Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party: Nguyen Van Linh and the Programme for Organizational Reform, 1987-91 9789814379229

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RENOVATING THE

Vietnamese Communist Party

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional resea rch ce ntre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability and security, economic developme nt, and political and social c hange. The Institute is governed by a twe nty-two-me mbe r Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambe rs of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer. The Indoc hina Unit (IU) of the Institute was form ed in late 1991 to meet the increasing need for information and scholastic assessment on the fast-changing situation in Indochina in general and in Vietnam in particular. Researc h in the Unit is developme nt-based , with a focus on conte mporary issues of political economy. This is done by reside nt and visiting fellows of various nationalities, a nd to understand the Vietnamese perspective better, the Unit also has a regular programme where by sc holars from Vietnam are invited to do research on issues of topical interest.

RENOVATING THE

Vietnamese Communist

PTY Nguyen Van Linh and the Programme for Organizational Reform, 1987-91

Lewis M. Stern

Unit INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES I5EA5 Indochina

Published by Institute of So utheast Asian Stud ies He ng Mui Keng Te rrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval syste m, or tra nsmitted in any form or by a ny means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permiss ion of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. ©

1993 Institute of Sou theast Asian Studies

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily riiflecl the views or the policy of the US. Department of Defense, the United States Government, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies or its supporters.

Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Stern, Lewis M. Re novating the Vietnamese Commun ist Party: Nguye n Van Linh and the programme for organizational reform , 1987-91. l. Vietnamese Communist Party- Reo rganization. 2. Vietnam -Politics and governme nt-19753. Vi etnam- Eco nomic policy. 4. Nguye n Van Linh I. Title. sls93 -33724 1993 DS559 .912 S83 ISBN 981-3016-558 (soft cover, ISEAS, Singapore) ISBN 981-3016-566 (hard cove t~ !SEAS, Sin gapo re) TSSN 0218-6 08X For the USA and Canada, a hard cover ed ition (ISBN 0-312-12037-0) is published by St. Martin's Press, New York. Typeset by Th e Fototype Business, Singapo re Printed in Singapo re by Singapore.> National Printe rs

Dedicated to the memory of Professor K.S. Sandhu Director of /SEAS, 1972-92

v

Contents

Acknowledgements

~X

1

Introduction one 1987: Consolidating the Programme for Party Renovation

two 1988: Staying the Reformist Course

5

27

three 1989: Turning Back to Orthodoxies: Conservative Backlash and the Impact on Reform

55

four 1990: Economic Crisis, Organizational Failure and the Conflict over Reformist Goals

91

five 1991: Fashioning Consensus: Towards the National Party Congress vn

135

V!U

Contents

six Conclusion: Nguyen Van Linh and the "New Way of Thinking"

177

Notes

181

Note on Terminology

207

Acknowledgements

This project began as an essay for Vietnam Commentary, published by the Information Reso urce Ce ntre of Singapore. I thank the m for th eir e ncourage me nt. I initially developed so me of th e the mes in this stud y in Conflict and Transition in the Vietnamese Economic Reform Program, published in 1988 by the Institute of Sec urity and International Studies of Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand. I gratefully acknowledge their assistance in preparing this early version of my views. I profited from astute co mme nts on the reforms in Vietnam by Sukhumbhand Boripatra, and Vo Nhan Tri's ex pert obse rvations o n Vietnam's eco nomy. I tha nk William Turley for his tre nchant co mme ntary and encourage me nt , and Nayan Chanda for his succi nct evaluation of my earl y drafts on Nguyen Van Linh . Jacques Be kae rt, Elizabeth Becker, Robert Deslatte, Bill Herod, Nguye n Man h Hung, Karl Jackson , Chau Kim Nhan, Douglas Pike, and Josep h Zasloff provided importa nt criticism and advice, and opportunities for long discussions about Vietnam . Ge neral John W. Vessey, Jr. , (ret), very kindly took me with him on several of his trips to Hanoi between October 1989 and April 1993 . I de rived the e ne rgy it too k to write thi s work from my wife, Mary, LX

.r

Ackno II' Iprfgements

who prodded me to turn an odd-sized manuscript into a book-length study, and from my children, Eva and Anna, who thought that writing a book was a nice thing for their father to do, and volunteered many hand-drawn illustrations. My father passed away before he could take this manuscript in hand and give it the close, discriminating examination all my work, from grade school on, received. I miss his loving assistance. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily represent the positions of the Department of Defense or any part of the United States Government.

Introduction

The Vietnamese Communist Party (VNCP) has been preoccupied with renewal and reorganization for over a decade. Its regimen of self-reform has included efforts to eliminate inefficient, ineffective and corrupt cadre; recruit younger, skilled and better educated members; improve basic party chapter-level leadership and organization; and select and train a generation of party secretaries at all levels. These reform efforts have limped along since the late 1970s with an inconsistent momentum and have taken several forms, including the sustained attempts to reclassify party chapters and organized efforts to expel dead wood from the rank and file. During 1987-90, under the leadership of Nguyen Van Linh, party reform gained a new lease on life. The political consequences of economic transformation prompted the Vietnamese leadership to shape a parallel reform within the interiors of the party. Linh's approach to party reform was unique in several respects. Linh relied less on mobilizational instruments - campaigns, exhortations, symbols - and more on bureaucratically co-ordinated programmes. Linh also utilized unique combinations of resources to attack specific party-related problems, often relying on media and selected mass organizations to propel his reformist agenda. 1

2

Introduction

During 1987 and 1988 Linh fashioned a comprehensive package of party reforms that was more ambitious than the reformist goals of his predecessors. That package included efforts to empower local organizations to take on more respo nsibilities, parallel with the increasing eco nomic autonomy gradua!Jy granted to e nte rprises. Under Linh the party also sought to introduce a more flexible style of manage ment, rely increasingly on modern organizational skills and manage ment techniques, and improve the training of party managers. The reforms also focused on co nfining the party to a more limited role as the co nscie nce of the revolution responsible for fashioning social and political direction and maintaining the integrity of the revolutionary inheritance, while allowing responsibilities for daily governance to pass to a body of elected and appointed officials. The reforms attempted to guide the party towards quality co ntrol in operational matte rs and membership policy in a manner that e mphasized respon sive ness to direct, critical complaints against party pe rsonnel and organizations. Under Linh, the party sought to instrume nt these goals through a variety of organizations, committees and local and provincial party committee meetings. Expanded sessions of provincial party committees were convened to facilitate the writing of Action Programmes inte nded to emphasize th e pre-e minance of the economic reforms. Provincial and subordinate party organizations were e mpowered to orchestrate local Purification Campaigns at the branch, district and provincial party co mmittee levels based on guidelines that governed the 1986 Criticism/Self-Criticism Campaign. Internal party and economic inspection tea ms were deployed at grass-root levels during the first quarter of 1987. Those teams were charged with closely monitoring and supervising the personal lives and individual morality of party members. Linh relied on visits to subordinate chapters by higher ec helon party officials to superv ise local party chapter self-inspection. He supported efforts by the party's secretariat to imple me nt the revision of th e party statutes put forth at the Dece mber 1986 Party Congress that shorte ned th e length of the probationary period for cand idates and aUowed only minimal leeway for me mbers found guilty of violation s of the party's code of conduct. In addition, Linh sought to improve control department mec ha nisms at aU levels by elucidating

Introduction

3

their role as ombudsmen-like structures to process the complaints and accusations triggered by his policy of opening the party to some public scrutiny. Linh's actions emphasized the need for sharing power between members of the polity. He strongly argued that party building should properly include non-party entities: "We should not leave patty-building work entirely to party committees at various levels .... We should overcome the tendency to separate administrative and specialized work from party work". Linh stressed the division of state and party labour in a manner intended to prohibit the pmty from tampering with governance. At the same time as Linh continued to seek means to broaden political participation by non-party entities and to maximize the independence of action of mass organizations, he took pains to stress the extent to which the party would remain central to the process, and would continue to exert a strategic, guiding influence. At the Sixth Congress of the Vietnamese Federation of Trade Unions in October 1988 Linh stated: It is true that, at present the working class and labourers are stiU dissatisfied with the party leadership and stale management, but it is also true that they have never contended that there is any other political force that can replace the historical role of our party and state ... 1

Under Nguyen Van Linh, plenary sessions of the Central Committee took on increasing importance in the decision process as a forum where competing views on policies and fundamental political issues were articulated and actively discussed. [n large part, this was a result of Linh's flexible, inventive and somewhat unconventional mode of operating in the context of the Vietnamese bureaucracy. At critical junctures between National Congresses of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Central Committee plenary sessions addressed pressing strategic issues and d efined poljcy direction for the party organization, often in highly charged environments. 2 Howeve r, the plenum had never been a highly structured format. The statutes of the VNCP disposed of the plenum in one brief, uncomplicated article which decreed that Central Committee plenary sessions are held to

4

Introduction

elect a Politburo, a Secretariat, and a General Secretary. The size of the Politburo and the Secretariat are decided by the plenary sessions. The Central Committee meets once every six months, and once every six months reports to the lower echelons (cap duoi) on the general situation and the work performed.:l The meaning and impact of the plenary session have been more dependent on the operating style of the General Secretary and the chemistry of the Central Committee than on the party's formal rules. At first, Linh used plenary sessions as a showcase for his policies and his skills as a spokesman for the new policies. He made strong speeches and took a highly visible, active role in representing his views on key issues at plenary meetings. Linh preferred a regular~ predictable and more frequent schedule of plenary meetings in order to maximize his opportunities to lobby for his policies. However~ by 1988 Linh was increasingly stymied by the closing of ranks of party conservatives, the glacial speed with which the party organization responded to pokes and prods intended to start the job of reshaping the organization, and the extent to which ineffective leadership, poor organizing habits and venality had saturated the core of the party. Though he was able to shift the balance of ministerial power more towards the advantage of non-Central Committee specialists, change provincial party leadership to a significant degree, and modify monopolies and regional policy cliques in at least small ways, by 1988 his ability to dominate the process of central party decision-making had slipped. In 1988 the schedule for plenary sessions reverted to the irregular calendar for meetings that was typical of Le Duan's stewardship over the VNCP The decreased number of plenary meetings in 1988 suggested that the party required additional time to discuss sensitive issues before public statements representing consensus could be presented, and in some instances could not come to agreement on the pressing issues, all of which points to Linh's diminished ability to maintain strong control over the organization and its policy processes in the second year of his rule. This book traces the evolution of the reforms of the party organization under Nguyen Van Linh.

one

1987: Consolidating the Programme for Party Renovation

Introduction In 1987 the VNCP encouraged the streamlining of organizations, sought to improve the personnel assignment process, and to devise more orderly training programmes for party officials. The party sustained province-wide campaigns to reclassify party chapters, recruit new membership, and expel unreformable elements. 4 The party also focused on teaching party chapters to run orderly meetings, and clarifying the roles and responsibilities of party officers. 5 Finally, the party continued efforts to create regular training cycles for committee and chapter secretaries, the party's workhorses. 6

Critical Introspection: Writing the Party's Report Card From late January to late February, expanded sessions of the provincial party committees convened to examine the documents of the Sixth Party Congress and to write Action Programmes to familiarize the provinces with the Three Economic Programmes - food production, consumer goods production, and production for export. 7 Beginning in early February, on the occasion of the anniversary of 5

6

Renovating the

Vietnameo~e

Communist Party

the founding of the party, the provincial and subordinate party organizations instituted local Purification Campaigns, systematic efforts to re-evaluate party members, and upgrade recruits. 8 The original schedules for the local campaigns, as defined in a VNCP Directive, stipulated that provincial party committees would receive district party accounts of a drive to improve party militancy and membership quality by 20 January. In addition, by that date the provincial party committees were to have received reports from district and provincial officers who had participated in the Meetings With The Masses in January. Those sessions were essentially town meetings at branch and district party committee levels that disseminated the results of the Sixth National Party Congress and discussed the criticisms levelled against the documents and resolutions drafted for the Congress. Proposed amendments to the Political and the Economic Reports to the Sixth Congress, and the Action Plans for putting that critical spirit to work, were to be recorded by participating cadre and dispatched to the provincial party committee standing bodies. The party had committed itself to another period of critical introspection, on the model of the Criticism/Self-Criticism Campaigns of late 1986. It empowered the organizational machinery established for that purpose to process local complaints against party chapters and local government machinery. The result was a careful weeding-out of the membership's dead wood, the initiation of a sustained recruitment drive, and a concentrated attack on inefficiency and corruption in the newly-elected party committees. 9 Provinces deployed internal and economic inspection teams to grass-root party chapters for a period of "membership surveillance", an exercise involving the close monitoring and supervision of the perso nal lives, individual morality, and the organizational capabilities of party cadres and members. 10 Local party chapters became more programmatic about enforcing self-inspection and undertaking chapter level evaluations. Higher echelon party officials paid visits to subordinate chapters to take the measure of chapter officials and the abilities of c hapter cadre to deliver services and perform party functions. 11 In the Fe bruary campaign, for example, ward committees in Ho Chi Minh City established standing committees for investigation, which were

Consolidating the Programme fo r Party Renovation

7

responsible for hearing cases involving alleged malfeasance of ward and basic level party me mbe rs, and malcing d ecisions regarding re primanding, warning, suspending or expelling from the party members judged to be culpable by those committees. 12 Provincial party committees carefully reviewed re ports on party perso nnel manage me nt and e nforced the programme of intensified disciplinary work durin g the 3 Fe bruary-19 May Political Activity Drive (Phong Trao Hoat Dong Chinh Tri). The drive emphasized educational and training tasks, and publicized the new Party Statutes. 13 The Secretariat issued a circular on the implementation of the Party Statutes that focu sed the attention of party committee echelons and basic party organizations on the amendme nts to and revisions of the statutes decid ed upon by the December 1986 Congress. Those revisions implemented a shorter probationary pe riod for candidate me mbers, reducing the 18-month term to 12 months; eliminated the disciplinary measure of returning a member accused of wrongdoing to probationary status; retained only four modes of punishment ranging from reprimand to ex pulsion ; and allowed only a minimum of leeway for members found guilty of violations of the party's cod e of co nduct. 14 The party also focused on reinvigorating its co ntrol department mechanisms at all levels (cac to chuc dang uy ban kiem tra cac cap). A late May conference of the Central Committee's Ce ntral Control Committee in Hanoi, over which Politburo me mber Do Muoi presided, stressed the req uire me nt of co ntrol work at the basic party organization level. The confe re nce foc used on the investigative roles of control departments as the keeper of party discipline, the arbiter of confli cts over the application of party statutes, and the point of control for local party financial matte rs. 15 Local control departments and mass organizations were urged to co-operate in these efforts. The formula describing co-operation betwee n party and non-party entities was so mething of a co mpromise version of the "experimental" role for nonparty instrume nts in the process of party reform that was prescribed during the June 1985 eighth plenary session. The compromise clearly sought to re move the intrusions into hallowed internal party business by non-party organizations appointed to monitor the party. 1(,

8

Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

The programme of reform for the party's apparatus at all levels provided for the broadening of control committee duties. 17 The programme paid continued attention to the question of refining the division of labour between the party and the state in precise terms, in a way that would rule out duplication of effort and preserve the party's guiding role and the state's administrative responsibilities. 18 The programme also focused on revising party membership criteria in a manner acknowledging the need for modern managerial abilities and technical economic and administrative knowledge, 19 and devising a more systematic and regularized public dissemination of the results of disciplinary measures taken at party meetings. 20 While these were by no means radical departures from standard operating procedures, they were an indication that the long-standing Vietnamese practice of creating more organizations to solve organizational weaknesses, and the habit of multiplying levels of bureaucracy to cope with institutional breakdowns, had been at least partially replaced by real intentions to refrain from burdening the system with yet another complex of decision-making centres. The party, however, remained a rigidly formal conglomeration of rules and relationships whose activities and authority were conditioned by the mechanisms invented to ensure Democratic Centralism. Control work, inspection procedures, and some of the other organizational reforms were essentially a way to cut across those systems, without departing from the system itself.

Sharing Power: The Calculus of Party-State Relations During the early months of 1987 newspapers and radio broadcasts focused on the party's failures, stressed the need to eject corrupt and ineffectual members who had managed to linger in the party's ranks, and highlighted the new calculus of party-state relations. In February, Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee Chairman Vo Tran Chi spoke of the limited "consultative" role that the party should play in the enterprise of economic and managerial reform .2 1 Considerable media attention was devoted to the separation of

Consolidating the Programme for Party Renovation

9

party and state power through the middle of the year. In articles published in Saigon Giai Phong in advance of the National Assembly elections, a good deal of attention was paid to the importance of minimizing the role of the party in determining election lists, and the need to eliminate the set percentage of party members who must be elected to representative positions. 22 During March and early April, newspaper articles focused on the weaknesses of an incestuous candidate selection process whereby local organizations had relinquished control over the selection of applicants to party entities at higher levels, resulting in consistent election of low quality cadre. 23 Additionally, the media discussed the need to allow individuals without party credentials to attain leadership roles in government. The party was taken to task in newspaper articles for making party membership the determining criterion for all positions of authority, which effectively precluded the candidacy of qualified people outside of the party with unique technical backgrounds, experience and specialized training. 24 By mid-year the party was bracing itself for a full-scale internal war against organizational inadequacies and personnel weaknesses. In late June, the media began to refer in elliptical terms to a cleansing campaign that the Politburo was poised to initiate, with the aim of purifying party ranks, stiffening the party organization, and strengthening the machinery of governance. 25 The campaign had its origins in late May meetings of chapter level party organizations, orchestrated by provincial party organizations, which were convened to consider the methods of membership candidacy, evaluation and selection. 2 " Provincial party organizations and subordinate party entities reviewed the cases of party card holders who had declined in quality, neglected their duties, and freely violated party and state laws. By late July, party organizations had begun to dispense judgments, reassign cadres, dismiss unredeemable characters, and dismantle party organizations that were too thoroughly penetrated by inefficient members and ineffective leadership to warrant recycling. Ha Bac reported the expulsion of members of party organizations subordinate to the provincial establishment, and the prosecution and subsequent dismissal of members of the provincial foreign trade organization. 27 Cuu Long dissolved a subordinate party committee attached to a corporation. 28 Kien Giang

10

Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

Province reviewed cases involving 2,290 members, and took undisclosed action against 184 members, including five party organization chiefs and deputies. 29 In an August interview, Nguyen Van Linh noted the party's plans to run a massive review of membership by the end of the year. 30

The Second Plenum, April 1987: Setting Bottom Lines The VNCP's second plenary session for 1987, from 1-9 April, provided General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh with the opportunity to demonstrate the strength of his convictions, reiterate the urgency of the issues, and argue in support of his special approach to remedial economic policies. :> J Linh spoke strongly on the need to address weaknesses in the area of pricing, finance, banking and wage, budget, and goods circulation policies. The General Secretary addressed the pressing problems caused by inflation through reductions of state expenditure, especially on capital construction projects; control of price increases on consumer items and essential supplies for production; and concerted efforts to confine the negative impact of inflation on state employees, workers and members of the armed forces. Linh emphasized the need to set the party's sights on manageable and achievable undertakings. He spoke of efforts to untangle the country's most immediately consequential problems by the end of 1987 as a "first step", deferring major systemic reforms until after the urge nt issues underlying the "current chaotic situation" were addressed. Linh reaffirmed the basic reform programme, forbidding reversions to the habit of "bureaucratic centralism" and the practices of state subsidies to enterprises. He also set an outside limit on the extent of the reforms, describing the plunge toward an unbridled contract economy as similarly anathema. In his opening speech to the plenum, Linh outlined the several fundamental questions that were to occupy the attention of the policymakers for the near-term future. To Linh , the central debate was over the role of the party and government in an economy consisting of increasingly autonomous compo nents and sectors. A second issue was

Consolidating the Programme fo r Party Renovation

ll

the process of economic planning, including the conflict over the balance between organized markets and "spontaneously developed markets", and the need for a more orderly division of labour between the central authorities and sectors on strategic a nd tactical economic decisions. Finally, Linh noted the party's focus on the debate over the choice between taking the means of production (the sum total of economic relationships that constitute the system of economic life) or the process of productivity (the more mechanical application of energy and input to produce an item) as the economic starting point. In his ope ning and closing speec hes at the plenary session, Linh noted the promine nce that this issue received in the months leading up to the Ce ntral Committee session , and the extent to which the issue was a major sticking point during the proceedings of the ple num itself. Linh's speeches and the ple nary session communique de monstrated that though the need for reform was a widely accepted premise, the direction and intent of the economic reform package d efined during 1984 and 1985 continued to be the subject of a Politburo level debate. The party continued to debate its role and organizational capabilities in the context of a complex and changing economic structure, and the efficacy of granting autonomy to economic production units. The party had not reached agreeme nt on the means of balancing increasing local decision-making powe r in economic affairs with the mainte nance of a centrally-run and state-controlled market. Finally, the party continued to disagree on the new patterns of authority for existing political instrume nts, new practices of ma nage me nt and powe r-sharing, and new instrume nts to run new eco nomic form s born of the regime's flexibility on the rules governing joint state-private businesses and independ e nt e nterprises. Finally, Linh suggested that though slow and ponderous, the system had begun to demonstrate a n ability to heal itself. The party had empowered new and specialized components to underta ke sensitive tasks in the context of the reformist process. The party had invigorated moribund or hithe rto low level, little-known or cla ndestine organizations within the party's executive structure, and charged those ele ments with new mandates in support of the reforms. The party had also e ncouraged working styles for th ose party organizati ons that were

12

Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

less capricious and more easily monitored, including basic habits of discussing and communicating decisions to lower levels through the "transmission belt" connecting higher echelons to their wards. The plenum, as evidenced by the Central Committee communique, was ultimately little more than an organized attempt to equivocate on hard questions over the role of free markets, the conditions for granting enterprises full managerial responsibility for profits and losses, the reduction of mandatory planning, and the increasing scope of "guidance planning" and market regulation. Linh, however, demonstrated his ability to speak firmly, to take on the tough issues in straightforward language, and to challenge and chide the Central Committee to take controversial steps along the reformist road.

Post-Plenary Developments In the aftermath of the second plenary meeting, the regime sought to devise the enabling legislation to implement Linh's specific programmes, and to define the operative economic units and market forms that had been authorized by the party. Among the central instruments for propelling the reforms were the pilot projects, islands of experimentation empowered to stay one or two steps ahead of the programme. 32 The regime was to keep its bargain by stabilizing contractual norms and readjusting taxation; allowing certain market forces to prevail, for example in e nterprise purchases of raw materials; and authorizing the inventive use of banking resources, business revenues, and capital depreciation funds, among other commitments.33 In return, the pilot projects were to feel their way along, attempting solutions to economic quandaries with newly available tools. There was not much order or energy behind the organization and management of such pilot projects. The most inventive uses of the new rules of socialist economics seemed, from journalistic accounts, to have been little more than local enterprises that forcefully and cleverly organized marketing efforts based on astute readings of consumer demands and opportunities presented by local economic disarray. 34 Before the flirtation with market forms could proceed too far, the

Consolidating the Programme for Party Renovation

13

regime became embroiled in a slight backlash of second thoughts that had simmered from the period prior to the Second Plenum. Strongly stated articles in the party's daily newspaper spoke of the need to recall the importance of state control over new forms of business, including private enterprise. 35 Vigorous jabs at the reforms, phrased as reminders to submit non-socialist economic components to the "guidance" of the socialist economy, appeared in the press from the days immediately following the Second Plenum through July. 36 Throughout, the regime continued to criticize party and state mechanisms. Some provincial party committees and municipalities established specialized groups directly subordinate to the standing committee of the party organization, which facilitated the investigation of cadre corruptionY The party emphasized a more global co-ordination of ministerial level control and inspection work. 38 Following the National Assembly elections in July, the regime focused attention on the weaknesses of people's councils and sought to (l) sync hronize the work of "specialized agencies" of local inspection and control with the existing judicial apparatus, (2) upgrade the status of people's councils and committees, and (3) turn disorderly local government into systematic administration. 39 The Vietnamese, however, seemed to have reached the limits of reformist possibilities between June and July. Merchants began to note the constraints on their maneuverability. The media began to highlight lapses in the system, including failures to register private businesses, fragmented supply distribution, and ineffectively coordinated plans. The government began to point out significant revenue losses and its dissatisfaction with the pace of the implementation of new economic laws. 40

Consolidating the Reform Programme: The Third Plenum, August 1987 The third plenary session of the VNCP Central Committee, which ran from 20-28 August, provided an opportunity for the leadership to collect their thoughts and consider alternatives. Earlier signs had suggested that while the Second Plenum had addressed policy questions

14

Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

in areas of pricing, finance, banking, wages, budget and goods circulation, the Third Plenum was to focus all its energies on nailing down the character and details of the new economic management mechanism. 41 The sum and substance of the Third Plenum, however, was less fixed on the business of defining the new economic mechanisms than on the cumulative effects of the reforms and the need for a consolidation of gains prior to the next step of the programme. The plenary communique emphasized the impact of renovated planning practices, including a reduction of centrally articulated norms and other regulatory pronouncements. The communique called for an "intensification" of the role of the party leadership in the renovation of the state's role in economic management, and restated the need to establish a "clear" definition of the "limits" of the decision-making power of primary economic installations. The plenum endorsed the cessation of "managerial control" of production and business by administrative agencies, and supported attempts to confine state economic management to decision-making areas having less to do with the allocation of materials and delivery of product, and more to do with overall strategic planning. General Secretary Linh's speech to the session was a frank catalogue of the areas of disagreement over the reforms. There seems to have been disagreement as to whether the starting point for the reorganization of management practices was to be the grass-root level, or the state management mechanism itself. Linh, who saw these two alternatives as being "organically related", recommended that the changes be undertaken in the local economic units and the state economic structure simultaneously. He argued against those taking the view that the grass-root level mechanisms should be the first subjects of the management experiments, leaving the state mechanisms intact and untouched. Linh viewed those levels as the "starting point for renovating economic management at the higher state level instead of the other way around", suggesting that he rejected using the central government's apparatus as the test case while allowing local units to function without modification. Linh's point was that the version of the reforms which saw change proceeding in two stages negated the integrity of the system, cutting natural links and violating relationships

Consolidating the Programme for Party Renovation

IS

that the mselves suggested the need for a tandem approach. He noted that substantial disagreeme nt surrounded the issue, and e ncouraged co ntinued discussion but was firm about maintaining a ce ntralized structure and agenda for th e reform programme, and full co ntrol over the local manifestations of the programme. Another point of co nte ntion was the definition of the first stage of the programme. One view was that Politburo Draft Resolution Number 306 on economic autonomy should focu s on grass-root level state-run eco nomic units (industrial and agricultural) and collective eco nomic units (agricultural, artisan, and handicraft industri es), in addition to individual private e nterprises, joint state-private e nterprises, and family-run e nterprises. The basis for this viewpoint was that the urge ncy of the economic issues required a more global plan, encompassing all the incarnations of local economic structures, if only because of the need to rapidly establish a "management mechanism" for eco nomic units in agriculture in support of the primary programme of grain and food production . A second view was that the Draft Resolution need not, at the outset, address the proble ms of the e ntire panoply of " mod els of grass-root economic units" cited in Resolution Number 306. This viewpo int was based on the ass umption that the larger menu of target units risked trivializing the reform plans by requiring massive and general aims rather than more tailored c hanges. In this instance, Linh accorded legitimacy to the argument that speed was esse ntial, but ad ded another angle to the differe nce of views by taking the position that the core issue was not the pressing nature of the proble ms to be addressed, but the time required to prepare co mpre he nsive reforms to address all form s of grass-root eco nomic structures. Linh, then, accepted the necessity of a global approach to reforms that would address "all models" of economic ente rprise, but he placed emphasis on a slow and careful planning stage, encouraging deliberate but measured speed in the programme rathe r than headlong progress. Linh noted that the third ple nary session would focus on grass-root level units and state-run industry, since several years of experime ntation with business methods and man age me nt practices had provided a good starting point, along with the preparatory work

16

Renovating the Vietname.1e Communist Party

addressing those economic forms accomplished in the course of drafting the Politburo resolution on economic autonomy. Importantly, Linh allowed slightly more than a year to fiddle with alternative structures enroute to establishing the basic forms of decision making and management for those categories of economic enterprise. 42 Linh also challenged those who argued that there was a need to establish a basic set of regulations for the new managerial devices. He rejected the need for strict guidelines for the reform of the management mechanisms, and supported an approach to reforms that allowed local variations in form and substance, considerable room for interpretation at the local and sectoral economic decision centres, and minimum central interference in the daily business of at least the individual and private capitalist economies. In his speech to the plenum, Linh stated that , Grasping the general absolutely requires a generalization of the specific through research. Otherwise, the general could very easily become a premise that has little concrete effect on practical guidance. 43 Official recognition of the private and individual economies had authorized a host of unknown forces which would act on the overall economic structure in unanticipated ways. Linh acknowledged that autonomy would take different forms in the state-run economy, and that the private and individual economies already presumed the existence of a certain amount of autonomous decision-making power. He acknowledged that the consequences of authorized private and individual enterprise remained unexplored, that th e regime had little knowledge of the likely impact of those sectors on the overall economic structure, and that the country was at present ill-equipped to test propositions regarding those variables. Linh stated that at this critical juncture the regime had put itself in the position of having to integrate new organizational entities, of which it had only the most basic understanding, into an unstable economic syste m, If what we want is to deal with general issues more fully. more deeply, and in a manne r closer to [the j reality of eco nomic development , to provide concrete guidance for th e building of management

Cvmolidating the Programme for Party Renovation

17

models for various eco nomic form s, I do not think we can do it at this time because we have not yet accumulated sufficie nt ex perie nce, as we U as a theoretical bas is. 44

Finally, Linh acknowledged the system's severe internal imbalances, the ill-defin ed economic strategy, the only partially articulated vision of the structural reform s, the co ntinuing influe nce of the old habits of state subsidization a nd the lingering impact of centralist economic manage me nt. He took note of the ill-equipped body of state functionaries who would run the new eco nomy, and co ncluded that, in view of all this, the co untry "lacked the pre mises and co nditions for the establishme nt of an eco nomic syste m that is new in nature, perfect, and uniform". Linh resolved the ce ntral issues for himself by stating that to get by in the near term the syste m and the reform programme should not see k to comply with general laws, and should not attempt to measure success by a fixed gauge of accomplishments meant to de monstrate progress along a co ntinuum towards an advanced stage of socialist co nstruction, In these circumstances, what is most important to us at this time is a strategy of manageme nt geared to the existing eco nomic state. This is a highly unstable eco nomic state in whic h old economic forms re main firml y rooted , and the new ones are in an e mbryo nic state. In other words, this tra nsitional eco nomic state req uires a transitional mechanism of manageme nt that simultaneously e mploys both old and new factors. -1s

Linh also contended with several other positions that clashed with his own view of the reform process. For example, Linh c halle nged the view that the regime should "immediately abolish a numbe r of necessary legal norms", characterizing that de mand as impossible. He noted that the number of norms had been drastically reduced , but rejected the need to replace state norms with "indirect eco nomic instruments" which would pre maturely place the regime at the me rcy of contractual eco nomic relations and market forces. Linh also stated that the de mand for "immediate" co mm ercialization of trading among various economic co mpone nts was an unrealistic suggestion, and noted that serious material shortages that impacted heavily on state ente rprises

18

Renovating the Vietname.1e Communist Party

necessitated the continued distribution of strategic production materials "in accordance with the state plan's priority objectives" . Finally, Linh described the demand for the immediate and widespread application of a one-price system as similarly unrealistic. He noted that the proposed policy of deco ntrolled prices, which appare ntly had substantial backing, was theoretically correct but too "idealistic" for application in Vietnam, where serious imbalances in supply and d e mand and high inflation reigned, necessitating continued quotas and controlled prices. Linh's solutions to the proble ms we re tentative, based on the assumption that a certain amount of ex perimentation must take place before authoritative decisions about the form of manageme nt mec hanisms could be made. He was very inclined to accept local innovation and tinkering with basic prescriptions for economic organization, but was firm in retaining the primacy of state control and unequivocal about the party's role in providing "comprehensive leadership". To Linh , the entire process was taking place in a transitional context where none of the old rules of operation and meas ures of success made sense. The process required deliberate and careful study; pilot investigations of the impact of new managerial forms on production; close observation of the efficacy of e nterprise level experime nts, including the use of joint enterprise forms and "ente rprise alliances"; and attentiveness to the question of the role of party organizations in the new enterprise structures. Linh's careful outline of the disputes ove r strategy and tactics in the area of economic reforms, and his own assessments of the competing views, suggest that he was atte mpting to serve as a co nciliator, brokering compromises between contending policy positions. He evinced flexibility, while making a firm commitment to the programmatic e nds of the reformist campaign. Yet, there was a se nse that he was not in a position to speak as the ultimate and authoritative arbiter, and that he may have only represented the opinions of a narrow band of the leadership. On several occasions in his ple nary speec h, Linh noted what amounted to a virtual third position, not a co mpromise view but a co mpletely differe nt tack on a problem . Linh hinted that there were limits to his strength and influence, and that he was possibly incapable of swinging the vole toward s his side.

Consolidating the Programme for Party Renovation

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The Purification Campaign On 12 September the party Central Committee issued a resolution on the Campaign to Purify Party Organizations and State Bureaucracies.46 The doc ume nt defin ed the campaign as an effort that would continue through the e nd of the te nure of the Central Committee elected at the Sixth Congress. The backbone of the campaign was to be the Criticism/Self-Criticism (C/SC) Campaign. The C/SC Campaign consisted of locally-sponsored efforts to enco urage cadre introspection and centrally-orchestrate d investigations by control and inspection organs. The critical journalism activated by Nguyen Van Linh's co mme ntaries was inte nd ed to play a role in moving the process along.4 7 The media-publicized text of the resolution co nfirmed that the campaign was to co ntinue to the end of the te rm of the Sixth Congress, but the resolution defin ed operational goals for a much more limited period of time. From September 1987 through late 1988, according to the document, the campaign would focus the attention of party and state cadre on co mpleting the adjudication of unfinished disciplinary cases and maintaining a pace that would prevent new cases from clogging the syste m. The campaign would also scrutinize the regime's managerial personnel resources and the sectors involved in running the eco nomic reform programmes, along with examining party me mbership and judging the fitn ess of curre nt card-holders. Finally, the campaign would be fin e-tuned into a syste m of periodic inspections. As suc h, the September resolution did not go far beyo nd the initial formulations of the Purification Campaigns defined by provincial party organizations during late January and February. The resolution did, however, detail a co mmand structure for the campaign. The Sta nding Co mmittee of the Office of the Council of Ministers and the party's Secretariat were to run the campaign. The party's Secretariat was c harged with developing a team of "specially designated cadre" who would oversee the daily operation of the campaign, suggesting that the VNCP had reserved control over tactical matters and local organization for itself, and had written itself a wide-open ma ndate to establish a n imple me nting mec hanism for the campaign. 4 R The Secretariat, according to the resolution, could call upon a range of party a nd state organs Lo run the campaign, including

20

Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

party co ntrol, organization, propaganda and training organs, and civilian proselytizing e ntities; state control, inspection, public security services, and people's tribunals; and mass organizations, including youth and wome n's organizations, trade union and peasant associations. The machinery that was to run the campaign focused authority on the line-level Central Committee departme nts and their c hain of command descending through local party organizations, and deposited fundamental responsibility over provincial, municipal, special zone, precinct, district and grass-root level programmes with the party ec helon . Heads of public organs and sectoral c hiefs were to run their own individual campaigns, sharing the responsibility for guiding the operations with the specific party committee chairmen within those organizations. 4 9 By late September provincial party committees had been instructed to take stock of what had been accomplished to date. They did so in an uneven manner that de monstrated major local variations in the organized response to central directives. For example, a 21 September account of the K.ie n Giang Provincial Party Committee's actions regarding the Purification Campaign noted that throughout the year the committee had issued instructions and resolutions inte nded to guide local imple me ntation of the centrally-decreed review of party work, but by late in the year local chapters had, in general, failed to put any of the disse minated instructions into action. In late Septe mber, the provincial party co mmittee organized a se ries of working sessions to review the problem and evaluate the impleme ntation of instructions. As a result of those sessions, a body drawn from the provincial party standing co mmittee and the party committee was e ntrusted with monitoring imple me ntation of provincial committee instructions by subordinate party blocs, groups and committees under their normal jurisdiction. In addition, the provincial party committee also assigned cadres to districts to oversee the impleme ntation of "specialized tasks" by party branches. The party Control Committee, the Organizational Committee, and the Propaganda and Training Committee were organized to serve as an advisory board for the provincial party co mmittees on matters pertaining to the Purification Campaign. These co mmittees were to be represe nted at the provincial party

Consolidating the Programme for Party Renovation

21

committee review sessions that were to be convened to take up the business of province-wide actions regarding the campaign. Finally, the Kien Giang Provincial Party Committee organized a parallel monthly "political day" , under the supervision of the Standing Committee, for party committee echelons and cadres from every organization to meet with mass organization counterparts in discussion sessions, replicating an earlier nationwide effort to institutionalize provincial party committee-run criticism sessions. 50 By late September it appeared that other provinces had fashioned similar ad hoc committees of department level party committee entities, and had made provisions for regularly-convened, executive level working sessions to facilitate the campaign within the provinces. By mid-November, provincial and municipal party organizations and central level party entities had convened study and planning meetings in response to the Politburo's resolution. Some provincial committees - the Hanoi party organization and the Economic, Industrial and the Mass Motivation Party Blocs, for example - held enlarged party committee conferences to define operating parameters for the implementation of the resolution. 5 1 In late October and early November, the central party mechanism encouraged another round of guidance meetings on the model of the 3 November Hanoi Executive Committee meeting to plan the Purification Campaign. 52 Those meetings were apparently intended to discuss the reduction of the size of party and state organizations, the trimming of subordinate offices and sections, the elimination of unnecessary de puty positions, and the redefinition of standards and qualifications for cadre and civil servant positions. 51 The changes in structure, leadership and organizational habits were described in Vietnamese press accounts as dramatic renovations. The centrally-orchestrated nature of the Campaign to Purify Party and State Organizations seemed to mark a reversion to grand, sweeping political move me nts with sprawling programmes and pronounced ideological underpinnings. 54 Importantly, the entire enterprise was under the stewardship of party secretaries Do Muoi and Tran Xuan Bach, both Politburo membe rs. Muoi seemed to have bee n charged with reviewing the accomplishments and organization of various General De partments in 1985 , and was therefore experienced in

22

Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

oversight activities and singularly well-equipped to contribute to an exercise focused on mending organizational weaknesses in governmental machinery.55 Bach, a party Secretariat member since 1982, had held sensitive positions since the Fifth Party Congress, including the responsibility for overseeing Vietnamese experts attached to Cambodian ministries. His rapid promotions from relative obscurity in the 1960s as a mass organization religious proselytizing cadre and provincial party secretary during the 1970s, to limelight positions in the 1980s, suggest high level sponsorship, perhaps by a combination of party elders including Le Due Tho and Le Due Anh. 56 Additionally, Politburo member and Hanoi Party Committee Secretary Nguyen Thanh Binh played a spokesman's role and was a key figure in prodding the municipalities, especially the capital city, towards active participation in the campaign. Binh, who headed the Central Committee Department for Distribution and Circulation from at least mid-1981 to 1986, had been an active supporter of the economic reforms. As an experienced observer of the intractable problems plaguing Vietnam's distribution system, he was particularly qualified to comment on party and state bureaucracy and the steps necessary to put the reformist strategies to work through that bureaucracyY The combination of top talent called upon to run the centre's role in the campaign underscored the party's commitment to remaking the party organization and the parallel government structures.

The End-Of-Year Retrospectives: The Fourth Party Plenum, Council of State, Council of Ministers, and National Assembly Sessions, December .l987 The customary end-of-year retrospectives by the Central Committee's fourth plenary session (8-17 December), the Council of State (18-19 December), the Council of Ministers (19-20 December), and the National Assembly (23-29 December) were highly critical of the regime's performance in economic affairs, offered a bleak picture of sectoral accomplishments, and made massive demands of the system's organizational resources in the context of the 1988 plan. SH

Consolidating the Programme for Party Renovation

23

The Central Committee's ple nary session, which le d the train of yeare nd recapitulations, began with a strong indictme nt of the leadership of the topmost party apparatus and the Council of Ministe rs for the laggard pace of c hange in the country's eco nomy. The fourth plenary session's catalogue of economic policy failures, bille d as a "unanimous assessment" of the regime's performance from the time of the Dece mber 1986 National Party Congress, was an extremely critical look at the party's post-Second Ple num record . The plenum noted production slumps, major inade quacies in tax policies, inflated market prices, enduring structural une mployme nt, and an unsettled programme of state investme nt in capital construction. The programme of action proposed by the plenum was confined to stabilizing the market situation and e ncouraging hikes in commodity production. According to the ple nary session communique, Nguyen Van Linh delivered both th e opening and the closing speeches, though he shared the podium on the final day of the ple num with Council of Ministers Chairman Pham Hung, whose address to the closing session was highlighte d in the media. 5 '~ Linh's opening remarks focused e ntirely on the eco nomic record and the rules guiding the developmental plans for the period through 1990, and they closely paralleled the thrust of th e plenary resolution and the plenary co mmunique. The ple nary co mmunique detailed the major leadership failings and the resulting accumulation of "acute" eco nomic difficulties, a rather familiar litany. The ple num singled out the inner circle's inability to limit damages as earlier economic reform policies and impleme nting strategies faltered, and the government's lumbering and co nfu sed efforts to tmn policy inte ntions into practices. The communique also referred to the problem of bloated, executive level offices and ingrained habits of ce ntralized rule, plus the weakness of untalented and uninventive though ideologically prope r cadre. In hi s opening remarks, Linh rec ited the basic structural and organizational shortcomings of the economy, There is a big gap betwee n income and spe nding and export and import a nd no accumulation in [the] eco nomy. Th e production and business transactio ns, in gene ral, suffe r losses. Productivity, equality,

24

Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

and eco nomic effectiveness are reduced. The distribution of national income is irrational and unequaL and the c irculation of good s faces many obstacles. The mechanism of bu reaucratic centralism based on state subsidies re mains in force. The new socialist eco nomic accounting and business transactions have been institution a lized strongly. The li[vesJ of workers, publjc employees, and armed forces, and people in general [areJ fac ing many diffic ulties and [instabilities]. Meanwhile, we have great potentials which have not yet been [tapped] to d evelop the economy, including those at hom f' and abroacJ.rgence of diso rgani zed , " unhealthy" political parties to fill the gap.m By mid-year the articles had become more clearly defensive and didactic, drawing lessons from tllf' decline of communism in Easte rn Europe to help re pair the damage to a di scredited Vietnamese party organization that so ught to urge ntly fe nd off its own dPmise. A latP-May article in Quan Doi Nhan Dan notf'd that ,

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Many lessons must be drawn from [the] historic events [in Easte rn Europe]. Nevertheless, the most urge nt lesson to learn while seeking ways to resolve the internal conllicts arising from restructwing, reform and re novation must be the need to re main vigilant in th e face of impe rialism's dark schemes of peacefu l evolution. 177

The arguments in articles and editorials centred on a more s hrill se nse of Vietnam's vuln e rability to conspiracies by familiar e nemies, and a more forcefully stated opposition to insidious "political pluralisms". Articles spoke of "dark sche mes" aimed at instilling a multi-party syste m, concocted by "imperialist forces a nd their reactionary exiled henchme n". Re mnants of former Government of Vietnam (GVN) pruties including the Dai Viet, Quoc Dan Dang, Xa Hoi Dan Chu, and Can Lao Nhan Vi in the ce ntre and the south we re said to be at the core of so me of the threate ning counter-revolutionary activities. Newspapers noted what was observed to be the re-emergence of Nguyen Van Thieu, Nguye n Cao Ky, Tran Thien Khie m and Nguyen Khanh as co mmanding figures in Ove rseas Vietnamese circles, clearly a misinterpretation of an e mbarrass ing attempt by Ky and Thie u to address audie nces of Viet Kie u in the United States.171l The media also fixed on the clear and present danger posed by pluralism, the " batte ring ram" and "spearhead" used by antiregime co nspirators to manipulate "legi timate desires" and political concern for freedom and democracy in order to discredit and disable the VNCP. 179 The Movement Against Crime and Social Pollutants continued to focus on crime suppression activities and took on the ad ded task of responding to the threat of antiregime activity. In 1990 the Move me nt relied increasingl y on normal chains of local governm e ntal authority for guidance a nd direction, instead of the co mbined party, security bureau and ad hoc assault youth groups a nd subward -village social ord er a nd safety cou ncils that were called upon in 1989 to powe r the Move m e nt. 1 ~ 0

The fifth phase of the campaign, launc hed in April 1990 to imple me nt Council of Ministers Directive 135 , focused on anticrime acti vities and e nforce ment of economic laws. 18 1 It was accompanied by a crack down on un au thorized activities by grass-root and social organizations; th e detention or close monitoring of the move me nts of

Economic Crisis, Organizational Failure and Rejimni.st Conflict

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Catholic priests, stude nt le aders, and other potential dissid e nts; and the restri ction of travel by visiting fore ign journalists, bus iness me n and aid workers. The crac k-down was a res ponse to the perce ived potential for antiregime protests on the fiftee nth anniversary of Hanoi's victory ove r th e U.S.-backe d so uthern re publican government (15 April), the one-hundredth anniversary of the birthday of Ho Chi Minh (19 May) , the de mise of Easte rn European co mmunist regim es, and the severe c ut in Soviet bloc assistance to Vietnam. 1H2 Co inciding wi th this mid-year pe riod , critical essays published in major papers ac knowledged that the re was support for political pluralis m in Vietnam. These mid-year articles note d support for the emergence of countervailing ce ntres of powe r and challe nges to the VNCP's monopoly, and for th e re moval of d e moc ratic centralism from party regulations to free political minorities from organized discipline and the obligation to respect the view and rule of the majority. 183 Th e party-controlled press portrayed th ese views as be ing liLLie more than the res ult of activist antiregime campaigns under the co ntrol of imperialist forc es rather than reaso ne d and serious viewpoinL held by legitimate interests within th e party.

11

Piuralism" and the Party

The party responde d to th e challe nges posed to the Vietnamese political order by the disintegration of Eastern European communism by restating the basic te rm s of refe rence that governed the party's relation s hips with the other parts of th e Vietnam ese political universe: the party is the vanguard of the working class, the labouring people, and the nation . The peo ple are the ultimate powers. The party is the guardian of the people. The slate is e ntrusted by the pm1 y wi th the rol e of executive agent for the people's will, and is e mpowe red to govern through the formal expression of that will, the law. To the party, pluralis m was a fragm e nting force that would work toward s overturning the social and political balance of power achieved by the party. 1 H~ Early in the year~ the party cautioned against viewing the deliberate efforts to nurture a multi-sectoral eco nomi c structure famil y, private cap italist and pelly bourgeo is '"eco nomies" - as a

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means of allow ing "economic pluralis m" to lead the way to political plu ralism. 18 > To fe nd off th e co nseque nces of pluralist tre nd s, and u p hold Marxist-Leninist orth odox ies, the party soug ht to co-opt a nd co ntrol the pa noply of new forces a nd inte rests unleashed by the eco nomic reforms that e mpowered private market activities a nd Limite d eco no mic acti vity by house holds a nd indi viduals. In the te rms of a late 1989 Nhan Dan editorial, T he major factor deciding the nature of socialist de mocracy is whether th e leaders hi p of the pa rt y can develo p the ro le of the stale a nd mass o rgani zations, a nd whet he r powe r truly lies in th e hands of the people. Multiple parties can still be de mocratic in fo rm only a nd o ne party still ca n be trul y de moc ratic. T he p roble m is the need to create a po litical syste m and mecha nism that considers the realistic structure of society. a nd the d ive rs it y of inte rests a nd inclinatio ns of a ll classes, strata a nd soc ia l and ethnic gro ups. ta(,

The Ce ntral Co mmittee's draft platform , circulated for co mment in earl y Fe brua ry, stressed the party's role as the organizing fo rce for these new interests a nd the part y's ab ility to respo nd inve nti vely to the rweds of new social a nd eco nomic groups: The pa rty suppo rts a nd acti vely he lps the peo ple gathe r togethe r in social organizations, a nd ope rates to meet th e occ upatio na l d ema nds an d d ive rse inte rests of th e peo ple a lo ng the li ne of benefitin g all fam ilies and the cou ntry as a whole in acco rdance with the law. IHi

The d raft platform so ught to ma ke a virtue o ut of necessity by recogni zing the natu ral te nd e ncy of new groups a nd co nstitu e ncies to see k an o rga nized state. T he party attempted to graft these orga ni zati ons to th e syste m while mini mizing the possibility that s uc h forces co ul d sup pla nt the party. It carefull y im posed limits on the process of ope nness, a nd un ambiguously opposed processes that would co mpro mise th e ce ntrality of the pa rt y. We shou ld overco me th e pessimistic a nd vac ill ating th oug hts and e rroneous views th at d e ny our rc\ o lutio na ry gains, lowe r or de ny

Economic Crisis, Organizational Failure and Reformist Conflict

the party's leade rship role, a nd ad vocate multi-partyism . 188

po~ti cal

97

pluralis m a nd

The Eighth Plenum, March 1990 The Draft Platform The Eighth Ple num, conve ned from 12-27 March, was prefaced by the public circulation of the Ce ntral Committee's draft platform in early Fe bruary, an unpreced e nted step. The draft platform argued that the shortcomings of the reform programme resulted from the party's truancy in re novating itself. Further, the draft platform asserted that the party's proble ms also ste mm ed from the failure to und erstand the role and importa nce of mass proselytizing and the relationship between the party a nd the people. The draft platform urged the improve ment of the party's re presentative role, and supported consolidation of the mass organizations and special inte rests with their own increasingly independent organizations which had begun to claim roles in the political system. These aims we re discussed unde r the rubric of perfecting socialist democracy and e nsuring the retention of powe r by the people. The reform policy introduced a " new stage" in which "diverse inte rests" in the form of new social groupings, new economic e ntities a nd interests, and more complex political and social aggregations of people impinged on this formula of political relationships. Those "diverse interests" required the system to be capable of flexible response to c ha nges. The draft platform stressed the party's role as th e organizing force for these new interests and th e party's a bility to respond inve nti vely to the needs of new social and economic groups. The new social groupings were to be strong and capa ble, not me rely "decorati ve sy mbols" but active and inde pe nde nt organizations, Tlw part y and stale respect the peo ple's indepe nd e nce from the orga nizatio nal sta ndpoint , promote th e initi ative a nd c reati vity of the people's soc ia l organizatio ns, and oppose th e p at c rna~ sti c a nd authoritarian attitudes of party cadres a nd the administratio n towards politico-social a nd social organ izatio ns of th e people, an d , at the sa me tim e, the bigoted o r no nc hala nt attitude towa rd s muste ring the people's forces. 1u9

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The draft platform noted that th e part y " must never neglect th e people's interests, but should not be de magogic nor allow the d evelopme nt of paroc hialism , de partme ntalis m, and localis m" , a re minde r of the party's position on poutical pluraus m. The draft platform contained so me obligatory positions on economi c improve me nt, including admonitions to overcome the proble m of une mployment, develop the family-based eco nomy, and adjust taxes and salaries to promote effective inco me distribution . It also calle d for improve me nts in health and ins urance se rvices, famil y planning, and national ca re for veterans and the handicapped. Th e draft platform urged legal recognition of the " legitimate right" to co nduct business, own land and inhe rit or transfe r land. Howeve r, the real crux of th e draft platform was the presc ription for specifi c organizational c hange. The docume nt endorsed, • the "consolidation" of people's organs of co ntrol and the melding of the work of those organs with the state ins pection syste m; • th e developme nt of state " information networks" for pop ulation ce ntres; • th e institutionalization of party-managed sf'ssions to monitor and guide the civil proselytizing work of fundame ntal party units and yo uth unions; • the institutionalization of regularly sc heduled public criticis m sessions focuse d on the actions and be haviour of individual pa rty me mbers and party c hapters; • the exa mination of party practices in the realm of long-te rm assignme nts for specialized cadre; • th e strengthe ning of National Assembly standing co mmittees, th e encourageme nt of active co mmunication between National Assembly delegates and voting co nstitue nc ies, and th e improve me nt of the decision-making process of the National Assembly, Council of State and People's Councils; • the reduction of intermediary admi ni strative lf've ls of slate bureaucracy, a nd the restriction of th e authority of slate man ageme nt age ncies over grass-root install ati ons and private and famil y businesses; and

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• the party-supervised improvement of mass organizations, including efforts to reform the management, cadre selection practices, and funding situation of mass organizations aimed at increasing their operational independence. The draft platform focused most closely on the last goal, and provided specific, detailed guidance on the steps necessary to upgrade the organization and performance of mass organizations. Most of the goals endorsed by the draft platform were not new additions to the programme of reform. The distinction of the draft platform was that it set these organizational reforms in the context of an expanding political system, with new organizations and interests claiming roles alongside established mechanisms. The draft platform clearly anticipated the burgeoning of organized interest groups, "In the near future, there will be more social societies". The various mass organizations were given more explicit responsibilities for organizing subsidiary groups. The Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union was the "key centre" for encouraging youths to join appropriate organizations - student associations, youth association chapters, the General High School Student's Association. The draft platform reaffirmed the Peasants' Association role in establishing professional groups of producers and specialized farmers, and re-emphasized the Women's Union role in developing "operating mothers clubs and midwifery groups".

Public Debate The draft document was the subject of public meetings, party study sessions, expanded provincial party committee conferences and intensive media coverage for the month leading up to the opening of the Eighth Plenum. Discussions of the draft document focused on the need to fwther refine the party's approach to its relationship with mass organizations, the concrete steps necessary to establish new social organizations, and the importance of empowering those new organizations to function with the promised autonomy and financial independence. Publicized meetings of mass organizations stressed the importance of formulating the platform to include more precise commitments to

Renovating the Vietname.\ e Communi:;/ Party

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e mployme nt and welfare programmes, and more stringent measures of official accountability. Such sessions also endorsed a reinvigorated anticorruption process that would rely more directly on th e court process and involve mass organizations in investigations of allegations of impropriety. The party was heavily criticized for the failure to sustain important links to inte rest groups and social organizations, and for eq uivocating on the formation of the Vietnam War Veterans Association after the co ncept for this organization had received Politburo level support. The party was castigated for failing to implement programmes to co rrect even the most basic abuses and lapses of its bureaucracies, and for neglecting citize n rights. Public sessions called to review th e draft document endorsed electoral reforms and the institutionalization of election campaigns to afford basic choices to vote rs. 190 Central Committee me mber Tran Bach Dang's 5 March essay on the draft document echoed many of th ese criticis ms. The draft platform , Dang argued, was a disappointment. The programme for improving party-mass organization interaction was little more than a re hash of long-standing precepts of party reform. lt reflected antiquated concepts of social organization, and inaccurately de picted reflections of th e progress of social and political renovation. The platform neglected the dialectical sy mbiosis betwee n the party and mass organizations, in Dang's view, and contributed little to und e rstanding the impact of curre nt social forces on the party. In Dang's argument, the draft platform delved into unnecessary detail on the mod e of operation of mass organizations instead of reserving such choices for the organizations the mselves and co nfining the party's role to defining the "general orientation". Dang asserted that the draft platform prese nted a flawed picture of social forces, and co nfused religious and mass socie ties, Moreove r~

cl assification of mass soC' icties is not mad e in a renovative manner while only a brief desc ription is made on suc h soc ial co mponents playing an im portant political role. suc h as gro ups of c itizens, workers, inte Ucctu als and ethnic mino rit y people, including th e Chinese, Khmer, Cham, religious and bourgeois grou ps as weU as the overseas Vietnamese. The re is a regretta ble mistake in th e section on mass a nd religiou s organizations, that is th e

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101

Catholic So lidarity Committee is regarded as a mass society while the Vietnam Buddhist Association is recognized as a religio n. It is not appropr iate for the programme to go into d etail on the orga nization of religious groups wh ile fai ling to set fo rth a re novative po licy on this matte r.l '! l

To Dang, the draft platform viewed the Vi etnam Fathe rla nd Front more as a passive umbrella organization than as the crucial co nnection betwee n the party and the mass organizations. H e e mph asized the importance of the draft as a tool for establishing a programme that would recognize and respond to c hanges in social forces, and co mpel th e party to mode rnize its relationship with these newly e nfra nchised inte rests. The month-long public discussions of the draft platform revealed numerous co mpeting views within the party on c ritical issues, such as the cow-se of the reforms and the principles guiding party-mass organization relations. While "almost all people and cad res" we re predisposed to support reform s that would re invigorate the party and "consolidate" its influe nce, by implication a significant yet undefined numbe r was not inclined to s upport a reform process that would return th e party to a level of strength, internal coherence a nd unrivalled influe nce achieved during the revolutionary war. Some argued that laws should be written to define th e relationship between the party and mass organizations in a manner that would delimit the party's purview and specify obligations of the interacting parties. 192 There was no co nse nsus o n the draft platform itself. Opposition to acceptance of the document focused on what so me provincial and subordinate party co mmittee participants saw as ineffective and incomplete descriptions of the roles of the individual mass organization s. 1 '~ 3 The re was also so me slight disagree me nt wi th the decision to circulate th e docum e nt for comme nt prior to the ple nary session. 1 profit margin in several state enterprises; the upgrading of communications and transportation; and an encouraging trend in the ex port index for January to July 1990. The communique acknowledged that despite these achieveme nts, socio-econom ic weaknesses persisted as the result of uncontrolled inflation, the problems associated with allowing a regulated market to begin the governing of a centrally planned economy, and managerial inexperie nce in the new multi-sector system. Corrupted bureaucracies; pe rsiste ntly stale and unresponsive banking and credit policies; a reluctance to take strong measures against bribery, violation of laws governing planning, pricing and the market co ntributed to the eco nomic muddle. The communique indicated that the Cen tral Committee had called for "urgent and effective" measures to correct these deficie ncies during th e 199195 Five Year Plan, in accordance with th e guidance of the Sixth National Congress regarding economic re novation. The resolution issued at the conclusion of the ple nary was terse and did not provide helpful guidance on the next steps in the reform programme. Gene ral Secretary Linh made the open ing and closing speec hes that were acknowledged in only the most perfunctory manner in the communique. He derived more status from his chairmans hip of one of the two planning document drafting subcommittees, and in that co ntex t was given equal billing alongside of Do Muoi, representing a net gain for th e more conse rvative Central Committee interests. 204

Organizational Weaknesses and Approaches to Renovation In articles and editorials th roughout the year, the party catalogued organizational weaknesses that led to co nfused relations betwee n ec helons and a proliferation of conflicting policies at the grass-root level. Party co mmittees subordinate to ministries, co mmissions, agen cies, unions, and party ct>lls were basically moribund and ignored. Interaction betwee n committees and directors of low-level organs had virtually ceased, leaving party organizations marginalized . A stud y of 30 provinces and municipalities concluded that approximately

ll2

Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

30 per cent of basic level key cadres were effective in their work. A third of the basic party cells were deficient, poorly led, overstaffed or tended to usurp the managerial responsibilities of production and business entities. 20 S Standards for recruiting had declined during the late 1980s, when 80,000 members were brought into the party. One 1990 survey of 29 provincial and municipal party organizations concluded that in several unspecified party organizations over 70 per cent of the newly recruited members were subjected to disciplinary action. More than 64,000 members had bee n subjected to some form of disciplinary action during 1988-1990, and 20,000 had been expelled. During the third quarter of 1990, municipal and provincial party organizations publicized reports on the progress of the campaign to consolidate basic party organizations, including accounts of the number of disciplinary actions - reprimands, dismissals from official position , and expulsions from the party - taken against party members. Hai Hung Province expelled 2,800 of its 55,600 membe rs, and Hau Giang expelled 107 of a total membership of 23,500 for the most serious violations of party roles, suggesting wide variations between provinces in th e implementation of the Party Purification drive.201' Overall recruitment levels had fallen from the 1985 high of 105 ,000 new members, though the intake level exceeded the 1984 recruitment of 64,000 members. Newspaper articles reporting cri ti cal studies and surveys noted that the party membership had grown older and that the number of retired cadres in the ranks had grown steadily. In 1986, 23.5 per cent of the membership were yo unger than 30 years of age. In 1988 that figurt> was 21.3 per cent. Retirees, who accounted for 18.2 per cent of the total national party membership, dominated village, subward and township party organizations. In Ho Chi Minh City, 57 per cent of subward and village members were pensioners. In some organizations 70 per cent of the membership were retired cadre. 20 7 In 1990, workers constituted from 9 to 11 per cent of the nation al membership, representing a serious decrease from 1985 when 15 per cent of the newly enrolled membt>rs were workers. The number of party members admitted after 30 Aprill975 climbed to 44.19 per cent. The majority

fade rship suitab le to the requirem e nts of each level, promptly rplace or appo int add itional party committee me mbers whe neve r necessary without having to wait until th e e nd of the ir tenure, con tinua Uy pe rfect the various s pecialize d sections of party committees a long th e line of

Fashioning Consensus

145

streamlining organization and staff to keep only competent cadres, revamp the organization and operation of basic party organizations to conform with changes in the socio-economic organizations and the procedures of party leadership for the new situation, and by all means overcome the problem of rotten basic party organizations. 285

The draft report raised conventional themes, and highlighted the importance of preserving Democratic Centralism, enhancing the authority of central committees, improving methods of monitoring party membership performance, training new party cadre, and recruiting new party members. The draft report avoided some of the more sensitive issues concerning the party's role and specific prescriptions for change that preoccupied party members and officials during some of the local debates over the draft documents. The report emphasized the conservative preoccupation with internal security issues, studiously avoided straying into the need to modernize Marxist-Leninist canon, and skirted key arguments over issues such as "political stability", the relationship between political and economic reform, the invigorated role for mass organizations, and the role and authority of grass-root party organizations.

The Party Congress

Top Leadership Changes The Seventh National Party Congress, the Congress of Wisdom, Renovation, Democracy, Discipline and Unity, convened on 24 June. Vo Chi Cong gave the opening speech. General Secretary Linh presented the Political Report. Do Muoi, selected to succeed Linh, closed the Congress on 27 June. The Congress elected a 146-member Central Committee, which elected a 13-member Politburo, a nine-member Secretariat, and a nine-member Control Committee. No alternate Politburo and Central Committee members were elected. In the past, the General Secretary was selected by the Central Committee but at the Seventh Congress this officer was chosen by the Politburo. The Politburo was elected by the new Central Committee at the first working plenary meeting of the Seventh Central Committee. In the past, the

146

Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

outgoing Politburo had elected its successor.286 The Central Committee named Linh, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Chi Cong to positions as advisers to the Central Committee, and left it to the advisory group and the Politburo to draft a statute outlining the responsibilities of the group and providing for the selection of additional advisers, subject to Central Committee approval.Z 87 The new Central Committee shrank by 27 seats. The new Secretariat was four seats smaller than the one elected by the December 1986 Congress. The Control Commission grew by two seats. Eight new names were added to the Politburo (Table 5 .1) Ranks 6 through 13 of the Politburo were filled by newcomers whose average age was 60. At the 1986 Congress nine Central Committee members joined four Politburo members to form the Secretariat. The Seventh Congress chose five Central Committee members and three Politburo members to form the Secretariat (Table 5.2). The National Congress elections did not result in a mass retirement of the elder party leadership. Though seven senior leaders, TABLE 5.1 New Po~tburo Members

Rank

Name

Position at the time of Party Congress

6.

Vu Oanh

Secretary, Party Central Committee, in charge of mass mobilization

7.

Le Phuoc Tho

Secretary, Party Central Committee, in charge of agriculture

8.

Phan Van Khai

Chairman, State Planning Committee

9.

Bui Thien Ngo

Deputy Minister of Interior

10.

Nong Due Manh

Head, Party Central Committee Commission for Nationalities

11.

Pham The Duyet

Secretary, Hanoi Party Committee

12.

Nguyen Due Binh

Director, Nguyen Ai Quoc In stitute

13.

Yo Tran Chi

Secreta ry, Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee

147

Fashioning Consensus

TABLE 5 .2 Secretariat Members

Sixth Congress

Seventh Congress

Nguyen Van Linh Nguyen Due Tam Tran Xuan Bach Dao Duy Tung Tran Kien Le Phuoc Tho Nguyen Quyet Dam Quang Trung Vu Oanh Nguyen Khanh Tran Quyet Tran Quoc Huong Pham The Duyet

Do Muoi Le Due Anh Dao Duy Tung Le Phuoc Tho Nguyen Ha Phan Hong Ha Nguyen Dinh Tu Trong My Hoa Do Quang Thang

TABLE 5.3 Rank of Politburo Membership

Sixth Party Congress l. Nguyen Van Linh Pham Hung Vo Chi Cong Do Muoi Vo Van Kiet 6. Le Due Anh 7. Nguyen Due Tam 8. Nguyen Co Thach 9. Dong Sy Nguyen 10. Tran Xuan Bach 11. Nguyen Thanh Binh 12. Doan Khue 13. Mai Chi Tho 14. Dao Duy Tung (alternate)

2. 3. 4. 5.

Seventh Party Congress Do Muoi Le Due Anh Vo Van Kiet Dao Duy Tung Doan Khue Vu Oanh Le Phuoc Tho Phan Van Khai Bui Thien Ngo Nong Due Manh Phan The Duyet Nguyen Due Binh Vo Tran Chi

148

Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

including General Secretary Linh, "retired" from the Politburo, Do Muoi, Vo Van Kiet, and Le Due Anh held on to their positions (Table 5.3). Vo Chi Cong, Chairman of the Council of State, and Dong Sy Nguyen departed from the Politburo, along with two relatively young me mbers elevated at the Sixth Congress in December 1986: Nguyen Due Tam, the chair of the Organization Department who did a rather lacklustre job, and Nguyen Thanh Binh. Minister of Inte rior Mai Chi Tho also vacated his Politburo seat and was replaced by a deputy, Bui Thie n Ngo, who was named Minister of Interior at the National Asse mbly meeting in August 1991. Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach lost his Politburo seat. The new line-up of the Politburo, Secretariat and Central Committee represe nted a net gain for the military and cautious reform ers. Do Muoi , the new General Secretary, was widely regarded as a reformer and an action-oriented man with considerable experience in untangling Byzantine state bureaucracies. There was some confidence among Vietnamese officials that Muoi would co ntinue the reforms. Though at first a lukewarm subscribe r to the reformist line in the mid-1980s, Muoi quickly became an imp01tant voice for sustained economic change and policy flexibility. Ministe r of Defe nce Le Due Anh became the second ranking Politburo me mber, and Doan Khue moved to the number five slot. Khue replaced Anh as Defe nce Minister at th e August National Asse mbly session. Togethe r, the positioning of Anh and Khue represented an important advance in influence for the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), which had been burdened with the need to slim down fast in the face of severe budget constraints, and had become e mbroiled in a debate over new national security requireme nts, Cambodia, and the role of the peacetime army. The new Politburo and Central Committee left the Foreign Ministry without Politburo level re prese ntation . Four Foreign Ministry officials - Tran Quang Co, Nguyen Duy Nie n, Vu Oanh and Nguyen Manh Cam - were elected to the Central Committee. The co mpelling influe nce that Thach wielded on foreign policy matters as a result of his Politburo post and his conc urre nt deputy c hairmanship on the Council of Ministers was not to be duplicated by the appointment of Nguyen Manh Cam as the new Foreign Minister at the National

Fashioning Consensus

149

Assembly session in August. Altogether, this was a net gain for the two ministries that had been e ngaged in frontal co mbat with Foreign Minister Thach over the iss ues of national security, the rapproche ment with China, diversifying foreign relations, and the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship. The new Politburo was a clear victory for th e views espoused by Le Due Anh in favour of a rapid normalization of relations with Beijing, and a clear loss for Thac h's "balanced" approach to expanding and diversifying foreign relations, as well as a negative co mme nt on Thach's approach to Cambodia and the United States.

Composition of the Central Committee Forty-six (31.5 per ce nt) of the 146 individuals elected to the Central Committee at the Seventh Party Congress in July were new me mbers. Sixty-four incumbe nts accounted for 68.4 pe r ce nt of the Seventh Central Committee. That number included 36 alternate members elected at the Sixth National Patty Congress who were elevated to full me mbership at the Seventh Congress. Classifying the Central Committee membe rship according to their primary responsibility and highest ranking job - ce ntral government, ce ntral party, provincial or military - reveals so me interesting patterns (Table 5.4) . The Central Committee co nsisted of an eve n balance of party and government officials, 60 (41.1 per cent) and 62 (41.8 per cent) respectively. Eleve n military officials co nstituted 7 pe r cent of the total me mbership. The number of party officials in the Seventh Ce ntral Committee represented a slight increase over the percentage of senior party officials in the Sixth Central Committee. Military officials co nstituted a steady 7 per ce nt of the Sixth and the Seventh Ce ntral Committees. Fifty-two of the 146 members (35.6 per cent) were provincial-level officials. Forty-nine per ce nt of the Sixth Central Committee were second a ry level officials. Thirteen of the 52 provincial leve l officials in the Seventh Central Committee held co ncurrent positions as deputy chairm e n of the provincial party co mmittee and chairmen of the provincial people's committee. The ratio of new to incumbent party officials roughly balanced

TABLE 5.4 Job Ranking and Responsibilities of Seventh Party Congress Leadership

Incumbent Alternate at Sixth Congress New Member Total

Party

Government

10 5 6 21

34* 13 15 62

Provincial Party

16** ll

12 39

Dual (Party-Government)

0 6

Military

7

4 1 6

13

ll

*

General Le Due Anh, who was replaced as Minister of National Defence by Doan Khue at the August National Assembly meeting; Colonel-General Dao Dinh Luyen, Vice Minister of National Defe nce; and Lieutenant General Nguyen Trong Xu yen, Vice Minister of National Defence and Director of the Rear Services Department; and Doan Khue, are classified according to their ministerial assignments as "government officials" at the time of the Seventh National Party Congress.

**

Trang A Pao, Chairman of the People's Council of Hoang Lien Son Province, held a dual district party and provincial government position during the tenure of the Sixth Party Congress. ln the authoritative list of the Sixth Congress Central Committee members, he was listed as holding the chairmanship of the Hoang Lien Son People's Committee, and the secretary post in the Bao Thang District Party Committee. He is not listed as Bao Thang Party Secretary in the Seventh Congress list, only as the governor of Hoang Lien Son Province., and is counted in the ranks of the government incumbents for th e purposes of this exercise.

151

Fashioning Consensus

the ratio of new to incumbe nt government officials. The Congress e lecte d 42 incumbents whose primary responsibility was within the central party apparatus, and 4 7 incumbents who were central governmt-nt officials, represe nting 28.8 per cent and 32.2 pt>r cent of the total membership respt-ctively. The Congress elected 18 new members whose primary respons ibility was within the central party apparatus, and 15 new members who were central government officials, represe nting 12.3 per ce nt and 10.3 per cent respec tively. Three of the five d e puty heads of Central Committee executive co mmittees were newly elected me mbers (Table 5.5). No new members held executive committee chairmanships. Three Central Commillee incumbents were placed in charge of key areas and issues : agriculture, id eology, and mass organizations. Together with the other Central Committee members who he ld leadership positions on the executive co mmittees, they underscore d the extent to which the incumbents dominated the Central Committee: nine incumbe nts and four newly elected Central Committee me mbe rs he ld membership or leadership positions on central executivt- committees or within the Central Committee structure itself.

TABLE 5.5 Rank of Central Party Officials in Seventh Party Congress Leaders hip

Incumbent

Sixth Congress A I1ernate

New

l

Ce ntral Com millee Commillce Heads Deputy Heads Commillcc Membt>n;

2 2

3

0 0

0 3 0

Central Committee Membe rs in Charge of Specific Areas Miscellancous Central Committee Positions

3*

0

0

2

3

2

*

Three Central Committee members were liste d as being in "harge of s pec ific areas: Lc Phuoc Th o, in c ha rge of agriculture: Dao Du y Tung. in ('hargc of ickology: and Vu Oanh. in "harge of ma~s organizations.

152

Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

TABLE 5.6 Rank of Government Officials in Seventh Party Congress Leadership

Sixth Congress Alternate

Incumbent Council of Ministers Chairman and Vice-Chairman Ministers Vice-Ministers Co mmiltee Chairmen Other

3

0 3 3 1 6

7

9 4 10

0 4 3 l 8

TABLE 5.7a Regional Re prese ntation of Provinc ial Party Officials the Seve nth Pa rt y Congress Lead ers hip

North So uth Ce ntre Total

New

111

Incumbent

Sixth Congress Alternate

New

Total

5 5 6 16

6 3 2

5 5 2 ]2

16 13 10

ll

TABLE 5.7 6 Regiona l Re prese ntation of Provincial Party /Government Dual Officials in th e Seventh Party Congress Leadership

No rth So uth Cen tre Total

Incum bent

S ixth Congress Alternate

0 0 0 0

3 2 1 6

New

6 1 0

Total

9 3 1

7

In cumbents s imila rl y dominated th e ranks of th e govt' rnm e nt o fTi c ials e lected to the Cc:-ntral Com mittc:-e. Twenty-two ministers or vice ministers were inc umbents (Table 5.6). Seven newly-elected Central Committee nwmbers Wf'rf' mini sters or vice minislf'rs.

Fashioning

153

Cvnsensu.~

Northern and so uth e rn provinces were eve nl y represented within the group of Ce ntral Committee me mbe rs who held provinc ial party positions (Table 5.7a). Approximately 11 pe r ce nt of th e me mbership who held provincial party positions were from the north; 9 per ce nt were from the so uth, and 7 pe r ce nt were from the ce ntre. Northern provinces clearly dominated th e Central Committee whe n the number of provincial officials holding co nc urre nt provincial party and government positions are add ed to this number (Table 5.7b). In that case, approximately 17 per cent of the me mbers hip who he ld either party offices or dual a ppointme nts were from the north , ll pe r ce nt were from the south, and 7 per ce nt were from the centre. Four military region commanders were newly elected to th e Central Committee (Table 5.8). Only one military region co mmand er was an incumbe nt. In cumbe nt staff officers dominated the Seventh Central Committee me mbers hip. Four Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials - one Ambassador and three vice ministers - we re elected to the Seventh Ce ntral Committee (Tabl e 5.9) . Vice Minister Tran Quang Co was elevated to full me mbe rs hip from alternate status. Four Ministry of National Defe nce (MND) officials we re elected to the Central Committee. AU were incumbents. The two Ministry of Interior (MOl) vice ministe rs elected by the Seventh Congress we re in cumbents. Thus, though th e MFA had the sa me numbe r of seats on the Central Committee as th e more co nse rvative MND, th e MND officials were expe ri e nced seco nd-term me mbe rs. Additionally, the four MND incumbe nts co upled with the two incumbe nt MOl me mbers gave those generally more conservative ministri es a slight voting edge over the MFA . TABLE 5.8 Rank of Military Re prese ntation at Seve nth Party Congress Leade rs hip

Incumbent Milita ry Region Commanders Ge ne ral S ta ff Tota l

L

3 4

Sixth Congress Alternate

0 l l

New

Total

4

5 6

2 6

Renouating the Vietnamese Communi.l! Party

! 54

TABLE 5.9 Security Bloc Ministe rial Re prese ntation Seventh Party Congress Lead e rship

Incumbent

*

Sixth Congress Alternate

New

Total

l

2

0 0

l

3* 3

0

4

0 2

Foreign Affairs Ministry Inte rior Ministry National Defe nce Ministry

Ill

4

Nguyen Manh Cam, one of th e four Foreign Ministry officia ls e lected to the Ce ntral Committee, held ambassado rial rank at th e time of the Seve nth Congress.

Th e MOl, MND and the MFA - th e "security bloc" - placed about th e same number of ministerial and vice ministerial officials on the Seventh Central CommiLLee as did the "eco nomic" ministries (Table 5.10). The MOl, MFA and th e MND elected more vice ministers than ministers to the Central Commiuee than did th e eco nomic ministries. The eco nomic minislries elected more mini ste rs th an vice TABLE 5.10 Ministerial Representation in Seve nth Party Congress Leade rs hip

In cumbent

Sixth Congress Alternate

5 l

New

Total

l 0

3

9 l

3 5

0

0

l

2

3 8

1 l

1 1

0 2

2 4

Secwity Bloc Vice-M inistPrs Ministcrs

0

Economic Ministries Vice-Ministers Ministers

Social We/fitre Bloc Viee-M inisters Ministers

Fashioning Consensus

155

ministers, and a slightly larger number of incumbents. Both the security bloc and the economic ministries promoted one member to full membership status.

Unfinished Business The resolution adopted at the 27 June closing session of the Congress "approved" the platform for national construction in the period of transition to socialism. The resolution also "entrusted" the Central Committee with "compiling the document" on views expressed at the Congress before the official announcement of the platform would be made. Clearly, continuing differences of views required further changes to the "approved" documents before they could be adopted by a Central Committee resolution. Further; the resolution approved the "basic contents" of the strategy for socio-economic stabilization, and approved the Political Report. However, the resolution again "entrusted" the Central Committee with the responsibility of "supplementing and perfecting" the strategy and the Political Report, based on views expressed during the Seventh Congress, before those two documents would be given official blessing. Only the party building report and the amended party statutes were given unqualiiied approval, according to the resolution. Finally, there was no indication that the party had adopted a set of main guidelines and objectives for the five years of the Seventh Central Committee's tf'rm, as had been done as a matter of course at the conclusion of previous National Congresses. ln editorials prefacing the Congress, briefings prior to the opening meeting, and in speeches on the first day of the session, it was made quite clear that the central task of the Seventh Congress was to pass a political platform defining the course for "national construction in the transition period advancing to socialism", and approve the development strategy for the period up to the year 2000. In his opening speech, Vo Chi Cong said, The paramount significance of the Seventh Party Congress lies in the fact that for the first time the Congress will approve a platform, point out the viewpoints and basic orientation for the period of

156

Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

transition to socialism in our country, and pass the strategy of socioeconomic stabilization and developme nt until the year 2000. These issues are related to the task of pe rfecting the party's political leadership over society, and will further strengthen the scientific basis of the party's major discussions.288

However, Vo Chi Cong went on to suggest that much of the work on key policy positions and general orientations, discussed in the draft documents, would have to contin ue beyond the Congress. Cong said that the documents themselves still required criticism and further rewriting, The delegates to the Party Congresses at all levels and the party Central Committee plenums have aL·eady studied, discussed, and adopted the draft documents. However, in my opinion, to arrive at the truth, one has to go through a lot of thinking and reasoning. It cannot be said that we have co mpleted our discussions ; it is important to reme mbe r that we did not focus on the various issues raised in the draft doc uments but on ly on fundamental issu es that need further clarifications or that contain major different viewpoints. 28 lJ

Others echoed this view. In his speech to the 24 June afternoon session of the Congress, General Doan Khue acknowledged that the party organization congresses of the military had "seriously discussed and achieved a high id entity of views" on the contents of the draft documents, but that he had some lengthy, additional opinions on the subject of national defence which he hoped to ex press. Clearly, the head of the army party organization delegation felt that the military's views concerning the streamlining of the People's Army of Vietnam, Vietnam's "internationalist duty" to Laos and Cambodia, and the necessity for laws e nsuring the stability of a budget and supplies for the PAVN were not sufficiently represented in the draft documents. Khue also felt the need to amplify issues pertaining to the reserve force, militia and self-defence forces, command and logistical-tec hnical supply systems, military education, and efforts to enhance Vietnamese defence industry. 290 Dao Duy Tung, who summarized the views and de bates over key issues in the draft docum ents heard by the Central Committee, noted that there were still differing views on some iss ues, and that

Fashioning Consensus

157

these unresolved issues suggested that the Central Committee should "seek ways to ame nd and perfect the Congress documents before making them public" .2 '! 1 An essay, broadcast on the closing day of th e Congress, stated that, Each of us profoundly unde rstands that congressional reso lution s can only point out the major orientations and dete rmine the major goals to be reached by us in a certain period. The applicati o n of these resolutions calls for the ability to calculate and we igh the m, a nd creativity and boldness to think and act, making the spirit and words of the reso lutions suitable to the circumstances of each sector and each localit y.

The essay furth e r noted that the resolutions would have to be turn ed into "specific guidelines a nd policies" through appropriate legislation. Further, the resolutions "passed" by the Congress, the essay argued, were not immutable, inflexible laws or dogma but rather positions that party me mbers would have to "supplement, perfect and furth er enrich based on practical realities and experience". 292

Delegate Speeches In their speeches to the Congress, most delegates commented in quite conventional term s about lapses in party leaders hip and rank and file failures to sustain basic me mbership standard s of educati on, technical capability, and organizational manage ment. The delegates' co mm entary on the party platform stressed the leading role of th e state in th e co untry's eco nomy, and the importance of reclaiming the key gove rnm ent role in industry and reaffirming Vietnam's co mmitme nt to co mmunist orthodoxy.n> In one form or another, delegates co mm en ting on eco nomi c policy echoed Linh's posi tion , Th e state eco no my must be co nso lidated and deve loped in th e key sectors a nd domai ns. We must co ntrol th e vital businesses and trades, and assume those o pe rations in which other eco nom ic sectors have no sui table conditions in which to invcst. 2 'J-I

Pham The Du yet, head of the Hanoi delegation, e ndorsed impleme nting a market orie nted eco nomy under state manage me nt. 2 %

/58

Reno1> a ting the Vietn am ese Comm unist Party

Nguye n Minh Tho ng, re prese nting th e Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, spoke of the necessity of placing natural reso urces such as la nd and water surfaces unde r uniform stale manage me nt.296 Bui Xuan So n, head of th e H a Nam Ninh Province Part y Organization de legati on, stressed the ce ntral role of the slate in ma naging agricultural projects and production pla ns. 2 o ple !n a manner th at would downgrad e th e pa rt y's le ad e rs hip role. He stro ngly s uppo rted co ntinu ed efforts to " reso lve" relations betwee n the party and the state, to "e nhance part y lead e rs hip" and ''co nsoLd ate state effi ciency". Linh al so noted the importance of instituti o nalizing the party's link with growin g mass organizati ons. Linh warned aga inst "d emagogic manoe uvres which take a dva ntage of th e d e moc ratic banne r to stir up di sturb a nces". De moc racy "cann ot ex ist with o ut ce ntrali s m, di sc ipline, o rd e r and a se nse of onf''s c ivi c duti es". He also reitf'rated his position o n political pluralism 111

unequi vocal te rm s, ~o rn e

peo ple ma inta in th at o nl y with tlw mec hanis m of po litica l plu ra jjs m a nd the ex istPnce of o ppositio n pa rti es a nd factions new line-up of the Politburo, Secretariat and Central Commitlee re prese nte d a net gain for the mihtary and cautious reform e rs. Though significant retire me nts did occ ur, the newly seated Politburo did not quite represent a successful transition to a new generation of leaders. The leadership change created a moment of suspended animation for the political syste m during whic h the aged elite co uld begin to step aside, and the new generation could start the process of forming working groups and alliances based on common interests, institutional affiliation s and issues. The Congress took up key iss ues co nce rning the pace and scope of eco nomic reform and development plans, the rights of private businesses and other new economic form s to make inde pe nd e nt decisions, th e state's authority over the eco nomic realm, and social problems that e merged in th e new eco nomic environme nt. The party leadership spo ke in support of a cautious, incre me ntal approach to the market, a nd the continued role of the state economic sector. The Congress accorded public security and national defe nce issues priority attention, a nd conservative delegates registered their strong co ncern regarding th e pote ntial for orga nized, ex te rnally-supported a ntiregime activities. De legates and key party officials und e rsco red th e need for a {oreign policy organized around famili ar frie ndships. The s peec hes of key leade rs and provincial de legates, and Linh's own valedictory address, manifeste d a s imple faith in the system , co nfid e nce in the e fforts to resurrect and reform the party and th e economy, and a be li ef that the party and thf' stale co uld share power. At thf' sa me timf', th e leadership made clea r to the Congress its preoccupation with th e situation in the Soviet Union and the collapse of co mmunist parties in Easte rn Europe. Linh's words to the Congress in hi s final state me nt as Gf'neral Secretary, for example, evinced a basic loyalty to Marxist-Le ninist orthodoxies, while at th e same time acknowledging the importance of Ilex ible, inve ntive respo nses to new

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Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Pw1y

proble ms. Linh's criticism of "ideological vacillation" and the "rejection of past achievements" gave expression to his worries about the impact of the dramatic changes in the socialist world but, like other delegates to the National Congress, Linh reite rated his unre mitting co mmitme nt to th e socialist path . The Seventh Congress was not a dramatic mome nt in party histo ry, or a be nchmark introducing startling institutional and leaders hip changes. Rather, it was the occasion for a reiteration of the importance of reforming slowly and carefully, without kicking the stru ts out from und er a syste m that, in the view of the Congress, still had the pote ntial to survive, and still co mmanded the support of a significant core of cad re and leaders.

six

Conclusion Nguyen Van Linh and the 11 New Way of Thinking"

A Matter of Style Nguyen Van Linh, a long-time southern activist and organizer, and twice Chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee, was elected General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party at the Sixth National Party Congress in December 1986. He quickly established himself as a forceful and forward-leaning leader, committed to a coordinated programme of economic change and party transformation. As General Secretary, Linh demonstrated flexibility and adaptability, and a penchant for the unorthodox twist to policy-making. Where his predecessor Le Duan had been unprepared to compromise, Linh was willing to break ranks and engage in tactical gambles. Linh developed a record for being quite frank about the limits of the political system and the inability of the party machinery, leadership, and the governing apparatus to organize rapid and effective change. Linh's hallmark was his contemplative approach to problems. He encouraged examination of the "theoretical issues" at the core of specific problems, and Look as his starting point the need to rethink fundamental assumptions about strategies, policies and practices. He was less fixed in his approach to problems than his predecessors and apparently not ill at ease with a style that abandoned prevailing 171

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Renovating the Vietname5e Communi.1t Party

paradigms and sought alternatives to nagging eco nomic, organizational and pe rso nnel issues, including recruitment and training of party and government newcomers. Linh was adamant about the need to end secrecy and to subj ect the e ntire policy-making structure and leadership to an open, public process of inspection. He urged full media cove rage of attempts to root out corruption , and e ndorsed a prying style of journalism in se nsitive and hithe rto sacrosanct realms, including the process of cadre selection and pe rso nnel advancement with in the party and the government. Linh defe nd ed his style by arguing that essentiall y unrestrained publicity was one mea ns of accelerating the reform s. An ope n media would prompt an outpouring of co mplaints and co nfessions, and bring to public and official attention cases of organizational and cad re defi cie ncies and policy weaknesses that otherwise would have re mained hidd e n. He steadfastly rejected the argument, made with inc reasing freq ue ncy in 1988, that his pe nc hant for public c riticism of the party ran the risk of discrediting the institution. Linh thought of himself as a proble m-solver and a catalyst uniquely capable of teasing out the hidde n possibilities and pote ntial from a deade ned syste m. On his parish visits to provinces, districts and enterprises, he sought to rectify problems by me nding organizational disco nnections, proposing alternative means of imple me nting policies to local officials, a nd suggesting immediate mea ns of addressing eco nomic Issues. Plenary Session Report Card Nguyen Van Linh used ple nary sessions to ca refully outline di sputes over reform strategies and tactics that divided the Central Committee, and to table his own means of resolving proble ms. At first Linh was basically successful at turning ple nary sessions into showcases for his reformist plans and policies. Howeve r; for a variety of reasons, including the ge ne rally dismal pe rformance of the eco nomy and the flagging ability of th e reform s to make eve n the most minor difference, beginning in 1988 Linh was less able to respond forcefully to c halle nges to his views, and less able to establish alliances necessary to press beyond conservative coalitions seeking to control the reformi st strategy.

Conclusion

173

Beginning with the second year of his leade rs hip, Linh had less of an opportunity to set the formal agend a for the regime. In part, thi s was the res ult of the altered ple nary session schedule. Four sess ions in 1987 provided the Ge ne ral Secretary with a regular forum for his policy views. That forum was not afford ed by the fewe r, more irregularly scheduled Central Co mmittee meetings in succeeding years. It was also the res ult of the more strictly tec hnical policy needs of the late 1980 s a nd the early 1990 s whic h foc used on imple me nting special tax a nd ma nagerial regulations, im po rt-ex port rules, a nd regulati ons establishing limits on sectoral activities. The nu ts and bolts tasks of imple me nting the reform s afforded a lot less opportunity for dra matic proble m solving th an defining the reforms the mselves, and required a great deal more focus on routines a nd regulations. Linh's relia nce on initiative, unique a nd experime ntal method s, and inve ntive approac hes to proble m solving was so mew hat less a ppropriate to the task of making syste ms work than it was to inve nting syste ms the mselves. The schedule of ple nary sessions that e merged in 1987 - three evenly spaced sessions for the year - was broke n in 1988, a nd the party reverted to th e basic pattern esta blished by the Fifth Co ngress. Linh had gained certain advantages from the 198 7 ple nary pace. He see med to be able to set the agenda a nd more vigorously dominate the first two post-Co ngress sessions of the Central Committee, using the seco nd a nd third ple nary sessions as instrume nts for defe nding and advancing his re novations. At the Fourth Ple num in Dece mber 198 7, h owever~ Linh took several direct hits as a conseq ue nce of the worse ning eco nomic situation, a nd the ina bility of the reform s to d ramatically improve things. His more restrained role at the fifth ple nary session (1 4 -20 June 1988) reflected so me slippage in his political position, ste mming from the increased questioning of the wisdom of the eco nomic reform progra mme. Linh's address to the Fifth Ple num lacked the activism of his address to th e seco nd and third sessions. Linh's third ple nary speech, whic h carefull y outlined the di sputes over eco nomic reform strategy a nd tactics a nd articulated his own assessme nts of competing views, suggested th at Linh was atte mpting to broker co mpromises between co nte nding policy positions,

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Renovating the Vietnamese Conununi,,t Party

and to function as an arbiter of policy disp utes. In co ntrast, his fifth plenary speech lacked the incisive co mm e ntary about conflictin g viewpoints within the party co nce rning party building that had bee n part of his previous statements. The speech was more of a recitation of issues, minus the synthesis of views and Linh's own reco mm e ndations on how to proceed. By mid-1988, Linh's appeal for a wider use of ex tra-party e ntities and e nhanced responsibility for local level parties in setting their individual reformist agendas had become singularly unpopular with a Ce ntral Committee inte nt on strengthening established chains of command. In his speech to the Fifth Plenum, Linh acknowledged that his perspectives were not widely shared, and seemed to vaguely indicate that his position on th e matte r of party building had not been incorporated into the draft version of the resolution. His pe rformance indicated that he could not press beyo nd th e co nse nsus of his colleagues. Linh's manoe uverability was furth e r co nstrained by th e sixth plenary session (20-29 March 1989), which more stringently defined the operating assumptions of the increasingly cautious Central Committee, without foreclosing on the reformi st goals. Linh was re mind ed that his formula for re making th e economy and the partystate structure of power was limited by the reluctance of at least a plurality of party decision-makers to accept major de partures from the political, ideological a nd organizational co re of th e revolution. Linh's speech to the Seventh Plenum (15-24 August 1989), whi ch focused on the impact of world c urrents on socialist revolutions and Vietnam's role in the socialist community, had an unc ha racteristic ideological stiffness about it. Linh urged adherence to party discipline, respect for the unity of the socialist community, and continued attention to internationalist responsibilities. Linh made the orthodox case in language that sounded somewhat alien in his voice, and while he urged avoiding rigid attitudes, he mapped out a rathe r determinist co urse for the eco nomic and social reform s that hinged on inevitable progress of socialism and the inexorable process of impe rialist decay. Linh's imprimatur was decidedly less evide nt at the eighth ple nary session (12-2 7 Marc h 1990), which discussed the draft platform

Co n cl uo~ io n

175

for th e National Party Co ngress. He gave the ope ning and closing s peeches at the ple num , ne ither of which were give n a great deal of atte ntion in the me dia cove rage of th e meeting. The eighth ple num marked a co ntinued retreat to orthodoxy, und e rscored by his criticisms of "pluralism" as a n unacceptable compromise with non-party interests. At the Ninth Ple num (16-28 August 1990) , whic h took up the two basic draft strategic planning docume nts commissione d by the party a nd the five year plan th at would guide the econo my through the year 2000, Linh's ope ning a nd closing speec hes were acknowle dged in th e co mmunique in onl y the most perfunctory way. He de rived more status from his c hairm a nship of one of the two planning co mmittees, a nd in that context was give n equal billing with Do Mu oi, re prese nting a net gain for the more conser vative Central Committee inte rests. By th e te nth ple nary session (17-26 Nove mbe r 1990) , Linh's s peeches we re ove rshadowed by Do Muoi's address on the socio-eco nomic plan whic h was highlighted in the communique issued at the ple nary meeting, and was in fact the main working docume nt of the session.

The Party under Linh Linh's approach to party reform was uniqu e in several respects. H e relied less on mobilizational instrum e nts - campaigns, ex hortation, sy mbols - a nd more on bureaucratically co-ordinated progra mm es with distinct organizationa l e nds. Linh utilized combinations of resources to attac k specific party-related proble ms, ofte n calling on instrume nts hitherto co nsidere d external to the process of party reform to unde rtake the c ha nges he set as his goals. He placed a special e mph asis on restoring bala nce to the political Trinity of the " party, th e state a nd the people" and stressed the necessity of disaggregating th e pa rty and gove rnm ental fun ctions - se parating the c hurch fro m the state. During the course of hi s te nure in offi ce, Linh fas hioned a co mpre he nsive pac kage of pa rty reform s that was more ambitious a nd pote nti ally more far-reac hing than the reformist goals of his predecesso rs. That pac kage incl ud ed efforts to e mpowe r local organi zatio ns

176

Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

to take on more responsibilities, parallel with the in creasing economic autonomy afforded e nterprises. Linh also introduced a more flexible style of manageme nt, and increased sensitivity to modern organizational s kills and manageme nt techniques, and a co ncomitant active support for the training of a skilled class of party managers. H e so ught to confine the party to a more limited role as the co nscie nce of the revolution responsible for fas hioning social and political direction and maintaining the integrity of the revolutionary inhe ritance, while allowing respo nsibilities for daily governance to pass to a bod y of qualifie d tec hnicians and electe d and appointed officials. Linh's aim was to guide the party toward s a quality co ntrol in operational matte rs and me mbe rs hip policy, e mphasizing responsive ness to direct, critical co mplaints against party perso nnel and organizations. Under Linh , th e party so ught to imple me nt these goals through a variety of organizations, co mmittees and local and provincial meetings. Expanded sessions of provincial party committees were co nve ned to facilitate the writing of Action Programmes, inte nd ed to co mmunicate the importance of the "Three Economic Progra mm es" - fo od production, consume r goods production , and production for ex port. Provincial a nd s ubordinate party organizations were e mpowered to orc hestrate local purification campaigns based on a syste m of branc h, district a nd provinc ial level party co mmittee meetings. Inte rnal party and eco nomic inspecti on teams we re de ployed during the first quarter of 1987. Those grass-root level teams we re res ponsible for close ly monitoring and s upe rvising th e pe rso nal li ves and individual morality of party members. Linh urged co mpljance with plans for re novating the party through visits by higher ec helon party offic ials to subord inate c hapters during whi c h th ose se nior officials assisted with local party chapte r performance reviews. He supported efforts by the party's Secreta ri at to imple me nt portions of th e revised party statutes put forth at th e Sixth Nati onal Congress th at shorte ned the le ngth of the probationary period for candid ates and allowed only minimal leeway for me mbe rs adjudicated to be gu ilty of violations of the party's code of conduct. ln add itio n, und e r Nguyen Van Linh th e effort was mad e to make th e party more publicl y acco unta ble fo r po ucies and pe rso nn el

Conclusion

177

choices, both through the activation of internal control mec hanisms and e mpowering a long dormant media to aggressively watch party be haviour. The party sought to reinvigorate control de partment mec hanisms at all levels with the aim of using them as ombudsmen-like structures to process the mass of co mplaints and accusations triggered by Linh's policy of public scrutiny of the sacred. Mass organizations were e nlisted as adjuncts to the process of monitoring party discipline. The party took ste ps to factor itself out of th e eq uation on iss ues of governance. It appeared to have supported the revision of the candidate selection process in advance of th e National Assembly elections, advocating a minimal role for the party in determining candidate lists. Linh's actions initiated the process of sharing powe r betwee n me mbe rs of the polity, and strongly argued that party building should properly include non-party entities. He stressed the division of state and party labour, in a manner inte nded to prohibit the party from tampering with governance. The adjustment of the ple nary and National Assembly sc hedule to allow the Parliame nt to co nve ne prior to the usual end-of-year Central Committee ple nary session was inte nd ed to portray the Asse mbly as being vigorous and inde pe ndent. While Linh continued to seek means to broade n political participation by non-party e ntities and to maximize the inde pend e nce of action of mass organizations, he also took pains to stress the extent to which the party would re main ce ntral to the process and would co ntinue to exert a strategic influe nce. Nevertheless, though forced to live by new rules, the party remained a stiff and distant organization. Leadership c hange was still ce ntrally determined according to the discretion of a small inner circle of party elde rs. Corruption and malaise remained blots on th e party's reco rd . Media scrutiny, internal co ntrol and vigorous prosecution of offenders made only partial headway toward s e radicating party scofflaws. Members hip rolls were cut by 20 per cent to eliminate the most egregious violators of party laws, and the least desirable cadre. In the e nd the party suffered a serious shortage of rec ruitable yo ung, tec hnically able, educated and - most of all - willing candidates. The party, however~ became a very diffe rent creature than it was

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Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party

und er Le Duan. To a large extent, that was due to Linh's own activism and reformist agenda, and his distinctive operational code that placed a primacy on expe rim entation, openness, and proble m solving.

The Party and the Future Under Nguyen Van Linh , the party began to learn the art of sharing powe r~ admittedly in a very initial , tentative and reluctant way. The party began to s hare ce ntre stage with the e nlive ned National Assembl y, with new and increasingly well organized social and eco nomic interest groups, and with established, strong and influe ntial parts of the political system. These groups a nd interests co mpeted for diminishing resources in an increasingly cluttered, fragm e nted syste m where the old alliances and rules of collegial political conduct had less and less meaning. Bureaucratic leverage, interagency strategies, and issue-orie nted alliances began to count more than the old loyalties, shared revolutionary experie nces, and personal relations. For example, in October 1990, dming a meeting in Washington, D.C. , th e n Fore ign Minister Nguyen Co Thac h mad e th e point that he could convince th e military of the need to participate in efforts to ac hieve th e fullest possible accounting for missing American servicemen. Thach noted th at he had shared a jail cell with Le Due Anh, and was co nfide nt that he co uld make the necessary arguments and elicit the required support. H oweve r~ it was Anh who c hallenged Thach's views on normalization of relations with the Un ited States most forcefully, took exception to Thach's policy of withdrawing combat operational troops from Cambodia and questioned Thach's approach to China. Anh struggled hard for the limited share of resources for his proble m-stricke n army and gave no quarter to Thach in interagency struggles over budget and policy direction. The party de monstrate d some finesse in its relationship with these new social groups and interests, and took relatively reasonable and flexible positions regarding the roles and rights of these groups. For example, though Hanoi respo nded to the emergence of a voice for dissatisfied veterans in 1989 and 1990 by closing their unregistered newspaper and co-opting their putative organization, ultimately the

Conclusion

179

party allowed the veterans group to stay together, unde r party rule. Othet; more drastic alternatives were theoretically available to the party. The VNCP, however, c hose to co-opt rather than destroy the organizations. The party dealt cautiously with these associations and with other te mporary, issue-oriented groups of farm ers and stud e nts protesting specific co nditions. However, by the end of Linh's te nure as General Secretary, the party was not prepared to, or capable of, coping with a non-communist movement or anti-party activism. The rules which said that the party should still be the pre-e minent political voice were still on the books. Those rules had been bent slightly, but not suppla nted . The syste m was by no means prepared to accommodate organized political competitors, or challe nges to the party's role as the key decision-maker. Howeve r; diminishing political resources and leverage, the dwindling faith of the me mbers hip, the virtual e nd of external support from like-minded syste ms, and the emerge nce of a less compliant legislature confound ed the party's ability to keep its grip on th e syste m. At the outset of hjs tenure, Linh sought to nurture the ability to compro mise, change political habits, and alter institutional rules. His goal was to turn the party into a flexible organization and abandon the practices that had mad e the party an ossified, unyielding, corrupt and uncompromising machine. Linh achieved some initial and limited success in makin g the party respo nsive to the altered political playing field, and capable of undertaking some organ izational changes. Linh, howevet; could not push beyond the co nservative majority and his own faith and political beliefs to provoke real c hange in the Vietn amese political world.

Notes

l. Han o i DonH ·slic Sc ni('(· in Vie tn amese. 0.500 GMT. 18 Ol'l o be r 1988,

l•i!l·eign Broadcast lnfimnation Seruice-East Asia (h e re aflcr FBIS-1:-'AS ). 88-20 3. 20 Oclo lw r 1988, p. 6.5 . William Duikn. The Conwwnist H.oad to Pot l'f'r in Vietna111 (Colorado: Westview Press. 1981) . pp. 14 1. 176 - 80. 187- 90 , 193-95. 22 1-24. 3. Acco rdin g lo llw I 968 S la lult ·s, IIH' pl t, nuni d ec id es llw s ize of llw 2.

Politburo. th e Secrcla ri a l and llw Cc nlra l Co ntrol Co mmilltT (Liv Ban 1-.:icm Tra Trun g Uo ng). In th e 1977 a nd 1987 SlaluiPs. llw ,.;ize of llw Po lilb11ro and Scc re larial is d e le rmi1wd bv a Cc nlral Co mmillcc plenum. T lw Control Co mmittee is drop ped from the formula . Sec Dan g Lao Don g Vid Nam. Dieu Le (H a no i: Ban C ha p Hanh Trung Llo ng. 1968) . p. 43: Nhan Dan. 3 Fe bnwrY 1977, pp. 2-5 ; and Dan g Co ng Sa n Vicl Na m. /)i eu IR (H a noi: N ha Xual Ban S u Th ai. 1987). Tlw 197 7 a nd 1987 S tatui ction s" to d ete rmine th e ex te nt of th e ente rpri se manage me nt's co mplia nce with party and state polic ies a nd reso lutions. See Saigon Giai Phong, 24 Fe bruary 1987, p. 2. 22. Saigo n Giai Phong, 26 Feb ruary 1987, p. 2.

Notes

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32 . 33 . 34 . 35. 36.

3 7.

3 8.

183

Saigon Giai Phong, 7 March 1987, p. 2. Saigon Giai Phong, 1 April 1987, p. l. Nhan Dan, 21 June 1987, ed itorial, pp. 1, 4. Hanoi Vietnamese News Agency in English, 0500 GMT, 3 March 1987, FBIS, 4 March 1987, k. 3. Hanoi Domestic Se rvice in Vietnamese, 25 July 1987, FBIS-EAS 27 July 1987, N. 4. Hanoi Domestic Se rvice in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 28 July 1987, FBIS-EAS, 31 July 1987, N. l. Saigon Giai Phong, 27 May 1987, p. l. Nebszabagsaq, 17 August 1987, p. 3, FBIS-EAS, 19 August 1987. For the text of th e Commun iqu e of th e Second Plenary Session of th e VNCP Central Committee, see Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 16 April 1987, FBIS, 17 April 1987, k. 7-13. For th e text of Linh's opening speech , see Hanoi Domestic Se rvice in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 16 April1987, FBIS, 17 April1987, k. 1-7. For th e text of Linh's speech at the closing cere mony, see Hanoi Domestic Se rvice in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 17 Ap ril 1987, FBIS, 20 April 1987, k. 4 - 9. Also see the VNCP docum e nt , Dang Co ng San Vi et Nam, Nghi Quyet: Hoi Nghi Lan Thu Hai Ban Chap Hanh Trung Uong Dang (Khoa VI - Giai Quyet Nhung Van De Cap Bach Ve Phan Phoi, Lu Thong), Hanoi, 9 April 1987. Hanoi Domestic Se rvice in Vietnam ese, 0500 GMT, 29 June 1987, FBIS-EAS, 8 July 1987, N. 3- 6. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 2 July 1987, FBISEAS, 8 Jul y 1987, N. 4. Washington Times, 4 August 1987, p. 4; Washington Post, 14 July 1987; Far Eastern Economic Reuiew. 23 July 1987, pp. 28- 29. Ngoc Son , "Viec Hoc Tac Kinh Doanh Thuong Ngh ie p Bi Lo i Dung", Nhan Dan, 26 March 1987, p. 3. Hanoi Vietnamese News Age ncy in Engbsh, 1504 GMT, 14 April 1987, FBIS-EAS, 15 April 1987, k. 4 - 7; "Dang Ky Kinh Doang Thuong Ngh iep Va Dich Vu" , Nhan Dan, 17 July 1987, p. l. Hanoi Domestic Se rvi ce in Vietnam ese, 0500 GMT, 17 July 1987, FBIS-EAS, 21 July 1987, N. 4; Hanoi Dom estic Service in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 13 Jul y 1987, FBIS-EAS, 16 July 1987, N. 8. Hanoi Domestic Serv ice in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 3 0 June 1987, FBIS-EAS, 1 July 1987, N. l.

184

Notes

39. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 6 June 1987, FBIS-EAS, 16 July 1987, N. 3-4. 40. Nhan Dan. 17 July 1987, p. 3; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1200 GMT, 22 June 1987, FBIS-EAS, 29 July 1937, N. 5-22. 41. Hong Kong AFP in English, 1354 GMT, 28 May 1987. FBIS-EAS, 87-170, 2 September 1987, p. 36. 42. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 31 August 1987, FBIS-EAS, 87-170, 2 September 1937. pp. 36, 40. 43. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 31 August 1987, FBIS-EAS. 87-170, 2 September 1987, p. 39. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Hanoi International Service in English, 1000 GMT. 31 December 1937, FBIS-EAS, 88-002, 5 January 1988, pp. 52-53. 47. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese. 1100 GMT. 28 August 1987, FBIS-EAS, 87-169, 1 February 1987, p. 41. 48. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT. 25 September 1987, FBIS-EAS. 87-187, 28 September 1987. pp. 33-34. 49. Ibid. 50. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 21 September 1987, FBIS-EAS. 87-186, 25 September 1987. pp. 36-37. 51. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT. 14 November 1987, FBIS-EAS, 87-223, 19 November 1987, p. 46. Thanh Hoa and Thuan

52. 53. 54. 55.

56.

Hai provinces had developed plans all the way down to the sectoral level by mid-November. Nhan Dan, 4 November 1987, pp. l, 4. Nhan Dan, 5 November 1987, pp. l. 4; Nhan /Jan, 23 October 1987. pp. 1, 4. Nhan Dan. 26 September 1987, pp. l. 4. Sec L.M. Stern, "The Vietnamese Communist Party in 1986: Party Reform Initiatives, the Scramble Toward Economic Revitalization, and the Road to the Sixth Party Congress", in Southeast Asian Af fairs 1987 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), pp. 360-63. Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After The War - A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon (New York: Harcourt, Rraee and Jovanovich, 1936), p. 3 73. Bach's career was short-livPd. He was rcmovt·d from his positions as PolitbtJro nwmlwr and Central

Notes

57. 58.

59.

60. 6 1. 62 . 63 . 64. 65.

185

Committee secretary at the Eighth Party Central Com mittee plenary sessio n in March 1990. "Nguyen Thanh Binh", US. Government Biograp hy l NVN-6-1972. Murray Hiebert, "Caught in a Downdraft: Vietnam Admilccmber 1989, FBIS-EAS, 89-236, ll December 1989, p. 59. Nhan Dan, 31 July 1989. p. 2. Nayan Chanda, "Force for Change", Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 October 1989, pp. 24-26; Barry Wain, "O io Revolutionaries in Vietnam Launch One Last Offensive", Wall Street }mana/. 4 May 1989, pp. 1, ll. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 28 August 1989, FBIS-EAS, 89-166. 29 August 1989, pp. 66-72. Quan Doi Nhan Dan, J9 January 1989, pp. l, 4. Quotations from Nguyen Dang Quang's article, c ited on pp. 82-85 above, are from Tap Chi Cong San, January 1989, pp. 18-22. Quotations from Nguyen Huy's article, cited on pp. 85-86 above, are from Tap Chi Cong San, February 1989, pp. 19-25. Nhan Dan, 23 January 1989, pp. 3- 4.

J 74. 175. References to Linh's closing spt>ech to the sixth plenary session, cited on p. 88 above, are from Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 30 March 1989, FBIS-EAS, 89-061. 31 March 1989, p. 70. The quotation from Linh's National Day speech, cited on p. 88 above, is from Hanoi Vietnarrwsc News Agency in English, 0831 GMT. 2 September 1989. FBIS-EAS, 89-17 3, 8 Septembe r 1989. p. 68. 176. Tclp Chi Cong San, January 1990, pp. 81- 84; March 1990. pp. 7577. J 77. Quan Doi Nlwn Dan. 23 May 1990. I 78. St>e ~ong Thicu 0 Hoa Thinh Don De Nghi Xoa Bai Lam Lai. Trong Khi 0 Cali Ong Ky Noi San Sang Vt> Nuoc Ncu Cong San No i Long Chinh Tri'', Tu Do, 7 April 1990, pp. L 2; "Xuat Hien

Note.s

179. 180. 18 1. 182.

183 .

184. 185 . 186 . 18 7.

195

Truoc 500 Nguoi Thuoc Thanh Phan Do Ban lo Chuc, Chon Loc, Cuu Thong Tong Nguyen Van Thieu Chinh Thuc Nhan Lanh Trach Nhiem Lam Mat Nuoc Va Doi Xoa Bai Lam Lai", Hoa Thinh Don Viet Bao, 7 April 1990, pp. 1, 2. Also see Susuma Awanohara, "Reconciling the Past", Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 August 1990, pp. 21-22. Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 23 May 1990. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 14 April1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-074, 17 April 1990, p. 73 . Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietn amese, 1430 GMT, 16 April1990 , FBIS-EAS, 90-075 , 18 April 1990, p. 55. Murray Hie bert, "Jailhouse Open Door", Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 May 1990, p. 22; Hanoi Domestic Se rvice in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 7 Jun e 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-111, 8 June 1990, p. 8. Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 30 May 1990, pp. 1,4; Hanoi Domestic Ser-vice in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 12 July 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-138, 18 July 1990, pp. 57- 58. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 16 January 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-013 , 19 January 1990, p. 57. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 2330 GMT, 14 January 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-014, 22 January 1990, p. 59. Nhan Dan, 16 Nove mber 1989, p. 3. Hanoi Vietnam ese News Agency in English , 0716 GMT, 7 March 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-045 , 7 March 1990, pp. 71-72 ; Hanoi Vietnamese News Age ncy in English, 0704 GMT, 25 Fe bruary 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-041, 1 March 1990, pp. 67-68; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 23 February 1989, FB/5-EAS, 90-044, 6 March 1990, pp. 70-71. Also see Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 March 1990, p. 18; Saigon Giai Phong, 6 March 1990, p. 2 . Hanoi Domestic Se rvice in Vietnamese, 1400 GMT, 9 April 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-071, 12 April 1990, p. 44; Hanoi Domestic Se rvice in Vietnamese, 1400 GMT, 15 March 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-054, 20 March 1990, p. 54; Hanoi Domestic Se rvice in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 22 March 1990, FBIS-EA S, 90-058, 26 March 1990, pp. 84-85; Han oi Vietnamese News Agency in English, 1525 GMT, 19 October 1990, FB/5-EA S, 90-204, 22 October 1990 , pp. 7 4-7 5; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietn amese, 2330 GMT, 5 Dece mber 1990 , FB/5-EA S, 90-244, 19 Dece mber 1990 , p. 55.

196

No te5

188. Hanoi Vi etnam ese News Agency in English , 0716 GMT, 7 March 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-045, 7 March 1990, pp. 71-72 . 189. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnam ese, 1100 GMT, 5 Feb ruary 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-0 28, 9 Fe bruary 1990. p. 54. 190. Hanoi Vietnamese News Agency in English , 0716 GMT, 7 Marc h 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-045 , 7 March 1990, pp. 71-72; Hanoi Vietnamese News Agency in English, 0704 GMT, 25 Fe bruary 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-041 , 1 March 1990, pp. 67-68; Ha noi Dom esti c Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 23 February 1989, FB/5-EAS, 90-044, 6 March 1990, pp. 70-71 . 191. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 5 March 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-051, 15 March 1990, p. 54. 192. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1000 GMT, 2 March 1989, FBIS-EAS , 90-044, 5 March 1990, p. 90; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vie tnam ese, 2300 GMT, 25 Fe bruary 1990, FBIS-EAS 90-044, 1 March 1990, p. 68. 193. Hanoi Vietnam ese News Agency in English, 0716 GMT, 7 March 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-045, 7 March 1990, p. 72. 194. Han oi Dom est ic Service in Vietnamese, 1400 GMT, 27 Feb ru ary 1990. FBIS-EAS, 90-046, 8 March 1990, p. 65. 195. Hanoi International Service in English, 1000 GMT, 29 March 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-062, 30 March 1990, p. 71. 196. Hanoi Domesti c Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, ll March 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-053, 19 March 1990 , p. 56. 197. Murray Hie be rt. "Again st the Wind", Far Eastern Economic Reuie,w, 12 Apr il 1990, p. 13 ; Gareth Po rter, "Th e Politics of 'Re novatio n' in Vietnam", Problem:s of Communism (M ay-Jun e 1990) , p. 87; Keith Ri chburg, '"Viet nam's Communists De mote Leading Propone nt of Politica l Change", Washington Post , 29 March 1989, pp. 29-30. 198. Hiebert, "Again st The Wind", p. 13; Tran Xuan Bac h, "Mot Doi Di e u Suy Nghi Tren Duong Loi Moi", Tap Chi Cong San , January 1990, p. 4 7. 199. Hanoi Domestic Se rvi ce in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 5 Ja nu ary 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-005, 8 January 1990, pp. 67-70 . 200. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 5 Janua ry 1990. FB/5-EA S, 90-016. 24 Ja nu a ry 1990 , p. 75. 201. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 5 January 1990, FB/5-EA S, 90-005, 8 Janu a ry 1990, pp. 68- 69.

Notes

197

202. References to the plenary communique, cited on pp. 105-07 above, are from Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 28 March 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-060, 28 March 1990. 203. References to the party resolution cited on pp. 107-109 above

204.

205. 206.

207. 208.

209 . 210. 211. 212.

are from "Nghi Quyet Hoi Nghi Lan Thu 8, BCHTUD (Khoai VI) , Doi Moi Cong Tac Quan Chung Cua Dang, Tang Cuong Moi Quan He Giai Dang Va Nhan Dan", Tap Chi Cong San, May 1990, pp. 1-8. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietn amese, 1100 GMT. 29 August 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-169, 30 August 1990, pp. 70-71 (communique); Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 29 August 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-169, 30 August 1990, pp. 69-70 (resolution). Nhan Dan, 12 January 1990, pp. 3, 4; Tap Chi Cong San, Fe bruary 1990, pp. 15- 19, 32. Nhan Dan, 12 January 1990, pp. 3, 4; Hanoi Domestic Se rvice in Vietnamese, 0500 GMT, 10 October 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-196, 10 October 1990, p. 59; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vi etnamese, 2300 GMT, 13 November 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-220 , 14 November 1990, p. 68. Also see Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 3 October 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-193, 4 October 1990, p. 70; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 17 Septe mber 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-184, 21 September 1990, p. 73; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 27 October 1990, FBIS-t"AS, 90-210, 30 October 1990, p. 81; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 27 October 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-210, 30 October 1990, p. 81. Nhan Dan, 7 September 1990, p. 3; Tap Chi Cong San, February 1990, pp. 15-19, 32. A January 1990 Tap Chi Cong San article suggested that of the 2,149,000 party members, 11.4 7 pe r cent had worked at enterprise work sites and slate farms. A February 1990 Tap Cong San articl e noted that 8.8 per cent were workers participating directly in production. See Tap Chi Cong San, February 1990, pp. 15-19, 32; Nhan Dan, 29 August 1990, p. 3 . Tap Chi Cong San, February 1990, pp. 15-19, 32. Nhan Dan, 12 January 1990, pp. 3, 4. Nhan Dan, 29 August 1990, p. 3. Saigon Ciai Phong, 26 May 1990, p. 2.

198

Notes

213. Nhan Dan, 12 January 1990, pp. 3- 4; Tap Chi Gong San, Fe bruary 1990, pp. 15-19. Acco rding to a late August article about Hau Giang

214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221.

222. 223.

224.

Province's basic party organizations, "In the rural area, the reo rganization of party chapters by hamle t in place of production units and the formation of a numbe r of chapte rs not directly e ngage d in production leade rship (comprised largely of retire d party me mbe rs) have overcome a situation of party chapters ' meeting without decision or making decisions without achievement' and of ' those working not speaking or th ose s pea king not working"'. See Nhan Dan, 29 August 1990, p. 3. Nhan Dan, 7 September 1990, p. 3. Nhan Dan, 5 February 1990, pp. 3- 4. Tap Chi Gong San, Fe bruary 1990, pp. 52-54. Hanoi Vietnamese News Agency in English, 1414 GMT, 2 Fe bruary 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-024, 5 Fe bruary 1990, p. 53. Hanoi Vietnamese News Agency in English, 1528 GMT, 2 December 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-232, 3 Dece mbe r 1990, pp. 71-72. Hanoi Dom estic Service in Vietnamese, 0500 GMT, 1 Dece mber 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-233, 4 December 1990, pp. 54-55. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 14 November 1990, FBIS-EAS, 14 November 1990. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 14 November 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-222, 16 November 1990, p. 70. For broadcasts following the plenary session, refere nced on p. 120 above, see Hanoi Vietnamese News Agency in English, 1528 GMT, 2 December 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-232, 3 Decembe r 1990, p. 71. Hanoi Dom estic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 27 November 1990, FBIS-EAS 90-229, 28 November 1990, pp. 66-68 . All references to the Draft Platform, cited on pp. 122-23 above, are from Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnam ese, llOO GMT, 30 Nove mbe r 1990; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 30 November 1990; and Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 30 November 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-229. 28 November 1990, pp. 66-68. In a co nve rsation during January 1991 with a se nior Min istry of Foreign Affairs official, th e official suggested that he and most of his co Ueagues, certainl y all of those who knew Bui Tin, regarded his indiscretion as the result of a mental weakening or sic kness, and as

Notes

225. 226.

227.

228. 22 9 . 23 0 .

199

such were not concerned with th e political impact of Tin's act. Also see Asian Wall Street Journal, 3 Dece mber 1990, p. 15; Asian Wall S treet}oumal, 11 March 1991, pp. 1, 19; " Duon g Thu Huon g", Xay Dung, (publis hed in California) , 1991, pp. 59-62. Author's interview with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs officia l, April 1991, and with Vietnam ese News Age ncy offi cial, October 1990. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 5 February 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-026, 7 Fe bruary 1990, p. 71 ; Hanoi Domestic Se rvi ce in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 1 Se ptembe r 1990, FBIS-EA S, 90-173 , 6 Se pte mber 1990, p. 58. Vo Van Kiet and Le Due Anh's positions we re unchanged from the Sixth Party Congress lin e-up to the Octobe r death of Le Due Tho wh e n a listin g of the fun e ral commillee ranked Kiet and Anh afte r Linh , Yo Chi Cong and Do Muoi. Howeve r, Nguye n Thanh Binh climbed ahead of Ngu yen Due Ta m, Nguyen Co Thach and Dong Sy Nguye n. Mai Chi Tho rose by several spots, displac ing Doan Khue by one notch. Hanoi Dom estic Service in Vi etnamese, 2300 GMT, 13 Octobe r 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-199, 15 October 1990, p. 78. Hanoi International Service in Englis h, 1000 GMT, 29 March 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-062 , 30 March 1990, pp. 67-68; Han oi Vietnamese News Agency in Englis h, 0721 GMT, 3 0 Marc h 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-063 , 2 April 1990, pp. 50-55 ; Ho Chi Minh Anh Hung Giai ?hong Dan Toe Danh Nhan Van Hoa (H anoi: Uy Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi Viet Nam, Nha Xu at Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1990) . Hanoi Dom estic Service in Vi etnam ese, 143 0 GMT, 5 Se ptembe r 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-174, 7 Se pte mbe r 1990, pp. 71-75 . Hanoi Vietnam ese News Age ncy in Engli sh, 0721 GMT, 30 March 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-063 , 2 April 1990, p. 53. Hanoi Domestic Se rvice in Vietnamese, 2300 GM1~ 14 Fe bru ary 19 90, FBIS-EAS, 90-035 , 21 Fe bruary 1990, pp. 7 3- 7 4 . Also sec Hanoi Domesti c Se rvice in Vietnam ese, 143 0 GMT, 9 March 199 0 , FBIS-EAS, 90-9052 , 16 March 1990, p. 5 9 about th e tri al of th e Tien ?hong co rrespond ent , Nguye n Minh Vie n. Vie n was co nvi cted of libel for an article published on the 1989 crac k-down on "decade nt vid eo cassettes" in mid-1989 , and retried and found guilty of a lesse r vi olation of the criminal code involvin g libe l - by the High-Leve l Military Appe ll ate Tribun al in Ho Chi Minh Cit y during earl y Ma rch

200

231. 232. 233.

234. 235 .

236. 237.

238. 239. 240. 241.

242 .

Notes 1990; Hanoi Vietnamese News Agency in English, 1552 GMT, 6 April 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-068,9 April1990, p. 74 ; Nhan Dan, 21 June 1990, p. 3; Nhan Dan, 24 Jun e 1990 editorial. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 13 June 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-117, 18 June 1990, pp. 72-7 3. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 143 0 GMT, 13 June 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-117, 18 June 1990, pp. 72-7 3. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 30 July 1990, FBIS-EA S, 90-152, 7 August 1990, pp. 55- 56; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 27 July 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-153 , 8 August 1990, pp. 56- 59 for a text of th e Secretariat's Directive on the Management of Literature and the Arts. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 7 September 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-176, 11 September 1990, p. 70. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 1 October 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-192, 3 October 1990, p. 53; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 19 October 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-204, 22 October 1990, pp. 71-73 . Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 9 November 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-220, 14 November 1990, pp. 70-72. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 24 September 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-189, 28 Se ptember 1990, p. 56; Hanoi international Service in English, 25 September 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-187, 26 September 1990, p. 72; Hanoi Domesti c Service in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 13 September 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-179, 14 September 1990, p. 68; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 11 September 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-177, 12 September 1990, p. 56. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 13 March 1990, FBIS-EA S, 90-052, 16 Marc h 1990, pp. 58- 59. Saigon Giai Phong, 7 March 1990, pp. 1,3. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietn amese, 1430 GMT, 16 April1990 , FBIS-EAS, 90-075, 18 April 1990, p. 55- 56. Hong Kong AFP in English, 0833 GMT, 16 April1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-073 , 16 April 1990, p. 58; Bangkok Post, 14 May 1990, p. 6; Saigon Giai Phong, 19 June 1990, pp. 1,2; Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 May 1990, p. 22. Hanoi Domestic Se rvice in Vietnam ese, 1100 GMT, 10 June 1990, FBIS-EA S, 90-118, 19 June 1990, p. 60.

No tes

201

243. Hanoi Domestic Se rvi ce in Vietnam ese, 1100 GMT, 8 June 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-114, 13 June 1990, pp. 57-58. 244. Hanoi Domestic Se rvice in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 4 June 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-112 , 11 June 1990, pp. 57- 58. 245 . Hanoi Vietna mese News Agency in English, 0711 GMT, 3 July 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-129, 5 July 1990, pp. 72-73; Nhan Dan, 12 July 1990, pp. 3- 4. 246. Ha noi Vietnamese News Agency in English, 0500 GMT, 25 August 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-129, 28 August 1990, p. 59. 24 7. Hanoi Vietnamese News Agency in English, 2300 GMT, 13 Se ptembe r 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-179, 14 Septe mbe r 1990, pp. 68- 69; Hanoi Vietnamese News Age ncy in English, 1100 GMT, 24 Septembe r 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-189, 24 Septe mbe r 1990, p. 56. 248. Saigon Giai Phong, 17 August 1990, p. 1; Hanoi Vietnam ese News Age ncy in English, 1430 GMT, 23 Septe mbe r 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-185, 24 Se ptembe r 1990, p. 65; Hong Kong AFP in English, 1020 GMT, 19 Septe mber 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-182 , 19 Septe mbe r 1990, p. 72 ; Hanoi Vietnam ese News Age ncy in English, 1430 GMT, 15 Septe mbe r 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-182, 19 Se pte mbe r 1990, pp. 72 -7 3; Hong Ko ng AFP in English, 0907 GMT, 7 Octo ber 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-195 , 9 Octo be r 1990, pp. 66-67; Ha noi Vietnamese News Agency in Englis h, 1430 GMT, 7 Octobe r 1990, FBIS-EA S, 90-196, lO Octobe r 1990, p. 59; Ha noi Vi etna mese News Age ncy in En glis h, 1100 GMT, 16 Octobe r 1990, FB/5-EAS, 90-201, 17 Octobe r 1990, pp. 67-68; William Branigan , "Hano i Tri es 38 Accused of Trying to Invade Vietnam", Washington Post, 11 Octobe r 1990, p. A. 32. 249. Nhan Dan , 7 Janu ary 1991, pp. 1, 4. 250. Nhan Dan, 12 January 1991, pp. 1, 4 . 251. Hanoi Domesti c Service in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 24 Fe bruary 1991, FBIS-EA S, 91-038, 26 Fe bruary 1991, pp. 39-40. 252 . Nhan Dan, 7 Janua ry 1991, pp. 1, 4. 253. Ha noi Domestic Ser vice in Vietn a mese, 1100 GMT, 4 Marc h 1991, a nd Han oi Vi etnam Television Network in Vietnam ese, 1200 GMT, 3 Marc h 1991, FBIS-EAS, 6 Ma rc h 1991, p. 59. 254. Ha noi Domestic Service in Vietn a mese, 2300 GMT, 4 Marc h 1991, FB/5-EAS, 91-044, 6 Marc h 1991, p. 58. 255 . Hong Kong AFP in Eng~sh, 1943 GMT, 28 Fe bruary 1991, FBIS-EAS,

202

256.

257.

258.

259.

260.

261. 262. 263. 264.

Notes

91-041, 1 March 1991, pp. 54-55; Intervi ew with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officiaL April 1991; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 4 March 1991, FB15-EA5, 91-044, 6 March 1991, p. 59, for example, which repo rts that for the first round of co ngresses, Vinh Phu had collected 48,000 suggestions to the Draft Platform for Building th e Nation in the Period of the Transition to Socialism and 26,000 suggestions regarding th e Draft Strategy for Socio-economic Stabilization and Development. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 12 March 1991, FB/5-EA5, 91-050, 14 March 1991, p. 57. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1400 GMT, 11 March 1991, FB15-EA5, 91-050, 14 March 1991, p. 56 recounts th e process in Song Be Province. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 12 March 1991, FBI5-EA5, 91-050, 14 March 1991, pp. 56-57; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 0500 GMT, 14 March 1991, FB15-EA5, 92-051, 15 March 1991 , p. 68. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1400 GMT, 11 March 1991, FB15-EA5, 91-050, 14 March 1991, p. 56; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1000 GMT, 18 March 1991, FBI5-EA5, 91-053, 19 March 1991, pp. 72-73. Hanoi Vietnam Te lev ision Network in Vietnamese, 1200 GMT, 17 March 1991, FBI5-EA5, 91-055, 21 March 1991, p. 70; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vi etnamese, 2300 GMT, 28 March 1991, FBI5EA5, 91-062, 1 April 1991, p. 45. Hanoi Domesti c Service in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 10 April 1991 , FB15-EA5, 91-073, 16 April 1991, p. 53; Hanoi Vietnamese Television Network in Vietnamcs, 1200 GMT, 20 March 1991, FB15-EA5, 91-073, 16 April 1991, pp. 53-54; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1400 GMT, 1 April1991, FB15-EA5, 91-074, 17 April1991, pp. 71-72 . Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 4 May 1991, F815-EA5, 91-091, 10 May 1991. p. 63. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 28 April 1991 , FB15-EA5, 91-099, 22 May 1991, p. 52. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 22 April 1991, F815-EA5, 91-098, 21 May 1991. p. 64. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, l May 1991, F815-EA5, 91-100, 23 May 1991, p. 58.

Notes

203

265. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 22 April 1991. FBIS-EAS, 91-098, 21 May 1991, p. 64. 266. Hanoi Vietnamese Television Network in Vietnamese, 1200 GMT. 2 May 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-091 , 10 May 1991, p. 64. 267. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnam ese, 2300 GMT, 28 April 1991. FBIS-EAS. 91-099, 22 May 1991, p. 52 . 268. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 1 May 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-100, 23 May 1991, p. 58. 269. Hanoi Domesti c Service in Vietnam ese, 1430 GMT, 29 April199l, FBIS-EAS. 91-091, 10 May 1991, p. 65. 270. Hanoi Vietnamese Television Network in Vietnamese, 1200 GMT, 7 May 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-091, 10 May 1991, p. 65; Hanoi Voice of Vi etnam Network in Vietnamese, 1200 GMT, 3 May 1991, FBISEAS, 91-091, 10 May 1991, p. 64. 271. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 1 May 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-100. 23 May 1991, p. 58; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 29 April 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-091, 10 May 1991, p. 65 . 272. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 29 April 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-091. 10 May 1991, p. 65; Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnam ese, 2300 GMT, 24 April 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-099, 22 May 1991, p. 53. 273. For example, see Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 2330 GMT, 31 March 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-078, 23 April 1991, p. 65. 274. Saigon Giai Phong, 3 March 1991. 275. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnam ese, llOO GMT, 29 April 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-085, 2 May 1991. p. 62. 276. See "Vietnam: Draft Political Report", Daily Report Supplement, FBISEAS, 91-080-S, 25 April 1991, pp. 1-24. 277. Tctp Chi Cong San, Jun e 1991 , pp. 2-4 ; Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 0228 GMT, 26 Jun e 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-123-S, 26 June 1991, pp. 15-18. 278. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 2300 GMT, 13 January 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-009, 14 January 1991, pp. 56-57. 279. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 29 May 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-104, 30 May 1991, pp. 67- 68. 280. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 0228 GMT, 24 June 1991 , FBIS-EAS, 91-123-S, 26 June 1991, p. 19.

204

Notes

281. Nhan Dan, 30 May 1991 editorial, p. l. 282. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 6 April 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-080-S, 25 April 1991, pp. 21- 22. 283. See, for example, Hanoi Vietnamese News Agency in English, 0735 GMT, 22 January 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-014, 22 January 1991, p. 55. 284. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 6 April 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-080-S, 25 April1991, p. 22; Nhan Dan, 29 January 1991, pp. 1,4, FBIS-EAS, 91-033, 19 February 1991, pp. 53-54; Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 6 April 1990, FBIS-EAS, 90-080-S, 25 April 1991, pp. 21- 22. 285. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 6 April 1991, FE/S-EAS, 90-080-S, 25 April 1991, pp. 21- 22. 286. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 23 June 1991, FE/S-EAS, 91-123-S, 26 June 1991, p. 6; Murray Hiebert, "More of the Same", Far Eastern Economic Review, ll July 1991, p. 11. 287. Hanoi Vietnamese News Agency in English, 1514 GMT, 27 June 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-027-S, 2 July 1991, p. 19. 288. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 24 June 1991, FE/S-EAS, 91-123-S, 26 June 1991, p. ll. Also see Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 24 June 1991, FE/S-EAS, 91-123-S, 26 June 1991, p. 3, and Hong Kong AFP in English, 1420 GMT, 23 June 1991, FE/S-EAS, 91-123-S, 26 June 1991, p. 7. 289. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 0205 GMT, 24 June 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-123-S, 26 June 1991, p. 15. 290. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 1400 GMT, 25 June 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-127-S, 2 July 1991, pp. 3-5. 291. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 28 June 1991, FE/S-EAS, 91-133-S, ll July 1991, p. 10. 292. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, llOO GMT, 27 June 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-127-S, 2 July 1991, p. 27. 293. Murray Hiebert, "More of the Same", pp. 10-ll. 294. Hanoi Vietnam Television Network in Vietnamese, 0228 GMT, 24 June 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-123-S, 26 June 1991, p. l. 295. Hanoi Vietnam Television Network in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 24 June 1991, FE/S-EAS, 91-127-S, 2 July 1991, p. l.

Notes

205

296. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 26 June 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-133-S, 11 July 1991, p. 4. 297. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 1 July 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-129, 5 July 1991, p. 53. 298. Saigon Giai Phong, 26 June 1991, pp. 1, 3. 299. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 3 July 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-133, 11 July 1991, p. 55. 300. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 0500 GMT, 28 June 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-133-S, 11 July 1991, p. 9. 301. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 26 June 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-133-S, 11 July 1991, pp. 4, 6; and Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, 1 July 1991, FE/SEAS, 91-129, 5 July 1991, p. 53. 302. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam in English, 1000 GMT, 25 July 1991, FE/SEAS, 91-127-S, 2 July 1991; Nhan Dan, 1 July 1991, p. 2. 303. Hanoi Vietnamese News Agency in English, 1445 GMT, 26 June 1991, FBIS-EAS, 91-127-S, 2 July 1991, p. 10. 304. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 0500 GMT, 27 June 1991, FE/S-EAS, 91-133-S, 11 July 1991, pp. 6-8; Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 0500 GMT, 28 Jun e 1991, FE/SEAS, 91-133-S, 11 July 1991, pp. 8-9, 9-10. 305. Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese, 1430 GMT, 23 June 1991, FE/S-EAS, 91-123-S, 11 July 1991, p. 6. 306. References to Linh's speech, cited on pp. 161-68 above, are from Hanoi Vietnam Television Network in Vietnamese, 0228 GMT, 24 June 1991 , FBIS-EAS, 91-123-S, 26 Jun e 1991, pp. 15-28.

Note on Terminology

Article 24, Chapter Five, of the Party Statutes, revised in 1991, d efin es the basic units, or the foundations of the party, in the followtng mann er: The basic party c hapte rs and basic party organizations (ge ne rall y known as basic organizations of the party) form th e foundati on of th e party. Each basic unit (village, ward , town, organ, co-operative, e nterprise, co rporation, sc hooL hospital , scientific research institute, and eac h of the basic units in the armed forces and other bas ic units) with three or more regular party me mbers can establish a party c hapte r. Jf a basic unit has less than three regular party me mbers, a higher party co mmittee ec he lon can introduce these pa rt y me mbe rs directl y to a nearby basic party organization to carry ou t party activities. A basic unit or a co mponent of a basic unit (a workship of an e nterprise, a ha mlet in a village, a departm e nt of a school, and so forth) with 30 or more part y membe rs can estabus h several party c hapte rs to be directly subordinate to a basic party co mmittee. A basic pa rt y co mmittee must inform a nd seek approval from tlw nex t hight> r party co mmittee ec helon when it wants to : • Organize s!"veral par1y c hapte rs on one basi(' unit or in a co mpon ent of a basic unit have less th a n 30 party membe rs;

207

208

Note on 'lenninology

• establish only one party chapter in a basic unit or in a component of a basic unit having more than 50 party me mbe rs; • establish a compon e nt party organization in a basic party organization.

This book uses the terms "basic party organizations", "local party organizations", and "sectoral party organizations" to draw distinctions betwee n the types of fundam ental party entities, and e mploys the terminology used by th e party itself to distinguish betwee n basic units (sometimes referred to as primary cells), basic party organizations (sometimes refe rred to as primary party organizations), party chapters, and party committees. See Tap Chi Cong San, July 1991, pp. 40-49 for th e Statutes of the Vietnamese Communist Party adopted by the Seve nth National Congress of Party Delegates on 27 June 1991. Also see Dang Lao Dong VietNam, Dieu Le, (Hanoi: Ban Chap Hanh Trung Uong, 1968), p. 43; Nhan Dan, 3 Fe bruary 1977, pp. 2- 5; Dang Cong San Viet Nam, Dieu Le, (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Su That, 1987); Charles N. Spinks, John C. Dun~ and Stephen Peters, The North Vietnamese Regime: Institutions and Problems, (Washington, D.C.: The American University Center for Research and Social Systems, April 1969), pp. 4- 9; Dang Cong San Viet Nam, Cac To Chuc Tien Than Cua Dang, (Hanoi: Ban Nghi e n Cuu Lich Su Dang Trung Uong Xuat Ban, 1977), pp. 345-52; Robert F. Turn e t~ Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development, (Stanford, California: Hoove r Institution Press, 1975), pp. 115 , 117.

LEWIS M. STERN , Ph.D. , is Director for Indochina, Thailand and Burma in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Security Affairs, United States Government.