detailed questioning. Opposition questioning focused on the right of command, interruption of duty and withdrawal, prior Diet approval, and, again, the use of weapons. Similarly energized by evidence of strong public support for its position, the DSP continued to push its amendment requiring prior Diet approval for every overseas dispatch of the SDF. Ko¯ mei continued to oppose this amendment.22 Rather than compromise further, the LDP sided with Ko¯ mei. After adopting Ko¯ mei’s proposed amendments, especially the previously mentioned five conditions for PKO participation, the LDP decided to ram the bill through the lower house Ad Hoc Committee on International Peace Cooperation in November. The decision to schedule an immediate vote,



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without warning, was driven by the desire to see the bill pass before the end of the fall session in early December. The decision to ram the bill through the Special Ad hoc Committee, instead of coming to an agreement with the opposition first over when to schedule a vote, proved to be a tactical blunder, not least because the DSP demand for prior Diet approval of all dispatches had strong public support. The already energized Socialists resorted to physical obstruction to try to stop the sudden vote. The DSP, alienated over the failure of the LDP and Ko¯mei to accept its amendment for prior Diet approval of dispatches, withdrew its support for the bill, thereby reducing to a thin majority the number of votes the LDP and Ko¯mei could muster in the upper house. Moreover, the physical confrontation and controversy surrounding the railroading of the bill alienated many Ko¯ mei legislators. After the full lower house passed the bill on November 29, the Socialists threatened further acts of physical resistance to run the clock down in the upper house.23 With the Socialists newly energized by public opposition, the DSP now opposing the bill, and Ko¯ mei wavering, even some within the LDP leadership began to distance themselves from the bill. Discipline within the party seemed to crack when LDP leader Goto¯ Masao resigned as chairman of the upper house Special Committee on International Cooperation, the committee charged with passing the bill.24 This only further encouraged the growth of opposition within the LDP. Under the combined weight of the DSP’s defection, the wavering of Ko¯ mei’s crucial support, and opposition beginning to appear even within the LDP, the LDP leadership decided to delay the bill until the following spring. Nonetheless, the LDP’s decision to drop the bill angered Ko¯ mei, which had risked alienating many of its own rank-and-file members to pass the bill in the fall; the ad hoc coalition between Ko¯mei and the LDP appeared in danger.25 The failure to pass the bill before the end of the fall session on December 20 was a great disappointment for the government and the ruling LDP because it was clear that the Diet would not be able to resume deliberations on the bill when the next session opened on January 24, 1992. Instead, passing the budget for the next fiscal year (starting on April 1) automatically took priority. It would not be until early April that politicians would again be able to give serious attention to the PKO issue. Spring 1992—Reintroducing the PKO Bill By early April 1992, the three-party coalition consisting of the LDP, Ko¯ mei, and the DSP had been resurrected. Ko¯ mei sought to further water down the

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PKO bill, apparently to make it more palatable for its dovish constituency and the broader public. After consulting with the LDP, the two parties agreed to freeze SDF participation in main-duty operations of peacekeeping, or PKF. This provision still permitted the SDF to participate in reararea support duties, including transportation, communications, and medical treatment. To lift the freeze, separate legislation would be required,26 an eventuality that would not come for nearly another decade. The DSP apparently did not participate in the LDP–Ko¯mei consultations over the freeze of PKF activities. Nonetheless, they agreed with the final terms worked out between the two parties. In a concession to the DSP, Ko¯mei and the LDP agreed to prior Diet approval for all PKF operations. In practical terms, this concession would not matter until the lifting of the PKF freeze.27 Formal debate resumed on the PKO bill in the upper house special committee on April 28. By May 1, the three parties had more or less agreed on the final shape of the bill. By further watering down the bill from what it had been in the fall, they had managed to overcome the opposing majority that had emerged the previous fall. In late April 1992, as the LDP and Ko¯ mei were reintroducing the bill into the Diet, Asahi Shimbun again conducted a poll on this issue. This poll revealed fundamental continuity on the question of overseas dispatch. Forty-seven percent supported nonmilitary assistance related dispatches, such as disaster relief; 20 percent supported participation in PKF under U.N. command; 4 percent recognized participation in a Gulf War–type multilateral coalition; and 24 percent opposed any overseas deployment (5 percent had no answer or another answer).28 These answers were little changed from the previous poll and showed a stable plurality in favor of nonmilitary humanitarian and reconstruction assistance dispatches. Significantly, the second question in the poll suggested a substantial shift of public opinion in favor of the PKO bill. In a similar, but subtly different, question from one asked in November 1991, respondents were told about the U.N. peacekeeping operations bill and asked whether they supported SDF participation in PKF. In a clear reversal from the November results, the April poll revealed that a narrow plurality, 47 percent, supported the SDF participation in a peacekeeping force (or army), versus 41 percent who opposed. However, differences in question wording may have inf luenced this change. The November question mentioned that the government’s bill “authorizes SDF participation in UN peace-keeping forces [armies] in conf lict zones while carrying light weapons.” By contrast, the April 1992 question merely notes that SDF participation in PKF has become “one of the main points of



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table 6.3 Japan’s cooperation with the U.N. PKO mission in Cambodia. “A U.N. peacekeeping operation has begun in earnest in Cambodia. How do you think Japan should cooperate with this operation?” (Choose one answer.) Provide financial and economic assistance Organize private individuals and dispatch them for nonmilitary operations Dispatch the SDF to participate in nonmilitary operations Dispatch the SDF to participate in the peacekeeping force [army] Other/don’t know

37% 20 22 12 9

source: Asahi Shimbun, May 1, 1992 (morning edition): 1.

debate.” Moreover, by the time the poll was taken, the Japanese media were already reporting on the LDP–Ko¯ mei agreement to “freeze” participation in PKF activities.29 This significant reduction in opposition to a key provision in the PKO bill bolstered the LDP, Ko¯mei, and the DSP and chastened the Socialists.30 By April 1992, the three parties had discovered that the public would at least tolerate a less military-connected PKO bill. The fourth question in the poll, on the other hand, may have encouraged both the LDP-led coalition and the Socialist opposition. It asked respondents how Japan should cooperate with the U.N. peacekeeping operation then beginning in Cambodia. The results are depicted in Table 6.3. Overall, these results reveal that, while financial assistance remained the most popular form of cooperation, dispatching the SDF had become the second preferred option. However, the idea of having a non-SDF organization perform this role was almost as popular. The Socialists responded to this new political environment by offering their own proposal to establish an “International Peace Cooperation Force” that would be a permanent organization, separate from the SDF, in which civilians would work in nonmilitary areas; in many ways this resembled the three-party LDP–Ko¯ mei–DSP agreement reached in November 1990. However, with apparently stronger public support this time for employing the SDF, the three parties rejected the Socialists’ proposal. The Socialists responded by reverting to physical resistance in an attempt to run the clock down on the spring Diet session and to pressure Ko¯ mei, and perhaps the DSP, to abandon the PKO bill. After a filibuster attempt, the famous “ox walk,” failed in the upper house, the bill was quickly passed by the upper and lower houses and became law on June 15.31 In sum, to achieve the enactment of the U.N. PKO bill in June 1992, the LDP had to water down the bill by freezing so-called front-line peacekeeping

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operations, cease-fire monitoring, weapon collection, and the like, in favor of concentrating on construction, medical services, and relief operations. In other words, so-called peacekeeping dispatches for the SDF came to resemble the popular humanitarian and disaster-relief missions that the SDF conducts at home and that Japanese public opinion had supported as a reason for overseas dispatch since at least 1986. In retrospect, it is obvious that what the LDP sold to the Japanese electorate was the idea that the SDF “disaster relief corps” should go international. The LDP modified its proposals to ensure they would not again provoke an opposing opinion majority. In June and early July, on the eve of and immediately following the enactment of the PKO bill, Nikkei Shimbun, the Tokyo Broadcasting Service (TBS TV) and Tokyo Shimbun conducted surveys measuring positions on the PKO bill itself. The Nikkei poll, conducted just before final debate on the bill, showed a clear majority of 55.1 percent strongly or reluctantly in favor of “sending the SDF overseas to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in non-combat roles as spelled out in the PKO bill.” On the other hand, 38.6 percent opposed sending the SDF overseas under any circumstances. To be sure, the answer options in this poll question were slanted in favor of the PKO bill because it gave two answer options in favor of the bill, with the second option being “support reluctantly,” an option that appeared almost neutral but in fact did signal support. On the other hand, respondents were not given the option of reluctantly opposing the bill or supporting overseas dispatch of the SDF in ways not spelled out in the PKO bill. Nonetheless, the emphasis on dispatching the SDF overseas to participate in the “noncombat roles” specified by the bill undoubtedly raised support and tapped into the large plurality bordering on a majority who supported overseas dispatch for humanitarian or relief operations.32 On the other hand, a Tokyo Broadcasting Service (TBS) poll taken just three days later, during the final stages of the Diet debate, and that simply asked whether respondents supported the PKO bill, found that only 32 percent supported the bill, while 55 percent opposed and 13 percent were undecided.33 A Tokyo Shimbun poll conducted at the beginning of July, after the passage of the PKO bill and with an upper house election looming, and that asked respondents whether they supported SDF participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, found undiminished opposition, with 55 percent opposing; but growing support as 42 percent supported their participation; and substantially diminished indecision, as a mere 3 percent remained undecided.34 This higher opposition rate appears to have ref lected alienation as a result of the final rancorous debate within parliament, as well as the famous



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“ox walk” filibuster. However, a subsequent Asahi poll and upper house election results suggest that this opposition gradually dissipated and turned into anger directed against the Socialists for their obstructionist tactics and uncompromising stance. In Asahi’s July survey, when asked whether the recent enactment of the PKO bill had been a positive development, respondents split evenly, with 36 percent responding that this had been a positive development, versus 36 percent who regarded it as a negative development; a strikingly large 28 percent expressed uncertainty (or answered “other”). The poll also asked respondents whether they would pay special attention to the PKO issue when choosing candidates and parties in then looming upper house elections: Sixty-three percent answered that they would pay “special attention,” up from 56 percent in April, whereas 23 percent said they would not pay special attention, down from 32 percent in April.35 Given that the Socialist party did very badly in these elections, whereas Ko¯ mei, and especially the LDP, did very well, these results tend to suggest that on balance public opinion tolerated, if not supported, the recently passed PKO bill but was inclined to punish the Socialists for their uncompromising opposition and filibuster tactics. Cambodia and Beyond The first dispatch of SDF troops overseas to Cambodia to participate in the U.N. Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC) elicited clear public support as they performed humanitarian and reconstruction missions with professionalism and discipline. The GSDF soldiers deployed on the ground in Cambodia concentrated on road repair, delivering food and water, water purification, sanitation work, and medical care. At its peak, the SDF UNTAC field clinic treated up to 600 patients a day. The GSDF’s water purification operations were especially acclaimed. UNTAC military commander General John Sanderson claimed the GSDF water purification teams were the best he had ever encountered.36 An Asahi Shimbun poll conducted in mid September 1992, just after Japanese troops arrived in Cambodia, found that 52 percent supported the dispatch, versus 36 percent who opposed and 12 percent who answered otherwise or did not answer.37 This represented a large increase in support; when Asahi had asked the same question in April, only 34 percent had supported some form of SDF dispatch to Cambodia. Of course, this very different result might have ref lected different answer options for the two questions. The April question gave a number of options for cooperation, including financial assistance (the most popular response), whereas the

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September question was an up-or-down dichotomous choice about SDF participation.38 Even factoring in differences in answer options, the fact that a small majority supported the dispatch suggests a significant shift in opinion, perhaps ref lecting the initial demonstration effect of the SDF performing professionally and providing valued humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations. In a subsequent question, 20 percent said that the dispatch had changed their impression of the SDF for the better, versus 11 percent who said it had changed their impression for the worse, a net improvement of 9 percent. The vast majority, 64 percent, claimed that their view had not particularly changed at all (5 percent answered “other” or gave no answer).39 This result suggests that the initial SDF deployment to Cambodia did indeed have a “demonstration effect” as Japanese citizens gave the SDF credit for obeying their civilian commanders, not “staging an incident,” and performing valuable humanitarian and reconstruction missions with professionalism and discipline. On the other hand, this “demonstration effect” did not translate into greater support for Japan or the SDF playing a global military role. In response to the question of whether Japan should limit is future global contributions to nonmilitary areas as much as possible, 71 percent agreed with this statement, versus 20 percent who disagreed and 9 percent who answered “don’t know” or gave another answer. 40 Given that the SDF was a military organization performing “nonmilitary” humanitarian relief and reconstruction missions in Cambodia, it is unclear whether the 71 percent insisting on limiting future contributions to nonmilitary fields were excluding similar Cambodia-like dispatches or including them. Nonetheless, these respondents were clearly registering opposition to the SDF performing overseas operations connected with the use of force. This represented strong continuity with opinion polls going back decades and, as we will see in subsequent chapters, opinion polls going forward over fifteen years. Among the supporters of the Cambodia dispatch, more than half answered that they supported dispatch in order to fulfill Japan’s “responsibility to the international community.” By comparison, the most prevalent reason among opponents for their choice was a belief that an international contribution should be made in “different way,” approximately 40 percent, whereas only about half as many cited the fear of causalities or the unconstitutionality of the move (19 percent each). Approximately 14 percent cited creating fear among Japan’s Asian neighbors as a reason to oppose dispatch. These results suggest that opposition to dispatching military forces overseas due to skepticism about the utility of projecting military force overseas was



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table 6.4 SDF’s most important role up to now and in the future. “Up to now, what, in your opinion, has been the most important role the SDF has fulfilled?” (choose one answer) “From now on, what, in your opinion, should be the most important role of the SDF?” (choose only one answer)

Up to now

Territorial defense Maintain public order Aid in disaster relief Aid in domestic disaster relief Aid in overseas disaster relief Partner of the U.S. military Participate in U.N. noncombat operations Also participate in U.N. military operations Other/don’t know

13% 6 73 NA NA 5 NA NA 3

From now on

19% 8 NA 35 10 0 18 4 6

source: Asahi Shimbun, September 28, 1992 (morning edition): 1.

more important for opponents than was the fear of casualties or constitutional concerns per se.41 The September Asahi poll also asked respondents what, in their opinion, had been the SDF’s most important role “up to now” and what its most important role would be in the future; the results are depicted in Table 6.4. Consistent with other polls, 73 percent identified providing disaster relief as the most important role. This finding is indicative of the robust plurality, if not majority, of Japanese respondents who had told pollsters since the mid1980s that they could support SDF dispatch overseas for nonmilitary assistance such as disaster relief. With its good reputation in Japan as a disaster relief organization, it is not surprising that many Japanese were willing to see this domestic disaster relief service go international but only on condition that this not lead to overseas combat. Over time, trust would grow in the government’s promise that these overseas deployments were divorced from combat. By contrast, territorial defense was a distant second, cited by only 13 percent of respondents as having been the most important role played by the SDF up to that time. Many respondents appeared to project the present into the future. Thus, another clear plurality of 35 percent cited “aid in domestic disaster relief ” as the SDF’s most important mission “from now on.” The next most common answer, territorial defense, finished at 19 percent, slightly above the importance of this mission “up to now” but in a statistical dead heat with participation in “U.N. nonmilitary operations,” at 18 percent. Because humanitarian

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and disaster assistance were by then being defined as the major role for SDF forces within “nonmilitary U.N. operations,” this number appears to be a good proxy for the number of Japanese supporting international disaster and humanitarian relief as the SDF’s most important mission in the future, along with the 10 percent who directly indicated support for such operations.42 Strikingly, no respondents saw partnering with the U.S. military as the SDF’s most important future mission, ref lecting the Japanese public’s distinctive skepticism about the U.S. military’s global role, a skepticism introduced in Chapter 3 and discussed throughout this book. Support for the SDF deployment to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Cambodia continued and even grew throughout most of the deployment. However, in May 1993 a Japanese police officer serving in the U.N. mission was killed and four others wounded, threatening support for the mission. Strikingly, one of the most vocal opponents of continuing the Cambodia deployment in Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi’s cabinet was then Posts and Telecommunications Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro¯ , a politician who would later distinguish himself as prime minister by expanding SDF deployments overseas.43 Years later, Miyazawa ref lected on the power of public opinion and how it almost led to an early withdrawal of the Japanese contingent from Cambodia. According to Miyazawa, in the cabinet, All around me were voices arguing for withdrawal. I had no one to consult and had to take the decision on my own. What went through my mind at that time was something like this: “Public opinion subsided quickly because there was only one victim. But perhaps if two or three had died, I would not have been able to stick it out.” Public opinion is that kind of dangerous, fragile thing. I learned to my core the terrible aspect of public opinion that can turn so easily.44

Miyazawa’s testimony ref lected an elitist-like image of public opinion as being unstable and easily changeable and appears to have stemmed from this predominant view of public opinion in the LDP and Japan (see the discussion on the preceding pages and in Chapter 2), as well as from his personal experience of having had public opinion turn against him. On the other hand, Miyazawa also displayed a pluralist-like respect for the inf luence of public opinion on policy, a belief that he had to respond to public opinion if he wanted to maintain his policies and premiership, a perception he confirmed in an interview with the author in 2005. Miyazawa’s personal experiences as a politician account for this respect.45 Miyazawa’s reference to a fragile and easily changeable public opinion notwithstanding, public opinion was comparatively stable and unchang-



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ing regarding the Cambodia dispatch, despite the killing. In part, this ref lected Miyazawa cabinet policy measures designed to respond to public concerns, thereby preventing an opposing opinion majority from forming. Most notably, the government of Japan asked the United Nations to move Japan’s police officers to a safer location.46 Indeed, the main complaint of the Japanese public appeared to be that the Miyazawa administration had exaggerated the safety of the Cambodia deployment, refusing to recognize it as a potential war zone. This picture emerges from an Asahi poll conducted at the end of May 1993. Despite the police officer’s murder, it nonetheless found a clear plurality still supporting the deployment: Forty-six percent thought the deployment had been a good idea, versus 33 percent who thought it had been a bad idea and 21 percent who answered otherwise or had no answer. This is a solid, although not impressive, rate of support for a mission that had scrupulously avoided any military activities; SDF members did not suffer any casualties and served professionally and without incident. However, this rate of support was far lower than that achieved by the dispatch of minesweepers two years earlier.47 In part, these results ref lect the aftershock from the Japanese policeman’s murder and in particular anger that the Japanese government had misled voters. Seventy-seven percent doubted the government’s explanation that the Cambodia peacekeeping mission was “safe,” versus 11 percent who did not doubt this explanation and 12 percent who were unsure. And while a plurality agreed that the dispatch of the SDF to Cambodia had been a good thing, 55 percent of respondents wanted it to withdraw from Cambodia as soon as possible, versus 32 percent who wanted the SDF to stay as per the U.N. plan and time line, and 13 percent who answered otherwise or did not answer.48 Respondents thus positively evaluated the work of the SDF while simultaneously expressing skepticism about the overall mission, especially in terms of safety, a pattern that repeated itself over a decade later during the GSDF’s deployment to Iraq for a similar mission. Antimilitarist mistrust of the ability of the government to control or use the military wisely or honestly emerged in answer to another question posed in the Asahi poll. When asked whether “you are worried that the government is expanding the role of SDF personnel dispatched to Cambodia,” 66 percent expressed such worry, versus 20 percent who denied such a worry and 14 percent who answered otherwise or did not answer. Clearly the first large-scale SDF deployment to the territory of another nation had raised trust in the SDF, but doubts about the honesty and judgment of the government in relation to the safety of the situation in Cambodia revived

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antimilitarist mistrust in relation to overseas deployments. When asked whether they supported further dispatches of the SDF overseas to participate in PKO, 21 percent expressed support for further dispatches, versus 60 percent who disagreed with the idea of further dispatches and 19 percent who answered otherwise or provided no answer.49 Finally, in a question paralleling, but not identical to, one Asahi asked the previous September, 42 percent of respondents claimed that a purely nonmilitary contribution to international society is sufficient, versus 31 percent who deemed a purely nonmilitary contribution to be insufficient and 27 percent who answered otherwise or had no answer.50 This finding, which seems to mark an increase in the number supporting a military contribution to international society, partially contradicts the clear, if not growing, reluctance to participate in future PKO missions revealed by the previous questions. Here again, changes in question wording may account for the difference. And, in the wake of a killing of a Japanese police officer in Cambodia, opposition to further PKO missions appears to have expanded temporarily. Nonetheless, these results suggest a continued willingness to support SDF overseas deployments for nonmilitary assistance and humanitarian missions but a clear reluctance to support anything that would involve the SDF even in noncombatant U.N. peacekeeping operations with an overtly military aspect or that might include the risk of ending up in combat. A poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun a year later found that 70.5 percent of respondents expressed strong (31.8 percent) or moderate support (38.7 percent) for SDF participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, when asked whether Japan should lift the freeze on socalled PKF or mainline peacekeeping operations that had the hue of military activities (cease-fire monitoring, collection of weapons, and the like), 23.4 percent thought the SDF should never participate in PKF, and 48.2 percent thought the SDF should not participate for many years to come. In total, 71.6 percent opposed participation in U.N.–sponsored PKF activities. By contrast, only 13.4 percent thought the SDF should participate in PKF, while 15 percent had another answer or no answer.51 Thus, the Japanese public had come to overwhelmingly accept nonmilitary roles in U.N. peacekeeping operations, essentially disaster relief missions such as road construction, water purification, and the like, while continuing to oppose SDF involvement with U.N. peacekeeping operations that included even a hint of involvement in military operations. At the same time, another poll question showed that popular confidence in civilian control was increasing. Of the respondents, 65.1 percent thought



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that civilian control could be maintained, versus 15.2 percent who thought it could not and 19.7 percent who did not answer or answered otherwise.52 The status quo of sending the SDF overseas to participate in humanitarian and relief operations was increasingly being accepted by the public: The domestic relief organization had successfully gone international. Nonetheless, the public remained overwhelmingly opposed to the SDF playing a military role overseas. The idea that Japan should dispatch the SDF to hot spots for the sake of allies or international stability remained unsupported by a stable opinion majority of Japanese. A poll cosponsored by the Tokyo Broadcasting Service (TBS) (along with CBS and the New York Times) in November 1991 and again in June 1993 found that 34 percent and 24 percent of Japanese respondents, respectively, felt their nation had a responsibility “to give military assistance in trouble spots around the world when it is asked by its allies,” while strong majorities of 63 percent and 74 percent disagreed.53 A significant portion of the Japanese public continued to worry about the reemergence of an aggressive foreign policy, if not the reemergence of militarism, if the SDF became involved in military operations overseas. According to the same June 1993 TBS poll, approximately 40 percent of Japanese worried that greater involvement in international peacekeeping operations could cause Japan to become too aggressive, whereas 54 percent disagreed that this could happen. Eighteen months later, in December 1994, a new iteration of the same TBS poll question found that Japanese respondents, by the same margin (40 percent), felt that, if their country increased its military power as part of its participation in international peacekeeping operations, there would be danger of Japan becoming too aggressive; again, a 54 percent majority dissented.54 On the other hand, Table 6.5 reveals the gradual delinkage of militarism fears from SDF participation in humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities overseas. A polling question asked repeatedly by the PMO between 1991 and 2000 shows that support for international disaster relief operations grew from a bare majority to an overwhelming majority while opposition collapsed, as the Japanese public increasingly recognized a distinction between overseas deployments for nonmilitary activities (kaigai haken), such as humanitarian and reconstruction activities, versus deployments for the sake of using military force (kaigai hahei). The domestic disaster relief corps had successfully gone international. The demonstration effect of the SDF performing humanitarian and reconstruction missions overseas with discipline and professionalism was reassuring.

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international peacekeeping table 6.5 Support for SDF participation in overseas disaster relief.

SDF participation in disaster relief operations overseas Answers (percentages)

Feb 1991 Jan 1994 Feb 1997 Jan 2000

Agree/agree somewhat

54.2% 61.6 78.0 86.3

Can’t say/ don’t know

15.3% 16.4 10.1 8.3

Disagree/disagree somewhat

30.4% 21.9 11.9 5.4

source: Poll conducted by the Publicity Office of the Prime Minister’s Office, January 2000, as carried in Bo-ei Nenkan Kanko- Kaihen, Bo-ei Nenkan 2001 nenban: 191.

However, growing support for SDF participation in nonmilitary humanitarian and reconstruction activities, even within a U.N. peacekeeping framework, did not translate into growing support for the use of force overseas. As already mentioned, a May 1994 Yomiuri Shimbun poll found that 71.6 percent opposed expanding participation into peacekeeping operations involving the use of force.55 Counterfactually, had the offensive realist hawks not been constrained by public opinion, the new PKO law would have allowed the SDF to participate in the full range of U.N. peacekeeping operations all the way up to peace enforcement. Japan would have likely sent the SDF to relatively dangerous missions such as Bosnia. On the other hand, had public opinion backed the pacifist agenda of the Socialist party’s leadership, the PKO law would not have been passed and there would have been no overseas dispatches of the SDF to Cambodia, Mozambique, or the Golan Heights, although Socialist proposals for creating a nonmilitary peacekeeping unit might have come to fruition.

The Revised U.S.–Japan Defense Guidelines and the Taepodong Shock Closer to home and beyond the issue of sending the SDF overseas, the 1990s posed numerous challenges to Japanese security in the form of regional crises regarding North Korea’s attempt to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and develop nuclear weapons in 1994; a Taiwan Straits crisis among Taiwan, China, and the United States, stemming from the issue of whether Taiwan was moving toward declaring independence from China; and North Korea’s August 1998 Taepodong missile launch over northern Japan. These



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crises raised anew the issue of SDF deployments overseas, but this time it was closer to home and in a context potentially more relevant to Japan’s territorial defense. They also raised the issue of enhanced national preparations for territorial defense, preparations that could include restrictions being placed on civil liberties. The Revised U.S.–Japan Defense Guidelines The revised 1997 Defense Guidelines updated the first set of guidelines concluded between the two countries in 1978. The 1978 Defense Guidelines specified forms of military cooperation between the two sides in repelling an armed attack against Japan but were largely silent regarding military cooperation in regional conf licts. Beginning with the U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration issued by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯ taro¯ in April 199656 and continuing until September 1997, Japan and the United States negotiated a new set of guidelines. The new guidelines specified expanded defense cooperation beyond repelling a direct attack against Japan to include crisis situations in “areas surrounding Japan.” In the document, “the concept, situations in areas surrounding Japan, is not geographical but situational.”57 This step was taken largely to avoid specifically including or excluding Taiwan in the ambit of the agreement. With this language the guidelines mandated, and perhaps legitimated, for the first time, a role for the SDF in dealing with regional conf licts. Like Japan’s participation in U.N. peacekeeping and international humanitarian operations, however, the role envisaged for the SDF, even during a regional crisis, was to be a noncombat one. The SDF was to offer logistical support “on the high seas and international airspace around Japan which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted.” The guidelines list forty examples of such support, including sea transportation of personnel and materials (including weapons and ammunition) to U.S. ships on the high seas and cooperation in noncombatant evacuation operation. The agreement also suggests cooperation in surveillance, minesweeping, search and rescue, and sea and airspace management. To these ends, the revised guidelines mandated joint operational planning between the two militaries.58 Ref lecting fear of entrapment in American wars and skepticism about the utility of projecting military force overseas, even if the SDF was not directly involved, the public was ambivalent. Because the Japanese military was not being called on to engage in combat or operate in a combat zone, an opinion majority did not form against the revised guidelines. In response to a March 1999 Asahi Shimbun poll, 37 percent (9 percent approved, 28 percent somewhat

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approved) of bills then before the Diet to implement the U.S.–Japan defense guidelines, while 43 percent disapproved (18 percent disapproved while 25 percent somewhat disapproved) of these bills and 20 percent were not sure or did not answer. Another question in the Asahi poll asked respondents whether they thought the SDF should be allowed to transport arms and ammunition for the U.S. military. In response, only 13 percent thought the SDF should be able to transport anything for the U.S. military, versus 49 percent who thought the SDF should be able to transport anything for the United States except weapons and ammunition and 29 percent who thought the SDF should not transport military goods for the United States.59 These findings help to explain the caution with which the LDP approached the question of allowing the MSDF to transport weapons and ammunition for the U.S. military two and a half years later, after the 9/11 attacks. Following the enactment of the guidelines-enabling legislation, a Yomiuri Shimbun poll found that 32.9 percent thought the enabling legislation would enhance Japan’s security, while 27.5 percent thought it would endanger Japan’s security, 35.1 percent were not sure, and 4.6 percent had no answer.60 Thus, even after enactment, a significant proportion of the Japanese public continued to be concerned about entrapment in American conf licts. Counterfactually, had the hawks not been constrained by public opinion, the revised U.S.–Japan defense guidelines and enabling legislation would have allowed the SDF to provide rear-area support for U.S. forces in combat zones and possibly to participate in actual combat. On the other hand, had public opinion been pacifist and inf luential, there would have been no new revised U.S.–Japan defense guidelines in the first place. The Taepodong Shock Although most Japanese firmly opposed military action to settle international disputes61 and did not want to see the SDF embroiled in overseas combat, even within a U.N. peacekeeping or U.S. alliance framework, by the late 1990s a solid opinion majority came to believe that military force was necessary to defend the nation’s independence and territorial integrity. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, this opinion majority had been gradually emerging from the shadows as antimilitarist mistrust receded during the course of the Cold War. This majority consolidated into a large opinion majority after what can be called the “Taepodong shock” of August 1998. North Korea’s test f light of a two-stage ballistic missile over northern Honshu shocked the Japanese public. Behind this shock lay a previous smug-



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ness that Japan’s economically distressed neighbor could not be capable of lobbing a missile as far as, not to mention over, Japan, despite previous missile tests in the Sea of Japan in the mid-1990s. This smugness certainly had been evident among policy elites and perhaps ref lected vestiges of an older attitude of superiority toward the Asian mainland. The author remembers a prominent security academic and former journalist for a national newspaper claiming over lunch in January 1996 that Chinese military capabilities should not be taken seriously because they supposedly could not even manufacture the nose cones on their fighters to be straight. This tendency to dismiss Asian military capabilities as backward quickly dissipated after the Taepodong shock, and Chinese as well as North Korean military capabilities began to be taken more seriously. Another factor was public shock over the possibility of Japan becoming a target. As discussed in earlier chapters, incipient defensive realism among the Japanese public included the idea that Japan risked provoking others if it built up its military power and that therefore Japan should maintain only a minimal defense. In the mid-1990s, the continued currency of this view was perhaps best captured by the phrase of Takemura Masayoshi, a leading centrist politician of that time who advocated “a small but bright and shining Japan (chiisakutomo kirari to hikaru kuni nihon)” that would avoid provoking others to target it.62 This attitude, while generally consistent with defensive realism and the security dilemma, nonetheless differed from a realist perspective to the extent that it minimized the role of military power in deterring threats. After the Taepodong launch a new perception about the possibility that Japan could become a target spread through public opinion. A personal experience while living in Kanazawa, a historic castle town on the west coast of Japan, illustrates this new perception. I heard a local rumor circulating during the summer of 1999 that North Korea was going to attack the nearby airport and ASDF airbase at Komatsu.63 Although this scenario was implausible, it clearly showed that local residents were increasingly doubting the idea that by avoiding a military buildup or involvement in foreign wars Japan could thereby avoid being targeted by others. The discovery of two North Korean spy ships anchored just off the Noto peninsula in March 1999 and subsequent admissions by North Korea in 2002 about its abductions of Japanese citizens in Japan itself increased this consciousness of being a target and consolidated support for the idea that military force had utility for deterring threats and defending Japanese territory and Japanese citizens living there.

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Thus, an August 1999 Nikkei poll found that 76 percent of respondents believed Japan should create a legal framework to prepare “for an attack by foreign forces,” versus 14 percent who did not think so and 10 percent who did not know.64 Even when respondents were told that enacting emergency laws for use in case of foreign attack might involve some sacrifice of civil liberties, a plurality were still supportive. Thus, a Yomiuri Shimbun poll found that 46 percent agreed that “a law should be passed to make it easier for the Self-Defense Forces to initiate military actions in case Japan is attacked by a foreign force, even if it means civil rights are somewhat restricted,” versus 24 percent who disagreed and 25 percent who responded “difficult to say.”65 These results suggest that already by the late 1990s, after the Taepodong shock but before 9/11, clear majorities of Japanese perceived that war is an ever-present possibility under anarchy and that military preparations to meet this contingency therefore have positive utility. Given that Japanese antimilitarism is first and foremost about mistrusting the state’s ability to wield the sword, these results, especially those from the Yomiuri poll, suggest a significant erosion of antimilitarist mistrust resulting from years of demonstration effects–based reassurance and the rise of foreign threats as a counterweight to lingering distrust of the state. By voting to enact the Emergency Legal Framework Law in 2003, the approximately 80 percent of Diet members that so voted thereby also signaled their acceptance of the essential tenet of realism that war is an ever-present possibility that must be prepared for.66 A PMO poll measured public perceptions of the SDF’s most important missions a year before 9/11 (see Table 6.6). Consistent with previous polls discussed earlier, it makes clear that the SDF’s most popular mission remained disaster relief. Yet a clear, if much smaller, majority recognized maintaining national security as a primary mission for the SDF, consistent with the emergence of a defensive realist view of military force. Because this poll did not ask about the utility of offensive military action for promoting various objectives, we cannot draw direct inferences about respondents’ views on this question. Nonetheless, the fact that this question is not even asked by Japan’s media or government pollsters implies that the idea of offensive military power having utility was beyond the pale of Japanese political discourse.67 Making an international contribution tied or exceeded “ensuring domestic order” as the third most important role for the SDF. Because the SDF’s international “contribution” had consisted of humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities, support for the SDF’s “international



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table 6.6 Primary, secondary, and future SDF roles. (Multiple answers allowed.) Answer (as a percentage)

Ensuring national security

Reason for existence Secondary role Future role

59.0% 19.1 44.7

Ensuring domestic International order Disaster relief contribution

24.3% 11.8 20.4

67.1% 87.2 67.5

25.1% 35.5 36.1

Support of civilian activities

7.6% 17.7 9.0

source: Poll conducted by the Publicity Office of the Prime Minister’s Office, January 2000, as carried in Bo-ei Nenkan Kanko- Kaihen, Bo-ei Nenkan 2001 nenban: 190.

contribution” can be seen as a proxy of support for this domestic relief organization going international. Thus, a year before the 9/11 attacks, opinion majorities recognized the importance of the SDF for national defense as well as for humanitarian relief. The only overseas missions with significant public support were disaster and humanitarian relief operations.

Conclusions Tokyo’s enactment of its PKO law in June 1992 has often been seen as a reaction to American pressure and Japan’s sense of humiliation for being derided as little more than a “cash dispenser.” While this was clearly an elite-level phenomenon,68 there is no evidence that this sense of shame over Japan’s purely financial contribution during the Gulf War was shared by the public at large, that public opinion was moved by American pressure, or that public opinion toward overseas dispatches changed much at all as a result of the Gulf War experience and aftermath. In fact, Japanese public opinion regarding overseas deployments changed very little between the 1980s and 1992; the main change evident is that public support for overseas SDF deployments for providing humanitarian assistance temporarily declined during the Gulf War because of the danger that these might implicate the SDF in the overseas use of force. The public had come to accept overseas SDF dispatches for humanitarian relief by the mid-1980s, and that is essentially what the LDP succeeded in authorizing with the PKO law by 1992. The evidence presented in Chapters 2 and 3 as well as this chapter suggests that the government could have enacted a law with much the same contents and with popular support in 1988, if political leaders had had the political will to make this a priority.

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In most respects the contents of the 1992 PKO law, with so-called mainline peacekeeping or PKF operations frozen, permitted overseas SDF operations that hardly exceeded the domestic humanitarian and reconstruction missions for which the SDF had become so popular domestically. Moreover, the actual missions that the SDF has been allowed to play under the PKO Law, including its participation in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Eastern Zaire, have generally focused on road construction, the provision of medical and transportation services, and other activities that could be roughly considered “humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.” Other missions, such as the deployment of a transportation detachment to the Golan Heights, do not significantly contradict this image. This latter mission suggested to the government that SDF overseas deployments overseas could avoid provoking the opposition of a stable opinion majority by taking part in inconspicuous noncombat missions with little danger, even if their role does involve some rear-area support for other militaries engaged in activities that go beyond humanitarian relief. This strategy of “f lying under the radar” is risky to the extent that there is a risk of casualties or combat. In either case, there would be a real risk of a public backlash. Significantly, the PKO bill prevented any kind of SDF mission that smacked of a military role. Thus, despite (failed) efforts by “hawks” in the LDP, the Foreign Ministry, and the Defense Agency to give the SDF a wider, albeit noncombat, role in U.N. peacekeeping and U.N.–sponsored missions, the final PKO law closely approximated what a stable plurality of Japanese public opinion had been supporting since the mid-1980s. Strikingly, this picture suggests not only that public opinion inf luenced policy, rather than the other way around, but also that the politically expressed preferences of the government and ruling party elites have been far more changeable and moldable than those of average citizens. Through the 1990s, support for the SDF’s overseas deployments for humanitarian and relief-type operations, whether within or outside a U.N. framework, gradually increased. Indeed, the single largest and most significant shift in public opinion found in this book is the collapse of public opposition to the SDF participating in humanitarian and relief operations overseas during the 1990s. On the other hand, support for going farther and participating in PKO operations that smacked of involvement in military activities remained minimal, and support for participating in overseas combat operations in U.N. or U.S. alliance framework, much less unilaterally, remained almost nonexistent. This pattern would persist with little change through the next decade.



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Strikingly, the Taepodong shock of 1998 did little to change public views toward overseas dispatches of the SDF. This did, however, galvanize support for Japan’s development of “normal” military institutions necessary for homeland defense, such as a legal framework to cover emergencies. Japanese public opinion increasingly saw the necessity to prepare for war and to maintain deterrence against external powers. However, this new realization remained limited to defensive uses of military power for territorial defense. For the most part, offensive power continued to be seen as having little utility in general and for Japan in particular.

7

Japanese Public Opinion and Responses to 9/11 and the Afghan Invasion In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Japanese public’s distinctive world outlook was challenged as perhaps never before. The public reacted with shock and alarm to the attacks and rallied to support their U.S. ally. The Japanese government’s response, especially its decision to dispatch the MSDF to the Indian Ocean to provide fuel and water to the United States and other allied navies in the context of supporting ongoing combat operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, raised questions about whether Japan was shedding its reluctance to send the SDF overseas for combat-related operations. Was Japan crossing its Rubicon?1 This chapter is thus a case study of the Japanese public’s inf luence on the government’s response to 9/11. Did 9/11 bring about fundamental change in Japanese public attitudes and hence in policy? Like Chapters 5 and 6, this chapter shows how public skepticism about projecting strategically offensive military power overseas inf luenced and channeled the government’s responses to the 9/11 attacks and American expectations for significant support from Japan.

Initial Reactions to 9/11 Japanese public opinion reacted with shock to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and to the loss of more than twenty of its nationals in the Twin Towers. In a Yomiuri Shinbun poll conducted September 24–25, 2001, 82.5 percent of Japanese expressed great concern about the 9/11 attacks, and 15.5 percent expressed some concern, for an astoundingly high total of 98 percent. A mere 1.9 percent expressed little concern; and 0.1 percent expressed no concern at all. Incredibly, the number expressing no opinion or not answering registered at 0 percent. These extreme results ref lect the deep initial impression that 9/11 graphic TV images and other media reports made on the Japanese public.2 Polling results also ref lected short-term anxiety: Of the respondents, 38.4 percent expressed great concern that similar terrorist attacks could occur in Japan, while 47.6 percent expressed some concern that this could happen: 86



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percent in aggregate. Only 11.9 percent expressed little concern such attacks could occur in Japan, and 1.7 percent claimed no concern about this possibility. Again, the “no answer” rate, at 0.4 percent, was amazingly low. If the Japanese public felt threatened, they also felt unprepared. Asked if Japan was adequately prepared to defend against a terror attack from terrorist organizations, only 3.6 percent answered that Japan was prepared, whereas a whopping 85.5 percent answered that Japan was not prepared. Ten percent responded that they could not say whether Japan was prepared or not, and 0.9 percent could not answer at all. On the other hand, 62.1 percent of respondents evaluated the Japanese government’s initial response to 9/11 very (15.5 percent) or rather (46.6 percent) favorably, versus 32.6 percent who rated the response somewhat unfavorably (26.6 percent) or very unfavorably (6.0 percent) (and 5.3 percent who gave no answer).3 Another question in the same poll asked Japanese whether they should cooperate with the United States in responding to combating terrorism. The results are depicted in Table 7.1. These results ref lect growing Japanese familiarity and comfort with rear-area support missions over the course of nine years of SDF participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief missions.4 As discussed in Chapter 6, the 1997 Revised U.S.–Japan Defense Guidelines and the 1999 Surrounding Areas Emergency Legislation (enabling legislation for the Revised Guidelines) also contributed by heightening awareness and producing debate about extending rear-area support operations beyond U.N. and humanitarian frameworks to embrace support for the U.S. military within an alliance framework. Strikingly, providing rear-area support proved to be a much more popular option than providing financial assistance, a reverse of the situation during the Gulf War. However, some of this support might have ref lected support for humanitarian relief like operations, such as providing medical treatment. Reduced support for financial assistance perhaps also ref lected reduced confidence in Japan’s economic stature brought about by a decade of economic stagnation. On the other hand, despite the shock of 9/11 and a decade of SDF participation in humanitarian, reconstruction, and logistical missions related to U.N. peacekeeping operations, these results indicate no greater willingness to use force overseas than had been the case during the Gulf War of a decade earlier. However, the Japanese public had become more willing to accept noncombat logistical support of U.S. military operations. As discussed below, even this support proved to be f leeting, ambivalent, and situationally specific.

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table 7.1 Should Japan cooperate with the U.S. response to 9/11? “America is seeking the cooperation of the international community while preparing military operations to eliminate the terrorist organizations that caused this incident.” Should Japan actively cooperate with this?

Yes To some extent Combined Yes No need to cooperate No answer

24.7% 62.4 87.1 12.0 0.9

Asked of respondents answering that Japan should cooperate: How should Japan cooperate?

Rear-area support (including medical, transportation, fuel services) Financial support Information gathering and sharing Direct participation in fighting Other forms of cooperation No answer

86.5% 54.9 55.8 8.2 0.5 2.0

source: Yomiuri Shinbunsha Seron Cho-sabu, Nihon no Seron (Tokyo: Ko-bundo-, 2002): 338–339, 344–345.

Although only a tiny minority of respondents was willing to countenance SDF participation in overseas combat, in a separate question, 62.7 percent supported the use of the SDF to help guard important domestic facilities and U.S. bases, versus 16.8 percent who opposed this, 19.7 percent who could not decide one way or the other, and 0.8 percent who provided no answer. This ref lected a growing defensive realist–like embrace of the SDF’s role in providing for national defense. Nonetheless, the one-third of respondents who either opposed or were ambivalent about the use of the SDF for domestic security missions indicated continued mistrust of the military by a substantial minority of the electorate.5 Waning of the Initial Shock The shock of the 9/11 attacks quickly began wearing off in Japan. In part this ref lected the onset of American military operations in Afghanistan, a move that shifted the focus of attention to the implications of this war. Asked to identify priority tasks for Japanese diplomacy in an October 20–21, 2001, Yomiuri poll (with multiple answers allowed), 42.9 percent chose international terrorism. Strikingly, global warming finished second and in a statistical dead heat at 42.8 percent.6 Another question in the same poll found 66.9 percent of



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table 7.2 How should Japan cooperate with international efforts against terrorism? “International society is strengthening its efforts to eliminate international terrorism. How do you think Japan should cooperate?” (Multiple answers were allowed.) Rear-area support for the U.S. military and others (medical, transportation, refueling services) Financial support for the U.S. military and others Information gathering and sharing Participation in combat Assistance to refugees Reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan Curbing funding sources for terrorists Others Oppose all forms of cooperation No answer

57.1% 17.6 31.0 3.6 63.3 36.5 35.7 0.6 2.4 3.2

source: Yomiuri Shinbunsha Seron Cho-sabu, Nihon no Seron (Tokyo: Ko-bundo-, 2002): 342, 344–345.

respondents criticizing Japanese diplomacy for being too Americentric (versus 25.0 percent who did not think so). A small plurality, 45.1 percent, also agreed that Japan pursued an Asia-passing diplomacy, versus 42.4 percent who did not so agree and 12.5 percent who did not answer. In comparison to a 1980 poll that asked the same question, the number answering that Japanese diplomacy was too Americentric had increased by 13 percent. Another question in the same Yomiuri survey asked respondents how Japan should cooperate with international society to eliminate terrorism. The results appear in Table 7.2. Question wording and answer choices differed somewhat between this and a similar question Yomiuri had asked a month earlier (look back to Table 7.1). Nonetheless, it is striking that only 3.6 percent supported direct participation in combat, a drop of more than half from the poll results of a month earlier. This drop appears to ref lect the onset of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, the growth of entrapment fears, and the opposition of the overwhelming majority of Japanese, even after the 9/11 attacks, to having the SDF engage in overseas combat. Although a solid majority still favored providing rear-area support (medical, transportation, and refueling services) for the U.S. military, this nevertheless marked a large reduction from the overwhelming majority that had supported this option a month earlier. Support for providing a financial contribution dropped to less than half of the level of a month before, although this answer option specified financial support for the U.S. military, whereas the previous month’s question had not specified whom the recipient would be. This result also suggests a continued

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reluctance to focus on making a financial contribution, perhaps a legacy of the Gulf War and Japan’s weak economy. Support for cooperation in information gathering and sharing also fell by nearly half. On the other hand, a solid majority of 63.3 percent supported providing assistance for refugees, a new answer option, while reconstruction assistance for Afghanistan and curbing funding sources for terrorists, also new answer options, received significant support as well. Strikingly, only a tiny minority of 2.4 percent opposed all forms of cooperation. Dispatching the SDF Tokyo wasted no time focusing on the implications of the attacks for Japanese security and the U.S.–Japan alliance. Setting up an emergency task force in the prime minister’s office within forty-five minutes of the attacks, Prime Minister Koizumi quickly decided upon a series of responses. Japan made financial contributions directly to victims’ families and to rescue and cleanup efforts in the United States. Emergency economic aid was earmarked for Pakistan and India, in an effort to ensure their cooperation in the looming war on terrorism. Koizumi announced a plan to amend the Self-Defense Forces Law to authorize the SDF to defend U.S. bases in Japan against any unexpected terrorist attacks.7 Finally, Koizumi, using the statutory authority of the 1992 PKO law, ordered the dispatch of six ASDF transport planes to deliver relief supplies to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.8 The centerpiece of Koizumi’s response to 9/11 was the decision to dispatch the SDF, notably ships of the MSDF, to the Arabian Sea to provide rear-area logistical support for U.S. military operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. This decision built on the framework of the 1997 Revised U.S.–Japan Defense Guidelines and the related enabling legislation enacted in 1999 (see the previous chapter), both of which provided for the SDF to provide rear-area logistical support for U.S. forces in areas far removed from combat. Although the Koizumi cabinet initially considered invoking the 1999 Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law, for a variety of reasons, including geographical distance and the need to seek the cooperation of third countries outside the U.S.–Japan alliance, it decided that new legislation was the better alternative.9 Dispatch of the SDF had also been the major provision of the UNPCC bill, which was debated, but ultimately discarded, in the fall of 1990. The UNPCC bill differed from the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill that Koizumi proposed in that the former did not permit logistical support for combat operations. Rather, it envisaged the withdrawal of the SDF should



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fighting break out. The bill also allowed SDF personnel to use weapons to defend not only themselves but also those who “have come under their control.” In these ways, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill represented a half-precedent, because it extended the definition of permissible noncombat operations for the SDF. Initially, the bill was even more ambitious, however. The geographic scope of SDF activity included India, Pakistan, and the Afghan–Pakistan border region. Koizumi included provisions for the SDF to conduct medical services for U.S. military personnel in combat zones and humanitarian operations in Afghan refugee camps.10 Apparently because of his high personal popularity, Koizumi initially tried to push the limits of SDF deployment, even to the extent of exposing the SDF to danger. Koizumi proclaimed that Japan “will no longer hold that the Self-Defense Forces should not be sent to danger spots.”11 As Daniel Kliman remarks, “By making this comment, Koizumi clearly outdistanced the Diet and, for that matter, Koizumi’s own cabinet.”12 An Asahi Shimbun poll conducted in late September asked respondents whether they supported Japan cooperating with the United States to respond to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. By a margin of 62 percent to 25 percent, they supported cooperation (13 percent answered otherwise or provided no answer). However, when asked whether, as one part of this cooperation, they supported Prime Minister Koizumi’s proposal for a new law enabling the SDF to provide “rear-area support for the American military,” only 42 percent approved, while 46 percent disapproved. This poll suggested that Koizumi’s initial proposal to dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean was close to the indifference point of Japanese voters but with opposition somewhat outweighing support. Ko¯mei, the LDP’s key coalition partner; the DPJ, the largest opposition party; and elements within the LDP, especially those linked to the rival Hashimoto faction, responded to public reservations and began to openly oppose the popular Koizumi’s ambitious plans. They criticized the Koizumi administration for deciding to dispatch the SDF overseas so quickly, without significant consultations within the LDP or with opposition parties, and with potentially linking this dispatch to the use of force.13 This opposition forced Koizumi to back down. Counterfactually, had public opinion not mattered or had it been more supportive, it is likely that Koizumi would have been able to act on his ambitious plans, allowing SDF dispatch to combat zones to noncombat support for the U.S. military and the like.

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In negotiations with Ko¯ mei, internal critics within the LDP, and to a lesser extent the DPJ, Koizumi made concessions intended to increase public support. First, he dropped his initial plans to dispatch the GSDF to Pakistan to provide humanitarian support to refugees and to have the SDF provide medical support for the U.S. military in combat zones. Second, the life of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was limited to two years, with one extension possible. Third, the transport and supply of arms were excluded from the range of permissible activities under the bill. This change ref lected the inf luence of a signal the public had sent over two years earlier during the debate over enabling legislation for the Revised U.S.–Japan Defense Guidelines (see the previous chapter), namely that it strongly opposed the SDF transporting weapons and ammunition for the U.S. military. Finally, the number of SDF personnel deployable under the bill was limited to 1,200, or 2,400 during rotation.14 These negotiations with critics both inside and outside the ruling coalition broadened support for the anti-terrorism bill. By mid-October support for the bill had increased substantially. Asked if they supported the “AntiTerrorism Special Measures Bill,” 51 percent said yes, versus 29 percent who said no and 20 percent who were unsure or did not answer. This reversal might also have ref lected substantial question change from Asahi’s polling question of a few weeks earlier. The October question omitted any mention of providing rear-area support for the U.S. military. In the face of this big increase in public support, opponents had an uphill battle to try to stop the bill. Opponents claimed that because the bill would allow the SDF to provide rear-area support for combat operations, the SDF would inevitably become embroiled in combat. According to Tajima Yoko, a member of the Social Democratic Party, “SDF personnel never thought they would be assigned to lend logistic support to other forces in Afghanistan when they joined the SDF. It would constitute a violation of a contract, because they were assured that they would not have to die while serving their country.”15 However, Koizumi’s watering down of the bill’s content made it hard for these arguments to stick. The big increase in public support paved the way for the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill to be enacted into law with lightning speed,16 demonstrating that the bill had been well placed to overcome the previous ambivalence of the public. A subsequent Asahi Shimbun poll conducted November 24–25, 2001, shows renewed public opposition to SDF overseas dispatches being linked to military operations, including noncombat rear area support for the U.S. military. Asked if they supported the dispatch of MSDF destroyers to the



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table 7.3 Evaluation of the Japanese government’s response to 9/11. Question: “How do you evaluate the Japanese government’s response to the terrorist attack at this time?”

Very favorably Rather favorably Aggregate favorable Rather unfavorably Very unfavorably Aggregate unfavorable No answer

Sept. 24, 25

15.5% 46.6 62.1 26.6 6.0 32.6 5.3

Oct. 20, 21

14.3% 51.1 65.4 23.8 6.1 29.9 4.7

Nov. 2–5, 2001

19.4% 29.1 48.5 27.3 16.0 43.3 8.2

source: Yomiuri Shinbunsha Seron Cho-sabu, Nihon no Seron (Tokyo: Ko-bundo-, 2002): 338–339, 344.

Indian Ocean, based on the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law, 44 percent expressed support, while 48 percent expressed opposition.17 Growing opposition to the naval dispatch appears to have been linked to the growing perception that the dispatch, rather than being essentially “nonmilitary” in character, had a significant military component. Discussions about dispatching an advanced Aegis air defense destroyer apparently added to this perception. Growing opposition to the prospect of an Aegis dispatch also appears to be behind a sharp reversal in public approval of the Japanese government’s response to the 9/11 attacks. This result was found over the course of several Yomiuri Shimbun polls. The results appear in Table 7.3. The Aegis Controversy The Aegis dispatch controversy, and related controversies over dispatching P-3C planes and AWACS early-warning planes, tested the limits of what the Japanese public was prepared to accept, even from a very popular prime minister. Although an opposing opinion majority was never measured on this issue, the growing controversy, combined with declining support for the overall MSDF dispatch and for the Japanese government’s response to 9/11, was enough to motivate both Ko¯ mei and critics within the LDP to act preemptively so as not to provoke an opposing opinion majority. A late September 2001 meeting of the LDP General Council (composed of the current and former secretary generals of the LDP) came out against an initial government plan for dispatching P-3C patrol planes, AWACS, and an Aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean for rear-area support of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Concern about provoking domestic opposition

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was cited as a central concern, as well as the fear of provoking parallel Asian mistrust. Thanks to this opposition, plans to dispatch P-3C maritime patrol aircraft and sophisticated AWACS early-warning planes were dropped. Nonetheless, the Koizumi cabinet drafted a plan to dispatch an Aegis-class destroyer equipped with advanced surveillance and information-gathering capabilities.18 Despite the elimination of P-3C and AWACs from the debate, the inclusion of an Aegis in the government’s dispatch plans continued to provoke opposition from within the ruling parties.19 Former Japanese Defense Agency ( JDA) Director Yamanaka Sadanori explained his opposition to the dispatch by alluding to the danger of provoking domestic mistrust: “Based upon fifty years of self-ref lection about war we have shown restraint. We should not allow the Defense Agency to ride roughshod over this policy.”20 Kato¯ Ko¯ichi, another General Council member and subsequently the head of the ad hoc lower house Counter-Terrorism Committee, was apparently thinking about ways to avoid provoking domestic public opposition when he again advised against an Aegis dispatch by saying, “We should not do something too showy.”21 Supporters of the Aegis dispatch recognized that continued popular mistrust of the military lay behind opposition to the Aegis dispatch. According to a Yomiuri Shimbun editorial in favor of the dispatch, “The basis for opposition for the dispatch is, first of all, the idea that SDF overseas dispatch could lead to a resurgence of militarism.”22 The fact that the editorial then felt compelled to reject this argument suggests how much weight it still carried among the public.23 Koizumi allies acknowledged that ignoring public opposition to the Aegis dispatch could be politically damaging. An unidentified aide to Prime Minister Koizumi admitted that if they “forced” the Aegis dispatch issue, “Public support will drop (yoron no shiji teika).”24 In the face of public opposition, a “majority pacifist view” suddenly emerged within the LDP to quash the dispatch.25 It was a bit like the 1990 Gulf War dispatch debate all over again, albeit on a much smaller scale. Yamasaki Taku, LDP secretary general, a member of the General Council, and a Koizumi ally, cited public opinion as a reason for scrapping the Aegis dispatch. Noting with concern television coverage such as “Is Prime Minister Koizumi going to go too far?” Yamasaki argued the dispatch “will not be a plus” for Koizumi’s plans to pursue economic and structural reform.26 This argument ref lects the reality that defying public opinion on one issue can have negative spillover effects on other issues, especially when political competition is significant.



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Yamasaki also argued that delaying the Aegis issue would make it easier to convince the DPJ to vote in favor of the dispatch plan.27 This consideration ref lects the continued importance of consensus norms in the Japanese Diet, especially on controversial defense issues. Although the ruling LDP–Ko¯ mei coalition had the votes to ram the Indian Ocean dispatch plan without the Democrats’ support, the desire to achieve as wide a consensus as possible provided the LDP with an additional reason to drop the Aegis dispatch. At a mid-November General Council meeting, internal LDP opponents successfully used the reality of public opposition to quash the dispatch.28 Once settled, the Aegis dispatch issue did not remain settled more than six months. In early May 2002, as the first Indian Ocean dispatch approached expiration, U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz urged a visiting nonpartisan delegation of Diet members specializing in security to push for the dispatch of an Aegis destroyer to augment the next MSDF f lotilla sent to the Indian Ocean in support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan. In response, group leader Nukaga Fukushiro¯ warned that, because of a lack of public support, dispatching an Aegis under current conditions was “impossible.”29 Former Defense Agency Chief Kyu¯ ma Fumio, a member of the same defense delegation, told a Heritage Foundation symposium that pushing the unpopular Aegis dispatch could endanger the enactment of the then pending Emergency Legal Framework bill.30 Representatives from the other two ruling parties, Ko¯ mei and even the New Conservative Party, were also reluctant to back an unpopular Aegis dispatch.31 Wolfowitz’s even more controversial idea of dispatching P-3C reconnaissance planes was not even met with a reply. Thus, the Indian Ocean dispatch was extended for another six months without dispatching an Aegis destroyer or P-3C reconnaissance planes. By November 2002, with the second dispatch plan approaching expiration, the issue of dispatching an Aegis destroyer and P-3C planes again resurfaced. This time the Koizumi administration pushed for the dispatch of an Aegis destroyer. Due to renewed opposition from within the LDP and Ko¯mei, the third dispatch plan of MSDF ships to the Indian Ocean was approved without including the dispatch of an Aegis destroyer.32 However, less than a month later, Koizumi again resurrected the issue and quickly pushed through the Aegis dispatch. During a regular rotation in mid-December, an Aegis was dispatched, along with other MSDF ships, to replace ships on station in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. Why the sudden reversal? Opposition from within the LDP had not lessened, and Ko¯mei remained firmly opposed.33

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An important reason appears to be the weakening of the DPJ and Ko¯ mei, two of the major opponents of dispatch. In November a small number of DPJ members bolted from the main opposition party and joined the Conservative Party, the smallest of the three ruling coalition partners, and a party generally considered to be an appendage of the LDP. These defecting DPJ members were believed to be seeking eventual (re)admission to the LDP. There was even speculation that this defection marked the beginning of the disintegration of the DPJ, just as the then-leading opposition New Frontier Party had disintegrated several years earlier. Moreover, this weakening of the DPJ reduced LDP dependence upon the Ko¯ mei party. This increased Ko¯ mei’s vulnerability and reduced their willingness to confront Koizumi over the Aegis issue. Thus, the eventual dispatch of an Aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean ref lected not a change in public opinion but rather the temporary weakening of two inf luential political parties giving voice to public opposition, namely the DPJ and Ko¯ mei. Put another way, the temporary weakening of the DPJ temporarily reduced political competition, giving Koizumi an opportunity to ignore his critics within the LDP as well as Ko¯ mei. Despite the improved political environment for dispatch, the Koizumi cabinet limited the deployment in ways designed to minimize public opposition. Rather than justify the deployment on military grounds, chief cabinet secretary Fukuda Yasuo emphasized that the Aegis dispatch was a way to enhance the amenities available for MSDF sailors. Because Aegis living quarters were supposedly plusher than those on other destroyers, sailors would “be thankful.”34 These efforts had some impact, as a mid-December 2002 poll indicated that only a plurality of 48 percent opposed the Aegis dispatch, whereas 40 percent approved.35 Nonetheless, to assuage the public and those in the LDP who were concerned about public’s opposition, the Koizumi cabinet made sure that the Japanese Aegis avoided any involvement in the March 2003 invasion of Afghanistan.36 After only nine months and the rotation of two Aegis destroyers into the Indian Ocean, they were withdrawn from further deployment.37 The Aegis deployment controversy thus shows the inf luence of public opinion on actual policy decisions and also the Japanese public’s continued opposition, even after 9/11, to support any overseas SDF deployment that implied military involvement. Counterfactually, had public opinion not mattered, Aegis destroyers would have been dispatched more than a year earlier and would likely have remained stationed in the Indian Ocean long after the start of hostilities in Iraq. P-3C surveillance planes (and perhaps AWACS planes) would also have



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table 7.4 Evaluation of MSDF counterterrorism deployment to the Indian Ocean. Asahi Shimbun: “In the wake of the simultaneous terror attacks in America, the Japanese government enacted legislation and dispatched SDF naval vessels to the Indian Ocean to supply the American military with fuel and provisions. Do you favorably evaluate these Japanese responses? Do you negatively evaluate them?”

August 2002

Favorably evaluate Negatively evaluate Other/don’t know

50 41 9

July 2003

49 37 14

sources: Data from Asahi Shimbun, September 8, 2002 (morning edition): 6; Asahi Shimbun, July 22, 2003 (morning edition): 4.

been dispatched. Both also might have offered direct support for U.S. combat operations (see the discussion in the following section). Evaluation of the Indian Ocean Deployment The MSDF deployment in the Indian Ocean continued well after the withdrawal of the Aegis destroyer and the beginning of the war in Iraq. In August 2002 and July 2003 Asahi Shimbun asked Japanese respondents whether they positively evaluated the dispatch of the SDF to provide “fuel and provisions” to the American military. As depicted in Table 7.4, both polls found approximately half of the electorate positively evaluating this deployment, whereas nearly 40 percent did not, and the rest were undecided. On the other hand, when Asahi Shimbun asked in July 2003 whether Japanese wanted the MSDF Indian Ocean dispatch extended, the response was negative. As depicted in Table 7.5, a clear majority of 55 percent answered no, and only 32 percent answered yes. Consistent with earlier polls discussed in Chapter 6, the work of the SDF has come to be highly evaluated by Japanese citizens. Nonetheless, they are not supportive of deploying the SDF overseas for rear-area missions connected with the use of force. In short, the public was saying: We like what the SDF has been doing, but we want them to return home as soon as possible. These results would prove highly significant four years later in 2007, when the DPJ decided to use its newfound control of the upper house to force a quick withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. Views on the Use of Force in Afghanistan In contrast to a pacifist rejection of all wars as unjustified, Japanese public opinion showed relative understanding for the U.S. attack on the Taliban

122

responses to 9-11 and afghan invasion table 7.5 Position on extending the Indian Ocean dispatch. Asahi Shimbun, July 2003: This law about SDF dispatch [to the Indian Ocean] runs until November of this year. Do you favor revising this law to permit an extended SDF dispatch? Are you opposed?

Support Oppose Other/don’t know

32% 55 13

source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, July 22, 2003 (morning edition): 4.

regime in Afghanistan. A Yomiuri Shinbun poll conducted on September 24–25, 2001, asked whether respondents supported American preparations to use military force against terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. Of respondents, 44.1 percent (59 percent of men and 30 percent of women) supported such preparations while 26.7 percent (19 percent of men, 34 percent of women) opposed military preparations. And 28.9 percent answered that they could not say one way or another, while 0.3 percent were unable to give any answer.38 In a Yomiuri Shinbun poll conducted on October 20, 2001, 23.2 percent responded that attacking Afghanistan was appropriate, while 59.5 percent answered that there was no alternative (literally, “it can’t be stopped”) but to attack under the circumstances. Of those taking the poll, 14.9 percent responded that the attack was unacceptable, and 2.4 percent did not answer.39 An Asahi Shimbun poll conducted a few days after the start of hostilities found that 46 percent supported the military attack in Afghanistan for the reason of “eliminating terrorist organizations,” while 43 percent opposed and 11 percent were unsure or did not answer.40 In answer to a similarly worded question in late November, a subsequent Asahi poll found a tie, with 46 percent supporting the use of force versus 46 percent who opposed and 8 percent who were unsure.41 Japanese respondents were thus relatively understanding, if still ambivalent, about supporting the U.S. use of force in Afghanistan as a direct response to the terrorist organizations and infrastructure that had launched the 9/11 attacks.

Conclusions In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Koizumi acted far more boldly than any previous prime minister in sending the SDF overseas to support the United States. This created a false impression, an impression



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that to some extent has persisted, that Japanese security policy, especially regarding the use of force overseas, was fundamentally changing. According to one account, “There is a growing possibility that the planned legislation will cross a fundamental line of Japanese security policy—that the SDF is not to exercise force unless the nation is under attack.”42 While this prediction did not underestimate the desire of Koizumi and those around him to move in this direction and lift the ban on the exercise of collective selfdefense (which would allow Japan to use military force overseas in defense of U.S. forces), this prediction proved to be wrong. Despite repeated statements about desiring to lift this ban, Koizumi failed to do so immediately after 9/11 or in the process of dispatching the SDF to the Indian Ocean to support U.S. operations in Afghanistan. This prediction, and others like it, underestimated the inf luence of the stable public opinion majority opposing such a development. Because public opinion mattered, the change in Japan’s defense policy was much smaller and less fundamental than had been initially anticipated. Counterfactually, had public opinion not mattered, Koizumi would likely have lifted the ban, allowing the SDF to participate directly in combat operations in support of the U.S. military. At a minimum, Japan would have dispatched the SDF to dangerous zones in Pakistan and perhaps Afghanistan to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and medical services for U.S. military personnel in combat zones. In addition to dispatching the MSDF ships for refueling operations, P-3C patrol planes and AWACS early-warning radar planes would have been dispatched as well. An advanced Aegis air-defense destroyer would have been among the first ships sent to the Indian Ocean, and there would have been no hesitation about using this ship to directly support U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan and even in the lead-up to the Iraq War. Also, the MSDF and perhaps other branches of the SDF would have transported weapons and ammunition for the United States. In a counterfactual scenario in which Japanese public opinion had been pacifist, the MSDF would not have been dispatched to provide rear-area refueling and logistical support for the United States and allied militaries. However, the ASDF might have nonetheless been dispatched to deliver humanitarian supplies to refugees in Pakistan because even the pacifist Social Democratic Party supported this dispatch. This change in the Social Democratic Party’s position ref lected the large swing that occurred in mass opinion during the 1990s in favor of having the SDF conduct overseas humanitarian relief operations that were not connected

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with combat (see Chapter 6). Nonetheless, despite the initial shock of the 9/11 attacks, rear-area logistical support for the United States and allied military forces engaged in combat in Afghanistan proved to be much less popular. It was necessary to very clearly divorce this support from any hint of involvement in combat or direct support for combat, such as delivering weapons or ammunition or fueling aircraft before taking off for combat missions. Even so, the public was at best ambivalent about this mission, praising the SDF’s performance, but supporting withdrawal as soon as possible. The emergence of this opinion majority demanding withdrawal as soon as possible coincided with the Iraq War, a development that appeared to damage support for the overall war on terrorism. We return to this theme in Chapter 9.

8

The Iraq War and the SDF

The Japanese public’s distinctive skepticism about the utility of offensive military power coupled with its skepticism of American offensive uses of military power and accompanying fears of entrapment, partially obscured by the initial shock of the 9/11 attacks, came roaring back to political salience by the time of the Iraq War and the debate about the SDF’s possible deployment there. Consequently, the ambitious plans of Koizumi and hawks regarding the Iraq deployment were thwarted. An envisaged security mission in support of the U.S. military was transformed into a humanitarian relief and reconstruction focused mission. This chapter thus presents the final full case-study of SDF overseas deployment in this book: the public’s reaction to the Iraq War and the Koizumi cabinet’s deployment of the SDF to Iraq following the end of initial hostilities and the establishment of a U.N. mandate for foreign forces in that country. It shows that the public consistently and overwhelmingly opposed the Iraq invasion, displaying its characteristic skepticism about the utility of strategically offensive military power. Moreover, the public strongly opposed Koizumi’s plans to dispatch the SDF to Iraq, especially for missions that implied involvement in combat or support in any way for the U.S. war effort. Public opposition led to a drastic watering down of Koizumi’s initial ambitions and transformed the eventual dispatch into a Cambodia-style humanitarian relief and reconstruction mission.

Japanese Public Opinion toward the Invasion of Iraq Japanese opinion about the prospect of attacking Iraq was, from the beginning, overwhelmingly critical. Although the size of the lopsided majority opposing the Iraq war waxed and waned over the months, it never shrank from clear majority status. Regarding the reasons for waxing and waning, the results in Table 8.1 suggest that the return of U.N. weapons inspectors and U.S. cooperation with the United Nations between September and December 2002 might have temporarily increased support for the eventual prospect of an attack on Iraq. However, by December 2002, as it became clearer that the

126

iraq war and the sdf table 8.1 Support for potential U.S. attack on Iraq. Prospect of a U.S. attack on Iraq.



Aug 02

Support Oppose

December 02

14% 77

26% 65

January 03

20% 69

source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, September 3, 2002 (morning edition): 4; and January 27, 2003 (morning edition): 4.

table 8.2 Japanese support for the U.S. invasion of Iraq versus Afghanistan.

Support war Oppose war

Mar. 20–21, 2003

31% 59

Iraq War       Afghan War Mar. 29–30, 2003

27% 65

Apr. 2003

Oct. 2001

Nov. 2001

29% 63

46% 43

46% 46

source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, October 16, 2001 (morning edition): 4; November 27, 2001 (morning edition): 4; March 22, 2003 (morning edition): 4; and March 24, 2003 (morning edition): 4; March 30, 2003 (morning edition): 4; and April 25, 2003 morning edition): 35.

United States was soon going to attack without U.N. support or the completion of weapons inspections, support fell again. Table 8.2 reveals that the start of the war coincided with some increase in support for the war. Yet, even during the first week, support quickly fell back close to prewar levels.1 The findings in Tables 8.1 and especially 8.2 reveal that opposition to the war in Japan was, from the beginning, consistently and overwhelmingly dominant and that the reaction of the Japanese public was clearly different than in the case of Afghanistan. The Japanese public demonstrated a willingness to make distinctions between wars. Nearly half of the public viewed the Afghan war as justified while overwhelmingly viewing the Iraq war as mistaken. As discussed in the following pages, Japanese opposition to the war in Iraq ref lected skepticism about the utility of military force for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and for promoting democracy. Table 8.3 reveals that only a small minority of the Japanese public had been convinced that the Hussein regime was indeed a threat, despite the then widespread belief that Iraq had WMD stockpiles (see the following discussion). Iraq’s violation of U.N. resolutions and solidarity with the U.S. ally figured as even less important reasons for Japanese war supporters. The



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table 8.3 Reasons for supporting and opposing the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Reasons for supporting the U.S. invasion of Iraq (March 20–21, 2003), asked of the 31 percent who indicated support for the invasion

Because Iraq f lagrantly violated U.N. resolutions Because the Hussein regime was a danger Because America is an ally

8% 15 6

Reasons for opposing the U.S. invasion, asked of the 59 percent who were opposed to the invasion

Because there was not a new U.N. resolution Because there was no legitimate reason for the war at this time Because of opposition to war

8% 12 39

source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, March 30, 2003 (morning edition): 4.

bottom half of the table provides a good measure of unconditional opposition to all offensive wars, with a large minority, 39 percent, opposing the U.S. invasion simply because they oppose war, a figure not much lower than the total percentage of Japanese opposed to the war in Afghanistan (see the preceding paragraphs).2 By comparison, the 12 percent who choose the option of opposing the war because there was no legitimate reason for war signaled a willingness to accept potentially valid reasons for offensive war but were not convinced by the reasons given for the Iraq invasion. Arguably, this group comes relatively close to academic defensive realism because it is open to the possibility of offensive war having utility under some circumstances. The 8 percent who opposed the war because of the absence of a new U.N. resolution also signaled a willingness to support offensive war under some circumstances and therefore are also reasonably close (albeit perhaps more legalistically inclined) to an academic defensive realist position.3 Table 8.4 indicates that, eighteen months after the initial invasion of Iraq, the view of the Iraq war as having been unnecessary and unjustified had grown to be embraced by more than two-thirds of the Japanese public. Japanese opinion exceeded Canadian opinion and approached French opinion in its opposition to the war.

Japan’s Response to the Iraq War Koizumi waited until the eve of the U.S. attack on Iraq, much later than other Bush allies, to express political support for the planned war. According to his top foreign policy adviser, Okamoto Yukio, Koizumi was concerned about the reaction of mass opinion: Koizumi’s “hesitation was only natural, as his

128

iraq war and the sdf table 8.4 Was the Iraq War justified? Asahi Shimbun, October 2004: “Was the war in Iraq justified?”



Japan

ROK

Canada

France

It was justified It was a mistake

16% 71

11% 85

24% 67

18% 77

source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, October 18, 2004 (morning edition): 8.

support for the war was certain to lower his popular support ratings.”4 Given that opinion polls were showing heavy opposition to the war itself, Koizumi’s hesitation was indeed well grounded. An internal Foreign Ministry source was more critical: “In the face of rising antiwar public sentiment, his ‘clear guidelines’ to support the U.S. position have degenerated into ‘trembling, guilt-ridden secret guidelines.’ . . . That’s why he can’t even provide any explanation to the public.”5 Yet, at the same time that Koizumi was hesitating to come out publicly in favor of the war, he was also loudly proclaiming his independence from public opinion. Speaking before the upper house budget committee on March 5, Koizumi proclaimed, “When asked which you choose, war or peace, everybody naturally chooses peace. But when the government conducts the affairs of state in compliance with public opinion, it might make mistakes in some cases. History proves this.”6 When Koizumi finally came out and publicly endorsed the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, just before the start of hostilities, he raised the specter of abandonment to justify his unpopular decision: “Damaging the confidence on the Japan–US relationship . . . would go against the national interest of Japan.”7 According to a Nihon Keizai Shimbun poll taken immediately after his statement of support, his approval rating fell 4 percent to 42 percent, while his disapproval rating increased 6 percent to 41 percent. This Nikkei poll showed that overall 49 percent disapproved of Koizumi’s public support for the war, while 40 percent approved.8 Nonetheless, as this poll indicates, the Japanese public, despite being consistently and clearly opposed to the Iraq war, was somewhat more supportive of their government’s political support for the war. Table 8.5 summarizes the findings of an Asahi Shimbun poll that made a comparable finding. Koizumi’s statement of support for the Iraq War was more popular than the war itself: Thirty-six percent of respondents supported Koizumi’s position, apparently buying his argument about the dangers of abandonment.



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table 8.5 Reasons for supporting Koizumi’s Iraq War statement (supporting the invasion of Iraq). Because U.S. assertions were persuasive Because the United States is an ally Because U.S. cooperation is needed on the North Korean problem Other

2% 12 21 1

Total approving of Koizumi’s statement

36%

source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, April 1, 2003 (morning edition): 4.

North Korea appears to be a significant reason for the relative popularity of Koizumi’s statement and perhaps the persuasiveness of the abandonment argument. Even among those who backed Koizumi’s statement of support for the war, only 2 percent thought U.S. assertions were persuasive. By contrast, the perceived need for U.S. cooperation and support on the North Korea issue loomed large among supporters of Koizumi’s statement, suggesting mistrust of U.S. alliance commitments and fear of abandonment. By implication, however, the opposing majority did not see the North Korean threat, or the fear of abandonment by the United States, as reasons to endorse Koizumi’s support for the Iraq war. Moreover, when all respondents were asked how important North Korea was as a factor in evaluating Koizumi’s statement of support for the U.S. war effort, 67 percent said this was a very (29 percent) or somewhat (38 percent) important factor in their evaluation.9 This high number (about 1.5 times the rate of support for Koizumi’s statement) means that many opponents of Koizumi’s statement considered North Korea an important factor when choosing opposition. Fear of encouraging an American preventive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities and entrapment in an ensuing war might have been reasons for considering North Korea to be a reason to oppose Koizumi’s statement. Polling data elsewhere in this book suggest significant Japanese skepticism about America’s offensive uses of force. Despite growing perceptions of a North Korean threat, a large opinion majority continued to favor a negotiated settlement with North Korea.10 Although never publicly acknowledged, there are indications that Koizumi and the director general of the Defense Agency, Ishiba Shigeru, pushed to dispatch the SDF during the initial full-scale fighting stage of the Iraq War. Ishiba reportedly had the GSDF and MSDF prepare dispatch plans. These plans included dispatching a makeshift hospital ship and a MSDF

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minesweeping f lotilla to the Persian Gulf. However, other members of the cabinet, most notably then Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo, objected to wartime deployments.11 Such deployments, or even their announcement, would likely have produced a strong backlash from public opinion. Counterfactually, if public opinion had not mattered, the offensive realist hawks would have had their way and the SDF would have been dispatched during initial combat operations to provide medical services for the U.S. military and allied personnel, if not to participate in actual combat. Minesweepers would also have been dispatched.12 By contrast, had public opinion been pacifist, Japan would have publicly opposed instead of publicly supported the invasion. Toward Dispatching the SDF to Iraq Even after the fall of Baghdad on April 9, and President Bush’s subsequent declared end to major combat operations on May 2, the Japanese government remained silent about the prospect and shape of possible legislation for dispatching the SDF to Iraq. As one keen observer of the policy process notes, “As the Contingency Legislation, which would provide a legal framework to mobilize the SDF in the case of foreign attack on Japan, was deliberated in the Diet, the Koizumi government was unwilling to create another controversy by disclosing information on the new legislation.”13 This illustrates a point discussed in Chapter 2, namely that public opinion matters more when other high-value bills are before the Diet, especially those in the same issue area, in this case, defense policy. Out of public view, the Koizumi cabinet was formulating its initial draft of the legislation. Early versions were ambitious, calling for the SDF to participate in counterterrorism and stabilization missions and for the GSDF to provide direct logistical support to the U.S. military by transporting weapons. Early drafts also called for the GSDF to help search for and dispose of WMD.14 However, with his approval ratings hovering just above 40 percent, Koizumi was too weak to push his ambitious plans through the LDP, even if he were able to obtain agreement from Ko¯ mei.15 He needed to compromise. On the other hand, Koizumi’s basic ambition of dispatching the SDF to Iraq got a boost from a mid-April 2003 Yomiuri Shimbun poll, which asked respondents about what Japan could do for Iraq reconstruction. In response, 9.8 percent said Japan should contribute only financially, 14.1 percent said Japan should contribute only personnel, 61.2 percent said Japan should contribute both, and 10.7 percent said Japan should not contribute anything at all;



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75.1 percent in total said Japan should contribute personnel. Of this 75 percent who supported a personnel contribution, 17.5 percent said only civil servants and private individuals should be sent, 14.2 percent said only the SDF should be sent, and 65.9 percent said civil servants, private individuals, and the SDF should be sent; a total of 80.1 percent of those who said personnel should be sent (or about 60 percent of all respondents) thought the SDF should be sent.16 The day after this poll, confident that it was not getting too far out in front of its readers, Yomiuri published an editorial pressuring the DPJ to come out in favor of dispatching the SDF to Iraq, arguing that the DPJ’s opposition to the Iraq War weakens the U.S.–Japan alliance.17 In mid-April, picking up on the fear-of-abandonment rhetoric being used by Koizumi and his cabinet, Yomiuri Shimbun again editorialized in favor of dispatching troops: “Under the U.S.-Japan Security and Cooperation Treaty, the US has a duty to protect Japan” and “Even if Japan did not support the US attack on Iraq, it would be incorrect to argue that this would fail to work against the alliance. . . . history is full of broken alliances.”18 By early June, mobilized by mounting concerns about public opposition, opponents to Koizumi’s original ambitions from Ko¯ mei (which was facing opposition from its So¯ ka Gakkai supporters)19 and the LDP acted to water down the Iraq reconstruction special measures bill draft. The Cabinet Secretariat plan of June 9 continued to call for the GSDF and other branches of the SDF to support U.S. and other forces to “ensure security,” and to “assist in the dismantling of weapons of mass destruction.”20 At a joint meeting of three of the LDP’s PARC subcommittees, Cabinet, Defense, and Foreign Policy, on June 10, 2003, opposition to the cabinet’s plan f lared. Young LDP lower house member and security expert Ko¯ no Taro¯ “questioned if ‘non-combat areas’ really existed in Iraq.”21 Even stronger opposition f lared at an LDP General Council meeting the next day, especially from members of the Hashimoto faction, including former Defense Director General Norota Yoshinari. Like Ko¯ no, former LDP Secretary General Nonaka Hiromu questioned “how to draw the line between combat and non-combat areas.”22 Internal LDP opponents were worried not only about retrospective voting in lower house elections expected in a few months. Many opposed the bill because of intensifying competition within the LDP. As one observer put it, Koizumi’s LDP rivals “wanted to take advantage of the public’s anti-war sentiments in order to cripple Koizumi” before the September LDP leadership election.23 Preventing the formation of an opposing majority was thus also Koizumi’s way to take the wind out of the sails of internal LDP rivals.24

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To avoid provoking a stable opposing opinion majority to the Iraq dispatch bill, and to get approval from the LDP General Council, Koizumi decided to drop provisions calling for the SDF to participate in the disposal of WMDs. It was agreed that the SDF could not transport weapons or ammunition for U.S. troops, as was the case with the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Similarly, the draft bill limited SDF operations to noncombat zones (sento¯ ko¯ i ga okawarete orazu).25 Previous provisions calling for the SDF to engage in policing or more ambitious antiterrorism and stabilization missions were dropped from the bill. Although language forbidding these operations was not clearly written into the law, the government pledged that the SDF would not engage in policing or more ambitious antiterrorism or stabilization missions; this solution left Koizumi some room to expand the mission to include some of these operations if he were able to swing public opinion in his favor. In response to concerns from the LDP itself about the possible unconstitutional exercise of collective defense, the government specified that the SDF would not be under the command of U.S. or British forces.26 To avoid provoking a large and stable opposing opinion majority, the Iraq Team of the Cabinet Secretariat decided that SDF rules of engagement (ROEs) would not be liberalized, this despite demands from hawks that ROE liberalization take place.27 Nonetheless, as the early details leaked out, opposition to the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures bill significantly increased. As Table 8.6 reveals, by late June the public was almost evenly divided on whether to dispatch the SDF to Iraq.28 By July a clear opinion majority had formed against dispatch. A desire to make an international contribution was the most important reason given among supporters of dispatch. Strikingly, very few of the supporters cited loyalty to the U.S. alliance as a reason to support deployment. Indeed, in an ominous sign for the alliance, by July slightly more respondents were citing American demands as a reason to oppose dispatch than were citing the alliance as a reason to support the bill. Among those who were opposed, the issue of safety was paramount. This concern ref lected the public’s demand that the proposed SDF dispatch was to be noncombat in nature. The publication of Asahi’s June poll had an immediate impact on the debate, and in particular on the DPJ, which had previously been undecided about whether to support the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures bill. Although the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party had already come out in opposition to the bill, throughout the month of June the DPJ had remained uncommitted. On June 3 then DPJ leader Kan Naoto announced



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table 8.6 Support for plan to dispatch the SDF to Iraq. Question: “The Japanese government has hammered out a policy for dispatching the SDF to Iraq. Do you support the SDF’s dispatch? Are you opposed?”

June

July

Support Oppose Other, no answer

46% 43 11

33% 55 12



June

July

Because relations with the United States are important Because it means making an international contribution Because we need to support the SDF Because Iraq has become safe Other/no answer

6% 29 8 2 1

6% 17 8 1 1



June

July

Because the demand for dispatch comes from America Because this conf licts with the constitution Because non-SDF support is sufficient Because Iraq is still dangerous Other/no answer

4% 8 13 16 2

7% 9 12 25 2

(To those who answered “Support”) Why do you feel this way?

(To those who answered “Oppose”) Why do you feel this way?

source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, June 30, 2003 (morning edition): 4; July 22, 2003. (morning edition): 4; and July 23, 2003 (morning edition): 4.

his party’s noncommittal stand when he stated, “We are not taking the stance that we will automatically not support necessary reconstruction in Iraq.”29 Throughout the month, internal opposition continued to mount as DPJ study groups visiting Iraq wrote reports criticizing potential SDF dispatch. On the other hand, a prominent young DPJ member and security hawk, Maehara Seiji, pushed for DPJ negotiations with the LDP over the contents of the bill. However, a day after the publication of the Asahi poll, the DPJ came out in opposition to the bill.30 Koizumi’s efforts to mollify public opposition by watering down the provisions of the bill proved to be insufficient. As Table 8.6 indicates, a clear opinion majority was forming against SDF dispatch to Iraq just as the bill was approaching a vote in the Diet. Nonetheless, Koizumi decided to ram the bill through the Diet, producing scuff les and wrestling matches in the upper house as the DPJ tried unsuccessfully to filibuster. Koizumi was able to do this because the DPJ remained weakened after the defection of several

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parliamentary members the previous fall; this in turn left Ko¯ mei vulnerable as well. Koizumi had also succeeded in marginalizing outspoken critics within the LDP, such as former party secretary general Nonaka Hiromu, who were reduced to breaking party discipline and voting against the bill, abstaining, or walking out of the Diet during voting.31 The sight of ramming through an unpopular bill, producing scuff les as a result, consolidated the small opinion majority in opposition to SDF dispatch. In an August Nihon Keizai Shimbun poll, 28 percent supported dispatch, versus 52 percent who opposed and 20 percent who did not answer or were not sure.32 Although only a narrow majority opposed dispatch outright, these polling results were enough to convince even the popular and determined Koizumi to shelve SDF dispatch until after Iraq had become “safe.” At the very least, Koizumi was going to delay actual dispatch until after elections for the lower house in the fall. In an Asahi Shimbun poll conducted approximately ten days before the November 9 lower house elections, when asked which issue would most inf luence the choice of candidate and party, a mere 4 percent of respondents answered that the Iraq problem would most inf luence their vote. By comparison, 6 percent listed reform of the public roads (expressway) corporations, 43 percent pension reform, and 45 percent economic policy. In short, Iraq did not have a big inf luence on voting behavior in this election. This result ref lects the fact that Koizumi and the LDP ran away from this issue during the election campaign, issuing vague statements about when, under what circumstances, or whether troops would actually be dispatched to Iraq. The opposition DPJ’s concentration on domestic economic issues also drove down the salience of Iraq.33 The LDP–Ko¯ meito coalition survived the election, albeit with a somewhat reduced majority, as the LDP lost nine seats. On the other hand, the DPJ made big gains, becoming the strongest opposition party in postwar history. Nonetheless, with the election past, Koizumi forged ahead with plans to dispatch the SDF to Iraq. Within LDP headquarters a security expert pointed to the experience of the PKO law from a decade earlier, arguing that the best response to public opposition to the Iraq dispatch was to ride it out and wait for opposition to evaporate.34 Nonetheless, the Koizumi cabinet had to respond to public concerns, as voiced by Ko¯ mei and some within the LDP, to limit the risks of the SDF becoming involved in combat and suffering casualties as much as possible.35 U.S. demands that Japan dispatch the SDF to dangerous regions north of Baghdad, including Balad, and more generally that it share risks along with



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the United States and other allies notwithstanding, the government decided to deploy the SDF to the relatively peaceful southern town of Samawah. Earlier plans to use the GSDF to provide rear-area logistical support for U.S. forces were also dropped in favor of exclusive concentration on humanitarian and reconstruction missions.36 The dispatch plan, which was announced during a nationally televised press conference by Koizumi on December 9, 2003, reaffirmed that the SDF would not engage in combat or transport weapons for other countries and would concentrate instead on humanitarian and reconstruction operations, most notably water purification. Nonetheless, Koizumi used hawkish arguments to justify the deployment, claiming that the dispatch was for the sake of solidifying confidence in the U.S.–Japan alliance. He also used a novel constitutional interpretation, suggesting that more important than the war-renouncing Article 9 is the constitution’s preamble, which obligates Japan to contribute to achieving high ideals in international society, such as the banishment of tyranny and oppression and promotion of international peace. Ignoring the part of the preamble that states Japan’s desire for “peace for all time,” Koizumi cited a different section: “We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone . . . We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.” After quoting this passage of the Constitution’s preamble, Koizumi added, “Indeed, I believe the international community is calling upon Japan, and the people of Japan to act in accordance with the ideals of our Constitution.”37 In making these arguments and by refusing to set a time limit on the deployment, Koizumi appeared to be trying to sway public opinion to accept broader missions for the SDF in Iraq beyond humanitarian and reconstruction operations.38 A Nikkei poll taken a week after Koizumi’s press conference again found a stable majority opposed to dispatch, with 33 percent expressing support for the SDF dispatch to Iraq and 52 percent expressing opposition. Koizumi’s explanation failed to move voters, as 63 percent of respondents in the Nikkei poll expressed dissatisfaction with Koizumi’ explanation, versus a mere 23 percent who expressed satisfaction. Indeed, in response to a subsequent question about how the Iraq dispatch plan affected their view of the Koizumi cabinet, a net of 10 percent of respondents answered that the Iraq dispatch plan had caused them to switch from supporting to opposing the cabinet.39 Thus, Koizumi’s hawkish justification for the Iraq dispatch appears to have been, if anything, counterproductive. An Asahi Shimbun

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poll also found a sudden and significant drop in Koizumi’s approval rating after this speech from 47 percent to 41 percent.40 A Yomiuri Shimbun poll in mid-December 2003 found similar results. It asked respondents whether they supported the immediate dispatch of the SDF to Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance or only after the stabilization of the security situation. Of respondents, 17.8 percent answered “as soon as possible” and 48.2 percent “as soon as the security situation stabilizes,” while 29.8 percent answered that there was no need to dispatch the SDF (4.2 percent had no answer). The plurality answer on this question appears consistent with the view of the SDF as a disaster-relief organization that deploys to only noncombat zones. Koizumi’s justification for dispatching the SDF to Iraq was unconvincing to an overwhelming majority of Japanese. Of the respondents, 85.7 percent answered that Prime Minister Koizumi had not provided a sufficient explanation for dispatching the SDF to Iraq, versus 10.7 percent who did not think so (and 3.6 percent who did not answer).41 Following these dismal polling results neither Koizumi nor other members of the cabinet repeated these hawkish arguments. Instead of suggesting that Japan had an obligation to send military forces overseas to promote peace and banish tyranny, the Iraq dispatch came to be justified purely as a humanitarian and reconstruction mission, much as the Cambodia dispatch of twelve years earlier had been.

The SDF in Iraq The deployment of all three branches of the SDF to Iraq and neighboring countries from December 2003 through March 2004 proceeded smoothly. Once in place in their well-fortified camp in Samawah, the GSDF began its humanitarian and reconstruction work, including water purification and distribution, provision of medical care, and the repair of schools and hospitals. However, because of continued strong opposition to anything that smacked of military operations, especially in case the GSDF suffered or inf licted casualties, the GSDF was forced to rely on Dutch troops to defend against possible insurgent attacks. A related reason was that the SDF had very cumbersome rules of engagement (ROEs) that made effective response to an armed attack difficult at best. These require SDF members to issue a verbal warning first and then fire in the air; only then are they allowed to fire at their attackers.42 Such cumbersome ROEs themselves ref lected public opposition to the SDF entering into overseas combat.



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table 8.7 Support for the SDF dispatch to Iraq March 2004 Asahi Shimbun poll: Do you support the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq?

Support Oppose

February 2004

March 2004

42% 41

44% 48

source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, March 17, 2004 (morning edition): 4.

Nonetheless, the GSDF’s humanitarian and reconstruction projects created good press images in Japan, as the SDF did in Iraq what it is most popular for doing in Japan itself. Given the failure of his previous justification for the deployment, which was based on Japan and the SDF playing a larger global security role, Koizumi began deemphasizing this justification and started emphasizing the SDF as the best organization to provide humanitarian and reconstruction relief in an unstable environment. During a policy speech on January 19, 2004, Koizumi emphasized: “In personnel terms, given that the situation in Iraq is one that cannot always be described as being safe, I have decided to dispatch the SDF, which have had a daily training regimen, and are capable of operating efficiently and avoiding danger in hostile environments. They will not use force.”43 In other words, Koizumi was trying to turn safety concerns to his advantage by emphasizing that the SDF is the only Japanese organization trained in how to avoid suffering casualties. The combination of the SDF performing its most popular mission in close proximity to combat produced ambivalence among the Japanese public. The results of two Asahi Shimbun opinion polls shown in Table 8.7 well represent these mixed feelings. The overall pattern that emerges is ambivalence about the presence of the SDF in Iraq yet consistent support for withdrawing the SDF at the first opportunity. When the SDF Iraq deployment was up for possible extension in December 2004 and again in December 2005, Nippon Television (NTV) polls asked respondents whether they favored extending the SDF mission in Iraq. The results, as depicted in Table 8.8, show a consistent desire on the part of Japanese public opinion to withdraw the SDF from Iraq at the earliest opportunity. In April 2004, after several Japanese civilians had been taken hostage and the hostage takers had demanded the withdrawal of the SDF in return for the hostages’ freedom, Asahi Shimbun asked respondents about their views on this issue. When asked whether the Japanese government had been correct

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table 8.8 Support for extending the SDF deployment in Iraq. Nippon TV: “Do you support extending the SDF deployment in Iraq for another year?”

Support Oppose No opinion/don’t know

Nov 2004

Dec 2004

Dec 2005

27.7% 53.9 18.5

30.9% 58.3 10.9

30.7% 59.8 9.6

source: Data from Nippon terebi yoron cho-sa, available at www.ntv.co.jp/yoron/.

in deciding not to withdraw the SDF from Iraq in response to the hostage incident, 73 percent said the government had been correct, versus 16 percent who said this had not been the correct decision and 11 percent who did not know or did not answer. When asked whether Japan should continue to deploy the SDF in Iraq, 50 percent answered that the deployment should continue, versus 32 percent who answered that the deployment should not continue and 18 percent who were unsure or did not answer. These results not only suggest that Japanese public opinion opposes making concessions to appease terrorist threats (at least on the scale of a troop withdrawal) but also that the terrorist demands actually increased support for keeping the SDF in Iraq. When supporters of continued SDF deployment were given a choice of reasons, 28 percent selected the SDF’s useful work for Iraqi reconstruction, 10 percent selected the importance of not giving in to crime or terrorism, 9 percent cited the importance of relations with the United States, and 3 percent gave another answer or no answer. When opponents were asked their reasons, 3 percent answered that the SDF’s reconstruction work is not useful, 15 percent cited the danger of becoming entrapped in combat or terrorism, 12 percent said the deployment itself was problematic, and 2 percent gave other reasons or did not answer. These results once again demonstrate the popularity of the SDF’s reconstruction work in Iraq.44 On the other hand, terrorist or guerilla attacks aimed at the SDF or their Dutch military protectors did tend to increase opposition to the SDF deployment in Iraq. This tendency is evident in the Table 8.9, where an attack on Dutch forces in Samawah appears to have precipitated a sharp decline in support for the SDF deployment in Iraq. These results suggest that if the SDF actually did suffer or inf lict casualties, the public backlash against continued deployment would be sharp indeed. In fact, in the only survey question to this author’s knowledge that asked about the hypothetical of SDF personnel being killed or wounded, a January 2005 Kyo¯ do¯ Tsu¯ shin



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table 8.9 Support for continued SDF deployment in Iraq in the wake of attacks. March question wording: “The Koizumi cabinet is proceeding with the deployment of the SDF to Iraq. Do you support the continued deployment of the SDF in Iraq? Do you oppose?” May question wording: “In Samawah, where the SDF is stationed, a Dutch soldier was killed while on patrol, and incoming projectiles have landed near the SDF base. Do you support the continued deployment of the SDF in Iraq? Do you oppose?”

March

May

Support Oppose No answer/don’t know

51.7% 39.9 8.5

39.6% 52.2 8.2

source: Data from Nippon terebi yoron cho-sa, available at www.ntv.co.jp/yoron/.

poll found that 65.2 percent, or nearly two-thirds, said Japan should withdraw the SDF immediately.45 The public’s negative view of the SDF’s continued deployment to Iraq became one of two top issues (along with pension reform) that moved voters, especially f loating voters, away from the LDP and toward the DPJ in the July 2004 upper house election, producing a stinging defeat for the LDP. The LDP leadership itself recognized this cause-and-effect relationship after the election.46 This demonstrated that the prospect of the SDF becoming embroiled in military operations overseas remained a potent issue in Japanese politics. In a bow to public opinion, Koizumi’s chief cabinet secretary subsequently suggested that, if armed clashes were to occur in Samawah, the GSDF would have to withdraw.47 By positioning the SDF deployment in Iraq as a humanitarian and reconstruction mission, Koizumi managed to place his final deployment plan reasonably close to the indifference slope of Japanese public opinion, with the aggregate reaction ranging from ambivalent to somewhat negative. The popularity of the SDF’s good works in Iraq was balanced by knowledge of their close proximity to the danger of combat; the public consistently supported withdrawal at the earliest possible date. Koizumi, with his phenomenal popularity and political skills, was better positioned than almost any other politician in the postwar era to ignore public opinion. Yet, his tendency to push Iraq policy beyond what voters wanted cost him and the LDP politically, most notably in the 2004 upper house election.

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More importantly, Koizumi was forced to drastically limit the SDF deployment to humanitarian and reconstruction operations, eschewing earlier ambitions to make logistical support for the United States and other coalition forces a main mission and to engage in at least limited policing and stabilization operations. An attempt to skirt restrictions on transporting weapons for coalition forces by transporting armed U.S. troops met with public opposition, forcing the government to back away from this form of support.48 Despite predictions from LDP headquarters that history would repeat itself, with opposition to the SDF dispatch to Iraq dissolving the same way opposition to SDF noncombat support for U.N. peacekeeping operations dissolved, this did not happen. Instead, public opinion remained consistently opposed to the Iraq war itself and ambivalent about, if not opposed to, the SDF deployments there. As a consequence, the GSDF Iraq deployment represented virtually no movement beyond the overseas humanitarian and reconstruction operations paradigm in place since the 1992 Cambodia deployment. Indeed, this is how Ko¯mei explicitly justified the deployment. According to Hamayotsu Toshiko, deputy chair of Ko¯ mei and an upper house member, “There is no argument regarding the purpose of the deployment of the Self Defense Force to Iraq; it is for humanistic support to rebuild and not for war.”49 Nonetheless, the lack of public acceptance for this mission was a clear indicator that it would be politically difficult for a future Japanese government to repeat this precedent, much less extend it. Although two observers of Japan’s recent security policy argue that “it is hard to understand this [the Iraq deployment] as anything short of a turning point in Japan’s postwar security policy,”50 it appears that Iraq is becoming a negative example used in Japanese politics to argue against further deployments of the SDF, rather than a positive example for expanded deployments. Despite a landslide victory in a snap lower house election called in September 2005 over postal privatization, Koizumi nonetheless finally bowed to public opposition to the Iraq deployment by announcing in late Fall that the SDF would withdraw by the summer of 2006, a year before the law authorizing the dispatch was set to expire.51 Given that Koizumi had successfully “changed the channel” from Iraq and pension reform, the two issues that led to the LDP’s defeat in the 2004 upper house election, to postal privatization and his vow to “break the LDP” through this privatization, plus his exceptionally strong political position following the September election (the LDP and their coalition partner Ko¯ mei won a two-thirds majority), this bow to public opinion might seem surprising. However, Koizumi



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had good reason to end his defiance of a stable public opinion majority: his desire to see his successor successfully amend Article 9. Counterfactually, had the offensive-realist hawks had their way, following the end of combat Japan would have dispatched the SDF primarily to participate in security and stabilization missions. Restrictive rules of engagement, if they still existed, would be abolished so that the SDF could conduct security missions and not depend upon the protection of foreign military units. Japan would have accepted the U.S. invitation to deploy the SDF to dangerous zones such as the Sunni Triangle. The ASDF logistical support mission would not have had any limits placed on it in terms of transporting weapons and ammunition. Had public opinion been pacifist, the SDF would not have been dispatched to Iraq for any reason, although Japan might well have offered economic and other assistance for rebuilding the country and alleviating human suffering.52 In particular, the ASDF logistical support mission would never have taken place. On the other hand, the SDF would likely have been dispatched overseas for disaster relief missions, such as the post-2004 tsunami relief mission, which even the Japanese Communist Party supported.

The GSDF Returns from Iraq, the ASDF Stays Despite Koizumi’s decision in the fall of 2005 to withdraw the GSDF from Samawah, he decided to continue the ASDF deployment there, apparently believing, as discussed in the following pages, that the ASDF in Iraq could continue “f lying under the radar” of public opinion. This also ref lected a desire to continue pleasing the Bush administration. During a meeting in early May 2006, Japanese Defense Agency Director Nukaga was able to convince U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to accept the withdrawal of the GSDF from Samawah. Nonetheless, Rumsfeld made it clear that he wanted the ASDF mission of transporting supplies in Iraq to continue.53 Even after the last GSDF troops departed Iraqi soil in July 2006, the ASDF transportation mission between Kuwait and Iraq continued for more than two years. Despite Koizumi’s initial interest in seeing the GSDF support U.S. forces in Iraq and even take on some stabilization and policing roles, in the end the GSDF played a purely humanitarian and reconstruction role. During the course of its deployment in Samawah, the GSDF supplied nearly 55,000 metric tons of purified water and over 250 instances of medical support at

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local hospitals and repaired thirty-six schools, thirty roads, and fifty-three other public facilities, including a stadium.54 Another reason that the SDF mission could be promoted to the public as having been a humanitarian and reconstruction mission was the lack of casualties and the fact that the SDF was able to avoid using force. According to a senior SDF official, “It’s a miracle that we had no casualties and didn’t have to fire a single shot.”55 Of course, this was less than a miracle. Because the Japanese public opposed a “military deployment,” the ROEs for the GSDF were not amended and hence remained cumbersome to the point of impracticality. This, and a strong desire to avoid casualties, led Japan to entrust the defense of the SDF to Dutch troops in the beginning and then, after the Dutch withdrew in March 2005, to Australian troops.56 The GSDF “boots on the ground” had been under constant protection. The Public’s Reaction How did public opinion react to the withdrawal of the GSDF and the continuation of the ASDF mission there? As Asahi poll conducted in late June 2006 found that a plurality of 49 percent of respondents believed that the Iraq deployment had been a good thing, versus 35 percent who thought it had not been a good thing. When supporters were asked why, 46 percent cited the SDF’s cooperation in helping to rebuild Iraq, versus 30 percent who cited the importance of playing a significant role in international society and 14 percent who cited the deployment as a plus for the alliance. Although the question asked only about the deployment of the SDF to Iraq, it was clear that respondents answered based on the deployment of the GSDF to Samawah and especially their role in providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The ASDF was not involved directly involved in such reconstruction efforts, and its mission was much less visible. Among reasons cited by opponents for opposing the SDF deployment to Iraq, 41 percent cited opposition to the Iraq war, and 25 percent cited giving too much weight to the U.S. alliance, a warning sign for the alliance given that support for the alliance was a much less important reason for favorably evaluating the SDF deployment. Fifteen percent negatively evaluated the SDF deployment to Iraq by claiming that the SDF had not done much to aid Iraqi reconstruction, and 15 percent said the SDF deployment to Iraq was constitutionally problematic.57 On the other hand, when asked whether they favored the continuation of ASDF transportation operations in Iraq with an expanded area of operations for the United States and other coalition partners, an even larger majority



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of 55 percent opposed, versus 33 percent who approved. These results show the continuation of a pattern discussed in the last chapter, namely that the Japanese public tended to highly evaluate the humanitarian and reconstruction work of the SDF, yet nonetheless oppose their deployment to Iraq. Given the ASDF’s relative distance from actual humanitarian and reconstruction missions on the ground, opposition to the continuation of their mission was thus even greater. Just after Koizumi left the premiership and Abe Shinzo¯ was moving into the Kantei, the PMO conducted a special poll on the SDF deployment to Iraq. This poll first prompted respondents by informing them that the GSDF had been sent to Iraq to provide “humanitarian reconstruction” assistance after the launching of a new government there and that all members had returned unharmed to Japan in July. It then asked them how they evaluated the “humanitarian reconstruction assistance provided by the GSDF.” In response, 71.5 percent (strongly, 25.6 percent; or somewhat, 45.9 percent) favorably evaluated the humanitarian reconstruction assistance provided, versus 22.5 percent who somewhat (17.4 percent) or very (5.1 percent) negatively evaluated the GSDF’s assistance and 5.9 percent who did not know.58 These results again shows the tendency of Japanese public opinion to highly evaluate the humanitarian and reconstruction operations of the SDF, especially when there are no casualties or involvement in combat. However, this should not be confused with support for the deployment itself. Indeed, given the way the question was asked, it was hard not to be for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance; being against purifying water and rebuilding schools per se would be equivalent to being against motherhood. Unless a respondent was sophisticated enough to answer strategically, seeing that an answer of support for these humanitarian accomplishments could be construed as supporting the overall mission and perhaps future combat missions as well, it is hard to imagine why any respondent would answer no. Nowhere in this question or in the prequestion prompting of respondents was Koizumi’s original justification of the deployment for supporting the United States or the U.S. military cited as a reason for the GSDF deployment. Moreover, when compared with pre–9/11 polls that showed around 85 percent of Japanese supporting overseas dispatches of the SDF for humanitarian relief operations (see Chapter 6), this poll showed a significant drop in support, with only 71 percent favorably evaluating the SDF humanitarian operations in southern Iraq.59 Strikingly, this PMO poll did not ask respondents whether they supported the continuation of the ASDF transportation mission in Iraq.

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Because of the Asahi poll (or perhaps their own unpublished poll question), the PMO pollsters could surmise that a majority would oppose the continuation of this mission by a wide margin. So instead they merely asked respondents whether they were aware of the ASDF mission. This question appeared to be an attempt to determine whether the strategy of keeping this mission “under the radar” (in other words, keeping it obscure) could work. In response, almost half of respondents reported being almost totally unaware (22.8 percent) or somewhat unaware (23.1 percent), suggesting that an “under-the-radar” strategy would be the most promising for ensuring the survival of the ASDF mission.60

Conclusions There was a mismatch between what Koizumi wanted to accomplish in Iraq and what he was finally able to achieve. Originally intending to dispatch the SDF during the initial wartime operations, he then started drawing up ambitious plans for involving the SDF in stabilization and law-andorder missions and other forms of direct support for the United States in Iraq. Eventually, Koizumi had to settle for a GSDF deployment to southern Iraq. Although this accomplished the symbolic goal of “putting boots on the ground” and appeared to satisfy President Bush, in reality Koizumi was forced to water down this deployment until it became a Cambodia-style humanitarian and reconstruction mission in proximity to combat. As such, the GSDF mission was far removed from the U.S. military and participation in peace and stabilization operations. Indeed, Japanese troops, as had been the case in Cambodia, relied on other troops to protect them. Koizumi’s greatly scaled-down ambitions ref lected the inf luence of public opinion. As Daniel Kliman notes, Koizumi “could not shape public opinion.”61 Although Koizumi liked to boast about ignoring public opinion, in fact it significantly shaped his plans. Richard Sobel’s description of President Reagan and his administration’s attempts to aid the contras could equally well describe Koizumi and his attempts to have the SDF play a military role in Iraq: The failure of President Reagan to persuade the public to support administration policy demonstrates the limits of leadership even for a popularly perceived president who attempts to change public opinion on a controversial issue. Administration policymakers acknowledged that opinion limited the scope of their contra aid policy . . . Reagan was well aware of public opinion and that it forced his administration to ask for less funding for the contras than he would have liked.62



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Nonetheless, did Koizumi’s success in deploying the GSDF for more than two years to southern Iraq effectively condition the public to accept more ambitious deployments in the future? Or had he gone too far, promoting policies that would prove politically unsustainable and counterproductive? The next chapter addresses these questions.

9

Reversing Course: An Iraq Syndrome in Japan

Despite predictions that the Japanese public would come to accept SDF overseas combat deployments following the Iraq dispatch and would support the hawkish policies of Koizumi’s successor, the resurgence of entrapment fears as a result of the SDF deployment to Iraq only increased the salience of the Japanese public’s general skepticism about the utility of offensive military power. Consequently, in the wake of Iraq the Japanese public pushed for retrenchment. This chapter thus explores the overall trajectory of Japan’s security policies over the two years following the GSDF’s withdrawal from Samawah and the impact of the Iraq deployment on this trajectory. It finds that opposition to the Iraq War, the SDF’s deployment there, and the resulting aggravated entrapment fears produced an “Iraq syndrome” (or perhaps a “Koizumi syndrome”) in public opinion characterized by reduced support for SDF overseas deployments of any kind. Support for constitutional revision or reinterpretation, especially in connection with Article 9, also fell drastically as a result.

Iraq as a Catalyst for More Overseas SDF Deployments? A Nordic diplomat based in Tokyo and long-time observer of Japanese politics told the author, “Japan’s deployment was amazingly successful. Japan did not suffer any causalities. . . . this is a great success for Koizumi.”1 Beyond the obvious success of avoiding causalities, many observers saw the Iraq deployment as conditioning Japanese public opinion to accept overseas military deployments for the sake of the U.S. alliance, if not for the sake of engaging in combat. According to another astute observer, political scientist Ellis Krauss, LDP leaders have often molded public opinion by breaking “small taboos” on security then let[ting] the public get used to the new outer limits, thus pushing the envelope out further next time of what is acceptable and what not. This is exactly what Koizumi did with Iraq. . . . So now the taboo of only sending SDF abroad under UN auspices has been broken for the first time, and because of that, Abe now takes the public stand that there has to be a case by case consideration



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of when “collective defense” with the U.S. is constitutional or not . . . . he couldn’t have done that without the Iraq precedent.2

Although most Japan observers and pundits supported this view, this chapter shows that within a year of the GSDF withdrawal from Iraq, Japanese public opposition to that war, distrust of their own government for having associated itself with it and other American policies viewed as unwise, and heightened fear of entrapment in U.S. wars had produced a backlash in public opinion that caused Tokyo to reverse course. In reaction, ruling coalition politicians abandoned Koizumi’s policy of expanding SDF overseas deployments and Japan’s international security role and scaled back missions he had already set in place, most notably the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. Deployments related to the U.S. war on terrorism became especially unpopular, but even unrelated U.N. missions, such as to the Sudan, became a harder sell. If not in full retreat, Japan was at least retrenching. Although often scaling back his ambitions to mitigate public opposition, Koizumi nonetheless followed his proclaimed predilection of leading not following public opinion to excess, thereby bequeathing a politically unsustainable security policy legacy for his successors. Some senior LDP leaders understood this early on. Erstwhile Koizumi ally Yamasaki Taku, speaking almost exactly one year before the 2007 upper house election, issued a prophetic warning to his party against excessive hawkishness. According to Yamasaki, if a movement develops within “my party, the Liberal Democratic Party, to pull the country into a warlike direction, Japan is a democracy and my party could be chased out of the government.” For example, there was little political support within Japan for preempting North Korean nuclear facilities: “There is absolutely no movement in that direction in Japan.” Similarly, in talks with U.S. officials, Yamasaki warned that extending the MSDF refueling mission, then scheduled to expire in November 2006, would require “a lot of political energy.”3

The Abe Administration In September 2006, two months after the GSDF completed its withdrawal from southern Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi completed his premiership, passing the baton to Abe Shinzo¯ , his chief cabinet secretary and a close political ally. Abe was committed to pushing forward Koizumi’s security policies, realizing unfulfilled promises to reinterpret the constitution to reclaim the right to collective self-defense, realizing revision of Article 9, and more generally continuing to expand the geographical and especially the operational

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scope of SDF operations overseas. Abe also proposed establishing a strong U.S.–style National Security Council, a policy institution that would help realize his goal of playing a more active role in international security.4 In his first policy address to the Diet, Abe asserted that his administration would “study which specific cases would come within the purview of exercising the right to collective self-defense, now prohibited under the Constitution,” a clear indication of his plan to reinterpret the constitution to allow the exercise of collective self-defense in at least some cases.5 However, Abe’s ambition faced an adverse and deteriorating public opinion environment. Before the Iraq War, popular support for reclaiming the right to collective self-defense had been rising. In 2002, before the start of the Iraq War, in an annual Yomiuri Shimbun poll support peaked at 35.2 percent, still well short of majority support. However, beginning in 2003, support started declining. By 2005 support for reclaiming this right stood at 30.5 percent.6 In a differently worded 2007 poll by Kyodo, 54.6 percent of respondents opposed changing the current constitutional interpretation banning the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, versus 18.3 percent who wanted to revise this interpretation.7 The timing of this decline suggests that the Iraq War caused many Japanese to worry that ending the ban on the right to collective self-defense could lead to Japan becoming entrapped in an American-led war that would not be in Japan’s national interest. Abe also reaffirmed Koizumi’s political support for the Iraq War and decided to continue ASDF transportation operations there despite unmistakable public opposition. He further decided to renew the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law set to expire in November 2006 and the legal basis under which the MSDF provided fuel and water for U.S. and allied vessels involved in maritime interdiction operations related to the Afghan War. Yet, despite his desire to expand SDF operations overseas, Abe failed to take advantage of this opportunity to expand the MSDF mission to include maritime inspection or to dispatch the SDF to Afghanistan to assist in reconstruction efforts. Most striking of all, Abe did not try to make this law permanent or to establish a permanent law on SDF overseas dispatch, as many hawks in the LDP had been calling for, including Abe himself two months earlier.8 Indeed, instead of extending this law for four years, the duration of this law when it was originally enacted, in a decision that would have huge implications one year later, Abe settled for a mere one-year extension.9 Despite his often-expressed ambitions for Japan to play a larger military role, even in the fall of 2006, when Abe had approval ratings averaging well over 50 percent, public opposition to continuing, not to mention expand-



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ing, overseas SDF deployments connected with U.S. military operations significantly constrained Abe. Yamasaki’s prediction (see the preceding discussion) proved to be right on the mark, extending this law was indeed politically costly. With a difficult upper house election looming in only nine months, Abe tried to minimize these costs and hoped to pass a more ambitious bill a year later. Yet others, even within Abe’s cabinet and the senior ranks of the LDP, were growing increasingly concerned about the electoral consequences of defying public opinion on SDF overseas deployments as the upper house election approached. With overwhelming public opposition to the Iraq War continuing, and indeed strengthening, concern began centering on a controversial bill coming up for Diet consideration in late spring 2007, just before what was expected to be a difficult upper house election for the ruling coalition, to extend the ASDF mission in Iraq. Defense Agency Director Kyu¯ ma Fumio began trying to distance the Japanese government and the ASDF dispatch to Iraq from the Iraq War itself in early December 2006. Answering a question from a member of the Diplomacy and Defense Committee of the Upper house on December 7, Kyu ¯ ma claimed that “the Government of Japan did not publicly support” the Iraq War. Rather, he suggested that Koizumi’s statement of support had been a personal opinion, that “he was making a comment to the press.”10 Regarding his personal position toward the war, Kyu ¯ ma said, “It would not be appropriate to say I ‘supported’ the war. ‘Understood’ would adequately describe my position.”11 The next day Kyu ¯ ma had to backtrack, acknowledging that Koizumi’s statement of support had indeed been backed by the entire cabinet, not just by Koizumi personally: “In that sense, Koizumi’s view (expressed) during the news conferences was an official view.” Nonetheless, he continued refusing to endorse the war: “I still wonder if there might have been better measures.” However, he continued to support SDF deployments to Iraq, arguing that these had been for the sake of supporting the reconstruction of Iraq, not for the sake of supporting the U.S.–led war. In doing so, he was openly trying to distance and insulate these operations from the war itself: “The SDF has been dispatched (to help with the) reconstruction of Iraq, based on UN resolutions, not to express support for an American war.”12 The following month Kyu ¯ ma renewed his criticism of the Iraq War and his efforts to insulate the ASDF deployment from this unpopular war. In late January, Kyu ¯ ma, now Japan’s first defense minister following the Defense Agency’s promotion to ministerial status, again criticized the Iraq war, claiming at a news conference that the decision to invade Iraq “based on an

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assumption that weapons of mass destruction existed was a mistake.” He volunteered that he had personally never supported the war, “and my opinion remains the same.” Kyu ¯ ma also insisted that Tokyo would not “automatically” or “hastily” decide to extend the ASDF resupply mission set to expire in July, despite U.S. plans at that time to “surge” its troop levels there.13 This attempt to politically insulate the ASDF deployment from the unpopular war produced fallout with Washington as the United States filed an official protest and threatened to delay an upcoming round of two-plus-two talks (defense and foreign ministers of the two countries) “if there are any more remarks critical of Bush.”14 However, several days later Foreign Minister Aso¯ Taro¯ appeared to join Kyu ¯ ma in trying to distance the Japanese government from the Iraq War, albeit by targeting former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld instead of naming Bush personally. According to Aso¯ , Rumsfeld’s postinvasion occupation policy was “very naïve,” and “because this operation did not work out well, it (Iraq) is in trouble now.”15 An aide to Kyu ¯ ma, in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun, spelled out the political logic behind Kyu ¯ ma’s criticism of the Iraq War, logic that perhaps lay behind Aso¯ ’s criticism as well. The aide told Asahi that Kyu ¯ ma’s criticism of the Iraq War was “aimed at making it easier for key bills to pass the Diet, such as the special measures law on Iraq that expires at the end of July. When the Diet votes on the law to extend the ASDF mission there, Kyu ¯ ma’s stance will help mitigate opposition among the public, the aide said.”16 This aide thus confirmed that Kyu ¯ ma’s remarks were indeed aimed at trying to distance the Iraq war from support for the ASDF mission, apparently fearing electoral consequences with the upper house election looming in July. Certainly, Kyu ¯ ma’s remarks earned public understanding if not support. According to an Asahi Shimbun poll, 57 percent of respondents “empathized” with Kyu ¯ ma’s criticism of the Iraq War as a mistake, versus 26 percent who did not.17 The battle within the LDP and even within Abe’s cabinet between hawks who wanted to follow Koizumi’s advice to lead rather than be “too sensitive to public opinion” and others who were more concerned about not defying public opinion so close to an election continued. Hawks painted dire pictures of what would happen if Japan was not willing to fight along side the United States in various hot spots. Ishikawa Atsushi, former head of the SDF Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued in the Yomiuri Shimbun that “for Japan to survive in international society,” it must be willing to “shed blood and sweat” for global stability. “If the US thinks ‘Japan is absent when it should be helping,’ the US–Japan alliance will collapse.”18 Meanwhile,



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other hawks claimed that expanded SDF overseas operations would be “an important diplomatic card for Japan.” Building on growing public acceptance of military power for territorial defense, the Abe administration was able to pass a law elevating the Defense Agency to ministry status late in 2006. However, Abe had to promise its junior coalition partner Ko¯ mei that the ban on collective self-defense would be maintained as a condition for the latter’s support of this bill, a promise that might have been short lived had Abe’s premiership been longer. Nonetheless, hawks were able to insert language into the ministry promotion bill elevating several overseas activities from subsidiary to “mainline duties” (honrai ninmu): international peace cooperation activities, the emergency evacuation of Japanese expatriates overseas, and minesweeping.19 In most respects, however, this language did little more than ratify the status quo, and because it was not tied to any concrete deployments it could be enacted without provoking opinion majorities opposed to continued Iraq and Indian Ocean dispatches. Abe speech’s at NATO headquarters in January 2007 highlighted this policy priority. He claimed that Japan would not “hesitate” from undertaking overseas SDF operations. On the other hand, the modest nature of this statement suggested that it ref lected domestic political constraints more than Abe’s ambition. Indeed, he added the qualifier that he would only dispatch the SDF overseas “while adhering to the principles of the Constitution,” an odd qualifier given Abe’s commitment to rewriting the constitution. Absent from his speech were any references to Japan expanding the types of missions played by the SDF overseas. Notably, he did not propose any Japanese deployment to Afghanistan to help provincial reconstruction teams there.20 The problems facing hawks such as Abe in expanding, not to mention maintaining current, overseas SDF deployments were made clear in a poll conducted by left-of-center Asahi Shimbun on March 10–11, 2007, which asked respondents whether they favored extending the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Law in order to allow the ASDF deployment there to continue. In response, an overwhelming 69 percent opposed continuing this deployment, a jump of 14 percent compared to a June 2006 Asahi poll (discussed in the previous chapter) that had asked the same question about the ASDF deployment. By contrast, only 19 percent favored continuing the mission, a drop of 14 percent when compared with the 33 percent who had so answered in June 2006; 12 percent answered “undecided” or “don’t know.”21 When asked whether Japan should continue cooperating with the Bush administration regarding Iraq more generally, respondents were opposed by almost the same margin: Sixty-nine percent opposed continued cooperation,

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versus 18 percent who supported it. Similarly, a poll conducted by rightof-center Nippon TV in May found 60.3 percent opposed to extending the ASDF mission there, versus 29.6 percent who supported it and 10.2 percent who were unsure or did not answer.22 Although the opposing opinion majority was less overwhelming in the May NTV poll than the March Asahi poll, it was still notably larger than it had been in the June 2006 Asahi poll. The public opinion environment for this mission was clearly deteriorating. With the extension of the ASDF mission due for a vote before July, the Abe administration’s strategy of “f lying below the radar” by minimizing media coverage of this unpopular mission could not be maintained for much longer. Kyu ¯ ma had been right to worry about public opposition to this mission, but his strategy of trying to distance the cabinet from the war had clearly failed. The coalition would have to defy public opinion right before the upper house election to extend this mission. It is no surprise that the Abe administration put all of its ambitious plans for a larger military role on hold until at least after the upper house election. Nonetheless, in early May 2007, during a visit to NATO headquarters, Kyu ¯ ma raised the possibility of Japan providing ASDF transportation for materials and goods to aid in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Looking ahead to plans to reauthorize the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in the fall of 2007, Kyu ¯ ma raised the possibility that this law could be revised to permit the ASDF to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. This proposal again showed the ambition of the Abe cabinet to try to expand SDF activities overseas geographically, if not functionally, but also the public opinion hurdles they faced. In particular, Kyu ¯ ma would go no further than to say that Japan would study the possibility of an ASDF mission to ferry reconstruction supplies. And he did not mention the possibility of dispatching SDF troops to even relatively safe areas of Afghanistan to engage in reconstruction assistance. From the timing and the tentativeness of Kyu ¯ ma’s remarks, it is obvious that he was proposing this new mission as a possibility only if the ruling coalition and the Abe cabinet survived the July upper house election.23 Two months later, in mid-July, with the upper house election only weeks away and the prospect of defeat looming ever larger, Kyu ¯ ma’s hawkish successor, Koike Yuriko, backed away from any additional Afghan or other SDF dispatch, saying the government had no plans for new SDF dispatches. She even ruled out a humanitarian mission connected with fighting and atrocities in Darfur, even though Japan had already conducted a similar mission in 1994 in connection with the Rwanda genocide.24 This unwillingness to consider any sort of Darfur dispatch appears to be a result of what this chapter



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identifies as the Iraq syndrome: the difficulty of sending the SDF overseas or continuing current missions because of the SDF dispatch to Iraq. On the other hand, Koike attempted to play on fears about a North Korea that had only recently conducted its first nuclear weapons test. She insisted that when she campaigned she would warn voters: “I doubt if you really can defend your country if you start discussing (new) security policies (under a different administration) when every single second matters.”25 A little over two weeks later, when voters went to the polls, they unambiguously rejected this message, identifying domestic insecurity as a far greater threat than North Korea or other external threats.

The Upper House Election: The Public Changes the Channel The September 11, 2005, lower house election has been dubbed the postal reform election because Koizumi called this election after dissolving the lower house following the failure of his postal reform bill to pass the upper house. Koizumi defined this election as a battle between himself and internal LDP opponents, the so-called Zo¯ han, who had opposed postal reform. He expelled these opponents from the party, sent in “assassins,” mostly women, to run against these ex-LDP members, and promised to crush the LDP if he could not reform it, an election strategy that has since become widely known in Japan as “Koizumi theater.” By staging “Koizumi theater,” the prime minister was effectively able to change the channel from pension reform, the Iraq deployment, and other policy areas where he was ignoring stable opinion majorities and thus vulnerable. In the run-up to the July 2007 upper house election Abe had initially tried to do likewise, defining the election as being a referendum on constitutional reform, overseas SDF deployments, and security issues. Given that only nine months earlier North Korea had staged its first-ever nuclear test, and major missile tests only three months before that, there was good reason to expect that security concerns would dominate in the minds of voters as they went to the polls. Yet, like those of his predecessor, many of Abe’s security policies did not enjoy public support. More importantly, the public had other concerns, and this time it, not the prime minister, changed the channel to issues they cared about, namely pension reform and growing economic inequality and insecurity. In an Asahi poll taken in January, a plurality of 48 percent claimed that it was “inappropriate” to make constitutional reform the central issue in the upcoming upper house election, while only 32 percent considered this appropriate.26

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In response to Abe’s promotion of constitutional revision, support for overall revision fell in a Kyodo poll from 61 percent in 2005 to 57 percent in 2007. Of respondents, 44.5 percent said there was no need to change Article 9, versus 26 percent who saw such a need.27 Similarly, in an Asahi Shimbun poll, 49 percent opposed amending Article 9 versus 33 percent who supported amendment (also see the related discussion later in this chapter). Ratifying the status quo seemed to be the most important motivation behind those supporting change, with 70 percent of respondents answering that the constitution should mention the existence of the SDF. Nonetheless, 70 percent wanted to maintain the status quo of the SDF, a sentiment shared by even 52 percent of those favoring an amendment to Article 9. These results suggest that even many of the supporters of amending the constitution, including Article 9, did not support the proposals of Abe and other hawks to create a “normal” military that could engage in overseas combat. With such polling results becoming known, the LDP began to run away from constitutional reform. Responding to polls showing the public prioritizing pension reform rather than constitutional reform, the LDP produced an election manifesto that barely mentioned constitutional reform and failed to state clearly which parts of the constitution it wanted to reform.28 Even Abe himself began to limit the amount of time he spent talking about constitutional reform and security issues. During the first day marking the official start of the upper house election campaign, Abe spent only 11 percent of his speaking time discussing diplomacy and security issues and 2 percent discussing constitutional reform. The DPJ’s Ozawa essentially spent no time discussing either.29 Meanwhile, some LDP candidates began explicitly running away from constitutional reform and security issues. For example, in Shimane prefecture, LDP incumbent Kageyama Shuntaro¯ started emphasizing that constitutional reform could wait and that he aligns himself with dovish elements of the LDP.30 This shift was not enough to save Kageyama, however, who went down to defeat despite representing the traditional LDP bastion of Shimane prefecture. The LDP and the Ko¯ mei Party, its coalition partner, suffered a historic defeat during the July 29 election. The LDP had lost its stand-alone control of the upper house back in 1989, but it had remained the largest party in the upper house until this historic defeat. With the LDP and Ko¯ mei now in the minority, the DPJ became the largest party and, in combination with other opposition parties, most notably the Social Democratic Party and the Japan Communist Party, was able to form a working majority in the upper house. This majority allowed the opposition to block ordinary legislation



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for at least sixty days, or permanently unless the lower house could muster a two-thirds majority to override the upper house. Because of Koizumi’s large victory in the September 2005 postal election, the LDP and Ko¯ mei, if they could agree, could muster a two-thirds majority in the lower house to override the upper house (although in the case of government appointments, such as the governor of the Bank of Japan, an upper house rejection could not be overridden). Although the ruling coalition retained the ability to triumph on most issues of greatest importance to it, the July 29 election represented a historic shift of power. The DPJ’s victory was a nationwide sweep as they won in many of the LDP’s traditional rural bastions. Based on the voting patterns for the July 2007 upper house election, Yomiuri Shimbun estimated that in a lower house election the Democrats (along with the Social Democrats and the National People’s Party) would win 334 seats, while the LDP and its coalition partner Ko¯ mei would win a mere 135 seats; in other words, the DPJ and their partners (and probably the DPJ alone) would win a two-thirds majority. That is, the same voting pattern in a lower house election would have knocked the LDP and their coalition partner cleanly out of power.31 Why did the DPJ win such a sweeping victory? In Yomiuri Shimbun and NTV’s joint exit polling during the July 2007 upper house election, constitutional reform finished fifth behind pensions, the economy and economic inequality, political corruption, and education but ahead of a possible rise in the consumption tax as the main priority in the minds of voters. However, it is not clear whether those selecting this as a priority when deciding their vote were primarily opponents or supporters of revision. But given that the Social Democrats and Communists were the most active in campaigning on constitutional reform, and were vociferously opposed, it is likely that a large percentage, if not a majority, voting on this issue were opponents.32 These results show that the public was not voting against constitutional reform or a greater overseas role for the SDF per se. Nonetheless, this exit poll and the overall results clearly show that voters punished Abe and the LDP for focusing on constitutional reform and international security rather than concentrating on domestic insecurity issues that mattered to them more, such as pension reform and growing economic inequality. Taken together with preelection polling results already discussed, the message that constitutional reform and an expansion of Japan’s overseas security role should be taken off the agenda was heard loud and clear by politicians. The day after the election, the head of Ko¯ mei bluntly warned Abe to stop focusing on constitutional reform and concentrate instead on

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bread-and-butter issues such as pension reform, growing economic inequality, and political corruption.33 The Asahi Shimbun reported the comments of a senior LDP party leader who admitted the reason the LDP took such a battering . . . lay in a perception gap over what the public wanted and what Prime Minister Shinzo¯ Abe’s cabinet pursued . . . while public attention was riveted on the debacle of millions of missing pension records, Abe kept harping on about making constitutional amendments a key issue of contention in the election.34

The Constitutional Revision Movement Retreats In the wake of the LDP’s massive defeat, a significant shift of opinion occurred in the upper house against constitutional reform. An Asahi Shimbun poll of elected members after the 2004 election had shown that 71 percent of upper house members favored constitutional reform of some kind, versus 20 percent who opposed, 7 percent who were unsure, and 2 percent who answered otherwise. The July 2007 election produced a big drop in support for constitutional reform to 53 percent, with 26 percent opposing, 15 percent undecided, and 6 percent answering otherwise. This was the first Asahi poll of Diet members since 2003 that showed less than the mandated two-thirds majority supporting constitutional reform in either chamber. Strikingly, only 48 percent of newly elected members supported constitutional reform, and only 10 percent wanted to see constitutional reform realized during their term in office. This drop was evident even in the LDP, with 89 percent strongly supporting constitutional reform after the 2004 upper house election, but only 62 percent strongly supporting it after the 2007 election. LDP upper house members weakly supporting revision rose from 9 percent to 29 percent, and 2 percent expressed opposition to reform, versus 0 percent of LDP members who expressed opposition in 2004. DPJ members supporting constitutional reform dropped from 61 percent to 39 percent between 2004 and 2007.35 Another survey of current and newly elected upper house members conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun found results consistent with the Asahi poll cited in the preceding paragraph, with about 50 percent supporting constitutional reform. About 90 percent of LDP members supported constitutional reform, versus only 29 percent of DPJ members, and 35 percent of DPJ members opposed reform.36 Support for revising Article 9 was even lower. After the July 2007 election, the Asahi poll found that only 31 percent of upper house members favored changing Article 9, versus 50 percent who opposed this. Whereas



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67 percent of LDP members supported changing Article 9 (67 percent of all members are needed to pass a constitutional revision), 94 percent of coalition partner Ko¯ mei’s upper house members opposed changing Article 9. Twenty-four percent of DPJ upper house members supported changing Article 9, versus 56 percent who opposed. With two-thirds majorities of both houses (plus approval in a national referendum) needed to pass constitutional reform, this seemingly put reform beyond reach for at least three years, and probably six years, especially in the case of Article 9.37 This Asahi poll also asked upper house members whether they supported recognizing Japan’s right to exercise collective self-defense. Overall, 51 percent of members opposed this. Among LDP members, 46 percent supported amending the constitution to realize this change, while 29 percent supported reinterpreting the constitution; 75 percent in all supported one or the other option, and only 6 percent opposed recognizing this right. Overall, 58 percent of DPJ members opposed recognizing the right to collective self-defense, while 8 percent supported changing the constitution to recognize this right and 10 percent supported reinterpreting the constitution. Strikingly, 100 percent of Ko¯ mei members opposed recognizing Japan’s right to exercise collective self-defense.38 Upper house members listened to voters and adjusted their policy positions accordingly. This large change in Diet opinion in turn ref lected a substantial shift in public opinion against constitutional reform, as depicted in Figure 9.1, which ref lects the results of Yomiuri Shimbun’s annual question about support for constitutional revision. In the context of this chapter what is most striking is the sharp drop of over 9 percent between April 2006 and April 2007, precisely when Abe was promoting constitutional reform and trying to make it the top issue of the upper house election. These poll results helped politicians make sense of the LDP’s historic defeat in the July 2007 election and draw lessons for their own political survival and policy positions moving forward. Taking a broader look at these 2003–2008 data, we see that support for constitutional reform peaked at 65 percent in 2004 but declined consistently thereafter, with the decline continuing even after Abe stepped down as prime minister. While Koizumi made progress in increasing support for constitutional reform in the beginning of his premiership, this progress eroded in the last two years of his premiership and accelerated during Abe’s year as premier. By April 2008, not only did a plurality oppose constitutional reform, but the rate of support had fallen back to levels not seen since 1993 when Yomiuri began polling annually on this issue and launched

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70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Yes

No DK/NA figure 9.1 Yomiuri Shimbun Annual Poll Question on Constitutional Reform source: Data from “Yomiuri Shimbun, April 8, 2008 (morning edition): 12; April 6, 2007 (morning edition): 14; Yomiuri Shimbun, April 8, 2008 (morning edition): 12; April 4, 2006 (morning edition): 14; April 8, 2005 (morning edition): 14; April 2, 2004 (morning edition): 10; April 2, 2003 (morning edition): 30. All numbers on the vertical axis are percentages.

its own campaign for constitutional reform. In other words, supporters of constitutional reform were left in the position of having to rebuild public support for constitutional revision from scratch. Moreover, as discussed previously, support for reforming Article 9 has been consistently lower than support for constitutional reform and has never achieved majority status in opinion polls. Public support for reforming Article 9 peaked at 43.6 percent in an April 2005 Yomiuri poll.39 Support for amending Article 9 in a contemporaneous Asahi Shimbun poll registered at 36 percent.40 By April 2008, an Asahi Shimbun poll found 66 percent opposed amending Article 9, versus a mere 23 percent who thought it should be amended.41

The Hawks Lose Control In the wake of the LDP’s historic defeat, pressure on Prime Minister Abe to resign to take responsibility for this defeat became intense, not least of all



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from inside his own party. Nonetheless, he resisted these calls and vowed to stay on, address the pension fiasco, and regain public trust. Given that the election results were widely seen as a repudiation of constitutional reform and greater security activism internationally, it is not surprising that the DPJ immediately targeted the MSDF Indian Ocean mission, which was due to expire on November 1, for termination.42 An August Asahi Shimbun poll found a stable majority opposing extension of this dispatch, with 53 percent opposed and 35 percent supporting extension, numbers almost unchanged from when Asahi had last asked the same question four years earlier in July 2003. Then, 55 percent had opposed extension and only 32 percent had supported; indeed, the variation between the two polls was probably within the margin of error.43 These results also showed that U.S. Ambassador Thomas Schieffer’s Japanese press interviews in which he pushed for extending the MSDF mission, made days before the poll was conducted, had no positive impact.44 Indeed, by linking the MSDF to combat, the ambassador may have undermined the case for extension; lack of trust in the United States, as discussed in Chapter 3, also likely contributed to the ambassador’s lack of persuasive effect. The DPJ focus on killing the Indian Ocean mission forced Abe to choose between saving this mission and concentrating on recovering public support by focusing on pensions and domestic economic issues. Characteristic of Abe, he decided that saving the MSDF Indian Ocean mission was to be the top priority of his cabinet. When asked in the same Asahi poll what the newly reshuff led Abe cabinet should focus on, 39 percent chose pension reform, 20 percent chose growing economic inequality among regions, 19 percent chose financial reconstruction, and 17 percent chose economic growth policy. Among the 53 percent who expressed disapproval for the new Abe cabinet, 56 percent choose as a reason (from among a list) that Abe’s priorities were detached from those of the public.45 After six weeks of struggling with the situation of a now divided Diet, intense criticism, and a very skeptical public and facing declining physical and mental health as a result, Abe abruptly resigned on September 12. After a short but intense contest with the hawkish former foreign minister Aso¯, Fukuda Yasuo, a former chief cabinet secretary under Prime Minister Koizumi, emerged as the new LDP president and prime minister of Japan. Unlike Aso¯ or Abe, Fukuda was a dove on foreign policy issues. In his first policy speech to the Diet, Fukuda did not even mention constitutional reform,46 and he thereafter took a very noncommittal position on the issue. Responding to election results, measurable public opinion, and his own

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policy inclinations, Fukuda quickly began to pull back from Abe’s hawkish policy initiatives. Answering a question from a Social Democratic member of the upper house of the Diet in mid-October about the advisory group former Prime Minister Abe had established in April to review the constitutional interpretation banning the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, Fukuda answered that he was considering either reforming or even scrapping the advisory group all together. Most importantly, he gave no indication that he was considering reinterpreting the constitution to allow for the right of collective self-defense as his predecessor had been promising.47 This change in position appeared to also ref lect a new consensus within the LDP resulting from the upper house election defeat. According to Harada Yoshiaki, a senior LDP lower house member, As a result of this election, the dominant view in the LDP has changed. The house of counselors election was a red light. Efforts to change the interpretation of the constitution have been set back at least 2–3 years and probably more. . . . Even if we eventually change the interpretation of the constitution we will not exercise this right of collective self-defense for a long time into the future if ever.48

In mid-December Prime Minister Fukuda decided to scrap legislation proposed and much touted by Abe to create a strong U.S.–style National Security Council. This decision appeared to be another effort to appease a public angered by Fukuda’s hawkish predecessor and to define himself as different. In making this decision, Fukuda himself noted, “In the current political climate . . . the outlook for the bills being passed is extremely poor.”49 Another reason for the decision to scrap plans to enhance the power of the NSC was undoubtedly the dovish policy inclination of Fukuda himself. Nonetheless, Fukuda did agree to enhance the counterespionage and the North Korea– and China–related intelligence analytical functions of the NSC, far more modest steps more directly related to Japan’s homeland defense and less related to overseas military involvement.50 In February 2008 the Fukuda cabinet began moving forward with longstanding plans from the Koizumi and Abe cabinets to enact a permanent law covering non–U.N. and non–humanitarian relief deployments by the SDF. However, already by the first meeting of the LDP’s internal subcommittee drafting this law, subcommittee director Yamasaki Taku announced that the committee should proceed under the assumption that the current interpretation of the constitution remains, thereby indicating an unwillingness to consider whether the bill should be based on a new interpretation that would allow Japanese forces to fight overseas in defense of allies under



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the right to “collective self-defense.” However, due to the continued unfavorable public opinion environment and the overall political weakness of the Fukuda cabinet, even this modest draft bill was soon shelved.51

Extending the Indian Ocean Deployment However, Fukuda did not fully abandon his predecessor’s position on the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, Fukuda honored Abe’s pledge to make the extension of this mission his cabinet’s primary goal for the fall session of the Diet. Fukuda appeared to be motivated by a desire not to alienate the United States and to defend the precedent of providing reararea noncombat logistical support to U.S. military forces engaged in combat overseas and the belief that, as a noncombat overseas mission, the MSDF refueling mission could earn public support or at least that he disrupt the stable opposing opinion majority that had formed against the bill. According to Harada, a supporter of extending the MSDF refueling mission, “They [the public] are not actively opposed to rear-area logistical activities overseas.”52 Indeed, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 7, the Indian Ocean mission was right on the indifference slope of public opinion. It was not an overseas combat mission, which the public has consistently opposed, but neither was it a humanitarian and reconstruction mission that usually enjoys strong public support. These characteristics gave Fukuda some hope that he could break the stable opinion majority that had formed against this mission by scaling back the mission and by distancing it and himself from the hawkish policies of his two immediate predecessors. Fukuda’s effective abandonment of constitutional reinterpretation, revision, and his scraping of Abe’s strengthened NSC plan should be seen in this context. After the DPJ announced its opposition to extension the day after the upper house election, the Abe administration and the LDP tried to compromise, seeking a meeting with the DPJ and suggesting concessions that had been proposed by the DPJ but rejected by the LDP in 2001 and even new concessions to convince the DPJ to support the extension of the Indian Ocean MSDF deployment. For example, they suggested a willingness to reconsider their previous rejection of the DPJ’s demand for prior Diet approval of SDF overseas deployment plans under this law. Conservative members of the DPJ, such as Maehara Seiji, who opposed their party’s opposition to renewing the deployment also sought compromise. They sought to impose strict requirements for reporting SDF activities to the Diet and to provide for secret Diet sessions where secret aspects of operations could be discussed.53

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However, DPJ leader Ozawa Ichiro¯ signaled his determination to shoot down the extension of the MSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean and also to introduce a bill calling for the withdrawal of the ASDF from Iraq during the fall 2007 Diet session, despite the likely futility of the later move. More generally, he appeared to be positioning the DPJ to oppose LDP plans to revise the constitution.54 Ozawa’s decisions to oppose the MSDF extension and also to pass legislation in the upper house calling for the withdrawal of the ASDF from Iraq were designed to signal to the public that the DPJ was ref lecting their opposition to both missions, especially the unpopular ASDF mission in Iraq. Ozawa also appeared to be trying to link the two, repainting the Afghanistan War as the Iraq War. During a meeting with U.S. Ambassador Thomas Schieffer, Ozawa insisted that Japan had no reason to help because Afghanistan was an American-initiated war, one that had not received ante-facto blessing from the U.N. Security Council, as had been the case with the first Gulf War; that it was a war for America’s, not wider global community, interests; and that therefore Japan could not participate.55 Following Abe’s resignation, newly inaugurated Prime Minister Fukuda tried to break up the opinion majority opposing continuation of the MSDF refueling mission by watering down the contents of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. In the end, he decided on a new bill that eliminated almost all of the provisions of the previous law, including those allowing for the dispatch of P-3C planes and other assets for patrol and intelligence gathering, joint search and rescue activities, medical assistance for U.S. military personnel, and the dispatch of the GSDF to refugee camps in Pakistan for relief activities, provisions that had never been exercised but that remained in the law. The stripped-down bill limited activities to providing U.S. and allied vessels with fuel and water only, and the new bill clearly stipulated that this fuel was supposed to be used only for counterterrorism maritime interdiction missions related to the Afghan conf lict and not for other conf licts, such as the Iraq War. It also limited the size of the MSDF contingent to one refueling vessel and one escort destroyer, significantly smaller than the MSDF contingent had been from November 2001 through summer 2005 but the same size as the MSDF f lotilla had been from summer 2005 through October 2007. The bill was also limited in duration to one year, also to try to minimize public opposition. The ruling coalition’s bill specified the dispatch down to such small details in part to justify stripping out a provision calling for Diet ratification of any actual dispatch. This change ref lected the new reality of DPJ opposition and control of the upper house. The Fukuda Cabinet’s position was that because all the details were already



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spelled out in the law there was no need for a dispatch plan and hence no need for a separate vote on it. While essentially accurate, this tactic raised concerns about weakened democratic or Diet control over the SDF and its overseas dispatches.56 Ironically, hawkish media outlets such as the Yomiuri Shimbun cooperated in this effort to remove the hawkish Iraq-related tint from the MSDF refueling mission. In an editorial, the Yomiuri Shimbun predicted that the watereddown bill “can easily win the understanding of the public.” Although this prediction was disproved by subsequent events, Yomiuri encouraged the perception that the new bill would cut any perceived links with the Iraq War: “Limiting the subjects of the refueling will certainly prevent the fuel provided from being diverted to the Iraq War.” Unlike U.S. Ambassador Schieffer, the Yomiuri editorial even implicitly tried to distance the refueling mission from the Afghan War and the United States by claiming that the water and fuel resupplying mission would be to support other nations’ vessels attempts to interdict “the movement of terrorists and transportation of weapons and drugs” on the high seas. This description made the mission sound more like a maritime policing mission, rather than part of a war.57 DPJ leader Ozawa responded by proposing that the SDF be dispatched to Afghanistan to participate in reconstruction operations through NATO’s U.N.–sponsored International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Ozawa restated his long-standing position that it would not be unconstitutional for the SDF to engage in overseas combat if they did so under a clear and direct ante-facto U.N. mandate.58 Ozawa’s statement was one of personal principle rather than a political tactic; and, indeed, public support for his idea was soon found to be lacking. However, he did succeed in outf lanking the Fukuda cabinet on its right, forcing them to retreat unambiguously behind the pre–Koizumi-Abe status quo. Whereas Koizumi and Abe often talked about their desire to reinterpret the constitution to allow for the right of collective self-defense, Fukuda did not jump at this opportunity to do so. Rather, his cabinet defended the status-quo constitutional interpretation prohibiting the SDF from engaging in overseas combat for any reason. Answering a question during a Budget Committee meeting in the lower house, Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura Nobutaka claimed that because Afghanistan is “a very dangerous area and can be called a combat zone . . . based on the Constitution (which prohibits the use of force), we cannot support” participating in ISAF activities. During that same Budget Committee meeting, Defense Minister Ishiba Shigeru added, “The government’s stance is that ( Japan) is

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not allowed to join the ISAF under the Constitution.”59 This reaffirmation of the long-standing constitutional interpretation that rules out the right of collective defense was yet another indication that Fukuda had abandoned his predecessor’s attempt at constitutional revision. The DPJ eventually drafted its own Afghan reconstruction bill, one that proposed dispatching individual SDF members whose expertise was needed, along with police officers and civilians, to participate in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, nonmilitary teams operating under ISAF instructions. These dispatches would occur after the conclusion of a cease-fire or before one in safe areas where no fighting was underway. This was a significant retreat from Ozawa’s position but appeared to ref lect strong opposition from within the DPJ, as well as from the public, to possible SDF involvement in combat, even under a U.N. mandate. The DPJ draft also called for resuming MSDF refueling operations in the Indian Ocean in support of maritime interdiction operations if such operations were mandated by a U.N. Security Council resolution.60 The DPJ also went ahead and submitted a bill to the upper house calling for the withdrawal of the ASDF from Iraq, a measure that clearly ref lected public opinion.61 The left-of-center Asahi Shimbun went further, editorializing that beyond rethinking the ASDF mission, Japan should rethink its support for the Iraq War and take some responsibility (ref lect, show remorse; in Japanese, hansei) for the war’s many casualties and destruction.62 Besides significantly watering down the contents of the Special AntiTerrorism Measures bill, the government worked hard to get U.N. sanction. Although the Security Council would not pass a resolution specifically mandating maritime interdiction operations, it did pass a resolution expressing gratitude for such operations. This, along with watering down the bill, Fukuda’s dovish policy stances in other areas, and his repeated calls for compromise with the DPJ, did prove somewhat effective in reducing the opposing opinion majority to an opposing opinion plurality and, brief ly, to a minority view. As Figure 9.2 shows, after Abe’s departure and Fukuda’s attempts to water down the bill and limit the deployment, opposition shrank to a plurality. Moreover, in December both Asahi and NTV polls showed a plurality supporting the bill. The increased support also ref lected Fukuda’s efforts reach broader compromises with the DPJ and especially the late October talks between Fukuda and Ozawa about forming a grand coalition. Although the public was generally nonsupportive of this “grand coalition” idea, with a plurality of 48 percent opposing (versus 36 percent who supported), 64 per-



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figure 9.2 Support for Extending the MSDF Indian Ocean Refueling Deployment source: Data from Asahi Shimbun, July 22, 2003 (morning edition): 4; August 30, 2007 (morning edition): 1; October 16, 2007: 4; November 6, 2007 (morning edition): 4; December 5, 2007 (morning edition): 1; December 22, 2007 (morning edition): 4; January 14, 2008 (morning edition): 4.

cent thought the DPJ and the LDP should seek compromise on the MSDF Indian Ocean dispatch issue, versus 22 percent who thought the DPJ should not compromise.63 Although Fukuda’s efforts to increase support by watering down the bill and offering to compromise with the DPJ appear to have had some effect, this nonetheless coexisted with distrust of the bill itself, with support for the bill being lower than support for the idea that the refueling mission should continue. In Asahi’s October poll, while 39 percent supported continuing the refueling mission, only 28 percent supported the new bill, versus 48 percent who opposed the bill. In Asahi’s November poll, 43 percent supported continuing the refueling mission, while only 35 percent supported the new bill, versus 43 percent who opposed the new bill. Strikingly, of those who thought refueling operations should be continued, only 62 percent supported the government’s new bill.64 This gap appears to ref lect resurgent antimilitarist distrust. Asahi attributed the difference to the lack of effective democratic control in the new bill, that is, the fact that it did not include a requirement for Diet approval of

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an actual dispatch. Another reason was growing distrust of the government over how the refueling mission had been carried out in the past. In particular, evidence surfaced that fuel provided by the MSDF to aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk was used for combat operations against Iraq. Although much of the evidence supported this claim, Defense Minister Ishiba nonetheless insisted in Diet testimony that none of the fuel provided to USS Kitty Hawk in February 2003 was diverted for use in the Iraq War. When asked about this in the NTV October poll, only 17.4 percent of respondents were satisfied with Ishiba’s explanation, versus 66.8 percent who were not convinced by his explanation and 15.9 percent who were not sure. The simultaneous emergence of a major inf luence-peddling scandal involving former Administrative Vice Minister of Defense Moriya Takemasa undoubtedly contributed to this mistrust as well. A large segment of the Japanese electorate appeared to be saying that they thought the refueling mission should be continued but that they did not trust this government or Defense Ministry to carry that mission out.65 In December and January, support for continuing the MSDF mission deteriorated significantly, as opposition began to return to levels not seen since the beginning of the debate. In addition to the Asahi and NTV results cited in the preceding paragraphs, a Kyodo poll found 46.7 percent opposed the refueling bill, while 38.8 percent supported it.66 This deterioration in support ref lected growing mistrust in Prime Minister Fukuda himself. In the mid-December Asahi poll, Fukuda’s overall support rate dropped by a whopping 13 percent, down to 31 percent. Among the 48 percent who expressed nonsupport for the Fukuda cabinet, 57 percent cited opposition to its policies as the primary reason. The main reason for these results was growing anger over his handling of the missing pension account issue; 60 percent of respondents said they thought the ruling cabinet had broken its promise on this issue, versus 30 percent who did not think so. Seventy-two percent of respondents said they could not expect Fukuda to regain public trust regarding the pension issue. Asked which party they would vote for in the proportional representation contest if a general election were held now, 38 percent picked the DPJ, versus 23 percent who picked the LDP, the largest gap in favor of the DPJ ever recorded in an Asahi poll.67 Fukuda was initially successful in reducing the stable opinion majority opposing the MSDF refueling extension down to a plurality, and brief ly to a minority, by watering down the contents of the bill and pushing hard for a compromise agreement with the DPJ. Given that this sort of mission was on the indifference slope of public opinion, unlike the dispatch of the SDF



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overseas to engage in combat, where overwhelming opposition had not lessened over the course of more than twenty years, Fukuda had some room to inf luence opinion. The DPJ, although unable to force the ruling coalition to confront a stable opinion majority against continuing the mission, was able to use its upper house majority to force Fukuda to focus his political energy on this issue, making it his top priority instead of the pension issue, which is what voters wanted him to focus on. In perception, and probably in reality as well, Fukuda’s focus on the refueling mission contributed to his poor handling of the pension issue, such as his costly and uninformed remark questioning whether the LDP had actually promised to find all the missing pension accounts.68 The DPJ managed to force Fukuda to change the channel back to international security and away from pensions, a move that created a large voter backlash against Fukuda. Fukuda’s resort to the (up to that time) rarely used constitutional provision allowing the lower house to override the upper house by a two-thirds majority vote to finally pass the MSDF refueling extension measure into law appears to have enhanced this negative perception among voters. Why, voters appeared to ask, was Fukuda spending so much time on extending the refueling mission when he had not yet proposed any kind of significant pension reform? The use of the override provision appears to have contributed to the reemergence of a clear plurality or small majority opposing the continuation of the MSDF mission. An NTV poll conducted just after the override vote found 50.5 percent opposed to this revote, versus 39.6 percent who supported it and 9.9 percent who were unsure.69 Junior coalition partner Ko¯mei’s caution about using the override, in retrospect, may have been wise. In mid-October 2007 Ko¯ mei leaders had suggested that the override provision should not be used unless more than 60 percent of public opinion backed the MSDF refueling mission. One senior Ko¯ mei official put it this way: “Unless every type of opinion poll shows more than 60% of the public supporting the new law, then we can cannot say the environment exists for overriding the Upper House.”70 However, what ended up mattering most in the end were not the numbers supporting or opposing the MSDF mission but public opinion about government priorities. The outcome of the MSDF refueling battle not only weakened the LDP and strengthened the DPJ but also reinforced the lesson of the July 2007 upper house election, namely that politicians who prioritize overseas military deployments and constitutional reform over domestic economic security issues do so at their own peril.

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Conclusions Counterfactually, had the offensive realists had their way, Japan would have dispatched the SDF to Afghanistan in 2007 to participate in ISAF reconstruction missions, including in dangerous areas of the country. Restrictive ROEs would have been changed to allow the SDF to defend themselves robustly instead of having to rely on other militaries for defense as had been the case in Iraq. The original terms of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law would have been fully implemented, with the GSDF being dispatched to refugee camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan for humanitarian assistance and to provide battlefield medical assistance to U.S. military personnel. The MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean would have been extended for at least two years, with no restrictions placed on this mission. Indeed, the MSDF would likely have been authorized to transport ammunition and weapons for U.S. forces (as had almost happened in 2001). At a maximum, as Abe wanted, Japan would have reinterpreted its constitution to allow for the exercise of collective self-defense, paving the way for the SDF to implement policing and stabilizing missions in Afghanistan and readily engaging in firefights with Taliban insurgents in its sectors of responsibility. Japan would also have dispatched the SDF in significant numbers to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations on the ground in Sudan. The ruling coalition would have enacted a permanent overseas dispatch law negating the need to pass new legislation through the Diet for each overseas dispatch outside of a U.N. peacekeeping or purely humanitarian relief context. Through this means, or through an extension of the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Act, the ASDF mission in Iraq would have been extended beyond the end of 2008. Finally, Japan would be moving ahead with the acquisition of long-range offensive missiles.71 Had public opinion been pacifist, the ASDF mission would have been immediately terminated (assuming Koizumi had ever gotten it off the ground in the first place), as would the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. Japan would not have codeveloped or deployed, much less accelerated deployment of, missile defenses on national territory and would not have modified its ban on the peaceful uses of outer space to allow the acquisition of military-quality spy satellites. Similarly, the Defense Agency would not have been raised to ministry status. Looking back at the first two years following the end of the Koizumi premiership, it became clear that an Iraq syndrome, and perhaps also a “Koizumi syndrome,” in public opinion contributed to a public backlash



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against Koizumi’s attempts, and those of Abe, to expand Japan’s international military role, especially the geographic scope and types of overseas SDF deployments. Opposition to the Iraq War, growing mistrust of the United States because of this war, and skepticism about the way in which Koizumi justified the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq damaged overall public support for even noncombat and humanitarian and reconstruction deployments of the SDF overseas. Reviewing the Iraq deployment in August 2007, a young LDP member specializing in security issues blamed Koizumi’s justification for the Iraq dispatch for undermining public support: “The way Koizumi sent troops to Iraq and justified this was wrong and damaged public support for overseas deployments. His explanations about deploying the SDF to ‘safe areas’ in Iraq were ridiculous.”72 Similarly, an editorial in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun in June 2006 pointed to a growing fear of entrapment among the Japanese public regarding U.S. global conf licts that are not in Japan’s interest. According to Ishizuka Masahiko, the Japanese public has misgivings about what appears to be Japan’s unlimited commitment to US initiatives around the globe. . . . Japan will be pulled on to this stage to play a supporting role as the US acts out its worldwide military strategy.  A question in the hearts of many Japanese: “How far can Japan’s commitment to the US strategy go?”73

The pattern found in this chapter regarding Iraq and the MSDF refueling deployment challenges the view that the LDP can mold public opinion though an accumulation of many small steps. More narrowly, this chapter shows a reversal of the previous pattern regarding the dispatch of the SDF overseas, beginning in 1992, for noncombat humanitarian and reconstruction missions, often within a U.N. peacekeeping framework. A prediction by a top security expert on the staff of the LDP PARC that public opposition to the SDF dispatch to Iraq would evaporate the way previous opposition to noncombat and humanitarian dispatches of the SDF had evaporated in the 1990s74 had clearly been disproved by 2007. Indeed, public opposition spread, endangering the extension of the MSDF refueling mission. Although Prime Minister Fukuda was eventually able to temporarily disrupt the opinion majority that had formed against this extension, he was never able to build a stable majority or even plurality in favor of this mission. In the end, public opposition to the priority the Abe and Fukuda cabinets put on overseas SDF deployments and other security initiatives versus domestic policy priorities proved to be the most politically damaging of all for both cabinets and for the LDP.

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This is not to say that Koizumi did not leave a more enduring security legacy in some areas. In particular, his decision to move forward with the United States in developing and deploying missile defense, regardless of how effective this system proves to be, nonetheless has continued to enjoy wide public support in Japan (see the next chapter). This is consistent with the major finding of this book about the foreign policy attitudes of the Japanese public: They see military force as having utility for homeland defense but not for offensive military operations overseas.

10

Conclusions

Overview of Findings Returning to this book’s original questions: Is Japanese public opinion stable, coherent, and composed of identifiable attitudes? Does Japanese mass opinion matter for policy? Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security finds that Japanese public opinion is inf luential because it is stable, coherent, and, regarding attitudes about the utility of military force, not easily or quickly swayed by elite attempts to inf luence it. Japanese public opinion matters because it has a significant inf luence on Japanese foreign and security policies. When actual outcomes are compared with the counterfactual scenarios presented in the case study chapters dealing with the Gulf War, overseas deployments within the context of U.N. peacekeeping, and the Afghan and Iraq wars, it becomes clear that Japanese public opinion thwarted the ambitious plans of hawkish leaders such as Koizumi and Abe to play a military role in international politics. Consistent with V. O. Key’s “dikes” model, public opinion has instead “channeled” Japanese policy toward initiatives more relevant for territorial defense, such as missile defense and enhanced capabilities for the coast guard. In sum, the combination of survey data on fundamental attitudes presented in Chapter 3 plus more than fifty years of real-world-event-driven media and government survey data presented throughout the book all point to a broad attitudinal defensive realism on the part of the public: growing support for the SDF as the guardian of national territory combined with robust skepticism about the utility of strategic offensive military force projection. This book further finds that these attitudes have in turn imposed defensive realist–like constraints on Japanese policy makers. Overall, this study demonstrates the value that qualitative methods can have for analyzing an area traditionally dominated by quantitative methods, namely public opinion and the relationship with policy.1 Indeed, given that public opinion research has always had a qualitative soft underbelly in the form of the question wording with which respondents interact in complex

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ways based on political, cultural, and linguistic contexts, what is surprising is that there have not been more qualitative analyses of public opinion surveys. That said, the methods used in this study, namely relying on real-world policy-context media and only a few polls more directly focused at revealing underlying attitudes, necessarily limit the precision of some of the inferences that can be drawn from this study. Although more than fifty years of real-world context media polling data allow this study to draw some very robust conclusions about attitudinal defensive realism, such as strong skepticism about offensive military power and opposition to SDF involvement in overseas combat operations, other finer-grained inferences remain more tentative and should be subject to future research that uses focused academic polls to undercover more information about underlying attitudes and how these interact with measured policy opinions.

Are Public Attitudes Stable? The findings of this book lend credence to the pluralist model in the elitist versus pluralist debate. Although most observers identify Japan as a strong state where government and ruling elites can have their way and public opinion is passive, unstable, composed of nonattitudes, and easily molded, the findings here suggest a very different picture. This book concludes that Japanese public attitudes toward security are stable, coherent, and inf luential. These attitudes are ref lected in measurable public opinion that is also generally stable and coherent. In most cases where there is apparent instability or incoherence in measurable opinion, this results from instability in survey wording overtime rather than instability in the public’s policy opinions. This in turn highlights the role of survey questions in inf luencing how underlying policy opinions are translated into measurable opinion. This book identifies two major security related attitudes, antimilitarist distrust and attitudinal defensive realism. The former has gradually eroded over time in the face of elites’ demonstration-based reassurance measures, while attitudinal defensive realism has persisted despite elite efforts to remold public opinion. Although the SDF has been permitted to conduct noncombat missions overseas since the early 1990s, as explained in Chapters 2, 4, and 5, this resulted from a process of trial and error, during which political elites searched for the indifference slope of Japanese voters (recall Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2), the point at which they could maximize the extent of such deployments without provoking a stable opposing opinion majority. Political elites have been more



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successful at discovering the “true long-term preferences” of Japanese voters regarding overseas deployments, a process complicated by the waxing and waning of entrapment fears and changing views of the United States, than at changing these preferences through a “molding of minds.”2 Antimilitarist Mistrust, Not Pacifism Has the predominant trend in Japanese public opinion toward foreign policy since the end of the Cold War been one of pacifist norms being replaced by realism?3 This book finds that the Japanese public was never truly pacifist. During the Cold War antimilitarist distrust of the state was strong, but public opinion never embraced unarmed neutrality as promoted by Japanese Socialist Party elites. As shown in Chapter 4, even many Socialist rank-and-file voters eschewed the idea that Japan should not have an army, although many initially mistrusted the SDF as a creature of right-wing and even antidemocratic forces. Over time, mass opinion has gradually come to trust the SDF and the state’s ability to control and wisely wield the sword. The receding of antimilitarist distrust has revealed a Japanese public that embraces defensive realist attitudes, recognizing military power as useful for homeland defense but not much else. The tendency to equate Japanese public views on security with pacifism during the Cold War was also a product of Japan’s political battles over defense. Ruling conservative politicians and sometimes even U.S. officials dismissed popular opposition to security initiatives as divorced-from-reality pacifism (if not “peace senility,” or heiwa boke in the domestic Japanese debate). Consequently, practical and concrete reasons for public opposition, such as fear of entrapment, often got obscured from view. The propensity to equate Japanese public opposition to military expansion with pacifism has hidden the true nature of the Japanese public’s evolving attitudes toward security. Some have confused a decline in antimilitarist distrust of the state with a rise in the inf luence of hawkish elites, seeing these elites as capable of molding Japanese public opinion to support SDF overseas combat missions. However, there is little evidence that the Japanese public is moving to embrace an offensive realist view of the utility of military force and instead has maintained a defense-dominant view of the utility of military power. Reassurance and Eroding Anti-Militarist Mistrust The robustness of public attitudes toward security limits elite inf luence over these attitudes and resultant policy opinions. Elites’ limited ability to shape

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external reality also limits their inf luence. In the case of antimilitarist distrust, this attitude was not so robust, and elites have been able to gradually erode this distrust through demonstration effects designed to reassure the public that the state can control and responsibly wield the SDF for beneficial purposes. These reassurance efforts began with domestic disaster relief and reconstruction operations and eventually expanded to similar overseas operations. On the other hand, attitudinal defensive realist skepticism about the utility of strategic offensive military power has proven more resistant to elite attempts at inf luence. Elites have not been able to demonstrate the utility of strategically offensive military power due to external circumstances beyond their control. Most fundamentally, they have not been able to demonstrate the SDF’s success in implementing strategically offensive combat operations. Although less salient for Japanese public opinion, foreign examples have not been especially encouraging either. Neither the Korean nor Vietnam war seemed to suggest the profitability of strategically offensive military operations (except perhaps in the context of a civil war), while the same negative lesson could be drawn from the Soviet and U.S. wars in Afghanistan and the U.S. invasion of Iraq.4 The relevance of foreign successes with strategically offensive military power for potentially undermining domestic skepticism, or at least skeptics, of the utility of strategically offensive military operations in Iraq and elsewhere has been noted by Tokyo University professor and international relations specialist Tanaka Akihiko. According to Tanaka, initial U.S. offensive military operations in Afghanistan “brought about results that completely refuted those questioning its effectiveness,” thereby suggesting the possibility that less skepticism might greet future offensive military operations.5 More directly, Kitaoka Shin’ichi asserted: “The U.S. attack on Iraq will be legitimated when good results there are seen.”6 Nonetheless, the continued paucity of successful exercises of strategically offensive military power (at least beyond the initial results) means that public skepticism about strategically offensive military power has proven to be a hard constraint on policy change, effectively preventing Japanese elites from implementing missions that would move overseas SDF activities beyond noncombat, and mainly humanitarian, missions into combat missions alongside U.S. forces. Continuity in Defensive Realist Attitudes The gradual ebbing of antimilitarist mistrust of the state during the Cold War revealed underlying defensive realist attitudes regarding the utility of mili-



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tary force. Despite this erosion and great changes in the international environment during the Cold War and after, the defensive realist attitudes of the Japanese public have remained almost unchanged. The public does not view strategically offensive military power as having much utility for destroying terrorist networks, for suppressing WMD proliferation, or for “offensive liberal” objectives such as promoting democracy and human rights. Japanese public opinion views nonmilitary means as usually being more effective for promoting these goals, especially in the long run. Ironically, this is why they came to support overseas SDF dispatches for humanitarian and reconstruction missions. As discussed in Chapter 2, this public attitude represents an element of developmentalist or liberal optimism: peace and stability through economic progress. The shock of the 9/11 attacks did little to change this attitude or Japanese attitudes toward security in general. Kono¯ Yo¯hei, then speaker of the lower house of the Japanese Diet, well represented mainstream Japanese mass opinion in this regard when he observed: “It is said that on 9-11 the world changed, but its structure has not changed. Poverty and inequality, and Middle Eastern problems must be solved, this was true before 9-11 and it is still true. . . . we must consider the reasons behind terrorism and how to solve them.”7 Defensive realist attitudes, plus this modicum of developmentalist optimism, explain why, as explored in Chapter 5, the Japanese public strongly opposed dispatching the SDF just before the outbreak of the first Gulf War in 1991 and why, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, they subsequently supported noncombat dispatches to remove mines after this war and later to conduct humanitarian relief and reconstruction missions within the context of U.N. peacekeeping operations. These attitudes also account for the Japanese public’s reaction to the war on terrorism, namely, its relatively understanding response to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 (see Chapter 7) and its subsequent strong opposition to the invasion of Iraq, as demonstrated in Chapter 8. They also explain the limited and conditional tolerance the Japanese public eventually gave the GSDF humanitarian and reconstruction operations in Southern Iraq. Although other studies have argued for the relevance of academic defensive realism for explaining Japanese grand strategy,8 this is the first study to point to the public’s defensive realist attitudes to explain Japan’s persistent reluctance to deploy the SDF overseas for any mission remotely approaching combat. Of course, had Koizumi and other offensive realist hawks been able to point to the Iraq War as an example demonstrating the successful and

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beneficial application of offensive military power, they would have been in a better position to convince the public about its utility and realize their ambitions to expand SDF missions in Iraq and beyond. However, this raises the question as to why Japanese mass opinion regarding the Iraq War ended up being more prescient than Koizumi and his allies. The public’s apparently prescient skepticism about this war would seem to lend credence to the pluralist contention that aggregated opinion, at least when it enjoys access to a competitive market place of ideas and is not systematically misled,9 has emergent properties that provide it with greater wisdom than individual opinions (because random individual errors tend to cancel out) and that elite opinion is often deficient (recall the discussion in Chapter 2). A less ambitious conclusion would be that the Japanese public’s skepticism about the utility of strategically offensive military power is grounded in the experiences of the Pacific War (see the following discussion), and this happens be a good basis for predicting the outcome of offensive uses of military power. In other words, the public’s defense-dominant view of military force may, due to the representativeness of Japan’s Pacific War experience in the context of modern wars, or due to coincidence, have corresponded well to the actual conditions (that is, defense dominance) of the contemporary anarchical international environment.10 Consequently, the Japanese public may have ended up being right about strategically offensive uses of military force more often than more sophisticated but less consistent elite views (see the discussion about underbalancing in the following pages).

The Origins of Attitudinal Realism Where does the Japanese public’s attitudinal defensive realism come from? As discussed earlier, others have already made a persuasive case that antimilitarism stems from the devastation of the Pacific War and the lessons learned from that experience in the immediate postwar period. The origins of Japanese public beliefs about the utility of military force have not been systematically considered to date. This study suggests the hypothesis that, like antimilitarist distrust, skepticism of the utility of offensive military power stems from Japan’s wartime experience. Strategically offensive military operations and occupation were found to be prohibitively costly, especially against nationalistically mobilized populations. Strategically offensive military operations also risked provoking other major powers into devastating great power wars. The lessons Japan drew from its Pacific War experiences also demonstrated the difficulty of limiting escalation or withdrawing when encountering a quagmire.



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Douglas Mendel found in the late 1960s that many prominent Japanese journalists and even conservative diplomats and politicians had internalized this lesson, arguing that Japan’s experience invading and occupying China in the 1930s showed that the U.S. war effort in Vietnam was bound to fail.11 Although there is a paucity of opinion data, especially from the early postwar years, regarding the utility of military force, the overwhelmingly negative reaction of mass opinion to possible SDF overseas deployments from that period forward suggests that these lessons formed the basis for postwar public attitudes regarding the utility of offensive military force.12 At the same time, these lessons did not raise doubts about the importance of territorial defense. As Yasuo Takao notes, during the postwar period, “ ‘the renouncement of war’ showed a strong determination to renounce aggressive war . . . but not [ Japan’s] right of actual self-defence.”13 Another tentative hypothesis that emerges from this work is what I call “attitudinal realism.” Although many academics, especially elitists (including, sometimes, realists), often argue that public opinion is constructed by elites, the opinions and belief structures that emerge from this book suggest that Japanese mass opinion is often reacting directly to the material reality of the international state system. The material result of Japan’s offensive wars, bringing destruction, defeat, and occupation, led directly to the formation of the public’s attitude of skepticism toward the utility of offensive military power. Nonetheless, the realist assumption of territorial self-defense was never really questioned. This suggests that under some conditions domestic public opinion might directly perceive the international environment as anarchical.14 Facing a similar international environment sections of the public and distinct national publics may react in similar ways, ways that produce an attitudinal realism consisting of certain basic elements: the perception of war as an ever-present danger that states must prepare for by maintaining a military, the need to maintain deterrence while not appearing threatening, and the danger of entrapment or abandonment by allies.15 Pluralist scholars who claim that realist logic is inherently challenged by the idea of public opinion guiding foreign policy are wrong.16 They often assume, without any serious attempt to marshal empirical evidence, that public opinion in a mature democracy is inevitably liberal.17 Also, while some notable realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, believed that public opinion could not be trusted to wisely guide foreign policy, in fact this ref lected his elitist views about the nature of public opinion rather than realist logic per se.18 Certainly, Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism, by explicitly excluding

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the domestic characteristics of states from his theory, is thereby neutral on the question of whether public opinion can or should guide foreign policy.19 Elite Use of the Media to Remold Public Opinion A counterargument to the claim of this book that public attitudes toward security are robust and often unchanging in the face of elite efforts to remold opinion, especially in the absence of empirically based demonstration effects, focuses on the ability of ruling elites to use the media to reform public attitudes and opinion. For example, Mark Holstein finds that the Japanese government demonstrated an “ability to use the media to articulate its positions and advance its frames” in media coverage of the GSDF deployment to Iraq.20 However, this ability did not, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, translate into an ability to move public opinion to favor the GSDF deployment in Iraq or prevent the public from subsequently becoming more opposed to almost all overseas SDF deployments (see Chapter 9). Similarly, a recent study finds that several of Japan’s major newspapers successfully remolded Japanese public opinion from the mid-1990s from opposing to supporting constitutional reform, an argument that leaves little room for independent attitudes or opinion.21 However, a sharp multiyear decline in public support for constitutional reform between 2004 and 2008 (see the previous chapter), despite continued support for this cause by many of Japan’s major dailies, would appear to largely falsify this hypothesis. These results point to the inf luence of other relatively variable factors, such as growing entrapment fears, and of more constant variables, such as longterm defensive realist attitudes.22 Calls by segments of the media for the SDF to play a military role overseas have also failed to move the public. Elements of the media have undoubtedly helped elite efforts to reassure the public about the SDF and civilian control by providing glowing coverage of the SDF performing disaster relief and reconstruction missions professionally and with distinction, first in Japan and then, from 1992, increasingly abroad as well. Nonetheless, it is the empirical success of these missions that has mattered, and their noncombat nature. Despite repeated elite predictions to the contrary, popular support for these missions has not translated into support for overseas combat missions (for example, after the 1991 minesweeper dispatch; see Chapters 5 and 6). Some point to changes in media and media consumption patterns as creating new opportunities for elites to inf luence the public. For example, Ikuo Kabashima and Gill Steel show how Koizumi was able to take advantage of TV to reach the public in new and persuasive ways. Nonetheless,



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although this gave Koizumi an advantage over his rivals and made him one of the most powerful prime ministers in recent Japanese history,23 as Chapters 7 and 8 show, this did not translate into inf luence regarding overseas dispatches of the SDF. Other recent works on the new media suggest that it is hard to find evidence that the media’s news content inf luences political outcomes.24 Matthew A. Baum finds that the new media focus more on human interest international news than geopolitics but are still essentially neutral. On the other hand, he argues that the new media appeal to less knowledgeable viewers who are more subject to inf luence.25 However, public opinion research demonstrates that a relative lack of preexisting information makes citizens less, not more, subject to inf luence. This paucity of information “motivates the development and employment of structure . . . structuring views about specific foreign policies according to their more general and abstract beliefs.”26 Ironically, it is the public’s comparative lack of information that makes them relatively impervious to elite attempts at opinion molding. On the other hand, there is growing evidence that new media forms are reducing the ability of national elites to filter and mold external news events for their own convenience. Although policy elites undoubtedly continue to be more directly exposed to the pressures of international politics, these pressures are also increasingly reaching domestic mass publics. To take an example from Japan’s large and nondemocratic neighbor, Susan L. Shirk observes that in China, “because of the Internet, it is impossible for Party censors to screen out news from Japan, Taiwan or the United States that might upset the public.”27 Despite the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) reported success at blocking dissidents from disseminating information domestically over the Internet (if less so by cell phone texting),28 its inability to block the f low of embarrassing major international news, such as Japanese rightist actions on the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands or the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, has caused ordinary Chinese to question their government’s ability to defend China’s national interests. Consequently, as Peter Hays Gries demonstrates in his book on China’s neonationalism, Chinese nationalists are increasingly reacting to this “upsetting news” in ways that challenge the policies and legitimacy of the ruling CCP, transforming nationalism into the most potent threat to continued Communist rule.29 If citizens in a comparatively controlled-information environment such as China can often directly gain access to information about the international environment, thereby bypassing elite attempts at opinion molding, at least in some areas, there is little reason to doubt that ordinary Japanese can

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do the same. This suggests that new media technology may be simultaneously making the public less susceptible to elite molding but more exposed to the pressures of anarchy, thereby enhancing the relevance of the attitudinal realism hypothesis discussed in the preceding pages.

Does Japanese Public Opinion Inf luence Policy? Having established that Japanese public attitudes toward security are broadly stable, not easily molded, and coherent and change in predictable fashion and that these attitudes determine public opinion, the second major question is whether public opinion inf luences policy in Japan. Contrary to the observations of many commentators and scholars, this book finds that Japanese public opinion has had a powerful impact on Tokyo’s security strategy during the Cold War, the post–Cold War decade of the 1990s, and since the beginning of the war on terrorism. Japanese policy elites are now primarily split between offensive realist hawks who want to see Japan become a “normal military power” capable of using military force overseas and defensive realists who, while advocating robust territorial defense, believe projecting offensive military force overseas has little utility for the national interest and carries significant risks. Mass opinion has constrained hawks and empowered defensive realists. Although hawks such as Prime Minister Koizumi were able to deploy the SDF overseas to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, public opinion empowered defensive realists, allowing them to successfully delay, curtail, and block altogether roles and missions desired by the hawks. In particular, they were able to ensure that both missions were strictly noncombat deployments and provided no direct support for U.S. combat operations. In the case of Iraq, a mission initially conceived of as supporting the American military was changed to a humanitarian relief and reconstruction mission; SDF operations in Iraq consequently ended up having more in common with peace corps operations than with military operations. Defensive realists used measurable public opinion to strengthen their bargaining position within the Koizumi and Abe coalition cabinets and the ruling parties and through the opposition DPJ. To be sure, stable opinion majorities are not almighty in Japan any more than they are in any other democracy. Opinion majorities are most effective at blocking new policies when there is significant political competition and ruling politicians have to worry about a backlash during election season or when other issues important for the ruling parties are being debated in the Diet and could be put at risk.



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LDP ambitions to revise Japan’s constitution, especially the warrenouncing Article 9, rendered the ruling coalition more sensitive to public opinion, making the Japanese government especially unlikely to endorse ambitious overseas deployments implicating the use of force because this could provoke a public backlash and a resurgence of antimilitarist distrust, putting any constitutional reform at risk. Indeed, public opposition to the 2004–2006 GSDF deployment in Iraq and the 2004–2008 ASDF operations in that country contributed to derailing the constitution reform movement in 2007 and put at risk Koizumi’s SDF overseas deployment legacy, most notably the continued MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. Japan’s summer 2008 decision to send no more than two SDF members to the U.N. peacekeeping mission (UNMIS) for Southern Sudan (the two were assigned to mission headquarters in Khartoum) was indicative of the climate of reduced support for overseas SDF deployments after Iraq.30 Behind this backlash lay exacerbated entrapment fears. Can U.S. Pressure Act as a Public Opinion Override Mechanism? A counterargument to the one advanced here about the inf luence of Japanese public opinion holds that ultimately it is not Japan’s hawkish elites but Washington that matters. When push comes to shove, in effect, Japan will comply with U.S. demands, and public opinion will recognize this as inevitable (“shikata nai”).31 This logic can help explain some aspects of Japan’s foreign policy, such as why Koizumi made a statement of political support for the Iraq War instead of remaining neutral. In other areas, such as base alignment, where the costs for Japan are not high or salient, the United States does not even have to push very hard to get what it wants in most instances. However, when highly salient issues such as the deployment of the SDF overseas for combat or even logistical support missions are at stake, U.S. pressure has been ineffective. Despite frequent U.S. pressure over many decades, beginning in the 1950s with attempts to get Japan to engage in fullscale rearmament and participate in regional security up to U.S. demands late in the George W. Bush administration that Tokyo dispatch the SDF to Afghanistan, Japan has consistently refused to allow its military to be deployed abroad for combat operations or anything that approaches combat. Behind this consistency lay a large and unwavering public opinion majority opposed to involvement in overseas combat. If anything, the record shows that public opinion becomes more inf luential precisely when and because the United States presses for Japan’s involvement in overseas combat, as the 1991 Gulf War and the Iraq War and its aftermath demonstrate. As discussed

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in Chapter 9, pressure from the U.S. ambassador to Japan to extend the MSDF refueling mission corresponded with a decline in public support and a scaling back of the refueling mission.

Has Japan Underbalanced? Stepping back from the public’s attitudinal defensive realism, this book’s conclusions raise the question of how Japanese public opinion and its inf luence upon Japanese security strategy look from an academic realist perspective. Although academic structural realism has minimized the importance of domestic level variables in explaining state behavior, as Randall Schweller observes, “a new wave” of realist research “posits that systemic pressures are filtered through intervening domestic variables to produce foreign policy behaviors . . . [and] responses may be less motivated by systemic-level factors than domestic ones.” Some realists within this wave see domestic factors causing reckless overexpansion, normal expansion, or adaptation to relative decline.32 By contrast, Schweller sees domestic variables as potentially causing the state to “underbalance” against external threats. His model of suboptimal balancing points to two domestic variables of relevance to this study, domestic regime legitimacy and perceptions of external threat. The constraining effect of antimilitarist distrust of the Japanese state ref lected a regime legitimacy deficit of the kind Schweller includes in his model. His inclusion of perceptions of external threat are also relevant for this study on public opinion, although missing from his model are perceptions of utility regarding various means for responding to threat.33 The relevance of some of Schweller’s variables does not necessarily mean that postwar Japan has suffered from underbalancing, however. Although it is beyond the reach of this book to offer a comprehensive analysis, on balance the evidence presented here and by others34 suggests that Japanese public opinion has prevented Japanese elites from overbalancing rather than caused underbalancing. As argued in Chapters 2 and 4, even some Japanese public attitudes that were labeled pacifist during the Cold War are actually consistent with defensive realism. This is especially evident in two areas. First, one subset of public attitudes often identified as antimilitarist or pacifist corresponded to realist logic about entrapment by allies in wars that are not in the national interest. The public feared entrapment in U.S. wars that were not in Japan’s interest.35



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Public opinion helped Japan prevent actual entrapment in the Vietnam War and Washington’s projection of military power into the Taiwan Straits during the Quemoy and Matsu crises of the 1950s. After the conclusion of the Vietnam War, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the Soviet regional threat grew, Japanese public opinion became more supportive of the U.S. alliance and Japan’s military buildup as a response. Later, Japanese public opinion helped prevent entrapment in two Gulf Wars and the post–9/11 war in Afghanistan.36 Beyond this traditional fear of “entrapment” has been the additional danger of entrapment in wars that might actually be in Japan’s national interests but where Japan would have trouble exercising control over its military and their degree of commitment once deployed. Extreme inequality vis-à-vis the United States has made it hard for Japan or others to imagine themselves as architects of foreign intervention. Even assuming the absence of nuclear weapons, it would be hard for South Korea and Japan to contemplate independent military intervention to bring about regime change in North Korea without accepting heavy dependence on the United States, and hence ultimate U.S. control, of this intervention and its outcome. This additional danger of loss of control over one’s own military may be somewhat unique to allies in the case of the United States because the United States is far more powerful than even its major allies. In less unequal alliance relationships these concerns should be less salient. Much of what has been labeled “pacifism” in Japan and in Europe might actually be these twin fears of entrapment masquerading as pacifism. Arguably, this is a major reason for why, in Robert Kagan’s words, Europeans, and by extension Japanese, appear to be from Venus while “Americans are from Mars.” As a result, almost all American allies end up seeming to be from Venus.37 Japan’s antimilitarist fear about the breakdown of civilian control has exacerbated concerns about the United States commandeering its military, leading Japan to more jealously guard national command of its military than have other U.S. allies. Indeed, Japan is the only major long-standing U.S. ally without any provisions for “joint wartime” command (in reality U.S. command of its own forces) with Washington.38 A second antimilitarist, if not defensive realist, attitude of the Japanese public has been that a lightly armed Japan that avoided bellicose or aggressive behavior would avoid provoking others to see Tokyo as a threat is consistent with a recognition of the security dilemma39 and the tendency of other states to balance against those viewed as harboring aggressive intentions.40 Given the historical legacy of Japan’s invasion and brutal occupation

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of much of Asia up to 1945, a large segment of the public recognized that full rearmament risked provoking other Asian states to counterbalance Japan, economically as well as militarily.41 Nonetheless, the solution proposed by many Japanese antimilitarists during the Cold War, namely lightly armed neutrality,42 went beyond what even academic defensive realism would predict. This view betrayed an unwillingness to see that military weakness, or a lack of deterrent capability, may provoke others to exploit the state just as surely as overarmament or aggressive behavior may provoke others to counterbalance the state. From a defensive realist, if not realist, position, the state always faces a deterrence-versus-reassurance dilemma.43 The optimal grand strategy is strong enough to deter others from challenging the state’s interests yet reassuring enough to discourage others from seeing the state as a threat that must be balanced against.44 Where the balance lies in practice varies according to time, place, the nature of the other state, and other variables. Beliefs that security is all about reassurance or conversely, only about deterrence, depart from important elements of (defensive) realism. Many Cold War–era antimilitarists departed from realist logic by largely ignoring the importance of deterrence while defining security strategy as being all about reassuring others. The perceived risk of Japan’s own military emerging as a threat outweighed perceptions of foreign threat. Nonetheless, such beliefs were digressions from realism rather than indicative of pacifism per se because these attitudes did not include a belief that war could be abolished and that Japan therefore did not need an army. Even after the Cold War, with domestic antimilitarist distrust greatly reduced, the belief that Japan should continue to avoid appearing threatening to others persisted even while recognition of the importance of deterring potential threats grew. The August 1998 North Korean missile test over Northern Japan and revelations about the North’s abductions of Japanese citizens from national territory contributed substantially to heightening recognition of the value of deterrence and defense, as well as reassurance. In short, if one focuses narrowly on North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens one could build a modest case for Japanese underbalancing. On the whole, however, Japanese public opinion contributed not to underbalancing, but to a well–rounded security strategy that avoided overbalancing and recognized that Japan’s insular position minimized external threats.45 When new threats have arisen, such as North Korea’s missile threat, the Japanese public has reacted consistent with its characteristic attitudinal defensive real-



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ism by supporting the development and procurement of missile defense, but not supporting preemptive strikes or the acquisition of offensive missiles. Of course, there is no guarantee that the Japanese public’s defensive realist attitudes will not become a cause of underbalancing in the future as the international environment changes. If the George W. Bush administration’s characterization of the war on terrorism as an offense-dominant war46 were to be proven correct, then Japan’s reluctance to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere might prove to be a case of underbalancing that leads to Japanese vulnerability to al-Qaeda attacks. Similarly, Japan might underbalance against a rising China in an altered strategic environment in which it is easier to defend Japan by launching attacks on military assets in China than to repel Chinese attacks on Japan.47 On the other hand, because of the rising strategic significance of China’s military might and Japan’s strategic significance in the global balance of power,48 a Japan that continues to eschew offensive military capabilities or deployments is unlikely to provoke the United States to abandon Japan. Especially against the backdrop of a rising China, Japan is simply too strategically significant to be abandoned by a still militarily potent United States.

Should Public Opinion Inf luence Policy? This book’s conclusions raise the question of what the link should be between public opinion and policy. Some observers in Japan argue that the lack of a mature public opinion, and by extension democracy, in Japan should not be allowed to undermine the coherence and rationality of foreign policy.49 Others argue that elites can, and by implication should, mold public opinion to make it “more realistic.”50 This view, identified as the “guardian” model of representation, agrees with Richard Nixon, Dick Cheney, and Koizumi Jun’ichiro¯ in seeing opposing public opinion as a threat to a coherent foreign policy. An alternative “delegates” model sees public support as both necessary and desirable for a successful foreign policy.51 It would be wrong, however, to frame the question in terms of two extreme alternatives, namely whether leaders should always follow public opinion or never. Neither is a desirable nor viable alternative. The real question is under what conditions politicians should heed public opinion versus those under which they should lead instead of follow. In this author’s view, time horizon is the key factor. In the short run, one year or less, especially in times of crisis, politicians should lead without much regard to public opinion while also trying to educate the public. In the medium to long run (more

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than a year), however, after having tried to educate the public as they see appropriate, politicians should step back, listen to the public, and increasingly be responsive to their policy preferences, especially when a stable opinion majority has formed.52 For example, the LDP should have recognized by 2006, if not before, that public opposition to the war in Iraq, and the continuing ASDF mission there, was not going to change. Therefore, at the latest, the ASDF should have been withdrawn from Iraq at the same time as the GSDF, and Japan should have distanced itself from the war.

Policy Implications The long-term growth in public trust in civilian control and the state’s ability to wisely wield the military instrument have revealed a public that has defensive realist attitudes regarding the utility of military force. This has long-term implications for Tokyo’s evolving security strategy, its alliance with the United States, and for U.S. policy makers. First, Japan will continue to gradually reduce the constraints on, and increase the capabilities of, its armed forces for conducting operations related to homeland defense. The Japanese public’s support for missile defense is one example. A 2006 PMO poll found that 56.6 percent supported (25 percent strongly, 31.6 percent somewhat) missile defense, versus a mere 25.1 percent who opposed (8.9 percent strongly, 16.2 percent somewhat) missile defense; 18.2 percent had no opinion.53 Overwhelming, Japanese acceptance of the legitimacy of war in case of attack suggests that Japan and its populace would show little hesitation in responding militarily to a North Korean attack or Chinese infringement on Japanese territory; even tactically offensive counterstrikes in response to either could come to enjoy public support. Japan’s decision to speed up the deployment of elements of missile defense following North Korea’s 2006 missile and nuclear tests had support from the opposition DPJ as well as from the LDP-led ruling coalition.54 When Prime Minister Aso¯ decided to deploy missile defenses in April 2009 to intercept a North Korean test missile in case it fell on Japan, an overwhelming 74.7 percent supported this decision in a Nippon TV poll, versus a mere 16 percent who did not.55 Second, as a consequence, Japan’s defense dependence on the United States will, in many areas, gradually decrease as the SDF becomes more capable in traditional national defense missions. Indeed, the Japanese public’s growing willingness to recognize the utility of military force for defending national territory and independence, combined with increasing mistrust of the United States and its involvement in wars considered imprudent,



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suggests that growing public support in Japan for greater military independence from the United States may emerge. One recent example that supports this interpretation was the lack of significant domestic opposition to Tokyo’s decision to modify its ban on military uses of outer space to allow the Defense Ministry to acquire military quality reconnaissance satellites, despite opposition from the United States.56 Ironically, the disputes over historical memory that have plagued Japan’s relations with many of its Asian neighbors and that have, on balance, left Japan more dependent on the United States for its security57could have the opposite effect if they spread to the U.S.–Japan alliance. Growing mistrust of the United States and some unf lattering American comparisons between prewar Iraq and Japan have contributed to a growing rejection of the U.S. narrative of the Pacific War. As a 2006 editorial in the centrist Weekly Nikkei noted, “The people’s acceptance of the post–WWII alliance with the US includes accepting the American-imposed myth that an evil Japan—militaristic and fascist—was defeated and remade into a democratic, peace-loving nation. Not a few Japanese disagree with this theory. Their doubt was reaffirmed early in the Iraq war when comparisons were made of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to prewar Japan and of post-Saddam Iraq to postwar Japan.”58 Third, as became clear by late 2007, Tokyo is very unlikely to agree to play a military role, such as participation in joint combat operations with U.S. forces or stand-alone security and stabilization missions, in theaters such as Afghanistan that are distant and involve missions not directly linked to Japan’s territorial defense. Japan will become more selective and less willing to involve its military in any way in future U.S. invasions of other nations; even humanitarian and reconstruction missions have become a harder sell.59 Just as evidence suggests the emergence of an “Iraq syndrome” in U.S. public opinion that limits U.S. willingness to use force overseas for years to come,60 as was the case with the “Vietnam syndrome” from three decades earlier, a parallel “Iraq” syndrome in Japan increases opposition to involvement in American-led military operations far from Japanese soil. In short, the Iraq War rekindled entrapment fears. Far from becoming a precedent for more ambitious SDF deployments overseas, the Iraq deployment has become a negative example that the Japanese public, and by extension decision makers, will seek to avoid repeating in the future. As discussed in Chapter 9, the drawn-out and contentious debate over resuming the MSDF refueling mission for U.S. and allied ships engaged

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in antiterrorism interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean in the fall of 2007 is a direct result of this Iraq syndrome. The opposition DPJ tried to extend public opposition by linking this mission to the Iraq War. However, the ruling coalition was partially successful in isolating this mission not only from the Iraq War but even from the war in Afghanistan. The deployment was promoted as providing noncombat support for a U.N.–centered mission designed to interdict drugs and weapons and maintain maritime safety rather than directly tying it to the U.S.–led war on terrorism or the war in Afghanistan. The government scaled back the MSDF deployment, restricting the use of MSDF provided fuel for any other mission such as the Iraq War or an attack on another nation (for example, Iran). Nonetheless, because of the Iraq War and mistrust of the United States, the resumption of the MSDF refueling mission, although eventually achieved through a twothirds vote override by the lower house of the upper house rejection of the measure, never earned public support. During the Koizumi and Abe administrations there was much debate about ending Japan’s ban on the exercise of the right of collective selfdefense so that Tokyo could contribute directly to U.S. defense as an ally. The range of possible missions discussed included assistance in defeating a missile attack on U.S. territory, assisting U.S. naval and air forces in international waters surrounding Japan, rear-area support for frontline U.S. troops (such as transporting weapons and ammunition) during combat, and joint combat operations with U.S. forces in third countries such as Iraq or Afghanistan.61 Although changes in the interpretation of the right of collective defense in the former two missions, which are closely tied to the defensive use of military power and Japan’s own territorial defense, would not likely provoke significant public opposition, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, because of strong public resistance there is little reason to expect that Japan will engage in joint combat operations overseas with U.S. forces anytime in the foreseeable future. Indeed, this debate about reinterpreting the constitution also proved to be a casualty of the Iraq syndrome, as Prime Minister Fukuda took it off the political agenda in the fall of 2007. His successor, Aso¯ Taro¯, although personally supporting constitutional reform, quickly reversed his public position and took it off the political agenda again in the fall of 2008 soon after assuming the premiership.62 These examples clearly show how the Iraq War, rather than marking a step forward in Japan’s overseas support for the U.S. military, has marked a step back as an Iraq syndrome in Japanese public opinion challenged the ability of the LDP-led ruling coalition just to maintain one of the expanded



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overseas deployments begun under Koizumi, with the goal of initiating new and more ambitious missions pushed off the political agenda. This demonstrates that deploying the SDF overseas without a clear mandate from the public can undermine the long-term viability of these deployments. Many American policy makers and observers came to expect over the past decade that Japan’s emergence as a “normal nation” and its deployments to the Indian Ocean and Iraq meant that Tokyo was moving to provide greater support for U.S. military operations in conf licts far from Japanese shores. The so-called new Armitage report issued in February 2007 appealed to those in Japan with great-power aspirations, claiming that deployments to the Indian Ocean, Iraq, and other areas of the Middle East have “accelerated” Japan’s emergence as a global power. They also claimed that these deployments had “helped to diminish the security hierarchy that typified the U.S.–Japan relationship in the past.”63 Although these arguments undoubtedly appeal to hawks among Japanese elites, the Japanese public overall appears unwilling to let the country become militarily involved in distant conf licts and is increasingly intolerant of politicians who seem to concentrate on these issues at the expense of dealing with urgent domestic issues such as aging society problems. Consequently, U.S. expectations for Japan to assist militarily in global conf licts will go unfulfilled. Rather than being disappointed, the United States should respect the attitudes of the Japanese public and not pressure Tokyo into dispatching its military to conf lict zones, especially with the intention of involving the SDF in overseas combat. Ironically, the less the United States pushes Japan in this direction, the more willing the Japanese public will be to consider noncombat humanitarian and reconstruction missions for the SDF in relatively safe areas in conf lict zones such as Afghanistan. Instead of pushing Japan to dispatch troops to combat zones, Washington should ask Japan to step up its economic aid and dispatch of civilians, and perhaps the SDF, to relatively safe areas to tackle the economic and social roots of conf lict and instability. The United States should also understand that most if not all Japanese overseas SDF dispatches will come in the form of humanitarian relief and reconstruction missions, such as the February 2010 dispatch to help with rebuilding Haiti after a massive earthquake there.64 Japan’s dispatch in 2009 of the SDF to participate in the noncombat aspects of international antipiracy operations off the coasts of Somalia represents the most that can be expected of overseas deployments for many years to come.65 This deployment has been possible because it is delinked from the U.S. alliance and is a U.N.–centric, politically neutral, and defensive policing action66

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in international waters that does not require Japan to engage in combat; rather the SDF has been concentrating on a surveillance role.67 This is why this mission has gained some public support68 and why Japan’s left-of-center DPJ government under Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio continued it. Japan’s historic change of government (or seiken ko¯ tai in Japanese) in 2009, when voters decided for the first time to remove the LDP (and its coalition partner Ko¯mei) from power,69 sweeping the DPJ into power with an overwhelming majority,70 only reinforces the conclusions of this book. By removing lingering doubts about the Japanese public’s willingness to kick a ruling coalition cleanly out of power, this election reinforced the lesson that Japanese politicians defy public opinion at their peril. Although this election was dominated by domestic issues, the security issues dealt with in this book played no small role in turning the public against the LDP led coalition. As discussed in Chapters 7, 8, and 9, public opposition to SDF overseas deployments that seemed to imply involvement in, or even close proximity to, the use of force played a significant role in DPJ victories in the 2004 and 2007 upper house elections, elections that together deprived the LDP-led coalition of control of that chamber and gave the DPJ crucial momentum for their overwhelming 2009 victory in the more powerful lower house. Beyond public opposition to these SDF deployments and Koizumi and Abe’s drive to revise or reinterpret the constitution to allow SDF participation in overseas combat, their preoccupation with these external security issues at the apparent expense of the public’s domestic economic priorities proved to be the crucial factor turning the public against the LDP. Although Abe’s successors Fukuda and even the hawkish Aso¯ abandoned the hawkish agenda of promoting overseas SDF deployments involving the use of force, their attempts to move away from these policies proved to be too little too late.71 Growing tensions in U.S.–Japan relations during the first months of the DPJ-led Hatoyama coalition government, stemming not only from the withdrawal of the MSDF refueling mission from the Indian Ocean72 but also tensions regarding the plan to relocate the U.S. Marine airbase from Futenma to Henoko in Okinawa, ref lect in part a continued political backlash to Koizumi and Abe’s promotion of unpopular overseas SDF deployments in support of U.S. combat operations.73 The Hatoyama administration’s promise to build a more “equal” alliance symbolically ref lects this backlash.74 Unfortunately, misconceptions about the nature and inf luence of public opinion on Japanese foreign policy continue to appear frequently in



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U.S. debates about Japan. A January 2010 editorial in the Wall Street Journal claimed that “the more Japan’s ordinary citizens . . . worry that the U.S.– Japan security alliance is at risk [due to the dispute over the Marine base relocation in Okinawa], the more they’ll lose confidence in their national leaders. Mr. Hatoyama’s approval ratings are already hovering around 45%, and falling.”75 In fact, Hatoyama’s approval ratings were falling due to corruption scandals plaguing his administration and worries about the economy, while his stance on the base issue and relations with the United States was reasonably well supported by the public.76 If the United States can show respect for Japanese policy and public opinion on big issues like overseas military deployments and relatively small issues such as the relocation of a single U.S. military airfield, Japan will continue to be a valuable and reliable U.S. ally. The findings of this book support the conclusion that Japan will continue to be a valuable partner in further developing and producing missile defense systems. Japan’s recent determination to play a more robust role in securing its own territorial defense reduces the burden that the United States has carried in this area. Washington should concentrate on pursuing cooperation with its ally in areas that accord with the attitudes and values of the Japanese public. This is the best way to build interdemocratic respect and thereby deepen cooperation between these two leading democracies.

Notes

Chapter 1 1.  Paul Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 11, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 1–43. 2.  Regarding the Fukuda Doctrine, see Sueo Sudo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992). The so-called Yoshida Doctrine has been deduced by scholars such as Kenneth Pyle as encapsulating the defining hallmarks of Japan’s postwar grand strategy, characteristics they trace back to Yoshida. However, Yoshida never formally announced this strategy, much less suggested it as his own. See Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era, the Japanese Question [(Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1992): 25–26; and Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: The Century Foundation, 2007), ch. 8, esp. 405. Masashi Nishihara appears to have been the first to coin the term Yoshida Doctrine. See Nishihara, “How Much Longer the Fruits of the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’?” in Hahn Bae-ho and Yamamoto Tadashi, eds., Korea and Japan: A New Dialogue across the Channel (Seoul: Asia Research Center, Korea University): 150–167. The Yoshida Doctrine is an implicit grand strategy doctrine, whereas the Fukuda Doctrine is an explicit diplomatic doctrine. 3.  Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror: Steady Incrementalism or Radical Leap?” CSGR Working Paper 104/02 (Center for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, University of Warwick: August 2002): 4. 4.  Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Reemergence as a “Normal” Military Power, Adelphi Paper 368-9 (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004): 131. Also see Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2009). 5.  John Miller, “Japan Crosses the Rubicon?” Asia-Pacific Security Studies 1, no. 1, ( January 2002): 1–4. For a skeptical Japanese view of this claim, see Akio Watanabe,

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“Nihon wa rubikon o watatta no ka? Higuchi repo-to igo no Nihon no bo¯ei seisaku o kento¯ suru,” Kokusai Anzen Hosho¯ 31, no. 3 (December 2003): 73–85. 6.  The phrase “Britain of Asia” ref lects the aspiration of several then-future George W. Bush administration Japan hands, who proclaimed, “We see the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for the alliance with Japan.” This statement was made in a publication dubbed the “Armitage report,” and published in October 2000. See Institute for National Strategic Studies, “The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership” (INSS Special Report, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2000). See www.ndu.edu/inss/press/Spelreprts/SFJAPAN .PDF. For a 2005 study claiming that Japan was making progress toward becoming the “Britain of Asia,” see Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation: Has Japan Become the Great Britain of Asia?” Issues and Insights 5, no. 3 (Honolulu: CSIS Pacific Forum, March 2005), retrieved March 9, 2009, from www .csis.org/pacfor/issues/v05no3_pdf.pdf. Also see Go Ito, “Redefining Security Roles: Japan’s Response to the September 11 Terrorism,” Journal of East Asian Studies 2, no. 1 (2002): 285–305, especially 297–298; and “Armitage: Article 9 Hinders Japan’s Alliance with US,” International Herald Tribune, July 23, 2004: 6. 7.  “The more muscular Japan,” The Boston Globe, August 7, 2007, as retrieved August 15, 2007, from www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2007/08/07/the_more_ muscular_ japan/. More generally see Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007). 8.  See, for example, Eugene A. Matthews, “Japan’s New Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (November/December 2003), retrieved February 2, 2010, from www.foreign affairs.com/articles/59369/eugene-a-matthews/japans-new-nationalism; and Anthony Faiola, “Japan–Taiwan Ties Blossom as Regional Rivalry Grows,” Washington Post, March 24, 2006: A12. 9.  Michael Green and Benjamin Self, “Japan’s Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism,” in Survival, Summer 1996. 10.  Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); and Daniel M. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik (Westport, CT: Praeger, and Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006): 62. A notable exception is Thomas U. Berger, “The Pragmatic Liberalism of an Adaptive State,” in Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, eds., Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007): 259–300, esp. 260, where Berger notes that Japan remains more reluctant to use force overseas than is either Britain or France. Another exception is Andrew Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). 11.  Ito, “Redefining Security Roles”; Miller, “Japan Crosses the Rubicon”; Institute for National Strategic Studies, “The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership”; and Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World. 12.  See, for example, Su-Yung Choi, “Peace for Northeast Asia and Japan’s Role,” in Foreign Press Center/Japan, ed., Japan and the World in the Post–Cold War Era: Fifteen Leading Journalists Give a Frank Assessment of Japan’s Future (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1990): 20; Kyon-Min Kim, Yomigaeru gunji taikoku Nippon (Tokyo: Tokuma shoten, 1996); Fujie Nakamura et. al., Ajia no shimbun ga hojita Jieitai no “kaigai hahei” (Tokyo: Nashinokisha, 1991); “Let Japan Choose Peace,” New York Times, February 21, 1993. For



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discussions of this perception of a remilitarizing Japan in Asia see Paul Midford, “China Views the Revised US–Japan Defense Guidelines: Popping the Cork?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 4 (2004): 113–145; Thomas Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs 75 (September/October 1996): 40–44; Shinju Butei, “Kan-Chu kokko juritsu to Nichi-Kan kankei,” Kokubo¯ 41, No. 11 (November 1992): 8–20; Sandra Burton, (Prisoners of Memory: Despite Japan’s Yen Diplomacy, Its Neighbors Remain Uneasy,” Time, October 29, 1990: 12; and Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Problem of Memory,” Foreign Affairs 77, No. 6 (1998): 37–49. 13.  Several former Japanese officials and current specialists on Japanese politics reacted with this phrase in response to a comment by the author that it was natural that politicians and parties would often seek to follow public opinion. Some used an even stronger for mobocracy, bo¯minseiji, which has a greater connotation of coercion. 14.  On pacifism, see Glenn Hook, Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan (New York: Routledge, 1996); and Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). Regarding antimilitarism, see Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 119–150; and Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 15.  A major exception is Davis B. Bobrow, “Japan in the World: Opinion from Defeat to Success,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 4 (December 1989): 571–604. Another partial exception is Everett Carll Ladd and Karlyn H. Bowman, Public Opinion in America and Japan: How We See Each Other and Ourselves (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1996): ch. 3. There is one notable doctoral dissertation, as well: Tetsuya Umemoto, “Arms and Alliance in Japanese Public Opinion” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1985). Douglas H. Mendel Jr. was a prolific pioneer in researching Japanese public opinion toward security from the beginning of the U.S. occupation in 1945 until his death in 1978. Notable works include “Japanese Views of the American Alliance,” PSQ 23 (Fall 1959): 1–9; The Japanese People and Foreign Policy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961); “Public Views of the Japanese Defense System,” in James H. Buck, ed., The Modern Japanese Military System (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975): 149–180; “Japanese Views of the American Alliance in the Seventies,” Public Opinion Quarterly 35, no. 4 (Winter 1971–72): 521–538; and “Japanese Defense in the 1970s: The Public View,” Asian Survey 10, no. 12 (December 1970): 1046–1069. 16.  Ole Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996): 204. 17.  Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since Vietnam: Constraining the Collossus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 240. 18.  See for example Brian Knowlton, “Global Image of US Worsening, Survey Finds,” The New York Times, June 14, 2006, as retrieved from www.nytimes .com/2006/06/14/world/14pew.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=global+image&st=nyt; and, more generally, Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, America against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked (New York: Times Books 2006). Regarding the Chicago Council on Global Affairs polls, see www.thechicagocouncil.org/curr_pos .php, retrieved on June 2, 2007. 19.  Kyodo Tsushin, “Cheney Wants More,” The Japan Times, February 18, 2007: 2.

196

Notes to Pages 5–10

20.  “New Report Calls for Japan Alliance to Remain at Core of U.S. Asia Policy,” The Japan Times, February 18, 2007: 2. For the actual report, see Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, The U.S.–Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020 (Washington, DC: CSIS, February 2007); available at www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_ pubs/task,view/id,3729/type,1/. Although the Japanese press presented this as a “new Armitage report,” it could also be seen as a “new Nye report,” or more accurately as a new bipartisan “Armitage–Nye” report. 21.  See, for example, “Abe Rallies Forces on Constitutional Revision,” Asahi Shimbun, May 5, 2007, as retrieved May 9, 2007, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/ TKY200705050053.html. Actually, Abe and the LDP started running away from these positions just before the election, when it became clear how unpopular they were with voters. Nonetheless, their association with these unpopular positions remained in the minds of voters as they cast their ballots. See Chapter 9. 22.  For the leading example of the contrary view see Ethan Scheiner, Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 23.  For a somewhat more detailed discussion of this point, see the end of Chapter 10. Chapter 2 1.  Ole Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996): 191–192, 204. 2.  Works representative of the elitist school include Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925); Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1950); Almond, “Public Opinion and National Security,” Public Opinion Quarterly 20, no. 2 (1956): 371–378; Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of the Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975); John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and William M. LeoGrande, “Did the Public Matter?” and Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, “The Domestic Politics of Contra Aid: Public Opinion, Congress, and the President,” in Richard Sobel, ed., Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Controversy over Contra Aid (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993): 168–169, and 75, respectively. More recently, see Ilya Somin, “Knowledge about Ignorance: New Directions in the Study of Political Information,” Critical Review 18, nos. 1–3 (2006): 255–278. In the same issue also see Russell Hardin, “Ignorant Democracy,” 179–196; Samuel DeCanio, “Mass Opinion and American Political Development,” 143–156; and Stephen Earl Bennett, “Democratic Competence, Before Converse and After,” 105–142. 3.  Phillip E. Converse, “Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue,” in Edward R. Tufte, ed., Analysis of Social Problems (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1962); and Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in David Apter ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: Wiley, 1964): 206–261. More recently Converse has accepted some pluralist contentions about the abilities of voters to make rational and informed decisions, but he still sees voters as vulnerable to elite manipulation. See Converse, “Democratic Theory and Electoral Reality,” Critical Review 18, nos. 1–3 (2006): 297–330. 4.  New York Times, September 27, 1958, as cited by Douglas H. Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961): 40.



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5.  Dan Eggen, “On War’s Anniversary Bush Cites Progress,” Washington Post, March 20, 2008: A1. In fact, a Washington Post–ABC poll question on this issue showed that more than 50 percent of the public had consistently answered that the war was not worth the cost since late 2004, suggesting that Cheney was taking refuge in the elitist image of f luctuating public opinion rather than the reality of actual poll results. On this poll result and Cheney’s remarks, see www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2008/03/20/ GR2008032000530.html?sid=ST2008031903870; retrieved April 4, 2008. 6.  The classic study supporting the elitists’ conclusion that public opinion does not affect policy is Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, “Constituency Inf luence in Congress,” American Political Science Review 57, no.1 (March 1963): 45–46. Also see Michael Margolis and Gary Mauser (ed.), Manipulating Public Opinion: Essays on Public Opinion as a Dependent Variable (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1989); Benjamin Ginsberg, The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power (New York: Basic Books, 1986). 7.  Douglas C. Foyle, “The Inf luence of Public Opinion on American Foreign Policy Decision Making: Context, Beliefs, and Process,” (Duke University, Department of Political Science, PhD dissertation, 1996): 145, as cited by Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam, 11–12. 8.  Major pluralist works include Sidney Verba et al., “Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” American Political Science Review 61, no. 2 ( June 1967): 317–333; John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973); Ole R. Holsti, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus,” International Studies Quarterly (1992), no. 36: 440–445; Miroslav Nincic, “A Sensible Public: New Perspectives on Popular Opinion and Foreign Policy,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 4 (December 1992): 772–789; and Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force,” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (March 1992): 49–74. For the pluralist perspective in the 2006 Critical Review debate, vol. 18, nos. 1–3, see Doris A. Graber, “Government by the People and for the People—Twenty-First Century Style,” 167–178; Athur Lupia, “How Elitism Undermines the Study of Voter Competence,” 217–232; Samuel L. Popkin, “The Factual Basis of ‘Belief Systems,’ A Reassessment,” 233–254. 9.  Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992). For a response by Page and Shapiro to their elitist critics, see Page and Shapiro, “The Rational Public and Beyond,” in Stephen L. Elkin and Karol Edward Soltan, eds., Citizen Competence and Democratic Institutions (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999): 93–115. 10.  Regarding the marketplace of ideas, see Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” International Security Vol. 20, no. 2 (Fall 1996). For an example of failure in the U.S. marketplace of ideas, see Chaim Kaufmann, “Threat Inf lation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War,” International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 5–48. Recently, some pluralists have become more concerned about the ability of elites to manipulate public opinion by promoting ideological polarization, distorting the way in which “polarized” voters respond to new information. See Robert Y. Shapiro and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, “Challenges to Democratic Competence,” unpublished manuscript of January 7, 2008. 11.  In The Rational Public, Page and Shapiro found that in the case of legalizing marijuana and views about Soviet intentions, the opinions of those with the highest education eventually “moved toward the opinions of those with less education, who had been

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more distrustful of the Soviets and less supportive of legalizing marijuana at the outset.” See The Rational Public, 203–204, 316. Also see Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon, “Challenges to Democratic Competence,” 13. 12.  Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); and Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. 13.  See Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peff ley, “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model,” American Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (December 1987): 1099–1119, at 1114. 14.  See for example Miroslav Nincic, “U. S. Soviet Policy and the Electoral Connection,” World Politics 42, no. 3 (April 1990): 370–396; and Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public, 203–204, 316. 15.  V. O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1961). 16.  Ronald H. Hinckley, People, Polls, and Policymakers: American Public Opinion and National Security (New York: Lexington Books, 1992); and Bridgette Nacos, Robert Shapiro, and Pierangela Isernia, Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion and European Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). For a discussion of these developments see Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since Vietnam, 25. 17.  Foyle, “The Inf luence of Public Opinion on American Foreign Policy Decision Making,” 145, as cited by Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam, 11–12. 18.  For the history of the concept of public opinion and the various ways it has been rendered in Japanese, see Michiko Miyatake, “Seron/Yoron Gainen no Seisei (The Birth of the Concept of Public Opinion),” in Toshihiro Tsuganesawa and Takumi Sato¯, eds., Ko¯ho¯, Ko¯koku, Puropaganda (Public Relations, Advertising, and Propaganda) (Kyoto: Minerva, 2003): 56–74. 19.  Miyatake, “Seron/Yoron Gainen no Seisei,” 59, 70. 20.  Tomohito Shinoda, “Becoming More Realistic in the Post–Cold War: Japan’s Changing Media and Public Opinion on National Security,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 2 (August 2007): 171–190. See the concluding chapter for a discussion of this hypothesis. Also see Kiichi Fujiwara, “Gaiko¯ ha yoron ni shitagau beki ka— Minshushugi no seijyuku to taigai seisaku,” Ronza, March 2008. 21.  This diplomat further volunteered that in his personal opinion this was a very unfortunate situation, and he would be happier with a more opinionated public, even if this meant that the Foreign Ministry would have to change policy from time to time to accommodate such a public (Author’s interview of March 18, 1994). 22.  Donald Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Chalmers Johnson, “Japan: Who Governs?” in The Rise of the Developmental State (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995); Glenn D. Hook, Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan (New York: Routledge, 1996); and Sheldon Garon, Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 23.  Leading pluralist works on Japanese foreign policy include Mendel, The Japanese Public and Foreign Policy; Akio Watanabe, “Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs: 1964–73,” in Robert Scalapino, ed., Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977): 105–145; and Martin Weinstein, Japan’s Postwar Defense Policy, 1947–1968 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).



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24.  Because the elitist perspective starts with greater credibility, the opposite is not true: If elitist predictions are confirmed, this will strengthen elitist credibility and reduce pluralist credibility, but to a lesser extent. This logic follows from the “crucial case-study” model of Arend Lijphart. See “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (September 1971): 158–177. 25.  Asahi Shimbun, January 20, 2004 (morning edition): 2. As discussed in Chapter 4, however, public opinion changed because the alliance itself changed after the end of the Vietnam War. 26.  “Koizumi tells Abe Cabinet ‘be insensitive,’ ” Asahi Shimbun, February 22, 2007. 27.  Regarding the concept of attitude structures in public opinion, see Hurwitz and Peff ley, “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured?” 28.  Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum”: and Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism. 29.  Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, and Katzenstein, “Same War— Different Views: Germany, Japan and Counter-Terrorism,” International Organization 57, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 731–760. 30.  Even Prime Minister Yoshida, speaking during formal Diet debate, initially denied that the postwar constitution permitted self-defense because “the Manchurian and Greater East Asian wars were justified as ‘self-defense,’ ” as quoted in Akira Nakamura, Sengo seiji ni yureta kenpo¯ kyu¯ jo¯ (Tokyo: Chuo ¯ Keizaisha): 62. 31.  Although the Japanese Socialist Party advocated unarmed neutrality, in fact many Socialist supporters believed that Japan needed a military, even while not necessarily trusting the SDF to be that military. This suggests that Socialist Party elites were out of touch, even with their own voters. See Chapter 3. 32.  For the classic statement on the entrapment versus abandonment alliance dilemma, see Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). 33.  See Chapter 3 and Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Unpacking Japanese Antimilitarism: Entrapment Fear, Domestic Liberal Ideology, and Pacifism in Japanese Politics,” paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), Fukuoka, Japan, July 9–13, 2006. Berger recognizes entrapment fear as one element in Japanese antimilitarism. See Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998): 67, 111. 34.  Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 3 ( January 1978): 167–214. 35.  This idea stems from an important strand of defensive realism known as balance of threat theory. See Stephen Walt, Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 36.  Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy.” 37.  As discussed in Chapter 3, pacifist elites in the Socialist Party famously advocated unarmed neutrality. However, there was little support for an unarmed Japan among the mass public. 38.  Whether this consistency between Japanese public opinion and realism ref lects the public’s “wisdom” or means that public opinion has a positive inf luence on Japanese foreign policy is both debatable and well beyond the reach of this book, which does not engage the competing paradigms of international politics. However, this consistency at least suggests that the many pundits who have labeled Japanese public opinion as “pacifist” have been off the mark. I return to this point in the concluding chapter. 39.  Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

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Notes to Pages 16–18

40.  As discussed further in the following pages, the Afghan example demonstrates that the Japanese public’s attitudinal defensive realism does not always translate into opposition to offensive military action. Rather, this example suggests a relative willingness to accept tactically offensive operations in response to an attack on one’s territory, a position that would have implications, for example, for Japan’s planned response to a North Korean attack. 41.  To be sure, this assumption is common to both defensive and offensive realism. 42.  As quoted by Yo¯ichi Funabashi, “Japan sa-pashingu,” Asahi Shimbun, March 25, 2004: 15. 43.  The similarities and differences between this attitudinal realism in Japanese public opinion and academic defensive realism are discussed in the following section. 44.  For a classic description of interventionist versus noninterventionist liberals, see Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), chapter 4. More recently, Berger makes a similar distinction between defensive and offensive liberals. See Berger, “The Pragmatic Liberalism of an Adaptive State,” 261, 291–292, note 4. For an argument that contemporary neoliberalism is often realist in reality if not name, see John J. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 82–93. For an argument about the potential of the democratic peace to overcome realist anarchy, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), especially chapter 7. 45.  Green and Benjamin Self, “Japan’s Changing China Policy.” In 2006–2007 there was a brief shift in Japanese foreign policy from emphasizing economic development to emphasizing democracy as a force for promoting stability and security. For more on this, see Masaharu Tamamoto, “Japanese Discovery of Democracy,” May 16, 2006, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, available at www.nautilus.org/fora/ security/0638Tamamoto.html. 46.  See Paul Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 11, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 1–43. 47.  These characteristics of effective reassurance are derived from the socialpsychological literature on this topic known as graduated reciprocation in tension reduction, or GRIT. See Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1962); Charles E. Osgood, “Suggestions for Winning the Real War with Communism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 3, no. 4 (December 1959): 295–325; Svenn Lindskold, “Trust Development, the GRIT Proposal, and the Effects of Conciliatory Acts on Conf lict and Cooperation,” Psychological Bulletin 85, no. 4 ( July 1978): 774; and Deborah Welch Larson, “Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty,” International Organization 41, no. 1 (Winter 1987): 33. 48.  Peter J. Woolley, Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971–2000 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), chapter 2. Woolley builds a cultural model based on the role of kata (a Japanese word meaning a model, pattern, tradition) to explain the MSDF’s gradual expansion. He argues that the MSDF gradually eases into new missions because the Japanese prefer gradual change over dramatic or spontaneous innovation. However, this argument is not well suited for explaining other examples of change in Japan, such as its prewar navy or its postwar economy. Instead of cultural constraints, a militarist image, the residue of the prewar military, has forced the SDF to limit itself to incremental expansion. Incrementalism is part of a reassurance strategy aimed at Japanese public opinion and also Asian nations. See Paul Midford, “Japan’s Navy: Politics and



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Paradox, 1971–2000,” book review in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 3, no. 2 (2003): 293–296. Regarding a similar Japanese reassurance strategies toward other East Asian nations, see Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy.” 49.  Woolley, Japan’s Navy, 26. 50.  See Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); and Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 51.  John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5–56. In his seminal work on offensive realism, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Chicago: W. W. Norton, 2001), Mearsheimer claims that “the international system provides great powers with good reasons to act offensively to gain power” (19). For another recent work applying offensive realist logic, see Eric L. Labs, “Offensive Realism and Why States Expand Their War Aims,” Security Studies 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 1–49. 52.  However, as discussed elsewhere in this book, more specific variables, such as the ease of conquest, factor into public attitudes regarding the utility of military force. 53.  Academic defensive and offensive realism have a more probabilistic and less absolutist view about the utility of offensive military force. Jack Snyder suggests the difference between academic defensive and offensive realism is that the former believe strategically offensive military action can advance the state’s interests about 20 percent of the time while offensive realists believe it can advance state interests about 30 percent of the time. See Jack Snyder, “Defensive Realism and the ‘New’ History of World War I,” International Security 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 174–185, at 183. By contrast, Japanese attitudinal defensive realism views strategically offensive military power as always lacking in utility. 54.  I use the modifier “strategic” before “offensive military force” to distinguish this from “tactically” offensive military force within the context of homeland defense. The latter would include Japanese counterstrikes on North Korean missile bases, while the former would include a Japanese-initiated attack on North Korea with the aim of achieving regime change or a preventive war to suppress WMD development from eventually threatening Japan. Preemption, or attacking when North Korea appeared to be preparing to attack, would be a borderline case but would probably fit into tactically offensive military force within the context of homeland defense. 55.  Christopher Layne sees a mix of liberalism and realism as the motivation for America’s frequent resort to offensive military force, a strategy he characterizes as “offensive liberalism.” See “Liberalism and American Overexpansion,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1–6, 2005. Also see Berger, “The Pragmatic Liberalism of an Adaptive State,” 261, 291– 292, footnote 4. 56.  This definition of the differences between defensive and offensive realism ref lects more the defensive realist definition of the differences between the two schools. See Snyder, Myths of Empire, 10–11; and Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 19–21. 57.  Although differing views of the utility of offensive military power largely capture the divide between defensive and offensive realists, this does not mean that academic offensive realists necessarily support all justifications for offensive military action or that the motivations of Japan’s offensive realists necessarily correspond to academic offensive realism’s theory of state motivation. As discussed in the preceding pages, academic defensive realists are only marginally more optimistic about the utility of offensive military power

202

Notes to Pages 20–25

than are academic defensive realists. John Mearsheimer, for example, opposed the invasion of Iraq for not advancing American national interests. See Snyder, “Defensive Realism and the ‘New’ History of World War I,” 175. Mearsheimer regards liberal rationales for offensive military action as a device by which U.S. policy makers conceal their true offensive realist motivations and seek support from the American public. See The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 25–27. When applied to public opinion, the key question is whether public opinion believes that offensive military power has utility for national interests. In this book, the terms neoconservative and offensive liberal are used interchangeably. 58.  See for example, Peter J. Herzog, Japan’s Pseudo-Democracy (Sandgate, UK: Japan Library, 1993); and Yumei Zhang, Pacific Asia: The Politics of Development (New York: Routledge, 2003): 60–71; and, more generally, Karel Van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1993). For a contrasting view that puts Japan into the context of other one-party dominant democracies, see T. J. Pempel, Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). The LDP’s decisive defeat by the DPJ in August 2009 should decisively dispel the image of Japan as a one-party democracy moving forward. However, this book focuses on the pre-2009 period. For more about the implications of the August 2009 election, see the concluding chapter. 59.  Indeed, the LDP has not won a majority of votes in any lower house election since 1963. 60.  Without majority support in the upper house, the lower house can enact a budget, ratify treaties, and select a prime minister and cabinet. However, for all other legislation, the majority support of the upper house is required, barring a two-thirds majority vote in the lower house ( Japanese Constitution, Articles 59, 60, 61, and 67). The LDP never controlled such a majority in the lower house, after it lost control of the upper house in the 1989, forcing it to enter into coalitions with other political parties, initially informally but, by the late 1990s, formally. Since 2005, however, the LDP and its coalition partner Ko¯mei have enjoyed a two-thirds majority in the lower house, thereby limiting the impact of the opposition DPJ’s seizure of control the upper house (together with other opposition parties between July 2007 and August 2009, when the DPJ won control of the lower house and became the main ruling party). 61.  See Stockwin, Governing Japan, 3rd edition (London: Blackwell, 1999): 148. 62.  For the claim that this phrase was the defining image of Koizumi’s tenure, see Asahi Shimbun, October 13, 2006 (international edition): 4. More generally, see Masato Shimizu, Kantei shudo¯: Koizumi Jun’ichiro¯ no kakumei (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 2005): 354–357. For a debate between the author and Ellis Krauss on whether Koizumi’s 2005 election landslide was a result of promoting postal reform or promising to “break the LDP,” see Social Science Japan Forum, messages 3870, 3875, 3882 and 3898, available at http://ssj.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/. 63.  Regarding this trend, see Tomohito Shinoda, “Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 7, no. 1 (April 2006): 71–91. 64.  Kurt T. Gaubatz, Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999): 55, as cited by Steve Chan and William Safran, “Public Opinion as a Constraint against War: Democracies’ Responses to Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Foreign Policy Analysis 2 (2006): 137–156, at 149. 65.  On these norms, see Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), es-



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pecially chapter 3. Although the concept of consensus norms may seem unfamiliar to many American observers, the same consensual norms are embodied in American political institutions preventing simple majorities from changing the constitution, ratifying a treaty, recalling judges, or impeaching a president. Many of the rules of the U.S. senate, most famously the filibuster, are based on consensus norms mandating supermajorities. 66.  Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996): 32; also see 115–116. 67.  Thomas P. Rohlen, “Order in Japanese Society: Attachment, Authority, and Routine,” Journal of Japanese Studies 15, no. 1 (1989): 16. 68.  Davis Bobrow, “Japan in the World: Opinion from Defeat to Success,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 4 (December 1989): 572. 69.  Akio Watanabe, “Foreign Policy-Making, Japanese Style,” International Affairs 54 (1978): 80. 70.  “Sanin hirei to¯hyo¯ sake, Jimin 24%, Minshu 23%, renzoku yoron cho¯sa,” Asahi Shinbun, June 25, 2007; and “Survey: 92% Angry about Pensions,” Asahi Shimbun, June 27, 2007. 71.  T. J. Pempel, “Japanese Democracy and Political Culture: A Comparative Perspective,” PS: Political Science and Politics 25, no. 1 (March 1992): 11. 72.  Ellis S. Krauss, “Conf lict in the Diet: Toward Conf lict Management in Parliamentary Politics,” in Ellis S. Krauss, Thomas P. Rohlen, and Patricia G. Steinhoff, eds., Conflict in Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984): 263. Also see Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 108. 73.  Watanabe, “Foreign Policy-Making, Japanese Style,” 75. 74.  Bobrow, “Japan in the World,” 572. 75.  Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 59. 76.  Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on US Foreign Policy since Vietnam. Although Sobel does not explicitly discuss this congruence procedure, his case studies all use congruence or the lack of it between public opinion and policy as a benchmark for establishing the inf luence or lack of public inf luence over policy. This study uses a richer array of public opinion data than Sobel uses to establish congruence. Regarding Sobel’s similar and “simple” model of process tracing, see 6–7. 77.  On the use of qualitative methods such as triangulation for examining quantitative political behavior data, see Henry E. Brady, “Data-Set Observations versus CausalProcess Observations: The 2000 U.S. Presidential Election,” in Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004): 267–271. 78.  Regarding the methodology of counterfactual benchmarks, see Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I use counterfactual benchmarks for evaluating the hypotheses presented in this work. Chapter 3 1.  Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003): 1. 2.  Author’s interview, August 8, 2007.

204

Notes to Pages 33–40

3.  Author’s interview, August 7, 2007. 4.  Nao Shimoyachi, “Japan Mulled Buying Cruise Missiles for Pre-Emptive SelfDefense: Ishiba,” Japan Times, January 25, 2005. Also see Shimoyachi, “Long-Range Missile Quest off Defense Buildup Plan,” Japan Times, December 10, 2004. 5.  “Tokyo Snuffs Plan to Study Long-Range Missiles after New Komeito Balks,” Asahi Shimbun, December 9, 2004; and James Brooke, “After Failures, Space Effort in Japan Gets a Lift,” New York Times, February 27, 2005. Also see the following discussion about nuclear weapons and preemption. 6.  This is all the more striking because the Bush administration has cited postwar Japan as a prime example of the successful use of military force to promote democracy. 7.  Author’s interview of August 7, 2007. 8.  Asahi Shimbun, October 18, 2004 (morning edition): 9. Germany and the United States were not included in this poll. 9.  Yoshio Katayama, “9/11 jiken ga imi suru mono,” Kokusai Anzen Hosho¯, vol. 30, nos. 1 & 2 (September 2002): 65. 10.  Shuichi Kato¯, “Bunmei no ‘Sho¯totsu’ kara ‘Taiwa’ e,” Ushio, no. 516 (February 2002): 97. 11.  Nippon Terebi poll, conducted October 13–15, 2006, with 569 valid responses and valid response rate of 56.9 percent. Retrieved on March 30, 2009, from www.ntv .co.jp/yoron/200610/question.html 12.  TV Asahi Poll conducted October 28 and 29, 2006, using a random sample of 1,000 at 125 locations, with a valid response rate of 55.5 percent. Retrieved on April 10, 2009, from www.tv-asahi.co.jp/hst/poll/200610/index.html. 13.  NHK polls show that 72 percent of respondents opposed the possession of nuclear weapons in 1969, 74 percent in 1974, and 82 percent in 1981. See NHK Broadcasting Poll Research Institute, ed., Zusetsu sengo yoron-shi, 2nd edition (Tokyo: Broadcasting Poll Research Institute, 1982): 170–171. 14.  Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: 48. Also see Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (London: Routledge, 2009): 102–111. 15.  “85% of Lawmakers Support Revising the Constitution,” Japan Times, September 5, 2004. 16.  Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: 45. Based on interviews he conducted with one DPJ and one LDP upper house member in August 2003. 17.  Kyodo, “Japan Could Go Nuclear under Abe, Expert Reckons,” Japan Times, September 29, 2006. To suggest that the failure of this prediction has more to do with Abe’s short term in office rather than the power of public opinion misses the point: It is precisely because Abe strayed from public opinion by pushing a debate on constitutional revision and claiming the right to collective self-defense, which involved defying far smaller opinion majorities than would be the case with acquiring nuclear weapons, that Abe was hounded from office after only a year. For another example of a failed prediction that Japan would move to develop nuclear weapons see Robyn Lim, “So Much for Japan’s Nuclear Taboo: Worried by China and North Korea,” International Herald Tribune, June 13, 2002. 18.  Author’s interview of August 7, 2007. 19.  “Kyo¯santo¯, Jieitai no kaigai haken, jindo¯ shien nara yo¯nin,” Yomiuri Shimbun, January 20, 2005: 4, and more generally, Brad Williams, “Why Give? Japan’s Response to the Asian Tsunami Crisis,” Japan Forum 18, no. 3 (November 2006): 399–416, especially 403–404.



Notes to Pages 40–51

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20.  Masaru Tamamoto, “After the Tsunami: How Japan Can Lead,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January/February 2005: 13. 21.  Williams, “Why Give?” 404. 22.  “Honrai ninmuka no ho¯kaiseian tsu¯jo¯ kokkai teishutsu seifu ga saikento¯,” Asahi Shimbun, January 8, 2005 (morning edition): 3; “Indoyo¯ tsunami ‘Jieitai kaigai haken e no seido, ho¯ritsu o seibi,’ Koizumi shusho¯ hyo¯mei,” Yomiuri Shimbun, January 8, 2005: 2. 23.  Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Unpacking Japanese Antimilitarism: Entrapment Fear, Domestic Liberal Ideology, and Pacifism in Japanese Politics,” paper delivered at the 2006 meeting of the International Political Science Association, Fukuoka, Japan, July 9–13, 2006: 13. A revised version of Izumikawa’s paper, “Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japanese Security Policy,” is forthcoming in International Security 35, no. 2 (Fall 2010). 24.  Frank L. Klingberg, Cyclical trends in American Foreign Policy Moods: The Unfolding of America’s World Role (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983). For a discussion, see Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since Vietnam, chapter 3. 25.  The data in this figure omit a third answer choice, I “cannot say there is no danger of entrapment in war” because this option is the most neutral and allows the respondent to avoid taking a clear position. Results from the 2009 survey have been omitted because the answer options were rewritten and changed from three to four, rendering the results difficult to compare. 26.  Asahi Shimbun, August 15, 1965 (morning edition): 4; Asahi Shimbun, Mini yonjunen no nagare (Tokyo: Asahi Newspaper, 1986) Vol. 1: 160. Shinkichi Goto¯ and Yoshinobu Yamamoto present a table that shows a similar chronological pattern of rising and falling fear of entrapment in U.S. wars. However, because the table is built using various polling agencies and question wordings its results must be interpreted with caution. See So¯go¯anpo to mirai no sentaku (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1991): 219. 27.  Data presented in Douglas H. Mendel, “Japanese Views of the American Alliance in the Seventies,” Public Opinion Quarterly 35, no. 4 (Winter 1971–72): 521–138, at 530. This survey was designed by Mendel and conducted by CRS. 28.  “Iraku ko¯geki, Nihon wa hantai 77%,” Asahi Shimbun, September 4, 2002 (morning edition): 1. 29.  “34% think Japan–U.S. ties good,” Daily Yomiuri, December 18, 2008; and December 16, 2006 (morning edition): 14. 30.  Asahi Shimbun, October 18, 2004 (morning edition): 9. Chapter 4 1.  On this point generally, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy off Great Power Politics (Chicago: W. W. Norton, 2001). 2.  Kenneth N. Waltz notes that unbalanced power can be a danger domestically or internationally and invokes Fenellon’s theorem to explain this in both realms. See “America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective,” PS, 24, no. 4 (Dec. 1991): 670; and “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” in G. John Ikenberry, America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002): 52. 3.  Richard Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and The Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007): 49. 4.  Joichi Ito, “An Anniversary to Forget,” New York Times, August 7, 2005: 12.

206

Notes to Pages 51–53 – 5.  Hideo Otake, Saigunbi to nashonarizumu (Tokyo: Chu¯o¯ Ko¯ronsha, 1988): 140–147, 177– 178; and Osamu Watanabe, Nihonkoku kenpo¯ “kaisei” (Tokyo: Nihon hyo¯ronsha, 1987). 6.  Masataka Ko¯saka, “Kishi Nobusuke to sengo seiji,” in Masataka Ko¯saka, Ko¯saka Masataka chosakushu¯ vol. 4 (Tokyo: Toshi Publishing Co., 1999): 544–545; and Kazuya Sakamoto, Nichibei do¯mei no kizuna (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2000): 210, 212–220. That Kishi himself had been a member of several wartime cabinets only exacerbated fears that he might be an opponent of postwar democratization. 7.  Mainichi Shimbun, October 18, 1971; Yomiuri Shimbun, October 19, 1971; and Asahi Shimbun, January 3, 1972; as cited by John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System (London: Athlone Press, 1988): 426, Table XIV.12. 8.  Yomiuri Shimbun, June 27, 1973, as cited by Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, Table XIV.14, 427. 9.  Mainichi Shimbun, May 3, 1972 (morning edition): 11. 10.  Asahi Shimbun, August 17, 1962. Also see Shu¯kan Asahi, April 5, 1968, as cited by Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse. 421, Table XIV.7. 11.  Article 11 read, “The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy.” Similarly, Article 12 stated, “The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy.” See Sho¯ichi Koseki, The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution, translated by Ray A. Moore (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998): 58. Also see Candee Yale Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil–Military Rivalry, 1930–1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957): 20–24; and Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996): 53–54. 12.  Mainichi Shimbun, June 14, 1971 (morning edition): 4. 13.  Yomiuri Shimbun, February 23, 1961. The term kaigai haken connotes overseas dispatch for peaceful purposes, versus the term kaigai hahei, which connotes overseas dispatch for the purpose of using force. 14.  Asahi polls conducted the 1950s found majorities ranging from just over 50 percent to two-thirds believing that Japan needed military forces, with the opposing view never exceeding 30 percent. See the following pages and Douglas H. Mendel Jr., The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1961): 68–70. 15.  Mainichi Shimbun, January 14, 1971 (morning edition): 1, 4. Welfield cites a range of polls conducted in the 1960s and 1970s by various newspapers, Shu¯kan Asahi, the JDA, and the PMO, in which majorities, or in one case a mere plurality, state that “military forces are necessary.” Interestingly, support for this view bottoms out in 1968, with only 49 percent supporting this view in a PMO poll and 51.3 percent in a Shu¯kan Asahi poll conducted that year. By contrast, in 1966 and 1977, over 80 percent of respondents see a necessity for military forces in PMO and Japan Defense Agency ( JDA) polls, respectively (as cited by Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: 420, Table XIV.5). Because different polling agencies used different question wordings, the results are not entirely comparable. Nonetheless, the fact that majorities consistently saw military force as being necessary, with the partial exception of 1968 (when there was a single large plurality result), suggests that this was a robust and stable view. 16.  Mainichi Shimbun, July 1, 1968 (morning edition): 1, 8–9; Asahi Shimbun, January 1, 1978 (morning edition): 8. The other polls—Shu¯kan Asahi, April 5, 1968; Sankei Shimbun, May 18, 1969; Asahi Shimbun, May 18, 1969; and Yomiuri Shimbun, April 17, 1978—are as cited by Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse 418–419, Table XIV.4.



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17.  Mainichi Shimbun, May 3, 1972 (morning edition): 11. 18.  Asahi Shimbun, January 5, 1969, as cited by Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 418–419, Table XIV.4. Thirty-two percent expressed concern about foreign threats, versus 52 percent who claimed to feel no anxiety. Among the 32 percent, 15 percent identified the Soviet Union as a threat, 6 percent identified the United States as a threat, 5 percent identified China, and 2 percent Communist countries in general. 19.  Yomiuri Shimbun, April 17, 1978, as cited by Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 418–419, Table XIV.4. This pattern of seeing the United States as a prominent military threat continued into the post–Cold War period, with a May 1995 Yomiuri Shimbun poll finding 26.6 percent of respondents listing the United States as posing a military threat to Japan, the third most listed country after North Korea (66.4 percent) and Russia (35.6 percent). By comparison, Communist China was fourth, with 21.3 percent of respondents saying it posed a threat to Japan. See Yomiuri Shimbun, May 23, 1995 (morning edition): 17. 20.  Shinkichi Goto¯ and Yoshinobu Yamamoto, So¯go¯anpo to mirai no sentaku (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1991): 219, 441. Goto¯ and Yamamoto present a table on page 219 depicting the Japanese public’s “fear of entrapment” in U.S. wars. However, because the table is built using various polling agencies and question wordings, its results must be interpreted with caution. Regarding entrapment fears, also see Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “Nichibei do¯mei no kokusai seiji riron” (International relations theories of the U.S.–Japan alliance), Kokusai Seiji No. 115 (May 1997): 170. Thomas U. Berger also notes the significance of fear of entrapment as a part of Japan’s culture of antimilitarism. See Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998): 67, 111. Regarding the role of entrapment fears in Socialist Party advertising, see Shigeyuki Funabashi, Sengo hanseiki no seiji katei (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2001): 22–23, 32, 39. 21.  Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Unpacking Japanese Antimilitarism: Entrapment Fear, Domestic Liberal Ideology, and Pacifism in Japanese Politics,” paper delivered at the 2006 meeting of the International Political Science Association, Fukuoka, Japan, July 9–13, 2006: 13. 22.  Regarding Japan’s strenuous efforts to fend off U.S. demands for a “ joint command” clause subordinating the SDF to a U.S. commander in wartime in the course of negotiations for the 1952 status of U.S. forces administrative agreement that followed the 1951 Security Treaty, see Eiji Takemae, The Allied Occupation of Japan (New York: Continuum, 2003): 506. 23.  Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy, 85–86. 24.  Hiroshi Takeuchi, Maruyama masao no jidai (Tokyo: Chu¯o¯ Ko¯ronsha, 2005): 134–138. 25.  Yomiuri Shimbun, October 4, 1959 (morning edition): 1. 26.  Yomiuri Shimbun, April 3, 1960 (morning edition): 1. 27.  Asahi Shimbun, August 15, 1965 (morning edition); Asahi Shimbun, Mini yonjunen no nagare 1 (Tokyo: Asahi Newspaper, 1986): 160; and Thomas Havens, Fire across the Sea: Japan and the Vietnam War, 1965–1975 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987): 50, and note 91. 28.  Tanaka Akihiko identifies 1973, the year the United States withdrew the last of its military forces from Vietnam, as a major turning point, because this withdrawal greatly reduced the Japanese public’s fear of entrapment in U.S. conf licts. See Akihiko Tanaka, Anzenhosho¯ (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1997): 243–244. 29.  Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: 102.

208

Notes to Pages 56–63

30.  Mainichi Shimbun, May 3, 1972 (morning edition): 11. 31.  Mendel reports that “I heard many Japanese” voice this optimism (Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy, 44). 32.  Everett Carll Ladd and Karlyn H. Bowman, Public Opinion in America and Japan: How We See Each Other and Ourselves (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1996): 27. 33.  Mainichi Shimbun, May 3, 1972 (morning edition): 11. 34.  Asahi Shimbun, August 15, 1965 (morning edition): 1. 35.  Newsweek, July 11, 1983, as cited by Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 415, Table XIV.2. 36.  Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy, 69. 37.  Ibid., 67–68. 38.  The convention-first institution not only isolated the party from voters, it even contributed to its isolation from its major interest group supporters, labor unions, who advocated less pacifist foreign policies. The convention-first rule appears to have empowered intellectual elites who were not answerable to the unions or voters. See Toshimitsu Shinkawa, “Failed Reform and Policy Changes of the SDPJ,” in Otake Hideo, ed., Power Shuffles and Policy Processes: Coalition Government in Japan in the 1990s (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000): 152–182. 39.  Asahi Shimbun, January 1, 1978: 8. 40.  Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy, 84. 41.  Ibid., 4–5. 42.  Asahi Shimbun, August 15, 1965 (evening edition): 1. 43.  Yomiuri Shimbun, June 27, 1973, as cited by Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 424, Table XIV.10. 44.  Davis Bobrow, “Japan in the World: Opinion from Defeat to Success,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 4 (December 1989), 602. 45.  For an overview of the logic underpinning arguments against overseas dispatch, see Hitoshi Mizuno, Kaigai hihahei no ronri—Nihonjin no dokuzenteki heiwakan o to (Tokyo: Shin hyo¯ron, 1997). 46.  Regarding the overseas dispatch of MSDF ships see Peter J. Woolley, Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971–2000 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000). 47.  See Hidejiro Kotani, “Jieitai no kaigai haken to kokuren ko¯roku,” Bo¯ei Ronshu¯ 2, no. 1 (1963): 27–28; and William L. Heinrich, Jr., “Seeking an Honored Place: The Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the Use of Armed Force Abroad,” PhD dissertation at Columbia University, 1997: 108–109. 48.  Havens, Fire across the Sea, 52. 49.  Ibid., 51–52. Regarding this skepticism, see the same pages and the following discussion. 50.  Glenn Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (New York: Routledge, 1996): 114. 51.  This was originally reported by Tokyo Shimbun, February 23, 1965 (morning edition): 1. For analysis, see Hidejiro Kotani, “Jietai wa kaigai hahei dekiru ka,” Jiyu¯, May 1966: 22; Heinrich, “Seeking an Honored Place”: 120–121; and Heinrich, in Yasuhide Soeya, et al., United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: A Guide to Japanese Policies (Tokyo: UNU, 1999): 13. 52.  Prime Minister’s Office, Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy (Tokyo: Foreign Press Center, March 1987): 13. Shin Joho Center conducted the survey, with a sample of 3,000



Notes to Pages 63–66

209

and an effective response of 2,385 (79.5 percent) (Retrieved from the Japan Data Archive, Roper Center, University of Connecticut). Another PMO poll conducted in 1983 used this same language and found that 42 percent supported and 23 percent opposed dispatching Japanese personnel to regions of conf lict, results that are little changed from those found in the 1986 poll. See Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization: 115. 53.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook (Tokyo: MOFA, 1989): 46 (Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japanese Disaster Relief Teams (Bill 93 of 16 September 1987), as carried in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan’s Contribution to UN peacekeeping operations [Tokyo: MOFA, 2005]. Retrieved April 4, 2009, from www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph2005.html). 54.  According to Hook, in PMO polls conducted between 1965 and 1989 that asked this same question, “a high of two-thirds to three-quarters of those surveyed persistently opposed and only up to one-quarter supported the SDF’s dispatch” (Militarization and Demilitarization, 114). 55.  Prime Minister’s Office, Public Opinion Survey on Japan’s Peace and Security (Tokyo: Foreign Press Center, September 1989): 12. 56.  Ibid. 57.  Douglas H. Mendel Jr., “Japan, Okinawa, and Vietnam,” paper presented to the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 20–22, 1967, 1. Thomas Havens generously sent me a copy of this paper, which he cited in Fire across the Sea, 51 and footnote 95. 58.  Havens, Fire across the Sea, 50–51. 59.  Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs, 2007): 356. 60.  “Public Opinion, Conservative Media Alter Policy on North Korea,” The Japan Times, November 19, 2007, 2. 61.  John Emmerson, Arms, Yen, and Power: The Japanese Dilemma (New York: Dunellen, 1971): 114. 62.  At the beginning of the occupation, Yoshida was reported to have told Colonel Charles Kades of the Government Section at general headquarters (GHQ), “You think you can make Japan a democratic country? I don’t think so” (“Kades Memoir on Occupation of Japan,” Journal of Tokyo Keizai University 148 [November 1986]: 306, as quoted and cited by John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II [New York: Norton, 1999]: 65, 572, note 1). 63.  Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis (London: Heinemann, 1961): 146. 64.  Mendel reports that, in answer to a different question, a slight majority in his 1957 sample agreed with the statement, “It’s useless to write letters to public officials because they don’t care what the average man thinks.” Thirty percent disagreed with this statement, which Mendel claims is a slightly higher number than was the case when he asked this question in 1953, although he does not provide the full results for either 1953 or 1957 (Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy, 37). 65.  Ibid., 39. 66.  Kei Wakaizumi, The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.– Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations. John Swenson-Wright, ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002): 207–208. For the Japanese version, see Kei Wakaizumi, Tasaku nakarishi o shinzemu to hossu (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju¯, 1994): 175, 413–414.

210

Notes to Pages 66–67

67.  Wakaizumi, The Best Course Available: 211. Similarly, Sato¯’s foreign minister, Miki Takeo, argued that Japanese public opinion would not accept a nuclear status for Okinawa different from that of mainland Japan. This issue was fought over in the LDP presidential election of 1968 (Ibid., 36–38; Wakaizumi, Tasaku nakarishi o shinzemu to hossu, 165–166). Wakaizumi’s account has recently been confirmed by the discovery in the former prime minister’s house of one original copy of the secret Sato¯–Nixon agreement allowing the return of nuclear weapons back into Okinawa in the event of a crisis (“Kakumitsuyaku bunsho, Sato¯ moto shusho¯ tei ni . . . hatsu no sonzai kakunin,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 22, 2009, as retrieved on January 4, 2010, from www .yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20091222-OYT1T00775.htm). To further placate public opinion and “cope with [opposition parties in] the Diet,” the Sato¯ government inf lated the cost of removing U.S. nuclear weapons from Okinawa to make it appear to be a major undertaking (“Nuke Cost Inf lated to Dupe Public,” November 14, 2009, Asahi .com, as retrieved on November 16, 2009, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/ TKY200911140134.html). 68.  A bureau chief in the PMO reported this to Douglas Mendel. See Mendel, “Japanese Views of the American Alliance in the Nineteen Seventies,” Public Opinion Quarterly 35, no. 4 (Winter 1971–72): 521–538. Although a critic could argue that Japan used political opinion as an excuse to exact political concessions from the United States, this case appears to be the opposite: Japanese leaders, by using political capital to seek electoral favors from the United States, thereby opened themselves to demands for concessions from the United States in exchange. I am grateful to a reviewer for helping me highlight this counterargument. 69.  Hook, Militarisation and Demilitarisation: 125–126. Emphasis in the original. 70.  “Chuki bo¯ei keikaku tekkai o,” Asahi Shimbun, October 28, 1985 (evening edition): 1; and Mainichi Shimbun, April 22, 1985 (morning edition): 1. 71.  Takao, Is Japan really remilitarizing? 136; and Joseph P. Keddell Jr., The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993): 132–134. 72.  Richard Samuels has recently suggested that Japan has been able to circumvent limits on defense spending by investing more to build up the capabilities of the JCG. See “ ‘New Fighting Power!’ Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/2008): 84–112. The problem with this argument is that while the recent buildup gives the Japanese Coast Guard ( JCG) enhanced capabilities to deal with small North Korean spy ships, Chinese civil society groups sending protestors to the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, and more generally anti­ piracy and law and fisheries regulation missions near Japan, the JCG’s new hardware is too lightly armed to enhance Japan’s naval capabilities vis-à-vis other states. Meanwhile, limits on defense spending have produced large and painful drops in the procurement of militarily significant equipment for the MSDF and other arms of the SDF. Since the early 1990s procurement has fallen to less than 20 percent of the constricted defense budget. See Takao, Is Japan Really Remilitarizing? 136. This pattern is consistent with the main argument of this book: The public supports more spending on JCG capabilities useful mainly for territorial defense while being wary of greater spending on SDF weaponry that could be used for projecting military force overseas.



Notes to Pages 69–72

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Chapter 5 1.  Shunji Yanai, “Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations and Other Operations,” The Japanese Annual of International Law 36 (1993): 35. 2.  Naoki Saito, “The Passing of the PKO Cooperation Law: Japan’s Struggle to Define Its International Contribution,” November 1992, Institute for Global Peace— Tokyo, IIGP Policy Paper 102E, 2; and Masaru Tachibana, “Where Is American Policy Driving Japan? The Aftermath of the Gulf Crisis on Domestic Japanese Politics,” The Center for International Affairs and the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University, 1992, USJP Occasional Paper 92-14, 3; Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), Asian Security 1991–92, 31. 3.  Article 3, para. 2 of the bill. See Kenichi Ito, “The Japanese State of Mind: Deliberations on the Gulf Crisis,” Journal of Japanese Studies 17, no. 2, 277. 4.  According to Article 27 of the bill, sidearms could be used “only in situations in which there exists sufficient reason to believe that there exists an unavoidable necessity for the protection of the life or safety of oneself or another and only within limits judged to reasonably necessary” (Ibid., 277). 5.  Sato¯ Seizaburo¯, “ ‘Sengo ishiki’ no dasei o tatsu aki,” Chu¯o¯ Ko¯ron, November 1990, 112; and Glenn Hook, Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan (New York: Routledge, 1996): 95. 6.  Mainichi Shimbun, October 18, 1990 (morning edition): 2. Also see interviews with Doi and Communist party leader Fuwa in Asahi Shimbun, October 5, 1990 (morning edition): 3; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 28, 1990, 3; Tokyo Shimbun, October 29, 1990, 2; Eugene Brown, “Contending Paradigms of Japan’s International Role: Elite Views of the Persian Gulf Crisis,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies (Spring 1991): 6; and Jiro¯ Yamaguchi, “The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics,” Journal of Japanese Studies 18, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 165. 7.  “Jieitai kaigai haken o shikaru,” Mainichi Shinbun, October 21, 1990 (morning edition): 1, 3. Also see Clayton Naff, “Japan’s Plan to Send Troops to Gulf in Trouble,” UPI, October 23, 1990. Also see Goto¯da Masaharu, “ ‘Kaigai hahei’ no bo¯ron o haisu,” Gekkan Asahi (December 1990): 40–46. 8.  Tahara Soichiro¯, “Nihon no Fumie” Bungei Shunju¯, October 1990; and Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era (Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1992): 15. Also see Goto¯da, “Kaigai hahei no bo¯ron o haisu,” 41; and Yoshitaka Sasaki, Umi o wataru jieitai: PKO Rippo¯ to seiji kenryoku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992): 48; and Hook, Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan, 87. 9.  Nakatani Iwao, “’Nihon mondai’ ga shisa suru mono,” Kokusai Bunka Kaikan Kaiho¯, October 1990, as cited by Pyle, The Japan Question, 15. 10.  “ ‘Jieitai haken sezu,’ 67%” Asahi Shimbun, October 1, 1990 (morning edition): 1, 3. 11.  “Kaifu naikaku shijiritsu, hatsu no teika,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 15, 1990: 1, 7. 12.  Ibid., 7. 13.  “ ‘Heiwa kyo¯ryoku ho¯ wa yoron fumaete’ Kanemaru shi shincho¯ shisei,” Asahi Shimbun, October 16, 1990 (morning edition): 2. 14.  “Kokuren heiwa kyo¯roku de kenpo¯ shinkaishaku ni hantai,” Mainichi Shimbun, October 21, 1990 (morning edition): 1.

212

Notes to Pages 72–76

15.  Hook, Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan, 87; “Kokuren heiwa kyo¯roku ho¯an no shincho¯na shingi o unagasu,” Asahi Shimbun, October 23, 1990 (morning edition): 2; and Pyle, The Japanese Question, 130. 16.  “Jieitai haken ni ‘hantai’ 53%,” Mainichi Shimbun, October 23, 1990 (morning edition): 1, 3. The Mainichi results were based upon a telephone survey with 2,000 respondents conducted October 21. In English, see Clayton Naff, “Japan’s Plan to Send Troops to Gulf in Trouble,” UPI, October 23, 1990; and Ivor Ries, “Japan: Gulf Plans on Hold,” Australian Financial Review, October 24, 1990, 1. 17.  Ibid., Mainichi Shimbun, 1–3. This fall followed a 4 percent fall in September after maintaining a consistent 45 percent approval rating for five months. 18.  “Kaifu naikaku shijiritsu 35% ni daun,” Mainichi Shinbun, October 24, 1990 (morning edition): 1. 19.  However, this result might also have ref lected question formatting more consistent with the September Asahi poll. The Mainichi poll, like Asahi but unlike Nikkei, gave respondents only two answer options. 20.  “Heiwa kyoryoku ho¯an no motatsuki ga genin,” Yomiuri Shimbun, October 25, 1990 (morning edition): 2. These results take on added significance given that respondents were only allowed to choose up to two reasons for expressing approval or disapproval. 21.  “Jieitai haken 78% ga hantai,” Asahi Shimbun, November 6, 1990 (morning edition): 1, 3. 22.  “Jieitai haken 78% ga hantai,” Asahi Shimbun, November 6, 1990 (morning edition): 1, 3. 23.  “Kaifu naikaku no shiji kyuraku,” Yomiuri Shimbun, October 25, 1990 (morning edition): 2. 24.  Steven R. Weisman, “Japanese Fear of Militarism Fuels Opposition to Sending Troops to Gulf,” New York Times, November 2, 1990, 1. 25.  “Sekkyoku sansei, jimin de hansu¯ waru,” Asahi Shimbun, November 1, 1990 (morning edition): 1. 26.  “Ozawa kanjicho¯ mukaeta giinra ni fuman,” Asahi Shimbun, October 21, 1991 (morning edition, Nagoya): 23; “Kenpo¯ shinkaishaku ni hantai,” Mainichi Shimbun, October 21, 1990 (morning edition): 1; Tahara Soichiro¯, “Nippon no fumie,” Bungei Shunju¯, October 1990; “Heiwa kyo¯roku ho¯an no motatsuki ga genin,” Yomiuri Shimbun, October 25, 1990 (morning edition): 2; “Sekkyoku sansei, Jimin de hansu¯ waru,” Asahi Shimbun, November 1, 1990 (morning edition): 1; and Sasaki, Umi o wataru jieitai, 48. 27.  Interview with Mihara Asahiko, Diet member and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the lower house, April 19, 1995. Mihara’s reluctance to support the UNPCC is all the more significant because his district, which is located in KitaKyuushu, includes many defense industries. Consequently, according to Mihara, opinion in his district is comparatively hawkish on defense issues. 28.  RIPS, Asian Security 1991–92, 32–33, 114–115. 29.  See Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998): 136. Also see Goto¯da Masaharu, Seiji to wa nani ka (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1988). 30.  Heinrich, “Seeking an Honored Place,” 185–186; and Ryokufu¯ shuppan henshu¯, PKO mondai no so¯ten zo¯hoban—bunseki to shiryo¯ (Ryokufu¯ Shuppan, 1992): 55–58; and Japanese Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1991 (Tokyo: Japanese Defense Agency, 1991): 137.



Notes to Pages 76–83

213

31.  Hook, Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan, 115–117; Heinrich, “Seeking an Honored Place,” 183–187; and Ryokufu¯ shuppan hensu¯, PKO mondai no so¯ten zo¯hoban: 51–54. 32.  Ryokufu¯ shuppan hensu¯, PKO mondai no so¯ten zo¯hoban: 57; and Heinrich, “Seeking an Honored Place,” 186. 33.  Asahi Shimbun, February 5, 1991. 34.  Ibid. 35.  Ibid. 36.  Yanai, “Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations and Other Operations,” 35–37; Shunji Yanai, “Nihon no kokusai heiwa kyo¯ryoku ho¯ o kangaeru,” Gaiko Forum, no. 78, 56; and RIPS, Asian Security 1991–92, 33, 115. 37.  Heinrich, “Seeking an Honored Place,” 185. 38.  Ryokufu¯ shuppan hensu¯, PKO mondai no so¯ten zo¯hoban: 51–55. 39.  Japan Economic Journal, March 2, 1991; and Ryokufu¯ shuppan hensu¯, PKO mondai no so¯ten zo¯hoban: 51–57. 40.  Heinrich, “Seeking an Honored Place,” 188–189; Hook, Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan: 116–117; Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan: 138–140; Ryokufu¯ shuppan hensu¯, PKO mondai no so¯ten zo¯hoban: 58–62, 282–283; T. R. Reid, “Japanese Minesweepers Set Sail for Persian Gulf,” Washington Post, April 27, 1991, 1; and Stuart Feldman and Matthew Rubiner, “Japan’s New Security Steps,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 9, 1991, 18. 41.  Heinrich, “Seeking an Honored Place,” 188–189. 42.  Heinrich, “Seeking an Honored Place,” 189. 43.  Asahi Shimbun, April 24, 1991 (morning edition): 1. 44.  Sam Jameson, “Japan to Send Ships to Gulf in Foreign Policy Reversal,” Los Angeles Times, April 25, 1991, 1. Unfortunately, the full results from this last poll were never published. 45.  Mainichi Shimbun June 14, 1991 (morning edition): 1. 46.  Asahi Shimbun, June 19, 1991 (morning edition): 1. 47.  Heinrich, “Seeking an Honored Place”; and Hook, Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan. Also see Martin E. Weinstein, “Japan’s Foreign Policy Options: Implications for the United States,” in Gerald L. Curtis ed., Japan’s Foreign Policy: After the Cold War Coping with Change (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993). This alternate inference is contradicted by the fact that a Japanese public opinion majority subsequently objected to SDF involvement in the military aspects of U.N. peacekeeping. See the next chapter for details. 48.  Hook, Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan, 123. Chapter 6 1.  “Jieitai to bekko ni shin soshiki,” Asahi Shimbun, November 9, 1990 (morning edition): 1. 2.  Glenn Hook, Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan (New York: Routledge, 1996): 114–116. Heinrich argues that U.S. criticism produced a change in Japanese opinion. See William L. Heinrich Jr., Seeking an Honored Place: The Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the Use of Armed Force Abroad, PhD dissertation at Columbia University, 1997: 189.

214

Notes to Pages 83–88

3.  Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 8, 1991, 1; Nikkei News Bulletin, March 9, 1991; Mainichi Daily News, March 10, 1991, 1. 4.  For a detailed explanation of this inference, see the previous chapter. It should also be noted that the inference LDP elites (and some Western observers) drew, namely that the popularity of the minesweeper dispatch would translate into greater public support for SDF involvement in military operations overseas, proved to be wrong. See the following discussion. 5.  Asahi Shimbun, June 19, 1991 (morning edition): 1. A Mainichi Shimbun poll taken at approximately the same time and asking only about international disaster relief found even stronger support: Fifty-four percent supported SDF deployment overseas for international disaster relief missions, versus 14 percent who opposed and a sizable 27 percent who professed that they “did not know” (5 percent did not answer). See Mainichi Shimbun June 14, 1991 (morning edition): 1. 6.  Ibid. 7.  Ibid. However, question ordering may have affected the result here: The question about whether “you support SDF” participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations (question #10) followed the question asking respondents whether they supported participation in various sorts of peacekeeping operations (#9). Because this question asked about unarmed missions, that might have boosted support for participation in peacekeeping among those who might have otherwise opposed it, assuming it involved the use of military force. 8.  Heinrich, “Seeking an Honored Place”; and Hook, Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan. Also see Martin E. Weinstein, “Japan’s Foreign Policy Options: Implications for the United States,” in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., Japan’s Foreign Policy: After the Cold War Coping with Change (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993). Glenn Hook, tracking this change in a graph, showed a dramatic reversal in public opinion by April 1991, as those favoring overseas dispatch gained clear predominance over opponents. Rather than corresponding to a dramatic shift in opinion, however, the dramatic shift in Hook’s graph ref lected a dramatic shift in survey questions after the Gulf War. During the UNPCC debate in the fall of 1990, pollsters failed to ask Japanese if they supported dispatching the SDF overseas for disaster relief or other humanitarian or nonmilitary missions. It was only after the Gulf War that pollsters conducted and published polls asking respondents for their opinion about overseas dispatch of the SDF for noncombat humanitarian relief missions. 9.  See Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization, 115. 10.  Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 29, 1991, 1. 11.  Ishihara Nobuo, then deputy chief cabinet secretary, claims that it was the success of the minesweeper dispatch that convinced then Prime Minister Kaifu to support full SDF military involvement in U.N. peacekeeping. See 2668 nichi: Seisaku kettei no butaiura (Tokyo: NHK Shuppan, 1995): 65. 12.  This acronym is used only in Japan. 13.  Saito, “The Passing of the PKO Cooperation Law,” 3; Yanai, “Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations and Other Operations,” 41. 14.  Ibid. 15.  Saito, “The Passing of the PKO Cooperation Law,” 3, 9. 16.  Asahi Shimbun, November 10, 1991 (morning edition): 2. Tomohito Shinoda misleadingly asserts these results showed public support for the PKO bill. He claims that 71 percent supported “SDF dispatch abroad,” a figure reached by adding up the number of respondents who supported participation in multinational Gulf War–style coalitions (2 percent), a military role under U.N. command (19 percent) (Shinoda conf lates these



Notes to Pages 88–94

215

two categories in a footnote), and the 50 percent who supported overseas deployment only on condition that it be limited to nonmilitary operations such as disaster relief. This is a mischaracterization, not so much because it aggregates very divergent answer categories but because this question did not ask respondents about the government’s peacekeeping bill. On the other hand, he also claims that 29 percent opposed overseas deployment, when in fact only 24 percent opposed such deployment, with 5 percent answering “don’t know” or “no answer,” an answer category that cannot be equated with opposition (Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 60 and footnote 34). 17.  Ibid. Here, Shinoda seriously mischaracterizes the Asahi Shimbun results, claiming they indicated that “public reaction to the legislation was generally supportive,” ignoring the fact that the Asahi poll found 58 percent opposed to the contents of the bill with only 33 percent supporting (Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 59–60). 18.  Ibid. Actually, as discussed in the previous chapter, a strong majority supported this dispatch from the beginning. 19.  Ibid. 20.  Ibid. 21.  Ibid. 22.  Saito, “The Passing of the PKO Cooperation Law,” 3, 9. The reasons for Ko¯mei’s opposition are unclear but appear to center on the fear that the requirement for prior Diet approval would force the party to vote for unpopular dispatches or force them to vote against dispatches they would otherwise support to avoid alienating their base. 23.  Ibid., Hisao Takagi, “LDP Forced to Retreat, but Still Expects to Pass Peace Force Bill,” The Nikkei Weekly, December 7, 1991, 19; RIPS, Asian Security 1992–93, 112–113; and “Inept PKO Bill Performance,” The Japan Times, December 12, 1991, 1. 24.  See “PKO bill Won’t Pass Current Diet Session,” Mainichi Daily News, December 7, 1991: 1. 25.  Ko¯mei’s boycott of a vote to extend the parliamentary session appeared to many observers at the time to mark the end of their de facto alliance with the LDP. See Robert Delfs, “Falling Apart,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 26, 1991: 13. 26.  Yanai, “Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations and Other Operations,” 47, 60–61; and Saito, “The Passing of the PKO Cooperation Law,” 3, 9. 27.  Saito, “The Passing of the PKO Cooperation Law,” 3, 9. 28.  Asahi Shimbun poll published May 1, 1992 (morning edition): 1. This poll was conducted April 26–27, 1992. 29.  Asahi Shimbun poll published May 1, 1992 (morning edition): 1. This poll was conducted April 26–27, 1992. It is possible that respondents confused such terms as PKO and PKF and expressed their opinion about the PKO bill itself, rather than the narrower issue of PKF participation. 30.  Ryokufu¯ shuppan hensu¯, PKO mondai no so¯ten zo¯hoban: 62–71. 31.  Ibid., 9. 32.  Nikkei Shimbun, June 10, 1992: 1. This poll was conducted June 6–7, 1992, and had a sample size of 10,000 respondents. 33.  Tokyo Broadcasting Service (TBS) poll of June 14, 1992. This telephone interview poll had a sample size of 1,500 respondents. 34.  Tokyo Shimbun July 4, 1992: 1. This poll was conducted July 1–2, 1992, and had a sample size of 2,000 respondents.

216

Notes to Pages 95–103

35.  Asahi Shimbun, July 13, 1992 (morning edition): 1. Unfortunately, beginning with Asahi’s July poll, the question about what kind of overseas SDF dispatch would be most appropriate was dropped, making it impossible to track immediate post–PKO enactment responses to this question. 36.  Fujii Tatsuya, “PKO iryo¯gyomu no jissai,” in Nakyama Taro, ed., Kokusai iryo¯ kyo¯ryoku: Iryo¯ ni kokkyo¯ nashi (Tokyo: Saimul Press, 1993): 14–20, at 15, 20. 37.  Asahi Shimbun, September 28, 1992 (morning edition): 1. This poll was conducted September 15–16, 1992, and had a sample size of 3,000 with 2,346 valid responses. 38.  Only 12 percent supported dispatching the SDF for participation in a U.N. peacekeeping force or army, implying involvement in military operations, while 22 percent supported dispatch for participation in nonmilitary operations, for a combined total of 34 percent (Asahi Shimbun, May 1, 1992). The poll was conducted April 26–27, 1992, with a sample size of 3,000 and 2,312 responses. 39.  Ibid. 40.  Ibid. 41.  Ibid. These percentages are based on the total opposing dispatch and were calculated by the author. The Asahi poll presents percentage distributions based on the total who answered for and against dispatch. 42.  Ibid. 43.  Paul Blustein, “Japan: Is Cambodia Too Costly? After Civilian’s Death, Tokyo Questions Price of U.N. Peace Keeping,” The Washington Post, May 8, 1993, A4. 44.  The Nikkei Weekly, June 26, 2006, 31. 45.  Interview of April 15, 2005, Office of Kiichi Miyazawa. Miyazawa’s reference to the “terrible aspect of public opinion that can turn so easily” was undoubtedly a reference to the revolt within the LDP driven by public dissatisfaction over Miyazawa’s failure to implement serious political reform, a revolt that led to the collapse of Miyazawa’s premiership two months after the police officer had been killed in Cambodia. Miyazawa’s political instinct that the deployment could survive one policeman’s combat death proved to be correct. 46.  Blustein, “Japan: Is Cambodia Too Costly?” 47.  Asahi Shimbun June 2, 1993 (morning edition): 1. This poll was conducted May 29–30, 1992, had a sample size of 3,000, with 1,818 valid responses. 48.  Ibid. 49.  Ibid. 50.  Ibid. 51.  “Hassoku 40 shunen Jieitai, kokumin ni ne o orosu,” Yomiuri Shimbun, June 9, 1994 (morning edition): 11. 52.  Ibid. 53.  As cited by Everett Carl Ladd and Karlyn H. Bowman, Public Opinion in America and Japan: How We See Each Other and Ourselves (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1996): 30. 54.  Ibid., 38. 55.  “Hassoku 40 shunen Jieitai,” 11. 56.  Defense of Japan 2002 (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2002): 348–351. 57.  Ibid., 388–394. 58.  Ibid. Also see Michael Green and Mike Mochizuki, The U.S.–Japan Security Alliance in the 21st Century: Prospects for Incremental Change (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998): 55–72.



Notes to Pages 104–110

217

59.  Asahi Shimbun, March 17, 1999, as carried by JPOLL. Retrieved on April 10, 2009, from: www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/StateId/ DJN7uu0XCDK3Xf5Sb5xEyF1dZZMsm-4r50/HAHTpage/Summary_Link?RCQU_ QSTN_ID=16727 60.  Yomiuri Shimbun, August 4, 1999 (morning edition): 15. 61.  In a November 1991 CBS/NYT/TBS poll, 70 percent of Japanese answered that it is not appropriate to use military force “to maintain international justice and order,” versus 26 percent who found this appropriate, as cited by Ladd and Bowman, Public Opinion in America and Japan, 25. 62.  Takemura Masayoshi, Chisakutomo kirari to hikaru koku nihon (Tokyo: Ko¯bunsha, 1994). 63.  To be sure, Komatsu is the closest ASDF base to North Korea, and the base from which planes scrambled when North Korean MiGs approached MSDF ships after the latter had finished chasing alleged North Korean spy ships halfway across the Sea of Japan in March 1999. On the other hand, attacking only this airbase would not make any sense as it would gain North Korean little but cost it dearly. 64.  Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 22, 1999, as carried by JPOLL, the Japanese Public Opinion Database, Roper Center, University of Connecticut, accessible at roperweb .ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/ 65.  Yomiuri Shimbun, July 20, 1999, as carried by JPOLL, the Japanese Public Opinion Database, Roper Center, University of Connecticut; retrieved on April 10, 2009, from roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/ 66.  Although a liberal critic might argue that support for a the emergency legal framework legislation was an epiphenomenal response to the North Korean threat rather than a recognition of war as an ever-present danger, in fact this legislation was tailored to respond to any and all external threats, including terrorist attacks, rather than to a specific threat from the north. Moreover, support for this measure builds on the opinion majority, evident since the 1950s (see Chapter 4), which has believed that Japan needs a military to defend it from external threats in general. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to my attention. 67.  The Japan–U.S. academic SAGE survey results, presented in Chapter 3, confirm that the Japanese public is indeed skeptical about the utility of offensive military power. 68.  For example, Okamoto Yukio, senior Japanese diplomat during the Gulf crisis and aid to Koizumi after 9/11, claimed that Japan was ridiculed by the rest of the world during the first Gulf War as little more than a “cash dispenser.” See “Mata onaji koto ni naranai ka—Moshi Wangan Senso¯ ga mo ichido okottara?” Gaiko¯ Forumu, no. 158 (September 2001): 12–20, quote at 15. More generally on this point see Paul Midford, “Busshyu ni ‘No-’ to ieru Nihon,” in Sugita Yoneyuki, ed., Busshyu o saiten suru: Nasei to gaiko¯ no seisaku hyo¯ka (Tokyo: Akishobo, April 2004): 175–206; this work was published in English as “A War in the Gulf and a Bush in the White House: Déjà Vu for Japan?” in Yone Sugita, ed., Evaluation of the Bush Administration (Musashino: Smallworld Libraries, 2004), accessible at www.smallworld.co.jp. Chapter 7 1.  For a positive answer, see John Miller, “Japan Crosses the Rubicon,” Asia-Pacific Security Studies 1, no. 1 ( January 2002): 1–4. For a negative answer, see Akio Watanabe,

218

Notes to Pages 110–116

“Nihon wa rubikon o watatta no ka? Higuchi repo-to igo no Nihon no bo¯ei seisaku o kento¯ suru,” Kokusai Anzen Hosho¯ 31, no. 3 (December 2003): 73–85. 2.  Yomiuri Shinbunsha Seron Cho¯sabu, Nihon no Seron (Tokyo: Ko¯bundo¯, 2002): 338–339, 344–345. Also see Yomiuri Shimbun, September 26, 2001 (morning edition): 3. This telephone poll had a sample size of 1,000 respondents but did not list a valid response rate. 3.  Ibid., 338–339, 344–345. 4.  Paul Midford, “Japan’s Response to Terror: Dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea,” Asian Survey XLIII, no. 2 (March/April 2003): 331–332. 5.  Yomiuri Shinbunsha Seron Cho¯sabu, Nihon no Seron, 338–339, 344–345. 6.  Ibid., 347–348, 352. This in-person interview poll had a sample size of 3,000 and a valid response rate of 63.7 percent. 7.  The law had previously permitted SDF involvement only after an attack on a U.S. base had begun and only when the police could not handle the situation. 8.  See “Statement by Prime Minister Jun’ichiro¯ Koizumi at the Press Conference,” September 12, 2001, at www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/0912kaiken_e .html; Tomohito Shinoda, “Japan’s Response to Terrorism,” paper presented at “Japan Sets Out: Japan’s Role in the Fight against Terrorism,” October 16, 2001, workshop, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 1, available at http://wwics.si.edu/asia/ reports/2001/jpnterr.htm. Also see David Leheny, “Tokyo Confronts Terror,” Policy Review 110 (December 2001/January 2002), at www.policyreview.org/DEC01/leheny .html; Go Ito, “Redefining Security Roles: Japan’s Response to the September 11 Terrorism,” Journal of East Asian Studies 2:1 (2002): 285–305; and Hideki Uemura, Jieitai wa Dare no Monoka? [To Whom Do the Self-Defense Forces Belong?] (Tokyo: Ko¯dansha, 2002): 195–206. For a pre–September 11 view of U.S.–Japan counterterrorism cooperation, see Michael Green, Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness: New Approaches to U.S.– Japan Security Cooperation (New York: Japan Society, 2001). 9.  See Midford, “Japan’s Response to Terror,” 331–332. 10.  See Daniel M. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realipolitik (Westport CT: Praeger, 2006):,80–81, 83. 11.  Asahi Shimbun, September 25, 2001 (morning edition): 1; “Backing of U.S. Revives Debate on SDF,” The Japan Times, September 28, 2001, 2; and “Prime Minister’s Remarks of ‘Dangerous Areas’ Perplex the SDF,” Asahi Shimbun, September 26, 2001 (morning edition): 1. 12.  See Kliman, Japan’s Strategy in the Post-9/11 World, 80–81, 83. 13.  Tomohito Shinoda, “Koizumi’s Top Down Leadership in the Anti-Terrorism Legislation: The Impact of Political Institutional Changes,” SAIS Review XXIII, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2003): 30. 14.  Robert Pekkanen and Ellis S. Krauss, “Japan’s ‘Coalition of the Willing’ on Security Policies,” Orbis (Summer 2005): 429–444, at 439; “Coalition Leaders Split on SDF bill,” Daily Yomiuri, September 23, 2001, 3; Asahi Shimbun, October 2, 2001 (morning edition): 1; and Asahi Shimbun, October 10, 2001 (morning edition): 4; Tamura Shigenobu, “Tero taisaku kanrenho¯ no shushi to pointo,” Jiyu¯ Minshu, November 2001, 42; and Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror: Steady Incrementalism or Radical Leap?” CSGR Working Paper 104/02. Center for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, University of Warwick (August 2002): 3. This last condition paralleled the PKO bill of a decade earlier, which limited total deployments to 600 personnel, with a total of 1,200 during rotation.



Notes to Pages 116–119

219

15.  Goro Hashimoto, “Japan Must Revise Constitution,” The Daily Yomiuri, November 11, 2001: 5. 16.  As Hughes notes, the bill required less than three weeks and thirty-three hours of debate to pass (Hughes, “Japan’s Security Policy,” 4). 17.  “Naikaku shiji, bizo¯ 74%,” Asahi Shimbun, November 27, 2001 (morning edition): 1. Appearing to cherry-pick poll results, Tomohito Shinoda claims that the Japanese public “overwhelmingly” supported the antiterrorism bill and the dispatch of the MSDF to the Indian Ocean, but this is misleading because he cites only the October 2001 Asahi poll discussed previously, ignoring subsequent polls, such as the November 2001 Asahi poll, that showed far less support. See Tomohito Shinoda, “Becoming More Realistic in the Post–Cold War: Japan’s Changing Media and Public Opinion on National Security,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 2 (August 2007): 171–190. 18.  Regarding proposals to dispatch AWACs and P-3C planes, see Yomiuri Shimbun, September 21, 2001 (morning edition): 1; and September 23 (morning edition): 1. 19.  Kyodo News Service, September 28, 2001. For an alternative analysis of intra-LDP opposition to the Aegis dispatch, one that stresses economic motives vis-à-vis Middle Eastern states, see Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan,” in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, eds., Asian Aftershocks: Strategic Asia 2002–03 (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002): 102–103. 20.  “Kensho¯/E-jisukan no hakken miokuri,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 18, 2001 (morning edition): 4. 21.  “Kensho¯/E-jisukan no hakken miokuri,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 18, 2001 (morning edition): 4. Nonaka and Koga Makoto also raised questions about alleged American “gaiatsu” on Japan to dispatch an Aegis destroyer: “The US is not demanding that Korea make a military contribution. Why are they demanding this of Japan?” 22.  “Shasetsu: Jieikan haken naze,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 9, 2001 (morning edition): 3. 23.  “Under today’s democratic politics, civilian control is assured, and the resurgence of pre-war militarism cannot occur” (Ibid.). 24.  “Bei shien no E-jisukan hakken miokuri,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 17, 2001 (morning edition): 4. 25.  The characterization of this opposition as “pacifist” comes from “Yamasaki’s Aegis Battle Lost to LDP ‘Pacifists,’ ” Daily Yomiuri, November 19, 2001, 2. 26.  “Kensho¯/E-jisukan no hakken miokuri,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 18, 2001 (morning edition): 4. Also see “Bei shien no e-jisukan haken,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 17, 2001 (morning edition): 4. 27.  Ibid., 4. His prediction proved to be correct, as the DPJ, after voting against the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill, nonetheless voted for the actual dispatch. 28.  “Kensho¯/E-jisukan no hakken miokuri,” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 18, 2001 (morning edition): 4. 29.  “ ‘E-jisukan haken ha muri,’ hyo¯to¯ha anpo giin dancho¯,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 4, 2002 (morning edition): 1. 30.  “Jieitai no e-ijisukan haken, Kyu ¯ ma shi, ‘Muzukashii’ Bei no shinpo de hatsugen,” Asahi Shimbun, May 2, 2002 (evening edition): 2. Also see “E-jisukan no haken, ko¯shiki yo¯kyu¯ Yoto¯ kanjicho¯ bu beikoku bo¯ fukukancho¯,” Asahi Shimbun, April 30, 2002 (evening edition): 1. Enactment of this key piece of security legislation was eventually delayed anyway due to an unrelated scandal involving the Defense Agency.

220

Notes to Pages 119–128

31.  “Bei ga e-jisukan to P3C haken o yo¯kyu¯, yoto¯ 3 to¯ kanjichyo¯ ni,” Asahi Shimbun, April 30, 2002 (morning edition): 2; and Tsutomu Ishiai, “US Makes Aegis Request Official,” Asahi Shimbun, May 1, 2002, 2. 32.  “E-jisu hakken mondai, ketsuron ha miokuri,” Asahi Shimbun, November 7, 2002 (morning edition): 2. 33.  “No Problem with Aegis Dispatch: Koizumi,” Japan Times, December 6, 2002, 2; “E-jisukan hakken, Ko¯meito wa hantai kankunin ‘shincho¯ ni taio¯,” Asahi Shimbun, December 4, 2002 (morning edition): 2; “E-jisukan so¯ki haken no ho¯shin setsumei jiminyamasaki kanjicho¯,” Asahi Shimbun, December 5, 2002 (morning edition): 1. 34.  “Yo¯to¯nai cho¯sei tsukeba nennai hakken mo E-jisu haken de shusho¯,” Asahi Shimbun, December 3, 2002 (morning edition): 1. 35.  Asahi Shimbun, December 16, 2002 (morning edition): 1. 36.  Yasuo Takao, Is Japan Really Remilitarizing? The Politics of Norm Formation and Change (Victoria, Australia: Monash University Press, 2008): 110. 37.  “Kaiji E-jisukan, Indoyo¯ kara tesshu e, Nihon kinkai‘ku¯haku’ o kaihi,” Asahi Shimbun, July 3, 2003 (morning edition): 1. 38.  Yomiuri Shinbunsha Seron Cho¯sabu, Nihon no Seron: 338–339, 344–345. 39.  Ibid., 341–342; 344–346. 40.  Asahi Shimbun, October 16, 2001 (morning edition): 4. 41.  Asahi Shimbun, November 27, 2001 (morning edition): 4. 42.  Takuya Asakura, “Backing of U.S. Revives Debate on SDF,” Japan Times, September 28, 2001, 1. Chapter 8 1.  This was largely because the war became more and more unpopular among men and LDP supporters. See Asahi Shimbun, March 30, 2003 (morning edition): 4. 2.  Although one could argue that this 39 percent was actually a pacifist hard core, numerous other poll results presented throughout this book show that the percentage of Japanese who oppose wars of defense or Japan defending itself is far smaller. Also, the context made it clear that the question was about offensive war. 3.  As discussed in Chapter 2, one major distinction between academic defensive realism and attitudinal defensive realism is that the later views all offensive wars as lacking utility while the former believes that under some, generally rare, conditions, offensive war can have utility. 4.  Okamoto Yukio, “Toward Reconstruction Aid for Iraq: A Path via the Indian Ocean and the Nile, Gaiko¯ Forum (Summer 2003): 7. 5.  Mark Schreiber, “What’s that Gum on Bush’s boot? It’s Koizumi,” Japan Times, March 23, 2003, 5. 6.  “Is the Prime Minister Turning His Back on the Public on the Iraq Issue?” Mainichi Shimbun, March 6, 2003 (morning edition): 1; and Schreiber, “What’s that Gum on Bush’s boot? It’s Koizumi.” 7.  Cabinet Office, “Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s Interview on the Issue of Iraq,” March 18, 2003, available at: www.kanteigo.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2003/03/ 18interview_e.html. Also see Daniel M. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realipolitik (Westport CT: Praeger, 2006): 127. 8.  The Nihon Keizai Shimbun poll numbers are cited by Tomohito Shinoda, “Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq,” Japanese Journal of Political Sci-



Notes to Pages 129–132

221

ence 7, no. 1 (April 2006): 71–91, at 75. However, Shinoda does not provide a citation for this poll. 9.  Asahi Shimbun, April 1, 2003 (morning edition): 4. 10.  See polls in Asahi Shimbun, May 24, 2004 (morning edition): 2; Yomiuri Shimbun, May 24, 2004 (morning edition): 2; and an NTV poll conducted in May 2004, as retrieved from www.ntv.co.jp/yoron/2004_05/200405/index.html. 11.  Daniel Kliman reports that officials from the JDA, Foreign Ministry, and the Cabinet told him of these plans during interviews (Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the post-9/11 World, 126, 142, notes 47–49). 12.  See Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World, 126, based on his interviews with officials from the JDA, MOFA and elsewhere. 13.  Shinoda, “Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq,” 77. Also see Robert Pekkanen and Ellis S. Krauss, “Japan’s ‘Coalition of the Willing’ on Security Policies,” Orbis (Summer 2005): 429–444, at 440. 14.  Go Ito, “Participation in UN Peacekeeping,” in Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, eds., Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2007): 85; and, more generally, Daizo¯ Sakurada, and Go Ito¯, eds., Hikaku Gaiko¯ Seisaku: Iraku senso¯ eno taio¯ Gaiko¯ (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2004). 15.  Shinoda, “Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq,” 81. 16.  Yomiuri Shimbun, April 21, 2003. 17.  Yomiuri Shimbun, March 22, 2003 (morning edition). Yomiuri Shimbun again published an editorial on this theme on March 25, 2003. 18.  Yomiuri Shimbun, April 11, 2003 (morning edition): 4. 19.  See Daniel A. Metraux, “Religion, Politics, and Constitutional Reform in Japan: How the So¯ka Gakkai and Ko¯meito¯ Have Thwarted Conservative Attempts to Revise the 1947 Constitution,” Southeast Review of Asian Studies 29 (2007): 166. 20.  Shinoda, “Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq,” 79. 21.  Ibid.; and “Jimin, Ko¯mei ni iron mo,” Kyo¯do¯ Tsu¯shin, June 10, 2003, as retrieved from http://news.kyodo.co.jp/kyodonews/2003/ira2/news/0611-1140.html. 22.  Ibid.; and “Iraku shinpo giron honkakuka,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 11, 2003: 1. 23.  Shinoda, “Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq,” 80. 24.  Pekkanen and Krauss, “Japan’s ‘Coalition of the Willing,’ ” 440; and Shinoda, “Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq,” 80, 82–83; Diet Rec­ ord, House of Councilors’ joint conference of Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and Cabinet Committee, July 9, 2003, available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp; and Diet Record, The National Basic Policy Committee’s Joint Inspection Conference, July 23, 2003, at http://shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf.html/index_kaigiroku.htm. Also see “Teiko seiryoku, oshikiri shyu¯sei,” Asahi Shimbun, June 14, 2003 (morning edition): 1. 25.  “Diet Opens Debate on SDF, Iraq,” Asahi Daily News, June 25, 2003: 1. 26.  “Koizumi Sidesteps Debate on Iraq War,” Asahi Shimbun, June 26, 2003. 27.  “Kokyuho¯ motome jo¯kentsuki ryo¯sho¯,” Kyo¯do¯ Tsu¯shin, June 12, 2003, available at http://news.kyodo.co.jp/kyodonews/2003/iraq2/news/0612-1149.html; and Shinoda, “Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq,” 78, 80. 28.  A Nikkei poll conducted the same month reached the same conclusion: Fortythree percent supported, and 41 percent opposed, dispatching the SDF to Iraq (raw

222

Notes to Pages 133–137

data obtained by the author from the Japan Data Archive, Roper Center, University of Connecticut), 2004. 29.  As quoted by Pekkanen and Krauss, “Japan’s ‘Coalition of the Willing,’ ” 440. Also see “Iraku fukko shien no arikata ni taisuru kangaekata,” June 19, 2004, available at www.dpj.or.jp/seisaku/gaiko/BOX_GK0212.html; and “Minshuto¯ no Iraku cho¯sadan hokoku no gairyaku, June 11, 2004, available at www.dpj.or.jp/seisaku/gaiko/ BOX_GK0120.html. 30.  “Is Baghdad Safe Enough for SDF? It Depends on Which Party You Ask,” Japan Times, July 2, 2003; “DPJ Security Advocate Bridges Internal, LDP Gaps,” Japan Times, June 19, 2003. 31.  Pekkanen and Krauss, “Japan’s ‘Coalition of the Willing,’ ” 440–442. 32.  Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 22, 1999, as carried by JPOLL, the Japanese Public Opinion Database, Roper Center, University of Connecticut, retrieved April 11, 2006, from: http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/ 33.  Asahi Shimbun, November 2, 2003 (morning edition): 1. For a very comprehensive case study of public opinion toward Iraq as a factor affecting the outcome of this election, see Natsuyo Ishibashi, “Japan’s Self-Defense Forces Dispatch to Iraq: Public Opinion, Election and Foreign Policy,” Asian Survey 47, no.5 (September/October 2007). 34.  Interview of December 10, 2003. 1. 35.  “Jimin haken zentei ni chumon zokushutsu, rikuji tonyu de Ko¯mei to masatsu mo,” Kyo¯do¯ Tsu¯shin, December 8, 2003; and Shinoda, “Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq,” 87. 36.  Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror: Steady Incrementalism or Radical Leap?” CSGR Working Paper 104/02. Center for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, University of Warwick (August 2002): 129; and Asahi Shimbun, June 11, 2003 (morning edition): 2; and “1,000 Strong SDF Division Eyed for Iraq,” The Daily Yomiuri, June 25, 2003, 1. 37.  “Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi,” December 9, 2003, www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2003/12/09press_html; and Shinoda, “Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq,” 87. 38.  Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a “Normal” Military Power, 130; Asahi Shimbun, December 10, 2003 (morning edition): 5; and press conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, 9 December 2003, available at www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/ koizumispeech/2003/12/09press_e.html. 39.  Nihon Keizai Shimbun polling data obtained by the author from the Japan Data Archive, Roper Center, University of Connecticut. Twelve percent of respondents said this plan caused them to switch from supporting the cabinet to opposing it, while 2 percent said the plan caused them to switch from being cabinet opponents to being cabinet supporters; in other words, there was a net movement of 10 percent toward disapproval of the cabinet. 40.  “Naikaku shijiritsu kyuraku,” Asahi Shimbun, December 12, 2002 (morning edition): 1. 41.  “Koizumi naikaku, seito¯ shijiritsu no cho¯sa kekka,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 16, 2003 (morning edition): 4. 42.  See Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a “Normal” Military Power, 130, 156. 43.  As cited by Shinoda, “Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq,” 89.



Notes to Pages 138–143

223

44.  Asahi Shimbun, April 17, 2004 (morning edition): 1. 45.  “Japanese Want Troop Withdrawal from Iraq, Kyodo News Poll Shows,” Bloomberg, January 23, 2005, 23:03 EST. This telephone poll contacted 1,491 households, with 1,056 people responding. 46.  “Nenkin, Iraku no 2 daiso¯ten giron, yukensha ni todoita ka,” Asahi Shimbun, July 14, 2004 (morning edition): 1; “Dai 20 kai saninsen, deguchicho¯sa bunseki,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 12, 2004 (morning edition): 6; “ ‘Saninsen 487 man nin no sentaku,’ (chu) Jimin mienu muto¯ha taisaku,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 15, 2004 (morning edition): 34; “ ‘Ko¯zo¯ henka’ shinso¯’ (4) Jiko¯ yugo¯, ichidan to shinka Jiminto¯, seisaku jyo¯ho no kenen,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 16, 2004 (morning edition): 4. The LDP’s defeat was much bigger in terms of votes than seats, due to substantial malapportionment in Japan’s upper house. According to one calculation, had the same voting patterns held for a lower house election, the LDP would have ended up with 160 seats versus 320 for the Democrats. In other words, this would have marked the end of LDP–Ko¯mei rule. See Peter Morgan, “LDP on the Way to Extinction?” Japan Weekly HSBC, July 16, 2004: 1–5, available at www.research.hsbc.com. 47.  J. Patrick Boyd and Richard Samuels, Nine Lives? The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan, EastWest Center Policy Studies #19 (Washington, DC: EastWest Center, 2005): 47. 48.  “ASDF Owns Up to Airlifting Armed US Troops to Iraq,” Japan Times, April 9, 2004: 15; Hughes, Japan’s Reemergence as a “Normal” Military Power, 131; and “June Eyed for GSDF Iraq Pullout,” Daily Yomiuri, May 21, 2006, retrieved on May 25, 2006, from www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/world/20060521TDY01002.htm. 49.  As quoted by Metraux, “Religion, Politics, and Constitutional Reform in Japan,” 166. 50.  Boyd and Samuels, Nine Lives? 46. 51.  “June Eyed for GSDF Pullout,” Daily Yomiuri. 52.  There is some room to speculate that a pacifist Japanese public would have supported the dispatch of a paramilitary force for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction to a safe area of Iraq such as Samawah, while simultaneously opposing the war itself. Norway, for example, publicly opposed the Iraq invasion but nonetheless dispatched its military for a noncombat mission that very much resembled the mission performed by the GSDF in Samawah. See Yukiko Takezawa, “Comparing the Responses of Japan and Norway to the War on Terror,” master’s thesis, Department of Political Science & Sociology, Norwegian University for Science and Technology (NTNU), June 2009. 53.  “Rikuji Iraku tessyu,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 31, 2006 (morning edition): 5. More generally, see “June Eyed for GSDF Pullout,” The Daily Yomiuri, May 21, 2006. 54.  “Iraq Troop Dispatch Over, Japan Casts about for New Role,” The Nikkei Weekly, June 26, 2006: 1. 55.  Ibid. 56.  Ibid. 57.  “Jieitai Iraku hakken yokatta 49%, yokunakatta 35% Asahi Shimbun yoron cho¯sa,” Asahi Shimbun, June 28, 2006 (morning edition): 3. 58.  Prime Minister’s Office, “Jieitai no Iraku jindo¯ fukko¯ shien katsudo¯ ni kansuru tokubetsu yoron cho¯sa,” conducted from September 21 to October 1, 2006, and published November 2006. There were 1,811 valid responses gathered, producing a valid response rate of 60.4 percent. In early July, Yomiuri Shinbun conducted a poll with similarly

224

Notes to Pages 143–150

worded questions and reached similar results. See “Jieitai ‘Iraq Fukko¯ ni ko¯ken’ 68% ‘Hakken hyo¯ka’ ” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 13, 2006 (morning edition): 2. 59.  Ibid. 60.  Ibid. 61.  Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post–9/11 World, 137. 62.  See Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since Vietnam: Constraining the Collossus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 236. Chapter 9 1.  Interview of July 20, 2006. 2.  Exchange posted on Social Science Japan, posting 4353, January 16, 2007, available at http://ssj.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/archives/2007/01/_ssj_4353_re_ne.html. In subsequent personal correspondence, Ellis emphasized to me that the logic he outlined in this passage no longer applies after the LDP’s fall from power (personal correspondence of February 3, 2010). It should be noted that Japan first dispatched the SDF overseas for a non–U.N.–sponsored mission in 1994, when Japan sent the GSDF to Eastern Zaire to provide humanitarian assistance for refugees from the Rwandan genocide. Also, the GSDF dispatch to Iraq was undertaken after the U.N. Security Council had (ex post facto) authorized the presence of U.S. and allied forces in Iraq. 3.  Kyodo, “Extend MSDF Indian Ocean Refueling Duty: U.S.,” Japan Times, July 27, 2006, 1. 4.  Hiroko Nakata, “Abe Wants NSC-Style Body, Extra Advisers to Boost Agility of Cabinet,” Japan Times, September 21, 2006, 2. 5.  “Mr. Abe Takes the Stage,” Japan Times, Sunday, Oct. 1, 2006, 5. For a scholarly prediction that Abe would transform Japanese foreign policy in a hawkish “normal nation” direction, see Kenneth B. Pyle, “Abe Shinzo and Japan’s Change of Course,” NBR Analysis 17, no. 4 (October 2006). 6.  See Yomiuri Shimbun, April 2, 2003 (morning edition): 30; April 2, 2004 (morning edition): 10; and April 8, 2005 (morning edition): 14. Also see Daniel M. Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post–9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik (Westport, CT: Praeger, and Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006): 55. After 2005 Yomiuri replaced its question about reclaiming the right to collective self-defense. 7.  Kyodo, “Response to Abe’s Drive-Support Falls for Amending Constitution,” Japan Times, April 17, 2007, 1. 8.  “Abe Wants Permanent Law for SDF Missions Abroad, Collective Defense,” Japan Times, August 26, 2006, 1. 9.  Kyodo, “Bill to Extend Antiterrorism Law Clears Diet,” Japan Times, October 28, 2006, 4. 10.  “Iraku shiji wa ‘zen shusho¯ no kojinteki kenkai,’ bo¯ei chyo¯kan,” Asahi Shimbun, December 7, 2006 (morning edition): 2; and Kyodo, “Kyuma hedges support for the US,” Japan Times, December 8, 2006, 2. 11.  “Iraku shiji wa ‘zen shusho¯ no kojinteki kenkai,’ bo¯ei chyo¯kan.” 12.  Reiji Yoshida, “Kyuma Admits Tokyo Backed Iraq Attack,” Japan Times, December 9, 2006, 1. 13.  “Kyuma: U.S. Invasion of Iraq a Mistake,” Japan Times, January 25, 2007, 1. 14.  Kyodo, “U.S. Protests Kyuma’s Criticism of Bush,” Japan Times, January 28, 2007, 2.



Notes to Pages 150–158

225

15.  “Japan’s FM Calls US Operation ‘Naïve,’ ” AFP, February 3, 2007; and Keizo Nabeshima, “To Move without US Cues,” Japan Times, March 5, 2007, 5. 16.  Yoichi Kato and Hitoshi Kujiraoka, “US peeved at Kyu ¯ ma’s Attacks on Policy,” Asahi.com, February 2, 2007, retrieved on February 5, 2007, from: http://asahi.com/ english/Herald-asahi/TKY200702020103.html. 17.  “Yanagisawa Ko¯ro¯sho ‘Yamesaseru hitsuyo¯,’ 53% honsha yoron cho¯sa,” Asahi Shimbun, February 20, 2007 (morning edition): 1, 4. 18.  “Jieitai hirogaru kaigai ninmu,” Yomiuri Shimbun, December 17, 2006 (morning edition): 3. 19.  “Jieitai hirogaru kaigai ninmu.” 20.  “ ‘Jieitai no kaigai katsudo¯ tamerawanai’ Shyusho¯, NATO de enzetsu,” Asahi Shimbun, January 12, 2007 (morning edition): 1; and Kyodo, “Abe Vows to Boost NATO Ties, Give SDF Global Role for Peace,” Japan Times, January 13, 2007, 1. 21.  Asahi Shimbun, March 15, 2007 (morning edition): 9. 22.  This NTV poll was conducted May 11–13, 2007, with 609 valid responses and a valid response rate of 54.1 percent. Polling results are available at www.ntv.co.jp/ yoron/200705/index.html. 23.  “Jieitai no Afughan shien, shizai yuso¯ o kento¯ e,” Asahi Shimbun, May 5, 2007 (morning edition): 2. “SDF May Head to Afghanistan to Aid Reconstruction,” Japan Times, May 6, 2007, 1. 24.  Reiji Yoshida, “Extend Indian Ocean Mission: Koike,” Japan Times, July 12, 2007, 3. 25.  Ibid. 26.  “Shitsumon to kaito¯ Asahi Shimbunsha Yoron Cho¯sa,” Asahi Shimbun, January 23, 2007 (morning edition): 4. 27.  Kyodo, “Response to Abe’s Drive-Support Falls for Amending Constitution,” Japan Times, April 17, 2007, 1. 28.  “Pensions, Health Top LDP’s Platform for July Election,” Asahi Shimbun, June 6, 2007, retrieved on June 11, 2007, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/ TKY200706060037.html. 29.  Yomiuri Shimbun, July 13, 2007 (morning edition): 3. 30.  Eric Johnston, “Shimane Voters: Has Tokyo Helped Us?” Japan Times, July 25, 2007, 2. 31.  “ ‘Nenkin’ jyushi dan totsu,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 30, 2007 (morning edition): 6. 32.  Ibid. 33.  “ ‘Kenpo¯ yori seikatsu jyu¯shi o,’ ” Asahi Shimbun, July 31, 2007 (morning edition): 4. 34.  “Abe Plots New Course without Clear Policies,” Asahi.com, August 29, 2007, available at: www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200708290099.html. 35.  “Sanin kaikenha 3 bun no 2 wareru,” and “Sanin sameru kaiken netsu,” Asahi Shimbun, August 7, 2007 (morning edition): 1, 4. 36.  “Toshen, hikaisengiin anketto,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 31, 2007 (morning edition): 21. This poll consisted of a questionnaire given to incumbents not up for reelection in 2007 before the July 29 election and to newly elected members after the election. 37.  “Sanin sameru kaiken netsu.” 38.  Ibid. By comparison, only 72 percent of Ko¯mei legislators had opposed exercising the right of collective self-defense in a spring 2004 Mainichi poll. See Mainichi Shimbun, May 3, 2004 (morning edition): 1. 39.  See Yomiuri Shimbun, April 8, 2005 (morning edition): 14.

226

Notes to Pages 158–163

40.  Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2005 (morning edition): 1. 41.  “Poll: 66% Want Article 9 to Stay as Is,” Asahi Shimbun, May 5, 2008, retrieved on May 24, 2008, from: www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200805050052.html. 42.  “Hatoyama shi tero tokuso ho¯ hantai,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 31, 2007 (morning edition): 3. 43.  “Support Rate for Reshuff led Cabinet hits 33%,” Asahi Shimbun, August 30, 2007, retrieved on September 4, 2007, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/ TKY200708300068.html and Asahi Shimbun July 22, 2003 (morning edition): 4. 44.  “Ozawa Tells US Envoy He Won’t Budge,” Asahi Shimbun, August 9, 2007, retrieved on August 11, 2007, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/ TKY200708080047.html; and Masami Ito, “Ozawa Rejects Schieffer Antiterror Overture,” Japan Times, August 9, 2007, 2. 45.  Ibid. 46.  “Editorial: Fukuda’s Policy Speech,” Asahi Shimbun, October 3, 2007, retrieved on October 3, 2007, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200710030087.html. 47.  Shudanteki jieiken, kondankai no kaihai fukume kento¯ . . . Sanin yosanin de shusho¯,” Yomiuri Shimbun, October 16, 2007 (morning edition): 2. 48.  Author’s interview of August 8, 2007. See the discussion about lifting this ban in the next chapter. 49.  “Fukuda Officially Scraps Abe’s NSC Plan,” Daily Yomiuri Online, December 26, 2007, accessed December 26, 2007, from www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20071226 TDY01301.htm; and “Fukuda Scraps Abe’s Security Council Plan,” Asahi Shimbun, Decem­ ber 26, 2007, retrieved on December 26, 2007, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/ TKY200712260078.htm. 50.  “Fukuda Officially Scraps Abe’s NSC Plan.” 51.  “Kenpo¯ kaishaku kaezu—Jieitai haken rongi,” Asahi Shimbun, February 14, 2008 (international edition): 4. 52.  Author’s interview of August 8, 2007. 53.  “Minshu to shu¯sei kyo¯gi mosaku tairitsu iro,” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 7, 2007 (morning edition): 2; and “’Kokkai jizen sho¯nin,’ o kaiseian ni, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 7, 2007, 1. 54.  “Ozawa shi, Anpo de tairitsu shoku,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 8, 2007: 3. 55.  “Tero tokuso ho¯ hantai tsutaeru,” Asahi Shimbun, August 9, 2007 (morning edition): 4; “Seiken tanto¯ no¯ryoku ni gimonfu ga tsuita,” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 9, 2007 (morning edition): 3; “Ozawa tells U.S. Envoy He Won’t Budge,” Asahi.com, August 9, 2007, retrieved from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200708090383.html; and “Ozawa Rejects Schieffer Antiterror Overture,” Japan Times, August 9, 2007, as retrieved on August 9, 2007, from http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070809a1 .html. Technically, Ozawa’s claim that the Afghan invasion and overthrow of the Taliban regime was not U.N. mandated appears correct, as is his claim that the United Nations subsequently authorized the ISAF. UNSC resolution 1386 did call for the establishment of the (non–U.N.–led) International Security Force (ISAF) under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. See: UNSCR 1386, 20 December 2001 (S/RES/1386/021), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/NO170855 .pdf?OpenElement. 56.  “Cabinet OK’s Bill for Fresh Anti-Terror Law, Daily Yomiuri Online, October 18, 2007, as accessed October 20, 2007, at www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20071018 TDY01247.htm; and Asahi Shimbun, October 18, 2007 (morning edition): 1; Interna-



Notes to Pages 163–169

227

tional Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Strategic Survey 2006: The ISS Annual Review of World Affairs (London: Routledge, 2006): 357; Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post–9/11 World, 81; and Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan,” in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, eds., Strategic Asia 2002–3: Asian Aftershocks (Seattle: National Bureau for Asian Research, 2002): 104. 57.  “Japan Mustn’t Quit War on Terrorism,” Daily Yomiuri Online, October 18, 2007. 58.  Ozawa spelled out his position in “Ima koso kokusai anzenhosho¯ no gensoku kakuritsu o,” Sekai, November 2007, retrieved on December 4, 2007, from www.iwanami .co.jp/sekai/. 59.  Masami Ito, “Ozawa’s Afghan Gambit Rejected,” Japan Times, October 10, 2007, 2. 60.  “Minshuto: Refueling Must Have UN OK,” Asahi.com, July 7, 2007, retrieved on July 9, 2007, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200707070447.html. 61.  Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 12, 2007, 1. 62.  “Minshuto¯ to gaiko¯,” Asahi Shimbun, August 10, 2007 (morning edition): 3. 63.  “Support for Fukuda Cabinet Slides to 47%,” Asahi.com, October 16, 2007, as retrieved on October 17, 2007, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/ TKY200710170474.html. This same tendency to favor compromise over confrontation in the Diet repeated itself several months later, when an Asahi poll found 60 percent supporting the abolition of a gasoline surcharge, versus 27 percent who thought it should be maintained. Yet 55 percent of respondents also answered that they wanted the DPJ and LDP to compromise, versus 33 percent who wanted the two sides to stand by their positions (“Poll: 55% Want Compromise on Gas Tax,” Asahi.com, February 6, 2008, as retrieved on February 14, 2008, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/ TKY200802140437.html). 64.  Ibid. 65.  This NTV poll had 611 valid responses, producing a valid response rate of 54.5 percent; retrieved on October 17, 2007, from www.ntv.co.jp/yoron/200710/soku.html. 66.  Kyodo, “Support for Fukuda Sinks to 35% over Pensions,” The Japan Times, December 17, 2007, 1. 67.  “Cabinet Support Rate Plunges to 31%,” Asahi.com, December 22, 2007, as retrieved on December 23, 2007, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/ TKY200712230047.html. The Kyodo poll cited above had similar results. See “Support for Fukuda Sinks to 35% over Pensions.” 68.  “Support for Fukuda Sinks to 35% over Pensions.” 69.  This telephone poll was conducted January 12–14, 2008, with 1,043 voters contacted and a valid response rate of 55.2 percent; retrieved on January 19, 2008, from www.ntv.co.jp/yoron/200801/question.html. 70.  “Yoto¯ ‘giketsu de seiritsu’ shincho¯ ron,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 12, 2007 (international edition): 1; and “Fate of Antiterrorism Bill Uncertain,” Daily Yomiuri Online, October 19, 2007; retrieved on October 31, 2007, from www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/ editorial/20071019TDY04704.htm. Ko¯mei’s opposition to using the override provision later succumbed to a larger fear that Fukuda would call for an early lower house election if the bill was not passed, an election that Ko¯mei was not prepared for. 71.  See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this point. 72.  Author’s interview of August 7, 2007. 73.  Masahiko Ishizuka, “Japan–U.S. Alliance Fails to Put Public’s Concern at Ease,” The Nikkei Weekly, June 26, 2006, 28.

228

Notes to Pages 169–177

74.  Interview with a senior security expert in the LDP’s Policy Analysis and Research Council (PARC), December 10, 2003. Chapter 10 1.  For a sober review of less-than-successful attempts to determine the relationship between policy and public opinion by using quantitative methods alone, see Benjamin I. Page, “Democratic Responsiveness? Untangling the Links between Public Opinion and Policy,” PS: Political Science and Politics XXVII, no. 1 (March 1994): 25–29. 2.  For this view of Japanese society and state relations, see Sheldon Garon, Molding Japanese Minds (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). 3.  For one argument to this effect, see Tomohito Shinoda, “Becoming More Realistic in the Post–Cold War: Japan’s Changing Media and Public Opinion on National Security,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 2 (August 2007): 171–190. 4.  However, the attitude that strategically offensive military power lacks utility might not necessarily apply to the same extent to naval and air operations in the more neutral terrain of international waters and airspace where offense and defense are harder to distinguish. However, lessons about provoking others and the difficulty of controlling escalation would still probably apply in this realm as well. 5.  Akihiko Tanaka, “Beikoku, iraku kogeki no mittsu no shinario,” Chu¯ o¯ Ko¯ ron, vol. 117, no. 1 (October 2002): 52. 6.  Shin’ichi Kitaoka, “Aratamete toku ‘Jieitai Iraku haken’ no imi,” Chu¯¯o Ko¯ron, 119, no. 2 (February 2004): 110. 7.  Asahi Shimbun, March 25, 2004 (morning edition): 15. 8.  See Paul Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy,” Security Studies, 11, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 1–43; and Christopher P. Twomey, “Japan, a Circumscribed Balancer,” Security Studies 9, no. 4 (Summer 2000): 167–205. Michael Green’s finding of an emerging “reluctant realism” in Japan is also broadly consistent with defensive realism. See Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). 9.  Public opinion in the pre-1945 era did not have access to a competitive market place of ideas and often advocated aggressive policies that frequently did not produce the desired outcome. 10.  Many international relations scholars view the balance of military technology in the international system as usually being defense dominant. For the most comprehensive presentation of academic defensive realism’s contention that it is usually easier to defend than to attack and occupy, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). For an argument that the overseas projection of military power to prop up allies against domestic opponents usually fails, see Hilton L. Root, Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). 11.  Douglas H. Mendel Jr., “Japanese Views of Sato’s Foreign Policy: The Credibility Gap,” Asian Survey 7, no. 7 ( July 1967): 454 and footnote 14; and Mendel, “Japanese Views of the American Alliance in the Seventies,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 35, no. 4 (Winter 1971–1972): 535. For a discussion of the origins of this attitude and antimilitarist distrust by Mendel, and his personal involvement in the first “scientific” opinion survey in Japan, conducted with thousands of respondents in November and December 1945 by the U.S. occupation, see “Public Views of the Japanese Defense System,” in



Notes to Page 177

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James H. Buck, ed., The Modern Japanese Military System (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1975): 151–154, and footnote 10. 12.  See Yasuo Takao, Is Japan Really Remilitarizing? The Politics of Norm Formation and Change (Victoria, Australia: Monash University Press, 2008): 53–54; Harayuki Wada, “Sengo nihon heiwashugi no genten,” Shiso¯ , no. 944 (2002), p. 11; Akira Nakamura, – Sengo seiji ni yureta kenpo¯ kyu¯jo¯ (Tokyo: Chu ¯ o¯ Keizaisha): 62; and Hideo O take, Sengo nihon bo¯ ei mondai shiryoshu (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1991): 149. 13.  Takao, Is Japan Really Remilitarizing? 53–54. 14.  This assumption holds true even if one agrees with constructivists that anarchy is more of a social than a material construction. See Samuel J. Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” International Studies Quarterly 38 (2003): 325–342. 15.  The relative weight of these elements will vary, based on national experience. 16.  For such claims, see Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); and Miroslav Nincic, “A Sensible Public: New Perspective on Popular Opinion and Foreign Policy,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 4 (December 1992): 772–789. 17.  Public opinion in Japan has in some ways been very unliberal, if not downright realist, in how it perceives foreign threats. For example, a 1995 Yomiuri Shimbun poll found that the United States was the second most identified military threat to Japan, behind only North Korea (albeit by a large margin) but ahead of China. See “Ajia 7 ka koku yoron cho¯sa,” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 23, 1995 (morning edition): 12. In some polls in the 1960s and 1970s the United States similarly finished as a highly ranked military threat, well behind the Soviet Union but nonetheless ahead of China. See John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System (London: The Athlone Press, 1988): 417–418. This pattern suggests that at least part of the Japanese public might be evaluating potential threats based on military capabilities (consistent with balance-of-power realism), rather than based on shared liberal democratic values or formal alignment. The Yomiuri poll previously cited found a similar pattern in South Korea, with liberal democratic Japan and the United States ranked by more respondents as military threats than Communist China. In Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, the United States finished first as the most often cited potential military threat. Regarding the South Korean public’s threat perceptions and how these challenge the liberal democratic peace, see Paul Midford, “Challenging the Democratic Peace? Historical Memory and the Security Relationship between Japan and South Korea,” Pacific Focus 23, no. 2 ( July 2008): 189–211. 18.  Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 6th edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Knopf, 1985): 168. Nincic, summarizing his understanding of the realist view, notes “ignorant of the hard realities of an anarchic world dominated by power struggles, the public is likely to be driven by naïve moralism and uninformed emotion.” Although challenging realism in other ways and claiming that public opinion is coherent and stable, Nincic nonetheless appears to uncritically accept this contention of realist elitists such as Morgenthau that public opinion is “ignorant” of the hard realities of anarchy (Nincic, “A Sensible Public,” 773). Also see Douglas C. Foyle, “The Inf luence of Public Opinion on American Foreign Policy Decision Making: Context, Beliefs, and Process,” PhD dissertation, Duke University, 1996, 142; and Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since Vietnam: Constraining the Collossus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 11.

230

Notes to Pages 178–181

19.  Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). Despite arguing that domestic politics affects the grand strategies of states, Schweller is also essentially neutral regarding the inf luence of public opinion on policy. See Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 20.  Mark Holstein, “Japan’s Insider and Outsider Media Discourse about the SDF Dispatch to Iraq,” in Robert Eldridge and Paul Midford, eds., Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 91–124, at 120. 21.  Shinoda, “Becoming More Realistic in the Post–Cold War.” 22.  As suggested in Chapter 9, Abe’s linking of constitutional reform with changing Article 9 and deploying the SDF overseas for combat missions, a link also strongly suggested by the GSDF’s Iraq deployment, not only stimulated entrapment fears but caused the public to view constitutional revision through the prism of its long-term skepticism about the use of military force overseas. 23.  Ikuo Kabashima and Gill Steel, “How Jun’ichiro¯ Koizumi Seized the Leadership of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (April 2007): 95–114. 24.  See James T. Hamilton, “News That Sells: Media Competition and News Content,” and Masaki Taniguchi, “Changing Media, Changing Politics in Japan,” both in Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (April 2007): 7–42 and 147–166. 25.  Matthew A. Baum, “Soft News and Foreign Policy: How Expanding the Audience Changes the Policies,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (April 2007): 115–146. 26.  See Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peff ley, “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model,” American Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (December 1987): 1099–1119, at 1114. Also see Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since Vietnam, 14. 27.  Susan L. Shirk, “Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (April 2007), 43–70, at 43. For a more general non–China-specific argument along the same lines, see, in the same volume, Samuel L. Popkin, “Changing Media and Changing Political Organization: Delegation, Representation and News,” 71–94. 28.  For a discussion of China’s Internet policies see Adam Segal, “Globalization as a Double Edged Sword: Globalization and Chinese National Security,” in Jonathan Kirsh­ ner, ed., Globalization and National Security (New York: Routledge, 2006): 293–230. 29.  Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). Also see Paul Midford, “Listening to Chinese Nationalism,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (2007): 159–161. Although the CCP has sometimes been able to suppress nationalist demonstrations, such as those planned in response to Japanese rightists’ landings on the disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands, they were not able to prevent the inward f low of information that provoked these would-be demonstrators. See Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyutai Islands,” International Security 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998/1999): 114–146. 30.  “Su-dan e jieitai haken Fukuda shusho¯, Ban Kokuren jimusho¯cho¯ ni seishiki hyo¯mei,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 1, 2008 (morning edition): 2; Kyodo, “GSDF Officers Help UN rebuild Sudan,” Japan Times, September 28, 2008, 2; and Kyodo, “UN Looks for Japan to Send Mine-Removal Troops to Sudan,” Japan Times, April 3, 2008, 3.



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231

31.  This perspective emerged from the author’s many discussions about Japanese foreign policy with Christopher W. Hughes. On this perspective generally, see Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Reemergence as a “Normal” Military Power, Adelphi Paper 368-9 (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004); and Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2009). I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of the importance of this counterargument. 32.  Regarding reckless overexpansion, see Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); normal expansion, Fareed Zakharia, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); and adjustment to decline, see Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) and discussion in Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 6–7, quotation at 6. 33.  Schweller, Unanswered Threats, quotation at 6; discussion of domestic variables at 11–15, 127–129. 34.  Although not focusing on the inf luence of public opinion, many recent studies emphasize that Japan’s postwar grand strategy has been far from suboptimal. See for example Jennifer Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 92–121; Twomey, “Japan, a Circumscribed Balancer”; and the author’s own work, “Japan: Balancing between a Hegemon and a Would-Be Hegemon,” in Marie Soderberg and Patricia A. Nelson, eds., Japan’s Politics and Economy: Perspectives on change (New York: Routledge, 2009): 46–68. For an argument that Japan’s grand strategy is a model for other states in terms of balancing military and technoeconomic threats, see Richard Samuels and Eric Heginbotham, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” International Security 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 171–203. 35.  See Chapter 3. 36.  One could argue that Japanese public opinion is actually encouraging Japanese “free riding” or “buck passing” of U.S. security efforts rather than avoiding entrapment. However, free riding and buck passing characterizations would assume that these wars were in Japan’s national interest, a debatable point. Whether considered cases of avoiding entrapment or free riding/buck passing, none of these characterizations necessarily imply suboptimal balancing. Regarding the rationality, under some circumstances, of strategies such as buck passing, hiding, distancing, appeasement, and engagement, see Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 7, 10. 37.  Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Vintage, 2004): 1. Also see Wilhelm Vosse, “Are Americans from Mars and Japanese from Venus? New Approaches in Explaining Different Public Attitudes towards Foreign Policy in Japan and the United States,” Journal of Social Sciences, Special CoE Edition, No 16 (2006): 305–330. American allies, such as Israel, that face a clear existential threat are the exception to this generalization. 38.  Sheila Smith, “The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the US–Japan Alliance,” in Michael J. Green and Patrick Cronin, eds., US–Japan Security Relations: Past, Present and Future (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999): 69–93; and Green, “The Challenges of Managing U.S.–Japan Security Relations after the Cold War,” in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., New Perspectives on U.S.–Japan Relations (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000): 246. Regarding Japanese negotiators’ strenuous efforts to fend off U.S. demands for a “ joint command” clause subordinating the

232

Notes to Pages 183–185

SDF to a U.S. commander in wartime during negotiations for the 1952 administrative agreement that followed the 1951 Security Treaty, see Eiji Takemae, The Allied Occupation of Japan (New York: Continuum, 2003): 506. 39.  Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30, no. 3 ( January 1978): 167–214. 40.  This idea stems from balance of threat theory, an important strand of defensive realism. See Stephan Walt, Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 41.  Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy.” 42.  As discussed in Chapter 3, pacifist elites in the Socialist Party famously advocated unarmed neutrality. However, there was little support for an unarmed Japan among the mass public, including many socialist supporters. 43.  While the security dilemma is one element of the deterrence versus reassurance dilemma, the deterrence versus reassurance dilemma is broader because it factors in mutual perceptions about intentions as well as capabilities. Also, the security dilemma does not include the trade-offs between sending deterrence versus reassurance signals or the possibility of deterrence failure, only spirals of tension leading to war. 44.  Arnold Wolfers points to this dilemma when he notes that “one can think of nations lined up between the two poles of maximum and minimum ‘attack propensity.’ . . . While security in respect to the first group can come exclusively as a result of ‘positions of strength’ sufficient to deter or defeat attack, nothing could do more to undermine security in respect to the second group than to start accumulating power of a kind that would provoke fear and counter-measures. Unfortunately, it can never be known with certainty, in practice, what position within the continuum one’s opponent actually occupies. . . . Security policy must seek to bring opponents to occupy a position as close to the second pole as conditions and capabilities permit.” See Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962): 160. However, if the state has revisionist aims, then the deterrence versus reassurance dilemma does not apply, although the state may face the quandary of how to lull others while preparing for aggression. For the claim that all great powers are, at their core, revisionist, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Chicago: W. W. Norton, 2001): 29–32. 45.  For a view that emphasizes the importance of geography and other factors in minimizing the security dilemma in East Asia, see Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 81–118. 46.  The Bush administration’s often-repeated claim that it is easier to prevent terrorist attacks by eliminating their bases in Afghanistan and elsewhere than to defend the homeland through port and border security measures is nothing less than a claim that the war on terrorism is (or was) an offense-dominant war where it is easier to attack than defend. 47.  For comparison, when facing a military threat from Nazi Germany in the late 1930s, insular England abandoned an offensive doctrine focusing on bombing Germany in favor of investing in defensive air power, which proved decisive during the battle of Britain. See Barry S. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), chapter 5. 48.  Although Japan is not a great power militarily, it has huge military potential in the form of its high-quality industrial base and strengths in strategic technologies such as space and nuclear technology. U.S. reliance on Japan for aspects of missile defense development is indicative of the strategic significance of Japanese technology. Regard-



Notes to Pages 185–187

233

ing Japan’s achievement of a strategically significant technological level already by the 1990s, see Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). If the United States were to lose access to these technoeconomic resources and China to gain access, the result would be a large, possibly unipole-ending, shift away from the United States in the global balance of power. 49.  Kiichi Fujiwara, “Gaiko¯ ha yoron ni shitagau beki ka—Minshushugi no seishuku to taigai seisaku,” Ronza, (March 2008), as retrieved on February 2, 2010, from http:// publications.asahi.com/ecs/detail/?item_id=9066. 50.  Shinoda, “Becoming More Realistic in the Post–Cold War.” 51.  Regarding these two conceptions of representation, and the intermediate models of “executors” and “pragmatists,” see Foyle, “The Inf luence of Public Opinion on American Foreign Policy Decision Making,” 145, as cited by Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since Vietnam, 11–12. 52.  This paragraph is inspired by Norman R. Luttbeg’s observation that “leaders should seek to educate the public” but “then be responsive.” See Luttbeg, “The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Preferences, by Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, Book Review,” The Journal of Politics 55, no. 2 (May 1993): 518–519. 53.  Bo¯ ei Handobukku 2007 (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 2007): 818. 54.  Michiyo Nakamoto, “Japan Plans to Speed Up Anti-Missile Programme,” Financial Times, October 26, 2006: 1; and “SDF Plans PAC-3 Redeployment Drills,” Daily Yomiuri, November 25, 2007, as retrieved on May 24, 2008, from www.yomiuri.co.jp/ dy/national/20080522TDY01474.htm; “Diet Enacts Law on Use of Space for Defense,” The Japan Times, May 22, 2008, 2; and Kakumi Kobayashi, “New Space Policy Result of Regional Tensions,” The Japan Times, May 22, 2008, 2. 55.  Of the respondents, 9.3 percent answered that they did not know or gave no answer in this Nippon TV poll conducted April 3–5, 2009. See www.ntv.co.jp/yoron/200904/ index.html, as retrieved on February 4, 2010. 56.  “Diet Enacts Law on Use of Space for Defense”; and Kobayashi, “New Space Policy Result of Regional Tensions.” Regarding the lead-up to enacting the legislation, see “Coalition to Submit Space-Defense Bill,” Asahi Shimbun, June 7, 2007, as retrieved from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200707070987.html; Jiyu¯ minshuto¯ seimu cho¯sakai, “Uchyu¯ kaihatsu tokubetsu iinkai, aratana uchyu¯ kaihatsu riyo¯ seido no ko¯chiku ni mukete: Heiwa kokka Nihon toshite no uchyu¯ seisaku (An)” ( Jiminto¯ honbu: Tokyo, September 2006): 12–13; and Steven Berner, Japan’s Space Program, A Fork in the Road (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, National Security Research Division, 2005): 4–37. The United States has been on record opposing Japan’s acquisition of spy satellites since the late 1990s, calling this an unnecessary expenditure because Japanese satellites would be redundant vis-a-vis U.S. reconnaissance satellites. Regarding Japan’s procurement of reconnaissance satellites in the late 1990s and U.S. reactions, see Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008): 136, 145. 57.  Regarding the disruptive effects of historical memory disputes on Japan’s relations with its neighbors, see Thomas U. Berger, “The Construction of Antagonism: The History Problem in Japan’s Foreign Relations,” in G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.–Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 63–84; and Marc Gallichio, ed., The Unpredictability of the Past: Memories of the Asia–Pacific War in U.S.–East Asian Relations (Durham,

234

Notes to Pages 187–190

NC: Duke University Press, 2007). Regarding how these historical memory disputes impact Japan’s grand strategy, see Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy.” 58.  Masahiko Ishizuka, “Japan–U.S. Alliance Fails to Put Public’s Concern at Ease,” The Nikkei Weekly, June 26, 2006, 28. 59.  I originally made this prediction in 2006 in an earlier study. See Paul Midford, Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism: Implications for Japan’s Security Strategy, Policy Study #27 (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2006): 50–51. 60.  John Mueller, “The Iraq Syndrome,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2003), as retrieved on February 2, 2008, from www.foreignaffairs.org/20051101faessay84605/ john-mueller/the-iraq-synd. 61.  See “Abe to Establish Panel on Collective Self-Defense,” Asahi Shimbun, April 6, 2007; “Shudanteki jieiken-Jimin tokumeii ga aki medo ni seifu ni teigen,” Asahi Shimbun, April 27, 2007 (morning edition): 2; Naotaka Fujita and Hitoshi Kujiraoka, “Collective Self-Defense Panel to Study 4 Scenarios,” Asahi Shimbun, April 28, 2007, as retrieved on May 1, 2007, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/ TKY200705010047.html. For a useful historical overview of the collective self-defense debate, see Boyd and Samuels, Nine Lives? 62.  Kyodo, “Aso Backtracks on Collective Defense: Shuns Earlier Wish to Reinterpret Constitution to Exercise Right to Come to Aid of Allies,” Japan Times, November 5, 2008, 2; Kyodo, “Aso Wary of Afghan Deployment,” The Japan Times, October 29, 2009, as retrieved on November 6, 2009, from http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ nn20081029b3.html. Aso¯ cited the LDP’s defeat in the 2007 upper house election as the reason for his reversal (“9 jyo¯ ha, sonzaiken wa kenpo¯ rongi, hatarakanu seiji,” Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2009, as retrieved on May 4, 2009, from www.asahi.com/politics/ update/0502/TKY200905020193.html). 63.  “New Report Calls for Japan Alliance to Remain at Core of U.S. Asia Policy,” The Japan Times, February 18, 2007, 2. For the actual report, see Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, The U.S.–Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020 (Washington, DC: CSIS, February 2007): 18–19, as retrieved on February 2, 2008, from www.csis.org/ component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3729/type,1/. Although the Japanese press presented this as a “new Armitage report,” it could also be seen as a “new Nye report” or more accurately as a bipartisan “Armitage-Nye” report. 64.  Masami Ito, “SDF Engineers Get Haiti Marching Orders,” Japan Times, February 6, 2010, as retrieved on February 15, 2010, from http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ nn20100206a2.html. 65.  “MSDF Begins Escort Work off Oman,” Daily Yomiuri Online, March 31, 2009, as retrieved on April 1, 2009, from www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20090331TDY01303 .htm; and Kyodo, “MSDF May Divert Oiler to Somalia Task Force,” The Japan Times, February 25, 2009, as retrieved on February 26, 2009, from http://search.japantimes .co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090225a2.html. 66.  China, Russia, India, Iran, and other non–U.S. allies actively participate (“China Antipiracy Move Leaves Japan All at Sea,” Daily Yomiuri Online, December 22, 2008, as retrieved on February 4, 2010, from www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/ national/20081222TDY02305.htm). 67.  Japan’s dispatch of P-3C maritime patrol planes has allowed Japan to play a large role in gathering information on pirate activities that it passes on to other participating navies to act on. Japan has not so far used force against pirates, and the P-3Cs could even



Notes to Page 190

235

be used to help ensure that this does not happen by helping MSDF vessels steer clear of pirate ships. During the first six months of the P-3C deployment, their most significant achievement was passing on information to an Australian naval vessel that then seized weapons from a suspected pirate ship. See Kyodo, “MSDF Patrol Planes Return after Anti-Piracy Mission,” The Japan Times, October 13, 2009, as retrieved on February 4, 2010, from http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091013a7.html. Also see “2 More MSDF Destroyers to Leave for Somalia,” The Daily Yomiuri Online, July 6, 2009, as retrieved on July 6, 2009, from www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20090706TDY02308.htm. 68.  According to an NTV poll conducted in April 2009, a large plurality, 49.7 percent of Japanese, supported the initial decision to send MSDF destroyers to international waters near Somalia, versus 35.4 percent who opposed and 14.9 percent who did not know or gave no answer. Retrieved on February 4, 2010, from www.ntv.co.jp/ yoron/200902/index.html. 69.  Although the LDP was out of power from August 1993 until June 1994, this ref lected less the decision of voters during the July 1993 lower house election than the split of the LDP before this election; the LDP actually achieved a modest gain of seats. 70.  The DPJ won 308 out of 480 seats. Regarding the elections results, see www2.asahi .com/senkyo2009/. 71.  However, the LDP’s effective abandonment of its drive for constitutional reform, including amending Article 9 to allow SDF participation in overseas combat, appears to have caused support for constitutional reform to rebound somewhat (“52% Support Revision of Constitution,” Daily Yomiuri Online, April 3, 2009, as retrieved on April 8, 2009, from www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20090403TDY01305.htm). The withdrawal of the ASDF from Iraq in early 2009 and the scaling back of the MSDF Indian Ocean refueling mission for the United States appears to have reduced the fear of entrapment in U.S. wars, suggesting the Iraq syndrome among the Japanese public might be beginning to wane. The withdrawal of the MSDF Indian Ocean refueling mission in early 2010 may cause this syndrome to wane further. 72.  “Japan Ends Anti-Terror Refueling Mission in Indian Ocean,” January 15, 2010, Asahi.com, as retrieved on January 15, 2010, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/ TKY201001150321.html; and “Indoyou hokyuu shien, saigo no butai ga kikoku,” Asahi Shimbun, February 6, 2010, retrieved on February 8, 2010, from www.asahi.com/politics/ update/0206/TKY201002060162.html. Yomiuri Shimbun, a vocal opponent of withdrawing the MSDF, proposed the bizarre idea that China might replace the Japan as the f loating gas station refueling U.S. warships in the Indian Ocean (“China May Take Over Refueling,” Daily Yomiuri Online, January 17, 2010, retrieved on February 2, 2010, from www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T100116003101.htm). Despite being highly implausible, this idea appears to ref lect (or attempt to play on) general Japanese anxiety about being overtaken by China. 73.  “No Decision on Futenma This Year,” Asahi.com, December 4, 2009, as retrieved on December 6, 2009, from www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200912040158. html; and Shinichi Murao, “Hatoyama’s Futenma Stance Shaking Japan–US alliance,” Daily Yomiuri, December 9, 2009, retrieved on December 9, 2009, from www.yomiuri .co.jp/dy/national/20091209TDY02307.htm. Even a poll in the conservative leaning Yomiuri Shimbun found 60 percent of the Japanese public favoring “modest” or “major” changes to the Henoko base relocation plan. See Yomiuri Shimbun, December 7, 2009, as accessed December 9, 2009, at www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20091206-OYT1T01071.htm.

236

Notes to Pages 190–192

74.  Regarding this phrase, see the Democratic Party of Japan, Manifesto: Detailed Policies: The Democratic Party of Japan’s Platform for Government: 28, retrieved on February 2, 2010, from www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2009.pdf. For DPJ leaders, a more “equal” alliance appears to mean an alliance where Japan has the ability to say no to U.S. demands when this is judged to be in Japan’s national interest. For a view that the DPJ leadership wants to reduce the U.S. military presence in Japan as part of building a more “equal” alliance, see Mariko Yasumoto, “DPJ Plan to Cut U.S. Forces Said behind Futenma Delay,” Japan Times, December 6, 2009, 1. 75.  “The Hatoyama Drift,” The Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2010, as retrieved on February 2010, from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703906204575026 650304205766.html. 76.  See Yomiuri Shimbun, December 7, 2009, as retrieved on December 9, 2009, from www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20091206-OYT1T01071.htm. Making the same point is Axel Berkofsky, “Okinawa Call to Shape New US–Japan Era,” AsiaTimes Online, February 6, 2010, as retrieved on February 6, 2010, from www.atimes.com/atimes/ Japan/LB06Dh01.html.

Index

abandonment, fear of, 56, 128, 129, 131, 177, 199n32 Abe Shinzo¯, 12, 25, 38, 143, 146–54, 171, 224n5; and Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, 148, 149, 152; and collective self-defense, 146–47, 148, 151, 160, 168, 188, 204n17; and constitutional reform, 5, 24, 147, 148, 151, 153–54, 155–56, 157, 160, 163, 164, 168, 190, 196n21, 204n17, 230n22; vs. Fukuda, 5, 159–60, 161, 163, 190; inf luence of public opinion on, 7–8, 19, 148–50, 151–52, 157, 180, 190, 196n21, 204n17; Iraq War policies, 148, 152, 230n22; and MSDF Indian Ocean mission, 148, 159, 161–62; and National Security Council, 148, 160, 161; and upper house election of 2007, 153–56 Aegis dispatch controversy, 23, 117–21, 219n19 Afghanistan: ISAF, 163–64, 168, 226n55; Japanese public opinion regarding war in, 16, 32, 34, 35–36, 44, 110, 112–14, 121–22, 123–24, 126, 127, 171, 174, 175, 183, 185, 189, 200n40; Soviet invasion of, 174; U.S. invasion of, 16, 23, 43, 44, 110, 112–14, 117, 119, 120, 121–22, 123, 126, 127, 162, 174, 226n55, 232n46. See also Indian Ocean, Japanese deployment to Almond, Gabriel: The American People and Foreign Policy, 196n2

Almond Lippmann consensus, 3 antimilitarism. See Japanese public attitudes, antimilitarism Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, 27, 168, 218n14, 219nn16,17,27; and Abe, 148, 149, 152; and Fukuda, 162–63, 164–65, 166–67; and Koizumi, 114–17, 132 Armitage report of 2000, 5, 194n6 Armitage report of 2007, 5, 189, 196n20, 234n63 Asahi.com, 226n55, 235nn72,73 Asahi Daily News, 221n25 Asahi Shimbun: editorials and articles, 156, 164, 202n62, 204n5, 205nn22,26,28, 211n13, 212nn15,26, 213n1, 218n11, 220nn31–34,37,1, 221nn9,26, 224nn10,11, 225nn23,28,33–35,37, 226nn44,51,55,56, 227n60, 233n56, 234nn61,62, 235n72; polls by, 25, 34, 35, 37, 42, 43–44, 46, 52, 53, 54–56, 57, 58–59, 60, 61, 71, 73, 74, 76–77, 80, 81, 83–84, 88, 89–90, 92–93, 95–98, 99–100, 103–4, 115, 116–17, 121, 122, 128, 129, 132–33, 134, 135–36, 137–38, 144, 150, 151–52, 153, 156–57, 158, 159, 164, 165, 166, 206n14, 207n18, 212n19, 215nn17,29, 216nn35–38,41,47, 219n17, 221n10, 223n46, 227n63 Asahi Shukan polls, 53 Asakura Takuya, 220n42 ASDF (Air Self-Defense Forces): dispatch plan during first Gulf War, 68, 75–79, 81,

238

index

ASDF (continued) 86, 102; Iraq mission, 1, 5, 141–44, 148, 149–50, 151–52, 162, 164, 168, 181, 186, 235n71; Komatsu base, 105, 217n63 Aso¯ Taro¯, 5, 38, 150, 186, 188, 190 Australia: during Vietnam War, 50 AWACS early warning planes, 117–18, 120–21, 123 Ballentine, Karen, 197n10 Barkin, Samuel J., 229n14 Baum, Matthew, 179 Belkin, Aaron: Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics, 203n78 Bennett, Stephen Earl, 196n2 Berger, Thomas U., 194n10, 195n14, 199n33, 200n44, 201n55, 207n20, 212n29, 233n57 Berkofsky, Axel, 236n76 Berner, Steven: Japan’s Space Program, 233n56 Blair, Tony, 23 Bloch-Elkon, Yaeli, 197n10 Blustein, Paul, 216nn43,46 Bobrow, Davis, 25, 26, 62, 195n15 Bowman, Karlyn H.: Public Opinion in America and Japan, 195n15, 208n32 Boyd, J. Patrick: Nine Lives? 223nn47,50, 234n61 Brady, Henry E., 203n77 Brooke, James, 204n5 Brown, Eugene, 211n6 Bungei Shunju¯, 212n26 Burton, Sandra, 195n12 Bush, George W., 130, 144, 150, 197n5, 217n68, 220nn5,6, 224n14; administration, 1, 2, 33, 141, 151, 181, 185, 194n6, 204n6, 217n68, 232n46; allies, 127 Butei Shinju, 195n12 Cabinet Legislative Bureau, 62 Cambodia: Japanese peacekeeping deployment to, 39, 82, 93, 95–102, 108, 125, 136, 140, 144, 216n45; killing of Japanese police officer in, 98–99, 100, 216n45 Canada: public opinion regarding Iraq war in, 34, 127 CBS/NYT/TBS polls, 217n61 Central Research Services polls, 42, 58 Cheney, Dick, 5, 185; on foreign policy and public opinion polls, 10, 197n5 Chicago Council on Global Affairs polls, 4

China: Communist Party (CCP), 179, 230n29; Internet policies in, 179, 230n28; Japanese public opinion regarding, 16, 17–18, 54, 60, 186, 207nn18,19, 229n17, 235n72; nationalism in, 179, 230n29; relations with Japan, 30, 56, 185, 233n48 Choi, Su-Yung, 194n12 Christensen, Thomas, 195n12 Clinton, Bill, 103 coherence of public opinion, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 12, 75, 171, 172, 180 Cold War: Japanese public opinion during, 6, 14–18, 26–27, 41, 42, 48, 49–67, 173, 174–75, 180, 182–83, 184, 206nn14,15 collective self-defense, 157, 160–61, 163–64, 225n38; and Abe, 146–47, 148, 151, 160, 168, 188, 204n17; and Koizumi, 123, 163, 188 consensus democracy norms, 25–26, 119, 202n65 Constitution of Japan, 76, 199n30; Article 9, 5, 24, 52, 64, 79, 135, 141, 146, 147, 154, 156–57, 158, 181, 230n22, 235n71; Article 11, 206n11; Article 12, 206n11; and collective self-defense, 123, 146–47, 148, 151, 157, 160–61, 163–64, 168, 188, 225n38; constitutional reform, 19, 24, 43, 146, 147, 148, 151, 153–54, 155–58, 160–61, 163–64, 168, 178, 181, 188, 190, 196n21, 204n17, 230n22, 235n71; override of upper house by lower house provision, 5, 155, 167, 188, 202n60, 227n70; preamble, 135 Converse, Philip E., 9 Cossa, Ralph A., 194n6 cross-party consensus building, 26 Crozier, Michael: The Crisis of Democracy, 196n2 cruise missiles, 33, 38 Daily Yomiuri, 205n29, 223nn48,51,53, 233n54, 235n72 Daily Yomiuri Online, 226n56, 234n65, 235n67 Darfur, 152–53 DeCanio, Samuel, 196n2 defense spending, 6, 66–67, 210n72 defensive defense posture (senshu bo¯ ei), 1 defensive liberals. See interventionist vs. noninterventionist liberals Delfs, Robert, 215n23 democracy: consensus democracy norms, 25–26, 119, 202n65; in Japan, 4, 7,



index

25–26, 51, 64, 177, 185, 209n62, 229n17; promotion by military force, 10, 13, 17, 20, 30, 32, 33–34, 47, 48, 126, 175, 204n6; views of Japanese elites regarding, 51, 64, 209n62 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 23, 26, 38, 166, 180, 186, 227n63, 236n74; and Aegis dispatch controversy, 119, 120; and Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, 115, 116; and constitutional reform, 156, 157; and Iraq War, 131, 132–34; and lower house election of 2009, 8, 190, 202nn58,60, 235n70; and MSDF Indian Ocean mission, 159, 161–62, 164–65, 167, 188, 219n27; and upper house, 121, 139, 154–55, 157, 159, 161, 167, 190, 202n60, 223n46; and upper house election of 2004, 139, 190, 223n46; and upper house election of 2007, 154–55, 159, 161 Democratic Socialist Party (DSP): and MSDF minesweeper dispatch, 79; and PKO bill of 1991, 82, 83, 87–88, 90, 91; and PKO bill of 1992, 92, 93; and UNPCC bill, 72 demonstration effects, 6, 14, 18–19, 80, 101, 172, 174, 178 Diaoyutai islands. See Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands Diet: and consensus democracy norms, 25–26, 119; Emergency Legal Framework bill, 24, 106, 119, 217n66, 219n30; and inf luence of public opinion, 24–25, 130, 180–81; and majoritarian rule, 25–26, 51; PKO bill of 1991, 27, 82–91, 215n22; PKO bill of 1992, 27, 43, 91–95, 102, 107–8, 114, 134, 218n14; and three nonnuclear principles, 38; U.N. Peace Cooperation Corps (UNPCC) bill, 27, 68, 69–75, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 85, 87, 88, 114–15, 211n4, 212n27, 214n8. See also lower house; upper house dikes model, 11, 171 diplomacy: and Fukuda Doctrine, 1, 193n2; Japanese public opinion regarding, 34, 35, 61, 73, 84, 112–13, 129 Doi Takako, 70 Downs, Erica Strecker, 230n29 DPJ. See Democratic Party of Japan ease of conquest, 20, 201n52 East Timor: Japanese deployment to, 39

239

economic conditions: in Japan, 4, 29, 31, 111, 114, 118, 134, 153, 155, 156, 167, 190, 200n43; Japanese public opinion regarding foreign economic development, 17–18, 34, 61, 175 Eggen, Dan, 197n5 elections: 1969 lower house, 66; 1989 upper house, 66; 1992 upper house, 95; 1993 lower house, 235n69; 2003 lower house, 134; 2004 upper house, 27, 139, 140, 190, 223n46; 2005 lower house, 22, 140, 153, 155; 2007 upper house, 5, 24, 25, 149, 150, 152, 153–56, 157, 160, 167, 190; 2009 lower house, 8, 190, 202nn58,60, 235n70 elitists, 3, 196n2, 197n6; and guardian model of representation, 10, 12, 185; in Japan, 11–12, 89, 98; vs. pluralists, 6, 9–12, 176, 199n24 Emergency Legal Framework bill, 24, 106, 119, 217n66, 219n10 Emmerson, John, 64 entrapment in U.S. wars: Japanese public attitudes regarding, 6, 15, 28, 41–43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54–56, 67, 76–77, 103–4, 113, 125, 129, 146, 147, 148, 173, 178, 181, 182, 183, 187, 199n33, 205nn25,26, 207n20, 230n22, 231n36, 235n71; pacifism vs. fear of, 41, 56, 76–77, 182, 183 Faiola, Anthony, 194n8 Feldman, Stuart, 213n40 financial contributions, Japanese: during first Gulf War, 69, 76–77, 107, 111, 114, 217n68; Japanese public opinion regarding, 76–77, 93, 94–95, 107, 111, 112, 113–14, 130 Foyle, Douglas C., 197n7, 198n17, 229n18, 233n51 France: attitudes regarding United States in, 45; vs. Japan, 194n10; public opinion regarding Iraq war in, 34–35, 127 Friedberg, Aaron: The Weary Titan, 231n32 Fujii Tatsuya, 216n36 Fuji-Sankei Communications Group polls, 80 Fujita Naotaka, 234n61 Fujiwara Kiichi, 64, 198n20, 233n49 Fukuda Takeo, 72, 74; Fukuda Doctrine, 1, 193n2 Fukuda Yasuo, 159–67; vs. Abe, 5, 159–60, 161, 163, 190; and Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, 162–63, 164–65,

240

index

Fukuda Yasuo (continued) 166–67; as Chief Cabinet Secretary, 120, 130; and constitutional reform, 163–64, 188; and MSDF Indian Ocean deployment, 161–67, 169, 227n70 Funabashi Shigeyuki, 207n20 Funabashi Yo¯ichi, 16 Funada Hajime, 89 Gallichio, Marc: The Unpredictability of the Past, 233n57 Garon, Sheldon: Molding Japanese Minds, 198n22, 228n2 Gaubatz, Kurt, 23 Ginsberg, Benjamin: The Captive Public, 197n6 Global Market Insite (GMI) polls, 45–48 Glosserman, Brad, 194n6 Golan Heights: Japanese deployment to, 82, 108 Goto¯da Masaharu, 70, 72, 74–75, 211nn7,8, 212n29 Goto¯ Masao, 91 Goto¯ Shinkichi, 205n26, 207n20 Graber, Doris A., 197n8 graduated reciprocation in tension reduction (GRIT), 200n47 Green, Michael, 200n45, 231n38; Arming Japan, 233n48; Japan’s Reluctant Realism, 228n8; on realism in Japan, 1–2, 16; Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness, 218n8; The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century, 216n58 Gries, Peter Hays, 179 GSDF (Ground Self-Defense Forces): Cambodia mission, 39, 82, 93, 95–102, 108, 125, 136, 140, 144, 216n45; Iraq mission, 5, 39, 99, 134, 136–45, 146, 175, 181, 186, 223n52, 230n22 guardian model of representation, 10, 12, 185 Gulf War, first: ASDF dispatch plan during, 68, 75–79, 81, 86, 102; and Japanese public opinion, 6, 7, 19, 30, 42–43, 67, 68–81, 85–86, 88, 99, 107, 111, 171, 175, 181, 183, 214n8; MSDF minesweeper dispatch after, 68, 79–81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 99, 175, 178, 214nn4,11; U.N. Peace Cooperation Corps (UNPCC) bill during, 27, 68, 69–75, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 85, 87, 88, 114–15, 211n4, 212n27, 214n8 Haiti: Japanese deployment to, 189 Hamayotsu Toshiko, 140

Hamilton, James T., 230n24 Harada Yoshiaki, 33, 160, 161 Hardin, Russell, 196n2 Hashimoto Ryu¯ taro ¯ , 103 Hatoyama Yukio, 189, 190–91 Havens, Thomas, 62, 64, 209n57; Fire across the Sea, 207n27, 208nn48,49, 209n58 Heginbotham, Eric, 219n19, 227n56, 231n34 Heinrich, William, Jr., 78, 79; “Seeking an Honored Place,” 208nn47,51, 212n30, 213nn32,37,40–42,47,2, 214n8 Helman, Donald: Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics, 198n22 Herzog, Peter J.: Japan’s Pseudo-Democracy, 202n58 Hinckley, Ronald H.: People, Polls, and Policymakers, 198n16 Holstein, Mark, 178 Holsti, Ole: “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” 197n8; on public opinion and policy, 4, 9, 28 Hook, Glenn, 66, 214n8; Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan, 195n14, 198n22, 208n50, 209n54, 211nn5,8, 212n15, 213nn31,47,48,2, 214n8 Hughes, Christopher, 1, 218n14, 219n16, 222n36; Japan’s Re-emergence as a “Normal” Military Power, 222nn38,42, 223n48, 231n31; Japan’s Remilitarisation, 204n14 Huntington, Samuel P.: The Crisis of Democracy, 196n2 Hurwitz, Jon: “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured?” 198n13, 199n27, 230n26 Imperial Japanese Army, 14 India, 114, 115 Indian Ocean: Japanese deployment to, 1, 3, 5, 23, 24, 104, 110, 114–21, 122, 123, 147, 148, 151, 159, 161–67, 168, 180, 181, 187–88, 189, 190, 235n71; tsunami relief operations, 27, 28, 40, 141 Indonesia, 229n17 inf luence of public opinion, 2–3, 5, 6–8, 9–14, 18–19, 20–29, 199n38; on Abe, 7–8, 19, 148–50, 151–52, 157, 180, 190, 196n21, 204n17; regarding ASDF dispatch plan during first Gulf War, 75–79; during Cold War, 62–67, 180; and consensus democracy norms, 25–26;



index

and consequences for other important issues, 24–25, 130, 180–81; dikes model regarding, 11, 171; and divided ruling coalitions, 24–25; elitists vs. pluralists regarding, 6, 9–12; regarding highsalience vs. low-salience issues, 11; regarding Iraq War, 125, 130–36, 138, 139–41, 144–45, 168–69, 181; on Japanese elites, 7–8, 14, 19, 20–26, 27–28, 29, 31, 33, 38, 62–67, 68, 70–72, 75–79, 82, 83–84, 86, 89–90, 92–94, 108, 110, 115–17, 118–19, 120–21, 125, 130–36, 139–41, 144–45, 147, 148–50, 151–53, 157, 161, 162, 164, 167, 169, 171, 174, 180–82, 185–86, 190, 196n21, 204n17, 210nn67,68; on Koizumi, 7–8, 19, 24, 115–17, 118–19, 120–21, 125, 130–36, 139–41, 144–45, 171, 180, 181, 190; regarding MSDF Indian Ocean mission, 147, 161, 162, 163, 164–67, 169, 182, 187–88, 219n17; and nearness of elections, 23–24; regarding nuclear weapons, 38; regarding offen­sive military power, 33; regarding peace­ keeping operations (PKO), 6, 7, 64, 81, 82, 83–84, 86, 89–90, 92–94, 98–99, 108; and political competition, 7, 21–23, 118, 120; and pressure from United States, 85, 159, 181–82, 189; and recent retro­ spective voting, 24, 25; in short run vs. long run, 185–86; and stable opinion majorities, 14, 21, 23, 24–28, 29, 70–75, 76–79, 81, 101, 108, 123, 125–26, 132, 167, 181; regarding terrorism, 110, 115–17, 118–19, 123, 125; and under­ balance, 176, 182–85; regarding UNPCC bill, 68, 69–75, 82; regarding U.S.–Japan Revised Defense Guidelines, 103–4 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS): Strategic Survey 2006, 227n57 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 163–64, 168, 226nf5 interventionist vs. noninterventionist liberals, 17, 200n44 Iran-Iraq War, 74–75 Iraq: Japanese civilian hostages taken in, 137–38; Japanese deployment to, 1, 3, 5, 7, 27, 39, 43, 99, 125, 136–45, 146–47, 148, 149–50, 151–52, 162, 168, 175, 180, 181, 186, 187, 189, 224n2, 230n22, 235n71; Japanese public opinion regard­ ing war in, 4, 7, 16, 30, 34–35, 36, 37,

241

43–46, 124, 125–41, 142–45, 146, 148–50, 151–53, 162, 163, 164, 166, 168–69, 171, 174, 175–76, 178, 180, 181, 183, 186, 187–89, 220n1, 221n28, 222n39, 223n52; Samawah, 5, 134, 136, 138–39, 141–42, 146, 223n52; U.S. invasion of, 23, 33–35, 36, 37, 43–44, 121, 123, 124, 125–27, 149–50, 174, 202n57; war with Iran, 74–75. See also Gulf War, first Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Law, 27, 130–34, 151, 168 ISAF. See International Security Assistance Force Isernia, Pierangela: Decisionmaking in a Glass House, 198n16 Ishiai Tsutomu, 220n31 Ishiba Shigeru, 33, 129–30, 163–64, 166 Ishibashi Natsuyo, 222n33 Ishihara Nobuo, 214n11 Ishikawa Atsushi, 150, 151 Ishizuka Masahiko, 169, 234n58 Israel, 231n37 Ito ¯ Go, 194n6,11, 218n8, 221n14 Ito Joichi, 51 Ito Kenichi, 211n3 Ito Masami, 226n44, 234n64 Izumikawa Yasuhiro, 41, 54, 199n33, 205n23 Izumo, 58, 64–65 Jameson, Sam, 213n44 Japanese Communist Party ( JCP), 40, 51, 56, 141, 154, 155; minesweeper dispatch opposed by, 81; PKO bill of 1991 opposed by, 89, 90 Japanese Defense Agency ( JDA), 40, 219n30, 221n11; Defense of Japan, 212n30, 213n40, 216n56; polls by, 206n15 Japanese elites: during Gulf War of 1990–91, 6, 68, 69–81; inf luence of public opinion on, 7–8, 14, 19, 20–26, 27–28, 29, 31, 33, 38, 62–67, 68, 70–72, 75–79, 82, 83–84, 86, 89–90, 92–94, 108, 110, 115–17, 118–19, 120–21, 125, 130–36, 139–41, 144–45, 147, 148–50, 151–53, 157, 161, 162, 164, 167, 169, 171, 174, 180–82, 185–86, 190, 196n21, 204n17, 210nn67,68; inf luence on public opinion by, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11–12, 13, 15–16, 18–19, 28, 38, 59, 66, 75, 81, 83, 85–86, 89, 103–4, 169, 172–74, 177, 178–80, 185–86; media use by, 178–80; views regarding overseas combat

242

index

Japanese elites (continued) operations, 5, 6, 7, 20, 39, 68, 69–75, 154, 161, 174, 180, 189, 214n4, 230n22; views regarding PKO operations, 82–83; views regarding acquisition of nuclear weapons, 38; views regarding Asian military capabilities, 104–5; views regarding defense spending, 6, 66; views regarding democracy, 51, 64, 209n62; views regarding disaster relief operations, 63; views regarding pacifism, 50–51, 58–59, 172, 199nn31,37, 232n42; views regarding public opinion, 3, 11–12, 89–90, 98–99, 128, 144, 147, 150, 173, 185, 195n13, 198n21, 216n45; views regarding utility of military force, 35–36, 39, 51 Japanese Foreign Ministry, 221n11; Diplomatic Bluebook (1989), 63 Japanese public attitudes: antimilitarism, 14–16, 18, 19, 29, 33, 41, 42, 49, 50–54, 60, 67, 69–70, 77, 78, 84, 99–100, 101, 104, 106, 112, 118, 165–66, 172, 173–75, 176, 182, 183–84, 195n14, 199n33, 207n20, 228n11; regarding defense of national territory, 1–2, 6, 12, 14–15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 29, 30, 31, 32, 48, 53–54, 58, 61–62, 67, 97, 103, 104–7, 109, 112, 151, 170, 171, 173, 177, 186–87, 188, 191, 200n40, 201n54, 210n72, 217n66; as defensive realist, 6, 15, 16–17, 19–20, 28–29, 31, 32, 48, 49, 50, 58–62, 75, 82, 105, 106, 112, 127, 171, 172, 173, 174–78, 180, 182, 184–85, 186, 200nn40,43, 201n53, 220n3, 228n8; fear of entrap­ ment, 6, 15, 28, 41–43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54–56, 67, 76–77, 103–4, 113, 125, 129, 146, 147, 148, 173, 178, 181, 182, 183, 187, 199n33, 205nn25,26, 207n20, 230n22, 231n36, 235n71; regarding humanitarian/ reconstruction missions, 3, 4, 14, 17, 18, 27, 28, 39–41, 43, 49, 52, 53, 63, 67, 77, 80, 82, 84, 85–86, 87, 88, 92, 94, 95–100, 101–2, 106–8, 111, 114, 123–24, 125, 136–37, 138, 139–40, 141, 142–43, 161, 169, 174, 175, 178, 180, 187, 189, 214nn5,16, 216n38; regarding offensive military power, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 26–27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 38, 48, 50, 61, 67, 77, 106, 109, 110, 125, 127, 129, 146, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 180, 185, 200n40, 217n67, 220n2, 228nn4,11; relationship to measurable public

opinion, 6, 9, 12–14, 20, 172; regarding state’s ability to control and use military, 2, 12–13, 14–16, 18–19, 33, 49, 50–54, 66, 67, 69, 70, 77, 78, 83, 84, 97, 99–101, 106, 165–66, 172, 173, 174–75, 182, 183, 186. See also coherence of public opinion; inf luence of public opinion; measurable public opinion; stability of public opinion Japanese Socialist Party ( JSP), 57, 76; anti­ militarism in, 52, 60, 78; conventionfirst rule of, 59, 208n38; and fear of entrapment, 51, 55, 56, 207n20; mine­ sweeper dispatch opposed by, 79, 81; “ox walk” filibuster of 1992 PKO bill by, 93, 95; and pacifism/unarmed neutrality, 50–51, 58–59, 102, 173, 199nn31,37, 232n42; PKO bill of 1991 opposed by, 87, 89, 90, 91; UNPCC opposed by, 70, 74 Japan Times, 215n23, 218n11, 220n33, 222n10, 223n48, 224nn8,12, 225nn23,24,30, 226n55, 233nn54,56 JCG ( Japanese Coast Guard), 69, 171, 210n72 JCP. See Japanese Communist Party Jentleson, Bruce W.: “The Pretty Prudent Public,” 197n8 Jervis, Robert, 199n34, 232n39 Johnson, Chalmers, 198n22 Johnston, Eric, 225n30 JSP. See Japanese Socialist Party Kabashima Ikuo, 178 Kades, Charles, 209n62 Kagan, Robert, 30, 183 Kageyama Shuntaro ¯ , 154 Kaifu Toshiki: and ASDF dispatch plan, 76, 77, 78; and minesweeper dispatch, 79–81, 214n11; and UNPCC bill, 69, 71, 73, 74, 82 Kanazawa, 105 Kanemaru Shin, 72 Kan Naoto, 132–33 Katayama Yoshio, 35–36 Kato¯ Ko¯ichi, 89, 118 Kato ¯ Shuichi, 36 Kato Yoichi, 225n16 Katzenstein, Peter J., 25; Cultural Norms and National Security, 195n14, 199n29, 206n11 Kaufmann, Chaim, 197n10 Keddell, Joseph P., Jr., 210n71 Key, V. O.: “dikes” model of, 11, 171



index

Kim, Kyon-Min: Yomigaeru gunji taikoku Nippon, 194n12 Kishi Nobosuke, 51, 55, 206n6 Kissinger, Henry, 65 Kitaoka Shin’ichi, 174, 228n6 Kliman, Daniel: Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World, 194n11, 218n10, 220n7, 221nn11,12, 224n6, 226n56; on Koizumi, 115, 144; on preemption, 38; on realism in Japan, 2 Klingberg, Frank, 41 Knowlton, Brian, 195n18 Kobayashi Kakumi, 233nn54,56 Koga Makoto, 219n21 Kohut, Andrew: America against the World, 195n18 Koike Yuriko, 152–53 Koizumi Jun’ichiro¯: and collective selfdefense, 123, 163, 188; and constitutional reform, 157, 163, 190; and Indian Ocean deployment, 24, 114–21, 123, 147, 180, 181; inf luence of public opinion on, 7–8, 19, 24, 115–17, 118–19, 120–21, 125, 130–36, 139–41, 144–45, 171, 180, 181, 190; Iraq War policies, 43, 125, 127–38, 139–45, 146–47, 148, 149, 168–69, 175–76, 180, 181, 188–89; and LDP, 22, 23, 140, 153, 155, 202n62; and lower house election of 2005, 140, 153, 155, 202n62; media used by, 178–79; missile defense policies, 170; as Posts and Telecommunications Minister, 98; response to September 11th attacks, 114–21, 122–23, 125; views on public opinion, 12, 128, 144, 147, 150, 185 Komatsu city airport, 105, 217n63 Kono¯ Yo¯hei, 175 Ko¯mei, 24, 79, 117, 140, 225n38; and constitutional reform, 157; Diet approval of ASDF dispatch advocated by, 76, 78, 81; Koizumi opposed by, 115, 116, 119–20, 131, 134; and lower house election of 2009, 190, 202n60; and lower house override provision, 167, 227n70; minesweeper dispatch supported by, 81; offensive missiles opposed by, 33; and pacifism, 72; PKO bill of 1991 supported by, 82, 83, 87–88, 89, 90; PKO bill of 1992 supported by, 91–92, 93, 95; relations with LDP, 5, 22, 23, 33, 78, 82, 83, 115, 120, 151, 202n60, 215n25; UNPCC bill opposed by, 72, 74, 215n22;

243

and upper house, 5, 72, 78, 91, 154–56; and upper house election of 2007, 154–56 Ko¯no Taro¯, 33, 34, 39, 131 Ko¯saka Masataka, 206n6 Korean War, 50, 56, 174 Koseki Sho¯ichi: The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution, 206n11 Kotani Hidejiro, 208nn47,51 Krauss, Ellis, 202n62, 203n72, 218n14, 221n24, 222n31; on LDP leaders and public opinion, 146–47, 224n2 Kristof, Nicholas D., 195n12 Kujiraoka Hitoshi, 225n16, 234n61 Kyo¯do¯ Tsu¯shin, 204n17, 219n19, 221n27, 222n35, 224nn9,10,14, 230n30, 234nn62,65, 235n67; polls by, 38, 138–39, 148, 154, 166, 223n45 Kyu ¯ ma Fumio, 119, 149, 152 Labs, Eric L., 201n51 Ladd, Everett Carll: Public Opinion in America and Japan, 195n15, 208n32 Larson, Deborah Welch, 200n47 Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japanese Disaster Relief Teams, 63 Layne, Christopher, 201n55 LDP. See Liberal Democratic Party Leheny, David, 218n8 LeoGrande, William M., 196n2 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 21–23, 38, 52, 63, 64, 65–66, 98, 147, 148, 166, 186, 210n67, 214n4, 227n63; and Aegis dispatch controversy, 118, 119, 120; and antiterrorism policy, 115, 116, 117–18; and ASDF dispatch, 78, 81; and constitutional reform, 5, 24, 154, 155–57, 162, 181, 196n21, 235n71; and election of 2009, 8, 190, 202nn58,60; General Council, 117–18, 119, 131, 132; and first Gulf War, 68, 69–75, 118; Hashimoto faction, 23, 115, 131; and Iraq War, 131–32, 133–34, 150, 169, 186, 188–89; Kaya-Kishi faction, 62; and Koizumi, 22, 23, 140, 153, 155, 202n62; and lower house, 8, 22, 23, 33, 39, 131, 190, 202nn58–60,62, 235nn69,70; and lower house election of 2009, 8, 190, 202nn58,60, 235n70; mainstream (shuryu¯ha) vs. antimainstream (hanshuryu¯ha) groupings in, 22; and MSDF Indian Ocean mission, 161, 167, 169, 188; and PKO bill of 1991, 87–88,

244

index

Liberal Democratic Party (continued) 89; and PKO bill of 1992, 90–92, 93–94, 95, 107, 108; Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), 131, 169; relations with Ko¯mei, 5, 22, 23, 33, 78, 82, 83, 115, 120, 151, 202n60, 215n25; Takeshita faction, 72; and UNPCC bill, 68, 69–75, 78, 82; and upper house, 5, 21–22, 25–26, 66, 139, 140, 154–56, 157, 158–59, 160, 190, 196n21, 223n46; and upper house election of 2004, 139, 140, 190, 223n46; and upper house election of 2007, 5, 154–56, 157, 158–59, 160, 196n21; Watanabe faction, 89 liberal optimism, 17–18, 175 Lijphart, Arend: crucial case-study model of, 199n24; Patterns of Democracy, 202n65 Lim, Robyn, 204n17 Lind, Jennifer, 231n34 Lindskold, Svenn, 200n47 Lippmann, Walter, 3, 196n2, 197n8 lower house: and DPJ, 8, 190, 202nn58,60, 235n70; election of 1969, 66; election of 1993, 235n69; election of 2003, 134; election of 2005, 22, 140, 153, 155; election of 2009, 8, 190, 202nn58,60, 235n70; and LDP, 8, 22, 23, 33, 39, 131, 190, 202nn59 60,62, 235n69; override of upper house by, 5, 155, 167, 188, 202n60, 227n70; and single-seat plurality district system, 21, 22, 23; Special Ad Hoc Committee on International Peace Cooperation, 90, 90–91 Lupia, Arthur, 197n8 Luttbeg, Norman R., 233n52 MacArthur, Douglas, II, 64 Machimura Nobutaka, 163 Maehara Seiji, 133, 161 Mainichi Daily News, 213n3, 215n24 Mainichi Shimbun: articles, 70, 211n14, 212n26; polls by, 51, 52–54, 56, 57–58, 61, 66, 73, 80, 212nn16,17,19, 214n5, 225n38 majoritarian rule, 25–26, 51 Malaysia, 229n17 Margolis, Michael: Manipulating Public Opinion, 197n6 Masato Shimizu, 202n62 Matthews, Eugene A., 194n8 Mauser, Gary: Manipulating Public Opinion, 197n6

Maxon, Candee Yale: Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, 206n11 McCormick, James M., 196n2 Mearsheimer, John: on neoliberalism, 200n44; on offensive realism, 20, 201nn51,56, 202n57; The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 201nn51,56, 202n57, 205n1, 232n44 measurable public opinion: changes in, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 18–19, 41–48, 53, 56, 67, 83–86, 89, 95–96, 108, 111, 123–24, 125–26, 157, 199n25, 205n26, 214n8; and consensus democracy norms, 25–26, 202n65; and divided ruling coalitions, 24–25; election results, 29; regarding majoritarian rule, 25–26; and nearness of elections, 23–24, 180; vs. policy opinions, 13; and political competition, 7, 21–23, 118, 120, 180; and recent retrospective voting, 24, 131; relationship to Japanese public attitudes, 6, 9, 12–14, 20, 29, 172; stable opinion majorities, 14, 16, 21, 23, 24–28, 29, 70–75, 76–79, 81, 101, 108, 123, 125–26, 132, 167, 181; and survey wording, 13, 21, 44, 71, 84–85, 92, 95–96, 100, 113, 143–44, 171, 172, 205n25, 206n15, 212nn19,20, 214nn7,8. See also inf luence of public opinion Meiji Restoration, 3, 11; Article II of Constitution, 52 Mendel, Douglas H., Jr., 177, 210n68; The Japanese Public and Foreign Policy, 198n23, 206n14, 207n23, 208nn31,36,37; polls by, 56, 57, 58, 60, 64–65, 195n15, 205n27, 209n64 methodology: case studies, 28–29; con­ gruence procedures, 28, 203n76; counterfactual analyses, 28, 203n78; process tracing, 28, 78; qualitative methods, 28–29, 171–72, 203n77; triangulation, 28, 203n77 Metraux, Daniel A., 221n19 Mexico: public opinion regarding Iraq war in, 34–35 Mihara Asahiko, 212n27 Miki Takeo, 75, 210n67 Miller, John, 193n5, 194n11, 217n1 Miller, Warren E.: “Constituency Inf luence in Congress,” 197n6 missile defense, 168, 170, 171, 185, 186, 191, 232n48 Miyatake Michiko, 11, 198n18



index

Miyazawa Kiichi: UNPCC bill opposed by, 72, 75; views on public opinion, 98–99, 216n45 Mizuno Hitoshi, 208n45 Mochizuki, Mike: The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century, 216n58 Morgan, Peter, 223n46 Morgenthau, Hans, 177, 229n18 Moriya Takemasa, 166 Mori Yoshiro¯, 22 Mozambique: Japanese deployment to, 82, 102, 108 MSDF (Maritime Self-Defense Forces), 62, 210n72, 217n63; Aegis dispatch controversy, 23, 117–21, 219n19; expan­ sion of, 18, 200n48; Indian Ocean mission, 1, 3, 5, 24, 104, 110, 114–21, 122, 123, 147, 148, 151, 159, 161–67, 168, 180, 181, 182, 187–88, 189, 190, 214n4, 219nn17,27, 235n71; Japanese public opinion regarding Indian Ocean Mission, 147, 161, 162, 163, 164–67, 169, 182, 187–88, 219n17; minesweeper dispatch after first Gulf War, 68, 79–81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 99, 175, 178, 214nn4,11; Somalia mission, 189–90, 234n67, 235n68 Mueller, John E.: “The Iraq Syndrome,” 234n60; War, Presidents and Public Opinion, 197n8 Murao Shinichi, 235n73 Nacos, Bridgette: Decisionmaking in a Glass House, 198n16 Naff, Clayton, 211n7, 212n16 Naikakufu (Cabinet Office) polls, 42 Nakamoto Michiyo, 233n54 Nakamura Akira, 229n12 Nakamura Fujie: Ajia no shimbun ga hojita Jieitai no “kaigai hahei,” 194n12 Nakasone Yasuhiro, 66–67, 70, 72, 74–75, 79 Nakata Hiroko, 224n4 Nakatani Iwao, 70 National Institute of Defense Studies, 35–36 National People’s Party, 155 National Security Council, 148, 160, 161 NATO, 163 neoconservatism, 2, 20, 202n57 neoliberalism, 200n44 New Conservative Party, 119, 120 New Frontier Party, 120 Newsweek polls, 58

245

NHK polls, 204n13 Nihon Keizai (Nikkei) Shimbun: editorials and articles, 169, 211n11, 213n3, 226nn53,54, 227n61; polls by, 71, 72, 73, 86, 94, 106, 128, 134, 135, 212n19, 215n32, 221n28, 222n39 Nikkei News Bulletin, 213n3 Nikkei Weekly, 215n23, 223nn54–56 Nincic, Miroslav, 198n14; “A Sensible Public,” 197n8, 229nn16,18; Democracy and Foreign Policy, 229n16 Nippon TV (NTV): polls by, 36–37, 137, 138, 152, 155, 164, 166, 167, 186, 204n11, 221n10, 225n22, 227nn65,69, 233n55, 235n68 Nishihara Masashi, 193n2 Nixon, Richard: on foreign policy and public opinion, 10, 185 Nonaka Hiromu, 131, 134, 219n21 Norota Yoshinari, 131 Northern Territories issue, 57 North Korea: abduction of Japanese civilians by, 16, 105, 184; Japanese public opinion regarding, 7, 16, 30, 31, 36–37, 43, 54, 82, 104–7, 109, 129, 147, 153, 184–85, 186, 200n40, 207n19, 229n17; Korean War, 50, 56, 174; and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 102; nuclear weapons program of, 30, 36–37, 38, 102–3, 147, 153, 186; spy ships of, 210n72, 217n63; Taepodong missile test of 1998, 7, 16, 82, 102–3, 104–7, 109, 184 Norway, 223n52 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 102 nuclear weapons: Japanese public opinion regarding, 30, 36–38, 38, 39, 48, 66, 204n17, 210n67 Nukaga Fukushiro¯, 119, 141 Obuchi Keizo¯, 22 offensive liberals. See interventionist vs. noninterventionist liberals Okamoto Yukio, 127–28, 217n68 Okinawa, 65–66, 190–91, 210nn67,68 Oros, Andrew: Normalizing Japan, 194n10, 233n56 Osaka, 57, 58, 64–65 Osgood, Charles E.: An Alternative to War or Surrender, 200n47 ¯ take Hideo, 206n5, 229n12 O outer space, 168, 187, 233n56

246

index

overseas combat operations: Japanese public opinion regarding, 1–2, 3, 6–7, 12, 15, 16, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 40–41, 50, 53, 61, 62–63, 68, 69–75, 89, 90, 96, 97, 101, 102, 103–4, 107, 108–9, 110, 111–12, 113, 120, 123–24, 125, 132, 136, 142, 146, 154, 161, 166–67, 172, 175, 178, 180, 181, 188, 189, 190, 210n72, 214n4, 216n38, 217n61, 230n22; views of Japanese elites regarding, 5, 6, 7, 20, 39, 68, 69–75, 154, 161, 174, 180, 189, 214n4, 230n22 Ozawa Ichiro¯, 69, 82, 83, 151, 162, 163, 164, 226n55 P-3C planes, 117–18, 119, 120–21, 123, 162, 236n67 Pacific War, 176, 183–84, 187 pacifism, 3, 195n14, 219n25, 223n52; vs. actual Japanese public opinion, 2, 5, 14–15, 27, 28, 29, 30, 41, 49, 50, 56, 75, 76–77, 78, 79, 81, 121–22, 123, 130, 141, 168, 173, 182, 183, 184, 199n38, 220n2; vs. antimilitarism, 14–15, 29, 50, 173, 182, 184; vs. fear of entrapment, 41, 56, 76–77, 182, 183; in JSP, 50–51, 58–59, 102, 173, 199nn31,37, 232n42; and Ko¯mei, 72; views of Japanese elites regarding, 50–51, 58–59, 172, 199nn31,37, 232n42 Page, Benjamin I., 10, 197n11, 228n1 Pakistan, 63, 114, 115, 116, 123, 162, 168 peacekeeping operations (PKO), 50, 82–102, 214n11; in Cambodia, 39, 82, 92, 95–102, 136, 140, 144; Five Conditions for par­ ticipation, 87, 90; on Golan Heights, 82, 108; Japanese public opinion regarding, 6, 7, 12, 40, 53, 62–63, 64, 81, 88, 92–93, 94–101, 107–8, 111, 140, 171, 175, 181, 209n54, 213n47, 214nn7,16; in Mozam­ bique, 82, 102, 108; PKO bill of 1991, 27, 82–91, 215n22; PKO bill of 1992, 27, 43, 91–95, 102, 107–8, 114, 134, 218n14; in Sudan, 147, 168, 181; in Zaire, 108, 224n2 Peff ley, Mark: “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured?” 198n13, 199n27, 230n26 Pekkanen, Robert, 218n14, 221n24, 222n31 Pempel, T. J., 26; Uncommon Democracies, 202n58 pension reform, 134, 139, 140, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 166, 167

Pew Center for the People and the Press polls, 4 Philippines: during Vietnam War, 50 pluralists, 177, 196n3, 197nn8,10, 198n23; and delegates model of representation, 11, 185; vs. elitists, 6, 9–12, 176, 199n24; in Japan, 12, 90, 98, 172 Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobitai), 49 political competition, 7, 21–23, 118, 120 Popkin, Samuel L., 197n8, 230n27 Posen, Barry S.: Sources of Military Doctrine, 232n47 preemption, 36–38, 185, 201n54 preventive war, 31–38, 129; suppression of WMD proliferation, 16, 17, 20, 28, 30, 32, 33–34, 36, 37, 39, 48, 126, 130, 131, 132, 175, 201n54 prime minister’s office (PMO): polls by, 53, 55, 62–63, 101–2, 106–7, 143–44, 186, 206n15, 208n52, 209n54 Public Policy Forum polls, 80 Pyle, Kenneth: on Abe, 224n5; The Japanese Question, 193n2, 211n8, 212n15; Japan Rising, 64, 193n2 Quemoy and Matsu, 55, 56, 183 Reagan, Ronald, 144 realism: academic defensive realism, 19–20, 127, 175, 184, 199n35, 200n43, 201nn53,57, 220nn3,10, 232n40; academic offensive realism, 19–20, 201nn53,57; and anarchical international environment, 177, 200n44, 229nn14,18; attitudinal defensive realism, 6, 15, 16–17, 19–20, 28–29, 31, 32, 48, 49, 50, 58–62, 75, 82, 105, 106, 112, 127, 171, 172, 173, 174–78, 180, 182, 184–85, 186, 200nn40,41,43, 201nn53,56, 220n3, 228n8; attitudinal offensive realism, 1–2, 20, 49–50, 75, 78–79, 102, 130, 141, 168, 173, 175–76, 180, 201nn54,56; balance of threat theory, 15, 183–84, 199n35, 229n17, 232n40; and cumulativity of resources, 20; deterrence vs. reassurance dilemma, 184, 232nn43,44; and domestic factors, 182; and ease of conquest, 20; and first move advantages, 20; and military technology, 20, 228n10; and underbalance, 176, 182–85; unitary actor assumption, 50 reassurance strategy, 18–19, 200n48 Reid, T. R., 213n40



index

Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), 212n28, 213n36, 215n23 retrospective voting, 24, 131 Ries, Ivor, 212n16 Rohlen, Thomas, 25 Root, Hilton L.: Alliance Curse, 228n10 Ross, Robert S., 232n45 Rubiner, Matthew, 213n40 rules of engagement (ROEs), 132, 141 Rumsfeld, Donald, 141, 150 Russett, Bruce: Grasping the Democratic Peace, 200n44 Russia, 207n19; Russo-Japanese War, 57 Rwanda genocide, 152 Ryokufu¯ shuppan henshu¯: PKO mondai no so¯ ten zo¯ hoban—bunseki to shiryo¯, 212n30, 213nn32,39,40, 215nn30,31 Safety Force, 54–55 SAGE. See Survey on Attitudes and Global Engagement (SAGE) Saito Naoki, 211n2, 214nn13–15, 215nn22,27 Sakamoto Kazuya, 206n6 Sakurada Daizo ¯ , 221n14 Samuels, Richard, 1, 219n19, 227n26, 231n34; on Japanese antimilitarism, 51; on JCG, 210n72; Nine Lives? 223nn47,50, 234n61 Sanderson, John, 95 Sankei Shimbun polls, 53 Sasaki Yoshitaka, 211n8, 212n26 Sato¯ Eisaku, 64, 65–66, 210n67 Sato¯ Seizaburo¯, 211n5 Saunders, Phillip, 230n29 Scheiner, Ethan: Democracy without Competition in Japan, 196n22 Schieffer, Thomas, 159, 162, 163 Schweller, Randall, 182; Unanswered Threats, 230n19, 231n36 SDF (Self-Defense Forces): establishment of, 40, 49, 51, 59–60, 76, 78, 79, 114, 218n7; rules of engagement (ROEs) for, 132, 141; SDF law, 40, 76, 78, 79, 114, 218n7. See also ASDF (Air Self-Defense Forces); GSDF (Ground Self-Defense Forces); MSDF (Maritime Self-Defense Forces) security dilemma, 15, 105, 183, 232nn43,45 Segal, Adam, 230n28 seiron/seron, 11 Self, Benjamin, 200n45 Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, 179, 210n72, 230n29

247

September 11th attacks, 4, 44, 104, 110–14, 124, 175; Koizumi’s response to, 114–21, 122–23, 125 Shapiro, Robert: Decisionmaking in a Glass House, 198n16 Shapiro, Robert Y., 10, 197nn10,11 Shigenobu Tamura, 218n14 Shii Kazuo, 40 Shimane prefecture, 58, 64–65, 154 Shimoyachi Nao, 204n4 Shin Joho Center, 208n52 Shinkawa Toshimitsu, 208n38 Shinoda, Tomohito, 198n20, 202n63, 218nn8,13, 220n8, 221nn13,15,20–24, 228n3, 230n21, 233n50; on Japanese media, 11; on MSDF dispatch to Indian Ocean, 219n17; on PKO bill of 1991, 214n16, 215nn17–21 Shirk, Susan L., 179 Shu¯kan Asahi polls, 52, 206n15 Smith, Sheila, 231n38 Snyder, Glenn: Alliance Politics, 199n32 Snyder, Jack L., 197n10, 202n57; on aca­ demic defensive and offensive realism, 201n53; Myths of Empire, 201nn50,56, 231n32 Sobel, Richard: on Reagan, 144; The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since Vietnam, 195n17, 198n16, 203n76, 229n18, 230n26; on U.S. public opinion and foreign policy, 4, 28, 144 Social Democratic Party, 116, 123–24, 154, 155, 160 Somalia, 234n66; Japanese deployment to, 189–90, 234n67, 235n68 Somin, Ilya, 196n2 So¯ka Gakkai, 72, 131 South Korea: attitudes regarding United States in, 45, 183, 229n17; Japanese public opinion regarding, 60–61; Korean War, 50, 56, 174; public opinion regard­ ing Iraq war in, 34; relations with Japan, 60–61; Rhee line, 60–61; during Vietnam War, 50 Soviet Union, 54, 56, 57, 60, 207n18 Spain: public opinion regarding Iraq war in, 34–35 stability of public opinion, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 12, 171, 178; stable majority opinions, 14, 21, 23, 24–28, 29, 39, 68, 70–75, 75, 76–79, 81, 98–99, 101, 108, 123, 125–26, 132, 135–36, 141, 153, 159, 161, 165,

248

index

stability of public opinion (continued) 166, 167, 172, 180, 181, 186, 206n15, 217n66 Steel, Gill, 178 Stockwin, J. A. A., 22 Stokes, Bruce: America against the World, 195n18 Stokes, Donald E.: “Constituency Inf luence in Congress,” 197n6 Sudan, 147, 168, 181 Sudo Sueo: The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN, 193n2 Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law of 1999, 6–7, 111, 114 Survey on Attitudes and Global Engagement (SAGE), 28–29, 31–34, 35, 217n67 Suzuki Zenko¯ , 72 Tachibana Masaru, 211n2 Tachibana Takashi, 38 Taepodong missile test of 1998, 7, 16, 82, 102–3, 104–7, 109, 184 Tahara Soichiro¯ , 212n26 Taiwan, 50, 103; Taiwan Straits crises, 30, 43, 55, 56, 102–3, 183 Tajima Yoko, 116 Takao Yasuo, 177, 210nn71,72, 220n36; Is Japan Really Remilitarizing? 229n12 Takagi Hisao, 215n23 Takemae Eiji: The Allied Occupation of Japan, 207n22 Takemura Masayoshi, 105 Takeuchi Hiroshi, 207n24 Takezawa Yukiko, 223n52 Tamamoto Masaharu, 200n45, 205n20 Tanaka Akihiko, 174, 207n28 Taniguchi Masaki, 230n24 technology, military: missile defense, 168, 170, 171, 185, 186, 191, 232n48; and realism, 20, 228n10; spy satellites, 168, 187, 233n56. See also weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism: Japanese public opinion regarding, 4, 5, 16, 17, 28, 32, 34–36, 39, 45–46, 48, 110–24, 147, 175, 219n17; Koizumi’s policies regarding, 114–21, 122–23, 125; September 11th attacks, 4, 44, 104, 110–14, 122, 124, 125, 175. See also Afghanistan; Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

Tetlock, Philip E.: Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics, 203n78; Expert Political Judgment, 198n12 Thailand, 229n17 Tokugawa Shogunate, 11 Tokyo Broadcasting Service (TBS TV) polls, 94–95, 101 Tokyo Shimbun, 208n51; polls by, 94 Tsuchiyama Jitsuo, 207n20 tsunami relief operations, 27, 28, 40, 141 TV Asahi polls, 37, 204n12 Twomey, Christopher P., 228n8, 231n34 Uemura Hideki, 218n8 Umemoto Tetsuya, 195n15 unarmed neutrality, 58–59, 67, 173, 199nn31,37, 232n42 underbalancing, 176, 182–85, 231nn34,36 United Kingdom: Blair, 23; Conservative Party, 23; vs. Japan, 1, 70, 194n10; Labor Party, 23; public opinion regarding Iraq war in, 34; public opinion regarding United States in, 45; relations with United States, 1, 194n6 United Nations, 34, 35, 163, 189; and first Gulf War, 162; Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group, 63; Security Council, 79, 87, 162, 164, 224n2; and U.S. invasion of Iraq, 125–26, 149, 224n2, 226n55. See also peacekeeping operations (PKO) United States: alliance with Japan, 4–5, 6, 7, 12, 30–31, 41–48, 49–50, 51, 54–58, 60, 103–4, 111, 114, 116, 128–29, 131, 132, 135, 142, 146–47, 150, 161, 169, 181–82, 183, 185, 186–87, 188, 189, 190–91, 194n6, 199n25, 207n22, 231n38, 232n48, 236n74; attitudes regarding Japanese public opinion in, 1–2, 5, 82, 190–91; attitudes regarding offensive military force in, 30, 34, 41, 68, 187, 204n6; George W. Bush administration, 1, 2, 5, 33–34, 130, 141, 144, 150, 151–52, 181, 185, 194n6, 204n6, 232n46; and consensus democracy norms, 203n65; inf luence of public opinion on policy in, 4, 28, 144; vs. Japan, 3–4, 30, 48, 70, 183; Japanese public opinion regarding, 4, 6, 13, 14–15, 16, 28, 30–31, 41–48, 49–50, 54–58, 60, 65, 67, 68, 82, 97, 98, 103–4, 110, 111, 112–14, 115, 116, 121–22,



index

125, 132, 146–47, 151–52, 169, 173, 180, 181–82, 186–87, 188, 207nn18,19, 229n17; Japan pressured by, 68, 75–76, 83, 85, 159, 181–82, 189, 219n21; military bases in Japan, 42, 49, 55, 56, 65, 114, 190–91, 210n67, 218n7, 235n73; Nixon administration, 10, 65–66, 210n67; public opinion regarding Iraq War in, 10, 197n5; Reagan administration, 144; relations with North Korea, 45; relations with Soviet Union, 56; relations with United Kingdom, 1, 194n6; September 11th attacks, 4, 44, 104, 110–14, 122, 124, 125, 175. See also Afghanistan; Cold War; Iraq; Vietnam War upper house: and DPJ, 121, 139, 154–55, 157, 159, 161, 167, 190, 202n60, 223n46; election of 1989, 66; election of 1992, 95; election of 2004, 27, 139, 140, 190, 223n46; election of 2007, 5, 24, 25, 149, 150, 152, 153–56, 157, 160, 167, 190; and Ko¯mei, 5, 72, 78, 91; and LDP, 5, 21–22, 25–26, 66, 139, 140, 154–56, 157, 158–59, 160, 190, 196n21, 223n46; Special Committee on International Cooperation, 91 U.S. Information Agency (USIA) polls, 57 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines of 1978, 42 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines of 1997, 6, 43, 82, 103–4, 111, 114, 116 U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty of 1960, 55 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 12, 51, 131, 207n22, 231n38 utility of military force: for combating terrorism, 4, 5, 16, 17, 28, 32, 34–36, 39, 45–46, 48, 110–24, 147, 175, 219n17; for defense of national territory, 1–2, 6, 12, 14–15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 29, 30, 31, 32, 48, 53–54, 58, 61–62, 67, 97, 103, 104–7, 109, 112, 151, 170, 171, 173, 177, 186–87, 188, 191, 200n40, 201n54, 210n72, 217n66; for humanitarian/reconstruction missions, 3, 4, 14, 17, 18, 27, 28, 39–41, 43, 49, 52, 53, 63, 67, 77, 80, 82, 84, 85–86, 87, 88, 92, 94, 95–100, 101–2, 106–8, 111, 114, 123–24, 125, 136–37, 138, 139–40, 141, 142–43, 161, 169, 174, 175, 178, 180, 187, 189, 214nn5,16, 216n38; Japanese public opinion indifference curves regarding, 26–27, 139, 172; for promotion of democracy/human rights, 10, 13, 17, 20,

249 30, 32, 33–34, 47, 48, 126, 175, 204n6; for suppression of WMD proliferation, 16, 17, 20, 28, 30, 32, 33–34, 36–37, 39, 48, 126, 130, 131, 132, 175, 201n54; views of Japanese elites regarding, 35–36, 39, 51. See also overseas combat operations

Van Evera, Stephen: Causes of War, 201n50, 228n10 Van Wolferen, Karel: The Enigma of Japanese Power, 202n58 Verba, Sidney: “Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” 197n8 Vietnam War: bombing of North Vietnam, 55–56; Japanese public opinion regarding, 30, 42, 49, 50, 54, 55–56, 58, 61, 62, 64, 67, 174, 177, 207n28; “Vietnam syndrome,” 187 Vosse, Wilhelm, 231n37 Wada Harayuki, 229n12 Wakaizumi Kei, 65–66 Wall Street Journal, 191 Walt, Stephen: Origins of Alliance, 199n35 Waltz, Kenneth: Man, the State, and War, 200n44; structural realism of, 177–78; Theory of International Politics, 230n19; on unbalanced power, 205n2 war on terrorism. See Afghanistan; Iraq; terrorism Watanabe Akio, 193n5, 217n1; on Japanese decision making, 25; “Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs,” 198n23; on political compromise, 26 Watanabe Osamu, 206n5 Watanuki Joji: The Crisis of Democracy, 196n2 Watanuki Tamisuke, 89 weapons of mass destruction (WMD): Japanese public opinion regarding, 30, 36–38, 39, 48, 66, 204n17, 210n67; suppression of WMD proliferation, 16, 17, 20, 28, 30, 32, 33–34, 36–37, 39, 48, 126, 130, 131, 132, 175, 201n54 Weekly Nikkei, 186 Weinstein, Martin, 213n47, 214n8; Japan’s Postwar Defense Policy, 198n23 Weisman, Steven R., 212n24 Welfield, John: An Empire in Eclipse, 206n15, 229n17 Williams, Brad, 204n19, 205n22 Wittkopf, Eugene R., 196n2

250

index

Wolders, Arnold: on deterrence vs. reassurance dilemma, 232n44 Wolfowitz, Paul, 119 Woolley, Peter J., 18–19; Japan’s Navy, 200n48, 208n46 Yamaguchi Jiro¯, 211n6 Yamaguchi Tsuruo, 70 Yamamoto Yoshinobu, 205n26, 207n20 Yamanaka Sadanori, 118 Yamasaki Taku, 118–19, 147, 149, 160 Yanai Shunji, 213n36, 214n13, 215n26 Yasumoto Mariko, 236n74 Yomiuri Shimbun: editorials and articles, 118, 131, 150, 151, 155, 163, 204n19, 205n22, 212nn23,26, 219nn18,23,28,29, 221n17, 223n53, 225n29, 226nn42,47,53,55,

230n30, 235n72, 236n76; polls, 35, 37, 39, 40, 44–45, 51–52, 54, 55, 61–62, 73, 100–101, 102, 104, 106, 110–13, 117, 122, 130–31, 136, 148, 155, 156, 157–58, 207n19, 212n20, 221n10, 223nn46,58, 224n6, 225n36, 229n17, 235n73 yoron, 11 Yoshida Reiji, 224n12, 225n24 Yoshida Shigeru, 64, 199n30, 209n62; Yoshida Doctrine, 193n2 Zaire: Japanese deployment to, 108, 224n2 Zakaria, Fareed: From Wealth to Power, 231n32 Zaller, John R.: The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, 196n2 Zhang, Yumei: Pacific Asia, 202n58

Studies in Asian Security a series sponsored by the East-West Center Muthiah Alagappa, Chief Editor Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center

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