Religion and Political Culture in Kano [Reprint 2020 ed.] 9780520337138

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Religion and Political Culture in Kano

Religion and Political Culture in Kano John N. Paden

University of California Press Berkeley / Los Angeles / London

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England Copyright © 1973, by T h e Regents of the University of California I S B N : 0-520-01738-2 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 74-153548 Printed in the United States of America Designed by Eileen Lavelle

This book is dedicated to the mallams of Kano and to their sons

Contents

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL CULTURE AND T H E KANO CASE S T U D Y The Concept of Political Culture The Kano Context Fulani and Hausa Orientations Toward Authority and Community P A R T I. P A T T E R N S O F RELIGIOUS A U T H O R I T Y A N D COMMUNITY 1 . RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND STRUCTURE

31

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Ethnicity and Religious Identity The Mallam Class in Kano The Structure of Islamic Law Mysticism and Brotherhood Identity Patterns of Islamic Reform

45 56 61 65 7°

2 . T H E TRANSITION FROM TRADITIONAL TO REFORMED T I J A N I Y Y A

The Authority and Community of Umar Futi . . . The Realignment of the Fulani Mallam Class . . . The Realignment of the Hausa Mallam Class . . . Salgawa Doctrines of Authority and Community . . . Early Linkages Between Fulani and Hausa Mallam Classes .

i i 14

73

. . . .

74 82 86 90 94

viiï

Contents 3 . THE CONSOLIDATION OF REFORMED T I J A N I Y Y A

IO5

The Structure of Authority in Kano The Structure of Authority Beyond Kano Functions and Doctrines of Authority Structures and Doctrines of Community

106 120 124 137

4 . QADIRIYYA, MAHDIYYA, AND U S M A N I Y Y A

146

Early Ethnic Structures of Authority and Community in Qadiriyya The Transethnic Authority Structure of Reformed Qadiriyya Doctrines of Authority and Community in Reformed Qadiriyya . Authority and Community in Mahdiyya Authority and Community in Usmaniyya 5 . COMPARATIVE ORIENTATIONS TOWARD AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY

I90

190 196 204

Orientations Toward Authority Orientations Toward Community Epilogue: Religion in Kano State PART II. PATTERNS OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY 6. EMIRATE AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY

213

213 226 238 251 260

Doctrines of Emirate Authority and Community The Structure of Emirate Authority The Structure of Emirate Community The Emergence of Emirate Identity Crises of Emirship Legitimacy 7 . THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF EARLY EMIRATE REFORM

The Reformers The Ideological Basis of Authority Reform The Ideological Basis of Community Reform The Style and Symbols of Reform Interpretation of the Qur'anic Paradigm

147 152 160 169 179

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273

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273 278 291 294 298

8. THE TRANSITION TO KANO STATE

The The The The The

Continuity of Authority in the Era of Party Politics Growth of the Sabon Gari Community Idea of a Northern Regional Community . . . Emergence of Kano Nationalism Crisis of Community

• .

307 3X3 322 329 333

9 . AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY I N KANO STATE

337

The Restructuring of Authority The Restatement of Emirship Legitimacy The Reconstruction of Community

338 345 354

ix

Contents The Growth of National Identity

366

10. COMPARATIVE ORIENTATIONS TOWARD AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY

373

Comparative Orientations Toward Authority . . . . Comparative Orientations Toward Community . . . . The Nature of Crisis and Reform CONCLUSION: R E L I G I O N A N D P O L I T I C A L C U L T U R E IN KANO The Authority Dimension of Political Culture . . . . The Community Dimension of Political Culture . . . .

373 378 381

Conclusions APPENDIXES 1. Bakin Ruwa Ward (Kano City) Religious Survey, 1965 2. Succession to Selected Clan and District Headships in Kano Emirate 3. Electoral Succession in Kano 4. Kano State Movement Debates 5. Authority Structures in Kano State, 1969-1970 . . . . GLOSSARIES 1. Hausa Terms Used in Text (with Arabic and English Equivalents) 2. Hausa Muslim Names (with Arabic Equivalents) 3. Kano Emirate Tides Mentioned in Text BIBLIOGRAPHY NAME INDEX SUBJECT INDEX

396

387 388 390

399 405 410 412 416

423 429 432 43^ 443 45 1

Figures 1. Dynastic Succession to Authority of Umarian Tijaniyya in Kano Province, ca. 1860-1960 2. Ibrahim Niass: Dynastic Succession to Authority . . . . 3. Ethnic Integration of Reformed Tijaniyya Authority Structure in Kano, 1935-1965 4. Authority Structure of Reformed Tijaniyya in Kano, 1960-1965 5. International Authority Structure of Reformed Tijaniyya, 1960-1965 6. Qadiriyya : Ethnic Integration of Sa'adian Authority Structure in Kano, 1903-1933 7. Qadiriyya: Ethnic Integration of Sa'adian Authority Structure in SUBJECT INDEX

81 96 4 115 116 n

*53 45 1

ix

Contents The Growth of National Identity

366

10. COMPARATIVE ORIENTATIONS TOWARD AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY

373

Comparative Orientations Toward Authority . . . . Comparative Orientations Toward Community . . . . The Nature of Crisis and Reform CONCLUSION: R E L I G I O N A N D P O L I T I C A L C U L T U R E IN KANO The Authority Dimension of Political Culture . . . . The Community Dimension of Political Culture . . . .

373 378 381

Conclusions APPENDIXES 1. Bakin Ruwa Ward (Kano City) Religious Survey, 1965 2. Succession to Selected Clan and District Headships in Kano Emirate 3. Electoral Succession in Kano 4. Kano State Movement Debates 5. Authority Structures in Kano State, 1969-1970 . . . . GLOSSARIES 1. Hausa Terms Used in Text (with Arabic and English Equivalents) 2. Hausa Muslim Names (with Arabic Equivalents) 3. Kano Emirate Tides Mentioned in Text BIBLIOGRAPHY NAME INDEX SUBJECT INDEX

396

387 388 390

399 405 410 412 416

423 429 432 43^ 443 45 1

Figures 1. Dynastic Succession to Authority of Umarian Tijaniyya in Kano Province, ca. 1860-1960 2. Ibrahim Niass: Dynastic Succession to Authority . . . . 3. Ethnic Integration of Reformed Tijaniyya Authority Structure in Kano, 1935-1965 4. Authority Structure of Reformed Tijaniyya in Kano, 1960-1965 5. International Authority Structure of Reformed Tijaniyya, 1960-1965 6. Qadiriyya : Ethnic Integration of Sa'adian Authority Structure in Kano, 1903-1933 7. Qadiriyya: Ethnic Integration of Sa'adian Authority Structure in SUBJECT INDEX

81 96 4 115 116 n

*53 45 1

*

Contents

8. Qadiriyya: Ethnie Integration of Shaziliyya Authority Structure in Kano, 1937-1965 9. Reformed Qadiriyya: Authority Sources of Nasiru Kabara 10. Mahdiyya: Authority Linkage Between Nigerian and Sudanese ix. 12. 13. 14.

155 161

Branches, 1885-1965 Fulani Succession to Emir ship: Kano Emirate Aminu Kano : Maternal Line . . . . Aminu Kano: Paternal Line . . . . The Structure of Government in Kano State, 1970

236 2 75

275

Maps 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Northern Nigeria: Administrative Units, 1962 Kano Urban Area, 1970 Kano City Wards, 1970 Kano Province: Major Inter-Urban Linkage, 1959 Nigeria: Selected Inter-Urban Linkage, 1961 Africa: Selected Inter-Urban Linkage Kano City: Mallam Class Locations Kano Emirate: Fulani District Headships, 1970 Twelve-State System in Nigeria

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15 16 21 29 30 33 195 252 338

Tables Estimated Income by Traditional Occupation, 1926 2. Income Distribution in Kano City by "Relative Deprivation" Ratio, 1926 3- Northern Nigeria: Religious Affiliation by Province, 1952 4- Nigeria: Religious Affiliation by Region, 1952 and 1963 . 5- Distribution of Qur'anic Schools in Northern Nigeria, 1964 6. Distribution of Ilm Schools in Northern Nigeria, 1964 7- Students in the Zawiya of Sharif Ahmad: Kano, 1965 8. Ethnic Integration of Reformed Qadiriyya Authority Structure in Kano, 1960-1965 Contemporary Bases of Brotherhood Legitimacy SiI.

24

25 44 44 59 60 *43 162 192

*

Contents

8. Qadiriyya: Ethnie Integration of Shaziliyya Authority Structure in Kano, 1937-1965 9. Reformed Qadiriyya: Authority Sources of Nasiru Kabara 10. Mahdiyya: Authority Linkage Between Nigerian and Sudanese ix. 12. 13. 14.

155 161

Branches, 1885-1965 Fulani Succession to Emir ship: Kano Emirate Aminu Kano : Maternal Line . . . . Aminu Kano: Paternal Line . . . . The Structure of Government in Kano State, 1970

236 2 75

275

Maps 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Northern Nigeria: Administrative Units, 1962 Kano Urban Area, 1970 Kano City Wards, 1970 Kano Province: Major Inter-Urban Linkage, 1959 Nigeria: Selected Inter-Urban Linkage, 1961 Africa: Selected Inter-Urban Linkage Kano City: Mallam Class Locations Kano Emirate: Fulani District Headships, 1970 Twelve-State System in Nigeria

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15 16 21 29 30 33 195 252 338

Tables Estimated Income by Traditional Occupation, 1926 2. Income Distribution in Kano City by "Relative Deprivation" Ratio, 1926 3- Northern Nigeria: Religious Affiliation by Province, 1952 4- Nigeria: Religious Affiliation by Region, 1952 and 1963 . 5- Distribution of Qur'anic Schools in Northern Nigeria, 1964 6. Distribution of Ilm Schools in Northern Nigeria, 1964 7- Students in the Zawiya of Sharif Ahmad: Kano, 1965 8. Ethnic Integration of Reformed Qadiriyya Authority Structure in Kano, 1960-1965 Contemporary Bases of Brotherhood Legitimacy SiI.

24

25 44 44 59 60 *43 162 192

*

Contents

8. Qadiriyya: Ethnie Integration of Shaziliyya Authority Structure in Kano, 1937-1965 9. Reformed Qadiriyya: Authority Sources of Nasiru Kabara 10. Mahdiyya: Authority Linkage Between Nigerian and Sudanese ix. 12. 13. 14.

155 161

Branches, 1885-1965 Fulani Succession to Emir ship: Kano Emirate Aminu Kano : Maternal Line . . . . Aminu Kano: Paternal Line . . . . The Structure of Government in Kano State, 1970

236 2 75

275

Maps 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Northern Nigeria: Administrative Units, 1962 Kano Urban Area, 1970 Kano City Wards, 1970 Kano Province: Major Inter-Urban Linkage, 1959 Nigeria: Selected Inter-Urban Linkage, 1961 Africa: Selected Inter-Urban Linkage Kano City: Mallam Class Locations Kano Emirate: Fulani District Headships, 1970 Twelve-State System in Nigeria

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

15 16 21 29 30 33 195 252 338

Tables Estimated Income by Traditional Occupation, 1926 2. Income Distribution in Kano City by "Relative Deprivation" Ratio, 1926 3- Northern Nigeria: Religious Affiliation by Province, 1952 4- Nigeria: Religious Affiliation by Region, 1952 and 1963 . 5- Distribution of Qur'anic Schools in Northern Nigeria, 1964 6. Distribution of Ilm Schools in Northern Nigeria, 1964 7- Students in the Zawiya of Sharif Ahmad: Kano, 1965 8. Ethnic Integration of Reformed Qadiriyya Authority Structure in Kano, 1960-1965 Contemporary Bases of Brotherhood Legitimacy SiI.

24

25 44 44 59 60 *43 162 192

Contents 10. Summary: Ethnic Integration within Brotherhood Authority Structures, Kano Urban Area, 1930-1965 11. Candidates for the Office of Kano Emir: Twentieth Century . 12. Ethnic/Clan Affiliation of District Heads in Kano Emirate, 180613. 14. 15. 16. 17.

1970 Characteristics of Residential Sectors in Kano Urban Area, ca. 1965 Sabon Gari Ethnic Composition, 1954-1955 Comparison of Kano City and Sabon Gari Markets, 1965 Emirate Title Holders, 1970 Aspects of Community Identity in Kano

xi 194 235 244 314 315 318 348 382

Acknowledgments

The original research for this book was undertaken in 1964 and 1965 on a grant from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program. I am grateful to my dissertation advisers at Harvard, Professors Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson, for their encouragement throughout the course of this work; to Dr. David Arnott of the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London) for assisting in preliminary Hausa language studies in 1963; to the Emir of Kano and his Council for permission to live, with my family, inside the walled city of Kano from June 1964 to September 1965. I was able to return to Kano for six months in 1970 on a Fulbright-Hays grant. I am indebted to the Program of African Studies at Northwestern University for support in the typing, and retyping, of this manuscript. Within Nigeria, more people helped me than I can begin to mention. A t Abdullahi Bayero College (Kano), the Provost, Shehu Galadanci, has been gracious in every way, and many of the staff members have read draft portions of this manuscript and have offered comments and corrections: John Lavers, Muhammad al-Hajj, Dandatti Abdulkadir, Ibrahim Mukoshy. A t Ahmadu Bello University (Zaria), Professors Abdullahi Smith and James O'Connell have encouraged my studies of northern culture. Dr. Murray Last read the entire draft manuscript closely and from the beginning has been a friend and inspiration in this work. Similarly, Professor Ernest Gellner en-

xiv

Acknowledgments

couraged me by his interest in this study from our first meeting in Kaduna, and portions of the manuscript have reached him on three continents. These sections without fail have benefited from his mature judgment and keen eye for detail. I could not have undertaken the initial field research in Kano without the cooperation of student scholars, many of whom are currently working in institutions of higher learning: Umaru Faruk Ladan, Muhammad Mijinyawa, Isa Kurawa, Muhummad Uba Adamu, Ahmad Getso, Mahmud Tukur, Ibrahim Yaro Yabaya, Abdurrahman Adam, and others. Many in Kano have opened their doors and have gone out of their way to make this study possible: Husaini Sufi, Ahmadu Trader, Aminu Kano, Ado Bayero, Maitama Sule, Alfa Wali, Dahiru Wali, Mudi Saiga. I am especially indebted to those friends and colleagues who have read major portions of this manuscript at various stages of preparation: John Chamberlin, Brad Martin, Haroun Adamu, and Abdullahi Mohammed. Colleagues at Northwestern University have also encouraged this study and contributed their ideas, especially Professors Ronald Cohen and Ivor Wilks. Ann Paden has worked with me on all phases of this book from the field research to the index. She is more a part of this effort at cross-cultural understanding than she will realize or acknowledge. I would particularly like to express my gratitude to those mallams, situated in the area from Senegal to Nigeria, who have shared their time and interest in discussing the substantive issues in this book: Limamin Kano Dalhatu; Wazirin Kano Abubakar Dokaji; Babban Mallami, Ibrahim; Limanin Yola; matar Wali Suleiman, Saudata; Muhammad Dan Amu; Nasiru Kabara; Ahmad b. Ali; Tijjani b. Usman; Shehu Maihula; Sharif Ahmad; Abubakar Atiku; Faruk Saiga; Sa'id Hayatu; Abba Sa'id; Garba Sa'id; Sayid Nuru Tall (Senegal); Ibrahim Niass (Senegal); Aliyu Sisi (Senegal); Muhammad al-Hadi (Mauritania); Tijjani b. Ibrahim (Senegal); Mawla'i Idris ( F e z ) ; Modibo Kari (Adamawa); Umaru (Zinder); Muhammad dan Maradi (Maradi); Babban Makaranta (Kumasi); Ibrahim Diop (Senegal); Babba Diasse (Senegal); Wazirin Sokoto, Junaidu; Sultan of Sokoto, Abubakar; Muhammad Sidi; Husaini Adamu; Abubakar el-Nafety; Mudi Sipikin; Na'ibi Wali; the staff members of the School for Arabic Studies, Kano; the staff of Shahuci Judicial School, Kano; the staff of the Arabic Teacher Training College, Sokoto; representatives from each of the traditional mosques in Kano; Na'iya (Zaria); Muhammad Ghali (Hadejia). I am grateful to the staff of the Nigerian Archives, Kaduna ( N A K ) , for their help. I would like to thank, too, Kabiru, Abu, Bashiru, Umaru, Abba, and Nuhu. An author must reserve in the end a special measure of gratitude for the

Acknowledgments

xv

gift of a talented secretary. Mrs. A n n e Potter has typed several versions of this book with skill and humor. A s a personal note, I would like to record for all those who have asked our son, Audu, where he got his nickname that it was given him by our neighbors in K a n o . Amy, his sister, was born after we left Kano, but we call her Amina because that is the name these friends would have chosen for her. T h e problems of cross-cultural research, especially participant observation, will be clear in reading this book. Any errors of judgment or fact are entirely my own responsibility. I have drawn heavily on primary written

sources

wherever possible, and have included many excerpts in this book, not only to illustrate the style of K a n o culture, but as a corroboration of more personal interpretations based on oral data and observations. In Kano, the line between public knowledge and private knowledge is often not well defined, and I have tried not to violate the confidence of those with whom I have worked. I have dedicated this book to the mallams of Kano, who have allowed me to record a part of their history. I have also dedicated this book to their sons, who will help to shape the destiny of modern Africa partly by the way in which they evaluate the legacy of their fathers.

Note on Language Use and Transliteration

Throughout this book I have used Hausa orthography rather than English or Arabic in the spelling of personal names, place names, and substantive vocabulary words. In those cases where a Hausa word is based on an Arabic root, I have included the Arabic word in parentheses the first time the Hausa word is used. Where such exist, I have preferred an anglicizcd form over Hausa or Arabic spellings, as with tariqa, imam, etc. In cases where North African or Arab names are mentioned I have transliterated from the Arabic, but have followed Hausa orthography for all persons, including Arabs, who have lived in Kano or are associated with Kano history. I have included in the glossary a list of Hausa words and names used in the text, with their Arabic and English equivalents. With regard to transliteration, there are no diacritical marks other than the apostrophe in Hausa, but there are certain globalized consonants which are expressed orthographically as hooked letters, namely, b, d, and k. I have not used hooked letters in this text because there is little possibility that a Hausa word would be misconstrued. With regard to Arabic transliteration I have used the standard forms (as outlined in Cataloging Service, Library of Congress, "Arabic Romanization," Bulletin 91, September 1970) except on certain matters of capitalization (where I have used anglicized style) and ordering of segments of proper names (where I have not used nisbahs initially but rather have listed authors alphabetically by first name).

Introduction: Political Culture and the Kano Case Study

This introductory chapter will consider the concept of political culture (including the idea of culture and society, the dimensions of political culture, and the relationship of religion to political culture); the Kano case-study context (including the socioeconomic factors of urbanization, ethnicity, class, and connectivity); and Fulani and Hausa orientations toward authority and community. THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CULTURE

In the comparative study of government, attempts are often made to identify the underlying values, symbols, and premises of society that influence political behavior. Such values may include the entire cultural experience of a society. Yet certain cultural dimensions are particularly relevant to the processes of political life: for example, the nature of authority and the way in which decisions are made; the criteria used to distinguish communities; the manner in which conflicts or disputes are resolved or managed; and orientations toward history or toward innovation. Such dimensions may be regarded as part of the political culture of a society, as distinct from the general culture. 1 1 Gabriel Almond used the term "political culture" in 1956 in describing his observation that "every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action." H e "found it useful to refer to this as the political culture" ("Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics 18 [August 1956]: 296). S. H. Beer and A . B. Ulam use the term in a narrower sense: "Certain aspects of the general culture of a society are especially concerned with how government ought to be conducted and what it should try

2

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

The orientations toward such dimensions within a society are in most cases not distinctive to any single sector of society but tend to be found in all sectors (military, economic, social, religious, political). Changes in orientation within any one sector, which may occur for a variety of reasons, may produce similar changes in other sectors. Thus, the political culture of a society is not static. In certain situations, change in political culture is brought about through revolution.2 In most cases, it is brought about incrementally. The question of how such incremental change occurs is of major importance. In this respect, several of the terms and theoretical assumptions of the present study should be briefly elaborated. Culture (excluding material items) is a combination of beliefs and values. Beliefs refer to propositions that are regarded as true, as distinct from false, and values refer to things that are preferred, either of a specific or general nature.3 The term "moral values" distinguishes values that refer to the quality of human relationships from values that may be aesthetic or spiritual. The term "ideology" may be used in a variety of ways, but like "culture" refers essentially to a combination of values and beliefs; unlike culture, the notion of ideology may contain an explicit imperative to a course of action that would change existing values and patterns of behavior. Ideology may be manifest, as in the writings of individuals, or latent, in the sense of inarticulated orientations.4 The term "doctrine" refers to explicit statements of values or beliefs by those who are in positions of authority within a community. Culture and ideology are often expressed in symbolic terms. Symbols represent a range of meanings that goes well beyond the intrinsic qualities of the symbol itself. Words as well as objects and behavioral patterns may be regarded as symbols. Symbols become socially and politically relevant when they to do. This sector of culture we call political culture. As with the general culture of society, the principal components of the political culture are values, beliefs, and emotional attitudes" (Patterns of Government, 2d ed. [New York: Random House, 1962], p. 32). For a review of the use of the concept since that time, see Y. C. Kim, "The Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics," Journal of Politics 26, no. 2 (May 1964). For applications of the concept in cross-national research, see Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965)2 See Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969). 3 For a discussion of beliefs, see Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, i960). For a discussion of values, see William A. Scott, Values and Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); Kurt Baier and Nicholas Rescher, eds., Values and the Future (New York: Free Press, 1969). 4 See Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1962); Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

Introduction

3

gain widespread usage and are fitted into a cognitive framework that allows for experiences to be shared and communicated by members of a society. Much of the power of symbols, however, is in their ambiguity and in the fact that individuals can interpret symbols in terms of their specific experiences.5 The notion of society essentially implies an interactional system of persons who share certain core values. In a plural society, interaction may be limited to the economic sector, and the core values may be limited to matters of reciprocity and conflict management. In an integrated society the interaction extends to political structures, and the core values must include some agreement on how and where political decisions should be made. In a homogeneous society there is interaction in all spheres (including religious and social), and the people share a common culture; in most cases they also share a common identity. In the study of societies, the concept of differentiation is central. The interactional patterns that define society may be regarded as role relationships (or structures) which are organized around particular functions. A role may be defined as "a set of norms and expectations applied to the incumbent of a particular position." 6 Differentiation may be defined as "the processes whereby roles change and become more specialized or more autonomous or whereby new types of roles are established or new structures and subsystems emerge or are created." 7 The process of differentiation implies change. In some societies the internalized expectations of persons or the gap between ideal behavior and actual behavior may be modified to the point where the structures of a society are completely reoriented. Such change, however, does not need to occur in linear progression from a diffuse, pre-differentiated situation to a highly differentiated pattern. A particular system may differentiate in response to particular situations and may then de-differentiate. The concept of differentiation is relevant to the study of political culture in several respects: in the initial inquiry into the existence of separate structures in the performance of social, economic, political, and religious functions; in the examination of specific political roles in terms of their broader social functions; and in the assessment 5

See Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Symbols and Social Theory ( N e w York: Oxford University Press, 1969); idem, Symbols in Society ( N e w York: Oxford University Press, 1968); Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964); Richard L . Merritt, Symbols of American Community, 1735-1775 ( N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 6 Michael Banton, Roles: An Introduction to the Study of Social Relations ( N e w York: Basic Books, 1965), p. 29; see also Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas, eds., Role Theory: Concepts and Research ( N e w York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966). 7 Gabriel Almond and G . B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 22.

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Religion and Political Culture in Kano

of the development of a political culture zone over time as such a zone may be a residue from the processes of differentiation. T h e selection of functions that are the basis of identifying roles may be analytical or phenomenological, the latter being perceptions which are "selfanchored" within the particular system. Anthropologists frequently suggest the following analytical categories which may be identified in all societies: religion, politics, economics, and recreation.8 Within most societies, however, even at the subsistence level, there is some perception of functional differentiation, and in most societies there is a corresponding division of labor (or role differentiation or specialization) which reflects such perceptions of function. T h e term "sectors" with regard to society refers to the broad analytical categories of function. In cases of societies with low differentiation, the political, economic, and religious sectors may all be parts of a single structure. In cases of high differentiation, independent roles are performed in the different sectors. In all societies the relationship between sectors is highly interactive. T h e political sector, however, because of its centrality in determining basic power distribution in society, is in most cases intimately linked with the military, economic, and religious sectors. A t the same time, the translation of power into authority by the political sector (which is necessary to some extent in all but the most coercive systems) requires some process of legitimation which usually involves a much broader segment of society than those who are actively involved in the political sector. T h e concept of legitimation, or justification and approval, is fundamental to all the dimensions of political culture. Authority must be legitimated; community boundaries must be legitimated; decision-making and conflict-resolving processes must be legitimated. A withdrawal of legitimacy may result in revolutionary action by those who feel they should assume power or may result in rebellion by those who wish to secure greater autonomy or even separation from the community. According to Talcott Parsons, legitimation is "the appraisal of action in terms of shared or common values in the context of the involvement of the action in the social system." Parsons further suggests that "the process of legitimation is the bridge by which values are joined to the differentiated subsystems of action." Karl Deutsch writes that "legitimacy is the assurance of the compatibility of a value pursuing course of action with other key values." According to T . Shibutani and K . M . K w a n , "Unless power is justified by linking it to accepted values, the governed are less willing to obey and question the 8

See Aidan Southall, "An Operational Theory of Role," Human Relations 12 (1959): 17-34; s e e a l s o S- F. Nadel, "The Concept of Social Elites," International Social Science Bulletin 8, no. 3 (1956): 431-40.

Introduction

5

right of others to hold power." 9 In short, legitimation is the process by which actions (and structures) are justified in society. T h e manipulation of this process is clearly in the interests of those with power but is equally important to those who are trying to reform the power structure or oppose those in power. In this study the discussion of legitimation will be directed to the values utilized in the justification of authority and community and the patterns of behavior that characterize the application of such values. Insofar as a particular stratum or class within society (such as the religious leadership) has a special role in influencing legitimation, attention will be directed to the manner in which such a class communicates its value judgments to other groups or classes in society and the manner in which such a class legitimizes its own right to this function. A second aspect of legitimation considered here is the degree to which the agents of legitimation and the society at large apply to the process of social and political change established criteria for judging social and political situations—the ways, that is, in which traditional roles are used to assess the legitimacy of institutions, processes, or collectivities that result from the process of social change and differentiation. While the process of legitimation is an underlying concern in the study of political culture, it is necessary to focus on the application of legitimacy to particular dimensions. T h e selection of dimensions within political culture may be done on analytical grounds, or it may be done by examining a particular society and trying to determine which dimensions are of most relevance. 10 In this volume, two broad dimensions of political culture will be examined: 9 Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (New York: Free Press, i960), p. 175; Karl W . Deutsch, "The Commitment of National Legitimacy Symbols as a Verification Technique," ]ournal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 3 (1963): 360; T. Shibutani and K. M. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 241. 10 Much of the work by Western social scientists has focused on the dimension of participation, which is closely related to political mobilization. A n examination is made of which people become involved in political life and which issues become politically relevant—that is, which people are regarded as legitimate participants in the political system and what is regarded as the legitimate scope of governmental activity. See, for example, the studies in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965). At present, Verba is directing a four-nation cross-cultural study of attitudes toward political participation. Verba elsewhere focuses on four dimensions: concepts of national identity, patterns of identification with one's fellow citizens, acceptable types of government output, and the processes of decision making. Lucien Pye in the same work also suggests four dimensions: trust and distrust, hierarchy and equality, liberty and coercion, and universal versus particular loyalties (Pye and Verba, Political Culture, pp. 526-27). Robert LeVine has been concerned with attitudes toward authority, intergroup behavior, participation in politics, and change and innovation; Robert LeVine, "Political Socialization and Culture Change," in Old Societies and New States, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Free Press, 1963).

6

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

authority (including succession to and protest of authority) and community formation (including formation and consolidation of community identities and boundaries). These dimensions were selected partly because they represent at an analytical level the essential or core requirements for a political community to sustain itself, and partly because these have been the issues of primary concern to the people within the case-study context. T h e influence of religious ideas and behavior on the development of these dimensions will be assessed. It will be argued that changes in religious culture have produced changes in political culture. T h e study of authority requires attention to the locus and procedure of decision making, whether within the particular sectors, within the component segments in a plural society, or within the polity as a whole. It also requires attention to the process of succession (or recruitment) to leadership. T h e process of legitimation in the establishment of authority may be assessed in terms of the types of justification invoked and in terms of the procedure by which individuals seeking legitimation are accorded or denied such status. A distinction will be drawn here between charismatic authority and bureaucratic authority. Charismatic authority is based on personal powers that are perceived to be of an extraordinary nature. Bureaucratic authority is based on the functioning of an administrative cadre whose powers derive from an institutional base rather than from the characteristics of any individual. T h e notion of traditional authority will be used sparingly in this study, since dynastic rule in practice tends to be either charismatic or bureaucratic. "Succession to authority" means the processes by which candidates are selected or validated and the manner in which a final choice is made. T h e distinction between succession based on ascribed criteria as opposed to achieved criteria will be used in this volume, 1 1 although in most cases, succession is based on a combination of such criteria. T h e reverse of succession—that is, deposition—is also important to an understanding of authority. There are usually explicit attitudes toward the justifications for removal from office and the status of individuals who have been removed from office. T h e concepts of reform, protest, and dissent are closely related to the idea of authority. T h e acceptability of those who hold opinions different from those in authority varies considerably in different cultures. In a theocratic state differences of opinion may not only constitute treason but also heresy. Reformist types of protest frequently attempt to manipulate or redefine the existing symbols of legitimacy. Attitudes toward the exercise of coercion or violence 11

See Banton, Roles, p. 25.

7

Introduction

by authority are relevant in those cases where governmental force is used against protest and dissent. The second broad dimension, community formation, refers to orientations toward maintenance, expansion, or contraction of system boundaries and to the criteria used to define such boundaries. 12 A major factor in the formation of a community is its relationship with nonmembers of the community, that is, the way in which the external environment defines it. The integration of communities may be regarded analytically as spectrum that includes cooperative interaction, structural interdependence (including interlocking authority systems), value congruence, and identity congruence. In this study the three major types of communities under consideration will be ethnic, religious, and political. The development of rationales to accommodate multiple membership (or identity) will be of special interest. An ethnic community may be defined analytically as one in which the quality of internal relationships is diffuse rather than specific. An ethnic community is based on kinship, or kinship-like, relationships in which there is a common core of cultural values and in which there are particularistic symbols of group identity. In most cases these include an assertion of common ancestry, a common language, and some degree of geographic proximity. Ethnic identity is invariably based on social definitions, however, and the criteria of ethnic inclusion become an empirical question. Ethnic pluralism refers to a situation in which two or more ethnic groups occupy a particular environment and are interactive in the economic sphere but not in the social, political, or religious spheres. This was a common occurrence in the colonial world where the colonial power acted as arbitrator or political broker between different ethnic groups. The consolidation of an ethnically pluralistic society into a more fully interactive community usually occurs through the linkage of particular sectors. Such linkage may initially develop through structural interdependence and value congruence but may later emerge into identity congruence. The religious sector is particularly important in this process because religious integration usually precedes social integration. Furthermore, the transformation of ethnic identity has frequently been a transition to the formation of broader political communities. (Although in some situations, political integration may precede religious integration.) The linkage of religious sectors may result in a sharing of values which may contribute to the formation of a general political-culture zone (as distinct from political-culture dimensions, which crosscut the various sectors) and hence facilitate the linkage of political sectors. 12 Sec David W. Minar and Scott Greer, eds., The Concept Aldine, 1969).

of Community

(Chicago:

8

Religion

and Political

Culture in

Kano

The conceptual relationship of ethnicity to nationality is largely a matter of definition. A nationality is a people who exhibit the characteristics of community cohesiveness, but is usually of "significant" size. Nationalism refers to the demands for political autonomy by such a people. Nationalism may be based on ethnicity, religion, or various combinations of political criteria. In this study the end result of ethnic and religious integration has been a type of city-state nationalism which eventually was accommodated through separate statehood within a national federation. The emergence of political culture patterns at the local level within a national context is clearly related to the process of national integration. This is the case with regard to both national mass-elite integration and national interethnic integration. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg write, "In the new states, the politically relevant cultures are . . . those of the hundreds of heterogeneous ethnic communities and tribal societies arbitrarily bunched together within the artificial boundaries imposed during the colonial period." Conversely, according to Claude Ake, "The essence of the problem of political integration is one of developing a political culture and inducing commitment to it." The process of linkage of communities within a national context may be illuminated by examining this process at a local level. The relationship of religion to political culture has been referred to at various points above. The argument is put in its basic form by Parsons: "The justification factor of legitimation is most prominent . . . where commitment to the relevant values is directly linked with highly explicit transcendental religious beliefs." 13 The logic of the relationship between religion and political culture will be examined below. Religion may be defined as beliefs, values, and action based on ultimate concern. The concept of ultimate concern, as developed by Paul Tillich and by Robert Bellah, has two aspects: meaning and power—"meaning in the sense of the ultimate meaning of the central values of a society or sub-group of it, and power, in the sense of ultimate, sacred, or supernatural power which stands behind those values." 14 In this broad sense, religion might be regarded as the basis of both ideological and cultural values. In its social manifestations (as distinct from personal or theological manifestations) religion usually posits a division of behavior and meaning into two categories: sacred and profane. 1 3 James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 2; Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 1; Parsons, Structure and Process, p. 176. 1 4 Robert Bellah, "Religious Systems," in People of Rimroc\: A Study of Values in Five Cultures, ed. Evon Z. Vogt and Ethel M. Albert (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 227.

Introduction

9

The boundaries between the sacred and profane in any society may be partly reflected in structural differentiation. According to Parsons, "It is well known that in primitive societies . . . no clear cut structural distinction could be made between religion and secular aspects of the organization of society; there has been no 'church' as a differentiated organizational entity." 15 Some scholars have regarded the scope of religion as the major empirical indicator distinguishing between types of societies. Other scholars have suggested that religion is the major component in the value and identity cohesion of society. Georg Simmel asserts that "co-existence and sharing of human interests is not possible with people who do not share one's faith." Colin M. Turnbull defines ethnicity primarily in religious terms. Friedrich Engels equates "tribal and national religions" with particularistic communities in the pre-bourgeois era.16 The close conceptual relationship between ethnicity and religion has resulted in the typological distinction of religions as universalistic and particularistic. A universalistic religion may be joined by anyone, regardless of ethnicity. A particularistic religion is ascriptive in that only persons of the ethnic group can participate in the religion. Ethnic religions (such as the Yoruba, Nupe, or Ashanti religions) are restricted to ethnic members. Transethnic religions (such as Christianity or Islam) are not restricted in membership. In certain cases, however, both Christianity and Islam may be regarded as particularistic religions. Historically, certain clans regarded Islamic identity as coterminous with their ethnic identity. Certain Christian sects have likewise been associated with ethnic groups and are essentially closed rather than open groupings. The structural differentiation of church and state did not necessarily occur with the introduction of universalistic religions. Within the Christian empires, the idea of political secularity and separation of church and state developed only in the late Middle Ages.17 In the Islamic areas, the notion of political 16

Structure and Process, p. 304. See Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: Free Press, 1965); this is discussed by Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1949), pp. 409-50. See also Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Religion and Society in Tension (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 171, and chap. 9, "Religion and the Integration of Society"; Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1955), p. 157; Colin M. Turnbull, "Tribalism and Social Evolution in Africa," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 354 (July 1964): 25, 29; Friedrich Engels, "I. Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy," On Religion (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1955), p. 240. 17 See Leo Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967); Guy E. Swanson, Religion and Regime: A Sociological Account of the Reformation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, ^ 6 7 ) ; Thomas G. Sanders, Protestant Concepts of Church and State (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964). 18

10

Religion

and Political Culture in

Kano

secularity did not develop significantly until the twentieth century. 1 8 T h e idea of separation of church and state was more evident in the multinational centralized empires prior to the rise of empires based on universalistic religions. 19 T h e modern concept of secularism developed in Europe as structural differentiation began to occur, primarily in the Protestant countries after the Reformation. 20 T h e direct influence of religion on politics varies partly with the degree of differentiation in society. In highly differentiated societies, religious actors may or may not participate in the political sector. 21 In a pre-differentiated society the political actors and the religious actors may be one and the same. T h i s study will be less concerned with the direct involvement of religious personnel in political life than with their indirect influence on political values and forms of organization. Transferences of values from the religious sphere to the political sphere and the extent to which the particular dimensions of political culture are affected by religious values, beliefs, and actions will be assessed. T h i s study is also concerned with theocracy. T h i s type of political system posits a transcendental source as the repository of political values. T h e term "political religion" refers to the transfer of the sacred qualities associated with religious collectivities and the incorporation

of ritual, sacred objects,

pro-

cedures of excommunication, value orientations, and charismatic authority patterns into the political sphere 18

22

See Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 233; Malcolm H . Kerr, Islamic Reform (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966). 19 See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Religious Organizations and Political Process in Centralized Empires," Journal of Asian Studies 2 1 , no. 3 (May 1962): 271-94, especially 272, 273, 278. Eisenstadt notes that in the case of Islam, the religious and political structures are formally undifferentiated. 20 For a discussion of the history of the concept of secularism, see Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), pp. 6-7. 21 According to Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, "only when a religious group makes claims upon the political system through religious authorities, or through specialized structures such as religious interest groups, religious political parties, or a religious press, do the intermittent political actions of the clergy, or the regular action of the specialized religio-political structures become part of the political system" ( T h e Politics of the Developing Areas [Princeton: Princeton University Press, i960], p. 9). 22 For a discussion of theocracy, see David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965): "In theocracies, leadership is shared through a priesthood. Many forms of leadership are therefore possible. . . . [The leaders] are representatives of the diety. Their authority derives from [this] quality, even if they are selected by the public at large. For the members of theocracies there is no sharp distinction between the natural universe and the state, the living and the dead, or the real state and the transcendent state, that is, between the kingdom of man and the kingdom of God"

Introduction

11

Yet the degree of structural differentiation in society between the religious and political sectors is not necessarily a guide to the religious basis of authority and community within the polity. In some states a structural linkage between church and state has remained long after religion ceased to be the basis of authority and community. In other states there has been structural differentiation, but religion continues to be a definitional element in community membership. In still other states there is an official state religion that is apparently intended to indicate the source of values (as distinct from identities) within the state. T h e relationship of religion to the two selected dimensions of political culture—authority and community—is fundamental. The concept of charismatic authority is etymologically derived from religious phenomena; 23 Bellah suggests that "any existent system of authority is based to some extent on charisma (another word for the sacred power mentioned as one aspect of ultimate control) of a more or less routinized form." 24 Even bureaucratic authority may entail a direct or symbiotic relationship with the explicitly religious elements in society. Thus Weber discusses the rejection of irrational religion by the bureaucratic classes, yet stresses their "recognition of the usefulness of this type of religion as a device for controlling people." 25 The religious patterns of ruling elites are frequently different from those of the masses, yet mass-elite integration may be achieved to some extent through the manipulation of common religious symbols. Conversely, religion may be used by a ruling class to explain class differences. According to Shibutani and Kwan, "whenever conspicuous differences of rank lead to embarrassing questions, ideologies emerge to explain the gradation. One of the most effective ways of justifying the status quo is by religion." 26 There is a considerable body of literature on religious protest and authority. The "disinherited" have frequently been attracted to certain types of religious movements, especially messianic cults.27 Religion may be related to concepts of community formation in two ways (p. 286). For a discussion of political religion, see Apter, "Political Religion in the New Nations," in Geertz, Old Societies and New States, pp. 57-104; see also Apter, Politics of Modernization, pp. 180-81, 267, 291-95, 305-6, 322-23, 413-14. Apter draws on J. L. Talmon, Political Messianism (London, Seeker and Warburg i960), for many of these concepts. 23 See A. R. Willner and D. Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 358 (March 1965): 77. 24 "Religious Systems," p. 228. 25 Sociology of Religion, p. 89. 26 Ethnic Stratification, p. 241. 27 See, for example, Vittorio Lanternari, The Religion of the Oppressed: A Study of Modern Messianic Cults (New York: Knopf, i960).

12

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

that are relevant to this study (apart from ethnic situations in which religion may be coterminous with community): the establishment of urban-rural linkages and interurban linkages, and the reinforcement of nationalism. With regard to urban integration, the migration of diverse persons from rural areas to urban areas presents special problems of community formation. Religious organization has often been developed or utilized to accommodate the scale-expanding process which urbanization represents. Weber suggests that Christianity developed in Europe as an urban religion: "it was the city which, in earlier times, was regarded as the site of piety. Actually, early Christianity was an urban religion. . . . In the Middle Ages too, fidelity to the church, as well as sectarian movements in religion, characteristically developed in the cities. It is highly unlikely that an organized congregational religion, such as early Christianity became, could have developed as it did apart from the community life of the city." Weber further suggests that this phenomenon may have developed in response to the need for a network of social cohesion larger than the family unit: "the congregational type of religion has been intimately connected with the urban middle classes of both the upper and lower levels. This was a natural consequence of the relative recession in the importance of blood groupings, particularly of the clan within the occidental city." 2 8 With regard to interurban linkage, it is clear that urban centers are nodes in a larger system of interactions. Transportation and communication patterns exist between cities, and ideas and information are exchanged between cities. Strangers and migrants reside in cities. This produces pressure for a universalistic form of religion in urban centers, as distinct from a particularistic form. Where interurban trade is important, religion may be used in establishing trust or confidence between trading partners and may facilitate interurban marriages which are frequently used to consolidate business relations. In the above processes, community integration may occur within the urban site as well as between urban sites. With regard to nationalistic community formation, religion may be influential in three ways: by forming the basis of separatism, by forming the basis of merger, and by consolidating a nationalist movement not involving merger or separatism. Separatist movements are seldom purely religious, although religion may be a surrogate factor for other types of cultural or economic grievances. In situations where a universalist religion does not recognize the legitimacy of religious pluralism, a separatist movement may develop. Mergers, by contrast, may result either through the positive or negative influence of 28

Sociology of Religion, pp. 84, 96.

Introduction

13

religion. In some nations, religion has been a force that has helped link geographical areas. In other situations, it has been the absence of religion or the secularization of political institutions that has allowed for merger. 29 The relationship of religion to nationalist movements is usually complex and is affected to a large measure by the degree of secularization in a society at the time. Emerson and Kohn have suggested that "the rise of nationalism . . . is likely to be preceded by a revival and reformulation of basic religious principles and outlooks." Emerson also calls attention to "the appearance of religious sects of protest and politico-religious movements of a messianic variety where the time is not yet ripe for full-blown nationalism, or where political activity is barred by the colonial authorities." 30 In the case of the Islamic world, there have been frequent attempts to link nationalist movements with an Islamic ideology. In several cases, nation-states have emerged that have represented particular orientations or sects within Islam. Similarly, after the Reformation in Europe, nation-states emerged that were clearly associated with particular orientations within Christianity. In any study of the relationship of religion to political culture, it is necessary to identify those in society who have explicitly religious roles. Even in relatively diffuse societies, at an early stage a class of persons tends to develop that undertakes primary responsibility for managing the organization and ritual of religion. In the particularistic as well as universalistic religions, elements of a clerical class (imams, shamans, priests, rabbis, ministers) usually exist, whether officially recognized as such or not. In some cases a clerical class will act as an intermediary between a ruling class and the common people. This intermediary function is strengthened if differentiation has occurred between religious and political functions, that is, if political leaders have residual religious authority and if religious leaders have residual political authority. Of central importance to the assessment of political culture, however, are the patterns of relations within the religious sector. Simmel writes, "the relationship between believers and priests involves representation and leadership, control and cooperation, veneration and provision of material sustenance." 3 1 It is precisely such patterns which may, in varying degrees, influence comparable patterns within the political sector. Several hypotheses may be suggested at this point. First, a belief system 29

Simmel suggests that the union of Scotland and England in 1707 required such secularization: "Only the separation of Church and State made the amalgamation of political interests between the two countries possible; otherwise the ecclesiastical interests would not have tolerated it" ( C o n f l i c t and the Web of Group Affiliations, pp. 159-60). 80 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, i960), pp. 159-60. 31

Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, pp. 161-62.

14

Religion and Politicai Culture in Kano

must have at least three characteristics if it is to survive and facilitate interethnic community formation: a credible universality, some internal justification for adaptation to new circumstances, and some criteria for identifying those persons qualified to render value decisions. Second, the processes of interethnic community formation may be facilitated by example, if a major nonpolitical group in society (for example, a religious group) integrates its authority structures. Third, the occupational category of cleric, with its primary function of teaching and providing access to ultimate values, has a role in the process of political-culture formation that is inherently more salient than those of other major occupations (farmers, craftsmen, traders, or administrators). THE K A N O CASE STUDY

T h e selection of Kano State (formerly Province) as a case-study unit is partly due to the importance of Kano City as an urban center in West Africa and partly due to the religio-political significance of Kano Emirate. Kano Province was a major component in the former Northern Region system, and as one of the twelve new states of Nigeria (the only one with a homogeneous HausaFulani population) Kano may be influential in the future course of national integration. During the period of the postindependence Nigerian civilian regime (1960-1966), K a n o reflected many of the problems of the federation as a whole: establishing a broadly acceptable central authority; handling succession and deposition crises; balancing ethnic, urban, regional, and national loyalties; judging the appropriate limits of dissent. During this period Kano served as the predominant center of political reformism and social change in the north. Kano also has become perhaps the major center of Islamic learning and reformism in Nigeria. Islam has been the basis of transethnic political communities in northern Nigeria and the Western-Central Sudan for several centuries. T h e Sokoto Empire, for example, was preserved by the colonial policy of indirect rule in northern Nigeria and formed the basis for much of the Northern Region. T h e K a n o case study may provide some insight into traditional political culture in the Muslim areas of northern Nigeria. It may also indicate the manner in which political culture itself is modified over time, under the impact of socioeconomic change and urbanization, and how such modification relates to the larger processes of national integration. A t this point, four aspects of the socioeconomic structure in Kano will be examined: urbanization, ethnicity, class, and connectivity. Kano State is situated in the central part of northern Nigeria and is bordered by Bornu on the northeast, Bauchi on the southeast, Zaria on the southwest, and Katsina on the west. T o the north, a common frontier exists with Niger

Introduction

15

Republic (see Map i ) . In 1963 Kano Province had an official population of 5,775,000 persons. Kano Emirate constituted about 85 percent of Kano Province, that is, about 4.9 million persons. Three other emirates—Kazaure,

Gumel,

Hadejia—constituted the remainder. Kano City has been the predominant urban site in the Western-Central Sudan since the early nineteenth century. 32 Within Hausaland, Katsina City, a rival to Kano in size and importance until the early nineteenth century diminished 32 "The Kano urban area (city and township) has a permanent population of 89,000, swelled by an estimated 25,000 during the harvest season, and by an additional daytime increment at that period of another 25,000. In all the Sudan only Khartoum-Omdurman, at the confluence of the White and Blue Nile, has more people. In the Western Sudan the District of Dakar, with about 50,000 people, is the only other urban area with a population of more than 20,000, and there are few of more than 10,000" (D. Whittlesey, "Kano: A Sudanese Metropolis," Geographical Review 27, no. 2 [April 1937]: 177); see also Murray Last, The So\oto Caliphate (London: Longmans, Green, 1967).

16

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

Map 2. Kano Urban Area, 1970

17

Introduction

WAJE wpmr

AIRPORT

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TO HJORU

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GOVERNMENT rTECHNICAL TRWH»H» ^SCHOOL SCHOOL > for RRRBIO STUDIES

"

KRNO ST«Ttr offvcts\

EMIR'S „ SUMMER ^PRV-RCt

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GROUNDNUT STACWN& AREA

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18

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

considerably after the Jihad and the establishment of the Hausa successor state in Maradi. 33 Sokoto, which was founded at the time of the Fulani Jihad, has never been large. With the establishment of colonial rule in 1902-3, Kano was not only the largest city in northern Nigeria but increased in size at a higher rate than any other urban center. By the time of the 1952 census, Kano was almost three times larger than any other northern city. Between 1952 and 1962, migration into Kano increased to the point where the urban area nearly doubled in population. By 1963-64 the Kano urban area had an estimated population of 260,687 and a population density of 40,000 per square mile,34 the highest in Africa south of the Sahara. During the latter part of the colonial era, there were three distinct districts within the Kano urban area (see Map 2). These included ( 1 ) Kano City (165,455), traditional walled city, which was predominantly Muslim HausaFulani; (2) Waje (83,584)—the "new town"—which consisted of Fagge, originally a camping site for Niger caravans in the nineteenth century but later a modern Hausa district and commercial center, Sabon Gari (consisting mainly of Ibo and Yoruba immigrants and including a large market), and Tudun Wada and Gwagwarwa, both recently settled areas of northern (Muslim) immigrants; (3) Township (9,246), formerly the Government Residential Area and later populated by Nigerian civil servants and expatriate commercial residents. The mean annual rates of growth from 1958 to 1962 for the sectoral components in the Kano urban area were as follows: Kano City, 11.5 percent; Fagge, 14.5 percent; Sabon Gari, 5.6 percent; Tudun Wada, 28.9 percent; Gwagwarwa, 33.0 percent; Township, 11.5 percent. The areas of highest growth 33 See M. G. Smith, " A Hausa Kingdom: Maradi Under Dan Baskore, 1854-75," ' n West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Daryll Forde and P. M. Kaberry (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 93-122. 34 Of the urban centers in northern Nigeria from 1911 to 1921 with populations over 20,000, the following percentages of population increase or decrease were recorded: Kano, 26.8 increase; Ilorin, 6.4 increase; Bida, 20.4 increase; Zaria, 14.7 decrease; Sokoto, 10.8 decrease (C. K. Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria [London: Oxford University Press, 1925], 2:169-262, especially 179). In 1952 urban centers in northern Nigeria with populations over 30,000 included the following: ( 1 ) Kano, 130,173; (2) Yelwa, 54,636; (3) Zaria, 53,974; (4) Katsina, 52,672; (5) Sokoto, 47,643; (6) Ilorin, 40,994; (7) Gusau, 40,202; (8) Kaduna, 38,794; (9) Jos, 38,527; (10) Okene, 32,602 (Northern Nigeria Statistical Yearboo\, 1964 [Kaduna: Government Printer, 1965], p. 17). For the Kano urban area the 1952 figure of 130,000 and the 1961 figure of 250,000 are used in Gavan McDonell, "The Dynamics of Geographic Change: The Case of Kano," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 54, no. 3 (Sept. 1964): 358. Unless otherwise noted, Kano urban data sources are drawn from B. A. W. Trevallion, Metropolitan Kano: Report on the Twenty-Year Development Plan, 1963-1983 (Glasgow: Greater Kano Planning Authority, 1966); for population densities see p. 10.

Introduction

19

were Tudun Wada and Gwagwarwa, both essentially northern Muslim communities; but the rate for Kano City (11.5 percent) is extremely high when weighted for population base. The Sabon Gari community grew at the lowest rate in this period. Northern Muslim migrants expanded the urbanization figures rather than southern Christians. Much of this northern Muslim increase was drawn from rural areas within Kano Province, but part of it represented immigration from other northern provinces.35 In short, Kano has evidenced an extremely high rate of urban migration in the twentieth century. On the basis of census figures over a fifty-year period (1911-62), the Kano urban area has increased in size by 650 percent. Furthermore, this increase was from a significant starting point, for Kano City was clearly the largest urban center in Sudanic West Africa in the nineteenth century. Within Kano City there are administrative areas, or wards, each of which has a clear social base. In the nineteenth century, Kano City was not formally subdivided into wards, although there were sections of the town that consisted of particular ethnic, clan, or occupational groups. At the turn of the century there were ten sections in Kano City: Zango, Gwauron Dama, Madabo, Chediya, Jingau, Sheshe, Darma, Makama, Shetima, and Chigari. Within these broad sections were subsections with distinctive characteristics (which, to a large extent, became the wards of the twentieth century). Thus the Madabo area included Hausa clans and groups such as the Zaitawa, Dukurawa, and Sankawa which had migrated to Kano before the Jihad from "Wangara." Chediya included the important Hausa area of Bakin Ruwa, a triangle stretching west from the market toward Gwauron Dutse and containing descendants of some of the original peoples of Kano. Chediya also contained most of the Arab quarter, and especially those Arabs who had left Katsina for Kano after the Fulani Jihad. Sheshe was identified with a pre-Jihad migrant group from Birnin Shem, reputedly of Arab origin. Darma included several of the Fulani clans (such as Kurawa and Yolawa) as well as the Sharifai area containing the descendants of the North African al-Maghili. This area also contained migrant groups of Nupe (Nufawa section) and Tuareg (Agadasawa section). The areas of Makama, Shetima, and Chigari were principally the Fulani quarters. 35

See R. Mansell Prothero, Migrant Labour from So\oto Province, Northern Nigeria (Kaduna: Government Printer, n.d.); M. B. Cleave, "The Changing Frontiers of Settlement in the Uplands of Northern Nigeria," Nigerian Geographical Journal 8, no. 2 (December 1965); M. J. Mortimore and J. Wilson, Land and People in the Kano CloseSettled Zone, Occasional Paper no. 1 (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University, Department of Geography, 1965); M. J. Campbell and J. Wilson, eds., Report on the Conference on Problems of Urbanization in Northern Nigeria (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1962).

20

Religion

and Political Culture in

Kano

I n the course of the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , the ten sections w e r e s u b d i v i d e d into 1 2 6 w a r d s . T h e s e w a r d s constitute f o u r districts East (Gabas), N o r t h

( A r e w a ) , and W e s t

(jus\o\i):

South

(Kudu),

( Y a m m a ) . W i t h i n these f o u r dis-

tricts, the H a u s a ethnic g r o u p s a r e p r i m a r i l y setded i n the W e s t a n d

North,

a n d the F u l a n i g r o u p s i n the S o u t h . T h u s , K a n o S o u t h ( 5 2 , 0 9 8 ) is the m a i n area of F u l a n i c l a n settlement

( w i t h the exception of the D a m b a z a w a

are i n K a n o E a s t ) a n d is the seat of e m i r a t e g o v e r n m e n t . K a n o E a s t

who

(40,596)

is the location of the central m a r k e t a n d is i n h a b i t e d b y laborers a n d t r a d e r s ; K a n o N o r t h ( 3 2 , 0 6 0 ) , w h i l e c o n t a i n i n g s o m e of the oldest H a u s a areas

(such

as M a d a b o a n d D a l a ) , is c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y fields f o r m e r l y u s e d f o r cattle g r a z i n g . M u c h of this u n o c c u p i e d l a n d w a s g i v e n b y K a n o e m i r s to the n e w class of H a u s a b u s i n e s s m e n i n the past fifty years. K a n o W e s t ( 4 0 , 3 8 3 ) , a center of the o r i g i n a l H a u s a settlement (especially the B a k i n R u w a a r e a ) is i n h a b i t e d b y c r a f t s m e n a n d traders. ( S e e M a p 3 . ) (With District Noted: North, South, East, West) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

Adakawa(N) Agadasawa (E) Aikawa (N) Akwa (W) Alfindiki (S) Alkantara (E) Arzai (N) Ayagi (W) Bakin Ruwa (W) Bakin Zuwo (E) Cedi (E) Cediya ( N ) Cediyar Fero (E) Cediyar Kuda (E) Chiranci (W) Chiromawa (E) Daganda (E) Dala (N) Dambazau (E) Dandago (W) Dandali (N) Daneji (S) Darma (E) Daurawa (N) Dausayi (W) Diso (W) Dogarai (S) Dogon Nama (W) Dorayi (S) Dukawa (E) Dukurawa (N) Durumin Arbabi (E) Durumin Daje (N) Durumin Iya (S) Durumin Zungura (S) Gabari (E) Galadanci (W) Gangamau (N) Garangamawa (W) Garke (N) Gidan Sarki (S) Gwale (W)

43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

Gwammaja (N) Gwangwazo (S) Gyaranya (W) Hausawa (W) Indabawa (S) Jingau (W) Jujin 'Yanlambu (E) Juma (N) Kabara (S) Kabawa (N) Kabuwaya (N) Kaigama (W) Kangiwa (N) Kankarofi (S) Kantudu (N) Kofar Kabuga (W) Kofar Mata (S) Kofar Mazugal ( N ) Kofar Nasarawa (S) Kofar Wambai (E) Koki (E) Kududdufawa (E) Kurawa (S) Kurmawa (S) Kurna (E) Kwalwa (E) Kwarin Mabuga (E) Lallakin Lemo (E) Limanci (N) Lokon Makera (W) Madabo (N) Madigawa (W) Mandunguru (W) Magashi (W) Magoga (W) Mai Aduwa (W) Makafi ( N ) Makafin Kofar Wambai (E) Makwalla (N) Makwarari (E) Mallam Ganan (E) Mandatari (W)

85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. ni. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126.

Manladan (W) Mararraba (W) Marmara (S) Masakar Kuda ( N ) Masukwani (E) Mazan Kwari (E) Rijiya Biyu (N) Rijiya Hudu (W) Rimin Kira (S) Sabon Sara (W) Sagagi (S) Sanka (W) Sararí (N) Satatima (E) Sharfadi (E) Sharifai (E) Shatsari (N) Sheshe (S) Shirawa (N) Soron Dinki (S) Sudawa (W) Takalmawa (E) Tudun Makera (N) Tudun Nufawa (E) Tudun Wada (E) Tudun Wazirci (S) Unguwar Gini (S) Uwariyo (N) Warure (W) Wudilawa (S) Yakasai (S) Yalwa (W) 'Yan Awaki (E) 'Yandoya (E) 'Yan Muruci (E) 'Yan Tandu ( N ) 'Yarkasuwa (W) Yola (E) Zage (S) Zaitawa (E) Zango (S) Zangón Barebari (E)

introduction

21

K. M A Z U G A L

KAN 0

CITY

DISTRICTS

K.VAMBM \ K.MATA

IK.

.'nassarawa

s

K.

HAI SA

K. DAM AGUNDI

SCALE

1:12,500 IPpO

300Q

4000

H

5000

Ji

6000

FEET

1

MILES

Map 3. Kano City Wards, 1970

1970

22

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

The major ethnic groups in precolonial Kano City were the Hausa, Fulani, Beriberi (including Kanuri), Tuareg (including Buzaye), Arab, and Nupe. All these groups were predominantly Muslim, and each spoke a distinct language. The only available census figures for ethnic distribution in Kano City were for 1931, when approximately 77 percent of the people were Hausa, 12 percent Fulani, and 7 percent Beriberi. In recent times, however, most people in Kano City have come to use Hausa as a first language and have accepted Hausa as an ethnic identification. Outside of Kano City, mainly in the Sabon Gari area, there have been southern Nigerian migrants, including Ibo, Ibibio, Edo, Yoruba, and a variety of groups from the Middle Belt. This latter cluster of minority peoples (including Idoma, Tiv, Bachama, and Igala) have come to be known in some quarters as the "thin tribe" or "minority tribe" (tsirarin \abilu). (The growth of the Sabon Gari will be discussed in chapter 8.) Ethnic distribution in the rural districts of Kano Emirate varies significantly but averages about one-third Fulani and two-thirds Hausa. In 1952 the Fulani population ranged from 49.5 percent in Ungogo district to 15.3 percent in Tudun Wada. The Hausa population in the rural districts ranged from 45.6 percent in Ungogo to 79.9 percent in Kura. In recent times it has become possible to speak of the Hausa-Fulani as a single ethnic group, representing an amalgamation of Fulani and Hausa peoples. In the past there was often conflict between the Hausa and Fulani, and their distinctiveness is still apparent in many contemporary situations. The Fulani conquest of Hausaland in the early nineteenth century was a critical juncture in the relations between these two groups. The major Fulani clans participating in the Jihad in Kano included the Sullubawa, Mundubawa, Jobawa, and Dambazawa. Other clans, such as the Jahunawa, did not participate in the Jihad and were on relatively good terms with the Hausa community. Throughout the nineteenth century, relations between the Hausa and the Fulani were influenced by the fact that the Fulani were not a unified community. Within Kano City, the Hausa were an overwhelming majority of the population and in many respects were treated with special consideration by the Fulani rulers. In the rural areas the precolonial patterns of Hausa and Fulani relations were perhaps more indicative of the general pattern of pluralism. In a sample of seven rural districts representing a full range of demographic balances, several patterns of ethnic relations emerge.36 At the time of the Fulani Jihad, 86 T h e districts include Gaya, Birnin Kudu, Dutse, Gabasawa, Rano, Jahun, and Tudun Wada. T h e primary source of data available on these districts is the "District Notebook," Kano Provincial Commissioner's Office, 1965.

Introduction

23

three of the seven districts evidenced severe Hausa-Fulani fighting. A fourth district revolted at the time of the succession of the first Fulani emir. Only one of the districts attempted any further revolt. In four districts, however, the Hausa and Fulani populations actively cooperated in withstanding external threat (mainly N i n g i ) . On issues of local leadership succession and in reaction to the British conquest, there was little involvement by the Hausa in "Fulani" affairs. Hence, four of the districts (Birnin Kudu, Gabasawa, Rano, and T u d u n Wada) evidenced direct Hausa-Fulani conflict. In the other three districts (Gaya, Dutse, Jahun) there seems to have been an overall neutrality on the part of the Hausa with regard to social and political matters. In summary, the two major ethnic groups in Kano (Hausa and Fulani) experienced a conquest relationship that was transformed during the nineteenth century into a pluralistic relationship based on division of labor and mutual economic interdependence. Ethnic groups in Kano have been associated with a stratification (or class) structure that is essentially based on an ethnic division of labor. Within Kano City there is a long history of specialization in both trades and crafts. Traditionally, families specialized in occupations (sana'a); and although it was unusual for all the sons of a particular family to follow the father's trade or craft, equivalent socioeconomic occupations were available to younger sons. A guild (jarniyya), or union, was equivalent to a combination of welfare society, labor union, and family council. These guilds regulated recruitment of membership and managed the affairs of the occupational groups. Many of the occupations were ethnically based, and many of the guilds were based in particular clans. Hausa families, for example, tended to dominate weaving and dyeing; a Fulani would rarely be found in such an occupation. Since clan groups tended to live in the same ward area, it was possible to determine the ethnic identification of an occupational category by the location of its guild in the city. Division-of-labor patterns in the precolonial period are difficult to calculate with precision. During the early colonial period, however, a system of taxation was established in which assessment was based on occupational categories. A full survey of urban occupations was undertaken in 1921, and a more refined assessment was made in 1926. According to the 1926 assessment, the 11,431 taxpayers in Kano City were divided into forty-five occupations (see Table 1 ) . T h e occupations with the most people were, predictably, those that could accommodate rural immigration (most of which was Hausa): cap makers, mallams, tailors, petty traders, and laborers. In 1926 the occupation of administration probably engaged about 200 persons at all levels in Kano City. Emirate administrative bureaucracy tended to

24

Religion and Political Culture in Kano TABLE

1

ESTIMATED INCOME ( P E R A N N U M ) BY TRADITIONAL OCCUPATION,

Occupation 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

Wealthy traders Chief traders Kola sellers Ground nut sellers Lodging-house keepers Grain sellers Skins sellers Chief butchers Black-gown sellers Cloth beaters Potash sellers Dyers White smiths Gown sellers Donkey sellers Builders Mattress makers Black-cloth sellers Horse sellers Blacksmiths Barbers Beggars Cattle sellers Brokers Small kola sellers Saddle cloth Leather workers Scent sellers Sword sling makers Kola wrappers Snuff sellers Sheep sellers Indigo sellers Petty traders Weavers Tanners Laborers Tailors Cap makers Sweetmeat sellers Horse trappings makers Petty meat sellers Raw cotton sellers Mallams Fruitiers Totals

Number Persons

Percent Total

Income* CD

43 200 472 142 290 143 153 69 46 80 62 337 204 226 34 220 29 40 40 64 167 197 20 479 20 61 473 53 5 15 70 33 70 766 227 122 611 877 2,405 38 49 296 9 1,320 11

.37 1.74 4.12 1.24 2.53 1.25 1.33 .60 .40 .69 .54 2.94 1.78 1.97 .29 1.92 .25 .34 .34 .55 1.43 1.72 .17 4.19 .17 .53 4.13 .46 .04 .13 .61 .28 .17 6.70 1.98 1.06 5-34 7.67 21.03 .33 .42 2.58 .07 11.54 .09

80 36 35 35 34 33 32 30 27 26 25 24 24 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 21 20 20 19 16 15 15 15 14 14 14 14 14 13 11 11 11 11 10 9 8 8

11,431

100.00

* Excluding wealthy traders, the average income was £14 per annum. Assessment, Kano.

SOURCB: 1 9 2 6

1926

Percent Average Income of Top Administrators 3.52 1.58 1.54 1.54 1.49 1.45 1.40 1.32 1.18 1.14 1.10 1.05 1.05 1.01 1.01 .97 .97 .97 .97 .97 .97 .97 .92 .92 .88 .88 .83 .70 .66 .66 .66 .61 .61 .61 .61 .61 .57 .48 .48 .48 .48 .44 .39 .35

25

Introduction TABLE 2 INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN KANO CITY BY "RELATIVE DEPRIVATION" RATIO, 1 9 2 6

Percentage of Population Receiving Less Than Administrative Elite

Amount of "Relative Deprivation"

.37 7.12

3 0 times less income

14.33

7 5 times less income

5 0 times less income

32.54

1 0 0 times less income

43.78

2 0 0 times less income

be identified with particular Fulani families or clans. Division of labor within the bureaucracy followed functional lines, which will be discussed in chapter 6. Since traditional occupations tended to follow ethnic or clan patterns, the distribution of income by occupational group is an important indicator of ethnic stratification. In order to establish some standard of upper income level within the emirate system, a per annum salary average of top-level administrators in 1926 has been calculated: emir, 8,500; waziri, ¿ 1 , 2 0 0 ; madaki, ¿ 1 , 2 0 0 ; galadima, ¿ 1 , 0 0 0 ; ma'aji, £720; chief alkali, ¿ 7 2 0 . T h e average salary for these six offices was ¿2,270. Other occupational incomes are calculated as a percentage of this amount in Table 2. T h e translation of occupational specialization and income distribution into categories of social class may be done analytically or according to social perceptions. Since social perceptions are of more interest in the study of political culture, some assessment of social class by these criteria seems necessary. In the early colonial period, Resident C. L . Temple wrote of Kano City: " T h e native community may be divided into four classes: the aristocracy, the upper middle class (traders and moneyed men), the lower middle class, and the poverty stricken." Forty years later, Aminu Kano was to write: "These people may be divided into four distinct social classes, namely, the aristocracy and the merchants, the mallams or doctors of divinity, the traders and the artisans, and the labourers and peasants." 3 7 During the postindependence era there were many interpretations of social class in Kano. Most of them, however, could be reduced to five categories: ( 1 ) ruling class Fulani (sara\una, or masu sarautd); (2) wealthy Hausa mer37 C. L . Temple, "Kano Provincial Report," Nigerian Archives, Kaduna (hereafter abbreviated N A K (44), 1909. Aminu Kano, "The Problem of Girls' Education in Kano" (unpublished essay, London University, Institute of Education, 1947).

26

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

chants (tajirai, or masu arzify) with incomes over ¿10,000; (3) educated senior-service personnel (siniya sabis) with incomes over ¿720 (the majority of whom were Fulani); (4) middle class Hausa traders Cyan \asuwa), who might have incomes ranging from £1,000 to ¿10,000; (5) common people (tala\a) with incomes under ¿500 (predominantly Hausa). The latter category is generally regarded as including five subcategories: farmers (manoma); petty traders Cyan tebur); craft workers (masu ai\i da hannu), including blacksmiths (ma\era), factory workers (masu ai\i a gidajen sanad), and construction workers (magina); laborers (leburori), including truck pushers and those who dig dirt for buildings; and beggars (musa\ai). The position of the mallam class will be discussed later, but significantly, it crosscuts all five major categories mentioned above. As another approach to ethnic distribution of income, an examination of the tax receipts in 1925 by ward indicates that the Hausa wards in Kano City West had a lower average per capita income than the Fulani and Arab parts of the city. In subsequent years, however, some Hausa merchants have expanded increasingly into the area of agricultural produce export and have developed a considerable base of wealth. Within Kano State as a whole the primary occupation is agriculture. In 1952 the primary male occupations in Kano Province were as follows: ( 1 ) agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting— 80.12 percent; (2) craftsmen, skilled and semiskilled workers—9.98 percent; (3) trading and clerical—3.75 percent; (4) administrative, professional, technical—2.01 percent; (5) other—4.12 percent.38 During the twentieth century there has been a rapidly expanding modern sector in Kano. During the 1930s, Lebanese businessmen came to Kano, settled in Fagge, and engaged in light industry and wholesale merchandising. Despite the worldwide depression, the Kano Native Authority extended itself in all departments, from public works to printing. During World War II, many new industries were initiated in Kano. By the end of the war, Kano had the largest modern sector in northern Nigeria, the manpower for which was drawn largely from non-Muslim southern Nigerian immigrants who settled in the Sabon Gari. In 1946 systematic plans were drawn up for development in Kano. In 1949 a Kano Native Authority Five-Year Plan was introduced. In 1950 it was transformed into a Kano Ten-Year Plan. Colonial policy makers had selected Kano as the main urban area in northern Nigeria for economic modernization. From 1954 to 1962, more industries were established in Kano. An examination of the Kano Labor Exchange reports reveals that toward the end of the 1950s the overwhelming majority of those looking for 38

'Northern Nigeria Statistical Yearbook 1964

p. 2 1 .

(Kaduna: Government Printer, 1964)

Introduction

27

work in the modern sector were northern Muslims (mainly Hausa) rather than southern migrants. T h e types of light industries that had been established in the Kano urban area had several effects in terms of ethnic division of labor: nonindigenous ethnic groups (from southern Nigeria) dominated skilled positions in the modern sector; indigenous ethnic groups increasingly came into competition with southerners in the semiskilled occupations; the Fulani administrative class in Kano came to hold advisory positions in the management structures of the new industries; and northern Muslim ethnic groups came to dominate the unskilled occupations in the modern sector. During the late colonial period the economic locus of the Kano urban area began to shift away from the city market to a commercial zone located between the four emergent "ethnic" groups with the most economic significance: Europeans, Lebanese ("Syrians"), southern Nigerians, and Kano City Hausa-Fulani. This commercial zone was essentially barren of residential units and was the center of the major modern-sector economic transactions. In recent years the Kano economic structure has expanded on both the national and international levels. Groundnuts (peanuts), hides and skins, and livestock have been exchanged for foodstuffs (kola and gari), textiles, and consumer goods. Agricultural exports, especially groundnuts, came to be the major source of wealth in Kano. Groundnuts were grown in Kano during World War I at the initiative of Hausa farmers. (The colonial regime tried to encourage cotton growing.) 3 9 Since World W a r I, groundnuts have revolutionized urban-rural relations in Kano. In addition to the effect of the infusion of a cash economy into the rural areas, many farmers require financial credit in order to get through the preplanting lean period and this credit may come from urban sources, especially licensed buying agents ( L B A ) . T h e same L B A are necessary to arrange for the transmission of produce from the farmer to the point of export. Both of these arrangements require trust and confidence as well as financial and legal assurances. Initially, however, it was the Lebanese trader who served the middleman function. According to the 1926 Kano provincial report, " T h e groundnut crop was fair. T h e average price was about _ £ I O - I O - O [per ton]. More and more the Syrian trader is becoming the middleman between the native and the European firms, a situation as displeasing to the firms as it is detrimental to the true interests of the native trader." 40 T h e major European firms subse39

See Jan Hogendorn, "The Origin of the Groundnut Trade in Northern Nigeria" (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1966). 40 Annual Report, Northern Provinces, 1926 (Kaduna: Government Printer, 1927), p. 31.

28

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

quently established their own "trading plots" in rural towns. In the 1950s, however, the export of groundnuts was centralized through a northern marketing board. T h e number of indigenous licensed buying agents was limited to those f e w wealthy Hausa traders who had the capital necessary for the financing of preseason planting—Alhassan Dantata, for example, who emerged as one of the wealthiest men in Nigeria. In the late 1950s preseason financing became available from the government to other Hausa businessmen, and the Hausa licensed buying agents nearly eclipsed all others. Licenses also became a political matter and were used by the governing party to control or entice individuals. In the meantime, groundnuts had become one of Nigeria's chief exports, and Nigeria had become one of the major groundnut producers in the world. Kano Province was producing almost half of all Nigerian groundnuts. In short, the predominance of groundnuts as a source of both urban and rural wealth considerably strengthened links between the urban and rural areas in terms of personal contact, interdependence, and mutual interest. Another consequence of these economic developments was the realignment in the system of spatial connectivity. T h e three most important modes of transportation connecting Kano to other urban centers have been rail, air, and road. T h e development patterns of these transportation systems are important to understanding social communication networks in Kano, which have fundamentally reoriented the concept of community scale. T h e Kano-Lagos railway was authorized in 1907 and completed in 1 9 1 1 . Kano served as the primary northern railhead and hence as a distribution center for goods intended for Katsina, Zinder, and other points north. Until the completion of the Maiduguri extension in 1965, Kano also served as the railhead for points to the east. T h e major function of the railway became the transport of groundnuts, not only from Kano but from the entire north and much of Niger Republic. The spur route from Kano City to Nguru, which passed through the central portion of Kano Province, meant that many Kano rural areas came into direct rail contact with Kano City. N e w towns developed out of isolated villages along the rail route within the Kano rural districts. Because these towns lacked a strong traditional authority structure, they often came under the influence of the emirate authorities in Kano City. T h e airport in Kano was opened in 1935, and a weekly service connected Kano with Khartoum, which, at that time, was on the main route from London to South Africa. During World War II the Kano airport became a major staging post for the United States to the Middle East and Far East. In the postwar period Kano became the major airport in Nigeria, surpassing in air traffic the airport in Lagos in the pre-independence era. By 1950 about 55,000 passengers a year passed through the Kano airport (of which about 75 percent were in

29

Introduction

transit) . 41 This development had two major effects on religious communication patterns in K a n o : it established Kano as the Nigerian point of departure for pilgrimage flights to Saudi Arabia, and it became a stopover point for other Muslims in West Africa, especially Senegal, who were on pilgrimage. T h e increasing use of air transportation for the pilgrimage was made possible by the infusion of wealth from the groundnut trade, and it meant that religious personalities with some basis of wealth were coming into contact with each other for the first time on such a scale. Eleven hundred pilgrims departed from the Kano airport in 1955. By 1961 this figure had almost doubled, to 2,043. In 1969 nearly 25,000 Nigerians went on pilgrimage and most left from Kano (including those who flew in from Lagos). 4 2 T h e major mode of transportation for the common people, however, has been roads. By about 1930 road connections had been established between Kano City and most of the rural district headquarters. Yet, with the development of the groundnut industry, the major problem remained the establishment of a feeder road system between the villages and the towns. Much of the incentive for the Kano Development Plan of 1949 seems to have been the need for efficient groundnut evacuation. According to the Kano resident, "Unless an early and concentrated attack on the problem of these feeder roads is launched, produce evacuation will next season, in certain places, come to a standstill."

43

During the 1950s these feeder roads were constructed, and many of the Kano rural areas were exposed for the first time to easy access with the urban center (see Map 4). T h e main road artery connecting Kano with the seaport of Lagos went through Zaria, Kaduna, Kontagora, Ilorin, and Ibadan. Although a rail link was established from Kafanchan to Port Harcourt (Eastern Region), the road links with the Eastern Region were never developed (see Map 5). T h e international "caravan" system passing through Kano was reoriented from a north-south axis (Kano-Tripoli)

to an east-west axis

(Dakar-Khartoum),

pardy as a result of French colonial policy. T h e east-west road patterns in French West Africa were well established by 1930: Dakar-Bamako-OugadouNigeria Yearbook, 7952 (Lagos: Times Press, 1953), p. 43. In 1964 the number of Nigerian pilgrims was 12,299; in 1965, 7,623; in 1966, 8,535; in 1967, 10,790; in 1968, 16,177; in 1969, 24,185. In 1969, Nigeria was ranked fourth in the world (after Yemen, Turkey, and Pakistan) in numbers of pilgrims (see "Pilgrims Who Came from 1384 A.H. to 1389 A.H. According to Their Nationalities," Haske [Kaduna], no. 13 [March 1970], pp. 6-9). For a historical account of West African pilgrimage, see Omar el-Nager, "West Africa and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A n Historical Study with Special Reference to the 19th Century" (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1969). 4 3 Sharwood-Smith, to Secretary, Northern Provinces, Kaduna "Development Funds and Staff within the Region," N A K (7014), May n , 1950. 41

42

30

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

gou-Niamey-Maradi (also, Bamako-Mopti-Gao-Niamey). In the 1880s a trip from Kano to Sokoto took twelve days. By 1929 a person could motor from Dakar to Lake Chad in twelve days. This pattern was reinforced during World War II, when east-west travelers could not use North African coastal routes because of war zone restrictions. With regard to the eastern route from Kano to Khartoum, the major factors in the opening up of the transportation network were the political effects of colonial rule, especially the defeat of the sultan of Darfur by Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1916, which allowed for free transit. At the same time, the Arab trading communities in Kano began to reorient themselves from north to east. In 1916, according to H. R. Palmer, acting resident of Kano:

Introduction

31

At the present time the dominant factor, as far as trade is concerned, is that Kano is the distributing centre for Manchester goods and native cloths; north, as far as Agades, east, as far as Wadai; and southeast to the region of Kuti and Darsilla and almost to the Ubangi. The Kano Arabs and native traders, consequent on the death of the Tripoli trade, have to a large extent turned their attention to Bornu and the Chad basin and Wadai. With the opening of Darfur to commerce there will soon result a great increase in the direct transcontinental traffic, which has hitherto been stifled by the attitude of the late Sultan of Darfur, Ali Dinar. 44 Although Palmer hoped to revive the Kano contacts with North Africa and even suggested the importation of Qur'anic teachers from Fez, the routes north were not competitive economically with the boat route from Lagos to Dakar to Casablanca. Yet one of the political effects of the east-west transportation pattern was the increased salience of the Kano-Sokoto relationship, for both 44 Governor-General of Nigeria to the Secretary of State, London, dispatch no. 38726, received August 4,1916.

32

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

were now on the same major route. In the postindependence era, an excellent road was constructed from Kaduna to Sokoto. Had this road been extended to Niamey, Kano might have been eclipsed as the commercial entrepot for the trade in the western portion of the Sudanic interior. (See Map 6.) In summary, the major economic mode of transportation was the rail link between Kano and Lagos in the south. Yet road and air facilities put Kano in a nodal position for linking centers in the Sudanic belt from Senegal to the Republic of Sudan. FULANI AND HAUSA ORIENTATIONS TOWARD AUTHORITY AND C O M M U N I T Y

There are three analytical categories of Fulani in Kano State, reflecting different life styles and hence different cultural patterns on matters such as authority and community. The first group is the pastoral nomads (sometimes called bororro and sometimes called Fulanin daji). The second group is the rural settled Fulani who mix farming with animal husbandry (called both Fulanin \auye and Fulanin gida). The third group is the urban Fulani, particularly those who have dominated the administrative structures in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (called Fulanin soro, or Fulanin birni, or Fulanin gida)}5 In pastoral Fulani society, authority is vested in the lineage leader, or ardo.4e The ardo usually has responsibility for lineages of about three generations. He does not have formal powers but has the authority to make decisions when necessary. Since it is his children and grandchildren who execute these decisions, there is usually discussion and agreement among all concerned prior to a decision. When an ardo becomes too old to function, he might be allowed to keep his title, but the decision-making process is handled by his sons or brothers or grandsons. An ardo may be formally deposed if necessary. In the rural settled Fulani societies, authority is vested in the lamdo, who must be Fulani and who is equivalent perhaps to a district head. In Kano the term is not used because of the village-head-district-head structure. In urban Fulani society (such as in Adamawa), power is vested in the lamido who may or may not be Fulani. Lamido is the Fulfulde equivalent to the Hausa title sar\i (that is, emir). A basic difference between an ardo and a lamdo (or 4 5 All of the above terms are Hausa. The author does not speak Fulfulde and is indebted to several persons, including Mahmud Tukur and Ibrahim Mukoshy, for assistance on Fulani concepts of authority and community. Although the dialect cited in this study is Adamawa, the terms are understood by a representative portion of those urban Fulani in Kano who do retain the use of Fulfulde. One of the few areas in Kano City where Fulfulde is actually used is Mubi, near Sabuwar Kofa, which is inhabited to some extent by recent immigrants from Adamawa. 4 6 From the verb arda, "to lead."

Introduction

33

b wo .3 i-J a

J

-o M CO 8 < a, I

34

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

lamido) has been that an ardo does not own land, whereas a lamdo or a lamido is regarded as a repository of land for his people. Prior to the Jihad, the terms lamdo and lamido apparently were not used. T h e Fulfulde noun baude implies both power and authority. Succession to authority is regarded as a matter of inheritance ( r o n a ) . While the eldest sons are regarded as the "most loved" of the children (although there are, as in Hausa society, some avoidance relationships with the first born), there are no specific rules of inheritance, and any male heir can (in theory) succeed to authority. Thus, authority is ascriptive to the extent that it is limited by lineage criteria, but within that context authority devolves on the person who is regarded as having the personal qualities most suited to leadership. There are two categories of persons who are regarded as bearing a direct relationship to authority: sons (including daughters) and slaves.47 The Fulfulde word for "freedom" (ndima\u) is taken directly from the word "born" (rim) and implies the state of being a blood relative.48 There is a third category of person in the Fulani typology: a person who is free but who is a son of someone who once was a slave ( d i m a j o ) . In some areas the dimajo have come to form a quasi-clan in their own right. A freeman, however, whatever his earlier status, is entitled to the rights of sonhood. T h e bororro took slaves from other ethnic groups and migrated with them. Slaves were inherited from one generation to the next, although they could gain their freedom in several ways. If a slave became a mallam he would in all likelihood gain his freedom. In general, children of male slaves remained slaves, while children of female slaves were not necessarily slaves. T h e concepts of sonhood and slavery are related to authority in several ways. First, the concept of "protest or crying out" (wullandu)—that is, the challenging of authority—implies "appeal to another authority." 49 While sons can protest a wide range of decisions, slaves can protest only certain things. Second, the criterion of sonhood is the basis of participation in political decision making. Third, the concept of ownership provides the basic paradigm in Fulani 47 Maccudu is a male slave, \ordo, a female slave; the general term for someone who is owned is jeyado. These terms are roughly comparable to the Hausa concepts of slave: bawa (male, singular); baiwa (female, singular); bayi (plural). Slavery in general is

called bauta.

4 8 This is parallel to the Hausa concepts of freedom and sonhood. In Hausa, a freeman is a "son" {da) or "daughter" Qya) (the plural of both of which is ^yan or 3 y a y a ) . T h e state of being free is 3yanci, that is, the state of being a son. Thus a freeman is ''yantacce, a freewoman is 'yantatta, free people are 'yantattu (also freed slaves). 4 9 F r o m the verb wul, "to protest." This concept is similar to the Hausa concept of protest or complaint ( \ a r a ) , which also entails appeal to another authority within the system. In Hausa, it is regarded primarily in its legal sense.

Introduction

35

concepts of God, which in turn become incorporated later into emirate concepts of theocracy. T h e Fulani word for God (Jaumirawo)—which even in pre-Islamic times implied a single high God—is based on the word for master (jaumu) and entails a notion of ownership. This is an almost exact parallel to the Hausa vulgate word for God (Ubangiji). T h e basic parallel between Fulani and Hausa terminology with regard to authority has been noted in the above discussion. Hausa concepts, however, have more clearly centered on the emirate structure than on kinship structures. (As mentioned above, "Hausa" has come to be less a term for a kinship group than a term for a language or cultural group.) Many of the Hausa terms for the components of the emirate authority structure are clearly borrowed from Kanuri (for example, galadima, chiroma, \aigama) or from Arabic (for example, tvaziri, wa\ili). In turn, when the Fulani leaders assumed control of K a n o Emirate in the early nineteenth century, they came to utilize much of the Hausa terminology for authority relationships. T h e Hausa concept of sar\i implies leadership or authority at any of several levels. T h e term is almost invariably used as an antecedent to a place name or a group name. Thus, the leader of Kano Emirate as a whole is called sar\in Kano; the leader of a district such as Rano would be called sar\in Rano; the leader of a children's play group would be called sarkin wasa. Sar\i is distinguished from mai which implies possession (thus the head of a household is called mai gida). T h e concept of emirate leader (for example, sarkin K a n o ) came to be regarded as the equivalent of the Arabic term amir (from which is derived the English words "emir" and "emirate"). T h e full title of the leader of the Sokoto Empire was amir al-muminin ("leader of the faithful"), but correspondence between Sokoto and Kano also refers to sarkin Kano as amir. This was interpreted by some during the Kano State Movement period (1964-65) as an abbreviation for amir al-muminin, in which case the authority relationship between Sokoto and Kano is made ambiguous. More commonly, it is regarded as an abbreviation for amir al-liwa ("flagbearer") which implies a deputyship to the leader of the faithful in Sokoto. (In some correspondence, the emir is also referred to as sultan.) With respect to the locus and scope of authority in Kano society, it was believed that the sovereign (in this case emir) had absolute power. T h e expression "the emir is the shadow of G o d " {sar\i zillullahi ne) reflected K a n o belief concerning the basis of legitimation of the sovereign. His description as "the possessor of power to administer the death penalty" (sarkin yan\a) summarized his position as court of final appeal on legal matters of capital consequence. T h e Hausa concept of power was twofold: physical {\arfi) and general ([i\o). T h e concept of authority (sarauta) implied general power,

36

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

but within a legitimate institutional framework. Authority is thus regarded more in a legal sense than in a broader charismatic sense. The possessors of legal (state) power have both rights and duties, yet the terminology is the same for each In common usage, hakki may also entail a "reward from the rulers" or a "just reward." The concept of obligation {\amata) entails a sense of "ought" or "preferable" as distinguished from an absolute command of God, regarded as wajibi. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Kano concept of government (mul\i) was inseparable from the notion of Fulani emirate government (mul\in gargajiya; literally, "government of our forebears"). The concept of government structure (hu\uma) was derived from the Arabic ( h u \ u m ) and implied rule, decision-making process, or administration. This administration was conducted by a small class of rulers (masu sarauta), theoretically for the benefit of a large class of nonrulers (tala\awa). Talakawa meant more than commoner. It referred to all persons who did not have responsibilities for government. The Hausa concept of freedom was an extension of this bifurcation. Freedom Qyancin talakawa) entailed noninterference by the rulers in the affairs of nonrulers. The principles that defined the proper sphere of government were termed fyfidar mul\i, and may be translated as "constitution." The classical Hausa term for "community" is umma. The term umma is also used for "mother," and the implication of blood linkage or kinship-like linkages appears to be related to the notion of community. (In both cases the words are borrowed from Arabic.) Umma has not normally been used in Hausa to connote associational or affiliational linkages. It refers to any group that is a primary reference system. In the Islamic sense, it is a religious community. In Hausa usage, however, it may indicate any primary-group reference system on the spectrum from humanity to family. The Hausa expression alummar dan Adam ("the community of the sons of Adam") refers to mankind and would be used in contradistinction to certain categories in the spirit world. The Hausa expression al-ummar gidammu ("the community of our household") would refer to the immediate extended family. It is also a common way of expressing nationality (for example, al-ummar masar refers to Egyptians). There have been at least eight major categories of communal identity reflected in Hausa culture in Kano. These have included religion, birthplace, ancestral home, clan or family, country, language, urban location, and race. With regard to religion (addini), communities were divided into three categories: Muslims (Musulmi); people of the book (ahalul \itabi), including Jews ('Yahudawa) and Christians ( N a s a r a ) ; and pagans (\afirai or arna). §ince Kano Emirate has been relatively homogeneous with respect to religion

Introduction

37

(98 percent Muslim), the matter of group identity arose primarily in connection with alleged backsliding or apostasy. With the settlement of southern Nigerians and Europeans in urban Kano (both groups being non-Muslim), religious identity increased in importance. T h e standard manner of inquiring whether a person is Muslim or not is to ask whether he prays (yana salla?). If a person does salla, he is regarded as a part of the Muslim community. Traditionally, the major non-Muslim community in Kano has been the Maguzawa (non-Muslim Hausa). Birthplace (garin haihutva) has been extremely important in Hausaland in determining political, legal, and ethnic identification. T h e term 5yan \asa ("sons of the land") refers to persons born in a given place. It could also refer to the original people of a locality. Place of birth was an important indication of maternal identity, since it was (and is) customary for a woman to return to her family home for childbirth. Ancestral home (asali) came to be included in census surveys as representing a type of communal identity. T h e classification partly reflects the importance of migration patterns and the need to fit original groups into a framework of communal identity. People who came to Kano from Shira, for example, were called Shirawa; those who came from the village of Auyo were called Auyawa; the earliest settlers of Kano, who came from Gaya, were called Abagayawa. In more recent years the concept of asali has continued to be an important ethnic criterion. This is particularly appropriate if the person in question has acquired an urban identification at some later date. T h e concept of family identification may be appropriate both in the narrow sense of household (gida) or in the broader sense of common, but not genealogically traced, descent (jamda). T h e term jamd'a may be used also in certain circumstances to suggest any sense of common identity. Thus, when the concept of northerner was introduced in Nigeria, one of the terms used by its proponents was jamo'ar arewa ("community of the north"). In the technical sense, the Kano Hausa term for a genealogically traced descent group is zuriya. T h e nuclear family and immediate dependents is usually referred to as iyali and the extended family as dangi. T h e concept of dangi is perhaps the most important of the restricted kinship concepts, since it is used to indicate threeor four-generation bilateral relationships (with complementary adjectives to refer to matrilateral or patrilateral kin). These have considerable bearing on ethnic identities which are appropriate at times of marriage. In the absence of a Hausa term for "nation," the concept of land or country (\asa) has been used to imply inhabitants of a defined political area. Thus Arabic-speaking countries were called \asashen larabawa. T h e modern Hausa word for "nationalism" is taken from this concept and is translated "jealousy

38

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

of the land" (\ishin \asa). The relatively modern communal identification attached to the northern region of Nigeria (arewa) illustrates the idea of kasa. Kabila is the normal Hausa word for "tribe," and \abilanci refers to "tribalism." Yet within Hausaland this term connotes a linguistic category and is theoretically unrelated to political identification. There is some question whether kabila is inevitably an umma type of identity. Such language groups as the Hausa, Arab, and Yoruba would be considered to be kabila. Urban place of residence usually entails identification with one of the major Hausa city-states. Thus, persons from Kano City are known as Kanawa. The identification by urban center rather than first language was probably necessitated historically by the assimilation processes that have occurred in the urban centers. (In certain circumstances, however, Kanawa refers to the original Hausa inhabitants of Kano, and in other circumstances it refers to persons from Kano Emirate.) With regard to skin color (fata) most Kano Hausa believe there are two racial groups in the world: white (fan) and black (ba\i). Indians, Arabs, Chinese, and Europeans are considered to be white. Yet even within Hausa society, a distinction is made between light and dark skin. A person with an unrecognizable amount of Arab blood would claim to be Arab for status reasons. Within Islamic society, skin-color distinctions are theoretically regarded as irrelevant. However, the historical Arab identification of West Africans as Tu\rur (black persons from Western and Central Sudan) may have reinforced racial categories of identification among those Hausa who had traveled in Arab lands. The more recent Hausa term ba\in mutum is used specifically as the equivalent of "Negro" or "black" and is relevant only in a biracial and bicultural situation. The concept is infrequently used as an ethnic identification, mainly because more precise criteria of differentiation are usually required, and because there are few recognizable culture-value concomitants to skin-color identities that cannot be accounted for through other categories. In partial reaction to the pejorative use of Tukrur by many Arabs, certain modern Kano Hausa have come to consider the Prophet Muhammad as having been dark skinned. Many of the Prophet's followers are thought to have been dark-skinned peoples from Abyssinia. The standard explanation for racial differences, however, continues to be the story of the sons of Noah, which is hardly flattering to black people. Also, a standard Hausa reference is to the Prophet Muhammad as Sidi Fari mat fada, dan Amina, which implies "white skin." The Kano Hausa ascription of positive values to lighter skin (for example, to the Arabs and Fulani) is probably a reflection of religious and socioeconomic values. For the past 160 years, Fulani and Arabs have been dominant in Kano society and have regarded themselves as being closer genealogically to Middle Eastern sources of religion.

Introduction

39

The colonial period in Kano reinforced the idea of skin color as a criterion for differentiating communities of people. The British administrators preferred to be called Turawa which originally referred to the light-skinned Arabs of Tripoli and later was extended to persons from Europe (Turai) as a whole, rather than Nasara (Christians). In French-controlled portions of Hausaland (for example, Zinder and Maradi), the preferred term for Europeans continues to be Nasara rather than Turawa. The increased utilization of skin-color symbolism in Kano to reinforce culturally distinct communities (Europeans vs. Kanawa) resulted in the Kano designation of particularly westernized African members of the colonial civil service as "black Europeans" (ba\a\en Turawa). In Fulani culture many of the same categories of community as in Hausa are used, although with certain variations. With regard to family identities, the basic unit in the Fulani lexicon is the "room" (sudu) within a household, which contains the children of one mother. This concept has more recently been extended to include family, and even relatives. The Fulani concept of household (sure) is comparable to the Hausa gida, and refers to people living within a household. Both gida and sare do not necessarily imply a physical household, but do imply that a person is married. The Fulani concept of dependants (iyalu) is equivalent to the Hausa (iyali) and the Arabic (al-iyal), and may include dependants such as parents who are not actually living in the immediate household. The Fulani concept of relatives ([bandirawo; plural, bandirabe) is equivalent to the Hausa dangi, and may include any blood relative on the mother's or father's side. In its broad usage sudu implies only patrilineal kinship, while bandirawo may be matrilineal as well. The Fulani concept of people (jamaare) is roughly equivalent to the Hausa jama'a. A definable blood tie is not essential, but there must be some communal linkage. The Fulani concept of nation has come to be called ummatore and refers to cultural unity (particularly religious-based culture). The Fulani concept of tribe (lenyol; plural linyi or lei) is roughly equivalent to the Hausa \abila, but with less stress on the language aspect. The Fulani refer to themselves as Pullo (singular) and Fulbe (plural), and their language as Fulfulde. T h e Hausa refer to the Fulani as Bafillace (singular) and Fulani (plural), and to the language as Fillanci or (Fulatanci). In Arabic the Fulani are called Fillata. Just as sudu has come in recent times to imply "clan," lenyol (which formerly referred to clan) can be used now as "tribe" or "race." Thus, the races of the world are referred to as lei duniyaru. As in Hausa, the Fulani usually divide the races of the world into two, black and white. Although neither the Fulani nor Hausa use red as a racial category, they both use it descriptively. Thus in Hausa, Arabs are sometimes referred to as jajayen mutane ("red men"), and Europeans as masu jan \unne ("possessors of red ears"). In Fulfulde, Arabs may be described with the adjective bode jo (singular) or wodt'en (plural).

40

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

Among black people, however, the Fulani distinguish four categories: balejo (very black); bayo (light black); bodejo (reddish black); and danejo (very light). The social status of these categories has tended to be from balejo (low) to danejo (high). (There have been a number of European misconceptions about the Fulani as being "red men.") In general, the urban Fulani regard themselves as a race of people and do not regard language as a necessary criteria. Rural Fulani tend to regard language as being more important to self-definition than urban Fulani. Thus an urban Fulani can give up his language and still regard himself as a Fulani. This is in distinction to the Hausa, who regard their language as part of their identity. The category of Beriberi, which in Kano refers to anyone who was originally from Bornu, excluding Fulani, does not entail a speaking ability in a Kanuri-related dialect. The category of Arab is used most commonly to imply Arabic as a mother tongue, but in certain situations (for example, with the Sharifai) it is used as a lineage-status identification. The Fulani term for "community" is ummatore, which does not necessarily entail kinship relationship. The type of community may be communal or affiliational. The related term for "followership" ([agal) can refer to any crowd of people. In both Hausa and Fulani there is a fairly extensive vocabulary to deal with situations in which one portion of a community breaks off, or rebels, from the community as a whole. In Hausa, the term 3 yan tawaye ("rebels") stems from the verb tawaye ("to revolt," which usually connotes violence). The Fulani verb turta ("to revolt") comes from the word tura ("to bend") and connotes a straightening up to withstand authority. Both Fulani and Hausa use the metaphor of "building" (maha and sa\e ginawa, respectively) to connote the reconstruction of a community that has been split by rebellion. In short, the Hausa and Fulani have a range of concepts dealing with criteria for classification of groups of persons, ranging from very small-scale communities to very large-scale language, religious, racial, and political units.

1 Religious Identity and Structure

Islamic affiliation in Kano State was 98 percent in 1952 and probably over 99 percent in 1970. 1 The remainder classify themselves as animist, 2 except for the Christians in the Sabon Gari. Within the twelve-state system of Nigeria and even within the former Northern Region, Kano ranks highest in Islamic affiliation (see Table 3 ) . Neither Kano nor the other northern states, however, represent a monopoly of Islamic culture in Nigeria. In 1963, 43 percent of the population in the Western Region classified themselves as Muslim, and some of the major urban centers, such as Lagos and Ibadan, are predominantly Muslim. Nigeria as a whole was 44.4 percent Muslim in 1952, 49 percent Muslim in 1963, and probably well over 50 percent Muslim in 1970 (see Table 4). Religious structure in Kano historically has been linked into larger contexts: North Africa, West Africa, the Sudan, northern Nigeria, and, increasingly, the Nigerian national context. 1 Department of Statistics, Nigerian Census, 1952 (Lagos: Government Printer, 1953), pp. 32-33. In 1966 many southern Nigerians emigrated from Kano, and throughout the 1960s many Maguzawa converted to either Christianity or Islam. 2 The 1952 census records a total of 49,659 animists in Kano Province, concentrated mainly along the Kano-Katsina border and the Kano-Zaria border, in districts such as Bici (3,539), Karaye (4,129), Gwarzo (8,294), Dawakin Tofa (3,967), Kiru (2,877), Sumaila (6,967), Tudun Wada (5,965), Rano (2,144), and Wudil (2,423).

44

Religion and Political Culture in Kano TABLE 3 NORTHERN N I G E R I A : RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION BY PROVINCE,

Province 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Kano Katsina Sokoto Bornu Bauchi Ilorin Zaria Niger Adamawa Plateau Kabba Benue Total

SOURCB:

1952

Total Population (000)

Percent Muslim

Percent Christian

Percent Animisi

3,398 1,483 2,681 1,596 1,424 531 806 716 1,181 892 664 1,468

98.0 95.2 94.0 83.5 74.1 62.6 61.4 44.1 30.1 24.1 22.4 10.6

A .3 •5 .6 1.6 6.0 7.8 4.0 3.2 12.9 18.5 6.9

1.6 4.5 5-5 15.9 24.3 31.4 30.8 52.9 66.7 63.0 59.1 82.5

16,840

73.0

2.7

24.3

Nigerian Census, 1951 (Lagos: Government Printer,

1953).

TABLE 4 N I G E R I A : RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION BY R E G I O N ,

Percent Muslim Region North West East Lagos Mid-west Total

1952

Percent Christian

AND

1963 Percent Animisi

1952 1963

1952

1963

1952

73.0 32.8 .6 41.0 —

71.7 43.4 .3 44.3 4.2

2.7 36.9 46.2 53.0

9.7 48.7 77.2 54.6 54.9

24.3 18.6 30.3 7.9 50.2 22.5 2.0* 1.1 — 40.9

44.4

49

22.0

34

33.6

—

1963

17

* Plus 4 percent other. SOURCE: Nigerian Census, 1952; Nigeria Yearbook, 1969 (Lagos: Times Press, 1970), p. 193. Several aspects of religious identity and structure in Kano will be examined briefly in this chapter: ethnicity and religious identity, the mallam class, the structure of Islamic law, mysticism and brotherhood identity, and patterns of Islamic reform.

Religious Identity and Structure

45

ETHNICITY AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

The emergence of a Muslim numerical predominance in Kano has developed over several historical periods. During these periods, affiliation to Islam and to particular variations of Islam was closely linked with family or ethnic patterns. In several cases, aspects of religious culture became the symbolic focus of interethnic conflict. Thus, the Fulani conquest of the Hausa states was legitimated by the Fulani in terms of the backsliding, syncretistic nature of Hausa Islam. Likewise, the Bornu rejection of the Fulani call to Jihad was partly legitimized on the grounds that the Bornu people had been Muslims before the Fulani and that the Fulani in Bornu were not particularly good Muslims. Apart from the mallam class within each ethnic group, the laity undoubtedly brought to Islamic culture a rich heritage of religious particularism. The ethnic variations of Islam are phenomena that must be accounted for in order to understand the later process of Islamic amalgamation. Furthermore, Kano political history is often viewed in time periods that reflect the ethnic and religious characteristics of the ruling class. Early Kano history, the period up to about A.D. 1500, may be termed preIslamic. The original inhabitants of Kano—a Hausa-speaking group called the Abagayawa, according to oral tradition—believed themselves to be descendants of a blacksmith named Kano, who settled near Dala Hill inside what later became Kano City. The grandson of Kano was named Barbushe. According to oral tradition the religion of the Abagayawa seems to have had at least seven characteristics: the location of sacred functions was Dala Hill; leadership was selected through a process that assessed both achieved and ascriptive qualities (that is, the strongest descendant from a certain line); a function of the leader was to act as a deputy for the deity; another function of the leader was to act as an intermediary between the people and the deity; the leader was believed to employ supernatural powers; the leader was believed to have the ability to make predictions; and "magic" words were invoked. Abubakar Dokaji, the late waziri of Kano, has recorded in Hausa some of this oral history: According to the custom at that time, the leader should be the strongest and the best worshipper of idols. Barbushe was the leader who was appointed. He was a great hunter and idol worshipper. He could kill an elephant and carry it for twelve hours. His house was on the Dala mountain where the idol called Tsumburbura lived. The idol has another name, Shamus. The Shamus was one of the idols of the time of the Prophet, just like Yakuku and Yagusa. . . . Now Tsumburbura is the spirit that the magicians call Danko Dan Musa. Barbushe was the chief courtier of Tsumburbura and was his deputy who looked after the people. Only Barbushe could enter the place of Tsumburbura. Anyone else

46

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

who entered that place would die. Barbushe had courtiers. There was Tunzagu, who had a house at the foot of the Gwauron Dutse on the east; there was Damburu, who had a house at Jigirya; Jandamisa, who had a house at Magwan; Hambarau, who had a house at Tanagar; and Gumbar Jadu, who had a house at Fanisau. There were many at the mountain of Dambakoshi Dan Dankwai. . . . Barbushe's house was on the Dala Hill. He used to come down yearly. When the time of his coming-down came, the people of Kano would meet together at the foot of Dala. Some brought black doves and others brought he-goats. At dusk, Barbushe would come down. Then the drummers would start drumming and he would start shouting. He would say some magic words: "Jamuna," "Akasa," "Munbgama." Then the people would say: "Oh, here is Tsumburbura, and here is the deputy of Dala." Then Barbushe would return to the hill, the people following him with black doves and he-goats. Then they would be slaughtered. Later Barbushe would say: "I am the deputy of Dala. Whether you like it or not you must follow me." Then the people would say, "Owner of the house of Mamambun, we follow you." Then they would be naked, both male and female, surrounding the shrine where Tsumburbura was living. Then Barbushe would go with the other leaders to the door of Tsumburbura's room and would prostrate themselves. Then Barbushe would go into the room and would not come out until the next day. When he came out he would predict to the people what would happen during the year to come, as he had heard it from the idol, Tsumburbura.3 There has been speculation, based on linguistic evidence, that these early Kano people were related to Berber groups of North Africa, and that the blacksmith cult was a variation of certain North African cults.4 Most of the questions about these early inhabitants remain unanswered. Recent radiocarbon datings of a smelting furnace from Dala Hill indicate seventh-century inhabitants.6 The Abagayawa were conquered by another non-Muslim Hausaspeaking group, which later came to be called Maguzawa (from the Arabic majus or "pagan") by the Muslim Hausa. Contemporary oral-history sources, perhaps as a legitimation of actual developments, suggest that Barbushe predicted the Maguzawa would at some point embrace Islam. According to Abubakar Dokaji, "Barbushe predicted one year that a certain nation would come and receive all the lands from their hands and eventually build a mosque. He told them that first a man would come with troops and conquer their country. . . . Bagauda, nicknamed Yakano, came to Kano in A.D. 999." 6 Speculation on the nature of early Maguzawa belief is largely based on 3

Abubakar Dokaji [Gidado], Kano ta Dabo Cigari [The Kano of Dabo Cigari] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1958), pp. 12-15. 4 H. R. Palmer, " 'Bori' Among the Hausa," Man 14, no. 52 (July 1914): 116. B Angela Fagge, personal communication, June 1970. 8 Dokaji, Kano, p. 15

Religious

Identity

and Structure

41

studies of contemporary Maguzawa.7 The cult of bori is primarily related to healing and medicine. Religious authority is vested in bori priests and priestesses who, through intensive drumming and dancing, create a hypnotic state of ecstasy. At the point of ecstasy, the supplicant is believed able to communicate directly with the particular spirit (is\a) being solicited. The full range of spirits (isJ{o\i) has been described by Joseph Greenberg and verified by Ludger Reuke.8 Palmer suggests that bori religion is animistic in the technical sense: "Bori is a Hausa common noun, and means a sacred and occult force which resides in matter." 9 Succession to bori leadership is not necessarily inherited. Anyone who can demonstrate special powers is regarded as a legitimate bori priest or priestess. Much of the contemporary bori practice in urban Kano is linked with prostitution, although some of the Muslim secluded wives are reputed to hold occasional bori ceremonies. The Hausa-Muslim period may be dated approximately as 1500 to 1800. After the time of Muhammad Rumfa, 1463-1499, all Hausa emirs of Kano were at least nominally Muslim. From the Kano Chronicle10 it would appear that the effects of the conversion of Hausa authorities were limited to the urban area itself. The conversion process was linked with both the Wangarawa from the west and the Sharifai who had been involved in the Tripoli-Kano trans-Saharan trade route.11 The advantages to Hausa traders of being able to identify with the larger world of Islam were considerable, including the easing of social intercourse, the right to marry Muslim women from other urban centers, and the facilitation of credit and finance. According to the Kano Chronicle, certain religious symbols were established during the period of Rumfa: the linking of Kano Islam with the "purest" clan of Arab Islam (the Sharifai), the building of a central mosque, the bringing 7

For unpublished studies of the Maguzawa, see the N A K file on "Pagans in Kano Province" ( G N P 5 / 1 , no. 1828; contents later removed to no. 5886), which includes "Maguzawa in Kazaure Emirate," by F . W . Parsons; "Maguzawa," by S. A . S. Leslie; "Non-Muslim Population of Birnin Kudu and Gwaram Districts," by C. W . Rowlings; "Maguzawa in Sumaila District and Part of Wudil, Gaya and Dutse," by R. S. Warner. The Palmer Papers, housed in the Jos Museum, contain the following: no. 138 ("Kano Maguzawa"); no. 141 ("Hausa Totemism"); no. 148 ("Magic and Witch Craft Among the Hausa"). 8 Joseph Greenberg, The Influence of Islam on a Sudanese Religion (New York: Monograph of the American Ethnological Society, 1946); Ludger Reuke, Die Maguzawa in Nordnigeria, Freiburger Studien zu Politik und Gesellschaft überseeischer Länder, Band 4 (Freiburg: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1969). 9 "Bori," p. 113. 10 Translated by H. R. Palmer, in Sudanese Memoirs (Lagos: Government Printer, 1928), 3:92-132. 11 See Muhammad A . al-Hajj, " A Seventeenth-Century Chronicle on the Origins and Missionary Activities of the Wangarawa," Kano Studies 1, no. 4 (1968): 7 - 1 6 .

48

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

of religious books, and the destruction of the sacred tree. Palmer assesses in some of his unpublished material the transition from Maguzawa religion to Islamic religion in Kano. 12 He argues that political pressures from the western Sudanic kingdoms were influential in persuading Kano authorities that Islam might be a useful official religion in Kano. He also suggests that the individual efforts of migrant Arab scholars in Kano City created the beginnings of a mallam class in Kano and a general acceptance of Islam in the urban area. The centrality of Kano City to Islamic growth is symbolized in the expulsion of the Maguzawa from Kano City by the Hausa Muslim rulers. The sociopolitical position of Islam during the Hausa-Muslim period is not clear from written sources. Most Fulani literature from the post-Jihad period is an apologia for Islamic reform and describes the earlier Hausa authorities as having incorporated major elements of Maguzawa religion into the theocratic ritual and structure of Kano. It is unlikely that the urban mallam class had much impact on the rural situation, except among the Fulani clans. Within the urban area, there was one major Hausa mosque in addition to the central mosque and the Sharifai mosque—the Madabo mosque. According to oral tradition, the Madabo mosque (in Madabo ward) is "770 years old" and was built on the site where the pre-Islamic sacred tree once grew. 13 During the Hausa-Muslim period, the Madabo mallams reputedly went on pilgrimage by way of Asben and returned with religious and legal books. The religious leader of the Madabo people, the babban mallami, was an Islamic legal adviser to the emir and was reputed to have been skilled in pharmaceutical medicine. Succession to the position of babban mallami, at least since the beginning of the nineteenth century, has been limited to candidates of patrilineal descent. The selectors are the students of the babban mallami. During the more recent period the babban mallami has continued to advise the emir on matters of law. 14 12 H. R. Palmer, "Islam in the Kano Chronicle," Palmer Papers, Jos Museum, no. 201, longhand, 8 pp. 13 Certain Madabo mallams believe that the spirit of the tree, Maisinberbere, left Madabo when the tree was cut and located itself west of Dambatta, in an area called Dankwai. T h e dating of the mosque is clearly too early. The Wangarawa Chronicle (see al-Hajj) places the building of Madabo mosque at the same time as the building of the Sharifai mosque. 14 The babban mallami is expected to teach all fields of Muslim knowledge, and his successor is chosen by his students from among his children or descendants. T h e present babban mallami, Alhaji Ibrahim, succeeded his father, Alhaji Umar, in 1947. Alhaji Umar had served as babban mallami for thirty-five years and had succeeded his father, Shehu Abdurrahman Sayudi, who had served as babban mallami for twenty-eight years. Abdurrahman had succeeded his father, Shehu Umar, who had served twenty-one years. Umar had succeeded his father, Shehu Muhammad, who was babban mallami during

Religious Identity and

Structure

49

A second Hausa mosque was constructed at the beginning of the FulaniMuslim period. Hausawa mosque (in Hausawa ward) was reputedly built on the instructions of Sultan Muhammad Bello as a gesture in return for the support which the Hausawa people had given the Jihad. 15 A n imam for the mosque was selected by the people who prayed at the mosque (subsequent imams have come from the original family), and a spokesman for the ward was given the title magajin mallam. T h e magajin mallam acted as a religious adviser to the emir until the time of the Kano Civil W a r (1893-1894). Subsequently, the office has had other functions. 16 T h e Fulani-Muslim period in Kano may be dated from the Jihad in 1807 until the British conquest in 1903. There has been a wide variety of Islamic practices among the different life-style groups of the Fulani. Despite the early acceptance of Islam by the pastoral Fulani (prior to their immigration into the Kano area), certain pre-Islamic cultural patterns have persisted in the rural areas. These have to do with age-grade systems and the use of the Fulani language. In contemporary rural Kano the pastoral Fulani may not undertake Islamic prayers five times daily until they have a son old enough to tend the cattle. Likewise, the pastoral functions of women preclude the custom of wife seclusion (\ulle). Of primary importance, however, has been the centrality of Fulfulde in Fulani religious culture. 17 This sacral use of language has created a sharp cultural divisiveness between urban and rural the reigns of Emir Suleiman and Emir Dabo (interviews with Alhaji Ibrahim, August 1965). During the 1960s the babban mallami advised the Kano Appeal Court and traveled throughout northern Nigeria to advise on legal matters. 15 The distinction between Habe (which is the Fulfulde word for non-Fulani peoples, although in Kano it is used mainly to designate the pre-Fulani ruling class of Kano) and Hausawa (which is both the Hausa word for Hausa peoples and the Fulani designation for those Kano Habe who assisted in the Jihad) is not widely made in present-day Kano, except in certain royalist Fulani circles. The term Hausawa is used to include all Hausaspeaking people, and the term Habe is seldom used, except in joking situations. 16 The first imam of Hausawa was Ibrahim Usman, who was succeeded by his brother Muhammad, who was succeeded by his brother Waisu, who was succeeded by the son of Ibrahim, Isiaku. Isiaku was succeeded by Abubakar, another son of Ibrahim. Abubakar was succeeded by another brother, Ali, who in turn was succeeded by another brother, Saminu. Saminu was succeeded by Muhammad Lawal, a son of Abubakar. Muhammad Lawal, who held the position for twenty-seven years, was succeeded by his brother Muhammad Mustafa, who has held the position since 1957. The first magajin mallam was Yusufu, who was also an alkali. The office of magajin mallam was discontinued during the Kano Civil War because the Hausawa refused to take sides. During the colonial period, magajin mallam was simply a title of administration. The first Fulani to be given the title was the late sarkin shanu, Muhammadu Sani. 17 For an elaboration of this point outside of Kano, see Ahmadu Hampate Ba, "The Fulbe or Fulani of Mali and Their Culture," Abbia [Cameroon] 1 4 - 1 5 (July-December 1966): 73.

50

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

Fulani, since the urban Fulani tend to give up the Fulani language in preference for Hausa. (The Jihad leaders themselves who formed a rural mallam class used both Fulfulde and Arabioin their religious poetry and preaching.) In short, the urban Fulani in Kano substituted Arabic for Fulfulde as a religious language and Hausa for Fulfulde as a language of daily discourse. The Fulani (who had been leaders of the Jihad) prided themselves on being strictly orthodox in their Islamic beliefs.18 Yet within the Kano urban area in the nineteenth century, the Fulani clan structure affected the pattern of residential location and also the location of religious functions. After the Jihad, five Fulani clan mosques developed in Kano City representing the major clan groups. While prayers were held in common on Friday, the daily pattern of religious life was conducted within the clan structure. The five mosques were Yolawa, Wudilawa, Dambazawa, Jalli, and Galadanci. The first three were built immediately after the Fulani Jihad and have served the particular Fulani clans associated with the names of the mosques. The imams of these mosques have served as religious advisers to their Fulani clan leaders and have been instrumental in the selection process of clan leaders. The Yolawa mosque has served the Yolawa clan, led by the madaki, in the wards of Yola, Darma, Alkantara, Satatima, Agadasawa, and Cedi. The imam of Yolawa is selected by the elders of the Yolawa. 19 The imam conducts all formal religious ceremonies for the madaki. Since the time of the Kano Civil War, Yolawa imams have also served as religious advisers to the emir. 20 The Dambazawa mosque was built during the time of Emir Suleiman, and 18

There is a considerable literature on and by the Fulani Jihad leaders. See Murray Last, The So\oto Caliphate (London: Longmans, Green, 1 9 6 7 ) ; R. A . Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, 1804-1906 ( N e w York: Humanities Press, 1 9 7 1 ) . 19 The madaki takes the name of the selected imam to the emir for approval. The mosque was built by Jibril, who also served as its first imam. Of particular interest, the imams of Yolawa have been from different families. The second imam, Chindo, who served from the time Dabo to that of Abdullahi Maje Karofi, was not from Yolawa ward. The third imam, Maigari, was a Fulani from Bornu who had been a student of the previous imam. During the time of the civil war, the Yolawa were divided, the madaki following Tukur. He was later deposed by Aliyu who appointed the madaki's brother, Kwairanga, to be imam. Kwairanga served during the time of Abbas and Abdullahi Bayero. H e was succeeded in 1940 by the present imam, Alhaji Nuhu dan Mustafa, who is unrelated to Kwairanga but was his student. H e is regarded as a legal expert. 20

Limam Maigari was the son of Isiaku, a mallam in the emir's court with the title of magajin mallam (a duplicate title to the representative of the Hausawa) and administrator of the areas of Dawanu and Danguguwa. Hence Maigari had close connections with the emir's court. Under Emir Usman and Emir Abdullahi Bayero, Imam Kwairanga served on the emir's council. Alhaji N u h u served on the emir's council under Sanusi and subsequently.

51

Religious Identity and Structure

the leader of the D a m b a z a w a clan, D a b o Dambazau, was the first imam. A f t e r his time, there was a disassociation of the functions of the imam from overall clan leadership (which were subsumed under the title sar\in imam became religious adviser to the sarkin bai.

bat), and the

21

T h e mosque of W u d i l a w a was reputedly built during the reign of E m i r R u m f a and during the Fulani period was assigned to the Jobawa clan, under the leadership of the ma\ama.

T h e makama was by tradition the district head

of W u d i l . T h e imam of W u d i l a w a mosque has acted as religious adviser to the makama. 2 2 T h e Galadanci mosque has served the Sullubawa clan. E m i r Ibrahim D a b o had been galadima

prior to his succession to the position of emir, and as

galadima he built the mosque and served as imam. 2 3 T h e Jalli mosque, located in Yakasai ward, is the most recent of the Fulani mosques and was built during the reign of E m i r Bello ( 1 8 8 2 - 9 3 ) by W a l i Jalli. T h e imams of Jalli were royal Sullubawa and became respected advisers to emirs in the twentieth century. 24 21

The imam, Shehu, has held the title since 1945 and is a Fulani from Hadejia. He is not from the Dambazawa clan. His father Alhaji had been guest of the sarkin bai, and Shehu had become a student of the previous imam, Umar. Umar, who also was not Dambazawa, was imam for fifteen years and was married to the daughter of the sarkin bai. Umar was preceded by Rafa'i, who served during the reigns of emirs Abbas, Usman, and Abdullahi Bayero. He was preceded by Salihu, apparently the only Hausa mallam to have been an imam of a Fulani clan mosque. During the civil war, the Dambazawa were divided. Alhaji Sarkin Bai Bashiru sided with Tukur and was succeeded by Abdussalem, an appointment of Yusufu. During the nineteenth century, the imamship was apparently kept within the Dambazau family. The first sarkin bai, Kwairanga, was not an imam. His imam was Goshi, a son of Dabo Dambazau. Goshi was succeeded by his son Yusufu. Goshi established the precedent of becoming an official adviser to the sarkin bai. 22 The late imam, Alhaji Sa'id, who died in 1969, succeeded in 1935 from Abubakar. The imams are selected by the Jobawa elders, and the makama then requests the emir's permission to make the appointment. 23 The elders in Galadanci ward select the imam, and the galadima then requests the emir's permission to make the appointment. It should be remembered that during the nineteenth century, the position of galadima was second in importance only to the emir. The present imam, Alhaji Bello, has been imam since 1935 and succeeded his father, Zubair, who was appointed during the reign of Emir Aliyu. Bello is the father of Imam Abubakar, principal of the School for Arabic Studies. Bello's three most distinguished brothers were Sa'id (a mallam to Emir Abdullahi Bayero and father of Shehu Galadanci, Provost of Abdullahi Bayero College), Ahmad (alkali of Dambatta and later Bici), and Mahmud (a businessman, and father of Kabir Galadanci of Abdullahi Bayero College and Sani Galadanci, area court judge of Kumbotso). 24 The imamship stayed with the Jalli family until 1958 when Yusufu, a Fulani from Wudil, was selected. He has been a student of the Jalli family. The original Jalli family was of the royal Sullubawa clan, but the mosque was intended to serve the people in the Yakasai district as well as the royal household. The persons who pray in the mosque select the imam.

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

52

In summary, rural Fulani religious patterns were closely connected with cattle ecology and the sacral use of Fulfulde. From this emerged a particular form of Islamic culture suited to the requirements of pastoralism. The rural mallam class was not associated with these pastoral religious patterns. The movement of these Fulani into the urban areas of Hausaland occurred primarily as a result of the Jihad. Yet within the urban context, clans or lineages remained the primary boundaries of religious interaction although an urban Fulani mallam class clearly existed, perhaps as a residue of the rural mallam class. The Fulani clan mosques still exist in Kano but have been eclipsed in importance by the Islamic brotherhoods, which, in a sense, replaced them. During both the Hausa-Muslim and the Fulani-Muslim periods, various forms of Islamic culture were also represented by the Arab communities in Kano. As with the Hausa and Fulani, religious structure was often based on clan or locational identity. One of the earliest of the "Arab" clans within Kano City were the Sharifai in Sharifai ward, although today they are indistinguishable from Hausa. The Sharifai mosque was built during the time of Rumfa, reputedly on the spot where al-Maghili (who was from Tlemcen, in Western Algeria) found the earth to be the same as that of Medina. His family settled on that spot; and when al-Maghili left Kano, three of his sons remained, one of which was selected as clan leader (sar\in sharifai). This first clan leader was Sidi Fari Isa, and subsequently sidi fari ("the honorable white one") became the title given to the Sharifai clan leader. The sidi fari was selected by men of Sharifai ward from among the descendants of al-Maghili. In practice, succession to the position of sidi fari has been based on patrilineal descent.25 The primary function of the sidi fari was religious: he was the imam of the Sharifai mosque. In more recent times, the sidi fari has delegated this responsibility to an imam appointed by himself. The sidi fari still conducts naming ceremonies and marriages and appoints the head of Sharifai ward. He reconciles many of the legal disputes in the ward. Since the time of al-Maghili, the sidi fari has been an official religious adviser to the Hausa and Fulani emirs of Kano. Other Arab groups in Kano followed much the same patterns of community distinction and religious autonomy as the Sharifai. Those Arabs from Ghadames and Tripoli, however, often retained their primary religious allegiances to individuals and communities in North Africa (to be discussed in chapter 4). 25

T h e present sidi fari, Isa, succeeded his father, Bilkassim, in 1956. H i s father suc-

ceeded in 1946 f r o m Labaran

( 1 9 4 5 ) , w h o succeeded Hajji ( 1 9 4 1 - 4 5 ) . Y u s u f u w a s sidi

fari during the time of E m i r U s m a n and Abdullahi Bayero, K w a m b o during the time of Abbas, A m a l e during the time of Abbas, and A d a m u during the time of the civil war. A d a m u had succeeded Jusa, Ginsau, and Y u s u f u .

Religious Identity and Structure

53

In short, the primary locus of Islamic activity in Kano, at least through the nineteenth century, was the various Hausa, Fulani, and Arab clan structures. These formed a segmental pattern of religious authority which could come together if the need arose. The final period in Kano history prior to Nigerian independence was the colonial era, from 1903 to i960. Many Kano people have regarded this period as being the "Christian" era. Initially the British were regarded as Nasara ("Christians") rather than Turawa ("light skinned," that is, "Europeans"). Later, according to Kano oral tradition, the British insisted on being called Turawa rather than Nasara. A number of persons in Kano resisted the British as a religious duty. The majority, who acquiesced to British conquest, did so by rationalizing that God had willed the Christians to have this power and that it was a sign of the coming of the end of the age. Others bore this fate with resentment. A Hausa poem by a Kano poet describes the era of the Christians: God has given them [the Christians] his favors over all human beings. One who does not recognize their power will meet evil. . . . In every land they established barracks and in every land, a district officer or resident. They also established churches so that they might lead people astray. Their schools are not beneficial at all and there is nothing in them but lies, evil, and paganism. Their prayers are only concerned with worldly things. . . . They have imposed a tax on us, which must be paid by people in the towns and villages. . . . They destroyed all the towns of Hausaland, and those of the Fulani, who were the organizers of the Jihad. Futa, Masina, Bornu, Zaburma were all destroyed by this Christian Jihad. They came to Munshi and to Bussa, and to the land of the Jukon, who are evil pagans [fusad]. . . . They came to Bida, Hadejia, Gumel, and Katagum, and they attacked Rabih's army. They came to Sokoto, with weapons of pursuit and drove out the sultan, who fled for the sake of his religion. They also drove away Zubair, the emir of Yola, who went to Mecca without any provisions. They took the emir of Kano, Aliyu, to exile in Lokoja, and became rulers of the town. . . . May God help us to restrain the evil of enemies.26 A Kano court scribe interprets the "Christian" conquest of Kano: The sultan of Sokoto [fled] because of his ignorance and his claim that he could fight against people whom God had sent for justice. For God had appointed them his successor on earth. . . . As for Emir of Kano Aliyu b. Abdullahi, one day a messenger, Babba Kano, came from Lokoja with a letter from Adamu Jakada [advising Aliyu that the European Christians were coming to Kano]. When Aliyu read the letter he kept it and didn't tell the other princes, but he said to the messenger, "Oh Babba Kano, you should know that I am not ready 26

Ishaq Kano, untitled manuscript, 6 pp., written A.H. 1360 (A.D. 1 9 4 1 ) ; author's copy.

54

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

to obey the Christians and surrender to them. I do not seek any trust from them. But I will fight them when they come to us here." . . . He began to prepare for his journey to Sokoto. . . . When they reached Zamfara and entered a town called Gidan Goga, they lodged. At night the emir came out and seated himself, when a certain woman called Kubura came to him on horseback. . . . She cried, "Oh Emir, Christians have entered your house and attacked your town and lodged in the middle of your house, and all your family is scattered." Then Aliyu said, "There is no god but God," and she advised Aliyu to take flight for the sake of his life and his religion. . . . Later the Christians appointed Abbas as emir [of Kano]. 27 The occupation of Kano was apparently undertaken to ensure the "safety" of the northern boundary commissioners, although the official pretext was to capture the murderer of Captain Moloney. 28 After Colonel Morland's unopposed entry into Kano, Emir Aliyu established a "war camp" twenty-four miles west of the city. T h e following proclamation was posted in K a n o : " B e it known to all people that the British Government have taken over the territory of Aliyu, E m i r of Kano, because he was hostile and desired war, and would not listen to words of peace. N o w , therefore, these territories belong to the British, and the Emir will be under the Government. The High Commissioner will choose whoever may be best as E m i r . " 2 9 In March 1903 Aliyu was captured. The sultan of Sokoto, however, was still in flight and by mid-April, en route to Mecca, passed through Kano Province where he received considerable support in the rural areas for what was interpreted to be a religious flight. T h e resident of Kano interpreted these events in religious-political terms: the Ex-Sarkin Musulmi . . . arrived at Belli, in the extreme south-west of Kano territory, on the 20th instant. . . . During these two days he must have quadrupled his following. Sarkin Karaye, the most important chief in the district, joined him, and most of the minor Sarkis followed suit. Each town he passed through the people were told to follow him to Mecca, or otherwise they would become "kaffiri" [pagans]. As a result half the population of every town tied up their bundles and joined in his train. . . . The Emir of Kano is most anxious for the capture of Attahiru, and much chagrined on account of the Kano 27 c 28

Abdallah al-Ghadamusi, untitled manuscript, 28 pp., Jos M u s e u m collection.

" I t has been determined to send a Commission to delimit the boundary between our

territory and that of the French. T h i s Commission must be secured f r o m attack, and communication must be maintained with it, in order to furnish it with supplies. Sir F . L u g a r d is of the opinion that this can only be accomplished by the occupation of K a n o "

879/79, M e m o r a n d u m for the Cabinet, 53142, Onslow, for the Secretary of State, 28, 1902). 29 C . O . 879/80, 8286, L u g a r d to Chamberlain, January 23, 1903. Enclosure 2.

(C.O.

December

Religious Identity and Structure

55

people who followed him. These consisted exclusively of the farmers and smaller towns. No one left Kano Town. 3 0 B y mid-May the K a n o resident reported that the resistance was assuming "Jihad" proportions: " T h e movement inaugurated by Attahiru,

ex-Sarkin

Musulmi, is rapidly assuming the proportions of a Jihad, and unless immediate steps are taken to cope with it with an adequate force w e are likely to find the entire Mohammadan population arrayed against u s . " 3 1 A small party was sent out from Kano to stop ex-Sultan Attahiru in May. According to the K a n o resident, Captain Sword's small force, of course, stands in danger of receiving a check, but I am compelled to run this risk, as to allow Attahiru to sit down even for a week unmolested in Kano territory would practically mean the population joining him en masse. The only course is to continually harass him and keep him on the move. . . . As it is, half the population of the districts he has traversed, including the majority of the Sarkis, have joined him. . . . He gives out that he is going to Mecca, but his real intention is to collect as many people as possible and occupy a strong position to the east of Gombe. The Madaki of Kano, one of the most fanatical men in the country, has selected the position and has been paving the way for Attahiru's coming. . . . The Emir is quite loyal, but anxious, and says that some of the Kano princes are disaffected and awaiting developments.32 In June 1903 the ex-sultan apparently was joined in Burmi (Bauchi Province) by elements of two other Muslim groups, the Mahdiyya and Tijaniyya. 3 3 They were defeated in battle by Captain Sword who had reinforced his armaments. 30

C.O. 879/80, enclosure 2, in no. 55. April 24, 1903. C . O . 879/80, enclosure in no. 66. Resident Kano to High Commissioner. May 15, 1903. 32 C.O. 879/80, enclosure 2, in no. 62. F. Cargill to High Commissioner. May 3, 1903. 33 " T h e Tejaniyah is one of the many orders of Islam and had great power in Senegal and the Upper Niger before the French conquest. It was always a militant order. In 1898 a number of these people from the Upper Niger retired before the French, and passing through Sokoto, asked permission of the Sultan to settle in Hausaland. "In February, 1902, I met these people at Golo near Gombe on the Gongola River, their headmen came to see me and were quite peaceful. They did not number more than 1,000 all told, and had large flocks and herds—but the Gombe people were afraid of them. They had a certain number of guns, perhaps 200, but no rifles. Their object is to avoid the whiteman and keep aloof when possible; they knew I was only passing by. 31

"From Mr. Hewby's last report I gather that he met them at Nafada, which is N . E . of Burmi (two days), and that they were going to that place. "I have little doubt that these people, together with the followers of the new Mahdi (who is probably either Mallam Jibrella's son or nephew) fought against Sword at Burmi" (C.O. 879/80, enclosure 5, in no. 68. T h e Commandant, West African Frontier Force, T . L . N . M . , to His Excellency. June 1 6 , 1 9 0 3 ) .

56

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

Those who were not killed scattered and either settled in other provinces or continued their flight to Mecca. T h e ex-sultan, the alkali of Kano, the madaki of Kano, and the bamaji of Kano were killed. T h e effect of the Battle of Burmi on K a n o Emirate was severalfold: it established British colonial government by right of conquest; it discouraged potential religious opposition to British rule in Kano Emirate; it demonstrated that there was widespread support for the notion of "flight" from a non-Muslim to a Muslim political territory (Mecca); and a new central authority in Kano Emirate was created, which later felt the need to legitimize its authority in religious terms while at the same time retaining its new-found independence of Sokoto. This contributed to the establishment of the Tijaniyya brotherhood in Kano (to be discussed in chapter 2). Subsequent relations between Kano Emirate authority and the "Christian" British never again centered on the religious factor as dramatically as in 1903. During the colonial period, a transethnic form of Islam developed in Kano which to a large extent consolidated the Hausa, Fulani, and Arab forms of Islam. THE M A L L A M CLASS IN K A N O

A l l historic periods in Kano have been characterized by the existence of a specialized class of learned men who are regarded as repositories of religious knowledge. During the Muslim eras, a mallam 34 was regarded as one trained in Islamic knowledge and Arabic language. A t minimum he was capable of teaching elementary Qur'an lessons. In Islamic theory there is no formal recognition of a priesthood, but the roles of prayer leader (imam) and teacher (mallam) are well accepted. In present-day Kano, only about half of the trained mallams teach. In addition to responsibility for education, the mallam class has had primary responsibility for higher level governmental administration, religious procedure and ritual, medical practice, legal practice, and the formulation of public opinion in general. When the chief imam of Medina addressed the mallams of Kano, he stated, " T h e duty of a mallam is to preach, teach, reform, educate, and 34Hausa:

mallam ( m ) , mallama ( f ) , mallamai ( p i ) . A r a b i c : mtfallim

( s ) , mucallimun

( p i ) ; similar to calim ( s ) and culami? ( p i ) . In F u l f u l d e the term modibo refers to someone w h o is a master of k n o w l e d g e ; the term ahidjo refers to the next highest rank. In recent years the term mallam (or malam) has been extended to include any

educated

person and as such is used as a title of respect (cf. " s i r " ) . T h e original usage, h o w e v e r , is still c o m m o n . T h e r e are different types of m a l l a m s in Hausaland. A mallamin manyamanya (or mallamin ilmi)

teaches advanced

subjects in the i l m schools; a mallamin

tafsiri is permitted to translate and interpret the Q u r ' a n and a mallamin majalisa is an adviser to the e m i r o n religious matters.

Religious Identity and Structure

57

enlighten the members of the public in all aspects of Islamic religion." 35 In a society where religion permeates all aspects of life and morals, the functioning of the mallam class becomes paramount. It has been customary in Kano, however, for many mallams to support themselves through other occupations, especially trade, tailoring, and farming. Kano society divides the mallams into two categories: those who have become involved in government and worldly things (mallaman duniya) and those who reject worldly things (masu gudun duniya). In general this tends to follow the distinction between those who specialize in law and those who specialize in sufism. In each of the emirates of northern Nigeria there is a definable relationship between the first category of mallams and the ruling classes. The second category probably has more influence with the common people and is widely respected. In Kano since the early nineteenth century, the Hausa mallams have been relatively independent of government, even those interested in law. The Fulani mallams in Kano have tended to be more closely associated with government and most would accept the emir as a spiritual leader. Most Fulani mallams would oppose an emir only if they regarded his holding of the office to be illegitimate (this issue has only occurred once, during the civil war of 1893). The exact relationship between Fulani mallams and Hausa rulers or Hausa mallams and Fulani rulers is not clear from existing historical evidence. Many of the Fulani government mallams in Kano live in Wazirci ward, and many are from the Gyanawa and Zarawa clans. In addition, each major government figure in Kano has a circle of personal mallams to advise him and pray for him. The madaki may have as many as ten mallams; the waziri may have six. These mallams pray for the success of the government official and have a personal client relationship with him. The question of mallam-class relationship to government and to the common people is partly a matter of finance. Za\\a (Zakat) is given to mallams by all strata of society usually after the time of the Babbar Salla (cId alKabir) celebrations during the month of Zulhajj (Dhu'l-hijja). This is obligatory on all Muslims with a taxable income of ¿ 5 or more. One-fortieth of each pound (6d) must be paid to the mallams, who in turn keep part and distribute the rest to the poor. Zakka is also calculated on cattle and produce. At the time of Karamar Salla ( c Id al-Fitr) which ends the month of fasting, it is obligatory sunna to give four "units" of food (mudannabi) to one's mallam, although this gift (fid da \ai) is primarily of symbolic value. At this same time, the Kano emir, by tradition, gives a gift of money (fid da \ai) to the mallams. 35

Sheykh Abdul Aziz, "Duties of Mallams," Kano Daily Mail, July 13, 1963, p. I.

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

58 In addition, people may give alms (sadafo)

to mallams at any time of year

and in any amount. Many urban mallam teachers have farms that are worked by their students. In rural areas many mallams work their own farms. For those who teach in Qur'anic schools, a weekly fee is usually paid by each student, and a gift is given to the mallam when the child has completed the Qur'an. Mallams who do special prayers for people receive a gift before ( \ a f i n alkalami) (lada)

and after

such prayers. Most mallams pride themselves on being able to exist

financially without gifts or stipends from the emirate government. T h e mallams of northern Nigeria have traditionally followed the ethnic loyalties of their particular clans, while at the same time sharing a common bond of language (Arabic and more recently Hausa) and Islamic loyalty which extended beyond ethnic allegiances. T o this extent, the mallam class was probably the first group in northern pluralistic society to be linked by transethnic loyalties. In the twentieth century the transethnic integration of the mallam class has been a major means of linking ethnic groups in other sectors. T h e origins and size of the mallam class are significant. According to the Wa\ar Bagauda,

there were about 3,000 mallams in K a n o during the time of

R u m f a (late fifteenth century). 38 This figure is probably high but clearly invites a reassessment of the scope of Islamic culture during this period. During the early colonial period, the official estimate for northern Nigeria as a whole was 25,000 mallams. According to the government report of 1919, Government did not interfere in the indigenous Qur'anic schools, in which reading and writing in the Arabic and Ajami character, i.e., local languages in Arabic script, and memorising passages from the Qur'an formed the curriculum. They were estimated at some 25,000, with over a quarter of a million pupils. These Qur'anic schools had produced a literary class known as "mallamai," learned in Arabic and the teachings of the Qur'an and the commentaries, from whose ranks the officers of the Native Administration, the judges of the Native Courts, and the exponents of the creed of Islam were drawn. They are a very influential class, some of them very well read in Arabic literature and law, and deeply imbued with the love of learning. 37 In i960 there were an estimated 50,000 Qur'anic teachers in

northern

Nigeria. 3 8 A n official questionnaire survey, however, resulted in specific in36

M. Hiskett, " 'The Song of Bagauda,' a Hausa King List and Homily in Verse,"

Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 27, no. 3 (1964): 540-67; and 28, no. 2 (1965). 37

38

Northern Nigeria Annual Reports (London: H.M.S.O., 1920), p. 60. Bashiru Tukur, "Koranic Schools in Northern Nigeria," West African

Education, October 1963, p. 139.

Journal

of

Religious Identity and Structure

59

formation on 27,600 Qur'anic schools.39 (The distribution of these Qur'anic teachers among the provinces of the Northern Region is shown in Table 5.)

TABLE

5

DISTRIBUTION OF QUR'ANIC SCHOOLS IN NORTHERN N I G E R I A ,

1964

( r a n k order by number of schools)

Province 1. S o k o t o 2. K a n o 3. Katsina 4. Bornu 5. Bauchi 6. A d a m a w a 7. Sardauna 8. Niger 9. Benue 10. Z a r i a 1 1 . Ilorin 12. Plateau 13. Kabba 14. Kaduna

Total

Number Quranic Schools 7,173 5,215 4,553 4,263 2,062 902 700 697 502 490 480

Percent Total Quranic Schools 25.98 18.90 16.49 15.44 7.47 3.26 2.53 2.52 1.81

45

1.77 1.73 .99 .88 .16

27,600

100.00

275 243

Number Quranic Students 114,173 87,137 62,763 47,580 29,049 9,744 7,063 12,629 11,491 11,223 10,070 8,688

Percent Total Qur'anic Students 26.99 20.60 14.83 11.24 6.86 2.30 1.66 2.98 2.71 2.65 2.38

9,717 1,605

2.05 2.29 .37

422,954

100.00

SOURCE: J. N. Eastmond and Husaini Adamu, The Place of Koranic Schools in the Immediate and LongRange Planning of Northern Nigeria (Kaduna: Ministry of Education, 1965), p. 8 and passim.

As part of the same questionnaire, an inquiry was made into the number of Islamic secondary schools ( i l m schools) -in northern Nigeria. Kano Province produced almost one-third of the total number of ilm schools (see Table 6). The number of registered teaching mallams in Kano Province which may be inferred from the survey is 6,162. Of this number 5,215 taught in Qur'anic schools, and 947 taught in ilm schools. The total number of trained mallams in Kano Province at this period (including those not teaching) would probably double this figure, that is, approximately 12,000. If older students {almaprat) and active disciples ( d a l i b a i ) of the mallams are included in the urban 3 9 J. N. Eastmond and Husaini Adamu, "The Place of Koranic Schools in the Immediate and Long Range Planning of Northern Nigeria" (unpublished paper, Ministry of Education, Kaduna, February 1965).

60

Religion and Political Culture in Kano TABLE

6

D I S T R I B U T I O N OF I L M SCHOOLS I N N O R T H E R N N I G E R I A ,

1964

(rank order by number of schools)

Province 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Kano Sokoto Bornu Katsina Bauchi Zaria Adamawa Niger Ilorin Benue Sardauna Kabba Plateau Kaduna Total

SOURCE:

Number Ilm Schools

Percent Total Ilm Schools

Number Ilm Students

Percent Total Ilm Students

947 550 472 344 179 72 67 54 35 20 19 8 6 4

34.10 19.80 16.99 12.38 6.44 2.59 2.41 1-95 1.26 .72 .68 .28 .21 .14

11,973 8,509 4,514 4,088 1,792 987 962 1,100 342 282 1,609 147 62 52

32.87 23.64 12.39 11.22 4.92 2.71 2.64 3.02 .93 .77 .40 .40 .17 .14

2,777

100.00

36,419

100.00

Eastmond and Adamu, pp. 12, 14.

mallam class, the figure increases to perhaps one-fifth of the adult male population. T h e numerical distribution of teaching mallams throughout northern N i geria may be an index to the influence of this class. More important than numerical strength, however, has been the concentration of higher level teachers in K a n o Province, where there have been almost twice as many ilm teachers as in any other northern province. T h e distribution of these mallams between urban and rural portions of K a n o Emirate is indicated by the tax records. In K a n o City, mallams were found to constitute 11.54 percent of all taxpayers in 1926 (see Table 1, p. 24). In K a n o rural districts in 1955, mallams constituted only 1.54 percent of all taxpayers. 40 In my survey of one ward in K a n o City which specializes in Islamic teaching (Bakin R u w a ) , teaching mallams were found to constitute 25 percent of all heads of compound. 4 1 N o n e of these figures 4 0 Data composited from district notebooks, Kano Provincial Commissioner's Office, 1965. 4 1 For details of the Bakin Ruwa survey, 1965, see Appendix I.

Religious Identity and

61

Structure

includes the large n u m b e r of itinerant t e a c h i n g m a l l a m s w h o pass t h r o u g h K a n o and w h o , in the 1960s, c a m e to be r e g a r d e d by the g o v e r n m e n t as a social p r o b l e m . 4 2 M o s t of the itinerant m a l l a m s operate in the rural areas, and f e w K a n o C i t y people send their children to rural Q u r ' a n i c schools unless the child has a discipline p r o b l e m . A d v a n c e d t e a c h i n g m a l l a m s in the various u r b a n centers in the n o r t h h a v e t e n d e d to specialize in particular aspects of M u s l i m k n o w l e d g e . K a n o has been noted f o r l a w , S o k o t o f o r mysticism, Z a r i a a n d K a t s i n a f o r A r a b i c g r a m m a r , a n d B o r n u f o r exegesis of the Q u r ' a n . T h o s e m a l l a m s w h o e m e r g e as a d v a n c e d scholars are likely to h a v e specialized in several subjects.

THE STRUCTURE OF ISLAMIC L A W

O n e of the p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n s of the r n a l l a m class has been the study a n d interpretation of Shan a {Shan

a),

t r a i n i n g i n jurisprudence, that is,

or Islamic l a w . T h i s requires fifyhu

(fiqh).

specialized

F r o m the t i m e of al-Maghili,

K a n o has f o l l o w e d M a l i k i l a w . 4 3 T h e three m a j o r sources of M a l i k i l a w i n K a n o w e r e the Kitàb Risâla

al-Muwatta,44

the Mukhtasar

of S ï d i K h a l ï l , 4 5 a n d the

of I b n A b i Z a y d a l - Q a y r a w a n i . 4 6 A f u l l study of precolonial sources of

legal theory in K a n o r e m a i n s to be done. 4 7 A s M a l i k i l a w c a m e to be applied in K a n o , there w e r e three m a j o r cate4 2 See M. J. Campbell, and J. Wilson, eds., Report 0} the Conference on Problems of Urbanization in Northern Nigeria (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University, printed by Institute of Administration, Gaskiya Corporation, 1962), p. 16. 4 3 Most Kano mallams agree that al-Maghili brought Maliki law books to Kano. Nasiru Kabara claims to have an extant copy of the Risàla of Ibn Zayd brought to Kano by al-Maghili (interviews, 1965). 4 4 Written by the founder of the Maliki madhhab, Malik b. Anas. See H. A. R. Gibb, and J. H. Kramers, Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961), p. 323. 4 5 Khalïl b. Ishâq al-Jundi (d. A.D. 1374). The Mukhtasar was central to legal thought in Kano and after the British conquest of northern Nigeria, the governor general of Nigeria, Sir F. D. Lugard, ordered a translation for use by district administrators. This was undertaken by F. H. Ruxton and was entitled Mali\i Law, Being a Summary From French Translations of the Mu\htasar of Sidi Khalil (London: Luzac, 1916). The introduction by Ruxton provides a discussion of Maliki law and of Sidi Khalïl. 4 6 A b û Muhammad b. Abi Zayd of Qairawan (d. A.D. 999). A translation and commentary has been published by Leon Bercher, La Risâla, ou Epître sur les éléments du dogme et de la loi de l'Islam selon le rite maliki te, 5th ed. (Algiers: Editions Jules Carbonnel, i960). 4 7 The Shahuci Judicial Library in Kano, consisting mainly of legal manuscripts in use in Kano, was established in the 1930s by Kano Emir Abdullahi Bayero. It includes much of the former legal library of the Kano royal family. Another repository of precolonial legal writing in Kano is the Nigerian Archives, Kaduna, which has catalogued Arabic manuscripts by province of origin.

62

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

gories of offenses (apart from property damage): ( i ) hululu (hudud), (2) jasadi (jasadi), and (3) tahazibi (tadhahib). Although hululu may apply to the general category of "legal offense," in practice hululu offenses were relatively minor and were concerned with such matters as drinking alcohol, disorderly conduct, illicit sexual intercourse, and so on. The jasadi offenses dealt with matters of bodily harm, such as homicide and wounding. The tahazibi offenses, frequently termed siyasa (siyasa), were directed against the political authority of the state. Maliki law was administered in northern Nigeria throughout the colonial period. Only after 1959 was criminal law removed from the sphere of religion and made a matter of civil legislation. Family law continued to be based on the Shari'a, and a northern Nigeria Shari'a Court of Appeal was established to administer Maliki law. (For a discussion of the legal reforms, see chapter 8.) A highly developed structure of Islamic law has existed in Kano Emirate. The chief deputy for judicial affairs is the waziri.*8 In the 1930s judicial functions were vested in the wall,49 but in i960 these functions reverted to the office of waziri. This function has included the supervision of all legal affairs in the emirate and, in particular, the supervision of the alkali (al-qadi)—that is, judgeship—structure. The emir himself had ultimate responsibility for legal affairs in Kano Emirate and conducted a weekly (Friday) court in the palace for appeal and capital cases until the court was discontinued in 1967. A major function of the waziri was to advise the emir's court. Prior to the judicial reorganization in 1967 (to be discussed in chapter 9), the judicial function was primarily carried out by alkalai. Throughout most of the twentieth century, an alkali was assigned to each rural district (with 48 In other northern emirates, the office of waziri was often that of "prime minister" rather than chief legal adviser. In nineteenth century Kano the galadima also had the title of waziri. These functions were separated by Emir Aliyu. T h e British conquest of Kano upset the preexisting functional division of administration. T h e office of waziri came to assume the functions of intermediation between the emir and the British. A slave of Emir Abbas, Allah Barsarki, became popular with the British and consequently was appointed waziri. H e tried to build up an independent basis of power for himself using the British, but finally he was deposed. Waziri Gidado, however, restored the office to its earlier importance. When he died, no one was appointed to the office, and the functions became vested in the office of wali. In i960 the office of waziri was reestablished, and a son of Gidado (Abubakar Dokaji) was appointed. When he died in June 1971, his replacement was Shehu Waziri, the imam of Waje mosque. Yet most of the functions of the waziri had devolved to state or national administrators. 49 T h e office of wali was created in Kano in 1937 and conferred on Wali Suleiman (wali had been a pre-Fulani title in Gaya). In Sokoto and Katsina there had been offices of wali, but they were of minor importance (for example, inspector of courts). In Zaria the wali was of major importance as adviser to the emir.

Religious Identity and Structure

63

the exception of Kumbotso and Ungogo). Within the Kano urban area, there was an alkali for Waje, one for Gwagwarwa, one for the market (al\alin kasuwa), and one for juveniles (alkalin yard). There was a chief alkali (babban alkali or alkalin Kano) and a deputy chief alkali (karamin alkali), making a total of twenty-nine alkalai in Kano Emirate. Since the Jihad they have been almost exclusively Fulani. As a group, the alkalai rank in importance next to the district heads. An alkali is assisted by a mufti ("deputy") or maga ta\arda ("secretary"). In the rural areas, however, most disputes are settled by the village head, and only if he is unable to resolve the dispute does it go to the district alkali. The waziri, wali, chief alkali, city alkalai, rural alkalai, and mufutai form an elite within the mallam class with regard to legal affairs. A large number of other mallams, however, are versed in Islamic law but prefer to remain outside of the formal government structure. Many of these mallams act as unofficial arbitrators of family-law conflicts in their respective wards. Conversely, many of the executive administrators in Kano have had extensive training in Islamic law but are not actively engaged in legal affairs. Kano City has served as a center of legal training for northern Nigeria since the nineteenth century. Madabo ward tended to serve the Hausa areas and Kabara ward the Fulani areas, although several of the major legal scholars from Kabara have studied in Madabo. During the early colonial period, the Shahuci Judicial School was established in Kofar Mata ward, and instruction (in Hausa and Arabic) was given to mallams from Kano and elsewhere. The centralization of legal training facilities in Kano resulted in the circulation of northern Nigerian mallams through Kano City. In 1934 the government opened Kano Law School, to serve northern Nigeria. 50 The school was conducted by three shaykhs from Khartoum, who were assigned to northern Nigeria from the Sudan. Prior to 1934 several Shaykhs from the Sudan had been teaching at Shahuci Judicial School. The basic textbook was Tuhfat al-hu\\am by Ibn c Asim. Later the Risala and the Mu\hta$ar were also used. In 1947 Kano Law School was transformed into the Kano School for Arabic Studies (SAS). The staff remained essentially Sudanese. Thirty students graduated in 1950 and the number has increased since that time. The compulsory introduction of elementary English alienated some of the traditional mallams, but a number of young men opted for the program as an alternative to second50 A t that time there were forty students from the following provinces: Kano, 1 1 ; Bornu, 6; Katsina, 6; Sokoto, 5; Bauchi, 4; Niger, 3; Zaria, 2; Ilorin, 2; Jos, 1. Ten subjects were taught: law, theology, tradition, biography of the Prophet, grammar, reading, dictation, copying, arithmetic, and the Qur'an. N A K ( 1 1 8 5 ) , n.d.

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

64

ary school. In 1962-63, Abdullahi Bayero College (a branch of the Ahmadu Bello University) for Islamic and Arabic studies was opened in Kano. Although Islamic law was not taught as a separate subject, in several respects the Abdullahi Bayero College has provided a continuation of the SAS program at the university level. The impact of Islamic law in Kano is reflected in many ways other than the comprehensive legal structure. At various stages in the Qur'anic schools, children are taught the major components of law as part of general religious knowledge rather than as law per se. Religious knowledge is regarded as being comprised of three parts: tajsiri (tafsir) is the interpretation of the Qur'an; hadisi (hadith) is the actions and utterances of the Prophet Muhammad; fikihu ifiqh) is legal interpretations of the Qur'an and hadith. Because the four Islamic legal schools (Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanifi, Hanbali) vary in their interpretation of the Qur'an and hadith, a child is initiated informally into a legal school through his study of fikihu. An average child in Kano City is taught six elements of belief: the faith that there is one God; 5 1 belief in all the prophets, from Adam to Muhammad; belief in all four of God's books; 52 belief in angels; 53 belief in the day of judgment; 54 belief that whatever happens (bad or good) is from God. 65 A child is also taught to emulate two categories of behavior: behavior that is obligatory, that is, farilla (fard); behavior that was exemplified by the Prophet but not obligatory, that is, sunna (sunna). The five pillars of Islam are regarded as farilla (with certain qualifications, such as that one must have property before he must give alms and one must not do the pilgrimage unless it is safe to do so). Such obligations fall on the individual and hence are regarded as jarillan ainihi (fard cain). Other types of farilla are the responsibility of the community as a whole rather than any particular individual and hence are regarded as farillan \ifaya (fard \ifayah). Examples include burial of the dead (for instance, if someone fails to bury his dead, the whole town is 51

Faith, or

imani (al-tman),

is assumed for those w h o are "born into Islam," as dis-

tinct f r o m those w h o are converted. M a n y in K a n o believe that the declaration of faith, or

shahada (shahada), is necessary only for those w h o are converted to Islam. 62 Zabura (zabür) is the testament or psalms of D a v i d ; Attaura (d-tawra) is the T o r a h , or testament of Moses; Unjila (Jnjil) is the testament of Jesus; Kur'ani (Qur'an) is the message given to M u h a m m a d . 68

It is believed that there is an angel or

mal