Resistance, Power and Conceptions of Political Order in Islamist Organizations: Comparing Hezbollah and Hamas (Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics) [1 ed.] 1138097454, 9781138097452

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Resistance, Power, and Conceptions of Political Order in Islamist Organizations

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order based on a comparative case study of the Shiite Lebanese Hezbollah and the Sunni Palestinian Hamas. Connecting Islamism research, Critical Constructivist norm research, and resistance studies from the field of International Relations Theory, it demonstrates that resistance constitutes both organizations’ core norm and is relevant for their conceptions of political order. Based on primary Arabic data the book illustrates that the core norm of resistance, deeply intertwined with both organizations’ interactions towards power preservation and the specific political context they are engaged in, characterizes Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order and explains the differences between them. In contrast to common perceptions presented in research, politics, and the media, the book shows that in the case of both Hezbollah and Hamas the religious orientation, i.e. Shiite and Sunni Islamist political thought, plays a secondary role only when it comes to explaining Islamist organizations’ political orientation. Bringing new insights from cases that lie beyond the Western liberal world order into Critical Constructivist norm research and resistance studies, the book establishes a theoretical framework that enables scholars to comprehensively analyze Islamist organizations’ political orientation in different cases without being caught in limited analytical categories. It will be of interest to students and scholars of International Relations Theory, Middle East Studies, and Global Governance. Maren Koss has completed a PhD at the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies and the University of Hamburg. She is an International Relations Theory researcher and an area specialist on the Middle East and North Africa, especially on the following topics: Political Islam, Hezbollah, Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, Lebanon, Palestinian Territories, and Syria.



Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics

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136 Christianity and American State Violence in Iraq Priestly or Prophetic? Christopher A. Morrissey

Resistance, Power, and Conceptions of Political Order in Islamist Organizations Comparing Hezbollah and Hamas

Maren Koss

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 Maren Koss The right of Maren Koss to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Names: Koss, Maren, author. Title: Resistance, power, and conceptions of political order in Islamist organizations: comparing Hezbollah and Hamas / Maren Koss. Other titles: Routledge advances in international relations and global politics; 134. Description: Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2018. | Series: Routledge advances in international relations and global politics; 134 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017045365 | ISBN 9781138097452 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315104867 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Islam and politics–Middle East. | Hizballah (Lebanon) | òHarakat al-Muqåawamah al-Islåamåiyah. | Middle East–Politics and government. Classification: LCC BP173.7.K694 2018 | DDC 324.25692/082–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017045365 ISBN: 978-1-138-09745-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-10486-7 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents List of figures Acknowledgments Note on transliteration List of abbreviations 1

Introduction: Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order, resistance, and power

2

Bridging the gap: connecting Islamism research and Critical Constructivism 2.1 The political ideology of Islamism 2.2 Critical Constructivist norm research and the core norm of resistance 2.3 Political order and power 2.4 Conclusion and research proposition

3

The Lebanese Hezbollah: politics serve resistance 3.1 Hezbollah’s intellectual background: Islamism, resistance, and political order in the Lebanese context 3.2 Engaging in national politics: protecting the resistance ranks first 3.3 Consolidating resistance: Hezbollah in domestic contestation processes 3.4 Defending resistance through reconstructing its meaning 3.5 Conclusion: Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order

4

The Palestinian Hamas: resistance, governance, and ambitions for maintaining power 4.1 Hamas’ intellectual background: Islamism, resistance, and political order in the Palestinian context 4.2 Hamas comes to power: new visions of a Palestinian political order? 4.3 Political order in Gaza under the authority of Hamas 4.4 Morsi’s rise to power: Hamas anticipates its moment has come 4.5 Conclusion: Hamas’ conceptions of political order

5

Hezbollah and Hamas: the interplay of resistance, power, and political order 5.1 Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ intellectual and structural background 5.2 Conceptions of political order 5.3 The core norm of resistance 5.4 Maintaining the power position 5.5 Conclusion

6

Ruling Islamist organizations and the connection of norms, power, and conceptions of political order 6.1 Ennahda in power: compromise and power-sharing in the constitution-making process 6.2 The Muslim Brotherhood: hasty constitution-making without compromise 6.3 Ruling Islamist organizations and the explanatory power of Critical Constructivist norm research

7

Conclusion 7.1 The key findings and their scientific contribution 7.2 Implications for future research and practitioners Annex I: list of interviews Annex II: list of written Arabic primary sources Index

Figures 3.1 4.1 5.1

Power preservation through resistance Power preservation through political order Main interest: power preservation in the specific context

Acknowledgments The time has come to thank all those who supported me to realize and finalize this book. I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Henner Fürtig and Prof. Antje Wiener PhD, FAcSS who both supported me during the whole research process. I thank them in particular for their continuous comments and inspiring recommendations throughout the various research stages of the project. I am grateful for the financial support offered by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) that made my field research trips possible. The offices of the Friedrich-EbertFoundation in Beirut and East Jerusalem deserve acknowledgments for providing me with institutional support during my field research trips. I also thank Britt Ziolkowski for helping me during my research stay in the Palestinian Territories and for the various stimulating discussions we had. I am indebted to my interview partners in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories who were willing to talk to me and to share their views and perspectives even under difficult conditions. Many thanks go to the members of the Doctoral Programme at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), the participants of GIGA’s IMES Colloquium, and the members of the Colloquium Global Governance at the University of Hamburg. Their ideas and critical comments from diverse research perspectives inspired my work and encouraged me to continue my way. I am grateful to many of my colleagues at the GIGA. Matthias Basedau, Ricarda Flemmer, Medha, and Annette Ranko supported me to finalize my book. Special thanks go my colleagues and friends André Bank, Babette Never, and Ina Peters. I thank them for their support and encouragement over the last years. Special thanks also go to Nadim Housni Alaoui who supported me with issues related to the Arabic language and to Luisa Müthel who helped me to clarify the questions I had concerning the transliteration of Arabic terms. I express my gratitude to Sven Schaffer who always showed great understanding for my book-project and provided me with flexible working conditions. This book would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of my friends, family, and partner. I thank Hannah Hönle-Stoll and Maja Wiese for sharing my experiences over the years throughout the different steps of the research process and for their friendship. I am deeply grateful for the moral support and love of my parents, sister, and brother. I especially thank them for going with me through the various stages of this project and for always encouraging me to continue my path. Finally, I am sincerely thankful for the understanding, encouragement, trust in my capabilities, and love of my partner. Thank you so much, Sven!

Note on transliteration For the transliteration of Arabic terms, I apply the transliteration system of the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES) in the literature references mentioned in the text and in the bibliography. To enhance the readability of the book, I apply a simplified version of the IJMES style throughout the running text. I drop diacritical characters and marks that indicate long vowels. When quoting a secondary source, which entails Arabic terms, I refer to these terms as they appear in the source.

Abbreviations CCSD CDU CPR ESF EU FJP FPM FTA GCC ICG IJMES IQB IR IS ISIE JMCC MENA MoU NCA NGO PA PASF PCBS PCP PFLP PLC PLO PNA PRC PSR SCAF SMT SSNP STL UN

Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation Christian Democratic Party (Germany) Congrès pour la République Executive Support Force European Union Freedom and Justice Party Free Patriotic Movement Free Trade Agreement Gulf Cooperation Council International Crisis Group International Journal of Middle East Studies Izz al-din al-Qassam Brigades International Relations Islamic State Instance Supérieure Indépendence pour les Elections Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre Middle East and North Africa Memorandum of Understanding National Constituent Assembly Non-governmental Organization Palestinian Authority Palestinian Authority Security Forces Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics Palestinian Civil Police Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine Palestinian Legislative Council Palestine Liberation Organization Palestinian National Authority Popular Resistance Committees Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Social Movement Theory Syrian Social Nationalist Party Special Tribunal for Lebanon United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon US United States of America

1

Introduction Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order, resistance, and power

There is hardly any other political ideology that has experienced so many ups and downs and attracted such an overwhelming attention during the last four decades than Islamism. Gaining momentum with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, Islamism moved to center stage in politics, academia, and media in the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. While following the September 11 attacks politicians mainly focused on Islamism with regard to terrorism or Western security interests (Benjamin and Simon 2005; Tellis 2004), at the same time Islamist organizations have become increasingly relevant as political actors in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).1 They have started to participate in national elections or have become an important part of the political opposition and increasingly been able to represent themselves successfully as authentic and reliable political alternatives to the authoritarian regimes in the MENA region (Albrecht and Köhler 2008; Asseburg 2007; Brown and Hamzawy 2010). Although Islamists did not initiate the Arab Upheavals2 and were themselves taken by surprise when the mass demonstrations started, they have benefited from the revolts. Established Islamist organizations managed to mobilize their adherents and to achieve electoral victories in countries like Tunisia or Egypt and new and dynamic Islamist political actors emerged at the same time (al-Anani 2012, 467ff.; Wright 2012). However, as fast as Islamist organizations came to power in the wake of the Arab Upheavals, their fall took place. The overthrow of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s first state President, Muhammad Morsi, on July 3, 2013 introduced the Islamists’ rapid fall. Nevertheless, Islamist organizations have not fallen into oblivion since then but will remain relevant with regard to politics and the societies in the MENA region over the long-term (ElSherif 2014; Khan 2014). Based on this significance that Islamist organizations hold as political actors in the MENA region, questions come up with regard to the organizations’ political orientation. A lot has already been written on Islamist organizations and processes of political inclusion and moderation (Schwedler 2006) as well as on their relationship to democracy and secularism (Ghobadzadeh 2013; Haynes 2013; Norris 2013). Scholars have also focused on reconsidering Islamist politics and key conceptions following the Arab Upheavals (Meijer 2014; Rosefsky Wickham 2014) or on highlighting general trends within Islamism (Mandaville 2014). Finally, many studies deal with concrete empirical cases in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, or Yemen (Donker 2013; Durac 2014; El-Sherif 2014; Omar 2012). I agree with the existing literature on the fact that Islamist organizations will remain relevant as political actors over the long-term. I argue, however, that this literature has shortcomings. To understand Islamist political actors the existing literature very often uses

narrow and limited categories that classify these actors as moderate or radical (Ottaway 2010; Wiegand 2010) or try to evaluate them as democratic or non-democratic (Cox and Marks 2006). In doing so, it misses to achieve a broader understanding of Islamist political actors that does not use pre-existing categories but rather follows an inductive procedure embedded in a broader theoretical framework that supports us to obtain an overall knowledge of Islamist organizations’ political orientation. In this book I move beyond these shortcomings by developing a theoretical approach that combines Islamism research and Critical Constructivist norm research from the field of International Relations theory (IR) to achieve a broader understanding of Islamist organizations’ political orientation without being caught within preestablished categories. The Shiite Lebanese Hezbollah and the Sunni Palestinian Hamas serve as case studies, as I will outline below. The theoretical framework based on Islamism research and Critical Constructivist norm research, which have mainly been studied in isolation from each other so far, enables me to apply an inductive methodological procedure, i.e. to analyze primary data from Hezbollah and Hamas and to connect them with the broader theoretical approach. In doing so, my book brings new insights from cases that lie beyond the Western liberal world order into IR theory, which suffers from Western-centrism to a large extent so far (Bilgin 2008; Tickner and Blaney 2012). Taking the Shiite Hezbollah and the Sunni Hamas as empirical examples is of major interest as both organizations belong to the most fascinating and most controversial political actors of the MENA region. They hold a special status among all Islamist organizations due to their resistance against Israel and a special political significance as they are involved in the IsraeliPalestinian-conflict and in regional affairs in the MENA. Hezbollah, member of the Lebanese government and parliament, and Hamas, democratically elected in 2006, are policymakers within the Lebanese nation state and the Palestinian national arena but at the same time partly listed as terrorist organizations in the West. They both emerged as Islamist resistance organizations against Israel during the 1980s. Both embody religious, charitable, armed, and political elements and have been engaged in welfare services, civil society activities, and armed resistance within their Islamist framework. Hezbollah and Hamas have also decided to enter the Lebanese and the Palestinian political arena respectively and to take part in national elections (Hroub 2006; Norton 2007a). Furthermore, both organizations’ relationships have never been limited to their particular national arena. Hezbollah and Hamas have been allies since the 1980s and always maintained close relations with regional actors such as Syria or Iran and also enjoy support from the Arab world due to their resistance activities against Israel (Mohns and Bank 2012). Bearing these commonalties in mind, the most apparent difference between Hezbollah and Hamas seems to be their Shiite or Sunni religious orientation respectively. Given this book’s main aim – the analysis of Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order – and Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective and particular significance in the MENA region, the following research question lies at the heart of this book: What characterizes Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order and how is it possible to explain the differences between these conceptions – given that both organizations are Islamist political actors engaged in processes of national policy-making

in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories respectively? As mentioned above, the most important difference between Hezbollah and Hamas seems to be their different religious orientation and at first sight one might argue that their adherence to Shiite and Sunni Islam might explain differences in the organizations’ conceptions of political order. This argument would strongly be supported by the rising rivalry between Sunni and Shiite Islam, which has been resumed and highlighted by politicians and scholars since the beginning of the twenty-first century. King Abdullah II from Jordan introduced his concept of the Shiite crescent3 in 2004 right after the Iraq war had begun in 2003. Since then, already existing fears in Sunni-led countries and the West have sharpened. Politicians fear a Shiite strengthening and a growing Iranian influence in the region (Maréchal and Zemni 2013, 1ff.). Tensions have further increased in recent years. While at the beginning of the Arab Upheavals less attention was paid to the difference between Sunni and Shiite Islam, sectarian rivalry and tensions have sharply increased through the Syrian civil war where several regional actors, including Hezbollah, are involved (Abdo 2013). However, although Hezbollah and Hamas have a different religious orientation and there is rising contention between Sunni and Shiite Islam, I argue that the difference between their respective conceptions of political order can mainly not be traced back to the divergence between Sunni and Shiite Islam. Instead, I assume, based on theoretical and empirical observations as will be outlined below, that muqawama (Arabic for resistance) constitutes Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ core norm. I further argue that this core norm of resistance is deeply linked to the organizations’ interactions towards power preservation and is relevant for their conceptions of political order. On the theoretical level, resistance has only recently become one of the hot research topics in IR theory. Scholars from the field of Critical Constructivism have started to conduct research on different forms of resistance with regard to the legitimacy of global governance. They look at forms of resistance such as contestation, opposition against power constellations in the global arena, and at resistance closely linked to the concepts of sovereignty and hegemony. Daase and Deitelhoff, for example, criticize that rule and authority are generally closely related to conceptions of compliance and propose to reconstruct global authority and rule through resistance (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014, 2015). They reformulate Foucault’s famous phrase4 and state that “where there is resistance there is also power and that the latter can be experienced through resistance” (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014, 11, author’s translation). Wiener also works on resistance excluding violent forms of resistance. She analyzes contestation as one form of resistance and understands it as a social practice, “which discursively express[es] disapproval of norms” (Wiener 2014, 1). Obviously, IR-scholars have started to uncover resistance as a practice that can lead to change and the reconstruction of global authority, rule, and order. They have shown that a connection between resistance, power, and order exists. In terms of empirics it holds true that resistance has a great significance for the Shiite Hezbollah and the Sunni Hamas. Both organizations define themselves as resistance organizations and resistance is an integral part of their identity. The Shiite Hezbollah whose name literally means “Party of God”5 calls itself “The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon,” which

is highlighted on the organization’s flag. This name is also closely related to Hezbollah’s jihadi activity,6 as the organization’s deputy Secretary General, Naim Qassem, states (Qassem 2005, 76ff.). Hezbollah defines resistance as resistance against Israel. First and foremost, the Shiite organization aims at liberating the Lebanese land from Israeli oppression and occupation.7 Also in the case of Hamas, resistance constitutes an integral part of the organization’s identity, which already becomes clear through its name: Hamas. Hamas is acronym for harakat al-muqawama al-islamiyya, which means The Islamic Resistance Movement. As Hezbollah, Hamas understands itself as a resistance movement against Israel and aims at liberating the occupied land and the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people, as the Palestinian organization claims. Hamas politicians such as Khaled Meshal, former head of Hamas’ Political Bureau, and Osama Hamdan, senior Hamas leader, highlight that resistance is not only conducted by military force but also by political, civil, or social means (Hamdan 2010, 1; Mishal 2010, 190). Obviously, resistance is important for both organizations’ identity and interactions irrespective of their different religious orientation. Until today, only very few studies exist that combine approaches from Middle Eastern Studies and IR theory (Fawcett 2013, 1ff.). Even fewer approaches link Islamism research and IR theory or explore Islamist organizations from an IR theory perspective. Neither Islamism research has worked with Constructivist approaches from the field of IR theory to a large extent so far, nor has Constructivism focused on analyzing Islamist actors or Islamist organizations’ policies or practices (Bettiza and Dionigi 2014, 2ff.). In Islamism research there are studies that take Constructivist elements into account, such as Salwa Ismail’s Islamist Politics. However, she rather focuses on historical narratives and on explaining how Islamism “develops in relation to existing political fields” (Ismail 2006, 25) than seeking to work with IR Constructivist approaches to understand how global norms, ideas, rules, or structures influence Islamist politics or what kind of influence Islamist politics might have in turn for the global arena. Constructivist research tends to be characterized by Western-centrism (Bettiza and Dionigi 2014) and also lacks in research on Islamist political actors. Dionigi’s recent study and that of Bettiza and Dionigi constitute rare examples. They try to combine Islamism research and Constructivism. Dionigi analyzes how norms of the liberal world order influence Islamist organizations based on a case study of the Lebanese Hezbollah (Dionigi 2014). Bettiza and Dionigi work on how non-Western actors, in this case Islamic international actors, diffuse their norms within the international liberal order. They aim at studying “norm dynamics beyond centre-periphery diffusion […] where non-Western agents become norm makers in world politics” (Bettiza and Dionigi 2014, 3ff.). However, these two studies are exceptional because Constructivist norm research traditionally focuses on the compliance or non-compliance of local actors with global norms or on diffusion processes of global norms (Risse et al. 1999; Tannenwald 2007). Moreover, scholars study the legal obligation of norms from a law perspective (Brunnée and Toope 2010). What most Constructivist approaches have in common is the habitude to look through “Western” lenses when studying norm dynamics. Very few researchers, such as Acharya or Tickner and Blaney, study how local actors reconstruct global norms in their national contexts and align them with their national norms (Acharya 2004, 2011; Tickner and Blaney 2012).

Obviously, there is a research gap because Islamism research and Critical Constructivism have so far been studied in isolation from each other. This book aims at contributing to fill this gap by analyzing Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order based on a Critical Constructivist theoretical framework and thus combining Islamism research and Critical Constructivism. Moreover, my book offers further insights into the new hot research topic of IR theory: resistance. Existing studies on resistance define resistance as a social practice and differentiate between violent and non-violent forms of resistance. Until today, these studies have focused on resistance practices within the Western liberal framework (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014; Wiener 2014). I depart from these studies and analyze resistance in nonWestern cases – including violent and non-violent forms of resistance. This will bring new insights from cases that lie beyond the Western liberal world order into Critical Constructivism. This book also departs from common Constructivist approaches that focus on the effects that global norms create within the local arena (van Eerdewijk and Roggeband 2014; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 404). Instead of applying this top-down approach and analyzing if Islamist organizations’ norms or orders comply or do not comply with global orders or studying how global norms or structures effect and influence Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order, I take a bottom-up and actor-centered perspective. I seek to analyze Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order on the organizations’ level, imbedded in both organizations’ national and regional context. Drawing on Wiener, I consider the organizations’ specific context to be significant for the emergence of normative meaning (Wiener 2004, 200) and thus for their conceptions of political order. Moreover, I argue that also the specific background knowledge actors possess is relevant for the establishment of normative meaning. It provides the background in which the organization’s interactions takes place (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 20ff.). Methodologically, I follow a constitutive approach and do not aim to establish causal correlations between different variables in a positivist sense (Wendt 1998). My approach rather focuses on explaining how particular developments or matters of fact become possible but does not deny, however, that constitutive explanations may lead to causal consequences (Lebow 2009). Consequently, I apply a hermeneutic and reconstructive procedure instead of testing theories or nomological hypotheses (Bohnsack 2010, 14ff.; Przyborski and WohlrabSahr 2010, 44). Critical Constructivism serves as a meta-theory, a framework, and tool for the qualitative research design of this book (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr 2010, 44). To broadly structure the empirical analysis, I have applied what Grounded Theory scholars call sensitizing concepts – concepts, which guide and structure empirical research (Bowen 2006, 2ff.). Kruse labels these sensitizing concepts as “scanners” applied by every researcher during the process of analyzing his data (Kruse 2010, 190ff.). However, the methodology I used in this book is generally open and inductive and does not pretend to apply a standardized procedure during the research process. Based on the research question, the theoretical background, and these methodological considerations, I apply an inductive, bottom-up approach with a special focus on the specific context in which social interactions are taking place. Contexts are not only important for the construction of normative meaning (Wiener 2007, 64) but also shape the construction of knowledge (Pouliot 2007, 362).

The data corpus of this book consists of primary sources from Hezbollah and Hamas. The predominant amount of the primary sources is in Arabic, which led to comprehensive translation works by my own. Only a few reliable political programs were available in English, which were included into the data corpus. Secondary sources were used to either complement the argumentation or at points when primary sources were not available to a sufficient amount. The primary data from Hezbollah and Hamas were mainly collected during field research in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories in 2013. The data corpus includes 22 semi-structured interviews8 with Hezbollah experts, politicians from Hamas, and Hamas experts, political platforms, and articles from the journals al-Intiqad (the critique, published by Hezbollah) and Filastin al-Muslima (Muslim Palestine, published by Hamas).9 Al-Intiqad is Hezbollah’s mouthpiece, published weekly and belongs to the network of the organization’s media institutions (Alagha 2011, 193; Khatib 2012, 9; Lamloum 2009, 358ff.). Filastin alMuslima is published outside of the Palestinian Territories since the 1980s. It can be understood as Hamas’ unofficial organ and as the “most consistent publication brought out by the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and [which has] […] consistently become the spokesman ‘of sorts’ for Ḥamās” (Nüsse 1998, 4, emphasis in original). Al-Intiqad and Filastin al-Muslima both regularly publish political declarations by the specific organization and speeches and interviews from both organizations’ leaders and politicians. To analyze the empirical data included into the data corpus, I conducted a qualitative content analysis based on Philip Mayring (Mayring 2010) within the time frame between 2005 and 2013. I chose this specific time frame as the research period to be under investigation in this book, because the years of 2005 and 2013 can be classified as being pivotal for both Hezbollah and Hamas. The year of 2005 marks a pivotal point for Hezbollah and Lebanon because three decisive events took place, which led to a reorganization of the power structure within the Lebanese political scene. First, in a politically highly fragmented atmosphere,10 Lebanon’s ex-Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri was assassinated.11 His assassination led to the second and third decisive event in the Lebanese political scene in 2005: the eruption of the Cedar Revolution12 and the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. These three events were decisive for Hezbollah and its conceptions of political order, as they forced the Islamist organization to more strongly engage in Lebanese national politics to secure its own interests and its position of power in Lebanon. The year of 2005 was also for Hamas and for the Palestinian Territories, especially the Gaza Strip, a very important year, characterized by two decisive events: Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ decision to participate in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. When Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, it failed to formally hand over power to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and left a vacuum behind with regard to the allocation of power and political and economic resources (ICG 2007, 3ff.). Hamas, the most prominent organization in the Gaza Strip since the 1950s already (Roy 2011, 21ff.), was ready to actively engage in this completely altered political context, to take over political responsibility, and to shape national politics. The analysis ends on July 3, 2013, the day the Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi was overthrown, as this date marks a crucial turning point for the political ideology of Islamism in

general. When Muhammad Morsi was elected as President in June 2012, it was the first time in history for the Muslim Brotherhood to hold the position of the president of the state. Morsi’s rise to power did not only send a clear message to the Egyptian political arena and the society but to the MENA region in general: Islamism and Islamist organizations were on the rise as political actors (Rosefsky Wickham 2013, 1ff.). Although statements that predict the demise of Islamism after Morsi’s fall in 2013 are much overstated (Fürtig and Ranko 2014, 8ff.), his overthrow has had implications on Islamism and Islamist political actors in the MENA region. This also applies for Hezbollah and even more so for Hamas due to its strong ideological and political ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This book is divided into seven chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 identifies the research gap and develops the theoretical framework of the book. It shows that Islamism research and Critical Constructivist norm research have largely been studied in isolation from each other so far. I propose to connect the two approaches, which enables us to achieve a broader understanding of Islamist organizations’ political orientation and to bring new insights into IR theory from cases that lie beyond the Western liberal world order. To do so, I introduce the core theoretical concepts of the book in Chapter 2. In a first step I focus on the political ideology of Islamism and present a brief overview of the emergence and development of Sunni and Shiite Islamist political thought and introduce the definition of Islamism applied in this book. In the following sections I outline further theoretical key concepts: norms, political order, resistance, and power. The concept of norms I apply follows a reflexive understanding of norms, i.e. I understand norms as entailing flexible and fix qualities at the same time and put emphasis on the emergence of normative meaning through social interaction processes (Wiener 2004, 192, 2007, 64). The concept of political order I have chosen for this book is a relatively broad one. It draws on Hedley Bull’s understanding of order, in which the following three criteria play the key role for the definition of order: (1) security, (2) securing and approving promises and agreements once made, and (3) stability (Bull 2002, 4). Although Bull belongs to the theory branch of the English School, it makes sense to draw on his understanding of order, as there are important overlaps between Constructivism and the English School, such as Bull’s commitment to the important role norms and institutions play in international politics (Hurrell 2002, xii). Furthermore, his understanding of order leaves enough room to inductively reconstruct Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order. In Chapter 2 I also introduce the concept of resistance I apply in this book. I take Daase and Deitelhoff’s hypotheses, named above, as a starting point and assume that where there is resistance there is also power. Moreover, I follow Daase insofar that I understand resistance as a relational concept (Daase 2014, 3). Subsequently, resistance achieves its meaning because it is directed at something. However, different from Daase who differentiates between violent and non-violent forms of resistance and Wiener who draws a clear distinction between contestation as a norm-generating practice that never involves violence and dissidence or resistance, which includes violent practices, I do not differentiate between violent and non-violent resistance. This would not make any sense because Hezbollah and Hamas have an encompassing understanding of resistance that includes violent and non-violent practices. Moreover, I depart from previous works, as I do not understand resistance as a norm-generating practice (Wiener 2014) but as a norm in itself. The

fourth and last theoretical key concept of this book is power. I apply a multi-dimensional understanding of power and, based on Barnett and Duvall, differentiate between the following different mechanisms of power: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive power (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3). At the end of Chapter 2 I develop the main research proposition of this book, which assumes that a close connection between Islamist organizations’ norms, power, and conceptions of political order exists. In Chapter 3 and 4 I present the empirical case studies of this book, i.e. I analyze Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the Shiite Lebanese Hezbollah. At its beginning the chapter introduces Hezbollah. It presents the organization’s origins, its Shiite Islamist political thought, its organizational structure, identifies resistance as the organization’s core norm, and explains what kind of political order Hezbollah favored to establish in its early years. This information is vital to understand the Lebanese Hezbollah and to reconstruct the organization’s conceptions of political order. The following sections are the key sections of the empirical analysis of Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order. They are organized along the most decisive events concerning Hezbollah’s political interactions in Lebanon and the MENA region. The sections show how Hezbollah protects, consolidates, and defends its core norm of resistance through interactions within the national and regional context and what this means for the Shiite organization’s conceptions of political order. Finally, I summarize the findings of the empirical analysis and outline Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the empirical case of the Palestinian Hamas. The chapter starts with a brief introduction of Hamas’ emergence in the Palestinian Territories, its Sunni Islamist political thought, its organizational structure, identifies resistance as the organization’s core norm, and introduces the organization’s early conceptions of political order. Again, this information is vital to reconstruct the organization’s conceptions of political order. As in the case of Hezbollah the empirical analysis is organized along the most decisive events concerning Hamas’ political interactions in the context of the Palestinian Territories. Throughout the chapter I identify two different stages of political order in the case of Hamas. The first (2005–2007) adheres to state building and pluralism and the second, which exists since 2007 in Gaza, is characterized by a strong security sector based on institutionalized resistance and shows authoritarian trends. I also illustrate Hamas’ difficulties of being a government and a resistance movement at the same time and address the question of whether the political order established in Gaza constitutes the ideal model of a political order favored by Hamas. At the end of the chapter I draw a preliminary conclusion on Hamas’ conceptions of political order. In Chapter 5 I discuss the main results of this book. I relate the empirical findings of Hezbollah and Hamas to each other and link them to the theoretical framework of this book. I connect the ideological and structural background of Hezbollah and Hamas with each other, characterize the organizations’ respective conceptions of political order and explain the differences between them. In doing so, I put a special emphasis on both organizations’ core norm of resistance and on their interactions towards power preservation in their respective context. In the final section I summarize the key findings.

Chapter 6 globalizes the results of this book and connects them to the research topic of political Islam and Islamist organizations more broadly. I link the findings from Hezbollah and Hamas to further cases and show how analyzing Islamist organizations’ core norms from a Critical Constructivist perspective helps us to understand these actors’ political orientations. To do so, I have chosen the Tunisian Ennahda and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as examples. As both organizations are, different from Hezbollah and Hamas, not resistance organizations, it does not make any sense to focus on the norm of resistance and its implications for political order and power. I rather put emphasis on the analysis of both organizations’ constitutional norms, as first Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood have both been engaged in the constitution-making processes in Tunisia and Egypt, and second constitutions are relevant for political orders per se. Different from Chapter 3 and 4, Chapter 6 is not based on a comprehensive analysis of primary data. It is rather meant to give an outlook on how the theoretical approach developed in this book might be used to understand Islamist political actors in a broader sense. Chapter 7 is the final chapter of this book. It summarizes the results and shows the implications this book has for future research and practitioners alike. Notes 1

2

3 4 5

6

7

8

The MENA region has no fixed boundaries and encompasses countries from Europe, Asia, and Africa, which range from Algeria to the Gulf. The term “Middle East and North Africa” is used in the West and in the Middle East itself, although it has often been criticized as being Eurocentric and some scholars prefer to use terms such as SWANA (South West Asia and North Africa) instead. However, drawing on international organizations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, I will apply the acronym MENA in the following to keep this study transparent and replicable (HaghighatSordellini 2010, 6). Scholars and journalists predominantly use the term “Arab Spring” to refer to the political and revolutionary developments that are reshaping countries in the MENA since late 2010 and early 2011. However, the term is problematic as it tries to capture the developments in the different countries within one category although they are very diverse. The term “Arab Spring” also borrows positive connotations from the “Prague Spring” towards democratization, pluralism, and freedom (AlSumait et al. 2014; Davis 2013). As the very diverse developments in the MENA are reshaping the countries in the region in very different ways and are far from being completed, I will call them in the following “Arab Upheavals.” According to Abdullah II from Jordan the Shiite crescent encompasses states that have a strong Shiite minority or even a majority and range from Lebanon to Iraq, Iran, and finally Bahrain (Ma‘oz 2007). Foucault originally stated, “where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault quoted from Daase and Deitelhoff 2014, 11, author’s translation). “Party of God” is a lexical translation of the Arabic term hizb allah that the Shiite organization borrows from the Quran, Surah 5, Verse 56, which says: “whoever allies with God, his messenger, and those who believe, made the right choice. Those who align themselves with God [Arab original: hizb allah] will be the victorious” (Paret 1979, 85, author’s translation). For Hezbollah jihad has a broader meaning than only military struggle. The organization differentiates between the internal struggle, i.e. the struggle against man’s personal enemies, such as falsehood, and the struggle against external enemies, which can also include armed or military struggle (Hamzeh 2004, 36ff.; Qassem 2005, 34ff.). Hezbollah’s understanding of the concept of jihad is explained in detail in Chapter 3. Israel withdrew from south Lebanon in 2000. Yet, Hezbollah claims that the Israeli withdrawal has not been fully completed as Israel still occupies the area of the Shebaa Farms until today. Due to the common international view the Shebaa Farms, a 25 km² strip strategically located at the Golan Heights, are originally Syrian territory occupied by Israel. Hezbollah, Lebanon, and Syria claim, it is Lebanese Land (Noe 2007, 240; Norton 2007b, 479). Annex I comprises a list that encompasses all interviews that I conducted in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories and used for the analysis of this study. Due to security reasons the names of the interviewees are kept anonymous. The interviews were anonymized based on a numeric scheme. To ease the readability of this study I translated all direct

quotations from interviewees that were expressed in other languages than English, i.e. Arabic or French, into English. Annex II comprises a list, which entails all written primary Arabic sources that have been included into the data corpus of this study. 10 Syrian military troops had been based in Lebanon since 1976. Damascus had sent its troops to Lebanon, one year after the Lebanese civil war had begun, to maintain the Lebanese state’s unity. By the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1989, Syria managed to legalize the presence of its troops based on the Ta’if agreement. Syria remained in Lebanon and strongly influenced Lebanese politics in favor of its allies (Norton 2007b, 482) until it was forced to withdraw in 2005 (Lundgren Jörum 2014, 53ff.). Since autumn 2004 pressure had increased on Syria from Lebanese and international actors to withdraw its troops and to grant Lebanon full sovereignty. The Lebanese political landscape split up into two factions: one, led by Hezbollah and its allies, which supported the Syrian presence in Lebanon and the other, a pro-Western oriented faction, which called for Syria’s withdrawal (Najem 2012, 70ff.). For an analysis of Syria’s political and strategic aims during its presence in Lebanon see Hinnebusch (1998). 11 Rafiq al-Hariri enjoys a special status in Lebanon until today. Hariri, a former businessman who had close ties to Saudi Arabia, had served as the Lebanese Prime Minister from 1992 to 1998 and from 2000 to 2004. He was very popular in Lebanon and well-known for the reconstruction of the Lebanese economy after the civil war and the reconstruction of central Beirut (el-Husseini 2012, 94ff.; Young 2010, 142ff.). 12 Cedar Revolution is the popular term of the mass protests that took place against the Syrian presence in Lebanon after exPrime Minister Rariq al-Hariri had been assassinated (Najem 2012, 72). 9

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2

Bridging the gap Connecting Islamism research and Critical Constructivism

In the early years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011, research was most interested in analyzing Islamist organizations related to questions of Islamic radicalism, global Islamic terrorism (Desai 2007; Esposito 2002; Gunaratna 2002; Saighal 2003), Western security interests (Benjamin and Simon 2005; Frisch and Inbar 2008), and also concerning the US military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq (Record 2004; Woodward 2002). Only in recent years, after Islamist organizations succeeded in national elections in Lebanon, Egypt, and the Palestinian Territories, a new branch of research has emerged that has concentrated on Islamist organizations as political actors in the MENA region. These scholars have assumed that moderate Islamist organizations, i.e. those that participate within the established political systems and agree to relinquish violence in domestic affairs (Asseburg 2007, 9), will have a long-term influence on political decision-making. Researchers have argued that Islamist political actors might function as reform actors within existing political systems (Asseburg 2007) and focused on the ability of these actors to pragmatically interact during decisionmaking processes and to adapt to changing circumstances (Albrecht and Köhler 2008). Very often research has tried to classify Islamist political actors along categories such as moderate and radical or democratic and non-democratic. Moreover, scholars have argued that the inclusion of Islamist organizations in established political systems and in electoral processes would lead to these actors’ moderation – understood as the opening of the Islamists’ specific worldview for alternative perspectives (Schwedler 2006). Studies more critical to the inclusion-moderation hypothesis have “question[ed] the degree to which cooperation leads to ideological moderation” (Clark 2006, 555) of Islamist political actors. In the democratization literature scholars have tried to evaluate if Islamist political actors comply with democracy or not (Bokhari and Senzai 2013) or to understand under what conditions Islam and democracy are compatible (Bayat 2007). There are a variety of studies that support the idea that Islam is in principle compatible with democratic politics (Krämer 1997, 1999) and cosmopolitan law (Feldman 2003; Jung 2004). Researchers who support this perspective have analyzed the relationship between Islam and liberal democracy from a theoretical perspective (Hashemi 2009), or democracy promotion attempts by the United States (US) or the European Union (EU) in the Middle East (Akbarzadeh et al. 2013; Carothers 2007; Pace and Seeberg 2010). Since the beginning of the Arab Upheavals in late 2010, new studies have promoted the hypothesis of a stimulating and positive future relationship between Islam and democracy (Cavuldak et al. 2014). Others have argued that “democratization […] offers the greatest theoretical purchase in the current context to understanding Islamism” (Bokhari and Senzai 2013, 11). What these studies have in common is that most of them remain caught within their own limited categories. By trying to evaluate if Islamist organizations are moderate or not or if they

comply with democracy or not the literature draws on pre-established categories, which does not enable us to achieve a broader understanding of Islamist actors’ political orientation. An issue that has become even more significant after the Arab Upheavals have begun and Islamist organizations succeeded in national elections in Tunisia and Egypt. In Egypt, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justices Party (FJP), Muhammad Morsi, even became the country’s president. It was the first time in history that a member of the Muslim Brotherhood held the position of the President of the State (Rosefsky Wickham 2013, 1). At that time, questions on the political orientation of Islamist organizations became more pressing and relevant. Since then scholars have increasingly tried to understand the origins and aims of Islamist organizations in the MENA region but very often this research has concentrated on single-case studies, i.e. specific political actors (Marzouki 2014; Rosefsky Wickham 2013; Wright 2012) and thus also failed to provide a broader framework that helps to understand Islamist political actors. Besides the increasing relevance of Islamist political actors, politicians and scholars have highlighted rising tensions and a widening gap between Sunni and Shiite Islam in the MENA region since the beginning of the twenty-first century. After Saddam Hussein’s fall in Iraq, the political leadership of the Sunni-led countries feared a Shiite strengthening and growing Iranian influence in the MENA region. In 2004, King Abdullah II of Jordan warned “that a new ‘Shiite crescent’ stretching from Beirut to Tehran might cut through the Sunni-dominated Middle East” (Nasr 2006b, emphasis in original). Since that time, the deepening Sunni-Shiite divide has also become one of the important topics on the research agenda of various scholars. In his 2006 publications concerning the rising Sunni-Shiite tensions Vali Nasr argues that the US war in Iraq has supported the Shiite empowerment in Iraq. He stresses that this has in turn led to a Shiite awakening in the region and sparked Sunni fears, which started in Iraq and then spread to the overall MENA region (Nasr 2006a, 2006b). Looking at the Shiite strengthening in Iraq after the fall of Saddam, Yitzhak Nakash argues that Shiites no longer promote confrontation with the West, but rather dialogue – although they aim to establish an independent state in Iraq based on their own values (Nakash 2006). Journalist Nicolas Pelham too starts his study by analyzing Shiite empowerment in Iraq after the fall of Saddam and argues that the center of Shiite power has moved from Iran to Iraq. Pelham furthermore states that the leaders of the Sunni MENA states made use of the anxieties of the Sunni population towards a Shiite strengthening, which has led to very severe tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in the MENA region (Pelham 2008). Although Puelings also takes the US war in Iraq as a starting point for his analysis of the rising Sunni–Shiite divide, his research focuses not only on the MENA region but also refers to some possible consequences of the Sunni–Shiite tensions for the EU (Puelings 2010). In this book I seek to develop a theoretical framework that enables researchers to achieve a broader understanding of Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order without remaining caught in pre-established categories or focusing on single-case studies only, whose results are difficult to transfer to further cases. Moreover, in analyzing one Shiite and one Sunni Islamist political actor the book seeks to move beyond the contemporary literature that puts a very strong emphasis on sectarian tensions per se but largely ignores other interests that might be hidden behind the actors’ specific religious orientation. To overcome the analytical

shortcomings identified above and to establish a broader theoretical framework I connect Islamism research with Critical Constructivism from the field of IR theory, which have largely been studied in isolation from each other so far. Based on theoretical and empirical observations, I assume that the concepts of norms, resistance, and power are essential to understand Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order. As Critical Constructivism pays special attention to the role of power with regard to ideas and in social interaction processes, it makes sense to apply and advance a Critical Constructivist approach. In contrast to mainstream or conventional Constructivism it is very “skeptical about this autonomy of ideas from power […] [and] believe[s] that certain powerful groups play a privileged role in the process of social construction” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 398). Hence, in power relations between actors, certain groups always play a stronger or more dominant role than others (Hopf 1998, 185). In connecting Islamism research and Critical Constructivism from the field of IR theory, this book enters relatively new grounds. Compared to other regions in the world fairly little research has been done that brings the MENA region and IR theory together. Until today, very often scholars have either concentrated on the domain of Middle Eastern Studies or that of IR theory and only rarely tried to use the rich empirical cases of the MENA for theory testing or building in the field of IR (Fawcett 2013b, 1ff.). However, in recent years, one can observe a soft increase in the amount of research that combines studies of IR theory with those of Middle Eastern Studies (Fawcett 2013a; Halliday 2005; Hinnebusch 2003). When it comes to research on Islamist organizations from Constructivist perspectives, almost no studies exist. Although researchers have analyzed Islamist organizations from a Social Movement Theory (SMT) perspective, which also takes Constructivist elements into account, they focus on mobilization processes, political opportunity structures, and framing processes (Bayat 2005; Beinin and Vairel 2013; Wiktorowicz 2004) and do not try to connect Islamism research with a broader Constructivist approach from the field of IR theory to understand Islamist organizations’ political orientation. Dionigi’s work constitutes a rare example. He discusses how international political theory can become more receptive towards Islamism. In doing so, he interprets Islamism as a form of communitarianism and argues that this approach establishes “a space for a political theory debate more inclusive towards Islamism and then more apt to address its claims” (Dionigi 2012, 75). In their co-authored article Bettiza and Dionigi work on the question of religious norms. They focus on the “process of contestation and interaction between Western and non-Western norms and their entrepreneurs in international society” (Bettiza and Dionigi 2014, 2) and “investigate norm diffusion from a non-Western periphery to a Western core, and by non-Western norm-makers to Western norm-takers” (Bettiza and Dionigi 2014, 2). Dionigi’s study Hezbollah, Islamist Politics, and International Society is probably one of the studies that approaches my book most closely in theoretical terms. He focuses on the question of how international norms influence Islamist politics and what effects they have on Islamism based on a case study of the Lebanese Hezbollah (Dionigi 2014). Dionigi, however, follows a top-down approach and analyzes the effects of international norms on Islamist organizations, in this case, Hezbollah, and does not concentrate on how Hezbollah’s norms might influence global norms. In the Constructivist literature that studies global norms and their implementation in the

regional or national arena, Dionigi’s study also constitutes a rare exception because it focuses on a case, the Lebanese Hezbollah, which lies beyond the Western liberal world order. Another exception is Amitav Acharya’s Whose Norms Matter?, which analyzes how local actors in Asia reconstruct global norms in their national contexts and align them with their national norms (Acharya 2004, 2011). In general, Critical Constructivist literature focuses on cases within the Western liberal world order or tries to understand norm diffusion processes from the global arena, which continues to be predominantly characterized by Western states, to nation states in non-Western countries. This is why Critical Constructivism suffers from Western-centrism to a large extent so far. Different from common IR Constructivist research, which follows the maxim that “international-level ideational structures exercise a powerful force in the world creating similar global effects in many countries” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 404), I take a bottomup perspective by analyzing Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order based on primary sources from both organizations. At the same time, I also pay attention to national, regional, and global effects that might influence both organizations’ respective conceptions of political order. In sum, the theoretical approach of this book is not limited to specific case studies but enables us to globalize the results from Hezbollah and Hamas and to comprehensively understand Islamist actors’ political orientation. It brings new insights from cases that lie beyond the Western liberal world order, in this case the MENA region, into Critical Constructivism. This might be an advantage for IR theory considering the increasing relevance of regions such as the MENA for the global realm and the transformation processes taking place within global power constellations. 2.1 The political ideology of Islamism Islamic reformism and its implications for the rise of the political ideology of Islamism Following the beginning of colonialism and Europe’s rise to power since the sixteenth century, Muslim intellectuals started to argue that Arab societies had fallen into a state of decay, because the Muslim societies had departed from the main Islamic sources, the Quran, the sunna,1 and the hadith2 and too many innovations had found their ways into the religion of Islam. To overcome this state of decay the Muslim intellectuals proposed to return to the main Islamic sources and to relate them to the problems the societies were facing. This approach soon became known as the salafiyya3 movement (Mandaville 2014, 45ff.). However, within the salafiyya movement Muslim intellectuals followed different approaches as to how the interpretation of the main Islamic sources should take place and two contrary main branches emerged within the Islamist intellectual debate: revivalism and reformism. Revivalism is closely connected to the figure of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab (1703–1792), whose Islamist doctrine is the official religion in Saudi Arabia to date. Abduhl Wahab had called for a strict monotheism and the literal interpretation of the main Islamic sources. Muslims should reject and overcome all forms of innovations, which had found their way into the religion of Islam and oppose all other branches within Islam, such as Sufism. Prominent adherents of Islamic

radicalism and fundamentalism, including Usama bin Laden, take Ibn Abduhl Wahab’s doctrines as an intellectual starting point until today (Mandaville 2014, 45ff, 57ff.). The second branch of the salafiyya movement, the reformist branch, is much more important than the revivalist branch in this book, as the understanding of Islamism, which I apply, draws on the reformist branch and its most important thinker, Muhammad Abduh.4 This is why the reformist branch will be outlined in detail in the following. Islamic Reformism emerged in Egypt during the nineteenth century and had important implications for the emergence of Sunni political Islam in the following century. Muslim intellectuals began to question the conditions of decay the Arab societies were facing in the light of Western imperialism and modernization. They stressed that the Arab societies found themselves in a state of decay and that there was a need for emancipation from “foreign rule and from internal religious stagnation” (Mandaville 2014, 60). These intellectuals started to articulate a national consciousness and expressed a need for change in Arab societies to overcome the state of decay. One of the most important thinkers among these intellectuals was Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), an important Egyptian religious and legal scholar and journalist. Abduh has often been characterized as the founder of Islamic Reformism, as a person who had a greater influence on intellectual and political thought in Egypt and beyond than any other Muslim thinker of that time (Hourani 1962, 161). Abduh argued that Islamic societies could only overcome the state of decay they were facing, if they accepted the need for change based on the main principles of Islam. He stressed that: the changes which were taking place were not only permitted by Islam, but were indeed its necessary implications if it was rightly understood, and that Islam could serve both as a principle of change and a salutary control over it. (Hourani 1962, 139) Based on that argumentation Abduh argued that “Islam could be the moral basis of a modern and progressive society […] [and] would enable Muslims to distinguish what was good from what was bad among all the suggested direction of change” (Hourani 1962, 140). Instead of returning to the past, he called for a reinterpretation of the main Islamic sources, Quran, sunna, and hadith in the light of the contemporary circumstances, which would enable the society to overcome its state of decay (Hourani 1962, 146ff.; Kügelgen 2007). In doing so, Abduh differentiated between binding and non-binding principles of Islam. He argued that only those rules established by the Prophet Muhammad, which he received as a prophet and which were part of the divine revelation, can be legally binding. The political and administrative decisions Muhammad took in the light of the contemporary circumstances the society was facing at that time cannot be legally binding (Krämer 1999, 57). Hence, conceptions of political order would be open to change, as Muhammad Abduh puts it: the Shari’a [Islamic law] does not provide for an explicit means of putting together a government nor for a given way of counselling the rulers, just as it does not prohibit any preferred way of expressing what is desired of . Consultation is a shar’i requirement, but the manner of implementation is not restricted to a particular way.

(Abduh quoted from Krämer 1999, 68; emphasis in original) Obviously, Muhammad Abduh’s intellectual thought is very open to interpretation. He called for drawing on the main sources of Islam and for reinterpreting them in the light of the contemporary circumstances. Abduh considered the society of the pious forefathers, as-salaf as-salih, who lived in the age of the Prophet Muhammad, as the ideal society – one, which had not been exposed to corruption and unjust rule, unlike the contemporary societies. He argued that this “ideal society is that which submits to God’s commandments, interprets them rationally and in the light of general welfare, obeys them actively, and is united by respect for them” (Hourani 1962, 149; Mandaville 2014, 62). This argumentation shows that Abduh put emphasis on the rational interpretation of God’s commandments. In contrast to most other Islamic scholars he argued that the Muslim societies should not understand the Quranic revelation and ijtihad,5 i.e. human reason,6 as being separated from each other. He criticized the spread of blind imitation and requested Muslim societies to assume responsibility by using human reason. In doing so, he differentiated between all issues that are spelled out in the divine Quranic revelation or in validated hadith and those issues that are neither regulated by the Quran nor the hadith. While Muslims must accept the issues spelled out in the Quran or the hadith, all matters that are not fixed there are open to human reason and interpretation, as Abduh puts it (Hourani 1962, 146ff.). Against this backdrop Muhammad Abduh called for “the abolition of the religious scholars’ monopoly on exegesis, abolition of blind imitation of predecessors (taqlid), assumption of individual and collective responsibility, and the abolition of racial discrimination and religious compulsion” (Kügelgen 2007). However, Abduh stressed that humans need their faith in God to adequately apply human reason and individual or collective responsibility (Kügelgen 2007). In summary, nineteenth century Islamic Reformism understands Islam as the alternative to Western Imperialism and as the solution for overcoming the state of decay the Muslim societies were facing at that time. Abduh’s intellectual and political thought is flexible. Based on his understanding the reinterpretation of the main Islamic sources becomes possible by using human reason. Islamic Reformism, which paved the way for the emergence of Islamist political thought in the twentieth century, and its flexible understandings of Islam related to contemporary politics, remained relevant until today. The rise of Sunni Islamism in the twentieth century and its shift to radicalization The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928, is one of the most important Sunni Islamist organizations until today. For politics and the emergence and development of Sunni Islamist political thought, the organization has always been influential in Egypt but also beyond (Krämer 1999, 181). In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is deeply entangled with the society based on its welfare engagement and its political activities (Fürtig 1995). Since the 1930s the organization also spread to several other countries of the MENA region, where individually led Muslim Brotherhood branches were established, which still exist (Euben and Zaman 2009, 49; Krämer 1999, 181).

Hasan al-Banna’s political thought followed the intellectual and political concepts of Muhammad Abduh (Krämer 1999, 183). Like Abduh, al-Banna understood Islam as the solution to political, social, and legal problems the society was facing and: as the only alternative to the forces of westernization, secularization and materialism that had penetrated Muslim society in the Middle East. They [al-Banna and his followers] argued that the menace of the West and its supporters could only be conquered by the wholesale adoption of Islam. (Milton-Edwards 2009, 143) Al-Banna argued that the Egyptian nation found itself in a period of transition that: poses two conditions: the first is the liberation of the nation from its political bounds so that it may obtain its freedom and regain its lost independence and sovereignty. The second is its reconstruction, so that it may take its own way among the nations and compete with these others in its progress towards social perfection. (al-Banna 2009, 57) Hasan al-Banna stressed that only “the way of Islam, its principles and fundamental assumptions” (al-Banna 2009, 57) can be followed through this period of transition and can lead to political and social reforms. It is important to note that in the early years after the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood al-Banna focused on the religious and social education of the society and did not stand for a revolutionary change from the existing political system into a new political order. He argued that only in a second step, after the religious and social education of the society was completed, political reform could be achieved (Milton-Edwards 2009, 144). In al-Banna’s writings, which emerged in the years prior to the beginning of the Second World War, his position slightly changed and he started to call for political reform but still within the existing system (Mandaville 2014, 77). He called for a law system in line with shari’a law and the diffusion of Islamic principles among the employees of the government and within the government institutions. However, at that time, social and educational reform still formed the larger part of his political thought (al-Banna 2009, 74ff.). At the end of the 1930s al-Banna changed his strategy into a more action-based approach, which partly included violent means and led to increasing tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian state (Mandaville 2014, 79). Sayyid Qutb was the Muslim Brotherhood’s second mentor and also an important politicalreligious ideologue. He promoted much more radical ideas and strategies than Hasan al-Banna had done before. Qutb’s religious-political worldview is based on the concept of jahiliyya, which directly comes from the Quran. In the Quran, the notion of jahiliyya refers to the condition of pre-Islamic ignorance, i.e. indicates that in pre-Islamic times the pagan Arabs lived in a state of ignorance. Qutb argued that the contemporary societies in the entire world lived in the same condition as the pagan societies in the pre-Islamic age, in the state of jahiliyya (Meier 1994, 196). Qutb stressed that the societies that live in the state of jahiliyya

ignored God’s sovereignty and authority (Qutb 2009b, 138). Theoretically inspired by the Indian Sunni Islamist Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, Qutb accepted no middle ground. The society could either live in the state of jahiliyya or in the way of Islam based on shari’a law (Mandaville 2014, 102). To escape from the state of jahiliyya Qutb requested the societies to return to the pious forefathers who lived at the time of the prophet Muhammad and to find out what does the Qur’an want us to do? What is the comprehensive worldview that it intends us to have? How does the Qur’an develop our understanding of God? What are the ethics, principles, and systems we must actualize in life? (Qutb 2009b, 143) A return to Islam, he argued: means returning God’s authority to Him, rejecting the usurpers who rule over human communities according to man-made laws. In this way, no human is placed in a position of Lordship over other people. To proclaim God’s authority and sovereignty means the elimination of all human kingship and to establish the rule of God, the Lord of the universe. (Qutb 2009a) God’s rule on earth is settled in shari’a law, as Qutb argued (Krämer 1999, 214) and he assumes jihad7 in its military and its advocacy form to be necessary to return to this divine order and escape the state of jahiliyya (Euben and Zaman 2009, 41ff; Qutb 2009a, 149). Qutb’s religious-political thought has been relevant for militant Islamist groups until today. Especially in Egypt these groups strengthened crucially after Qutb’s death8 and fought against the government by force. They even developed Qutb’s thought further and did not only fight against the state but also against single Muslim individuals if the militants believed them to be unbelievers. As a consequence, numerous attacks and murders took place in Egypt during the 70s, 80s, and 90s of the twentieth century, which culminated in the assassination of the Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981 (Steinberg 2005, 108ff.). The Muslim Brotherhood itself abandoned violence in 1981. Obviously, Hasan al-Banna and Sayyed Qutb have been very influential for the emergence of present-day Sunni Islamist political thought. While Hasan al-Banna’s political thought follows to a certain extent the tradition of the reformist thinker Muhammad Abduh and still embodies some flexible elements, Sayyed Qutb’s religious-political thought promotes much more radical elements and is fixed. According to his ideology the Quran is the guideline for the political order and the system of life. As only God can possess power and exercise sovereignty, Qutb refuses the reinterpretation of the main Islamic sources in light of the contemporary circumstances. Although in this book I understand Islamism based on Muhammad Abduh’s flexible understanding, as will be outlined below, Hassan al-Banna’s political thought is relevant too, especially for the case study of the Sunni Hamas who originates from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Shiite Islamism and the Islamic revolution in Iran As much as Islamic Reformism and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood have been relevant for the emergence of Sunni Islamism and for the case study of the Palestinian Hamas, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran has played a crucial role in the rise and formation of revolutionary Shiite Islamism and for the case study of the Lebanese Hezbollah. The Islamic Revolution in Iran, which led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, emerged from the middle of the Iranian population and has not been installed from the top. The ulama, the Islamic religious scholars, who have traditionally played a relevant role in the Persian society, held a crucial position in the protests that emerged against the Shah regime, which openly erupted during the Tobacco Protest9 in 1891 (Mandaville 2014, 246). The ulama, who had strong allies in the merchant class, were able to mobilize the population against the new ruler Reza Shah and his son, Muhammad Reza, who both granted Western powers more and more economic access to the Persian arena and adjusted Iran closer and closer with the West, which in turn allowed access to Iranian oil (Mandaville 2014, 246ff.). The dissatisfaction of the Iranian population grew and protests emerged from all segments of the society against the regime of the Shah. The cleric Ruhollah Khomeini became one of the most prominent figures of the protests. Originally from Qom, he was forced into exile in Najaf, Iraq, and later to Paris due to his critical stance towards the regime (Mandaville 2014, 246ff.). Khomeini, who followed an activist approach to achieve political change, developed the theoretical model of the wilayat-al-faqih (guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), which he started to publish in 1969. The wilayat-al-faqih became the central doctrine on which the Islamic state in the Islamic Republic of Iran was established after Khomeini’s return to the country in 1979. According to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s theoretical model of the wilayat-al-faqih, the Islamic state is ruled by the faqih (leading legal scholar), who is recognized and confirmed by the majority of the population as the leading legal scholar. The faqih is to be the head of the Islamic state until the twelfth Imam, the mahdi, who has vanished and lives in secret, returns to earth one day, as is understood by the followers of the Twelver Shia (Halm 1988, 163ff.). Hence, the faqih acts as a deputy of the mahdi until the latter returns to earth and the concept of the wilayat al-faqih is valid until then. By establishing this model of the wilayat al-faqih, Khomeini managed to “fuse […] religion and politics in the institutionalized figure of the jurisprudent” (Sabet 2014, 81). Khomeini’s political thought includes the notions of ijtihad.10 He argues that: the sole matters relevant to the ruler […] are: (1) the knowledgeability of the ruler or caliph, that is, his knowledge of the provisions and ordinances of Islam and (2) his justices, that is, his excellence in belief and morals. Reason also dictates the necessity for these qualities, because Islamic government is a government of law, not the arbitrary rule of an individual over the people or the domination of a group of individuals over the whole people. If the ruler is unacquainted with the contents of the law, he is not fit to rule. (Khomeini 2009, 177)

Hence, the ruler needs human reason to guide the state based on Islamic law. Saber argues, however, that the absolute authority Khomeini attributes to the faqih should: by no means [be understood] as a form of or a call for absolutism as such. Rather it was to be the framework within which the faqih could have the full authority to exercise ijtihad as well as religio-politics in line with the requirements of contemporary times rather than stagnated traditions. (Sabet 2014, 74) Khomeini’s theological model of the wilayat al-faqih shows a strict hierarchal structure on the one hand and embodies very flexible elements on the other hand. In terms of structure, the faqih, the head of the Islamic state, is the one who exercises ijtihad and thus interprets the main sources of Islam and takes the religious and legal decisions to which the believers adhere. This strict hierarchal structure can also be observed in the position of he marja altaqlid,11 whose decisions concerning Islamic law and practice the simple believers imitate and follow. Khomeini’s Shiite political thought also embodies flexible and dynamic elements. Based on his understanding, the faqih is able to include the contemporary circumstances in which the society is living into his decision-making. According to Khomeini the faqih is even allowed to revise his earlier decisions. Although Shiite activism in Iran differs much from that of Lebanon or Iraq (Keddie and Cole 1986, 2) the spark of the Islamic Revolution in Iran quickly spread to other countries and was particularly strong in those areas, where the majority of the people were Shiite Muslims (Keddie and Cole 1986, 3). This was especially the case, if Iran supported specific areas, actors, or countries directly or indirectly in ideological or material matters. The Lebanese Hezbollah constitutes one example of a Shiite Islamist actor, which has always been significantly supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran in ideological, political, and financial matters. Thus, the principles of Khomeini’s theoretical concept of the wilayat al-faqih are important to bear in mind when it comes to analyzing the Shiite Hezbollah. Defining Islamism In the literature one can find various definitions of the term Islamism. Some authors argue that the adherents of Islamism understand Islam as their primary source of thought and action, as a comprehensive social political program, and as a guideline for individual life and the collective order (Krämer 1999, 30). Others stress that Islamism provides the societies with political answers to the contemporary challenges these societies are facing (Ayoob 2008, 2). Furthermore, we can find authors who include societal perspectives in their understanding of Islamism. Instead of only concentrating on the activities of organizations or actors that mobilize the political sphere by using traditional Islamic symbols and concepts, Ismail proposes a different understanding. She uses the term Islamism “to encompass both Islamist politics as well as a re-Islamisation, the process whereby various domains of social life are invested with signs and symbols associated with Islamic cultural traditions” (Ismail 2006, 2). In doing so, she juxtaposes the societal perspective next to the political perspective in her understanding of

Islamism. Bayat has introduced the term post-Islamism into the scientific debate. PostIslamism, he argues, “represents an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty” (Bayat 2013, 8) and stresses that post-Islamism combines Islam with individual people’s choice and freedom and puts emphasis on individual “rights instead of duties, plurality instead of a singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scriptures, and the future instead of the past” (Bayat 2013, 8). I argue that it does not make sense to apply concepts such as that of post-Islamism in this book. Bayat’s focus on the fusion of religion and right, faith and freedom, and Islam and liberty seems to idealize the political and social reality in the MENA region. Rather, I agree with Krämer who argues that Islamist actors understand Islam as the source of thought and action and as a comprehensive social political program. I am furthermore aware of the fact that for contemporary Islamist political actors in the MENA region the political thought of the most important nineteenth and twentieth century Islamist political ideologues remains important until today. During electoral campaigns Islamist organizations still promote Islam as the solution for the contemporary problems they are facing (for the example of Hamas see Chapter 4 of this book). Against this backdrop I propose to draw on Islamist political thought developed by the nineteenth and twentieth century’s ideologues with a special focus on Muhammad Abduh when it comes to defining the term Islamism. Based on Muhammad Abduh’s political thought I understand Islamist political actors as actors who legitimize their political actions through a reference to the main Islamic sources, the Quran, the sunna, and the hadith but who rationally apply human reason to reinterpret these main Islamic sources in the light of the contemporary circumstances. Hence, Islamist political actors approve ijtihad and deny blind imitation, but nevertheless legitimize their actions through reference to the main Islamic sources. Drawing on Abduh’s political thought allows for a flexible understanding of the political ideology of Islamism, i.e. Islamism is not understood as a fixed or even homogenous phenomenon but as being open to interpretation, flexibility, and change. Although the definition of Islamism based on Muhammad Abduh’s political thought is very useful, this book also bears the specifics of the political thought of its cases, the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas, in mind. Concerning the Lebanese Hezbollah, especially Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s political thought and his theoretical model of the wilayat alfaqih has remained important until today, as will be shown in Chapter 3. In the case of the Palestinian Hamas the political thought of the Egyptian Brotherhood, especially that of Hasan al-Banna, bore a special significance until today (see Chapter 4). 2.2 Critical Constructivist norm research and the core norm of resistance Understanding norms in a flexible way Since the 1990s, when Constructivist norm research has been elaborated in the domaine of IR theory, Constructivist scholars widely accept that norms matter, i.e. they “constitute social identities and give national interests their content and meaning” (Adler 2002, 103). However, until today scholars have disputed how norms matter and broadly speaking, two overall

approaches can be distinguished: the behaviorist approach and the reflexive approach. The first approach follows a behaviorist logic and understands norms as being stable (Katzenstein 1996b), while the second approach holds a reflexive quality and puts emphasis on normative meaning (Wiener 2004, 2007). The first approach, the behaviorist approach, focuses on explaining the emergence of norms in international relations, what kind of explanatory power they possess, how they influence state behavior, and why they change over time (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Florini 1996; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Katzenstein 1996b). Early scholars of this approach have criticized that mainstream IR theory, such as neorealism or neoliberalism take state interests as given without taking other factors into account. Based on different case studies Katzenstein et al. have argued that actors are shaped by and respond to norms, identity, and culture to define policy fields, in this case politics of national security (Katzenstein 1996b). Other scholars of this branch have developed different theoretical models to understand how norms emerge in the international arena and influence state behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) or to analyze why, under what conditions, and to which degree actors comply with international norms (Checkel 2001; Risse et al. 1999). What those approaches, which can be related to the behaviorst approach, have in common is that they apply a fix, i.e. stable understanding of norms. In general, they adhere to Katzenstein’s definition that understands norms as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity” (Katzenstein 1996a, 5). This definition puts emphasis on the constitutive and regulative elements of a norm. Accordingly, norms can have constitutive effects in the way that they set up rules that form actors’ identities and at the same time regulative effects by which norms define standards for appropriate behavior of actors whose identity is given (Katzenstein 1996a, 5). The definition Katzenstein offers entails only stable elements. It understands identity and state behavior as being dependent on norms and assumes that normative meaning is not open to change. Drawing on this stable definition only would not be sufficient in this book, as I draw on a flexible definition of Islamism and understand Islamist organizations as political actors, which interact in changing contexts and which are able to adapt to contemporary circumstances. If Islamist organizations are able to adapt to change, a stable norm definition would not help us to understand their norms and their conceptions of political order. This is why I draw on the second approach developed within Constructivist norm research: the reflexive approach. The reflexive approach has been elaborated since the beginning of the twenty-first century. It differs from the behaviorist approach in the sense that it understands norms as being stable and flexible at the same time. The reflexive approach puts emphasis on social practices and its importance for the emergence and change of normative meaning (Reus-Smit 2001; Wiener 2004). According to this approach, identity and behavior not only change in response to norms but can have reciprocal effects on norms as well (Wiener 2004, 2007, 2008). It understands norms as being stable and flexible at the same time. Reus-Smit argues that international norms emerge or change their meaning through a communicative process between states and also nonstate actors (Reus-Smit 2001, 526ff.). Wiener introduces the concept of the dual quality of norms. Drawing on Anthony Giddens Theory of Structuration12 and his concept of the duality of structure and agency (Giddens 1986) she argues that norms entail a dual quality.

Accordingly, norms carry “a structuring (regulative and constitutive) quality identified as standards or reference frames for behaviour, on the one hand, and a constructed (evaluative or practice-based) quality generated by socio-culturally embedded practices, on the other” (Wiener 2007, 63). Obviously, the focus of this definition lies in the importance it ascribes to practices, i.e. social interaction processes, which take place in specific contexts. Wiener assumes these practices to be relevant for the emergence and change of normative meaning. She argues that if a “practice changes so will be the meaning of a norm [as, M.K.] social practices are central to the construction of meaning as a social outcome of a process” (Wiener 2004, 192). According to this definition, identity and behavior not only change in response to norms but can have reciprocal effects on norms as well. Moreover, Wiener argues that the specific cultural context in which a norm emerges is significant for the emergence of the norm’s meaning, as practices differ from context to context and from time to time (Wiener 2007, 55ff.). In sum, the flexible norm definition developed by Wiener fits very well with the flexible understanding of Islamism this book draws on. Drawing on the flexible norm definition allows us to analyze Islamist organizations’ norms as structuring on the one hand but to pay attention to the possible change of normative meaning on the other hand, as Islamist organizations’ norms are constructed through social interactions in context. The core norm of resistance Resistance has only recently become a hot topic in IR theory.13 Critical Constructivists have started to conduct research on different forms of resistance concerning the legitimacy of the global order or global governance (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014; Wiener 2014) and with regard to resistance against global norms on the national level (Zimmermann 2014). What these studies have in common is that they look at non-violent forms of resistance. Daase argues that resistance cannot be understood as a term that stands on its own but only gains importance through its relationship to other concepts it is directed at. He elaborates that political resistance is directed against the system of order or the power this system exercises. Based on this assumption he stresses that authority has become the counter term of resistance (Daase 2014, 3). He differentiates between opposition, i.e. resistance from within the political system, and dissidence, by which he understands unconventional means, including violent means, which may lead to the overthrow of the system (Daase 2014, 3). Daase who understands resistance as a social practice (Daase 2014, 9), avoids to normatively categorize forms of resistance as being legal or illegal (Daase 2014, 3). Antje Wiener works on contestation. She understands contestation as a social activity and a norm-generative practice (Wiener 2014, 1ff.) and identifies four modes of contestation: arbitration, deliberation, contention, and justification (Wiener 2014, 7). Like Daase she differentiates contestation from dissidence in the sense that contestation excludes all violent practices, which are rather important in acts of dissidence, as Wiener puts it (Wiener 2014, 1). Also, Daase and Deitelhoff classify resistance as a relational concept. They relate resistance to authority and propose to understand it as a typical phenomenon of global authority and suggest reconstructing global authority through resistance (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014, 2). Daase and Deitelhoff argue that homogenous and

heterogenous forms of authority can be illustrated based on resistance, which in turn reveals asymmetric power constellations and mechanisms to follow the superior (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014, 11). Based on this argumentation they draw on Foucault to understand the relationship between resistance and power. While Foucault argues that “where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault 1990, 95), Daase and Deitelhoff stress that this phrase needs to be reformulated and argue that “where there is resistance there is also power and that the latter can be experienced through resistance” (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014, 11; Foucault 1990, 95, author’s translation). In this book, I take Daase and Deitelhoff’s understanding of resistance as a starting point to elaborate an understanding of resistance. I stress as well that where there is resistance there is also power and argue that resistance should be understood as a relational concept open to change depending on issues it is directed at. However, I depart from Daase and Deitelhoff in three ways. First, different from Daase and Deitelhoff who understand resistance as a social practice, I conceptualize resistance as a norm. Second, I do not differentiate between opposition and dissidence, including violent means, as Daase and Deitelhoff propose. This would not be possible in the case of the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas who understand themselves as resistance14 organizations. Hezbollah and Hamas both operate within the existing political systems of Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories and are part of the Lebanese government or even constitute the government in Gaza respectively. Moreover, both organizations make use of unconventional means, including violence, to resist against Israel. Thus, in the case of Hezbollah and Hamas, overlaps between resistance activities understood as opposition and resistance activities understood as dissidence do exist. This is why a more encompassing understanding of resistance is needed in this work. Third, this book does not aim to reconstruct global authority through practices of resistance. Instead, it seeks to analyze the organizations’ conceptions of political order and assumes that a close connection between norms, resistance, power, and political order exist. It argues that in the case of Hezbollah and Hamas, resistance has a special relevance for their conceptions of political order, as both organizations understand themselves as resistance organizations. This is why the book assumes that resistance constitutes the core norm for both Hezbollah and Hamas. It ascribes the following attributes to the theoretical concept of a core norm: • •

•

A core norm is the most important norm an actor has and is linked to the actor’s identity. Contestation concerning the core norm and its meaning is very low or does not exists at all. This holds also true if the actor consists of diverse elements or units – like the organizations Hezbollah and Hamas do. The core norm is open to change.

In understanding resistance as a norm and conceptualizing it as a core norm, this book takes a new perspective. Existing studies focus on resistance as a concept that helps to reconstruct global authority, or on contestation as a norm-generative practice. So far, none of them has analyzed resistance as a norm in and by itself. Background knowledge and interaction in context

According to the flexible norm definition this book draws on, the context in which a norm emerges and achieves its meaning is crucial. Wiener stresses that “norms are embedded in sociocultural contexts that entail information about how to interpret a norm’s meaning” (Wiener 2004, 201). Based on Constitutionalism research, she puts emphasis on the notion of culture, which has long been denied in IR theory and been brought back to the research agenda only by the end of the 1990s (Barnett 1999; Jetschke and Liese 1998). Wiener argues that individuals gather their “‘normative baggage’ […] through experience and in interaction with a specific context” (Wiener 2008, 9; emphasis in original) and that culture, which prevails in the specific context in which the interactions take place, plays a key role with regard to the interpretation of a norm’s meaning (Wiener 2008, 35). Following this assumption, she introduces the principle of contestedness, which identifies tensions between norm facticity and norm validity. It stresses that although a norm is a fact, contestation processes and potential conflicts may emerge because the norm is interpreted differently in varying cultural contexts (Wiener 2008, 47ff.). I follow the argumentation that interaction processes in contexts play a crucial role for the emergence and change of normative meaning and that contestation over a norm’s meaning may emerge if the norm is interpreted differently in two divergent contexts. However, I argue that in the case of the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas the notion of culture plays a less important role with regard to the interpretation of a norm’s meaning. In doing so I follow Clifford Geertz, who conceptualizes culture as “historically transmitted patterns of meanings, embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which man communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life” (Geertz 1983, 89). Based on his definition of culture I understand religion, in this case Islam, as a subsystem of culture and argue that difference between the Shiite context in which Hezbollah is embedded in and the Sunni context that Hamas is engaged in is not the main factor that explains the differences between Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order. Rather, I assume that it is the connection of norms, in the case of Hezbollah and Hamas the core norm of resistance, and its linkage to power that is relevant for both organizations’ conceptions of political order. This book follows the argumentation that interaction processes in specific contexts are crucial for the emergence of normative meaning. To understand these interaction processes, I draw on Adler and Pouliot, who define practices as “as socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world” (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 4). Hence, the background knowledge that actors possess is an important part of the practices they conduct. Drawing on this argumentation I stress that actors achieve their background knowledge in the political and social context they are engaged in. Thus, the actors’ background knowledge significantly matters for their interactions with regard to the emergence and change of normative meaning. Focusing on background knowledge not only helps to explain practices and social interaction but also enables us to understand actors’ interactions as being rational. Adler argues that “background knowledge is the context within which rational action takes place”

(Adler 2008, 202). Accordingly, rational interactions become possible based on the actors’ background knowledge, which they have achieved in their specific political and social context. In this book I stress that the differences in contexts and the different background knowledge Hezbollah and Hamas possess helps to explain the divergence in their conceptions of political order. 2.3 Political order and power Political order As I follow an inductive methodological approach and draw on flexible theoretical concepts, which are open to change, it would be contradictory to define political order in a very strict and fixed sense. It rather makes sense to introduce a more comprehensive understanding of political order, which serves as a sensitizing concept during the empirical analysis. This allows for an inductive analysis of the primary sources of Hezbollah and Hamas and does not predetermine a fixed concept of political order prior to the empirical analysis. I agree with Chaturvedi and Painter who claim that although the academic discussion on world orders is vast and diverse “rather few writers on world order discuss the concept of ‘order’ itself. Its meaning is typically taken to be self-evident, and it is frequently treated implicitly as neutral, necessary and desirable” (Chaturvedi and Painter 2007, 376, emphasis in original). Chaturvedi and Painter only identify few scholars who have defined in a more precise way what they understand by order (Chaturvedi and Painter 2007, 377ff.). Among them they quote Hedley Bull, one of the founding fathers of the English School. His study The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics belongs to the standard references in Political Science. Bull mainly concentrates on questions of what order in world politics consists of and how order is maintained in the present system of sovereign states. He claims that order is closely related to questions of social life and that states form an international society (Bull 2002). I argue that it makes sense to develop an understanding of political order to be applied throughout this book by drawing on Bull. Although I agree with Hurrell who belongs to a later generation of scholars from the English School and argues that it might be difficult to squeeze Bull into a narrow Constructivist framework (Hurrell 2002, xii), drawing on Bull and the English School to define political order makes sense for several reasons: first there are important parallels and even overlaps between Constructivism and the English School (Buzan 2004; Reus-Smit 2002). Recent studies have even started to rethink the English School and to bring it together with Constructivist thinking. Buzan proposes for example to bring the English School and Social Constructivist concepts of the world society together (Buzan 2004). Second: it is evident that Bull was deeply committed to the centrality of norms and institutions in international politics and to the notion that the society is constituted through diverse political practices built around shared, inter-subjective understandings – that is, understandings that exist between and among actors. (Hurrell 2002, xii)

Third, Bull’s definition on social order does not illustrate a narrow and fixed understanding of order but leaves room for interpretations and allows for an inductive methodological proceeding by using the concept of political order as a sensitizing concept. Hence, his concept does not prescribe or asses the character of a political order such as democratic or authoritarian. Instead, it leaves enough room to identify what characterizes Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective political order through an inductive methodological proceeding. Hedley Bull differentiates between order in social life, international order, and world order (Bull 2002, 3ff.). I concentrate on his understanding of social order for three reasons: First, social order constitutes the foundation of the definitions of international and world order. Second, definitions of international order or world order do not fit with the empirical case studies of this dissertation. Third, this book aims at reconstructing Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order based on the analysis of the organizations’ core norm of resistance. According to the flexible understanding of norms this study works with, norms achieve their meaning through social interactions that take place in context. Hence, Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ social interactions are relevant when it comes to establishing their core norm of resistance. Based on the assumption that the norm of resistance is relevant for both organizations’ conceptions of political order, social interactions are relevant for their conceptions of political order as well. Hence, this study draws on Hedley Bull’s definition of social order to develop its own understanding of political order. Bull defines social order along the following three criteria: First, all societies seek to ensure that life will be in some measure secure against violence resulting in death or bodily harm. Second, all societies seek to ensure that promises, once made, will be kept, or that agreements, once undertaken, will be carried out. Third, all societies pursue the goal of ensuring that the possession of things will remain stable to some degree, and will not be subject to challenges that are constant and without limit. By order in social life I mean a pattern of human activity that sustains elementary primary or universal goals of social life such as these. (Bull 2002, 4) Obviously, this definition is a relatively broad one and does not focus on specific institutional elements, actors, or on legal issues. It rather puts emphasis on the society as such and on the notion of security, on the compliance with promises and agreements once made, and on maintaining things, that have once been achieved. In this book I take Bull’s three criteria as a starting point to elaborate an understanding of political order with regard to Islamist organizations as the main actors of analysis. Against this backdrop, this book does not take societies as the main actors with regard to a social or political order but Islamist organizations, which it understands as political actors. It furthermore aligns Bull’s three criteria towards the establishment of a possible future state. Accordingly, it defines a political order as a concept that entails the following criteria: 1

Political actors, in this case Islamist organizations, focus on ensuring security within the structure of the state they are engaged in or establish security measures for a possible

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future state. Political actors, in this case Islamist organizations, continuously approve promises and agreements once made with regard to the structure of the state they are engaged in or a possible future state. Political actors, in this case Islamist organizations, ensure to maintain that things remain stable or improve them within the structure of the state they are engaged in or elaborate them towards the establishment of a possible future state.

Power I have already highlighted the close relationship between the concepts of resistance and power and the very significance of both concepts for this book. In the following, I propose adopting a relational and multi-dimensional understanding of power to understand Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order. Like the overall theoretical framework of this book, its relational and multi-dimensional understanding of power draws on Constructivism. Power is one of the most contested concepts in IR theory and in overall political science (Baldwin 2013, 273; Lukes 2005b, 477). Traditionally, Political Scientists draw on Max Weber’s or Robert A. Dahl’s respective conceptions of power and take them as a starting point to develop more specific and comprehensive definitions of power that are appropriate for the specific research in the field (Never 2013, 6). Both Weber’s and Dahl’s definitions of power agree that actors play a significant role when it comes to defining power. Weber stresses the probability of an actor to enforce his or her will in a social relationship (Never 2013, 6), and Dahl, who draws on Weber, argues that an actor, whom he calls “A,” is powerful or possesses power if he “has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957, 202ff.). Although Dahl’s understanding of power has remained relevant (Nabers 2010, 52), since the second half of the twentieth century, political scientists have started to agree that power should be understood as a relational and multidimensional concept (Baldwin 2013, 274ff.; Lukes 2005a). Guzzini, for example, stresses that power should be grasped as relational, dispositional, and multidimensional, because first, power is “an ability: a capacity to effect a certain action” (Guzzini 2009, 7). Second, he ascribes a special significance to the interaction processes, which take place between different actors, embedded in a specific social context. Guzzini argues that the social relations taking place in a specific context are of high importance, as “the conditions under which dispositions can be translated into effects are dependent on social relations: on the particular identities and interests of actors in the interaction, as well as on the context in which the interaction takes place” (Guzzini 2009, 7). This holds true, as Guzzini argues, because power cannot be conceptualized based on financial or economic resources (Guzzini 2009, 7). Barnett and Duval also put a special focus on actors and social interaction processes. They introduce a two-dimensional concept of power. First of all, they argue that in general “power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects on actors that shape their capacity to control their fate” (Barnett and Duvall 2005b, 45). Barnett and Duvall highlight that this understanding of power builds on two dimensions: “(1) the kinds of social relations through

which actors’ capacities are affected (and effected); and (2) the specificity of those social relations” (Barnett and Duvall 2005b, 45). Based on this understanding they analytically divide between power, expressed through social interaction processes or through social constitution (Barnett and Duvall 2005b, 45) and between direct and indirect mechanisms through which power works (Barnett and Duvall 2005b, 47). In doing so, Barnett and Duvall differentiate between compulsory power, institutional power, structural power, and productive power (Barnett and Duvall 2005a, 3). Compulsory power is understood as a direct power mechanism. It refers to interaction processes in which one actor has the ability to directly control another actor. Institutional power is expressed indirectly, e.g. in state institutions in which actors usually do not hold the majority to initiate radical change but need to work persuasively over the long-term to achieve their goals. Structural power is a direct power mechanism again. It refers to the reciprocal establishment of actors’ capacities and interests. Productive power works indirectly and is understood as “the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and significance. A particular meaning of development, for instance, orients social activity in particular actions, defines what constitutes legitimate knowledge, and shapes whose knowledge matters” (Barnett and Duvall 2005a, 3ff.). This book argues that a multi-dimensional definition of power is needed in order to understand Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order. It agrees with Guzzini that is important to pay special attention to the social interactions between actors, which take place embedded in a specific context. However, in the following I do not draw on Guzzini’s definition of power but on that of Barnett and Duvall, which has the following advantage. Their understanding of power is multi-dimensional, as is that of Guzzini, but also allows for differentiating between different forms of power. I assume that the impact specific power mechanisms have depends on the context and the specific situation in which interactions take place. As Hezbollah and Hamas both interact in the always changing and political sensitive contexts of Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories, Barnett and Duvall’s definition of power along four different mechanisms might be useful to expose the multifaceted linkages between norms, power, and political order. 2.4 Conclusion and research proposition It is the book’s main aim to analyze Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order. To do so, I connect Islamism research and Critical Constructivist norm research to develop a theoretical background, which provides the framework for the empirical analysis. This theoretical background is broad and flexible and leaves enough room for an inductive and bottom-up proceeding. It builds on a flexible understanding of Islamism based on Muhammad Abduh’s conceptions of nineteenth-century Islamic Reformism. It puts a special emphasis on the notion of ijtihad and understands Islamist political actors as actors who rationally apply human reason to reinterpret the main Islamic sources in the light of the contemporary circumstances. The theoretical concepts from the field of Critical Constructivism are also based on flexible elements. The definition of norms this book draws on understands norms as being structuring and constructed through social interaction at the same time, i.e. as being open

to change. I agree with Wiener that the specific context a norm is located in is highly relevant for the emergence of normative meaning. I argue, however, that in the case of Hezbollah and Hamas, different cultural practices, in this case the organizations’ Shiite or Sunni religious orientation, play a less relevant role when it comes to the interpretation of a norm’s meaning. Rather, I argue that resistance, which I assume to be Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ core norm, is closely connected with the concept of power and relevant for Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order. As normative meaning emerges in context through social interaction, it is the specific social and political context Hezbollah and Hamas are engaged in that is relevant for the meaning both organizations’ core norm of resistance achieves. As for the linkage between the norm of resistance and power I take Daase and Deitelhoff’s hypothesis as a starting point as they argue that “where there is resistance there is also power and that the latter can be experienced through resistance” (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014, 11; Foucault 1990, 95, author’s translation). It is my main aim to identify what characterizes Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order and to explain the differences between these conceptions, given that Hezbollah and Hamas are both engaged in national policymaking. Based on the theoretical framework developed throughout Chapter 2 and the fact that Hezbollah and Hamas define themselves as resistance organizations the following research proposition lies at the heart of this book: it is (1) the organizations’ core norm of resistance, deeply intertwined with their interactions towards power preservation, and (2) specific political and social context they are engaged in, which characterizes Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order and explains the differences between them. Notes 1

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The term sunna denotes the practices and habits of the Prophet Muhammad’s life. Until today the sunna provides a guideline for the life of the religious Muslims and supports them in decision-making processes (Brown and Juynboll 1960– 2005). The term hadith is used to describe the conveyed tradition of what the Prophet Muhammad said or did, e.g. practices, habits, or doctrines (Robson 1960–2005). The term salafiyya is related to the pious forefathers, i.e. the companions of the Prophet Muhammad. Its adherents aim to revive Islam through a return to the early sources and traditions of Islam at the time of the Prophet Muhammad (Ende and Shinar 1960–2005). Although it is its clarity and purity what makes Salafism attractive to potential adherents, today’s salafiyya movement consists of several different branches (Meijer 2009b, 3ff.). These different branches include violent and non-violent groups, quietist groups, and since recent times groups that engage in politics (Høigilt and Nome 2014; Meijer 2009a; Wiktorowicz 2006). Rashid Rida, strongly inspired by Muhammad Abduh and closely working together with him, is also an important figure within the reformist branch of the salafiyya movement. In later years, however, he increasingly applied a literal understanding of the main Islamic sources, which does not fit with the understanding of Islamism I apply in this book. This is why I do not take a closer look at Rashid Rida’s doctrines here. Ijtihad is a term used in Islamic law. It means the use of individual reasoning in legal affairs by the lawyer instead of unquestioned compliance with the doctrines of established legal schools (Schacht and MacDonald 1960–2005). In the first half of the ninth century, during the Abbasid caliphate, the Mu’tazila school of thought brought the notion of reason into Islamic thought for the first time. Different from the majority of the Muslim umma (Muslim community) the Mu’tazila argued that the Quran had been created and Muslims should use reason and rationality with regard to religious issues. At the time of the Abbasid caliphate, the Mu’tazila thought was blamed as heretical and until today, its argumentation

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is contested in the Muslim umma (Gimaret 1960–2005). Etymologically the term jihad “signifies an effort directed upon oneself for the attainment of moral and religious perfection” (Tyan 1960–2005). It appears several times in the Quran. Jihad includes non-violent and violent connotations and means. Broadly speaking it stands for the expansion of the religion of Islam and can be considered as a religious duty for all Muslims. Based on Islamic law, the Islamic message can also be spread by violent or non-violent means or be defended by violent or non-violent means depending on what is necessary (Tyan 1960–2005). In 1966 Qutb was executed along several other Muslim Brothers based on the accusation of having planned the overthrow of the Egyptian regime and the assassination of the president (Mandaville 2014, 100). Iran’s Shah Nasser al-Din Shah had given comprehensive concessions for the sale and export of Iran’s tobacco to a businessman from Great Britain. The ulama managed to mobilize mass protest against the tobacco deal, which led Iranian merchants boycotting tobacco products. These protests became known as the “Tobacco Protests” (Mandaville 2014, 246). In Shiite Islam, the notion of ijtihad, human reason, goes back to the fourteenth century religious-political thought of Allama al-Hilli. Allama al-Hilli developed the theoretical model of taking legal decisions based on rational human reasoning. He argued that solely the ulama, who possess the necessary abilities, i.e. the legal knowledge, would be allowed to take legal decisions. While God’s decisions are infallible, those of the ulama are not and can be revised. The society, which does not possess the knowledge to use ijtihad for taking decisions, empowers one legal scholar, the faqih, with the authority to do so. His decisions are valid throughout his lifetime. In sum, the Shiite notion of ijtihad entails very flexible and dynamic elements and gives special significance to the authority of the faqih (Halm 1988, 84ff.). The marja al-taqlid is a person empowered by the religious community to function as a reference model in all aspects of religious practice and law. Due to the understanding of the Twelver Shia, the simple believers are subject to the judgments and interpretations of the marja al-taqlid and imitate them without questioning anything. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century very hierarchal tendencies can be observed in Twelver Shiite Islamism based on the role of the marja al-taqlid concerning the interpretation of Islamic law and practice (Calmard 1960–2005; Halm 1988, 134ff.). Article 107 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran explicitly names Khomeini as the faqih and as the marja al-taqlid (Halm 1988, 163ff.). For details on Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration, see Giddens (1986). Resistance has also become an important research topic within Peace and Conflict Studies. Some overlaps can be observed between Critical Constructivist studies on resistance and those within Peace and Conflict Studies. For more information on resistance in Peace and Conflict Studies see Kappler and Richmond (2011) and Richmond (2010, 2011). Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective understanding of resistance will be outlined in Chapter 3 and 4 of the book.

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Zimmermann, Lisbeth. 2014. Same Same or Different? Norm Diffusion Between Resistance, Compliance, and Localization in Post-Conflict States. International Studies Perspective: 1–19.

3

The Lebanese Hezbollah Politics serve resistance

Chapter 3 of the book is dedicated to the empirical case study of the Lebanese Hezbollah. It aims – analogous to the main research question of the book – to identify what characterizes Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order within the research period from 2005 to 2013. 3.1 Hezbollah’s intellectual background: Islamism, resistance, and political order in the Lebanese context Taking a closer look at the origins of Hezbollah, i.e. its theological background, its understanding of resistance, and its vision of political order is crucial to analyze the organization’s conceptions of political order between 2005 and 2013. This holds true because Hezbollah’s religious and ideological background has been highly influential for the Shiite organization until today and has implications for its conceptions of political order as the analysis will show. Hezbollah’s intellectual and structural background: Shiite Islamist political thought and unified leadership structure The Lebanese political system and the emergence of Hezbollah Hezbollah emerged during the Lebanese civil war (1975–1989)1 within the Lebanese political context, which is strongly determined by sectarian elements. To understand Hezbollah’s interactions in Lebanon and in the region, it is crucial to take a closer look at the Lebanese political system, which is based on a complicated distribution of political power along sectarian affiliation. The Lebanese political system is a parliamentary democracy referred to as a consociational democracy because political power is distributed among the eighteen officially registered sects according to their representation in the Lebanese population. The sects are proportionally represented in the political and administrative system of the country based on the unwritten National Pact of 1943, a document that was negotiated by Bishara al-Khoury and Riad el-Sohl, Lebanon’s President and Prime Minister at that time (Hanf 1990, 98ff.). The National Pact regulated the confessional power distribution based on a census conducted in 1932 (Rosiny 1996, 68). The unwritten pact defined that the President of the Lebanese Republic had to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shiite. This applies until today. The religious distribution in parliament and administration was regulated based on a 6:5 ratio in favor of the Christians, i.e. important decisions could and can only be taken based on compromise and consensus (Hanf 1990, 121ff.).

Since the size of the religious communities is essential for their political representation, it is very problematic that the last census was conducted in 1932, although the demographic growth of the different religious communities has been very divergent over the years. In 1932, the Maronites constituted 29 percent of the population, Sunni Muslims 23 percent and Shiite Muslims 20 percent (Hanf 1990, 119). In sum, Christians represented 50 percent of the population and Muslims 49 percent (Hanf 1990, 119). Even though new statics on demographic growth are not available until today, studies estimate that nowadays the Muslim community constitutes the majority of the Lebanese population and that the Shiite community comprises 30 to 40 percent (Abdo 2013, 5; Hamzeh 2004, 13; Shaery-Eisenloh 2008, xii). However, estimations remain vague and Hanf even argues that some authors rather express wishful thinking in their statistics than reliable data (Hanf 1990, 117). Although this remains very likely until today, all data agree on the demographic growth of the Shia and assume the Shia to be the largest Lebanese sect today. The Ta’if Accord, the agreement by which the civil war was brought to an end in 1989, tried to correspond to demographic change and adapted the power distribution between Christians and Muslims to a 6:6 ratio in parliament and administration and also strengthened the position of the Prime Minister vis-à-vis the President of the State (Hanf 1990, 729ff.). Yet, the Shiite population is assumed to be underrepresented in the current political system according to the above-named estimations on demographic growth, and the Shiites feel “that their representation is not commensurate with their numerical size” (Hamzeh 2004, 13). The Shiite Hezbollah first emerged in 1982 as a clandestine organization (Rosiny 1996, 127) and officially announced its foundation in 1985 (Hamzeh 2004, 22ff.). Hezbollah, calling itself the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, defines itself first and foremost as a resistance organization against Israel, as will be outlined below. At the same time, the religion of Islam has an essential meaning for Hezbollah in ideological and intellectual terms, which already becomes clear through the religious connotations contained in the organization’s name (see Chapter 1 of this book). Moreover, crucial written documents published by the organization highlight its theological background. Hezbollah’s Open Letter, the document in which the Shiite organization officially announced its foundation in 1985, clearly illustrates its religious and intellectual obligation to Shiite Islamism (Ḥizb Allāh 1985). In further documents Naim Qassem,2 Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General, specifies the organization’s commitment to Shiite Islamist political thought and underlines that the belief in Islam, jihad, and the concept of the wilayat al-faqih constitutes the intellectual backbone of the organization (Qassem 2005, 21ff.). Qassem labels these three elements as Hezbollah’s “three objectives that represent the primary pillar on which Hezbollah is based” (Qassem 2005, 21). The first pillar: the belief in Islam According to Qassem, the first of the three pillars is the belief in Islam. Hezbollah highlights its commitment to Islam and its main sources already at the very outset of its Open Letter. It portrays its strong ideological and political ties to the Quran, the sunna, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s theological ideology of the wilayat al-faqih (Ḥizb Allāh 1985, section one). The organization understands Islam as a comprehensive system, which encompasses

religious and political elements. Qassem states that Islam is “a conviction, and code of law” (Qassem 2005, 21) and underlines, that “Islam is both worship and a policy applicable for both life and the aftermath” (Qassem 2005, 27). He outlines eleven components that the comprehensive system of Islam encompasses. They entail religious elements, such as the belief in God, worship, or jihad, but also political elements such as the concern for politics, joint social responsibility, or justice. All of them are introduced by quotations from the Quran and references to the Prophet Muhammad (Qassem 2005, 22ff.). Qassem puts emphasis on the flexibility of Islamist political thought. Like Ayatollah Khomeini, he differentiates between fixed and flexible elements in Islam. Accordingly, fixed elements are those “related to the creation of man and the nature of his disposition […] [they] are harmonious with epochal change” (Qassem 2005, 28). At the same time, he highlights the flexibility of Islamist political thought and clearly promotes: open interpretations of Shari’a, the body of Islamic law addressing all societal concerns, discuss all the requirements of modernity and answer to the current events and arising queries, reconsidering previous interpretations and taking new circumstances into consideration. This creates the space needed to develop and keep pace with change. (Qassem 2005, 28, emphasis in original) The second pillar: jihad The second pillar Qassem refers to is the concept of jihad, which was not explained in a broader sense in the Open Letter. The Arabic term jihad means struggle or endeavor and for Hezbollah it has a more comprehensive notion than military struggle only. The organization rather understands jihad in a twofold sense: as a bigger jihad and a smaller jihad (Qassem 2005, 34). When talking about the bigger jihad, Hezbollah refers to the “struggle against man’s internal foes as represented by the soul’s institutions and temptations to evil or satanic calls to falsehood” (Qassem 2005, 34). The smaller jihad is the struggle to prevent “oppression and persecution by the enemy or an unjust authority” (Hamzeh 2004, 38). It encompasses military means but also political, cultural, or economic activities in the fight against the enemy (Hamzeh 2004, 38) Naim Qassem highlights that jihad “with the soul is the larger of the two challenges” (Qassem 2005, 36). As it will be shown on p. 51, Hezbollah characterizes itself as a jihadi movement and it is important to bear in mind that this includes the bigger and the smaller jihad and, with regard to the latter, the military and non-military means Hezbollah uses. Third pillar: wilayat al-faqih Hezbollah’s third pillar, as Qassem states, is the concept of the wilayat al-faqih.3 Through its commitment to the wilayat al-faqih, which Hezbollah announced in its Open Letter (Ḥizb Allāh 1985, section 1), the organization does not only reveal its commitment to Ayatollah Khomeini’s conceptions of Shiite political thought but also its ties to the ideological framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Already in the first section of its Open Letter it refers to the wali al-faqih, the jurist-theologian, whom Hezbollah acknowledges as the authority and leader of the umma.4 Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem adds that “the

Jurist-Theologian […] defines the general politics of a nation’s life […] [and] within the realm of duty, it is not directly possible to distinguish religious from political obligations” (Qassem 2005, 52). Although Hezbollah stresses this direct ideological relationship to the concept of the wilayat al-faqih and also directly mentions Iran in the first section of its Open Letter, the organization always makes clear, that Iran does not interfere in Hezbollah’s internal issues and Hezbollah is not an Iranian branch in Lebanon (Nasrallah quoted from Noe 2007, 84ff.). Hezbollah’s leaders stress that the organization is tied to the faqih no matter where he lives and that his nationality has no bearing on his role (Qassem 2005, 55). A Lebanese researcher and specialist on Hezbollah whom I interviewed in the realm of this book argues that Hezbollah considers the wilayat al-faqih as an ideological and political reference and uses the linkage to the concept to mobilize its adherents (Hezbollah Researcher 1 2013, 05/20). In sum, it becomes clear that Hezbollah clearly follows the conceptions of Shiite Islamism introduced in Chapter 2 of this book. Like Khomeini, Naim Qassem differentiates between fixed and flexible elements in Islamist political thought. While he outlines that issues related to the creation of man are fixed, issues related to contemporary questions the societies are facing remain open to interpretation. This shows that the concept of ijtihad is essential in Hezbollah’s Islamist political thought. In ideological terms Hezbollah clearly shows its commitment to the concept of the wilayat al-faqih, the theological concept the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on. Organizational structure The concept of the wilayat al-faqih is also powerful with regard to Hezbollah’s organizational structure,5 as the Hezbollah specialist whom I interviewed stressed (Hezbollah Researcher 1 2013, 05/20). The organization is headed by a Shura Council that consists of seven members, including the secretary general and his deputy. The military apparatus is directly assigned to the Shura Council and a political and administrative body with several operational units such as social or educational units are structurally subordinated to the main organ. The decisions of the Shura Council are definite and religiously binding for Hezbollah’s members and the organization’s particular units. If the Shura Council itself is not able to reach a decision, the wilayat al-faqih is directly involved. According to Qassem “the decisions of the wali al-faqih are final, binding, and can’t be challenged” (quoted from Hamzeh 2004, 48). The secretary general is usually responsible for supervising and guiding the Shura Council and the Council itself is “in charge for drawing the overall vision and policies, overseeing the general strategies for the Party’s functions, and taking political decisions” (Qassem 2005, 64). However, the current Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, holds a very special position. Hamzeh even stresses that “the secretary-general’s post has lately become the party’s center of gravity, the ‘imperial secretariat’” (Hamzeh 2004, 48, emphasis in original). A Lebanese Hezbollah researcher whom I interviewed, follows the same line of argument and emphasizes that Hezbollah’s members have to be obedient to Secretary General Nasrallah’s orders (Hezbollah Researcher 1 2013, 05/20). A Hamas member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) whom I interviewed in the West Bank even stated, Hezbollah’s theological ideology of the wilayat al-faqih leads to the absence of internal discussions within the Shura

Council and to a direct obedience to Hassan Nasrallah’s orders without challenging them (Hamas PLC Member 1 2013, 09/04). This statement might be exaggerated; however, one cannot deny that Hassan Nasrallah holds a very special position within Hezbollah when it comes to decision-making with regard to political or military issues. In terms of funding, Hezbollah was and is strongly supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Syria. Since Hezbollah was founded, the Iranian regime has always supported the group with financial contributions, military trainings, and with political and ideological backing. Until today, the Shiite organization receives relevant subsidies from Iran and many of the social organizations sponsored by Hezbollah are of Iranian origin (Norton 2007, 110). The Syrian regime has also always supported the Shiite organization. It has mainly provided political and logistical support to Hezbollah, i.e. delivered Iranian weapons to the Lebanese organization. Until today, Hezbollah and Syria are strategic allies (Hamzeh 2004, 63; PalmerHarik 2005, 39ff.). In sum, Hezbollah has a hierarchal and unified structure. On the one hand this became clear during the field research trip in Lebanon in 2013. It was impossible to talk to Hezbollah members without an official permission by Hezbollah’s Media Relations office where researchers and journalists have to apply if they want to conduct interviews with Hezbollah members. On the other hand, the hierarchal and unified structure becomes visible when looking at Hezbollah’s statements to the public. In general, Hezbollah speaks with a single voice and disputes over issues have hardly ever become visible to outside observers. Most of the time, Hassan Nasrallah, Naim Qassem, or the official elected members of the Lebanese government or parliament express their statements officially. Voices of other members of the Shura Council or of ordinary members are very rarely found. The core norm of resistance – from liberation to deterrence Resistance is the most important part of Hezbollah’s identity – it is the organization’s raison d’être and its leading norm. The overall importance of resistance for the Shiite organization already becomes clear when looking at the fact that Hezbollah calls itself the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon. Concerning the selection of the name “Hezbollah,” General Secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, stated in an interview with the Lebanese newspaper Nidar al-Watan in 1993 “what was this movement all about? It was a resistance movement, pure and simple” (Nasrallah quoted from Noe 2007, 127). Nasrallah explained that the movement did not have any political goals and that there was no talk about Lebanese political life. At the time, all these issues were out of context for us. The only reality for us was the fact that there was a country under occupation whose future and fate nobody knew. (Nasrallah quoted from Noe 2007, 127) He added that Hezbollah was born as a reaction to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon6 and that it needed young people “who dedicate themselves to God Almighty and decide to become martyrs in the fight against the enemy. […] These people deserve to call themselves Hezbollah

– Party of God” (Nasrallah quoted from Noe 2007, 127). At this point, Nasrallah obviously refers to the Quran Surah 5, Verse 56 where Hezbollah’s name is based on (see Chapter 1 of this book). Nasrallah also made clear, that “the name ‘Islamic Resistance’ has never had a sectarian connotation or referred to anyone in particular in this country [Lebanon]. The Islamic Resistance does not only fight to defend Muslims, or Muslim areas, but rather all of Lebanon” (Nasrallah quoted from Noe 2007, 223). Through highlighting Hezbollah’s cross-sectarian orientation as a resistance organization against Israel, the secretary general obviously tries to broaden Hezbollah’s legitimacy within the Lebanese population. Obviously, Hezbollah’s resistance is closely linked to the Israeli invasion in south Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war and to the hostility against Israel in a broader sense. However, when looking at the meaning of the norm of resistance in the time frame from Hezbollah’s beginnings in 1982 until 2005, it can be distinguished along two different stages of resistance: liberation and deterrence. A Lebanese researcher on Hezbollah argues in an interview conducted in the realm of this book that during the first of these two stages “resistance was defined as the fight against Israel and as the liberation of Lebanon” (Hezbollah Researcher 1 2013, 05/20, author’s translation). The second stage, he argues, is the “defense of south Lebanon against all Israeli aggressions” (Hezbollah Researcher 1 2013, 05/20, author’s translation). He furthermore outlines that the Shiite Islamist political thought Hezbollah follows does not play a role with regard to the resistance cause and is also not visible in the resistance actions the organization conducts (Hezbollah Researcher 1 2013, 05/20). Resistance and liberation The Shiite organization understands itself “as a jihadi movement to confront the ongoing occupation and the aggression on our people and land” as Nasrallah states (Nasrallah quoted from Noe 2007, 83). It was this radical and revolutionary understanding of fighting against Israel that led to the establishment of Hezbollah in the early 1980s.7 Previous to the Israeli invasion, the Shiite resistance was organized within the Amal8 movement, which was coined by intensive internal criticism in 1982 due to its quite modest stance regarding the Israeli invasion. Many important Amal leaders left the movement and subsequently became Hezbollah leading cadres (Rosiny 1996, 124). At its beginnings, in 1982, Hezbollah was supported in terms of ideological and military training by Revolutionary Guards who had been sent from the Islamic Republic of Iran to support the Shiite Resistance in Lebanon (Rosiny 1996, 125). In its Open Letter of 1985, Hezbollah outlines its primary goal: to dispel Israel out of Lebanon. This goal is closely linked to the organization’s resistance identity and Hezbollah understands it as a starting point prior to eliminating Israel and freeing Jerusalem (Ḥizb Allāh 1985, section 7). Hezbollah ideologically links its struggle against Israel to the fight between the oppressed and the oppressors. It understands Israel and the United States as the worst oppressors in the world and predicates that “resistance to Israel’s occupation of South Lebanon is not merely a ‘sacred right’ which can be relinquished, but a ‘religious legal obligation’ (wajib shari’), which cannot” (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002, 125, emphasis in original). During the 1980s in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s importance grew constantly. The organization, which has always been engaged in welfare and administrative affairs as well, managed to mobilize comprehensive Shiite support

and conducted complex military operations against Israel (Rosiny 2012, 174ff.). When the Lebanese civil war ended in 1989, Hezbollah was the only actor, which was allowed to keep its weapons to resist the Israeli occupation in south Lebanon. Based on the Tai’f Accord, the document that was signed to end the Lebanese civil war, the Shiite organization temporarily received the status as a party and a militia at the same time (Scheffler 1999). Resistance also remained Hezbollah’s uncontested core norm after the civil war had ended and the organization had decided to take part in the Lebanese national elections in 1992. Nasrallah highlighted that Hezbollah: were and will always be, the party of resistance that [operates] from Lebanon in reaction to occupation and daily aggression. […] Our [Hezbollah’s] participation in the elections and the entry into the National Assembly do not alter the fact that we [Hezbollah] are a resistance party. (Nasrallah quoted from Noe 2007, 88) Deputy Secretary General, Naim Qassem, also states that “resisting Israeli occupation takes precedence over all other priorities […] [and] there is no need for concern that such participation [in parliament] would have negative bearing on resistance activity” (Qassem 2005, 190ff.). Obviously, resistance against Israel and the liberation of south Lebanon has remained Hezbollah’s primary goal despite its participation in politics. Resistance and deterrence On May 25, 2000 Hezbollah celebrated its most important success, as the Shiite organization itself proclaimed: the unconditional Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon. During his celebration speech on the occasion of the Resistance and Liberation Day,9 Hassan Nasrallah did not only congratulate the resistance fighters but all Lebanese people, the Lebanese government and state, and all confessions of Lebanon (Nasrallah 2000). In doing so, he placed Hezbollah in the center of the Lebanese population – including all political factions and confessional communities. Even though Hezbollah received overwhelming support from the Lebanese population as well as from the entire Arab world (Khatib 2014, 71), the Israeli withdrawal urged the Shiite organization to redefine and expand its understanding of resistance. Until then, resistance had mainly been connected to the notion of liberating Lebanon from Israeli occupation, which had come to an end on May 25, 2000. To adhere to resistance as its core norm and to maintain its status as an armed group outside of the Lebanese army, Hezbollah reconstructed the meaning of resistance and pursues a twofold strategy since then: maintaining the principle of liberating Lebanon and simultaneously emphasizing the need for defending the Lebanese borders from Israeli aggressions. Concerning the liberation, Hezbollah claims that although Israel withdrew from south Lebanon in 2000, Lebanon is still occupied by Israel, because Israel did not withdraw from the area of the Shebaa-Farms, which Hezbollah considers to be Lebanese territory. Based on this line of argument Hezbollah stresses that the Israeli withdrawal is still incomplete until today (Qāsim 2010, 243).

As for the element of deterrence the reconstruction of Hezbollah’s core norm resistance starts to become visible in Nasrallah’s speech on the Resistance and Liberation Day, right after Israel’s withdrawal, when he puts emphasis on the fact that the Lebanese: live close to a conspiring enemy […] [and] that’s why we must all stay in perfect readiness, preserving our resistance, army, state, and national and inner unity so that we fortify this victory and prove that Lebanon is the fort that withstands […] even the strongest political earthquakes. (Nasrallah 2000) Hassan Nasrallah’s reference to “the close enemy” and to the preservation of resistance to promote the strength of the Lebanese state marks the beginning of the second stage of resistance: the stage of deterrence. In the years following the Israeli withdrawal, Nasrallah constantly emphasized the deterrence-strategy in stating that “the resistance has imposed a balance of fear and deterrence […] and this balance protects Lebanon and protects all of us here” (Nasrallah quoted from Noe 2007, 341). After the United Nations (UN) Security Council released the Resolution 155910 in September 2004, which called for “the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias” (United Nations Security Council 2004, 1), Hezbollah’s emphasis on the need to keep its weapons to protect the country became even stronger. This is based on the fact that the UN Resolution is oriented towards the disarmament of the Shiite organization, which Hezbollah absolutely rejects. In sum, resistance is and has always been Hezbollah’s core norm and integral part of the organization’s identity. In her reflexive norm definition Antje Wiener puts emphasis on the dual quality of norms as being structuring and constructed through social interaction at the same time. This applies for the core norm of resistance in the case of Hezbollah. During the founding period of the Lebanese organization several interactions took place on the national and regional level that promoted the establishment of the meaning of the norm of resistance for Hezbollah. According to the organization’s officials, Hezbollah emerged as a reaction to the Israeli invasion in Lebanon in 1982. Hezbollah’s understanding of resistance in the first phase, i.e. liberating Lebanon from Israeli occupation, served as a structuring component in the organizations’ struggle against Israel. The changing national environment and the changing interaction processes between Hezbollah and Israel, i.e. the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, shaped the Shiite organization’s understanding of its core norm of resistance. This led to a reconstruction of normative meaning. Hezbollah started to define resistance not only as the fight against Israel and liberating the Lebanese land but also as a strategy of deterrence against Israel. The redefinition of the resistance axiom helped Hezbollah to maintain its core norm with regard to its identity but also to uphold its military status outside the Lebanese army. If the Islamist resistance organization Hezbollah had not redefined its core norm of resistance after the Israeli withdrawal, the organization would likely have lost its cause. Recalling Daase and Deitelhoff’s understanding of resistance, it applies to the case of Hezbollah in that resistance and power are closely interconnected. First, Hezbollah’s resistance emerged as a reaction against the Israeli invasion, i.e. against a dominant power. Until 2000, Hezbollah conducted resistance activities against the Israeli power in Lebanon. Second, after 2000, it redefined

resistance as resistance against the dominant Israeli power in the region of the Shebaa-farms on the one hand and used resistance on the other hand as a means to exercise power and to remain a powerful player in Lebanon, especially through its armed wing outside the Lebanese army. Early conceptions of political order: from the vague vision of an Islamic state to Lebanese political realities When looking at Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order, which it aimed to establish in its early years, it becomes very clear that the organization did not have specific concepts on how this order should look. In its Open Letter from 1985, Hezbollah clearly opted for the implementation of an Islamic state, it failed, however, to outline any details on the structure of this Islamic state. Rather, the Shiite organization underlined that it would not impose an Islamic state by force and that the population should choose the political system it wants based on its free will (Ḥizb Allāh 1985, sections 7 and 9). These sections were directed at the Christian community in Lebanon. Hezbollah tried to convince the Christians, especially the Maronites, to convert to Islam but clarified that the organization would never force the Christians to do so (Ḥizb Allāh 1985, section 13). Besides calling for the establishment of an Islamic political order, Hezbollah sharply criticized the unjust and sectarian political system in Lebanon in which the organization would never have an interest to participate (Ḥizb Allāh 1985, section 12). In sum, the Open Letter rather constitutes a document, which introduces Hezbollah’s ideological background and its resistance identity than a political program. Some researchers even claim, Hezbollah itself understands its Open Letter as outdated today (Sobelman 2004, 23), although this has never been officially announced by the organization’s leaders (Norton 2007, 46). After the Lebanese civil war had ended, Hezbollah changed its stance with regard to participation in politics within the Lebanese political system. The Shiite organization decided to take part in the 1992 parliamentary elections, which can be understood as the first step towards integration into the political system and abolishing the concept of an Islamic state order. In the literature, the term Lebanonization has become famous “to describe the official shelving of Hezbollah’s demand for an Islamic state in Lebanon, and its acceptance of the rules of the game in the multi-sectarian Lebanese polity” (el-Husseini 2010, 807). However, Hezbollah’s participation in the parliamentary elections and in state institutions “was not a clear choice” (Qassem 2005, 187) and led to intensive internal discussions within the organization (Qassem 2005, 187ff.). The legitimacy of taking part in a sectarian political system that Hezbollah by nature criticizes and rejects was intensely discussed. However, finally Hezbollah took the decision to participate in the Lebanese political system – a decision, which was supported by Ayatollah Khameni who had become the guardian of the jurisprudent – the political and religious head – of the Islamic Republic of Iran after his predecessor Khomeini had died (Qassem 2005, 189ff.). Factors like Khomeini’s death, the end of the Lebanese civil war, the Ta’if Accord, and Hassan Nasrallah’s election as Hezbollah’s new secretary general very likely supported the organization in the process of opening itself towards Lebanese realities (el-Husseini 2010, 807). At the same time, radical factions lost

power within the Shiite organization. This also contributed to Hezbollah’s opening process towards the Lebanese political system. Hamzeh stresses that it was especially Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, Hezbollah’s spiritual guide, who “has greatly undermined the position of extremists in the party” (Hamzeh 1993, 324) and supported the organization’s participation in Lebanese politics and favored dialogue with the Christian community in Lebanon. Recalling that Hezbollah distinctly called for an Islamic state in its Open Letter, the question arises how the organization’s opening towards the Lebanese political system is compatible with its proclaimed goal of establishing an Islamic state. Hezbollah justified its entry in the Lebanese political system with the argument that participation in parliament “does not […] represent a commitment to preserving the structure as is, or require defence of the system’s deficiencies and blemishes” (Qassem 2005, 189). Qassem understands “parliamentary participation […] [as] an instrument for achieving change, as an official path that has a wider reach” (Qassem 2005, 189). At the same time, the organization upheld its theological concept of the wilayat al-faqih as its ideological backbone or its “spinal code” as Nasrallah underlines (Nasrallah quoted from Hamzeh 2004, 36). The election platform of 1992 but also the two following ones of 1996 and 2000 show that Hezbollah abandoned its programmatic vision of an Islamic state. The main reason for this is the fact that an Islamic state would not be supported by large parts of the multi-confessional Lebanese population (Khatib 2011, 63). However, at the same time, the organization continues to refrain from formulating specific political goals. In its 1992 program Hezbollah rather highlighted broader topics such as resistance and liberation of occupied Lebanon and the abolishment of sectarianism (Ḥizb Allāh 1992). The election platforms of 1996 and 2000 additionally addressed topics such as economics, welfare, and foreign policy but both documents remain very unspecific when it comes to formulating policy projects or reforms for Lebanon (Ḥizb Allāh 1996, 2000). However, although Hezbollah did not formulate concrete political positions, it upholds two topics that are of utmost importance for the organization: resistance and the abolishment of sectarianism in the political system. Hezbollah’s focus on resistance is not astonishing as it is the organization’s raison d’être and its core norm. In its election platforms the organization puts emphasis on resistance against Israel, although its move towards establishing resistance as a strategy of deterrence is not visible in the 2000 election platform yet. With regard to the second topic, abolishing political sectarianism, Hezbollah claims, that political sectarianism leads to political instability and inequality between the citizens and the different sects (Qassem 2005, 212ff.). This can mainly be traced back to the sectarian distribution of power in the Lebanese political system, in which the Shiites are discriminated (Hamdan 2012, 45ff.). Summing up Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order until 2005, it becomes obvious that in its early years the organization strongly favored an Islamic order although its notion of this order was not very clear. After entering the Lebanese political system in 1992, the Shiite organization left its goal of establishing an Islamic order behind and adapted to the Lebanese realities. Hezbollah, which had always put emphasis on its close relationship to the Islamic Republic of Iran, adopted a more national approach. By participating in the Lebanese political system Hezbollah shows its commitment to the Lebanese political order – at least a temporary

commitment. 3.2 Engaging in national politics: protecting the resistance ranks first Reorganization of power politics in Lebanon: entering the government to protect the resistance Emergence of the political division of Lebanon By late 2003, international pressures on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon had increased. This led to increasing political tensions in Lebanon and to the division of the political elite into two factions. The first one, in which Hezbollah has participated and which later became known as the March 8 alliance,11 supported Syria’s presence in Lebanon. The second faction, which later became known as the March 14 alliance, supported the demands for the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. This political antagonism provided the context in which ex-Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri was assassinated on February 14, 2005, finally leading to the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Hezbollah had already criticized UN-Resolution 1559, which called for the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias, as an instrument for promoting American and Israeli interest in Lebanon before Hariri was murdered (al-Intiqād 2004, 03/11). After his assassination the March 8 alliance constantly highlighted its support towards its Syrian ally and its opposition against UN-Resolution 1559 and foreign interventions in Lebanon. When Syria was finally forced to withdraw its troops from Lebanon after al-Hariri’s assassination (Najem 2012, 71ff.), the participants of a March 8 demonstration called for the “day of loyalty towards Syria and the resistance” (al-Intiqād 2005c, 03/11). Furthermore, they called for national unity and took a very critical stance towards international interference in Lebanon, specifically towards UN-Resolution 1559 (alIntiqād 2005c, 03/11). At the same time, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad strengthened the ties of his regime to Lebanon and underlined Syria’s interests in the neighboring country. He stressed that Syrian and Lebanese interests were strong interests and that both countries’ security was tied to each other in a joint destiny (al-Intiqād 2005a, 03/11). The Lebanese political arena underwent profound changes through the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri and the Syrian withdrawal. These changes had strong implications on Hezbollah, as its Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem underlines. Qassem states that since Hariri’s assassination occurred, dangerous developments took place in Lebanon and reshuffled the political cards. He argues that these dangerous developments would lead to a stronger foreign interference and especially the United States would understand Syria’s withdrawal as a weakening of Hezbollah. The US would finally aim to disarm the Shiite organization based on UN-Resolution 1559 (Qāsim 2010, 245). Qassem’s statement indicates under which pressure Hezbollah found itself after its close ally, Syria had left the country. It also hints at the reasons why Hezbollah decided to enter the government in the 2005 national Lebanese elections: to protect its resistance, as will be outlined in the following.

Entering government to protect the resistance The 2005 parliamentary elections were the first that took place without Syrian interference since the civil war had ended (Salamey and Payne 2008, 459). This had strong implications for Hezbollah, especially as it found itself in the challenging position in which there was strong national and international pressure on the organization to release its weapons. A disarmament would have directly led to a weakening of Hezbollah’s power position in the country and the region. Before the elections took place, Hezbollah conducted a comprehensive electoral campaign and put emphasis on its core norm of resistance and the organization’s rejection of international pressures on Lebanon. Hezbollah’s candidate for Bint Jbel for example, Hassan Fadlallah, underlined the strong commitment of the people from the south to the resistance cause and stressed their rejection of the UN-Resolution 1559 (al-Intiqād 2005b, 06/03). However, Hezbollah eschewed to formulate or print an electoral platform during the 2005 electoral campaign12 and thus did not outline any specific goals or conceptions of political order for Lebanon prior to the 2005 elections. The March 14 alliance finally won the parliamentary elections.13 Yet, a coalition government was formed in which Hezbollah hold two ministerial portfolios (Wilkins 2013, 34). It was the first time in its history that Hezbollah participated in the Lebanese government. Its decision to do so seems rather to be motivated by the objective to protect its resistance than by the aim to influence the Lebanese political order. This becomes clear by Naim Qassem’s argumentation who outlines Hezbollah’s vital interests in Lebanon in a surprisingly clear fashion: the protection of the resistance. He personally links Hezbollah’s decision to participate in the Lebanese government to the following events: the release of UNResolution 1559, the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, and Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon (Qāsim 2010, 246). He stresses that the Lebanese institutions would not be the same anymore after the Syrian withdrawal and that Hezbollah expects increasing American and international engagement and interventions in Lebanon. This engagement would support Israeli politics, damage Lebanese national interests, and aim to abolish Hezbollah’s resistance (Qāsim 2010, 246ff.). Building on this line of argument he underlines that a balanced government in which Hezbollah is embedded would support formulating political decisions that are in line with Hezbollah’s overall vision and that this government would protect the resistance (Qāsim 2010, 247ff.). Qassem’s statement makes clear that Hezbollah decided to participate in the Lebanese government to protect its resistance against international pressure after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. This becomes even more substantial when looking at the ministerial declaration released by the new government led by Fouad Siniora, a close confidant to Rafiq al-Hariri. The ministerial declaration explicitly mentions resistance twice. The introduction of the document states that “this declaration protects our courageous resistance” (al-Ḥukūma alTāsiʿa w-al-Sittūn 2005, author’s translation) and hence clearly outlines that Hezbollah’s resistance achieves protection under the umbrella of the new government. In Chapter 2 there is also a clear reference to resistance but with different connotations. It highlights that: the government considers the Lebanese resistance to be an honest and natural expression

of the national right of the Lebanese people to liberate their land and to defend their dignity in the face of the Israeli attacks, threats, and ambitions and to […] complete the liberation of the Lebanese territory. (al-Ḥukūma al-Tāsiʿa w-al-Sittūn 2005, author’s translation) In doing so, the ministerial document directly refers to the key parts of Hezbollah’s understanding of its core norm of resistance: liberation and deterrence. When looking at the ministerial document, Hezbollah’s most relevant concerns with regard to its resistance have been accounted for. Resistance achieves protection from international pressures, which request Hezbollah to release its weapons but also the resistance’s cause, liberation and deterrence, is mentioned. Having specific positions towards resistance within the ministerial document seems to have been Hezbollah’s core issue during the discussions on the document and Qassem states that “there were stable results for the interests [of Hezbollah’s resistance], its support, and its continuity” (Qāsim 2010, 247, author’s translation). Recalling the main research question and proposition of this book, Hezbollah shows a commitment to the political order of Lebanon especially with regard to criteria 1 and 3, security and stability, based on Hedley Bull’s definition of order. At the same time, Hezbollah’s core norm of resistance starts to function as a structural component in the Lebanese political order. While the organization managed to redefine its resistance cause after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, it started to participate in the Lebanese government and succeeded to lay down its understanding of resistance in the ministerial declaration. Recalling Barnett and Duvall’s analytical division of power into the four mechanisms it is clear that Hezbollah exercised institutional power. However, the mechanism of institutional power works rather direct than indirect, as framed by Barnett and Duvall. Hezbollah managed to enter the Lebanese government to protect the weapons of the resistance and to include its dual understanding of resistance – liberation and deterrence – into the ministerial declaration. Hezbollah’s understanding of resistance started to structure national Lebanese politics. Protecting the resistance through national interaction: signing a memorandum of understanding with the Free Patriotic Movement On February 6, 2006, Hezbollah and the Maronite Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) unexpectedly signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which addresses ten paragraphs concerning the political orientation they wanted for Lebanon. The document marked the beginning of a political alliance between Hezbollah, FPM, and the Shiite Amal, i.e. after the MoU was signed, the FPM entered the March 8 alliance. It is extremely striking that Hezbollah and FPM signed a joint document, as General Michel Aoun, the head of the FPM, has always been ranked among the worst enemies14 of the Syrian regime, which has ever since been one of Hezbollah’s closest allies and supporters. It is striking as well that the MoU signed between Hezbollah and FPM entails the most specific conception of a political order that Hezbollah published by then. Consisting of ten paragraphs, the document mainly calls for fostering national dialogue, reinforces commitment to consensual democracy, reforming the electoral law, fighting against

corruption, addressing security issues in a comprehensive manner, as well as Lebanon’s relations with Syria and the Palestinians, and treats the question of protecting the Lebanese state and preserving its sovereignty (MoU 2006). It becomes visible that the MoU discusses quite specific issues with regard to political reforms, building a just state with an independent judiciary, or eradicating corruption (MoU 2006). Concerning Hezbollah and its resistance and with regard to the political order favored in the MoU, the last paragraph, entitled “The Protection of Lebanon and the Preservation of its Independence and Sovereignty” (MoU 2006 X), is the most relevant one. The title of the paragraph, especially the terms independence and sovereignty, deal with two of the most important elements of the modern nation state. Safeguarding the state’s independence and sovereignty would require the state’s monopoly on the use of force, which lies at the heart of the understanding of the modern state. Against this backdrop the sociologist and political economist Max Weber even referred to the “legitimate monopoly for the use of force to safeguard the state’s order” (Weber 1985, 29, author’s translation) in his classical definition of the modern state. This means that the state is the one that enjoys the monopoly over the use of force and is authorized to use force to secure the state’s sovereignty. Following this line of argument, paragraph ten of the MoU between Hezbollah and the FPM clearly addresses the elementary function of the modern state. However, in paragraph ten of the MoU, multiple issues are embedded that are beyond the scope of securing the state’s independence or sovereignty but rather support Hezbollah’s overall goals. In particular, this applies to Hezbollah’s armed status outside the Lebanese army and its core norm of resistance. Paragraph ten defines the following three goals: liberating the Shebaa Farms from Israeli occupation, liberating Lebanese prisoners from Israeli prisons, and protecting Lebanese borders based on a strategy of national defense (MoU 2006, X). It understands Hezbollah’s weapons as part of a “comprehensive approach” (MoU 2006, X) although the paragraph states that “carrying arms is not an objective in itself” (MoU 2006, X) and underlines that concrete criteria regarding keeping the weapons must be formulated (MoU 2006, X). However, it becomes clear that the MoU directly links Hezbollah’s weapons to the liberation of the Shebaa Farms and Lebanese prisoners, and also to the formulation of a strategy of national defense. It is striking that the MoU reiterates and strengthens the linkage of the weapons of the resistance to the protection of Lebanese borders from Israeli aggressions and in doing so exactly covers Hezbollah’s discourse with regard to resistance as a strategy of deterrence that the organization has been elaborating since 2000. Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General, Naim Qassem, also directly refers to paragraph ten stating that mechanisms should be discussed regarding the weapons of the resistance as part of a comprehensive strategy of national defense. Yet, Qassem also underlines the need for dialogue with regard to the weapons of the resistance (Qāsim 2010, 249ff.). Hassan Nasrallah outlines the topic of Hezbollah’s weapons and the defense of the Lebanese borders even more straightforward. In a joint press conference with Michel Aoun during which the MoU was officially announced to the public, Nasrallah directly emphasizes the need of the weapons of the resistance with regard to the topic of deterrence in asking “what is the strategy to defend the country? It is the weapons of the resistance” (al-Intiqād 2006d, 02/10, author’s translation). Also, General Aoun addresses the question with regard to Hezbollah’s weapons and states that a decision on that issue has to be part of the national dialogue (al-Intiqād 2006d, 02/10,

author’s translation). When interpreting the MoU between Hezbollah and the FPM, Naim Qassem broadens the question of resistance and directly links it to the rejection of UN-Resolution 1559 (Qāsim 2010, 250). He argues that the implementation of Hezbollah’s weapons into a comprehensive strategy of national defense is a symbol for the rejection of the UN-Resolution 1559, which demands the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias – directly indicating at Hezbollah, as outlined earlier. Qassem’s reference to UN-Resolution 1559 is an indicator for Hezbollah’s reasons to enter an alliance with FPM. It indicates that the Shiite organization extremely feels national and international pressure to release its weapons and needs national allies after the Syrian regime’s withdrawal. Qassem even states that “FPM constitutes a political pillar for the resistance and the sovereignty of Lebanon” (Qāsim 2010, 250, author’s translation). Obviously, Hezbollah tries to protect its core norm of resistance through its new alliance with the FPM. The Lebanese researcher on Hezbollah, whom I interviewed in the realm of this study highlights that this became necessary because Syria was not able to act as Hezbollah’s patron, or to protect its position in Lebanon after it was forced to withdraw from Lebanon. He is sure that Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the pressure on Hezbollah to release its weapons forced the organization to sign the MoU with the FPM (Hezbollah Researcher 1 2013, 05/20). However, besides protecting resistance through a new national alliance, Hezbollah likely sees the opportunity to present itself as a broad organization which is open for all confessions and political forces in the country. Nasrallah clearly emphasized during the press conference that the alliance between Hezbollah and FPM is not closed, but open to all Lebanese people. Both factions indeed invite others to participate (al-Intiqād 2006d, 02/10). Hezbollah’s interactions with the FPM and the statements announced by Nasrallah and Qassem indicate that the organization was ready for concessions towards Aoun to protect its core norm of resistance. Michel Aoun and its FPM were seeking new political alliances because he had not been able to obtain any seats in the 2005 cabinet, although FPM achieved the best electoral results within the Maronite community (Germanos 2013, 21ff.). Naim Qassem elaborates that the MoU would offer a new opportunity for FPM, to build a strong alliance with influential and powerful national forces, after the March 14 coalition inhibited the FPM from taking over government responsibility, despite the fact that they had been elected to do so. Qassem states that through signing the MoU, FPM would be able to regain the Christian arena that had been stolen (Qāsim 2010, 251ff.). General Aoun might have also signed the MoU for personal reasons: he wanted to be elected as the Lebanese President and longed for Hezbollah’s support. Although the term of Émile Lahoud, President of Lebanon, had been extended in 2004, in 2006 there was still a controversial discussion taking place between the March 8 and the March 14 alliance: if Lahoud was to stay in his position until the end of his term or if a new president was to become the state President of Lebanon (al-Intiqād 2006e, 04/07). Against this backdrop the topic of becoming the President of the Lebanese state was not put aside. In the joint press conference, Nasrallah stated that the two parties had not discussed that issue when signing the MoU. However, he reiterated Hezbollah’s point of view and stated “we understand General Aoun as a real candidate for the position of the president of the republic. He is equipped with the competences and the popularity for this position” (al-

Intiqād 2006d, 02/10, author’s translation). Besides supporting Aoun as a presidential candidate, Hezbollah also abandoned any reference to the Islamic Republic of Iran in the MoU and also took a very official stance towards its ally, Syria. The MoU calls for the establishment of diplomatic ties between Syria and Lebanon (MoU 2006, VIII). According to Aoun’s traditional enmity with Syria it would have been very implausible to call for strong ties with Syria in a joint agreement. General Aoun himself addresses FPMs relations with Syria. He puts emphasis on the fact that signing a common document with Hezbollah does not imply a Syrian-Iranianalliance but that the document focuses on national Lebanese stances and is to be understood as a national document (al-Intiqād 2006d, 02/10). Concerning Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order, the MoU represents the clearest version of order Hezbollah had presented by then. The conceptions of political order that Hezbollah and the FPM present here, focus on issues that are of concern for the nature of the Lebanese state and Hezbollah: the national dialogue, building a strong state, and reforming the security sector. Again, Hezbollah manages to incorporate its resistance in a national document and the FPM became an important pillar of the resistance. Through its weapons and the integration of its resistance into the MoU, Hezbollah was again able to exercise power in Lebanon, especially through the mechanisms of institutional and structural power, as defined by Barnett and Duvall, i.e. to express power through institutions and to reciprocally establish its interests with FPM. Hezbollah entered the interaction process and the alliance with FPM based on its background knowledge. Lebanon is a multi-confessional state and Hezbollah needed an ally to protect its resistance. Hence, based on its specific background knowledge, the Shiite organization followed a pragmatic approach, as its national and regional context had changed and it was in “need for collaboration with other groups to make a claim for majority support” as Khatib (2011, 66) puts it. The 2006 war: challenging the government’s legitimacy and promoting resistance After Hezbollah had enhanced its engagement in Lebanese national politics since 2005 and succeeded to enshrine its core norm of resistance in national Lebanese political documents, the July 2006 war15 between Hezbollah and Israel started. Hezbollah’s interaction during that war had profound implications for the legitimacy of the Lebanese state (Geukjian 2008) and enabled Hezbollah to present itself as a powerful force that was able to resist the Israeli enemy (Khatib 2014, 83). Before the war started, the Shiite organization, which was part of the Lebanese government since 2005, had kidnapped two Israeli soldiers whom Hezbollah wanted to use to release Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails. Although Nasrallah had stated that Hezbollah would not intervene in security issues of the Lebanese state and that the Lebanese government was the sole authority that would decide to enter a war with Israel (al-Intiqād 2006c, 01/20), Hezbollah failed to inform the government about its plans to kidnap the Israeli soldiers, which provoked the sharp military aggression by Israel. When the military confrontation started, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora announced that the Lebanese government had neither been informed about Hezbollah’s operation nor did it support it. Siniora insisted that “the Lebanese government is the sole legitimate authority that decides on peace and war” (Siniora 2006). He

furthermore called for the help of the international community to achieve peace and for “the extension of the authority of the government over all its territories in cooperation with the UN in South Lebanon, striving to regain all Lebanese territory [and] exercising its full sovereignty over it” (Siniora 2006). Both statements clearly refer to the lack of legitimacy of the Lebanese government. Although Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah emphasized that Hezbollah would not have abducted the Israeli soldiers if it had known that this would lead to an encompassing war (Nasrallah quoted from Noe 2007, 394), the Shiite organization conducted a military operation outside the Lebanese government and the state’s authority. In pursuing its own interests, the release of Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails, Hezbollah threatened the stability of the government and also challenged the Lebanese political order in terms of legitimacy, sovereignty, and security. The March 14-backed Siniora government referred to the state’s legitimate authority of deciding to enter a military confrontation. Hezbollah, part of the government, threatened this authority, and also, the state’s security. Hezbollah reacted to the critique for not having informed the government prior to the operation by referring to the ministerial declaration announced in 2005. During the war, Nasrallah pointed out that Hezbollah participated in the government on the basis of the ministerial declaration which “talks about the Lebanese government’s endorsement of resistance and its national right to liberate the land and the prisoners” (Nasrallah 2006, 180). In referring to the ministerial declaration Nasrallah obviously tries to legitimate Hezbollah’s operations through linking them to governmental documents. At the same time, Hezbollah highlighted the Lebanese unity against the Israeli aggression by referring to the Lebanese army which supported Hezbollah and also the people who lived in south Lebanon close to the Israeli border. Especially by drawing a line between the army and Hezbollah, the Shiite organization tries to point out to the legitimacy of its actions as being part of the Lebanese government. The Siniora government developed a seven-point-plan,16 which the Prime Minister presented on a peace-conference in Rome. At that time, Nasrallah did not completely reject Siniora’s plan but emphasized that further detailed discussions were needed because there were still reservations against some of the paragraphs while Hezbollah agreed on others (alIntiqād 2006b, 08/11). Finally, UN-Resolution 1701 led to the end of the military confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah. Parts of the UN-Resolution draw on Siniora’s seven-point plan – especially the expansion of the mandate and the equipment of the United National Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). It is UNIFIL’s main task to oversee the ceasefire and to support the Lebanese government to enhance its control over the entire state’s territory. The resolution also emphasized the importance to implement all earlier resolutions and the Tai’f Accord “so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon” (United Nations Security Council 2006, 2). Although the resolution clearly referred to Hezbollah’s weapons, it was not the UNIFL’s task to disarm the organization. Nasrallah outlined against this backdrop, that: as long as this is not its task, and as long as its main task is backing the Lebanese army – and we approve of and support the role played by the army – I do not think there will be any problem at all in the area south of the [Litani] river, and all areas where the army or UNIFIL are deployed.

(Nasrallah quoted from Noe 2007, 384) Nasrallah’s remark clearly indicates that his organization will not release its weapons although it is part of the government. At the same time Hezbollah backs the Lebanese army. After the ceasefire was established in August 2006, Hezbollah presented itself as the big winner of the military confrontation with Israel. Naim Qassem even stressed that after its strategic victory Hezbollah achieved significant strength and became an inspiration for the people in the region (Qāsim 2010, 258). Other Hezbollah officials, such as Abdallah Qusair, the director of Hezbollah’s TV channel al-Manar, stressed that the resistance had conducted parallel steps and means in the war against Israel. Qusair stated that Hezbollah “did not only win in the military domain. We also won in the media domain” (Qusair quoted from al-Intiqād 2006a, 08/25, author’s translation) and that al-Manar TV had supported the resistance. It is likely that the media campaigns, which Hezbollah had conducted during the war, supported the organization’s good reputation in the Arab world after the war had ended. Regarding Hezbollah’s positive standing in the region, Khatib argues that the entire Arab world perceived the end of the war between Israel and Hezbollah as a victory for Hezbollah (Khatib 2014, 83) because the organization had been able to be defiant against Israel and to resist the enemy. This, as Khatib puts it, strove to a cultivate sense of legitimacy based on this reputation [good reputation because of the perceived victory against Israel], with the ensuing combination of power and legitimacy paving the way for Hezbollah’s rising authority in Lebanon and its broader popularity in the Middle East. (Khatib 2014, 83) Summing up, Hezbollah obviously did not hesitate to weaken the Lebanese state’s legitimacy to secure its own interests, in this case the liberation of Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails. Although the organization was part of the government it engaged in military actions against another state without informing the other cabinet members. This is a clear indicator for the direct mechanism of compulsory power. Through its armed status Hezbollah was able to exercise compulsory power over the Lebanese government. At the same time, the Shiite organization referred to the documents its participation in the government was based on, i.e. it referred to the paragraphs of the ministerial declaration in which resistance was clearly mentioned and where it got protection from. Overall, the Shiite organization’s interactions during the war and its procedure towards the establishment of resolution 1701 give reason to assume that the organization’s interest in pursuing its own goals and in safeguarding resistance were higher than its commitment to the Lebanese political order. 3.3 Consolidating resistance: Hezbollah in domestic contestation processes The special tribunal for Lebanon and its implications for Hezbollah’s resistance For two reasons the issue of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)17 is quintessential when it

comes to analyzing Hezbollah’s understanding of resistance and the organization’s interactions towards power preservation, which are crucial for Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order, as this book argues. First, Hezbollah’s close ally Syria was believed to be behind the Hariri assassination only hours after the ex-Prime Minister died (Blanford 2006, 140ff.). Shortly afterwards Hezbollah was also accused of being linked to the Hariri assassination. This allegation has been strengthened over the years (ICG 2010), although it has not been confirmed until today (Berti 2014; Rosiny 2010). Second, the STL has a special significance within the broader contestation processes, which have shaped the Lebanese political scene since 2005, because: the tribunal’s work has a much wider impact than finding out who assassinated Hariri. It is part of the big confrontation in the region between the US and its allies on the one side; and Syria, Iran and their allies on the other. (Bowen quoted from Zahar 2012, 77) The paralysis of the government and the establishment of the STL The contentious national decision-making process on the issue of the STL, which finally led to a paralysis of the Lebanese institutions, cannot only be ascribed to the STL as such but to the sharp division that has shaped the Lebanese political scene since the Syrian withdrawal. After the 2006 war, these strong tensions became more and more visible in the domestic discussion. March 14 criticized Hezbollah for its military actions towards Israel and the Shiite organization itself started calling for the formation of a national unity government that would include its partner, the FPM. Hassan Nasrallah claimed, FPM would represent 75 percent of the Lebanese Christians and thus needed to participate in the government and underlined the need to form a national unity government for reconstructing Lebanon after the 2006 war (Nasrallah in Noe 2007, 410). However, the domestic events, which were taking place, and the rising tensions between the March 8 and the March 14 alliances indicate that Hezbollah might have had further interests to form a national unity government than reconstructing Lebanon. This becomes obvious through the rhetoric the organization used vis-à-vis its partner in government, the March 14 coalition. Given the rising international pressure on Hezbollah, the organization sharply criticized the March 14 alliance for its close relationship to the US and blamed it for conspiracies with the enemy (Zahar 2012, 76). The criticism reached its peak when the UN commission, which was responsible for the investigation of the Haririassassination, send a draft proposal regarding the establishment of an international tribunal to the Lebanese government. The March 14 coalition pushed the government for a quick ratification of the draft as they feared the March 8 alliance would try to realize its demands for the reformation of the government structure. Albeit, the five Shiite ministers and one Christian minister with close ties to Syria, all part of the March 8 alliance, refused their participation, and the Lebanese cabinet approved the draft of the UN proposal. Subsequently the six ministers who had refused to approve the UN draft resigned from government (ICG 2006, 8). This shows that Hezbollah left the Lebanese government because it was not able to exercise institutional power, i.e. to prevent the government from approving the UN draft on the STL. Following the ministers’ resignation, Hezbollah leaders requested the resignation of the entire government

and strengthened their call for the establishment of a national unity government. They demanded for the formation of a national unity government that should include the FPM. This national unity government would “prevent all general decisions that deal with the sovereignty of Lebanon and its resistance,” as Qassem puts it (Qāsim 2010, 260, author’s translation). Qassem’s statement very clearly refers to Hezbollah’s main interests: the protection of its resistance. A national unity government would give a veto power status to Hezbollah and its allies and allow the Shiite organization to safeguard its very interests with the help of its political partners. However, no national unity government was formed and Siniora pushed the issue of the STL directly to the UN level, as he was not able to reach a decision in the Lebanese government and parliament. He wrote to the President of the UN Security Council saying that reaching a domestic ratification of the STL would be impossible and asked the UN to put the STL directly into effect to secure Lebanon’s stability (United Nations Security Council 2007a). The Security Council followed Siniora’s demand and ratified UN-Resolution 1757 at the end of May 2007, which put the STL into force (United Nations Security Council 2007b). The proceeding of the Siniora government and the ratification of UN-Resolution 1757 provoked sharp criticism by Hezbollah and its March 8 allies. The Shiite organization condemned the ratification as a “flagrant violation that makes the resolution illegal and illegitimate at the national and international level” (quoted from el-Masri 2008, 83). Hassan Nasrallah even claimed that “the other side […] [March 14] smuggled it [the issue of the tribunal] to the Security Council” (Nasrallah 2007) and Hezbollah labeled the tribunal as an “Israeli project” (Zahar 2012, 77, emphasis in original). Also, the organization’s spiritual guide, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, raised questions regarding the STL’s legitimacy and foreign interests, which would be pursued through the tribunal, as he assumes. Fadlallah asks: when we see that the states pushing most for this tribunal are the US, the UK and France, the big question is whether their aim is really to bring the truth or to introduce their interests in the region through it? (Fadlallah quoted from Wierda et al. 2007, 1074) While March 8 harshly criticized the implementation of the STL and claims its aims would be to blackmail Hezbollah and Syria, i.e. strengthen Israel’s enemies (Knudsen 2012, 228ff.), the March 14 alliance understands the STL as an instrument to achieve justice and accountability. Some of the March 14 leaders, such as the Christian leader Samir Frangie, regard the STL as “the only way to end Syria’s influence in Lebanon” (Frangie quoted from ICG 2006, 10). The suspicion of Hezbollah Obviously, the issue of the STL and its implementation were highly politicized and caused enormous tensions in Lebanon and sharpened the already existing political-sectarian division between the March 8 and March 14 alliances. The schism got even stronger when suspicions increased that Hezbollah was behind the Hariri murder. The German magazine Der Spiegel published an article stating that new results would directly reveal that special forces from

Hezbollah were responsible for the assassination of Hariri (Follath 2009). However, the STL investigators also started to summon Hezbollah individuals in 2010 and issued an indictment against four individuals, all members of Hezbollah, in 2011 (Berti 2014, 128). Hezbollah directly answered to the accusations. When the first individuals were interrogated Nasrallah gave an encompassing interview on Hezbollah’s TV channel al-Manar TV in which he did not deny that Hezbollah members were summoned but declared that they were not interrogated based on accusations at that time (Nasrallah 2010). Nasrallah referred to the newspaper articles by magazines such as Der Spiegel as being “part of a political campaign” (Nasrallah 2010) that did not only aim “to point fingers at Hizbullah, [but] they [also] mentioned names and they tried to go into details” (Nasrallah 2010). He stated that in the first days after Hariri was murdered, Syria was accused of being behind the attack and Israeli leaders had begun saying that Hezbollah was responsible. Following this line of argument, Nasrallah classified the accusations against Hezbollah in the broader framework of the American and Israeli attempts to destroy Hezbollah’s resistance after they had failed to do so during the 2006 war (Nasrallah 2010). He highlights that bodies such as the STL will not be able to undermine Hezbollah’s resistance and that “deleting Hizbullah is nothing but a fantasy” (Nasrallah 2010). By early 2011 the pressure on Hezbollah substantially increased. In January 2011, the STL’s prosecutor submitted an indictment against four supporters of Hezbollah to a pre-trial judge who confirmed the indictment on June 28.18 The indictment accuses four supporters and affiliates of Hezbollah, Badreddine, Ayyash, Oneissi, and Sabra, to be responsible for the Hariri assassination (STL 2011). Hezbollah quickly reacted and Hassan Nasrallah delivered a speech to respond to the STL indictment, on which Hezbollah published a book in 2011 (Hezbollah 2011). The introduction of the book already very clearly indicates the line of argument Hezbollah and Hassan Nasrallah follow. It frames the STL as an instrument that aims “to achieve a set of goals in the interests of the circles of the international community that controls the STL” (Hezbollah 2011, 3). It defines these goals as the political accountability of Syria, changing the structure of power in Lebanon and putting it in the hand of a Lebanese group allied with the U.S. administration, linking Lebanon with the U.S. system of interests in the region, beleaguering the resistance, isolating it, and distorting its image in favor of Israel that had failed to eliminate it. (Hezbollah 2011, 3) Obviously, the line of argument follows the same logic as Nasrallah’s earlier statements. Hezbollah blames the STL and now the indictment for trying to establish a new order in Lebanon and to destroy Hezbollah’s resistance. In his July 2011 speech, Nasrallah links the international interests in Lebanon even closer to the issue of Hezbollah’s core norm of resistance. He started his speech in recapitulating the main international interests in Lebanon from his earlier speeches by stating that: we talked about distorting the image of the resistance, its leaders and fighters. We discussed the goal of undermining the will and determination of the resistance, and certainly the most dangerous goal, that is to incite civil strife or cause civil war in

Lebanon, specifically between the Sunnis and Shiites. (Nasrallah quoted from Hezbollah 2011, 8) Nasrallah does not only refer to the risks for Hezbollah and its weapons but also to those for the stability of the Lebanese state. In doing so, he might try to address a broader audience than Hezbollah’s supporters only, because the political stability of Lebanon and civil peace between the religious communities is in the interests of the whole Lebanese population – no matter to which political alliance it is aligned. During the course of his speech Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah announces problems he perceives with regard to the STL and the indictment. He criticizes once again the lacking legal and constitutional validity of the STL (Nasrallah in Hezbollah 2011, 25) but also directly refers to the people involved in the STL and accuses them as being Israel friendly. Against this backdrop Nasrallah names, at that time, President of the STL, Antonio Cassese as “a great friend of Israel” (Nasrallah quoted from Hezbollah 2011, 25). Nasrallah furthermore blames the STL staff for being biased and having “a clear history of animosity towards resistance and Islamic movements, and […] hav[ing] affiliations with U.S. and U.K. Intelligence agencies” (Nasrallah quoted from Hezbollah 2011, 15). This leads to the assumption that Nasrallah tries to undermine the credibility and impartiality of the STL and the whole process around it. At the end of his speech Nasrallah recalls that Hezbollah considers the STL as an aggression towards its resistance. He underlines that “we [Hezbollah] will not tolerate any attempt to weaken us, harm our dignity or drag Lebanon into sedition or civil war” (Nasrallah quoted from Hezbollah 2011, 36). In doing so, he brings Hezbollah’s main interest back to center stage: the protection of its resistance, which is closely linked to the organization’s veto power status in Lebanon. At the same time, he makes use of the mechanism of productive power and tries to shape the Lebanese peoples’ knowledge concerning the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s resistance. Recalling the main research assumption of this book, in the case of Hezbollah, resistance and power seem obviously to be closely connected to each other. In the course of the establishment of the STL, Hezbollah absolutely underlined that it would not allow anyone to threaten the weapons of the resistance. As long as Hezbollah manages to carry its weapons it will be able to hold its power position in Lebanon. To do so, the organization uses the mechanisms of institutional and productive power. The May 2008 crisis: Hezbollah achieves veto power At the beginning of May 2008, after the Lebanese political system had already been paralyzed for 18 months,19 the Siniora government issued two decisions directed against Hezbollah. One declared the organization’s telecommunication network as being illegal and the other dealt with the removal of the chief of security at Beirut airport, as he was thought to be affiliated to Hezbollah (ICG 2008, 1; Knio 2008, 449). In turn, Hezbollah militarily took over west Beirut and used its weapons for the first time in the domestic realm since the end of the civil war (Salloukh 2008, 103). This is especially remarkable, because until that time the organization has always referred to its weapons with regard to the liberation of Lebanon from Israeli occupation and to their function as a deterrence against Israeli aggressions. The May 2008

clashes ended with a veto power position in the Lebanese cabinet for Hezbollah based on the Doha agreement, which will be discussed below. The following analysis shows that Hezbollah’s interactions during the May 2008 clashes can be interpreted as the organization’s strongest statement with regard to the preservation of its core norm of resistance and its interactions towards power preservation in Lebanon and the region until that date. By deploying its weapons in the domestic realm, Hezbollah exercised compulsory power, i.e. controlled the interactions of the March 14-led government, to secure its own power position in Lebanon. Hezbollah was surprised by the two decisions named above, which the unconstitutional government, as Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem calls the Sinora-government, had taken against the Shiite organization (Qāsim 2010, 264). However, the government’s decisions had direct repercussions on the Lebanese political arena. On May 7, 2008, only one day after the government had launched its decision, a general strike against the rising costs of living, organized by the Workers Union, turned into violent actions. Hezbollah and some of its allies from Amal and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) used the strike as a pretext to respond to the government’s decision against the organization’s telecommunication network and the Hezbollah-affiliated chief of security at Beirut airport. During the following days Hezbollah militarily seized Beirut and the Druze part of Mount Beirut, its adherents blocked the road to the airport and also the Beirut port. Additionally, they conducted operations in the Bekaa-Valley and on the road to Damascus (ICG 2008, 1ff.; Salem 2008, 1). After a couple of days only, 50 people were killed and 200 wounded in the military confrontation between Hezbollah, its allies, and the March 14 forces (Blanford 2008; Salem 2008, 1). However, Hezbollah and its allies did not only militarily respond to the government’s decisions against Hezbollah. General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah held a press conference on May 8, the first since the 2006 war, and classified the government’s decision as a “commencement of war from the government of Walid Jumblatt20 on the resistance and its arms on behalf of and for the benefit of the United States and ‘Israel’” (Nasrallah 2008b; emphasis in original). Nasrallah’s statement indicates that Hezbollah understands the government’s decisions as directly oriented towards its resistance and its arms, which Hezbollah will not tolerate. Qassem strengthens this point of view by referring to the telecommunication network as a complementary weapon to the weapons of the Shiite organization (Qāsim 2010, 265). Nasrallah stresses the point of protecting Hezbollah’s weapons in a further statement and argues that the government’s actions against Hezbollah can only be interpreted as a first step against the resistance. He underlines that: if we are tolerant with the wired network issue, tomorrow we will face a battle on the missile and anti-armor missiles and on every capability the resistance ahs (sic!) [has] to defend itself and its country or to confront any future ‘Israeli’ aggression. (Nasrallah 2008b; emphasis in original) Nasrallah’s statement shows that the resistance’s weapons are Hezbollah’s core interests and an issue that Hezbollah will always defend and never discuss with anyone. As Hezbollah had always stated in the past that it would not use its weapons in the domestic arena, Hassan

Nasrallah also commented on the use of the weapons within Lebanon and on Hezbollah’s procedures in West Beirut. The secretary general stated that also on this occasion, Hezbollah did not use its weapons in the domestic arena. Underlining that he keeps his oath concerning Hezbollah’s non-use of weapons within the Lebanese state, Nasrallah stresses that: if weapons excited to defend a country, a nation, and not to defend a party, sect, or geographic area … if someone came to take those weapons in favor of the country’s enemy, then fighting will not be internal conflict, it will be fighting on the battlefront. (Nasrallah 2008b) In demonstrating that someone took the weapons in favor of the country’s enemy, Nasrallah refers to the March 14 coalition, which announced its decisions against Hezbollah in favor of US and Israeli interests in Lebanon, as the Shiite organization argues. The secretary general argues that in this case Hezbollah’s use of weapons did not take place in the domestic arena. In doing so, Nasrallah very likely tries to justify the use of weapons within Lebanon and to preserve the peoples’ trust throughout political and sectarian alliances because many Lebanese felt betrayed, as Hezbollah had always promised not to use its weapons internally against the Lebanese citizens (Vloeberghs 2012, 174). Against this backdrop Naim Qassem highlighted the use of weapons by March 14 militias against Hezbollah and its allies during the violent actions and especially emphasized that Hezbollah did not seek to seize control of special regions of the country but directly turned over all issues to the Lebanese army after the violence had ended (Qāsim 2010, 266ff.). Dingel interprets Hezbollah’s interactions rather as a demonstration of power than a takeover (Dingel 2008, 2). Finally, the Lebanese government withdrew its decisions against Hezbollah (Baliani 2008, 7) and the political crisis ended based on the Doha Accord, on which the rival Lebanese factions had agreed under Qatari leadership in Doha on May 21, 2008. The accord determines the immediate election of Michel Suleiman as the consensus candidate for the position of the new President of the Lebanese Republic, the formation of a national unity government in which the opposition holds 11 out of 30 ministers, and the change of the electoral law. It furthermore called for “the pledge of all parties to refrain from a return to the use of weapons or violence for the purpose of achieving political gain” (United Nations Security Council 2008, 3) and the overall resumption of the national dialogue to ensure the authority of the Lebanese state and its security (United Nations Security Council 2008). Many observers interpreted the Doha Accord as a clear victory for Hezbollah and its allies (ICG 2010, 7; Knio 2008, 446; Wilmsen 2009, 6). One of the demands Hezbollah had uttered since December 2006 – the formation of a national unity government with a veto power for Hezbollah and its allies, was fulfilled by the Doha Accord. Hence, the Doha Accord enabled Hezbollah to exercise institutional power and to prevent the government from engaging in interactions that would pose a danger to the Shiite organization’s weapons. Furthermore, the Doha Accord did not call for the disarmament of Hezbollah but rather demanded from all parties not to use weapons for the realization of their political goals. Hassan Nasrallah reiterated that Hezbollah’s weapons will not be used to achieve political gains but to liberate Lebanese land and prisoners and to defend the country (Nasrallah 2008a). He furthermore stated that Hezbollah is against sectarian strife and

celebrated the formation of a national unity government based on the Doha Accord as a victory for Lebanon “just as May 25th, 2000 was not a victory for one category or political group, and again just Lebanon was the victor in July 2006, Lebanon is the victor in Doha today” (Nasrallah 2008a). Nasrallah’s statement indicates that he tries to regain trust from the Lebanese population and to present Hezbollah as an organization that follows Lebanese interests rather than its own interests. A MoU Hezbollah signed with the Lebanese Salafi factions in August 2008 against the American and Zionist project and sectarian strife in Lebanon supports this line of argument (Qāsim 2010, 276ff.). Hezbollah’s mouthpiece alIntiqad outlines, that the MoU stands up against the Americans and the Zionists and those who are promoting an Islamic schism in Lebanon (al-Intiqād 2008, 08/19). This points to the fact that Hezbollah is well aware of the sharp tensions that exist in Lebanon after the 2008 Beirut clashes and hence tries to present itself as an inclusive organization – even across the SunniShiite boundaries in Lebanon. Naim Qassem states that Hezbollah is against sectarian strife and therefore wanted to enter into a new phase with the Sunni mustaqbal movement after the Doha Accord had been signed. When the mustaqbal movement did not respond, Hezbollah started to negotiate with the Lebanese Salafists until the MoU was signed (Qāsim 2010, 276). Qassem’s statement shows that Hezbollah is well aware of the rising tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in Lebanon along the lines of the March 8 and March 14 alliances and hence tries to reach a rapprochement between the two Muslim communities. When looking at Hezbollah’s interactions with regard to the organization’s conceptions of political order during the May 2008 crisis, it becomes clear that Hezbollah pursued its main objective – the protection of its core norm of resistance and at that time in particular its weapons. Hassan Nasrallah and Naim Qassem both directly linked the question of resistance to the government’s decisions against Hezbollah’s telecommunication network and the removal of its chief of security at Beirut airport from his position due to the question of the weapons. When Hezbollah and its weapons were under extreme domestic pressure and endangered, the organization did not hesitate to launch military actions within Lebanon although it had always promised not to do so. In doing so, it exercised power towards the March 14 coalition and Arab negotiators through resistance. At this point, especially the direct mechanism of compulsory power is strong, because Hezbollah forced the March 14 forces to annul its decisions against the Hezbollah infrastructure. Hezbollah’s interactions indicate that participation in politics or the clear formulation of a political order would always be subordinated to the organization’s core norm of resistance and its interactions towards power preservation in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s Political Manifesto On November 30, 2009 Hezbollah issued its Political Manifesto (Ḥizb Allāh 2009),21 which outlines the organization’s political point of view 24 years after its first political document, the Open Letter, had been published. The new Political Manifesto can rather be understood as a political vision than a political program. Hezbollah presents itself as an organization that takes a global view on the contemporary world and Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem himself refers to the document as the organization’s renewed “vision” (Qāsim 2009). The document

consists of three parts of which the second part, called Lebanon, constitutes the largest one. It discusses Hezbollah’s vision of the state and the political system in Lebanon and the issue of its core norm of resistance. It furthermore illustrates Lebanese foreign relations.22 The second part constitutes the focal point of the organization’s Manifesto. It illustrates the historical victories of the resistance, e.g. the liberation of south Lebanon in 2000 and the 2006 war, and reiterates the resistance’s main goals: the liberation of Lebanon, i.e. the Shebaa Farms, the defense of Lebanon from Israeli aggression and the liberation of Lebanese prisoners form Israeli jails. In doing so, the document defines the resistance’s role and its tasks as permanent as long as there is Israeli aggression against Lebanon and a strong Lebanese state is absent (Ḥizb Allāh 2009, 6). The Manifesto furthermore calls for the definition of a strategy of national defense based on a close affiliation between Hezbollah’s resistance and the Lebanese army (Ḥizb Allāh 2009, 6). Obviously, Hezbollah aims to establish its resistance within the strategy of national defense, which would mean that the resistance’s weapons would be protected from government decisions even if the government changed. In a press conference held one day after the new Manifesto was announced, Nasrallah admits, that until now no national consensus on the question of resistance has been reached (al-Safīr 2009). With regard to political order, based on the definition that was elaborated in Chapter 2 of this book and which draws on Hedley Bull’s understanding of order, Hezbollah criticizes the sectarian political system in Lebanon and calls for the abolishment of sectarianism in favor of a true democracy in which the elected majority rules and the elected minority opposes. However, the document outlines that Hezbollah agrees on a political system based on consensual democracy as long as the system is based on sectarian grounds and a majoritarian democracy has not been established yet (Ḥizb Allāh 2009, 6). Broadly speaking, Hezbollah’s Manifesto calls for a strong state built on strong state institutions – a state which is able to guarantee and protect the public freedom, national cohesion, sovereignty, and independence (Ḥizb Allāh 2009, 7). The document furthermore demands for a reform of the electoral law and favors a state that provides its citizens with health care and education services (Ḥizb Allāh 2009, 7). When looking at Hezbollah’s vision of political order, it is striking that in contrast to its Open Letter Hezbollah does not refer any longer to the concept of the wilayat al-faqih and also leaves the goal of establishing an Islamic state behind. It clearly presents itself as a Lebanese organization but underlines that the Islamic Republic of Iran supported the resistance movements in the MENA region as well as the Palestinian cause (Ḥizb Allāh 2009, 9ff.). Overall, Hezbollah’s political vision remains quite vague. It neither illustrates how the majoritarian democracy should look nor how other issues, such as the reform of the electoral law or the provision of the state’s services with regard to welfare or education should take place. However, the organization severely criticizes political sectarianism and demands the rule of the elected majority. Hezbollah’s demand for a majority rule might be explained by the fact that the organization hopes to strengthen its position in Lebanese politics. As the demographic growth of Lebanese Shiites is stronger compared to other religious groups, Hezbollah’s political position would probably be strengthened if political sectarianism was abolished.

Concerning the timing of the announcement of Hezbollah’s Political Manifesto, different explanations exist. Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem states that for Hezbollah it was necessary to elaborate and present a new vision, because 24 years passed by since the organization had published its Open Letter. Since then, Hezbollah has gained many new experiences, as Qassem explains and furthermore many things happened in the national and regional arena such as military disputes with Israel, the assassination of ex-Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri or the ratification of UN-Resolution 1559. According to Qassem these developments made it necessary to publish a new document (Qāsim 2009). However, a complementary or alternative explanation might be that Hezbollah needed to reposition itself and to gain new trust within the Lebanese society after it had used its weapons internally during the Beirut clashes in 2008. This line of argument is strengthened by Nasrallah’s statements during the press conference where the Political Manifesto was introduced. As stated above, he pointed out that a national consensus on the issue of the weapons of the resistance has not reached yet and will be discussed in the sessions of the national dialogue. In the same paragraph Nasrallah emphasized that Hezbollah is not an enemy with regard to Lebanese domestic politics and that the organization aims at cooperating with the government to realize the latter’s priorities (al-Safīr 2009). Nasrallah’s statement indicates that he tries to regain trust from Lebanese politicians and the Lebanese citizens. It points to the fact that he tries to present Hezbollah as a political force that does not aim to overthrow the government but is aiming to support and achieve common goals. Also, Naim Qassem tries to clearly present Hezbollah as a pure Lebanese organization in claiming that the organization does not politically rely on Iran (Qāsim 2009). A more balanced situation in the national political arena would help Hezbollah to safeguard the status of its weapons, especially after the March 14 alliance had achieved an electoral majority in the 2009 parliamentary elections (Chambers 2009, 2). Summing up, Hezbollah shows a commitment to the Lebanese political order and an even stronger commitment to a political order based on pluralism and strong state institutions in its 2009 Political Manifesto. The organization relinquishes any Islamist rhetoric and presents itself as a national Lebanese organization. Concerning resistance and the resistance’s goals, the Shiite organization is very clear. It underlines the absolute need for keeping its weapons and highlights that it aims to include resistance in a Lebanese strategy of national defense. That would mean that Hezbollah’s weapons would be complementary to those of the Lebanese army and this is exactly how Hezbollah understands this issue itself, as Qassem puts it: “the resistance is a commitment to the state and is not a competition to it. The resistance understands itself as a support for the state and not as its alternative” (Qāsim 2010, 283, author’s translation). However, if Hezbollah managed that the resistance’s weapons would become part of the Lebanese national defense strategy it would be impossible to disarm the Shiite organization. Hezbollah would be able to exercise compulsory and institutional power to preserve its position of power in Lebanon. 3.4 Defending resistance through reconstructing its meaning

Military engagement in Syria: resistance as the fight against the Takfiri threat As outlined above, Hezbollah and the Syrian regime have been close allies ever since. Naim Qassem states that Hezbollah’s relationship with Syria is based on the organization’s ideological and political principles (Qassem 2005, 242) and stresses that: Hezbollah has never denied that its relationship with Syria is based on a computation of the interests of the Resistance. Syria is the only Arab state that has unwaveringly supported the Resistance, and has helped [sic] achieve Lebanon’s great liberation. (Qassem 2005, 242) Qassem’s statement reveals the pragmatic understanding Hezbollah has about its relationship with Syria. When looking at Qassem’s statement it seems as if Syria was the one with the upper hand in its relationship with Hezbollah. This might have been true in the early years after the Shiite organization was founded and when Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad was still in power. However, this changed to the opposite after international pressure on Syria increased following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and after Hezbollah’s proclaimed victory against Israel in the 2006 war. Since then, “it is likely that Nasrallah’s endorsement of the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad carries more weight than does the converse” (el-Husseini 2010, 810). Nevertheless, until today the Assad-regime is of utmost importance for Hezbollah, as Iranian money and weapons are supplied via Syria to Hezbollah (el-Husseini 2010, 810). Against this backdrop of the strategic political relationship between Hezbollah and Syria it is not surprising that Hassan Nasrallah backed President Bashar al-Assad when the upheavals in Syria started in 2011.23 Nasrallah’s support for the Syrian regime can very likely be drawn back to Hezbollah’s strategic interests and not to the organizations conviction. The backing of the Syrian regime overall contradicts the ideological background of the Hezbollah. The Shiite organization is usually committed to the fight for the right of the oppressed, as outlined in the Open Letter and in a more global form in the Political Manifesto. In contrast to its general fight for the rights of the oppressed, Hassan Nasrallah expressed his conviction about Bashar alAssad’s will to implement reform in Syria (Nasrallah 2011b) when the upheavals started and the regime had already conducted violent actions against the opposition. At that time the first rumors about a direct military involvement of Hezbollah fighters in Syria had already erupted (Ajbaili 2011). At the same time, the political and security situation in Lebanon sharply worsened due to the conflict in Syria, which drifted more and more into a civil war. Since mid-2011 the Syrian civil war has led to spillover effects in Lebanon – especially in Tripoli, north-Lebanon, where violent clashes have erupted between Alawite24 Assad-supporters and Sunni Assad opponents in June 2011 (al Jazeera Centre for Studies 2011, 2ff.). Since 2012 the violent clashes in Tripoli and also in other parts of the country have even sharpened and Lebanon has constantly been threatened to be drawn into the war in neighboring Syria (ICG 2012)25 Hezbollah’s mouthpiece al-Intiqad supported the line of argument that the dangerous spillovers, which have come from Syria, endanger the Lebanese political order. Al-Intiqad argued that symptoms

of the approaching collapse of the Lebanese order became visible, because of the violence in northern Lebanon, the smuggling of weapons, the Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and the fact that the armed Syrian opposition tried to establish a buffer zone on Lebanese territory (al-Intiqād 2012, 06/15). The tense security situation and the close alliance of some Lebanese politicians with the Syrian regime motivated the national dialogue team, which consists of both March 8 and March 14 members, to adopt the Baabda-Declaration in June 2012. In this document both alliances agreed on “eschew[ing] block politics and regional and international conflicts. It [Lebanon] should [furthermore] seek to avoid negative repercussions of regional tensions and crises in order to preserve its own paramount interests, national unity and civil peace” (United Nations General Assembly Security Council 2012, 3). Bairam, a well-known Lebanese political journalist and analyst underlined that besides its objective to isolate Lebanon from the Syrian war, the Baabda-Declaration also served to strengthen the role of the Lebanese army. He argued that based on the Baabda-Declaration, politicians tried to restore the Lebanese Army’s reputation and authority – especially in the north of Lebanon, which is highly characterized by violence spilling over from the Syrian civil war (al-Intiqād 2012, 06/15). Against this backdrop, politicians from the March 8 and March 14 coalition agreed to isolate Lebanon from the Syrian conflict and to promote civil peace in Lebanon. However, neither politicians nor the Lebanese population were taken by surprise when Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah announced Hezbollah’s military engagement in Syria in favor of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in May 2013. Nasrallah framed the Shiite organization’s military intervention in neighboring Syria as a fight against the takfiri26 threat, saying that the “takfiri’s current is dominant among the Syrian opposition” (Nasrallah 2013) and poses a severe threat to the Lebanese people and the state. Nasrallah even draws a connection between the takfiris, the United States, and Israel and claims that if Syria falls “in the hand of the US, ‘Israel’, Takfiris, and US puppet regimes calling themselves ‘states’, then the Resistance will besieged, and ‘Israel’ will invade Lebanon to impose conditions and achieve its greedy schemes again” (Nasrallah 2013; emphasis in original). Hassan Nasrallah directly links the maintenance of resistance to Hezbollah’s military engagement in Syria and thus tries to legitimize Hezbollah’s military support of the Syrian regime. He furthermore claims that Syria has always been an important supporter of Hezbollah and that the Shiite organization would be stupid not to back its supporter (Nasrallah 2013). By announcing its military involvement in Syria in favor of the Assad regime, the organization harms the BaabdaDeclaration. Secretary General Nasrallah, however, takes a different stance. Although he did not openly mention the document, he clearly refers to the Baabda-Declaration and also calls for the isolation of Lebanon from the Syrian civil war. He states that instead of fighting the differences that exist in Lebanon, the Lebanese should fight each other in Syria with regard to their conflicting stances towards Syria and keep Lebanon out of the conflict. He very likely uses this line of argument to face national criticism concerning Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war. In sum, Nasrallah’s line of argument can clearly be assigned to the indirect mechanism of productive power. The secretary general tries to frame Hezbollah’s interactions as being legitimate and part of the organization’s core norm of resistance. In doing so, he tries to shape the knowledge of other political actors in Lebanon and the Lebanese population

concerning Hezbollah’s military involvement in Syria. Hezbollah military involvement led to a strategic strengthening of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Only ten days after Nasrallah had announced the Shiites organization’s involvement in Syria, an alliance of the Assad-regime’s troops and Hezbollah fighters retook the strategically important town of al-Qusair close to the Lebanese border (ICG 2014, 7ff.). Hezbollah celebrated the recapture of al-Qusair by the Syrian army and Hezbollah-troops as a strategic success imbedded in the achievements of the Syrian army, especially in Homs, in the area of Aleppo and the region in the east of Damascus. The Shiite organization claims that it was the backbone in the battle of al-Qusair and blames its enemies for sophisticating the image of the resistance (al-Intiqād 2013, 06/07). When looking at Hezbollah’s military involvement in Syria and the rhetoric Hassan Nasrallah uses to legitimize the organization’s actions, it is striking that the organization once again redefines its understanding of resistance. After Hezbollah expanded its core norm of resistance from liberation to deterrence after the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon, Nasrallah expanded the organization’s understanding of resistance to the regional arena in stating that Hezbollah fights against Israel, the US, and the takfiri threat in Syria. This is absolutely necessary to secure Lebanon and the resistance from it, as Hassan Nasrallah stresses. It is important to note that Hezbollah did not leave its first and primary understanding of its core norm of resistance – liberating the land and fighting against Israel behind – but rather expanded its definition – already for the second time. With regard to Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict it is salient that the organization did not hesitate to engage in a war beyond the Lebanese borders at a period of time when the resistance’s weapons were in danger, although this contravened national declarations. This can be traced back to the fact that if the Assad regime in Syria had fallen, Hezbollah would have lost a strategic partner, which supports the resistance stance and is a supplier of its weapons. Without the support of the Syrian regime it would have been much harder for Hezbollah to receive the Iranian weapons which might have led to the weakening of Hezbollah’s power position in Lebanon. Hence, Hezbollah did not hesitate to support Bashar al-Assad militarily, although this weakened the Lebanese political order. Hezbollah in the Syrian civil war: defending the resistance has priority over national and regional relationships The political and sectarian division between the March 8 and the March 14 coalition has strongly sharpened since its open outcropping during the Cedar Revolution in 2005 but it reached its peak when Hezbollah officially announced its military engagement in the Syrian war in favor of the Assad-regime in May 2013. While the Shiite organization celebrated the victory in al-Qusair, the March 14 alliance sharply criticized Hezbollah for its military support of the Syrian regime. It developed a memorandum with regard to Hezbollah’s military involvement in Syria, which it delivered to the President of the Lebanese Republic, Michel Suleiman. March 14’s memorandum called for the “immediate and full withdrawal of Hezbollah from the fighting and the termination of its military presence in Syria as a prelude to tackling the dilemma of its arms in Lebanon” (quoted from Dakroub 2014). Obviously, the

March 14 alliance does not only criticize Hezbollah’s military support of the Assad-regime but links this issue again to the organization’s weapons outside of the Lebanese army. In a second paragraph the memorandum goes even further in directly referring to the: dilemma of the illegitimate arms of Hezbollah, which has established for itself a state, a military and security authority that is stronger than the state authority. And extended its domination and sway over many state institutions and [the state’s] sovereign decisions. (Quoted from Dakroub 2014; emphasis in original) This paragraph shows the perception that the March 14 alliance internalized with regard to the status of the Lebanese political order, which has – from the March 14 perspective – completely been undermined by Hezbollah. The March 14 alliance furthermore raises criticism on the alliance between Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran and blames Hezbollah for “serving the Syrian and Iranian regimes at the expense of Lebanon” (quoted from Dakroub 2014). Also, Michel Aoun, who is part of the March 8 alliance, stated that the FPM is against Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria. He did not break the MoU, which was signed by Hezbollah and FPM in 2006, but stressed that Hezbollah’s decision to militarily support the Assad-regime “was a personal initiative on the part of Hezbollah. We [FPM] had no agreement over this issue. We are against interference outside Lebanon” (Aoun 2013). The March 14 alliance’s and Aoun’s position show that Hezbollah’s decision to militarily enter Syria is very controversial in the Lebanese political scene. The March 14 forces are very critical and also Aoun stresses that he is against his partner’s interactions in neighboring Syria. It is very clear that Hezbollah’s engagement in Syria strengthens the already existing political and sectarian division of the Lebanese political arena. The Lebanese researcher on Hezbollah, whom I interviewed in the realm of this book confirms that the division between March 8 and March 14 becomes larger and larger (Hezbollah Researcher 1 2013) and a leading journalist of the famous daily newspaper al-Nahar added in a personal interview that the controversy between the Shiite Hezbollah from the March 8 camp and the Sunni mustaqbal movement, which is part of the March 14 alliance, “is a struggle over power and the future of the country. [It is] a struggle over ministries, interests, and the identity of the country. It exists a deep rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran – for a long time already” (Lebanese Journalist 2013, 05/15, author’s translation). The editor-in-chief of a leading Lebanese newspaper confirms this point of view and also stresses that “the struggle between March 14 and March 8 is not about national but about international issues” (Editor-in-Chief 2013, 05/30). Different from the alNahar journalist, the editor-in-chief does not refer to foreign interests or rivalries from states such as Saudi Arabia or Iran but “about how to proceed with the enemy Israel” (Editor-inChief 2013, 05/30). He follows a pro March 8 perspective and blames March 14 for aiming to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Regardless of whether the deep division between the March 8 and March 14 alliances is about the orientation of the country along Saudi or Iranian interests or whether it is about the proceeding with Israel, the statements of the interviewees very much indicate that foreign interests and orientations play a much larger role in the political division of Lebanon than national interests do. With regard to achieving stability or ending the division, interviewees are very skeptic. The al-Nahar journalist even argues that “it is impossible to

achieve stability” (Lebanese Journalist 2013, 05/15) in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s engagement in the Syrian civil war and the Syrian issue as such also had regional implications for Hezbollah.27 On the one hand, criticism from Arab actors emerged. The Arab League “condemn[ed] any foreign interference in the Syrian conflict, especially Hizbullah’s involvement” (al-Arabi; quoted from al Nahar 2013, 06/05) and the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) urged its citizens not to travel to Lebanon due to the tense security situation (al Nahar 2013, 06/05). On the other hand, Hezbollah lost support from the Arab population in the neighboring countries. A Pew Review poll dated mid-2014 shows that in Egypt 83 percent hold a negative view of Hezbollah compared to 57 percent in 2010 (Pew Research Center 2010, 2014). In Jordan 81 percent perceived Hezbollah in a negative way in 2014 compared to 45 percent in 2010 (Pew Research Center 2010, 2014). It is likely that Hezbollah’s reputation has suffered from the organization’s involvement in Syria. In the past, Hezbollah had always expressed its support for the oppressed people and now it supported the Assad-regime. Obviously, the sharp split, which runs through the Lebanese political landscape and the tense security situation the Lebanese state suffered from did not influence Hezbollah’s decision to militarily support the Syrian regime. Hezbollah accepted to weaken the Lebanese political order as well as to lose national and regional legitimacy and support to secure its core interests: the weapons of the resistance. This indicates that for Hezbollah the issue of defending its core norm of resistance always has priority over the issue of establishing a distinct political order. The Shiite organization exercised compulsory power over the other Lebanese political actors. Although it had signed the Baabda-declaration, it decided to militarily enter Syria. Based on Hezbollah’s armed status and the unstable political and security situation, the March 14 alliance was not able to prevent Hezbollah’s military engagement in Syria. 3.5 Conclusion: Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order Chapter 3 aimed to analyze what characterizes Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order. The empirical analysis conducted throughout the chapter has shown that Hezbollah does not have specific conceptions of political order. It became evident that Hezbollah shows a commitment to the Lebanese political order but at the same time endangers exactly this political order whenever its core norm of resistance comes under threat. Hezbollah’s main interest is the preservation of its power status. To do so, the organization uses its core norm of resistance. This structures Hezbollah’s politics. The organization’s Shiite Islamist political thought only served as a frame of reference. Protecting resistance ranks first When Hezbollah entered the government in 2005 after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon was completed, the organization has shown a commitment to the Lebanese political order. This applies in particular for criterion 1 and 3 (security and stability) of the definition of political

order I draw on in this book. This commitment to the Lebanese political order overlapped with Hezbollah’s core norm of resistance. The Shiite organization had underlined in a surprising clear manner that it had participated in the Lebanese government to protect the resistance and its weapons against international pressures, especially coming from the US and Israel. At the same time, the organization failed to formulate specific conceptions of political order and did not even advertise its own electoral platform. During the process of government formation, the Shiite organization exercised institutional power. As a member of the new Lebanese government it managed to include its core norm of resistance with its dual meaning of liberation and deterrence in the ministerial declaration of the 2005 Lebanese government. In 2006, Hezbollah protected its resistance through establishing a new national alliance. It signed the MoU with the FPM, which includes a clear commitment to the norm of resistance and its dual meaning of liberation and deterrence. By the joint agreement, Hezbollah and FPM both exercised structural power, as they mutually supported their interests. Although the MoU Hezbollah had signed with FPM represents the most specific conception of political order Hezbollah had outlined by then, in sum, concrete conceptions of a political order were less relevant for Hezbollah in the period after it had entered the Lebanese government. The organization’s participation in the 2006 July war with Israel underlines this line of argument. Hezbollah did not hesitate to enter a military confrontation with Israel without the approval of the Lebanese government. In doing so, it exercised compulsory power vis-à-vis the Lebanese government and at the same time contradicted its own commitment to the Lebanese political order. Consolidating resistance After the 2006 July war a period characterized by large contestation processes began in Lebanon. Hezbollah and its weapons were seriously challenged twice. The first time by the STL and the second time when the Lebanese government issued two important decisions against Hezbollah: one against the organization’s telecommunication network and the other against the chief of security at Beirut airport who was said to be a Hezbollah affiliate. Hezbollah reacted in both cases with confrontation. Concerning the issue of the STL, the organization’s ministers resigned from the Lebanese government and stressed in the following that the government would be illegitimate and emphasized that it would never allow anyone to weaken its resistance or its position in Lebanon. In the case of the decisions issued from the Lebanese government against Hezbollah, the Shiite organization entered a military confrontation within Lebanon. It seized West Beirut and other parts of the country and used its weapons for the first time within Lebanon since the civil war had ended. In doing so, the Shiite organization endangered the Lebanese political order by exercising compulsory power to secure its core norm of resistance. The military confrontation was ended by the 2008 Doha Accord, which assigned a veto power position in the Lebanese government to Hezbollah and enabled the Shiite organization to exercise institutional power, i.e. to prevent the Lebanese government from taking any decisions against Hezbollah. This position enabled Hezbollah to structure Lebanese politics. Again, Hezbollah seems less interested in establishing a specific and stable political order than in securing its core norm of resistance.

In its 2009 political manifesto Hezbollah calls for the abolishment of political sectarianism and for a political system based on consensual democracy. It outlines specific issues it assumes to be relevant for a state, such as strong institutions, being able to guarantee public freedom, sovereignty and independence, and an impartial judicial system. However, these issues can rather be understood as a political vision than a specific political program. When it comes to the core norm of resistance, Hezbollah is very clear, it states that adhering to armed resistance is an imperative due to the threat Israel poses to Lebanon. Hezbollah reiterates the dual meaning of liberation and deterrence in its core norm of resistance. Defending resistance through reconstructing its meaning Hezbollah expanded its understanding of its core norm of resistance for a second time when the Syrian civil war began and Hezbollah militarily supported the Assad regime. After Nasrallah had officially announced Hezbollah’s military engagement in Syria in favor of the Assad troops, he added a further meaning to it: the fight against the takfiri extremists in Syria. In doing so he tried to legitimize Hezbollah’s regional involvement via the mechanism of productive power although Lebanese political forces had agreed on isolating Lebanon from the Syrian civil war. By reconstructing the meaning of the core norm of resistance again, Hezbollah defended its resistance from criticism especially coming from within the multiconfessional Lebanese population who blamed the Shiite organization increasingly for engaging along sectarian lines in favor of the Assad regime. However, through its engagement in the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah endangered the security and the stability of the political order of Lebanon. The Shiite organization’s interactions in Syria reveal that its core norm of resistance has priority over political order. Concerning the main research question, the empirical analysis reveals that throughout the three different stages of Hezbollah’s core norm of resistance identified above, i.e. protecting resistance, consolidating resistance, and defending resistance through reconstructing its meaning, Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order were characterized by a commitment to the Lebanese political order and the state’s institutions. However, the analysis has demonstrated that Hezbollah’s commitment is only a literal one, which the organization only shows as long as this is in line with its overall interests: preserving its own power position through its core norm of resistance. Whenever Hezbollah’s core norm of resistance comes under threat from national, regional or international actors, the Shiite organization did not hesitate to enter military confrontations within Lebanon or vis-à-vis foreign actors and thus endangered the security and stability of the Lebanese political order. Hezbollah’s contradicting behavior, i.e. showing a literal commitment to the Lebanese political order but endangering its security and stability at the same time, leads to the fact that it is not possible to identify a specific political order Hezbollah would favor to establish in Lebanon. For the Shiite organization, the norm of resistance seems to be more relevant than the establishment of a distinct political order. Resistance structures Hezbollah’s political interactions and enables the organization to hold its power position in Lebanon. Figure 3.1 summarizes how Hezbollah preserves its power status in Lebanon through its core norm of resistance. The figure highlights the three stages of resistance identified in the

case of the Shiite organization. It illustrates Hezbollah’s interactions that were directed at protecting, consolidating, and defending its core norm of resistance, shows the mechanisms of power Hezbollah used to secure its core norm of resistance and to preserve its power status. The figure demonstrates that Hezbollah’s power preservation through its core norm of resistance leads to the fact that we cannot identify specific conceptions of political order in the case of Hezbollah.

Figure 3.1 Power preservation through resistance. Notes 1 2

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For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the Lebanese civil war see Hanf (1990). Next to Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem is one of Hezbollah’s protagonists. He has published comprehensive writings on Hezbollah’s ideological background, its understanding of resistance, and its interactions in Lebanon. They are central to understand Hezbollah, as Qassem’s documents comprehensively present the Shiite organization from an insider’s perspective. For more information on Naim Qassem’s analysis of Hezbollah see Qassem (2010, 2005). For very comprehensive and excellent analyses of Hezbollah’s understanding and application of the concept of the wilayat al-faqih see Saad-Ghorayeb (2002, 59ff.) and Hamzeh (2004, 30ff.). The term umma means people or community and occurs for 62 times in the Quran with regard to the religious community. Broadly speaking, the understanding of umma refers to a united Muslim community that transcends boundaries of time and space (Denny 1960–2005). For an excellent and detailed analysis of Hezbollah’s organizational structure see Hamzeh (1993) and Hamzeh (2004). In 1982 Israel launched the operation Peace for Galilee and started a military invasion in Lebanon that aimed to defeat the fighters of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which increasingly conducted military attacks against Israel from south Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war. Besides securing its borders, Israel aimed at installing an allied Christian government in Beirut, which would be friendly towards Israel. Although the Lebanese civil war was over in 1989, Israel stayed in south Lebanon until 2000. For a detailed analysis of the Israeli invasion in Lebanon see e.g. Yaniv (1987). Although the Israeli invasion in Lebanon can be understood as the most important factor that led to the foundation of Hezbollah, there are other parameters that triggered the emergence of the Shiite organization. The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 had catalyzing effects on the Shiite community in Lebanon and also the discrimination and economic marginalization of the Shiites that are predominantly living in south Lebanon fostered the establishment of Hezbollah (Hamzeh 2004, 6ff.).

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Amal is the Arabic term for “hope.” Over the 1960s and 1970s the Iranian cleric Musa al-Sadr, who had moved to Lebanon, mobilized the Lebanese Shiites politically and socially. In 1974, he founded the Movement of the Deprived to which he added a military wing, called Amal, in 1975. The latter was militarily trained by the Palestinian Fatah, present at that time in south Lebanon. During the civil war Amal received massive support from the Syrian regime, its long-term ally. After the civil war had ended, Amal resumed its weapons. Today, it is part of the Lebanese Parliament and the movement’s Secretary General, Nabih Berri, has been the Speaker of the Parliament since 1996. Since 2005 the former rivals, Hezbollah and Amal are allied in political coalition (el-Husseini 2012, 65ff.; Norton 2007, 15ff.). May 25 became officially known as the Resistance and Liberation Day and is a public holiday in Lebanon (Botschaft des Libanon 2015). UN Resolution 1559 called for the Lebanese sovereignty and political independence, requested the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, directly indicating at Hezbollah. The resolution also requested free and fair elections in Lebanon (United Nations Security Council 2004). The March 8 coalition mainly consists of Hezbollah, the likewise Shiite Amal, some smaller pro-Syrian parties, and Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), which has joined the coalition only in 2006 after signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Hezbollah. The March 14 block mainly consists of Hariri’s Sunni Future Movement, the Maronite Force Libanaises, the Maronite Kataeb, and Walid Jumblatt’s Druse Progressive Socialist Party (Rosiny 2010, 2). During the field research trip to Lebanon in May and June 2013, I went to The Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation (CCSD), Hezbollah’s think tank and research institute at the same time. They provided me with all electoral platforms from 1992 to 2009, which encompass all parliamentary elections in which Hezbollah participated. Only for the 2005 parliamentary elections no platform had been written, as the staff at CCSD explained. The March 14 block built the majority in the parliament of the 2005 government. Saad al-Hariri’s Future Movement gained 36 parliamentary seats, Walid Jumblatt’s Druse Progressive Socialist Party 15 and the Forces Libanaises and the mainly Christian Qornet Shehwan gained 6 each. Hezbollah held 14 parliamentary seats and Amal 15. The FPM, holding 21 parliamentary seats, decided to build the opposition block in the new parliament (EU 2005, 35). During the Lebanese civil war Michel Aoun strongly opposed the Syrian presence in Lebanon. In 1988, when Aoun was a General in the Lebanese Army, he was appointed as the head of the military government in Lebanon. This was a controversial issue because first, Aoun is a Maronite but the Prime Minister has to be a Sunni Muslim according to the Lebanese constitution. Second, the Muslim Parliamentarians did not recognize Aoun’s government but still supported Salim al-Hoss’ government, the last one that was officially confirmed. Subsequently, Lebanon was headed by two competing governments. In his position as the Prime Minister, Michel Aoun launched a “war of liberation” against Syria, which aimed to dispel the Syrian regime out of Lebanon. However, his attempts failed and he did not enjoy international support. After the civil war had ended, Aoun fled to France where he lived in exile until he was able to return to Lebanon in 2005, after Syria had withdrawn from the country (el-Husseini 2012, 24ff.; Norton 2007, 129). The July 2006 war was a military confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, which lasted from July 12 until August 14. The war was provoked by Hezbollah, which had kidnapped two Israeli soldiers close to the Lebanese border, which led to a massive Israeli invasion in Lebanon. A ceasefire and finally the end of the war was reached through UN-Resolution 1701. The war caused the death of 163 Israelis, of which 119 were soldiers, and of 2046 Lebanese, of which 46 were soldiers. Furthermore, it led to a massive destruction of the infrastructure in south Lebanon and one million Lebanese became refugees (Albrecht 2006; Feldman 2006; Tomuschat 2006). The seven-point plan encompasses the release of Lebanese and Israeli prisoners, (1) the withdrawal of the Israeli army behind the Blue Line, (2) to put UN-authority over the Shebaa Farms until they will be under full Lebanese authority, (3) the extension of the Lebanese government’s authority over the entire territory where no other weapons will exist except those of the state’s armed forces, (4) an expansion in terms of mandate, staff, and equipment of the UN international force in south Lebanon through its armed forces, (5) the support of the UN to re-enact the Armistice agreement between Lebanon and Israel signed in 1949, (6) and the international community’s support to rebuild Lebanon (Seven-Point Plan 2006, 177ff.). The STL is an international criminal tribunal whose primary mandate is to investigate the assassination of ex-Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and 21 others on February 14, 2005. In January 2007, the Lebanese government signed an agreement regarding the establishment of the STL, although this agreement was not ratified by the Lebanese parliament, which was paralyzed at that time. The STL was put into force by the UN by the end of May 2007 based on UN-Resolution 1757 (STL 2015). For a general analysis on the topic of the STL see i.e. Alamuddin et al. (2014). In January 2014 the trial against five Hezbollah members (another indictment against a further Hezbollah member had been issued in 2013) started in the Netherlands, although the accused are absent until today. In January 2015 the UN extended the STL’s term for another three years (Shaheen 2015). The six ministers that had resigned from cabinet when the March 14 government tried to vote on the establishment of the STL had not returned to government at the beginning of May 2008. Hezbollah and its allies from Amal and FPM furthermore called for the resignation of the government or the establishment of a national unity government. To achieve its goals, March 8 organized mass protests and sit-ins in downtown Beirut next to the government’s headquarters which lasted

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18 months (ICG 2007, 2; Knio 2008, 448; Vloeberghs 2012, 172). At the same time, Lebanon was suffering from a presidential crisis. When President Émile Lahoud’s term ended in November 2007, the March 8 and March 14 alliances were not able to elect a new President, although they had already agreed on the consensus candidate Michel Suleiman, former commander of the Lebanese army. The voting procedures and a reform of the electoral system were the issues March 8 and March 14 were not able to agree on (Baliani 2008, 9). In the same press conference Nasrallah outlines that he considers it to be wrong to speak about the government of Fouad Siniora, because Siniora would only be the employee of the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. In doing so Nasrallah indicates that he understands Jumblatt as being the one in the government who takes the decisions (Nasrallah 2008b). For an English translation of Hezbollah’s Political Manifesto see Alagha (2011). I used the Arabic primary version of the Political Manifesto provided by the Hezbollah affiliated research institution The Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation (CCSD), as I noticed some minor mistakes and inaccuracies in the English translation. Part one discusses dangerous aspects of Western, especially US, hegemony and American interests in the MENA region (Ḥizb Allāh 2009, 3). The third part outlines the Palestinian cause including sections on Jerusalem and the al-Aqsa Mosque, the Palestinian resistance, and settlement negotiations (Ḥizb Allāh 2009, 11ff.). In backing the Syrian regime Nasrallah reacted contrarily to what he had said when the Arab Upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya started. With regard to these protests he expressed support for the protesters (Nasrallah 2011a) and hence followed the ideological orientation Hezbollah usually pursues: the fight for the oppressed people. The Alawites, also called Nusaryis, are a Shiite sect, which is mainly based in Syria (about 11 percent of the population in 1946) and in the south-east of Turkey (about 80,000 adherents in 1921). A small community also lives in Lebanon. Current figures about the sizes of the Alawite community are not available. Muhammad b. Nusayr al-Namiri founded the Alawite sect in the ninth century in Iraq. The Alawites worship Ali as a supreme and eternal God. They believe that their souls are surrounding Ali in the beginning until they rebel against him and are sent to earth in metempsychosis. During their lifetime on earth, as the Alawites believe, God appears to them seven times until the identity of the essential is secured. Then the metempsychosis is finished and the adherent returns to heaven. The Alawites are known for following some pagan traditions e.g. worshipping places or trees or conducting specific rites (Halm 1960–2005). Besides the violence that has erupted in Lebanon against the backdrop of the Syrian war, the Lebanese state also has to deal with a huge number of Syrian refugees that fled to Lebanon. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) until February 2015 1,161 million Syrian refugees had officially registered in Lebanon (UNHCR 2015) and the estimated number of unknown cases is high. Lebanon has a total number of about 4,400 inhabitants (World Bank 2015). The last census was conducted in 1932. Takfiris are Muslim actors that declare all other people as being unbelievers even when they are Muslims but belong to a different branch of Islam. The doctrine of takfir was first applied in the fifteenth century and is used until today (Hunwick 1960–2005). The Syrian civil war also had important implications on the relationship between the two resistance organizations Hezbollah and Hamas. Both organizations had cooperated in the long-term in political, security, and military affairs. Hezbollah had been the upper part and provided Hamas with i.e. military trainings. This cooperation sharply decreased when the organizations took different stances towards Syria. While Hezbollah supported Bashar al-Assad, Hamas withdrew its Political Bureau from the Syrian capital.

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Saʿī li-Taḥqīq Ṭumūḥāt al-Shabāb (Candiadte of Bint Jebel Hassan Fadlallah: We Are Committed to the Issue of the Resistance and to the Pursuit of Realizing the Peoples’ Ambitions). al-Intiqād. June 3, 2005. al-Intiqād. 2005c. al-Zaḥf ʾilā Sāḥa Riyād al-Ṣulḥ: Lubnān Yahtifu bi-Daʿm al-Muqāwama wa-l-Waḥda al-Waṭaniyya wal-Wafāʾ li-Sūriyā (The Crawling to Riad el-Sol Square: Lebanon Cheers the Pillar of the Resistance and National Unity and the Loyalty towards Syria). al-Intiqād. March 11, 2005. al-Intiqād. 2006a. al-Mudīr al-ʿᾹmm li-Qanāat al-Manār ʿAbd Allāh Qaṣīr li-”l-Intiqād”: Naḥnu ʾAqwā min ʾAyy Waqt … wa Muṣdāqiyyatunā Hiyya allatī Intaṣarat (The General Director of the Channel al-Manar – Abdallah al-Qasir: We Are Stronger than Ever and our Credibility is the one which is Victorious). al-Intiqād. August 25, 2006. al-Intiqād. 2006b. al-Sayyid Naṣr Allāh fī Risāla Mutalfaza: Sanuḥawwilu ʾArḍ al-Janūb ʾilā Maqbura li-l-Ghazāa alṢahāyina (Sayyed Nasrallah in a Televised Message: We Will Turn the Earth in the South into a Cemetry for the Zionist Invaders). al-Intiqād. August 11, 2006. al-Intiqād. 2006c. al-Sayyid Naṣr Allāh fī Ḥadīth Tilifizyūnī: “al-Muqāwama Laysat Mīlīshiyan” Taḥullu al-Mushkila (Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in a Televised Speech: “The Resistance is not a Militia”. She Solves the Problem). alIntiqād. January 20, 2006. al-Intiqād. 2006d. Liqāʾ al-Sayyid wa-l-Jinarāl Yuṭliqu al-Ḥiwār al-Waṭanī – Naṣr Allāh: Liqāʾ Ḥaqīqī li-l-Taʿāwun Qāʾim ʿalā Tafāhum wa-Ruʾya wa-Minhaj; ʿAwn: Ijtimāʿunā ʿalā al-”Naʿam” li-Bināʾ Lubnān wa-Taqwiya al-Waḥda (Meeting of Sayyed and General Launches National Dialogue: Nasrallah: Real Encounter for Cooperation based on Understanding, Vision, and Program; Aoun: Our Meeting on “yes” to the Structure of Lebanon and to the Strengthening of Unity). al-Intiqād. February 10, 2006. al-Intiqād. 2006e. Raʾīs Kutlat al-Wafāʾli-l-Muqāwama al-Nāʾib Muḥammad Raʿd li “al-Intiqād”: Al-Mawḍūʿal-Riʾāsī Muʿaqqad wa-lā Yumkinu Battuhu bi-Surʿa (The President of the Block of Loyalty to the Resistance – the Deputy Muhammad Raad: The Topic of the President is Complicated and Cannot be Decided Hastily). al-Intiqād. April 7, 2006. al-Intiqād. 2008. Ḥizb Allāh wa-l-Tayyār al-Salafī Yuwaqqʿān Wathīqat Tafāhum: al-Wuqūf fī Wajh al-Mashrūʿ alʾAmīrikī – al-Ṣihyūnī al-Taqsīmī (Hezbollah and the Salafi Forces Sign a Memorandum of Understanding: Standing Up Against the Disruptive American-Zionist Project). al-Intiqād. August 19, 2008. al-Intiqād. 2012. al-Ḥiwār: ʾIʿādat Taʿrīf li-Siyāsat al-Naʾy bi-l-Nafs wa-l-Jaysh Yamnaʿu al-Taʾwīl (The Dialogue: Redefinition of Politics of Self-Esteem and the Army Prevents Interpretation). al-Intiqād. June 15, 2012. al-Intiqād. 2013. Istirjāʿ al-Quṣīr ʾilā Kanaf al-Dawla al-Sūriyya (Retrieval of al-Qusair to Protect the Syrian State). alIntiqād. June 7, 2013. al-Safīr. 2009. 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4

The Palestinian Hamas Resistance, governance, and ambitions for maintaining power

Chapter 4 deals with the empirical case study of the Sunni Palestinian Hamas between 2005 and 2013. It aims to analyze – along with the main research question of this book – what characterizes Hamas’ conceptions of political order. 4.1 Hamas’ intellectual background: Islamism, resistance, and political order in the Palestinian context It is crucial to take a closer look at Hamas in the Palestinian context between 1987, the year the organization was founded, and 2005, the year that constitutes the beginning of the empirical analysis of this book. The organization’s origins provide a relevant background for the reconstruction of Hamas’ conceptions of political order. Hamas in the context of the Palestinian territories: roots and evolution The name Hamas appeared for the first time in 1987, at the beginning of the first Intifada,1 published in a leaflet.2 However, the roots of the Sunni Hamas go back much further in Palestinian history and are closely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood founded in 1928 in Egypt. First contacts between the Palestinians and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were established in the 1930s. At that time, the Egyptians supported the Palestinians in their struggle against the British mandatory power and the Jewish immigrants (Abu Amr 1994, 1ff.). The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood branch was founded in 1946 in Jerusalem and quickly established a number of cells in different Palestinian cities (Shadid 1988, 659). The organization participated in the 1948 Arab–Israeli war, after Israel had announced the foundation of the Jewish state, and the Palestinian Muslim Brothers were supported by Muslim Brotherhood volunteers from Egypt (Shadid 1988, 659). After the 1948 Arab–Israeli war, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was geographically separated between Gaza and the West Bank and also experienced different conditions and challenges based on the fact that the West Bank had become part of Jordan, and that Gaza was under the administrative and military control of Egypt.3 After the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the borders between both territories were reopened and the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was able to engage in joint initiatives and directly coordinate its affairs. It engaged in building religious institutions and mosques, welfare institutions, and welfare services. It started to provide the people with religious education and managed to become increasingly popular in the Palestinian population by the mid-1970s (Baumgarten 2006, 31ff.). In terms of political positioning the

Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood made clear that it considered all areas on which Israel established its state4 as Palestine and that it would never give away any part of it. Analogs to Hasan al-Banna’s political thought and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (see Chapter 2 of this book), the Palestinian Brothers, presented Islam as the solution to the problems the Palestinian society was facing. It understood the “return to Islam […] [as] the only effective tool in the war with Israel” (Shadid 1988, 669) and hence called for the re-Islamization of the Palestinian population and the whole region, which would be a precondition for the liberation of Palestine (Shadid 1988, 669). Hence, the Palestinian Muslim brothers engaged in the religious education of the Palestinian society to prepare for the liberation of the land. Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who was the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza and later became the founding father of the Palestinian Hamas, was one of the leading figures in this strategy of the re-Islamization of the Palestinian society. He founded an Islamic Center (al-mujamma al-islami) in 1976 that supervised the construction of Mosques and social institutions (Baumgarten 2006, 33). Moreover, Yassin was the protagonist with regard to managing the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood organization (Croitoru 2007, 43ff.). When the first Intifada erupted in 1987, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood had to take a position with regard to the Palestinian uprising against Israel. It decided to depart from its pure educational program and to engage in direct resistance processes against Israel. One day after the Intifada had begun in December 1987, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership drafted a leaflet that demanded the Palestinian people to resist against Israel. Although the leaflet was signed with the Islamic Resistance Movement, and the name Hamas only first emerged two months later in February 1988, December 9, 1987 is generally acknowledged as the date of foundation of the Palestinian Hamas (Baumgarten 2006, 38ff.). The decision to participate in resistance activities and to establish the new movement, Hamas, can be traced back to several different factors. First of all, already prior to the beginning of the Intifada there were controversies within the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood whether or not to engage in resistance activities. Parts of the Muslim Brothers feared the organization would lose ground if it did not engage in the resistance activities against Israel. By the beginning of the Intifada, they saw the opportunity to take a leading position in the uprisings against Israel (Hroub 2010, 41). The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood’s position was furthermore increasingly challenged by another Islamist Palestinian organization: the Islamic Jihad,5 which focused, in contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood, on military resistance against Israel (Hroub 2010, 42). Finally, the foundation of the new organization, Hamas was of great advantage for the Muslim Brothers because if Hamas and the Intifada were not successful, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood would not be damaged. If, however, Hamas was triumphant, it would be a great achievement for the Muslim Brotherhood to present Hamas as part of its own organization. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood did not wait long until it first presented Hamas as its wing in February 1988 (Baumgarten 2006, 40). It reiterated this stance when it published its Charter in August 1988. Throughout the document Hamas presented its ideology, goals, and its worldview to the Palestinian people and strengthened its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Charter presented “the Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas] […] [as] a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood Chapter in Palestine” (Hamas 1993, 123, Article 2). During the first Intifada, Hamas managed to take one of the leading roles in the national Palestinian arena. It organized

mass demonstrations, armed resistance activities against Israel, and expanded its military branch – financially supported by resources collected for the cause of the Intifada abroad (Croitoru 2007, 109). The Sunni organization presented itself as a credible alternative and a serious rival to Yassir Arafat’s national-secular Fatah6 (Abusada 2010, 2) and even heavily influenced the standing of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. Gunning stresses “within years, Hamas had eclipsed the Muslim Brotherhood as the central Islamist political actor. Its leaders became the leaders of the Islamic movement, inheriting the movement’s welfare network, and the more conservative among the Brotherhood leadership receded into underground” (Gunning 2007, 39). Controversies between Hamas and Fatah sharpened, when Fatah recognized Israel, showed its commitment to the two-state-solution, and entered the Oslo peace talks.7 Until the present day, Hamas refuses the Oslo Accords saying that the peace talks are a waste of time as their goal would be the fulfillment of the Israeli demands (Baumgarten 2006, 68ff.; Herz and Steets 2003, 82; Hroub 2010, 95). The return of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to the West Bank and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) based on the Oslo Accords led to further tensions and controversies in the relationship between Fatah and Hamas. The latter decided to continue and expand its military actions against Israel in spite of the Oslo Accords. Violence between Israel and Hamas intensified and after a massacre by a settler against 29 Palestinians in Hebron in 1994, Hamas started its first suicide attacks against Israeli civilians (Baumgarten 2006, 113ff.). At the same time, the Sunni organization started to align closer with the Islamic Republic of Iran and to work with the Lebanese Hezbollah (Gunning 2007, 47). In 2000, when the second Intifada8 began, Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and also the al-Aqsa brigades, the new military branch of Fatah, started to commit dozens of suicide attacks against the Israeli state and its civilians (Croitoru 2007, 148ff.). Especially Hamas benefited from conducting suicide attacks against Israel, as this helped the Sunni organization to become an influential Palestinian player and the operations also led to increased support from the population (Gunning 2007). Israel responded to the Palestinian suicide attacks with targeted killings of Hamas’ leading figures. In early 2004, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Hamas’ founding father, was killed by an Israeli attack (Croitoru 2007, 160). Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, who had become Yassin’s successor, died in a similar attack only one month later (Croitoru 2007, 163). The year 2005 led to radical political changes in the Palestinian arena and also marked an important turning point for Israel. In August and September 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza strip. Ariel Sharon, at that time Prime Minister of Israel, justified this step by referring to Israeli security needs. He blamed the Palestinians for obstructing the Road Map (Sharon 2003), the new peace initiative that should solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.9 By implementing its disengagement plan in 2005, Israel gave up Jewish settlements in the occupied territories for the first time in history (ICG 2005, 4). This changed realities on the ground in Gaza with regard to the distribution of political power. Especially Hamas benefited from Israel’s unilateral withdrawal, as Gaza is the Sunni organization’s stronghold where it enjoys traditionally a huge popularity. At the same time, Hamas had managed to gain in popularity through its violent strategy of armed resistance against Israel during the second Intifada. In the wake of the Israeli withdrawal, Hamas indicated its interest in participating in

politics (Croitoru 2007, 163). Hamas’ intellectual and structural background: Sunni Islamist political thought and diversified leadership structure When looking at Hamas’ intellectual and ideological background, until today many Western politicians and the media refer to the organization’s 1988 Charter10 and subsequently to Hamas’ anti-Semitism and radicalism. Until the present day, they often assess Hamas based on its Charter and derive from this document the impossibility to recognize the Sunni organization as a Palestinian political representative (Bröning 2013, 17; Tamimi 2007, 148ff.). The Western representatives are right in saying that there is anti-Semitic rhetoric in Hamas’ Charter (Bröning 2012, 17). This applies for the Jewish people, which Hamas describes as Zionists and asks every Muslim to engage in a struggle against them (Hamas 1993, Article 14). However, Western politicians and media outlets fail to take into account that Hamas’ Charter, published in 1988, should be understood as a historical document. Hamas members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) confirmed in personal interviews conducted in the realm of this book that “the 1988 Charter is not part of Hamas’ thinking anymore. The Charter is part of the organization’s historic development. Today it is rather used by Hamas’ enemies to characterize Hamas and to say: look, this is Hamas” (Hamas PLC Member 1 2013, 09/04). They refer to the fact that many things published in the Charter would nowadays not be realistic anymore and that Hamas has changed since its foundation (Hamas PLC Member 2 2013, 08/25). One Hamas PLC member even stressed that today “no one gives attention to the 1988 Charter anymore” (Hamas PLC Member 3 2013, 08/28). These statements by the Hamas PLC members show that one should not base the analysis of Hamas’ intellectual thought on the organization’s Charter alone. I argue, however, that the Charter can tell us something about Hamas’ roots in Sunni political Islam and the evolution of its Islamist-nationalist ideology that can be found in the organization’s political thought until today. Islamist political thought Hamas presents itself in its Charter as the Islamic Resistance Movement that understands “Islam [as] […] its system” and underlines that “from Islam it reaches for its ideology, fundamental precepts, and world view of life, the universe and humanity; and it judges all its actions according to Islam and is inspired by Islam to correct its errors” (Hamas 1993, Article 1). Article 1 refers to Hamas’ deep religious background, which is underlined in the course of the entire document, because the organization very often includes Suras from the Quran to justify its argumentation. Also, the organization’s ideological ties to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood become clear. As stated above, the Charter directly refers to the Muslim Brotherhood and to its comprehensive understanding of Islam as a: precise conceptualization of the Islamic precepts in all aspects of life: concept and belief, politics and economics, education and social service, jurisdiction and law, exhortation and training, communication and arts, the seen and the unseen, and the rest of life’s way. (Hamas 1993, Article 2)

The direct reference to this comprehensive understanding of Islam as a maxim in all aspects of life, which is based on Hasan al-Banna’s political thought, indicates that Hamas also understands Islam as a comprehensive system. The paragraphs in the Charter that deal with topics such as the training of Muslim generations, the role of the Muslim woman, or welfare issues very much strengthen this line of argument. Besides its ideological commitment to Sunni political Islam, Hamas also reveals its position as a national movement in its 1988 Charter. It directly links its understanding of nationalism to its religious orientation in saying that “nationalism is part and parcel of [its] religious ideology” (Hamas 1993, Article 12). Another document published by Hamas’ Political Bureau in the late 1990s underlines the close relationship between Islam, nationalism, and resistance in Hamas’ political thought (see Tamimi 2007, 247). Hamas’ deep religious-nationalist orientation remains important until today although the organizations’ general orientation has been expanded. In a 2008 interview Khaled Meshal, at that time head of Hamas’ Political Buerau, characterized the organization as follows: Hamas can be characterized as a comprehensive movement. It is an Islamic movement, a nationalist movement, a militant movement, a political movement – in addition to its cultural and social dimensions, its service functions, and its institution building […]. It is a fusion of all these dimensions. (Meshal quoted from Rabbani 2008, 69) Meshal’s statement shows that Hamas’ should now be understood in a very encompassing way. At the same time Meshal reveals that religion and nationalism, which were introduced in the 1988 Charter, remained relevant until today. What is striking and remains important is Hamas’ flexible understanding of Islam and its flexible application of Islam in political matters. One Beirut-based leading Hamas official I interviewed in 2013 outlined that “Islam is Hamas’ spiritual and political source and our [Hamas’] principles are based on Islam. Islam calls for freedom, justice, equality, peace, and the ending of captivity, injustice and murder” (Hamas Official in Beirut 2 2013, 05/15, author’s translation). Obviously, the interviewee’s argument is in line with that of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the line of argument Hamas followed in its Charter already: he proposes Islam as the solution for contemporary problems. He furthermore presents Islam as a framework Hamas derives its principles from. Other interviewees confirm this perspective and underline the linkage between Hamas’ political thought and that of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. One former minister from Hamas based in the West Bank stated in an interview that I conducted for this book that: Hamas applies the principles of Islam within its politics, actions, and thoughts. In doing so, Hamas believes in the same thoughts as the Muslim Brotherhood. It believes in the Quran, the hadith and the sunna but in a flexible and not a strict way (Former Minister Hamas 3 2013, 09/04) A Hamas PLC member strengthens this perspective and underlines that the application of Islam

depends on the principle of ijtihad (Hamas PLC Member 1 2013, 09/04). This shows Hamas’ flexible understanding of Islam and indicates that the organization applies Islam in consideration of the contemporary circumstances. Some experts on Hamas based in the West Bank additionally claim that Hamas uses Islam to attract new members (Expert on Hamas 4 2013, 08/30) and as a motivation or means for the resistance cause (Expert on Hamas 1 2013, 08/24). Diversified organizational structure Hamas’ theological commitment to Sunni political Islam also becomes visible in the organization’s structure, which is heterogenous and characterized by the fact that it is located within and outside the Palestinian Territories. The most important organ of Hamas’ organizational structure is the Shura Council, which consists of approximately 60 members (Bröning 2013, 25) and is elected by local and regional units. The Shura Council is located within the Palestinian Territories and is responsible for the overall political strategy and the outline of the entire organization. “The Shura Council is the equivalent of the legislative power at a state level. It has final authority over formal policy decisions” as Gunning puts it (Gunning 2007, 100; emphasis in original). A Hamas member from the PLC underlines in a personal interview that in the Shura Council a high level of discussion takes place. He stresses that leaders do not automatically have the last word and are democratically elected (Hamas PLC Member 1 2013). This is in line with the general nature of a decentralized religious leadership in Sunni Islamism (Deming 2015, 435). The Shura Council elects Hamas’ Political Bureau, which is located outside the Palestinian Territories. It has up to 19 members (Bröning 2013, 25) and is based in Doha, Qatar today (Milton-Edwards 2013, 65).11 According to Gunning, the Political Bureau can be understood as an “equivalent to the executive at state level and is charted with the day-to-day implementation of the Shura Council’s strategy” (Gunning 2007, 100). Hroub underlines that the Shura Council and the Political Bureau establish further committees that deal with questions related to different affairs such as welfare, religion, media relations, or questions with regard to women (Hroub 2010, 160). Some studies claim, that Hamas’ military wing, the Izz al-din al-Qassam Brigades (IQB), is de facto controlled by the Political Bureau (Bröning 2013, 25; Gunning 2007, 40), although this seems to be a matter of uncertainty as Hamas deliberately keeps the concrete mechanisms of control between the political leadership and the military wing unclear (Hroub 2010, 160). The IQB were created by Sheikh Yassin at the beginning of the 1990s (MiltonEdwards and Farrell 2010, 112) and they are completely separated from Hamas’ political wings (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 113). The IQB, which have become known for committing bloody suicide attacks in the 1990s and during the second Intifada (Tamimi 2007, 163ff.), are said to have reached increasing autonomy within Hamas (Gunning 2007, 41). Besides the geographical separation between the Political Bureau and the Shura Council, leadership structures of Hamas also exist in those neighbor countries, where the Palestinian refugees are based: Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.12 Over the years, struggles over the distribution of power between the inside and the outside leadership have emerged within Hamas. As long as Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Hamas’ founding father and charismatic leader, was still alive, the leadership based inside the Palestinian Territories was more powerful than the

outside leadership. After his death, the balance of power was expected to have shifted from the inside leadership to the Political Bureau, located outside the Palestinian Territories (Hroub 2004, 32ff.). Until today, tensions between different branches and its leaders exist within Hamas. In sum, Hamas’ heterogenous leadership structure supports the organization to secure itself from Israeli threats but also from the PLO, especially in the early years (Tamimi 2007, 61). Hroub furthermore states that the outside leadership has also always engaged in recruiting financial and political support from the outside (Hroub 2010, 159). At the same time, one has to take into account that Hamas’ diversified leadership based inside the Palestinian Territories and abroad facilitates the emergence of different interests within the organization, which may lead to struggles over power within Hamas. The core norm of resistance – liberating the land The norm of resistance constitutes a significant part of Hamas’ identity. This becomes already very clear when looking at the organization’s name, Hamas, which is acronym for harakat almuqawama al-islamiyya meaning The Islamic Resistance Movement and hence directly refers to the importance of resistance for Hamas. In the preamble of its 1988 Charter, the organization outlines its primary goal: the liberation of Palestine through the fight against the Jews (Hamas 1993, 123, preamble). Hamas furthermore claims that it understands Palestine as an Islamic waqf (Arabic for endowment) and underlines that nobody is allowed to give the whole waqf or even parts of it away (Hamas 1993, 125, Article 11). The organization even stresses that “giving up any part of Palestine is like giving up part of its [the organization’s] religion” (Hamas 1993, 126, Article 13). In its Charter, Hamas directly links its right on Palestine to the liberation of the land from the Jewish occupation. In Article 15, it defines “jihad13 for the liberation of Palestine” (Hamas 1993, 126, Article 15) as obligatory for every Muslim if the land is occupied by the enemies and claims that “in the struggle against the Jewish occupation of Palestine, the banner of jihad must be raised” (Hamas 1993, 127, Article 15; emphasis in original). Although Hamas’ politicians underline that today the Charter should be understood as a historical document of the organization, the articles from the Charter quoted above illustrate the close relationship between resistance, jihad, and liberation in Hamas’ political thought. Other documents and statements announced at a later time by Hamas reiterate and strengthen this understanding. In a document published by Hamas’ Political Bureau in the mid1990s, Hamas introduces itself as a “Palestinian national liberation movement that struggles for the liberation of the Palestinian occupied territories and for the recognition of the Palestinian legitimate rights” (Hamas quoted from Tamimi 2007, 247). It furthermore states that Hamas understands “armed struggle […] [as] the only real means of liberation” (Hamas quoted from Tamimi 2007, 247). Although not only military resistance exists but also other forms such as social resistance (Roy 2011, 79), Palestinian researchers and experts on Hamas whom I interviewed in the Palestinian Territories in 2013 agreed that military resistance is the most important component of Hamas’ resistance means (Expert on Hamas 1 2013, 08/24; Expert on Hamas 2 2013, 09/02) and is closely linked to Hamas’ conceptions of power (Expert on Hamas 3 2013, 09/07). One expert on Hamas added that religion functions “as a motivation or means for resistance” (Expert on Hamas 1 2013, 08/24) and that “as far as

resistance is concerned religion cannot be seen” (Expert on Hamas 1 2013, 08/24). Hence, Hamas’ Sunni Islamist political thought seems not to be decisive for the organization’s understanding of resistance. Rather military resistance plays an important role for Hamas’ struggle for the liberation of Palestine and is important for Hamas’ understanding of power. When looking at Hamas’ discourse towards its military interactions, the document published by the Political Bureau in the mid-1990s and one top-ranking Hamas official whom I interviewed in Beirut in 2013 emphasize that Hamas restricts its fight against Israel to the Palestinian Territories (Hamas Official in Beirut 1 2013, 05/28; Tamimi 2007, 250). This indicates that Hamas would not attack Jewish political institutions or people outside the Palestinian Territories. The Political Bureau’s document from the mid-1990s furthermore states that military resistance is principally directed against military targets and not civilians (Hamas quoted from Tamimi 2007, 250). However, especially during the 1990s and early 2000s, when Hamas became known for its bloody suicide operations (Hroub 2010, 87ff.), the organization could no longer deny that its targets were also civilians. Already in the document published by the Political Bureau in the mid-1990s, Hamas classified these attacks as a vengeance against the assassination of Palestinian civilians by Israeli forces (Hamas quoted from Tamimi 2007, 250). This perspective has also been reiterated by the Hamas leadership in recent years (Meshal in Rabbani 2008, 63). Hamas also introduced the concept of a cease-fire with Israel in its political thought and its interaction processes towards Israel. In 1995, at the time when the Palestinian legislative elections14 took place, Hamas conducted for the first time a cease-fire although it was never formally declared. Later cease-fire offers and attempts followed, e.g. in 2003 when Hamas for the first time officially announced a cease-fire, referred to as hudna15 (Gunning 2007, 221ff.). Although Israel did not positively respond to any of Hamas’ cease-fire offers and also the Sunni organization’s intentions behind the ceasefire attempts were not clear,16 Hamas procedures show the different approaches and means the organization follows in its resistance activities towards Israel. In sum, resistance against Israeli occupation and the liberation of Palestine are inseparably linked to each other and resistance can be understood as Hamas’ core norm. It emerged and achieved its meaning through interactions with Israeli during the first Intifada. Once Hamas had been founded and resistance had become the organization’s core norm, this very core norm achieved a structuring quality for Hamas and became a reference frame for the organization’s behavior. Resistance against Israel and the liberation of Palestine have remained Hamas’ main aims until today. Only back in 2012 Khaled Meshal claimed that “Jihad and armed resistance is the correct and authentic means for the liberation of Palestine and the restoration of all rights” (Meshal 2012). Early conceptions of order – the vague vision of an Islamic state In its early announcements and publications, the leaflets at the beginning of the first Intifada and the 1988 Charter, Hamas uttered the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine as the goal that would be realized after the liberation of land (Hamas 1993, 125, Article 11). However, Hamas did not present is vision of an Islamic state in a clear manner. In its 1988 Charter, the organization announces that it “adopts Islam as a system of life, and [that it] works toward

raising the banner of Allah on every inch of Palestine” (Hamas 1993, 124, Article 6). Hamas furthermore argues that at the time, the organization evolved “the lack of the Islamic Spirit has brought about distorted judgement and absurd comprehension” (Hamas 1993, 125, Article 9). The organization proceeds in denouncing the deterioration of the values in Palestine, the occupation of land and the expulsion of people. Based on its ideological linkages to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Hasan al-Banna’s political thought, Hamas proposes Islam as the solution of those problems and claims that “as long as Islam does not take its rightful place in the world arena everything will continue to change for the worse” (Hamas 1993, 125, Article 9) and underlines that the organization will “conquer evil […] so that the country may return to its rightful place, and so that the call may be broadcast over the Minarets [lit, Mosques] proclaiming the Islamic state” (Hamas 1993, 125, Article 9). Hamas, however, did not substantiate its ideal of an Islamic state in its Charter except for referring to the fact that it understands Palestine as an Islamic waqf, which belongs to “all Muslim generations until the day of Resurrection” (Hamas 1993, 125, Article 10). Also in a memo that Hamas’ Political Bureau prepared in 2000, just before the second Intifada erupted, the Sunni organization defines its political program as being “based on mobilising the resources of the Palestinian people and the Arab and Islamic Ummah and dedicating them to ending the Zionist project and establishing an Arab Islamic state in the whole of Palestine” (Hamas quoted from Tamimi 2007, 262). Although Hamas derives some concrete political attitudes towards Palestinian forces and factions, settlements, external relations, and other religions (Hamas quoted from Tamimi 2007, 262ff.), it omits to define what such an Islamic state should precisely look like. In sum, the characteristics of the Islamic state ideal remain quite vague. In the secondary literature it is probably Jeroen Gunning who identifies the most detailed “structure of Hamas’ utopian Islamic State” (Gunning 2007, 57) as he puts it. Based on interviews with Hamas leaders and members, he distinguishes legislative, executive and legal elements within Hamas’ Islamic state (Gunning 2007, 57ff.). Khaled Hroub underlines that the ideal of an Islamic state has indeed been mentioned by Hamas members but has never been a precise plan, which Hamas seriously planned to implement (Hroub 2010, 48). 4.2 Hamas comes to power: new visions of a Palestinian political order? Changing national context: the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Hamas’ decision to enter politics When Israel completed the evacuation of its settlements in the Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank and its withdrawal from Gaza in September 2005, Hamas celebrated the withdrawal as a success of the resistance. The organization’s mouthpiece, Filastin al-Muslima, published a special column in its September 2005 edition that was called “Gaza free … and the resistance is ongoing” (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2005e, 9,). Additionally, Filastin al-Muslima published policy statements by the Hamas leadership that highlighted the achievements of the resistance in the fight against the Israeli occupation (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2005b, 9). However, Hamas was well aware of the power struggles that would possibly emerge between itself and Fatah in

the vacuum of the Gaza Strip. Already before the withdrawal was completed, Hamas demanded for the establishment of a joint committee, consisting of Fatah, Hamas, and further Palestinian factions, which should be responsible to monitor the Israeli withdrawal (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2005a). The joint committee was never established. On August 13, 2005, already before the withdrawal from Gaza was completed, the Hamas leadership held a press conference in Gaza. During that conference, Hamas presented eleven bullet points concerning the organization’s vision about its politics, the participation in the 2006 parliamentary elections, and its relationship with Fatah. It is striking that at this point of time, Hamas did not present any steps concerning a future political order in Gaza. Besides praising its success with regard to the Israeli withdrawal and reiterating the rights Hamas considered to be fundamental for the Palestinians, the Sunni organization concentrated on two distinct topics: its own position within the Palestinian national arena and the organization’s weapons. In bullet point seven, Hamas emphasized that the Sunni organization: is not a government within the government17 and does not go for a confrontation [with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)] […]. But at the same time there has to be established a national Palestinian decision based on partnership. And we [Hamas] note that it is necessary that the PLO renews its political and organizational fundament. (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2005c, 9, author’s translation) This statement indicates that Hamas was well aware of the lingering power struggle with Fatah and that it absolutely tried to present itself as an organization, which does not aim at imposing something on anyone but rather sought to achieve decisions based on common understandings. Although Hamas demanded a renewal of the PLO, it presented itself as an organization open for dialogue. This is the contrary in the case of the attitude Hamas presented concerning the resistance and its weapons. In bullet point eight of the declaration Hamas made clear that it would definitely adhere to resistance as a strategic choice until the occupation of the Palestinian land has ended and the Palestinians achieve their national rights. Hamas underlined, that it will adhere to its military branch, the IQB (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2005c, 9). Abu Ubaida, the IQB’s official spokesperson, further classified Hamas’ weapons as: legal weapons in the Palestinian arena [and stated that] they are not used by any side movements or within a context of chaos. The weapons of the resistance are only used against the occupation and this remains the cause. Hence it is not possible to release the weapons. (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2005d, 9, author’s translation) By labelling its weapons as legal, Hamas emphasized that it will not allow any discussion on a possible release of its weapons. Hamas’ decision to participate in elections – protecting resistance Nine months before the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza was completed, in December 2004, municipal elections were held in the Palestinian Territories for the first time for almost thirty

years.18 Hamas had announced its participation in the local elections in August 2004 and achieved a huge electoral success. The elections were held in four rounds in the West Bank and Gaza and especially in round four, which included important cities such as Ramallah where the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) is based, Hamas “won a net victory with 73% of the electoral voices” (Balawi 2006, 128). A couple of months later, Hamas announced its decision to participate in the Palestinian Legislative elections. In March 2005, the Sunni organization declared that: on the basis of adherence to the legitimate rights of our people and the preservation of the program of resistance as a strategic choice until the end of the occupation, [we want] to participate in building the institutions of Palestinian society on healthy foundations, to cure corruption and vice in all its forms, and to carry out the national global and authentic reform so that our people are able to resist occupation and aggression. (Hamas quoted from Legrain 2012, 190) In this declaration Hamas highlights that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and resistance as a strategic choice contribute to the motive for Hamas’ decision to participate in the establishment of healthy Palestinian institutions. It is striking that any reference to religion is missing. There are several reasons that might have influenced Hamas decision to participate in the elections. Khaled Meshal, head of Hamas’ Political Bureau at that time, emphasized Hamas’ need to participate in the PNA to secure resistance and its weapons. Confronted with a new reality: we [Hamas] were not dealing with an authority [the PNA] that protected us, that defended our program, our weapons, and our activities. It was therefore necessary to participate in this authority through the ballot box to defend the resistance program, prevent the loss of Palestinian rights. (Meshal quoted from Rabbani 2008, 69) It is striking that Meshal clearly links Hamas’ decision to participate in the elections to the need to secure the organization’s weapons and thus its core norm of resistance. However, there were further reasons that might have influenced Hamas’ decision to participate in the elections. First, the Hamas leadership structure in Gaza had changed after many of the Hamas leaders had become victims of Israel’s strategy of targeted killings – among them the charismatic leaders Sheikh Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi. This led to the emergence of a new leadership elite in Hamas after 2004. Second, based on its success in the municipal elections, the organization very likely assumed being able to achieve an electoral success in the national arena as well. The stagnating Oslo peace process has helped the Sunni organization to improve its reputation and to gain support from the Palestinian population (Asseburg 2007a, 39ff.). Hamas’ pluralist government programs The electoral platform change and reform – conceptions of a political order within an

Islamic frame of reference After Hamas had decided to participate in the Palestinian legislative elections, it announced an encompassing electoral platform called Change and Reform, which comprises eighteen sections (Ḥamās 2005). It sharply differs from the 1988 Charter in terms of content and language and Hamas also presents itself as a different organization from that one in its first official document. Hamas expert Khaled Hroub argues that based on its electoral platform Hamas presented itself as a completely altered and new Hamas (Hroub 2010, 186). The call for reform and awakening constitutes an elementary part of the electoral platform, which becomes already clear when looking at the title of the electoral platform: Change and Reform. Hamas starts the platform with domestic and foreign policy, deals with administrative reforms and the fight against corruption, with legal policy, social policy, youth issues, as well as economic, financial and monetary issues (Ḥamās 2005). It is striking that Islam plays a role but is less important than in the 1988 Charter. In the first section of its electoral platform, which is called Our Principles, Hamas states, that “the religion of Islam and its civilizational achievements are our reference and approach of life with all its political, economic, social, and legal components” (Ḥamās 2005, 3, Article 1, author’s translation). In referring to Islam as the frame of reference and approach of life, Hamas clearly shows its commitment to Hasan alBanna’s and the Muslim Brotherhood’s political thought, who understand Islam as a solution for all contemporary problems of life. The reference to the Muslim Brotherhood also becomes visible at the back page of the electoral program where Hamas quotes the famous phrase of the Muslim Brotherhood “Islam is the solution” (Ḥamās 2005, 28, author’s translation). Throughout the electoral platform itself, Islam is only mentioned rarely and Hamas calls for a modern civil state based on pluralism (Ḥamās 2005, 3, Article 2), the separation of powers (Ḥamās 2005, 8, Article 5), and equal citizen rights (Ḥamās 2005, 9, Article 6). However, Hamas’ electoral platform includes two sections that are very important for the legal system of the state and that include strong references to the religion of Islam. Section 5 discusses legislative policy and judicial reform and calls for the establishment of the shari’a, the Islamic law, as the main source of legislation in Palestine (Ḥamās 2005, 8, section 5). It is striking that the precise application of shari’a law remains open for interpretations at this point. With regard to family law, Hamas refers to the recognized Islamic jurisprudential schools where the shari’a shall be based on, but again the paragraph misses further clarification (Ḥamās 2005, 14, Article 90). Hamas’ core norm of resistance also plays a role in the organization’s electoral platform. In the introduction Hamas labels resistance as the strategic choice to end occupation and underlines in Article 1 that the Palestinian people have to use all available means to end the occupation – among them armed resistance (Ḥamās 2005, 3, section 1) and hence adheres to the weapons of the resistance. Resistance as such is only mentioned very rarely in the electoral program and it is extremely striking that Hamas does not always use the Arabic term for resistance, muqawama, when it refers to resistance but also the term samoud, which can be translated as resistance but also as steadfastness or endurance. This leads to the suggestion that at this point Hamas does not refer to its core norm of resistance but rather to a general enduring struggle and opposition against Israel. In sum, the electoral platform uses a very clear language and deals with Palestinian

political and social issues in an encompassing way. It departs from the vague vision of establishing an Islamic state, which was visible in the 1988 Charter, although some references to Islam are to be found especially with regard to legal issues. Overall, very clearly the element of reform follows through the electoral platform. This becomes clear by the title of the program Change and Reform but also by the organization’s focus on conducting reforms and fighting corruption in several policy fields. Concerning the institutions of the state, Hamas’ statements are characterized by a commitment to a civil state based on pluralism. Hence, Hamas’ conceptions of a political order presented in the electoral platform show democratic elements. At the same time, this political order would have a strong Islamic frame of reference, as Hamas calls for the implementation of shari’a law. Hamas’ core norm of resistance is still mentioned but fades into the background. Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind that the Sunni organization never put the existence of its weapons into question. By keeping this issue of its weapons in the background Hamas possibly tries to present itself as an open organization that is electable by the whole Palestinian population. Hamas’ performance in the legislative elections was characterized by a huge success. The Sunni organization won a clear majority in the Palestinian parliament. It managed to win 72 of the seats in the PLC while Fatah won only 45 seats (Central Elections Commission Palestine 2006). Fatah and Hamas were surprised by the latter’s groundbreaking victory, as a victory of Fatah was widely expected due to polls conducted before the elections took place (Baumgarten 2006, 177ff.). It is especially striking that Hamas itself had hoped for a relevant representation in the PLC to influence the Palestinian legislation but never expected the considerable victory it achieved in the elections (Knudsen and Ezbidi 2006, 10). The draft national unity government program After winning the Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas invited the other Palestinian factions, especially Fatah, to build a coalition government. Ismael Haniyeh, who had been Hamas’ frontrunner during the elections, underlined that Hamas followed this procedure, as it favored a dominant national governing coalition with a technocratic character because it would best serve the Palestinian population and its concern. Nevertheless, Haniyeh reinforced that Hamas was able to build a government on its own, if Fatah refused to enter a coalition government (al-Intiqād 2006, 02/10). Hroub argues that Hamas’ procedures towards building a national unity government can mainly be traced back to the fact that the Sunni organization had prepared itself and its candidates to become an important opposition force in the new parliament but not to take over government responsibility (Hroub 2010, 190ff.). After almost two months of negotiations, Ismael Haniyeh proposed a national unity government program to the Palestinian Legislative Council and delivered a list of the twenty-four members of the Palestinian cabinet and the speaker of the parliament. Fatah, however, refused to participate in a national unity government for two reasons: on the one hand, Fatah hoped that the Hamas government would fall quickly based on missing governance experience of its members and an international boycott19 of the government. On the other hand, international actors threatened Fatah to become subject of the boycott as well (Sayigh 2007, 15ff.). Although the coalition negotiations between Hamas and the other Palestinian factions failed, the following paragraph

gives a brief overview of the draft national unity government platform, as the document already shows how Hamas pragmatically departs from its electoral platform right after it achieved victory during the Palestinian Legislative elections. The draft national unity program consists of thirty-nine articles and it is striking that religion, i.e. Islam, is less important than in the electoral platform discussed above and almost does not play a role in the proposed national unity program anymore. Also, resistance is only mentioned once, when Hamas clarifies in Article 4 that it “uphold[s] the belief that resistance in its various forms is a legitimate right of the Palestinians to bring an end to the occupation and to secure their national rights” (Hamas 2006, 163, Article 4). Any reference to the issue of armed resistance is not mentioned at all. The organization rather concentrates on issues it had already emphasized in the electoral platform such as the fight against corruption and rebuilding the society and public institutions based on democratic principles (Hamas 2006, 163, Article 6). It furthermore demands for the strengthening of the rule of law, for building a strong civil society and strong welfare institutions and for strengthening the Palestinian economy through investments and trade relations (Hamas 2006, 164, Articles 18, 22, 26, 27, and 36). Hence the organization addresses issues that have a lot in common with the functions a nation state has to provide. Hamas also implicitly deals with the topic of Israel and a possible two-state solution without directly mentioning the Jewish state. Moreover, it drops the reference to “the enemy” which is how Hamas framed Israel in earlier documents. In section 5, the organization highlights the need to “cooperate with the international community to end the occupation, remove settlements, and demands a complete Israeli withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem, to achieve calm and stability during this phase” (Hamas 2006, 163, Article 5). In doing so, Hamas implicitly refers to a possible two-state solution, as it talks about the lands occupied in 1967 and not about historical Palestine – as the organization used to do. In sum, Hamas’ draft of a national unity program is in line with its electoral program. Again, the organization’s conceptions of political order are characterized by pluralism and a commitment to a strong civil state. It focuses on fighting corruption and building strong state institutions. Hamas’ core norm of resistance has been lost in importance towards the organization’s conceptions of political order. It is only mentioned once and seems to function more as a frame of reference than to be of high significance for the organization’s conceptions of political order. The same applies for Hamas’ ideological background. Its commitment to Sunni Islamist political thought plays no relevant role concerning its conceptions of political order presented in the draft of the national unity program. The Hamas government program As the negotiations for the establishment of a national unity government failed and Hamas owned the electoral majority, Ismael Haniyeh delivered the Sunni organization’s standalone government program to the PLC on March 27, 2006 and the new government won confidence. Khaled Hroub underlines that the government program is of special interest, as “it represents Hamas alone” (Hroub 2006, 20). It shows the political concepts Hamas had elaborated for the

Palestinian political order. Ismael Haniyeh presented Hamas’ government in his ministerial statement. The program consists of seven overall topics listed as follows:20 (1) The issue of occupation, (2) the provision of security and the end of chaos in the Palestinian national arena, (3) the economic conditions, (4) reform of administration and the finance sector and the fight against corruption, (5) building strong Palestinian institutions based on democracy and establishment of political partnership, (6) reinforce the status of the Palestinian cause in the Arab and Islamic world, (7) establishment of regional and international partnerships to serve the Palestinian cause (Haniya 2006, 3). It is striking that the organization only mentions resistance once throughout the entire program. It refers to the Palestinian people that engaged throughout history in the resistance against the occupation – martyrs, politicians, and ordinary Palestinians alike (Haniya 2006, 2). It completely lacks any reference to Hamas’ military wing or the organization’s arms. Also, religious terms or Islamist ideology do not appear in the government program except for some Quran suras, which were quoted. Hamas also does not call for the implementation of shari’a law anymore, which was part of the organization’s electoral platform. When looking at the core points of the government program, Hamas starts with its stances towards the occupation, as the organization refers to Israel. Again, it is striking that Hamas avoids using the term “enemy” as it used to do before but always speaks about “the occupation.” Khaled Hroub even argues, although Hamas does not officially recognize the agreements signed between Israel and the PLO “the concept of the two-state-solution is everywhere between the lines in Haniyeh’s speech” (Hroub 2006, 22). This argument might be exaggerated, because Hamas refuses to recognize Israel as well as any partial solutions or preliminary borders (Haniya 2006, 3), which very likely refers to the approval of a two-state solution and a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders. However, the organization makes clear that it is willing to cooperate with Israel with regard to economics, trade, healthcare, and labor issues (Haniya 2006, 4). When looking closer at the following sections it is striking that Hamas pragmatically addresses the issues, which are relevant to improve the daily life of the Palestinian people, before focusing on state building issues. It deals with the improvement of the security situation – for the Palestinian people and international institutions and embassies – and with a strengthening of the performance of the security apparatus to protect the people. The organization calls for the fight against corruption, as promised in the electoral platform and for reforming the public administration. First, concrete measures can be found, such as Hamas’ claim for the establishment of Palestinian societal strategy for the development of the administration (Haniya 2006, 4). It is only in section 5 that Hamas addresses the Palestinian political order. It shows its full commitment to pluralism, the principle of shura, and democracy. The organization acknowledges that the establishment of a rule of law free of prejudices and tribal influence is needed to promote democracy (Haniya 2006, 4). Moreover, Hamas considers an independent and professional judiciary as necessary to strengthen the rule of law, democracy, and human rights. The section also shows Hamas’ commitment to the principle of citizenship and to the protection of the people from discrimination based on religion or political affiliation. It is striking that Hamas shows a deep interest in national cooperation and national unity although the other Palestinian factions refused to participate in the Hamas-led government. Hamas strongly refers to the negotiations it engaged in with regard

to forming a national unity government and states “that the door remains open for participation in government” (Haniya 2006, 7, author’s translation). Concerning the main research question of this book we can sum up that Hamas’ conceptions of political order presented in the government program are in line with those in the electoral program and the draft of the national unity program. They are characterized by a commitment to a pluralist state order based on democratic principles. Hamas highlights the importance of building strong state institutions and the fight against corruption. It is striking, however, that throughout Hamas’ government program the security sector became more important than it used to be in the electoral platform and the draft national unity government program. Hamas’ core norm of resistance and its commitment to Sunni Islamist political thought have again been fading into the background and serve as reference frames for behavior. One has always to bear in mind, however that Hamas never put its core norm of resistance, including its armed status, into question. In keeping the core norm of resistance in the background Hamas presents itself as an organization open for the Palestinian peoples’ demands and tries to shape their knowledge concerning its own orientation. In sum, all three programs, Hamas’ electoral platform, its draft national unity government program, and its government program, are characterized by a commitment to a pluralist civil state, state-building issues, a reform of the administrative and financial system, and entail democratic elements. From program to program the core norm of resistance and Hamas’ commitment to Sunni Islamist political thought are fading into the background. One expert of Hamas, whom I interviewed argued that all of a sudden Hamas found itself “face to face with politics and they started to become more pragmatic and express themselves as [a] Palestinian political party with an Islamic reference and not as an Islamic party” (Expert on Hamas 3 2013, 09/07). This statement indicates that the new situation Hamas was facing in the Palestinian national context led to a mitigation of Hamas’ core norm of resistance in its programs and also of its Islamist political thought in favor of a more prominent role for pluralist concepts. Palestinian contestation: first trends towards authoritarianism and the emergence of a dual security structure The newly elected Hamas government was facing strong economic and security constraints. The international community and Israel had imposed a boycott on the Hamas government (ICG 2006a, 31, 2007, 2; Knudsen and Ezbidi 2006, 3; The World Bank 2006, i). At the same time, the government infrastructure Hamas inherited from Fatah was in a very bad condition and, in particular, “the PA police was in a state of near collapse” (quoted from ICG 2007, 9). The Hamas government tried to overcome the security challenges and to improve the security situation in the Palestinian Territories through establishing its own internal security force in April 2006: al-qawa al-tanfithiya, i.e. the Executive Support Force (ESF). The ESF is hierarchically structured and consists of 5500 to 5800 members (ICG 2007, 11; MiltonEdwards 2008a, 666). It represents an alternative police force besides the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP). Although Hamas integrated some of the members of its military wing, the Izz al-

din al-Qassam Brigades (IQB), into the ESF (Milton-Edwards 2008a, 665), the latter is an autonomous organization. Concerning the affiliation of the ESF members, a spokesperson claims that its members do not only belong to Hamas but also to Fatah, the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and some other smaller Palestinian groups. Fatah however claims that its members are not part of the ESF (ICG 2007, 11). The ESF, which was only deployed in the Gaza-Strip and not in the West Bank, managed to restore law and order to a certain degree although its primary function was contested. While some of its members understood the creation of the ESF as a means to integrate the different militias that were operating in Gaza and claimed it would become a legitimate part of the PA, (Milton-Edwards 2008a, 669) others criticized the ESF was founded to fight Fatah and “established to bolster Hamas’s power rather than an interior ministry unit meant to assist existing PA security forces to enforce law and order” (ICG 2006b, 14). MiltonEdwards argues that the control of the strategic dimension of the security sector was a “key dimension [to conduct] power through governance after the Palestinian elections 2006” (Milton-Edwards 2008a, 673). Her assessment is reinforced by the fact that the Fatah-PA security forces were unwilling to co-operate with Hamas and the Palestinian President Abbas reinforced the Presidential Guard and controlled a 60,000 members security force (Caridi 2012, 228). Fatah’s interactions show that it was not willing to completely hand over power to Hamas. Hence, Hamas might have used the ESF to exercise power and to uphold its power position and thus shows first tendencies towards authoritarianism after its government had come to power. Towards national conciliation – Hamas secures its interests Based on the severe economic challenges mainly caused by the international boycott and the duality of the security structure between Fatah and Hamas, tensions between both organizations sharpened. Hamas increasingly blamed Fatah and the international community for trying to thwart the choice of the Palestinian people, i.e. the democratic election of Hamas. Musa Abu Marzouq, at that time Deputy Chairman of Hamas’ Political Bureau, even detects attempts by others to create internal strife between the Palestinians without directly addressing someone (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2006, 9). Against that background, contentions between Hamas and Fatah sharpened and by April 2006 the first violent clashes erupted between supporters of Hamas and Fatah. Violence increased over the following months (Schanzer 2008, 99ff.). Given the violence between both factions many initiatives were launched to overcome the dispute by introducing reconciliation initiatives.21 It is relevant to take a closer look at them to reconstruct Hamas’ conceptions of political order in national Palestinian political documents. The National Conciliation Document of June 2006 consists of eighteen sections. The document does not only address the Palestinian reconciliation but also the issues on the future of a Palestinian state. Concerning the Palestinian reconciliation, the most important topics are the reorganization of the PLO, the strengthening of the PNA as the most important institution of a future Palestinian state, the work on the formation of a national unity government, and the reform of the Palestinian security system. The document already addresses the reorganization of the PLO in section 2. It calls for the reinforcement of “the status of the PLO as the sole

legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” (National Conciliation Document 2006, section 2) but at the same time highlights the need “to protect and support the PNA since it is the nucleus of the future state and was born of the struggle and the sacrifices of the Palestinian people” (National Conciliation Document 2006, section five). The strengthening of the PNA indicates a weakening of the PLO alike. If a Palestinian state was born, the PNA would be the core institution of that state and would then represent the people. This implicitly includes a marginalization of the PLO, which would in turn help Hamas to engage in the political infrastructure of the Palestinian Territories without becoming part of the PLO. Bearing in mind the duality of the security structure Fatah and Hamas have established and the violent clashes between Hamas and Fatah, a reform of the security sector belongs to the most important issues of the conciliation document. Section 16 calls for a comprehensive reform of the Palestinian security sector and all its branches and it is very striking that it highlights the “need to coordinate and organize the relationship between the security forces and the resistance and organize and protect their weapons” (National Conciliation Document 2006, section 16). This is a direct reference to the weapons of Hamas and implies that Hamas will not release its weapons but rather seeks to protect them in the framework of the national security system. Section 16 is not the only paragraph that refers to Hamas’ core norm of resistance. Already in section 3 there is a direct reference to: the right of the Palestinian people to resist and to uphold the option of resistance of occupation by various means and focusing on resistance in territories occupied in 1967 in tandem with political action, negotiations and diplomacy whereby there is a broad participation from all sectors in the popular resistance. (National Conciliation Document 2006, section 3) The section avoids mentioning armed resistance and focuses on different forms of resistance. A Hamas member of the PLC confirmed in a personal interview that resistance is not limited to military resistance and that different forms of resistance, such as civil disobedience, exist (Hamas PLC Member 4 2013). The limitation of the resistance activities to the territories occupied in 1967 goes along with the document’s call for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem “as its capital on all territories occupied in 1967” (National Conciliation Document 2006, section 1). Although the document does not recognize Israel, section 1 indirectly accepts a two-state solution. One Hamas member of the PLC whom I interviewed validated that Hamas “accepts a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders on the condition that it does not recognize Israel” (Hamas PLC Member 2 2013, author’s translation). Concerning the structure of a future Palestinian state the document refers to democracy, free elections, freedom of the public, and equality among the citizens (National Conciliation Document 2006, section 11). In sum, it is obvious that both Hamas and Fatah tried to overcome their difficulties and to prevent the Palestinians from entering a civil war. However, Hamas managed to secure its most important stances: it did not recognize Israel and included the protection of its core norm of resistance within the national conciliation document. Hence, “the government of national unity does not express anything new in the program of Hamas” as Musa Abu Marzouq puts it (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2009, 9, author’s

translation). Although Hamas and Fatah negotiated in the months following the document they had signed to establish a national unity government, tensions and violence rose once again and brought the Palestinians at the brink of civil war by the end of 2006 (ICG 2007, 16ff.). Against this backdrop the Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz initiated a meeting between the Palestinian factions in Mecca. Under the auspices of the Saudi leadership a new reconciliation agreement was signed on February 8, 2007, which led to the formation of the national unity government in March 2007. The Mecca agreement does not outline a detailed program for the national unity government but reiterates the need for establishing the government and for reforming the PLO (Mecca Agreement 2007). Dr. Khalil al-Hayya, the head of Hamas’ parliamentary change and reform bloc, perceives the Palestinian reconciliation as well as the willingness of both Palestinian factions to achieve a national unity agreement as the most powerful components of the Mecca agreement (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2007b, 3). In sum, the most precise and relevant part of the agreement is the proposed composition of the national unity government and hence the distribution of power in the PA, which had previously caused many disputes between Hamas and Fatah (ICG 2007, 17ff.). Finally, a national unity government headed by Ismael Haniyeh was formed on March 17, 2007. When taking a closer look at the national unity governments program, it becomes obvious that the document is very much in line with the documents Hamas had published earlier, the electoral platform and the government program of 2006, and with the national conciliation document. The 2007 government program reiterates the need to establish an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders (National Unity Government Program 2007, section 1) and calls for the reform of the PLO. It also shows a strong commitment to democracy and underlines the need for administrative and financial reform and the fight against corruption. As the previous documents, the national unity government program highlights that “resistance in all forms […] is a legitimate right of the Palestinian people” (National Unity Government Program 2007, section 3). It is striking that throughout the entire program there is not a single reference to the weapons of the resistance or to the need to protect them. The government program also calls for a comprehensive reform of the security sector and the establishment of a Higher National Security Council that has the authority over all security agencies in the Palestinian Territories (National Unity Government Program 2007, section 4). The Gaza takeover The national unity government of March 2007 only lasted for three months until Hamas militarily overtook the Gaza Strip. This development was caused by internal and external challenges the new government of national unity had to face. On the one hand, after the national unity government formation new tensions quickly emerged between Fatah and Hamas – mainly over the Ministry of Interior, headed by a technocratic minister, and the control of the security forces. New violent clashes erupted between Hamas and Fatah in May 2007 (Legrain 2012, 192). On the other hand, the US tried to undermine the national unity government and financially and militarily supported Fatah to regain power in the Palestinian Territories, partly backed by the EU (Asseburg 2007b, 4). Finally, Hamas started a preventative strike and

brought the entire territory of the Gaza Strip under its military control in June 2007. Musa Abu Marzouq argues, that Hamas absolutely needed to start the military offensive, because the US and Israel pushed Fatah and especially its security wing as hard as possible to mobilize its adherents against Hamas. At the same time, he blames an armed group around Fatah leader Muhammad Dahlan for having planned a coup against Hamas. Hence, Hamas needed to conduct a preventative strike, as Abu Marzouq claims (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2007a, 7). Abbas at the same time declared the state of emergency and established an emergency government headed by the previous minister of finance, Salam Fayyad, which governed the West Bank. Despite several attempts at reconciliation the political, economic, and military separation between the West Bank and Gaza has not been overcome, even today. 4.3 Political order in Gaza under the authority of Hamas After Hamas had taken over military control of Gaza in June 2007, it was responsible to provide the Gaza citizens with public and medical services, security, and to promote the Gaza Strip’s economic performance from one day to the next. In short, it was responsible to immediately provide governance for 1.7 million Gazans (PCBS 2015). The new Hamas government benefited from the Hamas movement in a comprehensive way. Hamas grassroots institutions, especially in the welfare and education sector, supported the government to provide its citizens with the fundamental services. Hovdenak even argues “that the fundament of the ‘Hamas-state’ was very much in place even before the Hamas ‘coup’ from the top of the PA institutions” occurred (Hovdenak 2010, 16, emphasis in original). Hence, the organization quickly managed to expand its control over Gaza after the takeover (Hovdenak 2010, 7). It started a process of reconstructing the PA institutions instead of establishing new parallel government institutions. Against this backdrop, two parallel Palestinian governments emerged: one under the authority of Fatah in Ramallah and another one under the authority of Hamas in Gaza. The Hamas government maintained the overall structure of the government institutions it inherited from the PA (Hovdenak 2010, 71). To secure staff loyalty, Hamas replaced government officials in ministries with Hamas affiliates – sometimes on the management level only and sometimes the entire staff (Hovdenak 2010, 11).22 However, Hamas reconstructed some key institutions of the government in Gaza, as will be shown below. Gaza’s strong security sector and institutionalized resistance Right after the takeover in June 2007, a Filastin al-Muslima article praised Hamas’ successes in terms of providing security and claimed the people in Gaza would be happy about the calm and stability prevalent in Gaza after the takeover. The article advertised Hamas’ achievements concerning the improvement of the security situation, especially the persecution of drug dealers and criminals, and highlighted the new government’s successes in the fight against corruption (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2007c). Moreover, Hamas officials underline the organization’s efforts in the security sector. Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zahri expresses that “Hamas’ focus lies on the reform of the security [apparatus] and the improvement of the security [situation]. […] The second focus lies in the economic sector” (Abu Zahri quoted from Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2007c,

8, author’s translation). It is striking that Abu Zahri puts the security sector as the primary focus and does not say much about how to provide the Gazans with other government services. It is even more striking that the author of a Filastin al-Muslima article directly links the security question to Hamas’ IQB and the organization’s internal security force, ESF, which was only established after the elections (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2007c). Both forces are armed elements and are of significant importance to keep control of the Gaza Strip. Against that background Islam Shahwan, ESF-spokesperson, highlights the role the ESF played during the reform process of the security sector. He underlines that the efforts of the EFS led to “progresses concerning the removal of the weapons that do not belong to the resistance” (Shahwan quoted from Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2007c, 8, author’s translation). This refers to a cooperation between the ESF and IQB and underlines that the weapons of the resistance are not called into question. Shahwan furthermore claims that the ESF would support the reform process in the security sector by establishing different reform committees to combat criminality. Also, former foreign minister from Hamas, Mahmud al-Zahar, highlights that a reform of the security apparatus is needed and states that “all factions will be included [in that process] and that their work is based on professionalism and not loyalty” (al-Zahar quoted from Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2007c, 8, author’s translation). It is remarkable that al-Zahar opens the dialogue to all Palestinian factions, which implicitly also includes Fatah. Obviously, Hamas tries to spread the message that it does not follow a policy of isolation from other Palestinian factions. This becomes even more clear when Hamas spokesperson Sami Abu Zahri promises that amnesty will be granted to the brothers of Fatah from the first moment when the events started [the clashes between Fatah and Hamas] and that they [the brothers of Fatah] will be able to live an ordinary life like before. (Abu Zahri quoted from Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2007c, 8, author’s translation) Besides these general remarks on the importance and reform of the security sector, a concrete reconstruction process was conducted. Quickly after the takeover Hamas Minister of Interior, Said Sayam, gave the order for the reconstruction process of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF). In a first step, the IQB were separated from the PASF. The IQB received the task of border control and were responsible for the confrontation with Israel. Also, the approximately 2500 members of the IQB, which were part of the ESF since April 2006, were now separated from the latter. Furthermore, different intelligence and security branches were merged into one intelligence agency and one civil police unit (Sayigh 2011a, 15ff.). Finally, the ESF were disbanded and integrated into the existing Civil Police in the Gaza Strip by October 2007 (Milton-Edwards 2008a, 664). Establishing a parallel judicial sector and maintaining social service institutions In the judicial sector, Hamas was facing severe challenges after the takeover. At the core of the challenges was the strike of the judges and prosecutors and the refusal of Fatah to permit the High Judicial Council in Ramallah to cooperate with the Gaza government. Both factors led to a paralysis of the judicial sector in Gaza and to the establishment of new judicial institutions in the Gaza Strip to keep the judiciary sector alive (Albasoos 2010, 43ff.). The establishment of

new judicial institutions in Gaza and the unwillingness of the Ramallah government to cooperate with the Gaza government in judicial affairs promoted the institutional separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Albasoos 2010, 44). In the health and the education sector, strong structural changes did not take place. In the health care sector there is even a limited cooperation between the Gaza government and its Ramallah counterpart in issues concerning the arrangements of treatments abroad for specific patients or for transferring medicine from the Ramallah institutions to Gaza (El Madhoun 2010, 66ff.). In the education sector Hamas hired up to 4000 new employees who often had a strong lack of experience. This had become necessary, because a major part of the teachers refused to work and demonstrated against the Gaza government because of the tensions between the authorities in Gaza and Ramallah (Abwada and Abu-Awwad 2010, 50). However, researchers observed that it has been the Gaza government’s primary goal to keep the education sector alive and that the changes made do not “represent [any] […] modifications of the education process” (Abwada and Abu-Awwad 2010, 57). In sum, especially the education and the health care sector strongly benefited from Hamas’ grassroots organizations and its social support services. Gaza’s economic sector The Gaza government’s economy is based on several branches and remains very much dependent on external sources. As Gaza is completely isolated from the US, the EU, and Israel, in terms of economy and politics, the Ramallah based PA remains one of the Gaza government’s most important donors. The Ramallah government still pays the salaries of 77,000 employees who were hired before December 2005. This makes up a monthly total of approximately $94 million (ICG 2008, 16). A second major source of income is the Gaza government’s engagement in the “tunnel-economy,” i.e. the smuggling of goods at Rafah border from Egypt to Gaza via underground tunnels. According to Hovdenak, by 2009 about 80 percent of Gaza’s imports reached the territories via the underground tunnels and about 40,000 Gazans were engaged in the tunnel-economy. The trade via the underground tunnels became the largest private sector employer in Gaza (Hovdenak 2010, 24). The Hamas government collects taxes on imported goods – at the country’s borders but also on goods that come through the tunnels (Hovdenak 2010, 25ff.). Finally, the Gaza government is supported by foreign donors, which financially back the Hamas government, the movement, and the military wing. In 2008, Iran and the Gulf States were said to have provided the Hamas government with $150 million to $200 million since the 2007 takeover (ICG 2008, 18). In sum, the political order Hamas has established in Gaza is clearly characterized by a very strong security sector, which is partly based on institutionalized resistance. The IQB, which are responsible to control Gaza’s borders and for military confrontations with Israel, have a double function now. They are part of the structure on which the political order in Gaza is built and at the same time of the Hamas movement. Hamas’ strong focus on the security sector might be explained by two factors: First, Milton-Edwards argues that Hamas was sure that “there was an imperative to bring much-promised security and stability to the residents of the Gaza Strip” (Milton-Edwards 2008b, 1587). A clergyman, who had lived in Gaza at the time of the

take over and in the years after, confirmed in a personal interview that this strategy was successful and that “many people respected Hamas for building up a strong order” (Clergyman 2013, 09/07). Second, in focusing on the establishment of a strong security sector, Hamas managed to control and consolidate its power in the Gaza Strip against internal challenges and external threats. It is remarkable that at that time, the organization’s officials do not refer much to the organization’s core norm of resistance. Right after the takeover, the Hamas government made clear that the ESF would not confiscate the resistance’s arms but did not focus on the discourse around its core norm of resistance as such. Governance versus resistance? The strategy of differentiating between technical and strategic resistance After the military takeover of Gaza Hamas was not only a resistance organization anymore but also had to function as a government. Since then, Hamas finds itself caught between these two axioms. The organization’s leading journal, Filastin al-Muslima, admits that: it is beyond question that it is difficult to combine resistance and political-diplomatic activities without paying for it, because the political conditions do not conform to the resistance. The political reality imposes on each movement to modify its tactics to suit the prevalent circumstances. (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2012a, 12, author’s translation) The article, which was published concerning Hamas’ twenty-fifth anniversary, outlines that Hamas differentiates between technical and strategic commands to overcome the disparity between the duty of governance and its core norm of resistance. It argues that based on a tactical decision Hamas agrees with President Abbas on the doctrine of popular resistance and on the decision to accept a Palestinian State in the 1967 borders. The tactical decision would not negate the ideological stance to liberate Palestine as part of the Islamic waqf. Against this backdrop the article praises the successes of the theory of paring the work of the resistance and the political work in a comprehensive way. It claims that this helps to protect the entire project of resistance, which is especially important with regard to the security obligations of the government towards the occupation (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2012a). Khaled Meshal, at that time head of Hamas’ Political Buerau, puts it as follows: Hamas tries to “combine resistance and governance and this is a difficult task. However, Hamas remains the resistance and is with the resistance” (Meshal quoted from Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2012a, 12, author’s translation). Meshal’s statement refers to the fact that Hamas will not give up its core norm of resistance although it forms the government in Gaza. The fact that Hamas openly addresses the difficulty of combining resistance and governance and explains how it solves this challenge shows that the organization tries to shape the peoples’ knowledge about itself. One Hamas expert whom I interviewed argues, however that “Hamas is at the same time a government authority and a resistance movement. But in the long-term they can’t have both” (Expert on Hamas 1 2013). Former Hamas ministers, PLC members from Hamas, and Hamas experts whom I interviewed in 2013 in the Palestinian Territories confirm that Hamas will neither give up its

resistance cause nor its weapons. One Hamas expert underlines “that even under the condition of reconciliation [Palestinian reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas] Hamas would not release its weapons. They would not even accept the integration of its weapons into the national Palestinian Armed Forces” (Expert on Hamas 1 2013). However, at the same time, PLC members from Hamas underline that the issue of resistance has changed over the years, which applies especially for the time after the elections and the Gaza takeover. One PLC member from Hamas claims that at the time of its foundation, Hamas was a military resistance movement but after the electoral victory of 2006 the organization would agree on a long-term hudna. He outlines that Hamas would also accept a Palestinian State in the borders of 1967 on the condition that it must not recognize Israel, which would be a suicide for Hamas, as he assesses (Hamas PLC Member 2 2013, 08/25). It is striking that when talking about a Palestinian State, one former minister of the Hamas government of 2006 precisely underlines what he expects from Israel: “Jerusalem should be the capital of this state and the issue of the refugees has to be solved. An independent state means […] free airspace, no Israeli border control, and free access to the see” (Former Minister Hamas 2 2013, 08/20). He furthermore claims that Hamas believes that it would be impossible to achieve an independent Palestinian state based on negotiations but only through resistance, which does not necessarily have to be armed resistance (Former Minister Hamas 2 2013, 08/20). According to one PLC member from Hamas, all Palestinian factions have agreed to conduct resistance activities only in the 1967 borders and would agree on a Palestinian State within the 1967 borders on the condition of establishing East-Jerusalem as the state’s capital, the release of the prisoners, and the return of the refugees (Hamas PLC Member 3 2013, 08/28). Hamas PLC members also underlined that in 2011 Khaled Meshal recognized various forms of resistance besides military resistance (Hamas PLC Member 4 2013, 08/25), which may include for example civil disobedience or the boycott of Israeli products (Hamas PLC Member 5 2013, 08/30). Taken as a whole, they understand resistance as a universal and international right of the Palestinian people (Hamas PLC Member 1 2013). The strategy of differentiating between the Hamas government and the Hamas movement during the Gaza wars Hamas’ difficulty of being a resistance movement and a government at the same time has become especially clear during the Gaza wars between Israel and Hamas in 2008–2009 and 2012. Apparently, Hamas tries to overcome this obstacle by differentiating between the Hamas government and the Hamas movement. While the Hamas politicians engaged in the various governments after the organization’s electoral success in 2006 have not paid much attention to the discourse about the organization’s core norm of resistance, the Hamas movement has done so. After the war in 2009, Filastin al-Muslima published a statement by Hamas, which praised the victory of the resistance during the war against the occupation. It is very much striking that the statement was published in the name of the Hamas movement. The article introduced the statement as follows: “After the glorious victory of the Palestinian people and the steadfastness of our people in Gaza, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) issued the following statement” (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2009, 2, author’s translation). The statement itself praises the victory of the resistance over the occupation and speaks in high terms of the steadfastness of

the Palestinian people and “their gathering around the option of resistance” (Filasṭīn alMuslima 2009, 2, author’s translation). Throughout the entire statement, which consists of five different parts, not a single time the Hamas government in Gaza is mentioned. This very much indicates that Hamas clearly tries to differentiate between its government and its movement and in doing so to keep the government to a large extent out of the resistance discourse. That the Hamas government does not pay much attention to the resistance discourse strengthens this assumption. In doing so, Hamas again tries to shape the Palestinian populations’ knowledge. Sayigh argues, however, that “in Gaza, the government’s rhetoric of ‘armed resistance’ is no longer used, but it justifies the autonomy of the IQB, which acts under orders from the Hamas leadership in exile” (Sayigh 2011a, 25) and hence refers to power struggles within Hamas itself. The IQB are responsible to defend the Gaza Strip against external threats and are responsible for the fight against Israel but if they achieved more autonomy it would also be easier for the Hamas government to separate the IQB’s actions from those of the government. Although Hamas obviously tries to separate between the government and the movement when it comes to the issue of armed resistance, there are overlaps between the two. This becomes especially visible in the aftermath of the Gaza wars in 2008–2009 and in 2012. One poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre (JMCC) in December 2012 revealed that there was a rise in the Palestinian population of those who support the Palestinian armed resistance from 25.2 percent in November 2012 to 32.6 percent in December 2012, although the majority prefers peaceful negotiations (JMCC 2012, 2). Different polls from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey (PSR) reveal that at the same time the support of the Palestinian population towards Hamas increased. While in September 2012, 50.5 percent of the population would have voted for Mahmud Abbas and 39.6 percent for Ismael Haniyeh if new presidential elections were to take place (PSR 2012a, 13), in December 2012, after the Gaza war, 47.7 percent would have voted for Haniyeh vis-à-vis 44.6 percent for Abbas (PSR 2012b, 11). This refers to possible overlaps between the issue of resistance and the support for Ismael Haniyeh, who is part of the Hamas government – at least in the perceptions of the Palestinian population. At the same time, Hamas has always benefited from its adherence to its core norm of resistance in terms of regional politics. It achieved support from the other members of the socalled axis of resistance23 – especially since the international embargo and the politics of isolation have begun in 2006. The Shiite Lebanese Hezbollah supports Hamas and there has always been a strong cooperation between both organizations since they were founded in the 1980s. Hezbollah assists and supports Hamas in terms of military training and political recommendations (Former Minister Hamas 2 2013, 08/20). Hamas even operates an office in the Hezbollah stronghold in south Beirut. Iran and Syria have also extensively supported Hamas and its resistance cause. While Iran provided Hamas in the Gaza Strip with weapons and money and shared military experiences with the Sunni organization, Syria operated more “as the essential corridor” for weapon transfers (Expert on Hamas 2 2013, 09/02; Filasṭīn alMuslima 2012b, 12). In sum, the Hamas politicians and experts whom I interviewed agree on the fact, that resistance remains Hamas’ core norm and the means to liberate the land and to establish a

Palestinian state. The political order in Gaza as an ideal model for Hamas? The special case of Gaza The political order in Gaza has been established under very special conditions and it is completely isolated from the outside. Thus, questions arise if the Gaza political order serves as an ideal model of the political order Hamas would like to establish. One former Hamas minister from the 2006 government confirmed in a personal interview that indeed: Gaza is a very special case, because it is very close of being under occupation. Gaza and its population are suffering from the boycott. The people in Gaza are always under the threat of war. Hamas does not feel happy about the situation they [the people] are living in but they [Hamas] try to establish a social order. (Former Minister Hamas 3 2013, 09/04) One of Hamas’ PLC members underlines the view that Gaza can hardly function as an ideal type for a Palestinian state Hamas favors. He argues that: if Hamas was able to choose a political order in Palestine, it would not look like the order established in Gaza today. Gaza cannot be assumed to be a normal case, as it is not free and independent and because of the Israeli attacks that continuously take place and Hamas’ problems with Fatah. (Hamas PLC Member 3 2013, emphasis added, 08/28) The statements by Hamas’ former minister and the Hamas PLC member indicate that Hamas was unable to establish the political order it would favor for a Palestinian state in Gaza due to the specific context conditions. When asked about the political order Hamas would favor for a Palestinian state, Hamas politicians refer to a state based on the principle of democracy and the free will of the people. Hence, Hamas would not impose a specific political order by force but follow the choice of the people (Former Minister Hamas 1 2013, 08/25; Former Minister Hamas 3 2013, 09/04; Hamas PLC Member 3 2013, 08/28). Hamas refuses to establish a liberal or a secular state but rather aims at establishing a civil democratic order (Hamas PLC Member 1 2013, 09/04), within an Islamic frame of reference, i.e. Islam would be the ideational foundation of a state Hamas favors (Hamas PLC Member 4 2013, 08/25). According to one PLC member from Hamas, the Islamic frame of reference of a Palestinian state favored by Hamas can be traced back to the fact that the majority of the Palestinian population is Muslim. Hence it would be necessary to establish an Islamic social security system and an Islamic economic system. Against that background, the interviewee clearly disassociates Hamas’ Islamist political thought from militant Islamist thought pursued by al-Qaeda and makes clear that Hamas promotes a moderate Islam, such as that pursued by Erdogan in Turkey24 (Hamas PLC Member 1 2013, 09/04). One other PLC member from Hamas clearly outlines Hamas commitment to a civil sovereign state based on the Islamic frame of reference

in the borders of 1967 (Hamas PLC Member 4 2013, 08/25). In sum, Hamas politicians agree that Hamas follows the Islamist political thought of the Muslim Brotherhood and has a very flexible understanding of Islam. One former minister from Hamas puts it as follows: Hamas believes in the Quran, the hadith, and the sunna but in a flexible and not a strict way. We do not live in the 16th century anymore and that is why Hamas has a flexible understanding of applying Islamic rules. Hamas calls this a moderate understanding of Islam, i.e. Islam wasatiya [middle, i.e. moderate Islam]. Hamas applies the heart of the Islamic thought but applies them in flexible forms. Some things the prophet said are not applicable nowadays anymore. Hamas Islamic thought is very far from being fanatic. (Former Minister Hamas 3 2013, 09/04) Other Hamas politicians highlight that as a religion Islam cannot change but that the forms of how it is applied change. Hence, Hamas applies Islam in a very flexible way and uses the principle of ijtihad (Hamas PLC Member 2 2013, 08/25). One Hamas official based in Beirut goes even further and underlines that Hamas uses Islam to mobilize the people to fight against Israel and that it takes the position that “politics is politics and not religion” (Hamas Official in Beirut 1 2013, 05/28). One Hamas expert underlined this perspective and stresses that for Hamas religion serves as a motivation for resistance (Expert on Hamas 1 2013, 08/24). The statements Hamas politicians have made concerning a political order for an independent Palestinian state and their understanding of Islam seem not to match with the politics conducted in Gaza after the Hamas takeover in 2007. The politicians’ statements correspond much more to Hamas’ political order based on pluralism, state-building, and democratic elements presented in the electoral programs and the 2006 government program. However, we have also to bear in mind that Hamas consists of a diversified leadership structure and that different perspectives and interests may exist between the different branches of Hamas. During the interviews I conducted, interviewees referred to the differences that exist between the different branches of Hamas. They emphasized that different opinions exist within Hamas but stressed that this can be drawn back to the external conditions the organization is facing rather than to different perspectives within the organization itself. Due to their own interpretation Hamas politicians in the West Bank express moderate stances while Hamas politicians in Gaza hold more radical stances, because they want to uphold their power position (Expert on Hamas 2 2013, 09/02; Former Minister Hamas 2 2013, 08/20). Islamization trends Although Hamas politicians made clear that the political order in Gaza does not serve as a model for a political order they would favor it is striking that there are several reports of Islamization trends and authoritarian rule in Gaza – especially since 2009. They claim that Hamas is working towards an Islamization of the Palestinian society. Females were forced to follow an Islamic dress code including a scarf, and some schools even sent home girls who wore jeans. There were also further measures implemented by the government such as that girls and boys were forbidden to sit together at the beach, alcoholic beverages were forbidden and men were not allowed to enter women’s hairdressers any longer (Roy 2011, 223). Sayigh

argues that the security sector strongly participated in the Islamization of the society. He outlines that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) particularly have to deal with widespread pressures coming from the Ministry of Interior towards accepting moral and Islamic codes, which the Ministry of Interior classifies as appropriate. In contrast, the Minister of Interior, Fathi Hammad, always underlined that it was not the ministry but individuals who were promoting Islamization trends (Sayigh 2011b, 95). One former minister of Hamas whom I interviewed stressed that the reports about the Islamization process in Gaza were only bad propaganda. According to him not a single woman was pushed to wear a scarf. Without clearly mentioning the Hamas government in Gaza, he stated that the people were only taught to follow common societal norms, a practice that is found everywhere in the world, as he claimed. The interviewee underlined that: the social institutions in Gaza [only] try to inform and educate the people about the norms of a society. They teach the people the correct social norms (not to wear baggy pants e.g.) […] People are obliged not to act against the norms of the society. (Former Minister Hamas 3 2013, 09/04) By recognizing that the social institutions make the people in Gaza adhere to specific norms, Hamas’ former minister implicitly admits that the Gazans are forced to behave in the way the institutions define as being appropriate and that Islamization is fostered institutionally. Possibly, the Gaza government supports Islamization in Gaza for two reasons. First, Salafi actors have become stronger in Gaza since 2009 and are challenging Hamas. Hamas politicians agreed on the fact there are Salafist factions in Gaza, which have connections to alQaeda and Saudi Arabia (Former Minister Hamas 3 2013, 09/04) and “destroy the image of Islam and the image of Hamas” (Former Minister Hamas 1 2013, 08/25). They do not belong to one organization but consist of different cells, which are in large parts supported by Saudi Arabia (Former Minister Hamas 2 2013, 08/20). One PLC member from Hamas stated that the Salafist shoot rockets on Israeli territory to undermine the hudna between Hamas and Israel (Hamas PLC Member 2 2013, 08/25). Hamas even had to take military actions against the Salafist as they tried to establish an Islamic Emirate in Rafah, close to the Egyptian border in 2009 (Former Minister Hamas 3 2013, 08/28). In sum, the Salafis criticize Hamas for having entered politics, its commitment to the hudna with Israel, its engagement and dialogue with Fatah, its deficit of implementing shari’a law in Gaza, and its lack of promoting the Islamization of society in Gaza (Stockmarr 2011, 29). In emphasizing these critical issues, the Salafis do not only address their own supporters but partly also supporters within the ranks and files of Hamas, which is one of Hamas’ strongest fears (Sayigh 2011b, 16). It is likely that the Hamas government engages stronger in promoting Islamization to meet the Salafi challenge and competition and to prevent losing support from its members or the public towards the Salafis. The second explanation for the Islamization politics promoted by the Gaza government may be internal disputes within Hamas. One Hamas expert mentioned in a personal interview that especially during the recent past, more radical voices emerge from the center of Hamas. They demand to end times of moderation as this did not help the Palestinians or Hamas at all until

now. He argues that this development promotes that parts of Hamas have come closer to the Salafis today (Expert on Hamas 2 2013, 09/02). Observations by the ICG confirm that there are different views on how strict Islamic concepts, such as the shari’a, should be applied (ICG 2011b, 26). Milton-Edwards identified that especially the IQB have moved closer to a fundamentalist Salafi orientation (Milton-Edwards and Farrell 2010, 129ff.). Hence, also within Hamas in Gaza there are internal reasons to push towards an Islamization of the society. These Islamization trends definitely contradict the statements of some interviewees who claimed that Hamas favors to establish a civil state within an Islamic frame of reference and who refer to the case of Turkey under AKP rule as an ideal model. Hamas, Fatah, and the struggles over political power in the Palestinian arena Since the Gaza takeover in June 2007, relations between Hamas and Fatah are very tense. A total split between the West Bank and Gaza has become true and two governments with parallel government structures and institutions have emerged. Although criticism between Hamas and Fatah sharply increased during and after the Gaza takeover, the Hamas government tried not to be too harsh towards Fatah and Ismael Haniyeh stressed that “the Government [Hamas government] will not permit a civil war or any internal Palestinian strife, as it will take the responsibility to end the tension” (Haniyeh quoted from Abu-Dheir 2012, 24). This statement indicates Hamas’ effort not to completely break up the relationship with Fatah but to remain open for dialogue. At the same time, measures undertaken especially in the civil society sector of the West Bank and Gaza and reciprocal media accusations clearly demonstrate the sharpening quarrel between both Palestinian factions. While Fatah has taken actions against Hamas’ civil society sector, i.e. its social institutions in the West Bank especially by summer 2008, that is, where many of the Hamas affiliated institutions were closed, Hamas did the same in Gaza. It attacked civil society associations that were said to be affiliated with Fatah and even abducted Fatah cadres in the Gaza Strip (Roy 2011, 215ff.). Roy argues that Fatah took actions against Hamas civil society institutions as it considers them to be the powerful backbone of the organization and in doing so tried to weaken Hamas’ support base (ibid.). Hamas described itself as a victim of a conspiracy and blames foreign powers for promoting the internal Palestinian strife aiming at destroying the Palestinian society (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2007a, 7). However, Muhammad Nizal, member of Hamas’ Political Bureau underlines that “Hamas is still a very powerful player in Palestinian politics. Its power is present in the Palestinian society” (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2007d, 12, author’s translation). Since 2007, several attempts have been made to achieve Palestinian reconciliation. At the heart of the agreements, which were brokered by Egypt and Qatar in 2011 and 2012, lies the formation of a national unity government composed of independent technocrats, the integration of Hamas and other Palestinian factions into the PLO, and the reform of the security sector.25 Although both organizations, Hamas and Fatah, signed the reconciliation agreements in Cairo and Doha, the Palestinians have failed to reach reconciliation until July 3, 2013, the date which marks the end of the period under investigation in this book. The interviews, which I conducted with Hamas politicians and experts, strongly refer to the fact that Palestinian reunification has largely been failed due to the struggle over political power in the Palestinian Territories.

Furthermore, foreign interferences in Palestinian affairs have also played a role due to Hamas members and politicians. One Hamas official based in Beirut emphasized that: it is difficult to find a solution to the struggle between the two [Hamas and Fatah]. Hamas doesn’t want to leave Gaza and Fatah doesn’t want to leave Ramallah and doesn’t want to give anything to Hamas. It is a struggle over power between the two. (Hamas Official in Beirut 1 2013, 05/28) One former minister of the 2006 Hamas government confirmed in an interview that “reconciliation is very much related to the power struggle between Fatah and Hamas” (Former Minister Hamas 2 2013, 08/20). He claimed that the struggle over political power is not only linked to the political arena of the Palestinian Territories but also to the question of leadership in the PLO and that Fatah is afraid of a strong Hamas in the PLO, if the institution was reformed (Former Minister Hamas 2 2013). One Hamas expert also underlined that Hamas is aiming at taking over the leadership role in the PLO (Expert on Hamas 2 2013), while one Hamas member from the PLC made clear that Hamas and Fatah are competing over its leadership role in the Palestinian population (Hamas PLC Member 3 2013). One former minister who was an independent member of Mahmud Abbas’ emergency government installed after the 2007 Gaza takeover, even claimed in a personal interview that reconciliation is also strongly related to personal interests. “Powerful people in Hamas and Fatah think about where they find themselves after reconciliation. They are afraid of losing their positions and losing power” (Independent Former Minister 2013, 09/05). Others refer to further issues that are hindering the Palestinian reconciliation process. Khaled Meshal claims that a reform of the security forces would be one of the major steps to achieve reconciliation, as the security sector caused the problems between Hamas and Fatah (Rabbani 2008, 79). Against that backdrop, one Hamas expert clearly addresses the most important issues with regard to reconciliation for Hamas. First, what happens with the Hamas fighters in Gaza? Second, what is the future of the resistance? And third, what is the future for Hamas (Expert on Hamas 3 2013, 09/07)? Concerning the weapons, Hamas experts and Hamas members agree that the Sunni organization will never release its weapons (Expert on Hamas 1 2013, 08/24; Expert on Hamas 3 2013, 09/07). It is striking that the agreements signed between Hamas and Fatah, addressed the question of the reformation of the security sector but did so based on a very broad understanding. The Cairo Agreement of 2011 for example calls for “the formation of the Higher Security Committee which […] will consist of professional officers in consensus” (Cairo Agreement 2011, 58). It is likely that the document remains very vague with regard to the reform of the security sector because it is a very sensitive issue that has the potential to become a major point of dispute between Hamas and Fatah. In sum, Hamas politicians all call for Palestinian reconciliation and for overcoming the complete split between Gaza and the West Bank. Against this backdrop, Izzat Rishaq, member of Hamas’ Political Bureau, supports the idea of establishing a comprehensive national strategy, which would include all Palestinian factions, to overcome the split (Izzat Rishaq in Filasṭīn alMuslima 2011b, 5).

Disputes between Hamas and Fatah can also be found concerning the Palestinians’ international orientation. Hamas sharply criticizes Fatah’s attempts to gain the international recognition of a Palestinian state. This was for example the case in late 2012, when Fatah tried to achieve a membership status for Palestine at the UN, which finally resulted in a permanent observer status at the UN without becoming a member state (UN 2015). Rafaat Murat, one high-ranking Hamas official based in Beirut, sharply criticized that Mahmud Abbas left the original aims of achieving a full membership for Palestine and agreed on the observer status (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2012e). Also, Hamas speaker Fawzi Barhoum outlined that Hamas refuses Abbas attempts at the UN, as they would not bring any benefit or advantage to Hamas and would hence be useless (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2012c). In sum, Hamas did not miss any possibility to sharply criticize Fatah and claimed that Fatah would be facing a strategic downfall in the Palestinian Territories (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2012d). In sum, the struggle over maintaining political power has not only prevented Palestinian reconciliation but has also shown that Hamas rather maintains the political order it has established in Gaza, based on compulsory power, although it is not Hamas’ ideal type of a political order, than to lose power. 4.4 Morsi’s rise to power: Hamas anticipates its moment has come Hamas hopes for ending Gaza’s political and economic isolation The overthrow of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011 had important implications for the other countries in the MENA, as Egypt traditionally plays a crucial role in the region (Fürtig 2011, 1) and has claimed to be located at the historical and physical center of the Arab world (Monier and Ranko 2014, 61). When the Arab Upheavals started in late 2010 and early 2011, Hamas supported the protest movements and openly called for regime change in Egypt, as it hoped to benefit from the Upheavals in terms of strengthening the Palestinian and the resistance cause (Berti 2012, 25). After the Muslim Brotherhood had won the elections in Egypt and Muhammad Morsi had come to power on June 30, 2012 as the first president in history who was part of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas anticipated its moment had come (Hezbollah Researcher 1 2013, 05/20). Based on its strong ideological and political ties to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas was eager to establish close relationships to the newly elected President Morsi and hoped the new Egyptian government would become its main supporter in the region (Knudsen and Løvlie 2013). Khaled Meshal underlined that Hamas’ political relations changed in the light of the Arab Upheavals and that he was sure that “Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco are certainly a qualitative addition to Hamas’s political relations in comparison to their former relations” (Meshal 2012). This shows that Hamas clearly hoped to co-constitute its interests with those of other Islamist actors in the region, in particular the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. One Hamas official whom I interviewed in Beirut also underlined that Hamas considered the Arab Upheavals as something natural and was sure that the organization would benefit from it (Hamas Official in Beirut 2 2013). The organization hoped for an end of the economic and diplomatic isolation imposed by the former Egyptian

President Mubarak,26 especially on the Gaza Strip. Indeed, Hamas’ diplomatic isolation was weakening. Following the electoral success of Islamist political actors in Tunisia and Egypt, Hamas leaders started political initiatives and traveled to Arab capitals such as Tunis, Cairo, or Doha where they were welcomed by state officials. This did not happen prior to the beginning of the Arab Upheavals (Bröning 2012, 1). A representative poll conducted in October 2012 by Najah National University in the West Bank shows that the majority of the interviewed Palestinians (57.3 percent) believed that Hamas would benefit from the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise in Egypt and would increase its power in Gaza, while only 29.6 percent believed, Hamas would not increase its power position (An-Najah National University 2012, 13). Concerning Hamas’ hopes for the end of Gaza’s economic isolation, President Muhammad Morsi could not meet the Palestinian demands. The Sunni Palestinian organization aimed at achieving freedom of movement and trade and the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Gaza and Egypt. Morsi could hardly make any concessions to Hamas – mainly due to security reasons and relationships with Israel and the West (Shaban 2012). Militants conducted several attacks against the Egyptian Police on the Sinai. They were suspected of having reached Egypt through Hamas’ tunnels at the Rafah border. This prompted the Morsi government to close up to 200 tunnels between Gaza and Egypt (Expert on Hamas 1 2013, 08/24). The Egyptian government had furthermore to meet severe economic and financial challenges in Egypt and was not able to support other countries or organizations economically (Lebanese Journalist 2013). However, although Morsi was not able to meet all of Hamas’ economic expectations and even closed some tunnels, the smuggling through the tunnels was widely tolerated, which helped Hamas to deal with the Israeli blockade (Koss 2013, 3). Following the victory of Islamist political actors in Tunisia and Egypt, Hamas also anticipated that the right moment had come to promote the Palestinian struggle for liberation and Hamas’ resistance cause. Khaled Meshal clearly linked the Arab Upheavals to the question of liberating Palestine. He understands the Arab Upheavals as “a major strategic development in the path to liberating Palestine and facing the Zionist project” (Meshal 2012). It is likely that Hamas has tried to locate the liberation of Palestine within the environment of the Arab Uprisings for two reasons. First, it might have tried to achieve support from other elected Islamist political actors for its fight against Israel and the liberation of Palestine. Second, Hamas might have been worried that the Palestinian cause would lose in importance vis-à-vis the challenges many other MENA countries had to meet themselves. Meshal furthermore outlined that Hamas has: no doubt that the Arab Spring and the changes it brought about in the Arab world give Hamas and the Palestinian resistance movements a chance to work in a better Arab environment that is more in line with the resistance, and more adherent to the national Palestinian fundamental rights. (Meshal 2012) Meshal’s statement clearly indicates that the organization holds up its core norm of resistance and expects more support from other countries in the MENA region. He even

demands a change of the Arab strategy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as towards the resistance. Meshal stresses that from the perspective or Arab official norms it “must become possible […] [to support the resistance]. A strategy must be drawn from the nation […] how to support the resistance movements with funds and arms, and how to back it politically” (Meshal 2012). Meshal obviously puts a strong emphasis on the issue of armed resistance and demands support from the Arab countries with regard to Hamas’ political and military resistance. It is striking here that Meshal directly refers to resistance movements and thus keeps the Hamas government in Gaza away from the resistance cause. In general, Hamas was supportive with regard to the upheavals in the MENA region. Nevertheless, it was also well aware that the demonstrations might also be dangerous for Hamas’ rule in Gaza. Similar to the Arab regimes that were facing demonstrations against their authoritarian rule, Hamas was also increasingly criticized for authoritarian tendencies in Gaza. To smother protests against Hamas’ rule, the Gaza government arrested people who participated in a solidarity demonstration with the people in Cairo. Afterwards protests against the government in Gaza became sanctioned and hence impossible (Milton-Edwards 2013, 62). This demonstrates again, how Hamas exercised compulsory power to uphold its political order in Gaza. In sum, the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt did not lead to a change of the political order Hamas had established in Gaza. The Palestinian organization managed to increase its outside legitimacy in countries ruled by Islamist leaders but this had no implications on the political order in Gaza. To maintain its power position, Hamas prohibited demonstrations against the Gaza government and arrested people and thus demonstrated increasing authoritarian rule based on institutionalized resistance. From Damascus to Cairo: Hamas’ changing regional relationships and the struggle over Palestinian political power When the Arab Upheavals reached Syria, Hamas first took a different position compared to the protest in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. It tried to act as a mediator between the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian opposition. This can be explained by the fact that Hamas was caught between two partners: on the one hand it had to please its long-term ally and supporter, the Syrian regime, which found itself in a very challenging position. On the other hand, Hamas had to act in line with the political orientation of the Muslim Brotherhood – the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood but also the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was part of the opposition against President Bashar al-Assad (ICG 2012, 5). When Assad increased the pressure on Hamas to back the Syrian regime’s position, the Sunni organization tried to take a neutral stance (ICG 2012, 6ff.). In April 2011, Hamas published an official statement on the situation in Syria labeling what was happening there as “an internal matter concerning our Syrian brothers” (quoted from al-Ahram Online 2011) while at the same time underlining its support for the Syrian people’s hopes and aspirations (al-Ahram Online 2011). However, when the political and the security situation worsened in Syria, violence sharply increased between the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition forces, and also Palestinian refugees based in Syria became affected, Hamas did not hold its neutral position

towards the Syrian regime anymore. As a consequence, the Hamas leadership left Damascus and moved to Doha, Qatar, and other countries during the first half of the year of 2012 (ICG 2012, 12). Khaled Meshal, at that time head of Hamas’ Political Bureau, expressed his disappointment about the deteriorated relationship between the Sunni organization and the Syrian regime in a speech delivered in Beirut. Without criticizing the Assad regime too sharply, he linked the future role of the Syrian regime as “the resistance’ fortress through its [the Syrian regime’s] foreign policies based on an internal policy that satisfies its people and responds to its demands” (Meshal 2012). Meshal’s announcement indeed indirectly requires from the Syrian regime to respect its people’s will, i.e. to implement demands of the opposition forces, if it wants to remain the resistance’s fortress. At the time Meshal held his speech in Beirut, the tensions between the Assad regime and Hamas had already reached its peak, which can be illustrated by the closure of several Hamas’ offices in Damascus by the Syrian regime. Al Risala,27 one Hamas affiliated newspaper, blames the Syrian regime for having stolen Hamas’ belongings from the offices and suggests that the Assad Regime tried to take revenge for Hamas’ support of the Syrian opposition by closing the offices (al-Risāla 2012). At that time, Hamas was not very concerned about its damaged relationship with its former strategic ally, the Syrian regime. “For us, […] the loss of Syria was compensated by the fall of Mubarak” as one senior Hamas leader put it (quoted from ICG 2012, 9). However, the withdrawal of Hamas’ political leadership from Syria and the organization’s critical stance towards the Assad regime had further implications on Hamas’ alliances, i.e. to the members of the resistance axis, as well as on its national, and even intra-organizational relationships. First, this applies for Hamas’ relationship to the Islamic Republic of Iran, one of Assad’s closest allies and also the main financial and military backer of Hamas – especially since 2006. One Hamas’ official whom I interviewed in Beirut declared, that the relationship between Hamas and Iran used to be very powerful “but today, it is not in a very good condition anymore, because of the Syrian war” (Hamas Official in Beirut 1 2013, 05/28). Members of the PLC from Hamas stress that the relationship between Hamas and the Islamic Republic of Iran has been severely damaged, because of Hamas’ withdrawal from Syria (Former Minister Hamas 3 2013, 09/04; Hamas PLC Member 3 2013, 08/28). They underline however, that the relationship has not been completely cut and Iran is still Hamas’ main backer until today (Hamas PLC Member 3 2013, 08/28). Second, Hamas’ withdrawal from Syria and its simultaneous deteriorating relationship to the Islamic Republic of Iran also affected Hamas’ relationship to the Lebanese Hezbollah. After Hamas withdrew from Syria, its relationship to the Lebanese Hezbollah, which had supported Hamas in terms of training and military advice in the long-term, severely deteriorated. “Today the cooperation has been reduced to a minimal level, because of the developments in Syria,” as one former Minister of Hamas puts it (Former Minister Hamas 2 2013, 08/20). One Hamas member of the PLC even stated, that the relationship between Hamas and Hezbollah has been completely interrupted (Hamas PLC Member 1 2013, 09/04). Both organizations accuse each other of being responsible for the deterioration of the relationship. One former minister from Hamas claims that “the war in Syria has nothing to do with Hezbollah’s resistance. Hezbollah has lost its credibility, because it has entered the war in Syria and is fighting on the side of Assad” (Former Minister Hamas 3 2013,

09/04). This statement indirectly indicates that from the interviewees’ perspective Hezbollah at least partly left the path of the resistance for other interests. One leading Lebanese Journalist and one former General of the Lebanese army – both close to Hezbollah – represent Hezbollah’s point of view. They both blame Hamas for having moved closely to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and for giving up the resistance against Israel (Editor-in-Chief 2013; Former General of the Lebanese Army 2013). The editor-in-chief even claims that Hamas “takes almost the same stance today as the PLO did in 1993 when the Oslo Accords were signed” (Editor-in-Chief 2013). In sum, the relationship between Hamas and Hezbollah has severely deteriorated although they both define themselves as resistance organizations against Israel. Third, Hamas’ withdrawal from Syria and its concomitant deteriorating relationship to the Islamic Republic of Iran also affected internal relationships within Hamas. Not all of Hamas’ politicians and members were satisfied with the organization’s withdrawal from Syria and the deteriorating relationship with Iran. One former minister from Hamas admitted during a personal interview that there are different positions within Hamas. However, he underlined that one should not talk about different factions but rather about different interpretations and meanings (Former Minister Hamas 2 2013, 08/20). One Hamas member of the PLC declared that there are different views between the internal and the external leadership of Hamas – especially concerning a possible rapprochement to Iran. He stated that the leadership in Gaza more strongly supports the re-establishment of the close relationship to Iran than the external leadership does (Hamas PLC Member 2 2013, 08/25). One former independent minister of the Palestinian government and one Fatah politician whom I interviewed in the West Bank in 2013 claimed that, nowadays especially, the IQB have become very strong and that they are very close to Iran (Fatah Politician 2013; Independent Former Minister 2013). Although one has to bear in mind that both of them might have given answers biased in favor of their own political position or Fatah’s political position, their statements coincide with the fact that the IQB have become increasingly independent over the last years as outlined above. Furthermore, the IQB are likely very close to Iran by nature, as the Islamic Republic provides them with weapons and funding, which in turn strengthens their position within Hamas. This is why the IQB and the Gaza branch favor a rapprochement with Iran. If the IQB and Hamas in Gaza entirely lose the support of Iran, they would neither achieve Iranian financial aid anymore nor military equipment. This would make it extremely difficult for Hamas to uphold the political order in Gaza, which is based on institutionalized resistance including the weapons of the IQB. Last, Hamas’ relationship with Fatah has also been affected through Hamas’ withdrawal from Syria and the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt. The Palestinian philosopher and thinker, Munir Shafiq, stressed in an interview published by Filastin al-Muslima right after the fall of Mubarak that the Arab Upheavals mark the entry into a new era: the era of resistance and victories. He underlined that Mubarak’s fall was a strong blow against the Fatah government in Ramallah and that the latter is in danger of being overthrown as well. Shafiq argues that a reconstruction of the Palestinian resistance and security cooperation between Ramallah and Gaza is needed to achieve Palestinian reunification (Filasṭīn al-Muslima 2011a). Milton-Edwards also argues against this backdrop that the loss of Mubarak negatively impacted Fatah, which in turn led to a weakened power position of Fatah vis-à-vis Hamas in

the Palestinian context (Milton-Edwards 2013, 62). Her argument implies what has already been shown earlier in this book: that power struggles play a dominant role in the relationship between Fatah and Hamas. Hence, it is not surprising that Morsi’s rise to power in Egypt strengthened Hamas’ position vis-à-vis Fatah. As outlined above, the Palestinian public also believed that Hamas would benefit from the presidency of Morsi in Egypt and increase its power in Gaza. 4.5 Conclusion: Hamas’ conceptions of political order Chapter 4 of this book aimed at analyzing what characterizes Hamas’ conceptions of political order. Based on the empirical analysis conducted throughout the chapter it is possible to identify two different stages of Hamas’ conceptions of political order, as will be summarized in the following: Stage one: state-building and pluralism The first stage existed in the period from Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 until Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2007. During this stage, Hamas’ conceptions of political order were characterized by a high commitment to a civil state based on pluralism and democratic elements. In its electoral platform, the draft of its national unity government program, and its government program Hamas constantly referred to these elements of a political order. All of these political programs are very much in line with each other and Hamas calls for the establishment of strong state institutions based on pluralism and the separation of powers. It aims at reforming the financial and administrative sector and to fight corruption. It is striking that from program to program, resistance, which was identified as Hamas’ core norm, fades away, although the organization never discussed the opportunity to release its weapons. At the same time, from program to program Hamas’ commitment to its Sunni Islamist political thought is less visible too. The organization seems to use its Islamist political ideology as a frame of reference only. After Hamas had taken over government responsibility and contestation with Fatah sharpened, it strengthened the security sector, established the ESF, used its weapons in violent clashes with Fatah, and more and more departed from its political programs issued since 2005. In the end, Hamas and Fatah failed, to co-constitute their interests and to work together on the joint goal of establishing a Palestinian state. Finally, Hamas’ militarily took over Gaza. Stage two: security through resistance The second stage of Hamas’ conceptions of political order sharply differs from the first one. It begins right after Hamas’ takeover of Gaza and lasts until today. In this stage of Hamas’ political order the organization’s core norm of resistance is stronger than in the first stage. Hamas’ political order in Gaza is characterized by a strong security sector partly guaranteed through institutionalized resistance. The IQB, Hamas’ resistance fighters, are responsible for protecting the political order in Gaza. The forces linked to the internal security sector in Gaza

are allegedly engaged in promoting Islamization trends in the Strip. However, Hamas’ Sunni Islamist political thought does not serve as an important component in the existing political order in Gaza. Rather, the Islamization policies seem to be conducted to please Hamas’ opponents – within the organization itself and within Gaza. In sum, it is obvious that its own power status is of utmost importance for Hamas. We can draw this conclusion, because Hamas maintains the political order in Gaza although it does not represent the organization’s ideal type of a political order. The statements of PLC members from Hamas whom I interviewed correspond much more to the pluralist political order Hamas had formulated throughout stage one than to the political order in Gaza. Moreover, for Hamas’ conceptions of political order its relationships with national and regional actors are of utmost importance. This applies especially for the struggle with Fatah over political power in the Palestinian Territories. Neither Hamas nor Fatah are willing to give up their power position. Numerous failed reconciliation attempts and the fact that Hamas maintains the political order in Gaza, although it does not constitute its ideal type of a political order, lead to the conclusion that Hamas and Fatah are both more interested in maintaining their power position than in jointly working on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Interview partners from Hamas confirmed this perspective. Figure 4.1 summarizes how Hamas preserves its power status in the Palestinian Territories through political order and highlights the role Hamas’ core norm of resistance plays. The figure shows the interactions Hamas has engaged in and demonstrates the role its core norm of resistance has played throughout stage one and two of Hamas’ conceptions of political order. Moreover, the figure highlights the power mechanism Hamas used, closely intertwined with its core norm of resistance, to preserve its power position in the Palestinian Territories.

Figure 4.1 Power preservation through political order.

Notes Literally translated from Arabic into English the verb intafada, which belongs to the noun intifada, means “wake up” or “shake off” but generally the noun “uprising” is used when referred to the Palestinian Intifada. The first Intifada erupted in December 1987 in Gaza and quickly spread to the West Bank. In the following years, the Palestinian people conducted peaceful demonstrations and violent operations to end the Israeli occupation and to declare an independent Palestinian state. The Israeli authorities and the PLO, based in Tunis at that time, were surprised by the eruption, the intensity, and the duration of the Intifada alike (Herz and Steets 2003, 76ff.). For a detailed analysis of the first Intifada see Nasser and Heacock (1990). 2 The phenomenon of publishing leaflets has always been very prominent in Palestine. The Palestinians already distributed leaflets during the British Mandate (1920–1948) but also after the state of Israel was founded in 1948. However, during the first Intifada leaflets played a more important role than ever before. Different organizations used the leaflets to mobilize the Palestinian people against the Israeli authorities. Generally speaking, the leaflets can be distinguished along two lines: the Palestinian national and the Palestinian religious orientation (Shaul and Aharoni 1994, 25ff.). 3 In the West Bank, between 1948 and 1967 part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to openly engage in interaction processes. It was legally recognized by the Hashemite Kingdom, as the Jordanian King understood the Muslim Brothers as an appreciated counterpart to the strengthening Arab Nationalism and Nasserism promoted by the Egyptian President Gamal Abd el-Nasser. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank put its programmatic and ideological focus on education matters such as encouraging Islamic moral principles or distributing values based on the Quran. The organization did not engage in military affairs in the West Bank at that time. In Gaza, the Palestinian Muslim Brothers faced severe constraints. Analogues to the policies Egypt pursued towards the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Palestinian Brothers were prohibited and forced to go underground. The Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza collected weapons in contrast to the West Bank branch, nevertheless they called for the evolution and education of a new generation of Muslims in Gaza before the liberation of Palestine should take place (Baumgarten 2006, 20ff. Croitoru 2007, 37ff.). 4 After Israel’s declaration of independence in May 1948 and the end of the 1948 Arab–Israeli war, Israel brought a larger territory under its control than classified in the UN-Partition Plan of 1947. Furthermore, Jordan controlled the West Bank and Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip. During the 1967 war Israel occupied the entire West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. In the West Bank and on the Golan Heights, Israel is present until today (Balke 2000, 62ff.). 5 Islamic Jihad was founded by former members of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, former members of Fatah, and other nationalist-leftist groups in 1982 (Hroub 2010, 28). 6 Fatah was founded by a Palestinian group around Yassir Arafat in 1959 in Kuwait. Based on its 1964 constitution its goal was “the complete liberation of Palestine and eradication of Zionist political, military, and cultural existence” (quoted from Bröning 2013, 59). Fatah engaged in violent guerrilla actions and terrorist attacks against Israel. In 1967 Fatah joined the PLO and quickly became its leading force under the leadership of Yassir Arafat (Bröning 2013, 58ff; Herz and Steets 2003, 36ff.). In 1988, the PLO recognized Israel’s right of existence (Herz and Steets 2003, 82). 7 The Oslo I Accord was signed by Israel and the PLO in 1993 in Washington D.C. Oslo I is to be understood as a roadmap that initiated a two-step process that should lead to a lasting peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. In a first step, the PLO returned from Tunis to the West Bank where it established a Palestinian interim administration elected by the Palestinian people from the West Bank and Gaza. In 1995, a further agreement regulated the responsibilities between the PLO and Israel in the West Bank in terms of governance, administration and security. Controversial questions such as the return of the Palestinian refugees from the neighboring countries, the Jewish settlements, or the status of Jerusalem were planned to be discussed after the end of the interim period, which should last until 1999. Until today, these questions have not been solved (Balke 2000, 85ff.; Herz and Steets 2003, 89ff.). 8 In the late 1990s tensions between Israel and the Palestinians had increased due to the stagnant Oslo peace process, worsening social and economic conditions in the Palestinian Territories, and the expansion of Israeli settlements (Gunning 2007, 49). Ariel Sharon, chairman of Israel’s conservative Likud party, visited the Temple Mount, one of the most important religious places for Jews and Muslims in the world, to demonstrate that it belongs to the Jewish state, while Israeli and Palestinian politicians tried to negotiate a peace agreement in Camp David at the same time. Sharon provoked violent Palestinian reactions and shortly after his visit the second Intifada, called the al-Aqsa-Intifada, began. It was characterized by a high level of violence from Israeli and Palestinian sides (Croitoru 2007, 144ff.). 9 The Roadmap is a peace initiative started by the Middle East diplomatic Quartet composed of the United States (US), the European Union (EU), Russia and the office of the Secretary General of the UN. It aimed at reaching a solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. For a detailed analysis of the Roadmap see ICG (2003). 10 During the field research trip to the Palestinian Territories in 2013 it was not possible to receive an exemplar of Hamas’ 1988 Charter, as neither interviewees nor research institutes could provide me with it. In this study, an English translation of the Charter, published in the Journal of Palestine Studies in 1993, was used. It seemed to be a much more reliable source 1

than Arabic versions, which are circulated on the internet. For more information on the poor availability of the Charter see Baumgarten (2006, 198, note 47). 11 During the 1990s, Hamas’ Political Bureau was based in Amman. After tensions between Hamas and the Jordanian Kingdom emerged, the Hamas Political Bureau was forced to leave Amman in 1999 (Mandaville 2007, 207). It first moved to Doha and then to Damascus where it was hosted until 2012 (Bröning 2013, 26). After the Syrian civil war began, the Political Bureau left Damascus for Qatar. 12 For a detailed empirical analysis of Hamas’ leadership and organizational structures in the neighboring countries Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon see Felsch (2011). His analysis was conducted before the civil war in Syria started in 2011/2012. Today, Hamas’ leadership and most of its members have left Syria, as will be discussed on p. 130f. 13 In Article 30 of its Charter Hamas clearly presents what it understands by jihad: Jihad is not only carrying weapons and confronting the enemy. The good word, excellent article, beneficial book, aid, and support, if intentions are pure, so that the banner of Allah is the most-high, is a Jihad for the sake of Allah. (Hamas 1993, 131, Article 30, emphasis in original).

14

15

16

17 18

19

20

21

22

23

24 25

This statement shows that Hamas understands jihad not only in terms of a military struggle but pursues a more comprehensive approach, which includes literature, education, and general human support. Within Hamas there were widespread controversies regarding the participation in the legislative elections. While some leaders in Gaza absolutely favored to participate, the outside leadership was against participation in the legislative elections. Finally, seven independent candidates were listed of whom three were considered being very close to Hamas (Legrain 2012, 189ff. Shikaki 1996, 20). The concept of hudna is derived from Islamic legal theory where the relationship between those living in the dar al-Islam (house of Islam, i.e. a territory where Islam prevails) and the dar al-harb (house of war, i.e. a territory where Islam does not prevail) is not peaceful. However, based on the Quran, Muslims are individually allowed to establish periods of peace, i.e. peace agreements or hudna with the dar al-harb (Khadduri 1960–2005). Hamas’ cease-fire offers usually coincided with political events that took place in the national arena at the same time. The Israeli authorities blamed Hamas to offer entering a cease-fire with Israel only to play for time and to rearm the organization (Gunning 2007, 222). Researchers see two reasons why Hamas might have offered the hudna. According to the first, achieving a hudna would be a tactic for Hamas to conquer entire Palestine. The second would be a strategic reason that would lead to achieve permanent peace with Israel (Tuastad 2010, 5). When Hamas mentions the (Palestinian) government before 2006, it points to the PNA. Municipal elections had not taken place since 1976 in the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip it was even before 1967 that municipal elections had been held. Supposedly, Yassir Arafat had again and again postponed the municipal elections, because he feared an electoral success of the Muslim Brothers and later Hamas, which has always enjoyed a good reputation in the population due to its encompassing social network (Baumgarten 2006, 164; Croitoru 2007, 171). After Hamas’ electoral victory, the Middle East diplomatic Quartet requested from Hamas to recognize the following main principles formulated by the Quartet: to recognize Israel’s right of existence, to give up the use of force, and to approve all previous treaties and agreements signed by the PNA and Israel (Asseburg 2007a, 42). At the beginning of his ministerial statement Haniyeh listed the main topics of Hamas’ government program in the order introduced above. During the speech, however, he changes the order of some of these points. Irrespective of the changed order, Haniyeh addresses all of the seven topics throughout the government program in detail. The most prominent among the initiatives is the Prisoners Document of May 2006, which was signed by members of different Palestinian political factions who were imprisoned in Israeli jails. It calls for overcoming the Palestinian disputes and to achieve a comprehensive compromise to prevent the Palestinian national arena from entering civil war (Ganim 2010, 160ff.). It is the initiative on which the National Document of June 2006 is based, which finally paved the way for the 2007 Mecca agreement on which a Palestinian national unity government was formed. After the Gaza takeover, the Ramallah government ordered its staff to remain at home, i.e. to go on strike, and at the same time still paid the employees’ salaries. After approximately three months, in the ministries of social affairs and health, the majority of the Fatah staff returned to work. In almost all other ministries, Hamas hired its own employees loyal to the Hamas government (Hovdenak 2010, 11ff.). The axis of resistance consists of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. It is an anti-Israeli and anti-Western alliance which is also critical of pro-Western Arab Regimes. As Hamas is a Sunni member of the axis, the alliance cannot be described as being sectarian although Iran and Hezbollah have a Shiite and the Syrian regime an Alawite background. The axis of resistance “is best understood as a political alliance based on common enemies” (Mohns and Bank 2012, 26). I conducted the interviews in 2013, i.e. before the coup against the Erdogan government occurred and the Turkish political system under AKP rule has started to show strong authoritarian trends. For more details on the Palestinian reconciliation agreements see ICG (2011a), ICG (2012, 18ff.), or Pal-Think for Strategic

Studies (2014). 26 The former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak can be considered to be closer to Fatah than to Hamas, because of the latter’s ideological and political links to the Muslim Brotherhood, which was not allowed to function as an official party or organization in Egypt during Mubarak’s reign. When Hamas achieved power in Gaza in 2007, Mubarak closed the Rafah border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip mainly due to pressures coming from Israel and the international community. At the same time, he did not take actions against the establishment of the tunnel economy between Gaza and Egypt at the Rafah border (Russell 2013, 262). 27 I have concentrated on analyzing Hamas’ mouthpiece Filastin al-Muslima, as outlined in the introduction of this book. When it comes to Hamas’ withdrawal from Syria, I also analyzed one article from al-Risala, one further Hamas mouthpiece based in Gaza, because Filastin al-Muslima did not deal with Hamas’ withdrawal from Syria. This might have been the case for reasons of downplaying the dispute between the Sunni organization and the Syrian regime – a strategy also some Hamas’ leaders, especially in Gaza, have followed.

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5

Hezbollah and Hamas The interplay of resistance, power, and political order

In Chapter 5, I discuss the results from the empirical chapters on Hezbollah and Hamas, relate them to each other and embed them into the Critical Constructivist framework of the book. Against the backdrop of the main research question I focus on explaining what characterizes Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order and on demonstrating how is it possible to explain the differences between these conceptions – given that both organizations are Islamist political actors engaged in processes of national policymaking in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories respectively. 5.1 Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ intellectual and structural background Islamist political thought and organizational structure As outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 of this book, Hezbollah adheres to the political ideology of Shiite Islamism and Hamas to that of Sunni Islamism. While Hezbollah follows Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s theological concept of the wilayat al-faqih, Hamas is ideologically committed to the Sunni Islamist conceptions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and combines its Islamist ideology with nationalist elements. Hence, the political and ideological basis of Hezbollah and Hamas is very different. Yet, both organizations have many things in common concerning their religious orientation. Hezbollah and Hamas both understand Islam as a comprehensive system of life, combining religious and political elements. They both follow a flexible understanding of Islam and do not adhere to the strict interpretation of the written text from the Quran but to the principle of ijtihad. Thus, both organizations are open to the application of human reason, and the rational interpretation of the main Islamic sources concerning the contemporary circumstances the societies are facing becomes possible. Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ flexible understanding of Islam fits very well with the definition of Islamism based on Muhammad Abduh on which this book draws. This definition also highlights the importance of the principle of ijtihad and understands Islamist political actors as actors who legitimize their actions by referring to the main Islamic sources but at the same time rationally apply human reason to interpret them in the light of the contemporary circumstances societies are facing. Hezbollah and Hamas display a complex organizational structure. In both cases the shura council is the most important body, which defines the overall political strategy. Moreover, both organizations have different units, focusing on political, religious, social, and military affairs. The most important difference between Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ organizational structure is that Hezbollah is much more unified and hierarchically structured than the more diversified Hamas.

This can be traced back to the circumstances under which the two organizations emerged and exist. Hezbollah emerged as a clandestine organization in the multi-confessional nation state of Lebanon, whose political system is strongly determined by sectarian elements, i.e. political power is distributed along sectarian lines. In contrast to Hezbollah, Hamas emerged and has always been engaged in the quite homogenous Palestinian Sunni Muslim context and did not interact in a multi-confessional nation state. The Sunni Palestinian organization arose during the first Intifada as the armed wing of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. Different from Hezbollah, however, Hamas did not emerge within an existing state but has struggled to liberate Palestine from the Israeli occupation and to establish a Palestinian state since its foundation. Moreover, unlike Hezbollah, Hamas is not only located in one territory but in different places in the Palestinian Territories and abroad, where automatically different perspectives emerge due to the different contexts the organization is located in. The differences we can witness between the organizational structure of Hezbollah and that of Hamas, i.e. hierarchical unified versus diversified leadership structure, do reflect themselves in the structure of Shiite and Sunni Islamism. Shiite Islamism, the political ideology Hezbollah follows, is in general more hierarchically structured and orientated towards one religious authority than Sunni Islamism to which Hamas adheres. Twelver Shiite Islamism has displayed hierarchal tendencies since the nineteenth century, which can in particular be observed in the positions marja al-taqlid and the faqih (see Chapter 2), which enjoy a special significance. A corresponding hierarchical structure does not exist in Sunni Islamist political thought. The core norm of resistance before 2005 In Chapters 3 and 4 of this book, resistance has been identified as Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ core norm. It is both organizations’ raison d’être and an integral part of their identity. Hezbollah and Hamas both emerged as resistance organizations against Israel. Through their interactions with the Israeli opponent in the context of the Lebanese civil war and the Palestinian Intifada, resistance achieved its meaning and became both organizations’ leading norm. In both cases the norm of resistance entailed also a structuring quality and served as a reference frame for behavior, once it had emerged and achieved its meaning. Thus, the core norm of resistance entails the dual quality Antje Wiener identified in her definition of a norm (Wiener 2007, 63). Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ commitment to Shiite and Sunni Islam respectively did not play any role with regard to the meaning of their core norm of resistance. Both organizations’ religious orientation only served as a means for the resistance cause. Recalling Daase and Deitelhoff’s argument, which holds that “where there is resistance there is also power and that the latter can be experienced through resistance” (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014, 11; Foucault 1990, 95, author’s translation), helps to explain the interplay between Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ core norm of resistance, their understanding of power, and their interaction towards power preservation. Both organizations hold weapons outside the Lebanese state and outside the political structure of the Palestinian Territories. They argue that they need their weapons to conduct resistance against Israel. However, at the same time their armed status enables Hezbollah and Hamas to uphold a special and a powerful status in the political system of Lebanon and in the Palestinian Territories. Hence, their resistance enables

them to exercise what Barnett and Duvall call compulsory power (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3ff.), i.e. gives them the ability to directly control other actors in interaction processes in the national and regional arena through the existence of their weapons. Although resistance constitutes Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ core norm, there are also differences with regard to Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ understanding of resistance, which can mainly be traced back to the divergent contexts both organizations are engaged in. In the period from the organizations’ foundation in the 1980s until 2005 the meaning of the norm resistance changed much more in the case of Hezbollah than in the case of Hamas. Hezbollah’s core norm of resistance emerged when the organization was founded in 1982. In the time frame from 1982 until 2005, it achieved the dual meaning of liberation and deterrence that has structured Hezbollah’s interactions towards Israel and within the Lebanese political context. Recalling Wiener’s norm definition on which this book draws (Wiener 2007, 63), Hezbollah’s norm of resistance holds a dual quality. First, resistance had the meaning of liberation, which structured Hezbollah’s interactions towards Israel. When the context in which the norm had initially emerged changed after Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah reconstructed the meaning of its core norm of resistance and added the element of deterrence. In contrast, in the years from its foundation in 1987 until 2005 the meaning of Hamas’ core norm of resistance did not change much. Hamas has always claimed to focus on resistance to liberate the Palestinian land from Israeli occupation. Hence, Hamas’ core norm of resistance holds the structuring quality according to Wiener’s norm definition. During this period of time the normative meaning was stable and Hamas understood resistance as liberation, i.e. liberating the Palestinian land from the Israeli occupation. However, the means of resistance Hamas used, have changed. While especially during the 1990s and early 2000s, Hamas used suicide attacks to fight against Israel, it agreed on a hudna in 2003. Vague visions of an Islamist political order Recalling Bull’s understanding of political order on which this book draws (Bull 2002, 4), the empirical analysis has shown that neither Hezbollah nor Hamas had specific visions of how a political order should look before 2005. Both organizations underlined the need to establish an Islamic state but failed to formulate how such a state should look (see sections 3.1 and 4.1). Hezbollah and Hamas both referred to their ideological Islamist background, i.e. the concept of the wilayat al-faqih and to the political ideology of Islamism of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood in their early days. However, those concepts did not have any practical implications for the formulation of conceptions of political order. Both organizations remain vague when it comes to the question of how an Islamist political order should look. 5.2 Conceptions of political order In Chapter 2, from Hedley Bull’s understanding of order (2002, 4) a definition was elaborated that serves as a sensitizing concept to analyze what characterizes Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order. The empirical analysis conducted in Chapters 3 and 4 of the book has revealed that it would not make any sense to systematically classify

Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order along the three criteria which are at the heart of Bull’s definition of order (Bull 2002, 4): (1) ensuring security, (2) approving promises and agreements once made, and (3) maintaining stability. The three criteria are of high importance for Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ conceptions of political order but as there are several overlaps between them in the case of both organizations it would be difficult to draw clear distinctions between the criteria identified by Bull. This is why I summarize criterion 1 and 3 when explaining Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order and only present criterion 2 separately in the following analysis. Concerning Hamas’ conceptions of political order two different stages could be identified during the empirical analysis (see Chapter 4). The three criteria derived from Bull’s definition of order are to be found in each of the two stages. Hezbollah: only literal commitment to the Lebanese political order Criteria 1 and 3: ensuring security and maintaining stability as long as the resistance is safe Since Hezbollah decided to participate in the national Lebanese elections in 1992 and became a member of the Lebanese government in 2005 it shows a general commitment to the Lebanese political order. It holds ministerial portfolios and seats within the parliament and constantly refers to governmental documents it is bound to (see section 3.2). However, the organization’s stances and interactions concerning ensuring the security of the Lebanese political order and maintaining its stability contradict each other. On the one hand, Hezbollah constantly reiterates that it is part of the government and that the resistance and its weapons are needed to secure the Lebanese borders from external aggressions and to defend the state (see section 3.2). In doing so, the Shiite organization shows its commitment to the political order of the Lebanese state and argues that the resistance guarantees border security, especially in south Lebanon, and also stability against the Israeli threat. If Hezbollah really used the weapons of the resistance to defend the Lebanese political borders only, this would in fact lead to a higher level of security and stability, even though it is not based on democratic standards as Hezbollah’s weapons are not under the control of the Lebanese army. On the other hand, however, Hezbollah itself has repeatedly endangered the political order of Lebanon by internal and external interactions of its armed resistance whenever its core norm of resistance got under threat. It used its weapons internally during the 2008 clashes in Beirut (see section 3.3), engaged in a military confrontation with Israel (see section 3.2) and militarily entered the Syrian civil war in favor of the Assad regime (see section 3.4). Hence, Hezbollah endangered the Lebanese political order concerning the criterion of security and stability. Obviously, there is a massive discrepancy between Hezbollah’s argumentation and interactions concerning guaranteeing security and maintaining stability. The Shiite organization shows a literal commitment to the Lebanese political order but endangers the state’s security and stability whenever its core norm of resistance gets under threat. Criterion 2: approving promises once made as long as they are in line with Hezbollah’s overall vision

Hezbollah’s actions concerning approving promises and decisions once made become especially relevant with regard to the institutional and the security structure of the Lebanese state. The analysis has shown that Hezbollah approves earlier promises and agreements only as long as they are in line with the organization’s overall vision. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Hezbollah’s political manifesto constitute the most specific conceptions of a political order Hezbollah has ever formulated. In both cases the Shiite organization shows a clear commitment to the political order of the Lebanese state. Both programs promote a strong Lebanese state and call for establishing consensual democracy as the political system of Lebanon over the long-term and for a comprehensive reform of the electoral law, and a security reform. Although the 2009 political manifesto represents Hezbollah alone and outlines its political vision in an even more detailed way, both programs do not contradict each other (see sections 3.2 and 3.3). Hence, theoretically Hezbollah adheres to the programmatic promises it has once made and it also clearly shows its commitment to the political order of the Lebanese state. However, again, Hezbollah’s argumentation contradicts its interactions. This applies to its engagement within the Lebanese state and the deployment of its weapons. To pursue its own interests, i.e. to protect its resistance against national and international threats, all ministers from Hezbollah and its allies resigned from the 2006 Lebanese government when Hezbollah’s core norm of resistance came under attack following the establishment of the STL. This led to an 18-month deadlock of the Lebanese government. The second issue that highlights that Hezbollah did not adhere to the promises it once made is the internal deployment of its weapons in 2008. Hezbollah had always stated that it would not deploy its weapons internally. When the government issued decisions against Hezbollah’s infrastructure, Hezbollah did not adhere to its promise anymore but classified the government’s decision as a war against the resistance and deployed its weapons internally (see section 3.2). Concerning the main research question of this book – what characterizes Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order – at first sight, Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order are illustrated by a clear commitment to the Lebanese political order. However, when relating the national documents Hezbollah is part of and its 2009 Political Manifesto to the organization’s argumentation and interactions in the Lebanese and regional context, massive contradictions appear. Hezbollah shows a literal commitment to the Lebanese political order but endangers exactly this order by its interactions as soon as its own interests, i.e. the resistance, is under threat. This leads to the fact that one cannot identify a specific conception of the political order in the case of Hezbollah. It is striking that Hezbollah’s Shiite Islamist political thought neither holds a relevant position within Hezbollah’s literal commitment to the Lebanese political order, nor in its interactions, which endanger this order. Instead, Hezbollah seems to be more interested in safeguarding its core norm of resistance and its power position in Lebanon as will be summarized below. Hamas: from a pluralist to an authoritarian political order based on resistance Stage one: political order characterized by state building and pluralism The first stage of Hamas’ conception of political order can be classified based on its electoral

platform, the draft of its national unity government program, and its 2006 government program. In general, all three programs follow the same broad policy approach: they focus on statebuilding issues, the fight against corruption, and reforms of the economic and fiscal sector. At the same time, Hamas repeatedly refers to a Palestinian state, whose institutions would be based on pluralism, the separation of powers, and equal citizen rights. In doing so, Hamas shows a commitment to democratic elements. What is also striking is that from program to program Hamas’ references to its core norm of resistance are fading away and the organization only hints at its Islamist ideology as a frame of reference (see section 4.2). Through its constant focus on pluralism, state-building issues and the reform of diverse political sectors, the organization adheres from program to program to its principles. At the same time, Hamas’ commitment to a pluralist political order, strong state institutions, the fight against corruption, and reforms of diverse sectors would lead to the improvement in the stability of the political institutions of the Palestinian Territories, which might be the basis of the institutions of a future Palestinian state. Only, concerning ensuring security, Hamas did not issue specifics during its electoral program and the draft of the national unity program. Throughout these programs, Hamas did not strongly focus on security matters. It did not even dedicate specific clauses or paragraphs to the security sector, neither concerning internal nor external security. This changed after Fatah had refused to build a national unity government with Hamas and the latter announced its own government program. In Hamas’ government program, paragraph two is wholly dedicated to the issue of guaranteeing security. This applies to the security of the Palestinian people and Palestinian and international institutions in the Palestinian Territories but also for the performance of the Palestinian security apparatus itself. At this period of time, the security sector, however, did not constitute the most important element of Hamas’ government program. Despite the organization’s efforts to ensure the security in the Palestinian Territories after it had established the Palestinian government on its own, Hamas did not manage to guarantee security and maintain stability in the Palestinian Territories. Challenged by the economic crisis, which had mainly been caused by the international blockade of the Hamas government, and struggles over political power with the Palestinian Fatah, the stability of the Palestinian Territories was severely threatened. Violent fights between Fatah and Hamas emerged, which ended in the takeover of Gaza by Hamas in 2007 (see section 4.2). Obviously, Hamas was not able to practically implement its conceptions of a political order and – recalling Bull’s definition of order – could not ensure the stability of the political order (criterion 1), not adhere to promises made in its political programs (criterion 2), and not maintain stability (criterion 3). Stage two: political order based on a strong security sector and institutionalized resistance The second stage of Hamas’ conceptions of political order begins with Hamas’ military takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, although first tendencies towards authoritarianism have already become visible earlier. Already in the months before the Gaza takeover occurred, Hamas’ focus on the security sector became stronger. At this time, after tensions between Fatah and Hamas had increased, Hamas started to establish its own internal security force, the ESF. After the military takeover of Gaza by Hamas, the organization’s most important issue was the security sector. Without even formulating a government program Hamas underlined the need for

a strong security sector. It established an internal security force responsible for the security in Gaza and the IQB became responsible for the external security. Hence, Hamas’ resistance became institutionalized and involved in guaranteeing the political order in Gaza (see section 4.3). However, institutionalizing the resistance forces did not only have advantages. Hamas had to deal with a rising autonomy of the IQB and with the issue of being the government on the one hand and upholding its core norm of resistance on the other hand. Hamas also used its internal security forces to cope with internal opponents in Gaza, which partly conducted violent actions, such as the Salafi factions. Moreover, there are rumors that Hamas’ security sector is strongly involved in promoting Islamization processes in Gaza to please different factions within Hamas and as well as Hamas’ opponents in Gaza who criticize the organization for not promoting Islamic values strongly enough (see section 4.3). In sum, the second stage of Hamas’ conceptions of political order are characterized by a strong security sector, partly based on institutionalized resistance. Hamas built up a strong security sector to maintain the stability of the political order both internally and externally. Although Islamization trends could be identified in Hamas’ political order, they rather serve as a means to deal with the different factions within Hamas and factions, which oppose Hamas’ rule in Gaza. The organization’s Sunni Islamist political thought is not the most important element of the political order. Instead, the element of security characterizes Hamas’ political order in Gaza. Against this backdrop Hamas’ political order shows strong authoritarian tendencies, because an impressive security sector is one of the most important elements of an authoritarian political order (Bellin 2012, 130). Although the political order Hamas has established in Gaza shows exactly Hamas’ conception of political order because the organization governs alone, one has always to bear in mind that the Gaza political order is not the ideal model of a political order Hamas favors. According to Hamas-members from the PLC an ideal political order would be based on a democratic civil state and Islam would serve as a frame of reference only (see section 4.3). The difference between Hamas’ ideal model of a political order and the one that prevails in Gaza can be explained by two factors: first, if Hamas currently tried to establish the political order it favors in Gaza, it would very likely lose its power position. Second, one has to bear in mind that different types of an ideal model of a political order might exist within the different branches of Hamas. While Hamas politicians in the West Bank promote quite moderate stances, Hamas politicians in Gaza take more radical positions – partly because they have to deal with the circumstances in Gaza and increasing competition from Salafi actors. When relating Bull’s definition of order to the political order Hamas has established in Gaza, it becomes clear that the organization has succeeded in ensuring the security (criterion 1) and to maintain the stability of the political order (criterion 3). It fails, however, to adhere to the promises made in its political programs (criterion 2) and claims itself that the political order it has established in Gaza does not represent the ideal model of a political order Hamas would favor to establish. 5.3 The core norm of resistance

Christopher Daase’s relational understanding of resistance, as introduced in Chapter 2 of the book, applies to both the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas. Both organizations direct their resistance activities against Israel. However, as opposed to Daase, I do not understand resistance as a practice but as a core norm that achieves its meaning through social interaction. Moreover, in the case of Hezbollah and Hamas it is not possible to differentiate between violent and non-violent resistance, because both forms of resistance overlap in the organizations’ interactions. Hezbollah: the dual quality of the core norm resistance Based on the empirical analysis conducted in Chapter 3 it was possible to show that for the Lebanese Hezbollah its core norm of resistance always ranks first and that resistance structures Hezbollah’s politics. At the same time, Hezbollah reconstructs the meaning of its core norm of resistance, when the latter comes under threat. During the empirical analysis I identified the following three stages that show how resistance structures Hezbollah’s behavior and how the organization reconstructs the meaning of resistance through interactions in context: (1) Protecting the core norm of resistance; (2) consolidating the core norm of resistance; (3) defending the core norm of resistance through reconstructing its meaning. 1 Protecting the core norm of resistance through participation in government In the year of 2005 Hezbollah decided to enter the Lebanese government, as the Shiite organization was facing severe challenges from the national and international arena. Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem very clearly highlighted the relationship between the challenges Hezbollah was facing and its decision to enter the government. He stresses that he expected increasing international engagement in Lebanon, especially by the United States, which would aim at eliminating the resistance. Hence, Qassem argues, a government was needed in which Hezbollah is embedded and which formulates political decisions, which are in line with Hezbollah’s overall visions as outlined in Chapter 3 of this book. Thus, Hezbollah entered the Lebanese government to protect its resistance through the state institutions (see section 3.2). After the 2005 elections Hezbollah managed to incorporate its core norm of resistance into the ministerial declaration of the new Lebanese government. The ministerial declaration understands resistance as “an honest and natural expression of the national right of the Lebanese people” (al-Ḥukūma al-Tāsiʿa w-al-Sittūn 2005, author’s translation). It even mentioned Hezbollah’s understanding of resistance: liberation and deterrence. Thus, Hezbollah’s resistance achieves a special protection through the Lebanese state. The Shiite organization further protected the norm of resistance by entering the crosssectarian alliance with the Christian FPM. In February 2006, Hezbollah and the FPM signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The MoU formulates political goals for Lebanon and comprehensively pays attention to Hezbollah’s core norm of resistance. In the last paragraph it accounts for Hezbollah’s dual meaning of the resistance and explicitly refers to the issues of liberation and deterrence. Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem outlines, in a surprising clear manner, that the alliance with the FPM protects the resistance and that the “FPM constitutes a political pillar for the resistance and the sovereignty of Lebanon” (Qāsim 2010,

250). Summing up, after the tumultuous events in the year of 2005 the meaning of the core norm of resistance remained stable. Resistance was understood as a relational concept, i.e. Hezbollah’s resistance was directed against the Israeli enemy. The organization sought to liberate Lebanon and to act as a force of deterrence against the Israeli threat at the south Lebanese borders. At the same time, resistance became a structuring component within the structure of the Lebanese state, as Hezbollah was now part of the Lebanese government and had managed to incorporate its norm of resistance in the ministerial declaration of the government and the MoU signed with the FPM. It is striking that Hezbollah very clearly outlined that it entered the government to protect its core norm of resistance and that it managed to incorporate the meaning of liberation and deterrence into national Lebanese political documents. 2 Consolidating the core norm of resistance in Lebanese politics – Hezbollah achieves veto power In the years after Hezbollah had entered government, two incidents severely threatened its core norm of resistance: the STL and the May 2008 crisis (see section 3.3). Hezbollah’s reaction to these threats can be understood as a consolidation of the core norm of resistance in the Lebanese political system. When the Lebanese government implemented the STL, Hezbollah’s minister resigned from government, which led to an 18-month paralysis of the Lebanese government. Hassan Nasrallah made clear that Hezbollah understood the STL to be against the resistance. He stated the STL would aim to change the power structure in Lebanon in favor of US and Israeli interests and to isolate and disarm the resistance. Nasrallah emphasized that Hezbollah would not tolerate anyone or anything to weaken the resistance. The Lebanese government provoked even stronger actions by Hezbollah when it issued two decisions against Hezbollah’s infrastructure in May 2008. The Shiite organization militarily took over West Beirut and used its weapons for the first time after the civil war had ended in the domestic arena. Hassan Nasrallah stressed that Hezbollah understood the government’s actions against Hezbollah’s infrastructure as a declaration of war and that it was the organization’s duty to defend its arms (see section 3.3). Based on the Doha Accord, which ended the 2008 Beirut clashes, Hezbollah managed to achieve a veto power position in the Lebanese government. This led to the fact that the Lebanese government would not be able to conduct actions against Hezbollah’s core norm of resistance. In its 2009 political manifesto Hezbollah strengthened its aim to further incorporate the resistance and its weapons into the Lebanese political system: it called for integrating the weapons of the resistance into an overall strategy of national defense. As such a strategy of national defense would not be limited to a specific government period, including the weapons of the resistance, such a strategy would even protect them from the decisions of governments to be elected in the future. During the stage of consolidating the resistance, the core norm of resistance entailed a structuring and a constructed quality. By the end of 2006 Hezbollah was increasingly questioned by the March 14 alliance. The Shiite organization decided that it was not able to

protect its resistance through participation in government anymore, and its ministers resigned. At that time, the structuring function of resistance was already strong but it became even stronger after Hezbollah had managed to achieve a veto power position in the Lebanese government based on the Doha Accord. The core norm of resistance had been consolidated through Hezbollah’s veto power position in government. Hence, its structuring component was strong not only concerning Hezbollah itself but also with regard to the Lebanese government. At the same time, the constructed quality of the norm of resistance increased although it was still less strong than the structuring one. The constructed quality could be identified when the meaning of resistance slightly changed after Hezbollah had used its weapons in the domestic arena for the first time. Although Hezbollah downplayed the internal use of its weapons at that point in time, Hezbollah had first directed its weapons against other Lebanese factions instead of against Israel. 3 Defending the core norm of resistance by reconstructing its meaning In the third stage concerning Hezbollah’s understanding of resistance and its interactions towards power preservation, the flexible, constructed quality in the norm of resistance is much stronger than the structuring quality. Resistance is still understood in terms of liberation and deterrence but due to the changing regional context, Hezbollah has added a third dimension: the fight against the takfiri threat (see section 3.4). Since the Syrian regime, which was closely aligned with Hezbollah, had become increasingly in danger of being overthrown in the civil war, Hezbollah officially announced its military engagement in Syria in favor of the Assad regime in May 2013. Hassan Nasrallah framed Hezbollah’s military involvement in Syria as being necessary for Lebanon’s safety. He argued Hezbollah’s resistance fighter would secure the Lebanese borders through fighting takfiris in neighboring Syria (see section 3.4). It becomes obvious that Nasrallah reconstructed the meaning of the core norm of resistance due to the changing regional context. Hezbollah supported the Syrian regime because if the Assad regime fell, Hezbollah would lose its strategic partner. Moreover, the supply chain with regard to delivering weapons from Iran to Hezbollah would be in danger. Hence, Hezbollah reconstructed the meaning of resistance and added the fight against the takfiri threat. Since then, resistance is not only directed against Israel anymore but also against takfiris in Syria. If we want to understand why Hezbollah does not have specific conceptions of political order, as shown in section 5.2, we have to relate this to the three stages of resistance, which structure Hezbollah’s behavior, which I identified above. They lead to the fact that Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order remain unspecific. The Shiite organization protects, consolidates, and defends its core norm of resistance through interactions in context. These interactions overlap with the organization’s political and military practices that endanger the Lebanese political order. This leads to the assumption that Hezbollah’s main interest is its core norm of resistance and that its literal commitment to the Lebanese political order serves as legitimization strategy for the resistance cause. It is striking that again Hezbollah’s Shiite Islamist political thought does not play a relevant role with regard to the organization’s understanding of resistance.

Hamas: maintaining the structuring quality of resistance and highlighting elements of resistance in context Also in the case of Hamas, the organization’s core norm of resistance holds a dual quality, according to Wiener’s norm definition. In the time frame from 2005 until 2013, two stages can be identified concerning Hamas’ understanding of resistance, which overlap with the two stages that have been highlighted concerning the organization’s conceptions of political order: (1) the core norm of resistance withers away, and (2) the institutionalization of resistance and the polarity between governance and resistance. The core norm of resistance withers away During the empirical analysis of Hamas’ electoral platform, its proposed national unity government program, and its government program, it became clear that Hamas’ core norm of resistance was increasingly withering away over time (see section 4.2). In its electoral platform, resistance still had an important meaning. Hamas highlighted resistance as a strategic choice and as a means to end occupation. The organization also underlined that the Palestinians should use all available means to resist the occupation – including armed resistance. However, besides this direct reference to the core norm of resistance, it is only mentioned rarely in the electoral platform. In its draft of a national unity government program Hamas mentions the core norm of resistance only once. It upholds the right of the Palestinians to resist but does not mention armed resistance anymore. In its government program, Hamas refers to the resistance only once. However, this can rather be understood as a historical reference, as the Sunni organization points out to the Palestinian people that engaged throughout history in resistance against the occupation. Obviously, the meaning of Hamas’ core norm of resistance altered after Hamas had decided to participate in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. Hamas did not remove the structuring quality of its norm, i.e. resistance still entailed the meaning of liberation and structured Hamas’ interactions towards Israel. At the same time, one can identify the flexible element in Hamas’ core norm of resistance. The norm of resistance as such was withering away from one political program to the next. This might be explained by Hamas’ interactions in the national context. First, the organization tried to form a national unity government. When Hamas and Fatah failed to agree on a joint government, the Sunni organization became responsible to govern the Palestinian people alone. In both cases a strong focus on the core norm of resistance might have been counter-productive. In sum, it is striking that the more Hamas became involved in establishing a Palestinian political order, the more the norm of resistance has been fading away. However, one must always bear in mind that Hamas never put its core norm of resistance – including the arms – into question. The institutionalization of resistance and the polarity between governance and resistance When the national contestation process between Hamas and Fatah increased in the Palestinian Territories, the meaning of Hamas’ core norm of resistance got stronger again. The 2007 national unity government program did not refer directly to armed resistance but highlights the legitimacy of all forms of resistance. After Hamas’ Gaza takeover the core norm of resistance

became institutionalized (see section 4.3). While Hamas’ internal security force, the ESF, was responsible for the internal security in Gaza, Hamas’ armed wing, the IQB, became responsible for the external security. They were responsible for controlling Gaza’s borders and for possible confrontations with Israel. Hence, in particular, the element of armed resistance became highly relevant for guaranteeing the stability of Hamas’ political order in Gaza towards external threats. Hamas has used its internal security sector also to confront opposition in Gaza and to conduct Islamization processes in the Strip. At the same time, Hamas found itself caught between being a government on the one hand and upholding its core norm of resistance on the other hand. Hamas politicians agree on the fact that it is difficult to combine resistance with political and diplomatic activities, because they often do not correspond to each other. To meet this challenge, Hamas has reconstructed the normative meaning of resistance. It differentiates between technical and strategic commands of resistance. The technical understanding of resistance allows for accepting a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and does not contradict the ideological commitment to the core norm of resistance to liberate the Palestinian land. The challenge of being a government and a resistance movement at the same time becomes especially clear during Hamas’ military confrontations with Israel. It goes without saying that the importance of the norm of resistance, especially armed resistance, increased strongly during these periods. However, it is striking that Hamas highlights the victory of the resistance but links this victory to the Hamas movement and not the government. It is also striking that although Hamas was caught between being a government and a resistance movement at the same time, it institutionalized its resistance to guarantee the preservation of the relatively stable political order in Gaza. Obviously, institutionalized resistance is strong in Gaza. This can largely be explained by the fact that Hamas’ resistance forces are responsible for upholding the political order in Gaza and are in particular responsible for the external border control. However, it can also be explained by divergent interests that the different branches within Hamas pursue. Over the previous years, the IQB, which are located in Gaza, are considered to have gained increasing autonomy within Hamas. This would automatically lead to an increasing importance of military resistance within Hamas’ political order in Gaza. Hamas’ specific conceptions of political order being distinguished along two different stages as outlined in section 5.2 of this book correspond with the two stages identified in its core norm of resistance. Hamas’ interactions towards resistance overlap with the two stages of its political order. During the first stage of Hamas’ conceptions of political order, resistance was increasingly fading away – very likely because it would have contradicted the relatively broad political approach Hamas had offered. During Hamas’ second stage of political order, in which the security sector is the strongest one and which is characterized through strong authoritarian tendencies, Hamas’ core norm of resistance became institutionalized to preserve the political order in Gaza. Throughout both stages of resistance Hamas’ Sunni Islamist political thought does not play a relevant role. Instead, the organization’s understanding of resistance is clearly linked to the element of liberation. In sum, the compliance of Hamas’ conceptions of political order with its core norm of resistance in the two different stages leads to the assumption that Hamas uses its norm of resistance as a means to establish or maintain its political order.

5.4 Maintaining the power position In the main research proposition of this book I argue that the core norm of resistance is closely related to Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ interactions towards power preservation in the context of Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. I assume further that resistance and its relation to power preservation and the political and social context Hezbollah and Hamas are engaged in characterizes their respective conceptions of political order and explains the differences between these conceptions. Bearing this proposition in mind (see section 2.4), section 5.4 highlights Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ power conceptions and sheds light on the power mechanisms both organizations have applied to preserve their power position in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories from 2005 until 2013. In doing so, I draw on a relational and multidimensional understanding of power, as outlined in Chapter 2 of the book and use Barnett and Duvall’s power mechanisms as sensitizing concepts (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3ff.). Hezbollah – securing its position through resistance and power Compulsory power: deploying the resistance’s weapons In the case of the Lebanese Hezbollah the direct mechanism of compulsory power is the strongest mechanism when it comes to explaining Hezbollah’s interactions towards power preservation in Lebanon. It is closely linked to Hezbollah’s core norm of resistance and especially to the weapons of the resistance. During the research period from 2005 until 2013, Hezbollah has exercised compulsory power against external enemies and within the domestic arena of Lebanon. The first time Hezbollah exercised compulsory power through its weapons was during the July war 2006 (see section 3.2). After the Shiite organization had kidnapped two Israeli soldiers to free Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails, Israel started a comprehensive military attack on Hezbollah and its infrastructure, mainly in the south of Lebanon. Hezbollah militarily responded to the attack and the military confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah lasted for 33 days. Although Hezbollah was part of the Lebanese government at that time, it did not inform the rest of the government prior to the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers and the military confrontation about its planned course of action. The Lebanese government was unable to end the war between Hezbollah and Israel without international support. Hence, Hezbollah controlled the abilities of the Lebanese government and exercised compulsory power vis-à-vis the government through the weapons of the resistance. The second time Hezbollah used its weapons and exercised compulsory power, the organization’s direct control of other Lebanese political actors was even stronger. In 2008, the March 14-led Lebanese government issued two decisions against Hezbollah’s infrastructure. The Shiite organization classified the government’s decisions as a war against the resistance and militarily seized West Beirut and parts of the country. Hassan Nasrallah underlined that it was Hezbollah’s duty to defend the arms and the resistance. The crisis was ended by the Doha Accord, which assigned a veto power position to Hezbollah (see section 3.3). Hezbollah had directly linked its military operation within Lebanon to the protection and the defense of its arms and the resistance. It managed to directly control the Lebanese government through the

mechanism of compulsory power. In the end, it was Hezbollah that achieved a veto power position in the government. In 2013, Hezbollah officially entered the Syrian civil war in favor of President Bashar alAssad. In doing so, again the organization exercised compulsory power through its weapons. The Lebanese government, including Hezbollah, had agreed to isolate Lebanon from the Syrian civil war. Nevertheless, Hezbollah has militarily supported the Syrian regime because of its own interests: if Assad fell, Hezbollah would lose its ally in Syria and the supply chain through which its weapons are delivered would be interrupted Institutional power: safeguarding the core norm of resistance through participation in politics Hezbollah applied the indirect mechanism of institutional power to protect the core norm of resistance against external pressures and threats through participating in Lebanese politics. This becomes most obvious when the Shiite organization entered the Lebanese government in 2005 (see section 3.2) and when it managed to achieve a veto power position in the government in 2008 (see section 3.3). Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General, Naim Qassem, stated several times that Hezbollah decided to enter the Lebanese government to protect the resistance. The Shiite organization managed to include the dual meaning of its norm resistance, liberation and deterrence, into the ministerial declaration of the 2005 Lebanese government. This allowed the organization to protect its core norm of resistance through indirect institutional mechanisms against threats coming from the international and national political arena. In 2008, when Hezbollah achieved its veto power position in the Lebanese government, it was again able to exercise institutional power. However, in this case, the institutional power mechanism departs from Barnett and Duvall’s definition. They claim that institutional power is an indirect mechanism of power (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3). In the case of Hezbollah in 2008, institutional power worked as a direct power mechanism, because Hezbollah and its allies hold a veto power position in the Lebanese government. They were always able to prevent interactions against the resistance and its weapons. Structural power: co-constitution of interests between Hezbollah and FPM The direct mechanism of structural power becomes relevant with regard to the political alliance between Hezbollah and the FPM based on their joint MoU. Hassan Nasrallah and Naim Qassem clearly stressed Hezbollah’s interests to enter an alliance with the Christian FPM to protect its core norm of resistance. At the same time, it aimed to extend its support base in the Christian community. Michel Aoun, head of FPM, in turn achieved Hezbollah’s support to become the President of the State of Lebanon, a position Aoun had longed for a long time already. Hence, Hezbollah and FPM co-constituted their vital interests through the direct mechanism of structural power. In sum, however, the mechanism of structural power is the least relevant mechanism of power in the case of Hezbollah. Productive power: reconstructing normative meaning

By making use of the indirect mechanism of productive power, Hezbollah reconstructed the meaning of its core norm of resistance. First, Hezbollah’s understanding of resistance entailed the meaning of liberation. After the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, the organization added the meaning of deterrence and when Hezbollah started to militarily engage in Syria it reconstructed the meaning of its core norm of resistance again and added the meaning of the fight against the takfiri threat (see section 3.4). Through reconstructing normative meaning, Hezbollah has tried to shape the knowledge of the Lebanese population concerning the interactions of its resistance. The reconstruction of normative meaning was likely conducted to legitimate the actions of the resistance and frame them as being supportive for the Lebanese state although they have been counter-productive. We can conclude that in the case of Hezbollah the direct mechanism of compulsory power is the strongest power mechanism. The organization exercises compulsory power through its weapons whenever its core norm of resistance is under severe threat. It also exercises institutional and structural power to protect its norm of resistance within the framework of the Lebanese political order. Productive power helps Hezbollah to legitimize its resistance interactions in the Lebanese population. Concerning the main research proposition of this study it becomes clear that Hezbollah’s core norm of resistance is closely linked to the organization’s power position in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s weapons and its participation in government enable the organization to exercise compulsory and institutional power and to maintain its position in the Lebanese context. Concerning preserving power, Hezbollah’s Shiite Islamist political thought could not be identified as being relevant. The Palestinian Hamas – maintaining political order through compulsory power Compulsory power: authoritarian trends in Gaza The direct mechanism of compulsory power becomes relevant through Hamas’ second stage of political order, the political order it has established in Gaza. After the Gaza takeover, Hamas put a special focus on the security sector and on the re-establishment of law and order in Gaza. Its armed resistance forces, the IQB, became responsible for the military confrontation with Israel and for the control of Gaza’s borders. The internal security forces, the ESF, which Hamas had established in 2006 when contestation grew between Hamas and Fatah, were integrated into the Civil Police in Gaza, which was responsible for the internal security situation of the Gaza Strip. At the same time, rumors on Islamization policing by Hamas in Gaza increased and political analysts argue that the security sector strongly participated in this process (see section 4.3). Through governing alone in Gaza and having a strong security sector, Hamas was able to conduct compulsory power and to uphold the authority in Gaza and its power position alike. The mechanism of compulsory power is strongly connected to the core norm of resistance, as the IQB are responsible for the external security of the Gaza Strip. Moreover, they were involved in the internal security sector of Gaza right after the takeover. Against the backdrop of the strong security sector in Gaza and the related mechanism of compulsory power, authoritarian trends can be observed in Gaza, because in authoritarian states the security sector is traditionally strong. Authoritarian regimes turn to different institutions to secure their survival. These can be military institutions, intelligence agencies, or

security institutions, such as the police, etc. (Bellin 2012, 130). In the case of Hamas, it is the organization’s military wing, the IQB, and the security sector in Gaza that secure the survival of the political order and allow Hamas to exercise direct control over other political actors. At the same time, the strong focus on the mechanism of compulsory power by institutionalized resistance does not only refer to the fact that Hamas makes use of its resistance to uphold its political order in Gaza, but also to the different interests that exist within Hamas. As outlined above, the IQB are considered to have gained increasing autonomy within Hamas over the years. Upholding the political order in Gaza by the weapons of the resistance also secures the IQB’s position. At the same time the IQB are dependent on a good relationship with Iran, which provides the resistance forces with weapons. This is why disputes have emerged within Hamas, when the Political Bureau decided to withdraw from Damascus and to align with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (see section 4.4). In sum, the mechanism of compulsory power shows the strong element of institutionalized resistance within the political order in Gaza and refers at the same time to the special interests of the IQB: to uphold its autonomy and power position within Hamas. The less distinct mechanism of institutional power The mechanism of institutional power is less important in the case of Hamas. Hamas tried to engage in a national unity government with Fatah after it had won the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006. However, the Sunni organization failed to convince the secular Fatah to engage in a joint government (see section 4.2). Hence, the mechanism of institutional power did not become relevant at this point of time. Before and after the Gaza takeover, Hamas and Fatah engaged in several reconciliation attempts. They formed a national unity government in 2007, which broke up after only three months. Since that time, further reconciliation attempts have been made. The Palestinian reconciliation agreements of 2011 and 2012 that were brokered by Qatar and Egypt are the most relevant ones. They were both signed by Fatah and Hamas. However, they were never implemented, because neither Fatah nor Hamas have been willing to give up their power positions. As Hamas did not comprehensively engage with other political actors in Palestinian institutions, the mechanism of institutional power is less relevant when it comes to explaining Hamas’ interactions towards power preservation in the Palestinian Territories. Structural power: Hamas’ hopes to benefit from Morsi’s rise to power The mechanism of direct structural power is also not very relevant when it comes to explaining Hamas’ interactions towards power preservation in the Palestinian Territories. However, it is stronger than the mechanism of institutional power. Structural power could especially be observed when it comes to Hamas’ relationship with its mother organization – the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. When Muhammad Morsi came to power in Egypt in June 2012, Hamas anticipated, its moment had come. It hoped, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood would comprehensively back and support the Palestinian Hamas in terms of achieving international legitimacy, removing the economic and political isolation of Gaza, and in a general support of the Palestinian cause (see section 4.4). Hence, the Palestinian organization hoped the Muslim

Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt would serve Hamas’ interests. However, Morsi could not meet all of Hamas’ expectations. During his reign, Hamas managed to increase its external legitimacy and visited some Arab capitals, such as Tunis or Cairo, which was not possible before, but the economic and political situation in Gaza improved only slightly, and the isolation was not lifted. In sum, Hamas had hoped the mechanism of structural power would work much stronger. However, the reality was different and Hamas’ interests were only accounted for to a minor extent. Productive power: governance, the core norm of resistance, and the privilege to interpret the role of Islam in Gaza Like in the case of Hezbollah, the mechanism of productive power becomes relevant when it comes to reconstructing the meaning of Hamas’ core norm of resistance. As outlined throughout Chapter 4, Hamas highlights or downplays different elements of the meaning within its core norm of resistance based on the changing context the organization is engaged in. During the first stage of its political order, Hamas downplayed resistance and also its Islamist ideology was fading away, because both would not have been helpful to establish a Palestinian government (see section 4.2). Throughout the second stage of its political order, Hamas has differentiated between technical and strategic demands of resistance to combine governance and resistance (see section 4.3). In doing so, the organization shapes the knowledge of its core norm of resistance and guarantees to adhere to the resistance cause, although it is responsible to govern the Gaza Strip at the same time. The Islamization trends in Gaza might also be explained by the indirect mechanism of productive power. Conservative factions within Hamas and Salafi actors in Gaza claim that Hamas should adhere to a more strictly practiced Islam. Through promoting pious policing in Gaza, Hamas might try to shape their knowledge and establish itself as the one who defines what constitutes political Islam. We can conclude, therefore, that Hamas’ first stage of political order was characterized by the organization’s focus on establishing a stable and strong state structure. At that time, its resistance was less visible and Hamas tried to exercise institutional power but failed in doing so. In stage one, Hamas’ Sunni Islamist political thought became less relevant over time and served as a reference frame for behavior. Hamas’ second stage of political order is characterized by a strong security sector. As the security sector is partly based on institutionalized resistance and on mechanisms of compulsory power, resistance is a means to maintain Hamas’ political order in Gaza and hence the organization’s power position. Throughout the second stage, Islamization trends could be observed in Gaza. However, they did not characterize Hamas’ political order but rather served the cause to please Hamas’ opponents – within and outside the organization – and hence to maintain Hamas’ power position. 5.5 Conclusion Based on empirical findings presented in Chapters 3 and 4, which have been summarized and embedded into the theoretical framework of this book in Chapter 5, we can draw the following

conclusions: Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order are characterized by a literal commitment to the Lebanese political order. The Shiite organization especially highlights the elements of security and stability through its resistance. However, when taking a closer look, it becomes obvious that Hezbollah’s interactions contradict its commitment to the Lebanese political order and even endanger it. Due to the contradiction between Hezbollah’s argumentation, i.e. its literal commitment to the Lebanese political order and its interactions, it is not possible to identify a concrete political order Hezbollah aims to establish in Lebanon. Instead, Hezbollah’s interactions, which endanger the Lebanese political order, often overlap with its core norm of resistance and its interactions towards power preservation Lebanon. By upholding and maintaining the norm of resistance Hezbollah is able to preserve its power position in Lebanon. Direct compulsory power and indirect productive power are the most relevant mechanisms. Through compulsory power the organization directly controls other political actors and through productive power it reconstructs the meaning of its core norm of resistance to legitimize its actions. In sum, Hezbollah seems to be more interested in the core norm of resistance through which the organization is able to maintain its power position in Lebanon than in questions of political order. One Hezbollah expert I interviewed in Beirut in the realm of this book confirms this argumentation and summarizes Hezbollah’s goals as follows: “Hezbollah has not a very strong interest in Lebanon but more in questions of power” (Hezbollah Researcher 2 2013). One reason for Hezbollah’s interest in power instead of political order can be the fact that the Shiite organization is embedded in the multiconfessional nation state of Lebanon. It would not be able to establish a political order based on its own conceptions only in Lebanon. Acting in the framework of the Lebanese state, however, helps Hezbollah to pursue its own interest: to preserve its power position through its key norm of resistance. This is why Hezbollah does not show any specific conceptions of a political order but rather a literal commitment to the Lebanese political order. It is striking that concerning Hezbollah’s literal commitment to the Lebanese political order, its core norm of resistance, and its interactions towards power preservation, the organization’s Shiite Islamist political thought does not hold a special position. In the case of Hamas, two stages within the organization’s conceptions of political order can be distinguished. The first is characterized by a broad political approach, which focuses on a pluralist political order with strong and stable state institutions. This political order entailed democratic elements. In this stage the organization’s core norm of resistance and its Sunni Islamist political thought have been fading away. During this stage, Hamas tried to exercise institutional power – through cooperation with Fatah – but failed in doing so. The second stage has begun after Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip. Although Islamization trends can be observed in Gaza, Hamas’ political order is mainly not characterized by its Sunni Islamist political thought but by a strong security sector, partly based on institutionalized resistance. Hamas has incorporated its core norm of resistance into the state structure. After the foundation of the internal security forces, members of the military wing were part of it. The ESF and later the Civil Police have been responsible for internal security, while Hamas’ military wing, the IQB, is responsible for protecting Gaza’s border and for military confrontations with Israel. Hence, Hamas’ core norm of resistance is closely linked to the

security sector in Gaza and supports Hamas in exercising compulsory power and to maintain its political order in Gaza. At the same time, one has to bear in mind that in particular the IQB might pursue their own interests in Gaza. They are considered to have increased their autonomy in Hamas over the years and upholding the political order in Gaza by military resistance might also serve the IQB’s own interests: to preserve its autonomy and its power position within Hamas. Like Hezbollah, Hamas harbors an interest in power, although the situation is different in the Palestinian Territories. While Hezbollah interacts in the political order of the Lebanese nation state, Hamas struggles for the establishment of a Palestinian nation state – a goal that has not yet been achieved. However, also in the Palestinian political arena strong contestation processes take place. Against that backdrop, Hamas could not manage to solely represent the Palestinian government after it had won the 2006 elections. The organization was not able to uphold its power position in the Palestinian Territories. Hence, it militarily took over the Gaza Strip. In Gaza the core norm of resistance serves the maintenance of Hamas’ political order. Without its strong focus on the security sector and the weapons of the resistance Hamas would not be able to uphold its political order in Gaza. Hamas’ politicians from the PLC have repeatedly stated that the political order in Gaza is not the ideal model of a political order that Hamas would like to establish. At the same time, Hamas has not reconciled with Fatah yet and uses resistance to uphold exactly this order. This leads to the assumption that Hamas is also more interested in questions of power than in political order, but the context is different from that of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Maintaining political order in Gaza secures Hamas’ power position within the Palestinian Territories. The main research proposition of this book argued that it is (1) the organizations’ core norm of resistance, deeply intertwined with their interactions towards power preservation, and (2) the specific political and social context they are engaged in, which characterizes Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order and explains the differences between them. Based on the Critical Constructivist framework and the empirical results of this study we can conclude that the organizations’ core norm of resistance, questions of power and power preservation, and the specific context both organizations are engaged in indeed play a crucial role when it comes to understanding their conceptions of political order. It became clear that both organizations use their core norm of resistance to preserve their power status in the specific context they are engaged in. As this context differs sharply from each other, the organizations’ interactions towards power preservation lead to different outcomes; i.e. different conceptions of political order. Hezbollah does not have specific conceptions of political order, as it operates in the multi-confessional nation state of Lebanon. The organization would not be able to establish a political system based on its own conceptions alone. Hence it shows a literal commitment to the Lebanese political order and preserves its power position in Lebanon through its core norm of resistance. While being formally included into the Lebanese political system and pursuing its power position, Hezbollah reconstructed its core norm of resistance much more than Hamas. Resistance was first understood as liberation, in a second step Hezbollah added the notion of deterrence, and finally the fight against the takfiri threat. The organization reconstructed its core norm for securing its own legitimacy in the Lebanese population.

Hamas operates in the Palestinian Territories where no nation state has been established yet. Hamas still fights for the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. The Sunni organization was not able to uphold its first stage of political order, based on a pluralistic approach, which included democratic elements. When the power position of Hamas was endangered, it militarily took over the Gaza Strip. The political order in Gaza is specific and characterized through a strong security sector partly based on institutionalized resistance. Hamas has not reconstructed its core norm of resistance comprehensively but rather emphasizes resistances or mitigates it according to the prevailing circumstances and contexts. The empirical analysis has shown that Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ religious orientations, i.e. Shiite and Sunni Islamist political thought respectively, serve as a reference frame for behavior but does not explain Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ different conceptions of political order. The religious orientation is not important for the norm of resistance either. A Lebanese expert on Hezbollah underlined that “their ideology, i.e. Sunni or Shiite Islam, is not important for resistance. It, [the ideology] does not have an influence on their understanding of resistance. One cannot recognize their ideology in their interactions” (Hezbollah Researcher 1 2013, 05/20, author’s translation). Figure 5.1 summarizes the key findings of this book. It shows that Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ main interest – to preserve their power status in their specific context – is deeply intertwined with their core norm of resistance. The figure highlights the very different context in which Hezbollah and Hamas interact, i.e. the multi-confessional nation state of Lebanon and the Palestinian context, in which a nation state has not been established yet. Finally, the figure illustrates that Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ interactions to secure their power position – deeply intertwined with their core norm of resistance – lead to the fact that Hamas has more specific conceptions of political order than Hezbollah.

Figure 5.1 Main interest: power preservation in the specific context. References al-Ḥukūma al-Tāsiʿa w-al-Sittūn. 2005. Al-Ḥukūma al-Tāsiʿa w-al-Sittūn. Sādis Ḥukūma fī ʿAhd Fakhāmat al-Raʾīs Imīl Laḥūd (96th Lebanese Government. 2005. Ministerial Declaration. 96Th Government in the Era of President Émile Lahoud). May 19, 2005 www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=3635. Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. 2005. Power in Global Governance. In Power in Global Governance, eds. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1–32. Bellin, Eva. 2012. Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East – Lessons from the Arab Spring. Comparative Politics 44 (2): 127–49. Bull, Hedley. 2002. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. 3rd ed. Hampshire/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Daase, Christopher, and Nicole Deitelhoff. 2014. Zur Rekonstruktion Globaler Herrschaft aus dem Widerstand. Working Paper Goethe-Universität Frankfurt. Frankfurt am Main. https://dissidenz.net/workingpapers/wp1-2014-daase-deitelhoff.pdf. Foucault, Michel. 1990. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. New York: Vintage Books Edition. Hezbollah Researcher 1. 2013. Author’s Interview. Beirut: May 20, 2013. Hezbollah Researcher 2. 2013. Author’s Interview. Beirut: June 6, 2013. Qāsim, Naʿīm. 2010. Ḥizb Allāh: al-Manhaj … at-Tajriba … al-Mustaqbal (Lubnān wa-Muqāwamatuhu fī al-Wājiha) (Hezbollah: the Method, the Experience, the Future (Lebanon and its Resistance at the Front)).7th ed. Beirut: Dār alMaḥaǧǧa al-Baiḍāʾ. Wiener, Antje. 2007. The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance beyond the State: Sociological and Normative Approaches to Interaction. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 10 (1): 47–69.

6

Ruling Islamist organizations and the connection of norms, power, and conceptions of political order

Connecting Islamism research and Critical Constructivism with empirical data from Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories, this book has shown that in the case of the Islamist organizations Hezbollah and Hamas a close connection exists between norms, power, and conceptions of political order. Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ core norm of resistance is closely linked to both organizations’ interactions towards power preservation and is crucial for their conceptions of political order. The analysis has also revealed that although Hezbollah and Hamas both adhere to the political ideology of Islamism, both organizations’ religious orientation only constitutes a frame of reference for their behavior but is not decisive for their conceptions of political order. To evaluate the reach of these results and of the Critical Constructivist framework developed in this book, it is inevitable to connect both to the research topic of political Islam and Islamist organizations more broadly, which is the main objective of this penultimate chapter. This will show how the theoretical framework developed and the results achieved in this book can support future research in analyzing Islamist organizations’ political orientation beyond narrow and limited categories such as moderate and radical or democratic and nondemocratic. At the same time, it illustrates how empirical results from beyond the Western liberal world order, in this case the MENA region, can be brought into and enrich International Relations (IR) theory, in this case Critical Constructivism, which suffers from a Western centrism so far (Bilgin 2008; Tickner and Blaney 2012). To stronger generalize the findings and the analytical framework of this book I will link both to further Islamist organizations and briefly show how the results of this book matter to understand the political orientation and interactions of these Islamist political actors, i.e. I will analyze how crucial norms of these organizations are tied to their understanding of power and their conceptions of political order. To do so, I have chosen the Tunisian Ennahda, which has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood (Mandaville 2014, 160), and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as examples. For two reasons Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood constitute appropriate case studies: First, although Ennahda and Hamas have their roots in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the three organizations are very different from each other and the same applies for the Lebanese Hezbollah, which is not connected with the Muslim Brotherhood at all. Second, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood constitute suitable case studies for their own sake when it comes to analyze the connection between norms, power and conceptions of political order as will be explained below. Where does the most important difference between Ennahda, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and Hamas lie? Tunisia’s Ennahda is considered to be a positive, however, fragile role model for political Islam related to democratization in the MENA region after the Arab Upheavals had taken place (Marks 2015; Muasher 2011; Campbell 2015). Politicians in the

EU and the US have highlighted Tunisia as being the most successful country in the process of democratization in the MENA region (US Embassy Tunisia 2014; Council of Europe 2014) and the Freedom House identified Tunisia as the “Arab world’s only Free country after holding democratic elections under the new constitution” in 2015 (Freedom House 2015: 9). The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was perceived differently in the West after it had succeeded in the Egyptian Parliamentary Elections and Morsi was elected as the President of the State. Although Western politicians, such as US-President Obama congratulated Morsi on his victory (The White House 2012) they were skeptical in the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Pinfari 2013: 461). They especially questioned the true intentions of the Muslim Brotherhood after having gained power and the organization’s stance towards the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel (Hamid 2012). Hezbollah and Hamas are again very different cases from Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood as they are national policy makers and at the same time demonized by the West and partly listed as terrorist organizations in some world regions such as the US or the EU due to their reluctance to renounce violence (US Department of State 2017; Europäischer Rat 2016). Obviously, on the one hand, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood are different from each other and on the other hand they are very different from Hamas and Hezbollah. In analytical terms the divergence between these four organizations is an advantage when it comes to evaluating the reach of the theoretical concept developed in this book. The cases of Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood will show how the theoretical concept helps researchers to understand Islamist organizations’ political orientation beyond the cases of Hezbollah and Hamas. The fact that Ennahda and Tunisia are perceived very positively while Hamas and Hezbollah are widely demonized especially helps us to understand under what conditions the theoretical concept of this book applies to understand Islamist organizations’ political orientation. This is the first reason why it makes sense to take Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood as case studies in this penultimate chapter. The second reason for choosing Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood as case studies lies in the two cases themselves. Ennahda constitutes a special case as it was the first Islamist organization that achieved electoral success after the Arab Upheavals had taken place and it was strongly engaged in the following national constitution-making process. Moreover, the organization is involved in the Tunisian political system since the fall of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia (Boubekeur 2016). As for the second case, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the organization has played a crucial role in politics and the society not only in Egypt for almost ninety years but spread to many countries in the Muslim world (Mandaville 2014, 89). On top, when Muhammad Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected as president in Egypt on June 30, 2012, he was the first elected Islamist president coming from the Muslim Brotherhood (El-Bendary 2013, 171; Rosefsky Wickham 2013, 1). Hence, the influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood moves far beyond national borders and has a considerable influence in the Arab world. This is why it makes sense to look at the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to globalize the analytical framework and the findings of this book. Hezbollah and Hamas label themselves as Islamist resistance organizations and thus constitute special cases among all Islamist organizations (Ayoob 2008, 113). Throughout the analysis in this book, I identified resistance as both organizations’ core norm and as being relevant for their respective conceptions of political order. Hence, resistance was the essential

norm to be analyzed throughout the book. The cases of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian Ennahda are different. Notwithstanding that the political ideology of Islamism and all Islamist organizations in general are hostile towards Israel to a certain extent (MiltonEdwards 2008: 74ff.), they cannot be understood as resistance organizations. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, for example, is very well-known for its critical stance towards Israel. Also, after it came to power in Egypt in 2012, it remained critical towards the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty but assured that it would respect the treaty and may revise it at a later point of time. The costs of breaking the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt seemed to be too high (Rosefsky Wickham 2013, 277ff.). As Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood cannot be identified as resistance organizations in a strict sense, resistance cannot constitute one of the crucial norms of both organizations and different norms have to be analyzed with regard to their conceptions of political order to show how the findings and the analytical framework of this book apply to their cases. I argue that it makes sense to take a closer look at constitutional norms. This applies for theoretical and empirical reasons. From a theoretical perspective analyzing constitutional norms to understand the linkage between norms and political order is essential. This holds true, because “by organizing the political, constitutions have a central role for communities” (Wiener 2004, 1), i.e. a constitution is the principle document that organizes and determines the structure and tasks of a state and the legal positioning of the state’s citizens (Schwegmann 2002, 1005). As constitutional principles are traditionally arranged by those who were authorized by the population of a state to develop and adopt the respective constitution “constitutional legitimacy follows from the – albeit hypothetical – assumption that it has been put into place by the pouvoir constitutant” (Wiener et al. 2012: 5, emphasis in original). Thus, a constitution is the most important document that defines political and legal questions of the state and this core document achieves its legitimacy from the fact that those who elaborate and adopt the constitution have been elected by the population of a state. Due to the crucial significance of the constitution for the shape of the political order it is essential to take a closer look at the constitutional norms those actors favor who are involved in the constitution-making process like Ennada and the Muslim Brotherhood as will be explained below. However, we have to bear in mind that the research needs to be contextsensitive – like during the empirical analysis in the cases of Hezbollah and Hamas – because Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood are non-Western political actors embedded in the specific contexts of Tunisia and Egypt. In this context Abu Obeh refers to modern local forms of constitutionalism [developed] in their own [the MENA region’s] cultures” (Abu Obeh quoted from Abat i Ninet and Tushnet 2015: 97). For this book this might, for example, imply that the shari’a might play a role in the constitutions developed by Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood or that democracy is understood in a different sense from that traditionally prevailing in the West (Abat i Ninet and Tushnet 2015: 97ff.). For empirical reasons it makes sense to analyze constitutional norms Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood favor because both organizations succeeded in national elections after the Arab Upheavals and were both engaged in the constitution-making processes in Tunisia and Egypt. In Tunisia, Ennahda succeeded in the elections for the Constituent Assembly and won 89 out of 217 seats. Although the organizations decided to establish a three-party coalition government afterwards, it is clear that Ennahda was politically strong during the constitution-

making process (Cavatorta and Merone 2013, 857). In Egypt, Muhammad Morsi, President of the Muslim Brotherhood, was in power during the Egyptian constitution-making process and the Constituent Assembly was dominated by Islamists (Helleyer 2013, 29; Röder 2016, 294). Against this backdrop one can assume that Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood were in the political position that enabled them to foster those constitutional norms they favored to be embedded in the new constitutions of Tunisia and Egypt respectively during the constitutionmaking processes. Thus, it makes sense to take a closer look at what kind of constitutional norms they advocate and how these norms are linked to power and political order. As outlined above, this chapter aims to generalize and globalize the results and the analytical framework of this book. However, the chapter does not draw on in-depth research and primary sources. It is rather meant to give a brief outlook on how the theoretical framework, which was newly developed in this book, can be used for future research. 6.1 Ennahda in power: compromise and power-sharing in the constitution-making process Ennahda: historical background, Islamist ideology, and electoral success Ennahda (Renaissance) has its intellectual and ideological roots in the late 1960s in Tunisia. At that time, intellectuals gathered around the young religious thinker, Rachid Ghannouchi, the co-founder of the Islamic Tendency Movement in the early 1980s, which was renamed as Ennahda in 1989. During the 1960s, the young Islamists mainly engaged in cultural and educational affairs and only started to engage in politics in the early 1980s and repeatedly tried to legalize the organization as a political party, which was refused by the Tunisian regime. Instead, Ennahda got increasingly suppressed by the regime under President Bourguiba and later President Ben Ali who viewed the organization as a threat. Many of Ennahda’s leaders, members, and adherents were arrested and others were forced into exile in the late 1980s. This also applies to the organization’s leader Rachid Ghannouch who left the country for Great Britain (Alexander 2012, 39ff. Feuer 2012, 7; Marzouki 2013, 208). While Ennahda mainly operated as a clandestine organization during the 1990s, the regime started to extend Ennahda’s maneuvering room during the 2000s to present itself as a strong and economically successful country in North Africa. Parts of Ennahda’s prisoners were released and the organization started to engage in national politics (Guazzone 2013, 42ff.). On January 30, 2011, after the fall of the Ben Ali regime, Rachid Ghannouchi returned to Tunisia and Ennahda was allowed to freely engage in politics (Guazzone 2013, 44). After the exiled Ennahda leaders had returned and the organization had been legalized as a political party, many Tunisians suspected Ennahda of pursuing a radical Islamist agenda and to be closely linked to Islamist actors in the region such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Marks 2015, 1ff). Ennahda leaders,1 however, repeatedly emphasized that Ennahda aims at establishing a civil state and defines itself as a “civic party emanating from the reality of Tunisia, not a religious party” (Jebali quoted from Stepan 2012, 95). They dissociated themselves from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which they understand as intellectually and philosophically inspiring but not as decisive as many analysts think, as Ennahda leader Sayida

Ounissi puts it (Ounissi 2016, 3). Ennahda leaders rather referred to the AKP2 in Turkey or the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany as role models on how to successfully combine religion and democracy (Marks 2015, 2ff.; Ounissi 2016, 7). Ghannouchi demands a democratic system that accepts the principles of freedom, citizenship, and equality between the state’s citizens. However, “Islam makes a distinction but not a separation between the state and religion” (Ghannouchi 2013, 164) as Ghannouchi puts it. He states that Islam “provides us with a value system and a set of principles to steer our thinking, behaviour and governance system in the right direction, i.e. a set of guiding values” (Ghannouchi 2013, 167). In May 2016, Ennahda moved a step further and separated the political party Ennahda from the social and religious movement. Ghannouchi underlines that “Ennahda is now best understood not as an Islamist movement but as a party of Muslim democrats” (Ghannouchi 2016, 4). Although it remains unclear, as to how this separation between the political party and politics, and religion and the social movement can practically work as the two are intertwined. It becomes clear that Ennahda has a flexible and not a stable interpretation of the role of the political ideology of Islam. Obviously, Ennahda does not interpret the Islamic sources in a literal sense but in the light of the contemporary circumstances that Tunisia is facing on a political, social, and cultural level. At the same time, it is important to highlight that Ennahda is quite well organized and structured, however, it cannot be understood as a monolithic organization. Internal divisions do exist and they are also relevant concerning Ennahda’s ideological stances as some branches are considered to be more dogmatic than others. This became especially clear during the constitution-making process and the discussion on the role the shari’a should play in politics and society. When Ennahda decided on agreeing not to refer to shari’a in the constitution, as will be outlined in detail below, demonstrations occurred in Tunisia in which leaders of Ennahda’s more dogmatic wing participated. Moreover, about 10 percent of Ennahda’s conservative youth branch was said to have left the organization and affiliated themselves with salafi currents as these young people did not agree on the Ennahda leadership’s decision not to include the shari’a into the new constitution (Wolf 2017, 139ff.). This criticism on the decision of the Ennahda leadership on the issue of the shari’a shows that different voices and branches within Ennahda exist of which parts are more dogmatic and others more open to the flexible adaption to political realities. Very likely the political orientation of Ennahda will always depend on which of the branches has the upper hand in ideological and political matters in a specific situation at a given time. On October 23, 2011 the first free elections were held in Tunisia. The Tunisian citizens were asked to elect the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) that had the task to write and ratify a new constitution for Tunisia. After the elections, the Instance Supérieure Indépendence pour les Elections (ISIE) announced the results. Accordingly, Ennahda won the elections and achieved 89 out of 217 (41.5 percent) of the seats in the NCA3 (EU 2011, 13; ISIE 2012, 190). Beyond dispute, Ennahda was the winner of the first free Tunisian elections. However, the Islamist party was not able to govern alone and hence established a coalition, the so-called Troika government, with the secular Congrès pour la République (CPR) and Ettakatol. The fact that Ennahda was not able to build a government on its own, was not the only reason why it engaged in the coalition with its two secular partners. Already, prior to the 2011 elections, Ennahda had called for power-sharing. Rachid Ghannouchi stated that Ennahda would engage

in power-sharing after the elections – even if it won the majority of votes. He said “our priority is to participate … one party should not govern alone. A party alone cannot face these [transitional, post-authoritarian] challenges” (Marks 2015, 3). This shows that Ennahda followed a very inclusive approach independent from its electoral success. Nevertheless, as Ennahda was the strongest partner in the Troika-government, one can assume that its influence in the constitution-making process, and on the draft of the constitution, was stronger than those of the other parties. Ennahda and constitution-making: compromise and concessions in the postrevolutionary context In January 2014 lawmakers successfully passed the new Tunisian constitution drafted by the NCA. The constitution-making process, however, had not been easy. The NCA controversially discussed many topics and four different drafts had to be issued until the constitution was passed in 2014. Due to these controversies the constitution-making process was delayed for more than one year and the Tunisian opposition criticized it as being illegitimate (AntonakisNashif 2013; Marks 2014, 1). In the following, I will discuss those constitutional norms that were most contested during the constitution-making process and show how they were implemented in the constitution and how they are related to Ennahda’s conceptions of political order and its interactions towards remaining in power. I identified the following four topics and the related norms as the most contested and discussed during the constitution-making process: (1) religious legal norms – the role of shari’a in the constitution, (2) the norm of freedom of speech – the issue of blasphemy, (3) gender norms – the status of women in the constitution, and (4) governmental norms – the political system to be established in Tunisia (elSayed 2014, 44ff.; Marks 2014; Shaqoura and Kristiansen 2015). 1 Religious legal norms – the role of shari’a in the constitution During the constitution-making process in the NCA and society a very controversial debate emerged on the status the shari’a should hold in the new Tunisian constitution. According to Ennahda’s 2011 electoral platform and its leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, the organization did not seek to implement shari’a in the new Tunisian constitution (el-Sayed 2014, 44; Feuer 2012, 3). However, after Ennahda had become the leading party in the NCA after the 2011 elections, controversies within the organization itself emerged around the issue of implementing Islamic law in the constitution or not. Different from the stance Ghannouchi had pronounced, some Ennahda leaders stated that the shari’a would become a “source among sources” (quoted from Pickard 2012b, 2) of legislation. Sahbi Atig, the president of Ennahda’s parliamentary group went even further and declared that the shari’a would hold the status of “the main source of legislation” (quoted from Pickard 2012b, 2) in the new Tunisian constitution. These contradictory statements almost provoked an earthquake in the Tunisian political landscape and throughout the society. Although Ennahda’s politicians state that only few of them really had the intention to implement the shari’a in the constitution and the majority only wanted to discuss this issue – an opportunity Ennahda never had before (Marks 2014, 20) – politicians and ordinary Tunisian citizens suspected Ennahda of being Janus-faced and of pursuing the

“constitutionalization of the sharia” (Hachemaoui 2013, 25). Especially Ettakatol, Ennahda’s coalition partner in the NCA, harshly criticized these statements. Mustafa Ben Jaafar, Ettakatol’s leader and chairman of the NCA, threatened to withdraw Ettakatol from the Troikacoalition if Ennahda did not exclude shari’a from the constitution (Pickard 2012b, 2). Finally, after comprehensive debates in its Shura council, Ennahda decided not to include shari’a into the constitution, which was announced by the organization in March 2012 (Marks 2014, 20ff.; Pickard 2012b, 2). Researchers and observers evaluate Ennahda’s decision not to implement the shar’ia as a legal religious norm into the constitution as pragmatic (Hachemaoui 2013, 25; Marks 2014, 22) and it is beyond debate that by renouncing the constitutionalization of Islamic law Ennahda shows that it stands by the NCA, which is responsible for drafting the constitution and of which Ennahda constitutes the largest part. Hence, at that point in time, Ennahda was interested to maintain a post-revolutionary government in Tunisia and not to provoke the collapse of the NCA. Bearing the Critical Constructivist analytical background of this book in mind, one can observe contestation over the issue of implementing religious legal norms into the new Tunisian constitution, i.e. contestation over the future relevance of Islamic law for the Tunisian state and society. When Ennahda noticed that by constitutionalizing shari’a a red line for its coalition partners would be crossed, the organization left the norm of the shari’a behind.4 This means that Ennahda is flexible and adapts to the respective context it is located in. At the same time, we have to bear in mind that if Ennahda had insisted on implementing shari’a into the constitution, the Troika-coalition would very likely have been collapsed. In that case, Ennahda would have lost power, i.e. its leading position in the Troika government. Hence, Ennahda’s pragmatic decision to resign from constitutionalizing shari’a can also be understood as a means towards power preservation. 2 The norm of freedom of speech – the issue of blasphemy Beyond the discussion on the implementation of the shari’a as a legal norm into the constitution, contestation emerged on the norm of freedom of speech – in this case closely related to the issue of blasphemy and to religious legal norms. Pushed by Ennahda as the dominant coalition partner in the NCA, the first draft of the new Tunisian constitution, which was announced on August 8, 2012, entailed a paragraph that criminalized blasphemy (Zoglin 2013, 2). In this draft Article 3 stated that “the state guarantees freedom of religious belief and practice and criminalizes all attacks on that which is sacred” (first draft of the constitution quoted from Marks 2012, 1). Immediately strong protest emerged in the Tunisian opposition and the society. Activists and civil rights organizations criticized that the criminalization of blasphemy in the Tunisian constitution would limit the norm of the freedom of speech (Guazzone 2013, 39; Shaqoura and Kristiansen 2015, 16). It especially raised concerns that in the draft the Troika had not properly defined what was meant by “the sacred.” Finally, after long and contentious debates Ennahda decided to remove the criminalization of blasphemy from the constitution (Zoglin 2013, 3). What led to the fact that Ennahda decided to step back from its initial stance and finally to the removal of the criminalization of the issue of blasphemy from the constitution? Broadly

speaking, Ennahda politicians went through a learning curve and flexibly adapted to their context. Ennahda politicians had first proposed to implement the criminalization of blasphemy in the constitution by the beginning of June 2012. Some politicians had conceded that they did not have the aim to criminalize blasphemy initially, they admitted that by summer 2012 they had been forced to do so, because at that time an art exhibit took place in Tunisia and also two films appeared that Ennahda understood as being a provocation by secularists and discriminatory and insulting towards the religion of Islam (Feuer 2012, 3; Marks 2012, 2). At the same time, one should not forget that in the past Ennahda was heavily oppressed by the Ben Ali regime and now might have sought to secure Islamic religious norms and values (Marks 2012, 3). However, as protest and critique from the Tunisian opposition and from Tunisian and international activists were high, who feared that the criminalization of blasphemy might endanger the norm of freedom of speech in Tunisia, Ennahda started to discuss the issue. After several internal debates and discussions with constitutional experts, the Islamist organization agreed on removing the criminalization of blasphemy from the constitution. Ennahda politicians admitted that the religion of Islam is a sensitive issue for them and that on a personal level it was difficult for them to remove the article. However, they stated that “ultimately it is not the job of a constitution to criminalize things. We learned that after talking for a long time with constitutional scholars” (quoted from Marks 2014, 24). Finally, the criminalization of blasphemy was removed from the constitution.5 Hence, obviously Ennahda was able to adapt to the context in Tunisia. The organization interacted with constitutional experts and was not able to be reluctant against critique from the opposition and civil society experts. Instead, the organization went through a learning curve and changed its stance towards the issue of blasphemy and hence the norm of the freedom of speech. 3 Gender norms – the status of women in the constitution Gender norms, in this case the status of women, belong to those norms that were most contested when the first draft of the constitution was announced in August 2012. The language used in Article 28 of the draft was more than ambivalent. “The state guarantees the protection of women and supports their achievements, considering them as men’s true partners in building the nation,” the article said. “Their [men’s and women’s] roles complement one another within the family” (first draft of the constitution quoted from Marks 2014, 22ff.). Although Article 28 did not explicitly say that women would hold a status subordinate to men, the formulation immediately evoked waves of criticism in Tunisia and abroad (Feuer 2012, 4; Pickard 2012a, 4). Civil society organizations, opposition groups, and ordinary citizens feared that Ennahda as the strongest party in the NCA would use this article to establish a more conservative role for women in the society closely related to tasks to be fulfilled in the family. Criticizers suspected Ennahda of trying to revoke Tunisia’s Personal Status Code, which is famous beyond Tunisia in the MENA region for its progressive stances on women’s rights.6 This holds especially true as members of Ennahda had proposed to withdraw some of the women’s rights that are protected by the Personal Status Law, such as the protection of single mothers and their children (Feuer 2012, 4). Indeed, the wording of Article 28 of the draft of the constitution represents many members’ conservative worldview on men’s and women’s role in the family as Monica Marks argues. Accordingly, men and women are equal but have, however, different duties in the

family related to their biological status (Marks 2014, 23). Against the backdrop of the massive criticism the wording of Article 28 had raised in Tunisia and abroad, Ennahda decided to change the Article and to grant equal rights to men and women in a much clearer language. Although the Islamist organization had withdrawn the controversial Article and explained, the former wording had been in the constitutional draft due to the swift constitution-making process, Ennahda’s image had been damaged seriously. Opponents and criticizers did not depart from suspecting the organization of pursuing conservative goals aiming at cutting down women’s rights (Marks 2014, 23ff.). As in the case of religious legal norms and the norm of freedom of speech, contestation was high on the issue of gender norms in the constitution. It becomes clear that Ennahda again adapts its stances and changes its strategies through interaction in the national and regional context. Ennahda holds a flexible understanding of gender norms. While the organization’s attitude was more conservative at the beginning, it was able to change its stances as required by the context in which Ennahda interacts. 4 Governmental norms – the political system to be established in Tunisia Although outside observers might have assumed that the most controversial discussion in Tunisia’s constitution-making process would be about the role of religion in the future Tunisian state, the strongest and most time-consuming discussion emerged around the question on the organization of Tunisia’s political system. While Ennahda representatives favored establishing a parliamentary system, its secularist coalition-partners preferred a presidential governance system in Tunisia. The discussion in the Troika was comprehensive and continued over several months. The Troika developed many drafts until a solution could be reached (Hachemaoui 2013, 26ff. Pickard 2012a, 3). Finally, the Troika agreed on establishing a semi-presidential political system, i.e. a compromise between the parliamentary system favored by Ennahda and the presidential system favored by the two secularist parties in the Troika-coalition (Choudhry et al. 2014, 54ff.). In sum, “compromising on this question [the political system] was far more difficult for Ennahda than giving ground on ideologically-oriented issues” (Marks 2014, 27ff.). This holds true for especially two reasons. First, Ennahda itself stated that it favored a parliamentary political system with a comparatively weak president, because this comes very close to the Islamic principle of shura applied in Ennahda but also in other Islamist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas for example. Second, it is likely that Ennahda favored a parliamentary system to preserve a powerful position in Tunisian politics. Ennahda held the majority in the NCA and a parliamentary political system would enable the organization to more stongly influence political decision-making than a presidential one (elSayed 2014, 45; Marks 2014, 27). However, finally Ennahda agreed on a compromise, i.e. the establishment of a semi-presidential system and thus encouraged the principle of powersharing (Choudhry et al. 2014, 55). As for the question of the organization of the political system we can again witness a flexible Islamist political actor. After time consuming discussions, Ennahda adapted its governmental norms in a flexible way to establish a compromise. However, one has to bear in mind that the Troika government would have very likely collapsed if the actors engaged in the

government were not able to find a compromise. In that case Ennahda would have lost its position of power. Summing up Ennahda’s interactions in the constitution-making process, the organization seems to have a flexible understanding related to core constitutional norms. It is striking that concerning the four core constitutional norms discussed here, Ennahda changed its initial attitude when criticism in Tunisia and abroad was evoked and increased. It is striking that Ennahda was less reluctant to pursue a flexible approach concerning constitutional norms related to religious and gender issues or the norm of the freedom of speech – norms that one would assume would protect the organization’s ideological perspective and worldview. When it comes to governmental norms – the parliamentary system that would support a powerful position for Ennahda, who held the majority in the NCA, the organization was less willing to agree on a compromise. Ennahda was embedded in a difficult national context characterized by political turmoil and a dangerous security situation7 and at the same time faced with regional challenges directly affecting the organization, such as the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood’s first president, Muhammad Morsi in Egypt (Marks 2015, 8). Thus, the Tunisian organization finally agreed on a compromise. In doing so, Ennahda on the one hand maintained the announcements concerning its interest in power-sharing that Ghannouchi made earlier. At the same time the organization did not provoke the collapse of the Troika-coalition and secured its own power status in Tunisia through its ability to achieve a compromise on core constitutional norms. 6.2 The Muslim Brotherhood: hasty constitution-making without compromise The Muslim Brotherhood: historical background, Islamist ideology, and electoral success As outlined in Chapter 3, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt and quickly became one of the most influential Islamist organizations in the MENA region. As the organization had been banned by the state since 1954 (Mandaville 2014, 96), it did not operate openly in Egypt neither in terms of social activities nor in terms of politics. However, it remained strong and was – although banned – the single organized opposition force8 vis-à-vis the Egyptian state (Antar 2007, 63). When the political system in Egypt slightly opened in the early 2000s, aiming to secure its long-term persistence,9 the Muslim Brotherhood took part in the 2005 parliamentary elections. As the organization was still legally banned at that time, it had nominated independent candidates. Based on the Muslim Brotherhood’s outstanding organizational capacities and its broad network, the organization’s independent candidates gained a high number of seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections and won 88 out of the 150 seats in the parliament it had contested for (Antar 2006, 6). Although well organized and politically represented in the parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood was not among the initiating actors of the 2011 revolution against the Mubarak regime, but rather was surprised by the outbreak of the massive revolt. However, it quickly backed the opposition and the revolution against the regime (Fürtig 2011, 6ff.). After Mubarak’s fall the Muslim Brotherhood backed the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

(SCAF), who had taken over executive power in Egypt and had declared to lead Egypt’s transition phase until parliamentary and presidential elections would have taken place.10 Already in February 2011, only days after Mubarak’s fall, the Muslim Brotherhood announced the foundation of its political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)11 (Pioppi 2013, 56). This shows the Muslim Brotherhood’s capability to adapt to the prevalent circumstances and to make use of the fact that the organization constituted the best organized opposition force. Grounded in the Muslim Brotherhood’s experience and ability to mobilize the masses and to rally support as well as in its organizational capabilities, the FJP won the Egyptian parliamentary elections and became the strongest party in the parliament with 235 seats, i.e. 47.2 percent of the seats, followed by the Salafist al-Nour party which won 123 seats, i.e. 24.7 percent of the parliamentary seats (Büchs 2012, 4).12 In the following presidential elections in June 2012, Muhammad Morsi, the candidate of the FJP, was elected as the president of state in Egypt, although only with a narrow margin advanced from his opponent Ahmed Shafiq (alAwadi 2013, 545). It was the first time in history that a member of the Muslim Brotherhood was elected as the president of a state. During the electoral campaign, when an encompassing success of the Muslim Brotherhood became more likely, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological orientation raised increasing suspicion in the Egyptian society. People feared “Islamist domination of the political sphere” (Mandaville 2014, 152) and asked themselves what the Muslim Brotherhood really wanted and what it stood for (Rosefsky Wickham 2011). The Brotherhood tried to meet these suspicions and emphasized that it sought to participate in Egyptian politics and not to dominate them (Mandaville 2014, 152). When trying to understand the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological backbone and its understanding of the political ideology of Islamism, it is important to bear in mind that the organization cannot be understood as a monolithic block but must be seen as hybrid organization that contains different branches with divergent political orientations (Pioppi 2013, 51). Rosefsky identifies three different branches within the Muslim Brotherhood: the da’wa13 branch, the pragmatic conservatives, and the group of reformers. The first includes elder conservative Muslim Brotherhood leaders committed to propagate religious outreach in the Egyptian society (Rosefsky Wickham 2011, 209). The second branch combines religiousconservative values with political participation. Muhammad Morsi and the FJP were said to belong to the second branch (Rosefsky Wickham 2011, 210). The third branch calls for rethinking the Muslim Brotherhood and for reforming it from within. It has a progressive and liberal understanding of Islam and wants to rethink crucial issues such as the role of women in society (Rosefsky Wickham 2011, 210ff.). As we can observe these different branches in the Muslim Brotherhood, it is difficult to detect “the one” religious and political orientation of the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization’s general orientation is dependent on internal power distribution and on external circumstances, i.e. on the question of which of the branches within the Muslim Brotherhood is the strongest and most assertive one at a specific time. Moreover, the organization’s orientation depends on the respective context in which it interacts as well as on external circumstances.

The Muslim Brotherhood and constitution-making: securing the power position In December 2012 the new Egyptian constitution was signed into law by President Muhammad Morsi. The constitution-making process, however, had not been smooth but deeply contentious and had led to a deep polarization of the Egyptian society into Muslim Brotherhood supporters and opponents, mainly brought about through the Muslim Brotherhood’s unilateral and clumsy actions in the constitution-making process. Different from the constitution-making process in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had not sought to comprehensively discuss the new constitution and to achieve consensus but rather pushed through the constitution-making process in great haste. On November 22, 2012 President Morsi had issued a Constitutional Declaration that granted himself absolute authority.14 Accordingly, all declarations, laws, and decrees Morsi had ever put into force since he took office in June 2012 were codified as being binding until a new constitution could be adopted. Moreover, the declaration stated that neither the upper house of the parliament nor the Constituent Assembly15 could be dissolved. The declaration also granted the President of Egypt the right to protect by all means the January 25 revolution, which had led to the fall of Mubarak (Ahram Online 2012b). Morsi’s declaration provoked massive protest and led to demonstrations and violent clashes between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and opponents (Lynch 2013, 10ff.; Pioppi 2013, 61ff.). Although President Morsi annulled the most important parts of his declaration, he strongly hastened the constitution-making process. Finally, a draft constitution was presented by the still-Islamist dominated Constituent Assembly by the end of November 2012 and approved by public referenda, which were highly controversial,16 by the end of December 2012. The constitution, however, still raised sharp protests in the Egyptian society and did not unite the Egyptian people (el Fegiery 2016, 65ff.; Pioppi 2013, 61ff.). As the Egyptian constitution was passed with such a hurry and an encompassing debate of the draft document did not take place in the Constituent Assembly, it was more difficult to detect those articles that were most contested than in the case of Tunisia. However, based on the controversies that emerged in the Egyptian society, I identified two main topics and related core norms that are relevant for the Muslim Brotherhood’s conceptions of political order and their aspirations towards power preservation. These are (1) religious legal norms – the role of religion and religious institutions in the constitution and (2) governmental norms – the role of executive power in the political system. They will be discussed directly in the following subsections. 1 Religious legal norms – the role of religion and religious institutions in the constitution Although among the Egyptian opposition forces, mostly secular, liberals, and leftist figures, fears were high that the Muslim Brotherhood and allied Islamist groups would try to Islamize the country and to establish political Islam as the dominant political ideology in Egypt (Hamid 2013, 25ff.), Islam had a much smaller role in the 2012 Egyptian constitution than expected before the draft was presented to the public. The constitution is conservative but “not a blueprint for an Islamic state” as Albrecht puts it (Albrecht 2013a, 4). The articles that refer to the role of shari’a and to the role of the religious institution al-Azhar17 are the articles that are

most relevant when it comes to the role of Islam in the Egyptian constitution. Article 2 defines Islam as the religion of the state and the principles of shari’a as the principle source of legislation (The Constituent Assembly 2012, 3). From first sight, this does not introduce anything new into the constitution, because Article 2 exactly kept the same wording it already had in the 1971 constitution which was in force under the Mubarak regime (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2013, 6). How to understand the principles of shari’a, however, remains vague in the 2012 constitution, although it refers to the shari’a in a more concrete way in Article 219, which was newly implemented into the constitution. Article 219 uses technical terms taken from Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, barely used outside the scholarly context, to specify the principles of the shari’a (Brown and Lombardi 2013, 34). Accordingly, Article 219 called for an application of Article 2 “that shows more respect for hadith and traditional interpretations of Islam” (Brown and Lombardi 2016, 256, emphasis in original) than it used to do in the 1971 constitution. Based on Article 219 Islamic legal experts will achieve a greater influence on law-making. When analyzing Article 4 of the constitution, which was also newly developed and included into the document, it becomes obvious that especially the religious institution al-Azhar was intending to play a larger role when it comes to interpreting the shari’a. Article 4 defines alAzhar as an independent Islamic institution, states, however, that its senior scholars should be consulted when it comes to interpreting the shari’a (The Constituent Assembly 2012, 3). Hence, al-Azhar’s importance increases with regard to law-making and policymaking. Brown and Lombardi outline, however, that al-Azhar’s legal scholars were not satisfied with the role they were intended to hold. They feared to lose its independence from state control, although this was granted by the constitution (Brown and Lombardi 2016, 257). In sum, the implementation of Article 4 is probably the largest change in the 2012 constitution when it comes to the role of religion and religious legal institutions. What do the religious legal norms implemented into the 2012 Egyptian constitution say about the Muslim Brotherood’s conceptions of political order and its aspirations to maintain its position of power in Egypt? The Muslim Brotherhood itself stated that it was not the decisive force behind the decision to implement Article 219 into the constitution. It was rather Salafi factions that supported Article 4 and Article 219 to be implemented into the document (Brown and Lombardi 2016, 257). This means that the Muslim Brotherhood applies a flexible understanding with regard to its religious norms. It adapted to the demands of the Salafi forces – very likely to ensure that the constitution-making process, which Morsi had sharply hurried up, would not be delayed. Hence, putting the new constitution into force was more important for the Muslim Brotherhood than the implementation of specific religious legal norms. In sum, religious legal norms received a more important role than they used to hold in previous constitutions. Nevertheless, neither the religious legal norms nor the institution of al-Azhar, which was in charge to interpret the shari’a, did allow the Muslim Brotherhood to install itself as a long-term ruler or to cement its position in power. Moreover, researchers evaluate the possibility of the establishment of a theocratic, i.e. Islamic, state by the Muslim Brotherhood as less likely (Albrecht 2013a, 2ff.). 2 Governmental norms – the role of executive power in the political system

Based on the 2012 constitution the political system in Egypt was a semi-presidential one (Schoeller-Schletter 2013, 11). However, it still focused on strong executive powers and especially a strong president (Albrecht 2013a, 3), whose competences were limited vis-à-vis the 1971 constitution. Based on the new constitution the presidential term was reduced from six to four years and, even more important, the president could only be elected for two terms and not for an unlimited number times like in the 1971 constitution (Schoeller-Schletter 2013, 11ff.). The strong restriction of presidential authority vis-à-vis the parliament when it comes to government formation is one of the further limitations of presidential power (Brown and al-Ali 2013, 3). However, although the competences of the president were limited vis-à-vis the previous constitution, there remain some articles in the 2012 constitution that are critical with regard to executive powers, especially the rights of the Egyptian president. Article 132 outlines that the president of the state is responsible for protecting the separation of powers (The Constituent Assembly 2012, 29). This Article refers to the outstanding position of the president because it places the president above the mechanisms of checks-and-balances he should actually be subordinated to (Albrecht 2013b, 3). As the 2012 constitution puts the president in the position of guardian of the balance of powers, it indeed endangers the imbalance between executive, legislative, and judiciary powers in favor of the executive, i.e. the presidency if conflicting situations or competition between the branches arose. One further critical issue that arose in the 2012 constitution was the issue of presidential decrees. From first sight, the issue of presidential decrees seemed to be unproblematic. Neither the president nor the prime minister were able to rule through decrees alone, as Morsi had done when he issued his constitutional decree on November 22, 2012. Although the president enjoys the right to initiate decrees, based on Article 131 these decrees have to be adopted by the upper and the lower house in the parliament within 15 days (SchoellerSchletter 2013, 12; Choudhry et al. 2014, 101). Based on these regulations the president’s competences are restricted and he cannot rule based on decrees. Albrecht, however, evaluates the issue of presidential decrees critical. Article 150 of the constitution states that the president may issue decrees that have to be adopted through public referenda “on important issues relating to the supreme interests of the state” (The Constituent Assembly 2012, 33, Article 33). Albrecht understands this Article “as a clause that invites popular – and populist – presidents to rule by decree and sideline the parliament” (Albrecht 2013b, 3). The president’s possibility to influence law-making and his options to exercise veto-power are two more critical issues with regard to executive power in the 2012 constitution. Articles 102 and 104 determine law-making in Egypt. Both chambers have to pass law first and then send it to the president. The president has the right to exercise veto-power on each law already passed by the lower and upper house of the parliament. Albrecht assumes that the presidential veto can easily become a hard fact, as a two-third majority, which is difficult to achieve, is needed to prevent the presidential decision. If President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood had remained in power, these articles would have especially become relevant with regard to the 2016 presidential elections. They might have supported Morsi in securing his position as Egyptian president, as the constitution does not explicitly regulate presidential elections.

Hence, articles 102 and 104 would have given Morsi the opportunity to influence the law for the 2016 presidential elections in his own favor (Albrecht 2013b, 4). It becomes clear that governmental core norms, i.e. executive norms in the advantage of the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood are strong in the 2012 constitution. They give the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood via Muhammad Morsi the possibility to influence laws on their own behalf. Albrecht argues that the Muslim Brotherhood might have been most interested to secure short term political achievements and especially its power position in post-Mubarak Egypt and thus hastened the constitution-making process (Albrecht 2013b, 8). Albecht’s argument is supported by the fact that Muhammad Morsi first tried to grant himself superior rights when he issued the constitutional decree and afterwards the Muslim Brotherhood pushed the constitution into law with great hastiness irrespective of the fact that this led to widespread protests in Egypt and the adoption of a constitution that missed the legitimacy from the Egyptian society. Moreover, surprisingly to many observers, the 2012 constitution is strongly influenced by the 1971 constitution (el-Rashidi 2013, 3). This holds especially true for the state-military relations. In securing that the Egyptian military received special and superior rights and economic benefits in the 2012 constitution the Muslim Brotherhood pleased the military that always been in a special position in Egypt (el-Rashidi 2013, 3ff.). This would finally support the Muslim Brotherhood to secure its power position. In sum, it becomes obvious that the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP adopt a flexible understanding of norms. Normative meaning, as became visible in the case of religious legal norms, changed in the context in which the Muslim Brotherhood interacted, in this case the Constituent Assembly, in which the Muslim Brotherhood made concessions vis-à-vis the Salafist and implemented more conservative religious norms into the constitution. At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood was not willing to allow a comprehensive discussion on core constitutional norms in the Egyptian society. It rather pushed the constitution through the process to rapidly put it into force to secure its short-term political achievements, i.e. to secure its own power status. 6.3 Ruling Islamist organizations and the explanatory power of Critical Constructivist norm research To more strongly generalize and globalize the main findings and the analytical framework of this book, I have linked both to further cases and shown in Chapter 6 that they also apply to the Islamist organizations Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood. In both cases the constitutional norms both organizations supported are linked to their aspirations towards power preservation and are relevant for their conceptions of political order. At the same time, it became clear that in the case of Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood Islamist political thought provided a frame of reference in which both organizations interacted but was not decisive for their decisionmaking. Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood: remaining in power through constitutional norms

Ennahda shows a flexible proceeding in the constitution-making process when constitutional norms were developed and became legally binding. In terms of (1) religious legal norms (the role of the shari’a in the constitution), (2) the norm of freedom of the speech (the issue of blasphemy), (3) gender norms (the status of women in the constitution), and (4) governmental norms (the political system to be established in Tunisia) Ennahda was willing to make concessions to demands coming from the opposition as well as from civil society actors in Tunisia and abroad. It is striking that for Ennahda it was most difficult to compromise on the semi-presidential political system to be established in Tunisia and not on religious matters. The organization itself had favored to establish a parliamentary political system in Tunisia, very likely because Ennahda was the strongest party in the NCA. A parliamentary political system would have allowed Ennahda to hold a strong position in Tunisian politics. In sum, Ennahda was part of a process in which the construction of normative meaning through interaction took place. In the specific context Ennahda was engaged it was willing to change its practices, which, in turn, led to the change of normative meaning – as it was the case with regard to all four constitutional norms discussed above. Finally, the constitution was adopted and the norms achieved a structuring quality as they became standards for behavior. Accordingly, these norms entail a dual quality, i.e. structuring and socially constructed elements (Wiener 2007, 63). As a constitution is the principle document of a state and Ennahda was heavily involved in the constitution-making process, the constitutional norms discussed here are relevant for Ennahda’s conceptions of political order. As in the case of Hezbollah and Hamas there is a close link between the concepts of norms and power in the case of the Tunisian Ennahda. During the long and controversial process of constitution-making Ennahda was willing to compromise, to share power, and to agree on concessions on the constitutional norms. It had realized that the Troika-coalition would only remain stable if Ennahda was willing to agree on compromises. If the Troika-coalition had broken, Ennahda would have lost its power position. Hence, for Ennahda it was more important to remain in power than to push its core norms without concessions into the constitution. Hence, the Tunisian Islamist organization exercised institutional and structural power in state institutions to reciprocally establish its interests with other actors (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3ff.). Ennahda was not always the strongest party in the power struggle but it remained in power. Its Islamist political thought rather worked as a frame of reference than as a decisive factor in policy-making. This becomes especially clear when Ennahda decided not to implement shari’a into the constitution anymore after protests had arisen throughout Tunisia. In Egypt, the constitution-making process was very different, especially as there was no comprehensive debate on the content of the constitution but President Morsi used the mechanism of compulsory power – the possibility to directly control other actors (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3) – and pushed the 2012 constitution into law. However, the core constitutional norms in the 2012 Egyptian constitution, i.e. (1) religious legal norms (the role of religion and religious institutions in the constitution) and (2) governmental norms (the role of executive power in the political system), hold a dual quality and thus follow a flexible understanding of norms. As outlined above, the religious legal norms that are brought into the constitution can be traced back more to the Salafi influence in the Constituent Assembly than to the Muslim

Brotherhood. At the same time, the constitution is still highly influenced by the 1971 Egyptian constitution and grants special rights to the military. This shows that although the Muslim Brotherhood did not allow for a deliberative and fair discussion of the content of the constitution, it was, however, willing to concede and responded to demands from the Salafi factions and the military, which was decisive for the emergence and change of normative meaning. These norms later turned into a binding constitution and thus received a structuring quality. The FJP, Morsi, and the Muslim Brotherhood strongly exercised compulsory power, i.e. used their ability to directly control other political actors, to hastily establish a constitutional draft and to turn it into law. In doing so, the Muslim Brotherhood hoped to secure its short-term political gains, i.e. to remain in power. As opposed to what the Muslim Brotherhood had outlined through the electoral campaign of the parliamentary elections, it did not seek any compromise or consensus. This shows that also in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood there is a close connection between the organization’s core constitutional norms and its ambitions towards power preservation in post-Mubarak Egypt. The organizations Islamist political thought serves as a frame of reference for the Muslim Brotherhood’s behavior but was not decisive during the organization’s interactions in the constitution-making process. This becomes clear because it was the Salafi factions who were behind the implementation of religious legal norms in the constitution and the Muslim Brotherhood did not seek to establish a state based on its Islamist political thought. This might be explained by the fact that the pragmatic branch in the Muslim Brotherhood had the largest influence in the organization during the Muslim Brotherhood’s reign. How ruling Islamist organizations use core norms to secure their position of power Bringing the results from Hezbollah and Hamas with those from Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood together and placing them on a more abstract and conceptual level, we can conclude that norms are closely linked to Islamist organizations’ interactions towards power preservation and are relevant for their conceptions of political order. We can also observe that the context and the time in which normative meaning emerges, matters. Different from what many observers and policymakers claim, the political ideology of Islamism serves as a frame of reference in which Islamist political actors interact but not as a decisive factor when it comes to explaining their behavior. Hezbollah and Hamas, comprehensively analyzed in this book, and Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood at which I briefly looked, adhere to core norms. In the case of Hezbollah and Hamas resistance and in the case of Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood constitutional norms. These norms emerged and achieved their meaning in a specific context through interactions with other actors engaged in this context. All four organizations hold a flexible understanding of norms, i.e. norms hold a dual quality (Wiener 2007, 63) and are constructed through social interactions and do structure actors’ behavior at the same time. Normative meaning may change over time and lead to different standards for behavior. In all four cases the core norms, which were identified during the analysis, where relevant for the organizations to secure their power status and at the same time for their conceptions of political order. As all

four organizations where engaged in different political and social contexts they used their core norms in different ways, which explains why they have different conceptions of political order. Hezbollah and Hamas both used their core norm of resistance to uphold their power status in Lebanon and in the Palestinian Territories. As they were engaged in different political and social contexts they made use of their core norm in diverse ways, which led to differences in their conceptions of political order. Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood were both engaged in the constitution-making processes after regime change had taken place in Tunisia and Egypt. The two organizations followed very different strategies. Ennahda tried to achieve its goals through compromise and consensus and flexibly adapted its constitutional norms to remain in power. Of course, this had implications for the political system that was established in Tunisia. Although the Muslim Brotherhood was willing to adapt its constitutional norms it pushed the 2012 Egyptian constitution into law in great haste. In doing so, it tried to secure its own power position in Egypt. The influence of the 1971 constitution was still visible in the constitution enacted by the Muslim Brotherhood because it helped the Morsi government and the FJP to secure their power position. It is striking that in all four cases Islamist political thought, irrespective of whether it is Sunni or Shiite Islamist political thought, can be understood as a frame of reference by which Islamist political actors legitimate their interactions but not as a driving factor when it comes to explaining their political orientation or behavior. Drawing on these results I conclude that Critical Constructivist norm research is very useful to understand Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order and their aspirations towards power preservation. If one wants to understand these actors’ political orientation, i.e. their conceptions of political order, it makes sense to look at their interactions towards securing their power position. Analyzing their norms and how these norms enable the organizations to remain in power helps to understand their political orientation. However, one limitation of the concept may be that it is a very useful tool to analyze Islamist organizations that are in power, i.e. that are ruling but that it might be less convenient to analyze Islamist organizations that belong to the opposition forces. In the case of Islamist organizations not taking part in the government, it might be difficult to evaluate the linkage between normative meaning emerging through interaction in context and the organizations’ interactions towards preserving or reaching power, because opposition forces are not able to directly influence political outcomes. Hence, in this case, the linkage between norms, power, and political order would be more difficult to observe. Notes 1 2

3

Ennahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi has comprehensively illustrated his Islamist political thought in books, academic journals, and newspaper articles. For a profound analysis in English see Tamimi (2001). It is interesting to observe that Ennahda leaders only referred to the Turkish AKP as a role model in those articles that were published before the military coup against the Erdogan regime took place in summer 2016 and the Turkish political system under AKP rule has increasingly shown authoritarian characteristics. The Islamist party was followed by the Congrès pour la Républilque (CPR) which had won 29 seats (13.8 percent) and Ettakatol, which had achieved 20 (10.1 percent) seats in the NCA (EU 2011, 13; ISIE 2012, 190). CPR belongs to the leftist parties and Ettakatol to the social democratic political spectrum.

4 5 6 7

8

9

10 11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Although Ennahda renounced from implementing shari’a in the constitution, this does not mean that the organization does not pursue to Islamize the society anymore (Marks 2014, 22). There have been rumors that Ennahda aims to constitutionalize the shari’a at a later point in time (el-Sayed 2014, 45). Although the Tunisian constitution guarantees freedom of conscience, it remains vague and ambivalent regarding the future relation of state and religion and the role of religious matters in the Tunisian state (Shaqoura and Kristiansen 2015, 16). Tunisia’s Personal Status Code i.e. grants equal rights to men and women, prohibits polygamy, and makes sure that women and men achieve equal rights in matters related to divorces (Feuer 2012, 3). During the constitution-making process Tunisia witnessed political murders and increasing violent terrorist attacks by Salafist and Jihadist actors. At the same time, jihadi criminality has increased at Tunisia’s porous borders. For more information on Tunisia’s security situation see ICG (2013). In the early years of the 2000s, opposition against the Egyptian regime increased and new opposition forces, such as the Kifaya-movement, emerged in the political landscape. However, the new movements were not organized as good as the Muslim Brotherhood and did not enjoy as much support in the Egyptian society as the Muslim Brotherhood who has engaged in social and political affairs since 1928 (Antar 2007, 64ff.). The Egyptian regime had faced increasing opposition and criticism in the early 2000 years. The regime of Husni Mubarak was neither able to meet economic and social challenges nor to handle the liberalization in the media sector and to integrate the growing private sector business community into the existing political regime (Fürtig 2011, 2). After having taken over power the SCAF decided that parliamentary and presidential elections should be held before a Constituent Assembly would be elected to draft a new constitution (el Fegiery 2012, 2). Although the FJP is formally independent from the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist organization’s influence on the party was immense. However, the party was open to all Egyptians – encompassing citizens who adhere to other religions than Islam, e.g. Christians. Muhammad Morsi, who later became the first Islamist president of Egypt, was elected as the chairman of the FJP (Dihstelhoff et al. 2015, 2; Roll 2016, 31ff.). In June 2012, only two days before the presidential elections took place, Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court, whose judges had been appointed by Mubarak, dissolved the democratically elected parliament, which was dominated by Islamists. A new parliament was only elected in 2015 (Aboulenein and Knecht 2015; Hearst and Hussein 2012). The word da’wa has its root in the Arabic verb meaning “to call” or “to invite.” In its religious-political sense da’wa can be understood as the effort to spread the religious message to the world and to reach and appeal to as many people as possible. In this sense, da’wa is often translated as “propaganda” or “mission” (Canard 1960–2005). Morsi may have had several reasons for his decision to issue the declaration, i.e. there were speculations that the SCAF might reinstall an earlier constitutional declaration that granted strong executive and legislative powers to the SCAF, which would have strongly reduced Morsi’s power and strengthened the position of the SCAF (Pioppi 2013, 61). Moreover, the dissolution of the Egyptian lower house of the parliament by the SCAF in June 2012 may have raised fears that the same might happen with the Constituent Assembly before a new constitution could have been drafted. If that had happened the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood would probably have been reduced, dramatically. Due to the Islamist dominance in the parliament, the first Constituent Assembly was strongly dominated by Islamists by an estimated 70 percent. As this raised widespread protests within the non-Islamist camp, based on negotiations a new Constituent Assembly was established. It compromised around 55 percent Islamists and 45 percent non-Islamists and independents (Hulsman et al. 2013, 12). However, the Constituent Assembly, which finally drafted the constitution, was dominated by the Islamists. Almost all non-Islamist members had withdrawn from the Constituent Assembly. The members who remained in the Constituent Assembly represented only four parties, three of the parties were Islamist oriented (alMasry 2012). Irrespective of the withdrawals the Constituent Assembly finalized the constitution drafting process with 85 members instead of 100 members. This was possible, because a vote of only 67 members was required to pass the constitution in the Constituent Assembly (Ahram Online 2012a). The constitution was approved with 64 percent of the votes. However, the constitution did not have the legitimacy and the backing of the Egyptian society as the voter turnout was low with only 33 percent (Pioppi 2013, 62). Hence, the constitution did not achieve legitimacy from the overall Egyptian society. Al-Azhar is the most influential Sunni institution for religious studies in the world. Its decisions are overall recognized in the Sunni Muslim community (Mandaville 2014, 67).

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In The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects, ed. Nouri Gana. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd., 207–24. Milton-Edwards, Beverley. 2008. Political Islam and the Palestinian-Israeli-Conflict. In Islamic Attitudes to Israel, eds. Efraim Karsh and P. R. Kumaraswamy. Oxon/New York: Routledge, 65–85. Muasher, Marwan. 2011. Tunisia’s Lessons for the Arab World. Beirut. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/01/tunisia-s-lessons-for-arab-world-pub-45888. Ounissi, Sayida. 2016. Ennahda from Within: Islamists or “Muslim Democrats”? – Islamists on Islamism Today. Sayida Ounissi, Member of Parliament (Ennahda), Tunisia. Washington D.C. www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/Ounissi-RPI-Response-FINAL_v2.pdf. Pickard, Duncan. 2012a. Lessons from Constitution-Making in Tunisia. Washington D.C. www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/publication_pdfs/403/mec121213tunisia.pdf. Pickard, Duncan. 2012b. The Current Status of Constitution Making in Tunisia. Brussels. http://carnegieeurope.eu/2012/04/19/current-status-of-constitution-making-in-tunisia-pub-47908. Pinfari, Marco. 2013. The EU, Egypt and Morsi’s Rise and Fall: ’Strategic Patience’ and its Discontents. Mediterranean Politics 18 (3): 460–6. Pioppi, Daniela. 2013. Playing with Fire. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Leviathan. The International Spectator 48 (4): 51–68. Röder, Tilmann J. 2016. State Control over the Military or Military Control over the State? A Comparison of Selected Arab Constitutions. In Constitutionalism, Human Rights, and Islam after the Arab Spring, eds. Rainer Grote and Tilmann J. Röder. New York: Oxford University Press, 283–322. Roll, Stephan. 2016. Islamistische Akteure in Ägypten: Pragmatismus Als Leitmotiv Nach Dem Sturz Mubaraks. In Islamische Akteure in Nordafrika, ed. Sigrid Faath. Sankt Augustin/Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 29–55. Rosefsky Wickham, Carrie. 2011. The Muslim Brotherhood and Democratic Transition in Egypt. Middle East Law and Governance 3 (1–2): 204–23. Rosefsky Wickham, Carrie. 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement. Princeton/Woodstock: Princeton University Press. Schoeller-Schletter, Anja. 2013. Die Ägyptische Verfassung von Dezember 2012 – Betrachtung aus verfassungstheoretischer Perspektive. München. www.hss.de/fileadmin/media/downloads/Berichte/130121_Aegypten_SB.pdf. Schwegmann, Friedrich G. 2002. Verfassung. Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft – Theorien, Methoden, Begriffe: 1005–6. Shaqoura, Mazen, and Annali Kristiansen. 2015. Islam and Human Rights: The Constitutional Debate in Tunisia. Copenhagen. www.humanrights.dk/sites/humanrights.dk/files/working_papers/2015.9._mattersofconcern_islam_and_human_rights__the_constitutional_debate_in_tunisia_2015.pdf. Stepan, Alfred. 2012. Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations. Journal of Democracy 23 (2): 89–103. Tamimi, Azzam S. 2001. Rachid Ghannouchi – A Democrat within Islam. ed. John L. Esposito. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. The Constituent Assembly. 2012. The New Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Cairo: The Constituent Assembly. http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Egypt-Constitution-26-December-2012.pdf. The White House. 2012. Readout of the President’s Call with President-Elect Morsi of Egypt. Washington D.C. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/24/readout-president-s-call-president-elect-morsi-egypt. Tickner, Arlene B., and David L. Blaney. 2012. Introduction – Thinking Difference. In Thinking International Relations Theory Differently, eds. Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney. Oxon/New York: Routledge, 1–23. Wiener, Antje. 2004. Conflictive Meanings: Constitutional Norms in Three Political Arenas. Bremen. www.monnetcentre.uni-bremen.de/pdf/VerfProz/10_Wiener.pdf. Wiener, Antje. 2007. The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance beyond the State: Sociological and Normative Approaches to Interaction. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 10 (1): 47–69. Wiener Antje, Anthony F. Lang Jr., James Tully, Miguel Poiares Maduro, and Mattias Kumm. 2012. Editorial – Global Constitutionalism, Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law. In Global Constitutionalism 1 (1): 1–15. Wolf, Anne. 2017. Political Islam in Tunisia. The History of Ennahda. London. Hurst & Company. US Department of State. 2017. Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Washington D.C. www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. US Embassy in Tunisia. 2014. U.S. – Tunisian Joint Statement on Strategic Partnership. Tunis. https://tn.usembassy.gov/ustunisia-joint-statement-on-strategic-partnership/. Zoglin, Katie. 2013. Tunisia at a Crossroads: Drafting a New Constitution. Insights 17 (18): 7.

7

Conclusion

Islamist organizations belong to the crucial political actors in the MENA and will be relevant with regard to political developments in the region in the long-term. This is why this book has aimed to achieve a better understanding of Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order. Based on a theoretical approach that combines Islamism research and Critical Constructivism I analyzed the conceptions of political order of the Shiite Hezbollah and the Sunni Hamas, which I chose as empirical case studies. Both organizations are relevant Islamist organizations in the MENA region and are embedded in the political contexts of Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. Given this main research interest, the following research question was at the heart of the book: what characterizes Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order and how is it possible to explain the differences between these conceptions – given that both organizations are Islamist political actors engaged in processes of national policy-making in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories respectively? 7.1 The key findings and their scientific contribution To analyze the main research question of this book and to achieve a broader understanding of Islamist actors’ political orientation without remaining caught in pre-established theoretical categories, I developed a theoretical approach that connects Islamism research and Critical Constructivist norm research from the field of IR theory. In Chapter 2 of the book I elaborated the main concepts that were relevant for the theoretical framework of the book: Islamism, norms, political order, resistance, and power. I show that these concepts are closely related to each other and that they have much in common because they all entail flexible elements, i.e. they should not be understood in a fixed sense but as being open for change depending on the specific context they are embedded in and the interactions that take place in this context. Against the background of my general methodological positioning and the subsequent hermeneutic, reconstructive, and inductive methodological procedure I followed, the theoretical concepts developed in Chapter 2 served as sensitizing concepts to structure the analysis. At the same time, they left enough room to inductively reconstruct the organizations’ respective conceptions of political order, their understanding of resistance, and their interactions towards power preservation throughout the empirical analysis presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The empirical analysis of the cases of the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas has shown that in general the results of this book sustain the main research proposition, which I developed in Chapter 2. The main research proposition assumes that it is (1) the organizations’ core norm of resistance, deeply intertwined with their interactions towards power preservation, and (2) the specific political and social context they are engaged in, which

characterizes Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order and explains the differences between them. Although the results I presented in this this book sustain the main research proposition in general, the empirical analysis has shown that the issue of preserving power is the most important factor that characterizes Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order and explains the differences between them. Both organizations use their core norm of resistance to preserve power but they do this in a different way, because they are engaged in different political and social contexts in Lebanon and in the Palestinian Territories. Hezbollah protects its core norm of resistance through the Lebanese political order but endangers exactly this political order through resistance, when its core norm becomes under threat. Hence, Hezbollah is less interested in formulating precise conceptions of political order than in preserving its power position in Lebanon through its core norm resistance. Hamas has institutionalized its core norm of resistance to uphold its political order in Gaza. In doing so, it secures its political order and hence its power position in the Palestinian Territories through resistance. Thus, different interactions towards power preservation based on resistance do characterize Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order and explain the differences between them i.e. show that Hamas has more specific conceptions of political order than Hezbollah. The organizations’ religious orientation, i.e. Shiite and Sunni Islamist political thought, serves as a frame of reference but is not the driving factor when it comes to explaining their respective conceptions of political order. In the following I move beyond the scope of these overall results of the book and briefly take a closer look at the case studies, i.e. on Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order. In its early years the Shiite Hezbollah had the vague vision to establish an Islamist political order in Lebanon – a vision it relinquished when it decided to participate in the Lebanese political system in 1992. Since then, Hezbollah shows a strong commitment to the Lebanese political order. This applies in particular for the criteria of security and stability of the Lebanese political order. However, when taking a closer look at Hezbollah’s interactions, it becomes obvious that the organization’s commitment to the Lebanese political order is only a literal one, because as soon as Hezbollah’s core norm of resistance gets under threat, the Shiite organization endangers the Lebanese political order. Although Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese government it has deployed its weapons for several times against external actors, like 2006 in the military confrontation with Israel and since 2013 in the Syrian civil war. Furthermore, the Shiite organization used its weapons for the first time since the Lebanese civil war had ended in the domestic realm when the March 14 government put pressure on Hezbollah and its infrastructure in 2008. Hezbollah understood the March 14 government’s actions as a “declaration of war against the resistance” (Nasrallah 2008) and underlined that it would never allow anyone to weaken the resistance. Hezbollah’s military interactions – against Lebanese and external actors – have strongly endangered the Lebanese political order. It is striking that these interactions overlap with Hezbollah’s interest to protect, consolidate, and defend its core norm of resistance and to preserve its power position in Lebanon. The empirical analysis has shown that through its interactions the Shiite organization uses and reconstructs its core norm of resistance to preserve its power position in Lebanon. It used compulsory power when it deployed its weapons against internal and external actors to

strengthen, consolidate, and defend its resistance status. It exercised institutional and structural power when it engaged in national Lebanese politics and alliances to protect its resistance and exercised productive power to reconstruct the meaning of resistance to legitimize its interactions and shape the knowledge on resistance within the Lebanese population. In sum, the empirical analysis presented in Chapter 3 revealed that Hezbollah’s main interest is related to questions of power and not political order. Hezbollah refrains from formulating its own conceptions of political order and does not hesitate to endanger the Lebanese political order whenever its own interests are under threat. This leads to the fact that Hezbollah’s conceptions of political order remain unclear and that it is not possible to identify specific conceptions of political order in the case of Hezbollah. This can mainly be explained by the context the organization is located in. Lebanon is a multi-confessional state in which Hezbollah would not be able to establish a political order based on its will only. Instead, a literal commitment to the Lebanese political order, interactions within the political system as long as it is in line with Hezbollah’s vision, and the organization’s focus on its core norm of resistance including the possession of weapons outside of the Lebanese army, much better secure Hezbollah’s power position in Lebanon than any specific conception of a political order could. Also, the political order the Palestinian Hamas favored to establish remained quite vague in the organization’s early years. It was only clear that this order would have an Islamic character but it had never been put into a precise plan. This changed throughout the period between 2005 and 2013, when two different stages of political order could be identified in Hamas’ conceptions of political order. The first stage became visible after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 until Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2007. It was characterized through a clear commitment to a pluralist political order based on strong state institutions and democratic elements. It is striking that during this period Hamas’ core norm of resistance was increasingly fading away as well as its commitment to its Sunni Islamist political thought, which was only sustained as a frame of reference in its political programs. However, the Hamas government was under severe economic and political pressures exercised by the international community and Fatah. At the same time contestation processes between Hamas and Fatah intensified and finally resulted in the military takeover of Gaza by Hamas in 2007. The second stage of Hamas’ conceptions of political order emerged in Gaza after the takeover in 2007. The political order Hamas established in Gaza, which is explicitly not the ideal model Hamas would favor as a political order, is strongly characterized through the security sector being partly based on institutionalized resistance. It definitely shows authoritarian elements. Caught between being the government and a resistance movement at the same time, Hamas exercises compulsory power to uphold its political order in Gaza. At the same time, it uses the mechanism of productive power to secure the Palestinian peoples’ and the Arab population’s support for the Palestinian cause, to strengthen the legitimacy of Hamas, and to end the economic and diplomatic isolation of Gaza. This holds especially true during the Gaza wars when Hamas highlighted the successes of its resistance and when it closed ranks with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood after Muhammad Morsi had come to power in Egypt in 2012. In contrast to Hezbollah, Hamas shows specific conceptions of political order. During the

first stage, Hamas’ political order was characterized by a clear commitment to a pluralist political order, based on the separation of powers, strong state institutions, and democratic elements. The second stage of Hamas’ political order, which persists until today, is characterized through security, partly based on institutionalized resistance and shows strong elements of authoritarianism. That Hamas has specific conceptions of political order can be traced back to questions of power as well and to the specific context Hamas is engaged in. The organization interacts in the Palestinian Territories in a quite homogenous society, in which the majority is composed of Sunni Muslims. Until today, a Palestinian state has not yet been established. However, as the Palestinian society is more homogenous than the Lebanese, for Hamas it would be much easier than for Hezbollah to unite the Palestinians behind a common vision of a political order for a future Palestinian state. When Hamas composed the Palestinian government, it failed to politically unite the Palestinians. It tried to exercise institutional power and to govern the Palestinian people. However, based on the economic challenges the government was facing and the contestation processes with Fatah, it could not manage to do so. Before losing power during the struggles with Fatah, which refused to hand over full political power to Hamas, especially in the security sector, Hamas militarily took over Gaza. That Hamas adheres to the political order in Gaza although it does not correspond to the ideal model of a political order Hamas would love to establish and that neither Hamas nor Fatah have managed to reconcile and jointly work on the establishment of a Palestinian state, indicates that Hamas is also strongly interested in questions of power. Presently, upholding the political order in Gaza seems to be the best possibility for Hamas to preserve its power position in the Palestinian Territories. Moreover, the fact that a Palestinian state has not been established yet and the competition between Hamas and Fatah over political power fostered the establishment of Hamas’ political order in Gaza. This applies especially if one compares the national context in which Hamas is engaged to that of Hezbollah. The Shiite Hezbollah operates within the multi-confessional national state of Lebanon where it would not be able to establish a political order based on its own conceptions. To show how the theoretical framework I elaborated in this book and the empirical results derived from the cases of Hezbollah and Hamas help to analyze Islamist actors’ political orientation more broadly, I have linked my findings to two further case studies: the Tunisian Ennahda and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In the brief empirical analysis, which is rather meant to function as an outlook than as an in-depth case study, I did not analyze the core norm of resistance but core constitutional norms of the two organizations. Analyzing the core norm of resistance did not make sense because neither Ennahda nor the Muslim Brotherhood are resistance organizations. Constitutional norms, however, were relevant for both organizations, as Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood were involved in the constitution-making processes in Tunisia and Egypt and because constitutions are linked to questions of political order by nature. The findings from the ruling Islamist organizations, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood, have shown that both organizations supported those core constitutional norms that helped them to hold their power position. Just as constitutions are relevant for political order per se, also are the core constitutional norms supported by Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood. These norms were important for the political order to be established in Tunisia and Egypt – a process in which Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood were strongly involved

or which they were even controlling. As in the case of Hezbollah and Hamas, the religious orientation of Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood provided the frame of reference in which both organizations interacted but was not decisive when it comes to explaining their conceptions of political order. Hezbollah, Hamas, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood are very different organizations. While Hezbollah and Hamas are resistance organizations engaged in processes of national policymaking in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories, but at the same time partly listed as terrorist organization in the West, the Tunisian Ennahda is considered as the positive example derived from the Arab Upheavals. Especially politicians in the US and the EU highlight Tunisia’s democratic achievements after the fall of the Ben Ali regime. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood achieved international recognition after Morsi’s victory but became demonized after his fall again. Although these differences between the four organizations exist, the theoretical framework developed in this book helped to analyze the organizations’ political orientation from a broader perspective. Without using pre-established theoretical categories, the Critical Constructivist framework enabled us to bring the findings from these four organizations on a more abstract level and to show that Islamist organizations make use of their core norms to preserve their power position. In turn, these core norms are relevant for Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order, which are in some cases linked and in other cases subordinated to the organizations’ main interest: to secure their power position. 7.2 Implications for future research and practitioners As I have outlined above, the theoretical concept developed in this book and the empirical findings enable researchers to analyze Islamist political actors from a Critical Constructivist perspective without being caught in pre-established theoretical categories. To analyze the political orientation of ruling Islamist organizations, i.e. Islamist organizations who participate in governments or parliaments, the theoretical concept will be especially useful. In this case it is possible to link the organizations’ norms to their interactions and to show how this is related to their position in power. This would possibly be more difficult if Islamist organizations are part of the political opposition. In this case it would be more challenging to anticipate how their norms are connected to their conceptions of political order as this would be difficult to measure. The theoretical concept developed in this book combined with the findings from the MENA region brings new insights into IR theory. It especially offers new insights into norm research and into the new hot topic within Constructivist IR theory: resistance. My book has shown that in the cases of Hezbollah and Hamas Daase and Deitelhoff’s argument, which assumes that “where there is resistance there is also power and that the latter can be experienced through resistance” (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014, 11/Foucault 1990, 95, author’s translation) holds true. Hezbollah and Hamas both make use of resistance to preserve their power position in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. In their work Daase and Deitelhoff understand resistance as a practice that they analyze in relation to authority – understood as asymmetric power structures, i.e. structures of institutionalized superiority or subordination (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014, 10).

They propose to use resistance as a key to identify different structures of authority that are based on practices of resistance and to derive from the nature of resistance, early conclusions on the changing nature of authority (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014, 11). The results of my book have shown that further questions need be addressed when studying resistance. I studied resistance, not as a practice, but as a norm. This revealed that resistance is not only directed against a specific authority but also used to preserve power. In the latter case I have shown that Hezbollah and Hamas both directed resistance initially at Israel but expanded the scope of the addressees of their resistance over time to preserve their power position. Hezbollah has conducted resistance practices in the domestic realm of Lebanon and in Syria in favor of the Assad regime. Based on its resistance in various contexts Hezbollah has managed to preserve its power position in Lebanon. The same applies for the Palestinian Hamas. Originally its resistance was only directed against Israel. Since the establishment of the Gaza political order it also directs its resistance against Fatah and uses resistance to maintain the political order in Gaza and its own power position in the Palestinian realm. When looking at these results, scholars within the field of IR theory should start to explore resistance not only related to authority but also related to questions of power. If resistance serves as means to preserve power, resistance might also work as a tool to expose power structures within the international realm or to reveal power positions distinct actors or movements might be interested to preserve. This might be interesting concerning armed groups in national or transnational contexts, but also with regard to global protest movements. Against this backdrop one might start to ask: what will happen if armed groups or global protest movements have achieved their goals? As they would have been groups or movements without a cause then questions arise if they withdraw from the political and social arena they are engaged in or if they change their goals to preserve the power position they have reached over the years. Interesting empirical examples for future research could be armed groups, which are currently supported by the West in the fight against the Islamic State (IS). Although it is not likely that the violence in Syria and Iraq will stop quickly or that IS will be completely eradicated anytime soon, questions arise what will happen with the groups, which are fighting against IS now, after they have reached their goal. Possibly they will not resume their weapons afterwards but rather use them to either preserve their power position in Iraq and Syria or even expand it. In that case, their armed resistance might be directed at a different person or issue than was originally the case. Another interesting empirical example could be the case of global protest movements, which have emerged since the 1990s against globalization. Although the organizations that comprise the global justice movement will not be able to realize all their goals, one can start to reconstruct the mechanism of power within the organizations itself based on their resistance interactions. It would then be possible to analyze if it is possible that these movements have broader interests than to realize their fixed goals, i.e. interests to preserve their own power position via resistance. The results of the book also offer new insights into the analysis of the Sunna–Shia relations. Since the rupture of Islam into the two branches of Sunni and Shiite Islam had taken place following Prophet Muhammad’s death (632 AD) and the dispute over who would be the most legitimate one to succeed him and to guide the umma, Sunni and Shiite Muslims have been struggling over who has the legitimate authority to interpret the religion of Islam. Over time,

we can identify periods of rapprochements and divide between the two branches of Islam (Mervin 2013, 16ff.). Since the Iraq war began in 2003 we have been witnessing a period of a sharpening divide between the two branches of Islam, which has strong political implications. This book studied Islamist organizations’ conceptions of political order based on a case study of the Shiite Hezbollah and the Sunni Hamas. It has shown different results than other studies, which focus on questions of the different Muslim religious identities to explain the differences between Sunni and Shiite political and religious actors (Abdo 2017). My book demonstrated that concerning Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order the religious orientation towards the political ideology of Shiite and Sunni Islamism worked as a frame of reference only, but it did not play any decisive role. It was rather the organizations’ core norm of resistance deeply intertwined with their interactions towards power preservation in the Lebanese, the Palestinian, and the regional context, which characterized the organizations’ respective conceptions of political order and explained how it is possible that Hamas has more specific conceptions of political order than Hezbollah. This has important implications for future research that concentrates on analyzing Sunni–Shiite relations concerning their political implications. Without trying to neglect that religion matters and has symbolic power, because Sunnis and Shiites both aim “to be accepted as the (only) authentic heir to the original Islamic tradition through the recognition of a doctrinal body” (Maréchal and Zemni 2013, 239, emphasis in original), future research should not reduce the analysis of Sunni and Shiite politics to sectarian issues only. Often, the religious difference might work as a frame of reference, as I have shown, or might be used by political actors. However, important core concepts from the field of Political Science, such as norms or power, may be useful to analyze the underlying causes of the conflict between Sunni and Shiite Islamist political actors or Sunni and Shiite states, reveal the nature of the distrust between them and develop approaches to achieve a rapprochement between Sunni and Shiite actors in the MENA region. This could be helpful for analyzing the sharpening divide between Sunni and Shiite states, such as between Saudi Arabia and Iran. At the same time, focusing on questions of power might support researchers when it comes to analyzing intrastate conflicts in which Sunni and Shiite political actors are engaged, such as in Yemen. The results of this book are not only interesting for scholars but also of particular interest for practitioners, especially policymakers. Hezbollah and Hamas are both relevant political actors in the MENA region. This holds especially true as they are both entangled in the Israeli– Arab conflict: Hamas as a Palestinian actor, even more so than Hezbollah. Politicians from the US or the EU tend to assess the possible behavior of both organizations based on considerations of what would happen if Hamas, for example, recognized Israel, if both organizations released their weapons one day, or if a greater inclusion of both organizations within negotiations led to their moderation. I have shown that questions of power preservation are of high significance for both organizations. Hence, it would be helpful if politicians started to evaluate Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ possible future behavior based on the organizations’ possibilities to preserve their power position in the Lebanese, Palestinian, or regional context. Practitioners should start to address questions such as how Hamas’ power position in the Palestinian Territories would be affected if the organization agreed with international demands, such as the formal recognition of Israel. One Hamas member from the PLC confirmed

in a personal interview conducted in the realm of this study that the organization would agree on a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders but not recognize Israel. Analyzing this statement against the backdrop of Hamas’ ambitions to preserve its power position in the Palestinian political arena would help Western policymakers to evaluate the organization’s future interactions. This would support them to elaborate new political strategies for the question of how to deal and potentially interact with Hamas in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Recalling the results on Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ respective conceptions of political order it is striking that the concept of power, which belongs to the core concepts of Political Science since ever, is crucial to understand Islamist organizations as political actors. References Abdo, Geneive. 2017. The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shia-Sunni Divide. New York: Oxford University Press. Daase, Christopher, and Nicole Deitelhoff. 2014. Zur Rekonstruktion Globaler Herrschaft aus dem Widerstand. Working Paper Goethe-Universität Frankfurt. Frankfurt am Main. https://dissidenz.net/workingpapers/wp1-2014-daase-deitelhoff.pdf. Foucault, Michel. 1990. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. New York: Vintage Books Edition. Maréchal, Brigitte, and Sami Zemni. 2013. Conclusion – Analyzing Contemporary Sunnite-Shiite Relationships. In The Dynamics of Sunni-Shia Relationships – Doctrine, Transnationalism, Intellectuals and the Media, eds. Brigitte Maréchal and Sami Zemni. London: Hurst & Company, 215–41. Mervin, Sabrina. 2013. On Sunnite-Shiite Doctrinal and Contemporary Geopolitical Tensions. In The Dynamics of Sunni-Shia Relationships – Doctrine, Transnationalism, Intellectuals and the Media, eds. Brigitte Maréchal and Sami Zemni. London: Hurst & Company, 11–24. Nasrallah, Hassan. 2008. Sayyed Nasrallah: We Are in a New Period – Unconstitutional Government Must Back Down and Accept Dialogue. www.english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=3450&cid=320 (May 20, 2012).

Annex I List of interviews List of the interviews that I conducted in the realm of the book by position. I was able to access more interview partners in the case of Hamas than in the case of Hezbollah. This imbalance could be compensated by drawing on a comprehensive number of textual sources from Hezbollah. Interviewee (anonymized name)

Location where Date the interview took place

1 Hezbollah Researcher 1 (close to Hezbollah) 2 Hezbollah Researcher 2 (close to Hezbollah) 3 Lebanese Journalist (Journalist in leading Lebanese Journal; expert on Hezbollah; had several interviews with Hassan Nasrallah) 4 Editor-in-Chief of leading Lebanese Journal (affiliated with Hezbollah) 5 Former General of the Lebanese Army (affiliated with Hezbollah) 6 Former Minister Hamas 1

Lebanon Lebanon Lebanon

05/20/2013 06/06/2013 05/15/2013

Lebanon

05/30/2013

Lebanon

05/27/2013

Palestinian Territories, West Bank Palestinian Territories, West Bank Palestinian Territories, West Bank Palestinian Territories, West Bank Palestinian Territories, West Bank Palestinian Territories, West Bank Palestinian

08/25/2013

7 Former Minister Hamas 2

8 Former Minister Hamas 3

9 Hamas PLC Member 1

10 Hamas PLC Member 2

11 Hamas PLC Member 3

12 Hamas PLC Member 4

08/20/2013

09/04/2013

09/04/2013

08/25/2013

08/28/2013

08/25/2013

13 Hamas PLC Member 5

14 Hamas Official in Beirut 1 15 Hamas Official in Beirut 2 16 Independent Former Minister

17 Expert on Hamas 1

18 Expert on Hamas 2

19 Expert on Hamas 3

20 Expert on Hamas 4

21 Fatah Politician

22 Clergyman

Territories, West Bank Palestinian Territories, West Bank Lebanon Lebanon Palestinian Territories, West Bank Palestinian Territories, West Bank Palestinian Territories, West Bank Palestinian Territories, West Bank Palestinian Territories, West Bank Palestinian Territories, West Bank Palestinian Territories, West Bank

08/30/2015

05/28/2013 05/15/2013 09/05/2013

08/24/2013

09/02/2013

09/07/2013

08/30/2013

08/27/2013

09/07/2013

Annex II List of written Arabic primary sources

Written Primary Arabic Sources Hezbollah (by Date) Source

Name of source

Title (IJMES transliteration style)

Title (translated to English)

Date

1 Program Hezbollah

Ḥizb Allāh

The Open Letter to the Oppressed

1985

2 Election program Hezbollah

Ḥizb Allāh

3 Election program Hezbollah

Ḥizb Allāh

4 Election program Hezbollah

Ḥizb Allāh

5 Journal (Hezbollah) article

alIntiqād

Al-Risāla al-Maftūḥa li-l-Mustaḍʿafīn Al-Barnāmij al-Intikhābī liḤizb Allāh fī al-Intikhābāt al-Niyābiyya al-ʿᾹm 1992 Al-Barnāmij al-Intikhābī liḤizb Allāh fī al-Intikhābāt al-Niyābiyya al-ʿᾹm 1996 Al-Barnāmij al-Intikhābī liḤizb Allāh fī al-Intikhābāt al-Niyābiyya al-ʿᾹm 2000 al-Qirāʾa al-ʾIsrāʾīliyya li-l-Qarār 1559 Tafḍaḥ alʾAhdāf al-ʾAmīrikiyya –

Hezbollah’s Election Platform for the 1992 Lebanese Elections in the Year of 1992

Hezbollah’s Election Platform for the 1996 Lebanese Elections in the Year of 1996

Hezbollah’s Election Platform for the 2000 Lebanese Elections in the Year of 2000

The Israeli Reading of the Resolution 09/10/2004 1559 Reveals American Interests – The Challenges of the Next Period and its Obligations

Taḥaddiyāt al-Marḥala al-Muqbila wa-Mūjibātuhā 6 Journal alKhitāb al-ʾAsad (Hezbollah) Intiqād al-Tārīkhī article Yuṭliqu Marḥala Jadīda min al-ʿAlāqāt al-Lubnāniyya – al-Sūriyya: Tafʿīl al-ʿAmal al-Muʾasasātī Wafaqa Ruʾya Jadīda 7 Journal alal-Zaḥf ʾilā (Hezbollah) Intiqād Sāḥa article Riyād al-Ṣulḥ: Lubnān Yahtifu bi-Daʿm al-Muqāwama wa-l-Waḥda al-Waṭaniyya wa-l-Wafāʾ li-Sūriyā 8 Ministerial alal-Ḥukūma declaration Ḥukūma al-Tāsiʿa (Lebanese alw-al-Sittūn. government) Tāsiʿa Sādis Ḥukūma w-alfī Sittūn ʿAhd Fakhāmat al-Raʾīs Imīl Laḥūd 9 Journal alMurashshaḥ (Hezbollah) Intiqād Ḥizb published Allāh ʿan Bint interview Jabīl Ḥassan Faḍl Allāh: Naltazimu Qaḍiyyat

Assad’s Historial Speech Launches a 03/11/2005 New Period in the Lebanese – Syrian Relations: Activating Institutional Work in Accordance with a New Vision

The Crawling to Riad el-Sol Square: 03/11/2005 Lebanon Cheers the Pillar of the Resistance and National Unity and the Loyalty towards Syria

96th Government; 6th Government in the Era of President Émile Lahoud

05/19/2005

Candidate of Bint Jebel Hassan Fadlallah: We Are Commited to the Issue of the Resistance and to the Pursuit of Realizing the Peoples’ Ambitions

06/03/2005

al-Muqāwama w-al-Saʿī liTaḥqīq Ṭumūḥāt alShabāb 10 Journal al(Hezbollah) Intiqād article including transcripts of parts of the speech

al-Sayyid Naṣr Allāh fī Ḥadīth Tilifizyūnī: “al-Muqāwama Laysat Mīlīshiyan” Taḥullu alMushkila 11 Journal alLiqāʾ al-Sayyid (Hezbollah) Intiqād wa-l-Jinarāl article Yuṭliqu including al-Ḥiwār altranscripts of Waṭanī parts of the – Naṣr Allāh: statements Liqāʾ Ḥaqīqī li-l- Taʿāwun Qāʾim ʿalā Tafāhum waRuʾya wa-Minhaj; ʿAwn: Ijtimāʿunā ʿalā al-”Naʿam” liBināʾ Lubnān wa-Taqwiya al-Waḥda 12 Journal alRaʾīs Kutlat (Hezbollah) Intiqād al-Wafāʾ li-l- published Muqāwama interview al-Nāʾib Muḥammad Raʿd li “al-Intiqād”: Al-Mawḍūʿ al-Riʾāsī Muʿaqqad

Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in a 01/20/2006 Televised Speech: “The Resistance Is Not a Militia”. She Solves the Problem

Meeting of Sayyed and General 02/10/2006 Launches National Dialogue: Nasrallah: Real Encounter for Cooperation Based on Understanding, Vision, and Program; Aoun: Our Meeting on “Yes” to the Structure of Lebanon and to the Strengthening of Unity

The President of the Block of Loyalty 04/07/2006 to the Resistance – The Deputy Muhammad Raad: The Topic of the President Is Complicated and Cannot Be Decided Hastily

wa-lā Yumkinu Battuhu biSurʿa 13 Journal al(Hezbollah) Intiqād article including transcripts of parts of the speech

Sayyed Nasrallah in a Televised Message: We Will Turn the Earth in the South into a Cemetery for the Zionist Invaders

08/11/2006

14 Journal (Hezbollah) published interview

The General Director of the Channel al-Manar – Abdallah al-Qasir: We Are Stronger Than Ever and Our Credibility Is the One which Is Victorious

08/25/2006

Hezbollah and the Salafi Forces Sign a Memorandum of Understanding: Standing Up against the Disruptive American-Zionist Project

08/19/2008

Hezbollah’s Political Manifesto

2009

Nasrallah Displays Hezbollah’s

12/01/2009

15 Journal (Hezbollah) article including political document

16 Program Hezbollah

17 Journal

al-Sayyid Naṣr Allāh fī Risāla Mutalfaza: Sanuḥawwilu ʾArḍ al-Janūb ʾilā Maqbura li-l- Ghazāa alṢahāyina alal-Mudīr alIntiqād ʿᾹmm li-Qanāat alManār ʿAbd Allāh Qaṣīr li-”l-Intiqād”: Naḥnu ʾAqwā min ʾAyy Waqt … wa Muṣdāqiyyatunā Hiyya allatī Intaṣarat alḤizb Allāh waIntiqād l- Tayyār al-Salafī Yuwaqqʿān Wathīqat Tafāhum: al-Wuqūf fī Wajh al-Mashrūʿ al-ʾAmīrikī – al-Ṣihyūnī al-Taqsīmī Ḥizb Al-Wathīqa Allāh al-Siyāsiyya liḤizb Allāh al-Safīr Naṣr Allāh

(Lebanese journal) article on Hezbollah

18 Journal statement by Naim Qassem, Deputy Secretary General Hezbollah 19 Book by Naim Qassem, Deputy Secretary General Hezbollah 20 Journal (Hezbollah) article

Yaʿriḍu Wathīqat “Ḥizb ʾAllāh”: AlIjmāʿ al-Waṭanī ʿalā al-Muqāwama Kāna Sharṭ Kamāl wa-Lam Yakun Sharṭ Wujūd Laysa ladayna ʿAdūw fī Lubnān wa-Mustʿiddūn li-l-Taʿāwun mʿa al-Kull li-ʾInjāḥ Hādhihi alḤukūma wa-ʾInjāz ʾAwlawiyyatihā Qāsim, Naʿīm in journal alSiyāsa

Naʿīm Qāsim: Lā Naʿtamidu al-Ṭahrāniyya al-Siyāsiyya wa-lTawāfuqiyya Maʿbar līʾIlghāʾ al-Ṭāʾifiyya Qāsim, Ḥizb Allāh: Naʿīm al-Manhaj … at-Tajriba … al-Mustaqbal (Lubnān waMuqāwamatuhu fī al-Wājiha) alal-Ḥiwār: Intiqād ʾIʿādat Taʿrīf li-Siyāsat al-Naʾy bi-l-

Document: National Consensus on the Muqawama Was a Perfect Condition and the Condition Was Not Existant; We Have No Enemy in Lebanon and We Are Ready to Cooperate with Everybody for the Success of This Government and the Accomplishment of its Priorities

Naim Qassem: We Do Not Rely on the 12/17/2009 Politics of Tehran and Agree on Abolishing Sectarianism

Hezbollah: The Method, the Experience, the Future (Lebanon and its Resistance at the Front)

2010

The Dialogue: Redefinition of Politics 06/15/2012 of Self-Esteem and the Army Prevents Interpretation

21 Journal (Hezbollah) article

alIntiqād

Nafs wa-l-Jaysh Yamnaʿu alTaʾwīl Istirjāʿ al-Quṣīr Retrieval of al-Qusair to Protect the ʾilā Syrian State Kanaf al-Dawla al-Sūriyya

06/07/2013

Written Primary Arabic Sources Hamas (by Date) Source

1 Journal (Hamas) published statements by Hamas leaders

Name of Title (IJMES Title (translated to English) source transliteration style)

Filasṭīn Qādat alal-Muqāwama Muslima fī Dardasha ʿan al-Mustaqbal: Lan Nussallima Silāḥanā waMustʿiddūn li-Naql al-Māl w-al-Silāḥ wal- Rijāl li-l-Ḍiffa 2 Journal Filasṭīn Qiṭāʿ Ghaza (Hamas) article alyaksaru Qayd Muslima al-Iḥtilāl: Masīrat 38 ʿᾹman min al-Muqāwama 3 Journal Filasṭīn Bayān Siyāsī (Hamas) article alli-Ḥamās Muslima ḥawla Qaḍāyā mā baʿd al-Insiḥāb: Ḥamās Sharīka fī alQarār

Date

Leadership of the Resistance in Conversation on the Future: We Will Not Hand Over Our Weapons and Are Ready to Transfer Money and People to the West Bank

09/2005

The Gaza Strip Breaks the Chains of the Occupation: The 38 Year March of the Resistance

09/2005

Political Declaration of Hamas 09/2005 about Post-Withdrawal Issues: Hamas Is a Partner in the Decision and Does Not Contest Anyone in the Government

4 Journal (Hamas) published interview

Filasṭīn alMuslima

5 Journal Filasṭīn (Hamas) article alMuslima

6 Hamas election platform)

Ḥamās

wa-Lā Tunāziʿu ʾAḥadan ʿalā al-Sulṭa Al-Qiyādī fī Ḥamās al-Shaykh Saʿīd Ṣiyām: Maʿrakat al-Taḥrīr Ṭawīla … Mutamassikūn bi-Silāḥinā … waMaʿrakatunā al-ʾAsāsiyya maʿa al-Iḥtilāl – Lā Nasʿā warāʾ alMakāsib wa-Daʿawnā li-Tashkīl Lajna li-l-Istifāda min al-Taḥrīr Al-ʾUstādh Khālid Mashʿal Raʾīs al-Maktab alSiyāsī li-Ḥamās: Indiḥār al-Iḥtilāl min Ghaza ʾInjāz li-l- Muqāwama Al-Barnāmij al-Intikhābī liMurashshaḥay

The Hamas Leader Sheikh Said 09/2005 Siyam: Long Battle of Liberation … We Are Stick to Our Weapons. … and Our Fundamental Battle With the Occupation; We Do Not Seek Gains Behind it and We Call for the Formation of a Committee to Benefit from the Liberation

The Master Khaled Meshal, Head 09/2005 of Hamas’ Political Bureau: The Defeat of the Occupation in Gaza is the Achievement of the Resistance

Election Platform for the List of the 2005 Candidates of Reform and Change; the Elections of the Palestinian Legislative Council, the Period

7 Journal (Hezbollah) published interview with Hamas’ Ismael Haniyeh in Hezbollah journal

alIntiqād

8 Government program (Hamas)

Haniya, ʾIsmāʿīl

9 Journal (Hamas) published interview

Filasṭīn alMuslima

Qāʾimat alTaghyīr w-al-ʾIṣlāh; al-Intikhābāt al-Majlis alTashrīʿī al-Filasṭīnī al-Dawra al-Thāniya 2006

2006

Raʾīs Kutlat al-Intikhābiyya ʾIsmāʿīl Haniya li-l-Intiqād: Ḥamās Dakhalat alMajlis al-Tashrīʿī li-Ḥimāyat Barnāmij al-Muqāwama wa-Laysa alʿAks Naṣṣ Kalimat ʾIsmāʿīl Haniya fī al-Majlis alTashrīʿī al-Filasṭīnī Ḥiwār Shāmil maʿa al-Duktūr Mūsā ʾAbū Marzūq Nāʾib Raʾis alMaktab al-Siyāsī liḤamās: Al-Muqāwama al-Filasṭīniyya Lan

The President of Hamas’ Electoral Block, Ismael Haniyeh, to alIntiqad: Hamas Entered the Legislative Council to Protect the Program of the Resistance and Not the Contrary

02/10/2006

Text of Ismael Haniyeh’s Speech at 03/28/2006 the Palestinian Parliament; Hamas Government Program

Comprehensive Dialogue with Dr. 09/2006 Musa Abu Marzouk, Deputy Head of the Political Bureau of Hamas: The Hands of the Palestinian Resistance Are Not Shackled and the Occupation Attacks; the Results of the Aggression on Lebanon Are Terrifying the Zionists

10 Journal (Hamas) published interview

Filasṭīn alMuslima

11 Journal (Hamas) published interview

Filasṭīn alMuslima

Tukabbila Yadayhā w-al-Ihtilāl yaʿtadī; Natāʾij alʿUdwān ʿalā Lubnān Murʿiba li-l- Ṣahāyina Al-Nāʾib alDuktūr Khalīl alḤayya Raʾīs Kutlat Ḥamās al-Niyābiyya: Qawat Ittifāq Maka ʾAnnahu ʿᾹlaj Masāʾil alKhilāf al-Jidhriyya bayna al-Filasṭīniyīn Al-Duktūr Mūsā ʾAbu Marzūq Nāʾib Raʾīs alMaktab al-Siyāsī liḤarakat Ḥamās: Tabaddala al-Waḍʿ waTaghayyarat al-ʾAḥwāl wa-Naḥnu biḤāja li-Ḥiwār Kāna Hunāka Mukhaṭṭaṭ

The Deputy Dr. Khalil al-Hiya, 03/2007 President of the Parliamentary Block of Hamas: The Mecca Agreement Is Strong; It Heals Issues of Profound Dispute between the Palestinians

Doctor Musa Abu Marzouq, Deputy 07/2007 Head of the Political Bureau of the Movement Hamas: The Situation Changes and the Conditions Changed and We Need Dialogue; It Was Planned to Remove Hamas from the Political Scene and to Keep it away from Influencing Decision Making

liʾIkhrāj Ḥamās min al-Mashhad al-Siyāsī wa-ʾIbʿādihā ʿan Dāʾirat alQarār al-Muʾaththir 12 Journal Filasṭīn Barnāmij (Hamas) article alʾIdārat Muslima Ghaza: Tashkīl al-ʾAjhiza al-ʾAmniyya ʿalā ʾAsās Waṭanī wa-ʾInshāʾ Lijān ʾIṣlāḥ Mūwājaha al-Fawḍā wal- Tajāwuzāt wa-Taḥsīn alWaḍʿ al-Iqtiṣādī 13 Journal Filasṭīn Muḥammad (Hamas) alNizāl published Muslima ʿAḍw alInterview Maktab al-Siyāsī liḤarakat Ḥamās: Muḥāwalāt Tashwīh Ṣūrat Ḥamās Muniyat bi-l-Fashal Ḥamās Ḥāḍira biQawa fī al-Muʿādala wa-

Program of the Gaza08/2007 Administration: Formation of the Security Apparatus on a National Basis and Establishment of Reform Committees to Fight against the Chaos and the Abuses and to Improve the Economic Situation

Muhammad Nizal, Member of the 12/2007 Political Bureau of the Movement Hamas: Attempts to Tarnish the Picture of Hamas Failed; the Center of Hamas Is Powerful in Balance; Its Siege Increases the Popularity

14 Journal (Hamas) including transcripts of parts of the declaration

Filasṭīn alMuslima

15 Journal (Hamas) published interview

Filasṭīn alMuslima

Ḥiṣārihā Yazīduhā Shaʿbiyya Bayān liḤamās baʿda Tawaqquf al-ʿAdwān ʿalā Ghaza: Nuqaddiru al-Ṣumūd alʾUsṭūrī al-ʿAẓīm liʾAbnāʾ al-shaʿb alFilasṭīnī; al-Qawa Takmunu fī al-Wahda wa- l-Sharʿiyya min al-Shaʿb w-alḤiwār lahu Munākhāt Al-ʾAmīn alʿᾹmm li-l-Muʾtamar al-Qawmī alʾIslāmī al-ʾUstādh Munīr Shafīq: Thawrat Miṣr ʾAnhat Ḥiṣār Ghaza waFataḥat al-Ṭarīq ʾamāma Mutaghayyirāt Istrātījiyya –

Declaration of Hamas After the End 02/2009 of the Aggression against Gaza: We Appreciate the Great Legendary Steadfastness of the Palestinian People; The Strength Lies in the Unity and the Legitimacy of the People and for them the Dialogue is the Abode

The Secretary General of the 03/2011 National Islamic Conference, the Master Munir Shafiq: The Egyptian Revolution Ended the Siege of Gaza and Opened the Way for Strategic Changes; We Are Now in the Age of the Revolutions, the Resistances, and the Victories

Naḥnu al-ʾᾹna fī ʿAṣr al-Tawrāt w-alMuqāwamāt w-al-Intiṣārāt 16 Journal (Hamas) published interview

Filasṭīn ʿUḍw alalMaktab Muslima al-Siyāsī liḤarakat “Ḥamās” ʿAzzat al-Rashq: La Budda min Istratījiyya Waṭaniyya Badīlan ʿan Istratījiyya al-Mufāwaḍāt al-Fāshila al-Mawqif alMiṣrī min alQaḍiyya al-Filasṭīniyya w-alMuṣālaḥa Taṭawwaru ʾila al-ʾAfḍal 17 Journal Filasṭīn ʿAdam Tarḥīb (Hamas) article alFilasṭīnī bi-l- Muslima Khuṭwa – al-Faṣāʾil: Dawla Ghayr ʿUḍw fī al-ʾUmm al-Mutaḥida Laysat Dhāt ʾAhammiyya 18 Journal Filasṭīn ʾAbraza

Member of the Political Bureau of 05/2011 the Movement “Hamas” Izzat alRishaq: We Need an Alternative National Strategy to the Strategy of Failed Negotiations during the Egyptian Time on the Palestinian Cause and the Reconciliation Develops in the Best Way

Palestinians Do Not Welcome the Step – The Factions: The NonMembership of the State in the United Nations Is Not Important

11/2012

Highlights of Stations of the

11/2012

(Hamas) article alMaḥaṭṭāt Muslima al-Dawla alFilasṭīniyya: Min “Taḥrīr Kāmil” thumma “Dawla” ʾilā Dawla Hazīla ʿalā 22% min al-ʾArḍ 19 Journal Filasṭīn Abū Māzin fī (Hamas) article alNiyūyūrk: Muslima Tarājuʿ fī Fikrat ʾIʿlān al-Dawla wa-Tawajjuh li-l- ʿAwada li-l- Mufāwaḍāt 20 Journal alʿAqiba ʾIghlāq (Hamas) article Risāla Makātib alḤaraka fī Dimashq – Ḥamās waSūriya … Ḥalaf alʾAms Tanhīh alQaṭīʿa al-Kāmila 21 Journal Filasṭīn Ḥamās wa-l(Hamas) article alJamaʿ Muslima bayna al-Muqāwama wa-l-Sulṭa: ʾInjāzāt Jayyida Raghma al-Ẓurūf alṢaʿba 22 Journal Filasṭīn Ḥamās wa-

Palestinian State: From “Complete Liberation” to “State” to a Narrow State on 22% of the Territory

Abu Mazen in New York: Abandonment of the Idea of the Proclamation of the State and Orientation towards Returning to Negotiations

11/2012

Following the Closure of the Movement’s Offices in Damascus: Hamas and Syria – Allies of Yesterday Complete Full Rupture

11/08/2012

Hamas and the Combination of Resistance and Governance: Good Achievements Despite Difficult Circumstances

12/2012

Hamas and the Axis of the

12/2012

(Hamas) article alMiḥwar Muslima al-Muqāwama fī al-Minṭaqa: Niqāṭ al-Iltiqāʾ wal- ʾIshkālāt fī Ẓill al-Taṭawwurāt al-Maḥalliyya w-alʾIqlīmiyya

Resistance in the Region: Selected Points and Shenanigans in the Light of Local and Regional Developments

Index Page numbers in bold denote tables, those in italic denote figures. Abduh, Muhammad 20–2, 24, 27, 36, 37n4, 147 Abdul Wahab, Muhammad Ibn 20 Abdullah II, King 3, 10n3, 17 Abu Obeh 174 Acharya, Amitav 5, 19 Al Risala (newspaper) 131, 139n27 Albrecht, Holger 1, 16, 85n15, 184–6 Ali, Ben 172, 175, 179, 202 Amal movement (1982) 51 Aoun, Michel 59–61, 78, 84n11, 85n14, 162 al-Aqsa brigades 96 Arab League 79 Arab Nationalism 136n3 Arab Spring 10n2, 129 Arab Upheavals 1–2, 17, 128, 130, 133, 172, 174 Arab–Israeli conflict 205; 1948 war 94, 136n4; 1967 war 95, 136n4 Arafat, Yassir 96, 136n6, 138n18 al-Assad, Bashar 56, 75–8, 82, 87n27, 130, 161 axis of resistance 121, 138n23 al-Azhar (Islamic institution) 184–5, 192n17 Baabda-Declaration (2012) 76–7 balance of powers 100, 186 al-Banna, Hasan 22–4, 27, 95, 98, 103, 106, 181 Barnett, Michael 31; and Duvall, Raymond 8, 35–6, 58, 62, 149, 160, 162, 188 bin Laden, Usama 20 blasphemy, criminalization of 177, 178–9, 187 Bourguiba, President 175 Bull, Hedley 33–4; on establishment of future state 34; social order, definition of 8, 33, 58, 73, 150, 153, 154 Cairo Agreement (2011) 127 Camp David 137n8 Cedar Revolution (2005) 7, 11n12, 78 Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 175 citizenship, principle of 110, 175 civil disobedience 113, 120 civil society organizations 179 core norm of resistance (Hamas) 101–2, 148–50, 154, 158–60; institutionalization of 159–60; polarity between governance and 159–60; withering away over time 158–9 core norm of resistance (Lebanese Hezbollah) 50–3, 148–50, 199; consolidating of 156–7; dual quality of 155–8; by reconstructing its meaning 157–8; through participation in government 155–6; veto power 66, 68, 69–72, 81, 156–7, 161–2, 186 corruption, fight against 110 Critical Constructivism 3, 5–6, 18–19, 36, 171, 198, 203; background knowledge and interaction 31–2; core norm of resistance 29–31; IR theory 28; understanding of norms 28–9 Daase, Christoph 8, 29–30, 154–5; and Deitelhoff, Nicole 3–4, 5, 8, 10n4, 29, 30, 37, 53, 149, 203

Dahl, Robert A. 35 Der Spiegel (German magazine) 67 Doha Accord (2008) 71–2, 81, 156, 157, 161 Egypt: balance of powers 186; Constituent Assembly 174; Constitutional Declaration 183; constitution-making process 174, 183–7; governmental norms in 185–7; Islam as the religion of the state 184; January 25 revolution 183; Kifaya-movement 191n8; Muslim Brotherhood see Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt); presidential power 185; role of religion and religious institutions in 184–5; Salafist al-Nour party 182; separation of powers 185; special rights to the military 188; state-military relations 187; veto-power 186 Ennahda (Tunisia) 171, 202; blasphemy, criminalization of 187; constitution-making process 176–81, 188; core norms to secure position of power 189–90; cultural and educational affairs 175; difference with other Islamist organizations 172; electoral success of 174–6; freedom of speech 178–9; historical background of 174–6; Islamic Tendency Movement 174; Islamist ideology of 174–6; post-revolutionary 176–81; in power through constitutional norms 174–81, 187–9; religious legal norms 177–8; as role model for democratization in MENA region 172; shari’a, role of 177; Troika-coalition 177, 188 Executive Support Force (ESF) 111–12, 116–18, 133, 153, 159, 163, 167 Fadlallah, Muhammad Hussein 55, 57, 66 faqih (leading legal scholar) 25–6, 148 Fatah 107, 111, 117, 153, 159, 201; Arafat, Yassir 96, 136n6; clashes with Hamas 115, 132; struggles over political power 125–8 Fayyad, Salam 115 Filastin al-Muslima (journal) 6, 103, 116, 118, 120, 133, 139n27 Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) 59–62, 78, 80, 84n11, 189 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 129 Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) 17, 182 freedom of speech 177, 178–9, 181 Gaza Strip 103, 111; economic sector 117–18; Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Egypt 129; governance versus resistance 118–21; Hamas’ authoritarian trends in 163–4; Hamas’ political order in 154; health and the education sector 117; Islamization trends in 124–5, 159; Israel’s withdrawal from 7, 103; judicial sector 117; Ministry of Interior 124; political order under Hamas 115–28; relations between Hamas and Fatah in 125; role of Islam in 165; security of 163; security sector and institutionalized resistance 116–17; social service institutions 117; special case of 122–3; takeover by Hamas 114–15, 167; technical and strategic resistance 118–20; tunnel-economy 118, 129; wars between Israel and Hamas 120–1 Geertz, Clifford 32 Ghannouchi, Rachid 174–7, 181 Giddens, Anthony 29; Theory of Structuration 29 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 79 Guzzini, Stefano 35–6 hadith 20, 21–2, 27, 37n2, 99, 123, 184 Hamas 2–3, 7; authoritarian trends in Gaza 163–4; cease-fire offers 138n16; changing regional relationships 130–3; Charter (1988) 97–8, 101–2, 137n13; clashes with Fatah 115, 132; closeness to Iran 96; commitment to Sunni political Islam 99; compulsory power, mechanism of 163–4; in context of the Palestinian territories 94–7; core norm of resistance 101–2, 148–50, 154, 158–60; decision to enter politics 103–4; decision to participate in elections 105–6; dual security structure, emergence of 111–12; early conceptions of order 102–3; electoral platform change and reform 106–7; emergence in the Palestinian Territories 9; on ending Gaza’s political and economic isolation 128–30; foundation of 95; Gaza takeover 114–15, 201; government program 109–11; institutional power, mechanism of 164; intellectual background of 94–103; Islamist political thought 98–9, 147–8; Izz al-din al-Qassam Brigades (IQB) 100, 104, 111, 163–4; leadership structure of 97–8; liberation of Palestine 102; national unity government program 107–9; new visions of a Palestinian political order 103–15; organizational structure of 99–100, 147–8; Oslo Accords 96, 106; participation in Palestinian legislative elections 7; pluralist government programs 106–7; Political Bureau 4, 87n27, 98, 100–3, 112, 126–7, 131, 164; political order, conceptions of 106–7, 133–4, 152–4, 201; political order in Gaza under 115–28, 159; power preservation through political order 135; productive power, mechanism of 165; relation with Iran 96, 131; relation with Lebanese Hezbollah 131; relation with Syria 131; resistance movement against Israel 4, 96, 102; roots and evolution of 94–7; security sector and institutionalized resistance 153–4; security through resistance 134; shari’a law, implementation of 109; Shura Council 99, 148; state building and pluralism 133–4, 152–3; structural background of 97–8; structural power, mechanism of 164–5; struggle over Palestinian political power 130–3; suicide attacks to fight against Israel 96, 149; Sunni Islamist political thought 97–8; towards national conciliation 112–14; trends towards authoritarianism 111–12; two-state solution to resolve Israeli conflict 109–10; vague

vision of an Islamic state 102–3; visions of an Islamist political order 150; withdrawal from Syria 132; see also Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood Hamdan, Osama 4 Hammad, Fathi 124 Haniyeh, Ismael 107–8, 109–10, 114, 121, 125, 138n20, 214 al-Hariri, Rafiq 7, 11n11, 56, 58 Hezbollah 2–3; Amal movement (1982) 51; belief in Islam 47; on challenging the Lebanese government’s legitimacy 62–4; coconstitution of interests with FPM 162; commitment to the Lebanese political order 150–2; compulsory power 160–1; confrontation with Israel 4, 46, 50, 199–200; consolidating resistance 81; core norm of resistance 50–3, 148–50, 155–8, 199; criticism of UN-Resolution 1559 56–7, 60; decision-making 49; declaration of war against the resistance 200; defending resistance through reconstructing 82; disarmament of 71; Doha Accord (2008) 71–2, 81; in domestic contestation processes 64–74; electoral campaign 57; element of deterrence 149; emergence of 45–7; entering government to protect the resistance 57–8; fight against Takfiri threat 75–8; Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) 59–62, 78, 80, 155; funding of 49; Hariri assassination 65, 67; help from Revolutionary Guards of Iran 51; institutional power, mechanism of 161–2; intellectual and structural background 45–50; Islamic Resistance in Lebanon 46, 50, 200; Islamist political thought 147–8; jihad, concept of 4, 47–8; July 2006 war with Israel 62–4, 81, 161; Lebanese political system and 45–7; from liberation to deterrence 50–3; al-Manar TV 64, 67; March 8 alliance 56, 59; March 14 alliance 56–7, 62, 72, 161, 200; Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 59–62, 80, 151, 155; military engagement in Syria 75–8; in national politics of Lebanon 56–64; objectives of 47–8; Open Letter of 1985 51, 54, 72; organizational structure of 48–50, 147–8; origins of 45; participation in parliamentary elections 54; political interactions in Lebanon 9; Political Manifesto 72–4, 81, 151–2, 156; political order, conceptions of 54–6, 64, 80–2, 150–2; position through resistance and power 45–7, 160–3; power preservation through resistance 83; productive power, mechanism of 162–3; protecting resistance ranks first 80–1; relation with Hamas 131; resistance and deterrence 52–3; resistance and liberation 51–2; resistance through national interaction 59–62; seven-point-plan 63; Shiite Islamism 24; Shura Council 49–50, 148; Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and 64–72; structural power of 162; in Syrian civil war 78–80; takfiri threat, fight against 157, 162; telecommunication network 72; three pillars of 47–8; unified leadership structures 45–7; veto power in Lebanese political system 69–72, 157, 161–2; vision of an Islamic state 54–6; visions of an Islamist political order 150; war in Syria 132, 200; weapons of the resistance 60; wilayat al-faqih, ideology of 48–9 Hroub, Khaled 100, 103, 106, 108, 109 hudna, concept of 102, 125, 137n15, 149 Hussein, Saddam 17 ijtihad, notion of 25–6, 27, 36, 38n5, 99, 123, 147 International Relations theory (IR) 2–5, 7–8, 18–19, 28, 29, 31, 35, 171, 198, 203 Intifada 94–7, 100, 102–3, 136n1, 148 al-Intiqad (journal) 6, 71, 76 Iran: Islamic Revolution (1979) 1, 24–6; Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah 25; Revolutionary Guards 51; Shiite Islamism in 24–6; support to Hamas 96, 131; support to Shiite Resistance in Lebanon 51 Iraq: Iraq war (2003) 3, 204; Shiite empowerment in 17 Islamic economic system 122 Islamic Jihad 95, 96, 136n5 Islamic radicalism and fundamentalism 20 Islamic Reformism 20–2, 24, 36 Islamic Resistance Movement 4, 95–6, 98, 101, 120 Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) 1, 24–6 Islamic State (IS) 204 Islamic Tendency Movement 174 Islamism: Abduhl Wahab, Islamist doctrine of 20; definition of 8, 26–7, 147; Islamic reformism and its implications on 20–2; in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 7; political ideology of 7, 20–7, 150, 171, 173, 189; radicalization of 22–4; reformism, notion of 20–2; revivalism, notion of 20; rise of Sunni Islamism 22–4 isolation, politics of 121 Israel: conflict with Arabs see Arab–Israeli conflict; conflict with Hamas 96; conflict with Hezbollah 4, 46, 50, 199–200; conflict with Palestine 97, 129, 205; declaration of independence 136n4; invasion in Lebanon 50, 53; July 2006 war with Hezbollah 62–4, 161; occupation of West Bank and Gaza 95; Palestinian conflict 97; suicide attacks against 96, 149; withdrawal from Gaza strip 97, 103–4; withdrawal from Lebanon 52, 149 Izz al-din al-Qassam Brigades (IQB) 100, 104, 111, 117, 121, 125, 132, 153, 163–4

jahiliyya, concept of 23–4 Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre (JMCC) 121 jihad, concept of 4, 47–8, 101 July 2006 war (Hezbollah–Israel) 62–4, 71, 81 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah 54, 147; ijtihad, notion of 25; political thought 25, 48; wilayat-al-faqih, model of 25–6, 47 al-Khoury, Bishara 45 Kifaya-movement 191n8 Lahoud, Émile 61, 86n19 Lebanon: Baabda-Declaration (2012) 76; Christian community in 54; civil war (1975–1989) 11n10, 45, 50, 51, 54, 148; Doha Accord (2008) 71–2, 81, 156–7, 161; Hezbollah see Hezbollah; Islamist political order in 199; Israeli occupation of 50, 53; liberation of 72; National Pact of 1943 45; political division of 56–7; political goals for 155; political system and emergence of Hezbollah 45–7; relations with Syria and the Palestinians 59; reorganization of power politics in 56–8; seven-point-plan 63; Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) 64–72; Syrian withdrawal from 7, 11n10, 56–7; Ta’if Accord (1989) 46, 51, 54, 63 March 8 alliance 56, 59, 65, 78, 84n11 March 14 alliance 56–7, 61, 62, 65, 67, 72, 74, 78–80 marja al-taqlid 26, 38n11, 148 Marzouq, Musa Abu 112, 113, 115 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 59–62, 151, 155 Meshal, Khaled 4, 98–9, 102, 105, 119, 120, 127, 128–31, 214 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 1–2, 129, 171, 198, 205; conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in 18; Hezbollah’s political interactions in 9; Islamism and Islamist political actors in 7; origins and aims of Islamist organizations in 17; process of democratization in 172 Morsi, Muhammad 1, 7, 17, 164–5, 172–4, 181–3, 185–6, 188–90, 191n11, 192n14, 201, 202; rise to power 128–33 Mubarak, Hosni 128, 131, 133, 138n26, 182, 191n9 muqawama 3, 107 Murat, Rafaat 127 Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt) 1, 6–7, 17, 24, 94, 98, 128, 171, 173, 202; al-Banna, Hasan 22–4, 27, 95, 103, 106, 181; and constitution-making 183–7; core norms to secure position of power 189–90; different branches within 182; electoral success of 181–3; establishment of 23; Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) 17, 182, 189; historical background of 181–3; Islamist ideology of 181–3; military resistance against Israel 95; organizational capacities 182; Palestinian branch of 94; parliamentary elections, participation in 182; perceptions in Western countries 172; political order, concept of 185; in power through constitutional norms 187–9; Qutb, Sayyid 23, 24; religious legal norms 184–5; rise to power in Egypt 130, 132, 165; Salafi factions 185, 188–9; Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) 182 mustaqbal movement 72, 79 Nasrallah, Hassan 48, 49–55, 60–71, 72, 73–7, 82, 84n2, 86n20, 86n23, 156, 157, 161, 162, 200, 207, 210–12 Nizal, Muhammad 126 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 124 Oslo Accords 96, 106, 132, 136n7 Ounissi, Sayida 175 Palestine: Arafat, Yassir 96, 136n6, 138n18; conflict with Israel 97, 129, 205; establishment of Islamic state in 102; Executive Support Force (ESF) 111, 117; Fatah 107, 111, 117, 153, 159, 201; Hamas see Hamas; Intifada 94–7, 100, 102–3, 136n1, 148; liberation of 102; National Conciliation Document (June 2006) 112; national unity government program 107–9; Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) 117; Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) 111; Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) 97, 108, 167; Palestinian National Authority (PNA) 7, 104, 105, 112–13; political structure of 149; Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 111; Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) 111; publishing leaflets, phenomenon of 97, 129; struggles over political power in 125–8; two-state solution, concept of 109–10 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 96, 104 Palestinian Authority (PA) 7, 96, 117 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey (PSR) 121 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) 97, 167 Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood 94–5; founding of 94; participation in Arab–Israeli war 94; religious education and welfare

services 95 political order, concept of 32–4 popular resistance, doctrine of 113, 119 power, concept of 35–6 power-sharing, principle of 174–81 Prophet Muhammad 21, 23, 37n3, 47, 204 publishing leaflets, phenomenon of 136n2 al-Qaeda 122, 124 Qassem, Naim 4, 10n6, 46–9, 50, 52, 54–5, 56–8, 60–1, 63, 66, 69–74, 75, 84n2, 155–6, 162, 212 Quran 20–1, 23, 27, 47, 50, 98, 109, 123, 147; hadith 21–2; Quranic revelation 21 Qutb, Sayyid 23–4; execution of 24; religious-political thought 24 al-Rantisi, Abdel Aziz 96–7, 105 revivalism, notion of 20 Rishaq, Izzat 127 al-Sadat, Anwar 24 salafiyya movement 20, 37n3 Shafiq, Munir Shafiq 133 Shari’a (Islamic law) 21, 23–4, 106, 109, 174, 176–7, 184; implementation of 178; role in constitution-making process 177–8 Sharon, Ariel 97, 137n8 Shiite crescent 3, 10n3 Shiite Islamism 3, 24–6, 46, 48, 147, 148; conflict with Sunni Islam 18, 204; Islamic revolution in Iran 24–6; rise of 24 Shura Council 49–50, 99, 100, 148, 177 shura, principle of 110, 180 Siniora, Fouad 58, 62–3, 66, 69 Social Movement Theory (SMT) 18 social order, definition of 33–4, 122 social security system 122 el-Sohl, Riad 45 Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) 64–72, 81, 156; decision-making process 65; establishment of 65–6; May 2008 crisis 69–72; paralysis of the government 65–6; ratification of 66; suspicion of Hezbollah on 67–9 Sufism 20 suicide attacks 96, 100, 149 Suleiman, Michel 71, 78 sunna 20, 27, 47, 123 Sunni Islamic jurisprudence 184 Sunni Islamism 3; conflict with Shiites 18, 204; mustaqbal movement 79; rise of 20–2; shift to radicalization 20–2; Sunni political Islam 20 Sunni–Shiite relations 18, 204; political implications of 205 Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) 182 Syria: Baabda-Declaration (2012) 76–7; civil war 78–80, 87n27, 200; Hezbollah’s military engagement in 75–8, 200; Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) 69; Syrian-Iranian-alliance 61 Ta’if Accord (1989) 46, 51, 54, 63 takfiri threat 75–8, 157, 162, 168 terrorist attacks: 9/11 attack 1, 16, 75 Tobacco Protest (1891) 25, 38n9 Tunisia: blasphemy, criminalization of 177, 178–9; Congrès pour la République (CPR) 176; constitution-making process 176–81; Ennahda see Ennahda (Tunisia); Ettakatol 176; freedom of speech 178–9; gender norms in 179–80; governmental norms in 180–1; Instance Supérieure Indépendence pour les Elections (ISIE) 176; Islamic law in 178; National Constituent Assembly (NCA) 176; Personal Status Code 179; religious legal norms 180; Troika government 176–8, 180 tunnel-economy 118, 129 two-state solution, concept of 96, 109–10, 113

ulama (Islamic religious scholars) 25, 38n9, 204 United Nations (UN): National Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 63; Resolution 1559 53, 56–7, 60, 74; Resolution 1701 63, 64; Security Council 53, 66 waqf 101, 103, 119 Weber, Max 35, 59 West Bank 49, 94–6, 99, 103, 105, 111, 115, 117, 123, 125–8, 154 Western imperialism 20, 22 Wiener, Antje 4–8, 29–31, 36, 53, 148–9, 158 wilayat-al-faqih (guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) 25–6, 48, 147, 150 world society, concept of 33 World War II 23 Yassin, Sheikh Ahmad 95–7, 100, 105 al-Zahar, Mahmud 116 Zahri, Sami Abu 116