Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics 9781501747731

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Reputation for Resolve

a volume in the series

Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt A list of titles in this series is available at cornellpress​.­cornell​.­edu.

Reputation for Resolve How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics

Dan i e l l e   L. L u pto n

Cornell University Press Ithaca and London

Cornell University Press gratefully acknowledges receipt of a grant from the Colgate University Faculty Research Council, which aided in bringing this book to publication. Copyright © 2020 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress​.­cornell​.e­ du. First published 2020 by Cornell University Press Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data Names: Lupton, Danielle L., 1987– author. Title: Reputation for resolve : how leaders signal determination in   international politics / Danielle L. Lupton. Description: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2020. | Series: Cornell   studies in security affairs | Includes bibliographical references and  index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019020875 (print) | LCCN 2019981418 (ebook) |   ISBN 9781501747717 (cloth) | ISBN 9781501747731 (pdf) |   ISBN 9781501747724 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: World politics—1955-1965. | Political leadership. |   Reputation—Political aspects. | Determination (Personality trait)   —Political aspects. Classification: LCC D843 .L855 2020 (print) | LCC D843 (ebook) |   DDC 327.1—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019020875 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019981418 Jacket photographs: Eisenhower photograph by Marion S. Trikosko. Dwight D. Eisenhower during a news conference at the White House, Washington, DC, October 9, 1957. https://www.loc.gov/ item/2012646646/. Kennedy photograph from NASA. John F. Kennedy delivers a message to a joint session of the US Congress, May 25, 1961. Khrushchev photograph by Warren K. Leffler. Nikita Khrushchev at a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, NY, September 22, 1960. LC-USZ62-134149.

To Cosmin, Ann, Chris, and Bear

Contents

List of Illustrations

ix

Acknowl­edgments

xi

Introduction: Why Leaders and Their Reputations for Resolve M ­ atter

1

1. How Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve

17

2. How Leader-­Specific Reputations Form and Change across

Repeated Interactions

47

3. How Contextual F ­ actors Influence Leader-­Specific

Reputations

70

4. A Reputation for Resolute Action: Eisenhower and Berlin

89

5. A Reputation for Irresolute Action: Kennedy, Berlin,

and Cuba

115

Conclusion: Lessons in Leader-­Specific Reputations for Resolve

141

Appendix A: Methods

163

Appendix B: Results

181

Notes 199 Bibliography 231 Index 245

vii

Illustrations

2.1. ​Single leader survey experiment design

50

2.2. ​The effect of contextual information treatments on perceptions of resolve

60

2.3. ​The effect of leader information and contextual information treatments on perceptions of resolve

61

2.4. ​The interaction of leader statements and be­hav­ior

65

2.5. ​Additional influences on perceptions of resolve

68

3.1. ​Leader turnover survey experiment design

72

3.2. ​The effect of treatments on perceptions of resolve

78

ix

Acknowl­edgments

This book would not be pos­si­ble without the support and guidance of many p ­ eople. I owe a large debt of gratitude to Joseph Grieco and Tim Büthe for their extensive and repeated feedback on vari­ous drafts of this work, as well as for their continued guidance throughout this pro­cess. Thank you also to Alexander Downes, Christopher Gelpi, Bruce Jentleson, and Peter Feaver for their many years of support. Over the years, many other p ­ eople provided invaluable feedback on portions of this book. Thank you to Bill Boettcher for his extensive comments on early drafts of the experiments presented in chapters 2 and 3. Amanda Murdie, James Scott, Thomas Preston, Wesley Renfro, and Steven Redd each gave me incredibly helpful feedback and notes on what would eventually become chapter 2. Thank you also to Keren Yarhi-­Milo for reading an early draft of the manuscript and providing her comments, particularly on the theoretical contribution of the work. At Colgate, I am fortunate to be surrounded by wonderful colleagues. Thank you to Noah Dauber, Ed Fogarty, Dominika Koter, Navine Murshid, Illan Nam, and other members of the Ju­nior Faculty Research Colloquium for their comments on the introduction and chapter 1. I also owe a g ­ reat deal of thanks to Valerie Morkevičius for reading and providing extensive notes on a full draft of the manuscript before its submission. Thank you to my se­nior colleagues at Colgate, including Tim Byrnes, Fred Chernoff, and Nina Moore, for their support and guidance throughout this pro­cess. Thank you also to Cynthia Terrier for her assistance in many ways. Many other colleagues outside of my institution helped me with the writing of this book, ­whether by letting me bounce ideas off them or by providing support. This includes Jonathan Brown, Marina Henke, Jonathan Markowitz, and Eleonora Mattiaci, among

xi

Acknowl­e dgments

­ thers. My apologies to ­those whom I forgot to mention ­here. Thank you o also to the archival staff at the Eisenhower Presidential Library for their help in locating and retrieving key documents central to the argument in chapter 4. Portions of chapter 2 w ­ ere published as “Signaling Resolve: Leaders, Reputations, and the Importance of Early Interactions,” International Interactions 44, no. 1 (2018): 59–87, www​.­tandfonline​.­com. I want to thank the series editors and reviewers for their extensive and constructive feedback. This book would not be what it is ­today without their fantastic comments, which greatly improved the manuscript. Thank you also to Roger Haydon for his detailed comments on vari­ous portions of this book and for his assistance throughout the pro­cess. This book would also not be pos­si­ble without the financial support of several institutions. Thank you to the Duke University Gradu­ate School, Duke University’s Social Science Research Institute, the Duke Program for the Study of Democracy, Institutions, and Po­liti­cal Economy, and the Robert K. Steel Fellowship Endowment at Duke University for funding to conduct the experiments presented in this book. Thank you also to Colgate University and Colgate’s Faculty Research Council for funding to support additional experimental surveys that served as critical robustness checks and for financial support to defray the costs of archival research. Thank you as well to the Eisenhower Foundation for its generous financial support to conduct research at the Eisenhower Presidential Library. Fi­nally, I would like to thank my ­family—to whom I dedicate this book. To my parents, Ann and Chris, thank you for always believing in me and for encouraging me to pursue my intellectual curiosity. Thank you also for all the sacrifices you have made for me. To my husband, Cosmin, thank you for your unwavering and total support. This is for you.

xii

Reputation for Resolve

Introduction Why Leaders and Their Reputations for Resolve M ­ atter

In 1964, U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson justified the United States’ continued military involvement in Vietnam in reputational terms. Johnson feared that removing U.S. troops from the conflict would make him appear weak on national security and would injure his personal reputation for resolve, confiding to Senator Richard Russell: “If I lose it [Vietnam], I think that ­they’ll say I’ve lost. I’ve pulled in.”1 Johnson and his advisers further worried that “any lack of firmness” on Amer­i­ca’s commitment to the war would undermine Johnson’s presidential campaign and signal weakness to the North Viet­nam­ese and Chinese.2 Indeed, U.S. decision makers during Vietnam so fervently believed in the reputational consequences of their actions that they continued to pour resources into the war, despite the mounting costs. As the conditions on the ground worsened, they believed it was even more impor­tant to signal their determination and to remain committed to their course of action. Thus, concern over reputation for resolve led U.S. policymakers to engage in an increasingly unpop­u­lar war and to continue to devote resources to a conflict they would ultimately lose. The Vietnam War is not the only instance in which U.S. decision makers have acted to establish or preserve their reputations for resolve. In 1973, Richard Nixon viewed Amer­i­ca’s airlift during the Yom Kippur War as a direct signal of his personal resolve in support of Israel.3 In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan believed sending military aid to the Mujahideen in Af­ghan­i­stan would bolster his and Amer­i­ca’s reputation for resolve, as it would “show firmness” and “demonstrate our commitment” to supporting t­ hose who opposed the Soviets.4 Thirty years l­ ater, Barack Obama framed his “red line” against Syrian president Bashar al-­Assad’s use of chemical weapons in reputational terms. In 2017, Donald Trump indicated he was investing in his personal reputation for resolve by “sending a message” to rogue states through his use of military strikes in Syria and Af­ghan­i­stan, as well as in his harsh rhe­ toric ­toward North ­Korea.5 1

INTRODUCTION

Even more so, U.S. decision makers are not alone in their belief that their reputations for resolve critically affect their ability to conduct foreign policy and achieve favorable outcomes abroad. In 1960, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru rejected China’s offer of compromise over the Aksai Chin in an effort to invest in his own reputation for firmness.6 In the 1980s, Soviet leaders ­were reluctant to end their military campaign in Af­ghan­i­stan, as they feared that pulling out of the conflict would injure their personal reputations for resolve as well as that of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), echoing the logic of U.S. decision makers during Vietnam.7 ­After the fall of the Soviet Union, Rus­sian president Boris Yeltsin invested in his reputation for resolve by standing firm in direct negotiations with the United States, hoping his personal reputation could offset Rus­sia’s recent loss of bargaining power.8 French president Jacques Chirac also directly put his personal reputation for resolve on the line in response to provocation against French peacekeepers in the Ivory Coast.9 Thus, U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s famous warning against underestimating or dismissing the value of reputation for resolve continues to resonate with leaders t­ oday.10 Yet, while policymakers believe their reputations for resolve ­matter, scholars of international politics intensely debate the extent to which reputations for resolve influence the conduct of international conflict and w ­ hether ­those reputations even exist to begin with. As a result, we still do not know how reputations for resolve form and what role past actions play in assessments of resolve; nor do we fully understand the extent to which such reputations meaningfully influence international politics. This book tackles both of ­these issues. In d ­ oing so, this book shows how leaders establish reputations for resolve through their statements and be­hav­ior, how ­these reputations are conditioned by the context in which leaders interact, and how t­hese leader-­ specific reputations for resolve influence the conduct of international negotiations and crises.

Defining Reputation for Resolve: Why Leaders Care about Their Reputations Leaders worry about their reputations for resolve ­because they believe certain reputations, such as a reputation for irresolute action, ­will make them and their states more vulnerable to international threats; but other reputations, such as a reputation for resolute action, w ­ ill make them and their states more secure.11 Broadly speaking, reputations “are the subjective beliefs that actors use to predict the f­ uture be­hav­ior of ­others,”12 and they are rooted in the interpretation of an actor’s past be­hav­ior. Reputations, therefore, are perceptional rather than objective, and actors do not have direct control over their reputations. While reputations are perceptions actors hold about each other, resolve is about an actor’s determination, “firmness, or steadfastness of purpose.”13

2

Why Leaders and Their Reputations for Resolve ­Matter

Resolute actors are ­those that are willing to incur costs in the pursuit of their goals. Within international security and foreign policy, ­these costs are most commonly—­though not always—­defined in terms of war fighting. Resolute actors are often characterized as t­ hose that are willing to “risk war to achieve [their] objectives.”14 More specifically, scholars have argued that resolute actors are ­those that are willing to “initiate military action,” to “persevere in war despite mounting costs,” or to “inflict vio­lence” against another.15 In contrast, irresolute actors are ­those that are believed to be unwilling to accept ­these costs or to stand up to threats.16 Resolve, however, is not synonymous with obstinacy or militancy. Reputations for resolve are not purely based on an actor’s risk propensity, as demonstrating resolve should help states avoid war and propose settlements that the more resolute party finds acceptable. Yet, while we typically talk about resolve in dichotomous terms— an actor is e­ ither resolute or irresolute—­actors can have varying levels of resolve and dif­fer­ent intensities of reputation. Reputation for resolve, therefore, is the belief ­others hold about an actor’s willingness to stand firm and face costs, based on that actor’s past be­hav­ior.17 And one can be more precise by clarifying ­whether an actor holds a reputation for resolute action or irresolute action and to what extent. A reputation for resolute action is the belief that an actor that stood firm and determined to a course of action in the past ­will continue to do so in the ­future, especially in a similar situation.18 According to deterrence theorists, actors that repeatedly follow through on their threats and promises and that stand up to international threats are perceived as more likely to maintain their commitments in the f­ uture and are viewed as more resolute and credible in their threats and promises.19 Theoretically, reputations for resolute action should make states less vulnerable to international threats and less attractive targets of aggression. If given the choice, a challenger (or aggressor) should prefer not to initiate a dispute with a target that was resolute in the past, as picking on a target with a reputation for resolute action can be risky for the challenger. Conversely, actors that repeatedly back down from international challenges or that fail to follow through on their threats ­will find it more difficult to convince ­others that their commitments are meaningful, and they ­will acquire reputations for lacking resolve. Accordingly, an actor’s past be­hav­ior is indicative of its willingness to fight to protect its interests, maintain its commitments, and achieve its goals. An actor’s reputation for resolve helps o ­ thers predict how that actor w ­ ill behave in the f­ uture, as an actor’s past be­hav­ior reveals how characteristically resolute or irresolute that actor is.20 Reputations for resolve, therefore, can help explain when international crises and disputes start, which actors are most likely to face international threats, and who ­will win international conflicts. Reputations for resolute action are so highly valued in princi­ple that Thomas Schelling, the renowned deterrence theorist, famously asserted

3

INTRODUCTION

that reputation for resolve is “one of the few t­hings worth fighting for.”21 And leaders continue to believe their reputations for resolve are influential to world politics.

The Puzzle: How Much Do Reputations R­ eally M ­ atter in International Politics? Yet, despite this logic about the value of reputation for resolve and the clear importance leaders place on establishing and maintaining reputations for resolute action, the effect of t­ hese reputations is hotly and deeply debated. For de­cades, scholars have examined the question of how much reputations ­matter in international politics, but ­there has been no resolution to this question. Instead, the debate between reputation supporters and reputation skeptics is currently at a stalemate, leaving policymakers with ­little understanding of how to establish reputations for resolute action or the extent to which their reputations for resolve actually influence international politics. On one side of this debate lie reputation supporters, who argue that reputations for resolve meaningfully impact the conduct of international security and pre­sent strong support for the under­lying logic of reputation for resolve. In par­tic­u­lar, supporters find that states that back down from international threats establish reputations for lacking resolve and are more vulnerable to international threats in the f­uture, especially when repeated ­future interactions between a target and a challenger are likely.22 Before the Falklands War, for example, Britain demonstrated its unwillingness to use force to defend its colonial interests, leading Britain to “establish a reputation for irresolute action, at least over colonial issues.”23 This then spurred the Argentinian Junta’s actions in the Falklands, as they believed Britain would again back down. Similarly, on the eve of World War II, Hitler took Britain’s actions at Munich as a signal that Britain, and its allies, would be unwilling to intervene in Western Eu­rope. Just before invading Poland, Hitler reportedly told his generals, “Our enemies are l­ittle worms. I saw them at Munich,” suggesting a direct connection between past be­hav­ior and a reputation for irresolute action.24 Supporters also find that states that demonstrate resolve by standing up to challenges are less vulnerable to international threats in the f­uture and can issue more credible threats of their own.25 Elli Lieberman, for example, argues that Israel established a reputation for resolute action during the Suez Crisis that successfully deterred Egypt from further provocation for over a de­cade.26 States also willingly invest in their reputations for resolve, as they are less willing to capitulate to coercive threats when they believe they w ­ ill be challenged again in the f­ uture.27 A state that backed down in the past may even be more likely to initiate or escalate conflict in an attempt to recoup its poor reputation.28 Thus, reputation supporters show a strong relationship

4

Why Leaders and Their Reputations for Resolve ­Matter

between a state’s past be­hav­ior and its ­future vulnerability to international threats, confirming the logic of reputation for resolve. On the other side of this debate, however, lies a vocal group of reputation skeptics, who broadly argue that “reputations do not ­matter” in international politics29 and who criticize policymakers for their adherence to “the cult of reputation.”30 ­These skeptics maintain that the costs of conflict are too high for policymakers to rely on a state’s past be­hav­ior when making decisions during international disputes. A state’s past actions, therefore, are not necessarily indicative of how it ­will behave in the ­future ­under a new set of circumstances. As a result, reputations and a state’s past be­hav­ior ­will have ­little effect on crisis bargaining.31 Instead, immediate determinants of conflict that change from crisis to crisis—­such as strategic interest in an issue ­under dispute or relative military capability—­are better predictors of how an actor w ­ ill behave in a given situation.32 By focusing heavi­ly on situational ­factors to explain perceptions of resolve, skeptics argue that reputations, as we traditionally think of them, do not in fact form, as ­these assessments are not characteristic in nature. Some skeptics even claim that reputations for resolve fail to exist in international politics ­because of the presence of anarchy and the necessity of states to assume the worst of each other.33 Two prominent skeptics have most heavi­ly influenced the conversation over the value of reputation for resolve. First, Jonathan Mercer argues the extent to which a state’s actions are attributed to the situation or to some dispositional characteristic (such as a state’s inherent level of resolve) is rooted in the observer’s relationship with that state and ­whether an action is considered desirable for the observer. The desirable actions of adversaries (that is, backing down) and allies (that is, standing firm) are attributed to the circumstances of a par­tic­u­lar situation rather than that state’s characteristic disposition. Allies, therefore, may acquire reputations only for backing down, while adversaries may acquire reputations only for standing firm. Thus, reputations form only ­under certain conditions, and Mercer’s theory “implies that policy-­makers should not think ­there is a direct correspondence between their be­hav­ior and their reputation,” contesting the under­lying logic of reputation for resolve.34 Second, Daryl Press maintains that assessments of resolve and credibility are driven by immediate determinants of conflict that change across crises and disputes, not by a state’s past actions.35 According to Press’s current calculus theory, predictions of a state’s be­hav­ior are rooted in two key immediate determinants of conflict: power and interest. Assessments of resolve and credibility, therefore, are based on w ­ hether a state has the capability to follow through on its threats or promises and ­whether it has the strategic interest in ­doing so. States that threaten to engage in military conflicts they cannot reasonably win or states that appear to have l­ittle strategic interest at stake in a given situation are unlikely to be perceived as resolute and their

5

INTRODUCTION

threats ­will not be credible. Thus, for Press, it is the combination of relative power and communicated strategic interest in a par­tic­u­lar dispute that determines assessments of resolve and credibility, not a state’s past actions. Reputation skeptics take par­tic­u­lar issue with the notion that backing down leads to a reputation for irresolute action and makes states more vulnerable to international threats in the ­future. Instead, they argue that states that back down do not suffer reputational consequences, at least internationally. Ted Hopf, for example, finds that Soviet assessments of U.S. credibility had ­little to do with the United States’ past be­hav­ior in peripheral regions of the world, as U.S. defeats (or victories) in the “Third World” did not substantively influence Soviet predictions of the United States’ f­ uture credibility.36 Similarly, Press finds l­ ittle evidence from World War II or the Cold War that backing down during crises negatively affects perceptions of credibility, and Mercer’s pre–­World War I findings echo a similar result. Accordingly, reputation skeptics maintain that reputations for resolve have l­ ittle influence on international conflict. Skeptics, therefore, continue to argue that reputations do not m ­ atter, while supporters continue to pre­sent evidence that they do. Thus, despite de­cades of research on the issue and the repeated value that leaders place on establishing reputations for resolute action, we still do not know which f­actors are most critical to the formation of reputations for resolve or how much ­these reputations actually ­matter in international politics. Instead, we are left with impor­tant yet unanswered questions regarding whose resolve ­matters, how ­these reputations for resolve form in the first place, and what effect ­these reputations actually have on international security. This is disconcerting not only for scholars who want to understand the formation and influence of ­these reputations but also for policymakers who require strategies to make themselves and their states more secure from international threats. This, then, prompts the question: Are leaders wrong to believe that their reputations for resolve ­matter?

The Argument in Brief Leaders are not foolish to believe that their reputations for resolve are impor­ tant and affect their ability to achieve their foreign policy goals. While reputation supporters are correct to maintain that past actions and reputations critically influence the initiation and conduct of international conflict, the scholarly focus on the reputations of states ignores a crucial f­ actor in understanding the role reputation for resolve plays in international politics: the reputations of individual leaders. By shifting the focus to the individual, I take a new approach to reputation for resolve, presenting a critical revision to reputational theory and challenging current approaches to reputation. In ­doing so, I break the stalemate between reputation supporters and skeptics,

6

Why Leaders and Their Reputations for Resolve ­Matter

as I show that we have been looking in the wrong place to understand the formation and effects of reputation for resolve in international security. In this book, I put forth and answer two critical research questions: (1) To what extent do leaders acquire individual reputations for resolve? (2) How do ­these reputations for resolve form and change across repeated interactions? Answering both of t­ hese questions is essential to identifying the conditions ­under which leaders acquire reputations for resolute or irresolute action, the extent to which they acquire t­ hese reputations, and how t­ hese reputations affect the conduct of foreign policy and international security. By addressing ­these questions, the theory I develop and test focuses on the pro­cesses by which individual leaders establish reputations for resolve from the very beginning of their tenures, illuminating the conditions ­under which dif­fer­ent reputations form and further elucidating the influence of individual leaders on international politics.37 In d ­ oing so, I bridge the gap between how policymakers view the importance of their reputations and how scholars primarily approach reputation for resolve. Due to the effects of leadership transitions and the emergence of new world leaders, what leaders say and do early in their tenures crucially affects ­whether they acquire reputations for resolute or irresolute action and to what extent. This interaction between a leader’s early rhe­toric and subsequent be­hav­ior is critical to the establishment of leader-­specific reputations. Individual leaders, therefore, can acquire their own reputations for resolve that are separate from both the reputations of their pre­de­ces­sors and the reputations of their states. In other words, leader reputations are not equivalent to state reputations, and leaders may vary in their personal levels of resolve and in their ability to effectively communicate their resolve to outside observers. Yet, the context in which leaders interact with each other further influences ­these leader-­specific reputations. ­Here, context refers to the external conditions ­under which two leaders interact, and I focus on four key contextual ­factors identified by reputation skeptics and supporters as potentially salient to perceptions of resolve: the relative military capability of a leader’s state, state strategic interest in an issue ­under dispute, a preexisting state reputation for resolve, and the regime type of a leader’s state. Thus, we need to consider the influence of a leader’s own signals of resolve as well as ­these external ­factors if we want to understand how leaders acquire reputations and how the ability of leaders to convey their resolve may vary ­under dif­ fer­ent conditions. Indeed, leaders from certain states may find it more or less difficult to communicate their resolve and to establish reputations for resolute or irresolute action. In testing this argument, I find that initial statements of resolve create expectations of ­future be­hav­ior, and leaders who fail to live up to expectations of resolute be­hav­ior acquire particularly strong reputations for irresolute action. Initial perceptions of resolve are also highly influential to ­later

7

INTRODUCTION

assessments of resolve, suggesting prudent leaders should work to effectively convey their determination early in their tenures. Yet, a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior are not the only influences on her reputation. Instead, both a preexisting state reputation for resolve and a state’s communicated interest in an issue ­under dispute consistently influence leader reputations. However, ­these two ­factors appear to be less influential to a leader’s reputation than a leader’s own statements and be­hav­ior. Reputation skeptics, therefore, are correct to assert that state strategic interest, a key immediate determinant of conflict, can influence perceptions of resolve. However, ­these perceptions are predominantly rooted in a leader’s own rhe­toric and past actions. Further evidence reveals that t­hese leader-­ specific reputations can influence crisis bargaining and diplomatic be­hav­ ior, as perceptions of a target leader’s resolve help challenger leaders decide which negotiating strategies they believe w ­ ill be most successful in the ­future. In other words, leader-­specific reputations for resolve ­matter during diplomatic interactions and crisis bargaining. Skeptics thus need to reconsider the value of past actions and reputations to international politics. My argument and findings, therefore, reveal how leaders can best communicate their resolve during international interactions, how their ability to effectively convey resolve may vary ­under distinct conditions, and which strategies of communicating resolve are most likely to succeed in dif­fer­ent circumstances. This, in turn, furthers our understanding of when leaders are more attractive targets of international threats based on their rhe­toric, their past actions, and certain contextual f­ actors. Not only are leaders capable of establishing in­de­pen­dent reputations for resolve based on their conflict be­ hav­ior, but their rhe­toric and actions during diplomatic interactions and negotiations before international crises further influence their reputations. Accordingly, my findings expand our understanding of how broader diplomatic interactions between leaders, including at formal summits and conferences as well as across informal extended negotiations, contribute to t­ hese reputational assessments. What leaders say, how they say it, and how they follow up ­these statements with concrete action profoundly and directly affect their reputations for resolve. The rhetorical and behavioral choices made by international leaders ­matter, as ­these choices directly affect how leaders view each other in terms of their resolve and how they react to each other during diplomatic interactions, negotiations, and international crises. Reputations for resolve are indeed an impor­tant ele­ment in international relations. Even more so, how leaders view each other’s resolve—­and their accompanying reputations— is crucial to the conduct of international security and foreign policy.

8

Why Leaders and Their Reputations for Resolve ­Matter

Why Past Actions Still M ­ atter In arguing that a leader’s statements and past actions m ­ atter, I agree with reputation supporters that past actions contribute to reputational inferences and that reputations based on ­these past actions are impor­tant. Yet, given the arguments of reputation skeptics, readers may won­der why past actions should m ­ atter at all. In response, I maintain t­ here are three critical overarching prob­lems with the arguments, assumptions, and evidence proffered by reputation skeptics that necessitate the continued examination of the i­ nfluence of past actions on international security. First, skeptics oversimplify the logic of reputational theory, and reputation for resolve more specifically. They often pit past actions against capabilities, interests, or other situational ­factors, implying that ­either past actions or immediate determinants can influence perceptions of resolve and credibility, but that both cannot do so at the same time. Press, for example, situates his current calculus theory in opposition to the importance of past actions but fails to consider that t­ hese two approaches need not be diametrically opposed or mutually exclusive. In d ­ oing so, skeptics mis-­specify the under­lying logic of reputational theory. Reputation supporters do not argue that the influence of past actions necessitates that other f­ actors are unimportant. Rather, they rightly maintain that assessments of resolve can be influenced by both dispositional and situational ­factors with the understanding that this inclusivity does not undermine the logic of reputation, its influence on international politics, or the role of past actions in t­ hese calculations.38 Furthermore, ­these dispositional and situational f­ actors can work in tandem to influence reputations, an interaction that skeptics often overlook. In par­tic­ul­ ar, a state’s past actions can complement and signal a state’s interests. Yet, as Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-­Milo explain, reputation skeptics fail to fully consider how reputation and interests may interact or complement each other. Past actions are “observable before a specific crisis” and should be most influential during this time. However, once a crisis begins, “information gleaned from past actions—­reputations—­will have been folded into the general assessment of interests, alongside other pertinent sources of information.”39 This can make it difficult to observe the existence and influence of a specific reputation in the case studies presented by reputation skeptics. Thus, the influence of power and interest does not necessarily negate the influence of past actions. Rather, one needs to consider a variety of ­factors, including past actions, to understand the formation and effects of reputation for resolve. Second, skeptics often overstate the influence of situational f­ actors, such as power and interest, during crisis bargaining. As Gregory Miller explains, “Observers may be unaware of any constraints on an actor, thus assigning a reputation even to be­hav­ior that is situational,” or they may “underestimate the power of a situation and assign a reputation to another state even if

9

INTRODUCTION

situational constraints exist.”40 Similarly, such empirical reliance on the prominence of power and interest suggests this information is readily available. But as Frank Harvey and John Mitton note, “Interests are not always obvious (or consistent),” and a state’s “willingness to use force” is not necessarily “clear or self-­evident” based on ­these ­factors.41 Indeed, the impact of immediate determinants of conflict is often outweighed by concerns about ­whether a state w ­ ill face another crisis in the ­future, making a state’s past actions an impor­tant ­factor.42 In the case of Israel’s interactions with Lebanon, for example, capability and interests alone w ­ ere not enough for successful deterrence. Israel’s lack of a reputation for resolve vis-­à-­vis Lebanon undermined its deterrence efforts against Hez­bollah in the 2000s.43 Similarly, relative capability and interest alone cannot explain the onset and outcome of recurrent crises across U.S.–­North Korean relations, as one also needs to consider reputations for resolve, credibility, and honesty.44 Furthermore, past actions remain influential even when ­there are only a few interactions between states. Such infrequent interactions may actually increase the relative influence of a state’s past actions precisely ­because “each action contains more information about a state’s intentions.”45 Even more so, the influence of past actions and reputations may be heightened in periods of uncertainty, as this is when other information—­such as that about power and interest—­may be less readily available.46 Theories that rely heavi­ly on power and interest tend to assume ­these two f­actors complement each other without fully considering that they may actually “pull in opposite directions”—­such as, argue Harvey and Mitton, in perceptions of U.S. credibility in Somalia and Bosnia.47 Third, and most concerning, skeptics unduly dismiss or ignore evidence that supports the logic of reputational theory. Skeptics have largely taken their results as the definitive answer to the question of ­whether reputations for resolve m ­ atter, while failing to acknowledge that a substantial body of research, in fact, indicates the opposite. Indeed, in an April 2017 interview with the New York Times, Mercer stated, “As the rec­ord shows, reputations do not ­matter.”48 Yet, the work of supporters demonstrates that ­there is actually a wealth of evidence that reputations do affect international politics. The prob­lem is that reputation skeptics—­particularly in their public discourse—­repeatedly fail to acknowledge that t­ here is substantial evidence to dispute their claims, resulting in a “premature closure of inquiry” regarding the “relevance of reputations” to international politics.49 Other scholarship directly disputes the arguments and evidence presented by prominent skeptics such as Press and Mercer. Research on the importance of past actions to alliance formation, for example, “suggests that the dismissal of past actions is premature,” instead revealing “that state reputation weighs rather heavi­ly in the decision-­making pro­cess.”50 Robert Trager’s results contradict Press’s historical findings, as Trager shows that German decision makers did use Britain’s past actions to make inferences about British

10

Why Leaders and Their Reputations for Resolve ­Matter

resolve on the eve of World War II.51 And in contrast to Mercer’s argument, scholars find reputations for resolve are not necessarily rooted in or conditioned by the relationship between states.52 Accordingly, it is simply incorrect to assert that we have l­ittle to no evidence that reputations for resolve ­matter in international politics. T ­ here is evidence that reputations form and that past actions are central to assessments of resolve and credibility—­and so we need to continue to consider how such past actions influence reputations and the conduct of international conflict.

Breaking the Stalemate: Why We Need a Leader-­Specific Approach Although my argument reaffirms the importance of past actions and reputations, the current state of the debate over reputations for resolve necessitates a new approach by which to understand the role reputations play in international politics. While current approaches proffered by both reputation supporters and skeptics contain useful insights, they also suffer from three critical prob­lems. They fail to adequately identify the pro­cesses by which reputations form and change. They employ relatively poor mea­sures of resolve and reputation. And they narrowly focus on the formation and effects of state reputation for resolve. The pro­cesses by which actors acquire reputations for resolve remain poorly understood. The conditions ­under which dif­fer­ent types of reputations form and how ­these reputations change over time require a deeper examination. Reputation is often identified ex post, or ­after a conflict has occurred. Changes in a state’s be­hav­ior are attributed to that state’s reputation for resolve without first showing if and how a par­tic­u­lar reputation formed before a dispute. The temptation is to assume that had the state maintained a stronger reputation for resolute action, it would have fared better during a conflict or would not have been the target of a threat to begin with. T ­ here is also a tendency, even among reputation supporters, to equate the outcome of an event with evidence that a par­tic­u­lar reputation formed. Yet, f­actors beyond reputation influence crisis and conflict outcomes.53 Understanding the formation and effects of reputation instead requires a firm grasp on which be­hav­iors directly contribute to a perception of resolve before a conflict begins. Conceptually, past actions are linked directly to reputations, but it remains unclear as to which specific actions or types of be­hav­ior affect reputations for resolve and to what extent. This lack of clarity about how resolve is communicated is illustrated by two key debates. First is the debate among reputation supporters over the extent to which reputations are challenger or issue-­specific. In theory, reputations are transferable to dif­fer­ent issues, especially if t­ hose issues are interdependent. By signaling an interdependence of commitments, policymakers communicate that their actions on one issue

11

INTRODUCTION

are directly related to their interests on another, which should make their actions and subsequent perceptions of resolve transferrable to a related issue.54 Yet, the evidence in support of this logic is mixed. States certainly try to transfer their reputations for resolute action by issuing extra-­dyadic threats, and ­there is some evidence that reputational inferences are not ­limited to individual challengers or issues.55 However, the ability of states to transfer their reputations may be context dependent, and direct interactions between a challenger and a target are more salient to a target’s reputation than the target’s interactions with other challengers.56 Second is the ongoing debate regarding the importance of statements of resolve to reputation. Traditionally, statements are viewed as l­ ittle more than cheap talk and are seen as an unreliable indicator of a state’s intentions.57 Yet, evidence demonstrates that statements can successfully convey resolve, suggesting diplomatic interactions and public rhe­toric may be critical to the formation of state reputation.58 Current approaches to reputation for resolve, however, cannot fully explain which f­ actors are most salient to t­ hese reputations, how ­these reputations form to begin with, or what effect t­ hese reputations have on international politics. ­There are also impor­tant opportunities to improve our mea­sures of reputation for resolve as a concept. Current approaches employ relatively static mea­sures of reputation for resolve to understand dynamic phenomena. As reputations should be tied to patterns of international conflict, the variables used to mea­sure both reputation and resolve must be able to explain changes in the timing and onset of international disputes. On the surface, a state’s past actions offer a potentially dynamic explanation, especially if reputations are issue-­specific. Changes in the resoluteness of a state’s response to international threats should lead to changes in that state’s reputation, which can then help explain the timing of ­future challenges and disputes. Yet, past conflict be­hav­ior is more static in practice than one may initially expect. If we consider more general reputations for resolve, most states in the international system enjoy relatively peaceful existences and rarely engage in any form of international conflict. Even states that are most likely to be at war or face threats from abroad experience periods without engaging in international conflicts or disputes. Furthermore, state reputation is an amalgamation of a state’s past be­hav­ior over an undefined period of time. While scholars acknowledge that the value of a par­tic­u­lar action to a state’s reputation should decline over time,59 it is not yet clear how long that action remains relevant to a state’s reputation for resolve or how quickly t­hese reputations decay. This prob­lem also persists if we consider issue-­specific reputations, as this raises questions of how often certain issues are in contention in international politics or how states determine the similarity of issues across time. Mea­sures of immediate determinants of conflict employed by skeptics also suffer from epistemological prob­lems. Relative military capability, in par­tic­ u­lar, may not provide sufficient explanatory power, as ­there is a mismatch

12

Why Leaders and Their Reputations for Resolve ­Matter

between a dynamic dependent variable and a rather static explanatory variable. Common mea­sures of relative state power, such as the Composite Index of National Capability, change ­little over time. Furthermore, ­those states that are most likely to engage in international conflict, such as major powers, often see l­ittle change in their relative power according to the primary indices and mea­sures employed in po­liti­cal science. Even if we consider that the relative military capability between two states in a dyadic interaction can change from crisis to crisis, recurring conflicts between g ­ reat powers and enduring rivalries historically “account for a large portion of international conflict and war.”60 Such static variables cannot sufficiently explain dynamic changes in patterns of crisis be­hav­ior and the onset of international disputes. This focus also leaves open questions about how much reputations change over time and across vari­ous interactions, an issue that my leader-­specific approach more directly addresses. As a w ­ hole, therefore, this mismatch in explanatory power between state-­centric variables, such as immediate determinants of conflict, and the phenomena of interest to international relations scholars further highlights the need to directly investigate the foundation of reputations for resolve in international politics. Fi­nally, current approaches to reputation for resolve conceive of reputations too narrowly, as they primarily focus on state reputations and fail to adequately consider how other actors, such as international leaders, may establish their own reputations. This narrow state-­centric focus is unnecessarily limiting, and the omission of individual leaders to current approaches is especially problematic given the extensive evidence for the importance of leaders to international security.61 This is also concerning as it assumes that findings about state reputation for resolve are broadly applicable, with reputation skeptics maintaining t­ hese reputations do not significantly influence the conduct of international politics. This may lead to erroneous conclusions about the value of reputation for resolve in general, further undermining our ability to understand the effects of resolve and reputation, especially if other actors (such as leaders) do acquire their own reputations. The leader-­specific approach to reputation for resolve I take remedies the prob­lems presented by current approaches. First, my approach better addresses the pro­cesses by which reputations for resolve form and change. Rather than focusing on more long-­term state reputations (­either generally or for specific issues) as reputation supporters do or on ­factors that change from crisis to crisis as reputation skeptics do, my leader-­specific approach provides a more intermediate temporal analy­sis, considering how an individual leader’s reputation for resolve forms and changes across that leader’s tenure. This, in turn, allows me to examine how longer-­term contextual ­factors that persist across interactions (such as a preexisting state reputation for resolve and state regime type) as well as shorter-­term situational ­factors that vary from crisis to crisis (such as power and interest) and that are out of the hands of individual leaders influence assessments of a leader’s resolve.

13

INTRODUCTION

Yet, at the same time, I can also determine how a leader’s own statements and be­hav­ior contribute to that leader’s reputation across interactions, even in the presence of ­these other ­factors. Thus, I do not argue that immediate determinants ­will not m ­ atter or condition t­ hese reputations, nor do I negate the existence of state reputations. Instead, I consider how past actions and immediate determinants influence the formation of leader-­specific reputations for resolve. Second, my leader-­specific approach provides greater analytical leverage over understanding dynamic changes in patterns of international conflict. While state reputation and state power often remain relatively static over long periods of time (especially if one focuses on general reputations rather than issue-­specific reputations), the emergence of new leaders into international politics through leadership transitions may better account for observed changes in reputation for resolve. In other words, individual leaders themselves act as a catalyst for change, particularly as resolve is a personally held characteristic that varies across individuals.62 As such, leaders should vary in which reputations they acquire based on their personal willingness to stand up to international threats and challenges. For example, it is commonly believed that differences in the personal resolve between Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill w ­ ere critical to British action during World War II. Similarly, Margaret Thatcher is noted for having an extraordinarily high level of personal resolve throughout her life.63 Thus, we ­will observe changes in the resolve and accompanying reputations of ­these leaders, as well as changes in the timing of international disputes; yet, ­these leader-­specific reputational dynamics would not be captured by the traditional state-­centric conceptualization.64 Furthermore, my leader-­specific approach allows for an analy­sis of how ­these leader reputations develop over the course of a leader’s tenure, providing leverage over the question of how much reputations change in international politics as well as when t­ hese reputations change. My theory argues that new leaders establish reputations that are separate from the reputations of their pre­de­ces­sors and the reputations of their states, but that t­ hese leader-­specific reputations form early during a leader’s tenure. Thus, my approach addresses how reputations for resolve change across leaders as well as within a leader’s tenure, providing a deeper understanding of the foundations of reputations in international politics.

What Is at Stake: Contributions of My Argument and Findings This book carries critical implications for the study of reputation for resolve, the long-­standing debate over the role of reputations in international politics, and the question of ­whether leaders should care about their reputations. Perhaps the largest issue at stake in my study is debunking the claim by rep-

14

Why Leaders and Their Reputations for Resolve ­Matter

utation skeptics that past actions and reputations do not ­matter. Reputations for resolve can influence the conduct of international crises, and a leader’s statements and past actions are central to that leader’s reputation. Yet, by considering how situational ­factors, such as strategic interest and relative military capability, influence perceptions of resolve, my work bridges the arguments of reputation skeptics and reputation supporters to examine how ­these dif­fer­ent ­factors contribute to leader-­specific reputations u ­ nder distinct circumstances. Thus, skeptics need to rethink the importance of past actions to international security, while supporters need to widen their conception of which actors acquire reputations for resolve. Shifting this conversation about reputation for resolve to the individual also carries broader implications about how and to what extent leaders and their be­hav­ior ­matter in international politics. First, thinking about reputation in terms of the individual changes the way in which we think about the effects of resolute and irresolute be­hav­ior. If reputations are tied to leaders, and not just states, distinct reputational pathways emerge when new leaders take office. In other words, each leader ­will acquire his or her own unique reputation for resolve. This means that changes across the reputations of individual leaders can affect how a new leader is perceived by outside observers, as well as how the actions of that new leader’s state are assessed in the ­future. ­These differences at the individual level across leaders, therefore, can also serve as a source of change at the state level.65 Thus, it becomes essential to not only consider how t­hese reputations vary across leaders but also address how leaders establish reputations for resolute or irresolute action in the first place and to what extent. Second, shifting the focus to the individual has further implications for the extent to which leaders affect the conduct of international politics. As individual citizens, we often believe our leaders are an impor­tant influence on international events, but scholars of reputation devote relatively l­ ittle attention to considering how actors beyond the state may acquire reputations for resolve. As it is unlikely that unimportant actors ­will acquire substantive reputations for resolute or irresolute action, my argument that leaders can establish their own reputations reaffirms the centrality of leaders to the conduct of international politics. Thus, shifting the focus to the individual increases the influence of leaders on international relations more broadly. My approach also carries implications for how policymakers engage in foreign policy. If new leaders acquire their own reputations, policymakers must be acutely aware that, as soon as they take office, their actions and their resolve are being judged by leaders in other states. New leaders, therefore, must be prepared to face challenges from leaders in other states, as they attempt to learn about the new leader’s resolve. T ­ hese new leaders may not be bound by the ­mistakes of their pre­de­ces­sors, nor may they benefit from their pre­de­ces­sors’ successes. Instead, they have the opportunity to establish reputations based on their own choices upon taking office. New

15

INTRODUCTION

leaders, therefore, need to know how to appropriately convey their resolve during t­ hese early interactions soon ­after they take office, lest they respond poorly and make themselves more attractive targets of aggression in the ­future. My theory and findings provide policymakers with strategies by which they can more effectively communicate their resolve during diplomatic interactions, negotiations, crises, and disputes. Thus, my approach informs leaders of the pitfalls they should avoid in signaling their resolve, especially early in their tenures.

Overview of the Book Chapter 1 explains my assumptions about why leaders can acquire individual reputations for resolve and then develops a series of hypotheses about how ­these reputations form and change across interactions from the beginning of a leader’s tenure. More specifically, I delineate how a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior interact to influence t­ hese reputations and how key contextual ­factors, including state reputation and key immediate determinants of conflict, further interact with t­ hese leader-­specific signals of resolve to condition leader reputations. I then test the hypotheses of my theory against alternative hypotheses across four chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 use two distinct survey experiments to isolate and disentangle the causal mechanisms by which leaders acquire reputations for resolve. Chapter 2 investigates how a single leader’s reputation forms and changes across repeated interactions, while chapter 3 examines how leadership transitions influence perceptions of leader resolve. Chapters 4 and 5 then use historical case studies to further test my hypotheses and to show how leader-­specific reputations for resolve evolve during real-­world interactions. Focusing on Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev’s assessments of U.S. decision makers, chapter 4 investigates how Khrushchev viewed the resolve of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, while chapter 5 observes how Khrushchev perceived President John F. Kennedy’s resolve. ­These two chapters, therefore, examine how the reputations of ­these consecutive presidents changed over time and across interactions, while holding the observer (Khrushchev) constant. Fi­nally, the conclusion to this book synthesizes the findings of the experiments and case studies, discusses their implications for the study of reputation for resolve and the debate between reputation supporters and skeptics, and delves into areas of f­ uture research. In d ­ oing so, I explain how policymakers can best communicate their resolve to make themselves and their states less vulnerable to international threats.

16

chapter 1

How Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve

To better understand the role reputation for resolve plays in international politics, we need to investigate how individual leaders establish ­these reputations. In ­doing so, it is critical to consider how a leader’s own statements and be­hav­ior as well as key contextual f­ actors, such as state reputation or immediate determinants of conflict, influence ­these reputational assessments. I theorize that a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior directly contribute to her reputation for resolve in three ways. First, due to the effects of leadership transitions, a leader’s statements of resolve ­will be more influential to her reputation early during her tenure rather than ­later. Second, a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior together influence reputational assessments, as a leader’s statements of resolve create expectations of ­future be­hav­ior that then interact with a leader’s subsequent actions to inform her reputation. Third, due to an initial lack of information about a leader’s resolve, early perceptions of resolve ­will influence ­later perceptions, making reputations difficult to change once established. In addition, I also consider how four key contextual f­ actors identified by reputation skeptics and supporters—­namely, state reputation, relative power, state interest, and regime type—­condition leader-­specific reputations for resolve. I theorize that ­these contextual ­factors ­will influence leader-­specific reputations in two ways. First, ­these contextual ­factors, on their own, ­will be more influential to perceptions of a leader’s resolve early during that leader’s tenure rather than ­later. While outside observers ­will rely on ­these contextual f­ actors when they have ­little direct information about a new leader’s resolve shortly a­ fter that leader takes office, the in­de­pen­dent influence of ­these contextual f­actors ­will decline as better and more accurate leader-­ specific signals of resolve become available via a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior. Second, each of t­ hese contextual f­ actors creates expectations of a leader’s be­hav­ior in a given situation, which then interact with a leader’s

17

chapter 1

subsequent actions to influence that leader’s reputation. Thus, leaders from certain states may find it more difficult to acquire specific reputations for resolute or irresolute action, as the ability to convey one’s resolve may be conditioned not only by a leader’s own statements and be­hav­ior but also by the context in which that leader interacts with o ­ thers.

Why Leaders Should Acquire Individual Reputations for Resolve My theory of leader-­specific reputations for resolve rests on four key assumptions that explain why leaders should acquire individual reputations for resolve that are separate from the reputations of their pre­de­ces­sors and of their states: 1. Leaders are central to the conduct of international politics, as they directly influence their state’s foreign policy be­hav­ior. 2. Leaders believe in the efficacy and importance of their and other leaders’ actions. 3. Leaders communicate their resolve through their statements and ­be­hav­ior. 4. Perceptions of resolve adhere to individual leaders based on their statements and be­hav­ior while in office. Leaders are central to the conduct of international politics, as they directly influence their state’s foreign policy be­hav­ior. While current approaches to reputation for resolve primarily focus on the reputations of states, this narrow focus limits our ability to understand the formation and effect of reputations for resolve on international conflict. Studies across international security demonstrate how leadership transitions and the emergence of new leaders alter state foreign policy and how differences in the characteristics and behavioral choices of individual leaders affect when states are involved in international conflicts.1 While a leader’s foreign policy decisions are influenced by po­liti­cal and institutional constraints, ­these individuals directly shape their states’ foreign policy agendas and choices.2 Even in democracies, where the power of any single individual is l­imited, primary state leaders, such as presidents and prime ministers, exercise wide influence over t­ hese decisions and act as the public ­faces of their states’ foreign policies. Leaders are particularly influential during crisis bargaining, where domestic institutional constraints are often relaxed due to the necessity of quick action. During international crises, the preferences of individual leaders can directly lead to policy outcomes due to a lack of both external and internal restraints on policymakers. President Kennedy’s creation of ExComm, for example, allowed him to bypass many institutional and public constraints during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Furthermore, major foreign policy initiatives are unlikely to be successful without the support of a state’s primary

18

How Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve

leader, and leaders are punished for their state’s foreign policy failures.3 Thus, t­ here is good reason to believe that leaders should acquire individual reputations for resolve based on their foreign policy choices. Leaders are often preoccupied with their own reputations for resolve and certainly believe their actions as an individual m ­ atter. Yet, this belief in the value of the individual is not purely based on ego, as leaders also believe in the importance of other leaders. World leaders view their counter­parts in other states as critical to the conduct of foreign policy and often perceive other leaders as the driving force b ­ ehind state be­hav­ior.4 While they do not always diverge from the foreign policies of their pre­de­ces­sors, the importance individual leaders place on each other in international politics is widely observed in how leaders and high-­ranking decision makers interact diplomatically, as well as how leaders react to leadership changes in other states. Leaders then communicate their personal level of resolve through their statements and be­hav­ior. Reputations are rooted in the belief that an actor that behaved a certain way in the past ­will do so again in the ­future, particularly in a similar situation. In the context of state reputations for resolve, states reveal their inherently held levels of resolve through their international actions. Applying this same logic to my leader-­specific approach indicates that leaders also communicate their personally held levels of resolve through their rhetorical and behavioral responses to international challenges and threats, especially as resolve is a personally held characteristic that varies across individuals.5 This, therefore, leaves open the possibility that leaders—­just like states—­may acquire issue-­specific reputations for resolve as well as more general reputations for resolve that cut across issues. This is especially true if leaders are able to signal that two issues are interdependent, linking their resolve on one issue to their resolve on another. While direct interactions between two leaders should be more pertinent to reputations than a leader’s interactions with other leaders, I do not negate the possibility that such indirect interactions can shape ­these reputational assessments, and I consider ­whether leaders acquire both issue-­specific and general reputations for resolve in the l­ ater chapters of this book. Yet, this assumption that leaders communicate or reveal their personal levels of resolve through their statements and be­hav­ior does not mean that leaders always develop accordant reputations for resolve based on ­these signals. While we say that actors acquire a reputation, it is impor­tant to remember that reputations are relative and perceptional.6 A leader cannot directly control her reputation for resolve; rather, her reputation is based on how ­others view and interpret her statements and be­hav­ior. It is, therefore, pos­si­ble for a leader to have multiple reputations depending on the issue at hand (such as reputations rooted in specific commitments), the assessment being made (such as assessments about resolve versus honesty), and whose perception is being mea­sured.7

19

chapter 1

This also suggests that not all leaders ­will be equally able to clearly and effectively communicate their resolve through their statements and be­hav­ ior. Some leaders may be better at signaling their resolve and capitalizing on their responses to foreign policy challenges to bolster their reputations. British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, for example, po­liti­cally leveraged her actions in the Falklands to solidify her personal reputation for resolute action, publicly stating, “I have the reputation as the Iron Lady. I am of ­great resolve.”8 To this end, some leaders may also be more concerned about their reputations than ­others. Culture, for example, may influence the extent to which leaders are concerned about issues relating to resolve and honor. In the American context, scholars note that southern presidents, such as George W. Bush and Lyndon B. Johnson, historically tend to be more concerned about ­these issues than presidents from other regions of the United States.9 Leaders may also vary in their willingness to protect their reputations. ­Here, Keren Yarhi-­Milo finds that leaders’ personal beliefs systems, particularly their concern over how o ­ thers see them, can influence their conflict propensity. Leaders who are “high self-­monitors” are more likely to use military force to protect or recoup their reputations for resolve.10 Similarly, leaders may further vary in their personal strategic acumen or their ability to deftly use signals to demonstrate their resolve at lower costs. Barbara Walter and Dustin Tingley suggest that some leaders may be less comfortable building “a reputation for toughness even if this would serve to deter more challengers,” while o ­ thers “may take longer to pro­cess how a par­tic­u­lar strategic game is played.”11 President Trump, for example, has been criticized for failing to understand how leaders are supposed to use strategic signals to convey their resolve or how to use coercive diplomacy to communicate one’s resolve and credibility. During the first year and a half of his presidency, Trump repeatedly used blanket statements of resolve—­such as blatantly stating “total American resolve” on North ­Korea in his 2018 State of the Union address; yet, scholars of reputation expressed concern that the Trump administration did not ­appear to have a clear and coherent strategy for how to convey that resolve beyond ­these statements and that Trump used coercive diplomatic tactics inappropriately.12 Some leaders may also be better at ensuring their signals of resolve are interpreted as intended or at “saving face” when confronted with the negative reputational consequences of their actions. Actors may try to “decouple” their actions from a par­tic­u­lar event where they performed poorly or “spin” away irresolute be­hav­ior to convince outside observers that their actions are not indicative of their personal resolve and to avoid reputational consequences.13 ­After the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, Khrushchev publicly backpedaled and tried to frame his actions as a “compromise” rather than a “back down.”14 Similarly, policymakers can try to “exaggerate” their

20

How Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve

resolve or interests to gain a better outcome and influence “other actors’ perceptions of their resolve.”15 Yet, ­there are limits to which an actor is able to manage or manipulate its reputation and explain such “retreats” simply ­because reputations are outside of the direct control of an actor. ­There may also be instances where such claims are not credible based on how a par­tic­u­lar issue was framed by an actor to begin with or the threats and promises made by that actor previously. Robert Jervis notes that “the more explicit a threat or promise, the greater the cost to the actor’s reputation if he defaults.”16 Furthermore, such attempts to decouple events or save face may simply not be believed by adversaries. And leaders then risk obtaining reputations for being dishonest or bluffing if they do exaggerate their resolve or interests.17 Thus, ­there can still be reputational costs for backing down (or bluffing) even if some leaders are better at spinning their actions than ­others. Relatedly, some leaders may simply choose better strategies for communicating their resolve. In theory, demonstrating resolve requires a costly commitment, or, at the very least, outside observers must believe a leader’s commitments are potentially costly to that leader.18 In this regard, leaders can employ a variety of strategies to convey their resolve to other leaders. They may choose actions that are financially or po­liti­cally costly to “sink costs” to communicate their resolve. U.S. president Bill Clinton, for example, used both firm statements of resolve and a vis­ib ­ le, large military mobilization to signal his determination and willingness to intervene in Haiti with success.19 They may also “tie their hands,” as indicating a decision is outside of their control may better communicate their resolve. A classic example of this is the “doomsday device” made famous in the film Dr. Strangelove; this machine would automatically launch nuclear weapons if it sensed that a rival state had launched a nuclear attack first.20 Leaders in demo­cratic states may also tie their hands by invoking audience costs, which increase the domestic costs of backing down from a declared course of action. Obama’s decision to involve Congress in response to the Syrian violation of the red line against the use of chemical weapons, for example, can be viewed as an attempt to invoke such audience costs. Leaders may also increase the costs of negotiations or disputes in an effort to signal they are resolute, as larger demands increase the potential costs of negotiation.21 Similarly, escalating a crisis can also convey resolve, although this carries the risk that a resolute adversary w ­ ill further escalate the crisis to war.22 Yet, leaders do not necessarily need to employ vio­lence or the threat of vio­lence to demonstrate resolve. While war fighting is often viewed as the strongest signal of resolve, actors can communicate resolve without the use of vio­lence by employing sufficiently costly responses to threats or dispute triggers. At times, the use or threat of vio­lence may be necessary to communicate resolve; but the specific action that signals resolve ­will vary based on the circumstances of a crisis and the relative severity or

21

chapter 1

intensity of a threat. For example, responding to a verbal threat with a verbal condemnation might adequately signal resolve, but responding to a violent military action with a verbal condemnation might not sufficiently convey resolve, as it may not be a costly enough signal given the severity of the initial threat.23 In e­ ither case, however, leaders who fail to follow through on a verbal threat may be perceived as irresolute if they do not also obtain impor­tant concessions from their opponent. In this regard, a leader’s public and private statements can communicate resolve, although the extent to which statements of resolve alone affect reputation is contested. In theory, statements can be costly, particularly when they invoke audience costs, and can therefore convey resolve. Statements of resolve are not without risk. Adversaries may respond with hostility to such statements and increase the costs of backing down from ­those statements, and states that back down a­ fter making public statements of resolve acquire reputations for bluffing and dishonesty.24 Furthermore, statements help convey resolve b ­ ecause they carry information about a leader’s intentions, interests, and personal determination. As Richard Ned Lebow teaches us, “Words are actions in their own right and significantly affect a state’s perception of the nature and intensity of the threat it ­faces.”25 From a leader-­specific perspective, statements of resolve should also be “positively correlated” with a leader’s “true under­lying level of resolve.”26 Accordingly, statements that communicate a leader is “committed to following a given action” can convey intention and commitment, and leaders who fail to follow through on ­these statements can face reputational costs.27 This does not mean, however, that all statements of resolve ­will be equally effective, as the construction and content of such statements, as well as the domestic po­liti­cal environment in which they are conveyed, influence their efficacy.28 More precise threats should be more credible and more effective at conveying resolve than broader, general threats. This may suggest that leaders need to convey both how they ­will react to a certain issue and why they w ­ ill react that way to effectively communicate their resolve through their statements. While a full examination of t­ hese issues is beyond the scope of this book, in ­later chapters I consider how the issuing of statements ­under dif­fer­ent conditions and how dif­fer­ent types of statements influence expectations of f­ uture be­hav­ior. In par­tic­u­lar, my case studies suggest that blanket statements of resolve may be less effective at conveying a leader’s determination. Leaders instead may need to explain why an issue is impor­tant to them, describe how they ­will act on a par­tic­ul­ ar issue, and have a clear policy position to use statements of resolve most effectively. While leaders convey their resolve through their statements and be­hav­ ior, the way in which t­ hese signals are interpreted and contribute to a leader’s reputation may also be influenced by the context in which t­ hose signals are communicated. As reputations are rooted in one actor’s perceptions of

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How Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve

another, we cannot simply look at a leader’s be­hav­ior and assume that such be­hav­ior ­will be interpreted in a certain way by ­others. Instead, we need to investigate how observers interpret a par­tic­u­lar action or statement as resolute or irresolute and then disentangle w ­ hether ­these perceptions of resolve are based solely on a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior or are confounded by other variables. For example, in chapter 5, I find evidence that the Kennedy administration believed the president’s statements of resolve ­were effective in communicating his determination to Khrushchev, particularly during the Berlin Crisis; yet, historical evidence shows that Khrushchev viewed ­these statements as less credible based on Kennedy’s past be­hav­ior. Similarly, Chinese leaders in the 1950s believed they ­were using effective signals to demonstrate their resolve to U.S. leaders during the Korean War, but President Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson did not believe such threats ­were credible based largely on China’s past be­hav­ior.29 Thus, I examine (1) what information was used to make an assessment about a leader’s resolve, (2) how this information was used to formulate the assessment, and (3) who made the assessment. If reputation supporters are correct and reputations are dispositional rather than purely situational, a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior should serve as informational cues as to ­whether that leader is characteristically resolute or irresolute and to what extent. Observers can derive information about an individual leader’s personal resolve by looking at that leader’s reactions to international threats or by listening to the rhe­toric the target leader uses to try to convey her resolve. Accordingly, I consider how a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior inform perceptions of a leader’s resolve across interactions and how this information is incorporated into ­these reputational assessments. I assume, therefore, that leaders can establish individual reputations for resolve based on their statements and be­hav­ior while in office, and I explic­ itly test this assumption in the l­ ater chapters of this book. In ­doing so, I build on an emerging debate over which actors are most likely to acquire reputations in international politics. While some research suggests that states are more likely to acquire reputations,30 other work supports my assumption that leaders can establish individual reputations for resolve that are separate from ­those of their pre­de­ces­sors and of their state.31 Not only are leaders preoccupied with their own reputations, but individual decision makers can acquire unique reputations for being credible—or believable—­and honest based on their be­hav­ior while in office.32 New leaders are also more likely to be tested in their resolve early in their tenures,33 suggesting that ­these leaders are perceived as distinct from their pre­de­ces­sors in their resolve. Furthermore, Scott Wolford finds that challenger leaders may base the timing of their threats on their assessments of a current target leader’s resolve and their predictions of the resolve of the target leader’s potential successor. If they think the current leader is more resolute than the successor

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­ ill be, they may delay their threats ­until the successor takes office in the w target state.34 Such findings, therefore, suggest leaders can acquire individual reputations. Yet, this emerging lit­er­at­ ure also leaves critical questions regarding the existence and formation of leader-­specific reputations for resolve unaddressed. In par­tic­ul­ar, we know relatively ­little about the conditions that influence how leaders are perceived as resolute or irresolute and to what extent, and we need to know more about how immediate determinants of conflict and other ­factors influence ­these leader-­specific reputations. Even more so, we still do not know how leaders establish t­ hese reputations for resolve in the first place. Thus, the mechanisms by which leader-­specific reputations form and change across interactions remain ambiguous, as scholars have not yet systematically addressed or theorized how the formation of leader reputations may vary from state reputations or how other contextual ­factors may contribute to perceptions of a leader’s resolve. Furthermore, this emerging debate about which actors acquire reputations combined with the long-­ standing debate over the value of reputations for resolve indicates that additional research is needed to disentangle the effect of leader be­hav­ior, preexisting state reputation, and immediate determinants of conflict on the emergence and formation of reputations for resolve in international politics. In short, we need to know more about which actors develop reputations for resolve, ­under what conditions dif­fer­ent types of reputations form, and how ­these reputations affect international conflict.

How New Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve My theory addresses each of t­ hese issues, as I investigate the conditions that influence the establishment of leader-­specific reputations for resolve, consider how t­ hese reputations form in the first place, and address how t­ hese reputations change across repeated interactions. I argue that t­hese leader-­ specific reputations for resolve are conditioned by two key ­factors: (1) the combination of a leader’s own statements and be­hav­ior, and (2) the context in which that leader interacts with o ­ thers, including the presence of a preexisting state reputation for resolve, power, interest, and considerations of state regime type. First, due to leadership transitions and the emergence of new leaders within states, early interactions are highly influential to the types of information that influence reputation formation as well as how ­these reputations change across interactions. ­Here, a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior are central to the establishment of that leader’s reputation, especially early during that leader’s tenure. Second, the context in which a leader interacts with ­others also conditions how and to what extent that leader’s statements and be­hav­ior contribute to her reputation. In this regard, key contextual f­ actors

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identified by reputation supporters and reputation skeptics (that is, power, interest, state reputation, and potentially regime type) may constrain how observers interpret a target leader’s actions within the context of her reputation and may interact with a leader’s own signals of resolve to influence reputational assessments. Accordingly, my theory explains when dif­fer­ent signals of resolve are most influential to reputations as well as how this information results in accordant reputations for resolute or irresolute action and to what extent. Thus, I identify when and how a leader’s own statements and be­hav­ior contribute to her reputation for resolve, rather than merely addressing ­whether ­these ­factors are influential. s tatem en ts, l ea d er be­h av­i o r, a n d re p u tat i o n f o r m at i o n Leadership transitions are critical to the establishment of leader reputations and affect the pro­cesses by which new leaders establish individual reputations for resolve, as the emergence of new world leaders creates distinct reputational pathways that do not frequently exist in the state-­centric approach to reputation for resolve. We know that leaders are more likely to face international threats early in their tenures, as other leaders attempt to obtain information about the resolve of t­hese new leaders. President Clinton’s resolve, for example, was tested early in his tenure by Serbian leader Ratko Mladić, who used “probes and challenges” to determine the new president’s commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organ­ization (NATO) and U.S. interests in Bosnia-­Herzegovina.35 Throughout the crisis and subsequent dispute, Clinton was able to use his statements and actions to convey his, American, and Western resolve, resulting in a successful outcome for NATO. This pattern of using challenges to test the resolve of new leaders suggests that leaders in other states have relatively ­little information about the resolve of new target leaders when ­these new leaders take office. The resolve of ­these new leaders is then revealed through their rhetorical and behavioral responses to t­ hese early foreign policy tests. This initial lack of direct information about a new leader’s resolve is critical to understanding the conditions u ­ nder which dif­fer­ent informational cues influence reputations, as it affects the impact of a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior on reputational assessments. Unlike states that have broader conflict histories on which international challengers can make judgments about resolve, a new leader-­specific reputational timeline is established when a leadership transition occurs within a target state. For example, in the state-­centric approach, the United States may have a longer-­term reputation for resolve based on its general past conflict be­hav­ior, or it may have multiple issue-­specific reputations based on its past be­hav­ior. However, in the leader-­specific approach, each U.S. president has his own reputational timeline, and inferences about a new president’s resolve should be based on that president’s actions once the new leader takes office.

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This is not to say that all leaders have a tabula rasa regarding their reputations for resolve when they come to power. Instead, some leaders may have a preexisting public image that may influence their reputation, especially if they held a highly vis­i­ble position ­either domestically or internationally before taking office. Such may be the case, for example, with Eisenhower’s rec­ ord as a five-­star general during World War II, Churchill’s actions as first lord of the admiralty and secretary of war during World War I, and Golda Meir’s time as minister of foreign affairs, to name a few. Yet, a leader’s actions prior to taking office should be viewed as less informative of that leader’s resolve, especially considering that he likely did not have as much direct influence or control over foreign policy in his previous roles or that he may not have been directly tested in his resolve in a previous public capacity. Thus, the actions a leader takes and the statements a leader makes during his tenure in office most directly contribute to his reputation for resolve. Accordingly, in the U.S. case, for example, ­there ­will be a period early during the new president’s tenure when world leaders outside of the United States have extensive information about the past resolve and actions of the United States as a state but have relatively ­little information about the resolve of the new president, even if the president previously held a dif­fer­ent po­liti­cal office. While challenger leaders initially lack direct information about a new target leader’s resolve, they acquire this information by interacting with the new target leader through diplomatic interactions, negotiations, and interstate crises. Accordingly, challenger leaders w ­ ill have more information about the target leader’s resolve ­later during the target leader’s tenure rather than ­earlier, especially if they repeatedly interact with the new target leader. From this logic flow three key hypotheses regarding how statements, initial interactions, and early perceptions of resolve influence how leader-­specific reputations for resolve form and change across interactions: 1. Statements are more influential to reputational assessments during initial interactions than during ­later interactions. 2. Statements create expectations of ­future action, which then interact with a leader’s subsequent be­hav­ior to influence that leader’s reputation for resolve. 3. Early perceptions of resolve are highly influential to l­ ater assessments of resolve. Due to leadership transitions, signals of resolve derived from a leader’s statements ­will be more influential during initial interactions in that leader’s tenure rather than during ­later interactions. Resolve is most effectively communicated when leaders take costly action to defend their commitments. Thus, war fighting is often viewed as the strongest signal of resolve b ­ ecause it communicates a willingness to pay substantial costs in the face of an imminent threat. Yet, leaders can also convey their resolve without resorting

26

How Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve

to the use of vio­lence or demonstrations of militarized force if they employ sufficiently costly responses to threats or dispute triggers.36 During lower-­ level or lower-­stakes interactions, leaders may not need to use force to convey their resolve. Indeed, new leaders are often initially tested in their resolve through such lower-­level and lower-­stakes interactions shortly a­ fter taking office, such as through direct negotiations or nonmilitarized crises. Kennedy’s resolve, for example, was tested by Khrushchev at the 1961 Vienna Summit, less than six months a­ fter Kennedy assumed the presidency. Similarly, Obama’s resolve was tested just two months into his tenure when North ­Korea conducted a missile launch test in the spring of 2009.37 While costly behavioral actions, like war fighting, can certainly convey resolve, leaders can also communicate their resolve during ­these lower-­level interactions before they have had the opportunity to demonstrate their resolve through high-­stakes physical acts. During initial interactions, new leaders work to communicate their policy positions and their dedication to t­ hese positions to outside observers and potential international challengers through their statements during direct negotiations, during other diplomatic interactions, and in their broader public discourse. U.S. president Ronald Reagan, for example, made the purposeful decision to use harsh rhe­toric to convey his resolve on arms control to the USSR, employing “both specific commitments regarding U.S. policy ­towards the Soviet Union and more general criticisms of the Soviet Union” from his first year in office.38 It is during this initial period in a leader’s tenure that t­hese verbal signals are particularly influential to communicating resolve, as statements made by leaders help signal their preferred actions and willingness to engage in certain be­hav­iors.39 If the resolve of a new leader is privately held ­until that leader takes action to publicly reveal her personal determination, potential challenger leaders in other states ­will have relatively ­little concrete information about the new target leader’s resolve directly a­ fter a leadership transition in the target state. Potential challenger leaders can easily obtain information about the resolve of the target state from contextual ­factors, such as the target state’s preexisting reputation. Yet, if we know that resolve varies across individuals, international challengers and outside observers cannot be sure that such information accurately reflects the new leader’s personally held level of resolve. For this reason, t­ hese contextual clues are less reliable than information about resolve directly revealed by the new target leader. Statements, therefore, are particularly impor­tant signals of resolve during initial interactions when t­ here is ­little direct information about a new leader’s resolve other than the new leader’s own statements.40 Before new leaders have taken direct action to signal their resolve, their initial reputations may be based solely on their statements. However, once ­these new leaders take physical action to communicate their determination and dedication to a policy, their statements of resolve may become less central to reputational

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assessments, as other leaders then have costlier—­and thereby more reliable—­ signals of the target leader’s resolve. Accordingly, I first predict a leader’s statements are more influential to reputational assessments during initial interactions, but become less influential once challenger leaders obtain information about resolve from the target leader’s be­hav­ior. Statements are also central to leader-­specific reputations for resolve as they create expectations of how a leader ­will act in the ­future. If statements are not simply cheap talk, they ­will be taken as meaningful commitments of a new leader’s intended f­uture action. In other words, statements signal resolve precisely b ­ ecause they carry reputational consequences.41 In this regard, a leader’s statements interact with her subsequent be­hav­ior to condition perceptions of her resolve. By and large, leaders ­will be expected to follow through on their stated actions, and their reputations for resolve ­will be injured or improved by meeting or defying the expectations of resolve created by ­these verbal commitments.42 This interaction effect suggests that reputations for resolve are not built solely on a leader’s statements or be­hav­ ior. A leader’s reputational timeline, therefore, does not begin when she first takes action. Rather, that leader’s past statements remain an impor­tant part of the decision making of potential challengers when they assess the new target leader’s resolve. Thus, new information about resolve revealed through a leader’s be­hav­ior is interpreted in the context of old information provided by that leader’s statements. This interaction between a new leader’s early rhe­toric and subsequent be­ hav­ior can be especially problematic for leaders who make highly assertive statements, promising to act tough in the ­future, but who then act weakly.43 ­These leaders may acquire particularly negative reputations for irresolute action, especially when compared with leaders who did not make such strongly assertive statements or who made such statements but followed through with their actions.44 The effect of irresolute be­hav­ior, therefore, ­will be magnified by the leader’s previous promises of resolute action. To illustrate this by way of analogy, CEOs who make exaggerated promises about their com­pany’s growth risk undermining their own credibility, devaluing their com­pany, and angering shareholders. This is not to say they should avoid making promises about what they ­will achieve. Rather, they should promise reasonable benchmarks, and by hitting t­ hose benchmarks, they can capitalize on their success to improve their reputations and the value of their com­pany. In international politics, one may not need to use bombastic rhe­toric and threaten war or military action—­for example—to credibly and successfully convey resolve. Rather, more ­limited threats may just as well convey resolve, and they may not run the risk of making exaggerated promises that a statesman cannot l­ater keep. The extent to which a par­tic­u­lar promise or threat is exaggerated certainly depends on the context of the situation; so, too, does the severity of the threat needed to convey one’s

28

How Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve

resolve, as ­there may be times when threats of military action are certainly warranted and needed to communicate resolve. However, my logic regarding the interaction of statements of resolve and a leader’s subsequent be­hav­ ior holds in a variety of contexts, be it during diplomatic interactions, crisis bargaining, or even dispute escalation. This also carries critical implications for policymakers. If leaders who verbally indicate they w ­ ill be resolute are punished for failing to follow through on their statements with firm action, policymakers should be wary about making bombastic or exaggerated statements of resolve if they are not serious about following through in the ­future. While leaders may be tempted to make strong statements early in their tenures, especially if initial perceptions of their resolve are largely based on this information, new leaders must be careful that they do not create unreasonable expectations of ­future resolute be­hav­ior they cannot ­later fulfill. This further indicates that bluffing—or stating you w ­ ill be resolute when you know that you ­will not or cannot—is a poor strategy for new leaders, especially ­those who face resolute adversaries. Yet, this line of logic is distinct from past work that examines the prob­lems that emerge by purposely misrepresenting one’s resolve.45 Being caught in a bluff can lead to reputations for being dishonest and less credible. My argument further suggests that bluffing or exaggerating one’s determination can also directly damage a leader’s reputation for resolve. While ­there may be situations in which ­there are incentives to misrepresent resolve or where bluffing is successful, leaders also have incentives to accurately communicate their intentions, especially during lower-­level negotiations where the potential costs may not be as high. This is especially true if leaders take each other’s statements as a sincere indication of their f­ uture resolve and intended be­hav­ior. This is not to say that leaders need to be fully honest about when they w ­ ill be irresolute, but this does suggest that grossly overstating one’s potential resolve can have long-­term negative reputational consequences. New leaders may not be forgiven for initially inflating their resolve. In addition to being viewed as dishonest or lacking credibility, t­hese leaders may also be perceived as characteristically irresolute. Choosing to bluff, or purposely overstating one’s resolve, can be a strategic choice. In d ­ oing so, actors bet on their opponents to believe such deception, as they think they can achieve a better outcome by being dishonest than by being straightforward. Yet, my hypothesis suggests that leaders may be punished not only for purposely overstating their resolve but also for simply failing to meet the expectations of resolve created by their statements, even if they did not intentionally bluff. Thus, leaders that are caught in a bluff ­will be punished through a reputation for irresolute action, but so too ­will leaders who unintentionally misrepresent their resolve. Clear communication of one’s intentions, therefore, is critical to the establishment of a reputation for

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resolute action. In this regard, a leader’s reputation for honesty complements his reputation for resolve (and vice versa), and the same be­hav­ior that leads to a reputation for honesty may also contribute to a reputation for resolute action. This further suggests a tension between the domestic incentives leaders face to publicly remain hawkish on foreign policy and the international consequences of overstating one’s resolve. Dovish leaders, or t­hose who strongly prefer peace and cooperation over conflict, may fear losing power and being replaced if they use weak rhe­toric.46 As a result, they may try to employ more hawkish statements to hide their dovishness. Yet, when push comes to shove, ­these dovish leaders are unlikely to back up their statements with firm action if tested. Despite the domestic incentives such leaders may have to misrepresent their resolve, they face harsh international consequences and risk making both themselves and their states more vulnerable to international threats in the f­ uture if they establish a reputation for lacking resolve by failing to follow through on hawkish statements with firm action. Instead, it is more beneficial to strongly, verbally assert resolve on issues for which a new leader knows she can or ­will stand firm and to be more careful, perhaps even ambiguous, in stating her resolve on issues for which she knows or thinks she cannot take a clearly resolute position (or even for which she does not yet have a clear policy position). While this may seem like an obvious implication and one that policymakers should already be aware of, evidence suggests this is not always the case. ­There are many examples of leaders issuing threats in which their potential actions are exaggerated (likely in an attempt to better convey their resolve). For example, President Trump employed extremely harsh rhe­toric ­toward North ­Korea in an attempt to coerce the state to abandon its nuclear program, promising in August 2017: “They [North ­Korea] ­will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” Trump’s use of bombastic and escalatory rhe­toric runs the risk that he ­will be unable or unwilling to deliver on t­ hese threats in the ­future, particularly as scholars of reputation have cautioned that “his administration has a long way to go to craft an effective signal” of resolve through ­these statements.47 This is also not to say that leaders should always avoid making threats. Rather, leaders need to use coercive threats carefully and be mindful of how they articulate and construct t­ hose threats. It is better to avoid making escalatory threats u ­ nless one is reasonably certain one can and w ­ ill follow through on ­those threats. Strategically, therefore, t­here are times early in a leader’s tenure when it is beneficial to verbally stand firm but avoid escalatory language and to then follow up t­ hese calculated statements with resolute action, rather than employ bombastic language that sets up unrealistic expectations of one’s ­future be­hav­ior. Thus, the severity and clarity of a leader’s statements of resolve can be critical to signaling intended be­hav­ior and to creating expectations of ­future action.48

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How Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve

I also consider how leaders pro­cess informational cues about resolve across interactions. ­Here, ­later assessments of resolve are conditioned by early perceptions, as ­these preexisting perceptions of resolve become the frame of reference through which a target leader’s ­later actions are interpreted.49 ­These early perceptions of resolve are influential due to the relatively l­ittle prior information challenger leaders have about a new target leader’s resolve ­after leadership transitions. Thus, t­ hese early perceptions carry significant weight in the challenger’s decision making, and challenger leaders enter into ­later interactions with preconceived notions about how the target leader is likely to act based on the target leader’s prior statements and/or be­hav­ior. Such early perceptions can be based on both a target leader’s statements and be­ hav­ior depending on the course of interaction between the target leader and the challenger leader. For example, target leaders who experience an international crisis early in their tenure, such as a few months ­after taking office, may see early perceptions of their resolve highly influenced by their be­hav­ior during such crises. In contrast, for other target leaders, t­ hese early perceptions of resolve may be based solely on their statements, verbal communications, or diplomatic interactions with potential challengers. State reputation for resolve is often mea­sured in terms of a state’s most recent interaction with an opponent with the belief that the influence of prior information should decline over time as new information about resolve becomes available.50 Yet, I predict that early interactions and their subsequent reputational assessments continue to influence leader-­specific perceptions of resolve, even if t­hese early assessments should be outdated. In other words, reputations are imperfectly updated as new information becomes available through a target leader’s ­later interactions. Thus, early reputational assessments continue to carry weight even in the face of potentially contradictory information about resolve.51 While reputations for resolve can be changed once established, it w ­ ill take considerable effort for a leader to alter his reputation, particularly once he has acquired a reputation for irresolute action. This hypothesis carries serious implications for policymakers. From a strategic perspective, early perceptions of a leader’s resolve inform the behavioral responses and strategies challenger leaders employ to test target leaders in the ­future.52 New leaders, therefore, need to be aware that their early actions are particularly impor­tant to their reputations and that ­these initial perceptions of resolve are difficult to change during ­future interactions. Accordingly, new leaders ­will need to clearly signal their determination and commitment to their foreign policy interests and actions early during their tenures if they want to establish strong reputations for resolute action. This makes understanding the pro­cesses by which leaders effectively signal their resolve even more crucial from a policymaking perspective.

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how co ntext i n flu en ces lea d er repu tat i o ns It is also essential to recognize that leaders do not interact with each other in a vacuum. Indeed, current approaches to reputation for resolve suggest that certain contextual f­ actors, particularly power and interest, influence reputational assessments and predictions of an actor’s ­future be­hav­ior. I, therefore, also consider the effects of four key contextual f­ actors on leader-­specific reputations for resolve: a preexisting state reputation for resolve, state interest in an issue ­under dispute, relative military capability, and regime type. I focus on ­these four ­factors, as they are identified by current approaches as being potentially influential to predictions of resolve and reputational assessments. It would be overly simplistic to assume that a leader’s statements and be­ hav­ior always directly inform and contribute to perceptions of that leader’s resolve. Instead, ­factors outside of a leader’s direct control, such as ­these key contextual ­factors, may also affect how leader-­specific signals of resolve are interpreted. In this regard, I propose two hypotheses about the influence of ­these contextual ­factors on perceptions of leader resolve: 1. Contextual f­actors, on their own, are more influential to reputational assessments during initial interactions. 2. Contextual ­factors also create expectations of ­future be­hav­ior, which interact with a leader’s actions to condition reputational assessments. The same mechanism that leads challenger leaders to value statements of resolve during initial interactions with a new target leader may also affect the impact of information regarding state reputation, power, interest, and regime type on a leader’s reputation at vari­ous stages of interactions with a target leader. As challenger leaders have relatively l­ittle information about a new target leader’s resolve early in the target leader’s tenure, they may look to the characteristics of a new target leader’s state to try to predict the new target leader’s resolve during initial interactions before the target leader has revealed her resolve through physical acts. While such information w ­ ill be unlikely to perfectly reflect the target leader’s personal level of resolve, it may provide much-­needed clues about the ability of the new leader to pursue certain actions and is preferable to having ­little or no information about the new target leader’s potential resolve. When taken in isolation, therefore, t­ hese contextual ­factors are more influential to perceptions of the target leader’s resolve during initial interactions than they are l­ ater during the target leader’s tenure. Once a new target leader reveals her resolve through her actions, challenger leaders w ­ ill lessen their reliance on ­these contextual ­factors as an indicator of the target’s resolve, as they w ­ ill instead have direct information about the target leader’s personal resolve. Such contextual f­ actors, therefore, act as a placeholder, and challenger leaders know that informational cues derived from such contextual

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f­ actors are a poor substitute for information derived from the target’s own statements and be­hav­ior. But given that new leaders are unlikely to have had the opportunity to provide much information about their resolve shortly ­after they take office, challenger leaders would rather rely on poor information derived from contextual f­ actors than be faced with making judgments about a new leader’s potential resolve and ­future actions without ­these clues. ­These contextual f­ actors also create expectations about how a leader w ­ ill behave in the ­future, and ­these expectations then interact with the resoluteness of a target leader’s statements and subsequent be­hav­ior to influence perceptions of the target’s resolve. Information regarding power, interest, state reputation, or regime type, therefore, does not supplant the value of leader-­ specific signals of resolve. Rather, each of ­these ­factors can amplify a leader’s reputation for resolute or irresolute action or make it more difficult for leaders to acquire certain reputations. Reputation supporters argue that expectations of a state’s f­uture be­hav­ ior are rooted in that state’s demonstrated resolve during previous conflicts, particularly on the same or similar issues. In other words, a state’s past actions are indicative of that state’s characteristic level of resolve. Applying a leader-­specific dimension ­here suggests that the past be­hav­ior of a leader’s state may condition expectations about how a current target leader w ­ ill or should act in the f­uture. For example, leaders who come from states with reputations for resolute action ­will also be expected to act resolutely. When a leader from a resolute state fails to meet t­ hese expectations and acts irresolutely, her reputation for lacking resolve may be amplified. In contrast, when a leader from an irresolute state defies expectations by behaving resolutely, her reputation for resolute action may be bolstered. One could argue, for example, that Britain’s poor reputation for defending colonial interests actually bolstered Thatcher’s reputation for resolve, as her response in the Falklands caught the Junta off guard and helped her solidify her personal reputation for resolute action. Drawing on the arguments of reputation skeptics, I also consider how state interest in an issue u ­ nder dispute and relative military capability, two key immediate determinants of conflict, condition a leader’s reputation for resolve. Skeptics argue that states are expected to stand firm on issues that are most impor­tant to them and in which the stakes are high, such as where their national security is directly threatened. Leaders who communicate that an issue is a high priority for their state ­will be expected to act resolutely to defend their interests.53 Leaders who then back down on t­hese high-­priority issues ­will acquire even stronger reputations for lacking resolve, and leaders who fail to defend vital national security interests ­will be perceived as particularly weak and irresolute. Conversely, leaders who are resolute on issues that are of relatively l­ittle importance to their state w ­ ill more readily acquire reputations for resolute action. In ­these instances, backing down may not be as detrimental to that leader’s reputation, as leaders are not necessarily

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expected to defend interests that are relatively unimportant to them. For example, leaders who use military force to defend nonvital interests may be viewed as more resolute, as one might not expect leaders to employ such actions on issues that are lower-­stakes or that do not threaten the state’s territorial sovereignty or national security. In contrast, leaders who argue an issue is of vital concern or directly threatens their state’s broader national security but who then fail to act tough ­will be viewed as particularly irresolute given the communicated high priority of the issue at stake. Relative military capability may also condition a leader’s reputation for resolve. States that are relatively stronger than their adversaries are more likely to acquire reputations for resolute action, as ­these states have the ability to follow through on their threats.54 Accordingly, leaders from target states that are more power­ful relative to the challenger leader’s state are also expected to stand firm in the face of a threat, making target leaders from ­these power­ful states who back down much more likely to obtain reputations for irresolute action. Conversely, leaders from weaker states who stand firm w ­ ill be perceived as even more resolute, as they would have been expected to back down in the face of a threat. Nehru’s actions prior to the Sino-­Indian War in the early 1960s illustrate this interaction effect between a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior and ­these immediate determinants of conflict. In 1960, Chinese leaders offered a compromise over the disputed Aksai Chin border region between China and India. According to Mahesh Shankar, Nehru was expected to accept this deal for two primary reasons. The region was largely “unimportant to India’s interests,” and China was significantly more power­ful than India.55 Yet, Nehru instead rejected the deal in an attempt to invest in his personal reputation for resolve. Furthermore, he believed that such action would be an even stronger signal of his firmness b ­ ecause the issue was a low priority for the Indian government and India was in a weaker bargaining position than China. Thus, Nehru’s decision making illustrates the logic of my hypothesis regarding the interaction of leader-­specific signals of resolve and immediate determinants of conflict. Fi­nally, a state’s regime type may also influence perceptions of leader resolve. While this contextual ­factor is not widely examined in the debate on reputations for resolve, it is impor­tant to consider how the effects of democracy, in par­tic­u­lar, may condition leader-­specific reputations. H ­ ere, ­there are two distinct ways to think about the effects of democracy. First, democracies may be perceived as generally more resolute during negotiations and crises owing to the institutional context in which demo­cratic leaders generate credible commitments and communicate their intentions to outside observers. In theory, demo­cratic leaders must publicly declare a course of action, which ties the hands of ­these leaders and allows them to more effectively signal their resolve internationally.56 As accountability mechanisms inherent to democracies may bolster the perceived resoluteness of demo­cratic states,57

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How Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve

demo­cratic leaders ­will be expected to act resolutely in the face of threats, lest their publics punish them for backing down. Demo­cratic leaders who then back down on t­hese threats w ­ ill acquire more robust reputations for irresolute action when compared with nondemo­cratic leaders who also back down. Alternatively, demo­cratic leaders may simply find it more difficult to acquire personal reputations for resolve, as their actions may be interpreted in the context of the public’s ­will rather than the resolve of the individual. When ­these leaders act resolutely, their be­hav­ior may be attributed to the accountability mechanisms inherent to democracies rather than to the leader. Thus, regime type may condition the ability of leaders to acquire individual reputations.

Implications of My Argument As a w ­ hole, therefore, my theory identifies the conditions u ­ nder which dif­ fer­ent types of information are most influential to leader-­specific reputational assessments, as well as how ­these distinct ­factors contribute to ­these reputations. Thus, it disentangles the pro­cesses by which a leader’s reputation for resolve forms and changes through repeated interactions from the very beginning of the leader’s tenure and yields the following hypotheses: Leader-­Specific ­Factors:

1. Statements are more influential during initial interactions when challengers lack direct information about a target leader’s actions. 2. Statements create expectations of ­future be­hav­ior. ­There is an interaction effect between a leader’s statements and subsequent action, which together influence perceptions of resolve. 3. Early assessments of resolve significantly influence l­ ater perceptions of resolve. Contextual ­Factors:

4. Contextual ­factors, on their own, are more influential during initial interactions when challengers lack direct information about a target leader’s actions. 5. Contextual ­factors create expectations of ­future leader be­hav­ior. ­These expectations interact with a leader’s subsequent be­hav­ior to condition assessments of resolve. ­These hypotheses have impor­tant implications for the study of reputations for resolve, as well as how policymakers establish reputations for resolute action. While I assume that leaders are critical actors in international politics, leaders do not have direct control over their reputations. Instead, reputational assessments may be conditioned by f­actors outside of a leader’s

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direct control, including power, interest, a preexisting state reputation, and regime type. Leaders from some states, therefore, may find it harder to effectively communicate their resolve and to establish reputations for resolute or irresolute action. This is not to say that a leader’s own signals of resolve do not m ­ atter in t­hese situations; rather, how t­hose signals are interpreted by ­others may also depend on f­ actors beyond a leader’s direct control. Although leaders may try to manipulate or influence how their personal signals of resolve are interpreted by observers, their ability to do so is further conditioned by the context in which they interact with other leaders. Thus, leaders would be wise to recognize that some contexts may make irresolute be­hav­ior even more damaging to their reputations (such as if their state has a reputation for resolute action). Conversely, ­there may be situations where the reputational payoff of resolute be­hav­ior is amplified, creating stronger incentives for demonstrating resolve u ­ nder ­these conditions. Leaders also face a critical juncture in establishing their reputations upon taking office. New leaders must be mindful that their early statements are not cheap talk, as their early rhe­toric carries reputational consequences and further creates expectations of f­uture be­hav­ior. Leaders’ early statements and be­hav­ior, therefore, can have long-­standing effects on how they are perceived ­later in their tenures. New leaders may not have a grace period in which they are allowed to make foreign policy m ­ istakes, as early missteps may be seen as a sign of weakness and lacking resolve. But if new leaders effectively signal they are resolute early during their tenures, they may be less likely to face international threats or be the targets of international crises in the ­future. Leaders need not be belligerent in their early actions to establish reputations for resolute action. Rather, and I show in ­later chapters, leaders can communicate resolve without resorting to unnecessary bombastic claims or militaristic threats. Indeed, my hypotheses suggest that new leaders should be cautious in making escalatory or aggressive claims if they are unwilling or unable to follow through on ­these statements with firm action. And leaders who pre­sent inconsistent policy positions on critical foreign policy issues may suffer reputational consequences, as such inconsistency may signal a lack of resolve and determination—an issue I directly investigate in the subsequent chapters of this book. My hypotheses also carry implications for how we think about the ­connection between international leaders and reputations for resolve in international politics. While scholars tend to focus on how the internal characteristics of leaders affect their be­hav­ior,58 we have paid less attention to how leaders view the be­hav­ior of each other and how ­these perceptions affect crisis bargaining be­hav­ior. My perceptional approach to reputation highlights the importance of understanding how leaders interpret each other’s be­hav­ior as well as how the statements and be­hav­ior of leaders during diplomatic interactions are viewed by their contemporaries. This is especially critical to the study of resolve, as it is the perception of resolve that

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How Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve

other leaders act on, and such perceptions may not align with the intent of a leader’s statements or actions. A leader could think his intentions and resolve ­were clearly communicated, but outside observers may interpret that leader’s actions differently. In chapter 5, for example, I find that Kennedy believed he employed effective signals of resolve at the 1961 Vienna Summit; yet, Khrushchev perceived Kennedy to be less resolute than Kennedy anticipated. Thus, it is impor­tant to remember that it is the perception of a leader’s resolve that observers and potential challengers react to.

Alternative Arguments and Hypotheses In contrast to my arguments and hypotheses, t­here are two broad alternative ways to think about leader-­specific reputations as well as more specific alternatives to the causal mechanisms of my theory. im m ed iate d et ermi na n ts o f co n fli ct and lead er-­s p eci fi c repu tati o n s The first broad alternative questions the impact of past be­hav­ior, ­either from an individual leader or from the leader’s state, on assessments of resolve or predictions of ­future be­hav­ior. This alternative, drawn directly from reputation skeptics, instead argues that such assessments w ­ ill be driven by immediate determinants of conflict, primarily relative military capability and strategic interest. In this view, leaders w ­ ill be perceived as resolute when they have (1) the military capability to follow through on their stated course of action and (2) a clear strategic interest in ­doing so. Conversely, leaders ­will be perceived as irresolute when they lack the capability to follow through on a threat or when an issue is not a high priority for their state. This line of reasoning, therefore, does not predict t­ here ­will be an interaction effect between a leader’s past be­hav­ior and t­ hese key immediate determinants of conflict. Instead, this alternative hypothesis privileges the influence of power and interests over past be­hav­ior on predictions of resolve and ­future action. s tate repu tati o n a s lea d er repu tati o n The second broad alternative also questions the influence of a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior on reputations for resolve and instead privileges state past action. In this alternative, perceptions of leader resolve fully depend on the state’s past be­hav­ior, and leaders do not acquire separate reputations. Instead, leaders are expected to act resolutely or irresolutely based on the preexisting reputation of that leader’s state, not on that leader’s own statements or be­hav­ior. In this alternate view, therefore, leader reputations are equivalent to state reputations.59 Leaders from states with a history of acting

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resolutely ­will be perceived as resolute regardless of that leader’s be­hav­ior or statements. Conversely, leaders from states with a history of backing down ­will also be perceived as less resolute. More broadly, this line of reasoning significantly devalues the impact of the individual on reputations for resolve, as it suggests that leader-­specific reputations simply reflect the reputation of the leader’s state. alternati ve h ypo th eses o n statement s and early in t eracti o n s ­ here are also alternatives to my theory’s causal mechanisms regarding the T influence of statements and early interactions on perceptions of resolve. While I predict that statements are more salient to reputational assessments during initial interactions in a leader’s tenure, an alternative would argue the effects of a leader’s statements are stable throughout a leader’s tenure and do not wane across ­later interactions. This hypothesis, however, is agnostic as to the general effectiveness of ­these statements. If one believes statements are cheap talk, then statements of resolve would remain unimportant across a new leader’s interactions with ­others. In contrast, if one agrees that statements signal resolve, then the impact of statements would remain equally impor­tant across initial interactions during a leader’s tenure and ­later interactions. Other alternative arguments focus on the conditions ­under which statements effectively convey a leader’s resolve. First, one could argue that statements signaling a leader ­will be resolute are most effective ­after that leader has a proven track rec­ord of resolute action.60 Conversely, t­ hese types of statements would be least effective in signaling resolve if a leader previously acted irresolutely. Accordingly, a leader’s past actions may condition the impact of that leader’s statements of resolve. This could create incentives for leaders to obtain a reputation for resolute action as early as pos­si­ble. A second alternative argument hypothesizes that the impact of a leader’s statements depends on the issue at stake. On lower-­stakes issues, statements may be highly influential, as they are costly enough to communicate resolve on their own, regardless of when in a leader’s tenure ­these issues occur. However, on higher-­stakes issues, statements alone may not sufficiently convey resolve. Fi­nally, an alternative line of logic may also question the effect of early perceptions of resolve on ­later assessments and predict that prior beliefs about resolve do not significantly influence current or ­future perceptions of resolve. Instead, reputational assessments may be perfectly updated as new information becomes available. In the subsequent chapters of this book, I directly test the hypotheses of my theory against ­these competing hypotheses and show that my theory best explains the pro­cesses by which leader-­specific reputations for resolve form and change across interactions.

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How Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve

Testing Competing Arguments Conceptually, ­there are two distinct ways to test my hypotheses against alternative hypotheses: the leadership turnover approach and the single leader approach. The leadership turnover approach focuses on periods of leadership transitions to understand how the reputations of new leaders vary from the reputations of their pre­de­ces­sors. Logically, individual leader-­specific reputations for resolve should take hold when a new leader assumes office.61 ­After leadership transitions, therefore, new leaders should acquire their own individual reputations for resolve. By comparing perceptions of a new leader’s resolve with perceptions of the preceding leader’s resolve, this approach allows me to identify which ­factors contribute to leader-­specific reputations, as it examines how key variables affect perceptions of leader resolve directly before and ­after leadership transitions. Furthermore, this approach enables me to determine ­whether ­these assessments of resolve vary across new leaders and their pre­de­ces­sors, providing strong analytical leverage over the question of ­whether reputations for resolve can be leader-­specific. In addition, this approach is an excellent ave­nue for understanding how contextual versus leader-­specific f­actors influence leader reputations, as it investigates the impact of contextual f­ actors on both a new leader’s reputation and the preceding leader’s reputation. This approach alone, however, cannot reveal how leaders establish their reputations for resolve in the first place or how ­these reputations change across interactions, as it focuses on periods of leadership transitions. In contrast, the single leader approach exclusively examines a single leader’s reputation for resolve across repeated interactions. This approach, therefore, allows me to trace changes in a leader’s reputation for resolve over time, elucidating which types of information affect perceptions of a leader’s resolve and how this may change across interactions. In other words, the single leader approach disentangles how a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior contribute to perceptions of resolve u ­ nder dif­fer­ent conditions. Yet, this approach is less equipped to test for the effects of contextual f­ actors on reputations, as it does not compare the effects of t­ hese ­factors across leaders. Thus, I employ both the leadership turnover and single leader approaches to investigate how leader-­specific reputations for resolve form and change. s u rvey experi men ts In investigating how leader-­specific reputations for resolve form and change, I first use survey experiments to understand how leaders establish their reputations for resolve and how t­hese reputations change across interactions. The first survey experiment, presented in chapter 2, examines how the reputations for resolve of new leaders form from the very beginning of their

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tenures. More specifically, chapter 2 employs the single leader approach and focuses on the effects of a leader’s own statements and be­hav­ior on reputational assessments across interactions. The second survey experiment, presented in chapter 3, then more closely examines how the key contextual ­factors identified by my theory influence perceptions of leader resolve. This second experiment uses the leadership turnover approach to consider ­whether new leaders are perceived as distinct in their resolve from their pre­ de­ces­sors and from their states. Together, ­these two chapters directly test the mechanisms of my theory, providing an in-­depth analy­sis of how a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior affect that leader’s reputation, how ­these reputations change across interactions, and how ­these reputations are influenced by key contextual ­factors beyond a leader’s control, including a preexisting state reputation for resolve, relative military capability, state strategic interest, and regime type. Survey experiments are especially useful in understanding the formation of perceptions where direct access to decision makers is impossible to obtain. Such experiments help us understand how p ­ eople think, interpret information, and use this information to formulate their perceptions and assessments.62 While survey experiments have been used heavi­ly in other fields for de­cades, t­hese types of experiments are becoming increasingly widespread across both international relations and po­liti­cal science. Scholars, for example, have used experiments to explore questions about the importance of world leaders as well as reputations in international politics.63 The experiments I use are particularly well suited to address the questions and hypotheses put forth in this book for several reasons. First, the use of such experiments allows me to examine the causal relationship between key variables identified by my theory and alternatives and to investigate interactions between ­these variables that are difficult or impossible to study in noncontrolled environments.64 This is critical for testing the core tenets of my theory, as I predict t­ here are interaction effects between a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior as well as between contextual ­factors and a leader’s own signals of resolve. Second, ­these survey experiments provide keen insight into how individual perceptions form in the context of foreign policy decision making. The experiments illuminate the decision making pro­cesses of participants when they make assessments of resolve and isolate the effects of differing variables on ­these assessments. Furthermore, the construction of my two survey experiments allows me to disentangle the pro­cesses by which individual leaders acquire reputations for resolve across repeated interactions as well as across leaders ­after periods of leadership transitions. Thus, the experiments directly test the causal mechanisms of my theory and alternatives, providing impor­tant insights into how and ­under what conditions leaders acquire reputations for resolve. Despite the advantages of experiments, ­there are two primary concerns regarding their use to study phenomena in international relations. One is the

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How Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve

prob­lem of external validity, and the other is the prob­lem of internal validity. Issues associated with external validity manifest themselves in two ways. First, ­there may be impor­tant differences between subject populations and world leaders.65 This is certainly a valid critique. While any researcher would be ecstatic if policymakers participated in her experiments, access to t­ hese decision makers is often difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Sample populations, however, may not be as dif­fer­ent from a­ ctual decision makers as one might initially assume, as t­ here is evidence that elites and sample populations are often strikingly similar in how they access and pro­cess information to form perceptions and make decisions.66 Furthermore, our theories about how ­people think should be broadly applicable across individuals from a variety of backgrounds. Researchers can also employ sample populations that mirror the demographics of policymakers in certain ways. The samples I use skew male, as do world leaders more generally, and are rather highly educated (with almost 90 ­percent of participants in my surveys having some form of a college education—­compared with 80 ­percent of world leaders).67 The majority of participants in my study are also interested in international affairs and international events. While I do not claim that my sample populations perfectly represent the demographics of policymakers, the participants in my study are not as uneducated or uninterested in politics as one might initially think. Moreover, I randomly assign participants to dif­fer­ent treatment groups, which helps address the issue of external validity. The second prob­lem of external validity stems from the question of ­whether the conditions of the experiment accurately reflect the conditions of the real world. Experiments purposely simplify events, which can limit the generalizability of experimental results. Yet, t­ hese simplifications are what make experiments useful, as they allow researchers to directly test competing hypotheses and identify causal relationships between variables. I address this prob­lem of external validity in several ways. First, while my experiments pre­sent participants with hy­po­thet­i­cal scenarios and streamline real-­world interactions between policymakers, the content of both survey experiments—­and the sequence of events in the first experiment—is inspired by the course of events that unfolded across the case studies discussed in chapters 4 and 5. Furthermore, my use of hy­po­thet­i­cal scenarios in the surveys is well grounded in the experimental lit­er­a­ture, as ­these types of experiments help illuminate crisis bargaining be­hav­ior.68 Second, I engaged in extensive pretesting of the survey instruments to ensure that the scenarios ­were plausible, realistic, and easy for participants to understand. Third, while the stakes for participants are certainly lower than ­those for real-­world policymakers, the decisions respondents made within the survey ­were not costless for them. Rather, participants ­were told that the financial compensation they received in the survey was dependent on the quality of their decision making and responses.69

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The issue of internal validity considers w ­ hether participants, if they took part in the experiment again u ­ nder the same conditions, are consistent in their judgments. In designing the experiments, I took several steps to address this concern. First, each experiment uses an iterative design in which participants engage in multiple rounds of decision making within the survey. This not only increases confidence about internal validity but also allows for an examination of how participants’ perceptions change across the stages of the experiment.70 Second, I use multiple constructs, or questions, to mea­ sure the dependent variable in each experiment. This helps ensure participants are consistent in their responses, improving response reliability as well as internal and external validity.71 Fi­nally, I employ fact-­checking questions to ensure participants are paying attention to and understand the scenarios within the experiment. In addition, readers may won­der ­whether my experiments are an easy test of my theory. I believe they are not, for three reasons. First, the surveys are constructed such that participants are not led to believe that a certain response is the “right” answer. Furthermore, respondents, when they agree to participate, do not know the purpose of the study. Instead, they are simply briefed that they w ­ ill “read a scenario and answer questions based on what you have read,” and I am careful to ensure that my control questions do not bias or prime participants to think about the scenario in a par­tic­u­lar way. Second, I run alternative versions of the study in which the dependent variable is framed differently to ensure my results are not biased by the framing of the scenario or the questions asked to participants. Fi­nally, and most importantly, the experiment addresses periods of diplomatic negotiation and crisis. According to Weisiger and Yarhi-­Milo, reputations should be more difficult to observe during crisis diplomacy and bargaining than in more straightforward deterrence situations.72 Thus, my study employs a scenario in which it should be more difficult for leaders to acquire a reputation for resolve, in which past actions should be less impor­tant, and in which immediate determinants of conflict should be more influential to participants’ decision making. Thus, one could argue that this makes my findings regarding the prominence of a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior to her reputation even more striking. I also bolster my experimental results with evidence from historical case studies. This anchors my findings in real-­world historical data. Both the experiments and the case studies test the causal mechanisms of my theory, but in dif­fer­ent ways. This multimethod approach is essential to contextualizing the results of the survey experiments and confirming their validity. It is also essential in showing that the findings from my case studies apply to a larger population of observers. My use of multiple methods, therefore, is instrumental in overcoming the empirical limitations of any single approach to hypothesis testing.

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c a se stu di es The historical case studies further integrate the leadership transition and single leader approaches. The first case study, presented in chapter 4, considers how President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s reputation for resolve formed and changed across repeated interactions with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev. The second case study, presented in chapter 5, addresses ­whether President John F. Kennedy was perceived as distinct in his resolve from Eisenhower, as well as how Kennedy’s reputation changed across his interactions with Khrushchev. Using qualitative pro­cess tracing methods, ­these case studies complement the experiments by rooting my results in historical evidence. While the survey experiments provide a rigorous test of the causal mechanisms of my theory, the case studies carry impor­tant advantages for hypothesis testing. To a ­limited extent, they illustrate the findings from the experiments. Yet, they also directly test my hypotheses, as well as competing hypotheses, by investigating how Khrushchev’s perceptions of each president’s resolve formed and changed across interactions. In the case studies, I use pro­cess tracing methods to delineate which information Khrushchev used when making assessments of each president’s resolve, as well as how dif­fer­ent pieces of information affected ­these perceptions. Unlike comparative case study methods, pro­cess tracing reconstructs the events within a par­tic­u­lar case to understand why and how the sequence of events unfolded.73 By focusing on which information an individual used at dif­fer­ent points in a historical sequence, pro­cess tracing shows how that information affected a historical outcome. Thus, pro­cess tracing is especially helpful in identifying and testing the causal mechanisms at play within a par­tic­u­lar case and provides a thorough test of competing arguments. In this regard, indications that Khrushchev looked to each president’s statements or be­hav­ior when making assessments of that president’s resolve would provide support for my hypotheses. In contrast, evidence that Khrushchev instead relied primarily on Amer­i­ca’s past be­hav­ior, such as the 1948 Berlin Airlift, for example, would suggest that Khrushchev used past state action (and thereby a state reputation) to make inferences about each president’s resolve—­providing support for the state reputational hypothesis. Similarly, discussion by Khrushchev of nuclear or conventional power as well as the strategic interests or stakes for ­either the United States or the USSR would suggest that immediate determinants of power w ­ ere central to his decision making, providing support for the immediate determinants alternative hypothesis. As I explain further at the beginning of chapter 4, however, I also consider how Khrushchev uses ­these informational cues and ­whether ­these cues interact, as predicted by my theory. One potential critique of ­these two case studies is their relatedness and my purposeful choice to examine a single leader’s perceptions. Readers may won­der how generalizable my results are beyond Khrushchev or the

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Soviets.74 Other scholars of reputation have similarly examined interrelated cases to test their hypotheses.75 Furthermore, my focus on related case studies and my decision to hold the observer (Khrushchev) constant are instrumental in understanding how reputational assessments change over time and across interactions. Throughout each case, I am careful to consider how Khrushchev’s interpretation of each president’s resolve may be influenced by ­factors unique to Khrushchev’s par­tic­u­lar situation, such as his domestic insecurity at certain points in time, other po­liti­cal motivations, or his personality. I not only rely on Khrushchev’s own statements but also incorporate the perspectives of other Soviet decision makers as well as rec­ords from non-­Soviet archives.76 To this end, I do not solely employ public statements but also examine declassified private statements made between Khrushchev and other decision makers, which according to Hopf should be more reliable than Soviet public claims.77 Additionally, my experiments complement my case studies by showing that my arguments are applicable across a broader population, and my results from across two separate experiments and two case studies largely confirm each other. ­These two methods together, therefore, provide a rigorous test of my theory. The events that occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1955 to 1962 provide both an appropriate and in-­depth test of my theory. Across each case, ­there are multiple episodes of interactions in which Eisenhower and Kennedy engaged with Khrushchev. The first case study traces the formation of Eisenhower’s reputation for resolve beginning with the 1955 Geneva Summit, spanning the 1958 Berlin Crisis, and investigating subsequent negotiations a­ fter the crisis. The second case study examines how Kennedy’s reputation formed and changed across the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the 1961 Vienna Summit, the 1961 Berlin Crisis, and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Thus, ­there is within-­case variance for each case study, allowing for an analy­sis of Khrushchev’s perceptions across ­these events. Each of ­these cases also has overlapping issues, such as Berlin, allowing for a direct comparison of how perceptions of resolve formed across t­ hese issues for each president.78 I focus on ­these two cases precisely b ­ ecause they should be instances in which immediate determinants of conflict identified by reputation skeptics—­ such as state interest and relative military capability—­are highly prominent in Khrushchev’s decision making, providing a rigorous test of my hypotheses regarding the influence of a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior on reputation for resolve as well as t­hose of reputation skeptics. Furthermore, the Americans and the Soviets had been feuding over Berlin since the end of World War II, as evidenced by the 1948 Berlin Crisis. Both states ­were major powers with nuclear capabilities, providing ample opportunity for the United States as a state to acquire a reputation for resolve according to conventional approaches. Thus, one could argue ­these are most likely cases for

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How Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve

alternative hypotheses, particularly regarding the direct influence of immediate determinants and state reputations. ­These crises are also central to the study of international relations.79 The crises that occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Kennedy administration, in par­tic­u­lar, are exquisite examples of brinkmanship, making them excellent cases for the study of reputation for resolve. ­These cases are also used to explain another central concept in international relations that is closely related to resolve: credibility.80 In fact, policymakers and researchers often conflate resolve and credibility, although they are distinct concepts. While resolve is about an actor’s toughness, firmness, and determination, credibility is about believability.81 Within deterrence theory, an actor’s predicted resolve contributes to an actor’s predicted credibility. If I do not believe you are willing to face costs to achieve your goals, t­here is ­little reason for me to believe you ­will follow through on your threats or promises.82 This distinction between resolve and credibility is an impor­tant one, and it is essential that, within the case studies in par­tic­u­lar, I accurately mea­sure each concept. This book, however, is about resolve and how leaders acquire reputations for resolute or irresolute action and to what extent. I am careful, therefore, to ensure that my focus remains on resolve rather than on credibility, but I explic­itly note when policymakers conflate the two or when perceptions of resolve affect perceptions of credibility, and vice versa, within each case. Past work on reputation for resolve also relies heavi­ly on ­these crises to examine the development and influence of state reputation. Reputation skeptics find that key immediate determinants, particularly relative military capability, ­were central to Kennedy’s assessments of Khrushchev’s resolve and credibility.83 ­These analyses, however, primarily focus on how the Americans viewed Soviet action. Declassified and translated archival documents now make it pos­si­ble for researchers from a variety of backgrounds to examine Khrushchev’s decision making during this period. I rely extensively on translated primary sources, including Soviet memorandums, Politburo meeting notes, and speeches and press conferences by Khrushchev. This focus on translated documentation is not uncommon across po­liti­cal science and is highly preferable to relying only on other scholarly interpretations of historical events.84 While this potentially limits the information available for study within a case, it also allows for an examination of a wider range of phenomena across international politics. Moreover, I triangulate evidence from Soviet and Rus­sian archives with documents available from U.S. archives, including rec­ords of summit meetings and conversations, as well as publicly available interviews with high-­ ranking Soviet and U.S. officials. I also use secondary scholarly sources where translated primary sources are not available. In using t­ hese secondary sources, I focus on direct translated quotations or passages from Khrushchev

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where the author had access to documents that are not publicly available, rather than relying on the author’s interpretation of events. The subsequent chapters of this book, therefore, test the causal mechanisms and hypotheses of my theory while also testing alternative hypotheses. While some of my propositions are more strongly supported than o ­ thers, and ­there are instances in which I find competing evidence for dif­fer­ent hypotheses, the results of my analyses show that new leaders do acquire individual reputations for resolve that are separate from the reputations of their pre­de­ces­sors and of their states. While I find that perceptions of leader resolve can be influenced by certain contextual f­ actors, most notably a preexisting state reputation for resolve and strategic interest in an issue u ­ nder dispute, the results of each of my experiments and case studies reveal that a leader’s own statements and be­hav­ior remain highly influential to ­these reputational assessments, even accounting for key contextual ­factors. My results further demonstrate that statements are critical to the signaling of resolve, as they create expectations of ­future be­hav­ior that interact with a leader’s subsequent actions to significantly impact leader reputations. This book, therefore, shows that the statements and be­hav­ior of individual leaders critically affect how o ­ thers perceive their resolve and reveals how the reputations of leaders form and change across interactions.

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chapter 2

How Leader-­Specific Reputations Form and Change across Repeated Interactions

One of the central contributions of this book is its analy­sis of how new leaders establish their reputations for resolve from the very beginning of their tenures. In this chapter, I use a survey experiment and take the single leader approach to test my hypotheses against alternatives and to examine how perceptions of a leader’s resolve form and change across multiple hy­po­thet­i­cal interactions. The results largely support the predictions of my theory. In par­ tic­ul­ ar, the experiment reveals that statements create expectations of f­ uture action, which then interact with a leader’s subsequent be­hav­ior to influence participants’ perceptions of that leader’s resolve. Within the experiment, leaders who initially make strong statements but then fail to stand firm are perceived as significantly less resolute than leaders who consistently make tough statements and also stand firm. Leaders who fail to back up their resolute statements are also perceived as less tough and determined than leaders who make consistently irresolute statements but then stand firm, as well as ­those who send mixed signals of their resolve through their statements but ultimately also stand firm. The results further show that early perceptions of a leader’s resolve are significantly correlated with participants’ l­ater assessments of that leader’s resolve, indicating early interactions and the perceptions that stem from ­those interactions are highly influential to leader-­specific reputational assessments within the experiment. In other words, first impressions ­matter, as they influence ­later assessments. Furthermore, only certain contextual ­factors—­namely, a preexisting state reputation and state strategic interest in the issue ­under dispute—­create expectations of leader resolve within the experiment. ­These expectations then interact with a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior to influence participants’ assessments of resolve.

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Pro­cess Tracing Experiments and the Single Leader Approach In this chapter, I employ a factorial pro­cess tracing survey experiment, which tracks how participants assess the resolve of a single leader across repeated hy­po­thet­i­cal interactions of increasingly high stakes.1 ­These types of experiments pre­sent participants with scenarios in which the researcher embeds dif­fer­ent information, or treatments, across groups.2 By varying the information participants are exposed to, one can analyze how each treatment affects participants’ decision making. ­Here, I manipulate five key ­factors: the leader’s signaled resolve via the leader’s statements and be­hav­ior, the preexisting reputation for resolve of the leader’s state based on the state’s past be­hav­ior, state interest in the issue u ­ nder dispute, the regime type of the leader’s state, and the relative military capability of the leader’s state. I then compare the responses of participants randomly assigned to dif­fer­ent groups to determine the relative effect of a par­tic­u­lar treatment while holding other ­factors within the experiment constant, allowing me to test the hypotheses of my theory against alternative hypotheses. My argument, for example, predicts that a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior w ­ ill have a statistically significant influence on participants’ perceptions of that leader’s resolve throughout the experiment, but that information regarding a leader’s statements w ­ ill be more influential during the initial stages of the experiment rather than during ­later stages. In contrast, reputation skeptics would predict that information regarding state interest and relative military capability w ­ ill be most influential to participants’ perceptions of resolve and that information regarding a leader’s or state’s past be­hav­ior ­will have ­little (if any) effect on participants’ decision making. Pro­cess tracing experiments are dif­fer­ent from other forms of survey experiments in how information is presented to participants. In traditional survey experiments, like the experiment presented in the next chapter, the manipulated information is provided to participants within the scenario itself. This information, therefore, is preselected for participants who receive a given treatment regardless of w ­ hether this information would have been salient to their decision making. With pro­cess tracing experiments, participants are still randomly assigned to treatment groups and read scenarios; but the treatment information is not directly embedded in the scenario. Rather, participants choose which information to view in making their judgments, allowing them to decide which information is most impor­tant to their decision making. Pro­cess tracing experiments, therefore, allow researchers to better understand how participants come to a par­tic­u­lar decision, when a par­tic­ul­ar piece of information is influential to a participant’s decision making, and how their decision making changes across the experiment.3 This method, therefore, delineates both when and how specific treatment information influences participants’ assessments of a leader’s resolve, as well

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How Leader-­Specific Reputations Form and Change

as how influential ­these treatments and subsequent assessments are within the experiment. e x perim en ta l setu p Participants in this experiment read three successive scenarios in which they take the role of a leader of an unnamed state.4 The three scenarios address a consistent issue ­under dispute and are of increasingly high stakes as the survey progresses.5 Each of the three scenarios involves an ongoing foreign policy dispute with the same leader from a neighboring state over who should control an area of resource-­rich land along the participant’s and neighboring state’s shared border. In the first scenario, participants are told they “are about to enter into negotiations at an international summit with the leader of the neighboring state over who should control this disputed area of land along your shared border.” In the second scenario, participants are informed that, “since the summit ended a few months ago, you have de­ cided to enter into ongoing negotiations to try to find a solution to the dispute over who should control the disputed area of land.”6 Fi­nally, in the third scenario, participants are told that “despite the continued negotiations over the disputed piece of land, a compromise has not been reached,” and they have the option to “issue a threat to send military forces to the border” to try to end the dispute.7 At each stage of the experiment, participants are presented with the appropriate scenario and then read that, on the next screen, they “­will find pieces of information your advisors can gather to help you predict how the opposing leader” may act in each scenario. Participants are then presented with a screen in which they can choose which types of information they wish to obtain. This information is randomly ordered and based on each participant’s randomly assigned treatment or control group and condition. Participants are f­ ree to access as much or as l­ittle information as they see fit, and participants are not aware of which information they ­will have access to before seeing this screen.8 Accordingly, participants are not informed of the group or condition to which they are randomly assigned, nor are they told the information participants assigned to other groups or conditions may access. Participants then click on a selected piece of information to read that information. Once they finish viewing all their desired information at a par­ tic­ul­ ar stage, they are asked to make assessments about the opposing leader’s resolve. They then proceed to the next stage of the survey. ­After the final scenario and accompanying questions are presented, participants answer basic demographic questions and are debriefed. Figure 2.1 visually demonstrates the flow of the survey instrument. It is impor­tant to keep in mind that, while researchers would ideally like to examine ­every pos­si­ble type of interaction between leaders, survey

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Consent Form + Control Questions

Stage 1 1. Read Summit Scenario 2. Access Information 3. Answer Questions

Stage 2 1. Read Negotiation Scenario 2. Access Information 3. Answer Questions

Stage 3 1. Read Crisis Scenario 2. Access Information 3. Answer Questions

Demographic Questions + Debriefing

Figure 2.1 Single leader survey experiment design

e­ xperiments must be kept relatively succinct, as participants experience question fatigue. Furthermore, while real-­world crisis interactions pro­gress over weeks, months, or even years, it can be difficult to engage participants in multiple surveys across time. Such extended panel studies often have high dropout rates, which further heightens prob­lems of self-­selection as well as internal and external validity. While it may be less realistic to have participants engage in multiple rounds of interaction in a single session, it is highly preferable to the alternative given the prob­lems associated with such panel studies. Thus, I purposely condense three stages of interaction into a single experiment. In d ­ oing so, the experimental design focuses on three critical types of interactions between leaders and is based, in part, on the events revealed through the case studies in the l­ ater chapters of this book. t r eatm ent gro u ps Participants are randomly assigned to treatment groups in which they can access ­either information about leader-­specific ­factors only (that is, the opposing leader’s statements and be­hav­ior) or information about leader-­ specific ­factors and information about key contextual ­factors. Leader-­specific information includes information about a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior and reveals ­whether a leader is likely to be resolute or irresolute at each stage of interaction. In contrast, the contextual f­actors are drawn from the arguments of reputation supporters and reputation skeptics and include information about the opposing state’s past be­hav­ior and accompanying reputation (resolute or irresolute), strategic interest in the issue u ­ nder ­dispute (high or low), relative military capability (stronger, weaker, or equal in strength to the participant’s state), and regime type (demo­cratic or nondemo­cratic). By comparing the responses of participants who can access information only about leader-­specific ­factors with the responses of participants who can access information about leader-­specific ­factors in addition to contextual

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How Leader-­Specific Reputations Form and Change

f­ actors, I test for the relative influence of a leader’s own statements and be­ hav­ior on perceptions of resolve when information about power, interest, state past action, and regime type is also available to participants. The inclusion of ­these contextual ­factors, therefore, serves as a probative test of my second set of hypotheses about the conditioning effects of t­hese ­factors on perceptions of leader resolve. It also allows for an initial test of alternative hypotheses regarding the importance of immediate determinants of conflict and state reputation to leader-­specific reputational assessments. Additional participants are assigned to a control group in which they can only access information about contextual ­factors throughout the survey.9 Each participant is assigned to only one group and condition, and participants who can access information about contextual ­factors can access information only about one specific contextual ­factor throughout the entire experiment.10 In the first experimental group, participants can access information only about the resoluteness of a leader’s statements or be­hav­ior throughout the experiment, and the value of this information reveals the leader’s “type”—­ that is, ­whether the leader has signaled he is resolute or irresolute at each stage. The leader’s signaled type (resolute or irresolute) can vary across each stage of the survey, but the leader’s statements and be­hav­ior at a par­ tic­u­lar stage signaling that leader’s type are in accordance with each other. This, therefore, produces eight pos­si­ble leader types across the three stages of the experiment: Resolute/Resolute/Resolute, Resolute/Resolute/­ Irresolute, Resolute/Irresolute/Resolute, Resolute/Irresolute/Irresolute, Irresolute/Irresolute/Irresolute, Irresolute/Irresolute/Resolute, Irresolute/ Resolute/Resolute, and Irresolute/Resolute/Irresolute. Across the survey, participants assigned to this experimental group can access information about a leader’s statements to the press, information about the leader’s actions with other leaders, or additional information about the leader’s actions during the previous stage of interaction. For example, participants assigned to the Resolute/Irresolute/Resolute leader information only condition can access information about the leader’s statements to the press, revealing that the opposing leader “promised that he would be tough during the summit and make sure that his state’s position is heard” prior to the summit during the first stage, then stated that he “wanted to quickly reach a compromise and seemed to waver in his position” prior to negotiations during the second stage, and l­ ater “warned that he would not be intimidated into a compromise if he felt the terms of a settlement ­were unacceptable” prior to the potential crisis during the third stage.11 The content of this information, however, varies based on the participant’s assigned condition within this treatment group and w ­ hether the participant accesses a specific piece of information at each stage. Respondents assigned to this treatment group can access information only about the opposing leader’s statements and be­hav­ior and cannot access any information about contextual ­factors at any point in the experiment.12

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The second experimental group examines the influence of a preexisting state reputation for resolve, as revealed through that state’s past actions, on perceptions of leader resolve.13 Participants in this group can access information about the opposing leader’s statements and be­hav­ior as well as information about the past actions of the opposing leader’s state. ­Here, I manipulate w ­ hether the state has a history of resolute or irresolute be­hav­ior during past conflicts. Participants assigned to the resolute state reputation condition can access information that the opposing state has been “unwavering in its position” in past negotiations and “tends to stand firm in its demands” prior to the summit and negotiation stages and that the state “has stood firm in the past” when threatened by other states during the crisis stage. In contrast, participants assigned to the irresolute state reputation condition can access information that the opposing state has been “indecisive” in past negotiations and “tends to be very willing to compromise” during past summits and negotiations in the first two stages and that the opposing state “has backed down when threatened by other states” in the past during the crisis stge. The third experimental group investigates the importance of state interest to leader-­specific assessments of resolve. In this group, participants can access information about the opposing leader’s statements and be­hav­ior in addition to information about the opposing state’s interest in the dispute. At each stage, participants in this group can learn w ­ hether the issue is a high priority for the opposing leader’s state. Participants assigned to the high-­ interest condition can access information revealing that the issue is a “high priority” for the opposing leader’s state during the summit, that it is “the top priority for his state” during negotiations, and that it remains a “high priority” during the potential crisis. In contrast, participants assigned to the low-­interest condition can access information revealing that the issue “may not be his state’s top priority” during the summit, that it “is not a top priority for his state right now” during extended negotiations, and that “­there are other foreign policy issues that are of a higher priority right now” during the final stage of the experiment. The fourth experimental group considers the influence of regime type on assessments of resolve. In this treatment group, participants can access information about the opposing state’s “government type” across the experiment.14 Participants assigned to the democracy condition can read that “the opposing state is a democracy” during the summit stage of the experiment and that “as the opposing state is a democracy, the opposing leader was elected by the ­people” during the negotiation stage and crisis stage of the experiment. In contrast, participants assigned to the nondemocracy condition can learn that “the opposing state is not a democracy” during the summit stage and that “as the opposing state is not a democracy, the opposing leader came to office by taking power. He was not demo­cratically elected” during the negotiation stage and crisis stage. For this experimental group,

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How Leader-­Specific Reputations Form and Change

I also directly investigate ­whether participants understand the difference between demo­cratic and nondemo­cratic regimes, and I find that they are indeed aware of the general differences in the electoral mechanisms between demo­cratic and nondemo­cratic states. Fi­nally, the fifth experimental group addresses the influence of relative military capability, as participants can access information regarding the opposing leader’s statements and be­hav­ior as well as the relative military capability of the opposing state. Participants assigned to the military stronger condition can access information revealing that the “opposing state’s military is stronger than your military” during the summit stage, “the opposing state’s military is stronger than your military. They have both more troops and weapons than your military” during the negotiation stage, and “the opposing state’s military is stronger than your military. Their troops are better trained than yours” during the crisis stage. Conversely, participants assigned to the military weaker condition can access information revealing that the “opposing state’s military is weaker than your military” during the summit stage, “the opposing state’s military is weaker than your military. They do not have as many troops and weapons as your military” during the negotiation stage, and “the opposing state’s military is stronger than your military. Their troops are not as well trained as your troops” during the crisis stage. Fi­nally, participants assigned to the equal military capability condition can access information revealing that the “opposing state’s military is of equal military strength to your military” during the summit stage, “the opposing state’s military is comparable in strength to your military. You have roughly the same amount of both troops and weapons” during the negotiation stage, and “the opposing state’s military is equal in strength to your military. Both your troops and their troops are equally well trained” during the crisis stage. mea­sur­i n g re so lve The main dependent variable of interest across the experiment is how resolute or irresolute participants perceive the opposing leader to be at each stage of the survey. ­Here, I employ two common synonyms to mea­sure resolve: toughness and determination.15 Directly ­after reading each scenario and accessing the available information they wish to see, participants rate the opposing leader on a five-­point scale in terms of the leader’s toughness and determination. The wording of each of ­these questions is tailored to reflect the current stage of the survey. For example, during the summit stage, participants are asked: “During the summit, how likely do you think this leader is to be determined to strongly pre­sent his position at the summit?” and “During the summit, how tough or weak do you think this leader ­will be during negotiations?” Similarly, during the crisis stage, participants are asked: “How likely do you think this leader is to be determined to have a

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strong response to the threat?” and “How tough or weak do you think this leader ­will be in response to this threat?” Each participant’s responses to ­these two questions are mea­sured across a five-­point scale ranging from very likely to very unlikely to be determined to strongly pre­sent his position and very tough to very weak. I then average the values of t­ hese two responses for each participant to create a mea­sure of the leader’s overall perceived level of resolve along a continuous five-­point scale (1 = not at all tough and determined; 5 = very tough and determined) at each stage of the survey.16 Thus, rather than conceptualizing resolve dichotomously, this mea­sure­ment allows for a more nuanced analy­sis of the extent to which a leader is perceived to be resolute or irresolute across the experiment. pa rtici pan t s e­l ecti o n a n d d emo gra p hi c s Participants ­were drawn from the Amazon Mechanical Turk online recruitment platform, a large and relatively diverse subject pool. Only subjects over the age of eigh­teen and located in the United States ­were eligible to participate in the survey, and participants who failed to correctly answer two fact-­ check questions embedded in the survey ­were excluded from the final sample. The final sample (N = 3,198) is fairly evenly split between male (50.91%) and female (49.09%) respondents.17 Participants are well educated, as approximately 90 ­percent have some form of college education or higher. Interestingly, this parallels the educational demographics of a­ ctual world leaders, as studies show that approximately 80 ­percent of world leaders have some form of college education.18 Respondents are more likely to identify as liberal (57.94%) or Demo­cratic (39.21%) than as conservative (20.85%) or Republican (14.48%). Overall, participants are interested in international politics, as over 50 ­percent report they e­ ither closely or very closely follow international events. ­Later, I consider how participants’ demographics or worldviews may influence their assessments of resolve or mediate the effects of treatments in the experiment.19

Results: How New Leaders Establish Reputations for Resolve In examining the results of the experiment, I focus on how dif­fer­ent pieces of information affect participants’ perceptions of leader resolve across interactions. As participants receive a given treatment only if they access that treatment’s relevant information, I compare only the responses of participants across groups who accessed a specific piece of information at a par­tic­ u­lar stage. Thus, I consider the effect of treatments on perceptions of resolve by comparing the means and variances of responses for participants assigned to dif­fer­ent groups and who access par­tic­u­lar pieces of information. This sta-

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How Leader-­Specific Reputations Form and Change

tistical and analytical technique, known as analy­sis of variance (ANOVA) methods, is especially helpful in understanding the substantive effect of dif­ fer­ent treatments on participants’ decision making.20 t h e i n fluen ce o f lea d er statemen ts and be­h av­i o r acro ss i n teracti o n s I first investigate the responses of participants who could access information only about the opposing leader’s statements and be­hav­ior throughout the experiment, and I examine the influence of ­these leader-­specific ­factors on participants’ perceptions of the opposing leader’s resolve. This pre­sents an initial, but crucial, test of the plausibility of my argument. If leader-­specific ­factors do not significantly influence perceptions of resolve within the experiment when this is the only information participants can access, t­ here would be l­ittle support for my theory and hypotheses. In other words, one could think of this first series of tests as acting as a “hoops test” for my theory. The results of t­hese tests, therefore, demonstrate the relative importance of a leader’s statements and be­hav­ior—­when taken in isolation—to reputational assessments across the experiment. ­Table 2.1 uses ANOVA tests to examine the statistical influence of resolute and irresolute leader statements and be­hav­ior at each stage of interaction across participants who accessed such information at each stage.21 ­These re­Table 2.1  Perceptions of resolve: Leader-­based information only

Information choice Summit stage Leader statements Negotiation stage Leader statements Past leader be­hav­ior Crisis stage Leader statements Past leader be­hav­ior

Resolute

Irresolute

Mean (sd)

Mean (sd)

4.701 (0.449)

F

n

2.241 (0.803)

2739.57***

778

4.079 (0.849) 4.133 (0.916)

2.364 (0.928) 2.302 (0.991)

427.12***

460

527.02***

576

4.276 (0.637)

2.371 (0.893)

498.75***

332

4.288 (0.627)

2.240 (0.803)

1200.09***

606

Note: Means presented; standard deviation in parentheses. *p