Rethinking Global Democracy in Brazil 1786604531, 9781786604538

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Rethinking Global Democracy in Brazil

Rethinking Global Democracy in Brazil Markus Fraundorfer University of São Paulo

London • New York

Published by Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26–34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB www.rowmaninternational.com Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd. is an affiliate of Rowman & Littlefield 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706, USA With additional offices in Boulder, New York, Toronto (Canada), and Plymouth (UK) www.rowman.com Copyright © 2018 by Markus Fraundorfer All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: HB 978-1-7866-0453-8 PB 978-1-7866-0454-5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Is Available ISBN 978-1-78660-453-8 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-78660-454-5 (pbk: alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-78660-455-2 (electronic) The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48–1992. Printed in the United States of America

Für meine Eltern in immerwährender Dankbarkeit.

Contents

Acknowledgementsix Abbreviationsxiii 1  2  3 

Introduction1 New Realities, Old Structures 1 Old Structures, Undemocratic Structures 2 Brazil: A Laboratory for Democratic Experiments   in the Tropics 6 Organisation of the Book 12 Democratising Global Governance The Peculiarities of the Global Governance System Ideal Types of a Democratic Global Order Promoting Democratic Practices in Global Governance   as People-Power The Theoretical Framework: Three Indicators   of People-Power

17 18 22

Brazil and the Purchase of Drugs The Brazilian Way of Tackling HIV/AIDS The Creation of UNITAID: One for All, All for One Democratic Practices at UNITAID

59 60 63 73

4  Brazil and Food Security Brazil’s National Food Security and Nutrition Framework

vii

29 36

85 86

viii



Contents

The Reform of the Committee on World   Food Security: New Beginnings Democratic Practices in the Committee on World   Food Security

90 109

5  Brazil and Open Government The Participatory Budgeting Programmes The Open Government Partnership: A New Paradigm? Democratic Practices in the Open   Government Partnership

127 128 132

6  Brazil and Internet Governance The Regulatory Framework for the Internet The NETmundial Meeting: A New Point of Departure   in Global Internet Governance Democratic Practices during the NETmundial Meeting

161 162

7 

148

165 172

Conclusion183 Rethinking Global Democracy in Brazil 183 A Pattern Emerges 186 Brazil’s Future Role in Global Democracy 195

Interviews201 Bibliography203 Index227

Acknowledgements

The initial idea for this book started to take shape when I lived in Brazil for the first time (in the academic year of 2012–2013 in Rio de Janeiro and Brasília). That period provided me with the possibility to see the field of international relations (IR), and life in general, in an entirely different light from what I was used to in Europe. These new angles, perspectives and experiences gradually shifted my Eurocentric worldview and a particular Eurocentric idea of IR I had harboured due to my academic education and life experiences in Europe. These new angles and perspectives further matured into a book project when I returned to Brazil in 2014, where I started as a research fellow at the University of São Paulo, Institute of International Relations. I profoundly thank the São Paulo Research Agency (FAPESP), which supported my book project through a generous scholarship (2014/18584–1). The research and writing process of the book took place at two institutions, first and foremost at the University of São Paulo and, for a five-month research stay, at the University of Edinburgh. The University of São Paulo, with its tropical campus, provided an idyllic oasis, replete with the most exotic and outlandish plants and trees, distant from the hustle and bustle of the city of São Paulo. In the midst of this green and tropical campus lies the Institute of International Relations. Here, I particularly thank João Paulo Cândia Veiga for establishing the initial contact, supporting me with the scholarship application and other academic and administrative issues. João Paulo has been a great supporter of my ideas from the very beginning. I also thank Janina Onuki and Amâncio Jorge de Oliveira for their more general support in my research and teaching activities at the institute. I also thank the researchers of the Study Centre of International Negotiations (CAENI – Centro de

ix

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Acknowledgements

Estudos das Negociações Internacionais) for their friendship, discussions and cafezinhos. Between March and August 2016, I stayed at the Just Wold Institute of the University of Edinburgh as a visiting fellow. The surroundings of the Just Word Institute, located in the School of Social and Political Science, also proved to be immensely inspiring. In the distance, the towering Salisbury Crags, which the setting sun, at the end of my working day, usually bathed in shimmering tones of red, orange and yellow. The cherry trees of the Meadows, whose cherry blossoms in April and May, transformed the wide green space into a miraculous sea of pink and violet. And the Old Town, where, with some imagination, the ghosts of Sir Walter Scott, Robert Louis Stevenson and Arthur Conan Doyle might still wander around. At the Just World Institute and the School of Social and Political Science, I would like to thank Tim Hayward for inviting me to the Institute and making my stay as comfortable as possible. I also extend my gratitude to the Political Theory Reading Group for discussing a draft version of the theoretical chapter. Special thanks go to Mathias Taler, Mihaela Mihai, Philip Cook and Kieran Oberman. I also thank the IR Reading Group for discussing a draft version of the chapter on the Committee on World Food Security. Here, I thank Juliet Kaarbo, John Peterson and Elisabeth Schweiger. On a more private note, I would also like to thank Youdon Lhamo for hosting me in her beautiful house and for familiarising me with some of the particular characteristics of Tibetan culture, food and the teachings of Tibetan Buddhism. Our talks allowed me to disconnect from my work and learn more about the lives and struggles of the Tibetan people. I thank Dhara Snowden, the commissioning editor of politics and international relations at Rowman & Littlefield International. Her awareness of the importance of non-Eurocentric approaches to IR and her enthusiasm about the project convinced me that Rowman & Littlefield International was the ideal publisher for this book. I also thank all those people who directly or indirectly influenced this work and improved its quality, be it anonymous reviewers, interview partners and all those who, through their comments, sometimes even unrelated to the book, made me think again about certain paragraphs, passages or chapters. Like my last book, this book would not exist without my wife, lover, companion and intimate friend Juliana. Some parts of chapters 2, 3 and 4 are based on the following journal publication: Fraundorfer, Markus. ‘Experiments in Global Democracy: The Cases of UNITAID and the FAO Committee on World Food Security’. Global Constitutionalism 4, no. 3 (2015): 328–64; chapter 5 represents a further development of the following journal publication: Fraundorfer, Markus. ‘The



Acknowledgements xi

Open Government Partnership: Mere Smokescreen or New Paradigm?’ Globalizations 14, no. 4 (2017): 611–26; chapter 6 is a further developed version of the following journal publication: Fraundorfer, Markus. ‘Brazil’s Organization of the NETmundial Meeting: Moving Forward in Global Internet Governance’. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 23, no. 3 (2017): 503–521. Markus Fraundorfer São Paulo, October 2017

Abbreviations

AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ARVs Antiretrovirals ATTAC Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens AZT Azydothimidine (or: Zidovudine) Brazil, South Africa, India and China BASIC BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa CAISAN Câmara Interministerial de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (Inter-ministerial Chamber of Food and Nutrition Security) CEO Chief Executive Officer CFS Committee on World Food Security CGI.br Brazil’s Internet Steering Committee CIGA Comitê Interministerial Governo Aberto (Brazil’s Interministerial Committee on Open Government) COLAB/USP Colaboratório de Desenvolvimento e Participação (Colaboratory of Development and Participation) CONSEA Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (Brazil’s National Council of Food and Nutrition Security) CONSOCIAL Conferência Nacional sobre Transparência e Controle Social (National Forum of Transparency, Participation and Social Control) CPLP Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries CSM Civil Society Mechanism of the Committee on World Food Security Civil Society Organisations CSOs DFID UK Department for International Development xiii

xiv

Abbreviations

EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations FGV Getúlio Vargas Foundation FIAN Food First Information and Action Network GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GESOC Gestión Social y Cooperación (Social Management and Cooperation) GNP+ The Global Network of People Living with HIV GRULAC Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (United Nations Regional Group) GSF Global Strategic Framework GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation Agency) HCV Hepatitis C Virus HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus HLPE High-Level Panel of Experts IBSA India, Brazil, South Africa ICANN The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers IETF Internet Engineering Task Force IGF Internet Governance Forum IMAFLORA Instituto de Manejo e Certificação Florestal e Agrícola (Institute of Florestal and Agricultural Management and Certification) IMF International Monetary Fund INESC Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos (Institute for Socioeconomic Studies) IOs International Organisations IPC International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty ISOC Internet Society IT Information Technology LOSAN Lei Orgânica de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (Law of Food and Nutrition Security) MKSS Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (Association for the Empowerment of Workers and Peasants) MMV Medicines for Malaria Venture MP Member of Parliament MPP Medicines Patent Pool MSF Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) NAPHAM National Association for People Living with HIV/AIDS in Malawi



Abbreviations xv

NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations NSA National Security Agency OGP Open Government Partnership PB Participatory Budgeting PMDB Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) PT Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party) RAI Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems RETPS Rede pela Transparência e Participação Social (Network of Transparency and Social Participation) RIRs Regional Internet Registries SC Steering Committee of the Open Government Partnership SISAN Sistema Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (National Food and Nutrition Security Framework) SUAS Sistema Único de Assistência Social (System of Social Assistance) TB Tuberculosis TDF Tenofovir Disoproxil Fumarate TDF/FTC Tenofovir Disoproxil Fumarate/Emtricitabine TRIPS Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights UAMPA União das Associações de Moradores de Porto Alegre (Union of Residents’ Associations of Porto Alegre). UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights UGT União Geral dos Trabalhadores (General Workers’ Union) UN United Nations UNAIDS The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS UNICEF The United Nation’s Children Fund UNITAID International Drug Purchase Facility US The United States of America VGGT Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security WHO World Health Organisation WSIS UN World Summit on the Information Society WTO World Trade Organisation

Chapter 1

Introduction

NEW REALITIES, OLD STRUCTURES How to tackle the immense global challenges overwhelming humankind at the beginning of the 21st century? We are confronted with challenges which are no longer limited to a particular country, region or continent. With every passing day, the consequences of climate change in the guise of rising sea levels, droughts, floods and other extreme weather conditions become more threatening to the security and safety of every society on this planet. Every couple of years a new dangerous virus embarks on an aeroplane and travels the world with potentially disastrous consequences. The Ebola outbreak in Western Africa in 2014 was only the latest example of a virus which nowadays, given our globalised and interconnected world, has the potential to spread beyond its natural confines of a few isolated villages and frighten to death whole societies hundreds of thousands of kilometres away. And the clock is already ticking for the next global virus outbreak, the next environmental disaster, the next security crisis. The miserable living conditions of approximately one billion people on this planet represent another grave threat to the stability and security of countries in the developing and the developed world.1 The developed countries are particularly vulnerable to the massive waves of immigrants and refugees, crashing day after day on the high walls of fortresses like the United States (US) or the European Union (EU). And time and again even these high walls, the intimidating barbed wire or the menacing fences at the external borders of the US or the EU are not sufficient to wear down the desperate determination of those masses to seek shelter on these islands of relative wealth and calm in the midst of an all too often very stormy sea. Global terrorist networks are able to disrupt, from one moment to the other, the finely woven fabric of 1

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the affluent societies in the West, producing chaos and fear. And while the Internet provides the tools for global dissemination of information, news and knowledge, it also plays into the hands of terrorists and lunatics spreading hate speech, intolerance and ignorance. All this within the blink of an eye! In our ‘brave new world’ the once enormous distances between different world regions have shrunk so rapidly that global challenges affect us all – sometimes instantly as in the case of global health epidemics, sometimes more gradually as in the case of climate change. The problem: the contemporary intergovernmental system of nation-states has experienced enormous difficulties tackling those challenges which no longer respect the boundaries of the state. The states have repeatedly failed to come up with sustainable and long-term solutions to the grand challenges of our time. Zygmunt Bauman argued that ‘we presently find ourselves in a time of “interregnum”, when the old ways of doing things no longer work, the old learned or inherited modes of life are no longer suitable for the current conditio humana, but when the new ways of tackling the challenges and new modes of life better suited to the new conditions have not as yet been invented, put in place and set in operation’.2 When considering the current transformation processes in the global system, we may arrive at a similar conclusion. The institutions, structures and decision-making processes, which the main international actors of the 20th century put in place to govern interstate relations, are no longer adequate to solve the crises, problems and challenges at the outset of the 21st century. David Held calls this situation the ‘paradox of our time’, when ‘the collective issues we must grapple with are of growing extensity and intensity and, yet, the means for addressing these are weak and incomplete’.3 What can be done to tackle these overwhelming challenges? OLD STRUCTURES, UNDEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES The global order at the outset of the 21st century suffers from severe structural injustices and a profound democratic deficit. Many scholars emphasise the neo-colonial and neo-imperial traits of the contemporary global order caused by the Western powers and the Western-dominated international organisations created after the Second World War, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) – since 1995, the World Trade Organisation (WTO).4 James Tully, for example, characterises the contemporary global order with the following words: First, it is a complex form of rule that governs imperialized peoples by means other than formal colonies (that is, by a combination of informal and indirect



Introduction 3

means). Second, the hegemonic great powers and their accompanying institutions recognize the imperialized or subalternized peoples as self-governing constitutional states and they interact with them on this basis, yet within the deeply unequal hegemon-subaltern relations of economic, political, legal, educational, and military power laid down over centuries of western expansion (that is, an interactive mode of governance among unequal sovereigns rather than the unilateral domination of formal colonialism).5

The structural injustices caused by these neo-colonial and neo-imperial activities of the Western powers are seen as a major reason for the stubborn existence of poverty and misery in the developing world.6 And more than that, the profoundly undemocratic and unjust nature of the global order represents a major reason for the repeated failures of the intergovernmental system to find sustainable and long-term solutions to the kaleidoscope of transboundary challenges. Many international organisations such as the IMF or the World Bank are still in the firm grip of the established powers; the UN Security Council no longer represents the distribution of power among the nationstates since the beginning of the 21st century; and the WTO, at its creation a clear instrument to further the interests of the Western states, is currently blocked due to the irreconcilable positions of the major trading blocs, the US and the EU, on the one side and the developing countries on the other side. In the face of these impasses, gridlocks and stalemates, an increasing number of scholars argue that international organisations, global processes and mechanisms need to be gradually democratised to unlock the inherent potential of all the different actors involved in today’s global system and create new ways of thinking and governing.7 Since global challenges affect everyone – every citizen, state and world region – much more voices need to be included in international decision-making processes and collective action.8 Apart from the powerful Western states, this would include developing countries, civil society organisations, social movements and local communities. Global governance mechanisms need to be redesigned to include meaningfully in their decision-making processes those actors and communities significantly affected by a transboundary problem such as environmental degradation, health epidemics or food insecurity.9 Democratic structures may help to make global mechanisms more responsive to the interests and needs of those actors, communities and citizens currently excluded from the intergovernmental decision-making processes; increase the states’ accountability vis-à-vis civil society; and, consequently, reduce existing injustices and inequalities.10 Many scholars argue that civil society actors are a central democratising force.11 Through global mobilisation efforts and the creation of transnational advocacy networks, civil society actors have been able to raise awareness about global challenges, frame international discourses and shape the

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international agenda. In this process, civil society actors have contributed to the generation of new norms; the reinforcement of international human rights legislation; the adoption of groundbreaking treaties, such as the Mine Ban Treaty; or the creation of new international bodies such as the International Criminal Court. Hence, civil society actors can be regarded as a highly dynamic and vibrant force in global governance, fighting very often at the forefront of global challenges. In 2014, during the most severe Ebola outbreak in history, it was the civil society organisation Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) that reacted faster than any state or international organisation to the tragedies unfolding in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The courageous actions of MSF and other civil society organisations during the Ebola outbreak probably avoided a global disaster with a deadly virus spreading from country to country and from continent to continent.12 Nonetheless, civil society actors are confronting a fundamental dilemma. Although they have an increased role to play in global politics and have become indispensable on many policy issues, they are still mostly left out of international decision-making mechanisms. In other words, it is still the states that primarily control the levers of power in global governance, be it in the decision-making processes of international organisations, international summits or international negotiations. Civil society actors are all too often relegated to an observer or advisory role in the arenas of global politics without real decision-making power. It is certainly true that the role of the state as the primary actor in global politics has been undermined by the rise of new nonstate actors. And yet civil society actors still have a long way to go in securing a place among the states at the high tables of global power politics where the ultimate decisions are taken. Civil society organisations do have a crucial role to play in democratising global politics, but they ultimately rely on the support of governments to create more just and democratic global governance mechanisms.13 As a consequence, for any realistic study on global democracy the states need to be included as indispensable actors. In the literature, several theoretical approaches emphasise the key role of the state. Scholars embracing the theoretical model of a world confederation argue that only democratic states can promote global democracy.14 The empirical evidence, however, refutes this argument. The most powerful Western states, which still largely control the dominant arenas of global politics, are all liberal democracies. Ironically, these democracies bear enormous responsibility for the undemocratic and unjust nature of the global order. Another current of scholars argues in favour of a cosmopolitan democracy, a global democracy consisting of global democratic institutions such as a world government and a world parliament.15 Although fascinating as an idea, its realisation will probably remain confined, for the foreseeable future, to the imagined worlds of science fiction.



Introduction 5

Over the last few years, a third approach, called polycentric democracy, has gained traction in the debate.16 In contrast to a world confederation and a cosmopolitan world state, polycentric democracy unfolds its democratisation potential due to the polycentric, fragmented and networked nature of global governance. This approach argues that global governance can be gradually democratised on the basis of the interaction and cooperation of all the relevant actors in global governance, including state and non-state actors. And when democratisation processes are understood as processes which ‘aim to transform power relations into relations of shared authority’,17 the cooperation efforts of all these actors play a fundamental role in the creation of more democratic global governance structures. As a consequence, the networked and polycentric nature of global governance, where countless state and nonstate actors including international organisations and agencies, corporations, NGOs, social movements, philanthropic foundations and individual experts compete for power and influence, has opened up new opportunities for the democratisation of global governance mechanisms and processes. When considering the polycentric nature of global governance, the approach of polycentric democracy appears to be the most realistic theoretical blueprint on which to base empirical studies of global democracy. In this context, scholars have almost exclusively focused on the role of civil society actors.18 What this literature has almost completely ignored so far is the role emerging democracies from the global South play in collaborating with other state and non-state actors to democratise global governance mechanisms. This omission is not particularly surprising, given the Western-centred focus of most of the research on global democracy. In the face of the profound transformation processes in the global system, the relevant role of democracies from the developing world can no longer be ignored. Those state actors who have dominated the international system for the last few decades (and centuries) face new competition. Several democratic states from the global South like Brazil or India are playing an emerging role in several sectors of global governance, while other (more authoritarian) states like Russia or China challenge the West in military and economic terms.19 These non-Western state actors have formed alliances to confront the Western states and challenge their dominant position. Brazil, India and South Africa created the IBSA Alliance in 2003 to strengthen South-South cooperation among these three democracies from the global South.20 The BASIC Alliance among Brazil, South Africa, India and China has stirred up international climate negotiations.21 And the BRICS Alliance, formed among Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, has gained political and economic clout since its first summit in 2009.22 These alliances demonstrate that non-Western state actors, which were either partly or entirely colonised by European powers, have an increasing role to play in global politics. With their growing influence, the

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democratic states of Brazil and India have turned into highly relevant actors in debates on global democracy. The few studies that do take these new democratic state actors seriously analyse their global democratisation efforts from the following two angles: scholars either equate democracy promotion with interventionism in other countries or examine the position of emerging democratic states like Brazil towards authoritarian regimes based on official statements or the voting behaviour in the UN Security Council.23 Since Brazil, for instance, is well known for its non-interventionist stance (as other current emerging powers are), these studies are very critical towards Brazil’s potential democratisation efforts in the global system. In the literature, however, widespread doubt exists about any positive democratisation effects of interventions.24 In the same vein, examining, for instance, Brazil’s position towards authoritarian regimes in international organisations does not tell us how to create more democratic global governance mechanisms or even if Brazil is more or less democratic in its foreign policy than other democratic states. In other words, no serious efforts have been undertaken to explore the activities of an emerging democratic state actor like Brazil in contributing to the creation of more democratic global governance mechanisms. BRAZIL: A LABORATORY FOR DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTS IN THE TROPICS Since the beginning of this century, Brazil has assumed an ever more important role in various areas of global governance ranging from health through food security to energy.25 Brazil’s emerging role in global governance is intrinsically linked to the continuous consolidation of its democracy since the early 1980s. With the end of the military dictatorship in 1985 and the passing of a new democratic constitution in 1988, the country has been living the longest and most stable period of a full democracy in its entire history. Over these last three decades, Brazil has made great strides in developing, improving and consolidating its democracy. Several democratic experiments have even made international headlines. One of them, the World Social Forum, is arguably the most famous one. Created as a counter-initiative to the World Economic Forum by several Brazilian activists and NGOs with the support of the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC), the World Social Forum has become a recognised platform for civil society organisations and social movements from all around the world to discuss and debate more just and democratic solutions to the world’s problems and challenges.26 The first World Social Forum took place in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre in 2001 and has ever since been



Introduction 7

organised in different places all around the developing world, including cities like Mumbai, Tunis or Dakar. Initially a Brazilian idea and invention, in more than one decade of its existence, the World Social Forum has become a genuinely global process and the largest gathering of civil society organisations, social movements, academics and citizens to debate alternatives to the contemporary global political and economic system.27 This book concentrates on four other democratic experiments which also originated in Brazil and have become role models in their contributions to more social justice and democratic values over the past 30 years. The first experiment refers to the participatory budgeting programme which was conceived in the late 1980s, also in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, and has ever since spread to hundreds of other cities and municipalities in Brazil and all around the world.28 Participatory budgeting, if done correctly, can contribute to social change and the promotion of democratic values when community organisations, mostly from marginalised and poorer neighbourhoods of a city or town, decide together with representatives of the municipal government on the municipal budget and the management of resources.29 Brazil’s National AIDS Programme constitutes another innovative experiment which allowed the country in the 1980s and 1990s to regain control over its devastating AIDS epidemic. Pushed by civil society, the government decided in 1996 to distribute AIDS drugs for free and develop a rights-based approach to tackling HIV/AIDS, involving an international strategy in alliance with civil society actors, social movements and other developing countries to reduce the exorbitant prices of AIDS drugs.30 The third democratic experiment refers to Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy and the construction of a National Food and Nutrition Security Framework, which actively contributed to a significant reduction of hunger and poverty rates in Brazil. The Zero Hunger strategy and the framework have made international headlines due to their rights-based approach and the active participation of civil society actors in all aspects of the strategy and the institutionalised framework.31 The last and most recent democratic experiment this book concentrates on refers to the Regulatory Framework for the Internet. This framework was officially signed into law by Brazil’s then President Dilma Rousseff in 2014 and establishes minimum conditions such as civil rights, duties and principles for the use of the Internet in Brazil.32 The drafting process of the final text involved several consultation processes, which were carried out with the innovative use of the Internet.33 The framework was praised as an exemplary model in the governance of the Internet by civil society organisations worldwide and famous Internet pioneers such as Vint Cerf, Tim Berners-Lee or Steve Crocker.34

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All these examples emphasise that Brazil is a highly fascinating laboratory for democratic experiments and innovation. And yet it cannot be ignored that Brazil continues to be one of the most unequal countries in the world, a situation that creates enormous obstacles for the development of democracy in the country. The Global Democracy Ranking of 2015 puts Brazil, in terms of the quality of its democracy, in place 43, which is still a long way from highly developed democracies such as Germany (7), the United Kingdom (12), France (14) or other Latin American countries such as Uruguay (22), Chile (25) or Costa Rica (28). At the same time, Brazil is far ahead of other big emerging economies from the developing world, such as Indonesia (65), India (68), the Russian Federation (98) or China (106).35 The results of this ranking illustrate Brazil’s democratic progress but do not conceal the deficits still plaguing Brazil’s democracy. Grave human rights violations are still widespread in the country. The most obvious manifestations of human rights violations in Brazil refer to slave labour and the discriminatory treatment of indigenous people, women and black people. Slave labour, including child labour, is still frequent in the production of sugarcane, cotton and other agricultural products; mining; cattle farming or the deforestation industry.36 After centuries of unspeakable suffering on the hands of the Portuguese colonisers, Brazil’s democratic constitution of 1988 officially guarantees the human rights of indigenous people. Although in the last decade some advances have been made in securing land and protecting the remaining indigenous tribes, their rights are still being trampled on for land and economic profit.37 In 2015, Brazilian public prosecutors accused the former left-wing government under Dilma Rousseff of committing an ethnocide against indigenous tribes living in an area in the Amazon Rainforest where currently construction work is ongoing for the socalled Belo Monte dam, planned to be one of the largest hydroelectric dam complexes worldwide. Apart from disastrous environmental damages, the construction of the dam involves the strategic elimination of the livelihoods of several indigenous tribes who call that area their homeland.38 Brazil also remains a very dangerous place for women and black people. In fact, with a rate of 4.8 homicides per 100,000 women, Brazil is the fifth most dangerous country for women after Russia, Guatemala, Colombia and El Salvador.39 The situation for black people (men and women) is not much better. Even more than 100 years after the official abolition of slavery in 1888, a huge majority of black people still lives at the bottom of society exposed to racism, discrimination and structural injustice.40 Apart from grave human rights violations, abysmal inequality and social injustice remain a fundamental characteristic of Brazil’s society. Even after having made huge strides in fighting hunger and poverty over the last decade, in terms of income distribution, the country still boasts one of the highest levels of inequality worldwide.41



Introduction 9

Endemic political corruption is another grave problem in Brazil. A fundamental characteristic of the political system for centuries, it continues to be a persistent phenomenon of Brazilian politics today.42 Corruption scandals have tainted all governments since Brazil’s re-democratisation. One president, Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–1992), even had to resign because of an impeachment process brought against him on the basis of corruption charges. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010), the charismatic president of Brazil’s economic boom years of the last decade, had to face accusations of corruption in the context of the so-called Mensalão scandal, which led to the imprisonment of several MPs of Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores).43 The government under Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016) became completely paralysed in the wake of a gigantic corruption scandal, dubbed Car Wash (Lava Jato), involving Brazil’s state-owned oil company Petrobras, leading construction companies and countless politicians from the parties in the ruling coalition government.44 Dilma Rousseff, the second president after Fernando Collor de Mello to suffer an impeachment process, was impeached on charges of crimes of fiscal responsibility, unrelated to the corruption scandal. The gigantic corruption scandal, however, was an important factor in politically dynamising the whole impeachment process. And almost all members of the interim government, including Michel Temer who succeeded Rousseff in Office, also face serious corruption charges. Political corruption pervades almost all parties and all levels of government in Brazil sustained by a political culture of government secrecy, patriarchy and nepotism. All these deficits are a sad heritage of Brazil’s dark history of domination and oppression at the hands of the Portuguese colonisers, and, after Brazil’s independence, a tiny (but very powerful) Brazilian elite whose grip on the country has remained firm and steady. When Pedro Álvares Cabral, the commander-in-chief of the Portuguese fleet, landed in 1500 on the northeast coast of present-day Brazil, the territory was taken hostage by the greed of the Portuguese crown and the religious fanaticism of the Catholic Church. The Portuguese colonisers turned their new colony into a place of unspeakable atrocities, appalling cruelties and revolting barbarities for centuries to come. As a result of the merciless exploitation of the colony’s abundant natural resources (wood, sugar, rubber, etc.), the indigenous tribes were almost completely extinguished and millions of Africans were shipped to the colony and sold into slavery.45 The Portuguese colonisers built up very powerful institutional relationships of oppression and domination, which were taken over by the Brazilian elite after the independence of the colony from Portugal in 1822 and survive until this very day, simmering under the surface of a now democratic Brazil.46 Given these historical circumstances, Brazil’s democracy has evolved in a

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context of extreme inequalities, unbearable injustice and perverse violence. Brazil’s society has always been a society of irreconcilable contrasts, shocking contradictions and scandalous paradoxes. Notwithstanding these severe obstacles, Brazil’s democracy has been under continuous and uninterrupted construction for 30 years, a democracy that is built and rebuilt on countless construction sites. Throughout the last three decades, some of Brazil’s construction sites proved to be a fertile breeding ground for some very encouraging experiments in participatory democracy. Those experiments – such as participatory budgeting programmes, the National AIDS Programme, the Zero Hunger strategy or the Regulatory Framework for the Internet – involving actors from the government and civil society contributed to strengthening Brazil’s democracy and became known as exemplary role models worldwide. In its rise to a more influential power at the global stage, Brazil attempted to integrate the lessons learned from these democratic experiments in its foreign policy approach. Over the last ten years, the Brazilian government has played an active role in the creation or reform of four global governance mechanisms seen as highly innovative and exemplary for democratic global governance. In 2006, Brazil with other five states created UNITAID, a highly successful mechanism for the reduction of drug prices for neglected diseases. In 2009, Brazil, together with other states and civil society actors, reformed the outdated and lethargic Committee on World Food Security. In 2011, Brazil, together with the US, announced the launch of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) with the aim of promoting democratic values and fight government secrecy. And, in 2014, Brazil almost single-handedly organised a global conference on Internet governance, the NETmundial Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance, which for the very first time in the history of global Internet governance adopted a human rights framework in collaboration with other states, civil society actors, companies, the technical community and individual experts. In light of these developments, Brazil represents a highly relevant case study for global democracy. Brazil’s democracy has evolved in a context of extreme inequalities and has faced serious development challenges such as health epidemics, poverty, hunger and the consequences of climate change. In other words, Brazilian challenges are global challenges. The very same words we use to characterise the realities of Brazil’s society may also be used to describe the realities of our global society. As part of the development of Brazil’s democracy, several innovative and original experiments of participatory democracy have emerged, which are based on the cooperation of government representatives and civil society actors to advance several core characteristics of democracy, namely the promotion of human rights, the creation of participatory mechanisms for civil society actors and accountability mechanisms.



Introduction 11

We stumble upon striking similarities when comparing the working mechanisms of these national democratic experiments with UNITAID, the Committee on World Food Security, the OGP and the NETmundial Meeting. Therefore, this book attempts to provide new answers to the urgent question of how global challenges can be tackled in a more democratic and just way. The book argues that the logic underlying those four democratic experiments in Brazil and those in global governance may teach us valuable lessons about how to democratise the global governance system. In the same vein, this study aims to evaluate Brazil’s potential in contributing to a gradual democratisation of global governance. This book holds that a focus on Brazil’s activities at the national and global level can help us better understand how to conceive of global democracy in three important ways. First, an analysis of several internationally acclaimed democratic experiments in Brazil may tell us more about how democratic processes unfold in a context of extreme injustice and inequality. Second, an analysis of four relatively young and innovative global governance mechanisms, which were created or reformed over the last ten years with the active participation of Brazil and other state and non-state actors, may tell us more about how to achieve more democratic global governance mechanisms. Third, a thorough analysis of Brazil’s democratic activities may emphasise the relevance of an emerging democratic state from the global South in contributing to a more democratic global governance system. By looking at several democratic experiments in Brazil (at the national level) and global governance (at the global level), I aim to show that in a context of enormous power asymmetries and social inequalities, (global) governance mechanisms may be successfully democratised through a particular institutional framework which is supported and sustained by the joint activities of state and non-state actors. This institutional framework should be designed to (1) promote human rights and transnational solidarity, (2) create participatory mechanisms for non-state actors to participate in the core decision-making processes and (3) establish accountability mechanisms to hold state and non-state actors accountable for their actions. The effectiveness of this institutional framework depends on the joint activities of governments and civil society actors, its most important participants. The more willing both governments and civil society actors are to support this framework, the more effective it will be in promoting democratic values such as human and social rights, social justice and an equal participation of all those actors involved. Given the massive power imbalances between state and non-state actors, I also argue that without the activities and decisions of progressive governments in promoting, enforcing and sustaining democratic governance mechanisms, no substantial progress is possible in this respect.

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ORGANISATION OF THE BOOK In the challenging endeavour of finding realistic pathways to the democratisation of global processes and mechanisms, this book wanders off beaten paths. The current transformation processes in global governance and the rise of new democracies from the global South are revealing new pathways in the thicket of the debate on global democracy. Therefore, this book explores Brazil’s democratising potential by examining several democratic experiments which unfolded in Brazil over the last 30 years and, much more recently, at the global level with significant Brazilian input. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical underpinning of the book and discusses how the mechanisms and processes of the current global governance system can be possibly democratised. The chapter starts with a brief characterisation of the current global governance system and explains the primary features which any approach towards more democracy at the global level needs to take into account. After that, the chapter presents the dominant approaches to global democracy in the literature and distinguishes between the understanding of global democracy as an ideal model of a world state (federalism, con-federalism and institutional cosmopolitanism) and as an incremental process leading to more people-power at the global level. Then, the chapter clarifies why this book embraces the understanding of democracy as an incremental process leading to more people-power at the global level. In this context, the chapter briefly looks back to the roots of democracy. Based on the understanding of democracy as people-power, the chapter then introduces a theoretical framework, with three indicators of people-power to assess the democratic nature of UNITAID, the Committee on World Food Security, the OGP and the NETmundial Meeting. These indicators refer to the promotion of human rights and transnational solidarity, the creation of participatory mechanisms and the establishment of accountability mechanisms. The following empirical analysis moves on in a chronological way, examining first the international drug purchase facility UNITAID (created in 2006), then the Committee on World Food Security (reformed in 2009), thereafter the OGP (launched in 2011) and, as the last case study, the NETmundial Meeting (organised in 2014). Chapter 3 turns to the first case study, examining Brazil’s role in the international drug purchase facility UNITAID and to which extent the mechanism can be seen as a successful democratic experiment in global governance. The chapter starts with a brief overview of the main pillars of Brazil’s National AIDS Programme, explores to which extent the Brazilian government’s actions at UNITAID were guided by its national AIDS approach and sheds light on the mechanism’s democratic and innovative aspects. In this context,



Introduction 13

the chapter analyses how UNITAID has contributed to promoting peoplepower on the basis of the three indicators mentioned earlier. This analysis is based on policy documents, monitoring reports and websites related to the activities of UNITAID. In addition, the chapter relies on expert interviews carried out with key participants in the decision-making mechanisms of UNITAID, from the Brazilian government and civil society. Chapter 4 moves on to examining Brazil’s contribution to the democratic practices in the Committee on World Food Security (CFS). First, the chapter provides a brief overview of the principal developments, the structure and key players of Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy and the construction of the National Food Security and Nutrition Framework. After that, the chapter turns to the reformed Committee on World Food Security, shedding light on its reform process, its new structures and major achievements since 2009. In this context, the chapter highlights Brazil’s role in the reformed CFS and examines to which extent the Brazilian delegation contributed to the democratic practices of the committee by promoting human rights and transnational solidarity, creating participatory structures and establishing accountability mechanisms. The analysis of this chapter is also based on a variety of policy documents, civil society monitoring and review reports and websites related to the activities of the CFS. In addition, the analysis draws on the diplomatic wires and reports written by the Brazilian delegation between 2009 and 2016 on the major activities of the CFS and the delegation’s positions in those years. This rich diplomatic source is compounded by expert interviews carried out with the Alternate Permanent Representatives of the Brazilian delegation in those years. Chapter 5 sheds light on open government and participatory budgeting. By presenting the key characteristics of Brazil’s participatory budgeting programmes, this chapter aims to highlight the fact that the OGP shares many similarities with these programmes which originated in Brazil in the 1980s. Thereafter, the chapter traces the development of the OGP, explains the founding members’ reasons for creating such a partnership and focuses on Brazil’s national OGP processes. Here, the analysis relies on policy documents, civil society monitoring reports and websites related to the activities of the OGP and its main actors, the governments and civil society organisations. In this context, the chapter draws on expert interviews carried out with representatives of the Brazilian Office of the Comptroller General and civil society organisations that played a key role in the creation and development of the national OGP processes in Brazil. Chapter 6 passes on to Internet governance and aims to demonstrate to which degree the organisation of the NETmundial Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance was directly inspired by Brazil’s Regulatory Framework for the Internet. The chapter briefly traces the development

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of the regulatory framework in Brazil and examines the principal democratic features of the NETmundial Meeting, which led to the unprecedented adoption of a Human Rights Charter for the Internet. The analysis is based on policy documents, websites and secondary literature related to the organisation of the NETmundial Meeting. The chapter also uses interviews, opinion pieces and articles published by different participants involved in the organisation of the NETmundial Meeting, including representatives of Brazilian ministries, Brazil’s Internet Steering Committee, academia and transnational civil society organisations. Chapter 7 concludes the book by discussing Brazil’s role in contributing to the democratisation of global governance in the context of the four mechanisms analysed. The chapter debates to which extent the four global mechanisms examined may serve as encouraging experiments in global democracy and point to new pathways in collective efforts to democratise global processes. The chapter compares the achievements and deficits of these mechanisms, identifying similarities and differences, and elaborates on how these deficits may be resolved. The chapter also discusses the relationship between democratisation and power politics and sheds light on the specific roles of governments and civil society actors. With respect to the Brazilian role, the chapter characterises Brazil’s democratic performance in the four case studies and explains how relevant the respective national programmes have been in this regard as guidance for a more democratically oriented Brazilian foreign policy. After the discussion of the results, the chapter ends with some final considerations of Brazil’s future prospects of rethinking global democracy. NOTES 1 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights. 2 Bauman, Liquid Modernity, 1. 3 Held, ‘Reframing Global Governance’, 157. 4 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law; Easterly, The White Man’s Burden; Harvey, The New Imperialism; Nicolaïdis et al., Echoes of Empire. 5 Tully, ‘Modern Constitutional Democracy and Imperialism’, 464. 6 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights; Sen, The Idea of Justice; Young, Responsibility for Justice. 7 Archibugi et al., Global Democracy; Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights; Gould, Interactive Democracy; Held, Democracy and the Global Order; Scholte, Building Global Democracy?; Macdonald, Global Stakeholder Democracy. 8 Held, ‘Reframing Global Governance’, 159. 9 Gould, Interactive Democracy; Held, ‘Reframing Global Governance’; Macdonald, Global Stakeholder Democracy.



Introduction 15

10 Archibugi et al., ‘Introduction’, 6. 11 Glasius, The International Criminal Court; Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders; Scholte, Building Global Democracy? 12 Fraundorfer, ‘How to Confront the Threat of Ebola?’ 13 Fraundorfer, ‘Experiments in Global Democracy’. 14 Marchetti, Global Democracy. 15 Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens; Archibugi and Held, Cosmopolitan Democracy; Held, Democracy and the Global Order; Held, Cosmopolitanism. 16 Archibugi et al., Global Democracy. 17 De Sousa Santos, The Rise of the Global Left, 40. 18 Archibugi et al., Global Democracy; Scholte, Building Global Democracy? 19 Alexandroff and Cooper, Rising States, Rising Institutions; Fraundorfer, Brazil’s Emerging Role in Global Governance; Narlikar, New Powers. 20 Stuenkel, India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA). 21 Qi, ‘The Rise of BASIC in UN Climate Change Negotiations’. 22 Stuenkel, The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. 23 Carothers and Youngs, ‘Democracy Promotion in the Age of Rising Powers’; Piccone and Alinikoff, ‘Rising Democracies and the Arab Awakening’; Stuenkel, ‘Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy Promotion’. 24 See, for instance, Lu, Just and Unjust Interventions in World Politics; Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect; Singh Puri, Perilous Interventions. 25 Fraundorfer, Brazil’s Emerging Role in Global Governance. 26 Corrêa Leite, The World Social Forum; De Sousa Santos, The Rise of the Global Left. 27 Ibid.; Smith et al., Global Democracy and the World Social Forums. 28 Fedozzi, ‘Avaliação das Práticas de Construção de Orçamentos Públicos’. 29 De Sousa Santos, ‘Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre’; Wampler, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil. 30 Fraundorfer, Brazil’s Emerging Role in Global Governance, 30–85. 31 See Da Silva, del Grossi and Galvão de França, Fome Zero, 247–68. 32 CGI.br, O CGI.br e o Marco Civil da Internet. 33 Oliveira Santos Neto and Santos, ‘A Internet como Ferramenta Colaborativa’, 12. 34 CGI.br, O CGI.br e o Marco Civil da Internet; Roncolato, ‘Marco Civil’, 6. 35 The Global Democracy Ranking is based on various dimensions including the political, economic, environmental, gender, socio-economic quality, health and knowledge dimensions. All these dimensions are composed of several indicators which are weighted to different degrees. For instance, the seven indicators of the political dimension include political rights (25 per cent), civil liberties (25 per cent), gender gap (25 per cent), press freedom (10 per cent), the perception of corruption (10 per cent), the peaceful change of the head of government (2.5 per cent) and the peaceful political party change of the head of government (2.5 per cent). The best scores in the overall ranking were achieved by Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands in this order. See Campbell et al., Democracy Ranking 2015 (Scores). 36 Repórter Brasil, ‘Operações de Fiscalização de trabalho escravo’.

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37 Brum, ‘Decretem nossa extinção e nos enterrem aqui’; Ribeiro and Redondo, ‘O conflito do governo com indígenas na construção de 40 hidrelétricas na Amazônia’; Survival International, ‘Brazilian Indians’. 38 International Rivers, ‘Brazilian Public Prosecutors Denounce Ethnocide and Call for Judicial Intervention in Belo Monte’; Survival International, ‘Background Briefing’. 39 Waiselfisz, Mapa da Violência 2015. Homicido de Mulheres no Brasil, 72. 40 Secretariat of Strategic Issues (Presidency of the Republic), ‘Banco de dados mostra situação da população negra no país’. 41 World Bank, Inequality and Economic Development in Brazil; World Bank, ‘Gini Index (World Bank Estimate)’. 42 Power and Taylor, Corruption and Democracy in Brazil. 43 Fraundorfer and Llanos, ‘Der Mensalão-Korruptionsskandal mit weitreichenden Folgen für Brasiliens Demokratie’. 44 The Economist, ‘Corruption in Brazil’; Schoenberg and Katz, ‘Petrobras “Carwash” Probe Said to Bring $2.5 Billion Bribe Fine’. 45 For more information on Brazil’s colonial history, see Bethell, Colonial Brazil. 46 The official abolishment of slavery in Brazil in 1888 did nothing to free the former slaves from these relationships of oppression and domination with their masters. Instead, slavery continued in different guises. See, for example, Wood, Black Milk; Fausto and Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil; Fernandes, O negro no mundo dos brancos.

Chapter 2

Democratising Global Governance

The international system has always been characterised as an environment of hostility, aggression and violence where concerns for justice and democracy lose out against the national interests of powerful states. The current global order has its roots in the colonial age when the most powerful European nations built their glorious empires on the bloodstained foundations of exploitation, genocide and the enslavement of millions of people around the world, particularly in the global South. Our global order today, which emerged after the end of the Second World War and a devastated Europe, has repeatedly been described as neo-colonial and neo-imperial. The structures of the global system, with the UN system and other international organisations and mechanisms, have been predominately shaped and fashioned by the powers of Europe and North America. This decades- or even centuries-long institutionalisation of European and North American dominance and power on the global stage has led to a situation where processes of democracy and social justice are extremely precarious, if not entirely absent. Hence, it is not surprising that any ideas about the effective democratisation of the international system have repeatedly been derided as illusionary and utopian. The beginning of the 21st century, however, is witnessing first manifestations of major transformations to upset the established order. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia, its successor state, is returning to the chessboard of power politics, aggressively reclaiming its traditional role as a global power. Further to the east, China, traditionally called the Middle Kingdom (or the Central Kingdom), is spectacularly emerging to become the new middle of the world, rivalling the status of the US as the world’s superpower. In the same region, India is also flexing its muscles asserting a stronger presence in global power politics. And in the south of the American continent, Brazil, a country that had been primarily created and shaped by 17

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the European colonisers, under brutal force and domination, has also risen to some prominence, turning into another central chess player in the new global power game. Russia, China, India and Brazil, all giants on their own, are ready to play with those giants who have shaped the rules of the game for the last few centuries. Under these new circumstances, does it make sense to bring forward new ideas on how to gradually democratise the global system? This chapter discusses on a theoretical basis how the mechanisms and processes of the current global system can be realistically democratised. The chapter starts with a brief characterisation of the current global governance system and explains the primary features which any approach towards more democracy at the global level needs to take into account. After that, the chapter presents the dominant approaches to global democracy in the literature and distinguishes between the understanding of global democracy as an ideal model of a world state (federalism, con-federalism and institutional cosmopolitanism) and as an incremental process leading to more peoplepower at the global level. Then, the chapter clarifies why this book embraces the understanding of democracy as an incremental process leading to more people-power at the global level by briefly looking back to the roots of democracy. Based on the understanding of democracy as people-power, the chapter then introduces a theoretical framework with three indicators, which will guide the empirical part of the book. These indicators refer to the promotion of human rights and transnational solidarity, the creation of participatory mechanisms and the establishment of accountability mechanisms. The theoretical framework will assess if UNITAID, the Committee on World Food Security, the Open Government Partnership and the NETmundial Meeting can be regarded as democratic global governance mechanisms and to which extent the Brazilian government has contributed to democratic practices in these mechanisms. THE PECULIARITIES OF THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM The global governance system today combines international, transnational and global characteristics at the same time. While intergovernmental approaches involving intergovernmental organisations and interaction between states still dominate the global system, the increasing influence of a broad range of non-governmental organisations, networks and movements has made the system much more complex. The rise of these new and non-traditional actors, compounded by the emergence of a variety of global challenges which do not respect the boundaries of the state, has seriously shaken up the Westphalian order of nation-states, which has been in place for more than 300 years.



Democratising Global Governance 19

The key dilemma of the global governance system today lies in the fact that the leading intergovernmental organisations and mechanisms created over the course of the second half of the 20th century, including the UN system, are no longer able to respond effectively to challenges and problems which today are of a genuinely planetary scale. No state or intergovernmental organisation alone has the power to find sustainable and long-term solutions to challenges such as the consequences of climate change, the global spread of health epidemics or any other issue affecting humanity as a whole. The new realities at the beginning of the 21st century have seriously challenged the intergovernmental approach, which was promoted by the Westphalian Treaty in 1648 and remained virtually undisputed until the end of the 20th century. The economic, political, social and cultural processes of globalisation after the Second World War, amounting to a profoundly interconnected and interdependent world, have accelerated the creation of transnational and global governance models. The cracks and fissures in the traditional intergovernmental order are visible everywhere. The international system of states is largely overburdened when it comes to tackling global health epidemics, the spread of dangerous viruses or the fight against neglected diseases.1 The very same system has become a lethargic and sluggish monster in confronting climate change.2 And both the authority and credibility of the intergovernmental bodies and organisations of the UN system have repeatedly been undermined by stubborn inaction on the part of the governments, lacking efficiency and outright failure.3 In the absence of decisive action from states and intergovernmental organisations, non-state actors, transnational civil society movements and transnational advocacy networks have increasingly tried to fill this void of commitment and distinguish themselves in confronting global problems. For instance, in the 1990s a transnational movement of civil society actors was crucial in the adoption of a global ban on anti-personal landmines, the so-called Mine Ban Treaty.4 In the same decade, a transnational movement of civil society actors was a driving force behind the creation of the International Criminal Court in 2002, a landmark achievement in the history of international law.5 During the Ebola epidemic in 2014, the civil society organisation Médecins Sans Frontières, together with other minor civil society organisations, were the first to act in the West African countries of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, and prevented with their courageous activities a much more devastating global epidemic of a terrifying virus. It took almost half a year for the international community and the World Health Organisation to put together an international mission to tackle that crisis.6 In confronting a variety of neglected diseases such as malaria or tuberculosis, affecting millions of people in the global South, some of the

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most innovative responses have come from transnational advocacy networks like the TB Alliance, the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative or the Medicines for Malaria Venture. These networks consist of international organisations, private actors, civil society organisations and public health experts united in their battle to reduce the prices of drugs and accelerate activities of research and development.7 The mechanisms to be discussed later in this book figure prominently among those innovative, transnational responses to transboundary problems and challenges. The international drug purchase facility UNITAID is a highly successful transnational mechanism in the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the developing world. The Committee on World Food Security stands at the forefront of innovation in developing transnational approaches to the global challenge of food and nutrition insecurity. The Open Government Partnership aims to establish transnational rules for more open and inclusive government practices. And the NETmundial Meeting in 2014 represented a transnational effort to develop and adopt, for the first time, a Human Rights Charter for the Internet. Philanthropic foundations like the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation or the Clinton Foundation have turned into highly relevant actors in development issues such as health, poverty and climate change and on several occasions exercise more power and influence than some states.8 Private actors, such as big corporations or banks, can be so powerful today that they easily evade state regulations, influence whole governments and ruin the lives of millions of people as in the last financial crisis in 2008.9 And since the beginning of this century, the economic and political rise of state actors from the global South, such as China, India and Brazil, has added to this very complex picture of the global governance system. These are just some of the most poignant examples of the new realities of power and influence in the global system characterised by several scholars as polycentric global governance where ‘power is exercised not only by states but by a myriad of non-state actors, such as companies, business associations, specialized IOs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social movements and networks of experts’.10 As such, this polycentric and multi-actor system of global governance is sustained through ‘collective actions to establish international institutions and norms to cope with the causes and consequences of adverse supranational, transnational, or national problems’.11 This view neatly ties in with Rosenau’s classic definition of global governance as a process constituted by the activities, practices and the shared knowledge agreed upon by the majority of the actors involved.12 These new realities have gradually undermined one of the cornerstones of the Westphalian state system, the institution of sovereignty. Sovereignty in the traditional sense as ‘the supreme power of a single political authority



Democratising Global Governance 21

over all that is living and dead on its territory’13 has slowly made place for an understanding of sovereignty as ‘the degree to which . . . [states] can fulfill certain human rights obligations toward their populations’.14 This new notion of sovereignty, contingent on the fulfilment of the individual citizens’ human rights, puts human security and the protection of the human being in the spotlight of global politics at the expense of state security. Since the Nuremberg Trials in 1945/46 and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, this new notion has silently crept into the undergrowth of the international system, slowly but persistently reconfiguring its very fabric. This extraordinary reconfiguration contributed to the emergence of a global human rights regime with the adoption of countless human rights treaties, the creation of several human rights courts,15 cosmopolitan norms16 and the emergence of what may be called transnational law, which in Seyla Benhabib’s words ‘binds and bends the will of sovereign nations’.17 In this context, it is highly intriguing that the proper states are the principal authors of this changing reality. Again in Benhabib’s words, ‘although territorially bounded states are increasingly subject to international norms, states themselves are the principal signatories as well as enforcers of the multiple human rights treaties and conventions through which international norms spread’.18 This reality is very well exemplified by the mechanisms to be discussed in this book. In 2006, five governments joined forces and created the international drug purchase facility UNITAID. The Committee on World Food Security was reformed in 2008–2009 on the initiative of the FAO member-states. The idea for the Open Government Partnership was initially put forward by the US government, which was then joined by seven other governments and nine civil society actors to launch the partnership. The NETmundial Meeting in São Paulo in 2014 was proposed by the Brazilian government in collaboration with other non-state actors in global Internet governance. In other words, these four transnational mechanisms would not exist without the initiative and engagement from the states. The continuing role of the states as the most powerful actors in the global system does not change the fact that the creation, consolidation and implementation of human rights today is an expression of transnational law;19 that is, human rights treaties and conventions, international norms and laws are increasingly created and realised at different sites of governance involving different actors, be they states, civil society actors, companies or individual experts. For instance, the progressive realisation of the human right to health, which was considerably intensified over the last decade, is a clear expression of transnational law, involving all sorts of actors and networks at different sites of governance, including the WHO, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN General Assembly, UNAIDS, the WTO and other more specific mechanisms such as the UNITAID.20 In Isiksel’s words, ‘The novelty of

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the contemporary legal landscape derives in part from the fact that certain regimes and institutions at the sub-, supra-, and transnational levels can create new obligations, rights, and duties that bind states, individuals and other actors even in the absence of hierarchically ordered means of enforcement’.21 For democratic states, this is not necessarily bad news. Several scholars argue that the consolidation of cosmopolitan norms and transnational law at the global level, as uneven and fragmented as it still may be, has the potential to reinforce the democratic sovereignty of a state.22 After all, the proper states sign up to these treaties! It is widely recognised that social movements and civil society actors have turned into indispensable players in the emergence, consolidation and strengthening of cosmopolitan norms through transnational cooperation, mobilisation, monitoring and other activities.23 The creation of the International Criminal Court or the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty attests to this fundamental role. In the same vein, in all four mechanisms to be analysed in this book, civil society actors play an indispensable role. The ultimate power of civil society actors, however, should not be overstated. The intergovernmental structures of many international arenas clearly favour the governments and their representatives in the ultimate decision-making processes and much too often relegate civil society actors to a role of mere observers, advisors and onlookers. Yet, through their ability to mobilise, campaign and network across boundaries, actors from civil society have become fundamental to our understanding of the structures and processes of global governance today. As this brief mapping has illustrated, the premises of the contemporary global order differ in important respects from those of the state. At the global level, no institution exists which could serve as a universal basis for order and legitimacy due to the absence of an overarching authority, a world government, a universal constitution or a unified world society, often referred to as a global dêmos. Instead, order and legitimacy in this polycentric global governance system is constructed, maintained and reaffirmed through cumbersome and conflict-ridden collective action processes involving multiple actors with different degrees of influence and power in various political arenas. On some occasions, as in the four case studies to be discussed later on in this book, these processes may lead to the creation of transnational law and cosmopolitan norms beyond the state. IDEAL TYPES OF A DEMOCRATIC GLOBAL ORDER When taking into account the distinctive nature of the contemporary global order, it is hard to imagine how this system could possibly be democratised. As David Held succinctly points out, ‘There are plenty of reasons for



Democratising Global Governance 23

pessimism [which] include the fact that the essential political units of the world are still based on nation-states while some of the most powerful sociopolitical forces of the world escape the boundaries of these units’.24 Political scientists and philosophers have always tried to come to grips with this challenge. In the literature on global democracy, three major normative models have dominated the debate, which are generally described as federalism, confederalism and cosmopolitanism. The federalist model reaches back to Immanuel Kant’s idea of a perpetual peace among nation-states. In his essay of 1795 Zum ewigen Frieden (Perpetual Peace), Kant sketched out a peaceful international order based on free and republican nation-states which organise themselves in a league of nations to avoid war, interference and domination of one another.25 This basic idea was reflected in the creation of the League of Nations in 1920 after the upheavals of the First World War and the foundation of the United Nations Organisation in 1945 after the devastations of the Second World War: a federation of states based on the Westphalian principles of sovereignty and non-intervention to avoid domination and war. The League of Nations failed to prevent the catastrophes of the Second World War and was dismantled in 1946. Its successor organisation, the United Nations, is the only international organisation which unites all recognised states, but it is not necessarily a strong force to democratise the global system. While the UN General Assembly with its one-state-one-vote system comes closest to representing the idea of equality among all states, the membership of a considerable number of nondemocratic states raises doubts about the potential of the UN to democratise the global order. It is even more worrying that the UN is increasingly losing touch with the new realities of the global system, most poignantly reflected by the constellation of the UN Security Council, which seems to be stuck in the realities of the post–Second World War order.26 Notwithstanding these setbacks, some scholars are convinced of the usefulness of the federalist model to build a more democratic order. Raffaele Marchetti, for example, relies on the basic idea of federalism to develop what he calls cosmo-federalism.27 In the cosmo-federalist approach, democratic nation-states create a league of democracies to promote democracy through intergovernmentalism. As one example, Marchetti mentions the European Council of the European Union, which brings together the heads of the democratic governments of the European Union and sets the political agenda of the EU.28 At the global level, the UN General Assembly stands as the only body which comes close to the cosmo-federalist idea except for the circumstance that it unites democratic and undemocratic governments. But the UN General Assembly is largely incompetent in effectively confronting global challenges. In light of this considerable weakness, it is highly questionable if cosmo-federalism represents a feasible and convincing democratic approach

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to solving challenges which go far beyond the reach of mere intergovernmental councils and assemblies. Another group of scholars favours a con-federalist model to compensate for the weaknesses of the federalist model.29 Con-federalism reaches beyond the premises of the federalist model by proposing the creation of truly global institutions such as a world government, a world parliament and a world judiciary; that is, con-federalists propose a world state with a multi-tiered system consisting of a federal system of democratic states and complemented by supranational institutions, with the necessary authority to act on global issues. Such a con-federalist order would require the states to delegate some of their powers to supranational bodies, while they would keep those powers and authorities necessary for the governance of domestic issues. The real-world example of such a model is represented by the supranational elements of the European Union, namely the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European elections and the European parties. Since the European Commission holds executive power and represents the EU in international organisations and other bodies of the UN system, it can be considered as the EU’s government whose members are nominated by the EU member governments. The European Parliament with its European-wide elections and parties has far-reaching legislative powers on issues concerning the European Union as a whole and its member-states. In this light, the con-federalist model proposes a world confederation of nation-states with different layers of governance including the principle of subsidiarity, a global dêmos with global citizenship and global (supranational) institutions which have the authority and necessary powers to decide on supranational issues. The trouble with this model becomes apparent when we look at the democratic deficit of the supranational bodies of the EU. The members of the European Commission are legitimised by the governments and not by European citizens who have no direct influence on who may become a commissioner. The elections for the European Parliament suffer from constantly lower participation and voter turnout rates than in national elections. And given the fact that truly organic European parties do not exist, European elections are generally hijacked by national politicians who more often than not turn those elections into mere national referenda on sensitive national issues.30 Pan-European debates on proper European issues and challenges are rare. The alleged Pan-Europeanism, which the supranational European institutions are supposed to promote, is often additionally undermined by the national governments, using European institutions as scapegoats for the failures of national elites. In other words, what is severely lacking in the EU is people-power: the possibility of European citizens to influence and shape those institutions and their decision-making processes! The persisting challenges of the



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supranational bodies of the EU to legitimise themselves vis-à-vis European citizens and national governments are linked to this serious problem. While the governments of European nation-states have been successful in creating supranational, Pan-European institutions, Europe’s governmental leaders have been much less successful in forming a Pan-European dêmos, or a PanEuropean people, which clearly identifies itself as European. Instead, the huge majority of European citizens continue to align themselves with their national identities. In a similar vein, national leaders and governments continue to think and behave in national rather than European terms.31 If it is so immensely difficult to create a Pan-European identity among peoples who share similar political systems, levels of development and cultural origins, how outrageously difficult must it be to shape a global identity with a global dêmos, global citizenship and universal values? Certainly, the formation of a European dêmos is far from being impossible, let alone the formation of a global dêmos. And yet, these identity-building processes are long-lasting and cumbersome, extending over decades, if not centuries. As in the case of the federalist model, the con-federalist approach is not very helpful in debates on how to gradually democratise the contemporary global order and consequently cope with contemporary global challenges. Both models are based on premises which characterise an international, statecentric system with the states as the only actors responsible for solving global challenges. The contemporary global order is increasingly based on rather different premises which both the federalist and the con-federalist models largely disregard. Cosmopolitanism,32 the third model dominant in the literature, does take into account the new realities of the contemporary global order and recognises the fact that ‘the meaning and place of democratic politics have to be rethought in relation to a series of overlapping local, regional and global processes’.33 These processes refer in particular to the new realities of interconnectedness in different fields of human activities and the emergence of various actors, groups and movements from civil society with an impact on the functioning of the state and local, national and global decision-making mechanisms.34 Specifically, the cosmopolitan model aims to engage with the following three issues, as David Held argues: First, that the territorial boundaries of systems of accountability be recast so that those issues which escape the control of the nation-state – global financial flows, the debt burden of developing countries, environmental crises, elements of security and defence, new forms of communication and so on – can be brought under better democratic control; secondly, that the role and place of regional and global regulatory and functional agencies be rethought so that they might provide a more coherent and sharp focal point in public affairs: and

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thirdly, that the articulation of political institutions with the key groups, agencies, associations and organizations of the economy and civil society, national and international, be re-formed so that the latter become part of the democratic process – adopting a structure of rules and principles compatible with those of democracy.35

The model of cosmopolitan democracy critically engages with the new realities of a fragmented polycentric order and acknowledges that democracy at the global level needs to be rethought and reformulated with the following premises:36 the global system is made up of multiple and overlapping networks of different power relations. Cosmopolitan democracy is governed by a legal order, cosmopolitan democratic law, which emerges out of the diverse interconnections, networks and relations of power. Within this legal order, certain principles are seen as universal, delimiting individual and collective action. Law-making and law enforcement occurs at different places and levels with regional and international courts as important pillars of the cosmopolitan legal order. Collective action must be compatible with principles of social justice. Disputes among the actors of this cosmopolitan order must be settled peacefully with the use of force as the very last resort. And the citizens in this order can enjoy multiple membership in various communities within one global dêmos. The cosmopolitan order would be governed by a cosmopolitan democratic law37 which, different from international law, would be entrenched within and across borders, transcending the particular claims and interests of states and applying to the whole global community including states and citizens.38 In this sense, the cosmopolitan democratic law would complement, rather than replace, international law understood as ‘bundles of rights and obligations’39 enabling citizens ‘to participate on free and equal terms in the regulation of their own associations’.40 Held distinguishes between seven clusters of rights, namely health, social, cultural, civic, economic, pacific and political rights. While these seven clusters of rights41 overlap with those human rights stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights declarations, it is worth noting that Held also considers due process and equal treatment before the law, equal opportunities for deliberation and direct involvement or representation in political bodies as political rights. In the same vein, Held emphasises as economic rights a guaranteed minimum income, diverse forms of consumption and productive property and access to productive and financial resources. Thus, the democratic public law represents a ‘meta-framework’42 for the political, economic and social interactions within the global order of cosmopolitan democracy. What makes this proposal of a cosmopolitan democratic law so relevant for the contemporary global governance system is the fact that it encompasses all



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peoples and citizens of the globe and not only the states. At the same time, it is important not to misinterpret the cosmopolitan approach. Unlike the federalist and the con-federalist model, cosmopolitanism does not seek to establish ‘a single, unified, international state structure’.43 Instead, the cosmopolitan model proposes an institutional framework which encompasses the whole globe including states and citizens, recognising that besides the state other centres of power and authority exist which contribute to the making of the cosmopolitan order.44 In addition, the cosmopolitan model explicitly recognises the fact that ‘sovereignty can be stripped away from the idea of fixed borders and territories and thought of as, in principle, malleable time-space clusters’.45 Nonetheless, the cosmopolitan model seeks a unified vision in that ‘cosmopolitan law demands the subordination of regional, national and local “sovereignties” to an overarching legal framework, but within this framework associations may be self-governing at diverse levels’.46 In other words, while cosmopolitanism does advocate the existence of a global dêmos united by a universal framework, it does also recognise multiple citizenship in various cross-border communities. Thus, cosmopolitan democracy is based on the belief that ‘democracy within a single community and democratic relations among communities are deeply interconnected, and that new organizational and legal mechanisms must be established if democracy is to survive and prosper’.47 How can this model be brought alive in the current context of the global order? David Held envisages several short-term and long-term objectives in the fields of governance and economy/civil society necessary to establish a cosmopolitan democracy.48 Among the short-term governance objectives, he proposes, for instance, a reform of the UN Security Council, enhanced political regionalisation based on the model of the EU, the creation of international courts and the establishment of an international military force. Among the long-term governance objectives appear the entrenchment of the cosmopolitan democratic law, the creation of a global parliament, an interconnected global legal system and the creation of supranational institutions. Among the short-term objectives for economic and civil society relations, he proposes the promotion of non-market and non-state solutions, experimentation with different democratic organisational forms in the economy, limiting private ownership and the distribution of resources to the most vulnerable citizens and communities. The long-term objectives in the field of economy and civil society include the creation of self-regulating associations in civil society, a multi-sectoral and pluralised economy, a social framework for investment and, as figures among the suggested economic rights, a guaranteed basic income for all adults. When comparing the cosmopolitan model with the realities of the contemporary global order, it becomes obvious that it is still a long way to go for the

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global system to even come close to accomplishing the short-term objectives, such as a reform of the UN Security Council, the creation of international courts or more profound regional integration processes outside of Europe. In institutional terms, the integration project of the EU still comes closest to the idea of what the cosmopolitan model may look like on a global scale. While Held does not see the EU as a model for the whole world, he does argue that the cosmopolitan model can benefit from the experiences of the EU.49 And since the EU can be regarded as a laboratory for peace and democracy with multi-layered authority, multiple citizenship, a European court, cross-border communities and supranational institutions, in a sense cosmopolitanism is already practised in the EU, albeit falling short of cosmopolitan ideals.50 Here, it is important to emphasise that the EU suffers from serious democratic shortcomings, such as the substantial lack of participatory structures which would give European citizens a stronger voice in decision-making processes. A brief glance at the global stage makes it very clear that the global order is still very far from being cosmopolitan. And yet, contrary to the federalist and con-federalist models, the premises of the cosmopolitan model are largely compatible with the features of the contemporary global order. It might even be possible to discern the emergence of some ‘cosmopolitan moments’ in the present global governance system. The global human rights regime emerging after the Second World War, the coining of the concept of human security and the creation of the International Criminal Court can all be seen as revolutionary developments which have gradually pushed the global system into a new orbit, away from the towering premises of the Westphalian order towards a more citizen-oriented and cosmopolitan global political system. At the same time, the increasing relevance of transnational law and cosmopolitan norms involving different state and non-state actors at different sites of governance may be regarded as a first step towards a cosmopolitan democratic law. In the same vein, there has been a growing debate on how to challenge the neo-liberal economic order and create more social justice on a global scale. The World Social Forum, a global platform for civil society organisations, social movements, activists and individual citizens, may represent the most successful example in this regard.51 And, not to forget, the rise of some major developing democracies from the global South, such as Brazil and India, has also contributed to putting topics of social justice higher on the international agenda.52 No less intriguing, we may be witnessing the first embryonic stage of the creation of a world parliament. In 2007, the UN launched a campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, a global network of parliamentarians and civil society organisations advocating the creation of a body of citizens’ representation at the UN.53 While no real progress has been made in the establishment of a UN citizens’ parliament so far, other initiatives have



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been more fruitful. On the initiative of political scientist Benjamin R Barber and supported by individual urban experts, transnational city networks, government representatives and current and former mayors, several planning sessions were held in 2013 and 2014 with the aim of creating a Global Parliament of Mayors.54 Finally, the inaugural session of the Global Parliament of Mayors took place in September 2016 in The Hague to debate cross-border challenges affecting cities all over the globe.55 Certainly, all these ‘cosmopolitan moments’ should not be overstated and it remains to be seen if they are more than just ‘moments’ in the long history of the international system, eventually swept away by the counterforces of nationalism and authoritarianism. Nevertheless, to some degree, these developments very much confirm that parts of David Held’s model of cosmopolitan democracy are highly relevant and, compared with the federalist and the con-federalist model, seem to be much more feasible in their realisation in the medium to long-term future. The primary challenge refers to the fact that a genuinely cosmopolitan democracy encompassing the whole planet and all living human beings with global institutions and an overarching cosmopolitan public law is out of reach. As a consequence, the model of cosmopolitan democracy, very much like the federalist and con-federalist models, represents an ambitious thought experiment in imagining a more peaceful and democratic world order in the future. Unfortunately, the cosmopolitan model, like the other two models, is unable to answer the principal question of how to democratise the profoundly undemocratic and almost feudal global order of today? The global order is still very far from creating a world parliament, a world government or a world judiciary with a global public law. And our ways of thinking and governing are still shaped by the gravitational field of the Westphalian idea. The dominant actors, the states, might have wavered under the changing conditions of the global system, but they have not fallen, with the Westphalian idea still heavily dominating the thinking of governments and peoples all around the world. PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AS PEOPLE-POWER Apart from the short-term and long-term objectives suggested by David Held, the cosmopolitan model does not answer the question of how to specifically democratise the here and now of the contemporary global order. To make headway on this particular question, it is instructive to return to the roots of democracy. For this, we need to travel back in time. The term ‘democracy’ is derived from the Ancient Greek word dêmokratia, meaning dêmos for

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‘people’ and kratos for ‘rule’, that is, the people’s rule or people-power. But it is very well known that in the Ancient Greek polis of Athens only a selected group of men were allowed to decide the fate of the polis, with slaves, foreigners, women and children excluded.56 It would also be misleading to assume that the Ancient Greeks invented what is the essence of democracy, namely people-power. Therefore, we need to look beyond the term ‘democracy’ (or dêmokratia) to understand and appreciate the very essence of its meaning. The Ancient Greeks may have invented the word ‘democracy’, but democratic practices are as old as humankind and not limited to human beings alone. Biologists have found evidence of rudimentary forms of democratic behaviour in our closest living relatives, the chimpanzees.57 Certainly, chimpanzees do not organise elections or cast votes on who is to be the next alpha-male of the group. But chimpanzees are capable of forming coalitions to counter the dominance and power of the alpha-male. For example, the abusing behaviour of a very aggressive and domineering alpha-male can lead to the formation of a coalition of hierarchically lower-ranked chimpanzees to counter this powerful male, keep him in check and even overthrow him. When several chimpanzees come together and form a coalition to counter the dominance of the alpha-male, this behaviour can be interpreted as a rudimentary form of people-power (or to be more adequate in this context: chimpspower), that is, the attempt of the many to prevent the abuse of power by the few, or, in the context of chimpanzees, the alpha-male. Apart from chimpanzees, there is mounting evidence that rudimentary democratic behaviour is much more natural in non-human animals than we might have thought. Sperm whales, for instance, make consensus decisions about their movements.58 Many other animals such as ants, birds or dolphins also take consensus decisions to decide about where and when to move. And beehives belong to the most democratic places in the animal kingdom, with honeybees as real masters in collective decision-making.59 Considering that rudimentary forms of people-power are commonplace among non-human animals, it should not come as a surprise that democratic behaviour has been part of our human history for millennia. Pre-historic hunter-gatherer societies, tens of millennia ago, were profoundly democratic in their day-to-day activities. Adult hunters treated each other as equals, took decisions in consensus and foiled attempts of any (male) individual to self-aggrandise himself and exercise power and dominance over the others. In cases when individuals did rise to power and dominance, the other male adults formed a coalition to either ostracise or kill the self-aggrandising individual. In less threatening cases, the group either ridiculed or just ignored this individual.60 William Shakespeare’s vivid play of Julius Caesar is one of countless examples in the history of humankind which illustrates that the resistance to



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the abuse of power by and overbearing dominance of one individual or a tiny elite is as fundamental a human trait as the lust for power and dominance. Therefore, the anthropologist Christopher Boehm argues that ‘democracy is basically a cultural solution to a practical problem that stems from our multifaceted genetic nature and everyday political situations’.61 He adds that ‘it has been our counter-dominant tendencies, shared with the other African great apes, that have helped to engender pre-emptive democratic checks and balances wherever we find them’.62 In other words, human and non-human animals had performed activities like power-sharing and collective decisionmaking thousands of years before the Ancient Greeks coined this behaviour as dêmokratia. These pre-emptive checks and balances have evolved, over the last 300 years, into the dominant form of democracy today, namely representative democracies in the state with a separation of power between the executive, the judiciary and the legislative and electoral processes in which the people have the possibility to empower or disempower their representatives in government. Here, it is important to realise that representative democracy based on elections represents just one expression of democratic practices. Democratic practices in their most basic expression are about (1) preventing the abuse of power by the few and (2) power-sharing by broadening the franchise of those who are involved in the decision-making process. When we return once more to the Athenian polis in Ancient Greece, we realise that this is exactly the great innovation dêmokratia was responsible for. While the Greek poleis were normally ruled by a few very powerful people from the Aristocracy, Kleisthenes’s reform of the aristocratic and oligarchic system of Athens broadened the franchise to the many (i.e., Athenian citizens which at that time were all adult males excluding women, children, slaves and foreigners) and made it much more difficult for the aristocratic and oligarchic few to abuse their power.63 This basic understanding of democracy as limiting the abuse of power and broadening the franchise (power-sharing) will help us to better understand and appreciate democratic practices at the global level. Practices in global governance mechanisms and processes can be characterised as essentially democratic when they are capable of opening up decision-making mechanisms for other actors in global governance, most importantly civil society actors, and when these practices contribute to preventing the abuse of power by the few, that is, powerful governments and companies. Along with these two basic characteristics of democratic practices, it is vital to bear in mind that democratic practices are always related to intensive power struggles. For the anthropologist Christopher Boehm democracy is ‘a solution to a practical problem’. For the hunter-gatherers, collective decisionmaking was a question of life and death and a highly practical solution in the

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hunting of large game.64 In a group of chimpanzees, coalition-forming serves to create a balance-of-power system and establish some stability among extremely competitive and hierarchic chimps.65 And the collective decisionmaking behaviour of bees, ants, birds, elephants and whales is fundamental in their daily struggle for survival. In other words, democratic practices, as imperfect as they may be, can be useful in tackling problems and challenges and thus guarantee the survival of a species. In this sense, can democratic practices at the global level contribute to the development of practical solutions to transboundary development challenges? When we understand democracy at the global level not as a ready-made institutional framework to be imposed on the international system but instead as practices promoting these basic characteristics with the ultimate goal of creating solutions to practical problems, then the notion of global democracy loses its utopian aura. Instead, global democracy, understood as democratic practices in its most basic sense, can be seen as a natural process in global governance with the potential to develop practical solutions to urgent global challenges. An increasing number of political scientists have developed ideas on how to conceptualise the notion of democratic practices at the global level. Dryzek and Stevenson, for example, hold that ‘democracy is not something that should be treated as either present or absent, but rather a matter of degree, and always a work in progress’.66 Urbinati distinguishes between democracy as ‘both a form of government and the political practice of participation and co-operation’.67 In this light, she emphasises that democracy ‘is also a form of political activity by the citizens that is primed to have an impact on people’s minds, behaviour, feeling, and language, even if and when it does not result in a good decision’.68 In the view of Adrian Little and Kate Macdonald, research focusing ‘on an incremental expansion of democratic practices’69 rather than a normative focus on ‘a transcendental model of wholesale systemic change’70 guarantees a more realistic approach to the study of global democracy. Similarly, Little and Macdonald emphasise that ‘the notion of democratic practices helps us to maintain our focus on evaluating how much work given institutions do in promoting democratic values, rather than assessing whether democratic values have been “fully” (or almost fully) realised’.71 What would such an ‘incremental expansion of democratic practices’ look like? Several scholars have concentrated on social mobilisation processes and the democratisation of global politics from below, focusing on the democratisation potential of civil society organisations and social movements.72 Others have suggested reforms of international organisations,73 the establishment of global judicial power74 and a more prominent role of the states.75 Carol Gould76 emphasises the importance of cross-border communities and transnational associations in the creation of collective or joint decision-making



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processes to successfully tackle transnational challenges more democratically. She advocates a multidimensional and interactive conception of global democracy which ‘should accommodate a diversity of existing forms of social organization, while still advancing more cosmopolitan frameworks of democracy, human rights, and global justice’.77 In her account, global governance mechanisms should be made more inclusive which would allow more public input from citizens and civil society actors, deliberative processes and transnational representation of those communities and citizens affected by particular decisions and policies.78 John Dryzek embraces the implementation of a form of deliberative democracy, a deliberative system, to democratise transnational decisionmaking processes. This deliberative system ‘is generally composed of multiple locations and practices that can be interpreted as together enabling the achievement of qualities we might seek in a more deliberative democracy’,79 such as practices leading to communication processes that are authentic, inclusive and have an impact on collective decisions. To put it shortly, the deliberative system advocates a more inclusive approach in the confrontation of global challenges, such as including a variety of marginalised voices from civil society in global mechanisms so that the powerful actors, like states and big corporations, would be forced to deliberate together with these new voices about possible solutions to global challenges.80 In practice, this would mean the establishment of activist gatherings, citizen forums and select platforms where citizens and other actors from global civil society can meet with representatives from governments and the private sector and, more importantly, have an impact on collective decisions made on particular transnational issues. The involvement of marginalised voices on the global stage would lead to a change in the present discourses on global challenges, thereby democratising collective decision-making and finding more sustainable solutions to global challenges.81 Terry Macdonald presents the multistakeholder model as a potential approach to gradually democratising global governance. The multistakeholder approach represents a potential alternative to the sole coordination of states and intergovernmental organisations. According to Macdonald, ‘The fact that the multistakeholder model represents individuals by issue-area rather than by territorial location or nationality ensures that it is better equipped than the nation-state model to accommodate the empirical reality of territorially dispersed interests within global society’.82 As such, in a multistakeholder approach, all those stakeholders affected by a particular political decision, be they state or non-state actors, should be involved in the decision-making process. In the multistakeholder approach, which completely relies upon deliberative processes, the states form just one group of many and are required, at least in theory, to treat other stakeholders as equal partners.83

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Michael Goodhart, while approving of the increased participation of various stakeholders in deliberative processes, puts particular emphasis on the promotion of human rights in his account of democracy at the global level. He argues that for institutions and processes to be seen as democratic it is fundamental for them to promote the principles of equality and freedom as the core values underlying any democratic approach. He likens democracy in the globalised age to a bridge whose superstructure collapses due to severe storms and extreme wind pressure with its piers remaining undamaged. He uses this metaphor to claim that ‘globalization exacerbates previously unrecognized structural tensions within modern democratic theory and practice’.84 He adds that ‘while few observers predict imminent collapse, many agree that democracy’s coherence and integrity have been severely tested, perhaps compromised’.85 Since the bridge’s piers remain undamaged, they can be used as the foundation to build a new bridge. In the same vein, Goodhart regards democracy’s core values, the principles of freedom and equality, as unchallenged.86 Therefore, those core values should be seen as the foundation and point of departure for any deliberation on global democratisation. The democratisation of global politics should be guided by institutions and processes which promote the principles of freedom and equality in the form of human rights to counteract the globalised forces of the neo-liberal ideology. The development of democratic alternatives to the dominant neo-liberal ideology has been a major concern of many scholars worldwide, such as a renewed emphasis on ecological and indigenous approaches. Vandana Shiva puts forward her idea of an ‘Earth Democracy’87 in which democratic practices can be strengthened through a shift in ideology. Away from privatisation, the protection of intellectual property rights, unregulated free markets and the power of global corporations towards valuing the Earth and this planet as our only home whose resources, species and cultures need to be protected and not ruthlessly exploited. Away from global supply chains towards local production and the protection of local communities; away from seeking security through weapons and arms races towards ecological and climate security; away from passive electoral systems towards more active, participatory and deliberative structures which include people as citizens and not as consumers; towards the idea that all of us are citizens of the Earth and not just citizens of one nation or one culture. Roy Madron and John Jopling developed a similar train of thought, coining the term ‘Gaian Democracies’.88 Every action and thought are directed towards the goals of sustainability, social justice, equity and people-power instead of profit maximisation and moneymaking. To deepen democratic processes, Madron and Jopling also favour participatory and deliberative structures to maximise the inclusion of new voices and actors vis-à-vis government representatives, that is, people-power. Among their examples



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figure the World Social Forum and the participatory budgeting programmes in Brazil, particularly in Porto Alegre, which build on the idea of including marginal voices from civil society into more participatory and deliberative decision-making processes. Alberto Acosta’s ‘El buen vivir’89 draws inspiration from indigenous peoples’ ways of living in the Andes. Also a clear departure from free markets, profiteering, global corporations and limitless resource exploitations, the idea of ‘El buen vivir’ (good living) proposes an alternative development model in harmony with our environment, more respectful of our planet and the living species populating the Earth, including the human being: not ownership of the planet and its resources but stewardship at best; not investment in human capital but further development of the human being as a citizen; not passive vote-casting in elections but the active and inclusive participation of all citizens in the construction of a state. All these ideas emphasise a return to the roots of democracy, that is, more people-power through more inclusive decision-making processes to confront the consequences of climate change, the mass extinction of the planet’s species, the depletion of the Earth’s resources, the marginalisation of many cultures and peoples worldwide and the general corrosion of democratic systems through the power of corporations, economic elites and the commoditisation of human beings. What all these ideas have in common is the recognition that the particular characteristics of the contemporary global order require a different way of thinking about global democracy as compared to the representative model of democracy in the state. These scholars emphatically stress the critical role of non-state actors such as civil society organisations, social movements, citizens, transnational advocacy networks and other cross-border communities in the endeavour to gradually democratise the global system. In the same vein, these alternative approaches also include concerns about global challenges such as climate change, the extinction of the planet’s species or food insecurity. By including these new voices from local communities, marginalised groups and peoples, decision-making mechanisms must be recast to allow for forms of democracy other than the representative, electoral model dominant in state democracies and different from the three ideal models of global democracy (federalism, con-federalism and cosmopolitanism). When we look at the peculiarities of the current global governance system, this understanding of democracy as people-power makes a lot of sense. These participatory and deliberative approaches may manifest themselves in the collective and interactive actions of the multiplicity of actors populating the global system at different sites of governance. Neither do these scholars rely on fixed and static institutional frameworks nor do they put their faith in the necessity of fixed boundaries, delimiting the democratic process as in the context of the state.

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This much more gradual and incremental approach also represents a shift away from the assumption of federalists, con-federalists and some cosmopolitans that the creation of a global dêmos is to be seen as a fundamental pillar of any democratic global order. Scholars like Carol Gould, James Bohman or Terry Macdonald see the absence of a global dêmos as an opportunity rather than a hindrance to more democracy at the global level. Instead of representing a global dêmos with clear boundaries as in the case of the state, the multiplicity of state and non-state actors in global governance could, through collective action, concentrate their efforts on representing particular local communities affected by transnational decisions, rules and policies.90 In the face of new social facts arising with the manifold processes of globalisation, Bohman argues that ‘the task is not to determine some special institutional design of an ideal cosmopolitan democracy in which a global dêmos could be formed’. Rather, it should be fundamental to ‘analyze the basic conditions of global democratization, the aim of which is the emergence of a democracy of dêmoi’.91 These more flexible and open approaches towards democratisation processes are a much better fit for the contemporary realities of the global governance system. The views put forward by these scholars allow us to zoom into the working methods and decision-making processes of current global governance mechanisms and determine if any progress has been made in the democratisation of global processes, and if so, what this progress looks like. However, this rich field of alternative approaches to democracy is not necessarily homogenous and harmonious. A variety of nuances and emphases exist in these proposals on how democratic practices can be promoted in a way to successfully tackle development challenges. Dryzek, for instance, stresses the importance of discourses and discursive actions within a deliberative setting. Gould, in contrast, very much criticises this deliberative approach and puts much more emphasis on interactive activities of solidarity among members of cross-border communities. Macdonald underlines the significance of stakeholder models in creating more participatory and deliberative decision-making processes. Goodhart elaborates an approach guided by the promotion of human rights. And Shiva, Madron/Jopling and Acosta stress the importance of an ecological awareness in the construction of participatory and deliberative structures. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THREE INDICATORS OF PEOPLE-POWER I selected three elements from the ideas presented above on which consensus exists about their significance in promoting democratic practices at the global level. These three elements serve as indicators for the understanding



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of democracy as people-power to (1) reduce the abuse of power by the few and (2) broaden the franchise of those who are involved in decision-making processes. These three indicators are (1) the promotion of human rights and transnational solidarity, (2) the creation of more inclusive and participatory decision-making mechanisms and (3) the establishment of accountability mechanisms.92 These three indicators allow me to measure to which extent democratic practices take place in UNITAID, the Committee on World Food Security, the Open Government Partnership and the NETmundial Meeting and which role the Brazilian government has played in these institutional arrangements. The Promotion of Human Rights and Transnational Solidarity In any attempts of democratising global governance mechanisms, the dominant ideology of our times cannot be ignored. The neo-liberal market ideology represents the biggest threat to contemporary democracies at state level, creeping into all parts of our public and private lives and subordinating the social, political and cultural to economic maxims of efficiency, profitability, financial stability and corporatist gains. Devoid of state regulation, this market ideology has eroded the very foundation a functioning democracy is built on, social justice and equality.93 Organisations such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank have produced, reproduced and institutionalised this ideology in the international system in the form of interventions, trade rules and agreements, reinforcing its claims on a global scale. A variety of corporations and banks are so powerful today that they circumvent regulations, bend laws and avoid oversight. The political elites of many democracies are enmeshed with the economic sector, with private interests dictating the political agenda at the expense of the whole of society. The all-encompassing dominance of the economic sphere has led to a situation neatly summarised by Boaventura de Sousa Santos:94 Capitalism is today experiencing one of the most destructive moments in its recent history as witnessed in new forms of primitive accumulation by dispossession, from land grabbing to the theft of wages and bank bailouts; in the subjection to capitalist law of the value of common goods and resources, resulting in the displacement of millions of poor peasants and indigenous peoples and in environmental devastation and ecological disasters; and in the eternal renewal of colonialism, revealing, in old and new guises, the same genocidal impulse, racist sociability, thirst for appropriation, and violence exerted on resources deemed infinite and on people deemed inferior.

Our inability to develop efficient solutions to global problems is not only the result of inadequate intergovernmental governance mechanisms. Our inability also has its roots in a particular mindset driven by commercial gains,

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profiteering and the predatory exploitation of human beings, other animal species and the planet’s resources. The overwhelming question is how to confront an ideology that pervades institutions, mechanisms and decisionmaking processes at all levels, be they local, national or global. It is evident that the dominant institutional design of the current global order is part of the problem and not part of the solution. David Held already touched upon this challenge in the mid-1990s. His answer to this problem is the implementation of a cosmopolitan democratic law ‘enhanced through its enactment in the agencies and organizations of economic life; through democratic deliberation and coordination of public investment priorities; through the pursuit of non-market exchange, and through experimentation with different forms of the ownership and control of capital’.95 His answer to the increasing commoditisation and privatisation of public life is a rights-based approach enforcing and realising several clusters of political, social, economic and cultural rights. As possible practical steps, he proposed the democratisation of companies, the creation of an overarching sanctioning system, the introduction of international taxes, a stronger investment in human capital and less of it in the arms industry and the defence budget.96 One decade later, he further elaborated on this idea by calling for a global covenant introducing the values and principles of social democracy at the global level, which he calls global social democracy.97 The World Social Forum, the OCCUPY movement and other transnational social movements such as ATTAC, the international peasant movement La Via Campesina or organisations such as Oxfam or ActionAid have been at the forefront of putting those proposals into action. The promotion of human rights puts the emphasis on the protection of the basic needs and interests of human beings. Michael Goodhart argues that ‘human rights are a necessary component of any plausible account of global democracy’.98 He further holds that ‘understanding democracy as a system to protect and promote human rights shifts the focus away from institutions, mechanisms and procedures and back to the core values underlying them’.99 These core values are freedom and equality as guarantors to fight oppression and domination and thus the abuse of power by the few.100 Human rights ‘include the absence of constraints such as threats to bodily security, or restrictions on liberty (including freedom from domination), as well as a set of enabling material and social conditions, such as means of subsistence and health care’.101 In this sense, human rights are essential in their constraining and enabling functions, that is, in their capacity to restrain the power of some actors and institutions and at the same time enable the agency of other actors.102 Constraining rights are those rights necessary for limiting power, such as fairness rights (for example, due process, nondiscrimination, equal treatment) and



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rights protecting individual liberty and security (freedom of thought, physical integrity, and the like). Enabling rights are those that make effective agency possible, including civil and political rights (petition, assembly, expression) and social and economic rights (education, health care, subsistence).103 (emphases in the original)

Human rights in their expression as constraining and enabling rights are vital for democratic processes:104 first, they apply, in theory, universally regardless of jurisdictions, persons or places. Second, they are supposed to be binding for state and non-state actors alike. Third, their implementation can rely on multiple governance mechanisms, as is the case in global governance, and is not restricted to one single political framework. Fourth, they can be viewed as normative claims describing what state and non-state actors should achieve. In this view, human rights obligations extend to all actors in global governance, including states, civil society actors and transnational companies, with the aim of creating ‘ethical standards for legitimate governance at all levels’.105 Many human rights viewed as constraining and enabling were significantly reinforced and codified in international law over the last few decades beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. All four mechanisms to be analysed in this book have a clear mandate to promote human rights. UNITAID works in its activities to promote the human right to health and the human right to access to medicines. The Committee on World Food Security develops norms and regulations to strengthen the human right to food. The Open Government Partnership has the ambition to develop and promote norms on open government worldwide, such as citizens’ access to government information and the participation of civil society in governmental decision-making processes. The NETmundial Meeting in 2014 adopted an Internet Human Rights Charter, which for the first time established rights and responsibilities for Internet users and other actors in global Internet governance. In a global governance system whose order and legitimacy depends on collective actions involving a multiplicity of state and non-state actors, human rights cannot be limited to the realm of states alone. Carol Gould argues that the realisation of human rights includes non-state actors as well. Her concept of transnational solidarity emphasises this point. While a rich literature exists on the notion of solidarity between and among nation-states,106 Gould tries to reconceptualise the notion of solidarity in the context of the transnational, inter-relative, interconnected and networked realities of the global governance system with a view to ‘contributing to the emergence of more democratic forms of transnational interaction within regional or more fully global frameworks of human rights’.107 Her concept of transnational solidarity builds on feminist theories emphasising the notion of care, empathy and

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human security in a globalised world, attempting to explore the ties which bind different people together to understand and empathise with the suffering of distant others.108 Solidarity, in Gould’s words, ‘can be concerned with action to help realize rights, including the range of human rights’.109 Solidarity, in her account, goes beyond the solidarity among individuals and includes the transnational relations among groups, associations and other organisations. Hence, Gould understands solidarity as a form of social empathy with distant others.110 Solidarity as a form of social empathy applied to the global sphere only makes sense as a concept with practical value when it refers to particular individuals or groups of people standing in relation with distant others. Nobody can feel empathy with every single human being on this planet.111 So, we can understand Gould’s notion of solidarity ‘as one that holds among particulars’112 including individuals, groups or associations which are organised in transnational networks. We can say further that when people or associations stand in solidarity with others at a distance, they identify with these others in their efforts to overcome oppression or to eliminate suffering, and they take action to aid these others or stand ready to do so if called upon. . . . The shared values that characterize these solidarity relationships consist, then, in a shared commitment to justice, or perhaps also, in more consequentialist terms, to the elimination of suffering.113

Gould’s notion of solidarity involves understanding and joint action among individuals and organisations to strengthen the human rights of distant others. However, transnational solidarity does not mean to impose those solutions found to eliminate suffering on others. On the contrary, transnational solidarity ‘recognizes that it is the people in the oppressive or needy situation who are usually best able to say what support they wish and expect to benefit from’.114 Solidarity, especially in its transnational variants, crucially adds to empathy an emphasis on understanding the social perspective of others, and on constructing ties in action among multiple individuals or associations. Accordingly, solidarity may exist among civil society associations, as well as among individuals operating within them and the people the organizations serve; yet, it applies as well to social movements, where these are understood as involving (loosely) shared goals and overlapping networks of people and groups.115

How, then, does transnational solidarity emerge among different transnational actors and individuals in the global system? Here, Gould suggests three possibilities:116 first, solidarity can be incentivised through media coverage of a disaster situation involving victims and people in need of help and support,



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such as a humanitarian crisis, an earthquake or floods. Second, through joint economic or political projects, which she calls ‘transnational common projects,’117 involving social movements, scientists, and other kinds of organisations, fighting for more global justice. Third, solidarity can also be expressed on a discursive basis, when civil society organisations, for instance, show solidarity with victimised people through discourses to draw attention to a particular social issue. While media coverage and discursive activities of civil society actors may lead to the emergence of solidaristic interrelations, only the creation of ‘transnational common projects’ has the potential to successfully institutionalise these interrelations in the long term. In the literature on global governance, these ‘transnational common projects’ are better known as transnational advocacy networks.118 These networks include ‘those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services’.119 As an international, or transnational, collaborative effort, these networks can pool, mobilise and exchange information to reach a particular objective.120 They are composed of different, nontraditional, actors defending a particular cause or mission when governments fail to act, with civil society actors playing an essential role in its creation and further development.121 This cause or mission very often affects the provision of global public goods, which are ‘available for all to consume and so potentially to affect all people’.122 Their benefits ‘extend across countries and regions, across rich and poor population groups, and even across generations’.123 Therefore, these networks very often emerge when governments fail to provide these public goods.124 The latest developments in global health governance provide some illustrative examples of what these transnational common projects may look like. Neglected diseases such as malaria or tuberculosis are a recurring scourge in global health governance affecting millions of people in the global South. Over the last 20 years civil society organisations, private companies, health and research institutes, government agencies and individual health experts have come together to establish several alliances which have become highly successful in promoting and accelerating research and development on these diseases. These alliances included the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative, the TB Alliance or the Medicines for Malaria Venture. These alliances were capable of institutionalising transnational solidarity among different state and non-state actors, crossing borders and the North-South divide, to stand in solidarity with millions of people affected by these neglected diseases, and react more swiftly and adequately to the global challenge of lacking investment in research and development on a series of neglected diseases. In addition, one factor of the success of these alliances lies in the fact that they achieved to reverse the neo-liberal market ideology of Western

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pharmaceutical companies largely responsible for the problem of neglected diseases by binding these companies to their cause and incentivising them to develop medicines as a public good.125 A similar potential for promoting transnational solidarity exists in the activities of the mechanisms to be discussed in this book. UNITAID, the Committee on World Food Security and the Open Government Partnership bring together different state and non-state actors with the aim of institutionalising and promoting transnational solidarity on several global challenges. The NETmundial Meeting brought together a rich diversity of state and nonstate actors to engender and promote transnational solidarity on the development of a universal Human Rights Charter for the Internet. –– Any move towards more democracy at the global level needs to confront the neo-liberal market ideology, which represents a serious obstacle to tackling global challenges and is responsible for undermining and hollowing out democratic processes worldwide. One reasonable way for actors in global governance to confront this ideology is to concentrate their activities on promoting the progressive realisation and implementation of human rights, emphasising the primacy of human rights over property rights, fighting for the powerless against the mighty and powerful or representing the voices of marginalised communities. Human rights shift our attention to the underlying values of democratic practices by trying to enable the powerless and disadvantaged and rein in the powerful and almighty. In the form of transnational solidarity, Carol Gould suggests a promising way to promote human rights in a system characterised by cross-border communities, transnational movements, transboundary challenges and the rising influence of non-state actors. Gould’s reconceptualised notion of solidarity adapted to the transnational realities of the global governance system has the potential to bind different state and non-state actors in transnational common projects to promote human rights as transnational law and cosmopolitan norms. Mechanisms of Participation In a global system whose main features make it exceedingly difficult to install elements of representative democracy similar to those present in democratic states, attempts to establish elements of participatory democracy may be much more fruitful. According to Larry Diamond, a well-functioning democratic system relies on ‘multiple avenues for the “people” to express their interests and preferences, to influence policy, and to scrutinize and check the exercise of state power continuously, in between elections as well as during them’.126 The people, however, need to be organised in a vibrant civil society



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to exercise influence and contribute to a more strengthened and consolidated democracy. To renew democracies which are strongly influenced by neo-liberal market ideologies, the Brazilian intellectual Roberto Mangabeira Unger emphasises that a ‘vigilant and organized civil society is indispensable’127 to empower the individual and fulfil the interests and needs of ordinary citizens. In the same vein, many intellectuals and civil society actors from Brazil who embrace democratic alternatives to the current neo-liberal order pin their hopes on the power of civil society and social movements. The principal idea of the Brazilian-inspired World Social Forum was to create a transnational social movement to debate and discuss proposals for a more democratic and social world order under the slogan ‘Another World is Possible’.128 The Brazilian Organising Committee, in the context of setting up the Forum, emphasised that social movements around the world ‘became conscious that, together, they constituted a planetary archipelago of resistance to neoliberal globalization . . . [turning into] a planetary counter-power of citizens’.129 This counter-power of citizens, social movements and civil society organisations from all around the world has been able to make those voices heard, particularly from the global South, which are usually excluded from meaningful participation in global governance mechanisms. Hence, Boaventura de Sousa Santos characterises the World Social Forum as an ‘epistemology of the South’ generating new practices and knowledges from the South in a transnational setting about how to govern the global system vis-à-vis the dominant knowledges and practices from the developed countries.130 As will be shown later in the book, Brazil’s re-democratisation process has been accompanied by several highly innovative experiments of participatory democracy which have broadened the influence of civil society actors to bear on governmental decision-making processes and Brazilian development challenges. These participatory structures between government and civil society representatives created the famous participatory budgeting programmes in the 1990s, allowed Brazil to find innovative solutions to the AIDS epidemic in the country in the 1980s and 1990s, freed Brazil’s society from the scourge of hunger in the 2000s and led to the development of a list of human rights principles in the use of the Internet through the internationally acclaimed Regulatory Framework for the Internet in 2014. An abundant literature has examined the crucial role of civil society and participatory mechanisms involving government agencies and civil society organisations in strengthening democratic processes throughout the world.131 Civil society organisations contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy by (1) monitoring, checking and restraining state power; (2) stimulating citizen participation in political processes; (3) educating citizens about their rights and duties and (4) creating new channels of access to

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political processes (beyond formal elections) for citizens to articulate their interests.132 Thus, it is no surprise that political theorists who emphasise the promotion of democratic practices in the gradual democratisation of global governance also embrace different elements of participatory democracy. The development of different aspects of participatory democracy on the global stage makes sense because of (1) the multiplicity of actors present in global governance and (2) the significant number of state and non-state actors excluded from the principal decision-making processes. Civil society participation has the potential to enhance the democratic processes of global governance mechanisms by representing the needs and interests of local communities, monitoring the governments’ activities, holding them accountable to human rights standards and exercising pressure through social campaigns.133 In the same vein, non-state actors from civil society tend to support the promotion of human rights and global public goods. In a global system characterised by an ever higher degree of participation and influence of actors other than the state, the inclusion of CSOs ‘broadens the range of actors involved in international policymaking and the provision of public goods’, which leads to the input and representation of different ideas and policy proposals.134 Despite the important role civil society actors and social movements undoubtedly play in advancing democratic practices both nationally and globally, essential questions about the democratic character of these organisations and movements remain. It should not be assumed that civil society is, for its own sake, a force for more democracy and social justice. Attention should be paid to questions about which CSOs participate, how they should participate and on which issue areas in global governance they participate.135 As in the case of the international society of states, global civil society is characterised by huge power imbalances with more powerful and influential CSOs from the developed global North, usually more often represented in global governance mechanisms than those from the global South.136 These power imbalances extend to questions of financial resources, administrative and technical capacities, mobilisation efforts and networking power. For civil society actors to be seen as a serious force for more democracy at the global level, these actors need to be able to build up their own democratic structures. Later on in the book, we will see how these power imbalances have played out in UNITAID, the Committee on World Food Security, the Open Government Partnership and the NETmundial Meeting. Carol Gould suggests that non-state actors, in particular CSOs, democratise their activities by developing democratic procedures to elect their representatives and ensure that those communities which CSOs claim to represent are also able to participate in the transnational activities of the respective CSO.137



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Thereby, non-state actors could lead by example, increase their credibility in global governance and exercise pressure on the states to follow suit. While countless scholars from the global South have highlighted the relevance of social movements and civil society actors in democratising the global system, their actual influence and power in bringing about ‘Another World’ in the context of the World Social Forum has been limited. The Brazilian sociologist and political scientist Emir Sader provides a very plausible explanation for this failure by pointing out that the World Social Forum has not been able to transform its strengths of global civil society mobilisation into effective political action at the governmental level.138 Indeed, real participation of CSOs in international decision-making processes is still rare, and their participation remains largely limited to contributing to agenda-setting, implementation and enforcement.139 Therefore, it is important to distinguish between different degrees of participation such as passive (observer status or consultation), active (presenting information, making statements in the decision-making body or contributing to the implementation of policies) or full (voting rights and agenda-setting power) participation.140 So far, full participation in terms of voting and agenda-setting power is still an exception for CSOs.141 Similarly, whereas in development sectors like health or food security the participation of CSOs is traditionally very strong, CSOs are generally still confronted with shut doors in policy areas dealing with security and military issues.142 Notwithstanding these question marks, a broad consensus exists among scholars that a higher degree of meaningful participation of non-state actors is fundamental to any legitimate global democratic project. Thus, global governance mechanisms must be designed to include civil society actors in their decision-making processes. Participation, in this sense, would also relate to the participation of those individuals and communities which are affected by the decisions of the respective global governance mechanism. Gould calls this kind of participation ‘the responsiveness to distant others’, which is directly related to her notion of transnational solidarity. This responsiveness to distant others follows from the normative priority of a cosmopolitan set of human rights in global affairs . . . and specifically derives from the idea that political, economic, and social organizations ought to be structured so that people can fulfill their human rights through the functioning of these organizations. The democratic principle would therefore support expansive and regularized representation for people, especially from poor and developing countries, within these organizations.143

Ensuring the participation of distant others in global governance mechanisms would also establish a counterweight against the interests of powerful states

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and global corporations, and potentially counter the developments of economic exploitation of the poor.144 Civil society actors can exercise considerable pressure on the states to force them into action, particularly when organised in transnational movements. The creation of more participatory and inclusive governance mechanisms, however, still depends on the political will of the states. Hence, an opportunity for civil society organisations to exercise effective political action and strengthen democratic processes in global governance arises when states start to cooperate with civil society organisations and invite them to participate in decision-making processes. States remain the most powerful actors in international institutions and other mechanisms of global governance and contribute with their actions to the emergence of international law and the existing human rights regimes; that is, the emergence of what Benhabib calls ‘cosmopolitan norms’ or what Held envisages as ‘democratic public law’ would not be possible without the states. Therefore, to put the promotion of human rights and transnational solidarity on an authoritative basis, participatory structures should be designed to include both state and civil society actors. And here, democratic state actors from the global South, such as Brazil, play an especially important role. The creation of participatory structures involving representatives from the government and civil society in Brazil has been essential to the promotion of innovative democratic practices in the country. And Brazil’s foreign policy approach over the last ten years has been profoundly informed by these experiences. Since the powerful governments from Europe and North America have considerably contributed with their actions to the unjust and undemocratic nature of the global order, it is difficult to conceive how those state actors alone would have the credibility to democratise the processes and mechanisms of global governance. As Boaventura de Sousa Santos rightfully claims, ‘the understanding of the world by far exceeds the Western understanding of the world’,145 including understandings of how to promote democratic practices to tackle global challenges. By the same token, Santos points to the relevance of particular ‘ways of knowing’, ‘ways of valuing and judging’ or ‘ways of deliberation and of ruling and being ruled’ in the societies of the global South, which may be different from those promoted by the West.146 These ‘different ways of knowing and different kinds of knowledge’147 can prove invaluable in the confrontation of global challenges and the gradual democratisation of global governance. And the Brazilian government has repeatedly worked to include its own way of knowing and its own kind of knowledge derived from those successful democratic experiments mentioned above in its activities in global governance. Later on, we will see to which extent this has been true



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in the cases of UNITAID, the Committee on World Food Security, the Open Government Partnership and the NETmundial Meeting. –– For democratic practices to emerge at the global level, the promotion of human rights and transnational solidarity can be reinforced in participatory settings including both state and non-state actors, particularly democratic state actors from the global South and democratically organised actors from civil society. In the creation of these participatory settings, both civil society and state actors have specific responsibilities. While civil society actors are required to build up their own democratic mechanisms to ensure better coordination and mobilisation, the states must show the political will to integrate civil society actors in international (or transnational) decision-making mechanisms. Only when civil society actors are allowed to participate in decision-making processes in a meaningful way, that is, by enjoying full voting rights and agenda-setting power, they are provided with opportunities for effective political action in their efforts to confront the states and make those voices and communities heard which have been marginalised and silenced by the neo-liberal order. Democratic states from the global South, such as Brazil, can play a highly relevant role when they assume a pro-active stance in these participatory processes and collaborate with civil society actors with the aim of promoting transnational solidarity on human rights issues and global development challenges. Mechanisms of Accountability Along with the promotion of human rights and transnational solidarity and the promotion of inclusive participation, the third element widely discussed among scholars is accountability. According to Tallberg and Uhlin, ‘Accountability as an ideal entails that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to assess whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in the light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they find that these responsibilities have not been met’.148 Given the distinctive characteristics of the global governance system without any existing overarching authority which could, for example, impose sanction mechanisms on actors violating human rights principles, accountability cannot be realised in the same way as in the state. This challenge, however, does not imply that it is impossible to hold actors in global governance accountable for their actions. Instead, accountability needs to be thought differently. The multiplicity of actors and the networked nature of the global governance system provide the background against which several accountability mechanisms can be designed.

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One of these mechanisms would be reputational accountability, exercised in transnational networks and involving different state and non-state actors, when one group of actors can hold to account another group of actors by challenging their reputation through naming and shaming.149 Mechanisms and procedures to pursue reputational accountability may include voting procedures, monitoring and policy review activities.150 Transparency plays a particularly important role in this context. Information on working methods, policy rules, selection procedures and funding must be accessible and should be put on the Internet.151 In the same vein, transparency ‘can often be achieved through measures such as provision of public access to the minutes of key decision-making meetings, details of evidence presented to these meetings, internal performance evaluation reports, and so on’.152 This may be done in the form of a website or by means of other social media. Also, actors can develop best practices, codes of conduct or certification schemes (in the context of transnational companies) to regulate the actors’ behaviour.153 It is also essential to distinguish between internal and external accountability. While internal accountability relates to the principles, the decision-making process of a mechanism is governed by, external accountability refers to those communities and people affected by these decisions.154 It is much more challenging to ensure external accountability rather than internal accountability. Internal accountability can be ensured with the methods discussed and on the basis of a participatory and inclusive process, which includes various groups of actors and therefore creates reputational pressure on all groups of actors involved. External accountability is much harder to achieve due to the peculiar characteristics of the global governance system and the existing power imbalances between states and civil society actors. In ensuring both internal and external accountability, civil society actors (CSOs) play a major role. Since CSOs very often claim to represent those communities and citizens affected by the decisions made in global governance mechanisms, they find themselves in a particularly responsible position to advance democratic accountability of the decision-making processes in global governance mechanisms. According to Scholte, CSOs have advanced democratic accountability in global governance in the following ways:155 They have called on governments to be more transparent in their decisionmaking procedures and demanded that policy documents and reports are not only made public but written in a language understandable to those people not involved in the decision-making process. CSOs have engaged in monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of governance mechanisms, or the activities of governments in compliance with international human rights legislations. CSOs may also draw the attention of the mass media, national parliaments or courts to the wrong-doing of governments in global governance and pressure them to change course. CSOs have campaigned for the establishment of formal accountability mechanisms to monitor the decision-making processes



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of international organisations or promote good practices of corporate social responsibility.156 While Scholte and others put civil society actors and social movements into the pole position for advancing accountability mechanisms in global governance, sceptics point out that many civil society organisations lack the legitimacy to do so due to their undemocratic structures. One central challenge here lies in the accountability of CSOs themselves. When CSOs are not able to build up adequate accountability mechanisms in their own organisations, it is difficult to demand more accountability from the governments. Another criticism refers to the fact that the representatives of civil society organisations are not legitimised through elections by citizens or local communities and do not rely on a dêmos within clearly delineated borders.157 How could these organisations possibly represent the needs and interests of marginalised citizens and communities? They can indeed because of the very different characteristics of the global system compared to democratic systems in the nation-state. In democratic societies within the state, the two democratic elements of participation and accountability very often fuse in the form of elections. On the one hand, elections are an instrument to hold politicians accountable to certain standards and their own campaign promises. On the other hand, elections provide an instrument for the common citizen to participate in the political process. Given the polycentric and highly fragmented nature of the global system, elections, as carried out in democratic nation-states, are difficult to establish, since non-state actors do not rely on clearly delineated constituencies nor are these organisations (and their representatives) elected by any citizens to represent their interests.158 Given these obstacles, non-electoral mechanisms of authorisation and accountability are much easier to establish and, when viewed in conjunction, do bear a potential for democratising global processes.159 Terry Macdonald defines these non-electoral mechanisms in the following words: Mechanisms of authorization and accountability are institutionally distinct but mutually complementary means of regulating the power relationships between rulers and ruled. More specifically, they are mechanisms for distributing power between stakeholders and public political agents in such a way as to ensure that the power exercised by public political agents remains subordinate, in some significant respects, to the power of stakeholders (emphasis in the original).160

While authorisation entails ‘the giving of authority to act’, accountability involves ‘the holding to account of representatives for their actions’.161 How these mechanisms work together is best exemplified by elections. When citizens vote for candidates, they can authorise particular public representatives to pursue a particular political agenda and, if unsatisfied with their

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performance, hold them to account and deny these public representatives the vote so that they lose their office.162 In this respect, elections are just one example, and a very powerful one indeed, of mechanisms of authorisation and accountability.163 By contrast, what may non-electoral mechanisms look like? Non-electoral mechanisms of authorisation involve, first of all, mechanisms of delegation, the process of transferring responsibility to individual representatives.164 Second, mechanisms of authorisation also include mechanisms of empowerment, the process of transferring power to the delegated representatives to take part in decision-making.165 Mechanisms of accountability, on the other hand, involve mechanisms of transparency and disempowerment.166 Meaningful transparency, however, should go beyond making information public and should also include the obligation of the participating actors to provide reasons for their decisions.167 The second mechanism of accountability refers to disempowerment, the possibility of delegitimising public representatives through sanctions or other methods.168 We need to keep in mind that this is a rather stylised account of mechanisms of authorisation and accountability which cannot be transferred identically and uniformly to global processes due to ‘the absence of stable and centralized frameworks of public political power’.169 Nevertheless, both mechanisms can contribute to democratising global processes if established in a complementary way, making decision-making processes more inclusive and increasing the control of stakeholders over public representatives.170 While Terry Macdonald’s notion of accountability very much relies on the creation of participatory structures and the inclusion of non-state actors in decision-making processes, pinning all her hope on the increased influence of non-state actors in those processes, she and other enthusiasts of the role of non-state actors may have downplayed the persisting power of the states. Those non-state actors who usually bear the brunt of holding the states accountable just do not have sufficient power required to control and sanction the states, the primary challenge in securing external accountability. Compare that to the situation in democratic nation-states where civil society has the power to change whole governments on Election Day. Due to this power imbalance between civil society actors and the states, a notion of accountability centred on who can be held accountable may not go far enough. Michael Goodhart argues that democratic accountability can also be achieved by looking at how norms are implemented. This expanded perspective on accountability allows to shift the focus ‘from who the accountability holders are to the norms of democratic accountability invoked’.171 Goodhart recognised the existing power imbalances in global governance by stating that the mechanisms in place ‘are mechanisms of influence rather than control’.172 Similar to Macdonald, he argues that ‘power can be made accountable to democratic norms through a variety of mechanisms and through the participation



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of many diverse actors’.173 Focusing on the actors’ accountability to norms also emphasises the imperfect and never finished process of democratic practices. The process of developing human rights standards is never completed and ‘must somehow be open to deliberation, contestation, and renegotiation’.174 The institutions to hold the actors in global governance, in particular, the states, accountable to norms and human rights standards partly already exist and include the European Court of Human Rights, the UN special rapporteurs and the monitoring and review activities of international organisations and the activities of civil society organisations to promote human rights.175 In addition, Goodhart suggests the creation of human rights commissions, ombudspersons and other institutions to issue human rights impact assessments and monitor the situation of the implementation of human rights.176 Goodhart’s notion of ‘accountability to norms’ represents another way of guaranteeing external accountability of states to civil society actors, citizens and local communities. In this sense, human rights frameworks and documents can serve civil society actors and progressive state actors as a tool to advance human rights issues and name and shame those actors reluctant to respect and implement those standards. –– At the global level, mechanisms of accountability play out rather differently than is the case at the national level. While in state democracies electoral processes are seen as the primary mechanism of accountability, the distinctive features of the global governance system make it difficult to establish similar electoral processes. A key to more reputational, internal and external accountability of global governance mechanisms lies in more participatory structures and processes including various stakeholders who would be able to restrain the exercise of power of one another. Goodhart’s concept of accountability focused on the promotion of norms and human rights standards complements this view. He argues that actors, in particular state actors, can also be held accountable to how they promote particular norms and human rights standards. This view underscores the significant power imbalances existing between state and non-state actors (particularly civil society). While civil society actors generally do not have the power to sanction and/or control the states, specific mechanisms such as UN special rapporteurs and other institutions may serve as additional accountability mechanisms. Human Rights, Participation and Accountability: Three Indicators of People-Power The promotion of human rights and transnational solidarity and the creation of more participatory and inclusive mechanisms feed directly into the creation of accountability mechanisms. If these three democratic indicators unfold in

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a co-constitutive and interdependent fashion involving a multiplicity of state and non-state actors, they may contribute to the promotion of democratic practices in global governance understood as people-power by limiting the abuse of power by powerful governments and corporations and expanding the franchise of those involved in the decision-making processes. As a further consequence, these democratic practices may lead to the development of transnational law and cosmopolitan norms. Seyla Benhabib’s concept of ‘democratic iterations’ helps us to better understand how these democratic indicators may be instantiated at the global level. Benhabib’s meaning of democratic iterations relies on Derrida’s term of ‘iteration’ which is not a mere repetition of an act, a term or a concept but a variation of its original meaning.177 Thus, ‘every iteration transforms meaning, adds to it, enriches it in ever-so-subtle ways’.178 By democratic iterations I mean complex processes of public argument, deliberation and exchange through which universalist rights claims are contested and contextualised, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned throughout legal and political institutions as well as in the associations of civil society. (emphasis in the original)179

Democratic practices at the global level are always in flux and ever-changing, being reconfigured and modified at every iteration, that is, with every action taken by the multiplicity of actors involved in collective processes to promote human rights and transnational solidarity and increase accountability of the actors involved in participatory structures. These iterations enhance and transform the meaning of democratic practices which are always subject to redefinition. Benhabib’s concept of ‘democratic iterations’ emphasises the fact that democracy is a process in the making, never perfect or ideal and always incomplete. It is a process which can never be taken for granted, contingent upon the activities, the iterations, of all the actors involved. Hence, the promotion and institutionalisation of the three indicators discussed, and therefore the basic understanding of democracy as people-power – reducing the abuse of power and broadening the franchise –, depend on the iterations unfolding in the collective group of actors involved. In the following four chapters, we will see how these democratic iterations have played out in the context of UNITAID, the Committee on World Food Security, the Open Government Partnership and the NETmundial Meeting. NOTES 1 Hein and Moon, Informal Norms in Global Governance; Abeysinghe, Pandemics, Science and Policy; Hein et al., Global Health Governance and the Fight against HIV/AIDS.



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2 Victor, Global Warming Gridlock. 3 Held, ‘Reframing Global Governance’, 162–63. 4 Williams et al., Banning Landmines. 5 Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court. 6 Fraundorfer, ‘How to Confront the Threat of Ebola?’. 7 Ibid. 8 Rushton and Williams, Partnerships and Foundations in Global Health Governance. 9 See George, Shadow Sovereigns; Gray, False Dawn; Harvey, Spaces of Hope; Polanyi, The Great Transformation. 10 Archibugi et al., Global Democracy, 8. 11 Väyrynen, ‘Norms, Compliance, and Enforcement in Global Governance’, 25. This is but one definition of global governance. In the vast literature on this subject, many different and controversial notions exist of how to conceive of global governance. 12 Rosenau, ‘Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics, 7–8. 13 Benhabib, ‘The New Sovereigntism and Transnational Law’, 113. 14 Ibid., 113–14. 15 The most powerful human rights court is the European Court of Human Rights. For more details see, for instance: Føllesdal et al., Constituting Europe. 16 Benhabib defines cosmopolitan norms as norms which treat individuals as moral and legal persons in a global civil society. See Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, 16. 17 Ibid., 16. 18 Ibid., 31. 19 See Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty; Fraser and Nash, Transnationalizing the Public Sphere. 20 See Fraundorfer, ‘Global Power Shifts and Transnational Law’; Hein and Moon, Informal Norms in Global Governance. 21 Isiksel, ‘Global legal pluralism as fact and norm’, 169. 22 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism; Dunoff and Trachtman, Ruling the World?; Goodhart, Democracy as Human Rights. 23 Lightfood, Global Indigenous Politics; Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders; Smith, Social Movements for Global Democracy. 24 Held, ‘The Changing Contours of Political Community’, 28. 25 Merkel and Wittmann, Zum ewigen Frieden. It is important to note that Kant did not speak of democratic states and the creation of a global democracy. He does not even elaborate on democracy. Instead, he was much more interested in explaining how to achieve global peace. To emphasise this point, Kant wrote the whole essay in the form of a peace treaty. 26 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man; Weiss et al., The United Nations and Changing World Politics. 27 Marchetti, Global Democracy. 28 The Council of the European Union represents another example, which brings together national ministers of the EU governments to adopt laws and coordinate policies.

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29 Marchetti, ‘Models of Global Democracy’; Cavallero, ‘Federative Global Democracy’. 30 See Corbett et al., The European Parliament. 31 It seems that the Europeanisation of the citizens’ national identities in Europe has been successful only in very privileged circles such as among national diplomats working in Brussels and exposed on a day-to-day basis to EU politics. And even here, the degree of harmonisation with Pan-European ideals is limited. See Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics. 32 When using the term ‘cosmopolitanism’, it is important to note that different versions of cosmopolitanism exist in the literature, such as moral and institutional cosmopolitanism. Moral cosmopolitans put emphasis on the individual as a global citizen with universal rights and obligations. See Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism; Brock, Global Justice; Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’. In turn, institutional cosmopolitans are concerned with the institutional frameworks necessary to make those moral and universal claims a reality. ‘Cosmopolitanism’ as used in this chapter refers to the institutional version of cosmopolitanism. See Brown, ‘Bringing the State Back into Cosmopolitanism’; Held, Democracy and the Global Order; Weinstock, ‘The Real World of (Global) Democracy’. 33 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 267. 34 Ibid., 267. 35 Ibid., 267–68. 36 Ibid., 271–72. 37 Held borrows from Kant, who also embraced the creation of a cosmopolitan law as a complement to national and international law. Kant’s version of a cosmopolitan law, however, is limited to his notion of universal hospitality, the respectable treatment of a foreigner in a different country (Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 227). For Kant, cosmopolitanism meant the ‘matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may develop’. See Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, 137. 38 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 227–28. 39 Ibid., 190. 40 Ibid., 191. 41 For a detailed characterisation of these rights, see Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 192–200. 42 Ibid., 200. 43 Ibid., 230. 44 Ibid., 232. 45 Ibid., 234. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., 237–38. 48 Ibid., 278–83. 49 Held and Patomäki, ‘Problems of Global Democracy’, 123–24. 50 Ibid., 124. 51 Corrêa Leite, The World Social Forum; De Sousa Santos, The Rise of the Global Left; Smith, Social Movements for Global Democracy. 52 Fraundorfer, Brazil’s Emerging Role in Global Governance.



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53 See UNPA Campaign, ‘Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly’, http://en.unpacampaign.org, accessed 02 March 2017. 54 See Global Parliament of Mayors, ‘Website’, http://www.globalparliamentof mayors.org, accessed 2 March 2017. See also Barber, If Mayors Ruled the World. 55 See Global Parliament of Mayors, ‘Website’. 56 Phillips, ‘Athens’, 99. 57 De Waal, Chimpanzee Politics; Goodall, In the Shadow of Man; Mitani, ‘Cooperation and Competition in Chimpanzees’; Nakamura et al., Mahale Chimpanzees. 58 Whitehead, ‘Consensus Movements by Groups of Sperm Whales’. 59 Cronin and Stumpe, ‘Ants Work Harder during Consensus Decision-Making in Small Groups’; Kao et al., ‘Collective Learning and Optimal Consensus Decisions in Social Animal Groups’; Lusseau and Conradt, ‘The Emergence of Unshared Consensus Decisions in Bottlenose Dolphins’; Seeley, Honeybee Democracy. 60 Boehm, Hierarchy in the Forest. 61 Boehm, ‘Prehistory’, 37. 62 Ibid. 63 Phillips, ‘Athens’, 97–108. 64 Boehm, Hierarchy in the Forest. 65 De Waal, Chimpanzee Politics. 66 Dryzek and Stevenson, Democratizing Global Climate Governance, 6. 67 Archibugi et al., ‘Global Democracy’, 94. 68 Ibid., 93. 69 Little and Macdonald, ‘Pathways to global democracy?’, 792. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid., 794. 72 De Sousa Santos, The Rise of the Global Left; Scholte, Building Global Democracy?; Smith, Social Movements for Global Democracy; Florini, The Third Force. 73 Archibugi, ‘The Reform of the UN and Cosmopolitan Democracy’; Held, Democracy and the Global Order; Imber, ‘The Reform of the UN Security Council’; Silberschmidt et al., ‘Creating a committee C of the World Health Assembly’. 74 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 279. 75 Brown, ‘Bringing the State Back into Cosmopolitanism’. 76 Gould, Interactive Democracy. 77 Ibid., 268. 78 Ibid., 256–69. 79 Dryzek and Stevenson, Democratizing Global Climate Governance, 7. 80 Dryzek and Stevenson illustrated how such an approach could be successful in global climate governance. See Dryzek and Stevenson, Democratizing Global Climate Governance. 81 Dryzek, ‘Global Democratisation’. 82 Macdonald, Global Stakeholder Democracy, 138. 83 Ibid., 19. 84 Goodhart, Democracy as Human Rights, 1. Goodhart refers to the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in Washington, which collapsed in 1940 only four months after its inauguration owing to unusual and severe wind pressure.

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85 Ibid., 1. 86 Ibid., 6. 87 Shiva, Earth Democracy. 88 Madron and Jopling, Gaian Democracies. 89 Acosta, El buen vivir. 90 The basic idea of ‘affected communities’ refers to the possibility of representing those people who are particularly affected by specific decisions, rules or policies. For instance, global governance mechanisms could be structured in a way to represent particularly those people who suffer from food insecurity regardless of their national background or any national borders. See, for a more profound discussion, Macdonald, Global Stakeholder Democracy; Gould, Interactive Democracy. 91 Bohman, Democracy across Borders, 5. 92 The literature provided here is not exhaustive and constitutes only a small selection of examples. On human rights see Fredman, Human Rights Transformed; Pogge, Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right; Sen, The Idea of Justice. On participation see Macdonald, Global Stakeholder Democracy; Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory; Smith, Democratic Innovations. On accountability see Held and Koenig-Archibugi, Global Governance and Public Accountability; Lewin, Democratic Accountability. 93 See George, Shadow Sovereigns; Gray, False Dawn; Harvey, Spaces of Hope; Polanyi, The Great Transformation. 94 De Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South, 45. 95 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 266. 96 Ibid., 263–66. 97 Held, Global Covenant, 164. This project of global social democracy involves promoting the rule of international law, transparency, accountability, democracy, social justice and rules and regulations for the global economic order. In terms of governance, these measures include the reform of global governance institutions, the creation of so-called global issue networks on social and economic problems and increasing the cooperation between all relevant actors, such as developed and developing countries, civil society actors and international organisations. 98 Goodhart, ‘Human Rights and Global Democracy’, 400. 99 Ibid., 416. 100 Ibid. 101 Gould, Interactive Democracy, 18. 102 Ibid. 103 Goodhart, ‘Human Rights and Global Democracy’, 403. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 For a discussion on the concept of solidarity among nation-states see Hestermeyer et al., Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity; Macdonald, ‘Solidarity in the Practice and Discourse of Public International Law’; Wolfrum and Kojima, Solidarity. 107 Gould, Interactive Democracy, 99. 108 See Robinson, Globalizing Care; Robinson, The Ethics of Care; Tronto, Moral Boundaries; Tronto, Caring Democracy; Held, ‘Care and Justice in the Global Context’.



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109 Gould, Interactive Democracy, 107. 110 Ibid., 99. 111 Ibid., 100–101. 112 Ibid., 109. 113 Ibid., 110. 114 Ibid., 111. 115 Ibid. 116 Gould, ‘Transnational Solidarities’, 157–58. 117 In her book Interactive Democracy, 112, Gould also uses the term ‘common or cooperative projects’. 118 Keck and Sikkink, ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics’. 119 Ibid., 89. 120 Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond borders, 1–3. 121 Ibid., 8–12. 122 Kaul et al., ‘Why Do Global Public Goods Matter Today?’, 2. 123 Ibid. 124 Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders, 12. 125 Fraundorfer, ‘How to Confront the Threat of Ebola?’. 126 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 219. 127 Mangabeira Unger, Democracy Realized, 269. 128 Corrêa Leite, The World Social Forum, 77–79. 129 Quoted in ibid., 80. 130 De Sousa Santos, The Rise of the Global Left, 13–34. 131 Diamond, Developing Democracy; Edwards, Civil Society; Elliott, Civil Society and Democracy. 132 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 239, 242–43. 133 Florini, The Third Force; Kaldor, ‘The Idea of Global Civil Society’; Scholte, Building Global Democracy? 134 Bexell et al., ‘Democracy in Global Governance’, 82. 135 Ibid., 87. Tallberg and Uhlin, ‘Civil Society and Global Democracy’, 216–17. 136 Bexell et al., ‘Democracy in Global Governance’, 87. 137 Gould, Interactive Democracy, 239. 138 Sader, ‘Beyond Civil Society’, 260. 139 Bexell et al., ‘Democracy in Global Governance’, 87. 140 Tallberg and Uhlin, ‘Civil Society and Global Democracy’, 218. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid., 217. 143 Gould, Interactive Democracy, 240. 144 Ibid., 268. 145 De Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South, 237. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148 Tallberg and Uhlin, ‘Civil Society and Global Democracy’, 211. 149 Benner et al., ‘Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance’, 75–76. 150 Tallberg and Uhlin, ‘Civil Society and Global Democracy’, 218–20.

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151 Benner et al., ‘Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance’, 77. 152 Macdonald, Global Stakeholder Democracy, 167. 153 Benner et al., ‘Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance’, 77. 154 Tallberg and Uhlin, ‘Civil Society and Global Democracy’, 211. 155 Scholte, ‘Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance’, 218–22. 156 Ibid., 230–32. 157 Keohane, ‘Accountability in World Politics’; Dahl, ‘Can International Organizations Be Democratic?’. 158 Macdonald, Global Stakeholder Democracy, 143–44. 159 Ibid., 145. 160 Ibid., 150. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid., 151. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid., 159–60. 165 Ibid., 164. 166 Ibid., 165. 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid., 168. 169 Ibid., 169. 170 Ibid., 169–72. 171 Goodhart, ‘Democratic Accountability in Global Politics’, 52. 172 Ibid., 56. 173 Ibid., 58. 174 Ibid., 54. 175 Ibid., 52–54. 176 Ibid. 177 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, 47. 178 Ibid. 179 Benhabib, ‘The New Sovereigntism and Transnational Law’, 122.

Chapter 3

Brazil and the Purchase of Drugs

Since its creation in 2006, the international drug purchase facility UNITAID has championed new approaches to tackling the lack of access to medicines for millions of people around the world. UNITAID has fundamentally contributed to a new thinking on access to medicines and inspired original solutions to the question of how to make medicines more affordable in the developing world. What lies behind this exceptional success story, and what role has Brazil played in this success story? In the early 1980s, many countries around the world were hit by the devastating consequences of HIV/AIDS. In Brazil, the impact of HIV was much more severe than in developed countries of the global North due to the high prices of AIDS drugs in the developing world. Given precarious national health systems and the high prices of medicines for large parts of the society health epidemics in developing countries have a particularly easy time to wreak havoc. Notwithstanding these significant obstacles, Brazil has achieved to turn the tables in the international access-to-medicines debate by challenging some of the major structural injustices imposed on the developing world by pharmaceutical companies and governments from Europe and North America. First, the Brazilian government developed a highly innovative response to its own AIDS epidemic, which became so successful that it turned into a major role model for other developing countries to follow. Second, the Brazilian government challenged the intellectual property rights of AIDS drugs produced by pharmaceutical companies in European countries and the US and advocated a more democratic and just approach to the access to medicines. In other words, Brazil became one of the leading actors in questioning the unjust and undemocratic activities of a tiny group of powerful actors from the global 59

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North of blocking the affordable access to drugs of millions of people in the developing world. To make sense of Brazil’s rise to a leading advocate of justice and human rights in this debate, this chapter provides a brief overview of the rationale of Brazil’s innovative approach to the AIDS epidemic in its country and how the country established itself as a credible force for a more just and democratic approach in guaranteeing access to medicines on the global stage. Then, we turn our attention to UNITAID, one of the most significant reflections of this new approach in the access-to-medicines debate. In this context, this chapter seeks to show to which extent Brazil has contributed to the democratic practices of UNITAID by promoting human rights and transnational solidarity, creating participatory structures and providing more accountability. THE BRAZILIAN WAY OF TACKLING HIV/AIDS When in the early 1980s Brazil, as many other countries, was hit by a rapidly spreading AIDS epidemic, it was hardly predictable that within two decades the government would develop one of the most innovative and democratic responses to HIV/AIDS worldwide. Brazil was caught up in the throes of democratic struggle against a collapsing military dictatorship, creating the conditions for a peaceful democratic transition and the formulation of a new democratic constitution, solemnly adopted in 1988. It was during that time of political upheaval that Brazilian society was struck by a new and mysterious virus, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), threatening a new wave of victimisation and stigmatisation of those infected, not less sinister in scale than what the majority of democratic-minded Brazilians had to endure during the two decades of military rule. The first cases of people infected with HIV appeared in the state of São Paulo. The state authorities swiftly reacted to this new threat with the launch of the São Paulo State Programme in 1983, focusing on controlling and preventing a further spread of the epidemic. The key pillars of this programme were the prevention and treatment of AIDS.1 The programme included awareness-raising and information-sharing activities about the disease and integrated key representatives of social movements active in the fight against HIV/AIDS.2 The input of civil society was crucial to the swift response of the state government, in particular, those representatives of risk-groups such as homosexuals, prostitutes and drug users who organised themselves in community groups and NGOs.3 It is at that time that the first AIDS NGOs in Brazil emerged, originating in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro and later mushrooming in the whole country.4 Due to the State Programme’s close collaboration with public health experts and representatives



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of those AIDS NGOs and communities, the state government’s approach to AIDS was directed from the very beginning by a focus on social justice and human rights, trying to avoid the stigmatisation, isolation and victimisation of those infected, particularly homosexuals, prostitutes and drug users.5 One of the innovative outputs of this joint state–civil society collaboration was the decision in 1989 to distribute the most important AIDS drug at that time, Zidovudine (AZT), and later on in 1995 combination therapy, for free.6 This approach in the state of São Paulo inspired the federal government, which followed suit in 1986 with the Ministry of Health’s creation of the National AIDS Programme, implementing the essential elements of the São Paulo State Programme all over the country.7 The National AIDS Programme started distributing Zidovudine in the whole country in 1991.8 And five years later, in 1996, then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso institutionalised free and universal access to AIDS drugs.9 With this decision, Brazil became the first developing country to guarantee universal and free access to AIDS drugs.10 Against the pressure of the US government and US-based pharmaceutical companies, the Brazilian government established a countrywide approach to AIDS based on prevention and treatment, supporting the human right to health and access to medicines of those infected and involving civil society actors and affected communities in the government’s political decisions and actions on AIDS.11 Public health experts and AIDS activists were integrated into the government’s public policies occupying leading positions and reinforcing an approach based on social justice and human rights rather than intellectual property rights and the stigmatisation of infected people, especially homosexuals, prostitutes and drug users.12 The strong organisation of AIDS NGOs and affected communities was particularly supported by Brazil’s Sanitarista Movement, a countrywide but loose civil society movement of public health workers and professionals, which formed in opposition to the military dictatorship and advocated a reform of Brazil’s public health system.13 The government organised awareness-raising campaigns, provided assistance to risk-groups and created an institutional infrastructure, such as participatory councils, which allowed civil society actors to actively influence and shape the government’s public policies.14 Two examples at the federal level are the National AIDS Commission, created in 1987, and the Civil Society and Human Rights Department of the National AIDS Programme, created in 1997.15 As a result of this joint policymaking process, Brazil’s organised civil society on AIDS experienced a major boost, growing from a negligible number of CSOs in the 1980s to more than one thousand organisations in 2010 spread all over the country.16 Due to Brazil’s federal system, the federal government aimed to decentralise the National AIDS Programme to the state and municipal levels. Given

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the endemic political corruption of a system where financial resources have to travel a long way, passing several bureaucratic levels (state and municipal), institutions and greedy politicians, the federal government looked for a way to bypass this system. Therefore, the federal government turned to civil society organisations, which became the government’s crucial allies in reaching the people on the ground.17 Between 1999 and 2008, the Brazilian government supported more than 4,000 civil society projects focusing above all on political advocacy, legal aid and the promotion of grassroots alliances and civil society networks at regional and national levels.18 The active involvement of different representatives from civil society organisations, movements and affected communities from the very beginning when the government’s approach to HIV/AIDS was taking shape guaranteed a constant focus on human rights, social justice and the inclusion of affected communities. At the same time, civil society actors could guarantee that the voice of the people was heard, and the federal government was developing public policies benefitting those affected by HIV. The free distribution of AIDS drugs, the pro-active support and funding of civil society actors and the creation of several participatory policymaking councils are the most obvious expression of this approach. As of January 2016, Brazil’s public health system offers 22 different AIDS drugs for free.19 Not only did the Brazilian government bring the AIDS epidemic in its country under control. Much more than that, Brazil’s approach to fighting HIV/AIDS started to herald a powerful message. The fight against HIV/AIDS is most successful with a strategy that combines prevention and treatment, respecting the human rights of those infected. After making headlines around the world, Brazil’s response to HIV/AIDS turned into a role model in the fight against the disease embraced by the UN and leading transnational civil society organisations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières and Oxfam. Not everyone was fond of Brazil’s innovative approach to HIV/AIDS, least of all the major supporters of the international intellectual property regime, the US government and the pharmaceutical companies from the US and Europe. The international intellectual property regime is embodied by the TRIPS Agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) of 1995, which was pushed for by a small group of influential pharmaceutical companies in the US, reinforcing intellectual property rights worldwide.20 One of the side effects of this agreement was that it protected the intellectual property rights of medicines produced by powerful US and European pharmaceutical companies and made it almost impossible for developing countries to produce generic versions of AIDS drugs which were produced after the TRIPS Agreement came into effect in 1995. As a consequence, developing countries without a well-developed and sophisticated pharmaceutical sector were at the mercy of the exuberantly high prices of AIDS drugs dictated by the pharmaceutical companies.



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Brazil’s decision to distribute the most important AIDS drug at that time for free – Zidovudine (AZT) was produced before 1995 and thus did not fall under the regulations of the TRIPS Agreement – came as a threat to the US government and the pharmaceutical companies. To protect the future success of its National AIDS Programme, Brazil turned into one of the staunchest defenders of a rights-based approach to the access to medicines, defying the major supporters of the international intellectual property regime. In the former UN Human Rights Commission and the World Health Assembly, the Brazilian government pushed for several resolutions which emphasised the primacy of the human right to health and access to medicines over the protection of intellectual property in situations of health emergencies.21 The government also directly threatened several pharmaceutical companies, such as Merck, Abbott or Gilead, to lower the prices of their AIDS drugs. Otherwise, the government promised to break the intellectual property of those drugs and have them produced generically – a decision which would have resulted in a financial loss for those companies. While Brazil was very successful in lowering the prices of several AIDS drugs through this strategy, the government put its threats into action in 2007 when it broke the patent on Merck’s drug Efavirenz.22 In addition to these activities, Brazil defended the so-called TRIPS flexibilities, the possibility for developing countries of breaking the patent on a drug and import the generic version of a drug from other developing countries in the situation of a health emergency.23 In other words, after the successful unfolding of its National AIDS Programme, the Brazilian government also started to get active at the global level and advocate a rights-based approach to the access to medicines, reinforcing its collaboration with the global AIDS movement and developing measures to lower the prices of AIDS drugs. Brazil’s active involvement in the international drug purchase facility UNITAID became an essential element in this international strategy. THE CREATION OF UNITAID: ONE FOR ALL, ALL FOR ONE UNITAID was officially created in 2006 as an international drug purchase facility by the governments of France, Brazil, Chile, Norway and the United Kingdom to jointly reach the health-related Millennium Development Goals.24 UNITAID particularly focuses on combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria by guaranteeing a better and more affordable access to medicines for millions of people in the developing world.25 To avoid the duplication of efforts with other health initiatives like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, UNITAID attempts to fill existing niches and ‘targets underserved markets in developing countries, such as

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child-friendly medicines, treatment for drug-resistant patients and innovative diagnostic products’.26 Among its many achievements, UNITAID created a market for child-friendly AIDS medicines and reduced the prices of child-friendly AIDS medicines up to 80 per cent, reduced the prices of essential second-line medicines up to 60 per cent, supplied around 1.5 million first and second-line TB treatments to patients in 72 countries and became the largest single provider of child-friendly TB medicines.27 While the French government, with the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Philippe Douste-Blazy and President Jaques Chirac, was the driving force behind the creation of an international mechanism to reduce the prices of AIDS drugs and other medicines, Chirac and Douste-Blazy found worthy allies in the then Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim to move forward this project. Both Lula da Silva and Amorim saw this project as an ideal opportunity to contribute to the global fight against hunger, one of the major cornerstones of Brazil’s foreign policy under President Lula da Silva.28 Jorge Bermúdez, a Brazilian public health expert who was to become the first executive director of UNITAID, provides an insight into how these discussions at government level developed on the Brazilian side. In a group consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we discussed how to interfere in this area in a new and innovative way. We were not talking about channelling more money to the WHO, more money to UNICEF, etc. but how to create innovative mechanisms which could create an added value. These discussions coincided with a group of countries discussing innovative financing mechanisms, and thus Brazil joined France in these discussions on an additional financing mechanism and an air tax to finance UNITAID. Then, Brazil and France proposed the creation [of this mechanism] and received the support of . . . Chile, Norway and the United Kingdom. . . . Then, Brazil proposed, in a discussion among these five governments, that a Brazilian should assume the coordination of this mechanism [as executive director] since the Executive Board was already headed by a French national [Douste-Blazy]. This was to create a balance between North and South and that someone from a developing country became executive director. And so, I was approached by the Brazilian government asking if I were interested to compete for the job as Brazil’s official candidate.29

From the very beginning of UNITAID’s creation, Brazil was very keen to leave its mark on this organisation: first, by occupying a leading position with a Brazilian expert on access-to-medicines issues; and second, by advocating its own approach to the access debate at UNITAID. Wim Vandevelde, the liaison officer of the Communities Delegation of UNITAID’s executive board, explains that the aspect of strong civil society support on the issue of



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access to medicines advocated by both France and Brazil also contributed to the success of this Franco-Brazilian initiative. I think that both France and Brazil wanted to make a mark in the access-scene and they were very much driven by strong civil society partners in their countries . . . And you can see that in the DNA of UNITAID that there is this strong intervention or presence of civil society in the work of UNITAID, at least on the global level.30

Brazil has left a very visible mark through the nomination of two Brazilians to assume two leadership positions of UNITAID. The two leading positions are those of the executive director, heading the secretariat of UNITAID, and the chair of the executive board, the main decision-making body of UNITAID. The position of executive director was exercised by Jorge Bermúdez from 2007 to 2011. Bermúdez is a leading expert on a range of different issues involving the access to medicines. He has held influential positions in Brazil’s leading public health institute, the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, and the Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO), and has been involved in several path-breaking decisions of Brazil’s foreign policy on improving the universal access to medicines, such as the decision to break the patent on Merck’s Efavirenz in 2007.31 Philippe Douste-Blazy, who can be credited to be the man behind the initial idea of what was to become UNITAID, became the first chair of the executive board, exercising this position from 2006 until 2016. Douste-Blazy, apart from his position as a former French minister of health and minister of foreign affairs under French President Chirac, had also served as UN undersecretary general for Innovative Financing. Initially developed by DousteBlazy in the French Foreign Office, UNITAID was later transferred to the WHO in Geneva where its secretariat was set up. In June 2016, Celso Amorim, the former Brazilian minister of foreign affairs, together with Douste-Blazy, one of the main architects of UNITAID, became Douste-Blazy’s successor as the chair of the executive board. Very similar to Douste-Blazy, Celso Amorim can boast a lot of experience in the field of global health, health diplomacy and access to medicines. Both as Brazil’s ambassador to the WHO and the WTO between 1991 and 1993 and 1999 and 2001 and Brazil’s minister of foreign affairs between 2003 and 2010, he was responsible for Brazil’s major successes in the global access-to-medicines debate, including Brazil’s successful confrontation with several pharmaceutical companies on the reduction of prices of AIDS drugs and the introduction of several resolutions in the WHO, advocating the primacy of the human right to health and access to medicines vis-à-vis intellectual property rights. In addition to his new role as the chair of UNITAID, he is a member of the

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UN High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines and the High-Level Panel on Global Response to Health Crises.32 The Participation of New Actors All the decisions concerning UNITAID are taken by the executive board, which is composed of 12 members. Besides the five seats reserved for the five founding members, a further seven seats are reserved for the following representatives: one seat each for the WHO (non-voting seat), Spain, an African country selected by the African Union, an Asian country (the Republic of Korea), the constituency of foundations (represented by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation) and one seat each for civil society organisations and affected communities. All the members of the executive board have equal voting rights (except for the WHO), which attribute a significant role to those members representing philanthropic foundations, NGOs and affected communities. Two seats are reserved for civil society of which one civil society seat represents NGOs and the other one those communities affected by the three diseases (a person living with HIV/AIDS, TB or malaria).33 The board members (one board member and an alternate) representing NGOs and affected communities are selected through an open call for applications by a board of civil society experts, based on specific criteria.34 Each representative serves a two-year term, before new possible candidates from NGOs and affected communities worldwide are selected. The NGO Delegation consists of a group of 250 NGOs and is led by two NGO representatives, one board member and one alternate board member.35 The Communities Delegation, also led by one board member and an alternate board member, currently consists of a group of around 30 community representatives coming from organisations from all around the world.36 Wim Vandevelde, the liaison officer of the Communities Delegation, from the Cape Town-based Global South Office of GNP+ (the Global Network of People living with HIV) explains that the delegation aims to ‘channel interests, concerns of the grassroots people [to the Board level] through the different communities’ representatives in our delegation which are specifically chosen because they are well-linked, well-connected to the grassroots organisations and people in their region or in their countries’.37 The post of the liaison officer of the NGO Delegation, currently hosted by the British NGO STOPAIDS (a London-based network of UK agencies to fight HIV/AIDS globally), facilitates the engagement of NGOs.38 At the same time, the liaison officer of the Communities Delegation assists the delegation in its ‘goal of representing the views, voices, needs and interests of communities living with HIV, tuberculosis and malaria and those co-infected with HIV and HCV [hepatitis C virus] at UNITAID Board and Committee level’.39



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The Civil Society Advisory Group consists of experts from developing and developed countries on intellectual property, access to medicines, and so on and advises the NGO and Communities delegations in their work on the executive board.40 The Communities Support Team comprises activists in the access-to-medicines debate and people affected by the three diseases to support the affected communities’ delegation and better connect with the needs of the affected communities.41 The Civil Society Contact Group was created as an information portal and forum to exchange information about the delegations’ work at UNITAID and foster debate about issues related to the work of UNITAID.42 Through the Facebook page and the Twitter account of the Communities Delegation43 and the website of the NGO Delegation,44 the representatives of NGOs and affected communities at UNITAID make a whole range of information available about their current activities at UNITAID, including how people from any community affected by HIV/AIDS, TB or malaria can actually become a board member and participate in the activities of the Civil Society Contact Group and the Communities Support Team. To disseminate information about civil society activities at UNITAID and publish calls for selection processes to become a member of the executive board, NGOs such as Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières also use email lists like E-Drug or IP-Health, which are an established communication tool for civil society actors engaged in the access-to-medicines debate.45 Through these communication tools, the liaison officers of the NGO and Communities Delegations to the UNITAID Board inform about UNITAID’s activities, including the meetings of the executive board and the monitoring and review activities of NGOs. According to several leading representatives of the Communities Delegation and the NGO Delegation, Brazil has played a vital part in stimulating and supporting civil society participation at UNITAID. Gracia Violeta Ross Quiroga, the board member of the Communities Delegation, emphasises that ‘Brazil has always been a champion in support of issues demanded by civil society organizations, especially the ones related to intellectual property and South to South cooperation’.46 The liaison officer of the Communities Delegation, Wim Vandevelde, states that ‘quite often, we as Communities Delegation and in general, both of the civil society delegations, have been strategically aligned with Brazil’s positions at UNITAID’.47 Brook Baker, the board member of the NGO Delegation, specifies this common agenda between Brazil and civil society: [Brazil has] been one of the most consistent voices in that UNITAID has to support countries in the use of TRIPS flexibilities, and they emphasise the needs of poor people and other people in middle-and low-income countries. So, Brazil historically has played an incredibly important role . . . and we had

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a close relationship with them and we have developed a close relationship with the representatives of Brazil.48

Robin Jakob, the current liaison officer of the NGO Delegation, corroborates this view and argues that, with Brazil’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim as the new chair, Brazil will remain one of the principal allies of civil society representatives on the executive board: I think if you talk about a spectrum of board members who are closest to our views, you have the NGOs [on one side], you have the UK [on the other side], France sort of hovering in the middle somewhere, and Brazil . . ., if not always completely in line with our opinion, more often than not supportive of our priorities. . . . So, absolutely, Brazil really is a key ally, and now more than ever with the new chair of the board, Celso Amorim, . . . . That’s the strength of Brazil, obviously, having him as chair and it’s a strength for us as well having him as chair’.49

UNITAID’s Major Innovations UNITAID has made headlines by adopting a bold and original approach to several issues in global health governance. The most outstanding examples include the creation of an international tax to finance its activities, a marketbased approach to incentivise pharmaceutical companies to produce medicines as public goods and the involvement of civil society organisations and local communities in the implementation of its projects. The Airline Ticket Tax Non-state actors like NGOs do not only have a crucial role to play in the current decision-making processes of UNITAID. Specific non-state actors and individuals have also been part of the conception and development of UNITAID prior to its official launch in 2006. Douste-Blazy exchanged his original views and ideas about an innovative finance mechanism with Bill Clinton, the former US president and founder of the Clinton Foundation; Lee Jong-wook, then the director-general of the WHO; Peter Piot, then the head of UNAIDS; Ira Magaziner, then the chairman of the Clinton Foundation; Richard Feachem, then the executive director of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; and Khalil Elouardighi, a representative of the AIDS NGO ACT-UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power).50 This communicative process resulted in the development of the airline ticket tax as the principal funding source for UNITAID.51 Debates on international taxes have existed for several decades, for instance on financial transactions, as a means of distributing global wealth more equally between



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the global rich and poor but had only been revived in the years preceding the creation of UNITAID.52 The rationale behind the airline ticket tax is to finance UNITAID through individuals from all over the world when they buy an airline ticket. Every time each of us buys an airline ticket from a website such as Orbitz or Opodo . . . we can participate directly in the fight against the big three infectious diseases. When we pay for our travel, we have the option to make a small donation – a voluntary contribution of as little as two dollars – to show our solidarity and save lives in the developing world.53

The airline ticket tax is designed as an international tax on flight ticket purchases ‘to convert the prosperity generated by globalization into an engine for change in poor countries’.54 Since international air traffic represents one of the key symbols of globalisation, only those individuals are affected by the tax who could afford to pay $1 or $2 more for their plane ticket without any problem.55 For the airline ticket tax, UNITAID cooperates with the three biggest companies dealing with airline reservations worldwide (Amadeus, Travelport and Sabre), complemented by voluntary contributions on hotel reservations.56,57 Gilles Pelisson, the chief executive of Accor Hotels (which owns the Sofitel, Novotel, Mercure, Ibis, and Motel 6 chains, among others, for a total of more than four thousand hotels worldwide), became the first leader of his industry to agree that every one of his customers would be given the chance to make a voluntary contribution at check-out time.58

By now, nine countries (Cameroon, Chile, Congo, France, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, the Republic of Korea) have implemented the airline ticket tax on transnational flights departing from their respective countries, while other countries and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation provide multi-year contributions.59 France alone achieved to collect more than €1 billion from the airline tax between 2006 and 2012.60 For domestic flights, France charged a fee of approximately €1, for international economy flights €4 and international business-class flights up to €40.61 As an example of the immense impact of this tax, one flight from Paris to New York can raise sufficient financial resources to cover the expenses of the treatment of 60 HIV-positive children for one whole year.62 Altogether, in the same period UNITAID has received from all members US$2.2 billion.63 The airline ticket tax proved to be an outstanding success. UNITAID’s considerable dependence on the airline ticket tax may also have a downside due to the tax’s susceptibility towards economic fluctuations.

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During the financial crisis of 2008–2009, when air traffic fell, UNITAID’s revenues also fell by 21 per cent, which could significantly compromise the organisation’s political process.64 Due to legal obstacles prohibiting Brazil to contribute to any taxes raised outside of the country, the government did not participate in the flight tax until 2011.65 Instead, the Brazilian government transferred an annual amount of approximately US$10 million to UNITAID.66 In 2011, then President Dilma Rousseff sanctioned a law legally allowing the Brazilian government to contribute to the international flight tax. In this context, Brazil donates US$2 per passenger flying from Brazilian territory to any international destination.67 Compared with the other members of the UNITAID executive board Brazil comes fifth in accumulated financial contributions between 2006 and 2015. While France is the strongest contributor with an accumulated contribution of US$1,504,798, followed by the United Kingdom with US$ 499,621, Norway with US$177,169, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation with US$ 90,000 and Spain with US$ 81,602, Brazil has so far contributed with an accumulated amount of US$ 80,133.68 UNITAID-Funded Projects How does UNITAID use the money derived from the airline ticket tax to support the fight against the three infectious diseases in the developing world? UNITAID works as a funding agency deciding on particular funding proposals from other international organisations (WHO, UNICEF, UNAIDS, etc.), specialised health funds and partnerships (the Global Fund, the Roll Back Malaria Partnership, the Stop TB Partnership, etc.), philanthropic foundations (Clinton Health Access Initiative of the Clinton Foundation) or civil society organisations (Médecins Sans Frontières, Oxfam, etc.) to fill niches unattended by other health initiatives.69 UNITAID’s funding proposals, received through open calls, are evaluated by the Proposal Review Committee. This committee is composed of independent public health experts who review the proposals according to seven criteria (public health problem and commodity access, market shortcomings and their reasons, innovative market intervention, sustainable market effects, public health effects, logical framework/ budget/value for money, capacity and capability to deliver),70 before the proposal is submitted for consideration to the executive board. It is important to note that governments do not belong to the beneficiaries of UNITAID-funded projects. In Malawi, for example, UNITAID supports the NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in its local efforts to increase viral-load testing in rural areas. Affected communities such as the National Association for People



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Living with HIV/AIDS in Malawi (NAPHAM) support MSF and UNITAID in guaranteeing that their efforts reach those people affected.71 In Uganda, UNITAID funds a project that aims to increase treatment and diagnostics for people affected by HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB. In this project, Ugandan health and community workers try to make sure that the treatment reaches affected people in villages and other remote areas.72 In another project, UNITAID supports the Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) to replace the traditional malaria drug ‘intravenous quinine’ with ‘injectable artesunate’, a drug which is much healthier for malaria patients, much more efficient and much easier to administer, in malaria-endemic regions in six African countries. Here again, local health workers try to guarantee that ‘injectable artesunate’ reaches those people in need.73 To assure that UNITAID products reach affected communities in the most efficient way possible, UNITAID aims to approve projects which concentrate on satisfying specific needs for affected communities in specific regions in the developing world, particularly in rural and remote areas. The Communities Support Team organises in-country consultations and site visits of UNITAID-funded projects to get into contact with affected communities, local health workers and the members of the project to learn more about the achievements, challenges and possible improvements.74 Civil society representatives at UNITAID currently discuss the possibility of creating a tracking system as a further tool to monitor which UNITAID product reaches which affected community in which region of the developing world.75 In other words, UNITAID aims to involve affected communities and locals in its projects to ensure a higher level of accountability to those people in need of UNITAID products. The secretariat publishes very detailed monitoring reports on UNITAID’s projects, measuring their success according to the organisation’s seven key performance indicators (monitoring performance towards public health outcomes; monitoring performance towards market outcomes; accessibility of market information; monitoring grant management; safeguarding predictable and stable funding; aligning and harmonising with international efforts to improve the health of people living with HIV, TB and malaria; resource management).76 The reports include very detailed data on the number of people benefitting from the testing and treatment measures developed by UNITAID, the specific names of the drugs, the exact number and name of the countries where the drugs and diagnostics are distributed, the role of civil society actors, the resource management of the whole organisation, the reduction of prices of key paediatric and second-line generic ARVs since 2008 and so on.77 In 2015, for example, 793,312 people benefitted from UNITAID products for HIV/AIDS in 15 African countries, while 18,449,419 people benefitted from UNITAID products for malaria in 14 African countries.78

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At the same time, 1,133,409 people from 35 different countries around the world benefitted from UNITAID products for TB.79 Of the 28 active grants in 2015, 12 had active involvement from civil society organisations and local communities.80 Notwithstanding this very detailed and transparent monitoring process of the use of financial resources, the different aspects of every single project (costs, participation, implementation), the cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, the development of new products, and so on, the executive board is having a debate on a more independent monitoring process carried out by civil society.81 The Medicines Patent Pool As the seven funding criteria reveal, UNITAID combines its public health mission with a clear market approach. This is not surprising given the critical role of pharmaceutical companies and their ownership of intellectual property rights of vital medicines. The Medicines Patent Pool, another innovative invention of UNITAID, created in 2010, best exemplifies this logic to stimulate the access to medicines further.82 The idea behind a patent pool is that patent holders – companies, governments, researchers or universities – voluntarily offer, under certain conditions, the intellectual property related to their inventions to the patent pool. Any company that wants to use the intellectual property to produce or develop medicines can seek a license from the pool against the payment of royalties, and may then produce the medicines for use in developing countries as defined by the World Bank. Producers that make use of the patents in the pool would need to meet agreed quality standards.83

Without the Patent Pool, a pharmaceutical company might need to approach several patent holders for a licence, which increases the transaction costs and risks.84 Based on voluntary commitments by the patent holders, the Patent Pool may offer benefits to all stakeholders by rewarding pharmaceutical companies for their investments, providing generic drug producers easier access to patents and guaranteeing patients in developing countries more affordable and faster access to medicines.85 Between its creation in 2010 and 2015, the Patent Pool achieved to license 12 key ARVs with 6 pharmaceutical companies (ViiV Healthcare, BristolMyers Squibb, Gilead Sciences, US National Institutes of Health, AbbVie, MSD – Merck in the US and Canada) and 59 sub-licences with 14 manufacturers of generic drugs.86 With these licence agreements, UNITAID was responsible for reducing the price of the respective drugs, accelerate their market entry and significantly increase their geographical expansion.87 For



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instance, in countries like Azerbaijan, Belarus, El Salvador, Georgia, Iran, Iraq or Paraguay the price of the ARVs TDF (tenofovir disoproxil fumarate) and TDF/FTC (tenofovir disoproxil fumarate/emtricitabine) fell by between 80 and 90 per cent following a Patent Pool licensing agreement.88 The innovative market incentives created for pharmaceutical companies to share their intellectual property are fundamental to the success of UNITAID. Douste-Blazy concedes that, besides its humanitarian mission, the success of UNITAID is related to the commercial attractiveness of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria with a particular emphasis on HIV/AIDS.89 Jorge Bermúdez, the executive director of UNITAID, during the development of the Patent Pool, emphasised that the whole process, which led to the creation of the Patent Pool, was consensus-based involving all members of the executive board, with Brazil advocating its traditional position of emphasising the importance of human rights in all issues concerning the intellectual property of medicines. This process took between two and three years. Initially, we discussed economic viability, technical viability, which type of patent pool we wanted, voluntary, obligatory, mixed . . . which legal format, would it be part of UNITAID, part of the WHO or a separate foundation – all this was a process of discussion involving the whole executive board. Brazil has always defended a pro-active stance on the issue of intellectual property understanding that the TRIPS flexibilities (the use of a compulsory licence) are a right of the countries.90

DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES AT UNITAID The Promotion of Human Rights and Transnational Solidarity UNITAID was created with a humanitarian mission, contributing with its activities to the progressive realisation of the human right to health and the human right to access to medicines in the developing world. In its activities, the organisation is dedicated to accelerating the research and development process of essential medicines, reducing its prices and increasing its geographical distribution to people living with HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria in the developing world – in short, making life-saving medicines accessible and affordable to the poor in developing countries. These activities and UNITAID’s success stories have contributed to strengthening the rights-based discourse in the access-to-medicines debate. UNITAID can be characterised as a transnational common project with the aim of promoting transnational solidarity among several state and nonstate actors in order to provide more affordable access to medicines of three diseases haunting the developing world, that is, HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria.

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Albeit small in size and concentrating on niches in its projects, such as childfriendly medicines, UNITAID provides a transnational setting for a dedicated group of states, civil society actors and representatives of affected communities to elaborate essentially transnational solutions in the fight against three major scourges of the developing world. The transnational solidarity expressed by the members of UNITAID’s executive board has resulted in collective action, the inclusion and representation of the voices of those living with the three diseases at the global level and the creation of a counterweight to the pursuit of purely commercial interests of powerful states and big pharmaceutical companies. UNITAID’s budget relies on the transnational solidarity of individuals throughout the world through the creation of the airline ticket tax. The airline ticket tax appeals to the transnational solidarity of flight passengers with the world’s poor. The Medicines Patent Pool stimulates pharmaceutical companies to produce medicines as global public goods. And in its projects, UNITAID stands in solidarity with governmental institutions, ministries, philanthropic foundations, civil society actors, public-private partnerships and other public health initiatives and institutes to reach the people on the ground. UNITAID reflects the idea that the transnational challenge of access to medicines can only be solved on the basis of transnational solidarity involving a selected group of highly ambitious and determined state and non-state actors. While UNITAID unites only a tiny circle of selected governments, it does nonetheless prove that a tiny mechanism can have significant impact. The Brazilian government has been one of the crucial actors in strengthening this transnational common project, supporting a rights-based approach and advocating the universal access to medicines of diseases which still are a death sentence for millions of people worldwide. Brazil’s nominations of the internationally recognised health expert Jorge Bermúdez for the position of executive director (2007–2011) and former Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim for the position of chair of UNITAID have been the most obvious expression of the fact that UNITAID represents a central piece in Brazil’s global approach to access to medicines. As in the context of Brazil’s domestic fight against HIV/AIDS, the government promotes the primacy of the human right to health vis-à-vis intellectual property rights and regards AIDS NGOs and affected communities as crucial allies in this fight for more solidarity with those who have no voice. Thus, Brazil’s position at UNITAID represents a clear continuation of its domestic and international efforts in guaranteeing affordable access to medicines, faithful to the principal elements of its national approach to HIV/AIDS.



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Mechanisms of Participation Relevant civil society organisations in the access-to-medicines debate and representatives of communities affected by HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria actively participate in UNITAID’s key decision-making body, the executive board, as full members. NGOs and affected communities are allowed to vote, on an equal footing with the states, on all relevant issues related to the functioning of UNITAID. Given the two-year term of representatives for the seats of NGOs and affected communities, manifold opportunities arise for the input of different views and standpoints from different affected communities and NGOs worldwide. In addition, NGOs have built their own independent institutions to increase their voice, better coordinate their actions on the executive board and connect with affected communities. The most prominent NGOs in the global access-to-medicines debate such as Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières, Health Action International, and so on, collaborate with representatives from communities affected by the three diseases. Given the variety of different stakeholders with voting rights on all issues concerning UNITAID, the organisation provides a platform for the input of different viewpoints on the access to medicines. In the same vein, the distribution of the 11 voting seats is fairly balanced, with 4 seats reserved for countries from the global North (France, the United Kingdom, Norway and Spain), four seats for the global South (one member-state of the African Union, Brazil, Chile, the Republic of Korea), one seat for philanthropic foundations and two seats (whose representatives change every two years) for actors from civil society (NGOs, affected communities). It is noteworthy that private-sector organisations are not members of the executive board (as in the case with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria). Instead, UNITAID attempts to attract the private sector to its Medicines Patent Pool by offering rewards to pharmaceutical companies for obtaining the intellectual property rights for particular medicines. The current representatives of civil society on the UNITAID executive board confirm the democratic and collegial atmosphere between state and non-state actors. Wim Vandevelde, the liaison officer of the Communities Delegation, emphasises the forthcoming attitude of the government representatives in the executive board: I believe we are a very well respected board delegation, as are the NGOs, and we know which countries will typically be more community-friendly and which ones will be less. But in general, there is a quite collegial collaboration and ours is definitely not a tokenistic board seat. Many of the discussions are led by either the NGOs or the Communities or influenced heavily by our delegation. I can definitely say it is not a tokenistic exercise. . . . On the secretariat-level, on the

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Geneva-level, on the board-level there is a strong presence and a strong recognition of civil society as a valid partner in the work of UNITAID.91

In the same vein, Brook Baker, the board member of the NGO Delegation, points out that civil society has become a fundamental part of UNITAID’s rationale and working mechanisms, although the hierarchy between governments and civil society actors has not been completely levelled. In the end, those who pay set the tone! The needs, interests and perspectives of donors receive very high priority. They are writing the checks. . . . Let’s say, our inputs are taken seriously and sometimes lead to changes in opinion on some things. . . . When we know that there is an issue of some controversy that’s coming up we will typical try to contact key board members in advance and discuss our position with them, and we will also do the same thing with the secretariat; we don’t think it’s terribly helpful to raise issues for the first time loudly and strenuously only in the formal session, alert people when we can, explain our position and try to understand what their position and perspective is; and it is the same with respect to the secretariat.92

Gracia Violeta Ross Quiroga, the board member of the Communities Delegation, hits the same line by stressing that ‘we are listened to and we have some influence but not as the donor members, that is self-evident’.93 Robin Jakob, the liaison officer of the NGO Delegation, adds to these observations that ‘our influence relies on allegiances with other powerful board members [and] without that hard work that we do making those friends, I think, it would be much more challenging’.94 Despite this persisting hierarchy, there does not seem to exist any movement on the part of the governments or the secretariat to seriously limit the civil society-friendly atmosphere. Wim Vandevelde states that ‘the current executive director [of the secretariat] wants to give more prominence to the Communities Delegation . . . because we are representing the end user or the end beneficiary of the projects’.95 This active engagement of the executive director was expressed by the signing of the civil society engagement plan in March 2016 envisaging to structure the cooperation between UNITAID and civil society. The plan aims at further strengthening UNITAID’s cooperation with civil society including reinforced information-sharing and feedback on UNITAID projects, the promotion of demand generation for UNITAID products, strengthening dialogue with local civil society networks on UNITAID projects, and so on.96 In addition to this development, the new chair of UNITAID, Celso Amorim, has contributed to an engaging atmosphere, as Robin Jakob finds: Politically and thematically, [Celso Amorim’s] positions are much more closely aligned with ours than the last chair’s [Philippe Douste-Blazy]. . . . The



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dynamics in the board have really changed with him as chair. . . . Douste-Blazy, particularly towards the end of his tenure, was a quite effective but relatively distant chair. He let the board get on with things and sometimes, if there was a particularly difficult issue, he would weigh in. And Celso . . . is a lot more hands-on, which for us is great because he is mostly aligned with our opinions.97

The nomination of Celso Amorim as the new chair of UNITAID has reassured civil society representatives that the voices from civil society will continue to be respected in UNITAID’s future decisions. Vandevelde was in fact very much relieved when Amorim was announced as the new chair: Celso Amorim is very respectful of our position . . ., and from his first intervention at the . . . board meeting in Paris [June 2016] I must say that I feel very confident that we have a community-friendly chair. . . . Both on the secretariatlevel and the board-level, I feel that we as civil society delegations are very well respected.98

Certainly, in his new position as the chair of UNITAID, Amorim does not represent the Brazilian position but engages in creating consensus among the different members of the executive board. Even so, as one of the architects of UNITAID his position is very much aligned with UNITAID’s general mission, particularly as far as the representation of voices from civil society and affected communities are concerned. And the Brazilian delegation at UNITAID can rely on a further asset in its traditionally close alignment with and its role as a key ally of civil society and local communities in the executive board. Mechanisms of Accountability By enjoying full voting rights on the executive board, civil society actors are able to increase their pressure on the governments to comply with UNITAID’s mission and the needs of affected communities (internal accountability). The Communities Support Team, along with the two civil society delegations, serves as a link between UNITAID and benefitting affected communities to guarantee that UNITAID’s products reach affected communities. By organising in-country consultations with affected communities, visits to places where UNITAID-funded projects are implemented and finding ways to track which products reach which affected communities, the Communities Support Team intends to increase their accountability to the affected communities (external accountability). Alongside their autonomous physical structures, CSOs have also established a virtual presence on the Internet via Twitter, Facebook and an independent NGO Delegation website. The website explains in more detail the

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governance structure of the NGO Delegation, provides information about the participating civil society representatives and makes available its own evaluation documents and other publications on activities involving civil society and local communities in the work of UNITAID.99 In addition, the liaison officers of the NGO Delegation and the Communities Delegation inform about civil society activities, selection processes and the activities of CSOs in the executive board meetings through a Facebook page and public email lists commonly used by CSOs and activists in the access-to-medicines debate. Both the debate on the development of a flight tax and the creation of the Medicines Patent Pool received significant input from the representatives of civil society organisations and affected communities in the executive board.100 It is not exaggerated to conclude that most of the innovative ideas UNITAID stands for would not have been possible without the input from different stakeholders representing different constituencies, be they states from the global North and the global South or representatives of civil society organisations and affected communities. Thus, the innovative participatory structure of UNITAID where government representatives are forced to confront representatives of organised civil society and affected communities contributes to the organisation’s internal accountability. It is much more challenging, however, to guarantee UNITAID’s external accountability to those communities affected by the three diseases. Ross Quiroga points out this weak point: Reach out to communities is not a very strong practice in UNITAID, this has been an area the Communities Delegation and the NGO Delegation as well have tried to demand. We are convinced a better involvement with local communities is the key for the uptake, acceptability and for the sustainability of UNITAID projects. Not all board members in UNITAID (my personal vision) are convinced of the same; some think it is very expensive, others think this might already be done in current projects and others think there are other agencies that might be doing this, such as the Global Fund and UNAIDS.101

Challenges in guaranteeing UNITAID’s internal and external accountability remain. For example, even though UNITAID publishes its financial statistics and grant portfolios (including the amount granted and the principal grantee) in the annual reports, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) criticised in 2011 that the ‘publication of documentation is patchy and often very slow’.102 The Centre for Global Development worried that UNITAID ‘measures its success based on its impact on the markets for medicines, diagnostics and related products’ – potentially conflating strategy with mission’.103 DFID also observed that UNITAID’s ‘financing choices have not been strategically aligned or necessarily delivered the best possible value for money’.104 Also, DFID criticised that UNITAID selected funding proposals



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on a “first come, first served” approach’ undermining the credibility of the selection process.105 Accordingly, Douste-Blazy conceded that the contributors of voluntary financial contributions to UNITAID (including the millions of airline travellers) have no say in how their money is finally spent. Since the organisation almost exclusively depended on these contributions, they needed to be invested according to the needs and plans of the organisation to ensure the effectiveness of its activities and the achievement of its targets.106 Considering potential economic fluctuations in the airline ticket revenues,107 this argument is understandable. However, providing for more transparency in how voluntary contributions are finally spent would reinforce the symbolic power of the airline ticket tax and UNITAID’s accountability to those people who in the end benefit from the contributions. The NGO Delegation organises an annual evaluation of its two board members, assessing their overall performance, their relations with other members of the executive board and the secretariat, the knowledge of UNITAID issues and their contribution to the various board and committee meetings. The 2014–2015 evaluation also included an assessment of the NGO liaison officer and the collective performance of the delegation.108 While the overall performance was assessed positively, the delegation should improve its relations with NGOs from the global South, better communicate with civil society in between executive board meetings, work more closely with the secretariat and develop strategic priorities. In very detailed evaluation reports, the secretariat assesses the performance of its projects and tracks the distribution of UNITAID products among affected communities on the ground. While these reports have been regarded as highly professional by civil society representatives, civil society has initiated a discussion on the executive board about the creation of an independent assessment report exclusively carried out by civil society.109 Such an independent and civil society–led assessment, if adopted, would add additional credibility to an already highly efficient and serious evaluation process of UNITAID’s activities. The collegial atmosphere between state and non-state actors at all levels of UNITAID and the active participation of NGOs and affected communities as full members in the structures of UNITAID guarantees a high degree of accountability. Both the civil society assessment reports, the secretariat’s assessment reports and independent assessment reports by third parties have ensured a continuous improvement and streamlining of UNITAID’s activities along its principles and original mission. Among these principles, the integration of the voices of those in need of UNITAID products figures very high. For this open channel between those people on the ground and the international architecture of UNITAID, the civil society structure is in place and the

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pro-active involvement and mobilisation of civil society actors is indispensable. The governments, however, are crucial in conceding civil society actors the necessary space to unfold their activities. The founding governments of UNITAID, in particular, France and Brazil, have been exemplary in supporting, promoting and strengthening civil society action within the architecture of UNITAID. Brazil, as a country from the global South with its rights-based agenda directed against the commercial interests of powerful pharmaceutical companies and those governments from the global North supporting these companies, contributes to an atmosphere in which the accountability of the different actors involved in UNITAID’s main mission can be much better upheld. Ross Quiroga stresses that ‘Brazil brings a healthy balance to the north centred power of 2 main northern donors [France and the UK]’.110 Since the representatives of civil society and affected communities see the Brazilian delegation as their key ally on the board, Brazil can be regarded as an active contributor to this participatory, inclusive and accountable atmosphere. –– UNITAID represents an inspiring experiment in global democracy. UNITAID implemented an international flight tax as the primary source of its budget, one of the many proposals suggested by scholars to make the international system more just and democratic. The executive board represents a fairly balanced distribution of various stakeholders from the global North, the global South and civil society, allowing civil society representatives full participation in all matters related to the agenda and mission of UNITAID. The full inclusion of those new voices from civil society has contributed to the development of innovative ideas such as the flight tax or the Medicines Patent Pool. Instead of including the private sector in the executive board, UNITAID tries to attract pharmaceutical companies to collaborate on a voluntary basis via the Medicines Patent Pool, another idea which echoes scholarly proposals to make the international system more equitable.111 This strategy proves to be a promising way to avoid an overrepresentation of commercial interests at the expense of human rights and as such the representation of powerful interests of global corporations. Representatives of civil society organisations and affected communities are an essential part of UNITAID and have become respected actors involved in all major decisions of UNITAID. This participation, facilitated through civil society structures and a strong digital presence, has also made UNITAID and its actors much more accountable to its rights-based mission in the access-to-medicines debate. UNITAID represents a major example of transnational solidarity in reducing the prices of medicines for various major diseases haunting the developing world. The organisation binds together a small but highly dedicated



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group of states, NGOs and affected communities around the world working on HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria, adopting projects to develop new medicines, reduce the prices of existing medicines and create new markets in cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, public–private partnerships, development agencies and public health networks and institutes. And Brazil, as one of its founding members, plays a vital role in promoting and sustaining all major features of this transnational common project. NOTES 1 Do Carmo Sales Monteiro and Da Penha Ramos Oliveira, ‘Desconstruindo a Verticalização’, 10. 2 Ibid.; Flynn, ‘Origins and Limitations of State-Based Advocacy’, 9. 3 Galvão, 1980–2001. Uma cronologia da epidemia de HIV/AIDS no Brasil e no mundo, 48–59. 4 Ibid., 62–73. 5 Flynn, ‘Origins and Limitations of State-based Advocacy’, 4, 8, 9. 6 Ibid., 9; Berkman et al., ‘A Critical Analysis of the Brazilian Response to HIV/ AIDS’, 1170. 7 Galvão, 1980–2001. Uma cronologia da epidemia de HIV/AIDS no Brasil e no mundo, 117; Teixeira, ‘Políticas Públicas em AIDS’, 47, 56. 8 Do Carmo Sales Monteiro and Da Penha Ramos Oliveira, ‘Desconstruindo a Verticalização’, 12. 9 Teixeira et al., ‘The Brazilian Experience in Providing Universal Access to Antiretroviral Therapy’, 76. 10 Hein and Moon, Informal Norms in Global Governance, 68. 11 Flynn, ‘Origins and Limitations of State-Based Advocacy’, 4, 8. 12 Flynn, ‘Origins and Limitations of State-Based Advocacy’; Galvão, 1980– 2001. Uma cronologia da epidemia de HIV/AIDS no Brasil e no mundo; Parker, ‘Civil Society, Political Mobilization, and the Impact of HIV Scale-Up on Health Systems in Brazil’. 13 Flynn, ‘Origins and Limitations of State-Based Advocacy’, 9. 14 Rich, ‘Grassroots Bureaucracy’, 4–6, 13. 15 Gomes, ‘Crafting AIDS Policy in Brazil and Russia’, 1151–53. 16 Rich, ‘Grassroots Bureaucracy’, 4. 17 Ibid., 8–9. 18 Ibid., 10–11. 19 Department of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, AIDS and Viral Hepatitis, ‘Brazil Breaks the Record of People Undergoing Treatment against HIV and AIDS’. 20 Drahos, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets’. 21 Fraundorfer, Brazil’s Emerging Role in Global Governance, 60–63. 22 Ibid., 76–77. 23 Fraundorfer, Brazil’s Emerging Role in Global Governance, 75–77.

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24 UNITAID, ‘Annual Report 2013’. 25 Douste-Blazy and Altman, Power in Numbers. 26 UNITAID, ‘Factsheet’, 2. 27 Ibid. 28 Douste-Blazy and Altman, Power in Numbers; Amorim, ‘Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003–2010)’; Bermúdez, Interview, 9 October 2012. 29 Bermúdez, Interview, 9 October 2012. 30 Vandevelde, Interview, 10 August 2016. 31 Bermúdez, Interview, 9 October 2012; Fraundorfer, Brazil’s Emerging Role in Global Governance, 79–80. 32 UNITAID, ‘Celso Amorim’. 33 Oxfam, ‘Civil Society and UNITAID’, 6. 34 Ibid. Track record on access to medicines; experience in representing those organisations affected by HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB; and string advocacy and communication skills. 35 UNITAID NGO Delegation, ‘Website’, unitaidngodelegation.org, accessed 8 March 2017. 36 Vandevelde, Interview, 10 August 2016. 37 Ibid. 38 Jacob, Interview, 9 March 2017. 39 Delegation Handbook, ‘Communities Delegation of People Living with and Affected by HIV, TB and Malaria and Those Co-Infected with HIV and HCV to the UNITAID Board’, 5. 40 Oxfam, ‘Civil Society and UNITAID’, 6–7. 41 Ibid., 7. 42 Ibid. 43 See Communities Delegation, ‘Facebook Page’, https://www.facebook.com/ groups/CommunitiesUNITAID, accessed 8 March 2017; Communities Delegation, ‘Twitter Account’, @UTDCommunities, accessed 08 March 2017. 44 See UNITAID NGO Delegation, ‘Website’. 45 See IP-health Archives, http://lists.keionline.org/pipermail/ip-health_lists. keionline.org/, accessed 8 March 2017. 46 Ross Quiroga, Interview, 10 October 2016. 47 Vandevelde, Interview, 10 August 2016. 48 Baker, Interview, 12 September 2016. 49 Jakob, Interview, 9 March 2017. 50 Douste-Blazy and Altman, Power in Numbers, 21, 24, 36. 51 Ibid., 24. 52 Ibid., 15–16. Talks exist about an international tax on financial transactions originally suggested by James Tobin in 1972. In 2004, the presidents of Brazil, Chile and France (founding members of UNITAID) came together to advance the international debate on international taxes. See Wahlberg, ‘Progress on Global Taxes?’. 53 Ibid., 6. 54 Ibid., 17. 55 Ibid., 18.



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56 Since UNITAID forms part of the UN system, it is prohibited to collect donations from private individuals. To get access to the voluntary contributions, UNITAID created in 2008 the Millennium Foundation to collect the donations and channel them to UNITAID. Ibid., 52. 57 Ibid., 41. 58 Ibid., 43. 59 UNITAID, ‘Factsheet’, 1. 60 UNITAID, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 10. 61 Ibid.; Bermúdez and ‘t Hoen, ‘The UNITAID Patent Pool Initiative’, 37. 62 Ibid. 63 UNITAID, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 98. 64 Silverman, ‘UNITAID’, 7. 65 Bermúdez, Interview, 9 October 2012. 66 Brazilian Government, ‘Brasil ajuda países pobres a conter epidemias’. 67 Presidência da República, ‘Lei N° 12.413’. 68 UNITAID, ‘Audited Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 December  2015’, 36. 69 UNITAID, ‘Factsheet’, 2. 70 UNITAID, ‘UNITAID Strategy 2013–2016’, 97. 71 UNITAID, ‘Malawi and Viral-Load Testing’. 72 UNITAID, ‘UNITAID in Uganda’. 73 MMV, ‘UNITAID Award MMV-Led Consortium up to US$ 34 Million (2012)’. See also a short documentary about the project on http://blog.unitaid.eu/ post/89792514390/a-recent-episode-on-al-jazeeeras-global-health, accessed 3 March  2017. 74 See the official documents on the following website: http://www.unitaid.eu/en/ how/gov/in-country-consultations, accessed 3 March 2017. 75 The Communities’ Support Team, ‘Ensuring UNITAID Products Reach Affected Communities’. 76 UNITAID, UNITAID’s Key Performance Indicators. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid., 67–68. 79 Ibid., 68–69. 80 Ibid., 55–56. 81 Vandevelde, Interview, 10 August 2016; Baker, Interview, 12 September 2016. 82 UNITAID, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 55. 83 Bermúdez and ‘t Hoen, ‘The UNITAID Patent Pool Initiative’, 38. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid., 38–39. 86 Medicines Patent Pool, Progress and Achievements of the Medicines Patent Pool, 1–2. 87 Ibid., 3–7. 88 Ibid., 11. 89 Douste-Blazy and Altman, Power in Numbers, 64. 90 Bermúdez, Interview, 9 October 2012.

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91 Vandevelde, Interview, 10 August 2016. 92 Baker, Interview, 12 September 2016. 93 Ross Quiroga, Interview, 10 October 2016. 94 Jakob, Interview, 9 March 2017. 95 Vandevelde, Interview, 10 August 2016. 96 UNITAID, Civil Society Engagement Plan. 97 Jakob, Interview, 9 March 2017. 98 Vandevelde, Interview, 10 August 2016. 99 See UNITAID NGO Delegation, ‘Website’. 100 Nichols, ‘What Do the Civil Society Delegations at UNITAID Do?’; Otwoma, ‘The Medicines Patent Pool and the Civil Society Delegations to UNITAID’. 101 Ross Quiroga, Interview, 10 October 2016. 102 DFID, ‘Multilateral Aid Review’, 3. 103 Fan, ‘Should UNITAID Rethink Its Raison D’Être?’. 104 DFID, ‘Multilateral Aid Review’, 2–3. 105 Ibid., 3. 106 Douste-Blazy and Altman, Power in Numbers, 69. 107 Silverman, ‘UNITAID’. 108 UNITAID NGO Delegation, ‘UNITAID NGO Delegation 2014/15 Performance Evaluation’. 109 Vandevelde, Interview, 10 August 2016; Baker, Interview, 12 September 2016. 110 Ross Quiroga, Interview, 10 October 2016. 111 To reduce the prices of medicines on the global level Pogge suggested a public-good strategy which envisages that ‘results of any successful effort to develop [. . .] a new essential drug are to be provided as a public good that all pharmaceutical companies may use free of charge’. Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Global Health’, 188.

Chapter 4

Brazil and Food Security

After its reform in 2008, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) has developed from a purely intergovernmental and lethargic talk-shop into the most innovative, participatory and transparent mechanism in global food security governance. How has such a sea change been possible? What has been Brazil’s role in this profound transformation process? And to which extent can this committee be characterised as a democratic global governance mechanism? Given a perversely unjust society, Brazil has always had to fight with extraordinary rates of poverty and hunger. While since its re-democratisation in the early 1980s, Brazil has heavily invested into its own agricultural sector making the country a leading exporter of a wide range of agricultural products, the situation of food security had only improved moderately. Still in 2002, around 22 million Brazilians lived in extreme poverty and around 53 million Brazilians suffered from hunger.1 This depressive situation has changed markedly after 2003 with the government’s introduction and the positive unfolding of the Zero Hunger strategy, a comprehensive national policy programme to reduce the high rates of hunger and poverty in the country and end this centuries-long scourge in the history of Brazil. The extraordinary success of this strategy propelled Brazil onto the global stage, turning the country into a relevant partner for international organisations, humanitarian aid agencies and developing countries in the fight against hunger and poverty. To understand this extraordinary success story, the following chapter first gives a brief overview of the principal developments, the structure and main actors of Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy and the construction of the National Food Security and Nutrition Framework. Thereafter, the chapter turns to the reformed Committee on World Food Security, shedding light on its reform 85

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process, its new structures and major achievements since 2008–2009. In this context, the chapter highlights Brazil’s role in the reformed committee and examines to which extent the government contributed to the democratic practices of the committee by promoting human rights and transnational solidarity, creating participatory structures and establishing accountability mechanisms. BRAZIL’S NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION FRAMEWORK Brazil was historically known as a country in which a considerable part of its society was trapped in a merciless quicksand of hunger and poverty, devouring the hopes and ambitions of millions of Brazilians, negating them human dignity and making them believe that the miserable living conditions they were born into represented their irreversible destiny. The paradox of this situation is that this quicksand existed in the midst of a tropical environment that has always been abundant with food. When in 2003 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva became the new president of Brazil, he introduced the Zero Hunger strategy, a comprehensive national strategy to fight Brazil’s historical scourge of hunger and poverty. In the years to come the Zero Hunger strategy was to prove to millions of Brazilians and the world that the merciless quicksand of hunger and poverty is not an irreversible destiny. The Zero Hunger strategy was conceived as a comprehensive, inclusive and multi-sectoral approach improving access to food, supporting Brazil’s family agriculture, generating income and promoting partnerships of various types and civil society participation. More than 30 complementary programmes were developed under the umbrella of the Zero Hunger strategy the largest of which are the Bolsa Familia Programme (cash-transfer programme supporting poor families), the Food Acquisition Programme (local distribution of food from family farmers), the School Meal Programme (provision of school meals), the Programme for the Strengthening of Family Agriculture (provision of financial and technical support for family farmers) and the CisternBuilding Programme (building cisterns to collect rainwater for domestic use in the semi-arid region of Brazil’s Northeast).2 The Bolsa Familia Programme is certainly the most famous programme encompassing four cash-transfer schemes such as gas assistance, food bonus, school bonus and food card.3 The School Feeding Law of 2009 very well exemplifies the complementarity of the School Meal Programme with the Food Acquisition Programme. The law constituted that at least 30 per cent of the purchase for the National School Meal Programme ought to be derived from local family agriculture, thereby



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reinforcing the Food Acquisition Programme and guaranteeing that part of the school meals derives from local agriculture.4 In 2006, the Law of Food and Nutrition Security (Lei Orgânica de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional – LOSAN) officially and legally set up the National System of Food and Nutrition Security (Sistema Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional – SISAN), defining food and nutrition security as the realisation of the right of all to the regular and permanent access to quality food, available in sufficient quantity, without compromising the access to other essential necessities.5 Article 2 of LOSAN emphasises that it is the duty of the state to adopt adequate policies and programmes to promote and guarantee food and nutrition security.6 LOSAN highlights the following principles underlying Brazil’s National Food and Security System: universal access to adequate food; respect for human dignity; social participation in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of programmes and public policies on food and nutrition security and transparency of the programmes; and public and private resources (Art. 8). SISAN’s principal guidelines refer to the promotion of inter-sectoral approaches of governmental and nongovernmental actions, policies and programmes, the decentralisation of activities and intergovernmental collaboration, monitoring the situation of food and nutrition security and the combination of direct and immediate measures and more structural and long-term measures to fight hunger and poverty (Art. 9). In 2010, the access to food as a social right was legally incorporated into the Constitution of Brazil.7 Brazil’s National System of Food and Nutrition Security is principally coordinated by the Inter-ministerial Chamber of Food and Nutrition Security (CAISAN) and the Council of Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA). The Inter-ministerial Chamber of Food and Nutrition Security focuses on the cross-sectional coordination among the different ministries as a means of further integrating and uniting the existing bodies in the area of food and nutrition security.8 CAISAN is composed of 16 ministers and 3 special secretaries, which at the same time are governmental counsellors in CONSEA.9 The Brazilian Council of Food and Nutrition Security and its counterparts on the state and municipal levels constitute the backbone of Brazil’s National Food and Nutrition Security System. Also created in 2003, CONSEA10 was directly linked to the presidency with the aim of evaluating, mobilising and debating with the Brazilian society the agenda of hunger.11 Francisco Menezes, director of CONSEA from 2004 to 2007, stressed the extraordinary significance of this institutional body in the National System of Food and Nutrition Security:12 The structural fact that two-thirds of its members13 are from civil society and that it functions as an advisory body to the president, although the body itself lacks decision-making power, places CONSEA at

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the intersection of all important actors, in particular representatives from the government and civil society, and considerably reinforces the coordination and cooperation efforts among them. In this process, several key programmes of the Zero Hunger strategy were formulated and after their implementation – which was carried out by the state and municipal CONSEAs – further improved, including the Food Acquisition Programme, the School Meal Programme and several sub-programmes of Bolsa Familia.14 For instance, the Cistern-Building Programme was completely developed by civil society actors and gained the necessary legitimacy it had lacked before when it was discussed and further elaborated among the members of CONSEA.15 Menezes further pointed out that CONSEA was also critical in the legislative developments of the National System of Food and Nutrition Security. The body was decisive in the adoption of the 2009 School Feeding Law, which had initially aroused scepticism among members of Congress. CONSEA was also behind the development of LOSAN (adopted in 2006) and the constitutional amendment in 2010, transforming the access to food into a social right.16 Along with the coordinated action among different ministries from different sectors, the involvement of Brazil’s civil society in the elaboration, development and implementation of the whole National Food and Nutrition Security Framework is a fundamental trademark of Brazil’s approach. Civil society organisations are represented in CONSEA with a two-thirds majority. Thus, it is not surprising that CONSEA has also been involved in the organisation of the key platform for Brazilian civil society organisations in food and nutrition security, the National Conferences on Food and Nutrition Security.17 The I. National Conference on Food and Nutrition, as part of the 8th National Conference on Health, in 1986, had already suggested the establishment of a National System of Food and Nutrition Security.18 As a further step, the I. National Conference on Food and Nutrition Security was held in 1994 with 1,800 delegates from civil society and the three different levels of government (municipal, state, federal), resulting in the formation of two social movements – ‘Ação da Cidadania Contra a Fome’ (Citizens’ Action against Hunger) and the ‘Miséria e pela Vida’ movement (Misery and for Life).19 The Brazilian Forum for Food and Nutrition Security and Sovereignty (Fórum Brasileiro de Soberania e Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional), created in 1998 as a huge network comprising civil society organisations, social movements, research institutions and individuals, was crucial to the development of several pivotal institutions in the framework of the Zero Hunger strategy, among them CONSEA.20 The Network of Citizen Education (Rede de Educação Cidadã), composed of different civil society actors and in close cooperation with the Brazilian Forum for Food and Nutrition Security and Sovereignty, involves more than 300,000 people engaged in



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raising awareness about food and nutrition security.21 And it was the Citizens’ Institute (Instituto de Cidadania), a Brazilian civil society organisation with the mission to promote citizen action and citizenship awareness, which elaborated the principal guidelines of the Zero Hunger strategy, before Lula da Silva presented it in 2003 as a governmental strategy.22 José Graziano da Silva, the FAO director-general since 2012, coordinated the Zero Hunger strategy in the Citizens’ Institute and was charged by Lula da Silva in 2003 to oversee the implementation of the strategy as the Special Minister of Food Security and the Fight Against Hunger.23 The System of Social Assistance (SUAS) provided further space for social mobilisation and participation on food and nutrition security issues. SUAS, created in 1993, works as a decentralised and participative system on the three different levels of government (municipal, state and federal) in the area of social assistance, defending and promoting the social rights of Brazilian citizens and guaranteeing the access to basic needs.24 One example of the fruitful interaction between SUAS and the National System of Food and Nutrition Security refers to the so-called Reference Centres of Social Assistance (Centro de Referência de Assistência Social). These centres provide a variety of social services (they are the key access points for families to be identified for the cash-transfer programmes like Bolsa Familia) and function as the main information providers for both the citizens and the different government levels about all different aspects of the Zero Hunger strategy.25 The Zero Hunger strategy and the emerging National System of Food and Nutrition Security involved considerable efforts to integrate a huge variety of ministries, include all three government levels and cooperate with various actors from civil society and the private sector to guarantee an integrative, decentralised and cross-cutting approach to the fight against hunger and poverty. In the same vein, the government coordinated its activities across different programmes, which reinforced the effectiveness of the entire system. The National Food and Nutrition Security Council (CONSEA) became the principal interface for all the different actors involved with significant weight attributed to representatives from civil society, which allowed Brazil’s highly organised and mobilised civil society to cooperate together with government representatives from different ministries on all relevant aspects of the Zero Hunger strategy and leave its mark on the most important programmes and legislative developments. With this inclusive, cross-sectoral and integrative strategy, involving the political will of all sectors of the government and the participation of an abundance of actors from civil society and the private sector, Brazil was able to pull millions of people out of the merciless quicksand of hunger and poverty. In raw numbers: in 2014, the FAO announced that Brazil had achieved both the UN Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of people

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suffering from hunger and the Rome Wold Food Summit target of halving the number of hungry people. In addition, overall poverty was reduced from 24.3 per cent in 2001 to 8.4 per cent in 2012 and extreme poverty from 14.0 per cent to 3.5 per cent.26 In one decade, extreme poverty was reduced by more than 50 per cent by lifting 36 million Brazilians out of extreme poverty.27 In 2011, Lula da Silva’s successor Dilma Rousseff launched the programme Brazil without Misery (Brazil Sem Miséria) to build on the success of the Zero Hunger strategy and take on the logical next challenge: the eradication of extreme poverty in Brazil. With this extraordinary success unfolding and the fact that the Zero Hunger strategy turned into a role model praised and promoted by many international organisations in the global fight against hunger and poverty, Brazil became recognised as a relevant actor in the global governance of food security, in particular in the reform of the Committee on World Food Security. THE REFORM OF THE COMMITTEE ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY: NEW BEGINNINGS The reform of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) can be seen as the most inspiring response to the global food crisis in 2007/2008.28 Ironically, the original CFS, established in 1975, was also the result of an emergency response to the global food crisis of 1974, which envisaged the creation of a global forum on food security.29 The CFS had developed over the following decades into a lethargic animal unable to adequately respond to the global food crisis in 2007/2008, which sparked widespread criticism from civil society organisations and governments.30 It remains to be seen if in a few decades the new CFS will not share a similar destiny, even though its reformed structures represent a promising new start. After first proposals had been exchanged in the CFS on the modalities of reform, a contact group was created to lead the reform process.31 The contact group comprised delegates of two FAO member states from each world region, UN agencies and civil society organisations, among them Oxfam, IPC (the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty),32 Biodiversity International, the UN International Alliance against Hunger33 and ActionAid.34 After a negotiation process involving CSOs, developed and developing countries, the final reform document was made public in October 2009, with the objective of turning the CFS into ‘the foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform for a broad range of committed stakeholders to work together . . . towards the elimination of hunger’.35 The new mission of the CFS and its members resided in transforming the committee into the central platform for all stakeholders on issues concerning food and nutrition



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security, elaborating strategies and guidelines towards eradicating hunger, supporting countries in the implementation of their own policies in the fight against hunger and creating a global strategic framework for better coordination among all stakeholders.36 In this light, the reform document emphasised inclusiveness, the creation of linkages with the field and flexibility in the implementation of the committee’s decisions as the three guiding principles to respond more adequately to emerging challenges, changing realities on the ground and changing membership needs.37 The new CFS consists of a bureau, an advisory group, a plenary, a secretariat (based at the FAO in Rome) and a high-level panel of experts. The bureau serves as the executive body and is led by a chair and 12 FAO member states elected on a two-year basis. The Brazilian delegation was one of the members of the bureau between the periods 2009–2011, 2011–2013 and 2013–2015 and re-elected for the period 2017–2019.38 In the period 2015–2017, Brazil served as an alternate member of the bureau.39 The advisory group supports the activities of the bureau and counts among its members the representatives from UN agencies, CSOs, the private sector, agricultural research institutions and international financial and trade institutions.40 The bureau and the advisory group together maintain the relationships of the CFS with other stakeholders on the regional, sub-regional and local levels, such as CSOs, regional and sub-regional organisations and actors from the private sector. The plenary serves as the principal forum for decision-making, debate and coordination among all stakeholders. The high-level panel of experts (HLPE) counts 15 internationally recognised experts on food and nutrition security and relies on several project teams to provide scientific advice to the other bodies.41 Between 2010 and 2015, the Brazilian Renato Maluf, a former president of Brazil’s CONSEA, served as one of those 15 experts in the HLPE.42 Both the Brazilian government and Oxfam supported his candidacy for that position.43 Brazil became one of several protagonists that assumed a pro-active role in the CFS since the first reform proposals were presented in 2008. From the very beginning of the reform talks, Brazil’s actions were guided by those principles which have become recognised as the main pillars of Brazil’s National Food and Nutrition Security System, such as multi-sectoral coordination, social participation in formulating and implementing food security policies, the creation of a comprehensive food security framework and the crucial role of a body involving representatives from government and civil society, embodied by Brazil’s CONSEA.44 In the contact group meetings, which were to facilitate the reform process, the Brazilian delegation took the lead in drafting a comprehensive reform proposal including all those elements which later on came to be known as the principal innovations of the new CFS, such as the committee’s overall new role in global food security governance, the inclusive decision-making

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process and civil society participation.45 During the whole reform process, Brazil, together with other leading actors such as the EU, Germany, France, Italy, Argentina and civil society representatives (most importantly from FIAN International and ActionAid), fought for an ambitious and visionary document which would lay the ground for the new CFS to step out of the shadows of its predecessor.46 Francisco Bendrau Sarmento, who represented the NGO ActionAid during the reform process in the CFS, confirmed that the pro-active role of the Brazilian delegation in pushing for an ambitious reform document was inspired by Brazil’s domestic experience, especially the role and composition of the National Council on Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA): The document was influenced by the recent experience Brazil had made with CONSEA. Even if the idea of the committee was pretty different from CONSEA, the initial [reform] document included some of the existing premises of CONSEA. One of those [was] the issue of social participation . . . this one was obvious, evident, pretty strong . . . but it was above all a global vision to bring all relevant actors to the negotiation table.47

The most stubborn opponents to this new ambitious project were top agricultural producers from the Anglo-American world such as the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.48 The delegations of these governments invested most of their energy into watering down the reform document so that in the end the new committee would be no more than a mere forum for information exchange.49 Bluntly, a toothless tiger, not more influential than its predecessor. For instance, due to strong resistance from the US, but also occasionally from the EU, the reform document laid out a two-stage approach in which the more ambitious objectives such as the formulation of a global strategic framework for food security and the creation of regional and national coordination mechanisms would be discussed in a second stage,50 obviously postponing these ambitious projects. The US viewed the elaboration of a global strategic framework as ‘unnecessary and overly ambitious for a CFS that had not yet proven itself’.51 The Brazilian delegation, however, together with other delegations and civil society actors insisted in the negotiations that such an approach should be regarded as a gradual implementation process of these ambitious projects, and not as an infinite postponement.52 One of the innovative elements of the new committee refers to its open and inclusive nature, a new characteristic which also extends to the composition of national delegations during the plenary sessions. Thus, during the 36th plenary session in October 2010, the first one of the new CFS, the Brazilian delegation was composed of representatives of several Brazilian ministries, such as the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger, the



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Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Agrarian Development, Brazil’s National Fund for Educational Development and the Secretariat of Strategic Issues of the Presidency of the Republic, the president of Brazil’s CONSEA and representatives of civil society organisations and unions such as the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers and the National Federation of Men and Women in Family Agriculture.53 This openness of the Brazilian delegation at the plenary sessions has been sustained ever since and very much reflects Brazil’s open and inclusive approach integrating those actors from the Brazilian government and civil society which also play a key role in the context of Brazil’s National Food and Nutrition Security Framework.54 Candice Vianna Sakamoto Souza, the Alternate Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN Agencies in Rome between 2012 and 2015, points out the relevance of this openness for Brazil. Generally, Brazil’s civil society participates in the [civil society] mechanism. But there are other cases, for example, in the plenary sessions the Brazilian delegation is always inclusive . . . if a Brazilian civil society organisation wants to be part of the delegation, we have it registered . . . in that case, that Brazilian civil society organisation participates as part of the [Brazilian] delegation and the civil society mechanism because we have this kind of dialogue [in Brazil]. . . . The Brazilian delegation maintains a dialogue with Itamaraty [Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs] in Brasília which converses with other ministries, and all of them bring their issues to CONSEA, and CONSEA maintains a dialogue with the civil society mechanism . . . in this process the information is always in flux and you have a feedback loop of all the national actors.55

This dialogue was fostered not only by Brazil but by the whole new setting of the reformed committee. Already in the reform process it became clear how relevant the participation of new actors, in particular from civil society, proved to be to breathe new life into the ossified committee. And the committee’s trademark of openness and inclusiveness was particularly supported by civil society actors. The Participation of New Actors The decision-making process in the CFS is characterised by the one countryone vote principle.56 Although the reformed CFS remains an intergovernmental body, with the FAO member states as the only members entitled to make decisions, other stakeholders like CSOs and private actors were recognised as official participants of the CFS and are strongly represented in the advisory group and the plenary.57 In comparison, in the old committee CSOs were only recognised as observers.58 It is important to note that civil society

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actors prefer the term ‘participants’ to ‘stakeholders’ which, in their view, highlights the continuing power imbalances between states and civil society actors and underscores the fact that the states, due to their power advantages, continue to have a special responsibility in food security issues.59 During the reform process some state delegations even went as far as to offer CSOs voting rights, which was rejected by CSOs on the grounds that decision-making and thus responsibility and accountability for guaranteeing food security lay with the states.60 In this context, both private actors and civil society organisations built up their own infrastructure to better organise themselves vis-à-vis the governments. CSOs created an autonomous civil society mechanism (CSM) to better coordinate their activities in the CFS. The establishment of such a mechanism was one of the central results of the reform document.61 A proposal for what this mechanism should look like was jointly elaborated by the International Planning Committee of Food Sovereignty, Oxfam International and ActionAid International with the final draft of the reform proposal presented and approved at a consultation of civil society organisations in late 2010.62 Through the CSM, CSOs have coordinated their activities in the advisory group, the plenary sessions and other task teams and working groups of the CFS.63 The CSM is governed by a global coordination committee with 41 members from 11 constituencies and 17 sub-regions.64 Both the 11 constituencies worldwide and the 17 sub-regions are represented by civil society organisations. For example, the constituency of indigenous peoples is represented by the Indigenous Caucus located in Panama. Or the constituency of agricultural and food workers is represented by the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Association located in Moldova.65 Each of these constituencies is represented by two members of the respective organisations (the only exception is the constituency of smallholder farmers which is represented by four members of the organisation La Via Campesina due to their high affectedness in all issues concerning food security).66 Along with these 11 constituencies the world regions are represented in the form of 17 sub-regions (one member each). Thus, North America is represented by one member of the New Yorkbased organisation WHY Hunger. Or the Southern Cone is represented by one member of the Uruguayan organisation Movimiento Agroecológico de América Latina.67 The coordination committee is responsible for the CSM’s finances and for ensuring effective communication with CSM members and participation of civil society representatives in the CSM’s working groups, the CFS plenary meetings and the advisory group.68 The CSM also facilitates the selection of civil society actors from the coordination committee for the four civil society



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seats in the advisory group. The original four civil society advisory group members – the Network of Peasant Organisations and Producers in West Africa, IPC, Oxfam International and the Mouvement International de la Jeunesse Agricole et Rurale Catholique – were selected on the basis of their experience and involvement in the creation of the CSM.69 The secretariat is based at the headquarters of the FAO and is responsible for the daily functioning of the mechanism. The CSM Forum is an annual forum which takes place annually before the CFS plenary sessions and serves the civil society members of the CSM as a platform for debate, discussion and review.70 The CSM is built on the principles of openness, inclusiveness and transparency, with a focus on consensus-building, consultation and the concept of facilitation instead of representation.71 The main objective of civil society delegates in the CSM is not necessarily to represent their organisation but facilitate the participation of those communities and people from the subregions and constituencies.72 In this context, the CSM also created several policy working groups on those issues relevant to the CFS, such as smallholders, monitoring, water, sustainable agricultural development, and so on. Apart from civil society, the private sector built up some structures to coordinate its voice. In October 2010, at the initial session of the reformed committee, the private sector was represented by merely one representative. In the following years, the Agri-Food Network, a transnational network of 12 international associations or farm groups worldwide, created the so-called private-sector mechanism to organise and represent business interests of food producers, agro-retailers, grain traders and food manufacturers in the CFS advisory group.73 The civil society mechanism is financially sustained through contributions from NGOs, FAO multi-donor trust funds and FAO member states. Between 2011 and 2015, the CSM had an overall budget of €2,901,187 of which governments and international organisations were responsible for 83 per cent and NGOs and CSOs for 17 per cent. The contribution of governments and international organisations amounted to €2,407,985 of which the EU was the unrivalled major donor with 44.6 per cent, followed by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation with 19.7 per cent. Brazil is the only non-European donor with 11.6 per cent, compared with Spain’s 9.4 per cent, Norway’s 6.7 per cent, Germany’s 4.8 per cent and France’s 2.2 per cent.74 The FAO multi-donor fund responsible for these generous contributions was created in 2011 and Brazil started to contribute to the fund in 2012 when a new budget law was adopted in Brazil to allow the government to support civil society participation in international organisations linked to the fight against hunger and malnutrition.75 For example, Brazil contributed in 2012 with US$380,000 (app. €330,000) to the multi-donor fund, US$160,000 (app. €140,000) of which were destined for the support of civil society participation

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in the processes of the CFS and US$ 220,000 (app. €190,000) destined for the civil society mechanism.76 The Committee’s Major Achievements Since its creation, the CFS has been able to debate several contentious issues in food security governance particularly owing to the increased participation and influence of civil society actors. These were topics which the states alone would have been rather unwilling to discuss, such as the negative impact of food price volatility on food security, the relation between climate change and food security, the significance of smallholder agriculture for food security or the impact of biofuels on food production.77 These issues put an emphasis on vulnerable communities such as smallholders, discussed how to ensure a rights-based approach to food security and thematised the critical impact of price volatility on food security. The CFS’s principal achievements refer to the open, inclusive and transparent negotiations of three major documents, the Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition, the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security and the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems. Although all these documents are non-enforceable and legally non-binding and thus do not involve any official sanction mechanisms, the documents represent an extraordinary achievement in global food security governance They were all negotiated and agreed on in an open and inclusive consultation and negotiation process involving representatives of governments, civil society organisations and the private sector. As a result, the reformed committee provided the platform for open and inclusive negotiations on the development of a global strategic framework for food security and nutrition to better coordinate food security policies at the national, regional and global levels, the elaboration of voluntary guidelines to improve the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests and ten principles for a responsible investment in agriculture and food systems. The Global Strategic Framework The Global Strategic Framework (GSF) was negotiated between 2010 and 2012 under the chairpersonship of the Brazilian delegation and aims to ‘improve coordination and guide synchronized action by a wide range of stakeholders’ and ‘provide an overarching framework and a single reference document with practical guidance on core recommendations for food security and nutrition strategies, policies and actions validated by the wide ownership, participation and consultation afforded by the CFS’.78 The document consists



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of six main chapters, referring to the background of the CFS reform and the nature, purpose and elaboration of the GSF (Chapter I), the root causes of hunger, the lessons learned and emerging challenges (Chapter II), existing overarching frameworks (Chapter III), food security policies and programmes (Chapter IV), strategies of how to unite and organise to fight hunger (Chapter V) and further issues relevant to the future debate (Chapter VI).79 After the successful conclusion of the reform process and the promising start of the new committee, the Brazilian delegation was mainly concerned with the Global Strategic Framework, which had been postponed by those governments most sceptical about the new role of the committee with the clear intention to delay any talk or possible implementation of the framework. The Brazilian delegation proposed to assume the chairpersonship of the working group on the Global Strategic Framework, with the responsibility to elaborate and develop a final document determining the principles, role and responsibilities of the framework. Candice Vianna Sakamoto Souza explained Brazil’s rationale for this step with the following words: Brazil was one of the main actors of the reform of the committee . . . and Brazil proposed to assume the chairpersonship of the Global Strategic Framework, which was not only one of the principal elements of the reform document but one of the central elements of what the committee itself planned to be. . . . We wanted to continue making an impact.80

The 36th CFS plenary session in 2010 decided to launch the process for the elaboration of the global framework and Brazil was officially indicated to coordinate the bureau’s working group on the Global Strategic Framework.81 As it was the case during the reform process, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were the staunchest opponents to the elaboration of an ambitious document.82 The chairperson of the working group, Renato Domith Godinho, Brazil’s Alternate Permanent Representative at that time, ‘conducted and coordinated the whole consultation process, . . . [overseeing] work on the initial drafts, the regional consultations, the reviews, the successive drafts’.83 Brazil’s position to push for an ambitious outcome document was in line with the position of civil society actors involved, particularly FIAN International, La Via Campesina, the Indigenous Caucus, the International Union of Food Workers and the World Alliance of Fisherfolk.84 The Brazilian delegation was particularly satisfied when Chapter V (Uniting and Organising to Fight Hunger) of the document was finally agreed on, which contains several recommendations on the aspects of governance, institutionalisation and coordination at the national, regional and global level heavily inspired by Brazil’s national experience.85 The chapter sets

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out emphasising that ‘good governance for food security and nutrition at all levels – global, regional and particularly national – is a prime requisite for progress in the fight against hunger and malnutrition’.86 The recommendations of core actions to be taken at country level highlight all those elements which are essential parts of Brazil’s National Food and Nutrition Security Framework. For instance, the chapter recommends establishing a comprehensive national framework consolidated in national law, creating inter-ministerial mechanisms and coordination with local levels of government through multistakeholder platforms (composed of actors from local governments, civil society, the private sector, farmers’ organisations, smallholders and other local groups affected by food security), setting up and strengthening monitoring mechanisms.87 As a real-world example of such coordinated action at country level the chapter explicitly presents Brazil’s national experience as a ‘success story in institutionalizing multi-ministerial coordination and civil society participation to address food insecurity and promote the right to food’.88 In this light, the chapter introduces Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy, the fundamental role of civil society participation, CONSEA, CAISAN and the legal consolidation of the food security and nutrition framework.89 Furthermore, the chapter offers recommendations for better regional coordination, mentioning as an example the African Union’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, which, since its creation in 2003 has turned into a continent-wide framework for accelerating agricultural growth, poverty reduction and food and nutrition security in sub-Saharan Africa.90 The remaining part of the chapter provides several recommendations for better global coordination with regional and national levels referring, among other issues, to the importance of country-led strategies (instead of isolated projects), South-South cooperation, multistakeholder partnerships and technical cooperation.91 The last part of the chapter also mentions the need for reinforced monitoring and follow-up activities of food security policies at all levels involving all stakeholders.92 In this context, the CFS bureau established an open-ended working group on monitoring activities to debate how to ‘monitor the state of implementation of the Committee’s decisions and recommendations’.93 Contentious conflicts emerged throughout the negotiations involving particularly the delegates from the US and Canada. In Chapter IV (policy, programme and other recommendations), which concentrated on food security policies and programmes, both delegates wanted to delete the reference to the ‘human right to adequate food’ as the ‘foundation’ for food security policies and programmes.94 The final agreed text refers to ‘taking into account the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security’95 as the basis for food security policies and programmes. While this compromised language can be seen as a success for the progressive-minded



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(state) actors – by maintaining the reference to the right to adequate food – at the same time it watered down the initial importance attributed to the right to adequate food as a foundation for food security policies and programmes.96 The most contentious conflicts arose on the language of the final Chapter VI. These conflicts were primarily due to the fact that Chapter VI (Issues That May Require Further Attention) was to contain issues which were not internationally agreed on. As a consequence, the more conservative group of governments attempted to block anything that went beyond the already agreed language, whereas the more progressive camp attempted to push things further and bring new issues to the table as a basis for future negotiations. The Brazilian delegation, as one of the more progressive actors, fought to incorporate the following issues:97 (1) direct access of smallholders to markets, stimulating investment in training, capacity-building and creation of retail spaces for smallholders, (2) stimulation of sustainable rural development, (3) emphasis on rural technologies such as Brazil’s Food Acquisition Programme, (4) emphasis on the definition of food and nutrition security, (5) maintaining the concept of food sovereignty which is legally defined in Brazil’s Constitution, (6) monitoring and integration as integral parts of sustainable food security policies should be realised by specialised international organisations of the UN system, governments and civil society. While the US, Canada, Argentina and Chile attempted to suppress the whole chapter, a broad alliance among African countries, Middle Eastern countries, GRULAC (in particular Venezuela and Ecuador) and civil society representatives came into being which insisted on maintaining the chapter. The EU, which had assumed an intermediary position, put forward a proposal which, according to the Brazilian delegation, would have considerably watered down the language of the whole chapter, but became an acceptable compromise for those governments favourable of eliminating the chapter.98 Since this compromise was not acceptable to the more progressive camp, negotiations continued. On 19 July 2012, the final chapter was concluded with controversial debates remaining on the definition of food sovereignty.99 Due to the strong resistance of the US, Australia and Canada and the subsequent lack of consensus on this issue, the definition of food sovereignty100 was put in brackets.101 This decision generated further controversies seriously threatening the final approval of the whole document at the 39th plenary session in October 2012. The US delegation, supported by the delegations of Canada and Australia, had threatened to block any consensus at the plenary session to avoid the approval of the document. In addition, regional controversies among GRULAC members (Venezuela and Ecuador wanted to maintain the term, while Chile and Mexico were in favour of eliminating it) put further strain on Brazil’s efforts to keep the reference to food sovereignty.102 In the document finally adopted

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at the 39th plenary session any reference whatsoever in Chapter VI to food sovereignty was eliminated. Nevertheless, when we look at the final version of that chapter, it becomes clear that except for the unsuccessful incorporation of the definition of food sovereignty Brazil and the progressive camp had achieved most of their objectives. Among those issues relevant to further debate were listed the integration and access of smallholders to markets, the support for rural development, the need of the international trade system to better recognise food security issues and attention to the impact of intellectual property rights on agriculture, food security and nutrition.103 The Global Strategic Framework has become a living document to be annually updated by the plenary and adjusted to new priorities and upcoming challenges, which is important for the relevance of the document, as Domith Godinho explains: In the case of the GSF [Global Strategic Framework], it was also important to ensure that it would organically remain linked to the year-to-year CFS policy convergence work. After the first endorsed version, Brazil wanted the GSF to be constantly updated to be in fact no more than a ‘vehicle’ and communication tool for the broad governance work of the CFS. While Brazil supported a number of policy recommendations based on its own successful national food security strategy and programmes, for the GSF the main position was to get a meaningful instrument approved.104

Among the major documents, the Global Strategic Framework remains the only ‘living document’ adopted by the CFS, allowing the committee to remain flexible and adapt the document to new developments in global food security. If this document can unfold practical impact remains to be seen, not least because, with the emphasis on national policy frameworks, its implementation depends primarily on the states.105 In addition, it remains to be seen how this framework can be implemented in a context of various competing policy frameworks which may suit the interests of states like the US or Canada much better due to the simple fact that they were developed without the degree of input and participation which characterised the negotiations resulting in the final document of the Global Strategic Framework.106 The committee created a working group on the monitoring of the Global Strategic Framework and organised several workshops in which the Brazilian delegation presented its national experience on monitoring food and nutrition security policies.107 In 2013, the FAO published a report on how to move forward on the implementation of the framework.108 In this report, the FAO proposed a seven-step approach including the following steps: (1) identify food-insecure populations; (2) undertake assessments of the gaps of existing food security policies and frameworks; (3) adopt a national human rights-based strategy for food security and nutrition; (4) identify the roles and responsibilities of the



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relevant public institutions; (5) legally integrate the right to food in national legislation; (6) monitor impact and outcome of the entire food security framework and (7) establish judicial, extra-judicial or administrative accountability mechanisms to hold the governments to account. To illustrate how these steps can be realised, the document repeatedly referred to Brazil’s national experience mentioning Brazil’s Information System on Food Security and Nutrition, a comprehensive database to identify food-insecure populations, Brazil’s assessment approach in the context of the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries (CPLP), Brazil’s integration of food security policies in national legislation legally fixing the responsibilities of the government, the role of the National Council on Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA) in the elaboration, implementation and monitoring of the whole food security framework and the elements of inter-sectoral and social participation in Brazil’s food and nutrition security framework.109 In short, Brazil’s national experience is regarded as one of the most exemplary guiding models in the implementation of the Global Strategic Framework. The Voluntary Guidelines The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (Voluntary Guidelines) were elaborated in a similarly inclusive process of consultations between 2009 and 2010 and in an open-ended working group chaired by the US delegation in 2011 and 2012, before they were adopted in May 2012.110 The Voluntary Guidelines aim to ‘serve as a reference and to provide guidance to improve the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests with the overarching goal of achieving food security for all and to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security’.111 Therefore, the actors involved agreed on a rights-based approach to the tenure of governance, land and fisheries in the form of the implementation of ten principles. These are human dignity (recognising the human rights of all individuals), non-discrimination, equity and justice, gender equality, holistic and sustainable approaches, consultation and participation, the rule of law, transparency, accountability and continuous improvement.112 The consensus on this rights-based approach was only possible because of the inclusive and participatory nature of the negotiations. The FAO had already launched a preparation process in June 2008, inviting representatives of international programmes and organisations such as UN Habitat, the World Bank, NGOs such as the Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN) and the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC), development agencies such as the German GTZ, and government representatives for preliminary discussions.113

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In the context of the participatory and consultative process, between September 2009 and November 2010 the FAO organised ten regional meetings (Brazil, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Jordan, Namibia, Panama, Romania, the Russian Federation, Samoa and Viet Nam), one private-sector meeting and four civil society meetings. These meetings were attended by almost 1,000 representatives from governments, civil society, the private sector, academia and UN agencies from 130 countries.114 The zero draft for the negotiations in the CFS was developed in these meetings with the FAO drawing on public readings and electronic consultations before the draft was submitted for negotiations to the intergovernmental working group.115 By creating a working group on land tenure in the civil society mechanism, civil society representatives used the CSM to coordinate their positions in the consultation process. According to Jessica Duncan, an avid academic observer of the whole process, the negotiations of the Voluntary Guidelines were ‘evidence of the willingness of member states to accept the implications of participations’ and further ‘evidence of a concerted effort on part of all actors to enact the reform vision of the CFS’.116 Brazil, while not chairing those discussions, pursued a similar approach as in the context of the negotiations for the Global Strategic Framework. In general, Brazil, civil society representatives and EU governments belonged to the progressive group which aimed to negotiate a document as innovative as possible, while the governments of the Anglo-Saxon world and others (e.g. the US, Canada and Mexico) formed the conservative group blocking any innovations which might have interfered with property rights, corporate investment opportunities and state sovereignty.117 Despite these two opposing camps, special emphasis needs to be put on the fact that over the course of the negotiations alliances were rather transient and changed depending on the issue discussed. This situation also applied to the alliances sought by the Brazilian delegation, as Domith Godinho explains: Brazil, with its aforementioned goal of facilitating consensus over a meaningful text, had a very changing geometry of allies depending much on context and issue. Its position generally came in favour of a reasonable outcome, and getting a middle – but still meaningful – ground between positions. Since the EU, especially Germany, who was in a way one of the sponsors of the VGGT [Voluntary Guidelines], shared this goal of facilitating their final approval, Brazil often found itself in similar positions during the negotiations. But the US (both the US delegation and the chair, who had managed to keep their respective roles quite separate), civil society, GRULAC [Latin American and Caribbean Group] countries, African countries and civil society were all at different points also key Brazil allies.118

Brazil’s main goal was to negotiate a text which could complement the Global Strategic Framework, incentivising the creation and consolidation of



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national regulatory frameworks on tenure governance.119 In the same vein, Brazil saw the successful adoption of an ambitious document of the Voluntary Guidelines as fundamental to the growing legitimacy and relevance of the committee’s work. Or in Domith Godinho’s words: Brazil believed in the high relevance of a VGGT [Voluntary Guidelines] -like instrument to promote the end goals of food and nutritional security – considering the key role land tenure plays in many countries. With that said, Brazil was also at least as highly motivated by the significance that the successful approval of a meaningful VGGT text by the CFS, as a result of an inclusive process, would have for the role and relevance of CFS itself and for the evolution of a legitimate, multilateral, multi-stakeholder model of global governance in general. It is my perception that Brazil´s goals were fully achieved, with a meaningful VGGT text successfully approved by the CFS.120

While the Brazilian negotiator was obviously very satisfied that the outcome of the negotiations was very much in line with Brazil’s objectives, the final document also contains weaknesses primarily deplored by civil society representatives. The main weaknesses of the document refer to the absence of any definition of land, fisheries and forests, the lacking prioritisation of small-scale food producers and the missing reference to the issue of water and fishermens’ access to fishing grounds.121 During the negotiations, it also became evident that the mere inclusion of civil society actors in the process would not necessarily facilitate rights-based approaches. Rather, the participatory process illustrated that civil society actors remain highly dependent on the governments and that due to the huge power imbalances between governments and civil society actors, some governments might use their structural advantage to undermine the whole process. Domith Godinho provides the following example in which, at one point in the negotiations, Brazil had come to the rescue of civil society actors in the negotiation process. Aside from the VGGT text itself, at one critical point, Brazil had, in its capacity as a member of the CFS bureau, to come in defence of civil society participation and the very CFS model, which was put in risk during the early stage plenary negotiations. Ceding to pressure by the US, Canada and others, the US chair for the VGGT . . . tried to push forward procedures by which there would be a ‘discussion phase’ where civil society would be allowed to speak, followed by a ‘decision-making mode’ during which only member countries would be able to intervene. This risked to completely overturn a key novelty in the reformed CFS model for plenary participation, in which civil society has exactly the same speaking rights as countries, just not being able to ‘vote’ (block consensus among countries). Brazil had to raise successive points of order from the plenary, summon emergency meetings of the CFS bureau, and generally interrupt negotiations until the normal proceedings were restored: the negotiation would have only one

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‘phase’, as it was always supposed to, and discussion would continue on any single paragraph of text, with the possibility of intervention and argumentation by all, until such point as no CFS member country were in disagreement about the language onscreen for that paragraph. Until that moment, CSOs and other participants could freely intervene in support of one position or the other.122

This statement shows that in advancing their interests, it is certainly an advantage for civil society actors to have allies among the governments. And Brazil, since the very beginning of the committee’s reform process, has in many respects proven to be a formidable ally of civil society actors. This reliance of civil society actors on progressive-minded governments will also be crucial in the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines. Given their voluntary and non-enforceable nature, it will particularly depend on progressive-minded governments to take the lead in implementing the guidelines. In this context, the Voluntary Guidelines are seen as an important stepping stone toward a more rights-based debate on tenure governance and affected local communities, a reference point for progressive-minded governments to identify policy gaps in their national legislation and a useful tool for civil society to monitor and review the actions of states.123 As in the case of the Global Strategic Framework, discussions have already moved to identifying ways and methods of how to implement the Voluntary Guidelines. The five methods identified by the FAO are (1) awarenessraising, (2) capacity-building, (3) country support, (4) partnerships and (5) monitoring. In this context, the FAO has organised workshops, regional seminars and developed an e-learning software which offers technical courses for different stakeholders (policy-makers, administrators, academia, civil society, the private sector, etc.) on how to address different aspects of tenure issues.124 In the seminars organised so far both the FAO and representatives of the civil society mechanism named Brazil as one of the most advanced and positive cases to follow in the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines.125 In 2016, after a two-year negotiation process, the CFS published an analytical guide entitled ‘Connecting Smallholders to Markets’126 with policy recommendations on how to promote and support smallholders in national and regional policy processes. Among those policy recommendations feature several programmes of Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy, such as the Food Acquisition Programme and the School Meal Programme. Both programmes have achieved in an innovative way to integrate smallholders (family farmers) into the market and make them an integral part of Brazil’s National Food Security and Nutrition Framework.127 Two civil society monitoring reports found that since the adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines in 2012, several initiatives have been undertaken worldwide to adopt and implement key aspects of the Voluntary Guidelines



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at the national level. Since the Voluntary Guidelines are regarded as soft law, that is, voluntary commitments, it is extremely challenging to force actors from governments and the private sector to adopt those guidelines. Despite these obstacles, civil society organisations, social movements, the FAO and governments worldwide have used the Voluntary Guidelines to create policy dialogue and multistakeholder platforms to develop further tools and activities on how to implement and monitor the Voluntary Guidelines in national policy processes.128 These are the first timid steps in the right direction. The development of a systematic and effective monitoring process will still confront many major obstacles from governments and the private sector. The case of Brazil provides an insightful example of how powerful these obstacles may be. Despite the country’s impressive successes in establishing and institutionalising a more rights-based approach to food security issues, another group of actors is constantly challenging these extraordinary achievements with an approach whose premises are entirely conflicting with those of the Zero Hunger strategy. It is the greedy and exploitative approach of Brazil’s big and powerful agricultural corporations and their relentless strategies of profiteering, which involves ruthless ecological destruction, utter disregard for local and indigenous communities and an authoritarian contempt for participatory and inclusive structures. After all, Brazil’s conservative-minded agribusiness has an extremely powerful lobby in Brazilian politics, and it is not uncommon for its representatives to cross any democratic, legal and ethical lines to defend their interests, and all too often with the backing of the government.129 The Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems The Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (RAI-principles) were also negotiated through an inclusive process very similar to that of the Voluntary Guidelines including governments, UN agencies, civil society organisations, private-sector organisations and international agricultural research institutions between 2012 and 2014 under the chairpersonship of the delegation of Switzerland and adopted at the 41st plenary session in October 2014.130 The RAI-principles seek ‘to promote responsible investment in agriculture and food systems that contribute to food security and nutrition, thus supporting the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security’.131 In this light, the document aims to ‘address the core elements of what makes investment in agriculture and food systems responsible’, ‘identify who the key stakeholders are, and their respective roles and responsibilities with respect to responsible investment in agriculture and food systems’, ‘serve as a framework to guide the actions of all stakeholders engaged in agriculture and food systems by

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defining principles which can promote much needed responsible investment, enhance livelihoods, and guard against and mitigate risks to food security and nutrition’.132 The ten RAI-principles agreed on refer to the states’ obligations to (1) contribute to food security and nutrition; (2) support sustainable and inclusive economic development and the eradication of poverty; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) engage and empower youth; (5) respect legitimate tenure rights to land, fisheries and forests; (6) conserve and sustainably manage natural resources, increase resilience and reduce disaster risks; (7) respect cultural heritage and traditional knowledge; (8) strengthen safe and healthy agriculture and food systems; (9) create inclusive and transparent governance structures, processes and mechanisms and (10) engage in monitoring activities to increase accountability.133 As in the negotiations of the other two major documents, two camps were pitted against each other from the very beginning; one rather conservative camp represented by governments like the US and Canada and the privatesector mechanism which defended the interests of big industries and technological investment in agriculture, and a more progressive camp with the civil society mechanism, the European Union and Brazil as its staunchest representatives defending a more sustainable and rights-based approach to agriculture with a focus on local communities, smallholders and social participation. The progressive actors sought to achieve ambitious goals based on what the committee had achieved in the documents of the Voluntary Guidelines and the Global Strategic Framework, whereas the US and Canada, in particular, pursued the strategy of emphasising from the very outset the ‘voluntary’ character of the RAI-principles.134 Canada even questioned any reference to the necessity of informed consultations with indigenous peoples on issues relating to agricultural investment.135 The first open-ended working group on 29 April 2014 discussed the first draft version of the document negotiated in the previous regional consultations, which took place from November 2013 to March 2014, with workshops and consultations held in all world regions.136 In this meeting, the major fault lines were the following: centrality of smallholders versus focus on other investors, strict focus on food production versus the inclusion of non-food agricultural production (referring to the production of biofuels), consideration of the traditional agricultural methods of indigenous peoples versus technological innovations in agriculture, free and informed prior consent of local communities (including indigenous peoples) to agricultural investment versus a restriction of the term ‘consent’ by preferring the term ‘consultation’, incorporation of an ambitious vision of the RAI-principles in trade agreements versus the preoccupation of some actors that the RAI-principles could be used as a justification for protectionist measures and, as the last point, the



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implementation of monitoring mechanisms versus the emphasis on the ‘voluntary’ nature of the RAI-principles.137 In this context of hardened views on agricultural investment, the EU put forward the concept of ‘do no harm’, making it clear that the RAI-principles should do no harm to local populations and the environment.138 Here, the EU did not propose anything new, for the Voluntary Guidelines in paragraph 12.4 on investments state that ‘responsible investments should do no harm, safeguard against dispossession of legitimate tenure right holders and environmental damage, and should respect human rights’.139 This concept, however, was firmly rejected by representatives of the private sector.140 The Brazilian delegation repeatedly emphasised the centrality of the promotion of sustainable development and the need for further clarification of the role of different stakeholders in the implementation of the RAI-principles.141 While the first draft version was generally well received by the delegations, the representatives of the civil society mechanism expressed their disappointment, since the text did not adequately deal with the problem of land-grabbing and the necessity to promote smallholder agriculture with the human right to food as its central element.142 In this context, Oxfam International published a report on how to build a new agricultural future on the basic concept of agroecology, the application of ecological concepts and principles to sustainable agriculture, calling for an integration of these principles in the document on the RAI-principles.143 The report highlighted that some governments such as Brazil, Viet Nam, Cuba or France supported this concept at the national and international level, particularly in the Committee on World Food Security and its Global Strategic Framework with an emphasis on the support of local communities.144 Among several model approaches, Oxfam cited Brazil’s Food Acquisition Programme, a fundamental element of Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy, which financially supports and promotes smallholder agriculture.145 In the following working group in May 2014 the US delegation was especially eager to drain out the document and block the whole negotiation process, which was particularly supported by Canada, the Russian Federation, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the private-sector mechanism. At the same time, the EU, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and the civil society mechanism tried to preserve the existing text.146 Now, the US also positioned itself against the concept of ‘do no harm’, proposed by the EU, and the same US delegate who had chaired the negotiations of the Voluntary Guidelines rejected to reproduce any language on the respect of tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the context of Principle 5 (respect legitimate tenure rights to land, fisheries and forests).147 Ultimately, the US delegation was not successful, for Principle 5 of the final document clearly underscores the necessity to respect the ‘legitimate tenure rights to land, fisheries, and forests, as well as existing

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and potential water uses’ with reference to the Voluntary Guidelines.148 The indigenous question remained a hot topic in the context of Principle 7 (respect cultural heritage and traditional knowledge) in which Canada was supported by the US and Russia in its rejection of the recognition of indigenous peoples as sources of traditional knowledge, as defended by Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and civil society.149 One hour before one of the plenary sessions came to an end, the US delegation took advantage of the absence of many delegations and sought to eliminate entire paragraphs of the text. Very similar to one situation during the negotiations of the Voluntary Guidelines, the Brazilian delegation challenged the US by defending the importance of references to indigenous peoples and local communities in the text; an act which received spontaneous applause from the plenary, members of the secretariat and even delegations which had supported the US manoeuvre.150 As a consequence, the text could be rescued into the next negotiation round. The last round of formal negotiations took place in August 2014, and representatives of the private-sector mechanism defended the exclusion of the whole second part of the document on the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in the implementation of the RAI-principles, which was rejected by the EU, the Latin American and Caribbean Group GRULAC (Brazil and Argentina) and civil society.151 Ultimately, the second part of the document was not eliminated. Instead, it describes the roles and responsibilities of all relevant actors involved (states, intergovernmental and regional organisations, financing institutions, research organisations, smallholders, business enterprises, civil society organisations, workers, communities and consumer organisations) in guaranteeing responsible agricultural investment.152 It was possible for all actors involved to come to an agreement on all outstanding issues except for the question of free and prior informed consent of indigenous peoples in the context of Principle 9 (inclusive and transparent governance structures, processes and mechanisms) which Canada rejected in isolated opposition.153 In the meantime, CSOs including ActionAid achieved to change the opinion of the US, which had allied with Canada on rejecting the reference to free and prior informed consent of indigenous peoples in agricultural investments.154 Thus, Canada was left as the only opponent. This made it necessary to find a compromise language which in the end proved to be a rather weak statement in favour of the protection of indigenous peoples. The final document in Principle 9iv includes a recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in agricultural investment with reference to the UN Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples and an emphasis on the ‘effective and meaningful consultation with indigenous peoples’ instead of the recognition of free and prior informed consent. At the same time, the paragraph also underlines



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that in consultations attention should be paid to the ‘particular positions and understanding of individual States’.155 The Brazilian delegation evaluated the final RAI document as a positive contribution to food and nutrition security. While not as ambitious and innovative as the Voluntary Guidelines, the Brazilian delegation argued that it did consolidate those concepts and visions which were developed in the context of the Global Strategic Framework and the Voluntary Guidelines, such as the importance of regional consultations, inclusive participation, the consideration of the interests of both investors and vulnerable communities, the respect for indigenous peoples and the strengthening of family agriculture.156 Many CSOs were not satisfied with the final language of the document and the general message the RAI-principles convey. Oxfam International believes that the RAI-principles are ‘too weak, vague and in a number of areas . . . actually worse than the standards that already exist’ and ‘allow human rights to be subordinated to trade interests’.157 ActionAid criticised the RAI-principles primarily for their inadequate recognition of smallholders, their silence on agroecological concepts and their focus on free trade at the expense of the protection of local communities.158 FIAN International regarded Canada’s rejection of indigenous peoples’ right to free and prior informed consent as unacceptable, weakening and undermining the legitimacy of the RAIprinciples.159 The civil society mechanism passed a devastating judgement on the RAI-principles stating that ‘they will not help small-scale food producers and workers overcome the economic, environmental and political constraints that hamper their capacities, and they will not assist people who are struggling to defend their land, seeds and territories.’160 DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES IN THE COMMITTEE ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY The Promotion of Human Rights and Transnational Solidarity The reformed structure of the CFS has certainly shown that an increased participation of civil society actors and the pro-active role of democratic developing countries from the global South, such as Brazil, can contribute to more rights-based discussions and negotiations on different food security issues. The debate of controversial issues such as food price volatility was the first positive sign of a departure from a purely intergovernmental body with an undivided focus on national interests to a mechanism where the states were required to engage with the needs and interests of local and vulnerable communities on the ground throughout the world, represented by the delegates of all those new actors from civil society.

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This significant innovation became particularly worthwhile during the negotiations of the Global Strategic Framework, the Voluntary Guidelines and the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems. All three documents integrate a much more rights-based focus than it would have been likely without the active involvement of civil society, emphasising the needs and interests of local communities and smallholders worldwide in food security issues. The Global Strategic Framework represents the ambitious idea to establish a policy framework on global food security with an inclusive, participatory and rights-based approach including all levels of governance and relying on the participation of all relevant actors in global food security governance. By prioritising the importance of implementing national food policy programmes, the Global Strategic Framework highlights the particular responsibility of the state in ensuring food security. Here, the participatory, inclusive and rights-based approach embraced by Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy serves as an inspiring role model for the CFS on how to approach food security in the context of this Global Strategic Framework. By chairing the discussions and pushing forward a very progressive agenda based on the key principles of its innovative Zero Hunger strategy, Brazil turned into a formidable defender of a rights-based, participatory and inclusive Global Strategic Framework against the strong resistance of other very powerful agricultural exporters such as the US or Canada which at the same time belong to the staunchest defenders of a neo-liberal approach to food security. The Voluntary Guidelines represent the first global guidelines on tenure of land, fisheries and forests which were negotiated in an intergovernmental body161 and were enthusiastically celebrated by representatives of the FAO, CSOs and civil society networks alike as a first step in the right direction to improve the tenure rights of smallholders.162 Stéphane Parmentier, an Oxfam advisor on food and agriculture, highlights the importance of the guidelines notwithstanding their voluntary and non-enforceable character: They are an application and clarification of Human Rights obligations, including the realization of the right to adequate food, in the specific context of land, fisheries and forests tenure governance. By approving their adoption, governments have validated this interpretation. In other words, the principles contained in the Guidelines are not optional or discretionary. 163

The inclusive character of their negotiations and their adoption by FAO member states considerably increased the legitimacy of the Voluntary Guidelines and put additional pressure on the states to value their commitments made. Sofia Monsalve of FIAN International hit the same line by highlighting that the Voluntary Guidelines represent ‘a tool to reactivate the social agenda’ in



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global food security and that the guidelines should serve as a reference for states, international organisations and financing institutions on the protection of the rights of vulnerable communities and smallholders.164 In contrast, the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (RAI-principles) cast a shadow on the committee’s capacity to promote human rights. The RAI-principles failed to become another ambitious and innovative document. Instead, they very much emphasised the neo-liberal approach to agricultural investments based on big industry, free trade and corporate gains at the expense of adequate protection of local communities, indigenous peoples and agroecological approaches to food security. It is even more worrying that this adverse outcome was possible in spite of an inclusive and participatory process involving regional consultations all around the world, input and active participation of civil society actors. Both in the negotiations for the Voluntary Guidelines and the RAIprinciples Brazil was guided by the rights-based principles of the Zero Hunger strategy and belonged to the progressive group of states which attempted to negotiate ambitious and innovative documents, defending rights-based, participatory and inclusive approaches to different aspects of global food security governance. It is certainly naïve to assume that these three documents will reverse the dominant neo-liberal approach to global food security. The RAI-principles certainly won’t. However, at least the Global Strategic Framework and the Voluntary Guidelines propose a different and much more rights-based approach towards food security, challenging and putting into question the activities of powerful states and big corporations. Very much as Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy institutionalised a much more inclusive and rights-based approach to food security in Brazil while at the same time big Brazilian food companies continue to exercise enormous power and influence in Brazil and abroad. In addition to the promotion of much more rights-based approaches to food security, the committee can be regarded as a transnational common project to promote transnational solidarity in global governance. Through its reformed structures, the committee has become unique in providing a transnational setting for states, civil society actors, social movements and local communities to work on truly transnational solutions for the progressive realisation of the human right to food. Transnational solidarity among a multitude of different state and non-state actors can lead to just collective action, the inclusion and representation of the needs and interests of the affected public at the global level and the creation of a counterweight to the commercial interests of powerful states and big corporations. Transnational solidarity transcends national borders and the interests of a few powerful nation-states, channelling the efforts of all participating actors towards challenges and problems of a transnational dimension, in this case the fight against food insecurity.

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Mechanisms of Participation The reformed committee can be regarded as the most participatory and inclusive mechanism in global food security governance today, whose whole legitimacy rests on this very inclusive approach.165 In other words, the novelty of the integration of civil society actors as full participants in the decisionmaking processes of the committee has completely changed the whole meaning of this mechanism. Any step towards a more intergovernmental and state-centred approach taken by the states would be interpreted as a ‘step backwards’ and seriously undermine this newfound legitimacy and meaning. And it is not only the states which need to be congratulated on their efforts to turn a lethargic, outdated and irrelevant talk-shop into a role model of participation and inclusion in global governance. Civil society actors achieved to establish a highly complex and elaborate mechanism of civil society representation and participation in the committee, the civil society mechanism. It is probably not too far-fetched to argue that the civil society mechanism slightly resembles key features of a global parliament for local communities affected by food insecurity around the world. Instead of representing their own organisations, civil society delegates have ambitiously aimed at facilitating the participation of representatives of those local and vulnerable communities in the consultations and negotiations of the CFS, which otherwise would remain without voice. The civil society mechanism provides a unique and extraordinary platform in global food security governance to bring together opinions, views and standpoints from all relevant civil society organisations and communities affected by food insecurity, including smallholders, indigenous people, farmers, and so on. Furthermore, these affected communities are represented by powerful CSOs from the global North and smaller organisations from the global South. Despite these extraordinary efforts of CSOs, the civil society mechanism is not perfect. Duncan and Barling enumerated several challenges the CSM is facing so far:166 First, the mechanism’s coordination committee has put its focus on structure rather than on process, diverting attention away from the actual political issues and possible solutions. This is why CSM working groups were created to allow for better dialogue between the CSM and the CFS on relevant issues. A second challenge refers to the identification of many committee members with their organisation. Contrary to the original intentions that the coordination committee members should facilitate the participation of the affected individuals in their constituency or sub-region, it seems hard for many members to detach themselves from the positions and values of their organisation. Third, since decisions are normally based on consensus, it has not always been easy to come to a unified position. Fourth, a committee with 41 members from organisations from all around the



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world is very resource intensive, in particular if it involves decision-making by consensus (and silence is not understood as agreement), and has resulted in delays, frustration and decisions not based on consensus due to the tight schedule within the CFS. Fifth, other bureaucratic and very practical challenges include language barriers (the official languages are English, Spanish and French), low participation of affected communities and organisations during harvest periods or missing access to the Internet of some members who live in areas with limited Internet access. Notwithstanding these administrative and technical challenges, the civil society mechanism, very much like the whole CFS, represents a powerful example of transnational solidarity. Through the CSM, civil society organisations from all around the world are engaged in intensive efforts of listening to the voices of the oppressed, those suffering from food and nutrition insecurity, and try to confront the states with the needs and interests of those communities affected by food insecurity. In the negotiations for the adoption of legal documents, civil society organisations have the unique opportunity to represent these voices and pressure the governments to include the needs and concerns of these voices in the legal documents. Through its activities, the CSM creates a bridge between the states at the global level and the local communities on the ground. The CSM tries to guarantee that these voices can no longer be silenced and marginalised in the international negotiations taking place among the governments in the CFS. Philip Seufert, a representative of one of the most active civil society organisations in the CFS, FIAN International, emphasised the importance of the committee’s new character for the negotiations and the final adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines: The voluntary nature of the Voluntary Guidelines may raise questions about their effectiveness and performance. However, with respect to the negotiation process and its outcomes, the combination of the UN principle of one country, one vote and the institutionalized participation of CSOs throughout the process (including a special effort by FAO to facilitate the participation of the most marginalized groups affected by landlessness and tenure insecurity) points to one of the most democratic institutional frameworks for global decision-making for international agreements ever. It is this experiment in global democracy that ascribes a high level of legitimacy and political weight to the Voluntary Guidelines.167

Notwithstanding these very positive developments, there is also sufficient room for caution, as Candice Vianna Sakamoto Souza emphasises: Today all countries defend the model [of the mechanism]. It is not proper to speak ill of the mechanism. . . . On the surface, in the discourses, nobody speaks out against it. But one needs to watch out because you have all these

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minor [technical] issues, the formation of working groups, who will be entitled to participate in them, etc. . . . one needs to remain vigilant. The devil is in the details. What is at risk? . . . That the participation of non-state actors loses real space while at the same time the countries continue praising the CFS participation process.168

Ultimately, the CFS remains an intergovernmental body in which voting rights are exclusively reserved to the states. According to many civil society representatives, this fact keeps the spotlight on the states’ responsibility to guarantee food security in the national context and does not distract from the existing power imbalances between state and non-state actors. However, this delicate situation creates an environment in which negotiation processes become finely tuned balancing acts between all actors involved. While the new structure of the CFS (and the CSM in particular) guarantees that the marginalised voices of local communities can no longer be silenced in the international negotiations in the CFS, conservative-minded governments have the power to wipe away civil society resistance with one stroke. In the final voting procedure, the (negative) vote of one single government can wield more power than the constant and arduous efforts of all civil society participants taken together. This was the case during the RAI negotiations with Canada’s stubborn rejection of the recognition of the free and prior informed consent of indigenous peoples to agricultural investments. In addition, by forming alliances, conservative-minded states can gather sufficient influence to successfully water down any ambitious and innovative rights-based language proposed by civil society actors. This was the case in the negotiations for the Voluntary Guidelines when CSOs saw their proposed language for particular paragraphs compromised. Ultimately, the governments took the final decisions on the guidelines, which necessarily obliged CSOs to make concessions to the states on various points. Notwithstanding high pressure from CSOs, the governments were successful in taking the issue of water in the responsible governance of land from the table.169 Similarly, CSOs were not successful in their efforts to ultimately ban land-grabbing, a move particularly opposed by various governments from developing countries.170 NGOs and social movements also criticised the voluntary character of the guidelines, arguing that in the end the guidelines were unable to successfully tackle land-grabbing.171 The same criticism applies to the negotiation process of the RAI-principles. Even though CSOs fought hard to include the positions of affected communities like smallholders, indigenous people, workers, and so on, in the negotiations, the governments maintained the upper hand by compromising and undermining the rights of these communities in the final text of the document.172 Given this power imbalance between states and CSOs and the ambition of the committee to reach consensus, civil society organisations will always



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have to accept compromises on their original proposals no matter how hard they try to represent the interests, opinions and views of all those communities affected by food and nutrition insecurity around the world. Domith Godinho, the representative of the Brazilian delegation between 2009 and 2012 and the chairperson of the discussions for the Global Strategic Framework, neatly pointed out the difficulties and challenges of such a situation for civil society actors and progressive-minded countries: Back when I left the ‘scene’, in 2012, my most secret worry was that the spirit of the reformed CFS (in the sense of a simultaneously inclusive and relevant governance mechanism) seemed to me a fragile thing that could at any moment be derailed by a few bad collective decisions. It is not at all easy to square inclusiveness and effectiveness. The more actors you have, the more open, long and complex consultation processes, the higher the risk to stumble into impasses, simple confusion, or into a common denominator too low to be useful. Avoiding that requires, I believe, factors like key highly committed people (and I mean committed to CFS, not to a specific cause in there) with some control of the process (process is key), a critical mass of good negotiators, and some sheer luck. The reformed CFS being so new, still having to prove itself, it would only take a few bad decisions about the role of the committee, a few mismanaged processes, and bang: scepticism and weariness would grow again and the committee would set on a path to relapse into its old ways. 173

When Domith Godinho speaks about the necessity of ‘highly committed people’ for this committee to safeguard its democratic spirit, he does not only refer to civil society actors. Ultimately, it is the states that decide the fate of this committee. For the committee’s democratic spirit to survive, civil society actors may be crucial but progressive-minded states which collaborate with civil society actors, support their activities, share parts of their agenda and remain seriously committed to the open, inclusive and participatory character of the committee are decisive. The budget of the civil society mechanism only corroborates this point. Without the financial contributions from the EU, EU member states and Brazil, civil society organisations would be unable to sustain such a complex mechanism. From the reform of the committee to the negotiations of the three major documents, Brazil has constantly proven that it belongs to those countries committed to safeguarding (and financially sustaining) this democratic spirit. At least on two occasions, once during the negotiations for the Voluntary Guidelines and another time during the RAI negotiations, Brazil even took action to intervene when some conservative-minded delegations skilfully tried to undermine the participatory and inclusive negotiation process. In their actions in the committee, the Brazilian negotiators have been guided by the democratic principles of participation and inclusiveness of the Zero Hunger strategy. In the same vein, they attempted to institutionalise these principles in the various negotiations

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of the committee and entrench them in the three documents adopted. In the case of the Global Strategic Framework and the Voluntary Guidelines at least, they were highly successful. Mechanisms of Accountability CSOs have put an extraordinary effort into making the civil society mechanism, and thus the whole CFS, as accountable as possible to those citizens and movements affected by food insecurity. The fact that each constituency and sub-region is represented by one member of a CSO in the coordination committee allows an individual to get in contact with the CFS by approaching the respective coordination committee member of his or her constituency and sub-region. The idea of creating 11 constituencies and 17 sub-regions and having them represented by civil society representatives delegates considerable responsibility to those representatives and provides opportunities for the empowerment of the local communities classified under those constituencies and sub-regions. The coordination committee intends to give priority to the proposals of smallholder farmers (as the only constituency they have four members in the committee, because they represent 80 per cent of the world’s hungry people and produce the largest proportion of the world’s food) and respect geographical and gender balance ensuring that 50 per cent of its members are women.174 To complement these efforts, a website was created to inform every citizen about the activities of the CSM and its members.175 CSOs also decided to take decisions in the CSM by consensus wherever possible. To further increase the accountability of its decisions to the CFS and affected communities, every member of the coordination committee is required to write reports on how they facilitate participation within their constituency or sub-region with the CSM.176 The CSM’s website provides access to its budget, contact details of the civil society delegates, minutes of meetings of the policy working groups, the CSM annual forums, internal guidelines, evaluation and review reports of the CSM’s working mechanisms and information about upcoming elections and selection processes. The same degree of transparency refers to the website of the CFS, which provides all the necessary information about the structure, the mission, the objectives and the activities of the committee.177 In 2013, the CSM coordination committee commissioned two independent consultants to review the functioning and working mechanisms of the CSM. In mid-2014, they published their report with the following key conclusions:178 The CSM had been a crucial factor in facilitating civil society engagement with the CFS and turning the attention of the committee (i.e., the governments) back to the main causes of hunger and malnutrition. The CSM had strengthened its outreach to other CSOs and affected communities around



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the world and continuously improved its website. In this context, the report suggested that communication and awareness-raising mechanisms as well as coordination efforts with representatives from various sub-regions needed to be further improved. The report also warned that regular reviews of the CSM’s mandate, its bodies and activities were necessary to guarantee the transparent and accountable functioning of such an ambitious project as the CSM. Considering the existing power imbalances in the global system and recognising the fact that these power imbalances cannot be undone in a participatory and inclusive setting such as the CFS provides, civil society actors see it as their main priority to monitor and review the activities of the states and provide policy recommendations which pay particular attention to affected communities worldwide. The new role as participants in the CFS negotiations provides civil society with a broad range of opportunities to confront the states and exercise even more pressure on government representatives than it would have ever been possible outside of such a mechanism. Through the whole participatory and inclusive setting, civil society actors have the possibility to hold states accountable in the negotiations for ambitious documents on food security reminding them of their ultimate responsibility as the main guarantor of food security in their countries (reputational and internal accountability). Outside the narrow confines of the new committee, it becomes much harder for civil society actors to hold the states to account to the principles agreed on in the major documents (external accountability). While the CFS per se has undoubtedly its merits, it holds no sway whatsoever over the possible implementation of the major documents, such as the Global Strategic Framework, the Voluntary Guidelines or the RAI-principles. Admittedly, all these documents belong in the realm of soft law, and no sanction mechanism exists which could force the states to implement the principles agreed. Here again, a lot depends on the behaviour of the states, particularly those which have proved to be the most progressive-minded in the negotiation processes. These states need to go ahead by implementing food security policies and programmes in a participatory and inclusive manner, fostering civil society participation, prioritising vulnerable communities and developing joint governance models with the joint participation of government representatives and civil society actors. Here again, the Brazilian Zero Hunger strategy is a case in point. The three major documents adopted in the CFS certainly serve as an additional tool for civil society actors to put pressure on the states and as a framework of reference for progressive-minded states like Brazil.179 The CSM established a specific policy working group on monitoring in which to discuss the creation of an accountability mechanism to review and monitor the progress of states made towards the governance of tenure, fisheries and forests.180 In addition, an intergovernmental working group has the task to

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follow up on these proposals by discussing possible assessment criteria and other methodological approaches in the implementation of in-depth country level assessment.181 Francisco Bendrau Sarmento, ActionAid’s former representative to the CFS, emphasised that the implementation of those guidelines and policies in the regions and the countries represents the major test for its future relevance : The CFS, having been a very important achievement, . . . runs the risk of becoming somehow irrelevant. That is, if the CFS does not reinforce very strongly its concrete connection with the regions and countries and if the decisions of the CFS do not have a more focused character on the structural problems of the food security system and if some of those decisions are not going to be clearly implemented or even known by the majority of the governments at the national level of the countries, the CFS runs the risk of turning into a very interesting event, a big annual seminar with numerous and parallel events, with dozens of interesting discussions, but all of them, in a way, with reduced consequences and applicability.182

Notwithstanding existing criticism and major obstacles in implementing the documents negotiated, the first few years of the ambitious new CFS have been seen as encouraging by a majority of actors involved.183 This success is maintained by the following pillars. First, both FAO member states and leading transnational CSOs in food security came together to jointly reform the outdated and lethargic CFS. Second, for the first time CSOs are represented as official partners in an intergovernmental decision-making body, even though they lack ultimate decision-making power. Third, CSOs built up further autonomous institutions to better coordinate their activities in the CFS and maintain their pressure on the states. In this respect, CSOs are extremely ambitious in keeping the civil society mechanism as accountable and representative as possible to both the states and the affected communities. Fourth, the CFS coordinates its actions at the global, regional and local levels with all relevant actors on issues concerning food security and thus has become the central platform for debate and action on food security. Fifth, the mission of all the actors involved in the work of the CFS is related to strengthening the progressive realisation of the human right to food. –– The CFS can be regarded as a democratic global governance mechanism in the sense that it has promoted rights-based approaches to food security on the basis of participatory and inclusive decision-making processes and the establishment of a series of accountability mechanisms. Both the general structures of the CFS and the particular structures of the CSM, designed as participatory and inclusive, provide civil society actors with increased opportunities to put pressure on the states in the decision-making processes. At the



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same time, civil society organisations have gone to extraordinary lengths to establish a participatory, inclusive and transparent civil society mechanism that allows local communities worldwide to be represented in the decisionmaking process of the CFS. Two of the three major documents which were negotiated and adopted by the CFS – the Global Strategic Framework and the Voluntary Guidelines – serve civil society actors and progressive states as an additional tool to hold other states accountable for their promises and the rights-based language they all agreed on. These collective actions perpetrated by a multiplicity of state and non-state actors have contributed to the emergence of democratic practices in the context of the Committee on World Food Security. These democratic practices are far from perfect and remain extremely fragile because of their ultimate dependence on the joint actions of state and non-state actors and, particularly, the willingness of some progressive state actors, such as Brazil, to protect, maintain and advance this process. In other words, while the activities of civil society actors are certainly crucial in the democratisation of the Committee on World Food Security, without the actions and decisions of the states no real progress on a more just and democratic food security governance framework will be possible in the long run. The Brazilian delegation has distinguished itself as a major advocate of the inclusive, participatory and democratic nature of the CFS and turned into a major ally of civil society actors in fighting for more rights-based approaches to food security. In this regard, the Brazilian delegation was principally guided by the key elements of Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy and has, on multiple occasions, successfully integrated those elements into the working methods and structures of the committee and the main documents negotiated. What unfolds as a consequence of the joint democratic practices of state and non-state actors is a major example of transnational solidarity on food security, binding together government representatives, private actors, NGOs, local communities and international organisations from around the world to find rights-based solutions to the global challenge of poverty and hunger. The first big step, the development of new and innovative cosmopolitan norms, has been taken. In the coming years, the committee’s international acclaim gained as an innovative and democratic global governance mechanism will ultimately depend on the implementation of its major success stories, the Voluntary Guidelines and the Global Strategic Framework. NOTES 1 Ziegler, ‘Report on the Right to Food’, 6. 2 FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, ‘The Zero Hunger Program’, 146. 3 Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome – MDS, Bolsa Familia. Transferência de renda e apoio à família no acesso à saúde e à educação.

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4 Presidência da República, Lei N° 11.947. 5 Presidência da República, Lei No. 11.346. See also Art. 3 in the Portuguese original: ‘A segurança alimentar e nutricional consiste na realização do direito de todos ao acesso regular e permanente a alimentos de qualidade, em quantidade suficiente, sem comprometer o acesso a outras necessidades essenciais, tendo como base práticas alimentares promotoras de saúde que respeitem a diversidade cultural e que sejam ambiental, cultural, econômica e socialmente sustentáveis’. 6 Ibid. See Art. 2 in the Portuguese original: ‘A alimentação adequada é direito fundamental do ser humano, inerente à dignidade da pessoa humana e indispensável à realização dos direitos consagrados na Constituição Federal, devendo o poder público adotar as políticas e ações que se façam necessárias para promover e garantir a segurança alimentar e nutricional da população’. 7 Veiga Aranha, ‘Fome Zero’, 81. 8 Santarelli and Moreira, ‘Da Lei à Mesa’, 16. 9 Ibid. 10 CONSEA had been established for the first time in 1993, abolished one year later in 1994 and was re-established only nine years later in 2003 under the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. See Recine and Leão, ‘O Direito Humano à Alimentação Adequada e o Fome Zero’, 41. 11 Tapajós and Coelho, ‘Desafios Sociais no Brasil em 2003’, 48. 12 Menezes, ‘Participação Social no Fome Zero’, 247–64. 13 In total 59 members, 17 of which are state ministers and 42 are representatives from civil society. See Menezes, ‘Mobilização Social e Participação da Sociedade Civil’, 123. 14 Menezes, ‘Participação Social no Fome Zero’, 253–55. 15 Ibid., 255. 16 Ibid., 254, 257–58. 17 Menezes nonetheless remarks that the processes that led to these achievements were not without obstacles and difficulties, which more often than not emerged in the form of failed proposals or unsuccessful suggestions for programmes or programme improvements, resistance from different actors and almost permanently hard and challenging work of persuasion. 18 Maluf, ‘Construção do SISAN, Mobilização e Participação Social’, 29. 19 CONSEA, I Conferência Nacional de Segurança Alimentar. 20 Maluf, ‘Construção do SISAN, Mobilização e Participação Social’, 29. 21 Veiga Aranha, ‘Fome Zero’, 85; Menezes, ‘Participação Social no Fome Zero’, 260. 22 Silva, ‘Entrevista’, 96. 23 Ibid. 24 Tapajós and Albuquerque, SUAS: Sistema Ùnico de Assistência Social, 13–14. 25 MDS – Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome, Cidadania; MDS – Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome, Bolsa Família, 31. 26 FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World, 23. 27 Chediek, ‘Brasil sem miseria’, 655. 28 Seufert, ‘The FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests’, 184.



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29 FAO, ‘The Establishment of a Committee on World Food Security’. 30 ActionAid, Caritas Spain, Engineering without Borders-Development Association and Prosalus, ‘Towards a New Governance in Food Security’, 54. 31 Committee on World Food Security, ‘Committee on World Food Security. Thirty-Fourth Session. Proposals to Strengthen the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) to Meet New Challenges’; Committee on World Food Security, ‘Concept Note and Terms of Reference for the Contact Group to Assist with Renewal of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS)’. 32 The International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty is an international network of NGOs and local communities involved in family agriculture. 33 The International Alliance against Hunger was called into life in 2003 by FAO, WFP, IFAD and CGIAR to create a global network of CSOs and agriculture institutions in the fight against hunger and poverty. 34 FAO, ‘CFS Contact Group Documents’. 35 FAO, ‘Reform of the Committee on World Food Security. Final Version, 14, 15 and 17 October’, 2. 36 Ibid., 2–3. 37 Ibid., 1. 38 Fraundorfer, Brazil’s Emerging Role in Global Governance, 105; Committee on World Food Security, ‘40th Session’, 13; Committee on World Food Security, ‘Forty-Third Session’, 14. 39 Committee on World Food Security, ‘Forty-Second Session’, 13. 40 The members of the advisory group: UN Bodies: FAO (Food and Agricultural Organisation), World Food Programme, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, UN Standing Committee on Nutrition; CSOs/NGOs: The World Forum of Fish Harvesters & Fish Workers, Mouvement International de la Jeunesse Agricole, Indigenous Caucus, World Alliance of Mobile Indigenous Peoples; International Agricultural Research Bodies: CGIAR Consortium; International Financial and Trade Institutions: World Bank; Private Sector/Philanthropic Foundations: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, International Agri-Food Network. See Committee on World Food Security, ‘Bureau and Advisory Group’. 41 FAO, ‘The High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE)’. 42 Committee on World Food Security, ‘First HLPE Steering Committee’; Committee on World Food Security, ‘HLPE Steering Committee’. 43 Fraundorfer, Brazil’s Emerging Role in Global Governance, 106. 44 Brazil Cable, ‘FAO. Direção-Geral. Candidatura brasileira. Conselho (Roma, 11–15/04/2011). Subsídios’. 45 Fraundorfer, Brazil’s Emerging Role in Global Governance, 103–6. 46 Brazil Cable, ‘FAO. Comitê de Segurança Alimentar. Aprovação da Reforma do CSA. Relato e Análise’; Bendrau Sarmento, Interview, 3 February 2017. 47 Bendrau Sarmento, Interview, 3 February 2017.

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48 Brazil Cable, ‘FAO. Comitê de Segurança Alimentar. Aprovação da Reforma do CSA. Relato e Análise’; Bendrau Sarmento, Interview, 3 February 2017. 49 Brazil Cable, ‘FAO. Comitê de Segurança Alimentar. Aprovação da Reforma do CSA. Relato e Análise’. 50 Brazil Cable, ‘FAO. Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional. 5a Reunião do Grupo de Contato. Discussão do 2a “Minuta”. Relato’. 51 US Cable, ‘Committee on World Food Security Reform Process Generally Moving in Right Direction’. 52 Brazil Cable, ‘FAO. Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional. 5a Reunião do Grupo de Contato. Discussão do 2a “Minuta”. Relato’. 53 Brazil Cable, ‘Comitê de Segurança Alimentar Mundial da FAO. 36ª Sessão’. 54 Brazil Cable, ‘Comitê de Segurança Alimentar Mundial. 37ª Sessão Plenária (17–22 de Outubro de 2011). Principais resultados’; Brazil Cable, ‘Comitê de Segurança Alimentar Mundial. 39ª Sessão Plenária (15–20 de outubro de 2012). Relato’. 55 Vianna Sakamoto Souza, Interview, 19 January 2016. 56 Duncan and Barling, ‘Renewal through Participation in Global Food Security Governance’, 151. 57 Civil Society Mechanism, ‘The Committee on World Food Security (CFS)’, 28. 58 Duncan, Global Food Security Governance, 125. 59 Ibid., 91. 60 Duncan and Barling, ‘Renewal through Participation in Global Food Security Governance’, 151. 61 Ibid. 62 Committee on World Food Security, ‘Proposal for an International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism for Relations with CFS’. 63 Duncan and Barling, ‘Renewal through Participation in Global Food Security Governance’, 152. 64 Civil Society Mechanism, ‘The Committee on World Food Security (CFS)’, 40; The 17 subregions: North America, Central America and Caribbean, Andean Region, Southern Cone, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, West Asia, South Asia, Pacifica, South-East Asia, Central Asia, Oceania, Southern Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa and North Africa. The 11 constituencies: agricultural and food workers, artisanal fisherfolk, consumers, indigenous peoples, landless, NGOs, pastoralists, smallholder farmers, urban poor, women and youth. 65 Ibid., 50–51. 66 Ibid., 50. 67 Ibid., 52. 68 Duncan, Global Food Security Governance, 131–32. 69 Ibid., 132. 70 See Civil Society Mechanism, ‘The CSM’, http://www.csm4cfs.org/the-csm/, accessed 6 March 2017. 71 Duncan and von Anrup, ‘Final Report’, 8. 72 Duncan, Global Food Security Governance, 141. 73 IAFN (International Agri-Food Network), ‘Private Sector Mechanism (PSM) to the UN Committee on World Food Security’; IAFN (International Agri-Food Network), ‘Introduction to the PSM’.



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The International Agri-Food Network was created in 1996. For more information see International Agri-Food Network, ‘Website’, http://www.agrifood.net/, accessed 8 March 2017. 74 Civil Society Mechanism, ‘CSM Expenditures 2011–2015 (Euros €)’. 75 Brazil Cable, ‘FAO. CSA. Apoio à participação da sociedade civil. Pedido de recursos’. 76 Brazil Cable, ‘Cooperação humantitária. Participação da sociedade civil. FAO’. 77 Duncan, Global Food Security Governance, 110–11. 78 Committee on World Food Security, Global Strategic Framework for Food Security & Nutrition (GSF), 6. 79 Ibid., 2–3. 80 Vianna Sakamoto Souza, Interview, 19 January 2016. 81 Brazil Cable, ‘Comitê de Segurança Alimentar Mundial. Marco Estratégico Global para a Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional. Processo de elaboração’. 82 Brazil Cable, ‘FAO. CSA. Proposta de lançamento do Marco Estratégico Global para a Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional’. 83 Domith Godinho, Interview, 4 December 2015. 84 Duncan, Global Food Security Governance, 196. 85 Brazil Cable, ‘CSA. Marco Estratégico Global. GT. Finalização. 27a. 29/06/2012. Relato’. 86 Committee on World Food Security, Global Strategic Framework, 37. 87 Ibid., 37–38. 88 Ibid., 39. 89 Ibid., 39–40. 90 Ibid., 40–42. 91 Ibid., 42–43. 92 Ibid., 46–48. 93 Ibid., 49. 94 Duncan, Global Food Security Governance, 197. 95 Committee on World Food Security, Global Strategic Framework, 15. 96 Duncan, Global Food Security Governance, 197. 97 Brazil Cable, ‘Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional. CSA. GT de fnalização do Marco Estratégico Global’. 98 Brazil Cable, ‘CSA. Marco Estratégico Global. GT. Finalização. 27a. 29/06/2012. Relato’. 99 Brazil Cable, ‘CSA. Marco Estratégico Global. GT. Capítulo VI. Finalização. 19/07/2012. Relato’. 100 The term ‘food sovereignty’ encapsulates the underlying logic of the social movements’ rights-based approach to food security with a strong emphasis on the sovereignty of local communities and smallholders over food systems in contrast to the profiteering of multinational corporations. See Duncan, Global Food Security Governance, 205–6. Or see for a detailed overview of the international peasants movement La Via Campesina and the development of the concept of food sovereignty Desmarais, La Vía Campesina.

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101 Brazil Cable, ‘CSA. Marco Estratégico Global. GT. Capítulo VI. Finalização. 19/07/2012. Relato’. 102 Brazil Cable, ‘CSA. Marco Estratégico Global. Capítulo VI. Reservas dos EUA e Austrália. Consultas informais. Quadro parlamentar’. 103 Committee on World Food Security, Global Strategic Framework, 50. 104 Domith Godinho, Interview, 4 December 2015. 105 Duncan, Global Food Security Governance, 203. 106 Ibid., 204–6. See also Committee on World Food Security, ‘Evaluation of the Committee on World Food Security. First Draft (for discussion)’, 16–17. 107 Brazil Cable, ‘CSA. Grupo de trabalho sobre monitoramento. Seminário (18/07/2013). Relato’. 108 FAO, ‘The Human Right to Adequate Food in the Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition. A Global Consensus’. 109 Ibid., 9–13. 110 FAO, Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, vi. 111 Ibid., iv. 112 Ibid., 4–5. 113 Brazil Cable, ‘FAO. Seguimento da CIRADR. Direito à terra. Diretrizes Voluntárias. Reunião de Especialistas (Roma, 24–25.11.2008). Participação Brasil’. 114 Duncan, Global Food Security Governance, 177. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid., 176. 117 Ibid., 184; Domith Godinho, Interview, 4 December 2015. 118 Domith Godinho, Interview, 4 December 2015. 119 Brazil Cable, ‘CSAM. 36ª Sessão (Roma, 11–14 e 16/10/2010). Instruções’. 120 Domith Godinho, Interview, 4 December 2015. 121 Duncan, Global Food Security Governance, 185. 122 Domith Godinho, Interview, 4 December 2015. 123 Duncan, Global Food Security Governance, 186. 124 See FAO, ‘E-learning’, http://www.fao.org/nr/tenure/e-learning/en/, accessed 7 March 2017. 125 Brazil Cable, ‘Comitê de Segurança Alimentar Mundial. 40ª Sessão Plenária. Evento paralelo. Diretrizes Voluntárias. Participação INCRA. Relato’; Brazil Cable, ‘Segurança alimentar e nutricional. Diretrizes Voluntárias sobre Governança da Posse da Terra. Evento de seguimento CSA(14/05). Relato’. 126 Civil Society Mechanism, Connecting Smallholders to Markets. 127 Ibid., 28. 128 Civil Society Mechanism, ‘Synthesis report on civil society experiences regarding use and implementation of the tenure guidelines and the challenge of monitoring CFS decisions’; Committee on World Food Security (2016), ‘Compilation of experiences and good practices in the use and application of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security’. 129 See Gomes, ‘Globalization and Concentration in Brazil’s Agri-Food System’; UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human



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Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises on Its Mission to Brazil’; Pires, ‘Indigenous People Protest against the Violation of Their Rights in Front of Brasilia Embassies’. 130 Committee on World Food Security (2014), Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems, 5. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid., 11–18. 134 Brazil Cable, ‘CSA. Princípios para investimentos responsaveis em agricultura. Reunião de consultas do OEWG (23 e 24 /09/2013)’. 135 Ibid. 136 Committee on World Food Security, Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems, 5. 137 Brazil Cable, ‘CSA. Princípios para investimentos responsáveis em agricultura. Reunião do Grupo de Trabalho (29/04/2014). Relato e próximos passos’. 138 Ibid. 139 FAO, Voluntary Guidelines, 21. 140 Brazil Cable, ‘CSA. Princípios para investimentos responsáveis em agricultura. Reunião do Grupo de Trabalho (29/04/2014). Relato e próximos passos’. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 Oxfam International, Building a New Agricultural Future. 144 Ibid., 9. 145 Ibid. 146 Brazil Cable, ‘Segurança Alimentar. CSA. Princípios para Investimentos Responsáveis em Agricultura. Reunião negociadora (19–24.5.2014). Relato’. 147 Ibid. 148 Committee on World Food Security, Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems, 14. 149 Brazil Cable, ‘Segurança Alimentar. CSA. Princípios para Investimentos Responsáveis em Agricultura. Reunião negociadora (19–24.5.2014). Relato’. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Committee on World Food Security, Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems, 19–27. 153 Brazil Cable, ‘CSA. Princípios de investimentos responsáveis en agricultura’. 154 ActionAid, ‘Twitter Action Helps Shift US Position in RAI Negotiations’. 155 Committee on World Food Security, Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems, 17. 156 Brazil Cable, ‘CSA. Princípios de investimentos responsáveis en agricultura’. 157 Oxfam International, ‘Oxfam Response to UN Committee on World Food Security Endorsement of Principles’. 158 Campbell, ‘5 Reasons Why We Couldn’t Support the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment’. 159 FIAN, ‘No Compromise on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’. 160 Civil Society Mechanism, ‘Civil Society Statement on Rai’.

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161 McKeon, ‘One Does Not Sell the Land upon Which the People Walk’, 110. 162 FAO, ‘Countries Adopt Global Guidelines on Tenure of Land, Forests, Fisheries’. 163 Parmentier, ‘Two Years On’. 164 Radio Mundoreal, ‘Killing Global Silence on The Agrarian Reform’. 165 Duncan, Global Food Security Governance, 116. 166 Duncan and Barling, ‘Renewal through Participation in Global Food Security Governance’, 153–56. 167 Seufert, ‘The FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests’, 184. 168 Vianna Sakamoto Souza, Interview, 19 January 2016. 169 Seufert, ‘The FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests’, 185. 170 Ibid. 171 Ibid. 172 Civil Society Mechanism, ‘CS Expressing Concern for the Rai Principles Content and Their Future Implementation’. 173 Domith Godinho, Email Correspondence, 28 October 2015. 174 Civil Society Mechanism, ‘Draft Terms of Reference for the Coordination Committee’, 2. 175 See Civil Society Mechanism, ‘Website’, http://www.csm4cfs.org/, accessed 6 March 2017. 176 Civil Society Mechanism, ‘Draft Terms of Reference for the Coordination Committee’, 3. 177 See Committee on World Food Security, ‘Website’, http://www.fao.org/cfs/ cfs-home/en/, accessed 6 March 2017. 178 Fraundorfer, ‘Experiments in Global Democracy’, 360. 179 Vianna Sakamoto, Interview, 19 January 2016. 180 See Civil Society Mechanism, ‘Monitoring’, http://www.csm4cfs.org/workinggroups/monitoring/, accessed 6 March 2017. 181 Committee on World Food Security, ‘Towards a Framework for Monitoring CFS Decisions and Recommendations’. 182 Bendrau Sarmento, Interview, 3 February 2017. 183 Committee on World Food Security, ‘Evaluation of the Committee on World Food Security. First Draft (for discussion)’.

Chapter 5

Brazil and Open Government

The Open Government Partnership (OGP) was launched in 2011 by the US and other seven governments, among them Brazil, as a new global governance mechanism aimed at promoting open government initiatives and democratic practices. Since its creation, the OGP has enjoyed widespread recognition among governments. The number of participating countries has skyrocketed from eight founding countries to more than 70 participating countries. While this global approach to promote open government initiatives represents a new move in global governance, it reflects, to some extent, the rationale behind the participatory budgeting (PB) programmes that originated in Brazil in the late 1980s and spread throughout the whole world. While Brazil stood at the beginning of the PB programmes, the Brazilian government has also been involved in the Open Government Partnership from the very start. So, what has been Brazil’s role in the creation and development of the OGP and in making government processes more democratic and inclusive? And can the OGP be seen as a new democratic innovation in global governance? This chapter seeks to analyse to which extent Brazil has been guided by its decades-long experience of PB programmes in contributing to the democratic practices of the OGP by promoting human rights and transnational solidarity, creating participatory structures and establishing accountability mechanisms in the context of the OGP. The chapter starts with a brief summary of the history, successes and limitations of the PB programmes in Brazil before it turns its attention to Brazil’s activities in the Open Government Partnership. 127

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THE PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING PROGRAMMES In the field of open government, participatory mechanisms are still rare. Participatory budgeting, however, represents a remarkable exception. Participatory budgeting was championed in the 1980s by the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre where community organisations, together with representatives and bodies of the municipal government, decided on the municipal budget and jointly managed public resources.1 After its initial success, this participatory approach to governmental affairs spread to more than 300 other Brazilian cities and municipalities in the following two decades and more than 1,000 outside of Brazil.2 Today we find PB programmes at the local level in countries throughout the world. Some countries have even built up national PB networks as platforms for knowledge exchange on PB experiences.3 The so-called ‘Porto Alegre Model’ became a role model for other municipalities in Brazil and all around the globe, including developed countries. In 1995, for example, the UN selected the PB programme of Porto Alegre as one of the best 40 experiences of local management, and it is also due to this inspiring experience that Porto Alegre became the birth cradle of the World Social Forum.4 In the face of this success, it is not exaggerated to see the PB programme as a Brazilian experiment in participatory democracy that has gone viral. However, not every single participatory budget automatically reinforces democracy and promotes social justice. Each participatory budget has its own structure and dynamics. Not every municipal government, which introduced PB in Brazil, actively involves CSOs in budgetary decisions. Instead, more often than not the participatory schemes created to foster a meaningful dialogue between the government and civil society are characterised by weak and isolated structures, lacking resources and low levels of engagement of government representatives and thus serve mostly to boost the image of the government instead of serving the citizens.5 Only when municipal governments are seriously willing to democratise their government activities by involving marginalised groups and community organisations in budgetary decisions, showing the capacity to lead with conflictive opinions and guaranteeing the financial resources for an efficiently working infrastructure, can PB become a new paradigm leading to more transparency and accountability.6 Brian Wampler, for example, compared the PB programmes in several municipalities in Brazil over a ten-year period (from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s) and found substantial differences regarding the programmes’ potential to contribute to more democracy and social justice. The original intentions of PB are promising and inspiring and therefore highly seductive to civil society actors and governments alike, even if not always for the same



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reasons. The programmes attempt to integrate citizens and social movements into governmental decision-making processes and establish close working relationships between representatives of the local government and local civil society, particularly those from marginalised regions, to adopt a budget that serves citizens’ needs and interests and thereby promotes social justice and democratic processes of participation, empowerment and accountability. In this sense, the PB programmes can unfold transformative potential to break down the thick walls of government secrecy and unaccountability which all too often separate the local governments from their citizens and are responsible for the unequal and undemocratic distribution of public goods, particularly in developing countries like Brazil.7 On this occasion, it is worthwhile remembering that the Brazilian federal government in its response to the AIDS epidemic deliberately circumvented municipal governments by establishing direct relationships with civil society actors to avoid that financial resources landed in the deep pockets of corrupt local politicians. On many occasions, local governments and their mayors shamelessly exploit the noble intentions of the PB programmes by portraying themselves as responsible actors while in the background hollowing out those PB programmes of all their substance. Some local governments use the positive image of the PB programmes as a smokescreen to deflect attention from ongoing government secrecy and lack of accountability. The thick wall, shrouded in the smoke of misinformation and deception, remains intact. As Wampler found, this government strategy has a devastating effect on the image and the transformative potential of PB programmes, hollowing out the democratic process and undermining citizens’ trust and confidence in their governments.8 The success of PB programmes crucially depends on the political will of local governments to involve civil society in governmental decision-making processes that lead to the adoption of a participatory budget. Given the general fragility of PB programmes, their ultimate success vitally depends on mayoral leadership. If ideological or electoral incentives exist for a mayor to support PB programmes, they are likely to be successful with the potential to transform the relationship between local governments and their citizens.9 Given that most of the institutional infrastructure for PB programmes needs to be provided by the government, the balance of power is heavily tilted towards the government, providing government officials with sufficient advantage to manipulate and influence these programmes in their favour.10 Therefore, apart from an organised and mobilised civil society, the political will of the government is crucial to make PB programmes a success. Porto Alegre, not only the place where PB programmes were born but also a city with highly successful PB programmes in general, exemplifies this reality. In Porto Alegre, government officials involve civil society actors in a

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way that the latter are able to shape, in joint cooperation with the government, the rules of the game, including the responsibilities, tasks and roles of representatives from the government and civil society, the negotiation process, the voting procedure, the monitoring process of the elaboration and implementation of policy projects and the institutional setting of the participatory council.11 In many other Brazilian municipalities, civil society actors do not even come close to enjoying this collaborative environment and have to live with rules imposed and dominated by the government. When citizens realise that their voices count in the elaboration of policy projects and feel that their decisions have an impact on the implementation of those projects, PB programmes start to unfold their transformative potential. They accomplish to distribute public goods, empower citizens from poor and marginalised communities and engage them in the political process. At the same time, government officials are forced to familiarise themselves with the interests and needs of local citizens, which can lead to higher credibility and legitimacy of the whole political process and the government in charge.12 The number of participants from local civil society continuously rose in Porto Alegre’s 16 regional assemblies in the 1990s from a low 976 participants in 1990 to a staggering 12,518 participants in 1998.13 Porto Alegre’s PB programme is an excellent example of how ‘participatory budgeting is capable of broadening popular sovereignty while dealing with issues of justice’,14 as long as the government is willing enough to empower civil society actors in an institutional framework that allows citizens to have an impact on policy decisions which contribute to the distribution of public goods. In this sense, ‘democratization ceases to be regarded simply as the institutionalization of political competition and becomes a societal practice in need of institutionalization’.15 To be sure, in Porto Alegre the active and profound cooperation between government and civil society was facilitated by ‘the prior existence of a critical social fabric’16 with highly mobilised and organised civil society movements. While a pro-active government is a necessary pre-condition for the future success of PB programmes, an organised and mobilised civil society movement is also crucial. In Porto Alegre, the whole idea of PB programmes was first brought to the government in 1986 by the community movement UAMPA (União das Associações de Moradores de Porto Alegre – Union of Residents’ Associations of Porto Alegre). The first PB programme, however, was only implemented in 1988 when the Workers’ Party (PT) came to power in Porto Alegre. Since the expansion of participatory democracy and collaboration with civil society movements was a fundamental part of the party ideology, the newly elected mayor embarked on negotiations with the city government and community movements to implement UAMPA’s idea and establish an institutional framework for the PB programme.17



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As a consequence, PB programmes in Porto Alegre unfolded their transformative potential when ‘government officials, CSOs, and citizens worked together to create the political processes necessary to allow citizens to learn about, deliberate over, and vote on substantive public policies’.18 More specifically, ‘government officials delegated control over policies and institutionalized the processes through which demands were transformed into policy proposals and, later, into actual projects’.19 This pro-active governmental approach allowed an atmosphere of intensive debates and decision-making procedures among government officials and civil society representatives who regarded each other as equals.20 Given their overall fragility and the tremendous efforts and investments to be made by the different actors involved in the process, PB programmes can easily fail. Wampler observed this failure in the cases of the Brazilian municipalities of Blumenau and Rio Claro. Those governments showed no political will towards civil society actors to actively involve them in the decisionmaking process. And at the same time, civil society actors did not sufficiently challenge the passive stance of their governments by publicly shaming them. If civil society actors are unwilling to contest their government’s passive stance through public campaigns, the PB process hits a dead end. Eventually, the government dominated the rules of the PB programmes in these municipalities with civil society actors relegated to the role of passive observers.21 In other Brazilian municipalities, the PB programmes neither failed nor generated impressive transformative potential. This was the case in the municipalities of São Paulo, Santo André, Recife and Belo Horizonte. In all four cases, the governments did involve civil society actors as active participants in the decision-making process, partially increasing citizenship-rights, but only as long as civil society actors kept the pressure high on their governments. As soon as civil society actors reduced that pressure, the governments tried on several occasions to influence the PB process in their favour, prioritising government projects over community projects or sidestepping PB rules, which at times left citizens and civil society actors in the role of mere consultants used by government officials to rubberstamp the government’s decisions and policy priorities.22 To summarise, PB programmes in Brazil were least successful when its actors did not adhere to four core principles: (1) the establishment of rules and mechanisms by government officials to create active citizen participation, (2) citizen involvement in decision-making, which goes beyond mere feedback or consultation processes, (3) a strong social justice component empowering citizens from poorer communities and (4) improved transparency through citizen oversight.23 When municipal governments and civil society actors took seriously these four principles, the PB programmes created a ‘virtuous cycle’ and contributed to social change, promoting new forms of democratic interaction between the government and the citizens.24

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Despite its transformative potential and impressive worldwide success, the impact of PB programmes should not be overstated. It is a reality that ‘establishing rights is a slow, arduous process that involves citizens’ placing pressures on states to recognize and protect the rights of marginalized citizens as well as the state’s reaching out to new groups of potential supporters that can be incorporated into the government’s ruling coalition’.25 Given that reality, PB programmes are always fragile depending on the social and political context and the actors’ interests and attitudes. In the same vein, PB programmes are not a panacea for more deeply rooted socio-economic problems. Their socio-economic impact is limited to the local level which explains why PB programmes have only been implemented at the local level. There is only one example of a PB programme adopted at the state level, which is the case of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul with its capital Porto Alegre between 1998 and 2002.26 In Brazil, the PB programmes are closely related to the rise of the PT as a national force in Brazilian politics. While the PT was the first Brazilian party to promote PB programmes, its adoption has also spread to other parties. In 2012, 45 per cent of all PB programmes were adopted in municipalities governed by a mayor from the PT, which resulted in 150 municipalities. The second-most dominant party in implementing PB programmes was the PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) with 26 per cent (or 92 municipalities). The party of former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002), the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party), was responsible for a meagre 4 per cent of PB programmes (or 15 municipalities) in 2012. Although the PT is still the strongest political force in promoting the PB experience in Brazil, it should not be ignored that only 150 of 544 municipalities governed by the PT in 2012 introduced PB programmes, which was less than 30 per cent.27 THE OPEN GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP: A NEW PARADIGM? During his administration, former US President Barack Obama actively promoted open government as one of several key initiatives. In January 2009, on his first day in Office, Obama signed the Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government in which he pledged to create a more transparent, participatory and collaborative government.28 In December 2009, Obama issued an Open Government Directive establishing specific deadlines for actions which include the online publication of government information, the improvement of the quality of government information, the creation and institutionalisation of a culture of open government in government agencies and the creation of



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a policy framework for open government.29 One year later, Obama presented his Open Government Initiative to the UN General Assembly pledging for new commitments in the fight against corruption, promoting transparency and empowering civic engagement.30 In 2011, as a result of this international call, eight governments (Brazil, Indonesia, the Philippines, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the US) and nine representatives from CSOs31 in the field of transparency and open government came together in New York at the UN General Assembly to launch the Open Government Partnership (OGP).32 The OGP aims at promoting democracy in the participating countries by creating mechanisms which increase the availability of information about government activities, support civic participation, implement codes of conduct for public officials and improve the access to new technologies for openness and accountability.33 This approach was hailed by its founders as a new model of cooperation on spreading democratic values. One of the principal architects of the OGP, Stanford Professor of Political Science Jeremy Weinstein, described the novelty of the OGP in the following words: We felt a need to reclaim the language of democracy-promotion – to put the focus on people’s universal aspiration to have a say in how they are governed, and on the common challenges of political leaders in responding to that desire. The emerging concept of ‘open government’ was loose and flexible, not attached to any particular ideology. It allowed anyone to bring his own agenda to a common goal. It was essential to place innovation at the front and center of any new effort, moving away from a framework in which developing countries were under pressure to adopt the ‘best’ practices of the West, toward one in which domestic reformers and activists were empowered to share their stories, and countries were encouraged to learn from one another and take further actions in a meaningful race to the top.34

Since its launch, the number of participating countries has risen from the initial eight founding countries to more than 70 participating countries, with most countries from Europe and the Americas. In the participating countries, the OGP has also been able to initiate a debate on the necessity of open government and the crucial role of civil society actors in this process, bringing together civil society actors and governments to collaborate on promoting the OGP principles.35 Given this international expansion and the involvement of CSOs from all around the world, it is time to examine in more detail if the OGP is delivering on its promises and turning into a new model of democracy for the promotion of transparency and open government in the participating countries. The OGP’s steering committee (SC) serves as its main decision-making body consisting of 22 members with 11 representatives each from OGP

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participating countries and civil society. One of the fundamental principles of the SC refers to maintaining parity between civil society and the governments. The representatives of both constituencies were elected in 2011 by each constituency for a three-year term with the possibility to be re-elected. The chairpersonship of the SC comprises two government chairs and two civil society chairs, which are all selected by the SC members. Through an annual rotation process launched in 2014, two governments and three civil society organisations are annually substituted to bring new voices and perspectives to the SC.36 In the case of the governments, the new SC members are elected by all participating countries. In the case of the CSOs, a selection committee reviews nominations. The members of both constituencies must adhere to the OGP principles and participate in the SC meetings on a regular basis. In the same vein, in both constituencies, a regional balance must be respected. For the governments, this means that all world regions must be represented and not more than four governments should be from one region. For the CSOs, every region must be represented by at least one representative with no more than two representatives from North America and no more than three from each of the other regions (Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Asia/Oceania and Europe). In addition, international organisations, networks and coalitions are to be represented each by at least one person and a maximum of two.37 Any government and CSO can apply for membership in the SC (and be re-elected) if they adhere to the principles, mission and agenda of the OGP. The key OGP principles are summarised in the Open Government Declaration, which any new participating member must endorse, and refer to the increase of the availability of information about governmental activities, the support of civic participation, the implementation of the highest standards of professional integrity through the administration and the increase of access to new technologies for openness and accountability.38 Decisions in the SC are consensus-based. In the election or re-election of its government members, the SC takes into account the performance of present member governments,39 regional diversity and adherence to OGP principles. Governments are elected or re-elected by all OGP-participating countries on the basis of ‘one country, one vote’. CSOs are selected by the civil society members of the SC on the basis of the recommendations of a civil society selection committee consisting of two current SC civil society members and three other organisations from the civil society community.40 In an annual plenary meeting, the OGP Annual Conference, all OGP stakeholders come together to debate key issues concerning open government and the OGP.41 So far, four annual conferences have taken place, the first one in Brasília (2012), the second one in London (2013), the third one in Mexico City (2015) and a fourth one in Paris (2016). In 2014, the OGP



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steering committee organised a high-level side event during the UN General Assembly session.42 In addition, the OGP organised in 2014 several regional conferences in different world regions to concentrate on the key challenges open government poses for countries and communities within those particular regions, such as the Asia-Pacific Regional Meeting, the Europe Meeting and the Americas Meeting.43 One of the cornerstones of the OGP refers to the promotion of civic engagement and the cooperation between governments and the national and local civil society communities in the promotion of the OGP principles. In the OGP steering committee, the civil society community is on an equal footing with the governments sharing with them the same decision-making powers. To further increase its voice and support its own coordination efforts the civil society community has created a civil society engagement team (CSE). The CSE works to strengthen the international civil society network around OGP and the national networks in the OGP participating countries to better represent civil society in the OGP and in the participating countries. The CSE established an OGP civil society hub which serves as a virtual platform for civil society actors on all issues concerning the OGP, including technical issues about open government, the functioning of OGP’s structure and how to pressure participating countries into meeting their targets. With this structure in place, how does the OGP go about promoting the OGP principles in the participating countries? Every government of a participating country is required to develop a two-year Action Plan in which the government is required to identify at least one of the five OGP grand challenges (improving public services, increasing public integrity, more effectively managing public resources, creating safer communities and increasing corporate accountability) and specific commitments to tackle the challenge(s). The participating governments need to create annual reports on the progress of their commitments, the so-called self-assessment reports. After two years, independent researchers (mostly from academia or civil society) assess the progress made in the respective countries through the so-called independent progress reports, which serve as the OGP’s principal accountability mechanism. Since the OGP understands itself as a voluntary partnership, every government is free to formulate its own commitments and create its own national infrastructure to pursue the pledges outlaid in the Action Plan, as long as they respect the OGP principles. In early 2016, the OGP started to extend its open government initiative to the subnational level with the pilot programme ‘OGP Subnational Pioneers’, inviting subnational governments to contribute to the OGP principles by developing their own specific Action Plans. For this pilot programme, the OGP steering committee selected 15 subnational governments. As in the National Action Plans, the subnational governments are required to develop

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commitments on open government in collaboration with local civil society actors to be implemented in a two-year period. The implementation of these commitments will also be reviewed by the independent reporting mechanism. In addition, the initiative plans to establish a large network of subnational actors from government and civil society that have distinguished themselves as innovative leaders on open government policies to assist their national government in the elaboration of the Action Plans.44 Among the pioneers in this initiative are cities such as São Paulo, Paris, Buenos Aires or Madrid, regional governments like Scotland or Bojonegoro (Indonesia).45 On its official website, the OGP publishes all documents concerning the functioning of the partnership including financial contributions from member states, the Action Plans, independent progress reports, SC minutes of meetings and application letters of governments and CSOs for membership or reelection in the SC. Similarly, when the independent progress reports are put online they can be commented on by the public, including representatives of CSOs and the governments. These comments are then also published on the website. The OGP budget relies on contributions from the participating governments and several foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, the Omidyar Network, the Hewlett Foundation, the Hivos Foundation or the Open Society Foundation, or civil society networks working on transparency and open government like the East African civil society network Twaweza.46 Considering its general structure, the OGP is highly innovative in several respects. The steering committee is not only equally controlled by state and non-state actors but aims to represent CSOs and governments from the developed and developing world alike. From the very beginning, the OGP was conceived as a forum to exchange different experiences on open government and learn from each other instead of imposing particular agendas or ideas from the West.47 This approach is reflected in the voluntary nature of OGP membership, the composition of the SC48 and the free choice of governments on how to design their own national (and subnational) structures to coordinate their own national (or subnational) OGP process. Brazil’s Role in the Open Government Partnership Brazil and the US were the first two governmental co-chairs of the OGP and have been among its most vocal advocates. Brazil has a long history of political corruption and government secrecy and has only very recently begun to promote open government initiatives to increase transparency and access to information at the federal level. But very similar to former US President Obama’s renewed focus on open government initiatives, then Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016) has principally emphasised the introduction of measures to scale up the fight against political corruption, increasing



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transparency and access to information through the adoption of the Law of Access to Information in 2011.49 The high attention Brazil has paid to the OGP is reflected in the government’s pro-active stance within the OGP by acting as its first co-chair and hosting the first annual OGP High-Level Conference in Brasília in 2012.50 Brazil has been a member of the OGP steering committee since its creation in 2011 and was re-elected in 2014 for a renewed three-year term.51 Jorge Hage, who as the head of the Comptroller General’s Office between 2006 and 2014 served as the founding co-chair of the OGP, highlighted some of the reasons why the OGP has so much appeal for the Brazilian government: The OGP is a multi-stakeholder approach to governance challenges countries have been facing for decades by themselves. However, every participating country agrees that there is no ‘one solution fits all’ for these challenges. We can help each other by sharing experiences, sharing successes and lessons learned . . . . .52

For the development of its Action Plans in its national OGP processes, the Brazilian government created the Inter-ministerial Committee on Open Government (CIGA)53 as the principal body to elaborate and develop the Action Plans and lead the process of implementing the OGP principles in Brazil. The committee is composed of 18 ministries and directly coordinated by the Cabinet Office of the Presidency. Within the committee, an executive group is responsible for the elaboration of the Action Plans. The executive group is coordinated by the Office of the Comptroller General, an anti-corruption body which was created in 2003 to assist the Presidency in defending public property and increasing transparency of government activities.54 In mid-2016, following the government change in Brazil, Dilma Rousseff’s successor Michel Temer changed the status of the Office of the Comptroller General by integrating it into the newly created Ministry of Transparency, Oversight and Comptroller General.55 The First Two Action Plans: A Bumpy Start In its first Action Plan (2011–2013), the Brazilian government presented 32 commitments to be implemented in the first two-year period. In early 2012, the Inter-ministerial Committee established a civil society working group, an online discussion group and an online process called Virtual Dialogue to support the dialogue between the government and civil society.56 The 32 commitments referred to the capacitation of government officials in activities revolving around access to information, the implementation of the law of access to information, citizen participation (i.e., the organisation of a National Conference on Transparency and Social Control, a National Meeting on Open Data, a National Seminar on Social Participation), open data,

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the increase of transparency and public integrity, corporate responsibility and the improvement of public services.57 Although these commitments appear impressive at first sight, most of these actions had already been in planning and preparation well before the creation of the OGP due to Brazil’s adoption of the Law of Access to Information, which was elaborated in 2009 and entered into force in 2012.58 In addition, the Action Plan and the government’s activities complied very loosely with the OGP principles, as several civil society activists involved in the process emphasised:59 (1) The elaboration of the Action Plan was largely carried out by the government, led by the Office of the Comptroller General, and restricted to the ministries, without significant involvement of Brazil’s civil society. (2) The Office of the Comptroller General invited selected CSOs, such as Article 19, Transparency Brazil, the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies (INESC) (one of the founding CSOs of the OGP), the Ethos Institute, the Public Policy for Access to Information Research Group at the University of São Paulo and other well-known Brazilian organisations in the field which had already worked together with the Office of the Comptroller General for several years. (3) Instead of being given the opportunity to provide any input to the Action Plan, CSOs were largely used in the public consultation process to legitimise the Action Plan. (4) The civil society working group established by the Inter-ministerial Committee turned out to be a paper tiger with no real influence, quickly sidelined by the Office of the Comptroller General. This sobering experience of several civil society representatives in the elaboration of the Action Plan provoked huge disappointment and frustration.60 The OGP process developed without the serious and effective involvement of civil society, although many civil society organisations were prepared and enthusiastic about becoming involved in the process.61 One illustrious example of the government’s self-serving attitude refers to the creation of the National Forum of Transparency, Participation and Social Control (CONSOCIAL), civil society’s most important vehicle in demanding more transparency, open government and social participation from the government.62 CONSOCIAL does represent a very important platform for Brazilian civil society actors to improve their mobilisation efforts on issues related to open government. And the Brazilian government has praised itself for having included the creation and organisation of CONSOCIAL as a fundamental aspect of citizen participation in its first Action Plan. Nevertheless, the Presidency of the Republic had already planned in 2010 to organise such a national conference, well before the creation of the Open Government Partnership.63 While the government’s action to organise CONSOCIAL is certainly laudable, it is not a new development resulting from the creation of the OGP. And civil society actors were very clear in their view that the



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first Action Plan did not significantly improve citizen participation on open government in Brazil. In its efforts to demand more active civil society participation in the OGP process, CONSOCIAL sent several letters to the Cabinet Office of the Brazilian president, the General Secretariat of the Brazilian president and the then director of the Comptroller General, Jorge Hage, demanding a restructuring of the Inter-ministerial Committee along the lines of the steering committee of the OGP to include representatives from civil society and guarantee a more effective participatory process.64 Although the Inter-ministerial Committee has not been restructured, the Comptroller General established a new civil society working group in November 2014 to assist the government in developing the second Action Plan.65 Since the working group’s main function is limited to consulting and accompanying the work of the Inter-ministerial Committee,66 it is questionable how this mechanism can increase effective civil society participation in the committee’s decision-making process. The Office of the Comptroller General did recognise that, given time constraints in the development of the first Action Plan, the mobilisation and engagement of civil society was not adequate.67 Interestingly, given all the frustration experienced by civil society actors, the Brazilian government drew a positive conclusion from the first national OGP process: The great progress of the 1st Action Plan of Brazil consists in the very essence of the plan: for the first time internationally Brazil committed itself voluntarily to disseminating information about the activities of the government in an open, understandable, timely and freely accessible fashion, meeting the basic standards of open data.68

The elaboration of the second Action Plan (2013–2015) largely resembled an unimaginative repetition of the mistakes made during the first Action Plan (2011–2013), even though the initial consultation process seemed rather promising to civil society participants.69 The government used once more the Internet to promote public participation such as the online virtual dialogue, allowing citizens to select priority topics, comment on the new commitments, propose new commitments and vote on the commitments suggested by the government.70 However, when civil society representatives realised that the dynamic consultation process at the beginning did not turn into meaningful collaboration, with civil society shut out from the ultimate decision-making process, many civil society organisations started to abandon the process in disillusionment.71 On the surface, the second Action Plan appears even more ambitious than the first one, with 52 commitments developed to improve public services, increase public integrity and the efficient management of public resources.

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The independent review report found that only three of the 52 commitments were of potential transformative impact. These three commitments referred to the implementation of a Land Management System to guarantee more transparency on and public access to information on public lands, the adaptation of educational data to an open data format and the implementation of an Internet connectivity infrastructure in municipalities.72 While other commitments with high priority for the government, such as the ‘Transparent Brazil’ Programme (the implementation of Brazil’s access to information law and other measures to increase public transparency), were certainly important and in accordance with the OGP principles, their impact was considered as merely moderate by the independent report.73 Judging from the first and the second Action Plan it becomes apparent that the priorities of the Brazilian government differed sharply from those of civil society actors. The government very much favoured measures on open data and transparency over meaningful civil society participation. While efforts to increase transparency of government data and the general promotion of open data are certainly a first step towards more open government and more accountability of the government to its citizens, they fall short of meaningful and profound changes which have the potential to transform government activities and make them more democratic. Also, the use of online tools alone to promote civil society participation, such as an online virtual dialogue and an online public consultation process, is not sufficient to stimulate meaningful civil society participation. Apparently, online discussion and consultation without meaningful physical involvement from civil society actors and interaction with government representatives lack the potential to promote a new democratic model of open government, as reflected by the first signs of disintegration of the OGP process caused by the disappointment and frustration of civil society actors. Therefore, to rescue the OGP process, the independent review report recommended, among other changes, adjustments in the structural and legal framework, such as the composition of the Inter-Ministerial Committee, to guarantee a ‘legitimate dialogue’ between the government and civil society.74 The Third Action Plan: Is the Government up to the Task? The third Action Plan (2016–2018) did bring structural changes in the collaboration between government and civil society. Given substantial criticism from civil society and suggestions of the independent review report to improve the existing framework, both the government and civil society revamped the whole OGP process. The government created a civil society working group with five members representing civil society organisations, one member representing academia and another member representing unions,



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who were all elected by their respective peers.75 The working group became responsible for coordinating civil society participation, advising the executive group and accompanying the implementation of the commitments.76 In addition, both the government and civil society created a more collaborative and participatory framework to guarantee the joint development of the new commitments in the form of co-creation workshops. In the first stage of the new process, members of civil society and the government selected the principal themes according to three categories. The first category included structuring themes with the potential to promote already existing laws and policy frameworks on open government. Here, the executive group, together with the civil society working group, selected the themes of access to information policy, open data and the improvement of management and public services through innovation. The second category included themes which were regarded a priority by and for the government. Here, the government prioritised five themes: public service assessment, open data and information governance on health, open government for culture, public service streamlining and the prevention of cruel treatment, inhumane and denigrating treatment in the penitentiary system. The third category included those themes prioritised by civil society. Here, two public consultations were carried out to involve as many members of Brazil’s civil society as possible to suggest a theme (first consultation) and later prioritise five themes (second consultation) from all the themes suggested and discussed. The most voted themes were: citizen participation mechanisms (143 votes), transparency of public funds (140 votes), fostering open government at state and municipal level (132 votes), innovation and open government in education (132 votes), open data and active transparency in the environment (131 votes). In addition to those 13 themes, the judiciary, embodied by the Superior Electoral Court, participated through the topic ‘transparency and innovation in the judiciary’.77 In the next stage of the process, the 14 themes (excluding the topic of the judicative which the Superior Electoral Court developed on its own) were developed into the final 16 commitments in 27 co-creation workshops between April and October 2016. All these workshops were on average composed of five expert members from the government (ministries, government agencies, etc.) and five expert members from civil society each.78 The whole process was generally carried out in a transparent and accessible way. The Office of the Comptroller General dedicated a website to the workshops with detailed information on their composition, members, activities and the results of the collaborative activities.79 After the commitments had been fully developed, they were subjected to a final public consultation process which allowed all the participants to add final comments or thoughts on the final draft of the Action Plan. The Action Plan was then presented on 29 November 2016 at Brazil’s first nationwide Open Government Meeting in São Paulo

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and, its English version, one week later to the international OGP community at the Global OGP Summit in Paris (7–9 December 2016). Both the government and civil society put an enormous effort into restructuring the OGP process and transforming it into a genuinely collaborative exercise. The 16 commitments80 were developed by 105 people, 57 of those from civil society and 48 from the government (federal, state and municipal) in a participatory environment which was very well received by members of civil society.81 As a further innovation, the Office of the Comptroller General had also invited government representatives from subnational entities and both the legislative and the judicative which each developed a specific commitment.82 Compared with the development of the first two Action Plans, the third OGP cycle gained a new participatory dimension and led to a genuinely participatory process in which members of civil society could make sure that their suggestions, proposals and comments were not only heard but also integrated into the final Action Plan.83 The impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff on 31 August 2016, the change of government and the successive reorganisation of the Office of the Comptroller General by the new President Michel Temer – the Office of the Comptroller General was integrated into the newly created Ministry of Transparency, Oversight and Comptroller General – did not seriously undermine or threaten the continuation of the whole process, although many participants could feel the ripple effects of the political and institutional instability in those weeks. Civil society representatives and the technical team of the Office of the Comptroller General were overcome by feelings of uncertainty and huge concern about the future of the OGP process with a new government.84 For the technical team of the Office of the Comptroller General, the government change and the consequential change of representatives from several ministries participating in the process created significant administrative challenges.85 Yet, the technical team, which was maintained by the new government, was able to bring the whole process to a successful conclusion, although its finalisation was delayed by half a year.86 Despite encouraging improvements, a closer look at the process still reveals several shortcomings. It seems that the government continues to exaggerate the innovative value of some of its commitments. This is the case of commitment 13 which promises to install electronic judicial proceedings at the Superior Electoral Court to guarantee a more secure and transparent processing of judicial and administrative proceedings. On 20 December 2016, the electronic judicial proceedings turned into a mandatory tool to be used by Brazilian citizens for several types of judicial proceedings.87 While this tool is certainly an important step towards more transparency in judicial proceedings, the impressive speed of its installation – a mere three weeks after the first presentation of the Action Plan in Brazil – is due to the rather



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unimpressive fact that this tool was already in the making since 2014 and would have been installed anyway. Interestingly, the installation of this tool was the only commitment not developed in a co-creation workshop together with members from civil society. In other words, while the government praised the involvement of the judiciary and the proposal of that commitment as one of the innovative elements of the third Action Plan, commitment 13 can be better described as an astute publicity stunt. This kind of dishonesty on the part of some government representatives left a sour impression on some civil society participants, such as Neide de Sordi, a representative of the NGO Open Knowledge Brazil. While de Sordi did welcome this project developed by the Superior Electoral Court as a step forward for open government initiatives at the federal level, she complained that ‘this project was already in development when they [representatives of the Superior Electoral Court] were invited to participate in the process, [taking] a project they had been working on for years and [putting] it into the [Action] Plan’.88 The government used the same strategy as in the first two Action Plans, albeit in a much more limited way, choosing commitments that had already been in the making instead of creating more ambitious and transformative commitments. Another persisting shortcoming refers to the highest body of the OGP process in Brazil, the Inter-ministerial Committee. Since the first Action Plan, civil society participants have repeatedly demanded to restructure this committee and open it for civil society members.89 These demands were supported by the second independent review report and reflected in the third Action Plan acknowledging that ‘there is an expectation around reviewing its management model, mainly to meet civil society’s demands’.90 Until now, however, no such restructuring has taken place and the Inter-ministerial Committee remains exclusively limited to government representatives with the ultimate authority to interfere in the process, change commitments at whim and undermine the newly won opportunities of civil society participants to influence the process. While the committee did not use its power to interfere in the development of the third Action Plan at the expense of civil society, its mere presence and authority can have a negative psychological effect on civil society participation. Joara Marchezini, the representative of the NGO Article 19 Brazil and member of the civil society working group, described this situation: Demands for a reformulation of the body [Inter-ministerial Committee] to include members of civil society have existed since the first [Action] Plan. . . . When we embarked on the third Action Plan, there was an agreement that in parallel to the development of the Action Plan the committee would be reformulated. . . . But the whole issue has remained pending. We developed the plan,

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that was great! But at the end, the committee had to approve the plan and they could have revised that plan. Obviously, this would have involved a political cost and therefore no invasive changes were made. But it is difficult to invest so much time into a partnership which really has built a relationship [between the government and civil society] when at the end the final decision on the approval of the document hinges on people which were not even involved [in the process]. Then, . . . for me, in terms of what the OGP represents, this situation is an anomaly without sense. And in some instances, when we were working on the Action Plan, we were thinking ‘Ah, will the committee pass this, or let’s be more careful with the language we use to be sure that the committee approves it’. So, the committee’s ghost was haunting our work which is not beneficial to the process.91

Pepe Tonin, a member of the technical team of the Office of the Comptroller General explains that the attempt to reformulate the committee during the development of the third Action Plan failed due to the political confusion created by the government and ministerial change. Tonin, however, emphasises that the technical team is in favour of a reformulation of the committee. This decision, however, is not up to the technical team and can only be taken at the ministerial level. Thus, Tonin suggests that a future change of the committee depends particularly on constant pressure from civil society.92 The Bigger Picture The OGP is a gigantic and ambitious exercise to spread open government initiatives worldwide with differing national OGP structures in more than 70 participating countries, an overarching transnational OGP structure and loose civil society networks in different world regions. Thus, it would go far beyond the scope of this book to provide a detailed assessment of the OGP as a whole. It should also be taken into consideration that in many countries the OGP is breaking new ground. Open government initiatives at the national level are still uncharted territory for many governments and civil society actors, particularly in the global South. The cases of the two co-founders of the OGP provide a good example. While the Brazilian government justifiably prides itself on having adopted its Law of Access to Information in 2011, the US government passed its Freedom of Information Act in 1966. This situation also refers to civil society mobilisation. In the US, one of the most influential civil society actors involved in the development of OGP Action Plans is OpenTheGovernment.org, a strong and powerful coalition that had already been in place for several years before the OGP was created.93 In Brazil, a strong national coalition of civil society organisations on open government initiatives has only grown slowly since 2011 exactly because of the OGP.



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Despite these challenges, recent civil society monitoring reports of the overall activities of the OGP can give us an idea of the bigger picture to better situate the Brazilian performance in a broader context. According to those reports, the challenges and shortcomings in Brazil’s experiences with the Action Plans reflect more general challenges the OGP is fighting with. An independent civil society monitoring report of 2015 evaluated the experience of civil society engagement in the then 65 OGP member countries and found that civic involvement remained limited throughout OGP member countries.94 A civil society report published in 2016 added to this criticism and identified the following challenges: (1) shrinking of civic space in many OGP participating countries; (2) lack of awareness of the OGP and its work among governments and civil society actors; (3) low levels of ambition and implementation of commitments without transformative impact on citizens’ lives; (4) weak accountability structures, which makes it challenging for civil society actors to hold governments accountable for their weak commitments and lack of will to create meaningful participatory structures; (5) lack of resources for meaningful civil society involvement.95 The low level of meaningful and transformative civil society participation is certainly the principal concern when the founding members’ initial praise of the OGP as a new model of democracy promotion is to be taken seriously. The 2015 civil society monitoring report ranked civil society participation in OGP participating countries according to four levels (inform, consult, involve and empower), with information as the lowest degree of civil society participation and empowerment as the highest degree. Meaningful participation in which civil society actors were empowered to the extent that governments really implemented actions decided by CSOs was found in a meagre 3 per cent of all cases. In 17 per cent of all cases, the cooperation between representatives of government and civil society reached at least a collaborative atmosphere, allowing CSOs to be involved in the development of the Action Plan so that their advice and recommendations were included in the OGP process. In 53 per cent of all cases, however, civil society actors were merely informed about and consulted during the OGP process. And in 13 per cent of all cases no civil society participation took place at all.96 In addition to these unsatisfying results, the report found that ‘only a narrow circle of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are usually involved in the OGP process, while citizens and smaller NGOs far from the national capitals often lack the capacity to engage in consultations or simply remain excluded’.97 According to the experiences of Brazil’s OGP processes so far, civic participation in Brazil’s first two Action Plans did not go beyond the levels of inform and consult, with civil society in a passive role merely rubberstamping the decisions of government representatives. In the development of the third

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Action Plan, however, the structural changes were so profound that civil society participation was largely empowered to a degree that allowed civil society actors to include commitments in the Action Plan, co-created by representatives from civil society and the government (empowered participation). Due to this new empowerment and the feeling that civil society actors are given the space to shape policy actions on open government, civil society actors evaluated the process in a highly positive way and remained extremely enthusiastic and engaged. This is an encouraging development given the consternation and disappointment of Brazilian civil society actors after the second Action Plan cycle. Apart from the most influential and traditional Brazilian NGOs in the field of open government involved since the first Action Plan, the third Action Plan was developed on the basis of a much broader participation, with several NGOs and other civil society actors participating for the very first time. This impressive change from the first two Action Plans to the third Action Plan is due in large part to structural reasons and a commitment from the government to create more participatory structures. Emilene Martinez Morales, OGP’s regional civil society coordinator for Latin America, confirms this positive development. For a long time, civil society in Brazil felt that they were sidelined. . . . But it seems spaces opened up for them and they were quite happy with government officials at CGU [Controladoria Geral da União - Office of the Comptroller General], there were some changes there, so, I felt that the new people that came on board had a better rapport with civil society. I have also seen more coordinated efforts on behalf of civil society that they are working together as a coalition. . . . So, I have seen positive developments in Brazil.98

The 2015 civil society report urged governments ‘to build capacity among civil servants to carry out effective and responsive consultations’, recommending that the ‘OGP should require its members to establish regular and institutionalized structures for civil engagement and dialogue’ and ‘strengthen its monitoring mechanisms for the engagement of civil society’.99 Transparency International blew the same horn in 2015, recommending stricter accountability and tracking mechanisms in the governments’ OGP implementation processes and warning the governments not to misuse civil society in the process: Civil society involvement in the OGP is resource intensive and frustration is growing as its suggestions are side-lined or its space for participation is limited in practice. We are especially concerned about countries using their OGP commitments to bolster their reputations while at the same time closing space for civil society and violating civil and human rights more broadly.100



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Another weakness, reflected in the shortcomings of the Brazilian OGP process, refers to the weak commitments developed for the National Action Plans. Most of the commitments of Brazil’s three Action Plans do certainly have merit in promoting open government initiatives in Brazil at the federal level. But a lot of those commitments are the result of projects which had already been in the making and would, sooner or later, have been implemented anyway due to requirements of the national legislation. The 2016 civil society monitoring report found that only 15 per cent of all commitments created by participating OGP members were potentially transformative ‘and only 5.7% led to specific, transformative, relevant, and complete open government reforms’.101 These two major shortcomings, civil society participation and output, can only be overcome through better accountability mechanisms. Thus, the implementation of stricter monitoring and sanction mechanisms should also be a clear priority for the OGP steering committee to prevent that its principles are gradually undermined, and the OGP abandoned by civil society actors as it almost happened in Brazil after the second Action Plan. In cases of very grave challenges to the OGP principles, the OGP steering committee has shown its seriousness to defend itself and its mission. In 2014, the OGP steering committee adopted a response policy to be used against governments undermining the OGP principles during their OGP membership, with a particular emphasis on civil society participation. The OGP steering committee found that ‘considerable evidence points to the space for CSO activities decreasing in a wide range of countries, including in some OGP participating countries’.102 If clear evidence is brought to the OGP steering committee that a government actively acts contrary to the OGP principles, that is, restricting civil society participation in the OGP process, the committee can, as a last resort, list the respective government as inactive in the OGP, excluding it from the OGP decision-making mechanisms.103 In 2016, the committee made use of this policy for the first time against the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkey. In May 2016, the committee decided to designate Azerbaijan as inactive based on clear evidence found that the government had threatened civil society actors and limited their activities through pieces of legislation, targeting, in particular, those working on transparency and accountability.104 These concerns had been brought to the committee by the civil society organisations Publish What You Pay, Civicus and Article 19.105 Only a few months later, in September 2016, the steering committee took the unanimous decision to designate Turkey as inactive on the basis of having acted contrary to OGP principles from the very beginning of its OGP membership.106 On the submission of its first Action Plan (2011–2013), Turkey was unable to provide a self-assessment report, and the independent

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reviewer found no evidence that the OGP commitments had been implemented.107 In addition, Turkey ultimately failed to submit its second Action Plan in the required time frame.108 In late 2014, the OGP steering committee also issued warnings to ten governments (Australia, Colombia, Italy, Kenya, Latvia, Malawi, Montenegro, Peru, Slovakia and Ukraine) which had not submitted their Action Plans according to the deadline set by the OGP.109 In 2015, the OGP steering committee issued a warning against Hungary because of a smear campaign organised by the government against NGOs working on human rights and transparency.110 As a consequence of this warning, the Hungarian government decided to withdraw from the OGP in late 2016.111 These actions show that the OGP is prepared to act when general OGP guidelines (deadlines for the submission of Action Plans, self-assessment reports, independent assessment reports, etc.) or OGP principles are clearly disrespected. In severe cases, such as those of Azerbaijan, Hungary and Turkey, the OGP had to act to protect its credibility as an organisation. In the cases of Azerbaijan and Turkey a new review one year after their enlistment as ‘inactive’ will determine if steps have to be taken to expel those governments completely from the OGP or if they can be readmitted.112 And yet, no tangible mechanisms exist for civil society or the OGP steering committee to oblige governments in their national OGP processes to design the principal decision-making body along the lines of the OGP steering committee with equal participation of members from the government and civil society. In Brazil, despite the positive developments in the third Action Plan cycle, civil society actors are still excluded from the principal decisionmaking body, the Inter-ministerial Committee. Bearing in mind the OGP principle of civic participation, this situation represents an ‘anomaly without sense’ in the words of Joara Marchezini,113 the representative of Article 19 Brazil. In the same vein, the example of PB programmes in Brazil highlights that empowering civil society structures are the key to real transformative changes in the relationship between government and civil society. DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES IN THE OPEN GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIP The Promotion of Human Rights and Transnational Solidarity The Open Government Partnership represents the very first global attempt to disseminate principles of open and participatory government worldwide by bringing together interested governments and civil society actors and promote the so-called OGP principles. These principles include efforts to increase the availability of information about governmental activities, support



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civic participation, implement the highest standards of professional integrity throughout participating administrations and improve access to new technologies for openness and accountability. In other words, the OGP has the ambition to contribute to the recognition and promotion of new universal values and norms to be embraced by all participating governments independent of their cultures and mentalities. As the Open Government Declaration states: We commit to espouse these principles in our international engagement, and work to foster a global culture of open government that empowers and delivers for citizens, and advances the ideals of open and participatory 21st century government.114

The fact that the OGP was called into life by the US and Brazil, a developed and a developing country, together with two other developed countries from Europe (the United Kingdom and Norway) and four other developing countries from every corner of the world (Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa), corroborates its universal claim. To date, the OGP unites more than 70 governments from all continents, although most of those countries are from Europe and the Americas. Through its activities, the OGP is particularly committed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Convention against Corruption, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2003. The convention defines several anti-corruption measures, among them the introduction of codes of conduct for public officials, the increase of transparency and information on governmental activities or the involvement of actors from civil society in decision-making processes.115 The vision and institutional structure of the Open Government Partnership promised to make government activities more transparent and accountable through the creation of participatory mechanisms involving the active participation of civil society actors. Both the voluntary character of the OGP and the fact that the participating governments are allowed to create their own structures and find their own answers to lacking transparency and accountability in government activities avoid one-size-fits-all solutions and the imposition of grand models and programmes by Western countries on developing countries. It is this potential which makes civil society actors passionately embrace this transnational initiative. In the ideal case, the OGP would contribute to creating a new model of democracy promotion on open government initiatives by empowering civil society actors in an attempt to develop projects on open government in a collaborative way between representatives from the government and civil society. The resulting projects may then unfold the potential to promote social justice and the democratisation of government activities. So far, however, monitoring reports indicate that the OGP is vastly underperforming. The

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underwhelming impact of the OGP is corroborated by the case of the Brazilian government which has not distinguished itself in any meaningful way as a leading and innovative actor in the OGP that could justify the emergence of a new democratic paradigm on open government. Unlike in the areas of health with UNITAID and food security with the Committee on World Food Security, the Brazilian government has wasted an exceptional opportunity to lead by example and stand again at the forefront of democratic innovation in global governance. As in health and food security, the Brazilian government could have sought inspiration from domestic programmes that truly inspired the world, such as the PB programmes. These programmes provided the perfect blueprint for how it is possible to create more open, participatory and transparent government initiatives with the potential to contribute to social justice and democratic values. If those government officials responsible for the national OGP processes had drawn inspiration from the wealth of experience gained in the PB processes in the country, they would have realised that a paradigm change on open government initiatives is only possible with the pro-active engagement of the government and the willingness to create meaningful space for civil society actors. At the same time, the government would also know that passive and lukewarm engagement with civil society would not have any paradigmchanging effects. On the contrary, this kind of passivity may eventually lead to the break-up of the entire process. Despite its vastly underwhelming performance, it would be premature to brush aside the OGP completely. The OGP still has the potential to create transnational solidarity among governments and civil society actors guided by the OGP principles. The OGP has contributed to more solidarity and coalition-building among civil society actors in Brazil. In the same vein, the OGP national processes have also created channels of trust and confidence between governments and civil society actors in other Latin American countries on open government initiatives.116 These first approaches towards more profound interactions and exchanges promoted by the OGP between civil society actors and governments may be regarded as an encouraging step towards more democratic processes. This is exactly the hope many civil society actors associate with the OGP. If the governments, however, continue to ignore or undermine civil society demands for more empowering participatory mechanisms and more ambitious commitments, the OGP will be doomed as a transnational common project. Mechanisms of Participation The great strength of the OGP, namely the fact that the governments are primarily responsible for the creation of participatory mechanisms that match their own respective social context, also represents a great weakness. As the



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case of Brazil and the general performance of the OGP have made clear, the OGP faces enormous challenges to compel governments to create participatory structures with transformative potential and thus guarantee meaningful and effective civil society participation in national OGP processes. The governments should have no excuse for their negligence. They do have a model to follow, the proper OGP steering committee. In the steering committee, both governments and civil society actors meet as equal partners and jointly take decisions on all international aspects of the OGP. Given the rotation principle and elections, the steering committee is not limited to a selected group of governments and civil society organisations or a specific world region. And in their official statements, many governments seem committed to recognising the importance of civil society participation to make the OGP a success.117 Brazil’s technical team of the Office of the Comptroller General, responsible for the National Action Plans and the outreach to civil society, also emphasised that Brazil’s involvement in the OGP was associated with ‘the vanguard of governmental transparency, accountability, the intensification and involvement of civil society on topics of open government and new technologies for fostering innovation in this respect’.118 The transnational structure and the guiding OGP principles may provide a blueprint for how to democratise national OGP processes. The meaningful cooperation of governments and civil society actors can unfold tremendous democratic potential if seriously promoted by the governments. The Brazilian experience of PB provides an illuminating example. PB programmes have shown that an innovative and original idea alone does not guarantee its instant success. The idea, as innovative and original as it may be, needs to be taken seriously by those actors responsible for bringing it to life. Wampler found that PB programmes in Brazil were least successful when its actors did not adhere to four core principles, namely (1) the establishment of rules and mechanisms by government officials to create active citizen participation, (2) citizen involvement in decision-making which goes beyond mere feedback or consultation processes, (3) a strong social justice component empowering citizens from poorer communities and (4) improved transparency through citizen oversight.119 When municipal governments and civil society actors took seriously these four principles, the PB programme created a ‘virtuous cycle’ and contributed to social change, promoting new forms of democratic interaction between the government and the citizens.120 A similar development can be observed in the Brazilian OGP performance. In the first two Action Plan cycles, the government was incapable of creating participatory structures which could have unfolded real empowering potential. In the third Action Plan cycle, however, a revamped collaboration process with co-creation workshops and an empowered civil society working group breathed new life into the national OGP process, stimulated civil society participation and empowered members of civil society to include

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their voices and proposals in the process. As a result, civil society actors felt their impact in the development of the commitments. Still, many civil society actors sensed that most of the commitments lacked transformative potential.121 In the same vein, the highest decision-making body, the Interministerial Committee, is still closed to civil society actors. This situation theoretically allows the government to maintain its ultimate influence and power to intervene in the OGP process whenever necessary, thereby gravely undermining the hard-won empowerment of civil society participation. In this respect, the Brazilian and many other governments have failed to assume their responsibility as the most powerful actors in the OGP and pro-actively create efficient and empowering participatory mechanisms. Admittedly, some positive effect of the OGP, both at the national and transnational levels, of stimulating civil society mobilisation and coordination on open government initiatives cannot be denied. Many civil society actors, particularly in Brazil, remain convinced that the OGP can help them to better mobilise and pressure the government on open government reforms. These activities are supported by the OGP`s civil society engagement team, which is able to provide support to and exchange knowledge and information with civil society actors across countries at the global and regional OGP summits. It is also evident that the participatory mechanisms in place in many countries are much too weak to generate a continuous and institutionalised empowerment of civil society actors. And when considering the striking contrast between lofty official government statements on the value of civic participation in the OGP processes and the modest realities, it may not be too far-fetched to suspect that the Brazilian government is leading civil society by the nose. The Brazilian government seems to use the OGP to manipulate, in a rather self-serving way, its image and present itself as a responsible actor in the transnational structure of the OGP and among other participating governments. To maintain its image and international prestige, the government relies on civil society participation. Instead of creating a permanent and institutionalised structure which may promote truly effective and meaningful civil society participation (i.e., opening up the Inter-ministerial Committee to civil society participation), the government only concedes as little space as possible to keep civil society actors entertained and prevent the emergence of any real paradigm change. As Wampler showed in his analysis of several PB programmes in Brazil, such a government strategy ultimately leads to frustration, disappointment and the abandonment of the process by civil society actors. Mechanisms of Accountability The clear divide between democratic potential and democratic performance in the OGP is also due to a lack of strong accountability mechanisms. Apart



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from the widespread absence of empowering participatory structures, the most recent performance reports have emphasised that most of the commitments developed by the participating governments lack transformative potential. The Brazilian government accomplished to implement 25 of its 32 commitments of its first Action Plan and 40 of its 52 commitments of its second Action Plan. At first sight, these numbers look seem impressive. When we look beyond the dried ink of official government documents and discover that the OGP process was in danger of disintegrating after the second Action Plan, the whole implementation process of these commitments can be called into question. If these commitments do not move beyond the mere creation of websites and electronic tools, which make government data accessible and freely available to the citizens, then the OGP serves mainly as a dandy plaything for the participating governments to self-congratulate themselves on their alleged achievements but not as a vehicle for the transformation of government processes. While internal accountability in the transnational structure of the OGP seems to be guaranteed by the transnational composition of the OGP steering committee, the overall performance of the OGP hinges on external accountability, that is, the accountability of the participating governments to national civil society actors in the national OGP processes. Given the weak participatory structures at the national levels, civil society actors are left with few opportunities to hold their governments to account. Very often, their participation is limited to naming and shaming as well as review and monitoring activities. Their leverage increases when they are allowed to participate in the decision-making process of the development of the commitments. In the development of the third Action Plan in Brazil, the government allowed civil society actors to participate and weigh in on the process. The third Action Plan cycle has led to a certain empowerment of civil society actors in the process. Still missing at the national and transnational level is a stronger mechanism of disempowerment allowing civil society actors or the OGP steering committee to sanction governments on the basis of their underperformance, such as the failure of many countries to create empowering participatory structures or develop commitments with transformative potential. The OGP’s response policy is a good first step in the right direction, giving civil society actors and the OGP steering committee the power to sanction and, as a last resort, expel those participating countries that gravely violate OGP principles. As already mentioned, many civil society actors involved in Brazil’s OGP process invest a lot of hope in the transformative potential of the OGP. For them, the OGP itself can serve as an overarching framework which provides civil society with a tool to hold the government accountable to the values of the OGP as well as its own national commitments and laws. Although civil

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society actors repeatedly complained about the lack of ambition of most of the commitments, they are convinced the OGP can help to strengthen, among other national legislation, the implementation of the Law of Access to Information, adopted in 2011. Neide de Sordi expressed this hope in the following words: The Law of Access [to Information] took some time to work; it is getting better now. . . . But still . . . it is not a successful and efficient public policy. The fact that the law exists does not mean that nothing more needs to be done. Thus, I believe that it is vital to create incentives to increase the preoccupation with open data and open government. So far, I see a lot of theatre going on. . . . We have progressed. We have now the Open Data Repository and many other things. But nothing happens to those who do not publish data; nothing happens to those who do not make public information. So, this issue needs to be much stronger reviewed. It has to be a concern of the state, not only of civil society.122

She clearly emphasises the importance of the role of the government in making the OGP an exercise with the potential to contribute to democratic practices on open government and, in the case of Brazil, to contribute to implementing and legitimising the Law of Access to Information. For many civil society representatives in Brazil, the OGP represents one of those incentives to put pressure on the government, in particular through the OGP’s opportunities to create space for civic participation in the national OGP processes.123 In this sense, the OGP may serve as an additional accountability mechanism to be used by civil society actors in Brazil to hold the government accountable to its promises and commitments. –– The OGP exhibits several striking weaknesses as a democratic global governance mechanism in all three key indicators. The OGP is vastly underperforming in the promotion of its principles due to deficient participatory structures and weak accountability mechanisms. Civil society participation is rather conventional. And most of the commitments developed are underwhelming. In the same vein, the OGP can only be regarded in a limited sense as a cosmopolitan framework generating a continuous and institutionalised transnational solidarity movement on open government. As long as the governments pay no more than lip service to the OGP principles, it is hard to see how the OGP can evolve into that new model of democracy promotion promised by its founders. As long as the governments understand ‘open government’ mainly as ‘open data’, that is, publicising data and information and creating websites to make government information public, it is difficult to see how the OGP is going to unfold transformative potential in the long run. The PB programmes in Brazil have emphasised the vital role of the government



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in conceding empowering space to civil society action. They have also shown that governments are in the powerful position to manipulate the entire process to their advantage, undermining the democratic potential of the whole programme. In this respect, the success of the OGP clearly hinges on the political will of the governments. And they have not shown the will to transform the OGP into a new model of democracy promotion. Therefore, albeit with some merits, the OGP is a weak democratic experiment and, if nothing changes, about to fail in the near future. The Brazilian government has wasted a unique opportunity to distinguish itself once again as a transformative actor as it has done so convincingly in the context of UNITAID and the Committee on World Food Security. NOTES 1 De Sousa Santos, ‘Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre’. 2 Fedozzi, ‘Avaliação das Práticas de Construção de Orçamentos Públicos’, 51–52. 3 Dias, ‘25 Years of Participatory Budgets in the World’, 23. 4 Fedozzi and Pereira Lima, ‘Participatory Budgets in Brazil’, 156. 5 Fedozzi, ‘Avaliação das Práticas de Construção de Orçamentos Públicos’, 54–55. 6 Ibid., 56. 7 Wampler, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil. 8 Wampler, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil, 3. 9 Ibid., 4, 35. 10 Ibid., 9–13, 63. 11 Ibid., 52–53. 12 Ibid., 17, 68, 100; Avritzer, Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America, 151. 13 Ibid., 152. 14 Ibid., 154. 15 Ibid., 5. 16 Fedozzi and Pereira Lima, ‘Participatory Budgets in Brazil’, 156. 17 Avritzer, Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America, 146–47. 18 Wampler, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil, 259. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., 261. 22 Ibid., 175–254. 23 Wampler, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil, 3–9; Fedozzi and Pereira Lima, ‘Participatory Budgets in Brazil’, 156. 24 Wampler, ‘Participatory Budgeting’, 9. 25 Wampler, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil, 266.

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26 Ibid., 29. 27 Fedozzi and Pereira Lima, ‘Participatory Budgets in Brazil’, 160. 28 Obama, Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government. 29 The White House, ‘Open Government Directive’. 30 Weinstein, ‘Transforming Multilateralism’, 4. 31 The Brazilian Institute for Socioeconomic Studies INESC, the Indian Association for the Empowerment of Workers and Peasants MKSS, the Mexican Institute GESOC (Gestión Social y Cooperación), the Open Government Institute from Moldavia, Twaweza from Tanzania, Publish What You Pay from Indonesia, the British Transparency and Accountability Initiative, the Revenue Watch Institute from the US and the International Budget Partnership. 32 Weinstein, ‘Transforming Multilateralism’, 4–7. 33 OGP, ‘Open Government Partnership’, 19–21. 34 Weinstein, ‘Transforming Multilateralism’, 5. 35 Vasani, ‘Improving the OGP Experience’. 36 OGP, ‘Steering Committee 2014 Rotation – Results’. 37 Ibid. 38 OGP, ‘Open Government Declaration’. 39 Achievements, publication of all required OGP documents like assessment reports, and so on, adherence to the Open Government Declaration, providing financial support for OGP and attending SC meetings. 40 OGP, ‘Open Government Partnership’, 5–9. 41 Ibid., 4. 42 OGP, ‘Open Government Partnership’. 43 OGP, ‘Events’. 44 Open Government Partnership, ‘Subnational Government Pilot Program’. 45 This is the list of all pioneers: Austin, United States, Bojonegoro, Indonesia, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Elgeyo Marakwet, Kenya, Jalisco, Mexico, Kigoma, Tanzania, La Libertad, Peru, Madrid, Spain, Ontario, Canada, Paris, France, São Paulo, Brazil, Scotland, United Kingdom, Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana, Seoul, South Korea, Tbilisi and Georgia. 46 Open Government Partnership, ‘Finances and Budget’. 47 Weinstein, ‘Transforming Multilateralism’, 4–5. 48 The composition of the steering committee as of April 2016: Governments: Brazil, Chile, Croatia, France, Georgia, Indonesia, Mexico, Romania, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. Civil Society : World Resources Institute, Open Government Institute, Open Democracy Advice Centre, GESOC (Gestión Social y Cooperación), Results for Development, IFID (International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development), Natural Resource Governance Institute, International Budget Partnership, Transparency & Accountability Initiative. The two remaining civil society seats are currently vacant. See OGP, ‘OGP Steering Committee: Membership’. 49 Waisbich, Interview, 22 January 2015. 50 OGP Technical Team, Email Correspondence, 27 January 2016. 51 OGP, ‘Steering Committee 2014 Rotation – Results’.



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52 IACC, ‘IACC Newsletter Interview – Minister Jorge Hage’. 53 Ministry of Transparency, Oversight and Comptroller General, ‘Comitê Interministerial Governo Aberto’. 54 Ministry of Transparency, Oversight and Comptroller General, ‘Histórico’. 55 Tonin, Interview, 24 January 2017. 56 Coelho and Waisbich, Mecanismo Independente de Avaliação, 3; Machado, Interview, 6 February 2015; Waisbich, Interview, 22 January 2015. 57 Coelho and Waisbich, Mecanismo Independente de Avaliação, 35–71. 58 Coelho and Waisbich, Mecanismo Independente de Avaliação, 75; Machado, Interview, 6 February 2015; Waisbich, Interview, 22 January 2015. 59 Burle dos Santos Guimarães, Interview, 30 January 2017; Coelho and Waisbich, Mecanismo Independente de Avaliação, 27–28; Machado, Interview, 6 February 2015; Marchezini, Interview, 29 January 2015; Waisbich, Interview, 22 January 2015. 60 Burle dos Santos Guimarães, Interview, 30 January 2017; Machado, Interview, 6 February 2015; Marchezini, Interview, 29 January 2015; Waisbich, Interview, 22 January 2015. 61 Machado, Interview, 6 February 2015; Marchezini, Interview, 29 January  2015; Waisbich, Interview, 22 January 2015. 62 CONSOCIAL, ‘Apresentação do Fórum de Transparência, Participação e Controle Social’. 63 Presidência da República, ‘Decreto de 8 de Julho de 2011’. 64 CONSOCIAL, ‘Solicitação de reformulação do Conselho Interministerial Governo Aberto (CIGA) para a inclusão de representantes da sociedade civil’. 65 Comptroller General, ‘Resolução N°1’. 66 Ibid., 1–2. 67 OGP Technical Team, Email Correspondence, 27 January 2016. 68 Ibid. 69 Steibel, Mecanismo Independente de Avaliação, 68–70; Marchezini, Interview, 29 January 2015. 70 OGP Hub, ‘Brazil’, 2–3. 71 Burle dos Santos Guimarães, Interview, 30 January 2017; Machado, Interview, 6 February 2015; Marchezini, Interview, 29 January 2015; Steibel, Mecanismo Independente de Avaliação, 68–70; Waisbich, Interview, 22 January 2015. 72 Steibel, Mecanismo Independente de Avaliação, 7, 8, 10. 73 Ibid., 10. 74 Ibid., 26. 75 Ministry of Transparency, Oversight and Comptroller General, Brazil’s Third Action Plan; Marchezini, Interview, 17 January 2017; Tonin, Interview, 24 January 2017. Members of Civil Society: Observatório Social de Brasília, Instituto de Estudos Socioeconómicos – INESC, Rede pela Transparência e Participação Social (RETPS), Instituto de Manejo e Certificação Florestal e Agrícola – IMAFLORA, Open Knowledge Foundation Brasil. Members of Academia: Colaboratório de Desenvolvimento e Participação – COLAB/USP. Member of the Sector of Workers/ Unions: União Geral dos Trabalhadores – UGT.

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76 Ministry of Transparency, Oversight and Comptroller General, Brazil’s Third Action Plan, 10–12. 77 Ministry of Transparency, Oversight and Comptroller General, Brazil’s Third Action Plan, 13–18. 78 Ibid., 15–16. 79 Parceria para Governo Aberto, ‘Confira os temas das oficinas do 3° Plano de Ação’, http://www.governoaberto.cgu.gov.br/noticias/2016/confira-os-temas-priorizadosno-3o-plano-de-acao, accessed 09 March 2017. 80 The commitments involved the creation of a variety of digital tools and online mechanisms to promote open data, increase transparency and strengthen social participation. 81 Barros, Interview, 18 January 2017; Burle dos Santos Guimarães, Interview, 30 January 2017; De Sordi, Interview, 16 January 2017; Machado, Interview, 19 December 2016; Marchezini, Interview, 17 January 2017. 82 Ministry of Transparency, Oversight and Comptroller General, Brazil’s Third Action Plan. 83 Barros, Interview, 18 January 2017; Burle dos Santos Guimarães, Interview, 30 January 2017; De Sordi, Interview, 16 January 2017; Machado, Interview, 19 December 2016; Marchezini, Interview, 17 January 2017. 84 Burle dos Santos Guimarães, Interview, 30 January 2017; Machado, Interview, 19 December 2016; Marchezini, Interview, 17 January 2017; Tonin, Interview, 24 January 2017. 85 Tonin, Interview, 24 January 2017. 86 Barros, Interview, 18 January 2017; Marchezini, Interview, 17 January 2017; Tonin, Interview, 24 January 2017. 87 Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, ‘Processo Judicial Eletrônico’, http://www.tse.jus. br/servicos-judiciais/processo-judicial-eletronico, accessed 08 March 2017. 88 De Sordi, Interview, 16 January 2017. 89 Burle dos Santos Guimarães, Interview, 30 January 2017; Marchezini, Interview, 17 January 2017. 90 Ministry of Transparency, Oversight and Comptroller General, Brazil’s Third Action Plan, 8. 91 Marchezini, Interview, 17 January 2017. 92 Tonin, Interview, 24 January 2017. 93 OpenTheGovernment.Org, ‘Website’, http://www.openthegovernment.org/, accessed 3 March 2017. 94 Francoli et al., ‘From Informing to Empowering’. 95 OGP, ‘OGP Now’, 2016. 96 OGP, ‘OGP Now’, 2015. 97 Francoli et al., ‘From Informing to Empowering’, 1. 98 Martinez Morales, Interview, 23 January 2017. 99 Francoli et al., ‘From Informing to Empowering’, 1. 100 Transparency International Secretariat, ‘Transparency International Statement on the Open Government Partnership at the OGP Summit 2015’. 101 OGP, ‘OGP Now’, 2016.



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102 OGP Steering Committee, ‘Policy on Upholding the Values and Principles of OGP, as Articulated in the Open Government Declaration’, 1. 103 Ibid., 4. 104 OGP Support Unit, ‘Media Briefing’; Article 19, ‘Azerbaijan’. 105 Article 19, ‘Azerbaijan’. 106 Open Government Partnership, ‘Turkey Made Inactive in the Open Government Partnership’. 107 Open Government Partnership, ‘Official Communication from the Open Government Partnership Support Unit’. 108 Open Government Partnership, ‘Turkey Made Inactive in the Open Government Partnership’. 109 Open Government Partnership, ‘Letters Sent to Countries Encouraging Submission of Action Plans’. 110 OGP Support Unit, ‘Statement by OGP’s Criteria and Standards Subcommittee Regarding the Government of Hungary’s Participation in OHP’. 111 OGP Support Unit, ‘Media Briefing’. 112 OGP, ‘Response Policy’. 113 Marchezini, Interview, 17 January 2017. 114 OGP, ‘Open Government Declaration’. 115 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘United Nations Convention against Corruption’. 116 Martinez Morales, Interview, 23 January 2017. 117 Fraundorfer, ‘The Open Government Partnership’. 118 OGP Technical Team, Email Correspondence, 27 January 2016. 119 Wampler, ‘Participatory Budgeting’, 3–9. 120 Ibid., 9. 121 Burle dos Santos Guimarães, Interview, 30 January 2017; Machado, Interview, 19 December 2016; Marchezini, Interview, 17 January 2017. 122 De Sordi, Interview, 16 January 2017. 123 Barros, Interview, 18 January 2017; Burle dos Santos Guimarães, Interview, 30 January 2017; De Sordi, Interview, 16 January 2017; Machado, Interview, 19 December 2016; Marchezini, Interview, 17 January 2017.

Chapter 6

Brazil and Internet Governance

The NETmundial Meeting in 2014 in São Paulo resulted in the adoption of the very first Human Rights Charter for the Internet, with representatives from different stakeholder groups in Internet governance (governments, civil society, companies and the academic/technical community) coming together to develop the very first human rights principles for the Internet. The NETmundial Meeting meant a significant breakthrough in global Internet governance after years of stalemate. The way the Brazilian organisers planned the whole meeting was essential to its final success. Why did the Brazilian government play such a substantial role in this process? And how democratic were the whole meeting and its decision-making process in the end? The Brazilian government made headlines in the global Internet community with the development of its Regulatory Framework for the Internet, which aimed to regulate the Internet and stipulate specific principles for its use in Brazil to guarantee the human rights of Brazilian Internet users. As a symbolic move, then President Dilma Rousseff took advantage of the international attention and used the NETmundial Meeting as her stage to sign into law the Regulatory Framework. The chapter discusses the development of Brazil’s Regulatory Framework, its innovative elements for the regulation of the use of the Internet and the critical role of Brazil’s Internet Steering Committee CGI.br in its conception. Thereafter, the chapter turns to the organisation of the NETmundial Meeting and examines to which extent the Regulatory Framework and the role of CGI. br served as an inspiration for the structure of the NETmundial Meeting. In this context, the chapter identifies the principal features during the two-day meeting which made the adoption of a Human Rights Charter for global Internet governance possible. In the end, the chapter analyses to which extent 161

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the NETmundial Meeting promoted human rights, installed participatory mechanisms and relied on accountability mechanisms. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERNET The first impulses for creating a Regulatory Framework for the Internet in Brazil were indirectly sparked by the attempts of Brazilian congressman Eduardo Azeredo in 2007 to pass a restrictive law which would have violated the privacy of Internet users and criminalised anyone for ‘transferring songs from a smartphone back into their computers’.1 Due to massive civil society mobilisation and an online petition, the Azeredo Law was postponed, and a debate emerged about an alternative law.2 In this debate, Brazil’s Internet Steering Committee, which in 2009 had elaborated a resolution entitled ‘The principles for the governance and use of the Internet’, served as an inspiration.3 Based on this resolution, the Ministry of Justice, together with the Law School of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV), a Brazilian think tank, took the initiative to develop a Regulatory Framework for the Internet.4 Brazil’s Internet Steering Committee CGI.br is the responsible body for coordinating the Internet in Brazil. CGI.br is composed of 21 members from different stakeholders involved in the governance of the Internet in Brazil; nine government representatives from different ministries and government agencies, four representatives from the private sector, another four representatives from the non-profit sector, three representatives from the scientific and technical community and one representative with notable knowledge in issues concerning the Internet. Although the government forms the largest group with nine representatives, it does not hold a majority as a single group. Instead, CGI.br comprises representatives from four different groups that have a stake in issues concerning the Internet.5 Both the Ministry of Justice and the Law School of FGV developed a zero draft text which was made public to Brazilian citizens in a first consultation round for suggestions and improvements. Then, a first draft of the legal text was developed based on the public input, which in a second consultation round was presented to the public for comments.6 The public consultation process started in October 2009.7 The working group established to coordinate the whole process used the proper tools of the Internet such as blogs, tweets and virtual discussion hosted by a website portal called Cultura Digital (culturadigital.br/marcocivil), which had been designed by the Ministry of Culture.8 Users could log on to the website, leave comments on the respective topics and take part in the virtual discussions which revolved around challenges, conflicts and open questions in the suggested text. In addition,



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users were able to cast votes on other user comments and contributions.9 In 2010, the social network Cultura Digital comprised around five thousand registered users and three thousand blogs with 280 discussion groups.10 At the end of the first round of the public consultation process, more than 800 comments had been made, which resulted in a report of more than 581 pages, while the second round received more than 1,168 user contributions.11 Each of the two rounds of public consultations took place during a period of 45 days.12 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also involved, to a limited degree, the international community by starting a dialogue with embassies worldwide to exchange information about similar regulatory frameworks in other countries, which could serve as inspiration for the Brazilian Regulatory Framework.13 Although the whole process can be considered a promising experiment in how to elaborate a regulatory framework with the participation of civil society, it must be cautioned that only a tiny fragment of Brazil’s society actually participated. In 2009 and 2010, when the framework was elaborated, no more than 40 per cent of Brazil’s population had access to the Internet.14 Also, given the complex and technical nature of the topic, only citizens who were well informed and highly enthusiastic about matters concerning Internet regulation were likely to participate in such an exercise. Only 130 users (registered on the website Cultura Digital) took part in the first round. And only 14 users sent 455 messages in the first round. These numbers reveal very clearly that only a fracture of the Brazilian society actually took part in the first round of the public consultation process.15 Notwithstanding the low number of participants, the discussions could be considered as largely qualified. Most user comments included justifications of one’s own position supported by external sources, users made technical and respectful responses to other comments and tried to enter into substantive discussion with the positions and viewpoints of other commentators.16 In general, the discussions only became polemic with regard to the issue of anonymity on the Internet.17 Otherwise, the discussions were mostly led in a civilised and respectful manner.18 In the end, the working group considered 54 per cent of the comments made by the users either partially or completely for the first version of the text.19 Taking into account that most of those comments not considered by the working group rejected any regulation, those citizens who actually participated had their voices heard.20 In addition, the use of a variety of online tools guaranteed a transparent process for all those participants involved. The working group took advantage of other web tools such as RSS feeds, trackbacks, Tumblr, Facebook, Twitter and Google Bookmarks to better support the consultation process, track user contributions and modify paragraphs, sentences and other parts of the original text, which in the end resulted in the first version of the legal text.21

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Critics may argue that the low participation rate undermined the democratic nature of the development of the Regulatory Framework. Notwithstanding this problematic aspect, the framework was praised as an inspiring model for countries worldwide by transnational CSOs and renowned Internet experts and pioneers like Vint Cerf, Tim Berners-Lee or Steve Crocker.22 And in fact, the framework planted the seeds for the NETmundial Meeting which was to develop a similar framework for the global sphere. Brazil’s Regulatory Framework developed a rights-based approach to the use of the Internet in Brazil and was elaborated on the basis of intensive citizen participation and a largely transparent public consultation process supported by the innovative use of a variety of Internet communication tools. Submitted to Brazil’s Congress in 2011, it would still take three years for the framework to be passed into law and sanctioned by Brazil’s then President Dilma Rousseff.23 When Congress finally approved the law, Dilma Rousseff chose the plenary meeting of the NETmundial Meeting in São Paulo as the perfect spotlight to sanction into law the Regulatory Framework with the global Internet community watching in delight.24 The major remaining gaps in the framework – exceptions to net neutrality, protection of personal data and records, and the responsible institutions of oversight for monitoring the rules established by the framework – were tackled between 2015 and 2016 through the creation of a presidential decree. As in the elaboration of the framework itself, the Ministry of Justice once more organised two stages of public consultations involving actors from the private sector, civil society and academia.25 Since presidential decrees are usually elaborated by the president and a team of bureaucrats behind closed doors, it was extraordinary to observe that this time the elaboration of a presidential decree took place by consulting Brazilian citizens in an interactive and transparent process on how to address the existing gaps in the framework. The first stage of the public consultation process took place between 28 January 2015 and 30 April 2015 and resulted in approximately 1,200 comments from citizens on the draft text. In a second stage, which took place in February 2016, the government made the draft decree public for further comments from civil society. In total, the draft presidential decree received approximately 1,500 comments, while the chapters on net neutrality and protection of records, personal data and personal communication received the most comments with 619 and 494 contributions, respectively. All these comments, together with the author’s name, are accessible on the website.26 In general, the public consultation process and the final presidential decree were well received by Brazil’s civil society actors.27 The final presidential decree, signed into law on 11 May 2016, improved the framework in three important respects. First, the problem of oversight was regulated with more clarity. The National Telecommunications Agency (Anatel) will be the responsible institution of oversight and will be obliged to



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follow the guidelines established by CGI.br. This means that Anatel’s influence was cut down to a mere body of oversight, while the normative power of CGI.br in establishing the leading principles and guidelines for the regulation of the Internet in Brazil was reinforced. As a second innovation, the decree reinforces the principles of net neutrality by clearly prohibiting commercial agreements, which may privilege or prioritise data packages and thereby violate the open, diverse and plural character of the Internet. As a third aspect, the role of CGI.br was further strengthened by attributing it the responsibility to promote and recommend procedures, norms and standards for the protection of records, personal data and private communication on the Internet.28 Brazil’s CGI.br with its model of stakeholder participation received a definite boost through the presidential decree as the leading model for Internet governance in Brazil. The presidential decree further reinforced the rightsbased nature of the framework, emphasising the important role of multisectoral participation via CGI.br and the protection of principles such as the right to privacy and net neutrality. For future public consultations, the responsible bodies will need to engage in more efforts to disseminate information and mobilise civil society organisations in a nationwide campaign to attract more attention to such an important issue.29 However, the more complex and technical a topic is, the harder it will be to ensure high participation rates. At least, the government provided the necessary infrastructure to guarantee that any citizen interested in the topic could participate. THE NETMUNDIAL MEETING: A NEW POINT OF DEPARTURE IN GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE The global governance of the Internet is still a relatively new phenomenon involving from its very beginning state and non-state actors, alongside intergovernmental and multilateral approaches. One of the leading bodies in global Internet governance, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), has been governed by different stakeholder groups since its creation in 1998. A private non-profit organisation based in the US (California), ICANN coordinates the allocation of domain names and root server computers.30 Given its status as a private actor dealing with very technical issues of the Internet, government representatives, for instance, are not allowed to sit on ICANN’s principal decision-making board, the board of directors, even though ICANN is accountable to the US government and the laws of the state of California.31 Given ICANN’s curious nature as a private US-based corporation with governmental functions affecting the whole Internet governance system and the fact that the US government has political control over ICANN,

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considerable conflict exists among other governments about ICANN’s role.32 But so far, any talks about creating an international successor organisation to ICANN or integrating it into the UN system have failed.33 Notwithstanding the problem of US oversight, ICANN’s ‘institutional design marked a revolutionary departure from traditional approaches to global governance’.34 Remarkably, ICANN represents one of the fundamental organisations in Internet governance where governments no longer play the first fiddle and were reduced to an advisory role.35 Between 2002 and 2005, the UN organised the UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) process, which should clarify fundamental issues in Internet governance, among them the role of ICANN, non-state actors and intergovernmental cooperation.36 Although several thousand representatives from governments, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholder groups were present to talk about new ways to govern the Internet, the summit process was characterised as a failure.37 It was overall ineffective in producing any worthwhile documents which could have served as a basis for all stakeholders involved on how to proceed in the global governance of the Internet.38 While failing to produce actual outcomes, WSIS achieved to shift the spotlight to non-state actors and came up with a definition of Internet governance conceding an important role to non-state actors, while still upholding the dominance of the states: Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.39

Another outcome of this process was the creation of a global multistakeholder forum which was to become the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).40 The IGF, however, has been unable to produce real progress on how to move forward in Internet governance.41 It is striking to observe that in Internet governance, where ICANN as one of its principal organisations is governed by several stakeholders, multistakeholder models have failed to effectively democratise decision-making processes. After years of frustration and failure, the NSA spying scandal, revealed by Edward Snowden in the summer of 2013, would spark a new approach to the global governance of the Internet spearheaded by Brazil. In the wake of the revelations, it became clear that the NSA had spied on several heads of state, among them the then Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff.42 Unlike other heads of state, she reacted very boldly, condemning the actions of the NSA and cancelling a scheduled state visit to the US.43 In September 2013 at the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly, Rousseff spoke out against



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the NSA practices and promised that Brazil would ‘present proposals for the establishment of a civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet and . . . ensure the effective protection of data that travels through the web’.44 In October 2013, after talks with the CEO of ICANN, Fadi Chehadé, Rousseff announced that Brazil would organise a world meeting in São Paulo to develop proposals in this regard.45 This world meeting, the NETmundial Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance, took place in São Paulo on the 23 and 24 of April 2014 with more than 1,200 participants from the most relevant stakeholder groups in Internet governance (governments, civil society, private sector and the academic/technical community).46 The meeting was organised by Brazil’s Internet Steering Committee CGI.br together with the Brazilian government, several international organisations, ICANN and the I* organisations.47,48 The composition and modes of operation of Brazil’s Internet Steering Committee and the process of the development of Brazil’s Regulatory Framework for the Internet served as inspiration for the organisation and development of the NETmundial Meeting. The Organisation of the Meeting More than 1,200 participants from all four stakeholder groups (governments, civil society, the private sector and the academic/technical community) took part in the meeting which was chaired by Virgílio Almeida, a member of CGI.br and then secretary of the IT department of the Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation.49 The objective of the organisers was to develop a charter of principles and a roadmap for future action in the global governance of the Internet. The preparation of these documents was modelled on the positive experiences made in the elaboration of the Brazilian Regulatory Framework for the Internet. The organisers prepared a zero draft text, which was made public and could be accessed by governments, private-sector organisations, civil society and the technical and academic community for comments and suggestions.50 The consultation process was, as in the case of the Regulatory Framework, divided into two rounds.51 From 14 February to 8 March, the NETmundial organisers received content contributions via its NETmundial website. Based on these contributions CGI.br prepared a draft of the document at its meeting on 31 March and 1 April in São Paulo, which was then made public on 11 April for the second round of comments.52 In the first round (content contributions), the NETmundial organisers received 188 suggestions from 46 countries and 158 institutions, which were used for the development of the first draft text to be presented at the NETmundial Meeting, while in the second round the organisers counted 1,370 comments on the draft text.53

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The organisers used the commenting tool ‘Commentpress’, an open-source WordPress plug-in for social texts, which allowed every participant to track every single comment made. Unlike during the public consultations for the Regulatory Framework, users were not required to register with a user account. However, they needed to provide their full name, an email address and identify with one of the stakeholder groups.54 The NETmundial organisers achieved to create a similar environment as during the elaboration of the Regulatory Framework allowing users ‘to engage in an online debate and critique on each and every paragraph, ultimately turning the document into an interactive conversation with a wide variety of stakeholders across the globe’.55 Theoretically, the NETmundial Meeting was open to everyone interested in Internet governance. However, due to the limitations of the venue in São Paulo to around 900 people, the organisers needed to be selective in the 869 applications received by civil society and the private sector.56 The executive committee selected 500 applicants based on achieving a balance of gender, geography and multistakeholder groups.57 The governments sent their applications to Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that in the end 933 participants from all four different stakeholder groups were selected to attend the meeting.58 According to the organisers, governments were represented by 39 per cent, civil society by 17.1 per cent, the private sector by 15.1 per cent, the technical community by 11.7 per cent, academia by 9.3 per cent, international organisations by 4.4 per cent and others, such as common citizens, by 3.3 per cent.59 In addition to the participants in São Paulo, CGI.br went to great lengths to assure that other citizens and organisations interested in the NETmundial Meeting were able to take part. CGI.br provided the logistical material for 33 hubs in 30 cities and 28 countries worldwide, which guaranteed real-time interaction with NETmundial’s plenary sessions in São Paulo and commenting on the draft text.60 These hubs61 were organised by the local Internet communities in the respective cities and countries.62 ARENA-NETmundial represents one example of such a hub in Brazil where the organisers interacted with Brazilian citizens in São Paulo, sharing knowledge on Internet governance and stimulating citizens to take part in writing comments and voting on particular parts of the draft document.63 Notwithstanding these efforts, Virgílio Almeida feared that the issues discussed at NETmundial ‘have [not] resonated with many people beyond those directly involved or interested in the subject’.64 The meeting itself, along with the public consultations in the weeks before the meeting, were coordinated and planned by a multistakeholder board with four committees. The high-level multistakeholder committee was responsible for the political articulation and the involvement of the international



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community. The executive multistakeholder committee had the mandate to organise the whole event, develop the agenda and review the draft proposals from participants. The logistics and organisational committee, composed only of representatives of the Brazilian government, dedicated its efforts to the logistical aspects of the event. And the council of governmental advisers was a special committee for governments willing to contribute with their input to the organisation of the meeting.65 The committees were supported by the executive secretariat, whose five members worked on site at CGI.br in São Paulo.66 The high-level multistakeholder committee united 27 members divided into one chair (the Brazilian minister of communications), 12 representatives of participating governments (invited by the Brazilian Ministry of Communications), two representatives of international organisations (appointed by the UN secretary general) and three representatives each from four stakeholder groups (civil society, private sector, academia and the technical community), nominated through the organisation 1net.67 The executive multistakeholder committee was composed of eight Brazilian members appointed by CGI.br (one representative each from the technical community and academia and two representatives each from governments, civil society and the private sector), nine representatives from the global multistakeholder community selected by 1net and one representative of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.68 These committees were crucial to the successful development of the event, reinforcing the bottom-up multistakeholder approach and increasing trust and transparency among the participants through the possibility of approaching contact persons from the different stakeholder groups on any problems, difficulties or uncertainties arising in the complex decision-making process of the event.69 The plenary meetings were also organised in an innovative way respecting the balance of the stakeholder groups. The organisers installed four microphones, one for each stakeholder group (governments, civil society, the private sector and the academic/technical community), and limited comments and interventions to two minutes.70 Participants had to queue up behind the respective microphone of their group. Due to the real-time connections with the remote hubs, one full round of comments consisted of six slots, the first four slots for the respective stakeholder groups at the plenary session in São Paulo and two additional slots for comments and contributions from the hubs worldwide.71 The discussions were divided into two parts. On the first day of the meeting, the discussion concentrated on the fundamental principles, whereas on the second day the participants concentrated on governance issues.72 The result was the elaboration and adoption of the very first online Human Rights Charter calling on all actors of global Internet governance that ‘rights

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that people have offline must also be protected online’.73 The whole elaboration process focused on three particular objectives:74 (1) to define clear rules and norms for governmental action for the regulation and formulation of public policies regarding the Internet; (2) to recognise, protect and regulate basic rights of Internet users and (3) to establish rules for those providing services on the Internet, rules on which the judicial authorities could act to resolve conflicts on the web. The final document was divided into two parts. While the first part established the so-called NETmundial principles, the second part was dedicated to formulating a roadmap for the future evolution of global Internet governance. The human rights and shared values embodied by the NETmundial principles established are freedom of expression, freedom of association, the right to privacy, the guarantee of full access to the Internet for persons with disabilities, freedom of information and access to information, and the right to development which emphasises the important role of the Internet in the realisation of human potential. In addition, those NETmundial principles established for the Internet governance process refer to democratic, multistakeholder processes; open, participative and consensus-driven governance; transparency, accountability, inclusiveness and equity; development of a distributive and decentralised governance system; collaborative and cooperative approaches and meaningful participation in the Internet governance architecture of anyone affected by Internet issues.75 Difficulties and Shortcomings Inspiring in many respects, the democratic character of the NETmundial Meeting also had its limitations. The process could not level the existing power hierarchies in the global system. Powerful corporations, for instance, tried to take advantage of the tremendous influence they have on governments and achieve a more favourable language through their lobbying efforts. Governments fell back into diplomatic horse trading, and civil society was not happy at all with the language on net neutrality, the most controversial issue of the meeting which could not be resolved and failed to be turned into one of the NETmundial principles.76 Even in the adoption of Brazil’s Regulatory Framework net neutrality became one of the most controversial issues, which in the end, however, could be included and further specified by the presidential decree in 2015 and 2016.77 Notwithstanding criticism from civil society (regarding net neutrality), the private sector (regarding privacy) and governments like Russia, China, India and Cuba, the final document was approved by all stakeholder groups. This achievement speaks for the strong legitimacy of a document jointly developed through the full participation of all participants having a stake in the issue.78



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It is self-evident, however, that such a complex meeting was also accompanied by several shortcomings and limitations, causing some frustration, misunderstandings and impatience among the participants. Three of those shortcomings are of particular relevance. First, the relatively low participation rate in online public consultations is a major preoccupation for policy-makers and scholars alike. Almeida was frustrated with the low participation and interest in NETmundial on the part of the general public;79 a clear reflection of the principal shortcoming of Brazil’s Regulatory Framework, which also suffered from low participation rates during the public consultation process.80 The low participation rates need not necessarily be detrimental to the whole democratic online process as long as it is guaranteed through the institutional design that every user is given the opportunity to participate. In the case of Brazil’s Regulatory Framework, the public consultation process was of high quality because those (few) citizens who took part were well informed. It can be argued that in this case the limited participation actually benefitted the democratic process. To further examine the positive and negative effects of low participation rates and voter turnouts in online consultations and online elections, more research is needed. A second shortcoming, which requires more reflection, refers to the selection mechanisms of stakeholders. From their experiences of organising the NETmundial Meeting Almeida, Getschko and Afonso enumerated some elements which still need improving. Among them the question of how to identify an adequate set of stakeholders for a particular issue, which mechanisms and criteria should be used for a better selection of stakeholder representatives, how to guarantee a fair power balance between powerful NGOs and private actors and those which are much less influential.81 An online public consultation process definitely provides the opportunity for all possible stakeholders interested in a particular issue to participate. The online process eliminates many barriers and obstacles to participation which exist in the offline world, as, for instance, when it comes to selecting a small number of stakeholder representatives for the venue of a physical meeting such as NETmundial. Here again, the organisers were creative and provided the logistics for the creation of 33 hubs worldwide for those who were not able to participate in the meeting in São Paulo. Of the more than 800 applications received from civil society and the private sector, the organisers selected more than half of them based on a balance of gender, geography and stakeholder group. But how were the applicants actually nominated by their respective stakeholder groups? Since each stakeholder group had their own selection processes to nominate candidates for application to the NETmundial Meeting, there are different standards and criteria for nomination.82 The third point of criticism refers to the selection of stakeholder representatives in the committees during the event (high-level multistakeholder

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committee and the executive multistakeholder committee). The selection of the people representing their respective stakeholder groups suffered from some lack of transparency since the selection criteria and process were not made public.83 The nomination of candidates for the committees was coordinated by the Internet Society and based on self-nominations. The interested candidates were required to submit a motivation statement laying out their relevant background and experience about Internet governance issues, multistakeholder processes and the work in their local Internet communities in line with several civil society principles such as transparency, openness, collaboration and community spirit.84 In the executive multistakeholder committee, the composition of members was clearly skewed in favour of Brazilians and other representatives from Latin America, with the Brazilian government as the only official member of the group of governments in the committee. Due to the significance of this committee in the drafting process, a more balanced representation in the committee would have avoided criticism from some representatives of other governments on the lack of transparency in the drafting process, voiced by the Russian Federation, for example.85 In the same vein, some efforts of duplication, misunderstandings and lack of clarity occurred in the drafting process between the high-level multistakeholder committee and the executive multistakeholder committee.86 DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES DURING THE NETMUNDIAL MEETING The Promotion of Human Rights and Transnational Solidarity Although the final document, the NETmundial Declaration, is legally nonbinding, it can be characterised as a hallmark in global Internet governance. Wolfgang Kleinwächter, an expert on global Internet governance and active participant in the NETmundial Meeting, argues that the NETmundial Declaration might be compared with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, also legally non-binding, because ‘never before in the history of Internet governance had there been a document with such broad political support both from governments and nongovernmental stakeholders’.87 The NETmundial Declaration directly refers to the UDHR by stating: ‘Human rights are universal as reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that should underpin Internet governance principles’.88 In other words, the NETmundial Declaration achieved to emphasise that the protection of human rights must also apply to the realm of the Internet, the online world. Similar to Brazil’s Regulatory Framework, the NETmundial Declaration establishes a catalogue of human rights which can be seen as ethical standards



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to be respected and implemented by all state and non-state actors in global Internet governance. The future implementation of these standards in multiple governance frameworks would allow for more legitimate governance of the Internet. The human rights emphasised by the NETmundial Declaration include freedom of expression, freedom of association, the right to privacy, the right to full access to online resources, freedom of information and access to information, and the right to development via the Internet.89 The different stakeholder groups also agreed on principles for the Internet governance process which ‘should be built on democratic, multistakeholder processes, ensuring the meaningful and accountable participation of all stakeholders, including governments, the private sector, civil society, the technical community, the academic community and users’.90 In the second part of the NETmundial Declaration, the roadmap for future Internet governance, the stakeholder groups agreed on improving the stakeholder process by guaranteeing its open, participatory and transparent character, reforming existing institutional structures in Internet governance and engaging in discussion about particular points such as net neutrality (non-discrimination of data on the Internet), which were controversial during the NETmundial Meeting and could not be included directly in the final document.91 However, the declaration indirectly emphasises the principle of net neutrality by referring to the concept of an open Internet and stating the right to freedom of expression and information.92 The NETmundial principles represent both constraining and enabling rights. The constraining rights (right to privacy, net neutrality, etc.) establish goals to be achieved among all state and non-state actors to limit the power of (or the abuse of power by) governments and private corporations vis-à-vis Internet users. The enabling rights aim to guarantee the protection and an expansion of political agency in global Internet governance. The protection of political agency refers to the rights of Internet users to freedom of expression, freedom of information, access to information, and so on, whereas the expansion of political agency is based on the agreement to establish more participatory governance processes for the better involvement of non-state actors. The NETmundial Declaration represents the very first online Human Rights Charter in global governance, establishing ethical principles and guidelines for the future governance of issues related to the Internet. This Human Rights Charter was clearly inspired by Brazil’s Regulatory Framework which, in turn, established ethical principles and guidelines for the Internet in Brazil, legally guaranteeing to Internet users the transparent, open and inclusive use of the Internet in Brazil. In this sense, the two days of the NETmundial Meeting represent an example of a global multistakeholder meeting creating and promoting an atmosphere of transnational solidarity among the main stakeholder groups in global Internet governance. The meeting bound together the different groups

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on those very topics which on past occasions have created deep rifts and repeated stalemates, with the mission to elaborate a Human Rights Charter which could serve as a reference point for all those groups and Internet users around the world. Mechanisms of Participation Responsible for the organisation of the NETmundial Meeting in São Paulo, the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee CGI.br, which had also played a principal role in the development of Brazil’s Regulatory Framework, was able to create an environment which allowed the active and full participation of all stakeholder groups in the development of the outcome document. Although the governments were still in the majority vis-à-vis other stakeholder groups, they were stripped of their traditional privilege of being the only actors with final decision-making power. Instead, the negotiation of the final document turned into an inclusive and participatory process, considering the involvement of all stakeholder groups with equal rights of full participation in the public consultations in the two months prior to the meeting and during the actual meeting. On top of that, the organisers went to great lengths to provide space for the participation of citizens and local Internet communities from all around the world through the installation of more than 30 high-tech hubs worldwide. Although representatives from civil society organisations were disappointed that NETmundial did not significantly change the existing balance of power which clearly favours powerful states and corporations, they conceded that the organisation of the meeting was in many respects highly innovative and original, pointing to an alternative and more inclusive way of generating international norms as opposed to a government-led approach.93 Deborah Brown from the civil society organisation Access Now remarked that ‘NetMundial was an example of a meeting in which all stakeholders were ostensibly on equal footing’.94 Gabrielle Guillemin from the organisation Article 19 emphasised that ‘unlike traditional international fora such as the UN Human Rights Council, NETmundial gave an opportunity to civil society, private actors, governments and Internet users to express their views and concerns in a highly open and transparent manner’.95 And Deborah Donahoe from Human Rights Watch underlined that the NETmundial Meeting represented ‘a far more inclusive and transparent approach than any process where only governments have a seat at the table’.96 Mechanisms of Accountability The participatory structures created for the meeting also reinforced accountability mechanisms among the different stakeholder groups, particularly as



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far as internal accountability is concerned. The organisers selected around 900 representatives from various stakeholders and established a setting in which all representatives, independent of their affiliation, confronted one another on an equal footing. In this setting, representatives of non-state actors were given the authority to speak and comment on behalf of their respective organisation, which considerably empowered them in contributing to the development of the outcome document. At the same time, these representatives found themselves on an equal footing with government representatives. This mechanism of authorisation (delegation and empowerment) was also extended to representatives from civil society, academia and the private sector from all around the world who convened at the hubs and were allowed to intervene with their comments during the meeting. Through a transparent decision-making process in which all stakeholders had access to documents and minutes of the meetings and could track each other’s contributions and comments all participants were mutually held to account. Everyone was allowed to comment each other’s contributions, including participants from the hubs. These accountability mechanisms were greatly facilitated by an innovative use of new Internet communication tools to provide, track and oversee comments and contributions, including the gradual development of the draft document. Not only was it possible for all participants, both those at the summit location and those at the hubs, to comment on the documents in process and track comments and changes made by other participants. All these comments and track changes made during the consultation process can still be followed up on the official website of NETmundial (netmundial.br/references). In addition, the very same website provides public access to the web interface of the NETmundial Declaration where all comments made can be tracked paragraph by paragraph including the name of the commenting person and his or her stakeholder group (governments, civil society, academia/technical community and the private sector). A separate report prepared by the executive secretariat provides precise information about the comments received throughout the whole consultation process, detailing the comments’ origins (stakeholder groups), specifying the exact days the comments were made and to which section in the document the comments were dedicated.97 Apart from these meticulous efforts in providing a transparent consultation process, the same report explains the secretariat’s formatting approach and how to read the entire report with comments, track changes and the secretariat’s summaries and recommendations for the final text.98 The official website of NETmundial also provides access to a spreadsheet including a list of all comments made and the exchanges of arguments during the consultation process, a list with information about all participants (including the websites and contact information of every single hub) and

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additional documents such as document proposals by various governments, policy briefs and other contributions from private-sector, civil society and academic organisations to enrich the debate on the development of the outcome document. If all this were not enough, the website also provides transcriptions of the various sessions that took place during the two days of the NETmundial Meeting and complete videos, in several languages (English and multilingual), of the morning and afternoon sessions of the two days which amount to more than 20 hours of video footage of the meeting still accessible as YouTube videos. The one-million-dollar question will be how to implement the NETmundial Declaration and hold governments and corporations accountable to its principles (external accountability). It can be taken for granted that the NETmundial Declaration will not make global Internet governance more democratic and equitable overnight. And without any doubt, many governments and corporations will deliberately ignore the NETmundial principles whenever they can. The value of those principles lies in the fact that for the first time, overarching and legitimate principles were developed to serve as ethical guidelines for progressive states and corporations. At the same time, civil society actors can rely on these principles to exercise pressure on governments and corporations and name and shame them whenever possible. In this sense, the NETmundial Declaration serves as an additional tool for progressive actors to further promote the democratisation of global governance processes related to the Internet. The principal organisers of the NETmundial Meeting – CGI.br and ICANN – had the idea of creating a follow-up process dubbed the NETmundial Initiative. This initiative was intended to serve as a platform to advance the NETmundial principles and stimulate practical multistakeholder cooperation on Internet governance issues. The initiative was chaired by a coordination council composed of 23 members from five different world regions (Europe, North America, Latin America & the Caribbean, Africa and Asia & Oceania) and several multistakeholder groups (governments & intergovernmental organisations, civil society, academia, the technical community & foundations, the private sector). The council held its first meeting on 30 June 2015 in São Paulo, where it endorsed its first two activities, the creation of a NETmundial collaboration platform and the NETmundial solutions map.99 The NETmundial collaboration platform serves as a space for the implementation of project proposals according to the NETmundial principles, most importantly, the involvement of all important stakeholders on Internet governance.100 The NETmundial solutions map serves as a crowdsourced information platform mapping and connecting actors, issues, resources and solutions in global Internet governance as digital networks.101 Ironically, the initiative met with huge resistance from civil society actors accusing the initiative as a top-down process composed of hand-picked people



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from the stakeholder groups which had already played a privileged role in the NETmundial Meeting. In addition, its close relationship with the World Economic Forum, the epitome of top-down, elite and neo-liberal governance and the host of the initiative, undermines the legitimacy of the initiative as a platform to promote principles of equity and justice. As a further aspect, the initiative is questioned for its potentially negative impact on the UN Internet Governance Forum, which was established as a forum to promote bottom-up activities and civil society involvement in Internet governance issues.102 Considering the obviously failed attempt of this initiative to capitalise on the innovative aspects of the NETmundial Meeting, it will be interesting to see how the original logic of the NETmundial Meeting and the resulting principles can be credibly promoted and implemented in the years to come. One credible institution to promote at least one of the NETmundial principles, the right to privacy, is the newly established special rapporteur for the right to privacy in the digital age. Following the revelations of the NSA spying scandal, the Brazilian government pushed for a UN resolution on the right to privacy in the digital age. Together with Germany, Brazil introduced a first draft resolution to the UN General Assembly on 7 November 2013, intended ‘to establish or maintain existing independent, effective domestic oversight mechanisms capable of ensuring transparency, as appropriate, and accountability for State surveillance of communications, their interception and collection of personal data’.103 In protecting the human right to privacy, the resolution reaffirmed Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that ‘no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . recognizing that the exercise of the right to privacy is important for the realization of the right to freedom of expression and to hold opinions without interference, and one of the foundations of a democratic society’.104 In this context, the resolution makes clear that the right to privacy has acquired a new dimension in the digital age. The resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly one month later.105 For the first time, the UN General Assembly affirmed that human rights, which are protected offline, must also be protected online. The resolution was reaffirmed in December 2014 by the UN General Assembly and mandated the new special rapporteur to gather information, report and raise awareness on the state of the right to privacy in UN member states.106 This institution, therefore, represents the first international attempt to monitor, promote, reinforce and raise awareness of the right to privacy of Internet users worldwide and thus hold governments accountable to the NETmundial Declaration. –– Contrary to UNITAID, the Committee on World Food Security and the Open Government Partnership, the NETmundial Meeting represented a one-time event, rather than a fully institutionalised mechanism. Nonetheless, this

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example demonstrates that one-time meetings can also benefit from democratic decision-making mechanisms, which contribute to the promotion of human rights and rely on meaningful participatory structures as well as efficient mechanisms of accountability. After all, this two-day meeting achieved what previous governance mechanisms in global Internet governance failed to do: develop a global Internet Human Rights Charter; set up inclusive participatory mechanisms which gave representatives from academia/technical community, civil society and even ordinary citizens a say in the elaboration of the final document and create an environment of reinforced accountability among the different stakeholder groups. As a result, the final NETmundial Declaration emerged out of an effort of transnational solidarity with citizens and Internet users worldwide to finally elaborate principles for the use of the Internet to be respected by everyone, irrespective of nationality, culture or stakeholder group. And very similar to UNITAID and the Committee on World Food Security, the Brazilian government and its national approach to this issue – the development of the Regulatory Framework – served as an inspiration for the whole process and turned into a key component of the final success of this two-day democratic experiment. To be sure, the implementation of this achievement, the first cosmopolitan norms in global Internet governance, is a different story and will depend on complex collective actions at different levels (local, national and global) involving different stakeholder groups. And it may be decades before an enforceable global framework exists for governments and corporations to respect these principles. Irrespective of the future fate of these principles, it is an outstanding success that they exist at all. And they only do exist because of the democratic decision-making process set up for the NETmundial Meeting. Their existence alone will not guarantee the rights of Internet users. But it can sow the seeds for future democratic progress in Internet governance. NOTES 1 Lemos, ‘Feet on the Ground’, Kindle loc. 2613. 2 Ibid., 2613–29. 3 CGI.br., O CGI.br e o Marco Civil da Internet. 4 Ibid. 5 See its website for the names and professions of the committee’s members. CGI.br, ‘Membros’ http://cgi.br/membros/, accessed 6 March 2017. 6 Oliveira Santos Neto and Santos, ‘A Internet como Ferramenta Colaborativa’, 12. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., 14. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., 15.



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11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Internet Live Stats, ‘Brazil Internet Users’. In 2016, this number rose to 66.4 per cent, while in the same year only 52.2 per cent of China’s population and 34.8 per cent of India’s population had access to the Internet. As a comparison, in countries such as the US, the UK, Japan, France and Germany more than 85 per cent of the population have access to the Internet. For more information, see Internet Live Stats, ‘Internet Users by Country (2016)’, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-usersby-country/, accessed 6 March 2017. 15 Cardoso Sampaio et al., ‘Inovadora e democrática’, 139. 16 Ibid., 141–42. 17 Ibid., 143. 18 Ibid., 142–44. 19 Ibid., 144. 20 Ibid. 21 Oliveira Santos Neto and Santos, ‘A Internet como Ferramenta Colaborativa’, 14–15. 22 Roncolato, ‘Marco Civil’, 6; CGI.br, O CGI.br e o Marco Civil da Internet. 23 Lemos, ‘Feet on the Ground’, Kindle Loc. 2581. 24 Silva, ‘Para onde vai a Internet?’, 6. 25 The public consultation process could be accessed from this website: Ministério da Justiça e Cidadania, ‘Marco Civil da Internet’, http://pensando.mj.gov.br/ marcocivil/, accessed 6 March 2017. 26 See the following website: Ministério da Justiça e Cidadania, ‘Minuta de Decreto’, http://pensando.mj.gov.br/marcocivil/texto-em-debate/minuta/, accessed 6 March 2017. 27 Intervozes, ‘Nota pública da sociedade civil’; Proteste, ‘Marco Civil da Internet está em consulta para regulamentação’; Conde Tresca, Interview, 19 January 2017. 28 Presidência da República, Decreto N°8.771; Zanatta, ‘O que mudou na regulamentação do Marco Civil da Internet?’. 29 Cardoso Sampaio et al., ‘Inovadora e democrática’, 145–47. 30 Klein, ‘The Feasibility of Global Democracy’, 338. 31 Mueller, Networks and States, Kindle Loc. 620; ICANN, ‘Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers’. 32 Mueller, Networks and States, Kindle loc. 658; Hunter, ‘ICANN and the Concept of Democratic Deficit’, 1173. 33 Mueller, Networks and States, Kindle loc. 596. 34 Ibid., Kindle loc. 608. 35 Ibid., Kindle loc. 623. 36 Ibid., Kindle loc. 580. 37 Ibid., Kindle loc. 587. 38 Ibid., Kindle loc. 595–603. 39 Ibid., Kindle loc. 685. 40 Ibid., Kindle loc. 692, 822. 41 Kleinwächter, ‘NETmundial’, Kindle loc. 4785.

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42 Mueller and Wagner, ‘Finding a Formula for Brazil’, 1. 43 BBC, ‘Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff Calls off US Trip’. 44 UN General Assembly, ‘Statement by H.E. Dilma Rousseff’, 2. 45 Varon Ferraz, ‘The NETmundial’, Kindle loc. 556–70. 46 Silva, ‘Para onde vai a Internet?’, 6. 47 The I* organisations include ICANN, IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force), ISOC (Internet Society), RIRs (Regional Internet Registries) and various other technical groups of the Internet governance system. See Kleinwächter, ‘NETmundial’, Kindle loc. 5164. 48 Kleinwächter, ‘NETmundial’, Kindle loc. 5006; Silva, ‘Para onde vai a Internet?’, 6. 49 Silva, ‘Para onde vai a Internet?’, 6; Varon Ferraz, ‘The NETmundial’, Kindle loc. 648. 50 Silva, ‘Para onde vai a Internet?’, 8. 51 Almeida, ‘The Evolution of Internet Governance’, 66. 52 Ibid., 67. 53 Ibid., 66–67. 54 Varon Ferraz, ‘The NETmundial’, Kindle loc. 688. 55 Ibid., Kindle loc. 700. 56 Almeida, ‘The Evolution of Internet Governance’, 66–67. 57 Ibid., 67. 58 Ibid., 66–67. 59 Ibid., 67. 60 Ibid., 67–68. 61 Ten of the international hubs were bidirectional (real-time video and voice interaction), whereas the remaining hubs were unidirectional (limited to real-time voice interaction); three of the hubs were from within Brazil, one of them the ARENA Netmundial, organised by São Paulo’s cultural centre. See Nwakanma, ‘Moving from the NETmundial of Today to the ‘NETmundial+’ of Tomorrow’, Kindle loc. 4704. 62 Almeida, ‘The Evolution of Internet Governance’, 67. 63 Ibid., 68. 64 Ibid. 65 Maciel, Zingales and Fink, ‘The Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance (NETmundial)’. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Silva, ‘Para onde vai a Internet?’, 8. 71 Varon Ferraz, ‘The NETmundial’, Kindle loc. 759–71. 72 Silva, ‘Para onde vai a Internet?’, 8. 73 NETmundial, ‘NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement’, http://netmundial.br/ wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf, accessed 06 March 2017. [Emphasis in the original.] 74 Oliveira Santos Neto and Santos, ‘A Internet como Ferramenta Colaborativa’, 11.



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75 Ibid. 76 Kleinwächter, ‘NETmundial’, Kindle loc. 5062; Silva, ‘Para onde vai a Internet?’, 10. 77 Silva, ‘Para onde vai a Internet?’, 10. 78 Kleinwächter, ‘NETmundial’, Kindle loc. 5062; Silva, ‘Para onde vai a Internet?’, 9. 79 Almeida, ‘The Evolution of Internet Governance’, 68. 80 Cardoso Sampaio, Callai Bragatto and Nicolás, ‘Inovadora e democrática’, 21–23. 81 Almeida, Getschko and Afonso, ‘The Origin and Evolution of Multistakeholder Models’, 78. 82 Varon Ferraz, ‘The NETmundial’, Kindle loc. 671. 83 Maciel, Zingales and Fink, ‘The Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance (NETmundial)’. 84 Internet Society, ‘Call for Nominations’. 85 Maciel, Zingales and Fink, ‘The Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance (NETmundial)’. 86 Ibid. 87 Kleinwächter, ‘NETmundial’, Kindle loc. 5078. 88 NETmundial, NETmundial, 46. 89 Ibid., 46–47. 90 Ibid., 48. 91 Ibid., 50–54. 92 Ibid., 54. 93 Brown, ‘NetMundial’; Donahoe, ‘Dispatches’; Donahoe and Canineu, ‘Brazil as the Global Guardian of Internet Freedom?’; Guillemin, ‘Netmundial’. 94 Brown, ‘NetMundial’. 95 Guillemin, ‘Netmundial’. 96 Donahoe, ‘Dispatches’. 97 NETmundial, NETMundial Draft Outcome Document, 3. 98 Ibid., 8–88. 99 Netmundial Initative, ‘São Paulo Communiqué’. 100 See Netmundial Initiative Collaboration Platform, https://platform.netmundial. org/, accessed 6 March 2017. 101 See Netmundial Initiative Solutions Map, https://map.netmundial.org/, accessed 6 March 2017. 102 Pohle, ‘Multistakeholderism Unmasked’; Mueller, ‘The Not-Mundial Initiative’. 103 UN Resolution, ‘The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’, A/C.3/68/L.45/ Rev.1. 104 Ibid. 105 UN Resolution, ‘The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’, A/RES/68/167. 106 UN Human Rights Council Resolution, ‘The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’, A/HRC/RES/28/16.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

RETHINKING GLOBAL DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL Development challenges of a global scale are redefining and reshaping the global system at the beginning of the 21st century. If global governance mechanisms can be designed to promote people-power by expanding the franchise of actors involved in decision-making processes and thus limiting the potential abuse of power by the dominant states and companies, they can contribute to developing practical solutions to a variety of persisting and novel global challenges. Amartya Sen famously argued that the introduction of a democratic system in India after its independence from the British colonisers contributed to the prevention of famines which had been common in colonial India. Through deliberation and public criticism, Sen observed, people of a more democratic society have the force to embarrass and shame the government if it remains inactive in catastrophic situations such as famines.1 In systems where people lack this freedom, any action depends entirely on the goodwill of the government. Promoting people-power by increasing the franchise of people participating in decision-making mechanisms and thus constraining the abuse of power by the few cannot only contribute to preventing catastrophic disasters such as famines. In the case of Brazil, those democratic structures have also contributed to promoting social justice and deepening democratic values. Brazil remains a deeply unequal country where much too often social justice and democratic values are a privilege of a tiny minority. Over the last 30 years of Brazil’s re-democratisation, a variety of Brazilian actors have developed democratic structures with a focus on deepening people-power and including marginalised citizens in more participatory decision-making mechanisms, be it the participatory budgeting (PB) 183

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programmes, the national response to HIV/AIDS, the Zero Hunger strategy or the development of the Regulatory Framework for the Internet. All these programmes and public policies have promoted people-power in Brazil, which, in turn, resulted in deepening social justice and democratic values. Given their impressive impact, these democratic experiments of people-power have turned into international role models, inspiring UN organisations, governments from the developed and the developing world as well as actors from civil society. These encouraging examples of democratic progress illustrate that even a developing democracy with all its flaws and deficiencies is capable of creating niches for democratic innovation of a kind so impressive that it can inspire the whole world. Even in a society where the majority of its citizens fight an arduous battle, on a daily basis, for more human rights and human dignity, freedom and liberty, respect and tolerance, solidarity and compassion, opportunities emerge for engaged citizens and government officials to join forces and design meaningful participatory structures which may unfold democratic potential beyond the superficiality of vote-casting and the triviality of electoral campaigns. The lesson to be learned from those successful democratic experiments is that a very practical way exists to inject new blood into the veins of a lethargic democratic system. Democracy needs to be understood in its most basic and elementary sense. Those basics are so profoundly rooted in the human nature (and more rudimentarily in the nature of other non-human animals) that every human being, irrespective of culture, religion, nationality and skin colour, is capable of practising them, that is, restraining the abuse of power by the few and increasing the franchise of the people in those decision-making processes affecting them. These fundamental values are neither ‘Western’ nor ‘European’ nor ‘Greek’ nor ‘American’ or whatever term might be invented by some civilisation or society to hijack those values and justify a fantasised stance of moral superiority. Taking the evidence of biologists and anthropologists on the democratic qualities of our nature seriously, it is certainly not wrong to claim that democracy in its most basic form as people-power is a universal value. Therefore, instead of a utopian and idealistic pipe dream, democracy can also serve as a practical solution to global development challenges haunting our human civilisation at the beginning of the 21st century. Democracy, after all, can be a practical solution to existing problems that threaten to tear apart the very fabric of our societies.2 Brazil’s national response to the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s and 1990s represented a very practical solution to a catastrophic problem that threatened Brazilian society as a whole. The Zero Hunger strategy stands for a practical solution to the centuries-long scourge of hunger and poverty in the country that had become a hallmark of Brazil’s misery and underdevelopment as



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a society in the world. The PB programmes that were successful in their democratising effects provided practical solutions to community development and promoted solidarity among citizens and local governments. The development of the Regulatory Framework for the Internet contributed to a reinforced sense of solidarity among the different stakeholders of Brazilian Internet governance with regulations to prevent the abuse of the Internet by powerful companies and the government. In their activities in global governance, Brazilian foreign policy actors have tried to embrace the fundamental logic of those democratic experiments which worked so well in Brazil. All these national policy programmes share several similarities fundamental to their success: (1) a commitment to human rights and social justice, (2) high pressure from civil society actors to get involved in the decision-making process and the development of rights-based solutions and (3) engagement from the government to create participatory mechanisms to integrate civil society actors into decision-making processes. In other words, these policy programmes promoted people-power by including actors from civil society in the elaboration of solutions to development challenges, whose part otherwise would have been severely limited to the passive role of vote-casting in municipal, state or federal elections. The electoral process, however, would not have been a democratic tool strong enough to force government officials to work together with civil society actors and jointly develop solutions which take into account the needs and interests of local (and marginalised) communities, citizens and other actors of civil society. In contrast, these experiments have actively included the voices of those people, organisations and movements affected by particular problems in the elaboration of solutions to those problems. At the same time, these experiments have been capable of forcing government officials to listen to those voices, take them seriously and accept those actors from civil society as legitimate participants in the decision-making process. These democratic experiments also illustrated what can happen when the government does not listen to the voices of civil society or civil society itself is incapable of forcing the government to listen; that is, when due to the failed communication between these two groups of actors, the government is not committed enough to creating meaningful and effective participatory mechanisms. This failure was particularly reflected in the PB programmes when in some municipalities PB programmes were less successful than in others or completely failed. The higher the commitment of the government to creating effective participatory structures and the more effectively civil society actors were allowed to have an impact on the outcome of the decision-making process, the more successful the PB programmes were in promoting social justice, strengthening solidarity among the actors involved and deepening democratic values.

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A PATTERN EMERGES Judging from these experiments, a clear pattern emerges. The more effectively civil society actors are capable of integrating proposals and ideas from communities and citizens affected by a particular problem into the decisionmaking process, the more positively civil society actors can influence the output vis-à-vis government officials in favour of the needs and interests of citizens and local communities. Given the considerable power imbalances between civil society actors and the government tilting clearly in favour of the government, government officials have a weighty role to play in these processes. While civil society pressure certainly is an essential condition to push governments into taking action, it remains insufficient for true transformative change. Transformative progress is only possible if governments are willing to act on civil society demands and committed to building up meaningful participatory structures with the potential to transform decision-making processes into empowering exercises of co-creation and collaboration. Brazil’s response to the AIDS epidemic unfolded such transformative potential because government officials listened to the demands of affected communities to connect treatment with prevention, offer AIDS drugs for free and integrate risk groups such as homosexuals, prostitutes and drug users into a rights-based approach instead of stigmatising them. Brazil transformed itself into a world champion in the fight against hunger and poverty because the government under former President Lula da Silva understood to turn the Zero Hunger strategy, developed by civil society actors, into a guiding government policy. The PB programme in Porto Alegre became known as the ‘Porto Alegre Model’ around the world because the municipal government of Porto Alegre listened to civil society demands and empowered the existing civil society actors and movements through the creation of highly effective and meaningful participatory decision-making processes. And the elaboration of the Regulatory Framework for the Internet was praised internationally as a role model because the former government under Dilma Rousseff took up the demands of civil society for such a framework and used digital tools to make the elaboration of this public policy a citizen-based exercise. Strikingly, a similar pattern emerges at the global level. The cases of UNITAID, the Committee on World Food Security, the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and the NETmundial Meeting demonstrate that the model of participatory democracy can also lead to successful democratising experiences in the global governance system. In terms of direct impact, UNITAID is certainly the most impressive example of all these democratic experiments at the global level. By reducing the prices of drugs for AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and by creating new markets for children’s drugs, UNITAID essentially contributes to the progressive realisation of the human



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right to health and stimulates a sense of transnational solidarity among all the different state and non-state actors involved in this mechanism. With its international flight tax, its community-based projects and the Medicines Patent Pool, UNITAID belongs to the vanguard of innovative developments in global governance, promoting social justice and people-power in the global system. Representatives from NGOs and communities affected by the three diseases actively participate in the decision-making structures of UNITAID together with the representatives of the eight governments involved. While UNITAID certainly takes advantage of neo-liberal ideas, such as in the Medicines Patent Pool, pharmaceutical companies are not represented in the decision-making structures. Instead, UNITAID empowers representatives of affected communities and transnational civil society organisations to propose ideas and their own views to government officials and jointly find solutions which benefit millions of patients, particularly children, infected by those diseases in the developing world. The facts that representatives from civil society and affected communities enjoy full voting rights and that civil society actors have achieved to build up an infrastructure to promote transnational civil society coordination, mobilisation and representation provide them with the opportunity to have a deeply felt impact on the course of action of UNITAID. The Brazilian government has significantly contributed to the success of UNITAID and its rights-based agenda with its national experience, supporting and defending all the key tenets of UNITAID. The focus on civic participation, the reduction of drug prices and the primacy of human rights over patent rights belong to the principal premises of Brazil’s domestic and international approach to AIDS. Thus, it is not surprising that the Brazilian government has turned into a key ally of NGOs and affected communities on the UNITAID executive board. While UNITAID is limited in size and very focused in its work as an operating agency, concentrating on particular niches in the fight against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, the Committee on World Food Security represents a gargantuan effort in the global fight against hunger and poverty. Involving FAO member states and dozens of actors from civil society, the CFS has built up an enormous infrastructure which completely overshadows that of UNITAID. As a further complication, the CFS is not an operating agency but a platform to forge new rules, principles and guidelines in the fight against hunger and poverty. Albeit very different in size, scope and mission, both UNITAID and the CFS share several important similarities. The CFS contributes to the progressive realisation of human rights, the human right to food, and is capable of generating a sense of transnational solidarity among governments, civil society actors and local communities affected by food insecurity. While governments maintain final decision-making power, civil society actors have been included as full participants in the negotiation

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process. This full participation has allowed civil society actors to pressure and challenge governments in a much more efficient way than ever before, that is, from within an intergovernmental body and not from outside as mere observers or consultants. To increase their own accountability and improve their mobilisation and coordination efforts, civil society actors created a highly sophisticated and complex mechanism, the civil society mechanism, which comes close to the idea of a global civil society parliament on food security. In this mechanism, civil society actors go to enormous lengths to represent the interests, needs and concerns of local communities worldwide affected by the consequences of food insecurity, which is caused by the consequences of climate change and the greed of big corporations or governments. The civil society mechanism represents a historic effort in global food security governance to bring the often unheard voices of marginalised and ignored communities to the high echelons of international diplomacy and confront the powerful governments with the interests of the powerless, including family farmers, indigenous communities, landless movements and others, at the negotiation table. This new kind of cooperation between governments and civil society actors has led to the adoption of several innovative documents on how to improve and promote food security policies with a more rights-based agenda. Given the high number of governments involved, it is not surprising that these documents, albeit encouraging in their innovative character, are all based on voluntary commitments. None of those documents forces the governments to implement their content. In the end, the implementation of the Global Strategic Framework; the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security or the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (RAI-principles) will depend on the pro-active stance of progressive and like-minded governments and the untiring efforts of civil society to monitor, review and name and shame intransigent governments. Since no effective tools exist to oblige governments to honour their commitments, the future of the CFS hangs in the balance. The guidelines and principles adopted can serve as guiding cosmopolitan norms and the whole CFS as a cosmopolitan framework for civil society actors and governments worldwide to promote more democratic, rights-based and just food security policy frameworks at the national, regional and local level. But still, given the huge power asymmetries between governments and civil society actors, the future of the innovative and democratic CFS hinges largely on the commitment and goodwill of the governments. While it is clear that the long-term success of the CFS depends on a long list of actors and protagonists, the Brazilian government has certainly distinguished itself as one of those protagonists. The stance of the Brazilian



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delegation in the CFS is very similar to that of Brazil’s government representatives in the context of UNITAID. The position of Brazilian diplomats has been guided by Brazil’s successful National Food and Nutrition Security Framework. Brazilian diplomats defended civil society participation as an essential value in the construction of more rights-based food security policies. They embraced the representation of local and marginalised communities affected by food security issues, supported policies benefitting local communities and on many occasions defended the primacy of human rights over property rights. Very often, several elements and programmes of Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy served as models for the development of food security policies in the CFS. The Brazilian delegation assumed a pro-active role in the CFS from the very beginning. The delegation fought together with like-minded delegations for an ambitious reform document. The Brazilian delegation chaired the negotiations for the Global Strategic Framework. And the delegation contributed with its rights-based stance to the development of the Voluntary Guidelines and the RAI-principles. On several occasions, Brazilian diplomats challenged attempts of hostile delegations to undermine the participatory model of the CFS. Since the future relevance and impact of the CFS largely hinges on the commitment of progressive delegations, civil society actors will depend on strategic allies among the governments to further their cause as well as the democratic spirit of the CFS. The activities of the Brazilian delegation have left no doubt that civil society actors can count the delegation among their key allies to defend the participatory, inclusive and rights-based character of the CFS. The NETmundial Meeting, as the name already suggests, was a two-day meeting in the city of São Paulo in April 2014 and in this respect clearly different from both UNITAID and the CFS as fully institutionalised mechanisms. Nevertheless, as a one-time event the NETmundial Meeting obtained an impressive achievement and allowed its participants to negotiate within two days an Internet Human Rights Charter, an unprecedented success in the history of global Internet governance. This success was made possible due to the specific institutional framework created by the Brazilian organisers, particularly Brazil’s Internet Steering Committee CGI.br. In this respect, the institutional framework of the NETmundial Meeting shares a logic similar to that underpinning UNITAID and the CFS. The Brazilian organisers, inspired by their own experiences gained from the composition of CGI.br and the elaboration of the Regulatory Framework for the Internet, designed an institutional setting which allowed all stakeholder groups in global Internet governance (governments, civil society, the private sector and the academic/ technical community) to fully participate as equal partners in the decisionmaking process and the elaboration of the Human Rights Charter.

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To be sure, the question must be asked how governments and companies can be possibly forced to implement the principles of this Human Rights Charter worldwide. As in the case of the documents adopted by the CFS, the implementation of the Human Rights Charter is voluntary. Nevertheless, the fact that such a Human Rights Charter could be developed and adopted by all participating stakeholders can be celebrated as an important first step. The creation of the position of a special rapporteur for the right to privacy in the digital age, initiated by the governments of Brazil and Germany, can be seen as a first positive step in the post-NETmundial world to monitor the right to privacy worldwide. As in the case of the major documents of the CFS, the Internet Human Rights Charter can also be regarded as a cosmopolitan framework by progressive governments and companies to use its principles as guidance. In the same vein, civil society actors can take advantage of this cosmopolitan framework to put additional pressure on governments and companies to abide by the principles they adopted during the NETmundial Meeting. All these three encouraging democratic experiments have several characteristics written into their DNA. They promote people-power in the global governance system by restraining the abuse of power by the few (powerful governments and companies) and increasing the number of participating non-state actors (organised civil society organisations, social movements, local communities and citizens). All three experiments put forward a more rights-based agenda with rights-based solutions to global challenges. This rights-based agenda was heavily influenced by the full participation of nonstate actors, particularly from civil society, in the decision-making processes. In this sense, the new spirit of participatory decision-making has represented a practical way of overcoming harsh conflicts and deep divides between different state and non-state actors and arriving at a new consensus on how to tackle global challenges. Of course, the implementation of those key documents will prove challenging to the democratic legitimacy and efficiency of the CFS and the NETmundial Meeting. There is no doubt that many governments and companies will ignore and even violate the principles and guidelines contained in these documents. But the value of these democratic experiments resides in the fact that they were actually capable of developing such innovative and exemplary documents in the first place and that they have been extremely efficient in developing rights-based approaches to global challenges. Now, any actor or alliance of actors in global governance, be it at the local, national, regional or global level, can take up these documents and build on their ideas and the democratic processes that made those documents possible. One example refers to the Brazilian-German initiative to create the position of the UN special rapporteur on the right to privacy with the mission to monitor the principle of the right to privacy as stipulated in the Internet Human Rights Charter.



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By contrast, the example of the OGP illustrates what happens to innovative governance mechanisms when meaningful participatory decision-making structures are heavily flawed or absent. In its mission and transnational structure, the OGP promised to become a highly innovative governance mechanism with the potential to establish a new model of democracy promotion. As in the cases of UNITAID, the CFS and the NETmundial Meeting, the OGP principles see the key to this new model in civic participation and the creation of participatory decision-making mechanisms including government officials and civil society representatives. The OGP steering committee, divided into 11 representatives from governments and civil society organisations each, clearly reflects this principle with full participation from civil society actors. The participating governments, however, do not follow this example in their national OGP processes. As a consequence, most of the National Action Plans do not unfold any transformative democratic potential and largely fail to promote social justice. Since meaningful participatory structures comparable to those in the other three democratic experiments are widely lacking, the development of National Action Plans has largely degenerated into a farce. Governments carefully control these processes, keeping civil society actors at bay and circumventing any move from civil society to play a more effective and meaningful role. The Brazilian government is a case in point. Instead of seeking inspiration from the rationale of the successful PB programmes, particularly the ‘Porto Alegre Model’, government representatives have invested their efforts into suffocating effective civic participation. Since the government could have sought inspiration from the Brazilian PB programmes, the government wasted an excellent opportunity to turn into a real democratic protagonist and to become, once again, an ally of meaningful and effective civil society participation and democratic renewal. The structural innovations introduced in the third OGP Action Plan cycle with the co-creation workshops and a more effective civil society working group offered a glimpse of what may be possible in terms of democratic development if the government were completely honest in its commitment to civil society participation. Given the flawed participatory structures and the governments’ reluctance to invest in those structures, the OGP is unable to effectively promote human rights and transnational solidarity. In the same vein, civil society actors are not given sufficient means to effectively hold governments to account and, thus, increase the legitimacy and credibility of the OGP. Figure 7.1 illustrates how UNITAID, the Committee on World Food Security and the NETmundial Meeting were able to create a virtuous circle of people-power in global governance. By building up meaningful participatory mechanisms with the full participation of non-state actors, these mechanisms empowered actors from civil society and local communities to play a vital

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part in the decision-making process vis-à-vis government representatives (and companies). As a consequence, these new actors found themselves in a much more advantageous position to hold governments accountable, strengthening the reputational, internal and external accountability of these mechanisms. These improved accountability structures were additionally compounded by civil society’s efforts to build up their own civil society structures. With these enhanced participatory and accountability mechanisms in place, UNITAID, the Committee on World Food Security and the NETmundial Meeting turned into transnational common projects, developing further existing or creating new human rights norms, advancing rights-based approaches and engendering a sense of transnational solidarity among very different actors. With all the three indicators of people-power (mechanisms of participation, mechanisms of accountability and the promotion of human rights and transnational solidarity) in place, feeding into and constituting one other, the ‘democratic iterations’ of the actors involved turned these mechanisms into cosmopolitan frameworks and their normative output into cosmopolitan

Figure 7.1.  The Virtuous Circle of People-Power in Global Governance



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norms. If, however, one of those indicators is flawed, particularly the indicator of participatory mechanisms, the virtuous circle either breaks down or is not even capable of unfolding its potential in the first place. In the case of the OGP, the flawed participatory mechanisms and the weak empowerment of civil society actors in national OGP processes frustrate major moves towards more robust accountability mechanisms and any significant progress in the promotion of human rights and transnational solidarity. What do the achievements and failures, the strengths and weaknesses of these four democratic experiments suggest about the possibilities of democratising the global governance system? Most significantly, the four case studies tap into the principal characteristics of the current global governance system, which have favoured their very emergence and existence. They take advantage of the polycentric order and the multi-level system of global governance; integrate new actors, particularly from civil society, into their decision-making mechanisms; base their activities on collective action processes; and relate in their agenda to several dêmoi at the local, national and transnational level. Above that, it is the governments which, given their continuing unrivalled dominance in the global system, play a pivotal role in determining the ultimate fate of these mechanisms. All the four mechanisms were called into life by governments. They have been financially sustained by governments. And their democratic success critically depends on the pro-active role of governments. After all, it is the proper states which are largely responsible for the emergence, existence and performance of these mechanisms. While the Brazilian government with all its various actors (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the cases of UNITAID and the CFS, the Ministry of Transparency, Oversight and Comptroller General in the case of the OGP, the Internet Steering Committee CGI.br in the case of the NETmundial Meeting) distinguished itself as one of those pro-active governments in the context of UNITAID, the CFS and the NETmundial Meeting, its activities in the OGP left much too be desired. Despite its weak performance in the OGP, the Brazilian government has clearly demonstrated that developing democracies from the global South have sufficient potential to play a relevant role in the democratisation of global governance. Inspired by several national experiences of participatory democracy, the Brazilian government has contributed to establishing more rights-based and democratic approaches to tackling global challenges. Notwithstanding the crucial role of governments in advancing democratic projects at the global level, there is no doubt that the role of civil society actors in all these four mechanisms cannot be valued highly enough. They are responsible for the constant pressure heaped on the governments; their tireless struggles for mobilisation, coordination and representation; their outreach activities to distant local communities; their monitoring and review activities and their persistent attempts to seek meaningful and effective

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dialogue with government representatives. But given the considerable power asymmetries between governments and civil society actors, their activities ultimately depend on the commitment of the governments. These findings confirm the argument of Seyla Benhabib and others that the states belong to the principal protagonists who helped in democratising the processes and mechanisms of global governance. These democratising tendencies may then eventually lead to the emergence of cosmopolitan norms and a law which ‘binds and bends the will of sovereign nations’.3 In this context, the current global governance system is conducive to the emergence of transnational solidarity through transnational common projects. As institutionalised global governance mechanisms, UNITAID, the CFS and the OGP can create the necessary institutional, financial and ideational resources to constantly involve state and non-state actors from different world regions on transboundary issues – be it the development of and access to essential medicines, food and nutrition security or open government initiatives – and develop transboundary solutions to these issues. In this process, these mechanisms institutionalise transnational solidarity among different state and nonstate actors with distant others which all too often remain unheard in global governance mechanisms, such as those local communities most affected by these transboundary issues. While UNITAID and the CFS have been capable of institutionalising a high degree of transnational solidarity, the OGP has achieved to create some transnational solidarity in a rudimentary form at least – most commonly among civil society actors and more exceptionally among civil society actors and governments. The NETmundial Meeting achieved to generate transnational solidarity in a two-day meeting among a vast number of different stakeholder groups in global Internet governance which resulted in the adoption of an Internet Human Rights Charter. These ‘common projects of transnational solidarity’ may eventually turn into cosmopolitan frameworks with the power to reinforce the democratic sovereignty of a state as long as sovereignty is understood as the ‘the degree to which . . . [states] can fulfill certain human rights obligations toward their populations’.4 This is the case of the CFS and the NETmundial Meeting. Both the CFS and the NETmundial Meeting have generated new cosmopolitan norms which can be taken up by progressive governments to strengthen the human right to food and Internet rights in their countries. Civil society actors, in turn, can use those norms as an additional tool to put more pressure on their governments. The OGP has largely failed to unfold its full potential as a cosmopolitan framework of cosmopolitan norms on open government. UNITAID, due to its nature as an operating agency, does generate products rather than norms such as more effective and cheaper medicines and new medicine markets. However, through its activities as an operating agency UNITAID certainly contributes to the strengthening of the cosmopolitan norms of the human right to health and the human right to access to medicines.



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These four case studies emphasise that the development of democratic practices, the broadening of people-power in global governance, is not an impossible task. On the contrary, it is an arduous, demanding and conflictridden process in which people-power can be progressively increased in collective, and often chaotic, actions. None of these four mechanisms is perfect or immaculate. All of them promote people-power to different degrees. Even the OGP, the weakest of these democratic experiments, is still viewed by participating civil society actors as an opportunity to increase democratic practices on open government initiatives. While the Brazilian government continues to be reluctant to open its highest decision-making body, the Interministerial Committee, to civil society participation and thus transform the Brazilian OGP process into an effective and meaningful democratic exercise, the advances made during the third Action Plan cycle did promote democratic practices and people-power to some extent. The democratic gains made in all four case studies have ultimately been the result of fierce power struggles between governments and civil society actors on the one hand and between more progressive governments and more conservative governments on the other hand. Despite their achievements, these democratic experiments remain utterly fragile, and their future existence ultimately depends on those democratic iterations which made them possible in the first place. BRAZIL’S FUTURE ROLE IN GLOBAL DEMOCRACY Given the fragile collective action processes these democratic experiments are dependent on, it is impossible to predict their future fate. It is, however, possible to have a look at one of the protagonists of these experiments, the Brazilian government. Given Brazil’s significant contributions to those democratic experiments, can we expect more from that country in the years to come? On 31 August 2016, an era in Brazilian politics came to an abrupt end. On that day, the Brazilian Senate concluded a highly controversial impeachment process, officially impeaching then President Dilma Rousseff on charges of fiscal irresponsibility and ending almost 14 uninterrupted years of a Workers’ Party (PT)–led government headed by the Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016).5 Rousseff was succeeded by Michel Temer, her former vice-president and leader of Brazil’s Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), the PT’s major coalition partner in the years in power.6 There is no doubt that in its long time in power, the PT was responsible for several large-scale political corruption schemes, mismanagement of economic and financial resources and, in its final years under Dilma Rousseff, an economic recession of almost unprecedented dimensions in Brazilian history.

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At the same time, there can also be no doubt that in those last 14 years Brazil has become a truly global power with ramifications unprecedented in Brazilian foreign policy. While certainly the economic foundations for this rise to global prominence were laid during the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002), it was the PT-led government under former President Lula da Silva which coined Brazil’s new image as a rising power with global reach.7 And there is more! All four global democratic experiments discussed in this book were launched in that very period. In 2006, it was Lula da Silva, together with his Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, who represented Brazil as one of the founding members of UNITAID. In mid-2016, Amorim became the new chair of the UNITAID executive board. In 2009, Brazil became one of the protagonists of the reform of the Committee on World Food Security and its subsequent achievements due to Lula da Silva’s domestic initiative in the fight against hunger and poverty. In 2003, the Lula government had turned the Zero Hunger strategy into an official government policy which during his presidency became a national and international success story. At the same time, Lula da Silva started a global campaign to fight hunger and poverty, supported by the UN secretary general and other heads of state.8 In 2011, now under his successor Dilma Rousseff, on the invitation of then US President Barack Obama, Brazil became a co-founder of the OGP. In her first few years as president, Rousseff represented herself as a rigorous opponent to Brazil’s endemic political corruption. In addition, the Office of the Comptroller General, the responsible institution for the OGP in Brazil, was created in 2003 by Lula da Silva. It is noteworthy to emphasise that Rousseff was impeached on charges of fiscal irresponsibility, not on charges of corruption. Last but not least, the NETmundial Meeting in 2014 was organised by the Brazilian government in São Paulo due to the initiative taken by Dilma Rousseff as a response to the NSA spying scandal. She had promised to the international community to organise an international meeting where solutions to the challenge of Internet surveillance could be discussed. Most of the democratic experiments in Brazil which actually influenced Brazil’s activities at the global level were also clearly PT influenced. The first PB programmes and the ‘Porto Alegre Model’ in the late 1980s were championed by PT governments. The creation of the World Social Forum, which is also rooted in the experience of the ‘Porto Alegre Model’, was considerably supported by the PT government in Porto Alegre. The Zero Hunger strategy and the resulting National Food and Nutrition Security Framework have very much defined Lula da Silva’s and Rousseff’s years in office. And the collaborative process of the elaboration and regulation of the Regulatory Framework for the Internet (2009–2016) was actively supported by both Lula da Silva and Rousseff.



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It is not necessarily surprising that PT-led governments have championed these experiments of participatory democracy. The PT has traditionally been very close to social movements, civil society organisations, unions and workers’ associations. It is evident that during the PT’s years in power, these traditional bonds were challenged, undercut and at times even demoralised through Lula da Silva’s more market-friendly politics and Rousseff’s difficulty of communicating with social movements. Despite the corruption of the PT during its 14 years in power and the chilling alienation from its roots, social engagement and civic participation continue to be characteristics which distinguish this party from other parties in Brazil. The only innovative approach discussed in this book not championed by the PT was the development of the national AIDS response. Here, the PSDBled government9 can be credited for this success story. It was Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidential decree in 1996 which made AIDS drugs in Brazil available for free. And it was Cardoso’s Minister of Health José Serra, a principal representative of the PSDB in Brazilian politics, who became a key figure in challenging US-based pharmaceutical companies and their high prices of AIDS drugs. To sum up, Brazil’s contribution to more democratic global governance mechanisms was fundamentally supported by PT-led governments. The corruption of the PT, Rousseff’s impeachment and the ultimate end of an era in Brazilian politics have cast dark clouds over Brazil’s future democratic role in global governance. The PT’s crushing defeat in the 2016 municipal elections has caused a new political alignment in Brazilian politics dominated by centre-right governments. While the PT was Brazil’s leading political force during the country’s rise to global prominence, the party is now in tatters. Instead, centre-right parties with neo-liberal, ultraconservative and religiously fundamentalist agendas have come to dominate the Brazilian Congress and Brazilian politics in general. In late 2016, the interim government under Michel Temer adopted a highly restrictive constitutional amendment, foreseeing a 20-year freeze on public spending, including public spending on education, health and welfare.10 It is certainly true that due to the economic mess left by Dilma Rousseff, the new government does not have much leeway and is under enormous pressure to restabilise Brazil’s economy, and spending cuts belong to the tools in the government’s strategy to rescue Brazil’s economy. Nevertheless, the plan to freeze public spending for the next two decades is a devastating sign. Considering that Brazil’s new role in the global system is rooted in innovative social programmes based on public spending, this constitutional amendment may therefore also prove disastrous for Brazil’s foreign policy. On top of that, the new ultra-conservative Congress has made several (so far unsuccessful) attempts to undermine and hollow out the Regulatory

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Framework for the Internet.11 These threats even include attempts by companies to pressure the government into changing the composition of Brazil’s Internet Steering Committee CGI.br so that companies can increase their sway over CGI.br’s decisions vis-à-vis civil society participants.12 Let us remember that the current composition of CGI.br and its important role conceded to civil society (and other stakeholders) was a crucial factor in the organisation and the ultimate success of the NETmundial Meeting. Brazil’s Internet Steering Committee is regarded as a role model in global Internet governance. Changing the power balance in the committee in favour of companies and private interests would have devastating effects on its leadership role at the national and global level. In this light, the question must be asked how seriously the new congressional representatives take the Regulatory Framework for the Internet, the NETmundial Declaration and the position of the special rapporteur on the right to privacy. Laura Conde Tresca, the digital rights officer of the Brazilian Office of Article 19, stresses that with the adoption of the Regulatory Framework ‘we won a battle but the war of the Regulatory Framework continues because there are many proposals for modification’.13 Interestingly though, the new political alignment in Brazil has not translated into major changes of Brazil’s position at UNITAID, the CFS and the OGP.14 While UNITAID came only into being in 2006, Brazil’s rights-based approach in fighting for lower drug prices goes back to the Cardoso government. In addition, this rights-based approach in the fight against AIDS championed by Brazil and others has turned into a broader international consensus over the last two decades; that is, Brazil’s fight for cheaper drug prices has become Brazil’s national foreign policy interest and an opportunity for the Brazilian government to claim international applause and standing ovations. Consequently, Brazil’s position in the access-to-medicines debate has also become a principal pillar in its 21st century foreign policy approach. Any reversal of this approach by a new government would actually hurt Brazilian national interests. Considering the severe spending cuts, it remains to be seen how the government plans to maintain the innovative elements of the Brazilian approach to HIV/AIDS, not least the free distribution of AIDS drugs. In the case of the CFS, Brazil’s rights-based approach is aligned with the general FAO approach to food security and a broader international consensus on food security policies that has emerged over the last decade. In addition, the Brazilian approach is based on one of the most successful national public policies in Brazil’s recent democratic history, the Zero Hunger strategy. In this sense, Brazil’s interest in defending the participatory model of the CFS and rights-based approaches to food security has also become Brazil’s national foreign policy interest, which provides the Brazilian government with another unique opportunity to garner international prestige. In the same vein,



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the rights-based approach to food security has become one of the principal pillars of Brazil’s modern foreign policy. Reversing this position would mean hurting Brazil’s national interest and its international standing in the world. But it would certainly not be the first time for a government to hurt its national interests due to ideological reasons. The Zero Hunger strategy might be well institutionalised and its impressive achievements respected across party lines. This does not mean that Brazil’s National Food and Nutrition Security Framework is safe from any attacks or threats. Brazil’s rights-based approach to food security has competed with a much older and traditional approach in Brazil’s agricultural sector, which has its roots in colonial times. It is the neo-colonial approach of big corporations, large-scale monoculture and the relentless exploitation of natural resources and human beings. The PT-led governments have indeed collaborated with the powerful agribusiness sector and the big-business approach, which is not surprising considering the extraordinary lobbying power of agribusiness in Brazilian politics. But, at the same time, the PT has also built up and consolidated an alternative approach. With the PT pushed out of the presidential palace and gravely decimated in Congress, the door is wide open for conservative politicians, the traditional advocates of the interests of agribusiness, to challenge and undermine this alternative approach. The future of Brazil’s role in the OGP is not really encouraging either. Here, not even the Rousseff government covered itself in glory, largely ignorant of the experiences gained from the PT-led PB programmes at the local level. One of the first steps of Temer’s centre-right government was to downgrade the Office of the Comptroller General and integrate it into a newly created ministry. Given the underwhelming performance of the Brazilian government in the OGP, the current corruption-riddled interim government does not fire the imagination of its future role as a more pro-active, honest and forthcoming actor on open government initiatives. The new political alignment does not inspire much confidence in Brazil’s future democratic activities at the global level. It is probable that the achieved gains, particularly in the context of UNITAID and the Committee on World Food Security, will be maintained. At the same time, it is highly improbable that a Brazilian government can continue to rethink global democracy with a political agenda driven by neo-liberal ideologies which defend overly intrusive spending cuts in the areas of social welfare, health and education; neglect social movements and local communities and attempt to hollow out the democratic progress made in the past. But even if the current or future Brazilian governments cannot be counted on in this endeavour, one thing is certain at last. Brazil’s organised civil society is alive, vibrant and pulsating. Any new ideas, projects and experiments for democratic progress will come from there.

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NOTES 1 Sen, ‘Democracy and Its Global Roots’. 2 See chapter 2. 3 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, 16. 4 Ibid., 113–14. 5 El País Brasil, ‘Posse de Michel Temer após o impeachment de Dilma Rousseff’. 6 The PMDB, a centre-right party, was Rousseff’s most important coalition partner. The PMDB supported Rousseff’s impeachment process. 7 Fraundorfer, Brazil’s Emerging Role in Global Governance. 8 Ibid., 94–101. 9 PSDB stands for Brazilian Social Democracy Party. It is difficult, however, to compare the PSDB with typical social-democratic parties in Europe. First, the PSDB has never boasted any proximity to unions or rights-based civil society movements. Second, the political agenda of the PSDB has always been guided by a clear neoliberal market ideology. 10 Alessi, ‘Entenda o que é a PEC 241 (ou55), e como ela pode afetar sua vida’. 11 See, for example: Soprana, ‘ “Fico triste em saber que o Marco Civil está sob ameaça”, diz precursor da internet’; Lemos, ‘CPI’; Fábio, ‘Quais são as ameaças à internet brasileira, segundo 39 entidades internacionais’. 12 Wiziack, ‘Governo quer mudar regras de comitê gestor da internet’. 13 Conde Tresca, Interview, 19 January 2017. 14 Mansur Tansini, Interview, 8 February 2017; Tonin, Interview, 24 January 2017; Marchezini, Interview, 17 January 2017; Machado, Interview, 19 December 2016; Baker, Interview, 12 September 2016.

Interviews

Those interviews carried out with Brazilian interviewees were held in Portuguese, while the rest of the interviews were held in English. Those interviews held in Portuguese were translated into English by the author. All the interviewees agreed to the use of the interview material in this book. In the same vein, all interviewees gave their permission for their names and affiliation to be included in the book. Baker, Brook. Board Member of the NGO Delegation at UNITAID. Skype Interview, 12 September 2016. Barros, António. Observatório Social de Brasília. Skype Interview, 18 January 2017. Bendrau Sarmento, Francisco. Representative of ActionAid to the FAO (2004–2010) and Representative of the FAO to Portugal and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) since December 2016. Skype Interview, 3 February 2017. Bermúdez, Jorge. UNITAID Executive Secretary (2007–2011). Interview, Rio de Janeiro, 9 October 2012. Burle dos Santos Guimarães, Caroline. NIC.br. Skype Interview, 30 January 2017. Conde Tresca, Laura. Digital Rights Officer of Article 19 Brazil. Skype Interview, 19 January 2017. De Sordi, Neide. Open Knowledge Brazil. Skype Interview, 16 January 2017. Domith Godinho, Renato. Alternate Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN Agencies in Rome (2009–2012). Email Correspondence, 28 October 2015. Domith Godinho, Renato. Alternate Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN Agencies in Rome (2009–2012). Telephone Interview, 4 December 2015. Jakob, Robin. Liaison Officer for the NGO Delegation to the UNITAID Board. Skype Interview, 9 March 2017. Machado, Jorge. Representative of COLAB/USP (Colaboratory of Development and Participation of the University of São Paulo) and Representative of the Sector of Academia in the Civil Society Working Group of Brazil’s National OGP Process. Interview, São Paulo, 6 February 2015. 201

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Machado, Jorge. Representative of COLAB/USP (Colaboratory of Development and Participation of the University of São Paulo) and Representative of the Sector of Academia in the Civil Society Working Group of Brazil’s National OGP Process. Skype Interview, 19 December 2016. Mansur Tansini, Fernanda. Alternate Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN Agencies in Rome (2015–2018). Telephone Interview, 8 February 2017. Marchezini, Joara. Access to Information Officer of Article 19 Brazil. Interview, São Paulo, 29 January 2015. Marchezini, Joara. Access to Information Officer of Article 19 Brazil. Skype Interview, 17 January 2017. Martinez Morales, Emilene. OGP Regional Civil Society Coordinator for Latin America. Skype Interview, 23 January 2017. OGP (Open Government Partnership) Technical Team of the Office of the Comptroller General. Email Correspondence, 27 January 2016. Ross Quiroga, Gracia Violeta. Board Member of the Communities Delegation at UNITAID. Email Correspondence, 10 October 2016. Tonin, Pepe. OGP Technical Team of the Office of the Comptroller General. Skype Interview, 24 January 2017. Vandevelde, Wim. Liaison Officer for the Communities Delegation to the UNITAID Board. Skype Interview, 10 August 2016. Vianna Sakamoto Souza, Candice. Alternate Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN Agencies in Rome (2012–2015). Interview, Campinas, 19 January 2016. Waisbich, Laura Trajber. South-South Cooperation Research and Policy Centre (Articulação SUL) and Brazilian Centre of Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP). Interview, São Paulo, 22 January 2015.

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Index

Note: Page references for figures are italicised. academia, 14, 102, 104, 135, 140, 164, 168 – 69, 175 – 76, 178 academic community, 167, 173 access to medicines, 39, 59, 60 – 61, 63 – 67, 72 – 75, 194; access-tomedicines debate, 59 – 60, 65, 67, 73, 75, 78, 80, 198 accountability, 3, 10 – 13, 18, 25, 37, 47 – 52, 60, 71, 77 – 80, 86, 94, 101, 106, 116 – 18, 127 – 29, 133, 135, 140, 145 – 47, 149, 151 – 54, 156n31, 156n48, 162, 170, 174 – 78, 188, 192 – 93, 192; external accountability, 48, 50 – 51, 77 – 78, 117, 153, 176, 192, 192; internal accountability, 48, 77 – 78, 117, 153, 175, 192; reputational accountability, 48, 51, 117, 152, 192, 192; unaccountability, 129 ActionAid, 38, 92, 94, 108 – 9, 118 Action Plan, 135 – 48, 151, 153, 191, 195 affected communities, 61 – 62, 66 – 67, 70 – 71, 74 – 75, 77 – 81, 112 – 14, 116 – 18, 186 – 87. See also local communities

African Union, 66, 75, 98 Agri-Food Network, 95, 121n40, 122n73 airline ticket tax, 68 – 70, 74, 79. See also flight tax; international tax antiretrovirals (ARVs), xiii, 71 – 73 Article 19, 138, 143, 147 – 48, 174, 198 Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC), xiii, 6, 38 Australia, 92, 97, 99, 148 authorisation, 49 – 50, 175 awareness-raising, 60 – 61, 117 Azerbaijan, 73, 147 – 48 AZT, xiii, 61, 63. See also Zidovudine Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 20, 66, 69 – 70. See also Clinton Foundation; philanthropic foundations bottom-up approach, 169. See also top-down process Brasília, ix, 93, 134, 137, 157n75 Brazilian delegation, 13, 77, 80, 91 – 93, 96 – 97, 99 – 100, 102, 107 – 9, 115, 119, 189

227

228

Index

California, 165 Cameroon, 69 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 61, 132, 196 – 98 CGI.br, xiii, 161 – 62, 165, 167 – 69, 174, 176, 189, 193, 198 child-friendly medicines, 64 Chile, 8, 63 – 64, 69, 75, 99 chimpanzees, 30, 32 citizens, xiii, 3, 6 – 7, 21, 24 – 28, 31 – 35, 39, 43 – 44, 49, 51, 88 – 89, 116, 128 – 32, 139 – 40, 142, 145, 149, 151, 153, 162 – 64, 168, 171, 174, 178, 183 – 86, 190; Athenian citizens, 31; citizenship rights, 131; Citizens’ Institute, 89, European citizens, 24 – 25, 28; global citizenship, 24 – 25; multiple citizenship, 27 – 28; UN citizens’ parliament, 28 civil society actors, 3 – 5, 7, 10 – 11, 14, 19, 21 – 22, 31, 33, 39, 41, 43 – 51, 61 – 62, 67, 71, 74, 76 – 77, 80, 88, 92 – 94, 96 – 97, 103 – 4, 109, 111 – 12, 114 – 15, 117 – 19, 128 – 31, 133, 135 – 36, 138 – 40, 144 – 54, 164, 176, 185 – 91, 193 – 95 civil society organisations, xiii, 3 – 4, 6 – 7, 13 – 14, 19 – 20, 28, 32, 35, 41, 43, 46, 49, 51, 62, 66, 68, 70, 72, 75, 78, 80, 88, 90, 93 – 94, 96, 105, 108, 112 – 15, 119, 134, 138 – 40, 144, 147, 151, 165, 174, 187, 190 – 91, 197 climate change, 1 – 2, 10, 19 – 20, 35, 96, 188 Clinton Foundation, 20, 68, 70. See also philanthropic foundations co-creation workshops, 141, 143, 151, 191 Colombia, 8, 148 Commentpress, 168 comments, 10, 136, 141 – 42, 162 – 64, 167 – 69, 175 Committee on World Food Security, viii, x, xiii, 10 – 13, 18, 20 – 21, 37, 39, 42, 44, 47, 52, 85, 90, 107, 109,

119, 150, 155, 177 – 78, 186 – 87, 191 – 92, 196, 199 community organisations, 7, 128 companies, 9, 10, 20 – 21, 31, 38 – 39, 41 – 42, 48, 59, 61 – 63, 65, 68 – 69, 72 – 75, 80 – 81, 111, 161, 183, 185, 187, 190, 192, 197; construction companies, 9; food companies, 111; pharmaceutical companies, 42, 59, 61 – 63, 65, 68, 72 – 75, 80 – 81, 84n111, 187, 197; transnational companies, 39, 48 con-federalism, 12, 18, 24, 35. See also federalism Congo, 69 cooperation, xiv, 5, 10, 22, 67, 72, 76, 81, 88, 95, 98, 130, 133, 135, 145, 151, 166, 176, 188 cosmopolitanism, 12, 18, 23, 25, 27 – 28, 35; cosmopolitan framework, 33, 154, 188, 190, 192, 192, 194; cosmopolitan norms, 21 – 22, 28, 42, 46, 52, 53n16, 119, 178, 188, 192, 194 Council of Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA), xiii, 87 – 89, 91 – 93, 98, 101 credibility, 19, 45 – 46, 79, 130, 148, 191 decision-making power, 4, 87, 118, 135, 174, 187 democracy, xv, 6, 8 – 10, 12, 17 – 18, 23, 26 – 38, 42 – 44, 52; cosmopolitan democracy, 4, 26 – 27, 29, 36, 55n73; deliberative democracy, 33; democratic deficit, 2, 24; democratic practices, vii – viii, 13, 18, 29 – 32, 34, 36 – 37, 42, 44, 46 – 47, 51 – 52, 60, 73, 86, 109, 119, 127, 148, 154, 172, 195; democratising, vii, 3 – 4, 12, 17, 33, 37, 45, 49 – 50, 185 – 86, 194; dêmoi, 36, 193; dêmokratia, 29 – 31; dêmos, 22, 24 – 27, 29, 36, 49; emerging democracies, 5; global democracy, viii, x, 4 – 6, 8,



Index 229

10 – 12, 14, 18, 23, 32 – 33, 35, 38, 80, 113, 183, 195, 199; kratos, 30; participatory democracy, 10, 42 – 44, 128, 130, 186, 193, 197; polycentric democracy, 5; representative democracy, 31, 42; undemocratic, vii, 2 – 4, 23, 29, 46, 49, 59, 129 developed countries, 1, 43, 59, 67, 128, 149 developing countries, 3, 7, 25, 45, 59, 62 – 63, 72 – 73, 85, 90, 109, 114, 129, 133, 149 domain names, 165 drugs, vii, 7, 20, 41, 59 – 65, 71 – 72, 186, 197 – 98; drug prices, 10, 187, 198; drug users, 60 – 61, 186. See also medicines Ebola, 1, 4, 19, 57n125. See also virus Efavirenz, 63, 65 elite, 9, 24, 31, 35, 37, 177 emerging powers, 6 Europe, ix, 17, 25, 28, 46, 59, 62, 133 – 35, 149, 176 European Union, xiv, 1, 23 – 24, 53n28, 106 the executive, 31 Facebook, 67, 77 – 78, 163. See also Tumblr; Twitter family farmers, 86, 104, 188. See also smallholders federalism, 12, 18, 23, 35 FIAN International, 92, 97, 109 – 10, 113 fight against hunger and poverty, 85, 89 – 90, 121n33, 186 – 87, 196 flight tax, 70, 78, 80, 187 food security, 6, 45, 85, 89 – 92, 94, 96 – 101, 105 – 6, 109 – 12, 114, 117 – 19, 150, 188 – 89, 198 – 99 food sovereignty, xiv, 90, 94, 99 – 101, 123n100 France, 8, 63 – 65, 68 – 70, 75, 80, 92, 95, 107 franchise, 31, 37, 52, 183 – 84

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), xiv, 2 Germany, 8, 92, 95, 102, 177, 190 global challenges, 1 – 4, 10 – 11, 18, 23, 25, 32 – 33, 35, 42, 46, 183, 190, 193 Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 63, 68, 70, 75, 78 global governance, vii, xi, 3 – 6, 10 – 12, 14, 14n3, 17 – 20, 22, 26, 28 – 29, 31 – 33, 35 – 37, 39, 41 – 49, 51 – 52, 85, 90, 103, 111 – 12, 118 – 19, 127, 150, 154, 165 – 67, 173, 176, 183, 185 – 87, 190 – 91, 192, 193 – 95, 197 global order, vii, 2 – 4, 17, 22 – 23, 25, 27 – 29, 35 – 36, 38, 46 global South, 5, 11 – 12, 17, 19 – 20, 28, 41, 43, 44 – 47, 66, 75, 78 – 80, 109, 112, 144, 193. See also South-South cooperation global stage, 10, 17, 28, 33, 44, 60, 85 Global Strategic Framework, the, xiv, 96 – 97, 100 – 102, 104, 106 – 7, 109 – 11, 115 – 17, 119, 188 – 89 global system, 2 – 3, 5 – 6, 17 – 18, 20 – 21, 23, 26, 28 – 29, 35, 40, 42 – 45, 49, 117, 170, 183, 187, 193, 197 government secrecy, 9 – 10, 129, 136 HIV/AIDS, vii, xiii, xv, 7, 10, 12, 20, 43, 59 – 68, 71, 73 – 75, 78, 81, 129, 184, 186 – 87, 197 – 98; AIDS drugs, 7, 59, 61 – 65, 186, 197 – 98; AIDS epidemic, 7, 43, 59 – 60, 129, 184, 186 homosexuals, 60 – 61, 186 humankind, 1, 30 human rights, 4, 8, 10 – 14, 18, 20 – 21, 26, 28, 33 – 34, 36 – 48, 51 – 52, 60 – 63, 73, 80, 86, 100 – 101, 107, 109 – 11, 127, 146 – 48, 161 – 62, 169 – 70, 172 – 74, 177 – 78, 184 – 85, 187, 189 – 94, 192. See also social rights

230

Index

human security, 21, 28, 40. See also state security Hungary, 148, 159n110 inclusive decision-making mechanisms, 37, 178 inclusive decision-making process, 35, 91, 118 inclusive governance mechanisms, 46, 112, 115 inclusive governance structures, 106, 108 inclusive government practices, 20 inclusive participation, 35, 47, 109 individual experts, 5, 10, 21 Indonesia, 8, 133, 136, 149 influence, 5, 18, 20, 22, 24, 42 – 45, 50, 61, 76, 96, 111, 114, 129, 131, 138, 143, 152, 165, 170, 186, 190, 196 information-sharing, 60, 76 injectable artesunate, 71 intellectual property rights, 34, 59, 61 – 62, 65, 72, 74 – 75, 100 intergovernmental organisation, 18 – 19, 33, 176. See also international organisations International Criminal Court, 4, 19, 22, 28 International Monetary Fund, xiv, 2 international organisations, xiv, 2 – 6, 17, 20, 24, 32, 49, 51, 70, 85, 90, 95, 99, 111, 119, 134, 167 – 69 International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty, xiv, 90, 94, 101, 121n32 international system, 5, 17, 19, 21, 29, 32, 37, 80 international tax, 38, 68 – 69, 82n52 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, xiv, 165 Internet Governance Forum, xiv, 166, 177 Internet users, 39, 161 – 62, 170, 173 – 74, 177 – 78, 179n14 Italy, 92, 148

the judicative, 141 – 42 justice, 7, 11, 17, 26, 28, 34, 37, 44, 61 – 62, 128 – 29, 131, 149 – 51, 183 – 85, 187, 191 Kant, Immanuel, 23. See also Perpetual Peace Kenya, 148 Latvia, 148 La Via Campesina, 38, 94, 97 the legislative, 31, 142 legitimacy, 22, 39, 49, 88, 103, 109 – 10, 112 – 13, 130, 170, 177, 190 – 91 local communities, 3, 34 – 36, 44, 49, 51, 68, 72, 77 – 78, 104, 106, 114, 116, 119, 186 – 91, 193 – 94, 199 London, 66, 134 Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio, 64, 86, 195 Madagascar, 69 malaria, 19 – 20, 41, 63, 66 – 67, 71, 73, 75, 81, 186 – 87. See also neglected diseases Malawi, xiv, 70 – 71, 148 Mali, 69 marginalised citizens, 49, 183 marginalised communities, 42, 130, 185, 188 – 89 marginalised groups, 35, 128 marginalised neighbourhoods, 7 marginalised voices, 33, 114 Mauritius, 69 mayoral leadership, 129 meaningful participation, 43, 45, 140, 145, 151 – 52, 170, 173, 191 medicines, 39, 42, 59 – 68, 72 – 75, 78, 80 – 81, 194, 198 Medicines for Malaria Venture, xiv, 20, 41, 71 Medicines Patent Pool, xiv, 72, 74 – 75, 78, 80, 187 Merck, 63, 65, 72 Mexico, 99, 102, 133, 149 Mexico City, 134



Index 231

Mine Ban Treaty, 4, 19, 22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 64, 93, 163, 168, 193 Ministry of Transparency, Oversight and Comptroller General, 137, 142, 193. See also Office of the Comptroller General monitoring, 13, 22, 43 – 44, 48, 51, 67, 71 – 72, 87, 95, 98 – 101, 104 – 7, 117, 130, 145 – 47, 149, 153, 164, 193 Montenegro, 148 multistakeholder, 10, 13, 33, 98, 103, 105, 137, 166, 168 – 73, 176 See also stakeholder municipal budget, 7, 128 municipal governments, 128 – 29, 131, 151 municipalities, 7, 128, 130 – 32, 140, 185 National Food and Nutrition Security Framework, xv, 7, 88, 93, 98, 189, 196, 199 national interests, 17, 109, 198 – 99 neglected diseases, 10, 19 – 20, 41 neo-colonial, 2 – 3, 17, 199 neo-imperial, 2 – 3, 17 neo-liberal, 28, 34, 37, 41 – 43, 47, 110 – 11, 177, 187, 197, 199 nepotism, 9 NETmundial Declaration, 172 – 73, 175 – 78, 198 NETmundial Meeting, viii, xi, 11 – 12, 14, 18, 20 – 21, 37, 39, 42, 44, 47, 52, 161 – 62, 164 – 65, 167 – 68, 170 – 74, 176 – 78, 186, 189 – 94, 196, 198 networks, 1, 3, 18 – 21, 26, 29, 35, 40 – 41, 48, 62, 76, 81, 110, 128, 134 – 36, 144, 176; networked, 5, 39, 47; transnational advocacy networks, 3, 19 – 20, 35, 41 NGOs, xv, 5 – 6, 20, 60 – 61, 66 – 68, 74 – 75, 79, 81, 95, 101, 114, 119, 145 – 46, 148, 171, 187 Niger, 69

non-state actors, 5, 11, 19 – 21, 28, 33, 35 – 36, 39, 41 – 42, 44 – 45, 47 – 52, 68, 74 – 75, 79, 111, 114, 119, 136, 165 – 66, 173, 175, 187, 190 – 92, 194 Norway, 15n35, 63 – 64, 70, 75, 95, 133, 149 NSA spying scandal, 166, 177, 196 Nuremberg Trials, 21 Obama, Barack, 132 – 33, 136, 196 Office of the Comptroller General, 13, 137 – 39, 141 – 42, 144, 146, 151, 196, 199 offline, 170 – 71, 177 online, 132, 136 – 37, 139 – 40, 162 – 63, 168 – 73, 177 open government, viii, xiii, 13, 39, 127 – 28, 132 – 41, 143 – 44, 146 – 47, 149 – 52, 154, 194 – 95, 199 Open Government Declaration, 134, 149 Open Government Partnership, viii, xi, xv, 10, 18, 20 – 21, 37, 39, 42, 44, 47, 52, 127, 132 – 33, 136, 138, 148 – 49, 177, 186 Open Knowledge Brazil, 143 Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, 65 Oxfam, 38, 62, 67, 70, 75, 90 – 91, 94 – 95, 107, 109 – 10 paradigm, viii, xi, 128, 132, 150, 152 Paris, 69, 77, 134, 136, 142 participation, xiii, xv, 7, 11, 24, 32, 34 – 35, 39, 42 – 45, 47, 49 – 51, 66 – 67, 72, 75, 79 – 80, 86 – 87, 89, 91 – 96, 98, 100 – 103, 106, 109 – 17, 129, 131, 133 – 34, 137 – 41, 143, 145 – 54, 163 – 65, 170 – 71, 173 – 74, 187 – 92, 192, 195, 197; participatory budgeting, viii, xv, 7, 10, 13, 35, 43, 127 – 28, 130, 183 – 84; participatory budgeting programme, viii, 7, 10, 13, 35, 43, 127 – 28, 183 – 84; participatory councils, 61; participatory mechanisms, 10 – 12,

232

Index

18, 43, 128, 149 – 50, 152, 162, 178, 185, 191, 193 Perpetual Peace, 23. See also Kant, Immanuel Peru, 108, 148 philanthropic foundations, 5, 20, 66, 70, 74 – 75 Philippines, 133, 149 polis, 30 – 31 political corruption, 9, 62, 136, 195 – 96 political will, 46 – 47, 89, 129, 131, 155 Porto Alegre, xv, 6 – 7, 35, 128 – 32, 186, 191, 196 power, 2 – 5, 10 – 11, 17 – 24, 26 – 27, 30 – 32, 34 – 35, 37 – 38, 42 – 45, 47 – 52, 68, 79 – 80, 94, 103, 111, 114, 117, 129 – 30, 143, 152, 165, 170 – 71, 173 – 74, 183 – 86, 188, 190, 194 – 99; abuse of power, 30 – 31, 37 – 38, 52, 173, 183 – 84, 190; decision-making power, 4, 87, 118, 135, 174, 187; disempowerment, 50, 153; empowerment, xiv, 50, 116, 129, 145 – 46, 152 – 53, 175, 193; people-power, vii, 12, 18, 24, 29 – 30, 34 – 37, 51 – 52, 183 – 85, 187, 190 – 92, 192, 195; power politics, 4, 14, 17; power-sharing, 31 Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems, xv, 96, 105, 110 – 11, 188 prostitutes, 60 – 61, 186 public consultation process, 138, 140 – 41, 162 – 64, 171 public resources, 128, 135, 139

Rio Grande do Sul, 132 root server computers, 165 Rousseff, Dilma, 7 – 9, 70, 90, 136 – 37, 142, 161, 164, 166, 186, 195 – 97 rules, 18, 20, 26, 36 – 37, 48, 130 – 31, 151, 164, 166, 170, 187

Regulatory Framework for the Internet, viii, 7, 10, 13, 43, 161 – 62, 167, 184 – 86, 189, 196, 198 Republic of Korea, the, 66, 69, 75 review, 13, 48, 51, 67, 70, 95, 97, 104, 116 – 17, 134, 136, 140, 143, 148, 153, 169, 188, 193 rights-based approach, 7, 38, 63, 74, 96, 101, 103, 105 – 6, 110 – 11, 118 – 19, 164, 186, 190, 192, 198 – 99

technical community, 10, 161 – 62, 167 – 69, 173, 175 – 76, 178, 189 Temer, Michel, 9, 137, 142, 195, 197, 199 top-down process, 176 transformative potential, 129 – 32, 151 – 54, 186, 191 transnational law, 21 – 22, 28, 42, 52 transnational networks, 40, 48

São Paulo, ix, xi, 21, 60 – 61, 131, 136, 138, 141, 156n45, 161, 164, 167 – 69, 171, 174, 176, 180n61, 189, 196 Slovakia, 148 smallholders, 95 – 96, 98 – 100, 104, 106, 108 – 12, 114 Snowden, Edward, 166 social movements, 3, 5 – 7, 20, 22, 28, 32, 35, 38, 40 – 41, 43 – 45, 49,60, 88, 105, 111, 114, 129, 190, 192, 197, 199 social rights, 11, 89 South Africa, xiii, xiv, 5, 15n20, 133, 149 South-South cooperation, 5, 98 sovereignty, 20 – 23, 27 102, 130, 194 Spain, 66, 70, 75, 95 stakeholder, 33 – 34, 36, 49 – 51, 72, 75, 78, 80, 90 – 91, 93 – 94, 96, 98, 104 – 5, 107 – 8, 134, 161 – 62, 165 – 78, 185, 189 – 90, 194, 198. See also multistakeholder state actors, 5 – 6, 20, 46 – 47, 51, 99, 119 state security, 21 stigmatisation, 60 – 61 subnational, 135 – 36, 142 Superior Electoral Court, 141 – 43



Index 233

transnational solidarity, 11 – 13, 18, 37, 39 – 42, 45 – 47, 51 – 52, 60, 73 – 74, 80, 86, 109, 111, 113, 119, 127, 148, 150, 154, 172 – 73, 178, 187, 191, 192 – 94, 192 transparency, xiii, xv, 48, 50, 79, 87, 95, 101, 116, 128, 131 – 33, 136 – 38, 140 – 42, 146 – 49, 151, 169 – 70, 172, 177, 193 TRIPS Agreement, xv, 62 – 63 TRIPS flexibilities, 63, 67, 73 tuberculosis, xv, 19 – 20, 41, 63, 66, 68, 75, 186 – 87. See also neglected diseases Tumblr, 163 Turkey, 147 – 48 20th century, 2, 19 21st century, 1 – 3, 17, 19, 149, 183 – 84, 198 Twitter, 67, 77, 163 Ukraine, 148 UNAIDS, xv, 21, 68, 70, 78 UN General Assembly, 21, 23, 133, 135, 149, 166, 177 UNITAID, vii, x, xv, 10 – 13, 18, 20 – 21, 37, 39, 42, 44, 47, 52, 59 – 60, 63 – 81, 150, 155, 177 – 78, 186 – 87, 189, 191 – 94, 196, 198 – 99

United Kingdom, the, 8, 63 – 64, 70, 75, 133 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, xv, 21, 26, 39, 149, 172, 177 universal values, 25, 149 UN system, 17, 19, 24, 99, 166 UN World Summit on the Information Society, xv, 166 victimisation, 60 – 61 virus, xiv, 1, 4, 19, 59 – 60, 66 Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, xv, 96, 101, 188 Western powers, 2 – 3 Westphalian, 18 – 20, 23, 28 – 29 Workers’ Party, xv, 9, 130, 195 World Bank, 2 – 3, 37, 72, 101 World Economic Forum, 6, 177 World Health Organisation, xv, 19 World Social Forum, 6 – 7, 28, 35, 38, 43, 45, 128, 196 world state, 5, 12, 18, 24 Zidovudine, xiii, 61, 63