Responding to Violent Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises: A Guide to Participants [1 ed.] 3030594629, 9783030594626

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Responding to Violent Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises A Guide to Participants Edited by Pamela Aall · Dan Snodderly

Responding to Violent Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises

Pamela Aall · Dan Snodderly Editors

Responding to Violent Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises A Guide to Participants

Foreword by Jane Holl Lute

Editors Pamela Aall United States Institute of Peace Washington, DC, USA

Dan Snodderly United States Institute of Peace Washington, DC, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-59462-6 ISBN 978-3-030-59463-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59463-3 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Maram_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Over the past several decades, the international community has learned many lessons from military and humanitarian interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among other places. Foremost among these lessons might be the importance of grounding international engagement in the understanding that no single organization or government can do all that needs doing, and that successful engagement always entails a collaboration of effort among numerous and quite different institutions that frequently operate in separate spheres. The complexity of international interventions is also reflected in the increased tendencies of donor governments and international organizations to act in partnership with host country government institutions and civil society. The nature of violent conflict continues to evolve, with the growing role of non-state actors and a general proliferation of organizational presences in the field. The challenges grow more difficult by the day, as peacekeepers and humanitarian workers alike struggle with their tasks in the midst of a global pandemic—Covid-19—now sweeping the globe, afflicting the vulnerable and able alike. In response to these challenges, the field of peacebuilding has evolved through lessons learned, new technological developments, and the changing nature of violent conflict. It has expanded its scope to include relief, protection of human rights, trauma-healing services, repatriation

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FOREWORD

of refugees and resettlement of internally displaced persons, and aid for economic reconstruction. At the same time, the humanitarian field has incorporated conflict resolution and peacebuilding into its programming. The practice of peacekeeping has also come under pressure in recent years as well, with heightened expectations, broadened mandates, demands for enhanced effectiveness, and continued reform efforts. One of the most important lessons learned is that the major groups involved in peacebuilding—international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, civilian government agencies, and militaries—come from very different cultures. They do not always understand each other. While substantial efforts have been made to increase cooperation and collaboration among these groups, given the serious challenges and the constantly changing cast of characters in the field and at headquarters, there is still a long way to go. In my experience at the United Nations and for the U.S. government, the need for effective, collaborative responses to these crises remains critical. At this writing, the United Nations estimates that 168 million people need help and protection in crises. The Covid-19 pandemic will increase that number dramatically. This book is part of the solution by helping the principal institutions carry out their missions, in ways that are both more informed and more effective. Washington, USA

Jane Holl Lute Special Envoy for the UN Secretary-General on the Cyprus Dispute

Jane Holl Lute is special envoy for the United Nations secretary-general on the Cyprus dispute and previously served as UN assistant secretary-general for peacekeeping. While at the United Nations, she also led the Office of Peace Building Support and the Department of Field Support. Lute served as U.S. deputy secretary for homeland security and on the National Security Council staff under presidents George H. W. Bush and William Clinton. She had a distinguished career in the United States Army, including service in the Gulf during Operation Desert Storm. She holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University and a J.D. from the Georgetown University Law Center. Lute is a member of the Board of Directors of the Center for Internet Security and the Atlantic Council.

Preface

Responding to Violent Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises is a substantially revised and updated edition of the Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations, published by USIP Press in 2007. That book was itself a substantial revision of an earlier book, Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations, published by USIP Press in 2000. In an online survey conducted by Jim Ruf and Kelly Mader-Schonour in 2018, respondents overwhelmingly supported publication of a new edition, and we gathered the current team to complete that task. We have changed the book’s title to reflect changes in the international environment and the fact that all the chapters have been extensively, if not entirely, rewritten.

Audience This guide is designed primarily for those serving in the field, but it should also be helpful to headquarters personnel, as well as military and agency trainees and university students. Furthermore, previous editions were added to the reading lists of a number of undergraduate courses in conflict resolution, security studies, and international relations, and were also used in military training institutions.

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What’s New in This Edition All the sections of this edition have been substantially revised to reflect current conditions and the latest research on best practices. Specific changes to each part are noted below. Chapter 1, Introduction, describes the purpose of the book and looks at the on-again off-again nature of the international community’s response to conflict and crises over the years, the evolving nature of conflict, and the continuing need for international actors to understand and learn how to work most effectively with other actors operating in the same space. Chapter 2 on International Organizations describes the three types of international organizations: the United Nations system, regional and sub-regional organizations, and other intergovernmental organizations outside the UN system that are built upon cultural, linguistic, religious, or historic ties, as well as international humanitarian organizations. We have expanded the material on regional and sub-regional organizations and on intergovernmental organizations outside the UN system. We have also provided a comprehensive overview of the various types of UN peace operations (in addition to peacekeeping operations), including political missions, police missions, and human rights missions. Chapter 3 on NGOs describes non-governmental organizations that respond to humanitarian emergencies, natural disasters, and violent conflicts and provide peacebuilding, long-term development, and advocacy. It provides basic information regarding the structure, staff and missions of NGOs found in peace, stabilization, and relief operations. We have added a discussion of the growth of civil society as an important component of peacebuilding as well as the challenges of on-theground coordination among the NGO community and between NGOs and other civilian and military actors. Chapter 3 also discusses the difference between neutrality and impartiality in terms of humanitarian assistance, as well as the pros and cons of NGO activity and the issues being debated within the NGO world itself. Chapter 4 on Civilian Government Agencies describes the array of U.S. government agencies encountered on the ground in peace and relief operations including the traditional foreign affairs departments— State, USAID, Defense, Commerce, and Agriculture—but also Treasury, Justice, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services. Although

PREFACE

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this chapter deals mostly with U.S. agencies, it also includes sections on agencies in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Japan, and Canada. In addition, we have focused on efforts to improve the capacities of civilian agencies in complex operations. We have added new material on the legal authorities and appropriations constraints that agencies operate under, coordination across agencies, and monitoring and evaluation, as well as a section on humanitarian response under USAID’s general direction. Chapter 5 on The U.S. Military retains the focus on the values, culture, organizational structure, and doctrine of the U.S. military, but has been updated to reflect the military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially the increasing use of private security contractors in peace and stabilization operations. In addition to describing the functional and geographic commands, as well as the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, and (briefly) Space Force services, the chapter covers such key information as how to “read” a military uniform, types of military funding and appropriate uses, and the best ways to interact with the U.S. military. These five chapters do not reflect the entire universe of third party participants that respond to conflict in fragile states. Nor do they cover the important contribution of local actors, both official and non-official, in bringing peace. Because they are operating in the same environment, however, the book should be as useful to these other parties as it is to U.S. military and civilians, UN officials, and NGO staff. Washington, USA

Pamela Aall Dan Snodderly

Acknowledgments

Like many books, this one has a long and complicated history, and that means many people have contributed, in one way or another, to its development and publication. When we first visited the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) in Carlisle, PA, in 1996, we were planning on discussing ways we might collaborate on educational projects including a book. We never dreamed we would be working on a completely revised, updated, and renamed version of that book 20 years later. This long journey began in 2000 with publication of the Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations (USIP Press), conceived of and designed by Dr. Judith Stiehm of Florida International University, at that time a visiting professor at PKI, and Pamela Aall, then director of education at USIP. The authors were Thomas Weiss, City University of New York, on intergovernmental organizations; Lt. Col. Daniel Miltenberger, PKI, on the military; and Pamela Aall on NGOs. A second edition, expanded to include civilian agencies and entitled Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations (USIP Press), was published in 2007. The volume editor was Robert Perito, a former U.S. Foreign Service officer and director for security sector governance at USIP, working with a steering committee that consisted of Col. John Agoglia, PKSOI (PKI had added Stability Operations to its name); Christopher Hoh, U.S. Department of State; Dawn Calabia, UN Information Center; Roy Williams, Center for Humanitarian Cooperation; and Karen Guttieri, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The present volume, now entitled Responding to Violent Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises: A Guide to Participants, was similarly the work of many hands. In the early stages of development, many people at the U.S. Institute of Peace were very helpful in moving the project forward. Special thanks go to Rusty Barber, Beth Cole, Annie Davies, Mike Dziedzic, Ted Feifer, Amanda Fogle-Donmoyer, Jake Harris, Julia Hurley, Mike Lekson, Alli Phillips, Cecilia Stoute, Nina Sughrue, Amb. William Taylor, Richard Walker, Abiodun Williams, and Demis Yanco. Thanks also go to PKSOI’s Jim Embrey, Mike Esper, and Stefan Weber (German liaison officer at PKSOI), and to USIP military fellows Rob Phillips, Eric Vanek, and Barian Woodward. Particular thanks are due to Bill Flavin, former assistant director at PKSOI, who was with us from the beginning, and Scott Braderman, formerly at PKSOI but now at the Army War College, for shepherding the military chapter to its successful conclusion. Two PKSOI interns contributed significantly to the restructuring of the military chapter, Stephen Spinder of Shippensburg University and Kpatcha Massina of Norwich University. We also recognize the contribution of UNICEF’s Trevor Clark who gave us wise feedback at a critical juncture. Finally, at Palgrave Macmillan, we own a deep debt of gratitude for the fine work of executive editor Anca Pusca, project coordinator Manikandan Murthy, and Sham Anand, project manager for Palgrave book production.

Contents

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1

Introduction Pamela Aall and Dan Snodderly

2

International Organizations Jonas Claes

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3

Non-Governmental Organizations Pamela Aall and Jeffrey W. Helsing

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4

Civilian Government Agencies Lauren Van Metre

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5

The U.S. Military Jim Ruf, Kelly Mader-Schonour, Stephen Spinder, and Kpatcha Massina

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For More Information

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Index

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Notes on Contributors

Pamela Aall is senior advisor for conflict prevention and management at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and previously headed the Institute’s education and training programs. She also teaches at American University, serves on the board of Women in International Security and is a member of the World Refugee Council. She has co-authored and co-edited a number of books on conflict resolution including International Negotiation and Mediation in Violent Conflict (2018), written with Chester Crocker and Fen Hampson. They are also the editors of a forthcoming book on peace and conflict diplomacy in the current international environment. Jonas Claes is policy officer on early warning and conflict prevention, European External Action Service, European Union, Brussels. At EEAS he advises on conflict sensitivity and supports EU conflict analysis and prevention efforts as part of the Conflict Prevention and Mediation Support division (ISP.2). Previously he coordinated applied research, training, and fieldwork on the prevention of election violence at USIP. Claes is also the editor of Electing Peace: Violence Prevention and Impact at the Polls (2016). Jeffrey W. Helsing was formerly head of USIP’s Academy, including its education and training programs and curriculum development. In his three decades of conflict resolution education and training globally, he has worked with NGO staff, educators, and students and young leaders, particularly in the Middle East. He is co-editor of Human Rights and Conflict (2006). xv

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Kelly Mader-Schonour is a senior program specialist at USIP. Her work on the Civilian–Military Relations program focused on bringing a range of actors together to troubleshoot communication and coordination issues in complex emergencies. She has developed instructional tools for both the Department of State and the Department of Defense. She also codesigned and delivered a course on Civilian–Military Relations at West Point. Kpatcha Massina currently works as an environmental security fellow at the Center for Global Resilience and Security at Norwich University. He is an international studies major and a rising senior at Norwich and was an intern at the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Colonel Jim Ruf (ret.) was formerly USIP’s senior program officer for civil-military affairs. He joined USIP after completing a 32-year assignment in the U.S. Army as a civil affairs officer, including deployments to Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Previous positions have included Provincial Reconstruction Team commander, Jalalabad, Afghanistan; deputy commander of the 352d Civil Affairs Command; and assignments at the Peace keeping and Stability Operations Institute and the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Dan Snodderly is an editor and publishing consultant in Washington, DC. He served as USIP’s director of publications from 1993 to 2004, and previously worked as an editor at Cornell University Press and Encyclopaedia Britannica. He is the author and editor of numerous articles and three books, the most recent of which is Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding (2d ed., 2018), now also available in Arabic, French, and Spanish editions. Stephen Spinder was an intern at the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. He graduated from Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania in 2016 with a B.A. in international studies with concentrations in global political relations and Middle Eastern affairs. Lauren Van Metre is a senior advisor for peace and security at the National Democratic Institute and also serves as an associate fellow at Louvain University and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. She has held a variety of positions in government, including in the Kosovo Peace Implementation Office, U.S. Department of State; and the Office for International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Van Metre is also an adjunct professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

Abbreviations

International Organizations (IOs) ASEAN AU CARICOM CIMIC CMCoord DFS DPA DPKO ECOSOC ECOWAS EU FAO G-7 GCC IBRD ICC ICJ ICRC ICSID ICTR ICTY IDA

Association of Southeast Asian Nations African Union Caribbean Community and Common Market Civil-Military Cooperation (Humanitarian) Civil-Military Coordination Department of Field Support, UN Department of Political Affairs, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Economic and Social Council, UN Economic Community of West African States European Union Food and Agriculture Organization Group of Seven Gulf Cooperation Council International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank Group) International Criminal Court International Court of Justice International Committee of the Red Cross International Center for the Settlement of International Disputes (World Bank Group) International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Development Association (World Bank Group) xvii

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ABBREVIATIONS

IFAD IFC IHL IMF IOM MIGA NATO OAS OCHA OECS OHCHR OIC OSCE POC R2P RC SADC SRSG UN UNDP UNESCO UN-Habitat UNHCR UNICEF UNODC WFP WHO WPS

International Fund for Agricultural Development International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group) International Humanitarian Law International Monetary Fund International Organization for Migration Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (World Bank Group) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organization of American States Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Organization of East Caribbean States Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Organization of the Islamic Conference Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Protection of Civilians Responsibility to Protect (sometimes RTP) Resident Coordinator Southern African Development Community Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UN United Nations United Nations Development Program United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization United Nations Human Settlements Program (Office of the) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime World Food Program World Health Organization Women, Peace and Security, UN agenda

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) AFSC ARC CARE CMG CRS ICG IRC IRI LWR MCC MCI

American Friends Service Committee American Red Cross Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere Conflict Management Group Catholic Relief Services International Crisis Group International Rescue Committee International Republican Institute Lutheran World Relief Mennonite Central Committee Mercy Corps International

ABBREVIATIONS

MSF NDI NED OIC SAWSO USCRI

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Médecins Sans Frontières National Democratic Institute for International Affairs National Endowment for Democracy Organization of Islamic Cooperation Salvation Army World Service Office U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants

Civilian Government Agencies CDC CMC CMM COM CSO CSSF DART DATT DEA DFID DOD DOJ DOS DRG DRL FAS FBI FCO FFP ICITAP INL MCC MOD OFDA OIA OPDAT OTI PRM SU USAID USDA USIP

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. (Office of) Civilian-Military Cooperation, USAID (Office of) Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID Chief of Mission (Bureau of) Conflict and Stabilization Operations, State Conflict, Stability, and Security Fund, UK Disaster Assistance Response Team Defense Attache Drug Enforcement Administration, Justice Department for International Development, UK Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of State, U.S. (Center of Excellence on) Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, USAID (Bureau of) Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, State Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA Federal Bureau of Investigation, Justice Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK (Office of) Food for Peace, USAID International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, Justice (Bureau of) International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, State Millennium Challenge Corporation, U.S. Ministry of Defence, UK Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID Office of International Affairs, Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training, Justice Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID (Bureau of) Population, Refugees, and Migration, State Stabilisation Unit, UK U.S. Agency for International Development United States Department of Agriculture United States Institute of Peace

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ABBREVIATIONS

U.S. Military AFFOR ANG AOR APC ARFOR ARG ARNG C3 or C3 CA CAG CERP CivMil CJCS CJTF CLT CMC CMO CMOC CNO COCOM CRSV CS CSA CSAF CWO DCU EOD ESG FDR FHA FP GCC HCA HDR HN I/R IW JCMOTF JCS JFCOM JIACG

Air Force Forces (of a combatant command) U.S. Air National Guard Area of Responsibility Armored Personnel Carrier Army Forces (of a combatant command) Amphibious Ready Group U.S. Army National Guard Command, Control, and Communications Civil Affairs Civil Affairs Group Commander’s Emergency Response Program Civilian–Military Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Combined Joint Task Force Civil Liaison Team Commandant, Marine Corps Civil–Military Operations Civil–Military Operations Center Chief of Naval Operations Combatant Command Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Combat Support Chief of Staff, Army Chief of Staff, Air Force Chief Warrant Officer Desert Camouflage Uniform Explosive Ordinance Disposal Expeditionary Strike Group Foreign Disaster Relief Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Force Protection Geographic Combatant Command Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Humanitarian Daily Rations Host Nation Internment and Resettlement Irregular Warfare Joint Civil–Military Operations Task Force Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Forces Command (combatant command) Joint Interagency Coordinating Group

ABBREVIATIONS

JIATF JTF MAGTF MARFOR MARO MEB MEF MEU MOOTW MP NAVFOR NBC NCO NEO NMCC NMS NSC NSS OCS OHDACA OOTW OPCON OPLAN PRC PRT ROE ROTC SECDEF SGBV SOF SOFA SOMA UCP USAF USAFR USAFRICOM USAR USC USCENTCOM USCG

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Joint Interagency Task Force Joint Task Force Marine Air–Ground Task Force Marine Forces (of a combatant command) Mass Atrocity Response Operations Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Pronounced Meb Marine Expeditionary Force, Pronounced Meff Marine Expeditionary Unit, Pronounced Mew Military Operations Other Than War, pronounced moo-twa (also called OOTW) Military Police Naval Forces (of a combatant command) Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (weapons) Noncommissioned Officer Non-combatant Evacuation Operation National Military Command Center National Military Strategy National Security Council National Security Strategy Officer Candidate School Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid Operations Other Than War, pronounced oo-twa (also called MOOTW) Operational Control Operations Plan Populace and Resource Control Provincial Reconstruction Team Rules of Engagement Reserve Officer Training Corps Secretary of Defense, pronounced sek def Sexual Gender-Based Violence Special Operations Force Status of Forces Agreement Status of Mission Agreement Unified Command Plan United States Air Force United States Air Force Reserve United States Africa Command United States Army Reserve United States Code United States Central Command (combatant command), pronounced u s sent com U.S. Coast Guard

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ABBREVIATIONS

USCGR USEUCOM USJFC USMARFORRES USMC USN USNORTHCOM USNRF USPACOM USSOCOM USSOUTHCOM USSTRATCOM USTRANSCOM WO

U.S. Coast Guard Reserve United States European Command (combatant pronounced u s you com U.S. Joint Forces Command U.S. Marine Forces Reserve United States Marine Corps United States Navy United States Northern Command (combatant pronounced u s north com U.S. Navy Reserve Force United States Pacific Command (combatant pronounced u s pay com United States Special Operations Command command), pronounced u s so com United States Southern Command (combatant pronounced u s south com United States Strategic Command (combatant pronounced u s strat com United States Transportation Command command), pronounced u s trans com Warrant Officer

command),

command),

command), (combatant command), command), (combatant

List of Figures

Fig. 5.1

Fig. 5.2

Fig. 5.3

Fig. 5.4

Fig. 5.5

Military operations across the conflict continuum (Source Operations: United States Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, C1, December 6, 2017, p. 1–1. https://fas.org/irp/dod dir/army/fm3-0.pdf) Organization of the Department of Defense (This chart does not include the new U.S. Space Force, approved in December 2019 and still in development, or the Coast Guard, which normally functions as a service in the Department of Homeland Security, but during a national emergency operates as a service in the Navy.) (Source Organization and Management of the Department of Defense, Resource Guide v3.2, March 2019. https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/org-man.pdf) Geographic Combatant Command areas (not including the functional commands) (Source https://www.armyup ress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-EditionArchives/November-December-2019/Sukman-GlobalContingency/) National chain of command (Source U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle, PA) Specialized staff designations (Source https://globalsec urity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/6-0/appc. htm#c-4 or Field Manual 6-0, Department of Army, Washington, DC, August 11, 2003)

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 5.6

Fig. 5.7

Fig. 5.8

Enlisted ranks, pay grades, and insignia by U.S. service (Source https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyafrica/427 4370595/in/photostream/ [enlisted]) Officer ranks, pay grades, and insignia by U.S. service (Source https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyafrica/427 4368989/in/photostream/ [officers]) Types of peace operations (Source Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Peace Operations” (JP3-07.3), March 1, 2018. https:// publicintelligence.net/jcs-peace-operations/)

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 5.1

Contingency Contracting Capabilities by Industry U.S. Army operational units

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction Pamela Aall and Dan Snodderly

Humanitarian crises, wars, and conflict cause loss, suffering and chaos. For millennia, people have joined together to help others afflicted by the results of natural disaster and war. This help became more institutionalized with the founding in 1863 of the Red Cross movement, which has grown into a global humanitarian network that reaches approximately 160 million people a year through the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and 192 national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. These institutions, and hundreds of others, view the task of relieving misery caused by humanitarian crises and violent conflicts as their core mission. Pursuing their goals inevitably puts these institutions in contact, directly or indirectly, with many other organizations. Some are similar to the humanitarians, and are organized, managed, staffed and funded in familiar ways. Many, however, are quite different. Militaries, for instance, see defending their countries by force if necessary as their main mission. Donor agencies may be much more focused on long-term development than addressing crises. Staff from government ministries and agencies first and foremost represent their countries and put those countries’ interests

P. Aall (B) · D. Snodderly United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Aall and D. Snodderly (eds.), Responding to Violent Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59463-3_1

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at the center of their activities. And yet, to be successful, these institutions must collaborate and support each other’s work. The first step in successful cooperation is understanding who is on your team and what makes them tick. And building that understanding is the purpose of this book.

Responding to Crises Responding to conflict and crises often depends on a permissive environment. If there is little political or popular support for action, it will be difficult for institutions to engage. As we note below, some humanitarian crises attract a great deal of support, especially those caused by natural disasters and disease. In such cases, both governments and individuals are often generous, especially in those cases where the crises occur in countries with limited resources and fragile governance structures. The response to conflict is more complicated. Over the past 70 years, support for international engagement to stop other people’s wars has waxed and waned. Why people fight is an ancient and in many ways still unanswered question. People resort to violence for many reasons: to assert power, gain or redistribute resources, eradicate enemies, take revenge on opponents and deliver retribution for past wrongs, assert rights, protect identities, advance autonomy, and demand independence. The fact that these motives are often mixed makes the answer to the question yet more complicated. For much of history, these conflicts often ended in either victory or stalemate, with little third-party peacemaking involved in the effort. More recently, the Cold War relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union produced another kind of conflict. Their competition provided a highly polarized framework for international relations. The world divided into allies of the Atlantic Alliance or the Warsaw Pact, and a loose grouping of neutral states. The ideological foundation of the fight colored nearly all conflicts of the period and turned them into proxy wars. In this environment, too, there was little room for third-party involvement in conflict management. This situation changed radically with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. The following decades saw a significant upswing in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and mediation efforts sponsored by individual states, international organizations, and at times non-governmental organizations and individuals. It was also a time in which terrorism and

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the attendant fear and chaos it causes threatened societies in Asia, Africa, Europe and North America. In response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, the United States invaded Afghanistan. In an effort to stop Iraq’s purported nuclear weapons development, it did the same in Iraq in 2003. International cooperation, whether around the resolution of violent conflict or the “War on Terrorism,” grew during this period. The Iraq War lasted fourteen years. As of this writing, the war in Afghanistan has entered into peace talks, albeit nineteen years after it started. A strong sense of intervention fatigue and a recognition that popular support for these wars had waned led U.S. political leaders— starting with the Obama Administration and continuing on in the Trump Administration—to pull back from international engagement. Conflict, however, has a way of ignoring the plans of politicians and leaders, and in 2020 the United States continues to deploy troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well in places such as Somalia, Syria, Mali, Chad and Niger. Altogether, there are roughly 165,000 U.S. troops stationed abroad in approximately 150 countries. Despite these turns and twists, there is relatively steady support for addressing human suffering caused by natural disasters and disease. The same impulse is true—albeit in a more piecemeal fashion—for suffering caused by violence and conflict. The 2005 UN member state endorsement of the commitment to provide protection against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (“Responsibility to Protect” or R2P) was a significant moment, even though some states have since expressed doubts about their commitment. The R2P endorsement recognized that state sovereignty included protection of its citizens. When a state failed to provide protection, then the international community had a responsibility to step in—contradicting traditional views of sovereignty—and provide the protection. The embrace of the “responsibility to protect” principles has gone beyond rhetoric and led to action—the international intervention in Libya was launched in accordance with R2P principles—and funding. While the amount does not cover needs, the level of funding for refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) care and protection is higher today than in any other point in history. The national and international structures that have been established to safeguard peace and security are still intact and in some respects have been strengthened over the past fifteen years. The United Nations

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remains the centerpiece of the institutional network and provides global legitimacy for engagement. Its role has been augmented by the increasingly active participation of regional organizations as first responders to regional crises. Africa has experienced a significant development of regional capacity in the African Union and in sub-regional institutions such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), and SADC (Southern African Development Community). While the regional organizations often turn over operations to the UN or call on the aid of a state as the mission progresses, their engagement early on enhances the legitimacy of the local government, thus enabling a smoother transition to host nation control and therefore the end of the UN mission. States also continue to be active in the peace and conflict area, either in their own right or in concert with regional groupings such as NATO and the European Union or more informal collectivities such as the International Contact Group for the Southern Philippines Peace Process and the International Contact Group on Citizenship and Human Rights Education in Europe. The effort to reduce state fragility through development, investment, and capacity building has also grown over the period. State-based aid and development agencies, working with and through international NGOs and local partners, gave more than $140 billion in bilateral aid in 2016, almost double the amount spent in 2000.1 In the same year, the World Bank provided nearly $65 billion in loans, grants, investments, and guarantees to countries around the world.2 International NGOs (INGOs) also continued their activities over the period, providing $20 billion from private funds in humanitarian assistance in the 2007–2011 period, in addition to over $14 billion from official sources.3 Despite the fact that there continues to be a normative commitment to alleviate human suffering as well as the institutional and financial ability to implement that commitment, other aspects of the peace and conflict field have followed a less positive trajectory. The nature of conflict itself has posed serious challenges for the societies in which they occur and for the international community. For instance, the development of social media has had a mixed impact on the nature of current conflict. While social media is often seen as a positive tool for engaging wide swaths of

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people in political and social activity it can also be used to whip up antagonisms and resentments, re-enforcing negative attitudes and enabling easy recruitment to violent causes. This new front for fomenting conflict presents difficult issues for those engaged in peacebuilding because of its individual nature—how can you react to the many messages that parties to the conflict and their supporters send and receive, particularly if you don’t know what the content is. The expansion of conflict beyond conventional and irregular wars into cyberspace requires a new set of peacemaking tools, often referred to as counter-narrative campaigns, and these approaches are still in their infancy. It has always been difficult to stop the violence and turn toward a political process. Current conflicts experience additional challenges in this area, due to the nature of the conflict parties themselves. The leading part that non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and ISIS took in conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan made it very difficult to develop a political process, especially in cases where their leadership could not be identified or engaged. We are also seeing this dynamic playing out with transnational organized crime elements and cartels in Central and South America. When non-state actors use terrorism as a principal tactic of war, this often eliminates the possibility of negotiation in these cases, at least until these tactics have been renounced. In conflicts featuring these non-state actors, the choices for outside peacemakers and other intervening agents is bleak—using force against elusive but ruthless targets may work, but usually at the cost of high civilian casualties and heavy damage to essential infrastructure. Another impediment to peacemaking, and especially to negotiated settlements, is the fracturing of conflict parties. It is hard enough to build an area of common interest between antagonists when each has a pronounced point of view and clearly articulated positions. The difficulties mount precipitously when one or more sides of a conflict is made of coalitions or groups united only by their opposition to the “other” side. The conflict in Burma/Myanmar, for instance, features twenty-two opposition parties, some of which are also fighting each other. Negotiations under these circumstances are a complex challenge of getting a score of parties to the table and keeping them there, while trying to find some common ground that can serve as a negotiating platform. The proliferation of interests and the zero-sum perspectives on compromising those interests make fractured-party conflicts become

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intractable much more rapidly than conflicts with well-defined sides. The conflict between the Assad regime and the opposition in Syria is a case in point, and it also shows the complexity of intractability in the current environment. The conflict was intractable in part because of the intransigence of the government, fracturing of the opposition, and rise of ISIS. But also as the result of larger geopolitical circumstances. Syria is embedded in a wider regional conflagration involving Iraq, Iran, and Israel. It is also embedded in a global stand-off between the United States and Russia. The conflict not only was intractable because of the internal dynamics, but also because it was captured by a number of larger contestations. Civil wars are often proxy wars in this era of regional and global polarization. Perhaps the lesson to take from this review is that responding to conflict and humanitarian crises will always be a feature of foreign and international policy even though we don’t know what the exact nature of the threat will be: refugees and internally displaced persons fleeing violence, repression, effects of climate change, internal conflict, war between states, pandemics like the Covid-19 virus, or some combination of these threats. And these circumstances will require cooperation between, coordination among, or at the very least, appreciation of all the institutions that are trying to make things right. Despite the recurrent debate about the need and efficacy of third-party interventions in violent conflicts, it seems highly likely that international organizations, governments, military forces, and non-governmental institutions will continue to undertake peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts around the globe.

Objectives of This Book The purpose of this book is to introduce the missions, structures, and operational styles of the four principal sets of institutions that engage in bringing peace to societies mired in violent conflict or humanitarian crises. These institutions—the United Nations and other international bodies, civilian government agencies, militaries, and non-governmental organizations—often have overlapping mandates and activities on the ground, but do not always collaborate in effective ways. Some of this lack of collaboration is a natural outgrowth of operating in a tense, fast-changing, ambiguous environment. But some of it is due to a lack of familiarity with the other institutions—how they are organized, how they make decisions, what they are capable of, and why they sometimes act in completely

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un-understandable ways. By lessening the mysteries between and among these organizations, this book is part of an effort to improve the outcomes of critical endeavors to manage conflict and build peace. This is the third edition of this guide, which was previously known as Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations. We have changed the book’s title to reflect changes in the international environment and changes in the international response. The first edition, published in 2000, was undertaken to answer challenges encountered in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia. In that edition, we noted that “peacemaking and humanitarian relief operations are usually as complex and multifaceted as the problems they address.” We introduced what seemed at the time a bewildering array of personnel—from international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the military—that are frequently “working side by side in the effort to build or rebuild peace and stability within divided societies and failed states.” The second edition, published in 2007, came after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the subsequent U.S.-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. In the military interventions, in particular, the United States was both a combatant in an ongoing struggle and a source of assistance to two struggling governments. This dual role had a substantial impact on civil-military relations, calling into question some of the traditional guidelines for interaction between the military and humanitarian relief organizations. The dual role also required greater involvement of civilian government agencies and new roles and new departments. The U.S. State Department elevated its operational role in addition to diplomacy, and established the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations to provide expert support and additional personnel to embassies in conflict-affected countries. The USAID Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation, established in 2008, created the capacity for defense and development to work better together in these complex environments through training, crossdepartment personnel assignments and joint planning processes. In order to respond to these changes, the second edition added an entirely new section on civilian agencies of the U.S. government, which highlights the expanded role that these agencies play in peace and relief operations. Since the second edition, once again much has changed. The multilateral interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have wound down or been

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substantially reduced. Budgets for defense spending have been reduced in many countries, and the public appetite for intervention by the international community has likewise waned. In addition, the Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Middle East starting in the early 2010s, and a massive earthquake devastated Haiti. And conflicts continue to rage. As tensions between and among states increase, the possibility of interstate war increases as well. In response to these and other changes, the fields of conflict management and peacebuilding have also evolved. The practice of peacekeeping itself has been transformed significantly in recent years as well, with broadening mandates, imperfect yet enhanced effectiveness, and continued reform efforts. In addition, the nature of violent conflict has continued to evolve, with the growing role of non-state entities and a general proliferation of organizations in the field. What has not changed, however, is that international actors—international organizations, non-governmental organizations, civilian agencies, and the military—are operating in the same space in conflicts and humanitarian emergencies, at times with only a vague understanding of each other’s mandates and operating cultures, as well as what particular organizations are capable of (and perhaps more importantly, what tasks they are best suited for). This lack of familiarity and understanding often undercuts their effectiveness in building peace and security and delivering badly needed services to populations under stress. Furthermore, this lack of a common understanding of the other actors in the field can lead to redundancy of effort, which can overwhelm the recipients’ ability to make good use of their support.

Other Actors This book focuses on the four major institutional participants in peace and relief efforts—international organizations, NGOs, official civilian agencies, and the military. It is important to note, however, that the crowded field of third-party actors includes many other entities and groups that we did not include in the new edition mainly for reasons of space. These other actors include, for instance, contractors or implementing partners, international financial institutions, diaspora groups, host nations, and other private sector actors.

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In addition, it is critical to understand the increasingly active participation of women in these efforts in the wake of the UN’s Women, Peace, and Security agenda as implemented since 2000. Women’s Participation We know that providing diverse members of society the opportunity to be informed and consulted and to have their concerns better addressed before, during, and after formal peace agreements results in more sustainable peace. Providing everyone—especially those most affected by violence—the chance to influence the decision-making process and be actively engaged in their country’s transformation enables tensions to be more effectively resolved and strengthens legitimacy in the outcomes. Of all the groups that suffer from social exclusion, women make up the largest number. In October 2000, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on women, peace, and security (WPS), recognizing the importance of increasing the participation of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peacebuilding, peace negotiations, peacekeeping, humanitarian response, and post-conflict reconstruction, and stressing the importance of equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the promotion of peace and security. Security Council Resolution 1325 urged the member states of the United Nations to develop national action plans to increase the engagement of women in the foreign policymaking apparatuses and to include gender perspectives in their national planning and programs. By April 2020, seventy-seven countries had done so, with the United States becoming the first country to enact comprehensive WPS guidance into law with the passing of the 2017 WPS Act. Contractors/Implementing Partners/Operational Contract Support The use of private sector companies in conflict zones has increased dramatically in recent years. Generically known as contractors, DOS and USAID tend to refer to them as implementing partners, DOD calls them operational contract support (OCS), and the companies themselves prefer the term contingency contractors (see Table 1.1). The term implementing partners has usually referred to local firms and workers hired to build or improve infrastructure, such as schools, clinics, roads, and public utilities. Ideally, these projects were undertaken

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Table 1.1 Contingency Contracting Capabilities by Industry Describing the stability services/Contingency contracting industry Logistics and support

Private security companies

Security sector reform and development

Industry support organizations

• • • • • • • • • •

• Site protection • Convoy • Private security detail • Threat assessment • Intelligence • Risk management

• SSR • Training • Economic development • Crisis mitigation & recovery • Governance • Rule of law • Law enforcement • Development

• Law firms • Insurance • Consultants accounting or financial • PR/Marketing • Reputational • Staff augmentation recruitment

Logistics Aviation Construction Maintenance UXO/Demining Transport Medical services Supply Shelter IT infrastructure

Source Adapted from Whitney Grespin, “The Evolving Contingency Contracting Market: Private Sector Self-Regulation and United States Government Monitoring of Procurement of Stability Operations Services,” PKSOI Paper, Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, January 2016. http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/Evolving%20Contingeny.pdf

after consultation with community leaders, development organizations, and international partners. Similarly, military forces typically employ OCS to provide a wide range of goods and services including interpretation, technical and communication support, and infrastructure development. These contractors might be host country nationals, third country nationals, or U.S. nationals, but they report to and are managed by the firm that employs them. Recently, private security organizations have played a larger—and more controversial—role in conflict zones, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Private security firms have served as guards and convoy escorts, which has sometimes required them to engage in combat, and they have provided training to host nation police and security forces. Controversy has arisen over the use of these private security groups because of concerns over accountability, especially in the use of force. As a result, there are ongoing private sector self-regulation and accountability initiatives, in addition to U.S. government legal oversight mechanisms regarding contractor rules of engagement.

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In addition to security assistance, private sector firms can promote economic growth and reduce poverty by providing direct access to expertise, by supporting membership organizations to further the aims of those with common goals, or by working with government agencies to promote competitive markets. These kinds of interventions can create jobs and increase trade, which will aid peacebuilding efforts, but private groups must be aware that their activities can, if not managed responsibly, distort the distribution of resources and increase conflict. It is important to note, however, that the widespread use of contractors may undermine another important peacebuilding goal—the long-term and continuous process of strengthening and expanding local capacity to deliver services and carry out programs in a sustainable way. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) There are a large number of international and regional financial institutions or development banks but the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are the best known. The World Bank, like its fellow institution the International Monetary Fund, is a specialized agency of the United Nations. In practice, however, they act quite independently from the United Nations. Both institutions are focused on achieving economic stability and prosperity but work at different levels. The World Bank works on economic and social development within countries to reduce poverty and foster sustainable development. The IMF works at the macro level to encourage stable monetary policies within countries and orderly economic relations among countries. Both institutions work with countries in crisis, whether through conflict or humanitarian disaster. Their work is generally through governments but many of their programs have a direct benefit to civil society. The World Bank has specific programs to further the development goals in countries characterized by fragility, conflict and violence, and cooperates closely with other institutions engaged in humanitarian activities and in the area of peace and security.

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Diaspora Diaspora groups result from the movement, migration, or scattering of a people away from an established or ancestral homeland. Historical examples include the Irish during and after the Irish famine of the 1840s, Jews during the Holocaust in the 1930s and 1940s, and Palestinians after the establishment of the state of Israel in the 1940s. More recently, the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and in Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic have led to new or expanded diaspora communities abroad. Some diaspora communities maintain strong ties with their homeland. Many diaspora groups provide much needed funds for humanitarian aid or economic development. Others provide advice and money to opposition groups and at times to rebel movements. Any international intervention must be knowledgeable about and take in account these diaspora groups, which can be highly influential in the politics and economy of their homeland. Host Countries It has become increasingly obvious that local ownership of any peace process is essential to its success. That is to say, the affected country must drive its own development needs and priorities even if transitional authority is in the hands of outsiders. But ownership requires capacity, and capacity may need strengthening, and the international intervention should emphasize the building of capacity at many levels—public and private, national and local, and formal and informal institutions. International partners often bypass national interests and actors, providing aid in overly technocratic ways that underestimate the importance of harmonizing with the national and local contexts, and emphasizing short-term results at the expense of medium-to-long-term sustainable results brought about by building capacity and systems.4 The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States was adopted at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011. Through the New Deal, development partners committed to supporting nationally owned and led development plans and greater aid effectiveness in fragile situations. The agreement was meant to ensure that both development partners and the host nation were committed to pursuing the five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals of legitimate politics, justice, security, revenue and

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services, and economic foundations. Development cooperation was seen as an equal partnership between governments and development partners, including civil society partners.5 Weak as the New Deal processes are, they provide new normative guidelines for how assistance should be delivered. This new model is based on the development of one national coordinated plan, which would allow assistance to be directed at institutions that have the capacity to absorb aid and reduce the risk of aid dependency. In all instances, intervening authorities should encourage the host nation to adopt international norms. In addition, the international community should employ interveners who come from cultures and governance systems that are similar to those of the primary planners and implementers of development initiatives to ensure the adoption of appropriately nuanced practices.

Compete, Collaborate, or Merely Overlap? Under what circumstances do these institutions and the ones that are the subject of this book—states, international organizations, militaries and NGOs—end up in the same space? And are there guiding structures, rules of the road, or accepted ways—formal or informal—on how to share that space when they do? The two principal circumstances that draw these institutions together are peacekeeping operations and responses to humanitarian emergencies. Peacekeeping missions are largely initiated by the United Nations, with the approval of the Security Council. Peacekeeping involves inserting military troops in a setting in order to help a conflict make the transition from war to peace. Peacekeeping—which is not defined or even mentioned in the UN Charter—was originally conceived as a means to guarantee that antagonistic forces respect the terms of a ceasefire or peace settlement. Its main activity was to facilitate and monitor the separation of armed forces in accordance to an agreement or treaty which defined the terms. In current times, however, UN peacekeeping often takes place in situation where “there is no peace to keep,” according to the 2015 High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. As a consequence, UN peacekeeping operations have become much more comprehensive in their mandates, organized around civilian protection rather than the separation of troops. It is a “whole of mission” responsibility which includes close cooperation with humanitarian actors, and may involve rule of law, the establishment of justice mechanisms, dialogue, reconciliation programs,

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local conflict resolution, police training, and a whole other set of activities that bring official and non-official institutions in pursuit of the same ends. The continual expansion of mandates for these operations has required the engagement of military and civilian experts and managers, from soldiers to lawyers to aid workers. The institutions also share the space during the response to a humanitarian disaster. The response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, for instance, brought together funding, materials, logistical support and other forms of aid from the UN (humanitarian aid and peacekeepers), over 100 governments, international NGOs, country-based NGOs, corporations, and private individuals. In natural disasters, militaries often provide logistical support, transportation, and staffing to the relief effort. In some cases—for instance the 2014 fight against the Ebola virus in West Africa— military forces (in this case the U.S. military) play a leading role in organizing the humanitarian or relief effort. In other cases—Haiti, for example—the humanitarian organizations have difficulty coordinating and operate in chaotic environments with little opportunity to build on each other’s programming. The greatest challenge in such an environment is often the mismatch between the amount of support provided to a nation and its capacity to take in all the support. Another major challenge is coordinating efforts between all these disparate groups to ensure the most needy populations are receiving sufficient support. Having a common understanding of the needs and a sufficiently robust communications infrastructure are also essential for creating a proportional response to the disaster. Responses to refugee crises provide another set of circumstances that bring together many diverse institutions. Under international law, refugees have the right to safe asylum and to be protected against involuntary return to their home country. Given the strain that refugee flows put on host countries—usually a neighboring state—it is remarkable how often these rights are respected. Generally, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spearheads the response to refugee movements, working with the host government including the military, local NGOs, international NGOs, and other international aid agencies to provide food, shelter, and other basic necessities for the refugee population. Finally, in a situation like the conflicts in Syria and Yemen, which combine a humanitarian crisis with an internationalized civil war being supported by proxy nations, official and non-official institutions may be operating in the same space, but with different goals and under

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independent mandates. The UN may be leading a political process to encourage negotiations, while UN Security Council member states use force to support opposing sides, causing civilian casualties and sometimes killing humanitarian workers as an unintended consequence. At the same time, attempts to provide aid or basic health services are blocked by fighting forces and negotiations for a humanitarian pause turn into political stand-offs. This brief description of situations that bring together the institutions covered in this book captures only a small percentage of the circumstances that serve as meeting grounds, but they do highlight two challenges to effective communication and cooperation among third-party institutions. • Although the importance of leadership and coordinated responses is recognized by all who participate in responding to conflict and crises, the framework that would define that leadership is not always in place. In refugee crises, for instance, UNHCR is recognized as a response leader, but there is no similar “lead” in the response to a humanitarian crisis caused by natural disaster. • Sometimes the institutions are operating under very different mandates. Some may be operating on the ground to support one of the conflict sides, while others may be treating wounded civilians. They may be in the same space but in completely different worlds. This book approaches the topic of responding to violent conflicts and humanitarian crises largely from a U.S. and to a much lesser extent European perspective. This perspective reflects the experience and background of the authors. However, in recognizing this, it is important to record our deep admiration of and appreciation for the peacebuilding and humanitarian work done by other countries’ nationals, especially those who come from within the crisis zones themselves. Our aim here is to support their work by helping internationals cooperate more effectively with each other. We must take the admonition to “do no harm” seriously, and the first step in that process is to make sure that we only proceed with interventions after careful consideration and widespread consultation, and with continuing attention to how resources are distributed and delivered.

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Notes 1. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Development Aid Rises Again in 2016 but Flows to Poorest Countries Dip,” accessed May 11, 2020. http://www.oecd.org/dac/developmentaid-rises-again-in-2016-but-flows-to-poorest-countries-dip.htm. 2. World Bank, “World Bank Lending, Fiscal 2016,” accessed May 11, 2020. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/634801473443116208/ WBAR16-FY16-Lending-Presentation.pdf. 3. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “An Overview of International NGOs in Development Cooperation,” accessed May 11, 2020. http://www.cn.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publicati ons/UNDP-CH11%20An%20Overview%20of%20International%20NGOs% 20in%20Development%20Cooperation.pdf). 4. International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “The New Deal,” accessed May 11, 2020. https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/newdeal/about-new-deal. 5. International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “The New Deal,” accessed May 11, 2020. https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/newdeal/about-new-deal.

CHAPTER 2

International Organizations Jonas Claes

International organizations serve as one of the preferred vehicles for states to structure their cooperation in the pursuit of shared interests and values. With an estimated 2 billion people affected by fragility, conflict or violence globally, conflict resolution and peacebuilding benefit significantly from institutionalized multilateral efforts. Organizations like the United Nations, the European Union, and the World Bank were established by groups of countries to pursue the peaceful conduct of international affairs, mitigate the human and financial impact of violent conflict, and address the rising number of complex transnational challenges to international peace and security. Through their field presence and direct engagement with conflict actors, international organizations have become leading players in peacebuilding. They invariably provide the operational impetus for collective efforts to prevent, resolve, or mitigate violent conflict, and strengthen local capacity through various types of field operations, including peacekeeping, police missions, electoral observation, humanitarian relief, and human rights monitoring. In the conduct of international peace operations, few organizations can match the authority, legitimacy, and experience of the United Nations

J. Claes (B) European External Action Service, European Union, Brussels, Belgium © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Aall and D. Snodderly (eds.), Responding to Violent Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59463-3_2

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(UN). The UN serves as the primary international actor in the collective promotion of global peace and security, human rights and justice, and political and economic development. In recent decades, the involvement of international organizations in peace, stability, and relief operations has both widened and diversified. Regional, sub-regional, and other intergovernmental organizations have all assumed greater responsibility. Although few organizations outside the UN system can independently deploy complex operations for an extended period, they do frequently complement or support the role of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations in conflict zones. Beyond their direct roles in peacebuilding and relief, international organizations also indirectly contribute to the mitigation of conflict through their roles in handling international health crises, improving education standards, and alleviating poverty. With the growing diversity in field presence come growing demands for collaboration and the risk of duplication, both between and within organizations. The prominence of emerging powers and evolving global power dynamics also present new opportunities and challenges to the operations of international organizations. International and regional organizations have been defined based on the scope of their operations, referring to any institution that operates around the globe or within a limited geographic area. This chapter will take the organization’s membership as the defining criteria. Based on this “inter-governmental” rationale, which more closely resembles the use of the term in practice, an “international organization” refers to organizations that consist of a representative number of member states or governments from across the globe. This contrasts with international nongovernmental organizations, which are defined as private, self-governing, non-profit groups organized on an international level. International organizations are typically established by treaties among their members and are subject to international law. The term “regional organization” refers to international organizations that promote the common interests and values from member states of a specific region. Sub-regional arrangements fulfill a similar purpose within a more limited space, and they often emerge with a primarily economic agenda. The international organizations listed in this volume are divided into three groups: (1) the United Nations, (2) regional and sub-regional organizations, and (3) other intergovernmental organizations outside the UN. The first section in this chapter will introduce the most prominent of all international organizations, the United Nations, with a specific

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focus on the various types of UN peace operations. The second section will address relevant regional and sub-regional organizations involved in conflict resolution activities in Africa, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. The third section will discuss those international organizations outside the UN system that are built upon cultural, linguistic, religious, or historic ties as well as international humanitarian organizations.

The UN System The United Nations was established in 1945 in San Francisco, where 51 countries signed the UN Charter, the organization’s founding document. Today, the UN has acquired a nearly global membership, with 193 member states. The most recent member is South Sudan, admitted in 2011 after its secession from Sudan. As stipulated by the charter, the UN was created to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war by promoting peace and international security; fostering respect for fundamental human rights, justice, and the rule of law; and promoting social progress and better standards of life. The institutional structure of the United Nations reflects the variety of tasks that have been conferred upon the organization. The United Nations System encompasses six principal organs that are established by the UN Charter, as well as eleven programs and funds, fifteen specialized agencies, and a bewildering array of committees, commissions, and related entities. Principle Organs The UN’s principal organs include the UN Security Council (UNSC), the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the UN Secretariat, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The sixth principal organ, the UN Trusteeship Council, suspended its operations in 1994 with the independence of the last UN Trust Territory, Palau. The Secretariat, ECOSOC, Security Council, and General Assembly are located at the UN headquarters in New York. The International Court of Justice is based in The Hague, in The Netherlands. Secondary organs—including the Joint UN Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

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(OHCHR), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)—are located in Geneva, Switzerland. The Security Council functions as the central executive body of the United Nations. The council has 15 members, of which only China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—the five permanent members (P-5)—have the power to veto resolutions. The General Assembly elects the remaining ten Security Council members for two-year rotating terms along the lines of regional groupings. The UNSC has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, determines the existence of threats or breaches to the peace, and can recommend actions that are binding on member states in the form of resolutions. Passage of a Security Council resolution requires nine votes in favor, with none of the five permanent members opposing. Collecting nine votes in favor of a controversial resolution can be difficult because any member can abstain. Under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes, the council can seek solutions for imminent, ongoing, or past conflicts through various conciliatory methods including negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. In addition, the Security Council can dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to reduce tensions, separate warring forces, or create conditions conducive to concluding a peace agreement. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council can exercise “peace enforcement powers” and take binding decisions authorizing economic or financial sanctions, armed embargoes, travel bans, or the deployment of a multilateral military force to maintain or restore international peace and security. The General Assembly is the main deliberative organ of the UN. With each of the 193 member states represented and having one vote, it is often mistakenly compared to a world parliament or global legislative branch. The General Assembly’s voice in international peace and security remains limited given the primary role of the Security Council in this arena. However, it can bring situations likely to endanger international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council. The UNGA can only formulate recommendations that are not binding on member states, in the form of a resolution, to condemn or draw attention to situations of concern. Its primary power lies in its authority to approve the organization’s budget and direct the Secretariat. The UNGA meets in September for its annual session. Given the growing number

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of issues presented before the body each year, the UNGA assigns initial consideration of complex issues to its six main committees: • • • • • •

First Committee: Disarmament and International Security Second Committee: Economic and Financial Third Committee: Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Fourth Committee: Special Political and Decolonization Fifth Committee: Administrative and Budgetary Sixth Committee: Legal

In theory, the UNGA could also assume the role of the UNSC in peace and security through the Uniting for Peace procedure, which allows for a transfer of decision-making power if the Security Council fails to act in accordance with its primary role. However, this potentially powerful procedure has not been activated since 1997, in an emergency special session of the UNGA to address the ongoing conflict over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The UN Secretariat is responsible for the daily operations of the organization, arranging meetings and implementing decisions, and is composed of approximately 37,500 personnel under the leadership of the UN secretary-general (UNSG). The Secretariat supports a broad range of UN activities in the field, including UN peace operations. The UN Secretary-General plays a direct role in conflict mediation by exercising his “good offices,” that is, the political weight or moral stature of his personal engagement, or by sending his envoys or special representatives to facilitate a political agreement between the warring parties or draw attention to an issue. Like the General Assembly, the secretary-general can bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. The secretary-general may indirectly steer the activities of the organization in peace and security through his relations with the UN Security Council. The UNSG must be particularly attentive to the views of the P-5, whose governments play a major role in setting the priorities, shaping the leadership, and determining the policies of the world organization. Located in The Hague, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) serves as the primary judicial organ of the United Nations and adjudicates disputes between states, particularly as it relates to international law. Contentious cases have included maritime border disputes and actions

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taken during violent conflict. The ICJ consists of fifteen judges elected by the UNGA and the UNSC. Only countries may be parties in a case before the ICJ, not individuals. If a country does not wish to take part in a proceeding, it cannot be forced to participate. If it accepts the court’s jurisdiction, parties are obligated to comply with the court’s decision. Other Relevant UN Entities In addition to the principal organs established by the UN Charter, the United Nations is composed of numerous departments, specialized agencies, programs and funds involved in conflict resolution and humanitarian relief efforts in the field. A number of these bodies fall under the authority of the principal organs. Others operate independently but are bound by the general rules of the Secretariat. The remainder of this section will introduce those UN entities that are explicitly aimed at the resolution or prevention of violent conflict, or directly contribute to UN peace operations and humanitarian relief efforts. To some extent this selection remains a subjective exercise. Several UN bodies or affiliated organizations are not included, even though they indirectly contribute to UN field efforts to establish peace and security, like the Office on Drugs and Crime, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, or the World Health Organization. In 2016, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) formally became a Related Organization to the United Nations, given its humanitarian purpose in conflict areas, and its presence around the world to deal with violence-stricken societies. The relevant UN entities are divided into five broad categories: departments and offices under the Secretariat, subsidiary organs to the General Assembly, subsidiary organs to the Security Council, programs and funds, and specialized agencies. Departments and Offices Under the Secretariat As the scope of the Secretariat’s activities increased, several functional departments and offices assumed some of its functions. While the list below is far from exhaustive, the following bodies under the UN Secretariat play an instrumental role in UN field operations: On 1 January 2019, the UN’s peace and security structure experienced a significant change with the creation of two new departments: the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA).

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The UN Secretariat’s Department of Peace Operations provides political and executive direction, management and support to UN peacekeeping operations around the world. DPO also provides guidance and support on military, police and mine issues to other UN political and peacebuilding missions. DPO consists of an Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), Office for Military Affairs (OMA), and Policy, Evaluation and Training Division. DPO assists member states and the secretary-general in their efforts to maintain international peace and security by supporting political processes; reforming judicial systems and security sectors; training law enforcement and police forces; disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former combatants; and facilitating the return of internally displaced persons and refugees. As of March 2020, DPO’s workforce totaled 69,230 troops and 8,942 police divided over 13 peacekeeping missions. DPO is responsible for liaising with the troop and police contributing countries; maintaining logistics depots; providing equipment; and informing the UN Security Council on the status of ongoing peacekeeping missions. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs contributes to the UN’s mandate in international peace and security through early warning, conflict prevention, peacemaking, crisis management, and peacebuilding. The department combines most of the responsibilities of the Peacebuilding Support Office, which remains active within DPPA, and the former Department of Political Affairs. DPPA coordinates UN electoral assistance activities, and provides support to the secretary-general through the envoys bringing to bear the UNSG’s good offices, as well as to UN political missions deployed around the world. In addition to over 500 staff at UN headquarters in New York, DPPA draws from the work of political and peacebuilding missions under its supervision, which employ an estimated 4,000 national and international staff in field missions around the world. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is responsible for coordinating humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to natural and man-made disasters or emergencies. The office serves as an inter-agency body, coordinating various UN agencies and non-governmental actors in the field. OCHA is responsible for mobilizing and coordinating effective humanitarian action to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies; advocating the rights of people in need; promoting preparedness and prevention; and facilitating sustainable

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solutions. With a staff of about 2,000, OCHA maintains a presence in 48 countries, including 32 country offices, 20 humanitarian adviser teams, five regional offices, and two headquarter locations. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights), located in Geneva, Switzerland, is the principal UN body mandated to promote and protect international human rights and fundamental freedoms. The office coordinates UN human rights activities throughout the UN system, promotes cooperation between national, regional and international human rights actors, and serves as the Secretariat of the Human Rights Council in Geneva. The office plays a significant operational role through its regional offices, human rights advisers, and local staff. As the leading authority for human rights, OHCHR integrates the human rights components of UN peace operations in the field. To implement its mandate, OHCHR employs about 1,400 staff, based in Geneva and New York and in 15 country offices and 12 regional offices around the world, including a workforce of nearly 900 international human rights officers serving in UN peace missions. Subsidiary Organs to the General Assembly The UN Charter permits the General Assembly to establish subsidiary organs to execute its functions. The Human Rights Council and the UN Peacebuilding Commission are recent creations of the General Assembly with an impact on UN operations in the field. The Human Rights Council (HRC) is an intergovernmental body within the UN system located in Geneva, Switzerland, aimed at strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and addressing human rights violations. The HRC can establish commissions of inquiry or fact-finding missions to investigate, condemn, or report on alleged human rights violations. The council can rapidly consider situations of concern on the field by holding special sessions, adopting non-binding resolutions, mandating the high commissioner for human rights to commence dialogue, and calling for access of humanitarian workers or monitors. The Human Rights Council replaced the former UN Commission on Human Rights and is comprised by 47 United Nations member states elected by the UN General Assembly. In June 2018 the United States announced its withdrawal from the body. The UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council to propose integrated strategies and advice on peacebuilding and recovery efforts. After an initial

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period of conflict management or crisis-response, international actors often shift their attention to new conflict hotspots, leaving fragile political actors and a nascent civil society to cope with the transition process on their own. The poor management of post-conflict situations often contributes to the eruption of renewed violence. The PBC brings together relevant peacebuilding actors, including international donors, the international financial institutions, national governments and troop contributing countries, to propose integrated strategies, and ensure sustainable financing and political support for recovery activities. Those countries on the PBC agenda include Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Colombia, and Papua New Guinea. Its 31 member states include the five permanent members of the Security Council, seven members of ECOSOC, five leading country contributors to UN budgets, and five top providers of military and police personnel to UN missions. Subsidiary Organs to the Security Council Like the General Assembly, the Security Council is authorized by the UN Charter to establish subsidiary organs for the execution of its functions. Relevant bodies created by Security Council resolutions include the ad hoc judicial bodies to investigate and prosecute serious crimes committed during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, and the attacks committed in 2004 and 2005 in Lebanon. Although the ICC is not a subsidiary organ, the UN Security Council also maintains a special relationship with the court. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was established in 1993 to investigate violations of international humanitarian law committed during the wars in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. The tribunal was authorized to bring to justice individuals responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law; to render justice to the victims; to deter further crimes; and to contribute to the restoration of peace by promoting reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established to prosecute the individuals responsible for the genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda between January 1 and December 31, 1994. The tribunal, located in Arusha, Tanzania, also dealt with the prosecution of Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other violations of international law committed in neighboring countries during that time. Following the completion of the mandates given to each of these tribunals, in 2010 the

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UN Security Council created an international residual mechanism to carry out any outstanding matters pertinent to the jurisdiction of any of these courts. Other ad hoc judicial bodies established by the UN Security Council include the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). In 2012, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was the first international court to convict a head of state since the Nuremburg trials, with the conviction of Liberian warlord Charles Taylor, a significant breakthrough in the establishment of an international justice system. The SCSL is a hybrid institution, with both the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone nominating the 11 judges that sit on the court for 3-year terms. Both the ICTR and the SCSL had a presence in the area where the alleged crimes took place, while the ICTY and STL functioned from The Netherlands. Although the International Criminal Court is legally independent from the United Nations, the UN Security Council can refer cases it considers to fall under the court’s jurisdiction. The ICC is a court of last resort, to be turned to only if a state is unable or unwilling to prosecute the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Unlike the International Court of Justice, the ICC can try individuals. The creation of the ICC represented a significant step in the creation of an international criminal justice system and, more specifically, the end to impunity for individual perpetrators of the most heinous human rights violations. The trial of Laurent Gbagbo, the former president of Côte d’Ivoire, presented the first time the ICC held a former head of state to account for crimes committed during their administration. Gbagbo was eventually acquitted in 2019. In the wake of the 2007–2008 post-election violence in Kenya, the ICC also initiated investigations against sitting president Uhuru Kenyatta as well as other high-ranking officers within his administration. However, the court ultimately dropped the charges due to insufficient evidence. To date, the ICC has only prosecuted African leaders, leading some African countries to accuse it of bias. This backlash has led to South Africa, the Gambia and Burundi withdrawing from the ICC. Programs and Funds The UN programs and funds include a broad range of semi-autonomous entities that, while bound by the rules of the Secretariat, enjoy a considerable degree of operational autonomy. These rules include procedures

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for reporting to the UN General Assembly and publishing official documents. Together with the Specialized Agencies, these entities lead UN efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), aimed at reducing the effects of poverty, hunger, and disease. The following programs and funds maintain a visible presence in the field in support of UN conflict resolution efforts and humanitarian assistance, and often engage to mitigate the impact of violence in post-conflict societies. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) serves as the United Nations’ global development agency, with a total workforce of 17,000 and an annual budget of approximately $5 billion and operates in around 170 countries to promote socio-economic recovery and development. UNDP works to reduce poverty, improve democratic governance, and assist in the reconstruction of societies in the aftermath of war and humanitarian emergencies. As a part of UNDP, the Crisis Response Unit helps to cover the gaps between immediate crisis response and durable development. To ensure greater coherence at the country level, UNDP usually coordinates development activities for the UN system. In the field, UNDP develops local capacity and provides training, technical expertise, and grant support to developing countries. The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) advocates and works for the protection of children’s rights throughout the world by providing longterm humanitarian aid and development assistance. UNICEF works with other UN bodies, governments, and NGOs to promote community-based services in primary health care, basic education, safe water, and sanitation in developing countries. Some of UNICEF’s largest and best-known projects are immunization, sanitation, prenatal care, and nutritional supplement programs. In humanitarian crises, UNICEF supplies suffering children and their families with temporary shelter, bedding material, and food. UNICEF has over 13,000 employees, maintains programs in 190 countries, with 7 regional offices, and more than 120 country offices. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), also known as the UN Refugee Agency, provides protection and assistance to refugees fleeing war, including those internally displaced within a state. In addition to its emergency response, UNHCR helps find durable solutions through repatriation, resettlement, and local integration programs. Most of UNHCR’s almost 17,000 staff is present in the field, assisting and coordinating international efforts through its presence in 134 countries. The office, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, also contracts non-governmental organizations to provide relief.

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The UN World Food Program (WFP) is the largest humanitarian organization tackling hunger worldwide. The program, located in Rome, Italy, provides food aid to vulnerable people in refugee and other emergency situations. WFP closely cooperates with its related UN agencies in Rome, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), as well as other government, UN, and NGO partners. In 2020, the World Food Program was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for improving the conditions of peace in conflict-affected areas. WFP’s 17,000 staff conduct food aid emergency and development operations that benefit almost 90 million people in more than 80 countries. Specialized Agencies Specialized agencies operate independently. While some were not created by the United Nations, they are all incorporated within the UN system through special agreements. Several agencies have activities focused on undermining the drivers of violent conflict, including the World Bank Group and its related organization the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Both of these institutions were established at the Bretton Woods Summit in 1944 and were charged with ensuring economic stability in the post–World War II period. The World Bank Group has 189 members and is comprised of two institutions jointly aimed at reducing global poverty: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA) (known collectively as the World Bank) and three related financial institutions, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The World Bank offers loans, advice, and an array of customized resources to developing countries. Conscious of the risks posed by economic shocks to fragile economies, the bank assists developing countries by providing financial cushions as they enter the global economy. The World Bank coordinates with other organizations to help developing countries achieve stable, sustainable, and equitable growth. Following the 2011 World Development Report, the World Bank has been increasingly active to ensure conflict sensitivity and improve the development status of fragile states by implementing projects that target specific poverty indicators. In 2018, the landmark joint UN–World Bank

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report Pathways for Peace made the business case for conflict prevention, providing a strong evidence base for the cost-efficiency of preventive action as opposed to reactive measures taken once conflict breaks out. The World Bank Group employs 10,000 employees in more than 130 offices worldwide. Like the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund is an international organization with quasi-global membership (189 members). The fund is open to any country willing to adhere to the IMF charter of rights and obligations, and works to promote international monetary cooperation and enhance economic stability by facilitating international trade, promoting high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reducing poverty. These reforms are intended to improve governance and increase state resilience, thereby reducing the risk of conflict. However, the reforms have, in some cases, led to short-term political instability. The organization makes financial resources available to member states experiencing balance of payments difficulties and offers macro-economic and financial policy advice. As of March 2019, the fund had a staff of approximately 2,700 from 150 countries, and committed loans totaling $210 billion, of which $133 billion has not been drawn. In addition to these Specialized Agencies, a large number of regional development banks provide loans, grants and technical assistance. Organizations like the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the African Development Bank (AFDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Islamic Development Bank Group (ISDB) are not tied to the UN system, and therefore do not operate as Specialized Agencies, like the IMF and World Bank Group. The largest regional development bank is the European Investment Bank, with close to $70 billion in loans in 2019. By funding projects on social inclusion, poverty reduction, gender equality, and other development priorities, these organizations often contribute directly to a reduced risk of violent conflict. Types of UN Peace Operations Among international organizations, the United Nations is by far the most visible peace organization, with over 90,000 personnel deployed in peace operations worldwide. The best-known type of international peace operation is the UN peacekeeping force, characterized by its blue helmets since 1948. During the Cold War, the UN’s conflict management influence was restricted to those rare cases where there was a consensus between the key

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countries of the East-West rivalry, thereby immobilizing the organization to a large extent. Following the Cold War, UN activity grew exponentially. Recently, however, there has been a general reduction in the number of missions and personnel. Apart from peacekeeping operations, the UN conducts various types of field missions, including police and civilian-led political missions. These specialized operations can deploy on a stand-alone basis, or as part of complex integrated missions. The categorization of mission types is primarily based on the stated objective and composition. For example, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, which ended operations in 2017, served as a multifaceted peacekeeping operation including security and justice, police, and election support components. The UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, on the other hand, serves as a stand-alone political mission, coordinating the prevention and peacebuilding efforts of international and local actors on the ground. UN peace operation mandates are increasingly complex, deploying military, police and civilian staff to stabilize the security situation, protect civilians, initiate security sector reform and provide electoral assistance and humanitarian relief, while operating in full respect of human rights standards and international humanitarian law. UN personnel deployments can include military staff and troops of contributing member states, civilian staff of the UN itself, other civilian officials from national governments, and contracted third parties. As the head of civilian UN operations in country, the resident coordinator (RC) works to promote interagency collaboration and develop joint planning, assessment, and implementation of UN programs. The RC manages relations with the host government as well as civil society and bilateral donors, and regularly convenes the Country Team, which includes representatives from all parts of the UN system present on the ground to collaborate on policy issues and develop priority programs for implementation. Multiple UN entities may be on the ground in a given conflict zone, depending on the development, security, and political challenges within the country or region. UN missions may transform from one type into another as the objective or composition evolves. As they succeed and the need for an international military presence is no longer required, peacekeeping operations may transform into a political or peacebuilding mission. Depending on the available resources, expertise and political will, each UN peace operation can be conducted independently, in hybrid format with a regional or sub-regional organization (as illustrated by the

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African Union–United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur), or supported by a separate regional mission such as the G-5 Sahel Force that operates alongside the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, as well as four other countries. The cardinal principles of peacekeeping operations are consent of the conflict parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. Peacekeeping Operations UN peacekeeping operations are deployed based on a Security Council resolution, and generally consist of military, police, and civilian personnel to provide security and governance support. The involvement of military personnel is the defining characteristic of a peacekeeping operation. Even though the charter does not refer to the term, peacekeeping has become a central component of the UN toolbox for conflict management. The practice of peacekeeping operations was developed during the Cold War as a pragmatic tool allowing the UN Security Council to exercise its primary responsibility to maintain peace and security. Traditional peacekeeping operations were tasked to monitor and report on situations at risk of violent conflict, observe cease-fire agreements, or position a military presence between warring parties. Historically, peacekeeping operations were authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which provides for the “pacific” settlement of disputes through “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement … or other peaceful means of their own choice” (Article 33). Traditional peacekeeping operations, like those in Cyprus and the Golan Heights, provided UN military observers to monitor cease-fire or peace agreements with the consent of the parties to the conflict. Their role was to report any infractions of the peace agreement, not to intervene. Recent peacekeeping operations are increasingly based on Chapter VII mandates authorizing UN forces to enforce the peace. Chapter VII mandates allow for “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression” and authorize the UN Security Council to “take such action … as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Article 42). Operations in the 1990s in Bosnia and Somalia were even undertaken without the consent of all the main parties and involved armed forces that attempted to impose order in these countries. Peace enforcement operations allow for the controversial use of coercive military measures to maintain stability—a significant breach with

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traditional peacekeeping. Modern peace enforcement missions, such as the Force Intervention Brigade within the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, involve simultaneous political, military, and humanitarian activities in contrast to traditional UN peacekeeping, which solely involved military tasks. UN Peacekeeping increasingly occurs in places where there is no “peace to keep,” moving beyond the original vision separating formerly warring parties, and instead adopting complex and expansive mandates. Several peacekeeping operations are currently active in countries that experience an ongoing violent conflict or frequent attacks by violent extremist organizations. In 2008, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations produced a capstone doctrine for peacekeeping, containing guidelines and principles on the planning and implementation of “multidimensional” and “integrated” UN peacekeeping operations. After the Cold War, there was a significant surge in the number and size of UN peacekeeping operations. After an initial contraction in 2011 and 2012, there has been a further decrease in both personnel and peacekeeping missions in recent years as several missions fulfilled their mandate, leaving a little more than 90,000 military, police and civilian staff currently serving in 13 peacekeeping missions. The 2019–2020 annual budget for UN peacekeeping stood at $6.5 billion, down from nearly $8 billion in 2016, with the United States, China, and Japan providing the bulk of the assessed financial contributions. The largest ongoing mission is the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) with 20,029 total personnel. The smallest UN peacekeeping mission is the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) with 116 total personnel as of September 2019. More than one hundred member states have contributed troops to UN peacekeeping operations. Overwhelmingly, most of them have been developing nations, with Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Rwanda serving as the three largest troop contributors. UNSC resolutions inviting “coalitions of the willing” (such as the NATO-led forces in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Libya) have primarily attracted forces from developed nations willing and able to undertake more robust peace enforcement missions in strategically vital areas. Peacekeeping operations are headed by a special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG), a civilian diplomat with the rank of undersecretary-general. The SRSG has overall authority over the political, humanitarian, and peacekeeping operations of the mission, and facilitates

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the political process by engaging the parties to the conflict. In multidimensional integrated missions, the SRSG is supported by a deputy special representative of the secretary-general (DSRSG), who also serves as resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator. Thus, the DSRSG bears most of the operational and day-to-day responsibilities of running the mission, which gives the SRSG more space to prioritize the political dimensions of the operation. The force commander (FC) is the senior military officer responsible for the planning, conduct, and oversight of UN military activities in country. Member states volunteer their national military contingents, formed police units (FPU) and/or military and police personnel, nominally transferring operational authority to the United Nations. However, member states remain responsible for disciplinary and personnel action, as well as for covering the financial burden of deployment, which is later reimbursed. Troops serve under their own officers, wear national uniforms and a blue helmet, or beret, and a UN badge. The objectives of a peacekeeping operation vary from monitoring a cease-fire, establishing a buffer zone and protecting the delivery of humanitarian aid, to assisting the demobilization of former fighters, clearing mines, or protecting civilians. Whereas some operations maintain a light footprint and play a traditional monitoring role, like the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, other missions assume the transitional authority of a country, as in the case of past UN administrations in Cambodia, Kosovo, and East Timor. In challenging security environments, the UNSC has increasingly provided Chapter VII mandates with rules of engagement calling for robust forces able “to use all necessary means” to protect civilians and prevent attacks on UN personnel. A large majority of peacekeepers today are mandated to protect civilians. Peacekeeping operations are generally mandated to stabilize countries following violent hostilities, and therefore play a primarily reactive role. Preventive deployments are a special type of peacekeeping operation. They are defensive military missions deployed prior to the eruption of widespread violent conflict in the hope that they will contribute to the prevention of armed conflict through deterrence. The UNPREDEP Mission deployed in Macedonia in the 1990s—the only UN preventive deployment mission to date—was established at the request of the Macedonian government and effectively prevented the outbreak of violent conflict.

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The authorization of military deployments requires a significant level of international support, and ultimately depends on the prominence of humanitarian concerns in relation to other strategic interests of Security Council members, regional support for international engagement, resource availability, level of media attention, and assessment of the mission’s likely effectiveness. When these come together successfully, the presence of a robust multilateral military force can project a strong level of international resolve by increasing the perceived cost of violent strategies, and potentially strengthen the credibility of complementary economic, political, and diplomatic efforts. According to data from the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the number of UN personnel deployed in peace operations rose significantly in the 2012–2015 period, from less than 100,000 to almost 115,000, including troops, police, civilian personnel and other staff categories. However, by August 2020 this number had fallen to 94,463. Political and Peacebuilding Missions Increasingly the UN deploys non-military peace operations or field-based support offices to prevent fragile countries from relapsing into conflict, including political missions or peacebuilding support offices. Special political missions rely on diplomatic persuasion to find a nonviolent way out of crises through engagement with the conflicting parties in fragile states. Among these many operations are the UN Support Mission in Libya and the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq. The existing missions vary in terms of activities, size and scope, and include standing regional offices and special envoys. Peacebuilding support offices seek to enhance local capacity and coordinate the UN presence in post-conflict zones that remain at risk but no longer experience high levels of ongoing armed conflict. Peacebuilding offices, like the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, support the creation of legitimate institutions able to provide security, maintain public order, and promote social and economic recovery. The post-conflict stage is characterized by programs that provide education, skills training, and access to land or micro-credits. Political missions and peacebuilding support offices are less controversial than coercive peacekeeping operations, particularly when they carry a region-wide mandate, like the UN Office for West Africa. Their generally discreet, non-military, and consensual nature limits their visibility and perceived intrusiveness. They are also relatively inexpensive and benefit

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from their adaptability to evolving circumstances. Both political and peacebuilding missions may serve as a platform for peacekeeping operations if the circumstances require the presence of troops and may serve alongside military missions such as those deployed to Somalia. These missions may also engage as the only acceptable tool in a non-permissive environment or facilitate the return to self-sustainable peace through structural peacebuilding activities when the presence of a peacekeeping force is no longer required. Their size strongly varies, from less than a dozen staff, like the Office of the Special Envoy on Myanmar, to operations including hundreds of international and local personnel, like the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). UNAMA is the largest political mission currently deployed by the United Nations, both in terms of staff (1,211 as of 2020) and budget ($136 million in 2020). Police Missions UN police units are usually deployed together with military personnel as an integral part of peacekeeping operations. A limited number of UN police serves as advisers in political missions. The UN Police Division operates as an independent unit within DPO. The number of currently deployed UN police has increased compared to the late 1990s, from 5,840 in 1995 to 8,815 in 2020, a growth which results from their ability to restore public order in the short term, while building law enforcement agencies that are critical for long-term stability. Additionally, as peacekeeping missions draw down, the Security Council frequently authorizes an increase in police personnel as it allows for the level of troops to be lowered. UN police missions are generally less expensive and more easily accepted than military operations. In conflict environments, national law enforcement personnel are often unavailable, unwilling, or unable to provide security. The largest police deployment occurred in Sudan (2,163 as of March 2020) as part of the UN-AU hybrid mission UNAMID. The longest-serving mission is in Cyprus, where UN Police have assisted in security arrangements on the “Green Line” since 1964. Along with the increased number of missions there has been an expansion of the tasks UN police are asked to perform. In early operations, UN police was deployed to strengthen national law enforcement agencies, not to replace them. This changed in 1999, when the UN Security Council authorized UN Police in Kosovo and East Timor to exercise a full array of executive law enforcement authority, including arrest, detention, and searches, as well as crowd-management and other critical public order and

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law enforcement functions. Policing mandates now go beyond the traditional duties of monitoring, observing and reporting, and include assisting in the reform, restructuring, and rebuilding of national law enforcement agencies as well as the provision of security support through the deployment of formed police units. An FPU is a team of about 140 police officers deployed to undertake crowd control, protect UN staff and material, and escort UN personnel in insecure regions of a mission area. UN Police are proposed by their respective member states, but individuals must qualify for UN service by passing examinations and satisfying physical requirements. UN police have demonstrated the ability to assist the national law enforcement agencies or, in some cases, replace them entirely. Other Field Presence Types: Human Rights or Humanitarian Missions The United Nations frequently deploys specialized civilian missions or teams to address sectoral challenges in fragile states, like human rights abuses and humanitarian crises. UN civilian personnel have also been called upon to help disarm and demobilize former fighters or organize and observe elections. Working with UN agencies and other humanitarian organizations, UN representatives have assisted with refugee settlement and repatriation, monitored respect for human rights, and alleviated both immediate and long-term humanitarian needs. Although some of these civilian teams operate within a stand-alone operation, they increasingly join peacekeepers as part of broad multidimensional operations. The UN investigates the human rights situation on the ground through fact-finding missions, truth and reconciliation commissions, or commissions of inquiry established by the secretary-general, the Security Council, or the Human Rights Council. In addition to investigating the occurrence of human rights violations, these instruments may strengthen local capacity to prevent future abuses and deal with past violations. As the leading authority for human rights, the high commissioner for human rights integrates the human rights components of UN peace operations in the field. The UN also deploys monitoring or observatory missions to verify compliance with peace agreements. In case of a humanitarian catastrophe, various UN entities will be on the ground to provide disaster relief. From population displacements caused by war and natural disasters, to the impact of such disruptions on health, hygiene, or education, the UN system is actively involved in the prevention of humanitarian disasters as well as the mitigation of

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its effects on populations in need through entities like the World Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). The humanitarian and disaster-relief efforts of the UN system are overseen and facilitated by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Where the United Nations has large relief and humanitarian programs, a humanitarian coordinator (HC) is appointed. The function of the HC is to oversee the collaborative assessment, planning, implementation, and operation of humanitarian efforts and liaise with headquarters, donors, and the host government. Assessing Progress and Remaining Challenges Mixed Results and Continuous Reform Since the establishment of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960, peace operations have become an increasingly common and effective multilateral tool to assist countries torn by violent conflict. As the Cold War came to an end, high expectations were held about the potential of peace operations, and peacekeeping in particular, to bring violent conflicts to an end. The United Nations had been instrumental in fostering reconciliation through its operations in Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Namibia, and Tajikistan. The UN assisted Kosovo and East Timor in establishing democratic institutions and supported the electoral process in Haiti. The UN-authorized coalition force in the Gulf War seemed to vindicate the hopes that the end of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry would enable a more active UN role in conflict resolution. A 2005 Rand Corporation study by James Dobbins found that UN peacekeeping efforts generally have been successful, despite the frequent mismatch between ambitious mandates and modest means.1 But the organization’s record in peace operations remains imperfect, as illustrated by a number of sobering experiences. UN peacekeepers were unable to halt large-scale massacres in Bosnia-Herzegovina and stood by as 800,000 people were killed in Rwanda, restrained by the narrow mandate they had received from the Security Council. Several peacekeeping operations have been required to maintain a long-standing presence or redeploy, as they failed to fulfill their mandate. The mixed track record of peace operations in the past two decades tempered the hopes for a “new world order” and refocused the attention on the operational and political challenges facing the conduct of

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these operations. Concerns about UN personnel management, program resourcing, and decision-making procedures are as old as the organization itself. Members of the U.S. Congress called for UN reform back in 1947, merely two years after the signing of the UN Charter. Reform efforts have succeeded each other ever since. Today, the United Nations faces significant challenges in adjusting its bureaucracy, structure, and operations to the demands of the twenty-first century and transition from “a convener of meetings to a coordinator of action.”2 Member states have insisted on the development of new financial oversight mechanisms, an ethics office, new codes of conduct, and whistleblower protection to improve performance and oversight. In 2015, then secretary-general Ban Ki-moon convened a High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to assess the most pressing challenges facing this instrument and formulate recommendations to improve its ability to deliver. The panel’s document, also known as the HIPPO Report , serves as the most significant effort since the early 2000s to improve the effectiveness and address the persisting flaws of UN peace operations. Among these flaws are a lack of commitment by member states to provide the required personnel and resources, and the lack of a proper information collection, processing, and analysis capability. The report highlights the shortcomings in the existing system and underlines the primacy of politics in advancing the implementation of Security Council mandates. Regarding the UN’s field presence, the report calls for robust rules of engagement, better equipped uniformed personnel, prioritized and sequenced mandates, and adherence to the impartiality principle. While several recommendations from the report have been adopted, many suggestions remain on the United Nations’ agenda for future action. New reform proposals concern the use of the full spectrum of peace operations at the UN’s disposal, a stronger push for partnerships with other intergovernmental and sub-regional organizations, and a larger field focus that gives the deployed missions more room to maneuver and react to developments on the ground. Ultimately, UN reform is about politics. The necessary political consensus to undertake comprehensive reform efforts and move beyond the status quo is rarely present within the General Assembly or Security Council. Even though reform may objectively improve the overall effectiveness, agility, or transparency of the organization, a proposal’s feasibility depends on the political, financial, or strategic calculus of each

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member state. Reform requires the convergence of interests and positions of a significant part of the UN membership, in particular the permanent members of the Security Council. A successful reform effort was the creation of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, also known as UN Women, following a unanimous vote in the General Assembly in 2010. UN Women contributes to women empowerment, equal representation in peace processes and security efforts, and efforts to combat violence against women. There have been some improvements, for example in the number of women holding political office. The overall picture remains mixed, however, with violence against women featuring as a consistent pattern in conflicts around the world. Remaining Challenges The United Nations faces numerous strategic and operational challenges as the mandates of its peace operations become increasingly complex and UN staff is exposed to a changing threat environment. These and other challenges highlighted by the HIPPO Report , including sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers, will require a serious commitment from member states and the Security Council to fundamentally change the way the organization conducts its peace operations in non-permissive environments. UN peace operations also suffer from a significant gender imbalance— currently, only around 6-7% of all uniformed military, police, and justice and corrections personnel in the field are women. This section will highlight three broad hurdles the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations will need to overcome in light of the multilateral nature and increased complexity of peace operations: impartiality, lack of coordination, and political will. Impartiality: As stated above, many ongoing multilateral peace operations today are deployed in situations of armed violence, where peace agreements may be elusive, and the authority of a central government is either faltering or under contestation. In these environments, most mandates call for the active support of government forces, challenging the traditional peacekeeping principle of impartiality. In 2013, the UN Security Council expanded the mandate of the DRC peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, with the creation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). FIB is the first UN peacekeeping operation authorized to carry out targeted offensive operations to “neutralize and

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disarm” groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security. MONUSCO soldiers are only authorized to use minimal force and often unable to hold territory. Controversially, the creation of FIB has blurred the lines between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, challenging the impartiality principle and drawing attacks by rebel forces. In addition to this fundamental complication, UN operations are asked to adapt to changing dynamics on the field. An increase in hostile behavior targeting peacekeepers has resulted in fatalities in recent years. The 2013– 2017 period recorded more hostile deaths than in any other since the 1990s, when blue helmets faced heavy losses in the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and Somalia. Approximately one half of all peacekeeper victims of violent deaths in 2013–2016 were deployed with the UN mission in Mali. In 2019 alone, 102 UN personnel lost their lives while active in UN peacekeeping and special political missions. The rising number of casualties has raised many alarms concerning the security of peacekeeping personnel, as well as their capabilities to deliver on their mandates given such adverse circumstances. The issues of impartiality and the perception of peacekeepers as legitimate actors by all parties are key issues the organization will have to face as it seeks to reform. Coordination: In recent decades, the working environments for international organizations responsible for peacebuilding support have been further complicated by the proliferation of organizational presences in the field, which has strengthened the need for improved coordination between local and international stakeholders. For the United Nations, the challenge of internal coordination became particularly acute given the expansion of UN mandates and the rising number of UN entities involved in peace operations. The creation of formalized mechanisms to enhance the coordination between peacebuilding actors is indispensable for the success of complex peace operations. The objectives of various international organizations may differ, or even undermine each other. Peace initiatives may undermine justice efforts, while political objectives could counter humanitarian priorities. Even if the goals of different organizations overlap, the applied tactics and strategies may vary significantly. International peace operations require integrated operating procedures and communication channels, as well as strategic objectives that are aligned with the available resources. Important lessons can be learned from the coordination efforts by the UN Regional Office in Central Asia in response to the riots in Kyrgyzstan

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in April 2010. The UN Office effectively coordinated local initiatives by OSCE, EU, and UN actors, and facilitated dialogue amongst the political actors in Kyrgyzstan following the violent protests. Effective coordination within international organizations is equally important. Integrated missions are difficult to implement effectively since the UN system contains a multiplicity of offices and agencies with different mandates, funding sources, personnel systems, project cycles, and governing structures. The UN system, like most large bureaucracies, has staff and departments that resist coordination and prefer to report to their headquarters rather than across relevant agencies. One way in which the UN seeks to develop integrated missions is by bringing the peace operation and UN country program together under the leadership of the SRSG. The SRSG’s responsibility is to manage relations with all external agencies and local parties so that the host government can swiftly resume full responsibility for the well-being of its citizens. When the UN establishes a peace operation, members of the pre-existing Country Team must embrace the plans and strategic vision of the SRSG. The SRSG’s team needs to become acquainted with the resident UN agency representatives and remain sensitive to the agencies’ needs for ongoing relations with donors, local authorities, the media, and overseas communities. Political Will: The United Nations is often perceived as an organizational entity that independently complements the role of nation states by facilitating cooperation in international peace and security, human rights, and social and economic development. Given its nature as an intergovernmental organization, the UN strongly depends on member state support, and the P-5 in particular, to conduct its operations. Particularly regarding the involvement in politically sensitive challenges that require coercive action, the United Nations is only as effective as its members allow it to be. Moreover, member states are often unwilling to allocate resources to missions of no direct political interest to them. The HIPPO Report encourages member states to provide political, personnel, material, and financial support to UN peacekeeping missions. So far, the demands for peacekeeping and the complexity of the operations, which have resulted in ever-expanding mandates, remain mismatched with the provided capabilities. National commitments to reduce spending on foreign engagements and create a leaner UN system may further hamper the effort to match capabilities with the operational requirements.

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Regional and Sub-regional Organizations Since the end of the Cold War, regional and sub-regional organizations have played an increasingly prominent role in peace operations, both within and outside their membership area. Regional organizations have become more proactive in dealing with local security concerns, driven by a sense of local ownership. In addition, the UN Security Council is relying more heavily on the support of regional or sub-regional organizations, as the council broadens its interpretation of “threats to international peace and security.” Many of the world’s international organizations are regional or sub-regional in nature—that is, they serve a limited geographic area or are composed of participating states located within a certain region. While regions generally overlap with continents, sub-regions refer to areas within a broader region or continent, like Western Africa, the Caribbean, Southeastern Asia, or Eastern Europe. Under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the Security Council can assign regional organizations an essential role in peacebuilding. The charter encourages states to approach regional organizations first and only approach the UN Security Council with the most severe and intractable disputes. While regional organizations have some level of autonomy in their efforts to prevent conflict or restore stability, no enforcement action can legally be taken without Security Council authorization. There are benefits and challenges to the growing custom of the UN deferring to regional organizations with regards to peace and security operations. Regional actors are familiar with local conflicts, their players and dynamics, and have an interest in regional stability. Regional organizations also benefit from their proximity to deliver a rapid response. On the other hand, regional or sub-regional organizations may bring pre-existing rivalries or legacies into play, as seen in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) role mediating conflict in South Sudan. Furthermore, political will to delegate to these organizations has not always been matched by adequate funding. Advocates of the subsidiarity approach favor decentralized control within a tiered governance system. However, these regional mechanisms may struggle in managing complex peace and security operations and humanitarian assistance. At least 29 regionally-based intergovernmental organizations have an established agenda related to international peace and security. They have diverse institutional arrangements, functions, and political cultures. The

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engagement and visibility of regional organizations in conflict management initiatives strongly differs as well. While the European Union (EU), African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are increasingly involved in preventing the initial outbreak of violent conflict, resolving ongoing conflicts, and stabilizing areas emerging from conflict, regional organizations in South or Central Asia and the Middle East rarely move beyond intergovernmental consultations. ASEAN has never conducted peace operations, leaving that role to the United Nations. Regional organizations may solely deal with inter-state tensions, and disregard internal tensions, cautious not to interfere in the domestic affairs of its sovereign member states. Most regional organizations are inward looking and confine their operational activities to their membership. Others, like the EU, also act against potential instability in the immediate neighborhood, and beyond. A large majority of military personnel in non-UN commanded missions are part of NATO operations and contributed by the United States. The remainder operates within AU, EU, ECOWAS, or ad hoc operations. Regional operations may deploy independently or in support of broader UN operations. Regional organizations may provide a rapid presence until the United Nations is able to deploy a more robust peace operation, or they may take over full or partial responsibilities from the United Nations for post-conflict reconstruction. They can thus start off, take over, or cooperate in a hybrid form or complementary manner. In Liberia, ECOWAS provided a force of armed peacekeepers that augmented a UN mission of unarmed observers. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) gradually absorbed peacebuilding responsibilities from the United Nations. The remainder of this section will introduce relevant regional or subregional organizations involved in peace or security-related activities and humanitarian assistance in Africa, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and the Atlantic, and the Middle East. Africa The African continent is home to several regional and sub-regional organizations that have made significant contributions to the management of violent conflict. African regional organizations are plentiful, generally under-resourced, and some do not hesitate to authorize the use of

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military force when deemed necessary. Regional organizations in Africa increasingly serve as first responders to local crises. In addition to the African Union, the sole organization with a scope and membership that spans almost the entire continent, Africa counts several sub-regional organizations, most notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Within the AU, the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is made up of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund. The Peace and Security Council can authorize several types of peace operations, including fact-finding missions, political missions, and peacekeeping operations. The PSC also allows the AU to assume its responsibilities for the deployment of military peacekeeping and quick intervention missions. The protocol establishing the council authorizes the AU to intervene in the internal affairs of member states to protect civilians, a first for an intergovernmental organization. The AU deployed its first peacekeeping mission, to Burundi, in 2003. The outcome of AU peace operations has been mixed. In Darfur, the AU failed to deploy an effective peacekeeping operation, whereas in Somalia, the AU initially succeeded in reinvigorating a failing operation. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), authorized by the UN Security Council in 2007, is a peace enforcement operation mandated to support the Somali Transitional Federal Government, secure space for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and support security sector reform. In addressing the security challenge posed by insurgent groups, in particular Al-Shabab, AU forces mount offensive military operations. In 2017, Al-Shabaab was driven out from many of its strongholds in the southern regions of the country, though these hard-fought gains have come at great costs in terms of AMISOM casualties, and regular terrorist attacks by the group in Somalia and neighboring Kenya. In 2017, AMISOM was instructed to steadily reduce its personnel starting in October 2018, with a complete departure foreseen in 2020. The timeline has since been altered, with a departure scheduled for 2021. A number of African sub-regional organizations complement the role of the African Union in peace and security activities, in particular the Economic Community of West African States. ECOWAS can deploy fact-finding missions and peacekeeping operations to deal with the management and mediation of intra-state conflict. Although created

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as an economic community, ECOWAS gradually engaged in peace operations, as illustrated by the peacekeeping missions conducted in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and The Gambia. Smaller sub-regional organizations in Africa include the South African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). SADC conducted a peace operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1998 to 2002; IGAD played a peacemaking role in the north-south Sudanese conflict; and in 2008, ECCAS established a Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic. ECCAS member states are increasingly involved in peace and security activities, leading to the creation of a sub-regional early warning system, as well as a nonpermanent military force serving as one of the AU’s African Standby Forces. Africa’s regional peace architecture has historically been under resourced, compared to its mandate and the expectations placed upon it. In 2017, member states funded 14% of the AU’s programs, well short of their July 2015 commitment to finance 75% of the programs by 2020. Americas Despite the deep commitment to human rights and governance throughout Latin America, the regional institutionalization of peacebuilding mechanisms, particularly crisis management tools, has been hampered by a profound adherence to territorial integrity and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Apart from fora for political dialogue and human rights protection mechanisms, the existing regional capacity to address violent conflict is primarily reactive in nature, with a focus on transitional justice and reconciliation. With the Organization of American States (OAS), the Americas are home to the oldest regional organization, dating all the way back to 1889. The organization was established to achieve an order of peace and justice, bringing together all 34 independent states of the Americas, including the United States and Canada. The OAS constitutes the main political, juridical, and social intergovernmental forum in the Western Hemisphere. Despite its significant contributions to the promotion of human rights, good governance, and development, the organization’s involvement in peace operations aimed at intra-state conflict resolution remains limited, although the OAS deployed political missions to support

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the peace process in Colombia and at the adjacency zone between Belize and Guatemala. The OAS primarily works towards preventing inter-state conflict and dispute resolution through mediation and judicial settlement, as well as post-conflict reconstruction efforts including demobilization and disarmament, verification, and monitoring activities. Routinely the OAS sends election observers and political advisers to assist member states in advancing their democratic development. In Haiti, the OAS played a role in stabilization efforts through the Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy, providing training and technical assistance to the Haitian National Police and the Haitian judiciary. The OAS also conducted successful landmine removal campaigns in Guatemala and Nicaragua, and launched good-governance initiatives in other Central American countries recovering from civil war. Sub-regional organizations contributing to conflict resolution efforts in the Americas include the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). While UNASUR primarily aims at economic integration and the free movement of people, the organization’s activities also include conflict prevention through political dialogue and coordination. Since its membership is limited to South American states, UNASUR provides a forum for regional dialogue in contexts sensitive to U.S. interference. UNASUR deployed a fact-finding mission in Bolivia in September 2008 after an escalation of the violence between peasant groups supporting President Morales and the opposing locals in the Pando province. CARICOM concentrates its work on economic integration, but also coordinates the external relations of its member states and undertakes projects to promote nondiscrimination and protect the rights of minorities. The OAS and CARICOM jointly deployed an observation team to the 2010 elections in Haiti. Asia and the Pacific The Asia and Pacific region has few well-established regional or subregional organizations involved in conflict resolution initiatives. Of the extant intergovernmental organizations in the region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is most deeply involved in the protection of regional stability. Despite its growing reputation for the maintenance of peace and security through dispute resolution, ASEAN is

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not a security organization and remains reluctant to conduct peace operations, leaving that role to the United Nations. While the organization has not acted collectively to deal with threats to regional security, individual members have responded to bilateral appeals from other members to provide monitors. In 2004, Malaysia deployed a military monitoring group to the Philippines, which was engaged in a struggle against separatist forces. In 2008, ASEAN established a Contact Group to facilitate a diplomatic solution in the dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, and mandated Indonesian observers to patrol the border. Other sub-regional organizations contributing to conflict resolution efforts in the region include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). The PIF aims to enhance cooperation between the independent countries of the Pacific Ocean. The forum sent an election observer mission to the Solomon Islands in 2001 and 2006 in support of a broader international observer force. It authorized the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003 to stabilize the country and support long-term capacity-building, including training of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. CIS has maintained a longstanding presence in Abkhazia, Georgia, and in Moldova alongside the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe following a secession attempt by Transnistria in the early 1990s. As opposed to ASEAN, several sub-regional organizations operating in Central Asia deal primarily, and often solely, with regional security challenges. The Common Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance that grew out of the CIS framework, formed a collective peacekeeping and rapid reaction capacity, a reportedly 17,000-strong force that is thus far yet to deploy. SCO primarily deals with security challenges posed by non-state actors in Central Asia, including terrorism and religious extremism. Other organizations active in the region similarly aim to address regional security challenges, provide a forum for inter-state consultations, and counter the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Despite their multitude, the sub-organizations active in Central Asia maintain a limited operational presence.

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Europe and the Atlantic Following centuries of large-scale conflict and mass killing, regional European and North Atlantic organizations have guided the transformation of Europe into a zone of relative peace and prosperity. In this process the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have established a significant peacebuilding capacity that aims to mitigate the risk of conflict on the European continent. The EU focuses primarily on the deployment of civilian and military operations limited in time and scope throughout Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe. EU capacity to engage in military peace operations is gradually expanding, yet remains limited in comparison to NATO’s military assets. The OSCE has acquired a recognized expertise in conflict prevention, election observation and post-conflict reconstruction through its capacitybuilding operations in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The European institutions originated in the aftermath of violent conflict, and reflected a conflict prevention objective at their core. Since the creation of the Economic Coal and Steel Community immediately following World War II, the European integration project’s first priority has been to build peace within its borders, a goal which has been largely achieved. Europe still experienced its share of violent conflict in recent decades, particularly at its eastern and southeastern border. The mass violence that occurred after the breakdown of former Yugoslavia in the late 1990s, with the atrocities at Srebrenica as one of the bloodiest episodes, demonstrated Europe’s continued dependence on the transatlantic alliance. The European Community’s failure to effectively manage ethnic conflict in the Balkans in the late 1990s strengthened the will of its member states to establish an autonomous common foreign and security architecture. The EU created its own diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (EEAS), established EU battle groups capable of deploying uniformed EU personnel in crisis situations, and deployed a number of civilian, police, and military missions beyond its borders. As part of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) the European Union engaged on the ground through civilian and military operations in three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia). The geographic scope of the operations is limited to areas of strategic importance, most notably the Sahel region, Somalia and Ukraine. The EU has established rule of

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law, border monitoring, and security sector reform operations, and is making great strides in better integrating its engagements, particularly in the Sahel. In 2003, the EU undertook its first deployment outside Europe by sending a French-led EU military force to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The EU’s Security Reform (EUSEC RD) and Police Reform (EUPOL RD) Missions in the DRC operated alongside a broader UN mission, MONUSCO. The EU has since authorized new missions to the Central African Republic, Libya, and Mali. Most recently, the EU authorized a new mission (Operation Irini) in the Mediterranean to enforce the UN arms embargo in and around war-torn Libya. In addition to its CSDP missions, the EU is active in conflict zones as one of the largest providers of humanitarian aid and development support. The primary humanitarian aid entity is the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO). ECHO’s task is to ensure that aid reaches crisis zones as quickly as possible, and it has disbursed sizable funding in Bangladesh as a response to the Rohingya crisis, and in Yemen, the DRC, and many other hotspots around the globe. The commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) provides significant financial means to promote resilience, security, and peace, including through conflict sensitive development in countries that face possible or ongoing violent conflict. As the EU’s diplomatic service, the EEAS is in charge of around 140 EU delegations or offices, and houses the EU’s intelligence and crisis management structures and conflict prevention instruments, including conflict analysis, early warning and mediation. Of all regional organizations worldwide, NATO has the greatest ability to provide military forces in response to severe conflict situations. The organization’s expansion and focus outside Europe demonstrates its awareness that transnational threats to North Atlantic security often originate in weak and failing states more vulnerable to violent conflict. As a collective defense organization at its core, NATO conducted peace operations in the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa and led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Civilmilitary Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) led by U.S. or NATO forces were deployed in provincial capitals to conduct counterterrorism exercises and promote improved governance, increased security, and economic reconstruction. Due to continued instability throughout the

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country, U.S. and allied troops remain involved in supporting the security and governance responsibilities of the Afghan government. In 2011, NATO conducted an air campaign in Libya, where the alliance enforced a UN-mandated no-fly-zone to protect civilians as part of Operation Unified Protector. Despite its ability to reverse the immediate threat to civilians posed by the regime of Muammar Ghaddafi, the NATO operation in Libya was highly controversial and criticized for its overly militaristic approach. Almost ten years later, the country continues to face severe instability and ranks as one of the most fragile states in the world. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has deployed a growing number of peace operations involved in human rights monitoring, political and legal capacity-building, and electionmonitoring. In addition to most North American and European countries, OSCE membership includes countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, as well as the Russian Federation, providing the organization a sense of legitimacy across long-standing East-West divides. The OSCE played a key role in democratization, media development, and conflict resolution in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The organization plays a leading role in combating human trafficking throughout Europe. With a staff of 1,316 as of March 2020, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (OSCE/SMM) is the largest political mission that is not conducted by the UN. The SMM was deployed in 2014 upon request of the 57 OSCE member states, in the wake of the Minsk Process to end the war in Eastern Ukraine. Its mandate is to monitor the line of contact and contribute to reducing tensions and help broaden the prospects of the peace process. The OSCE’s role is limited in some operations, however, by the requirement to operate by consensus. Since one member can veto the organization’s budget, there will always be constraints on OSCE operations. Unlike most other international organizations, the OSCE was not created by treaty but evolved from an international conference, and thus has no international legal status. Middle East The widespread political instability following the Arab Spring illustrated the limited presence and impact of regional organizations in the Middle East on conflict management efforts. Despite the frequency and lethality of conflict, and the continuity of authoritarian regimes and human rights abuses in the region, the record in the management of regional conflict

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of the League of Arab States and Gulf Cooperation Council, the most prominent regional organizations, has remained bleak. The few diplomatic initiatives conducted in their name are often executed by individual member states. The inability of the League of Arab States to integrate the region economically, politically, and militarily has led to the development of closer sub-regional ties. The Gulf Cooperation Council was established to complement the Arab League at the sub-regional level. While primarily focused on economic and political integration, the GCC undertook a number of peace initiatives, although the forum has recently been embroiled in internal disputes and a standoff between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The Arab League has deployed mediation missions as well, managing local crises or preventing the escalation of violent conflict throughout the region. In addition to its mediation missions in both Iraq Wars, the Arab League spoke out against the violence committed by the regime of Muammar Ghaddafi in Libya, acting as local gatekeeper legitimizing robust NATO intervention in the country. In 2011, the Arab League deployed a monitoring mission in Syria in accordance with the peace plan the organization proposed; the mission was terminated after two months. Kofi Annan, followed by Lakhdar Brahimi, served as joint UN– Arab League peace envoy in the country. So far, neither the Arab League nor the Gulf Cooperation Council have been able to mitigate the violence in Syria and Yemen. This reflects a lack of political will and funding, but more importantly unrealistic expectations placed upon them by the UN and its member states.

Beyond the UN System: Other Intergovernmental Organizations Although most international organizations are part of the UN System, several are not. A number of international organizations are neither affiliated with the United Nations, nor do they have a geographically defined membership. Most of these international organizations are defined along cultural, linguistic, religious, or historic lines, including the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Commonwealth of Nations. The OIC defends the interests and promotes the well-being of the Muslim world. The fact that the organization is defined along religious lines as opposed

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to geographic ones distinguishes the OIC from the Arab League or Gulf Cooperation Council. In addition to promoting solidarity, the OIC adopts measures to foster international peace and security, and has been involved in humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Kashmir. The Commonwealth of Nations consists of 53 member states, most of which were part of the British Empire. The commonwealth is committed to several objectives that contribute to the peaceful prevention and resolution of conflict, including the promotion of representative democracy and individual liberty, the pursuit of equality and opposition to racism, and the fight against poverty. Other linguistic-based organizations include the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) and the Comunidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa.

Conclusion Like the UN, regional organizations face challenges related to coordination and political will. Intergovernmental organizations are also increasingly challenged by the rise of political movements around the world that dispute the legitimacy of the rules and leadership roles of global governance. Regional organizations (like the European Union) and even informal groups (like the G-7) are increasingly challenged in sustaining consensus-based governance. Regional and sub-regional organizations no longer feature a continuous expansion and deepening of competencies, at times experiencing setbacks in terms of membership and authority in the face of new political movements that question the credibility or legal and moral authority of international law. Universal multilateralism has taken a hit and power politics appears to be on the rise, complicating the field operations of the United Nations and the many regional and subregional organizations around the world. Despite these shortcomings and challenges, and despite the fact that these organizations are often underfunded and overburdened, they continue to provide invaluable services to the international community.

Notes 1. James Dobbins et al., The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005). 2. United States Institute of Peace, American Interests and UN Reform (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2005), p. 4.

CHAPTER 3

Non-Governmental Organizations Pamela Aall and Jeffrey W. Helsing

Through most of the twentieth century, power was centralized either in strong states directly or through alliances or informal coalitions of these states. The strictures of the Cold War left little room for non-state actors, whether humanitarian organizations or religious groups, to play a role in managing conflict. The end of the U.S.-USSR confrontation, however, provided an opening for new voices and new actors in this area. The internal conflicts of the late 1980s and the 1990s—in the Balkans, Cambodia, Rwanda and other places—drove conflicts deeper into societies and created humanitarian crises that required a new kind of expertise. The United Nations and its specialized agencies were vastly overstretched and needed assistance in delivering aid to peoples in need. Governments did not have the skills or experience to deal with sectarian violence in refugee camps and other threats to everyday life that resulted from these civil conflicts.

P. Aall (B) United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, USA J. W. Helsing Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution Consultant, Silver Spring, MD, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Aall and D. Snodderly (eds.), Responding to Violent Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59463-3_3

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Into this gap stepped private, non-governmental organizations. While they had been a growing presence in the international sphere since the mid-twentieth century, their growth exploded after World War II from about 3000 international NGOs in 1945, to over 13,000 in 1990, and around 38,000 by 2006. Today, one estimate places the number at over 50,000.1 The expansion in the numbers of NGOs has meant that they have become more engaged in every area of conflict management. In recent years, other factors have also influenced their activities. Initially, NGOs were fairly strict about staying within the confines of their mission. If they were established to do humanitarian work, they essentially limited themselves to providing relief to suffering people. But in response to the changing nature of conflict from interstate to intra-state to intercommunity, many NGOs have broadened their missions to take on other tasks in addition to their original set of activities. This change reflected a growing understanding that responding to conflict, crises and development needs required a multi-dimensional approach. In other words, it has required humanitarian work, security efforts, development programming, and rule of law promotion to work alongside each other in a “shared space.” Today, it is not uncommon to see NGOs primarily dedicated to relief and development also take on the challenge of building the foundation for democratic transitions, promoting the rights of women, and engaging in conflict resolution. They are also working directly with the United Nations, with outside governments, with other NGOs, and with local civil society to provide services, rather than working alone as they often did twenty years ago. This increasingly complex and challenging environment has led to debates within the NGO community regarding a host of new issues. These issues include the relationship between the NGO community and the military in conflict zones, the relationship between the NGO community and parties to the conflict (including government actors and non-state armed groups), the rapid growth of local NGOs, the increasing awareness of the unintended negative consequences of interventions, the increasing demand for accountability and demonstrable impact, the effect of government funding on NGO approaches, and the role of the NGO community in setting the overall official policy agenda. In this chapter we will explore the world of non-governmental organizations, examining their missions, structure, staff, and ways of operating.

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We will also look at some of the issues that concern the NGO community. While NGOs are active in many areas, we will concentrate on those NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, and promotion of good governance and human rights, as these are the organizations most often found in conflict zones.

What Is an NGO? An NGO—also known as a private voluntary organization (PVO), notfor-profit, charitable organization (or charity), and civil society group—is a private, nonprofit organization that does not have official government status, but which provides support and assistance to people and communities. NGOs may also advocate for a variety of issues from environmental protection to gender inclusion. A number of NGOs specialize in conflict management and peacebuilding, while others focus on governance issues or capacity building. NGOs are usually created in order to address an unmet need, and their activities and structures can be as varied as their origins. NGOs may aim at tackling poverty, hunger, disease, and suffering; advocating for human, racial, gender, economic, and political rights; encouraging democratic institution building, conflict resolution practices, and fair electoral practices; and building sustainable agriculture, a healthy environment, and the infrastructure of a civil society. They may also focus, for example, on youth, women, or diaspora communities, or cultural, traditional, or religious affiliations. They come in many different sizes and shapes—NGOs can be large international organizations with multi-million dollar budgets or small groups made up solely of volunteers. As mentioned above, their principal activities in conflict areas can be broken down into several major areas: • humanitarian assistance • economic and social development • advocacy, including human rights promotion or environmental protection • promotion of democracy and good governance • conflict resolution and peacebuilding

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International NGOs NGOs operate all over the world. The twentieth century saw the creation of a handful of large international agencies, many of which set the foundation for the scope of activities that NGOs carry out today. For instance, CARE was originally formed as a cooperative of twenty-two organizations that provided aid to victims of World War II. Quakers founded the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), which played a vital role during and after World War I and World War II by providing food to starving children and helping Europe rebuild itself. Many international NGOs (INGOs) were founded by religious groups, sometimes as the relief arm of a church, mosque, synagogue or other religious institution or sometimes as an outgrowth of the activities of the religious group. Although developed and partly funded by religious organizations, most of these NGOs (for example Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Mennonite Central Committee, and Catholic Relief Services) deliver help regardless of religion, race, or ethnicity. Most large international NGOs have their headquarters in the West. The balance of maintaining a strong centralized headquarters in order to preserve a common structure and protocol while remaining flexible enough to provide local solutions to local problems can be a challenge. One way some have sought to resolve this dilemma is to implement a structural model known as the federated network model. Many large NGOs, including World Vision and Save the Children, have adopted a federal structure that combines largely autonomous or semi-autonomous affiliates with a central coordination mechanism. These local affiliates have become more developed over the past several years and can range from field offices that are dependent upon headquarters to fully independent offices that have a separate board of directors that then coordinates with the home board of directors. A few are located in other regions. Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee (BRAC), for instance, has its headquarters in Dhaka as well as offices in several South Asia and Africa countries, making it one of the largest NGOs in the world. In addition, there is a movement to relocate head offices to the global south. An example is ActionAid, which moved its headquarters from London to Johannesburg in 2004. More recently, Oxfam decided to move its head offices from Oxford to Nairobi.

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BOX 3.1: Red Cross and Red Crescent Although not NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) do similar work as humanitarian NGOs and operate in the same space, but have somewhat different origins. ICRC was established by an international convention, while IFRC is a league of national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. ICRC is an independent, neutral organization whose humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC organizes nursing and other care for those who are wounded on the battlefield; supervises the treatment of prisoners of war and makes confidential interventions with detaining authorities; organizes protection and care for civil populations; and on occasion will act as a neutral intermediary between warring parties. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) coordinates the work of the national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies (Red Cross counterparts in Islamic countries) in 190 countries, particularly in providing relief assistance and other humanitarian tasks during national emergencies. The ICRS and IFRC also promote respect for international humanitarian law and its implementation in national law through consultations with governments, publications and training.

Local NGOs and Civil Society Organizations A local NGO is one that is registered in a particular country, operating in that country and run primarily by citizens of that country. Most countries are home to local NGOs and other non-official groups that may work to alleviate poverty or respond to emergencies. It is, after all, the local community—affected individuals, local governments, NGOs, churches, mosques, temples, neighborhood associations—that most often responds immediately to a humanitarian crisis especially in the hardest hit or most remote areas. Local NGOs bring a range of advantages to the table. They fill many important roles such as acting as intermediaries between governments and citizens; mobilizing communities; building the skills and capacities of local people; and providing security services and information in nonpermissive environments (see the Save the Children report “Supporting

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Local Ownership and Building National Capacity” for more on how to better support local NGOs). Working and partnering with local NGOs in countries in conflict can be an effective way to promote sustainable development and peace. Local NGOs constitute part of a larger segment of society known as “civil society,” although the two terms are often used interchangeably. Civil society is a collective term for a wide array of groups, independent of government and the private sector, which can include civic, educational, trade, labor, charitable, media, religious, recreational, cultural, and advocacy groups, as well as informal associations and social movements. A strong civil society can protect individuals and groups against intrusive government and help to influence government behavior in positive ways. Most definitions of civil society do not include commercial enterprises but do include business associations and trade unions. The media is a different case, as historically it has sometimes been an ally of civil society, sometimes a foe, and sometimes absent completely from the scene, largely depending on its relationship with the state. Technological advances, especially in the social media world, have changed this relationship by reducing the need for traditional media in order to broadcast news and rallying cries. Now using Twitter or Facebook, civil society members can communicate directly with each other, transmitting information as well as ideas or calls to action. The international community has given much attention and funding in the past several years to the development of civil society in fragile states. This has had consequences, both good and bad. An active local civil society is an indicator of a functioning and democratic state since it can promote transparency and good governance by holding the state accountable for its responsibilities to its citizens. It can represent diverse voices and points of view, and deliver essential services to people in the community. Promoting civil society in these circumstances strengthens the social compact between citizen and state. However, in weak or authoritarian states, there can be serious negative consequences. Local NGOs working with international actors can become targets for government repression. Governments under these circumstances can feel threatened by advocates of free speech or increased participation in decision-making. As a result, they may attack NGOs on legal grounds, removing their rights to operate or to raise funds. More ominously, they may accuse them of sedition or of cooperation with outside forces that are trying to overthrow the government, and may seize

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or prosecute staff of the local NGO and ban its international sponsor. The international agency needs to be aware of the risks that local NGOs undertake in working with outside actors as well as the strengths and weaknesses of each individual organization. One unintended negative consequence of the international community’s goal to strengthen civil societies abroad has been increased competition among local NGOs for international funds. Some local NGOs become adept at complying with the fiscal monitoring and evaluation requirements which international donors impose on their grantees and contractors. These local institutions may do excellent work, but their domination in the local markets means that smaller community-based organizations may not be noticed by the donors. Often these communitybased organizations have strong ties with the local population and understand their abilities and needs more deeply than the internationalized local NGOs, but they do not benefit from the same attention and funding as their more worldly brethren. Sharath Srinivasan, in a review of international donor–local NGO relations, recognizes that “[i]nternational actors can find the [conflict] landscape difficult to navigate, especially when their pre-conceived ideas of what a ‘good’ civil society is and of ideal state-society relations come into collision with socio-culturally distinct, unstable and risky local contexts.”2 It is, however, important that international donors, international NGOs and other participants in peace and security broaden their reach beyond the familiar to seek out partners with the greatest legitimacy in the community they seek to help.

Budgets and Funding Funding is a major concern for western NGOs. Senior-level NGO executives and their boards devote much time and attention to securing funding for program activities, staff salaries, and overhead. Whether an organization’s annual budget is less than $100,000 or more than $100 million, much of that sum will have to be raised every year. Amounts and sources of financial support vary from one NGO to another. For example, in 2017, Catholic Relief Services received almost 40% of its revenues from private, corporate, and foundation donations and 60% from public support and revenue. In the same year, Oxfam America received all of its funding from individual, corporate, and foundation donations and other private sources.

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Solicitations for private donations take many forms—fundraisers, direct appeals, mass media advertising. In-kind donations can range from medical supplies to books and clothing. Although governments provide much in-kind food assistance, companies, hospitals, churches, and other bodies also provide many in-kind gifts. Overall, private donations provide significantly more funding to the NGO community than do governments. During fiscal year 2016, for example, the nearly 600 NGOs that are USAID partners received $23.8 billion in support from private sources, compared to less than $3 billion from the USAID.3 Many American NGOs that are engaged in peace and relief operations bid for and accept official government funding to work in these environments. Most funding for international NGOs comes from the United Nations or state-based agencies such as USAID. The importance of state-based funding has led to a rich debate within the community regarding the pros and cons of accepting official government funds. While some NGOs are willing to accept large amounts of official funding for international projects, others fear they will be viewed as an arm of the government, which will limit their independence on the ground, negatively impact their programming, or even place their staff in danger. For instance, most human rights NGOs do not accept funding from government sources for fear it will compromise their advocacy work. In addition, more non-western governments are increasingly engaged in humanitarian relief efforts, including contributions to the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations. In the past decade there has been an increase in funding and direct support from governments in the developing world as well as regional organizations. This is particularly true with respect to Brazil, China, Turkey and India. Turkey has provided considerable financial and humanitarian aid to famineaffected areas of Somalia while India has provided large numbers of medical personnel to Afghanistan. When Myanmar was devastated by cyclone Nargis in 2008, the Indian government was able to send medical staff and humanitarian aid workers into the country long before western aid agencies were allowed to do so. In fact, pressure from India helped change the willingness of the Myanmar government to allow other aid organizations ultimately to enter Myanmar. And, regional organizations like the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) all now have departments of humanitarian affairs.

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NGO Staff and Structure Individuals choose to work for NGOs for a variety of reasons. Some choose to devote their skills and energy to an organization whose mission and programs inspire them. Some are committed to a particular field, such as human rights or child protection. The culture embodied in many NGOs—a culture that values independence, flexibility, and mobility—also appeals to many people. Many NGO staff remain within the NGO world throughout their careers, but others regularly move between NGOs and international organizations. Those who have worked in the fields of relief, development, or human rights may move to agencies with similar missions, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the World Food Program (WFP). A number of former NGO employees can be found on the staffs of funding agencies such as USAID and the World Bank. Advanced degrees are common among NGO staff. Medical doctors become involved in the administration of health-oriented organizations, and engineers in the operation of agencies that deliver technical aid. University professors of political science, sociology, or psychology may be active in the field of conflict resolution. Lawyers dominate the staffs of human rights organizations and are well represented in refugee organizations. Other degrees common among NGO staff include business administration, public health administration, public affairs, and international affairs. The skills of particular staff vary according to the work of the NGO, the stability of its funding, and its personnel policies and practices. One agency may need a full-time bio-medical equipment technician to inspect heart monitors, EKG machines, and intravenous pumps, while another may require an engineer-architect to design a warehouse for food storage in tropical climates. The staff of large NGOs needs high levels of administrative and entrepreneurial skills. Whether for profit or not for profit, a multimillion-dollar operation requires decisive action in difficult situations, skilled financial management, and firm control of geographically extended enterprise. In addition, NGO managers must be aggressive fund-raisers, and they must be able to bring together the energy and commitment of volunteers and paid staff.

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When responding to a crisis, an international NGO will usually dispatch only a small number of its staff from its home office to the scene, and will hire or otherwise engage local inhabitants to fill other positions. Local staff members are selected for their skills, their local knowledge, their command of languages, and their ability to bridge the gap between NGO staff and host country nationals. The professional caliber of such workers can be high, because in a crisis zone there is sometimes a large pool of highly trained but unemployed professionals from which the NGO can select its staff. Hiring local staff can pose problems for both the NGO and the employees, however. Often, local workers will need permission from their government to work for a foreign NGO, and that government may summon the worker away for military service or government work at any time. Governments may also exercise a more direct influence, granting permission to work for NGOs only to persons they find politically acceptable or loyal, or asking them to report on the activities of the NGO. At times, well-paying NGOs can deplete local government, industry, and local NGOs of their best workers by offering salaries in hard currencies that are well above the local pay scale. However, NGOs are not the only source of well-paying jobs for local staff members. In many countries the first choice for national staff is to work with UN agencies, which reduces the number of staff available for international NGOs, and hampers their ability to implement those programs that the UN agencies and other donors fund. The benefits of engaging local staff can be high, bringing local expertise to the ongoing project and paving the way for its future management by domestic groups rather than foreign NGO staff. Where security is a factor, local nationals may be able to work in areas that are too risky for expatriate staff. That approach can have serious consequences, however, for local staff members as it places them in danger. Most NGO workers killed in the line of duty are local staff. Security is a challenge for international NGOs which do not have the money to spend on proper office security that meets even minimum security standards. This situation means that they are often attacked because they are seen as easier targets than the UN. At times, this has caused them to cease operations for a period, harming the implementation of needed programs and activities.

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Structure, Organization, and Lines of Authority In the United States, an NGO usually takes the form of a registered corporation with a board of trustees, an administrative structure, a set of bylaws, a mission statement, a permanent headquarters, and a means of funding. Such NGOs are clear about their values, goals, and the purposes of their activities, which are stated in a charter. All U.S. nonprofit organizations are incorporated as NGOs under the Code of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. This status exempts NGOs from taxation and allows contributors to take a tax deduction for donations. For American NGOs, a board of trustees governs the organization according to its bylaws. Board members are usually recruited from various sectors of the community—including the corporate, political, religious, legal, medical, media, and educational sectors—for their diverse skills. As board members, they are legally accountable for its operations and for the fulfillment of its mission and financial obligations. They generally serve without compensation, hold regular meetings, elect officers, set the mission and direction of the organization, and ensure that the organization has the capacity to meet these directives. Board decisions typically involve matters of policy, not day-to-day issues. Board action is likely to be needed when an organization considers undertaking an activity outside its current scope or venturing into a new geographical area. The board is usually responsible for recruiting and hiring the organization’s executive director, but not other staff members. Although board members are apprised of ongoing activities and may visit field offices to observe the staff at work, they generally are not involved in operational decisions. The administrative head of an NGO—the executive director, director, chief executive officer (CEO), or president—is directly accountable to the trustees. Other management staff are recruited and hired by the executive director. These positions typically include directors of finance, government relations, communications and public affairs, and programs.

Accountability As the NGO sector has grown and become an essential actor in peace, stability, and relief operations, questions have arisen as to whether it can be held accountable, and if so, to whom. NGOs are generally legally accountable for their work to their founders or founding institutions,

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their boards and their funders. This last group is quite diverse and can include governments, UN agencies, foundations, religious institutions and thousands of individuals. NGOs are expected to abide by international humanitarian and human rights law. As importantly, the NGO community recognizes its accountability to the communities it serves, a refrain found both in descriptions of its programming and in the codes of conduct that have been drawn up in the past 25 years to help humanitarian agencies uphold key principles in their on-the-ground work. The need for a code of conduct for humanitarian agencies became all the more apparent in the 1990s when human suffering caused by the post–Cold War intrastate conflicts drew humanitarian actors into chaotic situations where they were caught between warring groups and pressured by governments to take sides. One of the first codes of conduct for humanitarian assistance was developed by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in 1994. It was agreed upon by eight of the world’s largest disaster response agencies. The ten principles have been endorsed by the humanitarian community, including many NGOs. BOX 3.2: Core Principles of the IFRC Humanitarian Code of Conduct • The humanitarian imperative comes first. • Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone. • Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint. • We shall endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy. • We shall respect culture and custom. • We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities. • Ways shall be found to involve program beneficiaries in the management of relief aid. • Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs. • We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.

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• In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects. Source “Code of Conduct,” International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-rep orts/code-of-conduct/#sthash.pgjlOSkb.dpuf

Another effort to establish some rules of the road is The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, developed by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, a voluntary association of a number of large humanitarian agencies. The handbook is based on three overarching principles: • the right to life with dignity • the right to protection and security • the right to receive humanitarian assistance Sphere also emphasizes the principles—during armed conflict—of impartiality, the distinction between civilians and combatants, proportionality, precaution and impartial relief. It also addresses the importance of the protection and safety of populations affected by disaster or armed conflict as an integral part of humanitarian response, and addresses emerging issues like climate change, disaster risk reduction, early recovery of services and livelihoods, cash transfers and civil-military relations. These codes have been helpful not only because they define broad principles about how the humanitarian community works, but they also help to separate the humanitarian community from the political agendas of governments and security agendas of the military. Other NGOs also have established statements of core values which guide their work. For instance, Human Rights Watch’s values emphasize its commitment to human rights and humanitarian law, independence from governments, objectivity and neutrality, accuracy and fairness in reporting, support for civil society, and focus on effecting change. Amnesty International joined with 26 other NGOs in signing on to accountability commitments related to justice and equality, women’s rights, open organizations, responsive decision-making and good governance. While many conflict resolution organizations have specific codes of conduct that reflect the principles endorsed by other NGOs, there is

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not an agreed set of standards for their work, for instance in the international mediation field. This is in part due to the fluid and political nature of peacemaking and peacebuilding, and in part because it is a young field and still in development.

NGOs in Conflict Zones The Changing Context NGOs are increasingly working in hyper-politicized conflict environments requiring a comprehensive response to the crisis that would involve security, development, political and humanitarian entities. The war in Syria is a recent example of political and humanitarian crises which link the scope, orientation and objectives of humanitarian action to the political nature of the conflicts. In this conflict, national and regional politics at play with a diverse cast of actors from Iran, Israel, Jordan, the United States, Russia, and Turkey are all engaged to some degree, amid countless numbers of humanitarian and development organizations which are working to mitigate the effects of the ongoing war. Syria is also an example of how the political and security context in one part of the country may be significantly different from other parts. For instance, in mid-2018, the Assad regime re-established its control over the South of Syria, where the surrender of the armed groups in the South was mediated by Russia. Thereafter, challenges related to the re-establishment of governance, the return of refugees, and the possibility of reprisals by state security forces became paramount in the South. In other areas of the country, such as the territories controlled or supported by Turkey, or in the Northeast areas held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, humanitarian needs were critical as was the goal of defeating the forces of ISIS. With ISIS’ defeat, the U.S. announced its withdrawal from Syria which had the effect of promoting a new political and military struggle, particularly in northeast Syria. This shifting context has a profound impact on the work of NGOs throughout the course of a war in a country like Syria. Often humanitarian or development organizations find themselves attached to political and security arrangements encompassing political influences from a vast array of local, national and global actors. As these many actors realize the political implications of humanitarian engagement or outcomes, there is a risk that the humanitarian and development

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NGOs might be absorbed or perceived as co-opted into a wider integrated response. Such complex environments can imply multiple goals for any given organization, and thus different types of engagement, which can also increase the risks of poor or unclear coordination mechanisms. These dynamic environments, where political and security interests are intertwined, may limit the possibilities of what can be achieved. Thus, NGOs and INGOs—particularly ones that rely on access to those affected by violent conflict (refugees and victims in need of humanitarian relief; communities in need of reconstruction or development)—become part of the broader political negotiation as they gain or negotiate access. Their actions and policies can have consequences that spill over into the political, security or economic spheres. As the ICRC notes, “Non-state actors may become empowered via negotiations over access. The context becomes transactional.”4 But there are also different standards and policies that can enable or restrict the actions of INGOs in a conflict situation. Typically, an organization’s mandate allows or restricts institutions from engaging with non-state armed groups (NSAG). For example, the ICRC’s mandate enables the institution to interact and negotiate with NSAG, while the UN is occasionally hampered in its ability to negotiate access with these groups. In the United States, counter-terrorism legislation constrains NGOs’ ability to engage NSAG. Integrated missions are often strengthened when there are partners that are not seen as “western.” Over the years, there has been strong criticism that humanitarianism and peace operations reflect twenty-first century imperialism or western political agendas. That perception can make it difficult for internationals to gain access in a number of conflict zones.5 In some countries, UN organizations and western NGOs have been banned. In Somalia, however, the NGO Islamic Relief was still able to work in Mogadishu. Although Islamic Relief is based in the United Kingdom, it has field offices in over 50 countries and its staff and board come from many parts of the Muslim world; therefore, the ties to and focus on Islamic priorities enable it to reach communities that many western organizations cannot. Similarly, when most NGOs were forced to leave the province of Darfur in Sudan, Mercy Malaysia, a 20-year old Malaysian-based international NGO, continued to work in Darfur.

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BOX 3.3: Mercy Malaysia and Sant’Egidio as Examples of Variety Mercy Malaysia was established in 1999 by Dr. Jemilah Mahmood, a Malaysian obstetrician and gynecologist. Her goal was to provide a platform for like-minded Malaysians to play a role in the international humanitarian arena. The first mission was to Kosovo in 1999. Initially focused on medical relief, Mercy Malaysia’s humanitarian focus now includes emergency response to rehabilitation and recovery, mitigation and prevention, and disaster preparedness. It has provided humanitarian assistance in 32 countries in the past 20 years. In 2018 and 2019, Mercy Malaysia was hailed for its winter relief program and obstetrics and midwifery training in Syria, particularly for displaced populations and medical services in refugee camps. The Community of Sant’Egidio is a lay Catholic charity association founded in 1968 and dedicated to working with the poor, ill, elderly, marginalized groups, and others in need. It has also been active as a mediator and peacemaker. Its activities in this area started in the early 1990s, when it was asked by the warring parties in Mozambique to serve as the observer and then the mediator of the peace talks that ended the seventeen-year civil war in that country. Since that time, it has played a peacemaking role in over a dozen conflicts in Africa, Central America, the Balkans, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Challenges to Humanitarian Space In general, NGOs dedicated to humanitarian relief operations attempt to maintain policies that are consistent with the IFRC Code of Conduct described above. NGOs, especially those that focus on humanitarian aid, development, and conflict resolution, value their neutrality. Unless they are recognized as neutral by the parties to the conflict, they are unlikely to be able to gain access to those in need or to promote dialogue between the antagonists (individuals, community groups, governments, and rebel forces) with whom they work. In Sudan, for instance, the government forced a number of international NGOs to leave the country due to a perceived lack of neutrality. However, this situation is shifting somewhat in humanitarian negotiations, as relief agencies negotiate directly with parties to the conflict, at times resulting in occasions in which the NGOs have influence on the political dynamics or ongoing ceasefire or peace negotiations. Most human rights organizations are also careful to limit

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their advocacy to the rights of individuals or groups, so they are seen as impartial rather than as taking sides in the conflict. Recent operations in combat zones have increased discussion within the NGO community on what constitutes “humanitarian space.” For NGO workers, humanitarian space is that area where they can perform their work without concerns over interference from outside political or military influences. It is a physical area where the personal security of NGO workers and the beneficiaries of their aid are protected. Creating this space is not a matter of setting up a cordon of barbed wire and inviting those who wish to benefit to enter. It is more a matter of recognizing that such a space is a prerequisite for humanitarian work. For NGOs, it means the need to be free and secure in order to help others. In non-permissive environments, humanitarian space is shrinking. NGO workers are increasingly seen as the enemy, regardless of their humanitarian mission, the degree of their impartiality and neutrality, or the extent of their willingness to work with U.S. or other military personnel or UN or regional peacekeeping forces. They are often seen as foreign interlopers, there to advance the political and economic interests of external forces, and are therefore viewed with distrust by local communities. Armed militias sometimes target NGO workers, as they are vulnerable soft targets and the militias can be confident that such attacks will drive away the NGOs for a period of time. And where local government is barely functioning or has collapsed, NGO representatives must exercise great caution to avoid being injured, kidnapped, or killed. In fact, risk management has become an increasing concern for NGOs, as their field staff are sometimes seen as valuable assets to bolster insurgents’ visibility and finances. NGOs try to identify and ally themselves with forces seeking to resolve political differences, but this does not always provide protection against extremists in conflicted regions. Even in more stable situations typical of peacekeeping operations, NGOs can be snared in a web of political and practical difficulties by a shift in overall responsibility for operations from the United Nations to NATO, or a change in force composition from one country or coalition to another. Because of the increased risks, almost all NGO workers traveling to conflict zones receive security training, whether it be in-house training or training provided through the UN’s Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE) training or through a professional security company. The training emphasizes that, because of their work, NGO

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staff members are vulnerable to assaults and other violence. The security training aims to heighten their awareness to potentially life-threatening situations, hostage survival techniques, and stress- and trauma-coping mechanisms. Even in less chaotic situations, NGO field staff face numerous frustrations and challenges. Transportation is particularly difficult, as NGOs lack access to aircraft, sophisticated communications equipment, satellite imagery, and armored vehicles that peacekeeping troops possess, although the UN Humanitarian Air Service, run by the World Food Program, does offer services to international NGOs to aid them with transportation in many fragile contexts. Also, in combat zones even a short journey can be delayed by hours, days, or even months by damage to roads; by mines, bandits, and snipers; by unpredictable requirements for travel permits; by numerous checkpoints manned by undisciplined militias; and by the imposition of duties and fees. Neutrality Versus Impartiality BOX 3.4 Impartiality: Regarding foreign aid, impartiality means assistance must be based on need alone, without regard to nationality, race, religion, class, or politics; it does not imply equal provision of aid, however. In mediation or peacekeeping, impartiality means treating the contending sides equitably and with fairness. Neutrality: A deliberate policy of not taking sides in hostilities or, for many NGOs, of not engaging in controversies involving politics, race, religion, or ideology.

Neutrality, impartiality, and independence are the cornerstones of humanitarian NGO work. However, sometimes there is a conflict between impartiality and neutrality. Impartiality means that an organization makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinion. Those humanitarian workers are obliged to recognize the similarity of all people but to identify differences based on their needs. Aid distribution is therefore prioritized according to those who have the greatest need and are in the most urgent situations of distress. Neutrality, on the other hand, is a deliberate policy of not taking sides in hostilities. Neutrality is probably the most debated and contested

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humanitarian principle since in certain environments neutrality is impractical and even undesirable. For example, during the refugee crisis after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, NGOs in the refugee camps in neighboring Goma were committed to helping anybody they could, including the perpetrators of the genocide (genocidaires). Many genocidaires were fed and clothed by NGOs in the refugee camps, which allowed them to regroup and continue their mission of violence. The situation in Rwanda led the NGO community to seriously rethink the principle of neutrality in conflict situations. The question then became whether the principles were more important than their consequences. Another example is in Afghanistan. Some NGOs work with the Taliban in remote Taliban-controlled regions in order to gain access to people in need. Although the goal is to provide life-saving assistance to needy communities, does this cooperation give legitimacy and power to the Taliban, and when does neutrality turn into complicity for human rights violations? Today more and more NGOs have rethought the concept of neutrality and many have developed their own perspective on the principle and its implementation. Those who engage in humanitarian negotiations face a few key questions: how can negotiators pursue the specific objectives of gaining access to vulnerable populations in ways that do not compromise broader political and peacebuilding objectives while remaining true to the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality? For a long time, many in the humanitarian sphere considered anything “political” to be outside their operational remit. In situations where compromise is necessary, humanitarians often feel forced into win-lose scenarios in which they are asked to make ethically and legally imperfect decisions. As some have asked, when is it better to reject a bad deal (thus providing humanitarian aid to no one) than accept a bad deal (thus providing aid subject to restrictions imposed by governing authorities that run counter to humanitarian principles)? Ideally, neutrality is meant to ensure that aid agencies can work in conflict zones while avoiding the political dynamics. “The mission of humanitarian organizations is to take the side of civilians affected by the conflict. This neutral humanitarian perception may be difficult to maintain in situations where one of the main goals of a party to the conflict is to take aim at the life and dignity of a segment of the population (e.g. discriminatory policies, ethnic cleansing, genocide, etc.).”6 In fact, international and non-governmental organizations are finding that if they are

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not associated with a national government the space for humanitarian action in war zones shrinks significantly. On the other hand, if they cooperate with a national government, they are often suspected of taking sides and, in the eyes of armed non-state actors, seen as spies, informers, or agents of the regime. In 2014, Medicins Sans Frontieres took a public stand about an alleged massacre of Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine state of Myanmar, resulting in the government accusing MSF of favoring the Rohingya and banning it for 9 months. Conversely, in 2013 MSF withdrew from Somalia due to the increased killings and kidnappings of its staff on the ground. For many international NGOs, including those providing humanitarian aid, a strict adherence to neutrality in the increasingly political climate of the post-9/11 world is unrealistic. Paul O’Brien, ex-advocacy coordinator in Afghanistan for CARE, wrote in the Harvard Human Rights Journal in 2004, that “politics are too important to be left to politicians. The fiction of humanitarian neutrality … can no longer be relied upon for all humanitarians in highly politicized contexts such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In such environments, politicized humanitarianism is both right and realistic.”7 Not only is the number of aid workers being killed or kidnapped considerably higher than in previous decades, but humanitarian access is increasingly part of the broader political negotiation process.8 During the Geneva talks regarding Syria, humanitarian access was “overtly used to send signals and win concessions as part of the political agenda.”9 Some NGOs refused to provide aid in Syria when they found the terms of the Assad regime unacceptable regarding where and when aid could be delivered. Unintended Consequences: Do No Harm NGOs operating in conflict areas can be dragged into the fight by choosing to work with one group rather than another, by bringing supplies and resources into the war zone, or by becoming a target of the war effort. In addition, in a number of crises, NGOs have come to assume responsibilities that far exceeded their original missions. For instance, in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, NGOs moved into the vacuum caused by the collapse of central authority, undertaking many of the basic public services—food distribution, education, and health services—usually provided by local governments. In this situation, the

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NGOs essentially replaced the state. Their ability to swiftly initiate and improvise alternative services certainly benefited the local people, but at a significant cost to the effort to create an effective national government with ministries capable of providing essential services to the population. The international NGO community has concentrated over the past decade on engaging with local civil society in conducting its work in conflict zones. Many of their activities are performed with or through local partners. Given the size differential, it would be easy for an international NGO to take over existing local structures for relief distribution, development work, and conflict resolution, and overpower local NGOs and civil society organizations already engaged in these efforts, in the name of efficiency. But the long-term consequences of disempowering local civil society groups and structures is detrimental to strengthening civil society. The costs run both ways. After the 2010 Haiti earthquake, local Haitian civil society organizations were not actively engaged by NGOs and the international community at large in Haiti’s relief efforts. Consequently, the international NGOs did not benefit from the contacts, knowledge, and legitimacy of the local groups, nor did they build up the capacity of the locals to take over after the internationals leave. In other contexts, armed non-state actors can exploit the lack of coordination or a shared operating picture among NGOs to serve their own interests. NGOs, those that provide development or humanitarian assistance and resources, have been played off against one another. Neutrality and the desire to assist has been manipulated by both armed groups and governments, particularly when NGOs do not act in a coordinated manner. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab exploited the lack of coordination, secrecy and division among aid agencies by extorting payments in exchange for access to refugees or others in need by telling aid workers that they needed to pay for such access since all other agencies were doing so. Even with the best of intentions, misunderstandings can occur between NGOs and the people they are trying to serve. In meeting their own needs, NGOs may absorb the best of what is available locally in terms of office space, as well as local staff. NGO transportation and communication facilities are likely to be far better than those of the local government. This can cause tension and more seriously can disrupt the local economy. In Afghanistan and South Sudan, for example, the most educated locals can make more money working for international organizations and NGOs than in their professional capacities as doctors, teachers and police officers.

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Racing to the Rescue Another potential problem is the emergence of small, ad hoc NGOs that appear in disaster areas or conflict zones. Sometimes known pejoratively as “suitcase” NGOs, they can range in size from one individual, suitcase in hand and ready to make a difference, to several people who arrive in the disaster area and operate locally with limited funds. With the constant media coverage of violent conflicts and natural disasters, it is only natural that people want to do something tangible to alleviate suffering and help those in need. Advances in technology, especially computers and internet access, have created an environment where an individual can easily set up and run an NGO. Furthermore, the very structure and systems that large NGOs have developed to increase effectiveness and accountability may limit flexibility, with informal, spontaneous organizations then seeing themselves as less bureaucratic and better able to reach people quickly. Due to their small size and minimal internal procedures, these ad hoc NGOs can quickly adapt to the needs on the ground. Given their lack of bureaucracy, they can make contacts and build relations quickly with a local community. On the other hand, ad hoc NGOs can complicate the logistics of a relief operation. They may arrive in a disaster area eager to help, but without prior knowledge of the situation or contacts in the particular locale. They may have underestimated the security concerns and need protection. As a result, NGO workers from larger, more established organizations may spend some of their time ensuring that ad hoc NGOs do not make a bad situation worse.

The Challenges of Coordination The term “coordination” has become the focus of many critiques of the international response to humanitarian disaster or internal conflict. The criticisms about coordination have been targeted at all the operational institutions: the United Nations, the military, U.S. government agencies, and NGOs. Critics claim that the lack of a coordinated response, a refusal to share resources, and an unwillingness to subordinate particular national or institutional goals to an overriding peacemaking agenda have characterized peace and stability operations. Although there may be reasonable explanations for this lack of coordination, it is apparent that

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disunity weakens peacemaking efforts and that strengthening collaborative efforts must be a priority for all the intervening actors. Here, we look briefly at two types of collaborative activities: within the civilian community (including NGOs and IOs), and between that community and the military. Coordination Within the Civilian Community In the past, NGOs often acted independently, with little collaboration either among themselves or between themselves and other entities such as military forces. As a result of the many-layered international responses to recent crises such as mass famines, epidemics, warfare, and displaced populations, however, that practice is changing, and NGOs have greatly improved coordination in complex humanitarian emergencies. And there are a number of umbrella organizations, such as InterAction and the International Council for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), that encourage collective action, consultative programming and improved coordination among their membership. BOX 3.5: Coordinating Organizations A number of member-based organizations, networks and consortia have been created to amplify the work of NGOs and enhance coordination of their missions and priorities. These include the World Association for NonGovernmental Organizations (WANGO), headquartered in the United States; the Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN), housed in the Overseas Development Institute in the United Kingdom; and InterAction and the Alliance for Peacebuilding, located in Washington, DC. WANGO works to strengthen and encourage the work of the nongovernmental sector as a whole, as well as increase public understanding of the non-governmental community. It provides the mechanism and support needed for NGOs to connect, partner, and multiply their contributions to build peace, promote human rights, strengthen development and provide humanitarian relief. HPN provides a forum that brings together policymakers, practitioners and others working in or on the humanitarian sector to share thoughts, lessons and experiences, in order to develop better practices in the humanitarian field. InterAction is an alliance of international NGOs and partners that aims to help its members act collectively to more effectively respond to and serve the development, justice and peace

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needs of the world. The Alliance for Peacebuilding is a network of organizations working around the world to reduce violence and build peace primarily through creating coalitions, taking collective action and elevating the peacebuilding field. There are also more narrowly focused consortia, including the Centre of Competence on Humanitarian Negotiation created by five humanitarian organizations: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), Médecins sans Frontières (MSF-Switzerland) and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD).

Inter-NGO relationships allow individual NGOs to pool their knowledge, expertise, and sometimes also their resources, or to coordinate their efforts to tackle multifaceted problems. In some cases, donors actively support these efforts. One such example is the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which was established in 1992 to convene the major UN and non-UN players in humanitarian assistance (including the major NGOs) to develop humanitarian assistance policies, frameworks, and coordination mechanisms. In fact, since the IASC’s establishment, it is virtually a requirement for NGOs to follow the lead of the UN in order to secure funding for humanitarian relief in a conflict zone. Some NGOs are now co-leads with UN agencies both at the country and local level. Save the Children is a global co-lead with UNICEF for the education cluster and the emergency shelter cluster and performs a similar role at the local level where Save has a mission. NGOs active in the fields of human rights, civil society building, and conflict resolution also try to work with local groups where they exist. Where they do not exist, their creation is often promoted by the NGOs so as to establish a local capacity to press for political reform or to facilitate dialogues between opposing sides. In a humanitarian crisis, UN operational agencies, joined in a few cases by large NGOs such as Save the Children and Oxfam, take the lead in coordinating NGO activities, at the head of what is called the cluster approach. These clusters, which are made up of humanitarian organizations, form the nucleus of a coordinated response to humanitarian crises. Each cluster is dedicated to action in a certain area—from refugee camp management and coordination to food security, emergency telecommunications, water and sanitation, and education. Each cluster is led by a

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UN agency and the whole effort is coordinated by the undersecretarygeneral for humanitarian affairs of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In addition, at the country level emergency efforts are led by the humanitarian coordinator (HC) who is also the senior-most UN official in country. In the Philippines, for example, the same individual serves as the UN resident coordinator, the UNDP resident representative, and the UN humanitarian coordinator. In Afghanistan, it is the deputy special representative of the secretary-general who plays these roles. Unifying these roles in a single person helps the coordination effort with all INGOs charged with implementing UN-sponsored programs. In addition to better coordination with each other and with host governments and local authorities, the cluster approach improves accountability because the roles and responsibilities are clearly laid out and defined. The cluster agencies learned a great deal from the 2010 Haiti earthquake, which demonstrated the effectiveness as well as areas for improvement regarding the cluster approach. For example, there were gaps in addressing issues that span across clusters, such as the diverse needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Fully responding to the needs of IDPs in a massive emergency like Haiti requires joint action across particular cluster areas and it was challenging to develop a unified, multifaceted response to needs for food, health services, sanitation, shelter, and protection. Another issue in Haiti was the sheer number of humanitarian actors involved, many with limited capacity, which created situations where several hundred agency representatives attended cluster coordination meetings in key sectors such as health. The clusters also did not engage local NGOs effectively; unfortunately, cluster meetings were conducted in English, which shut out the local French and Creole-speaking NGO community. Again, finding the right balance between providing immediate assistance on the ground and working within local structures during times of immediate need is challenging and this issue will continue to be grappled with by the NGO community. That said, naming an agency responsible for coordinating efforts in a particular area is critical because it gives some structure in an otherwise chaotic environment. The 2010 Haiti earthquake revealed the importance of having a lead agency in each of the eleven areas critical to survival after

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a humanitarian emergency and also brought to bear the complexity of coordination among the clusters themselves. Relationships Between NGOs and the Military NGOs often work in the same “shared space” as military actors, particularly those NGOs involved in humanitarian operations. Often militaries (either engaged in peacekeeping, war fighting, peace operations, or counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions) will be conducting a variety of missions simultaneously—for example, peacekeeping, combat missions, force protection, non-combatant evacuation operations, or support to humanitarian assistance/disaster response operations, all of which will be governed by different objectives and rules of engagement with other stakeholders in the shared operating space. Among NGOs working in the field, there are varying degrees of willingness to work with the military. Many NGOs will tailor their relations with military forces based upon the specific mission of those forces: war, peacekeeping, or support to humanitarian operations. To work together cooperatively assumes recognition of each other’s areas of competence and capacity. For example, military logistical capabilities far exceed those of any NGO and there are times when this is the difference between meeting the needs of a population or not. Some NGOs will share information on the health status of populations or other concerns within their competence. NGOs will look to the military to share information on security, such as the location of minefields or other dangers. Traditionally, NGOs and the military have perceived their roles to be distinct and separate. NGOs have felt uneasy working with military forces, whether from their own country or from the country receiving assistance. NGOs have been conscious of the need to preserve their impartiality because of the protection it affords them. Some NGOs fear that their humanitarian space will be compromised if they cooperate with their military counterparts, or that there will be a blurring of roles that will reduce their effectiveness. On the other hand, military leaders have tended to regard NGOs as undisciplined and their operations as uncoordinated and disjointed. Efforts in the early 2000s to enlist the support of NGOs in Afghanistan to work with the military in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), for instance, met with little enthusiasm or cooperation from nonofficial organizations. NGO resistance increased when the military took on such “civilian” roles as building schools and repairing power plants.

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Not only did these activities duplicate the work of NGOs, the blurring of lines between soldiers and humanitarians put the NGOs at risk of becoming a target in the eyes of the insurgents. Some of the greatest obstacles that humanitarians face when conducting negotiations are determined by the political and security context in which they operate. Humanitarian concerns are often a low priority for state and non-state actors when issues of national security and state survival are at stake. Attitudes on both sides have changed, however, as exposure to each other’s strengths and capabilities has served to increase the military’s respect for the innovation and dedication of NGOs, and to foster an appreciation among NGOs, especially in complex emergencies, for the military’s unsurpassed capacity for protection, logistics, and at times evacuation. Generally, the military’s initial objective in any intervention is to achieve stabilization and provide security first for its own forces and then for others, but its overall objectives are defined by civilian political leaders. The military is often concerned about “mission creep”; they prefer to go in, fix the problem, and get out quickly. The NGO community’s objectives are typically to first address the humanitarian needs brought on by the conflict, and then to address longer term peacebuilding and development issues; their involvement is often open ended. These different goals and perspectives tend to produce different plans, expectations, and timelines. As we have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, these differing goals and plans, as well as shifting political directives, have called into question the concept of a clear exit strategy with a responsible handover to NGOs and local institutions. It is clear that the military was unprepared to meet public expectations following the initial end of major combat and that recognition of the roles of the relief community was insufficient. As noted above, NGOs have long-standing relationships with the local community and are an excellent source of information; they can provide information, for example, on such subjects as how best to set up a distribution system within a particular area and the relative dependability of various local groups and individuals. However, NGOs see their long-term success and physical security as dependent on good and open relationships with the indigenous population and are consequently wary of compromising the trust they have established by providing information to the military. They may even be reluctant to be seen with military personnel. One challenge for cooperative action is to find a way that the military and

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the NGOs can communicate and share information while respecting such inhibitions on full disclosure. Given the increase in politically motivated attacks on NGO personnel and the local beneficiaries of NGO programming, some humanitarian NGOs will remain reluctant to coordinate any activities with military actors. At the same time, NGOs will continue to encounter many different types of military units and personnel in hostile and potentially hostile environments. Fortunately, NGOs and militaries, including peacekeepers, have increasingly worked to adhere to, if not actually codify, the international humanitarian law principles of distinction and of precaution. The principle of distinction aims to reduce the likelihood of attacks on civilians or civilian objects such as vehicles and installations by distinguishing them from military personnel and objects. That is done by creating clear differences in the clothing, transportation, and housing of military forces and NGOs or other civilian organizations. Humanitarian assistance may be refused if the local population confuses military and civilian personnel or objects. The principle of precaution is the obligation by both armed forces and NGOs to take safety measures for the protection of civilians. This is embodied in the principle of “Do No Harm,” noted above, so that all actions or programs by NGOs, military forces, and any other group offering assistance should account for potential unintended impacts of intervention. The principle of precaution also requires steps to be taken to prevent “second order” unintended impacts, such as creating the perception that NGOs are working for the military, since this could lead to attacks on civilian personnel and installations. A critical component in reducing misperceptions is open communications between military and civilian personnel. Military forces, including the U.S. military, are keenly aware of the value of exchanging information with NGOs while understanding the need to minimize the interaction of NGOs with military personnel in order not to compromise their independence. Militaries also recognize the importance of ensuring freedom of movement for NGO staff during humanitarian crises. In complex operational environments, NGOs may need to negotiate directly with armed groups—both state and non-state actors—to create access of their workers to affected populations and ensure the safety of their beneficiaries and staff. Many NGOs do not allow weapons on their sites as a way to encourage local communities to trust and accept them. In order for NGOs to

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be effective, external military or peacekeeping forces must understand the importance of protecting the ability of NGOs to be accepted by communities in need as well as by armed groups. In each military service there are sections and personnel whose primary duty is to ensure that military and non-military actors are interacting and communicating well. Such coordinating organizations are staffed by military staff who have been specifically authorized and trained to support civilian-military dialogues and operations. The U.S. military uses the term civil affairs (CA) to describe these operations, while NATO uses civilmilitary cooperation (CIMIC). The American military has increasingly viewed the CA or CIMIC personnel as valuable advisors to the military mission commander on how military activities will affect or interact with the civilian sector. For instance, CA personnel are trained to operate within and coordinate activities when the military sets up humanitarian operations centers or humanitarian assistance coordination centers. In order to establish greater coordination between NGOs and the U.S. military, a group of NGOs and U.S. military personnel negotiated and developed guidelines for civil-military relations in complex emergencies. Key lessons and recommendations that emerged from that process are: Create organizational incentives for coordination; monitor websites of key agencies and organizations working in the same operational space; simplify language and acronyms and don’t assume there is a shared mission or shared understanding; document and hand over relationships in light of steady staff transition; and follow through on commitments.10

Countering Violent Extremism: Collaboration and Discord in a Complex Environment Many new NGOs have emerged in the past 10 years focused primarily on countering violent extremism (CVE). These include the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), the Quilliam Foundation, the Hedayah Center, the Global Center on Cooperative Security and the Counter Extremism Project. Many other NGOs are increasingly focusing on countering violent extremism as part of their mandates. In some cases this has been indirect, such as the efforts of Child Soldiers International (now part of the Romeo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative) to allow children recruited by radical groups to be treated in line with children’s rights standards as defined by human rights law.

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Equally important, a number of conflict resolution and development organizations have developed substantial programming around CVE. As an example, Mercy Corps has developed youth programs in Afghanistan and Somalia aimed at reducing support for armed opposition groups by supplementing standard education with training in nonviolent means of mobilizing, organizing and advocating for better governance. Another example is the work of Nonviolent Peace Force which was a key contributor to the UN’s Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism in the Philippines on violations committed against children in the course of the conflict between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. In three critical and interrelated areas, efforts have advanced to prevent radicalization: increasing public awareness and engagement in preventing radicalization; ensuring effective and accountable criminal justice and law enforcement procedures; and working to prevent recidivism. As a result, major areas of focus in CVE programs include: prevention of violent extremism through education; equipping communities to challenge violent extremism narratives; educating and engaging major stakeholders and community members to recognize and effectively deal with the threat of radicalization; and providing support and opportunities for child soldier and foreign fighter reintegration. The success of NGO initiatives in CVE seems to be largely based on their capacity to partner with the governments of the countries where they operate and with local stakeholders to develop comprehensive programs tailored for specific communities. Educational resources have been increasingly focused on reducing the appeal of extremism among young people and offering a positive alternative to the increasing amount of extremist material and propaganda available on the internet and across social media platforms. Other NGOs work to promote pluralism and inspire change. There are also programs that aim to counter extremism with messaging that works to undermine extremist rhetoric while also inspiring positive change. Much of this is done through revised or new educational curriculum, social media content and counterprogramming. In many cases, however, the broader counterterrorism (CT) agenda of donor governments and IOs such as the UN and World Bank creates significant impediments to engaging communities most affected by violent extremism, particularly the young and disaffected. One of the effects of counterterrorism legislation and donor funding restrictions has been to limit the potential engagement by NGOs with non-state armed

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groups in conflict-affected societies. In many conflict zones, particularly where there are non-state armed groups or those designated as terrorist, programs are designed primarily to avoid contact with or support to such groups and their members, and only secondarily to respond to humanitarian needs. In some cases, programs exclude whole groups of people on the basis of their perceived ties to such groups or fighters or their geographic location. In 2018, USAID suspended the provisions of food kits to areas of northern Syria when it was determined that some of the food was being diverted to a designated terrorist organization, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). To counter violent extremism, development efforts must target communities most vulnerable to extremism while avoiding inadvertently strengthening extremist or terrorist actors.

Gray Zone Conflicts Another emerging challenge that is receiving increased attention is gray zone conflicts, also known as hybrid warfare. Such conflicts reflect the role of external actors—states, armed non-state actors or transnational groups—engaging in a gradualist mode of warfare using both “hard” and “soft” forms of power to foment conflict by exploiting weaknesses in the international system and its laws and norms. Some countries, as well as nationalist groups in democracies and criminal actors, are increasingly challenging the principles and instruments of the western system, including democracy, through limited and low-intensity actions such as propaganda and misinformation campaigns. Rather than outright military triumphs, the goal is often to exploit the blurred boundaries and capacities of sovereignty and laws to conduct hostile actions against other states, enhance power and pursue self-interest short of violence or war. Some analysts point to Russian destabilization in Ukraine and Eastern Europe, and Iranian meddling in Syria and Lebanon, as examples. However, it can be difficult to distinguish between gray zone or hybrid conflict and traditional power politics. An example of the latter is China’s role in Myanmar. China has extensive economic interests in Myanmar, particularly along its border and in Rakhine state, including a planned special economic zone and a road, rail, and pipeline network to move energy and other materials and supplies through Myanmar to Yunnan Province in China. China has become increasingly involved in Myanmar’s peace process and its politics while, at the same time, actively opposing

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U.S. influence in Myanmar. Either type of involvement—power politics or gray zone conflict—can create a difficult environment for NGO programming. In many cases, gray zone conflicts are intended to undermine the relationships between citizens and their governments and political processes, often through campaigns against soft targets via cyber warfare, social media counter-messaging, corruption, disruption of labor markets and support for extremist political groups. Attacks on civil society organizations (accusations of corruption, or of being biased in favor of one side) and the creation of divisive organizations antithetical to democratic norms have worked to undermine the attempts of NGOs to bridge divides among different groups in society. Local NGOs and civil society organizations often work to uphold international norms and promote greater transparency and accountability. To the extent that such institutions are weakened, so too are those norms and institutions, making conflict more likely.

Within the NGO Community Another increasing source of friction in the NGO community is between human rights and humanitarian and conflict resolution professionals. Organizations active in human rights are distinct from other NGOs in their style and their activities. Generally, their goal is to seek out, research, and address specific and general situations where repression occurs. Once abuses are found and documented, human rights NGOs tend to encourage the voluntary correction of the abuse, then to pressure governments to change, and ultimately to publicly stigmatize the violator. Given this strategy, it is not surprising that these NGOs may antagonize those governments judged to be abusing human rights. Human rights NGOs also take the international community or their home governments to task for supporting abusive regimes, a process known as “naming and shaming.” Therefore, the work of human rights NGOs, while important especially in the long run, is not always a stabilizing factor in a conflict, and may further antagonize parties, alienate participants in a peacekeeping effort, or jeopardize the work of development agencies. In repressive regimes or in countries where religious or cultural values are at odds with the principles of individual rights, there exists an ethical dilemma for humanitarian and conflict resolution NGOs. They

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can either ignore human rights standards in order to provide the necessary food, supplies or medical treatment, or follow international human rights standards and risk the very real possibility of not fulfilling their missions, resulting in loss of life. Nowhere has this ethical dilemma been more apparent than in Afghanistan. On the one hand, negotiating with the Taliban is essential in order to reach some of the most remote, impoverished communities. On the other, working with the Taliban in Taliban-controlled regions of Afghanistan reaffirms their legitimacy and power. There are no easy answers. Most NGOs try to maintain a balance of meeting the needs on the ground while respecting international human rights standards as much as possible. NGOs need to remain flexible enough to make these types of decisions in the field since the answers are often blurred. There can also be tension between the human rights and conflict resolution professionals. Those in the conflict resolution community may tend to emphasize forgiveness and mercy in order to move parties from violent conflict towards peace. While those in the human rights community advocate for accountability and justice for human rights violations and serious crimes. At times these two worlds can be in conflict. Ultimately their goal is the same—for communities to acknowledge crimes of the past in order to move forward towards a better future. Most professionals in both communities agree that a balance of both accountability and reconciliation is required for sustainable peace in divided societies.

Conclusion Despite these difficulties and tensions, international efforts to prevent and resolve conflict and to respond to humanitarian crises depend heavily on the involvement of international NGOs and local civil society organizations. The INGOs are usually the implementing agencies for the UN and for state-based aid programs. They work alongside the military in some of the most dangerous missions and circumstances in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. They are often the first international organizations to respond to disaster and the last to leave in the post-conflict period. Civil society organizations from within the conflict area help to build resilience against conflict, providing both community involvement and badly needed services in difficult conditions. They are the direct link to the people affected by conflict and humanitarian crisis, and increasingly

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are also engaged in the implementation of the internationally funded efforts to alleviate suffering and help societies regain their footing. INGOs and civil society organizations are also agents of a more open and inclusive approach to addressing violent confrontation in their support of conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution. The voices they bring to the table may be numerous, disparate and at times challenging, but their contribution brings life to both crisis response and enduring peace.

Notes 1. Carolyn Stephenson, “Nongovernmental Organizations,” Beyond Intractability Knowledge Database, January 2005; Union of International Associations (UIA), Yearbook of International Organizations, 2005–2006; World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (WANGO), Worldwide NGO Directory: https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/role_ngo http://www.wango.org/resources.aspx?section=ngodir https://uia.org/yearbook 2. Sharath Srinivasan, “Civil Society as Counter-Power: Rethinking International Support Towards Tackling Conflict and Fostering Non-Violent Politics in Africa,” in Pamela Aall and Chester A. Crocker, eds., Minding the Gap: African Conflict Management in a Time of Change (Waterloo, Canada: CIGI Press, 2016). 3. USAID, “Report of Voluntary Agencies Engaged in Overseas Relief and Development (2016 VolAg Report),” Washington, DC, 2017. 4. Centre of Competence on Humanitarian Negotiation, Working Group on Humanitarian Negotiations in Integrated Response, “Summary Discussion of First Meeting of the Working Group, 28.04.2016,” U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC (unpublished paper). 5. See Andrea Binder and Claudia Meier, “Opportunity Knocks: Why NonWestern Donors Enter Humanitarianism and How to Make the Best of It,” International Review of the Red Cross 93 (884), December 2011, p. 1146. https://www.icrc.org/es/doc/assets/files/review/2011/ irrc-884-binder-meier.pdf. 6. Centre of Competence on Humanitarian Negotiation, CCHN Field Manual on Frontline Humanitarian Negotiation, December 2018, p. 340. https://frontline-negotiations.org/cchn-field-manual. 7. Paul O’Brien, “Politicized Humanitarianism: A Response to Nicolas de Torrente,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 17 (2), 2004.

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8. “Major Attacks on Aid Workers: Summary Statistics, 2008–2018,” Aid Worker Security Database, Humanitarian Outcomes. https://aidworker security.org/incidents/report/summary. 9. “UN Shelved 2017 Reforms to Syria Aid Response,” New Humanitarian, February 26, 2018. 10. “Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and NonGovernmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments,” United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 2007. https://www.usip.org/publications/2007/07/guidelines-rel ations-between-us-armed-forces-and-nghos-hostile-or-potentially.

CHAPTER 4

Civilian Government Agencies Lauren Van Metre

The array of civilian government agencies on the ground has expanded as global participation in peace and stability and humanitarian relief operations has increased. Whether by invitation of the host country or through application of military force, and whether under a UN mandate or the lead of a single country such as the United States, the presence of civilian agency personnel in zones of conflict is a certainty. Recent years have seen a marked expansion of the operations and composition of the official civilian government presence. In places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Syria, it has become normal to find government officials from treasury, justice, health, and agriculture as well as those from the traditional foreign affairs departments—foreign affairs, defense, development and humanitarian assistance. The trend is likely to continue for the reasons discussed below. This chapter will identify how conflict and crises have changed and the impact this has had on the civilian government agencies that play a significant role in responding to them. Conflict has become more complex—it proliferates across national borders, is driven by state and non-state actors, and becomes intertwined with other dynamics. Civilian

L. Van Metre (B) National Democratic Institute, Washington, DC, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Aall and D. Snodderly (eds.), Responding to Violent Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59463-3_4

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government agencies have adapted in multiple ways through better coordination, leveraging the capacities of additional civilian agencies, and reforming their agencies to take on more operational activities. Their evolution is described in this chapter, as well as the challenges that still remain.

Trends Affecting Civilian Participation Security threats today come not from large militaries in adversary countries but from small bands of extremists or networks of criminals with international reach. As the rash of terrorist attacks in every corner of the globe has driven home to the international community, these groups harbor and thrive in fragile states, with supportive or weak governments and sufficient infrastructure and stability to maintain their operations. Reducing the extremist threat requires cooperative civilian-military strategies to pressure the political actors that give refuge to terrorists, eradicate the destitution that renews their ranks, and engage and assist the security forces that combat them. Failing states are dangerous to citizens and neighbors. Their populations are at high risk of violent conflict and humanitarian crisis, catastrophic events that frequently spill over state borders. International embassy staff in these countries, drawn from agencies across their governments, protect refugees and work to resolve their displacement; build schools to provide access to education and nutrition; support local health officials to prevent widespread disease and provide basic care; and increase the capacity of regional organizations to manage the spill-over of conflict and crisis to neighboring countries. Another factor, in an ever-more-interdependent world, is that most cabinet-level government departments must engage globally. Prosecuting crime, fortifying national borders, and safeguarding health are all areas in which government personnel must operate abroad. In partnering with other governments on issues vital to their own national interests and working with them to manage transnational threats, civilian government agencies help build capacity. For example, the Government of the Netherland’s Ministry of Justice and Security secures the return of fugitives from abroad for prosecution in the Netherlands and obtains international assistance for the successful prevention and prosecution of crimes at home. Yet, support for Dutch criminal investigations and prosecutions depends on the capacity of other governments’ law enforcement

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services and criminal justice processes. Therefore, under Article 90 of its Constitution, which articulates a national responsibility to develop an international legal order, the Dutch government sponsors numerous programs to strengthen the quality of rule of law institutions in other countries, sending government experts abroad to develop legislation and regulations, improve cooperation within the judicial chain, and promote the detection and prosecution of international crime, corruption, and terrorism. Similarly, the U.S. State Department, which is the lead agency for most U.S. security force assistance programs, manages the Global Peace Operations Initiative to strengthen the operational effectiveness and build the institutional infrastructure required for 53 partner countries to achieve self-sufficiency in their support to United Nations and regional peace operations. The program has an added benefit; it contributes significantly to internal security sector reform through the professionalization of partner-country armed forces. Military-led interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria have also shown the need for complementary social and political engagement by civilian counterparts. Social disaffection, rampant lawlessness and political disorder—the conditions that have sustained terrorist and insurgent groups in these countries—require interlocking efforts to combat their effects. Civilians, working with host nation governments, can tackle social well-being, rule of law and economic development only when the military protects and secures areas where they work. And, military gains are not solidified until a region is effectively governed. In Afghanistan, the government of the United Kingdom is building the capacity of the Afghan government to combat corruption—one of the primary grievances driving popular support for the Taliban—through the establishment of an AntiCorruption Justice Center to investigate high-level corruption cases. In Iraq, following the fall of the Islamic State, the government of Denmark supported the return of Iraqi refugees to the liberated city of Mosul through a continuum of programming that bridges humanitarian and development assistance. The 2010 earthquake in Haiti (the deadliest national catastrophe in the Western Hemisphere) and the 2014 West Africa Ebola outbreaks demonstrated that, in fragile and conflict-affected states, disasters and crises can have political and social repercussions beyond the immediate catastrophic loss. A natural disaster or pandemic can impact the legitimacy of an already weak government by demonstrating its ineffectiveness

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in the delivery of basic services to affected communities. It may also provide illicit actors and militant groups an opportunity to exploit breakdowns in security and governance that can occur post-disaster. When such devastation happens, civilian agencies are on the forefront of providing emergency assistance. They also remain in countries long after the immediate crisis to support law and order institutions and enhance government function necessary for political and socio-economic stability, ensuring the progression from relief to recovery and reconstruction. Perhaps the most important trend regarding civilian agency leadership and preventing and responding to violent conflict has been the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, signed in 2011. It was forged by conflict-affected states themselves to drive a new approach to development assistance in these complex environments. At its heart, the New Deal challenged international donors to reform overly complex procedural requirements and lessen stringent conditions, and governments of conflict-affected states to hold themselves accountable for the identification and prioritization of national development requirements and for delivery on them. In the lead up to the New Deal, the most active members—Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, South Sudan, Timor Leste—met regularly to explore critical components for development reform, including capacity development, planning processes, political dialogue, and aid mechanisms. Based on these New Deal dialogues, conflict-affected states established the conditions that would have to be met to achieve the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. The New Deal not only advanced the leadership of fragile and conflict-affected states in development policy, it also articulated an assessment and implementation process designed to strengthen government capacity. National governments were tapped to conduct country-wide fragility assessments to inform a single, unified development plan that international actors pledged to support, thus strengthening government coordination. The fragility assessments had to be inclusive of civil society, creating avenues for citizen advocacy and government responsiveness. Finally, the assessments were meant to be meaningful discussions on the power relations that drove perpetual conflict and how they would be dismantled, leading to significant government reform. Civilian governments also pledged greater accountability and transparency in the implementation of development assistance. In return, international actors agreed to use government channels and systems in the disbursement

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of assistance to strengthen governance capacity and service delivery and ensure more predictability and better management of risk of international development commitments. New Deal implementation has since stalled, underlining the governance challenges in places where violent conflict and weak institutions have hollowed the capacity of civilian actors to deliver services, justice, and security; connect with citizens; and manage societal grievances and tensions. Although several countries—Liberia, South Sudan, Timor Leste, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia and the DRC—conducted fragility assessments, few met the standards of inclusion and country-wide assessment set out in the New Deal. Nor, did they address internal political power threats to peace and stability, instead focusing on deficits in technical capacity. Finally, under the New Deal, civilian government engagement in most countries never expanded beyond departments of finance and planning, leaving powerful and critical ministries of trade, defense and diplomacy out of the assessment and implementation processes. Critiques of the initial efforts note that the assessments and follow-on country plans were more government-donor focused than they were mechanisms to strengthen state-society relations, prioritizing the legitimacy of governments in the eyes of donors. In essence, neither donors nor countries have lived up to their New Deal commitments, and are seemingly stalemated, with donors waiting for governments to put in place accountable policies and institutions, and governments holding out for donor deference to country ownership. The humanitarian response community has also concluded that inclusion of, accountability to, and acceptance by national governments and affected communities enhances aid effectiveness. Since the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, “localization” has been a goal of the humanitarian sector. International organizations have long recognized that working through local partners enhances community trust. Working through national governments and local organizations, which understand local context and need, also makes humanitarian delivery more effective. Localization has several components, including: • strengthening the capacity of local civil society and governments to respond to humanitarian disasters, leading to more effective crises management in the long-term

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• working in partnership with local actors to deliver assistance more rapidly and effectively • supporting local response efforts to ensure surge capacity It is propelled by a convergence of factors including more durable networks of civil society and governance actors, more widespread humanitarian need, and the need for humanitarian, development and peace organizations to work together to address the world’s increasing protracted displacements. It is also the result of push-back by national governments that experience losses of legitimacy and governance control when largescale international humanitarian interventions distort local economies and labor markets, and challenge national control of the disaster response. The Global Humanitarian Platform, bringing together three humanitarian communities—the United Nations, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, and humanitarian NGOs—advocates for more inclusion of local actors through its Principles of Partnership. The Charter for Change and the Grand Bargain are efforts coming out of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summits to implement and institutionalize localization through specific activities within designated timeframes. The Grand Bargain, for example, calls for a target of 25% of humanitarian funding globally assigned to local and national responders, and favors funding tools which increase and improve assistance delivery by local and national responders, such as UN-led country-based pooled funds. Despite these large-scale efforts, without extensive reform of the humanitarian system, localization will not succeed. What are some of the structural impediments? The designation of the level of disaster, which drives funding, resourcing and response, is still determined internationally, and does not include local perspectives on the nature of the crisis, the risks and needs, and planning for and prioritization of assistance. International organizations have, at times, overstated the numbers of those affected (the 2005 non-famine in Niger; inflated refugee camp numbers) to increase funding commitments. At the same time, a 2017 Global Humanitarian report showed that local stakeholders, governments and civil society received only 2% of funding globally, while international funding and operations continue to increase. Thus, progress by country coalitions, and even by international actors themselves, to bolster the leadership and capacity of civilian ministries in conflict-affected states was uneven, significantly impeded by the structural constraints of international interveners around funding and risk

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management, concerns regarding their long-term institutional relevance, and their inability to operate effectively in complex, highly contextualized environments. A number of these constraints, as they pertain to civilian agency response to violent conflict, will be discussed in this chapter.

History of Civilian Participation Governments’ roles in peace, stability and relief operations around the world look very different in the twenty-first century than they did in the late 1970s and the 1980s. At that time, international military interventions were often focused on limited security aims without attempting to engage the local society (for example, Sinai, Grenada, Lebanon, and Panama). Development aid was concerned primarily with long-term economic and social progress. Civilian “crisis response” was essentially for humanitarian needs like refugee crises and natural disasters. In its peacekeeping practice, the United Nations circumvented Cold War politics by rarely, if ever, deploying U.S. and Soviet troops (or troops from other major allied powers). It also limited its involvement in the internal affairs of parties to a conflict. Peacekeeping operations primarily separated armies, monitored cease-fire agreements, and supported humanitarian relief operations, but did not try to transform belligerents’ conflict and political dynamics (for example, between Syria and Israel, Pakistan and Afghanistan, or Egypt and Israel in the Sinai). The nature of international intervention began to change as the Cold War ended. UN peacekeeping missions took up nonmilitary tasks like organizing elections, leading transitional administrations, and reforming legal systems as part of implementing complex peace agreements (for example, in Cambodia, El Salvador, and Namibia). International assistance programs retooled to promote post-communist reform in Eastern Europe and applied this experience to authoritarian transitions in other parts of the world, and to post-conflict settings. Consequently, the 1990s saw a series of complex interventions, with expanded civilian roles (for example, in Bosnia, Croatia, East Timor, Haiti, northern Iraq, Kosovo, Macedonia, Sierra Leone and Somalia). In these cases, international embassies and missions organized a more operational diplomacy in support of peace agreements and international coalitions. The extent of military participation varied both with circumstances in individual countries and with a fluctuating debate about nation building. The terrorist attacks on the United States on

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September 11, 2001, and the subsequent international coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq transformed that debate as the subsequent counter-terrorist operations morphed into larger nation-building endeavors. In October 2001, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Afghan Northern Alliance, joined later by NATO members and sanctioned by the United Nations, launched Operation Enduring Freedom to dismantle the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization based in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan operation ushered in one of the most activist periods of coalition interventions, with lasting effects on the civilian and military institutions that implemented them. At first eschewing a nation-building role in the initial phases of the Afghanistan and Iraq missions, the international community grew to understand that the military alone could not break the terrorist networks sustained by local populations. In fact, military operations were often creating the local conflicts and insecurity that fueled terrorist groups. The expertise and participation of civilians, working with the military, was needed to support and build local capacity for governance, service delivery and the rule of law—to give local communities alternative ways to engage politically, other than support for terrorist groups. New strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan required fundamental reform of the national security institutions of participating governments. For the United States, military-centric approaches to stability operations were no longer sufficient, driving a more comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to overseas interventions that included actively building the capacity of civilian government departments and standing up a new Civilian Response Corps that would tap into an inter-agency roster of stabilization experts to deploy with the military. Although U.S. civilian and military institutions in this period achieved heightened levels of coordinated policy, planning and operations, given limited civilian capacity, the U.S. military was routinely tasked to implement “civilian” responsibilities using military staff and resources. The issue of appropriate civil-military relations dominated U.S. participation in Iraq and Afghanistan, as these missions transitioned to nation-building, with the U.S. military often advocating for more resources and capacity for their civilian counterparts and having to fill the gap because federal agencies did not have adequate resources.

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The UK experience in Afghanistan mirrored that of the United States; it rapidly reformed its military strategy and operations to support a stabilization and nation-building agenda. However, due to smaller levels of defense funding, it could not conduct stability operations without civilian support. This allowed UK civilian agencies to play a more dominant role in Afghanistan than their U.S. counterparts. The UK response to its participation in the interventions of Afghanistan and Iraq was to forge ever-greater civilian-military collaboration. In 2007, it stood up the Stabilisation Unit (SU), a cross-government civil-military-police unit staffed by the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). These departments also pooled funding, which drove greater collaboration. Reinforcing the UK’s inter-agency imperative, its 2009 military doctrine on stabilization was developed jointly with the FCO, DFID and the newly formed Stabilisation Unit. With the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan, much of this civilian stabilization and humanitarian assistance capacity has been transferred to global efforts to eradicate violent extremism, manage the largest displacement of refugees and internally displaced in history, and support the efforts of conflict-affected states to build governance and peacebuilding capacity. Civilian agencies have also led and participated in major reviews of the effectiveness of decades of nation-building post-intervention missions, with significant implications for their own operations and the overall strategic direction of violent conflict and humanitarian response. For example, the U.S. and UK governments have concluded that the strategic outcome of stabilization (the immediate post-conflict intervention period) must be reconsidered. Afghanistan, Iraq, the Sahel, and Myanmar have demonstrated that, despite enormous funding pools and large-scale, long-term missions, enduring peace is illusive. Civilian agencies, and their military counterparts, should instead support small-scale efforts to sustain legitimate local actors capable of delivering peace and stability, and establishing the long-term conditions for inclusive governance. The human and financial costs of these interventions and more than a decade fighting the war on terror, which has had no effect on violent conflict trends globally, have also led to a growing shift on the part of national governments, and multilateral organizations, to demand increased attention to and resources for conflict prevention programs. In 2019, the United States Congress passed the Global Fragility Act,

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directing the U.S. State Department to develop an inter-agency strategy against which to implement a ten-year prevention and stabilization effort in five or more countries or regions at risk of or recovering from violent conflict. The act urged reform for civilian agency efforts in conflictaffected states, including locally driven and evidence-informed strategies and programs, rigorous and routine evaluations, and coordination across civilian and defense departments with input from civil society actors. These reforms target the major structural impediments to civilian agency effectiveness in conflict-affected states, as discussed below. This next section will outline the civilian government agencies generally involved in humanitarian and stabilization operations, recognizing that this capacity is being transformed, while at the same time becoming more expert, having absorbed the lessons of almost two decades of active civil-military interventionism.

Evolving Civilian Capacity Foreign Affairs The Iraq and Afghanistan interventions had a major impact on how the governments of coalition partners organized to lead and participate in these large-scale nation-building operations. The reforms to ministries and departments of foreign affairs were remarkably similar across countries and included: • making foreign affairs ministries more operational to increase field presence • elevating and consolidating peacebuilding, human security and stabilization tasks within these departments to achieve economies of scale • developing an expert cadre of deployable civilians • forging whole-of-government approaches to complex interventions The United States Department of State made great strides in increasing its operations in the field and building expertise in stabilization, peacebuilding and crisis response. However, the continued under-resourcing of civilian agencies in the United States has undercut the country’s ability to develop a civilian response cadre and forge whole-of-government approaches. It is in these latter areas, however, that the United Kingdom

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has excelled. This section will examine these two country approaches and the foreign affairs offices that support them. U.S. State Department From the perspective of conflict response and management the State Department underwent a significant reorganization in 2012, creating a super office made up of new and previously existing offices to more effectively counter threats to citizen security globally.1 Called the Office for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights, and informally known as the “J” Bureau, the new office was charged with working outside formal government channels with non-state actors on transnational issues: human trafficking, counter-terrorism, criminal justice, and youth. Housed within this new office is the Bureau of Conflict and Stability Operations (CSO)—an expert and analytical office on the methods and approaches for effective stabilization and peace. CSO analysis feeds into integrated planning processes conducted by State’s regional bureaus and embassies, and into tools and programming guides for countering violent extremism and preventing electoral violence. Their conflict advisors also deploy to embassies in conflict-affected states, or with military forces. Within the State Department the Office of Arms Control and International Security also plays a significant role in fragile and conflict-affected states, especially its Bureau for Political-Military Affairs, which oversees security force assistance policy and programs in consultation and coordination with the Department of Defense. Building the capacity of security forces in fragile and conflict-affected states is critical, as security is the enabling factor for establishing good governance, the rule of law and a stable economy. U.S. security force assistance training and equipment also help build effective military partners for combatting violent extremists. The traditional work of the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) underwent a radical transformation during the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions. Once primarily a diplomatic and reporting agency, the State Department is increasingly operational, conducting its work in ever more insecure and unstable places. This change in organizational culture has been controversial, with debate centered on what constitutes the core mission of the Foreign Service and whether critical resources (such as education and training, and security) will be budgeted for the department’s riskier operational work.

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United Kingdom The British government considers crisis response; governance, rule of law and security assistance to fragile and conflict-affected states; and addressing core global instability factors to be its national security priorities. The government recognizes that these challenges are best met through cross-government funding and programming that is overseen by the National Security Council so that country and regional responses are coordinated and add up to larger strategic effects. UK conflict prevention and stabilization programs are supplemented with pooled funding—the Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF)—which allows the UK to expand its geographic and thematic reach beyond regular departmental programming. The National Security Council oversees the CSSF through its Joint Funds Unit, which is attached to the NSC and monitors the effectiveness of CSSF programming and ensures that all programs cohere with the country’s larger strategic goals. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defense, the Department for International Development, the Home Office, the National Crime Agency, the Crown Prosecution Service, and the security and intelligence services all use CSSF pooled funding, although the FCO is the primary recipient. The Conflict Department, within the FCO, plays the lead role in identifying a need for options and coordinating in-country operations, and coordinates with the relevant country desks. The Conflict Department has extensive expertise in early warning analysis, prevention and early action. The UK’s Stabilisation Unit supports this cross-departmental approach to conflict and stabilization response. The Stabilisation Unit can be thought of as a resource boost for government offices and in-country teams; it provides education and training to civilian government personnel working on conflict and stabilization, and it can rapidly deploy integrated teams of military and civilians for work in fragile states, as well as technical support for programs using CSSF monies. Development Development assistance in fragile and conflict-affected states is disbursed and administered by multilateral organizations and bilaterally by countries. Increasingly, the world’s major national donors have agreed to frameworks to guide and coordinate their development assistance. The

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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) is a venue where the world’s major donors gather to promote development consensus and cooperation. These discussions have become increasingly inclusive of recipient states, as demonstrated by the New Deal on Fragile States. Recognizing that the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were in danger of not being achieved in conflict-affected states, the OECD-DAC accepted the guidance of the G7+ led by fragile states’ governments, to reform development assistance in contexts of fragility. The United Nations, in the negotiations for the establishment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), included both recipient and donor nations, recognizing that all countries have points of fragility, and that recipient countries are also experts on development assistance effectiveness. While the SDGs are a set of agreed upon outcomes by the international community, national governments have their own set of assumptions regarding priority goals and how they will be achieved. For those countries that are members of the OECD,2 inclusive of the world’s developed countries, there has been a significant transformation regarding how development assistance is administered. Focused in the 1980s and 1990s on structural adjustment (privatization of state industries, reduction of government spending, opening to free trade) as the means to national economic development and growth, major donors conditioned their assistance accordingly. Such austerity programs created extreme economic and social dislocations in the most fragile states, which often had large public sectors and natural resource-dependent economies. Furthermore, absent governance reform and rule of law systems, largescale privatization resulted in elite-capture of state-owned assets. With the turn of the century, OECD countries have emphasized wealth redistribution through poverty reduction and equal rights for minorities and women, and conditioned development assistance on governance reform. United States After two decades of downsizing and USAID’s re-designation as a subcabinet agency whose administrator reports to the secretary of state, the agency has created new offices and reformed other departments to address the social and economic dimensions of conflict and fragile states, and committed to innovative approaches such as building resilience to climate change in the Horn of Africa and implementing evidence-based approaches to countering the drivers of violent extremism.

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In 2018, USAID announced a major organizational reform driven to a great extent by its increasing focus on fragility and violent conflict. Central to the reform is the establishment of a new Office for Relief, Resilience and Response that will house existing USAID bureaus and programs in new configurations: • the new Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance combines USAID’s Food for Peace and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) • the new Bureau for Resilience and Food Security combines programs on food security with programs focused on water and climate change adaptation • the new Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization brings together USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), and countering violent extremist work Combining these programs allows the agency to create a strategic continuum of response from immediate humanitarian assistance through stabilization and development programming. The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation was created in 2002 to examine how USAID’s longer-term assistance programs (democracy and governance, economic growth, agriculture development, and health) could support sustainable peacebuilding efforts. The office was tasked with seeding conflict sensitive programming throughout the department, and better managing short-to-long term transitions in the delivery of assistance—two areas identified as contributing to the ineffectiveness of aid delivery to countries in or nearing crisis. CMM compiles lessons learned and best practices and provides analytical and operations tools to USAID overseas missions to implement more effective conflict management programs. CMM has helped the agency’s work not just on mitigating conflict but also in addressing conflicts’ underlying social, political and economic drivers with targeted programming. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives was created in 1994 to provide advice and funding to countries in transition from authoritarian to democratic governance systems, and from war to peace. OTI’s responsibilities have expanded, and the office works primarily to help conflict countries move to peace and stability. OTI lays the foundations for longterm development by promoting reconciliation, jump-starting economies,

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and helping stable democracy take hold. OTI encourages a culture of swift response among its staff and partners, deploying in the immediate transition phase from conflict or crisis. OTI is funded by a separate Transitions Initiatives budget account with special authorities that allow urgent spending where it is most needed. Finally, OTI has an innovative contracting mechanism that preserves the principle of competition while allowing quick start-up in new countries and direct grants to small indigenous organizations. USAID’s Office of Civil-Military Cooperation (CMC) was created in 2005 to make effective use of USAID and DOD funds and resources to help meet development goals and encourage the use of USAID resources to improve civilian-military coordination and cooperation. To accomplish these goals CMC engages in cooperative civilian-military planning by seconding its staff to military Combatant Commands, and to participate in civilian-military working groups in embassies. CMC also engages the military in joint assessments by training USAID and military officers to use common frameworks. Sweden Sweden’s development cooperation is both generous and ambitious— it devotes 1% of its GDP—and it is effective. The OECD consistently gives Sweden’s development cooperation very high marks for its longterm approach and emphasis on local dialogue and ownership. In 2016, Sweden adopted a development agenda that directly supports the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. While aligning its development agenda to that of the United Nations, Sweden also elevates three issues for more targeted programming and funding. Recognizing the erosion of democratic values, the closing of civil society space and the persecution of human rights defenders and journalists in many parts of the world, Sweden is prioritizing its democracy assistance programs. Sweden has also adopted a feminist foreign policy that puts gender equality and women and girls’ full attainment of their human rights at the center of its foreign policy agenda. The feminist agenda has provided coherence to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) development goals, embedding gender equality into its poverty reduction programming, advocating for greater representation of women in preventing and solving conflicts and in post-conflict environments, and combatting gender-based violence in conflict and fragile

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states. Thirdly, Sweden is providing development cooperation to mitigate the effects of climate change, including introducing promising new technologies and implementing pollution reduction programs in developing countries. Humanitarian Response With state failure or war in countries like Iraq, Libya and Somalia; the rise in state violence and predation in Syria, Myanmar and South Sudan; the growing control by Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda of swaths of non-government controlled areas of Africa; and Russia’s strategic destabilization of states on its periphery, the world is experiencing the largest protracted displacement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in its history. Add to the migration crisis the rise in natural disasters due to climate change, and the world’s ability to mount a successful humanitarian response is greatly challenged. In response, the international community is resurrecting the idea of humanitarian-development operational nexuses. That idea is based on the fact that humanitarian actors restore access to water and health by building infrastructure, as do development programs. Their operations often look the same, but their purpose and methods differ. Humanitarians act according to humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality to save lives, minimize suffering and protect people’s dignity, wherever and whomever they may be. Development actors also address the needs of the people, but have an imperative to strengthen the state and its institutions. Increasingly, civilian government institutions recognize that humanitarian and development responses need to operate in parallel, in the same space at the same time, and not sequentially, to reduce conflict- and disaster-deaths by both meeting immediate needs and reconstituting the capacity of the state. United States To ensure a response to foreign disaster relief operations that saves lives and provides timely assistance, Congress has given the president of the United States and the executive branch broad authority to define humanitarian response. Executive agency resources and personnel are brought together under the direction of the U.S. Agency for International Development, whose administrator is the president’s special coordinator for

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international disaster assistance. In the field, U.S. chiefs of mission oversee the execution of any U.S. government disaster relief effort. As noted above, the 2018 reorganization of USAID brought together the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Food for Peace (FFP) Program into a new Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance. OFDA helps in the coordination of disaster assistance and provides immediate material and personnel support based on the assessments of its Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) that deploy within hours, or OFDA personnel already in-country monitoring areas where disasters threaten. OFDA provides non-food humanitarian assistance in response to a declaration of a foreign disaster made by the U.S. ambassador or the U.S. Department of State. Once an event or situation is determined to require U.S. government assistance, OFDA can immediately provide funds to the U.S. embassy or USAID mission to purchase relief supplies locally or to contribute to a relief organization in the affected country. USAID/OFDA also sends relief supplies prepositioned around the world. USAID’s Food for Peace program administers emergency and relief food aid—commodities that are grown in the fields of virtually every U.S. state. FFP aid is also prepositioned in disaster-vulnerable regions and can be supplemented with surplus U.S. agricultural commodities held by the Commodity Credit Corporation and managed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. If FFP and OFDA are emergency responders providing immediate relief to devastated communities, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives works on short- to mid-term reconstruction efforts and lays the foundation for longer-term “post-disaster” development. Its transition assistance generally takes the form of short-term peace and democratization projects but can include humanitarian components (helping communities with housing, electricity, and water projects). The State Department is another traditional player in the U.S. government’s response to natural and humanitarian crises; its efforts help mitigate the trauma and deprivation experienced by populations fleeing disaster areas. The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) provides grants to international governmental and NGO organizations to work with internally displaced people and refugees on a broad range of issues from providing basic needs to community dialogues. The secretary of state can request the assistance of the U.S. Department of Defense, whose military personnel are deployed worldwide and whose logistics reach is global. DOD has legal authority under several provisions to make

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available a wide range of humanitarian assistance: provision, transport, and delivery of relief supplies, and funding for commercial transport, for example. To enhance civilian-military coordination the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) in USAID provides critical operational links with the U.S. military. Senior USAID staff is assigned permanently to the five geographic Combatant Commands that are tasked with delivering humanitarian assistance in their areas of responsibility (AORs). With USAID’s deep ties in the NGO community, OMA is also their point of contact with the military in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. USAID/OFDA can also request the support of other U.S. agencies, which increasingly have the capacity to contribute to crisis interventions. Nearly all departments of the U.S. government responded to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, a disaster of unprecedented scale. USAID/OFDA coordinated an inter-agency Response Management Team for Haiti (standing up an inter-agency task force is standard procedure following the deployment of a DART), which included the departments of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, Commerce and Transportation. Haiti’s proximity to the United States facilitated an extensive U.S. government response. For more distant relief operations, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami and Pakistan floods in 2009 and 2010 respectively, the U.S. military, OFDA, and the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Migration and Refugees were the primary U.S. government responders. Japan Japan is a world-renowned leader in disaster risk reduction and response due to its own tragic experience with natural disasters such as the 1995 Kobe earthquake and the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, which caused a nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Japan has hosted all the United Nation’s conferences on Disaster Risk Reduction, and, since 2011 has become the fifth largest donor of humanitarian aid, with Syria as its main recipient. The primary department for humanitarian aid is the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)—Japan’s bilateral aid agency. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs receives a request for assistance from the government of a disaster-stricken country, or from an international organization, JICA has three primary tools or responses. It can dispatch Japan Disaster Relief, or JDR, teams, of which there are five: search and rescue, infectious disease, self-defense, medical and expert. Tokyo may also provide emergency relief goods stockpiled in warehouses around the

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world. Japan also provides rapid monetary assistance in the form of Emergency Grant Aid, prioritizing support for refugees and internally displaced persons, and people affected by natural disasters or conflict. Japan incorporates a number of key principles in its support for the protracted displaced, including creating opportunities for cooperation between host communities and displaced persons, and increasing coordination between humanitarian and development assistance. Tokyo also is a global expert in reducing the risk of disasters by focusing on resilience— helping communities through the “Build Back Better” policy to become stronger against future disasters. Other Civilian Agencies and Actors Perhaps the greatest change in civilian participation in relief and stabilization operations is the increasing role played by other government agencies. For example, for work in fragile states, the UK government now funds the National Crime Agency, the Home Office and the Crown Prosecution Service—agencies not traditionally associated with development and foreign policy work. In East Africa, the UK’s National Crime Agency and the Crown Prosecution Service have partnered with Kenya and Tanzania law enforcement agencies to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate transnational and organized crime. These offices have worked with police officers on tracking and breaking criminal networks, and with prosecutors in managing the evidence to successfully prosecute terrorism cases. The have also strengthened the Kenya-Tanzania border management system to disrupt smuggling and trafficking networks, including narcotics, illicit wildlife trade, weapons, corruption and human trafficking, which pose threats to regional and internal state security. When the United States assumed governance of the Iraqi state following combat operations, it tapped the expertise of many civilian agencies. These agencies were also involved as the United States expanded its nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. Many agencies, such as Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture have extensive international mandates, which allowed them to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan in both traditional and new ways. In Iraq, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Transition Assistance (OTA), which advised Central European finance ministries transitioning from communism, worked with local Iraqi ministers and governors on financial and monetary policy, including the execution of Iraq’s federal and provincial budgets. OTA advisors, in effect,

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are oriented toward local institutions and ownership; local officials are their clients. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) was established in 1930 to represent U.S. agriculture abroad by collecting and analyzing production and trade data, and financing commercial exports. FAS has also, with USAID, administered U.S. food programs to help needy people around the world in development and relief efforts. With the U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, FAS significantly expanded its capacity-building and technical assistance operations. In Iraq, USDA personnel worked to improve the capacity of key government institutions to deliver essential services to the agriculture sector and integrate its agriculture produce into regional and global markets. In Afghanistan, where 80% of the population was involved in farming or herding and years of war had devastated the agriculture sector, USDA’s technical assistance programs supported reconstruction and capacity-building. These large nation-building exercises and complex global emergencies have reconfigured the structure and organization of civilian participation in overseas interventions in other ways. Because of the massive nature of the enterprise, government development agencies rely increasingly on large, for-profit international development contractors (IDCs) like Chemonics and Development Alternatives Inc. in the United States, Crown Agents and WYG Group in the United Kingdom, and COPA Consultants in Germany. The government financing and oversight relationships with IDCs are quite different from those with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Funded through contracts, government development agencies can more tightly dictate and oversee program requirements and outcomes than with more autonomous NGOs, which are funded through grants. In addition, IDCs are often umbrella companies, housing a range of services for their government clients—development assistance, security services, consulting services, etc. This has helped IDCs gain favorable positions in international operations overseas, although their profitoriented approach has raised concerns around funding their own staff at the expense of local partners, and their lack of interest in building local capacity that would reduce the need for development programming. Because peacebuilding and humanitarian interventions require deep knowledge of politics and context to be effective, and to avoid deepening or exacerbating local conflicts, the role of intelligence agencies has also

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greatly expanded, including both its operations and analytical divisions. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency operates with Special Operations Forces, and CIA operative and informant networks also monitor and influence political developments in countries, operating in national capitals and in front-line communities. Intelligence analysts also work within embassies to provide the chief of mission and embassy staff intelligence and risk assessments as they advance U.S. interests in-country.

Government Decision-Making: Stabilization and Peacebuilding Operations The international intervention in Afghanistan has had a lasting influence on how governments organize for peace and stability operations, with many adopting what is called a whole-of-government approach. Various models and concepts were introduced in different countries, including Canada’s 3D Approach (Diplomacy, Development and Defence), the United Kingdom’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy and the Netherland’s Security and Development doctrine, based on the common understanding that peace and stability operations were more effective when the political, security, governance and development dimensions of the response were interconnected. Thus, decisions about policy and programs for peace and stability operations in any country result from an interagency process. At the top of the hierarchy is the head of state, whose explicit approval is required for the escalation of a civilian-military presence in a conflict zone, the deployment of troops, and the expenditure of resources. Interventions also involve consultation with the legislative (parliamentary) branch. In many countries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, the National Security Council (NSC) oversees all foreign interventions. In the United States, the National Security Council is chaired by the president, and its statutory members are the vice president, the secretary of state, the secretary of treasury, the secretary of defense and the assistant to the president for national security affairs. The chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the council and the director of national intelligence is the intelligence advisor. Members of the president’s staff and other cabinet officials attend by invitation. The United Kingdom, which did not establish a National Security Council until 2010, has a similar configuration with members (prime minister, deputy prime minister, chancellor of the exchequer, leader of the

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House of Commons, foreign secretary, home secretary, secretary of state for energy and climate change, secretary of state for international development, chief secretary to the treasury, minister for government policy, defence secretary) and invited cabinet officials. In practice, a National Security Council will form committees to oversee and approve strategies. In the United States, it is a Principals Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC). The PC consists of officials at the level of cabinet secretary or head of agency and the DC of their second in charge. Standing members of the PC and DC, in addition to the NSC staff, include State Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Treasury Department, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and Office of Management and Budget, as well as Office of the Chief of Staff to the President and Office of the Vice President (OVP). The UK National Security Council has three standing committees: Threats, Hazards Resilience and Contingencies; Nuclear Deterrence and Security; and Emerging Powers. Other subcommittees are established on an ad hoc basis mostly in response to contingencies, such as Libya or Afghanistan. A country’s leadership, whether in the form of a National Security Council or with the Foreign Affairs Ministry or Department in the lead, will also provide guidance for all diplomatic efforts associated with the conflict, crisis or contingency, which can, at the highest levels, involve heads of state. For example, Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari and Russian prime minister Victor Chernomyrdin negotiated an ending to the Kosovo conflict with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and U.S. president Jimmy Carter negotiated the Camp David Accords, which led in 1979 to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin. Diplomats also engage extensively in negotiations in multilateral fora like the United Nations, as well as regional organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for American States (OAS) or the African Union (AU) to organize a more unified response to the conflict or crisis. In many cases, these multilateral or regional organizations may offer their good offices to mediate with adversaries an end to the conflict, or, at the least, to prevent it from escalating or spreading further. In 2015, the OSCE organized a meeting of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia to negotiate a peace settlement following Russia’s

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annexation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine that resulted in Minsk II, a framework for a peace process that has thus far not stopped the conflict. Negotiations continue within the Trilateral Contact Group. Finally, heads of government may appoint a special envoy or envoy extraordinary to focus specifically on the conflict: George Mitchell drove the Good Friday agreement that ended the North Ireland conflict, and Richard Holbrooke negotiated the conclusion of the Yugoslav Wars with the Dayton Accords. Both were special envoys appointed by U.S. president William Clinton. While the executive branch has the lead, the legislature plays a major role in exercising oversight and providing authorization and appropriation for stabilization operations. In the United States, agency officials consult members of Congress and their staffs regularly as situations develop and responses are planned, in addition to giving formal testimony, submitting official reports, and preparing detailed budget requests regarding operations. Strong congressional interest in a country or region can shape the U.S. government response, and site visits by members and staff assume top priority for civilian agency personnel abroad, usually preempting all other plans and activities. In the United Kingdom, parliamentary oversight of foreign affairs, and therefore of stabilization and peace operations, is considered less robust because the ruling party controls parliamentary business and ensures strong party discipline over members of parliament and their loyalty to party actions. Unlike in the United States, committees contract with experts, but do not employ committee staff in large numbers, nor research expertise. Non-governmental organizations play an invaluable role in briefing Parliament on events and the impact of international relations policies, providing not just expert advice, but a plurality of perspectives.

Coordinating Government Conflict Responses United States By law, in the United States the secretary of state is the president’s primary adviser on foreign policy and is responsible for the overall coordination and supervision of all U.S. government activities and operations abroad. In Washington, coordination among agencies takes place at several levels. Policy coordination committees (PCCs) on various issues

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meet at the assistant secretary level and report to the National Security Council’s Principals and Deputies Committees. Their composition, leadership and mode of operation vary according to the subject; their organization (and sometimes their names) tend to change from administration to administration. Regional PCCs, focused roughly by continent, are a continuing feature of the inter-agency landscape. Chaired by the State Department’s assistant secretary for the region, PCCs exist for Africa, East Asia, South Asia, the Near East, Latin American and Europe. When peace and stability operations take place over extended periods of time, such as the U.S. engagements in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo and Sudan, coordination becomes more fixed. Inter-agency decision-making groups consult frequently to sort out issues of policy and programs. Typically, the main participants are at the assistant secretary or deputy assistant secretary (DAS) level, and they meet face-to-face at least weekly. In addition, there is usually an expanded country desk, programs group, task force, or other office that provides staff support for the increased workload. Often, personnel from another agency are detailed to work in the State Department to support the effort. Even when members of these special staffs are not co-located, they are in constant contact and frequently meet for extended work sessions, forming a virtual secretariat. Frequently, an experienced diplomat or political figure is named as a special U.S. envoy for the crisis. Title, organization, and mandates vary, but the person usually has a small office and staff in the State Department. The special envoy has a mediating role involving frequent travel to meet with the parties in the region and with key international partners. A senior U.S. government official can be seconded to support a UN special representative or other international negotiator. In the field, the practice by which U.S. ambassadors and chiefs of mission (COMs) coordinate activities varies from country to country and from issue to issue. A few typical institutions are likely to be found, however. The country team consists of the heads of all U.S. government agencies in-country and some other officials. Chaired by the ambassador or COM, the country team meets periodically to review developments and coordinate activities. Working groups on specific subjects—for example, democracy, rule of law, and economic development—are typical, with a subset of the country team and others added. They might be chaired by the ambassador or COM, the deputy chief of mission (DCM), or a head of a section or agency at post. While some country teams will be more formal than others in terms of agenda, goals, work plan, and minutes,

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most will likely be key forums for getting action, plugging gaps, and addressing overlaps. United Kingdom In the event of an international crisis, the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office will rapidly stand up a Crisis Unit to deal with the 24-hour work surge. In time, the National Security Council will establish a sub-committee on that crisis or country that is the key vehicle for driving the response and is where the key ministers and officials meet regularly and make decisions. That committee is chaired by the prime minister, or in the PM’s absence, the deputy prime minister or foreign secretary. (Key decisions are made by the full cabinet.) In addition, typically a unit is also established in the National Security Secretariat that prepares the NSC ministerial sub-committee for decisions with timely advice and updates on the crisis, and ensures timely implementation of the NSC ministerial sub-committee’s decisions. Even in the earliest stages of the crisis, the development secretary, supported by cross-Whitehall staff, will develop a post-conflict stabilization plan, while it also drives government delivery of lines of effort and coordinates between all participating departments. The Stabilisation Unit will often be called upon to identify and deploy experts rapidly to the country or region in crisis. Often times, as in the case of the Libya crisis, the UK International Stabilisation Response team, plays a critical interim presence alongside international partners to facilitate early planning with the host nation government and to build international support. The embassy coordinates all assistance on the ground, and works hard to ensure that all departments at home receive timely information on the crisis from their representatives serving on the embassy staff. If the crisis is overwhelming and the embassy staff has to be evacuated or needs additional support, a special representative can be appointed.

Coordinating Humanitarian Relief Operations United States The purpose of humanitarian assistance is to save lives and provide for basic human needs as a result of a natural disaster or conflict, and it includes relief and rehabilitation, food assistance, programs for refugees

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and internally displaced, and logistical and operational support to affected governments and communities. In the United States, the president has broad authority and great flexibility to respond to disasters by making available a wide range of government-funded humanitarian assistance. The U.S. Congress plays a key role in any disaster by funding humanitarian assistance efforts through several accounts: International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDA), appropriated to USAID; the Food for Peace Act, appropriated to the Department of Agriculture; the Migration and Refugee Assistance Account and U.S. Emergency and Migration Assistance Fund, appropriated to the State Department; and Overseas Humanitarian and Disaster and Civic Aid, appropriated to the Department of Defense. If the request for disaster funding exceeds the amount appropriated, Congress has given the president authority to borrow from foreign aid, and it can reimburse a particular agency through appropriations amendments or supplemental appropriations. In addition, the president can authorize the Defense Department to assign equipment and personnel to disaster response and provide space on military transport to private donors who want to provide goods and equipment in response to the humanitarian crisis. The USAID administrator, as the special coordinator for international disaster assistance, has the authority, in response to natural and manmade disasters, to call upon any federal agency to provide assistance and coordinate the inter-agency response. In general, however, the primary government departments involved in response are: • USAID’s Office of Foreign and Disaster Assistance, Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), Food for Peace, and Office of CivilianMilitary Cooperation • State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration • the Department of Defense, whose response is synchronized by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and can include the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Combatant Commands, the services and civilian industry In addition, USAID, as the designated U.S. government coordinator, can contract with and fund private voluntary agencies to aid and coordinate the U.S. government response with other countries.

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The affected country’s government initiates the U.S. government response with a request for assistance through the U.S. ambassador or chief of mission. The president of the United States then sets the parameters for the aid that will be provided. OFDA can provide the most immediate response. Within 24 hours of a request, it can release funding to the USAID mission or U.S. embassy to be distributed to local disaster response organizations, such as the Red Cross or Red Crescent, or for the embassy to buy relief supplies or hire personnel locally. At that point, the United States begins working with the affected country’s government through its embassy to determine what additional aid might be needed. The United States also coordinates with its international partners, including UN agencies, other international organizations, bilateral or multilateral donors, and non-governmental organizations. Canada Canada’s humanitarian crises response is focused primarily on providing funding to experienced international humanitarian agencies, who are already responding to the crisis and are guided by humanitarian principles. For example, the Canadian government supports the United Nations Central Emergency Response Funds (CERF), which is funded by UN member states, but also by private entities, such as foundations, corporations, charities and even individuals. CERF provides rapid humanitarian relief, within 48 hours, and it provides grants to the world’s most neglected crises. Through grants, CERF funds the world’s “forgotten emergencies”—those crises that have not attracted funding beyond the immediate crisis. In addition, Canada contributes to the Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund, which is administered by the Canadian Red Cross, and provides immediate Canadian support to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for sudden onset crises that are not large-scale. Canada also works through non-governmental organizations that are expert in humanitarian and disaster relief. The Canadian Humanitarian Assistance Fund (CHAF) provides support to the Humanitarian Coalition, made up of the Canadian branches of Lutheran World Relief, Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE, Islamic Relief and Plan Canada. These NGOs have local branches in most countries of the world that need aid, using local knowledge and community-level relationships. CHAF funds smallscale, rapid-onset crises with unmet humanitarian needs. The government

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of Canada also works with non-governmental organizations through its Canadian Foodgrains Bank Food Assistance Fund, which aids church and church-based agencies to provide food assistance to end global hunger. Thus, Canada’s assistance is coordinated through international and non-governmental organizations, although, as a last resort, Canada will deploy personnel and emergency relief stockpiles. Canada’s Disaster Assistance Response Teams and Emergency Health Response Units deploy where there is a clear need for additional support beyond what experienced humanitarian partners can provide.

Issues Affecting Civilian Participation Legal Authorities and Budget Appropriations The ability of civilian institutions to participate effectively in peace, stabilization and reconstruction efforts is affected by how a government authorizes departmental activities, appropriates funds, and applies legal prohibitions (or sanctions). The impact is greatest on the capacity of government agencies to develop coherent intervention strategies and respond with flexibility to rapidly shifting events on the ground. In the United States, legislative authority over civilian peace and stabilization operations is spread among several congressional committees and sub-committees. Thus, legislative guidance, rather than outlining broad, strategic approaches to steer the 25 agencies that deliver foreign assistance, has generally been piecemeal, focusing on specific regional initiatives and delivery vehicles. In terms of congressional appropriations, funding for civilian peace and stabilization programs is spread among several standing accounts, each with its own provisions regarding the programs it can support and the conditions in which they can be funded. These programs include bilateral economic assistance, multilateral economic assistance, humanitarian assistance, military assistance, and law enforcement assistance. The impact on the ability of U.S. government agencies to coordinate their programs in a specific country is quite significant. An individual agency operates its programs from multiple accounts, and each fund designates money to multiple agencies. Ambassadors in-country are responsible for coordinating U.S. assistance, but the complexity and opaqueness of the funding process makes a comprehensive understanding difficult.

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Congress can also pass restrictions on how foreign assistance can be spent. One such restriction—Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Account, which prohibits U.S. funding for developing and training for foreign police—has had a major impact on peace and stabilization efforts. In states recovering from violent conflict, establishing security is paramount—it is the foundation for all other efforts—and deploying a professional police force is an important component. Congress has shown flexibility on this issue, authorizing exemptions to Section 660 to allow police funding, and in 2018 proposing to waive it. The overall result, however, has been fractured efforts that lack coherence and structure, since the Departments of Justice, State, Transportation, Treasury and Defense all have foreign police training programs. With no agency in charge, there has been no attempt to develop and test police training guidelines and standards, so training often fails to meet the security and governance needs of specific countries, and efforts can be duplicative. While the United States government organizes its funding and authorities around specific departments and specific programs, the government of the United Kingdom organizes its authorities and funding around budget pools. Those pools are attached to national security objectives. Government departments across Her Majesty’s government are eligible for Official Development Assistance (ODA) funding, but until recently the Department for International Development was the primary recipient. Each year the UK Treasury Department assigns ODA funding to the different departments and requests that they submit proposals against those assigned funding levels. All projects must be directed at the primary national strategic objective for ODA funding, which is to reduce global poverty. DFID, in addition to administering the bulk of UK international development assistance, has also been charged with building the capacity of other government departments to responsibly use ODA funds in support of poverty reduction. A new Ministerial Committee, established in 2018 and chaired by the minister for the cabinet office, oversees the governance of two crossdepartment funds, the Prosperity Fund and the Conflict Security and Stability Fund, which are administered by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. These two funds fulfill other national strategic objectives of the UK government to “protect our people” and to “project our influence.” The CSSF strengthens the peace and resilience of developing countries where there is actual, or a risk of, conflict and instability. The

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Prosperity Fund supports the economic growth and reform needed for development, and focuses geographically on middle income countries, such as Colombia, India and South Africa. For the UK, their funding and authorities arrangements—which emphasize cross-government development assistance funded primarily through three pools (ODA, CSSF and the Prosperity Fund)—present a challenge to achieving the right balance between the combined skills and expertise of different departments and the risks of strategic incoherence and duplication. Coordinating Peace, Stabilization and Reconstruction Coordination across agencies has been an enduring challenge for every civilian government. Bureaucratic infighting, personalities, the pace of events, and the need for confidentiality all may contribute to the breakdown of communications and cooperation among offices and agencies, particularly under pressure to respond to a crisis. Responding to breakdowns in unity of effort in Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan, both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government have, since the 1990s, implemented several initiatives to establish inter-agency and civilian-military coordination processes. Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration issued National Security Presidential Directive 24 (NSPD-24), which authorized the Defense Department to manage Iraq’s post-war relief and reconstruction, and replaced the on-going inter-agency planning process. With the inability of DOD’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to plan and implement a successful relief and reconstruction mission in Iraq, the administration signed NSPD-36, transferring management of the multi-agency effort in Iraq to the State Department’s chief of mission. In Washington, the State Department created the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction with the core mission to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations.” None of these directives, which attempted to resolve the U.S. government coordination problem by appointing a lead organization or agency, was fully implemented due to bureaucratic resistance, overlapping responsibilities that created competition with already established offices, and under-funding. Other attempts to coordinate complex multi-agency responses include the appointment, generally by the president, of a powerful individual who

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carries personal as well as executive authority, as was done in Iraq with the appointment of Paul Bremer as presidential envoy. Special representatives or envoys use their office and personal stature to elevate and sustain attention on a particular crisis and bring coherence to complex problems that require coordinated inter-agency and international responses. These special representatives, because of their presidential appointments, can also speak authoritatively with foreign leaders. The position can supplement normal diplomatic channels and is employed generally in critical circumstances, or in situations where multilateral responses are required that lie outside the scope of normal ambassadorial bilateral relationships. The special representative envoy, however, can also complicate civilian responses to peace and stability operations by operating outside of normal diplomatic and government channels, and providing yet another voice to the cacophony of perspectives on the crisis. In general, agencies of the U.S. government resist permanent oversight by another agency or office as the mechanism for coordinating their activities. Instead, to improve the capacity of agencies to work together on peace and reconstruction operations, they advocate for more balanced resource and funding allocations between civilian and defense, and a re-writing of legislative authorities to improve mission implementation. Finally, civilian agencies in Washington have argued for autonomy by asserting that complex interventions overseas are each unique. Different combinations of agencies are necessary to respond to different types of crisis; establishing a formalized coordination process would limit government flexibility and absorb limited agency resources to support it. The problem, however, is that this approach has consistently led to ad hoc responses and situations especially when departments work together for the first time in emergency or crisis situations. To deal with this issue, other countries such as the UK have allocated funding in ways that could enhance government and civilian-military coordination. In 2004, the UK established the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) to integrate civilian-military policy, planning and operations in the post-conflict phase. The unit was a model of cross-government coordination. Overseen by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Department of International Development, and the Cabinet Office, it was housed in DFID. It had a core staff drawn from each of its parent departments, as well as a deployable civilian-military staff of 400, made up primarily of civilian police officers. Its tasks were to develop a comprehensive, whole-of-government strategy that integrated

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civilian and military planning and linked to the broader international community. It was also the lead organization for planning, implementing and managing the United Kingdom’s contribution to post-conflict stabilization, focusing on boosting civilian capabilities necessary for stabilizing the immediate post-conflict situation. Several issues were not clarified when the PCRU was established: Would the PCRU or the FCO manage UK contributions to post-conflict stabilization missions? Could the PCRU serve as the whole-of-community if it was housed within DFID? How would Parliament oversee the work of a cross-cutting department that did not fit within the mandate of a single committee? Since 2004, the UK has revisited several times the way in which it coordinated its post-conflict programs across the government and built a stable of deployable experts. Its reforms have centered on a number of key areas: • linking its stabilization work to larger national interests • achieving whole-of-government approaches to strategy, planning, operations and lessons learned • building expertise and competence through education and training, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and lessons learned Initially, the focus of coordination was on the three parent institutions— FCO, MOD and DFID—which developed a whole-of-government strategy overseen by a board made up of representatives from their organizations, the National Security Council and the Stabilisation Unit. The Stabilisation Unit, originally a contender for the lead in stabilization planning and operations, was stripped of these responsibilities and they were situated in the FCO’s Conflict Department. During this time, the UK also consolidated several individual departmental funding pools (but managed by the three departments) into one jointly managed Conflict Pool. The Stabilisation Unit’s work focused on the professionalization of operational work, including maintaining a roster of deployable stabilization specialists, education and training, research, and collecting and synthesizing lessons learned to disseminate across all departments involved in the immediate post-conflict phase of stabilization.

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By 2015 the UK’s stabilization and fragile states work went through another transformation in an effort to deepen coordination, collaboration, and expertise.3 The UK’s work in this area is now overseen by the National Security Council which also oversees the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund in an effort to provide the pooled funding with strategic direction by linking it to the country’s core strategic objectives. The CSSF is also available to government agencies beyond the MOD, FCO and DFID, and is operationally overseen by cross-government regional and functional boards that report to the National Security Council. To build greater in-depth government-wide expertise on conflict and stabilization programming, the NSC established the Joint Funds Unit (JFU), which monitors all CSSF programs, maintains good program management of the funds, and, with the Stabilisation Unit, collects, compiles and disseminates lessons learned. Education and Training For the U.S. military, training and education is a key underpinning of its organizational structure. To ensure readiness and prepare personnel for greater responsibilities in often risky assignments, military and enlisted personnel participate in career development programs throughout their tenure, alternating operational tours with assignments to education and training programs. The military personnel system is structured to ensure education and training for all personnel regardless of rank—career advancement requires it and a personnel “float” is in place to ensure that critical combat and support positions are filled while personnel are assigned to education and training. U.S. government agencies have no such system, which was an issue in the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan where the inability to deploy qualified civilian personnel affected both missions. On the civilian side, different recruitment, advancement and resources issues exist, which impact education and training, and readiness. Agencies typically recruit generalists with advanced graduate degrees and provide short-term training necessary to work in a particular position or assignment. On the job learning is emphasized. To support training and relief operations the USAID’s Conflict Management and Mitigation offers a series of short courses designed primarily to familiarize development workers, and the military units they often work with, on tools for analyzing conflict and building conflict-sensitive approaches into their work. USAID’s

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Office of Civil-Military Cooperation offers the military and development workers short courses on how to work together to advance security and development goals, and facilitates USAID staff attendance at DOD courses. Like the United States, the government of the United Kingdom also offers education and training to it government and military staff assigned to work in fragile and conflict states. The education programs are run by the UK’s Stabilisation Unit and include basic inter-operability and conflict sensitivity courses, and more in-depth expert sectoral courses (rule of law, security) and cross-cutting issues (monitoring and evaluation, gender). In addition, the Stabilisation Unit educates and trains an expert cadre of fragility and conflict advisors, the Civilian Stabilisation Group, which is a pool of skilled individuals willing and able to deploy to fragile and conflict-affected states to assist the UK government in addressing instability. The Stabilisation Unit also conducts and contracts research on conflict and fragility; these reports are disseminated to all UK government staff working on CSSF programs, as well as the Civilian Stabilisation Group, to provide them the latest knowledge to enhance their collective performance. Monitoring and Evaluation Government agencies face significant systemic problems that can make the conduct of monitoring and evaluation in the field challenging. In any stabilization, peace or humanitarian mission, there are competing priorities that make it difficult to establish clear and consistent goals for monitoring and evaluation purposes. Common trade-offs include the pressure for quick impact versus the need for longer-term capacity building and structural reform, and progress on sectoral programs versus strengthening local capacity. Another factor affecting monitoring and evaluation is the time pressures civilian practitioners face in the implementation of their programs. Monitoring and evaluating large numbers of programs is difficult and is made more challenging in initial phases when hundreds of programs commence simultaneously. Civilian institutions often are also faced with short results cycles—oversight institutions such as the National Security Council, the legislative branch, and their own headquarters require frequent reporting on progress—which can lead to an emphasis on outputs (number or schools built, number of police trained) rather than

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outcomes (rise in literacy rates, police professionalism), which take a longer time to achieve. Rapid shifts in strategy and tactics throughout the life cycle of a program, as well as uneven progress from region to region, or at the community level, also have complicating effects. The ability of the U.S. State Department and USAID to assess the impact of their programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, was extremely limited. After extensive involvement in both countries and millions of dollars spent, critical programs like the rule of law, police, and aid delivery were still developing applicable metrics systems. Reporting on progress was not routine or meaningful—often, agencies relied on spending and outputs (number of police trained, number of weapons purchased) as measures of effectiveness. Finally, there was a failure to assess whether implementing partners and contractors were effective in their work. Most significant assessment of the performance of civilian agencies at stabilizing these countries was conducted by the special inspector general of Iraq (SIGIR) and Afghanistan (SIGAR). The special inspector generals’ offices were established to audit and investigate the use of government funds. In this process, they pushed civilian institutions to create and implement better assessment methods and more routine reporting so that programs could be reformed or redirected if their work was having harmful or limited effects. Most measurement efforts, however, even those of the special inspector generals, focused on programmatic performance rather than offering an integrated assessment of the country’s overall progress toward stabilization and peace. In 2011, largely as result of large-scale development failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Congress began negotiating the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act, which required U.S. government agencies to closely monitor and evaluate all foreign aid programs based on outcomes (moving away from outputs) and improve transparency by publicly sharing data on successes and failures on government websites. While the act was not passed until 2016, the initiative drove an organizational culture change at USAID not only in the area of monitoring and evaluation but also in transforming the agency to a learning organization. While individual departments and field missions have been encouraged to innovate, monitor, evaluate and learn, USAID also established two learning hubs: The Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning (PPL) and the U.S. Global Development Lab. The Global Development Lab works

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with external partners to produce breakthrough development innovations by testing and scaling proven solutions using data and evidence and harnessing scientific and technological advances. The lab has, for example, advanced sub-Saharan Africa’s off-grid energy sector, partnered with the private sector to provide security for communities in El Salvador, and worked with external partners to eradicate the gender gap in technology and digital use. In the UK, the structure around the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund drives cross-agency monitoring and evaluation of peace and stabilization programs. The UK’s National Security Council established the Joint Funds Unit that monitors CSSF programming to ensure that it fulfills government strategic plans. All programs funded by the CSSF have a results framework that identifies the intended impact, outcomes and outputs, and links these to the delivery of the UK government’s strategic objectives. Security is a critical issue for evaluation teams. When the conditions are too risky to conduct direct monitoring, third parties are engaged in-country so that program teams can continue to adjust design and delivery to respond to the dynamic, fluid contacts in which they work. Annual reviews assess how well a program is delivering on many different fronts, including commercial partnerships, financial and risk management and value for money. Annual lessons from across all program teams in the CSSF portfolio are synthesized by the Stabilisation Unit, which shares the lessons learned broadly with all government departments engaged in fragile and conflict states. This synthesis informs and improves future implementations. In addition, every year, the JFU and SU hold an annual lessonslearned workshop bringing together CSSF staff from every region, as well as departmental, regional and policy leads, to share and discuss policy updates and lessons learned. Regional and thematic review boards work to ensure that program teams incorporate the lessons learned from annual reviews and the lessons learned workshop by holding regional workshops. The CSSF has amassed a considerable body of evidence and lessons learned from conflict work. A major research and evaluation theme in the next few years is political influence; the CSSF will be focused on whether their programs and projects deliver diplomatic access and influence, especially when these are core objectives of a particular program.

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Contending Governments China and Russia are emerging as geo-political contenders globally, and that competition plays out more and more in conflict-affected and fragile states. Russian interventions are often implemented through shadow organizations—private security firms, oligarchy- owned business ventures, social media disinformation campaigns. Civilian agencies of the Chinese government, on the other hand, advance the global development and security strategies of the Communist Party. China has rapidly gained prominence as an influential international development donor through initiatives such as the China-Africa Development Fund and its Belt and Road Initiative, culminating, in 2018, in the establishment of the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA). While committed to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, China advances an alternative development approach that touts China as an economic and political model for developing countries: • respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries • political stability • state-directed economic development In contrast, to the civilian agencies of developed countries that condition development assistance to civil society and governance reform, China’s assistance is not conditioned. China’s government has stated explicitly that it respects the historical, political and cultural values of recipient countries and their right to their own political path. In fragile states, this policy of non-conditionality has been welcomed by authoritarian and corrupt elite who are further legitimized by inflows of Chinese loans and investment and a rise in international stature. China’s economic development is tied explicitly to economic growth in the form of infrastructure development—specific projects, such as roads, hospitals, and railways, that are built by Chinese workers, rather than through the provision of financial resources to support local labor and business. Political stability is ensured by China’s growing participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions, which also sustain Beijing’s economic and commercial interests in Africa, help professionalize China’s military and protect its expatriates. China contributes the most peacekeepers of any Security Council member, and in Africa its contingents

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have transitioned from support roles—medics, trainers—to infantry and police. China’s engagement in fragile states supports a global agenda to reshape trade patterns and assert geopolitical interests in ways that support its foreign policy goals and its domestic development. Its development assistance and peacekeeping operations not only establish Chinese regional spheres of influence, they generate employment for Chinese nationals, feed China’s resource intense industries, and open markets to Chinese exports.

Conclusion Civilian government agencies in developed countries responding to violence and disasters in fragile and conflict-affected states have expanded their presence and operations, conducted strategic reviews driving evolutionary reforms, and converged on an emerging consensus regarding effective diplomatic, development and humanitarian responses. However, significant structural barriers exist despite this increased activism, barriers that impede intervention effectiveness and the ability of governments in conflict-affected states to lead response and recovery. With fragile states emerging as new battlegrounds for geo-political competition, the role of civilian agencies will become that much more complex and important. Developed countries will have to increasingly demonstrate the effectiveness of their governance, development and response models. Contending powers, like China and Russia, will increasingly confront the complexities of these highly localized and contextualized responses, as domestic imperatives drive their increased involvement in these high-risk environments. Meanwhile, the governments of fragile and conflict-affected states are engaged in an emerging and increasingly influential consensus on what works in their countries.

Notes 1. These offices include the Bureaus of: Conflict and Stabilization Operations; Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism; Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Population, Refugees and Migration. And the Offices of Global Criminal Justice, Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, and Global Youth Issues.

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2. The countries of the European Union, Canada, Japan, Israel, Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 3. In September 2020, the UK government merged DFID and the FCO into a new Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office. It’s too early to know how the merger will affect UK participation in international affairs.

CHAPTER 5

The U.S. Military Jim Ruf, Kelly Mader-Schonour, Stephen Spinder, and Kpatcha Massina

In any given context or operating environment no single United States government organization will ever be the only one present. One of the most important actors in this “shared space” is the U.S. military. What they are doing or what their mission is will vary across the conflict continuum—everything from military engagements, supporting other U.S. government organizations, building partner capacity, and the building of infrastructure to combat operations. This chapter aims to introduce you to the military, its structure, how it organizes itself, its

J. Ruf (B) Carlisle, PA, USA K. Mader-Schonour United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, USA S. Spinder Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle, PA, USA K. Massina Center For Global Resilience, Norwich University, Northfield, VT, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Aall and D. Snodderly (eds.), Responding to Violent Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59463-3_5

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personnel, their culture, and how they interact with other organizations when they find themselves sharing the space. It concludes with suggestions on how other entities might best interact with the military.1

Why Do We Have a Military? The U.S. Armed Forces fulfill unique and crucial roles, not only preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense of the United States against all adversaries, both foreign and domestic, but also working closely with civilian and other actors with the aim of achieving unity of purpose. Within the U.S. government, the National Security Strategy (NSS) guides the development, integration, and coordination of all the instruments of national power to achieve national objectives.2

Range of Military Operations The complex nature of the strategic environment may require U.S. forces to conduct different types of joint operations and activities simultaneously across the conflict continuum (see Fig. 5.1). Below we describe three categories of military operations. For a more complete list of types of military operations see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, October 22, 2018, pp. V-4.

Fig. 5.1 Military operations across the conflict continuum (Source Operations: United States Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, C1, December 6, 2017, p. 1–1. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-0.pdf)

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Offensive / Defensive Operations Major operations and campaigns, whether they involve large-scale combat, normally include both offensive and defensive components (for example, interdiction, maneuver, forcible entry, fire support, countering air and missile threats, defensive cyberspace operations, base defense). Although defense may be the stronger form, offense is normally decisive in combat. To achieve military objectives quickly and efficiently, Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) normally seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive offensive operations. Nevertheless, during a sustained offensive, selected elements of the joint force (involving more than one service) may need to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute, while other forces continue the attack. Accordingly, certain defensive measures and protection activities (for example, operational security or OPSEC) are required throughout each joint operation phase. Joint forces at all levels should be capable of rapid transition between offense and defense and vice versa. The relationship between offense and defense, then, is a complementary one. Defensive operations enable JFCs to conduct or prepare for decisive offensive operations.3 Stabilization All military operations, including offense and defense, consider stabilization and its associated activities as a part of planning and implementation of the mission. Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning U.S. government efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence. Of note, The Department of State (DOS) is the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization efforts; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead implementing agency for non-security U.S. stabilization assistance; and Department of Defense (DOD) is a supporting element, including providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts.4

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How Does the Military Operate? Direction The U.S. Armed Forces function within the U.S. system of civil-military relations and serve under the civilian control of the president, who is also the commander in chief.5 Civilian leadership’s intent is codified in strategic, hierarchical documents, including the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy. These documents guide military action in support of U.S. national interests. From these guiding documents comes doctrine, which is a body of thought/guidance on how military forces operate as an integral part of a joint force in relationship to the other parts of the U.S. government and international partners. Leaders are expected to employ forces under the guidance suggested by the doctrine, but the doctrine is not a fixed set of rules. Leaders will adapt to the operational environment, guided by key doctrinal principles. Military operations are based on the central idea that military seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage over the enemy. The military’s focus will be to create a secure environment. The military will seek to identify the enemy or threats as well as “friendly forces,” which is where multi-agency partners such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) will be catalogued, and focus on addressing the threats. This is accomplished through simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stabilization tasks that set conditions for favorable conflict resolution. Operations are focused on defeating or destroying an enemy, protecting or securing key assets and populations, and preventing the enemy from gaining a position of advantage. Key complementary stabilization tasks will then enable other agencies and the host nation to accomplish their jobs. This is executed through mission command and operational planning and execution as discussed below. Mission Command Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Accompanying this authority is the responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish assigned missions.

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While command authority stems from appropriate orders and other directives, the art of command resides in the commander’s ability to maximize operational performance. Successful commanders can strike a balance between the “art of war” (human interaction) and the “science of war” (technological solutions) by emphasizing the inherently human aspects of warfare. Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission. They focus their orders on the purpose of the operation rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks. They delegate decisions to subordinates wherever possible, which minimizes detailed control and empowers subordinates’ initiative to make decisions based on understanding what the commander wants rather than on constant communications. Commanders communicate their intent to the force as a key component of mission command. Commander’s intent is the commander’s clear and concise expression of what the force must do and the conditions the force must establish to accomplish the mission. It is a succinct description of the commander’s visualization of the entire operation and what the commander wants to accomplish. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders once the operation begins, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. Successful command demands that leaders at all levels use disciplined initiative and act decisively and independently to accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent. To understand what the military unit is attempting to achieve, it is essential that all partners understand the commander’s intent. The intent is usually a written document carefully crafted and is one of the most important insights into the objective and approach that the military intends to take. Planning The military places great emphasize on planning, preparing, executing and assessing. The reason for this is to deal with the fog, friction,

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and uncertainty of conflict. Planning helps reduce complexity, anticipate future events, shape a positive future, recognize time horizons, and understand the possible pitfalls. Key elements of planning are determining end states, developing a concept for achieving those end states though lines of effort, identifying risks, and assessing the results and adjusting as needed. For every operation, commanders develop detailed understanding of the operational environment. They then visualize a desired end state that supports the overall U.S. government goal or end state and craft a broad concept for shaping the current conditions toward that end state. Finally, they describe their visualization through the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and concept of operations, setting formal planning processes in motion. Thus, planning is an adaptive process that ebbs and flows with the situation. As understanding of the situation evolves, planners develop branches (what if…) and sequels (what’s next…) to account for such evolution. Since planning is an ongoing process, the resultant plan is an interim product of deliberate thought, based on knowledge and understanding at a specific point in time and space. The truest measure of a good plan is not whether execution occurs as planned, but whether the plan fosters flexibility, initiative, and adaptability in the face of unforeseen events. Generally, the end state is a set of future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends. Clearly describing the end state requires assessing the operational environment’s friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral aspects. In operations, commanders achieve the end state through integrated, collective activities of all the instruments of national power, military and non-military. Essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power are lines of effort. A line of effort/thematic area of responsibility links multiple tasks to focus efforts toward establishing the conditions that define the desired end state. They prove particularly valuable where unity of command is elusive, if not impractical, and when used to engage in operations involving multinational forces and civilian agencies and organizations. Examples of a line of effort include policing, governance, and rule of law. All commanders continuously monitor operations and assess their progress against measures of effectiveness and end state conditions, and

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to determine if the operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if not, why not, and what changes are needed. Operational Considerations There are a number of operational considerations that may be of interest to other actors, as detailed below. Rules of Engagement (ROE) Rules of engagement are directives issued by a competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement. ROE are implemented to help ensure that, if force is required, an appropriate level of force is applied in a disciplined, principled manner that complies with law and policy and minimizes collateral damage while facilitating mission accomplishment. ROE are a fusion of mission requirements, national policy goals, and the rule of law as defined by the host country, by the countries of the troops involved, and/or by the United Nations. Legally, ROE define the boundaries of a commander’s action consistent with the applicable domestic and international law. In fact, ROE often impose greater restrictions on a commander than does the law itself. Generally, the initial ROE for peace operations simply allow for the protection of life and/or property. As the situation on the ground becomes either more violent and chaotic or more stable and peaceful, the ROE are adjusted accordingly. Even with the most thorough ROE, soldiers will be expected to exercise discretion in determining whether the use of force is warranted. Unit commanders always retain the right to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Commanders sometimes insert specific rules into ROE, including rules on the following: hostility criteria, escalation of force or challenging procedures, protection of property and foreign nationals, approval to use weapons systems, observed indirect fires, territorial or geographic constraints, restrictions on point targets and means of warfare, and detention criteria. Risk Management and Force Protection Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks and making decisions that balance risks with the achievement of the

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mission. Risk decisions are commanders’ business. Force protection (FP) should be based on risk management, not risk elimination. Commanders strive to preserve force integrity and combat power by integrating protection capabilities to safeguard bases/base camps, secure routes, and protect forces. Force protection measures should help create the conditions for political, economic, humanitarian, and peacebuilding activities to achieve the political objectives. A level of force protection that exceeds the risk assessment may send a psychological signal to the population that they are still in a tense and uncertain environment. It may delay the return to normalcy and lead to conditions that will prevent the peace process from continuing. Additionally, it can limit contact between the force and local population, reducing the force’s ability to gather information and to mitigate tense situations through negotiations. Role of Intelligence Intelligence is a process, using primarily unstructured information from all sources and focused externally, that is designed to reduce the level of uncertainty for a decision-maker.6 The intelligence process consists of the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis and interpretations of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. Examples of different kinds of intelligence are signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and electronic intelligence (ELINT). The success of joint and multinational operations hinges upon information and intelligence sharing, but the sharing of sensitive classified information is restricted by policy and regulatory rules. Exceptions to these rules can be granted based on trust and the need to know that information to accomplish the mission. If that information is related to protection of the military force or protection of populations and key partners, a case can be developed to allow the release of that information. Nonetheless, it is often a challenge to readily share information with partners, most often due to classification of intelligence and associated networks. Protection of Civilians (POC) United Nations’ Protection of Civilians Mandates authorize peacekeepers to take the initiative in the use of force when other measures have been

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exhausted and the civilian population is under imminent threat of physical violence. The military takes protection of civilians into account for every operation in accordance with the international law of land warfare. Protection of civilians consists of efforts to protect civilians from physical violence, secure their rights to access essential services and resources, and contribute to a secure, stable, and just environment for civilians over the long-term. Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) In the year 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1325 establishing the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, which calls for the empowerment of women to enable societies to reach their full potential and recognizes that societies which empower women to participate fully in civic and economic life are more prosperous and peaceful. The United States adopted its first National Action Plan in 2011, the first legal and policy framework to recognize women’s inclusion as a central aspect of U.S. conflict prevention and resolution efforts. It was developed by a broad inter-agency group, and the three main agencies charged with its implementation were the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Agency for International Development. Accordingly, the Department of Defense must ensure that relevant personnel receive training that addresses the importance of participation by women, including training regarding international human rights law and protecting civilians from violence, exploitation, and trafficking in persons. Corruption and Legitimacy Corruption undermines confidence in the state, impedes the flow of aid, concentrates wealth into the hands of a generally unaccountable and illegitimate minority, and provides elites with illicit means of protecting their positions and interests. It may provide insurgents, and sometimes legitimate opposition groups, with resources and information detrimental to long-term stability. DOD may provide the host nation (HN) government with legal guidance and assistance to help mitigate the near-term effects of corruption. But only long-term measures ensure lasting success. Support to anticorruption initiatives is usually led by DOS, with support from USAID and DOJ. The strongest military contribution, other than the provision of legal expertise, is the example set by commanders at all levels.7

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How Is the Military Organized? Every member of the U.S. armed forces is under a chain of command that begins with the president. This chain of command is complex, to be sure, but the thread that runs from the highest elected official to the lowest-ranking service member is never broken. The national chain of command encompasses six different services—Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Space Force (see Fig. 5.2 for more details). The services almost always conduct operations jointly.

Fig. 5.2 Organization of the Department of Defense (This chart does not include the new U.S. Space Force, approved in December 2019 and still in development, or the Coast Guard, which normally functions as a service in the Department of Homeland Security, but during a national emergency operates as a service in the Navy.) (Source Organization and Management of the Department of Defense, Resource Guide v3.2, March 2019. https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/ org-man.pdf)

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The National Command Structure The U.S. Constitution stipulates that the president is the commander-inchief of the military. The president is assisted by the secretary of defense (SECDEF), a civilian member of the cabinet appointed by the president and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. “The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is the principal staff element of the Secretary of Defense in the exercise of policy development, planning, resource management, fiscal, and program evaluation responsibilities.”8 The president and the secretary of defense are assisted by the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the National Security Council (NSC), and the Joint Staff (www.jcs.mil). As Fig. 5.2 shows, authority over and command and control of the armed forces is exercised through a single chain of command that separates below the secretary of defense into two distinct branches: operational and administrative. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) consists of the chair, vice chair, and chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, National Guard Bureau, and Space Force (the latter effective December 20, 2020). The president, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the CJCS and the vice chairman of the JCS. The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council (NSC). Following the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 the JCS do not have operational command authority, neither individually nor collectively, as the chain of command goes from the president to the secretary of defense, and from the secretary of defense to the commanders of the Combatant Commands (see Fig. 5.2). The combatant commands are responsible to organize and employ forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, and give authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training as necessary to accomplish the missions assigned. Combatant Commands The combatant commands are organized on a geographic or functional basis and include forces from the various services. The document known as the Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes these commands, identifies their specific areas of responsibility (AORs), defines the authority of the commanders, and establishes command relationships. The UCP is reviewed periodically by the JCS and is adjusted in response to changes

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Fig. 5.3 Geographic Combatant Command areas (not including the functional commands) (Source https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Rev iew/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2019/Sukman-Global-Con tingency/)

in the world situation. There are currently six geographic combatant commands and four functional commands, plus the newly established Space Command (see Fig. 5.3). Geographic Commands CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command—www.centcom.mil EUCOM: U.S. European Command—www.eucom.mil INDOPACOM: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command—www.pacom.mil SOUTHCOM: U.S. Southern Command—www.southcom.mil NORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command—www.northcom.mil AFRICOM: U.S. Africa Command—www.africom.mil Functional Commands SOCOM: U.S. Special Operations Command—provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, networked and distributed Global Combatant Command operations—www.socom.mil STRATCOM: U.S. Strategic Command—deters strategic attack and employs forces to deter conflict and deliver decisive capabilities— www.stratcom.mil

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TRANSCOM: U.S. Transportation Command—delivers globally integrated mobility, deployment and distribution solutions—www. transcom.mil CYBERCOM: U.S. Cyber Command—directs the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks and prepares and conducts full spectrum military cyberspace operations—www.cybercom.mil SPACECOM: U.S. Space Command—the newest of the eleven unified commands, SPACECOM brings focused attention to defending U.S. interests in space and reduces decision timelines for space operations—www.spacecom.mil Each of the combatant commands is organized under command of a four-star general or admiral. The combatant commander, in turn, organizes the members of the various services assigned as component commands. The service components are commonly known by the acronyms ARFOR (Army forces), NAVFOR (Navy forces), MARFOR (Marine Corps forces), and AFFOR (Air Force forces). More specifically, individual components are referred to by acronyms that indicate the combatant command to which they are assigned. Thus, for example, Navy forces assigned to CENTCOM are known as NAVCENT. Each of the geographic combatant commands also has a special operations component known as a SOC, or special operations command; for example, the special operations command for EUCOM is referred to as SOCEUR. The regional nature of the commands allows the United States to quickly detect and respond to problems anywhere in the world. Joint commanders typically respond to situations within their area by employing a combination of forces organized into a joint task force (JTF). A JTF is a flexible organizational structure, usually created by the responsible combatant commander, but also available at the national level in extraordinary circumstances or even to an existing JTF commander, should the need arise for a smaller, subordinate JTF. Each JTF operates for a specific purpose, with forces drawn from the service components that make up the joint command. Once the mission is completed, the JTF is normally disbanded. The JTF is the primary action organization within a joint command and the one with which NGOs, civilian agencies, and IOs will have the most contact in the field during stabilization and support operations. A JTF is led by a joint force commander who is normally a

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Fig. 5.4 National chain of command (Source U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle, PA)

flag officer (a general or an admiral) and who typically reports directly to the combatant commander. In multinational operations, a JTF may combine with a variety of forces from several nations. In such cases, the JTF becomes a combined joint task force (CJTF). For a diagram of how JTFs fit within the national chain of command, see Fig. 5.4. Operational Units and Command Structure/Sections Personnel are further organized into units and vary in size, task and purpose. The smallest unit is a team or squad and normally has 7–14 personnel. Typically, 3–4 squads make up a platoon and 2–4 platoons comprise a company. Likewise, 2–5 companies typically make up a battalion. See Table 5.1 for a breakdown of Army operational units and their commanders. Every unit of battalion size or larger has five or more specialized staff sections, each of which is identified by an alphanumeric designation. The staff or S designation is standard for Army and Marine units up to the level of a brigade or regiment. In Air Force units, A is used; in Naval units, N.

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Table 5.1 U.S. Army operational units U.S. Army units

Number of troopsa

Commander

Army Group (4–5 Field Armies) Field Army (2–5 Corps) Corps (2–5 Divisions) Division (3–4 Brigades) Brigade (2–3 Battalions)

400,000–1,000,000+

General

90,000–225,000 20,000–45,000 10,000–20,000 3000–5000

Battalion (4–6 Companies) Company (3–4 Platoons) Platoon (2–4 Squads)

500–1000 100–200 20–40

Squad (also called a section)

4–10

General Lieutenant General Major General Brigadier General or Colonel Lieutenant Colonel Captain Lieutenant (lowest officer rank) Staff Sergeant (enlisted)

a Numbers are approximate as the exact size depends on the type of unit

When the unit is commanded by a general officer, the designation is G to indicate general staff. (In a command where joint forces are resident, sections will be designated by a J instead of an S, and in a combined or multinational force the sections are designated by a C.) Staff Section 1 (S1) handles personnel administration; S2 handles the processing of intelligence and tactical information for the commander and deals with security issues; S3 handles plans, operations, and training; S4 handles all aspects of logistics—transportation, supply, ammunition, rations. Typically, staff Section 5 is the planning section. The S6 handles communications, S7 typically deals with training, and S8 deals with resource management and requirements (finance and contracts). Some commands may also have an additional section (S9) that focuses on civilian-military relations (engagements, partnerships, coordination, etc.) Most commands have all of the nine functionalities (see Fig. 5.5), but they may organize themselves differently. For example, sometimes the functionality of an S9 is housed within the S5. Usually the work of the various sections is coordinated and overseen by an executive officer at the battalion level, and by a chief of staff at the brigade level and higher. Staff officers plan and assist the commander in executing operations, but the leaders of staff sections are not commanders. However, when authorized and under the proper circumstances, staff officers may speak for the commander or issue orders in his or her name.

Fig. 5.5 Specialized staff designations (Source https://globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/6-0/appc. htm#c-4 or Field Manual 6-0, Department of Army, Washington, DC, August 11, 2003)

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U.S. Armed Services Each of the U.S. armed services has a specific and generally accepted defense function—the Army on land; the Navy at sea; the Marine Corps on land, usually from the sea; the Air Force in the air; Coast Guard at ports and waterways; the Space Force in space—it fulfills that function through units trained and organized around various specialties. Some of these specialties exist in more than one service, but each has its own unique mission. For example, three of the services have high-performance jet aircraft, but the Marine aircraft concentrate on supporting Marine ground units while Navy jets concentrate on protecting the fleet. Military personnel are very conscious of the specialties. In the Army, for instance, the specialties are grouped into branches that are identified by distinctive insignia and badges displayed on uniforms; for example, Army infantry soldiers wear a crossed rifle insignia. Army The United States Army is the largest of the services. Its primary role is to organize, train, and equip forces to conduct sustained land combat operations. The Army and, at a lower level, the Marine Corps have borne the largest share of the burden of providing units and personnel to support these operations. Army unit types and functions are described by one of the following war fighting functions: Move and Maneuver (for example, infantry and armor), Intelligence (for example Military Intelligence Units), Fires (for example, artillery), Sustainment (for example, supply and transportation), Command and Control (for example, communications), and Protection (for example, military police). Individual soldiers are grouped into branches that constitute these general categories. Many in the Army still refer to the older arrangement of Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support. The branches for lawyers, medical personnel, and chaplains are considered special branches. Additionally, the Army has many specialties that require advanced schooling and experience. These include public affairs specialists, comptrollers, and foreign area officers, who serve in U.S. embassies as military attaches. Joint operations generally require the participation of Army units from all categories, with the mix of these forces largely dependent on the nature of the mission. In humanitarian and disaster relief operations, for

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example, a typical joint task force is likely to include more Sustainment and Protection units than Move and Maneuver units. Many campaigns entail lengthy periods of both combat and stability operations. This situation requires the Army to sustain operations for as long as necessary and adapt to changes as required. At the same time, it must also sustain operational support to forces around the globe. For more information: www.army.mil Navy The primary role of the Navy is to maintain global maritime superiority, contribute to stability and security operations, conduct operations on and from the sea, and conduct such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of naval campaigns. The Navy is constantly “forward deployed” (that is, naval forces are within a relatively short distance of potential crisis areas), with ships at sea in each of the combatant commands. Because of its forward deployment, the Navy is the premier service for “power projection” (that is, the projection of national power beyond national borders), having the ability to respond quickly and with significant firepower. The Navy is organized into two major fleets: the Atlantic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. The Atlantic Fleet consists of the Second Fleet in the Atlantic Ocean proper and provides ships and other forces to the Sixth Fleet, under control of EUCOM, in the Mediterranean Sea. The Pacific Fleet comprises the Seventh Fleet, which covers the western Pacific, and the Third Fleet, which covers the eastern Pacific. Both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets deploy forces to the Fifth Fleet, under control of CENTCOM, in the Persian Gulf and the North Arabian Sea. Subordinate to these fleets are subcommands that are organized by type of vessel: surface vessels, aircraft carriers, or submarines. The Navy’s main fighting organization is the carrier strike group. Built around a large-deck aircraft carrier, each carrier strike group consists of about ten vessels: the aircraft carrier, four to six surface combatants (destroyers, cruisers, or frigates armed with air defense and antisubmarine weapons, cruise missiles, and guns), one or two submarines, and an ammunition and supply vessel. With the addition of another aircraft carrier and a Marine air-ground task force, the carrier strike group becomes a battle force capable of various combat missions, including amphibious operations and around-the-clock air operations.

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Naval forces can also be organized into naval expeditionary forces, each of which is tailored to meet specific threats and perform specific missions. Once they have accomplished their mission, they are disbanded. A JTF requiring naval operations may use either a carrier strike group, an expeditionary strike group (ESG), or another naval expeditionary force, depending its mission. The Navy also has deployable land-based forces, generally involved in port operations and construction. The most famous of these are the naval construction battalions, or Seabees. Other capabilities include maritime civil affairs, maritime and port security, logistics support, construction, littoral and coastal warfare and patrol, riverine warfare, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), expeditionary diving and combat salvage, and combat photography. For more information: www.navy.mil Marine Corps The Marine Corps is under the administrative control of the Secretary of the Navy. It is in every respect an equal partner with the other services. The Marines provide the capability to respond rapidly and forcefully to crises worldwide. Marine forces are formed into three major organizations: I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) based in Camp Pendleton, CA; II Marine Expeditionary Force based in Camp Lejeune, NC; and III Marine Expeditionary Force based in Okinawa, Japan. Marine units are normally slightly larger than Army units and have similar capabilities, particularly up to battalion level. Most Army units are optimized for participation in sustained land operations, to include heavy armored forces. In contrast, Marine units normally do not have as many heavy armored vehicles and are designed for amphibious or helicopterborne operations from the sea. With the Navy, the Marines are often the first units deployed in complex contingencies, primarily because they are at sea in the vicinity of a crisis area. The Marines must have the capability to support themselves until Army units arrive. If deployed as part of a long-term operation, Marines must often utilize Army service support capabilities. The Marine element of a JTF consists of a Marine Air ground task force (MAGTF), which may vary in size from a reinforced battalion to a reinforced division. In ascending order of size, these forces are designated as follows: Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) (a reinforced

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battalion); Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) (a reinforced regiment); and Marine expeditionary force (MEF) (a reinforced division). Each MAGTF normally consists of infantry, amphibious vehicles, armor, an aviation element, and combat and service support. A MEU, for example, is structured around a Marine infantry battalion, reinforced by a tank company, artillery, engineers, service support, and aviation units. In addition to tanks, a MEU has amphibious and light armored vehicles, helicopters, and vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) ground-attack aircraft. A MEU is often the first ground force deployed in response to any complex contingency. A MEF is made up of a Marine division, a Marine air wing, and a service support group. The division is composed of three infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, a tank battalion, and supporting forces. Though they share some of the same functions, Marine Corps civil affairs forces are smaller in number than their Army counterparts and are tactically oriented. The Marine Corps’ dedicated civil affairs (CA) structure is maintained entirely within the Reserve Component (RC) and consists of two Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs). Each CAG is designed to support a MEF. While every effort is made to recruit and train Marines with a broad variety of military and civilian skills, each member of the CAG is a CA generalist. These CA capabilities have been grouped under a Force Headquarters Group that also includes a Law Enforcement Battalion whose mission it is to mentor and assist host nation police forces. For more information: www.marines.mil Air Force The role of the Air Force is to organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of sustained combat operations in the air. The Air Force is also responsible for maintaining air supremacy, defeating enemy air forces, and conducting space operations as well as providing forces for air and missile defense. The Air Force works closely with the commander of TRANSCOM to provide strategic airlift in support of other combatant commands and services. When authorized by the president, Air Force transport aircraft can be used for transportation of civilian personnel, equipment, and supplies. Such support is often a part of a humanitarian effort. The Air Force also works closely with the commander of STRATCOM to maintain the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal.

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The Air Force is organized into ten major commands, categorized as either operational or support. Each major command is directly subordinate to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (HQ, USAF). The major commands are subdivided into numbered air forces, which in turn are subdivided into specialized wings: fighter, bomber, tanker, or training, depending on whether they are assigned to operational or support commands. The wings are then further subdivided into groups, squadrons, and flights. The basic unit for combat capability is the wing, which has always been the Air Force’s primary fighting instrument. Composite wings operate more than one kind of aircraft and may be configured as self-contained units designed for quick air intervention anywhere in the world. The wing is the primary AFFOR unit in a combatant command and a JTF. Other wings operate a single aircraft type and are assigned as needed to air campaigns throughout the world. For more information: www.af.mil Coast Guard The mission of the Coast Guard is to ensure the nation’s maritime safety, security and stewardship. The Coast Guard normally functions as a service in the Department of Homeland Security, but during a national emergency operates as a service in the Navy. Its mission includes ports, waterways, and coastal security; drug and migrant interdiction; search and rescue; aids to navigation; marine environmental protection; and ice operations. The Coast Guard can also be employed overseas, conducting missions similar to those it does at home along with assisting host nation militaries in preparing for comparable missions. For more information: www.uscg.mil Space Force The new U.S. Space Force was approved by Congress in late 2019 and is still in development. For more information: www.spaceforce.mil

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Reserves and National Guard Each of the services has a federal reserve force: U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), U.S. Navy Reserve Force (USNRF), U.S. Marine Forces Reserve (USMARFORRES), U.S. Air Force Reserve (USAFR), and U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR). These forces consist of trained units and individuals that can be called upon as needed. The National Guard is the organized militia reserved to the states by the U.S. Constitution. The National Guard consists of the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Air National Guard (ANG). In peacetime, the National Guard is commanded by the governor of each state or territory and provides the first military response in the states during emergencies. Most Reserve and National Guard forces train one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer. Once the force is mobilized, a period of training is required to ready it for deployment. The president can federalize National Guard units to respond to domestic disturbances, natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, or service abroad. When federalized, National Guard units are subordinate to the combatant commander of the theater in which they operate. National Guard units have fought in all the nation’s wars, including Iraq and Afghanistan. A significant number of combat support forces, such as transportation, medical, logistics, civil affairs, engineering, and military police, are in the Reserves rather than the active force. For more information: https://www.nationalguard.com/; https:// www.usar.army.mil/

Military Personnel Values and Culture The military profession is a unique vocation, with experts certified in the design, generation, support, and ethical application of land, maritime, and air power, serving under civilian authority and entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people. Below are the values that drive the behavior of the armed forces. Service to Country: The oaths of office for officers, enlisted members, and DOD civilians all bind uniformed members of the “Profession of Arms” to an unlimited liability—accepting risk of serious

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personal harm or even death. This unlimited liability distinguishes the Profession of Arms from other federal employees and other professions. Honor and Integrity: Honesty, fairness, respect, and integrity define honor. Integrity requires that the military member not deceive others. It is the willingness to do what is right even when no one is looking. Trust and Commitment: Trust is built among the internal parts of the military system by leaders demonstrating their own competence, character, and commitment. Leaders also develop trust through difficult training and shared experiences. Courage: Physical courage is a matter of enduring physical duress and at times risking personal safety. Facing moral fear or adversity may be a long, slow process of continuing forward on the right path, especially if taking those actions is not popular with others. Expertise: Military expertise is the design, support, and ethical application of power, primarily in unified operations, as well as supporting capabilities. The military places great emphasis on lifelong learning. Officers / Enlisted The military hierarchy is separated into two basic groups: officers and enlisted personnel. Enlisted personnel are further subdivided into junior enlisted and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Junior enlisted personnel hold ranks of private, specialist, lance corporal, seaman, or airman. (The rank titles are commonly used for both genders.) Noncommissioned officers are corporals or sergeants. Exact titles vary from service to service, and nation to nation. Enlisted personnel address officers either by their rank or by using “sir” or “ma’am.” Junior ranking officers address senior officers in the same way. Officers Officers are subdivided into two groups: warrant and commissioned officers. Warrant officers are between commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers. These officers are appointed based on their demonstrated level of competence in a specific area of expertise. Most warrant officers do not exercise command authority but rather operate, administer, and manage equipment, support activities, and technical systems. There

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are up to five grades of warrant officers in the various services. Warrant officers are often selected from the NCO ranks for advanced training in specific areas of expertise that mirror the specialties they held as enlisted personnel. Like commissioned officers, warrant officers serve for an indefinite period or for as long as they choose within parameters determined by the individual service component. Commissioned officers plan operations, manage resources, and provide leadership to enlisted personnel under their supervision or command. Commissioned officers serve at the pleasure of the commander in chief (through the respective service of assignment) or for extended terms of service depending on national regulations. They exercise command authority (derived from respective national legal foundations) and are held to the highest standard of responsibility for their conduct and performance. Of note, officers swear their allegiance to the Constitution and not to the commander in chief. Oath of Commissioned Officers: I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God. (U.S. Code, Title 5, “Government Organization and Employees,” Section 3331) Noncommissioned Officers/Enlisted From a civilian perspective, enlisted personnel are “hired” as employees for a specific term. Terms of service vary from two years to an indefinite period. Noncommissioned officers are known as the backbone of the military, even though they cannot legally exercise command except under the most extraordinary circumstances, such as in combat when the officer in charge is incapacitated or killed. They are the first-line supervisors and trainers in the military and conduct its day-to-day activities. Senior NCOs often possess university degrees and manage complex operations and large amounts of resources. They could well be considered the mid-level management of the military.

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Contractors Contractors have always accompanied U.S. armed forces. Today’s complex weapons and equipment systems, high operations demand, and limited force structure require that deployed military forces have contractor support. That support often includes traditional goods and services but may include interpreters, communications, infrastructure, and other non-logistics-related support. Whether it bridges gaps prior to the arrival of military support resources, when host nation support is not available, or augments existing support capabilities, contractor support is important for operations. Contracts may be let by contracting officers of U.S. military units or by support organizations, such as the United States Army Materiel Command and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The contracts may be prearranged or awarded during the operation itself. Contracted personnel may be U.S. citizens, third country nationals, or local subcontractor employees. Contractor activities are managed through the contracting organization, not the operational chain of command. Commanders in the field do not have direct control over contractors or their employees. Only contractors manage, supervise, and give directions to their employees. Contractors are prohibited from speaking for or committing resources on behalf of the U.S. government. When contractor employees are deployed, the U.S. force commander provides or makes available force protection and support services similar to what is provided to U.S. government civilian personnel. However, local contractors may not be given the same security or support. Private Security Organizations The presence of thousands of security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan drew attention to the increasing use of commercial security and military firms in peace and stabilization operations. Using mostly former military and law enforcement personnel, commercial security firms perform security functions, including static guards, convoy escorts, VIP protection, and engaging in combat in extreme situations. These companies are hired by host nation governments, private sector firms, and even military forces. The United States has in the past hired commercial security firms to train host nation police and security forces.

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As the result of controversial incidents in Afghanistan and Iraq, several policy and doctrinal manuals have been developed to clarify and control contracting. These manuals such as Operational Contract Support, Joint Publication 4-10, should be consulted to provide a clear understanding for U.S. military use of contractors. Clearly, commercial security is an established and growing aspect of peace, stability, and relief operations and will likely be an element in future operations.

Rank and Insignia: Reading a Uniform Rank is an integral part of military leadership. The visible signs of rank give the wearer instant credibility as a leader and decision maker and confer both authority and responsibility on the officer or NCO. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show the ranks, grades, and insignia of the services in the United States for enlisted staff and officers. The easiest way to distinguish among members of the military is by their uniforms and insignia. Each service has a variety of distinctive uniforms for formal and informal occasions and for field and combat duties. In the field, where most of the contact among NGOs, IOs, government representatives, and the military occurs, military personnel typically wear a camouflage uniform that matches the environment, which ranges from woodland to desert. These field uniforms do not display any of the ribbons and awards that an individual has received but may reflect some of the individual’s qualifications. It is often left up to the individual to decide which, if any, qualification badges are worn. In the U.S. military, each service requires, as a minimum, that every individual wear a name tag or a name tape and display his or her rank. Usually, rank insignia for military personnel are worn on the collar, the chest, the sleeves, or the shoulder. On more formal uniforms, officer rank insignia are worn on the shoulder epaulettes or on the sleeve; these uniforms can also display ribbons and qualification badges. A uniform can display more than just the name and rank of the wearer. Army officers through the rank of colonel wear distinctive insignia that indicate their branch or specialty. All Army personnel wear distinctive organizational patches on their sleeves; patches worn on the left sleeve designate the person’s current unit of assignment, and patches worn on the right sleeve generally indicate with which unit, if any, the person served in past combat. Military personnel may also wear badges that

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Fig. 5.6 Enlisted ranks, pay grades, and insignia by U.S. service (Source https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyafrica/4274370595/in/photos tream/ [enlisted])

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Fig. 5.7 Officer ranks, pay grades, and insignia by U.S. service (Source https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyafrica/4274368989/in/photostream/ [officers])

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indicate qualifications (such as explosive ordnance disposal and airborne earned at specialized schools) or tabs that indicate if they are qualified as Rangers or Special Forces. Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine aviators all wear wings and usually squadron patches on their flight jackets. Many military operations involve the participation of units from several nations. They may be operating under a UN mandate or under a mandate from a regional security organization such as NATO. When serving in UN operations, soldiers routinely wear their national flag on one or both sleeves to indicate their nationality. All soldiers participating in UN missions wear distinctive blue headgear (helmets, berets, or baseball-style caps) that displays the UN symbol of a world map flanked by olive branches. This headgear supplements the national uniform and is the only part of the uniform that is distinctive to the United Nations. During military operations, it is standard for the vast majority of members of the armed forces to wear a uniform.

Other Operations As mentioned above, the military can perform a wide range of operations in addition to their primary mission. Listed in more detail below are some—but certainly not all—of the operations that occur more frequently. They may occur separately or simultaneously depending on the size and scope of DOD’s mission in a specific environment. Security Cooperation Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to the Host Nation (HN). Peace Operations The different types of peace operations where partners might engage are shown in Fig. 5.8. Peace operations are intended ideally to prevent conflict and when necessary to build, keep, enforce, or make peace. They include crisis response and limited contingency operations to contain conflict, restore

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Fig. 5.8 Types of peace operations (Source Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Peace Operations” (JP3-07.3), March 1, 2018. https://publicintelligence.net/jcs-peace-ope rations/)

peace, and shape the strategic security environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding, as well as to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. The United States may conduct peace operations either independently or as part of an international or multinational effort. In any of these arrangements, U.S. forces will report to the U.S. chain of command. However, in multinational peace operations, the U.S. force may also report to the sponsoring international organization. By U.S. law, the president retains command authority over U.S. forces; however, as commander in chief, the president has the authority to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander when doing so serves American security interests.9 Military forces can help provide security so other actors have space to operate; ultimately, a successful peace operation depends upon the effectiveness of host nation police forces assisted by international organizations

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with the necessary non-military expertise. Other actors should have the lead role for many peace operations efforts. The fundamentals of peace operations are consent of all the major parties to the conflict; restraint and minimum force only in self-defense and in defense of the mandate; and impartiality to the dispute, while enhancing the credibility and legitimacy of the host government. Every peace operation should be directed toward clearly defined, achievable objectives and an attainable end state. Leadership should be alert for misunderstandings stemming from different practices and terminology used by civilian, police, and multinational military counterparts. Additionally, military efforts should support and avoid undermining political and other civilian objectives that may comprise the mission’s main purpose.10 Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Response (Humanitarian Relief Operations) In the case of a disaster, DOD supports USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which is the lead in any international disaster relief effort. Activities during the initial response phase aim to provide a safe, secure environment, allowing both the military and civilians to attend to the immediate humanitarian needs of the host nation population. Military forces support efforts to reduce the level of violence and human suffering while creating conditions that enable other actors to participate safely in ongoing efforts.11 DOD’s specific role(s) in a humanitarian response will vary depending on the needs as determined by OFDA as well as the conflict context of the environment. Where violent conflict is prevalent, DOD is less likely to provide direct assistance to affected populations, focusing instead on providing transportation and logistical support to ongoing humanitarian efforts. For an example of assistance to an extremely complex foreign disaster, see the box “Operation Tomodachi.” Box 5.1: Operation Tomodachi On March 11, 2011, Japan suffered a 9.0-magnitude earthquake, one of the worst in recorded history. The earthquake triggered a destructive tsunami that struck the coastal areas of northeast Japan, in some cases

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traveling up to 10 kilometers inland, and damaged the Fukushima nuclear power plant. In conjunction with the rest of the US Government, the US military quickly initiated crisis response actions in support of the Japanese government in an operation named “Tomodachi,” the Japanese word for “friend.” The military sent some 20,000 troops, 140 aircraft, and at least 20 ships in support of Operation Tomodachi. During the operation, US military forces conducted search and rescue operations; transported emergency response teams, equipment, and relief supplies to hundreds of thousands of displaced people in affected remote Japanese communities; and provided emergency medical care. Providing humanitarian assistance in the wake of a disaster is not an uncommon mission for the US military. However, the magnitude and the destruction caused by the earthquake and tsunami, joined with the radiological threat from the damaged nuclear plant, caused an unparalleled foreign disaster. Commander, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), established the command and control to execute Operation Tomodachi. Commander, US Forces Command Japan, initially served as the Commander of Operation Tomodachi until the command was handed off to the activated joint task force (JTF). Seventh Fleet, Fifth Air Force, US Army Forces Japan, and the Marine Forces Japan were assigned as supporting commands. USPACOM activated elements of JTF 519 to command the operation and operationally augment the staff of US Forces Japan to form a joint support force. The mission of this joint force was to support the Government of Japan with disaster response in the wake of the earthquake and subsequent tsunami. During Operation Tomodachi, US forces followed three lines of operations: foreign humanitarian assistance; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response; and noncombatant evacuation (voluntary departure of US Department of Defense [DOD] personnel and their dependents)…. Not only were countless lives saved, but the US-Japan alliance was strengthened. Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan, on April 20, 2011, acknowledged the support of the US: “Immediately after the earthquake, the United States, our most important friend and ally, provided swift cooperation…. The attitude that Americans have demonstrated during this operation has deeply touched the hearts and minds of the Japanese.” Source Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Joint Publication 3-29, May 14, 2019, pp. I 12–13.

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Mass Atrocities Response Operations (MARO) The goal of MARO is to establish the basis for a stable, secure environment in which civil authorities can work to resolve the underlying causes for the instability. As such, MARO are likely to be a mix of offense, defense, and stability operations. One of the most important questions related to MARO planning is the intervening force’s level of responsibility for civilians. The peace operations force commander’s mission may simply be to stop the killing, providing emergency assistance until relative stability has been restored, with handoff to another organization or the host nation government. Alternatively, the peace operations force may be expected to sustain its efforts beyond the cessation of the killing, to include the provision of services and restoration of governance. Intervening forces should be proficient in the employment of both lethal and nonlethal force options so as to reduce the potential for civilian casualties and the unintended damage. Beginning in 1999 with the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, the Security Council has mandated that a peacekeeping force “take the necessary action…within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”12 The UN Department of Peace Operations has developed a three-tiered “Operational Concept” for protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping missions: protection through dialogue and engagement, provision of physical protection, and establishment of a protective environment.13

U.S. Military Funding for Other Operations U.S. forces have limited authority to provide assistance to foreign governments and other organizations and agencies. The fiscal authority resides either in U.S. Code, Title 22, “Foreign Relations and Intercourse,” or in U.S. Code, Title 10, “Armed Forces.” Title 22 contains the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. These funds are generally managed by the Department of State and constitute the majority of fiscal authorities related to security force assistance. Title 10 authorizes limited types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, and exercises as well as limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance and they are managed by the Department of Defense. Congress may authorize specific appropriations to support specific operations. Likewise, the president may

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sign a National Security Presidential Directive that makes the geographic combatant commander responsible for coordinating all U.S. government efforts in a particular theater of operation. With these limited exceptions, the executive agency for training and equipping host-nation security forces resides with the Department of State. Restrictions on Funding The Foreign Operations Appropriation Act, commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment, prohibits the United States government from providing funds and training to a unit of a host-nation security force if credible evidence exists that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. Once implemented, this restriction can only be lifted when the secretary of state determines that the concerned host nation is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the hostnation security force unit to justice and that corrective training has been implemented. Quick Impact Project Funding Quick impact project funds for use by U.S. military commanders have been authorized in the past by special legislation and may be used in the future to provide U.S. government funds directly to unit commanders to respond quickly for urgent, small-scale, humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects and services that immediately assist the indigenous population and that the local population or government can sustain.14 These types of funds are best used following consultation with community leaders and other development organizations, including USAID, and multinational and international partners. They are usually spent by engaging local contractors and workers to build or improve infrastructure, such as schools, clinics, roads, and public utilities. In Iraq and Afghanistan, this type of project funding was called the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). For example, in the immediate aftermath of the Iraq intervention in 2003, the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division spent $28 million in CERP funds on 3600 projects in northern Iraq. The funds were used to improve local infrastructure, including refurbishing four hundred schools and employing thousands of workers.

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Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) is an enduring funding mechanism available to U.S. commanders. OHDACA includes three segments: the Humanitarian Mine Action Program, the Humanitarian Assistance Program, and Foreign Disaster Relief Assistance. OHDACA programs are coordinated with the Department of State and approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.15 Foreign Disaster Relief Assistance (FDR) The secretary of defense may provide disaster assistance only: (1) at the direction of the president; or (2) with the concurrence of the secretary of state; or (3) in emergency situations to save human lives, where there is not sufficient time to seek initial concurrence of the secretary of state. Types of such assistance include transportation, supplies, services, and non-lethal equipment. DOD can also provide Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs) after man-made/natural disasters. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) HCA operations must be conducted in conjunction with an authorized military operation, such as an exercise or a training deployment. The DOS must approve all HCA projects. HCA must complement but not duplicate any other form of social or economic assistance. No individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity can receive the aid. Although all HCA operations should strive to meet desired end states, benefit to the local populace is secondary to meeting the training requirements prescribed under law for any such operation. HCA activities are defined in the statute as medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

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How to Interact with DOD Mechanisms The combatant commander will work through the U.S. Embassy’s Country Team to coordinate the whole of U.S. government and international approaches. The country team, headed by the chief of mission (COM), is the senior in-country interagency coordinating body. The country team system provides for rapid inter-agency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of U.S. programs and policies. In almost all missions, DOD is represented on the country team by the senior defense official (SDO), who is the principal DOD official in U.S. embassies. The SDO is the U.S. defense attaché (DATT) and chief of the security cooperation organization (SCO). The SCO is sometimes called the office of defense cooperation, the security assistance office/organization, or the military group. The Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) are augmented with representatives from other U.S. government agencies. GCCs and, increasingly, JTF commanders are assigned a policy advisor by DOS. USAID has also placed senior development advisors at most GCCs to coordinate overall relations with USAID headquarters and field missions. They provide information about USAID programs that should be considered during planning and operations. Additionally, each of the GCCs has developed subordinate organizations and staff sections to enhance civil-military coordination. Organizations such as the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG), interagency coordination directorates, special staff offices, civil-military operations centers (CMOCs), NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) centers, Joint Interagency Task Forces JIATFs (usually formed around a focused mission such as counter drug or counter terror), and other structures and processes focus on enabling inter-agency, IO, NGO, and private sector coordination and shared situational awareness. They serve as a “middle ground” or “meeting place” for non-DOD representatives and joint force personnel to enhance communication, collaboration, and cooperation, and work toward common mission objectives and end states. Some civilian agencies and NGOs may not be comfortable or able to participate in these organized military coordination centers because doing so would jeopardize their neutrality and independence. It may be best to meet at a neutral space to conduct liaison and coordination.

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In cases where the United Nations is present, the U.S. military should be coordinating their activities with the UN representatives as well. Working with the Interorganizational Community While friction between the military and civilian organizations cannot be eliminated, its impact can be mitigated. The overriding factor bearing on the U.S. military relationship with the NGO community is the nature of the context in which they encounter each other. When responding to a major natural disaster, the motivations of both are largely congruent, and a critical concern is to maximize the efficiency of their collaboration. This requires coordination between the military and the IO/NGO communities and civilian agencies to provide assessments, determine priorities, and de-conflict resource allocations. This is not the case in contentious situations where the military may be seen as a party to the conflict. Among the inherent sources of friction between the military and NGOs when the former is engaged in such operations are contradictions in missions, tradeoffs between stabilization and development, and different time horizons. Many of the same complications may also be present in peace operations when force must be used to protect the mandate. Whereas humanitarian NGOs have a mission to serve populations in need regardless of their political allegiance, the military mission is to provide security by defeating the enemy. The U.S. military tends to be oriented to achieving results through quick impact projects and short-term efforts, while NGOs many times are focused on longer-term activities. Cooperation with military forces during such operations may put at jeopardy core values that underpin many such organizations. It could also place their personnel, facilities and even their clients at risk. Thus, preserving the perception and reality of their neutrality with regard to the conflict and independence from the policy objectives of states by disassociating themselves from military forces are cardinal principles for humanitarian and many other NGOs. Sometimes confusing is the military’s involvement in funding and implementing projects to build schools, roads, clinics, and wells. In addition to blurring the distinction between the role of military forces and that of NGOs, this can inadvertently produce concerns for NGOs that are involved in long-term efforts in the country. A deficiency that can arise when the military engages in civilian projects is unfamiliarity

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with potential unintended consequences. For example, well-intentioned military-funded projects might risk violating the principle of “do no harm.” To assist in dealing with these confusing complexities the U.S. military in Afghanistan revisited a Vietnam era civilian-military program called the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program and designed the Provincial Reconstruction Teams or PRTs. Although results varied, the PRTs, consisting primarily of civilian government and military personnel, interacted routinely with the NGOs that were present in the shared space. By attending meetings and sharing information the attendees were able to gain greater awareness of proposed and ongoing projects and in some cases reduce unwanted and unnecessary duplication. PRT’s were used in Iraq for similar purposes. To understand what the relationships should be there are several sources. One is the standing military doctrine. Another is the “Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments.”16 These guidelines articulate best practices for respecting the core principles for such organizations of humanity, impartiality, and independence. They preserve the ability of the humanitarian community and NGOs generally to do their essential work, an objective that is shared by the military. Other key ones are the “Oslo Guidelines: Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief” (2007), “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” (2006), and the “IASC Reference Paper on Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies” (2004). The use of military or armed escorts is described in the “IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys“ (2013).

Conclusion The U.S. military is a complex government department with over one million personnel working throughout many different layers of offices and geographic responsibilities. It operates on every continent, conducting a variety of operations from key leader engagements and training host militaries to responding to natural or human-made disasters. It is our hope that this brief introduction to the U.S. military’s structures, personnel,

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and operations will help readers develop a better understanding of the military and will therefore be better prepared to interact successfully with them when they encounter them in the shared space.

Notes 1. Each organization has its own lexicon, which can lead to misunderstandings when coordinating. If you are unfamiliar with a term, seeking clarity is critical. In this chapter, we tried to limit the use of acronyms or military-specific jargon. If there are any terms that are unknown to you or require clarification, please refer to the military’s current compilation of terms and acronyms: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as of January 2020. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doc trine/pubs/dictionary.pdf. 2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability, Joint Publication 3-07, August 3, 2016. http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/jp3_07.pdf. 3. Ibid., chap. V-15. 4. Ibid. 5. This section draws on material from Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1, July 2019; The Army, Army Doctrine Publication 1, July 2019; and U.S. Code, Title 10, “Armed Forces,” Section 3062. 6. Kristan J. Wheaton, Sources and Methods: What Is Intelligence? July 11, 2008. http://sourcesandmethods.blogspot.com/2008/07/what-is-intell igence-final-version-with.html. 7. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability. 8. For more information about OSD offices and functions go to https:// dod.defense.gov/About/Office-of-the-Secretary-of-Defense/. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability. 12. UN Security Council Resolution 1270, October 22, 1999, Paragraph 14. 13. “The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping,” United Nations Department of Peace Operations, 2019. 14. “Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System Handbook,” chap. 4. http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-27/ch-4.asp, accessed March 25, 2013. 15. http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2004/budget_justifica tion/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/Overview_Book/18_OHD ACA.pdf, accessed May 20, 2011. 16. United States Institute of Peace, InterAction, and U.S. Department of Defense, Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed

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Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, n.d. http://www.usip.org/resources/guidelines-relations-bet ween-us-armed-forces-and-nghos-hostile-or-potentially.

For More Information

General Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping. New York: United Nations, 1992. Burgess, Guy, and Heidi Burgess, eds. Beyond Intractability Project. Boulder: University of Colorado, Conflict Information Consortium. www.beyondintrac tability.org. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. Managing Conflict in a World Adrift. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2015. Greig, J. Michael, Andrew P. Owsiak, and Paul Diehl. International Conflict Management. Cambridge, Oxford, and Boston: Polity Press, 2019. Kurtz, Lester R., editor in chief. Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict, 2nd ed., 3 vols. Oxford: Academic Press/Elsevier, 2008. Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 4th ed. Cambridge, Oxford and Boston: Polity, 2016. Snodderly, Dan, ed. Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, 2d ed. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2018. Young, Nigel, editor in chief. The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Zartman, I. William. Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, rev. ed. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Aall and D. Snodderly (eds.), Responding to Violent Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59463-3

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Index

A ActionAid, 56 Adventist Development and Relief Agency, 56 Afghanistan, 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 32, 49, 52, 60, 71–73, 77–79, 82, 85, 89, 91, 92, 95–99, 107–110, 112, 118, 121, 123, 150, 153, 154, 162, 166 Afghan Northern Alliance, 96 African Union (AU), 4, 31, 35, 43–45, 60, 110 Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), 44 Peace and Security Council (PSC), 44 Alliance for Peacebuilding, 75, 76 Al-Qaeda, 96, 104 Al-Shabab, 44 American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), 56 Arab League, 51, 52 armed non-state actors, 72, 73, 83

armed services. See United States Military Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 43, 46, 47, 60

B Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee (BRAC), 56

C Canada Canadian Humanitarian Assistance Fund (CHAF), 115 Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART), 116 Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund, 115 Humanitarian Coalition, 115 capacity building, 4, 55, 122 CARE, 56, 72, 115 Catholic Relief Services, 56, 59 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 76

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 P. Aall and D. Snodderly (eds.), Responding to Violent Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59463-3

179

180

INDEX

Centre of Competence for Humanitarian Negotiation, 76 China Belt and Road Initiative, 125 China-Africa Development Fund, 125 China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), 125 civilian government agencies coordinating government conflict responses, 111 coordinating humanitarian relief operations, 113 evolving capacity, 98 history of civilian participation, 95 stabilization and peacebuilding operations, 109 trends affecting civilian participation, 90 civilian-military relations, 143 Civilian Response Corps, U.S., 96 civil society, 11, 13, 25, 30, 54, 55, 58, 59, 65, 73, 76, 84–86, 92–94, 98, 103, 125 cluster approach, 76, 77 codes of conduct, 38, 64, 65 conflict management and resolution, 31 conflict prevention, 23, 29, 46, 48, 49, 86, 97, 100, 137 Congo. See Democratic Republic of the Congo contractors, private sector, 8–11, 153–154, 162 countering violent extremism (CVE), 81, 82, 99, 126 counterterrorism (CT), 49, 67, 78, 82, 126 cyber warfare, 84

D Darfur, 31, 44, 67 Democratic Republic of the Congo, 12, 32, 49, 92 Denmark, 91 return of Iraqi refugees, 91 development, 1, 3, 4, 7, 10–13, 18, 27–30, 38, 41, 45, 46, 49–51, 54, 55, 58, 61, 66–68, 73, 75, 79, 82–84, 89, 91–95, 100–105, 107–110, 112, 113, 117, 118, 121–126, 130, 138, 139, 149, 162, 164, 165 diaspora groups, 8, 12 Do no harm, 15, 80, 166 donors, 25, 30, 37, 41, 59, 62, 76, 92, 93, 100, 101, 114, 115

E Ebola outbreak, 91 Economic Community of Central African State (ECCAS), 45 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 4, 43, 44 ethnic cleansing, 3, 71 European Investment Bank, 29 European Union Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 48, 49 Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO), 49 Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), 49 European External Action Service (EEAS), 48, 49 Operation Irini, 49

INDEX

F fragile states, 12, 28, 34, 36, 50, 58, 90, 92, 100, 101, 104, 107, 121, 125, 126

G genocide, 3, 25, 26, 71 Global Humanitarian Platform, 94 Global Peace Operations Initiative, DOS, 91 governance, 2, 13, 27, 29, 31, 42, 45, 46, 50, 52, 55, 58, 65, 66, 82, 92–94, 96, 97, 99–102, 107, 109, 117, 125, 126, 134, 158, 161 gray zone conflicts, 83, 84 Gulf Cooperation Council, 51, 52

H Haiti, 8, 14, 30, 37, 46, 72, 73, 77, 91, 95, 106, 112, 118 Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), 83 host nation (HN), 4, 8, 10, 12, 13, 91, 113, 132, 137, 148, 149, 153, 157–159, 161, 162 Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN), 75 humanitarian relief UK government funding accounts, 100 U.S. Defense Department response, 114, 118 U.S. government funding accounts, 60 humanitarian space, 69, 78 human rights, 17–19, 24, 26, 30, 36, 41, 45, 50, 55, 60, 61, 64, 65, 68, 71, 75, 76, 81, 84, 85, 103, 137, 162

181

I impartiality versus neutrality, 69–71 India, 32, 33, 60, 118 InterAction, 75 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 76 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 4, 42, 45 internally displaced persons (IDPs), 3, 6, 23, 77, 104, 107 international financial institutions (IFIs), 8, 11, 25 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 11, 28, 29 international NGOs, 4, 14, 16, 54, 56, 59, 60, 62, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 85, 86 international organizations regional and sub-regional organizations, 18, 19, 42 UN system, 18, 19, 41, 51 Iraq, 3, 5–7, 10, 12, 34, 72, 79, 85, 89, 91, 95–99, 104, 107, 108, 112, 118, 119, 121, 123, 150, 153, 154, 162, 166 Mosul, 91 ISIS, 5, 6, 66 Islamic Relief, 67, 115 Islamic State, 91

J Japan “Build Back Better” policy, 107 Japan Disaster Relief, 106 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 106 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 106

K Kenya, 26, 44, 107

182

INDEX

L local ownership, 12, 42, 57 M Medicins Sans Frontieres, 72 Mennonite Central Committee, 56 Mercy Corps, 82 Mercy Malaysia, 67, 68 monitoring and evaluation (M&E), 59, 120, 122–124 Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act, U.S., 123 Myanmar, 5, 35, 60, 72, 83, 97, 104 N nation building, 95 negotiation Camp David Accords, 110 Dayton Accords, 111 Good Friday agreement, 111 Kosovo conflict, 110 Minsk II, 111 Trilateral Contact Group, 111 Netherlands, 19, 26 Ministry of Justice and Security, 90 Security and Development doctrine, 109 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, 12, 92 non-governmental organizations (NGO) accountability, 54, 64, 65, 74, 84 budgets and funding, 59 challenges and risks, 54, 56, 62, 66, 69, 70, 79, 166 code of conduct, 64, 68 coordination, 6, 56, 67, 73–77, 81, 164, 165 federated network model, 56 international humanitarian law, 57, 80

relations with military, 78 staff and structure, 61 Nonviolent Peace Force, 82 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 49 operation in Libya, 50 response to severe conflict situations, 49 O Operation Enduring Freedom, 96 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 16, 101, 103 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 101 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 41, 43, 47, 48, 50, 110 combating human trafficking, 50 role in peace operations, 42 Organization of American States (OAS), 45, 46, 110 Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 51, 52, 60 Overseas Development Institute, 75 Oxfam, 56, 59, 76, 115 P Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), 47 peacebuilding, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 23–25, 30, 34, 35, 40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 55, 66, 71, 76, 79, 97, 98, 102, 108, 136 peace enforcement, 20, 31, 32, 40, 44 peacekeeping, 2, 8, 9, 13, 17, 20, 23, 29–33, 35, 37, 39–41, 44, 45, 47, 69, 70, 78, 81, 84, 95, 125, 126, 161

INDEX

peacekeeping missions, 23 Philippines, 4, 47, 77, 82 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 49, 78, 166

Q Quakers. See American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)

R radicalization, 82 Red Crescent, 1, 57, 94, 115 Red Cross, 1, 57, 94, 115 refugees, 3, 6, 14, 15, 23, 27, 36, 53, 61, 66–68, 71, 73, 76, 90, 94, 95, 97, 104–107, 113 regional organizations, 4, 18, 38, 42, 43, 49–52, 60, 90, 110 Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 3 Rohingya, 49, 72 rule of law, 13, 19, 49, 54, 91, 96, 99–101, 112, 122, 123, 134, 135 Russia, interventions, 125 Rwanda, 25, 32, 37, 53, 71

S Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE), 69 Save the Children, 56, 57, 76, 115 Security Council Resolution 1325, 9 security issues, 143 soft power, 83 Somalia, 3, 31, 35, 40, 44, 48, 52, 60, 67, 72, 73, 82, 93, 95, 104, 118 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 4, 45 South Sudan, 19, 42, 73, 92, 93, 104 Sphere Handbook, 65

183

stabilization operations, 7, 98, 107, 111, 116, 126, 153 Sudan, 19, 35, 67, 68, 112 Sweden, 103, 104 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), 103 Syria, 3, 5, 6, 12, 14, 51, 66, 68, 72, 83, 87, 89, 91, 95, 104, 106 T Taliban, 71, 85, 91 Tanzania, 25, 107 terrorism, 2, 5, 47, 91, 99, 107 Turkey, 60, 66, 127 U Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), 46 United Kingdom (UK) Anti-Corruption Justice Center, Afghanistan, 91 Building Stability Overseas Strategy, 109 Civilian Stabilisation Group, 122 Conflict Department, 100, 120 Conflict Pool, 120 Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), 100, 117, 121, 122, 124 Crisis Unit, 113 Crown Prosecution Service, 100, 107 Department for International Development (DFID), 97, 100, 117, 119–121 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 97, 100, 113, 117, 119–121 International Stabilisation Response team, 113

184

INDEX

Joint Funds Unit (JFU), 100, 121, 124 Ministry of Defense (MOD), 97, 100, 120, 121 National Crime Agency, 100, 107 National Security Council (NSC), 100, 109, 110, 113, 120, 121, 124 Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), 119, 120 Prosperity Fund, 117, 118 Stabilisation Unit, 97, 100, 113, 120–122, 124 training, 100, 120, 122 United Nations (UN) Central Emergency Response Funds Charter, 115 Children’s Fund, 27, 37, 61, 76 coordination with others, 39–41, 52, 74, 76, 77 country teams, 30, 41 Department of Peace Operations (DPO), 22, 23, 35, 161 Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), 22, 23 Development Program, 27, 54 Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), 32, 39 General Assembly, 19–22, 24, 25, 27, 38, 39 High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, 13, 38 HIPPO Report , 38, 39, 41 Humanitarian Air Service, 70 Human Rights Council (HRC), 24, 36 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 19, 21, 26 International Criminal Court, 26 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 25

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 25 International Organization for Migration (IOM), 22 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 101 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 20, 23, 24, 37, 77 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 14, 15, 19, 27, 61, 76 Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), 24, 25 police missions, 17, 35 reform efforts, 38, 39 Regional Office in Central Asia, 40 Secretariat, 19–24, 26 Security Council, 9, 13, 15, 19–26, 31–33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 42, 44, 125, 137, 161, 167 Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), 26 Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), 26 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 27, 92, 101, 103, 125 types of operations, 17, 19, 29, 30, 44 Uniting for Peace procedure, 21 UN Women, 39 World Food Program (WFP), 28, 37, 61, 70, 76 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization, 102 Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, 102

INDEX

Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning, 123 Bureau for Resilience and Food Security, 102 Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), 102, 121 Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART), 105, 106 Food for Peace (FFP), 102, 105, 114 Office for Relief, Response and Resilience, 102 Office of Civil-Military Cooperation (CMC), 103, 122 Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), 102, 105, 106, 115, 159 Office of Military Affairs (OMA), 23, 106 Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), 102, 105, 114 training, 7, 103, 121 U.S. Global Development Lab, 123 United States Central Intelligence Agency, 109, 110 United States Department of Agriculture, 105, 114 Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS), 108 technical assistance programs, 108 United States Department of Defense (DOD) combatant commands, 103, 105, 114, 160, 161 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 114 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 109, 110, 130, 139, 167 United States Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, 7

185

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 99 Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), 105, 114 congressional oversight, 111 coordination with other agencies, 99 country teams, 112, 164 Foreign Service, 99 Global Fragility Act, 97 “J” Bureau, 99 Office of Arms Control and International Security, 99 Office of Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights, 99 policy coordination committees (PCCs), 111 special envoys, 111, 112 United States Department of Treasury, 107 Office of Transition Assistance (OTA), 107 United States Military armed services: Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, Space Force, 138, 139, 142, 145, 147–149, 157 chain of command, 138, 139, 142, 153, 158 combatant commands, 7, 65, 103, 106, 114, 139, 141, 146, 148, 149 coordination mechanisms, 119 direction, 23, 132, 139, 153 doctrine, 32, 97, 132, 166 funding for other operations, 161 hierarchy, 109, 151 humanitarian assistance, 44, 78, 80, 81, 106, 116, 160 mass atrocities response, 161 mission command, 132, 133

186

INDEX

national command structure, 139 operational units, 142, 143 Operation Tomodachi, 159, 160 peace operations, 34, 39, 157–159 planning, 33, 96, 103, 119, 120, 131, 133, 139 protection of civilians (POC), 80, 137 range of operations, 157 rank and insignia, 154–156 relations with NGOs and IOs, 75 Reserves and National Guard, 150 risk management and force protection, 135 role of intelligence, 136 rules of engagement (ROE), 33, 78, 135 specialized staff designations, 144 values and culture, 150 United States National Security Council (NSC), 109, 112, 139

V Violent extremism. See Countering violent extremism (CVE)

W Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, 9, 137 World Association for NonGovernmental Organizations (WANGO), 75, 86 World Bank, 4, 11, 16, 17, 28, 29, 61, 82 World Humanitarian Summit, 93, 94 World Vision, 56

Y Yemen, 14, 49, 51