Religion, Power, and Society in Suriname and Guyana: Hindu, Muslim, and Christian Relations 9781032010205, 9781032016023, 9781003179269

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Religion, Power, and Society in Suriname and Guyana

This book surveys the development of the religious landscape in Suriname and Guyana, focusing on the interaction between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians and responses to Christian dominance. It reflects on how and why these religiously diverse Caribbean societies are characterized by relative harmony, whereas interreligious relationships in other parts of the world have been marked by extreme conflict and violence. The chapters explore ideological and institutional dimensions, including the role of government policies, religious demography, religious leadership, and private religious institutions. The author takes a critical stance toward a negative approach to power struggles and offers a perspective that does not necessarily consider religious diversity a hindrance for religious harmony. Making valuable data accessible to scholars in the English language, this volume provides a framework for the study of interreligious relations and for understanding the religious worlds of the Caribbean. R. Kirtie Algoe is a researcher in the Institute for Graduate Studies and Research at Anton de Kom University of Suriname.

Studies in World Christianity and Interreligious Relations Series Editor: Frans Wijsen, Radboud University, The Netherlands

The aim of this series is to publish scholarly works of high merit on relations between believers of various streams of Christianity, as well as relations between believers of Christianity and other religions. We welcome studies from all disciplines, including multi- and interdisciplinary studies, which focus on intra- and inter-religious relations and are non-denominational. Editorial Board: Francis Clooney (Cambridge, USA) Fatimah Husein (Yogyakarta, Indonesia) Diego Irarrazaval (Santiago, Chile) Robert Schreiter (Chicago, USA) Abdulkader Tayob (Cape Town, South Africa) Anya Topolski (Nijmegen, The Netherlands) Confucianism and Christianity Interreligious Dialogue on the Theology of Mission Edmund Kee-Fook Chia Christianity Across Borders Theology and Contemporary Issues in Global Migration Gemma Tulud Cruz Asian Christianity and Theology Inculturation, Interreligious Dialogue, Integral Liberation Edmund Kee-Fook Chia Moral Pedagogies for Africa From Ethnic Enmity to Responsible Cohabitation Edited by Theodros A. Teklu Religion, Power and Society in Suriname and Guyana Hindu, Muslim and Christian Relations R. Kirtie Algoe For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/religion/series/WCIR

Religion, Power, and Society in Suriname and Guyana Hindu, Muslim, and Christian Relations

R. Kirtie Algoe

BK-TandF-ALGOE_9781032010205-211691-FM.indd 3

08/04/22 11:26 AM

First published 2022 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2022 R. Kirtie Algoe The right of R. Kirtie Algoe to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 9781032010205 (hbk) ISBN: 9781032016023 (pbk) ISBN: 9781003179269 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003179269 Typeset in Sabon LT Std by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

Contents

List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgments

vi vii viii

1 Introduction

1

2 Theoretical Framework

8

3 Methodology

33

4 Evolution of Christian Dominance in Suriname and Guyana

48

5 ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations in Suriname and Guyana

101

6 General Conclusions

163

Appendices References Index

186 207 224

Figures

2.1 Factors and Dimensions of Religious Dominance9 2.2 Factors and Dimensions of Responses to Religious Dominance17 2.3 Typology of Interreligious Relations23 2.4 Conceptual Framework of ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations at National Level27 4.1 Population by Religion in Suriname 20th–21st Centuries49 4.2 National Population by Christian Denomination in Suriname 1946–201254 4.3 National Population by Muslim Denomination in Suriname 1971–201257 4.4 Population by Hindu Denomination in Suriname 1971–201258 4.5 Population by Religion Guyana 20th–21st Centuries75 4.6 Population by Major Christian Denomination in Guyana 1946–201278 4.7 East Indians by Christian Denomination in Guyana 2006–201479 4.8 Mobility Processes between Religious Groups and Denominations 1950–2014, Suriname94 4.9 Mobility Processes between Religious Groups and Denominations 1950–2014, Guyana95 5.1 ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations in Suriname 1950–2014129 5.2 ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations in Guyana 1950–2014148 6.1 New Conceptual Framework Interreligious Relations167

Tables

1.1 Focus and Limitations Theories on Interreligious Relations3 3.1 Periodization of Regimes in Suriname and Guyana38 3.2 Operationalization Factors of ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations40 4.1 Indices Population by Religion in Suriname 20th–21st Centuries (1900 = 100)49 4.2 Association Religion and Ethnicity in Suriname 1964–201250 4.3 Absolute Natural Growth of Major Ethnic Groups 1926–195051 4.4 Annual Expenditure on Education, Religious Organizations, and Leaders 1910–1940 (F) 61 4.5 Indices Population by Religion in Guyana 20th–21st Centuries (1911 = 100)75 4.6 Population by Religion Suriname and Guyana Early 20th–21st Centuries92 4.7 Indices Population by Religion in Suriname and Guyana 1946–2012 (1946 = 100)93 5.1 ‘Responses’ in Formal Education Suriname 1950–1979107 5.2 Administrations Suriname 1950–1979114 5.3 Ministers by Ethnicity in Suriname 1949–1979115 5.4 Administrations Guyana 1950–1968133 5.5 ‘Responses’ Suriname and Guyana 1900–1950150 5.6 ‘Responses’ Suriname 1950–1979 and Guyana 1950–1968152

Acknowledgments

This book is based on my PhD dissertation that could not be completed without the support of various individuals and institutions. I owe thanks to the Institute for Graduate Studies and Research (IGSR) for selecting me as the first Research Assistant with a PhD scholarship. This was an unusual policy at the Anton de Kom University till 2010. Therefore, I am very thankful. A special word of thanks goes to Prof. Dr. Jack Menke, my supervisor, who repeatedly explained the art of doing a PhD in a so-called ‘Third World’ society. Our feedback sessions were by no means easy. There were severe discussions ranging from the academic to the personal level. I learnt that a PhD is not just a matter of obtaining an academic degree. It involves organizational, analytical, and communication skills that are necessary for coping with societal changes in a regional and international context. During a PhD research, you are constantly challenged to get out of your comfort zone. I was taught to pursue higher standards of my own skills and deal with ‘defeat’, rejection, and criticism. It has been a tough journey, but I could not have completed this without the guidance of the supervisor. Many persons encouraged me during the PhD research and to some I must express my thankfulness explicitly. My deepest gratitude goes to my parents (Vijayanthie and Radjen Algoe) and brother (Nagish Algoe). Their support, particularly of my mother, is exemplary. She supported me beyond my imagination with the smallest things such as bringing coffee to my room when I was fighting with the texts. I must also thank my maternal grandmother, Kamla Charoe – Tjon Sie Fat, who repeatedly asked with interest when I was about to finish my study. While she hardly knows what a PhD is about – she has never been to school – her wisdom and problem-solving skills in social life have always guided my research adventure. Other people I thank are my colleagues at IGSR and Melody Hoefdraad for her research assistance in preparing the manuscript. To find the balance between mind, body, and spirit during the study, I needed physical challenges. Therefore, I hardly compromised with my formal training schedule of two times a week. In fact, I exceeded this when new opportunities drew the attention of my stubborn and curious mind. One was a half-marathon. I participated twice in this event, where

Acknowledgments ix I learnt to overcome the physical and mental challenges. Other aspects were the participation in the annual taekwondo competition and pencak silat demonstrations. These physical challenges reminded me that I could finish anything I focused on. I am therefore also thankful to my sports family. Special gratitude should be given to my taekwondo and pencak silat masters, Henk van Dams MSc. and Dr. Randy van Zichem, who helped me finding the balance between mind, body, and spirit through physical practice. An important group I must thank includes the resource persons, informants, and research institutions in Suriname and Guyana. Without ignoring others, I wish to express my explicit gratitude to Patrick Williams, Tota Mangar, Rishee Thakur, James Victor, Claude Blackmore, Shanue Samuels, Fazeel Feroz, Parnamand Bhanu, and Winston Mc Gowen. These persons helped me finding my way in Guyana, which was not easy in the beginning. I received support from the Caribbean Research Library at the University of Guyana. In Suriname the Commissie voor Promoties en Eredoctoraten (CPE) assisted and guided me a lot. Thank you! I hope that this thesis broadens the insight in interreligious relations, and might be a stepping stone for conceptualizing the larger Caribbean experience. Finally, I must express my gratitude to Dr. Freek Bakker who encouraged me to publish the dissertation. He was the main agent behind the whole publication process. Whenever I felt uncomfortable about the technicalities of publishing, his wisdom and experience guided me on a path of clarity. Furthermore, my warm backbone in life cannot be excluded. Between completing my dissertation and publishing the book I changed from a single scholar living with her parents to an expecting lady sharing life with a great person. Robin Waldring, thanks for your patience and warmth after coming together under one roof, in particular for being there when pregnancy roller coasters hit extremely hard. This book could not be finished without the working conditions you helped me to create amidst the severe COVID-19 pandemic circumstances. And yes, together, we hope that this piece of work can make a difference in people’s lives and especially uplift our region’s involvement in today’s global academic and policy debates about religious diversity. Rishmidevi Kirtie Algoe, September 2021

1

Introduction

In today’s world, Christians are the largest religious group (32%), followed by Muslims (23%) and Hindus (15%) (Pew Research Center, 2012). The demographic majority of Christians is an important factor that interacted with Christian dominance in many regions during western colonialism. Their dominance was expressed clearly in the compulsion and enforcement of the practice of Christianity on other religious groups. As Sankatsing (2007, pp. 2–3) states: ‘Western Christianity was to be imposed at all costs on all latitudes preferably by persuasion and conversion, but if so required with the use of genocidal force’. The Caribbean is among the regions with Christian dominance during western colonialism. However, from a religious demographic viewpoint it is a distinctive part in the world. Prior to Christian dominance, the Caribbean, as opposed to various regions, was not inhabited by Christians, Hindus, and Muslims. This region was populated only by indigenous religious groups before the arrival of colonizers in the 15th century (Lampe, 2001). Other regions, like Asia were already populated by Hindus (Singh, 2004); the Middle East and parts of Africa by Muslims, and Europe by Christians (Kaba, 2005; Lawler, 2011). This study concentrates on responses by Hindus and Muslims to Christian dominance in Suriname and Guyana, two religiously diverse societies in the Caribbean. This region is characterized by relatively harmonious responses, which is remarkable as in various parts of the world extreme violence between Christian and non-Christian religions is a common phenomenon. In many regions, Christians, Hindus, and/or Muslims were involved in wars during conflicts with dominant groups (Reychler, 1997). In former Yugoslavia, a European country, for instance, responses by Bosnian Muslims to the Serbian Christian dominance encouraged a war with a religious dimension in the early 1990s (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005). Kashmir (Asia) had bloodbaths during clashes between Muslim groups and the dominant Hindu government in the 1990s (Reychler, 1997). Responses to religious dominance in the Caribbean did not involve such extreme violence. Barriteau (2006, p. 12) even describes this region as a ‘zone of peace’ in the confrontational world. While peace may be an overrated DOI: 10.4324/9781003179269-1

2  Introduction classification, as the Caribbean has its challenges with cultural diversity, it is a distinct region in terms of absence of religious wars and a relative harmony between religious groups. Addressing this particular Caribbean experience is worthwhile considering the increasing debates on the negative influence of religious groups on social stability in the world (Canetti, Hobfoll, Pedahzur, & Zaidise, 2010). These debates do not entirely apply to the relative positive experiences of Caribbean societies with religion. The term responses is not new; it has been used before to refer to the ways subaltern groups cope with or free themselves from the rule of others (see for instance Hedlund, 2008; Kosambi, 1992; Lindenfeld, 2005). However, a conceptualization of responses was not identified. The interest in such a conceptualization came after the defense of the author’s master thesis on the institutional development of Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam in Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago in 2011 (Algoe, 2011). This thesis was criticized for dealing with responses of Hindus and Muslims to Christian dominance, but that these were not conceptualized. Responses are defined as strategies of subordinate religious groups to reduce the dominance of religious groups by using ideologies and institutions. Responses, therefore, have an ideological and institutional dimension. The ideological dimension focuses on values and beliefs of subordinate groups, while the institutional dimension emphasizes practices and strategies of these groups through institutions. In the next chapter both dimensions will be worked out. The main research objective is to develop a conceptual framework on interreligious relations for Caribbean societies. Such a framework is necessary for two reasons. First, standard approaches with a sociopsychological and theological nature cannot adequately explain the relative harmonious interreligious relations in Caribbean societies (Table 1.1). Mainstream sociopsychological theories, like the Social Identity and Social Identity Development theories, focus on the tendency of people to perceive their own group as more positive than others (Brown, 2000) and emphasize the negative aspects of relations between groups.1 These theories underline perceptions, behaviors, and attitudes of individuals toward the own and other group (Pettigrew, 1998; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2009). The theory of acculturation, which is in the field of cross-cultural psychology, provides relevant insight in relations between cultural groups (Table 1.1). This theory addresses the changes emerging from intercultural contact (Oudenhoven & Ward, 2012). Acculturation classically refers to ‘those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups’ (Redfield, Linton, and Herscovits, 1936 cited in Berry, 1997, p. 7). This theory is widely used to study the impact of large scale migration in western societies (Oudenhoven & Ward, 2012). In the view of acculturation, intercultural contact between immigrants and the hosts can result into separation, assimilation, marginalization,

Introduction 3 Table 1.1  Focus and Limitations Theories on Interreligious Relations Academic Discipline

Theory

Focus

Limitations

Social psychology

Social identity theory Social identity development theory

Tendency to perceive own group as more positive than others

Cross-cultural psychology

Theory of acculturation

Theology

Religious pluralism Interreligious dialogue

Perceptions, behaviors, and attitudes of individuals toward the own and other group Intercultural contact and implications for original cultural patterns due to migration Influence and need of common religious values to encourage religious harmony Own religious superiority is a basis to judge other religions

Exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism

No attention for global social changes such as rise of Evangelicalism Implicit homogeneity ideal

Inadequate to understand equality and solidarity between religious groups

and integration. The outcome of this contact is not a linear process; it is influenced by conditions and backgrounds of involved cultural groups (Berry, 1997). A limitation of the acculturation theory, however, is the lack of attention to global social changes such as demographic trends and transnational relations (Oudenhoven & Ward, 2012). An important global social change is the rise of Evangelicalism (Pew Research Center, 2014). Such changes hardly play a role in the debates of acculturation when migration is not involved. However, the rise of Evangelicalism may have implications for interreligious relations. There are ‘theological’ theories which implicitly argue that religious homogeneity is needed for religious harmony such as the interreligious dialogue and religious pluralism. Both interreligious dialogue and religious pluralism focus on how common 2 religious values such as the beliefs in one God encourage religious harmony (Hospital, 2007; Karuvelil, 2012; Porterfield, 2013). But there are limited explanations for peaceful interreligious relations without shared religious beliefs (Table 1.1). To develop a conceptual framework for interreligious relations in Caribbean societies, a perspective is needed that does not necessarily consider religious diversity a hindrance for religious harmony. To this end, the

4  Introduction concept of concerted diversity (Sankatsing, 2007) is used. This is the key approach that enables insight in the potential of religious groups to build harmonious relationships with each other. The theoretical relevance of this study is that it proposes a typology of interreligious relations that differs from the standard distinction between exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism3 (Cheetham, Pratt, & Thomas, 2013). These three forms take the own religious superiority as a basis to judge others (Karuvelil, 2012) which limits to understand the possible equality and solidarity between religious groups (Table 1.1). In our proposed typology, such an understanding is enabled by the concept of concerted diversity. The argument is that interreligious relations consist of two forms: concerted diversity and religious dominance. Concerted diversity allows a deeper understanding of the ability of religious groups to build harmonious relationships with each other. It involves the expression of equality and solidarity ideals and related practices as well as conflict solving abilities. Concerted diversity refers to the ways social groups are harmonizing their differences while respecting each other’s dignity through dialogue and negotiated compromises for the time being (Sankatsing, 2016). Religious dominance, on the contrary, conceptualizes the way religious groups express their superiority over others. Noteworthy is that hegemony, counterhegemony, and concerted diversity have not been combined before in studies on interreligious relations (see for instance Abu-Nimer, 2001; Ahlin et al., 2012; Alabi, 2002; Baines & Quartly, 2013; Bräuchler, 2007; R. K. Brown & Brown, 2011; Lancee & Dronkers, 2011; Phalet, Baysu, & Verkuyten, 2010; Smith, 2007; Sterchele, 2007). The combination of these three concepts may add to theoretical approaches of interreligious relations in the existing academic discussions. In addition to the theoretical contribution, this thesis contributes to in-depth studies on interreligious relations between Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in Caribbean societies. Most studies on these religious groups do not intensively address their interreligious relations. Ryan (1999) and Maharaj (2002) for instance discuss political and religious tensions between Christians and Hindus in Trinidad in the 1990s. Kassim (2004) deals with the cooperation between Hindus and Muslims in formal education in the same society in the 1990s. There is hardly any attention for the conceptualization of interreligious relations between Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in the recent published encyclopedia of Caribbean religions (Taylor & Case, 2013). There are comparative studies on religion in the Caribbean including Suriname, but hardly or not in-depth focused on interreligious relationships between these three religious groups. Ramsoedh and Bloemberg (1995) for instance focus on the institutionalization of Hinduism in Suriname and Guyana from the indentured period of the 19th century to the 1990s. Vertovec (1996) concentrates on Hinduism in Trinidad, Guyana, and Suriname. Schalkwijk (2011) addresses the development of the Moravian missionary work among East Indians in Suriname, Guyana,

Introduction 5 and Trinidad from 1850 to 1980. This study focuses on Suriname and Guyana as these are among the few Caribbean nations where Christians, Hindus, and Muslims comprise more than three quarter of the national population (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2013; Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2007). The central research question is: What were the responses of Hindus and Muslims to Christian dominance in Suriname and Guyana from 1950 to 2014? The theories of hegemony, domination, counterhegemony (Gramsci, 1999) and various studies (Algoe, 2009, 2011; Bader, 2003; Bouma & Singleton, 2004; Phan & Tan, 2013) point at four factors of dominance and ‘responses’: government policies, religious demography, religious leadership, and private religious institutions. Therefore, the sub questions are: a How did government policies, religious demography, religious leadership, and private religious institutions influence Christian dominance over Hindus and Muslims? b What is the influence of government policies, religious demography, religious leadership, and private religious institutions on the responses of Hindus and Muslims to Christian dominance? The influence of ‘responses’ on interreligious relations is examined to obtain insight in the assumed religious harmony in the Caribbean: c What is the influence of the Hindu and Muslim responses to Christian dominance on the interreligious relations? The comparison of Christian dominance, ‘responses’, and interreligious relations between Suriname and Guyana is important. Crossnational studies namely have the benefit to explain similarities and differences between countries and provide a deeper understanding of issues in varying national contexts (Hantrais, 1995). For this reason sub questions particularly address the comparison of Suriname and Guyana. d Are there similarities and/or differences in Christian dominance between Suriname and Guyana and how can these be explained? e Are there similarities and/or differences in Hindu and Muslim responses to Christian dominance between Suriname and Guyana and how can these be explained? f Are there similarities and/or differences in the influence of Hindu and Muslim responses to Christian dominance on the interreligious relations between Suriname and Guyana and how can these be explained? Christian dominance and responses by Hindus and Muslims will be differentiated by religious denomination. The latter is defined as a subgroup within a religion. As regards Christians, a distinction is made between traditional

6  Introduction and nontraditional denominations. Traditional Christian denominations in Suriname and Guyana are the Moravian, Dutch Reformed, the Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Anglican, and Lutheran Church. The nontraditional Christian denominations involve the Protestant movements with emphasis on the human spiritual experience that emerged since the late 1960s. Two forms of such movements must be distinguished: Evangelicalism and Pentecostalism. Evangelicalism4 is a denominational movement among Protestantism that emphasizes the authority of the Bible and the Holy Spirit (Woodhead, 2002). Two main beliefs of Evangelicals are that salvation comes through conversion where one develops a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, and that the Bible has a unique authority in the life of humans (ibid). Pentecostalism differentiates itself from Evangelicalism in the possession by the Holy Spirit. There is a main belief in ‘baptism by the Spirit’ (ibid, p. 201), where the experiences mark the difference between those who are born again and saved by the Spirit, and those who are enslaved by the world, flesh, and devil (ibid). In this study both Pentecostal and Evangelical movements since the 1960s are hence referred to as ‘Evangelicalism’. With respect to Hindus, there are two large denominations in Suriname and Guyana: Sanatan Dharma and Arya Samaj. Muslim denominations in Suriname are more diverse than Guyana. Guyana has predominantly Sunnis and other small denominations such as Ahmadiyyas. But Suriname also has a particular distinction of Muslims by ethnicity besides these two major Muslim denominations. Large ethnic groups among the Muslims are the Javanese and the East Indian people. The Javanese Muslims are further differentiated by east- and west-oriented prayers (Soeropawiro, 2016). Hindu and Muslim responses to Christian dominance (hence referred to as ‘responses’) between 1950 and 2014 are examined. To explain their responses, the 1900–1950 period is also addressed as it involved major sociohistorical changes which had implications for the 1950–2014 period. The choice of both periods requires a justification. The year 1900 is selected as conversion missions by Christian churches among Hindus and Muslims began to increase in Suriname and Guyana (Schalkwijk, 2011). These missions are an instrument of dominance, when used by ruling religious groups to attract followers who support the status quo of power relations. The year 1950 is considered a turning point as from this year on Hindus and Muslims increasingly began to institutionalize their religions. As will be explained in the next chapter, institutionalization is an important response to dominance of religious groups. In Suriname and Guyana, Hindu and Islamic denominational schools were gradually founded, recognized, and financially supported by the government (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001; Rambarran & Coonjah, n.d.). In both nations, Hindu and Muslim religious holidays were acknowledged between the 1960s and 1970s. The year 2014 is chosen as data collection was finished in this year and thus enabled insight in the most recent ‘responses’.

Introduction 7

1.1  Outline of the Book In the introduction of this book, the research focus is presented and its background and objectives are clarified (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 elaborates on the theoretical framework. The theories of hegemony and counterhegemony are reviewed, and the concepts of religious dominance, ‘responses’, and interreligious relations are elucidated. Chapter 3 deals with the methodology. The comparison between the nations of Suriname and Guyana is justified on the basis of theoretical similarities. Within the theoretical framework a mixed method research design and certain research methods are selected to explain ‘responses’. Chapter 4 discusses the evolution of the religious demography and Christian dominance in Suriname and Guyana. This provides a basis for Chapter 5 that deals with the responses to dominance in Suriname and Guyana at the national level. In the final chapter the main conclusions are presented.

Notes 1 Brown (2000) states that the Social Identity Theory underlines the ‘negative aspects of intergroup relations’ (p. 752) and that one of its challenges ‘remains to provide a better understanding of the affective aspects of intergroup behavior, particularly when these assume hostile or destructive forms’ (p. 769). 2 An important common ground underlined by religious pluralism and interreligious dialogue is that people perceive the ‘Ultimate/ God/ Supreme’ differently (Filoramo, 2003;Porterfield, 2013; Rosenblith, 2008). This perspective is important for creating mutual understanding, but it excludes religious groups who do not believe in an ‘Ultimate’ such as Buddhists. 3 Exclusivism argues that ‘truth’ is only found in the own religion, while others are false and wrong (Karuvelil, 2012; Smith, 2007). Inclusivism also perceives the own religion as superior above others, but still allows them to ‘share some of the territory’(Smith, 2007). Other religions are believed to have some elements of truth (ibid). Pluralism believes that other religions have important truths which are worthy to learn and seeks dialogue among them (ibid). 4 The term Evangelical dates from 1831. Throughout the years, it has been defined in various ways and with diverse links with Christian denominations (Crossley, 2016). In this study, the focus is on the renaissance movement of Protestant churches such as Pentecostal in Suriname and Guyana since the second half the 20th century. In the same period, the North American Protestant movement emerged and it was called ‘Evangelical’ (ibid).

2

Theoretical Framework

2.1  Religious Dominance Religious dominance is defined as the power of religious groups over others through institutions and ideologies. In this approach of dominance, religion is considered a phenomenon that expresses itself in terms of social relationships and sacred and secular parts of social life.1 Power refers to the ability to get one’s way with the consent of and even despite the opposition by others. This view on power differs from other conceptualizations that only emphasize the ‘ability to get one’s way even when others oppose it’ (Pyle & Davidson, 2003, p. 58). In this study, power includes the capability of ruling groups to win support for their supremacy and to rule without this support. The focus is on Christian dominance, thus the power of Christians, over Hindus and Muslims. In the conceptualization of religious dominance, Gramsci’s (1891–1937)2 approaches of hegemony and domination is used. He was an Italian Marxist who criticized the traditional view on dominance through economic, political, and armed forces and resistance in terms of revolutions. Unlike classical Marxists, he argues that ideological control rather than coercion lies at the core of dominance (Fontana, 2002; Gramsci, 1999). His main idea is that no ruling group, regardless of its power, can maintain itself only through organized state power and armed force (Burke, 2005). Such a group eventually requires popular support or consent of the mass and legitimacy (ibid) that are built by ideological control through civil society and the state. Gramsci conceptualizes this ideological control in the concept of hegemony, while coercive control is embedded in the concept of domination. Hegemony and domination enable analyses of existing and emerging processes of dominance (Scherrer, 2001). ‘Hegemony’ can provide insight in how new groups become involved in practices of dominance and how subordinate people are pacified with the existing order through ideological influences (ibid). ‘Domination’ explains how established ruling groups sustain themselves by using state power and coercive forces. DOI: 10.4324/9781003179269-2

Theoretical Framework 9

Figure 2.1  Factors and Dimensions of Religious Dominance.

This thesis modifies Gramsci’s hegemony and domination to conceptualize dominance in a somewhat different way. Whereas he distinguishes coercive and noncoercive control, this study focuses on the ideological and institutional dimensions of dominance. Both dimensions are preferred to obtain insight in the precise role of ideologies and institutions in dominance, which in Gramsci’s approaches are interwoven. Using insights from Gramsci’s approaches (Gramsci, 1999) and various studies (Algoe, 2009, 2011; Bader, 2003; Bouma & Singleton, 2004; Phan & Tan, 2013) four major factors of Christian dominance are elucidated: government policies, religious demography, religious leadership, and private religious institutions (Figure 2.1). The following sections discuss the influence of each factor on ideological and institutional Christian dominance. 2.1.1  Religious Ideological Dominance Ideologies can be considered as ‘mental constructs’ that interact with the larger society. They include ‘ideas and beliefs that symbolize the conditions and life experiences of a specific, socially significant group or class’ and which ‘arise from the material structure of society as a whole’ (Eagleton, 1991, p. 29). Ideologies are not limited to issues in the ‘head of people’ for these can be a reflection of structures in real social life. Ideologies consist of values and beliefs that express and intertwine with the material structure of society, the interests and experiences of particular social groups. Values include judgments and standards of people about social life. Values guide the choices of persons in life. This thesis focuses on shared values of religious groups such as principles, views on what is good, bad, and important. Beliefs are convictions of people without necessary empirical support such as stereotypes. It can be associated with values as these shape views on circumstances, persons, and objects. Beliefs can include perceptions, doctrines, religious views, and myths (Bueno, 2012).

10  Theoretical Framework Ideological religious dominance includes the beliefs and values that present particular religious groups as the naturally superior in society and that to the possible acceptance by other religious groups. In Gramsci’s hegemony, ruling groups propagate their beliefs and values in such a way that it becomes ‘common sense’ in the public’s opinion (Gramsci, 1999). The dominant ideology then is internalized to an extent that it evolves to the ‘natural order of things’ in the life of the general public (Billings, 1990). ‘Common sense’ includes popular beliefs, support or ‘consent’ among the mass created by ruling groups to maintain the status quo of power relations. It is the essential part of the concept of hegemony. Gramsci states that ‘everything that directly or indirectly influences or could influence public opinion belongs to it: libraries, schools, associations and clubs of various kinds, even architecture, the layout of streets and their names’ (Gramsci cited in Stoddart, 2007, p. 202). Here he merges the role of institutions and ideologies in ‘common sense’. In the concept of Christian ideological dominance only the role of ideologies is included. ‘Common sense’ has two functions: socialization and paralyzation of critical thinking. Socialization is the process through which people learn norms and values of a particular society and become a member of it (OpenStax, 2017). In the concept of ‘common sense’ these norms and values justify the superiority of ruling groups and as subordinate groups are socialized, power relations are maintained (Burke, 2005). The more the mass is educated and subjected to such beliefs, the more it will believe that the power structure of dominant religious groups is a natural thing. This is the strength of the socialization. People get convinced to subscribe to values and norms that favor dominant groups (Gramsci, 1999). The more the subordinate groups are socialized in ‘common sense’, the less it will think critical (Gramsci, 1999). Hence in Gramsci’s view, socialization paralyzes critical thinking (ibid). In this book such paralyzation discourages ‘responses’. Subordinate groups become uncertain about a new order. They are inclined to follow ‘the law of the least effort’ (Buttigieg, 1995) with the consequence that they cannot and/or do not want to counter dominance (Burke, 2005; Jones, 2006). Gramsci calls ‘common sense’ the ‘terrible slave-driver of the spirit’ (Buttigieg, 1995, p. 12). It discourages people from challenging the status quo and scares them with uncertainties that result from radical changes (ibid). If people want to take actions against coercive dominance through for instance revolutions, they will eventually fail due to lacking support by the mass that is under ideological control. Gramsci states that not everyone is able to understand how ‘common sense’ is produced and hence tend to support the status quo in society (ibid). He argues: ‘the class struggle becomes less harsh, the revolutionary spirit loses momentum. The so-called law of least effort becomes popular – this is the law of the lazy which often means doing nothing at all. In countries like this, the revolution is less likely’ (Gramsci cited in Buttigieg, 1995, p. 12).

Theoretical Framework 11 2.1.1.1  Government Policies Of all factors of religious dominance (Figure 2.1), government policies have the most impact on ideological religious dominance when these instantly target the entire public. Government policies are official policies of governmental authorities to encourage, prevent, or regulate certain activities in society (Bramadat, 2008) such as laws, and ordinances on religious matters. These policies can also create conditions to expand the power of particular groups when they are aligned to the state, while the latter disguises itself as an independent body. Government policies can enhance ideological religious dominance when they present values and beliefs of the dominant religious groups as universal through for instance public education. In Gramsci’s view it is ‘the organ of one particular group, destined to create favorable conditions for the latter’s maximum expansion’ (Gramsci, 1999, p. 406).3 The state ‘exerts moral, intellectual and cultural force’ (Gramsci cited in Fontana, 2002, p. 161) and presents itself as an objective and independent unit. This characteristic of the state enables dominant groups to indoctrinate subordinate groups with its own specific interests. Written law is a critical government policy that influences and expresses ideological dominance by prescribing customs and attitudes for collective life (Gramsci, 1999). Written law includes published ordinances, rules, and regulations that reflect values of ruling religious groups. It is the moral face of the state by telling the mass what belongs to praiseworthy and criminal action of individuals and groups (ibid). An example of how written law sustains ideological Christian dominance is the outlawing of the Hindu ‘fire pass’ ritual in Trinidad in the 19th century. This ritual was practiced by Hindu indentured workers of South India (Madrasis) where priests walked over smoldering ashes (Laurence, 1994). Trinidadian colonial authorities outlawed the fire walking ceremonies because these seemed horrid to them (Vertovec, 1992). Their perception was based on Christian values of religious practices and not of Hindus who practiced the respective ceremonies. As the Christian values prevailed over that of Hindus in the outlawing of the fire pass ritual, Christian ideological dominance is reflected in government policies. 2.1.1.2  Religious Demography Using the definition by Johnson et al. (n.d.),4 religious demography is described as the statistical analyses of the demographic characteristics of religious populations and the change of religious affiliation. Important demographic characteristics are population size, growth, migration, fertility, and mortality. Three factors explain religious demography: migration, natural growth, and conversion. Migration refers to the difference between the number of immigrants and emigrants. Natural growth includes the increase or decrease of the population based on births and deaths.

12  Theoretical Framework Conversion is the change of a person’s religious affiliation. People can convert within a religion by shifting from one denomination to another (Wingate, 2013), but more importantly in this study is the conversion from one religion to another. Religious demography may encourage ideological religious dominance when the population of the ruling religious group grows in numbers. With this growth, the support of people for the ruling ideologies increases which in turn can strengthen the public opinion. The more people believe in the ruling ideologies, the more these ideologies can be considered the ‘daily order’. An important way to enlarge the population size of the ruling religion is conversion of subordinate people. When their conversion rate is high, support for the status quo of power relations may enlarge. High conversion rates thus implies an increase of the number of persons that accept the power of ruling groups. When subordinate people convert, they get indoctrinated with beliefs and values that justify the ‘natural order’ including the superiority of the ruling religion. They conform to the prescribed religious values of the respective religious groups (Billings, 1990). 2.1.1.3  Religious Leadership Religious leadership enhances ideological-religious dominance when religious leaders of ruling groups subtly influence the thinking of subordinate religious groups approving the power structure in society. The concept of religious leadership is derived from Gramsci’s moral and intellectual leadership. He describes this leadership as the ability to win support of a particular group by connecting with its perceived interests (Billings, 1990). It includes the way leaders show concerns for the interests of groups and make efforts to realize these. They present themselves as well-wishers who try to solve the problems of the subordinate groups. But in essence, dominant groups are subtly trying to change the worldviews of the mass (ibid). In Gramsci’s view, they have two types of intellectuals: organic and traditional. Organic intellectuals are strongly related to the state and ruling groups (Burke, 2005) such as managers, civil servants, lawyers. They are ‘produced’ by and openly related to the dominant school system (ibid). Traditional intellectuals are not openly related to a dominating group. They present themselves as persons who work autonomously from the ruling groups and are perceived as such by many people, however, they are aligned to the dominating groups. Traditional intellectuals can be philosophers, clerks, and professors (ibid). In Gramsci’s approach, intellectuals are part of workforce that has to prevent rebellion against the power structures. He argues that dominant groups attempt to involve the interests of subordinate groups in the ruling institutions, but not at the risk of the own interests (Scherrer, 2001). They make ‘allies’ with the subordinate people and insert them in the established system of dominance. ‘Allies’ are made

Theoretical Framework 13 by partially including their needs in ‘hegemonic’ institutions in order to increase their support for the power relations in society (ibid). Religious leaders may not necessarily have intellectual leadership, but they exercise moral leadership. They may conduct conversion mission where they persuade subordinate groups to convert to the ruling religion by for instance doing humanitarian work, providing healthcare, and counseling. Conversion implies that members commit themselves to certain religious worldviews, which is encouraged by the interaction with ‘confirming others’ (Billings, 1990, p. 9). Illustrative for the role of religious leadership in Christian ideological dominance is the Christian missionary work in Asia, South Africa, and the Caribbean during colonialism. Christian missionaries attempted to persuade non-Christians for converting to Christianity in these regions for decades (Bhavan & Sangrahalaya, 2002; Bisnauth, 1977; Edmonds & Gonzalez, 2010; Nunn, 2011; Schalkwijk, 2001). In colonial times, Christian religious instruction was given to enslaved Africans in the Caribbean so they could be controlled mentally and labor unrest could be prevented (Edmonds & Gonzalez, 2010). Christian missionaries provided humanitarian work in education and health care to subordinate groups without asking them to convert in the first place such as in India (Bhavan & Sangrahalaya, 2002). However, these groups are subtly convinced to conversion which was the ultimate aim of missionaries (ibid). By such conversion, the subordinate people are made allies of the ruling group and thus support the power structure. This reflects the working of religious leadership of Christian missionaries in ideological dominance. 2.1.1.4  Private Religious Institutions Using the definitions of Bouma (1998), Algoe (2011), and Scott (2004), institutions are described as arrangements, practices, and organizations that coordinate social behavior and provide people meaning to life. Private religious institutions involve religious organizations, and sacred and secular practices of religious groups. Religious organizations are institutions that provide material resources such as religious buildings (mosques, churches, and temples), schools, and graveyards and that encourage shared values and norms among their members at the meso- and the national levels. Sacred practices include for instance rituals, celebration of holidays, and ecumenical services, while secular practices can be community projects and policies on admission to denominational schools. It is assumed that private religious institutions may influence ideological religious dominance as these have instruments to indoctrinate many subordinate people through for instance formal education. Gramsci is critical about the Roman Catholic Church as a religious institution. Like Marx, Gramsci also perceives this church as the opium of the mass: ‘Jesuitized Christianity (…) had become a pure narcotic for the popular masses’ (Gramsci cited in Kertzer, 1979, p. 327). The church was central and its

14  Theoretical Framework doctrine was perceived as the universal religion. In Gramsci’s view, the Roman Catholic spread its doctrine among the mass to maintain its power. It seeks for homogenization of religious beliefs and social life and had a cultural supremacy over the mass (ibid). Religious organizations such as schools can be used for spreading the own religious beliefs. Gramsci is clear about the relationship between school system and ideological control (Burke, 2005): schools are an instrument to socialize children in order to maintain the status quo of ruling groups (ibid). This study examines how private Christian institutions propagate Christian superiority over nonChristians through conversion missions and formal education. 2.1.2  Religious Institutional Dominance Institutional religious dominance is defined as the practices, the use of resources, and the strategies by educational, legislative, government bureaucratic, and religious institutions to strengthen the superiority of ruling religious groups over others. It is the dominance of these groups through private and public institutions. Explanatory factors of institutional religious dominance are government policies, private religious institutions, religious leadership, and religious demography. Government policies may strengthen institutional religious dominance by facilitating ruling religious groups with public resources such as holidays, laws, subsidies, jobs, and education at public schools. Privileged access to these resources strongly increases the institutional capacity of religious organizations and enhances the practice of the ruling religion. In colonial Indonesia for instance Dutch colonial authorities subsidized Christian churches for missionary activities (Jansen, 2006). These activities were allowed in certain areas, but with state subsidies Christians could institutionalize themselves. For example Christian schools were established in the Moluccas, a group of islands in the eastern region of Indonesia, in the early 20th century (ibid). Private religious institutions are able to encourage institutional religious dominance when these influence the upward social mobility of subordinate people. When ruling religious groups have far more institutions, material resources, and networks that provide upward social mobility, it can compel religious groups with a low socioeconomic status to convert to that ruling religion. Converts then become victims of power relations (Gabbert, 2001). In the case of Christian dominance there are various examples in the world where people converted to Christianity for material benefits. In India for instance low caste Hindus often became Christian due to social inequality in the first half of the 20th century. Access to material benefits provided during conversion campaigns attracted them to adopt Christianity (Bhavan & Sangrahalaya, 2002). Evidence for the influence of religious leadership on Christian institutional dominance is identified in Lampe’s (2001) work on Christianity in the

Theoretical Framework 15 Caribbean. During the colonial period in this region, the Roman Catholic Church encouraged ‘forced’ donations from its members. Christian missionaries stimulated customs of donations for the church in the will after passing away (ibid, p. 28). These private resources of members strengthened the institutional dominance of the Catholic Church. Religious demography may increase institutional religious dominance when the large population of ruling religious groups favors them to win elections, achieve political power, and influence government policies in their own favor. But religious demography, especially its component conversion, can also be influenced by institutional religious dominance. When ruling religious groups have more public and private resources to enhance upward social mobility, subordinate people are likely to convert to this religion. This happened for instance with Christian dominance in South Africa during European colonialism. By the 1940s, it had 5360 Christian denominational schools, and only a mere 230 public schools (Nunn, 2011). As the former schools socialized children with Christian values, their conversion to Christianity was encouraged. According to estimates, Catholics in Africa increased drastically between 1900 and 2000 (Tschannen, 2012). The institutional religious dimension can be coercive and noncoercive. It is coercive when ruling religious groups use state power and militant non-state groups to protect the ‘public order’. The latter is the practice of rules and regulations that reflect the interests of ruling groups. The main instruments of coercive dominance are the judiciary power of the state including the police, the military, the court, the prison, various laws and acts (Hunt, 1976, p. 8). Gramsci conceptualizes the coercive nature of institutional dominance in the concept of domination. He argues that state coercion is used when hegemony, i.e. ideological dominance, is insufficient or fails. Illustrative is his following statement: ‘The apparatus of state coercive power which “legally” enforces discipline on those groups who do not “consent” either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed’ (Gramsci, 1999, p. 145). An example of the use of coercive dominance when ideological dominance fails is the death penalty against religious practices by enslaved Africans in Santo Domingo during French colonialism. Enslaved Africans, who did not accept the religious superiority of Christians and followed their own religious beliefs, could be punished with the death penalty (Edmonds & Gonzalez, 2010, p. 58). Non-state actors can use coercion to support ruling groups. Non-state actors can be civil society agents, business circles, media, and foreign forces. Illustrative for non-state coercion by ruling religious groups is Ambon, an Indonesian island predominantly populated by Christians and Muslims. It used to be dominated by Christians during the colonial period till the

16  Theoretical Framework 1970s (Sholeh, 2013). They were favored over Muslims in terms of jobs and education opportunities by Dutch colonialists (ibid). But in the 1990s, Muslims started to dominate over Christians due to Muslim authoritarian government policies on transmigration and employment. New Muslim migrants arrived in Ambon and changed the local demography from a predominant Christian area to a major Muslim society. The Muslim dominance was reflected in the public sphere. Muslims were preferred over Christians by the government which created a power struggle between these two religious groups. Christian and Muslim gangs emerged using coercion against each other (ibid). Both gangs were instructed to attack churches and mosques (ibid). This section conceptualized religious dominance by modifying Gramsci’s approaches. It added a distinction between ideological and institutional dimension which are not explicit in his concepts. Furthermore, this section focused on four explanatory factors: government policies, religious demography, religious leadership, and private religious institutions. The conceptualization of Christian dominance is important for understanding the main component of the conceptual framework, ‘responses’, which is discussed in the next section.

2.2  Responses to Religious Dominance Responses refer to the use of ideologies and institutions by subordinate religious groups to structurally reduce religious dominance. It is a concept that will be applied to understand interreligious relations. Based on Gramsci’s concept of counterhegemony, a distinction is made between an ideological and an institutional dimension to ‘responses’. He argues that to counter dominance, subordinate groups have to break with being under ideological control first (Gramsci, 1999). They have to develop a liberated awareness on the own position which is a basis to take actions against political and ideological control (Billings, 1990). Gramsci believes that hegemony, including ideological control, could be countered by political and cultural struggles rather than socialist revolutions (ibid, p. 5). He differs from Marx who argues that revolutions were the main strategies in class struggles. Gramsci believes that these class struggles are ultimately of an educational nature. In the concept of counterhegemony, responses to the ideological and institutional dominance are interwoven. It includes both the creation of critical awareness and the establishment of counterhegemonic institutions to diminish hegemony and domination (Billings, 1990; Buttigieg, 1995). This study makes a distinction between the influence of ideologies and institutions and therefore proposes two types of responses to religious dominance: ideological and institutional. These responses can be influenced by religious demography, government policies, private religious institutions, and religious leadership (Figure 2.2).

Theoretical Framework 17

Figure 2.2  Factors and Dimensions of Responses to Religious Dominance.

2.2.1  Ideological ‘Responses’ Ideological ‘responses’ deal with the way subordinate religious groups resist ideological religious dominance. Emphasis is on the creation of critical values, and beliefs against the belief in the superiority of ruling religious groups over others. There are two ways to resist ideological dominance: syncretism and critical religious awareness. Syncretism refers to the combining of beliefs and practices of subordinate religions with those of the ruling religion as a ‘response’ of the former group to maintain the own religion.5 As the focus is on Hindu and Muslim responses to Christian dominance, syncretism here deals with the mixing of Christian, Hindu, and Muslim beliefs and practices. Syncretism emerges from contact between cultures in different contexts such as dominance (Grayson, 1992). In many ‘Third World’ societies syncretic practices emerged as an ideological response to unequal political and cultural relations (ibid). In India for instance local people defended their religions from false judgments of colonialists by syncretizing with the religion which dominated: Christianity (Kishwar, 2006). In various sub-Saharan African countries, churches combine Christianity with traditional African religious practices. Missionaries who are assumed to follow the Christian norm of monogamy, practice the African religious tradition of polygamy (Wilson, 2011).6 In Chile, local indigenous people syncretized their religion with Christianity such as the Mapuche (Gumucio, 2008).7 In Cuba, the Santería emerged, a religion that combines the worshipping of African entities with Christian practices (Edmonds & Gonzalez, 2010, p. 9). In Trinidad, the Christian La Divina Pastora worship by Hindus in Trinidad on Good Friday emerged since the 1860s (R. K. Algoe, 2011). Critical religious awareness includes the rejection of the superiority of the ruling religious groups as the ‘natural order’ and strengthens the beliefs in religious equality. This form of ideological ‘response’ is derived from the concept of counterhegemony (Billings, 1990) which argues that the reduction of hegemony, including ideological dominance, starts with critical thinking. According to counterhegemony an alternative view against

18  Theoretical Framework ruling ideologies must be encouraged (Buttigieg, 1995), which is required to act against dominance (Billings, 1990). It is therefore argued that critical religious awareness is a more significant response to dominance than syncretism. Significant changes in religious demography can encourage ‘responses’ in terms of critical religious awareness raising. Such responses can be triggered when large numbers of subordinate groups convert to the ruling religion. High conversion rates threaten the ‘market share’ of religious groups and can create tensions (Bouma & Singleton, 2004). By raising the critical religious awareness, subordinate groups seek to prevent conversion of their members to the ruling religion. An example is the resistance by Muslims to send their children to Christianity-based public schools in Jamaica during the indenture period (Afroz, 2000). Another example is the critical religious awareness by religious leaders in colonial Fiji in the 19th century. Hindu and Muslim leaders functioned as ‘guards’ by spreading views about strengthening their own religious beliefs and criticizing conversion to Christianity (Kelly, 1945; Lal & Yadav, 1995). To develop views that ‘challenge the status quo’, leadership of intellectuals is necessary (Billings, 1990, p. 27). This study addresses the role of intellectuals of Hindu and Muslim religious organizations in creating critical views to counter the beliefs in Christian superiority. As Gramsci states, intellectuals are key figures who assign meaning to their social groups. They help to bind and function their social groups (Burke, 2005). Intellectuals are not per se persons with formal authority, but informal educators. They can come from the community, such as the neighborhood, and are necessary since they know their local people. They may have similarities with the residents. And more importantly, the informal educators are able to develop strong relationships with the local people in such a way that they can raise critical commitments to the community (ibid). In Gramsci’s view the oppressed group has: to exercise its leadership role first and foremost in civil society by, among other things, fostering the development of an independent sociocultural and political consciousness among the subaltern classes and by promoting the formation of self-regulated autonomous organizations (…); moreover, this needed to be done before any attempts to assume governmental power. (Buttigieg, 1995, p. 19) As mentioned above, intellectuals can create indigenous influences on ‘responses’. They are driving forces that challenge the status quo from within the community. But this is not by definition the case. Intellectuals who create critical awareness, do not necessarily have to be locals. They can also be persons from outside who develop ‘responses’. In other words, we can have foreign influences on ‘responses’. This happened for instance

Theoretical Framework 19 in Trinidad and Tobago with the visit of Arya Samaj missionaries from India (Vertovec, 1992). They were Hindu reformers who challenged the dominance of the classical Hindu denomination, the Sanatan Dharma, which propagated the position of the Brahmins within Hinduism. The Arya Samaj missionaries contributed to a new wave of religious thinking and agency which created a dynamic atmosphere in the Hindu population. As Vertovec (1992, p. 117) points out: ‘the most significant advances in Hindu organizational development came as a response to the Arya Samaadj and its outspoken missionaries’. Private religious institutions of subordinate religious groups are critical for developing and raising critical religious awareness. These institutions can function as what Gramsci calls ‘autonomous organizations’. According to him such organizations are key in counterhegemonic actions as these are not under ideological control and create room for reflecting on the own position in society (Billings, 1990). Gramsci believes that autonomous organizations are often civil society agents (ibid). They develop a revolutionary mindset that challenges the coercive powers (Buttigieg, 1995). In this thesis, autonomous organizations can be religious institutions of subordinate religious groups. Such institutions belong to civil society that is not under control of administrative and juridical apparatuses of the state (ibid, p. 14). In this research, private religious institutions that are free from ideological dominance are not automatically instruments for ideological ‘response’. They also need institutional capacity to spread views that challenge ideological religious dominance. According to Gramsci, critical views against dominance must be repeated to create mass support for counterhegemonic actions (ibid). However, he does not adequately elaborate on the required institutional capacity of autonomous organizations. Such capacity may include manpower, material resources, and even finance. Government policies may contribute to ideological ‘responses’ by removing or changing laws that only privilege ruling religious groups. Subordinate religious groups can encourage the making of government policies that foster their religious equality through political parties. The latter then can become an autonomous organization (Buttigieg, 1995) that uses political decision-making power to influence government policymaking. In many postcolonial Caribbean societies subordinate groups attempted to reduce the ideological dominance of colonial Christian powers through political parties such as in Trinidad (R. K. Algoe, 2011). 2.2.2  Institutional ‘Responses’ Institutional ‘responses’ include the practices, the use of resources, and the strategies by educational, legislative, government bureaucratic, and religious organizations of subordinate religious groups to structurally reduce religious dominance. It is a ‘response’ where these groups seek the institutionalization of their religion. Institutionalization is defined as ‘a process

20  Theoretical Framework in which patterns of action are created that are enduring and standardized, and that transcend individuals’ (Ramsoedh & Bloemberg, 1995, p. 5). It includes the establishment of religious organizations; the standardization, celebration, and propagation of religious practices and beliefs; and the use of private and public resources to do the aforementioned. In Suriname, Guyana, and Trinidad – Caribbean societies with the largest share of Hindus and Muslims – Hindus and Muslims structured their religious practices after the indenture period (R. K. Algoe, 2009, 2011; Choenni, 1982; Maharaj, 2002; Ramsoedh & Bloemberg, 1995; Seecharan, 1993). This was necessary for the maintenance of their own religion, but also to prevent conversion to Christianity. Institutionalization can occur at the private religious institutional and national levels. An example of the former level is when Hindus and Muslims make arrangements for large celebrations of religious festivals in temples and mosques. But the broadcast of these celebrations on state-owned media brings the institutionalization of religions at the national level. Institutional responses of subordinate groups can structurally reduce religious dominance when they can express themselves religiously at the national level. Such expressions require the use of public resources besides the own religious institutions. Public resources are important for two reasons: limited sustainability and overruling of private religious institutions. The first reason deals with the benefit of public resources to overcome the problems of sustainability of private religious institutions. The latter are required for ‘responses’ in terms of establishing mosques, temples, schools, and welfare organizations, but some are difficult to maintain without financial state support like for instance denominational schools. In Suriname, a Hindu school was established in the 1930s, however, due to limited funding it could not be sustained (R. K. Algoe, 2011). Christian schools on the other hand received state subsidies that enabled their maintenance. The second reason refers to the potential of public resources to overrule the working of private religious institutions. Public resources are also more important than private resources to reduce religious dominance when legislation matters. Illustrative is the Hindu and Muslim marriage law in Trinidad and Suriname. Hindus and Muslims had long traditions of marrying according to own religious rites, but these remained illegal despite advocacy for legalization by their private religious organizations. It took decades before the Hindu and Muslim marriage law was passed in both countries (ibid). It is argued that subordinate religious groups must pursue changes in government policies to structurally reduce religious dominance, a process that requires political decision-making power. This also fits in Gramsci’s counterhegemony. According to him civil society, thus also private religious institutions, should act against hegemony. It must disable ‘the coercive apparatus of the state, gaining access to political power, and creating the conditions that could give rise to a consensual society wherein no individual

Theoretical Framework 21 or group is reduced to a subaltern status’ (Buttigieg, 1995, p. 7). Gramsci thus mentions that actions of civil society institutions should acquire access to the state and reduce hegemony. However, he does not elaborate on how this occurs. Fiori rightly stated: ‘What is so problematic about this reading (author: Gramsci’s notebooks) is that it does not really explain how “ideas become practical forces”’ (Fiori 1970, p. 93 cited in Kandil, 2011, p. 57). In many colonial Caribbean societies political power was used by subordinate groups to remove the control of colonizers (Menke, 2003, pp. 114–115). It is reasonable to elaborate on the access of subordinate religious groups to political decision-making power. Political decision-making power refers to the ability of groups or individuals to direct political decisions at the governmental level in their own favor even despite opposition by others. Illustrative for the influence of the access to this power on reducing institutional religious dominance is the struggle of Hindu and Muslim cultural organizations for subsidies in Christian dominated Trinidad in the 20th century. These struggles emerged in the early 20th century, but remained unsuccessful until Hindus and Muslims became represented in government positions in the mid-20th century (R. K. Algoe, 2011). This study examines the access of subordinate religious groups to political decision-making power by addressing their representation in strategic state institutions: Parliament, Council of Ministers, President, Vice President, Prime Minister. Through these institutions subordinate religious groups can create government policies in their own favor such as laws on subsidies. When they become part of the coalition, they even can favor their members with state resources8 without the necessary government policies. For instance, a Muslim Minister can approve the request for lands of Muslim organizations for building a Muslim orphanage. Some strategic state institutions, such as ministries, can be used by subordinate religious groups to give their own members jobs in civil services through patronage practices. Patronage is the reciprocal relation between exponents of subordinate groups who have acquired political decision-making power and those who support them politically. It is considered a system where the patron, who has influence, provides resources and services for the benefits of clients. It is a system based on connections such as friendship (Weingrod, 1968). Two factors influence political decision-making power in Suriname and Guyana: the electoral system and political power-sharing. To get political decision-making power, subordinate religious groups are required to win the political elections and be part of the coalition. But at a larger level this process is influenced by the electoral system that calculates the ‘elected positions in government that individuals and parties are rewarded after elections’ (King, 2000). This research considers two main electoral systems: ‘winner-takes-all’ and the proportional system. The former system assigns all seats of the parliament to the political party with most votes. This party does not necessarily have to get the majority (more than 50%) of

22  Theoretical Framework the votes. The latter system, on the contrary, gives the political parties the same percentage of seats as it gets votes in the elections (ibid). It is examined which electoral system is applied in Guyana and Suriname and how it influenced the access of Hindus and Muslims to political decision-making power from 1950 to 2014. Political power-sharing is conceptualized as the cooperation and negotiation between the elites of the major ethnic groups and their political parties to acquire political decision-making power and distribute public resources among themselves. Political power-sharing is embedded in the Lijphart’s theory of consociational democracy. The latter addresses the ability of governments consisting of elites of various cultural groups to transform a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy (Lijphart, 1969, p. 216). Political power-sharing can enhance political stability when various cultures are politically represented and the representatives are able to advocate the interests of their groups based on mutual cooperation and negotiation (ibid). In this process the exponents of the cultural groups are required to transcend cultural differences and to ‘join in a common effort’ with others (ibid). In the concept of political power-sharing subordinate groups create political combinations in order to become part of the coalition. These combinations are based on negotiations about the distribution of state resources such as ministries, board of directors of state firms, districts councils. This study is interested in the strategies of parties with exponents of Hindus and Muslims to politically cooperate with others. After the influence of government policies, now the role of religious demography in institutional ‘responses’ is elaborated. Marxists argue that demography can change power relations when the share of subordinate9 groups in the national population grows and transforms society from a capitalist to a socialist structure (Salamini, 1974). In this book the increasing share of subordinate religious groups can be advantageous for winning elections and gain political power. Through such power subordinate religious groups can counter religious dominance. The key topic in this section was the conceptualization of responses to religious dominance. A distinction is made between ideological and institutional dimensions of responses. Assumed explanatory factors of ‘responses’ are religious leadership, demography, private religious institutions, and government policies. The latter is considered the main factor to structurally reduce Christian dominance.

2.3  Conceptual Framework of Interreligious Relations This section links ‘responses’ to the larger theoretical framework of interreligious relations. It first conceptualizes interreligious relations. Then it elaborates on the link with ‘responses’. It will be argued that ‘responses’ may influence peaceful interreligious relations when these reduce Christian

Theoretical Framework 23 dominance at the national level and encourage interreligious cooperation by applying principles of equality, solidarity, and conflict solving. The conceptualization of interreligious relations is built on two existing approaches. One describes interreligious relations as the ways people with different religious background relate to, and engage with each other (Cheetham et al., 2013). According to the other approach interreligious relations are the ‘public expressions of feelings and opinions about other religions at the institutional and the national level, as well as the nature of the activities that connect or dissociate the respective religions’ (R. K. Algoe, 2011, p. 32). This study expands on both approaches and defines interreligious relations as the way people with different religious backgrounds associate with and/or dissociate from each other at the ideological and institutional level. A distinction is made between two forms of interreligious relations, dominance and concerted diversity, where each one has an ideological and institutional dimension (Figure 2.3). Dominance, as defined before, includes the power of particular religious groups over others. Concerted diversity is the opposite of dominance. It is the ‘interactive combination of differences into a mutually beneficial synergetic force that does not destroy the singular characteristics of specific groups because it values them as powerful assets for harmony’ (Sankatsing, 2016, p. 395). According to concerted diversity, differences of social groups are harmonized. In this process their dignity is secured while finding ways to cooperate with each other in solidarity. Concerted diversity in practice refers to an ongoing dialogue where involved parties are open to accept a negotiated compromise for the time being. It is a process where the respective compromise respects the stakeholders, maintains their principles and supports their aspirations (ibid). There is solidarity rather than polarization, competition, and conflicts. Concerted diversity upholds three values: equality, solidarity, and conflict solving. Equality refers to the beliefs in the similar importance of religiously diverse groups among people and the state. Sankatsing (2004) explains equality metaphorically. He states that different social groups are like instruments in a concert. As in practice every instrument contributes to a concert, so are various cultural groups equally important for the ‘concert’ of life. Solidarity, emphasizes the beliefs in joint effort rather than competition and dominance. It has the ability to sympathize with others, even if they

Figure 2.3  Typology of Interreligious Relations.

24  Theoretical Framework do not belong to the own group. Hence, it can cope with diversity in a positive way. Illustrative for solidarity is the African Ubuntu philosophy. Ubuntu’s central phrase is ‘a person is a person through other persons’ or ‘I am because we are’ (Metz & Gaie, 2010, p. 274). It is a philosophy which interconnects the individuals with the community in such a way that it promotes cooperation and harmony among people. Ubuntu is based on African theory of morality. It is a typical African ethic which demands one to relate to others positively in order to develop one’s humanness. ‘One cannot realize one’s true self in opposition to others or even in isolation from them’ (ibid, p. 275). In Ubuntu ‘the deepest moral obligation is to become more fully human. And this means entering more and more deeply into community with others. So although the goal is personal fulfilment, selfishness is excluded’ (Shutte, 2001, p. 30 cited in Metz & Gaie, 2010, p. 275). Conflict solving is important as in social life tensions can arise between people who have contradictory interests and needs with a material base (Sankatsing, 2007). Conflicting parties can solve these tensions by deliberately accepting what is seen as the ‘best available’ solution for the time being, rather than forcing homogeneity, uniformity, and consensus. It is not the unification, but the respect for different needs and interests and the acceptance of diversity among the people that have solutions. This respect and understanding stimulate the ability to negotiate contrasting interests. ‘Negotiation and joint action, based on the harmonization of divergent, even contrary interests among social forces, are the best available options to reach a viable project for the self-realization both of the social group and of society as a whole’ (Sankatsing, 2004). This study considers concerted diversity as a form of interreligious relations that is built through social interactions and institutional practices of various religious groups based on equality, solidarity, and the solving of opposing interests and views. It assigns an ideological and institutional dimension to concerted diversity. Religious demography, religious leadership, government policies, and private religious institutions can influence concerted diversity. However, the influence differs for these two dimensions, which is discussed next. 2.3.1  Ideological Dimension of Concerted Diversity The ideological dimension of concerted diversity centers on the expression of equality and solidarity ideals by religious groups in the own religious organizations and in public spheres. The upholding of these ideals can be influenced by religious demography, religious leadership, private religious institutions, and government policies. Religious demography may stimulate religious equality and solidarity when there is no threatening change in the share of religious groups in the population. As Bouma and Singleton (2004) explain such changes may lead to tensions among religious groups. When religious groups face

Theoretical Framework 25 a significant decline in their ‘market share’ due to conversion, it becomes difficult for them to encourage ideals of religious equality and solidarity. And as mentioned before, in concerted diversity, the principles and aspirations of social groups should be preserved. In the case of religious groups, large scale conversion can threaten the maintenance of their principles and aspirations and discourage concerted diversity. Religious leadership and private religious institutions are crucial factors that may promote ideals of religious equality and solidarity. Both factors have a certain authority over individuals and thus influence their thinking. Religious leaders can be persons to whom people trust their secrets, sins, and dreams (Kane & Jacobs, 2012). In some countries such as the USA, minorities even prefer to seek help from religious leaders rather than from other health care providing institutions (ibid). This indicates the influence religious leaders can have on individuals. For this study, religious leaders and religious institutions can encourage the ideological dimension of concerted diversity when the ideals of religious equality and solidarity are fostered. This happens for instance when religious communities use their capacity to stimulate interreligious cooperation through action and words. Vendley (2005, p. 95) says: ‘Cooperation breaks down barriers between different groups and creates “horizontal” connections between communities, helping them to function as common stakeholders, greatly reducing the temptation to manipulate religion itself in scapegoating dynamics’. By using religious assets, religious leaders and institutions can educate the local population in shared commitments, peace, and cooperation with each other. Government policies can support religious equality through words and actions in a nation. This can occur for instance by expressing these ideals explicitly in documents such as laws and policies. Countries can make laws that ensure the religious freedom (Fox & Flores, 2009). This endorses religious equality in word, as in theory the government behavior is expected to respect the laws. But, in practice – thus in action – this does not necessarily have to be the case (ibid). Constitutions provide room for various interpretations which governments may use not to follow the legal guidelines on religious freedom (ibid). Therefore, it is argued that laws are an example for stimulating religious equality, but more importantly are related government practices such as providing religious groups equal access to public resources through public institutions. These institutions must be in place such as the civil services infrastructure. Another issue that must be acknowledged is the participation in the decision-making of government policies. Such participation can increase the impact of these policies (Rose-ackerman, 2008), as it can prove the practice of religious equality. 2.3.2  Institutional Dimension of Concerted Diversity The institutional dimension of concerted diversity includes the practices of religious and state institutions based on religious equality, solidarity, and

26  Theoretical Framework conflict solving. Here the emphasis is on the interreligious cooperation, and the government policies and their decision-making. Factors influencing this dimension are religious leadership, private religious institutions, and government policies. Religious leadership and private religious institutions can strengthen concerted diversity through practices of interreligious cooperation. Interreligious cooperation refers to the way religious groups build mutual relationships at an institutional level. It consists of a set of joint interactions by various religious groups with certain intentions such as community welfare, or improvement of interreligious relations (Weller, 2013). Interreligious cooperation can emerge from within religious people, or from outside for instance during shared consultation about government policies (ibid). An example for the former is ecumenical services between religious groups. During such services, religious leaders attempt to express shared religious values. Government policies are critical in the institutional dimension of concerted diversity as these translate the ideals of religious equality, solidarity, and conflict solving into deeds. Policies can fairly and equally allocate public resources to religious groups and thus ‘prove’ the practice of religious equality. Policies can also influence an ongoing dialogue between religious groups by involving them in decision-making and encourage to settle their own conflicting interests. Government officials can make the policies in a transparent way after listening to involved parties (Rose-ackerman, 2008). Now the conceptualization of ‘responses’ and interreligious relations will be integrated. Figure 2.4 presents this integration in a conceptual framework. The main ideas are that ‘responses’ to religious dominance may have three possible outcomes: changed religious dominance, unchanged religious dominance, and concerted diversity (Figure 2.4). These possible outcomes will be discussed as well as the involved explanatory factors. 2.3.3  Outcome ‘Responses’: Changed Religious Dominance Changed religious dominance refers to either a sustainable decrease or increase of dominance of the existing ruling groups, or the emergence of new dominating religious groups. ‘Responses’ may sustainably decrease religious dominance under favorable influence of religious demography, government policies, religious leadership, and private religious institutions. These factors should encourage subordinate religious groups to make or change government policies in their favor and counter the beliefs in religious superiority. But when the factors are not favorable, religious dominance may persist. ‘Responses’ may result in new forms of dominance under influence of government policies, religious leadership, religious demography, private

Theoretical Framework 27

Figure 2.4   Conceptual Framework of ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations at National Level.a Concerted diversity may be encouraged by spatial distribution and neighborliness, but both factors are not included in the conceptual framework as these are examined at the neighborhood level. The respective framework deals with the nation. a

religious institutions (Figure 2.4). In the process of ‘responses’, subordinate groups can become dominant when they maintain their political decision-making power without using this power into fair postcolonial government policies. New forms of dominance may also emerge from struggles among religious groups themselves. This process can be influenced by religious leadership, religious demography, government policies, and private religious institutions rather than due to ‘responses’ (Figure 2.4). There can be struggles among ruling religious groups, where religious leadership and private institutional resources get divided.10 In this study, Evangelicals are assumed to become new dominating religious groups as they attract large numbers of followers at the international level and tend to be less enthusiastic about religious equality ideals. They are growing demographically in the Caribbean and Latin America, in particular at the cost of traditional churches such as the Catholic Church (Pew Research Center, 2014). In various cases, Evangelicals seem to be reserved about interreligious interactions. A survey in the USA for instance showed that Evangelical communities are not enthusiastic about having nonChristians in community life (Merino, 2010, p. 244). An explanation for this perception of Evangelicals is their broader attempt ‘to maintain the boundaries of evangelical identity in a highly pluralistic society’ (Cimino, 2005, cited in Merino, 2010, p. 244).

28  Theoretical Framework 2.3.4  Outcome ‘Responses’: Unchanged Religious Dominance Subordinate groups may respond to religious dominance, but without succeeding in reducing the power relations. This can occur in cases where ruling groups are able to maintain their political power and support of the mass. Subordinate groups then hardly get opportunities to change the power structure. In this process government policies and religious leadership play an important role. Government policies can ensure that the status quo of religious groups in public sectors are maintained. Religious leaders may maintain the power structures by influencing the thinking and actions of local people. In the case of unchanged religious dominance, religious leaders maintain their ideals of superiority over others. In various western countries, such as the USA and in Eastern Europe, studies show that religious leaders can endorse ignorance toward others (Kane & Jacobs, 2012). This indicates that leadership of religious groups do not necessarily work for the better good of interreligious relations in a nation. 2.3.5  Outcome ‘Responses’: Concerted Diversity ‘Responses’ may encourage concerted diversity, but not necessarily. It is encouraged when subordinate groups significantly reduce Christian dominance at the national level by using principles of equality, solidarity, and conflict solving. These principles should be reflected in government policies and religious leadership. When subordinate religious groups gain access to political decision-making power, they should use this power to make fair government policies on religious matters. Such policies can strengthen harmony between religious groups by recognizing and facilitating religious diversity (Bader, 2003; Bouma & Singleton, 2004). Kishwar (2006) points out that harmony between religions can be maintained when societies ‘are able to institutionalize fair and just norms for determining the rights of various groups – irrespective of power, status, class, race, caste, color, gender, language, religion or national origin’ (ibid, p. 1, italics by author). Religious leadership can encourage concerted diversity during ‘responses’ when the religious leaders of subordinate religious groups propagate respect for religious diversity. Studies show that propagating these ideals can settle possible conflicts with other religious groups (Abu-Nimer, 2001). ‘Responses’ may not encourage concerted diversity, when subordinate religious groups use coercion and own religious superiority ideals. Illustrative for the use of coercion in ‘responses’ is the war between Christians and Muslims in the former Muslim dominated Bosnia–Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. The Christians (Serb Orthodox and Croat Catholics) were a demographic minority. During the war the Serb Christians took over the state powers, in particular the judiciary and used these against the Muslims. Many people were murdered and mosques were destroyed (Sterchele, 2007).

Theoretical Framework 29 As a response to this, Bosnian Muslims attacked Christian religious buildings such as churches and monasteries (ibid). Here responses by subordinate groups encourage or result into violent conflicts. Another example of ‘responses’ that does not encourage concerted diversity is the Arya Samaj movement which responded to Christian conversion missions in India. This movement, founded by Dayananda Sarasvati (1824–1883), was explicitly anti-Christian, and aimed at winning back the hearts of former Hindus who converted to Christianity (Hedlund, 2008, p. 4). Let’s turn to concerted diversity at the neighborhood level to illustrate the influencing factors. There are two factors that may encourage concerted diversity in the neighborhoods despite dominance of religious groups in the nation: spatial distribution and neighborliness. These two factors may prevent that dominance at the national level spills over to the local level. Spatial distribution refers to how populations settle in a certain geographical space (Fossett, 2005). It includes the geographical distribution of people and their institutions with different religious background. Interreligious relations may improve when religious groups are exposed to each other in a geographical space (Bouma & Singleton, 2004). Exposure to the ‘other’ can reduce prejudices and misunderstanding that often cause conflicts or disagreements among religious groups. Neighborliness refers to the emerging social interactions and perceptions among people who reside in a close geographical space. It is a concept that can bridge religious differences. Neighborliness is ‘the exchange of small services or support in an emergency against a background of routine convivial exchanges (such as greetings or brief chats over the garden fence or in the street)’ (Forrest & Bridge, 2006, p. 14). Neighbors can have different social and emotional functions. They for instance can be asked to watch the house, run errands, and can support in personal problems (ibid, p. 17). An example that makes clear how spatial distribution and neighborliness encourage religious harmony in neighborhoods despite severe religious clashes at the national level is the Indonesian island Uma Pura. In this society, ideologies and practices of religious harmony prevail amidst violent clashes between Christians and Muslims in the nation of Indonesia (Wellfelt, 2007). There is a peaceful participation in each other’s religious celebrations. This is a result of a process where local Christians and Muslims constantly reason and maintain the own religious and ethnic identity, and yet seek a shared identity on that island (ibid). It is a process influenced by spatial distribution and neighborliness. So far, it is argued that interreligious relations are influenced by ‘responses’. This, however, is not always the case. Interreligious relations can also be influenced by religious demography, religious leadership, government policies, and private religious institutions themselves. In such cases, the responses by subordinate religious groups are not part of the explanation.

30  Theoretical Framework Religious demography, as mentioned before, has the ability to influence interreligious relations through conversion. When members of one religious group convert to another on a significant scale, this can be a source of tensions (Bouma & Singleton, 2004). But when conversion does not threaten the population share of religions, stability and peace between them are likely to be kept. Religious leaders and private religious institutions can directly influence interreligious relations through the way they address other religious groups. In sermons, preaches, and teachings, both religious leaders and institutions can ensure that other religions are referred to as equal stakeholders. In fact they can even transform armed conflicts in a country by utilizing religious assets for peacemaking and reconciliation (Vendley, 2005). Government policies, as stated before, also have a significant impact on interreligious relations through the way make and execute policies for religious groups in a country. These policies are not necessarily an influence of ‘responses’.

2.4 Conclusions Responses to religious dominance are conceptualized within a broader theoretical framework of interreligious relations. A distinction is made between an ideological and institutional dimension of dominance, ‘responses’, and interreligious relations. Based on Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and domination, strategic factors were examined that may explain both Christian dominance and ‘responses’. These factors are religious leadership, religious demography, private religious institutions, and government policies. The latter is considered the most important factor to structurally reduce religious dominance as it provides subordinate groups resources and the authority to change the power structures with a long term effect. Religious dominance is conceptualized as the power of religious groups over others through ideologies and public and private institutions. ‘Responses’ refer to the way subordinate religious groups use ideologies and these two institutions to structurally diminish the power of ruling groups. Ideological ‘responses’ include the creation of critical values and beliefs against the superiority of the ruling religious groups. Institutional ‘responses’ refer to the practices, the mobilization of resources, and the strategies by educational, legislative, government bureaucratic and religious institutions to reduce this religious superiority. The assumption is that ‘responses’ may influence interreligious relations. Three possible outcomes are changed religious dominance, unchanged religious dominance, or concerted diversity. However, it should be noted that interreligious relations can also be influenced directly by religious leadership, religious demography, private religious institutions, and government policies rather than through ‘responses’.

Theoretical Framework 31

Notes 1 This approach to religion is adapted from Beckford and Demerath III (2007) who perceive religion as a social phenomenon. They say that religions can be expressed by (1) social relationships, (2) ‘sacred’, and (3) secular parts of social life (ibid, p. 2). These three ways of religious expressions refer to various institutions and ideologies which are appropriate for conceptualizing the ideological and institutional dimensions of dominance and ‘responses’. 2 Gramsci (1891–1937) was involved in political struggles against the Mussolini regime in Italy. He became a member of a small communist group within the Italian Socialist Party and took various actions against the fascist movement for which he was finally arrested. This arrest brought a transition in his academic achievement. Inspired by Marx’s ideas and Russian socialist strategies, he wrote series of letters, which were published after the Second World War. His prison writings are known as ‘Prisons Notebooks’ (Rosengarten, n.d.). 3 Gramsci uses the term integral state to describe dominance manufactured by the state. The integral state is a ‘combination of force and consent which are balanced in varying proportions, without force prevailing too greatly over consent’ (Gramsci cited in Fontana, 2002, p. 159). 4 They describe religious demography as ‘the scientific and statistical study of the demographic characteristics of religious populations, primarily with respect to their size, age-sex structure, density, growth, distribution, development, migration, and vital statistics, including the change of religious identity within human populations and how these characteristics relate to other social and economic indicators’ (Johnson et al., n.d.). This definition includes a broad approach to religious demography. It does not only consider basic demographic features of religion, but other social and economic factors as well. 5 Not all syncretic practices automatically have to be perceived as a response in the academia. Some religious phenomena can emerge spontaneously due to contact between different religious groups that may or may not interact with processes of dominance. The blending of various religious elements is called ‘creolization’ by some scholars (Jap-A-Joe, 2005). Others may prefer to use the term ‘create’ rather than to ‘respond’. For the purpose of this study, we cannot fully engage in that discussion. A phenomenon is considered a ‘response’ when records clearly point at the influence of factors of dominance and actions to diminish this as pointed out by Gramsci’s counterhegemony. 6 Wilson (2011) explains: ‘many African churches identified themselves as Protestant yet permitted their priests and bishops to marry more than one wife, a practice that is still common today’. 7 The Mapuche traditions have been under Christian dominance for centuries. Chau Negnechen is held to be the Mapuche God and would correspond to the God of Christians, but in a vernacular version’ (Gumucio, 2008, p. 324). 8 The state includes public institutions through which social groups try to exercise political power, and that are also mobilized for achieving economic and political gains (Menke, 2003, pp. 114–115). 9 Marxists state that ‘growing numerical strength of the laboring classes would eventually result in automatic transition from capitalist to socialist structure’ (Salamini, 1974, p. 361).

32  Theoretical Framework 10 Gramsci addressed these struggles among the Roman Catholics implicitly. He made a distinction between Catholicism of the intellectuals and of the people (Fulton, 1987). Catholicism of the intellectuals was aligned to the ruling groups, while Catholicism of the people included the popular religious beliefs of subaltern groups (ibid). Such a distinction implies the division in religious leadership and institutions among a dominant religion.

3

Methodology

3.1  Research Strategy and Design The comparative mixed methods research strategy is chosen as it combines the mixed methods and the comparative case study designs which are both equally important in this study.1 The comparative case study design enables the theory development by comparing cases, while the mixed methods design supports the decision-making on combining qualitative and quantitative methods. The nations of Suriname and Guyana were compared as a case. Such comparison facilitates the purpose of this study which is to develop a conceptual framework of interreligious relations. It thus seeks for theoretical contribution and as Ragin (1987) clearly states, the advantage of comparing cases is the strengthening of theory development. The comparative case study design provides a methodological framework for comparing variables of interest in a particular study (Ragin, 1987, 2007). It goes beyond the classical distinction of qualitative and quantitative research, which is required for understanding a certain phenomenon. Comparative studies have proven to contain a larger added value for in-depth understanding of multireligious societies than non-comparative ones (Bouma & Singleton, 2004). Particularly in the field of religious studies, non-comparative studies do not provide insight in ‘what promotes and what hinders the emergence of harmonious inter-religious relations’, while this is possible by comparing societies (ibid, p. 5). The mixed methods design was essential to enable the qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis that were required for the comparison of Suriname and Guyana. The latter design has the advantage of providing forms of integrating qualitative and quantitative methods. It facilitates the mixture of both quantitative and qualitative methods into a single study to address the research questions (Creswell & Clark, 2011). In the current study, the sequential explanatory form of mixed methods design was chosen. Here quantitative analyses are followed up with qualitative analyses (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 69). Quantitative methods are important to understand the demographic composition of religious groups DOI: 10.4324/9781003179269-3

34  Methodology and conversion rates that affect ‘responses’. This understanding is a basis for in-depth analysis of ‘responses’. Here qualitative methods are used, particularly to obtain insight in the influence of policies, perceptions, experiences, and historical contexts. 3.1.1  Units of Analysis The nations of Suriname and Guyana are compared as ‘similar cases’, though in an adapted way. According to the classical form of the similar case design, cases are selected on the basis of theoretical similarities except for the differing variables of which the effect will be studied. As Seawright and Gerring (2008, p. 304) state: ‘the chosen pair of cases is similar on all the measured independent variables, except the independent variable of interest’. But, there should be a difference in the dependent variable between cases. The confounding impact on the dependent variable is excluded, while variables that may explain the differences between cases are examined (Ragin, 1987, p. 47). The similarities in the independent variables of cases are assumed to be irrelevant in explanations of differences in the dependent variable (ibid). According to this classical form of ‘most similar case’ design, the cases under comparison have a similar outcome, which is the dependent variable (Ragin, 1987; Seawright & Gerring, 2008). In other words, the independent variable is known. In this study, the dependent variable is the Hindu and Muslim response to Christian dominance. When the classical form of ‘most similar case’ design would be applied, it would mean that Suriname and Guyana have the same Hindu and Muslim responses to Christian dominance. This cannot be argued at the beginning of the study. However, there are indications that the ‘responses’ differ between Suriname and Guyana. A study showed that Guyana had fewer NGOs than Suriname in the 1990s, including religious organizations (Schalkwijk, 1997). One reason for this is the large control of the state over all sectors in Guyana (ibid). Since the establishment of religious organizations can be an institutional response, the limited number of these organizations in Guyana can indicate that Hindus and Muslims had fewer institutional responses than in Suriname. Suriname and Guyana were treated as similar cases for two reasons. First, they have two independent variables which appear to be similar and not relevant for explaining possible differences in ‘responses’. These similar independent variables are private religious institutions and religious demography. Private religious institutions, the first similarity of the nations of Suriname and Guyana, may encourage ‘responses’ (Figure 2.4). Between 1900 and 1950, Hindus and Muslims in Suriname and Guyana had national organizations that attempted to encourage the maintenance of the own religion and to discourage the conversion to Christianity. Both nations had Hindu organizations of the Sanatan Dharma and Arya Samaj denominations. Muslim organizations represented the Sunni and Ahmadiyya denominations (Algoe, 2011; Schalkwijk, 1997). Moreover,

Methodology 35 these Hindu and Muslim organizations were by and large established in the same period; the first half of the 20th century (ibid). The existence of these Hindu and Muslim organizations indicates a similarity in background, which many not be critical in explaining the ‘responses’. Religious demography is the second similarity between the nations of Suriname and Guyana. It can influence ‘responses’ by enabling electoral victory and acquiring political decision-making power, which in its turn can be utilized for making government policies that remove the inequal access to public resources. It can also influence ‘responses’ when there is a significant conversion of subordinate groups to the ruling religion. Religious demography in Suriname and Guyana are similar in two regards: the total share of Hindus and Muslims in the population, their conversion to Christianity. In Suriname and Guyana, both religious groups altogether have the largest proportion 2 of the national population, 36% and 32%, respectively (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2013; Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2007). This suggests that the Hindu and Muslim population size may not be significant for acquiring political power in these two nations. The second reason for comparing Suriname and Guyana as similar cases deals with the influence of government policies as a significant factor for explaining differences between nations. Government policies are assumed to differ between both nations and be a significant explanation for possible differences in ‘responses’. Government policy is considered the independent variable which may explain emerging differences in the dependent variable (this is explained in depth under section Periodization). An instrumental case study of a neighborhood was conducted in Suriname and Guyana to illuminate the influence of spatial distribution and neighborliness on concerted diversity. Instrumental cases are examined to enhance insight into a particular issue (Stake, 2005). It is a case to facilitate the ‘understanding of something else’ (Grandy, 2010) and support the main case. Neighborhoods are the ‘immediate local context’ in which interreligious relations are experienced (Bouma & Singleton, 2004, p. 6). With the neighborhood case study, this study attempted to generalize the findings theoretically rather than empirically. This means that the data were used for building the theory, namely theory of interreligious relations, but not as a sample for the entire nation. Departing from Buffel’s3 approach (2012), neighborhood is described as a geographical and social unit in which residents with various religious backgrounds express themselves religiously through religious institutions, religious practices, and social relationships with each other. Neighborhoods are selected on the basis of religious demography, private Christian institutions, spatial distribution, geographic location, and social stratification. These criteria were derived from previous studies (Bouma & Singleton, 2004). Religious demography and private Christian institutions are the selection criteria of the nation that are also applied to the neighborhood for similar reasons. Spatial distribution must be included to grasp how the

36  Methodology physical proximity of different religious groups enhances concerted diversity. It is necessary to take the geographic location as a selection criterion, since it is associated with the religious demography. Neighborhoods must consist of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims during the 1950s, which was more the case in the capital city of Suriname and Guyana. Both nations had large concentrations of East Indians in rural areas, and Javanese communities in Suriname (De Bruijne & Schalkwijk, 2005; Ishmael, 2012). East Indians were predominantly Hindu and to some extent Muslim, and Javanese communities, largely Muslim. Similarity in the social stratification of neighborhoods is crucial to get insight in how different religious groups interact with each other. Studies illustrate that social class can affect the way people treat each other in neighborhoods (Krysan, Couper, Farley, & Forman, 2009). They can hold prejudices about each other which may encourage segregation. This study selects the middle- and low-class income neighborhoods as studies show that in these areas social relationships are important (Fauth, 2004). Such social relationships may include interreligious relations. Based on these selection criteria, the neighborhood Abrabroki in Suriname and Kitty in Guyana were chosen. Religious demography, the first criterion, implies that the neighborhood should predominantly consist of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims. In both Kitty and Abrabroki, these three religious groups have a large share in the local population. In Kitty, the proportion of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in the census of 2002 is 68%, 22%, and 5%, respectively (Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2007). In Abrabroki, the share of these religious groups according to the census of 2004 are 78%, 9%, and 5%, respectively (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2013, unpublished data census 2012). As regards private Christian institutions, the second criterion, Kitty was predominantly Anglican, while Abrabroki mainly Moravian between 1900 and 1950. In Kitty, the Anglican Church was founded in 1838. It conducted Hindi sermons for local Hindus (Mangru, 1977). The church had a graveyard and school till the mid-20th century. The Surinamese neighborhood, Abrabroki, is located in the former plantation Beeckhuysen which was purchased by the Moravian trade company, Christoph Kersten & Co (CKC) in 1834. This neighborhood had many Moravian institutions. The Moravian church was established in 1851. It had economic and religious institutions in Beeckhuysen to serve the purpose of the Christian missions. Within the entire plantation, Abrabroki was the religious center of the Moravians including schools, an orphanage, graveyard and church.4 The third criterion, spatial distribution, requires that the neighborhoods have people and institutions with Christian, Hindu, and Muslim backgrounds by 2014. Important institutions are churches, temples, mosques, denominational schools, welfare organizations. The year 2014 is a basis to reconstruct the physical spatial dimensions from the 1950s on. The physical spatial dimensions are interesting since these can provide insight

Methodology 37 in social interactions among religious groups (Wedam, 2003). Both Kitty and Abrabroki have Christian, Hindu, and Muslim institutions. Kitty has religious institutions of Christianity (21), Hinduism (3), and Islam (2). In Abrabroki, Christians, Hindus, and Muslims have 14, 1, and 4 religious institutions, respectively.5 The geographic location, the fourth criterion, implies that neighborhoods should be located in the capital city. Kitty is in Guyana’s capital, Georgetown. Abrabroki is in Suriname’s capital, Paramaribo. Social stratification, the fifth and final criterion, requires that the neighborhoods consist predominantly of middle- and low-class households. Both Kitty and Abrabroki have a large middle- and low-class population. There is, however, also a small number of upper-class households. The upper class in Kitty consists particularly of some Portuguese Catholics, while in Abrabroki it includes a few Muslims and Moravians. 3.1.2  Limitations Research Design There are two limitations in the comparative design of Suriname and Guyana. The first is that this study cannot claim that ‘responses’ and interreligious relations are solely a religion-related phenomenon because of the confounding effect of ethnicity. This means that due to the strong association between ethnicity and religion, it is difficult to understand which one is most influential in ‘responses’ and interreligious relations. The association between ethnicity and religion in Suriname and Guyana was very strong in the mid-20th century. In the 1960s, the Hindus in Suriname and Guyana were predominantly of East Indian descent (between 70% and 80%) (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2007; Omoruyi, 1971). Most Muslims in Guyana were East Indian, while in Suriname these were of Javanese descent. In the latter nation a small group of the Muslims was East Indian. The majority of Christians were Creoles in Suriname and Guyana, respectively (ibid). Statistically between 1964 and 2012 in Suriname, the association between ethnicity and religion weakened somewhat for Creoles but strongly for Javanese persons. This means that Creoles remained predominantly Christian in 2012, but a little bit less compared to 1964. The case of Javanese persons differed as by 2012 Islam was no longer their main religion. The association between East Indians and Hinduism in Suriname did not change significantly between 1964 and 2012 (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2007, 2013). As regards Guyana, it is more difficult to say how religion and ethnicity are related nowadays due to unavailable statistical data. The second limitation regards the comparison of data. It is critical that the data on Suriname and Guyana are similar in order to make valid comparisons. This is not always possible for the religious demographic analyses due to differences in secondary data sources and data collection methods. Instead of using the census publication of Suriname of 2004 with a large

38  Methodology rate (15%) of ‘unknown’, another resource is used that corrected this rate to 5%. As a result, it is difficult to compare the census data of Suriname and Guyana between 2002 and 2004. Another issue is that reports on Christian conversion rates in both nations between 1900 and 1950 differ significantly. For means of similarity one data source is used. However, the problem is that this may not reflect the real conversion rates in the respective nations. Finally, there are problems with comparing the religious demography in Kitty and Abrabroki due to limitations in the data collection methods. For Abrabroki, the census data as these by and large reflect the research area, but for Kitty a survey is conducted. The latter is necessary as the research area in Kitty is much smaller than covered by the census data. Hence, this study does not compare the neighborhoods. 3.1.3 Periodization Within the 1950–2014 period, subperiods are distinguished based on turning points in political decision-making power (Table 3.1). The latter enables subordinate groups to change government policies that favor Christians. For the purpose of comparative analyses, the role of decision-making power is emphasized as it can provide insight in differences in ‘responses’ between Suriname and Guyana. Comparative studies of similar cases must consider factors that can create a varying impact on the dependent variable (Bureau & Salomonsen, 2012) which is ‘responses’. These factors may help to refine the theory in such a way that its usefulness is enlarged (Hulst, 2009). There are turning points in political decision-making power in Guyana in 1968 and 1992, and in Suriname in 1980 and 1987. Guyana had democratically elected governments from 1950 to 1968 and from 1992 to 2014. It is assumed that with such governments subordinate groups, Hindus and Muslims, may have relatively more access to political decision-making power as they can participate in fairly organized elections. By winning seats in parliament, they acquire political power. But this cannot be assumed during Guyana’s authoritarian regime between 1968 and 1992 (Singh, 2008). Such a regime involves the rule of a political party with Table 3.1  Periodization of Regimes in Suriname and Guyana

Subperiod 1. Democratically elected government 2. Authoritarian/civilmilitary regime 3. Democratically elected government

Access to Political Decision-Making Power

Guyana

Suriname

More

1950–1968

1950–1979

Less

1968–1992

1980–1987

More

1992–2014

1987–2014

Methodology 39 executive, judicial, and legislative power and where the members of the government are elected through unfair elections (Almond & Powell, 1996, cited in Bedeski, n.d.; Svolik, 2009). Suriname also had democratically elected governments which existed from 1950 to 1980, and from 1987 to 2014. The assumption is that subordinate groups, Hindus and Muslims, may have relatively more access to political decision-making power in these subperiods. But we do not expect this between 1980 and 1987 when Suriname had a civil-military regime.6 Military officers governed society by reserving the active veto powers for themselves over a predominantly civilian-staffed government and by threatening the use of force (Singh, 2008; Wahman, Teorell, & Hadenius, 2013). Due to the remarkable different duration of subperiods in Suriname and Guyana, it is assumed that ‘responses’ may not be identical in both nations. In Suriname, the democratically elected governments lasted much longer than in Guyana, while the regime in the former nation was much shorter. This implies that Hindus and Muslims had more favorable circumstances for ‘responses’ in Suriname than Guyana. Both religious groups may have longer access to political decision-making power in Suriname, which is advantageous for ‘responses’ in terms of government policies. 3.1.4 Operationalization Hindu and Muslim responses to Christian dominance were operationalized in four social spheres: education, religious practices and festivities, labor, and social services. The selection of these spheres is related to the concept of hegemony and counterhegemony, where dominance and counteractions against dominance are exercised by civil society institutions such as educational organizations, religious organizations, and media (Billings, 1990; Kandil, 2011). These institutions are located in the social spheres of education, religious practices and festivities, social services, and media. Religious practices and festivities, education, and social services are selected as these reflected Christian dominance the most in Suriname and Trinidad according to a recent study (Algoe, 2011). Since Trinidad and Guyana were predominantly British colonies, it is assumed that the findings on Christian dominance in Trinidad may be somewhat applicable to Guyana. The sphere of labor is selected as it involves employment in public sectors and this may reflect government policies, which is critical for ‘responses’. Drawing on the conceptualization of ‘responses’ and interreligious relations, the indicators involved private and public resources, religious education, and interreligious cooperation. The focus is on two private resources: schools and orphanages. As regards public resources, this study examines legal products (religious public holidays, marriages, and cremation), subsidies, and civil service employment. The operationalization of these indicators include the ideological and institutional dimensions of dominance and concerted diversity (Appendix 1). Ideologies are defined as values,

40  Methodology and beliefs about religious groups held propagated by the state and religious groups themselves. Institutions are state and religious organizations with legislative, financial, and material resources that are used by religious groups for expressing and practicing their religion. Important indicators of responses of Hindus and Muslims to Christian dominance were public resources (legislation, civil services employment, education, subsidies), and the ratio of religious institutions (Appendix 1). These responses can influence interreligious relations (see Section 3.3) which depends on government policies, religious leadership, religious demography, and private religious institutions, spatial distribution, and neighborliness (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2  Operationalization Factors of ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations Factor

Operationalization

Private religious institutions

Hindu and Muslim religious organizations that publicly act against government policies that favor Christians –– Kind and coaching conversations by Christian missionaries with common Hindus and Muslims about theological, moral, and social issues aimed at persuading conversion –– Views and statements of Christian leaders in churches and in public places about own religious superiority –– Statements of Hindu and Muslim leaders expressing critical views against Christianization and encouraging equality ideals about religious diversity –– Formal and informal gatherings, speeches, lectures, and publications of Hindu and Muslim religious organizations that spread above-mentioned statements Laws, regulations, ordinances on cremation; Hindu and Muslim marriages; subsidies to Hindu and Muslim leaders, schools, and orphanages; employment of Hindus and Muslims in civil services Absolute and percentages of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims at the national level Location of residence of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims and their religious institutions (schools, mosques, churches, temples, orphanages) in neighborhood Kitty and Abrabroki Interactions between neighbors with different religious backgrounds during

Religious leadership

Government policies

Religious demography Spatial distribution

Neighborliness

–– –– –– ––

sickness (home visits) religious celebrations (exchange of food items) taking care of children watch over houses when adults are away

Methodology 41 Private religious institutions refer to the largest national Hindu and Muslim religious organizations that develop and spread critical views against Christian dominance and execute activities to raise this awareness among their members. These religious organizations can take initiatives to change or discourage government policies that favor Christian dominance. Religious leadership may influence Christian dominance, ‘responses’, and concerted diversity. Since the influence on each concept is different, it is necessary to distinguish three dimensions of religious leadership in the operationalization. First, religious leadership involves the strategies and communication skills of Christian missionaries to persuade Hindus and Muslims for conversion to Christianity and the expression of Christian superiority at the meso and macro levels. It involves the kind and coaching conversations with common Hindus and Muslims through home visits and in the churches and the way Christian leaders articulate views about being religiously superior over others in the nation. Second, religious leadership includes statements, views of board members of Hindu and Muslim organizations criticizing Christian material privileges and superiority in the nation, the need for practicing the own religion, and expanding religious institutions. Here, religious leadership is a factor of ‘responses’. Third, religious leadership refers to the statements and views of board members of Christian, Hindu, and Muslim organizations on shared religious beliefs, and equality ideals about religious diversity. This study also examines their strategies to settle or avoid religious disputes with each other such as ignoring verbal attacks, emphasizing the need for cooperation, and negotiation about conflicting interests. In this operationalization, religious leadership is a factor of concerted diversity. Government policies include laws, regulations, and ordinances on the access of Hindus and Muslims to public resources: cremation; marriages; subsidies to religious leaders, schools, and orphanages; employment in civil services. These policies are influenced by political decision-making power. Therefore, we also analyze the representation of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in Parliament and Council of Ministries. This representation is further influenced by political power sharing practices among political parties. It is analyzed how elites of the major political parties negotiate to create a coalition after elections. Emphasis is on how they distribute public resources such as ministries according to ethnic and or religious lines. This study must involve religion and ethnicity as both are strongly associated. Religious demography has an impact on Christian dominance and ‘responses’. It includes the population size of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims which are influenced by conversion, migration, and natural growth. Both the absolute numbers and percentages of the population of these three religious groups are accounted for getting a clear understanding of demographic patterns. Absolute numbers are critical since they can reveal whether a percentual change is a result of changes within the

42  Methodology respective group (e.g. negative natural growth) or changes caused by other groups (e.g. immigration). Spatial distribution and neighborliness are assumed to foster concerted diversity processes at the neighborhood level. Spatial distribution refers to the location of the residence of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims and their religious institutions (schools, mosques, churches, temples, orphanages) in the neighborhood Kitty and Abrabroki. This study analyzes whether solidarity increases by the exposure of these three religious groups to each other’s religious practices and festivities. Neighborliness includes the influence of neighborly interactions on interreligious cooperation, shared religious celebrations, and conflict resolution. Neighborly interactions can involve visits among neighbors with different religious backgrounds during sickness, exchange of food items during celebrations, taking care of children, and watch the houses when adults are away.

3.2  Research Methods A similar set of qualitative and quantitative methods was used for the case study of Suriname and Guyana. This is required in comparative studies (Bryman, 2004, p. 53). The major qualitative methods are oral history and documentary research, while the main quantitative method is the analysis of official statistics. 3.2.1  Qualitative Methods Oral history is applied to reconstruct the responses of Hindus and Muslims to Christian dominance in the past. It is the core research method as it enables interviewing of subordinate people about significant events, processes, in the past for means of historical reconstruction (Ritchie, 2003) and to understand contemporary society (Yow, 2005, p. 23). The oral history method is applied in the case study of the nation and at the neighborhood level. At the level of the nation-state officials and (ex) board members of Christian, Hindu, and Muslim religious organizations were interviewed. The emphasis was on their experiences with and perceptions on Christian dominance and responses by Hindus and Muslims in the nation between 1950 and 2014. Attention is also paid to cases of interreligious cooperation. The main interview topics dealt with education, employment in civil services, subsidies for religious institutions, missionary work, evolution of religious institutions, strategies to cope with conflicts with other religious groups, areas of and experiences with cooperation with other religious groups. These interview topics were derived from the conceptual framework (Figure 2.4). At the level of neighborhood, (ex-)board members of local Christian, Hindu, and Muslim organizations and members of households of these

Methodology 43 three religious groups were interviewed, preferably people older than 60 years.7 Informants lived or used to live in the neighborhood between 1950 and 2014. They witnessed and could remember significant processes in this area. As regards households, the eldest member was selected, since (s)he could share the most and the oldest experiences with interreligious relations of the own family in the neighborhood. In some exceptional cases younger informants were also selected when s(he) could provide the data. The documentary research involves qualitative assessments of archives of religious organizations, scholarly literature, administrative governmental records, personal documents of informants, newspaper articles, and internet publications. It is a method that quantitatively and qualitatively analyzes documents (Hakim, 1987). In addition to oral history and documentary research, the method of secondary analyses is used. The latter refers to the reanalyses of data collected by others8 (Hakim, 1987, p. 20). In this study, qualitative secondary analyses are applied on data made available by the Foundation for Information and Development, a Surinamese research institute. The qualitative data are interviews with Javanese Muslims in Suriname conducted in 2004. These interviews provide data on access of Muslims to political decision-making power in Suriname for reanalyses. Ethnography is used to assess the sociocultural contexts of the neighborhood (Whitehead, 2005). Applied ethnographic methods are observations, and open and semi-structured interviews. Observations are used for making a geographic map of the neighborhood including pinpoint areas, streets, parks, rivers, religious buildings, government institutions, and civil society agents. Open and semi-structured interviews are applied for making a geographic map, which depict insights in the historical profile of the neighborhood in the 1950s. These interviews are also used as a basis for identifying informants for oral history. 3.2.2  Quantitative Methods Quantitative methods were particularly applied for insight in religious demography and its influence on Christian dominance. Three quantitative research methods were used: official statistics, survey, and quantitative secondary analyses. Analysis of official statistics, the main quantitative method, was used to gain insight in the religious demography of the nation. Demographic census data on religious populations are collected at the national and neighborhood level between 1900 and 2014. A survey was conducted in a Guyanese neighborhood, Kitty, in 2012, to obtain insight in the religious demography of the research area, which is smaller than the area covered in census data. Information was collected on religious affiliation, ethnicity, duration of residency, number of household members, nationality, sex, and age. The survey included questions of

44  Methodology the 2002 census household questionnaire in Guyana. It was based on a probability sample, in which everyone of the population has a known chance of being selected. A random sample was used which is drawn from a listing of all units in the population. Based on a reliability of 90% a sample (n)9 is selected of 257. Quantitative secondary analyses were applied at the neighborhood and national level. In Suriname data from a survey in 1993 by Stichting Wetenschappelijke Informatie (Foundation for Information and Development) were used. The purpose was to get insight in the religious demography of the neighborhood Abrabroki. As regards the national level, quantitative secondary data analyses were done on the datasets of the Latin American Barometer (LAPOP) survey of Suriname and Guyana. These datasets include information about religious demography. 3.2.3  Data Analysis Based on the sequential form of the comparative research design, quantitative analyses were conducted first and then the qualitative analyses (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 69). Quantitative analyses are made of the religious demography nationwide of Suriname and Guyana between 1900 and 2014. Religious demographic analyses are relevant for obtaining insight in changes in and mobility between Hindu, Muslim, and Christian populations and denominations. The emphasis is on changes due to conversion to Christianity. The obtained demographic insight is used as a basis for the qualitative assessment of Christian dominance and ‘responses’. Two data analysis methods were used: manual coding and Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Manual coding is a technique that analyzes qualitative data manually. It includes the selecting, coding, and fragmenting of data. This study applied manual coding on oral history interviews. SPSS is used for statistical analysis of survey data on Kitty and LAPOP datasets of Suriname and Guyana. To enhance the quality of the research findings, the principle of triangulation and respondent validation were applied in data analysis (Bryman, 2004). Triangulation refers to the use of more than one research method or data source, so findings may be cross-checked (ibid, p. 545). In this study, triangulation took place during the cross-checking of inconsistencies and conflicting information in data from interviews with various persons. Interview data were also cross-checked with secondary sources. Finally, cross-checking occurred among multiple statistical sources. Respondent validation includes the sharing of some research findings by the researcher with the respondents to ensure the right description of their perspectives and experiences (Bryman, 2004, p. 274). This study applied respondent validation on the case study on Guyana by sharing some interview transcriptions with informants for verification of their statements. This was only done for the case of Guyana since informants in this country

Methodology 45 had an English accent that sometimes was hardly understandable to the author. To enhance the clarity about their data, some transcriptions were sent back to these informants. Data were first collected in Suriname, followed by Guyana for logistical and methodological reasons. The author lives in Suriname and therefore had the opportunity to ‘test’ the case study design there. The data collection in Suriname served as a basis to modify the research design for Guyana. As Yin (1989) argues, the case study design is not fixed. It can develop along the process when new insights are obtained. This study modified the comparative mixed methods research design not only after the case study in Suriname but also during and after the case study of Guyana. Such modification was necessary to deal with problems of data collection and analyses.

3.3 Conclusions A comparative mixed methods strategy was chosen to enable the development of a conceptual framework of interreligious relations. This strategy combines the comparison of cases by integrating quantitative and qualitative methods; it is a combination of the comparative case study and mixed methods design. The comparative case study design itself has the strength of theory building, and is therefore appropriate to achieve this study’s purpose of developing a conceptual framework of interreligious relations. Comparative studies enable a better understanding of factors that encourage and discourage religious harmony rather than non-comparative studies. The mixed methods design allows the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods based on a certain purpose and in a particular way into a single study. It is not the convenient mixing of methods, but the application of methods in a justified sequence. The sequential form of the mixed methods design is used, where quantitative methods are followed by the qualitative methods. The nations of Suriname and Guyana are compared as similar cases, but with some adaptations. Traditionally such cases require differences in the dependent variables across cases (also referred to as the outcome). Similarities in independent variables are needed except for those that explain the differences in the outcome. The cases of Suriname and Guyana do not meet the criterion of dissimilar outcome; we do not know the nature of this outcome, the ‘responses’, in both nations at the beginning of the study. In other words, we cannot determine whether the influence of religious leadership, government policies, religious demography, private religious institutions will be similar on ‘responses’ in the initial stage of the research. Yet, it is possible to compare Suriname and Guyana for the similarities in two independent variables, private religious institutions and religious demography, and the assumed difference in government policies. It is argued that the similarities in private religious institutions and religious

46  Methodology demography may not explain differences in ‘responses’. Such explanation, however, can be provided by government policies. An instrumental case study is conducted at the level of neighborhoods to show the influence of spatial distribution and neighborliness on interreligious relations. This influence cannot be assessed at the level of the nation as this is a larger unit of analysis than the neighborhood. Data on Suriname and Guyana are collected and analyzed using identical research methods. Important qualitative methods are oral history interviews, documentary research, and ethnography. The main quantitative methods are analysis of official statistics, secondary analyses, and a survey.

Notes 1 Methodological studies do not usually use this term. Only one publication was found using the term comparative mixed methods design (Miller, 2012). Often most studies refer to one particular design where the principles of other one are included. For instance you will find a comparative design that uses various methods (Lor, 2011), or a mixed methods design that involves a comparative approach (De Bosscher, Shibli, van Bottenburg, De Knop, & Truyens, 2010). In this study selecting one of these particular designs is not appropriate, since the principles of both are methodologically equally important. 2 Christians contribute to the national population in Suriname and Guyana for 48% and 56% (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2013; Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2007). In many other Caribbean societies, the Hindu and Muslim population declined. In Jamaica for instance the population that arrived between 1845 and 1917 (Sahoo, 2006) declined with 83% in 2011 (International Religious Freedom Report for 2011. Jamaica, 2011). Trinidad also has a significant share of Hindus and Muslims (together 22%) (Development Ministry of Planning and Sustainable & Central Statistical Office, 2012), but this is less than Suriname and Guyana. 3 She describes neighborhood as a unit with physical and social boundaries that consists of four dimensions: physical-spatial, experiential, socio-cultural, and socio-political (ibid). This thesis focuses on the physical-spatial and socio-cultural dimensions. 4 Whereas other Surinamese neighborhoods could also meet this criterion, Abrabroki is more interesting because the emergence of a religious center of currently the second largest Muslim denomination in the Surinamese society, the Sunnis. Between the 1930s and the 1950s, the Sunnis established, and expanded the own mosque and denominational schools, while missionary activities were conducted by the Moravian Church in the neighborhood. This marks the transformation of the historical Christian to religiously diverse Abrabroki, which raises questions about underlying processes of ‘responses’ and interreligious relations. 5 Based on author’s observations of Abrabroki in 2011 and of Kitty in 2012. 6 Suriname also had a so-called telephone coup (also referred to as the ‘Christmas coup’) in December 1990. The president was ordered by the head of the military to resign. In 1991, a new president was selected. Since the respective coup was a relative small period, we do not involve it in our periodization.

Methodology 47 7 A household is a group of people with a common residence who share kinship relations. This study looks at households that consists predominantly of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims. 8 Secondary analyses often involves quantitative datasets and aims at replication or obtaining a comprehensive understanding of social phenomena (ibid), but qualitative records can also be used (Yin, 1984, p. 117–118, cited in Hakim, 1987, p. 20). 9 The sample is measured with a sample calculator at http://www. steekproefcalculator.com/steekproefcalculator.htm. Accessed 10th March, 2014.

4

Evolution of Christian Dominance in Suriname and Guyana

4.1 Religious Demography and Christian Dominance in Suriname In Suriname, the religious demography and Christian dominance are examined in two subperiods: 1900–1950 and 1950–2014. First the sociohistorical context of Suriname is addressed from the 15th to the 19th centuries. This will help to understand the circumstances of the demographic evolution of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims. Then the demographic evolution of these three religious groups is described and explained. Before European colonialism in Suriname, only traditional religions of indigenous people were practiced such as shamanism (Lampe, 2001). The religious and ethnic composition started to change with the arrival of European colonizers in the late 15th century. They introduced Christianity and Judaism (Loor, 2013; Vernooij, 2012). The religious and ethnic composition became more diverse with groups that were brought to the colony Suriname as labor force for the plantations that were established by the colonial rule. Large numbers of enslaved people from Africa were ‘imported’ between the 17th and the 19th centuries. Approximately 300,000 to 350,000 enslaved Africans were shipped to Suriname from 1667 to 1830 (Zunder, 2012). They predominantly practiced traditional religions and Islam on a small scale (Ho Suie Sang & Hoogbergen, 2002). After the abolishment of slavery in 1863, colonial authorities tried to fill in their need for plantation labor and brought Asian indentured laborers from India, the so called ‘Hindostani’, and Indonesia. About 34,000 and 33,000 persons came from these countries, respectively. The laborers from India and Indonesia mainly followed Hinduism and Islam (Malefijt, 1963; Ramsoedh & Bloemberg, 1995).1 4.1.1  Religious Demography Suriname 20th–21st Centuries In the course of colonialism, Christians, Hindus, and Muslims evolved as the largest religious groups. According to indices2 of the major religious populations, Muslims had the largest growth compared to Hindus from DOI: 10.4324/9781003179269-4

Evolution of Christian Dominance 49 Table 4.1  Indices Population by Religion in Suriname 20th–21st Centuries (1900 = 100) Religion Christians Hindus Muslims None/own Others Not stated Total

1900

1936

1946

1964

1980

2004

2012

100 100 100 100 100

138 287 1,072 156 216

161 303 1,418 72 254

275 785 1,629 302 476

285 872 1,779 467 521

465 1,014 2,009 1,165 722

506 1,081 1,916 2,040 795

Note: The total refers to the index made for all religious groups in the particular year. Source: Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek (2005, 2007, 2013); Jap-A-Joe, Sjak Shie, & Vernooij (2001); and Vernooij (2012); compiled by author.

1900 to 2012 (Table 4.1). Figure 4.1 illustrates that the share of Hindus grew from 16% to 22%, while that of Muslims from 6% to 14%. Christians, on the contrary, experienced a declining share since 1936. This is reflected in their smaller index than the total since 1936 in Table 4.1 and clearly illustrated in Figure 4.1. The Christian population declined from 76% to 48% in the 1900–2012 period. As pointed out before in Chapter 2, three factors may influence religious demography: natural growth, migration, and conversion. The declined Christian population between 1900 and 2012 is apparently a result of the increasing proportion of Hindus and Muslims in the national population. It will be explained that migration and natural growth influenced the religious demographic evolution between 1900 and 1946. These two factors

Figure 4.1  Population by Religion in Suriname 20th–21st Centuries. Source: Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek (2007, 2013) and Vernooij (2012), compiled by author.

50  Evolution of Christian Dominance Table 4.2  Association Religion and Ethnicity in Suriname 1964–2012 Year

Cramer’s V

1964 1971 2004 2012

0.623 0.564 0.503 0.508

Source: Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek (2007) and K. Algoe & Schalkwijk (2016).

also played a role in the 1946–2012 period, but an increasing influence of conversion is observed as well. In explaining the religious demographic changes, ethnicity is often used as a proxy when specific data on religious groups were not available. This proxy is chosen due to its strong association with religion between 1964 and 2012. The majority of Christians is Creole, most Hindus are East Indian, and Muslims are predominantly of Javanese descent (Appendix 3). This association was strong in 1964, but weakened somewhat in 1971 and then again in 2004. Up to 2012, the association hardly changed (Table 4.2). In respective sections, the changed association is addressed in depth. 4.1.1.1 Explaining Religious Demography between 1900 and 1946 From 1900 to 1946, migration had the largest influence on the demographic changes of Christians and Muslims. The immigration of Muslim indentured workers from Indonesia3 to Suriname (1980–1939) contributed largely to the increasing share of Muslims. Due to this immigration the proportion of Christians also declined. Natural growth explains the percentual increase of Hindus in the first half of the 20th century. This finding is derived from secondary data on major ethnic groups in Suriname. As said before, due to the strong association between religion and ethnicity, the latter is used as a proxy in religious demographic analyses. Historical works on East Indian and Javanese indentured workers (de Klerk, 1998; Malefijt, 1963) mention that the former was predominantly Hindu, while the latter was mostly follower of Islam in the first half of the 20th century. Creoles were linked to traditional religions and Christianity. The first statistical data on the association between ethnicity and religion dealt with the 1964 census. Then, already 93% of Creoles was Christian, 77% of East Indians was Hindu, and 91% of Javanese persons was Muslim (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2007). Of all ethnic groups, natural growth was highest among East Indians in most years of the 1920–1950 period (Table 4.3). This ethnic group was

Table 4.3  Absolute Natural Growth of Major Ethnic Groups 1926–1950 Creole Fertility

Mortality

1926 1930 1940 1950

1,842 1,948 2,064 2,933

1,196 907 980 906

Source: Lamur (1973).

Natural growth 646 1,041 1,084 2,027

Javanese

Fertility

Mortality

Natural growth

Fertility

Mortality

Natural growth

1,143 1,639 2,059 2,951

515 454 638 650

628 1,185 1,421 2,301

648 498 1,009 813

369 372 339 419

279 126 670 394

Evolution of Christian Dominance 51

Year

East Indian

52  Evolution of Christian Dominance predominantly Hindu. It can therefore be concluded that Hindus had the highest natural growth in the country in the first half of the 20th century. Natural growth is influenced by fertility and mortality. East Indians had the highest fertility and a low mortality rate between 1930 and 1950 (Table 4.3). The Javanese population with a predominantly Muslim affiliation had a low fertility rate while their death rates were high.4 Creoles, of whom the majority was Christian, had the lowest fertility rate but the highest death rates between the 1920s and 1950s. Between 1900 and 1950, few East Indians and Javanese people were converted to Christianity. According to Schalkwijk (2011, p. 46) about 2% of East Indians had Christianized between 1900 and 1950 in Suriname. By 1920, only 0.6% of Javanese had converted to the Moravian denomination (Gooswit, 2002, p. 97). Their conversion to Catholicism was also small. In 1920, of the total Javanese population of 16,000 (ibid) only 5 persons were baptized in the Catholic Church (Vernooij, 2012, p. 86). According to the census of 1964 about 2% of the Javanese population was Christian (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statisiek, 2005). Considering the strong association between ethnicity and religion, it is argued that conversion had little influence on the demography of the main practices religion of East Indians, which is Hinduism, and of Javanese persons, the Islam. In contrast to East Indians and Javanese persons, conversion played a role among Creoles. Most Creoles with a traditional religion became a member of the Moravian and the Catholic Church. Between 1863 and 1940, the number of members of the Moravian Church grew from 27,500 to 32,698, while the number of Catholics increased from 12,000 to 30,912 (Vernooij, 2012). Their conversion to Christianity was a result of state-supported Christian conversion missions among non-Christians, which will be discussed in next section. 4.1.1.2 Demographic Evolution of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims 1946–2012 Between 1946 and 2012, the share of Christians and Hindus grew slightly, while that of Muslims declined strongly (Figure 4.1). Migration and natural growth influenced the demography of all three religious groups. However, conversion also increasingly influenced the demography of Christians and Muslims. Ethnicity is used as a proxy for religion to explain the role of natural growth, migration, and conversion. This was mostly the case for Creoles and East Indians as their association between religion and ethnicity remained strong. In due time, this association weakened among Javanese persons and Maroons (Table 4.2). The association between religion and ethnicity among East Indians and Creoles did not drastically change in this period. Creoles remained for more than 90% Christian, while East Indians kept their Hindu majority of 77%. Bearing in mind the evolution of the

Evolution of Christian Dominance 53 association between religion and ethnicity, now the religious demographic analyses are made. Between 1964 and 2012, the large share of Muslims among Javanese persons decreased from 91% to 67% (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2007; K. Algoe & Schalkwijk, 2016). The proportion of Christians among this ethnic group on the contrary increased from 6% to 21% in the respective period (ibid). This means that Javanese persons are no longer predominantly Muslim as was the case in 1964. An increasing proportion became Christian. In 1964, 1971, 2004, and 2002 the percentage of Javanese Christians was 6%, 9%, 15%, and 21%, respectively (ibid). Maroons used to practice mostly traditional religions (officially5 61% in 1964). But this changed by 2012. In this year, 22% adhered to these religions. The percentage of Christians among Maroons, on the contrary, increased from 39% to 41% between 1964 and 2012 (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2007; K. Algoe & Schalkwijk, 2016). In 1964, 1971, 2004, and 2002, the share of Maroon Christians was 39%, 45%, 60%, and 61%, respectively (ibid). East Indians, and thus most Hindus, had the largest natural growth between the 1950s and 1970. The natural growth of East Indians in 1950, 1960, and 1970 was 2,301, 4,117, and 4,559, respectively (Lamur, 1973). This was higher than of Creoles and Javanese persons, who in this period were predominantly Christian and Muslims, respectively.6 The Creole population grew in 1950, 1960, and 1970 with 2,027, 3,877, and 2,979, respectively (ibid). This means that the Christian population also grew with more or less the same numbers. The natural growth of Javanese people, predominantly Muslim, in 1950, 1960, and 1970 was 394, 1,134, and 1,402, respectively. An important influential factor of the natural growth was fertility as mentioned previously.7 East Indians had the highest fertility. Creoles had a low fertility (ibid, p. 81), while Javanese persons had the lowest birth rate in the 1946–1964 period (ibid, pp. 62–63). Natural growth also influenced the gradual increase of the number of Christians from 1970 to 2012. There was a percentual growth of Maroons, of whom many became followers of Christianity. In 1971, Maroons comprised 10% of the national population, which rose to 22% in 2012 (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2011, 2013). An important reason for the percentual growth of Maroons is their fertility. They had the highest fertility among all ethnic groups in Suriname in 2012 (ibid). Migration can explain the percentual decrease of Hindus between 1971 and 1980. In this period a large share of the Surinamese population, East Indians in particular, emigrated around the independence of Suriname in 1975. As most East Indians were Hindu in this period, the data on the former can explain demographic changes of Hindus. It is estimated that 68,000 persons from Suriname emigrated to the Netherlands (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 1978, p. 4).8 Data on emigration by ethnicity are not available, however, the decreasing numbers of East Indians indicate

54  Evolution of Christian Dominance that most of them migrated. Between 1972 and 1980, their population size declined from 142,917 to 118,936 (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 1978, 2007). Migration also influences the Christian population, however, this cannot be quantified due to unavailability of data. Various informants have mentioned that Christian churches suffered from the mass emigration in the 1970s. A Catholic for instance said that after the independence the church lost many members as well as clergy (M, Personal Communication, July 26th, 2013). Another Christian informant, Evangelical, explained that his church became ‘empty’. ‘The pastors and other members had left and I took over the church. There was nothing left’ (A, Personal Communication, 10th January, 2017). Between 1946 and 2012, conversion played an important role in the demographic changes of Christians and Muslims. Whereas the former population was relatively stable, the share of Muslims declined. A turning point was 1980, as since then the proportion of Christians significantly increased, while that of Muslims declined. 4.1.1.1.1  CHRISTIAN DENOMINATIONS 1946–2012

In the 1946–2012 period, there was a striking percentual increase of Evangelicals since 1980 (Figure 4.2). Except for the Catholic Church, the share of many other traditional Christian denominations decreased after the second half of the 20th century. There was a percentual reduction of Moravians, Lutherans, and Dutch Reformists. In total the share of traditional Christian churches in the national population declined from 47% to 37% between 1946 and 2012.

Figure 4.2   National Population by Christian Denomination in Suriname 1946–2012. Source:  Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek (2007, 2013) and Vernooij (2012); compiled by author.

Evolution of Christian Dominance 55 To determine whether the Evangelical population grew at the cost of other religious groups or traditional Christian denominations, an analysis of the Christian denominations by ethnicity was done (Appendix 3a). Here, ethnicity is used as a proxy because of its high association with religion. This was particularly the case with East Indians and Creoles rather than with Maroons and Javanese persons. The association with religion among the last two mentioned ethnic groups declined drastically in 2004 compared to 1972. To analyze the demographic trend of Evangelicals between 1980 and 2012, the censuses of 1971 and 2012 were used. This was the best available option since there were no data on Christian denominations in 1980 nor 2004. The censuses of 1971 and 2012 indicate a relative increase of Evangelicals among all major ethnic groups (Appendix 3a). The largest growth is among Maroons, followed by Javanese people. Between 1971 and 2012, the number of Maroon Evangelicals increased from 49 to 21,746, which is a growth of 21,697. The growth ratio is 1,106.99. The Javanese Evangelicals grew from 50 to 7,117, an increase of 7,067 or a growth ratio of 353.35. The increase of Evangelicals among Maroons and Javanese persons most likely occurred at the cost of traditional Christian denominations and non-Christian religions. Data suggest that Maroon Moravians and followers of traditional religions converted to Evangelicalism. Both groups had a small growth compared to Maroon Evangelicals from 1971 to 2012. The Moravian Maroon population increased by ratio of 3.54 (11,186), while Maroons with traditional religions had a growth ratio9 of 2.25 (16,527). The increase of Javanese Evangelicals is apparently influenced by the conversion of Javanese Catholics and Muslims to Evangelicalism. This is reflected in smaller growth of Javanese Catholics and Muslims groups compared to Javanese Evangelicals. Between 1971 and 2012, the Javanese Catholic population grew from 3,379 to 3,621, a growth ratio of 0.18 (242). In this period the number of Javanese Muslims increased from 49,045 to 53,665. This is a growth ratio of 0.24 (4,620). Compared to the growth ratio of Javanese Evangelicals (353.35), that of Javanese Catholics (0.18) and Javanese Muslims (0.24) was extremely small. This suggests that the Evangelical population among Javanese persons may have grown at the cost of Catholics and Muslims. Compared to Maroon and Javanese persons, the number of Evangelicals among Creoles and East Indians grew less between 1971 and 2012. Apparently most Lutherans and Moravians of Creole ethnicity became Evangelical, as the numbers of Creole Lutherans and Moravians declined significantly. The increase of East Indian Evangelicals is most likely a result of conversion of East Indian Catholics and Muslims to Evangelicalism. This is suggested by the differences in growth. The East Indian Catholic population declined by 1,343 or a growth ratio of –0.75 between 1971 and 2012. The population of East Indian Muslims declined by 5295, which is a growth ratio of −0,55 from 1971 to 2012. The decline among the East

56  Evolution of Christian Dominance Indian Catholics and Muslims is apparently influenced by conversion to Evangelicalism. For the triangulation of statistical data, the Latin American Barometer (LAPOP) is used as an additional resource besides the official statistics. Based on the availability of data, the demographic changes of East Indians, Maroons, Creoles, and Javanese persons by Christian denomination is examined from 2010 to 2014. The assessment of LAPOP confirms that Evangelicals are demographically ‘in the lift’ among major ethnic groups in Suriname. Evangelicals had the largest percentual increase among Javanese people (63%), followed by East Indians (61%), Creoles (50%), and Maroons (47%). This increasing share of Evangelicals is most likely influenced by conversion of traditional Christians among the aforementioned ethnic groups to Evangelicalism. This assumption is derived from the decreasing share of traditional Christians among Javanese persons, East Indians, Creoles, and Maroons in the LAPOP data. Between 2010 and 2014, the share of traditional Christians decreased most among East Indians (24%), followed by Javanese people (23%), Maroons (20%), and Creoles (13%). To ascertain whether East Indians and Javanese people who converted to Evangelicalism were former Hinduism or Islam practitioners, the demographic changes of Muslim and Hindu denominations in 1971 and 2012 were examined. The first year is chosen as the baseline. The 1971 census was the first one registering Hindu and Muslim denominations. The 2012 census is selected as this provided the most recent data on religious demography. 4.1.1.1.2  MUSLIM DENOMINATIONS 1971 AND 2012

Although the Muslim population grew from 74,170 to 75,053 between 1971 and 2012, their share in the total religious population declined from 20% to 14%. The Ahmadiyya denomination showed the largest decrease in this period (Figure 4.3). In 1971, Suriname had 29,322 Ahmadiyyas who declined to 14,161 in 2012. Within the Muslim population their share decreased from 40% to 19%. At the national level the proportion of the Ahmadiyyas dropped from 8% to 3% between 1971 and 2012. Most remarkable among the Ahmadiyyas is the large decrease of Javanese of 62% between 1971 and 2012. There were 20,641 Javanese Ahmadiyyas in 1971, who declined to 7,862 in 2012. One explanation is that Javanese Ahmadiyyas disconnected their ties with the Ahmadiyya denomination after this was internationally declared a non-Islamic group (Soeropawiro, 2016). It must be remarked that among the Javanese Muslims there are two main groups: ‘west prayers’ or the traditionalists; ‘east prayers’ or reformists.10 In 1970, Javanese Ahmadiyyas were predominantly ‘west prayers’. They had an organization, called Ahmadiyya Islam which was led by Iding Soemita11 (S, Personal Communication, March 12th, 2017). But when the Ahmadiyya movement was declared a non-Islamic group by the World

Evolution of Christian Dominance 57

Figure 4.3  National Population by Muslim Denomination in Suriname 1971–2012. Source: General Bureau of Statistics (2007, 2013).

Muslim League, Iding Soemita changed the name of the organization to Sharikat Islam Assaf’iyyah (ibid). This was to prevent any association with the Ahmadiyya movement. Nevertheless there are still Javanese Muslims particularly west prayers, who consider themselves Ahmadiyya (ibid). Another possible explanation is that Javanese Ahmadiyyas converted to Evangelicalism, which is supported by the increased number of Javanese Evangelicals: from 50 in 1971 to 7,117 in 2012. Compared to the Javanese persons, the percentual decline of the East Indian Ahmadiyyas was less (−41%). The latter group also may have converted to Evangelicalism, but this was smaller than that of the Javanese group. Between 1971 and 2012, the East Indian Evangelicals increased from 91 to 4,720, which was an explosive growth of 5,087%. The denominational demographic changes among Muslims showed the influence of migration, natural growth, and conversion between 1971 and 2012. 4.1.1.1.3  HINDU DENOMINATIONS 1971 AND 2012

Although from 1971 to 2012 the Hindu population increased from 112,095 to 120,623, their relative share declined from 30% to 22% nationwide (Figure 4.4). Remarkable is the absolute and percentual decline among the Arya Samaj followers. Their population decreased from 20,869 members (6%) in 1971 to 16,661 (3%) in 2012. As has been said before, migration largely explained the decrease of Hindus between 1971 and 2012. However, conversion may also have played a role. Between 1971 and 2012, East Indian Evangelicals grew from 91 to 4,720, which was a growth of 5,087%. It was possible that the declined share of Arya Samaj followers was a result of their conversion to Evangelicalism. This conversion may have contributed to the growth of East Evangelicals between 1971 and 2012.

58  Evolution of Christian Dominance

Figure 4.4  Population by Hindu Denomination in Suriname 1971–2012. Source: General Bureau of Statistics (2007, 2013).

From 1900 to 1946, the populations of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims changed predominantly due to migration and natural growth. The share of Christians declined largely because of the immigration of Indonesian Muslim indentured workers. This immigration also contributed to a significant percentual increase of Muslims. The proportion of Hindus grew under the influence of natural growth. Conversion of Hindus and Muslims to Christianity had little influence on the religious demography. However, conversion played a role on the demography of Creole traditional religious groups as their members were forced to adhere traditional Christian denominations (will be explained in the Section 4.1.2). Between 1946 and 2012, the Muslim population had far more significant changes than Christians and Hindus. The proportion of Christians and Hindus increased a little, while that of Muslims largely declined. Conversion explained the demographic changes among Muslims more than migration and natural growth. The last two mentioned factors affected all three religious populations. The demographic changes between 1900 and 2012 can be linked to a larger context of Christian dominance. This is explained in the next section. 4.1.2  Christian Dominance in Suriname 1900–2014 The previous section addressed the religious demographic evolution of Christian, Hindu, and Muslim populations in Suriname in the 1900–1950 and 1950–2014 subperiods. This section will examine how their demographic evolution, particularly the influence of conversion to Christianity, is related to Christian dominance. Here the concepts of ideological and institutional religious dominance are applied. First, insight in the pre-1900 period is provided.

Evolution of Christian Dominance 59 4.1.2.1  Christian Dominance until 1900 After the colonization of Suriname by the Dutch in the 17th century, Christianity became a dominant religion. The process toward dominance of Christianity was influenced by government policies and private Christian institutions. The Dutch colonizer made a legal rule, ‘Octroy ofte fondamenteele condition’ (1682), that regulated the facilities for spreading pastoral messages in the colony (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001, p. 80).12 Christianity, the Reformed Church, was recognized as an official religion by the state. This was an important regulation that reflected the superiority of Christianity. However, not all Christian denominations were considered equally dominant. In the early years of colonization, only the Reformed Church was dominant. According to the ‘Octroy ofte fondamenteele condition’, it was the only church allowed in Suriname. It took years before other Christian denominations, such as the Moravians and Catholics, were allowed to establish own branches (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001, pp. 80–81). Yet, both denominations were considered inferior to the Dutch Reformed Church (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001). After declaring Christianity the state religion, Christian dominance in Suriname expanded with conversion missions by the Moravian and the Catholic Church, first among the indigenous and the enslaved people. The Moravians obtained state permission for conversion missions among enslaved people since 1765 (Jap-A-Joe, 2005). If plantation owners agreed, the Moravian Church could evangelize enslaved workers on the plantations (ibid). The Catholic conversion missions began later than the Moravians. In the 19th century, the former missions were initially concentrated only in Paramaribo, the city of Suriname. In 1892, Catholic missions expanded to rural locations with concentrations of enslaved people such as Albina (Vernooij, 1996, p. 47). The institutional and ideological dimensions of Christian dominance interacted in the conversion missions. The institutional dimension was reflected in various conversion strategies of the Moravian and the Catholic Church among the enslaved and the indigenous people. Both churches for instance used the native language of these people during church services. Catholic missionaries also carried out ‘nomadic’ church services13 to attract followers (Vernooij, 1988). The ideological Christian dominance in conversion missions among enslaved and indigenous people was reflected in the discouragement of their religious customs, and the propagation of Christian superiority beliefs. During church services, Christian missionaries condemned the religious beliefs of the indigenous people such as tattooing the body, worshiping separate gods for males and females, and seeking spiritual and health care at healers and fortune tellers (ibid). On the contrary, Christian superiority beliefs were encouraged. Illustrative for condemning traditional religious practices of indigenous people are the statements by the canonized Petrus Donders, a Catholic missionary of the

60  Evolution of Christian Dominance 19th century. He referred to them as inferior human beings comparable with brainless animals that did not know or wished to know the kindness of God, Jesus Christ. He described indigenous people as superstitious persons as they believed in spirits from another world (Vernooij, 1988, p. 87). Colonial authorities strengthened Christian conversion missions among enslaved people through a religious assimilation policy that was introduced in the early 19th century.14 Financial support was provided for conversion missions that in their turn had to indoctrinate enslaved people with values favoring Christians and officials. Important values were respect for planters and other colonial authorities and avoid rebellion after the emancipation in 1863 (Jap-A-Joe, 2005; Vernooij, 2012). The state established the Maatschappij tot bevordering van godsdienstonderwijs onder de slavenbevolking in Suriname, the Society for Encouragement of Religious Education among the Slaves (1828). This institution was meant to encourage the ‘Christianity oriented mind’ of the enslaved population (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001). Colonists had to arrange the finance for establishing churches, paying priests, building schools and welfare organizations (Vernooij, 1988). In addition to financial support to conversion missions, the religious assimilation policy sustained Christian dominance by forbidding the practice of traditional religions of enslaved people, and granting them freedom when they adhered to Christianity (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001). With these two rules, enslaved people were compelled to convert to Christianity in the 19th century. Most converts became Moravian and Catholic (Vernooij, 2013). This explains why Christians evolved as the largest religious group in the early 1900s. 4.1.2.2  Christian Dominance 1900–1950 In the first half of the 20th century, Christian dominance evolved both institutionally and ideologically. Of the four factors in the conceptual framework, government policies and private religious institutions were influential. Religious demography, which is a third factor, did not significantly influence Christian dominance over Hindus and Muslims between 1900 and 1950. As presented in the previous chapter the Christian demographic majority reduced from 76% to 46%. This was mainly due to the immigration of Javanese Muslim indentured workers between 1890 and 1939 and the natural growth of Hindu laborers. Furthermore, conversion of Hindus and Muslims to Christianity was small between 1900 and 1950. In this period, approximately 2% of the East Indians – most of Hindu religion – and 2% of Javanese people who were predominantly Muslim, had converted to Christianity (see previous section). First it will be explained how Christian dominance was exercised over Hindus and Muslims, followed by the reasons for their limited conversion to Christianity.

Evolution of Christian Dominance 61 Table 4.4  Annual Expenditure on Education, Religious Organizations, and Leaders 1910–1940 (F)a  Year

Education

Religious organizations and leaders

1910 1920 1930 1940

F 302,390 F 548,244 F 1,106,864 F 913,879

F 57,670 F 68,300 F 101,000 F 77,827

F stands for Florins, the local currency. Source: Handelingen en Bijlagen 1946–1947 (n.d.). a

The institutional dominance of Christians was reflected in their preferential access to material, financial, and legislative resources provided by the colonial state. The access to these resources was influenced by the colonial government policies. Christians were privileged with subsidies for their religious leaders, orphanages, and denominational schools (Hu-Ramdas, 2013; Ramsoedh, 1990).15 Between 1910 and 1940, the annual government expenses for education including Christian denominational schools increased from 302,390 to 913,879 Florins. The expenses for the religious organizations and leaders, predominantly Christian, rose from 57,670 to 77,827 Florins (Table 4.4). The subsidies to Christian denominational schools remarkably increased in 1920 and then again in 1930. This was due to the ordinance on equalization of subsidies for denominational and public schools in 1929 (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001, p. 236). Accordingly, the government had to pay the salaries, buildings, furniture and design, and exploitation costs of denominational schools (ibid, p. 230). In addition to state subsidies, Christians were privileged with national religious public holidays, legal marriages, and legal status of burial in the first half of the 20th century. It should be noted that Christian national holidays already existed before the arrival of Hindu and Muslim indentured workers. Christians had the following public holidays: Good Friday, Christmas Day, Boxing Day, Easter Monday, Whit Monday, and Ascension Day (Algoe, 2009). The colonial government policies on subsidies to religious groups sustained Christian institutional dominance. These subsidies enabled Christian denominations to maintain and expand the number of denominational schools. The number of Catholic schools for instance increased from 13 to 20 between 1920 and 1939 (Vernooij, 2012, pp. 84–85). By 1948, Suriname had 84 Christian schools (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001, p. 241). As Christians were educated, they could hold high status and well paid jobs in civil services.16 They were privileged with high educational and employment opportunities rather than Hindus and Muslims. A Javanese Muslim informant explained that Christians were encouraged to study

62  Evolution of Christian Dominance further at the tertiary level. Muslims did not have such an encouragement from the social structures in society ‘you then ended as an ordinary teacher’ (A, Personal Communication, March 8th, 2014). Christians could also hold political decision-making positions like in Parliament as they could pass the required literacy test to participate in elections (Choenni, 1982). Such tests were difficult for the poorly educated Hindus and Muslims. There is a remarkable difference between Christian denominations in the institutional dominance during the first half of the 20th century. The Dutch Reformed Church was the most privileged Christian denomination. From a legislative perspective it was the official religion. And the government had to encourage its practice and institutions of this religion (Vernooij, 2008). Other Christian churches got some ‘space’ for practices, but they did not have the same access to public resources as the Dutch Reformed Church. A clear example was a high status governmental job. Members of the Dutch Reformed Church could easily get employed in this branch. Catholics, on the contrary, could hardly get employed in civil services till the 1950s (L, Personal Communication, August 28th, 2010). Furthermore, followers of the Dutch Reformed Church were politically most influential (Vernooij, 2012). Christians were also ideologically dominant over Hindus and Muslims. As mentioned earlier, ideological dominance included beliefs and values that presented Christians as the natural superior religious group in society. There is evidence that these beliefs and values were used for socialization of people such as in religious education at schools in Suriname. In 1919, Van Eerd, a Moravian teacher, advocated Christian education for the entire society because this was felt necessary for the ‘civilization of humanity’ (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001, p. 252). Such statements reflect values of Christian supremacy. The latter was also expressed in stereotypes of traditional religious beliefs of Javanese Muslims at schools. A Javanese Muslim informant explained that as a young boy he was bullied by other Christian pupils calling him superstitious (A, Personal Communication, March 8th, 2014). The reason was his affiliation to a religious community that put umbrellas on the graves. This is typical in traditional Javanist beliefs. The ideological dominance of Christians was also reflected by their influence on setting Christian standards of morality in the country. During the Second World War, there were American soldiers in Suriname to protect the bauxite company Suralco (Jabini, 2003), which was a branch of the multinational American Aluminium Company Alcoa. According to traditional Christian churches, these soldiers deviated from social norms by holding parties and increasing the numbers of customers of prostitutes (ibid). A Moravian informant explained that during the Second World War prostitutes in the city were taken and brought to a place called ‘Katwijk’ where American soldiers ‘took care of them’ (H, Personal Communication, 28th June, 2012). However, the parties and prostitution were strongly disapproved by the Moravian Church (ibid). This church was very conservative

Evolution of Christian Dominance 63 and did not allow parties, even if there was a birthday. Every celebration had to be dedicated to the church and to God (ibid). As a response to the perceived immoral practices of soldiers, traditional Christians united in 1942 (Jabini, 2003). They established the Comité Christelijke Kerken, the Council of Christian Churches (CCK). The members were the Dutch Reformed, Moravian, Lutheran, and Roman Catholic Church (ibid). Compared to other non-Christian religions, these churches had a significant influence on political decision-making and had access to public resources. CCK later became the advisor of the colonial government and the labor unions (Vernooij, 2012). In this way CCK increased its influence, including its Christian ideologies, on the national thinking and policies. There were differences between Christian denominations in their ideological dominance which were reflected in missionary work. The Catholic and Moravian Church were the major denominations conducting missionary work among Hindus and Muslims (Vernooij, 2008). This was not the case with regard to the Dutch Reformed Church, even though it was the official religion. To understand the ideological dominance through missionary work, the role of moral leadership must be understood. This refers to the ability to win support of a particular group by connecting with its perceived interests (Billings, 1990). Missionary work included convincing people to convert to Christianity for their own good. Moral leadership in missionary work is the way leaders expressed concerns for the interests of groups and made efforts to realize that altogether encouraged a public belief about Christian superiority. Moravian and Catholic missionaries expressed moral leadership by presenting themselves as well-wishers of nonChristians. These missionaries explained that Christianity was the only true religion that could save people from sins and provide social upward mobility (B, Personal Communication, September 10th, 2010). Illustrative for the working of moral leadership was the case of Achmad Djoeneri, a Javanese Catholic. As a young boy he stayed at his grandparents and they were regularly visited by the Catholic priest Spekman on Sundays. Spekman could speak the Javanese language very well and convinced the grandparents to send Achmad to a Catholic school in the neighborhood. It could be concluded that Spekman’s moral leadership contributed to convince the grandparents to baptize Achmad in church. He got a Christian name, Petrus, and then could go to school (KITLV, n.d.). Christian ideological and institutional dominance interacted in missionary work when in addition to moral leadership, material resources were used for attracting Hindus and Muslims to Christianity. An Ahmadiyya Muslim informant explained that in the 1940s Christian missionaries visited areas with a high concentration of Hindus and Muslims such as the district of Wanica. During these visits the missionaries attempted to persuade Hindus and Muslims to become Christian by providing gifts, sweets, jobs, and literature (B, Personal Communication, September 10th, 2010).

64  Evolution of Christian Dominance Despite the Christian institutional and ideological dominance, conversion of Hindus and Muslims to Christianity was low17 between 1900 and 1950. Two factors explained the poor conversion among Hindus and Muslims. The first factor was the inconsistent religious assimilation policy. Unlike the enslaved people, the colonial government did not consistently apply this policy on Hindus and Muslims. The religious assimilation policy had been pursued since 1895 but faded away in the 1940s (Marshall, 2003; Ramsoedh, 1990) in order to encourage the settlement of indentured workers in Suriname after the expiration of their contract (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001). Their stay had to guarantee the production on the plantations and ensure economic profits for the colonial state. The inconsistency of the religious assimilation policy was reflected in the introduction of coolie schools for East Indians and dessa schools for Javanese people by the colonial government. These schools provided education in the own language (Ramsoedh, 1990). Some planters also incidentally offered material resources for maintaining cultural practices of Javanese Muslims. The latter group for instance received a gamelanset18 in the 1930s (Towikromo, 1997). Abbenhuis (1956) observed that planters prohibited Javanese conversion missions by the Catholics, because these could threaten the labor stability on the plantation in the early 20th century. During governor Kielstra’s rule, the colonial religious assimilation policy faded away. He arrived when Suriname suffered from a huge financial loss in the agricultural sector as a result of the economic crisis. Kielstra believed that to increase the production, solidarity among the labor force was required, which according to him could be achieved by the representation of the cultural and religious groups in public sectors (Ramsoedh, 1990). During Kielstra’s rule this representation did not exist. Illustrative are the descendants of enslaved people (hence referred to as ‘Creoles’19), who could legally marry according to Christian beliefs. Hindus and Muslims could not legally marry according to their religious traditions, even though they requested the legalization of their marriages. Therefore, Kielstra advocated and finally passed a Hindu and Muslim marriage law in 1940. This marriage law demarcates an official attempt by the colonial authorities to end the religious assimilation policy (Ramsoedh, 1990). The second factor that discouraged conversion of Hindus and Muslims relates to private Christian institutions. These institutions had limited human and material resources to conduct Christian missionary work in the first half the 20th century. The Moravian and Catholic Church for instance had separate churches for Javanese’s and East Indians where the own language was used in religious services (Schalkwijk, 2001). The largest Christian denominations, the Catholic and the Moravian church, had mostly Creole members which made them look like Creole churches (Vernooij, 2012). This outlook hindered the interest of Hindus and Muslims in Christian churches and activities such as education. Parents did not send their children to school, since these were not of the ‘own kind’. In 1891 for instance less than 20% of the children of immigrants attended school (Ramsoedh & Bloemberg, 1995).

Evolution of Christian Dominance 65 4.1.2.3  Christian Dominance 1950–2014 The 1946–2012 period showed a relatively high conversion of Maroons with their traditional religions and Javanese Ahmadiyyas to Evangelicalism. This section makes a specific religious demographic analysis of these groups by applying the concept of religious dominance including its ideological and institutional dimension. Between 1950 and 2014, the national context changed, particularly at the political level. Suriname received its internal autonomy from the Dutch government leading to? the dependence in 1975. This political transition comprised shifting power structures, growth of political parties and power, and emergence of new political views. The political transition had implications for the wider society including religious groups. There were ethnic tensions, mass migration, and transformation of traditional churches. Another political transition was during the regime from 1980 to 1987. This was followed by a period of democratic elections with at some moments a power shift from the traditional political parties to nontraditional ones. The political transition processes are discussed in depth in the next chapter. Till the early 1960s, the institutional and ideological dominance of traditional Christians over Hindus and Muslims was still evident. As regards institutions, Christians had most private denominational schools, orphanages, and were privileged with state subsidies (H, Personal Communication, July 31st, 2012). Through these institutions ideological dominance was stimulated. The private Christian institutions encouraged Christian superiority thinking and values among non-Christians. A Catholic informant, who is a priest, explained: ‘yes we had catechism at school and in church. These were typically designed to convert people. To call children to school and give them religious education and to prepare them for the first communion’ (M, Personal Communication, 26th July, 2013). Ideological dominance of traditional Christians was reflected in the ridicule of Hindu and Muslim beliefs on schools. This was experienced by a Muslim informant on a Moravian primary school in the 1950s: I can still remember the day I went to the mosque on Eid-ul-Fitr. I didn’t go to school, while we had grammar tests that day. And the next day when I went to school the teacher said to me ‘you can go to the mosque, but not in this way. If you fail, will the mosque help you?’ It felt bad. Sometimes you didn’t want to go to school, because you knew what was about to happen. It happened various times. Sometimes parents sent a letter saying that the children were sick. But everyone knew that you were not sick, but that you had a religious celebration. Teachers blew up that matter in class. (M, Personal Communication, September 11th, 2013)

66  Evolution of Christian Dominance In the above-mentioned case, the Muslim informant explained that Moravian teachers hardly expressed an understanding for the absence of Hindu and Muslim children in school on Hindu and Muslim holidays. He recalled incidents where teachers openly disapproved and ridiculed these children for not attending school on exam days (M, Personal Communication, September 11th, 2013). The respective Muslim informant argued that some Moravian teachers deliberately planned tests on non-Christian religious holidays, intended to discourage the practice of Hinduism and Islam. According to the informant this was intended to reduce the importance of non-Christian religious holidays for children by explaining that school comes first. This implicitly had to encourage non-Christians to feel inferior to Christianity (ibid). Since the 1960s, the institutional and ideological dominance of traditional Christians began to decline gradually which was reflected in legal products. They were no longer the only religious group with national religious holidays, state subsidies to denominational schools, orphanages, and religious leaders. This was due to government policies which changed with the increased political power of Hindus and Muslims. In 1971, Holi and Eid-ul-Fitr were declared national holidays (Algoe, 2009). Laws were made on state subsidies to Hindu and Muslim organizations in 1950 (Dew, 1978). Hindu and Muslim orphanages started to get governmental subsidies in 1953 (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001; Hu-Ramdas, 2013). In 1963, state subsidies were also granted to Hindu and Muslim schools. There was a law (Gouvernementsblad van Suriname, 1963) that regulated the payment of salaries of teachers and the costs of study material. In 1987, laws were introduced on subsidies to Hindus and Muslims (Staatsblad van Republiek Suriname 1987 no 87, 1987). With these legal products, the institutional and ideological dominance of traditional Christians declined. The declining dominance of traditional Christians was not only a result of government policies. Their religious leadership, at least of the Catholic Church, was also a contributing factor. In the 1960s, the Vatican, the highest authority of Catholics, declared to stimulate interreligious dialogue (Marshall, 2007) rather than converting non-Christians. By the independence of Suriname in 1975, there was a remarkable change in the religious leadership of Catholic churches. They ceased their categorical missionary work among non-Christians and applied a national orientation (Vernooij, 2006). In addition to the changed view of the Vatican, the national orientation of the Catholic Church was also influenced by its autonomization. In 1958, this church became an independent Diocese within the international Catholic society (Vernooij, 2008). The church became sensitive for strives of national unity. This included shared goals among the various ethnic groups which could be hindered by the missionary work among them (ibid). There were not only changes in Christian religious leadership of the individual denominations. A transition was also observed in the leadership of the CCK, the umbrella organization of Christian denominations. In the

Evolution of Christian Dominance 67 1970s, when the country geared toward the independence, there were social tensions such as arson. Ethnic tensions between East Indians and Creoles were manifest. The former feared the dominance of latter (Dew, 1978). The CCK then appealed to the society to maintain peace (‘Monseigneur Aloysius Zichem bijgelegd’, 2016). This occurred after Monsignor Zichem was appointed as bishop of the Catholic Church in 1971 (Katholiek Documentatie Centrum, 2003). Monsignor Zichem was known for his personal ideals of religious equality. He promoted respect for religion and culture. According to him it was a good matter when ‘people could practice their own religious things’ (J, Personal Communication, 8th June, 2015). Monsignor Zichem was considered a unique person in that particular time for his open mindedness toward others (ibid). Some described him as ‘an easy bishop, broad minded, open for dialogue’ (Katholiek Documentatie Centrum, 2003, p. KKM 834). This illustrates the influence of Christian leadership on the declined Christian dominance. A final example of changed Christian leadership was the founding of the national umbrella interreligious organization in Suriname in 1989. Among the founders were the Catholic bishop (‘Monseigneur Aloysius Zichem bijgelegd’, 2016). The national umbrella interreligious organization Interreligieuze Raad in Suriname (IRIS) has representatives of major religious groups (Marshall, 2007). The members are Arya Dewaker, Sanatan Dharma, Madjilies Moeslimin Suriname, Surinaamse Islamitische Vereniging (SIV), and the Roman Catholic Church. 20 IRIS aimed at strengthening the interreligious cooperation on social, religious, and ethical issues (Marshall, 2007). It for instance participated in a health community project on HIV/AIDS organized by the PAHO in 2005. Two congresses about religion and health were organized. IRIS also dealt with political elections. In 1996, it wrote a piece named ‘Hoe nu verder?’ with recommendations for the organization of the elections (ibid). In 2006, it contributed to an exposition about Earth day. It called Surinamese people across regions to express their bonding with earth in their own way such as painting, poem, craft, picture, and donation to children (Waagmeester, 2001). In 2012, it spoke against the amnesty law about the ‘December killings 1980’ the government passed. It argued that this law severely opposed the legal case the families of the victims had filed against Desi Bouterse, and therefore recommended that the law should be withdrawn (‘Iris: Amnestiewet is begin dictatuur’, 2012). IRIS had programs on religious education containing religious and ethical issues. An important contribution of IRIS was the broadcasting of Ramayana, a Hindu religious epic, on television (ATV) in the 1990s. The head of IRIS, Nico Waagmeester, gave a commentary in Dutch explaining the moral and religious dimension of this epic for both Hindus and non-Hindus. IRIS now regularly participates in World’s Religious Day. In 2010 for instance speeches were delivered by Christian and Hindu leaders on biodiversity. They spoke against gold

68  Evolution of Christian Dominance mining and logging that cause environmental pollution which strikes tribal societies in particular (Tull, 2010). An important activity of IRIS was the encouragement of solidarity ideals when the Christian holiday Good Friday and the Hindu festival Phagwa coincided in 2002. These are religious holidays with contradicting religious principles. During Good Friday Christians usually celebrate in a sober manner, while on Phagwa Hindus express enthusiasm. IRIS published articles in the newspapers asking the mass to respect and express solidarity for each other’s religious beliefs. Hindus were requested to remain silent in the neighborhood of churches (Waagmeester, 2002). In addition to the Catholic Church in IRIS, other traditional denominations also requested Hindus and Muslims to express solidarity for each other’s religious beliefs. This occurred through the CCK (H, Personal Communication, August 4th, 2006). The activities of IRIS and CCK illustrated that ideological dominance of traditional Christians had declined. Moreover, they emphasized ideals of religious equality and solidarity. While the dominance of traditional Christians in terms of demography was declining in Suriname, an increasing influence of Evangelicals was observed. Between 1980 and 2012, their share grew fast (from 1% to 11%), mostly at the cost of the share of traditional Christian populations and other religious groups. Evangelicalism was gaining followers particularly among Maroon and Javanese people. As observed in the previous section between 1971 and 2012 the number of Maroon Evangelicals grew drastically with 21,697 (or 44,280%), followed by Javanese people with 7,067 (or 14,134%). Evangelicalism was introduced in Suriname by Mr. Hoekendijk in the 1960s. He established a church in Paramaribo where spiritual healing campaigns were held (Lilian Pickering Neede, 2009a). This church was highly criticized by traditional Christian denominations, yet it increasingly gained popularity and within a few years various branches were founded in Suriname. Evangelicals21 in Suriname are a diverse Christian denomination. They have many congregations that operate as autonomous institutions, determine their own management and also lay their own emphasis in the worship. Evangelicals do not have a central international religious authority with a hierarchical structure as the Vatican of the Catholics. However, various churches are aligned to a national or international organization (Lilian Pickering Neede, 2009c). In 2012 in Suriname, an umbrella organization of Evangelicals called the Vereniging van Volle Evangelie en Pinkstergemeenten in Suriname, the Association of Evangelical and Pentecostal churches in Suriname (VVEPS) was established (Waal, 2012). The pioneering Evangelical churches in Suriname are: the Assembly of God, Stromen van Kracht, God’s Bazuin, Pinksterzending Suriname, Gemeente van Jezus Christus (Lilian Pickering Neede, 2009b). Assembly of God was founded by Rev. John D. Tubbs in 1962. This church was in the first 40 years led by American evangelists. Nowadays it has many

Evolution of Christian Dominance 69 congregations, also among Brazilians (ibid). ‘Stromen van Kracht’ was established by Karel Hoekendijk in 1962 (ibid). Various branches were born out of this church, such as God’s Rivier (S, Personal Communication, 23rd August, 2012). The founder of God’s Bazuin was Pudsey Meye. This church was established in 1963. Meye was inspired by a sermon of Stromen van Kracht (Lilian Pickering Neede, 2009b). The Pinksterzending Suriname came in 1963. This church worked in the districts of Saramacca and Commewijne. One congregation that emerged from Pinksterzending is Dian (ibid). Gemeente van Jezus Christus was established in 1965. Ilse van Kanten-Reeberg was among the leading pastors (ibid). In the past years many other Evangelical churches were established such as Bribi Ministries, Church of the Living God International, Faith and Love Ministries, and LOGOS (Lilian Pickering Neede, 2009c). It must be stressed that God’s Bazuin is a major congregation. It evolved to an umbrella organization called the God’s Bazuin Ministries in 1993 (Nieuwe Generatie Gemeente Gods Bazuin, 2017). This is managed by Steve Meye, the son of Pudsey Meye. Steve himself is in charge of the congregation the Nieuwe Generatie Gemeente Gods Bazuin (NGGBZ) (ibid). According to estimates there are more than 200 Evangelical congregations in the country.22 And God’s Bazuin Ministries itself has 75 congregations (ibid). The increased share of Evangelicals can be explained by the relative flexibility in institutionalization, conversion strategies, and nature of worship of Evangelicalism in Suriname. Compared to the traditional Christians, the Evangelicals have limited bureaucracy and hierarchy in establishing churches (Schalkwijk, 2004). 23 Whereas the traditional churches often prefer a church building in new areas before conducting sermons, Evangelicals start without this facility. The latter religious group already works at someone’s home (ibid). Furthermore, unlike traditional denominations, Evangelical churches are independent institutions and therefore can easily expand their organizations by founding congregations (S, Personal Communication, August 23rd, 2012). Often when a member of these churches evolves to a spiritual leader, he/she is allowed to establish an own church (ibid). Evangelical churches are self-supporting organizations that are run with tithes from members. Tithes are offerings to the church that consist of a tenth of the salary of a member. According to a pastor, approximately 30% of the members of most Evangelical churches pay ‘tithes’ (ibid). This helps the financial sustainability as well as institutional expansion of the congregation. The conversion missions of Evangelicals are based on a core religious belief of the denomination which is to spread the gospel of Jesus Christ among all nations. This foundation of this belief is the Christian religious scripture Matheus (28:19–21), where the last command of Jesus Christ to his disciples was ‘go and make disciples of all nations’ (S, Personal Communication, August 23rd, 2012). An Evangelical informant explained that this is the main reason why Evangelical branches should reproduce

70  Evolution of Christian Dominance themselves (ibid). These churches organize strong conversion campaigns throughout the country to convert the mass (ibid). They hold meetings in public places using wide screens, loud speakers, and religious prayers (W, Personal Communication, August 07th, 2013). Evangelical churches also use home visit method to attract followers in neighborhoods (ibid). They have branches among Surinamese people as well as among Guyanese, Haitian, and Brazilian persons (Schalkwijk, 2004). The nature of worship of Evangelical churches differs from traditional Christian churches. Evangelical churches hold revival sermons with spiritual healing and exorcism. A particular characteristic is the use of catching music, songs, and dance in worship. According to various Christian informants these religious programs and activities strengthen the spiritual and social life of many people, especially youngsters (M, Interview by RB, February 23rd, 2012). Church members cultivate spiritual qualities which assign to them a social position and status in the church (ibid). Traditional churches do not have the customs of dancing and catching music during sermons, at least not the way Evangelical churches do (H, Personal Communication, July 13th, 2013). An Evangelical informant points at the poor interaction between the priests and clergymen of traditional churches on the one hand and the people on the other hand (S, Personal Communication, August 23rd, 2012). He continued: The priests and clergymen come, read the scriptures, sing a few traditional hymns. The sermons start at 9.00 am and you leave at 10.00 am. In our church, the sermons last from 10.00 am to 2.00 pm. It is an entire happening. Sometimes people do not even want to leave. We have to send them away. And then they come back for the evening sermons. There is more interaction with the people. Furthermore, our congregation works with the people through counseling conversations, sports day meetings, burial services. The religious life is a particular one. (S, Personal Communication, August 23rd, 2012) After having addressed the reasons for percentual increase of Evangelicals in Suriname, now attention is paid to the growth of this religious group among Maroons. Various studies argue that the growing share of Evangelicals among Maroons should be understood by the way Evangelical churches cope with traditional religions in particular Winti (Jap-A-Joe, 2005; van der & Pijl, 2010). The latter is a traditional religion of people of African descent that was stigmatized and legally forbidden by colonial powers between 1870 and 1971. On the one hand Evangelical churches strongly disapprove of Winti, but on the other hand they use a theology that recognizes its spiritual world. This is clearly explained by van der and Pijl (2010): P/C (author: refers to Pentecostal and Evangelical churches) offers converts a new framework of interpretation, in which for example

Evolution of Christian Dominance 71 conceptions of ancestors, spirits and black magic are condemned, but not ignored – they are real (but evil). Consequently, P/C holds great attraction to those who no longer feel comfortable with their traditional symbolic system or have had bad, harmful experiences with it. Many P/C converts in Suriname seem to fit in this picture: they are badgered or chased by Winti; have negative experiences with wisi (black magic, witchcraft) or with particular treatments and purification rituals by bonuman (ritual specialists); and turn to P/C for help and cure in case of nowtu (spiritual need). (van der & Pijl, 2010, p. 187) Van der Pijl argues that people who have bad experiences with Winti, seek help at the Evangelical churches. The latter provides them a religious framework where their bad experiences with Winti and spiritual healing from the church properly fit in. Not only the religious framework, but also the use of native language in sermons of Evangelical priests is important in missionary work. The Evangelical churches hold services which appeal to the target group. The author of this thesis witnessed a religious service of Evangelical church in Abrabroki, a neighborhood in the capital of Suriname in August 2013. The service was held by a Maroon pastor who combined Sranan Tongo, the lingua franca, with his native Maroon language. This indicates the cultural adaptability of Evangelicalism to its target group. Internationally, cultural adaptability is an important factor of the increasing popularity of Evangelicalism (van der & Pijl, 2010). Missionary work among Javanese people explains their large conversion to Evangelicalism between 1971 and 2012. This Christian denomination has a specific branch, Dian, which conducts missionary work among the Javanese communities. By 2011, Dian had 16 churches in the nation (‘Javanen werken aan eigen Nederlands kerkgenootschap’, 2011). It has congregations in various districts: Nickerie, Commewijne, Saramacca, and Coronie (A, Personal Communication, January 10th, 2017). According to a Muslim informant, Evangelicalism has an increasing influence on Javanese west prayers (S, Personal Communication, 7th June 2016), mostly Ahmadiyyas, 24 because of the house visits and variety of sociocultural activities in the church. ‘They pay house-visits and organize many activities at the church. For instance they perform plays about the life of Jesus. They sing, dance, and use music. And they also apply the local Javanese language’ (ibid). Dian has weekly radio programs with sermons in the local Javanese language on the Javanese Radio Garuda since 1985 (A, Personal Communication, January 10th, 2017). This program is called ‘Gospel Jawa’ (ibid). Except for missionary work, conversion of Javanese Ahmadiyyas to Evangelicalism should also be explained by the influence of religious beliefs and leadership. Among the Javanese Ahmadiyyas there are west prayers. The latter are relatively flexible in their beliefs (S, Personal Communication,

72  Evolution of Christian Dominance June 7th, 2016). This is expressed in the practice of Islam combined with the adat, the customs of Javanese ancestors, and the openness to other religious groups (ibid). Furthermore, leaders of Javanese west prayers do not condemn nor sanction the conversion to other religions (ibid), at least not publicly. On the contrary, conversion is respected. The relative flexibility in religious beliefs and leadership may explain the increasing dominance Evangelicalism over Javanese Muslims. The critical question now is: are Evangelicals churches dominant in Suriname? It is argued in this book that they are increasingly influential but not dominant. Their influence is strongly reflected in their growing population size. Illustrative is also the appointment of Steve Meye as the spiritual advisor of the president in 2011 (‘Steve Meye in dienst als geestelijk adviseur van president’, 2011). It is the first time that such a function is created in civil services. The spiritual advisor is meant to provide moral and spiritual guidance for the president, who is Christian. This job reflects the institutionalization of Evangelical churches at the political level, which can be explained by the larger context of political struggles in the country where religion is used as an instrument for electoral support. The current president Bouterse was a Catholic (Evers, 2011), who did not receive support of the traditional Christian churches. On the contrary, they condemned him for the ‘December Killings’ and the military regime. Bouterse found his support at the Evangelical churches in the late 1990s, a period when the share of their members was increasing. Bouterse converted to Evangelicalism (ibid); he became a member of the Nieuwe Generatie Gemeente Gods Bazuin (NGGBZ) in 1999 (Maschhaupt, 2013). His conversion can be interpreted as a political strategy to enlarge his electoral support for two reasons: coping with his stigma of the ‘December Killings’ and identifying more political supporters. It is believed that by converting to Evangelicalism, Bouterse found a way to improve his public image (ibid). This also seemed to work in practice. The Evangelical churches embraced Bouterse justifying this with the Christian ideals of forgiveness (Ramdharie, 2000). The following statement of Steve Meye, the pastor who converted Bouterse, is illustrative: ‘Many rejected Bouterse and perceived him as the biggest murderer of Suriname (…). But we have embraced him, because the Bible states that everyone who comes to Him, will never be outcast. This is regardless whether they are thieves, murderers, and prostitutes. Everyone is welcome’ (Evers, 2011). Meye’s congregation has almost the largest church attendance of members (ibid). This means that by aligning with Meye, Bouterse could also influence the church members. As mentioned in this chapter, most converts to Evangelicalism were Maroons. And politically, it was a group ignored by the traditional political parties (Blanksma, 2006). To increase electoral support, Bouterse appointed Andre Misiekaba, who is a Maroon Evangelical pastor, for political campaigns among the Maroons (Maschhaupt, 2013).

Evolution of Christian Dominance 73 There is evidence that some Evangelical churches in Suriname want to further increase their influence in the nation. They advocate strong participation in the seven spheres or mountains of a society: politics, finance, education, culture, media, art, sports (S, Personal Communication, August 23rd, 2012). Increased participation in these spheres, particularly politics, is important for ‘salvation of the nation’ (ibid). It is argued that Evangelicalism is the only ‘real’ religion, thus other religious groups are not equal to this Christian denomination. 25 The political sphere is critical to prevent ‘controversial’ laws such as on abortion and gay marriage in a nation (ibid). There are some cases where Evangelical leaders with political influence publicly have condemned other religious groups. In 2011, Steve Meye for instance strongly opposed the request for formal recognition of Winti as a religion in 2011 (Bauw, 2011). Meye argued that Winti would bring bad luck to the country (ibid). He referred to Haiti where according to him the large scale practice of Voodoo, another traditional religion of people from African descent, has led to poverty and natural disasters (ibid). Despite the increased influence, Evangelicals cannot be considered dominant as they hardly have public resources that should allow them to express their religious superiority over other religious groups. Compared to traditional Christians, Evangelicals have fewer educational and social welfare institutions. There is one formal denominational school owned by the 7th Day Adventists in Paramaribo, while there are no graveyards (W, Personal Communication August 7th, 2013). Moreover Evangelical churches had been neglected as a religious group by the government till 2013, which resulted in exclusion of access to state subsidies (ibid). Furthermore, Evangelicals conduct missionary work with private resources rather than with government support. This is an important difference with Christian dominance during the colonial period when the government privileged Christians over non-Christians in public resources for purposes of religious assimilation and ‘historical rights’. Another reason for not considering Evangelicals dominant is that they are a diverse denomination with leaders who seek the largest power in the nation ‘to save mankind’ and condemn other religions, but also leaders who do not focus on such power and encourage interreligious understanding. Among the former category of leaders, there are Evangelical pastors who discourage interreligious interactions, arguing that these oppose their religious beliefs. ‘We do not encourage our members to participate in the religious celebrations of others’ (S, Personal Communication, August 23rd, 2012). Illustrative for Evangelical congregations that promote ideals of mutual respect for religious groups is Dian. A pastor of this church explained that he always tells his members to be humble and to respect others (A, Personal Communication, January 10th, 2017). ‘We do not condemn others’ (ibid). This may be explained by leadership. The pastor explained that over the years there has been a growing sense to keep a low profile when approaching Javanese persons. ‘They do not want any tension

74  Evolution of Christian Dominance with others. If they do not like something or someone, they will move back. Always treat them with respect, regardless of their religion’ (ibid). With such differences it is not possible to classify Evangelical churches as dominant. In conclusion, between 1950 and 2015, whereas the dominance of traditional Christians strongly declined, a growing influence of Evangelical churches was noticed. These churches had an increasing share of members and some of them had a relationship with the ruling political party. Yet, Evangelicals were not considered as dominant for they hardly possessed public resources that could function as a vehicle for expressing religious superiority such as schools, orphanages, and graveyards. The question is whether this was also the case in Guyana, which is addressed in the following section.

4.2 Religious Demography and Christian Dominance in Guyana Now the religious demography and Christian dominance of Guyana will be addressed. First, the historical context of this nation is described. To contextualize their religious demographic evolution, the settlement of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in this nation will be highlighted. Then, the religious demographic analysis is presented. The focus is on how natural growth, migration, and conversion influenced the populations of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in the 1900–1950 and 1950–2014 subperiods. Before colonialism, Guyana was populated by indigenous tribes such as Wai Wai, Machushi, Patamona, Arawak, Carib, Wapishana, Arecuna, Akawaio, and Warrau (Americas MRG Directory, n.d.). The religious composition in Guyana started to change during Dutch colonialism in 1616 and increasingly under British rule that began in 1796. The colonizers introduced their own religions: Christianity and Judaism. They ‘inserted’ other people in the colony of Guyana to work on the plantations. Major groups were enslaved workers from Africa (‘Co-operative Republic of Guyana’, 2008) who arrived in Guyana between the 1750s and 1807. They mainly practiced traditional religions and a few adhered to Islam. Other large groups were East Indian indentured workers who were followers of Hinduism and Islam (Ferreira, 2006; Khanam & Chickrie, 2009). They arrived in Guyana in the 1838–1917 period. The settlement of European colonizers, enslaved Africans, and Asian immigrants resulted in a diverse religious population. 4.2.1  Religious Demography in Guyana 20th–21st Centuries As in Suriname, in Guyana Christians evolved as the largest religious group, followed by Hindus and Muslims between the 20th and 21st centuries. In terms of demographic growth Christians ranked first, followed by Muslims, and then Hindus. This is reflected in their indices in

Evolution of Christian Dominance 75 Table 4.5  Indices Population by Religion in Guyana 20th–21st Centuries (1911 = 100) 1911 Religion

Absolute

Index

1931

1946

1960

1980

2002

2012

Christians Hindus Muslims Others Not stated Total

167,811 95,478 18,217 708 13,827 296,041

100 100 100 100 100 100

111 101 120 207 42 105

130 124 161 46 6 125

189 196 271 216 40 189

190 294 363 7,239 102 256

252 223 297 3,188 50 254

279 194 278 2,803 0 252

Source: British Guiana Population Census 1960. Volume 2, Part A, 1960, Census of the colony of British Guiana 1946, Part D, 1946; Bureau of Statistics Guyana, 2016b; and Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2007, compiled by author.

Table 4.5, with the exception of the index of ‘others’. 26 The absolute numbers of Christians increased from 1911 to 2012, while the population of Hindus and Muslims grew till 1980 (Appendix 2b). The percentage of Christians increased with 6%, while that of Muslims remained by and large similar between 1911 and 2012 (Figure 4.5). Remarkable is the decline of the share of Hindus with 4%. It is argued that between 1911 and 1946 natural growth and conversion were critical, while conversion and migration were significant from 1946 to 2012.

Figure 4.5  Population by Religion Guyana 20th–21st Centuries. Source: British Guiana Population Census 1960. Volume 2, Part A, 1960, Census of the colony of British Guiana 1946, Part D, 1946; Bureau of Statistics Guyana, 2016b; and Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2007.

76  Evolution of Christian Dominance 4.2.1.1 Changes in Demography of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims 1911–1946 Between 1911 and 1946, the share of Christians and Muslims in the national population increased slightly, but that of Hindus did not change (Figure 4.5). Conversion largely explains the respective demographic evolution of Christians and Hindus. Natural growth apparently influenced the Muslim population. Migration hardly played a role in the religious demography of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims from 1911 to 1946. To explain the influence of conversion, natural growth, and migration of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims, ethnicity is used as proxy. For Christians Blacks are used. Blacks are comparable with the Creoles as used in the census of 2004 and 2012 and Afro Surinamese in the census of 2012. For Hindus the East Indian ethnicity is the proxy. Remarkable is that there were also Muslims among the East Indians, but these Muslims comprised a smaller group. In the first half of the 20th century East Indians were predominantly Hindu (Omoruyi, 1971; Shiwcharan, 1990). At least 70% followed Hinduism. 27 Between the 1910s and 1930s, East Indians had a higher natural growth than Blacks. The natural growth resulted from fertility and mortality. East Indians had the highest fertility, while that of Blacks was low (Lamur, 1973, p. 61).28 In 1931 for instance, East Indians had 44,634 births and 35,905 deaths (Norton, 1932) which resulted in an absolute increase of 8,729. Blacks had fewer births (34,558) and deaths (30,444) (ibid) that led to a small absolute increase (4,114). Thus in 1931 the natural growth of Blacks was 50% less than that of the East Indians. Since East Indians in Guyana practiced Hinduism and Islam, it is important to understand if the natural growth of East Indians also influenced the share of Hindus and Muslims between 1910s and 1930s. Data suggest that this natural growth only had an impact on the population of Muslims. In the 1910s–1930s period the latter religious group grew with 3,575 members (growth ratio 0.98). The natural growth of East Indians did not influence the Hindu population, apparently due to their conversion to Christianity. Hindus had a smaller growth (absolute increase of 860 or growth ratio of 0.05) than Christians (absolute increase of 17,752 or growth ratio of 0.53). Most likely the conversion of Hindus to Christianity contributed to the increased Christian population. According to Schalkwijk (2001) the percentage of Christians among East Indians – who were predominantly Hindu and on a small scale Muslim – increased 29 from 4% to 5% between 1940 and 1950. This supports the idea that conversion affected the demographic changes of Christians and Hindus in the 1900–1950 period. It hardly influenced the demography of Muslims, as they were often resistant against conversion. Various scholars such as Bisnauth (1977) reported that most converts among East Indians were Hindu rather than Muslim.

Evolution of Christian Dominance 77 4.2.1.2 Changes in Demography of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims 1946–2002 Between 1946 and 2012, the proportion of Christians grew from 59% to 63%, while that of Hindus decreased from 32% to 25% (Figure 4.5). The share of Muslims in this period remained by and large stable (7%). Among the Christians, the share of traditional denominations declined strongly from 57% to 34%, whereas that of Evangelicals increased from 0% to 28%. The demographic changes of Christians and Hindus are remarkable from 1980, as from then on to 2012 the growth of the former and the decrease of the latter became much clearer (Figure 4.5). It will be argued that these demographic changes were influenced by conversion and migration, while natural growth had an impact on the demography between the 1940s and 1960s. To explain this influence, ethnicity is used as a proxy. Blacks are considered a proxy for Christians, while East Indians for mainly Hindus and Muslims. Natural growth influenced the decreasing Christian share and increasing percentage of Hindus and Muslims between the 1940s and the 1960s. According to Lamur (1973, p. 61) the fertility of Blacks was low and that of the East Indians was high in this period. This probably led to a higher natural growth of the Hindu population than of the Christian. Between 1946 and 1964, the number of East Indians increased with 104,406 (growth 64%), while that of the Blacks was far less: 40,595 (growth 28%). As in this period East Indians were predominantly Hindu and Muslim and Blacks were mainly Christian, the demographic growth of these two ethnic groups also influenced the respective religious populations. Migration had a large influence on the significant decline of Hindus and Muslims between 1980 and 2012. According to estimates about 10,000 to 30,000 emigrated annually in the late 1980s (‘The mass emigration from Guyana to the USA’, n.d.). In this period there was a peak emigration flow (Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2007) due to worsened economic and social circumstances. Emigration was mostly responsible for the decline of the population of Guyana from 759,567 to 740,153 between 1980 and 1991 (ibid) and thus also of the religious demographic changes in this period. Between 1980 and 1991, the population size of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims decreased. But, in terms of percentages30 the Muslim population declined the most (−13%), followed by Hindus (−10%) and Christians (−3%). Migration also influenced the demographic evolution in the 1990s, especially between 1996 and 2000 (Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2007). This demographic factor also influenced the population between 2007 and 2012. There were 7,238 departures against 5,332 arrivals, which gave a net emigration total of −1,906 (Bureau of Statistics Guyana, 2016a). In 2009, according to a Member of Parliament Guyana had an emigration rate of 33.5%, of whom many were university graduates (‘Guyana has the highest migration rate in region – Corbin’, 2009). They mostly went to

78  Evolution of Christian Dominance North America. It is the country where at least 75% of the Guyanese emigrants go for a better living (ibid). However, the influence of migration cannot be analyzed by the ethnic or religious groups due to nonavailability official data. Conversion had a strong influence on the percentual increase of Christians and the decline of the percentage of Hindus between 1980 and 2012. To understand this, the demographic changes of Christian denominations are analyzed (Figure 4.6). Between 1980 and 2012, the share of traditional Christians showed a very strong decline, while that of the Evangelicals grew significantly (Figure 4.6). The decline among Christian denominations was strongest among the Anglican and Presbyterian Church. Various Christian and Hindu informants mentioned that many adherents to traditional Christian churches switched to Evangelical churches. This could explain the percentual decrease of traditional Christians and the proportional increase of Evangelicals. However, there can also be converts from other religions. The declining share of Hindus between 1980 and 2012 suggests that many of them converted to Evangelicalism in this period. There are no statistical data that prove the influence of conversion on the percentual decrease of Hindus from 1980 to 2012. However, according to Hindu and Christian informants, Hindus have converted to these churches increasingly since the 2000s. The rising share of Evangelicals among East Indians between 2006 and 2014 supported their statements (Figure 4.7). According to LAPOP results, the percentage of Evangelicals among East Indians increased strongly from 4% to 13% between 2006 and 2014

Figure 4.6  Population by Major Christian Denomination in Guyana 1946–2012. Source: British Guiana Population Census 1960. Volume 2, Part A, 1960, Census of the colony of British Guiana 1946, Part D, 1946; Bureau of Statistics Guyana, 2016b; and Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2007, compiled by author.

Evolution of Christian Dominance 79

Figure 4.7  East Indians by Christian Denomination in Guyana 2006–2014. Source: ‘The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)’, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2014, compiled by author. Sig. 2006: 0.000; 2012: 0.000; and 2014: 0.000.

(Figure 4.7). But, the proportion of traditional Christians among them increased slightly from 13% to 14%. The stronger growth of Evangelicals than traditional Christians among East Indians strengthens the belief that conversion to Evangelicalism is a major reason of the declining share of Hindus between 1980 and 2012. The religious demographic changes of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in Guyana in the 1911–1946 and 1946–2012 subperiods are analyzed. In the former subperiod the percentage of Christians and Muslims grew slightly, while that of Hindus remained stable. This is explained by the larger natural growth of East Indians than Creoles, and the conversion of Hindus to Christianity. Migration hardly played a role. In the subperiod 1946–2012, emigration and a reduced natural growth contributed to an overall percentual decline of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims. However, between 1980 and 2012 the share of Christians grew significantly, which seemed to be influenced by conversion of mostly Hindus to Evangelicalism. How these religious demographic changes are related to Christian dominance in Guyana will be analyzed in the next section. 4.2.2  Christian Dominance in Guyana 1900–2014 After discussing the religious demographic evolution of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in Guyana between 1900 and 2014, this section moves to analyzing Christian dominance. It will examine in depth the relation between conversion to Christianity and Christian dominance by using the concepts

80  Evolution of Christian Dominance of ideological and institutional religious dominance. After having provided insight in Christian dominance before 1900, the focus is on the analyses of Christian dominance in the 1900–1950 and 1950–2014 subperiods. 4.2.2.1  Christian Dominance in Guyana until 1900 Like Suriname, in Guyana Christian conversion missions were supported by colonial government policies. Christian churches tried to first convert indigenous and African persons. During the conversion missions Christian denominations taught enslaved people to respect their superiors (Hoyte, 1968, p. 9). The churches for instance provided Christian teachings on Sunday schools and public schools. The main missions were conducted by the Anglican Church. Smaller denominations were the Methodist, Catholic, and Congregationalist Churches (Schalkwijk, 2011, p. 288). The colonial government facilitated conversion missions among indigenous and African people with state subsidies. Church clergies were paid for religious services among these people and for encouraging them to respect their superiors (Hoyte, 1968, p. 8). Not all Christian denominations were supported with subsidies or salaries from the colonial state. The Anglican and Roman Catholic Church received such financial support that was legally justified by various laws on financial support to churches and their personnel. Illustrative was a law that was passed for paying church clergy in 1847 (ibid, p. 9). In 1859, an ordinance was made on salaries to Anglican and Scots clergymen and annual grants31 to the Roman Catholic Church and dissenting32 churches such as the Methodists (ibid). In addition to salaries, Christian denominations received loans for the founding of houses, renovation, furniture, and payment of rents for churches which had not even been founded yet (ibid). The colonial government also granted subsidies to Christian denominational schools. In 1847 for instance, a law was passed that granted Christian denominational schools £3,521 (ibid, p. 9). These regulations and policies reflect how the colonial government enabled Christian dominance in the 19th century. In the 19th century, Hindus and Muslims in British Guiana (Guyana before the independence in 1966) were not heavily subjected to Christian conversion missions. There were few conversion missions by the Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists, and Catholics (Schalkwijk, 2011, p. 288). Illustrative were the schools established for children of indentured workers where they received Christian education. The main subjects were reading, writing, elementary arithmetic, recitation of for instance passages and verses of the Scriptures, singing (hymns), and religious knowledge (Lord’s prayers, 10 Commandments) (Mangru, 1977, p. 275). These schools did not attract many pupils. To some extent churches gradually felt a need to ‘civilize’ newly arrived East Indians in the colony received financial support from the colonial government in the mid-19th century (Bisnauth, 1993, p. 4). 33

Evolution of Christian Dominance 81 4.2.2.2  Christian Dominance in Guyana 1900–1950 Let’s turn now to the way colonial government policies, private institutions, religious leadership, and religious demography have influenced Christian dominance from 1900 to 1950. Both ideological and institutional dominance will be addressed to explain the evolution and working of Christian dominance.

4.2.2.2.1  IDEOLOGICAL CHRISTIAN DOMINANCE

In Guyana Christian ideological dominance was sustained in different ways and through various mechanisms: public education; preferential status of Christians in civil services and public holidays; conversion missions. The colonial government used public education for Christian conversion missions. In this regard government schools were a vehicle for Christian ideological dominance. To achieve this, they rigorously ‘injected’ Christianity in the minds of Hindus and Muslims children who were socialized in Christian morals at public schools. Illustrative is the following statement by Reverend Gallon, a prominent clergyman in Georgetown, in 1912: The authorities of all religious denominations, which profess and teach the Christian religions, understand the importance of training the young in principles of morality and religion. Their duty is not only to lay the truths of the Christian religion before their adherents, but to train them to direct their lives by those moral principles, which are based upon the teaching of Christ. (cited in Shiwcharan, 1990) Christian public holidays were another government policy that contributed to Christian ideological dominance. Public holidays may promote significant shared memories, values, and experiences (Zhu, 2012). In the first half of the 20th century, British Guiana had six Christian public holidays: Good Friday, Day after Good Friday, Christmas Day, December 26, Easter Monday, and Whit Monday. These holidays were acknowledged in the holiday structure of 1919 also called ‘the Clementi structure’ (McAlmont, 2009). With these holidays the British colonial government allowed Christians to celebrate and commemorate their festivals and strengthened the religious and political significance of Christianity in the colony. Most of the respective Christian holidays contain a theological message about Jesus Christ as God and savior for mankind and thus were religiously significant, while others were not. Non-Christian holidays and events like Holi (Hindu) and Tadja (Islamic) were considered inferior. Some Christian leaders were sarcastic about these holidays. In 1929 for instance, a missionary visited British Guiana and made a remark that Holi and Tadja had no religious significance. He argued

82  Evolution of Christian Dominance that these were celebrated as an excuse for rum drinking and carousing (Bisnauth, 1977, p. 272). Christian leadership held beliefs and views of Christianization as a requirement for ‘saving’ people. At the turn of the 19th century, a Catholic missionary stated that East Indians should be converted as: ‘For salvation there can be only one true path … it is of vital importance that all who have souls be saved should be guided to the right road irrespective of rank or color’ (Reverend Salomon cited in Khanam & Chickrie, 2009, p. 213). He argued that Muslims and Hindus are ‘ignorant and careless’ with a ‘few religious books’ (ibid). The Islamic prophet Muhammad and Hindu gods were seen as false and wicked (ibid). Influential clergymen who tried to explain Hindu and Muslim religions to the large public, such as Mr. Bronkhurst (Anglican), presented Hindu priests as false teachers. He described Hindu ceremonies as superstitious, Hindus as idolaters and sensual immigrants (Bisnauth, 1977, p. 456). Hindus and Muslims were considered as outcasts (Khanam & Chickrie, 2009, p. 213). Christianity, on the contrary, was portrayed as the true religion. Christian missionaries considered themselves, ‘in a state of perpetual warfare against Hinduism and Islam’ (Laurence cited in Khanam & Chickrie, 2009, p. 214). These views strengthened Christian ideological dominance. 4.2.2.2.2  INSTITUTIONAL CHRISTIAN DOMINANCE

Between 1900 and 1950, government policies enhanced Christian institutional dominance in public education and civil services. In the educational system of British Guiana, government schools were operated by churches. Christian churches had the lead over public elementary schools, as well as reputed secondary schools. These schools could sustain themselves with financial support by the colonial government34 (Hoyte, 1968, p. 9). In 1922, all primary schools (225 totally) were fully subsidized by the government, while the buildings were owned by Christian organizations. The administration and appointment of teachers were in the hands of the churches (Shiwcharan, 1990). By the end of the 19th century the Anglicans had most schools (19), whereas the Moravians owned one mission school (Schalkwijk, 2011, p. 295). In the early 20th century, the Presbyterian churches had 19 schools in 1912, which increased to 32 in the early 1940s. By the mid-20th century, the following numbers of Christian public elementary schools were registered: Canadian mission 32, Church of Scotland 32, Church of England 87, Congregational 19, Lutheran 5, Methodist 2, Roman Catholic 36 (Census of the colony of British Guiana 1946, Part D, 1946). It was difficult for qualified Hindus and Muslims to get jobs as teachers, unless they converted to Christianity (Shiwcharan, 1990). In 1924, for example, East Indians comprised only 8% of the civil service and just 3.5% were teachers (ibid). According to Hindu and Muslim informants it

Evolution of Christian Dominance 83 was usage that people showed their baptism card in order to get appointed as a teacher or civil servant (F, Personal Communication, September 14th 2012; S, Personal Communication, March 25th 2014). The former president Cheddi Jagan had such an experience: The fact was I could not find work. Armed with an Oxford and Cambridge School Certificate at the end of the school year 1935, I tried to get a job. But trying became hunting. My father and I knocked at many doors. The civil service was closed. A teaching job was proposed, but the salary offered was only $20 a month. Besides, there were suggestions that if I wanted to become a teacher, I would have to become a Christian, and my parents would have none of this. (cited in Hergash, 2013) Legal products that reflected the institutional dominance of Christians were the law on marriages and burial. As opposed to Hindus and Muslims, Christians could legally marry according to their religious ceremonies. Their clergymen could legalize these marriages as they were marriage officers. Hindus and Muslims, on the contrary, could not perform legal marriages till 1957. Colonial authorities refused requests for the registration and recognition of Hindu and Muslim marriages by immigration officers from India (Khanam & Chickrie, 2009, p. 212).35 In addition to marriages, Christians could be buried according to their religious rites. But cremation, which was custom in Hindu tradition, was not legalized. As such, Hindus could not be cremated. Besides government policies, the private Christian institutions also expressed institutional dominance of Christians. These institutions for instance got financial aid from abroad and contributions of local members. Illustrative is the Presbyterian Church, whose Evangelicals were paid by the Church of Scotland and Canada. This denomination already conducted missionary work among East Indians in 1849 (Schalkwijk, 2011, p. 302). In 1883, Scotland paid the salaries of missionaries in British Guiana (ibid, p.304).36 4.2.2.2.3  DENOMINATIONAL DIFFERENCES CHRISTIAN DOMINANCE

Christian dominance over Hindus and Muslims differed by denomination in British Guiana from 1900 to 1950. The Anglican and Catholic Church were institutionally more dominant, while the Presbyterian Church, Canadian Mission, and the Lutheran Church were ideologically more dominant. The Anglican Church was institutionally the most dominant, since it was considered the ‘national’ church. It was the official church of the colonizer, Great Britain (Hoyte, 1968, p. 10). The Anglicans were the most favored with the government resources. An example is that they owned most schools in the 1940s (Census of the colony of British Guiana 1946,

84  Evolution of Christian Dominance Part D, 1946). The Catholic Church ranked second with its social services and financial influence of the Portuguese businessmen. This denomination had many welfare organizations such as homes for elders and orphanages, and was particularly adhered to by Portuguese people from the business circles (Hoyte, 1968, p. 10). The Canadian Mission, Presbyterian, and the Lutheran Church expressed their ideological dominance in particular among Hindus of East Indian descent. This was achieved through the communication in Hindi. The Canadian Mission had Christian textbooks in Hindi (Hergash, 2013). The Ten Commandments, morning and evening prayers were taught in Hindi (ibid). The Presbyterian Church used elements of the Hindu religion in Christian sermons. For instance Jesus Christ was portrayed with Brahma, a highly important Hindu deity (Bisnauth, 1977). Christian missionaries used scriptures from the Bhagwat Gita, a Holy book of the Hindus, for authority claims of Jesus. He was presented as a Hindu god (ibid). In the missionary work among Muslims, it was apparently less common to have church services using Islamic elements. This, because the Presbyterian Church could not make the Islam compatible with Christianity (ibid). 4.2.2.3  Christian Dominance in Guyana 1950–2014 This section continues with the analyses of Christian dominance from 1950 to 2014 by building on the religious demographic insight. Section 4.2.1 pointed at a declining share of traditional Christians and the increasing proportion of Evangelicals in the 1950–2014 period. The percentage of the latter denomination grew at the cost of traditional Christians and other religious groups particularly Hindus. This section will examine whether and how this growth is linked to Christian dominance. But, first it addresses the remarkable changes in the dominance of traditional Christians in the 1960s–1970s. In the 1960s, dominance of traditional Christians declined under influence of ‘responses’ that removed certain privileged public resources of Christians and granted some to Hindus and Muslims. Political decisionmaking power came in the hands of local people, including exponents of both religious groups. With this power Hindu and Muslim marriages and cremation were legalized in 1957. Hindu and Muslim holidays were acknowledged in 1965 (McAlmont, 2009). And in 1961 various Christian schools were nationalized by the government (Mattai, 1977, p. 220). The precise influence of the political context is explained in the following chapter. In addition to legal products, the declined dominance of traditional Christians was reflected in expression of religious equality beliefs and practices of interreligious dialogue. Both phenomena were influenced by Christian leadership. In the 1960s, as in Suriname, in Guyana the changed leadership of the Vatican positively encouraged how the local Catholic

Evolution of Christian Dominance 85 Church treated other religious groups (F, Personal Communication, March 26th, 2014). A Christian informant explained: In the past there would be a high emphasis on membership and mentality that persons are only safe when they baptize. To go out and make as many members as possible. But today the emphasis is more to build the quality of the members in the faith (…). So the Vatican documents would actually talk about to live your faith and trying to be an example. (F, Personal Communication, March 26th, 2014) The above-mentioned informant explained that ideals of religious equality of the Vatican had consequences for the missionary work of the Catholic Church in Guyana. ‘It was not so much about evangelization, like going out to proselytize and win members. But just to strengthen the church. The main thing was that the actual living of the faith would be stronger among the members themselves’ (F, Personal Communication, March 26th, 2014). Practices of interreligious dialogue were reported mainly between Hindu leaders and leaders of traditional Christian churches in the 1970s. Here the remarkable role of the Guyana Council for Churches (GCC) must be mentioned. This was an umbrella organization of traditional Christian denominations founded in 1967 (‘Guyana Council of Churches’, n.d.). In the early years its members were the Anglican Church, Roman Catholic Church, Methodist Church, Presbyterian Church, and the Church of Nazarene (W, Personal Communication, March 25th, 2014). The GCC had dialogues with Hindu leaders (F, Personal Communication, March 26th, 2014). This was influenced by the religious leadership of the organization. The GCC had leaders such as Dale Bisnauth, a Presbyterian, who was befriended with non-Christian leaders (ibid). In this way he would encourage dialogue with non-Christians, especially Hindus, when he headed the GCC (ibid). During the Burnham regime (1968–1985) there was a further decline of the dominance by traditional Christians, particularly at the institutional level. In 1975, Burnham nationalized all denominational schools, which affected the traditional Christians most for they owned the majority. According to a Christian informant, this act of Burnham was meant to reduce the influence of the traditional churches (W, Personal Communication, March 25th, 2014). He said that Burnham became concerned when these churches began to criticize him, because this would mean that more people would oppose him (ibid). The churches after all, had the social control. Burnham wanted this control ‘He was an autocrat and loved power’, the informant explained (ibid). By nationalizing the schools, he took over the control of the churches. He also facilitated the controversial Evangelical organization, House of Israel, to maintain his regime. House of Israel, which consisted of persons who used coercion against groups that criticized the government. This church had to prevent rebellion against the regime. The use of coercion by ‘House of Israel’ can be explained by government policies of an

86  Evolution of Christian Dominance authoritarian state, religious leadership, and private religious institutions. The following quote of an Evangelical informant illustrates the influence of religious leadership and private religious institutions. It was an Edward Washington movement. They became a band of thugs more or less. And did a lot of their dirty work. (…) Edward Washington’s ability to control because he used the house of Israel very effectively as an instrument of terror. His ability to control (…). So they would not have subjected themselves to become part of any umbrella body or any group per se. (…) it was a large organization and back then they would have had quite a few thousand members. They were spreading in different parts of the country. He entrapped them through economic opportunities. Providing little subsidies hands out there and there. Giving them an opportunity to earn a few dollars through. They did a lot of business. A lot of them of how they earned money was through selling fudges and nuts. Sweet meats. Sell those on the street corners. They provide the capital and they would make it. They made very large quantities and they would sell all over the place. Georgetown mostly but they would also go to areas to sell these things. But it was not just an economic opportunity for them. A part of it they kept but there was another that part that went back to financing the operations of the house of Israel. (K, Personal Communication, March 27th, 2014) As described above, the leadership of ‘House of Israel’ was mostly responsible for the activities of this church. Its leader Rabbi Edward Washington had the ability to control its members. He provided them economic opportunities, and then mobilized them for expanding the private institutions of the church all over the country. In practice, however, this organization was not considered a religious institution. Various informants – Christian, Hindu, and Muslim – referred to House of Israel as a thug group. An organization with a religious mask to do ‘Burnham’s dirty work’ in order to maintain his regime (F, Personal Communication, March 26th, 2014; W, Personal Communication, March 25th, 2014; V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014; F, Personal Communication, September 14th, 2012). One informant mentioned that House of Israel ‘had nothing religious to say. The Christian churches did not consider them Christian at all. They were some kind of cult doing evil things. People were afraid of them. Nobody went to their churches (W, Personal Communication, March 25th, 2014). Despite the reduced dominance of traditional Christians, Christian dominance over Hindus and Muslims was still experienced during the Burnham regime. This was due to political rivalry between the largest Black and East Indian political parties. Burnham’s party, PNC, favored Blacks over East Indians in government jobs (will be discussed in depth in the next chapter).

Evolution of Christian Dominance 87 In the evolution of Christian dominance in Guyana, Evangelicals have increased their influence. As in Suriname, this is expressed in their demographic growth which can be understood by their relative flexibility in institutionalization, conversion strategies, and the nature of worship of Evangelicalism. But first, it is important to note that Evangelicals in Guyana, as in Suriname, are a diverse Christian denomination. Some large groups are the Pentecostal churches and Seventh Day Adventists (M, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). Their main umbrella organization is the Full Gospel Fellowship of Churches (FGF), founded in 1964 (‘Full Gospel Fellowship of churches turns 50’, 2014). By 2016, FGF had about 120 churches across the various (10) regions of the country (ibid). Besides this umbrella organization, there are organizations such as the Georgetown Ministries Fellowship that brings together the ministers of Evangelical and Pentecostal churches (W, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). The Pentecostal churches are considered the major Evangelical churches. The church ‘Assembly of God’ is considered the biggest Pentecostal church in Guyana, since it has branches allover the country (W, Personal Communication, September 20th, 2012). Assembly of God is not an independent church as other Evangelical churches. Rather, it is controlled by international organizations (ibid). Since the 1990s, Evangelicals have increasingly institutionalized themselves. They have a rising number of independent churches strongly engaged in missionary work (V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). The flexibility in institutionalization of Evangelical churches is explained by a pastor of this denomination. They organize sermons in many places. ‘Pentecostal churches just bring up all over the place (…) a bottom house, sometimes the school auditorium and so on’ (M, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). As in Suriname, Evangelical churches are flexible with respect to the location and new areas. They easily visit new areas and hold sermons there. In addition to the flexibility in institutionalization, other important factors that increased the share of Evangelicals were the conversion strategy and nature of worship. These had a strong focus on spreading the gospel to all people in the nation. To this end, Evangelical churches organized revival meetings. They had religious services with spiritual healing, catching music, songs, and dance. An important strategy in the missionary work of Evangelical churches was the crusade (ibid). This was a public campaign aimed at conversion of people. The churches went to areas with flat open land. As an Evangelical pastor said: ‘They would put down these tents. And run crusades for like a whole week and things like that. It’s a revival’ (M, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). After the crusades, attendants felt a lot of comfort, which made them decide to join the church and get baptized (ibid). ‘The crusades are a revival for the church, and also expansion of the church at the same time’ (ibid). According to Christian and Hindu informants, Evangelical churches

88  Evolution of Christian Dominance organized crusades in neighborhoods and in the capital city and had loud music. Mass media were also used for attracting people to convert. A Hindu informant explained that they broadcasted films on TV where Evangelical priests professed to heal people and change their fortune (V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014); they highly targeted people. An important is the socioeconomic status of the marginalized groups. According to a Hindu informant in Guyana, Evangelical churches targeted poor areas where people struggled with basic material resources. Missionaries visited them with gifts and provided counseling. Illustrative is the statement: But as I said the root cause of conversion. Several things. Poverty. So the people go in with gifts. And along with the gifts come the Bible. The people also promise them that they’re going to solve their problem. So they go in there and they offer counseling (…). When they go, they’re very desperate. (V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014) Other strategies were house visits one by one, youth work, and youth camp (W, Personal Communication, September 20th, 2012). Finally, the influence of gospel music made for specific ethnic and age groups must be mentioned. Some churches designed music to connect with particular people. As an Evangelical pastor explained: You find some areas that play a lot of reggae gospel. There are some areas you know they will be playing chutney gospel. So you know, you track the people according to their culture and you know what appeals to them. So you would like to say going to the Indian people area and play reggae gospel. That does not work. You go and you play chutney gospel there… You gonna see you gonna get a response. (W, Personal Communication, September 20th, 2012) The crusades, use of mass media, house visits, and composition of gospel music were important strategies of Evangelical churches that encouraged people, including Hindus, to convert to Evangelicalism. A pastor of this denomination stated that in every village (the rural areas), there would be more Hindu converts (W, Personal Communication, September 20th, 2012). Muslims hardly converted to Evangelicalism. The increased influence of Evangelicals also expressed by their private institutions and political power. They built independent churches that were sustained financially with tithes of members. But as in Suriname, they were not strongly represented in schools and graveyards. According to Christian informants, Evangelicals in Guyana had only one school in the interior and no graveyards (W, Personal Communication, March 25th, 2014).

Evolution of Christian Dominance 89 Guyana had various exponents of Evangelical churches in the Parliament, and even a bishop as Minister. Their increased access to political decision-making power seemed to have advantages for their followers. A Catholic informant stated that some Evangelicals in the coalition benefited from state resources such as buying tax free music instruments for the church (W, Personal Communication, March 25th, 2014), but this was not the only benefit. An Evangelical Christian informant explained that some Evangelical churches sought to increase their political decisionmaking power to enlarge their political influence on public policies: What is happening right now is that the independent churches, independent pastors are getting into the political parties. And right now in parliament you have about, I would say, about six or seven pastors are in the parliament. (…) In my discussions some of the independent pastors these guys got a plan. It is called positioning yourself. They are saying that you cannot expect the Parliament to make God, fearing of God tend the decisions if you got lot of Godless people in the Parliament. So the request now is for more religious leaders to become Parliament members. So if you got a whole set of religious leaders in the Parliament than they got greater ground for compromise and to make God centered decisions. That’s how they see it. (…) But for them to get in to Parliament they have to join political parties. (R, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014) Despite the increased influence, Evangelicals were not considered dominant for two reasons. First, Evangelicals did not have the power over Hindus and Muslims, at least not in the way as traditional Christians during the colonial period. As will be shown in the next chapter, Hindu and Muslim groups had access to political decision-making power, and run religious institutions that altogether attempted to maintain their religion. The second reason is that Evangelicals were very diverse, of which some seek to rule over non-Christians while others did not. A politically influential Evangelical informant for instance argued that the members of his church tried to be respectful toward relatives of non-Christian people who converted to Evangelicalism (K, Personal Communication, March 27th, 2014). According to him the church did not condemn other religions, even though it implicitly held on to the own religious superiority. When the Evangelical informant was asked how he dealt with the Hindus and Muslims who converted to Christianity, he said the following: That has been a challenge. So what we do is, we try to be respectful of the religious persuasion of other family members. But the one family, one member who has decided to come. We try to work with that one person and helping them to demonstrate the Love of Christ. Not be condemning. Not to be you know but to demonstrate the Love

90  Evolution of Christian Dominance of Christ. We try to show them how by demonstrating the Love of Christ it is easier to win your family members that way. (K, Personal Communication, March 27th, 2014) The above-mentioned Evangelical informant stated that the Evangelical church remained respectful to other religions in conversion missionary work. This is different from other Evangelical churches who rejected ideals of mutual respect. The respective Evangelical informant argued that there is a strong group of Evangelical churches that do believe in respect of other religions. They would not say this to him personally, but in public programs they would call other religions heathens and discourage the participation of Christians to their ‘religious’ practices and festivities. According to the Evangelical informant this group of churches didn’t believe in ecumenical services and argued that Christianity must be kept separated. Their perception of Christian leadership varies: ‘as a Christian leader you must not participate in anything that the other religions are doing’ (K, Personal Communication, March 27th, 2014). We saw the difference in religious leadership in the following belief of the Evangelical informant: ‘That’s their view and so if it has anything to do with national (…) they are unable to build social partnership because of their own view of religion which is that Christianity is separate. And Christianity separate from every other religion or in the world. That’s their view’ (ibid). In this statement again the informant clarified that superiority views about Christianity were not shared by all Evangelicals, including him. He argued that in his church people were taught to embrace religious diversity and that they were tolerant and respectful toward other religious groups (ibid). Various Evangelical churches participated in the national umbrella interreligious organization, the IRO, that emphasized religious harmony and equality. With such participation, Evangelicals could not be classified as a dominant religious group. The IRO was established in 2003. It was primarily concerned with the reduction of ethnic tensions during elections by encouraging shared religious morals. There were members from the Evangelical, Muslim, Bahai, Catholic, Anglican, and Rastafarian community (N & R, Personal Communication, December 13th, 2013). The IRO propagated ideals of mutual respect for religious groups. It for instance organized a peace walk in January 2006 which was the year of the election. IRO argued that this was the most peaceful general election in Guyana (N & R, Personal Communication, December 13th, 2013). The walk was supported by former president Jagdew (PPP) who halfway joined the mass of about 200 persons. In 2006, with support of the UN, the IRO convinced political parties to sign a peace pact in the building of the Parliament. The IRO also distributed peace buttons with words of peace as used by different religious groups such as Salome, Ohm Shanti, and Salam alekum (ibid).

Evolution of Christian Dominance 91

4.3 Comparing Suriname and Guyana: Religious Demography and Christian Dominance This section explains the differences and similarities of Christian dominance between Suriname and Guyana from 1900 to 2014, with emphasis on the 1950–2014 subperiod. Here is analyzed whether religious demography, government policies, religious institutions, and religious leadership have had the same influence on Christian dominance in both nations. It is also examined whether these factors equally explain the institutional and ideological Christian dominance in Suriname and Guyana. This section first deals with religious demographic changes. Then it addresses the differences and similarities in Christian dominance between Suriname and Guyana. There are important differences in the demographic evolution of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in the two nations from the early 20th to the 21st centuries (Table 4.6). In Suriname, the share of Christians declined from 76% to 49%, while it increased in Guyana from 57% to 63%. In contrast to the decreased share of Hindus in Guyana – from 32% to 25% –, the proportion of this group in Suriname increased from 16% to 22%. The Muslims in Suriname experienced a demographic increase from 6% to 16%, while their population size in Guyana hardly changed (6% to 7%) (Table 4.6). Three factors influence religious demography: natural growth, migration, and conversion. In the following parts the influence of these factors will be explained by in the 1900–1950 and 1950–2014 subperiods. From 1900 to 1950, Christians lost their majority in Suriname in terms of percentage, while they maintained this in Guyana. This difference is better explained by migration and conversion rather than natural growth. In both nations, Christians had a relative low natural growth. But there were major differences with regard to the influence of migration and conversion. Suriname had an immigration of large numbers of Muslim Javanese indentured workers that on the one hand contributed to the growing share of Muslims but on the other hand reduced the percentage of Christians. Guyana did not have such an immigration of Muslims. Conversion of Hindus and Muslims to Christianity played a role in both countries, but it was higher in Guyana than in Suriname. By 1950, conversion of East Indians, who were predominantly Hindu and on a small scale Muslim, was 5% in Guyana and 1% in Suriname (Jan M. W. Schalkwijk, 2011). The higher conversion rate may have contributed to the maintenance of the Christian population in the former nation.37 A major religious demographic difference between Suriname and Guyana from 1946 and 2012 is that the former nation had a larger population growth ratio (Table 4.7). This may be explained by the stronger emigration of people in Guyana than Suriname. The former nation suffered from a high number of emigrants in the 1960s and from 1980s to the early years of the 21st century. In the 1980s, about 10,000 to 30,000 left the country

Religion Christians Hindus Muslims None/own Others Not stated Total Total abs

Sur

Guy

Sur

Guy

Sur

Guy

Sur

Guy

Sur

Guy

1900

1911

1946

1946

1980

1980

2004

2002

2012

2012

56.6% 32.3% 6.2%

46.8% 19.5% 32.0%

0.2% 4.7% 100.0% 296,041

0.5%

58.9% 31.9% 7.9% 1.0% 0.1% 0.2% 100.0% 369,678

41.6% 27.4% 19.6% 8.5% 1.7% 1.2% 100.0% 355,240

41.9% 37.1% 8.7% 3.7% 6.8% 1.9% 100.0% 758,619

49.0% 23.0% 16.0% 4.0% 3.0% 5.0% 100.0% 492,000

56.3% 28.4% 7.2% 4.3% 3.0% 0.9% 100.1% 751,224

48.4% 22.3% 13.9% 7.5% 4.8% 3.2% 100.0% 541,638

76.0% 16.4% 5.7% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0% 100.0% 68,141

100.0% 173,404

62.6% 24.8% 6.8% 3.1% 2.7% 100% 746,955

Source: Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek (2005, 2013); Bureau of Statistics Guyana (2016b); Census of the Colony of British Guiana 1946, Part D, 1946; Guyana Bureau of Statistics (2007); Jap-A-Joe, Sjak Shie, and Vernooij( 2001); and Vernooij (2012).

92  Evolution of Christian Dominance

Table 4.6  Population by Religion Suriname and Guyana Early 20th–21st Centuries

Evolution of Christian Dominance 93 Table 4.7  Indices Population by Religion in Suriname and Guyana 1946–2012 (1946 = 100) Sur Religion Christians Hindus Muslims None/ own Others Not stated Total

Guy

Sur

Guy

Sur

1946 1946 1964 1960 1980 100 100 100 100

100 100 100 100

171 259 115  

146 159 168  

178 288 126  

100 100

100 100

421  

466 699

651  

100

100

187

152

205

Guy 1980 146 238 226 785

Sur

Guy

Sur

Guy

2004 2002 2012 2012 290 335 142  

194 181 185 895

315 357 135  

215 157 173 656

15,578 1,622 6,861 2,840 6,031 1,767   870     205

284

203

312

202

Source: Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek (2005, 2013); Bureau of Statistics Guyana (2016); Census of the Colony of British Guiana 1946, Part D, 1946; Guyana Bureau of Statistics (2007); Jap-A-Joe, Sjak Shie, and Vernooij (2001); and Vernooij (2012), compiled by author.

on an annual basis. Therefore, Guyana is considered the nation with the highest emigration rate in the Caribbean. Suriname also experienced emigration of persons, but less than Guyana. Except for the followers of ‘other’ and ‘none/own’ religious groups, 38 Christians had the largest growth ratio in Suriname and Guyana (Table 4.7). But, in Suriname this ratio was higher (315) than in Guyana (215), presumably due to the influence of migration (discussed in the section above). Another explanation might be conversion of Maroon traditional religious groups to Christianity and their high natural growth. In the 1946–2012 period, Suriname experienced an increase of the share of Christians, but this growth occurred after 1980 most likely due to christianized Maroons with traditional religions. Maroon Christians had the highest growth ratio (4.5) among all Christians by ethnicity between 1971 and 2012. This growth ratio can be explained by the large natural growth of Maroons between 1971 and 2012. In 1971, Maroons comprised 10% of the national population, which rose to 22% in 2012. Guyana does not have Maroon Christians nor experienced such a growth. Guyana differs from Suriname in the demographic evolution of Hindus and Muslims between 1946 and 2012. Table 4.7 shows a higher growth ratio of Hindus (357) than the total in Suriname, while a smaller growth ratio (157) than the total in Guyana in 2012. This means that the Hindu population grew in Suriname, but not in Guyana. Migration and conversion can explain this difference. Guyana had a larger emigration – which already caused a decline of the Hindu population – and a higher conversion of Hindus to Evangelicalism than in Suriname. As regards Muslims, Guyana had a growth ratio of 173 and Suriname a growth ratio of 135 (Table 4.7). Conversion to Evangelicalism is the major explanation for

94  Evolution of Christian Dominance

Figure 4.8   Mobility Processes between Religious Groups and Denominations 1950–2014, Suriname.

this difference. Suriname experienced a larger conversion of Muslims, particularly Javanese Ahmadiyyas, than in Guyana. The demographic mobility of Christians, Hindus, and Muslims from 1950 to 2014 is differentiated by denomination and then linked with Christian dominance (Figure 4.8). The results show that in 1950 traditional Christians were the only dominant religious group, when the denomination of Evangelicalism was not visible (Figure 4.8). This changed by 2014. Dominance of traditional Christians reduced while the influence of Evangelicalism increased in both Suriname and Guyana. This will be explained for each nation. 4.3.1 Suriname In 1950 in Suriname the dominant Christian denominations were the Catholic, Moravian, Lutheran, and Dutch Reformist Church (Figure 4.9). In terms of demography, Catholics and Moravians were the most dominant denominations. But the institutional dominance of the Dutch Reformed Church was stronger than of other Christian churches, which was reflected in government employment in the 1950s. The Catholic and Moravian Church were institutionally and ideologically dominant over Hindus and Muslims mainly with formal denominational schools and conversion missions. Between 1950 and 2014, the demographic dominance of traditional Christians declined under influence of migration and the natural growth of Javanese Muslims in the 1900–1950 period (Figure 4.9). Another contributing factor was the conversion of traditional Christians, Maroons with traditional religions, and Javanese Ahmadiyyas to Evangelicalism.

Evolution of Christian Dominance 95

Figure 4.9   Mobility Processes between Religious Groups and Denominations 1950–2014, Guyana.

The institutional and ideological dominance of traditional Christians over Hindus and Muslims began to weaken with the inconsistency and finally the disappearance of the colonial religious assimilation policy in the early 20th century. Due to this policy, governor Kielstra advocated the access of these two religious groups and legalized their marriages (Ramsoedh, 1990). With this law the colonial government pointed at the importance of reducing Christian superiority beliefs and improving the social status of Hinduism and Islam.39 In addition to colonial policies, national policies also decreased traditional Christian dominance. In terms of legal products, the legal privileges of traditional Christians in subsidies and national religious holidays reduced. This occurred with the passing of laws on subsidies for Hindu and Muslim institutions and Hindu and Muslim national holidays. Finally, religious leadership and private religious institutions contributed to the declined dominance of traditional Christians. This is reflected in the practice of interreligious cooperation between traditional Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in the national interreligious organization, IRO (Figure 4.9). Leaders of organizations of these three groups promote mutual understanding through the IRO. This is an important change, since traditional Christian churches used to perceive the increased institutionalization of Hindus and Muslims in the 1940s as a threat. They therefore established an umbrella organization (CCK). This changed totally in 1989 with the foundation of IRO. Its members were the Catholic Church, Sanatan Dharma, and Arya Samaj; the Ahmadiyya denomination of East Indian descent; the Sunni and Ahmadiyya denomination of Javanese origin (Figure 4.9).

96  Evolution of Christian Dominance The increased influence of Evangelicals in Suriname was reflected in demography. They were growing at the cost of membership of traditional Christians. It seemed that mostly Moravians turned to Evangelicalism. But there were also converts of non-Christians to Evangelicalism, in particular Maroon traditional religious groups and Javanese Ahmidyyas (Figure 4.9). 4.3.2 Guyana In 1950 in Guyana the dominant Christian denominations were Anglicans, Catholics, Presybyterians, Methodists, Moravians, and Wesleyans (Figure 4.9). The Anglican Church was the most dominant denomination in the nation in religious demography. It was also institutionally dominant with its schools, civil employment privileges. But the Presbyterian Church was ideologically more dominant over Hindus than other denominations as it integrated Hindu beliefs in Christianity in missionary work. From 1950 to 2014, the demographic dominance of traditional Christians reduced with the large migration and conversion to Evangelicalism (Figure 4.9). Since the 1980s, Evangelicals had been the largest growing Christian denomination at the cost of many traditional Christians and Hindus. The institutional dominance of traditional Christians in Guyana declined in terms of legal products and access to civil service jobs. Laws were made that removed the privileges in education and national holidays. Christian denominational schools were nationalized, and Hindu and Muslim national holidays were acknowledged. With these legal products, the ideological dominance of traditional Christians reduced their superiority ideals in the nation. The declined ideological and institutional dominance of Christians in Guyana was also reflected in the practices of interreligious cooperation. They used to participate with Hindus and Muslims in the national umbrella religious organization, IRO. However, their participation faded away with the Evangelical leadership in the IRO and the alliance of this organization with political agenda.

4.4 Conclusions Both Guyana and Suriname have in common that from 1950 to 2014 the dominance of traditional Christians declined, while the influence of Evangelicals increased. However, there were important differences. First, in Guyana the dominance of traditional Christians declined much more. Second, in Guyana the influence of Evangelicals was much higher than in Suriname. The differences between nations were clearly expressed by religious demography, legal products, and interreligious cooperation. In the 1946–2012 period, the decreased share of traditional Christians was much larger in Guyana than in Suriname. Furthermore, the relative

Evolution of Christian Dominance 97 increase of Evangelicals was higher in Guyana (from 0% to 28%) than in Suriname (from 0% to 11%). This difference in Christian demography is explained by the migration, natural growth, and conversion. The influence of these factors, especially the latter, differed by nation. In the former nation, Evangelicals were the largest growing Christian denomination at the cost of membership of traditional Christians, Maroons with traditional religions, and Javanese Ahmadiyyas. In Guyana most people that converted to Evangelicalism were traditional Christians and Hindus. Legal products expressed the decreased ideological and institutional dominance of traditional Christians. In both nations, laws were made that removed the institutional privileges of Christians over Hindus and Muslims throughout the entire nation as well as the beliefs in Christian superiority. In both Guyana and Suriname, Hindu and Muslim holidays were declared. In Guyana Christian schools were nationalized, and in Suriname subsidies were granted to Hindu and Muslim schools. Practices of interreligious cooperation also illustrated the declined ideological and institutional dominance of traditional Christians in Suriname and Guyana. Both nations had national umbrella organizations that promoted mutual respect and religious equality, of which traditional Christian churches were or used to be members. Their participation was explained by changed religious leadership of traditional Christian denominations. However, a critical difference was that interreligious cooperation at the national level in Suriname involved more active religious groups than in Guyana. This is due to the differences in influences of Evangelicals in the two nations. In Guyana they were strongly represented in the national umbrella interreligious organization, while they were not a member at all in Suriname. The obtained insight in Christian dominance is necessary to analyze the responses by Hindus and Muslims in the following chapter. This is in line with the selected sequential form of the mixed methods design, where the quantitative analyses are followed by the qualitative assessment. Chapter 5 will discuss in depth how Christian dominance and its changes had implications for ‘responses’.

Notes 1 Prior to the indentured laborers from India and Indonesia, there were small numbers of Chinese contract workers in Suriname (Tjon Sie Fat, 2009). 2 Indices summarize demographic data in a single number (Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, 2014), that provide insight in the changes of populations. 3 In 1920s and 1930s, about 50% (15,266) of all Indonesian indentured workers (about 33,000) migrated to Suriname (Derveld, 1982). 4 Official reports on death rates of Javanese people in the 1930s and early 1940s are not reliable. According to these reports Javanese communities had the fewest deaths among the major ethnic groups, while these apparently were a small friction of the real death rates. Lamur (1973, p. 112) explained that under registration of death rates was highly possible as most Javanese

98  Evolution of Christian Dominance









persons lived outside administrative regions in this period. And since there were few numbers of Javanese people (25,000), even the smallest under registration would significantly lower death rates (ibid). 5 This share may be much larger since the traditional religions were not registered as such by the colonial authorities in 1964. Till this year the census office used the term ‘heathens’ to refer to such religious groups. 6 In 1972, almost 93% of Creoles practiced Christianity, while 85% of Javanese people followed the Islam (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2007). 7 Death rates played a minor role in the natural growth of East Indians, which differed slightly from the Creoles between 1946 and 1970 (Lamur, 1973, p. 110). 8 In 1974, 1975, and 1976 the following numbers of emigrants from Suriname were reported, respectively: 17,902, 39,699, and 5,757 (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, n.d.). 9 This group also consists of Maroons with no religion (Appendix 3a). 10 The traditionalists kept on to their religious practices as in Indonesia where they faced to the west, oriented at Mecca, during prayers. The reformists on the contrary believed in praying with the face to the east, since Mecca was located toward the east of Suriname. 11 The name of the organization was aligned to the Muhammadiyyah movement in Indonesia (S, Personal Communication, 12th March 2017). 12 According to this rule only the Reformed Church was allowed in Suriname. In the 1700s other denominations were permitted to establish own branches (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001, pp. 80–81). 13 Most indigenous people were nomads. To spread the gospel, priests conducted church services at different places. This was called the Waka kerki (travelling church) system (Vernooij, 1988, p. 87). 14 Till the early 19th century, the colonial government did not support conversion missions by the Moravian and the Catholic Church. Both denominations were considered inferior to the state religion, which was the Dutch Reformed Church (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001). 15 Christian schools received government subsidies since 1929 (Ramsoedh & Bloemberg, 1995, p. 17), but the lecturers were always paid. 16 There was apparently no legislation which prohibited the access of nonChristians to high status jobs in the government, however, Christians used to be privileged in this sector. 17 Between 1900 and 1930 for instance, the number of East Indians – mostly Hindu – who were baptized in the Catholic church increased from 47 to 169 (Vernooij, 2012). The Moravian baptism rates of East Indians also rose in this period. In the 1900–1910 period, 150 East Indians were baptized, and about 500 between 1900 and 1931 (ibid). 18 This is a music instrument used during cultural and religious performances of Javanese. 19 The meaning of ‘Creole’ has been fluctuating in Suriname between the 18th and the 21st centuries (Menke, 2013). In this study, ‘Creole’ refers to descendants of enslaved people. 20 IRIS also had a representative of the Moravian Church in the early years. But this Christian denomination is no longer a member of IRIS (Marshall, 2007). 21 In this thesis Evangelicals refer to the Evangelical and Pentecostal churches (see Chapter 1). 22 According to estimates of the website of Evangelical churches they have more than 100 congregations in the country (Lilian Pickering Neede, 2009c). However, this number might be outdated. According to Schalkwijk (2004) there were already 200 congregations in 2004. In 2014, the total of Evangelical must have been higher.

Evolution of Christian Dominance 99 23 Schakwijk uses the term ‘new churches’ which refers to Evangelicals. 24 A Muslim informant argued that Javanese west prayers do not belong to a specific Muslim denomination and denied that they are Ahmadiyyas (S, Personal Communication, 7th June 2016). However, scholarly work confirms that west prayers belonged to the Javanese Ahmadiyya movement; they held beliefs in Allah, Prophet Mohamed, Javanese customs, and praying direction to the west (Soeropawiro, 2016). The fact that west prayers no longer identify themselves as Ahmadiyyas should be understood by the fact that they disconnected all ties with the Ahmadiyya movement after the latter was internationally declared to be a non-Islamic group (ibid). This declaration came in 1974 (Paracha, 2013), which was after the census of 1971 in Suriname Javanese Ahmadiyya were already registered. 25 Some Evangelical pastors even discourage interreligious interactions, arguing that these oppose their religious beliefs. ‘We do not encourage our members to participate in the religious celebrations of others’ (S, Personal Communication, August 23rd, 2012). 26 The demographic changes of ‘others’ cannot be compared with that Christians, Hindus, and Muslims because the former includes various small religious groups such Bahai, Rastafarian, Jehova Witness. 27 Triangulation indicates large differences in data sources on the share of Hindus and Muslims among East Indians between 1900 and 1950. According to Omoruyi (1971) for instance the share of Hindus among East Indians fluctuated between 84% in 1917 and 72% in 1946. The Muslim population changed between 16% and 18% in the respective years (ibid). There were thus hardly Christians. But according to Shiwcharan (1990) East Indian Christians also existed. In 1911 there were about 10% Christians among East Indians, which decreased to 7% in 1931 (ibid). Since the sources show that at least 70% of the East Indians was Hindu, this percentage is used as a point of departure. 28 An exception was the early 1910s (Lamur, 1973, p. 61). In this period East Indians had a lower fertility than Blacks probably due to surplus of males which affected a sex ratio that did not favor births (ibid). 29 According to another source this percentage is larger. Between 1917 and 1946, the proportion of Christian East Indians increased from 0.1% to 9.2%, while the share of Hindus declined from 83.3% to 72.3% (Omoruyi, 1971). In this period, unlike the Hindus, the share of Muslims increased from 16.3% to 19.9% (ibid). 30 The absolute decrease is the largest among Hindus (−28,054), followed by Christians (−10,142), and Muslims (−8,453). 31 Not all denominations got subsidies (or salaries) from the state. Those who received were in particular the Anglican and Roman Catholic Church. A law was passed for paying church clergy received £24,657 14s. 2d. in 1847 (Hoyte, 1968, p. 9). 32 Dissenters are Protestants who are not members of the state church. In Great Britain these are Baptists, Methodists, Quakers, and any other ‘Protestant’ group that is not Anglican. They are also called Nonconformists (Woodberry, 2004, p. 9). 33 This need was supported by the colonial government, but due to financial problems serious funding for churches to evangelize East Indians could not be made available till the second half of the 19th century. These problems relate to economic setbacks in Britain between 1836 and 1843, and losses in trade, agriculture, and financial crises in 1845–1846 (Bisnauth, 1993, p. 4). 34 In 1847 for instance a law was passed that granted Christian denominational schools £3,521 9s.2d. (Hoyte, 1968, p. 9).

100  Evolution of Christian Dominance 35 In 1860, the British Colonial Government passed a ‘Heathen Marriage Ordinance No. 10’. But very few Hindu and Muslim marriages were legalized under this ordinance: about 12 between 1860 and 1871 (Khanam & Chickrie, 2009, p. 213). There was legislation for registering Hindu and Muslim marriages called ‘the Immigration Ordinance 1891’, which validated marriages conducted by the magistrates or under the personal law of the religious group (Census of the colony of British Guiana 1946, Part D, 1946, p. XXXVIII). Again, despite the ordinance, few Hindu and Muslim marriages were registered (less than 5% between 1941 and 1945, and 7% in 1946). Both registered and unregistered marriages accounted for 43%, 41%, and 33% of the East Indians in 1911, 1921 and 1931, and 1946, respectively. The lack of legalization of Hindu and Muslims marriages resulted in the loss of properties of these two religious groups to the colonial government, since children could not prove to be the legal offspring of passed away parents. 36 In 1925, Evangelicals received EC$25 monthly (Schalkwijk, 2011, p. 312). 37 Omoruyi (1971) reports a higher conversion rate (10%) of East Indians in the first half of the 20th century. But his records are not used. For purposes of triangulation, the statistics by Schalkwijk are referred to. He has made comparative analyses of Suriname, Guyana, Trinidad, and Tobago by using by and large similar quantitative methods. 38 The category ‘others’ has the highest; growth ratio; 2,840 in Suriname and 6,031 in Guyana. But this religious group in the two nations cannot be compared as it comprises of various small religious groups such as Bahai’s, Rastafarians, Buddhists, and Jehova Witness followers. 39 Illustrative is the criticism of Kielstra to Christian members of Parliament during the debates of the Hindu and Muslim marriage law in the late 1930s. He said that these members considered East Indian and Javanese communities as inferior, because of their inability to imagine the existence of other cultures except for the Europeans (Ramsoedh, 1990, pp. 128–129).

5

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations in Suriname and Guyana

5.1  Responses to Christian Dominance in Suriname In the conceptual framework, it is assumed that ‘responses’ by subordinate groups aim at reducing religious dominance. ‘Responses’ have an ideological and institutional dimension that might be influenced by government policies, religious leadership, private religious institutions, and religious demography. By applying the concepts of ideological and institutional ‘responses’, this section examines whether and how ‘responses’ attained the aim of reducing religious dominance in Suriname. Finally, this section looks at the influence of ‘responses’ on interreligious relations. 5.1.1  ‘Responses’ 1900–1950 The analyses of the 1900–1950 period pointed at the importance to distinguish between joint and separate responses of Hindus and Muslims to dominance of traditional Christians in Suriname. The joint ‘responses’ regarded education, a sphere that was critical for upward social mobility. Christians, as explained in Chapter 4, owned many state-subsidized denominational schools that were used to convert non-Christian children. Particularly, Catholic schools made converts among East Indians between1 1910 and 1920 (Vernooij, 2012). The joint Hindu and Muslim institutional and ideological ‘responses’ in education aimed at reducing this dominance in schools. Their ‘responses’ occurred under the leadership of Bharat Oeday, an organization representing Hindu and Muslim indentured workers. 2 This organization strived for the rights of these workers and consisted of influential Hindu leaders such as J. Hira Singh and Rampersad Sukul Gosain (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001, p. 255) and Muslim exponents like Ahmad Khan (Chickrie, 2011). An important joint Hindu and Muslim ideological ‘response’ through Bharat Oeday was the strengthening of critical awareness against Christian schools among East Indians. Bharat Oeday was critical about conversion through education. It for instance discouraged parents to send children to private Christian schools. In 1927, Bharat Oeday distributed flyers calling East Indian parents to remove their children from DOI: 10.4324/9781003179269-5

102  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations Catholic schools and to be aware of how sweets, pictures, and clothes were used for conversion (ibid, p. 260). There were joint institutional ‘responses’ by Hindus and Muslims in education by sending letters to the colonial government requesting more public schools (ibid). These letters were sent by Bharat Oeday. Public schools were religiously neutral and hence not considered a threat to the own religion. To enlarge the social support for their institutional ‘responses’, leaders of Bharat Oeday held meetings with common East Indians. Illustrative is a meeting on 31st July 1927, where these leaders read the letters sent to the colonial government with requests for public schools. This meeting was held from 10.00 to 13.30 and attended by about 750 East Indians (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001, p. 259). With these activities, Bharat Oeday distinguished itself as an organization that provided a platform for Hindus and Muslims to develop a critical thinking and conduct practices to reduce Christian dominance. In addition to education, joint institutional ‘responses’ by Hindus and Muslims also regarded the legalization of their marriages. Until 1940 their marriages had an illegal status which created many inheritance problems. Requests for a Hindu and Muslim marriage law existed already in the 1910s (de Klerk, 1998, p. 175). In 1930, Bharat Oeday appealed for this law arguing that these were already legalized in Demerara, the neighboring western district in Guyana (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001, p. 322). These appeals were ignored till the 1930s during the rule by governor Kielstra. During the debates of the marriage law in the late 1930s, he acknowledged that East Indians and Javanese persons often asked for recognizing their marriages (Ramsoedh, 1990). But he finally passed the Hindu and Muslim marriage law in 1940 as part of his policy of representing cultural diversity in public sectors (ibid). The separate institutional ‘responses’ by Hindus and Muslims dealt with education and social welfare services. Hindus ‘responded’ institutionally more than Muslims. The Hindu denomination Arya Dewaker founded a private school in Nickerie (1934), and an orphanage in Paramaribo (1933) (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001). Such institutions by Muslims were not established yet. A possible explanation for the more institutional ‘responses’ of Hindus than Muslims is the religious leadership. Arya Dewaker applied a missionary approach to Hindus and Muslims (Bal & Sinha-Kerkhoff, 2007) and it sought to reduce the influence of Christianity on Hindus. The basic idea was ‘to criticise other religions and present itself as the true way of life’ (ibid, p. 22). Arya Dewaker was able to attract and bring forth conservative members, including from Bharat Oeday (Bal & Sinha-Kerkhoff, 2007). This means that by influencing Hindu leaders from Bharat Oeday, Arya Dewaker managed to profit from their experiences with ‘responses’ and enhance the own role in ‘responses’. The Muslims of Javanese origin had a few organizations, but so far a missionary approach toward others was not reported. Tjintoko Muljo, founded in 1918 (Towikromo, 1997),

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  103 was a secular organization consisting of members who split from Bharat Oeday (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001). There was also the organization Perkumpulan Islam Indonesie, established in 1932 (Towikromo, 1997). Another possible explanation for the fewer institutional ‘responses’ by Muslims deals with the timing of institutionalization of religious groups. The majority of Muslims, the Javanese people, migrated much later (1980– 1939) than the predominantly East Indian Hindu (1873–1917) in Suriname. This might explain why one of the responding organizations of Javanese Muslims, the Pergarakan Bangsa Indonesia (PBIS), was established much later. It was founded in 1947 (Sedney, 2010). PBIS wrote letters on behalf of the Javanese Muslims to the governor requesting public schools and subsidies for Muslim religious leaders (Breunissen & Hardjo, 2001, p. 42). But these ‘responses’ came later than that of Hindus. Arya Dewaker sent letters to the colonial government for subsidies to orphanages, religious leaders, and the own organization (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001).3 Muslims had fewer institutional ‘responses’ than Hindus in the 1900– 1950 period, however, the former group established institutions that contributed to ‘responses’ between 1950 and 2014. Their institutions were differentiated by religious denomination and ethnicity. Muslims of East Indian origin were represented by the Surinaamse Islamitische Vereniging (SIV). They believed that Mohammed was the last prophet. However, controversy emerged within SIV when Maulana Ameerali of Trinidad visited Suriname in 1934 (Bakker, 2002). He introduced the principles of a new theological school, the Ahmadiyya Movement that considers Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a reformer in the Islam. This theological difference in SIV led to the division between the Sunnis and Ahmadiyyas. The former accuses for taking Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as the final prophet, while the latter denies that (‘Al is de leugen nog zo snel, de waarheid (Al Haq) achterhaalt hem wel’, 1975, pp. 5–6). Ahmadiyyas argue that they follow principles of Mirza as long as these do not conflict with the Quran. Sunnis organized themselves in Khilafat Anjuman (1931), Anwar Islam (1931), and Hidayat Islam (1932) (Prins, 1961). In 1950, a Muslim leader from Pakistan encouraged Sunnis to bring various Sunni organizations together and organize themselves further. Consequently, various organizations including Khilafat Anjuman merged in de Surinaamse Moeslim Associatie (SMA) in 1950. Sunni and Ahmadiyya leaders had severe theological debates which often led to frictions within families (Surinaamse Moeslim Associatie, 2000). In their struggles, both denominations attempted to strengthen their institutions by building mosques, providing religious lectures, publishing books, and magazines. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Muslims of Javanese origin were divided in two main groups: ‘west prayers’ and ‘east prayers’. The former are traditionalists who kept on to their religious practices as in Indonesia where they faced to the west, oriented at Mecca, during prayers. The east prayers are reformists who believed in praying with the face to the east, since Mecca was located toward the east of Suriname. Later east

104  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations prayers established the Stichting Islamistische Gemeente Suriname (SIS) in the 1970s, which played a critical role in ‘responses’. Between 1900 and 1950, some joint ideological ‘responses’ of Hindus and Muslims raised critical awareness against Christian missionary work. Illustrative is the removal of East Indian children by parents from a Catholic school in 1927 after being urged for this by Bharat Oeday. The parents followed the recommendation as they removed their children from Catholic schools in various areas: Kwatta (112 children), Livorno (167 children), Kroonenburg (75 children), Bradimofo (55 children), Welgedacht C (117 children), and Antionogron (155 children). Bharat Oeday asked the government to admit these children on public schools, which had to be founded preferably in the own neighborhood (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001, pp. 258–259). The removal of the children by the parents indicated the influence of ideological ‘responses’ on enhancing the critical religious awareness against Christian dominance. Apparently, such awareness may also explain why conversion of Hindus and Muslims to Christianity was small (1%) between 1900 and 1950 (Jan M. W. Schalkwijk, 2011). From 1900 to 1950, the institutional ‘responses’ did not reduce dominance of traditional Christians as regards public resources. This was reflected in the colonial government’s refusal to reject the repeated requests of Hindu and Muslim organizations to grant subsidies to their religious leaders, organizations, schools, and orphanages. These subsidies were requested by religious institutions such as Arya Dewaker, and some members of Parliament. The colonial government rejected the requests for subsidies for Arya Dewaker arguing that this organization did not have the ‘historical rights’ as Christian institutions (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001, p. 273). Another argument was that Hindu and Muslim organizations were not legally recognized as religious organizations. In terms of legal individuality, they were an association, while according to the law only state recognized religious denominations could receive subsidies (ibid). The government’s refusal to enlarge access of Hindus and Muslims to public resources should be understood within the context of political decision-making power. This power enabled subordinate groups to change government policies that favored ruling groups. In Suriname, the political decision-making power between 1900 and 1950 was in the hands of Christians who privileged their own institutions with government resources, in particular subsidies. However, this was not always the case. In some instances, Christians even utilized their political decision-making power for ‘responses’. An important example was the advocacy by Biswamitre, a Catholic Member of Parliament, for subsidies for Arya Dewaker. Together with Rambaran Mishre, who was Hindu, Biswamitre appealed for providing financial support to Hindu organizations as was the case with Christians (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001). The participation of Biswamitre as a Catholic in ‘responses’ could not be understood by the conceptual framework, since Catholics were considered a dominant Christian

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  105 denomination. However, ethnicity was an explanatory factor. Biswamitre shared the same ethnic background, East Indian, like the Hindu majority. Here the influence of ethnicity most likely prevailed over religion in the respective ‘response’ by Hindus. The case of Biswamitre showed that ethnicity could be a more important factor than religion in explaining the influence of political decision-making power on ‘responses’. The access of Hindus and Muslims to this power changed in the course of time. As explained in Chapter 3, based on turning points in this access ‘responses’ are analyzed between 1950–1979, 1980–1989, and 1990–2014. 5.1.2  ‘Responses’ 1950–1979 Institutional ‘responses’ hardly reduced the dominance of traditional Christians in the 1900–1950 period. This was primarily reflected in the refusal of the colonial government to provide subsidies to Hindu and Muslim institutions, while giving these to Christian organizations. It was observed before in the conceptual framework (Chapter 2) that to reduce religious dominance, ‘responses’ require political decision-making power by subordinate groups. This power might be utilized for changing government policies. In the 1950–1979 subperiod, Hindus and Muslims were first represented in the coalition and thus increased their access to political decision-making power. This section examines Hindu and Muslim responses to dominance of traditional Christians between 1950 and 1979 with emphasis on the influence of their increased political decision-making power on government policies. But first the influence of religious leadership, private religious institutions, and spatial distribution on ‘responses’ will be explained. Like the 1900–1950 period, between 1950 and 1979 there were also joint and separate Hindu and Muslim responses to the dominance of traditional Christians. Their ‘responses’ were both ideological and institutional. The separate ideological responses of Hindus and Muslims were by and large similar. However, their institutional responses differed. Between 1950 and 1979, an important common ideological ‘response’ of Hindus and Muslims was the providing of informal religious teachings to prevent Christian conversion among their members, a process strongly influenced by religious leadership. 5.1.2.1  Religious Leadership Hindu and Muslim religious leaders in Suriname had more or less the same strategy of ideological ‘responses’ between 1950 and 1979. Both talked about the importance of the own religious ideals with individual members, and during lectures and religious services. In the 1950s, Muslim leaders from Pakistan visited the SMA, a predominant East Indian Muslim institution. During their visits, the leaders emphasized the need for formal Muslim schools in Suriname (M, Personal Communication, September 11th, 2013).

106  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations They stated that these schools were necessary to socialize children according to the own religious beliefs. The foreign Muslim leaders criticized Christian beliefs in public lectures by saying that Jesus Christ was not a prophet. He was a human buried on earth, and the last prophet was Mohamed (B, Personal Communication, August 29th, 2010). Local Muslim religious leaders also attempted to strengthen the critical religious awareness among common people by explaining the value of the own religion in depth. Illustrative is the following case in the 1950s. A young Muslim man wanted to become a Christian, after being convinced for this by Christian missionaries. But conversion was discouraged by the father-in-law who was a Muslim religious leader. He explained the content and strengths of the Islam and the necessity of knowing the own religion first before accepting another one (B, Personal Communication, September 10th, 2010). Many Muslim informants stated that their elders taught singing, praying, writing, and reading of the own sacred languages. Muslim parents raised the critical awareness among their children against Christianity. A clear example is given by a Muslim informant who went to a Catholic school in the late 1940s: I had made a crib at school brought it home. I was very enthusiastic about it. I had to finish it. I had to collect some moss from the forest. But when I came home, my father strongly criticized the crib. He said: ‘what is this daughter? Please come here. This belongs to Christians. Go and throw it away. It is not Islamic; we do not believe in it’. We were not allowed to believe in it. (R, Personal Communication, March 25th, 2012) In the above-mentioned case, the father of the Muslim informant emphasized that Christian attributes were not part of Islam, and that these were not supposed to be kept at home. He made clear that the crib, which was a Christian attribute, did not belong to the Islam and therefore had to be thrown in the gutter. This reflected an ideological ‘response’ in terms of critical religious awareness. Like Muslims, Hindu religious leaders also ‘responded’ ideologically through informal education. They for instance urged members to think about and believe in a higher purpose of being born as a Hindu. A Hindu informant explained that her father, who was a religious leader, used to say to families that when God wanted someone to be Christian, he/she would not be born in a Hindu family. Therefore, someone being born as a Hindu should have a purpose (R, Personal Communication, September 10th, 2010). In this way the Hindu leader attempted to make members accept their own Hindu religion rather than convert to Christianity. Hindus had more institutional ‘responses’ than Muslims in formal education from 1950 to 1979. Hindus had a higher ratio (0.23) of private

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  107 Table 5.1  ‘Responses’ in Formal Education Suriname 1950–1979

Religious Group

Denomination

Hindu

Arya Samaj Sanatan Dharma Total Hindu Ahmadiyya Sunni Total Muslim

Muslim

Number Denominational Schools 11 15 26 1 7 8

Ratio per 1000 0,53 0,17 0,23 0,03 0,42 0,11

Source: Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek (1971), Hanafi (2002), Hu-Ramdas (2013), Surinaamse Moeslim Associatie (2000), and V, Personal Communication, September 4th, 2015. Compiled by author based on the census of 1971, as this firstly registered Hindu and Muslim denominations.

denominational schools than Muslims (0.11). The former religious group established 26 schools, while the latter founded 8 schools (Table 5.1). At the subgroup level of Hindus and Muslims, the smaller denominations among both religious groups had a higher ratio of schools. In the case of Hindus, Arya Samaj had a ratio of 0,53 of schools, while Sanatan Dharma had 0,17 per 1000 members. As regards Muslims, the ratio of schools owned by the Sunni denomination was higher (0,42) than of the Ahmadiyya (0,03). Religious leadership may explain the higher ratio of Arya Samaji than Sanatan denominational schools between 1950 and 1979. The former had a strong focus on education in the early 20th century. Arya Samaj attempted to spread its religious views (Bal & Sinha-Kerkhoff, 2007). This focus still existed in the 1960s, and became practical actions with support of government studies to Hindu and Muslim schools (S, Personal Communication, June 5th, 2016). According to an Arya Samaji informant, the difference with the Sanatan Dharma was that this denomination had a larger drive to found schools (ibid). This was reflected in the regular discussions on education during Arya Samaj boardmeetings (ibid). According to the informant Sanatanists dealt more with pujas, religious services, at home (ibid). Religious leadership is also a possible explanation for the higher ratio of Sunni than Ahmadiyya denominational schools. There were two groups of Sunnis: the East Indian and Javanese. The latter had a higher ratio of denominational schools (1,57) than the former (0,21). The denominational schools of Javanese Muslims were established by the Stichting der Islamitische Gemeenten in Suriname (SIS), while schools of the East Indians were founded by the Surinaamse Moeslim Associatie (SMA). In both religious organizations religious leaders emphasized the need for own denominational schools and breaking reliance on Christian schools where their children were often converted. A former board member of the SIS explained that when the SIS was founded in 1971, the establishment of own schools was an important objective (V, Personal Communication,

108  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations September 4th, 2015). The SMA was visited by foreign Islamic leaders, who encouraged the local leaders and followers to found own formal educational institutions. They raised awareness about the hindrance of Christian education for the own religious identity and the need for religious guidance for children through own schools (G, Personal Communication, July 31st, 2012). These statements were made in speeches during mosque services. And after mosque services, the Muslim community discussed the necessity of building an own school, so children did not have to go to the Catholic or Moravian school in the neighborhoods (ibid). 5.1.2.2  Private Religious Institutions The separate institutional ‘responses’ of Hindus and Muslims in formal education were influenced by their private religious institutions. As conceptualized in Chapter 2 these institutions provided the material, human, and financial resources to establish institutions at the meso level. Hindu and Muslim organizations mobilized these three resources for establishing denominational schools. Illustrative is the building of Shri Vishnu school by the Sanatanists (K, Personal Communication, January 30th, 2014) and the Ansari school by the East Indian Sunnis (Surinaamse Moeslim Associatie, 2000). To establish the Vishnu school, a board member of the Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha took a loan from bank by mortgaging his own house (K, Personal Communication, January 30th, 2014). There were also donations from wealthy members of Sanatan Dharma like Karaibdjitsing, an entrepreneur who owned cinemas (ibid). The following statements illustrate the establishment of the Vishnu school as a response to Christian dominance: We collected money. We paid home visits. East Indians donated rice which was sold for fundraising. Baba Raja also did a donation to assist with the building of the school. The land was already owned by Sanatan Dharma. Shri Vishnuschool played an important role in the emancipation of the East Indians. We believed that we had to develop our own identity. Because as Moravian and Catholic secondary schools existed, Hindu secondary schools had also to be possible (…). (Cited in Hu-Ramdas, 2013, p. 24, translated by author) The mobilization and coordination of activities of the Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha to establish the Vishnu school show the influence of private religious institutions in institutional ‘responses’. Private religious institutions were also important in founding Arya Samaj denominational schools. Various religious leaders of Arya Samaj first made small branches of existing schools, and when enough children were admitted there, they became autonomous schools in the 1960s and 1970s (Hu-Ramdas, 2013). The establishment of these branches was influenced

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  109 by the provision of material resources that were collected by the organization of Arya Samaj, the Arya Dewaker. The latter was a private religious institution. An impact of private religious institutions on separate institutional ‘responses’ in education was also observed among Muslims of East Indian and Javanese descent. The Ansari school was built with donations from wealthy members of SMA. Land was donated by families related to SMA. Significant donations came from Islam Ramdjan, head of this body and an influential politician. He owned many slaughterhouses.4 In the case of the Javanese Muslims, the SIS also utilized manpower, own financial resources, and donations to build their schools such as the Nabawi school in Paramaribo in the early 1970s. This school was annexed to the building of the Nabawi mosque. A Javanese Muslim informant explained that members of this mosque built the Nabawi school (V, Personal Communication, September 4th, 2015). They had a collection box called ‘Amalbox’, where people donated money after the sermons. The donations were used to buy materials such as wood for building the school (ibid). Not only in Paramaribo, but also in Commewijne the SIS built a school with own human and financial resources. In 1973, the SIS formally requested the district commissioner to fundraise in the district in order to build a primary school (‘De S.I.S. in Commewijne’, 1973). This was approved, and with acquired funds the respective school was established. 5.1.2.3  Spatial Distribution Religious leadership and private religious institutions were not the only factors influencing separate institutional ‘responses’. Spatial distribution also played a role. Arya Samaj established denominational schools in areas with large numbers of East Indians and Hindus (S, Personal Communication, June 5th, 2016). Illustrative is the founding of Arya Samaji denominational schools in Meerzorg, a resort in the district Commewijne. This area only had a primary government school before the 1970s. Most children of East Indian descent did not have the finances to attend secondary schools in the city of Paramaribo and could not study further. When government subsidies were granted to Hindu schools, exponents of the Arya Samaji community in Meerzorg advocated the founding of secondary schools (ibid). This was supported by the board of Arya Dewaker and with the help of various local persons two secondary schools were built (ibid). Another example of the influence of spatial distribution on institutional ‘responses’ was the founding of denominational schools by Javanese Sunnis. According to a Javanese Muslim, SIS encouraged the founding of own schools for Javanese children in remote rural areas where often only Catholic and Moravians schools existed (K, Personal Communication, September 4th, 2015).

110  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations Yes, look, the children of the districts often had to go to the orphanages in the city for further education. These orphanages were owned by Christians. And then you can understand what happened. You had to learn their religious principles and the own religion was lost. Welleducated children turned their back to the own religion, resulting in big problems within families. Founding own schools was a simple way to deal with this. (K, Personal Communication, September 4th, 2015, translated by author) The founder of SIS itself, Amir Siregar, 5 established a SIS school in Moengo, which is located in the eastern district Marowijne (V, Personal Communication, September 4th, 2015). This area had a concentration of Javanese people who worked for the bauxite company Suralco. In addition to Marowijne, SIS schools were founded in the districts of Commewijne and Para. Not only denominational schools, but the founding of orphanages also illustrated the role of spatial distribution. Illustrative was the establishment of the Ansari orphanage by the SMA in the neighborhood of Abrabroki in 1972. As a Muslim informant explained: We saw that the orphanage was critical in society. Most nonChristian children depended on the Saron orphanage (author: a Moravian orphanage in Abrabroki) to go to the school, and hence were subjected to Christianization. You should understand that at that time people were not rich. There were some families with many children and they could not afford education. So some parents sent their few children to the orphanage, while others stayed with them. We built an orphanage so our children can stay here and get education without conversion. (M, Personal Communication, September 11th, 2013) As the above cited Muslim informant explained, many children who wanted to study in the city relied on the Christian orphanages where they were socialized in Christian beliefs. A Muslim orphanage was needed to break with the reliance on Christian orphanages. Here the role of spatial distribution is observed. The orphanage was founded in the city because of the presence of many Muslim children for educational facilities. 5.1.2.4  Political Decision-Making Power The joint institutional and ideological ‘responses’ by Hindus and Muslims specifically aimed at reducing Christian dominance in government policies. Between 1950 and 1979, these joint ‘responses’ reached a turning point as for the first time in history, laws were made that granted Hindus and Muslims subsidies and public holidays. Furthermore, laws were adjusted for

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  111 enabling cremation by Hindus. These laws were a result of the significant increased political decision-making power of both Hindus and Muslims. To understand this influence of this power on the joint ‘responses’, it is first explained how both religious groups increased their political decisionmaking power. The interaction between religion and ethnicity will receive attention. As was mentioned before, ethnicity could prevail over religion in the utilization of political decision-making power for ‘responses’. This was the case between 1900 and 1950 when a Christian and Hindu Member of Parliament advocated subsidies for Hindu organizations. This act of the Christian member was explained by the fact that he and most Hindus shared the same ethnic – East Indian – background. His participation in the ‘response’ was not only influenced by the political decision-making power of subordinate religious groups, but by the power of subordinate ethnic groups. 5.1.2.4.1  CONTEXT OF DECOLONIZATION STRUGGLES

Between 1950 and 1979, there were struggles for political decision-making power by various subordinate groups which occurred in a larger context of decolonization. These subordinate groups, with different ethnic and religious backgrounds, aimed at breaking with their inferior social status assigned by colonial powers. In 1950, the largest ethnic subordinate groups were the Creoles, East Indians, and Javanese. They made up 36%, 31%, and 18% of the population, respectively (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statisiek, 2005). In the attempt to improve the social status during decolonization, subordinate groups had non-political6 and political movements. The founding of political movements of subordinate groups was influenced by the introduction of universal suffrage (1948) and political power sharing practices. This universal suffrage enabled the participation of Hindus and Muslims in elections (Sedney, 2010). But their electoral victory was largely influenced by practices of political power-sharing. This was a complex process in which religion and ethnicity intertwined; a process that started already during the founding of political parties. 5.1.2.4.2  RELIGION AND ETHNICITY IN POLITICAL PARTIES

The first political parties were founded along ethnic and religious lines (Adama, 2005; Sedney, 2010). The religious differentiation also had an influence on political organizations. There were political parties consisting of mainly Hindus and Muslims. But among Hindus, the Sanatanists were organized in the Hindoe Partij (1947), while Arya Samaj was represented by Javanese persons in the Hindostaanse-Javaanse Politieke Partij (HJPP) (1947) (Bakker, 1999; Sedney, 2010). East Indian Muslims of the Sunni denomination established the Muslim Partij (1946). The Javanese Muslims founded the Kaum Tani Persatuan Indonesia (KTPI)7 and the Pergarakan

112  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations Bangsa Indonesia (PBIS) in 1947 (Sedney, 2010). Both parties were run by traditionalist and reformist Javanese Muslims, respectively (Dew, 1978). Important Creole parties were the Nationale Partij Suriname (NPS) and the Progressieve Surinaamse Volkspartij (PSV).8 NPS predominantly consisted of Creoles with a Moravian background and who practiced traditional religions (Blanksma, 2006). The PSV was mainly Catholic. The impact of ethnicity and religion in political parties was reflected in political campaigning and organizational structure. Political parties made sure that they had representatives of particular ethnic and religious groups to expand the electoral support. As regards religion, political organizations built alliances with religious organizations and their leaders. This was due to the benefits of religious organizations. Prior to the founding of political parties, East Indian and Javanese groups were already religiously well organized. They were sustained with ‘the commitment of members to the association and the loyalty to collective interests’ (ibid). In Adama’s view (2005, p. 45), this structure of religious organizations could easily be used for political organizations. The transition from religion to politics ensured the maintenance of this commitment. It meant that members kept their loyalty to the political organization and its hierarchy of leaders (religious and political) and followers. The VHP was a major political party where religion and ethnicity intertwined in political campaigning and organizational structure. Ethnicity was various times more important than religion in political campaigning. Illustrative was the name of the party, VHP referred to Verenigde Hindostaanse Partij, the United East Indian Party, in 1946 (Sedney, 2010, p. 186).9 It was a fusion of small predominant East Indian parties with different religious affiliations: the Muslim Partij, the Hindoe Partij, and the Hindostaanse-Javaanse Politieke Partij. The VHP was established to acquire more political seats within the electoral system. Due to these shared interests predominant East Indian political parties preferred to unite on the basis of a common ethnicity rather than religion. After ethnicity was dealt with, religion was import in the selection of people for the party council of VHP. The following ratio was applied: ten Hindus (both Sanatan and Arya Samaji), five Muslims, four Christians (Protestants and Catholics), and two other religions (Dew, 1978, p. 75). The representation and treatment of religious groups and their denominations in political parties influenced political power struggles of a party. The VHP faced various such struggles after imbalances in the party council ratio and religious disputes. In the late 1940s and 1950s, many religious disputes emerged within VHP that made East Indian Muslims leave this political party (Dew, 1978). In the early 1950s, the VHP was accused of not keeping its word about Muslims representation in the party council. Officially, there had to be two Muslims in the council (one Sunni and one Ahmadiyya), but in practice there was only one. This created political tensions, which peaked in 1951 when the VHP changed its name to the United

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  113 Hindu Party (ibid). In VHP, tensions were not only related to differences between Hindus and Muslims, but also among Muslims. A Muslim informant mentioned that the VHP politically favored the Ahmadiyyas over the Sunnis with candidate seats in Parliament. This made a significant number of Sunnis leave the VHP and join the Creole Christian party NPS, who offered them these seats (S, Personal Communication, July 20th, 2012; M, Personal Communication, September 11th, 2013). In certain cases, celebrations of religious festivities by religious organizations were used in political campaigning. Illustrative is a march during the Islamic festival Eid Miladun Nabi in the 1970s. This march was organized by the SMA, and included members of NPS and VHP in the 1970s. But a VHP related SMA leader used the Eid Miladun Nabi march to express the own electoral support in the 1970s. This infuriated the participating members who were affiliated to the NPS, as they were unaware of the political motive of the march. The following statement clarifies this incident: All people with different political affiliations cooperated, but one was in charge for the Eid Miladun Nabi (author: birthday of the Islamic prophet Mohammed) parade. It was election time and the night before the elections we had this parade. Instead of taking the parade from SMA yard to another mosque, the person in charge took the parade to a spot where political campaigns were held: Olifant (author: VHP compound). So you can imagine how this infuriated the participants of the parade who were mostly affiliated to the NPS. The person in charge wanted to show the head of the VHP how many supporters he had by bringing the parade to the campaigns. (M, Personal Communication, July 24th, 2013) Whereas in VHP, ethnicity prevailed over religion in political power struggles, in other parties like the NPS the opposite was observed. In 1967, the Sunni member Islam Ramdjan,10 head of the SMA, left the VHP and joined the Creole and Moravian dominated party NPS (Sewpersad, 1973).11 According to a Hindu informant, a reason why Ramdjan left the VHP dealt with an incident at the SMA mosque, where the VHP leader expressed the preference of Hindus over Muslims (R, Personal Communication, July 21st, 2013). Ramdjan once invited Lachman, the VHP leader who was Hindu, for an Islamic festival in the SMA mosque in Abrabroki. But Lachman did not come to this festival, which according to the informant made Ramdjan angry and he joined the NPS. He became a Member of Parliament. This case illustrated how religious differences prevailed over ethnicity in political power struggles of Muslims in the VHP. Religion and ethnicity also interacted in Javanese political parties, but unlike East Indians this interaction did not result in an ‘umbrella’ political party as the VHP. The main Javanese political parties, KTPI and PBIS, remained divided in the 1950s. The KTPI focused on the traditionalists

114  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations or ‘west prayers’ and aimed at returning to Indonesia. PBIS, on the contrary, included mostly reformists including ‘west prayers’, ‘east prayers’, and Christians. It focused on improvement of the social, political, and economic conditions of Javanese people in Suriname (Breunissen & Hardjo, 2001, pp. 37, 54). KTPI and PBIS had severe conflicts in the 1950s (Wengen, 1965). They did not participate in each other’s religious ceremonies and even had violent tensions. 5.1.2.4.3  POLITICAL POWER SHARING

After explaining the background of political parties, now the political power sharing practices are addressed. Cooperation between political parties that represented Hindus and Muslims, enabled these two religious groups to hold political office. Between 1960 and 1979, the major cooperating political parties were the NPS, VHP, and KTPI. Important small political parties that played a role in the political cooperation practices were the Hindostaanse Progressieve Partij (HPP, split from VHP), Actiegroep (split from VHP), Sarikat Rakjat Suriname (SRI, split from KTPI), Surinaamse Democratische Partij (SDP, split from NPS), Progressieve Nationale Partij (PNP, split from NPS), Partij Suriname (PS, split from NPS).12 Between 1955 and 1979, political cooperation practices resulted in coalitions (Table 5.2) with Hindu and/or Muslim exponents. Political power sharing practices differed by administration between 1950 and 1979. The most favorable administrations where these practices provided Hindus and Muslims political decision-making power were those of 1958, 1963, and 1969. During these administrations, East Indian and Javanese people altogether had the largest number of Ministers (14) (Table 5.3). Differences existed between the administration of 1958 and 1963 and that of 1969. During the 1958–1963 administration, political power was shared between the ruling parties VHP and NPS under the umbrella of Table 5.2  Administrations13 Suriname 1950–1979 Period

Administration

1951–1955 1955–1958

NPS Eenheidsfront: SDP, PSV, PS, KTPI NPS, VHP, PSV NPS, VHP, PSV, KTPI NPS, SDP, Actiegroep VHP-block: VHP, Actiegroep, SRI PNP-block: PNP, KTPI, PSV, PBP NPK: NPS, PNR, PSV, KTPI NPK: NPS, HPP, PSV, KTPI

1958–1963 1963–1967 1967–1969 1969–1973 1973–1977 1977–1980

Source: Menke (2015) and Sedney (2010).

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  115 Table 5.3  Ministers by Ethnicity in Suriname 1949–1979 Ethnicity

1949–1958

1958–1969

1969–1973

1973–1979

46 4 0 0 50

30 6 1 0 37

6 6 1 1 14

23 2 4 0 29

Creole East Indian Javanese Other Total Source: Menke (2015).

verbroederingspolitiek (fraternization). This was a political strategy that at the outset was meant to illustrate peace and harmony between two different cultural groups in Suriname: East Indians and Creoles. But in essence, the verbroederingspolitiek was meant to sustain the political power of the leaders of VHP and NPS within an electoral system that did not favor them electoral victory as a single political party (Sedney, 2010). The verbroederingspolitiek illustrates Lijphart’s consociationalism, the ability of governments with elites of various cultural groups that advocate the interests of their groups based on mutual cooperation and negotiation (Lijphart, 1969, p. 216). Consociationalism includes a system where multiple political parties participate in elections using the secret ballot voting method, the proportional electoral system and coalition formation, and cooperation between political parties that are aligned along ethnic lines (Menke, 2008, p. 30). Consociationalism emerged already after the first elections in 1949 with the practices of ethnic political mobilization and voting behavior (ibid). Ethnicity thus played a major role. In political campaigning, political parties used ethnic prejudices, fears, and groups interests to increase the own electoral support (ibid). The sustainability of consociationalism requires two things. First is the awareness of leaders of political parties that situations can worsen into ethnic conflicts in the country. Second is the necessity of political elites to negotiate and compromise with each other in political cooperation due to this awareness (ibid). The verbroederingspolitiek was discontinued in 1966 (Sedney, 2010). However, political power sharing between the VHP and PNP block still enabled Hindus and Muslims to form the coalition in 1969. This administration also took advantage from changes in the electoral system (ibid). During the 1973–1979 administration, political power sharing did not result in Hindus and East Indian Muslims to hold political office. In this period the NPK government led by the NPS did not want to cooperate with the VHP, as it felt betrayed by the East Indians in politics (Meel, 2014). There were attempts of the VHP to reactivate the Verbroederingspolitiek principles with the NPS in 1969, however, these failed as the latter had feelings of being betrayed by VHP and the Actiegroep in the 1958–1963 period. The NPS did not support the Verbroederingspolitiek (ibid), which hindered consociationalism between 1973 and 1979. This in its turn resulted in

116  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations limited political decision-making power of Hindus and Muslims. There were in total six East Indians and Javanese ministers. When Hindus and Muslims had more access to political decisionmaking power (1958–1973), they also had more joint ‘responses’. Between 1950 and 1958, there was only one ‘response’: subsidies to Hindu and Muslim organizations and orphanages (1953), while from 1958 to 1973 three ‘responses’ emerged: government subsidies to denominational schools (1963), cremation law (1969), and Hindu and Muslim holidays (1970). These ‘responses’ are described and explained in a chronological order in the following section. 5.1.2.5  Government Subsidies Laws passed on subsidies to Hindu and Muslims institutions in the 1950s seemed to be a result of political advocacy rather than political rule of these two religious groups. Subsidies by the government to Hindu and Muslim organizations were legally approved in 1950 (Dew, 1978), while their orphanages began to receive governmental financial support in 1953 (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001; Hu-Ramdas, 2013). In these years Hindus and Muslims (VHP/KTPI) did not hold political office, however, they were largely represented in the Staten van Suriname. There were 21 persons including seven East Indians and one Javanese.14 Hindus and Muslims, thus, made up about 40% in Parliament. In 1950, they voted for the law on subsidies to Hindu and Muslim organizations (Dew, 1978, p. 89). Here the joint institutional ‘response’ is noticed. According to the respective law, both religious groups would be subsidized in the same way as Moravian and Catholic organizations. A Hindu informant argued that individual members lobbied for the subsidies in Parliament (then de Staten van Suriname). One was a board member of Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha, Kanhai. He was not only a Member of Parliament from the VHP but also a close friend of Pengel, an influential member in NPS. According to the informant, Kanhai stated that Christians had ‘a lot of things done’, while Hindus and Muslims not. As a result, Pengel supported the decision to subsidize Hindu and Muslim organizations (K, Personal Communication, January 30th, 2014). The Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha seemed to receive the largest amount of subsidies: Sf. (Surinamese florins) 7500 yearly (ibid). The Arya Dewaker received Sf. 4500 annually (Arya Dewaker, 1979, p. 22). In 1953, there was only one Hindu orphanage, Swami Dayanand, run by Arya Dewaker (Hu-Ramdas, 2013).15 It received Sf. 2000 (ibid) on an annual basis. Muslims had no denominational orphanages in the early 1950s. State subsidies were granted to Hindu and Muslim schools when the VHP and KTPI held political office in 1963. A law was passed (Gouvernementsblad van Suriname, 1963), which stated that the government would pay the salaries of teachers and the costs of study material.

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  117 The maintenance of the school had to be done by the religious organization itself (K, Personal Communication, January 30th, 2014). Subsidies enabled the maintenance of schools, which was an important explanation for the rising number of Hindu and Muslims schools between 1950 and 1979. In this period, 25 Hindu schools were built of which 15 were run by the Sanatan Dharma and 10 by Arya Dewaker. The Muslims founded four denominational schools (Surinaamse Moeslim Associatie, 2000). Three were run by the SMA, and one by SIV (Gedenkboek Imdadia Isha ‘at Islam (Eerste afdeling van de Surinaamsche Islamitische Vereniging) 70 jaar. 16 augustus 1934-16 augustus 2004, 2004). 5.1.2.6  Cremation Law The law on cremation in 1969 is considered a joint institutional and ideological ‘response’ for this resulted from the collective political decisionmaking power of Hindus and Muslims. Cremation is a Hindu ritual where the deceased is burnt. Ideas for legalizing cremation existed already in the 1940s. Rambaran Misre, a Hindu Member of Parliament (1949–1951), was an important exponent advocating the cremation law in Parliament so he could cremate his father (Breeveld, 2000). The need for a cremation law was also expressed during a public meeting of an East Indian cultural organization, Djagaran16 in the late 1940s. In 1951, a cremation law was passed, though cremations were not executable till 1969. The cremation law of 1951 stated that every person or stillborn had to be buried in a closed coffin on a legally approved burial ground or cremated in a legally approved crematorium (Bijlagen, 1950–1951. Landsverordening van tot wijziging en aanvulling van de begrafenisverordening 1926, 1950). Such a crematorium, however, did not exist. Cremations became only executable in 1969 when the cremation law was changed to enable cremation of an influential Hindu exponent, Oedarajsingh Varma. The legal requirement of a crematorium was removed, while a rule was added that people could be cremated outside a crematorium (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001, p. 330). The first ‘open air’ crematorium was established for the cremation of and named after Oedarajsingh Varma in 1969 (ibid). The passing of the cremation law in 1969 should be understood within the context of increasing political power by Hindus and Muslims during VHP rule. Power that came after VHP won the elections with support of both religious groups, who comprised almost 50% of the population (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2007), and political power sharing practices. The law was passed after advocacy of Hindu Members of Parliament who were close friends of Oedarajsingh Varma. They appealed for the law, which was approved by Pengel (K, Personal Communication, July 2nd, 2015). This appeal by exponents of Hindu society in Parliament illustrated a ‘response’ in which political decision-making power of both Hindus and Muslims was used to pass the cremation law.

118  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations 5.1.2.7  Religious Public Holidays Joint institutional and ideological ‘responses’ in terms of national Hindu and Muslim holidays were triggered in the 1960s. The need for such holidays was influenced by three factors. First was the declaration of 1st July as a national holiday in 1960, now known as Keti Koti.17 This day was meant to commemorate the abolition of slavery which was regarded as a milestone for the entire society. However, in practice the East Indians considered this a day for commemorating the Surinamese of African descent (Algoe, 2009). Second were the demographic changes of ethnic groups, in particular East Indians. According to the census of 1964 they were the second largest ethnic group. Third was the improvement of the socioeconomic status of East Indians. In 1950, 23% of the population of East Indian descent didn’t work in the agriculture sector and in 1964 this number had even increased to 56% (Kruijer, 1977, p. 75). Based on these three changes Hindus and Muslims, and especially East Indians demanded ‘own’ holidays. Soon after the declaration of 1st July the Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha wrote letters to the government with requests for introducing ‘their own’ Hindu national holidays. This organization got support from the political party VHP, who had incorporated the official recognition by acknowledgment of Holi, Divali, and Eid-ul-Fitr in its party program in the 1960s These requests for own Hindu and Muslim holidays were not answered till the VHP came in office in 1969. Finally after consultation with Christian, Hindu, and Muslim organizations, labor unions, the Chamber of Commerce, and government officials, Holi and Eid-ul-Fitr were declared national holidays, while removing Easter Monday and Ascension Day in 1971 (Algoe, 2009). 5.1.3  ‘Responses’ 1980–1987 The previous section showed that ‘responses’ reduced the dominance of traditional Christians in terms of legal products and private institutions from 1950 to 1979. This section analyzes Hindu and Muslim responses to dominance of traditional Christians between 1980 and 1987, a period of civil-military regime. The assumption is that in this period Hindus and Muslims would have less political power and thus be limited in ‘responses’. Between 1980 and 1987 there were no ‘responses’ to the institutional Christian dominance. This should be understood by the influence of the civilian-military rule. In this period, organizations including religious organizations were restricted to freely organize activities (R, Personal Communication, June 23rd, 2013). Hence, there was no room for creating a platform for ‘responses’. Another possible explanation for the lack of ‘responses’ between 1980 and 1987, is the large scale migration of local people to the Netherlands. It is estimated that about 60,000 people migrated in this period.18 Exact data of the emigration of Hindus and Muslims are not available. However, the censuses of 1980 and 2004 indicate that the share

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  119 of Hindus declined from 27% to 23%, while that of Muslims dropped from 20% to 16%. Migration possibly contributed to this decline. It could be argued that because of emigration the institutional capacity of Hindu and Muslim religious organizations might have weakened, which was critical for ‘responses’. In 1987, the government further decreased Christian dominance in public resources by paying salaries to Hindu and Muslim leaders. A law (Staatsblad van Republiek Suriname 1987 no 87, 1987) was passed that explicitly granted the last two mentioned religious groups payments based on their education. Religious leaders who received salaries by the state were from Sanatan Dharm Maha Sabha, Arya Dewaker, Madjlies Moesliemien Suriname, Surinaamse Moeslim Associatie, Surinaamse Islamitische Vereniging (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken Afdeling Eredienst, 2011). The salary for religious leaders with a University, High School, Secondary, and Primary degree received monthly the following salary, respectively: Sf 1722, Sf 1128, Sf 905, Sf 712 (Staatsblad van Republiek Suriname 1987 no 87, 1987). It should be noted that this policy was based on a top-down decision-making. According to a Hindu informant, Hindu and Muslim organizations were not consulted (K, Personal Communication, July 2nd, 2015). This should be understood by the civil-military regime at that time. 5.1.4  ‘Reponses’ 1987–2014 The 1987–2014 subperiod is characterized by joint institutional ‘responses’ of Hindus and Muslims, and ideological ‘responses’ by Javanese Ahmadiyyas. It is a period during which the joint ‘responses’ aimed at decreasing the dominance of traditional Christians in national holidays as inherited from colonial times. The ideological ‘responses’ of Javanese Ahmadiyyas strived for discouragement of conversion of their members to Evangelicalism. Till 2011, Christians had four holidays, while Hindus and Muslim each had one. Christians had a relative higher ratio of public holidays per 1000 followers than Hindus and Muslims. Their ratio was 0.2, 0.1, and 0.1, respectively.19 Hindu and Muslim organizations attempted to encourage religious equality in national religious holidays. Their joint ‘responses’ were coordinated by the Culturele Unie Suriname (CUS) (AG, Interview Isaac et al, January 4th, 2014). It had lobbied to declare one more Hindu and Muslim national holiday since 2007. The CUS consulted 26 religious and cultural organizations which altogether decided that national holidays had to be reviewed. It was argued that Christians had far more public holidays than Hindus and Muslims. Among others, CUS suggested to declare Divali (Hindu), and Eid Miladun Nabi (Muslim) as a national holiday. To encourage support for these new holidays, in particular Divali, CUS organized large Divali celebrations at the Independence Square (ibid). A national dia was lit, symbolizing solidarity between the different religious groups for the nation. There were also slogans about ‘unity in diversity’. In 2010,

120  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations Divali and Eid-ul-Adha were proclaimed national holidays by the president, but legally declared in 2011. Compared to the 1950–1979 period, access to political decision-making power of Hindus and Muslims also influenced the joint ‘responses’ between 1987 and 2014 but as part of a different ideology of political parties. In the former period traditional political parties used this power for increasing the social status of their electorate which affected the ‘responses’. There was no particular ideology rather than the respective political party ‘looked after’ by the own ethnic group (see Section 5.1.2). In 2011, Hindu and Muslim national holidays were not declared by a government with the traditional political parties representing Hindus and Muslims (VHP), but during the rule of the Nationale Democratische Partij (NDP) and the KTPI. 20 The NDP is not a traditional political party representing one particular ethnic group. Rather, it has representatives of various religious groups in the board (‘Hoofdbestuur’, n.d.). In the 2011 administration, the NDP for instance had a Hindu Minister who was the former head of the CUS, which was the same organization that lobbied for more Hindu and Muslim national holidays. The NDP also had alliances with Sunni Muslims. According to a Muslim informant this denomination used to support the NPS in the late 1960s and 1970s (S, Personal Communication, July 6th, 2013). But, in the course of time, this party had little interaction with the Sunni Muslims and lost its influence. Meanwhile the NDP increased its alliances with this denomination (ibid). One clear example of this alliance is appointing Sunni Muslim candidates for the position of Member of Parliament during the elections in 2010 (ibid). Another example is providing a plot to the SMA and the renovation of its school and orphanage (ibid). According to the respective informant, the SMA had requested the plot and the renovation since the 1990s, but these were ignored by the traditional parties (ibid). ‘The whole renovation should be attributed to the NDP’ (ibid). The representation of Hindus and Muslims in strategic positions of the NDP implies that they had political decision-making power during its administration. But their influence occurred in a different ideological framework compared to the administrations of traditional parties. The NDP applies more or less an anti-colonial and nationalist ideology combined with harmonious cultural diversity ideals. Such ideology was clearly expressed during the elections of 2005 (Menke, 2008). During a NDP political meeting the master of ceremony remarked that the party was like a garden; it had members of all ethnic groups (ibid, p. 41). There were institutional and ideological responses of Javanese Muslims to the influence of Evangelicals, but these were more at the local level. The previous chapter clarified that large numbers of Javanese Muslims, especially young westprayers (Ahmadiyyas), turned to Evangelicalism. The share of Javanese Ahmadiyyas dropped with 62%, while that of the Javanese Evangelicals explosively grew from 50 to 7117 between 1971 and 2012. Javanese Muslim leaders attempted to maintain their members and prevent conversion to

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  121 Christianity by organizing social activities and encouraging informal religious education in the Javanese and Dutch language. One Javanese Muslim informant explained that once a week he gave informal religious education to elders and provided homework assistance to young people (S, Personal Communication, June 7th, 2016). ‘With these activities we try to keep our members interested in the own religion. But we do not condemn them when they leave for another religion. It is a private matter and we must respect people’s choice’ (ibid). There is also a football club to keep youngsters attached to the mosque. These can be described as institutional ‘responses’ through which Javanese Muslim leaders hoped to prevent conversion to Evangelicalism. They argued that this Christian denomination attracted young people particularly by organizing entertaining activities (ibid). Providing informal religious education in the Javanese and Dutch language is a critical ideological ‘response’ for maintaining membership of Javanese Muslims. There were individual initiatives of Javanese Muslim leaders to use the Dutch language in religious services to keep the members informed about and interested in the own religion. The reason for this was the fact that traditionally these services were in the Javanese language, which was difficult to understand by young people (S, Personal Communication, June 7th, 2016). Noteworthy is that ‘responses’ to influence of Evangelicals were more a local than a national matter as these involved individual mosques and not the umbrella organization. There was no central plan that was explained by the organizational culture. ‘Our mosques do not report all their unfavorable issues to us, because of the fear for sanctions by the board. Therefore, we do not precisely know what is happening. But we are aware that our members are getting more involved in other religions’ (S, Personal Communication, June 7th, 2016). These statements reflect that ‘responses’ were difficult at the national level. It can be concluded that most ‘responses’ occurred between 1950 and 1979. It was the first sub period during which Hindus and Muslims had political decision-making power, which encouraged the significant reduction of Christian dominance. Among these responses, Hindus had a more prominent role in separate institutional ‘responses’, which may be explained by the influence of their leadership in formal education. During the civilian-military regime, ‘responses’ were not identified, but between 1989 and 2014 Hindus and Muslims countered the remains of institutional dominance of traditional Christians. The Javanese Muslims of the Ahmadiyya denomination were involved in reducing the increasing conversion of their members to Evangelicalism.

5.2  Interreligious Relations Suriname Here the focus is on the influence of Hindu and Muslim responses to Christian dominance on interreligious relations in Suriname. It has been mentioned previously that there can be three possible forms of interreligious

122  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations relations: changed religious dominance, unchanged religious dominance, or concerted diversity. The previous sections showed that Hindu and Muslim responses contributed to a declined dominance of traditional Christians. Christian dominance thus changed. This section explains that ‘responses’ also strengthened concerted diversity. ‘Responses’ in legal products encouraged a basis for concerted diversity as these promoted ideals and practices of religious equality in government policies. This equality is a core principle of concerted diversity. One ‘response’ that clearly reflected the influence on concerted diversity was the declaration of Phagwa and Eid-ul-Fitr as national holidays in 1971. Its acknowledgment was meant to discourage the treatment of Hindus and Muslims as marginalized religious groups and promote religious equality. This was emphasized during the speech of the Prime Minister, Jules Sedney, in March 1970 (Appendix 4). He stated that the nation had ignored the desires of non-Christians to celebrate their national holidays the way Christians do. According to him, it took decades before the nation could realize not to marginalize religious feelings and needs of non-Christians and simply tolerate them (Azimullah, 1973, pp. 216–217). In addition to religious equality, ‘response’ in terms of Hindu and Muslim holidays in 1971 also enhanced ideals and practices of solidarity and conflict solving. These are also principles of concerted diversity. In 1970, during the decision-making of Phagwa and Eid-ul-Fitr cooperation between religious groups was strengthened. This decision-making probably was the first platform where Christian, Hindu, and Muslim organizations formally cooperated at a national level. They were joined in a consultation commission, called ‘Study group Working hours’ appointed by the government to provide recommendations regarding national holidays. This commission consisted of representatives of Christian, Hindu, and Muslim organizations, labor unions, the Chamber of Commerce, and government. Hindus were represented by three organizations: Sanatan Dharma, Arya Dewaker, and Arya Pratanidhi Sabha. Muslims were represented by Surinaamse Islamitische Vereniging (SIV), Surinaamse Moeslim Associatie (SMA), Surinaamse Moslim Federatie (SMF), Stichting Islamitische Gemeenten in Suriname (SIS), Azafia Islam, Federatie van Islamitische Gemeenten in Suriname (FIGS). On behalf of Christians, the Council for Christian Churches (CCK)21 was involved in the ‘acknowledgment’. The consultation commission in Suriname had to advice the government on the holiday structure. The main task of the religious organizations was to consult their members on the ‘acknowledgment’. Hindu and Muslim organizations had to consult their members, which religious festival they would like to have as public holiday. The Christian body had to consult its members on which Christian days to remove as national holidays in order to facilitate the acknowledgment of the Hindu and Muslim festivals. Christian, Hindu, and Muslim organizations recommended holidays based on solidarity and mutual understanding. Among various religious festivals, Hindu

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  123 organizations proposed Phagwa since it could be celebrated with other religious and ethnic groups as well. Muslim organizations chose Eid-ul-Fitr over Eid-ul-Adha, as the latter was religiously sensitive for Hindus and thus could create possible tensions. On Eid-ul-Adha the sacrifice of cows is a central Islamic ritual, while to Hindus these animals are considered religiously sacred. Christian organizations agreed on the removal of two of their holidays, Easter Monday and Whit Monday, to facilitate the declaration of Phagwa and Eid-ul-Fitr. It was argued that Christian organizations were an instrument of bonding rather than division (Algoe, 2009). In the cooperation between the Hindu, Muslim, and Christian organizations the mutual understanding of religious leaders was critical. This is precisely what concerted diversity is about. It acknowledges the differing interests of cultural groups, though they find a way to negotiate these and create a solution for the time being. It should be noted that the influence of ‘responses’ on concerted diversity is not a straightforward process. ‘Responses’ also involved incidents that opposed principles and practices of equality and solidarity. Illustrative is the decision-making of the public holidays in 1971 and 2010. There were social tensions after removing Easter Monday and Whit Monday as a national holiday in 1970. Various labor unions and Christian individuals publicly criticized the removal of Christian public holidays despite the fact that CCK had approved the removal of these two days. There were protests of labor unions such as the Union of Harbor, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Meteorological Service, the Federation of Civil Servants (FEHOMA), and the Union of Civil Servants (ABO) in 1970. On 6th March 1970, a local newspaper reported a protest of the Federation of Civil Servants (FEHOMA) against the legal procedures the government followed to acknowledge the Hindu and Muslim holidays and removing the Christian holidays (Algoe, 2009). According to them, Parliament, the Governor, and certain commissions (de Commissie voor Georganiseerd Overleg) had not been consulted before taking the final decision. Workers even threatened to stay at home as Easter Monday neared on 30th March, 1970 (Dew, 1978). The ABO had waged a strike for two weeks, but the strike had to be dismissed after the government had issued a legal case against the unions. According to the court order the strike was illegal. But after the public protests and criticism, the government finally decided to undo the removal of Easter Monday and to take out Ascension Day instead in 1971 (Algoe, 2009). The decision-making of Eid-ul-Adha as a national holiday in 2010 also involved obstacles. This day was not recommended as a national holiday by the CUS that had already consulted different religious groups in 2007. On the contrary, Eid Miladun Nabi was suggested a national holiday. Unlike Eid-ul-Adha, Eid Miladun Nabi did not contradict with Hindu beliefs. The declaration of Eid-ul-Adha as a national holiday was criticized by Hindu organizations in 2010. The Organisatie Hindoe Media (OHM) sent a

124  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations letter to the President on behalf of various Hindu and Muslim organizations stating that the religious principles of Eid-ul-Adha contradicted with Hindu beliefs (See Appendix 5). It also contradicted with the agreements about national holidays among Hindu and Muslim organizations in 2007. According to a Hindu informant Eid-ul-Adha was selected because of the pressure of the timing during the decision-making of national holidays in 2010. In this year, Divali was for the first time announced as a national holiday by the president during its celebration on the Independence Square in November 2010. And the following Islamic festival (after three weeks) was Eid-ul-Adha. Therefore, most Muslim organizations agreed to pass this festival as a national holiday even though it contrasted their initial agreements with the CUS (AG, Interview Isaac et al, January 4th, 2014). As a reaction to the criticism of the OHM, the SIV dedicated an edition of its newsletter ‘A Spiritual Note’ in 2010 (Appendix 6) to the declaration of the national holidays. SIV tried to raise awareness about Eid-ul-Adha among Hindus by writing a fictitious conversation between people of various religious backgrounds. However, this conversation was based on real discussions after introducing Divali and Eid-ul-Adha as public holidays in Suriname. In the respective fictitious conversation the following statements are important: According to some Islamic scholars, there are many resemblances between Abraham and the person of Brahma in Hinduism. Seen this way, this Islamic festival is important for all major religions. (…) Sacrificing an animal stands for sacrificing our attachment to worldly properties, power, and even children. (…) That is one of the objectives of religious public holidays in a multicultural society. In this way, followers of different religions learn about one another’s faiths, which strengthen mutual respect and solidarity (…) Well, I can’t judge for others how they consider the religious festivals of other religions, but I can imagine that some are not happy with slaughtering of cows. However, traditionally, in many mosques in Suriname bulls are slaughtered, not cows. In other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, people predominantly sacrifice sheep. And you should know that in other countries, such as India and Guyana, the Festival of Sacrifice is a public holiday, as well. As far as it considers Islam, we should respect religious festivals of other religions, even if there are differences in the way and concepts of worship. After all, the Quran teaches that all people had a Prophet and that all religions came with their own religious festivals. (‘Attitude towards other religions’, 2012) The newsletter made three critical arguments to deal with the objections by Hindus against Eid-ul-Adha as a national holiday in Suriname. First, it implicitly asked the Hindu society to accept the recognition of this Islamic festival as a national holidays. It argued that public holidays are meant to increase mutual respect and solidarity in Suriname. Even in India where

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  125 Hindus are the majority and where Hindus in Suriname have originated from, Eid-ul-Adha is a national holiday. India was mentioned here as an example where Eid-ul-Adha is accepted as a national holiday despite having being the ‘source’ of Hindu religious authority. Second, the newsletter reassured Hindus that bulls rather than cows were sacrificed in the mosques during Eid-ul-Adha in Suriname. This statement was meant to increase understanding for the celebration of this festival. Hindus object the slaughter of cows, since these are considered sacred. Cows are compared with mothers who give milk and ghee. But in Suriname bulls are slaughtered. These do not give milk or ghee and hence are not the same sacred animals Hindus refer to. Third, the newsletter implicitly argued that the celebration of Eid-ulAdha was not meant to provoke Hindus, since Islam accepted and confirmed that people had their own religions. It pointed to Quranic teachings that said there were many Prophets other than Mohamed. In other words, Islam was not out to disgrace other religious groups or their festivals. The influence of ‘responses’ in terms of religious public holidays on interreligious relations depended on religious leadership, participation in the decision-making, and the interaction between religion and ethnicity. In the decision-making of the holidays of 1970 and 2010, Christian, Hindu, and Muslim religious leadership expressed mutual understanding. It also negotiated differing and even opposing religious beliefs in the respective ‘responses’. In 1970, Hindu and Muslim leaders suggested national holidays which could be celebrated with other religious groups. Christian leaders cooperated to remove two own national holidays to facilitate nonChristian holidays. In 2010, Hindu and Muslim leaders argued to suggest two more holidays to encourage mutual understanding. Participation in the decision-making among religious organizations and in government policies challenged concerted diversity in legal products. In 1970, Christian organizations agreed on the removal of the Easter Monday and Whit Monday as national holidays, however, their view did not represent the entire Christian society. There were protests by various civil society organizations. Thus participation in the decision-making among Christian organizations was not sufficient for concerted diversity. In 2010, the state passed Eid-ul-Adha against the recommendations by the CUS about new national holidays, resulting in criticism by OHM. This shows that there was little influence of stakeholders on the decision-making of Eid-ul-Adha as a national holiday. 5.2.1  Case Study Neighborhood Abrabroki An important issue in this research is understanding the relative religious harmony in Caribbean nations and therefore the concept of concerted diversity. This study focuses on the nation, however, understanding and explanation of the concept of concerted diversity required an instrumental

126  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations case study of the neighborhood. As argued in Chapter 2, concerted diversity can be enhanced by spatial distribution and neighborliness. These factors are better understood at the neighborhood level. In Suriname, an instrumental case study is conducted of the neighborhood Abrabroki. This was a former sugar plantation founded by Benjamin Beeke in 1700 (Dikland, 2010). It was owned by Christians for almost two centuries (1700–1990s); first by predominant followers of the Reformed Church (1700–1843), and then by Moravians (1843–early 1990s).22 The religious diversity in Abrabroki increased with the settlement of Hindus and Muslims of East Indian descent. Creoles and East Indians used to be the major groups in Abrabroki in the 1920s (De Bruijne, 1970). Mass urbanization in the 1980s resulted into the settlement of another large ethnic group: the Maroons. In 1993, according to a survey, Maroons made up 17% of Abrabroki (Institute for Development and Strategic Studies, 1993). Their share increased to 31% in 2004 (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2012). The change in ethnic composition also implied differences in the religious demography of Abrabroki. Most Creoles are Christian, while East Indians are predominantly Hindu and on a small scale Muslim. Maroons are largely followers of traditional religions and Evangelicalism (see Chapter 4). This mostly explains the significant share of Christians (almost 80%) in Abrabroki. Hindus and Muslims are far smaller religious groups; they have a proportion in the population of about 10% and 5%, respectively. According to Kromhout (2000) Abrabroki had an estimated population of 9400 in 2000. 5.2.1.1  Spatial Distribution In 1921, Muslims were demographically and institutionally concentrated in the north of Abrabroki. Therefore, according to most Muslim informants, the first mosque was founded in this area in 1934. This mosque evolved to the religious center of the East Indian Sunnis. By the early 1960s, they built their denominational headquarters including a big mosque and denominational schools. Christians, mostly Moravians, had a concentration of people and institutions in the south of Abrabroki. Their church, Saron Church, was the first religious institution in the early 20th century. Gradually the Moravians founded other institutions: orphanage, schools, and a graveyard. Catholics settled later in Abrabroki, particularly in the center of Abrabroki. Their only church, Fatima Church, was founded in 1951 and in the following years schools and an orphanage were established. Hindus were a small group in Abrabroki. In terms of spatial distribution, they resided all over the area. 23 They had no own religious institutions till the 1990s. This may be explained by their small number and a temple in the Koningstraat, which was close to Abrabroki. Hindus in Abrabroki visited this temple. Except for the small concentrations of Moravians, Sunnis, and Catholics, Abrabroki had predominantly religiously mixed streets.

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  127 Abrabroki experienced a declined dominance of traditional Christians, while an increased dominance of Evangelical churches. The major dominant traditional denomination was the Moravian church. Its institutional dominance was reflected in the ownership of the land of Abrabroki. In fact, this neighborhood was private property of the Moravian company C.K. Kersten (CKC) who donated the land to the church (Saron) in 1934. The dominance of Christians in Abrabroki grew with the settlement of the Catholic Church in 1951. Hindus and Muslims in Abrabroki were mainly subjected to the institutional dominance of traditional Christians in education and employment. 24 Evangelical churches in Abrabroki had expanded institutionally and demographically since the 1980s. Four Evangelical churches had been established, that sprouted from other national organizations such as Stromen van Kracht (S, Personal Communication, August 23rd, 2012; W, Personal Communication, August 7th, 2013). 5.2.1.3 Neighborliness In Abrabroki, concerted diversity was reflected in the way Christians, Hindus, and Muslims historically participated and observed each other’s religious celebrations. Informants of these three religious groups argued that they participated in celebrations of Islamic and Hindu festivals such as Tadja and Eid-ul-Fitr of Muslims, and the Phagwa festival of Hindus. In the 1950s and 1960s, Hindus and Muslims even cooperated in organizing a Hindu drama, Ramayana, in Abrabroki with financial and material donations. While Christian festivals were more sober, Hindus and Muslims often had positive impressions by means of for instance the street processions of a Catholic clothed in white during Ascension Day (G, Personal Communication, July 31st, 2012; H, Personal Communication, July 13th, 2013). Neighborliness had a significant influence on the development of mutual trust and solidarity between Christians, Hindus, and Muslims who lived in each other’s close proximity. They for instance got water from others when their water reservoir was empty, took care of children when parents were away, looked after the house when the neighbors went to church, and watched TV in the neighbor’s house (G, Personal Communication, July 31st, 2012; H, Personal Communication, July 13th, 2013). These interactions increased the familiarity with each other, and built a relationship based on mutual trust and solidarity which further encouraged interreligious relations. In addition to shared religious celebrations, concerted diversity in Abrabroki was also expressed by interreligious cooperation between religious organizations and this was influenced by neighborliness. Illustrative is the cooperation between Christian and Muslim institutions in the 1970s, which is based on neighborliness. There was an incidental cooperation between a Sunni mosque and the neighboring Catholic Church in

128  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations the 1980s. They collaborated on a community project, where Boy Scouts related to the church spudded out the weeds of the gutter in the neighborhood (Calcuttastraat). This cooperation was based on feelings of neighborliness by concerned Catholic and Sunni religious leaders (M, Personal Communication, July 26th, 2013). The Christian leader argued that since he and the Muslim leader were neighbors, they could work together in cleaning the gutter. Another example for the influence of neighborliness on interreligious cooperation at the institutional level is found in the educational sphere. The Sunni and Moravian school gradually have cooperated since the 1990s. The Moravian church often invites the Sunni school for festivals such as Children’s Day, fundraising activities, and Keti Koti celebration. In 2012, the Moravian Church also supported an Islamic school by giving materials during its renovation (M, Personal Communication, July 24th, 2013). Neighborliness not only encouraged interreligious cooperation in Abrabroki, but also mutual respect among religious leaders. This is reflected in the incidental participation of Christian and Muslim leaders in each other’s religious celebrations in the early 1980s. Both the Catholic and a Muslim leader once invited each other on a religious festival. The Catholic priest invited the Islamic leader to the Christian church, where he publicly expressed respect for and equality to the Muslim guest. This was also the case when the Muslim leader invited the Catholic priest to the mosque on an Islamic festival. The priest even wore a Muslim hat. He was welcomed by the Muslim leader as the neighbor (M, Personal Communication, July 26th, 2013). 5.2.2 Integration Case Study of Suriname and the Conceptual Framework So far, the conceptual framework of interreligious relations and ‘responses’ have been worked out and applied on the case study of Suriname. The integration of both this framework and the empirical data have resulted in a more nuanced and adjusted framework (Figure 5.2), which makes ‘responses’ and Christian dominance better comprehensible. In 1950, Christian dominance was exercised by traditional Christians. This changed by 2014. The dominance of traditional Christians declined, while the influence of Evangelicals was emerging. The latter denomination is growing demographically at the cost of the share of traditional Christians and other religious groups in the national population. The institutional and ideological dominance of traditional Christians in the 1950s was not the same as the influence of Evangelicals by 2014 due to government policies. Back in the 1950s traditional Christians were favored over non-Christians in state resources. It was a period during which Hindus and Muslims were marginalized religious groups. They had limited political decisionmaking power and their needs and desires concerning religious practices were ignored by the larger society. Such a role of government policies is not

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  129

Figure 5.1  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations in Suriname 1950–2014.

observed in the emerging influence of Evangelicals. Moreover, Hindus and Muslims are no longer marginalized groups as they have access to political decision-making power and are treated as equal to Christians in government policies. In contrast to the initial conceptual framework, the case study of Suriname revealed that ‘responses’ led to multiple forms of interreligious relations: decreased Christian dominance and concerted diversity (Figure 5.1). Concerted diversity is reflected the clearest in the national umbrella interreligious organization, the IRIS. The members of this organization were Hindus, Muslims, and traditional Christians. Among the Hindus, both the Sanatanists and Arya Samajis were represented. The Muslim organization of East Indian descent of the Ahmadiyya denomination was a member of IRIS. The Javanese Muslims of both the Ahmadiyya and Sunni denomination were represented through the umbrella organization MMS. Finally, it was shown that ‘responses’ might be influenced by spatial distribution. This factor was not included in the initial conceptual framework in Chapter 2. Spatial distribution played a role in the establishment of Hindu and Muslim denominational schools. After examining ‘responses’ and their influence on interreligious relations in Suriname, this thesis continues with the case study of Guyana.

5.3  Responses to Christian Dominance in Guyana As in Suriname, Christian dominance in Guyana also changed between 1950 and 2014. The dominance of traditional Christians declined whereas Evangelicals were becoming dominant. This section describes the ideological

130  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations and institutional ‘responses’ to Christian dominance in Guyana from 1950 to 2014. It analyzes how the changed Christian dominance had implications for ‘responses’. The ‘responses’ between 1900 and 1950 are addressed first, as these are connected with those in the 1950 to 2014 period. 5.3.1  ‘Responses’ Guyana 1900–1950 In the first half of the 20th century, Hindus and Muslims had institutional ‘responses’ regarding marriages, and formal education in their own language. In 1922, the need for legalizing Hindu and Muslim marriages was mentioned in a meeting between East Indian exponents and colonial authorities about the social circumstances of indentured East Indian workers. An important exponent was Dr. Singh, head of the major Hindu organization, the Sanatan Dharma (Dindayal, n.d.) and the British Guiana East Indian Association (BGEIA) (Shiwcharan, 1990, p. 75) established in 1892 (Seecharan, 1993). Singh strived for better social and work conditions of indentured workers. He advocated the appointment of Hindu and Muslim priests as marriage officers, so they could validate marriages. However, the colonial government did not support this. In the requests for legalizing Hindu and Muslim marriages the influence of religious leadership and private religious institutions was observed. Hindu and Muslim institutions appealed for education in Hindi, and Urdu and Arabic classes in school, respectively. At the turn of the 20th century, Muslims presented petitions to the colonial government asking for financial resources for establishing an own mosque and school (Ali & Chickrie, 2013). They requested that the colonizer considered ‘the growing number of East Indian Immigrants in the colony, the sad want of education in the faith of their forebears and their want of an education in their mother tongue’ (ibid). Muslims emphasized that there was religious discrimination against non-Christians, and advocated state financial support. These requests were ignored by the British colonial government (ibid). To preserve the Urdu and Arabic language, Muslims requested the colonial government to include education on these languages in the curriculum in the 1940s (Khanam & Chickrie, 2009). In 1941, the British Guiana Islamic Association (BGIA) organized a special conference on a uniform system of Muslim Religious Education (ibid, pp. 211, 212). This system was in line with the Education Code of British Guiana. During this conference a resolution was adopted to demand state support for Urdu education in schools (ibid). However, the state did not reply the requests of the BGIA, which contributed to the loss of Urdu language in Guyana (ibid). Like the Muslims, Hindu institutions also in vain requested state resources for education in the own language between 1900 and 1950. The state ignored recommendations such as by the Education Commission to provide education in Hindi in 1925 (Shiwcharan, 1990). Hindu

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  131 exponents like Maharaj Sing, who suggested that teachers could be recruited in India, did not succeed in reducing Christian dominance in education. The government did not act on the recommendation of the Education Commission even though schools received limited funds for teaching Hindi (ibid, p. 249). Among Hindus, the Arya Samaj, seemed to lead the ‘responses’ in formal education in British Guiana. This denomination established the Dayananda Anglo Vedic College (DAV) in 1937. It was founded by Bhaskarananda, an Arya Samaji missionary. Its education was in Hindi and dealt with various themes: women’s rights, caste system, and simplifying Hindu rituals. There were also classes on social and physical sciences. DAV became the Arya Samaj headquarters (Ramracha, 2014). Another school of the Arya Samaj was the Oriental College (Ruhomon, 1988). The role of this denomination could be understood within the international context of theological struggles between Arya Samaj and Sanatan Dharma. In India, Arya Samaj was a reformist movement that interpreted the Hindu religious scriptures such as the Vedas in favor of marginalized groups including women and low caste. To spread the new interpretations, educational facilities were a critical requirement in and outside India. It is in this context that missionaries of the Arya Samaj visited colonies in the Caribbean with significant numbers of Hindus. In British Guiana, missionaries strengthened and further institutionalized Arya Samaj. This denomination had various branches; Bhaskaranand established the American Aryan League in 1937 (Ruhomon, 1988, p. 254), an institution with the explicit objective to remove ‘religious persecutions’ (ibid). Both Hindus and Muslims ideologically responded to Christian dominance by providing informal religious education to increase critical awareness, and syncretism. Informal education was given during religious practices and lectures at temples and mosques. Emphasis was on values such as self-worth and dignity of the own tradition (Shiwcharan, 1990) to enhance resilience of the religion and withstand conversion to Christianity. The temples held readings from religious scriptures particularly the Ramayana, emphasized moral values such as ‘duty to family, respect for elders, and racial unity; and communal feastings’ (ibid, p. 340). The mosques had religious lectures based on the Quran and Islamic philosophy (ibid). This was particularly the case in the 1920s, a period Seecharan (1993) described as ‘Indian cultural resurgence’. There had been an increase of establishment of temples and mosques since the late 19th century. In 1870, there were only two temples reported. But by 1891, 29 mosques and 33 temples were counted which increased further to 46 and 43 in 1916, respectively (Khanam & Chickrie, 2009). By 1920, there were about 50 of each in the coastland (‘The Indian presence in Guyana Stabroek’, 2009). These mosques and temples were critical to spread religious values and resist conversion to Christianity. This seemed to have an influence since in 1925 the Presbyterian Church complained

132  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations about the rising number of Hindu pujas and decreasing conversion rate (Shiwcharan, 1990). Religious leaders played an important role in giving informal religious education and the founding of temples and mosques. Illustrative is the establishment of the mosque at Queenstown. Plot for this mosque was bought by Gool Mohammed Khan, the first imam in British Guiana (Ruhomon, 1988). Members of the religious group made financial contributions which enabled them to finish the building of the mosque in 1897. It was a particular mosque in the history of Guyana at that time since it was meant to unite the various mosques in the colony (ibid). Syncretic practices of Hinduism and Christianity were a common phenomenon in British Guiana in the early 20th century (Shiwcharan, 1990). In many cases, Christian parents held Hindu marriages for their children besides a wedding in the church. This phenomenon was influenced by Christian dominance. For upward social mobility in terms of better jobs and education, Hindus often converted but still maintained Hindu traditions and practices. Converts for instance referred to Jesus Christ as Yisu Masiha, the manifestation of the Hindu god Brahma. Despite conversion Hindu gods were worshipped (ibid). It can be concluded that between 1900 and 1950 the institutional ‘responses’ on marriages and formal education did not change the government policies privileging Christians, while ideological ‘responses’ had some success in preventing conversion to Christianity. Next the evolution of the institutional and ideological ‘responses’ are discussed for subperiods based on turning points in the access of Hindus and Muslims to political decision-making power. These subperiods are 1950–1962, 1963–1992, and 1993–2014. 5.3.2  ‘Responses’ Guyana 1950–1968 Examining ‘responses’ between 1950 and 1968 is important to understand whether political decision-making power to Hindus and Muslims contributed to the reduction of Christian dominance. It was a period with democratically elected governments and theoretically Hindus and Muslims are assumed to have more access to political decisionmaking power then. Such power is critical for reducing Christian dominance structurally. The current section examines this power of both religious groups and its influence on ‘responses’ in terms of government policies. Between 1950 and 1968, important ‘institutional responses’ were the legalization of Hindu and Muslim marriages and cremation (1957), the founding of Hindu and Muslim denominational schools, removal of barriers to government jobs, and nationalization of Christian schools. These ‘responses’ were largely influenced by political decision-making power during the PPP government from 1953 till 1964 (Table 5.4). It will be

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  133 Table 5.4  Administrations25 Guyana 1950–1968 Period

Administration

1953–1957 1957–1961 1961–1964 1964–1968

PPP (Jagan and Burnham) PPP (Jagan) PPP (Jagan) PNC and UF

Source: ‘About Guyana. Background and history’, n.d.; ‘The 1957 General Election’, n.d.; ‘The General Election of 1953’, n.d.; and Center for Latin American Studies, n.d.

shown how this power and other factors played a role during each aforementioned ‘response’. 5.3.2.1  Marriage and Cremation Law The legalization of Hindu and Muslim marriage and cremation as a ‘response’ can be explained by the access of Hindus and Muslims to political decision-making power and their religious leadership. Exponents of Hindu and Muslim organizations had lobbied for the legalization of these marriages since the early 20th century. But, the law was not passed until Hindus and Muslims had significant representation in the Legislative Executive Council (later Parliament). In 1957, the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), which included representatives of Hindu and Muslim organizations, had won the elections. In the same year there were debates of the Hindu and Muslim marriage law in which Singh and Gajraj played an important role. They expressed the views of their religious organizations in Parliament. The former was head of the leading Hindu body the Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha, while the latter represented the main Muslim organization, the Guyana United Sadr Islamic Anjuman (Chickrie, 2007; Dindayal, n.d.; ‘National Assembly Hansard Report of Debates. Third Session. 25 April 1956–28 June 1957’, 1957). Singh and Gajraj consulted Hindu and Muslim organizations during the decision-making of the law on Hindu and Muslim marriages, which was reflected in the parliamentary debates of 1957. Singh, who was also the Chief Secretary of the Legislative Council, stated: ‘On Monday last, 17th June, I met representatives of three Hindu organizations and four Muslim organizations. I do not wish to hide anything from this Council and therefore I will say straight away that the majority of those present expressed opposition to the Bill’ (‘National Assembly Hansard Report of Debates. Third Session. 25 April 1956–28 June 1957’, 1957, p. 2711). This statement clarifies how Hindu and Muslim exponents in Parliament articulated the views of their religious groups. Similar to the marriage law, the cremation bill (1957) was also a ‘response’ that was influenced by the access of Hindus and Muslims

134  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations to political decision-making power. This is expressed in the following statement of a Hindu informant, who was a coalition Member of Parliament at that time: At that time I used to work with his (author: J.B. Singh, head of SDMS) son. I was the only person in the room with him, when he died. Jung Bahadoer Singh. So he died and we did not have cremation law. We call the president. The governor, the British white governor and tell him. And he gave permission for J.B. to burn. They had the act, allowing cremation. Then he passed a law and we have that. I introduce the line in parliament, because I was already an MP. (R, Personal Communication, December 13th, 2012) 5.3.2.2  Nationalization Christian Schools Nationalization of Christian schools was a ‘response’ influenced by the increased access of Hindus and Muslims to political decision-making power. However, it was also part of the larger socialism based decolonization struggle of non-Christians together with marginalized Christians. In 1961, 51 Christian schools were taken over by the government (Mattai, 1977, p. 220). The idea of nationalizing schools already existed in previous governments, the first in 1941 (Cameron, n.d.), but it was conducted when the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) was in power. This political party consisted of major subordinate groups, East Indians and Creoles, who altogether represented Hindus, Muslims, and Christians. This party held de jure a socialist ideology (McDonald, 1969). But in practice one leader of the PPP, Jagan, was considered a Marxist (ibid). The PPP strived for transforming British Guiana into a Socialist country (ibid). Breaking the ties with the colonial powers who maintained a system of Christian dominated schools was part of both the socialist and Marxist views. Nationalization of Christian schools thus fitted in the framework of the PPP. This nationalization is considered a ‘response’ as it was advocated by PPP Hindu and Muslim exponents. They argued that nationalization of Christian schools was important for reducing religious discrimination and conversion attempts. These schools were perceived as ‘“mouthpiece of the Christian denomination” who were seen as keen to Christianize Hindus and Muslims’ (Chickrie, 2007, p. 409). Nationalization became a political priority during the campaigning of elections for 1961 (Mattai, 1977). Remarkable is that not all Hindu and Muslim leaders supported the nationalization of schools. Some were leaders of the Muslim organizations Sad’r Islamic Anjuman and the Muslim League, and the Hindu organizations Maha Sabha and Pundits’ Council (‘The Election Campaign in 1953’, n.d.), who joined the Anglican and Catholic Church in criticizing nationalization. It is argued that the respective Hindu and Muslim leaders believed that the PPP was becoming anti-religion and hence attempted to take over the schools (ibid).

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  135 5.3.2.3  Removal of Barriers for Civil Service Jobs In the 1950s, the PPP government removed the requirements of a baptism certificate for civil service jobs and teaching professions in particular (F, Personal Communication, September 14th, 2012). To become a teacher, it was no longer required to be a Christian, because the government had taken over control of the churches (Ishmael, 2012). They were no longer in charge of appointing personnel. 5.3.2.4  Establishment Private Hindu Schools While the PPP aimed at taking over control of Christian organizations on public education, Hindus and Muslims further institutionalized their schools. The Guyana Oriental College of the Arya Samaj was active with religious education (Bisram, 2009). In addition to Arya Samaj, Sanatan Dharma also established denominational schools. In 1956, a Hindu secondary school was built with private financial support from the local Hindu elites and human resources from Guyana and Trinidad (Dibyananda, n.d.). Later two Hindu primary schools were established with donations from the own community: Sevashram Sangha (supported by Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha) and Rama Krishna Primary school (by the Sanatan Dharmic Sabha). There were apparently no Muslim schools26 between 1950 and 1968. Two factors played an important role in the establishment of Hindu denominational schools: private religious institutions and leadership.27 Bisram (2009) reported that in 1955 the Arya Samaj brought steward Shruti Kant, a lecturer, from India to promote the Arya Samaj way of life in British Guiana. This denomination, as explained earlier, preached its own gospel in the colonies and attempted to prevent religious persecution. Kant provided education. He was head of the Guyana Oriental College till 1979 (ibid). Another private religious institution was the Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha. A Hindu informant explained that this body worked throughout the country with many pundits with a vision against Christian dominance. They attempted to reduce the influence of Christianity on Hindus (P, Personal Communication, March 20th, 2014). This was also reported for the Sanatan Dharmic Sabha with its Rama Krishna Primary school. Apart from institutional ‘responses’, Hindus and Muslims gave ideological responses to Christian dominance. These ideological responses were the encouragement of critical awareness about the own religion, and syncretism. Between 1950 and 1963, the major Hindu religious institution was the Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha (SDMS), founded in 1934 (Dindayal, n.d.). This body conducted a strong awareness campaign 28 by foreign Hindu leaders with support of local people in the 1950s. Public lectures were organized for different Hindu denominations in various parts of Guyana. Hindu leaders preached the religious heritage of India and conducted sermons all over the colony. The leaders from India encouraged the critical awareness

136  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations of local people about their religion. In particular the need for cremation was addressed: ‘Hindus have the sacred privilege and birth right to cremate their dead organizations’ (Dibyananda, n.d., p. 6). One Hindu leader from India also showed the way to cremate the dead according do Hindu rites in 1956 when the first person was cremated in British Guiana (ibid). This leader also triggered the critical view on the dominance in the colony by saying the following with a rising and roaring voice: ‘You the Indians and you are the majority yet you Indians are treated like Coolies. How long you will all be dominated? Arise, wake and be a vibrant Hindu. One day you will have to rule this country’ (ibid). Local religious leaders were trained in Hinduism, religious books were published, Hindu teachings were given in the schools, founded in the 1950s (ibid). An important private Muslim religious institution involved in ‘responses’ was the Guyana United Sad’r Islamic Anjuman (GUSIA), founded in 1937. It conducted various religious campaigns and public lectures to strengthen Islam practices and beliefs (Chickrie, 2007). Religious leaders of GUSIA contributed to ideological ‘responses’ by raising critical thinking about Christianization among Muslims. As Chickrie (ibid, p. 7) notes: ‘Muslim religious leaders were fearful that eventually Islam would fade under pressure from the British colonial rule, like the way in which the African slaves lost their religions. Many Christian missionaries were in Guyana proselytizing and there was tremendous pressure to convert’. Important ‘responses’ in the field of education were the founding of teaching groups for educating adults and children, the founding of library and schools where Islamic religious instructions were given. One school was in Kitty. Here more than 50 children were taught Urdu. Special classes for adults were also organized and books about the basics of Islam were published. These educational activities express the condition of ‘interaction among responding religious group’. While the Hindu and Muslim organizations attempted to resist conversion to Christianity by strengthening critical religious awareness, various members ideologically ‘responded’ through syncretism. Illustrative was the celebration of Hindu festivals by Christianized people. Many Hindu informants shared experiences with families and friends who, despite being baptized in church, celebrate Divali, light dias, and offer Prasad. Compared to the Hindus, syncretic practices among Muslims were rare. Various scholars mentioned that Muslims were stronger in their religious beliefs and resisted conversion more than Hindus (Bisnauth, 1977; Khanam & Chickrie, 2009). An important explanation might be the ideological compatibility between Islam and Christianity. Hindus could better incorporate Christianity in the framework of Hinduism than Muslims (Bisnauth, 1977, p. 492). The catechists for instance argued that Jesus was an avatar of the Hindu God Brahma (ibid, p. 493). For Muslims this was probably more difficult. Another explanation for syncretic Hindu and Christian practices, according to many informants, was the intensity of Christian dominance.

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  137 Christians were preferred in employment as a teacher on Christian schools as well as school admission. Some even say that they needed to show their baptism record for getting admitted to these schools. By becoming Christian, Hindus and Muslims could increase their upward social mobility possibilities. Some government policies reduced Christian dominance, but cannot be classified as ‘responses’. One such policy is the introduction of Hindu (Divali, Phagwa) and Muslim (Eid-ul-Adha) public holidays in 1965. With this legal product, the government clarified that Christianity was no longer the superior religion in the nation. It was a policy to strengthen the Guyanese nation by promoting principles of religious equality and mutual understanding. As Burnham explained: (…) One of the difficulties in our community is that we have Christians living side by side with Muslims and Hindus and none of those three understanding even some of the basic tenets of the other two…I believe that if we were able to share the holidays we at least would be invited to attempt to learn each other’s point of view, creeds, beliefs and attitudes, and that further education and information will undoubtedly lead to a greater understanding and bring closer to us the day when we have a Guyanese nation as distinct from a country with a number of different peoples.29 Remarkable is that Hindu and Muslim organizations hardly participated in the decision-making of the Hindu and Muslim national holidays. A committee that was supposed to consult religious organizations on the holiday structure in 1963, held limited consultations in practice (McAlmont, 2009). The committee consisted of two state officials: an Afro Guyanese related to the PPP, and an East Indian who was head of the Muslim League and supporter of the PNC. In 1964, the committee recommended the following Hindu and Islamic holidays: Phagwah, Ram Naumi, and Dipavali for Hindus and Eid-ul-Fitr and Eid-ul-Ahza for Muslims. These holidays had no legal status yet (ibid). In 1967, the holiday structure was legalized with some modifications: Ram Naumi and Eid-ul-Fitr were taken off the proposed holidays (ibid). It is indicated that Hindu and other Muslim organizations were not involved in the decision-making apparently because of violent ethnic clashes between East Indians and Creoles in the early 1960s (McAlmont, 2009). On the so called Black Friday (February 16, 1962) many business companies in the city were burnt and looted (Morrison, 1998). The streets of Georgetown were characterized by strikes, riots, and burning of shops. These strikes occurred with tensions between the East Indians and Creoles, when the consultation for the religious holidays was being conducted in 1963 (McAlmont, 2009). It is believed that the ethnic tensions may have affected the working of the consultation committee (ibid). The government

138  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations wanted to present an artificial united front and apparently therefore chose to appoint a Creole as a representative for East Indians in this committee. ‘Responses’ began to decline with the reduced political decision-making power of Hindus and Muslims under PNC government led by Burnham in 1964. This declined power was influenced by the larger decolonization process with political competition between the two major ethnic groups, complex interaction of Hindu and Muslim religious leadership struggles, and colonial political interventions. The latter factor was highly influential. While Hindus and Muslims had access to political decision-making power under PPP leadership of Jagan (East Indian) and Burnham (Creole) (1957– 1963) (‘History of PPP’, n.d.), this got hampered by the interventions of the colonial government. Three months after the mass based PPP won the first election in 1953, the British colonizer suspended the constitution due to the fear of the communist ideals of the leaders (Mattai, 1977, p. 214). The British considered Jagan the most threatening leader. PPP at that time had mass political influence (McAlmont, 2009). It geared toward political independence based on communist ideals. This threatened the colonial powers who therefore introduced changes in the constitution with some provisions for the equal representation system in 1963. This system allowed de jure an equal representation of Colonial Office and Guyanese nationals, but de facto the government appointed less Colonial Office members. As such, decisions could only be taken as long as these were approved by the British government (Mattai, 1977, p. 215). The PPP started to weaken with these measures even though it was in political office till 1963. In the meantime internal leadership struggles between Jagan and Burnham added to this weakening. Fuelled by the colonial government the PPP split into two sections along ethnic lines, and a new party was formed under the leadership of Burnham. This party, later called the People National Congress (PNC), got into power in 1963 with support of the colonial government and the USA under influence of a new electoral system, the proportional representation, introduced in 1964 (‘About Guyana. Background and history’, n.d.; ‘The 1964 Election Campaign’, n.d.). PNC also strived for independence, but it followed socialist ideals, which according to the colonial powers were less threatening than the communist perspectives of the PPP. Hence, the PNC was supported by the western colonial countries. Religious leadership struggles among Hindu and Muslim organizations as a result of political rivalry also discouraged ‘responses’ between 1964 and 1968. To explain this, the alliances between political parties and religious organizations since the 1950s should be understood first. Hindu and Muslim organizations were initially related to the PPP. But when the PNC was established, it attracted PPP Hindu and Muslim leaders by for instance providing top governmental jobs (F, Personal Communication, March 26th, 2014). This weakened the initial Hindu and Muslim support to PPP support. The British colonizer seemed to encourage this weakening by financing the 1964 elections of the Guyana United Muslim Party

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  139 that had to attract the Muslims related to the PPP (‘The 1964 Election Campaign’, n.d.). This political party did not win seats. However, the religious political struggles caused frictions within the main Hindu and Muslim organizations that had members of predominantly the PPP and PNC. The main Hindu body, Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha divided into the Sasenarine Maharaj and Reepu Daman Prasad fraction (F, Personal Communication, March 26th, 2014). The former joined the PNC and became coalition Member of Parliament, while the latter remained in the PPP. Reepu eventually established an own organization in 1970: the Guyana Hindu Dharmic Sabha. Among the Muslims the main organization Guyana United Sadr Islamic Anjuman (GUSIA) split into the fractions of Yacoob Ali (PPP supporter) and Mohammed Nizar (PNC member) (ibid). These fractions did not benefit from the ‘responses’. According to a Muslim informant the Islamic leaders were more drawn to political issues rather than religious programs and that ‘nothing was being done for our religious community’ (F, Personal Communication, September 14th, 2012). A similar experience was reported among the Hindus (V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). 5.3.3  ‘Responses’ Guyana 1968–1992 Between 1968 and 1992, Guyana had an authoritarian regime of the PNC that limited institutional ‘responses’ of Hindus and Muslims. There were no ‘responses’ in terms of government policies. This is due to the use of coercion against threatened public activities of religious groups by the Creole Christian dominated government, division among Hindu and Muslim organizations as a result of political rivalry, and large scale emigration. The PNC violently boycotted all activities including those of religious groups that were considered a threat to the government. There were incidents of Hindus being physically attacked when their religious activities opposed the ‘public order’. The next statement by a Hindu informant is illustrative: Well … they (PNC) sent soldiers. For example I can remember a few things. My mother when she was pregnant. She was held at gunpoint. Because they were going to have a show at queen’s college. And Burnham did not feel that they should have that show. Because my father (author: leader of Hindu Dharmic Sabha), again was very popular so when he had anything lots of Hindus would go. Lots of Indians would go. And they didn’t like that kind of influence. (….) They used to have a raksha bandhan (author: Hindu festival) show. And that hall was taken away from them. That was surrounded by police. And it was taken away. She had guns pointed to her. And then they got someone else to offer another hall and they went ahead and did it. Which was not under the control of government. And that was only one. Many times

140  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations when he had to travel across the country to these jag’s (author: Hindu religious prayers) or to speak on religious issue’s he would be prevented. They would like lock him up. They would search him. They would beat him, they would do anything pretty much to prevent him engaging with people. (V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014) The boycott of Hindu public activities with armed forces occurred in a larger context of political rivalry between the PNC and the PPP. The Hindu leader of the Dharmic Sabha was an important member of the PPP and therefore his religious activities were suspected of political rebellion against the PNC. Noteworthy is that Burnham’s regime not only violently hampered Hindu practices, but also other activities that threatened his rule such as traditional Christians. Meetings of the Guyana Council of Churches for instance were boycotted by thug groups related to the PNC (D, Personal Communication, September 13th, 2012). This council began to oppose Burnham after he nationalized all schools in 1976 and increasingly after the murder of Walter Rodney, who was a leading scholar gaining large influence of people against PNC. The boycott of the GCC was executed by the House of Israel, a so called religious body with a controversial leader Rabbi Washington. Illustrative for the boycott is the following statement about a GCC meeting in 1985 by a Christian informant: GCC had organized a meeting in St. Andrews church. It was a women’s meeting, a women’s function. And if I can remember, because I was president of GCC at the time. And I had been responsible for the selection of passages to be read you know, from the prophets. These prophets announced the state at the time. The women’s organization of the PNC, political party, went to St. Andrews and disrupted the meeting. They broke up the meeting and pulled down the decorations and banner. And then there was another thing at the youth center in Subryanville, a meeting organised by the Guyana Council of Churches. And the PNC went and broke up the meeting (…). (D, Personal Communication, September 13th, 2012) ‘Responses’ were also hampered by mass emigration as a result of economic and political crisis during the PNC regime. With this emigration, all religious organizations faced a decline in their membership. But this particularly had a negative impact on the potential of Hindu and Muslim organizations to respond to Christian dominance. One of such organizations was the Islamic body called the Central Islamic Organization of Guyana (CIOG). It conducted various religious and social welfare programs in the 1980s (F, Personal Communication, September 14th, 2012. Another organization was the Hindu Dharmic Sabha. It could not adequately carry

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  141 out religious programs, for it lacked manpower and expertise in Guyana (P, Personal Communication, March 20th, 2014). Mass emigration created a gap in human resources for executing activities, and religious leadership. Chickrie (2007, p. 17) states: ‘By 1980 many people fled the hard economic life and dictatorship of Guyana, and many of the learned Muslims were part of this exodus. Ahmad Ehwaas left Guyana in 1981 for Libya, Yasin Khan left in early 1982 and Duad Abdul Haqq left in late 1982’. In the 1970s, Hindu and Muslim ideological ‘response’ aimed at increasing respect and dignity for own religion and names. As explained in Chapter 4, at that time there was a general belief that Christian names were better than those of Hindus. In the 1970s, the Hindu Dharmic Sabha attempted to change this belief by promoting modern Hindu names that appealed to the younger generation and encouraging members not to be ashamed of the Hindu identity (V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). While ‘responses’ were limited, dominance of traditional Christians was reduced by the PNC government. Burnham nationalized all denominational schools in 1976 (C, Personal Communication, December 4th, 2013). It should be remarked here that in 1961 only 50 Christian schools were nationalized (Mattai, 1977, p. 220). In 1976, all denominational schools were taken over by the government. But as Christians had most schools, the nationalization struck their influence in the country the hardest. Religious education was removed (V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014) and the employment of teachers was no longer in the hands of the churches, which significantly countered the institutional and ideological superiority of Christianity in the nation. There were two reactions on the nationalization of schools. On the one hand traditional churches and their members protested against the government (Morrison, 1998) but on the other hand it was a relief to the Hindus and Muslim who were no longer compelled to convert for a teaching job. A Christian informant pointed out that the nationalization of the schools made Christianized Indians convert back to Hinduism and Islam after 1976. This was particularly the case among East Indian Presbyterians. They largely became Hindu and Muslims (D, Personal Communication, September 13th, 2012). Hindu and Muslim informants mentioned that Burnham had reduced Christian dominance, yet maintained some Christian superiority in education, religious practices, and civil services. This government for instance nationalized the denominational schools, but it did not remove the practice of Christian prayers in the morning. At least, not at all schools. According to a Hindu informant, some schools still had Christian prayers in the morning, which is considered a serious threat for non-Christians as it influenced religious preferences of children (V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). Another issue was the ban of Hindu products in the 1980s, during the economic crisis. There was a stop on import of typical East Indian goods that were used for Hindu rituals such as daal (yellow peas), flour, and ghee (clarified butter) (ibid). Consequently, Hindus could not make

142  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations prasad, which is a basic offering of flour and ghee during religious services (ibid). With respect to civil services, Hindus and Muslims who did not belong to the religious body supporting the PNC – as said before both organizationally split into PPP and PNC fraction – could not find a government job. But getting such an employment was possible for those aligned to the government. A Muslim informant explained that if one applied for a job in civil service, you would not get employment. But if you were a Muslim related to the Muslim body that supported the PNC fraction you could get such a job. You then had to visit the leader of this fraction, who was a Member of Parliament, and he would write a recommendation letter (F, Personal Communication, September 14th, 2012). Christians in particular of African descent, however, did not have such restrictions on government employment. It could be concluded that Burnham’s policy, which was part of the political rivalry along ethnic lines, had implications for religious groups. The Christian dominance over Hindus and Muslims in government jobs during his regime was more a result of political interventions rather than of power by Christian institutions. 5.3.4  ‘Responses’ Guyana 1992–2014 In the 1992–2014 period, there were more responses of Hindus and Muslims to the influence of Evangelical churches than to traditional Christians in Guyana. This should be understood against the background of the increasing influence of Evangelicals. They had a strong missionary work resulting in conversion of many people of traditional Christian denominations and non-Christian groups. Chapter 4 mentioned that between 1980 and 2012 the share of Evangelicals in the population increased from 4% to 28%, at the cost of the number of Hindus and other traditional Christians. An important institutional ‘response’ to dominance of traditional Christians was the lobby for removing the practice of Christian prayers at public schools. These practices had been inherited from the dominance of traditional churches during colonial times. According to a Hindu informant, when Burnham nationalized the denominational schools he did not change the practice of prayers in the morning (V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). These were still conducted at some public schools. The respondent mentioned that the Hindu Dharmic Sabha talked to the Minister of Education who was ‘about to do something about it’ (ibid). This ‘response’ was influenced by the involved private Hindu institution, and religious leadership. The Hindu Dharmic Sabha conducted activities to encourage the Hinduism-mindedness of its followers and discourage them to convert to other religions (ibid). Its religious leadership explicitly disapproved Christian prayers at public schools. It was argued that prayers at public schools should be universal rather than represent a particular religious group since these influence the religious preferences of children. 30

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  143 The responses to the influence of Evangelicals were more ideological than institutional. Informants of Hindu and Muslim background explicitly stated that they were trying to educate their members and guard them against conversion to Christianity. In the view of a Muslim informant Islamic organizations had to educate their members: We don’t have facts and figures which regard conversion but we are aware that Muslims have left Islam and become Christians. I don’t think this is in a large number in my opinion, I’m not sure (…), but it is a concern and therefore it means that we have to make efforts to continuously educate our people. (…) our job as Muslims is to take care of our own, take care of our people, educate them and we intend to intensify our efforts in this to strengthen understanding of Islam among Muslims and also reach out to other denominations to understand Islam. (…) Inviting them to forums. Inviting them to meetings. Inviting them to the mosque (…) Giving them literature. We have programs on television that we share out Qorans… and so forth. (F, Personal Communication, March 26th, 2014) Hindu organizations looked more concerned than Muslim organizations about responses to missionary work of Evangelicals. A Hindu informant said: The influence of Christian church was a serious concern for many Hindu’s. Pandit Reepu Persad was very concerned about it, he wanted the Hindu organizations to become united in order to see how they could overcome the challenges of Christianity. (…) How could we get the people back and prevent this from happening again. (S, Personal Communication, March 25th, 2014) Education was considered the answer to ensure the maintenance of Hinduism in Guyana (P, Personal Communication, March 20th, 2014). As a Hindu informant argued, the Hindu Dharmic Sabha was trying to encourage the practice of Hinduism by organizing events and providing religious educating at their private school as much as possible (ibid). The following issue of this thesis will deal with the influence of ‘responses’ on interreligious relations in Guyana.

5.4  Interreligious Relations in Guyana ‘Responses’ as expressed by the legalization of cremation and marriages of Hindus and Muslims reduced Christian dominance and encouraged the religious equality of Hindus and Muslims in the Guyanese nation. Laws do not only regulate public life, but also contain ideological views that assign groups a certain social status in society. By giving marriages and cremation

144  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations a legal basis, the government also recognized Hindus and Muslims as equal to Christians. There are other policies that contributed to the decline of the dominance of Christians in public resources: the nationalization of Christian denominational schools, the removal of practices of baptism required for civil service jobs. With these policies, equality of Hindus and Muslims was further enhanced and a basis for concerted diversity was stimulated. ‘Responses’ did not only encourage but also seemed to limit processes of concerted diversity. As said before, Hindus and Muslims responded to dominance of Evangelicals, and the former group was more concerned about this dominance. Unlike Muslims, Hindus are not members of the interreligious organization (IRO). This was established in 2003 initially having representatives of traditional and Evangelical churches, Hindus, Muslims, and other small religious groups (R, Personal Communication, December 13th, 2013). However, Hindus are no longer a member of the organization. They prefer to be independent and work on social issues (V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). A possible reason why Hindus were no longer part of the IRO may be related to ‘responses’. There were many various Evangelical churches in IRO and Hindu organizations condemned the drive of conversion by this Christian denomination. Another factor threatening concerted diversity was the perceived political control of IRO. This umbrella interreligious organization was considered to be linked to the PPP, which was explained by an Evangelical informant: IRO was a political something, was a political influence. It was president Jagdeo’s brain child. Most Christian churches do didn’t not support IRO. (…) And Jagdeo was trying….you see religion was very powerful force in Guyana. And he was trying to bring the religions together. It was organisation that was politically larger with influence in there. You see the PPP has never had any Christian support, ‘cause it was predominantly Indian. Some Indian people had a lot of reservations. (…) Though they had some prominent Hindus in PPP, but many Christians in the IRO were attracted by president Jagdeo to bring the religions together, whether it meant we were controlling them. So he said he would offer them a Christian television station, that’s still in the kart. And the IRO you see got this championship of Edgill who was a Christian minister. People saw that it was a political thing that Jagdeo himself started today, with the aims of controlling Christians, Hindus and Muslims and political gain. And use the churches’ religious influence to support what the government was doing, right. So they never really got, most Evangelicals and Pentecostals don’t have anything to do with. (W, Personal Communication, September 20th, 2012) The IRO confirmed that it didn’t have all the support of the political parties, particularly of the opposition. The perceived linkage of the IRO

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  145 as a political instrument of the coalition restricted concerted diversity processes. Some Evangelical churches that did not support the political alignment of the IRO did not want to become member of this body. The founding of IRO was influenced by the government. According to a Muslim informant President Jagdeo was inspired to organize a harmony week in Guyana when he came back from a visit to the Middle East (F, Personal Communication, September 14th, 2012). Other factors that influenced interreligious relations in Guyana were government policies and religious leadership. In the conceptual framework, these two factors had an impact on ‘responses’ and the latter in turn affected interreligious relations. Analyses of Guyana showed that government policies and religious leadership could have a direct influence on interreligious relations. In this nation the PNC government introduced Hindu and Muslim national holidays, which were no ‘responses’, but a policy in a larger context of socialism. With this policy Christian dominance was reduced. Religious leadership was an important factor in interreligious cooperation projects, which reflected religious harmony. Guyana had various state and non-state supported projects in which Christians, Hindus, and Muslims were involved. A state supported project was the establishment of an interreligious TV channel for all religious groups. Religious organizations of Christian, Hindus, and Muslims were involved in the decisionmaking of this project (V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). A non-state-supported activity involving interreligious cooperation was a leadership program of the Guyana Muslim Youth league. It was a project which provided training in basic accountancy, presentation, and writing skills. It targeted especially religious communities in rural areas such as Black Bush Polder. Non-Muslims, especially Christians, were involved in this by providing the church building as the training location (S, Personal Communication, March 25th, 2014). Interreligious cooperation may be understood by the religious leadership in Guyana. Various Christian, Hindu, and Muslim leaders held and promoted views on mutual understanding. The following quote of a Hindu religious leader is illustrative: Each person has their own vision, their own way of seeing God. Different perspective of seeing. What Krishna (author: Hindu God) may appeal to you, Shiva (author: Hindu God) may appeal to you but not me. Christ may appeal to another one. Allah may appeal to another. We don’t tell people that look if you don’t believe in Krishna. Because we believe in the concept we’ve all born divine. So your birth is divine. So they have a God exists … In you and in me. All of God come it man and out of man come it God. So we are very different and we … And it’s something that no other religion or culture has. (PB, 8th December, 2013)

146  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations Positive views on religious diversity were also propagated by Muslim leaders, the traditional Christian denominations and even some Evangelical churches.31 While ‘responses’ reduced Christian dominance and encouraged concerted diversity, the perceived dominance of Hindus by Christians was a challenging factor. According to traditional and Evangelical Christian religious leaders, the PPP government restricted the granting of marriage licenses to their organizations in 2014. Hindus and Muslims on the contrary did not have such experiences. The following statement by an Evangelical informant is illustrative: It is far easier for Hindus than Christians … there is some discrimination to marry people you need a license from the government. And normally somebody has to apply for you, some Hindu organization, or Christian body. It is easier to get your application approved if you’re a Hindu than Christian. There would be one Christian minister and four Hindu men as a marriage officer in one area. It is easier. People know that. It is fact. (W, Personal Communication, March 25th, 2014) A Catholic informant personally experienced the difficulty in getting a license for Christian marriage officers. He said that his organization yearly applied for work permits for foreign missionaries including those who already worked in Guyana and newcomers. Recently a letter of the government to the Catholic Church stated that work permits were only given on replacement basis which meant that more missionaries from abroad couldn’t be recruited. When he complained about this to the officials, they gave him the impression that the letter would be corrected. However, this did not occur: (…) ‘I have never had a letter saying the opposite. They also take a lot time to give us permit. It is not necessary. Now you get a permit for three years, so it is bit easier. It is if they are in control’ (F, Personal Communication, March 26th, 2014). 5.4.1  Case Study Neighborhood Kitty To better understand concerted diversity in the nation, an instrumental case study on the neighborhood Kitty was performed. It was meant to illustrate the role of spatial distribution and neighborliness in concerted diversity, which were hard to examine at the national level. Kitty is a former sugar plantation, part of the sugar estate ‘La Penitence Estate Limited’, named after the daughter of the owner (A Brief History of the Church of Holy Rosary and St. Anthony 1897–1996, 1997). In 1847, Kitty was declared a country district (ibid). Most of the streets of Kitty were named after colonial authorities, Christian saints, and people living initially in the area.

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  147 Kitty had been multireligious since the early 20th century, but then there were more Christians than Hindus and Muslims. By the 1960s, the population consisted of 7247 Creoles and 4233 East Indians (Layne, 1970). Since most Creoles were Christian, and Indians predominantly Hindu, it could be assumed that Kitty consisted more of Christians than Hindus. By the early 1920s, the ethnic and religious composition changed. According to the census there were 3648 Creoles, 3408 East Indians, 2358 Mixed, and various other small groups (Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2007). Officially, the entire neighborhood consisted for 68% of Christians, 22% of Hindus, and 5% of Muslims. The research area, which is smaller, had by and large the similar religious composition as that of the census: 71% Christian, 18% Hindu, and 5% Muslim.32 Since the early 19th till the mid-20th century, the Anglicans had been the most dominant Christian denomination in Kitty. They were among the pioneering Christian denominations with a church founded in 1857 (Hernandez, 2009), a graveyard, and a primary school (Duke, 2000). The respective Anglican Church, St. James – the-Less, had an important role in training missionaries for an East Indian mission (ibid), the so called ‘Bel Air Coolie Missions’ in the colony established in 1874 (Mangru, 1977). As part of these missions St. James – the-Less also held special sermons in Hindi to attract East Indian followers in the neighborhood (Mangru, 1977, p. 95). There were other churches in Kitty like those of the Catholics (founded in 1897) (A Brief History of the Church of Holy Rosary and St. Anthony 1897–1996, 1997), the Methodists and the Brethren society. As in the nation, in Kitty the dominance of traditional Christians declined, while that of Evangelical churches emerged. Most illustrative for the declining dominance of traditional churches is the number of baptized persons in the Anglican Church. In 1950, 1961, 1970, and 1980 the church baptized 148, 114, 139, and 77 people, respectively (‘1962 Statistics of the Church’, 1962; ‘1970 Statistics of the Church’, 1971; ‘1981 Report and Appendices’, 1981; and ‘Reports and Appendices’, 1951). An important explanation was the emigration of people and the adherence to evangelical churches. According to an Anglican informant, many members of the Anglican Church passed away and left country, while others joined evangelicalism. Evangelical churches had been founded at an increasing rate since the 1980s. By 2014, we counted 16 Evangelical churches. Their dominance is both ideological and institutional. In terms of spatial distribution, Kitty was religiously mixed. There were no concentration areas of religious groups, which was an important explanation for the relative positive views of people on each other’s religion. A Christian informant mentioned that he lit dias (lamps) with other children and put these in a trench (S, Personal Communication, December 7th, 2013). Christian, Hindu, and Muslim informants in Kitty explained that they had good interreligious relations referring to their shared religious celebrations, swapping food during religious festivals (S, Personal

148  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations Communication, December 7th, 2013; PB, 8th December, 2013). It was argued that Kitty was a religiously mixed community where people lived besides and close to families with different religious backgrounds, which points at the influence of spatial distribution and neighborliness. According to Christian, Hindu, and Muslim informants there were no forms of interreligious cooperation between religious organizations between 1950 and 2014. However, there are indications that this existed before the 1950s when cremation was illegal. Kitty had a cemetery that was shared by Hindus and Christians. According to a record of the Catholic Church Hindus used ¾ of the plot, while Catholics used one quarter (A Brief History of the Church of Holy Rosary and St. Anthony 1897–1996, 1997). Since they shared the same physical space, it was likely that the Catholic Church and the Hindu organization must have interacted about the dates of burials and maintenance of the place. 5.4.2 Integration Case Study of Guyana and the Conceptual Framework The analyses of the case study of Guyana have implications for the conceptual framework of interreligious relations and ‘responses’. Figure 5.2 presents the adjusted framework with the key empirical results. Here the interaction between ‘responses’ and Christian dominance is better clarified. Between 1950 and 2014, Christian dominance in Guyana changed. This change included a decline of the dominance of traditional Christians, which existed in 1950, and the increasing influence of Evangelicals. The latter population was growing at the cost of the membership of mainly traditional Christians and Hindus, and to some extent Muslims. Dominance of

Figure 5.2  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations in Guyana 1950–2014.

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  149 traditional Christians in the 1950s differed from the influence of Evangelicals by 2014 in terms of government policies. Traditional Christians used to be privileged over Hindus and Muslims in public resources. This influence of government policies is not noticed in the dominance of Evangelicals. The case study of Guyana added one more factor to the conceptualization of dominance: spatial distribution. It was argued before that this factor could only be responsible for understanding concerted diversity. However, the analyses of the emerging influence of Evangelicals indicate that spatial distribution was considered in missionary work of this denomination. And missionary work can be an indicator of Christian dominance. Another addition of the case study of Guyana is that ‘responses’ can result into more than one form of interreligious relations. These forms were decreased Christian dominance and concerted diversity (Figure 5.2). Concerted diversity is mostly illustrated by the national umbrella interreligious organization, the IRO. The active participating members were Muslims and Evangelical churches. There were also other smaller groups such as Bahais.

5.5  Comparing Suriname and Guyana The adjusted conceptual frameworks of Suriname and Guyana (Figures 5.1 and 5.2) added one more explanatory factor of Christian dominance and ‘responses’: spatial distribution. Chapter 2 linked this factor only to concerted diversity. But the case of Suriname showed clearly that spatial distribution mattered in the institutional ‘responses’ in terms of founding schools in the 1950–1979 period. The case of Guyana clarified that the organization of missionary work of Evangelicals was influenced by spatial distribution. They conducted crusades and provided well fare services in neighborhoods with poor Hindus. The comparison of the Surinamese and Guyanese nations also showed that ‘responses’ do not necessarily lead to one particular form of interreligious relations: religious dominance or concerted diversity. The two cases showed that both forms can coexist. Finally, the empirical analyses have shown that differences in demography can have implications for interreligious relations. Suriname had an immigration of Javanese Muslims, which influenced the religious demography. This was not the case in Guyana. Due to these differences, in the evolution of interreligious relations in Suriname more religious groups were involved than Guyana. 5.5.1  ‘Responses’ Suriname and Guyana 1900–1950 After explaining the major findings of the comparison of the conceptual framework of Suriname and Guyana, this section now elaborates on the subperiods. It compares the nations of Suriname and Guyana on Hindu

150  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations Table 5.5  ‘Responses’ Suriname and Guyana 1900–1950 Religious Group

Dimension

Suriname

Guyana

Hindus

Ideological

Informal religious education

Institutional

School Orphanage Request subsidies Marriage law Request cremation Law Informal religious education Request subsidies Marriage law

Informal religious education Syncretism School Request Hindi education Request marriage law

Muslims

Ideological Institutional

Informal religious education Request Urdu education Request marriage law

and Muslim responses to Christian dominance and the influence of these on interreligious relations. With respect to the 1900–1950 period, the main finding is that institutional ‘responses’ in terms of government policies differed between Suriname and Guyana (Table 5.5). As opposed to Guyana, in Suriname the Hindu and Muslim marriages were legalized, while this was not the case in Guyana. The differences in ‘responses’ between Suriname and Guyana in 1900– 1950 period can be understood by the colonial government policies. Compared to the Dutch, the British had less flexible government policies on Hindu and Islamic practices. Both colonizers allowed practices of the two religious groups as long as these did not threaten the political order and economic profits. But unlike the British, the Dutch made cultural policies for facilitating Hindu and Muslim practices with the ultimate aim to foster economic profits. Education in Hindi and Urdu was provided on the so-called coolie and dessa schools, and the Hindu and Muslim marriage law was introduced (Ramsoedh, 1990). The Dutch argued that these policies were necessary to improve the social circumstances of indentured workers that in turn had to improve labor rest and productivity. The British made no serious cultural policies to facilitate Hindu and Muslim practices at the macro level. Moreover, the British restricted religious practices that seemed threatening to its empire. Two particular cases support this: refusing immigration of a leading Arya Samaj missionary and the surveillance of a visiting Sanatan priest probably from the Bharmic caste in the 1910s.33 Both persons were suspected of provoking the Indians against the colonial rule in British Guiana under disguise of religious lectures. The British colonizer did not only restrict religious practices in British Guiana, but also in its other colony Trinidad and Tobago. In the latter society, the colonizer passed an ordinance on Festivals of Immigrants in

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  151 1884 to discourage Tadja, an Islamic festival involving marches, the use of drum and sticks. This holiday was perceived as a threat to the labor rest on the plantations, since people often became involved in violent fights (Algoe, 2011). This shows that the British were indeed more careful and suspicious about religious celebrations during colonial times. The less flexible colonial policies toward Hindus and Muslims in British Guiana than in Suriname may be associated with the economic structure. These two religious groups worked in the sugar sector, which was a critical source of income in both colonies. After the international sugar crisis at the turn of the 19th century, the importance of this sector declined in Suriname as opposed to British Guiana (Menke & Egger, 1993). Illustrative was the share of sugar export in the total export between 1895 and 1940. In Suriname this percentage declined from 23% to 5%, while in British Guiana it dropped from 67% to 54% (ibid, p. 23). In contrast to Suriname, the sugar sector in British Guiana maintained its major contribution to the total export. Consequently, the importance of this sector remained for the British while it declined for the Dutch.34 This economic context might have encouraged the British to be more careful toward perceived labor threats than the Dutch and explain the less flexible colonial policies of the former on Hindu and Islamic practices. There are two important similarities between Suriname and Guyana in the ‘responses’ between 1900 and 1950. First is the ideological ‘responses’ in terms of informal religious education (Table 5.5). The commonality should be understood by the role of religious leaders and institutions who attempt to institutionalize the practice of the Hinduism and Muslims in both nations. More interesting is the second similarity, the institutional ‘responses’ of Arya Samaj by founding denominational schools. As far as examined, according to historical records it was the only Hindu denomination that established a formal school, which is explained by its international missionary approach (see Sections 5.1.1 and 5.2.1). Arya Samaj was a reformist movement emerged in India that was against the conversion to Christianity conservative Hindu beliefs about women and caste. It had a stronger focus on education than Sanatanists. 5.5.2  ‘Responses’ Suriname 1950–1979 and Guyana 1950–1962 It was assumed in Chapter 2 that the access of Hindus and Muslims to political decision-making power were required for significantly changing government policies and structurally reducing Christian dominance. Therefore ‘responses’ were analyzed in subperiods based on turning points in this access. The current section compares the ‘responses between Suriname from 1950 to 1979 and Guyana from 1950 to 1962. It is the period when Hindus and Muslims had enlarged access to political decision-making power.

152  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations Table 5.6  ‘Responses’ Suriname 1950–1979 and Guyana 1950–1968 Religious group

Dimension

Suriname

Guyana

Hindus

Ideological

Informal religious education

Institutional

Schools Subsidies to schools and orphanages Cremation law National holidays Informal religious education Schools Subsidies to schools and orphanages National holidays

Informal religious education Syncretism Schools Nationalization Christian schools Cremation law Marriage law Informal religious education Schools

Muslims

Ideological Institutional

Government policies had an important impact on the institutional ‘responses’ in Suriname from 1950 to 1979 and in Guyana from 1950 to 1962. These were the periods of internal autonomy and independence that gave local people more opportunities to participate in the decisionmaking of national policies than before. After the representation of Hindu and Muslim Members of Parliament, Guyana introduced the cremation and marriage law, as well as nationalized 51 Christian schools. Suriname introduced legal changes to make cremations executable, declared Hindu and Muslim national holidays, and made laws on subsidies to Hindu and Muslim denominational schools and orphanages (Table 5.6). A critical difference with the institutional ‘responses’ is that Suriname had far more Hindu and Muslim schools than Guyana. Suriname had about 26 Hindu schools largely owned by Arya Samaj, and 8 Muslim schools of which the majority belonged to Javanese Sunnis. Guyana had far less Hindu and Muslim denominational schools (Table 5.6). Records indicate that Hindu organizations owned at least four (two by Sanatan Dharma and two by Arya Samaj), while the Muslims none. The higher number of Hindu and Muslim schools in Suriname than Guyana can be explained by the ideology of government. In Suriname, the governments were based on forms of consociationalism, where political power was shared between elites of religious and ethnic groups. This power was used for favoring the own voters. As Adama (2005) stated the first political parties were based on ethnicity and religion and aimed at improving the social upward mobility of their own group. Various traditional political parties highly relied on religious organizations. This differed from Guyana, where the political parties held western political ideologies. The People’s Progressive Party (PPP) had predominant Marxist and socialist ideologies; its activities had a communist nature (Sukhram, 2013). It was

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  153 the first political party which was founded in a context of labor strikes on sugar plantations in 1949. The PPP was the transformation of the Political Affairs Committee (PAC) that built on the experiences with these strikes. The PAC held meetings with laborers with different ethnic backgrounds throughout the colony and soon its members agreed to transform the body into a political organization (‘The Establishment of the PPP’, n.d.). PAC consisted of a group of professionals and intellectuals (McDonald, 1969). Due to these differences in the ideological background of the political parties in Suriname, Hindus and Muslims benefited more from political decision-making power than in Guyana. In the former nation this power enabled both religious groups to enlarge the state support to denominational schools. With political decision-making power, Hindus and Muslims were able to introduce laws on subsidies to denominational schools which was critical for maintenance of these institutions. In Guyana political decision-making power of Hindus and Muslims, however, was used for nationalizing Christian schools. The government took over the schools. Denominational schools had to be run with private resources. Financial resources were critical for maintaining denominational schools. It is an important explanation why in Suriname Hindu and Muslim organizations could establish and sustain these schools as opposed to Guyana. It was assumed that with the longer duration of democratically elected governments in Suriname, Hindus and Muslims would have more possible access to political decision-making power and thus increased advantages for ‘responses’. The empirical analyses however show that not just this power, but rather the ideology behind this power is more important for ‘responses’. Suriname and Guyana did not only differ on the institutional ‘responses’ in the educational sphere, but also in terms of a Hindu and Muslim marriage law and public holidays. In Suriname this marriage law (1940) existed before Guyana (1957) which should be understood by the colonial government policies and the relations among Hindu and Muslim organizations. Unlike in Guyana, the Hindu and Muslim marriages in Suriname were legalized as part of colonial policies aimed at enhancing the representation of marginalized groups in public sectors (Ramsoedh, 1990). In Guyana such policies did not exist. Another issue is that Hindu and Muslim leaders appealed for a marriage law and a bill was drafted in the 1920s. There was a committee who had to finalize the bill, but it seemed that Hindus and Muslims wanted some changes they could not agree on. As a result, the marriage bill remained in draft form by the 1950s (‘National Assembly Hansard Report of Debates. Third Session. 25 April 1956–28 June 1957’, 1957, p. 2709). As regards the Hindu and Muslim public holidays, in Suriname these were a ‘response’ rather than in Guyana. In the latter nation the respective holidays were introduced as part of a socialist government policy with limited involvement of Hindu and Muslim organizations.

154  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations In addition to the institutional ‘responses’, Suriname and Guyana also differed on the ‘ideological’ responses. In Guyana syncretic practices of Hinduism and Christianity seemed common rather than in Suriname. Informants pointed out that it was common to organize two types of marriages between persons with a Hindu and Christian background. It was also not unique to have burial ceremonies with Hindu and Muslim religious leaders. In Suriname this occurred, but it was not considered a common phenomenon. A reason may be the stronger Christian dominance in Guyana than Suriname in the 1900–1950 period as discussed in Chapter 4. The comparison of Suriname and Guyana confirmed that during ‘responses’ government policies were significant in reducing Christian dominance. This was influenced by political decision-making power, but more importantly by the ideologies of governments. In Suriname, governments were based on principles of consociationalism where political power was shared between exponents of different religious and ethnic groups. Their political parties aimed at general improvement of social status of subordinate groups by providing more access to public resources which worked favorably for ‘responses’ and the institutionalization of Hinduism and Islam. In Guyana, the coalition had a predominant socialist and Marxist ideology, which led to different ‘responses’ such as nationalization of Christian schools and a reduced access to public resources such as subsidies. It was assumed that the type of electoral system would have consequences for ‘responses’ in Suriname and Guyana. The proportional representation was considered more advantageous than the majoritarian model as the former favored political power sharing and thus also ‘responses’ (See Chapter 2). The comparison of both countries showed that the electoral system had influenced the access of Hindus and Muslims to political decision-making power; however, this did not automatically benefit the ‘responses’. Sometimes ‘responses’ were given without such power, e.g. the passing of laws on subsidies to Hindu and Muslim institutions and cremation in Suriname in the 1950s. Neither did the access to political decision-making power by definition created grounds for favorable ‘responses’. This was the case in Guyana in 1963. This nation had the majoritarian model or the so called ‘first past the post’ (‘About Guyana. Background and history’, n.d.). In 1963, the constitution was changed with some provisions for equal representation system, but this limited the access of Hindus and Muslims to political decision-making power. The constitution theoretically allowed an equal representation of Colonial Office and Guyanese nationals, but in practice the government appointed less Colonial Office members. Consequently, the approval of the British government was required for taking decisions (Mattai, 1977, p. 215). With this system the PPP was weakened even though it was in political office till 1963. In 1964, the proportional representation system was introduced which brought the PNC and UF in power with

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  155 further colonial support (‘About Guyana. Background and history’, n.d.; ‘Electoral conditions in Guyana’, n.d.). Except for the ideology of the ruling party, this thesis also identified the influence of spatial distribution ‘responses’ in terms of the founding of schools in Suriname. This factor was not included in the conceptual framework of ‘responses’. In Suriname, both Arya Samajis and Javanese Sunnis founded denominational schools in remote rural areas with a concentration of their members between 1950 and 1979. 5.5.3  ‘Responses’ Suriname 1980–1987 and Guyana 1968–1992 Suriname and Guyana were similar in having no institutional ‘responses’ during their regimes. Some ideological ‘responses’ by Hindus were however identified in Guyana. An important reason for the limited ‘responses’ in both nations was that their regimes restricted the working of social groups including religions by using the armed forces. This did not only apply to Hindus and Muslims, but to traditional Christians as well. The two nations were similar in strong criticism of traditional Christians on the regimes. In Suriname, the eight ‘December Killings’ were condemned, and in Guyana the assassination of Walter Rodney was severely criticized. The influence of traditional Christians on the regimes was countered. In Suriname, the military regime demanded the deportation of a Catholic priest who wrote cynical columns about the leaders in the nation in the newspaper (M, Personal Communication, July 26th, 2013). In Guyana, the meetings of GCC were violently interrupted. But, in the latter nation the political threats by Hindus to the regimes were also removed or boycotted. Particular Hindu shows and religious ceremonies were violently interrupted as these were considered threatening to the government. Such actions against Hindus in Suriname were not identified. Not only regimes, but large scale emigration in Suriname and Guyana also contributed to the reduction of ‘responses’. Both nations suffered from loss of leaders and members which affected the working of Hindu and Muslim religious organization (P, Personal Communication, March 20th, 2014; S, Personal Communication, July 7th, 2013). While ‘responses’ were restricted, Christian dominance changed in Suriname and Guyana. In Suriname, the government introduced policies on subsidies to Hindu and Muslim leaders, which further reduced dominance of Christians. In Guyana, the government nationalized all denominational schools that strongly discouraged Christian dominance. The difference with Suriname, however, is that Guyana maintained Christian dominance in some respect. The Guyanese government favored the predominantly Christian Creoles over the East Indians who were mainly Hindus and Muslims in civil service jobs and scholarships. Another issue is that the government banned the import of goods that were mostly used by East Indians for daily use and Hindu religious worship such as flour

156  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations and ghee. These government policies thus indirectly encouraged Christian dominance in Guyana. It should be noted that the regimes differed between Suriname and Guyana. In Suriname the military suspended Parliament for seven years, while in Guyana the PNC changed the constitution in such a way that it controlled the organization of three elections (1973, 1980, and 1985) and the state apparatus in its own favor. Before the 1968 national election, the PNC-dominated government introduced fundamental changes in the electoral system including control over electoral machinery (‘Electoral conditions in Guyana’, n.d.). A critical aspect of this machinery was the registration of voters, the counting of the votes, and the introduction of postal and overseas voting. All these aspects were manipulated by the PNC which resulted in fraudulent winning of elections in 1986, 1973, 1980, and 1985. The PNC remained in political office 1992. In the latter the elections were highly supervised by international observers (ibid). 5.5.4  ‘Responses’ Suriname 1987–2014 and Guyana 1992–2014 After the regimes, democratically elected governments provided again room for ‘responses’ in Suriname and Guyana. Remarkable in the latter nation was the death of Burnham in 1985. Under leadership of Hoyte (PNC), democracy was gradually restored. Both Suriname and Guyana experienced ideological ‘responses’ to the increasing influence of Evangelical churches. In Suriname, a Javanese Ahmadiyya mosque encouraged the practice of the own religion by providing sport activities, assistance with homework of children, and informal religious education (S, Personal Communication, 7th June 2016). With these activities, the respective mosque attempted to reduce conversion to Evangelicalism. This is, however, more a local than a national ‘response’ as it regards an individual mosque and not a national religious organization. In Guyana, Hindus and Muslims responded ideologically more at the national level to conversion missions by Evangelical churches. They for instance organized religious lectures in which the practice of the own religion was advocated (F, Personal Communication, March 26th, 2014; V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). In terms of institutional ‘responses’ unlike Guyana, Suriname declared one more Hindu and Muslim holiday. This ‘response’ is largely influenced by the access of Hindus and Muslims to political decision-making power, though in a different ideological framework. The respective holidays were declared during the NDP government, which was not a traditional political party representing Hindus and Muslims. It had board representatives of various religious groups (‘Hoofdbestuur’, n.d.) and applied a by and large anti-colonial and nationalist ideology with ideals of religious equality. The NDP had a particular alliance with the Sunni Muslims. Furthermore, the

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  157 NDP coalition included other parties such as KTPI, a traditional political party with large support of Javanese Muslims. 5.5.5  Influence ‘Responses’ in Suriname and Guyana As observed in the first chapter, ‘responses’ in the Caribbean were relatively less physically violent than other regions. The case study of Suriname and Guyana supports this observation. In both nations ‘responses’ included institutionalization of Hinduism and Islam, informal education, and syncretism which were not violent. This section will expand on the influence of ‘responses’ on interreligious relations from a comparative perspective. In Suriname, ‘responses’ reduced Christian dominance and introduced government policies that foster religious equality in public resources. The latter is required for concerted diversity. ‘Responses’ thus also enhanced the conditions for concerted diversity. In Guyana this impact of ‘responses’ was observed as well, however it was more challenged by the increasing influence of Evangelical churches. Both Hindu and Muslim leaders condemned the strong conversion campaigns by this Christian denomination, but Hindu organizations were more concerned about the large numbers of converts of their members (V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). Also possibly this is a reason why Hindu organizations were no longer member of the IRO, which had many Evangelical churches. In addition to the increased influence of Evangelical churches, concerted diversity in Guyana is also more challenged than in Suriname by the working of an umbrella interreligious organization. In Guyana this organization, the IRO, was perceived as a political instrument of the ruling party, the PPP. The IRO lacked support of political parties, mainly of the opposition. In Suriname, however, the umbrella interreligious organization, the IRIS, was not perceived as a political instrument for gaining votes among a particular religious group. The difference between IRO and IRIS may be explained by the circumstances under which both organizations were founded. The founding of IRO was influenced by the government. A Muslim informant said that President Jagdeo wanted to organize a harmony week in Guyana after a visit to the Middle East (F, Personal Communication, September 14th, 2012). This is how IRO was born. The IRIS in Suriname was an initiative of religious groups to have equal access to broadcast time on television. Later this initiative was broadened to social and religious matters (Marshall, 2007). According to traditional churches interreligious cooperation was already stimulated in the Guyana Council of Churches (GCC) in the 1970s, an umbrella organization with mainly traditional Christians. But such interreligious cooperation weakened gradually after the membership of Evangelical churches. Some leading traditional churches were dissatisfied with these Evangelical churches to such an extent that the traditional churches withdrew themselves from the GCC (D, Personal Communication, September 13th, 2012).

158  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations The political influence of involved Evangelical members in GCC was considered a major issue for the traditional churches (F, Personal Communication, March 26th, 2014). The participation in decision-making of government policies on public resources could also be a concern for concerted diversity in both Suriname and Guyana. Illustrative is the declaration of Hindu and Muslim holidays in Suriname where limited consultation of religious groups resulted into criticism in letters by Hindus against a Muslim holiday in 2011. In Guyana the matter was even worse, as certain policies were made without proper consultation such as the nationalization of schools, and acknowledgment of Hindu and Muslim holidays. The former policy led to public protests, while the latter made Hindu and Muslim organizations feel excluded. Nevertheless, Suriname and Guyana benefited from religious leadership, spatial distribution, and neighborliness in building relative religious harmony. In both nations, Christian, Hindu, and Muslim leaders stressed the need for mutual respect and religious equality (Algoe, 2009; F, Personal Communication, March 26th, 2014; V, Personal Communication, March 21st, 2014). Case studies of a neighborhood in Suriname and Guyana showed that living in each other’s proximity enhanced mutual understanding and social interactions between religious groups (Sections 5.1.3 and 5.2.3).

5.6 Conclusions In the initial conceptual framework, government policies were considered the most important factor for ‘responses’ as these policies allowed subordinate groups to structurally reduce religious dominance. The comparison of Suriname with Guyana showed that government policies in both nations significantly influenced Hindu and Muslim responses to the dominance of traditional Christians. However, religious leadership and private religious institutions in Suriname and Guyana affected the Hindu and Muslim responses to the increased influence of Evangelical churches, rather than government policies in the two nations. Access to political decision-making power is not a precondition for ‘responses’ as was assumed in Chapter 2. More important is the ideology of the government. In the initial conceptualization of ‘responses’, decision-making power by subordinate groups would enable to change government policies in such a way that religious dominance in public resources is reduced. At the same time subordinate groups could make policies to enhance their access to these resources. Evidence is found that the influence of political decision-making power can be overruled by the ideology of the government. This ideology determines the opportunities and intensity of ‘responses’ in terms of government policies. Spatial distribution does not only influence concerted diversity at the neighborhood level as assumed initially, but has an impact on

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  159 ‘responses’ as well. The empirical findings of Suriname have shown that spatial distribution can also affect ‘responses’ when subordinate groups establish religious institutions on locations where large numbers of their members live. Responses to religious dominance have implications for interreligious relations in a nation, but these implications are strongly affected by religious demography. Suriname and Guyana had different processes of religious mobility, mainly due to demographic factors. Unlike Guyana, Suriname experienced an immigration of Javanese Muslims with significant implications for the religious demography. This in its turn affected the evolution of interreligious relations in Suriname. The immigration of Javanese Muslims contributed to a more religiously diverse population and the involvement of more religious groups in interreligious relations in Suriname than Guyana. The findings of Chapters 4 and 5 indicated the initial conceptual framework of interreligious relations (Chapter 2) should be reviewed. The final part of the book will address this matter. It will discuss the relevance of the conceptual framework and present an adjusted version.

Notes 1 In 1910, 61 children were baptized, which increased to 182 in 1920 (Vernooij, 2012). 2 Bharat Oeday was established in 1910, but in 1920, the Javanese indentured immigrants split from this organization (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001). Consequently, Bharat Oeday only represented East Indians. 3 Arya Dewaker also gave ideological responses to Christian dominance. It provided informal religious education to raise critical awareness. Oedarajsingh Varma, an Arya Dewaker leader, for instance taught principles of religious equality by citing from the Bhagavat Gita, a sacred Hindu script: ‘Whatever and whichever way men approach Me, even so do I accept them; whatever paths they may choose finally leads to Me’ (OHM, n.d.). These verses were meant to clarify that there are many and equal forms of worship. Therefore it is not necessary to consider other religions, such as Christianity, as more important (ibid). 4 Ansarischool first provided informal religious Islamic education in Urdu and Arabic. But on requests of the Islamic society it was made into a formal primary school. 5 Amir Siregar was an Indonesian religious leader who sought to unite the reformist mosques of Javanese people through an umbrella organization (Soeropawiro, 2016). It is believed that Siregar was for purposes of study in Suriname (V, Personal Communication, September 4th, 2015). 6 Some non-political movements were Wi Eegi Sani representing the Creoles, and Hindostani Nawyuak Sabhaa (HNS) by the East Indians. Both were antagonistic toward each other. Wi Eegi Sani was established by Creole exponents who studied in the Netherlands, 1951. Its was strengthening the Surinamese culture, liberate local people from the colonial cultural supremacy, and independence (Marshall, 2003, p. 67). East Indians, however, perceived Wi Eegi Sani as an organization that emphasized the Creole culture. They felt insecure about it and as a response to a possible Creole dominance, established the HNS. The latter strived for strengthening the East Indian culture

160  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations by organizing public lectures and discussions about East Indian culture (ibid). HNS invited foreign intellectuals who spoke about Sanskrit, a language used in Hindu scriptures. HNS leaders objected the propagation of Creole culture as the best Surinamese culture (ibid). 7 The Javanese initially also joined the HJPP, but soon they left and established the Kaum Tani Persatuan Indonesia (KTPI) in 1947. The acronym of KTPI changed to Kerukunan Tulodo Prenatan Inggal in 1987 (Sedney, 2010, p. 186). 8 In the 1960–1970 period, some ideology oriented political parties were established: the Partij Nationalistisch Republiek (PNR), the Progressieve Arbeiders en Landbouwers Unie (PALU), Volkspartij (VP), Revolutionaire Volks Partij (RVP), and Socialistische Partij (SP) (Adama, 2005, p. 45). But these parties played a minor role in the ‘responses’ and hence receive little attention in the analyses of this thesis. 9 VHP initially stood for Verenigde Hindostaanse Partij (1946). But then it became the Vatkan Hitkari Partij (1967), and finally renamed to Vooruitstrevende Hervormings Partij (1973) (Sedney, 2010, p. 186). 10 He was a VHP Member of Parliament from 1959 to 1963. 11 Prior to Islam Ramdjan, NPS had other influential Muslim members such as Asgar Karamat Ali, who was an Ahmadiyya (Sedney, 2010). 12 Other small parties that did not fuse or sprout from VHP, KTPI, and NPS were the Partij Pembangnuan Rakijat Suriname (PPRS), Pergarakan Bangsa Indonesia Suriname (PBIS), and Christelijke Sociale Partij (CSP). Most of the small parties did not acquire significant political decision-making power between 1949 and 1979. Therefore, this study does not focus on them. 13 The first election was held in 1949. The NPS held political office, while VHP and KTPI were in the opposition (Menke, 2015). 14 Compiled by author based on overview of members in Staten van Suriname by Sedney (2010, p. 200). 15 Sanatan Dharma established its orphanage in 1959 (Hu-Ramdas, 2013), and the Surinamese Muslim Association founded its orphanage in 1972 (M, Personal Communication, September 11th, 2013). 16 This organization was established by a Christian (Biswamitre) and Hindu East Indian (Lachmon) to raise the cultural awareness of people (de Klerk, 1998, p. 192). In the 1940s, it organized a meeting for a guest from India (H. N. Kunzru) who arrived to the colony to get informed about the life circumstances of the migrants (Gobardhan-Rambocus, 2001, p. 330). 17 Keti Koti is a word in Sranan Tongo, the lingua franca of Suriname. It means literally ‘Broken Chain’ and refers to the abolition of slavery in 1863. 18 Compiled by author based on figures provided by van den Broek (2002). 19 Compiled by author based on the census of 2012. 20 The KTPI was a small coalition partner. 21 The CCK included representatives of predominantly traditional denominations: The Reformed Church, Lutherans, Catholics, Moravians, Anglicans, and Leger des Heils. 22 The first owners, Benjamin Beeke and Gerrit Pater, were members of the Reformed Church (Dikland, 2010). Pater’s heirs were in charge of Beekhuizen since 1750 till it was sold to the Moravian Company, Christoph Kersten & Co (CKC) in 1843 (‘Genealogy family Bosch Reitz’, 2012). 23 As stated before, de Bruijne (1976) reports that in the northern area of Abrabroki (Koningstraat) a third of the population was East Indian between 1895 and 1925. These people were probably Hindu. This can be assumed since shortly afterwards a Hindu temple was built in the same area in 1930 (‘Sanatan Dharma Anno-1975. Informatie en orientatie omtrent de grootste godsdienstige organisatie in Suriname’, n.d.).

‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations  161 24 Christian schools had a selective admission policy in Paramaribo. They used to prefer the admission of Christians over non-Christians with the consequence that the latter group converted their children only to get admitted. This was for instance reported on the Catholic school in Abrabroki (Ashruf, 1986, p. 163). A Muslim woman baptized her daughter in the Catholic Church to get admitted in the Catholic school (ibid). With respect to institutional dominance in employment, Christians in Abrabroki had a network of institutions and resources which facilitated their upward mobility. Especially the Saron church had close relationship with the Stadszending in the city, who lobbied for employment for the children of the orphanage (‘Brief uit het Kinderhuis te Saron. Aan onze Oud-Saron-kinderen’, 1929). Hindus and Muslims did not have similar institutions and networks. 25 The first election was held in 1949. The NPS held political office, while VHP and KTPI were in the opposition (Menke, 2015). 26 According to a Muslim informant, there was one Muslim school, the Indian educational trust college (later Richard Ishmael School) in Brickdam (F, Personal Communication, September 14th, 2012). But this is not a denominational school. It was a private school established by Richard Ishmael for children of indentured workers (‘History of the school’, n.d.). 27 It is reported that in 1963 ‘the Government recognized that private secondary schools were also making a social contribution to education and thus sought to subsidize schoolteachers salaries’ (‘History of the school’, n.d.). This may have contributed to the emergence of Hindu and Muslim denominational schools. 28 This campaign was a result of a cultural mission in the West Indies (Trinidad, Guyana, and Suriname) on request of the First Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1948. The aim of this mission was to preach and propagate Hinduism. Between 1948 and the 1950s, various Hindu leaders from India came to British Guiana as part of this mission. Local religious leaders supported this project, sponsored and facilitated the foreigners in the village Kitty, located in the city of Georgetown (Dibyananda, n.d.). 29 Memorandum for Appendix 1, pp. 1, 2; ‘New Holidays for Guyana’, The Guyana Graphic, January 24th, 1963. Cited in Mc Almont (2009). 30 In 2015, the Ministry of Education said to review this practice of Christian prayers, which is a preference of teachers and not a government policy, and inform schools about having interdenominational prayers (‘Government to review Christian prayers in public schools’, 2015). 31 Source: F, Personal Communication, September 14th, 2012; D, Personal Communication, September 13th, 2012; F, Personal Communication, March 26th, 2014. 32 In 2014, a survey was conducted in Kitty by the author using a sample size of 284. 33 Shiwcharan (1990, pp. 282–283) wrote about this ‘In December 1910, for instance Bhai Parmanand, a leading missionary of the reformist Hindu Arya Samaj movement visited the colony and delivered a series of lectures on India. In an address at the Georgetown Town Hall, he spoke on “Ancient India”. So paranoid were the colonial authorities, that they had refused him use of the Immigration Department to address his many local admirers. The Government of India deemed him “a dangerous man” and requested information on his activities overseas including British Guiana. His crime was that he was articulating pride in an ancient, pre-Moghul, Hindu India; feeding a resurgence of Indian self-confidence rooted in a Hindu, Aryanatavism; thus cultivating notions of the Indian’s capacity to govern himself’. Another Indian who was under surveillance in British Guiana was Dr. Ram Narayan Sharma.

162  ‘Responses’ and Interreligious Relations In 1911, his mails were impounded and Governor Llodgson requested special legislation to have him deported: he, also, was deemed subversive ‘a declassed (with some brains) but with the prestige of a high Brahman family’. (…) In 1916, the surveillance of Sharma and censorship of his mails were increased because he was ‘under suspicion in connection with the propagation of sedition amongst East Indians in the colony, with certain classes of whom he appears to have influence’. 34 Since 1870, the interest of the Dutch in the plantation economy of Suriname declined as they had better investment perspectives in Indonesia (Menke & Egger, 1993).

6

General Conclusions

The main objective of this study was to develop a conceptual framework of interreligious relations. More specifically the aim was to construct an alternative framework for understanding the evolution of the relative harmonious relations between religious groups in Caribbean societies by analyzing responses of subordinate groups to Christian dominance. A new framework is necessary as standard approaches with a socio-psychological (such as the Social Identity and Social Identity Development theories) and theological nature (for instance interreligious dialogue and religious pluralism) cannot adequately explain the relative harmonious interreligious relations in Caribbean societies. The respective socio-psychological theories emphasize the “distance” between groups by addressing the tendency of people to see the own group as more positive than others. The problem with ‘theological’ theories is that they implicitly depart from the view that religious homogeneity is required for religious harmony. There is a focus on common values as a condition to connect groups with each other, while we need a framework that goes beyond the need of commonalities to build harmonious and resilient societies. The study examined Hindu and Muslim responses to Christian dominance in Suriname and Guyana between 1950 and 2014. Both nations were compared as similar cases for their similarities in religious demography and private religious institutions. Suriname and Guyana differed in the access of Hindus and Muslims to political decision-making power, which was the basis for making theoretical assumptions. It was assumed that Guyana would have fewer opportunities for ‘responses’ as the access of Hindus and Muslims to political decision-making power was less than in Suriname.

6.1  Christian Dominance To understand ‘responses’, it was necessary to acquire insight in Christian dominance. This study compared the influence of four factors that were assumed to explain Christian dominance in Suriname and Guyana: government policies, religious demography, religious leadership, and private religious institutions. There was evidence was in both nations that DOI: 10.4324/9781003179269-6

164  General Conclusions religious demography and government policies were more influential on Christian dominance than religious leadership and private religious institutions. Between 1950 and 2014 Suriname and Guyana had in common an unchanged Christian demographic dominance as Christians remained the largest group in the population. Both nations had in common a declined dominance of traditional Christians and an increased influence of Evangelicals. However, there are two differences between Suriname and Guyana. The first difference is that Guyana kept its Christian majority and even experienced a slight percentual increase (from 59% to 63%), while in Suriname Christians remained stable at slightly less than 50% of the population. The second difference relates to Christian denominational demographic changes, which affected the nature of Christian dominance. In Guyana the share of traditional Christians declined more (from 57% to 34%) than in Suriname (from 47% to 37%) between 1950 and 2014. At the same time, the proportion of Evangelicals increased stronger in Guyana (from 1% to 28%) than in Suriname (from 0% to 11%). The demographic differences between Suriname and Guyana can be explained by migration, natural growth, and conversion. The precise influence of each factor could not be determined due to unavailable data. However, the different influence of conversion to traditional Christian denominations and Evangelicalism in both nations was evident. Compared to Suriname, the conversion of Hindus and Muslims to traditional Christian denominations in Guyana was larger. By 1950 Guyana had 5% Christian East Indians and Suriname had 1%, while at the turn of the 20th century both nations had almost none. East Indians were predominantly Hindu. Therefore, an increase of Christian East Indians strongly indicated the influence of conversion of Hindus to Christianity. With a larger share of Christian East Indians, Guyana apparently faced a stronger influence of conversion. With respect to conversion to Evangelicalism, the similarity between the two nations was that this denomination experienced a demographic growth at the expense of the membership of traditional Christians and non-Christians. Though, at the same time important differences were found: in Guyana Evangelicals seemed to grow at the cost of the Hindu population, while in Suriname they grew at the cost of traditional religious groups of Maroons and Javanese Muslims of Ahmadiyya denomination, most likely “west prayers”. To explain Christian dominance in Suriname and Guyana conversion was more important than natural growth and migration as it can be both a cause and result of religious dominance. It is a cause when converted members support the ideologies and power relations of the dominant religion. Conversion is a result of dominance when subordinate groups are compelled to change their religious affiliation to enable upward mobility. In 1950 the larger influence of conversion of Hindus to traditional Christian denominations in Guyana was explained by the stronger institutional Christian dominance due to government policies in education and employment

General Conclusions 165 that compelled conversion to Christianity for upward social mobility. In Suriname there were no such policies, at least not in the same way. In Guyana the increased influence of Evangelicals is explained by the strategy of missionary work. In this nation Evangelical churches conducted missionary work in Hindu areas by providing material and medical support, organizing crusades and using gospel music that appealed to the own culture such as chutney-songs. In Suriname these churches attracted converts among Maroon traditional religious groups by recognizing their spiritual world in Evangelicalism. To convert Javanese Ahmadiyyas the instrument of missionary work in the own Javanese language was applied.

6.2  Hindu and Muslim Responses to Christian Dominance A comparison was made of the responses to the dominance of traditional Christians and to the increasing influence of Evangelical churches in Suriname and Guyana from 1950 to 2014. The institutional responses to dominance of traditional Christians were found to be more important than the ideological responses as these reduced Christian dominance significantly. There were institutional responses to traditional Christian dominance in Suriname and Guyana with a characteristic cooperation – regarding legal products on holidays and cremation - between Hindus and Muslims. Separate responses by Hindus and Muslims were also identified, such as the founding of denominational schools. The institutional ‘responses’ in Suriname occurred in more social spheres and were more intensive than in Guyana. The latter was reflected clearly in formal education from 1950 till the start of authoritarian regimes in both nations. Suriname had more Hindu and Muslim denominational schools than Guyana. This difference in ‘responses’ was explained by government policies, especially colonial policies, and government ideologies. The different role of these ideologies is observed in Suriname from 1950 to 1979 and in Guyana from 1950 to 1968. In the case of Suriname, the respective governments were based on a form of consociationalism, verbroederingspolitiek, that enabled the allocation of public resources to Hindus and Muslims. In Guyana the respective governments held Marxist or socialist ideologies that provided religious groups less access to public resources. The impact of ideological differences in government policies is primarily noticed in public education. Suriname passed a law on subsidies to pay for Hindu and Muslim schools, which pointed at the increased access of religious groups to public resources. In Guyana, however, Christian schools were nationalized and this included reduced access of religious groups to public resources. As regards the increased influence of Evangelical Christians, Suriname and Guyana experienced ideological responses rather than institutional responses. A difference is that in Guyana the ideological responses occurred at the national level, but in Suriname at the local level. In Guyana, Hindu

166  General Conclusions and Muslim national organizations discouraged conversion to Christianity by providing informal education through lectures and religious services. In Suriname Javanese Muslims responded ideologically to the increased influence of Evangelical Christians by providing informal religious education through individual mosques. Religious leadership and private religious institutions explain the respective difference in ideological responses between Suriname and Guyana. In Guyana both Hindu and Muslim leaders and institutions explicitly condemned conversion of their members to Evangelicalism, while in Suriname conversion was more or less accepted despite individual concerns about losing members. This was in particular the case among Javanese Muslims.

6.3  Influence of ‘Responses’ on Interreligious Relations In both Suriname and Guyana institutional ‘responses’ in particular, contributed to the declined dominance of traditional Christians. This is largely reflected in the government policies on increased access of Hindus and Muslims to public resources, especially legal products on subsidies, marriages, holidays and, cremation. The increased number of private institutions such as denominational schools further reduced the dominance of traditional Christians. Concerted diversity – defined as a form of interreligious relations based on religious equality, solidarity, and conflict solving – was encouraged as the dominance of traditional Christians declined in Suriname and Guyana. This is an important conclusion, since concerted diversity was applied to explain the assumed religious harmony in Caribbean nations. The principle of religious equality in ‘responses’ is identified in both Suriname and Guyana in terms of government policies that increased the access of Hindus and Muslims to public resources. However, the principles of solidarity and conflict solving in ‘responses’ are only observed in Suriname. An example was the declaration of the first Hindu and Muslim holidays as a ‘response’ in 1970. Unlike Guyana, Suriname experienced practices of interreligious cooperation between Christians, Hindus, and Muslims based on solidarity and conflict solving during the decision-making of these national holidays. In Guyana the first Hindu and Muslim holidays were declared by the government with limited participation of and among religious groups.

6.4 Adjusted Conceptual Framework Interreligious Relations Based on the research findings, the initial conceptual framework of interreligious relations is modified. In the new conceptual framework, the initial distinction between the two forms of interreligious relations - religious dominance and concerted diversity - is maintained, but one form is added: religious influence (Figure 6.1). Responses to dominance can result into these three forms of interreligious relations.

General Conclusions 167

Figure 6.1  New Conceptual Framework Interreligious Relations.

While the initial conceptual framework had four explaining factors religious demography, government policies, religious leadership, and private religious institutions - the new one includes two additional factors, namely ethnicity, and spatial distribution (Figure 6.1). All these six factors can influence responses to religious dominance, and concerted diversity. However, religious dominance is influenced by these factors, except spatial distribution. Religious demography in its turn is affected by conversion, natural growth, and migration (Figure 6.1). Government policies have a higher weight than religious demography to explain responses and interreligious relations. The new conceptual framework makes a distinction between colonial and national policies. Colonial policies refer to the policies before political independence of the country, while national policies refer to the post-independence period. Within this new perspective differences in dominance and ‘responses’ between Suriname and Guyana are evident. In Suriname colonial policies provided more opportunities for ‘responses’ when the government used a cultural representation policy to survive the economic crisis in the 1930s. This did not occur in Guyana, where on the contrary, the government prohibited activities of religious bodies that were considered a threat for the labor rest. Colonial policies may have implications for national policies, which may further affect the ‘responses’ (Figure 6.1). In Suriname colonial policies gave room for practices of political power sharing between elites of different religious and/or ethnic groups. However, in Guyana colonial policies boycotted the political power sharing between the elites of the various ethnic and religious groups by changing the electoral system and suspending the constitution. This contributed to the severe political rivalry along ethnic lines.

168  General Conclusions Besides colonial policies, national policies may influence ‘responses’ through other interacting factors: ethnicity, political decision-making power, electoral system, political leadership, demography, and ideology of governments (Figure 6.1). Initially it was assumed that access of subordinate religious groups to political decision-making power was required for changing national policies. Furthermore, it was assumed that this access to political decision-making power could be better provided by the electoral system of proportional representation. Findings showed that access of subordinate religious groups via their elites to political decision-making power was important for changing national policies (Figure 6.1), but it did not necessarily encourage institutional ‘responses’. In Suriname and Guyana different ‘responses’ occurred due to the ideology of the government. This difference was clearly expressed in the policy of subsidies to religious institutions in both nations. As regards the electoral system, no evidence was found for the greater advantage of the proportional representation than the majoritarian model for ‘responses’. Ethnicity was not just a confounding factor for religion as was assumed at the beginning of the study. It also influenced demographic differences and government policies (Figure 6.1). Suriname had more religious denominations than Guyana due to because of greater ethnic diversity. Suriname had for instance more ethnic groups among Muslims and Christians than Guyana. Ethnicity had an impact on (colonial) government policies. In Suriname the governor advocated cultural representation policies such as appointing East Indians in Parliament in the 1930s. In both Suriname and Guyana ethnicity also influenced the decision-making about the allocation of public resources to religious groups. In Suriname the declaration of Phagwa and Eid-ul-Fitr as national holidays was Illustrative, while in Guyana the ethnic preference in governmental jobs during the Burnham regime was an example. Religious leadership and private religious institutions may contribute to ‘responses’ (Figure 6.1). In Suriname and Guyana Hindu and Muslim leaders and organizations influenced ideological ‘responses’ by providing informal religious education to their members. This education was meant to discourage conversion to Christianity. The comparative mixed methods strategy in which Suriname and Guyana were considered similar cases enabled to identify factors that explained differences in ‘responses’ and interreligious relations between both nations. It contributed to the finding that these differences were influenced by government policies, in particular national policies – that was not included in the initial conceptual framework –, rather than other factors. The respective methodological approach showed that political decision-making power also influenced ‘responses’, but it appeared not to be a necessary requirement as was assumed.

General Conclusions 169

6.5  Limitations and Recommendations In the initial conceptual model religious dominance and concerted diversity were considered to provide a by and large complete understanding of the interreligious relations in Suriname and Guyana. Indeed, they proved their value to understand the traditional interreligious relations between Christianity, Hinduism and Islam that emerged since the beginning of the twentieth century. However, the recently increased role and influence of new Christian denominations, such as the Evangelical churches was not sufficiently covered by religious dominance or concerted diversity, the two initial forms of interreligious relations. Therefore, a third form is added to the new conceptual framework: religious influence. It must be remarked that this form is not the outcome of responses by Hindus and Muslims in Suriname and Guyana. Rather, it is the outcome of responses within Christianity at the international level which were outside the scope of this thesis. More research is needed to fine-tune the conceptual framework of interreligious relations. The new conceptual framework regards the interreligious relations between Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in Caribbean nations, where these three religious groups altogether comprise the majority of the national population. Therefore, this conceptual framework may also be valid for Trinidad and Tobago. Follow-up research in this nation is recommended to find further empirical support for the usefulness of the new conceptual framework.

6.6  Samenvatting (Dutch) Het belangrijkste doel van deze studie is het ontwikkelen van een verklaringsmodel voor interreligieuze relaties in het Caribisch gebied. In deze regio zijn er geen gewelddadige religieuze conflicten tussen christenen, hindoes en moslims geweest, zoals in vele andere delen van de wereld. In de 20ste eeuw zijn zulke conflicten wel geregistreerd in delen van Afrika, Europa, Azië. De bijzondere positie van het Caribisch gebied in de wereld is treffend verwoord door Barriteau (2006, p. 12): ‘(…) in this confrontational world, the Caribbean exists as a zone of peace’. Er zijn drie argumenten die een studie naar de interreligieuze relaties tussen christenen, hindoes en moslims in het Caribisch gebied rechtvaardigen. Ten eerste is er sinds de 20ste eeuw een toenemende academische discussie in de wereld over een positief verband tussen religie en geweld. Bovendien wordt er in de weinige internationale studies over religieuze harmonie nauwelijks verwezen naar de veronderstelde harmonie tussen christenen, hindoes en moslims in het Caribisch gebied. Het tweede argument dat een studie naar interreligieuze relaties tussen christenen, hindoes en moslims in het Caribisch gebied rechtvaardigt, betreft de gangbare theoretische

170  General Conclusions benaderingen die inadequaat zijn om de veronderstelde harmonie tussen deze drie religieuze groepen te verklaren. Het derde argument voor een studie naar interreligieuze relaties tussen christenen, hindoes en moslims in het Caribisch gebied verwijst naar de achtergronden van gewelddadige religieuze conflicten. De meeste van deze conflicten in de 20ste eeuw betroffen christenen, hindoes en moslims en waren doorgaans beïnvloed door responses van gemarginaliseerde groepen op religieuze dominantie. Hoewel het Caribisch gebied ook responses op religieuze dominantie heeft gekend – onder meer van hindoes en moslims - bleef deze regio gevrijwaard van gewelddadige conflicten tussen deze drie religieuze groepen. 6.6.1  Probleemstelling En Theoretische Uitgangspunten Deze studie analyseert de responses van hindoes en moslims op christelijke dominantie (voortaan aangeduid als ‘responses’) in Suriname en Guyana. ‘Responses’ verwijzen naar het gebruik van ideologieën en instituties door gemarginaliseerde religieuze groepen om religieuze dominantie structureel te verminderen. De onderzoeksvraag is: “Wat zijn de responses van hindoes en moslims op christelijke dominantie in Suriname en Guyana tussen 1950 en 2014?”. Het doel is deze ‘responses’ en hun invloed op interreligieuze relaties tussen christenen, hindoes en moslims te verklaren. De theoretische veronderstelling is dat ‘responses’ kunnen leiden tot twee vormen van interreligieuze relaties: religieuze dominantie en harmonische diversiteit. 6.6.2 Methodologie Suriname en Guyana zijn gekozen voor dit onderzoek vanwege de overeenkomsten in de religieuze demografie. Binnen het Caribisch gebied hebben deze landen de grootste aantallen hindoes en moslims. Dit maakt de analyse van responses van deze twee religieuze groepen op christelijke dominantie mogelijk. Religieuze demografie is een belangrijk criterium voor de selectie van landen in dit onderzoek, omdat het gevolgen kan hebben voor interreligieuze relaties. Wanneer grote demografische veranderingen zich voordoen vooral door bekering van de ene religieuze groep tot een andere, kunnen er spanningen of conflicten tussen de respectieve groepen ontstaan. De comparatieve mixed methods onderzoeksstrategie is toegepast om de interreligieuze relaties in Suriname en Guyana te bestuderen. Hierbij is de natie gekozen als analyse-eenheid. Binnen de gekozen onderzoeksstrategie worden de twee naties beschouwd als similar cases. Dit houdt in dat beide naties vergeleken worden op basis van theoretische overeenkomsten. De focus is op de ‘responses’ tussen 1950 en 2014 in Suriname en Guyana. De periode rond 1950 is als beginpunt gekozen, doordat er vanaf toen in beide naties religieuze instituten, zoals formele scholen en wetgevingsproducten van hindoes en moslims, werden ingevoerd. Deze instituten kunnen

General Conclusions 171 theoretisch een belangrijke response zijn. Het jaar 2014 is het eindpunt, omdat data in Guyana tot in dit jaar verzameld zijn. De belangrijkste kwantitatieve onderzoeksmethodes in deze studie zijn secundaire analyse van databestanden en analyse van officiële statistieken. De meest gebruikte kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethodes zijn analyse van documentaire bronnen en oral history interviews. 6.6.3  Vergelijking Suriname En Guyana Om de ‘responses’ in Suriname en Guyana te kunnen verklaren, is er eerst een analyse gemaakt van de christelijke dominantie in beide naties. Er blijken overeenkomsten en verschillen te zijn tussen beide naties wat betreft de christelijke dominantie van 1950 tot 2014. 6.6.3.1  Evolutie Christelijke Dominantie Tussen 1950 En 2014 Suriname en Guyana komen overeen in de zin dat de christelijke dominantie demografisch intact bleef tussen 1950 en 2014. In beide naties vormen christenen de grootste groep. Maar in Guyana was van meet af aan een christelijke meerderheid die enigszins toenam van 59% naar 63%. Daarentegen bleef in Suriname het christelijk aandeel iets minder dan de helft, dat voorts op hetzelfde niveau bleef van 1946 tot 2012. Een tweede overeenkomst tussen Suriname en Guyana betreft de veranderingen die zich voltrokken in de demografische samenstelling naar christelijke subgroepen of denominaties, waardoor de aard van de christelijke dominantie veranderde. Met name blijken onder de christelijke denominaties de volle evangelie-kerken invloedrijk te worden, wat ten koste ging van het ledental van traditionele christelijke kerken en andere niet-christelijke religieuze groepen in de periode 1946-2012. Hoewel er belangrijke overeenkomsten tussen Suriname en Guyana in de christelijke dominantie zijn vastgesteld, zijn er ook cruciale verschillen. Het eerste verschil betreft de grotere relatieve afname van traditionele christenen in Guyana tussen 1946 en 2012. Het tweede verschil is de grotere relatieve groei van volle evangelie belijders in Guyana dan Suriname. Theoretisch zijn drie factoren van invloed op de religieuze demografie: migratie, natuurlijke groei en conversie. Wat de factor conversie betreft, zijn er wel twee belangrijke verschillen tussen Suriname en Guyana. Ten eerste scheen conversie van hindoes tot de traditionele christelijke denominaties groter te zijn in Guyana. Ten tweede, blijkt er een verschil te zijn in de bekeerden tot het volle evangelie in beide naties. In Guyana zijn hindoes de belangrijkste groep die bekeerd zijn tot het volle evangelie, terwijl in Suriname het vooral Marrons met traditionele religies en Javaanse moslims zijn. Wat betreft de conversie kunnen de verschillen tussen Suriname en Guyana beter worden verklaard door een onderscheid te maken tussen institutionele - en ideologische dominantie van religies. Conversie kan

172  General Conclusions namelijk zowel het gevolg als het resultaat zijn van de dimensies van religieuze dominantie. Conversie van hindoes tot het christendom was in 1950 blijkbaar groter in Guyana dan in Suriname, vanwege de sterkere institutionele dominantie van traditionele christenen. In Guyana werden christenen bevoorrecht in openbaar onderwijs en overheidsbanen. Hierdoor werd bekering van niet-christenen afgedwongen voor opwaartse sociale mobiliteit. Dit was minder het geval in Suriname. Hier hadden christenen geen bevoorrechtte positie in openbaar onderwijs. Ze kregen wel betere toegang dan niet-christenen tot overheidsbaantjes, maar de christelijke dominantie bleef minder dan in Guyana. Een verklaring voor het verschil in de groeiende conversie tot het volle evangelie tussen beide landen is mogelijk de doelgroep en strategie van bekeringsmissies. In beide naties brengen volle evangelie-kerken huisbezoekjes, en zij organiseren publieke evangelisatiecampagnes en genezingsdiensten. Maar in Guyana bezoeken zij gebieden met een concentratie aan hindoes. De volle evangelie-kerken bieden medische en materiële hulp aan, en gebruiken chutney gospelliederen bij bekeringsmissies. In Suriname wordt de groei van het aantal Marron volle evangelie-belijders gestimuleerd door het erkennen van de spirituele overtuigingen van Marrons met traditionele religies bij het belijden van het volle evangelie. Onder de Javaanse moslims schijnen Ahmadiyyas waaronder vermoedelijk de westbidders zich te bekeren tot het volle evangelie. 6.6.3.2 ‘Responses’ Op Dominantie Traditionele Christelijke Kerken Er zijn responses op zowel de dominantie van traditionele christelijke kerken als op de groeiende invloed van volle evangelie in Suriname en Guyana. Wat betreft de dominantie van traditionele christelijke kerken zijn er opmerkelijke verschillen in de institutionele responses tussen beide naties. Vergeleken met Guyana, had Suriname institutionele ‘responses’ in meerdere sferen. Verder kende Suriname intensievere ‘responses’ dan Guyana. Overheidsbeleid is een belangrijke verklaring voor de verschillen in institutionele responses van hindoes en moslims op de dominantie van traditionele christelijke kerken tussen beide naties. Vergeleken met Guyana, faciliteerde het koloniaal overheidsbeleid in Suriname de hindoes en moslims beter met staatsmiddelen, zoals de huwelijkswetgeving. Dit geldt ook voor het overheidsbeleid in beide naties, met name in Suriname van 1950 tot 1979 en in Guyana in de periode 1950-1968. Het verschil in dit overheidsbeleid tussen deze naties wordt verder verklaard door ideologische verschillen tussen regeringen. In Guyana waren regeringen in de periode 1950-1968 in termen van westerse politiek ideologische stromingen, doorgaans gestoeld op het marxisme of socialisme. In Suriname waren de regeringen tussen 1950 en 1979 veelal gebaseerd op een vorm van consensusdemocratie, waarbij de verdeling van politieke macht tussen de elites van

General Conclusions 173 verschillende etnische en religieuze groepen centraal stond. Echter waren er belangrijke verschillen in het gebruik van deze macht bij ‘responses’ vooral op het gebied van formeel onderwijs. In Suriname ontstond in de periode van de verbroederingspolitiek beleidsruimte voor het invoeren van subsidies voor hindoe- en moslimscholen. In Guyana, daarentegen, hadden de marxistische en socialistische visies van opeenvolgende regeringen andere ‘responses’ tot gevolg waaronder de nationalisatie van 51 christelijke scholen in 1961. Hierdoor beëindigde de overheid de dominantie van christelijke organisaties in het onderwijsbeleid van deze scholen. 6.6.3.3  ‘Responses’ Op Invloed Van De Volle Evangelie-Kerken Hoe waren de responses van hindoes en moslims op de groeiende invloed van de volle evangelie-kerken in Suriname en Guyana? Het blijkt dat de ideologische ‘responses’ een groter gewicht hebben dan hun institutionele ‘responses’ in beide naties. Dit verschilt met de responses op de dominantie traditionele kerken waar het gewicht van de twee typen responses juist andersom was. Wat betreft het grotere gewicht van de ideologische responses op de toenemende invloed van de volle evangelie-kerken blijken er verschillen tussen Suriname en Guyana. In Guyana worden de ideologische ‘responses’ van hindoes en moslims gecoördineerd door hun nationale religieuze organisaties, terwijl in Suriname de ideologische ‘responses’ van Javaanse moslims plaatsvinden via individuele moskeeën. Hierdoor spelen deze ‘responses’ een grotere rol in Guyana dan in Suriname. Een verklaring voor dit verschil is het religieus leiderschap en privé religieuze instituten. Guyana kent hindoe- en moslimorganisaties en leiders die het groeiende aantal volle evangelie christenen onder hun leden veroordelen en daarom de bekering tot het volle evangelie proberen te verminderen. Dit is eerder het geval bij de hindoes dan bij de moslims. 6.6.3.4  Invloed ‘Responses’ Op Interreligieuze Relaties Er werd verondersteld dat ‘responses’ leiden tot (gewijzigde of ongewijzigde) religieuze dominantie of tot harmonische diversiteit. De vergelijkende analyse van Suriname en Guyana heeft aangetoond dat institutionele ‘responses’ bijdroegen aan de afname van dominantie van traditionele kerken in beide landen. Dit duidt op een gewijzigde christelijke dominantie. Verder hebben responses van hindoes en moslims op traditionele christelijke kerken een positief effect op de harmonische diversiteit in Suriname gehad, wat niet aantoonbaar is in Guyana. 6.6.4  Aangepast Conceptueel Model Er werd uitgegaan van vier mogelijke verklarende factoren van ‘responses’ en interreligieuze relaties: overheidsbeleid, religieuze demografie, religieus

174  General Conclusions leiderschap en religieuze instituten. De bevindingen van deze studie hebben nieuwe inzichten geleverd die aanleiding geven tot het aanpassen van het initieel conceptueel model. De veranderingen betreffen de verklarende factoren van ‘responses’, hun onderlinge relaties en de vormen van interreligieuze relaties. In het oorspronkelijke conceptueel model kunnen ‘responses’ slechts via overheidsbeleid de religieuze dominantie verminderen. Theoretisch werd verondersteld dat dit kan wanneer gemarginaliseerde religieuze groepen politieke invloed bezitten via hun elites. Hoewel de resultaten van de studie aantonen dat ‘responses’ via het overheidsbeleid inderdaad cruciaal zijn om religieuze dominantie te verminderen, blijkt politieke macht van gemarginaliseerde religieuze groepen hiervoor geen vereiste. In Suriname werd de christelijke dominantie verminderd door zowel het koloniaal als nationaal beleid, terwijl hindoes en moslims geen politieke invloed hadden. Er werd verondersteld dat politieke invloed een belangrijke verklaring zou zijn voor verschillen in ‘responses’ tussen beide naties. De analyses tonen aan dat politieke macht de verschillen in ‘responses’ tussen deze twee naties niet verklaart. Guyana had inderdaad minder beleidsruimte voor ‘responses’, maar dit kwam eerder door verschillen in de ideologieën waarop regeringen gestoeld waren. Etniciteit werd als proxy voor religie gebruikt. De studie toont aan dat etniciteit niet alleen een proxy is voor religie, maar ook van invloed is geweest op de interreligieuze relaties in zowel Suriname als Guyana. Etniciteit werkt door op demografische verschillen en het overheidsbeleid. Suriname heeft meer religieuze denominaties vanwege de etnische diversiteit. Er zijn bijvoorbeeld onder de moslims en christenen meer etnische groepen in Suriname dan in Guyana. Tenslotte blijkt een zekere invloed van ruimtelijke ordening op ‘responses’, welke niet werd verondersteld in het initieel conceptueel model. Ruimtelijke ordening heeft de institutionele ‘responses’ op het gebied van formeel onderwijs in Suriname beïnvloed. 6.6.4.1  Vormen Van Interreligieuze Relaties De twee veronderstelde vormen van interreligieuze relaties in het initieel conceptueel model – religieuze dominantie en harmonische diversiteit – hebben tot op zekere hoogte een verklarende kracht voor Suriname en Guyana. Ze schoten echter tekort in het weergeven van de groeiende invloed van nieuwe denominaties met name de volle evangelie-kerken. Daarom is een nieuwe vorm van interreligieuze relaties toegevoegd, te weten religieuze invloed.

6.7  Summary (English) The aim of this study was to develop a conceptual framework that could explain interreligious relations in the Caribbean. This region has had no extreme violent religious conflicts between Christians, Hindus, and

General Conclusions 175 Muslims as in other parts of the world. Such conflicts have been reported in parts of Africa, Europe, and Asia in the 20th century. The remarkable position of the Caribbean in the world is clearly stated by Barriteau (2006, p. 12): ‘(…) in this confrontational world, the Caribbean exists as a zone of peace’. A study on the interreligious relations between Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in the Caribbean is justified for three reasons. Firstly, since the 20th century there has been an increasing international academic debate about the positive asociation between religion and violence. Besides, the few studies on religious harmony, there is hardly any reference to the assumed harmony between Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in the Caribbean (ibid). Secondly, the justification of a study on the interreligious relations between Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in the Caribbean deals with the mainstream theories that are inadequate to explain the assumed harmony between these three religious groups. Thirdly, the importance of a study on the interreligious relations between Christians, Hindus, and Muslims in the Caribbean regards the background of violent religious conflicts. Most of these conflicts in the 20th century were between and among these three religious groups which were mainly influenced by responses by marginalized groups to religious dominance. While the Caribbean also experienced responses to religious dominance – such as by Hindus and Muslims – it did not face violent conflicts between Christians, Hindus, and Muslims. 6.7.1  Research Question and Theoretical Background This study analyzes Hindu and Muslim responses to Christian dominance (hence referred to as ‘responses’) in Suriname and Guyana. ‘Responses’ refers to the use of ideologies and institutions by subordinate groups structurally reduce religious dominance. The research question is: What were the responses of Hindus and Muslims to Christian dominance in Suriname and Guyana from 1950 to 2014? The aim is to explain these ‘responses’ and their influence on interreligious relations between Christians, Hindus, and Muslims. It is assumed that ‘responses’ can result into two forms of interreligious relations: religious dominance and concerted diversity. 6.7.2 Methodology Suriname and Guyana were selected for this study because of their similarities in religious demography. In the Caribbean both nations have the largest share of Hindus and Muslims. This enables the analyses of their responses to Christian dominance. Religious demography is an important criterion for the selection of cases, as it can have implications for interreligious relations. Major demographic changes, particularly due to conversion

176  General Conclusions from one religion to another, can trigger tensions among the involved religious groups (ibid). The comparative mixed methods research strategy is used to examine interreligious relations in Suriname en Guyana. The nation is selected as the unit of analysis. In the research strategy both nations are considered similar cases. This means that these nations are compared because of their theoretical similarities. The focus is on ‘responses’ from 1950 to 2014 in Suriname en Guyana. The year 1950 is selected as from that period on in both nations Hindus and Muslims increasingly began to institutionalize their religions, for instance by founding of schools and making legal products. Theoretically institutionalization is an important response to dominance of religious groups. The year 2014 is selected as data collection was completed then. The major quantitative research methods are secondary analysis and analysis of official statistics. The main qualitative research methods are documentary analyses and oral history interviews. 6.7.3  Comparison Suriname and Guyana To explain ‘responses’ in Suriname and Guyana, Christian dominance was analyzed first. There were similarities and differences in Christian dominance between both nations from 1950 to 2014. 6.7.3.1  Evolution Christian Dominance between 1950 and 2014 Suriname and Guyana have in common that Christian dominance was maintained in terms of demography between 1950 and 2014. In both nations Christians remained the largest religious group. But Guyana had a Christian majority from the beginning that slightly grew in the 1946-2012 period. In Suriname, on the contrary, the share of Christians remained less than 50% between 1946 and 2012. A second similarity between Suriname and Guyana regards the demographic changes of Christian denominations, which had implications for Christian dominance. Among the Christian denominations, the Evangelical churches were gaining influence at the cost of the membership of traditional churches and other religious groups in the 1946-2012 period. While there were important similarities between Suriname and Guyana in Christian dominance, critical differences between both nations were observed. The first difference is that Guyana had a larger decrease of the percentage of traditional Christians from 1946 to 2012. The second difference is the larger percentual growth of Evangelicals in Guyana than Suriname. Theoretically three factors influence religious demography: migration, natural growth, and conversion. As regards conversion, there are two important differences between Suriname and Guyana. Firstly, conversion

General Conclusions 177 of Hindus to traditional Christian denominations seemed larger in Guyana. Secondly, apparently there was a difference in the converts to Evangelicalism between both nations. In Guyana Hindus were an important group that converted to Evangelicalism, while in Suriname Maroons with traditional religions and Javanese Muslims converted. The differences in conversion between Suriname and Guyana can be better explained by making a distinction between institutional and ideological dominance of religous groups. Conversion was a result and factor of both dimensions of dominance. In 1950 conversion of Hindus to Christianity was apparently higher in Guyana than in Suriname due to the stronger institutional dominance of traditional Christians in the former nation. In Guyana Christians were privileged over others in public education and civil service. As a result non-Christians were compelled to convert to Christianity for upward mobility. In Suriname this was less intense. An explanation for the difference in the growth of Evangelicals between both nations is the conversion strategy. In Suriname and Guyana Evangelical churches paid house visits, organized crusades and healing-campaigns. In Guyana they targeted areas with a large Hindu population. The Evangelical churches provided medical and material assistance, and they used chutney gospel-songs during their conversion missions. In Suriname the growth of Maroon Evangelicals was stimulated by the recognition of the spiritual world of the traditional religions of Maroons in Evangelical practices. As regards the Javanese Muslims, Ahmadiyyas and apparently the west prayers converted to Evangelicalism. 6.7.3.2 ‘Responses’ to Dominance of Traditional Christian Churches Suriname and Guyana experienced responses to both the dominance of traditional Christians and the increasing influence of Evangelical churches. As regards the dominance of traditional Christians, there were remarkable differences in the institutional ‘responses’ between both nations. Compared with Guyana, Suriname had responses in more social spheres. Furthermore, Suriname had more intense ‘responses’ than Guyana. Government policies are an important explanation for the differences between Suriname and Guyana in institutional responses by Hindus and Muslims to dominance of traditional Christians. Compared with Guyana, the colonial government policies in Suriname better facilitated Hindus and Muslims with public resources such as marriage law. This was also the case with the government policies in Suriname from 1950 to 1979 and in Guyana between 1950 and 1968. This difference in government policies between both nations was further explained by ideologies of governments. In Guyana the governments between 1950 and 1968 held more western political ideologies namely Marxism and socialism.

178  General Conclusions In Suriname the governments from 1950 to 1979 were based on a form of consociationalism, where power-sharing between elites of different ethnic and religious groups was central. However, there were differences in the use of this power for ‘responses’ particularly in the sphere of formal education. During the period of verbroederingspolitiek Suriname got more opportunities for making policies such as subsidies to Hindu and Muslim denominational schools. In Guyana, on the contrary, governments held Marxist and socialist views which led to different ‘responses’ such as nationalization of 51 Christian denominational schools in 1961. By doing so the government ended the Christian dominance on these schools. 6.7.3.3 ‘Responses’ to Increasing Influence of Evangelical Churches What were the responses of Hindus and Muslims to the increasing influence of Evangelical churches in Suriname and Guyana? It seemed that ideological ‘responses’ had a larger ‘weight’ than institutional ‘responses’ in both nations. This differed from the responses to the dominance of traditional Christian churches where the institutional responses had a larger ‘weight’. As regarded the larger role of ideological responses to the increasing influence of Evangelical churches, there were differences between Suriname and Guyana. In Guyana these ideological ‘responses’ were coordinated by national Hindu and Muslim organizations, while in Suriname the ideological ‘responses’ by Javanese Muslims were more in the hands of local mosques. Therefore ‘responses’ had a more significant role in Guyana than in Suriname. An explanation for this difference was religious leadership and private religious institutions. Guyana had Hindu and Muslim organizations and leaders who condemned the increasing converts of their members to Evangelicalism and therefore actively sought to reduce such conversion, particularly the Hindus. 6.7.3.4  Influence ‘Responses’ on Interreligious Relations It was assumed that ‘responses’ could result into (changed or unchanged) religious dominance or concerted diversity. The comparison of Suriname and Guyana has shown that institutional ‘responses’ contributed to the decline of dominance of traditional Christian denominations in both nations. ‘Responses’ led to changes in government policies in such a way that Hindus and Muslims compelled access to public resources which was ignored before. The declining dominance of traditional Christians theoretically refers to changed religious dominance. Finally, it was shown that Hindu and Muslim responses to dominance of traditional Christian churches had a positive influence on concerted diversity in Suriname, which is not observed in Guyana.

General Conclusions 179 6.7.4  Adjusted Conceptual Model It was assumed that four factors influenced ‘responses’ and interreligious relations: government policies, religious demography, religious leadership, and private religious institutions. The findings of this study revealed new insights which encouraged the adjustment of the initial conceptual model. The adjustments regard the explanatory factors of ‘responses’, the relationship among these factors, and the forms of interreligious relations. In the initial conceptual model ‘responses’ could reduce religious dominance only through government policies. It was assumed that this occurs when subordinate groups have political decision-making power. The findings showed that ‘responses’ through government policies were indeed important for reducing religious dominance, however, political decisionmaking power of subordinate groups through their elites was not a requirement. In Suriname Christian dominance was reduced by colonial and national government policies, while Hindus and Muslims had no such power. It was assumed that political decision-making power would be an important explanation for the differences in ‘responses’ between both nations. Data showed that such power did not explain the differences in ‘responses’ between the two nations. Guyana had fewer opportunities for ‘responses’ in government policies. But this was due to the larger influence of the ideologies of governments. Ethnicity was considered a confounding factor of religion. The study has shown that ethnicity also influences demographic differences and government policies. Suriname had more religious denominations due to the greater ethnic diversity. There were for instance more ethnic groups among Muslims and Christians in Suriname than Guyana. Ethnicity influenced government policies. In both Suriname and Guyana ethnicity prevailed in the decision-making about the allocation of public resources to religious groups. Finally is shown that spatial distribution had a certain influence on ‘responses’, which was not assumed in the initial conceptual model. Spatial distribution had an impact on the institutional ‘responses’ in formal education in Suriname. 6.7.4.1  Forms of Interreligious Relations The two forms of interreligious relations in the initial conceptual model – religious dominance and concerted diversity – to some extent explained the experiences of Suriname and Guyana. However, there were limitations in expressing the increasing influence of new denominations such of Evangelicalism. Therefore religious influence is added as new form of interreligious relations in the new conceptual framework.

180  General Conclusions

6.8  Resumo (Portuguese) O objetivo mais importante dessa pesquisa é desenvolver um modelo de explicação para relações inter-religiosas no Caribe. No Caribe não há violentos conflitos religiosos entre cristões, hindus e muçulmanos como existem em muitos outros partes do mundo. No século 20 estes conlfitos foram registrados em muitos partes da África, Europa e Ásia. A posição especial foi apropriadamente expressa por Barriteau (2006, p. 12) ‘(…) in this confrontational world, the Caribbean exists as a zone of peace’. Há três argumentos justificam que um estudo nas relações interreligiosas entre cristões, hindus e muçulmanos no Caribe. Primeiramente, desde o século 20 há uma crescente discussão acadêmica no mundo sobre uma relação positiva entre religião e violência. Além disso, nos poucos estudos internacionais sobre harmonia religiosa, mal se referencia a presumida harmonia entre cristões, hindus e muçulmanos no Caribe. Barriteau diz de forma acertada que que a paz no Caribe é ‘one obvious, but overlooked lesson’. O segundo argumento que justifica este estudo trata das abordagens teóricas usuais que são inadequados para explicar a presumida harmonia entre estes três grupos religiosos. O terceiro argumento aponta para os fundos dos conflitos religiosos violentos. A maioria destes conflitos do século 20 no mundo trataram cristões, hindus e muçulmanos e que estes foram influenciados por respostas (responses) de grupos marginalizados à dominação religiosa. Embora o Caribe também conheceu respostas à dominação religiosa - entre hindus e muçulmanos - a região fico livre de conflitos violentos entre estes três grupos religiosos. 6.8.1  Problema e Princípios Teóricos Este estudo analisa as respostas de hindus e muçulmanos sobre dominação cristã em Suriname e Guiana. Respostas referem para o uso de ideologias e instituições de grupos religiosos marginalizados para reduzir estruturalmente dominação religiosa. A questão de pesquisa é: Que são respostas de hindus e muçulmanos à dominação cristã em Suriname e Guiana entre 1950 e 2014?". O objetivo é explicar essas respostas e sua influencia nas relações inter-religiosas entre cristões, hindus e muçulmanos. O pressuposto teórico é que respostas podem levar a duas formas de relações inter-religiosas: a dominação religiosa e diversidade harmoniosa. 6.8.2 Metodologia Suriname e Guiana foram escolhidos para esta pesquisa devida as semelhanças na demografia religiosa. No Caribe estes países tem o maior número de hindus e muçulmanos. Isto permite a analise das respostas de estes dois grupos religiosas à dominação cristã. Demografia religiosa é um critério importante para a seleção de países nesta pesquisa porque pode ter

General Conclusions 181 consequências para as relações inter-religiosas. Quando acontecem grandes mudanças demográficas, especialmente por meio de conversão de um grupo religioso para um outro, podem surgir tensões entre os respectivos grupos. A estratégia de pesquisa utilizada para estudar as relações inter-religiosas em Suriname e Guiana é o método comparativo misto. Aqui a nação foi escolhida como unidade de análise. Entre o escolhido estratégia de pesquisa as duas nações foram considerados como casos similares. Este significa que ambos as nações foram comparadas com base em semelhanças teóricas. O foco é nas respostas entre 1950 e 2014 em Suriname e Guiana. O período de 1950 foi escolhido como ponto de partida porque desde então em ambos as nações instituições religiosas, como escolas formais e procedimentos legislativas, de hindus e muçulmanos foram introduzidos. Essas instituições teoricamente podem ser uma resposta importante. O ano de 2014 é o ponto final pois até este ano informações foram reunidas em Guiana. 6.8.3  Comparação Suriname e Guiana Para explicar as respostas no Suriname e na Guiana, há primeiro uma análise de dominância cristã em ambas as nações. Parece que há semelhanças e diferenças entre ambas as nações em relação ao domínio cristão de 1950 a 2014. 6.8.3.1  Evolução Dominação Cristã Entre 1950 e 2014 Suriname e Guiana concordam no sentido de que o domínio demográfica Christian permaneceu intacta entre 1950 e 2014. Em ambos as nações os cristãos constituem o maior grupo. Mas na Guiana foi desde o início uma maioria cristã, que aumentou ligeiramente de 59% para 63%. Por outro lado, manteve-se no Suriname a parcela cristã menos da metade, que ficou ainda mais no mesmo nível de 1946 a 2012, com, respectivamente, 47% e 48%. Uma segunda semelhança entre Suriname e Guiana é as mudanças que ocorreram na composição demográfica de subgrupos ou denominações cristãs, que mudou a natureza da dominação cristã. Em particular, entre as denominações cristãs igrejas as igrejas volle evangelie parecerem mais influentes, em detrimento dos membros de igrejas cristãs tradicionais e outros grupos religiosos não-cristãos, no período 1946-2012. Embora foram constatados semelhanças importantes entre o Suriname e Guiana na dominância cristã, existem diferenças cruciais entre as duas nações. A primeira diferença diz respeito ao maior declínio relativo dos cristãos tradicionais na Guiana entre 1946 e 2012. Durante este período, a participação dos cristãos tradicionais decresceu de 47% para 37% no Suriname, enquanto a sua diminuição percentual na Guiana era muito mais forte de 57% para 34%. A segunda diferença é o maior crescimento relativo de seguidores do volle evangelie na Guiana que de Suriname. Entre 1960 e 2012, sua participação cresceu na Guiana de 1% a 28% e no Suriname de 0% a 11%.

182  General Conclusions Teoricamente, três fatores influenciam a demografia religiosa: a migração, o crescimento natural e conversão. Em relação ao fator de conversão, existem duas grandes diferenças entre Suriname e Guiana. Em primeiro lugar, a conversão de hindus às denominações cristãs tradicionais parecia ser maior na Guiana. Em segundo lugar, parece haver uma diferença nos convertidos para o volle evangelie em ambas as nações. In Guyana os hindus foram o principal grupo convertido ao volle evangelie, enquanto que no Suriname foram principalmente Marrons de religiões tradicionais e muçulmanos Javaneses. Quanto a conversão pode-se explicar melhor as diferenças entre Suriname e Guiana pela distinção entre dominação institucional e ideológica das religiões. Conversões pode tanto ser a consequência ou resultado dessas dimensões de dominância religiosa. Conversão de hindus ao cristianismo era aparentemente maior na Guiana que no Suriname em 1950 devido ao forte domínio institucional dos cristãos tradicionais. Em Guiana cristãos eram privilegiados em educação pública e emprego no governo. Com isso a conversão dos não-cristãos foi forçada para mobilidade social ascendente. Esta foi menos o caso no Suriname. Aqui os cristãos não tinha uma posição privilegiada na educação pública. Eles tinham melhor acesso do que os não-cristãos para cargos no governo. Mas o domínio cristã ficou menor do que na Guiana. A diferença na conversão para o volle evangelie entre Suriname e Guiana não pode ser explicado pela predominância ideológica e institucional das religiões. Isso ocorre porque as igrejas do volle evangelie não atendem indicadores cruciais de dominação religiosa ou seja, um acesso privilegiado aos recursos públicos. Mas uma explicação sobre a diferença entre o número crescente de seguidores entre os dois países é possivelmente o público-alvo e estratégia das missões conversão. Em ambas as nações as igrejas do volle evangelie visitam domiciliares e organizam campanhas públicas de evangelização e de serviço de cura. Mas na Guiana eles visitam áreas com uma concentração de hindus. As igrejas do volle evangelie oferecem assistência médica e material, e usar canções gospel chutney nas campanhas de conversão. Em Suriname, o crescimento no número de seguidores da volle evangelie Marroons é incentivados pelo reconhecimento das crenças espirituais dos marrons com religiões tradicionais na confissão do evangelho. Entre os muçulmanos javaneses parecem Ahmadiyya incluindo, presumivelmente, os intercessores do oeste se converter o volle evangelie. 6.8.3.2  Respostas à Dominação Das Igrejas Cristãs Tradicionais Existem respostas para tanto o domínio das igrejas cristãs tradicionais quanto à crescente influência do volle evangelie no Suriname e Guiana. Em relação ao domínio de igrejas cristãs tradicionais existem diferenças notáveis nas respostas institucionais entre as duas nações. Em comparação com a Guiana, o Suriname teve respostas institucionais em várias esferas. Além disso Suriname tinha respostas mais intensivas do que a Guiana.

General Conclusions 183 Em comparação com a Guiana, o governo colonial no Suriname facilitou os hindus e muçulmanos melhor com recursos do Estado, como as leis de casamento. Isso vale também para o política governamental em ambos os países, especialmente no Suriname 1950-1979 e na Guiana, no período 1950-1968. A diferença nesta política do governo entre essas nações é ainda explicada por diferenças ideológicas entre os governos. Em Guiana foram os governos no período 1950-1968 em termos de correntes ideológicas políticos ocidentais, geralmente com base em marxismo ou socialismo. Em Suriname, os governos entre 1950 e 1979 baseados principalmente em uma forma de democracia de consenso, em que a distribuição do poder político entre as elites de diferentes grupos étnicos e religiosos era central. No entanto, houve diferenças significativas no uso desse poder em respostas, especialmente no campo da educação formal. No Suriname surgiu no período da política de confraternização espaço para introduzir subsídios às escolas hindus e muçulmanos. Em Guiana, por outro lado, as visões marxistas e socialistas de sucessivos governos tinham diferentes respostas levando a nacionalização de 51 escolas cristãs em 1961. Como isso, o governo terminou o domínio de organizações cristãs na política educacional destas escolas. 6.8.3.3  Respostas a Influência Da Igrejas Do Volle Evangelie Como foram as respostas de hindus e muçulmanos sobre a crescente influência das igrejas evangélicas em Suriname e na Guiana? Parece que as respostas ideológicas de hindus e muçulmanos tinham um peso maior do que as suas respostas institucionais em ambas as nações. Isto é uma diferença com respostas ao domínio das igrejas tradicionais onde o peso dos dois tipos de respostas foi justamente o oposto. Em relação ao maior peso das respostas ideológicas para a crescente influência das igrejas evangélicas parece haver diferenças entre Suriname e Guiana. Em Guiana as respostas ideológicas são coordenados pelas organizações hindus e muçulmanos nacionais, enquanto em Suriname isso acontece através de mesquitas individuais. Por isso as respostas tem um maior papel na Guiana que no Suriname. Uma explicação para esta diferença é a liderança religiosa e as instituições religiosas privadas. Guiana tem organizações e líderes hindus e muçulmanos que condenam o número crescente de evangélicos entre os seus membros e, portanto, tentam reduzir isso ativamente. Isso acontece mais com os hindus do que os muçulmanos. 6.8.3.3.1  INFLUENCIA DAS RESPOSTAS SOBRE RELAÇÕES INTER-RELIGIOSAS

Supunha-se que respostas leva a dominação religiosa (modificados ou não) ou a diversidade harmônica. A análise comparativa do Suriname e Guiana têm mostrado que as respostas institucionais contribuíram para o declínio em dominância de igrejas tradicionais em ambos os países. Este foi porque

184  General Conclusions estas respostas mudaram as políticas governamentais, no sentido que políticas foram executados onde hindus e muçulmanos receberam recursos estatais, que anteriormente eram rejeitados, como subsídios. O declinando domínio cristã indica uma alterada dominância cristã. Respostas de hindus e muçulmanos a igrejas cristãs tradicionais têm um efeito positivo sobre a diversidade harmônica no Suriname, o que não é detectável na Guiana. 6.8.4  Modelo Conceitual Ajustado O modelo conceitual inicial assumia que respostas influenciam as relações inter-religiosas. Aqui se baseou em duas formas de relações interreligiosas: a dominação religiosa e diversidade harmoniosa. Também se partiu de quatro possíveis fatores explicativos das respostas e relações interreligiosas: a política governamental, demografia religiosa, liderança religiosa e instituições religiosas. Os resultados deste estudo apresentaram novos insights que levam a ajustar o modelo conceitual inicial. As alterações dizem respeito aos fatores explicativos das respostas, suas relações internas e formas de relações inter-religiosas. No modelo conceitual original as respostas podem apenas por meio de políticas governamentais reduzir a dominação religiosa. Teoricamente, assumiu-se que isso é possível quando grupos religiosos marginalizados possuem poder político. Embora os resultados do estudo demonstram que respostas do governo são realmente crucial para reduzir a dominância religiosa, parece que a detenção do poder político pelos grupos religiosos marginalizados não foi necessário. Em Suriname a dominância cristã foi reduzida em tanto pelas políticas coloniais quanto as nacionais, enquanto os hindus e muçulmanos não tinham poder político. Supunha-se que o poder político seria um grande explicação para as diferenças de respostas entre as duas nações. A suposição era que a Guiana teria menos espaço política para respostas que Suriname, porque hindus e muçulmanos foram menos representadas no centro do poder político em Guiana entre 1950 e 2014. A análise mostra que o poder político não explica as diferenças de respostas entre estes dois nações. Guiana tinha de fato menos espaço política para respostas. Mas isso era mais devido às diferenças de ideologias em que os governos eram baseados. Etnia foi usado como um substituto para a religião. O estudo mostra que a etnia não é apenas um substituto para a religião, mas um fator que teve impacto sobre as relações inter-religiosas, tanto Suriname e Guiana. Etnicidade atua nas diferenças demográficas e políticas do governo. Suriname tem mais denominações religiosas por causa de sua diversidade étnica. Existem, por exemplo, mais grupos étnicos entre os muçulmanos e cristãos no Suriname que na Guiana. Etnia também teve um impacto sobre a política do governo. Tanto no Suriname como na Guiana a etnia prevaleceu ao decidir sobre a alocação dos muitos recursos estatais, entre muitos grupos religiosos.

General Conclusions 185 Finalmente, parece que há alguma influência de ordenamento territorial nas respostas, o que não foi assumido no modelo conceitual inicial. O ordenamento territorial tem afetado as respostas institucionais no campo da educação formal em Suriname. 6.8.4.1  Formas De Relações Inter-Religiosas As duas formas presumidas de relações inter-religiosas no modelo conceitual inicial - dominância religiosa e diversidade harmoniosa - tem, até certa altura um poder explicativo para Suriname e Guiana. No entanto, as duas formas não satisfazem totalmente a representação de influências crescentes de denominações novas, especícificamente as igrejas volle evangelie.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Operationalization Interreligious Relations and Responses Appendix 1a: Operationalization Ideological Dimensions of Dominance, Concerted Diversity, ‘Responses’ Concept*** Indicators

Operationalization*

Religious public Existence of C, H, M** public holidays as holidays official recognition of their religious practices Statements H, M leaders with disapproval of number of C public holidays Religious Ideals of religious equality in prayers at public education primary and secondary schools Statements H and M about C superiority beliefs in religious education at C schools Statements H and M about stereotypes and sarcasm about H and M beliefs and practices at C schools Values in religious education at C, H, M schools in statements C, H, M about:

Dom CD Resp X

X X X

X X

–– respect for religious differences –– similarities in significance C, H, M festivals

X

Critical views on C religious education at public schools in narratives H and M leaders Ideals of maintaining own religion to prevent Christianization in narratives H and M leaders during:

X

–– Public lectures –– Sermons in mosques/ temples

X

Disapproving views of Christianization in narratives H and M leaders during: –– Public lectures –– Sermons in mosques/ temples

(Continued)

Appendices 187 Concept*** Indicators

Operationalization*

Christian missionary work

Statements C, H, M about C values propagated during:

Dom CD Resp X

–– home visits –– evangelization meetings Using Christian prayers for spiritual healing of non-Christians during: –– visiting the sick at homes –– sermons in public places –– church services

X

X

Statements by C during public meetings including:

Acceptance C superiority

–– stereotypes of Hinduism and Islam –– judgments about non-Christians Legitimacy of Christianization in statements H and M about: –– admission C schools –– civil services employment –– employment at C schools

Interreligious cooperation umbrella interreligious organizations Interreligious cooperation individual religious organizations Syncretism

C Superiority beliefs in statements H and M about name giving Wearing hats during Christians sermons in churches Beliefs that practicing Christianity is better than other religions Shared religious values in statements C, H, M leaders about:

X

X X X X

–– ecumenical services –– community projects Shared religious values in statements C,H,M leaders about:

X

–– ecumenical services –– community projects Statements H and M leaders on combining C and H beliefs and practices Statements H and M households on combining C and H beliefs and practices

X

* The operationalization of all indicators regards three subperiods in Guyana (1950–1968, 1968–1992, 1992–2014) and Suriname (1950–1980, 1980–1987, 1987–2014). ** C, H, M symbolizes Christian (s), Hindu (s), and Muslim (s), respectively. *** Dom=Dominance, CD=Concerted Diversity, Resp=‘Responses’.

188  Appendices Appendix 1b: Operationalization Institutional Dimensions of Dominance, Concerted Diversity, ‘Responses’ Concept*** Indicators

Operationalization*

Religious public holidays

Ordinances on C, H, M public holidays Ratio C, H, M public holidays by religious group Statements C, H, M leaders on practices of:

Religious education

Admission C primary and secondary schools Missionary work

Government subsidies

Private material resources

Legalization religious practices

–– cooperation C, H, M organizations in decision-making public holidays –– negotiation for dispute settlement among C, H, M leaders during decision-making public holidays Statements C, H, M on practices of C prayers at public primary and secondary schools Narratives H and M leaders about activities against Christianization: –– sermons by H and M institutions –– lectures by H and M institutions –– religious education at H and M schools Statements H and M about practices of preferred admission of C at C schools

Dom

CD

Resp

X X

X X

X X

X

X X

X

Narratives of C, H, M leaders about:

X

–– home visits by C missionaries –– Providing gifts and goods during C festivals –– Organizing C sermons in native languages –– Organizing C evangelization meetings Granting of government subsidies to:

X

–– C, H, M schools –– C, H, M orphanages –– C, H, M religious leaders –– C, H, M organizations Ratio of

X

X

X

X

X

–– C, H, M school –– C, H, M orphanages Presence of crematoria Ordinances on

X

X

X

X

–– C, H, M marriages –– cremation (Continued)

Appendices 189 Concept*** Indicators

Operationalization*

Civil service employment

Narratives C, H, M about eligibility in civil services employment Ratio civil services employees by religious groups Narratives H and M on removal eligibility of C in civil services employment Narratives H, M, C leaders with incidents of destroyed

Violence against religious objects

Violence against religious practices Physical harassment Interreligious cooperation umbrella interreligious organizations Interreligious cooperation individual religious organizations

Syncretism

–– religious buildings –– religious idols –– religious sites Narratives C, H, M leaders with incidents of violent boycott of religious practices Narratives H, M, C leaders with threatening other religious groups Statements on participation C, H, M in: –– community projects by umbrella organizations –– ecumenical services by umbrella organizations Narratives of C, H, M leaders with participation in: –– extracurricular activities of denominational schools –– in community projects by different religious organizations –– community projects by different religious organizations Narratives C, H and M about their common participation during:

Dom

CD

X

X

X

X

Resp

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

–– burials at home –– marriages * The operationalization of all indicators regards three subperiods in Guyana (1950–1968, 1968–1992, 1992–2014) and Suriname (1950–1980, 1980–1987, 1987–2014). ** C, H, M symbolizes Christian (s), Hindu (s), and Muslim (s), respectively. Dom=Dominance, CD=Concerted Diversity, Resp=‘Responses’.

190  Appendices

Appendix 2: Population by Religion in Suriname and Guyana 20th–21st Century Appendix 2a: Population by Religion in Suriname 20th–21st Century Religion

1900

1936

1946

1964

1980

2004

2012

Christians Hindus Muslims None/ own Others Not stated Total

51798 11158 3918   1267   68141

71413 32000 42000   1979   147392

83187 33764 55543   910   173404

142233 87575 63809 17835 3827 8932 324211

147670 97274 69713 30337 5923 4323 355240

241080 113160 78720 19680 14760 24600 492000

262320 120623 75053 40718 25842 17082 541638

Source: Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek (2007, 2013), Vernooij (2012).

Appendix 2b: Population by Religion Guyana 20th–21st Century Religion Christians Hindus Muslims None/ own Others Not stated Total

1911

1931

1946

1960

1980

2002

2012

167811 95478 18217   708 13827 296041

185563 96338 21792   1463 5777 310933

217608 118095 29281 3568 329 797 369678

316805 187403 49290   1532 5573 560603

318040 281119 66122 28006 51252 14080 758619

422454 213282 54050 31933 22574 6931 751224

467682 185439 50572 23419 19843   746955

Source: British Guiana Population Census 1960. Volume 2, Part A, 1960, Census of the colony of British Guiana 1946, Part D, 1946; Bureau of Statistics Guyana (2016b), Guyana Bureau of Statistics (2007).

Appendix 3: Population by Religion and Ethnicity in Suriname 1971 and 2012 Appendix 3a: Major Ethnic Groups by Christian Denomination in Suriname 1971 and 2012 Creole

East Indian

Denomination

1971

2012

Growth Ratio

1971

Catholic Moravian Dutch Reformed Lutheran Evangelical Other Christian Total abs

50820 47297 7787

35909 27833 1621

(0.73) (1.03) (1.98)

4494 1312 83

3507 639  

1310 10789 3034

(1.57) 39.71 N.A. 

110050

80496

(0.67)

Javanese

Maroon

Growth Ratio

1971

3151 1143 125

(0.75) (0.32) 1.27

3379 1762 65

3621 3123 63

0.18 1.93 (0.08)

8017 7907 21

27626 19093 62

6.11 3.54 4.88

32 91  

71 4720 1635

3.05 127.17 N.A. 

31 50  

167 7117 1464

10.97 353.35  N.A.

13 49  

100 21746 3538

16.73 1,106.99 N.A. 

6012

10845

2.01

5287

15555

4.86

16007

72165

8.77

2012

2012

Growth Ratio

1971

2012

Growth Ratio

Source: General Bureau of Statistics (2007, 2013), compiled by author. NB: Growth ratio: (P1-P0/n)/P0*100. P1=population 2012, P0= population 1971, n=40

Appendices 191

Creole

East Indian

Javanese

Maroon

Denomination

1971

2012

Growth Ratio

1971

2012

Growth Ratio

1971

2012

Growth Ratio

1971

2012

Growth Ratio

Christian Hindu Muslim None and Own Other Unknown Total

110050 351 565 4039 2650 1354 119009

80496 201 420 3293 2061 2385 88856

(0.67) (1.07) (0.64) (0.46) (0.56) N.A. (0.63)

6012 110952 24070 780 272 831 142917

10845 115521 18775 739 1052 1511 148443

2.01 0.10 (0.55) (0.13) 7.17 N.A. 0.10

5287 530 49045 1850 222 754 57688

15555 915 53665 2085 864 891 73975

4.86 1.82 0.24 0.32 7.23 N.A. 0.71

16007 16 33 18400 295 1087 35838

72165 94 243 34927 3645 6493 117567

8.77 12.19 15.91 2.25 28.39 N.A. 5.70

Source: General Bureau of Statistics (2007, 2013), compiled by author. NB: Growth ratio: (P1-P0/n)/P0*100. P1=population 2012, P0=population 1971, n=40

192  Appendices

Appendix 3b: Major Ethnic Groups by Religion in Suriname 1971 and 2012

Appendices 193

Appendix 4: Rede1 Premier Jules Sedney Nationale Feestdagen in Maart 1970 Stellig van meer ingrijpende betekenis voor ons land is de verheffing van Holi en Ied, die voorheen slechts binnen de besloten kring van Hindoe- en Moslimburgers werden gevierd, tot waarlijk nationale dagen. Generaties lang hebben wij op Christelijke hoogtijdagen het werk neergelegd en de bedrijvigheid in het gehele land gestaakt, om in gewijde stemming en naar de aloude christelijke gebruiken, onze Schepper te loven en te danken. Welbeschouwd hebben wij generaties land verzuimd ons af te vragen, of ook de zeer grote groep niet-christenen in ons land de behoefte zouden gevoelen, om ook hun hoogtijdagen op dezelfde wijze te beleven. Thans, na tientallen jaren, zijn wij uiteindelijk tot het inzicht gekomen, dat Suriname zich niet langer mag en kan veroorloven om de religieuze gevoelens en de behoeften van het niet-Christelijk georiënteerde deel van de bevolking als minder belangrijk te beschouwen en deze slechts minzaam te tolereren. Ik beschouw het dan ook vandaag, als een groot voorrecht als Ministerpresident, maar ook als exponent van de christelijk gezinde bevolkingsgroep, te mogen mededelen dat, de Regering besloten heeft te bewerkstelligen, dat voortaan de beide feesten Holi en Ied naar de wetten van ons land zullen gevierd, zoals wij christenen de zondag en de daarmee gelijkgestelde dagen reeds eeuwenlang hebben beleven. Zoals ik reeds zei, is de Regering eveneens op ernstige wijze verweten, dat zij in deze kwestie aan de daarvoor in aanmerking komende belangengroepen geen gelegenheid tot inspraak heeft geboden. Het schijnt mij wenselijk toe – voordat ik inga op het verwijt zelf – eerst een en ander te zeggen over de gedachte van inspraak in het algemeen. Inspraak is wellicht één van de meest gehanteerde termen van de laatste tijd. Daarmee wordt aangegeven, dat belangengroepen dienen te worden betrokken bij het beraad over aangelegenheden, voor zover deze hun belangen raken. Het is bekend, dat onder meer in de Regeringsverklaring ook tot uiting is gekomen, dat deze Regering niet alleen het recht van inspraak onderschrijft, maar ook de noodzaak daarvan volledig onderkent. Over het principe van inspraak bestaat er daarom ook geen verschil van mening, mogelijk wel over de uitwerking en de toepassing daarvan in de praktijk. Zeer in het bijzonder geldt dit de vraag, aan wie in een bepaald geval inspraak moet worden gegeven en in welke mate. Het is niet mogelijk daarvoor vaste regels aan te geven. Het gaat hier immers om samenwerkingsvormen tussen Regering en maatschappelijke groeperingen, die slechts in de praktijk van het dagelijks leven gestalte kunnen krijgen.

194  Appendices Vooral in het begin zal er veelvuldig verschil van mening kunnen optreden over de vraag, wie bij een bepaalde zaak in het overleg dient te worden betrokken. Als regel kan gesteld worden, dat het slechts zinvol is die groepen bij het overleg te betrekken, die een daadwerkelijk en specifiek belang hebben bij de te beslissen zaak. Ook zal het slechts zinvol zijn diegenen in te schakelen, van wie op grond van ervaring mag worden verwacht dat zij in staat en bereid zijn een constructieve bijdrage te leveren in het overleg. Wellicht nog moeilijker dan het aangegeven wie in het algemeen in aanmerking komen voor inspraak, is het beantwoorden van de vraag, in welke mate inspraak dient te worden verleend. Ook dit is een zaak die zich in de dagelijkse praktijk moet ontwikkelen. Daarbij zal de groep, die inspraak verlangt en verkrijgt zich te allen tijde moeten realiseren, dat de Regering als zodanig niet slechts rekening mag houden met het specifieke groepsbelang, maar dat zij uit hoofde van haar taak en verantwoordelijkheid ook andere belangen in haar oordeelsvorming zal moeten betrekken. Ook mag nimmer vergeten worden, dat een Regering een geheel eigen verantwoordelijkheid draagt en ter verwezenlijking daarvan, zich onder alle omstandigheden de vrijheid moet kunnen voorbehouden, om af te wijken van het advies, dat haar in het overleg gegeven is. Het is niet eenvoudig in zaken als deze absolute grenzen te trekken”.

Appendix 5: Brief OHM Naar President 2010 Aan: De President van de Republiek Suriname Z.E. D.D. Bouterse Kleine Combe weg Alhier Onderwerp: Verzoek tot behoud religieuze harmonie in onze unieke samenleving Paramaribo, 13 November 2010 Zijne Excellentie, Naar aanleiding van media berichten verschenen inzake het mogelijk uitroepen van het Offerfeest Ied Ul Adah tot een nationale feestdag wensen wij U alsvolgt te informeren: Dat in de eindjaren zestig er door diverse religieuze gemeenten, geestelijken vele discussies hebben plaatsgevonden en in gemeen overleg is besloten de toenmalige gouverneur het verzoek te doen jaarlijks de Ied Ul Fitre dag gelijk te stellen aan de zondag. De grondslag tot dit besluit was ondermeer: dat het overgrote deel der Brits Indische Immigranten in Suriname het Hindoe geloof belijden God Krishna als reïncarnatie van God Vishnu (het onderhoudend aspect) op aarde is gekomen om het kwaad te bestrijden

Appendices 195 God Krishna in het dorp Mathura met zijn ouders Nanda Baba en Jasoda Mata koe- herders waren waarbij de koe als moeder de aarde een onlosmakelijk geheel vormde met God Krishna zelve, dit met verwijzing naar de heilige geschriften w.o. de Bhagavata Gita Het Hindoeisme het Ahimsa levensprincipe t.w. niet doden hoog in het vaandel draagt en dus je je eigen moeder die melk, ghee, etc produceert om in leven te blijven niet doodt. Dat er in Suriname vele Krishna tempels zijn gebouwd en er wekelijks ere diensten worden gehouden ter ere van God Krishna. Dat in andere landen deze tegenstrijdige, controversiële religieuze principes hebben geleid tot geschillen, oorlogen, moord, spanningsvelden in families, buurtgemeenschappen, districten, steden e.d. Dat in een mooi, vredig en voor de wereld voorbeeldig land Suriname deze spanningen niet zouden moeten overwaaien en deze unieke harmonie behouden zou moeten blijven voor ons nageslacht in het licht van eenheid, solidariteit, vriendschap, wederzijds respect en vrede. Dat onze Moslim broeders hun offerfeest traditioneel in familie- en moskee verband verder stemmig vieren. Dat bovengenoemde besluiten door gezaghebbende en zeer prominente Hindoe- en Moslims leiders zijn genomen. Na de laatst gehouden census zijn nav onze veranderde bevolkings -samenstelling wederom discussies voor een her-orientatie van de nationale feestdagen opgelaaid en de oude discussies weer gevoerd hetgeen heeft geleid tot een gezamelijke verklaring van 28 juni 2007 ondertekend door een 30 tal religieuze – culturele- en sociaal maatschappelijke organisaties. In deze verklaring, een initiatief van de Culturele Unie Suriname, werd aangegeven dat naast de oproep tot correctie van de ongelijkwaardige posities van Hindoes en Moslims alsook de Javanisten, het Ied Milaad Ud Nabi werd opgegeven als verzoek tot vrije dag en niet het IED UL ADHA offerdag. Deze verklaring is mede ondertekend door alle grote gemeenten in Suriname tw. Sanatan Dharma, Arya Dewaker, Surinaamse Islamitische Vereniging, Madjilies Moesliemien Suriname, Surinaamse Moesliem Associatie, Federatie Javanisme in Suriname, Khilafat Anjuman, Mata Gauri, Sewa, Nauyuga, SSDP, ISCON, GOPIO, NSHI, OHM etc… Het bevreemd ons dan ook dat contrair aan deze gezamelijke verklaring een verzoek aan U wordt gedaan. Wij doen daarom een beroep op U ter behoud van dit voornoemd en nobel streven ter handhaving van harmonie en vrede, het verzoek NIET te honoreren. Hoogachtend, Bhagwan Gangaram Panday Voorzitter Cc: Vz en leden DNA De Minister van Binnenlandse zaken CUS

196  Appendices

Appendix 6: Newsletter ‘A Spiritual Note’ Nov 19, 2010. A Spiritual Note November 19, 2010 - Zul-Hijjah 13, 1431 Assalamu Alaikum (peace be upon you). Nederlandse vertaling onderaan Universal Values of the Festival of Sacrifice The conversation below is based on real discussions, which were a result of introducing Divali and Eid-ul-Adha as public holidays in Suriname, starting this year. MRS. A:  Hey,

I heard that we have another public holiday tomorrow. I read something about the Festival of Sacrifice in the newspapers. Do you know about it? MR. B:  I am not sure, but I know that it is an Islamic festival. Shall we ask our colleague next door? She is a Muslim. […] MRS. C (MUSLIM):  Well, that is a long story. In the first place, the festival is part of the annual pilgrimage in Mecca, this week. In the second place, the Festival is a commemoration of the important prophet, Abraham, when he received the order from Allah to sacrifice his son. When it appeared that Abraham was ready to fulfil the sacrifice, Allah allowed him to sacrifice an animal instead. This is a significant point for all major religions, as this event is mentioned in the Old Testament as well [1]. Hence, Abraham is considered the patriarch of Jews, Christians and Muslims, as Moses, Jesus and Muhammad all descended spiritually from him. According to some Islamic scholars, there are many resemblances between Abraham and the person of Brahma in Hinduism [2]. Seen this way, this Islamic festival is important for all major religions. Thirdly, sacrificing an animal stands for sacrificing our attachment to worldly properties, power, and even children. This event teaches us not to turn ourselves away by extravagant worldly pleasures, but instead to lead a more sincere life. According to the Quran, this is the most important part of the festival [3]. Next, sacrifice teaches us to be humble. We know that we have the power to take the life of an animal at any time, but, likewise, Allah also has the power to take our lives whenever He pleases! And last but not least, part of the meat is distributed among the poor and needy, so there is also an aspect of charity in this festival. MR. B:  Wow,

that’s a lot! I had heard about the Festival of Sacrifice before, and that it involved the slaughtering of animals, but I never knew about the background.

Appendices 197 MRS. A:  That

is one of the objectives of religious public holidays in a multicultural society. In this way, followers of different religions learn about one another’s faiths, which strengthen mutual respect and solidarity. MR. D (JUST WALKS IN): Hello all, I just heard that the Government will withdraw the Muslim public holiday tomorrow, because some people are against it! MRS. A (SHOCKED):  Is that true? And I had so many plans to spend the day with my family! MR. D:  No, I was just joking, but it’s true that some religions don’t agree with a festival where cows are slaughtered, so they requested the President to withdraw the public holiday. MRS. A (TO MRS. C):  What is your opinion about this? Is the protest appropriate, seeing the background of the festival? MRS. C: Well, I can’t judge for others how they consider the religious festivals of other religions, but I can imagine that some are not happy with slaughtering of cows. However, traditionally, in many mosques in Suriname bulls are slaughtered, not cows. In other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, people predominantly sacrifice sheep. And you should know that in other countries, such as India and Guyana, the Festival of Sacrifice is a public holiday, as well. As far as it considers Islam, we should respect religious festivals of other religions, even if there are differences in the way and concepts of worship. After all, the Quran teaches that all people had a Prophet [4] and that all religions came with their own religious festivals [5]. It should also be mentioned that many of the earlier Prophets are mentioned in the Quran, as well, such as Abraham, Moses and Jesus [6]. [Silence.] MR. D: 

What? Are these Prophets indeed mentioned in the Quran? I should say that we have learned a lot today. [AND TO MRS. C]:  May I wish you a pleasant sacrifice, or do you say this in another way? MRS. C:  We say Eid Mubarak, but you can also say: Have a blessed Sacrifice Festival. I wish all of you a pleasant day tomorrow, as well, and see you again day after. Notes: [1] Gen. 22:2; Hebr. 11:17 [2] http://www.aaiil.org/suriname/ dawn/2002_01.pdf [3] Quran 22:37 [4] Quran 35:24 [5] Quran 22:34 [6] Quran 2:136 and others.

198  Appendices

Appendix 7: Declaration Vatican about Approach Non-Christians DECLARATION ON THE RELATION OF THE CHURCH TO NONCHRISTIAN RELIGION, NOSTRA AETATE PROCLAIMED BY HIS HOLINESS, POPE PAUL VI, ON OCTOBER 28, 1965 1 In our time, when day by day mankind is being drawn closer together, and the ties between different peoples are becoming stronger, the Church examines more closely her relationship to non-Christian religions. In her task of promoting unity and love among men, indeed among nations, she considers above all in this declaration what men have in common and what draws them to fellowship. One is the community of all peoples, one their origin, for God made the whole human race to live over the face of the earth.(1) One also is their final goal, God. His providence, His manifestations of goodness, His saving design extend to all men,(2) until that time when the elect will be united in the Holy City, the city ablaze with the glory of God, where the nations will walk in His light.(3) Men expect from the various religions answers to the unsolved riddles of the human condition, which today, even as in former times, deeply stir the hearts of men: What is man? What is the meaning, the aim of our life? What is moral good, what is sin? Whence suffering and what purpose does it serve? Which is the road to true happiness? What are death, judgment and retribution after death? What, finally, is that ultimate inexpressible mystery which encompasses our existence: whence do we come, and where are we going? 2 From ancient times down to the present, there is found among various peoples a certain perception of that hidden power which hovers over the course of things and over the events of human history; at times some indeed have come to the recognition of a Supreme Being, or even of a Father. This perception and recognition penetrates their lives with a profound religious sense. Religions, however, that are bound up with an advanced culture have struggled to answer the same questions by means of more refined concepts and a more developed language. Thus in Hinduism, men contemplate the divine mystery and express it through an inexhaustible abundance of myths and through searching philosophical inquiry. They seek freedom from the anguish of our human condition either through ascetical practices or profound meditation or a flight to God with love and trust. Again, Buddhism, in its various forms, realizes the radical insufficiency of this changeable world; it teaches a way by which men, in a devout and confident

Appendices 199 spirit, may be able either to acquire the state of perfect liberation, or attain, by their own efforts or through higher help, supreme illumination. Likewise, other religions found everywhere try to counter the restlessness of the human heart, each in its own manner, by proposing ‘ways’, comprising teachings, rules of life, and sacred rites. The Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions. She regards with sincere reverence those ways of conduct and of life, those precepts and teachings which, though differing in many aspects from the ones she holds and sets forth, nonetheless often reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men. Indeed, she proclaims, and ever must proclaim Christ ‘the way, the truth, and the life’ (John 14:6), in whom men may find the fullness of religious life, in whom God has reconciled all things to Himself.(4) 3 The Church, therefore, exhorts her sons, that through dialogue and collaboration with the followers of other religions, carried out with prudence and love and in witness to the Christian faith and life, they recognize, preserve and promote the good things, spiritual and moral, as well as the sociocultural values found among these men. The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the one God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, the Creator of heaven and earth,(5) who has spoken to men; they take pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, submitted to God. Though they do not acknowledge Jesus as God, they revere Him as a prophet. They also honor Mary, His virgin Mother; at times they even call on her with devotion. In addition, they await the Day of Judgment when God will render their deserts to all those who have been raised up from the dead. Finally, they value the moral life and worship God especially through prayer, almsgiving and fasting. Since in the course of centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities have arisen between Christians and Moslems, this sacred synod urges all to forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of all mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and freedom. 4 As the sacred synod searches into the mystery of the Church, it remembers the bond that spiritually ties the people of the New Covenant to Abraham’s stock. Thus the Church of Christ acknowledges that, according to God’s saving design, the beginnings of her faith and her election are found already among the Patriarchs, Moses, and the prophets. She professes that all who believe in Christ-Abraham’s sons according to faith (6) are

200  Appendices included in the same Patriarch’s call, and likewise that the salvation of the Church is mysteriously foreshadowed by the chosen people’s exodus from the land of bondage. The Church, therefore, cannot forget that she received the revelation of the Old Testament through the people with whom God in His inexpressible mercy concluded the Ancient Covenant. Nor can she forget that she draws sustenance from the root of that well-cultivated olive tree onto which have been grafted the wild shoots, the Gentiles.(7) Indeed, the Church believes that by His cross Christ, Our Peace, reconciled Jews and Gentiles. making both one in Himself.(8) The Church keeps ever in mind the words of the Apostle about his kinsmen: ‘theirs is the sonship and the glory and the covenants and the law and the worship and the promises; theirs are the fathers and from them is the Christ according to the flesh’ (Rom. 9:4-5), the Son of the Virgin Mary. She also recalls that the Apostles, the Church’s mainstay and pillars, as well as most of the early disciples who proclaimed Christ’s Gospel to the world, sprang from the Jewish people. As Holy Scripture testifies, Jerusalem did not recognize the time of her visitation,(9) nor did the Jews in large number, accept the Gospel; indeed not a few opposed its spreading.(10) Nevertheless, God holds the Jews most dear for the sake of their Fathers; He does not repent of the gifts He makes or of the calls He issues-such is the witness of the Apostle.(11) In company with the Prophets and the same Apostle, the Church awaits that day, known to God alone, on which all peoples will address the Lord in a single voice and ‘serve him shoulder to shoulder’ (Soph. 3:9).(12) Since the spiritual patrimony common to Christians and Jews is thus so great, this sacred synod wants to foster and recommend that mutual understanding and respect which is the fruit, above all, of biblical and theological studies as well as of fraternal dialogues. True, the Jewish authorities and those who followed their lead pressed for the death of Christ;(13) still, what happened in His passion cannot be charged against all the Jews, without distinction, then alive, nor against the Jews of today. Although the Church is the new people of God, the Jews should not be presented as rejected or accursed by God, as if this followed from the Holy Scriptures. All should see to it, then, that in catechetical work or in the preaching of the word of God they do not teach anything that does not conform to the truth of the Gospel and the spirit of Christ. Furthermore, in her rejection of every persecution against any man, the Church, mindful of the patrimony she shares with the Jews and moved not by political reasons but by the Gospel’s spiritual love, decries

Appendices 201 hatred, persecutions, displays of anti-Semitism, directed against Jews at any time and by anyone. Besides, as the Church has always held and holds now, Christ underwent His passion and death freely, because of the sins of men and out of infinite love, in order that all may reach salvation. It is, therefore, the burden of the Church’s preaching to proclaim the cross of Christ as the sign of God’s all-embracing love and as the fountain from which every grace flows. 5 We cannot truly call on God, the Father of all, if we refuse to treat in a brotherly way any man, created as he is in the image of God. Man’s relation to God the Father and his relation to men his brothers are so linked together that Scripture says: ‘He who does not love does not know God’ (1 John 4:8). No foundation therefore remains for any theory or practice that leads to discrimination between man and man or people and people, so far as their human dignity and the rights flowing from it are concerned. The Church reproves, as foreign to the mind of Christ, any discrimination against men or harassment of them because of their race, color, condition of life, or religion. On the contrary, following in the footsteps of the holy Apostles Peter and Paul, this sacred synod ardently implores the Christian faithful to “maintain good fellowship among the nations” (1 Peter 2:12), and, if possible, to live for their part in peace with all men, (14) so that they may truly be sons of the Father who is in heaven (15). Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Cf. Acts 17:26 Cf. Wis. 8:1; Acts 14:17; Rom. 2:6-7; 1 Tim. 2:4 Cf. Apoc. 21:23f. Cf 2 Cor. 5:18-19 Cf St. Gregory VII, letter XXI to Anzir (Nacir), King of Mauritania (Pl. 148, col. 450f.) Cf. Gal. 3:7 Cf. Rom. 11:17-24 Cf. Eph. 2:14-16 Cf. Lk. 19:44 Cf. Rom. 11:28 Cf. Rom. 11:28-29; cf. dogmatic Constitution, Lumen Gentium (Light of nations) AAS, 57 (1965) page. 20 Cf. Is. 66:23; Ps. 65:4; Rom. 11:11-32 Cf. John. 19:6 Cf. Rom. 12:18 Cf. Matt. 5:45

202  Appendices

Appendix 8: National Religious Organizations Suriname and Guyana Appendix 8a: Hindu Organizations Suriname and Guyana No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Suriname

Guyana

Suriname Sanatan Dharma Sabha Arya Dewaker Suriname Stichting Organisatie Hindoe Media Stichting Suriname Hindi Parishad ISKCON Suriname Stichting Mata Gauri Shri Sanatan Dharm Paramaribo Noord Kabir Panth Suriname

Guyana Sanatan Dharma Sabha

Brahmarishi Ashram Kwatta Sri Sathya Sai Baba Organisatie Suriname Brahma Kumaris Suriname

Guyana Dharmic Sabha Guyana Central Arya Samaj Guyana Arya Pratinidhi Sabha Pundit Council Guyana Maha Kali Organization Hindu College Guyana Sevashram The Sri Sathya Sai Baba Organization of Guyana Hare Krishna Raja Yoga Centre Guyana Hindi Prachaar Sabha

Source: Schalkwijk (1997), J, Personal Communication, February 25th, 2017

Appendix 8b: Muslim Organizations Suriname and Guyana No

Suriname

Guyana

1

Surinaamse Islamitische Vereniging

2

Surinaamse Moslim Associatie

3 4 5

Surinaamse Moesliem Federatie Persarekatan Jamaah Islamiya Suriname Stichting Islamitische Gemeenten in Suriname Syarikat Islam Assafi’iyah Islam Federatie van Islamitische Gemeenten in Suriname Surinaamse Islamitische Organisatie

Guyana United Sad’r Islamic Anjuman Central Islamic Organization of Guyana Guyana Islamic Trust Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat

6 7 8

Source: Schalkwijk (1997), J, Personal Communication, February 25th, 2017, S, Personal Communication, March 12th, 2017, J, Personal Communication, June 13th, 2013.

Appendices 203 Appendix 8c: Umbrella (Inter)Religious Organizations Suriname and Guyana Country

Organization

Members

Suriname

Interreligious Organization Suriname

Arya Dewaker, Sanatan Dharma, Madjilies Moeslimin Suriname, Surinaamse Islamitische Vereniging, Roman Catholic Church Reformed, Lutheran, Catholic, Moravian, and Anglican Church, and Leger des Heils.

Council of Christian Churches Suriname Vereniging Volle Evangelie en Pinkstergemeenten Madjilies Moeslimin Suriname

Guyana

Interreligious Organization Guyana Guyana Council of Christian Churches

Full Gospel Fellowship of Churches

Surinaamse Moesliem Federatie (SMF), Persarekatan Jamaah Islamiya Suriname (PJIS), Surinaamse Islamitische Vereniging (SIV), Stichting Islamitische Gemeenten in Suriname (SIS), Syarikat Islam Assafi’iyah Islam (SIA), Federatie van Islamitische Gemeenten in Suriname (FIGS), Surinaamse Islamitische Organisatie (SIO) Evangelical churches, CIOG, Bahai organization, Catholic Church, Anglican Church, Rastafarian community Anglican Church, Catholic Church, Guyana Presbyterian Church, African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, African Methodist Episcopal Church, Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, Church of God, Church of the Nazerene, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, Guyana Congregational Union, Guyana Missionary Baptist Church, Methodist Church (in the Caribbean and the Americas), Moravian Church, Outreach Ministries International, Presbytery of Guyana, Salvation Army

Source: ‘Feroz Nazir, nieuwe voorzitter Madjlies Moesliemien Suriname’, 2013, ‘Full Gospel Fellowship of churches turns 50’, 2014, ‘Guyana Council of Churches’, n.d., Edwin K. Marshall (2007), Schalkwijk (1997), Waal (2012), S, Personal Communication, March 12th, 2017, M, Personal Communication, December 13th, 2013.

204  Appendices

Appendix 9: Religious Institutions in Abrabroki and Kitty Appendix 9a: Religious Institutions Abrabroki (Suriname) No Religion

Name Denomination institution

1

Christianity Pentecostal

2 3

Christianity Catholic Christianity Catholic

4 5 6

Christianity Moravian Christianity Pentecostal Christianity Pentecostal

7 8 9

Christianity Moravian Christianity Moravian Christianity Moravian

10

Christianity Catholic

11

Christianity Catholic

13 14 15

Christianity Moravian Christianity Moravian Hinduism Sanatan

16

Islam

Sunni

17

Islam

Wahabi

18

Islam

Sunni

19

Islam

Sunni

20  Islam

Sunni

 21 Islam

Sunni

Pentecostal Church Fatima Church Katholieke Charismatische Vereniging Suriname Saronkerk Ik ben God’s Rivier Ministries Saronschool Akselschool Marcel Ria BO school Fatimaschool - LO A St. Tarciciusschool Saron Saron Temple (Shiv mandir) Surinaamse Muslim Associatie Sadar Anjuman Akaidul Islam Vereniging Abu Hanafi Mulo school MULO F. R. Dr. Ansari school GLO Noorani school GLO Ansari

Type of institution

Address

Church

Calcuttastraat 30

Church Church

Calcuttastraat 79 Awaradam 15

Church Church Church

Slangenhoutstraat 103 Bruinhartstraat 13 Begoniastraat 7

School School School

Slangenhoutstraat 105 Slangenhoutstraat 106 Slangenhoutstraat 107

School

Groenhartstraat 25

School

Calcuttastraat 81

Graveyard Slangenhoutstraat 103 Orphanage Slangenhoutstraat 99 Temple Purperhartstraat 24 Mosque

Kankantriestraat 32

Mosque

Calcuttastraat 87

School

Kankantriestraat 40

School

Hernhutterstraat 76

School

Kankantriestraat 40

Orphanage Kankantriestraat 40

Source: Personal Communication, February 12th, 2012.

Appendices 205 Appendix 9b: Religious Institutions Kitty (Guyana)* No Religion

Name Denomination institution

Type of institution

Address

Holy Rosary Church St. Winefride School

Church

Davidstreet 13

School (private)

St Thomas More Men’s Homestead St. James - the - Less church St. James graveyard Kitty Christian Brethren 7th Adventist Guy Bible College Diocesan Youth centre Guy Bible College, Kitty Wesleyan Church Pentecostal Church

Social

Davidstreet (opposite church) Gordonstreet

Church

Davidstreet

Pentecostal church Pentecostal Church Pentecostal Church (Brazilian) Church of Christ Church of Christ Theology School 7th Day Adventist Church Kitty Methodist Church

1

Christianity

Catholic

2

Christianity

Catholic

3

Christianity

Catholic

4

Christianity

Anglican

5

Christianity

Anglican

6

Christianity

Brethren

7 8

Christianity Christianity

Pentecostal  

9

Christianity

Catholic

10

Christianity

 

11

Christianity

 

12

Christianity

Pentecostal

13

Christianity

Pentecostal

14

Christianity

Pentecostal

15

Christianity

Pentecostal

16

Christianity

Pentecostal

17

Christianity

Pentecostal

18

Christianity

Pentecostal

19

Christianity

Methodist

Graveyard Davidstreet Church

Davidstreet 25

Church School

Gordonstreet 19 Public Road

 

Subryanville

School/ church Church

Stanley’s Place

Church

Church

Corner of Thomasstreet & Alexanderstreet (past cinema) Davidstreet

Church

Shell Road 112

Church Church

Corner of Barrstreet & Alexanderstreet Gordonstreet

Church

Gordonstreet

Church

Public Road

Church

Williamstreet

Sandy Babb street 12

(Continued)

206  Appendices No Religion

Name Denomination institution

Type of institution

20

Christianity

 

nursery

21

Islam

 Sunni

22

Islam

 Sunni

23

Hindu

Sanatan

24 25

Hindu* Sanatan Christianity* Catholic

Pilgrims Daycare Kitty Jamaat (Guy Sad’r Islamic Anjuman) Guy Sad’r Islamic Anjuman orphanage Rama Krishna School Cemetery Cemetery

Mosque

Address Alexanderstreet/ Davidstreet Sandy Babb street 77

Orphanage Corner of Thomasstreet & Alexanderstreet School

Barrstreet 105

cemetery cemetery

Pikestreet Alexanderstreet

Source: Personal Communication, December 11th, 2013; Personal Communication, September 22nd, 2012. * Various addresses do not have a plot number as the author could identify this during the fieldwork. ** No longer active.

Note 1 Azimullah E., De realisering van het mogelijke, een greep uit de prestaties van de Regering Sedney, Offsetdrukkerij Westfort, 1973, Paramaribo, p.216–217.

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Index

Abrabroki 36–38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 71, 110, 113, 125–128, 160, 161, 204 acculturation theory 3 Ahmadiyyas 6, 56, 57, 65, 71, 94, 97, 99, 103, 113, 119, 120, 165, 172, 177 Anglican Church 36, 80, 83, 85, 96, 101, 147, 203 Arya Samaj 6, 19, 29, 34, 57, 95, 107–109, 111, 131, 135, 150–152, 161, 202 baptism 6, 83, 98, 135, 137, 144 beliefs 2, 3, 6, 9–12, 14–18, 20, 23, 26, 30, 32, 40, 41, 59, 62, 64, 65, 68, 71–73, 82, 84, 95–97, 99, 106, 110, 123–125, 136, 137, 151, 186, 187, 210 BGEIA 130 Bharat Oeday 101–104, 159 Bible 6, 72, 88, 205 Blacks 76, 77, 86, 99 burial 61, 70, 83, 117, 154 Canadian Mission 82–84 Caribbean 3–5, 13, 15, 19–21, 27, 46, 93, 125, 131, 157, 163, 166, 169, 174, 175, 180, 203 Caribbean religions 4 case study 33, 35, 42, 44, 45, 46, 125, 126, 128, 129, 146, 149, 157, Catholic Church 13, 15, 27, 52, 54, 59, 63, 64, 66–68, 80, 83, 84, 85, 95, 98, 99, 127, 134, 146, 148, 161, 199, 203 Catholics 15, 28, 32, 37, 52, 55, 56, 59, 62, 64, 66, 68, 80, 94, 95, 104, 112, 126, 147, 148, 160 CCK 63, 66, 67, 68, 95, 122, 123, 160

ceremonies 11, 82, 83, 114, 154, 155 children 100, 101, 104, 106–110, 124, 127, 132, 136, 141, 142, 147, 156, 159, 161, 196 Christian denominations 6, 7, 54, 55, 58, 59, 61–64, 66, 68, 78, 80, 85, 94, 96, 97, 142, 146, 147, 164, 169, 176–178 Christian dominance 1, 2, 5–9, 11, 14–17, 22, 28, 30, 31, 34, 39, 40–44, 48–102, 104, 108, 110, 118, 119, 121, 122, 128–132, 135–137, 140–143, 145, 146, 148–151, 154–157, 159, 163–165, 175–179 Christianization 40, 82, 110, 136, 186–188 Christians 1, 4, 5, 8, 13–16, 27–29, 31, 36–38, 40–42, 46–50, 52, 53–56, 58, 60–63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 73–79, 81, 83–86, 89–101, 104–106, 110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 119, 121, 122, 126–130, 132, 134, 137, 140–149, 155, 157, 158, 161, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 174–179 churches 6, 7, 13, 14, 16, 17, 27, 29, 31, 36, 40–42, 54, 59, 60, 62–66, 68–74, 78, 80, 82, 85–90, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 122, 127, 135, 140–142, 144–147, 149, 156–158, 165, 169, 176–178, 187, 203 civil service 39, 82, 83, 96, 135, 142, 144, 155, 177, 189 civil services 21, 25, 40, 41, 42, 61, 62, 72, 81, 82, 141, 142, 187, 189 clashes 29, 137 coercive and noncoercive control 9; coercive control 8; noncoercive control 9

Index 225 colonialism 1, 13, 15 48, 74 common sense 10 community projects 13, 187, 189 comparative case study design 33, 45 comparative mixed methods research strategy 33, 176 conceptual framework 2, 3, 16, 22, 26, 27, 33, 42, 45, 60, 101, 104, 105, 128, 129, 145, 148, 149, 155, 158, 159, 163, 166, 167, 168, 169, 174, 179 concerted diversity 4, 23–30, 35, 36, 39, 41, 42, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 129, 144, 145, 146, 149, 157, 158, 166, 167, 169, 175, 178, 179, 186, 187, 188, 189 conflict solving 4, 23, 24, 26, 28, 122, 166 Consociationalism 115, 152, 154, 165, 178 conversion 1, 6, 11–15, 18, 20, 25, 29, 30, 34, 35, 38, 40, 41, 44, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56–60, 64, 65, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74–91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 104–106, 110, 119–121, 131, 132, 134, 136, 142, 143, 144, 151, 156, 157, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 175, 176, 177, 178, 209, 212, 223 conversion missions 6, 14, 29, 52, 59, 60, 64, 69, 80, 81, 94, 98, 156 conversion missions 6, 14, 29, 52, 59, 60, 64, 69, 80, 81, 94, 98, 156, 177 conversion rates 12, 18, 34, 38 converts 14, 60, 70, 71, 72, 76, 78, 88, 96, 101, 132, 157, 165, 177, 178 cooperation 4, 22–26, 39, 41, 42, 67, 95–97, 114, 115, 122, 123, 127, 128, 145, 148, 157, 165, 166, 187–189 counterhegemony 4–7, 16, 17, 20, 31, 39 cremation 39–41, 83, 84, 111, 116, 117, 132–134, 136, 143, 148, 150, 152, 154, 165, 166, 188 Creoles 37, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 64, 67, 76, 79, 98, 111, 112, 115, 126, 134, 137, 147, 155, 159 crisis 15, 64, 140, 141, 151, 167 critical thinking 10, 17, 102 Crusades 87, 88, 149, 165, 177

cultures 2, 17, 22, 100 CUS 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 195 data analysis 44 data collection 6, 33, 37, 38, 45, 176 denominational schools 6, 13, 15, 20, 36, 46, 61, 65, 66, 80, 85, 94, 96, 99, 101–110, 116, 117, 126, 129, 132, 135, 141, 142, 144, 151–153, 155, 161, 165, 166, 178, 189 denominations 6, 7, 34, 44, 54–59, 61–69, 77, 78, 80, 81, 85, 94–99, 103, 104, 107, 112, 135, 142, 143, 146, 147, 160, 164, 168, 169, 176–179 differences 4, 5, 22, 23, 29, 34, 35, 37, 38, 45, 46, 55, 63, 74, 83, 91, 96, 97, 99, 113, 114, 124, 126, 149, 150, 153, 164, 165, 167, 168, 176, 177, 178, 179, 186, 197 dimensions 2, 9, 17, 22, 24, 31, 36, 39, 41, 46, 59, 177, 186, 188 domination 5, 8, 9, 15, 16, 30 Dutch Reformed Church 59, 62, 63, 94, 98 Dutch Reformists 54 east- and west-oriented prayers 6 East Indians 4, 36, 37, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 60, 64, 67, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 86, 91, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 107–109, 111, 113, 115, 116, 118, 126, 134, 137, 138, 147, 155, 159, 162, 164, 168 east prayers 56, 103, 114 ecumenical services 13, 26, 90, 187, 189 elections 15, 21, 22, 38, 39, 41, 62, 65, 67, 90, 111, 113, 115, 117, 120, 133, 134, 138, 156 electoral support 72, 112, 113, 115 electoral system 21, 22, 112, 115, 138, 154, 156, 167, 168 electoral victory 35, 111, 115 elites 22, 41, 115, 135, 152, 167, 168, 172, 174, 178, 179, 183 emigration 53, 54, 77, 79, 91, 93, 118, 119, 139–141, 147, 155 enslaved Africans 13, 15, 48, 74 equality 3, 4, 17, 19, 23–28, 40, 41, 67, 68, 84, 85, 90, 97, 119, 122, 123, 128, 137, 143, 144, 156–159, 166, 186 ethnic tensions 65, 67, 90, 137

226  Index ethnicity 6, 37, 41, 43, 50, 52, 53, 55, 76, 77, 93, 103, 105, 111–113, 115, 125, 152, 167, 169, 179, 191 ethnography 43, 46 Evangelicalism 3, 6, 55–57, 65, 68, 69, 71–73, 78, 79, 87–89, 93, 94, 96, 97, 119, 120, 121, 126, 147, 156, 164–166, 177–179 fertility 11, 51–53, 76, 77, 99 flexibility 69, 72, 87 GCC 85, 140, 155, 157, 158 Georgetown 37, 81, 86, 87, 137, 161 God 3, 7, 31, 60, 63, 68, 69, 81, 84, 87, 89, 106, 132, 136, 145, 194, 195, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203 government policies 5, 9, 11, 14–16, 19–22, 24–29, 30, 35, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 59–61, 66, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 91, 101, 104, 105, 110, 122, 125, 128, 129, 132, 137, 139, 145, 149, 150–154, 156–158, 163–168, 177–179 Gramsci 5, 8–11, 13–16, 18, 19, 21, 31, 32 graveyards 73, 74, 88 GUSIA 136, 139 Guyana 1, 4–7, 20–22, 33–39, 42, 44–46, 48, 74–81, 84, 85, 87–97, 100–102, 124, 129–133, 135, 136, 138 harmony 2, 3, 5, 23, 24, 28, 29, 45, 90, 115, 125, 145, 157, 158, 163, 166, 175 hegemony 4, 5, 7–10, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 30, 39 Hindu Dharmic Sabha 139–143 Hinduism 2, 4, 19, 37, 48, 52, 56, 66, 74, 76, 82, 95, 124, 132, 136, 141, 142, 143, 151, 154, 157, 161, 169, 187, 196, 198, 204 Hindus 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20–22, 29, 34–37, 39–50, 52, 53, 57, 58, 61–68, 74–89, 91–156, 158, 161, 163–166, 169, 174–184, 190 holidays 6, 13, 14, 39, 61, 66, 68, 81, 84, 95, 96, 97, 110, 116, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 137, 145, 152, 153, 156, 158, 161, 165, 166, 168, 186, 188, 196, 197, 216, 223 House of Israel 85, 86, 140 house visits 71, 88, 177

ideological dominance 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 81, 82, 84, 95, 96, 128, 177 ideologies 2, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 18, 29, 30, 31, 39, 63, 152, 154, 164, 165, 175, 177, 179 immigrants 2, 11, 64, 74, 82, 130 immigration 42, 50, 58, 60, 83, 91, 100, 149, 150, 159, 161 indentured workers 11, 50, 58, 60, 61, 64, 74, 80, 91, 97, 101, 130, 150, 161 independence 53, 54, 66, 67, 80, 119, 124, 138, 152, 159, 167 India 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 29, 48, 83, 97, 124, 125, 131, 135, 136, 151, 160, 161, 197 indices 49, 74, 75, 93, 97 indigenous people 17, 48, 59, 60, 98 Indonesia 14, 29, 48, 97, 98, 103, 111, 112, 114, 160, 162 influence 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12–16, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 34, 35, 40–43, 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 57, 58, 60, 62, 63, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74. 76, 77, 78, 84–89, 91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 101, 102, 104, 105, 108, 109, 111, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 127, 128–132, 135, 138, 139, 140–145, 148–150, 155–158, 162–169, 175–179 institutional dominance 14, 15, 16, 61, 62, 63, 81, 82, 83, 94, 96, 97, 121, 127, 161, 177 institutionalization 4, 6, 19, 20, 69, 72, 87, 95, 103, 154, 157, 176 institutions 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 68, 69, 73, 81, 83, 86, 88, 89, 91, 95, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, 116, 118, 126, 127, 130, 135, 142, 151, 153, 154, 158, 159, 161, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 175, 178, 179, 188, 204, 205 intellectual leadership 12, 13 interreligious cooperation 23, 25, 26, 39, 42, 67, 95, 96, 97, 127, 128, 145, 148, 157, 166, 187 interreligious dialogue 3, 7, 66, 84, 85, 163 interreligious relations 2–5, 7, 16, 22–24, 26–30, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39,

Index 227 40, 43, 45, 46, 101–169, 174–176, 178, 179, 186 interview 42–44, 46, 70, 119, 124, 171, 176 IRIS 67, 68, 98, 129, 157 IRO 90, 95, 96, 144, 145, 149, 157 Islam 6, 37, 48, 50, 52, 56, 57, 66, 67, 72, 74, 76, 81, 82, 84, 95, 98, 99, 103, 104, 106–109, 113, 117, 119, 122–125, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136, 137, 139–141, 143, 150, 151, 154, 157, 159, 160, 169, 187, 195, 196, 197, 199, 202–204, 206 Javanese 6, 36, 37, 43, 50–53, 55–57, 60–65, 68, 71–73, 91, 94–100, 102, 103, 107, 109–121, 129, 149, 152, 155–157, 159, 160, 164–166, 177, 178, 191, 192 jobs 14, 16, 21, 61, 63, 82, 86, 96, 98, 132, 135, 138, 142, 144, 155, 168 Kitty 36–38, 40, 42–44, 46, 136, 146–148, 161, 204–206 KTPI 111, 113, 114, 116, 120, 157, 160, 161 laborers 48, 60, 97, 153 law 10, 11, 20, 64, 66, 67, 80, 83, 95, 99, 100, 102, 104, 106, 116, 117, 119, 133, 134, 150, 152, 153, 165, 177, 200, 214 legal products 39, 66, 83, 84, 95, 96, 97, 118, 122, 125, 165, 166, 176 legalization 20, 64, 100, 102, 132, 133, 143, 188 Legislative Council 133 Lutherans 54, 55, 160 marginalization 2 market share 18, 25 Maroon Evangelicals 55, 68, 177 Maroon Moravians 55 Marxism 172, 177, 183 material resources 13, 14, 19, 40, 63, 64, 88, 109, 188 Methodists 80, 96, 99, 147 migration 2, 3, 11, 31, 41, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 65, 75, 76, 77, 78, 91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 118, 119, 164, 167, 176, 212, 213, 215, missionaries 13, 15, 17, 19, 40, 41, 59, 63, 82, 83, 84, 88, 106, 131, 136, 146, 147, 188, 222

mixed methods design 33, 45, 46, 97 moral leadership 13, 63 Moravian church 36, 46, 52, 59, 62, 63, 64, 94, 98, 127, 128, Moravians 36, 37, 54, 55, 59, 82, 94, 96, 109, 126 mosques 13, 16, 20, 28, 36, 40, 42, 103, 121, 124, 125, 131, 132, 159, 166, 178, 186, 197 Muslim denominations 6, 56, 107 Muslims 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 34–41, 42, 43, 46–50, 52–58, 60–66, 68, 72, 74–77, 79–84, 86, 88, 89, 91–97, 99, 100–122, 126–139, 141–157, 159, 161, 163–66, 168, 169, 175–179, 190, 196 national population 5, 22, 35, 46, 49, 53, 54, 57, 76, 93, 128, 169 nationalization 132, 134, 141, 144, 152, 154, 158, 178 natural growth 11, 41, 42, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 57, 58, 60, 74–77, 79, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 164, 167, 176 natural order 10, 12, 17 NDP 120, 156, 157 negotiation 22, 24, 41, 115, 188 neighborliness 27, 29, 35, 40, 42, 46, 126–128, 146, 148, 158 Netherlands 53, 118, 159 NPS 112–116, 120, 160, 161 OHM 90, 123, 124, 125, 159, 194, 195 opposition 8, 21, 24, 133, 144, 157, 160, 161 oral history 42–44, 46, 171, 176 orphanage 21, 36, 102, 110, 116, 120, 126, 150, 160, 161, 204, 206 Paramaribo 102, 109, 161, 194, 202, 206 parliament 21, 38, 41, 62, 77, 89, 90, 100, 104, 111, 113, 116, 117, 120, 123, 133, 134, 139, 142, 152, 156, 160, 168 party council 112 pastors 54, 69, 73, 89, 99 PBIS 114, 160 Pentecostal churches 68, 87, 98 Pentecostals 144 perceptions 2, 3, 9, 29, 34, 42, 214, 221

228  Index periodization 35, 38, 46 plantations 48, 59, 64, 74, 151, 153 PNC 86, 133, 137–142, 145, 154, 156 political decision-making power 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 35, 38, 39, 41, 43, 89, 104, 105, 110, 111, 114, 116, 117, 120, 121, 129, 132, 133, 134, 138, 151, 153 154, 156, 158, 160, 163, 179 political party 21, 38, 74, 112, 113, 115, 118, 120, 134, 139, 140, 153, 156, 157 political power-sharing 21, 22, 111 power relations 6, 10, 12–14, 22, 28, 164 power shift 65 PPP 132–135, 137, 138–140, 142, 144, 146, 152–154, 157 Presbyterian church 78, 83, 84, 85, 96, 131, 203 private religious institutions 5, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 34, 40, 41, 45, 60, 86, 95, 101, 105, 108, 109, 130, 135, 158, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 178, 179 Prophet 82, 99, 103, 106, 113, 124, 196, 197, 199 proportional representation 138, 154, 168 proportional system 21 Protestant movements 6 proxy 55, 76, 77, 174 public opinion 10, 12, 79, 221 public schools 14, 15, 18, 61, 80, 81, 102, 103, 104, 142, 161, 186 ratio 40, 55, 76, 91, 93, 99, 100, 106, 107, 112, 119, 188, 189, 191, 192 Reformed Church 59, 62, 63, 94, 98, 126, 160 reformists 54, 56, 98, 103, 114 regime 31, 38, 39, 65, 72, 85, 86, 118, 119, 121, 139, 140, 142, 155, 168 religions 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 17, 20, 23, 28, 30, 31, 48, 53, 55, 60, 63, 65, 70, 72–74, 78, 81, 82, 89, 90, 93, 94, 97, 98, 101, 112, 121, 124–126, 136, 142, 144, 155, 159, 176, 177, 187, 196–199 religious assimilation 60, 64, 73, 95 religious buildings 13, 43, 189 religious demography 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 22, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 43, 44,

45, 48, 49, 50, 56, 58, 60, 74, 76, 81, 91, 96, 101, 126, 149, 159, 163, 164, 167, 175, 176, 179, religious diversity 3, 28, 40, 41, 90, 126, 146 religious dominance 1, 4, 7, 8, 9–17, 19–22, 26, 28, 30, 58, 65, 80, 101, 105, 122, 149, 158, 159, 164, 166, 167, 169, 175, 178, 179 religious harmony 3, 5, 29, 45, 90, 125, 145, 158, 163, 166, 175, 215 religious homogeneity 3, 163 religious influence 144, 166, 169, 179 religious institutions 5, 9, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 22, 24–27, 29, 30, 34–37, 40–42, 45, 60, 86, 89, 91, 95, 101, 104, 105, 108, 109, 126, 130, 135, 158, 159, 163, 164, 166–168, 178, 179, 204, 205 religious leadership 5, 9, 12–14, 16, 22, 24–30, 32, 40, 41, 45, 66, 81, 85, 86, 90, 91, 95, 97, 101, 102, 105, 107, 109, 125, 130, 133, 138, 141, 142, 145, 158, 163, 164, 166–168, 178, 179 religious organizations 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 24, 34, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 61, 104, 107, 112, 113, 118, 119, 122, 125, 127, 133, 137, 138, 140, 145, 148, 152, 187, 189, 202, 203 religious pluralism 3, 7, 163 religious studies 33 religious tensions 4 responses 1, 2, 5, 7, 10, 16–20, 22, 26–31, 34–35, 37–42, 44–46, 84, 97, 101–163, 165–180, 186–189 rituals 13, 71, 131, 141, 220 Roman Catholic Church 13, 15, 63, 67, 80, 85, 99, 203 ruling group 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 26, 28, 30, 32, 104 sacred 8, 13, 31, 106, 123, 125, 136, 159, 199–201 Sanatan Dharma 6, 19, 34, 67, 95, 107, 108, 116–118, 122, 130, 131, 133, 135, 139, 152, 160, 195, 202, 203 Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha 108, 116, 118, 133, 135, 139 secondary analyses 43, 44, 46, 47 secular 8, 13, 31, 103 Seventh Day Adventists 87 shared religious beliefs 3, 41

Index 229 similarities 5, 7, 18, 34, 45, 91, 151, 163, 175, 176, 186 SIS 104, 107, 109, 110, 122, 203 SIV 67, 103, 117, 122, 124, 203 slavery 48, 118, 160 SMA 103, 117, 120, 122 Socialist 16, 22, 31, 134, 138, 152–154, 165, 178 sociopsychological theories 2 solidarity 3, 4, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 42, 64, 68, 119, 122, 123, 124, 127, 166, 197 spatial distribution 27, 29, 35, 36, 40, 42, 46, 105, 109, 110, 126, 129, 146–149, 155, 158, 159, 167, 179 status quo 6, 10, 12, 14, 18, 28 subordinate groups 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 29, 30, 35, 38, 39, 101, 104, 105, 111, 134, 154, 158, 159, 163, 164, 175, 179 subsidies 14, 20, 21, 39, 40, 41, 42, 61, 65, 66, 73, 80, 86, 95, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 109, 110, 111, 116, 117, 150, 152–155, 165, 166, 168, 173, 178, 188 Sunni 34, 46, 95, 103, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 120, 126, 127, 128, 129, 152, 155, 156, 204, 206 Sunnis 6, 46, 103, 107–109, 113, 126, 152, 155 Suriname 1, 2, 4–7, 20–22, 33–39, 42–46, 48–50, 52–54, 56–62, 64–80, 84, 87, 88, 91–94, 96–101,

103–105, 107, 112, 114–116, 119, 121,122, 124–126, 128, 129, 149–197, 202–204, 207 survey 27, 38, 43, 44, 46, 126, 161 Syncretism 17, 18, 131, 135, 136, 150, 152, 157, 187, 189 temples 13, 20, 36, 40, 42, 131, 132, 186 theoretical framework 7–32 theoretical similarities 7, 34, 176 theory development 33 Traditionalists 56, 98, 103, 113 Triangulation 44, 56, 99, 100 Trinidad 2, 4, 5, 11, 17, 19, 20, 21, 39, 46, 100, 103, 135, 150, 161, 169 umbrella organization 66, 68, 69, 85, 87, 95, 121, 129, 157, 159 values 2, 3, 9–13, 15, 17, 23, 26, 30, 39, 60, 62, 65, 81, 131, 163, 186, 187, 196, 199 verbroederingspolitiek 115, 165, 173, 178 VHP 112, 113–118, 120, 160, 161 Wesleyans 96 west prayers 56, 57, 71, 72, 99, 103, 114, 164, 177 Western Christianity 1 ‘winner-takes-all’ 21 Winti 70, 71, 73