Resonances: Neurobiology, Evolution and Theology: Evolutionary Niche Construction, the Ecological Brain and Relational-Narrative Theology 9783666570360, 9783525570364, 9783647570365

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© 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525570364 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647570365

Religion, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft/ Religion, Theology, and Natural Science

Edited by Christina Aus der Au, Willem B. Drees, Antje Jackel¦n, and Ted Peters Volume 29

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

© 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525570364 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647570365

Markus Mühling

Resonances: Neurobiology, Evolution and Theology Evolutionary Niche Construction, the Ecological Brain and Relational-Narrative Theology

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

© 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525570364 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647570365

With 15 figures Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data available online: http://dnb.d-nb.de. ISBN 978-3-525-57036-4 You can find alternative editions of this book and additional material on our Website: www.v-r.de Ó 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen/ Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht LLC, Bristol, CT, U.S.A. www.v-r.de All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Typesetting by Konrad Triltsch, Ochsenfurt Printed and bound in Germany by Hubert & Co, Göttingen Printed on non-aging paper.

© 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525570364 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647570365

Dedicated to the people working, researching and living at the Center of Theological Inquiry, Princeton (NJ)

© 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525570364 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647570365

© 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525570364 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647570365

Contents Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

1. The Dialogue between Theology and the Natural Sciences . . . . . . 1.1 Certainties in the Natural Sciences and Theology . . . . . . . . 1.2 Natural Sciences and Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Two Regulative Principles: Etsi deus non daretur—etsi mundus non daretur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 The Core and the Periphery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Entheorizing and Extheorizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Interdisciplinary Dialogue as Inter-Faith Dialogue . . . . . . . 1.7 Public Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 Metaphors, Models and Myths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8.1 Metaphors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8.2 Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8.3 Myths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8.4 Theological Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13 13 17

2. Experience and Perception—Epistemology in the Neurosciences . 2.1 Neuroconstructivist-Representational Dualism in the Neurosciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Representationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 Modularity and Modularism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 Neuroconstructivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.4 Mythical, Idealistic Dualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.5 Phenomenal Naivety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.6 Causal Atomism and the Externality of Relations . . . 2.1.7 Individualist Intellectualism, Theory of Mind and the Social Brain Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.8 Reductionist Naturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Problems of Neuroconstructivist-Representational Dualism . 2.2.1 Abandoning Representationalism . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1.1 Ecological Subjectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1.2 Externalism of Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1.3. Active Externalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1.4. Conceptual Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Abandoning Modularism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 Abandoning Neuroconstructivism . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.4 Abandoning Idealistic Dualism . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

2.2.5

Abandoning Phenomal Naivety—Introducing Phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.6 Abandoning Causal Atomism and the Externality of Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.7 Abandoning Individualist Intellectualism, Theory of Mind and the Social Brain Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.8 Abandoning Dogmatic Reductionist Naturalism . . . . 2.3 The Ecological Brain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 The Leib as Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Ecological Subjectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Efficient Causality, Formative Causality and their Unity in Circular Causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4 Dynamic Capabilities, Open Loops and Formative History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.5 The Brain in the Framework of Vertical Circular Functional Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.6 The Brain in the Framework of Horizontal Circular Functional Circuits and the Ecological Understanding of Perception and Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.7 The Basic Self and the Personal Self . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.8 Implicit Theology in Fuchs’ Theory . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Experiencing Divine Self-Presentation—Epistemology in Theology . 3.1 Sola experientia? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 A Basic Question of Theological Epistemology . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Revelation and Reason? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Cognitive Sciences of Religion and Neurotheology . . . 3.2.3 The Possibility of Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Revelation and Experience—The Initial Model . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Problems with the Initial Model in Light of the Neurosciences . 3.5 Perceiving Intendedness? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 Describing Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.1 Faith and Semantic Externalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.2 Faith and Active Externalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.3 Faith and Ecological Subjectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.4 Faith as Conceptual Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.5 Faith and the Basic Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.6 Faith and the Personal Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 Re-formulating the Initial Model of Revelation and Experience. 3.7.1 The Structure of Narrative Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7.2 Religious Experiences, Disclosure Experiences and Revelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8. Three Resonating Stories and Two Sets of Actors . . . . . . . . 3.9 The Self-Presentation of the Triune God . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

4. Evolution as Niche Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Some Features of Neo-Darwinism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Character Traits of Neo-Darwinism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Problems of Neo-Darwinism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Niche Construction as an Extended Evolutionary Theory . . 4.5.1 The Basic Idea of Niche Construction . . . . . . . . . 4.5.2 Definitions, Categories and Principles of Niche Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.3 Models of Population Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.4 The Development of Homo and Paranthropus . . . . . 4.5.5 Neo-Darwinism as an Abstract Form of an Extended Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Character Traits of Niche Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.1 Abandoning Hidden Representationalism . . . . . . . 4.6.2 Abandoning Hidden Dualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.3 Abandoning Localized Information . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.4 Internal Relationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.5 Adding Formal Causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.6 Genes as Providers of Open Loops . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.7 Resonances Instead of Adaptions . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.8 Semantics in Evolution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.9 What about Phenomenology? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.10 Is there any teleology in evolution and why are people talking about it all the time? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Implicit Theology in Niche Construction? . . . . . . . . . . . 5. The Triune Life, Niche Construction and Niche Reception . . . . 5.1 A Proposal for a Doctrine of God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 A Storied God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2 ‘Love Story God’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.3 The Attributes of the Relational Essence of God . . . 5.2 A Proposal for a Doctrine of God’s Relation to the World . 5.2.1 Creation and Perfection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 Humans among other Created Animals . . . . . . . 5.2.3 Incarnation and the First Part of Reconciliation . . . 5.2.4 Concarnation and the Second Part of Reconciliation 5.2.5 Attributes of God’s Relation to the World . . . . . . 5.3 Theological Expectations of Biology . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Faith as Niche Constructor—The Ecclesiological Meaning of Niche Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

© 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525570364 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647570365

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Contents

5.5 Creation and Perfection as Niche Construction and Niche Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 5.5.1 Illingworth, Teilhard de Chardin and Theißen as Providers of Evolutionary Theological Models . . . . . 209 5.5.2 Contemporary and Ultimate Reality as Niche Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 6. Concluding Theses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Epistemology in the Neurosciences and Theology . . . . . . 6.2 Phenomenological Neurobiology and Niche Construction . . 6.3 On Causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Narrative Relational Theology, Niche Construction and Niche Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 The Benefits of the Inter- and Transdisciplinary Trialogue . .

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Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 Index of Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 Index of Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

© 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525570364 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647570365

Preface This book explores several resonances between theology and biology and tries to show the fertility of the interdisciplinary discussion. Its two themes— neurobiological epistemology and evolution, as well as their use for theology—are bound together by the main theme of a turn from nonconstitutive relationality to constitutive or internal relationality. Its aim is to demonstrate that both disciplines, biology as well as theology, will reap serious profits by entering a shared discussion—if, that is, this discussion is held in the right way. This book is the outcome of one such discussion which occurred during my time as a member of the research group ‘Evolution and Human Nature’ at the Center of Theological Inquiry, Princeton, New Jersey. Without those actual discussions and the flourishing life at CTI, this book would have never come about. The part on neurobiology in Ch. 3 focuses on the concept of experience to show that a representationalist view of brain processes cannot satisfactorily explain our perception of phenomena while the ecological brain model can, especially if experience is understood as a resonance in a functional circuit between the brain and its environment without sharp borders. The corresponding theological thematization in Ch. 2 focuses on epistemology. It shows that theological epistemology has to begin with revelation and that revelation has to be conceived as experience. This experience happens in, with and under everyday experience and cannot be restricted to specific places or times. By applying the insights of the phenomenological approach of the ecological brain to theology, one can see that faith is not a kind of separable interpretation of something given, but rather a kind of perception. Whereas Ch. 2 and Ch. 3 provide the epistemological preconditions, the following chapters focus on the material content. Evolutionary theory as a theory about the biological change of the processes that are decisive for the world cannot be understood by means of classical Neo-Darwinism alone, but we are in the need of an extended theory of evolution. One of the very best means to supplement this extension is provided by the theory of niche construction. Like the turn from a representationalist view of the brain to an ecological view, the turn from a one-sided relationship between population and environment to a reciprocal one, as found in niche construction, is an instance of constitutive relationality. The ‘resonating’ chapter (5) on theology delivers a model of both the nature of the relation between God and world, as well as a doctrine of God, which not only resonates with an extended understanding of evolution, but which can also use this extended theory as a means for the fruitful and fresh development of genuine theological insights.

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Preface

The introductory first chapter offers some methodological reflections stemming from the dialogue between theology and science. Discussions between the scientists and theologians at CTI convinced me that such explicatory remarks on this more formal aspect on the nature of the dialogue might be useful. However, those primarily interested in the material elements of the discussion can simply start with Ch. 2. The title of the book, ‘Resonances’, refers to at least two things: On the one hand, it refers to the resonating structures of the functional circuits that play a major role in this book, on the other, it means the fruitful resonances that appear in discussions shared between biology and theology. As I mentioned before, these discussions actually took place at CTI, which means that I have profound thanks to say to all the colleagues who met there to research, engage in continuous conversation and, quite simply, to live among one another. This group included Jan-Olav Henriksen, Nicola Hoggard-Creegan, Eugene Rogers, Conor Cunningham, Aku Visala and Celia Deane-Drummond, as well as Agust†n Fuentes, Lee Cronk, Richard Sosis, Hillary Lenfesty and Dominic Johnson. Optimal conditions were provided by the director of CTI, William Storrar, and by Robin Lovin. Shirah Metzigian and Carlee Brand were exceptional aids in all practical matters. Furthermore, CTI supported my research with the generous Houston Witherspoon Fellowship. Christiane Tietz, Wolfgang Drechsel, Verena Schlarb and Christoph Schwöbel were extremely helpful in preparing for my stay in Princeton. Martin Wendte, Franziska and Philipp Stoellger were in different respects helpful at home while I was abroad, and David Gilland gave extraordinary support during the ‘post-production’. Dominic Schlapkohl courtesly provided the cover photo. I owe thanks also to Niels Henrik Gregersen for encouraging me to alter the research project in a creative way and to Wentzel van Huyssteen and Robert W. Jenson for discussing parts of the project. I am especially grateful to Agust†n Fuentes, whose research inspired me for some seminal parts of this book, who discussed some of the biological and philosophical issues at stake and who read the manuscript and, especially in the parts on niche construction, offered invaluable critique. I owe also thanks to Ken Oakes for improvements and to Thorsten Strampe for help with the publication, to the editors of the series and to Jörg Persch and Christoph Spill as well. Preeminent thanks, however, belong to my wife Anke, who not only quite simply accepted my long-term absence, but also encouraged me in a decisive way to pursue this project. June 2014

Markus Mühling

© 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525570364 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647570365

1. The Dialogue between Theology and the Natural Sciences What is ‘theology’? What are the ‘natural sciences’? How are they related and in what sense and for what purpose should one speak of a dialogue between theology and the natural sciences? These are the primary questions considered in this chapter.

1.1 Certainties in the Natural Sciences and Theology The dialogue between theology and the natural sciences has a long history. Different entry points, different communities and institutions, different motivations and intentions have been involved in these discussions from the beginning. Today, not only the various issues stemming from the natural sciences and theology themselves have become topics within the dialogue, but also the history and what could be called meta-dialogical questions— questions about the motivations, means and ends of the dialogue itself—have become the very subject of the dialogue. Sometimes the meta-dialogical questions of interdisciplinary epistemology have even become prominent in such a way that the dialogue appears to be more an independent discipline in its own right than an inter-disciplinary undertaking. Implicit within this development are a number of virtues and vices: Interdisciplinarity at a high standard, and an awareness that no scholar has to invent the means of the dialogue altogether but is able to rely on a specific history are certainly advantages. However, this highly specialized standard also entails a specific danger—the danger of forgetting the material subjects and questions. In order to avoid this particular pitfall, this book will not give an introduction into this kind of highly specialized dialogue, its history, methods and subsequent questions.1 Rather, the present methodological chapter has only to provide the tools necessary for the subsequent material chapters. In the Anglophone academic context and also slightly in the German one, the typology suggested by Ian Barbour2—classifying the relationship in the 1 A good introduction into the history of the dialogue can be found in Schwarz, H., 400 Jahre Streit um die Wahrheit; a more thematically oriented introduction is Barbour, I.G., When Science Meets Religion. More restricted to specific fields but also more detailed is Losch, A., Jenseits der Konflikte. 2 Cf. Barbour, I.G., Religion and Science, 77 – 105.

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The Dialogue between Theology and the Natural Sciences

different models of conflict, independence, dialogue and integration—has become a standard starting point. However, not even this kind of typology is designed without specific material interests, but is dependent on the author’s opinion that theology and science are different poles of a spectrum, that they share common methods of model-making, that process metaphysics is helpful and that an integration of both fields is a more or less preferable goal.3 On the other hand, the German-speaking approach to the dialogue—but sometimes the Anglophone one as well—presupposes the history of the relatively sharp distinction between Naturwissenschaften (natural sciences, sciences) and Geisteswissenschaften (humanities). I am convinced that one can find some particula veri in both approaches, but also that neither provides the road to heaven. Therefore, I am proposing a third way : To start with a phenomenological approach to action. Whatever it is that theologians or natural scientists are doing, it is clear that they are doing something. My claim is that in the phenomenon and the concept of action there lies some common ground between theology and the natural sciences, which makes this dialogue necessary, because without this dialogue theology would become less theological (but more obscure) and the natural sciences less scientific (but more scientistic and therefore also more obscure). However, I do not want to spend time here providing an extensive analysis of the phenomenon and the concept of action, which I have done elsewhere.4 For the purposes of this book it is sufficient to know that doing something presupposes, among other things, a specific set of certainties. Certainties are a specific kind of pragmatic knowledge, a specific kind of belief. Let us give an example: In order to write a book I have to know (among many other things): (a) the material content which I want to explain, (b) how to type, (c) how to use academic facilities like a library, (d) the geographical location of my office at the CTI and (e) that it is meaningful to write a book. Without one of the mentioned beliefs I would not be able to perform the action in question, i. e. writing a book. However, the examples reveal that some features of this pragmatic kind of knowledge are quite specific in the sense that sometimes these features are overlooked. Nevertheless, they are decisive for the concept of certainty. First, none of the convictions a–e are infallible; scholars are sometimes mistaken about the facts and the explanations they give. Authors also occasionally doubt the meaningfulness of their action. Certainties are not securities. The concept of certainty implies the concept of doubt, whereas the concept of security excludes doubt. Historically, the phenomenological

3 Cf. Barbour, I.G., When Science Meets Religion, 37 f; Barbour, I.G., Religion and Science, 106 – 136. A good analysis is provided by Losch, A., Jenseits der Konflikte, 70 – 81. 4 Cf. Mìhling, M., Ethik, 12 – 33.

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Certainties in the Natural Sciences and Theology

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distinction between certainties and securities was elucidated to a large extent by the Protestant Reformers.5 Second, despite the fact that I can be more or less doubtful about my certainties, there is no strict hypothesis. The concept of hypothesis is a technical term and it presupposes an ‘if-then structure’. Despite the fact that hypotheses play a major role in both the natural sciences and theology6, the very endeavour of the natural sciences and theology does not presuppose hypotheses, but rather certainties. The difference is this: Whereas hypotheses are only true under specific conditions and therefore only lead to what potentially could be action, the performed academic activity is always actualized. Therefore, whereas hypotheses provide the advantage that potential actions only imply potential consequences no one is actually responsible for (because they are only potential, not actual), actual actions imply certainties that do imply real consequences—they alter the state of the world we live in—and are therefore my responsibility. I may be doubtful about a certainty in the strongest possible terms. But at the moment I decide to perform the activity connected with this certainty I am going to have to pay a price. This could be the price of getting wet while cycling to my office, or of taking responsibility for what I have written. Certainties are always a serious matter, whereas hypotheses only stand to become serious. Third, I may be aware of some of my action-guiding certainties. This is mostly the case when there is some amount of doubt and I have to deliberate about different ways of acting. But in every action there is also an implicit amount of knowledge. For example, I certainly do know how to type, but I can’t explain how to someone else. To be honest, I am probably not able to memorize the keys on the keyboard by heart in the same way I might the lyrics of a song. Nevertheless, typing is very much a certainty for me with virtually no doubt whatsoever. It is most likely the case that these kinds of implicit certainties are extremely important for action in general and for scientific action in particular. Making this tacit knowledge explicit is one of the preeminent tasks of academic work and of interdisciplinary dialogue.7 5 Cf. Schrimm-Heins, A., Gewissheit und Sicherheit, 186 – 213; Ebeling, G., Gewißheit und Zweifel, 312 – 317. 6 The hypothetical character of theological claims was stressed prominently by Pannenberg, W., Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie, 302, 334 – 346. A postfoundationalist approach on the basis of Nicolas Rescher’s non-sceptical fallibilism (cf. Rescher, N.A., Realistic Pragmatism, 115) is provided by van Huyssteen, who stresses the personal and contextual aspects of rationality, cf. van Huyssteen, J.W., The Shaping of Rationality, 145. 7 A material example of unveiling hidden certainties in science is provided by Mìhling, M., Einstein und die Religion. Michael Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge was innovative in the discovery of hidden action-orientating certainties, cf. Polanyi, M., Personal Knowledge, and Polanyi, M., The Tacit Dimension, 8 – 10: ‘Another variant of this phenomenon was demonstrated by Eriksen and Kuethe in 1958. They exposed a person to a shock whenever he happened to utter associations to certain “shock words”. Presently, the person learned to forestall the shock by avoiding the utterance of such associations, but, on questioning, it appeared that he did not

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Fourth, certainties are always bound to persons. Actions are performed by persons in relationships to other persons and smaller or larger communities with their own specific histories. Certainties are therefore also dependent on persons, whereas hypotheses or other kinds of knowledge and beliefs are not. That does not imply that they are necessarily subjective, but only that they are particular and part of a common narrative tradition. This is also true for academic and scientific action. There is no such thing as pure science apart from the scientific activity performed by human persons. As part of an abstraction we can make the distinction between the sciences and its performers for some pragmatic—e. g. methodological—reasons, but we have to beware of hypostasizing this distinction in the manner of primitive Platonism and turning natural sciences and theology, along with their theories and models, into independent entities. My explanation so far has focussed on the similarities between all certainties presupposed by academic action. But there are also differences. A decisive difference is the distinction between empirically testable certainties and non-empirically testable certainties. Every kind of action in general, but also every act in the scientific endeavour presupposes both kinds of these certainties. Empirically testable certainties are the convictions b, c and d in the above-mentioned example. If I am mistaken in my conviction about where my office is, perhaps because I am cycling on a foggy day, I can then test different directions and correct my conviction. What is decisive at this point is not the means by which a certainty is testable (this would be a methodological issue), but only that it is testable at all. Now, compare certainty e from the example above, that writing a book is meaningful. Of course I can also even doubt this conviction like Qoheleth, ‘of making many books, there is no end’ (Ecc 12:12), and of course I can give reasons why I nevertheless regard it as being meaningful. Asked whether it is meaningful to write this book I could answer, ‘well, I want to promote academic work’, or ‘it is a pleasure to write books’, or ‘it is part of my duty as a scholar’. But you could also question every possible answer by asking ‘Well, and is it really meaningful to promote academic work (to have pleasure, to perform according to duty)?’ I can surely give reasons why know he was doing this. Here the subject got to know a practical operation, but could not tell how he worked it. […] These experiments show clearly what is meant by saying that one can know more than one can tell. […] Why did this connection remain tacit? […] Here we have the basic definition of the logical relation between the first and the second term of a tacit knowledge. It combines two kinds of knowing. We know the electric shock, forming the second term, by attending to it, and hence the subject is specifiably known. But we know the shock-producing particulars only by relying on our own awareness of them for attending to something else, namely the electric shock, and hence our knowledge of them remains tacit. […] Using the language of anatomy, we may call the first term proximal, and the second term distal. It is the proximal term, then, of which we have a knowledge that we may not be able to tell.’ Although Polanyi refers here to tacit empirically testable knowledge, empirically non-testable knowledge can also be conceived as being of the same structure. A brief introduction to Polanyi is given by Losch, A., Die Bedeutung Michael Polanyis.

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Natural Sciences and Theology

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these things might also be meaningful. Nevertheless, you can question these new reasons once more. In other words, we can never reach the end of this game; it is an infinite one. However, if you are asking for proof that it is meaningful to write a book, there is none. In short, one can give infinite reasons for non-empirically testable certainties like convictions of something being meaningful, but there are no empirical proofs or other methods of showing that they really are meaningful.8 Nevertheless, the conviction that an act is meaningful is neither accidental nor epiphenomenal. Without it I would not perform the action in question.

1.2 Natural Sciences and Theology The natural sciences can be understood as those kinds of specific institutionalized actions that consist in the attempt to perform research, i. e. methodologically guided endeavour, on the empirically testable certainties presupposed by action. This kind of definition might be surprising. One might object: ‘The natural sciences research nature and facts, not personal certainties. It is decisive that the facts natural science investigates are considered to be real separately and independently from any particular convictions about nature.’ In order to respond to these objections, one has to say two things. First, the two definitions are not mutually exclusive. Facts of nature are only given in the shape of intentional states like beliefs, convictions and certainties. Second, this definition does not exclude the objectivity of the state of affairs that the empirically testable convictions are related to. On the contrary, since this definition of natural science relies on the distinction between empirically testable convictions and non-empirically testable convictions, a kind of realism is necessarily included. Non-empirically testable certainties can also be called ontological commitments, ontological certainties, religious certainties, quasi-religious certainties, etc. These different terms are not equivalent, but the differences do not matter for our purposes at this point. Theology is the academic discipline that investigates these non-empirically testable certainties in a methodologically guided way. It is not, of course, theology alone that has these kind of religious certainties as its proper subject. But it is theology alone that focuses on exactly what kind of perceptivity is necessarily included in the phenomena of nonempirically testable certainties. This is because theology does not deny the fact 8 It is necessary to be precise at this point. It might be possible to give empirical explanations about why I consider x to be meaningful (‘You consider writing books to be meaningful, because your parents did not allow you to read books but always put you in front of a TV’). But the question, (a) ‘Why does someone regard x as y (= meaningful, meaningless, superstitious, scientific, red, blue, etc.)?’ has nothing to do with the question, ‘Why is x meaningful?’

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that it is also an activity guided by particular non-empirically testable certainties. Moreover, it is the relationship between its own non-empirically testable presuppositions and the non-empirically testable presuppositions of the kind of action being investigated that is the proper subject of theology. Therefore we can define theology in general as the methodologically guided self-explication of the truth-claims implied by a specific set of religious and quasi-religious certainties held by particular communities of persons in particular traditions. However, since this general task is only itself available in particular perspectives, communities and traditions, there is no such thing as theology in general. The attempt to establish a so-called ‘metatheology’9 or ‘megatheology’10 is a contradictio in adiecto and is therefore as impossible as having a triangle without any angles. Theology focuses on what is general in a particular perspective. Therefore, theology is always the theology of a specific historically shaped community. Therefore, we can now define theology more precisely, but nevertheless still only preliminarily, (A) Theology is the methodologically guided self-explication of the practice of Christian communities with regard to the certainties and truth claims this practice implies. The non-empirically testable certainties of Christian communities share a common feature: They are understood not to be at one’s disposal, that is, they are not manipulable (unverfügbar). What does this mean? Whatever specific convictions might be implicit in Christian practice, under all circumstances an instantiation of ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived (id quo maius cogitare nequit)’11 is implied. If people have knowledge about such a state of affairs, it could only be true knowledge if the persons in question attained this kind of knowledge neither due to their own efforts nor due to biological or sociological facts. The only way to have certainties about that that than which nothing greater can be conceived that are not mistaken is that that than which nothing greater can be conceived discloses (or reveals) itself. This does not exclude the possibility that than which nothing greater can be conceived could use biological and sociological facts as well as perhaps the personal effort of human beings in order to disclose itself. On the contrary, the Christian concept of revelation pronounces the fact that 9 Cf. Newberg, A.B., Principles of Neurotheology, 64: ‘A metatheology can be understood as an attempt to evaluate the overall principles underlying any and all religions or ultimate belief systems and their theologies. […] Principle XII: Neurotheological scholarship should pursue its potential applicability as a metatheology.’ 10 Cf. Newberg, A.B., Principles of Neurotheology, 65 f: ‘A megatheology should contain content of such a universal nature that it could be adopted by most, if not all, of the world’s great religions as a basic element without any serious violation of their essential doctrines. […] Principle XIII: Neurotheological scholarship should pursue its potential applicability as a megatheology.’ 11 Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion, ch. 2, 84.

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Etsi deus non daretur—etsi mundus non daretur

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revelation cannot be conceived supra-naturally, in a manner that excludes natural facts.12 Revelation is a kind of experience. We will deal with this concept later. For our present purpose these arguments lead to a new and more precise definition of theology. Since that than which nothing greater can be conceived is a minimal and rudimentary description of at least a necessary part of the meaning of the term ‘God’, we can say : (B) Theology is the methodologically guided academic inquiry and rethinking of the perceived self-disclosure of the Triune (= Christian) God. Definition A partially resembles definitions of theology given in the traditions of F.D.E. Schleiermacher and others,13 who take their starting point in humanity, whereas definition B is similar to definitions like that of Karl Barth, which take their starting point from divine revelation.14 These two different starting points for defining theology are frequently understood to stand in contradiction. However, nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, both definitions, A and B, are simply descriptions of the same thing from differing perspectives and both need the other in order to avoid becoming deficient.

1.3 Two Regulative Principles: Etsi deus non daretur—etsi mundus non daretur Both fields of academic work, theology and the sciences, deal with different aspects of the phenomenon of human action. Both have developed arguments in order to restrict themselves to these aspects. In the case of theology we have already mentioned the concept of disclosure-experiences or revelation. In the case of the natural sciences, Hugo Grotius’ famous dictum with respect to methodological atheism, etsi deus non daretur, safeguards this restriction. However, God, deus, does not simply mean a supernatural being. As we have used the concept of God to this point, we made reference to Anselm’s minimal definition of God as something id quo maius cogitari nequit. Now we have to introduce another, yet still inadequate minimal description of God as something upon which one sets one’s heart.15 This description, which was introduced by Luther, does not refer to the ‘heart’ as a metaphor for human 12 Cf. Ch. 3 of this book. 13 Cf. Schleiermacher, F.D.E., Kurze Darstellung, 1, §1: “Die Theologie in dem Sinne, in welchem das Wort hier immer genommen wird, ist eine positive Wissenschaft, deren Teile zu einem Ganzen nur verbunden sind durch ihre gemeinsame Beziehung auf eine bestimmte Glaubensweise, d. h. eine bestimmte Gestaltung des Gottesbewußtseins; die der christlichen also durch die Beziehung auf das Christentum.” 14 Cf. Barth, K., CD II/1, §27, 203: ‘The pertinence of theology consists in making the exposition of revelation its exclusive task.’ 15 Cf. Luther, M., Large Catechism, 12.

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affectivity and emotions, but he uses the concept as a description for an instantiation which organizes and unites the entirety of one’s non-empirical beliefs: ‘What is God? Answer : A God means that from which we are to expect all good and to which we are to take refuge in all distress, so that to have a God is nothing else than to trust and believe Him from the [whole] heart; as I have often said that the confidence and faith of the heart alone make both God and an idol. If your faith and trust be right, then is your God also true; and, on the other hand, if your trust be false and wrong, then you have not the true God; for these two belong together, faith and God. That now, I say, upon which you set your heart and put your trust is properly your God.’16

The examples of gods given by Luther include money and possessions, great skill, prudence, power, favour, friendship, honour and a lot of other reference points of trust.17 Surely, none of these gods mentioned by Luther satisfies Anselm’s condition of being something id quo maius cogitari nequit. These things are therefore more idols than gods. Nevertheless, they have the same function: they all stand at the centre of one’s non-empirical commitments. And this is the concept of God which has to be used in Grotius’ methodological condition for scientific work, etsi deus non daretur. The work of the natural sciences shall proceed as if there were nothing like these non-empirical beliefs. Of course, this methodological claim is, strictly speaking, impossible, as we have seen, since scientific work is always action-based and since the very concept of action presupposes non-empirical beliefs. Nevertheless, it is a meaningful claim. The ‘as if ’ signifies a concentration which requires that specific other things be suppressed. Similarly, we can alter Grotius’ proposed methodological principle for theology. Anselm’s description of God as id quo maius cogitari nequit can serve as a principle for distinguishing among the possible realm of gods, mere idols and non-idols. However, it is very abstract. Therefore, I want to transform Anselm’s principle into the methodological claim that theology shall proceed etsi mundus non daretur, as if there were no world. Like Grotius’ methodological atheism, this methodological claim of ‘amundanism’, strictly speaking, is impossible to achieve literally. Without a world there would be no human beings and no revelation which enables human beings to speak of God. And yet, however closely one may see the relationship between God and world, only a God that can be conceived as being principally independent of the world can be a non-idol. Every particular mundane reference point of faith, therefore, has to be deemed an idol. The pantheistic question, however, does remain, whether the world as a whole can satisfy the role of a non-idol. We will come back to this question later. 16 Luther, M., Large Catechism, 12. 17 Cf. Luther, M., Large Catechism, 12 – 16.

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The Core and the Periphery

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Methodological and counterfactual principles are not basic principles of either the natural sciences or theology. They can, however, fulfil a regulative function. But they simply become wrong if the ‘as if ’ is overlooked or if they are turned from regulative principles into constitutive principles. In the case of the natural sciences this would happen if they were to deny the existence of something along the lines of non-empirical certainties. This could happen in theology if one were to claim that revelation is purely supernatural and that natural things do not matter. Theology and the natural sciences are activities, but activities which both, to a certain extent, require some abstraction from the real lifeworld (Lebenswelt), though we also need to remember that an abstraction always ignores some part or parts of reality. Science is not ontology, nor is theology simply identical with ontology, but it does entail ontology. The best way to avoid turning these regulative principles into fundamental principles—and therefore into idols which pervert both the scientific and the theological endeavour—is the dialogue between science and theology. In entering dialogue, natural scientists are not simply doing theologians a favour, nor are theologians simply serving natural scientists. Entering into dialogue will improve the excellence of the academic standard of both disciplines.

1.4 The Core and the Periphery In both theology and the natural sciences we can distinguish core regions of work from the peripheries.

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In the case of theology, the core is the primary task of the reconstruction and re-thinking of revelation. But this re-thinking is always bound to a wider circle where concepts are used which might be influenced by the natural and social sciences or by different philosophical systems. This wider peripheral work aims at the development of a hypothetical ontology. Whereas the core work of rethinking revelation has the content of the doctrines of God, Creation, Christology, Soteriology, Eschatology etc.—topics which cannot be questioned as meaningful unless theology is altered into something completely different—on the periphery of the circle the theologian tries to apply these results in a broader, but also more hypothetical and speculative manner. However, the relationship between the two fields of work is by no means a oneway street. For example, whereas the core region contains a doctrine of creation, it does not contain a Christian natural philosophy. Nevertheless, there are Christian hypothetical natural philosophies. They belong to the periphery. In the natural sciences, the core region consists in scientific work using concepts of a merely regional so-called ontology, without making real ontological claims. This core region might be an ideal, but theories of science like Popper’s falsificationism or instrumentalism can best be understood to deal with this core region. As for this realm, the scientist exercises restraint with regard to making ontological claims for reasons of intellectual honesty. Let me give an example. In quantum physics the concept of Planck-time is well known and established. It indicates the impossibility of segments of time shorter than 10–44 seconds. When I asked Volker Weidemann, a German astrophysicist and pupil of Hermann Weyl, whether Planck-time can lead one to conclude that time has a discontinuing, atomic structure, he answered that physics can make no such judgments, because this question is an ontological one and therefore fits more to the disciplines of philosophy and theology. However, if the natural sciences were only to consist of this core region without any natural philosophy, they would be too abstract and meaningless. Moreover, the natural sciences would become self-contradictory if they were to attempt to ignore these ontological questions, because they would nevertheless influence science as an endeavour of human action. Therefore, for the natural sciences, ontology, natural philosophy and implicit theologies belong to the periphery. The relationship between the inner and the outer circle is also a mutual one. The history of the dialogue between theology and the natural sciences as well as its contemporary practise can best be understood as an overlapping of these two outer circles, not as an overlapping of the core circles. Also implicit in this overlapping of the outer circles is a convergence with philosophy. In order to lead a fruitful dialogue between the natural sciences and theology, this aspect has to be made explicit, i. e. the dialogue is really a ‘trialogue’. Moreover, not only philosophical issues are at stake, but also issues of the other social sciences and the Geisteswissenschaften. So, in principle, this intersection is

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open to an all encompassing interdisciplinary and perhaps also transdisciplinary dialogue. It is sometimes said that interdisciplinarity is not enough to grasp the different phenomena of life, because some phenomena need to be explored using transdisciplinary methods. Without going too far into the debate between the adherents of interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity, it is also decisive that we do not devise a contradiction. Both aspects are important. Since the subjects of the intersection of the outer circles are not restricted to certain specific phenomena, but to reality as such, there is a transdisciplinary aspect as well as an interdisciplinary aspect. The reason why the dialogue cannot be dissolved completely into transdisciplinarity is that the universal subject of the intersection can only be brought into focus by using the means provided by the particular perspectives. And these particular perspectives are always bound to specific non-empirical certainties. In the case of the dialogue in question, access to the universal by the means of the particular is represented by theology’s core circle. Therefore, the interdisciplinary aspect has to be retained. Being bound to particular perspectives means that theology has to remain faithful to the critical methods used within its own inner circle. Theology can indeed, together with the other disciplines in question, creatively investigate and invent new methods for use within the realm of transdisciplinarity, but it cannot give up the prevalence of the inner core. One therefore has to maintain the interdisciplinary aspect. A real dialogue or ‘trialogue’ presupposes different starting points and different positions and therefore interdisciplinarity and not only transdisciplinarity. This concept has a further advantage. If the dialogue is conceived as regarding an overlapping of the peripheral circles, it can be understood as an open dialogue. The aim is neither a new integration of both disciplines, nor a consensus among them, nor the establishment of a new comprehensive metadiscipline (like Newberg’s so called ‘metatheology‘ and ‘megatheology’18). In addition, conflicts over specific material topics might occur and among these conflicts might be some that cannot be resolved through contemporary conceptual means. But this possibility should not be counted as a vice. On the contrary, it is a virtue because it acknowledges the fallibility of all human endeavours of inquiry. Thus dialogue among the disciplines as one primarily between the peripheral circles is indeed a real dialogue. It acknowledges the relative independence of the disciplines as far as their core regions are concerned, but it also acknowledges the fact that one can attempt work on potential, hypothetical and perspectival integrations. However, there are always only integrations in the plural due to the perspectival nature of religious certainties and the status of these integrations remains of a highly hypothetical nature. The potential for conflict is also involved, including the possibility of a conflict 18 Cf. Newberg, A.B., Principles of Neurotheology, 64 – 66.

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that might not be able to be resolved. Therefore, this notion of dialogue among the peripheral circles of the disciplines maintains the particular veri of the typologies of dialogue like the one presented by Barbour19, but also corrects this typology in decisive respects. Barbour’s types do not only not exclude each other, they occasionally all appear at the same time. They are not therefore different stages of the relationship, which undergoes periodical change as has been suggested.20 They are rather aspects present at the same time. Furthermore, this notion of a dialogue among the peripheral circles of both disciplines also allows integration of the particular veri of the two different traditions, the Anglo-American on the one hand, which tends to bind the two disciplines closer together as in different poles of a spectrum, and the continental tradition, on the other hand, including its sharper distinction between natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) concerned with explanation and human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) concerned with understanding.

1.5 Entheorizing and Extheorizing Whereas for theology it is clear that the dialogue between the natural sciences and theology is not a facultative, but a necessary endeavour, because Christian faith conceives of God as the creator of all things, including the realm of all possibilities, the impact on the natural sciences that comes with this dialogue concerns the explication of otherwise hidden ontological commitments, nonempirical certainties or implicit theologies. Talking to theologians can be helpful for making these commitments, certainties and ‘theologies’ explicit. Whether these certainties may be explicated or not, they do by all means influence the genuine work of natural science in its core region. In order to do this joint work on the explication of the mostly tacit relationship between empirical and non-empirical certainties in the activity of the natural sciences, one first has to describe the nature of this relationship. On the one hand, one has to admit that the distinction between the two sets of certainties is an abstract and artificial one. The distinction does not appear in everyday life and the everyday work of the sciences. Nevertheless, maintaining this distinction is decisive for maintaining the natural sciences as academic disciplines as we have seen above. The best way to describe this relationship between the sets of empirical certainties and non-empirical certainties, that is, between the core and the peripheral circles of scientific activities, is by means of the concepts of extheorizing and entheorizing. The concept of entheorizing was introduced by Arthur Fine. It signifies a 19 Cf. Barbour, I.G., Religion and Science, 77 – 105. 20 Cf. Losch, A., Jenseits der Konflikte, 88 f.

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method that allows ontological concepts to appear in the specific regional conceptuality of a specific discipline without destroying it. We have already mentioned an example: The idea that time might be discontinuous is not a question of natural science, but of natural philosophy. Nevertheless it is possible for this idea to appear in physics by saying that it is ‘not meaningful to use times shorter than 10–44’ seconds. Arthur Fine’s original description of the concept of entheorizing is the following: ‘I coin the word “entheorize” to describe the following move (one well known in analytic philosophy): when asked whether such-and-so is the case, one responds by shifting the question to asking instead whether a theory in which such-and-so is the case is a viable theory.’21

But entheorizing is far more than a mere strategy for answering difficult questions by not answering them directly. It also describes how implicitly non-scientific, non-empirical and religious certainties shape genuine scientific work. Entheorizing is always happening; it is unavoidable. Making entheorizing explicit is a feature of the reflective work in the dialogue between the natural sciences and theology. But that is only half the story. There exists not only what we are calling entheorizing, but also something we can call extheorizing. The concept of extheorizing signifies the fact that scientific insights also contribute to the shaping of the ontological and religious commitments held by individuals and communities. It can result in a slight alteration of a given traditional set of beliefs, but it can also result in the constitution of a new patchwork religiosity. Extheorizing is universally present regardless of whether it is acknowledged or not. As in the case of entheorizing, making extheorizing visible is also one of the genuine tasks of the dialogue between the natural sciences and theology.22

1.6 Interdisciplinary Dialogue as Inter-Faith Dialogue On the one hand, the dialogue between theology and the natural sciences is presupposed in the very concept of action that is necessarily bound to a specific perspective due to its being subject to the interaction between empirical and non-empirical certainties. It is therefore decisive that the natural scientist enter a dialogue with theology and not only with religious studies, which cannot satisfy this need. On the other hand, it is not only the beliefs of a specific Christian confession that are subject to entheorizing and 21 Fine, The Shaky Game, 87. 22 I have done a comprehensive study on the explication of entheorizing and extheorizing in the formation of Albert Einstein’s religiosity and scientific work in Mìhling, M., Einstein und die Religion.

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extheorizing, because there are scientists committed to other traditional faiths as well as the shaping of patchwork religiosities and worldviews by means of extheorizing restricted to individual scholars or smaller communities. The only way to meet this double feature and its demands is to acknowledge that every interdisciplinary dialogue always implies an inter-religious dialogue. This important feature is often overlooked in contemporary theology. The communicative logic involved in leading interdisciplinary dialogue and the logic involved in inter-faith dialogue are not the same and are sometimes very different. People engaged in one kind of dialogue are not necessarily engaged in the other. This separation comes with some advantages, because both dialogues seem to take on institutional form in the realm of theology, which appears to be the precondition for deeper understanding. Nevertheless, this tendency towards the institutionalization of the two different dialogues has not been used as an excuse to ignore the interreligious dimension of the interdisciplinary dialogue itself.

1.7 Public Concern The primary public forum for the dialogue between the natural sciences and theology is the academic context, although there are, of course, other forums. In addition to the various communities of faith, we also have to mention here the public sphere of society as a whole. Since the relationship between empirical and non-empirical certainties is presupposed in the concept of action and since action is always interaction and cooperation, this dialogue is of especially high value for the well-being of democratic and tolerant societies. This may be true with regard to the dialogue in many respects, but of preeminent importance is the question of tolerance. Tolerance does not mean having to accept religious convictions that contradict one’s own as being true in the same sense as one’s own, but rather enduring the contradicting conviction of the other and cooperating with respect to the possible ends of action on the basis of different fundamental convictions that cannot be unified. It is not consensus that is the most vivid principle of democratic society, but tolerance. Democracy itself might suffer at the hands of contemporary problems, as Colin Crouch has suggested with his thesis about post-democracy.23 Practical constraints—both ecological and economic ones—have become more important for politics than in past times. But democracy dies where there are no longer any public decisions, which are only possible due to the practice of tolerance: A large plurality of 49 % might regard the decisions of the other 51 % as wrong. Nevertheless, they have to be willing 23 Cf. Crouch, C., Post-Democracy.

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to accept them. Democracy lives by difference, variety and tolerance rather than by consensus.24 Applied to the dialogue between science and theology, the principle of tolerance implies acknowledgement of one’s own non-empirical certainties and the non-empirical certainties of the other as not being at one’s disposal (unverfügbar) and not produced by human and empirical means. Whenever religious and quasi-religious certainties are described as completely teachable or producible, religions and worldviews are perverted into dangerous, intolerant ideologies. This danger has been extremely vivid in the history of all religions, but in the history of the sciences as well. This danger occurs whenever the reality and impact of entheorizing and extheorizing are denied. Whenever science becomes scientism, science not only ceases to be science and changes into religion, but becomes an intolerant danger for liberal societies. It is therefore important for the dialogue to possess a means for evaluating this danger. I have elsewhere suggested the following typology of the ontological commitments of certainties with respect to their capacity for tolerance.

The second row from the top of the diagram is the distinction, introduced above, between non-empirical certainties and empirical certainties. Found on the third level are, on the one hand, ‘religious’ (technically speaking) certainties which acknowlede that the sum of all personal, social and natural parameters are only necessary but not sufficient conditions for the 24 Cf. Rescher, N., Pluralism.

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constitution of the worldview in question. From the perspective of the natural sciences, the constitution of the worldview remains partly contingent. Thus, in their self-descriptions these views of reality tend not to exclude contingency. On the other hand we see ‘ideological’ (technically speaking) certainties or quasi-religions, i. e. worldviews which in their self-understanding comprehend the sum of personal, social and natural parameters as sufficient to their own constitution. Whereas ‘religious’ worldviews in this technical sense are per definition capable of tolerance, with respect to ideologies the capacity for tolerating others can be and occasionally is denied.25 However, one can also claim that nothing but purely natural factors can be responsible for the constitution of belief systems without resulting in intolerance. This is the case precisely if the sum of personal, social and natural parameters is seen as being sufficient in principle for the constitution of the belief system in question. But it is also possible that these parameters are nevertheless not subject to technical or didactic manipulation, and if it is acknowledged that human beings are never able to understand the sum of all these parameters appropriately. In this case, the formation of the worldview at stake is relatively subject to contingent factors. Therefore, these worldviews are also able to tolerate other worldviews. They can be called ‘non-totalitarian ideologies’. If a worldview claims that all personal, social and natural parameters constitute sufficient conditions and are also subject to human manipulation, it denies the existence of any contingent factors and therefore it is no longer capable of tolerating other convictions. It is in this case that we can speak of totalitarian worldviews. With respect to history, there is no question about whether the traditional religions and churches have sometimes perverted themselves not only into ideologies but also into intolerant ideologies. But whenever this happens, a religion or a church ceases to be ‘religious’ in the proper sense. It is one thing to have the means for diagnosing tolerance and intolerance and another to deal with intolerance. We cannot discuss here the possible answers to this question, which is rather a subject for social ethics. For our purposes, only one thing is decisive: If a religious self-explanation turns into an intolerant ideology, it forsakes its capacity for tolerance and its potential status as a theology, i. e. as an academic endeavour. Therefore, it cannot be a participant in the dialogue between theology and the natural sciences. Similarly, if scientists claim that their work, principles and results are free from any non-empirical certainties, and that empirical certainties are all a society needs in order to act towards the promotion of its well-being, science is perverted not simply into a religion, but into an intolerant ideology. It is for this reason that such types of scientism cannot be a participant in the dialogue between theology and the natural sciences. As a result, we do not need to acknowledge these areas of thinking in this book. This impacts most of all the very similar modern phenomena of the so-called ‘new atheism’ (which is 25 Cf. Mìhling, M., Einstein und die Religion, 15 – 22.

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neither really new nor atheistic) and so-called ‘creationism’ (which is neither properly theological nor faithful to the Christian doctrine of creation). However, ignoring these and other branches of intolerant modern thinking in this book does not mean that I regard ignorance as the best way of dealing with these phenomena. It is surely wrong not to enter into dialogue with these thinkers, but in both cases this is more of an interreligious dialogue and not a dialogue between science and theology.

1.8 Metaphors, Models and Myths From the last quarter of the 20th century on, there has been increasing development in research on the role of models and metaphors in both science and theology, and especially but not only, in the Anglophone context.26 This is not the place to revisit this development in any great detail. I simply want to mention some points which might be important for understanding the following constructive task. I am, thereby, referring to a theory of metaphors and models that I have written on more extensively elsewhere.27

1.8.1 Metaphors This theory of theoretical models presupposes the essentially metaphorical character of all language. Metaphors are neither reducible to literal language, i. e. metaphors carry a cognitive load, nor is there a categorical distinction between metaphors and literal language. Metaphors cannot be understood simply as tropes in a theory of rhetoric, but the tropes called ‘metaphors’ reveal a dimension of our use of language and of our cognitive abilities—a dimension of experience—as such. If there is no categorical difference between metaphorical and ‘literal’ language, the distinction will have to be understood in another way. Here I refer to Earl R. MacCormack’s insight that both conceptual and metaphorical language can be understood with the help of fuzzy sets.28 Normally, the extension of the intension of a concept appears sharply distinguished from all things not belonging to the extension of a concept. There is either the truthvalue of ‘true’ or ‘false’, of 1 or 0: Entities are either part of a specific intension, or not. The statement ‘x is life’ is true for some entities x whereas for others it is not true. 26 Cf. e. g. the reception of Blumenberg by Stoellger, P., Metapher und Lebenswelt. 27 Cf. Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 24 – 44. 28 Cf. MacCormac, E.R., Metaphor and Fuzzy Sets; MacCormac, E.R., Metaphor and Myth.

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But if this conventional view of concepts and the relationship between intension and extension are abandoned, we can understand language in another way :

The relationship between things belonging to a set or a concept is not a categorical one of only two truth-values of 1 and 0, but one of a function with a continual shift between 1 and 0 in a way that 1 und 0 represent limits that are only reached in infinity. For practical reasons, we can simply divide this function in the middle, gaining ‘true’ and ‘false’, or we can divide it in another way, such as ‘true, false, undecided’ or ‘literal’, ‘ephiphoric’, ‘diaphoric’ and ‘wrong’. But these moves are abstractions from how language really works. However, I am not claiming that we can really find a mathematical function between the transition of 1 and 0, because fuzzy-set-theory is also only a model for language. The reason is that fuzzy set-theory on a deeper mathematical level once more presupposes a sharp distinction between 0 and 1 in order to work.

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Thus, fuzzy-set theory can illuminate how concepts and metaphors work, but it cannot explain them.29 It might therefore be better to remember the insight derived by the late Wittgenstein that semantics cannot be isolated from pragmatics.30 In other words, the relationship between semantics and pragmatics (and syntactics) is a reciprocal one, but not one of equivalence or pure symmetry. Therefore, a realistic claim is not excluded. Under these circumstances, we are using the following definition of metaphor, which shows that all language use, including conceptual and theoretical ones, is metaphorical: A metaphor is the use of a semantic unit x in pragmatic context A in relationship to a semantic unit y in the same context, with at least one different pragmatic context B belonging to semantic unit y.31

Semantic units can be words, statements, but also whole theories or narratives. These are used in pragmatic contexts, i. e. contexts of language usages. For example, when someone says, ‘Jesus is life’, one uses the semantic unit ‘Jesus’ in the pragmatic context of, say, proclamation, together with the semantic unit ‘life’ in the same context. But it is decisive for the understanding of this metaphor that life is also used in other contexts, such as evolutionary theory for us today. Whether a metaphor is literal or boring or impressive or inconceivable, depends how much the differing contexts A and B overlap. 29 The problem with fuzzy-set theory is that as an algebraic theory it presupposes a two-value logic, whereas it only seems to be abandoned in its application to methaphor theory. 30 Cf. Wittgenstein, L., Philosophische Untersuchungen, No. 43, 262. 31 Cf. Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 30.

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Therefore, ‘reproduction of genes means life’ is commonly understood to be a kind of more literal metaphor, since the two contexts are both biological ones. If I say ‘water is life’ which might be a slogan used in a commercial, both contexts, the context of the promotion of the responsible use of resources and the biological understanding, are not far apart. The metaphor is therefore intuitive, epiphoric, but also a little bit boring. In the case of ‘Jesus is life’ the contexts of use for the first Johannine communities might not have been so close. Therefore, they regarded diaphoric statements like this as a surprising and innovative way of seeing the world in a new light, but also as sometimes subject to misunderstanding.32 If I say ‘clue is life’, the statement appears to be meaningless because we cannot easily imagine a context in which both are used in conjunction, although there might be one. Since no two usage contexts of two semantic units can be entirely disparate, a completely wrong use of language is only a theoretical or asymptotic possibility. And since there is also more than one context of usage (if an expression is to be intelligible at all, i. e. a semantic unit), there is also, strictly speaking, no such thing as literal language, viz. only in infinity. For practical reasons, we are choosing specific contexts as the regulative one. The context of a definition in an encyclopaedia or the context of the discourse of a community or communities of experts. 1.8.2 Models Theoretical models are nothing but systematically and methodically guided elaborations of one metaphor or a set of metaphors by finding new rules of recombination and permutation. Nevertheless, the metaphor as a whole refers to a specific state of affairs. Further, by altering the models we are doing nothing other than looking for a better understanding of these states of affairs which would remain invisible without these language usages. If this definition of theoretical models on the basis of metaphors is valid, then the relationship between so-called ‘metaphors’ and ‘literal’ language is also valid for the relationship between ‘models’ and ‘theories’: There is no sharp distinction, but rather a fuzzy one. Theories can always be seen as specific kinds of models and models do more than simply illustrate things that could have been said in another, better, theoretical or more cognitive way. Of course there are also theoretical models designed for the purposes of illustration. But even in this case they are doing more than illustrating: they shape our certainties, both the empirical and the non-empirical ones. Quanta are neither particles nor waves, but they can be understood as particles and waves. Genes cannot really be selfish, but if expressions such as these did not suggest something decisive about our view of the world—or if a sharp distinction between metaphorical and literal speech were actually valid—then expressions like these could not 32 Cf. Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 30 f.

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be used as book titles for the purposes of increasing sales, but would simply be incomprehensible and nonsense. A decisive part of this view of models is the fact that it is similar to the classical theories of analogy, but that it also transcends theories of analogy. As Mary Hesse argues,33 models comprehend not only positive and negative analogies, but also ‘neutral’ ones. The neutral analogies are what is really interesting. It is likely that some neutral analogies can be transformed into positive or negative analogies by further research, but it is also possible that there remains a set of neutral analogies which might not be subject to further reduction in the future. Furthermore, if it is true that in our world it is not only states of affairs that are undergoing changes, but possibly also the rules that might be used to describe these changes—be it in history or in evolution—as Charles Sanders Peirce has argued,34 then the distinction between positive, negative and neutral analogies might also change over time. In other words: The advantage of a theory of theoretical models based on a theory of metaphors as a basic dimension of all language (and in principle of all semiotic processes) in contrast to a theory of mere analogy is that it leaves open the question of whether a model (or theory) is only an epistemological one or an ontological one, without giving up reference to reality. Thinking in models and metaphors in this way means not only not thinking representationally, but also acknowledging that our semiotic capacities are not something which can be seen as apart from the world, but instead as something which is inherent in the world. For theological reasons one might also say that the universe is a semiotic universe. I have argued elsewhere that the notion of ‘truth’ itself also has to be modified under these circumstances into an ‘ethical theory of truth’ in which truth can be defined as the noncontradiction or resonance of creaturely semiotic acts with divine semiotic acts and its results.35 Although this is a definition of truth from a specifically Christian perspective, one of its decisive consequences is that wherever truth occurs, be it in everday life, theology or in the natural sciences, it has to be understood as inaugurated by the Spirit of Truth.

1.8.3 Myths Models can become myths if they are regarded as completely factual descriptions of a particular state of affairs. Since we cannot be aware of the model-like character of our theories in academic endeavours at all times, and since we cannot be aware of the metaphorical character of all our semiotic activity in everyday life at all times, using, creating and sustaining myths is a normal activity. It is, therefore, quite simply not true that myths are in the 33 Cf. Hesse, M.B., Models, 9 ff. 34 Cf. Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers, 6.267f and Ch. 5 of this book. 35 Cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 36 – 48.

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process of completely vanishing as a result of the development of academic research and the natural sciences. That myths can be altogether abandoned is itself a myth, it might even be called the myth of modernity. But it is also not true that our present late modern or post-modern times are the times of the end of the great narratives or meta-narratives (Lyotard). Even this hypothesis itself is a myth or a meta-narrative, because it is simply a model about models or a key model used to understand and inter-relate other existing models. We will see that myth, model and also narrative are not identical and that narratives are specific kinds of models, i. e. narrative models, which share specific features and which can become narrative myths as well. There is in principle nothing wrong with producing and sustaining myths just as there is nothing wrong with producing and sustaining models, theories and metaphors. However, and this is one of the decisive claims being made in this book, wherever myths are claimed not to be myths, wherever myths simply are claimed to be, the use of myths could become dangerous. In other words, problems occur whenever a theory or a narrative lacks the capacity for self-relativization and for seeing itself as only one part of reality. The aim of our present reflection is not to cast out myths, but to make explicit that myths are myths, models are models and metaphors are metaphors. 1.8.4 Theological Models Theological theories are quite simply a set of conceptual models, which are related to specific kinds of narrative models. I have elsewhere given a description of the specific features of theological models, which does not have to be revisited at this point. Decisive here is only one point: Theological models are models that have to be distinguished from what they are related to. Theological models are distinct from the narrative models of Christian practice. And, the narrative models and metaphors which occur in Christian practice, however closely they might be related to the divine self-disclosure, are nevertheless also to be distinguished (but perhaps not separated) from the divine and ultimate. These ideas provide theology with a kind of double selfrelativization. In other words, theological models remain fallible and they incorporate within themselves theories about why they are fallible. But our point here is positive rather than negative. In presupposing the fallibility of theological models and the model-like character of theology, it seems possible to reinterpret old theological models, to develop existing theological models further and also to construct new ones. Further, given the changes (not necessarily the growth) of our semiotic activity and of our understanding of reality in all disciplines, it is not only possible to reinterpret, develop and (re-) construct both old and new theological models, but this activity also appears to be necessary if theology wants to remain capable of communication. My suggestion is that in the realm of the theological periphery—to which natural

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philosophy seems to belong—it is easier to reconstruct, to develop and also to invent new models. It is easier, since its primary function is not so much that of altering the core region of theology and therefore influencing Christian practice in the one way or the other, but more of being in inter- and transdisciplinary communication with other fields of academic work. Therefore, in some passages of this book we will try to develop theological models with the help of the language of other disciplines. This endeavour is not to be misunderstood. It is neither constructivist, nor speculative, nor non-adaptive. However, if one works solely in certain specific paradigms, it might appear to be non-adaptive. If one works strictly in the core region of theology, it might seem constructivist. And if one does not want to stay in contact with the core region of theology, it might also seem to be speculative. But under the presupposition that it consists of a kind of development of conceptual models including their fallibility, it is more adaptive than non-adaptive, more experiential than speculative and more realistic than constructivist.

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2. Experience and Perception—Epistemology in the Neurosciences In order to cultivate a dialogue between theology and the neurosciences one can—from the perspective of theology—start with the epistemological paradigms of the disciplines, i. e. with the question: ‘What are cognition and experience?’ Adding ‘experience’ to ‘cognition’, however, implies a preliminary decision: In both fields, the neurosciences as well as theology, the notion or notions of ‘experience’ are claimed to be the epistemological silver bullet.

2.1 Neuroconstructivist-Representational Dualism in the Neurosciences The most frequently used epistemological paradigm in different branches of the neurosciences in the first two decades of the 21th century consists in identifying a number of traits which more or less appear among the epistemic presuppositions of many neuroscientists. These traits are representationalism, modularity, neuroconstructivist dualism, and—more loosely connected to the other features, phenomenal naivety, causal atomism and reductionist naturalism. 2.1.1 Representationalism It is not unreasonable to expect that the brain might play a decisive role in answering the question of how humans have access to reality and the question of how they experience different things. One answer to the question of how reality—in the sense of everything experienced—can be a part of our cognition is that it is represented in the brain. I will call this the representational paradigm. It is assumed that entities in the world outside of the body as well as states of one’s own body are perceived as a result of stimulation to different sensory capacities, transferred by nerve tracts and transformed into the content of the mind by the electro chemical nervous activity of the brain. In other words, the environment or bodily states are represented by impressions, which are created or (re)constructed by the activity of the brain. According to this view, the brain pictures the world in its own language and creates maps of the world. Of course, these pictures are not 1 to 1 representations of what is there, but the brain adds or subtracts different

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features.The brain interprets sensual data with the effect that the specific content of the mind, the perceptions, are formed not only by sense data, but also by these add-ons of the experiencing subject. ‘Representation’, ‘picture’, ‘image’, ‘map’ and ‘pattern’ are used in a metaphorical sense, by analogy to the visual sense, but analogies to the other sense impressions can also be applied. Consider, for example the following description by Antonio Damasio: ‘The human brain is a mimic of the irrepressible variety. Whatever sits outside the brain—the body proper […] as well as the world around […]—is mimicked inside the brain’s networks. In other words, the brain has the ability to represent aspects of the structure of nonbrain things and events, which include the actions carried out by our organism and its components […]. How the mapping happens exactly is easier said than done. It is not a mere copy, a passive transfer from the outside of the brain toward its inside. The assembly conjured by the senses involves an active contribution offered from inside the brain […] can block the view of what we are trying to explain.’1 ‘[…] I use the terms image, map, and neural pattern almost interchangeably. On occasion I also blur the line between mind and brain, deliberately […].’2 ‘Looking at a patch of cerebral cortex, it is easy to see why the most detailed maps the brain makes arise here, although other parts of the brain can make them, albeit with a lower resolution. One of the cortical layers, the fourth, is probably responsible for a large part of the detailed maps. Contemplating a patch of cerebral cortex, one also realizes why the idea of brain maps is not a far-fetched metaphor. […] they are, rather, the result of the momentary activity of some neurons and of the inactivity of others.’3

What is noteworthy is that this view of human cognition implies a sharp distinction between what is internal and external to the brain, as well as the fact that the representations—called images, maps and neuronal patterns— are technical terms. Representationalism is by no means either a new opinion or one that is restricted to the neurosciences. It has appeared and reappeared throughout the centuries in epistemology. The only difference is that the classical term ‘mind’ is replaced here by the term ‘brain’. But this is only a small alteration. Note that Damasio, although far from identifying brain and mind, explicitly uses ‘brain’ and ‘mind’ interchangeably on occasion. Consequently, we have to take into account not only neuroscientific but also general philosophical arguments when we discuss the matter later on in more detail.

1 Damasio, A., Self Comes to Mind, 64. 2 Damasio, A., Self Comes to Mind, 65. 3 Damasio, A., Self Comes to Mind, 66.

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2.1.2 Modularity and Modularism The representational view of the brain’s imaging of what is present to it leads to the question of how and by what means the brain creates these neuronal patterns or maps of reality. Despite the fact that this question cannot be answered completely given the contemporary state of our knowledge, specific areas and modules of the brain are often referred to as being part of this representational work. The idea of associating different areas of the brain with different mental activities and abilities originated in theories of Paul Broca and Carl Wernicke at the end of the 19th century and is frequently presupposed by scientists using the contemporary methods of neuroimaging like fMRI, PET, SPECT, etc. This view of modularity can be taken as an ontological truth claim rather than as a functional description. This significant move has two implications. On the one hand, not only the brain, but also our ‘consciousness is modular, i. e. organized and divided into bricks’.4 For example, the Broca and Wernicke areas are associated with the capacity for language, the visual cortex with sight, the amygdala with fear, etc. A good part of neuroscientific research consists in identifying different associations between modules of the brain and conscious or unconscious mental activity. It is also claimed that aspects of personality can be associated with different modules, such as the neurotic personality with a specific activity of a module called dACC (dorsal anterior cingulate cortex).5 The idea that faith in a personal and anthropomorphic ‘God’ or ‘gods’ is associated with a specific ‘God-module’, originally hypothesized by V.S. Ramachandran,6 has been elaborated or transformed into the theory frequently used by CSR (Cognitive Sciences of Religion) and the EPsyR (Evolutionary Psychology of Religion) to the effect that there might be a HADD (Hyperactive Agency Detection Device), which, due to evolutionary adaption, leads humans to identify observed events primarily with agents, also implying that belief in anthropomorphic ‘gods’ relies on this mechanism.7 Some of these ‘devices’ and ‘modules’ might consist simply in extrapolations from the expectations of scientists, others rely on more or less empirical evidence. To summarize these examples, the brain, like consciousness, appears to be spatially divided. On the other hand, problems with modularism arise in that no one 4 Roth, G., Fühlen, Denken, Handeln, 198. („Bewusstsein ist modular, d.h. in Bausteine gegliedert, organisiert“). 5 Cf. Eisenberger, N.I./Lieberman, M.D./Satpute, A.B., Personality from a Controlled Processing Perspective. 6 Cf. Ramachandran, V.S./Hirstein, W.S./Armel, K.C./Tecoma, E., Neural Basis of Religious Experience. 7 Cf. Boyer, P., Religion Explained, 142 – 144; For an analysis cf. Visala, A., Religion and the Human Mind, esp. 121.

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experiences conscious states as either spatially located or as modular. Thus, the branch of neuroscience adhering to the theory of modularism is confronted with the so-called ‘binding problem(s)’, the question(s) of how and by what kind of mechanisms the brain is able to compose an undivided state of consciousness out of these divided modules. The most radical form of this question consists in asking by what means the brain creates the impression of an ‘I’ viz. ‘consciousness’ itself, since there is no ‘I-module’. Wolf Singer illustrates these binding problems: ‘The brain of mammals is to a high degree distributively organized. In the case of humans, we count ca. 120 different areals working on different tasks. […] Our introspection […] suggests that there might be a centre somewhere in our brain combing all information […]. However, neuroscience develops a completely different image of the constitution of the organ in which the I constitutes itself. We see a plenitude of areals […]. But a single centre is nowhere to be found. Nowhere in the brain is a single place where the perception of a friendly barking, velvety dog as a whole is represented. The representation of this perception is rather a very complex spatiotemporal pattern of neuronal activity which changes in time and actually cannot be localized. […] It is a high-dimensional, dynamic, spatiotemporal pattern. A high amount of spatially distributed neurons contribute to its constitution.’8

This quote illustrates that modularity is both dependent on and has implications for representationalism. On the one hand, the ‘binding problem’ is caused by the basic idea that specific things present to the consciousness have to be represented in (parts of) the brain. On the other hand, the ‘binding problem’ presses us to redifine the concept of representation. Whereas Damasio can use the terms ‘image’, ‘map’ and ‘pattern’ as equivalents, Singer only uses the notion of pattern, though even this usage is only possible with a number of qualifications. Whereas the original concept of a ‘pattern’ is accompanied by a very vivid imaginativeness (Vorstellung9), a ‘high-dimensional, dynamic, spatiotemporal pattern’ is a very abstract concept. 8 Singer, W., Ich denke, also bin Ich?, 25 – 27. („Das Gehirn von Säugetieren ist in hohem Maße distributiv organisiert. Wir zählen beim Menschen etwas 120 verschiedene Hirnareale, und diese arbeiten alle an verschiedenen Aufgaben. […] Unsere Introspektion […] legt nahe, dass es irgendwo in unserem Gehirn ein Zentrum geben müsse, wo alle Informationen zusammenlaufen […]. Die Hirnforschung entwickelt ein völlig anderes Bild von der Verfasstheit des Organs, in dem das Ich sich konstituiert. Wir sehen eine Fülle von Arealen […]. Aber nirgendwo findet sich ein singuläres Zentrum […]. Nirgendwo im Gehirn ist ein singulärer Ort auszumachen, an dem dieses Perzept des bellenden, samtigen, friedfertigen Hundes als ganzes repräsentiert wäre. Die Repräsentation dieses Wahrnehmungseindrucks ist vielmehr ein sehr komplexes raumzeitliches Erregungsmuster, das sich zudem noch in der Zeit verändert und nicht wirklich verortbar ist. […] Es handelt sich um hochdimensionale, dynamische, raumzeitliche Muster, an deren Ausbildung sich jeweils eine sehr große Zahl von räumlich verteilten Neuronen beteiligt.“) 9 Vorstellung is a Hegelian term and is usually translated as ‘representation’. However, Vorstellung does not mean a representation in the sense of representation as used elswhere in this book. ‘Imaginativeness’ seems to be a better translation.

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2.1.3 Neuroconstructivism Representationalism is also a necessary but not sufficient precondition for what has recently been called neuroconstructivism10 : The idea that every phenomenal and conceptual perception and cognition of what is—of reality— is not only represented in and by brain functions but also more or less actively constructed by the activity of the brain. This feature of neuroconstructivism appears in a broad range of positions. The most radical among them claims that the brain is the only agent involved in constructing reality, in addition to personal attributes being ascribed to the brain. Consider the following quote by Roth: ‘I have said that the brain creates the Wirklichkeit [reality perceived] and that it develops the distinctions of our world of experience. In assuming that the Wirklichkeit [reality perceived] is a construct of the brain I am also forced to assume a world in which there is a constructor, the brain. This world is called the “objective” or transphenomenal world, independent of consciousness. I have called it simply Realität [reality itself] in contrast to Wirklichkeit […]. In this world, we assume, there are many things, e. g. organisms, some organisms possess sensory organs capable of being influenced by physical and chemical stimuli and they have brains, in which due to these stimuli and internal processes a phenomenal world is constituted, the Wirklichkeit.[…] The Wirklichkeit [reality, realness] is created in the Realität [reality itself] by the real brain. […] This is the most evident assumption, but it is made in the Wirklichkeit [reality, objectiveness] and it is not to be understood as a statement about the actual constitution of the Realität [reality assumed].’11

The distinction between Wirklichkeit and Realität is a bit artificial in German as well, with both normally meaning simply reality. But let us suppose that this distinction is meaningful. In this case, all assumptions about reality— 10 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 25. 11 Roth, G., Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit, 324 f. („Ich habe davon gesprochen, daß das Gehirn die Wirklichkeit hervorbringt und darin all die Unterscheidungen entwickelt, die unsere Erlebniswelt ausmachen. Wenn ich aber annehme, daß die Wirklichkeit ein Konstrukt des Gehirns ist, bin ich gleichzeitig gezwungen, eine Welt anzunehmen, in der dieses Gehirn, der Kontrukteur, existiert. Diese Welt wird als ‘objektive’, bewußtseinsunabhängige oder transphänomenale Welt bezeichnet. Ich habe sie der Einfachheit halber Realität genannt und sie der Wirklichkeit gegenübergestellt […]. In dieser Welt – so nehmen wir an – gibt es viele Dinge, u.a. auch Organismen, viele Organismen haben Sinnesorgane, auf die physikalische und chemische Reize einwirken, und sie haben Gehirne, in denen aufgrund dieser Einwirkungen und interner Prozesse eine phänomenale Welt entsteht, eben die Wirklichkeit. […] Die Wirklichkeit wird in der Realität durch das reale Gehirn hervorgebracht. […] Dies ist die höchst plausible Annahme, die wir allerdings innerhalb der Wirklichkeit treffen und die nicht als Aussage über die tatsächliche Beschaffenheit der Realität mißverstanden werden darf.“) For a critical analysis of Roth’s position cf. Herms, E., “Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit”. Similar to Roth’s position is also Wegner, D.M., Precis of The illusion of Conscious Will.

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perceptions as well as theoretical constructs like theories, statements, assumed entities—are actually constructs of the Wirklichkeit. The only valid assumption about the Realität itself consists in the ‘real brain’. Despite the fact that Roth wants to explain all states of affairs in a naturalistic manner, he nevertheless introduces personal concepts, such as ‘constructor’, ‘creating’ (in our example) or ‘decisions’ of the brain (elsewhere).12 Apart from the fact that scholars coming from a naturalistic perspective appear to be in need of introducing implicitly teleological concepts, a point that will occupy us later, it becomes clear that in this perspective reality is primarily a construct of the brain alone. In this radical position, the entity appearing to be reality itself is the ‘real brain’. Less radical positions do not regard the brain as the sole constructor of perceived reality but also allow evolutionary history and social and cultural factors to accompany or influence the brain in its activity of constructing reality. Singer, for example, claims: ‘The results of cognitive neurosciences suggest that a high amount of our seemingly objective perception is constructed by our brains and also that a lot of what we call objective is nothing but a result of interpretation.’13 ‘Can we reduce the question of the sources of knowledge to the question of what factors constitute the architecture of the brain? First of all, there is evolution. […] Evolution can be understood as a cognitive process by which animate beings gain knowledge about the world.’14 ‘In addition to the evolution there is a second source of knowledge that is frequently underestimated […]. The human brain develops between birth and ca. the 20th year. […] It is most probable that culturally specific imprints transfer implicit knowledge, which in the same way as the knowledge gained through evolution determines how humans perceive the world.’15 12 Cf. e. g. Roth, G., Worüber dürfen Hirnforscher reden, 73. An analysis of the implicit turn from naturalistic to personalistic and teleological language is given by Rott, H., Freiheit in den Zeiten neurowissenschaftlichen Fortschritts. 13 Singer, W., Ich denke, also bin Ich?, 17. („Die Ergebnisse der kognitiven Neurowissenschaften legen nahe, dass ein erstaunlich hohes Maß dessen, was wir objektiv wahrzunehmen glauben, von unseren Gehirnen konstruiert ist und dass sehr vieles von dem, was wir für objektiv halten, lediglich Folge von Interpretationen ist.“) 14 Singer, W., Ich denke, also bin Ich?, 19. („Reduziert sich die Frage nach der Herkunft des Wissens also auf die Frage nach den Faktoren, welche die Architektur von Gehirnen bestimmen? Zunächst und vor allem ist dies die Evolution. […] Evolution kann demnach als kognitiver Prozess verstanden werden, über den Lebewesen Wissen über die Welt erworben haben.“) 15 Singer, W., Ich denke, also bin Ich?, 20 f. („Neben der Evolution gibt es eine zweite Wissensquelle, die in ihrer Bedeutung oft unterschätzt wird […]. Das menschliche Gehirn entwickelt sich von der Geburt bis etwa zum zwanzigsten Lebensjahr. […] Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass frühe kulturspezifische Prägungen impliziten Wissen vermitteln, welches genauso wie das evolutionär erworbene Wissen festlegt, wie Menschen die Welt wahrnehmen.“)

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In this moderate constructivist approach, not only are evolutionary history and cultural imprints considered as factors in the constitution of reality, but the activity by which these factors constitute reality is described chatoyantly as somewhere between ‘constructing’ and ‘interpreting’. Nevertheless, we can see that the primary problems are the same, including the implicit introduction of the language of agency. Of course, neuroconstructivism in all its forms is not a new branch of thinking, for constructivist approaches to reality are as old as the history of philosophy. 2.1.4 Mythical, Idealistic Dualism Also necessarily accompanying neuroconstructivism is a feature that its protagonists explicitly and tragically want to deny : dualism. Most neuroscientists have the explicit aim (or presupposition) of avoiding any kind of mind-body dualism or Cartesian dualism between the res cogitans and res extensa. However, neuroconstructivist representationalism is intrinsically dualistic rather than monistic and possesses a strong tendency towards idealism rather than realism. Thereby we do not want to emphasize the fact that, under the condition of a monistic ontology, a duality of aspects or aspect dualism is often acknowledged.16 We are simply referring to the fact that the constructivist and representationalist views introduced above rely on a basic distinction between what can be perceived and conceived either by the 1st or 3rd person perspective on the one hand, and what is really real on the other. In the case of the above-mentioned quote by Roth, the similarity to Plato’s analogy of the cave and the sun is more than obvious. The constructs of the brain, which build up consciousness, resemble the platonic shadows on the wall. Just as the ideas that cast shadows lie beyond our sight and have to be transcended by different steps into the light of the fire of the cave and ultimately into the single reality of the light of the sun,17 for Roth the transcendental and transcendent ‘real brain’ has replaced the last anchor of reality or—in Kantian terms—the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich). In order to adhere to a strict dualism it is not necessary to introduce two incompatible ‘substances’; it suffices to separate what can be known from what is—to separate epistemology from ontology as happens in Roth’s case or in the more moderate opinion of Singer. Singer is not only willing to simply include a transcendent brain, but also naturalistic entities (physical, chemical, biological and cultural) on the side of reality itself. But that only means that he divides reality with a different line, more similar to Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities.18 This distinction between qualities that are non-relative and possessed by the things 16 Cf. e. g. Damasio, A., Self Comes to Mind, 65. 17 Cf. Plato, Platonis Opera, Tomus IV, 514 – 516.517d–525b. 18 For an analysis of the distinction cf. Jenson, R.W., On Thinking the Human, 50 – 58.

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themselves on the one hand, and qualities that are only attributable in relation to experiencing subjects on the other hand, lies at the heart of the notion of dualism—more than the Cartesian distinction between incompatible ‘substances’. Thus far, neuroconstructivist representationalism seems inherently dualistic. But is it also idealistic? One could object that neither Locke nor Kant really are idealists. According to some of the more careful analysis, Locke should not be seen as an outright anti-dualist just as Kant should not be considered an idealist. Kant claims that there is a thing itself, different from perception and conception, whereas idealism consists precisely in the identification of this thing itself. The early Fichte saw the ‘I’—which does not refer to the individual consciousness, but rather to something like ‘Iness’—as the foundation which constitutes reality,19 whereas Hegel speaks of the self-realization of the Spirit, and Schopenhauer—who surely did not want to be mentioned alongside Hegel and idealism—20 identified the thing-in-itself with the unconscious and unintentional will.21 But these are precisely the same kinds of identification that take place in neuroconstructivist representationalism: Roth identifies the thing-in-itself, the reality in the last instance, with the ‘real brain’, whereas the moderate neuroconstructivsm of Singer identifies it with factors possibly shaped by evolution. We, therefore, seem to be forced not only to label this kind of neuroscientific approach as dualistic, but also idealistic, as Thomas Fuchs suggests in a careful analysis.22 Fuchs also makes the crucial observation that this is not exclusively a matter of viewing the world theoretically. This view is furthermore accompanied by a subtle ‘virtualization’23 of perception that also alters our actions and behaviour. Eilert Herms observes that this kind of identification of the transcendental noumenal realm with parts of what is known phenomenally lies at the very heart of the production of myths: ‘The structure of these views is well known from the myths of religions and ideologies. Also well known is the fundamental critique of all these views as reiterated and popularized by the modern criticism of religion. The heart of this critique is: The material contents of the transphenomenal sphere are gained by a projection of the contents of the phenomenal sphere into something transcendent. There is no justification or motivation for that projection other than the pure wish of attaining a satisfactory explanation. It is nothing other than this wish which produces the whole idea—and this is only possible by paying the price of a manifest self-contradiction: The difference between phenomenality and its constitutive basis, which should have been understood and maintained, is ignored—lept over or undermined—by 19 20 21 22 23

Cf. Fichte, J.G., Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, 16. 24. Cf. Schopenhauer, A., Parerga und Paralipomena, Bd. 4, 34 f. 37. 179. 206. 43. Cf. Schopenhauer, A., Welt als Wille und Vorstellung DB 2, §25, 283. Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 25 – 30. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 26.

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ascribing, without further ado, traits of what is been constituted to the constitutive basis itself—in other words: by grounding the constitutive basis on what it has grounded.’24

The decisive question that remains is: Can the similarity between neuroidealism and mythology be overcome, or is it unavoidable?

2.1.5 Phenomenal Naivety The aforementioned features are only loosely connected—if at all—with the others in a conceptual way. Nevertheless, they are worth mentioning because they have to be considered in interdisciplinary dialogue. The first of these features we call ‘phenomenal naivety’. This might not be the best term since it is evaluative. However, the seemingly more neutral formulations, such as ‘immediateness’, also have a technical meaning and signify phenomenologically something which is in principle the opposite of what is at stake here. In many approaches to neuroscientifc work as well as in a lot of studies of CSR, the initial ideas for empirical studies appear to be gained first from the intuitive ideas of the scholars themselves, possibly even reflecting their knowledge and history of personal formation more than their fit to the phenomena in question. Let me illustrate this problem with a few examples. In assessments of the human ability to make ‘free’ decisions and the capacity for ‘free will’, it has become a commonplace to refer to Benjamin Libet’s well known experiments. At the very start of the experiments subjects were given the task of waiting for an ‘urge’25 to move their fingers. However, acting on a perceptibly evolving urge is far from what we observe and recognize in everyday life as willing freely. In contemporary experiments on free will using fMRI this problem also reappears in a similar but juxtaposed manner. Haynes et al. pronounced that ‘it was specifically emphasized that the subject’s decisions should be unbiased and spontaneous. […] it was ensured that subjects made spontaneous decisions and 24 Herms, E., Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit, 99. („Die Stuktur derartiger Vorstellungen ist aus den Mythen der Religionen und Weltanschauungen bestens bekannt. Ebenso bekannt ist die grundlegende Kritik aller derartigen Vorstellungen, die in der neuzeitlichen Religionskritik ständig repetiert und dadurch zu Breitenwirkung gelangt ist. Diese Kritik besagt: Die inhaltlichen Bestimmungen der transphänomenalen Sphäre ergeben sich sämtlich daraus, daß die Bestimmungen der phänomenalen Sphäre in ein Jenseits projiziert werden, wobei diese Projektion durch nichts anderes begründet und motiviert ist als durch den auf anderem Wege nicht zu befriedigenden Erklärungswunsch. Es ist nichts anderes als dieser Wunsch, der die gesamte Vorstellung produziert – und zwar unter Inkaufnahme eines manifesten Selbstwiderspruchs: Die Differenz zwischen Phänomenalität und ihrem sie gewährenden und erhaltenden Grund, die es gerade zu verstehen und zu begreifen gilt, wird dadurch ignoriert – übersprungen oder unterlaufen, daß dem konstituierenden Grund umstandslos Züge des Konstituierten beigelegt warden, ja, daß er selbst als im Konstituierten begründet gedacht wird.“) 25 Cf. Libet, B., Mind Time, 193 – 199.

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did not pre-plan them.’26 The authors were aware of the problem that acting on the basis of an ‘urge’ cannot be associated with acting freely. However, acting completely spontaneously without any pre-planning does not correspond to any situation of acting in every day life for which we use the language of will and freedom. In the fields of neuroscientific research on religion, d’Aquili and Newberg place their focus on ‘mystical’ experiences during meditation and specific kinds of prayer. In other words, they focussed exclusively on exceptional experiences, not only segregating these experiences from every-day experience, but also from most experiences that are meaningful and decisive for the self-understanding of the different historical religions.27 In this, they isolate a significant factor from one particular religious tradition and then use it as a key to understand a variety of different phenomena in a completely arbitrary way. In their view, impersonal and undifferentiated experiences become the very heart of faith. Conversely, several studies taking place in the field of CSR focussed on revelations of anthropomorphic individual deities or agents.28 Here, religion is modelled in a completely different way ; the extraordinary experiences of particular individuals are treated as models par excellence. Most believers, however, do not receive individual revelation in this way and the concepts of revelation in the different religious traditions refer to very different phenomena than presupposed in some branches of CSR research. In some cases, experiments have been designed which completely misunderstood the phenomenal basis of the reports. In one study the researchers wanted to determine why a number of religious revelations have occurred on mountains.29 The study had limited academic merit because it did not take into account the fact that these texts do not necessarily claim to be reporting historical events. Mountains—as well as deserts or important cities—are used literarily in a series of narrative events in order to pronounce climaxes of different kinds in the narrative. In some cases, e. g. Mount Zion, the ‘mountain’ is simply a raised area of no significant elevation. They are

26 Haynes, J.-D./Bode, S./Hanxi He, A./Soon, C.S./Trampel, R./Turner, R., Tracking the Unconscious Generation of Free Decisions, 2. 27 Cf. Newberg, A.B./Alavi, A./Baime, M./Poudehnad, M./Santanna, J./d’Aquili, E., Blood Flow during the Complex Cognitive Task of Meditation; Newberg, A.B./Wintering, N./ Morgan, D./Waldman, M.R., Blood Flow During Glossolalia; Newberg, A.B./Wintering, N./ Waldman, M.R./Amen, D./Khalsa, D.S./Alavi, A., Blood Flow Differences between Longterm Meditatiors and Non-Meditators. A good ananlyis of Newberg’s and d’Aquili’s work is given by Runehov, A.L.C., Sacred or Neural?, 137 – 200. However, her evaluation, ibid., 200, that it is plausible that the brain creates God only appears to be possible against the background of representationalism. 28 Cf. e. g. Boyer, P., Religious Thought as By-product; Boyer, P., Religion Explained; Barrett, J.L./Keil, F.C., Anthropomorphism in God Concepts. A good introduction and analysis of the field of CSR is now provided by Visala, A., Naturalism, Theism and the Cognitive Study of Religion. A short overview can be found in Visala, A., Religion and the Human Mind. 29 Cf. Arzy, S./Idel, M./Landis, T./Blanke, O., Revelations Occurred on Mountains. One can only be astonished about the fact that such an article with so little academic or scientific merit was actually published.

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chosen due to their importance in the history of the specific narrative, not due to their particular status as a mountain or even due to their experiential value.

I do want to make it clear that it is not my intention to suggest that an entire branch of scientific research is guilty of making such simple interpretive errors. In the field of CSR there are many studies that do not present such problems, and there are other experiments which use neuroscientific methods in which such problems do not occur. The studies by Haynes et al. we mentioned also provide what are perhaps some decisive insights.30 But the question is this: What is the difference between those experiments relying on such phenomenally nave presuppositions and those experiments which do not? It is not the descriptions of the experiments themselves or their interpretation that are mistaken in these cases, but something actually preceding the methodological work altogether.

2.1.6 Causal Atomism and the Externality of Relations Another problem, perhaps only incidentally related to neuroconstructivist representationalism, can be called ‘causal atomism’. I am hereby referring to the idea that entities at their most basic level are something like individual substances, individual events or individual phenomena which are causally related to other individual substances, events or phenomena , i. e. by external relationality, which does not affect the identity or the constitution of these individual substances, events or phenomena. In the paradigm of causal atomism, the main goal of research consists in identifying these individual entities, events or phenomena in a correct manner and identifying the causal relations between them in the correct way. One may ask why causal atomism is deemed problematic here. It is sometimes reckoned to be the distinctive feature of scientific work, but even if not, it does seem to be convenient because it fits very well to our common understanding. In order to illuminate the problems bound up with this position, we have to go into more detail, i. e. we have to refer to an important discussion in philosophy. The naturalistic philosopher Bertrand Russell explicitly defended causal atomism or the externality of relations and tried to make this position the only meaningful one. Russell presents his opinion in a (virtual) debate with British philosopher Francis Herbert Bradley, who introduced Hegelianism into Anglophone philosophy in the late 19th century. Bradley’s position is the complete opposite of Russell’s. Bradley introduced the internality-thesis into philosophy, the opinion that all possible relations are internal or intrinsic: 30 Cf. Haynes, J.-D./Bode, S./Hanxi He, A./Soon, C.S./Trampel, R./Turner, R., Tracking the Unconscious Generation of Free Decisions; Haynes, J.-D./Soon, C.S./Brass, M./Heinze, H.-J., Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions.

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‘But every relation […] essentially penetrates the being of its terms, and, in this sense, is intrinsical.’31 ‘I do not admit that any relation whatever can be merely external and make no difference to its terms.’32 ‘We have seen […] all relations imply a whole to which the terms contribute and by which the terms are qualified […]. Nothing in the whole and in the end can be external, and everything less than the Universe is an abstraction from the whole, an abstraction more or less empty […].’33 ‘Relations are all intrinsical.’34

Russell used Bradley’s explanations to describe an entire branch of philosophy from Leibniz via Kant and Hegel up to the idealists of his own time: ‘I called this the “doctrine of internal relations”, and I called my view the “doctrine of external relations”. The doctrine of internal relations held that every relation between two terms expresses, primarily, intrinsic properties of the two terms and, in ultimate analysis, a property of the whole which the two compose. […] Suppose that A and B are events, and A is earlier than B. I do not think that this implies anything in A in virtue of which, independently of B, it must have a character which we inaccurately express by mentioning B. Leibniz gives an extreme example. He says that, if a man living in Europe has a wife in India and the wife dies without knowing it, the man undergoes an intrinsic change in the moment of her death.’35

The consequences of the so called doctrine of internal relations, according to Russell, is a bold monism: ‘Further, assuming that we are not to distinguish between a thing and its “nature”, it follows from the axiom that nothing can be considered quite truly except in relation to the whole. For if we consider “A is related to B”, the A and the B are also related to everything else, and to say what the A and the B are would involve referring to everything else in the universe.’36 ‘Consequently, if the axiom of internal relations is true, it follows that there is no diversity, and that there is only one thing. Thus the axiom of internal relations is equivalent to the assumption of ontological monism and to the denial that there are any relations.’37 ‘Again, the axiom of internal relations is incompatible with all complexity. For this axiom leads […] to a rigid monism. […] In short, the whole conception of identity in difference is incompatible with the axiom of internal relations; yet without this conception, monism can give no account of the world […]’38

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

Bradley, F.H., Appearance and Reality, 392. Bradley, F.H., Appearance and Reality, 574. Bradley, F.H., Appearance and Reality, 581. Bradley, F.H., Appearance and Reality, 627. Russell, B., Philosophical Development, 54 f. Russell, B., Philosophical Development, 56. Russell, B., Philosophical Development, 57. Russell, B., Philosophical Development, 60.

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Russell’s own position is the doctrine of external relations, which means that all relations are external. One necessary implication of this view is a radical pluralism: ‘We thus get a world of many things, with relations which are not to be deduced from a supposed “nature” or scholastic essence of the related things. In this world, whatever is complex is composed of related simple things […].’39 ‘I still hold to the doctrine of external relations and to pluralism, which is bound up with it. […] I still hold that any proposition other than a tautology, if it is true, is true in virtue of a relation to a fact, and that facts in general are independent of experience.’40

While we need not ask whether Russell’s views of continental philosophy, idealism or Hegel are accurate—they are not—the kind of pantheistic monism he constructs in order to condemn, is indeed problematic for the reasons he gave. But his view is also problematic. He is not simply arguing for complexity and plurality or pluralism in the sense we are using it today. Russell’s pluralism destroys the very notion of the world and every individual entity becomes a world of its own. On the one hand, all relations, including causal relations, are claimed to be external, not affecting the identity of the individual things. But on the other hand, no statement like ‘all relations are x’ is possible. By turning all relations into external ones, Russell is not establishing any kind of realism, be it a nave or more sophisticated one, but simply a negative idealism. For practical reasons, this solution is convenient: Any scientist can use experiments and interpret them. But apart from identifying causal relations between individual entities, there is no connexion between them. There is no possibility of saying that physics might decisively influence biology, or biology culture, or evolution acting. In addition, the claim that there are only causal relations of ontic value is, in principle, a violation of the presupposed axiom. Therefore, it simply cannot be true that all relations are external and it cannot be right to restrict all scientific work to the identification of individual things, simple predicates or attributes and external, causal relationships.

2.1.7 Individualist Intellectualism, Theory of Mind and the Social Brain Hypothesis Features that are not necessarily bound to neuroconstructivist, idealist dualism can be called intellectualism and individualism. Therefore, they also appear independently from it and they also appear independent of each other. Individualism is, strictly speaking, a subset of atomism, and thus the problems 39 Russell, B., Philosophical Development, 61. 40 Russell, B., Philosophical Development, 63 f.

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which arise in the case of atomism also apply to that of individualism. Individualism and intellectualism can also be bound together. A decisive example of this can be found in the cognitive sciences loosely supported by neuroscientific evidence combining intellectualism and individualism: the socalled ‘theory of mind’ (ToM). The various ToMs explain human sociality as a phenomenon which in its decisive features is secondary to the human individual, whereas the human individual has a priority in the sense that only different individual cognitive capacities allow a full account of social relationships. It is assumed that in order to behave socially it is necessary to understand that other persons are also persons like the individual subject in question, with phenomenal subjectivity, intentions, mental states, feelings, etc. In short, in order to enter social relationships fully, it is necessary that every person develop a ToM that is a theory in which others also like oneself. Broadly speaking, ToM theories appear in two branches. First, the theory theory assumes that all intellectual capabilities are necessary in order to value another person as possessing a mind. Second, the simulation theory assumes that our understanding of the other is based upon simulating their behaviour, i. e. imagining how we would behave, feel and think in similar situations.41 In both cases, certain mental capacities constitute the necessary preconditions for gaining a theory of mind, particularly different levels of intensionality. This kind of individualistic understanding of intensionality is described by R.I.M. Dunbar : ‘Computers can be said to know things because their memories contain information; however it seems unlikely that they know that they know these things, in that we have no evidence that they can reflect on their states of “mind.” In the jargon of the philosophy of mind, computers are zero-order intensional machines. […] Most vertebrates are probably capable of reflecting on their states of mind, at least in some crude sense: they know that they know. Organisms of this kind are first-order intensional. By extension, second-order intensional organisms know that someone else knows something, and third-order intensional organisms know that someone else knows that someone else knows something. […] in practice, humans rarely engage in more than fourth-order intensionality in everyday life and probably face an upper limit at sixth-order (“Peter knows that Jane believes that Mark thinks that Paula wants Jake to suppose that Amelia intends to do something”). A minimum of fourth-order intensionality is required for literature that goes beyond the merely narrative […].’42

The presence or absence of a ToM, i. e. at least a capability of second-order intensionality as well as higher-order intensionality, can be empirically tested by cognitive developmental psychology with the help of many of the so called ‘false belief ’ tests. These tests also reveal that the usual ToMs presuppose a 41 Cf. Gallagher, S./Zahavi, D., Phenomenological Mind, 191 – 195. 42 Dunbar, R.I.M., The Social Brain Hypothesis, 188.

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representationalist understanding of sociality : The other and his theoretically ascribed or simulated state of mind (as well as one’s own) has to be a representation in the subject’s own mind. Well known false-belief experiments by Wimmer and Perner go back to the 1980s: ‘Understanding of another person’s wrong belief requires representation of the wrongness of this person’s belief in relation to one’s own knowledge. Three to nine year old children’s understanding of two sketches was tested. In each sketch subjects observed how a protagonist put an object into a location x and then witnessed that in the absence of the protagonist the object was transferred from x to location y. Since this transfer came as a surprise they had to assume that the protagonist still believed that the object was in x. Subjects had to indicate where the protagonist will look for the object at his return. None of the 3 – 4 year old, 57 % of the 4 – 6 year old, and 86 % of the 6 – 9 year old children pointed correctly to location x in both sketches.’43

Experiments of this kind seem to justify the classical ToMs which were developed based on experiments of this kind because these experiments provide evidence that children can distinguish between facts of the world and beliefs of the mind. Robin Dunbar observed that capacities like this are dependent on the evolutionary development of the human brain and he proposed a theory that these intellectual capacities might have evolved due to social needs. He observed a correlation between the sizes of the neocortex of different primates and their mean group size. Therefore, he concluded: ‘In summary, parsimony and biological common sense would suggest that it is group size that drives brain size evolution rather than brain size driving group size and that group size itself is a response to an ecological problem (most probably predation risk […]).’44

This thesis has been called the ‘social brain hypothesis’ or ‘Machiavellian intelligence’, since the notion of tactical deception was given a decisive role in the individual dealing with sociality : ‘These [social] systems can be shown to involve processes such as tactical deception and coalition-formation, which are rare or occur only in simpler forms in other taxonomic groups [than humans]. Because of this, the suggestion was rapidly dubbed the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, although there is a growing preference to call it the social brain hypothesis.’45

The social brain hypothesis should not be misunderstood. The sociality of which the hypothesis speaks does not mean some kind of internal relation between humans, but is rather modelled on the image of external relations of 43 Wimmer, H./Perner, J., Beliefs about Beliefs. 103. 44 Dunbar, R.I.M., The Social Brain, 169. 45 Dunbar, R.I.M., The Social Brain Hypothesis, 178.

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manipulating and trading. This becomes clearer from the fact that the basic explanatory presupposition is an economic cost-benefit law, which is estimated to underlie all evolutionary processes. Competing hypotheses for the evolution of human brain size were rejected by Dunbar because they ‘suffer from the problem that they ignore a fundamental principle of evolutionary theory, which is that evolution is the outcome of the balance between costs and benefits’.46 Dunbar has also suggested that the modern human brain’s ability to deal with different group sizes appears in clusters representing ‘pints of stability or clustering in the degrees of familiarity within the broad range of human relationships, from the most intimate to the most tenuous’.47 Among these clusters of 5, 12, 35, 150, 500 and 2000 persons the size of 150 is called ‘Dunbar’s number’ and represents the extrapolated assumed size of the ability of the neocortex to deal with social situations.48 Although this hypothesis is highly speculative and debated, some institutions have started to rearrange their groups around Dunbar’s number.49

2.1.8 Reductionist Naturalism Like causal atomism, reductionist naturalism is by no means only a feature that can be found in neuroscientific and evolutionary approaches, but is also a common feature of some approaches to interpreting the sciences. Like causal atomism and the doctrine of the externality of relations, it is not necessarlily implied by neuroconstructivist representationalism. However, the link between the problem of the causal atomism and the doctrine of the externality of relations on the one hand and between reductionist naturalism on the other is a very close one. Unlike many other books, we will refrain from entering the endless debates of whether science has to be interpreted ontologically in the framework of reductionist naturalism or not. This debate appears to be fruitless and more about the quasi-religious interpretation of science than about scientific work itself. Someone holding to a reductionist naturalism will most likely never turn these pages, if even taking a look into the book at all. Nevertheless, just as reductionist naturalism is not a viable option, neither is dualism or anti-reductionism. The particula veri of reductionist naturalism is that reformulating a problem of theory A in terms of theory B is a common move in the sciences and is able to carry some explanatory weight, not per se, but under specific circumstances. However, if any explanatory value is antecedently ascribed to reduction, science becomes comprehensively dependent on quasi-religious ideologies. This might be a problem of some 46 47 48 49

Dunbar, R.I.M., The Social Brain Hypothesis, 179. Dunbar, R.I.M., The Social Brain Hypothesis, 187 f. Cf. Dunbar, R.I.M., The Social Brain Hypothesis, 186 f. Cf. Swedish Tax Collectors Organized by Apes.

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present research in any of the fields in the contemporary sciences as well as in the neurosciences and in evolutionary biology in particular. But this problem can only be resolved if one acknowledges the relatively positive value of reduction, not by condemning it wholesale.

2.2 Problems of Neuroconstructivist-Representational Dualism 2.2.1 Abandoning Representationalism In this section I want to introduce four examples, both from empirical studies and from conceptual inquiry, which clearly demonstrate that the universal proposition that experience or cognition consists in representations of the world in the brain (or in the mind) is wrong.

2.2.1.1 Ecological Subjectivity In a classic study, Hein and Held let neonatal kittens grow up in an apparatus in which two kittens were physically linked. The kittens in group A were able to move by themselves, whereas the kittens in group P were moved passively according to movements of their partner kitten in group A. Whereas the kittens in the A group developed normal behaviour in discerning their environment by normal paw placements on objects and the ability to avoid objects, kittens in the P group failed these tests. Hein and Held inferred that the visual stimuli, which were exactly the same for the two groups, were not sufficient for allowing the kittens to gain an orientation to their environment. The developmental process ‘requires for its operation stimulus variation concurrent with and systematically dependent upon self-produced movement’.50 Other examples include the experiences of blind people using white canes. The experience of the resistance given by the presence of objects does not exist in their hands, but at the end of the white cane.51 Similarly, welltrained motorcyclists develop a sense of feeling the condition of streets in the tires. In these cases the tools become a part of the living body (Leib) and the interface between Leib and environment occurs at the end of the tool—not at the limit of the body— whereas the interface between body and environment remains at the limit of the body. The interface of experience of the Leib and the bodily interface are not the same. The tool, the cane or the tyres of the motorcycle are integrated into the body schema of the person for as long as 50 Held, R./Hein, A., Visually Guided Behavior, 876. 51 Cf. Merleau-Ponty, M., Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung, 173.

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they are in use.52 A number of interpreters, including Thomas Fuchs recently, have concluded that perception ‘always means to participate in a world, to touch it and to be touched by it. It is constituted by bodily (leiblicher) practice.’53 Therefore, conscious experience does not appear to rely on representation, but it rather seems to be spread throughout the living entire body (Leib), and it seems to have a capacity for being extended into the environment. However, neuroconstructivists can simply object that this holistic impression of the living body (Leib) and its environment can simply be understood to reflect representation in brain patterns. Well known examples of phantom pain in the case of amputation and studies where test subjects regard rubber hands as their own54 seem to allow these alternative interpretations which cohere with representationalism. It is said that the body’s consciousness of itself and its environment appear factually in the

52 Cf. Spiegel, B., Die obere Hälfte des Motorrads, 112 – 141. 53 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 32. 54 Cf. Botvinick, M./Cohen, J., Rubber Hands Feel Touch that Eyes See.

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‘phenospace’55 of the brain, a metaphor in analogy to ‘cyberspace’. But objections of these kinds are not valid and only possible if one were to assume a kind of radical solipsism: that there is only one conscious brain, one’s own. This is because a patient experiences pain in the hand at the same spatiotemporal location that the physician experiences the same pain from the 3rd person perspective: ‘The “Syntopy”, i. e. the concurrence of the position of pain and injury, regards the body as perceived by physician and patient in common. […] For here the subjective spaces of both persons are congruent in a manner which excludes their pure subjectivity. The body perceived by both persons jointly cannot be understood as a subjective virtual mirage. It is in a shared, intersubjective and therefore objective space.’56

2.2.1.2 Externalism of Meaning Here I am referring to the classical Twin-Earth thought experiments developed by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge in the 1970s.57 I follow Putnam in principle, but I have given his examples a slightly more modern shape: Imagine a TwinEarth with exactly the same state of affairs, the same history, same languages and people. Everything on the Twin-Earth is the same with one exception. On the Twin-Earth, there is no H2O, but substance XYZ, called water. People on Twin-Earth react to XYZ exactly like people on Earth to H2O and both substances have the same visual and haptic attributes. Imagine Oscar1 on Earth seeing H2O and calling it ‘water’. Imagine that Doppelgänger Oscar2 from Twin-Earth was teleported instantly from Twin-Earth to Earth, sensing H2O and calls it ‘XYZ’. A super-fMRI reveals that both have exactly the same brain patterns in uttering the sentences. Nevertheless, their beliefs are different, since meaning is dependent on reference to an extension: In uttering the sentence Oscar1 believes ‘this is H2O’, whereas in uttering the same sentence Oscar2 believes ‘this is XYZ’. Furthermore, neither Oscar has any training in chemistry and does not know anything about H2O or XYZ. Nevertheless, their beliefs are different, and Oscar2’s belief is quite simply wrong. Since the brain patterns and mental propositions are exactly the same and since there is, nevertheless, a decisive difference in meaning including the implication that Oscar1’s belief is true whereas Oscar2’s belief is wrong, 55 Metzinger, T., Subjekt und Selbstmodell, 243. 56 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan. 34 f. („Die ,Syntopie‘ oder das Zusammenfallen des Ortes von Schmerz und Verletzung betrifft nämlich jetzt den von Arzt und Patient gemeinsam wahrgenommenen Körper […]. Denn hier kommen die subjektiven Räumlichkeiten beider Personen in einer Weise zur Deckung, die ihre bloße Subjektivität aufhebt. Der von beiden Personen übereinstimmend gemeinte Körper kann kein subjektives Scheingebilde mehr sein. Er befindet sich im gemeinsamen, intersubjektiven und insofern objektiven Raum.“) 57 Cf. Putnam, H., Meaning of ‘Meaning’; Burge, T., Individualism and the Mental.

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Putnam concludes: ‘Cut the pie anyway you like, “meanings” just ain’t in the head!’58 2.2.1.3. Active Externalism Building on Putnam and Tyler’s insights, Andy Clark and David Chalmers developed their view of active externalism.59 In epistemic action such as using notebooks in order to remember things, rotating geometrical forms on a computer screen like in the game Tetris, or arranging tiles on a Scrabble tray or thinking by physically writing etc., we find coupled cognitive systems in which the cognitive process is necessarily bound to the factors outside one’s body. Without them the cognitive process would not happen at all; environmental factors are not add-ons, but rather belong to the core of the process. Active externalism, therefore, means first, that we have to speak of extended cognition. It is not necessary that all relata of the system are conscious for these coupled cognitive systems; it is also the case with internal memory that the single modules of the brain are neither conscious nor sentient. Second, Clark and Chalmers also apply active externalism to the mind. A patient suffering from Alzheimer’s disease relies on his belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53th Street not from his memory, but from his notebook. Beliefs, therefore, are not necessarily entities bound to the brain, but include externally coupled systems that form a single cognitive process. These coupled systems can in principle also include other persons, social knowledge and languages, the environment and history. Since the initial boundaries of skin and skull have been dropped, the further distinction between mind and environment no longer seems to be categorical, but, if at all, a gradual or fuzzy distinction. Third, Clark and Chalmers also assume that active externalism also has to be applied to the concept of the self: The extended mind also seems to imply an extended self. 2.2.1.4. Conceptual Experience How do we know? On the one hand, we have our conceptual abilities, such as causality, space, time, different predicates, statements, etc. We can call this along with W. Sellars and John McDowell our ‘conceptual space’. On the other hand, there is, in Kantian terms, a Ding an sich, something outside of and independent from our concepts, if one wants to avoid a strict idealism. Therefore, it is necessary to describe the relationship between these two aspects. According to John McDowell a dilemma emerges: Either the space of reason is broader than the space of concepts, i. e. in the space of reason 58 Putnam, H., Meaning of ‘Meaning’, 227. 59 Cf. Clark, A./Chalmers, D.J., The Extended Mind.

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something emerges which is ‘given’ by reality itself. Or there is no link at all or only a causal one between reality itself and our concepts. An example of the first case could be found in Roth’s above-mentioned ‘real brain’. This ‘real brain’ cannot belong to the conceptual space, but is nevertheless called ‘brain’ instead of ‘niarb’ or anything incomprehensible. Therefore, it is correctly called, we have seen, a myth and the criticism of religion is comprehensively applicable. McDowell, in accordance with Sellars, calls any such attempted solution the ‘Myth of the Given‘. The second case is the purely coherentist solution: The space of reason and the space of concepts are the same, but closed. Causal relations from reality might influence them, if in reality there really is something like causality. But no one can identify this mysterious relationship between the real and our conceptuality as causality. The consequence is that the link becomes completely ineffable, incomprehensible and apophatic.60 However, if we were to try to identify this relationship with, e. g. causality, this identification would once more count as the other side of the dilemma and it would amount to another ‘Myth of the Given’: ‘Causality’ would have replaced the ‘real brain’. Furthermore, this case would be useless for our knowledge, because it can also be assumed that false beliefs, as well as true ones, are influenced by causal relations. There would, therefore, be no truth criterion apart from the notion of coherence. But coherence can only be a necessary one! In spite of the seriousness of this dilemma, McDowell’s solution is surprising as to its simplicity : ‘Experiences already have conceptual content […]’.61 ‘The view I am recommending is that even though experience is passive, it draws into operation capacities that genuinely belong to spontaneity.’62 ‘A genuine escape would require that we avoid the Myth of the Given without renouncing the claim that experience is a rational constraint on thinking. I have suggested that we can do that if we can recognize that the world’s impression on our senses are already possessed of conceptual content.’63 ‘I have claimed that we are prone to fall into an intolerable oscillation: in one phase we are drawn to a coherentism that cannot make sense of the bearing of thought on objective reality, and in the other phase we recoil into an appeal to the Given, which turns out to be useless. I have urged that in order to escape the oscillation, we need a conception of experiences as states or occurrences that are passive but reflect conceptual capacities, capacities that belong to spontaneity, in operation.’64

According to McDowell, this kind of experience with inherent experience makes no distinction between experiencing one’s own body and the environment: 60 61 62 63 64

Cf. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 8. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 10. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 13. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 18. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 23.

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‘To give the impression of “inner sense” the right role in justifying judgments, we need to conceive them, like the impressions of “outer sense”, as themselves possessing conceptual content […]. So the impressions of “inner sense” must be, like the impressions of “outer sense”, passive occurrences in which conceptual capacities are drawn into operation.’65

This recommendation entails a lot of implications as well as further problems. One implication is that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities has to be altered, if not abandoned. All possible qualities seem to behave like the classical secondary qualities.66 Speaking theologically, this is not a new insight; Jonathan Edwards criticized Locke for establishing the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.67 Second, the idea of a boundary between the conceptual and reality itself has to be abandoned: ‘Although reality is independent of our thinking, it is not to be pictured as outside an outer boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere. That things are thus and so is the conceptual content of an experience, but if the subject of the experience is not misled, that very same thing, that things are thus and so, is also a perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible world. […] there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or generally the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing that can be the case.’68 ‘But I am trying to describe a way of maintaining that in experience the world exerts a rational influence on our thinking. And that requires us to delete the outer boundary from the picture. The impressions on our senses that keep the dynamic system in motion are already equipped with conceptual content. […] My point is to insist that we can effect this deletion of the outer boundary without falling into idealism, without slighting the independence of reality.’69

Third, experience then has to be conceived as a manifestation of reality : ‘Conceptual capacities are already operative in the deliverances of sensibility themselves. […] they are about the world, as it appears or makes itself manifest to the experiencing subject […].’70

Fourth, conceptual experience does not exclude the possibility that there are also experiences without any conceptual content, such as some emotions. Not all experiences are conceptual ones.71 Fifth, if experiences themselves are conceptually loaded, it seems to be the case that there is no sharp distinction between humans and other animals. However, McDowell wants to maintain this distinction in that humans, in 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

McDowell, J., Mind and World, 21 f, Cf. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 11 f. Cf. Jenson, R.W., On Thinking the Human, 50 – 58. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 26 f. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 34. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 39. Cf. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 55.

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contrast to other animals, are capable of observing the conceptual content that is already in the world itself: ‘Instead we can say that we have what mere animals have, perceptual sensitivity to features of our environment, but we have it in a special form. Our perceptual sensitivity to our environment is taken up into the ambit of the faculty of spontaneity, which is what distinguishes us from them.’72

In my opinion, at this point McDowell has a slight tendency to distinguish humans from other animals by inaccurately divinizing the former, e. g. when he adopts from Marx and Gadamer the idea that humans not only inhabit but also ‘possess’ a world.73 Sixth, McDowell acknowledges that his position could entail the danger of ‘a crazily nostalgic attempt to re-enchant the natural world’.74 His recommendations to avoid this danger invoke the classical Aristotelian concept of second nature and the concept of Bildung (formation) as it can be found in the tradition of von Humboldt and others.75 However, at this point, the proposed solutions remain a bit opaque: ‘Our nature is largely second nature, and our second nature is the way it is not just because of the potentialities we were born with, but also because of our upbringing, our Bildung. Given the notion of second nature, we can say that the way our lives are shaped by reason is natural, even while we deny that the structure of the space of reasons can be integrated into the layout of the realm of law. This is the partial reenchantment of nature that I spoke of.’76

Seventh, McDowell’s suggestions amount to a large extent—e. g. with regard to the notion of embodiment77—to what has already been proposed by the philosophical tradition of phenomenology. However, certain prejudices against this tradition lead him to exclude this branch of philosophy.78 None of the aforementioned examples of ecological subjectivity, externalism of meaning, active externalism and conceptual experience provide a new epistemological system. However, both in themselves and in combination, they clearly indicate that representationalism as a universally valid theory has been falsified: It is simply not the case that experience consists in the representation of a world in a brain or mind. Whereas the relation of the world and its map in a mind/brain can simply be understood as an external relation, the collapse of representationalism alters the picture. If we need embodied interaction in order to experience, if meanings just ‘ain’t in the head’, if active 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

McDowell, J., Mind and World, 64. Cf. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 118. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 72. Cf. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 84 f. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 87 f. Cf. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 111. Cf. McDowell, J., Mind and World, 94.

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externalism is at least to a minimal amount true, and finally if the approach of conceptual experience entails only some particula veri, then experience and cognition have to be at least partially understood as internal relations between experiencer and experienced. To avoid misunderstanding, the terms ‘external/ internal’ are used in a completely different sense in the case of all examples mentioned here than in the case of the distinction between external and internal relations. The reason for this is that ‘external/internal’ are not absolute but relative concepts. They are only meaningful if one can specify in what regard something can be seen as internal or external. In the case of the examples found in this section, this is either the boundary of the brain/mind or the boundary of the body. In the more abstract question of the classification of relations, the regard in which a relation is internal or external is the relation itself. Therefore, if experience is a non-representational relation in which conceptual content has to be seen in what is experienced itself, then experience is external with regard to the one who experiences (mind, brain or body), whereas it is internal to the relation between the one who experiences and what is experienced (and vice versa). 2.2.2 Abandoning Modularism Modularism is simply an absolute or dogmatized interpretation of modularity, i. e. the relation (relative to neuroplasticism) that is possible between brain areas and mental functions. These brain areas play the role of providing necessary but not sufficient conditions for the mental functions in question. The transition from modularity to modularism relies on the following fallacies: First, we have to mention the mereological fallacy, the attempt to ascribe psychological and personal faculties and activities to the brain, which can only be meaningfully attributed to the whole living human person. This mereological fallacy also leads to the odd language which personalizes the brain. Consciousness, for example, is neither a meaningful attribute of the brain (which possesses no actual sensitivity itself) nor a spatially identifiable mental substance, but an active process of the living person in a particular environment.79 Second, there is the localistic fallacy, i. e. the attempt to substantialize concrete mental activities and to identify them with the neuronal activity of different areas of the brain:80 ‘Therefore, the language of “neuronal correlates of consciousness” is also not adequate. It implies that phenomena like perceptions, feelings or cognitive activities 79 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 65 – 68 and Bennett, M.R./Hacker, P., Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, 68 – 108. 80 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 68 – 76.

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could be separated from the activity of the consciousness as a whole. But these phenomena are not isolable states of affairs; rather they need a perceiving, feeling, thinking subject, etc.’81

Third, the renaissance of modularism is due to the rise of the imaging processing methods in the neurosciences like PET, SPECTand fMRI. However, these techniques also do not measure the neuronal activity itself. Further, the fascination with these techniques has recently led to an implicit abuse, which has been called the ‘voodoo-science of brain imaging’:82 Vul et al. surveyed more than 55 studies applying fMRI voxel83-identification with a variety of different personality measures. They found that the correlations, surprisingly, are higher than one would expect from other kinds of studies (a probability higher than 0.8). They interviewed the scholars and it was revealed that in more than half of all studies a strategy was used ‘that computes separate correlations for individual voxels and reports means of only those voxels exceeding chosen thresholds.’84 In order to illustrate this ‘voodoo-fallacy’ or ‘nonindependence error’—the expression used in the article itself—Vul et al. give an example: ‘It may be easier to appreciate the gravity of the nonindependence error by transposing it outside of neuroimaging. We have identified a weather station whose temperature readings predict daily changes in the value of a specific set of stocks with a correlation of r = –0.87. For $50, we will provide the list of stocks to any interested reader. That way, you can buy the stocks every morning when the weather station posts a drop in temperature and sell when the temperature goes up. […] We arrived at –0.87 by separately computing the correlation between the readings of the weather station in Adak Island, AK, with each of the 3,315 financial instruments available for the New York Stock Exchange […] over the 10 days that the market was open between November 18 and December 3, 2008. We then averaged the correlation values of the stocks whose correlation exceeded a high threshold of our choosing […]. Of the 3,315 stocks assessed, some were sure to be correlated with the Adak Island temperature measurements simply by chance—and if we select just those […], there is no doubt we would find a high average correlation. Thus, the final measure (the average correlation of a subset of stocks) was not independent of the selection criteria.’85

81 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 70. („Deshalb ist auch die Rede von umschriebenen, ,neuronalen Korrelaten von Bewusstsein‘ nicht angemessen: Sie impliziert nämlich, dass sich Phänomene wie Wahrnehmungen, Gefühle oder Denkkvorgänge von der Bewusstseinstätigkeit insgesamt isolieren ließen. Doch diese Phänomene sind keine isolierbaren Zustände, sondern sie setzen ein Subjekt voraus, das wahrnimmt, fühlt, denkt, etc.“) 82 Cf. Begley, S., The ‘Voodoo’ Science of Brain Imaging. 83 Voxels are threedimensional picture patterns of different sizes, depending on the resolution of the fMRI, e. g. 1 mm3. 84 Vul, E./Harris, C./Winkielman, P./Pashler, H., Puzzlingly High Correlations, 274. 85 Vul, E./Harris, C./Winkielman, P./Pashler, H., Puzzlingly High Correlations, 279 f.

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Back to neuroimaging: The nonindependence fallacy means that the criteria of selecting specific brain areas or a set of voxels are not independent of the question at stake and the final experiments. In spite of the fact that it is possible to temper the independence error, it is not possible to live completely without it, since a kind of calibration and pre-correlation is necessary. The scholars who had been accused of the nonindependence error were not aware of their mistake. This fact seems to provide evidence that modularism becomes a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy when it is accompanied with neuroimaging. I do not want to be misunderstood here. There is nothing wrong with modularity, as long as it is not dogmatized. There is also nothing wrong with neuroimaging as long as it is not practised under a quasi-religious commitment to modularism. 2.2.3 Abandoning Neuroconstructivism In relationship to neuroconstructivism, we do not need to refer to empirical evidence that humans under most circumstances are able to gain real insights. It is also not necessary to emphasize that any neuroconstructivist approach is only inherently coherent when it adheres also to neurosolipsism, i. e. the opinion that there is only one perceiving individual (like the individual ‘real brain’), which is an implausible option. Rather, it is possible to disprove neuroconstructivism by using a simple rational argument. We have seen that neuroconstructivism is dependent on representationalism in such a way that the latter is a necessary condition of the former. One can be a representationalist without being a neuroconstructivist. But one cannot be a neuroconstructivist without also being a representationalist. The reason for this is that there must be something that is to be constructed, and this would have to be the theoretically postulated maps and images produced by the brain that no one has actually ever observed. This would be an unusual kind of representationalism, since there would be images and maps constructed by the brain that do not have any counterpart in the real world. However, in section 2.2.1 we saw that representationalism is not a meaningful option precisely because the brain does not produce images or maps. Therefore, since the necessary condition of neuroconstructivism is falsified, neuroconstructivism itself also has to be wrong. 2.2.4 Abandoning Idealistic Dualism There is no need to abandon dualism based on principle alone. Different versions of dualism have always constituted a serious option throughout the history of philosophy and they still do. Similarly, some branches of theology— those relying more on Christianity’s Hellenistic heritage than on the Hebraic

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tradition or on Lutheranism—also opt for dualism. In addition, the fact that many neuroscientists who do not want to be dualistsic nevertheless appear to be so after a critical analysis of their thinking does not provide a sufficient reason to abandon dualism. Neither people nor theories behave completely coherently, but that is not really newsworthy. Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons for abandoning dualism. The first comes in the yet to be explicated theology underlying this inquiry. It is a kind of Christian theology that excludes dualism for theological reasons.86 The second reason has to do with the kinds of arguments we used in abandoning representationalism. In using the ideas of conceptual experience and active externalism in particular, there does not appear to be any place whatsoever for an idealistic dualism between the mind/brain and the material world. However, this does not mean that every viable kind of aspect-duality has to be rejected. Nevertheless, a serious problem remains. In analysing neuroconstructivist representationalism not only as dualistic but also as idealistic, we have seen that the underlying argument creates a myth which can be easily blown away by applying the traditional criticisms of religion to neuroconstructivist representationalism. However, is there an alternative? It seems to be the case that demythologizing certain myths is only possible by creating new ones, as the history of theology teaches.87 The decisive argument of the criticism of religion was that the contents of the accessible phenomena are transferred into the noumenal without any justification apart from the sheer desire to express something more than radical scepticism. It seems that at the end there remains a kind of contingency and chance in this kind of attribution. And this kind of contingency is overridden by the sheer desire for explanation. Is this move really avoidable? In my opinion, the decisive feature of this kind of criticism of religion is the ‘sheer desire’ to exclude this contingent factor that binds experience to reality. If we were to acquire a theory which allows this move without excluding this kind of contingency, it would have to be viewed as impervious to this kind of criticism. We will later suggest such a theory. Here it only has to be mentioned that to affirm this element of contingency in bridging the gap between the phenomenal and the noumenal the theory necessarily has to be one that belongs to the realm of theology or philosophy. Furthermore, if 86 Different theological traditions deal with the problem in different manners. Broadly speaking, theologies influenced more by the Hebrew Bible, as well as the Lutheran tradition in general, stress monism, whereas theologies influenced more by the Hellenistic tradition try to maintain a mind-matter distinction. A more comprehensive argument about why one should abandon the mind-matter distinction for theological reasons can be found in Mìhling, M., Eschatologie, 164 – 193. 87 ‘Demythologizing’ was the programmatic approach to the New Testament by R. Bultmann, accompanied by ‘existential interpretation’, an interpretation on the basis of the anthropology of M. Heidegger; cf. his programmatic article Bultmann, R., Neues Testament und Mythologie. From the perspective of model theory, Heidegger’s anthropology is also nothing but a myth, if taken literally. Furthermore, Bultmann also underestimates the function of a myth, as Blumenberg suggests, cf. Bormann, L., Gott in der Sackgasse, 25 f.

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it really acknowledges a contingent element, it has to be a hypothetical and fallible one. But acknowledging fallibility is the litmus test of any serious theology88, as well as of the sciences and any academic endeavour.

2.2.5 Abandoning Phenomal Naivety—Introducing Phenomenology Phenomenal naivety can be overcome by inter- and transdisciplinary work and by respecting certain insights of phenomenology, both methodological and material. These insights include the need for a phenomenological reduction, called epoch¦ by Husserl, a method which means the explication of hidden ontological assumptions89, the intentional character of all possible experience, the protentional-retentional character of conscious experience and therefore the irreducibility of the other, the basic significance of the Leib (living body) in contrast to the abstractions of Körper (body) and mind, the constitutive role of embodiment in every experience, the perspectivity of any kind of knowledge, its boundedness to different horizons, the need to incorporate the different perspectives of the 1st person, 2nd person, 3rd person, be it in the singular or plural. In recent years, a great deal of effort has been made in this respect, e. g. by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher, Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch,90 Thomas Fuchs and many others. It is therefore not necessary to give once more a description of what phenomenology is and how it works. The methodological insights of phenomenology—insofar they can be applied to the natural sciences—are not of much interest for our purposes, since this is not an introduction to methodology. Zahavi and Gallagher mention suggestions of different possibilities of incorporating phenomenological methods.91 We can thus move on quickly from this section because we will later discuss one of these concepts in more detail.

2.2.6 Abandoning Causal Atomism and the Externality of Relations We observed that Russell’s universal thesis that all relations must be external is incoherent. However, even apart from the inherent incoherence of Russell’s view, there is also physically observable evidence that proves the universal claim that ‘all relations are external’ is wrong. The experimental evidence that EPR experiments are possible and that Bell’s theorem is violated, which 88 89 90 91

Cf. van Huyssteen, J.W., The Shaping of Rationality, 111 – 178. Cf. Fçrster-Beuthan, Y., Zeiterfahrung und Ontologie, 33. Cf. Varela, F.J./Thompson, E.T./Rosch, E., The Embodied Mind. Cf. Gallagher, S./Zahavi, D., Phenomenological Mind, ch. 2.

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demonstrates the empirical existence of internally related quanta, is more than clear.92 Quantum mechanics behave exactly in analogy to Russell’s dismissed example from Leibniz. Consider the case of quantum entanglement. If a particle in India is entangled (‘married’) to another one in Europe, and the wave function of the Indian particle collapses by being messured, then the European one will instantaneously (!) receive its properties from the other. Of course, before the wave function collapsed, there were no actual properties, only possible ones. Real possibilities, however, also belong (in contrast to fictive possibilities) to reality. It might be true that not all relations are internal, but there are surely some internal relations. Actually, even Russell allowed that some relations are internal, but this is only true for him with respect to intentional relations of experience, something he wrongly labelled as fictitious, as his examples reveal.93 The easy solution that neither Russell nor Bradley are right, but that some relations are internal whereas others are external, has been maintained by different philosophers such as Wittgenstein94 and Whitehead. Whereas this solution might appear to be the obvious one, the implications are far-reaching: 1. Scientific explanations cannot be restricted any longer to identifying individual events and causal relationships. This remains the most decisive task, but it serves a specific function: testing where external relations are at work and where not. 2. A purely instrumentalist understanding of science appears to be excluded, since the question at stake is an ontological one. 3. Since there are at least some internal relations, which are primarily known from intentional relations, intentional experience and reality cannot be separated from a reality independent from experience. 92 One of the best introductions into quantum physics that also discusses its philosophical problems is given by Ijjas, A., Der Alte mit dem Würfel. 93 Russell, B., Philosophical Development, 54: ‘With some relations this view is plausible. Take, for example, love or hate. If A loves B, this relation exemplifies itself and may be said to consist in certain states of mind of A. Even an atheist must admit that a man can love God. It follows that love of God is a state of the man who feels it, and not properly a relational fact.’ 94 Cf. Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (engl.), 46 (4.122): ‘We can speak in a certain sense of formal properties of objects and atomic facts, or of properties of the structure of facts, and in the same sense of formal relations and relations of structures. (Instead of property of the structure I also say “internal property”; instead of relation of structures “internal relation”. I introduce these expressions in order to show the reason for the confusion, very widespread among philosophers, between internal relations and proper (external) relations.) The holding of such internal properties and relations cannot, however, be asserted by propositions, but it shows itself in the propositions, which present the atomic facts and treat of the objects in question.’; ibid., (4.125): ‘The existence of an internal relation between possible states of affairs expresses itself in language by an internal relation between the propositions presenting them.’; ibid. (4.1251): ‘Here the disputed question “whether all relations are internal or external” disappears.’

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4. One can assume that internal relations cannot be discovered by the detailed research of highly specialised disciplines alone, but rather an inter- and moreover trans-disciplinary dialogue is needed to discover them. 5. Since relatedness to the world is at stake with this question, it is also a matter of a particular ontology. Consider, for example, Whitehead’s reformulation of the task: ‘How can the other actual entities, each with its own formal existence, also enter objectively into the perceptive constitution of the actual entity in question? This is the problem of the solidarity of the universe. The classical doctrines of universals and particulars, of subject and predicate, of individual substances not present in other individual substances, of the externality of relations, alike render this problem incapable of solution.’95 ‘It is by means of “extension” that the bonds between prehensions take on the dual aspect of internal relations, which are yet in a sense external relations. It is evident that if the solidarity of the physical world is to be relevant to the description of its individual actualities, it can only be by reason of the fundamental internality of the relationships in question. On the other hand, if the individual discreteness of the actualities is to have its weight, there must be an aspect in these relationships from which they can be conceived as external, that is, as bonds between divided things.’96

Whitehead’s own solution is the concept of ‘prehension’, which we need not explain here. Rather than designing an answer to the question consisting of a prescriptive ontology, our task is to find preliminary answers in inter- and trans-disciplinary dialogue. 2.2.7 Abandoning Individualist Intellectualism, Theory of Mind and the Social Brain Hypothesis Since both the differing ToM hypothesis and the so called ‘Social Brain’ hypothesis presuppose representationalism and merely external relationality between persons in societies, it comes without any surprise that we are recommending their modification if not complete abandonment. Given the fact that with the falsity of representationalism and the falsity of rendering all relations as external, the falsity of individualist intellectualism also becomes evident, the argument above might not be of much value for a scientist as long as no empirical evidence can be given. However, there is empirical evidence for abandoning both intellectualism and individualism. Intellectualism and its neuroscientistic correlate, ‘cerebrocentrism’,97 might have survived in some branches of the cognitive sciences, but the 95 Whitehead, A.N., Process and Reality, 56 96 Whitehead, A.N., Process and Reality, 309. 97 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 40.

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majority seems to be a movement inaugurated by Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. In short, the ‘key idea in the hypothesis is that “marker” signals influence the processes of response to stimuli at multiple levels of operations, some of which occur overtly (consciously, “in mind”) and some of which occur covertly (non-consciously, in a non-minded manner). The marker signals arise in bioregulatory processes, including those which express themselves in emotions and feelings, but are not necessarily confined to those alone. This is the reason why the markers are termed somatic: they relate to body-state structure and regulation even when they do not arise in the body proper but rather in the brain’s representation of the body. […] The hypothesis rejects attempts to limit human reasoning and decision making to mechanisms relying, in an exclusive and unrelated manner, on either conditioning alone or cognition alone.’98

In other words, the neocortex might be necessary for all activity we call ‘cognitive’, but it is not sufficient to bring this activity about on its own. Without evolutionarily older brain areas like the amygdala, the peripheral nervous system99 or without the whole living body, reasoning and decisionmaking100 would not be possible at all. There is no strict biological boundary between affectivity, reason and will; these are mere concepts without substantial referents. The relationship between reason, will and affectivity is fuzzy, and reason—like will and the emotions—is always embodied. Individualism provides further difficulties: The individualism of the different kinds of ToMs and of the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis can be given up without denying the empirical results of the false-belief experiments. It is not the experiments themselves that are mistaken, only their interpretation. In order to see this we have first to refer to what has been called primary and secondary intersubjectivity. Primary intersubjectivity101 develops from the uterus on102 and persists throughout the entire human life. Neonates are able to distinguish clearly between other humans and inanimate objects,103 and become distressed in so called ‘still-face-experiments’, in which the mother intentionally does not alter her facial expression for several minutes,104 which shows that infants are only responsive to the mother by means of imitation if the mother is attentive to the infant at that specific moment.105 2-month old infants will only interact with 98 Damasio, A., Somatic Marker Hypothesis, 1413. 99 Cf. Bechara, A./Damasio, H./R., D.A., Emotion, Decision Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex. 100 Cf. Bechara, A., The Role of Emotion in Decision-making. 101 Cf. Trevarthen, C., Communication and Cooperation in Early Infancy 102 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 188 f. 103 Cf. Dornes, M., Der kompetente Säugling, 68. 104 Cf. Tronick, E.Z., Things Still to be Done on the Still-Face Effect. 105 Cf. Bermffldez, J.L., Transcentental Arguments and Psychology ; Gallagher, S., The Moral

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the face of the mother shown on a screen if it is temporally co-present, since the actions of both infant and mother cannot be viewed as separate,106 but rather as integral parts of the mother-child dyad.107 Primary intersubjectivity is a kind of developing non-conceptual intersubjectivity which includes a bodily intentionality in which shared emotional states are developed by the embodied means of imitating gestures and facial expressions. These kinds of bonds between mother and child do not rely on any kind of theorizing or any explicit or implicit kind of simulation simply because infants do not have these capacities. Furthermore, it does not presuppose any kind of picture or representation of the mother. Rather, it can be described as a kind of mimetic resonance. The expression ‘primary intersubjectivity’, as Trevarthen108 uses it, is a bit misleading because it does not mean that two individual subjects enter a relationship. Rather, there is a single system consisting of two internal relata bound by inter-corporeal resonance.109 This inter-corporeal relatedness is the stage in the developing inter-affectivity of the mother-child dyad which is characterized by a non-verbal exchange or communication of affectual states and emotions, and which appears completely developed around the age of 9 months.110 Through social interaction, the infant has learned to bind the feelings and emotions expressed by others to the same situations by implicit memory. With Fuchs we can conclude: ‘The contemporary psychology of social cognition focuses on the idea of a “Theory of Mind”, according to which children learn due to the means of stimuli to ascribe “mental states”, i. e. emotions, ideas, intentions and ends, to other persons […]. But neither children nor adults need theories and their presuppositions and inferences in order to understand one another. The primary perception of the other relies not on hypothetical inferences to an invisible inner world in their heads, but on intercorporeal communication und joint empathy of embodied subjects […].’111

106 107 108 109 110 111

Significance of Primitive Self-Consciousness; Gallagher, S./Meltzoff, A.N., The Earliest Sense of Self and Others. Cf. Murray, L./Trevarthen, C., Emotional Regulations of Interactions between Two-montholds and their Mothers. Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 198. Cf. Trevarthen, C., The Neurobiology of Early Communication. Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 190. The expression of intercorporeality (Intercorpor¦it¦, Zwischenleiblichkeit) goes back to Merleau-Ponty, M., Das Auge und der Geist, 256, 263. Cf. Dornes, M., Der kompetente Säugling, 154. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 192 f. („Die gegenwärtige soziale Kognitionspsychologie ist auf den Begriff der ,Theory of Mind‘ fokussiert, wonach Kinder erst aus bestimmten Hinweisreizen lernen, anderen Personen ,mentale Zustände’, also Gefühle, Ideen, Absichten und Ziele zuzuschreiben […]. Doch weder Kinder noch Erwachsene benötigen Theorien mit Annahmen und Schlussfolgerungen, um einander zu verstehen. Die primäre Wahrnehmung des Anderen beruht nicht auf hypothetischen Schlüssen auf eine unsichtbare Innenwelt in ihren Köpfen, sondern auf der zwischenleiblichen Kommunikation und wechselseitigen Empathie verkörperter Subjekte […].“)

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Secondary intersubjectivity is added to primary intersubjectivity from the 9th month on. The two-relata system of mother and child is now opened up to a shared intentionality with regard to 3rd relata. 18-month-old children are able to spontaneously complete goal-directed action of adults, if the adults are not able to complete the task and are showing signs of frustration.112 Both through deictic acts and by identifying with others, the 9-month-old child begins to experience the acquisition of its own intentionality and of other persons as intentional as well:113 ‘The intentionality of the others is by no means a private mental state which has to be deduced or simulated, but it is visible in the forms of meaning of the actions and embodied in the gestures of their living bodies in the context of joint situations.’114

Over the next few months and years, this embodied and socially interactive development progresses, leading to speech, language, symbolic sign use and abstract thinking, although the capacity for abstract thought remains bound to earlier, learned and embodied faculties.115 In the meantime, the neurobiological faculties that are presupposed and developed further during this period are on the way to becoming better understood. The binding system of the brain involving different areas appears to be responsible for the development of intentionality, such as the cingulate cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex.116 In addition, the system of mirror neurons, which can be found in different areas of the brain and inaugurate a resonance between perceiving and acting, appear to be decisively involved in the development of intentionality.117 It is also decisive that there is no one-way causality between the brain and the development. Rather, it is reciprocal. The neuronal system inaugurates a social development, but it is only if this social development is actualized in specific ways that the neuronal system can undergo further development. For example, adopted children who spend only a few months in an orphanage, demonstrate underdeveloped cognitive and social abilities at the age of 6 years in comparison to a control group.118 112 Cf. Meltzoff, A.N., Understanding the Intentions of Others; Meltzoff, A.N./Brooks, R., ‘Like me’ as Building Block for Understanding Other Minds. 113 Cf. Tomasello, M., Die kulturelle Entwicklung des menschlichen Denkens, 111. 114 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 210. „Die Intentionalität der Anderen ist kein privater mentaler Zustand, der erst erschlossen oder simuliert werden muss, sondern sie ist sichtbar in den Sinngestalten ihrer Handlungen und verkörpert in den Gesten ihres Leibes im Kontext der gemeinsamen Situation.“ 115 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 210 – 223. 116 Cf. Amini, F./Lewis, T./Lannon, R./Louie, A./Baumbacher, G./McGuiness, T./Schiff, E.Z., Affect, Attachment, Memory ; Also Schore, A.N., Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self, provides a comprehensive description. 117 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan197 – 200. 200 – 208.212 – 216. 118 Cf. O’Connor, T.G./Rutter, M., Attachment Disorder Behaviour Following Early Severe Deprivation.

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To sum up the role of the brain in this development up to the higher mental capabilities like language use and thinking, we can say with Fuchs: ‘Language plays the same role for the particular mind as air for the living organism— it is its means of living and developing. The brain resembles the lungs, which animates by means of air. With the attainment of its capacity for language the brain, which is already an organ of life, also becomes an organ of the mind.’119

This picture of the character and development of intentionality, in which one’s own intentionality does not precede the intentionality of the other—this picture of the reciprocal dependence of one’s own subjectivity and the subjectivity of others fits well to insights stemming from the phenomenological tradition. For example, Max Scheler developed a concept of empathy understood to be any intentional act that presents the subjectivity of the other to oneself. He observed that the argument by analogy—the idea that we simply ascribe subjectivity to other minds because we are observing them to be so in our own—presupposes what it wants to show : We already need to have a perceived subjectivity in order to ascribe own states of mind to others or to simulate the mental states of others in our own subjectivity.120 Scheler is able to subscribe to the opinion that the states of others’ intentionality can be perceived directly because he does not assume that there is a dualism between the material body on the one hand and a hidden mind on the other. Rather, he assumes that there is a living body which is an expressive unity (Ausdruckseinheit), which needs to be grasped by a perceptual theory of other minds.121 The obvious objection to this, that perceiving one’s own intentional states and the states of others is nevertheless different because only the former are private, has been recently and plausibly rejected by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher : ‘Second- (and third-)person access to psychological states do differ from first-person access. But we shouldn’t make the mistake of restricting and equating experiential with first-person access. It is possible to experience minds in more than one way. When I experience the facial expressions or meaningful actions of another, I am experiencing another’s subjectivity, and not merely imagining it, simulating it, or theorizing about it. The fact that I can be mistaken and deceived is no argument against the experiential character of the access.’122

119 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 215 f. („Die Sprache ist für den individuellen Geist, was die Luft für den lebendigen Organismus ist – das Medium der Belebung und Enfaltung. Das Gehirn gleicht der Lunge, die diese Belebung durch die Luft vermittelt. Mit dem Erwerb des Sprachvermögens wird das Gehirn, ein Organ des Lebens, auch zu einem Organ des Geistes.“) 120 Cf. Scheler, M., The Nature of Sympathy, 240, 251. 121 Cf. Scheler, M., The Nature of Sympathy, 220, 261. 122 Gallagher, S./Zahavi, D., Phenomenological Mind, 204 f.

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Coming back to the initial point of this section, we have to clarify why these results are not in contradiction with the false-belief experiments but only with the traditional kinds of ToM. The answer is quite easy : False beliefs provide a sufficient condition for being able to be intentionally directed to other ‘minds’, not a necessary one. In other words, the experiments provide a terminus ad quem in the development of the ability to be bound to others. If they are successful, there has to be an ability to understand others; if they are unsuccessful, nothing can be drawn from that. If one makes conscious and cognitive manipulation of others the criterion for understanding others, like in ToM and more explicitly in the so-called ‘Social Brain’ hypothesis, then the impression is created that perceiving other ‘minds’ would be dependent on these cognitive faculties. However, the fact that manipulative cognitive capacities are always derivative from and parasitic on non-cognitive experience of others and their intentional states has been masked by this interpretation. It is not different kinds of ToM’s that provide access to others, but quite simply the ability to perceive others. Similarly, as ecological environments and communities precede societies, there is primarily neither a ‘social Brain’ nor a ‘Machiavellian intelligence’, but an embodied ecological communitarian brain.

2.2.8 Abandoning Dogmatic Reductionist Naturalism In most cases, reductionist naturalism is simply a set of presupposed ontological claims. Therefore, the phenomenological method of reduction or epoch¦ excludes this kind of presupposed reductionist naturalism. However, it does not exclude natural reductionism as a possible quasi-religious interpretation of scientific research. In the sections on external relationality we saw that reductionist naturalism and the claim that there are only external relations are bound together. Further, we saw that it is decisive to distinguish between which relations can be deemed external and which cannot. In this respect, my proposal is that this task can be treated by methodological and hypothetical reductions. In order to discover how far the external aspect of the underlying relationality reaches, reductions to causal connections between hypothetical ‘individual’ events might be helpful. In order to prevent this method from becoming a quasireligious ‘-ism’, we must (1) not override contradictions and difficulties occurring in the attempted reduction, and (2) not treat reductionism as a dogma. In respecting these rules, phenomenological reduction on the one hand and hypothetical naturalization on the other do not necessarily contradict each other. However, the second task mentioned in the section on the externality of relations deals with the question of explaining the partial internality of relations. This is the more challenging question and here also a

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hypothetical reductionist naturalism does not seem to be able to provide anything. With respect to methodology, it is wise to rely preliminarily on classical causal approaches in the neurosciences and not to introduce too quickly theories about quantum effects in the brain that cannot be tested yet. However, a decisive feature of scientific honesty is also acknowledging the possibility of contingent neuronal processes of this kind, instead of dogmatically preaching the causal-determinist credo. Further, under the conditions of our present knowledge of the brain, such a credo is nearly already falsified, since there is clearly some evidence for contingent processes, particularly in the sense of stochastic probability. For example, the action potential at the synapses releases neurotransmitters only in 10 – 20 % of the cases. Therefore, the synaptic signalling process is most likely an indeterministic one.123

2.3 The Ecological Brain In the last two sections, 2.1 and 2.2, we introduced, analysed and criticized the neuroconstructivist and representationalist paradigm in neurobiology and the cognitive sciences. As a proposal we now have to introduce a more viable alternative. It comes without any surprise that I want to use an example from the phenomenological tradition. And since the criticisms we used in some of the foregoing sections also relied on Thomas Fuchs’ position, it seems appropriate to select his formulation as an example of a more fruitful approach to the neurosciences. 2.3.1 The Leib as Subject On the basis of insights drawn by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Waldenfels, Fuchs assumes124 that the primary given is the experience of self-deprivation, since the experience of one’s own self is not immediate.125 Rather, we find ourselves being thirsty, hungry, tired, etc., and also we find ourselves thinking, willing, etc. Spontaneity is therefore given passively : ‘[…] it is not me, who lets me think in the same way as it is not me who lets my heart beat.’126 Furthermore, humans are always directed towards something in both their conscious and unconscious activities. Life precedes consciousness and is 123 Cf. Craver, C.F., Explaining the Brain, 22; Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 260 f. 124 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 96 – 99. 125 In this respect, Fuchs and the phenomenological tradition are rightly distinguished from F.D.E. Schleiermacher’s notion that there is an immediate self-consciousness and that it is accessible by feeling. 126 Merleau-Ponty, M., Das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare, 281, („[…] nicht ich bin es, der mich denken lässt, sowenig ich es bin, der mein Herz schlagen lässt.“)

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given as embodied life. The means of its activity is the unity of the living body (Leib), not only the physical body (Körper). The Leib is also the natural subject of the experience of capabilities like being able to dance, or being able to remember something spontaneously, etc.: ‘My Leib is therefore not the body that I see, touch or experience but it is rather my capability to see and to experience. It is no object in the world but the capability that discloses the world.’127

In a reciprocally constitutive way, the Leib is given to others as for myself. Others perceive me, including my attitudes and expressions of feeling, as immediately embodied as I experience them immediately embodied. Embodiment is therefore the basis of intersubjectivity. However, in the case of deprivations such as illnesses or exhaustion, I experience my Leib as alienated, i. e. as body. Therefore, I can direct two attitudes towards my Leib, a ‘personal attitude’, as Husserl called it128, as the basis of the shared lifeworld, and a ‘naturalistic attitude’, in which it becomes an object.129 The Leib is understood to be the means of personhood. The person, according to P.F. Strawson130, is a primitive concept, not an aggregate one. In abstracting the two attitudes which one can direct towards the whole person, the concepts of Leib and body are gained, or sometimes also the duality of mind and body. However, both Leib and body remain embodied. They are not different ‘substances‘, but different aspects. Therefore, Fuchs can speak of a Leib-body duality (not dualism!) that replaces mind-body dualisms.131 Strawson illustrates his notion that persons cannot be understood as a combination of two substances, one mind and one matter, with a famous thought experiment ex contrario. Imagine yourself being disembodied: ‘[…] When I was discussing the concept of a pure individual consciousness, I said that though it could not exist as a primary concept to be used in the explanation of the concept of a person […], yet it might have a logically secondary existence. […] each of us can quite intelligibly conceive of his or her individual survival of bodily death. […] One has simply to think of oneself as having thoughts and memories as at present, […] whilst (a) having no perceptions of a body related to one’s experience as one’s own body is, and (b) having no power of initiating changes in the physical condition of the world, such as one at present does with one’s hands, shoulders, feet and vocal chords. […] Then two consequences follow […]. The first is that the 127 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 99. („Mein Leib ist also nicht der Körper, den ich sehe, berühre oder empfinde, sondern er ist vielmehr mein Vermögen zu sehen, zu berühren und zu empfinden. Er ist kein Gegenstand in der Welt, sondern das Vermögen, das mir die Welt eröffnet.“). 128 Cf. Husserl, E., Husserliana 3/1, 63. 129 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 99 – 103. 130 Cf. Strawson, P.F., Individuals, 103 – 105. 131 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 103 – 110.

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strictly disembodied individual is strictly solitary […]. The other […] is that in order to retain his idea of himself as an individual, he must always think of himself as disembodied, as a former person. […] Since then he has, as it were, no personal life of his own to lead, he must live much in the memories of the personal life he did lead […]. In proportion as the memories fade, […] to that degree his concept of himself as an individual becomes attenuated. At the limit of attenuation there is, from the point of view of his survival as an individual, no difference between the continuance of experience and its cessation. Disembodied survival, on such terms as these, may well seem unattractive. No doubt it is for this reason that the orthodox have wisely insisted on the resurrection of the body.’132

2.3.2 Ecological Subjectivity Fuchs combines these phenomenological considerations with insights from the biological system theories of Maturana, Varela and Bertalanffys as well as with insights from the ecological biology of Jakob v. Uexküll and the philosophical insights of Plessner, Victor von Weizsäcker and Jonas.133 On the one hand, intra-organic processes become autopoietic processes and the system gains relative autonomy. The system constitutes itself due to its parts and these parts sustain and regenerate the system.134 On the other hand, the relative autonomy of the autopoietic system is by no means self-sufficiency, but it relies on its interdependence on its environment. In the case of animals, two processes are decisive, reception and effect: ‘Every animal uses something like two grippers in order to be directed to its object— one organ of memory (receptor) and an organ of effect (effector). With these means it discovers the complementary qualities of reception and effection of the object, i. e. the animal gives the object the meaning of stimulus and cause.’135

This is the basic idea of Jakob v. Uexküll’s theory of the functional circle. Fuchs quotes v. Uexküll: ‘Every animal is a subject which, due to its specific constitution, selects specific stimuli out of the general causes in the external world that it responds to in a specific way. These answers themselves have specific effects in the outer world, and in return 132 Strawson, P.F., Individuals, 115 f. The 2011 movie ‘Perfect Sense’ by the Scottish director David Mackenzie can be interpreted as an elaborated model of this thought experiment. 133 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 133 – 184. 134 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 111 f. 135 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 114 f. („Jedes Tier greift gleichsam mit zwei ,Zangen‘ sein Objekt an – einem Merkorgan (Rezeptor) und einem Wirkorgan (Effektor). Damit entdeckt es am Objekt die dazu komplementären ,Merkmale‘ und ,Wirkmale’, oder anders ausgedrückt, es erteilt ihm die Bedeutung von Reiz und Wirkobjekt.“)

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influence the stimuli. This mechanism establishes a closed circuit that can be called the functional circle of the animal’136

The consequence is that the outer world and the environment are not identical. The environment is constituted by the interdependence of the living organism and the outer world, and they are complementary. The outer world gains meaning by this process: feet are related to pathways, mouths to nutrition and weapons to enemies.137 Fuchs sums up the insights derived from ecology : ‘Through the living organism’s selection and identification of beneficial and harmful elements in its environment, these elements become incorporated into a comprehensive complete system comprised of living animal and environment. This living system has at the same time subjective and objective qualities.’138

Processes of this kind lead to the development of subjectivity. What is decisive for subjectivity, however, is the interruption between memory and effect or stimulus and reaction. This interruption creates the space and the time for consciousness, whereas the affectivity, including feelings and moods, bridges this gap. The objects of the environment, which already possess meaning, thereby gain an additional value: They become desirable or frightening.139 Necessary for this development is, furthermore, a principle of interruption: Motor actions have to be observed immediately by the nervous central organ of the animal itself in order for it to gain the distinction between its own movements and movements by parts of the environment. In order to develop complete subjectivity it is necessary that the functional circle become, according to Thure v. Uexküll140, a situative circle ‘in which processes of perceiving and moving are not faded into one another, but in which they can be simulated by a “rehearsal” in imagination and fantasy. […] To gain distance from oneself also means being able to share the perspective of the other. The eccentricity of human beings is reciprocally constitutive with their sociality.’141 136 Uexkìll, J.v., Theoretische Biologie, 150. („Jedes Tier ist ein Subjekt, das dank seiner ihm eigentümlichen Bauart aus den allgemeinen Wirkungen der Außenwelt bestimmte Reize auswählt, auf die es in bestimmter Weise antwortet. Diese Antworten bestehen wiederum in bestimmten Wirkungen auf die Außenwelt, und diese beeinflussen ihrerseits die Reize. Dadurch entsteht ein in sich geschlossener Kreislauf, den man den Funktionskreis des Tieres nennen kann.“) 137 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 116. 138 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 116. „Indem das Lebewesen geeignete, förderliche bzw. schädliche Bestandteile seiner Umwelt selektiert und erkennt, werden sie einbezogen in ein übergreifendes Gesamtsystem aus Lebewesen und Umwelt. Dieses lebendige System trägt zugleich subjektiven und objektiven Charakter.“ 139 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 118. 140 Cf. Uexkìll, T.v./Wesiack, W., Wissenschaftstheorie und Psychosomatische Medizin. 141 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 119. „in dem die Prozesse von Wahrnehmung und Bewegung nicht tmehr ineiannder übergehen, sondern zunächst durch eine ,Probehandeln‘ in der Vorstellung oder Fanrtasie durchgespielt werden können. […] Abstand zu

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Fuchs now combines the insights of phenomenology and ecology : Subjectivity is constituted at the end of these biological processes. And, as subjectivity is necessarily embodied, a living body is also necessarily subjective, i. e. a Leib.142

2.3.3 Efficient Causality, Formative Causality and their Unity in Circular Causality It is often observed that the traditional restriction of the Aristotelian four causes to efficient causality alone and its reconstruction from David Hume onward does not satisfy what is given phenomenally. However, attempts to reintroduce teleology and a causa finalis are highly debated.143 Despite the fact that neither Aristotle nor his medieval followers could have seen any contradiction between the four classical causes, it seems to be the case that any attempt to reintroduce notions of teleology into natural philosophy or science helplessly ends up with a re-enchantment of nature. It is decisive, therefore, that in his attempt to describe the phenomena more appropriately by overcoming the simple notion of efficient causality, in which a cause A inaugurates an effect B, which is then cause for an effect C, etc., Fuchs does not refer to the causa finalis, but instead reformulates insights stemming from the tradition of the causa formalis to developing a ‘formative causality’ which is not opposed to efficient causality. Living systems can be described hierarchically. The organism as a whole and its parts constitute each other reciprocally. The parts and microstructures are causal for the higher orders and the whole system in a way which can be described by traditional efficient causality or bottom-up causality. However, the whole system and higher structures of the system restrict the possibilities of the efficient causal influences of the lower structures and the parts. This kind of restriction is also a selection and can be described as formative causality or as causa formalis.144 The joint effects of formative causality and effective causality lead to a dynamic co-emergence which can be described as circular causality or reciprocal causality.145 The term ‘circular causality’ is gained in analogy to the theory of functional circuits and should not be associated with the ‘hermeneutical circle’. Despite the fact that Fuchs can call the joint work of formal and efficient causality ‘co-

142 143 144 145

sich selbst zu gewinnen, heißt zugleich, sich in die Perspektive des Anderen versetzen zu können. Die Exzentrizität des Menschen ist gleichursprünglich mit seiner Sozialität.“ Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 121. Cf. e. g. Thomas Nagel’s attempt to re-introduce teleology in Nagel, T., Mind and Cosmos, and its critique in Orr, H.A., Awaiting a New Darwin. Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 122 – 124; Fuchs, T., Neurobiology and Psychotherapy. Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 121.

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emergent’146 processes, he rejects the notion that theories of emergence might be of any value. Although there are a number of very different concepts of emergence with a variety of different meanings,147 emergence, as it is used in the philosophical interpretation of the neurosciences, refers to the emergence of higher properties from the parts of the system, without being simply the sum of the parts themselves. Therefore, theories of emergentist monism148 are bound to the one perspective of naturalism. But Fuchs wants his theory of integral causality to be compatible with his theory of two aspects or perspectives which are bound to the two attitudes of Husserl, the personalistic and the naturalistic attitude, which are related in a complementary manner without the possibility of reducing one to the other.149 This combination of formative and efficient causality, i. e. circular causality, works in two different respects: Vertically, it shapes the intra-organic processes between the organism, the organs, cells and lower forms of matter.150 In this process, the brain plays a decisive role. It ‘[…] functions as a transformer of vertical, circular causality, i. e. it transforms influences of a higher level (e. g. intentional, meaningful ones) and influences of a lower level (e. g. biochemical ones) for the organism and “translates” them into the other hierarchical level.’151

Horizontally, it also shapes some intra-organic processes, but, moreover, even the relationships between the organism and its environment in all their 146 The expression is used with reference to Thompson, E.T., Mind in Life, 60 f. 147 Cf. the description of the history of emergence in Clayton, P., Emergenz und Bewusstsein and Boost, M., Naturphilosophische Emergenz. 148 Fuchs is here referring to Bunge, M., Das Leib-Seele-Problem, 32 and Searle, J.R., Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes, 29. Whereas the concept of emergence in theology was highly attractive during the first decade of the 21st century, and has led to impressive conceptions like Clayton’s (cf. Clayton, P., Emergenz und Bewusstsein) and recently Boost’s (Boost, M., Naturphilosophische Emergenz), criticism of emergence has recently been gaining ground. Not only Fuchs evaluates conceptions based on the concept of emergence as dangerously bound to the quasi-religion of reductionist naturalism, Mutschler, H.D., Von der Form zur Formel, 142 f., also joins the criticism and accuses Clayton: ‘Whoever reads books like that [i. e. Clayton’s] might firstly be surprised. The theologian erases everything spiritual out of nature, indeed, out of humans and confesses without any doubt scientific materialism!’. „Wer solche Bücher liest, wird erst einmal verblüfft sein. Der Theologe eliminiert alles Geistife aus der Natur, ja sogar aus dem Menschen und bekennt sich ohne Wenn und Aber zum szientifischen Materialismus!“ Mutschler’s criticism might seem bold, but it is not simply the criticism of a dualist. E.g. Boost provides very careful analyses, but nevertheless also seems at the end to work in the naturalist paradigm. Fuchs’ attitude towards the matter seems to be the most fruitful one. 149 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 242 f. 150 Cf. Fuchs, T., Neurobiology and Psychotherapy, 122 – 125. 151 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 125. („[…] dass das Gehirn dabei als ein Transformator für vertikale zirkuläre Kausalität fungiert, dass es also hochstufige (z.B. intentionale, bedeutungshafte) und niederstufige (z.B. neurochemische) Einflüsse auf den Organismus umwandelt und jeweil in die andere hierarchische Ebene ,übersetzt’.“)

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different forms from metabolism to perception and movement are describable by circular causality.152

2.3.4 Dynamic Capabilities, Open Loops and Formative History Both kinds of processes, vertical and horizontal circular causal processes, lead to the realization of dynamic capability, a reconceptualization of the Aristotelian dynamis. Dynamic capabilities are possessed by a living organism as a whole in relation to its environment and cannot be separated. These dynamic capabilities are not closed, but open to alterations of the environment. One of their decisive functions is to create ‘open loops’ as the interface of organism and environment: ‘Dynamic capabilities bundle subsystems and organs by means of vertical causality into cooperating unities for the purpose of actualizing demands. They are actualized by fitting situations. […] They can only be described in relation, in the framework of a preceding and always existing relationship between organism and environment. Organically realized dynamic capabilities of perception and movement constitute ‘open loops’ that merge with fitting parts of the environment with the outcome that in the instant of fitting the perception or movement is realized. By means of these processes on the basis of dynamic capabilities an ever new situative coherence between organism and environment is achieved.’153

Dynamic capabilities and open loops do not restrict, but enable and broaden the possibilities of organisms. They are decisive for understanding implicit learning and implicit memory. Implicit memory is not a reproduction of past experiences as stored maps or images, but a preproduction of experience in the form of the dispositions of perception and behaviour without being bound to the original situation.154 The organism learns implicitly and thereby gains its faculties not by storing more information, but by altering organic structure and by inaugurating a formative process. Not only do the phenomena of implicit learning, like playing an instrument, rely on these processes, but the higher, biographical consciousness does as well. By these ongoing formations 152 Cf. Fuchs, T., Neurobiology and Psychotherapy, 125 f. 153 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 128 f. („Vermögen bündeln also Subsysteme und Organe in vertikaler Kausalität zu kooperierenden Einheiten, die zur Realisierung von Leistungen bereitstehen. Sie aktualisieren sich, sobald die dafür geeignete Situation eintritt. […] Sie lassen sich nur relational, im Rahmen einer immer schon bestehenden Beziehung von Organismus und Umwelt beschreiben. Organisch verankerte Wahrnehmungs- und Bewegungsbereitschaften bilden gleichsam ,offene Schleifen’, die sich mit geeigneten Gegenstücken der Umwelt so zusammenschließen, dass im Moment der Passung die Wahrnehmung oder Handlung realisiert wird. So stellt sich auf der Grundlage bestehender Vermögen immer wieder eine neue situative Kohärenz von Organismus und Umwelt her.“) 154 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 129.

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the circular processes become spiralled and the relationship between organism and environment gains a narrative or a history. In all these processes, the brain plays an eminent function: ‘In the brain there is no separation between “memory” and “processor” or between “hardware” and “software”. Experiences and capabilities are embodied, i. e. they shape the bodily and neuronal structures themselves. Biographical memories are also not stored as fixed “information“, but are existent only as the capability to recall specific events. This capability is associated with specific neuronal potentials for action. […] Organisms and environment are subject to an ongoing coevolution. In other words, the complete system consisting of organism and environment reconfigures itself with every interaction. Therefore, the specific presence of an animate being cannot be completely described without its history.’155

2.3.5 The Brain in the Framework of Vertical Circular Functional Circuits The primary function of the brain is the regulation of the inner vegetative conditions of the organism like immunological processes, breathing, circulation, temperature, hormones, oxygen concentration, etc. Without the whole body, the brain cannot fulfil its role and thus there is no strict boundary between the brain and the extra-cerebral body.156 Analogically, the body-brain relationship is also responsible for higher brain functions. Fuchs is here referring to Damasio’s somatic marker theory and to his theory that a protoself which provides a background sensation is the joint outcome of resonances and feedbacks between areas of the brain and different systems of the body : ‘Different basic emotions are correlated with different physiological profiles. The peripheral reactions are noticed in somatosensible areas of the right hemisphere and they lead to the conscious experience of all these coordinated reactions as feelings.’157 155 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 129 f. („So gibt es auch im Gehirn weder eine Unterteilung in ,Speicher‘ und ,Prozessor‘, noch in ,Hardware‘ und ,Software‘. Erfahrungen und Vermögen werden vielmehr inkorporiert, also den körperlichen bzw. neuronalen Strukturen selbst eingeprägt. Sogar autobiographische Erinnerungen sind nicht als fixierte ,Informationen‘ abgespeichert, sondern sie existieren nur als das Vermögen, sich an bestimmte Ereignisse zu erinnern, dem seinerseits bestimmte neuronale Aktionsbereitschaften entsprechen. […] Organismus und Umwelt sind in fortwährender Koevulution begriffen, oder mit anderen Worten: Das Gesamtsystem aus Organismus und Umwelt rekonfiguriert sich mit jeder Interaktion, so dass die jeweilige Gegenwart des Lebewesens nicht ohne die Geschichte seiner Erfahrungen vollständig beschrieben werden kann.“) 156 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 135. 157 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 139. („Verschiedene Grundemotionen sind dabei mit unterschiedlichen physiologischen Profilen verknüpft. Diese peripheren Reaktionen werden wiederum in somatosensiblen Arealen vorwiegend der recheten Hirnhemisphäre […] registriert und führen schließlich zum bewußten Erleben all dieser koordinierten Reaktionen als Gefühle.“)

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Higher feelings are also built on these processes, and out of the proto-self different stages of consciousness emerge. The brain fulfils a role as an organ for the regulation and sensation of the entire organism, with its homoeostasis and relationship to the environment shaping its internal states: ‘The ongoing “resonance” of brain and organism is the presupposition for conscious experience. Basic consciousness consists of feelings and moods. It is an integral of the specific state of the whole organism itself, or in other words: it is a manifestation of embodied subjectivity. […] The phylogenetically original form of grasping reality consisted in immediately and affectively experiencing the Leib in its different states of relationship between the organism and the environment. The genuine, specifically directed emotions developed first in connection with the increasing differentiation of evaluation of perceived situations, especially social relationships. However, even after higher emotional and cognitive functions have emerged, basic affective sensation is still the necessary motivational basis of foresight, planning and aim-directed intentionality.’158

2.3.6 The Brain in the Framework of Horizontal Circular Functional Circuits and the Ecological Understanding of Perception and Consciousness The relationship between brain and organism on the one hand and its environment on the other cannot be understood with simple stimuli-reaction mechanisms, which are the instantiations of merely external relationships. Perception cannot be described without action, but it is a result of the sensomotoric linkage between brain and environment. Fuchs here refers to the enactive theory of perception by O’Reagan and Noe.159 According to this theory, perception is dependent on the organism’s movements and on implicit knowledge of what is perceived. To perceive an object means to know how to behave in relation to it. In this interactive process the brain functions once more as an organ of mediation by providing open loops which can be closed by fitting parts of the environment to a functional circuit:160 158 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 142. („Die fortwährende ,Resonanz‘ von Gehirn und Organismus ist die Voraussetzung für bewusstes Erleben. Basales Bewusstsein besteht in Befinden und Stimmungen – es bildet ein Integral des jeweiligen Zustands des Organismus selbst, oder mit anderen Worten: es ist eine Manifestation der verkörperten Subjektivität. […] Die phylogenetisch ursprüngliche Form der Wirklichkeitserfassung bestand in der unmittelbaren, affektiv getönten Selbstempfindung des Leibes in den jeweiligen Zuständen der Organismus-Umwelt-Beziehung. Die eigentlichen, spezifisch gerichteten Gefühle entwickelten sich erst in Verbindung mit der zunehmend differenzierten Bewertung wahrgenommener Situationen, insbesondere sozialer Beziehungen. Aber auch nach dem Auftreten höherer emotionaler und kognitiver Funktionen blieb das basale affektive Erleben die unabdingbare motivationale Grundlage von Voraussicht, Planung und zielgerichteter Intentionalität.“) 159 Cf. O’Regan, J.K./Noe, A., A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consiousness. 160 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 147.

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‘Through its formation of memory the brain provides a decisive part for the entire unity, but it is not possible to locate this function in the brain. […] In order for there to be a “current flow”, the whole circular structure is necessary—the organism being in a complementary environment and actively living.’161

The state of the brain is only a fragment of the functional circuit of perception and experience. Therefore, experience cannot be understood by a model of representation in the brain, but by resonance between neuronal structures, structures of the Leib and structures in the environment. Rather than being an organ of representation, the brain is an organ of resonances. Whereas representation is a model of external relations between representing and something represented, resonances are internally related and not separable into a resonans and resonatum. Either there are resonances in synchronicity or there are no resonances at all.162 A decisive consequence for understanding consciousness is that consciousness cannot be located exclusively in the brain. Rather, it emerges in the complete system itself, since without the complementary parts of the environment there would be no consciousness at all. The brain is important 161 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 148. („Das Gehirn stellt durch seine Gedächtnisbildung ein zentrales Teilstück für diese Einheit zur Verfügung, freilich ohne dass sich die Funktion in ihm lokalisieren ließe. […] Für den „Stromfluss“ ist aber die gesamte Kreisstruktur erforderlich – der in einer komplementären Umwelt situierte und aktive Organismus.“) 162 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 149. 180 f.

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insofar as it is the organ of combining all processes of functional circuits. But, in spite of this importance, it cannot be separated out from the immediate ‘environment’ of its living body (Leib) and the surrounding environment. Therefore, Fuchs provides an operational theory for insights about the externalism of meaning (Putnam, see above) and the insights of the active externalism of the extended mind theory (see above). He also refers163 to McCulloch, who put these combined ideas into a syllogism: ‘a) Meanings just ain’t in the head (in accounting for meanings, we must advert to factors in the agent’s environment). b) Meanings are in the mind (meanings, and grasping meanings are conscious phenomena). c) The mind just ain’t in the head (an adequate characterization of an agent’s consciousness must advert to factors in the agent’s environment).’164

Thought experiments involving the isolation of a brain in a vat would only work if outside the brain, but inside the vat, a bodily and environmental structure were to be remodelled. But remodelling such a system would not amount to the image of a brain in a vat, but to recreating a whole world.165 Without bodily and environmental states the state of the brain lacks meaning. There are therefore no neuronal correlates to something that is ‘outside’, only resonances of different parts within the whole system. Consciousness and experience are always embodied experience and to this extent not qualities of something that does not have any sense perception of its own, but only attributable to the Leib, the body-in-relationships. A precondition for the brain’s ability to provide open loops for its interaction with the environment is its neuroplasticity, its capacity for its neuronal structures to be formed and re-formed through processes of interaction. In sum, the different neuronal higher functions provide open loops, fitting patterns, capacities for resonance and coherence, transformation and transparency.166 If one wants to postulate a principle behind these processes, it would not be fitness in the sense that there is a tendency to picture or represent something at the lowest possible cost, rather it would be a principle of optimal fitness in the sense of optimal coherence, provided, that however, open loops are closed or newly created, and neuroplasticity is a means for this. The result of this tendency towards optimal coherence is transparency between environment, living body and brain and consciousness: the body is transparent to the world. Perception and experience are therefore neither constructs of the brain, nor do 163 164 165 166

Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 174. McCulloch, G., The Life of the Mind, 11 f. Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 152 f. Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 165.

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pictures represent the world as it would be without being an environment. Rather, the brain enables ‘mediated immediateness’, as Plessner has called it using Hegelian terminology,167 whereby the brain itself remains invisible.168 Since other higher animals and human beings always belong to the environment of higher animals and human beings, every process of perceiving and experiencing also presupposes an implicit intersubjectivity169 and the giveness of the other. In philosophical terms, Fuchs describes his position neither as one of naive realism, nor as constructivism, but as ‘lifeworld realism’ (‘lebensweltlicher Realismus’).170

2.3.7 The Basic Self and the Personal Self Relying on his neurobiological, developmental psychological and phenomenological findings, Fuchs provides the following theory of the self, which is divided into a basic self and a personal self.171 1) The basal or embodied self means the experience of one’s self which is inherent in any possible process of consciousness. It can be divided into three aspects or dimensions: a) Implicit, prereflexive self-awareness is the general means of every experience. It is aware without introspection and it means (in reference to Nagel)172 ‘what it is like to be’. To this extent it possesses a transcendental function and can be called, according to Michel Henry, ipseity.173 Nevertheless, it is embodied and includes a primary feeling of the Leib, affectivity and the protentional-retentional structure of experience. In the case of major damage like amnesia or dementia it survives. b) The ecological self174 means the dimension of the basic self in its fluid relationship with the environment. In a developmental respect it emerges prenatally, and it provides sensomotoric self-coherence and the experience of self-authorship. c) The social self develops from birth onwards and signifies the neonatal’s ability to recognize the living bodies of others as similar to its own. It is part of the mother-child dyad and subject to proto-conversation. In its 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174

Cf. Plessner, H., Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, 169. Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 161. Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 184. Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 184. Cf. Fuchs, T., Selbst und Schizophrenie, 888 – 891. Cf. Nagel, T., What is it like to be a Bat? Cf. Henry, M., L’essence de la manifestation. Cf. Neisser, U., Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge.

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inter-bodiliness it develops faculties like empathy and other forms of implicit knowledge of relationships. 2) The personal or reflexive self is developed from the 9th month on, including the capacity for recognizing itself in a mirror and understanding itself in temporal continuity. The implicit awareness between ‘other’ and ‘self ’ becomes explicit; it is the source of joint attention and joint intentionality. The outcome is the ability to share other perspectives, both by affective processes (shame, awkwardness, feeling guilty or proud) and cognitive activities. In addition, the reflexive self includes these decisive aspects or dimensions: a) The intentional self refers to the capacity for conscious awareness of other persons as intentional agents. b) The reflexive self-consciousness refers to the higher-level capacity to reflect upon one’s own feelings and experiences of events. c) The narrative identity refers to the ability to put experiences into coherent stories. d) The autobiographical self refers to the ability to reflect on the stories in which one is involved and to combine them into larger stories, as well as to abbreviate these with concepts of self and identity claims.

2.3.8 Implicit Theology in Fuchs’ Theory It is not surprising that in a theory of the brain presented by a psychiatrist who is also a philosopher, there are some implicit non-empirical certainties that have to be critiqued from a theological perspective. However, the great advantage of Fuch’s conception is that he makes no attempt to hide these. Rather, he makes them explicit. In Fuchs’ theory there appear to be at least three aspects that are problematic from a theological perspective: 1. In broadening his model of functional circuits, which lead to open loops between the organism’s capabilities and the environment, he occasionally seems to overstress the concept of coherence. In writing on the faculty of the will, he emphasizes that freedom is the faculty of a person to ‘come to an internal coherence or fitness by decision’.175 We can make three objections to statements like these. First, if the coherence is something gained in the ecological embodiedness of the brain, it does not seem to be adequate to base a person’s coherence on the notion of decision. Second, a person may or may not have a strong character in the sense of a will to coherence. In most cases the narrative biography will be full of coherently occurring events and reactions that cannot simply be combined in a coherent way. 175 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 259. („im Entschluss zu einer inneren Kohärenz oder Stimmigkeit zu gelangen“)

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One would at least have to alter the concept of coherence to dramatic coherence in order to integrate the tensions and fragments of stories. Third, in a theological perspective, it is not the freedom of the will, but bondage of will that is the determinative feature of the will.176 2. The tendency to over-emphasize volitional coherence is paired with a tendency to make the human person into something primordial, ultimate, sacral or holy. In a kind of concluding remark, Fuchs writes of human persons: ‘They are not simply living, they are leading their life and form by that themselves. […] Persons are the primordial phenomenon: that which appears and is present in its appearing.’177 From a theological perspective, no one could seriously deny that persons themselves are determinative influences in their own lives. However, it also has to be said that individual human persons are at the most co-authors of their own biographies and lives. Neither the concrete form of the story of their lives, nor the evaluation of whether it might be seen as positive or negative relies on them; there are other factors, communitarian ones and first and foremost the activity of the triune God. To give persons themselves such a primary constitutive place in their own stories comes close to idolatry. 3. Fuchs’ view of reality seems to be immanentist. Persons, like Christ in Christianity, have a twofold nature: ‘The embodied (leibliche) nature, which we are, and the bodily (körperliche) nature, which we have, are not capable of being reconciled perfectly, and the outcome of the conflict among them is death. The ambiguity of the person overcomes all attempts of being lifted into a homogeneous unity.’178

In this twofold nature of living body (Leib) and body (Körper) the ultimate destiny and end of a human person seems to be an ultimate or eschatical179 decoherence and conflict. On the one hand, Fuchs seems to overstress the voluntary ability of producing coherence and the value of the human person as something sacred. On the other hand, he introduces a kind of ultimate decoherence. These two characteristics of his view of reality appear to produce either an outright contradiction or at least a tragic element. One might also ask: What are the possible outcomes for such a human self-concept? What is 176 Cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 291 – 300. 177 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 310 f. („Sie leben nicht nur, sondern sie führen ihr Leben, und damit formen sie sich selbst. […] Personen sind das Ur-Phänomen: das, was sich zeigt, und was in seinem Erscheinen selbst anwesend ist.“) 178 Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 300. („Die leibliche Natur, die wir sind, und die körperliche Natur, die wir haben, lassen sich nie vollständig miteinander versöhnen, und ihr Konflikt endet schließlich im Tod. Die Ambiguität der Person widersetzt sich allen Versuchen zu ihrer Auflösung in eine homogene Einheit.“) 179 The term ‘eschatical’ refers to what ultimately will happen, wheras the term ‘eschatological’ refers to the academic reflection on the eschatic. This distinction was introduced into theology in Germany during the 1990s and the first decade of the current millenium, cf. Mìhling, M., Eschatologie, 46 f.

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the final promise? As it stands, the answer can only be the following one: Since ultimate decoherence cannot be overcome and since the last appeal to the person is the call for voluntary coherence, human being is tragic through and through. Fuchs does not refer to them, but one is nearly reflexively reminded of Heidegger’s being-unto-death or to Albert Camus’ Myth of Sisyphus.180 At this point, one simply has to leave Fuchs behind. In terms of observation, the conflict between coherence and incoherence may be plausible. However, attempts of religions and many philosophies are used here to provide answers as alternatives to this tragic one. Schopenhauer’s pessimism also seems to be optimistic in this respect. Schopenhauer’s system is also a kind of tragedy. The aim of becoming depersonalized is tragic, since the non-voluntary will comes to life again. However, in Schopenhauer the will is impersonal and the person is not sacred. From a Christian perspective one would have to respond that the conflict Fuchs is describing only arises here because the person is understood to be her own author and that, as a result, the tragic (sin) has to be seen as humanity’s true and original nature. However, in a Christian perspective, sin is not humanity’s nature, but only its present, quasi-natural state. Therefore, it is possible not to avoid, but to overcome sin. Passively relying on Christ in being justified and reconciled from all fragmentary and unsuccessful attempts to create coherence by one’s own means provides another message that is not an appeal, but the promise of the gospel: Contrary to every impression and extrapolation from life, you will be made coherent passively just as your existence is given passively! Fuchs’ description of human nature as a twofold nature resembles, as we mentioned, classic christological statements. If we stretch this analogy somewhat, we can say that Fuchs puts humanity in the place of Christ. But by relating the two natures together in terms of an irresolvable conflict, his formulation resembles the heresies connected to the Antiochene christology of separation. Similar to how the christology of separation safeguards the integrity of both natures of Christ but loses the unity of his person, so Fuchs’ is also in danger of losing the unity of his concept of the human person. Theology also speaks to the notion of a final incoherence of the two natures in death. Further, the promise of coherence cannot be reached without undergoing death. However, the Christian concept speaks not only the death of Christ (as human and as divine!), but also of the death of the death of Christ.181

180 Cf. Camus, A., The Myth of Sisyphus, 1 – 138. 181 Cf. Luther, M., WA 39/I,427,6 – 8: ‘Sed statim exclamat Christus: Mors mortis, infernus inferni, diabolus diaboli ergo sum, noli timere, fili mi, ego vici’. (‘But immediatly Christ is calling: “I am the death of death, the hell of hell, the devil’s devil. Therefore, my child, don’t be frightened, come to me.”’)

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3. Experiencing Divine Self-Presentation—Epistemology in Theology 3.1 Sola experientia? ‘Experience alone makes a theologian’1

The central role of experience for theology can be illustrated by means of this quote from Luther. Such a sola experientia might seem strange in the light of the fact that many textbooks tell us that in the theology of the Reformation there can be only a solo Christo, a solo verbo, a sola scriptura, a sola fide and a sola gratia.2 It does, however, also appear strange to talk about a multiplicity of sola or ‘alones’. Yet, in principle, these solas do not constitute any kind of plurality, but rather describe the central Reformation discovery from different angles: sola scriptura does not mean that the theology of the Reformers tended towards Biblical literalism, but it rather simply means that it is only by the Word (solo verbo) that faith can be constituted. However, ‘word’ does not refer to a combination of letters or phonemes; it refers to Jesus Christ as the second person of the Trinity, the logos (Word) of God. Therefore, the sola scriptura is derived from the solo verbo, which is derived from the solo Christo. The only cause of what theology is all about is therefore Christ as the second person of the Trinity. The only activity on the side of the receiver by which Christ can be grasped, however, is faith, i. e. personal trust (sola fide). And the only mode by which this personal trust itself can be given is by grace alone (sola gratia); i. e. the faith of a human subject is itself not a product of the cognitive, volitional and affective capabilities of the trusting subject, but of Christ himself. The traditional solas of the Reformation can be explained in this way and this explication of their relationship does not only apply to the theology of a particular confession, but can be understood as a basis for Christian faith itself. In sum, it is not actually necessary to speak of a multiplicity of solas. But what about sola experientia? Experience does indeed appear everywhere as a representative notion of the Christian tradition, but only in some traditions, like that of the Reformers, does it become a central concept.3 In order to see what is meant, we have to go back to the relationship between Christ and the Word. On the one hand, Christ is the Word. The words of the Scripture are not fundaments for Christian 1 ‘Sola […] experientia facit theologum’, Luther, M., WA TR 1; 16,13 (1531). 2 Cf. e. g. Allen, R.M., Reformed Theology, 77. 3 For the history of the concept of experience cf. Ebeling, G., Klage über das Erfahrungsdefizit.

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theology ; they rather witness to the only ground, Christ. But it is not Scripture as a document of some (perhaps doubtful) authority that testifies to Christ, but the viva vox evangelii, the living voice of the gospel.4 This living voice means that the words of the Scripture have to be actualized in the act of the reciprocal communication of the promise. Additionally, the actualization of this communication is only possible under two conditions: When the one who actualizes this promise in a specific situation has already applied it to her whole history of experience and when the one who receives it is also able to apply it to her own history of experience. However, since at the same time the sola gratia also has to be true, the only circumstance under which Christian theology is not falsified is if the whole history of the experience of those who communicate the faith is not a closed state of affairs, but the Spirit who presents Christ is active in the history of this experience. Therefore, Christian faith is only about experience. However, this is not a kind of experience that is a specific, localizable event (Erlebnis, experimentum), but it is experience in the sense that all of what a person can experience, her life experience, is enlightened by the light of the story of the gospel’s promise, and conversely, that the story of the gospel’s promise becomes concrete in the lifeexperience of those who communicate faith. This decisive insight of the Reformers, one that belongs to the very heart of Christianity according to the Reformation tradition, implies that there are no ‘holy’ or ‘sacred’ places, times, events, offices, etc. In other words, there is no distinction between the sacred and the profane in Christianity. This implies that there is also no concrete separation between ‘sacred’ or ‘religious’ experience on the one hand and ‘profane’ experience on the other.5 Interestingly, this diagnosis is also supplied by anthropological studies, as this distinction only appears in a brief sliver of the history of the West.6 Every possible experience or event in life can be experienced in the light of the promise of the gospel (as justified) or not (and would therefore be assessed as sinful). By abandoning the sacred-profane distinction, the theology of the Reformation makes neither the whole of reality sacred nor anything profane; rather, it sees the whole of experienceable reality under the distinction of either being in accordance with the divine claim and promise (being justified) or not being in accordance with the divine claim and promise (being sinful). Gerhard Ebeling summarized this view by commenting that the object and task of theology is nothing but experience, but also that this experience has to be described as ‘experience with experience’ or as ‘experience of profane experience’7. Ebeling’s original intention was to respond to specific com4 5 6 7

Cf. Asendorf, U., ‘Viva vox evangelii’. Cf. Mìhling, M., Art. Profanität; Hunsinger, G., Art. Heilig und profan. V. Dogmatisch. Cf. Paden, W.E., Art. Heilig und profan. I. Religionswissenschaftlich. Cf. Ebeling, G., Klage über das Erfahrungsdefizit, 22 f. 25 f; Jìngel, E., Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 40 f; Jìngel, E., Unterwegs zur Sache, 8 and Jìngel, E., Erfahrungen mit der Erfahrung, 9 f.

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plaints arising in the 1970s about deficiencies with respect to the concept of experience in Christian theology. He holds the position that theology cannot simply import a concept of experience from sources other than the experience of faith itself. However, he did not give a theological definition of experience, but instead only provided some guidelines that would be decisive for a theological concept of experience. A theologically meaningful concept of experience needs reference to life, reference to history (including the history of one’s own life and of the community), reference to perception and reference to reality.8 With regard to any of these relationships, any reflexion on experience has to resolve specific problems. We will mention only the following two polarities, which are seen as constitutive for the concept of experience, the polarity between the particular and the general, and the polarity between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experiences: ‘[…] Epistemologically, we are faced with the problem of how experience is distinguished from a mere aggregate of perceptions, and methodologically with whether, and if so under which conditions, there is an inductive way from perception to the universal. The orientation on the particular implies the orientation on comprehensive contexts of meaning: by categories by means of which something becomes experienceable as something, and by a theory which locates it.’9

Here Ebeling presupposes the distinction between mere perception, which is particular, and experience, which appears to be understood as the incorporation of particular perceptions into larger frameworks of meaning. Compared to our description of experience in the context of the neurosciences, one can determine that the problem of perception and experience resembles the problem of stimuli and their representations. This polarity of the particular and the general, which is instantiated by the polarity of perception and experience, is accompanied by a second problem: ‘On the other side, one can only use the opposite concept of inner experience if one does not thereby claim an unrelatedness to outer experience. This form of expression is meaningful and necessary if the relationship is conceived in a way that every outer experience is able to become inner experience, and that there can be no inner experience without the context of outer experience. […] If one were to try to give a precise explication of the phenomenon of experience, one would not to be able to avoid reference to the ontological problem, in order to clarify the distinction between 8 Cf. Ebeling, G., Klage über das Erfahrungsdefizit, 17 – 20. 9 Ebeling, G., Klage über das Erfahrungsdefizit, 19. („Erkenntnistheoretisch stellt sich dann aber das Problem, was die Erfahrung von einem bloßen Aggregat von Wahrnehmungen unterscheidet, und in methodischer Hinsicht, ob und, wenn ja, unter welchen Bedingungen von ihr aus durch Induktion der Weg zum Allgemeinen führt. […] Die Ausrichtung auf das Einzelne impliziert die Orientierung am umgreifenden Sinnzusammenhang: durch Kategorien, mittels derer etwas allererst als etwas erfahrbar und sagbar wird, sowie durch die Theorie, in der es seine Ortsbestimmung erhält.“)

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“inner” and “outer” with regard to life. Even with regard to the so-called ‘inner life’ […] the external relation is controlling. The difficulty that inner experience, in contrast to the other, cannot be precisely diagnosed, thus leaving inner experience confronted with the massive problems of communication and verification, does not allow—in the face of the incontrovertible communicability and reasonableness of such experience—abandonment of the concept of experience in general.’10

In this passage, Ebeling claims that the distinction between some ‘inner’ experience and some ‘outer’ experience is seen as constitutive for the concept of experience. He claims, furthermore, that outer experience has to take the leading role somehow. It seems that with ‘inner experience’ Ebeling is referring to what has recently been seen as 1st person perspective and that outer experience refers to the 3rd person perspective; this is especially the case when he ascribes a specific kind of objectivity to the latter which the former lacks. Compared to our reflections on experience in the neurosciences, Ebeling’s theological problem of the inner-outer distinction is similar to the dualistic problem of the neurosciences. Ebeling gains his concept of experience from the experience of Christian faith as reflected in the theology of the Reformation. The remark that Christian faith is a kind of ‘experience with experience’ might be true as a characterization of the insight of the Reformers that there is no separation between the sacred and the profane,11 the everyday and the religious. However, the absence of a separation does not simply imply the absence of a distinction. Without any distinction, the religious and the mere concept of experience would coincide with the result that the expression ‘experience with experience’ would be a tautology. Is there any way to maintain the distinction without separation and to explain it without relying on contents of explicitly Christian faith? Eberhard Jüngel tried to explain the idea that religious experience consists of ‘experience with experience’ in such a manner. In every experience we are experiencing an intentional object and ourselves, or in short: something. In accordance with Schelling one may ask, why is there something and not nothing? Obviously, it is not necessary for something to be experienced. But 10 Ebeling, G., Klage über das Erfahrungsdefizit, 19 f. („Andererseits wird man nur dann den Gegenbegriff der inneren Erfahrung aufgreifen dürfen, wenn man damit nicht eine Beziehungslosigkeit zur äußeren Erfahrung statuiert. Sinnvoll und notwendig ist diese Ausdrucksweise, wenn das Verhältnis so bestimmt wird, dass jede äußere Erfahrung zu innerer Erfahrung werden und keine innere Erfahrung ohne den Kontext äußerer Erfahrung zustande kommen kann. […] Für eine gründliche Ausarbeitung des Erfahrungsphänomens käme man nicht daran vorbei, auf das ontologische Problem einzugehen, um im Blick auf Leben die Distinktion von ,außen‘ und ,innen‘ zu klären und gerade auch in bezug auf das sogenannte Innenleben […] die Externrelation als maßgebend zu bestimmen. Die Schwierigkeit, daß sich innere Erfahrung im Unterschied zur äußeren der exakten Feststellbarkeit entzieht und darum vor erhebliche Probleme der Kommunikation und deren Verifikation stellt, berechtigt angesichts einer nicht bestreitbaren Mitteilbarkeit und Zumutbarkeit solcher Erfahrung keineswegs dazu, den Begriff der Erfahung dafür überhaupt preiszugeben.“) 11 Cf. Mìhling, M., Art. Profanität.

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factually this is not only a reflexive question of philosophy, but a question that is experienced in everyday life. Further, it is not simply experienced as a question, but as a preliminarily answered question. And this kind of experience with experience is the specifically religious experience in distinction to other kinds of experience: ‘[…] with the question about the ground of the non-being of that what exists, nonbeing now appears to man as a possibility […] which allows him to have a qualitatively new experience over against the experience, of that which exists. In this new experience, all that has been experienced until now under the aspect of its nothingness is experienced once more. The new quality of this experience makes it impossible to align it with other experiences. Rather, it is related to those experiences from which it differs in that “old becomes new.” Human existence experiences itself when it confronts the possibility of not being in a qualitatively other way than in all those experiences which it has within the context of existence. In view of the possibility of nonbeing, man has a qualitatively new experience with his being. I call it an experience with experience, because in it not only every experience already had, but experience itself is experienced anew.’12

At the moment our concern is not whether this definition is materially a good one. Note simply that Jüngel also describes the specifically religious experience as an experience with experience, i. e. a kind of second order experience. In addition, the question arises her, whether this second order experience is still a kind of immediate experience or whether it is more a kind of interpretation of previous experiences in a reflective manner. In the framework of the representational theory of experience, only the latter would be possible, whereas in the framework of the theory of the ecological brain, the former would be the meaningful option. The implications are decisive: If experience with experience is more a kind of reflective interpretation, then it would not be necessary to have this experience. Then humans would not have to have religious experiences and the religious would not be a part of what can be called necessarily human. However, if experience with experience is itself an immediate, non-representational experience, two implications are key. First, it would be possible that this experience could be a general one, implied by the concept of experience itself. Second, whether this kind of experience with experience were a general one or not, it would under all circumstances be a non-voluntary experience, a passive occurrence which in fact is not subject to any kind of choice made by the humans who experience it. Ebeling and Jüngel only provide some guidelines and Ebeling in particular does not explicitly try to provide a precise theological explication of experience. Since then, however, a number of attempts running in this direction have been undertaken. Before introducing one of them, we have to ask whether there are other concepts that might concur with the concept of 12 Jìngel, E., God as the Mystery of the World, 32.

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experience with regard to the basic role it is claimed to have in theological epistemology. There is, of course, at least one very common basic concept: revelation.

3.2 A Basic Question of Theological Epistemology 3.2.1 Revelation and Reason? A common misunderstanding is that revelation, understood as the primary way of gaining knowledge in theology, is a kind of supernatural and inconceivable thing. Theology itself is partly responsible for this misunderstanding, at least to some point, because revelation has often been conceived within a polarity of reason and revelation—although some branches of theology also understood knowledge of God via reason, sometimes called ‘natural theology’, as a kind of revelation as well.13 But the theology of the first half of the 20th century’s history also constructed a polarity between reason and revelation. George Hunsinger recently provided a comprehensive typology based on this polarity that distinguishes five types of this relationship:14 1. Reductionist: Reason is self-sufficient. Revelation, if such a thing exists, has to remain within the limits of reason alone. Faith only has a symbolic meaning. This is the classical rationalist approach as it can be found in Enlightenment theologies, e. g. in Lessing or Kant.15 2. Supplementalist: Reason is independent of revelation, but is preparatory for revelation. Revelation completes and perfects reason. This can be associated with the classic Thomistic approach.16 3. Correlationist: Reason and revelation exist together in a kind of creative tension. They can be seen as two centres of an ellipse or as two separate circles without any overlap. Classical examples of this kind might be seen in the theologies of Albrecht Ritschl and Paul Tillich.17 4. Coherentist: This can be modelled as the reverse of type 1. Reason is seen as an internal feature of revelation and at the same time as dependent on revelation. Hunsinger describes it as ‘reason within the limits of revelation 13 The Old Protestant Orthodoxy distinguished between revelatio generalis/naturalis and revelatio specialis/supernaturalis, cf. Schmid, H., Dogmatik, 8 – 10. 14 Cf. Hunsinger, G., Uncreated Light, 235. 15 Cf. Steiger, J.A., Art. Rationalismus. 16 Cf. Bçhner, P./Gilson, E., Christliche Philosophie, 514 – 526. 17 For an analysis of Ritschl’s theology cf. Mìhling, M., Versöhnendes Handeln, 45 – 127, and for Tillich cf. Grube, D.-M., Unbegründbarkeit Gottes?, 16 – 87.

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alone’. One can associate those theologies influenced by Barth, such as that of T.F. Torrance, with this kind of approach.18 5. Fideist: Revelation, seen as noncognitive and extra-rational, is incommensurable with reason, but is nevertheless the only way to gain knowledge for theology. Revelation is based on an extra-rational inner experience and it is only conceivable within the framework of genuine forms of life. One might usually think of D.Z. Phillip’s Wittgensteinian approach.19 This typology can very well serve the function of structuring some approaches to revelation. However, the question is whether it is the best conceptual device for structuring the problem itself. Its advantage is that it focuses on the polarity between revelation and reason that was so prominent in the 20th century.20 But the problem remains the same. It regards the polarity between reason and revelation as the key relationship for conceiving what revelation can be. This is a problem for two reasons. First, if the polarity of reason and revelation determines what revelation can be, revelation becomes dependent on reason—albeit in a negative way, but nevertheless in a determinative one. Second, in this framework, the concept of experience only appears once: in the final ‘fideist’ type. Even in this case, ‘experience’ obviously refers to some extraordinary kind of experience, which cannot simply be applied to our everyday experience. This kind of overestimation of the meaning of the revelation-reason distinction leads to a tendency to underestimate revelation itself and to underestimate the concept of experience for theology by restricting it to very special and extraordinary experiences. Nevertheless, Hunsinger’s typology illustrates a very common approach which is also typical in non-theological approaches to religious phenomena. We can illustrate this point with two examples from the cognitive sciences of religion (CSR) and neurotheology. Neurotheology and CSR seem to work presently in the framework of the representationalist-dualistic paradigm of the neurosciences that was critiqued and rejected in Ch. 2 of this book. We shall therefore only use these branches of scholarship as examples.

3.2.2 Cognitive Sciences of Religion and Neurotheology CSR assume that religious experiences are special or extra-ordinary kinds of experiences, also interpreted as kinds of personal experience, without 18 For a short introduction into the theology of T.F. Torrance cf. Molnar, P.D., Torrance. 19 Cf. Phillips, D.Z., Glaubensansichten und Sprachspiele. 20 Historians of theology usually demonstrate this by means of the famous conflict between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner. However, the distinctions between their positions are more complex and more deeply rooted in the particularities of their respective theologies than traditionally rendered. Cf. Gilland, Law and Gospel.

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experiencing an actual human person as object. Attributes of human agency are ascribed to specific experiences, but at the same time the specific attributes of human agents, like spatiotemporal location, possession of only limited capacities for knowledge and power, etc., are denied. As a neurobiological basis, a HADD—a ‘hypersensitive agency detecting device’—a kind of evolutionary brain function, has been postulated.21 Thus, a kind of supernatural individual human has become the prototype for modelling the image of God and the key to understanding religion.22 We do not need to deal at length here with a theological analysis, since this has been done in the past.23 In neurotheology, D’Aquily and Newberg also focus on specific experiences, but ones which are the opposite to those CSR considers. Here the paradigm of religious experience is the mystical experience, which in this case means an experience without the experience of distinct entities or a distinction between oneself and world. In this case, a hypothesis about the conditions of the possibility of such experiences in the brain is also given: Newberg distinguishes between different kinds of brain operation during the experience. Three of these modes refer to ‘baseline reality’, which ‘refers to the primary epistemic state in which there is the perception of discrete objects with regular relationships’24. An intermediate way of experiencing refers to the ‘next three states’ that ‘are associated with the perception of discrete objects, but contain irregular relationships between the objects in that sense of reality’.25 ‘The final three states involve the perception of unitary reality in which everything is regarded as a singular oneness. One can see that the categories of unitary reality perceived as having either regular or irregular relationships need to be omitted. Relationships can only be considered to exist between discrete, independent objects […]’.26 In all of the three kinds of experience, Newberg is talking about three possible states distinguished by positive, neutral or negative affectivity. The brain’s mode of experiencing ‘unitary reality’, however, is a mere postulate and by no way scientifically proven.27 Nevertheless, Newberg asks his decisive epistemological question, ‘How can we know what is really real?’28 He seems to prefer the solution that experiencing ‘unitary reality’ is more fitting to reality itself: ‘This raises another fascinating problem particular to the unitary state—since there is no self, there can be no perceiving self. Thus, the state is experienced without there being a perceived experiencer. There is no self, no mind, and no brain that is experienced. […] But these 21 The concept of HADD was used by Barrett, J.L., Why would anyone believe in God?, 31 – 44 and also used by Boyer, P., Religion Explained, 142 – 144. Cf. also Visala, A., Naturalism, Theism and the Cognitive Study of Religion, 66 f. 22 Cf. Barrett, J.L./Keil, F.C., Anthropomorphism in God Concepts. 23 Cf. Visala, A., Naturalism, Theism and the Cognitive Study of Religion. 24 Newberg, A.B., Principles of Neurotheology, 256. 25 Newberg, A.B., Principles of Neurotheology, 257. 26 Newberg, A.B., Principles of Neurotheology, 258. 27 Cf. Runehov, A.L.C., Sacred or Neural?, 174 – 191. 28 Newberg, A.B., Principles of Neurotheology, 262.

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characteristics may be crucial to our neurotheological investigations since we have considered before that try to avoid the uncertainty principle and to ascertain what is the true nature of reality, we must somehow get outside of the brain and outside of the self. This appears to be commensurate with the primary epistemic state of absolute unity.’29 At the end of his book he confesses: ‘Neurotheology must look at all of these possible epistemic states and attempt to help evaluate them both from the experience of baseline reality as well as from unitary reality. Thus, neurotheology might help better determine which perspective on reality provides the most accurate information. In such an exercise one can see that there is no question that the absolute unitary state takes priority as being “more real”.’30 Newberg reveals, that he can conceive of relations only as external relations and he prefers a genuine understanding of reality in that all relations are deleted. All in all, Newberg’s position in his recently published ‘Principles of Neurotheology’ sometimes appears to be more reminiscent of the founding of a new religion than the analysis of religions by academic means.

In both CSR and neurotheology, the exemplary experiences are treated as separable from other experiences in space and time, with the implication that they can be identified at specific times and places in the self-description of particular humans and perhaps also correlated with identifiable states of the brain. However, both the kind of identifiable experiences and consequently the kinds of brain states that might be associated with them differ. In CSR, the encounter between human persons is the keymodel for specific kinds of religious experience, whereas in neurotheology, the extraordinary experience of perceiving the collapse of space, time, the individual and particularity is the key model. Thus, entirely different phenomena are taken to be the paradigm of religiosity, and neither of the models is really able to accept the other one as basic for religion. This contrasts with the state of affairs in the most practised religions, especially in Christianity. Here we can find different forms or pious practise—some of which might be more similar to what CSR has in mind, some of which tend in the Newbergian direction, and many more—but they coexist without too much tension. Regardless of the different kinds of objects or phenomena to which CSR and neurotheology refer, they nevertheless share the same basic character trait: These kinds of experiences have to be identifiable in space and time, as well as distinct from other kinds of experiences. But it is precisely these claims themselves—that religious experiences are separable from other kinds of experiences, that experience can only be seen in the 5th, fideist category and that the revelation-reason dichotomy is the common basis for all theological epistemology—that are inappropriate, for either the phenomenon of faith or for theological epistemology. These kinds of empirical studies of so-called ‘religious’ phenomena reintroduce the sacred-profane distinction (which the Reformation aban29 Newberg, A.B., Principles of Neurotheology, 259. 30 Newberg, A.B., Principles of Neurotheology, 264 f.

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doned) not because of the results of their experiments or their interpretations of those experiments, but simply by defining from the very outset what is ‘religious’ and what is not. The problem that this raises for the discussion with theology and pious practice is not that these approaches try to attain empirical results, but simply that in order to work they need to separate out something as ‘religious’ which does not also happen to be understood in Christianity’s self-interpretation as specifically ‘religious’. Therefore, a conflict regarding the power, ability and authority to define concepts has arisen. Which community has the right and capacity to define concepts like ‘religious experience’? The church community and its self-interpretation in theology, or the scientific community? For theology, this is not a decisive question in the last instance, because the notion of ‘religion’ itself might not turn out be particularly significant in comparison to other concepts. However, the concept of experience is decisive. Communication between theology and the fields of CSR and of neurotheology is, therefore, not without problems. In the 1970s Ebeling had other addressees in mind, but nevertheless his words seem to fit perfectly to the use of the concept of ‘religious experience’ in CSR and neurotheology. He writes that there was reason to ‘criticize bad theology which cannot satisfy the need of reference to experience precisely because experience comes into the game in a theologically inappropriate way. Thus, it is precisely this kind of emphasis on experience that both obscures and at the same time reveals the fact that one did not have a clue how experience has to be considered theologically.’31

The objection that this argument does not apply to neurotheology is not satisfactory, because it explicitly claims to be presenting not only a theology, but a kind of metatheology and megatheology. With regard to CSR, however, since there is no claim to be doing theological work, the objection can stick. The effect, nonetheless, is the same. If this kind of claim on the power to define what ‘religious experience’ can be is used in the way described, it also produces effects that were clearly seen by Ebeling: ‘In the face of the imposing impression of the power of the empirical sciences the experience of God loses its relation to the experience of the world, and is pushed away to become an isolated inner experience. By this move religious experience seems to get rid of its real subject as well, and it therefore at the same time loses its character of experience. Thus, religion itself, not only in its expressions, but also in its reality, becomes subject of empirically explanatory inquiries, which necessarily assume the character of the criticism of religion. This process of the shrinking and the 31 Ebeling, G., Klage über das Erfahrungsdefizit, 15. (“[…] zur Kritik an schlechter Theologie, die den Erfahrungsbezug deshalb verfehlt, weil sie ihn theologisch unsachgemäß ins Spiel bringt. So wird gegebenenfalls gerade durch eine betonte Berufung auf Erfahrung verdeckt und zugleich offenkunding, daß man davon, wie Erfahrung in der Theologie in Betracht kommen muß, keine Ahnung hat.”)

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dissolution of religious experience has the effect that the only experience one can have in dealing with religious traditions is the experience of alienation and incomprehension.’32

However, the problem is not any particular criticism of religion, because the criticism of religion can be a very fruitful endeavour and needs to be considered a vivid and necessary part of theology itself.33 The decisive problem is that those phenomena which were formerly known as ‘religious experience’ have not vanished. They are rather simply only no longer labelled as the phenomena of ‘religious experience’, and so remain unexplained and inexplicable. They are still there as religious phenomena, but even though they are no longer known as phenomena of religious experience, they not only exercise influence on society and life, but even do so in a manner that is resistant to any possibility of being reflected upon or criticized. Ebeling was also aware of this tendency : ‘Experience of the fact that profanity assumes crypto-religious characteristics in dayto-day life, cautions against leaving it to uncontrolled proliferation. The fact that religious experience works in, with and under profane experience is a process, which can only emerge from specific, historically formed religion.’34

In the case of Christianity, the fact that ‘religious experience’ does not refer to the extraordinary, but to the ordinary, can be easily shown. Saying grace at the table, giving an evening prayer, talking with a fellow Christian about her everyday problems, participating attentively or inattentively in a service, performing mystical prayer or meditation, are all acts and experiences expressing exactly the same religious value—if there is indeed something like religious ‘value’ at all!

32 Ebeling, G., Klage über das Erfahrungsdefizit, 22. („Unter dem imponierenden Eindruck der Macht empirischer Wissenschaft verliert somit die Gotteserfahrung den Bezug auf die Welterfahrung und wird auf eine isolierte innere Erfahrung abgedrängt. Dadurch scheint sie aber auch eines wirkliches Gegenübers verlustig zu gehen und deshalb zugleich den Erfahrungscharakter einzubüßen. So wird Religion selbst nicht nur in ihren Äußerungen, sondern auch in ihrer Wirklichkeit Gegenstand empirisch erklärender Untersuchung, die dann notwendig den Charakter von Religionskritik annimmt. Dieser Prozeß der Schrumpfung und Auflösung religiöser Erfahrung läßt einen dann auch im Umgang mit religiöser Überlieferung nur noch die Erfahrung von Entfremdung und Nichtverstehen machen.“) 33 Cf. Barth, K., CD I/2, §17, 280 – 361. 34 Ebeling, G., Klage über das Erfahrungsdefizit, 24. („Die Erfahrung, daß Profanität im Lebensvollzug Züge von Kryptoreligiosität annimmt, warnt davor, dies dem Wildwuchs zu überlassen. Daß in, mit und unter der profanen Erfahrung die religiöse Erfahrung zur Geltung kommt, ist ein Vorgang, der nur von bestimmter, geschichtlich geformter Religion ausgehen kann.“)

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3.2.3 The Possibility of Faith Examples like these illustrate the fact that the question of how such faith is constituted cannot be answered in general with the remark that there might be separable and identifiable experiences. They also cannot be answered by cognitive arguments that might be associated with reason. Nevertheless, if we do not want to exclude the possibility that all kinds of faith are completely mistaken, i. e. if we want to allow the possibility that faith or trust in life is a meaningful concept, we cannot dismiss the concept of revelation as the offspring of these kinds of faiths and trusts. The reason is simply that faith in reality or life not only relates the trusting person to reality or life, but also distinguishes the trusting person from reality or life. Perhaps reality or life need not necessarily be understood as divine or ultimate in the sense that it has to be seen as id quo maius cogitari nequit. However, it has to be seen as distinct and as something other, which cannot be, at least completely, grasped by one’s own abilities. Life or reality has to be grasped at least partially as something that needs to be disclosed or revealed, because it is in some sense greater than the experiencing subject. Furthermore, if these arguments are valid, the distinction between revelation and reason—however useful typologies of the kind Hunsinger has provided might be—cannot be the primary one for understanding what revelation can be. Obviously, reason is not simply given, but speaking phenomenologically, we are constantly experiencing reason, or better yet, structures and phenomena we learn to call reason. Therefore,—phenomenologically, but not necessarily ontologically—, experience precedes reason.35 The decisive question, therefore, is: Is there any kind of relationship between revelation and experience that can be the basis for theological epistemology?

3.3 Revelation and Experience—The Initial Model From the 1980s on, German Protestant theology has designed a number of different concepts for relating revelation and experience. We shall use as examples here the respective positions of Eilert Herms and Christoph Schwöbel. These positions are not recognized everywhere, but they have been incorporated into some of the most widely used textbooks in German 35 I do not want to enter the quarrel between rationalists and empiricists with this statement. The phenomenological fact that experience precedes reason does not determine the answer to the question of whether reason or experience is more ontologically primary. Imagine a world without any sentient being. In such a world, there would be no one to experience anything. But that scenario does not exclude the possibility that such a world could be one of structured and coherent relations in between the entities—and that is something one might call reason.

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theology36, and rely on both the German and Anglophone traditions. These models can therefore provide a good starting point for our considerations. As a result, we shall call them ‘initial models’, because they provide the basis from which we will proceed later on. In this section, we will describe the basics of these models, to the extent that they serve our purposes here. Herms observes that modern resentment against the notion of revelation relies heavily on a version of revelation as something which is communicated in extraordinary situations to extraordinary people; as something that cannot be tested but has to be believed on authority ; and further, as something that delivers an invulnerable social position to those who receive it. Herms actually agrees with criticisms of religion that object to this concept of revelation. However, he also makes the observation that revelation as it is used in everyday language does not necessarily have a specifically religious meaning. We use, for example, expressions like ‘What a revelation!’ or ‘That was a revelation to me’.37 Herms now claims that this use of the word revelation can also indicate its meaning for theology. Let us illustrate the case with a simple example. Albert, a young man, is attracted to a young girl, Victoria, but he is too shy to show any behaviour indicating that he is attracted to her. He fears and even expects that Victoria will find him unattractive. Victoria, sitting next to Albert during a sunset in the mountains, remarks: ‘I love you’. Albert regards this as a revelation by thinking to himself, ‘What a revelation!’ In analysing these everyday uses of the concept of revelation, Herms concludes that revelation refers to a kind of disclosure experience38 that includes six characteristics. Disclosure experiences are characterized by (1) a specific content (being in love, whatever that means), (2) a specific author (Victoria), (3) a specific receiver (Albert), (4) a specific situation (sunset in the mountains), (5) an embodied re-action and re-sponse (Albert becomes joyful, his blood pressure increases, he suddenly rises and spontaneously shouts: ‘Me too!’), and by (6) a decisive change in the life situation of the recipient and therefore also of the recipient’s personhood (Albert could now enter into a romantic relationship with Victoria, marry her, have children, etc.). Christoph Schwöbel has formalized this kind of approach by using a relational analysis of the concept of revelation: ‘A discloses in the situation B the content C for the recipient D with the result E’.39

Herms observes that a decisive common feature of disclosure experiences is that the recipient is completely passive in receiving the experience. He is indeed actively involved, but he cannot do anything to inaugurate the 36 37 38 39

Cf. H•rle, W., Dogmatik, 81 – 89. Cf. Herms, E., Offenbarung, 172 f. 175. Cf. Herms, E., Offenbarung, 176 f. Schwçbel, C., God: Action and Revelation, 87. Note that Herms’ fifth feature is either missing or combined together with the sixth one under E.

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disclosure, as to do so, at least in our example, would mean forsaking the seriousness of Victoria’s confession. Furthermore, disclosure experiences broaden our horizons of expectation.40 In our example, Albert expected anything but the fact that Victoria could somehow be attracted to him. The unexpected revelation now becomes the ground of Albert’s own activity. Of course, disclosure experiences of this kind are not necessarily religious ones. Herms now defines religion as: ‘Religion is becoming aware of and acting in face of the fact that the abilities of humans to produce effects in the world is only there as a given, completely passive, participation in the power, which is absolutely superior to every reality and creates the world.’41

This definition has certain consequences. Only disclosure experiences whose content is the disclosure of that which constitutes reality, and only disclosure experiences whose author is identical with its content as that which constitutes reality, can be regarded as religious revelations.42 Therefore, religious revelation is always self-revelation, not revelation about something other than the author (like future historical events, etc.).43 In the case of Christian revelation, Schwöbel explains that the relata of the formula ‘A discloses in the situation B the content C for the recipient D with the result E’,

are instantiated in a specific manner. The author A is the triune God. Situation B is any historical situation in which there is a constitutive reference to the original disclosure situation of the Christ event. Content C is the author’s selfgiving activity as the constitution, reconciliation and perfection of any reality other than the author. Recipient D appears by the disclosure experience in a specific light in this tension between creation, reconciliation and perfection: She experiences herself as being created, abusing her given abilities of relative freedom, being reconciled by the Christ-event, and living in hope of perfection. Result E of this self-disclosing activity is seen in the constitution of Christian faith.44 The decisive feature is that this kind of religious revelation—or in our case Christian revelation—as a disclosure situation is also related to the concept of experience in a specific way, which includes that (1) revelation is always 40 Cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 460 – 470. 41 Herms, E., Offenbarung, 180. („Religion ist das Innewerden und der Umgang des Menschen mit der Tatsache, dass seine Macht, etwas in der Welt zu bewirken, nur existiert als eine ihm gewährte, von ihm völlig passiv empfangene Anteilhabe an der uns schlechhin überlegenen weltschöpferischen Macht über alle Wirklicheit“) 42 Cf. Herms, E., Offenbarung, 181. 43 The insight that revelation has to be understood as self-revelation was developed by Hegel and has been common to much Protestant theology since. 44 Cf. Schwçbel, C., God: Action and Revelation, 95 f.

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experience, and that (2) revelation is an experience that constitutes experience itself. ad (1): The first point, that revelation is itself experience, can be illustrated by a formalized description of experience that Schwöbel gives: ‘(A experiences) A experiences x as y, insofar as x is integrated into the interpretative framework I by interpreting it as y{, and thereby the interpretative framework I is modified to I*}.’45

The experiencing subject A experiences an object x. But only to say this would be incomplete, because, according to Schwöbel, experience means an act of predication: ‘In this process of conceiving “something” “as something” the set of sense data which we have isolated as a particular object of perception is constituted as an object of experience by the use of general predicates. The paradigmatic case for such basic synthetic acts of predication is the classification where the object of perception x is subsumed as an element under the class y and thereby acquires object status. Viewed formally, this process functions according to specific rules, which can be formulated in a table of categories. In this synthesis of experience a specific object of perception is signified, not, however, by an individual name, but by a general predicate. The synthesis of experience can therefore be expressed as a proposition which follows the logical form f(x): This x is a y.’46

Whereas one can perceive some x, one cannot simply experience some x as such, but only by attributing to it status as a y. Predicates like y are parts of the interpretative, semiotic framework I. Disclosure experiences, in contrast to other kinds of experiences, alter or broaden the horizon of expectations, i. e. our semiotic interpretative framework. Therefore, by the act of experiencing, the presupposed interpretative framework I is now modified into the new interpretative framework I*. This very decisive feature appears only in the revised German versions of Schwöbel’s work.47 At the very same time a recursive aspect appears. A not only experiences x, but she also experiences the fact that she experiences x. In other words, in experiencing something different from oneself, one always experiences oneself as well. Therefore, the phrase in brackets has to be added to the formula. However, even in this form the analysis of experience is not complete; in practise, experience is always a social reality. It is not only possible to experience something and thereby to experience oneself. One always experiences other subjects as having experiences at the same time. Schwöbel exemplifies this with the example of personal experience, i. e. experiencing 45 Schwçbel, C., God: Action and Revelation, 107. The decisive addition in these {} brackets can only be found in the revised German edition in Schwçbel, C., Gott in Beziehung, 91. 46 Schwçbel, C., God: Action and Revelation, 105. 47 Schwçbel, C., Gott in Beziehung, 91.

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another person (A experiences B), by giving this comprehensive structural formula for personal experience: ‘A experiences B implies therefore (A experiences) A experiences x as y by integrating x through the predication as y into the interpretative framework I{, and thereby the interpretative framework I is modified to I*} and it presupposes (B experiences) B experiences x as y by integrating x through the predication as y into the interpretative framework I{, and thereby the interpretative framework I is modified to I*} so that we arrive at the full structural formula A[=(A experiences) A experiences x as y by integrating x through the predication as y into the interpretative framework I{, and thereby the interpretative framework I is modified to I*}] experiences B[=(B experiences the fact that) B experiences x as y by integrating x through the predication as y into the interpretative framework I{, and thereby the interpretative framework I is modified to I*}]’48

Let us for our purposes use the easier description of experience, ‘(A experiences the fact that) A experiences x as y, insofar as x is integrated into the interpretative framework I by interpreting it as y, and thereby the interpretative framework I is modified to I*’. Here it is obvious that revelation and (disclosure) experiences are interchangeable and that both concepts describe the same state of affairs from a different perspective. Recipient D of revelation has become experiencing subject A, the content of revelation C has become the attribution of x as y, and result E of revelation has become the modification of I to I*. The only relata that do not explicitly appear are situation B and the author of revelation A. However, as we have seen, with respect to religious revelation, author and content have to be the same. Therefore, in the case of religious experience the predication of x as y, the content, is also author of the passively received experience. In practise, this author does not necessarily have to be a personal entity. For example, in Einstein’s impersonal religion, the world as a whole occupies this position.49 48 Schwçbel, C., God: Action and Revelation, 108. The decisive additions in these {} brackets also only appear in the revised German version in Schwçbel, C., Gott in Beziehung, 94. These [] brackets appear in the original. 49 Cf. Mìhling, Einstein und die Religion, 301 – 355

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With regard to Christian practise, however, the author is experienced as tripersonal, implying that in principle the complete formula is to be applied. Situation B of revelation is still not being made explicit, but this is not really a deficiency either. It could easily be added, and such an addition would not have to be seen as an expansion, but only as explicating something hidden within the structure. The result is that revelation is a specific kind of experience, i. e. a disclosure experience and that every disclosure experience has to be called a revelation. However, not every revelation has to be a religious revelation. Only revelations, which are self-disclosures,50 i. e. disclosure experiences, in which the predication of x as y also implies information about the one who inaugurates the experience (= the author of revelation) can count as religious experiences or religious revelations. Furthermore, a second criterion has to be given. It is not a specific interpretative framework I that has to be altered, but the most comprehensive framework of interpretation (= faith) that comprehends or is related to all other frameworks of interpretation, which are available to a subject. ad (2): Second, what is being claimed is not only that there is no revelation that is not also at the same time experience, but also that revelation is a kind of experience that constitutes experience as such, i. e. a kind of experience that is the condition of the possibility of experience itself. In Schwöbel’s case, this feature of revelation can only be explained by reference to specifically Christian experience, i. e. in referring to the whole context of the revelation of God as creator, redeemer and perfector in Jesus Christ by the Spirit: ‘This experiential judgement which is expressed in the predication of Jesus as the Christ includes a new self-understanding of human beings who can now understand their actions no longer as the creation of righteousness which is to be recognized by God, but as obedience to the will of God who will bring about righteousness and salvation. […] God’s action in creation, reconciliation and salvation is, as it is made manifest in the experience of Christ as God’s self-disclosure, the condition for the possibility of created freedom for human action. Therefore, human action can correspond in the interpretation and organisation of the world to its constitution and so realize the destiny of humanity by obeying the will of God. The specific characteristic of the experience of Christ is therefore that the self-disclosure of God is vindicated as the condition of the possibility of all experience, insofar as the constitution of the certainty of this experience validates its content. The experience of Christ has this special status because the Christ event discloses in the reality of experience the action of God as the condition of the possibility of all human experience. Human experience is therefore confronted in the vindication of the Gospel of Christ with its truth as the correspondence between the determination of 50 For further explanation cf. Herms, E., Offenbarung V.

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reality by the will of God and its consequent and dependent determination in the interpretative acts of human experience. […] The fact that reality can be experienced is both with respect to the object of experience as well as with respect to the subject of experience not an independent property which could be ascribed to the subject or object of experience, but is grounded in God’s action as the ground of its possibility. On the basis of the experience of Christ the relationship between revelation and experience is clarified as the relationship between the constitution of the existence of reality which is capable of interpretation and organisation and its active interpretation and organisation by human subjects of experience. Revelation is therefore not a special realm alongside or above experience, but it is the ground of its possibility and the condition for the possibility of its truth.’51

In other words, since the experience of the Christ event is a religious experience that at the same time discloses the author of this experience as the triune ground of the constitution of all reality, and since experience in itself is a part of that reality, the content of the Christian disclosure experience, i. e. the triune God, is also to be understood as the condition of the possibility of experience itself. Otherwise, the content of the Christian disclosure experience would be either incoherent or not a religious experience at all. Eilert Herms makes a similar point: ‘Sometimes the imagination is vivid, as if revelation would disclose an additional or alternative reality, apart from reality as it is given by experience. But this opinion is mistaken. Experience and revelation are two aspects of one and the same reality. Therefore, the revealing activity of God has […] the same content as experience, i. e. the creatural existence of embodied subjects of action coram Deo.’52 ‘And these two things together : – that the revelation of God does not disrupt the regularities of the world of experience because revelation constitutes this world; and – that revelation does not surpass the content of experience, since revelation rather unsurpassingly makes the content of experience concrete, means ipso facto: The revelation of God does not devalue experience.’53 51 Schwçbel, C., God: Action and Revelation, 117 f. 52 Herms, E., Offenbarung und Erfahrung, 267. („Vielmehr lebt die Vorstellung immer wieder auf, als erschließe Offenbarung eine Zusatz- oder Alternativwirklichkeit zu derjenigen, die Inhalt von Erfahrung ist. Aber diese Meinung ist irrig. Denn Erfahrung und Offenbarung sind nur zwei Aspekte ein und derselben Wirklichkeit. Folglich gilt: Das Offenbarungswerk Gottes hat (zur Gänze und in allen seinen wesentlichen Momenten) denselben Inhalt wie die Erfahrung, nämlich die geschöpfliche Existenz leibhafter Handlungssubjekte coram Deo.“) 53 Herms, E., Offenbarung und Erfahrung, 267 f. („Und dies beides zusammen: – daß Gottes Offenbarung die Regelmäßigkeit der Erfahrungswelt nicht sprengt, weil sie diese vielmehr konstituiert, und – daß sie ihren Inhalt nicht überbietet, weil sie ihn vielmehr unüberbietbar konkretisiert, heißt ipso facto: Gottes Offenbarung entwertet die Erfahrung nicht. Die Wirklichkeit der Offenbarung weist der Wirklichkeit der Erfahrung nicht den minderen Rang einer uneigentlichen, bloß

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Thus far, we can summarize the two points with regard to the relationship between revelation and experience according to the ‘initial model’: 1. Revelation and experience are not mutually exclusive. Rather, revelation is a kind of experience, a disclosure experience. This is based on formal descriptions of revelation and experience. 2. Revelation is also the condition of the possibility of experience. This point is an implication of the specifically Christian revelation of the Christ event, which discloses ‘God’ as the author, redeemer and perfector of all reality including experience. The first point is a universal claim, one that might be seen by a reasonable structural comparison. The second point is also a universal claim. However, its validity can only be seen from the particular perspective of the Christian faith, i. e. by persons who have had experiences that can be described as a kind of Christian disclosure experience. This last feature, however, is by no means a weakness. On the contrary, the particularity of the insight into the universal structure of all experience as grounded in revelation is a necessary condition of its coherence. Since the content of the Christian revelation is a revelation of the insight that no particular instance of the reality of experience is itself the sufficient condition of the possibility of experience, every claim to an epistemic universality would deny that experience is intangible, i. e. would deny that experience is in its constitution not at the human’s disposal, but passively given. In the framework of these ‘initial models’ of the relationship between revelation and experience, putative experiences of extraordinary kinds also have to be put in their proper place. A true revelation cannot be determined to be so due to its emotional intensity, its extraordinariness, its separability from other experiences or due to the specific areas of the brain that might be involved. The only criterion is its content. Any experience or any set of experiences whose outcome is an understanding of reality and the self in accordance with the Christ event have to be seen as genuine revelation. Christoph Schwöbel expresses this point in the following way : ‘The relationship between “experience” and “religious experience” or “experience of faith” can be described in a similar way. All experience indicates on the basis of its specific structure that it presupposes the openness of reality for acts of reflection and interpretation in the synthesis of experience as the condition for its possibility. In religious experience we do not have access to a particular object of experience which existed in a separate sphere of experience alongside or above the general realm of experience. In religious experience divine action as the condition of the possibility of all human experience becomes thematic in its connection to all forms of human vorläufigen Wirklichkeit zu, sondern genau ihren eigenen Rang eigentlicher, definitiver Wirklichkeit.“)

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experience. On the basis of the insight into the enabling of all human action through divine action and into the constitution of human experience in God’s revelation which can be gained from the particular experience of the Christ-event, all experience is open for insight into the underlying conditions of its possibility. There is therefore no specific epistemological privilege of certain forms and types of experience in relation to others which would thereby be devalued in their significance.’54

Eilert Herms describes the same position with the following words: ‘In its […] concrete form the concept of “experience” excludes dogmatic empiricism and abstract rationalism just as it includes the existence of reliable rules of the events of the world. These rules do not exclude but actually include the fact that they are not at our disposal, including the fact that revelation is also not at our disposal. Revelation does not disrupt the uniformity of experience […]. This negative statement has also to be expressed in a positive way. That means that revelation happens—nota bene, not at one’s disposal—in, with and under experience in all its normativity and regularity. Processes of revelation cannot be restricted to extraordinary areas of the feasts of our life or to extraordinary areas that might be explicitly called “religious”, separated from other areas of culture. Rather revelation is the “opportunity of everyday life”. Not of any kind of everyday life, but of a specific one, i. e. the kind of every day life that is, since the times of the mothers and fathers of the OT, shaped by memories and traditions of contingent events of revelation.’55

3.4 Problems with the Initial Model in Light of the Neurosciences The initial model can be understood as an explication of Ebeling’s and Jüngel’s demand for a theology based on experience. At the same time, it allows us to conceive of revelation in a consistent and intelligible way that bases revelation in experience and experience in revelation. In principle, this model surpasses those typologies that attempt to conceive of revelation in the polarity between 54 Schwçbel, C., God: Action and Revelation, 118. 55 Herms, E., Offenbarung und Erfahrung, 266. With the expression ‘opportunity of everyday life’ Herms is referring to a book title by Ernst Lange. („Aber in seiner […] konkreten Gestalt schließt der Begriff der ,Erfahrung‘ diesen dogmatischen Empirismus und den ihm entsprechenden abstrakten Rationalismus gerade aus und nur eine zuverlässige Geregeltheit des Weltgeschehens ein. Diese aber schließt ihrerseits wiederum Unverfügbarkeit nicht aus, sondern ein; auch die Unverfügbarkeit von Offenbarung. Offenbarung zerreißt nicht diejenige Uniformität von Erfahrung […]. Diese negative Aussage muß aber auch positiv gewendet werden. Dann besagt sie: Offenbarung geschieht – nota bene: unverfügbar – in, mit und unter Erfahrung in ihrer ganzen Normativität und Regelmäßigkeit. Ihr Geschehen ist nicht auf besondere Feier- und Festbezirke unseres Lebens beschränkt, sondern es ist die ‘Chance des Alltags’. Zwar nicht eines beliebigen Alltags, sondern nur eines bestimmten, nämlich des – seit der Zeit der Erzväter – jeweils durch bestimmte Erinnerungen und Traditionen an kontingente Offenbarungsereignisse geprägten Alltags.“)

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revelation and reason. This can be shown by comparing it to Hunsinger’s typology given section 3.2. Revelation as experience only appears in Hunsinger’s model in type 5, but obviously in type 5 revelation and experience are restricted to non-cognitive states of affairs that surpass everyday experience. Thus, our initial model does not fit to Hunsinger’s type 5. One could also consider exchanging ‘reason’ in type 4 with ‘experience’. Then the feature that revelation is seen as the basis of experience would be expressed. However, it is not possible to delete ‘reason’ in only one instance. Therefore, the initial model cannot be understood by the means of the revelation-reason typology. This has to be seen as an advantage. A second advantage of the initial model is that it denies any specific religious relevance to spatiotemporally localizable and separable experiences, such as the extraordinary experiences CSR and neurotheology attempt to reckon with. This does not, however, mean that there is no communicability between the concept of experience in the initial model and the concept of religious experience in the natural sciences. The only thing which one has to alter is the fact that it is not CSR which is the appropriate communication partner for theology with respect to experience, but those sciences which deal with experience as such, and these are e. g. basic questions of the neurosciences as introduced in Ch. 2 above. The decisive question now arises: Is the initial model compatible with the representationalist model and/or with the ecological model? On the first glance it seems to be the case that the initial model might be more compatible with the representationalist model. However, we will see that only some features are compatible whereas others are not. Further, the same is also true with regard to a combination of the initial model and the ecological model. Here, compatibilities as well as incompatibilities also arise. In the following paragraphs we will describe the problems in detail: 1. The initial model explicitly distinguishes between perception and experience in such a way that experience is understood as a predication of an underlying perception with the help of predicates from an interpretive framework. It therefore seems to be compatible with a representationalist understanding of experience, but not with an ecological one. It might also be true that in the initial model a kind of pure perception without any interpretation could be denied,56 but it nevertheless uses the language of the interpretation of something given. The consequence is that faith would be conceived as a representation of reality. But it is doubtful whether this is theologically appropriate. 2. By understanding revelation as a disclosure experience and by analysing disclosure experiences as an interpretive activity with the help of predicates situated in interpretive frameworks, the problem of misunderstanding 56 Cf. Schwçbel, C., God: Action and Revelation, 104 – 106.

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revelation as a matter of interpretation could occur. This misunderstanding, however, would become inevitable if the initial model were combined with the representational model. 3. If this kind of experience is dependent on predication, it could be misunderstood primarily as a cognitive function, which is dependent on higher brain functions and abilities that occur in a relatively late ontogenetic state. It seems to fit Dunbar’s claim that religion presupposes the capacity for higher levels of intensionality57 and it therefore also seems to presuppose the necessity for a theory of mind (ToM). In this respect, the initial model could be rendered as compatible with the representationalist model. But there would be a price to pay : humans who are unable or have not yet developed the higher functions of ToM could not have faith. 4. The initial model is able to incorporate sociality with the help of the concept of personal experience. However, it renders personal experience as a special case within experience in general. As a result, the concept of experience in itself seems to be constituted somewhat independently from sociality and personal otherness. It further appears to be the case that the initial model carries an implicit relic of individualism. In the framework of the representationalist model, this would have to be evaluated as an advantage, but in the framework of the ecological model—and also in light of the specific Christian content of revelation—as a vice. 5. With respect to modularism the initial model is compatible with modularity, but not with modularism. Since the initial model denies that there are specific phenomena which can be seen as specifically ‘religious’ or as revelation in explicit contrast to everyday experience, the search for neurological correlations is misleading from the very beginning. It is,

57 Cf. Dunbar, R.I.M., The Social Brain, 177 f: ‘For a supernatural-based religion to have any force in making us toe the social line, I have to believe that you suppose that there are supernatural beings who can be made to understand that you and I desire that things should happen in a particular way. This involves four levels of intentionality (marked by the italicized words). Making religion a social as opposed to individual phenomenon thus adds significantly to the cognitive load needed to underpin it. Without working at this level, we will be unable to ensure that our actions are coordinated (as in the performance of rituals) or that we can agree that infringements of the social mores are to be discouraged (i. e., to accept adherence to social norms without the need for punishment). In contrast, conventional interpersonal attempts to insist that you adhere to a social norm require only three levels of intentionality (I intend that you believe that you must behave in the way that the rest of us want). It is the reference to an external supernatural world that cannot be immediately apprehended that adds the key extra layer of intentionality that pushes the cognitive demand to the limits of normal human capacity at level 4. For the individual that conceives all this as a good idea, there is an additional level that he/she needs to aspire to: I believe that I can persuade you to believe that there are some supernatural beings who will understand what it is that we all want. Kinderman […] found that, although level 4 intentionality was the typical level achieved by normal adult humans, a small proportion of individuals can achieve higher levels as a matter of course. It is these individuals that presumably act as the cultural leaders of the societies they live in.’

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however, compatible with modularity in the sense that any area of the brain can be involved in revelation as experiences of disclosure. 6. The question of whether the initial model is not only representationalist, but also dualistic or idealistic has to remain open. In and of itself, the initial model seems to be indifferent about this point. However, if one views the initial model in light of the representationalist model of the neurosciences, it also becomes, at the very minimum, dualistic. 7. It only seems at first glance as if the initial model could be combined with the representationalist model. However, there is one decisive point where a strong incoherence appears. The initial model is basically non-constructivist. It does not deny that the constructive abilities of human beings and apersonal entities can contribute something to experience, but it does deny that experience at its base can be constituted by the brain. The only way of combining the initial model with the constructivist trait of the representationalist model in its most radical form, as it is instantiated by Roth, would be to identify the author of revelation with the so-called ‘real brain’ itself. In other words: A coherent combination of the two models implies a divinization of the ‘real brain’. It would, therefore, be self-contradictory if revelation were seen in a Christian way including the disclosed experience, that no spatiotemporally localizable entity could be the origin of the disclosure experience. It could also be the case that Roth’s ‘real brain’ (see Ch. 2) is not only a transcendental, but also a transcendent entity. But even in this case it cannot be combined with the initial model of revelation, because the divine ‘real brain’ is not compatible with the divine Triune God of Christianity. 8. If the initial model were combined with the representationalist model, it would be necessary to understand revelation and religious experience in the model of external relations, i. e. relations which are neither constitutive for the experienced object, i. e. the divine author, nor constitutive for the experiencing subject and the concept of experience itself. Whereas Christianity sometimes affirms the first claim, that the author of revelation could be perhaps seen as independent of the experience, it strongly denies that the experience and the one who experiences can be understood without this kind of disclosure experience. Here a contradiction also emerges. Revelation as disclosure experience needs to be understood in a model of experience in which the relationship between what is experienced and the one who experiences is at least partly an internal relationship. Otherwise, the decisive claim that disclosure experiences are constitutive for experience as such cannot be maintained. The result of our inquiry is therefore that the initial model cannot be combined with the representationalist model in a meaningful way. It would indeed be possible to combine both models, but only insofar as the specific Christian content of the initial model were abandoned—and that is a price

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which is unacceptable theologically. If it were revealed in the future that the representationalist model of experience in the neurosciences is correct, then the initial model of experience and revelation in Christian theology would necessarily be falsified. Any possible dialogue between adherents of the representationalist model and theological adherents of a model of revelation as experience as it is conceived in the initial model can therefore amount to nothing but conflict. Note that in our analysis we did not refer to the occasionally proffered naturalistic reductionism of the representationalist model. Therefore, the emerging conflict is also independent of the question of whether one understands the representationalist model in a naturalistic way or not. One consequence of this diagnosis is that the certainty maintained by some scientists—who have chosen religious phenomena as their genuine field of work and who at the same time share the representationalist paradigm— that their work does not affect the ontological truth of the analysed phenomena58 is wrong. This result does not come as a surprise. The representationalist model was also criticized for non-theological reasons and abandoned in favour of the ecological model. Therefore, the question arises: Is the initial model of conceiving revelation as experience compatible with the ecological model? Unfortunately, it is also the case that this question cannot receive a positive answer. Some of the characteristics of the initial model—especially its distinction between perception and experience and its understanding of experience as a predicative activity—seem too closely bound to the representationalist model. The remaining task, therefore, can be outlined in the following question: Is it possible to give a theological account of revelation and experience that can maintain the advantages of the initial model, but that at the same time coheres with the ecological model?

3.5 Perceiving Intendedness? As decisive elements of the ecological view we used Putnam’s semantic externalism and McDowell’s open mind theory. Recently, Swedish Roman Catholic theologian Mats Wahlberg has provided a proposal for using these theories in a specific way for theological epistemology. He combined Putnam’s and McDowell’s insights, along with Plantinga’s argument for God from the problem of other minds.59 However, what Wahlberg has in mind is in no way a kind of inference or interpretation: 58 The assurance that the work of neither CSR nor neurotheology affects religious truth claims is a common cantus firmus, but sometimes the problem of hidden religious or quasi-religious presuppositions is explicated. Cf. e. g. Newberg, A.B., Principles of Neurotheology, 62. 59 Cf. Plantinga, A., God and Other Minds.

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‘We have found nothing that suggests that it would be doxastically irresponsible for a well-educated, intellectually sophisticated person to take herself to be able to perceive that biological structures have been created. This allows us to draw the conclusion that, possibly, there exist people who know that biological structures are expressive of the intent and intelligence of a creator, and because they take their experiences seriously—that is, as revelatory of how things really are. Other people also see that biological structures are […] expressive of intent and intelligence, but they take their experiences to be illusionary.’60

To reach this point, Wahlberg follows McDowell in the opinion that the mind is not closed and that perception always implies an intelligible structure. His first point, therefore, is that nature is seen or perceived as creation, not that it is merely interpreted as creation or inferred as creation. His second point, following Putnam, is that if it is correct that ‘meanings just ain’t in the head’, this kind of perception also provides knowledge. In the words of McDowell and Putnam, knowledge cannot be simply defined as justified true belief, at least if ‘belief ’ means a kind of representation. The perception of a quality can be fitting or not fitting, e. g. one could perceive the colour of a shirt in low light to be blue. In this case the quality of blue is neither an inference nor an interpretation, but a perception of something that is a real quality of the perceived object. However, under different conditions, the same shirt could actually be revealed to be green. If the shirt is perceived to be blue and it actually is blue, then the perception is also knowledge. The same holds for perceiving nature as creation: ‘If you think that the possibility of a bad case is incompatible with my claim that I now (in the case I am actually in) know that I see that nature is created, this is because you assume that one must always be in a position to know what one’s evidence is. The perspective advocated in this book entails, however, that this assumption is false. If the assumption is false, then it is possible that if I am in the good case, I am in a position to know that I am in the good case […] while if I am in the bad case I am not in a position to know that I am not in the good case. Hence, if I am in the good case right now, my claim to know that I see that nature is creation could be true.’61

Wahlberg illustrates his idea about perceiving nature as creation in the same sense as someone perceives artefacts as products of intentional action. His basic idea is that if McDowell and Putnam are right, then the theory of the open mind can explain at once (1) why people in all times are tempted to invoke teleological arguments for the existence of something intentional and divine, like the argument from design, and (2) why as a rational argument these attempts are mistaken:

60 Wahlberg, M., Reshaping Natural Theology, 194. 61 Wahlberg, M., Reshaping Natural Theology, 197.

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‘If the suggestion that we can directly perceive natural structures as expressive of intent and intelligence is correct, then there is a good explanation for why the project of inferring divine design from the (non-expressive) properties of biological nature has been, and still is, so popular—even though it has turned out to be so difficult. People have, if the suggestion is correct, always seen biological structures as created. […] What I have suggested in this book is that a clear and certain knowledge of nature’s createdness might be available from observations of biological organisms, even though there is no cogent inference from the existence of biological organisms to the existence of a creator. […] People have, however, usually assumed that if complex biological structures “testify” to a creator […], then it must be because knowledge of a creator is inferentially available from observations of those structures. The insight that it can be true both that biological structures testify to a creator and that the design-inference project is doomed, has been lacking.’62

Wahlberg therefore votes at the end for an unapologetic theology that neither follows the postliberal claim of avoiding apologetics nor the revisionists claim that apologetics as a kind of rational argumentation is decisive for any kind of public theology.63 Wahlberg’s suggestion can be seen as one possibility of applying McDowell’s position to theology. A decisive feature of Wahlberg’s proposal is that he restricts perceptibility to creation, and that ‘creation’ only means ‘to be intended’. He explicitly denies that other elements of faith could be seen in the same way and he also denies that this kind of seeing createdness means at the same time that there is a theistic deity.64 Rather, this experienced knowledge ‘supports’65 belief in a creator God in the way that such a deity can be found in Christianity, Judaism and Islam. At this point it seems that Wahlberg allows inferences and interpretations on a second level as based on perceived knowledge. His suggestion therefore resembles the neo-Thomistic claim from Vatican I that God can be seen clearly by his works,66 and it presupposes the classical Thomistic distinction between a praeambula fidei and a revelation of grace. Whereas classical doctrines of the praeambula fidei invoke reason, Wahlberg invokes perception. So at the end, Wahlberg’s attempt does not appear to be really creative, since it does not solve the decisive questions. The content of what nearly all Christians have faith in remains unaffected. Furthermore, the term ‘creation’ is not used by Wahlberg in a theological way, because creation does not only mean ‘intended by an x’, but along the 62 63 64 65 66

Wahlberg, M., Reshaping Natural Theology, 164 f. Cf. Wahlberg, M., Reshaping Natural Theology, 195 – 206. Cf. Wahlberg, M., Reshaping Natural Theology, 198. Cf. Wahlberg, M., Reshaping Natural Theology, 198. Cf. Denzinger, H./Hìnermann, P., DH/DS 3004: ‘Eadem sancta mater Ecclesia tenet et docet, Deum, rerum omnium principium et finem, naturali humanae rationis lumine e rebus creatis certo cognosci posse’.

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lines of Rom 4:17 it cannot be separated from the doctrine of justification. To believe that God creates without mundane presuppositions also implies having faith in God creating justice in the sinner without presuppositions and being hopeful that God speaks the dead into life—and vice versa. That biological structures are intended is by no means a statement or a conviction that is vivid in the practice of faith. Wahlberg therefore has to use expressions which appear in these practises, such as ‘to testify’. In a second step he interprets ‘to testify’ as ‘to perceive’. In short, Wahlberg proposes a way that seems to be fruitful, but because of its abstractness, then fills it with the wrong content. Furthermore, in adhering to McDowell he abandons representationalism, but only on one side: Experiencing creation is no longer modelled as an external relationship of an interpretation of something given (the biological structures) in the experiencing subject, but nevertheless on the side of the creator the biological structures represent the intention of something divine. Wahlberg relies on only McDowell and Putnam, but not on the complete ecological view of experience including the ecological view of the brain. Perhaps this very restricted theoretical vantage point might be responsible for these problems in his proposal.

3.6 Describing Faith If it is true that Christian experience is no extraordinary kind of experience, but rather a kind of experience in experiencing, and if it is true that human experience can be more appropriately reconstructed under the conditions of the ecological brain than under the conditions of the representational dualistic view, then Christian faith can be described with the help of the ecological view of experience relying on the model of the ecological brain. The explication of this task in more detail is the subject matter of the following sections. 3.6.1 Faith and Semantic Externalism Due to its notion of fides quae creditur (the faith which is believed) Christian faith, insofar as it is also belief, can only be understood by means of semantic externalism as regards its object of belief. We can show this by applying Putnam’s Twin-Earth thought experiments to Christian faith. Imagine scenario A: A Christian, Albert, living on Earth, trusts the fact that the ultimate story of his own life is measured by the life and destiny of Jesus Christ who died for our sins. Imagine that Jesus Christ actually lived, died and that his death has a salvific function. Imagine scenario B on Twin-Earth with the believer Balbert holding the same belief as Albert. Twin-Earth is like Earth in every respect, except that Jesus never lived (and consequently never died).

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Imagine Scenario C on Third-Earth with believer Calbert holding the same belief as Albert. Third-Earth is in every respect like Earth, except that Jesus death was objectively of no salvific value. With regard to their beliefs and their own history, Albert, Balbert and Calbert are indistinguishable, and this would also be the case if there were a super-fMRI which could record their brainstates throughout their entire lives. The images produced would be exactly the same. However, the statuses of their beliefs are different and their beliefs are also different. Only Albert’s belief is knowledge, whereas the beliefs of Balbert and Calbert are not knowledge, but simply false beliefs. The meanings of their beliefs are also different. Now imagine that Balbert, without his knowledge, is teleported to Earth. His belief still does not become knowledge, because his belief refers to the history on Twin-Earth, not Earth. If he were be able to test his belief that Jesus actually lived by using a time machine on Earth, his belief would still not be justified. He only would think that his belief is now justified (because he also still believes he is on Twin-Earth); however, if he were to become aware that he is no longer on Twin-Earth, his test would become meaningless, especially if he could repeat his test after being back on TwinEarth. Consequently, the meaning of Christian faith is subject to semantic externalism and it is the factual state of affairs of history that determines the reference and meaning of the belief. The reference and the meaning of Christian belief is consequently dependent on the historical events. Furthermore, imagine the same scenario with Calbert instead of Balbert. Calbert discovers that Jesus had lived, on Earth as well as on Third-Earth. However, the meanings of Albert and Calbert’s beliefs are still different: Albert refers to a state of affairs where the real story of Jesus was one of salvific value, whereas Calbert refers to one without any salvific significance. However, Calbert has no chance of discovering the fact that he does not hold the same belief as Albert, since the fact ‘died for our sins’ cannot be subject to historical tests. The beliefs of Christians are therefore not only dependent on historical facts as necessary conditions of truth and of reference, but also on their narrative (or dogmatic) fittingness. Whereas in Albert’s world the belief refers to a state of affairs that fits narratively, in Calbert’s case his belief does not refer to a factually occurring state of affairs. Of course, the interesting question would be: Do we find ourselves to be in Albert’s case or in Calbert’s case? If we are in Albert’s, Christian faith amounts to actual knowledge of a real state of affairs, but if we happen to be in the same situation as Calbert, Christian faith is based on false perceptions. There is, however, no test for this. In sum, Christian belief can only be understood by referring to semantic externalism. 3.6.2 Faith and Active Externalism Andy Clark and Thomas Chalmers (see section 2.2.1.3 above) have noted that semantic externalism only has a historical meaning and also try to show that

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there is also an active externalism, including the concepts of extended cognitive capabilities, an extended mind and an extended personality. Christian faith is also subject to these features. In the last section we simply relied on the part of the content of Christian faith. But Christian faith is not primarily a belief, but personal trust. It is dependent on the viva vox evangelii, i. e. the communication of the gospel in Christian practise. According to Christian faith, this trust is not something like a property or attribute of the particular believer. Whereas parts of the content of faith, like the belief ‘Jesus Christ died for our sins’, can perhaps be known independently of the communication of faith, faith itself is not identical with this belief, but means that this belief directs one’s own actions in the mode of certainty (but not security). Faith means, therefore, trusting that the promise of the gospel—that God will act with respect to the one who trusts as he has acted with respect to Jesus Christ—will become true. Faith also includes doubt and temptation in the different events of one’s own life story. As a trustworthy promise, the gospel promise has to be communicated—no one can make the promise of the gospel to him- or herself. Therefore, the act of faith, fides qua, is subject to active externalism, since it is dependent on other agents in the world, on coChristians, called sisters and brothers, as without them there would be no faith at all. One Christian is no Christian at all. Consequently, faith is only a matter of the mind if there is such thing as an extended mind that includes the activities of other persons. A necessary constitutive factor of faith is traditionally called the verbum externum,67 i. e. all of the formative activities of the community of believers, both in their historical as well as synchronic dimension. In the last instance, Christians, due to their anthropology and their understanding of personhood—where persons are understood as particular whence-and-whither-becomings, as persons in relation to other persons or as ex-sistentiae—68 would also claim that personhood is extended, since other persons are just as necessary for one’s own identity, being and becoming.

3.6.3 Faith and Ecological Subjectivity Faith is always embodied faith and it is observable in syntopy, both for a trusting person in the 1st person perspective, as well as for other persons in a 3rd person perspective. The expressions of faith, such as acts of love or behaving in specific ways in circumstances of turmoil (Anfechtung, tentatio), are not separable additions to merely intentional belief, but are an integral part of faith itself. Historically, the Reformers rejected the medieval opinion that 67 Cf. Schwçbel, C., God: Action and Revelation, 24. 68 Cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 281 – 284.

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faith has to be formed by acts of love (fides caritate formata).69 Rather, faith is only faith if the acts of humans are already formed by faith. The distinction between the two positions is the following. Whereas in the Aristotelianmedieval tradition the relation between faith and works is seen as being external, the Reformers conceive the relationship of faith and works as internal. Consequently, faith implies the actuality of works. Yet one must add that this relationship is not only valid for active behaviour (works) but also for passive behaviour, such as suffering in conformity to Christ in being persecuted in particular situations. Imagine such a situation of persecution: Angela, a Christian, describes certain events as an opportunity to practise her faith in suffering, as being passively formed into the image of Christ, etc. An observer, however, will observe her as practising non-violent resistance. Nevertheless, this observer perceives Angela as being formed into the image of Christ, although he would not be able to describe it in this way unless he had spoken to Angela. Angela’s 1st person description ‘I am formed into the image of Christ’ and the observer’s 3rd person description ‘Angela practises nonviolent resistance’ are referring in syntopy to the same spatiotemporal event. Their descriptions might be different, but this is due to their differing phenomenological perspectives. Furthermore, there is not only syntopy between perceiving faith in the 1st and the 3rd person perspective, there is also a need for living faith being embodied and situated in the world. Luther’s claim that it is experience that makes a theologian, refers primarily to the experience of being subject to events of turmoil (Anfechtung, tentatio) in daily life. Faith, therefore, is not something that could be learned in an area separate from everyday experience, but only in, with and under this experience. In addition, the relationship between faith and everyday experience is not an external or separable one, but rather one that is internal. Therefore, faith is always embodied faith and it presupposes both the faith and action of sisters and brothers as well as being subject to persons of other faiths. It may be correct to describe faith primarily as a subjective reality, but this description is only true if this subjective reality is understood as an ecological and communitarian subjectivity. One could express this in the terminology of Schleiermacher70—without adopting his pneumatology—by claiming that there cannot be any consciousness of being absolutely dependent without there being a common spirit of community.

3.6.4 Faith as Conceptual Experience McDowell describes perception itself as a kind of conceptual experience. This argument can also be applied to the experience of Christian faith. In perceiving 69 Cf. Lohse, B., Theologie Luthers, 220. 70 Cf. Schleiermacher, F., Glaubenslehre 2, §121, 248 – 254; §123, 259 – 264.

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the world one does not perceive some state of affairs with hidden qualities which is only secondarily interpreted as creation, but the believer perceives the world as creation which is fallen, saved and destined to perfection. However, this does not mean what Wahlberg means, i. e. something which is intended by someone. The very perception is formed by the story of the gospel, which the believer has recognized as the truth of the story of his life and of his lifeworld. In this sense, perceiving creation, perceiving fallenness, perceiving grace and perceiving eschatical hope relies on what McDowell has called, using an Aristotelian term, ‘second nature’71. Indeed, perception is dependent on processes of personal formation (Bildung). Perception develops and alters with the different stages of personal development. However, what is added in these developmental processes is not the ability to interpret something as something. Rather, faith is a school of perception. A Christian does not perceive a human being in some kind of misery and then interprets her as being in the need of some help, but she simply experiences her as a fallen sister in the need of the grace of God and sibling love. If ‘being a fallen sister in the need of the grace of God and being in the need of sibling love’ were a predicate ascribed by acts of interpretation to something prevalently perceived, it would be an external relationship between some belief and something perceived, not an internal relationship between faith and perception. Furthermore, in the former case it would not alter at once the perception and behaviour of the perceiver and it would be without any ethical orientation. The fact that our perception develops according to our formation of second nature over the course of our whole life does not mean that it is not real perception. The skills and abilities acquired during these processes of personal formation rely on the development of the embodied and ecological brain. These skills and abilities provide open loops allowing the perception of the conceptual content of e. g. ‘being created by grace and in further need of grace’. These kinds of conceptual content, however, have to be seen as a structure of the perceived, as a quality of the interrelationship between the perceived and the perceiver. It might be true that this perception is a misperception. But if it were appraised to be a kind of interpretation, it would be self-contradictory from the beginning on. Christian sibling love does not rely on the ability of a ‘theory of mind’ in the sense of simulation: Christians do not simply transfer their own needs to the needs of the other. The ‘golden rule’ is not identical with the double commandment of love; it is simply a regulative rule, not a constitutive one.72 Therefore, having developed empathy during the first three years of development is more decisive for the practise of love than gaining the ability to develop beliefs about other minds in later stages of the development. 71 Whereas ‘second nature’ in a McDowellian interpretation seems to be a meaningful concept, it needs to be added that ‘second nature’ has to be liberated from its Aristotelian framework. 72 Cf. Mìhling, M., Ethik, 133 f.

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Christian faith in all its dimensions, including its structure of ecological subjectivity—i. e. its embodied dimension, its internal relatedness and copresence with other persons, communities and histories—, is therefore a means of perception of reality. Faith resembles more embodied means of the extended mind like notebooks, glasses, white canes, eyes and ears than philosophical belief systems, since faith is not simply just a theory. Faith does not ascribe attributes to something, but the one who trusts simply experiences the conceptual qualities of creation. 3.6.5 Faith and the Basic Self Christian faith provides a means of perception and is a kind of experience, but a kind of experience which shapes all forms of everyday experience. Therefore, what is true about the structures of everyday experience cannot be destroyed by the experience of faith. And since everyday experience is dependent on the experiential faculties and structures of the self—both as the basic self and as the personal self—, these structures also determine what Christian experience as a kind of religious experience can be. This is first true with respect to the basic self. The basic or embodied self in all its dimensions is decisive for the development of faith. Included in pre-reflexive self-awareness is the certainty of being a Leib, the immediate perception of ‘what it is like to be’, and the embodied protentional-retentional structures of every experience as well as the spatial perspectivity of every experience. Therefore, any exceptional and extraordinary experience, which claims that genuine religious experiences do not rely on these fundamental structures of experience, cannot be appraised as being genuinely religious. Furthermore, the dimension of the ecological self also belongs to the basic self, i. e. the experience of self-authorship as well as being an object of movements of other facts in the environment. Therefore, it is also the case that the experience of the relationship between other and self, and the experience of intentionality belong to every genuine religious experience. Finally, since the social-self, including its capacities for empathy, and other forms of interembodied tacit knowledge of other persons belong to the very basis of experience, these features also belong to genuine religious experience. Any claim that these features would not belong irreducibly to Christian faith as a form of religious experience must therefore be rejected. But it is not only these dimensions of the basic self that are decisive for religious experience. In the very occurrence of experience on the level of the pre-reflexive embodied self, religious experience as a basis of experience is present because in this kind of experience a pre-linguistic distinction is given. There is already a pre-reflexive awareness of passive relatedness to something including an awareness of a challenge to react. There is, in other words, an awareness of being a part of processes of reality. The awareness of oneself

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being challenged to react to something that is other implies the finitude of both oneself and the sum of the relata of the pre-reflexive relatedness. Therefore, the distinction between world (self-awareness, plus awareness of other relata) and its background of possibilities is given, but only implicitly. In reflecting the pragmatic insights of William James and John Dewey, Christoph Seibert explains this state of affairs: ‘If the meaning included in any possible coming to awareness is the provocation of processes of behaviour, this implies that the directedness of behaviour itself embodies meaningful structures bodily, whether it is explicitly thematic or not. In this respect one of the greatest advantages of pragmatist theories is certainly conceiving these dimensions of meaning as necessary aspects of the human quest’s intentional relatedness to a world. They are inherent to situatively rooted actual behaviour, which is already directed to select out of the plenitude of possibilities in order to realize more determined states of reality. And that means that meaning is always implied by embodied practise.’73

That meaning is implied by embodied practise, however, is something that can only be diagnosed from the perspective of the reflective self. The embodied or pre-reflective self indeed possesses the faculties of perceiving and behaving, but these aspects of embodied practise are not conscious as such. Furthermore, even after the reflexive self talks about these faculties retrospectively, its embodied structure remains. The embodied self is not something that could be abandoned by reflexion, and consequently the conditions of its appearances also remain persistent. In addition, the decisive feature of these appearances is not the distinction and internal relatedness of experience and activity as two basic parts of practise, but the origin of both in a kind of contingent—and therefore underdetermined—passivity that cannot be completely resolved by perception and behaviour, be it pre-reflexive or reflexive. In other words, the pre-reflexive self is internally passively related to something, but this relatedness is not yet intentional in the sense that there are intentions. This structure also persists for the reflexive self. Indeed, the reflexive self responds with intentionality in experiencing and acting, but the ‘whence’ of these responses is still purely contingent and underdetermined. Philipp Stoellger expresses this in the following way : 73 Seibert, C., William James, 391 f. („Liegt der in jedem Gewahrwerden beschlossene Sinn also darin, Verhaltensvollzüge zu provozieren, so impliziert das […], dass das Ausgerichtetsein des Verhaltens selbst schon sinnhafte Strukturen leibhaft verkörpert, ob ausdrücklich thematisch gemacht oder nicht. In diesem Zusammenhang besteht eine der stärksten Seiten pragmatistischer Theoriebildung gewiss darin, jene Sinndimensionen als notwenige Aspekte des Weltbezugs menschlichen Strebens zu begreifen. Sie sind dem situativ verwurzelten Verhaltensvollzug inhärent, der stets darauf aus ist, aus der Fülle gegebener Möglichkeiten auszuwählen, um im Zuge ihrer Realisierung zu bestimmungsreicheren Realitätslagen zu gelangen. Und das heißt: Sinn ist stets Implikat leibhafter Praxis.”)

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‘This pathos evokes ethos and logos, i. e, an event befalls one unintentionally and it evokes one’s own intentional response, because or since it is impossible not to answer.’74

Ethos and logos in this quote refer to the experiential and behavioural capacities and this logos does not have to be equated with the theological use of logos in particular. Stoellger is here referring to Waldenfels and his opinion that in this pathos, the passive event generates a challenge, which cannot be completely satisfied by the response. Furthermore, the response generates a new challenge. The event occurring in this sense is not only prevalent; it is also alien and remains alien in all resonances that respond to it. Nevertheless, the relationship between the alien event which occurs and the self is an internal relationship insofar as a self cannot be conceived without the occurrence of an alien event. In interpreting a quote of Waldenfels, Stoellger defines this responsive active relating, on the basis of this relatedness, as the very heart of experience: ‘“‘Having experiences’ does mean undergoing something and not producing something.” Therefore the matter is not an empirical or naturalistic reduction of the self to a marginal epiphenomenon […], but a broadening of the self to the embodied “incarnated” self, which is not a principle, but an “effect” (which itself is effecting). Effect is not meant in a causal or conditional sense, but it means a response, evoked by an framework of events, that makes comprehensible the transition from the whom to whom something befalls to the who of the response.’75

3.6.6 Faith and the Personal Self The personal or reflexive self is also decisive for the structures of Christian faith as a kind of experience that relates to experience itself. The dimension of the intentional self means that other agents are explicitly known as intentional agents; the reflexive self-consciousness means the ability to reflect on the awareness of one’s own perceived states of embodied mind as well as the other’s perceived states of embodied mind. Therefore, whatever 74 Stoellger, P., Passivität aus Passion, 350. („Dieses Pathos evoziert Ethos und Logos, das heißt: Ein Ereignis widerfährt einem nichtintentional und evoziert die eigene intentionale Antwort, weil oder sofern man darauf nicht nicht antworten kann.“) 75 Stoellger, P., Passivität aus Passion, 397. („,Erfahrungen machen‘ heißt etwas durchmachen und nicht etwas herstellen’. Daher geht es auch nicht um eine empiristische oder naturalistische Reduktion des Selbst auf ein marginales Epiphänomen […], sondern um dessen Weitung zum leibhaftigen, ,inkarnierten‘ Selbst, das nicht als Prinzip, sondern als ,Effekt‘ gelten kann (das seinerseits Wirkungen zeitigt). Effekt allerdings nicht im kausalen oder konditionalen Sinn, sondern als Antwort, evoziert durch einen Widerfahrnis- bzw. Ereigniszusammenhang, der den Übergang vom Wem etwas widerfährt zum Wer der Antwort darauf verständlich werden läßt.“) The quote-in-quote can be found in Waldenfels, B., Topographie des Fremden I, 19.

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Christian experience might be, these features have to be included in Christian experience. The decisive dimension for every Christian experience as well as for religious experience in general is, however, the dimension of narrative identity and the autobiographical self. Christian experience is any experience in which one’s personal experience is perceived within the frame of any number of more or less coherent stories that are measured by and incorporated into the story of the gospel. Seeing life incorporated into the story of the gospel, seeing one’s own autobiographical reconstructions and conceptual identity claims as relying on these narrative stories in the light of the story of the gospel, is the only specific feature that distinguishes Christian experience and perception from other kinds of religious experiences. If Thomas Fuchs is correct in his position that there cannot be a personal self without a narrative identity and an autobiographical self, then we can also see that if a person’s narrative is not shaped by the story of the gospel, it nevertheless has to be shaped by another story or another set of stories. The story or set of stories—they might fit coherently to one another or they might be combined as fragments with extreme tension—, which constitute the metastory in which experience generally is made, can be called the religion of the person. It might be the case that this story or set of stories coincides with the cultural realm that is normally called an institutional religion. But it might also be the case that it does not coincide with what is called institutional religion. In the latter case, where no particular religious institution is of theological significance for the person in question, the set of stories that factually provides the meta-narrative for the shaping of narrative identity and the autobiographical self is, however, of theological significance. Interreligious dialogue has to focus more on these theologically significant stories. Furthermore, if the theory of the personal self including its unrestrictive dimensions of the narrative self and the autobiographical self is correct, there is no religionlessness, even in the case that these stories are not labelled ‘religious’. Generally speaking, the social processes of normal human development include the potential for the development of religious convictions that, however, have to be actualized in one way or another. On the one hand, there is no pure religion in and of itself, only religions shaped by particular stories. On the other hand, we can see this potentiality for becoming bound to particular stories with regard to the self ’s narrative identity as ‘religion’. In this case, ‘religion’ is an open loop, i. e. the embodied self ’s need for combining its experiences into narratives and meta-narratives. This need or open loop has to be closed externally by different narratives, i. e. by particular religious traditions. It is obvious, that there might be narratives that close these open loops in ways that are more or less appropriate to our being situated in the processes of the lifeworld. However, it does not necessarily have to be one individual story that exclusively fulfils this role. In contrast to theories, narratives are far more open to incorporating other stories within

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themselves and combining stories with other stories to form meta-narratives. The reason for this is that theories rely strictly on coherence in the sense of conceptual non-contradiction, whereas stories can combine some (but not all) contradictions together as tensions in dramatic coherence.

3.7 Re-formulating the Initial Model of Revelation and Experience 3.7.1 The Structure of Narrative Identity There are a number of different approaches to personal narrative identity.76 For our purposes here, however, an account of a few aspects of one of the oldest approaches to narrative identity, that of Aristotle, may suffice. 1. Narrative identity is not simply historical identity. Humans do not narrate their identities as unchangeable facts about the past, but as reflexions on the protentional-retentional structure of experience. Therefore, narrative identity as a reflexion on experience includes the past, the present and the future. All these times, not only the future, are related as possibilities. It is obvious that future aspects of one’s own story can only be spoken about as possibilities. But the past and the present are also spoken about as possibilities rather than as unchangeable facts. The story of the narrative identity is no fixed text stored in the brain. Rather, the story has to be externally actualized: it is created, altered and recreated depending on the situation, the communication partners and the various other stories a person is confronted with. Narrative identity also belongs to the extended person and to the social person. Without communication and the presence of others there would be no self-narration. We can therefore correctly describe personal identity as narrative identity instead of as historical identity. This fits with Aristotle: ‘[…] it is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen,—what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity. The poet and the historian differ not by writing in verse or in prose. […] The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen.’77

2. The narratives at stake in personal identity are dramatic narratives built up in a process by the resonances between different actors. It is not the self that is the author of narrative identity ; rather the authors are the different 76 Cf. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 201 – 205; Taylor, Sources, 47; Davenport, Narrative Identity, Autonomy and Mortality ; Ricœur, Time and Narrative; Ricœur, Oneself As Another. An excellent discussion on narrative identity in Ricœur, Jenson and Hauerwas is provided by Schlarb, Narrative Freiheit. 77 Aristotle, Poetics (Engl.), ch. 9, p. 14.

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‘agents’, personal and pre-personal ones, who are perceived in experience together with the particular self. Therefore, the self is only a co-author of its narrative identity. In this self-narrating I not only involuntarily tell different stories to different people, but I also express different identity claims and I react to the different identity expectations of others.78 The reflexive dramatic identity or narrative identity is a resonance of experience and it shapes and forms experience. Therefore, narrative identity is not related to experience or reality as a representation, but every narrative episode is a resonance of experience and provides open loops for further experiences. We have to reject or modify Aristotle’s understanding at this point. Aristotle conceives poetry as a kind of mimesis of action.79 However, the Greek expression mimesis does not simply mean a representation or a report. Therefore, resonance seems to be a better way to characterize narrative identity. This also fits with Aristotle’s opinion that rhythmic kinds of arts, such as dancing, are also a kind of mimesis. However, it might be possible that Aristotle himself thought in a representationalist way. In this case we would simply reject his position at this point. A second point is also important. As a mimesis of action Aristotle does not simply refer to other personal agents, but also to nonpersonal entities and events.80 So the best explanation might be to say that narrative dramatic identity is a kind of reflexive resonance of the experience of processes and events in which the particular person is a part of. 3. Reflexive narrative identity not only resonates experience but also inaugurates and shapes experiences on the level of the basic self and on the level of moods, feelings and affectivity. ‘What it is like to be’ in a particular context, the mood immediately being experienced, depends on one’s experience of the other, but also on the particular story being told. Aristotle exemplifies this feature by reference to Greek tragedy : ‘But again, Tragedy is a mimesis not only of a complete action, but of events inspiring fear of pity.’81

4. As a reflexive activity of the personal self, narrative identity relies necessarily on the semiotic ability to use signs, i. e. on pragmatic, semantic and syntactic faculties. Although these semiotic abilities may be actualized in most cases by verbal expressions, verbality is not a necessary condition. Aristotle also includes music, rhythm and dance into his theory of poetry.82 The narrative identity therefore exists in continuity with the abilities of the 78 79 80 81 82

Cf. Vate, D.v.d.j., Romantic Love, 16 – 27; Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 273. Cf. Aristotle, Poetics (Engl.), ch. 1, p. 4 f; ch. 9, p. 14. Cf. Aristotle, Poetics (Engl.), ch. 2 – 3, p. 5 – 7. Aristotle, Poetics (Engl.), ch. 9, p. 15. Cf. Aristotle, Poetics (Engl.), ch. 1, p. 5.

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basic self; and, although it is an activity resonating on one’s own experience, it is not necessarily bound to the use of language. The ability to develop a narrative self does not depend on any ‘theory of mind’, but simply on the ability to fill roles in different situations in one way or the other ; i. e. in following rule-guided, semiotic action. 5. Also decisive for narratives is dramatic coherence. Dramatic or narrative coherence is not simply a kind of non-contradiction. It means that events are resonated in sequences that are bound together in a way that includes at the same time contingency and necessity. Aristotle writes that drama’s ability to resonate moods and feelings like fear or pity relies on this kind of dramatic coherence: ‘Such an effect is best produced when the events come on us by surprise; and the effect is heightened when, at the same time, they follow as cause and effect. The tragic wonder will be greater than if they happened of themselves or by accident; for even coincidences are most striking when they have an air of design.’

We are calling this the law of dramatic coherence. Implied is that future events are not merely the sum of all previous events. The sum of all previous sequences is not sufficient to describe the following one. Therefore, subsequent events are always experienced with more or less surprise and expectation. However, after an event has occurred, it can be conceived as the outcome of the other events. Dramatic coherence is emergent in the sense that all known or unknown events in the past and their effects only provide necessary conditions for subsequent events. The events of the past are determinative for the future course of a narrative, but only for its ability to distinguish between real possibilities, the set of future events that might be actualized contingently, and unreal possibilities, the set of events that cannot be actualized in the future. It is therefore decisive that a person involved in a (good) narrative cannot at any given time distinguish the sets of factual possibilities from the unreal possibilities. Since narrative identity is dramatic identity in the sense that there is more than one possibility for the course of the narrative, the set of future possibilities is always larger than the self ’s set of expectations. 6. A further feature of dramatic coherence is that it includes not only contingency and rules, but also tensions, which would be contradictions in the framework of predicative theories. Predicative theories belong to logic and logic in its simplest form is timeless. Therefore, the proposition p and the proposition not-p cannot both be incorporated into the same theory as true in the same respect. Narratives, however, possess irreducibly temporal or sequential structure, and therefore, different sequences at different times that claim p and not-p can occur simultaneously, as well as the fact that one particular sequence that claims both p and not-p may evolve; the only condition for dramatic coherence in this

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respect is that later sequences are able to lift up (aufheben) previous ones. It seems that Aristotle did not observe this feature of drama. His poetics sometimes tends to dissolve contingency into necessity. A better expression and explanation of this feature of dramatic coherence can be found in a theory not originally developed to describe the narrative, but the conceptual: Hegel’s dialectic and its moment of Aufhebung (to lift up, to elevate, to keep, to preserve, to sublimate, to absorb, to supersede, to remove, to negate).83 However, our claim is that Hegel’s notion only works in the realm of narratives, not in the realm of the conceptual. 7. Since the narratives of personal narrative identity are never complete, they produce horizons of expectation at every stage of experience. Since the underlying narratives are not stored in the brain, but have to be actualized in actual communicative sign use, the narratives resonating our experiences are in most cases tacit. However, the horizons of expectation are a persistent effect of these stories. In the moment where the basic self is further developed into the personal self, including its narrative identity, horizons of expectation are there. All human experience as well as action happens within specific horizons of anticipation and expectation. These horizons of expectation can be divided up between two primary distinctions, one affective and one rational. The affective distinction means that horizons of expectation are structured on the affective distinction between fearing and hoping and therefore on the experiences of the basic self. Human affectivity shapes this horizon of expectation, but so does human reason. In this regard, it has been suggested that distinctions be made between four modes of expectation derived from the resonances between experience and narrative identity :84 a) The unsurprising: there are some things we simply expect with more or less certainty, e. g. that a lecture will end, for example, or that Tuesday will follow Monday, etc. We have certain sure evidence in our 83 Cf. Hegel, G.W.F., Enzyklopädie, Teil 1, Werke 8, §96, 204 f: ‘We have to remember the double meaning of our German term aufheben. We understand with aufheben first to remove, to negate as in saying e. g. a law or an institution, etc. is aufgehoben. Furthermore, aufheben also means to keep s.th. or to preserve s.th., and we are using the term with this meaning, that something is aufgehoben in a good manner. This double meaning, according to which the same term has a positive and a negative meaning, is anything else but accidental. And we have to beware to accuse the language use as if there were confusion. In fact, we experience the speculative spirit of our language that transcends the pure either–or.’ „Es ist hierbei an die gedoppelte Bedeutung unseres deutschen Ausdrucks aufheben zu erinnern. Unter aufheben verstehen wir einmal soviel als hinwegräumen, negieren, und sagen demgemäß z. B., ein Gesetz, eine Einrichtung usw. seien aufgehoben. Weiter heißt dann aber auch aufheben soviel als aufbewahren, und w i r sprechen i n diesem Sinn davon, daß etwas wohl aufgehoben sei. Dieser sprachgebräuchliche Doppelsinn, wonach dasselbe Wort eine negative und eine positive Bedeutung hat, darf nicht als zufällig angesehen noch etwa gar der Sprache zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, als zu Verwirrung Veranlassung gebend, sondern es ist darin der über das bloß verständige Entweder-Oder hinausschreitende spekulative Geist unserer Sprache zu erkennen.“ 84 Cf. Mìhling, M., Eschatologie, 41 – 48, and Mìhling, M., Eschatical Perfection.

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horizon of expectations that such events will happen. They are located close to the centre of a horizon of expectations. b) The prospectively surprising: Some events may be highly improbable, but we are able to imagine them happening. It is very improbable that the President of the United States will appear in the publishing house of this book and that he—out of gratitude for the new insights gained by this book—will appoint its author as his new Minister of Philosophy. However improbable it may be, the fact that I am able to imagine it signifies that were it to happen, it would have to be classified as a prospective, or imaginable surprise. Events of this kind lie within our horizon of expectations, but they are located closer to the margins. c) The absolutely retrospectively surprising: Some events are absolutely surprising. These can only be events that lie completely beyond the horizon of expectations. I cannot provide an example of such an event. If I could, it would mean it would have to be classified under one of the other subsets of events. Therefore, we have to call it ‘absolutely retrospective’ because we can label such events as surprises only after they have happened. Nevertheless, it does seem that expecting such absolutely retrospective surprises is essentially human. Absolutely retrospectively surprising events broaden our horizon of expectations and are essential elements of our life experience. Viewed from the present, however, such events are to be seen as located beyond our horizon of expectations. d) The relatively retrospectively surprising. There is a fourth kind of future event in our lives which plays a key role in narrative identity. It is a combination of the first and the third kind of surprising event. While we expect to be surprised by some future events in a retrospective way, because we have sufficient evidence that they will happen, we do not yet know in what manner they will occur. Good birthday presents belong to this kind of event: I expect a future event belonging to the first type, e. g. my birthday this year still lies in the future. Therefore, I expect to get birthday presents, but I have no idea what those gifts will be. Thus, they belong to the realm of the relatively retrospectively surprising. As we are using different kinds of stories to express narrative identity, we also have different horizons of expectations, depending on our involvement in different communities, different times of action and different relationships to different people. But since narrative identity is always lifted up in the autobiographical self and its meta-narrative, there is something like an almost implicit all-inclusive horizon of expectation. This all-inclusive horizon of expectation can be called the ultimate or eschatical or religious horizon of expectation. Whereas all our particular horizons of expectation can be broadened by future experience, our eschatical horizon of experience cannot be broadened by surprising

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events in the future. Or, rather, it can be changed by surprising events in the future, but this is not a kind of broadening but a kind of ‘conversion’. The reason is that particular horizons of expectation are dependent on sequences or stories that can be bound together within the framework of a meta-narrative, whereas the meta-narrative cannot be incorporated in another one without being altered. Some of these ‘conversions’ might not appear to be ‘conversions’ in everyday life, e. g. in the case where members of a religious community only observe that a particular person has changed his religious practise, whereas other kinds of these ‘conversions’ are recognized as such, especially when the particular person leaves the particular community. Horizons of expectation are not sets of concepts or predicates. Rather they consist in possible successions of stories, possible sequences or possible events. But even this description is still somehow inadequate, since there is no set of identifiable sequences. In addition, horizons of expectation do not simply belong to a circumscribable mind, but rather to the extended mind embedded in communities and nature. The only way to discover their existence is the fact that life provides surprises. 8. Whereas in Continental systematic theology narrative approaches can be seen as the exception, they are common in Anglophone theology and found in a wide variety. Of course, there have also been a number of critiques.85 Among these, Celia Deane-Drummond’s view is important for our aims. Referring to Hans Urs von Balthasar and Aristotle, DeaneDrummond introduces the distinction between narratives—also called epic narratives—on the one hand and drama on the other. The epic character of narratives consists in their closedness, their exclusion of contingency by necessity and their claim to have an objective view from nowhere. Drama, by contrast, includes greater possibilities of freedom for its actors. Conceptual theories and models are also included within this basic distinction, which can either be epic narratives or dramatic narratives. In using the term ‘dramatic narratives’ instead of ‘drama’, we are slightly correcting Deane-Drummond’s view for the following reasons. Deane-Drummond combines her critique with the postmodern talk of the end of all grand narratives. She does not thereby subscribe to a vulgar arbitrariness, but sees the danger of the epic narrative in consisting in losing its power of orientation and motivation, since epic narratives produce fatalistic attitudes, promote decontingentization and exclude the world’s openness. Theology, by contrast, has to use von Balthasar’s concept of theodrama. Creatures, including human persons, non-human animals and pre-personal entities are among the actors in the theodrama, 85 Cf. e. g. Murphy, F., God is not a Story ; Deane-Drummond, C., Christ and Evolution; Strawson, G., Against Narrativity ; Williams, Life as Narrative; Lippitt, Getting the Story Straight.

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whereas God can be described as its director. Deane-Drummond also admits that theodramatic approaches need at least some form of narrative in order to work.86 Deane-Drummond’s critique does mention several decisive features, but I would suggest that the main distinction to be drawn is more the one between myths that are not disclosed as myths, as is often the case with conceptual theories, on the one hand, and between narrative approaches in general that include contingency, open possibilities and fallibility on the other. Despite the fact that the main differences between Deane-Drummond’s theodramatic approach in the tradition of von Balthasar and the dramatic-narrative ontology presented in this book might be primarily due to divergences in terminology, and despite the fact that these two approaches might converge in their intentions, there are three points that still have to be mentioned. First, personal beings, even when they conceive of themselves as actors involved in dramatic episodes, have autobiographical selves that force them to perceive their past within the framework of particular episodes connecting their narratives together, and that forces them to explore future possibilities of action and behaviour by perceiving their expectations and possibilities within the framework of the potential and provisional courses their narratives can take. These fallible narratives are always meta-narratives, since they connect individual episodes and sequences, but not grand narratives, because they do not include necessity and infallibility. Second, I am somewhat sceptical about the notion of the end of all grand narratives, if this indeed means the programmatic abandonment of any structure connecting fragmentary sequences. Such claims can become dangerous, because in this case all narrative elements that necessarily appear (due to our autobiographical self) would then no longer be seen as autobiographical. A narration can only be a biography of an autos if the sequences constituting this particular narration include contingency, but are not connected in a purely contingent way. But they would nevertheless implicitly work in the described narratival way. We can also combine this with a logical critique. If one claims the end of all grand narratives in a rigorous way, this claim would constitute a grand narrative in itself, including all the very same features the thesis wants to deny.87 Thirdly, the Aristotelian approach to drama is far too polluted by necessity, as we have seen above. We therefore had to add Hegel’s term Aufheben in order to gain the concept of dramatic coherence. At this point, however, we have to avoid certain misunderstandings. Hegel’s philosophy appears to exclude alterity and contingency altogether and in using the term Aufheben we are 86 Cf. Deane-Drummond, C., Christ and Evolution, esp. 48 – 53. 87 The thesis of the end of all grand narratives can be traced back to Lyotard’s famous analysis in Lyotard, J.-F., Postmodern Condition, 9 – 16. In contrast to some of his more radical followers I do not see Lyotard himself making the mistake of providing a new grand narrative.

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not adopting Hegelianism in any way. As we have seen, Hegel introduces the term by referencing its common German usage, including its manifold meaning as negation, conservation, transformation, being open for future development, etc. As a result, we did not translate the term with the commonly used ‘to sublate’, but the more appropriate ‘to lift up’ and other translations to signify explicitly that we are not adhering to Hegel’s dialectics in order to attain the concept of dramatic coherence. The concept of dramatic coherence thereby enables metanarratives, understood as being constructed out of dramatic episodes, which are neither closed, nor decontingentized nor claim to posses a ‘view from nowhere’.

3.7.2 Religious Experiences, Disclosure Experiences and Revelation Based on considerations in the previous section, we are now in a position to modify the concepts of experience and revelation maintained by the ‘initial model’ outlined in section 3.2. In principle, all that has to be done is the substitution of predication with perception and the interpretative framework with the narratively constituted horizon of expectation. First, we are now able to describe what ‘religious experience’ means: (A) Religious experience: A perceives in the perspective of embodied situation B an event C in the framework of his/her ultimate horizon of expectations D, which is derived from the communally constituted dramatic meta-narrative of his/her identity with the effect E. Religious experiences are not necessarily disclosure experiences. They are simply experiences like any given everyday experience, with the exception that the background story and the implied horizon of expectations is not a particular one, but the one which provides the canonical framework for A’s narrative identity. Accordingly, the same event in the same embodied situation can be perceived by the same person A in light of different stories. For example, the event in which accountant Albert calculates Victoria’s tax return could be perceived by Albert as part of the particular narrative of his daily work routine. In this case, Victoria is simply perceived to be a client and the effect might be to spare time in his calculations in order to maximize the amount of clients he can take. The same event could also be perceived in the light of the gospel. In this case, Albert will perceive Victoria as a sister in Christ and his work of calculating her tax return as a duty that helps his brothers and sisters in Christ negotiate their lives. Consequently, the effect E could be completely different, like doing the calculation more seriously and also spending time with the brother/sister as a person and not only as a means to an end. Perceived within the light of the story that determines one’s narrative identity and its implied ultimate horizon of expectations, any experience can

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be a religious or a pious one. But since the effects are contingent upon the story providing the narrative framework, the event itself also changes and its identity is dependent on the different stories of the different persons of which it is a part of. Not every religious experience is also a religious disclosure experience. Disclosure experiences are experiences in which the absolutely retrospectively surprising or at least the relatively retrospectively surprising—relatively to a particular horizon of expectation and its story—is perceived, with the implication that the effect E is not just any effect, but one inherently bound to the horizon of expectations itself: the effect is the broadening or alteration of the horizon of experience and therefore the alteration and retelling of the background story. Disclosure experiences in this sense are not necessarily religious experiences; one can speak of a religious disclosure experience only if the horizon of expectations is the ultimate one and its background story is the meta-narrative of one’s ultimate identity : (B) Religious disclosure experience: A perceives in the perspective of embodied situation B an event C that exceeds the framework of his/her ultimate horizon of expectations D, which is derived from the communally constituted dramatic meta-narrative of his/her identity, with the implication of altering his/her ultimate horizon of expectation to D*, based on the altered communally constituted dramatic meta-narrative of his/ her identity. The embodied situation B can be a more or less closed one. It can be a specific spatiotemporally located event, such as, for example, Paul’s encounter with the risen Christ most likely was, but it can also come in the form of a larger sequence of the life story of A, which takes more time, like days, months or years. A decisive test of whether a disclosure experience is really a religious one is that it can be described in the perspective of revelation. Therefore, the structure of (B) can be expressed in terms of: (C) Religious revelation: X provides in the perspective of the embodied situation B an event C for A that extends the ultimate horizon of expectation D, which is derived from the communally constituted dramatic meta-narrative of A’s identity, and thereby alters the communally constituted dramatic meta-narrative and the implied ultimate horizon of expectation to D*. Whereas experience is described from the perspective of the one who perceives the experience, revelation is described from another standpoint that is ultimately the standpoint of the entity who is responsible for the revelation. In our formula, we have called this entity X. In non-religious revelation, X can be anything or anyone except the one who actually perceives the revelation. Although the one who perceives the revelation is active in providing open loops, the responsible entity has to be a state of affairs in the world distinct

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from the one who perceives the revelation, since perception means perceiving a conceptual content that is already a part of the objective world, according to the history of one’s formation of a second nature. However, in the case of religious revelation, the responsible entity X cannot be either a completely spatiotemporally localizable feature or event in the world, or likewise a set of different parts or events in the world. If one were to identify this entity X with a human being or a specific natural mechanism, then this entity would already be, by definition, part of an existing horizon of expectations and therefore incapable of being responsible for providing its alteration or expansion.88 Therefore, the entity X of religious revelation can be identified with classical minimal descriptions of God, such as ‘that which determines the entirety of reality’, ‘that which brackets time’, ‘that which brackets every possible kind of experience’, or ‘that, than which nothing greater can be conceived’. In other words, entity X of religious revelation is a transcendental one, i. e. it has to be identified with the condition of the possibility of experience itself. This transcendentally responsible entity X can also be a merely transcendent one; in this case it would be no real revelation, because it necessarily has to remain completely undetermined and inconceivable. Religious experiences in the apophatic mystical traditions belong to this kind. Transcendental entity X can also be identified with the entirety of the world itself; in this case the religious experience would be a pantheistic one. Or, transcendental entity X can be identified as partly immanent to the realm of experience, but at the same time as transcending it. This is the case in most forms of the classical religious traditions and especially Christianity.

3.8. Three Resonating Stories and Two Sets of Actors Christians live out their daily experiences in resonance with the story of the gospel. Their perceptions, behaviour and actions are formed by this story, i. e. they live in resonance with this story. In short, perceptions and actions are the practise, and according to our insights gained from the neurosciences, this practise is always embodied, and as such both communitarian and embedded in the natural world. One can therefore describe Christian experience as perceiving the world in the framework of an entanglement of four stories that are decisive factors in the formation of the narrative identity of a person: (1) the story of the gospel, (2) the story of the communities, i. e. the social niches we live in, and (3) the story of nature, i. e. the natural niches we inhabit, and (4) the story of our fragmentary and process-like autobiographical consciousness based on the basic self. All these stories provide important and necessary 88 This argument can be understood as a reformulation of Schleiermacher’s argument in Schleiermacher, F., Glaubenslehre 1, §4, 23 – 30.

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conditions for Christian experience and behaviour and none are dispensable. Agents in all of these stories and their ongoing communication contribute influences for coming to and maintaining faith. Therefore, this implies that coming to and maintaining faith cannot be reduced to one single story. However, since in the entanglement of these stories the story of the gospel provides the factor that determines the ultimate horizon of expectation, i. e. the character of experience as Christian experience, the story of the gospel precedes the other stories in a specific sense: The entanglement between the stories has to resonate in such a way that excludes (dramatic) incoherence with the story of the gospel. If we ask how these stories are resonating, and who the authors of the narrative identity in total are, the answer has to be that regardless of the importance of all mundane authors the decisive or constituting author in the last instance is that ‘which brackets time’ or ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’—i. e. the divine—in the way as it is accessible in the story of the gospel. The decisive question therefore is: Is there a common structure or a common content of this story of the gospel? Before we proceed to suggest an answer, we will sum up what we have found in the last section: Christian experience and behaviour, i. e. Christian practise is (1) constituted and maintained by the joint resonances between the agents in the personal and pre-personal stories as a necessary condition. In classical theological speech we can call this, along with the Reformers, the verbum externum or the embodied word.89 (2) The ultimate ground of the story of the gospel is the second necessary source of the constitution of faith and its maintenance. We can call this, in accordance with the Reformers and especially Calvin, the testimonium internum.90 Classically, the testimonium internum means the inner experience of evidence for the truth of the verbum externum in the hearts of the believers, inaugurated by the Holy Spirit. Perhaps at this point we can find some remnants of Calvin’s dualistic worldview when it is said that this experience of evidence is an inner one. But this dualistic remnant can be extinguished without any difficulty. We simply have to add that the experience of evidence is always an embodied experience.

3.9 The Self-Presentation of the Triune God When we talk about the ‘gospel story’ we are not referring to ‘gospel’ as a kind of text. The gospel is the viva vox evangelii, the living voice of the gospel, i. e. 89 Cf. CA 5, Die Bekenntnisschriften der Evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, herausgegeben im Gedenkjahr der Augsburgischen Konfession 1930, BSLK 58, 12 f. The German version of the Latin ‘verbum externum’ is significantly ‘leibliches Wort’; cf. BSLK 453, 18 f. 90 Cf. Luther, M., WA 17/II, 459,35 – 460,6. The terminology ‘testimonium internum’ is shaped by Calvin, cf. Essler, H.H., Die Lehre vom “testomonium Spiritus Sancti internum” bei Calvin.

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the actual communication of the promise in actualizing the witness of Scripture. Scripture, however, does not consist of a single story, but of many stories. What makes them the ‘Scripture’ for Christians is simply that these stories are themselves witnesses to the promise of God in Christ through the Spirit. Therefore, there is no basic categorical distinction between Scripture and tradition. The distinction is in the first case a historically contingent one. There can be no satisfactory answer of why these texts became Scripture and not others that can come from beyond sheer historical reasoning. However, according to Karl Barth the historical contingency of the Scripture does not mean that the canon is a work of the church. Rather it is an acknowledgment of something that is antecedently and contingently given.91 The historical contingency of Scripture therefore resonates the historical contingency of the divine self-presentation in Christ. Linguistically speaking, the texts of Scripture are not only stories, but they are stories of many different kinds, including juridical texts in the OT or letters addressing specific situations in the NT. However, all these stories and texts do form a meta-narrative; and this meta-narrative can be described by a threefold narrative of experience and a threefold narrative of identification of the divine. The threefold narrative of Christian experience is (1) the experience that experiencing something is always antecedently given and necessarily not constructed by humans jointly with pre-personal beings. This is the experience that there is something and not nothing at all, i. e. the experience of being created. It can be called the experience of creatio ex nihilo; i. e. the experience of the fact that the experience of oneself as one who experiences and any possible intentional content of experience is inaugurated by a divine entity without any presupposition in the world. Creation, therefore, is not about the factual, but primarily about the possible!92 (2) We also have to mention the fact that life can be imagined in a better way than it actually is, and any real good way of life, not only one better than the actual one, is also passively constituted by this divine entity. It is, in other words, the experience of being saved sola gratia, without any presupposition in the world and despite being misled by one’s own works. Salvation leads (3) to the experience of living a life of hope, not fear, in the perfection of the world. However, this kind of perfection also shares the trait of being a gift sola gratia, i. e. not predictable or being a subject of extrapolation of natural and social processes. The threefold narrative identifying the divine can be described with help from ideas by Robert Jenson and Christoph Schwöbel,93 but in a modified 91 Cf. Barth, K., CD I/2, 473. 92 Cf. Dalferth, I.U., Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen. Hermeneutische Religionsphilosophie, 139 – 141. Dalferth here defines the concept of a world as the horizon of the possibilities of actualities. 93 Cf. Robert W. Jenson, ‘The Triune God’ in Robert W. Jenson/Carl E. Braaten, ed., Christian Dogmatics, vol. 1, (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 79 – 191; Christoph Schwöbel, ‘Trinitätslehre

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manner. We can identify a threefold narrative structure in the gospel story. 1. Jesus Christ is seen as the ultimate personal disclosure of the divine: he is the preeminent actor in the story through his implicit claims about being the kingdom of God himself, both in his person and his actions. 2. This kingdom of God proclaimed by Jesus Christ is the kingdom of the God of Israel, a God who is addressed as his Father, the creator of the world. 3. The result of his claim is his death on the cross, which appears to suggest the failure of his claims. However, Christians claim that he has been resurrected. Asked for the reason for this belief, Christians answer with reference to the activity of God, which discloses that Christ is alive (Gal 1:15 f). Since this activity of God among believers has not come to an end but continues to generate faith in people living today, the lives of people today merge with the story told to them, which is also related in this story of the gospel itself. The threefold narrative structure of the gospel can also be evaluated as an identity descriptor of the Christian God, abbreviated with the use of proper names and understood as the story of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. In the history of theology, a theoretical reflexion on this self-identifying story has lead to the notions of the classical doctrine of the Trinity. In short, the identities Father, Son and Spirit are constitutively related to one another through relationships which the Christian tradition describes with different terms. The Eastern tradition speaks about the two relationships of gennesis and ekporeusis, the Western tradition since Richard of St. Victor has tended to speak of a single relationship of processio, providing the necessary personal proprieties with the help of the filioque.94 We could discuss which of these descriptions is more appropriate. We could also discuss whether we have to add other or new descriptions of this eschatical or ultimate relationship.95 However, for now we want to focus on the logical structure of the descriptions of this relationship, independent of its semantic content and independent of its ontological claims: 1. The story of the Father is not the story of Christ or the Holy Spirit and the story of Christ is not the story of the Father or the Holy Spirit. The same holds true for the story of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the relationship between them is one of asymmetry (but it is nevertheless reciprocal). 2. The Father is in a way related to the Son and the Spirit in which he is not als Rahmentheorie des christlichen Glaubens’ in Christoph Schwöbel, Gott in Beziehung, (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2002), 25 – 51. 94 Cf. Richard von St. Victor, De Trinitate (Paris: J. Vrien, 1958), 5,13, p. 336; as interpreted by Markus Mühling, Gott ist Liebe. Studien zum Verständnis der Liebe als Modell des trinitarischen Redens von Gott, 2nd ed. (Marburg: Elwert, 2005), p. 164. 95 Robert Jenson, for example, has added relations of liberations to the classical relations of origin, and Jürgen Moltmann distinguishes between a level of constitution and a level of execution of life in the inner-divine relations. Cf. Jenson, R.W., ST I, 156, 158, 161 and Moltmann, J., Trinität und Reich Gottes, 194, 199 – 201.

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related to himself. Further, the Son is in a way related to the Father and the Spirit in which he is not related to himself. The same holds true for the Spirit’s relationship to the Father and the Son. Hence, this ultimate relationship is a relationship of irreflexivity. 3. a) Coming to faith means experiencing the activity of the Holy Spirit. But the gospel communicated in the Christian discourse of God tells us that the Holy Spirit is related to Jesus Christ. Therefore, experiencing the activity of the Holy Spirit always implies experiencing the activity of Jesus Christ. For this reason, the mainline churches of the Christian tradition have refused to talk about any activity of the Holy Spirit as unconnected to the activity of Christ. b) Furthermore, since the story of Jesus Christ implies the story of the God of Israel as Creator, experiencing the activity of Jesus Christ means experiencing the activity of the God of Israel. For this reason, the church has rejected the view of Marcion and others that there can be Christian faith without reference to the God of Israel. Given a) and b) we can conclude that since experiencing the activity of the Spirit means experiencing the activity of Christ, and since experiencing the activity of Christ means experiencing the activity of the Father, then experiencing the activity of the Spirit means also experiencing the activity of the Father. In other words, the relationship between Father, Son and Spirit is a relationship of transitivity. The logical structure of the divine identities of the divine meta-narrative is the structure of an asymmetrical, irreflexive and transitive relation. Admittedly, in comparison to many descriptions of God from Christian tradition such as ‘life’ or ‘love’, this talk about God does not seem very vivid and illustrative. We will come to more vivid descriptions later on in this book. But the advantage of this very formal description is that it can include many vivid descriptions of God from language derived from the practice of piety and theology, because it avoids all semantic definitions and uses only syntactical ones. For reasons we will explore later on, we can add another formal characteristic: this ultimate relationship between the three identities can also be described as an open event96. The story of the gospel closes neither with the last pages of Scripture nor with the present state of humans and their development. If, in the threefold narrative of Christian experience, humans do not experience themselves as either self-created, self-healed or as subjects of self-perfection, and furthermore, if the threefold ground of experience itself can be identified as Father, Son and Spirit, then we can conclude that the divine ground cannot be completely transcendent to experience. The tradition has expressed this insight with the concept of incarnation: an embodied God in a manger, on the cross, in96 Cf. Mühling, Gott ist Liebe, p. 276, 308 – 315.

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between manger and cross and thereafter as the present Christ. But this kind of embodiment of God also determines the other kinds of God’s activity, not only God’s action with regard to salvation. Accordingly, the Reformers described the relationship between the threefold narrative of experience and the threefold identification of God as the threefold narrative of the action of God. The decisive point here is that it is a threefold story of embodiment, because it is a threefold story of action as divine self-giving: ‘For by this knowledge we obtain love and delight in all the commandments of God, because here we see that God gives Himself entirely to us, with all that He has and is able to do, to aid and direct us in keeping the Ten Commandments—the Father, all creatures; the Son, His entire work; and the Holy Ghost, all His gifts.’97

This quote can be found at the end of Luther’s explanation of the Apostles’ Creed as a summary of faith. Similar to how we have seen within the framework of the model of the ecological brain that experience, activity and affectivity cannot be separated, Luther speaks analogously of knowledge or experience that provide us with love and delight, which are affective states, for the Commandments, i. e. to our ethical action. The basis for this combination of knowledge, action and a specific affective state of affairs is our perception; in Luther’s words, the fact that we are ‘seeing’ something. And the object of believers’ perception is the entire selfgiving of God in his triune identity as Father, Son and Spirit. The consequence of this concept of divine action as self-giving is that the identification of God also has to be seen as a self-identification. And since this self-identification is not only a self-identification in the story of the gospel alone, but a self-identification in the entanglement of the stories of the gospel, the story of nature, the stories of communities and of the autobiographical self, this self-identification has also to be understood as a self-presentation in, with and under all forms of experience. Therefore, God’s revelation has to be understood as a self-presentation. It is therefore in, with and under experience that the triune God is perceived. Revelation is therefore not simply a new supply of information for an enclosed human mind about something that is merely transcendent to everyday experience. Revelation is also not interpretation. God’s self-presentation is perceived immediately by Christian believers. It is not necessary to have theological theories about the triune God in order to perceive the triune God. Further, as it is not necessary to have a theory of mind in order to be empathically related to others, it is also not necessary to be acquainted with the doctrine of the Trinity. However, human beings as creatures also have cognitive needs. ‘Theologizing’ is therefore an important activity, though not a basic one. It relies necessarily on experience and practise. 97 Luther, M., Large Catechism, 76; German orig. in: Die Bekenntnisschriften der Evangelischlutherischen Kirche, herausgegeben im Gedenkjahr der Augsburgischen Konfession 1930, BSLK, 661, 35 – 42. Italics mine.

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We are now able to apply our explications of the concepts of religious experience, religious disclosure experience and religious revelation, as we explained them in section 3.7, to our concept of divine self-presentation: (A) Christian Experience: A perceives in the perspective of the embodied situation B an event C as created, in need of salvation and perfection in the framework of his/her horizon of hope D, that is derived from the entangled dramatic story of the gospel (as a metanarrative of his/her identity) with the effect E. (B) Disclosure Experience in Christian Perspective: A perceives in the perspective of the embodied situation B an event C as created, in need of salvation and perfection in exceeding the framework of his/her ultimate horizon of expectations D, that is derived from the communally constituted dramatic meta-narrative of his/her identity’, with the implication of altering his/her ultimate horizon of expectation to the horizon of hope D*, based on the entangled dramatic story of the gospel as the new meta-narrative of his/her identity. (C) Revelation as Divine Self-Presentation: Father, Son and Holy Spirit disclose in the perspective of the embodied situation B themselves as God to A, which extends the ultimate horizon of expectations D, that is derived from the communally constituted dramatic meta-narrative of A’s identity ; thereby meaning that Father, Son and Spirit alter the communally constituted dramatic meta-narrative and the implied ultimate horizon of expectations to the new story of the gospel and the horizon of hope D*. In this chapter we focussed on the phenomenological questions: ‘What is Christian experience?’ and ‘As who is God present in this experience?’ One of the decisive theoretical and more cognitive questions of theology is: ‘What kind of God is this, who self-identifies and presents his identity in the entanglement of these stories?’ One could simply answer, like Stanley Hauerwas for example, that it has to be a ‘storied God’.98 Although this answer is correct, it does not give us enough information, because the question is an ontological question, but the answer is not an ontological answer. At the end of this book we will give a preliminary answer to this ontological question with the help of a model, i. e. a kind of preliminary, fallible ontology. But we cannot proceed directly to this task. Since God is self-identified within the entanglement of the stories of the gospel, the communities, the natural world and the autobiographical self, we need to have a closer look at these other stories. In order to restrict ourselves, we will deal only with one part of these other stories, in our case, the story of nature insofar as it concerns the pre-personal and the personal realm, i. e. evolution. 98 Cf. Hauerwas, S., Community of Character, 91.

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4. Evolution as Niche Construction 4.1 Introduction In chapter 2 we saw that the brain has to be understood as embodied and that the living body is related in partly internal or reciprocally constitutive relations to its environment. Therefore, to speak of the brain is also to speak about the environment; the brain is basically the ecological brain. It cannot be understood apart from the history of the person in question and his or her environment. History, however, is a process and thus means change. Since the onset of modernity, people have appeared to be more concerned than in other times to find hidden laws and rules by which these changes and processes, which constitute the life-world, can be explained. Perhaps this has to do with a specific modern attitude or a specific modern mood of life-experience that is elsewhere1 called an apocalyptic attitude: The feeling that one proceeds through changes into the future rather than the feeling of experiencing changes coming to us from the future. This attitude can be called apocalyptic because the common and decisive feature of apocalyptism is not so much an awareness of living at the end of a specific history—that can be called imminentism—but the consciousness of being in possession of a revelation about the somehow hidden laws of change of this history.2 With regard to what we normally call history—the story of our societies since the advent of written sources or at least archaeological artefacts—the endeavour of looking for these assumed laws of history was not very fruitful. Lessing and other modern thinkers thought that something like constant progress towards the good was the hidden rule of history, Hegel thought there might be a dialectic of what his followers called thesis, antithesis and synthesis, and Oswald Spengler thought cultures might rise and fall like the development of the individual human body.3 Despite the fact that there has never been any consensus or universally accepted set of facts indicating that the history of our cultures is driven by these very different and jointly exclusive ‘laws’ convictions about the validity of these laws have became certainties and securities—intolerant ideologies— for people, communities and even entire cultures. This is partially responsible for the streak of cruelty in modernity. The attempt to extirpate or overrule

1 Cf. Mìhling, M., Eschatologie, 198 – 220. 2 Cf. Mìhling, M., Eschatologie, 199 – 203. 3 Cf. Mìhling, M., Eschatologie, 206.

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those elements of society that do not follow such convictions about the hidden laws of history.4 However, not all processes of events are simply cultural ones. As embodied persons we have a living body, including a natural history. In addition, our communities and societies are also embodied, and also have a partly natural history. Understanding this natural history can by no means completely clarify the question of our nature or natures, but, whatever we might be, we do have a natural history as well. Whereas the attempt to gain insight into the laws of culture can perhaps be appraised as one of the failed projects of modernity, the attempt to get insight into the laws of natural history and natural change was surprisingly successful. From Darwin’s time on, evolutionary theory itself evolved. This development was not without dead ends and mazes, but all in all, by the end of the 20th century the scientific community was able to work satisfactorily with a theory called Neo-Darwinism or the Modern Synthesis. Moreover, from the beginning on, theology also appreciated the development of evolutionary theory ;5 and additionally, used evolutionary theories as models for developing different suggestions for new, often creative theologies but also sometimes highly problematic ones.6 The common impression today that there has always been a conflict between evolutionary theory and theology is a myth, a persistent, but nevertheless mistaken myth, and its development is historically well known.7

4.2 Some Features of Neo-Darwinism Despite the fact that basic knowledge of evolutionary theory is included in the general education in at least most of the cultures in the northern hemisphere, it will still be useful at the beginning of this chapter to recall some of its decisive features: 1. Mutation refers to a chemical change of the DNA. The majority of these changes are neutral, i. e. without any effects, but sometimes changes result in new alleles, sometimes with beneficial, but often with harmful results for the phenotype. Mutations are decisive because they provide the only known mechanism for getting new genetic material and therefore variation.8 The causes for all mutations are independent of the other features of evolutionary theory and therefore relatively contingent. But contingency relative to the theory of evolution does not mean that 4 5 6 7 8

Cf. Mìhling, M., Eschatologie, 203. Cf. Schwarz, H., 400 Jahre Streit um die Wahrheit, 56 – 110. Some examples are given below, see section 5.5.1. Cf. Losch, A., Jenseits der Konflikte, 21 – 41. Cf. Fuentes, A., Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You, 50.

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mutations are necessarily contingent in themselves. Theoretically, they could be the result of other causes (chemical ones, etc.) and, at least in principle, the theory could be compatible with a deterministic quasireligion. However, at the molecular level there are some mechanisms known today—like local sequence changes, intragenomic reshuffling of DNA segments and acquisition of segments of foreign DNA—which do not seem to be explainable without real chance and contingency. As Nobel prize winner Werner Arber states: ‘In the DNA acquisition strategy, contingency is clearly seen in the randomness of encounter of donor DNA with a recipient cell, in the chance of integration of the invading genetic information into the genome, and in the functional characteristics of the resulting hybrid. […] A philosophical conceptual aspect of the actual scientific knowledge on genetic variation is the rather unexpected conclusion of a duality of the genome. Besides a majority of genes serving to each individual organism to fulfil its own life, the genome also carries genes enabling populations of organisms to undergo biological evolution. This can be seen as the basis for the expansion of forms of life, that is, for biodiversity. [… W]e can conclude here that contingency is widely present in the natural generation of genetic variants and that it thus influences to a large extent the course of biological evolution of the living world.’9

Arber has also expressed the conviction that some of these mechanisms represent a kind of ontological contingency.10 If this were correct, then in biology there would also have to be examples not only of epistemological contingency, but, similarly to quantum mechanics, of irreducible contingency as well. 2. Genetic flow refers to the movement of alleles in populations. It is through this mechanism of migration among the population that allele-frequencies can be altered.11 3. Genetic drift refers to the shift of allele-frequencies in a population due (relative to evolutionary theory) to random or stochastic processes. The transmission of the genes of one generation to the following one is not a complete copy, but a stochastic selection from the gene pool.12 4. Natural selection is closely related to the concept of adaption. Agust†n Fuentes describes natural selection in the following way : ‘1. There is biological variation in living forms. 2. Some of this variation can be passed from one generation to the next. 9 10 11 12

Arber, W., Molecular Darwinism, 1091 f. Cf. Arber, W., Lebensverständnis der Biologie. Cf. Fuentes, A., Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You, 51. Cf. Fuentes, A., Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You, 51 f.

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3. Within any given environment some variants help the organism leave more offspring than others (on average). 4. Those variants that help organisms do better, if they are heritable, will over time become more common […]. 5. Those variants that become more common in a population are seen as adaptions to the particular environmental contexts.’13

As a result, natural selection appears to be a non-random process working at the same time that genetic drift is also in effect. Natural selection does not work on the genes itself; it is mediated through the expression of the phenotypes. And, it is decisive to mention that in evolutionary theory itself the genes only constitute necessary conditions for the results appearing in the phenotype. Genes and their alleles have polygenetic (different genes can be expressed by a single effect) and pleiotropic (a single gene leads to different effects) effects.14 Strictly speaking, therefore, the language of phenotypes as expressions of genes is a bit of a misunderstanding. Theories that try to reduce phenotypic phenomena to genes and their alleles, or theories, like some expressions used in the so-called field of ‘sociobiology’, which tries to reduce social behaviour to genes or which tries to invent new entities like ‘memes’,15 belong neither to Neo-Darwinism nor to one of its possible extensions, but are rather interpretations of evolutionary theory on the level of natural philosophy and are therefore quasi-religious.

4.3 Character Traits of Neo-Darwinism Compared to many other scientific theories, Neo-Darwinism works well. It is a simple theory that can explain most of the facts of biological change. For serious Popperian fallibilists, its scientific status might be doubtful, because Neo-Darwinism cannot make any prognoses for future development that can be falsified. However, on the basis of Neo-Darwinism, prognoses about the future results of past development are possible, and it seems to be that the criterion of falsification has to be applied at this level—if it is a meaningful criterion of being a science at all.16 Nevertheless, there are problems as well as certain philosophical constructs inherent within Neo-Darwinism. We begin with the latter. After a comparison to the representationalist-dualist doctrines of the neurosciences, we can see that many of these same features also appear in the theory of evolution. 13 14 15 16

Fuentes, A., Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You, 52. Cf. Fuentes, A., Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You, 47. Cf. Dawkins, R., The Selfish Gene. 30th Anniversary Edition, 189 – 201. Cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 22, 171.

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First, it resembles to a certain degree the representationalist view of the brain, since the phenotypes can also be seen as representations of the gene or vice versa. In order to be a representation of something, it is not necessary that only the one relatum be a necessary condition for the other one. The neurosciences have also claimed that the supposed representations in the brain and the ‘outer world’ are related only by ‘correlations’. Second, although genes are in no way different to all other entities in the material world—they are chemical molecules—a form of dualism also appears here: the dualism between phenotype and genotype. In this regard, evolutionary theory can also be seen as a classical form of Platonism. In classical Platonism the multiplicity of ideas are responsible for phenomena, but phenomena are nevertheless not sufficiently influenced by these ideas, they are rather mere shadows of the idea.17 Similarly, in evolutionary theory the multiplicity of genes are responsible for the phenotypes, but the phenotypes are not sufficiently influenced by the alleles of the genes. Third, the relationship between genotype and phenotype is an external relation, i. e. the genotype can be seen as part of the causation of the phenotype. Fourth, the external relationship between genotype and phenotype is a unidirectional one. For example, there are no acquired qualities of the individual phenotypes which can in turn shape the genotypes. During the history of evolutionary theory this lesson was not to be learned without sacrifices.18 Fifth, classical Neo-Darwinism also seems to be inherently individualistic. Since the order of relations between genotype and phenotype precedes the relationship of a population, there is no room for qualitative concepts like community, but only for those like ‘group’ and ‘population’. The study of group selection might currently be a growing sub-discipline, but this does not alter the Vorverständnis (a prior non-empirical certainty) that a society has a compositional, and therefore individualistic, character. In other words, relationships among individuals are viewed as being merely external. Sixth, evolution has neither a direction nor an aim. Evolutionary theory describes a process without teleology and also without any necessary development into ‘higher’ forms of life. Whereas the rejection of teleology by evolutionary theory is widely known, the fact that evolutionary theory does not actually describe a hierarchical order is not so obvious. Of course, one can observe different kinds of hierarchies among biological life forms. But the fact that these hierarchies have arisen is by no means necessary ; it is, relative to the theory of Neo-Darwinism, a contingent fact. Seventh, the relationship between environment and the organism is also seen as a unidirectional external relationship. Due to the mechanism of natural 17 Cf. Plato, Platonis Opera, Tomus IV, 514 – 516, 517d–525b. 18 Cf. Bowler, P.J., The Eclipse of Darwinism, esp. 58 – 106 on Lamarckianism.

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selection, alterations of organisms have to be seen as adaptions to the environment.

4.4 Problems of Neo-Darwinism The philosophical implications or character traits mentioned in the last section might not be unproblematic for theological evaluation; in particular, the absence of any internal relationship is potentially questionable. However, these seven philosophical implications do not stem from any deliberate philosophical self-interpretation but are rather actual implications of the theory. Therefore, simply not being comfortable with them is not a sufficient reason to question their validity. In any case, these seven implications are not in fact separable and culminate in the seventh character trait: A position that has recently been called adaptationism.19 Adaptationism, however, is certainly also problematic. What is wrong with adaptationism if it is simply the implication of a wellconfirmed theory? We shall start with the observation that the relationship between life forms and their environment is not unidirectional. Life forms alter their environment and those changes to the environment might themselves cause organisms to adapt. This fact on its own is no problem for evolutionary theory, because evolutionary theory does not make statements about how changes in the environment occur. Environmental changes are purely contingent facts relative to Neo-Darwinism and simply have to be taken as a given. There might be causes for changes in the environment, but these causes cannot be described, because they do not belong to the regional ontology of Neo-Darwinism. This is no problem for the internal coherence of Neo-Darwinist theory, but it does alter the status of the theory radically. The theory now has to be recognized as an abstraction from the phenomena, in what is a kind of fading away from specific phenomena of biological change, or, if you like, of evolution. In other words, Neo-Darwinism has a blind spot in the relation to its very subject, evolution. As a result, scientists have tried to expand classical Neo-Darwinism in different ways. Snail shells are clearly understood to belong to the phenotype, but beaver dams are usually not. And yet, is there really a difference between snail shells and beaver dams? The impact of beaver dams on the ecosystem is clearly higher than that of snail shells. In the 1980s, Richard Dawkins tried to solve this problem with a simple solution: altering the concept of phenotype and now speaking of beaver dams, spider webs, etc. as extended phenotypes.20 This solution has an advantage and 19 Cf. Lewontin, R.C., Adaption, and for a discussion Godfrey-Smith, P., Adaptationism and the Power of Selection. 20 Cf. Dawkins, R., The Extended Phenotype.

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some disadvantages. The advantage is that it appears to leave Neo-Darwinism as a whole unaffected, since only a new entity, the entity of the extended phenotype has been added. But this seeming advantage is outweighed by the disadvantages. Adding the concept of the extended phenotype also alters the concept of phenotype, since it is not clear where a line has to be drawn. In principle, every expression of the phenotype in the environment now becomes a phenotype itself. The ultimate consequence would be that the concept of the environment would collapse altogether, i. e. the environment itself is the phenotype. But in that case evolutionary theory would collapse. In his quasireligious interpretation of Neo-Darwinism, Dawkins seems to be aware of this fact and appears to provide a solution completely in line with the philosophical implications of Neo-Darwinism consisting in the opinion that the relationship between genotype and phenotype is much closer than previously assumed: phenotypes are clearly ‘vehicles’21 of genotypes in such a way that the most decisive factor for the shape of the phenotype consists in the genotype. Perhaps it would be most convenient if it could be shown that phenotypes are reducible to expressions of genotypes, i. e. that genotypes are causes in the sense of being sufficient conditions of phenotypes. But that is clearly falsified by the facts.22 Therefore, we have to look for other solutions. In the 1980s, Richard Lewontin also provided an excellent analysis of the problem.23 The first thing he did was to give an example, which in the meantime has become a classic, where adaptationism does not provide any helpful explanations. We are quoting a version given by Odling-Smee et al.: ‘[…] The earthworm has no business living in soil […]. Earthworms are structurally very poorly adapted to cope with physiological problems such as water and salt balance on land, and they would seem to be better suited to a freshwater habitat. They can survive in a terrestrial environment only by constructing a more suitable niche through activities such as tunnelling, exuding mucus, eliminating calcite, and dragging leaf litter below ground. Earthworms co-opt the soils that they inhabit and the tunnels they build to serve as accessory kidneys that compensate for their poor structural adaption. For instance, by producing well-aggregated soils, the worms weaken matrix potentials and make it easier for them to draw water into their bodies […]. In the process, earthworms dramatically change their environment. […] The results of earthworm activity highlight a problem with the concept of ‘adaptation’. In this case it is the soil that does the changing, rather than the worm, to meet the demands of the worm’s freshwater physiology. So what is adapting to what?’24 21 Cf. Dawkins, R., The Extended Phenotype, 82: ‘Genes are replicators; organisms and groups of organisms are best not regarded as replicators; they are vehicles in which replicators travel about’. 22 Cf. Fuentes, A., Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You, 45 – 47. 23 Cf. Gould, S.J./Lewontin, R.C., The Spandrels of San Marco; Lewontin, R.C., Gene, Organism, and Environment. 24 Odling-Smee, F.J./Laland, K.N./Feldman, M.W., Niche Construction, 374 f.

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4.5 Niche Construction as an Extended Evolutionary Theory 4.5.1 The Basic Idea of Niche Construction Lewontin not only provided examples where adaptationism cannot explain very much—examples arising more frequently than one might have expected in the 1980s.25 He also gave a description of the heart of the matter.26 The classical theory can be described with two differential equations which are both valid at the same time: (1)

dO ¼ f ðO; EÞ dt

(2)

dE ¼ gðEÞ dt

In equation (1) dO represents the change of organisms (O), dt the change of time (t) and f(O,E) is a function between the organisms and the environment (f). The equation states that the change of organisms over time (dO/dt) depends as much on the state of the organism as on its environment. However, the change of the environment (dE) over time (dE/dt) according to equation (2) depends only on the function g(E) of the states of the environment. ‘The crucial point is that these two equations are separable. Adapted organisms are not supposed to cause any of the environmental changes that subsequently select for adapted organisms. Hence, the evolution of organisms is generally assumed to be directed exclusively by independent natural selection pressures in environments, and not at all by the niche-constructing activities of organisms.’27

Lewontin then suggested that we need a pair of coupled differential equations in order to describe what really happens in nature: (1)

dO ¼ f ðO; EÞ dt

(2*)

dE ¼ gðO; EÞ dt

Equation (1) remains unaltered; but now in equation (2*) the change of the environment over time (dE/dt) is also seen as a function of the state of the 25 Cf. Lewontin, R.C., Gene, Organism, and Environment. 26 Cf. Lewontin, R.C., Gene, Organism, and Environment; Lewontin, R.C., The Triple Helix, 101. 27 Odling-Smee, F.J./Laland, K.N./Feldman, M.W., Niche Construction, 18.

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environment in relation to the state of organisms. These equations now describe the coevolution of both organism and environment. Here, both function alike as causes and as effects, and the unidirectional character of evolutionary theory is abandoned. This only seemingly slight alteration changes everything. Relying on Lewontin’s analysis, John Odling-Smee, Kevin Laland and Marcus Feldman have proposed that classical evolutionary theory has to be expanded in such a way that the new theory can satisfy the new demands resulting from Lewontin’s work. This is only possible when niche construction is not viewed as a given fact of nature explainable by classical Neo-Darwinism, but only if niche construction itself is seen as an additional mechanism of evolution working at the very same basic level as natural selection. The theory of niche construction has the following features.

4.5.2 Definitions, Categories and Principles of Niche Construction 1. In order to get a basic impression of niche construction, we first need to introduce some basic concepts. The first one is, of course, the concept of the niche itself: ‘We will treat the niche of any population as the sum of all the natural selection pressures to which a population is exposed. […] It differs only [from another definition] in that the fundamental niche is now treated as a set of “n” natural selection pressures relative to its occupant […]. Our evolutionary niche has a duality. It refers to natural selection pressures relating to “lifestyles” of organisms […]. It also refers to the real habitats of organisms in real space and time […].’28

2. We can now proceed to the definition of niche construction: ‘Niche construction occurs when an organism modifies the feature-factor relationship between itself and its environment by actively changing one or more of the factors in its environment, either by physically perturbating factors at its current location in space and time, or by relocating to a different space-time address, thereby exposing itself to different factors.’29

Niche construction in this sense requires temporal persistence in order to modify selection pressures. Selection pressures can be altered in relation to the population in question, to other populations sharing the same niche or in relation to both. 3. These definitions are more than definitions, because they provide a new mechanism additional to natural selection. But by doing so, niche 28 Odling-Smee, F.J./Laland, K.N./Feldman, M.W., Niche Construction, 40. 29 Odling-Smee, F.J./Laland, K.N./Feldman, M.W., Niche Construction, 41.

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construction broadens Neo-Darwinism in another respect as well. Classical Neo-Darwinism knows only one inheritance system, the genetic one. The genetic pool alone plays the role of a system of transferring information over time. But niche construction has the consequence that information can be transferred in another, additional way : through alterations to the environment, i. e. the information which is inherent to the biota, abiota and artefacts of the environment. Therefore, Odling-Smee et al. introduced the concept of ecological inheritance: ‘We define ecological inheritance as any case in which organisms encounter a modified feature-factor relationship between themselves and their environment where the change in the selective pressures is a consequence of the prior niche construction by parents or other ancestral organisms.’30

The authors also provide a ‘niche function’ N(t)=h(O,E), in which N(t) represents the niche of the population of organisms (O) at a specific time (t), which is dependent on a coupled function of the states of the organisms and the states of the environment h(O,E). Basically, this coupled function includes the two equations (1) and (2*) mentioned above.31 4. The authors also suggest 2x2 = 4 categories, which can be orthogonally combined. Niche construction can happen by perturbation, i. e. actively changing the physical conditions of an environment at specific places and times. It can also happen by relocation, i. e. a movement of organisms in space at chosen times. Furthermore, niche construction can be seen as inceptive, i. e. the initiation of environmental selection pressures by perturbation or relocation. It can also be seen as counteractive, i. e. the reaction of prior environmental factors by perturbation or relocation. 5. Niche construction can have positive effects, i. e. it inaugurates environmental effects that increase the fitness of the organisms relative to its environment, but it can also have negative effects, i. e. it inaugurates environmental effects that decrease fitness.32 6. Niche construction not only widens the mechanisms and inheritance system so that we have natural selection and niche construction as decisive mechanisms and the genetic and ecological inheritance system as two decisive forms of transferring information from time to time. Both aspects can also be combined so that one can also describe the flow of matter, energy and information at any given time throughout space. This ecological aspect leads the authors to posit the theoretical entities of ‘environmentally mediated genotypic associations’ (EMGAs), which cannot be discussed here in more detail. It may suffice to mention that these ideas are leading to some interesting ideas in combination with 30 Odling-Smee, F.J./Laland, K.N./Feldman, M.W., Niche Construction, 42. 31 Cf. Odling-Smee, F.J./Laland, K.N./Feldman, M.W., Niche Construction, 42 – 44. 32 Cf. Odling-Smee, F.J./Laland, K.N./Feldman, M.W., Niche Construction, 44 – 47.

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suggestions influenced by developmental biology. Schlichting and Pigliucci introduced into developmental biology the idea of a ‘developmental reaction norm.’ Its basic idea is that it ‘leads us to eliminate the dichotomy between internal and external environments. In fact, we view the developmental process itself as a reaction norm. Gene expression may be constitutive or determined by the cellular environments to which the genes are exposed. The ensuing phenotypes will be dependent on these patterns of gene expression as well as on the interactions of the gene products mediated by the other features of the environment.’33

However, it has to be admitted that this rejection of a categorical distinction between inner and outer environments as suggested by Schlichting and Piggliucci is of no consequence to niche construction itself. It is only a compatible view. 7. An inherent feature of niche construction as an elementary evolutionary mechanism is that, in contrast to other mechanisms like selection or gene drift, ‘it introduces directedness into the evolutionary process’34. The kind of directedness niche construction adds is a non-teleological one, but it is a kind of information related to purpose, and therefore ‘semantic information’: ‘By semantic information we mean information that relates to the fitness of specific organisms, about their requirements, about their local environments, and about how to operate in their local environments in ways that satisfy their requirements, and that is, in this sense, “meaningful” to organisms in their local environments. […] Finally, because the niche constructing acts of organisms must be selected in advance of their expression, it follows that the niche constructing activities of organisms must either suffice, for example, because they arose for other reasons, or be oriented a priori toward targeted future outcomes of organism-environment interactions on the basis of at least rudimentary and semantically informed search plans. Therefore, in this limited and, in most species, entirely noncognitive sense, niche construction must be preparative or predictive in character.’35

8. The last decisive feature of niche construction is that it alters the perception of the role of cooperation in evolutionary history. Indeed, the idea that the evolutionary process is ‘egoistic’, or the idea that wars are inherent to human evolutionary ‘nature’, is nothing but a falsifiable myth that cannot be adequately matched to the phenomena.36 However, in traditional evolutionary biology, cooperation and/or egoism are not in any way 33 34 35 36

Schlichting, C.D./Pigliucci, M., Phenotypic Evolution, 333. Odling-Smee, F.J./Laland, K.N./Feldman, M.W., Niche Construction, 33. Odling-Smee, F.J./Laland, K.N./Feldman, M.W., Niche Construction, 177 f. Cf. Fuentes, A., Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You, 129 – 131.

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meaningful categories; they simply do not exist. Since we have seen that there are philosophical implications for the ontological prevalence of individualism in Neo-Darwinism, it has to remain neutral with regard to this question. Selfishness presupposes a given dependency on others and can therefore only be a parasitic concept. What I mean is something different. It is of course the case that the effects of a population’s niche construction does not necessarily inherently presuppose a concept of cooperation. An example of these cumulative but nevertheless individual influences might be seen in the alterations of soil conditions by earthworms. But since the information of the ecological inheritance system also includes artefacts, and since artefacts of higher organisms, especially human beings, are only possible under the presupposition of culture—in the sense of cooperation as at least a necessary condition for the production of artefacts—culture and cooperation therefore also influence the processes of evolution. This happens precisely by contributing to an increase in niche constructing activity : The greater the level of cooperation, the greater the level of niche construction. Odling-Smee et al. refer to humans as the ‘ultimate niche constructors’37. If there is any particula veri in that statement, then it is due to the simple rule that cooperation contributes to the increase of niche construction: ‘It is likely that the type and complexity of cooperation—on a level beyond that found in other primates and the other hominins—combined with rapid behavioural plasticity and innovation—both facilitated by cooperation and social coordination—is what allowed us to successfully construct our niche and evolve with it.’38

For humans, anthropologists can show that cooperation is a common trait which can be found everywhere: ‘This prevalence of cooperation does not mean that individuals do not act selfishly on occasion or that some might use aggression to take from others. It means, contrary to some perspectives, that a primarily selfish orientation (sometimes referred to as Homo economicus) is not characteristic of most people in most societies. The basic notion of Homo economicus is that humans as individuals will make decisions based on what is best for themselves. This turns out not really to be the case. In a study of fifteen societies, the research team led by Joseph Henrich and colleagues demonstrated unequivocally that the central axiom of Homo economicus (humans will behave selfishly in economic situations) is refuted. In fact, selfishness as a primary pattern was not found in any of the societies studied. Rather, patterns of cooperation and social reciprocity were dominant, with much variation in details across societies, based on integration 37 Odling-Smee, F.J./Laland, K.N./Feldman, M.W., Niche Construction, 28. 38 Fuentes, A., It’s Not All Sex and Violence, 716.

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into world markets as well as demographic and other social variables. This does not mean that humans are all egalitarian or that we are selfless. It simply reflects the reality that human societies are based on extensive and extremely complex systems of cooperation and mutual inter-reliance on one another, such that a consistently selfish behavioural strategy will not be sustainable in human groups.’39

This new role of cooperation is also part of the evidence, that neither the individual nor the collective can claim priority, but that also in a biological sense communities—or at least proto-communities—are the decisive factors.40 In the meantime, there are not only a huge collection of examples that can be explained more clearly in the framework of niche construction than in the framework of classical evolutionary theory, but niche construction also provides theoretical models for the development of populations. And since here feedback is incorporated from the beginning on, these models are very different from comparable models found within the framework of the classical theory.41 4.5.3 Models of Population Growth42 In order to illustrate the explanatory value of niche construction I want to refer to an example from biological anthropology. But first we have to refer to different models of population growth. a) The exponential model simply describes the growth of population size over time as the product of the size of the population h and rate of growth r : dH/ dt = rH. As time goes on the population will grow. A decisive feature of classical evolutionary theory—that resources are limited, and therefore a population can only grow within the boundaries of limited resources—is not taken into account. Another model is necessary : b) The logistic model introduces parameter K signifying the carrying capacity of the particular ecosystem. According to this model, small populations increase in time up to this point and large populations decrease to this point. The logistic model satisfies the needs of classical evolutionary theory, but it does not take niche construction into account. c) The single species cooperation model does satisfy some of the needs of niche construction. Niche construction alters the parameters of the 39 Fuentes, A., Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You, 151. 40 For the community structure in human evolution cf. Fuentes, A., Human Evolution, Niche Complexity, and the Emergence of Distinctively Human Imagination; Fuentes, A./DeaneDrummond, C., Human Being and Becoming Situating Theological Anthropology in Interspecies Relationships in an Evolutionary Context. 41 Cf. Odling-Smee, F.J./Laland, K.N./Feldman, M.W., Niche Construction, 116–166. 42 Cf. Fuentes, A./Wyczalkowski, M.A./MacKinnon, K.C., Niche Construction through Cooperation.

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environment that represent selection pressures in a nonlinear way. The strength of cooperation can be modelled by parameter S which is the square of the population size and which has to be related to carrying capacity parameter K. In this model, one can introduce cooperation parameter b (b=SK2). The effect of adding this nonlinear parameter is, on the one hand, that larger populations are understood to have rates of cooperation that increase exponentially in comparison to that of smaller populations. An initial population smaller than critical size (M), and therefore with less cooperation, will experience a similar and only slightly different rate growth than proposed in the logistic model. However, if the initial population is larger than another critical size (N), and therefore possesses the capacity for a higher amount of initial cooperation, it will grow without bound similar to the exponential model. Although the single species model takes niche construction and cooperation into account, it abstracts from the fact that niches are always shared by different populations and that niche construction has implications for all of them. But it is also possible to take other populations into account. d) The two species cooperation model is the easiest form of such a case and we shall try to design it as simply as possible. Let us assume two populations H and P, each with its own population size and its own parameters: ‘[…] The population of one species is given by H and of the other by P. […] The growth rates of the two species are like that for the single-species cooperation model, with the exception that the benefits of cooperation in one species result in an equivalent detriment in the other. Specifically, cooperation in H results in an

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increased rate of growth of H given by SH x H2 ; in turn, the rate of growth of P is decreased by the same amount, and vice versa. This coupling of the rate of growth of the species then models the transfer of, for example, predation pressure from the more cooperative species to the less cooperative one. Note that aside from sharing predation pressure there is no direct competition for resources in this model […]. Introducing a second species complicates the analysis somewhat, in part because visualizing all possible solutions is more difficult. For the discussion that follows, we will assume that the cooperation of species P is fixed at some intermediate value, for example, bP = 1/8. [… The corresponding figure] shows how populations of H and P change with bH while bP remains fixed. With bH less than 1/4, both species coexist. Small changes in bH not near the critical value of 1/4 result in only small changes to the equilibrium populations, analogous to small changes in the carrying capacity for the logistic model. As bH increases past the value of 1/4, however, this system undergoes a fundamental shift: the equilibrium solution disappears. Now, the H[…] population will explode, while P […] will decline to extinction. Such a bifurcation causes the system to change rapidly and fundamentally with only small changes to the parameter bH, a phenomenon that does not occur in linear models. As a result, models with the feedback that is inherent in niche construction can behave in ways fundamentally different, and not predictable, from simpler models where such feedback is ignored.’43

4.5.4 The Development of Homo and Paranthropus The last section provided interesting examples showing that niche construction alters the available models and their consequences for the description of evolution to a surprisingly high degree. We introduced the example of these models as theoretical ones. However, they are far more than this. They can be applied to a specific problem in human (pre)history, and Fuentes et al. have suggested that niche construction can indeed solve a specific problem.44 Two kinds of Hominini lived in southern Africa between 2.5 and 1 million years ago, the genus Homo, then represented e.g by Homo erectus and Homo ergaster (which cannot be clearly distinguished), and the genus Paranthropus. Paranthropus was most probably an offspring of the genus Australopithecus, which is most known for Australopithecus afarensis and the 1974 skeleton discovery of ‘Lucy’ (>3 mi years).45 Homo erectus/ergaster on the other hand seems most probably to be one of our ancestors, that is, an ancestor of modern humans. The time and place were subject to massive changes in climate and alterations to the structure of species. From ca. 1 million years ago onwards, 43 Fuentes, A./Wyczalkowski, M.A./MacKinnon, K.C., Niche Costruction through Cooperation, 439. 44 Fuentes, A./Wyczalkowski, M.A./MacKinnon, K.C., Niche Costruction through Cooperation, 435 – 436, 439 – 442. 45 Cf. Johanson, D./Edey, M., Lucy ; Walter, R.C., Age of Lucy and the First Family.

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Paranthropus became extinct, whereas Homo survived. It is possible to give some non-monocausal theses for the success of Homo, but in principle the extinction of Paranthropus remains a mystery, as a hypothesis focussing on another kind of nutrition does not appear to be supported by the findings. Fuentes et al. have proposed a model focusing on predation risk as a decisive factor for selection pressure as well as on a comparative distinction between the capacities for cooperative action. The outcome of their hypothesis is that the two species cooperation model, as we introduced it in the last chapter, offers an explanation for what happened 1 million years ago. Simply substitute the abbreviation H used in the equation in the last section with Homo and the abbreviation P with Paranthropus, and you will have what is being suggested. For our purposes, we can use the probable extinction of Paranthropus and the survival of Homo as an example of how niche construction and its focus on cooperation can explain a state of affairs that would remain mysterious without niche construction. At the same time, events happening 1 million years ago in our prehistory also belong to evidence used to support niche construction.

4.5.5 Neo-Darwinism as an Abstract Form of an Extended Theory The extension of classical Neo-Darwinism by the evolutionary mechanism of niche construction is not the only proposal for extending evolutionary theory. In recent decades there have been suggestions of other kinds. For example, Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb have suggested46 a multi-inheritance systems theory. Here, not only the genetic inheritance system provides information that can be transferred and changed in biological history, but they also propose an epiphenomenal inheritance system, a behavioural inheritance system and a symbolic inheritance system. All of these systems contribute causes that jointly influence biological processes.47 Another example is Susan Oyama’s proposal of a developmental systems theory.48 Its starting point consists in the rejection of the inherent dichotomy between biological inheritance and culture including their mono-causal relationship, as can be found in the classical theory. Positively, the theory posits a set of principles: a) Determination has to be seen as inaugurated by multiple causes. b) The contexts of evolutionary development have to be taken into account, which in the case of human beings include culture and contingency. c) Inheritance has to be seen as extended, since it also includes the memory and experience of group members. d) Evolution is not a dualistic theory about organisms or populations as externally related to their environments, but is a theory about 46 Jablonka, E./Lamb, M., Evolution in Four Dimensions. 47 Cf. Fuentes, A., A New Synthesis, 12 f. 48 Oyama, S., Evolution’s Eye; Oyama, S./Griffiths, P.E./Gray, R.D., Cycles of Contingency.

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complete organism-environment systems and their change over time.49 Both theories share some features with niche construction and often stress the same points. The reason for our focus on niche construction in this chapter is that it is an example for an extended evolutionary theory and that it is supported by a great deal of evidence from different individual studies. Niche construction and the other theories mentioned also have another common feature: In contrast to explaining the phenomena either by hyper-religionizing the classical theory and by idolizing the genes or postulated ‘memes’ (sociobiology) or by an atheistic abandonment of the classical theory by re-invoking hidden natural laws of teleology,50 niche construction can be seen as an extension of the classical theory. Therefore, classical Neo-Darwinism stands in relation to the extended theory like Newtonian mechanics in relation to 20th century physics: It is a particular case within a broader theory. To put it another way, we might be presently observing the emergence of something which could play the same role for contemporary biology as the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics played for early 20th century physics. And niche construction may indeed have a key role in that process. If one compares the development from classical Neo-Darwinism to an extended theory including niche construction to the two paradigms we presented in the section about the neurosciences, a decisive distinction is visible. Whereas niche construction can be seen as an extension, the ecological brain thesis has to be seen as a complete alternative to representationalist dualism. The former is no extension of the latter. In order to explain the underlying phenomena, it seems that in the neurosciences something that could be called a paradigm shift appears to be in order, whereas in evolutionary biology an extension of the older theory seems to be best.

4.6 Character Traits of Niche Construction Despite having a different status in the history of the specific sciences, the philosophical implications of an extended theory of evolution including niche construction are very similar to the features of the ecological brain thesis. This might be due to the fact that niche construction not only extends the classical theory, but also alters it in a thoroughgoing manner.

49 Cf. Fuentes, A., A New Synthesis, 14. 50 Cf. Nagel, T., Mind and Cosmos, 7; cf. on Nagel also Orr, H.A., Awaiting a New Darwin.

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4.6.1 Abandoning Hidden Representationalism In abandoning adaptationism, the implicit representationalism of the classical theory is also given up. Neither phenotypes nor states of the environment can be seen as extended phenotypes any longer. Evolution is not a theory about organisms in their environment, but rather a theory about how complete systems change. Organisms and/or populations are conceived as relata in reciprocal, but not symmetrical relationships—that is, as internally related. 4.6.2 Abandoning Hidden Dualism Further, the hidden dualism of classical theory is given up. It is not only genes that carry information which causally influences both organisms and environments. In adding an ecological inheritance system, feedback is added and this feedback prevents the use of linear models. 4.6.3 Abandoning Localized Information It seems to be the case that this theory implies more than appears at first glance. The ecological inheritance system consists of biota, abiota and artefacts as carriers of evolutionary effective information. However, it is not the addition of a couple of biota, abiota and artefacts that carries this information, it is their complete complex relationship. Imagine a population which divides into two populations A and B at separate locations a and b, without any further interaction. Imagine that each of the populations are impressive niche constructors at a and b, but that after a while population B is extinct with the effect that population A also spreads immediately to location b. In this relocation A also inherits the niche of B and its ecological inheritance system. Consequently, the evolution of A will change due to the new evolutionary factors provided by the ecological heritance system of B. Now, imagine that several centuries pass between the time of extinction of B and the relocation of A. In the meantime, the ecological niche is also changing both due to other organisms and relative to other contingent factors. Let us assume then that the effects of B’s niche construction vanish entirely except for a single unrelated artefact, e. g. a single building. In that case the single building will not alter A’s evolution. It no longer belongs to the ecological inheritance system of B. Of course, it still belongs to the cultural heritage of B and therefore it can also become part of the cultural heritage of A—presupposing A had developed faculties like archaeology and history. The reason for the fact that the single part of the cultural heritage of B may not cause evolutionary effects in the latter case is that it is only a single entity. This thought experiment

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therefore shows that single biota, abiota and artefacts are not carriers of ecological inheritance, but only their complete relationship. The information from the ecological inheritance system that is valid for evolution cannot be located. Further, it would be completely meaningless to postulate hidden entities, which could serve as vehicles for this process. However, it is not only the ecological inheritance that has to be seen as ‘embodied’ in the complete system, in the last instance this is true for all information relevant to evolution. The information of the genetic inheritance system might be more or less localizable (in the DNA), but it is only effective in combination with the reciprocally interactive ecological inheritance system. Therefore, the effective information informing evolution is not localizable at all; it is rather the quality of the complete system over time. In analogy to the extended mind thesis, one cannot therefore speak of an extended phenotype; it is rather the other way around: one would have to speak of extended evolutionary information, or, to put it as boldly as possible, of an extended genotype, a phenogenotype or a genophenotype! 4.6.4 Internal Relationality The example given in the last paragraph not only illustrates the illocality of information effective for evolution, it also illustrates the fact that the complete system possesses a large number of internal relations, i. e. relationships that are reciprocally constitutive. First, the relationships between biota, abiota and artefacts shaping the set of ecological inheritance have to be seen as consisting at least partly in internal relations, as our thought experiment has illustrated. Second, the relationship between organisms and environment cannot be illustrated by the addition of two sets of external relationships, but only by one internal relationship that is reciprocally constitutive (but nevertheless not necessarily symmetrical). Niche construction, therefore, describes what is an at least partly internal relationship. 4.6.5 Adding Formal Causality Since the relationship between the genotype and the phenotype now has to be seen as a partial relation that is included within the larger, complete relation, it can no longer be understood as an external relationship in and of itself. One consequence of this is that efficient causality alone no longer appears to be a satisfactory philosophical explanation. But there are alternatives. In the same way that Fuchs developed his concept of integral causality by applying Jacob v. Uexküll’s and Viktor von Weizsäcker’s Gestaltkreistheorie to neuroscience, we can also use integral causality as a means for describing niche construction. Integral causality consists in the integration of two kinds of causality :

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traditional efficient causality and formative causality. Formative causality restricts efficient causality by determining what forms are possible in a given situation. The contribution of ecological inheritance to the process of niche construction appears to have precisely this function. In effect, ecological inheritance determines the selective activity of natural selection itself; whereas natural selection works according to efficient causality, niche construction works according to formative causality. It is only in their work together that they can be seen as integral causality. Note as well that the relationship between formative causality and efficient causality has to be seen as an internal relationship, because neither of the two relata could be there if the other were missing. This is immediately obvious in the case of formative causality, which works as a constraint on efficient causality. However, this statement is also true in the other direction. It is important to remember that while the effect of the genotype on the phenotype can be described in a similar way to that of efficient causality, the genotype is nevertheless nothing but a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition for the effects seen in the phenotype. An isolated portion of DNA in a test tube causes nothing at all! Thus, the efficient causality of the genotype can only be efficient causality in relation to the formative causality of the effects of ecological inheritance. Integral causality is therefore not only a partly internal relation between efficient and formative causality, but also an internal relation in itself: Without either of its relata the other relatum would not be there at all. Genes are not pure DNA! DNA is only the stuff of genes when it is embodied. Genes, therefore, are always embodied genes. Furthermore, a body in this sense, i. e. an organism, is only comprehensible in its at least partly internal relationship to its environment. Therefore, the embodiment of genes is only possible if they are ecologically ‘ensystemized’ or ‘incarnated’. The notion of the embodied gene is only meaningful if it is also at the same time an ‘ensystemized’ gene.

4.6.6 Genes as Providers of Open Loops In going a step further by drawing insight from the theory of the ecological brain to niche construction, we are suggesting that the role the genes play in the game can be described with the function of providing ‘open loops’. Just as neuronal activity provides open loops for other functions of the body, which provide open loops that can be closed by the environment, so the genotype also provides open loops that can only be closed in the last instance by niche construction. Thus, the relationship between natural selection and niche construction is a relationship of a functional circuit. In this functional circuit the genotype provides open loops for resonances of the phenotype, and the phenotype provides open loops for resonances of the environment.

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4.6.7 Resonances Instead of Adaptions Modelling niche construction with the help of these philosophical insights means an extension of classical Neo-Darwinism, but it nevertheless also means abandoning adaptationism completely. This seems to be a strange claim. At least if we only focus on the part of natural selection, we seem to be in need of speaking about adaptation. Conceptually, however, this is not quite correct. We do not need to speak of adaptation; we only need to refer to that which the older theory refers to as ‘adaptation’! What was then called ‘adaptation’ could now be called co-adaptation or understood as an aspect of co-adaptation. But since the concept of adaptation relies on the dualist framework of the classical theory, we would suggest giving up the language of adaptation altogether and substituting it—analogously to the ecological brain theory—with the term resonance. An organism does not adapt to its environment through natural selection, and the environment does not adapt to the organism through niche construction. Rather, an organism resonates with the environment through natural selection as the environment resonates with the population’s niche construction activity. The language of resonance, originally coming from acoustics and music, is a far better expression than adaptation for more than one reason. The concept of resonance fits perfectly to the language of ‘feedback’, which is already common in the field of niche construction. Furthermore, resonances describe non-localizable phenomena and therefore mirror internal relationality. Resonances also describe relationships that are necessarily reciprocal. It is not possible for one relatum to resonate and its correlated relatum to remain silent. Resonances do not necessarily have to be personal, they do not presuppose the language of agents, but they do not also necessarily exclude the notion of agency. By comparison, the language of adaptation seems to have been more strongly influenced by

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personal language. Prior to the emergence of evolutionary theory only personal agents were understood to have the capacity for adaptation.

4.6.8 Semantics in Evolution? Odling-Smee et al. mention the fact that the theory of niche construction introduces a kind of ‘directedness’ into evolutionary theory. This kind of directedness is a distinctive feature in comparision to natural selection as the other mechanism of evolution, which is ‘blind’. But this directedness does not mean that there is a plan for evolution as a whole, or that evolution as a process itself has to be seen as directed toward some goal. Rather, this kind of directedness consists in semantic information whereas the information effective in natural selection is, abstractly viewed in itself, non-semantic (see above). In other words, niche construction is only possible by a kind of semantic, i. e. meaningfully related information between organism and environment, at least in so called ‘higher’ life forms. However, the term ‘semantic’ used by Odling-Smee et al. does not fit to the use of semantics in semiotics. In semiotics, semantics describes a dimension of the semiotic relation, which can only be completely described by pragmatics and syntactics as the other dimensions of the semiosis.51 In other words, semantics, syntactics and pragmatics also constitute an internal relation. If there are semantics, there must also be syntactics and pragmatics. Despite the fact that these implications of niche construction—which are only available if one describes niche construction with the term of semantic information—lead unavoidably to the idea of a semiotic universe and a semantically closed world, and in spite of the fact that this idea can be appreciated for different reasons,52 it would nevertheless be best to proceed carefully at this point. Is it really necessary to speak of semantic information in order to describe how niche construction works? Or does this feature rather belong to the philosophical interpretation of niche construction? Without deciding which alternative might be best here, we want to suggest that what Odling-Smee et al. describe as ‘directedness’ or ‘semantic information’ can be better expressed by the dimension of formative causality as it is explained above. The advantage is not only that it refers to the same referent, but also that it avoids any kind of teleology. By contrast, the term ‘directedness’ unavoidably invokes teleological language and is therefore open to misunderstanding.

51 Cf. Morris, C.W., Foundations of the Theory of Signs, 6 – 13. 52 Cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 31 f.

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4.6.9 What about Phenomenology? In contrast to our approach to the neurosciences, we have not made recourse to phenomenology up to this point in analysing evolution. The reason for this is quite simple. Whereas the experience of feelings, affects, moods, thoughts, dreams, etc. is inherently perceptible in everyday life, this is not the case with evolution. Whereas intentional states are observable for anyone at anytime if there is something to be observed at all, evolution itself is not a directly observable fact. What we observe phenomenologically is history ; it is the narrative structure of our lives in community including certain changes in the pre-personal realm. However, in daily life evolution is not practically observable because it deals with far larger time spans than everyday events. The fact that in some cases—like the well-known changes of the phenotype of the Peppered Moth in England due to industrial melanism—this occurs relatively quickly does not provide any serious objection. In cases like this, one needs the exclusive attention of research in order to see this fact. Evolution, of course, is an observable fact, but it is one which demands a specific type of observation. In other words, we are phenomenally aware of the processes of cultural and ontogenetic history, but we can only regard evolution itself as a fact in the 3rd person perspective. Does this really mean, then, that there is no space for phenomenology and its emphasis on 1st person perspective within the study of evolution and its privileging of 3rd person perspective? Well, we do not think so. Evolutionary processes might not be observable as such in everyday life due to their long duration. However, if evolution is a fact at all, it is always present, but somehow ‘hidden’. Therefore, it is most probable that phenomenology can at least contribute a small portion to evolutionary biology. We are suggesting here that this portion affects more the theoretical status and the philosophical implications of evolution than the design of a phenomena-fitting theory of evolution itself. But this small portion does solve a decisive problem. According to Husserl, as we have seen (see 2.3.1), there are two possible attitudes which we can use in order to deal with the world: a personalistic attitude and a naturalistic attitude. Both attitudes are complementary, i. e. non-reducible to each other, but also not really separable—with separable being used here in the sense that one might be pursued without the pursuit of the other. We always have a personalistic attitude to evolution. We experience being alive, we experience the other— which in this context means our personal and pre-personal environment—as constitutively influencing us; we experience change, we experience a protentional-retentional structure in every act of experience, we also experience being part of relational processes. We experience the past vanishing and therefore being remembered, whereas the future is subject of hope and expectation. So, at the end of the day, what are we doing other than experiencing evolution? But it is not only obvious that we experience in our

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personalistic attitude something that might be called ‘evolution’ when we change to the naturalistic attitude, it is also clear that we only experience evolution in the context of what it means for us; so we can only take an evaluative approach to evolution from the beginning of our observations onwards. Moreover, we are from the outset embedded in the narratives of life whose biological aspects can be called evolution. For practical reasons and only as a result of training we can try to distinguish between the two attitudes. Nevertheless, this distinction is an abstraction. Some insights for evolutionary theory might be drawn from these considerations and we will focus particularly on one: 4.6.10 Is there any teleology in evolution and why are people talking about it all the time? The personalistic attitude is not something one can choose to accept or not to accept. It is simply a given. Further, the personalistic attitude is only a personalistic attitude because experience always means experiencing oneself as a subject of interaction (not only some kind of interplay). We do not perceive the fact that we are partly subject to ‘natural’ inter-causal relationships and partly subject to personal interrelationships. We perceive that we are the subjects of personal interrelationships as natural relationships and we perceive that we are the subjects of natural interrelationships as personal interrelationships. It is only possible to keep both dimensions distinct if something goes wrong with these interrelationships or if they are perceived as being physically painful. In these cases, we can easily distinguish between the two attitudes. However, we can only distinguish between these attitudes, we cannot actually separate them; the perception of pain or interruption clearly reveals precisely this inseparability. Of course, after having learned to distinguish between the personalistic and the naturalistic attitude, and after having learned that some processes are pre-personal, we can meaningfully draw more or less exclusive attention to the pursuit of one or the other attitude for specific purposes. And that is precisely what we are doing in our academic pursuits, be they in the natural sciences or in theology. Whereas the personalistic attitude is natural in the sense that it is developed from the first appearance of the basic self on, the naturalistic attitude comes later. Further mental capabilities are not necessary in order to understand the other as a personal other by a ‘theory of mind’, but further mental capabilities are necessary in order to understand the other as a cause by means of a ‘theory of causality’ we have to develop during personal formation. The outcome of this is that the personalistic attitude is not something that we can lose (except, perhaps, by dying). And, irreducibly belonging to the personalistic attitude is the experience of plans, intentions, directions, values, norms, etc. In other words, when we are trying to view the character trait of our personalistic

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attitude from the perspective of the naturalistic attitude, we have to say that we are inherently teleological, by hoping, expecting, fearing, planning and experiencing ourselves as subjects of hope, expectation, fear, and planning. This kind of phenomenologically given teleology is not necessarily a personal one nor a positive one. It can also be modelled in the way Heidegger has done, as a primordial anxiety about the future of non-being.53 But in Heidegger’s analysis, non-being appears as the direction of the future course of our experience. The question is not whether Heidegger’s analysis is correct as a phenomenological analysis.54 The point, however, is that Heidegger’s future appears in all its inconceivability as the outcome of a directed course of processes, i. e. as the outcome of some kind of teleology, in this case a negative one. We introduce Heidegger here only because one can demonstrate that we are inherently teleological in our personalistic attitude, even if there are kinds of teleology that one might not so label in our everyday language. Let us go a step further. If our personalistic attitude necessarily contains a teleological attitude, it would simply be incoherent if we were to exclude teleology when we are shifting to the naturalistic attitude. In analysing a work of art like a novel, we are justified in asking teleological questions about the intentions and intended ends of the author. It might be true that with respect to a great deal of (post)modern literature and art this question might not lead to any results and it might also be true that with respect to literature in general these questions might not be the best ones. But we nevertheless are justified in using teleological concepts and asking teleological questions in literary studies. As with all academic endeavours, however, literary studies belong to our naturalistic attitude. Note that ‘naturalistic’ in this sense does not refer to the definitions of naturalism given by some naturalistic philosophers in the sense of causal reductionism. However, if teleology is always part of our personalistic attitude and if we are also justified in using teleological concepts in some endeavours driven by the naturalistic attitude, then the decisive question is simply : In which academic endeavours, disciplines or theories shall we use teleological concepts and in which shall we refuse to use such concepts? This simple question has no simple answer and we can give no such answer. However, we can suggest a procedure which can provide preliminary answers. If we adopt the principle of methodological atheism in a such way that it also entails methodological ateleology, i. e. when we try to use a kind of methodological reductionism, then we might discover in which endeavours this approach might be fruitful and which not. Measured by Occam’s razor, classical Neo-Darwinism is simpler in comparison to niche construction, but 53 Cf. Heidegger, M., Sein und Zeit, 252 – 301; for a discussion cf. Jenson, R.W., On Thinking the Human, 1 – 15. 54 A comparison of the different insights of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty on time in conversation with the tradition of the analytic philosophy can be found in Fçrster-Beuthan, Y., Zeiterfahrung und Ontologie.

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it does not satisfactorily explain the phenomena in question. Therefore, we suggest using an extended version of evolutionary theory including niche construction. Analogously, we suggest using this kind of extended theory without any concept of teleology (and only presupposing an integration of efficient causality and formative causality). Let us see if it works. To sum up these remarks, phenomenology helps us to understand why people have been attempting to introduce teleology into evolutionary theory since its beginning. The reason is simply the fact that it is always present in our personalistic attitude, and that we are therefore always also tempted to use teleology in the pursuit of our naturalistic attitude as well. Nothing is wrong with this as long as we do not try to make teleology omnipresent, since in contrast to our personalistic attitude our abilities allow us to choose whether we are going to employ teleology or not in the complementary realm of the naturalistic attitude. Our belief is that teleology should not be part of an evolutionary theory as a natural science. Note, thereby, that no statement about natural philosophy or theology has been made. It might be possible that a glance at evolution from the perspective of the natural sciences excludes teleology whereas an interpretive glance at evolution from the perspective of natural philosophy includes it.

4.7 Implicit Theology in Niche Construction? With respect to the use of evolutionary theory for understanding humanity Odling-Smee et al. claim: ‘Our niche-construction framework may provide such a bridge because it emphasizes the active role that organisms play in the evolutionary process. Humans are not just passive vehicles for genes, they actively modify sources of natural selection in environments. They are the ultimate niche constructors.’55

Despite the fact that the present book does provide evidence for their claim that niche construction is highly valuable for inter- and transdisciplinary dialogue and in spite of our knowledge that humans are able to alter their environment to such an extent that, according to Eugene Stoermer and Paul Crutzen,56 we have to speak of the present geological epoch as the ‘anthropocene’, the above statement is in need of correction. First, according to niche construction theory, it is not ultimately the organisms themselves that are responsible for the construction of niches, but the whole system, including both organisms and the environment. To place human beings as they are here exclusively in the role of being constructors 55 Odling-Smee, F.J./Laland, K.N./Feldman, M.W., Niche Construction, 27 f. 56 Cf. Crutzen, P.J./Stoermer, E.F., The ‘Anthropocene’.

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contradicts their own theory and makes it more constructivist, a feature not normally inherent to niche construction. Second, the last sentence in particular requires critique, as it represents an implicit anthropocentrism. To say humans are the ultimate niche constructors not only adds a kind of value to niche construction, but implicitly denies the fact that humans can be succeeded by others in niche construction activity. Therefore, it implicitly denies that, with regard to temporality, evolution will carry on in significant ways and that humans could be displaced by other species. Furthermore, with regard to spatiality, this statement also denies the possibility that something similar might take place at other places in our universe. Against these implications one can object that humans are only relatively ultimate niche constructors, relative, that is, to the history of evolution as it is known to us. But nevertheless, even this objection is not valid. This might be illustrated by a comparison. At the beginning of the 20th century, Ernst Troeltsch claimed that Christianity could not be seen as the instantiation of the absolute religion, but that one has to relativize this claim of absoluteness historically. However, Troeltsch also claimed that Christianity nevertheless remains relatively the best instantiation of religion in relation to the known history of religions.57 It is clear that in order to make such a judgment a criteriology is necessary, a canon, which allows placement of the different religions—or niche constructors—in an order of value. In the case of Troeltsch, this order might be constituted by a combination of his historicism and his theological position and it therefore might be somehow transparent. However, what is the order of values of Odling-Smee et al. that might give evidence to such a statement? It does not appear to be explicated anywhere. Third, speaking of ultimate things always makes theologians suspicious. To attribute ultimacy to something means attributing something divine to it. Strictly speaking, ‘being ultimate’ can only mean being part of id quo maius cogitari nequit, i. e. being part of that than which nothing greater can be conceived. Putting the matter this way, calling humans ultimate niche constructors not only adds a kind of anthropocentrism to the theory, but also implies an idolization of human beings. Although that is most likely not the authors’ intention, the danger of interpreting the theory of niche construction in such a way becomes more probable than without it. Fourth, the matter is not only theoretical. Let us illustrate this with another example: When Christian churches in Europe reacted to the emerging ecological crisis at the turn of the 1980s, they promoted the slogan of the preservation or conservation of creation.58 But theologically speaking, this concept can easily be misunderstood. According to theology the preservation of creation is a divine work—a specific feature of the doctrine of creatio 57 Cf. Troeltsch, E., Absolutheit des Christentums, 125 – 129. 58 This concept was used e. g. at the 6th general assembly of the WCC in Vancouver 1983 and inaugurated a conciliar process; cf. Mìller-Rçmheld, W. (Hg.), Bericht aus Vancouver 1983.

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continuata—not a human one. To speak of preserving something presupposes that the subject of preservation has all the abilities necessary in order to achieve this preservation, and it presupposes that the subject of preservation is the only responsible entity if the work of preservation fails. Therefore, the concept of the preservation of creation not only reflected the altered consciousness about the ecological crisis in the early 1980s. It also reflects the fact that the attitude of the self-made man—the attitude of the homo faber, which fuelled the hyper-optimistic faith in technology between the 1950s to 1970s—has survived, though with only a change in its aim: preservation instead of improvement. Whereas this might not have been intended, every possible misunderstanding could easily have been avoided if a concept of cooperation in preservation of creation had been developed instead. In this case there would be an acknowledgment that every human effort is relativized by comparison to an ultimate entity, sometimes called the divine, which is not completely at humanity’s disposal. Let us apply this argument to niche construction. If humans are called the ultimate niche constructors this might impose a similar attitude that overestimates human capabilities. Whatever humans might become, they remain penultimate niche constructors and remain always co-operators with other entities in the complete system. Niche construction does not exclude contingency. On the contrary, since contingency appears to be a decisive part of the world and also of evolution, as Werner Arber has suggested,59 it represents precisely what prevents humans from having niche construction at their disposal. Niche construction may help us avoid developing ethical-orientated self-images of man as homo oeconomicus; however, it should also not drive us into the channel of the homo faber. From a theological point of view one can ask whether the expression ‘niche construction’ is the right one. This expression suggests a basic kind of activity. But in its basis niche construction is far from being active. On its deepest level it is rather passive or a pathos. For organisms and populations it is not possible not to be active as niche constructors. Therefore, niche construction is always given. Actually, niche construction is niche reception.60 This aspect of niche reception can be seen as the createdness of all niche constructive activity.

59 Cf. section 4.2 above and Arber, W., Molecular Darwinism, 1091 f. 60 I am grateful to Ken Oakes for the suggestion of this term.

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5. The Triune Life, Niche Construction and Niche Reception In chapter 3 we applied the theory of the ecological brain to theological epistemology and found, in accordance with the Reformers, that faith can be understood as based on an embodied perception of the triune story of the gospel, entangled with the stories of the world. The Reformers described the same state of affairs as the triune, entire self-giving of God. Nevertheless, living a life of faith in this triune story does not mean that one also is aware of theological concepts such as the doctrine of the Trinity. Awareness of theological doctrines belongs to theology as a second order reflection on faith. The first order reflexion on faith belongs to the particular lives of believers and their communities. The first order also entails reflection, but it deals with the levels of the entanglement of the different stories and with dramatic coherence. However, theology as a second level discourse can be understood with the metaphor of the ‘grammar’1 of this storied faith, or as the methodically guided self-explication of the truth claims implied by these entangled stories. Although this level is bound to the entangled stories and to dramatic coherence, telling, expanding or modifying stories would not be sufficient to satisfy the needs of a second level reflection. Since the truth claims should be made explicit, conceptual inquiry is needed. And since concepts are a specific kind of controlled metaphor, as we have seen in chapter 1, and since metaphors are the fundaments of models, the best way to satisfy the needs of the second level reflection of theology is to build theological models on specific key metaphors. The key metaphor of a model relies on the semantic units that are involved in a metaphor.2 In this chapter we try to combine the two semantic units of (the triune) ‘God’ and ‘niche construction’ in order to investigate what or what not this model of conceiving God would imply, and whether it would be a meaningful model for understanding reality according to the Christian faith. One of the relata, ‘niche construction’, has been explicated independently in the last chapter. Before we can start with the modelling, we have to explicate the first relatum, the triune God, independently of niche construction. These descriptions are, however, not independent 1 The language of theology as the ‘grammar’ of Christian faith was promoted by the postliberal theology of Lindbeck, G.A., Nature of Doctrine, esp. 84. Although we can appreciate Lindbeck’s understanding of theology as a kind of a cultural regulative rule theory, we do not think that this approach is necessarily an alternative to what he calls the cognitive or propositional approach. 2 For metaphor theory and model theory in theology cf. Ch. 1 of this book and Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 24 – 44.

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of other metaphors and models. The task in the following explanation is to provide qualifiers for combining the notions of ‘God’ and ‘niche construction’. Since the basis of the Christian understanding of God is available in the entanglement of the different stories, we have here to deal not only with some of the basics of the doctrine of God, but also with God’s relationship to other agents in the story, i. e. the world and especially human beings.

5.1 A Proposal for a Doctrine of God 5.1.1 A Storied God God as id quo maius cogitari nequit3 can only be understood by self-revelation. This self-revelation is at the same time experience of the entanglement of the stories of the gospel and the stories of believers. Therefore, a necessary condition for the possibility of the truth of Christian faith is that God actually is how God is experienced. And since God is experienced in a dramatic story, the notion of a dramatic story cannot be external to the very being of God. However, hypothetically, God also has to be understood etsi mundus non daretur, as we had seen in chapter 1. Therefore, certain decisive elements of the story cannot simply belong to the world, but also to God independently of the world. The notion of events, of communication between distinct actors, dramatic coherence, or, in short, a notion of ‘time’, cannot just belong to creation, but must also belong to God. Therefore, one can describe God as an eternal and therefore open event-like relationship of the three actors or identities Father, Son and Holy Spirit.4 The very being or, as traditionally expressed, the divine essence is a relationship, and a relationship that includes sequences, events and a time-like structure. These sequences called eternity are, due to the concept of the simplicity of God, identical with the essence of God. Eternity is the essence of God, and this kind of eternity is neither Augustine’s timeless eternity nor Boethius’ simultaneity of the time of the world.5 Jenson has described God as ‘what brackets time’6, but although there might be a particula veri in this opinion, it cannot refer to the divine essence, since otherwise the time of the world would be a part of God and therefore 3 Cf. Anselm von Canterbury, Proslogion, 84 (ch. 2). 4 Cf. Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 330 – 332. 5 For different types of eternity and their relations to different understandings of created time cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 215 – 257. 6 Cf. Jenson, R.W., ST I, 54 f: ‘gods are eternities of a certain sort […]. Just so also our actions and with them our lives threaten to fall or be torn between past and future, to become fantastic or empty, unplotted sequences of occurrence that merely happen to befall certain otherwise constituted entities. Human life is possible only if past and future are bracketed by reality that reconciles them in present meaning.’

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would itself be divine. The solution to this problem is that divine eternity can be understood partly analogously to time and partly not. Divine eternity resembles time in that it has, to use Swinburne’s terminology, a topology7—an event-like structure—, but is different to time in that it has no metric, no beginning and no end. That eternity has no metric means that the sequences of eternity are not determined by external rules and processes, but simply by God alone. We have seen in ch. 3 that the relationship between the three divine identities or divine actors, Father, Son and Spirit, is an internal relationship that is irreflexive, asymmetric (but reciprocal) and transitive. These relational attributes of irreflexivity, asymmetry and transitivity can also be observed in created time. 2014 follows 2013, but 2014 never follows 2014; therefore, time is irreflexive. 2014 follows 2013 but 2013 does not follow 2014; therefore, time is asymmetric. If 2014 follows 2013 and 2013 follows 2012, then 2014 also follows 2012; time is therefore transitive. Note that we do not need to know something like the explicit nature of time in order to get these formal attributes. But if created time, as we experience it, and the divine essence or eternity share the same formal relational attributes, we can metaphorically speak of eternity as analogous to the topology of time, even if there were no created world and no created time. If God is a story in this ontological sense, apart from any created agents, then the master event that is God and that brackets all possible ‘sequences’ in the life of God has to be an open event, since a decisive distinction between the divine and creation is that creation is limited whereas the divine is unlimited.8 A decisive question, then, is whether the feature of dramatic coherence can also be applied to the open and relational event that is God. Dramatic coherence presupposes that the actors and authors who experience the story can be surprised. Can God be surprised? Could God be surprised even if there were no world? The answer we are suggesting is that God can be surprised, but not by anything other than Godself.9 Surprise implies contingency and unpredictability to a certain extent. Therefore, even ontic contingency has to be attributed to the essence of God. At this point in our explication, the problem arises that the divine is traditionally described as the ens necessarium, as the only being necessary in and of itself. But modal logic tells us that the contingent is defined as what is not necessary. A proposition p is necessary (Np), if and only if it is not contingent, i. e. if and only if it is not possible that it is and/or if it is not possible that it is not: A statement p is called contingent (Cp), if it is possible (Pp) that it is, or if it is possible that it is not (Cp = Pp ^ P p). But necessity is defined as what is not possibly not there n

7 Cf. Swinburne, R., Christian God, 72. 8 Cf. Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 307. 9 Cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 155 – 157.

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(Np = P p).10 If there is a contradiction between contingency and necessity, can both claims hold with regard to God, or do we have to abandon one of the claims? The easiest solution would be the traditional one, i. e. simply abandoning contingency in God, but not necessity. However, if that were right, the story as we would experience it would not be a self-revelation of God. Consequently, there would be no religious value in the entanglement of the stories, neither of the story of the gospel nor of our stories. But if we affirm contingency in God and simply abandon necessity, this kind of God seems to resemble more a second world than id quo maius cogitari nequit. But there are ways to resolve this dilemma: n n

1. Nicolai Hartmann has provided an analysis of necessity. Necessity is not an absolute attribute, but rather a relational one. Something can only be necessary for something else.11 It was in this respect that necessity was used as a divine attribute in the history of theology : God is necessary for what is not God, i. e. for the world. Therefore, the divine attribute of necessity is not an attribute of the essence of God as if there were no creation, but it is a property of the relationship between God and creation. 2. But even for the divine essence there is a sense in which God can be called necessary, if we — by interpreting Eberhard Jüngel in a particular way— attribute to God the status of being ‘more than necessity’12. God is not simply necessary, God is more than necessary, and this means including contingency into necessity. At first glance, this move seems to destroy the whole semantics and syntax of the language of contingency and necessity. However, there is also a solution here. In modal logics, contingency, possibility and necessity are modal expressions; C, P and N. They have no inherent meaning without a proposition p. But if we combine a modal expression like P with a proposition p (e. g. ‘non-human animals are persons’) to Pp, such as ‘it is possible that non human animals are persons’, Pp is itself a proposition that we might call q (Pp=q). And of course it is possible that this new proposition also has a modality like necessity, contingency or possibility, e. g. Pq, being the same as PPp. There are different calculi in modal logic. In some of them, modal expressions of higher levels, so-called iterated modalities, can be reduced under specific circumstances, others not.13 We want to suggest that divine contingency and divine necessity of the essence of God are attributes of different levels. To say ‘the divine essence includes contingency’ is a proposition q; this proposition is itself necessary, Nq: ‘It is necessary that the divine essence as 10 A good introduction into modal logic is still Hughes, G.E./Cresswell, M.J., New Introduction to Modal Logic. 11 Cf. Hartmann, N., Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, 94 f., and for an interpretation Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 140. 12 Jìngel, E., Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 30. 13 Cf. Hughes, G.E./Cresswell, M.J., New Introduction to Modal Logic, ch. 3, 51 ff.

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a story includes contingency’. We are also allowed to factor out the modal term of contingency included in q, giving us NCp. In other words, the fact that the divine essence includes contingency is itself not contingent, but necessary. If God can be surprised—but by nothing other than God—one could ask whether one can also describe God metaphorically as an adventure.14 Although this is not a biblical term and was used at the time of the Reformation as an expression for a kind of story that will most likely have a hazardous result or that is far from being trustworthy in any way,15 in the meantime the use of ‘adventure’ has changed to having far more positive connotations. However, exploring whether the story that God is could also be described as an adventure would certainly be worth a separate inquiry. Since the open event of the essence of God is relationally constituted by the relata of Father, Son and Spirit, it can also be described as a dramatic story. In contrast to dramas in art, however, it is a drama in which story and history coincide; in other words, a drama in which roles and persons coincide. The persons of the Trinity are nothing apart from their ‘roles’ and these ‘roles’ are identical with the persons; therefore, the triune history is not only eternal, but also unrepeatable. Another classical divine attribute of the Western metaphysics is impassibility or unchangeability. Of course, a storied God that is an open event appears to imply changeability. And changeability appears to exclude impassibility. Do we have to abandon the divine attribute of impassibility? This move would be a normal one. Since the 20th century, most theologians and almost all in the Protestant tradition have abandoned impassibility as an attribute of God. For example, Wolfhart Pannenberg has stated that it is not the Hellenistic attribute of impassibility, but the Hebrew attribute of faithfulness that has to be applied to God.16 Indeed, faithfulness seems to be a more decisive divine predicate than impassibility. And, in contrast to impassibility, faithfulness is consistent with dramatic coherence. However, there is also a sense that still allows the attribution of unchangeability to God. If it is correct that the divine essence has to be understood as an open event, then this event or open story can itself be unchangeable, since created events are also always unchangeable.17 The event, ‘12 scholars met in 2013 at CTI, Princeton, in order to research evolution and human nature’, is unchangeable, but of course the scholars and their thinking were subject to change during 14 Cf. The suggestion for a theological model of adventure can be find in Schlarb, V., Narrative Freiheit, and I have referred shortly to this innovation in Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 156. 15 Cf. Grimm, J./Grimm, W., Art. Abenteuer. 16 Cf. Pannenberg, W., ST, Bd. 1, 466 – 477 and for an interpretation Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 231. 17 Cf. Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 306 f.

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this period of time. Events are relations and relations imply relata. Whereas the relata of an event are undergoing change, the event itself is not subject to change. This might also be true of open events. But strictly speaking, the divine essence is the only known event that can be called open. The consequence is that one might be allowed to affirm the attribute of unchangeability in God if it is attributed to the entire divine essence—that is, the divine story or the divine event—but not to the relata of this story and its ‘sequences’.

5.1.2 ‘Love Story God’ The biblical statement, ‘God is love’ (1 John 4:8.16) is correctly regarded as a description of the essence of God. However, the context does not explain the meaning of this statement. We only find an unexplained statement serving as a basis for the ethical practise of Christians. Is it possible to call the essence of God love? Of course, the history of theology is also overflowing at this point with different and manifold theories about the meaning of ‘God is love’.18 We cannot refer to this history in detail, but we do have to explain in what sense we conceive God as love for our purposes. And that first means saying what ‘God is love’ does not mean. First, God as love might imply that God is also loving, but the proposition that ‘God is the loving one’19 is not an adequate explication of the love that is God. In most of the cases where this expression is used, it appears that God is simply understood as a theistic God, i. e. a supernatural, individual, omniscient and omnipotent being.20 Although there has been some effort at the end of the 20th century to defend such an understanding of God, e. g. Swinburne’s21, it ultimately does not fit to Christian experience. It might be the case that even Christians, despite their experience of the gospel—sometimes possess such a theistic understanding of God. From a historical perspective, however, this understanding first arose in the West in early modernity, when early Enlightenment thinkers, on the lookout for a consensus of denominations and religions, tried to jettison doctrines like the Trinity, Christology, grace and several others.22 The reality, however, was that they did not establish any consensus, but rather simply invented a new doctrine of God, one that fits to the human inclination towards self-idolization and understanding God in terms of the image of individual humans. Second, even when these kinds of theism are avoided, sometimes the love of God is explained merely in terms of a loving subject. For example, in the 18 19 20 21 22

Cf. Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 68 – 268. Cf. Barth, K., KD II/1, 288, 318 f., 366, 393; KD IV/2, 857. Cf. Swinburne, R., Existence of God, 93 – 106, 282 – 291. Cf. e.g Swinburne, R., Existence of God; Swinburne, R., The Coherence of Theism, etc. Cf. Dalferth, I.U., Roots of Theism.

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theology of Karl Barth, the divine subject is understood as the one who loves in freedom.23 Here divine love and divine freedom are necessary in order to comprehend each other. They jointly balance each other out. Additionally, the description of the divine essence as love is missing, since if love is indeed the divine essence, all other predicates, including freedom, would simply be implications of divine love. In fact, Barth sometimes also comes close to this understanding of divine love, but in using the dyad of love and freedom as a guideline, he is in fact rather drastically misunderstanding the notion of love as the divine essence.24 Third, the declaration of the divine essence as love also bears the implicit danger of the idolization of our own, preliminary, and perhaps false understandings of love, which might be nothing other than an expression of our narcissism. This is especially true when divine love is understood to exclude wrath and other attributes which we normally do not want to experience. Modernity’s obsession with the problem of theodicy can be conceived as an effect of this alienated wish. If the divine is simply the perfectly loving one, and if love excludes everything painful, then it would seem that we would have an exclusive right to constantly experience blissful moments and that the divine would have to be the guarantor of this wish. But in fact, in this case, our desire, derived simply from our embodied needs, becomes the determining factor of our view of life and therefore also of what can be regarded as divine. This example shows that belief in God as love can be an expression of idolatry. Fourth, love is sometimes seen simply as an emotion or a feeling. Although it is undeniable that human love includes affectivity and therefore emotions, it is not simply an emotion. Even in the case of falling in romantic love, love is not a feeling. Rather, manifold feelings—being excited in the presence of the other, joy, longing, etc.—are included, but there is no simple emotion love.25 Fifth, sometimes love is seen as an attitude, like the attitude of desire, benevolence, nurturing, exclusive attention and others.26 Although attitudes might imply certain feelings, and although certain attitudes like desire or benevolence might be implied by love, they are not in themselves love. This misunderstanding goes along with conceiving God as the loving one instead of being love: If God is seen as the loving one, love is understood as an attitude, normally that of benevolence. Sixth, with regard to human love, proper love can be understood as a specific kind of a ruled relationship of interaction and cooperation. The distinctive feature of all relationships of human love is that the end or goal of this interaction and cooperation is nothing but the identity of the persons 23 24 25 26

Cf. Barth, K., KD II/1, 288. Cf. Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 100 – 112. Cf. Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 272; Vate, D.v.d.j., Romantic Love, 18 – 36. Cf. Brìmmer, V., Model of Love, 39 – 56; Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 279 – 284.

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involved. Whereas in economic or mercantile relationships the good of the communication between the partners are not the partners themselves—with the consequence that the partners serve each other as means of getting goods that are not the partners themselves (lust, security, wealth, etc.)—the communicated good in the case of love is the identity of the partners themselves. Whereas in manipulative relationships only one of the partners is responsible for the relationship, in relationships of love both partners are responsible.27 Human love can best be understood as a relationship between partners, which is reciprocally but not necessarily symmetrically ruled by faithfulness, trust and veracity and that is itself related to a third relatum of a shared project, i. e. something, that is co-loved. So in fact, human love is always a relationship between three relata, not two. The shared project or the co-loved determines the kind of love involved. In the case of friendship between colleagues it might simply consist in shared interest and enthusiasm for a field of study. In the case of romantic love it might include sexuality, and in the case of life-partnerships and marriage it is principally unrestricted and includes the entanglement of the stories of identity of the partners in more than one possible respect. Faithfulness, trust and veracity are the same phenomenon, viewed from different angles. I can only trust in you if you are faithful and vice versa; and I am only veracious, i. e. faithful with respect to myself, if I am faithful with respect to you. Therefore, I cannot become disloyal without also becoming untrue to myself. Since in relationships of love the identitycommunication of the partners is the distinguishing factor, I cannot harm you as the other without harming myself. The one rule of loyalty, trust and veracity is a distinctive feature of all kinds of love, but loyalty, trust and veracity are second order rules: They have to be applied to a first order interaction. Whereas in all kinds of love this second order rule is the same, the first order interaction differs in regard to the third relatum of the co-loved. For example, if our shared project implies sexuality or acquisition of joint property, I would damage my own identity if I were to cheat on you or if I were to acquire property without your knowing.28 Love as a relationship of ruled interaction and cooperation includes different attitudes and feelings, which might occasionally be called love on their own, but these attitudes and feelings are only phenomenologically love, because they belong to these relationships of love. Relationships of love can be divided phenomenologically into different kinds of relationships of fellowship, i. e. relationships involving the symmetrical communicating of a good, filial relationships and sibling relationships. Relationships of fellowship can be divided into friendship, sexual friendship, life-partnership, marriage, etc. Besides mutual fellowship, filial love and sibling love also belong to love as a relationship. In the case of filial love, there is a high amount of asymmetry : The 27 Cf. Brìmmer, V., Model of Love, 149 – 181. 28 Cf. Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 290.

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communication of the good flows from one partner, called the parent, to the other one, called the child. Whatever the shared project might include, the future alteration of the relationship of filial love into a more reciprocal relationship of love is included. Sibling love resembles relationships of fellowship, but with one distinction. Whereas the constitution of relationships of fellowship might be contingent—they can arise through the discovery of shared interests—sibling love is constituted by the fact that both partners share the same filial relationship to the same parent.29 This kind of a phenomenological analysis of human love is able to render the same phenomena which the history of thought, both philosophical and theological, has tried to understand. Therefore, classical concepts like needlove (eros), gift-love (agape), mutual love (philia) or being turned towards someone (storge),30 are also entailed, but without some of the oversimplifications and false exclusions of the classical schemata. Another exciting feature is that love as a relationship has an embodied basis, which can be seen in the biological understanding of pair-bonds31 or the mother-child dyad.32 Seventh, this kind of love as a relationship of fellowship might be able to be used as a model for the love that is the essence of God. We have already seen that God is an open event, that God is a relationship and also a story. Now we can see that God as love—etsi mundus non daretur (as if there were no world)—can be conceived as a relationship of ‘fellowship’ between Father, Son and Spirit in faithfulness, trust and veracity. There are, however, some decisive negative analogies between human love and divine love: 1. Whereas humans rely in their identity not only on relationships of love, but on all their relationships, the divine identity is constituted by this love that is the divine essence. 2. Whereas only the identity of the partners is communicated in human love, the subject of the communication of divine love is being itself. 3. Whereas the unity of human love is nothing but an entanglement of identities, in the case of divine love it is a unity of being. 4. In the case of human love, two of the three relata are simply particular humans. The decisive question, however, is what are the relata of divine love, apart from their names Father, Son and Spirit? A classical answer from Trinitarian theology is that the relata can be called hypostaseis or personae, i. e. persons. Person in this theological sense is not something that is observed in humans and then metaphorically ascribed to the divine persons. Person in this theological sense is rather a technical term. In principle, it means a relatum of the relationship of the divine love—or a relatum of the relationship of the divine relational essence. Throughout the 29 Cf. Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 291 – 293. 30 The most known inquiries using these historical concepts are Nygren, A., Eros und Agape I; Scholz, H., Eros und Caritas; Lewis, C.S., Four Loves. 31 Cf. Fuentes, A., Patterns and Trends in Primate Pair Bonds; Fuentes, A., Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You, 185 – 192. 204 – 206. 32 Cf. Fuchs, T., Das Gehirn – ein Beziehungsorgan, 198.

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history of theology, we can find some attempts to define personhood in this sense. The most promising one, since it does not presuppose an ontology of substance, was proposed by Richard of St. Victor : A divine person is an incommunicabilis ex-sistentia:33 Richard uses the Latin term existentia in order to define personhood. Existentia, however, does not mean ‘existence’. The term existentia combines two aspects in one: that of sistentia and that of ex; with sistentia Richard is referring to the fact that a person is always a relatum; with the aspect of ex he means that this relatum is related towards others in a twofold way : passively as becoming from others and actively as becoming for others. Therefore, the correct translation would be becoming-from-others-and-for-others, or whenceand-whither-becoming. The term incommunicabilis also has a double meaning: On the one hand, it signifies the fact that in this relational whence-andwhither-becoming of the person there is something which cannot be communicated or transferred. These are the classical personal properties that make a person particular. On the other hand, the term signifies that the particularity of the person is something that is not a property of the substance or the relatum, but a property that emerges only in the communication between persons. Communication here is not restricted to the exchange of information, but means, according to the classical use, exchange in a broad sense. We can therefore define a divine person as a particular communicative whence-and-whither-becoming—or simply as a relatum of the divine love. Although the divine persons are really distinct, they are nevertheless related in a unity—a kind of unity that exceeds the amount of unity one can find in created life. The being of the person of the Father is constituted in relation to the Son and the Spirit. Without the Son and the Spirit, there would be no Father. The same is applicable to the other persons. One might say that in God the highest unity and highest diversity are combined without any tension. The fact that these relationships have to be seen as reciprocally constitutive means the relationships between the persons are internal relationships. The Trinity, therefore, is the paradigm of internal relationality—and historically, also the first context, in which internal relationality was discovered.34 Thus, in comparison to other Trinitarian conceptions, such as e. g., those of Jürgen Moltmann or Cornelius Plantinga,35 we do not simply choose a social model of the Trinity. The social model of the Trinity looks at human sociality and uses it as a metaphor for modelling God. However, we are simply relying on the experienced story-like self-disclosure of God and use nothing apart from this 33 Richard von St.Victor, De Trinitate 4,18 (268); for an interpretation cf. Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 161 – 164. 34 Cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 95 – 99; Zizioulas, J., Cappadocian Contribution. 35 Cf. Moltmann, J., Trinität und Reich Gottes; Moltmann, J., In der Geschichte; Plantinga, C.j., Social Trinity and Tritheism. For an interpretation of Moltmann’s trinitarian theology see Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 180 – 199, and Deane-Drummond, C., Ecology in Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology.

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story for our model building. Only in a second step it might be meaningful not to conceive God in terms of a model provided by human sociality, but rather to conceive human sociality in the light of the communion of love that is God. If we are combining the two aspects of the essence of God, that God is an open event or in Godself a story and that God is love, we can also say that the divine essence is a story that is love, or love that is a story, or—in a very specific sense that should not be equated with its ordinary use—a love story.36 5.1.3 The Attributes of the Relational Essence of God There are a lot of schemes used to describe the possible attributes of God. For example, Protestant orthodoxy spoke of the proprietates, i. e. the personal properties of the trinitarian persons, the praedicata, which are the predicates of God with respect to his creation, i. e. the attributes of his action directed toward the world, and of attributa, which are attributes of the divine essence. Since God is simple, the different attributes in God do not signify different things as in humans, but the same: the divine relational essence. Classically, there is no distinctio realis, no real distinction, between these attributes. The difference between the attributes relies on difference in human language, not on differences in the divine state of affairs. This distinction could be conceived as purely on the side of human capabilities, like in late medieval scholasticism, i. e. they merely signify a distinctio nominalis, or, like in high-scholasticism and in Protestant orthodoxy itself, a distinctio formalis, an expression first used by John Duns Scotus at the end of high-scholasticism, meaning a distinction in the human mind based on external circumstances.37 In most cases, these attributes are divided into absolute attributes and attributes in relation to the world. Despite the fact that the schemata do vary in the narrow history of Lutheran orthodoxy,38 our approach to the doctrine of God cannot follow any of them in particular ; we rather have to alter the entire idea. Interestingly, Gottfried Thomasius in the 19th century provided a distinction that may better fit to our approach. With regard to the so-called immanent attributes of God, he writes: ‘The attributes which signify the relations of God to the world have to be separated out [from the essential attributes], since in that case one would not only make the above-mentioned mistake of making God dependent on the world, but one would also understand the world as being necessary. For example, the classical attributes like omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, justice express God’s relations to the world, since without the concept of a world they are incomprehensible. If they were only essential attributes then there would have to be a world in order for God to be 36 Cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 29 – 35. 37 Cf. Beuttler, U., Gott und Raum, 35 – 37. 38 Cf. Schmid, H., Dogmatik, 82 – 91.

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what he essentially is; the world would be necessary for God’s self-becoming. […] But our opinion is that both [classes of attributes—immanent and relative ones] are to be sharply distinguished. Therefore, the first class is subject of the doctrine of God, the second is subject of the doctrine of the world […].’39

In short, the classical theistic attributes which, according to contemporary reformulations of theism,40 belong essentially to a theistic conception of God, do not belong to the attributes of God in our Christian perspective. Omniscience, omnipotence, etc. are not aspects of the doctrine of God and are not essential attributes of God. The only attributes which are essential to God are attributes of the love of God. On the one hand, these are attributes of the event-like framework of relations that God is; on the other hand, these are the in-communicable attributes that emerge out of these relationships and which constitute the three divine relata of love or persons. The first set can be called the attributes of the relational essence of God as perfect, storied love: As suggested elsewhere, these may be perfect surrender, perfect loyalty, perfect trust, perfect veracity, liberty, justice (in contrast to Thomasius), reliability, potency (but not omnipotence), the ability to act, intentionality and consciousness (of the relata).41 In a more formal sense, we can also add the more formal descriptions of section 5.1, i. e. being eternal, being event-like, being a story, being perfect love and being personal, in short, being a love story in the sense explained above. We should remember that everything that has been said so far in section 5.1 is the outcome of our second order theological reflection. It belongs, metaphorically speaking, to the grammar of Christian faith; i. e. it does not have to be consciously expressed in the communication of faith. It is only necessary to make this explicit if something in the communication of faith starts to run in the wrong direction, i. e. tends toward being a communication of idolatry rather than a communication of the gospel. Furthermore, another key consideration is that the results of section 5.1 belong to the Christian doctrine of God without any relation to the world. Therefore, all these propositions are not only preliminary, as they are statements in the framework 39 Thomasius, G., Christi Person und Werk. Erster Theil, 44 f. („Andrerseits aber müssen von ihnen diejenigen ausgeschieden werden, welche blos Beziehungen Gottes zur Welt ausdrücken; denn außerdem würde man nicht nur in den oben angedeuteten Fehler zurückfallen und Gott von der Welt abhängig machen, sondern man würde auch die Welt als nothwendig setzen. So z.B. drücken die Attribute Allmacht, Allgegenwart, Allwissenheit, Strafgerechtigkeit ohne Zweifel Beziehungen Gottes zur Welt aus, sie lassen sich ohne Hinzunahme des Welbegriffs gar nicht verstehen. Wären sie nur wesentliche Eigenschaften, so müßte auch auch die Welt sein, damit Gott sein könne, was er wesentlich ist; sie erschiene als nothwendig zu seiner Selbstverwirklichung. […] Nach unserer Anschauung sind beide [immanente und transeunte Eigenschaften] scharf auseiananderzuhalten und ist die erstere Klasse bei der Lehre von Gott, die andere bei der Lehre von der Welt zu behandeln […].“) 40 Cf. Swinburne, R., The Coherence of Theism, 129 – 217. 41 Cf. Mìhling, M., Eschatologie, 75.

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of a model, but are also abstract; they are not concrete descriptions. Nevertheless, they are necessary presuppositions for looking at the relationship between God and world.

5.2 A Proposal for a Doctrine of God’s Relation to the World 5.2.1 Creation and Perfection In the framework of the Christian doctrine of creation the following points are decisive: a) Creatio ex nihilo:42 The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo appears in 2 Macc 7:14.28 and in Rom 4:17. In both cases, it appears without explanation as a reason for other states of affairs, i. e. the resurrection of the dead and justification sola gratia. Its meaning is not that there was something called ‘nothing’ which was used as a kind of material for creation. Rather, it means—in addition to rejecting the notion that creation is some kind of divine emanation—simply ‘not something’, i. e. the sheer absence of any presupposition for creation on the side of the world. The doctrine of creation is therefore not primarily about the factual, but about the possible. Pure possibilities, distinctions between real possibilities and fictional possibilities, logical laws, etc. also have to be understood as created. The world, therefore, is contingent in a radical sense: There is no reason for the world to exist. The relationship between God and world is therefore asymmetrically constitutive. Whereas the divine processes are necessary in order for there to be a world, world processes are not necessary in order for God to be God. And yet, creatio ex nihilo does not mean that there were no presuppositions to creation at all, only that there were no presuppositions on the side of the world, whereas there certainly are important presuppositions about the specific shape of the relational essence of God. In short, one can say that creatio ex nihilo means formally that the activity of the triune God towards the world is a sufficient condition for the existence of the world.43 In this respect, creatio ex nihilo describes a logical relationship, not a temporal one; in addition, time, be it endless or infinite, has to be understood as created. b) Creatio continuata: The idea of creatio continuata is a supplement to the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. It signifies that the action of the triune God towards the world is also the necessary condition for each event or 42 A very good introduction and explication of the concept of creatio ex nihilo is Wçlfel, E., Welt als Schöpfung. 43 Cf. Wçlfel, E., Welt als Schöpfung, 26 – 35.

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sequence in the course of the world.44 Therefore, there is no complete godlessness anywhere in the world. c) Image of Divine Love. God is not bound to any condition prevalent in the world in order to create the world, but God is of course bound to the divine essence. And since the divine essence is perfectly relational and processual love, it is necessary that, if God creates a world at all, that God creates a world in accordance with his essence. Therefore, the world as a whole can be seen as correspondent to divine love. Time and space are created resonances of the inner-divine relationality by sharing the same logical structure; like God, the world is also a kind of story including a history. Furthermore, since the world is neither an emanation of God nor independent of God, the world is not a fact, but a gift. Put concretely : Creatures are given as gifts by God for each other and—as we had seen in the theology of the Reformers—by the very same act God has also given God’s very own self. Theologically speaking, there is a rule of love that is the basic law of the processes of the world, as Luther explains: ‘No creature […] lives for itself or serves itself. The sun does not shine for itself, water does not flow for itself etc. In this manner every creature is directed by the rule of love.’45

This love is also valid in the case of non-personal beings, but as such not necessarily observable outside the Christian story. However, we should remember the fact that only in modernity is love restricted to the realm of the personal. Even in the 19th century C.S. Peirce saw love as the principle behind evolution46 and in medieval thought love was also a principle of cosmology.47 In this pre-modern, broad sense, created love means nothing other than a kind of internal relationality of the world that resonates with the internal relationality of God. It means the interdependence of entities, sequences, events and actors in the world—not only on God, but also on each other. Finding linguistic means to actualize this insight for today in a way that is also communicable to the language of contemporary science is a decisive requirement for the proclamation of faith. A decisive implication of the world’s character as ruled by created love in correspondence to divine love is that the world as a whole is no fact, 44 The term continuata is used instead of continua in order to signify that the concept of creatio ex nihilo is presupposed but not excluded. 45 Luther, M., WA 5,38,14 – 16: ‘nulla creatura sibi vivit aut servit […]. Sol non sibi lucet, aqua non sibi fluit &c. Ita omnis creatura servat legem charitatis’. 46 Cf. Peirce, C.S., Evolutionary Love. 47 This is best illustrated by Alighieri, D., Divine Comedy, paradiso 33,143 – 145: ‘But now my will and my desire, like wheels revolving with an even motion, were turning with the Love that moves the sun and all the other stars.’ Love is foremost a cosmic principle that moves the inanimate world, and the human will is only in its perfected state able to join this principle.

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but a gift—and therefore the correct attitude of created persons who are a part of the story of the world is gratitude. d) Co-creativity : Another important feature that has been emphasized in the 20th century, especially by Michael Welker,48 and in other sense by Ph. Hefner, but which is also present in the biblical witness, is the co-creativity of the world in creating the world. Inner-worldly actors and events are creative, but relatively creative, not absolutely creative like the divine action. Inner-worldly creativity is not creatio ex nihilo, but nevertheless it is there and it cooperates with divine creativity. e) Intended Perfection. As an intentional gift, the world as a whole is not a changeable process not intended for perfection, but one that is destined for perfection, and therefore a story. Whereas this kind of intended perfection might rely on rules, they are in principle not naturally knowable for creatures. Being in a story means not knowing the next sequence and therefore being subject to dramatic coherence. Religious claims about insight into the rules that govern history—which one might call apocalyptism49—are therefore to be deemed as out of sync with the Christian understanding of creation. This notion of the intentionality of creation implies two further characteristics: First, the world is created as good, not as perfected. Even without the fall the world would have been in need of a story and being perfected. Second, the end is not a result of natural processes, i. e. not an outcome of purely immanent processes, rules and laws. The perfected state of the world is therefore itself not a part of the world. The world is limited; the perfected state of the world is not. Whereas the world can be understood as a story in the framework of an individuation of created space and time, the perfection of the world has to be understood as a perfection in the framework of an individuation by the divine immanent relations. Therefore, the end of the world is its Aufgehobenwerden, being elevated, into the love and life of the triune God—or traditionally speaking, its theosis sola gratia or ex nihilo without conflating creator and creature.50 f) The Possibility of the Fall: Also included in creation was the possibility of the fall, i. e. the possibility that during the course of the story of the world, creatures would not act in accordance with its intended end. This possibility is understood to have been actualized and is called the fall.

48 Cf. e. g. Welker, M., What is the ‘Spiritual Body’?, 352; Welker, M., Was ist “Schöpfung”? Gen 1 und 2 neu gelesen. Hefner, Ph., Biocultural Evolution and the Created Co-Creator. 49 Cf. Mìhling, M., Eschatologie, 199; Mìhling, M., Eschatical Perfection, 207. 50 Although the notion of theosis in Eastern Orthodoxy is not a single, unified concept, the most important traditions emphasize that theosis is not a transformation of the human into the divine essence, but an event of grace. Cf. the rejection of conflating creature and creator in Anastasius vom Sinai, A.v., Wegweiser, PG 89, 36.

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g) Perfection by Specific Cooperation: Since the outcome of the world is the perfected state of the world in the framework of the triune relationships intended in a supralapsarian manner by God and gained by the cooperation between God and world, this kind of cooperation can be outlined in greater detail. The ethical outcome, i. e. the certainty that the perfected state of the world is to consist in nothing but perfect good, lies exclusively within the responsibility of the triune God. The aesthetic shape, however, lies within creation itself. With respect to humanity, the doctrine of the last judgment signifies the divine transformation of the ethical differences between human action in the world and divine perfection into aesthetic differences in the eschatic state.51

5.2.2 Humans among other Created Animals If creation resonates its origin in divine love in its very ontic structure, as Christianity claims, then human animals are also images—or better resonances—of divine love. The understanding of the concrete imago dei therefore depends on one’s understanding of God in a concrete way. The minimal conditions of God-talk coming from philosophy of religion are not satisfying in this respect. Only the different concrete understandings of God are determinative for one’s understanding of humanity—and despite pervasive postmodern tendencies to attempt to ignore the special doctrine of God and to relativize the distinctions—they are nevertheless there and shape our self-understanding, our understanding of others, both human and non-human, as well as our behaviour. If the Christian God was a theistic God, an incorporeal, omnipotent and omniscient being,52 able to do anything it wants except what is logically impossible, and reigning over the created world in a hierarchical manner, then our understanding of humans corresponding to this understanding would be one that either sees humans as objects of the will of this divine despot or as participating in the despot’s power and arbitrariness. Since theistic voluntarism actually came about in early modernity, this view of humans as bearing the image of a despotic individual God was and still is very common, even in cases where the existence of such a deity is denied. In many cases, humans have simply inherited its position themselves and humanity’s image was shaped in the image of such a deity. This result is only amplified if one denies the existence of such a deity, as now most of these predicates can be transferred to humanity. Nietzsche’s superman (Übermensch) can be seen as a consequence of this kind of thinking. There is no question about the fact that the doctrine of the imago dei and the related doctrine of dominium terrae have 51 Cf. Mìhling, M., Eschatologie, 282 f; Mìhling, M., Why does the risen Christ have scars? 52 Cf. Swinburne, R., Christian God, 160 – 163.

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been misused to wrongly justify arbitrary domination of ‘nobles’ over other ‘classes’, of some ‘races’ over others, of males over females, of humans over non-human animals, etc. It is generally obvious today that these were mistakes. Nevertheless, the image of theistic arbitrariness persists. Often complicit in the understanding of humans is simply a variation on the same theme. Instead of some humans being put into the role of the divine ruler and bearing the image of God and some excluded from this role, every single individual is understood to be in this position. The individualistic idea that every social rule relies on the negotiation of a kind of a social contract,53 the hedonistic idea that everyone as an individual has a right to feel perfect happiness, the relativistic idea that everyone has to define for him-/herself what can be seen as good and/or true, and the misunderstanding that evolution is about the survival of the stronger individuals fit perfectly into this version of rendering humans in the image of a theistic deity. Whereas it may not be possible to find historical linkages between all these lines of thinking, the absence of clear historical pathways is not due to their being scant evidence, but rather due to the overwhelming amount of evidence. Besides conceiving God theistically, there is also a second kind of understanding of God prevalent in modernity that has shaped our rendering of humanity up to today : the impersonal pantheistic one. God, or perfection, is identified with the whole of the universe, its (more or less) rational structure of law, which can be interpreted in either a mechanistic or an economic way. Even in this case, the image of humanity resonates these conceptions of the divine. The resonance in this paradigm consists in conceiving humans as part of the machine. We see ourselves as bodies rather than as a Leib, we try to separate the natural and corporeal from some residuum of the soul, we try to understand ourselves as homines oeconomici and we tend to broaden this functional understanding of humanity to all areas of thought. The representationalist idea that all living forms, including humans, are merely vehicles for their genes and are shaped by the constraints of a purely mechanistic environment,54 is an expression of this paradigm as well as its broadening to the cultural realm in ‘sociobiology’ or the contemporary and postdemocratic55 tendency to technocracy. Decisions by communities and societies (which should be democratic according to their explicit self-understanding) demonstrate in many cases and at increasing levels nothing but acquiescence to the factors with which they are composed and that therefore economic or scientific rationality will have to determine our social decisions. The expansion of regional markets into global markets, including many politi-

53 Cf. Mìhling, M., Ethik, 208 – 213. 54 Cf. Dawkins, R., Sefish Gene, 254. 55 The postdemocracy hypothesis was introduced by Crouch, C., Post-Democracy, and is highly debated, cf. the articles in Postdemokratie? Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte.

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cians’ conviction to order their decisions according to the TINA (there-is-noalternative) principle,56 are both expressions of this attitude. Interestingly, both the theistic and mechanistic image of humanity are present at the same time, even though they are logically incommensurable.57 According to Peter Berger’s analyses from the 1980s,58 modernity and postmodernity force us to conceive of ourselves in the image of the voluntaristic God in the reality of our having to make decisions in more realms than ever before. We have to decide about our spouses, our work, the place where we want to live, our political, religious and ethical preferences, and even about our sexual ones. Whereas we seemed to be forced into voluntaristic individualism, the constraints of mechanistic collectivism of the global market or the ecological crisis prevent there effectively being any space for really important decisions. In addition, the economy of an unrestricted market relies on both of these two non-coherent images of humanity at the same time. As parts of the working environment and in being employed we are parts of collectives, we have to follow the mechanisms of the collective, in most cases companies or other institutions that provide work, and we are forced to conceive of ourselves as ascetics in providing as much power for the lowest cost for the sake of the specific collective within the framework of its competitive situation. At the same time, in our private lives, in our spare time, we are called to conceive of ourselves as individuals, as free and possessing the (financial) power we need in order to express ourselves and to actualize our wishes about who we want to be and our individual fulfilment in demonstrating attitudes of hedonistic consumer behaviour. These examples might sufficiently demonstrate that what concrete divine image humanity resonates is decisive. The two examples, the rendering of ourselves in the image of a theistic individual deity and/or in the image of a collectivistic mechanical deity are of course not the only ones and neither fits the Christian understanding of God and humanity. Since the whole creation resonates the rule of love, humans are also shaped into this image, as resonances of divine love. The imago dei is therefore primarily the imago trinitatis and therefore the imago dilectionis and at the same time the imago personalitatis. Humans are created images of divine relationality. This is not a feature distinctive to other creatures. What really 56 The TINA principle was used by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, cf. Jay, A.H., The Oxford Dictionary of Political Quotations, 361, and reappeared during the 2010 economic crisis in the rhetoric of Angela Merkel, cf. Kçnig, J., Das Totschlagargument. “Alternativlos” ist Unwort des Jahres 2010. 57 However, the incommensurability of the theistic and the mechanistic approach is not acknowledged throughout the history of thought. I am grateful to David Gilland for the reminder, that Heidegger is an exception here. Late Heidegger says that technology is a consequence of onto-theology. Philosophy from Soctrates onwards attempts to put reason over being, and technology is essentially the end of this process, of reason’s total domination over being. 58 Cf. Berger, P.L., The Heretical Imperative.

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seems to be distinctive, however, is more our ability to reject the created rules of love. In the previously cited statement by Luther about the created rule of love we omitted a decisive passage that illustrates precisely this point: ‘No creature—except humans and the devil—lives for itself or serves itself. The sun does not shine on behalf of itself, water does not flow for itself etc. In this manner every creature is directed by the rule of love.’ 59

Nevertheless, the distinctive feature of humanity is not to be seen in fallenness itself. Being human does not mean being fallen, since otherwise humans would not be able to be saved, justified and perfected without also losing their humanity. According to Christianity, it is not only humanity that is subject to the fall. The non-human creation also shares in the effects of the fall in its concrete shape, but without responsibility for the fall (Rom 8:19 – 23). From the perspective of our present natural philosophy it is not easy to understand these Christian claims: How can, for example, the fact that there are carnivores be an effect of human sin, since there were carnivores long before humans evolved? How is it possible to imagine that this seemingly ‘natural’ law, that life as life always costs other lives, can be eschatically abandoned?60 At this point we have to remember two decisive insights. First, the fall not only affects our moral abilities, but also our rational and affective ones. According to Reformation anthropology, the whole human (totus homo) as embodied participates in the fall. Therefore, our means of experience and our means of rationally reconstructing our experience are also subject to the fall. In a Christian perspective the activity of the natural sciences does not consist in finding the real platonic and eternal laws of science, which are independent of our understanding. Rather, our scientific endeavours are always fallible in every possible state of the story of the created world. Second, the perfection of the world is seen as intended by God and as the outcome of cooperation between created beings and the creator. The perfection of the world is not something that inheres in the world or in nature. But if it does not inhere, then the divinely intended perfection cannot be visible to any kind of empirical observation or natural faculty. If humans, by means of the perspective of the natural sciences—i. e. by using their naturalistic attitude and by restricting experience to the 3rd person perspective—were able to observe the divinely intended teleology, it would be a contradiction to the Christian understanding of God, creation and humanity. Nevertheless, the perfection of the world can be rendered theologically with the help of the model of niche construction, as we will see later. 59 Luther, M., WA 5,38,14 – 16: ‘nulla creatura sibi vivit aut servit praeter hominem et diabolum. Sol non sibi lucet, aqua non sibi fluit &c. Ita omnis creatura servat legem charitatis’. Italics in the English translation by MM. 60 Cf. Mìhling, M., Eschatologie, 188 – 194.

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The decisive Christian insight that humans resonate God is by no means a conviction based on the distinction between humans and other animals. Nevertheless, the attributes of this resonance are important; perhaps more than if they were distinguishing features. We therefore have to explicate the decisive features briefly : As a resonance of divine love, love also is decisive for humans. We can expect that love is always embodied, that there is a natural basis for love and that our love always shapes us. However, as images of divine love, there are also several differences with divine love: Whereas divine love constitutes the divine being, our loves only constitute our identities, and even then only partly. As resonances of the divine story, we are also ‘storied people’, our lives are processes and consist in sequences that can be bound together in dramatic coherence. In the last instance we live in the story of the divine love and life61, both in our present state as well as in the eschatical reality. As resonances of divine personality we are also persons, albeit in a derivative and imperfect way. In a Christian perspective, to speak of a personal God does not mean to picture God in an anthropomorphic way, but rather to picture humans and perhaps other non-human created persons in a theomorphic way. Concretely, the concept of a created person has the following features: A created person is a particular and proceeding becoming-from-and-forothers, who is being constituted by the final judgment, lives presently in either trust or mistrust toward the gospel promise and possesses reflexive selfawareness in either a self-disclosing or self-enclosed manner. (1) In speaking of created persons as becomings-from-and-for-others or whence-and-whither-becomings (existentiae)62, an actual individual person is inconceivable; being personal always means standing in constitutive relationships to oneself and others. Thus, with respect to both one’s identity and ontic constitution, personal relationality is by no means accidental, but rather belongs to human being qua human being. From this standpoint, individualistic understandings of personhood in which reciprocal sociality is seen as secondary or only incidental to being human, e. g. as presupposed in certain kinds of social contract theory,63 are illusory. (2) Created persons are also proceeding or event-like entities. They are not static, but rather inhere irreducibly within and possess narrative histories. Persons are ‘storied people’.64 According to a suggestion by Tim Ingold65, this fact can be expressed by talking about human 61 I am indebted for this expression to Drechsel, W., Lebensgeschichte, 365. 62 Cf. Richard von St.Victor, De Trinitate, 4,12. (Engl.: Richard of St.Victor, On the Trinity, 151 f.) 63 For an account of individualism and social contract theory, cf. Mìhling, M., Ethik, 208 – 213. 64 Hauerwas, S., Community of Character, 91. 65 Cf. Ingold, T., Becoming Persons; Ingold, T., To Human is a Verb; Ingold, T./Palsson, G.

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becomings instead of human beings. Insofar as these histories consist in multiple series of intertwined events occurring in the spatio-temporal world, the a-personal or pre-personal realm must also be understood as constitutively necessary for created personhood. That is, a created person exists apriori within a given relationship to the pre-personal world. They are parts of a story that is at the same time the story of nature and created persons are always embodied persons. Created persons are indeed also related to themselves through selfawareness. Not only do created persons experience their history in a way that is constitutively related to the pre-personal realm, they also actually experience their own experience of their history. Thus, created persons are always reflexively self-related. Persons, however, are also particular. In the history of the concept of personhood, the question of what makes an individual person distinctive from others, traditionally called the problem of individuation, frequently comes into view. For our purposes it may suffice to suggest that this distinctiveness, particularity or individuality cannot be presupposed as an aspect or attribute of a person’s whence-and-whither-becoming, but rather ought to be understood as constituted precisely by that person’s whence-and-whither-becoming.66 That is to say, individuality is not a subsistent property of personal being, but is constituted precisely in the act of its storied becoming. In so far as human persons are also creatures, three sets of relationships are constitutive for human personhood. These are relations to oneself, relations to the pre-personal world and relations to other persons. These relations, however, are not primarily active, but are rather to be understood in terms of a passive relatedness, givenness or pathos. While it is indeed possible to deny that one is constituted by these relationships, the actual reciprocally constitutive existence of these relationships cannot be denied. Further, this relational framework is, intrinsically, a wholly dependent one: there must be a sufficient condition for it to exist, and there must be a necessary condition for it to continue to exist.67 Insofar as this account of personhood presupposes divine creation, the necessary and sufficient conditions for its existence and continuation cannot be understood to derive exclusively from this threefold relational framework, nor can they be this framework itself. If a created person was fully aware that her dependence on this threefold set of reciprocal relations was wholly constitutive of her personal selfdisclosedness, then this person, speaking hypothetically, would already be

(eds.) Biosocial Becomings; Fuentes, A., Blurring the Biological and Social in Human Becomings. 66 Cf. for an extensive review of the concept of a person, v. Mìhling, M., Ethik, 236 – 261. 67 Cf. Wçlfel, E., Welt als Schöpfung, 26 – 35.

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in the state of consummated perfection. However, created persons in the here and now can and do deny precisely those relationships which are constitutive of their existence. Penultimate personal self-disclosedness is therefore understood to be under the condition self-enclosedness, an abstract characterization of what we otherwise call sin. Created persons are therefore dislocated in relation to the actual relational framework by which they exist: to themselves, to the pre-personal world around them and to others. Recovery from the state of the sinful self-enclosedness to a state of self-disclosedness, and thereby also restoration of the relational framework as a whole, comes in the self-disclosing presence of the condition of the possibility of true creaturely personhood. In other words, it is God’s efficacious self-disclosure in Jesus Christ and the presence of the Holy Spirit that bring about restoration of the dislocated three-fold relatedeness and return the created person to her proper place within this framework. The incarnate activity of Christ and the concarnate (with-theflesh) activity of the Spirit inaugurate a history in which both re-located self-disclosedness and sinful self-enclosedness are inseparably intertwined. As a result of this convergence, the created person is understood to be simul iustus et peccator, as she is also being retrospectively constituted in her relationality by the eschatological perfection.68 This perfection includes both the concrete history of the identity of a person, as well as the overcoming of intra-historical ambiguities. Thus, the narrative of creation, redemption and perfection as a whole belongs irreducibly to the concept of creaturely personhood. (7) As a result, one may indeed say that created personhood is always personhood in becoming and personhood only insofar as it is in the process of being perfected. Or, to put it another way, created personal bcomings are always being retrospectively constituted by and towards the final judgment; they receive their proper self-disclosedness passively. (8) As Luther suggests, it is during the course of their lives that created persons receive their personhood by trusting alone in the faithful promise of the gospel, consisting in the promise of the verdict of the final judgment, which in this connection can be understood as consummation of the process inaugurated by the Triune God which constitutes creaturely personhood.69

68 Cf. Mìhling, M., Eschatologie, 282 – 286. 69 So Luther, M., WA 56, 371,1 – 6: ‘Quia philosophi oculum ita in presentiam rerum immergunt, vt solum quidditates et qualitates earum speculentur, Apostolus autem oculos nostros reuocat ab intuitu rerum praesentium, ab essentia et accidentibus earum, et dirigit in eas, secundum quod futurae sunt’ and WA 39/I, 177,3 – 5: ‘Quare homo huius vitae est pura materia Dei ad futurae formae suae vitam. Sicut et tota creatura, nunc subiecta vanitati, materia Deo est ad gloriosam futuram suam formam’.

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It is in the promise of human personhood that the author of human personhood is co-disclosed: the Triune God, understood here in terms of a framework of relations of love between Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The divine persons or relata of these relations of love are therefore themselves particular, self-disclosed from-and-for-the-other-becomings (or particular, self-disclosed whence-and-whither-becomings). In other words, the relata of God in themselves have to be understood as persons. As a result, ‘being a person as presented here is not something ascribed both to human beings as well as God. Being personal is rather originally and essentially purely divine; personhood can only be ascribed to human beings derivatively.’70 It is not, therefore, because human beings are persons that they conceive of God in personal terms, but it is rather because God is this threefold love, etsi mundus non daretur, that human beings are also imagines personalitatis, resonances of God, and therefore resonances of divine personhood. The condition of the possibility of being a human person is therefore quite simply the triune relational being as becoming of God. Sin can also be described relationally as a defect in humanity’s resonation of the divine love, the divine story and divine personality. As already said, sin affects the totus homo, the whole person, and since persons are relationally constituted, sin is also a relational fact; being sinful basically means being dislocated within the created framework of relations. To this extent, sin has to be distinguished from guilt, since any experience of being misplaced is sinful, even a victim’s. I make this point precisely in order to avoid any possibility of ‘blame the victim’, but rather to compare and contrast sin and guilt. One cannot blame someone for being sinful, but one can blame someone for being guilty. The concept of blame needs to be liberated from its unholy alliance with sin. However, this does not mean that there is no guilt of sin. But guilt of sin is not the same as sin. With respect to love and being a person, being misplaced expresses itself through a mistaken form of loving. Luther’s quote a few pages above is not to be interpreted in such a way that it is understood to refer to an absence of love. Rather, it consists in functionalization, i. e. treating persons as non-persons, i. e. as means for other ends, and in pseudo–personalization, i. e. treating entities that are non-persons, i. e. objects, as persons and ends in themselves.71 A great challenge for Christian hamartiology (i. e. the doctrine of sin) consists in the clarification of how animals are to be treated. Animals are surely not non-persons, i. e. objects, but it is also not very common to treat animals as persons either. The communicative relationality that constitutes personality is not restricted to communication by the means of language; rather it means the 70 Herms, E., Personbegriff, 410. („Personsein wie hier beschrieben […] nicht sowohl dem Menschen als auch Gott zu[kommt], sondern ursprünglich und wesentlich kommt es allein Gott zu und den Menschen nur abgeleiteter Maßen.“) 71 Cf. Mìhling, M., Gott ist Liebe, 287 f.

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meaningful exchange of information. Most vertebrates clearly have a 1st person perspective and what we have said about the basic self in section 2.3.8 and in section 3.6.5 might also be valid for certain kinds of animals. Furthermore, if one avoids the mistake of defining personality according to attributes and properties, we can see no clear argument for denying the personhood of certain animals. The biblical tradition also speaks of animals as ends in themselves in the eyes of God without any utility for humans (Ps 104:2672). On the other hand, the biblical witness tells us in a narrative that God’s experiment of finding reciprocally constitutive partners among animals for humans failed (Gen 2:20b73). Non-human animals are clearly pre-persons, but plants and inanimate natural entities are also pre-persons. The description of non-human animals as pre-persons is therefore not satisfying. Perhaps the transition between created pre-persons and created persons is a fuzzy and continual one. The best solution therefore is to leave the case provisionally open. With respect to the resonating story of God, human sin finds a plurality of expressions. In principle, all narratives that provide for the self-interpretation of human persons, communities and societies which cannot be incorporated by dramatic coherence into the meta-story of the triune life and that therefore claim to be an ultimate meta-story in themselves portray the state of displacement. A decisive feature in a narrative ontology is that denying the existence of contingency is an expression of displacement. Therefore, decontingentization is another decisive basic form of sin.74 In classical terms, the consequences of sin are the loss of holiness, i. e. being no longer oriented in the right way, and the loss of integrity, i. e. being exclusively subject to mechanistic laws of nature.75 The biblical narratives describe sin as the unsuccessful attempt by humans to be themselves exclusively the standard and canon of constituting the good (Gen 3:576). The result of this unsuccessful attempt is that in their actions and 72 In this verse, the Leviathan, an animal representative for non-human creatures is no longer an enemy of humans and deities like in Mesopotamian mythology, but its aim and purpose is rather play, an activity exemplary of being an end in and of itself. 73 Note two interesting features of Gen 2 – 3 that are often overlooked: First, in creating humanity God is actually experimenting; humans are perfected only after some time. Second, in comparison with Plato’s myth of human creation in the Symposium, relationality is the perfected, not the imperfect state of humans. In Plato, the perfect state is the individual unity of mythical spherically shaped humans. Since they were too powerful, the gods became afraid and dimished their power by creating human relationality. By contrast, in Gen 2 – 3 there is an individual proto-human that has to be perfected through relationality. Since other pre-personal creatures do not satisfy in resonating human relationality, another human creature is necessary. 74 Cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 152 – 159, 293 – 296. 75 Cf. Mìhling, M., Versöhnendes Handeln, 316 – 321. 76 The Hebrew word yadah not only means to know, but also to be intimate, to copulate or to beget; therefore, the traditional English translation of ‘knowing’ the difference between good and bad is an intellectualistic misunderstanding. A far better translation of the serpent’s promise is ‘and

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behaviour humans now have to rely on what seems to be good, whereas insight into the created good is lost. In the case of love as mutual fellowship, this point is obvious and one can easily show that it leads to conflicts. A decisive feature of mutual fellowship is that the persons involved are ends in themselves and that one is ready to provide one’s own property as means for the real—i. e. good—ends of the other. If one is not ready to surrender oneself in this sense to the other, it is clearly another expression of being misplaced. However, even if one is willing to surrender to the other, it is not guaranteed that one is not displaced, since surrender to the other does not mean surrendering to the expressed will of the other. Because will is also affected by sin and the ends that a person pursues are not necessarily the real or good ends for that person, the following problem occurs: Do I have to surrender myself to the ends of the other as the other expresses it? Or do I have to surrender myself to the ends of the other as I myself understand them? Or do I have to surrender myself to the ends of the other as third parties understand them? Under the conditions of the fall, this trilemma remains irresolvable. The decisive consequence is that there is no strategy for overcoming sin or being displaced. Being displaced is obviously something that displaced creatures cannot alter themselves. Therefore, as Augustine says, after the fall sin is indeed necessary.

5.2.3 Incarnation and the First Part of Reconciliation According to Christian faith, the second person of the Trinity, called God the Son or the Logos, became a human becoming in Jesus of Nazareth. God the Son is therefore also a human becoming, and humanity and deity are one person in Christ. Against a tendency sometimes found in the history of doctrine called a christology of separation, the identity of the eternal Son and the human becoming Jesus Christ in one person is the basic presupposition of christology, i. e. the doctrine of how it is possible that the eternal Son is at the same time a human becoming. Incarnation is the epistemic foundation for our understanding of deity and humanity, not the other way around. In a supralapsarian way, the incarnation is not a kind of divine crisis management in response to human falleness, but a decisive part of the story of the way from creation to perfection in God. ‘Hena tes hagias triados peponthenai sarki—It was one of the Holy Trinity who had suffered in the flesh.’77 At this point, we cannot provide an introduction into christological doctrines or review the different problems and the various ways to resolve them. Some general descriptions will have to suffice. What we will provide is a reformulation of the classical two-nature doctrine ye shall be as God, generating good and evil’. Only later did the serpent become identified with the devil. In the story itself the serpent is a representative of pre-personal nature. 77 Cf. Beyschlag, K., Dogmengeschichte II/1, 149 f.

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in the framework of a relational and narrative ontology that is both able to maintain the virtues of the classical doctrine and at the same time avoid its vices. First of all, Jesus of Nazareth and the Son are exactly one identical person in the sense of a divine person as an in-communicable ex-sistence, as a whenceand-whither-becoming. However, instead of talking about two ‘natures’ like the classical doctrine, we speak of two sets or frameworks of narrative relationships: the one divine eternal relationship of the essence of God that is the Trinity, and the story of human becomings in creation. What does it mean to be divine? To be a part of the eternal story that is God. And what does it mean to be human? To be a part of the created story in which humans participate in the world. To participate in two stories is possible as long as the two processes can be combined in dramatic coherence; therefore, no contradiction whatsoever arises. In principle, in becoming Jesus, the eternal Son does not enter some foreign state of being, but comes ‘into his own’ (John 1:11), since the Son is related to the individuating framework of the story of the creation as a whole. What changes is ‘only’ the perspective. The Son is now not simply related to creation as a whole, but at the same time at specific changing places at specific changing times in history.78 Thereby it is not necessary to change the attributes and predicates of divinity. As we have seen in section 5.1.3, the essential divine attributes are attributes like perfect surrender, perfect loyalty, perfect trust, perfect veracity, liberty, justice, reliability etc.— and none of these attributes stand in contradiction to being a creaturely person in the framework of the story of creation. However, since the story of creation, along with all the particular relationships of Jesus Christ, belongs to his personal identity as well as his divine relationships, and since the divine relationships are also internal relationships, the story of creation is in a specific sense not external and not only constitutive for the person of the Son, but also for the person of the Father and the person of the Spirit. At first glance, there appears to be a contradiction emerging here. We have seen that on the one hand the divine essence has to be understood as independent from creation, that creation is a contingent gift of the creator. We explicitly used the phrase etsi mundus non daretur as a heuristic principle of all God-talk. However, this is precisely what it is: a heuristic and therefore a regulative principle. As such it is an abstract one. The decisive word is the etsi, the as if. God could also have been a story without the world, but that is not actually the case. God indeed transcends the world but is at the same time immanent in, with and under the natural and social processes of the world. The incarnation means that the concrete God is always an embodied or incarnated God; the incarnation is more a dramatic rule of the entire divine story than a temporary sequence within the story. Incarnation therefore reveals that the Christian view of reality is a panentheistic one, but it is a special kind of panentheism, one of grace and love: God could have been a 78 Cf. Mìhling, M., Versöhnendes Handeln, 330.

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life, love and a narrative becoming without any world. But since God decided to create a world, he created a world in resonance with his being as love; therefore, the world is also now factually decisive for the divine being. The story of the world is a part of the story of God from creation on, but that fact is only perceivable in light of the incarnated and embodied Son. Neither the logical structure of time, nor contingency, nor dramatic coherence, etc. can be external to the relational being of God. And since being part of created stories always means being embodied (leiblich), Leiblichkeit (bodiliness) is not foreign to the creator. In the last instance, Leiblichkeit also has to be seen as applicable to God. At this point it is decisive to distinguish sharply between the Leib and the body. In referring to the phenomenological tradition of Fuchs, Zahavi and Gallagher we saw that the concepts of Leib (living body) and body are not simply identical, but that the concept of Leib includes the one of the body but not the other way around. For example we saw that a Leib presupposes being in relationships, participating in the protentional-retentional structure of experience or participating in different perspectives of experience. All these features remain valid in the christological understanding of the Leib, but now something more has to be said. The definition of a Leib in a christological sense is that the Leib is simply a person’s means of becoming in communicative relationships.79 Such a means of communication, exchange and processes can rely on quantum-based matter-energy equivalences, as it is actually the case in all parts of the process of the story of the natural world. However, it is not ‘being quantum-based matter-energy equivalences’ that is the definition of Leiblichkeit, but ‘being a means of communicative becoming in relationships’. This christological definition of the Leib fits perfectly to Peter F. Strawson’s philosophical observation already cited at the end of section 2.3.1, according to which body and soul are nothing but abstractions from being a person. Further, Strawson’s famous thought experiment and its result that a bodiless soul is not able to communicate can be used in the line with this definition of Leib as a means for communicative relationships. At this point, only one question remains: There is no English term for Leib. Although there is the English term body, it is not normally seen as equivalent with Leib, but rather equated with Körper. However, Körper in German also bears the meaning of ‘material particle’, ‘corpse’, ‘cadaver’ and of course, ‘body’ as it is used in English—and sometimes even of the German ‘Leib’. However, the English term ‘body’ sometimes does overlap with the German Leib: The use of the term ‘living body’ and the language of embodiment also refers more to what is meant with ‘Leib’ than to body in the sense of a sum of corporeal particles. We would therefore also suggest making the theological and proper use of the English term ‘living body’ equivalent to that of the German term ‘Leib’: Properly speaking, the living body is simply a means of being in communicative relationships. 79 Cf. Mìhling, M., Eschatologie, 259 – 262.

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The doctrine of the person of Christ, including the doctrine of the twoframeworks of relationality, and the doctrine of incarnation or embodiment are not stand-alone doctrines; they are a part of soteriology, sometimes called the doctrine of the work of Christ. We shall have to restrict ourselves to some brief comments in this respect as well.80 In the soteriological work of Christ, two aspects are included: The perfection of the world in a particular instance and the overcoming of displacement. The first aspect is decisive, but it cannot be separated from the second. How the incarnation and the soteriological work of Christ would have taken place if humans had not been subjected to sinful displacement is simply unknown. Nevertheless, it is still important to recognize the fact that the perfection of the world is decisive for the story of creation as such. Creation was created as good, but not perfect. In this respect, christology deals with a cosmic fact: the perfection of creation during the course of the story.81 The aspect of overcoming sin is prevalent in the Western tradition. It is decisive that the life and death of Christ cannot be separated from each other. In principle, we can model soteriology as sacrifice, more precisely, as a dramatic story of surrender in a twofold way.82 Being a part of the inner-divine relationship, the incarnated Son is the only one who knows the true end of any creature; therefore, being a part of the created personal framework of relationships, he is the only one in this framework who is able to practise true surrender and love. Moreover, one can only surrender something one already possesses, but no created person has complete possession over their own personhood, but receives it continuously as a gift from God. As a result, created beings are not able to exercise non-displaced surrender with respect to their own personhood. But Christ, as divine person is able to exercise perfect surrender since the Father and Spirit also consent. In the displaced story of creation, Christ is the only actor who knows the real end of creatures and at the same time is the only one able to practise perfect surrender. However, as the only one able to pursue the real ends of the others, he comes necessarily in conflict with others, since they do not pursue their true ends, but only what appears to them to be their true ends. The clearest expression of this surrender is the death of Christ on Calvary. It has to be understood as the death of the person, i. e. the relationlessness of the person of the incarnated Son and therefore as the greatest possible kind of displacement. Good Friday signifies not only the dissolution of Christ’s relationship with his fellow creatures; it also signifies the dissolution or the attempted dissolution of the relationship 80 For a comprehensive doctrine of atonement cf. Mìhling, M., Versöhnendes Handeln, 292 – 346. 81 In principle, Pannenberg also uses this figure when he conceives the resurrection as the prolepsis of the eschatical perfection; cf Pannenberg, W., Dogmatische Thesen – Offenbarung als Geschichte, esp. thesis 4, 103 – 106. 82 Cf. Mìhling, M., Versöhnendes Handeln, 325 – 334.

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between Christ as the Son and the Father and the Holy Spirit. Since the relationships between the Son, the Father and the Spirit are internal relationships, the death of the Son means a violation of the very being of the relational essence of God. On Good Friday and Holy Saturday the existence of Godself is at stake. The only way to avoid this consequence is that the Spirit surrenders himself to the dead Son in his work of resurrecting the Son. In other words, the Spirit relates himself to the unrelated Son and reconstitutes the divine relational essence. However, since the identity of the Son is just as dependent on his divine framework of relations as on his created framework of relations, the only way of re-relating to Christ is also re-relating to Christ’s fellow creatures. The surrender of the Spirit to Christ is therefore bound up with his surrender to the whole of creation. The sacrifice or surrender of Christ is therefore only the first part of the drama of saving creation and overcoming sin; the surrender or sacrifice of the Spirit to Christ and his fellow creatures is the second decisive sacrifice.

5.2.4 Concarnation and the Second Part of Reconciliation The Spirit’s activity in human beings is usually described as ‘inspiration’. ‘Inspiration’, however, has rather disembodied, ‘spiritual’ and dualistic overtones. I rather want to suggest the term concarnation as able to give a more comprehensive account of the Spirit’s activity.83 It signifies the fact that the Spirit’s activity is always bound to the embodiment of the Son and to embodied creatures. Whereas incarnation means being localizable at a specific time and place in a story and being available for other persons, the term concarnation signifies that the Spirit is not himself incarnated, but acts ubi et quando visum est deo (where and when it pleases God), without, however, acting arbitrarily. The term concarnation has another advantage. It shows that the Spirit’s activity in the world resembles the Spirit’s role in the Trinity itself. According to Richard of St. Victor, the Spirit is not the bond between the Father and the Son, as in Augustine’s works, but the condilectus,84 what is co-loved by the mutual love of the Father and Son. We have already seen that love is not a relationship between two, but between three. The love of the lover and the beloved are only possible if there is a third party, a shared project. In the case of the essence of God this third party is itself a personal one—the Spirit. Therefore, concarnation signifies the fact that the Spirit’s role in creation resembles his role in the relational essence of God. The Spirit’s activity ad extra resonates his personal property and activity ad intra. The Spirit’s concarnating activity in regard to creation is threefold: On the one hand, the Spirit makes Christ co-present to the sequences and 83 Cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 372 – 390. 84 Cf. Richard von St.Victor, De Trinitate, 3,11 (192).

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events of the stories of believers. By doing this, believers are able to perceive creation in the light of the story of the gospel. According to Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, the Spirit does not alter the personal faculties of affectivity directly like a psychotic drug alters the metabolism of the brain. Rather, the Spirit acts like a friend’s presence and authority. Perceptions and arguments become decisive and recognizable in the presence of the Spirit, whereas they would be overlooked in the Spirit’s absence.85 It is therefore correct to call the Spirit the Spirit of Truth. Wherever truth is seen, it has to be interpreted as the work of the Spirit. This, first of all, regards the re-placement of the displaced persons in their framework in the sense that persons are now able to acknowledge the story of the gospel as the decisive truth for their own lives. The Spirit enables persons to see alienation as sin and in re-placing the person in relationship to what is truly good, he creates the community of believers. This community, called the church, is the community where the story of the gospel is communicated. The Spirit does not act on persons abstracted from this community. The Spirit is a person, not an individual. Nor does the Spirit act upon individuals. However, the Spirit is also not incarnate, and what is perceptible in the light of the gospel might not be perceptible without it. On the other hand, the Spirit’s concarnational activity is not restricted to the community of the church; wherever people are able to perceive what is really true, even in the natural sciences, the Spirit has to be seen as present. In the realm of the sciences the Spirit’s activity appears to be more similar to an incarnation, since it seems that the Spirit makes the eternal laws of nature, the logos of creation, present. Whereas the 3rd person perspective of the sciences enables verifiability, the laws of nature should not simply be seen as incarnations of the Spirit, but rather as metaphors and abstractions. The terms ‘law’ and ‘rule’ are metaphors from the social world. The Spirit’s concarnating activity enables us to see these regularities, but the Spirit does not allow us to decide whether these regularities rely on eternal quasi-platonic laws or whether these regularities are expressions of the faithful regular activity of divine preservation, which could be altered in future. Therefore, even in this regard, the term concarnation fits better than the term incarnation. Christians can also speak of a concarnating activity of the Spirit in a third way, with regard to the pre-personal world: Wherever the pre-personal, natural world is not displaced and relational integrity can be found, these relationships between creatures can be seen in the light of faith as related by the Spirit, although these relationships are nonetheless actual, even in the case that no one observes them. The Spirit constitutes the distinction between real and fictional possibilities. With these three kinds of concarnational activity, the Spirit not only preserves the world against the effects of sin and redirects the perception of 85 Cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 383.

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human beings, but the Spirit has also an eschatical function. In presenting Christ to believers, the Spirit incorporates creaturely persons into the story that is God—although in a mediated, indirect manner. Only the state where the relationship between creatures on the one hand and the triune God on the other is not a mediated, but a direct one—so that we perceive ‘face to face’ (1Cor 12:13)—can be understood as the eschatic perfection of the world. But this perfection does not rely on natural mechanisms and structures and is therefore itself a concarnational effect. Apart from perception in the light of the gospel this end or telos has to be invisible if dramatic coherence is to be valid. 5.2.5 Attributes of God’s Relation to the World With the description of the concarnational activity of the Spirit our tour de force of creation in relation to God is finished. In section 5.1 we saw that omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence are not essential attributes of God, but that these attributes actually presuppose God’s relation to creation. Therefore, at the end of this chapter it is time to say a few words towards a proper understanding of these concepts. Omniscience means the knowledge of all past and present facts and all possibilities for the future. God therefore knows the future as future, i. e. as the possible and is able to be surprised—even by his creatures. However, whatever possibilities creatures might choose, God is able to respond appropriately, since God is the origin of all possibilities. Peter Geach uses the image of a grandmaster in chess: He does not know the next move of an absolute beginner, but he nevertheless knows that he will win the game.86 God knows, therefore, that the final outcome of the world will be the perfection of the world. But this perfection is not inherent to the world’s created and natural laws. There is a sharp distinction between the world in its present state and in its perfected state, traditionally called ‘the final judgment’. This final judgment has to be understood as an Aufhebung (lifting up) of some features of the created story into the eternal story and of a transformation of other features of the created story. The ethical differences, i. e. differences in good and bad that emerge during the course of the world, will be transformed into aesthetic differences. Therefore, God knows in his omniscience that the outcome of the world will be in an ethical respect nothing but good and perfect, but God does not know what kind of aesthetic shape the perfected world will consist in. The best picture for this idea is the risen Christ.87 The wounds from the cross, i. e. the consequences of sin, are overcome, but they are not simply erased, they are transformed into the scars of the Risen One as signs of his beauty. In comparison with the theistic concept of absolute knowledge the concept of 86 Cf. Geach, P.T., Providence and Evil, 57 f. 87 Cf. Mìhling, M., Why does the risen Christ have scars?

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omniscience in the framework of the theology presented in this book is more concrete. And being concrete means always being limited by specific constraints. The main constraint against making omniscience concrete is the fact that a storied God has created a storied creation. But there is also a second constraint, which has to do with love and embodiment. Persons are only persons if they are mutually constitutive for each other and if there is a specific in-communicability, at least the in-communicability of the specific 1st person perspective. Further, love is only love if the personal particularity of the partners is acknowledged. Since God is essentially perfect love, even in his relation to his creatures, it would not be possible for God to act contrary to love. As a result, it is most likely that God will respect his creatures’ personal embodied perspectives. One consequence of this state of affairs would be that God does not know the private state of the 1st person perspective of a created mind unless the person in question were to allow it. However, since the mind of a person cannot be restricted to the 1st person perspective, but rather has to be seen as extended, even one’s relationship to the creator is ultimately a part of the extended mind. A theology of prayer would have to take these understandings of omnipresence into account. Omnipotence, moreover, cannot be understood in an abstract voluntaristic way as the ability to do anything except the logically impossible. In a radically voluntaristic framework, the logically impossible would belong to the divine potentia absoluta, but not to the divine potentia ordinata. However, the distinction between a potentia ordinata and a potentia absoluta also has to be rejected. This idea signifies that there is no reason for constituting a specific kind of ordained power except for the pure divine will. The voluntaristic God is therefore not only able to choose—even without making recourse to a ground based in God’s own perspective—what kind of world there should be and what kind of laws this world should have, but also what God God should be. Such a voluntaristic God would be a God of arbitrariness and of pure contingency. He would be a despot rather than a God of freedom. Therefore, any kind of talk about omnipotence and power in God has to be understood to refer to the power of love. This indeed sounds nice, since popular culture loves expressions like these. However, ‘love’ in this expression does not signify what our immediate intuition may suggest, since even our intuition can be displaced, sinful and consist in disordered love. The power of love and therefore the defining framework of love cannot be anything other than the story of Godself insofar as it can be perceived in our stories through the light of the story of the gospel. In other words, there is no omnipotence without love, no love without the love story that is God and also the created world, and therefore there is no omnipotence without crisis, dramatic coherence, death and resurrection. God does not act in the way of a deus ex machina and the power of love surely does not mean that God is a vending machine with the purpose of satisfying our narcissistic wishes. A theology of prayer would also have to take these considerations into account.

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Finally, omnipresence can be understood in a twofold manner. On the one hand, it is identical with the fact that God is what brackets time:88 The story of the world is bracketed by the story of God; God is omnipresent. On the other hand, the persons of the divine essence cannot be present in a manner that violates their perceptivity and Christ’s embodiment. Omnipresence is therefore always the omnipresence of the incarnated and embodied one presented to our perception by the concarnated one. As a result, we can say that there is no event (even the cruel ones) in which God can really be absent. But there is also no event in which God’s presence could be perceived without our fully embodied and restored perspective. In other words, there could not be an event in the world in which God’s presence could be perceived by the natural means of a restricted 3rd person perspective.

5.3 Theological Expectations of Biology Karl Barth is often seen as an example of a theologian who did not perceive any need to enter into dialogue with the natural sciences. This view could be supported by the following statement: ‘The Word of God is concerned with God and man. It certainly gives us an ontology of man, and we shall be concerned with this in the doctrine of the creature. i. e., with the ontology of man living under heaven and on earth. But the Word of God does not contain any ontology of heaven and earth themselves.’89

But apart from the possibility of interpreting this quote as an expression of scepticism with respect to interdisciplinary dialogue, it can also be interpreted as providing a particula veri about the benefits of such a dialogue. Surely one would have to correct Barth in his opinion that anthropology is the preeminent content of the doctrine of creation. However, it is also true that humans and nature are not subjects of the doctrine of creation in abstraction from their relation to God. If one methodically brackets out the relation of creation to God, i. e. working etsi deus non daretur, one is working within the realm of the natural sciences. But these two are not the same. However, even if it is true that the theologian cannot provide statements about humans or nature apart from their relation to God, it is nevertheless possible to make statements about the theologians’ expectations of the natural sciences and particularly of physics and biology. If the doctrine of God as presented in section 5.1 and the doctrine of creation as presented in section 5.2 are valid, what statements could one expect from the natural sciences about nature? In other words: If Christian faith is meaningful, what could one then expect from the knowledge about the 88 Cf. Jenson, R.W., ST I, 54 f. 89 Barth, K., CD III/2, § 43,6.

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world gained by the natural sciences? This question, of course, does not have to influence the work of the natural sciences and its outcome in any way. But it is decisive for relating insights gained by theology with insights gained by the natural sciences, as well as for seeing whether there are compatibilities or incompatibilities. This question is also important because its answer can alter the way one can proceed further in dialogue. So, what would one expect from nature as it is seen in biology from the perspective of the gospel? 1. Since God is a relational being and has created a relational creation, one would also expect that nature can be described in relational terms. 2. Since God is a storied God and since creation is a storied creation, one would expect that nature is not a fixed entity, but a framework of relations that undergoes change. 3. Since the primary rule for a story consists in dramatic coherence, which combines both regularity and contingency, one would also expect that change in nature would follow certain rules. 4. Since narratives also entail contingency, one would also expect the natural world not to be deterministically closed. 5. Since the story of humanity in relation to God cannot be separated from the story of humanity in relation to the story of the entire creation, one would expect that humans could not be treated as complete categorical exceptions in relation to other living beings. 6. Since in Christ God is always revealed as embodied and incarnated, and since the person of Christ defines what can be called truly human, one would also expect that humans and nature are seen in an embodied way, i. e. in a way that strictly excludes a mind-matter dualism. As far as we can see, the classical Neo-darwinian description of evolution as change in nature completely meets these theological expectations. The Neo-darwinian theory would surely not be the only possible theory that meets these expectations. But there are clearly also (pseudo-)scientific explanations of nature that do not meet these expectations, such as the view that there is no change at all, the pseudo-theological and equally pseudoscientific view that the natural beings would now be as they were at the very beginning of the world without any change or the view that mind and matter are to be seen as basic kinds of essences that are independent of each other. While these first six expectations fit very well to the classical theory of evolution, more expectations arise in light of the gospel: 7. Since God and creation are not only to be seen as stories, but also as stories of love, it is to be expected that this kind of love would resonate in one or another way in biological accounts of life on earth. God is not only a relational being, but a being consisting of an internal relationality of love. Accordingly, one could expect that to some extent this internal relationality would also resonate in and through creation.

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8. Since the love of creation itself can only be perceived in awareness of the truth of the gospel, one would at the same time expect that a biology restricted exclusively to a naturalistic perspective could not find any love itself in evolution. Expectation 7 expresses the core problem in the dialogue between theology and evolutionary biology. Whereas in medieval times love was seen as a cosmological principle and in the theology of the Reformation it expresses the rule of created beings, since the rise of evolutionary biology the question arises whether this expectation can be met in any meaningful way. In 1889 Charles Sanders Peirce analysed the problem in a way that is still helpful for understanding the problem today. Peirce, an unusual monist who regarded the mental as basic and material as the derivative, explained his understanding of love as follows, with the love commanded in Christian ethics meaning: ‘Sacrifice your own perfection to the perfection of your neighbour. […] Love is not directed to abstractions but to persons; […] “Our neighbour” […] is one whom we live near, not locally perhaps but in life and feeling.’90

But apart from being an ethical principle, love is also a law of development: ‘Everybody can see that the statement of St. John is the formula of an evolutionary philosophy, which teaches that growth comes only from love, from I will not say selfsacrifice, but from the ardent impulse to fulfill another’s highest impulse. […] The philosophy we draw from John’s gospel is that this is the way mind develops; […] Love, recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely.’91

In this statement, love has a creative function reminiscent of Luther’s famous explication of the distinction between the love of God and the love of humans in the 28th thesis of the disputatio heidelbergensis: ‘The love of God does not find, but creates, that which is pleasing to it. Human love comes into being through that which is pleasing to it.’92

However, what Luther attributes solely to God, creative love, is attributed by Peirce to love as a creative principle in evolution. This kind of evolution is called ‘agapasm’ and its principle, that Peirce regards as being in concord with the gospel, is the following: ‘The gospel of Christ says that progress comes from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy with his neighbors. […] Yet the strong feeling is in itself, I think, an argument of some weight in favor of the agapastic theory of evolution […]. 90 Peirce, C.S., Evolutionary Love, CP 6.288. 91 Peirce, C.S., Evolutionary Love, CP 6.289. 92 Luther, M., WA I, 365: ‘Amor dei non invenit, sed creat suum diligibile; amor hominis fit a suum diligibile’.

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Certainly, if it were possible to believe in agapasm without believing it warmly, that fact would be an argument against the truth of the doctrine.’93

We can interpret this quote in such a way that the evolutionary principle is a kind of internal, narrative relationality in which the sacrifice or surrender of particularity in sympathy creates something new through merger. What is interesting is that Peirce also advocates a warmly and in another passage even ‘sentimental’94 attitude as integrally belonging to this position. We can interpret this in a way that Peirce in principle votes for a personalistic attitude and rejects the notion that this position could be coherent on naturalistic grounds alone. In principle, Peirce opts for what is ultimately later called a phenomenological approach. It is decisive not to misunderstand Peirce’s position. Agapasm is not a biological theory, but a philosophical theory of evolution. Besides agapasm there are, according to Peirce, only two other philosophical modes of evolution possible, the tychastic and the anacastic, which are degenerate versions of the agapastic mode: ‘Three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us: evolution by fortuitous variation, evolution by mechanical necessity, and evolution by creative love. We may term them tychastic evolution, or tychasm, anacastic evolution, or anancasm, and agapastic evolution, or agapasm. The doctrines which represent these […] we may term tychasticism, anancasticism, and agapasticism. On the other hand the mere propositions that absolute chance, mechanical neessity, and the law of love are severally operative in the cosmos may receive the names of tychism, anancism, and agapism. All three modes of evolution are composed of the same general elements. Agapasm exhibits them the most clearly. The good result is here brought to pass, first, by the bestowal of spontaneous energy by the parent upon the offspring, and, second, by the disposition of the latter to catch the general idea of those about it and thus to subserve the general purpose. […] tychasm and anancasm are degenerate forms of agapasm.’95

Peirce’s theory of possible theories of evolution presupposes a notion of development and evolution incorporating the values of ‘good’ and ‘better’. Progress from state of affairs A to the better state of affairs B can therefore be inaugurated either by – contingency alone (tychasm), or – purpose-directed rules alone (anancasm), or by – a combination of contingency and purpose-directed rules. In using these second order conceptual tools to look at different theories of evolution, Peirce assesses Darwinian evolution as a kind of tychastic theory, whereas naturalistic theories that see evolution driven by causal determinism 93 Peirce, C.S., Evolutionary Love, 6.294 – 6.295. 94 Cf. Peirce, C.S., Evolutionary Love, 6.292. 95 Peirce, C.S., Evolutionary Love, 6.302 – 6.303.

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alone and Hegelian theories that see progress as a kind of logical inference96 are instantiations of anancasm. Peirce thought that agapasm would be best instantiated by Lamarckism, which at his time had not yet been falsified. However, it is not the case that agapasm is bound exclusively to Lamarckism. Peirce explicitly deals with positions attempting to show that Darwinian evolution could be a kind of agapasm and he agrees that indeed any tychasm is a derivative form of agapasm, but not a genuine one.97 The same is true for some anacastic systems as well, particularly the Hegelian one, which explicitly wants to be agapastic, but which cannot include contingency.98 In the last instance, it seems to be the case that Peirce thinks that there is a continual or fuzzy transition between the three philosophical types.99 What is perfectly clear is that Peirce holds to agapasm as a philosophical theory, whereas he leaves the question of which concrete theory of development in the first order—biological or philosophical—may fit best to the phenomena to the future. In other words, the question of whether agapasm is an phenomenological-empirical reality or not, is open: ‘I do not wish to be very strenuous. If thinkers will only be persuaded to lay aside their prejudices and apply themselves to studying the evidences of this doctrine, I shall be fully content to await the final decision.’100

The fact that Peirce was mistaken in favouring Lamarckism does not mean that his account of agapasm is also falsified. As we have seen, neither tychasm nor anancasm contradict agapasm; therefore, the following question is decisive against what Peirce is arguing: What is the counter theory to agapasm? Here Peirce is perfectly clear: It is the economic perversion of love, i. e. the opinion that development is driven by self-love, the love of a limited class with shared common interests and love of mankind as a species.101 In other words, Peirce argues against the economic interpretation of evolution—a character trait that he does not see incorporated in original Darwinism. However, the history of the development of Neo-Darwinism in the 20th century has showed that imposition of the credo of the homo oeconomicus onto nature is common: We simply have to recall, e. g. Robin Dunbar’s proposal, that a ‘fundamental principle of evolutionary theory […] is that evolution is the outcome of the balance between costs and benefits.’102 The question for us is, then, is it possible to revisit Peirce’s question about 96 Cf. Peirce, C.S., Evolutionary Love, 6.313: ‘That from given premisses only one conclusion can logically be drawn is one of the false notions which have come from logicians’ confining their attention to that Nantucket of thought, the logic of non-relative terms. In the logic of relatives, it does not hold good.’ 97 Cf. Peirce, C.S., Evolutionary Love, 6.304. 98 Cf. Peirce, C.S., Evolutionary Love, 6.305. 99 Cf. Peirce, C.S., Evolutionary Love, 6.306. 100 Peirce, C.S., Evolutionary Love, 6.317. 101 Cf. Peirce, C.S., Evolutionary Love, 6.291. 102 Dunbar, R.I.M., The Social Brain Hypothesis, 179.

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the possibility and actuality of agapasm in evolution under the present circumstances? In order to do that, we have to alter some of Peirce’s presuppositions. Like Peirce we shall try to avoid a mind-body dualism, but not by making mind the underlying reality, but by conceiving both mind and matter as abstractions of a phenomenologically embodied reality. Like Peirce, we see the need for a kind of internal and processive relationality as necessary. And like Peirce, we would agree that in a Christian perspective this internal relationality has to be seen as surrender or sacrifice and not as the victimization orientated ‘eat or be eaten’. And like Peirce we would also suggest that there has to be a combination of both chance and regularity in order to see love in evolution. However, unlike Peirce, we would argue that being convinced ‘warmly’ of a kind of agapasm is not a real possibility for the fallen, but only for the restored; therefore, perceiving love in evolution presupposes the personalistic attitude and cannot be restricted to the naturalistic one. Furthermore, not any personal attitude can be a presupposition, but only the restored one that is necessarily culturally and communally formed. Like Peirce we would also claim that there is a kind of value in evolution, but unlike Peirce we would claim that it is not perceivable under the limitations of the naturalistic attitude. Therefore, it is not only expectation 7— that love is somehow at work in evolution—that is decisive, but also expectation 8—that under a naturalistic attitude it is not love itself that is perceptible, but only something vaguely compatible or a restricted kind of love. And at that point we would opt for the claim that whereas classical NeoDarwinism does not meet these expectations, an extended theory of evolution and niche construction does. A slightly altered and revisited kind of ‘agapasm’ is at least compatible with niche construction. Love is an internal relationship including mutuality, but not necessarily symmetry ; niche construction is also a relationship in which the relation between a species and the environment (including other species) is seen as an internal relationship. Furthermore, cooperation alters and increases the models of evolutionary theory in a decisive way—this is something one would expect in light of the gospel. One would also expect that not only different species, but also particular living beings are bound together in ways that resonate what can theologically be called love. The importance of pair-bonds in anthropology and primatology103 meets this expectation in a very clear way. At the same time the empirical proof from small-scale societies that humans do not naturally behave in terms of the model of the homo oeconomicus104, but that humans rather can be described as hyper-cooperators,105 meets the expectations of theology. At the same time, it is clear that one would not expect to see the concept of love itself as appearing 103 Cf. Fuentes, A., Patterns and Trends in Primate Pair Bonds. 104 Cf. Henrich, J./Boyd, R./Bowles, S./Camerer, C./Fehr, E./Gintis, H., Foundations of Human Sociality. 105 Cf. Fuentes, A., Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You, 150.

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in biological anthropology.106 Therefore, expectations 7 and 8 are satisfied by biology. However, it does seem that they are not satisfied by classical NeoDarwinism, but more by an evolving new theory that includes niche construction. Let us add two more expectations: 9.

Since God created the world for a specific end—its perfection—which depends on God as creator and perfector, one would expect that this kind of intentionality is conceivable in scientific description. 10. Since creation is seen as both fallen, redeemed (in the work of Christ) and in the process of being perfected, one would expect to see something like dramatic coherence on the way to this end. However, one would also expect that this kind of personal intentionality towards perfection is not incarnated in a mechanical way : One would not expect to find teleology! Perhaps from the alternative perspective of an abstract theism one would expect to find teleology. But if the Trinity, the fallenness of creation and its need to be redeemed and perfected are not merely accidental features of Christian faith, but important ones, the conclusion can only be that one would not expect to find teleology, but simply structures and laws that do not exclude intentionality. Similarly, one would not expect to find dramatic coherence itself in the structure of the theory of change in biology, but only some traits that do not exclude dramatic coherence or are similar in certain decisive ways. In our opinion, expectations 9 and 10 are also being met by some theories in contemporary biology. There is clearly no principle of teleology in evolution, but it also seems that a kind of intentionality and direction is not completely excluded, especially in niche construction, as we have seen. On the contrary, theology at this point has to be a sentinel for restricting naturalistic attitudes in biology. It sees that Odling-Smee et al. in their description of a kind of directedness in niche construction (cf. section 4.6.8)107 have gone too far— these declarations appear to rely more on their convictions in natural philosophy than on natural science. The fact that biological descriptions of evolution including niche construction cannot speak of an absolute hierarchy in evolution or cannot attribute any kind of value to the phenomena, the fact that future developments cannot be predicted and the fact that future alterations are retrospectively meaningful and understandable, fits with the expectation that a structure similar to dramatic coherence can be seen in evolution, but not dramatic coherence itself, which remains a personalistic concept. Another concept that resembles dramatic coherence is the concept of emergence. However, to see evolution in terms of emergence is always an interpretation of the natural sciences in the light of specific natural 106 Cf. Fuentes, A., Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You, 187. 107 Cf. Odling-Smee, F.J./Laland, K.N./Feldman, M.W., Niche Construction, 177 f.

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philosophies. Although there is not simply one concept of emergence, but several108 and despite the fact that the concept of emergence has experienced a new heyday in the last 20 years, even in theology,109 we do not think it necessary to make recourse to this concept. If ‘emergence’ is only used in a very minimal sense—that the attributes of the whole relation exceed the sum of the attributes of the relata110—then nothing is wrong with the concept. In this case it is simply another term for internal relationality. But emergence is often used as a concept for explaining the mental as an outcome of the material in a framework of a reductionist ontology. And a reductionist ontology is not something that can be meaningfully adopted. In summary, the concept of emergence can be used in natural philosophy in some of its meanings and it could provide means of communicability for theology ; at the same time, however, this concept can also contribute to a number of misunderstandings and therefore we shall refrain from using it. In section 4.5.5 we noticed the alterations in evolutionary biology on the way to a new extended theory that we are presently observing could be similar to alterations in physics at the beginning of the 20th century due the development of quantum physics. At this point we have to remember that abandonment of the causal determinism of the 19th century allowed by quantum physics meant a certain liberation for theology. The possibilities for dialogue and interaction between physics and natural philosophy have increased dramatically since the early 20th century.111 If it is true that the meaning of the changes to evolutionary theory, including niche construction, at the beginning of the 21th century is as important as the changes that occurred in physics during the 20th century, then we can expect that this would mean another level of liberation for theology, since the potential for dialogue between biology and natural philosophy could possibly also increase dramatically. It is even possible that the author of this book and his conversation partners at CTI have experienced a very small part of this

108 Cf. Boost, M., Naturphilosophische Emergenz, 25 – 130. 109 Cf. Clayton, P., Mind and Emergence; Clayton, P., The Re-Emergence of Emergence. A sharp rejection of Clayton’s approach can be found in Mutschler, H.D., Von der Form zur Formel, 142 f. 110 This minimal conception of emergence was promoted by Broad, C.D., The Mind and its Place in Nature, 87: ‘Put in abstract terms the emergent theory asserts that there are certain wholes, composed (say) of constituents A, B, and C in a relation R to each other ; that all wholes composed of constituents of the same kind as A, B, and C in relations of the same kind as R have certain characteristic properties; that A, B, and C are capable of occurring in other kinds of complex where the relation is not of the same kind as R; and that the characteristic properties of the whole R(A,B,C) cannot, even in theory, be deduced from the most complete knowledge of the properties of A,B, and C in isolation or in other wholes which are not of the form R(A,B,C).’ For an interpretation cf. Boost, M., Naturphilosophische Emergenz, 44 – 62. 111 A short introduction into the history of the dialogue between theology and natural sciences is provided by Schwarz, H., 400 Jahre Streit um die Wahrheit.

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development during their inter- and transdisciplinary research time in Princeton during 2012 – 13. It would be easy to end this book with a prognosis for the dawn of a new and increased dialogue between theology and evolutionary biology, enabled by recent alterations in the theory of evolution and niche construction. Compared to the Neo-darwinian 20th century, the conditions have already changed. The 10 expectations outlined above and the proposed ways in which theology can meet biology in a new way is already one concise result of our work. It would also be easy—and important—to go into more detail with regard to biological and theological anthropology. However, we want to go a few steps further in finally proposing a theological model based on niche construction. This might indeed be a risky endeavour, but it can also be a promising one. However, before pursuing this task we first have to make a few remarks about some of the more obvious considerations: The ecclesiological promise of a model of niche construction.

5.4 Faith as Niche Constructor—The Ecclesiological Meaning of Niche Construction Christian faith is not individualistic, it is personal and therefore necessarily communitarian. In a doctrinal sense the church is the community of believers, i. e. the community of persons restored sola gratia in hope. In addition, this community of saints—in the Protestant perspective every baptised believer is a saint—is a community of those who have been restored, but not yet perfected. The church is also simul iusta et peccatrix, justified and yet sinful at the same time. Furthermore, the visible institutions of the church are institutions of the communication of the stories of the gospel, i. e. they are institutions of the communication of faith, not of faith itself. ‘Not actually being faithful’ cannot therefore be a meaningful criterion for not being part of the church, since no one, not even the believer, is able to make judgments about the reality of faith. However, the wish to be or to become faithful can indeed be a meaningful basis for being part of the church. The visible sign of whether a community is a church cannot be either the doctrinal or ethical state of its members, but only the fact that the communication of faith is occuring. The church is a community of the communication of the gospel, and as such a community of formation112 and also a community of orientation. But Christian churches are in fact not the only visible communities where the formation of character takes place and they are not the only communities where an orientation for action in a postmodern society is provided. Christian 112 For a more detailed account on ecclesiology cf. Schwçbel, C., Kirche als communio.

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churches are also a part of the religious system of a given society and therefore they are a part of the society itself. The broader society, in other words, is the environment of the life form of the church. One decisive question therefore is: How and by what kind of theoretical means shall we conceive of the relationship between church communities and broader society? Both theoretical means and answers to this question in the context of ecclesiology are manifold. However, one can find some extreme types. On one end of the spectrum is the idea that the visible community of the church should come close to being identical to the doctrinal meaning of the church. In this case, the members of the empirical churches in question consider themselves to be a better part of a community and a better part of society. The church does not have the task of either accommodating itself to the broader society, nor looking for means to improve society as a whole: Rather, the church is, to put it in post-liberal terms, a contrast-society.113 At the other end of the spectrum there is the opinion that every society consists of different subsystems, which provide demands for the society as a whole. Among these subsystems are polity, economics, the academic realm of gaining and distributing knowledge and religious systems as systems of providing orientation for individual and social action.114 From this point of view, the church not only lives for itself, but for the broader society by contributing a means for understanding life in confessional plurality and in discussion with other religions and quasireligions. In addition to theologians, scholars working in the field of CSR also ask questions related to ecclesiology, in most cases presupposing an evolutionary framework of interpretation. Asking, for example, whether and in what sense having faith, being part of a institutional church or in which way denominational differences can contribute to a religion’s or a society’s fitness and ability to adapt to specific demands given by the environment are classical questions of this kind of research. The different kinds of intra-theological concepts of relating the church to society do not necessarily come into conflict with such evolutionary approaches. However, if this evolutionary approach is driven by a Wilsonian sociobiology,115 a conflict between the intra-theological and evolutionary approaches is the only result, since sociobiology, in applying the mechanisms of classical Neo-Darwinism as a paradigm for the laws of society, ethics and religion, has to understand itself as a quasi-religion which includes conflicting truth claims about the nature, origin and destiny of human beings. Many of the features causing such problems do not rely on the specific features of sociobiology which are obviously non-scientific but quasi-religious, such as 113 Cf. e. g. Hauerwas, S., Community of Character, 128. 114 This kind of theological subsystem distribution of societies is often used by Eilert Herms, e. g. in Herms, E., Kirche in der Zeit. 115 Cf. Wilson, E.O., Sociobiology.

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Dawkins’ meme theory—but they are rather inherently bound to classical Neo-Darwinism and adaptationism. If we are justified in applying biological mechanisms to sociological realities, and if evolutionary theory can rely only on a single inheritance system, and alterations in the long run are only explainable by monocausal adaptions, then any ecclesiological self-understanding of the church in relating itself to society would have to be wrong. Neo-Darwinism, however, is on its way to being broadened into an extended theory which includes the insights of niche construction. This provides new ways for understanding the relationship between the church and the broader society, ones that not only can deliver new insights, but ones which can also be used for ecclesiological selfunderstanding as well. If the communal lifeform of faith, the church, not only creates its own means of cultural vocabulary for communicating the gospel, such as services, musical hymns, religious art etc., and if these social expressions of faith are not only active in constructing particular communities that satisfy adaptional needs of the society, then one can also conceive of faith as constructing its own niche, as altering the society as a whole to the one or other extent, even if this is not intended. What might the consequences be if niche construction is used as a model for understanding the church’s relationship to its social environment? 1. Evolutionary approaches and ecclesiological approaches would not necessarily have to come into conflict anymore, since niche construction as a theory is more open and not so restricted as its primary conceptions. Niche construction, in other words, is a science conditioned by the insights of natural philosophy, whereas sociobiology is a natural philosophy strongly conditioned by quasi-religious presuppositions. 2. Intra-ecclesiological conflicts appear to vanish. By means of niche construction the intention of some post-liberal theologians to conceive the church’s task as simply contributing to a lifeform in accordance with the story of the gospel no longer stands in antagonistic tension to the intentions of public theology that depicts the church as being in a positive relationship with other functional areas of society. By creating a structured and institutionalized form of life for the members of the church, the environment and other systems are also changed. 3. Scholars working in the field of CSR gain new questions. The main question cannot any longer be the question of the adaptional function of a specific kind of faith. Rather, cognitive scientists of religion have to question in what way particular faith communities alter their environments, i. e. in what particular ways they alter society. 4. In church history and pastoral cybernetics, a new interpretative tool is provided. Churches that are better niche constructors have better presuppositions for maintaining their vitality. For example, due to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, religion, at least at first glance, often appears to be a highly individualistic endeavour. Since there is

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no public tax contract between churches and the state, churches have to provide for their own financial means. However, in many cases such individualistic characteristics of the society as a whole have led to high amounts of niche construction that have resulted in not individualistic, but communitarian features. The life of a parish is often not simply restricted to attending services, but includes a much broader array of social situations and activities. By contrast, in Germany there is a contract between some churches (and other religious communities) and the state, by which the churches are allowed to make use of the public tax system for providing their own financial support. This kind of tax contract between state and churches does not affect the freedom of religion as such, it is simply another way of shaping it, though in a formally more socially oriented manner. Thus, not every parish or particular church has to rely on its own individual financial system, but is able to participate in the public tax system. However, this system as a whole appears to have led to a decreased amount of niche construction. Many individual churches are no longer in need of developing and producing creative opportunities for social communication. In many cases, participating in a service twice a year is the most common form of being a parish member. One result is a tendency towards a more individualistic understanding of faith that makes it possible for many to withhold from paying the church ‘tax’, without however also forfeiting a sense of their Christian identity. 5. Depicting the churches’ lives with the help of niche construction does not, however, conflate normative theological questions with descriptive empirical ones. Churches that are better niche constructors are not necessarily better institutions of communicating the gospel. ‘Successful’ niche constructing activities could also occur side by side with a forfeiture of the church’s authentic task. 6. With regard to missiology, niche construction can help to avoid certain misunderstandings. Unfortunately, the history of the visible churches shows that success in niche construction can parallel the loss of Christian identity. As a consequence, the term ‘mission’ today is often understood in a colonialist framework: actively turning outsiders into church members. However, in a theological sense, ‘actively turning outsiders into church members’ is not possible as a human activity, either for individual Christians or the church. Since the church in a doctrinal sense is the community that communicates trust in the gospel, and since this trust is a collaboration between humans and the Holy Spirit, no human institution is able to produce faith. Therefore, ‘mission’ in its original sense means witnessing one’s own certainties through different forms of communication including action as communication, without looking to the success of this kind of witness. This original meaning of mission, as well as its seemingly paradoxical effect that faith can and does emerge where the

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‘witnesses’ were not intentionally trying to bring about faith in others, can be understood by means of niche construction. These few remarks about the ecclesiological horizon of niche construction may suffice at this point. We can now turn to our final task.

5.5 Creation and Perfection as Niche Construction and Niche Reception 5.5.1 Illingworth, Teilhard de Chardin and Theißen as Providers of Evolutionary Theological Models Is it possible to understand the relationship between God and world in its evolving, narrative way as a kind of niche construction? Can salvation history be modelled as niche construction? To proceed a step further : Can creation and its perfection be understood as niche construction? At a cursory glance, questions like these seem to be speculative or conflate science and theology. However, the history of the dialogue between evolutionary biology and the sciences hints that this might actually be a prejudice. Let us choose three examples of evolutionary models in theology from three different time periods: the end of the 19th century, the first half of the 20th century and of the 1980s as the heyday of Neo-Darwinism. a) The Anglican Lux Mundi theologians, especially John Illingworth, already attempted to use evolutionary concepts as theological models in 1895, e. g. for understanding the incarnation of the Son: ‘Now in scientific language, the Incarnation may be said to have introduced a new species into the world—a Divine man transcending past humanity, as humanity transcended the rest of the animal creation, and communicating His vital energy by a spiritual process to subsequent generations of men.’116

Illingworth’s modelling of christology in evolutionary terms was driven by the understanding of evolution during his own time, one that has certainly passed. One of his basic ideas is that successful developments in evolution are persistent, which is clearly not the case. However, Illingworth provides an example of a very early theological use of evolutionary metaphors, as well as an example of the inherent fallibility of all attempts at model building. b) The perhaps best-known example of a theological key model using evolutionary concepts is the theology of the Roman Catholic scholar Pierre 116 Illingworth, J.R., Incarnation and Development, 151 f.

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Teilhard de Chardin. Teilhard’s basic idea is that evolution follows a kind of emergent progress, and he tries to see the history of revelation as a whole as driven by this hierarchical process. The process of evolution is salvation history ; the biosphere emerged out abiotic matter, out of the biosphere the noosphere emerged and the final evolutionary stage to emerge is the Christosphere. Realized the first time in the historical person of Jesus Christ, the destiny of the whole creation is its perfection, and that means being transformed into Christ. The end of evolution is the Christogenesis of the whole creation, a figure that is an application of the Lateran doctrine of the transsubstantiation of the Eucharist to the whole creation by evolutionary means: ‘Consider, still from the Catholic-Christian point of view, what happens when we go to communion. […] All the communions of our life are, in fact, only successive instants or episodes in one single communion—in one and the same process of Christification. Even this is not the whole story. […] To put it briefly, to adhere to Christ in the eucharist is inevitably and ipso facto to incorporate ourselves a little more fully on each occasion in a Christogenesis, which itself (and it is in this […] that the essence of Christian faith consists) is no other than the soul of universal cosmogenesis.’117 ‘Objections have […] been raised […] to this final identification of cosmogenesis with a Christogenesis. It has been said that all this may well mean that the human reality of Jesus Christ is lost in the super-human and vanishes in the cosmic. Nothing, I believe, is more baseless than such doubts. The more, indeed, we think about the profound laws of evolution, the more convinced we must be that the universal Christ could not appear at the end of time at the peak of the world, if he had not previously entered it during its development, through the medium of birth, in the form of an element. If it is indeed true, that it is through Christ-Omega that the universe in movement holds together, then, correspondingly, it is his concrete germ, the Man of Nazareth, that Christ-Omega […] derives his whole consistence, as a hard experiential fact.’118 […] Supposing […] the universal-Christ assumes the place and fulfils the function of Omega Point: we shall then find that a warm light spreads from top to bottom and over the whole cross section of the cosmic layers, rising up from the nethermost depths of things. With cosmogenesis being transformed […] into Christogenesis, it is the stuff, the main stream, the very being of the world which is now being personalized. Someone, and no longer something, is in gestation in the universe. To believe and to serve was not enough: we now find that it is becoming not only possible but imperative literally to love evolution. […] love of evolution is not a mere extension of love of God to one further object. It corresponds to a radical reinterpretation […] of the notion of charity. “Thou shalt love God.” “Thou shalt love thy neighbour for the love of God.” In its new form, “Thou shalt love God in 117 Teilhard de Chardin, P., Christianity and Evolution, 166. 118 Teilhard de Chardin, P., Christianity and Evolution, 181.

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and through the genesis of the universe and of mankind”, this twofold gospel commandment is synthesized into a single meaningful act […].’119

This kind of hierarchical development is nothing one could have observed by means of the evolutionary theory of Teilhard’s times. However, Teilhard provides a fascinating example of how theology, philosophy and evolutionary theory can contribute models to metaphysical systems of thinking. c) Nearly a century after Lux Mundi, the German Protestant New Testament scholar Gerd Theißen used the classical Neo-Darwinist theory to model christology. What is interesting in Theißen is that he not only uses evolutionary language to express christological insights, but that he is also aware that theological insights conflict with a Neo-Darwinian approach. He therefore uses evolutionary terminology not only to understand christology, but also to show how Christianity is a protest against what is naturally obvious and how Christ and Christianity transcend NeoDarwinism as an appropriate description of reality. He conceives of Christ as a ‘mutation’ that is a protest against the pressures of selection as a universal law of reality : ‘Human History is a chain of “mutations”, of new beginnings, innovations and variations, but only a few of them gain stability and historical effectiveness. The problem is not to show that Jesus is a kind of “mutation”, but that this view entails the possibility that Jesus is the beginning of something of permanent value.’120 […] ‘That is what the New Testament is doing: It transcends what we might guess or suspect as general possibilities. It claims that factually a decisive “mutation” has happened that is the beginning of a new world.’121 […] ‘According to the convictions of the New Testament, in Jesus not only a new beginning among others has happened, but the decisive change of a world without salvation to a new creation. At this point the christological metaphor of mutation is limited. Mutations happen on and on. It seems to be nothing but arbitrariness to evaluate one of them as decisive, unless one posesses unambiguous criteria for such an exception. Such criteria has to be derived from the content of what Jesus thought. 119 Teilhard de Chardin, P., Christianity and Evolution, 184. 120 Theissen, G., Evolutionäre Sicht, 136. („Menschliche Geschichte ist eine Kette von ,Mutationen’, von Neuanfängen, Innovationen und Varianten, von denen nur wenige Stabilität und geschichtliche Wirksamkeit erlangen. Das Problem besteht nicht darin, zu zeigen, daß Jesus eine Art ,Mutation’ ist, sondern darin, daß diese Auffassung von Jesus die Möglichkeit zuläßt, in ihm das Erscheinen von etwas bleibend Gültigem zu sehen.“) 121 Theissen, G., Evolutionäre Sicht, 143. („Die christologische Mutationsmetaphorik integriert alle drei Elemente eines kritischen modernen Bewußtseins: Relativismus, Bedingtheit und Immanenz – und schließt doch gleichzeitig die Möglichkeit einer das Leben fördernden, unableitbaren und offenbarenden ,Mutation’ nicht aus, ohne diese allgemeine Möglichkeit als Wirklichkeit behaupten zu können oder zu wollen. Eben das tut das Neue Testament. Es geht über das hinaus, was wir als allgemeine Möglichkeit ahnen und vermuten können. Es behauptet, daß tatsächlich eine entscheidende ,Mutation’ eingetreten sei, mit der eine neue Welt begonnen hat.“)

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The content of the proclamation of Jesus fits with the tendency that is observable in the whole cultural evolution, a tendency to soften the pressures of selection. In the biblical religion this tendency is increased up until the point of a protest against the rigidity of the principle of selection, in the faith that this protest is the only way to correspond to the central reality. In Jesus this central reality is revealed. The contradiction of the central reality’s disagreement with the principle of selection gains gruff shapes.’122 […] ‘Jesus aims for a greater liberty against the natural and social pressures of selection. He grants also possibilities of life for these humans, which possess restricted chances to live in a physical or social perspective. His proclamation is a protest against the principle of selection.’123 […] ‘The original Christian faith explicates its antiselectionist protest most clearly in the faith of the resurrection of the crucified one. At this point, the impotent one is proclaimed as the pantocrator, the sacrifice and victim as priest, the condemned as judge and the outcast one as the middle of community. What selection by death would discard as dysfunctional that is the starting point of a new development and the basis of unconditional motivation to live.’124

The three different models not only illustrate the fact that it is possible to use evolutionary models in theology, they also illustrate three things that are happening: 1. In using evolutionary models in theology, both theological and evolutionary insights change. 2. Evolutionary models are fallible and dependent on what is the state of the art of evolutionary biology at different times. 3. The three models are also dependent on theological decisions by their authors that come neither from traditional theology nor from evolutionary 122 Theissen, G., Evolutionäre Sicht, 143 f. („Nach neutestamentlicher Überzeugung geschah in Jesus nicht nur ein Neuansatz neben anderen, sondern die entscheidende Wende von einer unheilvollen Welt zu einer neuen Schöpfung. Hier muß die christologische Mutationsmetapher an ihre Grenzen stoßen. Mutationen geschehen immer wieder. Es scheint Willkür zu sein, einer von ihnen einen entscheidenden Platz einzuräumen – es sei denn, man hat eindeutige Kriterien für ihre Sonderstellung. Solche Kriterien können sich nur aus dem Inhalt dessen ergeben, was Jesus vertreten hat. Der Inhalt der Verkündigung Jesu stimmt mit der Tendenz überein, die in der ganzen kulturellen Evolution zu beobachten ist, einer Tendenz zur Selektionsminderung, die in der biblischen Religion zum Protest gegen die Härte des Selektionsprinzips gesteigert wird – im Glauben, daß man nur so der zentralen Wirklichkeit gerecht wird. In Jesus offenbart sich dieselbe zentrale Wirklichkeit. Ihr Widerspruch gegen das Selektionsprinzip nimmt schroffe Formen an.“) 123 Theissen, G., Evolutionäre Sicht, 148. („Jesus zielt somit auf eine größere Freiheit gegenüber dem natürlichen und sozialen Selektionsdruck. Er spricht auch den Menschen Lebensmöglichkeiten zu, die physisch und sozial verringerte Lebenschancen haben. Seine Verkündigung ist ein Protest gegen das Selektionsprinzip.“) 124 Theissen, G., Evolutionäre Sicht, 151. („Urchristlicher Glaube bringt dagegen seinen antiselektionistischen Protest am klarsten im Glauben an die Auferstehung des Gekreuzigten zum Ausdruck. Hier wird der Ohnmächtige als Weltenherr proklamiert, das Opfer als Priester, der Verurteilte als Richter, der Ausgestoßene als Mitte der Gemeinschaft. Was in der Selektion durch den Tod als dysfunktional ausgeschieden wäre –, hier wird es zum Ansatzpunkt einer neuen Entwicklung und zur Gundlage unbedingter Motivation zum Leben.“)

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biology. The models are used to promote a specific conceptual theology. With regard to this third point, it is fascinating that the three models produce completely different statements. Illingworth uses the model to explain incarnation in a way that reflects his interests in distinguishing humans from other animals and in immanent transcendence. Whereas the latter can probably be seen as a genuine Christian interest, the former is a non-empirical conviction more bound to his time than to Christian theology. Teilhard uses the notion of evolution in a very optimistic way. Evolution is not only a part of nature or creation, it is also a sacramental means of salvation that leads to a specific kind of ethics and a creative interpretation of the double commandment of love. However, believing in an optimistic development is not a requisite part of Christian faith. This becomes perfectly clear in observing how Theißen uses the Neo-Darwinian concept of evolution. He does not draw an analogy between evolution and the history of salvation, but with the history of creation’s falleness and with the concept of law. As a result, Christ can be modelled as a mutation, but one that transcends the laws of Neo-Darwinism in a conflicting way like the gospel had been understood by some theologians as conflicting with the law. This rather pessimistic view of Neo-Darwinian evolution—selection is not a means of salvation—is superseded by a rather optimistic understanding of protest against selective pressures. But once again, viewed from the historical distance of several decades, the salvific function of protest seems to fit much better to the public German consciousness of the times between 1968 and the 1980s than to traditional Christian interests. Another problem also arises: What happens if the model-providing metaphor changes? What Theißen only attributes to cultural evolution but not to biological evolution—an alteration and perhaps sometimes softening of selective pressures—is today part of biological evolution itself, e. g. in the shape of niche construction. In fact, Theißen’s model is dependent on an incomplete theory of evolution, at least when measured against the backdrop of an extended theory. However, under the new conditions it does not seem very plausible to render the traditional dialectic of law and gospel with the help of evolutionary theory. We can learn the following for our own model building from these attempts from the past: 1. Models are always fallible since they use scientific concepts that do not necessarily persist. In using an evolving theory like niche construction, this danger—and challenge—always has to be remembered. This fallibility is twofold. On the one hand, it is an epistemic fallibility. Present insights into the laws of nature are reconstructions, and it is not necessary that they resonate the ‘real laws of nature’. On the other hand, the expression ‘laws of nature’ is itself problematic. ‘Laws’ belong to the social realm. If the term is applied to the realm of science, then it is a metaphor. Has the world really been created to include permanent ‘laws’ from its origin on? Is it e. g.

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actually meaningful to speak of laws or rules of biological evolution for times when there are no organisms on a planet? This does not appear to be very meaningful. The alternative to an essentialist understanding of the laws of nature is a statistical or verisimilitudinous one: ‘Laws’ of nature and regularities are nothing but statistical abstractions from perceptions and observations that grasp reality in an asymptotic way.125 Is it the case that the regularities and rules that structure chance in nature—i. e. the rules of nature including evolution—are themselves subject to change and development as C.S. Peirce thought?126 If this is true, then insights from evolutionary theory might fit reality at a specific time, whereas they no longer fit to another time in the future. Furthermore, if laws of nature also evolve in evolution, they might also be subject to niche construction. Niche construction would then be seen as a recursive theory. Since such a development of the basic rules cannot be studied by the sciences in the same way as propositions about laws of nature are not scientific but philosophical, this thought has more the function of a regulative rule. Even if there was no epistemic fallibility in human intellectual endeavours, there could be a kind of ontic fallibility in the sense that in a radically storied or narrative world the basic laws of change also have to be subject to change. Accordingly, we can say that using evolutionary metaphors in theology is always a preliminary, recursive endeavour. In the contemporary dialogue between science and theology the idea of change in the laws of nature itself is used by a specific charismatic branch of theology in order to claim a strong form of special divine agency, especially the agency of the Holy Spirit.127 From a theological perspective, nothing can be said against the idea that the activity of the Spirit might also alter the regularities of the world and that therefore much more is possible than one might expect, as long as it does not contradict the dramatic coherence of the story of God, viz. God’s faithfulness in respect to himself that is an implication of the love that is God. However, this does not imply that specific kinds of 125 Cf. Polkinghorne, J., The Laws of Nature and the Laws of Physics, 439 – 431. 126 Peirce’s concept of the laws of nature is part of his ontology. He sees law analogously to habits evolving contingently : ‘diversification is the vestige of chance spontaneity ; and wherever diversity is increasing, there chance must be operative. On the other hand, wherever uniformity is increasing, habit must be operative […] laws are nothing but acquired habits, like all the regularities of mind, including the tendency to take habits; […] this action of habit is nothing but generalization’ (Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers, 6.267 f.). ‘Conformity with law is a fact requiring to be explained; and since law in general cannot be explained by any law in particular, the explanation must consist in showing how law is developed out of pure chance, irregularity and indeterminancy’ (Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers, 6.46). ‘Now the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature and for uniformity in general is to suppose them results of evolution. It makes an element of indertminacy, spontaneity, of absolute chance in nature’ (Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers, 6.13). A good introduction into the ontology of Peirce is Mayorga, R.M.P.-T., From Realism to ‘Realicism’. 127 Cf. Yong, A., Spirit of Creation, 102 – 132.

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events that could be seen as irregularities, like wonders, healings, purported psi-phenomena etc., can be identified with this kind of liberating activity of the Spirit.128 Only things that are embodied or incarnated, i. e. located at a specific place at a specific time can be identified. The Spirit, however, is concarnated, not incarnated.129 Therefore, automatically identifying exceptional circumstances with the agency of the Holy Spirit is a theological mistake, since a false identification of the special action of God in the world would not only be mistaken, but also sinful since it would amount to idolatry.

2. The model will, unless it is only used in a non-cognitive, illustrative manner, come into conflict with contemporary theologies in traditional ways, as well as surpass what can be said from a scientific point of view alone. 3. The model will necessarily be a constructive one, i. e. it will reflect the particular theologies of its authors, not simply the ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of Christianity (if there is such a thing). However, if it is true that theories always rely on models and metaphors, then apart from communicating the story of the gospel, there can be no consensus on the conceptual secondlevel discourse of theology. It will always resonate more the particular perspective of the scholars, be it in an explicit way or in an implicit way that only becomes more visible through historical distance. However, none of the three insights really posits a substantial objection against the attempt to develop models. Rather, the three points illustrate the fascinating character of this activity. 5.5.2 Contemporary and Ultimate Reality as Niche Construction In the 17th century, the orthodox Lutheran Johann Gerhard had a bold idea that was considered anything but ‘orthodox’. He saw the eschatical perfection of the world in God in terms of God becoming the environment for human creatures. However, at the same time he did not see non-human creation as having any value for God outside of its direct relationship to God. As a result, he taught the ultimate annihilation of creation, with the exception of personal beings (i. e. angels and humans). Konrad Stock sums up Gerhard’s idea: ‘In and with the annihilation of the world God constitutes the constancy of human salvation. God’s self replaces the world for humans. Metaphorically speaking, such as there are no temple and no buildings in the heavenly Jerusalem, and such as the inhabitants of the heavenly city do not need sun and moon […], God’s own self takes the place of the world for the eschatologically identical human. The eternity of God in the place of mundane time, vision of God in place of provisional and mediated 128 Cf. Yong, A., Spirit of Creation, 173 – 228. 129 Cf. Mìhling, M., Liebesgeschichte Gott, 387 – 391.

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experience, home in place of a strange land, the presence of God in place of the promise. Godself becomes, by annihilating the world, the environment for humanity. God becomes, by annihilating space and time of human existence, the space and time of human being. That is the meaning of eschatological salvation.’130

Gerhard’s idea is ambivalent. On the one hand he thinks that it is possible for humans to have a disembodied identity and he sees created non-human beings as having no ultimate value. In this respect we have to reject Gerhard’s idea. However, at the same time, Gerhard also suggests that God is to become the ultimate environment for creatures, and in this way his ideas provide inspiration for our model of niche construction. Although the idea that God becomes the ultimate environment of created beings does not seem to express an orthodox insight, it actually has its roots in the theology of the Reformers: ‘I often think, with what will we fill our time if there is no object to think, because there will be no change, no daily work, […] no food and drinks and no labour? But I really think that there are enough objects in God for us. […] Lord, show us the Father, and we are satisfied. That will be our sweetest object.’131

God as the environment of his personal creatures—this perspective on the relationship between creator and creation can be modelled with the help of niche construction. As in biological niche construction, the environment provides open loops for the development of the species. The divine special action in the world can be seen as providing open loops for created causality, created contingency and created action. Like in biological niche construction, the activity of God—his intentional action in the perspective of faith—can be seen in the mode of formative causality. Since open loops have to be closed by created activity, every event can be seen as collaboration between creator and creature. Like in narrative ontology, the story that is Godself is the frame for the different stories of creation and enables and limits our co-authoring of the story 130 Stock, K., Annihilatio Mundi, 122 f: („In und mit der Vernichtung der Welt begründet Gott die Stetigkeit des menschlichen Heils; Gott selbst ersetzt die Welt für den Menschen. Im Bilde gesprochen: wie das himmlische Jerusalem ohne Tempel und Gebäude zu denken ist, und wie die Bewohner der heiligen Stadt Sonne und Mond entbehren können […], so wird für den eschatologisch identischen Menschen Gott selbst an die Stelle der Welt treten. Es tritt Gottes Ewigkeit an die Stelle welthafter Zeit; es tritt das Schauen Gottes an die Stelle andeutender und mittelbarer Erkenntnis; es tritt Heimat an die Stelle der Fremde; es tritt das Gegenwärtighaben Gottes an die Stelle der Verheißung. Gott selbst wird, indem er die Welt vernichtet, die Welt des Menschen. Er wird, indem er den Raum und die Zeit menschlichen Existierens aufhebt, selbst der Raum und die Zeit menschlichen Seins. Das ist der Sinn des eschatologischen Heils.“) 131 Luther, M., WA TR 3,695,15 – 21 [3901]: ‘Ich gedenck im offt nach, sed non possum assequi illius obiectum, wo mit wir doch die zeith werden zupringen quia ibi nulla mutatio, nihil laboris […] cibi, potus et negotiorum. Jch halt aber, wir werden obiecta genug in Deo haben. […] Domine, ostende nobis Patrem, et sufficit nobis. Das wirdt vnser obiectum sein dulcissimum.’

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between God and world, so God as the ultimate environment of creation enables and limits some of the world’s possibilities. But in the same way that the divine story does not remain unaltered by creation, but narratively incorporates receptivity into itself, the metaphor of niche construction illustrates the fact that the divine story as frame or environment for our stories and processes is receptive and altered in a specific way. The brave and perhaps adventurous idea of the model of niche construction is that God is not only purely active without any possibility of receptivity, as in Hellenistic theism—, but that to a specific extent creatures even influence through their own development the identity and perhaps the life and being as becoming of their divine environment—of Godself. Ideas like these fit to the theopaschite insight that it is one of the Holy Trinity that suffered in an embodied way in and as flesh.132 They furthermore correspond to ideas derived from process metaphysics, such as the claim that God is receptive in his consequent nature and undergoes a development towards perfection.133 The idea of process metaphysics that no worldly event is lost since it is incorporated into the memory of God134 finds its analogy in the idea of an ecological inheritance system of niche construction. In addition, Pannenberg’s idea that the reality of God is ontologically contested during history since the divine being cannot be conceived without divine authority in history, whereas at the same time the fact that divine authority is contested by creation—not everyone accepts the authority of the triune God—135 fits to the idea of God as being affected by the processes of the world like environment is by species. However, at this point the first objections may arise: Does this entail a form of pantheism? Does it conflate creator and creation? Our answer is that a model of niche construction and niche reception can be built in such a way that completely avoids these dangers. Negative analogies between niche construction and the divine as constituting the environment of the creatures are the following: Whereas niche construction can be inceptive, creaturely activity in influencing the divine cannot be inceptive, but is always receptive. The classical creature-creator distinction can be modelled using this conceptual means. Here, a comparison with process metaphysics is also helpful since process metaphysics does not avoid conflating creator and creature: The

132 Cf. Beyschlag, K., Dogmengeschichte II/1, 149 f. 133 Cf. Whitehead, A.N., Process and Reality, 345: ‘The other side originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires integration with the primoridal side. It is determined, incomplete, consequent, “everlasting”, fully actual, and conscious. […] The perfection of God’s subjective aim, derived from the completeness of his primordial nature, issues into the character of his consequent nature.’ 134 Cf. Gunton’s evaluation in Gunton, C.E., Process Theology’s Concept of God, 294. 135 Cf. Pannenberg, W., ST, Bd. 1, 352 f.

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original nature of God is pure unintentional causality.136 God can only be understood to be receptive in the divine consequent nature, but in such a way that the divine consequent nature can be understood as the product of the niche construction of creation since it is also inceptive: God becomes personal only insofar as personal creatures evolve in creation, since the consequent nature is composed of the multiplicity of worldly events.137 The consequent nature is in principle the effect of the Aufhebung of the world into the divine— nothing more. In a Christian narratival-relational ontology, however, it is the other way around: It is not because persons evolve in creation that God becomes personal, but rather only because God is tri-personal in eternity is it also possible that personal creatures evolve in creation. The difference can also be illustrated in another way. The God of processthought can be modelled using niche construction in an inverted manner. Instead of paralleling creatures with the organism and the environment with God, one can also drawn an analogy between God and the organisms, and the world with the environment. In process metaphysics God needs the world in order to be God; the world is necessary and therefore it plays the role of a necessary environment for God. In Trinitarian relational ontology, however, God is indeed factually not without the world. But it would have been possible for God not to create anything other than God, because, hypothetically speaking, God would have still been a narrative of love without creation. If one wanted to express this insight with the help of niche construction, one would have to say that the triune God is the ultimate niche constructor. The divine persons live their own relationships, the divine essence of love. This divine essence can be understood as the divine environment itself. Or, in other words, only God can be called the ultimate niche constructor, because it is only in God that the distinction between niche constructor and environment vanishes: God is his own environment. Since in biology a niche is defined as the sum of selective constraints, in the theological model of niche construction a niche can be defined as the sum of essential influences of other relata. In the case of process metaphysics the world would indeed be the necessary niche of the divine, whereas in Trinitarian theology there are no constraints apart from the divine life of love: God is his own niche. To sum up these arguments, the creature-creator difference can still be maintained in the model of niche construction. There is no conflation between creator and creature, but an interrelationship is possible. Insofar as there is a concrete creation, niche construction as a model becomes more fruitful: 136 Cf. Whitehead, A.N., Process and Reality, 345: ‘One side of God’s nature is constituted by his conceptual experience. This experience is the primordial fact in the world, limited by no actuality which it presupposes. It is therefore infinite, devoid of all negative prehensions. This side of his nature is free, complete, primoridal, eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious.’ 137 Cf. Whitehead, A.N., Process and Reality, 349.

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– Since the incarnation of Christ indicates that the identity of creation affects the identity of the divine, – and since Christ’s incarnation is a reality in the world from the world’s origin onwards (because in Jesus the logos of creation, the law in which creation is originally made, is visible), – God is therefore affected by his creatures’ niche constructing activity. However, the creator-creation distinction is still maintained. Even in this respect no inceptive niche construction is possible for created agents. Creatural niche construction is always niche reception. Just as niche construction is not necessarily fruitful but can lead to consequences that disturb the entire system of organisms and the environment, personal creatures can disturb both their created niche and themselves. The concept of the created niche signifies one relatum as related to the rest of creation, which then has to be seen as the created niche. Creatures are also niche constructors, but only in a manner that resonates the ultimate niche construction of the triune God. If one remodels the classical doctrine of the imago dei, one has to say that being made in the image of God does not mean a representational relationship, but a resonating one: humans resonate God in co-creating their own created niches on the basis of niche reception. At the same time this resonating niche construction has effects on the construction of the created niches of other creatures and still has feedback resonating into divine niche construction. Interpreting the imago dei in this way means interpreting the imago in a non-distinctive way. The imago dei as a resonance of divine niche construction in creation is able to express what is ‘essential’ for humans. But this ‘essence’ does not distinguish humans from other species. Since a created niche is always presupposed for a creature, there cannot be anything like an inceptive niche construction and every created niche in relation to the divine environment has to be reactive. It is always niche reception. The theological model of niche construction is an anti-constructivist model in the sense that reality is prevalent. Rejecting one’s role as an exclusively reactive niche constructor and attempting to be an inceptive niche constructor in relation to the created niche as a whole (i. e. rejecting niche reception) can be understood as sin—in the same sense as the promise of the serpent is not only knowledge of the difference between good and evil, but also the ability to constitute this distinction. As a result, the created niche is disturbed and the creature is displaced. However, the Christ-event discloses that the created niche is not separated from the divine niche. Good Friday and Holy Saturday are symbols of the fact that sin not only affects creation, but also the divine story itself. Since God’s essential niche is a framework of love, God identifies himself with the niches of creation. However, the self-identification of the niche that is Godself with the created niche is not an expression of a kind of crisis management in the face of sin. Since the world is created as a story in dramatic coherence, it is created in order to be perfected, even if there were no

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perturbations of the created niche. It is to this extent that the entanglement of the niche that is the divine relationship itself and the created niche is something that exists from creation on. The ultimate end of the entanglement of the divine story with created stories—or the ultimate end of divine niche construction and the niche construction of creatures—is not only the entanglement of the stories, viz. niches, but the lifting of the created stories into the divine story, viz. the lifting of the created niche into the divine niche. However, the lifting up itself is no possible subject matter of creatural niche construction. It is purely receptive. This kind of ultimate entangled niche construction can be called, to use the terminology of Eastern Orthodoxy, theosis.138 In this respect, some decisive modulations have been applied to the model as gained by the history of Christ. In the same way that there is no resurrection without the cross of Christ, there is also no continuity between the history of the world and the eschatical reality : world history is only a part of the ultimate divine story, but from the perspective of history—if it is not perceived in the light of faith in cross and resurrection— there can be no expectation that the story will be continued. An expression of the displacement of creation is that history is mistakenly regarded as the whole story. Applied to the model of niche construction this means that the ultimate niche of the ultimate reality—the perfected life and love of the world in God—is not a direct product of creaturely niche construction in history. Indeed, the ultimate reality has to be understood as a kind of niche construction shared between God and creation. But divine and created agents have different roles and in dramatic coherence the process of ultimate niche construction is interrupted by death as the interruption of all relationships—by the transforming effects of what is called traditionally the final judgment. The effects of the judgment are transforming effects from the perspective of history : Whereas some events can be lifted into the ultimate relationship or niche that is Godself, others cannot. Compared to process metaphysics, this is an advantage: Whereas in process metaphysics the awful events also have to be lifted into the divine consequent nature, in Trinitarian metaphysics the horrific events have to be transformed: Ethical differences will be transformed into aesthetic differences. Therefore, the niche of ultimate reality will be nothing but good in an ethical respect. And this is already known by the three divine persons of Father, Son and Spirit. The concrete aesthetical shape remains open and may even be a surprise for the triune God. It is the concrete aesthetic shape of the ultimate niche that our construction of created niches affects directly.139 Nevertheless, the perfection of creation in lifting created niches up into the ultimate niche of divine eternity cannot be understood as an absolute end in the sense of a dissolution of the story. The divine story—now united with the 138 Cf. Anastasius vom Sinai, A.v., Wegweiser, PG 89, 36. 139 Cf. Mìhling, M., The T&T Clark Handbook of Christian Eschatology, ch. 3.3 and ch. 5.3.

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created one in a direct communicative manner—will go on in eternity. And therefore divine-creaturely niche construction will also go on, but in a way that is in every respect fruitful for both divine and created inhabitants. ‘In my Father’s house are many mansions.’ (John 14:2) This statement is not about places for storing dead bodies and memories, but about the fruitful life of a plurality of created niches in the ultimate divine niche. Further, this integration of created niches into the ultimate niche does not refer to a disembodied purely spiritual happening. It is still an embodied one in the sense that living bodies are means of communication. At this point we will interrupt the development of our model of niche construction. The reader may discover whether there are more theological themes that can be expressed by use of the metaphor of niche construction. Our conclusion, therefore, is not a permanent fixed theory but rather an expression of support for further creative efforts. Niche construction as a model for divine and creaturely interaction may seem unusual; there are still many negative analogies and necessary qualifiers—e. g. there is no genetic inheritance system in God, there can be no prognosis about divine niche construction based on mathematical models, the three divine persons are not a ‘population’, etc.—but that is the nature of a model. In principle, any two concepts can be used as a basic metaphor for modelling. Models can only be of cognitive interest if the neutral and positive analogies have more weight than the negative ones. Is this the case with respect to the metaphor of niche construction? We also leave this judgment to the reader. However, what we can claim is that the number of positive analogies with the metaphor of niche construction is much higher than with the traditional Aristotelian metaphors like the ‘unmoved mover’. Therefore, the adventure of discovering the promise of a theological model on the basis of the key metaphor of the originally evolutionary concept of niche construction seems to be worthwhile. Understanding created life—our life in history and our future life in the ultimate reality—as niche construction can liberate a famous biblical quote from its essentialist Hellenistic pitfalls and can reactualize its insight anew : ‘They would search for God and perhaps grope for him and find him—though indeed he is not far from each one of us. For in him we live and move and have our being’ (Act 17:27 – 28a).

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6. Concluding Theses With respect to the treatment of all three disciplines handled in this book— neurobiology, evolutionary theory and theology—a turn towards an inherently relational form of conceptuality has been combined with specific material insights in order to provide a needed foundation for successful interand transdisciplinary dialogue.

6.1 Epistemology in the Neurosciences and Theology Thesis 1: Resonances instead of representations: Revelation is perception! In neurobiology the brain can no longer be seen as an organ of representation, but instead as an organ that deals with the resonances between the environment and the living body, i. e. the neural system provides open loops for the living body and the environment which then become internally related. Likewise, in theology, revelation cannot be seen as a kind of interpretation of something given, but rather as a kind of perception which resonates experiences in the life-world. Thesis 2: Religious experience is nothing extraordinary! Revelation as perception does not refer to particular, spatiotemporally identifiable events, but to everyday, narrative experience itself in the way it constitutes the very condition of the possibility of perception and experience. Approaches to religious experience associated with the natural sciences such as CSR and the so-called ‘neuro-theology’ that focus on individual, extraordinary experiences do not actually deal with the same subject matter as theological epistemology, but rather with something that would have to be seen as superstition from a theological perspective Thesis 3: Internal externalism! Both theological and neurobiological epistemology can broaden their own understandings by discussing philosophical insights derived from the phenomenological theories of ecological subjectivity, the extended mind theory (active externalism) as well as the theory of conceptual experience.

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6.2 Phenomenological Neurobiology and Niche Construction Thesis 4: Niche construction instead of adaptationism! Just as the brain can no longer be understood in a representationalist manner, but as a resonating organ, so evolution cannot be understood in an adaptationist way. And, similar to the neural system, just as the living body and its environment are partially internally related parts of a closed system in a functional circuit, the relationship between population and environment also forms a complete system in a functional circuit. Whereas in classical NeoDarwinism only the organisms themselves are able to adapt to contingent changes in the environment, the theory of niche construction widens the understanding of evolution by recognizing the feedback between organisms and the environment. Given this move, evolutionary biology now has to work with two kinds of inheritance systems: a genetic one and a ‘cultural’ one. The niche constructing effects of populations can no longer be seen as extended phenotypes, but rather as extended genotypes or phenogenotypes, since both serve the same function: transferring information for biological change.

6.3 On Causality Thesis 5: Efficient causality needs to be extended—but not by teleology! If one applies the philosophical concept of causality to science, the best way is to widen the classical concept of efficient causality by a kind of formative causality that constrains efficient causality, but that at the same has no need for teleology. Both are inseparably connected together in the idea of integral or circular causality. This idea of integral causality was developed in phenomenological neurobiology and can be fruitfully transferred to an extended evolutionary theory : the niche constructing activity of populations provides formative causal constraints for the efficient causal effects of the environment. Speaking philosophically and theologically, the concept of integral causality can be extended by the use of teleological concepts if the particular view of reality in question sees this step as necessary, but only if teleology is not imposed on natural science. The reason for the last restriction is a theological one. If teleology were to be treated as a concept in the natural sciences, it would no longer fit an understanding of revelation as perception. This is because any issues concerning experience that could be studied by the natural sciences alone could only be seen as providing open loops for the self-giving activity of the triune God as an activity that is never at the disposal of the perceiver.

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6.4 Narrative Relational Theology, Niche Construction and Niche Reception Thesis 6: The triune God is the ultimate niche constructor and the ultimate environment for creation! The theological expectations and demands as to what natural science can say about natural change cannot be completely satisfied by Neo-Darwinism, but they can be satisfied via an extended theory of evolution and niche construction. Furthermore, the metaphor of niche construction provides a fruitful keymetaphor for understanding the relationship of the triune God to the world. The triune God can be modelled as the ultimate niche constructor, because life and environment are identical to each other in God’s relational, narrative essence. From the perspective of creation, God can be seen as the ultimate or eschatical environment for his creatures. The niche construction model maintains both the necessary asymmetry and reciprocity in this relationship. It not only makes it possible to picture God’s relationship to the world through creation, redemption and perfection in evolutionary terms, but it also provides a deeper theological basis for perceiving creaturely life in the light of the gospel. Different 20th century theologies attempted to express not only the activity, but also the receptivity of God, along with the inclusion of contingency, but often failed to maintain the necessary categorical distinction between creator and creation at the same time. Here the model of niche construction is of preeminent help, since it allows us to maintain both this distinction and to sharpen our understanding of the kinds of asymmetry in the reciprocity between God and world. All creatural niche construction is niche reception as a gift of the creator. As an example, this becomes totally clear in eschatology, where the action of the triune God safeguards the ethical goodness of the eschatical reality, whereas the niche constructing activity of all of God’s creatures (human and non-human animals, human and probably non-human persons, created contingency) can contribute to its aesthetic and surprising shape. The model of niche construction therefore fits a specific kind of dramatic theology, one which includes the precise conceptual work of a narrative relational ontology centered on the key concept of dramatic coherence. In addition, the relationship between God and God’s creatures can also be understood as a functional circuit: God provides open loops for the resonances of creatures.

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6.5 The Benefits of the Inter- and Transdisciplinary Trialogue Thesis 7: The dialogue provides at least six benefits! The benefits of the dialogue for theology not only consist in deeper communicability to the natural sciences—and thereby satisfy the need of faith that the triune God is perceived as creator of the realm of personal trust as well as scientific endeavor—but also in providing genuine theological insights on the basis of fresh thinking. However, whereas the benefits for theology might be clear, it is often doubted that this inter- and transdisciplinary work can also provide benefits for the conversation partners in the natural sciences. We have therefore made six of these benefits explicit: 1. In both branches of the natural sciences we have analyzed—neurobiology and evolutionary biology—the key for moving beyond the antagonism with theology consisted in using the concept of internal relationality (i. e. relations that are ontically constitutive for the relata) to describe the relationships (in part) between seemingly external things. This particular concept of constitutive relationality, however, stems from its original use in the doctrine of the Trinity and has a long theological history. 2. Every kind of scientific endeavor presupposes ontological convictions that cannot be empirically tested. Since the very concept of perception implies these kinds of certainties, the impact of worldviews and faiths on the natural sciences do not belong simply to the interpretation of the results of scientific research, but are inherent from the very beginning. The dialogue with theology can provide an awareness of this fact and a means for clarifying certain of these presuppositions. Another decisive thing the natural sciences can learn from theology is that scientific excellence cannot consist in excluding or ignore these kinds of certainties, but dealing with them and making them explicit. 3. Natural science and theology can only fruitfully lead a dialogue if philosophy and especially natural philosophy are taken into account. Therefore, there can be no dialogue without a ‘trialogue’. 4. Natural science and theology can only enter a fruitful dialogue when themes are at stake that are of scientific interest in the particular fields. We have used the doctrine of revelation and narrative Trinitarianism on the one hand and questions of epistemology in the neurosciences and of niche construction in biology on the other. At its best this can lead to transdisciplinary reflection, and at the very least to a better understanding of one’s own subject with the help of new models stemming from the other disciplines. 5. Improved awareness and accuracy can help to avoid another, extremely prominent danger that is often fostered by the public news media: the

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conflict between fundamentalist types of Christianity and fundamentalist types of naturalistic quasi-religiosity. That debate does not in any way reflect what is at stake for either theology or the natural sciences in the kind of legitimate academic dialogue we are proposing here. If anything, the dispute between these kinds of fundamentalism would more appropriately belong to the realm of inter-faith dialogue than to legitimate academic interdisciplinary dialogue. But it is more likely that the inordinate amounts of attention these disputes receive simply reflect, in part, attempts to manipulate public opinion for the sake of monetary gain. 6. Our study has shown that there are a number of concepts shared between relational theology, niche construction and the theory of the ecological brain. To these concepts belong not only internal relationality, but also the concept of the complete system, the concept of the functional circuit, the concept of resonances between different, internally related, but distinct ‘entities’ and the concept of dramatic coherence. An interdisciplinary dialogue exposes not only actual resonances between the disciplines and deepens them, but it also realistically corresponds to the resonating nature of reality itself.

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Abbreviations CSR EPsyR fMRI PET SPECT ToM PO EECB TINA HADD

Cognitive Science of Religion Evolutionary Psychologie of Religion Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Positron Emission Tomography Single-photon emission computed tomography Theory of Mind Perceiving Others Embodied Ecological Communitarian Brain ‘There-is-no-alternative’-Principle Hypersensitive Agency Detecting Device

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Index of Authors

Alavi, Abass 45 Allen, R. Michael 86 Amen, Daniel 45 Amini, F. 68 Anastasius of Sinai 179, 220 Anselm of Canterbury 18, 20, 166 Antonio 37, 39, 42, 66, 78 Arber, Werner 139, 164 Aristotle 75, 121 – 124, 126 f. Armel, K.C. 38 Arzy, Shahar 45 Asendorf, Ulrich 87 Baime, Michael 45 Balthasar, Hans Urs von 126 Barbour, Ian G. 13 f., 24 Barrett, Justin L. 45, 93 Barth, Karl 19, 92, 96, 132, 170 f., 197 Baumbacher, G. 68 Begley, Sharon 60 Bennett, Max Richard 59 Berger, Peter L. 182 Bermffldez, Jos¦ Luis 66 Beuttler, Ulrich 175 Beyschlag, Karlmann 189, 217 Blanke, O. 45 Bode, Stefan 45 f. Böhner, Philotheus 91 Boormann, Lukas 62 Boost, Maximilian 76, 204 Botvinick, Matthew 53 Bowler, Peter J. 141 Bowles, Samuel 202 Boyd, Robert 202 Boyer, Pascal 38, 45, 93 Bradley, Francis Herbert 46 f., 64 Brass, Marces 46 Broad, Charles Dunbar 204

Brooks, Rechele 68 Brümmer, Vincent 171 f. Bultmann, Rudolf 62 Bunge, Mario 76 Burge, Tyler 54 Calvin, Jean 131 Camerer, Colin 202 Camus, Albert 85 Chalmers, David J. 55, 113 Clark, Andy 55, 113 Clayton, Philip 76, 204 Cohen, Jonathan 53 Craver, Carl F. 71 Cresswell, Maxwell 168 Crouch, Colin 26, 181 Crutzen, Paul J. 162 Dalferth, Ingolf U. 132, 170 Darwin, Charles 75, 138, 153 Davenport, John J. 121 Dawkins, Richard 140, 142 f., 181 Deane-Drummond, Celia 12, 126 f., 149, 174 Denzinger, Heinrich 111 Dornes, Martin 66 f. Drechsel, Wolfgang 12, 184 Dunbar, Robin I.M. 49 – 51, 107, 201 Edey, Maitland 151 Eisenberger, Naomi 38 Eßler, Hans Helmut 131 Fehr, Ernst 202 Feldman, Marcus W. 143 – 149, 162, 203 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 43 Förster-Beuthan, Yvonne 63, 161

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Index of Authors Fuchs, Thomas 40, 43, 53 f., 59 f., 63, 65 – 69, 71 – 85, 120, 155, 173 Fuentes, Agust†n 12, 138 – 140, 143, 147 – 149, 151 – 153, 173, 202 f. Gallagher, Shaun 49, 63, 66, 69 Geach, Peter T. 195 Gilland, David A. 12, 92 Gilson, Etienne 91 Gintis, Herbert 202 Godfrey-Smith, Peter 142 Gould, Steven J. 143 Gray, Richard D. 152 Griffiths, Peter E. 152 Grimm, Jacob 169 Grimm, Wilhelm 169 Grube, D.-M. 91 Gunton, Colin E. 217 Hacker, Peter 59 Hanxi He, Anna 45 f. Härle, Wilfried 98 Harris, Christine 60 Hartmann, Nicolai 168 Hauerwas, Stanley 136, 184, 206 Haynes, John Dylan 44 – 46 Hefner, Philip 179 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 43, 47 f., 99, 124, 127, 137 Heidegger, Martin 62, 85, 161 Hein, Alan 52 Heinze, Hans-Jochen 46 Held, Richard 52 Henrich, Joseph 148, 202 Herms, Eilert 40, 43 f., 97 – 99, 102 f., 105, 187, 206 Hesse, Mary B. 33 Hirstein, W.S. 38 Hughes, George E. 168 Hünermann, Peter 111 Hunsinger, George 87, 91 f., 97, 106 Husserl, Edmund 63, 71 f., 76, 159 Idel, M. 45 Ijjas, Anna 64

241

Illingworth, John R. 209, 213 Ingold, Tim 184 f, 231, 233 Jablonka, Eva 152 Jay, Anthony 182 Jenson, Robert W. 42, 57, 132 f., 161, 166, 197 Johanson, Donald 151 Jüngel, Eberhard 87, 89 f., 105, 168 Khalsa, Dharma S. 45 König, Jürgen 182 Laland, Kevin 143 – 149, 162, 203 Lamb, Marion 152 Landis, T. 45 Lannon, R. 68 Lewis, C.S. 68, 173 Lewis, T. 68 Lewontin, Richard C. 142 – 145 Libet, Benjamin 44 Lieberman, Matthew 38 Lindbeck, George A. 165 Lippitt, John 126 Lohse, Bernhard 115 Losch, Andreas 13 f., 16, 24, 138 Louie, A. 68 Luther, Martin 19 f., 85 f., 115, 131, 135, 178, 183, 186 f., 199, 216 MacCormac, Earl R. 29 MacIntyre, Alasdair 121 MacKinnon, Katherine 149, 151 Mayorga R.M.P.-T. 214 McCulloch, Gregory 81 McDowell, John 55 – 58, 109 – 112, 115 McGuinness, T. 68 Meltzoff, Andrew 67 f. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 52, 67, 71, 161 Metzinger, Thomas 54 Molnar, Paul D. 92 Moltmann, Jürgen 133, 174 Morgan, Donna 45 Morris, Charles William 158 Müller-Römheld, Walter 163

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242

Index of Authors

Murray, Lynne 67 Mutschler, Hans Dieter

76, 204

Nagel, Thomas 75, 82, 153 Neisser, Ulrich 82 Newberg, Andrew B. 18, 23, 45, 93 f., 109 Noe, Alva 79 Nygren, Anders 173 Oakes, Ken 12, 164 Odling-Smee, F. John 143 – 149, 158, 162 f., 203 Orr, H. Allan 75, 153 Oyama, Susan 152 Paden, William E. 87 Pannenberg, Wolfhart 15, 169, 192, 217 Pashler, Harold 60 Peirce, Charles Sanders 33, 178, 199 – 201, 214 Perner, Josef 50 Phillips, Dewi Zephania 92 Pigliucci, Massimo 147 Plantinga, Cornelius jr. 174 Platon 42, 141, 188 Plessner, Helmuth 73, 82 Polanyi, Michael 15 Polkinghorne, John, Russell 214 Poudehnad, Michael 45 Putnam, Hilary 54 f., 81, 109 f., 112 Ramachandran, V.S. 38 Rescher, Nicolas 15, 27 Richard of St.Victor 174, 184, 193 Ricœur, Paul 121 Rosch, Eleanor 63 Roth, Gerhard 38, 40 – 43, 56, 108 Rott, Hans 41 Runehov, Anne 45, 93 Rutter, Michael 68 Satpute, Ajay 38 Scheler, Max 69 Schiff, E.Z. 68 Schlarb, Verena 12, 121, 169 Schleiermacher, F.D.E. 19, 115, 130

Schlichting, Carl D. 147 Schmid, Heinrich 91, 175 Scholz, Heinrich 173 Schopenhauer, Arthur 43, 85 Schore, Allan N. 68 Schrimm-Heins, Andrea 15 Schwarz, Hans 13, 138, 204 Schwöbel, Christoph 12, 97 – 106, 114, 132, 205 Searle, John E. 76 Seibert, Christoph 118 Singer, Wolf 39, 41 – 43 Spiegel, Bernt 53 Steiger, Johann, Anselm 91 Stock, Konrad 60, 215 f. Stoellger, Philipp 12, 29, 118 f. Stoermer, Eugene F. 162 Strawson, Galen 126 Strawson, Peter F. 72 f., 191 Swinburne, Richard 167, 170, 176, 180 Taylor, Charles 121 Tecoma, E. 38 Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre 209 – 211, 213 Theißen, Gerd 209, 211 – 213 Thomasius, Gottfried 175 f. Thompson, Evan T. 63, 76 Tomasello, Michael 68 Trampel, Robert 45 f. Trevarthen, Colwyn 66 f. Troeltsch, Ernst 163 Tronick, Ed Z. 66 Turner, Robert 45 f. Uexküll, Jakob von 73 f., 155 Uexküll, Thure von 73 f., 155 van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel 12, 15, 63 Varela, Francisco J. 63, 73 Vate, Dwight van de jr. 122, 171 Visala, Aku 12, 38, 45, 93 Vul, Edward 60 Wahlberg, Mats 109 – 111, 116 Waldenfels, Bernhard 71, 119

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243

Index of Authors Waldman, Mark 45 Wegner, Daniel M. 40 Welker, Michael 179 Wesiack, W. 74 Whitehead, Alfred North 217 f. Williams, Bernard 126 Wilson, Edward O. 206 Wimmer, Heinz 50 Winkielman, Piotr 60

64 f.,

Wintering, Nancy 45 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 31, 64 Wölfel, Eberhard 177, 185 Wyczalkowski, Matthew 149, 151 Yong, Amos

214 f.

Zahavi, Dan 49, 63, 69 Zizioulas, John 174

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Index of Subjects

abandonment 62, 65, 87, 153f., 157, 168, 204 abiota 146, 154f., 210 absoluteness 59, 94, 99, 115, 125, 129, 163, 168, 175, 179, 195, 200, 203, 214, 220 action 14–20, 22, 25f., 28, 33, 37, 43f., 48, 55, 67–69, 71, 74, 78f., 87, 96, 100, 102–104, 107, 110, 114–116, 118, 122–125, 130, 133, 135, 147f., 152, 159, 166, 175–180, 185, 188, 193f., 196, 205f., 208, 211, 214–216 active externalism 55, 58, 62, 81, 113f. activity 15–17, 21, 24, 33f., 36–42, 59f., 66, 71, 83f., 86, 99, 103, 106, 109, 114, 118, 122, 133–135, 143f., 147f., 156f., 163, 177, 183, 186, 188, 193–195, 208, 214–217, 219 actor 121, 130, 133, 166f., 178f., 192 adaptation 35, 38, 139f., 142–144, 157, 206f. adaptationism 142–144, 154, 157, 207 adventure 169, 217, 221 aesthetics 180, 195, 220 affectivity 20, 66f., 74, 79, 82f., 86, 93, 122, 124, 135, 159, 171, 183, 187, 194, 219f. agapasm 199–202 agape 173 agency 38, 42, 93, 157, 214 agent 38, 40, 45, 81, 83, 93, 114, 119, 122, 131, 157, 166f., 219f. aim 11, 22f., 34, 42, 79, 85, 141, 164, 188, 217 alienation 72, 96, 171, 194 alleles 138–141 alterity 127 amor 199

amundanism 20 amygdala 66 analogy 33, 37, 42, 54, 64, 69, 75, 85, 135, 151, 155, 157, 167, 173, 213f., 217f., 221 anancasm 200f. annihilation 215 anthropocene 162 anthropocentrism 163 anthropology 62, 87, 114, 148f., 183, 197, 202, 205 anthropomorphism 38, 45, 184 apocalyptism 137, 179 apologetics 111 apophatic speech 56, 130 appearance 13, 15, 26, 29, 32, 34, 38, 40f., 51, 57, 68, 84, 87f., 90, 92, 94, 99–101, 106–108, 111, 118, 133, 137, 140f., 143, 153, 155, 160, 164, 169f., 177, 190, 192, 194 art 161, 169, 207, 212 artefact 110, 137, 146, 148, 154f. asymmetry 133f., 167, 172, 177 atheism 19f., 28, 64, 153, 161 atomism 22, 36, 46, 48, 51, 64 attitude 72, 76, 137, 159f., 162, 164, 171f., 179, 182f., 200, 202f. Aufhebung/Aufheben 84, 124f., 127f., 195, 220 autobiographical self 127 autobiography 83, 120, 125, 130, 135 beaver 142 Becoming/being-from-and-for-others 174, 184 behaviour 16, 43, 49, 52, 77, 98f., 115f., 118, 130f., 140, 180, 182, 189 belief 14, 16–18, 20, 25, 28, 38, 49f.,

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Index of Subjects 54–56, 70, 110–112, 114, 116f., 133, 162, 171 bifurcation 151 binding-system 68 biodiversity 139 biography 77f., 83f. biology 11f., 18, 32, 42, 48, 50, 52, 66, 73, 75, 110–112, 139–142, 147, 149, 152f., 159, 173, 197–201, 203–205, 207, 209, 212, 214, 216, 218 biota 146, 154f. body (Leib) 36f., 52, 54–56, 59, 63, 66f., 68f., 71f., 75, 78–82, 84, 117f., 137f., 143, 156, 181, 191, 221 body-schema 52 bodiliness (s.a. embodiment) 83, 191 brain 11, 36–43, 45, 50, 52–56, 58–62, 66, 68–71, 76, 78–81, 83, 90, 93f., 104, 107f., 112, 116, 121, 124, 135, 137, 141, 153, 156, 165, 194 brain-patterns 54 brain-states 113 cadaver 191 caritas 115 caritas 178, 183 carnivores 183 causality 55, 68, 75–77, 155, 158, 160, 216, 218 cerebrocentrism 65 certainty (certidudo) 14–18, 21, 23–28, 32, 83, 102, 114, 117, 124, 137, 141, 180, 208 chance 60, 62, 105, 113, 139, 200, 202, 212, 214 change 11, 24, 27, 33f., 39, 47, 60, 72, 98, 129, 137f., 140, 142–146, 151, 153f., 159, 164, 169, 190, 198, 203f., 211f., 214, 216 christology 85, 189, 191f., 209, 211 church 28, 95, 132, 134, 163, 194, 205–208 co-creativity 179 co-emergence 75f. co-loved 172, 193 co-evolution 78, 145 cognition 29, 32, 36f., 40f., 49, 52, 55, 59,

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65–68, 70f., 79, 83, 86, 92, 97, 107, 114, 135f., 165, 207, 221 coherence 53, 56, 77, 81, 83–85, 104, 121, 123, 142, 165–167, 169, 179, 184, 188, 190f., 195f., 198, 203, 214, 219f. coherence, dramatic 84, 121–123, 128f., 131, 136, 165–167, 169, 179, 184, 188, 190, 192, 195f., 198, 203, 214, 219f. commitment 17, 20, 24f., 27, 61 communicability 89, 106, 178, 204 communion/community 70, 84, 115, 130, 175, 205, 208, 210 complementarity 73f., 76, 80, 159, 162 concarnation 186, 193–195, 197, 215 conceptual experience 57f., 62, 115, 218 condilectus 193 conflict 14, 23, 84f., 92, 95, 109, 138, 192, 206f., 211, 215 consciousness 38–40, 42f., 53, 59, 71f., 74, 77, 79–82, 115, 130, 137, 164, 176, 213 consensus 23, 27, 137, 170, 215 consequent-nature 217f., 220 constitution 11, 21, 25, 28, 39f., 42f., 46, 63, 65, 72–74, 84, 88f., 99, 102–105, 108, 114, 116, 131, 133, 137, 147, 155, 173f., 177, 184f., 188, 190, 196, 207 construction 12, 145–147, 149, 151–158, 161–165, 183, 202–205, 207–209, 214, 216–221 constructivism 35, 42, 82, 108, 163 contingency 28, 62, 71, 105, 118, 123, 127, 132, 138f., 141f., 152, 154, 164, 167f., 173, 177, 188, 190, 196, 198, 200f., 214, 216 conviction 14, 16–18, 26, 28, 120, 137, 203, 211 cooperation 26, 147–150, 152, 164, 171f., 180, 183, 202 cortex 37f., 68 cosmogenesis 210 cosmology 178, 199 creatio ex nihilo 132, 177f., 179 creation continua(ta) 178 creation 22, 29, 99, 102, 110f., 116f., 132, 163, 166–168, 175, 177, 179f., 182f.,

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185f., 188–190, 192–199, 203, 209–211, 213, 215–220 creator-creature-distinction 217, 219, 221 creationism 29 cross 134, 195, 210, 220 culture 48, 105, 137f., 148, 152, 196 death 47, 72, 84f., 112, 133, 192, 196, 212, 220 decisions 26, 41, 44, 148, 181f., 212 decontingentization 126, 188 dementia 82 democracy 26, 181 demythologizing 62 determination 41, 45, 84, 92, 94, 97, 104, 113, 117f., 123, 128, 130f., 135, 139, 147, 156, 167, 171f., 180f., 198, 217 determinism 71, 200, 204 dialogue 12–15, 21–28, 36, 44, 65, 120, 162, 197, 199, 204f., 209, 214 disclosure-experience 19, 98f., 101–104, 106, 108, 128f., 133, 136 disembodiement 72f., 193, 216, 221 dislocation 186f. disorder 196 displacement 163, 188f., 192, 194, 196, 219f. divinization 58, 108 dominium terrae 180 doubt 14–16, 60, 73, 76, 87, 106, 114, 140, 210 drama 123f., 126, 143, 169, 193, 204 dramatic coherence 84, 121–123, 127f., 131, 136, 165–167, 169, 179, 184, 188, 190, 192, 195f., 198, 203, 214, 219f. dualism 36, 42f., 48, 51, 61f., 69, 72, 76, 89, 108, 112, 131, 141, 152–154, 157, 193, 198 duality 42, 72, 139, 145 earth 198 earthworm 143, 148 ecclesiology 205–207, 209 ecological-brain 153, 157 ecology 11, 26, 50, 58, 70, 73–75, 79, 82f.,

90, 106f., 109, 112, 114–117, 135, 137, 146, 148, 153–156, 163, 165, 182, 217 economy 26, 51, 148, 172, 181f., 201, 206 ecosystem 142, 149 egoism 147 ekporeusis 133 elevation (s.a. Aufhebung) 124, 179 emanation 177f. embodiment (s.a. bodiliness) 58, 63, 66–68, 70, 72, 75, 78f, 81–84, 98, 103, 114–120, 128–131, 134, 136–138, 155f., 165, 171, 173, 183–185, 190, 192f., 196–198, 202, 215, 217, 221 emergence 76, 123, 153, 158, 203f., 210 emotion 20, 57, 66f., 78f., 104, 171 empathy 67, 69, 83, 116f., 135 empiricism 16f., 24–28, 32, 38, 44, 49, 52, 61, 65f., 94f., 97, 105, 119, 183, 202, 206, 208 enlightenment 87 entanglement 130, 135f., 165f., 168, 172f., 220 entheorizing 24f., 27 environment 11, 36, 52, 55f., 58f., 70, 73f., 76–83, 117, 137, 140–147, 150, 152, 154–159, 162, 181f., 202, 206f., 215–219 epic narratives 126 epiphenomenon 17, 119, 152 epistemology 11, 13, 37, 42, 91, 94, 97, 109, 165 eros 173 eschatology 84, 116, 125, 133, 164, 180, 183f., 186, 192, 195, 215, 220 eternity 166, 169, 176, 183, 189f., 194f., 215, 217f., 220 ethics 28, 33, 116, 135, 164, 170, 180, 182, 195, 199, 205f., 213, 220 ethos 119 etsi deus/mundus non daretur 19f., 166, 173, 187, 190, 197 eucharist 210 event 37f., 45–47, 64, 70, 78, 83, 87, 99, 105, 113–115, 119, 122f., 125f., 130, 138, 152, 159, 166, 169, 178f., 185, 194, 215, 218, 220

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Index of Subjects everyday-experience 11, 45, 92, 115 evolution 11, 31, 33, 38, 41–43, 48, 50f., 66, 93, 136, 138–145, 147, 149, 151–155, 158–160, 162–164, 169, 178, 181, 198–206, 209–212, 214, 221 expanded theory 145 expectation 20, 36, 38, 60, 98–100, 122–126, 128–131, 136, 144, 159, 161, 184, 197–199, 202–205, 214, 220 experience 11, 19, 29, 36, 39f., 43, 45, 48, 52, 56–58, 62–64, 68–72, 77–83, 86–90, 92–112, 115, 117–125, 128–132, 134–137, 150, 152, 159f., 166f., 170f., 174, 183, 185, 187, 191, 204, 216–218 experiments 16, 44–46, 48, 50, 61, 66, 70, 81, 95, 112 explanation 16, 24, 43, 62, 72, 102, 111, 122, 124, 135, 152, 155, 177, 214 explication 24f., 63, 86, 88, 90, 105, 112, 136, 167, 170, 177, 199 existentia 114, 174, 184, 190 extended cognition 55 extended genotype 155 extended mind 55, 81, 114, 117, 126, 155, 196 extended person 114, 121 extended phenotype 142, 154 extended self 55 extended theory 11, 152f., 155, 162, 202, 204, 207, 213 extension 11, 29, 49, 54, 65, 129, 136, 140, 152f., 157, 210 external relations 37, 46–48, 50f., 58, 63–65, 70, 79f., 89, 94, 107f., 112, 115f., 141, 147, 155, 166, 175, 190 eternality 37, 46–48, 50f., 58, 63–65, 70, 79f., 94, 107f., 112, 115f., 141, 147, 155, 166, 175, 190 extheorizing 24–27 extinction 151f., 154 faith 11, 20, 24, 26, 38, 45, 71, 86–89, 94, 97, 99, 102, 104, 106f., 111f., 114f., 117, 119, 131, 133–135, 164–166, 176, 178, 189, 194, 197, 201, 203, 205–208, 210, 212f., 216, 220

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falleness 56, 116, 137, 166, 179, 183, 189, 203, 213 fallibility 15, 23, 34, 63, 127, 136, 140, 183, 209, 212f. falsification 22, 58, 61, 71, 87, 109, 140, 143, 147, 201 fatalism 126 Father 133–136, 166, 169, 173f., 187, 190, 192f., 216, 220f. fiction 64, 177, 194 fideism 92, 94 fides caritate formata 115 filial relations 172 filioque 133 first-person perspective 69 formation 25, 28, 44, 58, 75–77, 80, 114, 116, 130, 156, 160, 205 fragment 80, 84f., 120, 130 freedom 45, 83, 99, 102, 171, 196, 208 friendship 20, 172, 194 from-and-for-the-other-becoming/being 187 functional circle/circuit 11f., 73–75, 78–81, 83, 156 future 33, 99, 109, 121, 123, 125, 137, 140, 147, 159, 161, 166, 173, 186, 194f., 201, 203, 214, 221 fuzzy-set-theory 29–32, 55, 66, 188, 201 genes 32, 139–141, 147, 153f., 156, 162, 181 genetics 138–140, 146, 152, 155, 221 genome 139 genotype 141, 143, 146, 155f. gift-love 173 God 19f., 33f., 85–87, 97, 104, 108, 110–112, 131f., 134–136, 163, 166–169, 171, 173–182, 184f., 187, 189f., 192, 194, 196f., 214, 216–221 godlessness 178 gods 20, 38, 166, 188 goodness 13f., 20, 38, 45, 90, 98, 107, 110f., 123f., 132, 137, 168, 172, 177, 179–181, 188, 192, 194f., 200f., 214, 219f. gospel 85, 87, 114, 116, 120, 128, 130f.,

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133–136, 165f., 168, 170, 176, 184, 186, 194–196, 198f., 202, 205, 207f., 211, 213, 215 grace 86, 96, 111, 116, 132, 170, 179, 190 grand narratives 126f. gratitude 125, 179 guilt 46, 83, 187 habit 214 hamartiology 187 heaven 14, 215 Hegelianism 39, 128 hellenism 62 historicism 163 history 13f., 22, 27, 33, 41f., 44, 46, 54f., 61f., 76, 78, 86–88, 91, 113, 130, 133, 137f., 141, 147, 151–154, 159, 163, 168–170, 173–175, 178f., 185f., 189f., 201, 204, 208–210, 213, 217, 220f. holy 84, 87 Holy Spirit 115, 124, 193 homo 151f., 186 homo economicus 148, 164, 181, 201f. homo ergaster 151 homo faber 164 homo heidelbergensis 199 hope 99, 116, 132, 136, 159, 161, 205 horizon 63, 99f., 124–126, 128–132, 136, 209 human becoming/being 16, 18–20, 22f., 27f., 36–39, 41, 44, 49f., 57–59, 61, 66, 71, 74, 76, 82, 84–86, 90, 93f., 99, 102, 104, 107f., 111f., 115f., 118, 120, 124f., 130, 132, 134f., 137, 147f., 151f., 162–164, 166, 168–171, 173–175, 178–190, 192f., 195, 197–202, 206, 208, 210, 212–215, 219 humanities 14, 24, 162 humanity 19, 85, 102, 164, 180–183, 187, 189, 198, 209 hyper-religionizing 153 hyperactive agency detection device (HADD) 38 hypostasis 15f., 51, 173

idealism 42f., 47f., 55, 57, 62, 108 identity 43, 46–48, 56, 60, 83, 114, 120–125, 128–130, 132–136, 166, 171, 173, 184, 186, 189f., 193, 208, 210, 215–217, 219 ideology 27f., 43, 51, 137 idol 20f., 84, 153, 163, 171, 176, 215 illocality 155 image 37, 39, 50, 61, 77, 81, 93, 113, 115, 170, 180–182, 184, 187, 195, 219 imago dei 180, 182, 219 immanent trinity 130, 175f., 179, 190, 213 imminentism 137 incarnation 119, 134, 186, 189f., 192–194, 197f., 203, 209, 213, 215, 219 incommensurability 92, 182 incommunicability 174, 176, 190, 196 indeterminancy 71, 214 individual 25, 45, 107, 141, 148, 181f., 194 individualism 48f., 65f., 107, 141, 148, 181f., 184, 205, 207 individuation 179, 185, 190 infant 66 infinity 30 information 39, 49, 77f., 94, 102, 135f., 139, 146–148, 152, 154f., 158, 174, 188 inheritance 146, 152, 154–156, 207, 217, 221 inseparability 160 inspiration 12, 122, 193, 216 integrity 85, 188, 194 intellectualism 48, 65, 188 intension 29, 49, 107 intention 13, 17, 46, 49, 63f., 66–70, 76, 79, 83, 87, 89, 107, 110, 112, 114, 117–119, 132, 159f., 163, 176, 179, 203, 207, 209, 216 intercorporeality 67, 83 interdisciplinarity 11, 13, 15, 23, 25f., 44, 197 internal relations/internality of – 11, 37, 40, 46f., 50, 55, 59, 64f., 67, 70, 79f., 83, 91, 108, 115–119, 137, 142, 147,

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Index of Subjects 154–158, 167, 174, 178, 190, 193, 198, 200, 202, 204 interpretation 11, 41, 46, 51, 59, 62, 66, 70, 76, 90, 100–102, 104, 106, 109f., 112, 116, 128, 133, 135, 142f., 158, 162, 168f., 174, 201, 203f., 206f., 213 interrelationship 116, 160, 218 intersubjectivity 54, 66, 68, 72, 82 intolerance 28 introspection 39, 82 intuition 32, 44, 196 irreflexivity 134, 167 judgment 22, 57, 163, 180, 184, 186, 195, 220f. justification 43, 50, 62, 85, 87, 110, 112f., 161, 177, 181, 183, 205, 207 kingdom 133 kitten 52 language 16, 29–32, 35f., 38, 41f., 45, 54f., 59, 64, 68f., 106, 123f., 134, 140, 157f., 161, 165, 168, 175, 178, 187, 191, 209, 211 law 51, 58, 121, 123f., 137f., 153, 177–179, 181, 183, 188, 194–196, 199f., 203, 206, 210f., 213f., 219 liberation 204, 215 liberations 133 liberty 176, 190, 212 life 11, 23, 29, 31, 33, 44, 49, 66, 69, 72f., 84f., 87–90, 92, 96–98, 105, 112, 115f., 120, 125f., 132–134, 139, 141f., 158–160, 165–167, 171, 174, 179, 183f., 188, 191f., 198f., 206–208, 210, 212, 217, 220f. life story 14, 129 life-experience 87, 137 life-partnership 172 lifeform 207 lifeworld (Lebenswelt) 21, 72, 82, 116, 120, 137 literalism 20, 25, 45, 62, 86, 210 logics 16, 26, 31, 72, 100, 123, 133f., 167f., 177f., 180, 182, 191, 196, 201

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logos (Word) 194 love 64, 98, 114, 116, 134f., 170–176, 178–180, 182–184, 187, 189f., 192f., 196, 198–202, 210, 213f., 218–220 love story 175f. Lux mundi 209 manipulation 28, 51, 70, 172 maps 36–38, 61, 77 materialism 76 matter/engergy 17, 21, 37, 43, 65, 72, 76, 107, 112, 114, 119, 144, 146, 163, 191, 198, 202, 210 megatheology 18, 23, 95 melanism 159 meme-postulate 140, 153, 207 mereological fallacy 59 meta-narrative 34, 120, 125, 127–129, 132, 134, 136 meta-story 120, 188 metaphor 19, 29–34, 37, 54, 165, 167, 169, 173f., 176, 194, 209, 211, 213, 215, 217, 221 metaphor-theory 31, 165 metaphysics 169, 211, 217, 220 metatheology 18, 23, 95 mimesis 67, 122 mind 36f., 49f., 52, 55, 58, 62–64, 66, 69f., 72, 81, 93–95, 107, 109f., 114, 116, 119, 123, 126, 135, 160, 175, 196, 198f., 202, 214 mind-matter/body-dualism 42, 62, 72, 198, 202 mirror-neurons 68 misplacedness (s.a. displacement) 187, 189 model 11, 14, 16, 29f., 34, 45, 62, 73, 80, 83, 94, 97f., 104–109, 112, 121, 128, 135f., 138, 149–152, 154, 165, 169, 173f., 177, 183, 192, 202, 205, 207, 209, 211–213, 215–221 model 32, 149 modularism 36, 38f., 59–61, 107 module 38f., 55 monism 42, 47f., 62, 76, 199 monocausality 152, 207

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mother-child-dyad 67, 82, 171, 173 mutation 138, 211, 213 mystics 45, 93, 96, 130 myth 33, 43, 56, 62, 85, 127, 138, 147, 188 narcissism 171, 196 narration 16, 31, 34, 45, 49, 78, 83, 113, 120–125, 128, 130, 132, 134, 159f., 165, 174, 184, 186, 188, 190f., 198, 200, 209, 214, 216, 218 naturalism 36, 41f., 46, 51, 70, 72, 76, 109, 119, 159f., 162, 183, 199f., 202f. need-love 173 Neo-Darwinianism 138, 198, 205, 207, 211, 213 neonate 52, 82 neuro-idealism 44 neurobiology 11, 68, 71, 82, 93 neuroconstructivism 36, 40, 42f., 46, 48, 51, 53, 61f., 71 neuroimaging 38, 60f. neuron 37, 39 neuroplasticity 59, 81 neuroscience 36f., 39, 41, 52, 60, 71, 76, 88f., 92, 105f., 108f., 130, 140f., 153, 155, 159 neurosolipsism 61 neurotheology 92–95, 106 niche 12, 130, 143, 145–149, 151–158, 161–165, 183, 202–205, 207–209, 214, 216–221 niche construction 11f., 130, 143–149, 151–158, 161–165, 183, 202–205, 207–209, 213, 215–221 niche reception 164f, 209, 217, 219, 224 nonindependence-error 60f. noosphere 55, 117, 210 observation 63, 85, 98, 111, 114, 142, 159f., 178, 183, 191, 212, 214 omnipotence 170, 175f., 180, 195f. omnipresence 162, 175, 195–197 omniscience 170, 175, 180, 195 ontogenetics 107, 159 ontology 17, 21f., 24f., 27, 33, 38, 42, 47, 51, 57, 63–65, 70, 88, 97, 109, 133, 136,

139, 142, 148, 167, 174, 188, 190, 197, 204, 214, 216–218 ontology, dramatic-narrative 127 open event 134, 166f., 169, 173, 175 open loops 77, 79, 81, 83, 116, 120, 122, 129, 156, 216 open story 169 organism-environment 37, 40, 49, 69, 74–80, 83, 111, 139–148, 152, 154–158, 162, 214, 218f. pain 53f., 160, 171 pair-bonds 144, 173, 202 panentheism 190 pantheism 20, 48, 130, 181, 217 pantocrator 212 partial-relation 155 passivity 37, 52, 56f., 71, 85, 90, 98f., 101, 104, 115, 117–119, 132, 162, 174, 185f. pathos 119, 164, 185 paw-placements 52 perception 11, 17, 36, 39–44, 53f., 57–59, 61, 65, 67–72, 74, 77, 79–82, 88, 93f., 100, 106, 109–112, 115, 117–120, 122, 128–130, 135f., 147, 159f., 165, 191, 194, 196f., 199, 202, 214, 220 perfection 99, 116, 132, 136, 179–181, 183, 186, 189, 192, 195, 199, 203, 209, 215, 217, 220 person 15–18, 27, 38, 40f., 44, 49–52, 54f., 59f., 63, 65, 67–69, 72, 76, 82–87, 89, 92, 94, 97f., 100f., 104, 107, 110, 114–117, 119–124, 126, 128, 130f., 133, 136–138, 157, 159f., 162, 168f., 171, 173–176, 178f., 183–190, 192–200, 202f., 205, 210, 215f., 218–221 phenomenology 11, 14, 44, 58, 63, 69–71, 73, 75, 82, 97, 115, 159, 161, 172f., 191, 200–202 phenotype 138, 140–142, 147, 154–156, 159 pphilia 173 physics 22, 25, 48, 153, 197, 204 plasticity 148 pluralism 48 pneumatology 115

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Index of Subjects polygenetic & pleiotropic effects 140 possibility 23f., 48, 57, 63f., 71, 75–77, 90, 93, 96f., 102–104, 110f., 118, 121, 123, 130, 132, 163, 166, 168, 177, 179, 186f., 194f., 197, 202, 204, 211, 217 post-democracy 26, 181 post-liberalism 206f. post-modernity 34, 182 practice 18, 22, 26, 34, 49, 53, 94f., 100f., 112, 114–116, 118, 126, 130f., 134f., 170, 192 pragmatics 14, 16, 31, 118, 122, 158 pragmatism 118 pre-personal nature 122, 131f., 136, 159f., 185f., 188f., 194 presence 49, 52, 78, 121, 171, 186, 194, 197 preservation 163, 194 primatology 202 process 11, 33f., 40f., 50–52, 55, 59f., 66, 71, 73–79, 81–83, 95f., 100, 116–118, 120–122, 130, 132, 137–141, 143, 147, 152, 155f., 158–160, 162f., 167, 177–179, 184, 186, 190, 202f., 209f., 217, 220 process-metaphysics 14, 217f., 220 processiones 133 profanity 87, 89, 96 project 12, 111, 138, 172f., 193 prolepsis 192 promise 85, 87, 114, 132, 184, 186–188, 205, 216, 219, 221 prospective surprise 125 protestantism 99 proto-conversation 82 proto-human 188 proto-self 78f. pseudo-science 198 pseudo-theology 198 quantum-physics 22, 64, 71, 139, 191, 204 quasi-religion 17, 27f., 51, 61, 70, 109, 139f., 143, 206f. race 181 rationalism 91, 97, 105

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rationality 15, 181, 183 re-enchantment 58, 75 realism 17, 31, 35, 42, 48, 82 reason 16, 22f., 28, 30, 32f., 43, 48, 55, 58f., 61f., 64–66, 73, 91f., 95, 97, 106, 109, 111, 121, 124, 126, 133f., 142, 147, 153f., 157–160, 162, 177, 196 reciprocity 11, 31, 68f., 72, 74f., 87, 133, 137, 154f., 157, 167, 172–174, 184f., 188 reconciliation 84f., 99, 102, 166, 193 redemption 102, 104, 186, 203 reductionism 36, 51, 70, 109, 161, 204 relata 55, 67f., 99, 101, 118, 141, 154, 156f., 165, 169f., 172–174, 176, 187, 204, 218f. relatedness 65, 67, 117–119, 185f. relatednessless 46–48, 50f., 56, 59, 63–65, 70, 80, 88, 94, 97, 108, 114f., 133, 137, 141, 155, 166, 170, 175f., 179, 185, 187, 192, 198, 204 relation 11, 16, 43, 47f., 50, 58f., 64, 70, 77, 79, 92, 95, 98, 105, 115, 134, 141f., 145, 153, 155–159, 163, 167–169, 173–178, 182, 184–188, 190–198, 200, 202, 204, 218f. relationship 11, 13, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 30–32, 48f., 51, 55, 61, 64–67, 76–79, 82f., 86, 88, 91, 93, 97f., 103f., 108, 112, 115–117, 119, 125, 133–135, 141–143, 145f., 152, 154–157, 160, 166, 168, 171–174, 176f., 180, 184–186, 190–196, 202, 206f., 209, 215f., 218–220 relativism 181 religion 17f., 23, 25–28, 43, 45, 56, 62, 76, 85, 87, 89f., 92–96, 98f., 101–109, 117, 120, 125, 128–130, 136, 163, 168, 170, 180, 182, 206f., 212 religiosity 25f., 94 relocation 145f., 154, 186 representationalism 11, 33, 36–39, 42f., 46, 50–53, 58, 61f., 65–67, 71, 80, 88, 90, 92, 106–110, 112, 122, 140f., 153f., 181, 219 resonance 11f., 67f., 78–81, 121–124, 130f., 157, 178, 180–182, 184, 187f., 191, 193, 198, 202, 213, 215, 219

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responsibility 15, 28, 32, 37, 68, 78, 91, 112, 129, 141, 162, 164, 172, 180, 183 resurrection 73, 133, 177, 192f., 196, 212, 220 retrospective surprise 118, 125, 129, 186, 203 revelation 11, 14, 18–22, 29, 45, 49, 54, 60, 64, 91f., 94f., 97–111, 121, 128f., 135–137, 160, 190, 198, 210, 212 righteousness 102 rubber-hands 53 sacrament 213 sacred 84, 87, 89 sacred-profane distinction 87, 94 sacrifice 141, 192, 200, 202, 212 salvation 102, 112, 135f., 209–211, 213, 215 skepticism 62, 197 schemata 173, 175 scholasticism 48, 175 sciences 12–17, 19–22, 24–29, 33f., 45f., 48f., 51, 63–65, 70f., 75f., 92f., 95, 106, 138–140, 153, 160, 162, 178, 181, 183, 194, 197f., 203f., 207, 209, 213–215 scientism 12, 14, 21f., 25, 27f., 38, 48, 65, 109, 142, 207 securitas 14, 114, 137, 172 selection 60, 75, 139f., 142, 144–147, 150, 152, 156–158, 162, 211–213 self 18, 55, 82f., 93, 99, 104, 117–125, 130, 135, 160, 165, 167, 178, 188, 196, 207 self-authorship 82, 117 self-awareness 82, 117f., 184f. self-becoming 176 self-coherence 82 self-concept 84 self-consciousness 83, 119 self-disclosure/disclosedness 19, 34, 99, 102, 174, 184–187 self-enclosedness 184, 186 self-explanation 28 self-giving 99, 135, 165 self-identification 133, 135f. self-idolization 170 self-images 164

self-interpretation 95, 188 self-love 201 self-narration 122 self-sacrifice 199 selfishness 32, 148 semantics 31, 109, 112f., 122, 133f., 147, 158, 165, 168 semiotics 33f., 68, 100, 122, 158, 195 sequence 123, 126, 129, 139, 166f., 170, 178f., 184, 190, 193 serpent 188, 219 sexuality 172, 182 simultaneity 123, 166 sin 85, 183, 186–188, 192, 194f., 205, 219 social-self 117 sociality 22, 27f., 41, 49f., 55, 67f., 70, 74, 79, 82, 98, 100, 107, 120f., 130, 132, 140, 148, 174, 181, 184, 190, 194, 206–208, 212f. society 26–28, 34, 65, 70, 96, 107, 137f., 148, 181, 188, 202, 205–208 sociobiology 140, 153, 181, 206f. sociology 18, 207 sola gratia 86f., 132, 177, 179, 205 sola scriptura 86 solae 86f., 132, 177, 179, 205 solipsism 54 solo verbo 86 soteriology 192 soul 181, 191, 210 spatiotemporality 39, 54, 93, 106, 108, 115, 129f., 185 species 147, 149–151, 163, 201f., 209, 216f., 219 spontaneity 44, 56, 58, 68, 72, 98, 200, 214 still-face experiments 66 storied God 136, 165f., 169, 176, 184f., 196, 198, 214 story 25, 83f., 87, 112, 116, 120–122, 124–126, 128–131, 133–137, 165–167, 169f., 172f., 175f., 178f., 183–185, 187–190, 192–198, 205, 207, 210, 214–216, 219f. subjectivity 49, 54, 58, 69, 74f., 79, 114f., 117 super-human 210

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Index of Subjects supernatural 19, 21, 91, 93, 107, 170 superstition 17 supralapsarianism 180, 189 surprise 17, 32, 50, 56, 60, 65, 71, 76, 83, 109, 123, 125f., 129, 138, 151, 167, 169, 195, 220 surrender 176, 189f., 192, 200, 202 synapses 71 syntactics 31, 158 syntopy 114f. tacit knowledge 15, 117 technocracy 181 teleology 41, 75, 110, 141, 153, 158, 160–162, 183, 203 temporality 67, 163 temptation 110, 114f., 162 theism 111, 170, 176, 180–182, 195, 203, 217 theodicy 171 theodrama 126f. theology 11–17, 19–29, 33f., 36, 61f., 76, 84, 86f., 89, 91f., 95–98, 105f., 109, 111, 133f., 136, 138, 160, 162f., 165, 168, 170f., 173f., 178, 196, 198f., 202–205, 207, 209, 211f., 214–216, 218 theopaschite formula 217 theosis 179, 220 there-is-no-alternative (TINA) 182 thing-in-itself 43 time 11, 22, 24–26, 33, 39, 47, 55, 74, 87, 91, 93–95, 100, 102f., 105, 109–111, 113, 121, 123, 125, 128–131, 137f., 140, 144–146, 149, 151–156, 159–161, 166, 169f., 177, 179, 182, 185, 189f., 192f., 195, 197, 199, 201f., 204f., 209–212, 214–217, 219 tolerance 26–28 topology 167 totalitarianism 28 totus homo 183, 187, tradition 16, 18f., 24–26, 28, 45, 58, 62, 69–71, 75, 86f., 96, 98, 105, 114f., 120, 130, 132–134, 147, 156, 161, 166f., 169, 179, 185, 188, 191f., 195, 212, 215, 220f.

253

transcendence 33, 42f., 108, 124, 130, 134f., 190, 209, 211, 213 transcendentality 42f., 82, 108, 130 transdisciplinarity 23, 35, 63, 65, 162, 205 transformation 20, 33, 36, 38, 76, 81, 179f., 195, 210, 220 transitivity 134, 167 transubstantiation 210 trialogue 22f. trilemma 189 trinity 84, 99, 102f., 131, 135, 165, 169, 174f., 177, 179f., 182 187f., 195, 217–220 truth 18f., 29f., 33, 38, 56, 102, 109, 113, 116, 131, 165f., 194, 199f., 206 tychasm 200f. typology 13, 24, 27, 91f., 106 ultimate 18, 34, 42, 47, 84, 97, 112, 125, 128f., 131, 133f., 136, 143, 148, 162–164, 170, 188, 196, 200, 215–217–221 uncertainty 94 unchangeability 121, 169 unconsciousness 38, 43, 71, 218 universal/universality 58, 104, 137 universalality 18, 23, 25, 52, 63, 210f. universals 65 universe 33, 47, 65, 158, 163, 181, 210 unsurprising 124 value 26, 46, 48f., 51, 60, 65, 74, 76, 84, 96, 113, 149, 151, 163, 168, 202f., 211, 215f. variety 27, 37, 45, 52, 60, 76, 138f., 148, 181, 200 vehicles 143, 155, 162, 181 veracity 172f., 176, 190 verbum externum 114, 131 verification 16f., 89, 194 vice 13, 23, 59, 107, 112, 141, 151, 172, 190 victimization 187, 202, 212 virtue 13, 23, 47f., 190 viva vox evangelii 87, 114, 131 volitions 84, 86 voluntarism 180, 182, 196 voodoo-fallacy 60

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whence-and-whither-becoming/being 114, 174, 184f., 187, 190 witness 50, 87, 132, 179, 188, 208 Word (logos) 25, 40, 86, 97f., 131, 188, 190, 197 world 11, 15, 18, 20, 28, 32, 36f., 40f., 43, 47f., 50, 52f., 56–58, 61f., 65, 67, 72–74, 81, 93, 95, 97, 99, 101–103, 105, 107,

113–116, 118, 129f., 132f., 139, 141, 149, 158f., 164–168, 173, 175–180, 183, 185f., 190, 192–198, 203, 209–211, 213–220 worldview 26–28, 131 yadah 188

© 2014, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525570364 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647570365