Religious policy: Between theory and practice [1 ed.] 9783666368578, 9783525368572

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Stefan Dudra / Tytus Jaskułowski / Ryszard Michalak (eds.)

Religious policy Between theory and practice

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Stefan Dudra / Tytus Jaskułowski / Ryszard Michalak (eds.)

Religious policy Between theory and practice

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

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Contents

PREFACE Stefan Dudra, Tytus Jaskułowski, Ryszard Michalak Religious Policy. Between Theory and Practice ..........................................

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THEORY Ryszard Michalak, Piotr Pochyły Religious Policy as a Subject of Research on the Political Science of Religion (Politology of Religion) in the Polish Perspective........................... 13 Dorota Szaban Methodological Problems of Research on Confessions and Religiosity as a Factor Impeded the Creation of Denominational Policy ........ 33 Beata Springer Governmental Religious Administration in Poland. Central Level ................ 49 Jarosław Macała Religious Policy and Geopolitics: Some Reflections .................................... 67

PRACTICE Stefan Dudra Orthodoxy in Estonia as Part of the Internal Religious Policy of the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates ................................................ 83 Bernadetta Nitschke-Szram The Policy of the Polish People’s Republic Authorities towards the Polish-Speaking Pastoral Care of the Roman Catholic Church in Germany as Part of the State’s Religious Policy........................................... 103

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Contents

Aleksandra Kruk The Influence of Political Parties on the Religious Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany .................................................................. 119 Wioletta Husar-Poliszuk Catalonia’s Religious Policy as an Instrument in the Independence Process ... 137 Anna Ratke-Majewska Religious Policy and Politics of Memory – Case Study of Catholicism in Poland after the Political Changes of 1989 ........................... 155 Olgierd Kiec Continuations and Turns in the Religious Policy of the Polish State towards Evangelical Churches in the 20th and 21st Centuries ....................... 169

PREFACE

Stefan Dudra, Tytus Jaskułowski, Ryszard Michalak

Religious Policy. Between Theory and Practice

The aim of the book is to analyze the phenomenon of religious policy, understood primarily as a detailed type of state public policy. The deliberations consist of chapters that deal with theoretical issues as well as case studies focused on specific examples. The paper was written in the Zielona Góra center, among Polish researchers of religious policy, hence the dominant Polish perspective on research and exemplification is noticeable. However, there are also other references, including those to German issues. Moreover, one of the chapters shows the active religious policy of religious entities. The theoretical part includes reflections on the following issues: studies on religious policy as a component of research in the field of religious political science (Ryszard Michalak, Piotr Pochyły), methodological problems of research on religions and beliefs as a factor hindering the creation of religious policy (Dorota Szaban), the conditions of the current governmental religious administration in Poland (Beata Springer) and the search for regularities in the relationship between religious policy and geopolitics (Jarosław Macała). The practice of religious policy, however, includes the following issues: the activity of the Orthodox Patriarchates of Moscow and Constantinople in Estonia (Stefan Dudra), the policy of the Polish People’s Republic towards the Polish pastoral care of the Roman Catholic Church in Germany (Bernadetta Nitschke-Szram), the influence of political parties on the religious policy of Germany (Aleksandra Kruk), Catalonia’s religious policy as an instrument in the independence process (Wioletta Husar-Poliszuk), the religious policy in relation to the policy of remembrance based on the casus of Roman Catholicism in Poland (Anna Ratke-Majewska) and the continuation and turns in the religious policy of the Polish state towards Evangelical Churches in the 20th and 21st centuries (Olgierd Kiec).

THEORY

Ryszard Michalak, Piotr Pochyły

Religious Policy as a Subject of Research on the Political Science of Religion (Politology of Religion) in the Polish Perspective

For years, the studies on religious policy (confessional policy) have been the domain of representatives of the legal sciences, who have studied its nature in relation to subjective religious law. Most often in contextual research they also appeared in the works of historians, who sought to explain wider phenomena in the analysis of state-religious relations. Such a tendency concerned both world and Polish science. In Poland, following the Soviet model, additionally, religious policy as a subject of research attracted the attention of philosophers and religious experts in the 1970s of the twentieth century, who closely associated conceptualization in its area with Marxist ideological determinants, as a result of which this work is often perceived as a service in the face of the then absolutely binding ideological monism. Relatively recently, religious policy has become an area of growing interest for researchers representing political sciences. Representatives of political science of religion (politology of religion) have played a special role in this respect1 . The traditions of research into the relationship between religion and politics in Polish science date back to the interwar period, with Leon Halban as their precursor, in the 1930s professor at the Faculty of Law at the Jan Kazimierz University in Lviv2 . 1 Bogumił Grott (ed.): Religia i polityka, Kraków 2000; Maria Marczewska-Rytko: Religia i polityka w globalizującym się świecie, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2010, eadem (ed.): Czynnik religijny w polityce wewnątrzpaństwowej i międzynarodowej na przełomie drugiego i trzeciego tysiąclecia, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2016; Piotr Burgoński/Michał Gierycz (eds.): Religia i polityka. Zarys problematyki, Warszawa 2014, pp. 19–24; Ryszard Michalak (ed.): Religijne determinanty polityki, Zielona Góra 2014, pp. 5–11; Dariusz GóraSzopiński: Czym może, a czym nie powinna być politologia religii?, in: Ryszard Michalak (ed.): Polityka jako wyraz lub następstwo religijności, Zielona Góra 2015, pp. 13–31; Maria Marczewska-Rytko: Politologia religii jako subdyscyplina religioznawstwa i/lub nauk o polityce, in: Maria MarczewskaRytko/Dorota Maj (eds.), Politologia religii, Lublin 2018, pp. 17–33; Ryszard Michalak: The history of politology of religion in Poland. A research overview, in: Politics and Religion Journal Vol. 14, No. 2 (2020), pp. 219–262. 2 Bogumił Grott: Profesor Leon Halban jako badacz neopogaństwa niemieckiego i prekursor politologii religii w Polsce (w czterdziestą piątą rocznicę zgonu), https://konserwatyzm.pl/profesor-leonhalban-jako-badacz-neopoganstwa-niemieckiego-i-prekursor-politologii-religii-w-polsce-wczterdziesta-piata-rocznice-zgonu/ [last accessed 27.07.2020]; Bogumił Grott/Olgierd Grott (eds.): Przedchrześcijańskie korzenie nazizmu czyli dusza niemiecka w świetle filozofii i religioznawstwa,

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In this context, his analyses of the significance of the religious factor in German Volkism are cited, e.g: Religion in the Third Reich (Lviv 1936) or Mystical Basics of National Socialism (Lublin 1946)3 . The beginnings of the defined research in the field of the politology of religion in Poland – as understood by reference to the name itself – are connected with a scientific project by Professor Bogumił Grott from the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, carried out in 1992–1993, concerning research on the significance of religious factors in the ideas and programmes of political parties. In his book entitled Religion, Church, Ethics in the Ideas and Concepts of the Polish Right, which is a collection of source texts, the Cracow-based researcher stressed that in the research of the relations between the state and the Church (Churches) an in-depth exploration is necessary, i.e. one that, apart from the practice of these relations (the domain of historical sciences) and beyond the formal and legal perspective (the domain of legal sciences), will also be able to capture the motivations and plans of the aforementioned actors, and even the activity of the side subjects. In such a context, he referred to the politology of religion and its tasks: The object of interest of the politology of religion outside the sphere of the real state – church relations in the history of the state – on the level of political actions or the doctrines applied in practice are also sometimes never and nowhere realised various concepts which are only proposals coming from political movements which do not have the power or even individual thinkers and theorists expressing their individual thoughts4 .

Bogumił Grott then described the very politology of religion as a “research branch”, the essence of which is to explore “the problem of relations between religions and their accompanying organizational structures and the broadly defined sphere of politics”, taking into account the necessary “character of individual religions” and “the degree of development of a given civilization or national culture”5 . Today, in the most popular and commonly used interpretation – initially formulated by religiologists, and with time also by political scientists – the politology of religion is considered to be the whole of research taking into account all possible combinations of phenomena specific to the worlds of religion and politics, based on the marriage of methods of many disciplines of science, in particular: the sciences of

Radzymin 2018; Ryszard Polak, Kościół katolicki i neopogaństwo niemieckie w myśli Leona Halbana, Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis No 3933: “Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem” 41, nr 3, Wrocław 2019, pp. 109–125. 3 Leon Halban: Religia w III Rzeszy, Lwów 1936; idem, Mistyczne podstawy narodowego socjalizmu, Lublin 1946. 4 Bogumił Grott: Religia, Kościół, etyka w ideach i koncepcjach prawicy polskiej, Kraków 1993, pp. 7–8. 5 Ibid.

Religious Policy as a Subject of Research

politics, religiology, theology, sociology, philosophy, anthropology, cultural studies, history, law, economics and geography. In this sense, the specific findings of these disciplines will be an inherent part of the politology of religion, and it in turn – in the opposite direction – aspires to the role of their sub-discipline (political science, religiology) or auxiliary science (other disciplines). In the sense proper to social sciences, the politology of religion is defined as a sub-discipline of the political science, the essence of which is the political analysis of the phenomenon of religion – both in its full dimension and in relation to any of its components, i.e. doctrine, worship, religious organization. In such a case, the basic assumption is to see religion as a political phenomenon – analogously to the assumptions of the sociology of religion, which sees religion as a social phenomenon. Or even differently: If the sociology of religion is a sub-discipline of general sociology and deals with doctrinal, cult and institutionalized religion in their social contexts, then the politology of religion is a sub-discipline of the political science and deals with doctrinal, cult and institutionalized religion in their political contexts. Another exegesis regarding the position of the politology of religion among the sub-disciplines of the political science – again by analogy with the position of the sociology of religion within general sociology – assumes that its content includes issues of the permeability or interplay of religious phenomena and political phenomena (in the sociology of religion: social phenomena), but the obligatory starting point for research is the assumptions of political science with reference to methods and achievements of other scientific disciplines. The politics of religion in the narrower sense is in turn political research on religion based on the paradigm of the function of the political factor in religion.6 The most important research issues in the field of political science of religion include as follows:

6 Ryszard Michalak: Politologia religii – w poszukiwaniu definicji. The paper was delivered during the conference “Politology of Religion” on 10 May 2017 in Lublin (UMCS). The theses of the paper were published in 2018 in the form of an extensive explanatory note, see: idem, Politologia religii, in: Joanna Marszałek-Kawa/Danuta Plecka (eds.): Leksykon wiedzy politologicznej, Toruń 2018, pp. 344–348. See also: Kazimierz Banek: Politologia religii jako dziedzina badań religioznawczych, in: Przegląd Religioznawczy 3–4 (1999), pp. 77–82; Miljorub Jevtić: Political Science and Religion, in: Politics and Religion Journal Vol. 1, No. 1 (2007), pp. 59–69; Bogumił Grott/Olgierd Grott (eds.): Wiedza religioznawcza w badaniach politologicznych, Warszawa 2015, p. 7; Steven Kettell: Do We Need a “Political Science of Religion”?, in: Political Studies Review, Vol 14, issue 2 (2016), pp. 210–222; Piotr Mazurkiewicz: What Should a Political Scientist Know About Religion?, in: Chrześcijaństwo – Świat – Polityka 23 (2019), pp. 11–30; Maciej Potz: Perspektywy badawcze politologii religii, in: Studia Religiologica 52/4 (2019), pp. 277–291; idem: Political Science of Religion. Theorising the Political Role of Religion, Cham (Switzerland) 2020.

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a. studies in the field of religion teaching, which has a direct political content and message of the religious legitimacy of power; religious justification of authority and social/political leadership; religious explanations/justifications of political processes; religious justification of the existing political order; religious visions of political order; justification of theocracy and primacy of religious law over secular law; the principle of symphony (synergy, symbiosis); religious justification of political activity; the question of the politicisation of religion and religious politics; the phenomenon of political theology; politics as an expression or consequence of religiousness; b. research in relation to functional or destructive influence (direct and indirect) of a religious factor in the political sphere – e.g. religion and the issue of war and peace; religious conflict transformed into political conflict or vice versa – religion as a factor mitigating / resolving another conflict; socially integrating role of religion; socially disintegrating role of religion; processes of transforming religious fundamentalisms into political expressions; religious movements creating ideologies; ethnophylethism; religious dimension of political transformations; relations between religion and democracy – in the dimension of national states, in the dimension of individual civilization circles and under the conditions of crossing territorial and national borders by religions; a religious factor as a determinant of specific state policies; c. studies on religious terrorism and extremism and their social and cultural background – e.g. relations between religious extremism and religious terrorism; classification of religious terrorism/extremism among other types of terrorism/extremism and comparisons of terrorism/extremism; classification and comparisons of religious terrorisms/extremisms; Islamic terrorism/extremism – logistics and social facilities; Hindu and communalist terrorism/extremism; Sikh terrorism/extremism; Judaistic terrorism/extremism; the so-called JudeoChristian anti-abortion terrorism; paramilitary organizations and religious militias; terror/terrorism state; d. search for religious behavior and religious practice, which has no direct political content and message, but has direct political consequences – e.g. social and political conflicts as a consequence of building/limiting the construction of sacred buildings, the presence of religious symbols in public space, place of religion in the public sphere, participation of politicians in religious ceremonies; e. explaining the attitudes of political actors towards religion and religious organizations – for example, the state’s religious policy; religious policy of the European Union; positions of the state authority apparatus, political parties, ideological and political groups, pressure groups on religion and religious organizations; open or veiled implementation of religious and philosophical-religious content and principles in the political sphere; the question of the institutionalization of dialogue in relations between state authorities and religious organizations;

Religious Policy as a Subject of Research

f. researching the relations between religious subjects when these relate to political matters – for example, relations that make religious organizations and religious organizations de facto political actors; g. inquiring about theoretical categories, phenomena and matters remaining in the circle of independent (and differently perceived) interests of the world of religion and the world of politics – e.g. political and religious interpretations of truth, loyalty, freedom, upbringing, good and evil; determinants of emotionality in people’s behavior; the issue of human development; issues of secularization, privatization and deprivatization of religion; the question of religious and political ritualism; theodicies and anomies; religious and political conditions for cultural change in international relations; h. studies of what is apparently within the limits of a secular society, which has no religious motivations but has religious consequences – e.g. the phenomenon of nationalism becoming similar to religion; ethnic mythology; national iconography; racist mythology; the phenomenon of “sacralization” of Marxism-Leninism; quasi-religious meaning of values, e.g. tradition for political entities; the phenomenon of deification of political leaders within the individual cult; political missionism and messianism; civic religion; religious transformations as a result of economic migration or political refugees; i. research on religious sources of shaping collective memory – e.g. religious narratives about the past; religious communities of memory; influence of religiously conditioned memory policy on political decisions; the attitude of religions and religious communities towards contemporary historical debates; functions, goals and strategies of religiously conditioned memory policies; religious determinism in the processes of shaping collective identity; j. studies on the theory of political science of religions – e.g.: politicalization of religious narration; conceptualization of key notions describing matters related to religious and political factors conjunctions, especially those that are commonly used but not in accordance with the essence of the described phenomenon7 . The greatest contribution to the development of Polish research in relation to religious policy was made by Professor Kazimierz Urban8 . The latest achievements

7 Ryszard Michalak: Political science of religion, in: Joanna Marszałek-Kawa/Danuta Plecka (eds.), The Dictionary of Political Knowledge, Toruń 2019, pp. 364–368. 8 Among the numerous publications, see a collection of posthumously published texts on the policy of the Polish state towards the Orthodox Church, the Evangelical-Augsburg Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Religious Union of the Mosaic Faith: Kazimierz Urban, Mniejszości religijne w Polsce po II wojnie światowej. Szkice i materiały (ed. Czesław Bywalec), Kraków 2012.

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(2018–2020) of Polish science (mostly politology of religion) in the field of research on religious policy include the following books: a. Radosław Zenderowski/Ryszard Michalak, Religious Policy. Theoretical Aspects and Exemplications9 , b. Piotr Mazurkiewicz/Robert T. Ptaszek/Łukasz Młyńczyk, Religious Policy. Perspective of the European Union10 , c. Stefan Dudra/Renata Król-Mazur/Dorota Maj, Religious Policy. Eastern and ecumenical ecclesial perspective11 , d. Wioletta Husar-Poliszuk/Bartłomiej Secler/Piotr S. Ślusarczyk, Religious Policy. Contexts of other public policies. Austria, Catalonia, Poland 12 , e. Anna Ratke-Majewska/Waldemar Rogowski, Catholic Church against authoritarianism and integrationism. The case of Spain, Chile and the Brotherhood of St. Pius X 13 , f. Dariusz Góra/Krzysztof Łabędź/Piotr Pochyły, Religious Policy. Perspective of the Third Republic of Poland 14 , g. Małgorzata Świder/Sylwia Góra, Beata Springer, Muslims and Islam in Germany. Political, legal and cultural perspective15 , h. Katarzyna Krzysztofek, The Legal Position and Activity of Non-Roman Catholic Churches and Religious Organizations in Cracow in 1945–197016 , i. Stefan Dudra, Lemko Identity and the Orthodox Church17 ;

9 Radosław Zenderowski/Ryszard Michalak: Polityka wyznaniowa. Aspekty teoretyczne i egzemplifikacje, seria: “Politologia religii” [vol. 5], Zielona Góra 2018. 10 Piotr Mazurkiewicz/Robert T. Ptaszek/Łukasz Młyńczyk: Polityka wyznaniowa. Perspektywa Unii Europejskiej, seria: “Politologia religii” [vol. 6], Zielona Góra 2018. 11 Stefan Dudra/Renata Król-Mazur/Dorota Maj: Polityka wyznaniowa. Wschodnia i ekumeniczna perspektywa eklezjalna, seria: “Politologia religii” [vol. 7], Zielona Góra 2018. 12 Wioletta Husar-Poliszuk/Bartłomiej Secler/Piotr S. Ślusarczyk: Polityka wyznaniowa. Konteksty innych polityk publicznych. Austria, Katalonia, Polska, seria: “Politologia religii” [vol. 8], Zielona Góra 2018. 13 Anna Ratke-Majewska/Waldemar Rogowski: Kościół katolicki wobec autorytaryzmu i integryzmu. Przypadek Hiszpanii, Chile i Bractwa św. Piusa X, seria: “Politologia Religii”, [vol. 9], Zielona Góra 2019. 14 Dariusz Góra/Krzysztof Łabędź/Piotr Pochyły: Polityka wyznaniowa. Perspektywa III RP, Kraków 2019. 15 Małgorzata Świder/Sylwia Góra/Beata Springer: Muzułmanie i islam w Niemczech. Perspektywa polityczna, prawna i kulturowa, Kraków 2019. 16 Katarzyna Krzysztofek: Położenie prawne i działalność nierzymskokatolickich Kościołów i związków wyznaniowych w Krakowie w latach 1945–1970, Kraków 2018. 17 Stefan Dudra: Lemko Identity and the Orthodox Church, preface by Paul. J. Best, New Heaven 2018.

Religious Policy as a Subject of Research

j. Stefan Dudra, Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the field of religious policy and national policy of the People’s Republic of Poland and the Third Republic of Poland 18 .

From the perspective of politology of religion, religious policy is primarily a detailed type of public policy of the state, which is aimed at the activity of religious associations (religious associations or religious organizations)19 . According to Michał Pietrzak, a religious union is, in turn, “a specific type of organized human community, having a specific internal system, capable of creating bodies of power, fulfilling internal functions and representing the union outside and entitled to determine the rights and duties of its members”20 . Its purpose is to meet the “religious needs” of its followers. Religious associations “differ in the distinctness of their dogmas of faith, rites and religious practices”21 . The essence of religious policy is therefore to shape the relationship between the state and individual religious associations, but also to influence relations between them22 . A broad view of the religious policy allows for a perspective in which the state apparatus undertakes specific actions towards entities directly or indirectly connected with religious organizations, precisely because of this connection. These may be religious parties (e.g.: the Israeli Miflaga Datit Leumi, the French Union des Démocrates Musulmans, the Indian Bharatiya Janata Party), parties referring to religion (in the name, programme or ideological declaration – e.g. German: Christlich Demokratische Union and Christlich Soziale Union), as well as associations, foundations, publishers and editorial offices of magazines and other organized 18 Stefan Dudra: Polski Autokefaliczny Kościół Prawosławny w obszarze polityki wyznaniowej oraz polityki narodowościowej Polski Ludowej i III Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 2019. 19 Ryszard Michalak: Polityka wyznaniowa. Zakres zjawiska, in; Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie Skłodowska, Sectio K: Politologia, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2019), pp. 23–35; Geraldine Fagan, Believing in Russia. Religious Policy after Communism, Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series, London/New York 2013; Daniel Gerster/Viola Van Melis/Ulrich Willems (eds.): Religionspolitik heute. Problemfelder und Perspektiven in Deutschland, Freiburg 2018. 20 Michał Pietrzak: Prawo wyznaniowe, Warszawa 1995, p. 9. 21 Anna Tunia: Polityka państwa w zakresie ustalenia jednolitej siatki pojęć stosowanych w przepisach prawa wyznaniowego, in: Michał Skwarzyński/Piotr Steczkowski (eds.): Polityka wyznaniowa a prawo III Rzeczypospolitej, Lublin 2016, pp. 34–35. 22 Ryszard Michalak: Polityka wyznaniowa państwa polskiego wobec mniejszości religijnych w latach 1945–1989, Zielona Góra 2014; Antonius Liedhegener/Gert Pickel: Religionspolitik in Deutschland. Ein Politikbereich gewinnt neue Konturen, in: Antonius Liedhegener/Gert Pickel (eds): Religionspolitik und Politik der Religionen in Deutschland. Politik und Religion, Wiesbaden 2016, pp. 3–22; Dagmar Mensink: Religionspolitik – (mehr) als Integrationspolitik? Die gegenwärtigen Debatten um Religion und ihre Bedeutung für die religionspolitische Praxis, in: Jahrbuch für Christliche Sozialwissenschaften 58 (2017): Religion(en) in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft, pp. 19–29.

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forms of social activity (e.g. Polish charities – Roman Catholic Caritas, Orthodox Eleos and Evangelical Diakonia), which have a religious connotation and, what is perhaps more important, are perceived as religious in public space. In special cases, individual people connected with religious life may also be party to religious policy. As Józef Krukowski points out, apart from the principles and goals “which the state authorities follow in relation to religion and religious denominations”, the second pillar of religious policy is “the methods (means) they use to implement them in social life”23 . Furthermore, Maria Libiszowska-Żółtkowska stresses that “religious policy fulfils the functions: normative and control over religious institutions, defines the nature of relations between the state and churches and religious associations present on its territory”24 . Developing these views, it can therefore be assumed that the religious policy of the state consists of activities of a conceptual, programmatic, operational and executive nature, carried out by specialized state authorities towards religious entities. In the conditions of a democratic state, these are administrative institutions (independent, e.g., in the form of an office or ministry, or as part of a wider structure, e.g., a department within a ministry) and special services (e.g., monitoring the activities of religious fundamentalists or destructive sects). In authoritarian and totalitarian states, the entity pursuing a religious policy may be more complex, as party structures usually have decision-making status alongside the state structures, and extended special services also play a greater role25 . The political conceptualization in the area of religious policy is connected with the findings of other disciplines of science, in particular the legal sciences with regard to religious law and the definition of a model relationship between the state and religious organizations appropriate for this field. It is also an optic that takes into account the diversity of competences – legal and political – of decisionmakers responsible for the sector of religious policy. A complementary research perspective, combining the methods of the legal sciences with those of the political and administrative sciences, seems indispensable for such an exploration, since, on the one hand, religious law is generally the expression of a certain policy and, on the other hand, real religious policy does not always fit into the formal and legal order exclusively26 . 23 Józef Krukowski: Polityka wyznaniowa państw postkomunistycznych. Główne linie, in: Roczniki Nauk Prawnych XII (2002) 2, pp. 5–19. 24 Maria Libiszowska-Żółtkowska: Polityka wyznaniowa, in: Jerzy Kwaśniewski (ed.): Nauki o polityce publicznej. Monografia dyscypliny, Warszawa 2018, p. 266. 25 Paweł A. Leszczyński: Administracja wyznaniowa wybranych państw współczesnych – zarys zagadnienia, in: Artur Mezglewski (ed.): Prawo wyznaniowe w systemie prawa polskiego, Lublin 2004, pp. 347–356. 26 Michał Pietrzak: Polityka wyznaniowa III Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1990–2001 (próba diagnozy), in: Prawo CCCXI, seria: Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis, No. 3270 (2010), pp. 365–377; Paweł A. Leszczyński: Regulacja stosunków między państwem a nierzymskokatolickimi Kościołami i innymi

Religious Policy as a Subject of Research

Religious policy is conditioned by a number of factors, which can be grouped into internal and external ones. In the first group these are particularly important: a. the specificity and religious and denominational structure of the state; b. the size of the population of the state declaring atheism, agnosticism, apatheism or religious indifference; c. the proportions between sacralization and secularization of public space; d. the state and political system, and ideology in force or prevailing in the state; e. pragmatics of political rivalry in the variant allowing for instrumentalization/ politicization of religion; f. legal and systemic religious model of the state; g. potential of religious associations to influence state decision-makers; h. need for religious legitimacy of power by decision-makers; i. personal beliefs and religious involvement of state decision-makers; j. interdependencies between identities: ethnocultural and religious identifications. Among external factors, on the other hand, these play a special role: a. state security considerations (variously defined and instrumentalized); b. the nature of religions (single or plural) occurring in the vicinity of the country; c. religion and religious structure of neighboring countries (including the status of minorities associated with the country in question); d. the nature of religious policy occurring in the international environment; e. geopolitical conditions of the region (the presence or absence of “sacred geopolitics”, “mosque policy”, etc.); f. the international legal norms in which the country in question participates or bases its influence on; g. the scale and nature of the international “networking” of the religious community concerned; h. the existence or absence of religious conflicts in the international environment; i. the existence or absence of pro-ecumenical tendencies among the religious entities of the region; j. the actual, and not merely declared, importance of irenology in the transmission of religious associations in the region.

związkami wyznaniowymi określona w art. 25 ust. 5 Konstytucji RP, Gorzów Wielkopolski 2012; Wacław Uruszczak/Katarzyna Krzysztofek/Maciej Mikuła (eds.): Kościoły i związki wyznaniowe w służbie dobru wspólnemu, Kraków 2014.

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In the modern world, new migration trends are the most recent factor that occurs in both sets and that affects the religious policies of almost all countries27 . In these cases, religious policy is most often closely related to national or ethnic policy28 . The state’s religious policy is most often considered as a component of domestic policy, but it is also a successful component of foreign policy, which is nowadays exemplified by the “mosque policy” of Turkey29 , Iran and Saudi Arabia or the Russian policy of promoting the idea of Moscow – the Third Rome30 . It is also important to note the significant nature of the financial commitment of these states to the implementation of religious foreign policy in the form of significant expenditures such as the construction of mosques, and furthermore, this process is supported by remittances that are difficult to cut and block using an extremely simple and effective way (known for centuries in the Middle East and Asia) of sending money over long distances without the intermediation of banks – hawala31 . The process of initiating and then financing their construction in the world also indicates the adoption by these countries in foreign policy planning of an important time factor – patiently carrying out stages of long-term operations, the effects / results of which are known only after many years. A separate example for analysis should be the example of Poland – a country which, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, is referring in its foreign policy to Christian values and supporting in its development policy the activity of a charitable Christian public benefit organization, Caritas Polska. Already in the early 1990s, Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski pointed to cooperation with the Holy See in terms of “international morality, peace and friendly cooperation of states and nations”32

27 Michał Gierycz: Polska debata o imigracji w perspektywie politologii religii, in: Chrześcijaństwo–Świat–Polityka 20 (2016), pp. 73–84; Piotr Pochyły: Polska polityka zagraniczna w reakcji na trzy kryzysy w Europie. Analiza “mini” exposé ministra Witolda Waszczykowskiego z 2016 r., in: Janusz Golinowski/Sławomir Sadowski (eds.): Pomiędzy mythos i logos społecznej zmiany, Bydgoszcz 2017, pp. 113–128. 28 Radosław Zenderowski: Religia a tożsamość narodowa i nacjonalizm w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej. Między etnicyzacją religii a sakralizacją etnosu (narodu), Wrocław 2011; idem: Konflikt etniczny, konflikt religijny, konflikt etnoreligijny jako konflikty polityczne, in: Andrzej Szabaciuk/Dariusz Wybranowski/Radosław Zenderowski (eds.): Religia w konfliktach etnicznych we współczesnym świecie. Tom 1: Zagadnienia teoretyczne. Europa i obszar poradziecki, Lublin 2016, pp. 29–51. 29 Ryszard Michalak: The significance of the religious factor in the internal and external policies of Turkey, in: Review of Nationalities 9 (2019), pp. 167–176. 30 Ryszard Michalak: Powrót koncepcji Trzeciego Rzymu, in: Doctrina – Międzynarodowy Przegląd Humanistyczny 1 (2004), pp. 91–105. 31 Edwina A. Thompson: Misplaced Blame. Islam, Terrorism and the Origins of Hawala, in: Armin von Bogdandy/Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds.): Max Plank Yearbook of United Nations Law 11 (2007). 32 Krzysztof Skubiszewski: Polityka zagraniczna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w roku 1991. Exposé przedstawione na 65. Posiedzenie Sejmu RP – 27 czerwca 1991 r., in: Exposé Ministrów Spraw Zagranicznych 1990–2013, Warszawa 2013, p. 34.

Religious Policy as a Subject of Research

and the United Right, in power since late 2015, has continually raised the issue of Christian values – e.g. Prime Minister Beata Szydło’s position on the demolition of the statue of John Paul II in France (Ploërmel) in 2017 and the proposal to move it to Poland, Poland’s long-standing (also by previous governments) support of Roman Catholic missions around the world, or the organization of World Youth Day in 2016 which turned out to be a huge organizational success, and the government used the event to promote Poland as a modern country with a significant contribution to the history of European and Christian civilization33 . Religious policy is the domain of the state, but it may also concern other types of entities. Analyzing, for example, the law and actions of the European Union34 or the Organization of Islamic Cooperation35 in relation to the religious sphere, it is possible to specify the category of religious policy of an international organization. In the opposite direction, not externally, but within the structure of the state, regional/local/self-governing religious policy can be seen36 . In the conditions of religious pluralism, a given religious association may also create its own religious policy towards other religious associations, e.g. by entering into coalitions and alliances with some religious organizations and/or by competing with others – at national and international level37 . In this case, the religious policy of the religious association is referred to. In the specific circumstances of a state hierocracy or total theocracy, the religious policy of the state and the religious policy of the dominant religious association are convergent in practice. Remaining in the perspective of a religious

33 Rząd: Światowe Dni Młodzieży zakończyły się sukcesem, https://www.wnp.pl/parlamentarny/ wydarzenia/rzad-swiatowe-dni-mlodziezy-zakonczyly-sie-sukcesem,15936.html, (last accessed 30.10.2020). 34 Krzysztof Orzeszyna: Podstawy relacji między państwem a kościołami w konstytucjach państw członkowskich i traktatach Unii Europejskiej. Studium porównawcze, Lublin 2007. 35 Agnieszka Gieryńska: Organizacja Współpracy Islamskiej Geneza, charakterystyka i działalność w regionie Bliskiego Wschodu, Warszawa 2017; Marta Woźniak-Bobińska/Anna M. Solarz (eds.): Wprowadzenie do polityki zagranicznej muzułmańskich państw Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej, Warszawa 2018. 36 Janusz Mierzwa: “Między starostą a plebanem”. Relacje między państwem a związkami wyznaniowymi na szczeblu administracji ogólnej I instancji w okresie Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej – zarys problematyki, in: Jarosław Durka (ed.): Państwo – religia. Instytucje państwowe i obywatele wobec religii w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w XX wieku, Kalisz 2014, pp. 7–22. 37 Sylwia Górzna, Polityczny wymiar dialogu Kościoła katolickiego z judaizmem w wybranych dokumentach Kurii Rzymskiej, in: Studia Oecumenica 15 (2015), pp. 291–312; Dorota Maj: Konferencja Kościołów Europejskich wobec integracji europejskiej, Lublin 2016; Michael Abdalla: Unickie Kościoły Bliskiego Wschodu. Polityka Watykanu wobec chrześcijan nierzymskich, in: Stefan Dudra/Ryszard Michalak/Łukasz Młyńczyk (eds.): Polityczne uwarunkowania religii – Religijne uwarunkowania polityki, Zielona Góra 2017, pp. 193–207; Joanna Kulska: Między sacrum i profanum. Rola czynnika religijnego w rozwiązywaniu konfliktów i budowaniu pokoju, Opole 2019.

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association as a conceptual and operational entity in the area of its influence, its religious policy can also be discussed in relation to actions created e.g. for the purpose of resolving disputes that may arise in relations between representatives of different inter-confessional entities. The latter (factions, interest groups, individuals) are de facto also subjects of religious policy in such a context38 . Taking into account such circumstances, a religious policy may therefore mean a policy of any social actors towards religious associations or religious organizations. These social entities then become, nolens volens, political entities. The research on religious policy based on the criterion of the state’s approval/ disapproval of religious associations allows to distinguish three clear directions (profiles, varieties). These are: a) religious policy of concession, which means the activities of the religious associations are practically unlimited and supported or at least accepted by the state and free of interference from the state; b) religious policy of rationing, which entails the consent of the state to the activities of religious associations, aimed at the faithful of its own community and – in a non-restrictive version – consent to limited external activity; in the radical version, there is deep rationing, which means permission for only a small part of religious practices or for such a version of religious teaching that is trimmed of any content that is contrary to the line of the state; c) liquidation religious policy, which includes actions of the state aimed at counteracting negatively assessed trends and phenomena occurring in the activities of a religious organization or even striving for legal prohibition and full liquidation of the religious organization. It seems that the most important challenge faced in this context by the religious political science is to establish the relationship between these directions and the religious structure, the systemic and political basis of states, the type of political regime and the model of the state and religious associations. In this combination, ten categories of states can be proposed (in the perspective of the 20th and 21st century) – as an alternative to other typologies: a) Democratic, secular state that is friendly towards religious associations in the formula of soft separation or coordinated separation (e.g. contemporary Germany);

38 Maciej Potz: Teokracje amerykańskie. Źródła i mechanizmy władzy usankcjonowanej religijnie, Łódź 2016; Krzysztof Kowalczyk: Między antyklerykalizmem a konfesjonalizacją. Partie polityczne wobec Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce po 1989 roku, Toruń 2016; idem: Sacrum czy profanum? Partie i ugrupowania parlamentarne wobec ustawodawstwa antyaborcyjnego w Polsce, Szczecin 2020.

Religious Policy as a Subject of Research

b) Democratic, secular state that is fully distanced from the phenomenon of religion in the formula of hostile separation (e.g. contemporary France); c) Democratic and at the same time religious state de iure (e.g. contemporary Denmark, Cyprus, Greece, Great Britain); d) Democratic and at the same time religious state de facto (the most speculative category, based on presumption, e.g. modern Israel); e) Hybrid and religious country de facto (e.g. contemporary: Russia, Armenia, Turkey); f) Autocratic and religious state (e.g. Spain during Franco’s rule, Portugal during Salazar’s rule, contemporary: Myanmar, Saudi Arabia); g) Autocratic and secular state (e.g. Turkey during the Ataturk rule, modern China); h) Theocratic/hierocratic state (e.g. modern Iran, Vatican City); i) Total theocracy (e.g. Islamic State, Caucasian Emirate); j) Totalitarian state creating a parareligion (e.g. former Soviet Union, Mao-era China, modern North Korea)39 .

The analysis of detailed examples in the area of religious policy allows to capture several regularities: a) Confessional policies: concessions, rationing and liquidation occur simultaneously in all countries. This happens regardless of their political system and regime, and even regardless of the general model of relations between the state and religious associations; b) Systemic factors, however, influence the scale and level of intensity of each denomination policy. With regard to the basic division into democratic and non-democratic states, the dominance of concessional policies of acceptance and rationing in the first group of states and the predominance of concessional policies of support and liquidation in the second group can be observed; c) The central solutions – based on acceptance and non-restrictive rationing – are a kind of barometer of social balance in a country where believers and non-believers are equal hosts of the same public space; d) The coincidence of extreme policies – the concession of boundless support and absolute elimination – occurs in extremely undemocratic types of states: total theocracies and totalitarian states, which simultaneously create parareligious phenomena;

39 Radosław Zenderowski/Ryszard Michalak: Polityka wyznaniowa …, chapter III, pp. 67–151.

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e) Profound religious rationing policies are often used as a pretext for the state to reject accusations of persecution and religious intolerance. Deep rationing usually does not differ from the policy of liquidation; f) The prevalence of the direction of religious policy in a given state is also determined by the nature of the religions themselves which dominate it, as well as the profile of the religious organizations which are the carriers of these religions; g) The phenomenon of compatibility and collision of the aims of states and religious associations is to a large extent the effect of unity or collision of axiological orders – convergent or competing – represented by both types of entities; h) Apart from ideological conditions, the reason for choosing a particular direction of religious policy is the position of state decision-makers, most often resulting from their assessment of religious organizations, made through the prism of a subjectively defined dichotomy: /A/ and /B/ = /A/ socially positive religious relationship vs. /B/ socially destructive religious relationship and/or in another variant /C/ and /D/ = /C/ politically desirable religious affiliation vs. /D/ politically undesirable religious affiliation 1. Compliance as defined by the simultaneous occurrence of features /A/ and /C/ leads decision-makers to a religious policy of support concessions, meaning virtually unlimited and minimally counteracted activities of a religious association; 2. An assessment of /A/, but without feature /C/, may give rise to a religious policy of acceptance concessions and a religious rationing policy. 3. Under options /B/ and /D/ the solution adopted by policy makers is inevitably a liquidation religious policy); i) A tendency towards polarization of the systemic solutions taken by the state towards religious associations is noticeable. The processes of renouncing the model of a religious state (visible primarily in Western Europe, in the Protestant cultural-religious circle) proceed parallel to the solutions towards a distinct religious state (in the non-European or borderline cultural-religious circle, on the grounds of Islam, Judaism, Buddhism and Orthodoxy); j) Cultural and religious determinants increasingly activate the foreign policies of contemporary states, and this requires that religious policy be seen beyond its classical functions and framework, i.e. beyond internal politics.

Summarizing the above observations, it should be particularly emphasized that religious policy is commonly found as a detailed type of public policy of the state, which is directed at the activity of denominational associations (religious associations, religious organizations). Increasingly, however, it also concerns other types of entities. For example, the category of religious policy of an international orga-

Religious Policy as a Subject of Research

nization and the regional/local/self-governing religious policy can be successfully specified. Given the subjective (causal) criterion, religious policy can therefore be understood as a policy of social actors which is directed towards religious associations. In the comprehensive edition of the religious policy of a given entity, its scope includes activities of a conceptual, programmatic, operational and executive nature. Most often, such possibilities are available to the state apparatus, which has in its potential administrative institutions (independent, e.g., in the form of an office or ministry, or constituting an element of a wider structure, e.g., a department within a ministry) and special services (e.g., monitoring the activities of religious fundamentalists or destructive sects). The political conceptualization in the area of religious policy is connected with the findings of other disciplines of science, in particular the legal sciences with regard to religious law and the model definition of the relationship between the state and religious organizations which is appropriate for this discipline. A complementary research perspective, combining the methods of the legal sciences with those of the political and administrative sciences, seems indispensable for such an exploration because, on the one hand, religious law is generally the expression of a specific policy, and on the other hand, real religious policy does not always fit into the formal and legal order alone. Extending this perspective to include the scientific apparatus proper to religiology, sociology or economics additionally allows us to grasp the numerous conditions (internal and external) of religious policy, and also creates the basis for finding regularities in its area. This, in turn, argues in favour of such a perception of political science of religion that makes the findings of the political sciences an initial research perspective, but with the necessary reference to the methods and achievements of other scientific disciplines. The challenge facing Polish religious policy (and at the same time researchers of this topic) is the behavior of the state apparatus towards churches and religious associations during the Covid-19 epidemic in Poland, when the reaction of the clergy and faithful of religious communities to restrictions on congregations and other forms of religious worship was noticeable. A key issue is to determine the degree of categoricality of a given doctrine and its susceptibility to adaptation/nonadaptation to the challenges of the epidemic. Analysis of this process will determine the nature and model of the state in relation to the phenomenon of religion.

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Michalak, Ryszard: Powrót koncepcji Trzeciego Rzymu, in: Doctrina – Międzynarodowy Przegląd Humanistyczny 1 (2004), pp. 91–105. Michalak, Ryszard (ed.): Religijne determinanty polityki, Zielona Góra 2014, pp. 5–11. Michalak, Ryszard: Polityka wyznaniowa państwa polskiego wobec mniejszości religijnych w latach 1945–1989, Zielona Góra 2014. Michalak, Ryszard: Politologia religii, in: Joanna Marszałek-Kawa/Danuta Plecka (eds.): Leksykon wiedzy politologicznej, Toruń 2018, pp. 344–348. Michalak, Ryszard: Political science of religion, in: Joanna Marszałek-Kawa/Danuta Plecka (eds.): The Dictionary of Political Knowledge, Toruń 2019, pp. 364–368. Michalak, Ryszard: Polityka wyznaniowa. Zakres zjawiska, in: Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie Skłodowska, Sectio K: Politologia, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2019), pp. 23–35. Michalak, Ryszard: The significance of the religious factor in the internal and external policies of Turkey, in; Review of Nationalities 9 (2019), pp. 167–176. Michalak, Ryszard: The history of politology of religion in Poland. A research overview, in: Politics and Religion Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2020), pp. 219–262. Mierzwa, Janusz: “Między starostą a plebanem”. Relacje między państwem a związkami wyznaniowymi na szczeblu administracji ogólnej I instancji w okresie Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej – zarys problematyki, in: Jarosław Durka (ed.): Państwo – religia. Instytucje państwowe i obywatele wobec religii w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w XX wieku, Kalisz 2014, pp. 7–22. Orzeszyna, Krzysztof: Podstawy relacji między państwem a kościołami w konstytucjach państw członkowskich i traktatach Unii Europejskiej. Studium porównawcze, Lublin 2007. Pietrzak, Michał: Prawo wyznaniowe, Warszawa 1995, p. 9. Pietrzak, Michał: Polityka wyznaniowa III Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1990–2001 (próba diagnozy), in: Prawo CCCXI, seria: Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis, No 3270 (2010), pp. 365–377. Pochyły, Piotr: Polska polityka zagraniczna w reakcji na trzy kryzysy w Europie. Analiza ‘mini’ exposé ministra Witolda Waszczykowskiego z 2016 r., in: Janusz Golinowski/Sławomir Sadowski (eds.): Pomiędzy mythos i logos społecznej zmiany, Bydgoszcz 2017, pp. 113–128. Polak, Ryszard: Kościół katolicki i neopogaństwo niemieckie w myśli Leona Halbana, Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis No 3933: “Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem” 41, nr. 3, Wrocław 2019, pp. 109–125. Skubiszewski, Krzysztof: Polityka zagraniczna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w roku 1991. Exposé przedstawione na 65. Posiedzenie Sejmu RP – 27 czerwca 1991 r., in: Exposé Ministrów Spraw Zagranicznych 1990–2013, Warszawa 2013, p. 34. Potz, Maciej: Teokracje amerykańskie. Źródła i mechanizmy władzy usankcjonowanej religijnie, Łódź 2016. Potz, Maciej: Perspektywy badawcze politologii religii, in: Studia Religiologica 52/4 (2019), pp. 277–291. Potz, Maciej: Political Science of Religion. Theorising the Political Role of Religion, Cham (Switzerland) 2020.

Religious Policy as a Subject of Research

Ratke-Majewska, Anna/Rogowski, Waldemar: Kościół katolicki wobec autorytaryzmu i integryzmu. Przypadek Hiszpanii, Chile i Bractwa św. Piusa X, seria: “Politologia Religii” [vol. 9], Zielona Góra 2019. Rząd: Światowe Dni Młodzieży zakończyły się sukcesem, https://www.wnp.pl/parlamentarny/ wydarzenia/rzad-swiatowe-dni-mlodziezy-zakonczyly-sie-sukcesem,15936.html, [last accessed 30.10.2020]. Świder, Małgorzata/Góra, Sylwia/Springer, Beata, Muzułmanie i islam w Niemczech. Perspektywa polityczna, prawna i kulturowa, Kraków 2019. Thompson, Edwina A.: Misplaced Blame. Islam, Terrorism and the Origins of Hawala, in: Armin von Bogdandy/Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds.): Max Plank Yearbook of United Nations Law 11 (2007). Tunia, Anna: Polityka państwa w zakresie ustalenia jednolitej siatki pojęć stosowanych w przepisach prawa wyznaniowego, in: Michał Skwarzyński/Piotr Steczkowski (eds.): Polityka wyznaniowa a prawo III Rzeczypospolitej, Lublin 2016, pp. 34–35. Urban, Kazimierz: Mniejszości religijne w Polsce po II wojnie światowej. Szkice i materiały (ed. Czesław Bywalec), Kraków 2012. Uruszczak, Wacław/Krzysztofek, Katarzyna/Mikuła, Maciej (eds.): Kościoły i związki wyznaniowe w służbie dobru wspólnemu, Kraków 2014. Woźniak-Bobińska, Marta/Solarz, Anna M. (eds.), Wprowadzenie do polityki zagranicznej muzułmańskich państw Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej, Warszawa 2018. Zenderowski, Radosław: Religia a tożsamość narodowa i nacjonalizm w Europie ŚrodkowoWschodniej. Między etnicyzacją religii a sakralizacją etnosu (narodu), Wrocław 2011. Zenderowski, Radosław: Konflikt etniczny, konflikt religijny, konflikt etnoreligijny jako konflikty polityczne, in: Andrzej Szabaciuk/Dariusz Wybranowski/Radosław Zenderowski (eds.): Religia w konfliktach etnicznych we współczesnym świecie. Tom 1: Zagadnienia teoretyczne. Europa i obszar poradziecki, Lublin 2016, pp. 29–51. Zenderowski, Radosław/Michalak, Ryszard: Polityka wyznaniowa. Aspekty teoretyczne i egzemplifikacje, seria: “Politologia religii” [vol. 5], Zielona Góra 2018.

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Methodological Problems of Research on Confessions and Religiosity as a Factor Impeded the Creation of Denominational Policy

A multidimensional diagnosis of the emerging trends and directions of changes (characteristic for the postmodern era, related to globalization, migrations, demography, liberalization, consumerism or emancipation trends of various minorities and social categories, as well as activities at the junction of law and politics, especially beyond the area of national communities1 ) is one of the most important research areas of modern science focused on the issues of religion, religiosity and confession2 . The process of making a diagnosis requires a clear definition of its scope and purpose as well as an indication of methodological solutions. It is necessary to find answers to the questions what we want to know, how to determine it, and for whom and what the knowledge gathered during the diagnosis is to be used. The issue of religion, religiosity, and confessions is extremely complex. It is caused by the multiplicity of concepts that make up the definition scope of the question, the multiplicity of methodological and empirical approaches with their advantages and limitations, and the multiplicity of environments and groups included in this matter. The different optics on religious issues might have institutions responsible for functioning, recipients, and users (members of communities, ordinary citizens, but also representatives of institutionalized religious organizations) and groups indirectly involved in its functioning (local communities, politicians). The nature of the diagnosis constituting the basis for the creation of confessional policy or its change is the result of various cognitive perspectives – usually an objective one, resulting from subjective assessments. An additional factor considering in the process of designing a (religious) diagnosis is the existing formal conditions (priorities in a given field or solutions already implemented). A well-prepared diagnosis is then the starting point for the efficient creation of confessional policy. The confessional policy is one of the policies that the state implements, regardless of the formation and historical time in which it exists, defining its attitude to

1 Ronald F. Inglehart: Culture shift in advanced industrial society, Princeton 1990; Anthony Giddens: Konsekwencje nowoczesności, Kraków 2008. 2 Mirosława Marody/Sławomir Mandes: Przemiany polskiej religijności, in: Aleksandra Jasińska-Kania (ed.): Wartości i zmiany. Przemiany postaw Polaków w jednoczącej się Europie, Warszawa 2012, pp. 165–190.

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religious issues and taking adequate decisions. These decisions are political (and technically even legal) and they are made (and enforced) by the state and its agencies. Thus, the confessional policy is treated as a detailed type of state public policy, which is focused particularly on the activity of religious associations (religious associations or religious organizations)3 . The confessional policy is defined by state conceptual, programmatic, operational, and executive activities. Effective creation of this policy, however, is not possible without getting to know the broader context in which religious organizations or institutions are functioning and indicating general social attitude to religion and religiosity. Religion (as a very broadly defined concept – including subjective experience and the religiosity aspects) is seen as one of the potential instruments of political action4 . The plurality of concepts related to the possible directions of creating confessional policy allows one to emphasize the multidimensionality of the elements treated as key questions in this matter. Different optics appear depending on how we treat religious issues – whether from the perspective of the individual (and his rights and needs), or the institutional perspective (churches and other religious associations) or the perspective of general socio-political and legal regularities (related to the phenomenon of religiosity and religion). Such a multidimensional approach to religious- and confessional-based policy, including the complexity of cognitive and theoretical perspectives, also generates problems of a methodological and empirical nature. Confessional policy is the area of the growing interest of researchers from many disciplines of science – in particular: political and administrative sciences, sociology, cultural and religious sciences, theology, philosophy, history, jurisprudence, canon law, economics, and socio-economic geography5 . The common denominator for them is the question of establishing a methodological framework that will eliminate misunderstandings regarding the approach to religious issues as a broad issue. From this interdisciplinary perspective, emphasizing the cognitive role of social sciences, the considerations in this work will be undertaken6 . 3 Ryszard Michalak: Polityka wyznaniowa, in: Joanna Marszałek-Kawa/Danuta Plecka (eds.): Leksykon wiedzy politologicznej, Toruń 2018, pp. 355–357. 4 Piotr Mazurkiewicz/Robert T. Ptaszek/Łukasz Młyńczyk: Polityka wyznaniowa. Perspektywa Unii Europejskiej, Zielona Góra 2018. 5 Ryszard Michalak: Polityka wyznaniowa. 6 The importance of religion for political processes remains on the margins of interests of political science studies, even though religions, while giving meaning to social life, must also be politically significant in some way. This is important especially concerning the assumptions of the political science of religion itself, within which considerations in the field of confessional politics are considered per se. Taking into account a broader perspective, common to many disciplines of social sciences, will allow indicating a slightly different context and indicate methodological problems, the consideration

Methodological Problems of Research

Issues regarding the socio-political impact of religion and religiosity on individuals and groups in public (but also private) space are treated as phenomena and processes of a cognitively difficult nature7 . From the perspective of a researcher, the “difficult” issue is sometimes one of the most interesting. Addressing the problems of religiosity and religion is on the border of two types of reality: overt – available for direct observation (manifested in social behavior) – and hidden reality, to which the researcher has no direct access (resulting e.g. from worldview and faith issues). Difficulties in conducting research efforts in the area of diagnosing issues related to religion, religiosity, and confessions appear at every step. These are mainly problems with the definition of the subject of interest itself and the problem of choosing an appropriate research method or analysis reference point. There is a question of value, quality, and correctness of assumptions in this area. As a result, the researcher may find himself in a situation where the control of the research process is insignificant. The study aims to characterize selected methodological problems in research on two distinguished aspects affecting the shape of confessional policy – religion, religiosity, and the confessions themselves. These problems are treated as elements that make it difficult to formulate a good diagnosis of the situation, and thus generate disturbances related to the possibility of an accurate adjustment of the planned activities and legal and political mechanisms to the existing reality.

The First Problem – Conceptualization of the Research Subject One of the primary stages of researching social sciences, which at the same time may become the source of methodological problems, is a conceptualization. Conceptualization consists of defining key concepts for the study, describing phenomena that are the subject of research interest, and determining the relationship between these concepts8 . In the case of social sciences, a properly prepared conceptualization should refer to theories concerning phenomena and processes that are the subject of the researcher’s interest. A key feature of good conceptualization is then the precision in defining the concepts used9 . However, the definition of the subject of research does not allow to specify a cognitive extent of the concept, because religion is an area of interest in many disci-

of which in the conceptual or program activities of this policy may turn into the effectiveness of formulated solutions. 7 The cognitive difficulty, in this case, concerns both the issue of the possible capture of the phenomenon as well as its emotional and intimate character. 8 Norman Blaikie: Designing Social Research, Cambridge 2009, p. 16. 9 Earl Babbie/Allen Rubin: Research Methods for Social Work, Wadsworth 2009.

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plines and is conditioned by a fairly broad socio-cultural context. Interdisciplinary studies draw the attention of researchers to the multitude of definition perspectives. The definition of the concepts of religion, religiosity, and confession provokes the appearance of many trends in research in this area. The scope of researchers’ interests is the description of social phenomena or facts that are religious in nature (or are related to it). The most popular directions of social research on religion and religiosity include among others: (1) Study of the basic dimensions of religion and religiosity; (2) Research on religious communities and institutions and the determinants of their socio-political functioning; (3) The phenomenon of religion in its political aspect, as well as the historical and contemporary roles of religious institutions in shaping the political order – both locally, nationally and internationally; (4) Interconnection of political and religious institutions; (5) Characteristic of the legal and political regulations considering religions and confessions; (6) Study of religiosity and denominational structure in relation to various social categories, e.g. youth, rural inhabitants, foreigners and migrants; (7) Researching the relationship between religion and other areas of human activity (economy, politics, culture, etc.); (8) Research on the impact of socio-cultural changes on religiosity and the functioning of religious communities. Currently, the attention of researchers is also focused on new forms of the presence of religion in collective life. Its significant impact on the construction of contemporary identities is caused by new and intensifying processes and phenomena, especially migration processes (and the related issue of multiculturalism) or the development of modern technologies allowing the transfer of many spheres of life to virtual space. New sub-disciplines of social sciences are also dynamically developing, making issues in this field the key area of their scientific research (one of such sub-disciplines is the political science of religion). The optics of studies of religion and religiosity subsequently are shifting from the subject of global changes in religion (already exploited in social sciences since the times of Durkheim10 and Weber11 ) to new forms of religiosity and ways of constructing and manifesting sacred identities, value systems, and worldview models (also in contexts that go beyond national or ethnic borders). The key problem with defining religion is the question of how to treat religiosity. The concept of religiosity is closely related to the concept of religion. This is a oneway relationship. Adopting a specific position that defines religion directly affects the understanding of the term religiosity and the manner of its subsequent operationalization. In the social sciences, religiosity generally refers to the functioning of

10 Emile Durkheim, Elementarne formy życia religijnego, in: Franciszek Adamski (ed.), Socjologia religii. Wybór tekstów, Kraków 1984. 11 Max Weber: Szkice z socjologii religii, Warszawa 1983.

Methodological Problems of Research

religion in the conduct of an individual or social life. Religiosity is understood as a socio-cultural phenomenon, a social fact that manifests itself in the consciousness and life of individuals and communities. Social researchers trying to create a conceptual grid for describing religious phenomena point to a lack of homogeneity in understanding a religion. Most often it is described as a set of beliefs based on tradition, about the world and the forces that govern it. It is a form of social awareness. These beliefs reflect the attitude of a person towards the sphere of the sacrum, manifested in religious doctrine, religious worship or religious organization (institutions)12 . Referring to Beckford’s methodological postulates, Borowik emphasizes that the scientific understanding of religion should be separated from the everyday, colloquial understanding13 . Science cannot identify itself with a certain socially, historically, or individually defined construction of religion without having a distance to it. This should result in a clear separation of two levels of religion construction – institutional (related to the functioning of the formal and legal order and its emanation in social consciousness) and individual (related to the presence and experience of religion in everyday life). The complexity of thinking about religion and religiosity is not a new construct. Simmel pointed out the existence of a distinction between “religion” (defined as a remote and abstract belief system) and “religiosity” (understood as the frame of meaning which arises from what people typically consider as religious). For Simmel, religiosity is a subjective source of religion14 . Religion is treated as an abstract unity, similar in character to society or state in its influence on individuals, it is the purest form of unity in society, elevated above all concrete individuals15 . Religion is not synchronic, its content may be predefined and independent of the unique lives of individuals. Unlike religion, for Simmel, religiosity is constantly transformed, and it is not perfected. Religion decodes into subjective perceptions of what people consider to be religious. The usefulness of the distinction between religion and religiosity is, according to Simmel, variable over time and between different socio-cultural-political groups. The same elements are defined as religious both by religion and religiosity. Under such conditions, there is no discrepancy

12 Kazimierz Banek (ed.): Słownik wiedzy o religiach, Bielsko-Biała 2007, p. 22. 13 Irena Borowik, Religia jako konstrukt. Jamesa Beckforda analiza społecznego tworzenia religii, in: James Beckford, Teoria społeczna a religia, Kraków 2006; also: James. A. Beckford: Social Theory and Religion, Cambridge 2003. 14 The concept of religion and religiosity in Simmel’s considerations differs from the one which is the basis of modern sociology of religion. 15 Georg Simmel: A contribution to the Sociology of Religion, American Journal of Sociology 60/6 (1955), p. 13.

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between beliefs about systemically defined religion and the way people describe the sacred (religiosity). Simmel’s position as a classic researcher (apart from Durkheim and Weber) in the way of defining the concepts of religion and religiosity is the starting point for the classification of definitions. The multiple concepts are grouped into two categories – functional and substantial definitions. Functional definitions are, in practice, nominal definitions, while substantial definitions – real definitions. The functional definitions are based on criteria for identifying and classifying a phenomenon, which emphasizes the functions it performs16 . Substantial definitions, on the other hand, are based on a conceptual and theoretical schema, which allows the formulation of empirical statements to a limited extent, and adopts their actual content as a criterion for identifying and classifying phenomena. There are several basic assumptions on which the substantial definitions are based17 : (1) Religious phenomena arise from human needs, ideas, and experiences; and religious rituals connect human life with a non-empirical world that is also real; (2) Religious phenomena have their value, are autonomous, and cannot be compared with any other values; (3) Capturing the essence of religion in empirical findings concerning religious phenomena takes place with the use of theoretical constructs such as “sacred”, “God” or “supernatural”; (4) Religiosity is concretized in the context of the socio-cultural-political system. Using these assumptions, religion is defined in a broad context by Piwowarski, who treats religion as a system of beliefs and values and activities related to them, shared and performed by a group of people, which result from the distinction of the empirical and the non-empirical reality and assignments of the empirical reality to the non-empirical reality18 . In definitions, religious phenomena are related to religious institutions that directly or indirectly participate in the processes of religious socialization of individuals and social groups, or translate into a legal and formal impact on their behavior. Religiousness shaped by institutions is considered from two perspectives: social, external, one-dimensional (the criterion of religiosity here is mainly religious practices) and individual, social, multi-dimensional (the criterion of religiosity is related to faith, it’s experiencing and acting by the dictates of religion). In social systems, there is usually not only institutional or individual religiosity. The phenomenon of religion and religiosity as a socio-cultural phenomenon is subject to

16 Robert Robertson: Podstawowe problemy definicyjne, in: Franciszek Adamski (wybór), Socjologia religii. Wybór tekstów, Kraków 1983, p. 40. 17 Stella Grotowska: Religijność subiektywna. Studium socjologiczne na podstawie wywiadów narracyjnych, Kraków 1999, p. 32. 18 Władysław Piwowarski: Socjologia religii, Lublin 1996; Władysław Piwowarski/Witold Zdaniewicz: Z badań nad religijnością polską. Studia i materiały, Poznań–Warszawa 1986.

Methodological Problems of Research

transformations caused by factors shaping the processes of development of societies, civilization, and cultural changes. Individual religiosity is also determined by many socio-demographic variables. Thus, in contemporary social thought realistic religiosity is an internally diversified and pluralized creation, assuming arbitrary, unclear, chaotic, or even “mosaic” forms, and remains non-institutional (e.g. esotericism, New Age movement). Socially visible forms of religious life are also non-churched (and generally non-institutional).

The Second Problem – the Procedure and Research Methods The question of faith and religiosity is not an easy field for empirical research. A social researcher taking up these topics faces a choice. In the spectrum of possible research, he can carry out descriptive, diagnostic, explanatory, comparative, historical and – possibly – prognostic projects, but there is also an option of conducting research aimed at beneficially changing phenomena and processes – this is what experimental research or research in action serve19 . The choice of a specific approach depends on the goal of the researcher and expectations concerning the applicability of conclusions. Thinking about creating or changing the shape of a confessional policy can combine many types of research. Faith and related to it religiosity presuppose a specific type of experience of transcendence, an experience that often gets out of hand of research tools, especially of a quantitative nature, shifting the burden of findings towards qualitative research. This does not mean, however, that because there are limitations in this regard, the issue of religion, religiosity, or confession should not be dealt with using only one of these approaches. Despite a certain imperfection in the indicators of faith and religiosity used in empirical research, they are an unquestionable source of knowledge about society and the changes taking place in it20 . Moreover, religion location in a specific area of research requires a researcher to have extensive knowledge, often exceeding the narrow discipline of science, and to be unequivocal in formulating hypotheses and consequently explaining them. The selection of an appropriate toolbox (methods, techniques, and research tools) is crucial for the success of cognitive endeavors. In empirical research on religious phenomena, for many years their methodological and empirical framework was

19 John W. Creswell, Projektowanie badań naukowych. Metody jakościowe, ilościowe i mieszane, Kraków 2013; Chava Frankfort-Nachmias/David Nachmias: Metody badawcze w naukach społecznych, Poznań 2001. 20 Robert Boguszewski: “Polak-katolik” casus polskiej religijności w warunkach globalizacji na podstawie badań empirycznych CBOS, in: Maria A. Libiszowska-Żółtkowska (ed.), Religia i religijność w warunkach globalizacji, Kraków 2006.

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formulated following political or church ideology. The findings of such studies lacked neutrality and objectivity. Today, researchers have greater freedom, but the methodological dilemma is still present – whether religiosity should be studied from the perspective of quantitative or qualitative methods. The majority of the research done on religion and religiosity is quantitative (even if it only creates the context of the considerations), formulating and answering questions about the prevalence of the religious practice, the rise or fall in the number of religious movements, or the intensity of religious beliefs or confessional structure. Measuring religious variables allows researchers to identify who is religious and to what extent the level of religiosity varies according to socio-demographic characteristics. Quantitative research is also used to study how religion and religiosity are related to other social values, attitudes, and behavior, which allows us to test hypotheses about the causes and consequences of religious commitment. The advantage of quantitative research is allowing for relatively accurate testing of hypotheses connected with being less prone to theoretical errors than qualitative methods21 . There are these three most frequent accusations about quantitative research in the case of research on religious phenomena: (1) Religion and religiosity are too complex phenomena to be classified and measured in general; (2) Quantitative methods are too simplistic for use in a non-positivist epistemological framework (as transcendent phenomena are); and (3) Religiousness is too context-dependent and sensitive to measurement bias from quantified parameters. Research on religion and religiosity carried out with the use of questionnaire surveys has been conducted for over 30 years22 . Several hundred thousand people have answered the predefined, standardized questions23 ,24 that have been used in many European and global projects (e.g. World Value Survey). The main reason for this is that researchers believe that there is a strong differentiating power for

21 T. L. Brink: Quantitative and/or qualitative methods in the scientific study of religion, in: Zygon 30 (1995), pp. 461–475. 22 See more: Wil Arts/Loek Halman: Cross-national Values in Europe Today. Facts and Explanations, in: Paul de Graf/Loek Halman (eds.), Value Contrasts and Consensus in Present-Day Europe, Leiden 2013. 23 The question asked in the international survey program as World Value Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/, [last accessed: 15.09.2020]) or European Value Survey (http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/, [last accessed: 15.09.2020]) is: Which of the following statements comes closest to your beliefs? a) There is a personal God. b) There is some sort of spirit or life force. c) I don’t really know what to think. d) I don’t really think that there is any sort of spirit, God, or life force. 24 Por. Ronald Inglehart, Mapping Global Values, in: Comparative Sociology 5/2–3 (2006), pp. 115–136.

Methodological Problems of Research

these statements25 . The key assumption of such a solution lies in the attempt to indicate the differences between religiosity and the lack of it26 . These predefined statements conceal very specific expectations of what people should think about when choosing one of the statements closest to their beliefs. This method of research is not intended to make the respondents consider how issues concerning God and beliefs are shaped and disseminated in their closest environment and the media messages addressed to them. The indications do not even concern individual, own moral principles, but what religion – generally defined – the researcher would probably expect that the respondent would recognize himself as a follower of. Social researchers try to identify religious people on a certain scale – from fully religious to non-religious27 . This way of measuring religiosity is the most characteristic of the study of Christian religions and characterizes the way of measuring society in the USA28 . Contemporary solutions differ slightly from the adopted starting point and from conventional standards. The questionnaire questions mentioned earlier serve to classify people as religious or non-religious, which remains relatively compatible with general definitions of religion and various forms of belonging (or not) to non-religious communities and communities as specific belief systems. From this perspective, the explanation of religion by beliefs is used and the acceptance of the transcendent description of holiness as religion is used, and the immanent description of holiness as an alternative religion and the rejection of these descriptions is an indicator of non-religion. This difference in belonging to certain belief systems does not, however, turns any divergence between religions (also understood as confessions). In research on the issues raised, it is important to focus on what can be treated as an indicator of an individual’s belonging to a particular religion. For religion as an abstract unity, the process of indicating its specific religion may be visible, for example, in the analysis of texts and the ways of their interpretation by representatives of religious organizations. Generally speaking, this is how a specific variety of religions is read. A good diagnosis of problems in social sciences concerning religion and religiosity is the result of the research methodology used29 . Quantitative methods in this

25 Wil Arts/Loek Halman: Cross-national Values in Europe Today. 26 Stephen Harding/David Phillips/ Michael Fogarty: Contrasting Values in Western Europe. Unity, Diversity, and Change, Hampshire, London 1986. 27 See also: David Voas: The Rise and Fall of Fuzzy Fidelity in Europe, in: European Sociological Review 25/2 (2009), pp. 155–158. 28 See also: Courtney Bender/Wendy Cadge/Peggy Levitt/ David Smilde: Religion on the Edge: Decentering and Re-centering the Sociology of Religion, New York 2013. 29 Robert J. Wuthnow: Taking talk seriously. Religious Discourse as Social practice, in: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 50/1 (2011), pp. 1–22.

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area are constantly criticized for linking their effects to social reality too poorly and treating them as the source of many problems30 . The consequences of the decision to use a quantitative approach are subject to systematic criticism31 . It is based on the excessive focus on institutional (church) identification, leaving people unrelated to institutions out of the area of analysis, or including them in the wrong categories32 . However, the complete abandonment of quantitative procedures is also not a desirable solution. Research on religious phenomena entered “critical paradigmatic reflection”. The main part of it is describing precisely – the methodology. However, most social theories concerning changes in the functioning of the socio-political order require the use of quantitative methods. When the research focuses on religiosity, the categorization process can be observed with repeating patterns of what kind of significance people give religiosity and religion while communicating with others. Therefore, religiosity can be a way of accepting religious dogmas, an effect of attitudes towards the phenomenon, and the institutions representing it, which is usually implemented in everyday life. It can also be analyzed as experiencing phenomena of a transcendent nature. This cultural significance of religiosity manifests itself in thinking, acting, and recognizing various events in everyday life as significant. The “religious” aspects that are given “cultural significance” also do not need to be historically or theologically justified to get a social significance. Religion is a fundamental part of human experience and is deeply rooted in the issues of “making sense” and “frames of meaning” for the world and individual existence. It is important to understand the motivation behind religious activities. In this sense, religion is therefore not only personal but also social. Religion can be one factor that can influence the way a person perceives and experiences himself and another external reality. The meaning given to an experienced sacrum is best expressed in a conversation with others33 . Taking the interpretative approach into account has reasons both in the transformations of contemporary societies and in the transformations of religion itself in Western culture (subjectivization, privatization, respiritualization, experience-seeking orientation, etc.). Contemporary, experience-oriented religiosity requires a non-

30 Edward Shils: Primordial, personal, sacred and civil ties. Some particular observations on the Relationships of Sociological Research and Theory, in: The British Journal of Sociology 8/2 (1957), pp. 130–145. Robert Robertson: The Sociological Interpretation of Religion, Oxford 1970. 31 See also: Christian Smith et al.: Roundtable on the Sociology of Religion. Twenty-Three Theses on the Status of Religion in American Sociology. A Mellon Working Group Reflection, in: Journal of the American Academy of Religion 2013, pp. 1–36. 32 See also: Thomas Luckmann: The Invisible Religion. The problem of religion in modern societies, New York 1974. 33 Michael Patton: Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA 2002.

Methodological Problems of Research

quantitative research procedure. This way of thinking about religion and religiosity leads researchers to focus their attention on qualitative methods. Considering a qualitative perspective, research on religion and religiosity, as a complex phenomenon, challenges to apply research methods based on ethnography. Religion researchers have many other methods at their disposal in their toolbox – participant observation, in-depth interviews and various narratives, but in practice, they may be limited to one selected aspect of the studied subject. It then becomes a source of further methodological problems, bearing in mind the complexity of the conceptualization constructs for the analyzed phenomena34 . Ethnography is a solution that proposes a comprehensive analysis, combines approaches and techniques, and allows us to understand the assumptions and principles that govern the daily life of the studied community35 . Moreover, the area of interest of ethnographers is “silent knowledge”, difficult to verbalize, acquired through individual experience, composed of unconscious rules that are untranslatable into verbal expressions, but are enabling practical action36 . All the arguments presented lead to the conclusion that methodological development in research on religious phenomena favors a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches. According to Flick37 , a good solution is to use the mixed method as a way to obtain access to various approaches to the studied phenomenon. It is important to ensure that the empirical methods and criteria are adequate for the topic under consideration. Since the use of different data may hinder direct comparability of data, it is worthwhile to focus on achieving complementarity, contextualization, and development of earlier (usually quantitative) measurements, rather than simply confirming the results obtained from these studies38 .

34 David Silverman: A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book about Qualitative Methods, London, Thousand Oaks 2007. 35 Kathy Charmaz: Teoria ugruntowana. Praktyczny przewodnik po analizie jakościowej, B. Komorowska (trans.), Warszawa 2009. 36 Monika Kostera/Paweł Krzyworzeka, Etnografia, in: Dariusz Jemielniak (ed.), Badania jakościowe. Podejścia i teorie, t. 1, Warszawa 2012, pp. 167–187. 37 Uwe Flick: Triangulation Revisited. Strategy of Validation or Alternative?, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 22 (1992), pp. 169–197,; Uwe Flick: The Sage qualitative research kit. Designing qualitative research, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781849208826, 2007 [last accessible 01.04.2021] 38 Pat Bazeley: Issues in Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches to Research 1st International Conference. Qualitative Research in Marketing and Management, University of Economics and Business Administration, Vienna 2002.

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Different Optics: Studies on Religious Confessions in Public Statistics – a Case of Poland Apart from the sensitive and intimate nature of topics related to religious phenomena in general, many aspects of widely understood religiosity are not subject to quantitative research. One of the most important sources of information in this regard is official statistics39 . One of its tasks is to estimate the number of members of churches and religious associations, which differ in size, degree of dispersion, and territorial distribution. Religious research in public statistics is carried out with the use of many research procedures, most often research on representative samples, censuses, and statistical reporting covering religious institutions. Each of these procedures has its advantages and limitations due to methodology, organizational and financial capacities, and sometimes also aroused for political reasons. Research on representative samples takes into account the question of religion, which requires the use of many simplifications of the nature mentioned earlier. Such research also does not allow obtaining sufficient knowledge about the number of confessions. The problem is the use of samples, but even increasing their number does not solve the indicated problem. Another, more complete source of data on the country’s religious structure is the census. The question about religion was included in the censuses of 1921, 1931, and 201140 . Another important source is the GUS statistical survey on religious confessions in Poland conducted since 1990. As part of this research, data on the condition and activity of churches and religious associations are obtained directly from religious organizations.

Conclusions Religion, religiosity, and confession in social sciences constitute an extensive, thematically rich, and therefore multi-dimensional area of analysis. A good diagnosis of the situation of religion, religiosity, and confessional affiliation is the sine qua non condition for constructing sensible policies on many levels, including confessional policy. Considerations about the role of the state, its agendas, and politics (and policies) remain related to social and religious perceptions. Religion in its broadest sense plays an important role in systemic changes, political conflicts, and reconciliation processes.

39 Wyznania religijne w Polsce 2015–2018, Warszawa, 2020. 40 Ibid.; during PRL, the subject of religion was omitted in all censuses for ideological reasons. The question of religion was also not included in the first census of the population conducted after Poland regained independence and sovereignty in 2002.

Methodological Problems of Research

Two fundamental methodological problems make a good and complete diagnosis of questions related to religion difficult. Creating such a diagnosis is the domain of representatives of social sciences, representing various disciplines, to be able to capture the phenomenon of religion and confession in an interdisciplinary way in a specific socio-political and cultural order. And such a diagnosis is the starting point for creating politics, especially religious politics. The first highlighted problem is conceptual in nature, which is related to a clear definition of what can be classified as a religion, religiosity, and confession. Specifying the semantic criteria is crucial for taking the next steps in the process of diagnosing this cognitive area. The second problem raised in the considerations concerns methodological issues. The phenomenon of religious phenomena grapples with the problems of quantification, classification, and measurement, and opens up space for criticism of the approaches used. Religious phenomena are so complex that it is important to be clear about what analyzes and what populations they relate to to generalize their results or indicate the presence of universal characteristics. Regardless of the methodological preferences of the researchers themselves, some issues related to the analyzed conceptual area are better suited for analysis using quantitative methods, and may even be dependent on them. Others, on the other hand, fit much better in the area of qualitative research, which tries to recreate the sense of the meaning assigned to religious phenomena as transcendent experiences. In the area of quantitative research, researchers are looking for selection criteria for appropriate levels of religiosity, or indicators of religious and confessional affiliation. In the area of qualitative research, researchers more often try to analyze the causes and motivations regarding, for example, the increase in the level of spirituality (also the alternative one), the apparent strength of evangelical or charismatic gatherings, or attempts to explain the religiosity of certain categories. Methodological choices direct to indicating one paradigm (positivist for quantitative research, interpretative for qualitative research), which generates at the same time some methodological problems. There is a myth in research on religious phenomena emphasizing that all quantitative social research is based only on a positivist approach to knowledge. Religion, religiosity, and confession are multidimensional and such an approach would be an obstacle in the application of quantitative methods for most researchers of religion. Quantitative research on religious phenomena can be conducted from many epistemological perspectives, ranging from positivism to constructivism. Qualitative research on religion cannot be limited only to the sphere of internal experiences of given social actors. It would then not be possible to read the regularities which characterize religious phenomena. Most academic research is based on a fundamental ontological belief that there is an observable external reality to the researcher, and the study of religion is no exception. The approach combining the

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quantitative context with the qualitative recognition of its determinants seems to be the most optimal solution in this context.

Bibliography Arts, Wil/Halman, Loek: Cross-national Values in Europe Today. Facts and Explanations, in: Paul de Graf/Loek Halman (eds.): Value Contrasts and Consensus in Present-Day Europe, Leiden 2013. Babbie, Earl/Rubin, Allen: Research Methods for Social Work, Wadsworth 2009. Banek, Kazimierz (ed.): Słownik wiedzy o religiach, Bielsko-Biała 2007. Bazeley, Pat: Issues in Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches to Research 1st International Conference. Qualitative Research in Marketing and Management, University of Economics and Business Administration, Vienna 2002. Beckford, James A., Social Theory and Religion, Cambridge 2003. Bender, Courtney/Cadge, Wendy/Levitt, Peggy/Smilde, David: Religion on the Edge. Decentering and Re-centering the Sociology of Religion, New York 2013. Blaikie, Norman: Designing Social Research, Cambridge 2009. Boguszewski, Robert: “Polak-katolik” casus polskiej religijności w warunkach globalizacji na podstawie badań empirycznych CBOS, in: Maria Libiszowszka-Żółtkowska (ed.), Religia i religijność w warunkach globalizacji, Kraków 2007. Borowik, Irena: Religia jako konstrukt. Jamesa Beckforda analiza społecznego tworzenia religii, in: James Beckford, Teoria społeczna a religia, Kraków 2006. Beckford, James A.: Social Theory and Religion, Cambridge 2003. Brink, T. L.: Quantitative and/or qualitative methods in the scientific study of religion, in: Zygon 30 (1995), pp. 461–474. Charmaz, Kathy: Teoria ugruntowana. Praktyczny przewodnik po analizie jakościowej, Warszawa 2009. Creswell, John. W.: Projektowanie badań naukowych. Metody jakościowe, ilościowe i mieszane, Kraków 2013. Durkheim, Emile: Elementarne formy życia religijnego, in: Franciszek Adamski (ed.), Socjologia religii. Wybór tekstów, Kraków 1983. Flick, Uwe: Triangulation Revisited. Strategy of Validation or Alternative?, in: Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 22 (1992), pp. 169–197. Flick, Uwe: The Sage qualitative research kit. Designing qualitative research, https://doi.org/10. 4135/9781849208826 (2007) [last accessed 01.04.2021]. Giddens, Anthony: Konsekwencje nowoczesności, Kraków 2008. Grotowska, Stella: Religijność subiektywna. Studium socjologiczne na podstawie wywiadów narracyjnych, Kraków 1999. Harding, Stephen/Phillips, David/Fogarty, Michael: Contrasting Values in Western Europe. Unity, Diversity, and Change, Hampshire, London 1986.

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Inglehart, Ronald: Culture shift in advanced industrial society, Princeton 1990. Inglehart, Ronald: Mapping Global Values, in: Comparative Sociology 5/2–3 (2006), pp. 115–136. Kostera, Monika/Krzyworzeka, Paweł: Etnografia, in: Dariusz Jemielniak (ed.), Badania jakościowe. Podejścia i teorie, t.1, Warszawa 2012, pp. 167–187. Libiszowska-Żółtkowska, Maria: Polityka wyznaniowa, in: Jerzy Kwaśniewski (ed.): Nauki o polityce publicznej. Monografia dyscypliny, Warszawa 2018, p. 266–287. Luckmann, Thomas: The Invisible Religion. The problem of religion in modern societies, New York 1974. Marody, Mirosława/Mandes, Sławomir: Przemiany polskiej religijności, in: Aleksandra Jasińska-Kania (red.), Wartości i zmiany. Przemiany postaw Polaków w jednoczącej się Europie, Warszawa 2012, pp. 165–190. Mazurkiewicz, Piotr/Ptaszek, Robert/Młyńczyk, Łukasz, Polityka wyznaniowa. Perspektywa Unii Europejskiej, Zielona Góra 2018. Michalak, Ryszard: Polityka wyznaniowa, in: Joanna Marszałek-Kawa/Danuta Plecka (eds.): Leksykon wiedzy politologicznej, Toruń 2018, pp. 355–357. Patton, Michael: Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA 2002 Piwowarski, Władysław/Zdaniewicz Witold, Z badań nad religijnością polską. Studia i materiały, Poznań – Warszawa 1986. Piwowarski, Władysław: Socjologia religii, Lublin 2002. Robertson, Robert, Podstawowe problemy definicyjne, in: Franciszek Adamski (wybór), Socjologia religii. Wybór tekstów, Kraków 1983. Robertson, Robert: The Sociological Interpretation of Religion, Oxford 1970. Shils, Edward: Primordial, personal, sacred, and civil ties. Some particular observations on the Relationships of Sociological Research and Theory, in: The British Journal of Sociology, 8/2 (1957), pp. 130–145. Simmel, Georg: A contribution to the Sociology of Religion, in: American Journal of Sociology, 60/6 (1955), pp. 1–18. Smith, Christian et al.: Roundtable on the Sociology of Religion. Twenty-Three Theses on the Status of Religion in American Sociology. A Mellon Working Group Reflection, in: Journal of the American Academy of Religion 2013, pp. 1–36. Voas, David: The Rise and Fall of Fuzzy Fidelity in Europe, in: European Sociological Review, 25/2 (2009), pp. 155–158. Weber, Max: Szkice z socjologii religii, Warszawa 1984. Wuthnow, Robert J.: Taking talk seriously. Religious Discourse as Social practice, in: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 50/1 (2011), pp. 1–21. Wyznania religijne w Polsce 2015–2018, Warszawa, 2020.

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Governmental Religious Administration in Poland. Central Level

Introduction The construction of contemporary governmental structures in Poland began after the political transformation in 1989. Due to the dysfunctionality of the previous system, it was necessary to restore the proper place and functioning of government administration in democratic countries. Since it is always a process, not a oneoff act, it has lasted for many years and now, 30 years after the beginning of the transformation, changes are still taking place. Due to the history, tradition and social structure in Poland, religious issues have become one of the important elements of implementing public policies. Taking into account the fact that in the years 1945–1989 there was a so-called “hostile separation” in the relations between the state and religious communities1 and the goal of power was to athesize the society, there was a need to build those relations on different principles. The introduction of new normative regulations in connection with the transformation of the political system was the basis for a change of attitude towards religious policy. The analysis begins with a brief description of the construction of governmental structures in Poland and then the location of the tasks of religious governmental administration in them. It should be remembered, however, that due to the change of the political system after 1989, the Polish administration was undergoing huge transformations and its model was only beginning to shape. Therefore, in the last 30 years, the functioning of the government administration in religious matters has been modified many times. It is important that the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 contains the regulation of religious matters. The constitutional provisions concerning freedom of conscience and religion determine the way those are regulated at the statutory level and have an impact on the regulation of the functioning of public administration in this area2 . The Constitution of the Republic of Poland creates a framework, basic principles, which are then translated into

1 Katarzyna Krzysztofek: Wpływ prawodawstwa okresu Polski Ludowej na przepisy prawa wyznaniowego III Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej – wybrane zagadnienia, in: Studia z Prawa Wyznaniowego 21 (2018), p. 302. 2 Paweł Borecki: Postulowana nowelizacja postanowień wyznaniowych Konstytucji RP z 1997r., in: Przegląd Prawa Publicznego 2 (2018), pp. 33–46.

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acts of statutory and sub-statutory rank. The realization of these tasks is a separate aspect. The way the tasks are carried out, the functioning of the governmental religious administration will always be a derivative of the religious policy, that is one of the public policies3 . Since, according to Professor R. Michalak: “The essence of religious policy is therefore to shape the relations between the state and individual religious associations, as well as to influence the relations between them”, then the way in which the administration executes its tasks will be directly influenced by the views of those currently in power4 (which, of course, should be done within the framework of the applicable legal rules). At the same time, it may bring about a change of regulations or even an informal influence on the functioning of the administration (an interesting issue, although definitely beyond the scope of this argument). The starting point for this analysis is primarily the regulations contained in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997, but also in other normative acts passed before 1997 (called in the doctrine religious acts5 ). In general, in the Constitution we can find two dimensions of the relationship between the state and churches and religious associations: institutional and individual. The former is largely referred to in Article 25 of the Constitution, while Article 53 of the Constitution refers to the individual dimension (guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion). From the point of view of these considerations, the institutional aspect will be important, as it is expressed, inter alia, in the functioning of the governmental administration of the denominations. Article 53 of the Constitution treats the guarantees of religious security analyzed from the point of view of the citizen / human being. Article 25 of the Constitution defines the relations of churches and religious associations with the state. At the same time, the following principles result from it: equal rights of religious associations, impartiality of public authorities towards religious beliefs, respect for the autonomy and independence of religious associations, cooperation between the state and churches and religious associations for the benefit of man and the common good.

3 See more: Ryszard Michalak: Polityka wyznaniowa. Zakres zjawiska, in: Annales UMCS, Sectio K. Politologia 26/1 (2019), pp. 23–35; and Ryszard Michalak: Polityka wyznaniowa, in: Joanna MarszałekKawa/Danuta Plecka (eds.): Leksykon wiedzy politologicznej, Toruń 2018, pp. 355–357; and also Michał Pietrzak: Polityka wyznaniowa III Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1990–2001 (próba diagnozy), in: Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis. Prawo CCCXI 3270 (2010), pp. 365–377. 4 On the impact of policies on administrative decisions on important public matters, see more: Brainard Guy Peters: Administracja publiczna w systemie politycznym, Warszawa 1999, pp. 211–295. 5 These include: the Act on the Relationship of the State with the Catholic Church in the Polish People’s Republic (Journal of Laws No. 29, item 154, as amended), the Act on guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion (Journal of Laws 2005, No. 231, item 1965, as amended) and the Act on social insurance of clergy (Journal of Laws No. 29, item 156, as amended).

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In accordance with Article 25, paragraph 1, Churches and other religious associations are equal, and in paragraph 2 we read that public authorities in the Republic of Poland maintain impartiality in matters of religious, worldview and philosophical beliefs, ensuring freedom of expression in public life. Maintaining impartiality or neutrality of worldviews by public authorities in relations with religious communities should in fact result in the prohibition of privileged treatment of any religious community6 . However, the very term “impartiality” is a contentious doctrine and is interpreted in various ways7 . The public administration, both governmental and self-governing, has a duty to function and carry out its tasks in an objective manner that is not religiously motivated and free from any prejudice. At the same time, public office holders, as citizens, have the right to have their own convictions (in accordance with Article 53 of the Constitution, which ensures freedom of conscience and religion), which, however, when performing public functions, cannot influence the decisions made. Article 25, paragraph 3 stipulates that relations between the State and the Churches and other religious associations shall be governed by the principles of respect for their autonomy and the mutual independence of each other in their respective areas, as well as cooperation for the good of man and the common good. This generally means the prohibition of state interference in doctrinal and ideological matters and the prohibition of interference by religious associations in matters relating to the exercise of public authority. Mutual relations should be arranged on the principle of independence. However, the situation may become more complicated because the followers of a given religion are at the same time citizens of the state and therefore the two orders cannot remain indifferent to each other. Article 25 sec. 4 establishes a special regulation for the Catholic Church, specifying that the relations between the Republic of Poland and the Catholic Church are defined by an international agreement concluded with the Holy See and by laws. A concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Poland was signed on 28 July 1993 (Journal of Laws 1998, No. 51, item 318)8 . Whereas in Article 25 sec. 5 it was decided that the relations between the Republic of Poland and other Churches and religious associations are defined by laws passed on the basis of agreements concluded by the Council of Ministers with their respective

6 Paweł Borecki: Dobro wspólne jako determinanta relacji między państwem a Kościołami i innymi związkami wyznaniowymi we współczesnej Polsce, in: Przegląd Prawa Wyznaniowego II (2019), p. 33. 7 Ryszard Mariusz Małajny: Neutralność a bezstronność światopoglądowa państwa (uwagi na tle polskiej praktyki konstytucyjnej po 1989r.), in: Tadeusz Jacek Zieliński (ed.): Bezstronność religijna, światopoglądowa i filozoficzna władz Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warszawa 2009, pp. 71–92. 8 However, its ratification did not take place until 23 February 1998 (entered into force on 25 April 1998).

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representatives. The particular situation of the Catholic Church is related to its subjectivity to international law.

Building Government Administration Structures in Poland Analyzing the activity of the governmental administration of religions, it seems necessary to place it in appropriate structures. It is also necessary to discuss the structure of government administration in Poland. Government administration is a segment of public administration in Poland created by bodies, offices and central and local institutions that perform public tasks for the benefit of citizens, both individual and collective entities. The origins of government administration date back to the interwar period, when, after regaining independence, temporary structures of government administration were created, which survived until 19399 . These institutions did not exist between 1950 and 1990 due to the political regime of the time and the nature of a single centralized state authority. After 1989, the political transformation made it necessary to restructure the central and local government. It was organized in a centralized way and the individual organizational units are now built on the principle of hierarchical subordination. We can distinguish between central and field level. The government administration bodies at the central level can be divided into the following main ones: the council of ministers, i.e. the prime minister and ministers, and the central bodies, subordinate to the main bodies: heads of central offices, heads of state organizational units (e.g., President of the Central Statistical Office). The central bodies are appointed and supervised by the supreme bodies. They perform administrative tasks, having a professional character. The supreme bodies are political in nature, they shape the state policy. The local government administration is formed by a voivode and subordinate to him local government combined administration and the non-combined government administration subordinate to a competent minister or central government administration body. The Council of Ministers, as the supreme body, is anchored in the Polish Constitution of 1997. It is a collegiate body exercising executive power in the political system of the Republic of Poland. It conducts the current internal and foreign policy of the state (in accordance with Article 146 of the Constitution), which at the same time imposes on it the obligation to carry out tasks also in the area of religious policy. The detailed scope of activity and manner of functioning is

9 By the Decree of the Regency Council of January 3, 1918 on the temporary organization of the supreme authorities in the Kingdom of Poland, governmental authorities and central administration were structured. See: Hubert Izdebski/Michał Kulesza: Administracja publiczna. Zagadnienia ogólne, Warszawa 2004, pp. 65–66.

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defined by the Act of 8 August 1996 on the Council of Ministers (Journal of Laws No. 106, item 492, as amended). The minister is also a one-man government administration body and a member of the executive body. We can distinguish between the ministers who manage the departments of government administration (the so-called ministry) and the so-called ministers “without portfolio” not managing the departments. The Act of 4 September 1997 on government administration departments (Journal of Laws No. 141, item 943, as amended) classifies tasks and competences within specific departments. Currently, there are 36 departments in the Act (including religious denominations and national and ethnic minorities, environment, family, internal affairs, transport, public administration, labor, justice, fisheries, agricultural markets, energy or the Polish membership in the EU). The minister in charge of a particular department implements the state policy with regard to matters within the given department of administration. He does so with the help of the administrative apparatus – a specific organizational structure – of the ministry. The central authorities are subordinate to and supervised by the central authorities. Their role is to perform administrative tasks of a managerial and executive nature10 . By applying the law, they implement government policy. The government administration in the field has been built on the principle of vertical and territorial deconcentration, which means the dispersion of the exercised competences to the central and local authorities, without transferring responsibility11 . According to the constitutional regulation the representative of the Council of Ministers in the province is the voivode. The functioning of the local government administration is regulated in the Act of 23 January 2009 on Voivode and Government Administration in the Province (Journal of Laws No. 31, item 236, as amended). The government administration performs functions both in the political and executive sphere. The former concerns setting the directions of the state policy, formulating public policies at the decision-making level, while the executive sphere is the execution of administrative tasks in accordance with the legal norms in force in order to execute the government policy. In the process category: the first one is the process of government, while the second one is the process of law application12 .

10 Eugeniusz Zieliński: Administracja rządowa i samorządowa w Polsce, Warszawa 2013, p. 177. 11 Dawid Sześciło/Jowanka Jakubek-Lalik: Administracja multicentryczna. Poziomy zarządzania publicznego, in: Dawid Sześciło/Arwid Mednis/Magdalena Niziołek/Jowanka Jakubek-Lalik (eds.): Administracja i zarządzanie publiczne. Nauka o współczesnej administracji, Warszawa 2014, p. 48. 12 Beata Springer: Administracja rządowa, in: Joanna Marszałek-Kawa/Danuta Plecka (eds.): Leksykon wiedzy politologicznej, Toruń 2018, p. 16–20.

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Tasks of Central Administration Bodies The purpose of these considerations is to analyze the functioning of central government structures through the prism of the classification of government departments and a specific section: religious denominations and national and ethnic minorities. In the light of Article 5 Section 25 of the Act on Government Administration Departments, the sections of government administration include, among others, the section: religious denominations and national and ethnic minorities. Article 30 of the Act states that this section covers the following matters: 1. relations of the State with the Catholic Church and other churches and religious associations, 2. matters related to the preservation and development of the cultural identity of national and ethnic minorities, civic and social integration of persons belonging to those minorities, as well as the preservation and development of the regional language. Historically, during the period of the Polish People’s Republic, the department of administration in charge of religious denominations was within the competence of the Office for Religious Affairs established by the Act of 19 April 1950 on the change of organization of the chief state authorities in the field of municipal economy and public administration (Journal of Laws of 1950, No. 19, item 156, as amended). The political transformation brought liquidation of the Office by the Act of 23 November 1989 amending the Act on changes in the organization and scope of operation of some of the supreme and central state administration bodies (Journal of Laws of 1989, No. 64, item 387). The institution that took over this administrative department was the Office of the Council of Ministers, in the structure of which the Office for Religious Affairs was established, functioning from 26.02.1990 to 31.12.1996 and from 14.12.1994 as the Department of Religious Affairs13 . In connection with public administration reforms in Poland, a Directorate General for Religious Affairs14 was planned, but due to the turmoil on the political scene (early parliamentary elections), religious issues were placed in the Ministry of the Interior and Administration. They stayed there until 2011 (with changes within the ministry due to the reform of the Administrative and Economic Center of the Government). First, in 2002, the Department of Denominations and National Minorities was created, and then was changed in 2005, because then the Act of 5 January 2005 on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language (Journal 13 Anna Barszcz: Prezydium Rady Ministrów i Urząd Rady Ministrów jako wytwórcy państwowego zasobu archiwalnego (1945–1996), Warszawa 2014, p. 174. 14 Stefan Dudra: Polski Autokefaliczny Kościół Prawosławny w obszarze polityki wyznaniowej oraz polityki narodowościowej Polski Ludowej i III Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 2019, p. 92.

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of Laws of 2005, No. 17, item. 141, as amended) came into force, when the Group for Culture of National and Ethnic Minorities existing in the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage was incorporated into the Ministry of Interior as the Department of Religious Denominations and National and Ethnic Minorities15 . Therefore, from 2005 to 2011, the Minister of Interior and Administration was the central authority of the government administration in matters of religious denominations and national and ethnic minorities. In 2011, this department was transferred to the Ministry of Administration and Digitization and assigned to the competent Minister. In 2015, the solutions from before 2011 were reinstated, because after the parliamentary elections won in 2015 and the creation of the Government of the United Right, there were organizational changes in the structures of the Council of Ministers. The Regulation of the Council of Ministers of November 20, 2015 on the establishment of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration (Journal of Laws 2015, item 1946) incorporated the previously established Ministry of Administration and Digitization (but leaving as a separate unit the Ministry of Digitization) together with the organizational units of the latter (including religious denominations and national and ethnic minorities). In accordance with the Ordinance of the Prime Minister of 18 November 2019 on the detailed scope of activities of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration (Journal of Laws 2019, item. 2264), the minister manages, among others, the department: religious denominations and national and ethnic minorities. The detailed scope of operation was established in the Ordinance No. 13 of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration of 13 March 2018 on determining the organizational regulations of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration (Official Journal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration 2018, item 15). The Department of Religious Denominations and National and Ethnic Minorities has three internal organizational units: the Department of Legal Regulations, the Department of the Register of Churches and other Religious Associations and the Department of National and Ethnic Minorities. According to § 26, the scope of the Department’s activities includes in particular: – matters concerning relations between the State and churches and religious associations, – The Church Fund, – The register of churches and other religious associations, – national and ethnic minorities and a regional language, – The Official Register of Municipalities in which an auxiliary language is used, – The register of communes where names in a minority language are used.

15 Ibid., p. 93.

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The Department also deals with organizational and technical support: – The Commission for the return of property of churches and religious associations, – Commissions of the Joint Representatives of the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Bishops’ Conference as well as joint Commissions and Teams of the Government and authorities of other churches and religious associations, – The Joint Commission of Government and National and Ethnic Minorities. The register of churches and other religious associations is an computerized register in which churches and other religious associations which do not have a regulated legal situation in the form of a separate law and inter-church organizations are entered. The basis for the entry is the Act on Guarantees of Freedom of Conscience and Religion and the Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration of 31 March 1999 on the register of churches and other religious associations (Journal of Laws No 38, item 374). As of 7 July 2020, 193 entities were entered in the register, including 188 in section A (churches and other religious associations) and 5 in section B (inter-church organizations)16 . The registration of a church or religious association is regulated in Articles 30–35 of the Act on Guarantees of Freedom of Conscience and Religion and is the responsibility of the competent minister. The body may not register the association if the body considers that the doctrinal rules of the association do not have the features of religious doctrine17 . This remains a voluntary decision of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration. M. Kasinski rightly points out that due to the confusion with regard to the understanding of religion18 , subjective judgments can be made in this matter and the authority has the possibility to apply arbitrary criteria, as well as opinions of experts can turn out to be biased19 . The Ministry also maintains a list of churches and religious associations operating under separate laws (among others, churches which have

16 https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia/rejestr-kosciolow-i-innych-zwiazkow-wyznaniowych, [last accessed 31.07.2020]. 17 Michał Kasiński: Wolność sumienia i wyznania jako dobro chronione w prawie administracyjnym (wybrane problemy), in: Zofia Duniewska (ed.): Dobra chronione w prawie administracyjnym, Łódź 2014, p. 125. 18 Michał Pietrzak aptly pointed out that the Supreme Administrative Court, by recognizing that the concept of religion is limited to faith in God as holiness (sacrum), at the same time prevented other interpretations of the concept beyond that traditional. The result of such an analysis is the elimination of the impartiality of public authorities, because: “They seek to impose limits on freedom of conscience and freedom of religion that are not provided for in international conventions or in the Constitution”. See more: Michał Pietrzak: Prawo wyznaniowe, Warszawa 2013., p. 245. 19 Michał Kasiński: Wolność sumienia i wyznania jako dobro chronione w prawie administracyjnym (wybrane problemy), p. 125.

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signed agreements with the Republic of Poland include: Catholic Church in the Republic of Poland Latin rite, Catholic Church in the Republic of Poland Greek Catholic rite (Byzantine–Ukrainian)). In the register of communes kept by the Ministry, in the area of which names in the minority language are used, there are 62 communes (to which there are sometimes several or several dozen towns). The last ones, which were added on 28 March 2019, are the municipality of Reda and the municipality of Wejherowo with the Kashubian language20 . The second important register is the Official Register of Municipalities in which an auxiliary language is used. The list includes 33 municipalities, and the last entry was made in February 2014 and concerned the municipality of Luzino in Wejherowo Poviat21 . The Ministry also maintains a list of communes where no less than 10 % of the inhabitants belong to national or ethnic minorities or use the regional language. There are 94 municipalities on the list22 . The Ministry of Interior and Administration also provides organizational and technical support for various committees (the Department of Religious Denominations and National and Ethnic Minorities). One of the widely commented on and controversial activities was that of the Property Commission (established in 1989 and liquidated in 2011) in regulatory proceedings concerning the restoration of ownership of nationalized properties (or parts thereof) of the Catholic Church. This procedure was provided for by the Law on the Relationship of the State with the Catholic Church. The Commission was formed by representatives appointed by the Minister and the Secretariat of the Polish Episcopal Conference. Four other commissions (still in operation today) were set up, following the example of the commission for the property of the Catholic Church: the Regulatory Commission for the Autocephalous Orthodox Church23 , the Evangelical-Augsburg24 , the Jewish

20 http://mniejszosci.narodowe.mswia.gov.pl/mne/rejestry/rejestr-gmin/6794,Rejestr-gmin-naktorych-obszarze-sa-uzywane-nazwy-w-jezyku-mniejszosci.html, [last accessed 31.07.2020]. 21 http://mniejszosci.narodowe.mswia.gov.pl/mne/rejestry/urzedowy-rejestr-gmin/6884,UrzedowyRejestr-Gmin-w-ktorych-jest-uzywany-jezyk-pomocniczy.html, [last accessed 31.07.2020]. 22 http://mniejszosci.narodowe.mswia.gov.pl/mne/mniejszosci/wyniki-narodowego-spis/8022,Gminyw-ktorych-udzial-mniejszosci-narodowych-etnicznych-lub-spolecznosci-poslug.html, [last accessed 31.07.2020]. 23 Ordinance of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration of 14 May 1999 on the detailed procedures of the Regulatory Commission for the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Journal of Laws 1999 No. 45, item 456). 24 Ordinance of the Minister – Head of the Office of the Council of Ministers of 12 October 1994 on the detailed procedure for regulatory proceedings to restore the ownership of real estate or parts thereof to legal persons of the Evangelical-Augsburg Church in the Republic of Poland to (M.P. No. 55, item 461).

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Religious Communities25 , and the Inter-Church Regulatory Commission26 for other Churches and Religious Communities (1998). The committees are collegial bodies. Their structures, modes of operation, salaries of members27 and auxiliary staff are determined by the competent minister. Another is the Joint Commission of Representatives of the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Bishops’ Conference established to maintain permanent contacts between the Government and the Polish Bishops’ Conference to resolve issues concerning relations between the state and the Church. The basis is the Act on the Relationship between the State and the Catholic Church in the Republic of Poland (Article 4 paragraph 1). The Commission is composed of six representatives of the government and the Catholic Church each. The representatives of the governmental side are appointed by the Prime Minister at the request of the Minister of Interior and Administration. Meetings of the Commission are held alternately at the place of one party28 . The Joint Commission of Representatives of the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Ecumenical Council acts on the basis of the Act on guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion. It was established in 1991. It consists of six representatives of the Government Party (appointed and dismissed by the competent minister) and seven representatives of the Churches associated in the Polish Ecumenical Council. Meetings are also held alternately at the place of one party. The last one was held on 11 July 2019 at the seat of the Christian Academy of Theology29 . The Joint Commission of representatives of the Government of the Republic of Poland and Evangelical Alliance in the Republic of Poland acts on the basis of the Act on guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion. It consists of four representatives of the Government Party

25 The Decree of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 10 October 1997 on the detailed procedure of the Regulatory Commission for Jewish Religious Communities (M.P. No 77, item 2067). 26 Ordinance of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration of 9 February 2000 on the detailed procedure of regulatory proceedings before the Inter-Church Regulatory Commission (Journal of Laws No. 12, item 151). 27 Ordinance of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration of 10 December 2020 on the amount of remuneration of members and auxiliary staff of regulatory committees acting on the basis of the Acts on the relations between the State and churches and religious associations in 2020 (Journal of Laws 2019 item 2394). 28 According to the information available on the website of the Catholic Information Agency, the last meeting was held on 11 December 2018. See: https://ekai.pl/dokumenty/komunikat-poobradach-komisji-wspolnej-przedstawicieli-rzadu-rp-i-konferencji-episkopatu-polski/, [last accessed 15.09.2020]. The minutes of the meeting of 16 April 2018 are available on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration as the latest. See: https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia/ protokoly-z-posiedzen-komisji-wspolnych, [last accessed 15.09.2020]. 29 https://ekumenia.pl/aktualnosc/spotkanie-komisji-rzadu-i-pre/, [last accessed 15.09.2020].

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(appointed and dismissed by the competent minister) and seven representatives of the Churches associated in the Evangelical Alliance in Poland. The Joint Commission of Representatives of the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Evangelical-Augsburg Church in the Republic of Poland also operates on the basis of the Act on Guarantees of Freedom of Conscience and Religion. The Commission is composed of three representatives of the government and four representatives of the Evangelical-Augsburg Church in Poland. The representatives of the governmental side are appointed by the Minister of Interior and Administration. Meetings of the Commission are held alternately at the place of one side. The Joint Team of Representatives of the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Holy Council of Bishops acts on the basis of the Act on the Relationship between the State and the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Holy Council of Bishops of 26 September 2007. It consists of four representatives of the governmental side and four representatives of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church. The representatives of the governmental side are appointed by the Prime Minister at the request of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration. Meetings of the Commission are held alternately at the place of one side. The last meeting was held on 3 October 201830 . The Group for the Catholic Church in the Republic of Poland of the Byzantine-Ukrainian rite operates on the basis of the Act on guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion. It consists of four representatives of the Government Party (appointed and dismissed by the competent minister) and four representatives of the Catholic Church in the Republic of Poland of the Byzantine-Ukrainian rite. The Joint Commission of Government and National and Ethnic Minorities was established on the basis of the Act of 6 January 2005 on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language (Journal of Laws No. 17, item. 141, as amended). As in other cases, the Commission is composed of representatives of the government (e.g. representative of the minister in charge of religious denominations and national and ethnic minorities or the minister of justice) and representatives of minorities. On 18 December 2019 in Warsaw, the LXIXth meeting of the Joint Commission of Government and National and Ethnic Minorities was held, on the Ministry’s website recordings of the meeting are available31 . The Minister of Interior and Administration also performs tasks related to the Church Fund32 . It was established under Article 8 of the Act of 20 March 1950 30 http://www.diecezjawroclawsko-szczecinska.pl/news/display?id=348, [last accessed 15.09.2020]. 31 https://www.gov.pl/web/mniejszosci-narodowe-i-etniczne/komisja-2019, [last accessed 15.09.2020]. 32 The Church Fund is a separate item in part 43 of the state budget – religious denominations and national and ethnic minorities, in chapter 758 – various accounts, in chapter 75822 – Church Fund https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia/fundusz-koscielny, [last accessed 11.09.2020].

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on the State’s takeover of dead hand property, guarantee to parish priests to own farms and the establishment of the Church Fund (Journal of Laws No. 9, item 87, as amended) and was to be a form of compensation to churches for the land taken over by the State. The Fund may be used by all churches and religious associations with a regulated legal status in the Republic of Poland. The basic expense that is covered by the Church Fund are social and health insurance contributions for clergy. Moreover, the Minister, as the disposer of the Fund, announces a call for applications for obtaining grants for the maintenance and repair of sacral and church buildings of historic value in the sense given by current legislation or jurisprudence and for supporting church charitable and caring activities. In 2019, the Fund’s expenses reached 171 million PLN33 . In addition to the Church Fund, the state budget also finances the Church’s universities (e.g., KUL, UKSW or CHAT), theological faculties and the Orthodox Theological Seminary. A total of 14 entities receive funding (in 2018 182 million złoty was allocated to the Catholic University of Lublin, 130 million złoty to the UKSW34 ). In the previous parliamentary term (2011–2015) there was an extensive discussion on abolishing the Church Fund and replacing it with a tax deduction35 . After the change in the parliamentary arena in 2015, the discussion on this issue was abandoned (which is understandable given the relations of those currently in power, mainly with the Catholic Church). However, as it is noted in the doctrine, the religious communities other than the Catholic Church would be the worst losers of the liquidation of the Church Fund, as the number of their believers is much

33 See: https://www.rp.pl/Kosciol/200709542-Padl-kolejny-rekord-wydatkow-panstwa-min-na-sklad ki-duchownych.html, [last accessed 14.09.2020]. More on the Church Fund: Łukasz Bernaciński: Wydatkowanie środków Funduszu Kościelnego w XXI wieku, in: Łódzkie Studia Teologiczne 28 (2019) 3, pp. 49–60. 34 See: https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/setki-milionow-na-katolickie-uczelnie-tak-resort-gowina-dotujewyzsze-szkoly-6425473646499457a, [last accessed 22.09.2020], https://oko.press/ponad-377-mlnzlotych-z-budzetu-trafilo-od-2007-r-do-wydzialow-i-uczelni-katolickich-chociaz-nie-wymagatego-konkordat/, [last accessed 22.09.2020]. 35 Prime Minister Donald Tusk in his exposé of 18 November 2011 referred to this issue. See: https://www.premier.gov.pl/files/pliki/20111118_expose.pdf, [last accessed 17.09.2020]. Also Paweł Borecki: Dylematy likwidacji Fundusz Kościelnego i komisji regulacyjnych, in: Przegląd Sądowy 6 (2012), pp. 19–33, Paweł Kaleta: Problemy prawne likwidacji Fundusz Kościelnego, in: Studia z Prawa Wyznaniowego 15 (2012), pp. 255–274, Finansowanie Kościoła. Debata Rzeczpospolitej. See: https://www.rp.pl/artykul/790857-Finansowanie-Kosciola—debata-Rzeczpospolitej.html, [last accessed 28.02.2020], Paweł Borecki: Likwidacja Fundusz Kościelnego. Refleksja krytyczna, https:// www.rp.pl/artykul/841403-Likwidacja-Funduszu-Koscielnego—refleksja-krytyczna.html, [last accessed 28.02.2020].

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smaller, so the hypothetical income from the tax write-off would not be equal to the amounts received from the Funds36 . Other ministries are also involved in religious matters. In 2019, the Ministry of Digitization established the Council for cooperation with churches and religious associations in matters of processing personal data by them. The Council was appointed by order No. 3 of the Minister of Digitization of 30 January 2019. (MC Official Journal, item 3) on the basis of Article 7 paragraph 4 point 5 of the Act on the Council of Ministers. The aim of the Council’s activity is to diagnose areas related to data processing by churches and religious associations, which may require the support of the Minister of Digitization. The first meeting of the Council was held on 27 February 201937 . One of the elements of the realization of the tasks of government administration in the matter of religious policy is to supervise the foundations established by religious legal persons38 . The regulations concerning the establishment and functioning of foundations also apply to foundations established by legal persons of different denominations. The supervision over the foundations is exercised by the minister indicated by the founder (appropriate for the scope of activity and purpose of the foundation). In view of the above, individual ministers publish at their websites lists of the foundations they supervise, including the religious foundations of legal persons (for example, the Minister of Science and Higher Education supervises 923 foundations, including e.g. the Primate of the Millennium Foundation for the Support of the Higher Metropolitan Seminary of St. John the Baptist in Warsaw)39 . In connection with the obligation to submit reports on the activities carried out to the competent minister, we can also find templates of reports on the websites of individual ministries40 , the scope of which is regulated in the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice of 8 May 2001 on the framework of the report on the activities of the Foundation (Journal of Laws of 2001, item 529 as amended). The Ministers were obliged to examine the annual reports on the Foundation’s activity, as well as to demand the removal of the Board’s shortcomings or its change, and also to file motions to the court. G. Gura rightly points out that, paradoxically, the supervisory

36 Michał Szewczyk: Wybrane problemy związane z realizacją konstytucyjnej zasady rozdziału Kościoła od państwa w III Rzeczypospolitej, in: Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 2/14 (2013), p. 117. 37 https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/rada-do-spraw-wspolpracy-z-kosciolami-i-zwiazkamiwyznaniowymi-w-sprawach-przetwarzania-przez-nie-danych, [last accessed 31.07.2020]. 38 More about church foundations in Poland: Grzegorz Gura: Nadzór nad fundacjami kościelnymi w Polsce, in: Studia z Prawa Wyznaniowego 16 (2013), pp. 93–109. 39 https://www.bip.nauka.gov.pl/g2/oryginal/2020_04/6d7b08b0b9f629ed1b4e1fa4e3848940.pdf, [last accessed 11.09.2020]. 40 https://www.bip.nauka.gov.pl/g2/oryginal/2019_01/51e270d2cf6f569bc2539a2fc5fce2e4.pdf, [last accessed 11.09.2020].

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authorities have been deprived of their powers in practice because they do not have the possibility to inspect the documents or to enforce the submission of the report (no sanctions for not submitting)41 .

Conclusions Undoubtedly, the success of the Polish state after the transformation in 1989 was taking advantage of the opportunities and potential of churches and religious associations by enabling them to participate in the performance of public administration tasks as well as to maintain relations between the state and churches and religious associations42 . It was undoubtedly a turn towards a coordinated separation and a move away from a hostile separation in the politics of the Polish state. The realization of tasks by the government administration (on each level) must result from the adopted legislation. In the legal system of the Republic of Poland we find a number of examples of this. Institutional cooperation of state bodies with churches and other religious associations is provided for in the Act on Guarantees of Freedom of Conscience and Religion. In accordance with Article 16, paragraph 1, the State cooperates with churches and other religious associations in preserving peace, shaping the conditions for the development of the country and combating social pathologies. The next paragraph of this article provides for the possibility of creating permanent forms of cooperation, and Article 16a allows for the form of an agreement that specifies cooperation. In turn, the article 17 includes the possibility of cooperation in the field of protection, conservation, making available and dissemination of architectural monuments, art and religious literature, which are an integral part of cultural heritage. It can be said that the meta norm expressed in Article 16 allows for extensive cooperation in the realization of various types of tasks by particular agencies of government administration in detailed pragmatics. The implementation is assigned to specific ministries putting into practice particular public policies, according to the departments of government administration assigned to them. The concretization takes place, of course, in laws and it is these laws that impose an obligation on government administration bodies to cooperate with the Catholic Church and other churches and religious associations. Thus, the Act of 26 October 1982 on upbringing in sobriety and counteracting alcoholism (Journal of Laws of 1982, No. 35, item 230, as amended) in Article. 1 sec. 3 requires cooperation in working for the aforesaid goal. On the other hand, the Act of 12 March 2004 on social assistance (Journal of Laws 2004, No. 64, item 593,

41 Grzegorz Gura: Nadzór nad fundacjami kościelnymi w Polsce, pp. 96–97. 42 Katarzyna Krzysztofek: Wpływ prawodawstwa okresu Polski Ludowej …, pp. 316–317.

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as amended) obliges the government administration bodies to cooperate in the field of social assistance organization. The provision of Article 51 of the Act on the relations between the state and the Catholic Church obliges state and ecclesiastical institutions to cooperate in the field of protection, conservation, making available and popularizing the monuments of ecclesiastical architecture and sacred art and their documentation, the resources of museums, archives and libraries owned by the Church, as well as works of culture and art with religious motives, which are an important part of the Polish cultural heritage. Cooperation of public administration with organizational units of churches and other religious associations in the sphere of public tasks is also provided for by the Act of 24 April 2003 on public benefit activity and volunteerism (Journal of Laws 2003, No. 96, item 873, as amended). To sum up, it is in the interest of the state to support churches and religious associations, especially in their charitable and caring activities43 . The state is obliged (at least in part) to carry out tasks in this area (e.g., to help the poorest, the excluded, the persons in need of care) and uses the activities of churches and religious associations at this level. However, this should be done in accordance with the institutional separation of the secular and religious spheres and with respect for the autonomy of all actors, as well as with the principles of equal treatment.

Bibliography Barszcz, Anna: Prezydium Rady Ministrów i Urząd Rady Ministrów jako wytwórcy państwowego zasobu archiwalnego (1945–1996), Warszawa 2014. Bernaciński, Łukasz: Wydatkowanie środków Funduszu Kościelnego w XXI wieku, in: Łódzkie Studia Teologiczne 28 (2019) 3, pp. 49–60. Borecki, Paweł: Dylematy likwidacji Fundusz Kościelnego i komisji regulacyjnych, in: Przegląd Sądowy 6 (2012), pp. 19–33. Borecki, Paweł: Postulowana nowelizacja postanowień wyznaniowych Konstytucji RP z 1997r., in: Przegląd Prawa Publicznego 2 (2018), pp. 33–46.

43 At this point it is worth quoting the Article 39 of the Act on the Relationship between the State and the Catholic Church, which states that the Church’s charitable and caring activities include in particular: running facilities for orphans, the elderly, people with physical or mental disabilities and other categories of people in need of care, running hospitals and other medical facilities and pharmacies, organizing help in the field of maternity protection, organizing help for orphans, people affected by natural disasters and epidemics, war victims, families and individuals, including those deprived of their liberty, running nurseries, orphanages, boarding houses and shelters, helping to provide recreation for children and young people in need, promoting the idea of helping others and social attitudes that foster it, providing assistance to victims of natural disasters and individuals in special need abroad.

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Borecki, Paweł: Dobro wspólne jako determinanta relacji między państwem a Kościołami i innymi związkami wyznaniowymi we współczesnej Polsce, in: Przegląd Prawa Wyznaniowego II (2019), pp. 23–42. Borecki, Paweł: Likwidacja Fundusz Kościelnego – refleksja krytyczna, https://www.rp.pl/ artykul/841403-Likwidacja-Funduszu-Koscielnego—refleksja-krytyczna.html, [last accessed 28.02.2020]. Dudra, Stefan: Polski Autokefaliczny Kościół Prawosławny w obszarze polityki wyznaniowej oraz polityki narodowościowej Polski Ludowej i III Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 2019, p. 92. Gura, Grzegorz: Nadzór nad fundacjami kościelnymi w Polsce, in: Studia z Prawa Wyznaniowego 16 (2013), pp. 93–109. Izdebski, Hubert/Kulesza, Michał: Administracja publiczna. Zagadnienia ogólne, Warszawa 2004, pp. 65–66. Kaleta, Paweł: Problemy prawne likwidacji Fundusz Kościelnego, in: Studia z Prawa Wyznaniowego 15 2012, pp. 255–274. Kasiński, Michał: Wolność sumienia i wyznania jako dobro chronione w prawie administracyjnym (wybrane problemy), in: Zofia Duniewska (ed.): Dobra chronione w prawie administracyjnym, Łódź 2014, pp. 113–131. Konstytucja RP z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997r. (Dz. U. z 1997r., Nr 78, poz. 483 z późn. zm.). Krzysztofek, Katarzyna: Wpływ prawodawstwa okresu Polski Ludowej na przepisy prawa wyznaniowego III Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej – wybrane zagadnienia, in: Studia z Prawa Wyznaniowego 21( 2018), pp. 301–322. Małajny, Ryszard Mariusz: Neutralność a bezstronność światopoglądowa państwa (uwagi na tle polskiej praktyki konstytucyjnej po 1989r.), in: Tadeusz Jacek Zieliński (ed.): Bezstronność religijna, światopoglądowa i filozoficzna władz Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warszawa 2009, pp. 71–92. Michalak, Ryszard: Polityka wyznaniowa. Zakres zjawiska, in: Annales UMCS, Sectio K. Politologia 26/1 (2019), pp. 23–35. Michalak, Ryszard: Polityka wyznaniowa, in: Joanna Marszałek-Kawa/Danuta Plecka (eds.): Leksykon wiedzy politologicznej, Toruń 2018, pp. 355–357. Peters, Brainard Guy: Administracja publiczna w systemie politycznym, Warszawa 1999, pp. 211–295. Pietrzak, Michał: Polityka wyznaniowa III Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1990–2001 (próba diagnozy), in: Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis. Prawo CCCXI 3270 (2010), pp. 365–377. Pietrzak, Michał: Prawo wyznaniowe, Warszawa 2013, p. 245. Rozporządzenie Prezesa Rady Ministrów z dnia 18 listopada 2019r. w sprawie szczegółowego zakresu działania Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji (Dz. U. 2019 poz. 2264). Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji z dnia 14 maja 1999r. w sprawie szczegółowego trybu postępowania Komisji Regulacyjnej do Spraw Polskiego Autokefalicznego Kościoła Prawosławnego (Dz. U. 1999 Nr 45, poz. 456). Springer, Beata: Administracja rządowa, in: Joanna Marszałek-Kawa/Danuta Plecka (eds.): Leksykon wiedzy politologicznej, Toruń 2018, pp. 16–20.

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Sześciło, Dawid/Jakubek-Lalik, Jowanka: Administracja multicentryczna. Poziomy zarządzania publicznego, in: Dawid Sześciło/Arwid Mednis/Magdalena Niziołek/Jowanka JakubekLalik (eds.), Administracja i zarządzanie publiczne. Nauka o współczesnej administracji, Warszawa 2014, pp. 24–53. Szewczyk, Michał: Wybrane problemy związane z realizacją konstytucyjnej zasady rozdziału Kościoła od państwa w III Rzeczypospolitej, in: Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 2/14 (2013), pp. 91–118. Ustawa z dnia 17 maja 1989r. o stosunku Państwa do Kościoła Katolickiego w RP (Dz. U. Nr 89, poz. 154 z późn. zm.). Ustawa z dnia 8 sierpnia 1996r. o Radzie Ministrów (Dz. U. Nr 106, poz. 492 z późn. zm.). Ustawa z dnia 4 września 1997r. o działach administracji rządowej (Dz. U. Nr 141, poz. 943 z późn. zm.). Ustawa z dnia 23 stycznia 2009r. o wojewodzie i administracji rządowej w województwie (Dz. U. nr 31, poz. 236 z późn. zm.). Zarządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji z dnia 10 października 1997r. w sprawie szczegółowego trybu działania komisji regulacyjnej do Spraw Gmin Wyznaniowych Żydowskich (M.P. Nr 77, poz. 2067). Zieliński, Eugeniusz: Administracja rządowa i samorządowa w Polsce, Warszawa 2013. https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia/rejestr-kosciolow-i-innych-zwiazkow-wyznaniowych, [last accessed 31.07.2020]. http://mniejszosci.narodowe.mswia.gov.pl/mne/rejestry/rejestr-gmin/6794,Rejestr-gminna-ktorych-obszarze-sa-uzywane-nazwy-w-jezyku-mniejszosci.html, [last accessed 31.07.2020]. http://mniejszosci.narodowe.mswia.gov.pl/mne/rejestry/urzedowy-rejestr-gmin/ 6884,Urzedowy-Rejestr-Gmin-w-ktorych-jest-uzywany-jezyk-pomocniczy.html, [last accessed 31.07.2020]. http://mniejszosci.narodowe.mswia.gov.pl/mne/mniejszosci/wyniki-narodowego-spis/ 8022,Gminy-w-ktorych-udzial-mniejszosci-narodowych-etnicznych-lub-spolecznosciposlug.html, [last accessed 31.07.2020]. https://ekai.pl/dokumenty/komunikat-po-obradach-komisji-wspolnej-przedstawicielirzadu-rp-i-konferencji-episkopatu-polski/, [last accessed 15.09.2020]. https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia/protokoly-z-posiedzen-komisji-wspolnych, [last accessed 15.09.2020]. https://ekumenia.pl/aktualnosc/spotkanie-komisji-rzadu-i-pre/, [last accessed 15.09.2020]. http://www.diecezjawroclawsko-szczecinska.pl/news/display?id=348, [last accessed 15.09.2020]. https://www.gov.pl/web/mniejszosci-narodowe-i-etniczne/komisja-2019, [last accessed 15.09.2020]. https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia/fundusz-koscielny, [last accessed 11.09.2020]. https://www.rp.pl/Kosciol/200709542-Padl-kolejny-rekord-wydatkow-panstwa-min-naskladki-duchownych.html, [last accessed 14.09.2020].

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https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/setki-milionow-na-katolickie-uczelnie-tak-resort-gowina-dotujewyzsze-szkoly-6425473646499457a, [last accessed 22.09.2020]. https://oko.press/ponad-377-mln-zlotych-z-budzetu-trafilo-od-2007-r-do-wydzialow-iuczelni-katolickich-chociaz-nie-wymaga-tego-konkordat/, [last accessed 22.09.2020]. https://www.premier.gov.pl/files/pliki/20111118_expose.pdf, [last accessed 17.09.2020]. https://www.rp.pl/artykul/790857-Finansowanie-Kosciola—debata-Rzeczpospolitej.html, [last accessed 28.02.2020]. https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/rada-do-spraw-wspolpracy-z-kosciolami-i-zwiazkamiwyznaniowymi-w-sprawach-przetwarzania-przez-nie-danych, [last accessed 31.07.2020]. https://www.bip.nauka.gov.pl/g2/oryginal/2020_04/6d7b08b0b9f629ed1b4e1fa4e3848940. pdf, [last accessed 11.09.2020]. https://www.bip.nauka.gov.pl/g2/oryginal/2019_01/51e270d2cf6f569bc2539a2fc5fce2e4.pdf, [last accessed 11.09.2020].

Jarosław Macała

Religious Policy and Geopolitics: Some Reflections

Introduction Entering into the complicated and little researched and appreciated relationship between religious policy and geopolitics, we must note that in the Western world, the religious factor has, for many decades, been treated as marginal among the instruments used to analyze changes on a global scale. This has been fostered by the specific intellectual climate in the West, as expressed by the theory of secularization or even by the quasi-religious belief that in the processes of modernization and progress, religion is playing an ever smaller role in individual and social life, until it finally disappears. In many other civilizations, the opposite has been and is true1 . Only the last decades have brought about a clear increase in publications on the relationship between religion and geopolitics in the Western world, but without developing a deeper and more coherent approach. Quantity does not turn into quality. This also applies to some poorly outlined interference between internal/ external religious policy and geopolitics. Some of them are briefly signaled by this text, the basic premise of which is to identify a number of possible research fields for the title issue. At the beginning, it is worth realizing the basic problems faced by amateurs of exploring the relationship between religious policy and geopolitics. Doubts arise even if the research instrumentation is weak, for example, in terms of low precision of the basic concepts: geopolitics – religion – religious policy. The methodological problems should also be recalled, because the analysis of religious and geopolitical interrelationships requires interdisciplinary research, because religion is usually not an independent or sovereign factor, and specifically in relations with politics, often politically passive and differently interpreted. In addition, religion and religious policy must be considered in relation to cultural, socio-political or geopolitical contexts.

1 Luke M. Herrington/Alaisdair McKay: Introduction, in: Luke M. Herrington/Alasdair McKay/Jeffrey Haynes (eds.): Nations under God. The Geopolitics of Faith in the Twenty-First Century, Bristol 2015, p. 2.

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Religion and Geopolitics In my opinion, there are three basic approaches to the interaction between religion and geopolitics. In each of them there is a different understanding of the geopolitical connotations of religious policy: from ignoring them through noticing them to considering them as a very influential phenomenon. The first is a position related to the traditional understanding of geopolitics, treating religion as a phenomenon that is irrelevant in practice. It contains the conviction that both these spheres (religion and geopolitics) belong to different and separate worlds: sacrum and profane. After all, geopolitics, especially classical and neoclassical, analyzed the process of creation, development and collapse of centers of power, mainly states, within a specific territorial framework on the basis of rational, material calculations. The culture, religion or ethical principles were also irrelevant, irrational, and not analyzed. Therefore, for many years they were treated separately in geopolitics, without any significant correlation between them. This also resulted from the theory of secularization and modernization, which was influential in Western science. In recent decades, this view has changed, as it turned out that “religion is returning to the public sphere or rather never left”, and consequently “religion is much more pervasive in modernity and (geo)political forms than the last 50 years of social science has allowed”2 . This undermined the simple opposition between religion and secularism declared in the Western world. And after 1989 “[t]he collapse of Communism and the demise of the Cold War has deprived international affairs of an organizing script and a defining drama”, which in an increasingly unstable and unpredictable world was accompanied by a renaissance in geopolitics3 . These evaluations, together with an analysis of broader social and civilization processes, such as globalization, and the increasingly questionable thesis of an “epitaph for religion” also in the Western world, justify the clear increase in the importance of culture and religion in geopolitical research, which was evident after the end of the Cold War. However, it gained particular importance after 11 September 2001, when cultural and religious differences were recognized as one of the fundamental sources of conflicts in the modern world, and above all, a revolt against Western domination. All in all, the second trend in geopolitical research is growing in strength, which treats religions as a recognized geopolitical factor and points to the importance of the fact that religions can legitimize non-religious goals4 . The revival of religion as a research area has shown the problem of its adaptation to existing schools and 2 Tristan Sturm: The future of religious geopolitics: towards a research and theory agenda, in: Area 45/2 (2013), p. 136. 3 Gearoid Ó Tuathail: Critical Geopolitics. The Politics of Writing Global Space, London 1996, p. 177. 4 Gertjan Dijkink: Shifting Territorial Orders and Religion, in: Luke M. Herrington/Alasdair McKay/ Jeffrey Haynes (eds.): Nations under God, p. 39.

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geopolitical theories, hardly recognizing that the behavior of geopolitical actors does not have to be solely the instrumental intentions of using religion for political purposes. The easiest way to include religions in geopolitical research was to use a culinary metaphor: add and mix religion with other food in the pot. The following two positions seem to be most popular: a) expanding the field of geopolitical research with so-called “soft power” factors (cultural, religious, ethical, etc.), best expressed in Joseph Nye’s term “soft power” coined in the late 1980s. Nye aptly noted in the post-Cold War world, with the declining role of “naked power” in international relations, the growing importance of non-material power factors, the cultural system, values, politics and thus also religions, which build up an image of the attractiveness of individual states or alliances in the international arena (especially the West) and often have the ability to attract other states, persuade and influence them without having to resort to “hard power”. However, he did not attribute any particular role to religion5 . b) a geo-civilizational approach, which assesses that the basic contradictions of the world are cultural, that is, civilizational. However, this method of analysis does not consider religion to be important, the divisions of civilization (intertwined cultural, ethnic, national, religious and material factors) are important for it, influencing the possibilities of using the geographical environment. The most famous work of that trend was the famous “Clash of Civilizations” by Samuel P. Huntington, who saw the return of civilizations, largely formed by religions, as a new strategic framework for post-Cold War geopolitics. The problem is that many of the current geopolitically important disputes and conflicts are less frequent between civilizations and much more frequent within them, e.g. between different confessions or religious movements – see Sunni and Shiite in Islam. In the third variant of the relationship between geopolitics and religion, rarely present in contemporary geopolitical research, and appearing especially among some representatives of critical geopolitics, religion is treated as an independent or even dominant factor, classified as the religious geopolitics6 . This current of research assumes that although religion and geopolitics belong to different spheres, they have many analogies, which translates into ambitions to create a new theoretical layer. Therefore, staying once again in the circle of culinary metaphors, to develop a recipe for a new, appetizing dish. First of all, in this aspect religion is, in my opinion, definitely overrated, it is treated as geopolitics, because both are a way of seeing the world, an ideological way of constructing reality. Religions strongly 5 Joseph Nye: Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics, New York 2004. 6 Jarosław Macała: Geopolityka religii jako szczególny sposób badania relacji między przestrzenią a polityką, in: Ryszard Michalak (ed.): Implementacja zasad religijnych w sferze politycznej, Zielona Góra 2016, pp. 191, 193–197.

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influence the social processes of cohesion and identification, mainly in terms of the key distinction between each identity – their own and that of others – and shape the understanding of the world and its processes, expressed in the geopolitical imagination. They are the foundation for great narratives, myths that transcend the horizon of life of one person, generation or nation. Thus, they become a worldview, an ideology, which generally becomes politicized. In other words, they show how to interpret the world that surrounds us and how to act in it. They are certainly divided by the kind of faith they require for their visions of the world7 .

Religious Policy Religious policy in all its diversity of typologies undoubtedly has connections with all understandings of the relationship between geopolitics and religion. For the purposes of this text, it can be considered that, in a narrower sense, “it is the shaping of the relations between the state and individual religious associations”, and in a broader sense, important for the geopolitical context, “the apparatus of the state undertakes specific actions with respect to subjects directly or indirectly connected with religious organizations precisely because of this connection”8 . This may include, for example, religious or quasi-religious parties or movements. Two interlinked perspectives on religious policy seem important for our needs: internal and external. Among them, the latter seems to be much more important, which includes, among other things, the following conditions, but not all of them have an important geopolitical significance: 1) state security considerations (differently defined and instrumentalized); 2) the nature of the religion or religions present in the vicinity of the state; 3) the religious and denominational structure of neighboring states (including the status of minorities associated with the said state); 4) the nature of religious policy in the international environment; 5) geopolitical conditions of the region (presence or absence of “sacral geopolitics”, “mosque politics“, etc.); 6) the international legal norms in which a country participates or resists their influence; 7) the scale and nature of the international “networking” of the religious community concerned; 8) the existence or absence of religious conflicts in the international environment;

7 Tristan Sturm: The future of religious geopolitics, p. 139. 8 Ryszard Michalak: Polityka wyznaniowa. Zakres zjawiska, in: Annales UMCS, Sectio K. Politologia 26/1 (2019), p. 25.

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9) the presence or absence of pro-ecumenical tendencies among religious entities in the region; 10) the actual and not merely declared importance of irenology in the transmission of religious associations in the region9 .

Undoubtedly, the external religious policy outlined in this way contains a large number of variables, and is strongly dependent on the picture of interactions between religion and geopolitics, as can be seen in this text. However, it shows not only a strong connection with the state or nation as a geopolitical actor, which was and is typical of classical or neoclassical geopolitics, but also allows for treating individual religions or religious associations (e.g., the Catholic Church) as geopolitical entities, as territorial organizations. Finally, it also refers to new geopolitical entities, which can be religious movements or organizations, even without the attribute of territoriality, with certain geopolitical notions of their own space and identity, in this case strongly dependent on religion.

From Sacralization to Secularization A geopolitical reference seems relatively simple, taking into account the correlation of external/internal religious policies of the various forms of theocratic states (for example ancient despotic states)10 , where religion was the basic model of social and political life and providing a recognized discourse on political power and territorial identity. Thus, it influences the sacralization of basic geographical categories, both imagined as place, space and real, such as territory, area, borders, etc. By imagining space vertically and hierarchically in relation to a god or gods, the religious and territorial ties constituted a single entity, as did the fusion of geopolitics and religion and the exclusive, because addressed to only one state religion or confession, religious policy of the state and of the dominant religious union. In this case, religion became the leaven and the basis of the territorial community, but at the same time the basic dividing line between those who belonged to the community and those who were excluded from it. Rarely, however, were the traditions of faith and relations to their own and foreign religious associations the only driving forces behind the foreign policy of the theocracies, and were often processed into the ideological sphere as a broader state thought. This was done in order to justify and strengthen 9 Ibid., p. 27. 10 I define theocracy as a political system in which power derives its legitimacy from the supernatural, i.e., the hallmark of power is its religious justification, and not necessarily directly the rule of the clergy, see Maciej Potz: Teokracje amerykańskie. Źródła i mechanizmy władzy usankcjonowanej religijnie, Łódź 2016, p. 74.

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the geopolitical interests of the state, often on a long-term and permanent basis. The official religion and the mythological system associated with it, as well as monopolistic religious structures, were treated as the basic factor of statehood, enjoyed the full support of the state, and legitimized its power. The missionary nature of religion and its extension by the force of the state to other religious geopolitical entities, treated as essentially foreign and hostile, simultaneously strengthened the territorial power of despots. However, for our religious and geopolitical identity, the image of a symphony of marriages between Christianity and the declining empire in Rome and later in Byzantium, or the Kingdom of God on earth seems to be much closer, where Christianity as a state religion, its institutional and territorial structures, the imperial idea, power, the state and its imaginary space and territory were intertwined in an inextricable relationship. In many aspects, it was similar in the European Middle Ages, for example, in the idea of the Respublica Christiana, a united Christian empire with a complex internal structure ruled by the Pope and the Emperor, which meant not only the institutional and territorial structures of the Church and of the various state or quasi-state entities, but also places connected by the cult of the saints. On the other hand, the sacred places understood in this way, e.g. in Poland, Gniezno, the capital of the Archbishopric of St. Adalbert, consolidated the idea of a sovereign state and its territorial power through the links between the structures of the Church and the state. This combination of secular and religious power can also be seen in exclusive religious policies, such as missions, forced conversions of pagans or crusades against infidels, where the missionary acquisition of souls, often by violence, and the political conquest and organization of conquered territories had a common religious, political and geopolitical context. It was also visible in the conquest of America by conquistadors, justified by the superiority of Christianity over barbarism11 . The integral relationship between religion and politics, constructing a specific external religious policy, was also manifested in the effects of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Europe and the religious wars connected with them, when the Reformation served the principalities of the Reich to geopolitically and ideologically break away from the Catholic Habsburg Empire in order to build their own religious identity, intra-confessional solidarity and state sovereignty (cuius regio, eius religio), as defined in 1648 in the form of the Westphalian system. There was also a feedback, since the establishment of the Lutheran states of Germany strengthened the influence and expansion of Martin Luther’s teachings, since it was a state religion, subordinated to secular power12 . This initiated an increasingly far-reaching autonomy of the state and

11 John Agnew: Deus vult. The Geopolitics of the Catholic Church, in: Geopolitics 15/1 (2010), p. 41. 12 Gertjan Dijkink: Shifting Territorial Orders and Religion, p. 41.

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its politics, including external ones, from the influence of religion, facilitating its integration with the national idea. However, according to Gearoid Ó Tuathail, cocreator of critical geopolitics, contrary to the opinions of many researchers, there was no severance of the key links in our study, but rather their intertwining and reconceptualisation. This link can be seen in the largely religious-driven colonial expansion of European powers, for example, by dressing imperialist targets in strongly resonating religious robes. Moreover, the pioneers of these conquests were sometimes clergy13 . Reaching beyond the Latin civilization, this theocratic structural relationship of religion and politics, the altar and throne, and the related religious policy in the form of the sacralization of space can be seen in Islam in the caliphate and later in the Turkish sultanate, whose goal was to unite the Prophet’s followers in one country, i.e., to expand Dar-al-Islam at the expense of the lands of the infidels of Dar-al-Harb, which meant a radical religious and geopolitical change. Religious policy became a means to this end, helping to achieve geopolitical goals. Even today political Islam is still reviving its aspirations to create a new caliphate as a way to a revolutionary religious and geopolitical reconstruction of the world, such as the ISIS concept. A similar example from another civilization circle is the messianic idea of “Rome III”, proclaiming the uniqueness of Moscow and its Patriarchate, which made Orthodox Christianity the basis of identity and, according to the principles of politicization of religion, an instrument of Rus / Russia geopolitics, focused first on collecting Ruthenian lands and then on imperial expansion. However, it was based on the subordination of the sacred Church and the autocratic power of the tsar. It was used in tsarist times to jointly defend Orthodoxy and Russianness. However, also established after the collapse of the USSR, Russia after 1991 included Orthodoxy as one of the ideological foundations of imperial myths, and as a result it recognizes its followers in the former post-Soviet republics under the Moscow Patriarchate as a circle of its own cultural and geopolitical influence, in the Church nomenclature called with a clear geopolitical message, its canonical territory. Hence the Kremlins support for the Church, e.g. as an element of weakening Ukraine internally after the conflict in 2014. On the other hand, Russia’s religious policy is aimed at practically discriminating against Western Christianity, i.e. “insidious Latin people”, mainly Catholicism, treated as an outpost of civilizational and geopolitical influences of the West hostile to the Kremlin, which through proselytism aimed at weakening its national and Orthodox identity.

13 Gearoid Ó Tuathail: Spiritual Geopolitics. Fr. Edmund Walsh and Jesuit Anti-Communism, in: Klaus Dodds/David Atkinson (eds.): Geopolitical Traditions. A Century of Geopolitical Thought, London/ New York 2003, pp. 187–188.

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Since modern times, the distance between the sacred and the profane in Western Europe has been deepening in the form of questioning the direct influence of religion on politics, treated as dysfunctional and conflictogenic in the internal and external dimensions, which was the aftermath of religious wars. In geopolitics, it was expressed through the increasing distance between the divine kingdom and the earthly world dominated by states, their goals and spatial interests, and later also by nations and nationalism, which, moreover, eagerly and successfully also reached to religious narratives and myths, but the scale of this the impact varied. In this way, the ethnization of religion also took place, e.g. in the form of the autocephalization of the Orthodox Churches. By way of exemplification: we have a geopolitically significant reference to the sacralization of nations, especially those at risk, who consider themselves harmed or discriminated against by stronger nations or states. In the related religious policy, we usually refer to mythology, which gives a given national group a number of religious meanings in order to obtain the sanctification of immortality. It is accompanied by ideologies that sanctify not only the nation and its special history, but also the places and spaces it imagines and the territory it occupies14 . Laicization on the Western model as an ideology and religious policy based on it was also to be a kind of geopolitical “export commodity” against other religions and civilizations, which confirmed the superiority of the Western model of modernization, framing the cultural and geopolitical hegemony. The problem is that attempts to apply it, even in countries of the Third World, today often referred to as the conventional South, made by native elites, sometimes under external pressure, as a symbol of the road to modernity on the Western model, or even a much more hostile communist model to religion, in countries from other circles of civilization, especially Islam, with a strong influence of religion on identity and a sense of place and space, often ended in political and geopolitical upheaval, an increase in religious fundamentalism or the return of modern theocracies. The Renaissance and the strength of religion often turned out to be directly proportional to the weakening of the credibility of the state, which was undergoing a process of hasty modernization15 . Suffice it to mention the actions and failures of secular regimes in some Arab states or the modernization policy of Emperor Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran, which ended with the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

14 Gertjan Dijkink: When Geopolitics and Religion Fuse. A Historical Perspective, in: Geopolitics 11/2 (2006), p. 194. 15 Manlio Graziano, What is the Geopolitics of Religions?, https://www.resetdoc.org/story/what-is-thegeopolitics-of-religions/, [last accessed 30.07.2020].

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Geopolitical Reflections on Contemporary Religious Policy The changes in the geopolitical importance of religious policy are influenced by the growing role of religion and the declining power of the state in recent decades due to globalization, which is well explained by the following two assessments: “One of the defining features of the post-Cold War era has been the resurgence of religious politics. By this we mean the increased politicization of individuals and groups that are defined by their faith tradition”16 . The second concerns the phenomenon of secularization which is important for the West in the geopolitical dimension, too: “religious politics also gained focus because it appears to challenge secularism as an ideology, and this has led to an examination of the post-Enlightenment notion that religion is something private and separate from the public secular realm”17 . Even Western secular states have begun to reach out to religious or quasi-religious narratives more willingly, still appreciating the considerable influence of religion on the creation and mobilization of collective identities, but also better understanding its meaning in other civilizations, especially in the religious soft power dimension. For their message to other countries and religions is that a religious policy based on religious freedom and tolerance can mitigate religious conflicts and disputes, strengthens the stability of the state, reduces radicalism and extremism, because it equalizes the opportunities for different groups, churches and religious organizations to influence the state policy. As a consequence, in the conditions of Western pluralistic societies, based on inclusive religious policy, it is worthwhile, as part of the interaction between religious policy and geopolitics, to examine how institutional forms of religion or religious movements are becoming increasingly influential pressure groups also in the geopolitical dimension, competing with other political or social circles and non-governmental organizations. It shows the geopolitical function of religion well, the soft influence of its organizational forms, beliefs and doctrines on the spatial images of state elites and their realization. For the geopolitical example, a strong evangelical movement in the U.S. can be cited, influencing Washington’s policy towards Israel, and thus towards its fundamentally hostile Islamic and Arab environment. Another noteworthy example is the growing influence of fundamentalist Jewish movements and organizations and related religious parties, including those preaching religious nationalism and talking about the area of the biblical Jewish state, on the external policy of formally secular Israel. This includes the country’s special relationship to the location of Jewish communities scattered throughout 16 Scott W. Hibbard: Religious Politics and the Rise of Illiberal Religion, in: Luke M. Herrington/Alasdair McKay/Jeffrey Haynes (eds.): Nations under God, p. 104. 17 Mona Kanwal Sheikh: Sociotheology. Significance of Religious Worldviews, in: Luke M. Herrington/ Alasdair McKay/Jeffrey Haynes (eds.): Nations under God, p. 136.

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the world and their organizations, which influences Israel’s foreign and religious policy18 . However, this is not the case in other civilizations (e.g. Africa, the Middle East or the Indian subcontinent), where religion plays a much greater role in producing social categories of thinking, concepts and institutions, where religious tradition is the foundation of national and cultural unity and spatial identity, a refuge from an increasingly unstable world. There, the basis of geopolitics and related religious policy are states rather than wider religious entities such as the Islamic umma. Therefore, an observation regarding contemporary relations between religious policy and geopolitics seems to be quite accurate: “the construction of religion by states to fulfil ‘special’ state interests remains the dominant characteristic of foreign policy. Thus, what looks like a new policy engagement with religious actors and interests is actually the containment of religion via traditional state agendas.“19 The clustering of religion and politics within the politicization of religion results in support for many autocratic regimes and, consequently, in the proliferation outside of exclusive religious politics in the geopolitical dimension, where religion in its various components and its institutional forms has been and is used by states (e.g., the cradle and sacred places of Islam in the case of Saudi Arabia), and the religious bond connects with the state and territorial bond, contributing to building a geopolitically crucial division into allies and enemies. For example, by mobilizing and supporting intra-confessional solidarity and geopolitically using the spatial network of states, religious movements or organizations of the same religious profile, treated as potential allies because of this closeness, as shown by the policy of Shiite Iran after 1979. Then, it is often the case that confreres are actively or indirectly supported in the faith, especially in situations of threat or repression, while other religions, confessions, religious movements or dominated states are identically identified and imagined in a hostile or less competitive manner, even if they do not take such actions. The rejection of secularization on the Western model often influences the external policy of many countries, giving it an anti-Western ideological and political orientation, also framing the search for religious allies and the identification of enemies to defend their own identity and place, threatened by the processes of modernization and globalization, supported by the Western cultural and geopolitical hegemony. Hence, in religious policy, e.g., there is discrimination or combating Western Christianity, treated as a tool of cultural and geopolitical influences of the West. This is accompanied by a deep sense of injustice that transcends territorial 18 R. Scott Appleby: Fundamentalist and Nationalist Religious Movement, in: John Agnew/Katharyne Mitchell/Gerard Toal (eds.): A Companion of Political Geography, Malden 2006, p. 378–380. 19 John A. Rees: The Four Religions of Foreign Policy, in: Luke M. Herrington/Alasdair McKay/Jeffrey Haynes (eds.): Nations under God, p. 47.

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divisions, often, for example, in the Middle East or Africa, artificially and forcefully introduced by the Western powers, which is best expressed by unifying religious symbolism. As part of the broader processes of state erosion more recently the subject of research into the interaction between religious policy and geopolitics has been a mosaic of different religious movements and organizations, especially for several decades of the conservative or fundamentalist ones, mainly anti-Western and antiChristian, religiously signed, e.g., the USA or the West as “The Great Satan”. They are generally devoid of the attribute of territoriality, but sanctify geopolitical goals, pursue their own geopolitical and religious policies, and are often instrumental in the religious policy of states, especially those that are religiously close or confessional, which sometimes use them for their own purposes, such as Hezbollah, within the framework of a network of true or false intra-confessional solidarity generated by religious policy. This can be seen in the civil wars within Islam in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, or in the decades-long, civilizational conflict between India and Pakistan. Despite the great geopolitical and not merely religious goals (e.g., Al-Qaeda, ISIS) sometimes declared by these movements or organizations, which undermine the current political and territorial order, it is difficult for them to replace states. Moreover, they generally do not have sufficient tools for a dream-like geopolitical change of the world on this scale, such as the birth of Christianity or Islam. Most often researchers signal the correlation of external/internal religious policy with the soft power category, which has clear geopolitical connotations. In the West, they speak of using various religious associations to promote human rights and religious freedom, especially where they are lacking. The second geopolitical aspect is the use of the influence of many religious associations and religiously colored NGOs to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian and development aid, especially where there is an intra-confessional bond with religious associations in the countries that are beneficiaries of this aid. Thirdly, it is also worth noting the involvement of individual religious entities in the external religious policy of Western countries, especially within the framework of their external intra-confessional solidarity, through the formation of coalitions and alliances and the fight against competing religious entities, which the state also considers a threat. Such references to religious organizations and movements in the geopolitical dimension as support for the external policies of individual countries can also be seen in Europe in religious policy, for example in the dialogue conducted by governments in France, Great Britain, the Netherlands or Belgium with Muslim religious organizations in order to isolate extremists and radicals, which makes it easier to combat them and makes it difficult to recruit people willing to join terrorist organizations. A similar dialogue has been important in the context of the problems of the multi-culti and the recent migration crisis.

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In other cultural circles, however, within the framework of the politicization of religions, it is worth recalling the examples of Turkish “mosque diplomacy”, which has been going on for a decade, aimed at strengthening Turkey’s position within Islam as a reflex of internal and external re-Islamization, referring to the Ottoman heritage and, at the same time, treating Christianity increasingly often in religious politics as a threat from the West20 . Worth mentioning are the competing strategies of religious policy of radically Sunni, Wahhabi Saudi Arabia and the Shiite dominated Iran. The religious policy of Saudi Arabia, where the two most important places for Islam are located and which is considered to be the promoter of Suniism worldwide, is based on the network of intra-confessional solidarity by supporting billions of dollars of similar organizations and foundations around the world. Saudi Arabia’s main competitor is Iran, whose division among the followers of Islam is of great importance in foreign policy and therefore helps Shiite minorities and majorities and their organizations in the region and in the world – to strengthen their position in the region but also in the world of Islam and thus towards the West21 . It is also appropriate to mention the religious diplomacy of multifaith but civilizational Hindu India aimed at supporting religious associations of Hinduism and Buddhism, e.g. in relation to Nepal or Tibet, which are geopolitically important for Delhi – using the fact that seven of the eight most important places of Buddhism are in India –, which is a result of the growing importance of religion in Indian politics, associated with the growth of Hindu nationalism. This is also accompanied by a sharp anti-Islamic course in domestic politics: actual discrimination of the Muslim minority in religious and external politics – conflicts with Pakistan22 .

Conclusions This text indicates that the issue of studying the relationship between religious policy and geopolitics is in statu nascendi. Most researchers, especially in the highly secularized West, looking for proportions between the most important geopolitical factors of the modern world, do not consider religion to be an important geopolitical phenomenon, such as economics, as it can be seen in publications. The complexity of religious and geopolitical phenomena also discourages potential amateurs of this research, which also refers to their correlation with religious policy. However, it seems that especially in non-Western cultures, where the influence of religion on 20 Ryszard Michalak: The Significance of the Religious Factor in the Internal and External Policies of Turkey, in: Przegląd Narodowościowy – Review of Nationalities 9 (2019), p. 167–176. 21 Edward Wastnidge: Religion and geopolitics in Iranian foreign policy, https://fpc.org.uk/religion-andgeopolitics-in-iranian-foreign-policy/, [last accessed 30.07.2020]. 22 Robert Kaplan: The Revenge of Geography, New York 2012, p. 240–245.

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identity and worldview is still strong, without an analysis of a particular religion or confession and religious policy, it will be difficult to explain the actions of many geopolitical actors and the resulting balance of power. However, it is first necessary to study geopolitics and then religions. Against this background, it is worthwhile to reach for the research fields mentioned above, where the analysis of internal and external religious policies can facilitate the understanding of spatial imaginings and their implementation in the external policies of individual countries from different civilizational and cultural circles, e.g. within the framework of soft power.

Bibliography Agnew, John: Deus vult. The Geopolitics of the Catholic Church, in: Geopolitics 15/1 (2010), pp. 39–61. Appleby, Scott R: Fundamentalist and Nationalist Religious Movement, in: John Agnew/ Katharyne Mitchell/Gerard Toal (eds.): A Companion of Political Geography, Malden 2006, pp. 378–392. Dijkink, Gertjan: When Geopolitics and Religion Fuse. A Historical Perspective, in: Geopolitics 11/2 (2006), pp. 192–208. Dijkink, Gertjan: Shifting Territorial Orders and Religion, in: Luke M. Herrington/Alasdair McKay/Jeffrey Haynes (eds.): Nations under God. The Geopolitics of Faith in the TwentyFirst Century, Bristol 2015, pp. 39–44. Graziano, Manlio: What is the Geopolitics of Religions?, https://www.resetdoc.org/story/ what-is-the-geopolitics-of-religions/, [last accessed 30.07.2020]. Herrington, Luke M./McKay, Alasdair: Introduction, in: Luke M. Herrington/Alasdair McKay/Jeffrey Haynes (eds.): Nations under God. The Geopolitics of Faith in the Twenty-First Century, Bristol 2015, pp. 1–21. Hibbard, Scott W.: Religious Politics and the Rise of Illiberal Religion, in: Luke M. Herrington/ Alasdair McKay/Jeffrey Haynes (eds.): Nations under God. The Geopolitics of Faith in the Twenty-First Century, Bristol 2015, pp. 103–111. Kanwal Sheikh, Mona: Sociotheology. Significance of Religious Worldviews, in: Luke M. Herrington/Alasdair McKay/Jeffrey Haynes (eds.): Nations under God. The Geopolitics of Faith in the Twenty-First Century, Bristol 2015, pp. 134–143. Kaplan, Robert: The Revenge of Geography, New York 2012. Macała, Jarosław: Geopolityka religii jako szczególny sposób badania relacji między przestrzenią a polityką, in: Ryszard Michalak (ed.): Implementacja zasad religijnych w sferze politycznej, Zielona Góra 2016, pp. 187–198. Michalak, Ryszard: Polityka wyznaniowa. Zakres zjawiska, in: Annales UMCS, Sectio K. Politologia 26/1 (2019), p. 23–35. Michalak, Ryszard: The Significance of the Religious Factor in the Internal and External Policies of Turkey, in: Przegląd Narodowościowy – Review of Nationalities 9 (2019), pp. 167–176.

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Nye, Joseph: Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics, New York 2004. Ó Tuathail, Gearoid: Critical Geopolitics. The Politics of Writing Global Space, London 1996. Ó Tuathail, Gearoid: Spiritual Geopolitics. Fr. Edmund Walsh and Jesuit anti-communism, in: Klaus Dodds/David Atkinson (eds.): Geopolitical Traditions. A century of geopolitical thought, London-New York 2003, pp. 187–210. Potz, Maciej: Teokracje amerykańskie. Źródła i mechanizmy władzy usankcjonowanej religijnie, Łódź 2016. Rees, John A.: The Four Religions of Foreign Policy, in: Luke M. Herrington/Alasdair McKay/ Jeffrey Haynes (eds.): Nations under God. The Geopolitics of Faith in the Twenty-First Century, Bristol 2015, p. 45–55. Sturm, Tristan: The Future of Religious Geopolitics. Towards a Research and Theory Agenda, in: Area 45/2 (2013), p. 134–169. Wastnidge, Edward: Religion and geopolitics in Iranian foreign policy, https://fpc.org.uk/ religion-and-geopolitics-in-iranian-foreign-policy/, [last accessed 30.07.2020].

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Stefan Dudra

Orthodoxy in Estonia as Part of the Internal Religious Policy of the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates

Introduction The issue of different ecclesiastical jurisdictions is characteristic of Orthodox diasporas. It is visible in many European countries, especially in Western Europe, which is identified with Catholic and Protestant tradition, and recently also with Islam. Orthodoxy is wrongly associated only with the East (and more often with Judaism than with Christianity). Nevertheless, it has been an integral part of European identity for centuries. It has made a significant contribution to the development of European culture, science and spirituality1 . In the twentieth century, as a result of migration from Greece and the Middle East (economic background) and the escape of Orthodox Russians after the Bolshevik Revolution (political factor), its traditional boundaries changed. Millions of Orthodox Christians ceased to be “Eastern” Christians, living permanently in Western European countries and forming diaspora communities there2 . The emerging religious communities (due to their size) were organized according to the ethnic key and according to the tradition of a given country (they had their own hierarchy and clergy and used the liturgical language of their own country)3 . Kallistos Ware emphasizes that in the initial period, the initiative came not from above, but from below, rather from the laity than the hierarchy. The emigrants joined together in larger groups, bringing a clergyman from their old country and thus creating new parishes. Bishops usually started to participate in this

1 See: Bishop Hilarion (Alfayev): Orthodoxy in a New Europe. Problems and Perspectives, http://www. georgefox.edu/ree/2004/hilarion.pdf, [last accessed 28.12.2014]; about Orthodoxy, its essence see: Steven Runciman: Teokracja bizantyjska, Warszawa 1982; John Meyendorff: Teologia bizantyńska. Historia i doktryna, Kraków 2007; Kallistos Ware: Kościół prawosławny, Białystok 2011. 2 Aristeides Papadakis: Zarys dziejów Kościoła prawosławnego, in: Krzysztof Leśniewski (eds.): Prawosławie. Światło ze wschodu, Lublin 2009, p. 659. As a result of emigration processes, Orthodox Christians also settled in Southern Europe, Scandinavia, USA, South America and Australia, see: Georges Lemopoulos: Orthodox Diaspora in Europe: An Attempt to Describe a Range of Old and New Issues, http://www.deltapublicaciones.com/derechoyreligion/gestor/archivos/.pdf, [last accessed 19.05.2015]. 3 Paul Bos: Prawosławie w Europie Zachodniej, in: Arche. Wiadomości Bractwa 3/4 (1998), p. 69.

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process much later. For the first generation of emigrants, the local parish church was their main link to their homeland – a place where they could hear their mother tongue, it was a refuge and a guardian of their national customs. In this way, for perfectly understandable reasons, the Orthodox Church in the West had a distinctly ethnic character from the very beginning4 .

Orthodox communities formed in the diaspora usually remained within the jurisdiction of their home churches. In the initial period, the latter did not pursue any religious policy towards the emerging communities. They were limited to maintaining them within their own jurisdiction. This resulted in the formation, on the same territory, or even in the same city (e.g. Paris, London), of several Orthodox communities with a separate hierarchy under the jurisdiction of their parent Churches5 . An additional element strengthening the diversity of ecclesiastical jurisdictions was the rivalry between the individual Churches (e.g., between the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the latter promoted the concept of subjugation of all ecclesiastical structures in the diaspora and beyond the borders of the Orthodox autocephalous Churches. It was formulated in a letter from Patriarch Focjusz to Serbian Patriarch Barnabas of 30 May 1931: “All Orthodox ecclesial communities and colonies in the Diaspora and beyond the borders of the Orthodox Autocephalous Churches, regardless of nationality, should be subordinate to our Most Holy Patriarch’s Cathedral in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.”6 This was probably due to concern for the fate of the Orthodox faithful, but it was also a sign of competition for influence in the Orthodox world. The Patriarchate of Constantinople took advantage of the difficult situation in which the Russian Orthodox Church found itself, which it considered to be an interference in its internal affairs and therefore illegitimate. The position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate giving it the right of exclusive competence to diaspora communities became a source of conflicts within the Orthodox Church7 . It also

4 Kallistos Ware: Kościół prawosławny, p. 193. 5 Tadeusz Kałużny: Nowy Sobór Ogólnoprawosławny. Natura, historia przygotowań, tematyka, Kraków 2008, pp. 352–354; Charles Wegener Sanderson: Autocephaly as a function of institutional stability and organizational change in the Eastern Orthodox Church, http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/ 2340/1/umi-umd-2195.pdf, [last accessed 28.12.2014]. 6 Aleksy Znosko: Prawosławne prawo kościelne, part 1, Warszawa 1973, p. 169. 7 The Ecumenical Patriarchate invokes the 28th canon of the Fourth General Council of Chalcedon (451), which refers to the special privileges of Constantinople as the capital of the New Romans with respect to “barbaric“ countries, that is, those outside the territory of the Byzantine-Roman Empire. This privilege meant, among other things, the right to the chirotonia of the bishops of these countries, that is, to the jurisdictional sovereignty. This interpretation is rejected by Slavic canonists, see: Demetrios J. Constantelos, The Orthodox Diaspora. Canonical and Ecclesiological Perspective, in: The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 2/3 (1979), pp. 199–211; Serge Keleher: Orthodox Rivalry

Orthodoxy in Estonia as Part of the Internal Religious Policy

led to the creation of various religious policies within the Orthodox Church. At the same time, for ecclesiastical, political and prestigious reasons, none of the national Orthodox Churches wanted to renounce their influence on their own diaspora8 . Diasporas have become one of the elements of the religious policy of the Orthodox Churches. The latter, as the main entities, often in agreement with the political authorities, began the process of cooperation and then consolidation of diaspora communities (for both canonical and organizational reasons). In the latter case, it is possible to find crystallization and the creation of a common diaspora policy. This is a wide range of activities, the final element of which would be the formation of autocephalous Orthodox churches (the principle of one Church in the state). The aim of the common diaspora policy is to bring together and coordinate the Churches of different jurisdictions. This process was already visible since the second half of the 1960s. In 1967 the Committee of Orthodox Bishops in France was established. It was to announce the creation of a single canonical structure. Since 1997 it has operated under the name of the Congregation of Orthodox Bishops in France. Its creation is to be the next step in establishing a local church in France. Other examples of the process of unification of different jurisdictions were the All-Orthodox Commission in Belgium (1985), the Commission of Orthodox Churches in Germany (1994), the Orthodox Committee in Great Britain (1994), the Working Group of Orthodox Churches in Switzerland (2006)9 and the Conference of Orthodox Bishops of Austria and the Benelux Orthodox Congregation of Bishops established in 2010. Their main task was to establish and optimize cooperation between the Churches. They do not limit the jurisdictions of the individual bishops, but only perform advisory and representative functions. They are supposed to demonstrate the unity of Orthodoxy on a local level, coordinate the joint activities of the diocese, and represent the Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the state authorities. The aim is also to take a common position on important social issues and to prevent conflicts between the hierarchy and the clergy10 . They are an exemplary realization of the universalistic diaspora policy of the Orthodox Churches and a promise to

in the Twentieth Century. Moscow versus Constantinople, in: Religion, State & Society 2 (1997), pp. 125–137. 8 Tadeusz Kałużny, Nowy Sobór Ogólnoprawosławny, pp. 352–354; bp Jerzy (Pańkowski): Aktualny stan przygotowań do panprawosławnego soboru, in: Polski Żołnierz Prawosławny 2 (2013), p. 3. 9 Stefan Dudra/Renata Król-Mazur/Dorota Maj: Polityka wyznaniowa. Wschodnia i ekumeniczna perspektywa eklezjalna, Zielona Góra 2018, p. 87–88. 10 The process of cooperation between the Orthodox Churches of different jurisdictions was also visible outside Europe. Among others, bishops from the United States and Canada cooperate within the Standing Conference of Orthodox Bishops in America. In 2010, the Conference established the Congregation of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of North and Central America, see: Truth I Find in Orthodoxy (interview with Archbishop Washington, Metropolitan of All America and Canada Tikhon), in: Przegląd Prawosławny 9 (2018), p. 6.

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create a parallel religious policy. The above mentioned phenomenon gives rise to a possible process of establishing autocephalous Churches. The issue of the Orthodox Diaspora was dealt with by the Pan-Orthodox Council (Crete 18–26 June 2016). During the Council, a temporary compromise solution was adopted (the representatives of the patriarchates: Antioch, Russian, Georgian and Bulgarian did not participate in the Council)11 in the form of creating Episcopal Assemblies. They are to be composed of all bishops recognized as canonical in the area12 . These congregations are not to deprive the bishops of their administrative and canonical powers, nor to restrict their rights in the diaspora13 . Their task is, among other things, to show the unity of the Orthodox Church, to represent all Orthodox Christians in the region, to develop theological and Orthodox education. They are to operate until the establishment of autocephalous Churches. The establishment of Episcopal Congregations is to initiate the process of restoring the unity of Orthodoxy in diasporas. It will also emphasize the credibility and responsibility of the Orthodox Church for the crowds of believers who, as a result of migration, have found themselves outside the jurisdictional boundaries of their own autocephalous Churches. It is also a step towards canonical solutions and, at the same time, a response to the changes taking place in the Orthodox structures both in Western Europe and in the areas where Orthodox diasporas were formed as a result of historical events. It is also the beginning of formation of common religious policies of the Orthodox Churches. Today, the main problem is the rivalry between the patriarchates of Moscow and Constantinople for leadership in the Orthodox world. The governments of individual countries are also drawn into these conflicts. Aspects of this are visible in Estonia and Ukraine, among others. In the latter case, after the establishment of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, there was a sharp religious conflict14 . These factors

11 See: Stefan Dudra: Polski Autokefaliczny Kościół Prawosławny w obszarze polityki wyznaniowej oraz polityki narodowościowej Polski Ludowej i III Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 2019, pp. 673–674. 12 All decisions of the “Bishops’ Assemblies were to be made on the basis of consensus. The principle of temporary avoidance of local churches demanding the status of autocephaly for diaspora communities was also adopted. The “Orthodox Diaspora document was adopted at a meeting in Chambégsy in June 2009, see: Andrzej Kuźma: IV Konferencja Przygotowawcza do Soboru Ogólnoprawosławnego, in: Wiadomości Polskiego Autokefalicznego Kościoła Prawosławnego 7/8 (2009), pp. 4–5. 13 The Bishop’s Assemblies are to be presided over by the first of the hierarchs belonging to the Church of Constantinople, or in the absence of such a hierarchy, according to the order of the diptychs, see: Prawosławna diaspora. Dokumenty przyjęte przez Święty i Wielki Sobór Cerkwi Prawosławnej, Kreta, 18-26.06.2016 r., in: Cerkiewny Wiestnik 4 (2016), pp. 44–45. 14 See: Stefan Dudra: Autocephalization of the Church in Ukraine an element of competition between the patriarchates of Constantinople and Moskow for the leadership in the orthodox world, in: Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne 3/63 (2019), pp. 137–155.

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lead to divisions among local Orthodox communities. They also do not encourage the implementation of a common religious policy.

Political and Historical Aspects of the Divisions of Orthodoxy in Estonia As a result of historical conditions, Orthodox diasporas were also formed in the countries that were part of the Soviet Union, and as a result of its collapse they regained their independence. This phenomenon is exemplified by Estonia, where Orthodox communities carry out pastoral activities in two separate structures: the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church of the Constantinople Patriarchate. Their separation, having historical traditions, led to an international religious crisis in the 1990s. At its root was also the problem of nationality: fear of influence and domination of the Russian community15 . The Estonian religious division reflects the lack of a common religious policy of the Orthodox Churches. Orthodoxy appeared in the territory of present-day Estonia in the Xth –XIIth century together with the missionaries from Novgorod and Pskov. Already in 1030, a group of believers was mentioned in the Tarbat fortress occupied by the Russian army of Kiev prince Jaroslaw. The churches were also erected in trade towns for the needs of merchants (probably already in the 11th century a temple in Tartu was built by Russian merchants). At the beginning of the 13th century, the Orthodox monks began their missionary activity in the southern Estonian lands. In the manuscripts of Rewal (later Tallinn) in 1371, St. Nicholas Church and the Orthodox cemetery were mentioned16 . The further development of the Orthodox Church was halted in favor of Catholicism with the expansion of the Order of Knights of the Sword. The population was forced to adopt a new religion, initially Catholicism, then Lutheranism in the 16th century17 . After the Swedish occupation of the area, Orthodoxy was limited to a small Russian minority. They had their temples in Rewal and Dorpat. In the latter village there were two churches: one was owned by merchants from Novgorod and the other from Pskov. The Orthodox community also lived in Narva. In 1648 the

15 In 1991, out of 89 Orthodox churches in Estonia, 39 used the Estonian language, 38 used Russian, and 12 used both languages, see: Ałła Matreńczyk: Z życia Cerkwi na świecie, in: Tygodnik Podlaski 2 (1991), p. 17. 16 Jaanus Plaat: Orthodoxy and Orthodox Sacral Buildings in Estonia from the 11th to the 19th Centuries, http://www.erm.ee/pdf/pro19/plaat.pdf, [last accessed 10.07.2018]. 17 See more: Jan Lewandowski: Historia Estonii, Ossolineum 2002, pp. 26–29; Tarmo Toom: Orthodox Church in Estonia, in: John A. McGuckin (eds.): The Encyclopedia of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Vol 1, Oxford 2011, pp. 226–228.

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Orthodox were expelled from Dorpat and some clergy were murdered. In 1710 there was only one church on the territory of modern Estonia – St. Nicholas Church in Tallinn. The re-development of Orthodoxy was connected with the settlement of the Old Believers persecuted in Russia (17th –18th centuries). Orthodox refugees, among others from the Novgorod region, settled on the western and northern shores of Lake Pejpus. A large group were also Russian peasants coming to southern Estonia18 . The situation changed after the Northern War and the accession of Estonia to Russia by the Treaty of Nystad (1721). The Russian authorities recognized the dominant role of the Lutheran faith, but Orthodoxy became a privileged religion. With the support of the Tsar, new temples were erected. Initially, they were to meet the needs of Russian troops stationed in Estonia, incoming officials and merchants. Lutheran churches were also taken over and turned into Orthodox churches (e.g. Narva, Tartu, Pärnu). The increase in the number of Orthodox Christians contributed to the establishment of the vicariate of the Pskov diocese in Riga in 1836. According to Piotr Paszkiewicz, the economic situation of the local population was favourable for the development of Orthodoxy. The Latvian and Estonian peasants felt that it was the Russian religion of the distant and good Tsar, as opposed to the German religion (Lutheranism) of the feudal lords who oppressed them19 . At the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church pursued the political goals of the Russian state as part of its religious policy. In the middle of the nineteenth century, about 47,000 Estonian peasants reported a desire to convert from Lutheranism to Orthodoxy, hoping for material benefits (additional land allocation, reduced tax burden). The movement of mass conversion of Estonian peasants to Orthodoxy began in the Estonian part of the Livonian province in 1845. They were convinced that when they adopted the “Russian” faith, they would receive the land, be released from serfdom and be showered with graces. The movement took on such a massive scale (despite the fact that official statements of the authorities informed that the change of religion did not give any privileges) that the Russian authorities themselves were concerned about it and introduced a six-month period of “reflection” for those wishing to adopt the state religion. Over three years, more than 60,000 Estonians converted to Orthodoxy. There were municipalities and districts where Orthodoxy received 70–80 % of the population20 . The increase in the number of believers influenced the erection of the diocese of Riga in 1850 (it included Estonian and Latvian lands). Already in 1851, a church 18 Jan Lewandowski: Historia Estonii, pp. 60, 89. 19 Piotr Paszkiewicz: W służbie imperium rosyjskiego 1721–1917. Funkcje i treści ideowe rosyjskiej architektury sakralnej na zachodnich rubieżach Cesarstwa i poza jego granicami, Warszawa 1999, p. 106. 20 Tarmo Toom: Orthodox Church in Estonia, pp. 226–228.

Orthodoxy in Estonia as Part of the Internal Religious Policy

seminary was opened, educating both clergy, church conductors and catechists. Translation of liturgical texts into Estonian was also started (at the end of the Tsarist times there were translations of most of the liturgical books). Spiritual literature was also published: catechisms and lives of saints. Since the mid-nineteenth century there was also a development of Orthodox education, parish schools and teacher colleges were established. An important role was played by the Russian Christian Student Movement, whose activists introduced new educational forms in their work with children and youth21 . The construction of new temples began, among others: St. John the Baptist in Lohus (1863), St. Nicholas in Mustvee (1864), St. George in Tartu (1870) and the Holy Trinity in Narew (1875). In 1875, the parish of Riga had 158 Orthodox churches, including 92 brick ones and 11 chapels. In 1876 another 13 churches were built. In 1884 the Cathedral of the Nativity of Christ was built in Riga. An important event that revived religious life was the erection of the female Pühtitsa monastery in 1891, which became an important pilgrimage center. The following years brought the construction of new churches: Epiphany in Jõhvi (1895), Resurrection Cathedral in Narva (1896), Epiphany Church in Lohusuu (1898) and St. Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Tallinn (1900). At the end of the nineteenth century, about 20 % of Estonians professed the Orthodox Church22 . Numerous priestly vocations from among the local population made the majority of the Orthodox clergy in the early 20th century Estonians. From the end of 1917 onwards, the further development of the Orthodox Church was connected with the activities of Lord Plato (Kulbusch), the first ever Orthodox bishop of Estonian nationality. He was appointed as a temporary governor of the Diocese of Riga and took steps to expand the parish network in the Latvian and Estonian lands23 .

Between Moscow and Constantinople: Two Visions of Religious Policy The situation of Orthodoxy changed after the declaration of independence in Estonia. The church lost a significant part of its landed estates and properties granted by the tsarist authorities. Among others, the Pühtitsa Monastery of the Dormition of the Mother of God lost its hospital and school buildings and part of the land. The

21 Irina Paert/Toomas Schvak: Orthodox Education in the Baltic provinces of Imperial Russia and independent Estonia from 1840s till 1941, https://journals.urfu.ru/index.php/QR/article/view/066/ 1043, [last accessed 09.05.2018]. 22 Piotr Paszkiewicz: W służbie imperium rosyjskiego 1721–1917, p. 108. 23 In January 1919, during the Estonian-Bolshevik war, after Tartu was taken over by the Bolsheviks, the hierarchy was arrested. He was placed in a temporary prison. When the Estonian army entered Tartu, the security forces (Bolsheviks) began to shoot prisoners. Bishop Plato was the first to be stabbed and shot at the same time. The Ecumenical Patriarchate canonized bishop Plato in 2000.

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parishes were also confiscated. On June 15, 1920, the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church granted the Church of Estonia autonomy in economic, administrative and educational matters, as well as the right to use the new (Gregorian) style24 . Taking advantage of the further weakening of the Moscow Patriarchate on February 11, 1921, a broad autonomy was obtained from Patriarch Tikhon. Metropolitan Aleksander (Paulus) became the first superior25 . After gaining independence, the new state authorities aimed to break off relations with the Moscow Patriarchate and obtain an autocephaly. As a result of the government’s pressure, in 1922 the Synod of the Estonian Church came to an agreement with the Patriarch of Constantinople, passing into his jurisdiction on the basis of autonomy. This finally happened on 6 July 1923 by virtue of the tomos of Patriarch Meletius IV26 . This act did not receive the approval of the Russian Church and part of the clergy and the faithful; among others, Bishop Jan (Bulin)27 expressed his opposition. Receiving the tomos from Constantinople was part of the correlated religious policy of state and church authorities. This led to the independence of the Orthodox structures in Estonia from the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Church was headed by the Metropolitan of Tallinn and all Estonia, Aleksander (Paulus). The administrative structure was formed by two dioceses: Tallinn and Narew. The latter was administered by Archbishop Euzebiusz (1924–1929)28

24 See more: Sebastian Rimestad: The Challenges of Modernity to the Orthodox Church in Estonia and Latvia (1917–1940), Frankfurt am Main 2012. 25 Bishop Alexander (Paulus) [1872–1953], ordained a priest in 1901, received a bishop’s chirotonia on 5 December 1920. From 1937, under the new Constitution of Estonia, Metropolitan Alexander, as the Head of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church, became a member of the State Council. In 1944, he was deported to Germany. From 1947 he stayed in Stockholm and created parishes outside the borders of the USSR for Orthodox Estonians in exile (17 in total), http://www.pravenc.ru/text/ Александр, (Паулус) [last accessed 03.08.2016]. 26 Jan Lewandowski: Historia Estonii, p. 185. 27 Bishop John (Bulin) [1893–1941], graduated from the Riga Seminary (1914), was ordained a priest in 1919, and received the rank of archimandrite in 1921, he served as superior of the Pskovsk-Pechersk monastery, ordained bishop in 1926, refused to submit to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, was deprived of the bishop’s cathedral and dismissed from the function of monaster’s superior (1932) and excluded from the clergy of the Estonian Church. He was in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Upon his return to Estonia, he was arrested by the NKVD in 1940 and murdered in 1941, Епископ Иоанн, http://zarubezhje.narod.ru/gi/i_068.htm, [last accessed 08.02.2014]. 28 Archbishop Eusebius (Grozdow) [1866–1929], graduated from the St. Petersburg Theological Academy (1890), in 1903 he received the rank of archimandrite, rector of the Yaroslavl Seminary (1903–1906), bishop’s chirotonia in 1906, bishop of Uglic (1906–1910), Bishop of Tübingen and Siberias (1910–1912), Pskovsky and porochowsky (1912–1918). In 1918 he received the dignity of archbishop, after the Bolshevik Revolution he emigrated to Estonia, he administered the Narew diocese (1924–1929), Епископ Евсевий (Гроздов), http://www.ortho-rus.ru/cgi-bin/ps_file.cgi?2_ 3928, [last accessed 09.02.2014].

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and Archbishop Paul (1937–1945)29 . Between 1929 and 1937, the diocese did not have a bishop. Church affairs were managed by the Church Administration, consisting of bishops, four clergy and three laymen. More important decisions were made by the General Assembly. The General Assembly consisted of clergy and lay representatives of the parish. The activity of the Metropolitan Aleksander contributed to obtaining legal personality by Orthodox parishes in 1934. The church also received a compensation for the church lands nationalized in the 1920s. In 1935, the Council of Bishops adopted new internal regulations of the Church (it was then renamed the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church). New churches were also erected: St. Nicholas in Tallinn (1936), the Transfiguration of the Lord in KohtlaJärve (1938), and the Protection of Our Lady in Kiviõli (1940). During this period, 156 parishes functioned within its structure. There were 131 priests, 19 deacons, and 2 monasteries (the second was in Petseri). The number of believers was estimated at 210,000 (17.5 % of the total population). The majority of its members were native Estonians30 . After the annexation of Estonia to the USSR, the existing Orthodox Church structures with diocesan rights were incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church on 23 September 1940 (the decision to return the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church to the Russian Orthodox Church was announced on 31 May 1941). Metropolitan Aleksander, after having previously submitted a penitential act for joining the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, kept the administration of the Diocese of Tallinn. The Faculty of Theology of the University of Tartu and the only seminary were closed31 . After the German occupation of the area, the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church headed by the Metropolitan Aleksander was organized again (excluding 29 Archbishop Paweł (Dmitrowski) [1872–1946], graduated from the Tauridian Seminary in Simferopol (1894), served in the dioceses of Taurida and Symphropolis and St. Petersburg and Ladoga, in 1919 emigrated to Estonia and served in the Council of the Transfiguration of the Lord in Narew, in 1937 accepted the bishop’s chirotonia and the nomination for bishop of Narew. After his incorporation into the Moscow Patriarchate, he retained the administration of the Narew Eparchia. After the reactivation of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church, he kept the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, in 1942 he received the rank of archbishop. In 1945, after the reintegration of all Orthodox structures in Estonia into the Moscow Patriarchate, he became Archbishop of Tallinn and Estonia, Епископ Павел (Дмитровский) http://www.ortho-rus.ru/cgi-bin/ps_file.cgi, [last accessed 09.02.2014]. 30 Data for 1940. About 20 % of the Estonian population were Orthodox Christians, the majority of whom were Estonians (12 % of the total population), Heikki Huttunen: The Resurrection of a Church, in: Grigorios D. Papathomas/Matthias H. Palli (eds.): The Autonomous Orthodox Church of Estonia. L’Église autonome orthodoxe d’Estonie. (Approche historique et nomocanonioque), Katérini 2002, pp. 399–416. 31 The Autonomous Churches of Estonia and Latvia became part of the established Exarchate of the Baltic States in 1941, headed by the Metropolitan of Vilnius and Lithuania Sergei (Woskriesenski).

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the Narew Eparchia, where the faithful were mostly Russians, who remained under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate). On 19 September 1941, this structure was officially recognized as the only Orthodox jurisdiction in occupied Estonia (it operated until 1944)32 . The clergy and believers of Russian nationality became the object of persecution by Metropolitan Aleksander. This was interrupted in mid-1943 by the intervention of the German authorities. At that time, the principle of the clergy’s free choice of jurisdiction was established (they could choose between the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Aleksander or Exarch Sergei). This led to the separation of the independent structures of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church. In September 1944, by order of the German authorities, the Orthodox bishops from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were evacuated to Germany33 . After the next occupation of Estonia by the Red Army, on 9 March 1945, the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church was liquidated and parishes and believers were reintegrated into the structures of the Moscow Patriarchate. The head of the Orthodox Church with the title of Archbishop of Tallinn and of Estonia was lord Pavel (Dmitrowski) [1945–1946]. Religious life was restricted, the Church was forbidden to undertake charitable activities and work with children and youth. Deportation of a part of the clergy, psalmists and people connected with the church life also began. In the second half of the fifties the churches in Kullamaa-Silla, Prangli-Maaritsa and Kastolatsi were closed. The buildings of the last two became the property of local kolkhozes34 . It is worth noting that the liquidation of the community in Kullamaa-Silla was caused by the decision of the church council and Bishop Roman (Tang)35 . The reason was a problem with paying taxes and insurance. Between 1959 and 1960 the chapels in Abruka (founded in 1887) and Reo-Tsolgo, the parishes of Mustvee Trinity and Suislepa and the monastery in Tallinn were

32 Some of the faithful, Metropolitan Alexander and 22 clergy, went into exile, where a foreign exarchate was established under the Patriarchate of Constantinople. After the death of Metropolitan Alexander in 1953, the Patriarchate of Constantinople consecrated the Estonian Orthodox Bishop Yuri Valbe (he held this function until 1961). After his death, Estonian parishes were transferred to the local bishops of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 33 Michaił W. Szkarowskij: Polityka Trietiego Riejcha po otnoszeniju k Russkoj Prawosławnoj Cerkwi w swietie archiwnych matieriałow 1935–1945 godow, Moskwa 2003, pp. 237–239. 34 Andrei Sychov: The Liquidation and the Attempts of Reopening of the Congregations of the Estonian Eparchy during the Governance of Nikita Hruschtschov in 1954–1964, http://www.orthodoxa.org/GB/ estonia/documentsEOC/closingGB.htm, [last accessed 10.09.2014]. 35 Bishop Roman (Tang) [1893–1963] was ordained a priest in 1931, from 1933 he was chaplain to the female Pühtitsa monastery, in 1950 ordained a bishop of Tallinn, from 1955 he was named Bishop of Lusk, in 1956 he took over the Ivanov Cathedral, then in 1958 the Kursk Cathedral, and from 1959 the Vilnius and Lithuanian Cathedrals, see: Роман (Танг), http://www.ortho-rus.ru/cgi-bin/ ps_file.cgi?2_1142, [last accessed 10.09.2014].

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closed. Mass liquidation of the churches took place between 1962 and 1964. 14 Orthodox parishes were closed during this period. In addition, the communities of Tartu, Juuru, Lihula and Tänassilma were liquidated. In total, 74 % of all churches were closed within 10 years36 . The religious policy of the communist authorities during the entire period of the USSR was aimed at limiting religious life. The closure of subsequent parishes was countered by the Tallinn and Estonian metropolitan Aleksy37 , who was in office between 1961 and 1985 (he prevented, among other things, the liquidation of the Pühtits monastery, St. Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Tallinn and 36 Orthodox so-called “unprofitable”, mainly Estonian parishes)38 . At the same time, religious life was also partially revived. Among others, Metropolitan Aleksy resumed the practice of organizing night paschal services and occasional processions in the Tallinn Eparchy. Despite the fact that Orthodoxy in Estonia was persecuted on an equal footing with other faiths, during the Soviet period the aversion to it increased among ethnic Estonians who associated it with Russians coming to Estonia en masse. It was seen by the general public as the religion of the occupier. In this aspect, there was a phenomenon of intermingling of religious and national policies, characteristic of multi-ethnic Orthodoxy.

The Issue of Church Jurisdictions after 1991 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of independent Estonia had an impact on the situation of Orthodox Christians in the country. The strong antiRussian sentiment among the native Estonians contributed to the crisis among the

36 On 16 October 1958, the authorities adopted a decree on taxation of dioceses and monasteries. This led to the closure of several parishes and monasteries. For the policy of the Soviet authorities towards the Orthodox Church in Estonia and a complete list of closed churches, see: Andrei Sychov: The Liquidation…. 37 Archbishop Alexei (Ridigier) [1929–2008], later patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Alexei II (1990–2008), graduated from the Leningrad Seminary (1949), Leningrad Spiritual Academy (1953), ordained priest (1950), parish priest in Jõhvi (1950–1957), Tartu (1957–), in 1959 took the monastic vows with the name Alexei. Ordained bishop of Tallinn and Estonia in 1962, raised to the rank of archbishop in 1964, and metropolitan in 1968. In 1984 he received the title of Doctor of Theological Sciences for a three–volume work on the history of Orthodoxy in the Estonian lands, in 1985 he took over the Leningrad Cathedral. After the death of Patriarch Pimen, elected the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, see: Aleksij II, „Православная Энцикклопедия“, http://www.pravenc.ru/text/ 64696.html, [last accessed 09.02.2014]. 38 Wtedy już nie rozstrzeliwali (the last interview that Patriarch Alexis II gave to the “Wiesti“ Canal at the end of October 2008), in: Przegląd Prawosławny 1 (2009), pp. 8–9.

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Orthodox faithful and the creation of two parallel church jurisdictions. At the same time, both of them pretended to be heirs of the autonomous Orthodox Church from the interwar period. This was the cause of an internal religious crisis. After Estonia regained independence, attempts were made to build an autonomous Orthodox Church. However, due to opposition from the Moscow Patriarchate, this was not possible. Furthermore, problems arose with the legal recognition of the Church under the Moscow Patriarchate by the new authorities. It was considered to be in the interest of Russia, and could therefore weaken and threaten the sovereignty of the Estonian state39 . The religious policy pursued by the authorities was aimed at the independence of local Orthodox structures from Russian influence (both state and religious). The changes taking place in Estonia forced the actions of the Moscow Patriarchate, which gave autonomy to the Estonian Orthodox Church on 11 August 1992. However, some clergy and believers, supported by the state authorities, did not agree to such a solution. As early as August 1993, the Ministry of the Interior registered the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church, which made efforts to pass under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople (there were even attempts to create an autocephalous church)40 . On 20 February 1996, the patriarch tomos brought back to life the decision of 1923 to accept the Orthodox Church of Estonia under its jurisdiction. In this way, the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church was reactivated (the Patriarchate of Constantinople recognized it as a legal continuator of the tradition of the Church operating in the interwar period)41 . Bishop Johannes (Rinne) from the Finnish Autonomous Orthodox Church was elected Locum tenens of the Church. Since 1996, a conflict of two jurisdictions began: the unwanted one, associated with the former hostile regime – Moscow – and the one with no legal basis for interference – Constantinople. As Marek Ławreszuk points out, on the one hand, the actions of Constantinople were based on an overinterpretation of the canons of the Fourth General Council, “on the other hand, the Moscow Patriarchate, according to

39 Ronald G. Roberson: Chrześcijańskie Kościoły Wschodnie, Bydgoszcz 1995, p. 73; Alicja Curanović: Czynnik religijny w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej, Warszawa 2010, p. 261. 40 Vello A. Pettai: Estonia, in: Walter R. Iwaskiw (ed.): Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania country studies, , http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Estonia,%20Latvia,%20and%20Lithuania%20Study_1.pdf, [last accessed 20.09.2018]; Asli Bilge, Moscow and Greek Orthodox Patriarchates: Two Actors for the Leadership of World Orthodoxy in the Post Cold War Era, https://www.esiweb. org/.../esi_turkey_tpq_vol7_no3_asli_bilge.pdf, [last accessed 10.07.2018]. 41 See: Milena Benovska-Sabkova: Armastus, Andestus, Alandlikkus. The Rediscovery of Orthodox Christianity in Post-Soviet Estonia, Tartu 2011, vol. 5, pp. 25–26; Alicja Curanović: Czynnik religijny w polityce zagranicznej, pp. 259–260. The delegation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate announced the tomos publicly on 24 February 1996 at the Transfiguration Church in Tallinn on the day of the national holiday of Estonia.

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the ecclesiological territorial principle, should, with the ecclesiological requirements for an independent Church, separate the Estonian Church from the jurisdiction of Moscow”42 . There was a clash between the two concepts of religious policy, which are rooted in the conflict between the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Moscow, in the pursuit of primacy in the Orthodox world. The situation worsened the relationship between Moscow and Constantinople (the former imposed penalties on the clergy that had assumed the jurisdiction of Constantinople). In the initial period, no mutual contacts were maintained. In early March 1996, Moscow even broke off the communion with Constantinople. However, as early as 17 May 1996 in Zurich, the two Churches reached an agreement. The agreement established that there would be two jurisdictions on Estonian territory (parishes and clergy were to decide which one they belonged to)43 . On 27 November 1998, another meeting of representatives of the Constantinople Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church was held in Geneva on the Church’s situation in Estonia. It was agreed to seek legal regulation of the Orthodox parishes operating there. In part of the churches the services were held alternately by the clergy of both jurisdictions (e.g. in the Uspen Council in Tartu and in St. Isidor’s Church in Walga). Despite the signing of the agreement the dispute was not settled (the problem was unresolved property issues). Moreover, the Moscow Patriarchate accused the Estonian authorities of violating human rights and restricting religious freedom. On 21 March 2001, these issues were discussed by Pavel Niedosekin, a permanent representative of the Russian Orthodox Church to the European Union. In April, the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate did not receive permission to register its own structure. The state authorities proposed to change the name to “Estonian Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church”, which was not agreed to by the church. The official registration problems concerned the statute of this church and its name (the statute of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate was adopted in 2000). In fact, the most important matter was the issue of ownership of temples and other church property, which was also claimed by the previously registered Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church. This issue took on an international dimension. In October 2001, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe considered a parliamentary question concerning the situation of the Orthodox faithful in Estonia. It was addressed by Dmitry

42 Marek Ławreszuk: Prawosławie wobec tendencji nacjonalistycznych i etnofiletystycznych. Studium teologiczno-kanoniczne, Warszawa 2009, p. 281; on the conflict between the jurisdictions see also Daniel P. Payne: Nationalism and the Local Church. The Source of Ecclesiastical Conflict in the Orthodox Commenwealth, http://www.academia.edu/2336529, [last accessed 08.10.2018]. 43 Karol Karski: Kronika wydarzeń ekumenicznych styczeń-czerwiec 1996, in: Studia i Dokumenty Ekumeniczne 2 (1996), p. 157; Paweł Letko: Zaangażowanie Patriarchatu Moskiewskiego w Estonii w kontekście rozbicia estońskiego prawosławia, in: Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 4 (2013), p. 173.

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Rogozin, Chairman of the Committee for International Affairs of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, who headed the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The inter-parliamentary delegation asked the Estonian authorities to influence the issue of the registration of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate44 . Alicja Curanović rightly notes that in the case of Orthodoxy in Estonia, the Moscow Patriarchate acted as an institution protecting Russian culture, faith and language. It received strong support from the Russian authorities, who presented problems with registering the structures of the Orthodox Church in Tallinn on the international arena as manifestations of discrimination against the Russian minority in this country45 . Finally, on 23 December 2001, the Estonian Parliament passed the law “On Churches and Parishes”. It provided a legal basis for the activities of churches, parishes, monasteries and religious communities in the country. Among other things, the article preventing the registration of Churches whose administrative centers are located outside the border or which have administrative centers in Estonia but are forced to have their resolutions approved by church authorities located outside the country was removed from the text of the act. The adoption of the new act created the basis for the registration of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which had been seeking this since 199346 . As a result of the above events, on 17 April 2002, the Estonian Ministry of the Interior recognized the civil status of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (this enabled efforts to be made in the area of church property ownership)47 . The same status was enjoyed by the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church, registered in 1993 and subordinate to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. On 4 October 2002 a protocol on the property rights of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate was signed. On its basis, the state handed over

44 Jarosław Charkiewicz, Z życia Cerkwi na świecie, in: Wiadomości Polskiego Autokefalicznego Kościoła Prawosławnego 12 (2001), p. 12. 45 Alicja Curanović: Czynnik religijny w polityce zagranicznej, p. 259, see also: Aleksandr Aidarov/ Wolfgang Drechsler: Estonian Russification of Non-Russian Ethnic Minorities in Estonia? A Policy Aanalysis, http://www.kirj.ee/public/trames_pdf/2013/issue_2/Trames-2013-2-103-128.pdf, [last accessed 20.07.2016]. 46 In 1993, an act on churches and religious communities was passed, which, among other things, regulated registration rights, see: Ringo Ringvee, Religious Freedom and Legislation in Post-Soviet Estonia, http://www.law2.byu.edu/lawreview/archives/2001/2/rin11.pdf, [last accessed 10.08.2015]; Merilin Kiviorg: Religion and the Secular State in Estonia, http://www.iclrs.org/content/blurb/files/ Estonia.pdf, [last accessed 10.08.2015]. 47 The Ministry of Interior and the Department of Religious Affairs have registered the diocese and three parishes in Tallinn, Nomme and Maardu. Later on, other parish communities were also registered, see: International Religious Freedom Report 2003 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Estonia, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2003/24355.htm, [last accessed 20.08.2015].

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18 church buildings (14 temples and four parish houses)48 . This initiated a period of normalization in mutual relations. Their manifestation was, among other things, the visit of the Patriarch Alexei II to Tallinn in September 2003 (there were discussions about the guarantee of equal rights for Orthodox people, regardless of jurisdiction, and the resolution of disputed property issues)49 .

Conclusions Despite jurisdictional problems, Orthodox religious life developed in Estonia after 1991. New Orthodox churches were built within the Moscow jurisdiction, among others: St. Michael the Archangel in Maard (1998), Narew Icon of Our Lady in Narew (2003) and St. Panteleimon in Paldiski (2003). There was also a development of the diocesan network. On 30 May 2011 the Narew eparchy was erected (its territory was separated from the Tallinn diocese). Bishop Lazar (Gurkin)50 became the Ordinary51 . On 15 May 2012 a new statute regulating the life of the church was adopted. Since 2000 the head of the Church has been the Metropolitan of Tallinn and all Estonia Cornelius (Jakobs)52 . The Moscow Patriarchate Church has 30 parishes, about 50 priests and 40,000–50,000 believers53 .

48 The Estonian government guaranteed the exclusive right to use the religious buildings for 50 years and paid 35 million crowns as financial compensation, see: Alicja Curanović: Czynnik religijny w polityce Rosji, p. 260. The Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate was also given St. Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Tallinn to use free of charge for 99 years. 49 Paweł Letko: Zaangażowanie Patriarchatu Moskiewskiego w Estonii, p. 174. 50 Bishop Lazarus (Aleksander Gurkin) [born 1969], in 1991 he took the solemn monastery vows and was ordained a hieromonk, superior of the Chufarov Monastery of the Holy Trinity (1993–2000) and the Monastery of St. John the Theologian in Saransko (2000–2009), graduated from the Seminary in Samara (2001), the Moscow Clerical Academy (2005), and the Auxiliary Bishop of the Diocese of Tallinn (2009–2011), see: Лазарь, епископ Нарвский и Причудский (Гуркин Александр Николаевич), http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/657832.html, [last accessed 09.02.2014]. 51 Устав Эстонской Православной Церкви Московского Патриархата, http://www.orthodox.ee/ epc/official-docs-rus, [last accessed 10.12.2014]. 52 Bishop Cornelius (Jakobs) [born 1924], graduated from the Leningrad Seminary (1951), served in the Wallachian diocese (until 1957), arrested by the authorities for “vilifying Soviet power and storing anti-Soviet literature“ and imprisoned until 1960, parish priest in Tallinn (1960). He received the episcopal chirotonia on 15 September 1990. He became Bishop Ordinary of Tallinn and the whole of Estonia after the Estonian Orthodox Church received the status of an autonomous Church, since 1995 he has the title of Archbishop and since 2000 Metropolitan. He is the author of the autobiography titled “The Church of the Holy Spirit“, see: Корнилий, митрополит Таллинский и всея Эстонии (Якобс Вячеслав Васильевич), http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/56439.html, [last accessed 10.09.2014]. 53 See: Przegląd Prawosławny 11 (2003), p. 39.

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Similar processes took place in the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church of the Constantinople’s Patriarchate. On 13 March 1999, the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate elected the Bishop of the Greek Orthodox Metropolis of France, Stephanos (Charalambides) as Metropolitan of Tallinn and all of Estonia54 . In 1999 the General Assembly of the Church also convened for the first time and the ecclesiastical administration was elected. In 2003, a new statute of the Church was adopted. Administratively, it was divided into three dioceses. Publishing activities were developed, including the resumption of the monthly “Usk ja Elu”. (“Faith and Life”), since 2001 the pastoral bulletin “Metroopolia” has also been published. The number of clergy has increased from 17 priests and 2 deacons in 1999 to 28 priests and 10 deacons in 2007. The church has three hieromonks, one monk and one nun. The Council of Bishops includes Metropolitan of Tallinn and all of Estonia, Stephanos (Charalambides), Bishop Tartu Elijah (Ojapärv)55 , and Bishop PärnuSarema Alexander (Hopjorski)56 , appointed in October 2008. Their appointment made it possible to form their own synod of this Church. In total, it had about 20,000 believers (most of them were ethnic Estonians) and had 60 parishes. In 2011 the Gregorian calendar was adopted57 . Nowadays, Orthodox Churches participate in the local ecumenical movement. They function in the Council of Churches of Estonia58 . The state of relations is based on mutual reluctance between Estonians (Orthodox representatives of this nationality recognize Constantinople’s jurisdiction) and Russians, who recognize Moscow’s jurisdiction. The situation is complicated. As Marek Ławreszuk states, in Estonian Orthodoxy, Russian influence is combined with aversion to the Russian nation, historical pressure and political struggle for spheres of influence. The national element also takes an active part in the ecclesiastical conflict – Russia defends itself against

54 Stefan (Charalambides), born in 1940 in Congo in a Cypriot family, was ordained a priest on 17 November 1968. On 25 March 1987, he received chirotonia as auxiliary bishop of Paris with the titular capital of Nazianze. On 21 March 1999 he was enthroned as the first Archbishop of Tallinn, source: http://www.eoc.ee/eesti-apostlik-oigeusu-kirik/metropoliit/, [last accessed 12.02.2014]. 55 Bishop Elijah (Ojaperv) was born in 1977 in Tartu, ordained a deacon in 2006 and in 2007 a presbyterate, on 10 January 2009 he received bishop’s chirotonia, see: http://vys.palvelee.fi/uutiset. html, [last accessed 20.04.2017]. 56 Bishop Aleksander (Hopjorski), born in 1964 in Võru, ordained a deacon on 7 December 1996 and on 10 December 2000 a presbyterate, received a bishop’s chirotony on 12 January 2009, source: http://www.eoc.ee/vaimulik/hopjorski-aleksander, [last accessed 20.04.2017]. 57 See: Przegląd Prawosławny 11 (2003), p. 39. 58 Stefan Pastuszewski: Prawosławie Estończyków i Łotyszy, http://akant.org/archiwum/182-swiatinflant/swiat-inflant-2017/5906-stefan-pastuszewski-prawoslawie-estonczykow-i-lotyszy-6, [last accessed 28.08.2020].

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the loss of sovereignty over the Orthodox Russians in Estonia, forgetting the territorial ecclesiological principle – the geopolitical division of the Church59 .

After the end of 2016, Metropolitan Stefan proposed to take action to unify the two Estonian jurisdictions (this was to be based on the findings of the All-Orthodox Council in Crete, which confirmed the inadmissibility of the existence of two Orthodox churches in one country). The hierarchy prepared a plan of unification, which assumed equal treatment of both jurisdictions under his own authority. However, this project was rejected (as having political overtones) by the Metropolitan of Tallinn and all Estonia, Cornelius60 . As already mentioned, the jurisdictional dispute in Estonia is part of a wider rivalry between the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates for leadership in the Orthodox world. It is also a manifestation of the lack of a common religious policy of the Orthodox Churches, which leads to the political breakdown of Orthodoxy. Recently, this process has been reflected in religious events in Ukraine. Undoubtedly, the Russian Federation, using the Russian Orthodox Church, aims to maintain the Russian cultural space and strengthen its position on the international arena61 .

Bibliography Aidarov, Aleksandr/Drechsler, Wolfgang: Estonian Russification of Non-Russian Ethnic Minorities in Estonia? A Policy Aanalysis, http://www.kirj.ee/public/trames_pdf/2013/issue_2/Trames-2013-2-103-128.pdf, [last accessed 20.07.2016]. Benovska-Sabkova, Milena: Armastus, Andestus, Alandlikkus. The Rediscovery of Orthodox Christianity in Post-Soviet Estonia, Tartu 2011, vol. 5, pp. 23–43. Bilge, Asli: Moscow and Greek Orthodox Patriarchates: Two Actors for the Leadership of World Orthodoxy in the Post Cold War Era, https://www.esiweb.org/.../esi_turkey_tpq_vol7_ no3_asli_bilge.pdf, [last accessed 10.07.2018]. Bos, Paul: Prawosławie w Europie Zachodniej, in: Arche. Wiadomości Bractwa 3/4 (1998), pp. 69–71. Constantelos, Demetrios J.: The Orthodox Diaspora. Canonical and Ecclesiological Perspective, in: The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 2/3 (1979), pp. 199–211. Curanović, Alicja: Czynnik religijny w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej, Warszawa 2010.

59 Marek Ławreszuk: Prawosławie wobec tendencji, p. 284. 60 See: Propozycja zjednoczenia Cerkwi, in: Przegląd Prawosławny 11 (2016), p. 42. 61 Paweł Letko: Zaangażowanie Patriarchatu Moskiewskiego w Estonii, p. 171; this process is analyzed thoroughly by Alicja Curanović: Czynnik religijny w polityce zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej …, pp. 244–267.

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Dudra, Stefan: Autocephalization of the Church in Ukraine an Element of Competition between the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Moskow for the Leadership in the Orthodox World, in: Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne 3/63 (2019), pp. 137–155. Dudra, Stefan: Polski Autokefaliczny Kościół Prawosławny w obszarze polityki wyznaniowej oraz polityki narodowościowej Polski Ludowej i III Rzeczypospolitej, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2019. Dudra, Stefan/Król-Mazur, Renata/Maj, Dorota: Polityka wyznaniowa. Wschodnia i ekumeniczna perspektywa eklezjalna, Zielona Góra 2018. Hilarion (Alfayev): Orthodoxy in a New Europe. Problems and Perspectives, http://www. georgefox.edu/ree/2004/hilarion.pdf, [last accessed 28.12.2014]. Huttunen, Heikki: The Resurrection of a Church, in: Grigorios D. Papathomas/Matthias H. Palli (eds.): The Autonomous Orthodox Church of Estonia. L’Église autonome orthodoxe d’Estonie. (Approche historique et nomocanonioque), Katérini 2002, pp. 399–416. International Religious Freedom Report 2003 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Estonia, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2003/24355.htm, [last accessed 28.12.2014]. Kallistos, Ware: Kościół prawosławny, Białystok 2011. Kałużny, Tadeusz: Nowy Sobór Ogólnoprawosławny. Natura, historia przygotowań, tematyka, Kraków 2008. Karski, Karol: Kronika wydarzeń ekumenicznych styczeń-czerwiec 1996, in: Studia i Dokumenty Ekumeniczne 2 (1996), pp. 150–174. Keleher, Serge: Orthodox Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. Moscow versus Constantinople, in: Religion, State & Society 2 (1997), pp. 125–137. Kiviorg, Merilin: Religion and the Secular State in Estonia, http://www.iclrs.org/content/ blurb/files/Estonia.pdf, [last accessed 10.08.2015]. Kuźma, Andrzej: IV Konferencja Przygotowawcza do Soboru Ogólnoprawosławnego, in: Wiadomości Polskiego Autokefalicznego Kościoła Prawosławnego 7/8 (2009), pp. 4–5. Lemopoulos, Georges: Orthodox Diaspora in Europe. An Attempt to Describe a Range of Old and New Issues, http://www.deltapublicaciones.com/derechoyreligion/gestor/archivos/. pdf, [last accessed 19.05.2015]. Letko, Paweł: Zaangażowanie Patriarchatu Moskiewskiego w Estonii w kontekście rozbicia estońskiego prawosławia, in: Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 4 (2013), pp. 171–190. Lewandowski, Jan: Historia Estonii, Ossolineum 2002. Ławreszuk, Marek: Prawosławie wobec tendencji nacjonalistycznych i etnofiletystycznych. Studium teologiczno-kanoniczne, Warszawa 2009. Meyendorff, John: Teologia bizantyńska. Historia i doktryna, Kraków 2007. Paert, Irina/Schvak, Toomas: Orthodox Education in the Baltic Provinces of Imperial Russia and Independent Estonia from 1840s till 1941, https://journals.urfu.ru/index.php/QR/ article/view/066/1043, [last accessed 09.05.2018]. (Pańkowski), Jerzy: Aktualny stan przygotowań do panprawosławnego soboru, in: Polski Żołnierz Prawosławny 2 (2013), pp. 3–4.

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Papadakis, Aristeides: Zarys dziejów Kościoła prawosławnego, in: Krzysztof Leśniewski (ed.): Prawosławie. Światło ze wschodu, Lublin 2009, pp. 639–660. Pastuszewski, Stefan: Prawosławie Estończyków i Łotyszy, http://akant.org/archiwum/182swiat-inflant/swiat-inflant-2017/5906-stefan-pastuszewski-prawoslawie-estonczykow-ilotyszy-6, [last accessed 28.08.2020]. Paszkiewicz, Piotr: W służbie imperium rosyjskiego 1721–1917. Funkcje i treści ideowe rosyjskiej architektury sakralnej na zachodnich rubieżach Cesarstwa i poza jego granicami, Warszawa 1999. Payne, Daniel P.: Nationalism and the Local Church. The Source of Ecclesiastical Conflict in the Orthodox Commenwealth, http://www.academia.edu/2336529, [last accessed 08.10.2018] Pettai, Vello A.: Estonia, in: Walter R. Iwaskiw (ed.) Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania country studies, http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Estonia,%20Latvia,%20and%20Lithuania%20Study_1.pdf, [last accessed 20.09.2018]. Plaat, Jaanus: Orthodoxy and Orthodox Sacral Buildings in Estonia from the 11th to the 19th Centuries, http://www.erm.ee/pdf/pro19/plaat.pdf, [last accessed 10.07.2018]. Rimestad, Sebastain: The Challenges of Modernity to the Orthodox Church in Estonia and Latvia (1917–1940), Frankfurt am Main 2012. Ringvee, Ringo: Religious Freedom and Legislation in Post-Soviet Estonia, http://www.law2. byu.edu/lawreview/archives/2001/2/rin11.pdf, [last accessed 10.08.2015]. Roberson, Ronald G.: Chrześcijańskie Kościoły Wschodnie, Bydgoszcz 1995. Runciman Steven: Teokracja bizantyjska, Warszawa 1982. Sychov, Andrei: The Liquidation and the Attempts of Reopening of the Congregations of the Estonian Eparchy during the Governance of Nikita Hruschtschov in 1954–1964, http://www. orthodoxa.org/GB/estonia/documentsEOC/closingGB.htm, [last accessed 10.09.2014]. Szkarowskij, Michaił W.: Polityka Trietiego Riejcha po otnoszeniju k Russkoj Prawosławnoj Cerkwi w swietie archiwnych matieriałow 1935–1945 godow, Moskwa 2003. Toom, Tarmo: Orthodox Church in Estonia, in: John A. McGuckin (eds.): The Encyclopedia of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Vol 1, Oxford 2011, pp. 226–228. Truth I Find in Orthodoxy (interview with Archbishop Washington, Metropolitan of All America and Canada Tikhon), in: Przegląd Prawosławny 9 (2018), pp. 5–7. Устав Эстонской Православной Церкви Московского Патриархата, http://www.orthodox.ee/epc/official-docs-rus, [last accessed 10.12.2014]. Wegener Sanderson, Charles: Autocephaly as a function of institutional stability and organizational change in the Eastern Orthodox Church, http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/ 1903/2340/1/umi-umd-2195.pdf, [last accessed 28.12.2014]. Wtedy już nie rozstrzeliwali (the last interview that Patriarch Alexis II gave to the “Wiesti” Canal at the end of October 2008), in: Przegląd Prawosławny 1 (2009), pp. 7–9. Znosko, Aleksy: Prawosławne prawo kościelne, part 1, Warszawa 1973.

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The Policy of the Polish People’s Republic Authorities towards the Polish-Speaking Pastoral Care of the Roman Catholic Church in Germany as Part of the State’s Religious Policy

The official relations between the state and the Roman Catholic Church in the Polish People’s Republic were not always correct. However, for the Polish society, the Church was an important point of reference and a great authority. The situation was similar in the case of the émigré communities. Thus, the means of influence of party and government authorities on the clergy were similar in both cases.

Determinants of State Policy towards the Institutions of the Church The shape and implementation of the Polish People’s Republic’s policy towards the pastoral care of the allegedly Polish diaspora can be considered at three levels: party, governmental and social. This was due to the essence of the system that emerged in Poland after 1945 – and that was the existence of many constitutional state bodies on the one hand and informal structures with decisive influence on the other. The leadership or superior role of the Polish United Workers’ Party (“PZPR”) was reflected in its three attributes. The first consisted in the monopolistic power of the PZPR to set directional goals for the system of power as a whole and partial goals, or rather components for individual institutions. The second attribute of the party’s leadership role, which enabled the realization of the developed political line, was based on its presence in all formal institutions of the system. Finally, the third was based on the assumption that the legal system did not restrict the party in its operation1 . The political system of the People’s Republic of Poland expressed formally proclaimed norms and rules, supplemented by a system of informal rules and mechanisms regulating the functioning of political power and its links with society. Thus, one should agree with J. Wrona that “it was an undemocratic, totalitarian system”2 . which only “in the semantic layer ... had a democracy that guaranteed an

1 Janusz Wrona: PZPR a partie satelickie, in: Dariusza Stoli/Krzysztofa Persaka (eds.): PZPR jako machina władzy, Warszawa 2012, p. 140. 2 Ibid., p. 139.

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extensive catalog of civil rights and freedoms, attributed power to a representative body, proclaimed the principles of control of those in power and determined the important role of the judiciary”3 . The lack of monolithic state structures was a special feature of totalitarian states. The party and the state were two sources of power. The concepts of democracy, parliament, government, courts, and the law were only mock-ups of the originals4 . As Mr. Gasztold points out: “The state machine played the role of a screen behind which the communists’ power was hidden.”5 In this political model, the party played a dominant role, often hiding behind other organizations and performing their functions. As W. Janowski notes: (...) the review of the statutory powers and the shape of the PZPR’s chief authorities over the course of its functioning points to the nominal clear primacy of the collegial bodies – the Congress and the Central Committee – over the executive bodies, such as the Politburo, the Organizational Office or the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which mostly consisted of the full-time apparatus. However, the aforementioned, statutorily defined superiority had only a formal dimension. The role of the collegial bodies was in practice diminished in favor of narrower decision-making bodies, more operative, efficient and effective in action6 .

A special position in the party was fullfiled by its full-time apparatus, which included both elected officials and those employed on a full-time basis financed by the party’s budget without electoral procedure. In this sense, a full-time member of staff was the party’s first secretary, who together with the other secretaries formed the secretariat. This group supervised all areas of the social and political life of the state. The division of duties between the individual secretaries was not permanent and was subject to frequent changes. The number of departments and the scope of their competences were also variable. However, there were also those that existed despite numerous reorganizations throughout the communist period. These included, among others,

3 Janusz Wrona: Kompetencje i hierarchia urzędów. Formalna a rzeczywista pozycja polityczna marszałka sejmu, przewodniczącego Rady Państwa, prezesa Rady Ministrów, in: Konrada Rokickiego/Roberta Spałka (eds.): Władza w PRL. Ludzie i mechanizmy, Warszawa 2011, p. 27. 4 Ibid., p. 27. 5 Przemysław Gasztold: Towarzysze z betonu. Dogmatyzm w PZPR 1980–1990, Warszawa 2019, p. 30. 6 Włodzimierz Janowski: Ustój władz, zadania i struktura aparatu wykonawczego KC PZPR w latach 1948–1990, in: Krzysztof Persaka (ed.): Informator o strukturze i obsadzie personalnej, Warszawa 2000, p. 15.

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the Foreign Department, crucial from the point of view of the policy towards the Polish community and the Polish pastoral ministry7 . The Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the PZPR was established as early as 15 December 19488 . Its structure included, among others, the Polish Community and Political Emigration Sector. As W. Borodziej emphasizes, the degree of independence of the Foreign Department (as well as that of other departments) was insignificant, because its competence was limited to preparing materials for the decisions of the most important bodies and the most important matters were reserved for the Secretary of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. This was due to the desire: (...) to make it easier for the Central Committee to scrutinize the administration and control different parts of society. This departmental division resulted in direct interference of the party apparatus in particular sections of life. This far-reaching interference entailed, on the one hand, the replacement, in many cases, by the departments of the Central Committee, of the leaders of the relevant economic and social sectors, and, on the other hand, the removal of responsibility from those sectors9 .

Institutions Responsible for Implementing Policy towards Poles Abroad The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was closely subordinated to the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (KC PZPR), was responsible for the broadly defined policy towards the Polish community. It could not be otherwise, if it provided guidelines on Polish foreign policy worked out in the highest party groups. It also controlled the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through party organizations, which functioned not only at the Warsaw headquarters but also at diplomatic and trade posts10 . The Consular Department, which included the Department for the Polish Diaspora, was in charge of Polish affairs. In 1964, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a direct executor of the policy in this area, took over direct supervision of the “Polonia” Society for

7 Krzysztof Dąbek: PZPR. Retrospektywy portret własny, Warszawa 2006, pp. 42–44. 8 Paweł Ceranka: Podstawowa Organizacja Partyjna PZPR w Ministerstwie Spraw Zagranicznych 1949–1989, in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość 27 (2016), p. 255. 9 AAN (Central Archives of Modern Records), Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (KC PZPR), ref. 237/XXII-662, Note on the draft changes in the Central Committee apparatus. 10 Krzysztof Ruchniewicz: Warszawa – Berlin – Bonn. Stosunki polityczne 1949–1958, Warszawa 2003, p. 18.

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Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad from the Ministry of Culture and Art11 . Taking into account the religious issues, the role of the Office for Religious Affairs, which was the central unit of the state religious administration, should be emphasized. It was established on 19 April 1950, taking over the matters of the state’s attitude towards religious associations, which until then had been the responsibility of the Religious Department of the Ministry of Public Administration. It functioned within the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, and after its liquidation the Office of the Council of Ministers12 . Thus, it was formally subordinated to the Prime Minister. In fact, however, it was subordinated to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PZPR. It also cooperated closely with the Ministry of Security in limiting the Church’s activities. The development of the fundamental assumptions of the state policy towards the Polish community required coordinated actions, hence on 10 October 1973 Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz appointed the Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Polish Foreign Community. It was headed by Wiesław Adamski, then Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Secretary General of the “Polonia” Society. The Commission rested on it: The Commission was responsible for: 1. coordinating work with the Polish Diaspora abroad of state ministries, offices and institutions based on the government’s Plan of Work with the Polish Diaspora in the capitalist countries; 2. evaluating the implementation of the directions contained in the Plan by individual ministries, offices and state institutions; 3. giving opinions on programs and organizational plans concerning cooperation with the Polish Diaspora; 4. exchanging information between individual ministries, offices and state institutions in the field of Polish diaspora issues; 5. initiating and providing assistance in the preparation and implementation of Polish diaspora activities13 .

However, the actual coordination of activities towards the Polish diaspora had already taken place. It was established in the seemingly social character of the “Polonia” – an Association for Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad. The decision to establish it was made on 17 May 1955 at the meeting of the Committee

11 Krzysztof Szczepanik: Dyplomacja Polski 1918–2005. Struktury organizacyjne, Warszawa 2005, pp. 138–139. 12 Tomasz Gajowniczek: Przyczyny powstania i główne cele działalności Urzędu ds. Wyznań jako narzędzia realizacji polityki wyznaniowej władz w początkach Polski Ludowej, in: Rocznik Dobromiejski, Vol. 1 (2007), pp. 241, 243. 13 AAN, Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad “Polonia”, sign. 11/25, Ordinance No. 79 of the Prime Minister of 10 October 1973 on the composition, scope and mode of operation of the Interdepartmental Commission for Foreign Polonia, p. 3.

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for Public Security14 . It was supposed to promote both remigration and, in the long run, policy towards the Polish diaspora and refugees. The Society performed typical executive functions, being a kind of a cover for proper decision-making centers. In order to make the Society credible in the eyes of the Polish community, the Secretariat of the Committee accepted the proposal of the Propaganda Department concerning the composition of the Society’s Board of Directors, headed by the Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, Professor Stanisław Kulczyński, who chaired the founding meeting15 . The first president of the “Polonia” Society was Professor Stanisław Kulczyński. After him this function was held by Prof. Mieczysław Klimaszewski, Wincenty Kraśko and Tadeusz Witold Młyńczak (President since 1977 – Deputy Chairman of the State Council and Chairman of the CK SD). The vice-presidents and since 1973 the general secretaries were: Hugon Hanke, Gen. Stanislaw Zawadzki, Zygmunt Dworakowski, Tadeusz Strzałkowski, Wieslaw Adamski, and Wojciech Jaskot16 . It is necessary to agree with S. Cenckiewicz that “(...) the basic task of the Society was the proverbial building of bridges between Poles abroad and Poland. The intention was to deprive the state in exile (president, government, national treasury, political parties and associations in exile) of its social background”17 . In the first years of the “Polonia” Society’s functioning, there were many times extremely sincere statements in various declarations, in which one can see criticism of the actions of party and state authorities, although this did not concern the main assumptions and guidelines. A statement of this nature appears in the 1961 “Theses for working with the Polish Diaspora abroad”, where the importance of the clergy working with the Polish Diaspora was clearly recognized. It was realized that by sending appropriately selected clergy representatives to the Polish community, it could prove to be extremely beneficial. It was noted with concern that: The travel of priests and nuns, which has been suspended for a long time, does not allow to supplement the personal state of existing Polish parishes and orders abroad, which often conduct cultural and educational work. The clergy of predominantly German origin, who use the religiousness of the Polish community against the country and propagate the revisionist policy of West Germany, is quickly introduced to the vacant places.

14 Sławomir Cenckiewicz, Oczami Bezpieki. Szkice i materiały z dziejów aparatu bezpieczeństwa PRL, Kraków 2008, p. 45. 15 Jan Lenczarowicz: Rola Towarzystwa “Polonia” w polityce PRL wobec Polonii w krajach zachodnich, in: Przegląd Polonijny 1/79 (1996), p. 47. 16 AAN, Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad “Polonia”, sign. 6/223, 30 years of the Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora, Warsaw 1985, p. 3. 17 Sławomir Cenckiewicz, op. cit., p. 45.

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The need to liberalize this policy was stressed: The recent departure of several Polish priests to the Polish community has contributed to changing the mood among the Polish community. They are engaged in cultural and educational work and learning the Polish language. They are, in a way, carriers of the new Poland to the clerical Polish community. The specific situation among the Polish community, which is largely believable, speaks in favor of extending the Polish clergy’s trips18 .

This was strictly in line with state policy. It was particularly clear when Władysław Gomułka was the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party. This is shown in a fragment of the Society’s plan of work for 1969, where the first words were already emphasized: The main task of the Polonia Society in 1969 will be to win public opinion in the Polish community for the purposes of the Polish People’s Republic’s foreign policy. The main aim is to further expose the possessive intentions of Bonn’s policy, which threatened world peace and encouraged the revival of fascism in West Germany. This case is particularly important at a time when Bonn’s provocations against the socialist countries continue and when the neo-fascist NPD party is mobilizing its forces for representation in the Bundestag. It is important to realize that West German propaganda will try to misinform and even gain some political circles of emigration in the name of anti-communism and thus weaken the unity of Poles in the world and the bond between them and their country. Therefore, in all the means of propaganda used by the Society, it is necessary to choose the right argumentation, so that, based on the reality and the facts, it can serve as a reliable weapon against slanderous propaganda by all forces hostile to Poland and its people19 .

The most visible form of these activities was the popularization of the opinion about the threat to the course of the western Polish border. It was even emphasized that: “The issue of the border on the Oder, Lusatian Neisse and Baltic Sea is a common issue for all Poles at home and abroad”20 . In the 1960s, the permanence of the western border was one of the main elements in the propaganda efforts to consolidate the Polish community with the country.

18 AAN, Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad “Polonia”, sign. 4/2, Theses to work with the Foreign Polonia, pp. 5–6. 19 AAN, Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad “Polonia” , sign. 4/2, Work plan of the “Polonia” Society for 1969, p. 3. 20 AAN, Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad “Polonia” , sign. 4/2, Work plan of the “Polonia” Society for 1965, p. 2.

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The community of Poles living in Germany was very diverse. For the most part, they were forced laborers, prisoners of former concentration camps, prisoners of war, and persons deported from Poland for Germanization. This represented a considerable number of about 1.9 to 2 million people21 . In addition, the western occupying zones were mainly inhabited by so-called “old emigration”, with a population of approximately 97,000, as shown by the results of the census conducted by the Allies in October 1946. This was the number of people who reported Polish as their mother tongue22 .

Structures of the Pastoral Ministry among Poles Abroad The organizational structures of the Polish diaspora ministry were gradually shaped in all major Polish-American communities. Its basic element became the Polish Catholic Missions. The rectors of the missions were subordinate to all Polish pastoral institutions of the Roman Catholic Church, which were also subordinate to the local ordinaries. On behalf of the Polish Episcopate, the Pastoral Commission of Polish Emigration supervised the Polish pastoral ministry23 . The coordination of pastoral care for Poles in Germany was initially carried out by Józef Gawlina, the Field Ordinary of the Polish Army. He was appointed to this post by Pope Pius XII. After his death in 1964, Father Edward Lubowiecki took over as Ordinary for Poles in West Germany, who carried out his mission until his death in 1975. The Polish pastoral ministry in West Germany was then essentially reorganized. It became subordinate to the Department of Pastoral Care of the Western German Bishops’ Conference, which appointed a delegate for chaplains/missionaries of Polish-speaking circles in West Germany called the rector of the Polish Catholic Mission. The first rector was prelate Stefan Leciejewski. The headquarters of the Polish-speaking pastoral ministry was located in Freising near Munich. In 1986 it was moved to Würzburg. It was then that Father Dr. Franciszek Mrowiec took over as Rector24 . In 1947, there were about 70 priests working in all occupied zones of Germany, whose pastoral care was mainly focused on Poles who came there not of their own accord. For this reason, Cardinal August Hlond agreed that the priests could

21 Wojciech Necel: Kształtowanie i rozwój struktur polskojęzycznego duszpasterstwa w Niemczech, in: Prawo kanoniczne: kwartalnik prawno-historyczny 57/2 (2014), p. 44. 22 Peter Oliver Loew: My niewidzialni. Historia Polaków w Niemczech, Warszawa 2017, p. 203. 23 Monika Wiśniewska, Duszpasterstwo polonijne Kościoła Rzymskokatolickiego w ostatnim programie rządowym PRL, in: Remembrance and Justice 1/33 (2019), p. 136. 24 Kazimierz Kosicki: Duszpasterstwo wśród Polaków w Niemczech w latach 1945–1950, Lublin 1993, pp. 90–100; Wojciech Necel, Kształtowanie i rozwój struktur, pp. 45–49.

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leave with emigrants for other countries subject to the consent of their respective ordinaries25 . A separate issue was the situation of the former emigrants and their descendants, who had German citizenship. The German church authorities were reluctant to respond to their religious and national demands. The party and government authorities of the Polish People’s Republic gradually became more and more interested in the quantitative and general situation of the Polish diaspora and the Polish pastoral ministry. They systematically monitored the geographical distribution of the Polish community, the intensity of migration movements and their causes. The establishment and implementation of governmental programs of cooperation with the Polish community was accompanied by talks between representatives of party and state authorities and church authorities. This was because the party and governmental authorities of the Polish People’s Republic saw a certain convergence of state interests with the pastoral efforts of the Church. Such a point of view was systematically gaining more and more supporters among the party-government elite, which was even reflected in the information of the Office for Veterans. It was emphasized that: The clergy has a significant influence on public opinion in the Polish community, especially those who come from economic emigration. In general, the Polish clergy is patriotic. Numerous priests convey to the faithful a picture of the current Polish reality, either completely objective or more objective than the one that has shaped – according to their ideas and specific goals – many circles in exile. The whole situation creates the basis and certain possibilities of cooperation between the state authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland and the Polish clergy26 .

The organized trips of clergy to work in the Polish community date back to 1963. Previously, they had an individual character and started in this form, according to the Office for Religious Affairs, after 1956. There was no concept of using the activities of the clergy as a form of influence on the Polish diaspora. Between 1963 and 1964, 38 priests were allowed to leave, which had a polling character. According to the report of the “Polonia” Society: “The activity of this group of priests, during their stay abroad, confirmed our predictions – all priests behaved loyally towards Poland by intensively developing cultural and educational activities, promoting

25 Jerzy Pietrzak: Pełnia prymasostwa. Ostatnie lata prymasa Polski kardynała Augusta Hlonda 1945–1948, vol. II, Poznań 2009, pp. 799–800. 26 AAN, Office of the Minister of Veterans Affairs, sign. 1/182, Information on cooperation with the Polish clergy and the efforts of the state authorities to intensify it, 6 December 1977, p. 1.

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trips to the country, informing objectively about the situation in our country”27 . It couldn’t have been otherwise if the candidates were strictly selected and thus the situation in Poland was not different: “The state authorities allow only those clergy whose attitude and attitude of their congregation towards the Polish People’s Republic did not raise political objections to go to work in the Polish diaspora. This causes a certain sifting of the candidates. Until 1970, for example, no permits were granted to members of the Pauline Order because of the politically harmful actions of the Order’s authorities and their failure to comply with state regulations”28 .

Priests, on the other hand, who were trusted by the authorities, were generally given passports to all countries of the world, with the right to cross the border several times, and usually valid for five years29 . The cooperation with this part of the clergy was completely different, as it had been brought to the Polish émigré communities by a different route and much earlier, among other things, due to various forced situations during or before the war. This was pointed out by the Office for Confessions in its characteristics of pastoral activity in the Polish community: Contacts between the rectors of Polish Catholic missions (PMK) and our diplomatic and consular posts are very limited. Of the 17 rectors of PMK, only one of them (the rector of PMK in Brazil, Fr. Benedict Grzymkowski) has visited the country in recent years. This has had adverse consequences for the cooperation between the state and the Church for the benefit of the Polish community. Suggestions of the state authorities concerning the organization of periodic meetings of the rectors of PMK in the country (so far held in Rome) have not brought any results.30

The Office for Religious Affairs organized collective conferences for senior superiors of religious orders and congregations with the participation of representatives of the Polish Episcopate, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the “Polonia” Society. During these conferences, issues related to the work of the clergy abroad were discussed. The Office for Religious Affairs (UdSW) informed the participants about the position of the Polish People’s Republic authorities towards the pastoral ministry of the Church 27 AAN, Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad “Polonia”, sign. 11/25, Information on the forms of influence of the state authorities on the clergy leaving for work in Polish communities abroad, p. 1. 28 Ibid., p. 4. 29 AAN, Office for Religious Affairs, sign. 126/167, Pastoral activity in Polish émigré communities, p. 9. 30 Ibid., p. 4.

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among the Polish community and presented the principles and directions of Polish foreign policy. After summing up the proceedings, UdSW employees each time drew up detailed reports, which often stressed: The aim of our contacts with the Episcopate and the Polish clergy should be to bring about a situation in which the Polish clergy, in coordination with the Episcopate, in a patriotic spirit, will actively engage in the process of bringing the Polish diaspora closer to the country and the authorities, regardless of existing ideological differences31 .

Gradually, forms of cooperation and influence were developed on the clergy who rendered their service in the Polish diaspora and those who were to come there. Among them, the annual seminars for priests and nuns preparing for the trip as well as collective and individual meetings with priests and sisters returning to Poland for the period of their vacation or due to other circumstances should be listed first. They were considered to be: (...) representatives of Polish culture and Polish heritage, who, in addition to their fundamental religious mission, are to strengthen the bond between Poles in foreign countries and their country. A variety of activities were undertaken in this field, particularly with the aim of maintaining lasting contacts with this clergy and influencing its attitudes32 .

Particular emphasis was placed on individual forms of contacts, which were established through the Office for Religious Affairs. It was also the main organizer of annual week-long seminars for priests and nuns going to Polish communities and other missions. In the decade of the 70’s and 80’s they were attended on average by 500 people each. Moreover, in July each year in the Wilanów Palace, the Office for Denominations organized one-day meetings with priests and nuns working in Polish communities and on missions abroad, and staying in the country at that time for various reasons33 . It was also considered very important to provide clergy with various types of information and propaganda materials concerning Poland. This also applied to religious literature and all kinds of devotional materials, to which significant reliefs in customs duties were applied or which were completely exempt from them. Convenient conditions were created for printing religious studies in Poland. The priests were also encouraged to take part in ceremonies organized by the consular posts of

31 AAN, Office for Religious Affairs, sign. 126/169, Information note on the participation of the Polish Episcopate and the Polish Catholic clergy in Polish activities of 29 January 1987, p. 6. 32 AAN, Office for Religious Affairs, sign. 126/167, The activities of the Polish diaspora, p. 20. 33 Ibid., pp. 20–22.

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the Polish People’s Republic. Various types of facilitations were also introduced for tours from the Polish diaspora to Poland organized by priests34 . This was strictly in line with the guidelines of the governmental programs of work with the Polish diaspora in the capitalist countries of 1972 and 1986, which emphasized: – Permanent supply of the Polish pastoral ministry to Polish clergy and nuns from the country by, among other things, inspiring and facilitating the trips of priests and nuns to permanent or temporary work in Polish centers; – influencing clergy going abroad and Polish pastoral workers visiting the country in order to shape patriotic attitudes and better prepare them to fulfil their mission; – to make more extensive use of national Catholic and Christian institutions (associations, publishers, economic and commercial enterprises) for the benefit of the Polish diaspora; to inspire these institutions to undertake various cultural, educational, publishing, touristic, etc. initiatives aimed at maintaining ties with the Polish community; – inspire, support and facilitate various activities of national ecclesiastical institutions and the Polish clergy, aimed at maintaining the links between the Polish community and the country and its cultural and ethnic distinctiveness35 . The effectiveness of these forms of influence largely depended on the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church. Issues related to sending priests and nuns to work among the Polish community and forms of contact with the country were the subject of constant discussions between the representatives of the Office for Religious Affairs and the Church authorities, especially the Polish Bishops’ Secretariat and the major religious superiors. However, special emphasis was put on individual meetings with clergy who were already preparing to leave – or visiting the country. As it was emphasized in one of the reports of the Office for Religious Affairs: The Polish clergy as a whole is an important factor integrating the Polish diaspora. Since the beginning of their emigration, despite various political adversities, these priests have continued their commendable work on maintaining Polishness among Polish families and communities. The old, pictorial adage that the key to the Polish diaspora lies in the church, still retains an important value of topicality36 .

34 AAN, Office of the Minister of Veterans Affairs, sign. 1/182, Information about the cooperation with the Polish clergy and the undertakings of state authorities to intensify it, 6.12.1977 e., pp. 5–9. 35 AAN, Office for Religious Affairs, sign. 126/167, Pastoral activity in Polish émigré communities, p. 17. 36 AAN, Office for Religious Affairs, sign. 126/165, Main directions of using the religious factor in the impact on the Polish diaspora of Western countries, p. 1.

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Means of Influencing the Institution of the Church and their Results For obvious reasons, the interest of the party and government authorities of the Polish People’s Republic focused on those countries where the Polish diaspora was most numerous. In Europe, Germany gained the title of such a state, and from 1955 onwards, waves of displaced persons and, in the final phase, Polish emigrants began arriving. In the years 1955–1959, 250,000 people arrived as part of the “family reunion”, and in the next decade, 150,000 more. In 1971–1980, 220,000 more socalled late displaced persons left. In the 1980s, the greatest wave of migration took place, dictated mainly by the poor economic situation in Poland. At its peak in the years 1988–1990, 520,000 Poles came to Germany. In total, within half a century, starting in 1950, the number of displaced persons and emigrants from Poland reached 1.4 millions37 . This is why the role of the Polish diaspora clergy in this country was appreciated, as noted by the Consular Department of the Polish Embassy in Cologne: The Polish pastoral ministry in Germany plays an important role in preserving Polishness and patriotic education of Polish communities. The majority of Poles settling in Germany are of Roman Catholic faith, for whom the only church is the so-called traditional Polish Church. Also people of so-called German origin often remain with the Polish Church, which sometimes remains the only link between them and Poland38 .

The growing number of emigration to Germany was also the focus of interest of the Polish Episcopate, which resulted in the elevation of Polish parishes in Germany to the rank of Polish Catholic Missions and their staffing39 . They became a kind of centers of Polish life, which not only organized religious life but also cultural and social life. As emigration from Poland increased, so did the number of Polish priests or priests of Polish origin. In 1989 their number was estimated at about 50040 . Contrary to popular belief, the attitude of the vast majority of them to the Polish People’s Republic and institutions representing it was passive. The reasons for this state of affairs were found in the fact that: “The majority of this group are priests working in West German parishes. Their position is probably due to the conditions in which they operate. Local parishes do not generally deal with political issues on a broader 37 Peter Oliver Loew: My niewidzialni, p. 208. 38 AAN, Office for Religious Affairs, sign. 142/37, Information note on the Polish Catholic clergy in the Federal Republic of Germany dated 17 May 1989, prepared by the Consular Department of the Polish Embassy in Cologne, p. 3. 39 Ibid., p. 1. 40 Ibid., p. 2.

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scale and are deprived of greater independence of action”41 . Of course, one should not forget about the priests who have been actively involved in political activity. The representatives of the communist authorities in Germany wrote about them that: “(...) in their work they interpret events in the country in a biased way”42 . Among those most involved were the following priests: Franciszek Blachnicki from Carlsberg, Stanisław Budyń from Hannover, Jerzy Galiński from Munich, Kazimierz Kosicki from Frankfurt, Kazimierz Latawiec from Mannheim, Jan Śliwiński from Hamburg and Wacław Tokarek from Dortmund43 . They were subjected to slander and defamation activities, which were supposed to discredit them in their environment. The effectiveness of such actions was, however, limited, as the Consular Department of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in Cologne clearly indicated when reporting to the headquarters: The actions taken so far and attempts to establish wider contacts have not brought the expected results. Our influence on Polish priests is relatively small. Cooperation with a small group of priests brings certain benefits, but it is not enough to shape positive trends in the whole clergy44 .

Such steps were taken by the Consular Departments of the Embassies of the Polish People’s Republic in Germany and the Polish Military Mission in Berlin. To this end, representatives of the Polish diaspora clergy were invited to Polish representations. However, they rarely went beyond the casual exchange of courtesy visits, which is indicated by the documentation of the Office for Religious Affairs. Undoubtedly, however, this is confirmed by the fact that the party and governmental authorities appreciated the importance and power of the Roman Catholic Church’s influence on emigration. They saw it as an effective tool for achieving political goals. For this reason, improving contacts with the Polish clergy was a priority in governmental programs of cooperation with the Polish diaspora. The social and political changes that took place in Poland and Germany in the last decade of the 20th century forced the need to develop new principles for the Polish-speaking ministry in Germany. These were included in the “Guidelines for the Polish Language Pastoral Care in Germany” of 17 September 2001, which

41 AAN, Office for Religious Affairs, sign. 126/170, Information note on the Polish Catholic clergy in the Federal Republic of Germany dated 10 November 1986, prepared by the Consular Department of the Polish Embassy in Bonn, p. 3. 42 Ibid., p. 6. 43 Ibid., pp. 4–6. 44 Ibid., p. 8.

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were developed jointly by the German Bishops’ Conference and the Polish Bishops’ Conference45 .

Bibliography AAN (Central Archives of Modern Records), Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (KC PZPR), ref. 237/XXII-662, Note on the draft changes in the Central Committee apparatus. AAN, Office for Religious Affairs, sign. 126/165, Main directions of using the religious factor in the impact on the Polish diaspora of Western countries, p. 1. AAN, Office for Religious Affairs, sign. 126/167, Pastoral activity in Polish émigré communities, pp. 4, 17, 19. AAN, Office for Religious Affairs, sign. 126/167, The activities of the Polish diaspora, pp. 20–22. AAN, Office for Religious Affairs, sign. 126/169, Information note on the participation of the Polish Episcopate and the Polish Catholic clergy in Polish activities of 29 January 1987, p. 6. AAN, Office for Religious Affairs, sign. 126/170, Information note on the Polish Catholic clergy in the Federal Republic of Germany dated 10 November 1986, prepared by the Consular Department of the Polish Embassy in Bonn, pp. 3–8. AAN, Office for Religious Affairs, sign. 142/37, Information note on the Polish Catholic clergy in the Federal Republic of Germany dated 17 May 1989, prepared by the Consular Department of the Polish Embassy in Cologne, pp. 1–3. AAN, Office of the Minister of Veterans Affairs, sign. 1/182, Information on cooperation with the Polish clergy and the efforts of the state authorities to intensify it, 6 December 1977, pp. 1, 5–9. AAN, Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad “Polonia”, sign. 11/25, Information on the forms of influence of the state authorities on the clergy leaving for work in Polish communities abroad, pp. 1, 4. AAN, Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad “Polonia”, sign. 11/25, Ordinance No. 79 of the Prime Minister of 10 October 1973 on the composition, scope and mode of operation of the Interdepartmental Commission for Foreign Polonia, p. 3. AAN, Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad “Polonia”, sign. 6/223, 30 years of the Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora, Warsaw 1985, p. 3. AAN, Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad “Polonia”, sign. 4/2, Theses to work with the Foreign Polonia, pp. 5–6. AAN, Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad “Polonia”, sign. 4/2, Work plan of the “Polonia” Society for 1969, p. 3.

45 Wojciech Necel: Kształtowanie i rozwój struktur, p. 14.

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AAN, Society for Communication with the Polish Diaspora abroad “Polonia”, sign. 4/2, Work plan of the “Polonia” Society for 1965, p. 2. Cenckiewicz, Sławomir: Oczami Bezpieki. Szkice i materiały z dziejów aparatu bezpieczeństwa PRL, Wydawnictwo LTW, Karków 2008, p. 45. Ceranka, Paweł: Podstawowa Organizacja Partyjna PZPR w Ministerstwie Spraw Zagranicznych 1949–1989, in: Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość 27 (2016), p. 255. Dąbek, Krzysztof: PZPR – retrospektywy portret własny, Warszawa 2006, pp. 42–44. Gajowniczek, Tomasz: Przyczyny powstania i główne cele działalności Urzędu ds. Wyznań jako narzędzia realizacji polityki wyznaniowej władz w początkach Polski Ludowej, in: Rocznik Dobromiejski, Vol. 1 (2007), pp. 241, 243. Gasztold, Przemysław: Towarzysze z betonu. Dogmatyzm w PZPR 1980–1990, Warszawa 2019, p. 30. Janowski, Włodzimierz: Ustój władz, zadania i struktura aparatu wykonawczego KC PZPR w latach 1948–1990, in: Informator o strukturze i obsadzie personalnej, edit. Krzysztofa Persaka, Warszawa 2000, p. 15. Kosicki, Kazimierz: Duszpasterstwo wśród Polaków w Niemczech w latach 1945–1950, Lublin 1993, pp. 90–100. Lenczarowicz, Jan: Rola Towarzystwa “Polonia” w polityce PRL wobec Polonii w krajach zachodnich, in: Przegląd Polonijny 1/79 (1996), p. 47. Loew, Peter O.: My niewidzialni. Historia Polaków w Niemczech, Warszawa 2017, pp. 203, 208. Necel, Wojciech: Kształtowanie i rozwój struktur polskojęzycznego duszpasterstwa w Niemczech, in: Prawo kanoniczne: kwartalnik prawno-historyczny 57/2 (2014), p. 44. Pietrzak, Jerzy: Pełnia prymasostwa. Ostatnie lata prymasa Polski kardynała Augusta Hlonda 1945–1948, vol. II, Poznań 2009, pp. 799–800. Ruchniewicz, Krzysztof: Warszawa – Berlin – Bonn. Stosunki polityczne 1949–1958, Warszawa 2003, p. 18. Szczepanik, Krzysztof: Dyplomacja Polski 1918–2005. Struktury organizacyjne, Warszawa 2005, p. 138–139. Wiśniewska, Monika: Duszpasterstwo polonijne Kościoła Rzymskokatolickiego w ostatnim programie rządowym PRL, in: Remembrance and Justice 1/33 (2019), p. 136. Wrona, Janusz: Kompetencje i hierarchia urzędów. Formalna a rzeczywista pozycja polityczna marszałka sejmu, przewodniczącego Rady Państwa, prezesa Rady Ministrów, in: edit. Konrada Rokickiego/Roberta Spałka (eds.): Władza w PRL. Ludzie i mechanizmy, Warszawa 2011, p. 27. Wrona, Janusz: PZPR a partie satelickie, in: Dariusza Stoli/Krzysztofa Persaka (eds.): PZPR jako machina władzy, Warszawa 2012, pp. 139–140.

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The Influence of Political Parties on the Religious Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany

By regulating the relationship between the state and religious groups, German religious policy forms part of public policy and influences international politics. It is conditioned by the achievements and mistakes of the past and depends on current trends and tasks (globalization, migration crisis, tensions between secularism and religiousness, threats of fanaticism and extremism, integration policy challenges, or the Covid 19 pandemic). According to Ulrich Willems, religious policy is a political decision and process that regulates the religious practices of individuals (including the collective forms of their expression) as well as the public status, position and functions of religious symbols, religious practices and religious communities within a political community1 . Joachim Wiemeyer enumerated that in the twenty-first century, religious policy is concerned with the effects of the declining importance of the Catholic and Protestant churches; the integration of minorities into the functioning relationship between churches and the state, and that conflicts usually concern decisions on the construction of mosques, circumcision, the problem of genital mutilation, the slaughter of animals according to religious rules, the ban on wearing the burqa and other headgear, the granting of citizenship; the situation in families and forced marriages; and media policy on religious issues2 . After the Second World War, the relationship between the state and the religions in Germany was shaped according to a cooperative model because, despite the fundamental separation of church and state, these institutions worked together to raise funds and carry out tasks3 . Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde influenced the discourse on religious policy after World War II. His dictum: “A liberal secularized state has a basis in something it cannot guarantee on its own”, expressed a reflection on the

1 Ulrich Willems: Religionspolitik von neuen Herausforderungen, in: Daniel Gerstner/Viola van Melis/ Ulrich Willems (eds.): Religionspolitik heute. Problemfelder und Pespektiven in Deutschland, Freiburg bei Breisgau 2018, p. 38. 2 Joachim Wiemeyer, Religionspolitik in Deutschland nach dem Ende des Sozialismus, in: Polonia Sacra 2 (2016), pp. 71–91. 3 Thomas Großbölting, “Abendland”, “Rechristianisierung” und “hinkende Trennung”. Entstehung und Entwicklung der religionspolitischen Ordnung in der frühen Bundesrepublik, in: Daniel Gerstner/Viola van Melis/Ulrich Willems (eds.), Religionspolitik heute, p. 74; Ryszard Michalak, Polityka wyznaniowa. Zakres zjawiska, in: Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, 1 Section K (2019), p. 29.

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tasks of the state, including the potential for guaranteeing religious freedom4 . E.-W. Böckenförde’s reflections concerned the point that the so-called “res mixtae”, i.e., issues that concern the state as well as religious groups and beliefs, for example in trade, education, health and social policy, cannot be avoided5 . It should be noted that after the Second World War, social and demographic changes took place, which led German society and political parties to discuss the need for an evolution of religious policy. Currently, two thirds of Germans are non-believers. The number of followers of Islam has increased, and the Catholic and Evangelical Church has been struggling with the problem of the departure of believers since the 1960s. In Germany, the process of religious diversity has intensified, which results from the permeation and similarity of certain faiths and sometimes superficial duplication of beliefs and traditions, e.g. due to a lack of knowledge. At the same time, the processes of religious syncretism are continuing alongside the dangers posed by dogmatism and fundamentalism, although their level varies and is dependent on many factors, such as demographic, economic and educational factors. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution is investigating the risks caused by the extreme and dangerous links between religion and politics. One of the most spectacular examples was the activity of the so-called Hamburg group, represented by Mohamed Atta, responsible for the attack on the World Trade Center. Through political socialization and the pursuit of pluralism, the media and other institutions are transmitting knowledge about religions, including those less known and popular6 . The problem is the lowering of the credibility of authorities among the representatives of religions and the recurring scandals in religious circles. Stereotypically and superficially, the weakening of the significance of religiousness was interpreted as a manifestation of modernity. Recent research shows the interpenetration and influence between religious attitudes and attitudes towards democracy and pluralism; and 87 % of Germans declare openness to religion. Studies and projects on attitudes toward democracy and the political culture of religious representatives who live in Germany are being continued7 . The article analyzes how, in the 21st century, in a united Germany, German political parties reacted to atheistic processes among the religions that dominated after the Second World War, which had the status of a corporation of public law, and the increase of immigrants who declared their faith in Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism

4 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde: Wolność–państwo–Kościół, Kraków 1994, p. 120. 5 Antonius Liedhegener: Religionsfreiheit und die neue Religionspolitik. Mehrheitsentscheide und ihre Grenzen in der bundesdeutschen Demokratie, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 55 (2008), p. 87. 6 Ulrich Willems: Herausforderung religiöse Vielfalt, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 52 (2016), p. 42; Michael Walzer, Lewica. Stare błędy, nowe wyzwania, Warszawa 2018, p. 231. 7 Gert Pickel, Weltanschauliche Vielfalt und Demokratie. Wie sich religiöse Pluralität auf die politische Kultur auswirkt, Bertelsmann Stiftung, VII (2019), pp. 18 and 37.

The Influence of Political Parties on the Religious Policy

or other religions. To this end, a method of analyzing the content of the sources was used, especially the programs of political parties. In addition, research work carried out in the prestigious cluster “Religion and Politics” at the University of Münster and the Research Group on World Views in Germany was analyzed. The views of Volker Beck, representative of the Green Party, who initiated the Center for Religious Studies at the University of Bochum, were analyzed8 . Reports from the Bundestag, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the Pew Research Center, and the Bertelsmann Foundation were analyzed, as conclusions could be drawn from their reading about the level of perception of religious problems among political party representatives. Discussions on religious policy were also moderated and coordinated by representatives of German political foundations, e.g. the Friedrich Ebert Foundation on the left and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation on the right9 . In addition, selected monographs and articles of scientific and journalistic provenance were included. Religious issues have been the cause of many social conflicts, in which a number of state institutions, including courts, are involved. Representatives of political parties initiated debates and projects concerning religious issues and fought for the electorate of representatives of various world views. Political discussions considered to what extent religions and atheism could become “aggressive”, influence world-view pluralism or create social distance? Among the discourse on religious symbols, e.g., wearing scarves, burqas, or hanging crosses in public institutions, answers were sought to problems of integration policy, such as educational challenges, attitudes towards abortion and euthanasia, social trust, threats posed by fundamentalism and dogmatism. Conflicts concern disputes arising in everyday life about the relationship between the need to freely manifest religious beliefs and civil rights and duties. In this way, there is a need to regulate the postulates to introduce a general subject about religions instead of religion lessons in schools, or to defend women’s civil rights against the restrictive rules of some religions. There are also voices (in favor of research by the 2017 Religious Monitor) which claim that feeling threatened by and fear of Islam is not necessarily associated with the presentation of attitudes attributed to Islamophobia and hostility to Islam10 .

8 Volker Beck: Religion, Staat, Gesellschaft im Konflikt. Bündnisgrüne Religionspolitik als Antwort auf Säkularisierung und religiöse Pluralität, in: Daniel Gerstner/Viola van Melis/Ulrich Willems (eds.), Religionspolitik heute, p. 367–377. 9 Karlies Abmeier/Andreas Jacobs, Religion braucht Politik, https://www.kas.de/de/kurzum/detail/-/ content/religion-braucht-politik, [last accessed 25.07.2020]. 10 Danuta Janicka, Rozwiązywanie problemów dotyczących praktykowania religii i zwyczajów muzułmańskich w Niemczech – wybrane regulacje i orzecznictwo, in: Studia Iuridica Torunesia 22 (2018), pp. 66–69.

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The German constitutional state is based on the experience of previous centuries, including the consequences of the Thirty Years’ War, which spread the principle of “whose realm, his/her religion”; the consequences of the Napoleonic conquests in the form of the confiscation of ecclesiastical property; the war for culture (Kulturkampf), which was waged during the Otto von Bismarck era, i.e. “the struggle between the secular worldview and the Church-dominated religious worldview”11 . As a result, the Weimar Constitution of 1919 sanctioned state compensation to the Catholic and Protestant Church for the losses suffered as a result of the wars. The Church’s disgraceful decision to conclude a concordat with Hitler in 1933 and the burden of the Second World War, with the persecution of religious and ethnic groups, resulted in an attempt by postwar Germany to implement the concept of a constitutional state based on the sincere principles of tolerance and openness. The approach to religious matters in West Germany was regulated on many levels: the Basic Law of 1949, the constitutions of the Länder and international agreements that addressed the issues of religious freedom and tolerance. The constitution of 1949 continued the process of compensating churches for the loss of property, which had been initiated in the Weimar constitution. Compensation was also paid to churches in East Germany. Through the process of Europeanization, Western Germany followed principles rooted in the Catholic teachings of the church, such as subsidiarity and solidarity. After the Second World War, the church in West Germany played the role of “the basis for a new beginning”12 . Over time, some church members formed various organizations, such as PAX Christi, the Deacons, to speak out on important social and political issues. Before the reunification of Germany, the activity of the followers of the Catholic and Evangelical churches also took place in East Germany, especially as a form of protest against communist power and an appeal for German reunification. Monday demonstrations at St. Michael’s Church in Leipzig became a symbol of this time. In addition to the organized activities of the churches, an atheistic trend was also observed, which was reflected in the evolution of the shape of the party system in Germany, which was based on two dominant groups after the Second World War: The Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). The influence of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) wasn’t big. With the emergence of the Greens on the party scene and the evolution of the party system in the 21st century (activity of the Left Party or the Alternative for Germany and other groups), new lines of conflict emerged in the area of religious policy and problems in the implementation of the principles of religious freedom, pluralism, neutrality and equality. Religious issues also gave

11 Jerzy Krasuski, Kulturkampf. Katolicyzm i liberalizm w Niemczech w XIX wieku, Wrocław 2009, p. 7. 12 Thomas Großbölting: “Abendland”..., p. 75.

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impetus to other groups, which often received low public support in elections. In 1989, the Party of Christians Faithful to the Bible (Partei Bibeltreuer Christen) was founded and in 2015 joined the Labor, Environment and Family Party (Labor, Environment and Family, AUF) to form the Alliance C – Christians for Germany (Bündnis C – Christen für Deutschland)13 . Attitudes toward religion among party members led to polarization and the emergence of working groups that added the creation of positions on religious issues to their agenda. Representatives of the Greens, the FDP, and the Pirate Party14 presented their views, which at times expressed polemics against the party’s mainstream ideology. Researchers like Jürgen Habermas initiated discussions on the role of religion in the public sphere and the relationship between religious tolerance and cultural rights15 . The question of defining a leading culture and the importance of integration policies emerged. Questions about the possibility of preventing religious fanaticism and extremism became open. Former German President Joachim Gauck, whose social and political life was intertwined with his spiritual life, called for tolerance and open society. As a pastor and theologian, he represented a view that he shared in 2017 when he handed over the office of President to Frank Walter Steinmeier: “the decisive dividing line in our democracy is not between the incumbent and new citizens, not between Christians, Muslims, Jews and atheists. The decisive dividing line is between democrats and non-democrats. It is not the origin that matters, but the attitude”16 . The constitution of 1949 was the basis for discussion of religious matters (the preamble, Article 4). The Constitution also regulates the issue of education in Section 3, Article 717 . In the twenty-first century, party discourse on religious policy followed challenges in domestic and international politics. The previously adopted core and electoral programs that formed the doctrine of the main political parties reflected the continuity and change in the debates and decision-making processes that concerned the role of religions in the German state. The more conservative and reactive stance was maintained by the Christian Democrats, while other parties began to postulate changes over time and signalled (like the Greens) that the system 13 Bündnis C, https://buendnis-c.de, [last accessed 20.07.2020]. 14 Frank Schenker, Laizismus- und Säkularismusdebatten in den bundesdeutschen Parteien, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 2 (2014), p. 211–217. 15 Jürgen Habermas, Między naturalizmem a religią. Rozprawy filozoficzne, Warszawa 2012. 16 Joachim Gauck: Rede zum Ende der Amtszeit zu der Frage “Wie soll es aussehen, unser Land?”, Rede zum Ende der Amtszeit zu der Frage “Wie soll es aussehen, unser Land?”, https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Joachim-Gauck/Reden/2017/01/ 170118-Amtszeitende-Rede.html, [last accessed 25.07.2020]; Joachim Gauck, Helga Hirsch, Toleranz: Einfach schwer, Freiburg 2019. 17 Ustawa zasadnicza dla Republiki Federalnej Niemiec, 23.05.1949, https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/ pdf/80205000.pdf, [last accessed 10.06.2020].

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of relations between the state and the churches based on the Weimar and 1949 constitutions needed to be reformed. The desire for change was due, among other things, to the social and demographic changes that were gradually taking place in Germany. The influx of followers of Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and other religions led to the modification of the party doctrines of the 20th century. After 2015, the alternative for Germany, which included a number of demands concerning Islam in its program, also reflected the influence of representatives of religions other than Christianity or Judaism on the socio-political reality. During the Bundestag election campaign in 2017, religious issues were included in the election programs of the political parties, which were largely based on documents created by party committees and committees for party congresses at both federal and Land level. SPD – The provisions of the Erfurt Program of 1891 indicated that religion was a “private matter”. The 1959 Godesberg Program postulated tolerance of religion and respect for the followers of religion. According to the SPD, churches should have public-legal protection. The SPD was in favor of freedom of conscience and religion and not using world views for anti-democratic and party purposes18 . Helmut Schmidt, the Social Democrat nestor in the coalition with liberals, presented himself as a Christian and a representative of the liberal-conservative trend in politics. He maintained contacts with church dignitaries (e.g. Hans Otto Wölber, Eduard Lohse), wrote and spoke about the relationship between politics and religions. The Prime Minister of Brandenburg, Manfred Stolpe, was also involved in political and religious life19 . The SPD’s core program, which was adopted on 28 October 2007 in Hamburg, included proposals for churches, religious and world-view communities. The priority for the SPD was to respect the constitution. The Social Democrats stated that the Basic Law “offers cultural diversity” and points to boundaries that “cannot be crossed, also because of tradition and religion”. They were in favor of democracy, dialogue, cooperation in the realization of common tasks between religions. The SPD emphasized: “we inform about the Jewish-Christian and humanist legacy of Europe and declare tolerance in matters of faith. We defend the freedom of thought, conscience, faith and proclamation”20 . The SPD protested against religious fundamentalism. It pointed to the role of globalization in increasing contacts between religions and indicated that it brings together members representing different religions. The value

18 Grundsatzprogramm der SPD, Bad Godesberg, 13.–15.11.1959, https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Beschluesse/Grundsatzprogramme/godesberger_programm.pdf, [last accessed 09.07.2020]. 19 Reinhard Bingener: Rainer Hering: “Aber ich brauche die Gebote ...”. Marc Aurel der deutschen Religionspolitik, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.02.2013. 20 Grundsatzprogramm der SPD, Hamburg 28.10.2007, https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/ Beschluesse/Grundsatzprogramme/hamburger_programm.pdf, [last accessed 09.07.2020].

The Influence of Political Parties on the Religious Policy

is tolerance and coexistence of people who represent different religions as well as different cultures. The SPD protested against all forms of privilege, also because of religion. Religious and philosophical organizations are an important part of civil society. For religious extremism “there is no place in Germany”21 . In the election program of 2017, the SPD emphasized the value of civil society, which involves many associations, initiatives, churches and religious groups. The Social Democrats expressed their support for equality regardless of gender, religion or skin color. They postulated interreligious dialogue and dissemination of knowledge about religions and cultures as a condition for peaceful coexistence and mutual respect between people. They pointed out that knowledge of religions makes it possible to prevent extremism and advocated enabling children to learn religion and ethics. They declared their support for teaching Islam at schools in German. The SPD stressed that Muslims and Islam are part of Germany. They supported the development of Muslim organizations and municipalities on condition that it takes place on the basis of German constitutional law22 . CDU/CSU – Even the names of the Christian Democratic Parties showed that they attach importance to the Christian cultural heritage. The CDU’s first postwar core program of 1978 proclaimed in its preamble: “The policy of the CDU stems from the Christian understanding of people and their responsibility to God”. The program recognizes the independence of churches and religious communities and supports their activity and co-responsibility for the common good. It advocated cooperation between Christians and non-Christians. The Christian Democrats pointed out that the activity of the churches in public matters deserves recognition for their achievements and the way they work23 . In the main program of 1994, the Christian Democrats supported compulsory religious education at school and pointed to the influence of Catholic churches in shaping religious freedom in the world. They emphasized that many Germans are Christians and that churches and religious communities influence the shaping of values in society and contribute to social, charitable and educational activities. Churches should be enabled to carry out their tasks by maintaining the church tax. They pointed to the contribution of the churches to the shaping of the common good and the dignity of people. They expressed their gratitude to the Jewish communities and pointed out that Judaism and Christianity are united by common traditions and

21 Ibid. 22 Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit. Unser Regierungsprogramm für Deutschland. https://www.spd.de/ fileadmin/Dokumente/Regierungsprogramm/SPD_Regierungsprogramm_BTW_2017_A5_RZ_ WEB.pdf, [last accessed 16.07.2020]. 23 Grundsatzprogramm der CDU, Ludwigshafen, 23.–25.10.1978, https://www.kas.de/c/document_ library/get_file?uuid=c44fbaf4-a603-d097-6898-e72e6fae6f39&groupId=252038, [last accessed 09.07.2020].

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culture. The Christian Democrats pointed out that they were in favor of religious freedom in the world24 . In its 2007 core program, the Christian Democrats postulated compulsory religious lessons in all federal states. The program’s signatories believed that the offer should include Catholic, Evangelical and other religious lessons, if such a need arises. These obligatory lessons should take place in German and under state supervision. The CDU recognized that other religions also contribute to social development and have a positive impact on social life. It emphasized that Jewish communities play a special role. The Christian Democrats postulated autonomy and independence of the Catholic churches and other recognized religious communities. They supported the current system of collecting church tax and pointed to the positive role of churches in social service. They supported religious freedom and appealed for religious freedom to be respected in other countries. They postulated a dialogue with other religions and the development of integration policies. According to the Christian Democrats, churches and religious communities positively shape public life and relations with migrants25 . In its election program of 2017, the CDU reminded that it supports the separation of church and state and respects the principle of religious freedom for all. They called for an interreligious dialogue, including the continuation of the dialogue with Islam within the framework of the German Conference on Islam which has been ongoing since 2007. The election program included a note that the CDU and CSU do not respect the abuse of Islam for violence, inequality, terrorism and oppression. In addition, the group also advocated the closure of mosques that show the activities of the Salafists. The political exertion of religious influence from abroad was also criticized. The Christian Democrats advocated social cohesion, in which the churches engaged in socially important tasks, e.g. educational activities, helping the sick and old, and youth work. It considered the adoption of the Integration Act on 31 July 2016 as a success, the aim of which is to broaden the offer of language and integration courses and monitor integration, e.g. on the labor market. The Christian Democrats brought to mind that churches participate in overcoming crises and carry out missionary activities. The Christian Democrats supported the appointment of the Government Special

24 Freiheit in Verantwortung: Grundsatzprogramm der CDU, Hamburg, 20.–23.02.1994, https://www. kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=3c7580d4-1a63-31f6-5d94-4f057de659c0&groupId= 252038, [last accessed 09.07.2020]. 25 Das Grundsatzprogramm. Hannover, 3.–4.12.2007, https://www.cdu.de/grundsatzprogramm-2007, [last accessed 09.07.2020].

The Influence of Political Parties on the Religious Policy

Representative for Religious Freedom and stressed the importance of celebrating the 500th anniversary of the Reformation26 . FDP – The Liberals postulated a tolerant attitude and supported the vision of a secular, pluralist state. At the party congress in Hamburg (30 September–2 October 1974), they adopted the Theses “Free Churches in a Free State” in which they advocated: the independence of church and state; dialogue between state and churches; legal reforms to regulate the status of religious associations; respect for the legal order; churches and religious groups should regulate the acquisition and loss of membership according to their principles; the replacement of church tax by a church contribution system; respect for the principle of neutrality in the constitutions of the Länder; the state offering religious lessons or knowledge. The Liberals called for the beliefs of the groups not to become binding on everyone, and therefore advocated the abandonment of religious symbols in state institutions and public schools. They were in favor of abolishing the privileged position of churches and religious groups in public life. They recognized the right to use the services of representatives of religious groups for the Bundeswehr, such as military chaplains27 . Although the party’s doctrine is dominated by the phrases concerning the separation of church and state, Philipp Rösler, one of the party leaders, stressed the role of Catholicism in his life. Mr. Rösler was born in 1972 in South Vietnam, where he was brought up by nuns. The boy came to Germany because he was adopted by a Bundeswehr officer, Uwe Rösler. After studying medicine, he began working in a hospital belonging to Diakonia. He met a girl who was Catholic and became involved in church life as an adult. He sometimes mentioned that his membership of the FDP was criticized by a priest. He was one of the few members of the FDP who worked in the Central Committee of German Catholics. As a doctor and minister of health, and later as deputy chancellor, he pointed out the importance of bioethics. He represented the Catholic Church’s position on the death penalty. During the work on the reform of the health care system, he argued that the principle of solidarity should be observed. When the FDP failed in the 2013 Bundestag elections, he withdrew from political activity. In its election program for 2017, the FDP advocated religious freedom and equal treatment of churches, religious and philosophical communities. The FDP advocated religious freedom in the rule of law and the observance of the principle of tolerance. According to the FDP, section 166 of the Penal Code, which deals with blasphemy, insulting believers, religious and philosophical communities, is redundant and should be

26 Für ein Deutschland, in dem wir gut und gerne leben. Regierungsprogramm 2017–2021, https://www. cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/170703regierungsprogramm2017.pdf?file=1, [last accessed 09.07.2020]. 27 Thesen der FDP „Freie Kirche im Freien Staat, Hamburg 1974, http://www.payer.de/religionskritik/ FDP1974.htm, [last accessed 08.07.2020].

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abolished. The FDP feels that the provisions of this paragraph are “medieval”. They appealed to religious leaders to oppose every religious justification for violence and terror. The FDP calls for the principle of equality between churches and religious denominations to be respected, but requires that constitutional law be observed. The Liberals indicated that they advocated human rights protection for LGBTIs. They opposed religious fundamentalism28 . Left Party – In 2016, the Left Party postulated secularism and stressed that the church in Germany is privileged. Representatives of the Left Party criticized the so-called Church Tax (Kirchensteuer), which makes it possible to collect money from believers using the public tax system. The Left Party criticized the church labor law and the teaching of religion in schools. It demanded that the army and police hire psychologists instead of access to chaplains. In the election program of 2017 the grouping postulated the separation of the church from the state and freedom of religion. According to the Left Party, the decision to withdraw from a church or religious group should not be financially burdensome. Representatives of the group advocated a reform of the church labor law to allow employees of churches, deacons and Caritas to go on strike. They called for the deletion of Article 118 of the Enterprise System Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), which states that religious communities and their charitable and educational institutions are not affected. They demanded recognition of the struggle of the churches and trade unions for the Sundays off. They expressed their solidarity with people who were oppressed because of a strike for religious reasons, such as changing their religion or leaving church. The Left Party pointed out that churches and religious institutions acting as employers are obliged to respect the rights of LGBTTIQ+ people. The Left Party opposed discrimination against religious minorities and “cultural conflicts” (“Kampf der Kulturen”). It supported the teaching of ethics in schools. The Left Party protested against both anti-Muslim racism and radical groups in all religions. In its opinion, Jewish and Muslim holidays should be respected in the same way as Christian holidays. The political party indicated that it supports world views and religions working for global social justice, democracy and peace. The grouping supported the resignation from the presence of military chaplains in the army and the preparation of a contract for religious care in the army for followers of all religions29 . The Greens – The foundations of this grouping’s doctrine are freedom, pluralism, inclusiveness. The party advocates the coexistence of people of different origins,

28 Denken wir neu. Das Programm der Freien Demokraten 2017, https://www.fdp.de/sites/default/files/ uploads/2017/08/07/20170807-wahlprogramm-wp-2017-v16.pdf, [last accessed 08.07.2020). 29 Wahlprogramm der Partei Die Linke zur Bundestagswahl, Hannover, 9.–11.06.2017, https://www.dielinke.de/fileadmin/download/wahlen2017/wahlprogramm2017/die_linke_wahlprogramm_2017. pdf, [last accessed 07.07.2020).

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religions, and cultures in an open society and a secular state. Cem Őzdemir, leader of the party of Turkish origin, stressed that the success of integration policy is knowledge of the German language, compliance with the constitution and German legislation, and joining the German education system30 . Omid Nouripour, a representative of the Greens of Iranian origin, repeatedly warned against the threat of jihadism and the consequences of fundamentalism. Like many politicians from the Greens, Nouripour criticized Salafism and, in his work on integration policy, analyzed programs to prevent religious extremism31 . The Greens adopted the Commission’s report at the 2016 convention in Münster: “World Views, Religious Communities and the State,” which was included in the 2017 election program. The Greens pointed out that religious conflicts were related to social policy. They emphasized that the number of Christians in Germany had decreased, but that the number of followers of other religions and atheists had increased. They pointed out the contribution of European unification to overcoming conflicts and guaranteeing peace within the framework of universal values such as equality, democracy, human rights and tolerance. They pointed out that the policy of the Greens aims to respect human rights and religious freedom, which should be guaranteed by respecting the tree pillars: equal treatment, pluralism and preventing discrimination. They postulated the prevention of racism, anti-Semitism, hostility to Islam and homophobia. They pointed out that they were in favor of promoting immigration and respecting peaceful coexistence between people of different origins. They called for the observance of the constitution by religions and world-view groups. They protested against religious discrimination and called for interreligious dialogue. According to the Greens, relations between the state and the churches should be reformed (labor law, church tax). Since the number of atheists in Germany increased, state subsidies for churches should be abolished. Religious practices and traditions can be criticized, for example in art. Like the Left Party, they called for the abolition of Article 166 of the Penal Code on Blasphemy. The Greens brought to mind that religious and philosophical communities can be an important support for democracy through social (charitable, ecological) activity. They opposed religious agitation and fundamentalism. For the Greens, Islam belongs to Germany, the activities of Islamic political organizations cannot be observed recklessly. The activities of Islamic organizations should be within the framework of the constitution and civil society. Religious organizations can cooperate in implementing projects against right-wing extremism. It is unacceptable to use religious organizations for

30 Cem Őzdemir: Leitkultur, Verfassung, Republikanismus, in: Norbert Lammert (ed.): Verfassung. Patriotismus. Leitkultur. Was unsere Gesellschaft zusammenhält, Bonn 2006, p. 208. 31 Omid Nouripour, Was tun gegen Dschichadisten? Wie wir den Terror besiegen können, München 2017; Omid Nouripour, Mein Job, meine Sprache, mein Land. Wie Integration gelingt, Freiburg bei Breisgau 2007; Verfassungsschutzbericht, ibid., p. 193.

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political purposes or spying. The Greens pointed out that four important Muslim organizations: 1. the Turkish-Muslim Union of the Presidium for Religious Affairs (DİTİB); 2. the Muslim Council of Germany (Islamrat für Bundesrepublik Deutschland); 3. the Central Council of Muslims, 4. the Union of Muslim Cultural Centers Zentralrat der Muslime (V.I.K.Z.) are religious associations, but do not meet the legal requirements for membership of religious communities under religious law. They indicated that imams and teachers of Islam at German universities are obliged to respect scientific freedom32 . Alternative for Germany – In its election program of 2017, the political party noted that in a secular state, the state law is above religious orders and traditions. It called for the development of an intellectual discourse on religions. Although, according to AfD, many Muslims live in Germany in accordance with the law and enjoy social respect, the party opposed Islam, which in its opinion is in conflict with the free and democratic order. Party members protested against the emergence of isolated Islamic parallel societies and the political and religious radicalization of Muslims. They expressed concern about Salafism and terrorism. They protested against the financing of the construction and operation of mosques sponsored by the Islamic state and foreign sponsors, such as the dependence of the DITIB mosques on the state “Office for Religious Affairs” in Turkey (Diyanet). The party also criticized the Muezzin invocation as an expression of “religious imperialism”. According to AfD, minarets and muezzin invocations are contrary to the principle of tolerant religious coexistence. AfD stressed that the imams should respect the constitution and loyally observe German law. Sermons in the mosques should be given in German, while imams agitating against the constitution should be prohibited from preaching. Neutral Islamic researchers must be employed at the universities. AfD demands a ban on the full covering of the body in public places and public services, because burka and niqab make it difficult to live together in society. They supported the European Court of Human Rights’ 2014 ruling that a ban on covering the face is justified in the interest of social cohesion. AfD pointed out that it is opposed to cultural war (Kulturkrieg)33 .

32 Abschlussbericht der Kommission “Weltanschauungen, Religionsgemeinschaften und Staat” von Bündnis 90/die Grünen, 2016, https://sven-giegold.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Abschlussbericht_ ReliKomm_GRÜNE.pdf, [last accessed 09.06.2020]; Bundestagswahlprogramm 2017 Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen, https://cms.gruene.de/uploads/documents/BUENDNIS_90_DIE_GRUENEN_Bundestagswahlprogramm_2017_barrierefrei.pdf, [last accessed 10.07.2020]. 33 Programm für Deutschland. Wahlprogramm der AfD 2017 Köln, https://cdn.afd.tools/wp-content/ uploads/sites/111/2017/06/2017-06-01_AfD-Bundestagswahlprogramm_Onlinefassung.pdf, [last accessed 10.07.2020]; Małgorzata Świder/Sylwia Góra/Beata Springer, Muzułmanie i islam w Niemczech. Perspektywa prawna, polityczna i kulturowa, Kraków 2019; Piotr Madajczyk, Między fundamentalizmem a asymilacją. Muzułmanie w Niemczech, Warszawa 2015, pp. 131–139.

The Influence of Political Parties on the Religious Policy

As a result of the election of 2017, a parliament was elected in which Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, Evangelical and Christian Democrat, became the Speaker of the Bundestag. The composition of the Bundestag indicated that secularization was progressing, and that more Members of Parliament than in 2013 did not decide to publish information about their religious affiliation. The coalition agreement concluded after the elections between the CDU/CSU and the SPD indicates the importance of churches in building civil society and European identity. The grand coalition pointed to the importance of religion in supporting education, social and health policies. The government was in favor of supporting interreligious dialogue. It announced a program to fight right-wing extremism and anti-Semitism. It declared its willingness to set up an expert committee on discrimination against Sinti and Roma. Christian Democrats and Social Democrats stressed that religious freedom is a central human right that also includes religious minorities. They demanded support for persecuted Christians, especially Christian women, and the appointment of a Federal Government Plenipotentiary for Religious Freedom in the World. The coalition parties stressed that they valued the activities of churches and religious groups and treated them as partners of the state and a party of dialogue34 . The coalition’s proposals for religious policy were a continuation of their earlier activities, which were presented in 2016 in the “Government Report on Religious Freedom” commissioned by the Bundestag35 . In 2016, the members of parliament discussed the “Report on Global Religious Freedom”, an important part of which is an assessment of Germany’s efforts to promote religious freedom. The Foreign Office’s research for the Bundestag on the situation of religions in the world was a compendium of knowledge about forms of religious persecution by state and non-state actors. The Bundestag debates on the promotion of religious and philosophical freedom within the EU, the Council of Europe, the UN, the OSCE and bilateral cooperation. The activities of the Working Group on Human Rights (EU), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE), the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Freedom are listed. The situations considered were: Restriction of the possibility of changing religion; sanctions; administrative obstacles; prejudices and social stigmatization; restriction of the possibility of public practice of religion; issues related to the practice of religion; religious socialization; the practice of building permits for places of worship; issues related to the worship of indigenous people; denial of military service on religious grounds; freedom of religion and freedom of expression; discrimination on religious and philosophical

34 Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD. 19. Legislaturperiode, https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975226/847984/5b8bc23590d4cb2892b31c987ad672b7/2018-03-14koalitionsvertrag-data.pdf?download=1, [last accessed 10.07.2020]. 35 Bericht der Bundesregierung zur weltweiten Lage der Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit, http:// dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/087/1808740.pdf, [last accessed 10.06.2020].

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grounds; access to state service, public offices; access to education; the possibility of using private property; restrictions on religious freedom due to family law and inheritance law; LGBTTIQ+ rights. The subjects of analysis and discussion were: violence argued for religious reasons, violence against religious critics, so-called “free thinkers”, non-conformist people; against religious minorities and LGBTI representatives; terrorism. It was studied how states provide protection for people persecuted for religious reasons36 . Markus Grübel of the CDU, government plenipotentiary for religious freedom37 , pointed out that hostility to Islam and anti-Semitism were a problem in the western world, and that in the Arab countries, hostility to Christians and radicalization of Islam were a problem. The politician drew attention to the tense situation in the Middle East. According to the plenipotentiary, the priority is to take action in cooperation with the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development on the territory ravaged by the Islamic State of Iraq. M. Grübel pointed out that the government’s projects include three stages: reconstruction, return and reconciliation. To this end, the ministry is working with churches and religious groups to implement the “Religion and Development” concept. M. Grübel also recalled the persecution of Muslims in Burma and the plight of Christians in Africa, including Nigeria and Sudan. Among the problems in Germany, he mentioned anti-Semitism and statements hostile to Islam. His next research was presented in a report published two years later38 . At the European Union level, there was a case for the office of the Union Plenipotentiary for Religious Freedom, established in 2016. In 2020, the European Commission, headed by Ursula von der Leyen, decided to delegate the task of plenipotentiary to special representatives for human rights and democracy. In July 2020, the 135 Members of the Bundestag representing the CDU/CSU, the SPD and the FDP signed an appeal to the European Commission to retain the office of Commissioner for Freedom of Religion39 . In addition to the level of respect for religious freedom, the Federal Government and the Länder are responding to daily religious problems. Due to the influx of

36 Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur weltweiten Lage der Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit, Drucksache 18/8740, 9.06.2016. 37 Bericht der Bundesregierung. 38 Religionsfreiheit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zum Abbau von Fluchtursachen Markus Grübel, MdB Beauftragter der Bundesregierung für weltweite Religionsfreiheit, 17.09.2018, https://www. kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=40fbf9f4-8518-3813-0d11-97b412f8ddba&groupId= 264621, [last accessed 10.06.2020]. 39 Weiter Kritik an Abschaffung des EU-Beauftragten für Religionsfreiheit, https://www.pro-medienmagazin.de/politik/2020/07/02/weiter-kritik-an-abschaffung-des-eu-beauftragten-fuerreligionsfreiheit, [last accessed 10.07.2020].

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immigrants, religious policy in Germany has faced difficult challenges, which have affected many areas of public life. The political parties, aware of the potential of the electorate representing different faiths and of the inclination to religious conflicts, are increasingly engaged in program and conceptual work on religious life and worldview issues. The diversity of worldviews and religions in Germany requires greater efforts on the part of state and private institutions to guarantee the security and freedom to demonstrate one’s faith within the framework of the established order and law, which should respond flexibly to changes while respecting the principle of certainty.

Bibliography Abmeier, Karlies/Jacobs, Andreas: Religion braucht Politik, https://www.kas.de/de/kurzum/ detail/-/content/religion-braucht-politik, [last accessed 25.07.2020]. Abschlussbericht der Kommission “Weltanschauungen, Religionsgemeinschaften und Staat” von Bündnis 90/die Grünen, 2016, https://sven-giegold.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ Abschlussbericht_ReliKomm_GRÜNE.pdf, [last accessed 09.07.2020]. Beck, Volker: Religion, Staat, Gesellschaft im Konflikt. Bündnisgrüne Religionspolitik als Antwort auf Säkularisierung und religiöse Pluralität, in: Daniel Gerster/Viola van Melis/ Ulrich Willems (eds.): Religionspolitik heute. Problemfelder und Pespektiven in Deutschland, Freiburg im Breisgau, 2018, pp. 367–377. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur weltweiten Lage der Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/087/1808740.pdf, [last accessed 10.06.2020]. Bingener, Reinhard: Rainer Hering: „Aber ich brauche die Gebote ...”. Marc Aurel der deutschen Religionspolitik, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.02.2013. Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang: Wolność–państwo–Kościół, Kraków 1994. Bröcker, Michael: Philipp Rösler. Ein Porträt. Glaube. Heimat. FDP, Leipzig, 2011. Bundestagswahlprogramm 2017 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, https://cms.gruene.de/uploads/ documents/BUENDNIS_90_DIE_GRUENEN_Bundestagswahlprogramm_2017_ barrierefrei.pdf, [last accessed 10.07.2020]. Bündnis C, https://buendnis-c.de, [last accessed 20.07.2020]. Denken wir neu. Das Programm der Freien Demokraten, 2017, https://www.fdp.de/sites/ default/files/uploads/2017/08/07/20170807-wahlprogramm-wp-2017-v16.pdf, [last accessed 08.07.2020]. Freiheit in Verantwortung: Grundsatzprogramm der CDU, Hamburg, 20.–23.02.1994, https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=3c7580d4-1a63-31f6-5d944f057de659c0&groupId=252038, [last accessed 09.07.2020]. Für ein Deutschland, in dem wir gut und gerne leben. Regierungsprogramm 2017–2021, https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/170703regierungsprogramm2017.pdf?file=1, [last accessed 09.07.2020].

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Gauck, Joachim/Hirsch, Helga: Toleranz. Einfach schwer, Freiburg, 2019. Großbölting, Thomas: “Abendland”, “Rechristianisierung” und “hinkende Trennung”. Entstehung und Entwicklung der religionspolitischen Ordnung in der frühen Bunderepublik, in: Daniel Gerster/Viola van Melis/Ulrich Willems (eds.); Religionspolitik heute. Problemfelder und Pespektiven in Deutschland, Freiburg im Breisgau, 2018, pp. 73–95. Grundsatzprogramm. Hannover, 3.–4.12.2007, https://www.cdu.de/grundsatzprogramm2007, [last accessed 09.07. 2020]. Grundsatzprogramm der CDU, Ludwigshafen, 23.–25.10.1978, https://www.kas.de/c/ document_library/get_file?uuid=c44fbaf4-a603-d097-6898-e72e6fae6f39&groupId= 252038, [last accessed 09.07.2020]. Grundsatzprogramm der SPD, Bad Godesberg, 13.–15.11.1959, https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Beschluesse/Grundsatzprogramme/godesberger_programm.pdf, [last accessed 09.07.2020]. Grundsatzprogramm der SPD, Hamburg 28.10.2007, https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Beschluesse/Grundsatzprogramme/hamburger_programm.pdf, [last accessed 09.07.2020]. Habermas, Jürgen: Między naturalizmem a religią. Rozprawy filozoficzne, Warszawa 2012. Janicka, Danuta: Rozwiązywanie problemów dotyczących praktykowania religii i zwyczajów muzułmańskich w Niemczech. Wybrane regulacje i orzecznictwo, in: Studia Iuridica Torunesia 22 (2018), pp. 65–82. Joachim Gauck: Rede zum Ende der Amtszeit zu der Frage “Wie soll es aussehen, unser Land?”, https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Joachim-Gauck/Reden/2017/01/170118-Amtszeitende-Rede.html, [last accessed 25.07.2020]. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD. 19. Legislaturperiode, https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975226/847984/5b8bc23590d4cb2892b31c987ad672b7/ 2018-03-14-koalitionsvertrag-data.pdf?download=1, [last accessed 10.07.2020]. Krasuski, Jerzy: Kulturkampf. Katolicyzm i liberalizm w Niemczech w XIX wieku, Wrocław, 2009. Liedhegener, Antonius: Religionsfreiheit und die neue Religionspolitik. Mehrheitsentscheide und ihre Grenzen in der bundesdeutschen Demokratie, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 55 (2008), pp. 84–107. Madajczyk, Piotr: Między fundamentalizmem a asymilacją. Muzułmanie w Niemczech, Warszawa, 2015. Michalak, Ryszard: Polityka wyznaniowa. Zakres zjawiska, in: Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska no 1 Sectio K (2019), pp. 23–35. Nouripour, Omid: Mein Job, meine Sprache, mein Land. Wie Integration gelingt, Freiburg bei Breisgau, 2007. Nouripour, Omid: Was tun gegen Dschichadisten? Wie wir den Terror besiegen können, München, 2017.

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Özdemir, Cem: Leitkultur, Verfassung, Republikanismus, in: Norbert Lammert (eds.): Verfassung. Patriotismus. Leitkultur. Was unsere Gesellschaft zusammenhält, Bonn, 2006, pp. 206–211. Pickel, Gert: Weltanschauliche Vielfalt und Demokratie. Wie sich religiöse Pluralität auf die politische Kultur auswirkt 7 (2019), https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/ BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/Religionsmonitor_Vielfalt_und_Demokratie_7_ 2019.pdf, [last accesed 10.07.2020]. Programm für Deutschland. Wahlprogramm der AfD 2017, Köln, https://cdn.afd.tools/wpcontent/uploads/sites/111/2017/06/2017-06-01_AfD-Bundestagswahlprogramm_ Onlinefassung.pdf, [last accessed 10.07.2020]. Religionsfreiheit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zum Abbau von Fluchtursachen. Markus Grübel, MdB Beauftragter der Bundesregierung für weltweite Religionsfreiheit, 17.09.2018, https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=40fbf9f4-8518-38130d11-97b412f8ddba&groupId=264621, [last accessed 10.06.2020]. Schenker, Frank: Laizismus- und Säkularismusdebatten in den bundesdeutschen Parteien, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 2 (2014), pp. 209–231. Świder, Małgorzata/Góra, Sylwia/Springer, Beata: Muzułmanie i islam w Niemczech. Perspektywa prawna, polityczna i kulturowa, Kraków 2019. Thesen der FDP „Freie Kirche in Freien Staat“, Hamburg 1974, http://www.payer.de/religionskritik/FDP1974.htm, [last accessed 08.07.2020]. Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur weltweiten Lage der Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit, Drucksache 18/8740, 9.06.2016 Ustawa zasadnicza dla Republiki Federalnej Niemiec, 23.05.1949, https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80205000.pdf, [last accessed 10.06.2020]. Wahlprogramm der Partei Die Linke zur Bundestagswahl, Hannover, 9.–11 VI 2017, https:// www.die-linke.de/fileadmin/download/wahlen2017/wahlprogramm2017/die_linke_ wahlprogramm_2017.pdf, [last accessed 07.07.2020] Walzer, Michael: Lewica. Stare błędy, nowe wyzwania, Warszawa, 2018. Weiter Kritik an Abschaffung des EU-Beauftragten für Religionsfreiheit, https://www. pro-medienmagazin.de/politik/2020/07/02/weiter-kritik-an-abschaffung-des-eubeauftragten-fuer-religionsfreiheit, [last accessed 20.07.2020]. Wiemeyer, Joachim: Religionspolitik in Deutschland nach dem Ende des Sozialismus, in: Polonia Sacra 2 (2016), pp. 71–91. Willems, Ulrich: Herausforderung religiöse Vielfalt, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 52 (2016), pp. 41–46. Willems, Ulrich: Religionspolitik von neuen Herausforderungen, in: Daniel Gerster/Viola van Melis/Ulrich Willems (eds.): Religionspolitik heute. Problemfelder und Pespektiven in Deutschland, Freiburg bei Breisgau 2018. Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit. Unser Regierungsprogramm für Deutschland. https://www. spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Regierungsprogramm/SPD_Regierungsprogramm_BTW_ 2017_A5_RZ_WEB.pdf, [last accessed 16.07.2020].

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Catalonia’s Religious Policy as an Instrument in the Independence Process

Introduction The phenomenon of immigration in recent decades has become an urgent problem for many countries. The issue of religious diversity is closely related to it, and in the face of this, the religious factor is gaining in importance, both in social and political context1 . Most often, religious policy is the domain of states, but this does not mean that it cannot be created at the level of the regions as a specific type of public policy that targets the activity of religious associations or religious organizations. An example of a religious policy that has been scrupulously built up for decades at regional level is the work of the Autonomous Government of Catalonia, which has undertaken activities of a conceptual, programmatic, operational and executive nature2 , including ministries, departments, offices and agencies. Among the factors determining Catalan religious policy is the migration trend. Moreover, this policy is conditioned by the specificity and religious structure of the area, by the progressive secularization, and by the possibility of using it in political rivalry with the Spanish authorities, and by the shaping of Catalonia into being more pro-European than other regions of Spain through the pursuit of a multicultural model of social organization or, as underlined by Catalan decision-makers, the building of a modern, pluralistic society. From the perspective of Catalanists and then independents, religion has become a political phenomenon. It seems, therefore, extremely important to pursue one’s own religious policy, especially in the context of national minorities or communities that aspire to or recognize themselves as a fully-fledged nation, making separatist claims. Therefore, national and ethnic policy is often closely linked to religious policy3 . In the case of Catalonia, these relationships are further complicated by the growing influx of people, and thus the accompanying increase in religious diversity. The resulting multicolored reality requires coordinated action on the part

1 Paul Bramadat/Matthias Koenig: International Migration and the Governance of Religious Diversity, Montreal/Kingston 2009. 2 Ryszard Michalak: Polityka wyznaniowa państwa polskiego wobec mniejszości religijnych w latach 1945–1989, Zielona Góra 2014. 3 Stefan Dudra: Lemko Identity and the Orthodox Church, Connecticut 2018.

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of Catalan decision-makers to allow not only integration within Catalan society, but also the active involvement of religious communities in political projects, including independence. The purpose of this article is to analyze Catalan religious policy in the context of the aspirations for independence in the region. The verification of regional-religious relations is intended to identify the mechanisms that will encourage the secession of Catalonia and to determine the interrelationship between religious minorities and the aspirations of independents and nationalists. The research was based, among other things, on an analysis of normative acts, including the Spanish Constitution, the Statute of the Autonomy of Catalonia, as well as laws issued by the Generalitat and documents drawn up by institutions, bodies and agencies under its authority. Furthermore, reports and surveys were an important source of information, as well as a comparison of the results of the analysis with the studies presented in the current literature.

Changes in the Field of Religion in Democratic Spain The process of democratization of Spain was associated not only with political and economic changes, but above all with social changes, including changes in religion. The Constitution of Spain of 1978 established a secular state, and recognized the most important values of the legal order: freedom, justice, equality and political pluralism. This meant that the right to religious freedom was part of the catalog of fundamental rights4 . As a result, the Catholic Church, which during the regime was one of the most important pillars of Frankism, lost its ideological monopoly in the public space and, as a result, its influence on the life of the Spanish people was greatly reduced, since the Basic Law clearly outlines the departure from the religious system or the principle of the one religion of the Spanish people5 . The citizens became equal before the law, and therefore any discrimination, including on religious grounds, is unacceptable. Article 16 of the Spanish Constitution guarantees “the freedom of individuals and communities in the sphere of ideology, religion and worship” and “the exercise of these freedoms is subject only to such restrictions as are necessary for the maintenance of the public order protected by law”6 . The question of religious freedom was further clarified in the 1980 organic law. Religious freedom

4 Joaquím Mantecón Sancho: El derecho fundamental de libertad religiosa. Textos, comentarios y bibliografia, Pamplona 1996, p. 121. 5 Andrés Ollero Tassara: España: Un Estado laico? La libertad religiosa en perspectiva constitucional, Cizur Menor 2005. 6 Constitución Española de 27 de diciembre de 1978, Boletín Oficial del Estado núm. 311, de 29 de diciembre de 1978.

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is a confirmation of systemic change and, at the same time, an announcement of the development of a secular model of state, where religion is not seen in political and political terms, but as a social reality7 . The 1990s brought significant changes in the religious landscape of the whole country. Spain became a destination for immigrants. This had two fundamental consequences in the religious field. The first was the significant increase in cultural and religious diversity on the Iberian Peninsula. The second was the need for greater participation in public life by religious minorities. This led to the need for a more coordinated policy towards these groups and, at the same time, the thought of the need for the effective inclusion of religious minorities in the public sphere became increasingly bold among political decision-makers. In 1992, therefore, state cooperation agreements were signed with Protestant, Muslim and Jewish communities. Under these agreements, the communities were granted a number of rights. However, in reality, these agreements were just paper. Therefore, finding for themselves a niche for political action, the Catalan authorities decided to take an innovative approach to the visiting population and religious matters. This resulted, among other things, in the conclusion of regional government agreements with many religious communities, which were effectively implemented in public life.

Immigration and Religion in the Region The Catalan approach to the phenomenon of migration and the accompanying cultural diversity was partly due to historical experience. Migration flows have affected the region many times, resulting in far-reaching demographic, social, economic and political transformations. They also influenced changes in the selfidentification of the Catalans, among whom the awareness of their own national identity was formed over the centuries. The self-awareness of the visiting population was also subject to change. Furthermore, this phenomenon influences the inclusive nature of regional nationalism and independentism and underlines the importance of the process of “becoming” a nation rather than “being” a nation. The scale and nature of immigration determined the political and economic situation in the region, but also in the immigrants’ places of origin. In the 16th century they came mainly from France8 . In the following centuries, the influx of people from the rest of Spain was particularly intense, especially from Aragon and Valencia,

7 Piotr Ryguła: Wolność religijna w Hiszpanii na tle przemian społeczno-politycznych w latach 1931–1992, Katowice 2009, p. 319. 8 Xavier Torres Sans: Los sin papeles y los otros. Inmigrantes franceses en Cataluña (siglos XVI–XVII), in: Mediterranero Economico 1 (2002), pp. 347–361.

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followed by Extremadura and Andalusia9 . Subsequent waves of influxes took place at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and from the beginning of the twenty-first century. Immigrants came mainly from European countries, Latin America, Africa and Asia. As early as the 1950s, the regime of General Francisco Franco announced the opening of Spain to visitors from different parts of the world. To this end, cooperation with the Maghreb, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon was strengthened. In the following years, groups of people from Palestine and Iran settled in Spain, followed by Morocco, Gambia and Senegal10 . After 1985, the most numerous group was made up of Moroccans, while at the same time there was a significant increase in the number of representatives of various religions and cultural circles. During the military dictatorship, the influx of people was directed to regions where the inhabitants had a strong sense of their own national identity, mainly in the Basque Country and Catalonia. These activities were part of a broader strategy of blurring all differences11 and building a unified state. The influx of immigrants with their own strong culture, language, customs, traditions, but also religion and the canon of values was, according to the Francoists, supposed to blow the cohesion of the Catalan community from the inside out and, in time, to let go of all that is Catalan. This was supposed to contribute to the weakening and, in time, the elimination of peripheral nationalisms. According to estimates by some researchers, Catalonia had a population of 2,000,000 in 1900 and 6,000,000 in 1992, mainly due to the arrival of immigrants. Without their presence, this increase could have been at most 400,00012 . According to data published by the Catalan Statistical Institute, as of 1 January 2020, Catalonia had 7,727,029 inhabitants (representing just over 16 % of Spain’s total population)13 , of which 1,259,013 were immigrants, representing 16.2 % of the total population of the region. Since the 1990s and the two decades of the 21st century, there is also the greatest cultural diversity, including religious diversity among immigrants, and in Catalan society as a whole.

9 Andrew Dowling: The rise of Catalan independence: Spain’s territorial crisis, Abingdon/New York 2008. 10 Wioletta Husar-Poliszuk: Polityczne determinanty rozwoju islamu w Katalonii w świetle radykalizacji independentyzmu w regionie, in: Wioletta Husar-Poliszuk/Bartłomiej Secler/Piotr S. Ślusarczyk: Polityka wyznaniowa. Konteksty innych polityk publicznych. Austria, Katalonia, Polska, Zielona Góra 2018, p. 118. 11 Eadem: Katalończycy: Od budowy własnej tożsamości do independentyzmu w regionie, Poznań 2020, p. 203. 12 Walter Actis/Miguel Ángel de Prada/Carlos Pereda: La Inmigración Extranjera en Catalunya. Balance y Perspectivas, Barcelona 1992, p. 11. 13 Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya, (2020), https://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=253&lang=en, [last accessed 28.08.2020].

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The scale of immigration to the region is also illustrated by the fact that, as of 1 January 2020, there were 5,423,198 immigrants in parallel throughout Spain14 , which means that more than every fourth of them chose Catalonia as their place of residence. Nearly 20 % of those arriving in the region are Moroccans, Romanians (nearly 8 %) and Chinese (more than 5 %), then significant groups of immigrants come mainly from the following countries: Italy, Pakistan, France, Bolivia, Honduras, India, Ecuador, Colombia, Russia, Ukraine and Peru. These number, according to government figures, from 4 % to 2 %. This not only determines the rich cultural mosaic of Catalonia, but also the religious diversity of the area, as confirmed by the data provided in the document, the so-called Religious Map. According to this map, in 2019 there were 8,165 places of worship in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, respectively belonging to 13 churches and religious denominations15 . The vast majority of them (over 6,000) are Catholic places of worship. Despite the Catholic roots of Catalonia and the still highest number of believers of the Catholic Church compared to other churches and religious associations in the region, the number and role of the Catholic community is constantly decreasing. Already in the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, Protestant communities had an established position in the region thanks to their schools, hospitals and libraries, among other things. According to the official website of the Ministry of Justice at the Generalitat, the first Jewish synagogue was established in Catalonia in 1918. Later the Baha’i, Jehovah’s Witnesses and followers of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints began to arrive in the region. It was not until the second half of the 20th century that places of worship for groups of Buddhists, Hindus, Orthodox Christians and Muslims appeared.

Catalan Immigration Policy and Religious Diversity With the new territorial regime, Catalonia has regained its autonomy and, no less importantly, the possibility to continuously expand its competences. The then ruling coalition, Convergència i Unió (CiU), held power in the region for the next 23 years and became a frequent coalition partner for all-Spanish parties. In addition to CiU, an important political actor from the region who is involved in cooperation with the national parties is the separatist Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC). Their strong position was confirmed by the torpedoing of Pedro Sánchez’s government, e.g. during the lack of support for the new budget. The activities of the Catalan

14 Ibid. 15 Mapa religioso de Cataluña, Departamento de Justicia Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona 2020.

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regional parties repeatedly hampered or even destabilized the political situation in the country. The importance of the region on the scale of the whole country is determined by not only the social capital, but also the economic potential, including nearly 20 % contribution to the GDP of Spain with investments of the central government in the region of about 10 %. According to the independentists, as a result, Catalonia’s budget deficit was between 7 % and 9 % of GDP in previous years16 , which was the main cause of the Catalan–Spanish conflict during the 2008–2009 economic crisis and in Catalonia, especially during the 2009–2014 period. CiU’s regional policy was determined mainly by the assumptions of Pujolism17 , whose foundations were laid by its then leader Jordi Pujol. Pujolism, or moderate Catalan nationalism, considered Catalanism to be primarily a cultural, intellectual and social movement, but also economic and political. It is aimed at preserving and further building a strong Catalan identity. Therefore, Catalonia should strive to become the most European of the Spanish regions and to respond to the changing reality, which is perfectly in line with the phenomena of immigration, cultural and religious diversity, in order to be able to effectively realize the aspirations of the community18 . This will enable Catalonia to move on to the next stage – fer país or “creating a country”. According to Pujol’s doctrine, the nationalistic goals can only be realized through openness and acceptance of otherness. The “otherness” is not, therefore, a disintegrating factor but, on the contrary, an element enriching Catalan identity. Therefore, in this light, a Catalan is one who works and lives in Catalonia and considers himself or herself a Catalan or expresses a desire to become one. The “trying” alone reveals the individual’s great emotional commitment to the Catalan cause19 . Pujol himself considered himself a representative of Christian humanism and his thought is rooted in personalistic nationalism, which defines the will and possibility of being. Despite this, Pujolism did not put Catholicism at the center, so followers of other religions and faiths could freely strive to “become” a true Catalan. In the 1970s, three strategy proposals were made in the region with regard to immigrants. The first one involved assimilation (acceptance of the Catalan culture and rejection of one’s own), the second one was duplication (co-existence of both cultures), and the third one was integration (permeation of cultures). Finally, it was decided to implement the latter20 . However, the Catalan edition of integration

16 Diego Muro: Territorial Accommodation, Party Politics, and Statute Reform in Spain, in: South European Society and Politics 14/1 (2009), p. 459. 17 Jaume Lores: Aproximació al pujolisme, in: Taula de canvi 23–24 (1979). 18 Jordi Pujol: Tot compromís comporta risc, Barcelona 1997, p. 130. 19 Manuel Castells: Siła tożsamości, Warszawa 2008, p. 39. 20 Agnieszka Grzechynka: Doktryna katalonizmu a współczesna polityka językowa Katalonii wobec imigrantów, Kraków 2017, pp. 167–168.

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meant the transposition of “one’s own” into “one’s other”. In accordance with this premise, visitors were to voluntarily adopt Catalan models and join the community, while at the same time freely maintaining contact with their own diaspora, culture, tradition and customs. As Steven Byrne states, Catalonia has always been a receiving region for immigrants, but integration has not involved assimilation or a multicultural approach21 . Here it was decided to apply an intercultural strategy with an invitation to integration within the community22 . In this way, the New Catalans ensured that several goals were met. First of all, they increased the social potential of the region, which was particularly important in times of demographic crisis, aging of the population, and the need to provide a workforce for the rapidly growing Catalan economy. Second, they were to have a positive impact on the survival and development of the Catalan culture, language, traditions and customs. In fact, this mechanism meant the popularization of “Catalanism” as well as the possible expansion of the audience for nationalists23 and nowadays also for Catalan independentists. In addition, among its symptomatic features are openness, inclusiveness, but also a positive attitude to the phenomenon of immigration, which also means a greater acceptance of cultural or religious differences within the community24 . Integration seems to be extremely important in the context of the realization of the independence project, especially since a progressive process of polarization has become apparent in Catalan society, where the attitude to the secession of the region has become the main axis of division 25 . According to a study by the Centro de Estudios de Opinión de la Generalitat de Catalunya (CEO) in July 2019, 44 % of Catalans supported the region’s independence, while 48.3 % opposed it, 5.5 % of respondents did not know how to address the issue and 2.1 % did not answer the question26 . The phenomenon of internal divisions is confirmed by, among other things, the tensions surrounding the referendum on independence in 2017 and the unilateral declaration of independence or the results of the early autonomous elections in Catalonia in December 2017 – the election was won by the party against the independence, Ciudadanos. It seems that for strategic reasons 21 Steven Byrne: Amic o enemic? Immigration and the Catalan Struggle for Independence, in: Ethnopolitics 4 (2020). 22 Josep-Maria Carbonell: The Two Main Challenges to Catalan Identity, in: American Behavioral Scientist 63/7 (2019), pp. 789–806. 23 Daniel Cetrà: Nationalism, Liberalism and Language in Catalonia and Flanders, Edinburg 2019. 24 Toni Rodon and Nuria Franco-Guillén: Contact with Immigrants in Times of Crisis. An Exploration of the Catalan Case, in: Ethnicities 14/5 (2014), pp. 650–675. 25 Cristina Pérez de Algaba Chicano and Elena Bellido-Pérez: iMemes and Polarization. Twitter Users’ Stances regarding the Catalan Independence Referendum and Catalan Regional Elections, 2017, in: Banu Baybars Hawks/Sarphan Uzunoğlu (eds.): Polarization, Populism, and the New Politics. Media and Communication in a Changing World, Newcastle upon Tyne 2019. 26 El conflicto independentista en Cataluña, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid 2019, p. 36.

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it is more beneficial for the independentists to maintain cohesion and a high level of mobilization among the Catalans. On the other hand, with a similar number of supporters and opponents of the region’s independence, the support of religious minorities, or more broadly, the support of immigrants, may become critical. An instrument to encourage immigrants to acquire “Catalanness” and to integrate is a properly modelled education, including language policy. In the case of learning Catalan, the phenomenon of linguistic immersion was used. This concept includes free language courses for adults and young people and additional language classes in schools for children, as well as training and programs to help them adapt to the new environment, learn about the culture, traditions or history of the region. This has resulted, on the one hand, in immigrants becoming increasingly auto-identified with Catalonia and, on the other hand, in many cases, in their identification with Catalan affairs, including the process of independence, by building emotional ties with the community in the region. This could naturally mean greater susceptibility of the immigrant population to nationalist or independentist narratives in the long run.

Catalonia’s Religious Policy and Independence Aspirations The religious policy is most often created at the state level, but the role of regional authorities is becoming increasingly clear in this respect. Multi-level governance, including at the regional level, is therefore becoming increasingly important27 . It was mainly the dynamic growth of diversity in Catalan society that forced the Catalan authorities to partially revisit their approach to the integration of the immigrant population and to focus on pluralism and interculturalism, and pointed to the much greater importance of religious issues than was originally assumed for the broader politics of the region, including the aspirations for independence. As Zapata-Barrero notes, a national minority and/or a minority group aspiring to be a nation that wishes to preserve its own identity and thus ensure the survival of its community must exercise control over immigration policies, with which a religious factor is associated28 . The first actions of the Catalan government to lay the foundations for a religious policy in the region are the Immigration Plan implemented between 1993 and 2000

27 Matthias Koenig: Europeanising the Governance of Religious Diversity. An Institutionalist Account of Muslim Struggles for Public Recognition, in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33/6 (2007), pp. 911–932. 28 Ricard Zapata-Barrero: Filosofies de la immigració i autogovern: el Quebec, Flandes i Catalunya, in: “Revista d’Estudis Autonomics i Federals” 2 (2006).

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and the Citizens and Immigration Plan implemented between 2005 and 200829 . Both initiatives focused on the problem of immigration, which included religious issues. Successive waves of immigrants forced regional authorities to take more coordinated action and develop religious and immigration policies. The formal confirmation of the jurisdiction of the Generalitat in the area of religion and the recognition of the religious policy of Catalonia, which has been in place for a long time, was the content of Article 161 of the reformed Statute of the Autonomy of Catalonia of 2006. This article indicates the exclusive authority of the Generalitat over religious entities that carry out their activities in the community. These powers include the regulation and establishment of cooperation mechanisms. The second paragraph of this article emphasizes that the executive power in the area of religious freedom is vested in the Generalitat30 , which is realized, among other things, in its participation in the management of the State Registry of Religious Entities with respect to churches, confessions and religious communities operating in Catalonia. In addition, it is the responsibility of the Generalitat to develop, conclude, promote, and implement the agreements and conventions concluded with the aforementioned entities. In addition, the Generalitat is required to cooperate with state authorities dealing with religious matters31 . As a consequence of the last reservation, both governments signed a cooperation agreement in this area in 2010. While formal jurisdiction was not a sine qua non condition for the Catalan authorities, before it was achieved, the framework of religious policy was an important political and symbolic goal. It marked a great success for the regional government and indicated a large degree of autonomy for Catalonia compared to other communities. In fact, the religious policy became a tool for broadening the scope of competence, the independence of the autonomous community, along the lines of the state in whose domain the sphere of religious governance is located. This last element, i.e., a “higher level of self-government”, is a frequent point of reference for independentists, and thus the “gaining” of another level of political independence is seen as an argument for Catalonia’s independence. In addition, this is to be confirmed by the historical imperative, i.e., the existence of the Commissariat for Cults32 in Barcelona during the civil war, which was already then supposed to create a platform for dialogue between the Republican authorities and religious subjects. Moreover, as Ilke Adam points out, among others, this legitimizes the

29 Mar Griera: The Governance of Religious Diversity in Stateless Nations. The Case of Catalonia, in: Religion, State and Society 44/1 (2016), pp. 13–31. 30 Organic Act 6/2006 of the 19th July, on the Reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, Boletín Oficial del Estado núm. 172, de 20 de julio de 2006. 31 Ibid. 32 Hilario M. Raguer Suñer: La Unió Democràtica de Catalunya i el seu temps (1931–1939), Montserrat 1976, p. 483.

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region as a liberal-democratic actor33 . These are to be elements of a symbolic nature that distinguish a tolerant, open and friendly Catalan religious minority from a closed and uninvolved Spain. The resulting image is also intended to perpetuate a higher level of secularization and pluralism in the region, since the Catalan builders intend to combine modernity and secularization, and the modern society created on this basis is to guarantee pluralism. The beginnings of building the religious policy of Catalonia included the establishment of pioneering institutions and bodies dealing with religious matters. One of the first initiatives of this kind was the establishment of the Office for Religious Affairs in the late 1990s. The aim of the office was to structure the program of activities for religious minorities34 . Then, in 2000, on the initiative of CiU, the Secretariat for Relations with Religious Confessions was established, now called the Directorate General of Religious Affairs. It is one of the specialized agencies in the Generalitat system. The fundamental tasks of the agency are: dialogue with representatives of various churches and religious associations, promoting religious freedom at all levels of governance, and ensuring respect for the diversity of religions, which is considered the basis of coexistence35 . The functioning and effectiveness of the General Directorate, as well as the definition of the model of religious policy in Catalonia, are primarily influenced by the main political parties, and thus, in fact, from the beginning, it has been designated by nationalist and independent parties. The establishment of the Secretariat was also a response to the expectations of the Catalan Evangelical Council. The Evangelical Community was looking forward to the emergence of an entity representing the Generalitat during the discussions36 . Moreover, according to Mar Griera, it was a strategic action of the Catalan government in order to involve the Catholic Church in the cooperation within the indicated scope37 . This was part of the “We Want Catalan Bishops” campaign, which aimed for the Vatican filling vacancies in Catalonia by nominating bishops from the region. It was also the party ERC that initiated the parliamentary debate on the objectives of Catalan politics in religious matters in 2001. The four fundamental pillars of

33 Ilke Adam: Immigrant integration policies of the Belgian regions. Sub-state nationalism and policy divergence after devolution, in: Regional and Federal Studies 23/5 (2013), pp. 547–569. 34 Joan Manel Sánchez Griñó/Gerard Serratusell Miró: La gestió del pluralisme religiós als municipis catalans, in: Revista Catalana de Sociologia 28 (2012), pp. 29–44; Ivan Serrano/Albert Bonillo: Boundary shifts and vote alignment in Catalonia, in: Ethnicities 17/3 (2017), pp. 371–391. 35 Religious freedom and diversity of beliefs in Catalonia, Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de Justícia, September 2018, p. 3. 36 Mar Griera: The Governance of Religious …, p. 21. 37 Eadem: De la religió a les religions. Polítiques públiques i minories religioses a Catalunya, Barcelona 2009.

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religious policy in Catalonia were finally determined. The first of these was the promotion of public understanding for secularism and political pluralism in the entire society of the region. The Catalan side decided to establish bilateral cooperation with religious groups by signing agreements with them. These agreements were concluded, for example, with the Evangelical, Orthodox, Muslim, Buddhist, Catholic or Jehovah’s Witnesses and atheists. The former gained official recognition, which made it possible to normalize many aspects of their functioning in Catalonia, while the Catalan side wished to ensure that religious communities respected the language, culture, traditions or regional customs as a prologue and encouragement to actually join the Catalan community and acquire “Catalanness”. In analyzing these agreements, M. Griera concludes that, while the wording of these agreements is not the same for all religious entities, there are also schematic solutions, dedicated to each community38 . In accordance with the adopted model of conducting an inclusive accommodation policy at the local level and in public institutions the autonomous government has undertaken to support members of various religious groups in their adaptation in these places, e.g. through pastoral care and facilitating access to places of worship. The agreements also included a respect for the achievements of the Catalan community, especially the regional language and cooperation for social cohesion and peaceful coexistence. The Catalan government was to take steps to improve the exposure and recognition of religious minorities by society in the region and these groups are committed to respecting the accepted pluralism and secularization in the public sphere. It is worth noting that the recognition of the region by religious minorities is associated with awareness of, and very often support for, Catalonia’s independence aspirations, since in this case the right to decide39 on the future of the region is integrative. It is also important that the Catalan decision-makers were directly involved, without Spanish mediation, shown to be more efficient in the field of religion and with a keen interest in this sphere, as opposed to the passive center. This allowed the creation of regional organizations/ representative bodies. On the other hand, the Catalan authorities had direct contact with religious communities, which implied specific tied transactions, thanks to the diagnosis of the needs of both parties. As a second objective, the parliament required the Catalan government to increase its efforts to extend autonomy in religious matters40 . This is based on the reservations in Article 161 of the Statute of the Autonomy of Catalonia, cited above, about the exclusivity of the Generalitat in the region with regard to religious matters. A further premise was to promote the acquisition of “Catalanness” (catalonization) 38 Eadem: The Governance of Religious…, , pp. 24–25. 39 Peter A. Kraus/Joan Vergés Gifra (eds.): The Catalan Process. Sovereignty, Self-Determination and Democracy in the 21st Century, Barcelona 2017. 40 Mar Griera, The Governance of Religious…, p. 23.

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of religious hierarchies by avoiding the involvement of foreign countries in this matter. This was to be made possible by learning the language, getting to know the Catalan culture first by the religious leaders, which would probably make it easier to reach the other members of the religious community and encourage them to use the regional language. One of the first initiatives to fit into this mechanism were language courses for imams and training in Catalan culture and programs to support the integration of Muslims into Catalans. In addition, the establishment of the Catalan Islamic Council was announced at this stage. As a result, many Muslim organizations have been established, including la Unión de Centros Islámicos de Catalunya and la Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de Catalunya (Ucidcat). Since 2002, there has also been an initiative called Volunteer Service for the Language, which is the possibility for immigrants to practice Catalan during conversations with volunteers. At the same time, it makes it easier for members of religious minorities or, more broadly, for immigrants to become involved in an independentist project. The last goal was to promote interfaith dialogue and good relations between religious communities and political actors and society in the region41 . There are many examples of this task, one of which is the organization of Interfaith Harmony Week in many cities in Catalonia. This initiative is intended to promote peaceful coexistence between different religious minorities. The decision of the Generalitat to implement a pilot project for teaching Islam in public schools in the region in 2020 is also worth mentioning here. In addition, the separatist Candidatura de Unidade Popular (CUP) has proposed to include the Arabic and Berber languages in its curriculum. The objectives set are in fact the framework of the curriculum of the constitutionalized religious policy in Catalonia, which is increasingly being used as an instrument by both nationalists and independents. In the years that followed, the Catalan government developed its religious policy, with additional institutions and new mechanisms being established. In April 2011, the Generalitat established the Advisory Council on Religious Diversity, an advisory body to the Directorate General of Religious Affairs, which issues guidelines and recommendations on religious issues and prepares documents and reports for other entities such as organizations, public institutions, religious groups, but also for individual interested persons42 . Moreover, the role of religious entities has become more and more important, which in order to function freely and open their own

41 Ibid. 42 Jordi Play: La Generalitat de Cataluña crea el Consejo Asesor para la Diversidad Religiosa, https:// www.europapress.es/sociedad/noticia-generalitat-cataluna-crea-consejo-asesor-diversidadreligiosa-20110429182023.html, 2011, [last accessed 01.10.2020].

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place of worship must be reported to the Ministry of Justice’s Religious Entities Register. This gives them legal personality43 . Regional decision-makers also took care to give the places of worship a legal framework. The Generalitat, on the basis of the Places of Worship Law 16/2009, of 22 July, and the subsequent implementing decree, adopted the following priorities: to facilitate the exercise of the right to religious freedom, to this end it was to support local councils in guaranteeing this right and to ensure appropriate conditions (health and safety) in the premises designated for use44 . The importance of these legal acts and the subsequent implementation are confirmed by the results of a study in a document called Mapa religiós de Catalunya (comparativa 2004–2019), published by the Dirección General de Asuntos Religiosos de la Generalitat de Catalunya. The latest update from 2020 confirms that the Catholic Church continues to make up the vast majority of the places of worship. Importantly, for this entity, data are given only from 2013, where the number of suitable places of worship was 6,701, with 8,165 places of worship in Catalonia in 2019. It is worth noting that the information on places of worship for Catholics is provided by the Catholic Dioceses of Catalonia and includes both active places of worship and places of worship that are no longer used for religious purposes45 , such as those used for tourism only, or shared with other religious communities. The largest number of places outside the Catholic Church belong to the Evangelicals: in 2004 there were 341 of them and in 2019 there were already 796. The Evangelical Churches have experienced the most dynamic development over the last two decades. The second place in this collection is occupied by Muslim places of worship, 139 and 286 respectively. Jehovah’s Witnesses continue to be placed, but their output has decreased from 141 to 119. In 2019, the Orthodox Christian believers had 57 holy places (in 2004, there were only 8) and the Hindus had 30 (in 2004, there were 16). The number of places of worship of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church has also increased from 12 to 25 and also that of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (from 13 to 15). The number of places of worship belonging to Sikhism (from 5 to 11), Taoism (from 5 to 6) and Judaism (from 2 to 6) has also increased. The number of Baha’i places of worship decreased slightly from 12 to 10. The remaining churches and religious associations had 31 places in 2004 and 3746 in 2019. Analysis of the document indicates an upward trend among most non–Catholic places of worship, which is closely related to the efforts of the Catalan authorities to develop an effective religious policy.

43 44 45 46

Religious freedom and diversity…, p. 4–6. Ibid., pp. 6–17. Mapa religioso de Cataluña. Ibid.

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In addition, the Catalan government has intensified its efforts to research religious diversity and community religious phenomena and has decided to make them more popular. This includes the creation of these religious maps in collaboration with experts and academics, and conducting a Barometer study on religion and religious diversity and its management in Catalonia from 2014 onwards with the CEO. The results of the study indicate how Catalans see themselves in the context of religion, as well as their views on religious diversity and religious policies47 . In addition to numerous scientific publications, often supported by regional budgets, the Directorate General of Religious Affairs issues Guides to Religious Diversity, which promote respect for religious diversity and are targeted at those involved in specific sectors. An interesting measure is the publication of brochures, good practice guides and other information materials on the linguistic, religious, cultural, etc. situation in the region, dedicated to the immigrant population in order to present the linguistic similarities and links between their mother tongue and Catalan, and at the same time to encourage people to use el català. In this aspect, the Plataforma per la Llengua plays a leading role. The organization develops materials together with religious entities from specific religious groups48 . The Platform is closely linked to the communities that are conducive to the independence of Catalonia. Catalan policy towards religious minorities has often been criticized by the Catalans themselves and by the authorities in Madrid. This is exemplified by the accusations against Catalan politicians of favoring Muslims, who were said to have given support to the independence project by, among other things, voting for regional independence in a referendum in 2017. The investigation carried out after the terrorist attack in Barcelona (2017) revealed that the government of autonomy had neglected to ensure the security of citizens, for example, by not following the recommendations of the security services49 . The approach of the Independentists to Muslims may find its pragmatic justification in the fact that most immigrant and Spanish Muslims live in Catalonia. According to the 2018 report of the Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, Catalonia was home to 522,113 followers of Islam50 . Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that some of the pro-independence circles have made efforts to encourage Muslims to participate more in the political life of the region. The effectiveness of these efforts is evidenced by the presence of the first Muslim woman — Najat Driouech, Spanish,

47 Religious freedom and diversity…, pp. 20–21. 48 Ibid., p. 23. 49 Krzysztof Izak: Sieć ekstremizmów religijnych i politycznych. Sojusznicy i wrogowie, in: Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego 21 (2019), p. 107. 50 Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana. Explotación estadística del censo de ciudadanos musulmanes en España referido a fecha 31/12/2017, Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, http://observatorio.hispanomuslim.es/estademograf.pdf, [last accessed 15.09.2020].

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born in Morocco, or the declarations of 2018 by Muslim communities to form their own political parties.

Conclusions The political aspirations of the Catalan independent communities require the use of diverse instruments. A regional religious policy, which is directly linked to the growing phenomenon of immigration, can be considered a subtle form of realization of the independence project. Over the years, the underestimated influence of religion on reality has gained recognition among decision-makers from various backgrounds in Catalonia. Faced with the threat of a blurring of Catalan identity as a result of successive waves of immigrants51 , regional authorities have developed a specific approach to the issue that many believe has turned a potential threat into an opportunity. This step was part of a permanent narrative of nationalists and independents in the region. As a result, religious politics began to play a pragmatic strategic role. On the one hand, its creation serves the fundamental political goal of extending autonomy. The second and equally important goal is the symbolic role, as well as the socializing and integrating of religious minorities with the inhabitants of the autonomous community. For decades, politicians have consciously been implementing actions aimed at secularization, which, in conjunction with the modern Catalan society, is to build pluralism. The supporters of independent Catalonia are aware that immigrants socialized in the Catalan spirit are an important group of voters, while religious minorities are the communities that nationalists and independents (of course not all formations and their members, albeit the vast majority) are trying to reach in order to gain support during the process of independence and the future Republic of Catalonia.

Bibliography Actis, Walter/Prada, Miguel Ángel de/Pereda, Carlos: La Inmigración Extranjera en Catalunya. Balance y Perspectivas, Barcelona 1992, p. 11. Adam, Ilke: Immigrant Integration Policies of the Belgian Regions. Sub-state Nationalism and Policy Divergence after Devolution, in: Regional and Federal Studies 23/5 (2013), pp. 547–569.

51 Will Kymlicka: Politics in the Vernacular. Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship, Oxford 2001.

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Bramadat, Paul/Koenig Matthias: International Migration and the Governance of Religious Diversity, Montreal/Kingston 2009. Byrne, Steven: Amic o enemic? Immigration and the Catalan Struggle for Independence, in: Ethnopolitics 4 (2020). Carbonell, Josep-Maria: The two Main Challenges to Catalan Identity, in: American Behavioral Scientist 63/7 (2019), pp. 789–806. Castells, Manuel: Siła tożsamości, Warszawa 2008, p. 39. Cetrà, Daniel: Nationalism, liberalism and language in Catalonia and Flanders, Edinburg 2019. Constitución Española de 27 de diciembre de 1978, Boletín Oficial del Estado núm. 311, de 29 de diciembre de 1978. Dowling, Andrew: The Rise of Catalan Independence. Spain’s Territorial Crisis, Abingdon/New York 2008. Dudra, Stefan: Lemko Identity and the Orthodox Church, Connecticut 2018. El conflicto independentista en Cataluña, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid 2019, p. 36. Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana. Explotación estadística del censo de ciudadanos musulmanes en España referido a fecha 31/12/2017, Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, http://observatorio.hispanomuslim.es/estademograf.pdf, [last accessed 15.09.2020]. Griera, Mar: De la religió a les religions. Polítiques públiques i minories religioses a Catalunya, Barcelona 2009. Griera, Mar: The Governance of Religious Diversity in Stateless Nations. The Case of Catalonia, in: Religion, State and Society 44/1 (2016), pp. 13–31. Grzechynka, Agnieszka: Doktryna katalonizmu a współczesna polityka językowa Katalonii wobec imigrantów, Kraków 2017, pp. 167–168. Husar-Poliszuk, Wioletta: Polityczne determinanty rozwoju islamu w Katalonii w świetle radykalizacji independentyzmu w regionie, in: Wioletta Husar-Poliszuk/Bartłomiej Secler/ Piotr S. Ślusarczyk: Polityka wyznaniowa. Konteksty innych polityk publicznych. Austria, Katalonia, Polska, Zielona Góra 2018, p. 118. Husar-Poliszuk, Wioletta: Katalończycy: Od budowy własnej tożsamości do independentyzmu w regionie, Poznań 2020, p. 203. Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya, (2020), https://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=253 &lang=en, [last accessed 28.08.2020]. Izak, Krzysztof: Sieć ekstremizmów religijnych i politycznych. Sojusznicy i wrogowie, in: Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego 21 (2019), p. 107. Koenig, Matthias: Europeanising the Governance of Religious Diversity. An Institutionalist Account of Muslim Struggles for Public Recognition, in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33/6 (2007), pp. 911–932. Kraus, Peter A./Vergés Gifra, Joan (eds.): The Catalan Process Sovereignty, Self-Determination and Democracy in the 21st Century, Barcelona 2017.

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Kymlicka, Will: Politics in the Vernacular. Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship, Oxford 2001. Lores, Jaume: Aproximació al pujolisme, in: Taula de canvi 23–24 (1979). Mantecón Sancho, Joaquím: El derecho fundamental de libertad religiosa. Textos, comentarios y bibliografia, Pamplona 1996, p. 121. Mapa religioso de Cataluña, Departamento de Justicia Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona 2020. Michalak, Ryszard: Polityka wyznaniowa państwa polskiego wobec mniejszości religijnych w latach 1945–1989, Zielona Góra 2014. Muro, Diego: Territorial Accommodation, Party Politics, and Statute Reform in Spain, in: South European Society and Politics 14/1 (2009), p. 459. Ollero Tassara, Andrés: España: Un Estado laico? La libertad religiosa en perspectiva constitucional, Cizur Menor 2005. Organic Act 6/2006 of the 19th July, on the Reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, Boletín Oficial del Estado núm. 172, de 20 de julio de 2006. Pérez de Algaba Chicano, Cristina/Bellido-Pérez, Elena: iMemes and Polarization. Twitter Users’ Stances regarding the Catalan Independence Referendum and Catalan Regional Elections, 2017, in: Banu Baybars Hawks/Sarphan Uzunoğlu (eds.): Polarization, Populism, and the New Politics. Media and Communication in a Changing World, Newcastle upon Tyne 2019. Play, Jordi: La Generalitat de Cataluña crea el Consejo Asesor para la Diversidad Religiosa, https://www.europapress.es/sociedad/noticia-generalitat-cataluna-crea-consejoasesor-diversidad-religiosa-20110429182023.html, 2011, [last accessed 01.10.2020]. Pujol, Jordi: Tot compromís comporta risc, Barcelona 1997, p. 130. Raguer Suñer, Hilario M.: La Unió Democràtica de Catalunya i el seu temps (1931–1939), Montserrat 1976, p. 483. Religious freedom and diversity of beliefs in Catalonia, Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de Justícia, September 2018, p. 3. Rodon, Toni/Franco-Guillén, Nuria: Contact with immigrants in times of crisis. An exploration of the Catalan case, in: Ethnicities 14/5 (2014), pp. 650–675. Ryguła, Piotr: Wolność religijna w Hiszpanii na tle przemian społeczno-politycznych w latach 1931–1992, Katowice 2009, p. 319. Sánchez Griñó, Joan Manel/Serratusell Miró, Gerard: La gestió del pluralisme religiós als municipis catalans, in: Revista Catalana de Sociologia 28 (2012), pp. 29–44. Serrano, Ivan/Bonillo, Albert: Boundary shifts and vote alignment in Catalonia, in: Ethnicities 17/3 (2017), pp. 371–391. Torres Sans, Xavier: Los sin papeles y los otros. Inmigrantes franceses en Cataluña (siglos XVI–XVII), in: Mediterranero Economico 1 (2002), pp. 347–361. Zapata-Barrero, Ricard: Filosofies de la immigració i autogovern. El Quebec, Flandes i Catalunya, in: Revista d’Estudis Autonomics i Federals 2 (2006).

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Religious Policy and Politics of Memory – Case Study of Catholicism in Poland after the Political Changes of 1989

Religious Policy, Catholic Religion and the Politics of Memory in Poland – Overview of the Issue The framework for the construction of religious policy in the Third Republic of Poland was set out in the Basic Law of 1997, according to which churches and religious associations are equal before the law in the Polish state. Between the state subject and them there is a principle of respect for autonomy and mutual independence, while Polish public authorities maintain impartiality in matters of religious, worldview and philosophical beliefs. These rules were also supported by the declaration of ensuring freedom of conscience and religion for everyone, as well as equal rights for all citizens regardless of their religion or lack thereof, and the right to express their worldview as well as religious and philosophical beliefs in public life. Referring to the indicated issues with regard to the Catholic religion, it should be pointed out that the content of these principles included in the Constitution concerning the confessional issues in Poland caused that on the subject of the relations between the Polish state and the Catholic Church, the friendly model of the separation of the Church from the state was discussed many times (in the scientific, political and social discourse), which the Basic Law established, and the concordat valid since 1998 (although signed in 1993) confirmed. This is because in the concordat – established due to “the fact that the Catholic religion is professed by the majority of Polish society”1 and due to “the role played by the Church in the thousand year old history of the Polish State”2 – these rules of autonomy and independence are underlined3 . What is important is that the literature on social sciences, humanities and theology as well as journalism abounds in studies interpreting the issue of the separation of the Catholic Church in Poland from the state, the issues of the mutual relations between secular and church institutions, the issue of the concordat’s legitimacy in Polish law, as well as the issue of the rift

1 ISAP: Konkordat między Stolicą Apostolską i Rzecząpospolitą Polską, podpisany w Warszawie dnia 28 lipca 1993 r., http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU19980510318/O/D19980318.pdf, [last accessed 03.08.2020]. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

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between the accepted principles and formal declarations and the practice of sociopolitical life in the area of Catholic religion4 . Therefore, this text is not intended to constitute another item discussing the problems indicated. Its aim, in turn, is to provide an answer to the question how elements of the religious policy conducted towards the Catholic Church are used within the limits of the Polish politics of memory after 1989. Politics of memory is one of the specific policies of the state entity, which is built up by structured strategies and ways to achieve the goals that the state authorities have set in the area of collective memory of the community. Through the construction of narratives about the past, resulting in the formulation of specific contents in human memory, it aims at, on the one hand, achieving benefits in the area of community survival and, on the other hand, at achieving the intended effects in the sphere of current policy. In this way – through the politics of memory – the authorities arbitrarily decide what will be remembered and what will be forgotten – this in turn is done through the creation of narratives about the past by specific state bodies and institutions5 . What is more, the authorities use various types of tools in order to realize the politics of memory. Among them there are: calendar of state holidays, state-supported scientific research, educational and information programs, media and media products, various legal solutions, as well as created topography of sites of memory6 . The range of means used for conveying stories about the past is therefore wide, because in creation of the politics of memory both the content of the memory narratives and the methods of their transmission, effectively reaching a specific recipient, are important. The Polish politics of memory after the political changes of 1989 was neither uniform nor consistently oriented. In the early years after the breakthrough, the politics of memory was dominated by impulsive and politically disordered actions, which, however, had one common denominator – the denial of everything connected with the Polish People’s Republic, including the symbolic space it had created. A very important issue was the decommunization of public space. For years since the beginning of the transformation, it was carried out by the new local authorities 4 See among others Marcin Olszówka: Ustawy wyznaniowe. Art. 25 ust. 5 Konstytucji RP – próba interpretacji, Warszawa 2010; Sabrina P. Ramet/Irena Borowik (eds.): Religion, Politics, and Values in Poland. Continuity and Change Since 1989, New York 2017; Piotr Stanisz: Religion and Law in Poland, Alphen aan den Rijn 2017; Michał Szewczyk: Wybrane problemy związane z realizacją konstytucyjnej zasady rozdziału Kościoła od państwa w III Rzeczypospolitej, in: Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 2/14 (2013), pp. 91–118. 5 Daniel Levy: Memory Practices and Theory in a Global Age, in: Gerard Delanty/Stephen P. Turner (eds.): Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory, Oxon–New York 2011, pp. 482–492; Anna Ratke-Majewska: Politics of memory, in: Joanna Marszałek-Kawa/Danuta Plecka (eds.): The Dictionary of Political Knowledge, Toruń 2019, pp. 371–376. 6 Ibid., p. 374.

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spontaneously, without the support of top-down statutory provisions. Thousands of street and square names were transformed in this way (often restoring their prewar names), monuments, decorative elements and commemorative plaques were removed, and patrons of institutions and facilities were changed. At the same time, new places of commemoration were created. The sphere of education and culture also started to change. In the course of the transformation, previously forbidden elements (including topics of Soviet occupation and repressions) were included in school curricula, while creators and works promoted in the Polish People’s Republic began to be marginalized in public space after the democratic breakthrough in Poland7 . The transitional and post-transitional politics of memory lacked coherence of concepts, also in the area of such important issues as deubekization and vetting, on which the formulated proposals were often contradictory. This inconsistency and divisions led in consequence to a temporary stagnation in the precision of the assumptions of this specific policy. This distancing manifested itself in the way that, despite the fact that state holidays, commemorating important events for the state and nation, were still celebrated, school textbooks were changed, and the statements of politicians repeatedly referred to events from Poland’s past, showing clearly that there was no coherent vision of how the Polish politics of memory should be conducted. The situation changed at the beginning of the 21st century. It was then – especially after Lech Kaczyński took over the office of the President of Poland in 2005 – that the activities undertaken within the framework of the Polish politics of memory intensified and were more clearly directed. The importance that began to be attached to conducting the politics of memory in the country is evidenced, among other things, by the fact that since the time of Lech Kaczyński’s presidency, each president of the Republic of Poland has had a historian among his advisors8 . It is also important to note that the politics of memory in Poland after 1989 has repeatedly referred to elements of Polish confessional decisions, including those relating to the Catholic Church. At the same time, it happened that the memory narratives created in the political sphere were constructed against the rules adopted within the religious policy of the Third Republic. In many cases talking about the Polish Catholic tradition, defending traditional Catholic values, the Catholic history of the Polish nation or the leading role of the Catholic Church in Polish society over the centuries became only an instrument for achieving the goals set by the

7 Joanna Kałużna: Dekomunizacja przestrzeni publicznej w Polsce – zarys problematyki, in: Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne 2 (2018), pp. 157–160; Lech M. Nijakowski: Polska polityka pamięci. Esej socjologiczny, Warszawa 2008, pp. 123–128. 8 Anna Ratke-Majewska: Ewolucja polityki pamięci państwa polskiego po 1989 roku, in: Danuta Plecka et al.: System polityczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Wybrane aspekty, Toruń 2020, pp. 186–197.

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authorities within the limits of the politics of memory. The assumptions of the religious policy were thus subordinated to the priorities of the politics of memory. This phenomenon, due to its complexity, is worth discussing in more detail.

The Memory of Polish Religious Tolerance, Pole-Catholic and Polish Catholic Tradition The sources of Polish religious tolerance can be found in the 14th and 15th centuries. At that time, Polish territory was inhabited not only by Catholics, but also by followers of other Christian factions (Orthodox), as well as Judaism, Islam, Monophysitism or Karaimism. People of different rites and religions not only functioned side by side in one area, but also participated in the defense of the common territory, taking part in the Polish-Teutonic wars. The rooted co-existence of various religions in Poland was, in turn, the basis for the religious freedoms of Protestants, which they could enjoy in Poland (“asylum of heretics”) in the 16th and 17th centuries. Tolerant attitudes were somewhat lost during the victory of the Counter-Reformation (i.e., at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries)9 , however, they were fully renewed during the Enlightenment. They also became a permanent component during the years of the Partitions, when a society deprived of its own statehood showed a lot of understanding for the fate of oppressed nations, which were in a similar position to that of the Polish nation10 .

This does not mean, however, that there were no voices that saw Poland’s religious tolerance as the cause of its misfortunes. Such opinions appeared both on the wave of the Reformation and in the partitioning era. There were, however, more theories about the collapse of the Republic of Poland (there were, among others, those where the defeat of Poland appeared as punishment for the moral corruption of Poles, the sins of pride and self-confidence and calling oneself “Christ of the nations”). Importantly, during the partitions of Poland, the belief in the connection between the Catholic faith and the Polish nationality, which was born in the second half of the 17th century, and which was fueled by the emphasis on the difference – including

9 Agata Kwiatek: Azyl heretyków czy ocean nietolerancji? Czy Rzeczpospolita była państwem bez stosów?, https://histmag.org/Azyl-heretykow-czy-ocean-nietolerancji-Czy-Rzeczpospolita-bylapanstwem-bez-stosow-14392/, [last accessed 06.08.2020]; Janusz Tazbir: Państwo bez stosów. Szkice z dziejów tolerancji w Polsce XVI i XVII w., Warszawa 2009, pp. 9–12; idem: Tolerancja w Rzeczypospolitej XVI–XVII stulecia, in: Biblioteka Teologii Fundamentalnej 3 (2008), pp. 119–131. 10 Ibid., pp. 131–132.

Religious Policy and Politics of Memory

religious – to the partitioners (traditionally Orthodox Russia and Protestant Prussia), began to strengthen strongly. The combination of Catholicism and Polishness reflected both the sustained (and often secret) social and political activity as well as science, culture and art. Catching this wave a stereotype of the attitude or type of mentality of a Pole-Catholic was created, which is part of the Polish national mythology, although often criticized11 . It is worth noting that the portrait of a Pole-Catholic was drawn through many forms, but despite its heterogeneity, it reflected important common features (including a certain social morality and historical tradition) that make up a reproduced and perpetuated myth. In the literature of the 19th century, the Pole-Catholic (being – what is important – a secular ideological proposal) revealed his traits through the figures of both an honest and respectful old-fashioned host, faithful to the traditions of his ancestors and respectful of the Catholic religion, and a girl from the Polish court, combining her own and constant feelings with the pride of the future mother-Pole and the courage of sacrifice for the Homeland, as well as a faithful servant, conscious and co-responsible fighter for the cause12 . However, regardless of the figure who represented the character of a Pole-Catholic, his invariable task was to “persistently defend his Polishness and Catholicism, not to trust foreign social or civilization recipes, to protect tradition, not to enter into any compromises with the enemy, to preserve the possession of hearts and Polish land, from the pressure of the invader protecting himself in internal emigration”13 . The Pole-Catholic was therefore faithful to the worldview, moral, national and customary dogma he represented. This had not only advantages but also disadvantages, since this fidelity and intransigence resulted from the conviction “of having a complete, essential and sufficiently resolving truth”14 , which had numerous consequences. As the holder of a comprehensive truth based on the authority of religion, the Pole-Catholic felt protected from error. At the same time, he did not give up his understanding of the faith, being convinced of the mysticism of the Polish nation at the dawn of Christianity15 . The possession of the old and unchangeable truth, which was supposed to be always in force, in turn, meant that the Polish Catholic – as an attitude functioning in the consciousness of Poles with features consistently supported by literature –

11 Sebastian Adamkiewicz: O upadku zawinionym. Wizja upadku Rzeczpospolitej w dziełach historyków szkoły krakowskiej, https://histmag.org/O-upadku-zawinionym.-Wizja-upadku-Rzeczpospolitej-wdzielach-historykow-szkoly-krakowskiej-692, [last accessed 06.08.2020]; Bożena Domagała: Polakkatolik w oglądzie socjologicznym (analiza wyników badań i wybranych problemów debaty publicznej), in: Humanistyka i Przyrodoznawstwo 24 (2018), p. 269. 12 Bohdan Cywiński: Rodowody niepokornych, Warszawa 1971, pp. 265–310. 13 Ibid., p. 310. 14 Ibid., p. 311. 15 Ibid., pp. 310–311.

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did not have to be interested in the changes of the surrounding reality (social, civilization, cultural or worldview), taking the position that Poland’s participation in the history of Europe is neither necessary nor really possible for it – due to the specific historical path and the destiny of the Polish state16 . The stereotype of the figure of a Pole-Catholic, constructed in this form, survived the partitioning era and entered independent Poland in 1918. It persisted during the interwar and war years, and did not lose its relevance after 1945. The memorynarratives relating to the fights and actions taken by the Polish population during World War II, as well as the strong identification of the opposition activity with faith and religious practice during the period of the People’s Republic of Poland, also maintained in the society’s consciousness the type of stance of a Pole-Catholic as characteristic of the Polish national identity: The persecution of the Church in Poland and the fact that for decades of the Polish People’s Republic it remained the only independent institution against the oppressive state strengthened the link between Catholicism and Polishness. However, it was a special relationship. The vast majority of Poles declared their affiliation to the Church, and although this affiliation was often formal and superficial in its mass, it was [...] extremely significant for an even stronger link between the religious sphere and national identity. [...] it was the pressure of communism that caused an even stronger connection between “religion and the nation” to defend endangered values17 .

After 1989, this connection continued, but there were significant changes in the way it was perceived. It is worthwhile to analyze these transformations through the prism, first, of the social changes taking place, which also affected the sphere of collective (including national) identity, and second, of the conduct of social and political discourse. As far as the sphere of social transformations is concerned, many studies prove that the intertwining of Polish national and religious identity (often manifested by the identification of Catholicism with Polishness, strongly present in the concepts of interwar national democracy), shaped and consolidated by the 19th and 20th centuries, began to give way to secularization and laicization after 1989, also entering the sphere of patriotism perception. These changes were not violent, which prompted some researchers to state that the transformations in the area of Poles’ religiousness not only took place slowly in the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, but will also take place slowly in the future, making Poland a special case compared to other European countries. Others, in turn, pointed out that the

16 Ibid., pp. 312–322. 17 Bożena Domagała: Polak-katolik w oglądzie socjologicznym …, pp. 270, 271.

Religious Policy and Politics of Memory

secularization of Polish society may or may not be sudden or dynamic, but it is an ongoing process whose importance should not be ignored – despite its slow but consistent pace, it makes Polish society one of the fastest secularizing in the world, especially among young people. The research indicated that in 1992 the percentage of believers was 96 %, while in 2018 – 92.7 %. Paying attention to the age of the respondents, among the 18–30-year-old, in 1992 there were 95 % believers, in 2018 – 86 % (i.e. the number of non-believers in this age group increased from 5 % to 14 %). However, not only was the increase in the number of atheists in Poland, which occurred over time, significant – it was also a significant decrease in the involvement in religious practices. In 2018 it was noted (according to a survey conducted by the research company Pew Research Center) that the percentage of Poles under 40 years old who pray every day dropped below the European average (14 % for these younger respondents and 39 % for the older ones). Weekly attendance at masses was declared by 26 % of people under and 55 % over 40 years of age; 40 % of Poles in the group of older respondents and 16 % of younger ones considered religion a very important element of life. In terms of participation in masses at least once a week and through the prism of declaring that religion is very important, in Poland the greatest generational decline among all countries in the cited survey (whose number was 108) was noticed in this way. In the category of reducing the frequency of daily prayer, the observed generational decline was also in the lead, because it was in the second place in the world among the surveyed state entities (after Japan). It is also worth adding that Polish religiousness (especially Catholic religiousness) was accused not only of weakening, but also of being a facade, consisting, among other things, in any choice of shared truths of faith. As far as Catholic dogmas are concerned, the attitude of Poles to their observance of them has been assessed many times as being guided by pragmatism or subject to selective acceptance (especially with regard to issues such as abortion, divorce, sexual ethics, in vitro, or faith in the resurrection or hell)18 . How did laicization and secularization processes affect the memory about the Pole-Catholic? Many researchers (as well as participants of social life) emphasized in their analyses that the separation of Polishness from Catholicism is progressing, which not only has weakened the reference in national identity to the relationship between Polish nationality and Catholicism, but will continue to weaken it. Others,

18 See among others Ibid., pp. 267–280; Janusz Mariański: Katolicyzm polski, ciągłość i zmiana. Studium socjologiczne, Kraków 2011; Lech M. Nijakowski: Polak – katolicki poganin, in: Miesięcznik Znak 714 (2014), https://www.miesiecznik.znak.com.pl/7142014lech-m-nijakowskipolak-katolicki-poganin/, [last accessed 11.08.2020]; Krzysztof Pacewicz: Polska globalnym liderem… w spadku religijności, https://oko.press/polska-globalnym-liderem-w-spadku-religijnosci/, [last accessed 11.08.2020]; Joanna Radzikowska: Czy Polska to nadal katolicki kraj?, https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/spoleczenstwo/1611795,1,czy-polska-to-nadal-katolicki-kraj.read, [last accessed 11.08.2020].

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in turn, pointed out that many non-believers, those who do not practice or follow other religions, declare respect for Catholic traditions in Poland, expressing their support for their evocation in the narratives – as historically correct – and for their continuation19 : The progress of the process of secularization is not accompanied by [...] the phenomenon of privatization of religion understood as the “clearing” of the public sphere from religion, symbols and religious content. […] Polish society accepts the model of relations between state and church developed after 1990 and the fact that the presence of religious symbols, the Catholic Church and clergy in the public sphere is firmly established and is not subject to fundamental criticism as part of the Polish landscape and culture […]20 .

This prompted some people to state that – with the simultaneous almost universal approval for the story of the past of the Polish society, which is connected with Catholicism – the link between the national affiliation of Poles and the Catholic denomination will never fully pass21 . Therefore, the persistence of the memory of a Pole-Catholic and Polish Catholicpatriotic tradition was strongly influenced by the conducted socio-political discourse, which effectively reproduced and maintained the memory narratives, linking Polish Catholicism with the political and national identity of Poles. Thanks to the appropriately constructed stories about the past, the figure of a Pole-Catholic remained in Polish society as an almost monolithic concept, despite the progressing secularization and the phenomenon of façade religiousness22 : It is these deeply rooted discursive strategies that make it possible to renew the vision of Catholicism as the nucleus of Polishness with the reproduction of the Polish nation as a specific imaginary community. Even if this does not apply to every citizen, it reveals itself as a regularity at the level of the community, as shown by sociological studies of public discourse. We will still have to wait for the spread of such a narrative about the Polish nation which Catholicism ignores in silence23 .

It is worthwhile to take a closer look at the socio-political discourse conducted for years after 1989, as it has undergone a very significant change over three decades. The 19 20 21 22

Bożena Domagała: Polak-katolik w oglądzie socjologicznym …, pp. 267–280. Ibid., p. 275. Ibid., pp. 267–280; Lech M. Nijakowski: Polak – katolicki poganin. Marta Duch-Dyngosz: Do kogo należy ta tożsamość?, in: Miesięcznik Znak 714 (2014), https:// www.miesiecznik.znak.com.pl/7142014marta-duch-dyngoszdo-kogo-nalezy-ta-tozsamosc/, [last accessed 11.08.2020]; Lech M. Nijakowski: Polak – katolicki poganin. 23 Ibid.

Religious Policy and Politics of Memory

combination of Polishness and Catholicism – which had its origins in the past and which has penetrated to the present day through the necessary tradition – existed in this discourse all the time, but for many years it was connected with emphasizing tolerance rooted in Polish society, which has its several hundred years of history. Interestingly, the relationship between Polish national identity, the Catholic religion and tolerance – which exists both in past times and in the contemporary society – was emphasized, on the one hand, by scientific discussions and statements made by representatives of Catholic circles and, on the other hand, by voices coming from political circles. For example, in 1990, in “Tygodnik Powszechny”, a Catholic social and cultural magazine, its editor-in-chief Jerzy Turowicz considered “the attitude of a Catholic who, without giving up his clear Christian identity, is ready for dialogue and cooperation with people of other faiths and beliefs, and is oriented towards dialogue with the world”24 , and then he noticed: The appearance of this new orientation in the Polish Catholic community is, I believe, a very important change, which is linked to the rejection of the pre-war contaminants present in this community in the form of national egoism, chauvinism, lack of respect for ethnic and religious minorities, anti-Semitism and intolerance, attitudes which cannot be reconciled with the spirit of the Gospel25 .

In turn, a 1997 study published (by a Polish Catholic priest, Janusz Marianski) on the subject of fundamental values in the consciousness of Polish high school graduates stated that: “In Polish culture, three leading fundamental values were particularly exposed: patriotism, religion and tolerance. […] Patriotism refers to a nation, but it must also be seen in the context of an entire society that includes all citizens regardless of ethnic or religious divisions”26 . In 2010, the Dominican, Jacek Salij, on the other hand, pointed out: “We would condemn Catholicism to heavy idolatry if its main source were to be the love of the homeland, if we wanted to be Catholics above all because we are Poles”27 . At the same time adding that today, the stereotype of a Pole Catholic seriously appears rarely – only in very niche, nationalistic circles, usually calling for loving the homeland above all else, and thus idolatrously. Since Poland is the highest value for these people, they treat Catholicism

24 Jerzy Turowicz: Próba wolności, in: Tygodnik Powszechny 47 (1990), p. 3. 25 Ibid. 26 Janusz Mariański: Patriotyzm i religia jako wartości podstawowe w świadomości polskich maturzystów, in: Studia Płockie 25 (1997), pp. 175, 176. 27 Jacek Salij: Polak katolik, https://prasa.wiara.pl/doc/664560.Polak-katolik, [last accessed 13.08.2020].

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instrumentally. Hence their little interest in questions really connected with faith and their tendency to disregard ecclesiastical authorities, whenever they do not go with them28 .

As far as political statements are concerned, it is worth quoting, among other things, the words of President Lech Kaczyński, who in 2007, during talks with representatives of various Christian churches in Poland, pointed out that that meeting was “an expression of tolerance and equality of rights traditional in our country”29 . A year later he also stated: Here in Poland, or at least in many parts of Poland, national tradition, Catholic tradition, church tradition – are strongly connected. This obviously does not mean that every Pole is a Roman Catholic, that there are no very good Poles who are of a different faith, or that there are no very good Poles to whom the grace of faith is not given at all.30

Thus, the memory of the Polish tradition of tolerance for years after 1989 appeared in the discourse of various circles, including right-wing political circles. Over time, however, these “three leading fundamental values” such as patriotism, religion and tolerance – as Father Janusz Mariański pointed out – began to move away from each other in public space. And although the figure of the Pole-Catholic was significantly aroused by the politics of memory activated by President Lech Kaczyński and the Law and Justice party, it was still accompanied by tolerance for years after 2005. The situation has changed noticeably since the parliamentary elections of 2015. Although individuals or groups that did not identify Polishness and Catholicism with tolerance (e.g. for other religions) had already existed before, after the Law and Justice party gained an advantage in the Parliament – supported by formulated political statements – they received a sense of consent for their activity. The stereotype of the Pole-Catholic, which five years earlier – in the opinion of the Dominican Jacek Salij – was supposed to appear seriously rare, started to strengthen, but very often in a reduced or modified form. The Pole-Catholic in the interpretations of 19th century literature or in the deliberations of 20th century science was a multi-faceted attitude, with specifically directed political intentions. The Pole-Catholic aroused after almost three decades of the Third Republic of Poland lost his distinct meaning, becoming an ambiguous concept, without a clearly

28 Ibid. 29 Prezydent.pl: Tradycja tolerancji i równouprawnienia, https://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum-lechakaczynskiego/aktualnosci/rok-2007/art,149,219,tradycja-tolerancji-i-rownouprawnienia.html, [last accessed 13.08.2020]. 30 Prezydent.pl: Udział Prezydenta RP w uroczystości Niedzieli Palmowej w Łysych, https://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum-lecha-kaczynskiego/aktualnosci/rok-2008/art,148,41,udzial-prezydenta-rp-wuroczystosci-niedzieli-palmowej-w-lysych.html, [last accessed 13.08.2020].

Religious Policy and Politics of Memory

defined catalog of meanings behind his figure. It can be seen that the multiplicity and simultaneous simplification of the repeated (often thoughtless) interpretations – including Polishness, patriotism or Catholic religion – contributed significantly to this. The contemporary Pole-Catholic became what he means by that. If he renounces the outside world, or defends Poland against the enemy coming from it, he defends self-defined Polishness and religion, something he considers to be an “eternal tradition”, a “Polish custom”, against a threat that he understands in his own way31 .

Summary The religious policy and the politics of memory in Poland after 1989 went hand in hand for a very long time, interpreting equally the rules of organization of the confessional sphere in Poland, which were adopted on the wave of political transit. After many years, however, the religious policy became hostage to the politics of memory, entangled in dynamically changing guidelines, set for current political goals. One of the manifestations of this phenomenon, which made the religious policy an instrument of the politics of memory, was the dominant social-political discourse stimulation of the feeling of existence of a strong (and exclusive, unrivalled) connection between Polishness and the Catholic faith, presented, however, in an almost arbitrary form, often incompatible either with the principles of faith or with the findings of the historical sciences. It should be noted that this construction of the “Pole-Catholic” pattern – the effect of political and media manipulation – has become much easier in a society commonly using the new mass media, where truth and untruth were replaced by post-truth32 . The perception of Polishness began to take shape in this way, not on the knowledge and analysis of facts (including historical ones), but on the references to emotions, aroused by patriotic-martyrological narratives, showing “war and struggle as something very attractive, spectacular, revealing the best human qualities”33 . The romantic cult of struggle and armed

31 See among others Marta Duch-Dyngosz: Do kogo należy ta tożsamość?; Newsweek.pl: Kaczyński: Nie ma Polski bez Kościoła. Każdy musi to przyjąć, https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/jaroslaw-kaczynskina-urodzinach-radia-maryja-w-toruniu/5ysvrft, [last accessed 17.08.2020]; Lech M. Nijakowski: Polak – katolicki poganin; Piotr Pacewicz/Magdalena Chrzczonowicz: Kaczyński i Głódź ręka w rękę: Polska to Kościół, Polska to PiS. Ten sam przekaz w 6 punktach, https://oko.press/kaczynski-iglodz-reka-w-reke-polska-to-kosciol-polska-to-pis-ten-sam-przekaz-w-6-punktach/, [last accessed 17.08.2020]. 32 See more Ralph Keyes: Czas postprawdy. Nieszczerość i oszustwa w codziennym życiu, Warszawa 2018. 33 Paweł Machcewicz: Muzeum, Kraków 2017, p. 221.

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action began to revive in this way in the Polish consciousness (especially in many young Poles), and pointing out the enemy to be fought against became an important point of political games. The Pole-Catholic created against this background did not have to accept the tradition of a hierarchical order in the society, nor did he have to pursue the principles of social justice derived from the teachings of Jesus Christ – but he could – in the name of his mission – remove “all other, especially ‘civil’ ways of serving the homeland, into the shadows”34 , concluding that “everyday work for the community is not valued as much as the hypothetical willingness to die for it”35 .

Bibliography Adamkiewicz, Sebastian: O upadku zawinionym. Wizja upadku Rzeczpospolitej w dziełach historyków szkoły krakowskiej, https://histmag.org/O-upadku-zawinionym.Wizja-upadku-Rzeczpospolitej-w-dzielach-historykow-szkoly-krakowskiej-692, [last accessed 06.08.2020]. Cywiński, Bohdan: Rodowody niepokornych, Warszawa 1971. Domagała, Bożena: Polak-katolik w oglądzie socjologicznym (analiza wyników badań i wybranych problemów debaty publicznej), in: Humanistyka i Przyrodoznawstwo 24 (2018), pp. 267–280. Duch-Dyngosz, Marta: Do kogo należy ta tożsamość?, in: Miesięcznik Znak 714 (2014), https://www.miesiecznik.znak.com.pl/7142014marta-duch-dyngoszdo-kogonalezy-ta-tozsamosc/, [last accessed 11.08.2020]. ISAP: Konkordat między Stolicą Apostolską i Rzecząpospolitą Polską, podpisany w Warszawie dnia 28 lipca 1993 r., http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU19980510318/O/ D19980318.pdf, [last accessed 03.08.2020]. Kałużna, Joanna: Dekomunizacja przestrzeni publicznej w Polsce. Zarys problematyki, in: Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne 2 (2018), pp. 157–171. Keyes, Ralph: Czas postprawdy. Nieszczerość i oszustwa w codziennym życiu, Warszawa 2018. Kwiatek, Agata: Azyl heretyków czy ocean nietolerancji? Czy Rzeczpospolita była państwem bez stosów?, https://histmag.org/Azyl-heretykow-czy-ocean-nietolerancji-CzyRzeczpospolita-byla-panstwem-bez-stosow-14392/, [last accessed 06.08.2020]. Levy, Daniel: Memory Practices and Theory in a Global Age, in: Gerard Delanty/Stephen P. Turner (eds.): Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory, Oxon/New York 2011, pp. 482–492. Machcewicz, Paweł: Muzeum, Kraków 2017.

34 Ibid., p. 222. 35 Ibid., p. 225.

Religious Policy and Politics of Memory

Mariański, Janusz: Patriotyzm i religia jako wartości podstawowe w świadomości polskich maturzystów, in: Studia Płockie 25 (1997), pp. 175–192. Mariański, Janusz: Katolicyzm polski, ciągłość i zmiana. Studium socjologiczne, Kraków 2011. Newsweek.pl: Kaczyński: Nie ma Polski bez Kościoła. Każdy musi to przyjąć, https://www. newsweek.pl/polska/jaroslaw-kaczynski-na-urodzinach-radia-maryja-w-toruniu/5ysvrft, [last accessed 17.08.2020]. Nijakowski, Lech M.: Polak – katolicki poganin, in: Miesięcznik Znak 714 (2014), https:// www.miesiecznik.znak.com.pl/7142014lech-m-nijakowskipolak-katolicki-poganin/, [last accessed 11.08.2020]. Nijakowski, Lech M.: Polska polityka pamięci. Esej socjologiczny, Warszawa 2008. Olszówka, Marcin: Ustawy wyznaniowe. Art. 25 ust. 5 Konstytucji RP – próba interpretacji, Warszawa 2010. Pacewicz, Krzysztof: Polska globalnym liderem … w spadku religijności, https://oko.press/ polska-globalnym-liderem-w-spadku-religijnosci/, [last accessed 11.08.2020]. Pacewicz, Piotr/Chrzczonowicz, Magdalena: Kaczyński i Głódź ręka w rękę. Polska to Kościół, Polska to PiS. Ten sam przekaz w 6 punktach, https://oko.press/kaczynski-i-glodz-rekaw-reke-polska-to-kosciol-polska-to-pis-ten-sam-przekaz-w-6-punktach/, [last accessed 17.08.2020]. Prezydent.pl: Tradycja tolerancji i równouprawnienia, https://www.prezydent.pl/ archiwum-lecha-kaczynskiego/aktualnosci/rok-2007/art,149,219,tradycja-tolerancji-irownouprawnienia.html, [last accessed 13.08.2020]. Prezydent.pl: Udział Prezydenta RP w uroczystości Niedzieli Palmowej w Łysych, https://www. prezydent.pl/archiwum-lecha-kaczynskiego/aktualnosci/rok-2008/art,148,41,udzialprezydenta-rp-w-uroczystosci-niedzieli-palmowej-w-lysych.html, [last accessed 13.08.2020]. Radzikowska, Joanna: Czy Polska to nadal katolicki kraj?, https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/spoleczenstwo/1611795,1,czy-polska-to-nadal-katolicki-kraj.read, [last accessed 11.08.2020]. Ramet, Sabrina P./Borowik, Irena (eds.): Religion, Politics, and Values in Poland: Continuity and Change Since 1989, New York 2017. Ratke-Majewska, Anna: Ewolucja polityki pamięci państwa polskiego po 1989 roku, in: Danuta Plecka et al.: System polityczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Wybrane aspekty, Toruń 2020, pp. 179–201. Ratke-Majewska, Anna: Politics of memory, in: Joanna Marszałek-Kawa/Danuta Plecka (eds.): The Dictionary of Political Knowledge, Toruń 2019, pp. 371–376. Salij, Jacek: Polak katolik, https://prasa.wiara.pl/doc/664560.Polak-katolik, [last accessed 13.08.2020]. Stanisz, Piotr: Religion and Law in Poland, Alphen aan den Rijn 2017. Szewczyk, Michał: Wybrane problemy związane z realizacją konstytucyjnej zasady rozdziału Kościoła od państwa w III Rzeczypospolitej, in: Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 2/14 (2013), pp. 91–118.

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Tazbir, Janusz: Tolerancja w Rzeczypospolitej XVI–XVII stulecia, in: Biblioteka Teologii Fundamentalnej 3 (2008), pp. 119–132. Tazbir, Janusz: Państwo bez stosów: szkice z dziejów tolerancji w Polsce XVI i XVII w., Warszawa 2009. Turowicz, Jerzy: Próba wolności, in: Tygodnik Powszechny 47 (1990), p. 3.

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Continuations and Turns in the Religious Policy of the Polish State towards Evangelical Churches in the 20th and 21st Centuries

The twentieth century is called the “short” century, limited to the years 1914–1991, at least as described by Eric Hobsbawm, who published his book on the “age of extremes” in the mid-1990s1 , i.e. before 2001, when the terrorist attack in New York marked a new turning-point considered the end of the twentieth century. However, regardless of the treatment of the last hundred years in terms of “short” or “long” age, the distinct internal milestones, marked primarily by the two world wars and the rivalry between democracy and totalitarianism, resulting in radical political turnarounds, seem more important. This prompts not only political scientists but also historians to study relatively small periods, ranging from a few years to a maximum of several decades, with 1945, considered by many researchers to be the beginning of contemporary history, being of fundamental importance2 . In the Polish context, the year 1945 acquires additional significance as a radical breakthrough of all continuity and a period of national bondage. As Ryszard Legutko, Professor of Philosophy and Member of the European Parliament, stated in 2008, the People’s Republic of Poland was “a new creation, consciously built in opposition to everything” that Poland had been for centuries3 . In fact, elements of continuation were preserved in many fields, including the religious policy towards churches and religious associations of religious minorities. In further deliberations, this issue will be brought closer to the example of two faiths, Lutheranism and Calvinism, which have been present in Poland for almost 500 years and which may refer to historical traditions dating back to the 16th century. The remaining Protestant denominations, which began to build more permanent structures on Polish soil only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, will be considered to a lesser extent, necessary to show the conditions of the religious policy of the Polish state in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Poles are widely recognized as a Catholic nation and usually define themselves as such. However, since at least the 14th century, Poland was a multinational and multi-

1 Eric Hobsbawm: Age of Extrems. The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991, London 1994. 2 Gabriele Metzler: Einführung in das Studium der Zeitgeschichte, Paderborn 2004, pp. 27–32. 3 Ryszard Legutko: Esej o duszy polskiej, Kraków 2008, pp. 7–12.

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faith state, especially since the Polish-Lithuanian Union of 1386, the ethnic mosaic, consisting of Poles, Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Jews, Germans, Armenians and Tatars, was further strengthened by the religious mosaic. Apart from Catholicism, in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, there were also dense groups of Orthodox Christian, Jewish and Muslim population, and from the first half of the 16th century also Protestant ones. However, the dominant position of Catholicism remained intact, which was confirmed by the Constitution passed on 3 May 1791, which included a ban on conversion from Catholicism to other religions4 . The 3 May Constitution practically did not come into force, becoming a political myth of a nation opposed to foreign Russian domination. The partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian monarchy carried out between 1772 and 1795 by Russia, Austria and Prussia meant that Poland did not function as an independent state at the time of the birth of modernity, in the 19th century. And it was a time of shaping both modern nations and modern churches – both processes, referred to as nation-building and church-building, often supported each other5 . Moreover, these processes took place under the conditions of confrontation between the Polish national movement and Polish Catholicism and the administrations of Russia and Prussia, which clearly favored Orthodoxy and Protestantism in their religious policies. Modern Polish nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century, however, was not free of contradictions: on the one hand, it referred to history and sought to rebuild the Polish state within the 1772 borders (with the majority of the Orthodox and Greek-Catholic population in the east), but on the other hand, it referred to ethnic borders, pointing to the numerous clusters of the Polish population in Silesia, Pomerania and Masuria, that is, in areas that never belonged to the Polish Kingdom. In this way, there were demands for the incorporation into the Polish state of border areas of Prussia and Austria, which were inhabited not only by the Polish Catholic but also by the Evangelical population. The national consciousness of these people was ambiguous and labile, and the use of the Polish language was often accompanied by a leaning towards German national self-identification, especially for the Evangelicals in the eastern provinces of Prussia. The Catholic nature of Polish nationalism, however, made it difficult to convince these “Polish-speaking Germans” to accept the Polish national idea6 .

4 Richard Butterwick: Polska rewolucja a Kościół katolicki 1788–1792, Kraków 2019, pp. 712–718. 5 Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg: ‚Church-building’ – ein komplementärer Ansatz zur Beschreibung von Vergemeinschaftung im östlichen Europa. Die ‚Volkskirchen‘ in Polen und den baltischen Ländern, in: Markus Krzoska (ed.): Zwischen Glaube und Nation? Beiträge zur Religionsgeschichte Ostmitteleuropas im langen 19. Jahrhundert, München 2011, pp. 11–34. 6 See: Richard Blanke: Polish-speaking Germans? Language and National Identity among the Masurians since 1871, Köln 2001.

Continuations and Turns in the Religious Policy

The Polish state rebuilt in 1918–1921, which referred by its very name the Second Republic of Poland to the tradition of the state which was liquidated in the 18th century, was a compromise between the historical and ethnic idea of the nation and the nation state. To simplify matters, we can say that it was a compromise between the federation idea of Józef Piłsudski and the idea of an ethnically homogeneous state, proclaimed by Roman Dmowski. In the east, the 1772 border was not reached, but the areas inhabited by several million Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Ukrainians and Belarusians were annexed. In the west, meanwhile, areas beyond the 1772 border were joined, inhabited by Polish Catholic and Evangelical population: large parts of Upper Silesia and Cieszyn Silesia, as well as small border strips of Lower Silesia and East Prussia. The percentage of national minorities in interwar Poland was over 30 percent, which, in the conditions of the collapse of multinational empires and the primacy of the idea of a nation state, made it difficult to grant full equality to all citizens. The situation of the largest – apart from Catholicism – Christian denominations in Poland, Protestantism and Orthodoxy, was determined by the fact that they were regarded as national minorities. Their existence on the territory of the Second Republic was treated not so much as an inheritance of the multicultural Jagiellonian monarchy and the noble Republic, but as an unwanted legacy of the partitions and the Germanization and Russification policies forced in the 19th and early 20th centuries. A clear manifestation of this attitude of the ruling elites was the religious legislation, including the religious provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. As early as 2 November 1918, the Polish Catholic bishops officially supported the restoration of those provisions of the 3 May Constitution of 1791, which guaranteed Catholicism the status of the national religion. Of course, the anachronistic provisions from over a hundred years ago could not be reinstated, but the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, passed in March 1921, included a reference to the “tradition of the 3 May Constitution”. Although Article 111 guarantees “freedom of conscience and religion” to all citizens, Article 114 reiterated the pre-partition traditions: the Roman Catholic faith, which is the “religion of the majority of the people,” was considered to occupy “the highest position in the State among equal denominations”. This “supreme position” did not mean only honorary priority, but actual privilege: only the Catholic Church received the right to function on the basis of its own law, which was not subject to the approval and control of the state administration, and the attitude of the state towards the Catholic Church was to be regulated on the basis of concordat with the Holy See. The Evangelical Churches, like all non-Catholic denominations, had to regulate their status in accordance with the Constitution by enacting laws on relations with the state and by the approval of the internal Church law by the state administration. The position of Protestantism was further weakened by the ecclesiastical structure,

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which was a legacy of the partitioning governments. There were seven Lutheran and Calvinist Churches in interwar Poland, which until 1918 were integral parts of the Evangelical Churches in Prussia, Russia and Austria. The largest of these seven Churches was the Evangelical-Augsburg Church, headed by the Consistory in Warsaw, while the second largest was the Evangelical Union Church, headed by the Consistory in Poznań. The latter did not include all the Evangelical Union parishes in Poland: in the autonomous province of Silesia, an Evangelical Union Church was established in the Polish Upper Silesia, benefiting from the protection of the Polish-German Convention of Upper Silesia, concluded in 1922 for fifteen years. In the former Prussian district there was also a small Evangelical-Lutheran Church (better known as the Old Lutheran Church), which after 1919 maintained unofficial contacts with the Evangelical Supreme Church College (Evangelisches Oberkirchenkollegium) in the German Reich. In the former Austrian province of Galicia, the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg and Helvetic Confessions functioned, with Lutheran and Calvinist parishes, as in the Prussian Union Church. In interwar Poland, however, there were also two separate Evangelical-Reformed Churches, both in the former Russian partition, but with consistories in the former Polish and Lithuanian capitals of Warsaw and Vilnius. From the point of view of the religious policy of the Polish state, it was not only the relationship of the Evangelical Churches with national minorities – in practice with the German minority – that was problematic, but also their dependence on the church authorities in neighboring countries. Apart from the two small EvangelicalReformed Churches, only the Evangelical-Augsburg Church was administered by a Warsaw-based consistory during the partitions. The organizational breakdown and the large German domination of all the Evangelical Churches (except for both Calvinist Churches) made it difficult, or even impossible, to regulate the legal status of these Churches. The basic premise that the state authorities applied in their religious policy towards Protestantism was to ensure the loyalty of the authorities of individual Churches to the Polish state. In practice, this was expressed in the expectation that these Churches would unequivocally accept the rebirth of the Republic of Poland and would break all contacts with the leading church authorities in the German Reich and Austria. A specific criterion for full loyalty, however, was not only the acceptance of the Polish state, but also the declaration of Polish national self-identification and the undertaking of measures for the Polonization of the Churches – and in this respect, Bishop Juliusz Bursche (1862–1942), from 1904 onwards head of the Evangelical-Augsburg Church, was a model partner of the Polish authorities. Even before World War I, Bishop Bursche was a supporter of giving the Polish national religion a counterpart to Lutheranism on Polish soil. However, the quantitative domination of the Germans in the Evangelical-Augsburg Church meant that this goal could only be achieved by changing national relations within the

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Church. The best results could be achieved by enlarging the area of the Church with areas inhabited by dense clusters of Polish Evangelical population – and here the supporters of the idea of Polish Lutheranism found a platform for joint action with the Polish national movement. The claims of Polish national activists – mostly Catholics – against territories not belonging to Poland before the partitions in the 18th century, but inhabited by ethnically Polish Lutherans, were supported by the authorities of the Evangelical-Augsburg Church, aiming to build a Polish Lutheran Church. As early as 1919, Bishop Bursche personally appeared at a peace conference in Paris, where he presented and justified Polish claims against border areas of the German Reich, inhabited by Polish Evangelicals. In 1920 he actively supported the Polish action preparing the national plebiscite in Warmia (Ermland) and Mazuria, convincing the Evangelical Mazurians in East Prussia that Poland is not a 100 % Catholic country. These actions brought only partial success, because the plebiscite ended with an overwhelming victory for the Germans, and Poland was joined only by small areas of Lower Silesia and East Prussia. However, the more important result of this involvement of Bishop Bursche was something else: the establishment of close cooperation with the Polish authorities and the favor of the state administration. The Evangelical-Augsburg Church was the only Protestant Church that could function without any obstacles throughout Poland, although formally, on the basis of the regulations from the partition period, it should limit its activities to the former Congress Kingdom, that is, central Poland. With the support of the state administration, the Evangelical-Augsburg Church extended its borders to the entire Polish state, incorporating Polish Lutherandominated parishes in Cieszyn Silesia and Cracow, which belonged to the Austrian Augsburg Church and the Helvetic Confession until 1918. During the first few years of independence, the Lutheran (mostly German) parishes in the eastern provinces of Poland, subordinated to the consistory in Mitawa and St. Petersburg in Russia during the partitions, were also subordinated to the Evangelical-Augsburg Consistory in Warsaw7 . However, a special situation prevailed in the area of the former Prussian partition, where Poles from the Evangelical-Augsburg Church established Polish Evangelical parishes, avoiding any contact with Germans from the dominant Evangelical Union Church in this area. The Evangelical Union Church was almost a mirror image of the EvangelicalAugsburg Church. It was established in 1920 from the parishes of the Prussian Union Church, which were located in the areas of the German Reich granted by the Treaty of Versailles to Poland. The Evangelical Consistory in Poznań became the leading institution of the Evangelical Union Church in Poland. It was staffed by the Germans,

7 Elżbieta Alabrudzińska: Kościoły ewangelickie na Kresach Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej, Toruń 1999, pp. 38–41.

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who mostly retained the citizenship of the German Reich. The highest-ranking clergyman of this church, general superintendent Paul Blau, maintained unofficial contacts with the church authorities in Berlin and clearly declared that his church should be a support for the German minority not only in western Poland but also in the rest of the country. In this way, the main axis of the dispute within Protestantism in the Second Republic of Poland was delineated, personified by the names of the heads of both churches: Juliusz Bursche in Warsaw and Paul Blau in Poznań. Bursche became a symbolic figure of Polish Protestantism, supported but also controlled by the Polish state administration, while Blau became a symbolic figure of German Protestantism, seeking to remain independent from the Polish administration, but at the same time maintaining close contacts and support (including material support) from the leadership of the Evangelical Union Church in Prussia, which officially proclaimed the doctrine “state borders are not church borders”8 . The religious policy of the Polish state towards the Evangelical Churches was determined by several important factors, but one of the most important was the national division within Protestantism in Poland. This division caused the attempts to pass a single law regulating the state’s attitude towards the Evangelical Churches with an identical confessional face to fail. Each church had to negotiate internal church law independently, thus weakening its position – let us recall that only Catholicism was treated by the state administration as an equal negotiating partner. Eventually, only one of the seven Evangelical Churches in the Second Republic of Poland, functioning already during the partitions, was legally regulated. It was the Evangelical-Augsburg Church, whose head was not only prepared to agree to close cooperation with the state administration, but also led the Polonization of Lutheranism. However, even the declaration of Polishness by the church authorities did not guarantee the rapid adoption of the law: The Evangelical-Augsburg Church was only legally recognized in 1936. Bursche’s position was weakened by the intra-church conflict with the German majority, which rejected draft laws regulating relations between the state and the Evangelical-Augsburg Church and draft church laws that granted a strong position to church authorities, which were dominated by Poles. The German resistance within the Evangelical-Augsburg Church additionally prompted Bursche to seek support from the authorities in exchange for permission for farreaching administrative interference in the affairs of the Church – but the limitation of the autonomy of the Church also aroused protests from some Polish pastors and secular church activists. In the meantime, the Polish religious administration clearly

8 See more: Gerhard Besier (ed.): Altpreuβische Kirchengebiete auf neupolnischem Territorium. Die Diskussion um ‚Staatsgrenzen und Kirchengrenzen‘ nach dem Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg, Göttingen 1983.

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delayed acceptance of the law and statutes of the Evangelical-Augsburg Church, raising doubts, among other things, as to whether the title “bishop” for the head of the Church and “priest” for the other clergy should be legalized9 . The main reason for the delay in reaching an agreement, however, was probably the fear that the law on the attitude of the Evangelical-Augsburg Church to the state would be a precedent, i.e. a model for similar laws regulating the legal position of the other Evangelical Churches – and there was no intention to grant full rights to these, fearing among other things the strengthening of the German minority. However, the laws regulating the status of these Churches were never passed, considering that it was more beneficial for the state administration to maintain the legal status from the period of partitions. Negotiations were conducted with representatives of Evangelical Churches, but without greater involvement of the state authorities. An exception was the Evangelical Union Church, whose functioning was considered a threat to the state. Therefore, already in 1920, after the Church was formally constituted at the Synod in Poznań, an attempt was made to impose supervision of the state authorities over the functioning of this institution. Officials of the religious apparatus claimed that, according to the Prussian regulations from the partition period, the place of the Prussian king as head of the national church was taken over by the head of the Polish state, and therefore members of the church authorities should be appointed by the Head of State. However, the formal regulation in this matter was never enforced but served the Evangelical Consistory in Poznan to file a complaint to the League of Nations. After the coup d’état in May 1926 and the seizure of power in Poland by a political camp pushing for a less restrictive national policy, assuming state rather than national assimilation, there was a possibility of agreement. However, the Constitutional Synod of the Evangelical Union Church, held in 1928–1929 under the decree of President Ignacy Mościcki, did not manage to work out a project of church law consistent with the expectations of the Polish administration. The lack of an unequivocal resignation from the right to maintain communication with the Evangelical Union Church in the German Reich resulted in Polish officials breaking off further talks. The Evangelical Union Church functioned as a legally recognized church from that time on, but based its activities on regulations from the period of the Prussian monarchy. The Polish authorities tried to limit the activities of the clergy and laity of this church, but in practice, this came down to administrative harassment, which included the imposition of fines for, among other things, the illegal teaching of German while teaching religion. The restrictions were severe and caused a sense of pressure or even persecution, although in reality, the Evangelical Union Church functioned beyond any control of

9 Krzysztof Krasowski: Związki wyznaniowe w II Rzeczypospolitej. Studium historycznoprawne, Warszawa/Poznań 1988, p. 222.

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the Polish state. Despite the departure of hundreds of thousands of Germans from western Poland after 1919 – there were less than 300,000 people left in parishes in the 1930s – the church retained most of its properties, including temples, parish houses, hospitals and cemeteries. Polish authorities only sporadically tried to take over some Evangelical buildings, treating it as an element of the policy of “deGermanization” or repolonization, but not even trying to liquidate Evangelical churches built by Prussians as symbols of foreign rule – in this respect the policy in the former Russian partition, where in the 1920s and 1930s at least two actions of systematic demolition of Orthodox churches were carried out, was different. Lack of decisive actions to take state control over the Evangelical Union Church in Wielkopolska and Pomerania did not mean resigning from taking more energetic steps in favorable circumstances. The general test of strength was to take over the supervision of the Evangelical Union Church in Polish Upper Silesia in 1937. The timing of this operation was carefully chosen: in 1937, the 15-year period of protection of the rights of religious and national minorities in Upper Silesia, granted in 1922 by the Upper Silesian Convention, expired. The key role in the operation of taking over power in the Evangelical Union Church in Polish Upper Silesia by persons loyal to the state was to be played by Poles from the Evangelical-Augsburg Church, settling in Upper Silesia after 1922. A few months later, in mid-July 1937, the Silesian Parliament passed a law transferring power in the Evangelical Union Church in Upper Silesia to the Temporary Church Council, dominated by Poles. Despite the protests of Church President Hermann Voss, the Polish President of the Council took over office premises and church files with the assistance of the police, and the Governor of Silesia declared that, in accordance with the Constitution, he was ready to negotiate a law on the relations between the Church and the state – but only with the new church leadership appointed by the Polish authorities. However, such negotiations never took place, and the gradual takeover of parishes by Polish pastors led to a paralysis of church life. Parish councils and the majority of German Evangelicals refused to cooperate with Poles (and a few Germans) imposed by the authorities, and the only positive effect of this action – from the point of view of Polish religious policy – was to increase the number of Polish Evangelical services in Upper Silesia10 . The failure of the action in Upper Silesia effectively discouraged the Polish administration from similar actions against the much more numerous Evangelical Union Church in Wielkopolska and Pomerania, and an additional circumstance inhibiting more energetic actions became the German resistance in the EvangelicalAugsburg Church. The elections of the diocese’s seniors in 1937 brought victory to

10 See more: Henryk Czembor: Ewangelicki Kościół Unijny na Polskim Górnym Śląsku (1922–1939), Katowice 1993.

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the opponents of Bishop Bursche in four cases, to which the head of the Church responded with the annulment of the election result and the appointment of commission administrators. In the struggle against the German adversaries, the Polish administration was assisted, an example of which was the deprivation of Polish citizenship of Pastor Alfred Kleindienst, a parish priest in Łuck, who was elected senior citizen of the Diocese of Volhynia in 1937. In fighting German influence in the largest Evangelical Churches, relations with other Evangelical denominations were neglected. The decision to refuse legal recognition of the Evangelical-Lutheran (Old Lutheran) Church was, admittedly, a rational one, because the Church did not want to give up formal contacts with the former church authorities in Breslau (since 1945 Wrocław), a city in the German Reich at the time. Unfortunately, the refusal of the Lutherans in 1928 did not make Bishop Bursche’s situation any easier, as he had already maintained friendly contacts with the Old Lutherans in the Prussian partition before World War I, which continued after 1918. However, the recommendations in favour of the Old Lutherans given by Bursche to the Polish authorities was not enough to convince Polish officials who were afraid of the precedent that the Evangelical Church of the Union could invoke. Less understandable, however, is the failure to work towards legal recognition of the two Evangelical-Reformed Churches in Warsaw and Vilnius, which had a significant percentage of Polish members and authorities whose loyalty to the Polish state was beyond doubt. What is more, many prominent politicians and people of culture of the Second Polish Republic benefited from the favor of these Churches in matters of conversion, divorce and baptism of children from non-denominational families. A separate issue is the refusal not only to regulate the legal status but also to legalize many smaller, broadly understood Protestant denominations. National issues were of secondary importance here, since the main accusation was the alleged threat to Catholicism posed by these religions. This concerned, among others, the Methodist Church, the Polish National Catholic Church, but also the British and Polish Foreign Biblical Society. The latter was forbidden to distribute the Holy Scriptures, because – as the Poznań Voivode Adolf Bniński, referring to the opinion of the Archbishop’s Curia, argued in 1924 – it was to be the “Protestant Bible” sold by the “sectarian organization”11 . The balance of the Second Republic’s religious policy towards the Evangelical Churches is therefore difficult to consider as positive and it is difficult to disagree with the authors who refer to the main principle of this policy as “unfriendly neutrality”12 . The support for the Polonization of Protestantism led to an intensification

11 Olgierd Kiec: Historia protestantyzmu w Poznaniu od XVI do XXI wieku, Poznań 2015, pp. 366–367. 12 Michał Pietrzak/Wiktor Wysoczański: Prawo Kościołów i związków wyznaniowych nierzymskokatolickich w Polsce, Warszawa 1997, p. 18.

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of antagonism between Polish and German Lutherans and Calvinists, and Polish Lutherans were all the more inclined to seek support from the Polish administration. The price of this support, however, was the loss of independence and dependence on the state, strongly contrasting with the position of the Roman Catholic Church, which was clearly favored by the state authorities. This national division within Protestantism was strengthened and formalized during the period of German occupation (1939–1945): only German Evangelical Churches could function in western Poland, which was incorporated directly into the Reich, while in the General Government (central and partially eastern Poland), the Evangelical-Augsburg Church was formally divided into German and Polish parishes. Polish pastors were subjected to repression, many of them were sent to German prisons and concentration camps, and Bishop Bursche himself, who had already been arrested in the fall of 1939, died in a prison hospital in Berlin in 194213 . However, the brutal repressions were inflicted mainly upon the Polish Evangelicals, who constituted a minority among the Protestants in Poland – German Protestants welcomed the Wehrmacht invasion with enthusiasm, of which the bestknown manifestation was a letter from General Superintendent Blau, who thanked the brave German soldiers for their liberation from the Polish plague14 in the fall of 1939. The Nazi occupation and religious policy had an impact on the perception of Germans in postwar Poland: it was then that the myth of the Volksdeutscher treacherously collaborating with the invaders spread. This myth became one of the key elements of anti-German propaganda after 1944, which was the pillar of Polish communists’ efforts to legitimize their power. Already in the first program manifesto, announced by the communists in July 1944, the promise was made to build an ethnically unified state without national minorities. Ethnic homogenization, however, also meant religious homogenization, and Catholicism was to become an important ally in the first years of power. Until 1948, the state authorities were therefore guided by the so-called pragmatic compromise, which consisted in abandoning open world-view confrontation with the churches15 . In the first postwar years, leading state officials participated in Catholic religious rituals, and Roman Catholic clergy played an important role in integrating the Western and Northern Lands, also known as the Recovered Lands. The incorporation of these lands into Poland in 1945 meant the necessity to carry out mass deportations of the German population, mostly Evangelical, and to settle the Polish population, mostly

13 Bernd Krebs: Państwo, Naród, Kościół. Biskup Juliusz Bursche a spory o protestantyzm w Polsce w latach 1917–1939, Bielsko-Biała 1998, pp. 219–261. 14 Bernd Krebs: Evangelische Christen in Polen unter zwei Diktaturen, in: Martin Greschat (ed.), Deutsche und polnische Christen. Erfahrungen unter zwei Diktaturen, Stuttgart 1999, p. 26. 15 Ryszard Michalak: Polityka wyznaniowa państwa polskiego wobec mniejszości religijnych w latach 1945–1989, Zielona Góra 2014, pp. 85–101.

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Catholic. The Roman Catholic state and the Roman Catholic Church therefore complemented each other perfectly: if the state authorities spoke of the “repolonization” of the Recovered Lands, the bishops eagerly spoke of the “recatholicization” of territories lost during the Reformation in the 16th century. Of course, this peculiar “covenant of the cross and the red star”16 was only tactical, and both sides were guided by fundamentally different principles and goals; the real, strategic goals were betrayed even by the termination of the concordat with the Holy See by the Polish government in September 1945. Both sides agreed, however, that one of the important means of Polonization of both pre-war Poland and the Recovered Lands was taking over hundreds of Evangelical temples, parish houses, schools, hospitals, cemeteries and other properties by the Roman Catholic Church and state institutions. The decimated Evangelical-Augsburg Church, affected by war losses and escapes and deportations of German followers, returned in these conditions to the idea of building a Polish Lutheran Church, acquiring Polishspeaking followers from the Evangelical Union Church not only in the former Prussian partition, but also in the Recovered Lands. In these activities, Polish Lutherans again, as before the war, obtained the support of the authorities counting especially on the Polonization of Masuria, among which it was impossible to conduct national agitation both in the Roman Catholic and even more so in the communist spirit17 . The legal status of the Evangelical-Augsburg Church was a sign of the continuation of the pre-war religious policy of the state authorities towards Protestantism. The post-war authorities not only recognized the 1936 decree of the president regulating the attitude of this Church to the state, but also effectively liquidated the remaining Lutheran Churches. As early as September 1946, the EvangelicalAugsburg Church was recognized as the only legally functioning Lutheran Church on the territory of the former pre-war Republic of Poland (without, of course, the eastern territories incorporated into the USSR), including all the Lutheran parishes of the four remaining Churches operating in the area. The next step was taken in July 1947, when the jurisdiction of the Evangelical-Augsburg Church was extended to the entire area of post-war Poland, including the Recovered Lands, belonging to the German Reich until 1945. The Evangelical-Augsburg Church then included all the Lutheran parishes operating in the whole territory of the state, which until then had belonged to the Evangelical Union Church, the Old Lutheran Church and the

16 Franz Scholz: Zwischen Staatsräson und Evangelium. Kardinal Hlond und die Tragödie der ostdeutschen Diözesen, Frankfurt am Main 1988, pp. 117–118. 17 See more: Olgierd Kiec: Die protestantischen Kirchen in Polen unter kommunistischer Herrschaft. Die Phase der Errichtung der kommunistischen Herrschaft 1945–1949, in: Peter Maser/Jens Holger Schjørring (eds.): Zwischen den Mühlsteinen. Protestantische Kirchen in der Phase der Errichtung der kommunistischen Herrschaft im östlichen Europa, Erlangen 2002, pp. 137–208.

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Augsburg and Helvetian Confessions. It was, however, a paradox that the pre-war presidential decree remained in force and served to formally dismantle the church structures of German Protestantism, while the Roman Catholic Church, after the concordat was dissolved in 1945, remained unregulated until 1989 – which did not prevent Primate August Hlond from removing the German Roman Catholic bishops in the Recovered Lands, to the great satisfaction of the state authorities. Meanwhile, the effects of the Polonization of Mazurians and Silesians were similar to those of the Evangelical-Augsburg Church in the Second Republic, i.e. very moderate. The reasons were complex: apart from the small number of Polish pastors and the unexpected competition of Methodists conducting an intensive mission among the Masurians, it was not possible to overcome the mistrust of local officials and the Polish Catholic population, who considered all Lutherans as Germans. As a result, around 1950, the “German option”, i.e. the strengthening of the German autoidentification of the Polish-speaking Evangelical population in Masuria and Silesia, was observed18 . Moreover, there was the problem of the pastoral care of Germans who never declared themselves Polish, but stayed in Poland, among other things as specialists in industry and mining in Lower Silesia. Initially, they were cared for by the few remaining priests of the Evangelical Union Church, but after the liquidation of German church structures in Poland in 1947, it was the Evangelical-Augsburg Church that had the obligation to formally take over the German pastoral care. However, the restoration of the German pastoral ministry could have been proof of the failure of several years of efforts to build the Polish Evangelical-Augsburg Church, and therefore decisions were long postponed. It was only after the German Democratic Republic recognized the Polish-German border in 1950 that German Evangelical parishes, officially called “non-Polish parishes”, were established in Silesia and Pomerania19 . The initial cooperation of the state authorities with the Roman Catholic Church and the Evangelical-Augsburg Church suddenly collapsed in the late 1940s, when the model of the “national road to socialism” gave way to adapting Poland’s political system to that of the USSR. The state applied a number of measures aimed at hitting the material basis of the functioning of the Roman Catholic Church in particular and limiting its presence in public space. An important element of anti-church activities was also state interference in the staffing of church offices. It was then that the strength of the Roman Catholic Church and the weakness of the EvangelicalAugsburg Church became apparent: Catholics defended their right to staff the highest offices of the clergy, while Lutherans, like other (though not all) religious 18 Philipp Ther: Die einheimische Bevölkerung des Oppelner Schlesiens nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die Entstehung einer deutschen Minderheit, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 26/3 (2000), pp. 407–438. 19 See: Kazimierz Urban: Zbory niemieckie Kościoła Ewangelicko-Augsburskiego w Polsce 1948–1970. Wybór materiałów, Kraków 2003.

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minorities, were forced to staff the offices of the Bishop of the Church and the President of the Synod by pastors ready to cooperate with the authorities. Cooperation with the authorities had complicated conditions and the pressure of the authorities was a significant but not the only factor. Fear of the dominance of Catholicism, the specific responsibility for the Church, including the desire to realize one’s own vision of the Church, were only some of the elements that determined the attitude of clergy in the highest positions. In this context, it is worth recalling the figure of Bishop Bursche, who carried out his program of building the Polish Lutheran Church with the support of the state and in the atmosphere of struggling with the intra-Church opposition. The example of Bursche was constantly followed by the successors of Bishop Jan Szeruda, who was dismissed in 1951, especially Andrzej Wantuła and Janusz Narzyński; the latter, defending himself against accusations of excessive submissiveness to the authorities, publicly stressed in 1982 that like Bursche, he had to face criticism and sometimes brutal attacks20 . The readiness to cooperate with the authorities took on a different dimension after 1956, when the most brutal repressions came to an end and party and state authorities competed with the Roman Catholic Church on propaganda grounds. This was not only a worldview dispute, but also a nationalist one: both sides tried to prove that they served the Polish nation better. Religious minorities were then used by the authorities to propagandistically present the People’s Republic of Poland as a state of religious freedom, guaranteeing equal rights for all faiths, and at the same time to point out that in the history of Poland an important role was played by believers of various religions, especially Protestantism and Orthodoxy. These statements sounded quite credible, especially since in the 1940s, the state authorities regulated the legal status of the religions that were denied legal status in the Second Polish Republic. This was the case with the already mentioned Methodists, but most of all with the Evangelical-Reformed Church. The last mentioned Church turned out to be an interesting example of the fact that anti-Catholic fears did not necessarily have to push religious minorities into the grip of communist authorities – in this Church, attempts were made already in the 1970s to get closer to Catholics (or at least to some Catholic circles) while criticizing the state authorities21 . However, the collapse of the Polish People’s Republic once again increased concerns about the construction of a religious state dominated by the Roman Catholic Church. Such fears were publicly expressed in 1991 by Czesław Miłosz, winner of the 1980 Nobel Prize for Literature, and numerous events of the 1990s seemed to

20 Zwiastun 22/7-8 (1982), pp. 102–107. 21 Olgierd Kiec: Protestantische Kirchen in Polen in der Phase des Zusammenbruchs der kommunistischen Herrschaft (1980–1990), in: Peter Maser/Jens Holger Schjørring (eds.): Wie die Träumenden? Protestantische Kirchen in der Phase des Zusammennbruchs der kommunistischen Herrschaft im östlichen Europa, Erlangen 2003, pp. 129–132.

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confirm these fears. The restoration of religious teaching in schools, the participation of Roman Catholic clergy in state ceremonies, the installation of a chapel in the Sejm, or the construction of a monument to officers murdered in Katyń in the USSR in 1940 – in all these cases, the non-Roman Catholic Churches had to “remind” about their existence and claim their rights. The privileged position of Catholicism was confirmed by the Polish government by signing a concordat with the Holy See in 1993, even if the ratification had to wait until 1998. A specific paradox, however, turned out to be the fact that the concordat was signed and ratified during the period of right-wing dominance in the parliament, and in the meantime, in the years 1994–1995, the parliament dominated by the post-communist left-wing and people’s party (coming partly from the satellite party to the PZPR) passed laws regulating the relation of the state to the Evangelical-Augsburg, Evangelical-Reformed and Evangelical-Methodist Church22 . These acts were of crucial importance, abolishing the existing decrees and laws (including the 1936 decree) and granting the listed religious minorities full equality of rights by means of laws passed by the democratically elected parliament. Although the Constitution passed in 1997 once again differentiated between the Roman Catholic Church and other churches and religious associations, as echoed in the Constitution of March 1921, most commentators point out that the inspiration for these provisions was rather the Constitution of the Italian Republic. This does not imply an end to the disputes over the legal status of the non-Roman Catholic Churches, since the Constitution explicitly speaks of laws adopted on the basis of agreements between the government and representatives of “other Churches and religious associations”23 . The battle for the equal rights of Protestants in Poland, apart from the legal issues – important but not necessarily readable to the majority of the society – was and is played out also in the symbolic sphere. The millennium celebration of the Gniezno Convention in 2000 was a breakthrough in this respect. The celebration was attended by the presidents of Poland and Germany, as well as several Central European countries, and the ecumenical service was celebrated by the heads of three Churches: Catholic, Orthodox and Lutheran, thus confirming the contribution of non-Catholic religions to Polish culture, which was raised by minorities during the communist era24 . However, this positive trend is not linear and widespread, as evidenced by the celebration of the Reformation anniversary in 2017. Many Polish

22 Olgierd Kiec: Protestantische Kirchen in Polen nach 1989, in: Katharina Kunter/Jens Holger Schjørring (eds.), Die Kirchen und das Erbe des Kommunismus. Die Zeit nach 1989 – Zäsur, Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Neubeginn, Erlangen 2007, pp. 41–66. 23 See more: Paweł A. Leszczyński: Regulacja stosunków między państwem a nierzymskokatolickimi Kościołami i innymi związkami wyznaniowymi określona w art. 25 ust. 5 Konstytucji RP, Gorzów Wielkopolski 2012. 24 Olgierd Kiec: Protestantische Kirchen in Polen nach 1989, pp. 52–53.

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museums, cultural institutions and universities have prepared occasional exhibitions, conferences and publications that show a positive image of Protestantism in Polish history, especially in the regional aspect. Representatives of Evangelical Churches were also welcomed by President Andrzej Duda, who emphasized the important role of Evangelicals in Polish history. At the same time, however, the Polish parliament refused to grant patronage to the anniversary celebrations (which was explained with procedural reasons), and a number of publications appeared on the publishing market, showing the Reformation and Martin Luther himself in a negative light25 . The authors of these publications were historians and journalists who declared their connections with the right wing and Catholicism and were gaining increasing influence in the media, science and culture. The story does not seem to be over, and the future of religious policy towards the Evangelical Churches does not necessarily have to move towards full equality of religions26 .

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25 Ireneusz Szczukowski: Marcin Luter i reformacja w polskim dyskursie prawicowym, in: Krzysztof Obremski (ed.): Marcin Luter 1517–2017, Toruń 2018, pp. 135–158. 26 See also: Paweł Lisicki: Luter. Ciemna strona rewolucji, Warszawa 2017, Grzegorz Kucharczyk: Kryzys i destrukcja. Szkice o protestanckiej reformacji, Warszawa 2017.

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der Errichtung der kommunistischen Herrschaft im östlichen Europa, Erlangen 2002, pp. 137–208. Kiec, Olgierd: Protestantische Kirchen in Polen in der Phase des Zusammenbruchs der kommunistischen Herrschaft (1980–1990), in: Peter Maser/Jens Holger Schjørring (eds.): Wie die Träumenden? Protestantische Kirchen in der Phase des Zusammennbruchs der kommunistischen Herrschaft im östlichen Europa, Erlangen 2003, p. 117–134. Kiec, Olgierd: Protestantische Kirchen in Polen nach 1989, in: Katharina Kunter/Jens Holger Schjørring (eds.): Die Kirchen und das Erbe des Kommunismus. Die Zeit nach 1989 – Zäsur, Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Neubeginn, Erlangen 2007, pp. 41–66. Kiec, Olgierd: Historia protestantyzmu w Poznaniu od XVI do XXI wieku, Poznań 2015. Krebs, Bernd: Państwo, Naród, Kościół. Biskup Juliusz Bursche a spory o protestantyzm w Polsce w latach 1917–1939, Bielsko-Biała 1998. Krebs, Bernd: Evangelische Christen in Polen unter zwei Diktaturen, in: Martin Greschat (ed.): Deutsche und polnische Christen. Erfahrungen unter zwei Diktaturen, Stuttgart 1999, pp. 22–67. Krasowski, Krzysztof: Związki wyznaniowe w II Rzeczypospolitej. Studium historycznoprawne, Warszawa–Poznań 1988. Kucharczyk, Grzegorz: Kryzys i destrukcja. Szkice o protestanckiej reformacji, Warszawa 2017. Legutko, Ryszard: Esej o duszy polskiej, Kraków 2008. Leszczyński, Paweł A.: Regulacja stosunków między państwem a nierzymskokatolickimi Kościołami i innymi związkami wyznaniowymi określona w art. 25 ust. 5 Konstytucji RP, Gorzów Wielkopolski 2012. Lisicki, Paweł: Luter. Ciemna strona rewolucji, Warszawa 2017. Metzler, Gabriele: Einführung in das Studium der Zeitgeschichte, Paderborn 2004. Michalak, Ryszard: Polityka wyznaniowa państwa polskiego wobec mniejszości religijnych w latach 1945–1989, Zielona Góra 2014. Pietrzak, Michał/Wysoczański, Wiktor: Prawo Kościołów i związków wyznaniowych nierzymskokatolickich w Polsce, Warszawa 1997. Scholz, Franz: Zwischen Staatsräson und Evangelium. Kardinal Hlond und die Tragödie der ostdeutschen Diözesen, Frankfurt am Main 1988. Szczukowski, Ireneusz: Marcin Luter i reformacja w polskim dyskursie prawicowym, in: Krzysztof Obremski (ed.): Marcin Luter 1517–2017, Toruń 2018, pp. 135–158. Ther, Philipp: Die einheimische Bevölkerung des Oppelner Schlesiens nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die Entstehung einer deutschen Minderheit, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 26/3 (2000), pp. 407–438. Urban, Kazimierz: Zbory niemieckie Kościoła Ewangelicko-Augsburskiego w Polsce 1948–1970. Wybór materiałów, Kraków 2003. Zwiastun 22/7-8 (1982), pp. 102–107.