Religion, Citizenship and Democracy (Religion and Human Rights, 8) 3030832767, 9783030832766

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Religion and Human Rights 8

Alexander Unser   Editor

Religion, Citizenship and Democracy

Religion and Human Rights Volume 8 Series Editors Hans-Georg Ziebertz, University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany Carl Sterkens, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

To the extent that modern societies are characterised by centrifugal forces like pluralization of norms, economic globalization, nationalism, political populism and claims of regional autonomy, the question of how to hold this society together becomes increasingly important. Democratic institutions proof to be vulnerable in such context. Even the possibility and desirability of democracy as it developed in Western countries after the Second World War is being questioned. Societal cohesion can no longer be achieved through shared religious beliefs, and common values seem to be scarce. Human rights are regarded as an important instrument to guarantee freedom and equality of citizens. This series investigates how religion can both challenge and contribute to a democratic society shaped by the culture of human rights in different national and cross-national contexts. Volumes address these questions by means of a theoretical, empirical and comparative approach. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/15597

Alexander Unser Editor

Religion, Citizenship and Democracy

Editor Alexander Unser Department of Humanities and Theology TU Dortmund University Dortmund, Germany

ISSN 2510-4306     ISSN 2510-4314 (electronic) Religion and Human Rights ISBN 978-3-030-83276-6    ISBN 978-3-030-83277-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83277-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 Introduction: Religion, Democracy and Citizenship����������������������������    1 Alexander Unser Part I Religion and the Development of Civic Virtue 2 Are Religious People the Better Democratic Citizens?������������������������   13 Hans-Georg Ziebertz 3 Educating for Civil Society and Democracy in Non-formal Programs of Religious Education: The Example of Confirmation Work������������������������������������������������������   39 Friedrich Schweitzer 4 Contributing to Local and Civil Society: Explorations for a Context-Sensitive and Public Character of Pastoral Ministry ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   55 Kerstin Menzel 5 Attempting a Connection Between Teenagers’ Religious Consciousness and Citizenship Education in the Greek Educational System ����������������������������������������������������������   75 Iro Potamousi Part II Religion and the Protection of Individual Rights 6 Ethno-cultural Diversity, Discrimination and Democracy: Empirical Research Among Students in Tamil Nadu, India����������������   93 Francis-Vincent Anthony 7 The Contribution of Religion to the Promotion of Critical Citizenship: An Empirical Study Among Young People in Tanzania����������������������������������������������������������  117 Clement Fumbo and Alexander Unser v

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Part III Religion and the Basis of Social Cohesion 8 The Income Equality Gap Between Rich and Poor and Its Effect on Citizenship, Democracy, and Religion����������������������  137 Raymond J. Webb 9 Religious Humour in a Welfare State Context��������������������������������������  155 Pål Ketil Botvar 10 Religious Diversity and the Secularization Process in Malta: A Reflection Through the Experiences of Health, Social Work and Education Professionals ��������������������������  175 Adrian-Mario Gellel, Zoi Arvanitidou, and Christine Rossi 11 Testing the Contact Hypothesis: The Association Between Personal Friendships and Anti-Jewish Attitudes Among 13- to 15-Year-Old Students in England and Wales����������������  199 Ursula McKenna and Leslie J. Francis 12 Normative Citizenship Education in Plural Societies: A Dialogical Approach to Possible Tensions Between Religious Identity and Citizenship������������������������������������������  221 Ina ter Avest, Ibrahim Kurt, Ömer F. Gürlesin, and Alper Alasag 13 No Citizenship for Ruth? Names as Access Permissions in the Scroll of Ruth ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  245 Karl-Heinrich Ostmeyer Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  273

Chapter 1

Introduction: Religion, Democracy and Citizenship Alexander Unser

The political dimension of religion has gained considerably importance in the public debate of the past three decades (Herbert, 2003; Kepel, 1994; Körner, 2020). In the process, the climate of this discussion has also changed. Religions and religious people, especially in Western countries, are increasingly obliged to explain whether and how their views, values and traditions are compatible with a majority secularised, liberal democratic society. The articles in this volume aim to contribute to the debate on the role of religion in democratic societies by presenting analyses dedicated to the complex interplay of religion, democracy, and citizenship. Since these three concepts  – religion, democracy, citizenship  – are already multifaceted in themselves, it is essential to first outline the complexity of the object of study before the specific focus of this volume and the individual contributions can be presented in a further step. The question of whether religion is compatible with democracy as a political system of many modern states is often a question of whether members of certain religions or religious people in general are capable of democracy. Being capable of democracy can mean different things (Herbert, 2003). It can be a question of whether religious people accept the rules of democracy – for example, that majority decisions apply as long as they do not violate the fundamental rights of individuals or entire groups, even if this restricts or overrides religious norms and values (the discussions on the legalisation of same-sex partnerships or the right to abortion are examples of such conflicts); that fundamental principles such as the equality of all citizens apply (this concerns above all the equality of women and men) (Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2012; Gellner, 1994; Kepel, 1994). It can also be a question of whether religion contributes to the social cohesion of a society or whether it tends to divide; whether religious people are open to dissent and work for the common A. Unser (*) TU Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Unser (ed.), Religion, Citizenship and Democracy, Religion and Human Rights 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83277-3_1

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good, or whether religion leads to isolation, exclusion and segregation (Cnaan et al., 2003; Emerson & Smith, 2001; Putnam, 2001). Finally, it can be a question of whether and how religions fulfil a necessary and critical function in society by conveying a pro-social ethos to their members, reducing ethnic conflicts and promoting movements against rogue regimes (Gill, 1999; Körner, 2020; Kubik, 1994). All these questions about the capacity for democracy are thus about the extent to which religion helps or hinders people to fulfil their role as citizens. This ability to fulfil the role of a citizen is usually referred to as citizenship. When we talk about citizenship, we must bear in mind that this term has at least three different but interrelated meanings. First, citizenship in the legal sense defines a specific status of a person within a nation state. The holder of citizenship – the citizen – has a certain number of political, civil and social rights, such as the right to vote and to participate in political processes (Jackson, 2003; Marshall, 1992). In a second sense, citizenship means the realisation of these rights in political action. According to an Aristotelian approach, the possession of rights implies the duty to engage in society and participate in political processes (Jackson, 2003). The term citizenship thus describes an ideal of being a citizen, to be realised by everyone. Depending on the underlying political theory – e.g. liberalism, republicanism, or communitarianism – the definition of the ideal citizen, his or her role and duties can vary considerably. Finally, the third meaning of citizenship builds a conceptual bridge between the first (legal status) and the second (fulfilment of duties). In this sense, citizenship means a certain competency of citizens to realise their rights, which is developed through socialisation and educational processes (Schulz et al., 2016). Things become even more complex when one considers that religion is also a multifaceted phenomenon that can be researched in many different ways. In a very broad sense one can distinguish between religion at the macro- (comprehensive religious systems or traditions), meso- (religious organisations or communities) and micro-level (religious individuals or believers). Comprehensive religious systems or traditions such as Christianity, Islam or Hinduism provide teachings, symbols and narratives that interpret our reality and can motivate action (Lindbeck, 1984). They are found, for example, in the holy scriptures of these religions, in their rituals and in the practice of piety and may or may not be compatible with the basic principles of democracy. Religious organisations such as parishes or mosque communities on the meso-level fulfil an important mediating function between religious systems and individual believers. They interpret religious systems and traditions and distinguish between the binding and the non-binding; they thereby influence their members by enabling them to distinguish between those who belong to the community and those who do not on the basis of shared beliefs, values and norms of action; and they provide structures for voluntary work. However, it is mainly at the micro-level that it is decided whether religion and democracy are compatible, because it is the individual believers who, as citizens of a state, must show whether they are capable of democracy. Moreover, the debate on the pluralisation and individualisation of religion (Davie, 2003; Luckmann, 1967; Peter, 2006) shows that forms of institutionalised

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religion are increasingly losing their importance and that the individual is free to construct his or her own religious worldview. Research into the relationship between religion, democracy and citizenship always faces the problem of this complexity. Since one can analyse religion, democracy, and citizenship at very different levels, it is inevitable to select and focus on a few phenomena while neglecting others. This also applies to the research presented in this volume. Here, too, different questions and research objects are addressed with different theoretical, empirical, and philological research methods. What the contributions to this book have in common, however, is that they all analyse practices in which the relationship between religion, democracy and citizenship is negotiated. In doing so, they provide exemplary insights into processes that are of considerable importance for a deeper understanding of the relationship between religion and democracy. At the same time, the various research contributions can be systematised and related to each other. This is done through the socio-political problems to which they refer. Their starting point is not the question of how to understand religion or what citizenship is. Rather, it is the question of what constitutes the central problem of living together in a democratic state. From this, a systematisation can be made that builds on the three basic positions of political philosophy  – republicanism, liberalism and communitarianism (Young, 2007). The structure of this volume is based on this system, which will be explained in more detail below.

1  R  eligion and the Development of Civic Virtue: The Republican Perspective The basic idea of republicanism is that politics is a public matter, something that affects all citizens. It is therefore their right and duty to govern themselves (Dagger, 2002). This requires not only the necessary institutions and processes to enable political participation, but also a civic virtue on the part of citizens, which can be understood as the essence of citizenship. This virtue is characterised by the will to leave aside exclusively private interests and to contribute to the common good, which requires the ability to adopt perspectives, to deliberate and to compromise (Heater, 2005). In addition, citizens need practical skills and abilities (such as rhetorical or organisational skills) to be able to act politically. The question of where and how citizens develop this civic virtue is therefore the central problem for a republican understanding of citizenship (Dagger, 2002; Young, 2007). In this respect, religion also becomes relevant. It was Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) who spoke of religious communities as schools of democracy, because it is there that citizens can acquire, through volunteer work, the skills and abilities they need to become politically active and the necessary ethos that places the common good above self-interest (Young, 2007). Previous studies have already shown that involvement in religious organisations does indeed have a positive influence on

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political participation and civil society action (Sarkissian, 2012; Smidt, 1999; Uslaner, 2002; Verba et al., 1995). So, does religion help people to develop civic virtue? The first part of this volume is dedicated to this field of research and explores values, self-concepts and educational programmes. In the first chapter, Hans-Georg Ziebertz examines on the basis of a representative sample for Germany (N = 1,000) whether highly religious respondents differ from non-religious respondents in their attitudes towards democracy, democratic institutions, social trust and civic engagement. His analyses show that the highly religious respondents have significantly higher approval ratings in all areas. These findings are surprising, given that in Germany, as in large parts of Western and Northern Europe, the importance of religion in public life is expected to diminish. Whether these differences are actually due to the fact that religious institutions function as schools for democracy must, of course, be investigated further. Friedrich Schweitzer’s contribution (Chap. 3) offers important insights in this regard. He examines the effects of non-formal religious education – as offered in Protestant communities in the form of confirmation work – on the prosocial attitudes, understanding of democracy and voluntary work of the young people involved. The study examined around 30,000 young people in a total of nine European countries and used both qualitative and quantitative methods. The results of the study showed that the pro-social attitudes of the young people and their willingness to volunteer increase during the course of confirmation work. Schweitzer is therefore in favour of further expanding participation structures and generally paying more attention to the area of non-formal education in the field of religious and civic education. In the fourth chapter, Kerstin Menzel looks at the professional self-concept of East German pastors. In a qualitative study she examines how pastors interpret the civil society activities of their congregations. She identifies two types of professional action. The first type is characterised by an orientation towards needs, which emphasises the role of the church as a mediating organisation and as an actor in civil society. The second type is goal-oriented, based on strong ideals of religiosity, community or membership practice. The insights gained from this help to understand why religious organisations act in quite different ways and how this can affect their role as schools for democracy. Finally, in Chap. 5, Argyro Potamousi examines the influence of religion on citizenship education in public schools in Greece. Starting from the close relationship between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek state, he analyses and problematises the current curriculum.

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2  R  eligion and the Protection of Individual Rights: The Liberal Perspective The basic idea of liberalism is that individual freedom – primarily understood as the absence of heteronomy and limitation  – should be the highest value in society. Therefore, it is characteristic of the liberal perspective to see citizenship as a bulwark against and a limitation to state interference in the private sphere (Schuck, 2002; Young, 2007). Citizens thus exercise their citizenship by taking action against state interference and regulations that restrict their individual freedom. Accordingly, civic engagement is seen as an essential component of checks and balances. The question of where and how citizens develop the motivating disposition to stand up for their own rights and respect the rights of others is therefore the central problem for a liberal understanding of citizenship. Religion can have a formative influence on such motivational dispositions, but this can be ambivalent. On the one hand, religion can promote the development of liberal citizenship if its stories, teachings and values sensitise people to the violation of freedom and motivate them to act accordingly. On the other hand, this development is hindered when religion is increasingly privatised or when members of a religious community undermine the legal order by denying other believers or non-­ believers their rights to freedom (Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2012; Herbert, 2003; Young, 2007). This ambivalence is also reflected in the findings of the studies published in this book series, which examined the influence of religion on attitudes to human rights (Sterkens & Ziebertz, 2018; Ziebertz, 2020; Ziebertz & Sterkens, 2018). Their findings range from a lack of any influence to a strong influence of religion on attitudes to certain human rights – especially when controversial issues such as the right to life are concerned (Ziebertz & Zaccaria, 2019). It is therefore still an open question whether religion is compatible with the basic ideas of a liberal democracy. The second part of this book is therefore dedicated to this research problem. In the sixth chapter Francis-Vincent Anthony examines whether Christian, Muslim and Hindu students in India (N = 942) consider discrimination on the basis of religion, caste, gender and race to be compatible with human rights and their faith. Issues of inequality and the resulting acts of discrimination are particularly present in the Indian context. The results of the research show that, on average, respondents consider discrimination on the basis of religion, caste, gender and race as rather incompatible with human rights and their faith. However, significant differences can be found between Christian and Hindu respondents, with Christian respondents placing greater emphasis on incompatibility. This may also reveal the influence of different religious traditions and their assessment of equality and inequality. In the seventh chapter, Clement Fumbo and Alexander Unser use quantitative data (N  =  1,252) to examine whether religion promotes critical citizenship. The study was carried out in Tanzania, a country where civil liberties have been increasingly restricted in recent years. As an indicator of critical citizenship, Fumbo and

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Unser use a scale that measures satisfaction with democracy in Tanzania. Their results show that the respondents’ religiosity and their trust in their own religion have a negative influence on satisfaction with democracy. The authors see this as an indication that religion can indeed contribute to a more critical awareness of the state. Raymond J. Webb addresses the problem of poverty and its influence on citizenship, democracy and religion in Chap. 8, arguing in this theoretical contribution that the unequal distribution of income also has a negative impact on the quality of life and opportunities for participation of those affected and thus on democracy as a whole. In a second step, he analyses the contribution that religion – for example in the form of the doctrine of predestination – can make to stabilising these conditions.

3  R  eligion and the Basis of Social Cohesion: The Communitarian Perspective Communitarianism is less interested in the processes of political participation or the protection of individual rights than republicanism and liberalism. Rather, it focuses on the question of social cohesion. In a communitarian perspective, it is the respective ethnic, religious and cultural communities that guarantee the foundations of this cohesion, because they create social bonds and moral orders that hold society together (Delanty, 2002; Young, 2007). In this perspective, citizenship is not only an individual category, but rather a collective one. The question of whether and how ethnic, religious and cultural communities create social bonds and moral orders that create cohesion rather than social fragmentation is therefore the central problem for a communitarian understanding of citizenship. Again, it must be borne in mind that the influence of religion can be both positive and negative. Research on social capital, for example, shows that religious communities can generate both bridging and binding social capital. While the former contributes to the common good by increasing social cohesion beyond the boundaries of one’s own community, the latter runs the risk of focusing only on the welfare of one’s own group and shutting oneself off from the outside world (Emerson & Smith, 2001; Putnam, 2001; Roßteutscher, 2009; Traunmüller, 2009; Welch et al., 2004). The third part of the volume deals with problems of social cohesion and focuses in particular on challenges arising from religious plurality and tensions between religious and secular people. Such tensions can take different forms – for example, that of offending humour. It is therefore not trivial to investigate what is and is not supposed to make people laugh in a society. Pål Ketil Botvar has investigated this for the Norwegian context in a survey (N = 1,500) (Chap. 9). His analyses show that especially jokes about vulnerable groups  – such as 22 July survivors and disabled people  – have little social support, which he attributes to the values of the welfare state. Jokes about religions and believers, however, are widely accepted.

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Adrian Gellel, Zoi Arvanitidou and Christine Rossi show how processes of religious pluralisation also pose challenges to state institutions, using Malta as an example (Chap. 10). Until just a few years ago Malta could be described as a relatively homogeneous Catholic society, which has now become more pluralistic in recent years due to migration and refugees. Particularly with regard to Islam, questions of social cohesion arise here. Gellel, Arvanitidou and Rossi have used qualitative interviews to ask employees in the health sector, education and social workers about their experiences. The interviews reveal above all irritations and lines of conflict in their daily work. In a longer-term perspective, it will be interesting to see whether Maltese society succeeds in integrating what is still foreign today. In Chap. 11, Leslie J. Francis and Ursula McKenna examine the extent to which contact and exchange can be a key to breaking down prejudices and stereotypes between members of different religions. In their contribution, which is based on the contact hypothesis, the influence of personal encounters on breaking down anti-­ Jewish attitudes is tested. In line with previous studies, Francis and McKenna are able to show that contact with Jews actually reduces anti-Jewish attitudes. On the basis of these findings, they advocate the use of learning materials that also enable virtual encounters with members of other religions. In Chap. 12, Ina ter Avest, Ibrahim Kurt, Ömer F. Gürlesin, and Alper Alasag examine the perspective of Muslim youth in the Netherlands. In contrast to the previous contributions, this chapter presents the view of a religious minority in a secular context, in which religion in general and Islam in particular are viewed rather sceptically. They present the results of a pilot study which – based on Hermans’ Dialogical Self Theory – shows how young people try to position themselves both as Muslims and as Dutch citizens. In the concluding Chap. 13, Karl-Heinrich Ostmeyer presents an exegetical study of the Ruth scroll. He is concerned with the question of how the author of this Old Testament book manages to theologically justify the integration of the Moabitess Ruth into the people of Israel. By juxtaposing the story of Ruth with the story of Lot  – especially with regard to the symbolism of the biblical names  – Ostmeyer interprets the story of Ruth as a story of the return home, which brings Lot’s fate and that of his descendants to a good end. The exegesis shows that even in biblical times, questions of belonging to the community and the integration of hitherto strangers played a remarkable role. The results exemplify how religious narratives can be used to construct communities and legitimise integration processes. These insights are not only interesting from a historical and systematic-theological perspective, but can also be helpful in analysing current phenomena. Acknowledgements  The research findings compiled in this volume were presented and discussed at a conference on ‘Religion, Democracy and Citizenship’ held at the University of Würzburg from 10 to 13 October 2019. I am very grateful to Prof. Dr. Dr. Hans-Georg Ziebertz and his staff (especially Sylvia Scheller) for organising this conference. I would also like to thank the authors of this volume, who have revised their presentations for publication. Moreover, I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers who helped us to improve the manuscript through their constructive feedback. Finally, I would like to thank my student assistants Anne Effing, Janina Balke and Sebastian Dötsch for preparing the layout of the manuscript and for compiling the index.

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References Ben-Nun Bloom, P., & Arikan, G. (2012). A two-edged sword: The differential effect of religious belief and religious social context on attitudes towards democracy. Political Behavior, 34, 249–276. Cnaan, R. A., Boddie, S. C., & Yancey, G. I. (2003). Bowling alone but serving together: The congregational norm of community involvement. In C. E. Smidt (Ed.), Religion as social capital: Producing the common good (pp. 19–31). Baylor University Press. Dagger, R. (2002). Republican citizenship. In E. F. Isin & B. S. Turner (Eds.), Handbook of citizenship studies (pp. 145–157). SAGE. Davie, G. (2003). Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without belonging (Repr). Blackwell. Delanty, G. (2002). Communitarianism and citizenship. In E.  F. Isin & B.  S. Turner (Eds.), Handbook of citizenship studies (pp. 159–174). SAGE. Emerson, M. O., & Smith, C. (2001). Divided by faith: Evangelical religion and the problem of race in America. Oxford University Press. Gellner, E. (1994). Conditions of liberty: Civil society and its rivals. Allen Lane. Gill, R. (1999). Churchgoing and Christian ethics. Cambridge University Press. Heater, D. B. (2005). What is citizenship? (Repr). Polity Press. Herbert, D. (2003). Religion and civil society: Rethinking public religion in the contemporary world. Taylor and Francis. Jackson, R. (2003). Citizenship, religious and cultural diversity and education. In R.  Jackson (Ed.), International perspectives on citizenship, education and religious diversity (pp. 1–28). RoutledgeFalmer. Kepel, G. (1994). The revenge of god: The resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the modern world. Pennsylvania State University Press. Körner, F. (2020). Political religion: How Christianity and Islam shape the world. Paulist Press. Kubik, J. (1994). The power of symbols against the symbols of power: The rise of solidarity and the fall of state socialism in Poland. Pennsylvania State University Press. Lindbeck, G.  A. (1984). The nature of doctrine: Religion and theology in a postliberal age. Westminster Press. Luckmann, T. (1967). The invisible religion: The problem of religion in modern society. Macmillan. Marshall, T. H. (1992). Citizenship and social class. Pluto Press. Peter, F. (2006). Individualization and religious authority in Western European Islam. Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 17(1), 105–118. Putnam, R. D. (2001). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. Simon & Schuster. Roßteutscher, S. (2009). Religion, Zivilgesellschaft, Demokratie: Eine international vergleichende Studie zur Natur religiöser Märkte und der demokratischen Rolle religiöser Zivilgesellschaften. Nomos. Sarkissian, A. (2012). Religion and civic engagement in Muslim countries. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 51(4), 607–622. Schuck, P. H. (2002). Liberal citizenship. In E. F. Isin & B. S. Turner (Eds.), Handbook of citizenship studies (pp. 131–144). SAGE. Schulz, W., Ainley, J., Fraillon, J., Losito, B., & Agrusti, G. (2016). IEA international civic and citizenship education study 2016 assessment framework. Springer. Smidt, C. (1999). Religion and civic engagement: A comparative analysis. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 565(1), 176–192. Sterkens, C., & Ziebertz, H.-G. (Eds.). (2018). Political and judicial rights through the prism of religious belief. Springer International Publishing. Traunmüller, R. (2009). Religion und Sozialintegration. Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 19(3), 435–468. Uslaner, E. M. (2002). Religion and civic engagement in Canada and the United States. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 41(2), 239–254.

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Verba, S., Schlozman, K.  L., & Brady, H.  E. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics. Harvard University Press. Welch, M. R., Sikkink, D., Sartain, E., & Bond, C. (2004). Trust in God and trust in man: The ambivalent role of religion in shaping dimensions of social trust. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 43(3), 317–343. Young, J. F. (2007). Rapture or rupture? Religion and civil society. In I. Marga, G. G. Sander, & D. Sandu (Eds.), Religion between church, state and society (pp. 11–21). Kovač. Ziebertz, H.-G. (Ed.) (2020). International empirical studies on religion and socioeconomic human rights. Springer International Publishing. Ziebertz, H.-G., & Sterkens, C. (Eds.). (2018). Religion and civil human rights in empirical perspective. Springer International Publishing. Ziebertz, H.-G., & Zaccaria, F. (Eds.). (2019). Euthanasia, abortion, death penalty and religion – The right to life and its limitations: International empirical research. Springer International Publishing.

Part I

Religion and the Development of Civic Virtue

Chapter 2

Are Religious People the Better Democratic Citizens? Hans-Georg Ziebertz

The title of this paper can cause different reactions. One expectation could be that the author wants to cleanse his religious sheeps’ – a paper ‘pro domum’. And there are, of course, examples of well-known contemporaries who are recognisably religious and at the same time very committed to civil society, or churches which contribute well to democratic society. So, yes, why should religious people not be good democrats – or even the better ones? But opposite reactions are also conceivable if one may have thought of religious fundamentalists who have many opinions, but no democratic convictions. Or even worse, fanatics who can only imagine an autocratically governed state under the rule of a rigid religious ideology. In addition to this, one has to consider that religious organisations themselves are rarely democratic and that many of them have problems with freedoms that are guaranteed in open democratic society: gender equality, sexual orientation, cultural and religious pluralism, etc. Against this background, a demand could be made to reverse the title: ‘Are non-religious people the better democrats?’ The more we look for examples, the more we are aware of contradictory experiences. I am interested in gaining data about the empirical reality in Germany which will hopefully help to answer the research question. Because the available empirical data is ambiguous, my approach is explorative. Methodologically, I will not interview religious people and decide how democratic they are, but I will compare those respondents who are highly religious with those who are non-religious. So, we will This text was presented during the International Conference Religion, Democracy and Citizenship, 10–13 October 2019  in Würzburg. The stylistic elements of the lecture were not completely changed. H.-G. Ziebertz (*) University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Unser (ed.), Religion, Citizenship and Democracy, Religion and Human Rights 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83277-3_2

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see whether there are significant and relevant differences between both groups regarding democratic citizenship. It is not my aim to give a normative definition of the characteristics of a good democratic citizen, instead normativity is the subject of this study. This paper deals with three theoretical concepts: first democracy as a certain order of the functioning of a state; second citizenship as the acting of people within a cultural community, nation-state, region and/or in the global community; and third religion with the dimension of the institution (religious community, church) and the individual dimension of personal belief. In this case we speak of religiosity. Part 1 of the lecture will reflect on these concepts. Part 2 outlines this study’s empirical design, and in part 3 I will present the findings before drawing conclusions and offering a final discussion in part 4.

1  Theoretical Introduction 1.1  Democracy The concept of democracy is faced by two problems. The first is how to indicate what characteristics of democracy are, and the second and more complicated problem is as to why democracy should be the preferred form of government. The first question concerns empirically measurable phenomena and the second concerns the normative problem of what justifies democracy. Characteristics of democracy To determine the characteristics of democracy, we can consult The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index (2019) which examined 167 countries around the world according to specific criteria. They left out very small states as Andorra, Lichtenstein, Monaco and the Vatican – certainly no candidates for top positions in a democracy-ranking. The Democracy Index Consortium distinguishes five categories, of which I will mention only a few elements: The first category is about the electoral process and societal pluralism and the consortium states that free elections on all levels (from local to national) is a conditio sine qua non for democracy. It is also of importance whether the law guarantees all political parties equal opportunities and if there is an independent opposition that has a real chance of coming to power. The second category concerns the functioning of government. Important elements are that political representatives are freely elected, that the legislature is the supreme political body, that an effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority is in place, that the government is not affected by the influence of interest groups and that people trust the government and their political parties. The third category is political participation which is manifested, in a similar vein to the criteria above, in participation in elections at all levels. However, participation

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must be secured, and authorities have to make a serious effort to promote political participation of all citizens. A vital democracy relies on the engagement of citizens in public life. People are free to express their disagreement with the functioning of the state in elections or by public protest, whereas a high degree of apathy is a danger for democracy. The fourth category comprises various aspects of the political culture in a country. Examples are the degree of general agreement in society, the degree of cohesion on fundamental issues and the feeling of security and public order. The very essence of the category of political culture is that strong public support is essential for the legitimacy, smooth functioning and, ultimately, the sustainability of democracy. The fifth category is about civil liberties. This category contains rights dealt with in the UDHR (1948) and later human rights declarations. It is important for democracy that people are convinced that fundamental rights are well protected and that nobody will be discriminated against according to race, colour, sexual orientation and religion. Conversely, democracy is undermined if so-called new hazards (refugees…), risks or threats are used as justification for restricting civil liberties. The consortium also has findings, consistent with the outcome of our 2019 poll, that democracy stagnates. Civil liberties become restricted and people are especially disillusioned with the functioning of government, after which only political participation increased. 22 countries are labelled as having a “full democracy”, 54 as having “flawed democracies”, 37 as being “hybrid” and 54 as “authoritarian regimes”. 46.4% of the world’s population lives in a full or flawed democracy, while 51.6% live in a hybrid or authoritarian regime. Justification of democracy The much more difficult question to answer is how democracy can be justified. Why should democracy be desired, maintained or defended? If democracy is to be justified then no higher entity can be invoked, nor is it possible to pretend that democracy is some kind of pre-state-law, as is argued in relation to human dignity within the discourse of human rights. Political scientists say that today’s open, modern society has no centre; it is based neither on a central theory nor controlled by a particular dogma (see Himmelmann, 2018, pp. 34–37; Lauth et al., 2000). For the justification of democracy there is no independent reason and no independent truth, rather only socio-immanent forces, ideas and interests. Democracy as a form of society stems exclusively from regulative ideas with which society tackles its problems. Regulative ideas are the ‘rules of the game’, they are gained from historical experience and they exist and function because they enjoy a high level of social acceptance. By acting communicatively with these rules, people in society accept them as an adequate basis by which they can live together. Moreover, while people live and operate according to these rules, they can develop them further. Rules of a modern society are open and constantly changing (Himmelmann, 2018). Our current experience is that rules are being harmed, which causes a widespread feeling of declining cohesion and uncertainty among people. The openness of society is a problem for many people, meaning the search, even the longing for a synthesis or a unifying idea arises. The hope is that it curbs openness and gives structure

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to diversity. However, the more that uniformisation is driven forward, the more it comes into conflict with factual plurality (Himmelmann, 2018). The more pluralism is prevented, the more the freedoms, which are the very hallmarks of democracy, fall under the wheels. Particularly popular at present among right-wing groups are regulatory ideas that operate with the terms ‘the people’, ‘fatherland’, ‘nation’, ‘unmixed ethnicity’ or ‘familiar’. These concepts aim to reduce diversity and align society with one dominant feature (Himmelmann, 2018; Negt, 2018). Due to its open character, democracy is a fragile construct and one may not trust that democracies will keep themselves alive. Democracy thus seems to be based above all on accepting the diversity that exists in a society, that different ideas are discussed in an open sphere and in a spirit of compromise, that majorities and minorities deal fairly with each other and that principles such as freedom and equality are respected because they ultimately benefit all. Transformation must be an inherent component and a full democracy is able to initiate processes to modify rules. Conversely, democracy is threatened when diversity is pushed back in favour of an idea, which means that one group wants to force other groups under their way of life (Himmelmann, 2018, pp. 31–33). In this research, a selection of instruments will be used to obtain the perspective of German citizens to democracy.

1.2  Citizenship In recent years there has been increased focus on the concept of citizenship, even in the context of (religious) education, and in the various approaches the problems of who is a citizen and what distinguishes him or her from other people is tackled. One may only imagine how the question what citizenship will be answered in Norway (number 1 on the Democracy Index) or in North Korea (at the bottom of the Democracy Index). Given the extensive literature on this subject, I would like to highlight just three challenges regarding the concept of citizenship. Passive citizenship (enjoying rights) or active citizenship (complying with obligations)? In the discussion about the concept of citizenship in post-war society the focus was on defining citizenship through rights, especially those freedoms established by the UN in the UDHR, 1948. People should feel, it was said, as full and equal members of a state by enjoying certain rights. Later this was called “passive citizenship”. In more recent research it has been questioned whether it is sufficient to grasp citizenship mainly through rights that citizens can enjoy, or whether there are also obligations associated with citizenship whereby one has to talk about duties and demands. For some, that sounds too much like communitarianism. Kymlicka and Norman (1994, p. 360) point out that it is not unusual for the state to expect certain attitudes and actions from its citizens. Public policy already relies on the responsible behaviour of citizens, f.i. in adequate health care and regarding

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the consumption of all sorts of drugs, or that old and young people live together in solidarity and take care of each other, that citizens pay their taxes, that they contribute to the protection of the environment and that people behave in a socially appropriate way towards each other. The conclusion is that society can only function if people are willing and able to cooperate with each other and practise self-restraint. That is what the state needs from its populace in order to reach “a fuller, richer and yet more subtle understanding and practise [sic] of citizenship”, and this cannot secured by coercion (Cairns & Williams, 1985, p. 43). This approach will bring rights and obligations into balance. It is not questioned that citizens shall enjoy rights and freedoms, but it is feared that a democratic state can only guarantee these rights in the long term if its citizens also make efforts to ensure that these rights can continue to exist in the future. In other words, citizens have the obligation to stand up for the strengthening of the order that, at the same time, grants these rights and freedoms to all people. The pretention of such a concept of citizenship is to integrate the view of both the care for the individual and the needs of a particular community (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 352). Citizenship in the stranglehold of nationalism and the nation-state A few years after the end of World War II, Hannah Arendt made an interesting reflection when she spoke about the conquest of the state by the nation. For Arendt the conquest happened as a transition from ‘the State as an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation’. Against the background of her experiences with Nazi Germany (and with other nationalist ideologies such as Stalin’s Russia), the scope of this reflection becomes clear. It was part of the nationalist ideology that only nationals can be citizens, meaning only people of the same national origin and race can enjoy the protection of legal institutions. In the post-war period, the category ‘national’ retained its importance, as when people of a different nationality came to a country, for example to take up work, they were met with the idea that (if they weren’t going back) they would need some law of exception until or unless they are completely assimilated into the nation – and divorced from their country of origin (Arendt, 1951, p. 275; see Isin & Turner, 2007, p. 12). The function of this heteronomous conception of assimilation is to achieve conformity. Supporters of this idea argue that the more groups are assimilated with cultural mainstream patterns, the less they feel the necessity to emphasise differences and peculiarities (Banks, 2008, p.  131). They think that assimilation will solve the problem of deviation. This, however, presupposes that there is something in common, whereupon assimilation is to happen, be it common values, common myths, symbols, memories, traditions, language or religion (Roche, 2001, p. 75). Charles Taylor speaks of a ‘collective subject’ with which members of a state identify and which they understand as a guarantee of their freedom and the place of their national and cultural expression (Taylor, 2003, pp. 170–173). It is precisely this deep desire for unity that stands behind the assimilation concept that is currently being taken up by right-wing groups and nationalists (Banks, 2008, pp. 132–134). Their key-idea is of a unitary society with a shared identity, where oneself – of course – represents the dominant culture. The propagation of a

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homogeneous mono-cultural society meets a deep desire which results from the feeling of insecurity in the face of socio-cultural transformations (Himmelmann, 2018, pp. 35–37). Nationalist and right-wing movements promise that heterogeneity can be reduced for the benefit of homogeneity if citizenship is limited to national origin and ethnic belonging. However, in the current age such single criteria as origin, ethnicity and religion are empirically questionable, because all societies are to a greater or lesser extent involved in the process of pluralisation and globalisation (Banks, 2008, p. 134). Because the world’s individual countries are becoming more diverse and pluralistic, the attempt of enforcing homogeneity against plurality creates a great potential for violence. The more these ideas are put into practice, the more dangerous they are for liberal democracy (cf. Isin & Turner, 2007). In this context, empirical facts are often ignored. Empirically many countries in the world are currently undergoing major changes through migration. Irrespective of what causes migration, almost all societies around the globe became multinational and polyethnic. The world currently comprises about 180 independent states, but there are 600 living languages, and on average 3.3 languages per country. Further, there are 5000 ethnic groups, about 28 groups per nation-state on average (Banks in reference to Kymlicka, 1995, p. 1; Bellamy, 2008, p. 71). These numbers underline the improbability that a state could permanently immunise itself against polyphony. If citizenship becomes a concept exclusively linked to the nation-state, this definition can also cause trouble for those who belong to the state but remain out of the country itself (Koopmans et al., 2005; Beckman & Erman, 2012). National boundaries are eroding, because millions of people have citizenship in one state (passport) but work and live in another. Examples are Polish workers in Britain, Italians in Germany, Albans in Italy, Algerians in France, etc. Research shows that immigrants define often themselves twofold: they identify their national identity as Pakistani, Indian, Iranian, etc., but their national identity is also defined by their daily experiences as a citizen of the country they live in (Banks, 2008, p. 134). It is obvious that those people who cross borders particularly experience these different meanings of nationality and citizenship. Research in countries that explicitly pursue multicultural policies (e.g. Australia, Canada) shows that there is a high percentage of the first and second generations of migrants who are proud of their origins but at the same time have a patriotic attachment to their new country. These considerations make clear that it is not forward-looking if citizenship is reduced to the identity of the nation-state specified on one’s passport. Should the development of the new cosmopolitan citizenship be forced? If we agree that citizenship includes rights and obligations (Habermas, 1992), and if we also agree that citizenship in a globalised world must be thought of as extending beyond the nation state, the concept of cosmopolitan citizenship comes into play. Today we are observing an interesting phenomenon. On the one hand, we can see an increase in nationalist tendencies, which are hostile to multilateral ideas. On the other hand, the young Greta Thunberg succeeds in motivating young people all over the world to work for the global climate. Both, nationalism and transnationalism,

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are becoming stronger at the same time. Not only Greta, but many activists in the field of peace, justice and sustainable environment point out that thinking within national boundaries is no longer sufficient to meet the challenges and threats facing the world (Brooks, 2014). Instead, they demand responsibility for people all over the world, going far beyond the notion that citizenship is a matter of national territory (cf. Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). The idea of citizenship extending beyond national territory is by no means a modern phenomenon. Kant and Pufendorf reflected on the conception of cosmopolitan citizenship, both philosophers referring to the natural law as something that is above all humankind and which states that humans are equal and forced not to harm each other (cf. Turner, 2001, pp. 11–13; Linklater, 2002, pp. 320–321). Under this school of thought, all people are treated as citizens of a universal state of humanity, thought of as a collective entity. This thinking contains the idea that there can be the existence of a universal community of humankind alongside the system of states and that principles can be developed for the conduct of nation-states regarding international relations, values, securities, etc. (Nussbaum, 2002). If within the nation-­ state co-nationals are the point of reference, then the same identity can be extended to foreigners. Cosmopolitan citizenship ensures that sense of moral community is not confined to co-nationals as point of reference but enlarged to members of separate sovereign states and a collective We (Taylor, 2003; Linklater, 2002, p. 328). Cosmopolitan citizenship has to put up with being called an idealistic idea (Linklater, 2002). It is questioned if there is a real equivalent to cosmopolitanism regarding belonging, a shared culture and political participation. Criticisms of this concept are based on the assumption of an analogy between cosmopolitan citizenship and citizenship of a nation state. This analogy is built when it is said that the concept of cosmopolitan citizenship only makes sense if humanity is led and secured by a world state, that is to say, if the world state does what the nation state is doing today. But this is not where proponents of cosmopolitanism want to go. They speculate about neither the possibility of a world state nor its desirability, and they do not question whether individual nation-states are still independent and unite all power. Moreover, they do not assert that citizenship and democracy exist first and foremost within individual nation-states (Linklater, 2002, pp. 318–320). So, is the concept of cosmopolitan citizenship too weak to be seriously considered? Not at all, there is already considerable empirical evidence of how and in what direction transnational and cosmopolitan citizenship is developing. Examples include the many covenants the UN has adopted to establish rights of world citizens and the many noteworthy initiatives towards global ethics and a culture of human rights. International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) participate in UN conferences and can contribute their positions; international efforts for the implementation of women’s rights are organized by UN departments with the participation of women’s organizations from many parts of the world. There are indeed many social and environmental movements in which these group participate on a global level (Linklater, 2002, pp. 326–329). These consulting and decision-making processes have a performative effect because facets of global ethics and participatory political processes emerge while

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one talks and negotiates about them. These actions trigger the reflection that the time has come for transnational responsibility. It is precisely this that national policy should take up and strengthen: to convince citizens of nation states to develop an interest in the world as a whole and to commit themselves more decisively and sustainably to societal welfare, the reduction of inequality and violence and the preservation of the environment. This is not only a moral appeal, rather there is a legal basis for it, which is often forgotten: citizens are implicated in an international regime of multiple responsibilities and obligations because the nation states have ratified them. So it is high time to implant the thought in people’s minds and hearts, to think of citizenship as existing beyond the state border (Isin & Turner, 2007, p. 16). The cosmopolitan perspective picks up elements from the Golden Rule, represented by religions and the Categorical Imperative formulated by Kant. In the 1980s, for example, Habermas (1981) reflected on the problem of how people should act in the face of universal humanity. Under the theory of ‘communicative action’ he says that it is hardly sufficient to imagine what the other could wish, but instead that discourse with all others must be sought in order to ensure that everyone can express their interests. This idea appeared utopian when Habermas first presented it. Today, Facebook, Twitter and Co. show that this possibility already does exist, and that ongoing technical development will further facilitate the possibility of global opinion-­forming (Turner, 2001, pp. 22–28). Democracy in the ancient polls comprised face-to-face interaction, while in our times the electronic revolution overcomes the problem of space. This development will have an impact on the definition of citizenship. Isin and Turner state: “The electronic commonwealth will indeed constitute a de-territorialized and de-nationalized entity” (2007, p. 24). Parochial thinking, possibly fed with such ideas as ethnocentrism and inward-­ looking patriotism, represents the nostalgia of a common past, but it is now unsuitable and cannot be sustained for future generations (cf. Nussbaum, 2002). Cosmopolitan citizenship expresses the necessity of the development of an identity that is attached to the global world and to humankind around the globe. The need for transnational thinking can only be denied if, from a comfortable European perspective, one is cynically opposed to the development of the world in the face of global poverty, violence, the victims of human rights, etc. We will cover some of these attitudes in the following empirical study.

1.3  Religion There is a lot to say regarding the type of relationship between certain religions and concepts of democracy and citizenship that can be assumed. In my book on these issues I explore this in depth, but here again, I must limit myself to a few remarks. Religion and Democracy – do they both go together? There are numerous examples where religious communities are important pillars of support for national identity. We can mention Catholicism and its historically

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significant influence on national identity in Poland, Spain, Ireland or Quebec, how Protestantism has shaped the national identity of the Nordic countries and how Christian Orthodoxy has contributed to the national identity of Greece and other Eastern European countries. The same can be said about Islam and the identity of the countries on the Arabian Peninsula. However, it is important to say that, for religion’s support of national identity it does not matter whether the country is democratic or not (Taylor, 2003). Religions have made pacts with both dictators and with liberation movements. Richard Rorty is disillusioned when he says that, in spite of all the good a religion does, religious institutions endanger the health of democratic societies (Rorty, 2005). Critics emphasise that there is no compelling justification for a positive relationship between religion and democracy. With regard to Christianity, Turner sees the ambivalence of religion towards the state as grounded in Augustine’s thinking. Augustine had established a perspective on the state as a necessary evil and its main justification was its ability to create order, although the state order could never be just (Turner, 2002, p.  266). Before the II.  Vatican Council the Catholic Church taught the “doctrine of indifference” as developed by Pope Leo XIII, according to which any form of state can be accepted on condition that it respects the fundamental requirements of natural law as taught by the Church (Rhonheimer, 2012, p. 165). With Gaudium et spes (Vatican Council II, 1965) the church developed a more positive view on democracy, which Pope John Paul II further elaborated in Centesimus annus (1991, especially no. 44–47). The Church insists that democracy must commit itself to the higher truth to acquire its full value, and the Catholic Church claims to be an institution that judges the democratic system from a higher and more independent perspective, because the sacred-eternal always enjoys primacy over the earthly-temporal (Rhonheimer, 2012, pp. 172–187). This differentiation can also be found in the Reformation, especially with Calvin. With regard to Islam, Shi’ism and Sunni Islam differ in their convictions about the source of authority and leadership within the Islamic community. According to Turner Shi’ism holds the doctrine of the Hidden Imamate in which the secular state has no ultimate authority over the community. The core of this leadership theory is the infallible authority of an imam that is pure, perfect and all-knowing. Sunnism accepts four different caliphates and dynasties as legitimate forms of government, but it is all about a leadership of the Prophet that combines religious and political power (cf. Turner, 2002, p. 264ff). Although there are such Islamic authors as Hasan Eshkevari, Mohsen Kadivar and Mohammed Shabestari (cf. Armipur, 2009) who have developed liberal approaches wherein the secular is not invariably subordinate to religious doctrine, the political mainstream in Islam sees itself as a politico-­ religious program that derives legal and political institutions from Islamic theology and law. If the self-understanding is that Islam is rather a state itself or defines the state as a component of religion it is difficult to see any bridge to the principles of democracy (Rhonheimer, 2012, p. 315). Given that the present empirical study is done with German data, it should be noted that there are no serious doubts that in practice both major churches in Germany, the Catholic and the Protestant, show that they stand by democracy and

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recognise its basic elements. For Islam it is more difficult to say because Islam is subdivided into many organisations and mosque associations. Spiritual and/or secular citizenship? When talking about religions (plural), we do not intend to level out the many nuances between religions. Generally, one can say that religions provide universal claims, universal ethical principles, show support for human rights (with certain exceptions) and share the conviction in favour of equality of all human beings in the context of God’s creation. Among other values, religions teach empathy and the duty of care and they demand hospitality to be extended to strangers. Without doubt, religions still can release the power for a universal humanity. The idea of universality, inherent in all religions, opens a perspective that is close to the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship and it might be assumed that religious people are particularly receptive to this concept. It must be admitted, however, that this could be called an idealistic remark, because historically there are many examples where religious institutions have promoted intolerance, prejudices, fundamentalism and ethnic violence. These negative sides of religion are still visible in many parts of the world today. As to the situation in Europe and Germany, I would not expect such negative outcomes because the major religions have become fully domesticated over time. Even if it may be assumed that there is a similarity between religious universalism and the cosmopolitan idea of citizenship (Turner, 2002, p. 272), the question remains as to whether religious and secular notions of universalism are linked or whether they exist in parallel and independent from each other. It seems that many writers, such as Max Weber, are convinced of the latter. He said that the greater the ascetic rejection of this world, the more the sacred and the profane became separated. While a religion claims the monopolistic authority over spiritual services, the state holds the monopoly of power within a given territory. The result is a twofold understanding of citizenship, first a spiritual citizenship within the religious community (in the Christian religion this would be people as living within the body of Christ, in Islam the umma as community of all Muslims regardless of family ties, nationality, race and social position) and second a profane citizenship within the political community (Turner, 2002, p. 260). However, Weber’s theory emerged 100 years ago and both social systems and religions have since changed. In the context of secularisation – which means deconfessionalisation, dwindling relevance of dogmatic convictions for the way of life and privatisation of faith – parallel notions of universality are not very likely. There is a probability that religious people think universalism not only in terms of transcendence to the ultimate, but also in the context of the world’s immanence. Conversely, it might be that the concept of cosmopolitan responsibility makes use of trans-empirical justifications. This leads to the empirical study.

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2  Design of the Study There are many approaches to operationalizing democracy, citizenship and also religion so that a restriction is necessary. This research paper is intended as a first exploration of the problem and the analyses follows a “diet” order which means both, a restriction to a few parameters and a limited number of analyses. It is clear that this can only provide initial insights that do not claim to be a comprehensive analysis.

2.1  Research Question, Procedure and Sample The research question of this paper is: Are there significant differences in the attitudes of highly religious and non-religious people towards democracy and citizenship? As already mentioned at the beginning, two groups are compared to answer the question, namely those respondents who are highly religious with those who are non-religious (see Table 2.2, below). T-tests are used for this purpose. The data collection took place in Germany in spring 2019 by a research institute. For the selection of the N = 1000 respondents, the criterion was specified that the sample should reflect religious diversity in Germany. This has largely been achieved (for details see Table 2.1). However, with regard to the age structure, the sample does not reflect the situation in Germany. While the average age of the German population is 44 years, in this sample it is 52 years. The sample covers a wide age spectrum which ranges from 14 to 89 years. The gender distribution is roughly balanced. 51.2% of the respondents are male, 48.8% are female. The highest degree in education and the number of books in a household are indicators of the level of education and living standard, which comes close to reality in Germany.

2.2  Measuring Instruments In this segment the measuring instruments will be presented, thus instruments to measure attitudes towards democracy and citizenship as well as tools to distinguish highly religious from weak or non-religious respondents. Democracy Democracy research distinguishes between three levels. First the level of the political community in which normative principles of democracy are taken into account, e.g. acceptance of democracy and fundamental rights. Second the level of political structure which looks how implemented democratic structures are in a society (f.i. the Democracy Index). The level of political performance concerns the evaluation

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Table 2.1  Sample description (N = 1000) Variable Age

Sex Highest degree

Country of birth (respondent)

Country of birth (mother of respondent) Country of birth (father of respondent) Religious affiliation

Number of books in household

Income (netto €/month)

14–29 30–40 41–49 50–59 60–69 70–89 Female Male 9th/10th grade 12th/13th grade College University Other Same country Another European country Out of Europe Same country Another European country Out of Europe Same country Another European country Out of Europe Roman Catholic Protestant Pentecostal/Free Churches Islamic Religious in general sense Other affiliation Non-religious 0–20 21–50 51–100 101–200 200