Regional Reflections: Comparing Politics Across India's States 9780195668087, 0195668081

Citation preview

R e g io n a l R e f l e c t io n s

R e g io n a l R e f l e c t io n s C O M P A R IN G P O L IT IC S A C R O S S I N D I A ’S STA TES

edited by

Rob Jenkins

OXJFORD U N IV E R SIT Y PRESS

OXFORD U N IV E R S IT Y PRESS

Y M CA Library Building, Jai Singh Road, N ew Delhi 110 001 O xford U niversity Press is a departm ent o f the U niversity o f O xford. It furthers the U niversity’s objective o f excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing w orldw ide in O xford N ew York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires C ape Town C hennai D a re s Salaam Delhi H ong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala L um pur M adrid M elbourne M exico C ity M um bai Nairobi Sao Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto O xford is a registered tradem ark o f O xford U niversity Press in the U K and in certain o th er countries Published in India By O xford U niversity Press, N ew D elhi © O xford U niversity Press 2004 T he m oral rights o f the author have been asserted Database right O xford U niversity Press (maker) First published 2004 All rights reserved. N o p an o f this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, o r transm itted, in any form o r by any means, w ithout the prior permission in w riting o f O xford U niversity Press, o r as expressly perm itted by law, o r under term s agreed w ith the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope o f the above should be sent to the Rights D epartm ent, O xford U niversity Press, at the address above You m ust not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you m ust impose this same condition on any acquirer ISB N 0 19 566808 1

Typeset in Aldine in 10.5/12 by Excellent Laser Typesetters, Pitam pura, Delhi 110 034 Printed at Rashtriya Printer, D elhi 110 032 Published by M anzar Khan, O xford U niversity Press Y M C A Library Building, Jai Singh Road, N ew D elhi 110 001

Dedicated to the memory of P ro f. P a u l H irs t

( 1946- 2003)

/

«

i

Contents Acknowledgements Notes on Contributors 1.

In tro d u ctio n Rob Jenkins

P a r t I: E c o n o m i c P o l i c y m a k i n g

2.

T h e Political D eterm inants o f R eform Packaging: C ontrasting Responses to E conom ic Liberalization in A ndhra P radesh and Tamil N ad u Loraine Kennedy

3.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy C hange: A C o m p ariso n o f West Bengal and G ujarat Aseema Sinha

P a r t II: S u b a l t e r n P o l i t i c i z a t i o n

4.

Janata Regionalized: C ontrasting Bases o f Electoral S u pport in B ihar and O rissa Sanjay Kumar

5.

P ost-‘M a n d a r Politics in U tta r Pradesh and M adhya Pradesh Christophe Jaffrelot and Jasmine Ztrinini-Brotel

P a r t III: C iv ic E n g a g e m e n t

6.

States o r C ities? Studying H in d u -M u slim Riots Ashutosh Varshney

viii

7.

C O N TEN TS

In Varying States o f Decay: A n ti-C o m ip tio n Politics in M aharashtra and Rajasthan Rob Jenkins

P a r t IV: P o l i t i c a l L e a d e r s h i p

8.

Explaining Political Trajectories in A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka James Manor

9.

Populist Leadership in W est Bengal and Tamil N adu: M am ata and Jayalalithaa C om pared M ukulika Baneijee

Acknowledgements

T h e co n trib u tio n s to this volum e w ere first presented at a w orkshop held in M ay 2000. T h a t m eeting was hosted by the School o f Politics and Sociology at Birkbeck College, U niversity o f L ondon, and took place in the C ollege’s Keynes Library in G o rd o n Square, Bloom sbury. T hanks m u st g o to the adm inistrative staff fo r helping to m ake the logistical arrangem ents. We are also indebted to discussants and o th er participants at th at m eeting, including Ian D u n can and Sunil K hilnani. As editor, I benefited from the thoughts o f G eoffrey H aw thorn, w h o read m ost o f the chapters, and the advice o f m any o th er colleagues w ith w h o m I discussed th e idea for the book. T h e team at O xford U n iv ersity P ress have been efficient and in sig h tfu l. A n onym ous referees provided helpful additional com m ents. I also ow e a debt to A nne M arie G oetz, w h o has been supportive, as ever, and w ith w hom I jo in tly conducted the research o n w hich m y ow n chapter is based. Finally, I w o u ld like to express m y g ratitu d e to the v o lu m e’s contributors, w h o have p u t up w ith a lengthy delay in getting the volum e into press, not to m en tio n endless editorial interventions. H aving such cooperative colleagues is an invaluable asset, for w hich I am thankful indeed. B righton, U K January 2004

R o b J e n k in s

Notes on Contributors M UKULIKA BANERJEE teachcs in the D epartm ent o f A nthropology at

U niversity College, L ondon. She is the au th o r o (T h e Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memory in the North West Frontier (O xford, 2000), as well as n u m ero u s articles in professional jo u rn als and edited collections. She is also the co -au th o r (w ith D aniel M iller) o f The Sari (Berg, 2003). B anerjee’s c u rre n t research interests are p o p u lar perceptions o f dem ocracy and the study o f M uslim societies o f S outh Asia. C h r i s t o p h e J a f f r e l o t is D irector o f the C e n tre d ’E tudes et de

R echerches Internationales (C ER I) in Paris. H e also teachcs South Asian politics at the Institut d ’E tudcs Politiques, Paris. H e is the • author o f The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to 1990s (C olum bia U niversity Press, 1996) and India's Silent Revolution: The Rise o f the Lower Castes in North India (H u rst, 2003), as w ell as books on A m bedkar and dem ocracy in India, and n u m ero u s articles on politics in M adhya Pradesh. Jaffrelot has also edited four books, tw o o f w hich deal w ith Pakistan. R O B JEN K IN S (editor) is Professor o f Political Science at Birkbeck

College, U niversity o f London, w here he directs th e M Sc Program m e in Global Politics, H is research interests include national and provin­ cial politics in India, the political econom y o f developm ent, the politics o f m ultilateral trade governance and aid policy in sub-Saharan Africa. H e is the author o f Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India (C am bridge, 1999) and Reassessing the Commonwealth (Royal Institute o f International Affairs, 1997), and the co -au th o r (w ith A nne M arie G oetz) o f Reinventing Accountability: Making Democracy Work for the Poor (Palgrave/M acm illan, 2004).

N otes on Contributors

xi

LORAINE KEN N EDY is C hargée de R echerche at the C N R S (C entre

N ational de R echerche Scientifique), based at U M R REGARDS in B ordeaux, France. H e r research interests include policy dynam ics in India’s federal system , local production system s, and sm all firm strategies for global com petitiveness. R ecent publications include articles in World Development and the Revue Tiers Monde, and an edited volum e for the U N E S C O -M O S T p rogram m e (Paris, 2002). SANJAY K u m a r is Associate Fellow at the C e n tre for the Study o f

D eveloping Societies (C SD S), D elhi. H e has been w orking on the N ational E lection Studies organized thro u g h th e Lokniti netw ork for several years, and has published n u m ero u s articles in such publications as the Economic and Political Weekly, The H indu, and Frontline, as well as in academ ic jo u rn a ls and edited collections. JAMES M a n o r is Professorial Fellow at the Institute o f D evelopm ent

Studies, U niversity o f Sussex. B etw een 1993 and 1997, he was Professor o f C o m m o n w ealth Politics and D irecto r o f the Institute o f C o m m o n w ealth Studies, U niversity o f L ondon. H is m ore recent publications include (w ith Richard C rook) Democracy and Decentrali­ zation in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance (C am bridge, 1999) and The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization (T h e W orld Bank, 1999). ASEEMA SlN H A is Assistant Professor in the D ep artm en t o f Political

Science, U niversity o f W isconsin-M adison, U SA . H e r research inter­ ests include th e political econom y o f developm ent in India, the politics o f liberalization, and com parative federalism . She is the au th o r o f Leviathan Divided: The Regional Roots o f Developmental Politics in India (Indiana U niversity Press), w hich w on the A m erican Institute o f Indian Studies 2002 ‘Joseph E lder Prize for th e Best Social Science Book on India’. H e r academ ic articles— on m arket-preserving feder­ alism, econom ic policy-m aking and o th er subjects— have appeared in Comparative Politics and India Review. A SH U TO SH VARSHNEY is D irector o f the C e n tre for South Asian

Studies and Professor o f Political Science a t the U niversity o f M ichigan. H is research and teaching cover ethnicity and nationalism , the political econom y o f developm ent, and S o u th Asian politics. H e is the au th o r o f Democracy, Development and the Countryside: Urban-Rural Struggles in India (C am bridge, 1995) and Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (Yale, 2001, O U R 2002). Varshney is also

x ii

NOTES O N CO NTRIBUTO RS

the editor o f Beyond Urban Bias (Frank C ass, 1993), and co-editor (w ith Jeffrey Sachs) o f India in the Era o f Economic Rrforms (O xford, 1999). JASMINE Z £ r i n i n i - B r o t e l is based at the Paris P antheon-S orbonne U niversity. She contributed to an edited collection The BJP and the Compulsions o f Politics in India (O xford, 1998), and has published in academ ic jo u rn als. Z 6rinini-B rotel has conducted h e r field research u n d er the auspices o f the French C en tre for H u m a n Sciences, N ew D elhi, and has undertaken policy-oriented studies for m inistries o f the French governm ent.

1 Introduction Rob Jenkins

his book serves tw o com plem entary purposes: it responds to academic interest in four key areas in the study o f Indian dem ocracy; and by doing so thro u g h a series o f tw o-state com pari­ sons, the book also dem onstrates the range o f m ethods by w hich com parative analysis, w ithin the confines o f a single nation-state, can contribute to th e study o f social and political change. T h ere is an elem ent o f evangelism in this approach, for w h at unites th e otherw ise extrem ely diverse contributions to this volum e is a core b elief that scholars concerned w ith the practice o f actually existing dem ocracy— and the puzzles left in the wake o f co n tin u o u s dem ocratization— w ould do w ell to apply the intra-national com parative case-study m ethod. Each o f the eight chapters exam ines a d istin ct analytical problem from the perspective o f a tw o-state com parison. T h e subject m atter ranges from the reasons w hy m arkedly different institutional in h er­ itances and patterns o f socio-political change in A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka nevertheless produced (at least u n til 1999) such sim ilar party and electoral systems, to an explanation fo r the differing levels o f com m unal violence in U ttar Pradesh and Kerala, True to the book’s dual aim , th e answ ers to these and o th er questions are b oth illum i­ nating about the nature o f dem ocratic practice in contem porary India and instructive ab o u t questions o f ho w and o n w hat scale to apply the com parative m ethod. T h e A ndhra-K am ataka com parison, for

T

2

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

instance, underscores the im portance o f ‘political m anagem ent’, or w hat m ight be term ed ‘the art o f governance’, that is only now receiving the attention it deserves in the study o f Indian politics. T he explanation for the U P-K erala discrepancy, on the o th er hand, reveals an im portant methodological caveat by finding that local-level variables, rather than those m anifested state-w ide, can best predict the extent o f com m unal violence. T h e eight chapters are divided into four them atic areas, each containing tw o chapters. T h e them es— E conom ic Policymaking, Subaltern Politicization, Civic E ngagem ent, and Political Leader­ ship— represent fo u r key aspects o f the concrete reality o f dem ocratic politics. Each o f these is a topic o f intense academ ic and political debate w ithin India and beyond. For instance, close scrutiny o f the political processes underlying so-called ‘second generation’ econom ic reform s in India, especially at the state level, has created a large dem and am ong students o f institutional change for detailed analyses that address crucial theoretical concerns, not least the determ inants o f foreign-investm ent prom otion and perform ance. T h e process by w hich subaltern groups have becom e politicized has varied en o r­ m ously from state to state, and the tw o chapters treating this issue help to account for som e o f this variation. T h e section o f the book dealing w ith the dynam ics o f India’s extrem ely vibrant civil society exam ines both econom ic (corruption) and social (ethnic conflict) issues, b u t in ways that transcend these artificial disciplinary divisions. Jen k in s’s chapter o n corru p tio n analyses issues o f concern to political sociologists (such as the influence o f caste identities on the evolution o f social m ovem ents) w hile Varshney’s chapter o n H in d u -M u slim rioting exam ines such econom ic factors as the role played by business associations in m aintaining com m unal peace. Interest in the issue o f political leadership, on the o th er hand, is n o t confined to these disciplines, b u t has draw n in anthropologists and students o f cultural studies. G aps

in t h e

E x is t in g L it e r a t u r e

T h e notion o f India as a laboratory o f dem ocracy is now a co m m o n ­ place. Even those w ith o u t a detailed understanding o f its politics grasp the degree to w hich— in the tw enty-first century as m uch as in the m id-tw entieth, w h en it w as b o rn — dem ocratic India represents a bold experim ent. In transplanting ideas and institutions from one historical

Introduction

3

context to another, the founders o f in d ep en d en t India w ere challeng­ ing a n u m b er o f w idely held beliefs: that sustaining dem ocracy required relative affluence; that extrem e cultural diversity w ould im peril state unity; that rule-governed institutions could n o t survive in the face o f conflicting legal traditions. A n avalanche o f scholarship has exam ined th e results o f this experim ent, w ith the fiftieth anni­ versary o f In d ia’s independence in 1997 having provided an oppor­ tu n ity for m u ch reflection. B ut this is ju s t one o f tw o senses in w hich India constitutes a laboratory o f democracy. For the very diversity that seem ed at first a threat to its survival as a unified dem ocratic state has also been m anifested institutionally in the form o f a federal political system. Indeed, m any com m entators have attributed th e longevity o f political pluralism in India to the existence o f a robust fo rm o f federalism that serves to com bat tendencies tow ards over-centralization o f power, create opportunities for the expression o f vo ice,1 and quarantine political conflicts w ithin regional arenas before they can e n g u lf the apex o f the political system .2 B ut w hether or n o t India’s federal system has helped to preserve democracy, it has certainly enhanced the capacity o f political scientists to analyse it. India’s federal system has created 29 ‘m ini-dem ocracies’ w ith alm ost identical institutional infrastructures, at least in term s o f the form al system s o f representation. India’s States, m oreover, operate u n d er a set o f co m m o n conditions, including N ew D elhi’s foreign and econom ic policy fram ew ork and the legal protections enshrined in the Indian C on stitu tio n . T hese control variables represent a m ajor boon to students o f com parative politics w h o seek to understand and explain the divergent patterns and outcom es that the practice o f dem ocracy can produce. C ross-national com parisons betw een d em o ­ cratic system s are unable to control for institutional characteristics or the policy and external environm ent to anything like the sam e degree. 1. Alfred Stepan locates Indian federalism closer to th e ‘dem os enabling’ form than to the ‘dem os constraining’ variety, the tw o poles o f the spectrum con­ tained in his theoretical article, ‘Toward a N ew C om parative Politics o f Feder­ alism, (M ulti)N ationalism , and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism’, in A. Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics (Oxford: O xford U niversity Press, 2001), pp. 315-61. 2. See M yron W einer, ‘T he Indian Paradox: Violent Social C onflict and D em o­ cratic Politics’, in M yron W einer (ed.). The Indian Paradox: Essays in Indian Politics (N ew Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989).

4

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

It is in this sense— the creation o f a controlled en v iro n m en t for assessing the causes o f change— th at India’s federal system provides a laboratory o f democracy.3 G iven this laboratory-like setting,4 it is surprising h o w few studies o f Indian politics have been based o n an inter-state com parative approach. W hile a n u m b er o f edited volum es o n In d ian politics explore a single issue o r th em e by exam ining its m anifestation in several regional contexts, the individual state-level cases are by and large studied in isolation, n o t in a fundam entally com parative fram ew ork. For instance, the volum e on H in d u nationalism edited by T hom as B lom H ansen and C h risto p h e Jaffrelot,5 to w hich th ree o f the authors in this collection also contributed, provided an illum inating glim pse o f the range o f ways in w hich politicized H in d u ism had expressed itself in a n u m b er o f India’s states. B ut each chapter dealt w ith ju s t a single state. W hile the editorial introduction o f that v o lu m e provided valuable reflections o n som e o f the general patterns o f divergence and convergence to have em erged across the single-state case studies, the editors w ere constrained by the diversity o f approaches taken by the contributors and the tendency for term s to be used differently by each author. T h is has been the n o rm in the study o f Indian politics, especially in those volum es devoted to the dynam ics o f provincial political systems generally,6 b u t also those related to specific them es, such as patterns o f political transform ation.7 3. T his second usage comes from Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty in India (Cambridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1987). Kohli was seeking to identify political variables that could account for inter-state variations in poverty-reduction. 4. T h e idea that units contained w ithin a com m on governance framework could act as laboratory for political innovation has occurred to analysts o f classical Greece as m uch as to students o f contem porary politics. B ertrand Russell’s treatm ent o f Aristotle’s Politics, for instance, noted that ‘G reece, ow ing to its division into independent cities, was a laboratory o f political experim ent’. Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2000 [1946]), p. 1%. 5. The BJP and the Compulsions o f Politics in India (Delhi: O xford University Press, 1998), w hich contains articles by M anor, Jaffrelot, and Jenkins. 6. In this now outm oded genre can be found Iqbal N arain (ed.), State Politics in India (M eerut: M eenakshi Prakashan, 1967); M yron W einer (ed.), State Politics in India (Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1968); and J o h n R. Wood (ed.), State Politics in Contemporary India: Crisis or Continuity? (Boulder: Westview, 1984). 7. T h e m ost notable entry in this category is Francine R. Frankel and M . S. A. Rao, Dominance and State Power in Modem India: Decline o f a Social Order, vols I and II (Delhi: O xford University Press, 1989 and 1990).

Introduction

5

Kohli’s w ork has been one o f the m ain exceptions to this pattern,8 and Kohli refers specifically to India’s potential as a laboratory for controlled experim ents in democracy, and the utility o f com parative analysis in explaining expectation-defying variations across states. It is a hopeful sign that in recent years Kohli’s challenge has been taken up by both younger and m ore established scholars o f Indian dem oc­ racy. Kanchan C h an d ra has em ployed inter-state analysis in a n u m b er o f publications on the nature o f caste m obilization9— a subject covered in Part II o f the present volum e. A recent article by H arriss, w hich sought to explain differential poverty-reducing perform ance across India’s states, not only exem plified the trend tow ards inter­ regional political analysis, b u t explicitly co m m ented on the need for m ore com parative studies o f this sort. As H arriss p u t it, ‘the apparent opportunities [to explore inter-regional variations in patterns o f political change] have n o t been taken up very much.*10 T h a t H arriss’s concern was econom ic perform ance (and the p o ­ litical determ inants thereof) points to one area w here inter-state analysis has been taken up w ith vigour: the field o f policy studies (a subset o f w hich is treated in Part I o f this book). T his literature has taught political scientists tw o m ain lessons for com parative analysis. First, inter-state analysis can force regional specialists to reassess the political narratives they have settled u p o n for states they have, in som e instances, spent m any years researching. C om parative analysis can lead to a re-fram ing o f debates, and a questioning o f underlying assum ptions. A recent study o f variations in popular participation in developm ent schem es— w hich exam ined Bihar, Jharkhand, and West Bengal— used this intra-national com parative m ethod to dem onstrate the way in w hich the configuration o f political society affects both ‘the scale and significance o f rent-seeking behaviour. Second, the experience o f quantitative policy studies has helped to liberate political scientists from an excessive preoccupation w ith 8. Kohli, The State and Poverty in India. 9. See, for instance, Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India (Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press, forthcom ing). 10. Jo h n Harriss, ‘C om paring Political Regimes across Indian States’, Economic and Political Weekly, 27 N ovem ber 2001. 11. Stuart Corbridge, G lynn W illiams, Rene Veron, and M anoj Srivastava, ‘M aking Social Science M atter: H ow the Rural Poor See the State in Bihar. Jharkhand and West Bengal’, Economic and Political Weekly, 14 Ju n e and 21 June 2003, p. 2561.

6

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

‘problem s o f evidence’. T h e nature o f inform ation o n political behaviour will necessarily vary from state to state. B ut this need not preclude the undertaking o f sensitive com parisons. C o m m en tin g on interstate econom ic analysis, form er finance secretary M ontek Singh A hluw alia noted that there are ‘differences in m ethods o f estim ating the SD P [state dom estic product] in different states’, b u t argues that ‘this should n o t deter us from using state level data for analysing state perform ance’.12 C om parisons w ithin India, he notes, are n o t neces­ sarily any m ore problem atic (and possibly m u ch less so) than international com parisons: ‘the national accounts data o f developing countries arc also not always fully c o m p a ra b le ...th is has not deterred developm ent econom ists from com paring perform ance across devel­ oping countries and draw ing lessons from inter-co u n try variations’.13 T h e validity o f inter-state (but still intra-country) com parisons based on data that is not fully consistent becom es even less o f an issue w hen the focus is o n processes rather than outcom es, as it m ainly is in the political issues discussed in this book.

C o m p a r i n g P o l i t i c s A c r o s s I n d i a ’s S t a t e s T h e eight essays in this volum e represent an attem pt to engage w ith key puzzles that have em erged in the study o f com parative politics generally, and India in particular. T h e relevance o f the Indian case to the larger global context stem s from the fact that India has been the m ost durable dem ocracy in the developing w orld; any indication o f its self-preserving m echanism s is autom atically pertinent. India has itself been undergoing certain changes in its political profile that a book o f tw o-state com parisons can illum inate— for instance: the regionalization o f Indian party politics; the increased role o f state governm ents in second-generation econom ic reform s (and the pos­ sibility that reform s will w iden gaps betw een rich and poor states); the need for stronger local civil societies in ord er to resist the potential ill effects o f globalization. T hese issues have m ade understanding state-level politics m ore urgent. T h is volum e, by design, places state politics in a broader com parative perspective. 12. M ontek Singh Ahluwalia, ‘Economic Performance o f States in PostRcform s Period’, Economic and Political Weekly, 6 May 2000, p. 1637. 13. Ibid.

Introduction

7

T h o u g h the b o o k ’s m ethodological purpose is to dem onstrate the variety o f uses fo r a particular analytical device (the use o f intra­ national com parative case studies), the puzzles them selves have been draw n from four key aspects o f dem ocratic practice: (i) E conom ic Policym aking (ii) Subaltern Politicization (iii) C ivic E ngagem ent (iv) Political Leadership Two chapters are devoted to each o f these them atic areas, though the conceptual fram ew orks and discursive styles u sed by the authors vary, intentionally, w ith in each pair. Clearly, these fo u r aspects do n o t exhaust the full range o f activities undertaken w ith in dem ocratic systems. T h e coverage within each o f these areas is also n o t intended to be com prehensive. Instead, the objective is to convey at least som e sense o f th e sheer diversity o f approaches that th e com parative m ethod m akes available, and the range o f em pirical and conceptual issues w ith w hich students o f Indian dem ocracy are engaging. T h e relevance o f each o f the four dim ensions o f dem ocratic politics is briefly in troduced at the beginning o f its corresponding section below, follow ed by a sum m ary o f the key findings o f each o f the contributions to this volum e. T h is chapter concludes w ith a set o f observations con cern in g both substantive and m ethodological issues that cut across th e individual com parative studies, and indeed the sections into w h ich they have been grouped. E co n o m ic P olicym aking T h e politics o f In d ia’s decade-old program m e o f econom ic reform is an area o f study that has lacked an inter-state com parative-case fram ew ork. T h e existing literature has n o t been unaw are o f the im portance o f th e state level in m anaging the politics o f econom ic refo rm .14 T h ere have been m any studies o f individual states, as well as the role o f the federal system generally (as an institutional feature 14. See, for instance, Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H ocber Rudolph, ‘T he Iconization o f C handrababu: Sharing Sovereignty in India’s Federal M arket E conom y’, Economic and Political Weekly, 5 M ay 2001.

8

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

o fln d ia n dem ocracy) in u n d ercu ttin g political resistance to econom ic policy change d u rin g the 1990s.15 H ow ever, researchers have not, in general, taken advantage o f the laboratory furnished by India’s federal dem ocracy to test the extent to w hich the findings from these studies w ere valid. For instance, Jen k in s’s 1999 book places great em phasis on the role o f dem ocratic institutions in facilitating ‘reform by stealth*. W hile sensitive to the existence o f state-w ise variation in the w illingness o f state-level political leaders to openly em brace reform o r to proceed o n their reform ist agendas quietly, Jenkins did not attem pt to explain the reasons for these variations. K ennedy’s chapter on A ndhra Pradesh and Tamil N a d u does address this issue, using detailed inter-state com parative analysis. K ennedy begins by d o cum enting the differing responses o f these tw o states to the policy autonom y that the central governm ent’s liberalization program m e unleashed d u rin g the 1990s. Successive governm ents in Tamil N ad u — including periods o f rule by each o f the state’s tw o d o m in an t political parties— have consistently pursued a relatively understated approach to attracting the investm ent now theoretically w ithin the grasp o f any state able to com pete for it. Tamil N ad u ’s governm ents played dow n the radical im plications o f their reform agendas, and certainly did n o t consider econom ic liberalization part o f a w in n in g electoral cam paign strategy. T h e Telugu D esam Party (T D P ), w hich has ruled A ndhra Pradesh since the m id-1990s, has taken the opposite approach. A ndhra Pradesh’s c h ie f m inister is am ong the loudest ‘tru m p eters’ o f eco­ nom ic reform am ong India’s state-level leaders, identifying him self publicly w ith liberalization w h erev er possible. C h ie f M in ister C handrababu N aid u n o t only celebrates his m arket-oriented policy agenda at every opportunity, b u t also claims to have rooted the state’s econom ic reform s in a set o f supporting governance reform s. T he A ndhra Pradesh governm ent has positioned itself as the driving force behind w hat it calls— rather unstealthily— a project o f social transfor­ m ation. Two sim ilar-seem ing states, in the sam e region— such differ­ en t approaches. W hy? K ennedy’s answ er relies m ainly o n tw o explanatory factors: the degree o f fragm entation in the tw o states’ party system s, and the 15. Rob Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic Rrform in India (Cambridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1999).

Introduction

9

extent o f political m obilization am ong D alits and o th e r traditionally low -status castes. T h e existence o f high-levels o f b o th party fragm en­ tation and subaltern political assertiveness has restrained governm ents o f all political hues in Tamil N a d u from actively p ro m o tin g a vision for the role o f m arkets and econom ic reform s in th e state’s political destiny. T h is is because u n d er conditions o f great fluidity, such as prevail in highly fragm ented party systems, reform decisions threaten to destabilize governing coalitions, and because the political rhetoric o f low er-caste groups equates liberalization w ith an elite-biased agenda, an association that any governm ent facing re-election w ould like to avoid. T h e result has been an understated approach to reform . W here A ndhra Pradesh trum pets its reform ist credentials— often m ore than is justified by its achievem ents, in fact— Tamil N a d u ’s political profile on issues o f econom ic policy change is m uted, in effect concealing m any o f the quite radical reform s that have been ushered in b y the state governm ent since 1991. K ennedy’s explanatory fram ew ork calls into q u estio n the validity o f tw o existing theoretical m odels. T h e first contends that poorer states are less likely than richer ones to launch active, politicized reform ist projects— n o t only because these can be seen as p ro-rich by a rural grassroots electorate, b u t also because governm ents o f u n d er­ developed states often anticipate little chance o f success in com peting for inw ard investm ent. T h eir biggest fear, according to this theory, is that m arket-oriented reform s will im ply a scaling back o f the centrally m anaged system o f cross-regional subsidization by richer states. G iven that A ndhra Pradesh lags behind Tamil N ad u o n m ost developm ental indicators, its governm ent’s greater desire for con­ spicuous political association w ith m arket-oriented reform is thus surprising. T h e facts o f the A P -T N com parison are, how ever, consistent w ith the second theory w ith w hich K ennedy engages: th at underdeveloped states are more likely to launch high-profile cam paigns, driven by a need to ‘signal’ to potential investors the sincerity o f th eir reform ist intentions. E xtrem e dem onstrations o f credible co m m itm en t to markets, according to this theory, are necessary to offset w hat these states lack b y way o f hum an, institutional, and physical infrastructure. K ennedy argues that this explanation, w hile logical, cannot bear all o f the explanatory freight: it accounts for som e, th o u g h n o t all, o f the differences in approach betw een the governm ents o f A ndhra Pradesh and Tamil N adu. W hile signalling is im portant, the m ultiple

10

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

dim ensions o f this process m ust be appreciated. In particular, Kennedy rem inds us th a t state governm ents transm it signals n o t only to external actors (investors from outside the state) ab o u t economic intent, b u t also to internal actors (social groups w ithin the state) about political intent. A rm ed w ith this m ore nuanced u n d erstanding o f the calculus and behaviour o f political elites, K ennedy is able to identify a range o f o th e r factors— relating to party politics, social m obilization and electoral contestation— that help to shape th e divergent approaches to the political positioning o f reform taken b y these tw o states, w hich otherw ise have p ursued very sim ilar (often identical) policies. Sinha’s chapter on W est Bengal and G ujarat also seeks to explain variation across states in term s o f how they respond to the liberalized policy environm ent. B ut instead o f exam ining the process o f attracting investm ent, Sinha begins w ith differences in the outcome o f com pe­ tition for investm ent. T h e fact that industrially advanced G ujarat has received m o re inw ard investm ent than W est Bengal is n o t surprising; that it has received m ore th an twelve times th e investm ent is, however, difficult to explain in light o f the policy convergence betw een the tw o states since th e m id-1990s, w hen n o t radically dissim ilar investm entprom otion packages w ere introduced. N e ith e r differentials in re­ source/infrastructure endow m ents n o r the ideological baggage o f the ruling leftist coalition in W est Bengal appear sufficient to account for the tw o states’ hugely divergent investm ent-attraction perform ances. Sinha’s explanation for the divergence is th e differing ‘institutional and political capacities’ possessed by G ujarat and West Bengal. In particular, th e investm ent-prom otion bureaucracy in G ujarat is vastly better institutionalized, and rooted in a political system that is able to support its activities instead o f th w artin g them . T h e argum ent stresses the variation across the tw o states in term s o f the interplay betw een ideas, interests, and institutions— an innovative use o f a fam iliar analytical fram ew ork. T h e explanatory pow er o f Sinha’s findings is increased by the extent to w hich the com parison is constructed against the grain o f the ‘stability thesis’, o r the idea that political stability helps to overcom e o th er disadvantages in the com petition to attract investm ent. West Bengal has been a paragon o f political stability, w hile G ujarat has for at least tw enty years been a cauldron o f political discontent, m ani­ fested in various bouts o f caste and com m unal conflict, high govern­ m en t turnover, and persistent factionalism in the state’s successive ru lin g parties. And yet W est Bengal has been the w orse perform er. If

Introduction

11

the pair o f cases had been stability-thesis-affirm ing in character, then the explanatory pow er o f the ideas/interests/institutions fram ew ork w ould have been less convincing. As it tu rn s o u t, Sinha is able to exam ine n o t only the institutional strength o f G ujarat’s form idable investm ent-prom otion bureaucracy, and the corresponding w eakness o f its counterpart in West Bengal, but also the im portance o f tw o o th er key variables. T h e first is the spatial distribution o f industrial developm ent. W here industrialization is less concentrated in urban areas, as it is in G ujarat, th e potential constitu­ ency for reform — or at least the one perceived by politicians as m ost likely to em erge to support th e ir political gam ble on liberalization— m oves beyond ju s t city-dw ellers and residents o f urban districts generally. T his pattern o f econom ic developm ent, in w hich th e urbanrural divide does n o t m ap directly o n to the industrial-agricultural dichotom y, also affects the way in w hich disaffected elem ents w ithin a state-level ru lin g party— especially one that is com m itted to re­ form — go about seeking to build opposition to th e state governm ent’s policy decisions. T his is the second variable th at Sinha exam ines in her com parative analysis o f G ujarat and W est Bengal. T h e result is a nuanced u n d erstanding o f the way in w hich th e real-w orld politics o f ideological m obilization and the nitty-gritty o f bureaucratic p ro ­ cedures com bine to shape policy outcom es. S u b altern P oliticization T h e rise o f socially m arginalized groups in party and electoral arenas has tra n sfo rm e d th e landscape o f Indian politics. T h e political assertiveness o f these groups has been on the increase since at least the early 1970s, b u t received a huge boost w h en in 1990 the central governm ent agreed to increase quotas in central governm ent em ploy­ m en t for m em bers o f O th e r Backward Classes, o r O B C s, people w h o belong n eith er to the ‘twice b o m ’ elite castes n o r to the exuntouchable groups at the b o ttom o f the ritual hierarchy. In the 1990s parties form ed aro u n d the assertion o f subaltern political identities, and specifically co m m itted to the ‘up liftm en t o f the w eaker sections o f society’, took pow er in U ttar Pradesh and Bihar, and becam e a significant, th o u g h erratic, political force in M adhya Pradesh. In all three states the established national parties, th e C ongress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), reacted to these developm ents by seeking to broaden the social com position o f their party hierarchies.

12

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

K um ar’s chapter on Bihar and O rissa m oves beyond the familiar sim ilarities betw een these tw o states, w hich are o fte n grouped together in analyses o f Indian politics because both are poor and located in the cast o f the country. Bihar and O rissa also share a history o f effervescent socialist politics, m anifested in sustained support over the past quarter century for the various centre-left Janata political form ations. D u rin g the latter part o f the 1990s, the Janata Dal effectively ‘regionalized’ itself in b oth states, w ith the party’s Bihar u n it breaking away to becom e the Rashtriya Janata D al (RJD) and the O rissa u n it styling itself the Biju Janata D al (BJD). Sim ilar in m any ways because o f their shared parentage, these tw o parties nevertheless represent com pletely different social groups. U sing detailed data from India’s m ost sophisticated election surveys, K um ar docum ents the degree to w hich B ihar’s R JD represents m ainly O B C s (w ith m em bers o f the Yadav caste-cluster loom ing particularly large), w hile O rissa’s BJD relies to a m uch greater extent o n the su p p o rt o f a higher-status caste clientele. K um ar th en proceeds to show w hy this m ight be the case. Analysts convinced o f the determ inacy o f social dem ography w ould point to O rissa’s lack o f a num erically preponderant O B C caste— like B ihar’s Yadavs— to explain the relative w eakness o f the state’s O B C m ove­ m ent. A nd yet K um ar show s that there are O B C groups in O rissa o f alm ost exactly the sam e size as those found in Bihar. O rissa is also a m ore com pact state, so the lack o f barriers to collective action should have made it a more likely state to experience the type o f O B C dom inance that Bihar has w itnessed. In exam ining this puzzle, Kumar dem onstrates the im portance o f w hat m ight be called political geog­ raphy. Politics in O rissa is built around regional groupings. T hese result n o t sim ply from the nature o f the caste distribution— tho u g h this is a key variable in any such analysis— b u t also from the pattern o f political m obilization in the state. T h e divergent history o f social and political m ovem ents varies n o t only across the tw o states, b u t also betw een regions within at least one o f the states— O rissa. K um ar analyses the significance o f these m ovem ents, and (cru­ cially) som e o f their econom ic im plications, particularly the im pact o f land reform o n different social groups in the tw o states. T h e extent to w hich patterns o f land ow nership correspond w ith changes in social status— w h eth er these are the result o f ‘reservations’ for low er castes in g o v e r n m e n t e m p lo y m e n t, o r th r o u g h o th e r , less s ta te - d ir e c te d

avenues o f social m obility— helps to influence the likelihood o f

Introduction

13

certain political alliances form ing. T hese, K um ar argues, are the key to understanding the divergent social bases o f the Janata D al’s offspring in O rissa and Bihar. W hile careful to avoid lapsing into econom ic determ inism , K um ar nicely illustrates the way in w hich the historical unfolding o f social m ovem ents can have im plications for subsequent political developm ents. Jaffrelot and Z erin in i-B ro tel’s chapter o n U tta r Pradesh and M adhya Pradesh assesses tw o states that reside, in term s o f the salience o f lower-caste m obilization in their politics, on eith er side o f K um ar’s case o f Bihar. U P is a case in w hich subaltern political aw akening, and its expression in the form o f durable parties com m itted to represent­ ing these groups, has been perhaps even m ore p ro n o u n ced than in Bihar. M adhya Pradesh, on the o th er hand, has n o t w itnessed the rise o f bahujan politics to anyw here near the sam e levels. T h e BSP has perform ed well (if erratically) in elections for the state assem bly and parliam ent, b u t no identifiable vehicle to channel the aspirations o f M adhya Pradesh’s O B C s has em erged. But, interestingly, this difference betw een the tw o states was n o t paralleled by the representational strategies adopted by the m ain national parties. T h e authors use statistical data o n the caste profile o f state legislators and party officials to dem onstrate the w ay in w hich th e C ongress and the BJP each clung to a particular strategy for accom m odating subaltern assertiveness, regardless o f th e seem ing differences betw een the tw o states. W hile the upper-caste-dom inatcd BJP sought in b oth M P and U P to co u rt fragm ents o f the backward castes as a way o f u n d erm in in g th e em ergence o f a broad backward-caste political m ov em en t, the C ongress relied to a m uch greater degree on a ‘coalition o f the ex­ trem es’ strategy, adding m ainly tribal o r D alit su p p o rt to its uppercaste base. W hile this is a significant finding in its ow n right, vindicating th e use o f closely paired com parative cases, Jaffrelot and Z erin in iB rotel have also provided strong evidence to support th e ir claims for w h y this pattern was so persistent for each party, despite th e different state-level political contexts. T h e analysis is rooted in an u n d erstan d ­ ing o f both the political histories o f these tw o states— m o st notably th e relative dearth o f certain types o f political m ovem ents in M adhya Pradesh— and the incentives facing key political actors. T h is chapter is striking because, like K um ar’s analysis o f O rissa and Bihar, it situates these historic shifts in the social profile o fln d ia ’s parties w ith in a keen u n d erstanding o f how politics is played by its leading operatives. It

14

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

explores the m eans by w hich party leaders reconcile strategies for expanding their electoral bases w ith the tactics they deploy in order to com bat rivals w ithin their ow n parties. C ivic E n g ag em en t Because o f the starring role devised for civil society in aid program m es designed to consolidate fledgling dem ocracies in the developing w orld, the case o f India has always loom ed large in this literature. Some theorists sec India, the developing w orld’s longest-lasting democracy, as clear evidence o f the ability o f civil society to assist dem ocratic practices in taking root and, ultimately, to check the p ow er o f the state. O th ers see civil society in India as an arena through w hich privileged interests fu rth er entrench their dom inance— th ro u g h , for instance, the press and ‘independent’ associations controlled by social and political elites— w hile using the state to u n d erm in e the viability o f associations organized by less privileged groups. Each o f the tw o chapters in this section o f the volum e steps back from this stark choice. Actually existing civil society organizations reveal them selves in each chapter as, sim ultaneously, m odels o f civic engagem ent and decidedly //»-civil, capable o f co n tributing to better governance b u t also, u n d er certain circum stances, vulnerable to m anipulation by elites. Varshney’s chapter on Kerala and U ttar Pradesh addresses the question o f w hy U P should have suffered so m uch H in d u -M u slim violence, com pared to Kerala, w hich d u rin g the early part o f the tw entieth century had been a com m unal tinderbox. T h e conventional w isdom has interpreted the statistical correlation betw een state-w ide levels o f illiteracy and the propensity tow ards co m m u n al rioting as a causal relationship. Fewer illiterates in Kerala, in o th e r w ords, m eans few er chances to m anipulate com m unal passions th ro u g h ru m o u r and m isinform ation, spread by w ord o f m o u th th ro u g h o u t each co m m u ­ nity. Som e variants o f this explanation are based o n a slightly broader array o f variables, including n o t ju s t literacy, b u t also health status or even such intangibles as the existence o f cadre-based political m obi­ lization am ong the progressive left. Varshney observes that no less an authority than A m artya Sen has advanced this line o f argum ent as part o f his larger cam paign to dem onstrate the benefits o f ‘hum an developm ent', an approach that no t only looks beyond m ere incom e-poverty, b u t also stresses the relationship betw een various types o f ‘capabilities’. Labelling this a

Introduction

15

m odernist understanding o f the causes o f H in d u -M u slim rioting, Varshney does n o t dispute the correlation betw een social developm ent and com m unal violence indicators at the state level. B ut his analysis suggests that states are the wrong unit of analysis for this particular problem . Varshney’s analysis provides an excellent exam ple o f the com plexi­ ties o f applying the com parative m ethod. C o m m u n al violence, he argues, is a local (prim arily urban) p henom enon, and w h en data on social developm ent and com m unal violence are aggregated at the city o r tow n level, the correlation disappears. W hat does correlate, inversely, w ith low er levels o f com m unal violence is the degree o f local civil society organizing along H in d u -M u slim lines— that is, the existence o f inter-com m unal associations that can act as an unofficial b u t sem i­ form alized institution for defusing disputes and preventing escalation into full-scale rioting. Varshney’s fu rth er p o in t is that exam ination o f inter-state differences does n o t do away w ith the obligation for researchers to seek out, and probe the causes of, variation within states. H aving relocated the u n it o f analysis to the city level, Varshney is th en able to address w hat is, in effect, th e opposite arg u m en t to that p u t forw ard by Sen. Varshney labels this the ‘an ti-m o d ern ist’ position. T his critique argues that processes o f m odernization, m ost notably urbanization, are the prim ary cause o f com m unal violence. T he rootlessness o f m etropolitan existence, the insecurity o f em ploym ent in the m odern sector, the scope for m anipulation o f group identities offered to elites operating w ithin urban settings— these are w h at spark H in d u -M u slim riots. V arshney’s response is that if the an ti-m o d ern ists w ere correct, th en all cities w ould be prone to violence, w hen in fact the data indicates quite clearly a great deal o f variation. N o t all cities are equally riot-prone— indeed m any are notably peaceful. M oreover, the data do n o t indicate a clear correlation betw een, o n the one hand, variables that could be considered indicators o f rootless m odernity, and on the other, a city’s riot-proneness. Jen k in s’s chapter on M aharashtra and Rajasthan arrives at sim ilar conclusions to Varshney concerning the unit-of-analysis question, b u t by way o f a different route. T h e chapter asks w h eth er any characteristics shared by these tw o states— in term s o f socio-econom ic developm ent, the pattern o f party com petition, o r any o th er relevant variable— could account for the fact that these are the only tw o Indian states to have produced sustained, broad-based, and politicizedbut-non-partisan anti-corruption m ovem ents. T h e answ er is that

16

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

state-w ide variables can not in fact explain w hy these m ovem ents, w hich share a striking num b er o f features that set them apart from o th er such m ovem ents, should have em erged in Rajasthan and M aharashtra and now here else in India. Jenkins argues that far m ore relevant explanatory factors are to be found by exam ining the nature o f the regions (within their respective states) w here these tw o m ovem ents are based. Two similarities in th e hom e regions o f these m ovem ents are exam ined in particular: th e dem ographic w eight o f the d om inant caste group, and the nature o f corruption. T h e latter variable focuses on the m ethods used by officials to obtain illicit incom e from public works projects. T h e analysis highlights the extent to w hich existing theoretical fram ew orks discount the ability o f officials to choose am ong different ways o f structuring co rru p t transactions, and in particular the effects these choices have on the poor. W hile locality-specific, as opposed to state-w ide, factors are found to account fo r the em ergence o f such strikingly sim ilar m ovem ents in these tw o very different states, it tu rn s o u t that state-level variables are im portant in explaining the divergence betw een these tw o m ove­ m ents that began to m anifest itself as the 1990s cam e to a close. T h e very different civil societies and political cultures in Rajasthan and M aharashtra ultim ately produced fairly distinct state responses to efforts by anti-corruption activists to institutionalize participatory m onitoring o f governm ent decision-m aking. Political L eadership T he issue o f political leadership has taken on greater salience in recent years for a n u m b e r o f reasons, three o f w hich are suggested by trends identified in three previous sections. First, the ability to balance economic policy considerations against political survival has becom e an increasingly valuable leadership asset in recen t years in India. Second, the changing social composition o f the political elite has produced in som e cases a new idiom for the exercise o f political leadership, and a change in the nature o f political representation. A nd, third, it is clear that o n e o f the m ajor challenges facing India, and indeed a great num b er o f even new er developing country dem ocracies, is the need to m aintain civil society's poised state— that is, its ability to influence politics w ith o u t becom ing subsum ed w ithin intractable political conflict, o f either the partisan o r identity-based variety.

Introduction

17

M an o r’s chapter o n Karnataka and A ndhra Pradesh probes the historical and sociological data o n these tw o states to uncover deeper social-structural reasons for the sim ilarities betw een th em in term s o f parties, party systems, and electoral dynam ics. Interestingly, he finds none. M anor argues that the im peratives o f coalition building at the national level is a m uch m ore im portant influence o n the pattern o f party and electoral politics in A ndhra and Karnataka, accounting in particular for the recent divergence in the fortunes o f political leaderships in the tw o states. T h e rem arkable period o f parallel party alternation across the tw o states— that is, w h en C ongress w on o r lost elections in eith er state, it tended to do so in the o th er too— came to an e n d in 1999, w hen A ndhra Pradesh C h ie f M inister C handrababu N aid u was able to w in re-election against a C ongress opposition, w hile his counterpart in Karnataka (w ho like N aid u led a centre-left regional party) could not. M an o r em phasizes the role o f political leadership, draw ing o n a diverse array o f em pirical material to dem onstrate how differing ‘m odes o f political m anagem ent’ betw een leaders in the tw o states can help to account for their different electoral fates. B ut as M anor points o u t, this divergence came at precisely the m o m e n t w h en the tw o states had finally begun to look m ore alike in term s o f patterns o f socio-econom ic developm ent. A ndhra Pradesh d u rin g the 1990s, for instance, started to develop a m ore diversified econom y, and had success in com bating illiteracy— n o t to Karnataka levels in either case, b u t closing the gap. T h is discrepancy helps to highlight the relative autonom y o f high politics— the realm o f political leadership expressed th ro u g h party ideology and partisan com petition— fro m the changing socio-econom ic reality o n the ground. T h e com parison betw een A ndhra Pradesh an d Karnataka also allows M a n o r to exam ine the variety o f m eans by w hich political leaders go a b o u t reconciling tw o distinct types o f governance chal­ lenges: governance w ithin their parties, and the relationship betw een the state and social groups. B oth states have in fact throw n up examples o f leaders w ho, by seeking to centralize decision-m aking have in fact ended up losing n o t only control o f th e ir parties, b u t also th eir grip over the instrum ents o f state power. B u t the com parison also highlights the danger o f the opposite strategy: seeking to satisfy too large a variety o f social groups (by, for instance, distributing posts to representatives o f different com m unities) can en d up both crip­ pling a state governm ent’s capacity for concerted action, and building

18

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

a base o f electoral support that is im pressively w ide b u t lacking in depth. Banerjee’s chapter on West Bengal and Tamil N ad u tackles the issue o f political leadership head o n — exam ining tw o leaders, b oth w om en, from these tw o very different states. J. Jayalalithaa in Tamil N ad u and M am ata Baneijee in W est Bengal are b oth figures o f som e national standing, m ainly by virtue o f the increasing im portance o f even small regional parties to the construction o f parliam entary m ajorities and the form ation o f coalition governm ents in N ew D elhi. W hile neither is prim arily a ‘w o m en ’s leader’ in term s o f the issues they highlight o r the organized constituencies they represent, th e ir fem ale-ness rem ains in both cases a salient feature in the m ale-dom inated w orld o f party politics, and tends to be as m u ch rem arked up o n as their regional identifications. B aneijee’s paper highlights the inter-relation betw een these tw o facets o f the leaders’ political personas— their gender and regional identities. In particular, she dem onstrates th at the m eans by w hich Jayalalithaa and M am ata enacted their fem ale political roles was in both cases shaped by regional context, including social attitudes, electoral dynam ics, and institutional legacies. B ut the influence o f state-level factors o n things like the leaders’ relationship to fem ininity is tem pered by the im pact o f the w o m en ’s social position. M am ata’s grassroots im age em bodied one narrative about w o m en ’s place in politics, w hile Jayalalithaa’s glam or­ ous (but socially stigm atized) past as a film h ero in e im pelled her tow ards a different persona altogether. B oth are fam iliar options in the repertoire o f political strategies available to w om en political leaders. W hich one is adopted m ay have m ore to d o w ith social position than w ith state-level factors, tho u g h how they are played o u t can be signifi­ cantly affected by the shape o f the regional political universe. T h e Jayalalithaa-M am ata com parison also highlights the ability o f sim ilar m odes o f political leadership to assum e different guises u n d er different leaders. B oth w om en can be said to practise populist politics, their program m atic priorities designed to appeal to a mass audience by forging a personal bond w ith a dispersed electorate. B ut bo th the style and co n ten t o f populism differ m arkedly across these tw o cases. W hile M am ata revels in h er earthiness, claim ing an affinity w ith the people, Jayalalithaa pursues an ‘elitist’ form o f populism — a contra­ diction in term s that she uses a variety o f discursive strategies to elide. From this com parative perspective, populism appears inevitably rooted in regional culture.

Introduction

C o m p a r in g C

19

o m p a r is o n s

B eyond th e them atic com m onalities w ith in each section o f the volum e, a n u m b e r o f insights em erge if w e exam ine patterns across the book’s fo u r parts— that is, if w e com pare the com parisons. T hese are m ainly o f three types: those relating to regional issues, those that concern substantive m atters o f theoretical significance, and those that illum inate m ethodological questions. R egional Issues Four states (A ndhra Pradesh, Tamil N ad u , W est Bengal, and U ttar Pradesh) are covered in m ore than one tw o-state dyad. T h is furnishes an excellent opportunity to appreciate the extent to w h ich a com para­ tive fram ew ork can bring into relief certain facets o f a state that w ould be obscured if it w ere treated on its ow n. T h e versions o f A ndhra Pradesh conveyed in the chapters by M an o r and Kennedy, for instance, d o n o t com e into direct conflict, especially as the form er is m ore concerned w ith the substance o f reform , and the latter w ith its political packaging. B ut view ed alongside one an o th er the tw o studies reveal contrasting ways o f looking at the im portance o f party system s in the tw o states: M anor m akes a case for electoral dynam ics and party contestation existing o n a slightly different (th o u g h n o t unattached) level o f politics from eith er econom ic realities o r th e politics o f social transform ation, w hile K ennedy can chart m ore or less direct im pacts from partisan behaviour to political practice. T h e tw o different takes o n U P found in this volum e provide a richly nuanced po rtrait o f this central force in India’s politics. U P can seem increasingly norm less w h en contrasted w ith the political civility that still prevails in Kerala— tho u g h Varshney’s chapter, as w e have seen, em phasizes the im portance o f local rather than state-level variables. And yet, w h en the process o f political aw akening in U P analysed by Jaffrelot and Z erinini-B rotel is com pared w ith the far less advanced stage o f M andalization achieved in M adhya Pradesh, it becom es pos­ sible to appreciate the significance o f w hat is taking place in India’s largest state, poised as it is at the vanguard o f n o rth India’s social transform ation. Indeed, the very intensity o f the social ch u rn in g and political fragm entation that is taking place in U P raises questions about the role o f state governm ents in fom enting the co m m u n al conflicts that V arshney is describing: even tho u g h Varshney m akes a convincing

20

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

case for the role o f local factors in explaining the propensity tow ards com m unal violence, one cannot help w ondering w hether, as he indi­ cates in his critique o f the anti-m odernists, there is som ething about the revolutionary quality o f the dem ocratic upsurge represented by low er-caste assertiveness that is at least partly responsible for the force o f conflict w hich local civil societies m u st steel them selves to endure. T h e com plexities o f Tamil N a d u ’s politics are revealed in b oth Banerjee’s account o f flam boyant political leadership and the staid w orld o f econom ic policy reviewed by Kennedy. B ut different m eanings o f the idea o f populism can be found in these tw o accounts. In Banerjee’s version, populism em erges as part o f an entrenched ethic o f noblesse oblige. For Kennedy, however, populism in Tamil N ad u is one o f the m eans thro u g h w hich d o w ntrodden social groups get m obilized. T h e tw o visions are n o t contradictory. In fact, the seem ing tension betw een these tw o accounts o f populism helps to underscore an im portant point concerning the nature o f political change: w hat begins as the acceptance o f charity can m utate into dem ands for the recognition o f rights and dignity. R ather than representing a contra­ diction, these tw o accounts o f populism in Tamil N adu illustrate the im portance o f both the analytical context— w hich for K ennedy concerns the justification o f policy reform , and for Baneijee the construction o f a leader’s persona— and the nature o f the com parator: paired w ith West Bengal, Tamil N a d u ’s politics can seem rather alien; w h en bracketed w ith A ndhra Pradesh, Tamil N ad u appears far less politically exotic. West Bengal, the last o f the four states represented in m ore than one chapter, com es across differently in the chapters by Sinha and Banerjee. C ontrasting West Bengal w ith the industrial dynam ism o f G ujarat, Sinha is naturally draw n to the im pacts o f a M arxist ideology on various aspects o f econom ic perform ance. Banerjee, o n the o th er hand, because the axis o f her com parison (w ith Tamil N adu) concerns the cultural politics o f w o m e n ’s political leadership, is draw n into a discussion o f Bengali culture, w hich casts West Bengal in a different light, though the sense o f a serious public culture rem ains a consistent th em e ru n n in g through both chapters. S ubstantive M atters o f T h e o re tic a l Significance C ertain m atters o f relevance to theory-building in the study o f political developm ent crop up repeatedly th ro u g h o u t the book. T hese

Introduction

21

fall into four m ain categories: the com plexities o f federal politics, the b u ild in g blocks o f political econom y, the interaction betw een caste and region, and the im portance o f political style. T h o u g h addressing a crucial issue, studies o f ‘centre-state relations* can veer tow ards the dull and plodding. T h e co n trib u to rs to this volum e w ho deal w ith this topic, how ever, m anage to sidestep the som etim es tedious preoccupations o f th at portion o f thp federalism literature that is dom inated by students o f public adm inistration, w hile still raising im portant questions about the n atu re o f federal politics. B oth M an o r and Jaffrelot, for instance, address th e im pact o f coalition politics at the national level— involving as it does regional parties in key roles— on the politics o f individual states and the strategies deployed by key leaders. M anor, in effect, exam ines the m irro r image o f the regionalization o f natiQnal politics: the nation­ alization o f regional politics. W hile changes in the balance o f forces w ith in individual states increasingly have im plications for political alignm ents in D elhi, the cases o f A ndhra Pradesh and K arnataka are clear examples o f the way in w hich the calculations o f a party’s high co m m an d in D elhi can affect the contours o f state politics: had the B JP national executive n o t forced the party’s Karnataka u n it into an ill-advised alliance w ith a section o f the state’s Janata Dal in 1999, the o u tco m e o f that year’s assem bly election m ight well have been different; b u t it was seats in the national parliam ent th at concerned party strategists at BJP headquarters in D elhi. T his th em e is echoed in the chapters by Kumar, Kennedy, and Jaffrelot and Z erinini-B rotel. Issues o f political econom y appear not only in Part I o f the book, w hich focuses on policym aking, b u t elsew here as well. Jenkins, for instance, analyses the way in w hich the incentives created by certain types o f corrupt transaction affect the w illingness and capacity o f civil society organizations to m obilize people to dem and accountability. B u t Jen k in s’s characterization o f the associations that are the subject o f his chapter as ‘m ovem ent groups’ raises the question o f how best to classify am biguous expressions o f civil society. T his is an issue to w hich a n u m b er o f o th er contributors retu rn — m ost notably Varshney, w h o draw s (implicitly) on the distinction betw een the bridging and b o n d in g form s o f social capital. Sinha’s exploration o f th e political dynam ics o f reform uses econom ic associations as its m ain p o in t o f reference, b u t the analysis is sensitive to the role played by political g roups w hose identity m ay be unclear in interest-based term s, b u t w hich have been a key influence o n efforts to derail econom ic reform

22

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

in West Bengal. Sinha’s approach advocates a b lu rrin g o f the lines separating the conventional categories o f ideas, interests and institu­ tions. Jaffrelot and Z £rinini-B rotel, seeking a m eans for describing som e o f the changes w rought by M andalization (and efforts by political parties to capitalize on it), argue that the potential for reservations, com bined w ith outrage at th e resistance displayed by u p p er castes, tu rn ed the O B C s into an ‘interest group’, a term w hich, in this context, appears to resem ble the R udolphs’ ‘dem and group’— som ething o f a hybrid category denoting a m ovem ent w hich draws o n traditional identities, b u t for purposes o f advancem ent through m o d e m politics.16 M ore fam iliar aspects o f political economy, such as analysis o f the political im plications o f landholding patterns, are fo u n d in the chapters by M anor and Kumar. K um ar traces the im pact o f b o th the G reen R evolution and land reform on patterns o f caste m obilization in Bihar and O rissa, dem onstrating the grow ing ten ­ dency for issues o f econom ic change to be studied alongside those o f political change, though in ways that an earlier generation o f scholars, steeped in M arxist categories o f analysis, m ight not fully recognize. As for the issue o f region and caste, how th e rise o f regional identity in politics has been prom oted rather than supplanted by caste politics is a them e explored by a n u m b er o f contributors w hose chapters are not to be found in Part II o f the book, o n the political assertion o f the low er castes. B oth Banerjee and Kennedy, for instance, em ploy an analysis o f caste’s political significance in their respective treat­ m en ts o f Tamil N a d u ’s politics. Banerjee, in fact, though her chapter is not prim arily concerned w ith the politics o f caste, ends up echoing th e theoretical fram ew ork used by Jaffrelot and Z erinini-B rotel in th eir analysis o f M adhya Pradesh’s adaptation to M andal politics. Tamil N ad u politics, according to B anerjee’s reading o f H arriss (som eone, as we saw earlier, w ho has taken seriously the need to engage in inter-state com parative w ork), contains its ow n version o f th e coalition o f extrem es. Banerjee even quotes one analyst w ho described the AIA D M K ’s construction o f its electoral base as a process 16. For a discussion o f dem and groups, see Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susannc H ocbcr Rudolph, In Pursuit o f Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (Chicago: U niversity o f Chicago Press, 1987). For a discussion o f the hybrid nature o f m uch o f India’s civil society, see Lloyd I. R udolph and Susantie H oeber R udolph, The Modernity o f Tradition (Chicago: U niversity o f Chicago Press, 1967).

Introduction

23

o f the ‘have-a-lots allying w ith have-nothings against the have-alittles’. T h e parallel w ith Digvijay Singh’s strategy in M adhya Pradesh is obvious. B ut w hereas Jaffrelot and Z erin in i-B ro tel focus on w hat m otivated this political strategy, and the differing form s it has taken, Banerjee is concerned w ith the overtones im plied b y the A IA D M K ’s discourse. In Tamil N ad u , benefits are delivered to the have-nots in the form o f charity, n o t as som ething to w hich th e poor possess an autom atic entitlem ent. T h e contrast w ith M adhya Pradesh, a m u ch poorer state o n aggregate than Tamil N ad u , is th u s all the m ore striking: th e m achinations o f even a seasoned politician like Digvijay Singh involve appeals to sentim ents o f rights and social em pow er­ m ent. T h e chapters by M an o r and Jenkins view certain sim ilarities in caste profiles as im portant explanatory variables, tho u g h w ith respect to very different questions: M an o r looks at sim ilarities betw een A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka as a way o f u n d erstan d in g the constraints facing political leaders in these tw o states, w hereas Jenkins exam ines th e parallel caste configurations in tw o sub-state regions— one in M aharashtra and o ne in Rajasthan— in o rd e r to understand its im plications for the efficacy o f an ti-corruption activism. T h e fina l area o f theoretical interest is that o f political style. Several dim ensions o f political style em erge in the com parative studies contained in this volum e. T h e tendency for a certain brand o f Indian politics to involve dem onstrations o r em b o d im en ts o f personal sacrifice is found in the chapters by Banerjee and Jenkins. Banerjee notes that ‘M am ata (w hose nam e m eans “m aternal love”) is univer­ sally know n as D idi, the archetype o f the sacrificing and caring older sister in th e Bengali im agination’. T h is is part o f th e political persona that M am ata has constructed. And w hile M am ata takes part in the m ainstream o f party politics, the echo o f this style o f politics can be found in the w ork o f b oth o f the m ovem ent groups studied by Jenkins, w h o describes th em as operating w ithin w h at W. H . M orrisJo n es once called ‘the saintly idiom o f politics’. Saintly politics— w hich appeals to norm s o f public m orality— w orks only w here som e m odicum o f political civility exists. T his, in tu rn , is reflected in m odes o f governance that are accom m odative in nature. Jen k in s sees accom ­ m odative governance as severely lacking w h en co rru p tio n takes an exclusionary form , as it has in the regions w here th e tw o m ovem ents he studied are based. A ccom m odative governance as a political style is also a th em e in the chapter by M anor, w h o argues that the tradition o f political accom m odation is m uch stronger in K arnataka than in

24

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

A ndhra Pradesh. T his helps to explain the relative absence o f seces­ sionist m ovem ents in Karnataka, w hereas the Tclengana m ovem ent in A ndhra Pradesh has long been a source o f political conflict. M eth o d o lo g ical Q u e stio n s T h e contributions to this volum e illustrate the large array o f m ethods that can be em ployed w ith in the context o f a tw o-state com parison. H a lf o f the chapters— those by Varshney, Kumar, Sinha and Jaffrelot and Z e rin in i-B ro te l— rely heavily o n quantitative data, eith er to establish a pattern that requires explaining, or else to m easure an indicator that is to be used in accounting for a given phenom enon. In tw o cases— the chapters by Varshney and Sinha— quantitative in ­ dicators are used for both purposes. B ut it is w orth noting that in all chapters, at least som e quantitative inform ation is used, and that even in those m ost heavily reliant on quantitative data, a substantial degree o f qualitative inform ation is subjected to an interpretive fram ew ork. A n u m b er o f m ethodological questions appear in m ore than one chapter. M anor, Jenkins, Banerjee and Varshney, for example, contend w ith the unit-of-analysis issue— com bining an inter-state focus w ith appreciation o f the m ultiple levels o f aggregation at w hich causality takes place, and the speed w ith w hich the relevant level can shift. M anor draw s attention to the historical differences betw een the m ajor regions w ithin A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka, especially betw een those that w ere under British rule and those that prior to In depen­ dence w ere subjects o f one o f India’s princes. Jenkins looks at the district level and slightly above for relevant facts that m ight help to explain R ajasthan’s unlikely pairing w ith M aharashtra in term s o f the politics o f anti-corruption. K um ar’s explanation for the different political support bases o f state-level descendants o f the Janata D al in O rissa and Bihar pays close attention to the differences betw een sub­ state regions w ithin Orissa. Varshney’s analysis o f U P and Kerala not only m oves to the local level, but to urban India, and w ith strong em pirical reason: com m unal rioting in India is alm ost entirely an urban affair— the first clue that it is the structure o f civic life that will prove critical in determ ining a city’s propensity to suffer com m unal riots. Banerjee’s analysis o f West Bengal and Tamil N ad u is less preoccupied w ith geographic scale, and m ore concerned w ith conven­ tional notions o f social status. T his, for instance, is central to her analysis o f the West Bengal case, w here m uch attention is paid to the

Introduction

25

reactions o f the bhadralok to M am ata’s particular b ran d o f firebrand politics. Because the bhadralok cannot be conceived w ith o u t Kolkata, the chapter brings us, indirectly b u t inevitably, back to a local level o f analysis. In term s o f the research design and selection o f cases, a range o f different strategies are represented in the volum e. For instance, both Jen k in s’s chapter o n M aharashtra and Rajasthan and Jaffrelot and Z £ rin in i-B ro tel’s chapter o n U P and M adhya Pradesh build their analyses aro u n d the way in w hich rather different states can end up producing roughly sim ilar outcom es, though both chapters highlight the differences that lie beneath the surface. T h e chapters by K ennedy and Sinha each exam ines a pair o f cases that is subjected to a com m on externally im posed shock: the shift in India’s policy fram ew ork from a variety o f state socialism to a far m ore m arket-oriented approach to econom ic policy. T his allows their analyses to exam ine how this shock was dealt w ith differently by different states, and th e n to develop an explanation for these differences. B oth Jenkins and M anor em ploy analytical devices that allow them to account fo r b o th patterns o f sim ilarity across states, and subsequent divergences. A part fro m form al issues o f research design and m ethodology, the chapters also highlight the im portance o f different approaches to political analysis, even w here the authors are n o t from opposing m ethodological cam ps as such. Exam ining the dynam ics o f party organization, Banerjee argues that w hen assessed ‘against the usual academ ic param eters for ju d g in g the efficacy and m aturity o f a political party, such as w ell-form ed political ideology and econom ic policies, disciplined organization o f cadres, coherence and depth o f leadership, and links to clearly defined constituencies and interest groups, b o th the A IA D M K and Trinam ul seem deficient.’ T h at Banerjee m anages to find alternative ways o f conveying the sense o f w hat is significant about these tw o parties by focusing on less conventional conceptions o f ho w pow er is represented and exercised w ithin political organizations is a useful rem in d er o f biases that can infect ostensibly neutral term s. B ut ju s t as im p o rtan t is the fact that w hile M anor, in his study o f A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka, does em ploy th e ‘usual academic param eters’ listed by B aneijee, he does so in ways w hich recognizes that seem ingly universal analytical categories are n o t always translatable across cultural boundaries, even w h en the bou n d ary in question is o ne separating tw o otherw ise fairly sim ilar so u th Indian states.

Part I Economic Policymaking

2 The Political Determinants o f Reform Packaging Contrasting Responses to Economic Liberalization in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu Loraine Kennedy1

ne o f the effects o f econom ic liberalization in India has been to enhance the autonom y o f the states vis-à-vis the central g o v ern m en t, notably w ith respect to eco n o m ic policy-m aking.2 A fter a decade o f progressive b u t substantial econom ic reform s, it has becom e increasingly apparent th at regional political leaders are responding differently to the n ew policy space that the central g o v ern m en t’s liberalization program m e has created. R ecent studies have sh o w n th at states participate in the m arket reform process in accordance w ith their ow n agendas and political com pulsions: p u sh ­ ing som e reform s forw ard, braking o n others, negotiating w ith affected interest groups, and building new coalitions o f support.3 In

O

1. I w ould like to thank Rob Jenkins for his cheerful and extremely useful assistance on successive drafts, and alsojos M ooij,Jean-Luc Racine, K. Srinivasulu, A ndrew W yatt, and KL C . Suri for kindly taking time to read and com m ent on an earlier draft. T he usual disclaimers apply. 2. States have traditionally enjoyed greater autonom y in designing and im plem enting social policies. 3. See R. Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India (Cam bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1999) and A. Sinha, Leviathan Divided: The Regional

30

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

different ways, these studies underscore the fact that states are n o t ju s t passive recipients o f central policy b u t are becom ing, at least in som e cases, agents o f reform . M oreover, it is recognized increasingly that state governm ents are the crucial actors w ith respcct to ‘secondgeneration reform s’, w h ich include rationalizing m ajor utilities, red u cin g subsidies, d ow nsizing p u b lic-secto r em ploym ent, and privatizing state-ow ned enterprises. T h e fact that the World Bank increasingly undertakes sectoral reform program m es at the state level lends fu rth er credence to this view. B ut in w hat respects d o states differ in their responses to their new found policy autonom y? T h is paper engages w ith this neglected question by com paring the experiences o f tw o south Indian states, A ndhra Pradesh and Tamil N adu. Since India launched its experim ent w ith m arket-oriented reform in 1991, A ndhra Pradesh and Tamil N ad u have pursued rem arkably sim ilar policies in a num ber o f areas, particularly industrial p ro m o ­ tion. B ut w hile the basic content o f the tw o states’ policies have m uch in com m on, each state has pursued a distinct approach to reform — in term s o f both the discursive fram ing o f its response to liberalization, and the depth and sequencing o f policy change. Like its counterpart in a n u m b er o f Indian states, the political leadership in A ndhra Pradesh has since the m id-1990s openly em ­ braced a pro-liberalization stance. B ut A ndhra Pradesh has in at least one im portant respect gone further: it has publicly identified eco­ nom ic liberalization as part o f a larger political project o f fundam ental governance reform . In Tamil N adu, the political leadership responded rapidly to opportunities to design sub-national variations o n the central governm ent’s liberalized policy agenda, and these have focused on stim ulating grow th in the state by creating a congenial en vironm ent for private capital. But unlike in A ndhra Pradesh, successive govern­ m ents in Tamil N adu have been cautious about openly endorsing liberalization. T h e policy th ru st rem ains m ore strictly lim ited to grow th strategies, w ith little attention to governance reform . T his paper seeks to explain w hy these tw o states have varied so m arkedly in the way in w hich they have pursued w hat are otherw ise rather sim ilar econom ic policy agendas. T h e com parison is based on an analysis o f their responses to the policy autonom y afforded by the Roots of Developmental Politics in India (Bloom ington, IN : Indiana U niversity Press, forthcom ing).

The Political Determinants o f Reform Packaging

31

central g o v ern m en t’s decision to deregulate m arkets. T h e focus is less o n the precise provisions o f policy— let alone th e results they have produced— than o n their ‘political positioning’. W hile attention is given to specific policy m easures— in sectors su ch as inform ation technology— the m ain p h en o m en o n to be explained is the differing rhetorical strategies in the tw o states. An analysis o f political factors in each region, particularly the nature o f com petitive politics and social m obilization, suggests hypotheses to explain the variations observed in these tw o states. L ib e r a l iz a t io n Autonom

y in

and the

I n c r e a s e d P o l ic y T w o States

T h e point o f dep artu re for this analysis is th at the liberalization process has in tro d u ced significant changes in federal relations, notably w ith respect to econom ic policy-m aking. T his developm ent, m ean­ ingful in its ow n right, assum es added significance due to long­ standing claims fo r m ore decentralized policy-m aking from different regions and political parties. Before central planning began to be dism antled in the 1990s, decisions related to the allocation o f resources in the econom y w ere concentrated in central governm ent m inistries. States th u s had little direct influence o n investm ent decisions, w h e th e r private or public, and w ere com pelled to lobby w ith the central g o v ern m en t (or, as it is often called, ‘th e C e n tre ’) to get industrial and rural infrastructure projects located in their jurisdictions. Indeed, in th e pre-liberalization period, despite th e im portance o f private enterprise in the Indian econom y, public investm ent constituted, according to som e analysts, the m ain d eterm in an t o f grow th.4 It was n o t u n co m m o n for state governm ents to com plain o f discrim ination in the inter-regional distribution o f public-sector investm ent, and th ey did so increasingly as political com petition increased from the late 1960s. U n d e r Indira G an d h i’s leadership, federal relations becam e ten ser still, and in the early 1980s the central governm ent appointed a com m ission to make recom m endations for the im provem ent o f C en tre-state relations. T he Sarkaria C om m ission, as it becam e know n, received m em oranda from , am ong o th e r sources, state governm ents. By revealing the states’ 4. See W orld Bank India: Sustaining Rapid Economic Growth (Washington D .C.: T he World Bank, 1997), p. 19.

32

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

specific grievances in a n u m b er o f areas,5 these subm issions co n stitu te a rich source o f inform ation for understanding chronic tensions in federal relations. Several states pointed o u t that central policies w ere often ill-adapted to their specific econom ic circum stances. M any states expressed th e ir frustration in particular w ith the earm arking o f ‘plan’ aid and th e n u m ero u s conditionalities attached to funds supplied in support o f centrally-sponsored schem es, w hich constituted a significant propor­ tion o f the transfers devolved from the centre to the states.6 To be eligible for these earm arked funds, states w ere usually required to m atch them w ith their ow n resources. Two examples from Kerala illustrate the kind o f centrally im posed policy constraints that states have faced, and w hich help to explain their dem ands for greater autonom y.7 In the early 1990s, Kerala’s state governm ent com plained o f having to spend precious resources o n non-priority areas like irrigation, b u t said they did so in o rd er to obtain central funding.8 T ied fun d in g from the C en tre n o t only forced states to deviate from their original spending priorities; they w ere also b o u n d by centrally determ ined criteria for selecting beneficiaries o f targeted schem es. In the late 1980s state officials com plained bitterly because centrally sponsored schem es designed to assist the coir industry, a m ajor elem ent in Kerala’s economy, w ere being im ple­ m ented th ro u g h the C o ir Board, a central agency. T h is deprived the state governm ent, led by the Left D em ocratic F ront, o f patronage resources and allowed its local C ongress rivals to use their co nnec­ tions in N ew D elhi, w here C ongress was in pow er, to influence the im plem entation process, notably the selection o f beneficiaries.9 5. See G overnm ent o f India, Commission on Centre-State Relations: Report, vol. II (N ew D elhi, 1987). 6. G overnm ent o f India, Commission on Centre-State Relations..., p. 367. O n average, tw o-thirds o f plan aid was earm arked for program m es and sectors deem ed a ‘priority’ by central planners. 7. T his is not to suggest that states had no room for policy m anoeuvre at all. T heir degree o f leverage depended on factors such as w hether there was correspondence betw een central and state ruling parties and the ruling party’s social base— factors w hich continue to influence policy choices. 8. Interview with an official at the Kerala State Planning Board, Trivandrum , 6 D ecem ber 1990. 9. See L. Kennedy, Articulation des espaces de developpement en Inde: les industries traditionnelles au Kerala, unpublished PhD dissertation (Paris: Ecole des H autes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1994).

The Political Determinants o f Reform Packaging

33

T h e cu rren t context o f liberalization and deregulation has created o p portunities for states to assert greater autonom y in the form ulation and im plem entation o f their econom ic policies. Early o n in the reform process, m ost states recognized the need to revam p industrial and infrastructure policies and to create a m ore conducive environm ent for private investm ent. T his led to sim ilar prom otional strategies and incentives being adopted in m any states, and hence to increasingly overt inter-state com petition. B ut beyond such efforts, w hich can be considered a m inim al response, governing elites at the state level m ight have been expected, in light o f earlier constraints, to seize opportunities created by contem poraneous political developm ents to assert greater control over econom ic policy-m aking. In this com parative study o f A ndhra Pradesh and Tamil N ad u an analytical distinction is made betw een prom otional efforts (incentive packages and procedural reform s designed to stream line the invest­ m en t process) and structural reform s. T h e latter include the secondgeneration reform s m entioned above, b u t also governance reform s, w hich aim prim arily to im prove public-sector m anagem ent and the accountability o f the governm ent to individual citizens and the voluntary associations into w hich they are organized. C o m p a r in g P o l ic y A u t o n o m A c t io n

and

y in

R h e t o r ic

T h e objective o f this section is to characterize the policy approaches being pursued in A ndhra Pradesh and Tamil N adu. T h e analysis o f political rhetoric presents a necessary, if challenging, task because o f its ‘internal’ and ‘external’ roles. In term s o f the external environm ent, the way in w hich a state go v ern m en t’s approach to econom ic policym aking is fram ed can be an im portant determ in an t o f the state’s success in attracting both private-sector investors and official and n o n ­ governm ental aid agencies. Internally, the rhetoric articulated by a strong party or dom inant political figure can serve as an in stru m en t for m obilizing public opinion around a ‘societal project’ expressing collective goals. Before assessing the influence o f these tw o aspects o f policy rhetoric, it is necessary to understand the broader political context w ithin w hich reform ers in these tw o states had to operate. W hen India’s econom ic reform program m e was launched in 1991 the C ongress Party ruled both the central governm ent in N e w D elhi

34

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

and the state governm ent o f A ndhra Pradesh. In 1994 it was defeated in state assem bly elections in A ndhra Pradesh, losing pow er to its rival, the Telugu D esam Party (T D P ). T h ere was a significant reorientation o f policy in 1995 w hen N . C handrababu N aid u displaced his fatherin-law, N . T. R am a R ao (N T R ), the fo u n d er and leader o f the TD P, as ch ief m inister o f A ndhra Pradesh. N aid u ’s hostile takeover o f the party provoked a split, w hich divided the T D P ’s vote in the 1996 and 1998 parliam entary contests.10 In 1999 N aid u led his party to re-election w ith the help o f an alliance w ith the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), effectively elim inating the rival T D P form ation. In Tamil N adu, the political scene is dom inated by two rival Dravidian parties, the Dravida M u nnetra Kazhagam (D M K ) and the A ll-India Anna D ravida M u nnetra Kazhagam (AIADM K). T h e A IADM K, u n ­ der the leadership o f j. Jayalalitha, was in pow er in Tamil N ad u at the outset o f the reform process. T h e A IA D M K was defeated in the 1996 state assem bly contest by the D M K , led by M . K arunanidhi, w h o had served as c h ie f m inister on tw o previous occasions.11 In M ay 2001, the A IA D M K regained control o f the state assem bly w ith the help o f an electoral alliance, and Jayalalitha once again becam e c h ie f m inister. S im ilar P ro m o tio n al Strategics In A d d itio n to s im p lify in g i n v e s tm e n t p r o c e d u r e s a n d a c c e le r a tin g th e

approval o f project proposals, governm ents in both states have used a w ide range o f incentives to attract private capital to the state.12 T hese included fiscal incentives, such as tax exem ptions, as well as project finance and the subsidized provision o f land, water, electricity con­ nections, and o th er infrastructural am enities. 10. T he two rival parties were know n as T D P (N ), for N aidu, and T D P (L P ), for Lakshmi Parvathi, N T R ’s widow. Jam es M anor’s chapter in this volum e provides further details about A ndhra Pradesh’s recent political history. 11. Karunanidhi was chief m inister from 1969 to 1976 and again from 1989 to 1991. 12. Both states arc qualified as ‘reform -oriented’ by N . Bajpai and J. D. Sachs, ‘T h e Progress o f Policy' Reform and Variations in Performance at the SubN ational Level in India’, D evelopm ent Discussion Paper 730 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Institute for International D evelopm ent, N ovem ber 1999), p. 2. Bajpai and Sachs place India’s 15 m ajor states into three categories: reform -oriented (Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat. Karnataka, M aharashtra, Tamil N adu), interm ediate reform ers (Haryana, Orissa, West Bengal) and lagging reformers (Assam, Bihar, Kerala, M adhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, U ttar Pradesh).

The Political Determ inants o f Reform Packaging

35

W hen the central governm ent first an n o u n ced a m ore liberal policy tow ard foreign direct investm ent in 1991 and started to dism antle the ‘licence-perm it raj’, Tamil N ad u was am ong th e first states to react. In a bid to lure industrial investm ent in particular, the A IAD M K governm ent stream lined its procedures and offered potential investors attractive tax holidays and capital subsidies. In addition, successive governm ents in Tamil N ad u have set up o r facilitated the establishm ent o f industrial estates in and around the state capital o f C hennai (form erly know n as M adras).13 T h e authorities o f these estates and new ly form ed industrial tow nships have been em pow ered to g ran t ‘single-w indow clearance’ to firm s locating there. To fu rth er speed u p the process, investors are perm itted to com m encc the co nstruction o f th eir factories w ith o u t w aiting for the plan’s approval from local authorities.14 In 1995 the Tamil N ad u governm ent succeeded in clinching a very large industrial investm ent from the Ford M o to r C om pany, a coup that established the state’s reputation as a highly aggressive player in the com petition for foreign investm ent. W h en Ford established a jo in t venture w ith M ahindra and M ahindra to m anufacture Fiesta autom obiles in India, it initially short-listed fo u r states as potential bases for its op eratio n s.15 A lthough the proxim ity o f the m anufactur­ ing plant to India’s m ost lucrative consum er m arkets, centred around M um bai and D elhi, was said to be a m ajor consideration, Tamil N ad u nevertheless w o n the contract. W hat tipped the balance in its favour was the custom ized package o f incentives devised by governm ent officials. C h ie f M inister Jayalalitha took a great personal interest in this project: in m id - 1995 she gave assurances to Ford’s C E O that the state governm ent w ould render ‘all necessary assistance for the quick im plem entation o f this project’.16 Jayalalitha’s interest w en t to the 13. For an analysis o f how statc-lcvcl strategies, notably the prom otion o f specialized industrial estates, are shaping space in and around C hennai and Hyderabad, see L. Kennedy, ‘Shaping Econom ic Space in C hennai and Hyderabad: T he Assertion o f State-Level Policies in the Post-Rcform Era’, Purusartha (Paris: Editions EHESS, forthcom ing). 14. These perm issions arc extended on condition that investors agree to corrective action at a later date. Sec Bajpai and Sachs, ‘T h e Progress o f Policy R efo rm ....’, p. 8. 15. These were G ujarat, Haryana, M aharashtra and Tamil N adu. For a detailed analysis, see T. S. Subram anian, ‘Seeing the Fiesta th ro u g h ’,Frontline, 20 Septem ber 1996, pp. 82-8. 16. Ibid, p. 84.

36

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

extent o f am ending the state go v ern m en t’s rules o n new investm ents: a G o v ern m en t O rd e r was issued one day before the M em o ran d u m o f U n d erstan d in g betw een the state governm ent and Ford was signed, defining a new category o f investm ent— know n as ‘super m ega’ projects— and the incentives to w hich they w ere entitled. A su p er m ega project is one w ith an investm ent o f at least Rs 1500 crore (U S $ 330 m illion) in the first five to seven years. T h e investing firm receives in exchange a sales tax deferral/w aiver for 14 years, o r 21 years if the q u an tu m o f sales tax deferral/w aiver does n o t reach 100 per cent o f the investm ent in fixed assets by the fourteenth year.17 M ahindraFord obtained additional concessions, including sales tax exem ption on capital equipm ent and inputs procured w ithin Tamil N ad u , exem ption on electricity tax (in addition to a guarantee o f u n in ter­ rupted pow er) and full exem ption from stam p du ty on the purchase o f land. T h e value o f this last concession was increased substantially by Tamil N a d u ’s passage o f legislation in 1997 that eased the acquisition o f private land for industrial purposes. T h e opposition D M K party criticized the state go v ern m en t’s agreem ent w ith M ahindra-F ord, and accused the ruling party in particular o f pandering to m ultinational corporations at the expense o f Tamil N a d u ’s interests. B ut w hen the D M K cam e to pow er a few m onths later, it agreed to abide by the term s o f the M em o ran d u m o f U nderstanding, including the agreed incentives. M oreover, in Ju ly 1996, South Korea’s H yundai M o to r C o m pany signed a deal w ith the Tamil N ad u governm ent for another super m ega project (a regulatory category that was n o t repealed by the D M K governm ent w hen it cam e to pow er) and was thereby able to benefit from the sam e generous package. T his was follow ed by an o th er large investm ent from the French firm Saint-G obain, for a glass-m aking factory o n a specially designed site near C hennai. T hese examples suggest the degree o f discretion— exceeding offi­ cial policy rules— enjoyed by state governm ents in negotiating w ith international firms. T h ey also underscore Tamil N a d u ’s strategic use o f its new ly acquired autonom y. Since Ford and H yundai have started operations, o th er autom obile and com ponents m anufacturers have followed, creating prom ising linkage effects in this sector. In 1996, the N ational C ouncil o f Applied E conom ic Research ranked Tamil N adu 17. Interview w ith a high-ranking official in the Industries Ministry. G overn­ m ent o f Tamil N adu, C hennai, 29 Ju n e 2000.

T h e Political D e term in an ts o f R efo rm Packaging

37

as the Indian state w ith the m ost attractive package o f investm ent 1H incentives. A ndhra Pradesh has been equally aggressive in its efforts to attract private capital for industrial grow th. Indeed, som e industry profes­ sionals consider A ndhra Pradesh the m ost pro-active am o n g south Indian states in creating a business-friendly atm osphere, particularly w ith respect to regulatory transparency.19 O n e o f the key character­ istics o f A ndhra Pradesh’s strategy is intensive use o f m edia to m arket th e state as an investm ent destination and to broadcast propaganda ab o u t the state’s policies and program m es. C h ie f M in ister N aidu appears frequently in the m edia, w here he carefully cultivates his im age as a reform er and projects A ndhra Pradesh as a tren d -setter am o n g India’s states. An em phasis o n new technologies is part o f a strategy that aim s to m ake the state synonym ous w ith m o d em , forw ard-looking dynam ism . Speed is a co m p o n en t o f this strategy, consciously deployed to achieve tactical and psychological advantage over o th er states. As one policy d o cu m en t p u t it: To (its m any) strengths, A n d h ra P radesh w ill add speedy refo rm a n d capability b u ild in g , giving it a significant com p etitiv e edge. M o st In d ian states and m an y c o u n trie s are anticipating o p p o rtu n ities and m o v in g to capture th e m . W h at w ill separate the w in n e rs from th e losers w ill be th e ability to m o v e fast, reform g o v e rn m e n t, create in frastru ctu re and develop h u m a n reso u rces. A n d h ra P rad esh w ill m ove quickly on all these fro n ts to en su re th at it em erges a w in n e r.20

Like Tamil N adu, A ndhra Pradesh has achieved a n u m b e r o f highprofile investm ent ‘coups’, such as the decision by the softw are giant M icrosoft to establish in H yderabad its first research and developm ent centre outside the U S. Inform ation technology is an area th a t A ndhra Pradesh and Tamil N ad u are b oth very keen to develop, and over w h ich they are openly com peting. A com parison o f th e ir respective strategies, in the next section, indicates sim ilarities and also gives a glim pse o f an im portant difference. 18. See G overnm ent o f Tamil N adu, Destination Tamil Nadu (C hennai: Tamil N a d u Industrial D evelopm ent, n.d.), p. 25. 19. T his was the opinion o f the regional director o f the C onfederation o f Indian Industry (southern region), interview, C hennai, 26 Ju n e 2000. 20. G overnm ent o f A ndhra Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh: Vision 2020 (Hyderabad, 1999), p. 10.

38

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

C o m p e tin g fo r IT In v estm en t As stated above, one o f A ndhra Pradesh’s prim ary focus areas has b e e n the p ro m o tio n o f the inform ation technology industry. In 1995, th e state governm ent launched the co n stru ctio n o f H itec City, i.e. H yderabad Inform ation Technology E ngineering C onsultancy C ity, a jo in t public-private sector project situated 15 kilom etres from th e centre o f H yderabad. B uttressed by an IT policy containing n u m ero u s ‘industry-friendly’ incentives,21 H itec C ity has succeeded in attracting Indian and international firms. By late 2002, the tw o m ain office buildings, C yber Towers and C yber Gateway, housed approxim ately 50 IT com panies and n um erous others had settled on the su rro u n d in g cam pus, including M icrosoft, Infosys, O racle, and Satyam. H itec City, w hich claims to be Asia’s largest IT park, gives substance to the governm ent’s aspirations in the field o f IT, and its sym bolic significance was apparent in 2000 w hen U S President Bill C lin to n sp en t the m ajor part o f his sh o rt visit to H yderabad at H itec City. A ndhra Pradesh’s m edia campaign has clearly played an im p o rtan t role in bringing IT investm ents to H yderabad. C h ie f M in ister N aid u ’s public persona, representing a ‘m o d em m indset’,22 and his public relations skills have also been instrum ental. An anecdote published in India Today, India’s m o st established weekly new s magazine, relates how N aidu cornered M icrosoft C E O Bill G ates during his first visit to India, exposing his am bitious plans for th e developm ent o f the IT industry in A ndhra Pradesh. Gates w as 21. In 2002 the Andhra Pradesh governm ent released a new IT policy for 2002-05, replacing the 1999 policy. A m ong th e incentives granted automatically to IT com panies w ere exemption from statutory pow er cuts, exem ption from inspections u n d er m ost labour legislation in exchange for a regime o f selfcertification, and permission for three-shift operations. Com panies may also apply for concessional pow er tariffs, reim bursem ent o f stamp duty, exem ption from zoning regulations, and partial rebates for land-acquisition costs. See G overnm ent o f Andhra Pradesh, IC T Policyfor 2002-2005 (Hyderabad: Inform ation Technol­ ogy and C om m unications D epartm ent, 2002), pp. 2-4. 22. T his was the term used by Narayana M urthy, the chairm an o f the software firm Infosys: ‘T h e fact that [C linton] is visiting a state w here the ch ief m inister symbolizes a m odem m indset proves [that In d o -U S relations are being p u t o n a trade platform rather than a political platform]*. S. Srivastava, ‘India’s High-Tech H opes’, BBC N ew s O nline, 17 M arch 2000.

The Political Determinants o f Reform Packaging

39

apparently bew ildered initially, b u t was eventually convinced by N aid u ’s sincerity and sound planning.23 A ndhra P radesh indulges in w hat m any observers consider exag­ gerated claims ab o u t the state’s IT excellence and its state-of-the-art facilities. N evertheless, the in d u stry ’s recent perform ance has been rem arkable: data provided by the H yderabad branch o f Software Technology Parks o f India (S T P I)24 indicate that exports from A ndhra Pradesh increased from Rs 60 cr. in 1995-6 to m o re than Rs 3500 crore in 2002-03. In th e same period, the n u m b er o f com panies registered w ith S T P I and in operation rose from 31 to 820 (81 new units in 2002-03), providing em ploym ent to 71,445 persons. W here reality diverges m ost dram atically fro m the projected image is that H itec C ity does n o t as yet function in accordance w ith the ‘Silicon Valley’ ideal that inspired it— nam ely a place w here synergies are generated betw een research institutions and private firm s creating opportunities for the com m ercial exploitation o f cutting-edge inno­ vations.25 U n lik e its m ain rivals, Bangalore and C h en n ai, H yderabad docs n o t offer first-rate engineering schools n o r academ ic institutions w ith reputations fo r cutting-edge research in science and technology.26 T h e Tamil N a d u governm ent also aspires to specialize in IT. Starting its push later, b u t w ith considerable advantages, Tamil N a d u ’s approach to developing this prestigious and econom ically prom ising sector is overtly com petitive, reacting explicitly to the challenge posed by the industry-friendly policies and generous incentive packages offered by A ndhra Pradesh.27 23. India Today, 31 M arch 1997, pp. 72-7. 24. Software Technology Parks o f India is an autonom ous agency established in 1990 by the G overnm ent o f India. 25. M orel reports that interviews w ith managers indicated that they did not have R&D links w ith research institutes in H yderabad, although they do have this kind o f exchange w ith centres in the USA and Australia, w here their hom e offices arc locatcd. Sec S. M orel, Hi-Tec City—Hyderabad: Mythes et Réalités d ’un Projet Urbain, unpublished masters thesis, D ept, o f Geography, University o f R ouen (France), 2000. 26. In an attem pt to fill this gap, a specialized engineering school, the Indian Institute o f Inform ation Technology, was launched in 1998. 27. In the press, Tamil N ad u ’s officials frequently criticize the ‘hype’ projected by the Andhra Pradesh governm ent. As an illustration o f the competitive feeling in Tamil N adu, C h ie f M inister Karunanidhi boasted to the state assembly that the TID E L software park in C hennai w ould be larger than H itec C ity in Hyderabad. The H indu, 9 M ay 2000.

40

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

As early as 1997, the Tamil N ad u governm ent announced a farreaching IT policy, including the creation o f a special dep artm en t to oversee im plem entation.28 As in A ndhra Pradesh, the policy included provisions for capital subsidy and tax relief, and adm inistrative incentives such as exem ption from certain types o f legislation an d perm ission for self certification w ith respect to others, such as th e Tamil N ad u Shops and E stablishm ents Act, the C o n tract Labour Act, and the M in im u m Wages Act. To achieve its objectives, identified as the p rom otion o f b o th hardw are and softw are industries as w ell as upgrading the skills required to su p p o rt the IT industry, Tamil N ad u has em phasized its recognized strengths in tw o key areas: hu m an resources and infra­ stru ctu re.29 T h e state has a highly trained labour force, in clu d in g a large percentage o f the c o u n try ’s softw are professionals and co m p u te r science graduates, and also the greatest n u m b er o f colleges teaching IT courses.30 O n the infrastructure side, since m id-2000 C h en n ai has had an equivalent to H yderabad’s H itec City, the Inform ation T ech­ nology Park, situated in close proxim ity to the Indian Institute o f Technology, the A nna Technical U niversity, and several o th er research institutes. It is part o f a larger planned IT corridor: 35 kilom etres dow n w hat has recently been re-baptized in fo rm a tio n H ighw ay’, another IT park is being developed at Siruseri. T h u s, there are a n u m b er o f sim ilarities in the approaches adopted by Tamil N ad u and A ndhra Pradesh to attract industrial investm ent. T hese include efforts by each state to create an investor-friendly en v i­ ro n m en t through incentives, regulatory reform , and the developm ent o f specialized infrastructure. T h e ir strategies are particularly sim ilar— in som e cases identical— in the inform ation technology industry. 28. See N . Bajpai and A. Dokeniya, in fo rm atio n Technology-Led G row th Policies: A Case Study o f Tamil N ad u ’, D evelopm ent Discussion Paper 729 (Cam bridge, Mass.: H arvard Institute for International D evelopm ent, O cto b er 1999). T he current AJLADMK governm ent released a new IT policy in 2002. See http://www. tn.gov. in/m isc/ITpolicy2002.pdf. 29. A study by the N ational Association o f Software and Service C om panies rated Tamil N adu the best location for setting up a software industry after considering criteria like skilled hum an resources, data com m unications facilities, and electricity supply. Sec Bajpai and Dokeniya, in fo rm atio n Technology-Led G row th Policies....’, p. 8. 30. See A. Krishnakumar, ‘Special Feature: Education in T N \ Frontline, 21 Ju ly 2000, pp. 111-27.

T he Political Determinants o f Reform Packaging

41

B ut a closer reading o f these tw o states’ policy d o cu m en ts reveals key differences that are indicative o f m ore general trends in econom ic policy: Tamil N ad u applies a m ore strictly defined sectoral approach, w h ich tends to be highly pragm atic and operational. It focuses on enhancing existing strengths and w hile the go v ern m en t plays an enabling role, m ajor initiatives are left to private actors. A ndhra Pradesh also uses conventional policy instrum ents, b u t th ere is considerably m ore em phasis o n creating new capacities, both physical and hum an. W hile it w orks in close collaboration w ith p ro m o ters and firm s, the governm ent rem ains the driving force in the process. In the language used by the A ndhra Pradesh go v ern m en t and its m ost high-profile officials, pro-grow th policies are linked w ith strategies aim ed at achieving long-term developm ent goals. For instance, IT is presented as n o t ju s t an industrial activity, capable o f creating w ealth and em ploym ent, b u t as a m eans to achieve radical transform ation in the quality and m odes o f governance. S itu a tin g E co n o m ic R e stru c tu rin g w ith in a W id e r D e v e lo p m e n t A genda W hat m ost sets apart A ndhra Pradesh’s policy approach from Tamil N a d u ’s is that its discourse m oves beyond prom otional, pro-grow th m easures to m ore long-term orientations that involve restru ctu rin g th e economy, im proving governance, and p rom oting social develop­ m en t. A crucial aspect o f the political rhetoric is to situate econom ic reform s, w hich involve sh o rt- to m ed iu m -term sacrifices o n the part o f the state’s people, w ithin a broader transform ationalist vision o f developm ent. T h is agenda, elaborated in a 350-page d o cu m en t, Andhra Pradesh: Vision 2020, pledges to create by 2020 ‘a level o f developm ent th a t will provide its people trem endous opportunities to achieve prosperity and w ell-being and enjoy a high quality o f life’.31 Regardless o f its chances o f realization, this policy m aster plan is in itself o f interest to the extent that it represents a societal project, expressing collective goals. U nveiled in 1998, Vision 2020 identifies nineteen grow th engines, covering a variety o f econom ic sectors,32 31. GoAP, Andhra Pradesh: Vision 2020...... p. 1. It is notew orthy that this do cu m en t was prepared by McKinsey, an international m anagem ent consulting firm . For a critical analysis, sec D. N arasim ha Reddy (cd.), Vision 2020, Myths and Realities (Hyderabad: Sundarayya Vignanaakendram, 1999). 32. These include agriculture, horticulture, and agro-industry; industry and infrastructure; and services such as logistics, tourism , healthcare, and education.

42

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

that are expected to ensure balanced developm ent across A ndhra Pradesh’s three m ain regions. Significantly, realizing this vision w ill rely o n private investm ent; the governm ent’s self-defined role is to catalyze this process by creating conditions capable o f attracting increasingly footloose foreign and dom estic capital. G overnance reform is presented as the necessary condition o f Vision 2020's success. A lthough A ndhra Pradesh’s approach to governance cannot be called original— aid agencies have elaborated a sim ilar good g overnm ent agenda over the last decade— the idea o f explicitly situating econom ic liberalization w ithin a larger fram ew ork o f gov­ ernance reform , and associating the ruling party’s political image w ith this project, is unique am ong India’s states. As form ulated in Vision 2020, the reform s aim to render the adm inistration m ore transparent and m ore accountable to citizens. T hese ideals are conveyed by catch phrases like ‘SM A R T (Sim ple, M oral, A ccountable, Responsive and Transparent) G o v ern m en t’, and im plem ented th ro u g h e-g o v em m en t initiatives like e-Seva, w hich aim s to im prove citizen-governm ent interface on service delivery by using inform ation technology. IT is thus view ed n o t only as a key econom ic sector, b u t also as an in stru m en t for achieving ‘revolutionary’ changes in the nature o f governance. N aid u elaborated this point his book, Plain Speaking: IT can provide w h a t good governance needs: speed, efficiency, transparency, consistency and reliability. It can sm o o th e n th e interface citizens and business have w ith th e g o v ern m en t, by m ak in g th e latter m o re responsive. W ith in fo rm atio n technology it becom es possible to im prove in tern al efficiencies, integrate services, and to in tro d u ce n ew services.

Som e m easures have been im plem ented such as the state-w ide C om puter-aided A dm inistration o f Registrations D epartm ent (C A RD ), w hich aim s to provide transparent m ethods for valuing properties and calculating stam p duties. T h e objective is greater reliability, less discretionary decision-m aking on the part o f governm ent servants, and a reduction in the tim e required for registering deeds, obtaining certificates, and perform ing o th er routine services. Inform ation tech­ nology has also been applied to facilitate both planning and im ple­ m en tatio n o f g o v ern m en t-sp o n so red d ev elo p m en t program m es. D atabases containing inform ation from household surveys, in con­ ju n c tio n w ith geographic inform ation system s and rem ote-sensing 33. N . C . N aidu (with S. N inan), Plain Speaking (N ew Delhi: Viking, 2000), pp. 83-4.

The Political Determ inants o f Reform Packaging

43

technologies, have been used to generate detailed maps, the idea being that access to location-specific inform ation o n a w ide range o f variables (soil types, rainfall averages, roads, bore wells) w ill im prove the accountability o f elected officials.34 Involving the public— thro u g h a discourse rem iniscent o f the ‘third w ay’ political philosophies espoused by centre-left governm ents in E urope d u rin g th e 1990s— is at the centre o f A ndhra Pradesh’s governance reform strategy: In India people have bccom c very conscious o f th e ir fu n d a m e n tal rights. B ut n o o n e has asked, w h a t are his o r h e r fu n d am en tal duties?...G o v ern an ce is bey o n d th e capacity o f th e g o v e rn m e n t alone. C ivil society, th e private sector, local c o m m u n ities— all have to play th e ir part.35

N aidu claims that public opinion m u st be ‘educated’ about the necessity o f reform s so that ordinaiy people w ill su p p o rt them : ‘the art o f politics is to m ake such decisions palatable so that they are not rejected ou trig h t by citizens, w h o are the voters. H ow ever, as go v ern m en t officials adm it, only part o f the am bitious agenda for ‘e-governance’ has been realized. O n e im portant reason that procedures have been effectively m odified in only a lim ited n u m b er o f areas is that com puterization o f go v ern m en t services has m et w ith strong opposition from state em ployees’ unions, w h o fear retren ch m en t and the loss o f opportunities for obtaining illegal incom e. Field interview s suggest that an o th er explanation for the lim ited results o f governance reform s is the lingering unw illingness o f governm ent officials to undertake the lengthy and often risky process o f co nsulting the public about reform s and collecting feed­ back. W ithin th e adm inistration, a strong em phasis o n results puts bureaucrats u n d e r heavy pressure to produce data even w hen it is n o t available.37 Policy d o cu m en ts and political rhetoric also em phasize popular participation in developm ent initiatives and the notion o f citizens as 34. N aidu opines that “W ith so m uch inform ation on tap, alibis for doing nothing about alleviating poverty and backwardness arc fast disappearing.’ Ibid., p. 101.

35. Ibid., p. 15. 36. Ibid., p. 10. 37. Some close observers have questioned the reliability o f the m uch-touted data bases designed to track program m e im plem entation. Interview, C entre for G ood Governance, Hyderabad, 4 April 2003.

44

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

stakeholders— ideas borrow ed liberally from the good governance debates o f the 1990s. T h ey are m anifested in the c h ie f m in ister’s flagship rural developm ent schem e,Janmabhoomi.38 L aunched in 1997, this schem e is a highly visible part o f the governance reform agenda. U n d e r this program m e, w h ich favours ‘self-help’ initiatives, massive funds have been devolved to the local level. In theory, villagers m eet in gram sabhas (village councils), decide collectively o n their priorities (e.g. roads, schools, latrines) and th en are required to participate in the realization o f the chosen projects by co n trib u tin g eith er cash o r their labour. Janm abhoom i has been controversial from the start, and critics have often alleged that the schem e is lacking in transparency, allow ing T D P cadres to becom e its prim ary beneficiaries. Packaging S tru ctu ral R efo rm s T h e com parison o f the tw o states’ approaches to structural reform s, including ‘second-generation’ reform s that are at the core o f liberal­ ization, reveals considerable differences in how th ey have been politically positioned. B oth states are p u rsuing reform s, b u t w hile A ndhra Pradesh ‘tru m p ets’ its support for th em — its ch ief m inister openly identifying h im self w ith specific policy m easures and the reform ist instinct generally— successive governm ents in Tamil N ad u (representing b oth the D M K and the A IA D M K ) have acted far m ore discreetly, avoiding w herever possible taking a public stand in su p p o rt o f m arket reform , and certainly displaying n o inclination to situate econom ic reform w ithin a larger transform ationalist developm ent agenda built around a vision o f radical citizcn-oricntcd governance reform . Shortly after taking over as c h ie f m inister o f A ndhra Pradesh in 1995, N aid u took decisions dem onstrating his su p p o rt for econom ic reform s, intentionally distinguishing h im self from his predecessor. N aid u ’s expressed co m m itm en t to liberalization, and the m arket ideology that underlies it, has if anything grow n over the years. Initially, isolated policy decisions like tariff hikes for electricity users (including farm ers39) w ere presented as necessary to redress the state’s 38. Janmabhoomi literally means ‘land o f birth’. T h e G overnm ent o f A ndhra Pradesh uses the term to convey a grassroots approach to w h at it calls ‘a peoplecentred developm ent process’. 39. Im plem ented shortly after arriving in office, this political decision assumes added significance in light o f the fact that electricity continues to be provided free o f charge to farmers in neighbouring Tamil N adu.

The Political Determ inants o f Reform Packaging

45

financial crisis, b u t since then N aidu has taken u p the refrain that reform s in India should go fu rth er and faster. H is public discourse has becom e explicitly supportive o f n o t only the m ark et m echanism as a m ore efficient allocative device, b u t also o f global econom ic integration, in general, as m eans to achieve g row th and social devel­ opm ent. ‘Today’, he argued in one governm ent policy docum ent, ‘global forces are creating unprecedented o p p ortunities for growth*.40 Taking th e ir cue from the c h ie f m inister, officials in A ndhra Pradesh have been at the forefront am ong Indian states in p utting ‘second-generation reform s’ o n the policy agenda. Vision 2020 is largely ab o u t refocusing public priorities and spending— that is, pulling o u t o f certain sectors and developing a presence in others, deregulating or creating new regulation to ensure a friendly environ­ m en t for private enterprise. It extols the benefits o f disinvestm ent o f public sector units, and unpopular action has been taken against even highly politically sensitive sectors, such as the state-ow ned and co-operative sugar and spinning mills, w hich have accum ulated heavy losses over the years. Perhaps the m ost significant reform o f public enterprise is the cu rren t restructuring o f th e pow er sector. W ith W orld Bank funding and technical assistance, and follow ing a m odel im plem ented in several o th er Indian states, pow er-sector reform in A ndhra Pradesh involves u n b u n d lin g the production, transm ission, and distribution functions, and establishing for each function a separate, quasi-autonom ous corporation, to be m anaged on a com m ercial basis. T h e governm ent is attem pting to redefine the u ser-provider rela­ tionship in o th e r utilities as well. A pilot reform in H yderabad linked increased u ser charges for w ater to better perform ance by governm ent. A citizen’s ch arter was designed to ensure a p re-d eterm in ed level o f services to custom ers w h o pay their bills regularly, w ith com pensation to be paid i f services failed to m eet the stipulated standard. T h is is a concrete exam ple o f how the adm inistrative-reform agenda outlined above is being integrated w ith econom ic reform s. T h e idea is that the public should perceive a change in its interaction w ith servicedelivery agencies. Indeed, convincing people th a t th e lo n g -term benefits they stand to gain w ill m ore than com pensate for their presentday sacrifices involves m odifying their expectations about the proper role for governm ent. 40. GoAP, Andhra Pradesh: Vision 2 0 2 0 ...., p. 8.

46

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

N a id u ’s adm inistration contends that it has introduced greater rigour in its m anagem ent o f public finances, in keeping w ith th e W orld Bank conditionalities to w hich it has agreed.41 A lthough th is claim has been contested,42 at least som e politically sensitive refo rm s have been im plem ented in recent years, in clu d in g a reduction o f subsidies, notably on rice, a freeze on em p lo y m en t levels in certain categories o f governm ent service, and an increase in user charges fo r public services such as w ater and electricity. N aidu claim s that w hile the era o f ‘h a n d o u ts’ is over, external fu n d in g has allowed his governm ent to spend m ore on developm ent than ever before, m ain ­ taining selective subsidies o f various sorts. T h is encapsulates th e T D P ’s policy approach, w hich com bines econom ic liberalization, popular redistribution program m es, and governance reform .43 Tamil N a d u ’s response to the challenge o f im plem enting structural reform s has been m u ch less enthusiastic th a n that o f A ndhra Pradesh. Since 1991, elected leaders and civil servants in Tamil N a d u have adopted a m o re gradual and discreet approach to econom ic reform s com pared to th e ir counterparts in A ndhra Pradesh— for instance, w ith respect to reducing subsidies or hiking tariffs for public services. B ut this reserved stance, like A ndhra Pradesh’s pro-active approach, m u st be evaluated critically, and has m ore to d o w ith packaging th an substance. Indeed, w hile A ndhra Pradesh’s go v ern m en t does less than it announces, Tamil N ad u ’s does more. Tamil N a d u ’s political leadership has, on the w hole, avoided overtly positioning itself as a cham pion o f th e liberalization agenda, focussing very selectively o n those aspects m o st favourable to indus­ trial grow th. In his 2000-01 budget speech to the state assembly, C h ie f M inister K arunanidhi did n o t even m ention econom ic reform s, som e­ th in g unthinkable for N aidu. H ow ever, interview s w ith Tamil N ad u governm ent officials conducted in Ju n e 2000 show ed that the gov­ ern m en t was in fact m oving ahead, quietly, o n a n u m b er o f sensitive reform issues.44 T h e M inistry o f Industries w as phasing o u t assistance 41. A ndhra Pradesh agreed to reduce its fiscal deficit to 2.5 per cent o f state dom estic product by 2002-03 (from 3 per cent in 1997-8). 42. See, for instance, Jam es M an o r’s chapter in this volum e. 43. See Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H o eb er R udolph, ‘Iconization o f C handrababu: Sharing Sovereignty in India's Federal M arket Economy*, Economic and Political Weekly, 5 May 2001, pp. 1541-51. 44. Interview s w ith IAS officers in the M inistry o f Industries, G overnm ent o f Tamil N a d u , Ju n e-Ju ly 2000, C hennai.

The Political Determinants o f Reform Packaging

47

m easures to public-sector units, as well as indirect subsidies to sm allscale industries (SSIs), actions that w ere n o t openly publicized, lest they catalyze political resistance. T h e g o v ern m en t passed an order lifting the req u irem en t that governm ent departm ents and publicsector undertakings purchase certain item s from SSIs, allow ing them to procure from any com pany thro u g h open tender.45 T his discretion, or stealth, w hich has been observed in o th er states’ approaches to liberalization,46 is also evident w ith respect to the privatization o f state-ow ned units. In 1994, w hile in opposition, the D M K loudly protested the proposed privatization o f the Tamil N adu C em en ts C o rp o ratio n (T A N C E M ) by the A IA D M K governm ent and played a role in obtaining a stay ord er from the courts. H ow ever, once back in p ow er (1996-2001), the D M K go v ern m en t abolished the req u irem en t that public-w orks contractors buy cem en t from the state-run units. T h is com pelled T A N C E M to find ways o f adjusting to com petitive conditions, b u t relieved the go v ern m en t o f the need to face a public outcry over privatization. Tamil N a d u ’s political leadership has n o t sh o w n a com parable interest in governance reform . U nlike the transform ationalist rhetoric touted by A ndhra Pradesh’s T D P governm ent, the c u rre n t A IAD M K governm ent in Tamil N ad u is invoking the state’s financial crisis as the reason behind its reluctant im plem entation o f pow er-sector reform s.47 W here structural reform receives public co m m en t, it tends to be narrow ly focused on the perceived technical requirem ents o f econom ic grow th. In contrast to A ndhra Pradesh, Tamil N ad u has not w itnessed a significant change in governing style in the 1990s; upon taking office, each new ruling party typically initiates a n u m b er o f social o r developm ent schem es targeted at specific groups. T h is is consistent w ith the political ideology and practice o f the state’s D ravidian parties, w hich have n o t sought radically to redistribute 45. T he AIADM K, announcing its first budget after retu rn in g to pow er in 2001, revoked this controversial G overnm ent O rder. Sec ‘M ove to Set U p Industrial Estate W elcomed’, The Hindu, 20 August 2001. 46. U sing examples from a num ber o f states, Jenkins analyses in detail the ways in w hich India’s governing elites have engaged in obfuscatory tactics in their pursuit o f reforms. Sec Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic Reform. . . , especially C hapter 6, pp. 172-207. 47. T his crisis is explicitly im puted to the m ism anagem ent o f the form er D M K governm ent. See ‘Financial crisis: T N ju m p s on the bandw agon’, The H indu, 11 N ovem ber 2001.

48

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

w ealth through reform o r taxation, b u t rather to increase h an d o u ts to disadvantaged groups in the form o f w elfare schem es.48 T h e se schcm es rarely w ithstand a changc o f ruling party, as cach new governm ent is eager to create its ow n party-branded form o f p o p u ­ lism. For instance, after retu rn in g to pow er in 2001 the A1ADM K governm ent announced that it w ould phase o u t the ‘farm ers’ m arkets’ (uzhavar shandhais), a popular schem e devised by the form er D M K governm ent to help small farm ers avoid interm ediaries and sell th eir produce directly to consum ers.49 O th e r program m es took its place. T h u s, despite the sim ilarities in the policy responses o f Tamil N a d u and A ndhra Pradesh to central deregulation— notably regarding p ro ­ m otional strategies designed to attract and facilitate industrial invest­ m en t— there are clear differences in the way in w hich these policies have been ‘packaged’, o r politically positioned. T h o u g h packaging is m anifested in stated policy positions, and th e political rh eto ric invoked to justify policy decisions, it is n o t a reliable indicator o f th e actual depth o f policy changes. T h e re is nevertheless a m arked degree o f inter-state variation in the w illingness o f ruling parties to em brace econom ic liberalization openly, and to sell it as part o f a larger project o f societal transform ation, supported by fundam ental governance reform . W hile A ndhra Pradesh has pioneered this political strategy, Tamil N adu has reverted to the m ore fam iliar path o f ‘reform by stealth’. But why? E x p l a in in g I n t e r - S t a t e V a r ia t io n s in

R e f o r m P a c k a g in g

O n e popular view, especially prevalent in India, is that states respond to liberalization on the basis o f their relative econom ic standing— in o th er w ords, that there is a positive correlation betw een the econom ic perform ance o f a state and the inclination o f its leaders to project a pro-reform stance. G ovcrnem nts in ‘forw ard’ or ‘rich’ states, accord­ ing to this theory, are m ore likely to make reform s a central part o f their political program m e since it is presum ed that they stand to gain 48. Sec D. >X&shbrook, ‘Caste, Class and D om inance in M o d em Tamil N adu: N on-B rahm anism , Dravidianism and Tamil N ationalism ’, in F. R. Frankel and M. S. A. Rao (cds), Dominance and State Power in Modem India, vol. I (Delhi: O xford U niversity Press, 1989). 49. See S. Rajcndran, ‘C urtains for Farm ers’ M arkets?’, Economic and Political Weekly, 21 July 2001, pp. 2737-9.

The Political Determinants o f Reform Packaging

49

from the shift tow ards m arkets and global econom ic integration. Relatively prosperous states can m ake this case m o re easily to key constituencies in their states, and have at their disposal the argum ent that they have been ‘held back’ as a result o f th e interventionist policies im posed o n states by the central go v ern m en t d u rin g the era in w hich th e ‘com m anding heights’ o f the eco n o m y w ere subjected to central planning. G overning elites in ‘p o o r’ o r ‘backw ard’ states, on the o th e r hand, are n o t inclined to em brace reform s since they perceive th e ir states as unlikely to gain from a greater reliance o n m arkets. T h e com m on assum ption, in fact, is that these states stand to suffer im m ediate losses, as liberalization can lead to reductions in central subsidies and centrally directed industrial investm ent. T h e theoretical logic is that because elites in such states are fearful o f losing, their ruling parties w ill m aintain a political stance opposed to reform s, and will plead for central governm ent m ediation as a way o f m aintaining the status quo w ith respect to inter-state financial transfers. T h is does not m ean that they will n o t actually undertake reform s, since doing so m ay be a m atter o f necessity, b u t they will tend to do so stealthily, lest they incur the w rath o f local public opinion, w hich (it is assum ed) shares the perception th a t liberalization is advantageous only for prosperous regions, n o t those fu rth er dow n the econom ic ladder. T h is th eo ry is often im plicit in studies that evaluate post-liberalization perform ance. Since w ealthier states have attracted the lion’s share o f investm ent and are experiencing the fastest rates o f econom ic grow th, it is presum ed that they are the m ost refo rm -o rien ted , even w h en there is evidence to the contrary. Likewise, states show ing slow er g row th are presented as lagging reform ers. T h is bias com es across in a study by Bajpai and Sachs, w here the classification o f states according to their degree o f progress on reform can n o t be unequivo­ cally derived from the tables provided. For instance, states that are actively p u rsu in g reform s, b u t are achieving slow grow th, such as O rissa, are n o t categorized as ‘reform -oriented’. M oreover, highgrow th states like M aharashtra o r Tamil N ad u are n o t necessarily as radical in th eir reform efforts as the Bajpai and Sachs classification system suggests.50 50. T he authors do adm it that their classification is ‘purely indicative, and fraught w ith varying degrees o f unsettled questions’. Bajpai and Sachs, ‘T he Progress o f Policy R eform .. . . ’, p. 2.

50

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

T h e cases o f A ndhra Pradesh and Tamil N ad u them selves r u n co u n ter to the theory that m ore prosperous states will be m ore likely to em brace reform than those that are less developed. T h e political leadership in A ndhra Pradesh, a relatively ‘backward’ state according to standard socio-econom ic indicators, and certainly a less diversified econom y than that o f Tamil N ad u , has n o t resorted to a strategy o f reform by stealth. O n the contrary, it has openly em braced liberaliza­ tion and is projecting a far-reaching ‘vision’ o f developm ental progress based on the integration o f governance and econom ic-policy refo rm . Tamil N ad u , o n the o th er hand, is am ong India’s m ore p ro sp ero u s states, w ith a m ore m o d ern and dynam ic econom y than A n d h ra Pradesh’s. And yet its ruling parties have conspicuously shied aw ay from adopting anything that m ig h t identify them w ith a b o ld reform ist agenda. W ith the exception o f highly targeted prom otional policies aim ed at attracting investm ent, successive adm inistrations have played dow n the ‘hard refo rm ’ m easures they have taken, o r have blam ed th em on necessity, on the need to adapt to the changes unilaterally introduced by the central governm ent. A m ore p o ten t and explicit theory that helps to explain a state’s approach to econom ic liberalization has been advanced in the policyreform literature. A ccording to this theory, it m akes sense for a state w ith a negative image am ong external investors, due to real o r pcrccivcd weaknesses (such as unfavourable econom ic indicators, th e strong presence o f unions, political instability, or the absence o f infrastructure), to ‘tru m p et’ its co m m itm en t to reform in ord er to com pensate for its image problem .31 As one proponent o f this theory argues, getting the right signals to investors som etim es requires a state to exaggerate its reform agenda (to ‘go overboard’) in ord er to achieve credibility.52 T h e suggestion is that states perceived positively by investors have less ‘need’ to m arket them selves to attract investm ent. 51. T his literature also addresses the question o f how governm ents signal to ‘losers’ the degree o f com pensation they arc w illing to offer in order to prevent them from opposing reform. See R. Castro and D. C oen-Pirani, ‘O n the Political Econom y o f Sequential Reform s’, C ahier 21-2001, C entre de Recherche et D évcloppem cnt en Econom iquc, U niversité de M ontréal, Septem ber 2001. (forthcom ing as ‘C om pensations as Signaling Devices in the Political Economy o f Reforms’, International Economic Review). 52. D. Rodrik, ‘Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signaling’, in F. Sturzenegger and M . Tommasi (eds). The Political Economy o f Economic Reforms (Cam bridge, Mass: M IT Press, 1998), citcd in Sinha’s chaptcr in this volume.

The Political Determ inants o f Reform Packaging

51

It is assum ed that private enterprises possess inform ation about attrac­ tive locations, w hich conventional econom ic th eo ry defines in term s o f the availability and quality o f infrastructure and h u m an resources and proxim ity to m arkets. T h is signalling theory, w hich takes account o f external econom ic perceptions* is consistent w ith the observed pattern in the tw o case studies exam ined in this chapter. A ndhra Pradesh’s hum an develop­ m en t indicators com pare poorly to Tamil N a d u ’s (for instance, infant m ortality is 71 per thousand in A ndhra Pradesh, com pared to 58 per thousand in Tamil N ad u ). O n m any indicators, such as its literacy rate, A ndhra Pradesh is well below the national average, w h ile Tamil N ad u is consistently near the top o f the league tables. A ndhra Pradesh lags behind o n m easures o f infrastructure as well: in 1994, its relative index was 96.1 (all India = 100), placing it eleventh am o n g the 17 m ajor states, in contrast to Tamil N ad u , ranked th ird w ith an index o f 144.53 Crucially, o n the econom ic front, A ndhra P radesh’s perform ance has also been quite m ediocre: m anufacturing co n trib u ted 9 per cent to net state dom estic p ro d u ct in 1996, com pared to 22 per cent in Tamil N a d u . T hese, and A ndhra P radesh’s tradition o f populist policies, im plying heavy budgetary pressures, co u ld certainly be said to co nstitute an image problem in a liberalizing context, w here states are openly com peting for private investm ent. Since the arrival o f N aid u as c h ie f m inister in 1995, A ndhra Pradesh g o v ern m en t has m ade an energetic effort to signal to dom estic and international investors that it is serious about reform s and is doing a great deal to facilitate private enterprise. M oreover, A ndhra Pradesh’s policy stance can be, and frequently is, characterized as ‘going over­ board*. A ccording to the theory, Tamil N ad u should have less need for ideological p o stu rin g to convince investors that it is com m itted to reform , since it possesses a strong private enterprise base and a traditionally laissez-faire governm ent, according to industry insid­ ers.54 Its econom ic ‘fundam entals’ are considered solid, and it ranks high w ith respect to b o th conventional infrastructure (e.g. transport and com m unications) and specialized infrastructure (e.g. education and financial services). It is therefore n o t surprising that Tamil N adu 53. These figures are draw n from C entre for M onitoring th e Indian Economy, Profile o f States (Bombay, 1997). 54. Interview w ith the regional director o f the C onfederation o f Indian Industry (southern region), C hennai, 26 Ju n e 2000.

52

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

has indeed n o t engaged in high-profile salesm anship, and that its governm ents have in fact conspicuously avoided draw ing too m u ch political attention to the nature o f its reform program m e. Successive governm ents have chosen instead to concentrate o n stream lining investm ent procedures and offering attractive incentives, a strategy that has m et w ith considerable success. Indeed, in 2000 Tamil N ad u m oved into first place am ong Indian states for new industrial investm ent (dom estic and foreign) in the period since 1991, surpass­ ing M aharashtra and G ujarat, the traditional fro n t-ru n n ers.55 W hile external economic perceptions are im portant influences o n the ‘political positioning’ strategies o f reform ing governm ents— that is, in deciding w h eth er to tru m p et th eir liberalizing efforts o r to reform by stealth— politicians pay at least as m u ch attention to the perceptions o f internal political constituencies. T h a t is, signalling political credibility to key electoral groups is as crucial to the calculations o f reform ist governm ents as signalling policy credibility to potential investors. In the cases o f A ndhra Pradesh and Tamil N ad u , tw o political variables have shaped the approaches to ‘reform packaging’ adopted by th eir governm ents: the extent o f fragm entation in the state-level party system and the extent o f political m obilization o f D alits and o th e r traditionally low -status groups. To sum m arize, the greater fragm entation and m obilization in Tamil N ad u has created strong incentives for its governing parties to avoid overt political identification w ith econom ic reform , w hereas the relative absence o f these characteristics in A ndhra Pradesh, and the existence o f o th er countervailing factors, has m ade the opposite strategy politically appealing. O r to p u t it slightly differently, w hile the need to signal their credibility to investors m ay have been a necessary condition for A ndhra Pradesh’s governing elites to adopt a strategy o f openly em bracing econom ic reform , it w as the existence o f a political environm ent that reduced the potential electoral p en­ alties for this stance that provided the sufficient condition. Social M o b ilizatio n and F rag m en tatio n in Tam il N a d u Tamil N a d u ’s policy stance, notably its greater reliance on stealth as a way o f introducing reform s, has m uch to do w ith the intense com petition betw een both the D M K and the A1ADM K for the 55. According to the C entre for M onitoring the Indian Economy, cited in ‘State Poised to Overtake M aharashtra, Says C M ’, The Hindu, 9 M ay 2000.

The Political Determ inants o f Reform Packaging

53

political su p p o rt o f the state’s highly m obilized m iddle-low er castes and Dalits, w h ich tend to be vocally opposed to liberalization. Given th eir historical roots in the n o n -B rah m in m ovem ent, b oth the D M K and the A1ADM K are naturally w ary about appearing to pander to the upper castes, w hich constitute (w ith the urban m iddle classes gen­ erally) the m o st visible pro-liberalization constituency in Tamil N adu, and indeed th ro u g h o u t India. As W ashbrook has argued, the D ravidian political cu ltu re accom m odates elite privilege, b u t ‘...p riv ileg e be­ com es objectionable w hen it is “seen’’. . . ’.56 M oreover, the co n tem ­ porary rank-and-file m em bership o f these parties rem ains antagonistic to w hat it perceives as pro-rich policies that benefit the upper castes. O n e com m entary o n the D M K stated that ‘party cadres b ro u g h t up o n a staple diet o f socialism find this shift (tow ard m arket reform s) hard to digest’.57 Beyond this apparent aversion to p ro -m ark et m easures, recent political developm ents, notably the m obilization o f D alits and specific groups am o n g the O th e r Backward Classes (O B C s), have increased pressure on ruling parties in Tamil N ad u to avoid th e risk o f alienating subaltern groups by advancing explicitly liberalizing policies. As in o th er regions o f India, there has been a grow ing tendency for partisan loyalties to be built around caste. Party and electoral politics have becom e significantly m ore com plex in Tamil N ad u in the last decade, w hich roughly corresponds to the liberalization period. Changes taking place include the splintering o f established parties, the em er­ gence o f n ew political form ations and the realignm ent o f the social bases o f political parties. T h is state o f perpetual flux reflects, am ong o th er things, the failure o f the tw o m ain parties, th e D M K and the ALADMK, to accom m odate certain groups from am ong b oth the D alits and the O B C s. 9 A nother im portant developm ent d u rin g the 1990s was the virtual disappearance o f the C ongress Party in Tamil N a d u as a serious electoral force. Even after it lost its political dom inance in the late 1960s, the C ongress in Tamil N ad u had until the 1990s been able to hold o n to ab o u t 20 per cent o f the electorate, w h ich contributed to a stable pattern o f party com petition in the state.5® 56. W ashbrook, ‘Caste, Class and D om inance__ ’, p. 248. 57. L. R. Jagadheesan, ‘O u t o f the Shadow ’, Frontline, 9 N ovem ber 1998, p. 49. 58. See A. K. J. Wyatt, ‘N ew Alignments in South Indian Fblitics: T he 2001 Assembly Elections in Tamil N ad u ’, Asian Survey, vol. 42, no. 5 (2002), p. 740.

54

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

T h e D M K and A IA D M K rely o n differing bases o f political support, although the electoral profile o f both parties cuts across social categories, reflecting in part the distinctive caste stratification o f T am il society.59 In contrast to m ost regions o f n orth India, B rahm ins a n d o th er ‘twice b o rn ’ castes com prise only a sm all percentage o f th e population. M ore im portantly, vama categories appear to have h ad lim ited relevance in determ in in g status in Tamil society.60 I t is estim ated that betw een o n e -h a lf and tw o-thirds o f Tamil N a d u ’s population belongs to an interm ediate group o f so-called ‘backw ard castes’. O th e r groups include landed castes such as Vellalas an d M udaliyars, w hich are considered high caste, form er u ntouchables (approxim ately 20 per cent o f the population), and religious m in o ri­ ties (m ainly M uslim s and C hristians). Som e regionally concentrated groups that can be classified as ‘d o m i­ n an t castes’, such as Vanniars in the n o rth ern and coastal areas a n d T hevars in the so u th ern districts, ten d to vote ett bloc for particular parties in particular elections, and have traditionally pledged th e ir support to one o r the o th er o f Tamil N a d u ’s m ain parties. T h e sam e is tru e o f D alit groups, w hich have m ainly favoured the AIAD M K . B u t the stability o f this identity-based support has been seriously u n d e r­ m ined o f late, and m ust be constantly re-negotiated in the context o f the coalition politics no w prevailing at the state and national levels. R ecent years have seen the em ergence o f new political parties w hose influence has reached beyond state-level politics61— for in­ stance, the Paatali M akkal Katchi (PM K ), a caste-based party fo rm ed in 1989 follow ing a series o f protests by the Vanniar Sangham .62 59. It also rcflccts the tendency for the Dravidian parties, the D M K in particular, to mobilize across casttglines, appealing to the Tamil com m unity as a whole. ‘T he D M K ’s vision o f the Dravidian com m unity was overtly hom oge­ neous, including all Tamils/South In d ian s...’. N . Subramanian, Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and Democracy in South India (D elhi: O xford U niversity Press, 1999), p. 136. 60. Ibid., p. 86. 6 1 .1 thank G. Venkatasubramanian o f the French Institute o f Pondicherry for providing inform ation for this section. For m ore details on recent political devel­ opm ents in Tamil N adu, see Wyatt, ‘N ew A lignments in South Indian Politics.. 62. T his new caste association was form ed in 1980 around dem ands for a separate quota for Vanniars, the largest ‘megacaste’ o f the no rth ern plains, in an attem pt to obtain recognition com m ensurate w ith their num bers. Subram anian, Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization..., p. 292.

The Political Determ inants o f Reform Packaging

55

Besides asserting itself as a m ajor player in Tamil N ad u politics, the P M K has participated in the national coalition governm ent. T h e same is true o f the M arum alarchi D ravida M u n n etra Kazhagam (M D M K ), w hich broke away from the D M K in the m id-1990s u n d er the charism atic leadership o f M r V G opalsam y (alias Vaiko). T h e M D M K ’s social base is m ore heterogeneous than the PM ICs, and it has succeeded in extending its influence bevond its traditional stronghold in the so u th ern part o f Tamil N adu. In 1998 the P M K and the M D M K en tered national coalition politics as m em b ers o f the A IA D M K -BJP alliance, though they w ere subordinate to the A IA D M K leader, Jayalalitha, w h o rem ained the ch ief m ediator for this bloc o f M Ps vis-à-vis the BJP-led coalition. B ut rather quickly, w hen the A IA D M K threatened to pull o u t o f the N ational D em ocratic Alliance (N D A ) coalition governm ent, these sm aller partners asserted their independence by deciding to continue supporting the N D A in N ew D elhi.64 F or the Tamil N ad u assem bly elections in 2001, the PM K severed its association w ith the national coalition governm ent to re­ jo in the A IA D M K -led front, b u t th en re-entered the N D A a couple o f m onths later. O n e o f the m ost significant developm ents in Tamil N ad u politics d u rin g the 1990s was the m obilization o f D alit groups, w hich resulted in the form ation o f new political organizations. In the so u th ern districts in particular, a portion o f the D alit vote (m ainly from the Pallar com m unity) has been consolidated in the Puthiya T ham izhagam (P T ), o r ‘N ew Tamil N a d u ’. T h e A IA D M K inadvertently contributed to this developm ent in the early 1990s by show ing favour to the Thevars, a politically d o m in an t (though, ritually speaking, backward) ‘m egacaste’ in the sou th ern districts. Jayalalitha’s close com panion, Sasikala N atarajan, is from the T hevar com m unity, a com posite grouping o f form er w arrior clans (Kallar, Maravar, and Agamudaiyar) th at have clashed frequently w ith D alit groups over the years. O th e r political form ations, like the V iduthalai Siruthaigal (som etim es called the D alit Panthers or the Liberation Panthers), have established a significant base in the n o rth ern districts. H ere Dalits (m ainly from th e Paraiyar com m unity) are in direct opposition w ith local O B C s 63. In the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, for instance, the M D M K w on seats in four geographically dispersed constituencies: Sivakasi, Tiruchcngodu, Tindivanam, and Pollachi. See ‘Election Analysis’, Frontline, 6 -1 9 N ovem ber 1999. 64. See ‘Amma’s Isolation’, India Today, 28 Septem ber 1998, pp. 34-5.

56

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

(m ainly Vanniars), and violent confrontations betw een the g ro u p s have intensified in the last few years, m ost recently d u rin g the 1999 parliam entary elections.65 D alit m obilization has n o t only eaten into the electoral base o f th e AIA D M K , w hich has traditionally relied m ore on the support o f Dalits than has the D M K ; it has fundam entally altered political equations across Tamil N a d u ’s political landscape. D epending o n local factors, organized D alit form ations have started jo in in g forces w ith one or the o th er o f Tamil N a d u ’s m ain parties.66 T h e traditional rivals, the D M K and the A IA D M K , are now each required to assem ble coalitions from am ong these sm aller breakaway parties, and n o t necessarily according to a uniform logic th ro u g h o u t the state. As was seen in the 2001 assem bly elections, these electoral alliances have in them selves contributed to destabilizing the traditional D ravidian parties— the D M K and the A IA D M K — since they are som etim es m e t w ith hostility from longstanding cadres w ithin these d o m in an t p ar­ ties. Som e voters are also p u t o ff by these m arriages o f political convenience. For instance, the D M K ’s alliance w ith the m ajor D a lit organizations was considered to have contributed to its defeat b y alienating its traditional O B C voters.67 T hese developm ents are consistent w ith a recent tren d in In d ian politics, nam ely the narrow ing o f social bases to individual castes, as opposed to m ore broad-based coalitions.68 T h is has im portant im p li­ cations for electoral politics: the localization o f political arenas, splits w ithin established parties, and the em ergence o f new political form a­ tions have fragm ented the social bases o f Tamil N a d u ’s parties a n d increased com petition. T hese developm ents have been at the expense o f the D M K and the ALADMK, the tw o parties that have d o m in ated 65. T he press reported widespread irregularities at voting booths and violent clashes betw een Vanniars and Dalits in the C hidam baram Lok Sabha constituency. 66. In the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, three D alit form ations— the PT, the D P I, and the Republican Party o f India—jo in ed the Tamil Maanila Congress, w hich split from die C ongree in 1996, in an attem pt to form a third (‘secular’) fro n t in the state. T his alliance w on no seats and was dissolved after the election. 67. It was also reported that during the campaign som e D M K candidates did not w ant to share a platform w ith Dalit leaders. ‘Dalit C ard C ost D M K O B C Vote Bank’, The Hindu, 15 M ay 2001. 68. See for instance R. Jenkins, ‘A ppearance and Reality in Indian Politics: An Analysis o f the 1999 General Election’, Government and Opposition, vol. 35, no. 2 (2000), pp. 49-66.

The Political Determ inants o f Reform Packaging

57

politics in the state since the early 1970s. C oalition politics has fu rth er exacerbated political instability because, as w e have seen, even small parties negotiate th e ir support on a case-by-case (som etim es m o n th by-m onth) basis. T h e fragm entation o f the traditional social bases o f the D M K and A IA D M K as a result o f D alit and O B C m obilization helps to explain— at least in part— the reluctance o f these parties, w hen in pow er in Tamil N a d u , to identify th eir governm ents too strongly w ith the agenda o f econom ic liberalization. First, significant portions o f their social bases are hostile to w hat they perceive as pro-rich policies that benefit u p p er castes. Second, the incentive n o t to antagonize these groups has increased due to the context o f coalition politics, w hich gives disaffected social groups the o p p o rtu n ity to shift their loyalties to o th er parties, and provides sm aller parties a m ore credible threat to sw itch th e ir support to an alternative coalition. T h e political incentives th ro w n up by the new party system , w h ich im proves ease o f exit for factions and parties displeased by policy change (especially those perceived as elite-biased), have becom e even m ore skewed against em bracing econom ic liberalization. It is m u ch m ore attractive for a governm ent in Tamil N ad u to reform quietly, grudgingly alm ost, w hile publicly blam ing the C en tre o r its political rivals for m aking necessary w hatever policy changes do attract public criticism . T h e C o n tra s tin g C ase: A B ipolar P arty S y stem in A n d h ra P radesh T h e political realities facing A ndhra Pradesh’s ru lin g parties appear quite different. T h e party system has been essentially bipolar since the early 1980s, w h e n the T D P em erged as a rival to th e C ongress Party. O th e r sm aller parties— the co m m u n ist parties (C P I, C P I-M ), the M ajlis Ittehadul M uslim een (M IM ), and the BJP— usually form electoral alliances w ith one or the o th er d o m in a n t party.69 In term s o f social bases, th e T D P and the C ongress are dom inated respectively by tw o castes, th e Kam m as and the Reddys.70 T h ese landed (often 69. T h e Left parties did not contest as part o f a larger alliance in the 1999 assembly elections, th e first tim e they failed to do so since 1984. 70. T h e Kammas and the Reddys com prise 4.8 per cen t and 6.5 per cent o f the state’s population, respectively, according to K. Srinivasulu, ‘Caste, Class and Social Articulation in A ndhra Pradesh, India: M apping Differential Regional Trajectories’, O D I W orking Paper 179 (London: O verseas D evelopm ent Institute, Septem ber 2002), p. 3.

58

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

dom inant) castes are considered ‘forw ard’ in the local caste configu­ ration. It is largely these and o th er upper-m iddle castes/classes th a t m ake u p the political leadership o f the state. U sin g strategies o f accom m odation, including popular subsidies for rice a n d o th er basic com m odities, the alternating T D P and C ongress governm ents in A ndhra Pradesh have m anaged to carry the su p p o rt o f significant sections o f the low er castes and classes in electoral contests. C h a ris­ m atic leadership, such as that o f N T R , a w ell-know n cinem a figure, has also been an im portant ingredient in A ndhra P radesh’s politics. As sum m arized by one analyst: While the parties in power changed, the stability of the polity continued. The success o f a party seemed to lie in building a strong and charismatic personality on the one hand and carrying out populist policies on the other, capable o f appealing to a broad spectrum o f disadvantaged groups.71 T h e T D P ’s re-election in the 1999 assem bly polls seem ed to up set this bipolar balance w ith the C ongress, b u t sub seq u en t analysis has indicated that C ongress’s vote share was only seven percentage points behind that o f the T D P -B JP alliance.72 As election experts have pointed out, the T D P could n o t have w o n w ith o u t its electoral partner, the BJP Subsequent local governm ent elections confirm th e co n tin u in g bipolar pattern: the T D P lost a n u m b er o f seats, b u t d id n o t suffer a m ajor decline in its vote share.73 W hat follows from this schem atic presentation is that to date A ndhra Pradesh’s political system has rem ained significantly m o re stable and less fragm ented th an Tamil N a d u ’s. C ertainly there is evidence o f social groups shifting their support betw een the tw o m ain parties, b u t this has n o t m odified in any substantial way the basic system. For instance, there was a perceptible shift o f th e M u slim vote 71. G. Ram Reddy, ‘T h e Politics o f A ccomm odation: Caste, Class and D om inance in Andhra Pradesh’, in F. R. Frankel and M. S. A. Rao (cds), Dominance and State Power in Modem India, vol. I (Delhi: O xford U niversity Press, 1989), p. 287, emphasis added, cited in J. H arriss, ‘C om paring Political Regimes across Indian States’, Economic and Political Weekly, 27 N ovem ber 1999. 72. See C SD S team w ith K. C . S un, ‘A Trium ph o f Alliance A rithm etic’, Frontline, vol. 16, no. 23, 6 -1 9 N ovem ber 1999. 73. See K. C . Suri, ‘Setback for T D P in Panchayat Elections’, Economic and Political Weekly, 13 O ctober 2001; and S. N agcsh Kumar, ‘A Shock for the T D P ’, Frontline, vol. 18, no. 17, 18—31 August 2001.

The Political Determinants o f Reform Packaging

59

from the T D P to the C ongress in the 1999 assem bly elections, presum ably because o f the fo rm er’s alliance w ith the H in d u nation­ alist BJP. B ut this has n o t fundam entally altered the structure o f electoral politics in A ndhra Pradesh. T h e re are signs, how ever, that the bipolar system is u n d er strain. Analyses o f elections in the 1990s underscore th e volatility o f the support bases o f th e tw o m ajor players, the C ongress and the TDP, indicating increasing com petition in the state’s political system .74 T h e BJP em erged as a m ajor player in state politics in the 1998 Lok Sabha elections, w restin g seats away from both m ajor parties. F urtherm ore, there are indications o f social and political m obilization in the state, including radical agrarian-reform activism and caste-based m ove­ m ents. As in Tam il N ad u , there has been m obilization am ong O B C and D alit groups, tho u g h on a sm aller scale.75 W hat is significant for the purposes o f th e present study is that these diverse m ovem ents had not, d u rin g the period o f liberalization analysed in this paper, consolidated into new party form ations capable o f u n d erm in in g the stability o f the state’s party system. T h e relative stability o f the bipolar order has contributed to the T D P go v ern m en t’s w illingness to adopt an aggressive political stance o n econom ic reform . Such a position is less risky than it w ould have been in a m ore fragm ented party system. A n o th er co n tributing factor is the T D P ’s social base, w hich has far greater representation am ong the upper and m iddle castes/classes than does th a t o f eith er the D M K o r the A IA D M K Srinivasulu has argued that N a id u ’s m ove away from the paternalist p o p u lism o f his predecessor w as a response to one section o f his p arty ’s support base, ‘the urban entrepreneurial class’, w h ich was in favour o f a reform agenda and an increased em phasis o n industrial developm ent.76 T his is a significant p o in t o f divergence from the social bases o f the D ravidian parties in Tamil N ad u , w hich are com posed largely o f O B C groups and are considered ‘low er caste/ 74. See, for instance, K. Srinivasulu, ‘Party C om petition and Strategies o f M obilization: An Analysis o f Social C oalitions in A ndhra Pradesh’, in R Wallace and R. Roy (eds), India’s 1999 Elections and 20th Century Politics (N ew Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), pp. 141-66. 75. See, for instance, Srinivasulu, ‘Caste, Class and Social A rticu latio n ...’, pp. 2&-60. 76. In the 1999 assembly and Lok Sabha contests, the T D P ’s election strategy focused on consolidating the pro-reform support base. See Srinivasulu, ‘Party C om petition and Strategies o f M obilization.. .*.

60

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

class-dom inated1 according Jo h n H arriss’s typology o f political re­ gim es am ong Indian states. T h e T D P ’s ‘forward caste’ image is accentuated by the fact th at it has an alliance w ith the BJP, a party that typically recruits support from u p p er castes. In the 1999 assem bly election, according to the C S D S election team ’s study, the T D P -B JP alliance secured 65 per cent o f the upper caste vote, an estim ated 90 per cent o f the Kamma vote (as com pared to an estim ated 28 per cent o f the Reddy vote), 54 per cen t o f the votes am ong the forw ard Kapu com m unity, 64 per cen t o f ‘peasant O B C s’, and 47 per cent o f ‘low er O B C s’. O n ly 33 per cent o f the D alit vote w en t to the T D P -B JP com bine, against 64 per cent for C ongress.78 B oth o f these ‘enabling’ factors— the relative lack o f fragm entation in the party system and the m ore privileged social profiles o f the tw o m ain parties— help to explain the policy choices adopted by the TD P, and specifically its approach to packaging reform s. To sum m arize the argum ent: w h en a state’s political leadership pursues econom ic reform s, w h eth er it em ploys a political strategy o f active identification w ith the reform ist project, o r an understated approach characterized by stealth, is to a significant degree influenced by calculations concerning internal political factors, including th e nature o f the party system and the degree o f social and political m obilization. T hese internal political factors can com bine w ith an appreciation o f how the reform program m e is perceived by external econom ic actors. B ut the desire o f governm ents to signal a credible co m m itm en t to m arket orientation does not necessarily tru m p all o th er considerations. It m ay (or m ay not) be necessary, but it is n o t sufficient. In teg ratin g P opulism an d R efo rm in A n d h ra Pradesh H aving recognized the com plex calculations that governm ents m ake in determ in in g their reform strategies, it is im portant to underscore that the m ere absence o f strong incentives for a ruling party to avoid political identification w ith m arket reform is n o t necessarily sufficient to induce the opposite strategy o f ‘tru m p etin g ’ co m m itm ent to liber­ alization. T h e T D P ’s ‘class association’, its traditional link to locally 77. H arriss, ‘C om paring Political R eg im es...’. 78. C SD S Team w ith K. C . Suri, ‘A Trium ph o f Alliance A rithm etic... Table 9.

The Political Determinants o f Reform Packaging

61

d o m in an t castes/classes, has n o t prevented it from being responsive to subaltern groups, o n w hose electoral support it depends. O n the contrary, th e T D P has show n rem arkable co n tin u ity in ru n n in g prop oor social schem es. T h is is part o f the reason w h y the T D P can prom ote refo rm s w ith o u t alienating these and o th e r disadvantaged groups, in clu d in g the poor am ong the d o m in an t castes. A substantial m easure o f political skill has enabled the T D P ’s leadership openly to su p p o rt reform s w hile co n tin u in g to be seen as sensitive to the poor and to groups deem ed unlikely to benefit from liberalization. T hese skills are ev id en t in both the packaging and the sequencing o f reform s. A ndhra Pradesh’s political fram ing o f m ark et reform — w hich conceived o f econom ic liberalization as one c o m p o n en t o f a larger vision o f societal transform ation— evolved d u rin g N a id u ’s first term as ch ief m inister. O v er the years, this approach becam e progressively m ore em phatic. T his gave the public tim e to adjust to N aid u ’s style o f rhetoric, w hich consisted in part o f cham p io n in g the state and stressing its potential for developm ent. M o re im portantly, the sequencing o f reform s gave the T D P governm ent th e o p p o rtu n ity to defuse opposition and build new coalitions o f su p p o rt,79 thereby allow ing it to m aintain itself in office. O n various occasions, the T D P g o v ern m en t has show n that it is w illing to backtrack on its agenda w h en the opposition is very strong. By the tim e Vision 2020 was introduced in 1998, liberalization and globalization had becom e ‘o p p o rtu n ities’ that, if seized in tim e, w ould allow th e state to flourish. C areful packaging has consisted o f situating econom ic restructuring w ith in a larger reform project that prom ises to deliver o n both econom ic and social fronts by m eans o f a governance revolution. T h e go v ern m en t’s ‘successes’, such as the W orld Bank loans it secured in 1998, have contributed to locking the T D P in to this pro-reform stance. T h is im posed constraints, in the form o f conditionalities, b u t also created fu rth er incentives to pursue reform . A form o f pathdcpendcnce had been generated. T h e T D P ’s cam paign for the 1999 assem bly elections focused explicitly o n reform s by calling on voters to ju d g e the perform ance o f the go v ern m en t over the previous four years (the period after N aidu had taken control o f the T D P and the state governm ent). 79. T his strategy has been analysed in detail, w ith exam ples from Rajasthan and M aharashtra, by Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic Reform. . . . , C hapter 5, pp. 119-71.

62

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

C areful to project a consistent discourse, the ruling party refrained from pledging popular subsidies. T his was in sharp contrast to its m ain rival, the C ongress, w hich prom ised to provide free electricity to farm ers. B ut at the sam e tim e the T D P skilfully m anaged to project tailored messages to distinct constituencies, including th e message to disadvantaged groups that social spending w ould co n tin u e. By 1999 the public had had tim e to realize that the g o v ern m en t’s p ro-reform stance did n o t prevent it from m aintaining a substantial level o f subsidies nor from channelling funds to the village level for a variety o f popular developm ent schem es targeted at specific Q1 groups. H ence, the T D P ‘sells’ econom ic reform s to A ndhra Pradesh by situating them w ithin a broader governance reform package, w h ich prom ises rew ards in exchange for sacrifice. T h e approach consists o f m oving forw ard o n reform s, including som e ‘hard’ reform s, w hile m aintaining subsidies for crucial interest groups and funding substan­ tial developm ent schemes. Ironically, Tamil N ad u , because it has relied m ore o n the strategy o f ‘reform by stealth’, has n o t been required to com pensate w ith quite such fanfare.

C

o n c l u d in g

R em arks

T h e liberalization process has created space for India’s states to assert greater autonom y vis-à-vis the central governm ent, especially in th e realm o f econom ic policy. State-level ruling parties have reacted differently b oth to this new policy space and to the liberalization agenda. T his com parative study o f A ndhra Pradesh and Tamil N a d u has exam ined the ways in w h ich their responses have differed and has advanced hypotheses to explain these variations. T he analysis has focused o n the political positioning o f reform in each state— that is, on the packaging o f reform and the rhetorical strategies deployed to justify it, rather than on policy content or policy outcom es. 80. See D. K Rao. ‘A Clear Majority for T D P ’, Frontline, vol. 16. no. 22. 23 O ctober 1999. 81. These include M undadugu for the dow ntrodden, Roshini for minorities, Adarana for artisans, Cheyuta for the disabled, am ong others. See R. H arshe and C . Srinivas, ‘Elections 1999’, Economic and Political Weekly, 30 O ctober 1999; and D. Ravinder, ‘A darana Programme and Vote Bank Politics in A P \ Economic and Political Weekly, 2 4 -3 0 July 1999.

T he Political Determinants o f Reform Packaging

63

A ndhra Pradesh and Tamil N ad u have b oth aggressively pursued industrial grow th, and have adopted sim ilar p ro -in v estm en t strategies (incentives, regulatory reform , and specialized infrastructure) d e­ signed to create a business-friendly en v iro n m en t in their respective states. In th e area o f inform ation technology, w here th e tw o states are overtly com peting, their policies are m u ch alike, w ith som e variations in em phasis. Tamil N a d u ’s m ore strictly defined sectoral approach tends to focus o n enhancing existing strengths w hile A ndhra Pradesh places m o re em phasis on creating new capacities. In the A ndhra Pradesh g o v ern m en t’s rhetoric, prom otional policies are articulated alongside strategies to realize the long-term developm ent aspirations outlined in Vision 2020. W here A n d h ra Pradesh and Tamil N ad u diverge m o st prom inently is in ho w th e ir respective ru lin g parties have positioned them selves politically vis-à-vis econom ic reform . In A ndhra Pradesh, C h ie f M inister N a id u has chosen to em brace liberalization, to becom e explicitly identified as a cham pion o f reform . H e has adopted a highly m edia-focused approach, projecting an image o f a m o d e m state ru n by a forw ard-looking leader com m itted to m arket-led grow th and a transparent, business-friendly regulatory en v iro n m en t. T h is ‘tru m ­ peting’ o f his reform agenda is aim ed at international investors and aid agencies, b u t it is also paraded o n the dom estic front. It is not necessarily a correct indication o f the actual m agnitude o f reform s on the ground, as critics p o in t out. Still, a n u m b er o f concrete m easures have been taken, such as increasing user charges for utilities and freezing certain categories o f governm ent em ploym ent. Reasonably far-reaching adm inistrative reform s are progressing as well. U niquely am ong In d ia’s states, A ndhra Pradesh’s go v ern m en t has pursued a rhetorical strategy o f situating econom ic reform w ith in a broader fram ew ork o f institutional reform aim ed at transform ing governance. Inform ation technology, in particular, is presented to the public as an in stru m en t fo r ensuring greater transparency and accountability on the part o f th e adm inistration. By contrast, Tamil N a d u ’s political leaders have been reluctant to be seen as openly endorsing, let alone em bracing, liberalization. Significant reform s have been introduced nonetheless. For instance, the A IA D M K governm ent (1991-6) took steps, later aborted, to privatize a m ajor public-sector enterprise. T h e D M K governm ent (1996-2001) reduced direct and indirect subsidies to small-scale enterprises an d to public-sector units, and exposed th em to greater

64

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

com petition. B ut these decisions w ere carried o u t discreetly for the m ost part, notified thro u g h governm ent orders as opposed to m o re high-profile legislative acts. To explain inter-state variations in the approach to structural reform , the existing literature tends to em phasize econom ic factors. B ut these tw o states do n o t support the theory th at richer states are m ore likely to em brace econom ic reform . O n th e o th er hand, th e case studies are consistent w ith the idea that states w ith relatively w eaker econom ic fundam entals— w hich describes A ndhra Pradesh, c o m ­ pared to Tamil N ad u — have an incentive to ‘go overboard’ in project­ ing visible signs o f their co m m itm en t to m arket principles, as a way o f ‘signalling’ to potential investors that they are seriously engaged in reform . T h is theory, however, m ay place to o m uch em phasis o n external econom ic perceptions and n o t en o u g h o n dom estic political calculations. As the com parative analysis o f political trends in A ndhra Pradesh and Tamil N ad u has show n, the degree o f fragm entation in the party system and the nature o f social m obilization can be key considerations in this calculus o f political survival. In Tam il N ad u , an increasingly fragm ented party system has eroded the su p p o rt bases o f the tw o m ain D ravidian parties, the D M K and the A IA D M K . T h e 1990s w itnessed intense political m obilization o f O B C s and Dalits, and several new form ations em erged. T h ese and o th er caste-based voting blocs are now negotiating their support to the D M K and the A IA D M K o n a case-by-case basis, a developm ent that substantially reduces the room for m anoeuvre for ruling parties in crafting their econom ic policies. T h e instability resulting from this com bination o f m obilization and fragm entation helps to explain the reluctance o f Tamil N a d u ’s leadership to tru m p e t its co m m itm en t to econom ic reform . M oreover, the left-of-centre and egalitarian political idiom , if n o t ideology, o f the state’s tw o m ain parties, and especially their low er caste/class social base, constitutes an additional disincentive to identifying them selves too closely w ith policies per­ ceived as pro-rich. Political fragm entation in A ndhra P radesh’s party system has occurred to a lesser degree, and although th ere is considerable social and political m obilization, it has n o t as yet dism antled the state’s essentially bipolar political system . T h e m ain ru lin g parties in A ndhra Pradesh, the T D P and the C ongress, effectively use accom m odative strategics to secure the electoral support o f low er caste/class groups and to contain potentially destabilizing caste-based m ovem ents.

The Political Determinants o f Reform Packaging

65

T h e state’s political leadership has thus been less restrained than Tamil N a d u ’s in em barking o n a radical policy shift. T h e fact that the m ain ruling parties continue to be dom inated by u p p er-m id d le caste/ class interests, m ay also contribute to explaining the T D P ’s w illing­ ness to prom ote m arket reform s. Finally, political skills— packaging and careful sequencing o f reform s— have enabled the T D P ’s leader­ sh ip to openly prom ote reform s w hile still claim ing sensitivity to p o o r and disadvantaged groups. Indeed, despite the A ndhra Pradesh g o v ern m en t’s stated co m m itm en t to reform s and its concrete m ea­ sures to im plem ent them , it has m aintained n u m e ro u s popular schem es targeted at specific constituencies. T h e hypotheses that em erge from this analysis m ay have explana­ to ry value for o th er cases in India if it can be show n th a t states w ith m obilized subalterns and/or highly fragm ented party system s d o not o p en ly endorse reform s. T h is is the case in U tta r Pradesh and Bihar, fo r instance. States that explicitly support reform , like M aharashtra an d G ujarat, do n o t show equivalent levels o f D alit/O B C m obilization an d have m anaged to contain party fragm entation, at least w hen com pared to Tamil N ad u or U R W hile these internal political factors can n o t suffice to explain a state’s inclination to adopt reform s, they m ay contribute to explaining its political capacity to do so.

3 Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change A Comparison o f West Bengal and Gujarat Aseema Sitiha*

h e shift from state-led to m arket-oriented econom ic policies has been one o f the m ost im portant changes in the developing w orld in the past tw o decades. India’s lim ited econom ic reform s o f the 1980s, w hich had stalled by the end o f th e decade, received a large boost in 1991when the incom ing go v ern m en t o f Prim e M inister R V. N arasim ha Rao found itself faced w ith a serious econom ic crisis. T h e g o v ern m en t’s policy response, however, w ent far beyond the stabilization m easures necessitated by a balance-of-paym ents crisis, encom passing both the external sector (trade, foreign investm ent, and technology-transfcr policies) and dom estic reform s (licensing, com petition policy and m icroeconom ic interventions). T h u s the

T

* I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the American Institute o f Indian Studies (AIIS) and the Institute for the Study o f W orld FV>litics. Special thanks are due to Rob Jenkins and Anindya Saha for their detailed and valuable com m ents on earlier versions. C om m ents from Ron H erring, M ary Katzenstein, C handra M ohan, Baldcv N ayar and Lawrence Sacz greatly im proved the chapter. Research assistance from Jason M iklian was valuable. T h e chapter is based on fieldw ork conducted in G ujarat, West Bengal and N e w D elhi in 1997-1998 and in 2001.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

67

refo rm s o f the 1990s, in contrast to the ‘half-hearted’1 liberalization o f the m id-1980s, systematically m odified the existing trade, indus­ trial, investm ent and m acro-econom ic regim es.2 E conom ic policies, institutions and ideas about the proper role o f states and m arkets have all undergone a fundam ental transform ation. T his com prehensive change in econom ic policy had surprising consequences. India’s federal C o n stitu tio n assigns prim ary responsi­ bility for industry, trade and investm ent policy to the central govern­ m en t, and yet policy changes initiated by the C entre w ere accom panied, follow ed and in som e cases even preceded by state-level policy initiatives. M s J. Jayalalitha, then ch ief m inister o f Tamil N adu, announced a new industrial policy on 4 Ju ly 1991.3 She presciently declared that w hile the first stage o f the centre’s econom ic reform program m e— de-licensing and deregulation— was relatively straight­ forw ard, the second stage, ‘the creation o f the right conditions to foster rapid grow th’ w ould be m uch m ore difficult. She noted that th e second stage w ould require a greater role for state governm ents in accelerating the provision o f infrastructure and en su rin g a m ore participatory and labour-intensive form o f grow th.4 G iven the centralizing tendencies in India’s federal relations, ob ­ servers have been surprised by the sudden zeal o f state governm ents to re-regulate the post-1991 central policy fram ew ork.5 It is plausible 1. See Jo h n Harriss, ‘T he State in Retreat: W hy H as India Experienced Such H alf-H earted Liberalization in the 1980s?’ ID S Bulletin vol. 18, no. 4 (1987), pp. 29-36. 2. T his is widely recognized by both proponents and critics o f the reform program m e. Sec T. N . Srinivasan, ‘Economic Reform s in South Asia,’ in Anne O. Krueger (cd.), Economic Policy Reform: The Second Stage (Chicago an d London: U niversity o f Chicago Press, 2000); A. Bhaduri and D. Nayyar, The Intelligent Person’s Guide to Liberalization (N ew D elhi: Penguin, 1996); a n d J. Sachs, A Varshney and N . Bajpai (eds), India in the Era o f Economic Reforms (Delhi: O xford U niversity Press, 1999). 3. T he C entre devalued the rupee on 4 July 1991 and announced industrial policy reform s on 24 July 1991. 4. The Hindu, 14 April 1994. 5. In pointing to the zeal o f state governm ents, I refer to policies and processes and not to outcomes. N o t all o f this zeal has positive impacts on investm ent flows, grow th or developm ent; the relevant point here is that state governm ents seek to re-regulate central policy in a variety o f ways; som e o f these m ay be dcvclopm ent-enhancing, while others may re-reinforce non-productive policies. In each case, state governm ents seek to re-shape policies initiated by the C entre.

68

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

to argue that liberalization in India am ounted n o t to deregulation b u t to the reordering o f state-m arket relations m ediated by subnational re-regulation strategies and processes.6 Vikas Kasliwal, a d irecto r at textile firm S. K um ars echoed this assessm ent: M o st o f us w h o have been d ealing w ith th e co rrid o rs o f p o w e r in D elh i fo r th e past 10 years, probably no w feel th at th e visits to U d y o g B havan [M in istry o f Industry, G o v e rn m e n t o f India] have d eclin ed dram atically, m ay have e v en disappeared— B ut, u n fo rtu n ate ly th e visits and th e in teractio n req u ired w ith th e state g o v ern m en ts and th e d istrict au th o rities has in fact g one u p d ram atically T h is is so m eth in g very fu n n y and I th in k academ icians n e e d to study w h y this is happening. W hy is d ereg u latio n at th e C e n te r lead in g to increased regulation a t th e state [level]?7

T h is chapter analyses subnational re-regulation after liberalization by exam ining how elites o f tw o very different states— G ujarat an d W est Bengal— pursue p ro -refo rm policies and launch their ow n reregulation agendas in response to central policy changes.8 C ertain 6. For an elaboration o f this argum ent, sec Asccma Sinha, ‘From State to M arket—via the State G overnm ents: H orizontal C om petition after 1991 in In d ia’, Paper presented at the Association o f Asian Studies, Annual M eeting, Boston, 1114 M arch 1999. T he counter-intuitive finding that liberalization dem ands reregulation has been confirm ed by empirical evidence from a wide variety o f cases, particularly in Latin America— including M exico [Richard, Snyder, ‘A fter N colibcralism : T he Politics o f Re-Regulation in M exico,’ World Politics 51 (January 1999), 173-204]; Chile and Britain [H . E. Schamis, Re-forming the State: The Politics of Privatization in Latin America and Europe (Ann Arbor: U niversity o f M ichigan Press, 2002)]; and Peru [Carol Wise, Reinventing the State: Economic Strategy and Institutional Change in Peru (Ann Arbor: University o f M ichigan Press, 2003)]. 7. Vikas Kasliwal, ‘C om m en t,’ in Western Regional Cooperation: A Necessity and Opportunity (conference proceedings), 24—5 N ovem ber 1995. 8. Scholarship on liberalization in India that focuses on the subnational level includes, Rob Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic Rrform in India (C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1999), especially C hapter Five; Aseema Sinha, ‘From State to M a rk e t....’; N irupam Bajpai and Jeffrey D. Sachs, ‘T h e Progress o f Policy Reform and Variations in Perform ance at the Sub-N ational Level in India,’ Development Discussion Paper No. 730 (H arvard Institute o f International D evel­ opm ent, H arvard University, 1999); and Samuel Paul, ‘D o States Have an Enabling Environm ent for Industrial G row th? Some Evidence from Karnataka’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 35, nos 4 3 -4 (2000), pp. 3861-9. See also the Special Issue devoted to econom ic reform s in A ndhra Pradesh, Economic and Political Weekly, 22-8 M arch-4 April 2003; and Rob Jenkins, ‘H ow Federalism Influences India’s Dom estic Politics o f W T O Engagem ent (And Is Itself Affected in the Process)’, Asian Survey, vol. 43, no. 3 (2003), pp. 598-621.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

69

contrasting outcom es across the tw o states— the level and com posi­ tio n o f industrial investm ent— are also puzzling. W est Bengal and G u jarat have b o th attem pted to evolve pro-investm ent policies after 1991. W hile o ne m ight expect G ujarat to ou tp erfo rm W est Bengal on th is front, it nevertheless com es as a surprise that G u jarat attracted roughly 11 times the actual investm ent received by West Bengal for th e period A ugust 1991 to Septem ber 2003. M oreover, th e com po­ sitio n o f investm ent— foreign versus dom estic— show s an unexpected pattern: W est Bengal has m anaged to attract a higher am o u n t o f foreign investm ent in the aggregate. T hese tw o states reveal significant differences in investm ent patterns despite sim ilar re-regulation agen­ das and partially sim ilar pro-liberalization policies. W hat accounts for this- variation across these tw o regional states? T h is chapter assesses the role o f several factors in o rd er to answ er this q u estio n , including the structure o f the state bureaucracy, the nature o f industrialization and the configuration o f the political environ­ m en t. Variations in risk and infrastructural conditions explain a good deal o f the difference betw een the levels o f investm ent (dom estic and foreign) flow ing to these tw o states. N evertheless, even after account­ in g for these factors, m u ch o f the difference rem ains unexplained. F o r example, W est Bengal show ed rapid agricultural grow th in the late 1980s and 1990s, increasing dem and for industrial investm ent; and y e t industrial investm ent continues to lag behind, even in rural areas, w h ere o ne w ould expect to see increased investm ent in this period. T h e role o f infrastructure in influencing investor decisions is n o t absolutely linear. T h e infrastructural index o f Kerala has been ex­ trem ely high (the highest am ong all states); yet investors are reluctant to invest in Kerala. G iven these anom alies, this chapter assesses the ex ten t to w hich variations in risk for investors, the n et m aterial benefits obtained by econom ic actors and investors’ choices them selves, are affected by a state’s policies, the political support o f social actors an d prevailing institutional conditions. R ecent theoretical developm ents em phasize th e need to analyse political and institutional factors, w h ich m ay affect m o re surface-level behavioral factors like risk, credibility o f policies 9. Kerala’s infrastructure index in 1993-4 was 157 (w here the all-India average is 100). M aharashtra was 107, although it attracts the highest share o f investm ent (C entre for M onitoring the Indian Economy, Profile o f States (Bombay, 1997), p. 7.

70

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

and investors’ choices.10 T h u s, a degree o f m odesty is called for in analysing the relative im portance o f b oth econom ic an d political vari­ ables; these explanations m ay n o t be contradictory b u t com plem entary to each other. M oreover, an ethnographic analysis o f investors’ d eci­ sions m ay show that expectations about risk and credibility o n the part o f investors are n o t pure cost-benefit calculations ab o u t profits, b u t are m ediated by m icro-institutional conditions and w h at may be char­ acterized as the ‘feel good’ factor, w hich, in tu rn , is affected by the extra policy effort initiated by a m averick leader o r policy maker. If this is true, th en political factors such as policy o u tp u ts, innovative signalling and institutional differences w ill affect concrete investm ent decisions even w h en the econom ic logic m ay suggest otherw ise. T h e three surveys conducted by Business Today from 1996 onw ards show that, over tim e, governance has acquired an enhanced role as a d eterm in an t o f investm ent by affecting the risk perceptions o f business actors.11 In these surveys, investors repeatedly insist th at ‘state governm ent su p p o rt’ continues to be a ‘fu n dam ental’ param eter affecting location decisions. Institutional variables such as ‘law and o rd e r’, ‘quality o f adm inistration’ and ‘quality o f w o rk cu ltu re’ are also very im p o rtan t.12 T hese findings fu rth er ju stify th is chapter’s focus 10. For a sampling, see Robert Barro, ‘Econom ic G ro w th in a C ross-section o f C ountries,’ Quarterly Journal o f Economics 106 (1991), pp. 407-43; and Sebastian Edwards and G uido Tabellini, Political Stability, Political Weakness and Inflation: A n Empirical Analysis, W orking Paper N o. 3721 (Cam bridge, Mass: N ational Bureau o f Econom ic Research, 1991). T hese two articles focus on th e relationship be­ tw een political stability and econom ic grow th. M ore recently, there have been increasing attem pts to focus on the im pact on econom ic developm ents o f insti­ tutional frameworks beyond m ere political stability. See Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, ‘Institutions and Econom ic Bsrformance: C ro ss-C o u n try Tests U sin g Alternative Institutional M easures’, Economics and Politics, vol. 7, no. 3 (1995). O n India, see M ancur O lson, ‘A Collective Choice Perspective on the Indian E conom y’, IR IS Conference Ihper (College Park, M D: IRIS C enter, 1995); and Pranab Bardhan, ‘T he N ature o f Institutional Im pedim ents to Econom ic D evelopm ent’, IR IS Conference Paper (College Park, M D : IRIS C enter, 1995). 11. Business Today, 22 D ecem ber 1999-6 Janaury 2000, p. 43. 12. ‘A Business Today-Gallup-M BA Survey: Best States to Invest In,’ Business Today, 7-21 Ju n e 1996; ‘A B T-G allup Research Project: T h e Best States to Invest In,’ Business Today, 22 D ecem ber-6 Janaury 1998; and ‘T h e Best States to Invest In: A Business Today-Gallup O rganization Research Project,’ Business Today, 22 D ecem ber 1999-6 Janaury 2000 and ‘H ottest States fo r Business: F ourth BT-G allup Survey’, Business Today, 28 Septem ber 2003.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

71

on how political and institutional factors interact w ith econom ic dim ensions to produce divergence across India’s states. In choosing West Bengal and G ujarat, I em ploy th e ‘m ost-different system s design’, w hich m akes it possible to study the m an n er in w hich a sim ilar policy o r process w orks o u t and is adapted in very different contexts.13 Structural adjustm ent policies are received very differently in different contexts. Subnational variation w ithin India offers an ideal context for analysing how a com m on global policy takes a variety o f form s as it intersects w ith different environm ental and political processes. T h is m ethodological approach is especially helpful for process-oriented analysis that seeks to explicate and trace the paths o f co m m o n policies from different starting points.14 In 1991, w h en the central policy o f liberalization was announced, these tw o states differed substantially in term s o f policies, parties in pow er, econom ic structure and institutions o f industrial governance. Politically, various factions o f the C ongress party ru led G ujarat in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s; in the 1990s it was ruled by the BJP Political instability has been endem ic to the state. West Bengal, by contrast, has been ruled by the C P I(M )-led Left F ront coalition since 1977. D espite these pre-existing contrasting patterns, regional elites in b o th states so u g h t to utilize the liberalization agenda for th eir ow n reregulation ends. B oth states sought to involve the private sector in their econom ies; b oth ran advertising cam paigns and took investm entprom otion road show s abroad. Incentives w ere used in bo th cases to attract investors. Each state sent delegations to the o th e r to learn from its policy innovations. H o w do these com m on policies and similar reregulation agendas interact w ith political, institutional and politicoeconom ic differences that exist in the tw o states? D o policies m atter? By explicating how sim ilar policies w ork differently in different contexts, an analysis o f tw o states w ithin India helps us to understand the various routes by w hich neoliberal policies becom e em bedded. T h is tw o-state com parative analysis o f policy change allows us to 13. See Sidney Tarrow, ‘Expanding Two-Paired C om parison’, A P S A -C P News­ letter (APSA Com parative Politics Subsection, 1999), p. 11. 14. Methodologically, a ‘m ost-different system design’ requires a different research plan than the multivariate regression model. In a m ost-different system design the variables interact differently given specific pre-existing factors. T hus, a m odel adequate to capturing interaction effects and m ultiple causal factors is needed. See C harles C . Ragin, The Comparative Method : Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University o f C alifornia Press, 1987).

72

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

evaluate if horizontal com petition, a p ro d u ct o f globalization, produces convergent tendencies in policies, institutions and outcom es as well. Post-liberalization intra-national com parison offers an ideal laboratory for such an analysis: the national political context is u n ifo rm for subnational econom ies yet the central state is far less active in p ro tect­ ing regional states against international pressures, allow ing us to observe the expected im pact o f com petition w ithin a relatively c o n ­ trolled environm ent. T his chapter argues that despite co m m o n m otivations am o n g India’s states, the pattern o f liberalization in any given state is shaped by its institutional capacities, the dynam ics o f its political econom y and the societal responses to policy changes. T his argum ent reflects an analytical approach that recognizes the com plex interplay am ong ideas, interests and institutions in the im plem entation o f econom ic policy reform s. Ideas can be defined as m ental m aps that allow actors to give m eaning to their putatively objective interests. I focus o n ideas em bedded in policies, and attend to the overall discursive structure w ithin w hich policy debates are fram ed by politicians. Institutions are defined as rules o f the game and procedures that structure expecta­ tions about possible consequences; they can be b oth form al and inform al. In this chapter I focus on form al institutions, specifically the various industry-related state agencies, b u t w ith som e attention to how they w ork in practice. Interests refers to the m aterial interests o f social o r econom ic groups. W hile econom ic policy changes may create tw o types o f groups— w inners and losers— it is their responses and their strength, that are crucial in shaping the pattern o f a state’s regulatory fram ework. T his chapter adopts a ‘structure and process approach’ to the study o f policy reform , exam ining ho w bo th structural variables (like socio­ econom ic interests) and proxim ate variables (like policies, ideas and institutions) interact to affect the process o f liberalization. I also incorporate an analysis o f how parties m ake choices about econom ic policy alternatives. Analysing, w ith the use o f a co m m o n fram ework, the interaction betw een interest articulation, partisan econom ic strategy by governm ents and electoral com pulsions helps to bridge the familiar divide betw een com parative political econom y and the study o f parties and elections.15 15. In a similar vein, Herbert Kitschclt speaks of the divide between political economists and students of party politics. See his ‘European Social Democracy:

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy' Change

73

T h is chapter dem onstrates that despite a partial convergence in policy design, West Bengal and G ujarat reveal very different invest­ m e n t outcom es. T hese are explained largely w ith reference to their sharply differing institutional and political capacities for dealing w ith the o nerous task o f re-regulation. T h u s, w hile the ideological differences (m anifested m ost notably in term s o f econom ic policy) betw een the tw o ruling parties— the BJP in G ujarat and the C P I(M ) in West Bengal— have been reduced through a com petitive dynam ic to attract investm ent, the institutional and political econom y factors at the state-level lead to divergent patterns o f investm ent, and even m ore crucially, to differences in the way ideas about liberalization interact w ith societal responses and group interests. T h u s, a com parison o f the tw o states reveals, first, that the horizontal com petition unleashed after 1991 has reduced the range o f policy divergence betw een different parties, and second, that policy convergence has less effect o n econom ic outco m es than is often supposed. R ather, institutions and responses by political organizations con tin u e to bias the result against West Bengal. C oalitional alignm ents and institutional legacies o f the pre-liberalization period prove con­ sequential in this dynam ic betw een policy change, institutions and political interests. An analysis o f state-level econom ic reform s m ust n o t be ahistorical. T h e subnational institutions governing industrial regulation in the license raj period shape the n atu re o f institutional effectiveness in the post-reform period as well. Equally significantly, th e interests various societal groups acquire, and th e alliances form ed d u rin g earlier periods o f conflict, m ay persist over tim e, and the outco m e o f the earlier struggles will have en d u rin g consequences for later patterns o f subnational adjustm ent. Table 3.1 lays o u t the building blocks o f the argum ent. T h e next section o f this chapter outlines the regional pattern o f investm ents in the post-1991 period. I th en discuss the policy shifts in West Bengal and G ujarat. A pplying the tools o f com parative institutional analysis, I reveal the role o f institutional legacies from th e pre-1991 period. T h e chapter concludes by exam ining the role o f econom ic interests and the logic o f political coalitions in the tw o states. Between Political Econom y and Electoral C om petition’, in H erb ert Kitschclt et al. (eds). Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cam bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1999).

74

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

T a b l e 3.1 T he Political Logic o f Subnational Liberalization in Post-1991 India

West Bengal

Gujarat

Policy orientation o f the state governm ent

Pro-liberalization

Pro-liberalization

Institutions o f industrial governance

Weak

Strong

Societal responses

Partisan— i.e. seek to defeat the project

Participatory— i.e. seek to participate in the project

Political strength o f w inners (from liberalization policies)

N arrow base

Dispersed base

Political strength o f losers (From liberalization policies)

Strong, with organized links to key political parties

Weak, w ith no organized links to key political parties

Resulting re-regulation framework

Fragmented

C oherent

Investm ent flows

Low

H igh

R e g io n a l V a r ia t io n s

in

In v e s t m e n t P a t t e r n s

Liberalization affects the rate o f investm ent directly. H o w d o w e assess its regional patterns? It is possible to infer the extent o f investm ent in a state from governm ent data o n investm ent proposals (dom estic and foreign). T h e data on investm ent ‘proposed’ show s that a few regional states capture a disproportionately large share o f proposals. T h ere is a definite regional pattern, w ith the tw o w estern states, M aharashtra and G ujarat, absorbing m ore than l/3 rd o f the total investm ent proposals from 1991 to 2003. T h e ir share o f India’s population is 14.3 per cent. West Bengal receives a relatively low share o f total proposed investm ent: a m ere 2434 proposals for a share o f 3.85 per cent o f all-India investm ent. Table 3.2 furnishes a state-w ise overview. A m ore disaggregated picture is also revealing. Table 3.3 presents the per capita data on investm ent and introduces the tw o routes thro u g h w hich proposals are adm itted after 1991.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

75

T able 3.2 State-wise Investm ent Data N am e o f state

M aharashtra

IEM + LOI (num ber o f proposals)

% of all India proposals

Investm ent (Rs m illion)

% of all India investm ent

10,232

19.9

2,426,410

21.11

Gujarat

6483

12.61

1,889,160

16.43

Tamil N adu

4786

9.31

702,540

6.11

U ttar Pradesh

4553

8.86

776,290

6.75

A ndhra Pradesh

3613

7.03

1,258,110

10.94

Haryana

3097

6.02

336,130

2.92

Rajasthan

2451

4.77

409,730 •

3.56

West Bengal

2434

4.73

442,220

3.85

Punjab

2312

4.5

538,970

4.69

M adhya Pradesh

2097

4.08

449,760

3.91

Karnataka

2086

4.06

557,150

4.85

Dadra and N agar Haveli

1520

2.96

217,650

1.89

D am an and D iu

704

1.37

42,690

0.37

Chhattisgarh

627

1.22

378,180

3.29

Kerala

528

1.03

105,540

0.92

Pondicherry

523

1.02

79,970

0.70

Goa

504

0.98

69,940

0.61

D elhi

490

0.95

65,190

0.57

H im achal Pradesh

455

0.88

98,580

0.86

Orissa

414

0.81

301,640

2.62

Jharkhand

357

0.69

111,090

0.97

U ttaranchal

341

0.66

63,820

0.56

Assam

244

0.47

79,160

0.69

Bihar

171

0.33

44,680

0.39

Jam m u and Kashmir

145

0.28

12,020

0.10

Meghalaya

123

0.24

14,440

0.13

Chandigarh

38

0.07

4580

0.04

Tripura

20

0.04

18,790

0.16

Arunachal Pradesh

13

0.03

1530

0.01

Source: Calculated from Secretariat o fln d u strial Assistance, M inistry o fln d u strial Development, S IA Statistics, G overnm ent o f India, May 2003.

T a b l e 3.3

Total Proposed Investm ent and Per Capita Proposed Investm ent (August 1991-January 2003) State

IEM (num ber)

IEM investm ent (Rs m illion)

LOI (num ber) •

G ujarat

6058

1,681,860

425

207,300

1,889,160

37,409

West Bengal

2348

402,430

86

39,790

442,220

5514

LOI investm ent (Rs million)

Total investm ent (Rs m illion)

Per capita investm ent (Rs m illion)

Note: After 1991, investm ent proposals are m ade through tw o routes: Investm ent E n trep ren eu r M em o­ randum (IEM ) and Letters o f Intents (LO I). LO I refers to those industries that need a governm ent licence (for example, defense related industries). IEM s do n o t require a license. Source: C om puted from SLA, M inistry o f Industrial D evelopm ent, S IA Statistics, G overnm ent o f India, May 2003, and C ensus o f India, 2001. G ujarat’s population in 2001 was 50.5 m illion. West Bengal’s was 80.2 million.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

77

T his snapshot o f investm ent intentions needs to b e com plem ented w ith an analysis o f actual investm ent flow. B etw een 1996-9 the ratio betw een proposed and im plem ented investm ent ranged betw een 51 and 59 p e r cent in G ujarat, w hile in West Bengal, the range was narrow er— betw een 32 and 35 per cent. T able 3.4 Ratio o f Im plem entation (Investm ent under Im plem entation/Proposed Investm ent, in per cent) States M aharashtra G ujarat West Bengal Tamil N adu Kerala

April 1996

April 1997

April 1998

January 1999

49.5 59.8 35.0 23.9 20.8

44.3 56.6 37.2 25.4 17.3

52.1 54.1 36.6 21.2 16.3

50.2 51.9 32.8 17.3 15.3

Source: CM IE, Survey o f Investment projects: Overview, February 1998, p. 5 and N ovem ber 1998, p. \OzndM onthly Review o f Investment Projects, February 1999, p. 13.

T his ratio allows us to rein terp ret the ‘proposed investm ent’ data outlined above and calculate the actual investm ent flow s into G ujarat and W est Bengal. T a b l e 3.5 Actual Investm ent for West Bengal and G ujarat (August 1991-January 2003)

G ujarat Wsst Bengal

Average ratio o f actual investm ent to proposed investm ent (1996-9)

Actual per capita investm ent (Rs m illion)

Ratio o f G ujarat to West Bengal actual per capita investm ent

55.4 per cent 35.4 per cent

20,724.6 1951.9

10.6:1

Source: A uth o r’s calculations from the SIA and C M IE D ata (above tables).

T hese calculations confirm that G ujarat and W est Bengal attract divergent investm ent flows. T h e d istribution data regarding the source o f investm ent (foreign versus dom estic) across these tw o states reveals a m o re com plicated picture. West Bengal attracted a higher share o f aggregate foreign investm ent proposals th an G ujarat for the period 1991-7. T his data on foreign investm ent intentions may reflect the relative success o f West Bengal’s aggressive policy tow ards foreign investm ent w hich began in 1994.

78

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

T able 3.6 FD I Proposals State-wise (August 1991-January 1997) N u m b er o f projects

Investm ent (Rs million)

F^r cent (share in all India)

1355

126,764

12.5

G ujarat

548

37,625

3.7

West Bengal

271

52,495

5.2

Tamil N adu

812

54,680

5.4

Kerala

104

5209

0.5

Andhra Pradesh

439

25.113

2.5

69

1307

0.1

10359

1,014,940

100

M aharashtra

Bihar All-India

Source: CMIE, Monthly Review of Investment Projects (Bombay: C M IE, 1999), p. 33. TABLE 3.7 Foreign Invcstm cnt-—Proposed and Actual (August 1991-January 1997) FD I proposals per capita (Rs m illion)

Actual FD I flows per capita (Rs m illion)

G ujarat

917.6

508.3

West Bengal

771.9

273.2

Source: A uthor’s calculations. I use population figures for 1991 for calculations in this table.

Total investm ent patterns show G ujarat perform ing m uch b etter than West Bengal in attracting investm ent, and West Bengal d o in g unexpectedly well in term s o f foreign investm ent, or at least n o t as poorly as in dom estic investm ent. W hat explains this pattern? P o l ic y W

est

and

I d e a t io n a l S h if t s

Bengal

and

G

in

u ja r a t

W hen India’s C ongress Party-led central governm ent introduced structural adjustm ent and liberalization m easures in 1991-2, West Bengal and G ujarat w ere ruled by parties o f contrasting ideological hues. In G ujarat the BJP supported the state’s first non-C ongress governm ent, w hile the C P I(M )-led Left F ront was in pow er in

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

79

W est Bengal. T h is party disharm ony across central and regional levels seem ed to prom ise increased conflict over econom ic policy. T h e national C P I(M ) came o u t strongly against w h at they described as ‘IM F dictated’ econom ic policies. T h e West Bengal State C om m ittee o f the C P I(M ) was expected to launch strikes, protests and rallies against the c en tre’s m ove tow ards liberalization o f the Indian economy. T h e BJP was espousing its policy o f econom ic nationalism : Swadeshi (M ade in India). M oreover, in G ujarat, given the nature o f party com petition in th e state, w here the m ain opposition to the BJP-Janata coalition was provided by the C ongress, one w ould have expected the state governm ent to pursue alternatives to C o n g ress’s national policy fram ew ork. D espite these expectations, these and o th e r state governm ents introduced their ow n ‘liberalization policies’, an n o u n cin g a greater role for the private sector and m ore scope for foreign investm ent. T h is was followed by institutional and adm inistrative changes, such as the creation o f state-level agencies that could provide single-w indow clearance for investm ent proposals. D iscursive shifts in the way policies w ere publicly fram ed w ere also m u ch in evidence. T h e G o vernm ent o f West Bengal announced in 1994: ‘We need to accept conditional private participation for a quick qualitative change o f o u r industrial and social infrastructure’. By contrast, an official in G ujarat declared: *We [in G ujarat] m ust com pare ourselves to the Asian T igers.. .. In five years hopefully w e will b e ranked am ong the new ly industrializing countries’.17 D id these policy, institutional and rhetorical shifts contribute to the investm ent patterns outlined above? D id th ey respond to statespecific policy dilem m as adequately? In this section, I argue that these policy shifts reflect attem pts by subnational elites to evolve their ow n re-regulation agendas in the face o f central policy changes and external pressures. W hile the im m ediate stim u lu s for new regional policies came from the central (and global) level, and was therefore external to states, each state evolved its policy fram ew ork to respond to region-specific policy dilem m as. T his shaped th e specific m anner in w hich the n ew policies w ere ‘fram ed’, and th e intensity and scope o f the specific policy com ponents adopted. T h u s, policy convergence 16. G overnm ent o f West Bengal, Industrial Policy Statement (Calcutta, 1994). 17. L. M ansingh, the managing director o f G ujarat Industrial Investm ent C orporation (G IIC ), in an interview to the Business Standard, 19 M arch 1997.

80

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

co-existed w ith im p o rtan t differences across th e tw o states, in te rm s o f th e scope o f liberalization policies and the discourses em ployed to ju stify them . T h ese differences are a p ro d u c t o f pressures a n d dilem m as specific to each o f these tw o states. T h e story o f state-level liberalization w ith in India m u st be a com bined account o f h o w th e internal (region-specific) constellations o f discourse and political a n d econom ic forces n o t only ‘accom m odate th e externally push ed change b u t, far m ore actively, also pulls it in and shapes i t . W est B engal: Policy S hifts a n d Ideological T u rn a ro u n d A shift tow ards m arket orientation in the national policy fram ew o rk confronts social dem ocratic p anics like th e C P I(M ) w ith a ‘policychange d ilem m a’ n o t faced by cen trist o r rig h t-w in g parties: H o w can such a party m odify its ideological agenda tow ard public sector-led industrialization and redistributive econom ic policy strategies w ith o u t losing its core base o f political su p p o rt— public sector w orkers and the m iddle peasantry. T h is dilem m a is even m ore tro u b lin g in dem ocracies, w h ere left-of-centre parties m ay be p u n ish ed electorally for abandoning earlier ideological com m itm ents. J u s t a year after an n o u n cin g its new industrial policy in 1994, th e ru lin g Left F ro n t in W est Bengal was defeated in m unicipal and corporation elections. It had gone ‘against th e p ro -lab o u r im age o f the Left F ro n t govern­ ment*. T h is policy change dilem m a is resolved differently by d ifferent labour-based parties. C ertain socialist parties in France, Italy, and Spain, for instance, have revised th eir doctrines so as to pursue m arket-oriented policies. O th e rs, such as C h ile’s co m m u n ists, refuse to em brace doctrinal change. T h e national apparatus o f India’s C P I(M ) falls into this latter cam p. H ow ever, the W est Bengal u n it o f th e C P I(M ), w hich had ruled the state since 1977, chose to initiate politically risky policy shifts in favour o f private, and even m ultinational capital in th e early 1990s. In 1994, a n ew policy regim e— including both policy m easures and in stitu ­ tional reform s— cam e into being in W est Bengal. It included a range o f incentives to attract private investm ent. Som e o f these reform s had begun, in a fragm ented form , as far back as 1985. B ut the 1994 policy 18. Suzanne Berger and Ronald D ore (eds), National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: C ornell U niversity Press, 1996), p. 19. 19. Observer o f Business and Politics, 30 M arch 1996.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

81

statem ent, by encom passing m o st governm ent departm ents, heralded a system ic shift.20 Involving the private sector in the infrastructure sector— for instance, in the provision o f education and health— becam e govern­ m en tal policy for the first tim e.21 Institutional changes involved the reorganization o f the West Bengal Industrial D evelopm ent C o rp o ra­ tio n (W B ID C ) and the upgradation and revival o f an investor ‘escort service’ w ith in the W B ID C , the Silpa B andhu.22 Jyoti Basu, th en ch ief m in ister o f the state, explained his stance on the central policy o f liberalization: In 1991 th e N e w E co n o m ic Policy o f th e G O I [G o v e rn m e n t o f India] was a n n o u n c e d . W hile disagreeing w ith m an y item s in th is policy w e w elco m ed its tw o aspects, viz. th e de-licen sin g and d isco n tin u an ce o f th e freight e q u alizatio n s c h e m e .. .. W ith th e rem oval o f reg u latio n and c o n tro ls, w e have g o t th e o p p o rtu n ity to plan for th e industrial d e v elo p m en t o f o u r s ta te .. . . As a state g o v ern m en t, w e are to fu n c tio n w ith in [th e c e n tre ’s] e co n o m ic m ilieu a n d th erefo re endeavors n eed to be step p ed up fo r all c o n c e rn e d q u arters to b rin g a b o u t th e in dustrial resurgence o f W est B engal.23

Sim ultaneously, the c h ie f m inister appointed as the ch airm an o f th e W B ID C a senior C P I(M ) leader, S om nath C h atteijee, w h o was given a free hand to evolve new policies for the state’s industrial developm ent. U n d erly in g these institutional and policy changes w as a m o re subtle shift in the balance o f pow er betw een the g o v ern m en t and party w ings o f West Bengal’s C P I(M ). T h e W B ID C w as accorded significant autonom y vis-à-vis the party an d the C IT U (C en tre for Indian Trade U n io n s), its trade union branch. T h e W B ID C ’s authority cam e directly from the c h ie f m in ister’s office, w h ich m eant that party pressures w ould have to co n ten d w ith the form idable M r Basu him self. A n ‘E m pow ered C o m m itte e ’ headed by 20. Jyoti Basu, West Bengal C h ie f M inister from 1977 to 2000, initiated policy reform at the sub-national level in the m id 1980s. A round 1985, Basu announced th a t the state’s w ork culture had to change. M any projects involving private-sector participation were initiated (see India Today, 15 July 1985). Basu’s office com pared h is initiatives to prom ote jo in t ventures w ith private capital w ith G orbachev’s perestroika reform s (Indian Express, 8 Ju ly 1990). 21. G overnm ent o f West Bengal, Industrial Policy Statement (C alcutta, 1994). 22. Silpa B andhu means ‘A Friend o f Industry.’ G overnm ent o f West Bengal, Memorandum on the Reconstitution of Silpa Bandhu, 6 O ctober 1994 (Calcutta: W BIDC). 23. Jyoti, Basu, People's Power in Practice: 20 Years o f Left Front in West Bengal (C alcutta: N ational Book Agency Private Ltd., 1997), p. xiv.

82

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

the ch ief secretary and o th er departm ental secretaries was also estab­ lished to ‘arrange for tim e-b o u n d decisions in respect o f investm ent proposals and clearances required’.24 T h e W B ID C ’s pow er vis-à-vis o th er state agencies expanded as it assum ed responsibility for coor­ dinating the various aspects o f the state’s liberalized policy stance. W hile a surface-level reading o f the new policy d o c u m e n t m ight indicate that the pro-private sector policy was highly qualified, reflecting continuity w ith the Left F ront’s pre-1994 policy goals, it is also clear that the policy announcem ents co m bined w ith concrete state actions represented a radical shift in the ru lin g party’s public discourse.25 Even traditionally anti-left new spapers in W est Bengal, such as the Telegraph and the Statesman, recognized th e radical nature o f the shift, especially in light o f the co n tin u in g anti-liberalization stance o f the C P I(M )’s national leadership. Studies o f liberalization usually focus o n policies in term s o f objective o u tp u t and policy instrum ents. Yet, equal atten tio n m u st be paid to the way in w hich these policy changes are fram ed w ith in the discursive m oral econom y o f the state.26 R odrik suggests that the source o f the credibility problem for reform ing governm ents m ay be asym m etric inform ation. T h e governm ent has ‘private’ inform ation about its policy intentions b u t econom ic actors affected by govern­ m en t policy are unable to assess the seriousness o f policy reform . U ncertainty about governm ent intentions often leads to an indifferent response by private-sector investors.27 In such a situation o f asym m et­ ric inform ation, the governm ent w ill have to signal its pro-liberalization com m itm ents aggressively. A chieving credibility requires a larger policy reform — ‘going overboard’, as R odrik puts it— th an w ould have been dictated in the absence o f the credibility p ro b lem .28 24. G overnm ent o f West Bengal, Industrial Policy Statement (Calcutta: G overn­ m ent o f West Bengal, 1994), p. 11. 25. A closer analysis o f governm ental statements, and the response by new s­ papers and the party cadre, suggests that m ost observers in West Bengal recognized this as a significant discursive shift. Later criticisms that ‘n o th in g has happened’ refer mainly to im plem entation issues, w hich are separate from ideational shifts. 26. See Jam es C . Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (N ew Haven: Yale U niversity Press, 1976). 27. ‘Private inform ation’ refers to the fact that only the governm ent knows w hether it intends to follow through on its policy com m itm ents. 28. Dani Rodrik, ‘Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signalling*, in Federico Sturzenegger and M ariano Tommasi (eds), The Policy Economy o f Reform (Cam bridge, Mass: T he M IT Press, 1998), p. 309.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

83

In a sim ilar way, the governm ent o f West Bengal faced a problem n o t confronted by n on-left parties operating at the subnational level (such as those that dom inated G ujarat’s politics). T h e re was w ide­ spread scepticism am ong both investors and the public about the C P I(M )’s policy intentions given its earlier antipathy tow ards the private sector. Selling W est Bengal as an attractive location for investors becam e even m ore im portant th an it was for o th er states. T h e governm ent needed to reassure m any doubters o f its serious and long-term co m m itm en t to policy change. Part o f this involved blam ing the central governm ent for co n tributing to long-held m is­ conceptions about the state. As Som nath C hatteijee p u t it: T h e m o st serious p ro b lem is o n e o f im age— an im age th at n o th in g happens in W est B engal, n o b o d y w o rk s h ere, th e re ’s n o pow er, n o w ater, an d the g o v e rn m e n t is ru n by th e M afia, th e in d u strial sector is full o f all sorts o f irresp o n sib le people. T h a t’s th e im age th a t has b een very assiduously created [by th e press and th e C e n tr e ] .... T h e re w as d eliberate action o n th e p art o f th e C e n tre to deny licenses, p ersu ad e people to m ove people fro m h e re __ B u t I say, forget th e past, except to learn fro m th e past.29

O fficials and politicians focused on changing the reputation o f the Left F ro n t governm ent by signaling its seriousness in pursuing reform s. H aving long dism issed the m ainstream press as ‘bourgeois’, C hatteijee began co u rtin g the m edia, giving n u m ero u s interview s in w h ich he argued explicitly that the credibility problem required West Bengal to undertake ‘larger’ and ‘stro n g er’ reform s: . . . u n fo rtu n ate ly th ere is still th e feeling a m o n g a section o f th e industry: W hy sh o u ld w e go to a c o m m u n ist-le d state? T h is sh o u ld p ro m p t us to be m o re aggressive in pro jectin g W est Bengal. We m u st attract private capital. I d o n ’t see any alternative. W here is th e m o n ey ?30

T h e volum e o f interview s and press statem ents after 1994 were intended to m ake available detailed inform ation about the West Bengal governm ent’s intentions and decision-m aking procedures. T h e state governm ent n o t only instituted new policies and restruc­ tu red institutions; it also changed the discursive fram es through w h ich m ost people view ed the governm ent’s econom ic program m es. A social dem ocratic party at the subnational level had to sim ulta­ neously convince industry o f its credible intentions and persuade a 29. Interview, Business World, 22 Ju n e 1997, p. 94. See also ‘C entre Blamed for Bengal’s Poor Image Abroad’, Business Standard, 20 O ctober 1995. 30. Economic Times, 12 August 1997.

84

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

sceptical public that the new policy fram ew ork allow ed West Bengal to liberate itself from N ew D elh i’s old centralist tendencies. T h u s, the Left F ro n t portrayed its reform program m e as part o f an effort to p ro m o te regional autonom y. T h e ‘reform ers’ w ithin the C P I(M ) also had to convince the ‘h a rd ­ liners’ w ith in the party as w ell as reluctant coalition partners, som e o f w h o m w ere w edded to even m ore revolutionary form s o f ideology To the national politburo o f the C P I(M ) in N e w D elhi, Basu invoked the T IN A [T here is n o Alternative] argum ent. H e defended the paradigm shift in West Bengal by declaring, W e are n o t a republic’. Basu argued th at the state governm ent could n o t resist the ‘pulls o f the m ark et econom y w hich the centre has ushered in w ith the en d o rsem en t from parliam ent’.31 To his fellow party com rades in W est Bengal, Basu suggested that they should m ake a virtue o f political necessity. T h e ruling C P I(M ) had exhausted th e political w indfalls o f the ‘rural strategy’, Basu argued.32 H e therefore urged th em to m ake industrialization itself an electoral issue and carry the message o f W est Bengal’s industrial revival to ‘the hearts and m in d s o f the people’.33 Basu’s successor as West Bengal’s C h ie f M inister, M r B uddhadeb B hattacharjee, defended the state’s invitation to M icrosoft as eco­ nom ically necessary, w hile differentiating his approach from th at taken b y N e w D elhi: Yes, I k n o w M icrosoft is an A m erican com pany. B u t w e are b ein g fo rced to accept th e ir help. W e n eed th at h elp in areas in w h ic h w e d o n ’t have ex p ertise____ B u t th ere w ere areas w h ere th e Left w o u ld n o t fo llo w th e C e n tre . We w ill try to find ways o f keeping th e p u b lic d istrib u tio n system afloat even i f th e C e n tre chooses to d isco n tin u e it.34

T h e state governm ent’s massive advertising cam paign in India and abroad to back its new found co m m itm en t to econom ic liberalization was inten d ed to signal to investors that its policy reform s w ere radical en o u g h to deserve their interest. T h e advertisem ents in the Washington Post and the Financial Ttmes proclaim ed that ‘R ed Flags and Red Tapeism have been Replaced by a Red C arp et’.35 31. Basu spoke thus at a N ational Politburo m eeting o f the C PI(M ). M alabika Bhattacharya, ‘An A lluring Investm ent H aven’, Hindustan Times, 10 O ctober 1995. 32. Interview w ith a C P I(M ) leader, 2 August 2001. 33. Interview w ith a C P I(M ) leader, 2 August 2001. 34. The Telegraph, 9 Septem ber 2001. 35. Saumya Bhattacharya, ‘A N ew State o f M ind’, Financial Express, 18 August 1995. Also see cover story on ‘T h e N ew Calcutta’, Newsweek, 31 M arch 1997.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

85

T h e W est Bengal governm ent also sought im proved new relations w ith both cham bers o f com m erce and trade unions. A fter 1992 the Left F ront G o v ern m en t began to curtail the pow er o f organized labour so as to provide conditions conducive to private investm ent. ‘O u tsid e r’ investors regard labour m ilitancy and high em p lo y m en t costs as am ong th e key reasons for the lack o f investm ent in the state.36 T h e state g o v ern m en t im pressed u p o n the trade unions affiliated w ith the ruling party the im portance o f quality and productivity. It stressed th at w hile ‘j u s t’ dem ands w ould be m et, the question o f w o rk discipline and w ork culture was a m uch larger and m ore im portant issue. Jyoti Basu w ent so far as to threaten the unions w ith ‘stern actio n ’ if they did n o t m aintain harm onious labour-business relations. T h is disciplining o f w orkers and o f C IT U has continued. In 2001 B hattachaijee, Basu’s successor as ch ief m inister, approved a proposal b an n in g road and rail blockages by dem arcating a fixed place for such protest events.37 T h o u g h Jyoti Basu had long m aintained close personal relations w ith certain key business families (for exam ple, the G oenkas), a w ider shift in the governm ent’s public attitudes tow ards the private sector was also needed. B usiness-govem m ent interactions in liberalizing West Bengal have been m arked by m ore intensive dialogue at the organizational level, m oving from individual contacts to collective engagem ent. In 1996, the West Bengal State P lan n in g Board was reconstituted and for the first tim e a representative from the private sector was included. T h e state governm ent representative adm itted th at this w as m eant to signal the governm ent’s co m m itm en t to boosting industrial developm ent in the state.38 A G o v ern m en t-In d u stry C o o rd in atio n C o m m ittee was also established in 1996. It included various m em bers o f the West Bengal chapter o f the C onfederation o f Indian Industry. Regular interactions and close consultations betw een various sections o f the business co m m u n ity w ere evident in the m an n er in w hich the ‘Partnership S u m m it’ was organized in 1997. T h e re was com plete coordination betw een the governm ent o f West Bengal and the C II both before and d u rin g this event.39 36. It is notable that insiders— businesspersons with longstanding investm ents in West Bengal— hold generally positive views about the state’s ruling party and its ability to catalyze industrial developm ent. 37. Telegraph, 9 Septem ber 2001. 38. G overnm ent o f West Bengal, Press Release, D ecem ber 1996. 39. I draw this inform ation from G overnm ent o f West Bengal, Internal Memo, No. 320(6) on the Partnership Summit, 1996.

86

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

T h u s, the econom ic policy fram ew ork in W est Bengal was signifi­ cantly transform ed d u rin g the 1990s. Its significance goes beyond th e im pact o n econom ic outputs, affecting also the discursive fram es th rough w hich various relationships— betw een state and C en tre, party and governm ent, go v ern m en t and business— are represented and pursued. G ujarat: C o n tin u ity in In d u strial Policy In G ujarat, responses to liberalization policies, w hile less ideologically radical, w ere also significant. D u rin g the early 1990s, w hile the C ongress party ruled in N ew D elhi, the H in d u nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) took pow er (in a coalition governm ent) in G ujarat. T h is generated a natural political incentive for the BJP in G ujarat to differentiate itself from the national policy fram ew ork o f liberaliza­ tion, so closely associated w ith the m ain opposition party in the state, the C ongress Party. T h e ch ief dilem m a facing governing elites in G ujarat was to fram e the state governm ent’s policy responses as a com bination o f both change and continuity from the state’s previous C ongress governm ent. T his was in contrast to the challenge faced by the C P I(M ) in West Bengal, w hich was u n d er intense pressure to signal reversal from its ow n earlier policy orientation. G ujarat’s policym akers and politicians fram ed th e ir liberalization policies in the 1990s as internally driven rath er than externally im p o sed , d esp ite th e sim ilarities w ith th e n a tio n a l e c o n o m ic program m e. M oreover, since G ujarat’s ruling party d id not face th e reputational problem faced by a social dem ocratic party in reversing its econom ic strategy, its re-regulation strategy involved reorientation rather than reversal. T h e state’s leadership fram ed its policy response as w h ole-hearted su p p o rt for p ro -m ark et forces, w hile stressing its continuity w ith G ujarat’s earlier business-friendly policies and institutions. In the absence o f a credibility crisis in G ujarat, th e go v ern m en t’s ‘policy statem ent’ did n o t aim to clarity its stance regarding public versus private sectors in the regional econom y, n o r did it engage in a strenuous West Bengal-style public relations exercise. W hile in 1995 the G ujarat governm ent did issue an industrial policy statem ent— ‘G ujarat AD 2000 and B eyond’— the policy m easures contained w ith in it w ere characterized m ore by continuity than by change. G ujarat had issued an investm ent incentive policy every five years since the early 1980s, w hich m ade the 1995 policy statem ent n o th in g o u t o f the

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

87

ordinary. T h e 1995 d o cu m en t argued that G ujarat’s prior experience m ade it u n iquely poised to take advantage o f the national policy o f liberalization: ‘T h e econom ic reform process has provided a boost to the [earlier] efforts o f the state tow ards rapid industrialization’.40 W hile sim ilar in stru ctu re to earlier policy statem ents, th e 1995 d ocum ent em phasized the need to adjust to changes in the international (as opposed to ju s t the national) m arket. T his ‘extra-national’ reorientation sits som ew hat uneasily w ith the d o c u m e n t’s b rie f perfunctory m ention o f Sw adeshi [national selfreliance], th e ideological plank o f the ruling BJP T h e goal o f Swadeshi d evelopm ent is m entioned twice in the 25-page d o cu m en t w ithout specifying h o w it is to be operationalized. In the su b seq u en t policy statem ent, ‘G ujarat Industrial Policy 2000’, Sw adeshi received no m en tio n at all. Clearly, the BJP’s econom ic ideology did n o t pose as strong an ideological constraint to its governing elites as the econom ic goals o f the C P I(M ) posed to the ruling Left F ront in West Bengal. G ujarat officials used different techniques than th e ir counterparts in West Bengal in ord er to sell the state to potential investors. C o n ­ tinuity w ith earlier institutions o f industrial governance w ere specifi­ cally em phasized. Various docum ents stressed continuity: ‘G ujarat: Located M idw est o f the Indian su b co n tin en t, th e state began in 1 9 6 0 ...w ith one ideology— Business. An ideology th at has rem ained constant in the face o f successive governm ents’.42 U n lik e West Bengal’s officials, those in G ujarat had no need to reassure investors about th e state’s radically transform ed ‘political c o m m itm e n t’. N o n e o f its advertisem ents em phasized that G ujarat had changed. Instead, they stressed the advantages o f a stable policy tow ards industry from the 1960s onw ards. G ujarat sim ultaneously tried to sell itself as a ‘true believer in u nregulated m arkets’. O fficials insisted that the purpose o f the 40. G overnm ent o f Gujarat, Gujarat 2000 A D . and Beyond (Gandhinagar: G overnm ent o f Gujarat, 1995), p. 1. 41. G overnm ent o f Gujarat, Gujarat Industrial Policy 2000 (Gandhinagar: G overnm ent o f Gujarat, 2000). 42. IN D EX T B , An Eye for Business (Ahmedabad: IN D E X T B , 1995). See also IN D E X T B , Gujarat: Prosperity through bistitutional Support (Ahmedabad: IN D EX TB, 1995); and IN D EX TB, Wheels: A n Industrial Journal (Ahmedabad: IN D EX TB, April 1996). Interviews w ith entrepreneurs confirm that state governm ent officials consider continuity w ith past policies one o f G ujarat’s institutional strengths.

88

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

gov ernm ent’s privatization program m e was n o t to cover revenue deficits, b u t to professionalize the m anagem ent o f the firm s c o n ­ cerned, insisting that they understood that the state ‘should n o t b e in activities w here it has n o business being’.43 W hen the G ujarat go vernm ent received a loan from the Asian D evelopm ent Bank, governm ent officials w ere adam ant that the loan agreem ent contained n o policy conditionalities to w h ich the govern­ m en t had n o t already com m itted itself. O n e official pointed o u t th a t a governm ent report, published in April 1994, had in fact anticipated the A D B ’s policy guidelines, and that, as a result, ‘th e present public sector exercise in G ujarat can be seen only as an endogenous effo rt and n o t an exogenous o ne im posed by A D B ’.44 D espite the p ro -m ark et discursive fram e used by policy m akers, in actual practice G ujarat’s policy fram ew ork in the 1990s m arried th e national policy o f liberalization to its erstw hile state-led m odel o f industrialization. T h e G ujarat governm ent co n tin u ed to invest in projects and sectors w here it expected private in v estm en t to need fu rth er encouragem ent. To accelerate developm ent o f the electronics industry, for instance, the state governm ent an n o u n ced a special incentive package, w hich included investm ent subsidies and sales tax benefits, and five additional electronics industrial estates w ere planned.43 In 1995-2000, m any new state agencies w ere created, such as the G ujarat Infrastructure D evelopm ent Board and the G ujarat Pow er C orporation. T h is was an augm entation o f th e state, n o t its w ithdraw al. T h u s, b oth in term s o f quantity (increases in the n u m b e r o f state agencies) and quality (perform ance o f d ifferen t types o f functions), state-level agencies shape the process o f liberalization directly. T h e policy changes in West Bengal and G ujarat outlined above w ere clearly a response to differing policy dilem m as in the tw o states: the credibility crisis in W est Bengal and the n eed for flexible reorientation in G ujarat. I have suggested that policy changes in the tw o states w ere adequate to deal w ith their respective dilem m as: in W est Bengal the co m m itm en t o f the go v ern m en t leadership to a 43. A uthor’s interview w ith the Finance Secretary, G overnm ent o f G ujarat, 16 April 1997; and L. M ansingh, M anaging Director, G IIC , 10 April 1997. Also see the interview w ith L. M ansingh in, ‘Survey o f G ujarat’, Business Standard, 19 M arch 1997. 44. Business Line, 15 M arch 1997. 45. Financial Express, 29 Ju n e 1991.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

89

private sector-based econom ic strategy translated into significant institutional innovations and changes in authority relations. M o re­ over, despite the change o f leadership in 2000-01—-with Bhattacharjee replacing th e retiring Basu as W est Bengal's C h ie f M inister— the policy co m m itm en t has continued w ith new initiatives. In G ujarat, th e state leadership quickly reoriented itself to th e private sector (especially its international com ponent), in stitu tin g m any policy and organizational reform s in support o f this shift in em phasis. T h e overall policy orientation in both states is pro-liberalization, and incum bents have show n significant abilities to respond to and deal w ith their state-specific policy dilem m as. D espite these sim ilarities in policy goals and policy instrum ents, th e pattern o f investm ent flows are different across the tw o states.46 Som e o f th a t variation arises o u t o f differences in th e infrastructure level and d em and factors in the tw o states. H ow ever, the extent o f th e differences— the fact that G ujarat receives alm ost eleven times m o re investm ent than W est Bengal—c a n n o t be fully explained by econom ic factors. A m u ch higher per capita incom e in West Bengal and higher agricultural grow th rates in the 1990s sh o u ld in theory have enhanced the dem and for industrial products. Infrastructural factors, such as the availability o f electricity, sh o u ld w o rk in West Bengal’s favour, as it is currently a pow er-surplus state.47 W hat, then, explains the difference in investm ent flows? A range o f factors is considered below.

S t ic k y I n s t i t u t i o n s in W e s t B e n g a l a n d G u ja r a t : A C o m p a r a t i v e I n s t i t u t i o n a l A n a l y s is

T h e cu rren t conventional w isdom is that institutions influence in­ vestors’ econom ic decisions, and yet there is little system atic em pirical analysis o f how institutions m atter. In this section, I argue that the ideological stance o f the respective parties tow ards econom ic issues is n o t as im p o rtan t as the institutions governing industrial change. I specifically analyse the investm ent m anagem ent system s in the 46. Clearly the intensity o f policy change in Bengal was stronger, b u t the goals w ere and continue to be similar. 47. M oreover, infrastructure is not a pure econom ic variable, as m any aspects o f infrastructure provision are affected by institutional and political variables.

90

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

tw o states. W hile the approval adm inistration at the central level w as substantially stream lined and m any licensing regulations w ere abol­ ished, its counterparts at the state-level rose in im portance. D espite this enhanced role, the effectiveness o f these in v estm en t-p ro m o tio n organizations after 1991 was largely determ ined by th eir pre-1991 capacities and skills. Historically, industrial regulation in India was vertically shared betw een the C en tre and the regional states.48 T h e regulatory process can be disaggregated, at least, into a tw o-stage interaction, one involving the central M inistry o f Industry in N e w D elhi, and the o th er involving state-level industry adm inistrations. W hile the central governm ent continues to set the rules and receive investm ent applications, investors m u st also interact w ith the regional institutions, both w hen they decide to invest in a particular state and (crucially) d u rin g the im plem entation process. Aware o f these dow nstream req u irem en ts, central go v ern m en t officials ten d to decide the fate o f investm ent applications in coordination w ith statelevel investm ent-prom otion agencies. T his m eans that investors begin interacting w ith state-level institutions even before the application process begins in N e w D elhi. T his shapes th eir choice o f w hich state to locate in, and also shapes the speed (and ease) w ith w hich the project is im plem ented. In the license-raj period some regional states w ere able to im prove m oderately the fu nctioning o f the licensing system by ensu rin g that the licenses allotted by the central governm ent w ere actually im ple­ m ented relatively speedily. T his involved careful m o n ito rin g o f the licenses at the central governm ent level. M o nitoring the needs and intentions o f private-sector firm s at the regional level was also crucial in attracting license-holders to a given state d u rin g the license-ra/ period. G u ja ra t’s g o v e rn m e n t system atically m o n ito re d th e c en tral governm ent’s licensing system from the late 1970s onw ards. R. J. Shah, the director o f the state’s Investm ent P rom otion C ell, recalled how attem pts to increase the flow o f investm ent in the 1970s led G ujarat’s Industry D ep artm en t to evolve a system o f m o n ito rin g 48. T his argum ent challenges the oft-repeated claim that because industry is in the central governm ent’s list o f responsibilities state governm ents had no role to play in industrial regulation. For an elaboration o f this argum ent see Aseema Sinha, Leviathan Divided: The Regional Roots of Developmental Politics in India (B loom ington, IN : Indiana U niversity Press, forthcom ing).

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

91

central licenses from the stage o f allotm ent to actual p ro d u ctio n .49 T h e state governm ent m aintained a register o f the ‘Letters o f In te n t’ allotted for G ujarat. T h e G ujarat regulatory agency, th e Industrial E xtension B ureau (IN D E X T B ), used to send a letter to the relevant investor, inviting him to G ujarat to see possible sites. In addition, a sim ple m o n ito rin g form was sent to the investor that urged them to re p o rt ‘the application status’ o f the project. If the application was pending, the investors w ere required to specify ‘p ending w ith w h o m ’, an d the date. T h is enabled IN D E X T B to pursue the m atter w ith the agency w ith w hom the application was pending. A n analysis o f the internal w orking o f G ujarat’s D ep artm en t o f Industries show s de­ tailed attention to licenses granted by the central g o v ern m en t for projects to be located in G ujarat, including periodic updates on their ‘im plem entation status’. N o such ‘investm ent p rom otion cell’, o r indeed any o th e r m ethod fo r m o n ito rin g the various stages o f the central licensing process, existed in West Bengal before 1991. T h e ‘j o in t regulatory stru ctu re’ in G ujarat survived fro m the pre­ refo rm days, b u t its inform al w orking was m odified as a result o f the com bined yet separate actions taken by the central and state govern­ m en ts. Since 1991 the approval adm inistration at the state level has acquired m uch greater im portance. Two aspects o f this essentially subnational process are crucial: persuading new investors to apply for a n Industrial E n trep ren eu r M em o ran d u m (IEM ) for a particular state, a n d ensu rin g speedy im plem entation o f b oth the IE M and L O I (Letter o f Intent) proposals. T h e G ujarat governm ent’s policy o f consistent m o n ito rin g o f th e central licensing system before 1991 was m odified, n o t w ith ­ draw n, after 1991. T h e pre-existing skills o f m o n ito rin g th e pre-1991 licensing system allowed G ujarat, even after 1991, to co n tin u e its successful system. T h e targets o f attention began to include foreign investors as well as the dom estic private sector.50 T h e strategic capacities that had proved useful d u rin g the license-ra/ proved equally 49. Interview w ith R .J. Shah, an official o f the G overnm ent o f Gujarat, 21 Ju n e 1997. 50. D uring m ost o f the ‘license raj’ G ujarat’s bureaucracy targeted mainly G ujarati capital from West Bengal, M aharashtra, East Africa and the U nited K ingdom . In the 1980s, and especially after 1991, it has becom e m uch m ore indiscrim inate, targeting non-G ujarati and Gujarati investors from all over India as well as from Europe, Africa and the U nited States.

92

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

beneficial after its abolition. C urrently, the state’s ‘m o n ito rin g cell’ keeps track o f every investm ent proposal. T h is helps to account for the very high proportion o f proposed investm ents th at get im ple­ m ented in G ujarat, w hen com pared to m ost o th er Indian states. M o n itoring the investors is as im portant. Inform ation-provision is key to the effective p u rsu it o f new and old investors. T h e d ep artm en t o f industry collects detailed and in dependent inform ation about those investors w ho express an interest in G ujarat. R egular follow -up action on the part o f state agencies vis-à-vis the central governm ent and the prom oters has rem ained a regular feature o f industrial governance in the state.51 A n investor described the approach o f the industrial bureaucracy in G ujarat: ‘T h e state bureaucracy has developed a killer instinct w hen it com es to w ooing investors*.52 O u tlin in g the w o rk in g o f the G ujarat Pow er C orporation, one o f its vice-presidents said, ‘W hat the corporation does is after identifying the area in w hich the project can be developed, it acquires land and begins to get clearances. By the tim e the com petitive bidding for the project takes place, every clearance has been bagged [by the G ujarat g o v ern m en t].’53 In W est Bengal, after 1994 the state’s in v estm en t-p ro m o tio n fu n c­ tions w ere perform ed by the W est Bengal Industrial D evelopm ent C orporation (W B ID C ). H ow ever, unlike its co u n terp art in G ujarat, the W B ID C did n o t have a pre-existing system for m o n ito rin g eith er investors o r the fu n ctio n in g o f the license-raj. E ven after 1994, potential investors w ere n o t required to subm it an ‘Im plem entation Status’ form o r any sim ilar docum entation. T h e West Bengal govern­ m e n t did keep track o f som e o f the industrial proposals and a lim ited degree o f follow -up action is evident. H ow ever, disproportionate attention is directed to large-scale prestige projects. T h e Industry Advisory C o m m ittee evaluates the progress m ade o n these projects, b u t m any m id-sized and sm aller projects are not carefully m onitored. T h e revived prom otional organization— the SilpaB andhu— is th e 51. T he above inform ation is draw n from, IN D EX TB./i^m fiJ Items (IND EX TB: Ahmedabad, 19%); G overnm ent o f G ujarat, Overseas Indian Business & Technology Exposition at N ew York, U SA: Tour Report of the Gujarat Team (IN D EX TB : A hmedabad, 1989); G overnm ent ofW est Bengal,/! Review o f Industry in West Bengal (various years); and interviews w ith IN D E X T B officials and businessm en w h o were affected by the state-level industrial approval bureaucracy. 52. ‘Is M aharashtra Losing out?’, Business India, 25 M arch -7 April 1996, p. 62. 53. Ibid.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

93

designated ‘single w indow agency’ o f the W B ID C , b u t helps only th o se investors w hich com e to it w ith problem s. In contrast, various p rom otional agencies in G ujarat have institutionalized procedures for proactively seeking investors even before they begin to have problem s. T h is and o th er aspects o f the tw o states’ bureaucratic perform ance— in clu d in g the capacity o f relevant agencies to collect and dissem inate in fo rm atio n to investors, in w hich G ujarat, building o n its vast ex­ perience in this area, again outperform s West Bengal— dem onstrates th a t institutional differences pre-dating the C e n tre ’s 1991 reform s persist. O n ce liberalization becam e a feature o f the national policy landscape, these institutional differences co n tin u ed to influence in­ vestors’ decisions, and this helps to explain the variations across the tw o states in term s o f the investm ent flows each has received. G ujarat h as benefited by the significant continuity in policies b u t also the co n tin u atio n o f the p re -1991 institutional framework u n d erly in g its regional industrial strategy. Institutions are sticky in b o th G ujarat a n d West Bengal, and this accounts for the greater divergence across th ese tw o states than m odels based o n policy alone w o u ld predict. If policy change w ere enough, then West Bengal and G ujarat— w hich in tro d u ced broadly sim ilar m easures d u rin g the 1990s— sh o u ld have seen levels o f investm ent converging. T

he

P o l it ic s

of

(W e s t B e n g a l )

P o l ic y C

versu s

C

hange:

F r a g m e n t a t io n

oherence

( G u ja r a t )

W hile the nature o f state-level institutions helps to explain varying investm ent patterns betw een W est Bengal and G ujarat, w h en co m ­ p arin g the politics o f subnational policy change in the tw o states it is im p o rtan t to consider the factors shaping the societal responses in each region. Indeed the effectiveness o f state-level institutions risks b ein g u n d erm in ed w hen the responses o f actors such as party m em bers, business actors and labour leaders underline the objectives o f governing elites. T his section o f the chapter argues that policy shifts en g en d er political responses from key social groups and that these societal responses are crucial for the coherence w ith w hich a policy sh ift can be im plem ented. D ifferent responses by key social actors (parties, labour and business) in W est Bengal and G ujarat produced d ifferen t patterns o f policy im plem entation. Electoral com petition also played different roles across the tw o states.

94

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

R esponses by key social actors in W est Bengal— b oth party cadres and trade u n io n m em bers— m ake the state g o v ern m en t’s policy shifts difficult to im plem ent. M ost crucially; how ever, the ru lin g C P I(M ) faces u n iq u e organizational and policy dilem m as peculiar to social dem ocratic parties. In G ujarat, responses o f key social actors w ere different and the ru lin g BJP was relatively u n tro u b led by organiza­ tional and ideological dilem m as. M oreover, the relative pow erlessness o f local party (BJP) m em bers and the absence o f a political force th a t could em body the w orkers’ dem ands co n trib u ted to greater flexibility in im p lem en tin g various reform efforts. In addition, the industrial base o f the state is m u ch m ore dispersed in G ujarat leading to g reater su p p o rt from potential ‘w inners.’ O verall, the coordination o f expec­ tations aro u n d industrial activity by m any social groups in G ujarat can be contrasted w ith inconsistent and fragm ented responses by key actors in West Bengal. W est B engal: T h e Political Logic o f F ra g m e n te d R esponse R esponses to econom ic liberalization in West Bengal are shaped b o th by the socio-econom ic balance o f forces as w ell as constraints posed by the n atu re o f party co m p etitio n . M o st im portantly, how ever, w hat distinguishes West Bengal’s reform trajectory are the m ultiple dilem m as faced by the ruling social dem ocratic party (the C P I(M )) in the face o f the given balance o f social groups and the necessity o f w in n in g elections. Social dem ocratic parties like the C P I(M ) are co n fro n ted w ith un iq u e challenges d u rin g periods o f globalization and liberalization.54 In W est Bengal, these dilem m as m ust be understood w ith reference to three interacting dim ensions: the spatial political econom y o f industrialization in the state; intra-party and party-union conflicts over industrial policy; and the recent (p o st-1998) electoral challenge posed by a new ly form ed political party— the Trinam ul (‘G rassroots’) C ongress. G ujarat differs from W est Bengal in all three respects. T h e socio-econom ic balance o f forces in W est Bengal poses form i­ dable challenges to the politics o f industrialization in the state. Two inter-linked dim ensions are especially notable: a spatially concentrated 54. T h e experiences o f social dem ocratic parties in Europe offer som e insights into the political dilem m as attendant upon the dem ise o f the welfare state. See H erbert Kitschclt, ‘European Social Democracy: Between Political Econom y and Electoral C om petition’, in Kitschelt et al. (eds), Continuity and Change__

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

95

p attern o f industrialization in West Bengal aro u n d C alcutta and its suburbs narrows the political su p p o rt for liberalization. M oreover, th e direct m apping o f the agricu ltu ral-in d u strial divide o n to the ru ral-u rb an divide in West Bengal distributes the benefits from lib­ eralization only to u rb an industrialists and consum ers. T h e benefits o f liberalization are shared by a few, w hile its costs are w idespread and large. T h is creates an opposition to neo-liberal reform ist agendas. T h e w inners from liberalization— urban consum ers and businessm en— are relatively sm all and, crucially, lack political pow er. T h is dynam ic— high costs across a large and politically im p o rtan t rural sector w ith sm all concentrated benefits to industrial/urban constituents— makes th e political consolidation o f econom ic reform s in W est Bengal dif­ ficult. T h e spatial pattern o f industrialization in West Bengal is highly concentrated aro u n d C alcutta. N o te d by K rishna Bhardw aj, as well as K undu,55 this pattern has co ntinued to persist. B etw een 1991-5, 74 per cen t o f n ew industrial applications and 60 per cen t o f proposed new investm ent was for five districts— C alcutta, H ow rah, H ooghly, South 24 Parganas and N o rth 24 Parganas— all o f w hich are clustered aro u n d C alcutta (see m ap).56 M idnapore (the location o f the H aldia Petrochem ical plant) and B urdw an shared about 13 per cent o f applications betw een them . T h is concentrated band o f industrializa­ tion narrow s the base o f political support for renew ed industrializa­ tio n and, by extension, liberalization. Sim ultaneously, about 75 p er cent o f assem bly seats are located in rural districts and about 57 per cen t o f the seats w o n by the Left F ro n t in the 2001 assem bly elections w ere from rural districts. T h u s, the Left Front, dispropor­ tionately, depends u p o n the political su p p o rt o f the rural sector. T h is spatial n arro w in g o f the political su p p o rt in favour o f liberalization is aggravated by the nature o f W est Bengal’s urban-rural divide, w hich maps sym m etrically o nto the agricultural-industrial divide in West Bengal. All urban districts are also the m ost industrially 55. Amitabh K undu and M oonis Raza, Indian Economy: The Regional Dimension (N ew Delhi: C entre fo r the Study o f Regional D evelopm ent, Jawaharlal N eh ru University, 1982); and K rishna Bharadwaj ‘Regional D ifferentiation in India: A N ote’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 17, nos 14-16 (1982), pp. 605-14. 56. Calculated from Government of West Bengal, A Review o f the Industrial Scene in West Bengal, Annual R eport 1996-7 (Calcutta: G o v ern m en t o f West Bengal, 1997).

%

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

M a p 3.1: West Bengal State

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

97

developed (except N adia and M urshidabad); rural industrialization is alm o st non-existent in the state.57 T h is sectoral-spatial overlap (see Table 3.8) affects th e political eco n o m y o f liberalization in tw o distinct ways. First, because the opposition to the ruling Left F ro n t is concentrated in cities, the sort o f industrial relations conflicts that tend to accom pany th e in tro d u c­ tio n o f neoliberal policies take place in precisely the areas— urban centres— w here opposition parties w ill be m ost able to exploit them fo r partisan advantage. C alcutta, for instance, is the m ain base o f su p p o rt for the anti-L eft F ront T rinam ul C ongress. T h e urbanindustrial district sym m etry m eans that the governm ent’s econom ic refo rm s becom e the subject o f considerable protest action in precisely th e areas w here the state’s ru lin g party w ould have hop ed to build su p p o rt from am ong the natural ‘winners* o f reform . Second, any policy change in favour o f urban-industrial Bengal faces the consolidated rural sector w hich is alm ost entirely agricul­ tural. Rural industrialization is alm ost nonexistent in W est Bengal, w h ich m eans that no countervailing group o f w in n ers from the countryside supports the governm ent’s program m e.58 C o m bined w ith this narrow potential su p p o rt base for proliberalization policies is a political-organizational variable: the lack o f cohesion w ithin the Left F ront coalition and across the party-union stru ctu re on the question o f policies favourable to the private sector in general, and foreign firm s in particular. C oalition politics w ithin th e Left Front and disharm ony betw een the C P I(M ), th e lead party in the state governm ent, and its m ain trade u n io n , the C IT U (C onfederation o f India Trade U nions), contribute to a fragm ented an d protectionist policy on the part o f C IT U and o th e r coalition partners, such as the C o m m u n ist Party o f India (C P I), th e Forw ard B loc and the RSP (R evolutionary Socialist Party). D espite pressure from key party leaders, unions have been far from u n ifo rm ly supportive o f liberalization. Im portant pockets o f resistance w ith in the party and the unions rem ain. T h e lack o f harm ony 57. T he extent o f rural industrialization in su tes like Gujarat, Tamil N adu, A ndhra Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana makes for a different logic o f political econom y in these states. 58. T his implies that the pro-liberalizaron policy o f the Left F ront m ust, to be successful, create potential w inners in the countryside. T h e class o f rural entrepreneurs form ing the backbone o f a revived capitalism in A ndhra Pradesh, Tamil N adu, G ujarat and Punjab does not as yet exist in West Bengal.

98

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

T able 3.8 Extent o f U rban-Industrial Sym m etry in West Bengal Districts

Percentage o f urban population

Industrial vs. agricultural districts (I or A)

Percentage o f m a in industrial w o rk e rs in population

I

26.5

Urban districts Calcutta

100

H ow arh

49.6

I

36.7

N o rth 24 Parganas

51.2

I

25.0

South 24 Parganas

13.3

I

15.6

Hooghly

31.2

I

22.5

Burdwan

35.1

I

14.1

Daijeeling

30.4

A

7.2

Nadia

22.6

I

17.2

M urshidabad

10.4

I

17.9

M idnapur

9.8

A

10.1

C oochbehar

7.8

A

7.1

Jalpaiguri

16.3

A

7.1

Bankura

8.2

A

8.3

Purulia

9.4

A

8.1

B irbhum

8.9

A

8.2

13.3

A

5.9

7.0

A

12.3

Rural districts

West D inajpur Malda

Notes: (1) I define a district as industrial if the share o f Main Industrial W orkers exceeds 15 percent, and as urban if the urban population exceeds 25 per cent. (2) M ain Industrial Workers arc defined by the C ensus o f India as those w h o w ork m ore than 183 days a year in either household or non-household industry. (3) South 24 Parganas is classified as an urban district given its proxim ity to Calcutta. Burdwan is categorized as an industrial district because o f the location o f D urgapur w ithin it. Source: Calculated from C ensus o f India, West Bengal Tables, 1991.

betw een, o n the o n e hand, the go v ern m en t w ing o f the C P I(M ), and o n the other, th e C P I(M ) party m achine, its coalition partners and the unions, leads to im portant gaps in th e im plem entation o f liber­ alization. P arty-union relations have been particularly troubled, w ith the C IT U scoring im portant victories over the party in policy m atters.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

99

T h e C IT U and im p o rtan t m em bers o f the C P I(M ) forced the state go v ern m en t’s leadership to m odify the original draft o f its aggressively pro-private sector m anifesto. T h e 1994 statem ent o n industrial policy as w ell as subsequent governm ent an n o u n cem en ts spoke, m ore reservedly, o f su p p o rt for ‘foreign investm ent for m utual interest and only in infrastructure sectors’. In 1995 C IT U leaders w ere able to reverse the state g o v ern m en t’s earlier decision to approve the takeover o f the G reat Eastern H otel by a French hotel chain and the co n stru c­ tio n o f several m ultiplex cinem as by W arner B rothers.60 T hese tw o reversals w ere strongly w elcom ed by the coalition partners— the C PI, R SP and the Forw ard Bloc. In Ju ly 1998, the foreign C E O o f a w ellkn o w n footw ear m anufacturer was attacked by em ployees w hen he refused to recall three u n io n leaders w h o had been suspended on disciplinary grounds. A local industrialist’s response was that the th en c h ie f m inister Myoti Babu appears to have no control o n the local C IT U leaders.’ A m em b er o f the Left Front coalition added th at ‘In private, Jyoti B abu adm its that neith er the party bigwigs n o r the C IT U leaders listen to h im these days. H ow ever hard h e m ay try, industri­ alists will n o t com e here to b u rn their fingers’.62 In 2001, a govern­ m e n t o rd er authorizing state-run hospitals to stop using the services o f som e 12,000 fem ale attendants was criticized by C P I(M ) cadres because, as a result o f governm ent action, the attendants had ‘crossed over to the T rinam ul C ongress camp*. T hese snapshots o f party-state and p arty -u n io n relations highlight the inability o f policy change at the top level to percolate dow n to th e local level, leading to incoherent im p lem en tatio n .64 Even if 59. Interview w ith a C IT U m em ber, C alcutta, 15 N o v em b er 1997. 60. See num erous newspaper reports on this issue: The Times o f India, 26 August 1995; Observer of Business and Politics, 31 August 1995 and Business Standard, 23 A ugust 1995. 61. Tapash Ganguly, ‘Capital flight in Industry’, The Week, 16 August 1998. 62. Ibid. 63. Sum it M itra, ‘Clash o f Com rades: Two Leftists Leaders Squabble over Efforts to Introduce Econom ic Reforms in the State’, India Today, 19 N ovem ber 2001, pp. 51-2. 64. Apart from intra-organizational conflicts over econom ic policy, the C PI(M ) has been troubled by serious factionalism from the late 1990s onwards. Even Jyoti Basu publicly acknowledged the existence o f factionalism w ithin the party. T he factionalism and conflictual intra-party and party-C IT U relations outlined in this chapter thus present the C PI(M ) in a different light from the version found in

100

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

sim ilar problem s occur elsew here in India, it is fair to say th at p arty u n io n relations are m ore troublesom e in West Bengal than in n o n C P I(M )-ru led states. Even after alm ost ten years o f reform s, W est Bengal’s ch ief m inister m u st hold m eetings w ith party cadres to ‘Sell R eform s to Skeptics’.63 T h ese organizational dilem m as produce a fragmented response at the local level to the pro-liberalization initiatives o f the state governm ent. T h ese tw o constraints, arising from the spatial logic o f the state’s political econom y and the organizational dilem m as facing its ru lin g party, are fu rth er com plicated by the electoral dilem m a facing th e C P1(M ) in the late 1990s. W hile W est Bengal’s pattern o f party co n tro l has been extrem ely stable com pared to all o th er Indian states since the late 1970s, the nature o f electoral com petition in West Bengal u n d erw en t changes in the late 1990s, creating serious political p ro b ­ lem s for the Left Front. T h e C P I(M )’s vote share has steadily declined in th e parliam entary (Lok Sabha) elections. In the late 1990s, the T rinam ul C ongress (T C ) em erged as a serious electoral contender. Very quickly after its for­ m ation (1998), the T C m ade definite electoral gains w ith a share o f 26 per cent o f the state’s vote in the 1999 parliam entary elections and 31 per cent in the 2001 state assem bly elections. In th e 1999 general elections, the T C and the C ongress together captured 39.3 per cen t o f the vote, a higher share than the C P I(M ). U nderlying this general picture is a m ore specific pattern. T h e strength o f this new political form ation lies prim arily in the industrial districts o f West Bengal although it has also sh o w n the ability to challenge the Left in certain o th er key districts (M idnapore). T h u s, the C P I(M ) is confronted by a loss o f pow er in key urban/industrial constituencies. In the 1998 parliam entary elections th e C P I(M ) lost the D u m D u m constituency, an industrial district th a t had long been a party stro n g h o ld /* In the 2001 regional assem bly elections the Left Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty in India (Cambridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1987). T he evidence presented in this chapter suggests that conflicts over econom ic policy play a crucial role in enhancing intra-party differences. A new analytical model is needed to understand the C PI(M ). 65. Sunando Sarkar, ‘C M Sells Reforms To Skeptics’, Telegraph, 9 Septem ber

2001. 66. Reflecting on the outcom e o f the 1998 parliam entary elections, Basu w rote. T h e Trinam ul-BJP com bine had em erged as the biggest opposition challenge’. Basu argued that ‘w e m ust look into the erosion o f o u r base in the urban areas

Ideas, Interests, and In stitu tio n s in Policy C h an g e

101

T able 3.9 Vote Shares o f M ajor Parties in Parliamentary (Lok Sabha) Elections, 1991, 1996, 1998, and 1999 (in per cent) C PI(M )

TC

IN C

BJP

C PI

FB

RSP

1991

35.2

N o t yet form ed

36.2

11.7

3.7

3.7

4.5

1996

36.7

N o t yet form ed

40.1

6.9

3.8

3.4

4.8

1998

36.8

23.1

15.2

10.2

3.6

3.3

4.5

1999

35.6

26.0

13.3

11.1

3.5

3.4

4.2

Notes: (1) C PI(M ): C om m unist Party o f India (M arxist); T C : Trinam ul Congress; IN C : Indian N ational Congress; BJR Bharatiya Janata Party; FB: Forward Bloc; RSP: Revolutionary Socialist Party. Both the FB and the RSP are coalition partners in West Bengal’s Left Front governm ent. (2) T h e T C was form ed in 1998. Source: Election C om m ission o f India, http://wunv.eci.gov.in.

F ront w o n 40 o f the 75 seats in the industrial belt (South Bengal excluding C alcutta), w hile the T rinam ul-C ongress alliance w o n 32 seats. In 1991, the Left F ront had captured 65 seats from this industrial belt, and in 1996 it had w o n 45. T h e T rinam ul C ongress is also challenging the hegem ony o f the ruling party in traditional left strong­ holds such as M idnapore. T h is is evident in heightened social and violent conflict in recent years. Increasingly, the conflict betw een the C P I(M ) and the T rinam ul C ongress has becom e violent and has spilled over in to industrial relations at the local level. In Jan u ary 2001, tw o m anagers o f a ju te m ill w ere b u rn t to death by som e o f the firm ’s em ployees, after a w orker had been shot dead by one o f the m anagers. In M idnapore, a traditional C P I(M ) constituency, a politically m oti­ vated m u rd er o f a p ro m in en t stu d en t leader, and subsequent gang violence by the tw o parties, claim ed m any lives. T h u s, w hile the C P I(M )’s rural m iddle-class base is proving loyal, the T C has exerted serious pressure. M am ata Banerjee, the leader o f the T C , raised the issue o f ‘law and o rd e r’ in W est Bengal w ith the central governm ent and m iddle class. T h at is vitally im portant now ’. Jyoti, Basu, Memoirs: A Political Autobiography, translated by Abhijit Dasgupta (Calcutta: N ational Book Agency Private Ltd., 1999), pp. 389-90. 67. Frontline, 8 Ju n e 2001, pp. 124-5.

M ap 3.2: G ujarat State

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

103

in w hich she served as railway m inister. She persuaded the national ho m e m inister to dispatch a team to visit the state and review the law and o rd er situation. T h e com bination o f electoral challenge in the industrial districts and violent conflict at the local level creates p ro b ­ lem s for the sm ooth im plem entation o f the new industrial policy o f th e Left Front. At the very least it creates disincentives for investors to follow -through o n proposed projects. A n investor told m e that he ‘w ill th in k tw ice before establishing a factory at a location w here the conflict betw een T C party w orkers and [C P I(M )] party cadres is so intense; no incentives will take m e th ere’.68 T h e ru lin g party in West Bengal, despite its policy and institutional c o m m itm e n t to im plem enting a program m e o f econom ic liberaliza­ tion, co n fro n ts serious challenges arising from the spatial dim ensions o f the state’s political econom y, intra-organizational conflict (m ani­ fested in th e political response by party cadres and trade unionists to new policy m easures) and the electoral challenges th at began to em erge in the late 1990s. T h e result is that the politics o f liberalization be­ com es fragmented, the m ultiple sites o f contestation leading to incoher­ ence betw een econom ic policies and the way in w hich they get im plem ented. G u jarat: T h e Politics o f C o h e re n t R esponse T h e political econom y o f policy change in G ujarat presents the opposite o f the fragm entation found in West Bengal. T h e societal response to liberalization in G ujarat takes place in an econom ic and political context that contributes to a coherent process o f policym aking and im plem entation. D u rin g the 1990s, G ujarat’s successive govern­ m en ts have represented either political centrism (the Janata D al-B JP coalition o f 1990-5) o r w hat m ight be called econom ic conservatism (the BJP from 1995 to present), and n eith er go v ern m en t has faced the peculiar ideological o r organizational dilem m as confronted by the C P I(M ) in W est Bengal. In addition, societal responses in G ujarat are m o re co h eren t and broad-based than in W est Bengal. T h e coherence o f the responses by key econom ic and social groups can be attributed in large p art to the spatial dispersion o f industrialization, w hich has led b oth to b etter distribution o f the benefits o f industrialization and to a situation in w hich the dichotom y betw een u rb an and rural does n o t m ap precisely o n to the fam iliar dyad o f industry and agriculture. 68. Interview w ith an investor, Calcutta, 15 August 2001.

104

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

T h e costs o f liberalization are shouldered by relatively pow erless constituencies, w hile its benefits are shared by a diverse array o f groups, all o f w h o m have acquired crucial stakes in supporting the liberalization policy o f the state governm ent. T h e fact th at in d u stri­ alization is n o t confined to urban districts m eans th a t su p p o rt for industrialization and co ntinued liberalization policies com es from people in b o th urban and rural areas. In this context, the extent o f political instability in the state is less able to co u n teract the strong and w idespread support for liberalization. G ujarat’s m ore dispersed pattern o f industrialization69 dates at least in part to the 1960s and 1970s. Since th en , industries co n tin u ed to disperse, in an ever-w idening arc, beyond the industrial centres o f central and south G ujarat. By the 1990s w est G ujarat, w h ich had been quite undeveloped in the 1960s was relatively m o re industrialized than the corresponding backward regions o f W est Bengal. Areas like A m reli, K achchh and Jam nagar, w hich traditionally had been back­ w ard, began to see significant investm ent flows in th e liberalization period. N o rth G ujarat rem ains largely non-industrialized, yet relative to W est Bengal there is far less spatial co ncentration o f industrial developm ent. T h is is tru e as well for sm all-scale industries, significant num b ers o f w hich can now be fo u n d even in G ujarat’s m ost backward areas.70 T h u s five rural districts are industrialized in G ujarat w hile only tw o rural districts are industrialized in W est Bengal. T h is spatial dispersion in G ujarat broadens the political su p p o rt for co n tin u ed industrialization in the state. G ujarat’s ruling party in the 1990s— the BJP— faces n o serious contradictions betw een its governm ent and organization w ings o n econom ic policy. W hile factionalism has bedeviled fhe BJR leading to a split in the late 1990s, these disputes revolved a ro u n d personalities (S. Vaghela versus K. Patel, for exam ple) and did n o t spill over in to econom ic policy m atters. M oreover, these leaders lack an in d ep en d en t organizational pow er base o f the sort enjoyed by the trade unions in W est Bengal. T h e G ujarat B JP’s top leadership is able to subvert th e ir disruptive pow er easily. Even M r Vaghela’s spirited challenge to th e BJP’s leadership was effectively defused. T h ese factional fights d o n o t 69. K undu and Raza, Indian Economy__ ; and Bharadwaj, ‘Regional D ifferen­ tiation in India....* 70. Takashi Shinoda, ‘Institutional C hange and Entrepreneurial D evelopm ent: SSI Sector’, Economic and Political Weekly vol. 35, nos 3 5 -6 (2000), p. 3212.

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

105

T able 3.10 Extent o f U rban-Industrial Sym m etry in G ujarat Districts

Percentage o f urban population

Industrial vs. agricultural districts (I or A)

Percentage o f main industrial workers in population

Jam nagar

40

I

13.6

Rajkot

47

I

19.7

Surendranagar

30

I

14.8

Bhavnagar

35

I

23.8

Junagadh

32

A

8.7

Kachchh

30

A

10.0

G andhinagar

40

I

13.2

Ahm edabad

74

I

27.5

Vadodara

42

I

15.1

Surat

50

I

31.5

Amreli

21

I

16.7

M ahesana

22

I

11.7

Kheda

22

I

9.1

B haruch

21

I

10.4

Valsad

24

I

18.4

Banaskantha

10

A

7.2

Sabarkantha

10

A

4.4

Panchmahals

10

A

4.1

Dangs

11

A

2.5

Urban districts

Rural districts

Notes: (1) I define a district as industrial if the share o f M ain Industrial Workers exceeds 15 percent, and as urban if the urban population exceeds 25 per cent. (2) M ain Industrial Workers are defined by the C ensus o f India as those w ho w ork m ore thaji 183 days a year in either household or non-household industry. (3) T he figures for M ain Industrial W orkers underestim ate the extent o f industrialization in Khcda, Jamnagar, M ahesana and B haruch; these can be classified as industrial. Bharuch (similar to Burdwan in West Bengal) has many public-sector units, m aking it clearly an industrial area. Khcda, M ahesana and Jam nagar have a large num ber o f small-scale units, m aking th eir classification as industrial districts m ore appropriate. T his is consistent w ith the criteria used in V éronique D upont, Decentralized Industrialization and Urban Dynamics (N ew D elhi and T housand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1995). Source: C alculated from C ensus o f India, G ujarat Tables, 1991.

106

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

becom e conflicts over policy: key ‘w inners’ (particularly the w ellorganized business com m unity) provide stro n g support for th e state governm ent’s new econom ic agenda; the losers— m ost notably labour— lack th e political strength to pursue their issues effectively. W hile labour and the C P I o r C P I(M ) have b een historically w eak in G ujarat, the business classes have had a stro n g presence in state politics. By the 1990s both large-scale and sm all-scale firm s w ere politically w ell established and evenly diversified, sectorally and geographically. G ujarat’s large-scale sector includes b oth dom estic and foreign capital. T h is includes m any o f In d ia’s large fam ily-run business houses as well as M N C s. U n lik e in W est Bengal, w here m o st o f the non-B engali Indian capital has consisted o f M arw aris, G ujarat’s business class is far m ore diversified, covering m o st o f the nation: th e Tatas (originally based in Bihar and Bombay), Birlas (originally based in W est Bengal), Ruias (Punjabis), R aunaq Singh group (also Punjabi) and D alm ia (Parsis) w ere jo in e d by m ultinationals such as ABB (a Swedish/Swiss conglom erate) and G eneral Electric (from the U n ite d States). M oreover, long-established G ujarati business houses, such as the Sarabhais, Lalbhais and M afatlals are to be found alongside new com ers such as N irm a, T orrent, U n ited P h o sp h o ru s and G ujarat A m buja C em en t, as w ell as jo in t-se c to r com panies. T h is diversifica­ tion o f business capital in the state m akes fo r a pow erful lobby in su p p o rt o f co ntinued liberalization. T h is diversified business profile, com bined w ith the grow th and geographic dispersion o f sm all-scale firm s, m akes for a broader base o f industrialization in G ujarat, and thus a stronger response by the business com m unity. T h e potential losers from liberalization consist chiefly o f w orkers w h o lose their jo b s as a result o f policy-induced restructuring. In 1995-6, 14, 000 w orkers in G ujarat’s textile m ills w ere asked to accept voluntary severance packages. A nd yet n o p ro test against the state’s econom ic agenda o f liberalization and privatization follow ed. T h e process proceeded sm oothly for tw o reasons. First, no political party was eith er w illing o r able to translate the w o rk ers’ grievances into a political issue. Second, and ju s t as im portantly, the m an n er in w hich the state governm ent m anaged the proccss o f restru ctu rin g m eant that the political reaction was m uted. T h e G ujarat governm ent received a $ 250 m illion loan from the A D B , w hich it used to create a State Renew al F und (SRF). T his allowed the go v ern m en t to offer generous voluntary retirem en t packages to displaced w orkers. U nlike in W est Bengal, these w ere negotiated w ith the full su p p o rt o f the textile trade

Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change

107

u n io n , the M ajdoor M ahajan (or L abour G u ild ). Each w orker re­ ceived about Rs 250,000 thro u g h the SRF, w h ich in contrast to its national co u n terp art was n o t biased against younger w orkers.71 M oreover, the SRF provided for the retraining o f w orkers. Even the M ajdoor M ahajan adm itted th at the schem e ‘fo u n d favour w ith m any w orkers’.72 T his exam ple o f privatization at the state level suggests that losers from liberalization in G ujarat, w hile significant in num ber, do n o t have any political party (like the C P I(M ) in W est Bengal) to take u p their claim s.73 Even m ore crucially, the terms o f privatization in G ujarat m ilitate against significant distributional conflict over liber­ alization. As a result, G ujarat’s successive governm ents faced no th in g like the organizational o r ideological difficulties experienced by the Left F ro n t in W est Bengal. T his lends coherence to the societal response, and greater political support for liberalization.

C

o n c l u s io n

T h is chapter has argued that regional actors respond to m acro policy environm ents in com plex ways. T h e com parison o f West Bengal and G ujarat reveals significant change and rem arkable continuity at th e state-level. Structural adjustm ent policies do in som e respects narrow the range o f policy options available to governing elites. State governm ents that had once opposed foreign investm ent changed course, deciding to lure bo th dom estic and m ultinational capital. Policy changes in troduced at the central level are th u s replicated at th e subnational level. H owever, this apparent policy convergence (both betw een the C entre and the states, and indeed betw een states) is crucially shaped by the ideology o f political parties, th eir perceived interests in a given region and the alignm ent betw een auxiliary organizations and coalitions o f socio-econom ic interests. Pre-existing legacies shape the response o f 71. Anil Padm anabham , ‘Program m ed for Privatization’, Business Standard, 9 January 1997. 72. C ited in Padm anabham , ‘Program m ed for Privatization’. 73. It m ust be noted that opposition from environm ental groups and activism o f the Suprem e C o u rt on the question o f industrial pollution has created a m obilization o f sorts, puttin g som e constraints in the way o f unbridled and environm entally unhealthy industrialization in G ujarat; such mobilization is lacking on the question o f labour’s rights.

108

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

th e socio-econom ic actors tow ards state-level re-regulation agendas, and ruling parties are constrained by intra-organizational and ideologi­ cal dilem m as. Two larger counter-intuitive conclusions em erge from this line o f analysis. First, despite policy convergence there are persistent institutional differences across India’s states. It is these th a t largely d eterm in e the regionally diverse patterns o f investm ent flows. T hese institutional variables, drive investm ent patterns b o th before and after liberaliza­ tion. Second, policy change from above is n o t sufficient to explain outcom es. R esponses from below shape the coherence o f policy shifts. H ow ever, societal responses to policy shifts are them selves influenced by such variables as the degree o f industrial dispersion, the way in w hich interests are organized and the nature o f electoral com petition. H o w these variables stack up will play a large part in d eterm in in g w h eth er o r n o t partisan conflict u n d erm in es the coherence o f eco­ nom ic policy. T h is tw o-step explanation explains b oth convergent state-level p ro liberalization initiatives and m arked regional divergence in invest­ m en t patterns by providing an analytical fram ew ork that integrates attention to ideas, institutions and societal responses— three variables that interact in different ways in G ujarat and W est Bengal.

Part II Subaltern Politicization

4 Janata Regionalized Contrasting Bases of Electoral Support in Bihar and Orissa Sanjay Kumar

he reordering o f India’s electoral landscape d u rin g the 1990s has throw n up an array o f analytical puzzles for psephologists and o th er observers o f Indian politics. O n e subset o f issues stem s from the regionalization o f party politics— or, m ore precisely, from the need to explain inter-state variations am ong those state-level parties that are political ‘descendants’ o f a com m on national ‘parent’ organization. T h e cen tre-left Janata Party, w hich em erged follow ing Indira G an d h i’s declaration o f a N ational E m ergency in the m id-1970s, and ultim ately succeeded M rs G andhi as part o f a short-lived coalition governm ent, has been in a state o f perpetual disintegration from its very inception. But Janata’s successor national party, the Janata Dal, began to fragm ent even m ore heavily than usual in the early 1990s. In addition to the norm al ideological and factional disputes, the party was also becom ing regionalized— com posed o f distinct state-level units. Ironically, this disintegration occurred im m ediately follow ing the party’s historic decision, d u rin g the prim e m inistership o f V P Singh, to im plem ent the M andal C om m ission recom m endations o n enhanced affirm ative action for low er castes in central go v ern m en t em ploym ent. To be sure, m any o f the state-level ‘m ini-Janatas’— such as the Janata D al(D ), a R ajput-dom inated faction o f the early 1990s that,

T

112

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

alm ost by coincidence, adopted the Janata franchise in R ajasthan at that m o m en t— died out quickly. T h e JD (D ) participated in the BJPled coalition governm ent that took office in the state in 1990, b u t by 1993 the J D - D (and m ost o th er subspecies o f the Janata genus) had all b u t vanished from Rajasthan’s electoral map. B ut a n u m b er o f other Janata offspring w ere m ore durable, em erg­ ing as autonom ous regional parties, each operating prim arily in one sta te th o u g h so m e tim e s w ith sm all o v e r-th e -b o rd e r bases in neighbouring ju risd ictio n s.1 Two o f the m ore successful electoral battlegrounds for Janata’s regional descendants have been B ihar and O rissa. B ihar’s Rashtriya Janata D al (R JD ), under the leadership o f Laloo Prasad Yadav (both d u rin g his ow n period in office, and since handing the ch ief m inistership to his wife, Rabri D evi), has been m ore successful electorally than its sibling in O rissa. In Bihar, the Janata D al/R JD w o n B ihar’s assem bly elections in 1990, 1995 and 2000— an outstanding achievem ent given that reelection has becom e increasingly u n com m on for India’s state-level ruling parties. O rissa’s Janata Dal (and its successor, the Biju Janata Dal [B JD ]) w on the assem bly elections in 1990, and again in 2000, b u t lost in 1995. T h is is still a better-than-average perform ance, and m oreover, unlike its counterpart in Bihar (w hich has been mainly o u t o f pow er at the national level), O rissa’s Janata D al incarnations have, thanks to strong electoral perform ances in parliamentary elections (as opposed to m erely state assembly elections), m anaged to get them selves included in b oth left-led and right-led national coalition governm ents follow ­ ing the electoral dem ise o f R V. N arasim ha R ao’s C ongress govern­ m en t in 1996. In short, these are regionalized versions o f Janata that both fall into the category o f having enjoyed very high levels o f electoral success, though in slightly different ways. W hat does distinguish these tw o Janata descendants, how ever, is the social profile o f the electoral constituencies upon w hich each relies. B ihar’s R JD is far m ore oriented tow ards O B C groups th an is its counterpart in O rissa. T his w ould n o t be surprising if the populationshare o f the O B C bloc, or the distribution am ong groups w ithin the O B C category, w ere not so sim ilar in these tw o states. A nd yet, despite these sim ilarities, the pattern o f O B C political m obilization in Bihar and O rissa diverges markedly. In Bihar, the O B C s, and especially the 1. T he C ongress Party experienced a similar fate during the m id- to late-1990s, with offshoots cropping up in places like M aharashtra (where the local Congress already had a history o f regionalization) and Tamil N adu (where it did not).

Janata Regionalized

113

th ree d o m in an t O B C castes (the Yadavs, K urm is and Koeris), are politically m obilized and function as a pow er bloc in the state, backing n o t only the RJD , b u t o th er O B C -o rie n te d parties (such as the Samata Party) as well. In O rissa, the O B C s, despite th e ir num erical strength, have n o t been able to play as significant a role in electoral politics. W hile in Bihar th e RJD draw s significant su p p o rt from the O B C s in general, and the Yadavs in particular, the BJD in O rissa has its base largely am ong upper-caste voters, tho u g h w ith som e notable excep­ tions, including su p p o rt from the backward K handayat com m unity. In the light o f th e foregoing set o f factors, this paper seeks to explain why, in the case o f O rissa, the Janata-descended party found the n o n O B C ro u te so m u c h m ore attractive (and effectual) than did its co u n terp art in Bihar. T h e answer, the paper argues, lay in the contrast­ in g pattern o f social and political dom inance in these tw o states. W hile caste has been (and rem ains) the m ost im p o rtan t politicized social cleavage in Bihar, the O rissa case finds people are m ore divided on regional lines th an along any o th e r large-scale cleavage. T h is helps to explain th e divergent social bases in these tw o states at least as well as any claim o f ideological differences betw een th eir leaders. B ut before proceeding to this analytical task, it is necessary first to establish em pirically the existence o f the contrasting electoral support bases across these tw o states. T h e paper analyses data— colleted th ro u g h sam ple surveys in Bihar and O rissa d u rin g th e last few Lok Sabha and A ssem bly elections2— that reveals th e support base o f key political panics, including the R JD (B ihar) and the BJD (Orissa). T

he

Sta te C

ontext

B ihar and O rissa display several sim ilarities o n a range o f social and econom ic indicators. Bihar and O rissa are both located in the eastern region o f India, and occupy the eighth and n in th positions, respec­ tively, am ong all Indian states3 in term s o f geographic area. T h e urban populations o f b o th O rissa and Bihar are low er than the national average,4 w hile (n o t surprisingly) the p ro p o rtio n o f people reliant on 2. T he N ational Election Study was coordinated from D elhi’s C en tre for the Study o f D eveloping Societies. 3. T he figures are from the C ensus o f India 1991. T h e rank for Bihar refers to the undivided Bihar, w hich includes the present Jharkhand state as well. 4. As per the 1991 C ensus, the percentage o f India’s population that was urban was 25.7 per cent, com pared to 11.1 per cent in Bihar and 13.4 per cent in Orissa.

114

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

agricultural livelihoods is higher than the all-India n o rm .5 D espite agriculture being the m ainstay o f econom ic activity in both states, foodgrain production in B ihar and O rissa is usually w ell below the national average.6 T h is is even m ore true for industry: per capita gross industrial o u tp u t in both Bihar and O rissa has usually been below half th e national average.7 B oth states also lag behind the national average in term s o f literacy, tho u g h B ihar does so by a m u ch larger m argin.8 Bihar and O rissa are also India’s tw o w orst perform ers in term s o f the p ro portion o f people living Below the Poverty Line (BPL). For B ihar the figure was 55 per cent; O rissa is ju s t above it in th e league table, w ith 48.6 per cen t o f its people living in poverty.9 It is tru e that the tw o states differ m arkedly in term s o f population. Bihar has th e second largest population o f any Indian state (behind U P). A nd yet O rissa, w hich is ranked ten th am ong India’s 28 states in term s o f population, is not am ong the group o f exceptionally small states, such as G oa o r N agaland, w hose ccccntricity w ould render any com parison w ith a state like B ihar alm ost irrelevant. In Bihar, the traditional upper castes— B rahm ins, B hum ihars, and R ajputs— are num erically sm all. As per the 1931 census estim ates, B rahm ins constitute 4.7 per cen t o f the population, w ith R ajputs at 4.2 per cent and B hum ihars at 2.9 per cent. W ith 1.2 per cent o f the population represented by Kayasthas, the traditionally literate caste o f local officialdom , these four u p p er castes together account for 13 per cent o f B ihar’s population. O n this small social base had been b u ilt 5. As per the 1991 census estimates, 38.7 per cent o f India’s population is engaged in agricultural cultivation and nearly 26.1 per cent w ork as agricultural labourers. In Bihar the comparable figures were 43.6 per cent (for cultivation) and 31.6 per cent (engaged in agricultural labour). Similarly, in O rissa 44.3 per cent o f the population is engaged in cultivation and 28.7 per ccnt w ork as agricultural labourers. 6. As per the 1998-9 estimates, die national average o f pci capita food grain production was 2055 kg. But in Bihar the per capita food grain production during that period had been only 130.2 kg. At 162.5 kg per capita, Orissa is doing slightly better on this score. 7. T he national average in 1998-9 had been Rs 8037, but only Rs 1111 in Bihar and Rs 3063 in Onssa. 8. India’s literacy rate was 65.4 per cent, according to the estimates o f the 2001 C ensus o f India. Orissa does n o t lag far behind the national average, w ith 63.6 per cent literacy, though Bihar recorded an abysmal 47.5 per cent literacy. 9. Estimates for the poverty ratio are based on the sample survey data on consum ption expenditure conducted by India’s N ational Sample Survey (N SS).

J a n a ta

Regionalized

115

a coalition th a t long dom inated the social and political life o f the state, creating and controlling its institutions. A large n u m b e r o f com m unities in Bihar, com pared to o th er Indian states, are categorized as O th e r Backward Classes (O B C s). In total the O B C s co nstitute nearly 32 per cent o f B ihar’s population, b u t d o m i­ n a n t am o n g th em are the Yadavs, the Koeris, and th e K urm is. T hese are n o t only num erically larger caste groups, b u t also upw ardly m obile, socially and economically. T h e census estim ates o f 1931 p u t the Yadavs at 11 per cen t o f the population, the largest single caste in term s o f num erical strength. T h e Koeris constituted 4.1 p e r cent, and the K urm is 3.6 p e r cent, o f B ihar’s population. W hile people belonging to these three O B C com m unities have traditionally been agriculturists, th ere has in recent decades been som e diversification in th eir occupa­ tional pattern. Som e o f th em m oved u p the eco nom ic ladder. Som e, w ith the h elp o f m o d em education, entered the service sector. Besides these three ‘d o m in an t’ O B C com m unities, B ihar is h o m e to a large n u m b e r o f other, m u ch smaller, O B C groups. D alits constitute 14.6 p e r cent o f B ih ar’s population and the scheduled tribes 7.7 per cen t.10 In O rissa, the upper-caste category com prises m ainly B rahm ins, K am as and Kshatriyas. A large n u m b er o f castes belo n g to the O B C category. A m ong the m ost p ro m in en t, num erically large and upw ardly m obile, socially and educationally, are the Khandayats. Dalits account for 16.2 p er cent o f th e population. P ro m in en t am o n g O rissa’s D alit castes are th e Pano, D hoba, and C ham ar. As p er the 1991 census estim ates, scheduled tribes— including the G ond, the Santhal, the M u n d a and the Kandha— are 22.2 per cent o f the state’s population. T h o u g h the B rahm ins and the K am as are num erically n o t very large,11 th ey had been politically d o m in an t in O rissa. T his was m en ­ tioned by F. G. Bailey d u rin g the m id-1950s, b u t still holds true. T h ey are n o t o n ly ritually superior to all o th er castes, b u t also dom inate the p ow er stru ctu re and bureaucracy o f the state. M ost o f O rissa’s influ­ ential politicians have been from eith er the B rahm in o r K am a caste. T h e political dom inance o f the B rahm ins and the K am as in O rissa is perpetuated th ro u g h the use o f the state bureaucracy, a large portion o f w hich is com posed o f m em bers o f these castes. 10. Figures based on the 1991 C ensus estimates. 11. As per th e estimates o f the 1931 C ensus o f India, B rahm ins constitute 5.74 per cent and Kamas nearly 1.48 per cent o f O rissa’s population. T h e Rajputs constitute a very small proportion (0.39 per cent) o f the state’s population. All three upper castes com bined constitute nearly 7.61 per c en t o f O rissa’s people.

116

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

T h e Khandayats constitute num erically the largest caste group in O rissa,12 b u t they have n o t traditionally held a d o m in an t position in the politics o f O rissa, largely because the Khandayats are n o t a hom ogeneous o r even w ell-integrated group, and because they have lagged far behind the upper castes socio-economically. Khandayats are divided on the basis o f certain cultural attributes and also d ue to a chronic tendency to engage in land disputes. T hose Khandayats w h o m ove u p the social ladder as a result o f educational attainm ent o r occupational diversification tend to becom e assim ilated w ith in th e Kam a com m unity, w hile those w ho decline in social o r econom ic term s often end up identifying them selves w ith the C hasa, an O B C group som ew hat low er dow n the caste hierarchy. T

he

on

P o l it ic a l C o n t e x t : A n H E l e c t io n s

in

B ih a r

and

O

is t o r ic a l

P e r s p e c t iv e

r is s a

Electoral patterns in B ihar and O rissa since Independence reveal a n u m b er o f strange sim ilarities. In b oth states twelve assem bly elec­ tions have been held, and in m ore o r less the sam e years. Since th e assem bly elections held in 1980, all the subsequent assem bly elections have been held at regular intervals, and that too only after the assem bly had com pleted its full te rm .13 T h ere have been very few periods w h en either o f these states has been placed u n d er President’s Rule. T h ese are unusual characteristics am ong m ajor Indian states, and provide an indication o f the u n co m m o n stability o f politics in Bihar and O rissa. 12. As per the 1931 census estimates, the Khandayats constitute nearly 10.29 per cent o f O rissa’s population, the single largest caste. T h e Chasa, w ho are also considered Khandayats, b u t are socially and educationally backward com pared to the Khandayats, account for 7.9 per cent o f the state’s population. Kultas constitute nearly 1.67 per cent o f the population in Orissa. These three O B C castes are the cultivating castes, and are socially, educationally and economically m ore upw ardly m obile that other O B C s such as the Bania (0.39 per cent), Barahi (0.57 per cent), Bhandari (1.22 per cent), Daiji (0.02 per cent), G aur (9.11 per cent), G udia (1.57 per cent), Kewat (2.72 per cent), Kamar (1.00 per cent), K um bhar (1.40 per cent), Kurmi (0.97 per cent), Mali (0.% per cent), Teli (3.16 per cent) and Tanti (1.68 per cent). 13. As per the constitutional provisions, the term o f the assembly is five years. Politics in Bihar and O rissa in the recent past has been stable. In contrast, there has been a very high degree o f instability in UP, w here assembly elections w ere held in 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1996, in each case well before the assembly com pleted its full term o f five years.

Janata Regionalized

117

At the sam e tim e there has been a rise in the political graph o f the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in both these states. T h e L ok S abha E lections In Lok Sabha elections in Bihar, the dom inance o f C ongress was m ore o r less absolute p rio r to the 1984 elections, w ith th e exception o f the 1977 Lok Sabha election. Before then, C ongress always m anaged a m ajority o f the seats, and secured no less (and usually substantially m ore) th an 35 per cent o f the popular vote. Since th e 1989 elections, w h e n C ongress w o n only four Lok Sabha seats from the state and polled 28.1 p e r cent o f the vote, C ongress in Bihar has w itnessed even fu rth er decline. C ongress contested the next tw o L ok Sabha elections (in 1991 and 1996) in Bihar w ith o u t electoral allies and its vote shrank to only 13 p e r cent in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections. It was d u rin g the 1998 an d 1999 Lok Sabha elections that C ongress entered into an alliance w ith the RJD, the descendant o f the Janata in Bihar. T h o u g h C ongress m anaged to w in five seats in 1998 and fo u r in 1999, its vote share w en t d o w n to as low as 7.3 and 8.8 per cent, respectively. T h e political v acuum created by C ongress’s decline was filled largely by the RJD , th e BJP and the Samata party, w hich in 1995 broke away from the L aloo-dom inated B ihar-unit o f the Janata D al. C ongress had difficulty m aintaining its traditional base am ong the upper castes, the D alits and th e M uslim s. W hile the upper-caste voters m oved tow ards the BJP, an increasing proportion o f Dalits and M uslim s w ere lending th eir su p p o rt to the RJD. T h e Samata party drew su p p o rt from tw o o f the th ree do m in an t O B C groups, the K urm is and the Koeris. (F u rth er details o f this pattern will be discussed w ith the aid o f survey data below.) T h e Lok Sabha elections held in O rissa contrast sharply w ith B ihar’s. T h e G antantra Parishad (G P) had a very strong presence in O rissa until 1962, and d u rin g the tw o subsequent Lok Sabha elections (1967 and 1971) the Sw atantra Party had p u t up a strong challenge to C ongress. In the 1967 Lok Sabha elections Sw atantra polled 30.9 p er cent o f th e vote, w inning eight Lok Sabha seats, tw o m ore than C ongress. T h e em ergence o f C ongress as a central political force in O rissa was late by the standards o f m ost Indian states. It was only in 1980 that C ongress began to take charge. In the 1980 Lok Sabha elections, C ongress w on all 21 o f the state’s parliam entary seats and polled 56.1 p e r cent o f the vote; T h o u g h it suffered a setback during

118

REGIONA L REFLECTIONS

the 1989 Lok Sabha elections, w h en th e Janata D al w o n 16 Lok Sabha seats fro m the state, C ongress in O rissa has rem ained a m ajor political force in the state, w hich is m ore than can be said for its counterpart in Bihar. W hile C ongress did not w in large n u m b e rs o f seats d u rin g the 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections, it obtained 41 per cen t and 36.9 p e r cen t o f the vote, respectively. T h is w as a period d u rin g w hich the BJR leading the coalition governm ent in N e w D elhi, experienced a su d d en surge in its standing w ithin O rissa politics. D u rin g the 1998 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP polled 21.2 per c e n t o f the vote and w on seven seats. In 1999, it im proved its tally fu rth e r to n in e Lok Sabha seats backed by 24.6 per cent o f the vote. In term s o f the structural features o f th e ir respective state-level party system s, w e can observe a significant p o in t o f variation. In O rissa C ongress still rem ains a d o m in an t political force, and is opposed by the B JD in alliance w ith the BJP In Bihar, C ongress is n o longer looked u p o n as a party that could conceivably capture political pow er. T h e R JD is the central factor in state politics in Bihar, opposed by the BJP-Sam ata alliance. T h e S tate A ssem bly E lectio n s T h e state assem bly elections held in Bihar and O rissa show several dissim ilarities. In Bihar, C ongress had been a d o m in a n t force in m ost o f the state assem bly elections held p rio r to 1985, w ith the exception o f the 1977 state assem bly election w hen C ongress w on only 57 seats and polled ju s t 23.6 per cent o f the vote. C o n g ress’s decline in B ihar’s state politics began w ith the 1990 state assem bly elections, w h en it m anaged to w in only 71 seats. T h e state assem bly elections o f 1995 and 2000 w itnessed fu rth er decline o f C ongress as the vote share for th e party p lu m m eted to only 11.1 per cent. T h e results o f O rissa’s state assem bly elections present a rather d ifferen t picture. W ith the exception o f the 1961 state assem bly election, w h en C ongress w o n a m ajority o f 82 seats and polled 43.3 p er c e n t o f the vote, the party has n o t d om inated state assem bly elections. In all state assem bly elections held p rio r to 1980, C ongress could n o t w in a m ajority o f seats. T h e 1980 state assem bly election, held co n cu rren tly w ith the parliam entary elections that sw ept M rs G andhi back to pow er, m arked the em ergence o f C ongress as an im p o rtan t political force in the state. D u rin g the 1980 assem bly elections, C ongress w o n 118 seats and polled 47.8 per cent o f the vote.

T a b l e 4.1

Bihar—Summary of Lok Sabha Election Results (1952-99) Year

Total scats

Turn out

RJD (1998-9) J D (1989-% ) J N P (1977-84) PSP (1952-71)

IN C

(%) Seats

Vote %

Scats

Vote %

BJP BJS (1952-71)

Scats

O th e r parties

Vote %

Party

Scats

Vote %

3.4

—

0.4

SO C

3

213

2

21.6

—

0.1

JK D

6

7.5

43.9

2

12.7

—

2.3

SWA

7

18.2

34

34.8

1

7.4

1

11.1

SSP

7

17.8

39

40.1

-

1.1

2

12.1

C PI

5

9.9

22.9

52

65.0

-

-

C PI

-

5.6

30

36.4

8

23.9

—

-

JN P S

5

16.6

58.8

48

51.8

1

6.7

—

6.9

C PI

2

8.2

54

60.7

4

28.1

31

36.4

9

13.0

C PI

4

7.9

1991

54

60.4

1

24.2

33

34.1

5

15.9

C PI

8

7.6

1996

54

59.5

2

13.0

22

31.9

18

20.5

SM P

6

14.5

1998

54

64.6

5

7.3

17

26.6

20

24.0

SM P

10

15.7

1999

54

61.5

4

8.8

7

28.3

23

23.0

JD (U )

18

20.8

1952

55

40.5

45

45.8

—

1957

53

42.9

41

44.5

1962

53

47.0

39

1967

53

51.5

1971

53

49.0

1977

54

60.8

1980

54

51.9

1984

54

1989

-

Note: R em aining scats and shares o f the popular vote have gone to oth er m inor parties and independents. Source: C S D S Data Unit.

T a b l e 4.2

Orissa—Summary of Lok Sabha Election Results (1952-99) Year

Total seats

Turn out (%)

RJD (1998-9) J D (1989-96) J N P (1977-84) PSP (1957-71) KM PP (1952)

IN C

Scats

Vote %

Seats

Vote % 1.4

C P I (1989-99) SSP (1967-84) S O C (1952-62)

Scats

Vote %

1

15.4

O th e r parties

Party

Seats

Vote %

GP

5

26.2

-

GP

7

29.1

1952

20

35.4

11

42.5

—

1957

20

36.1

7

40.0

2

15.4

1962

20

23.6

14

55.5

1

15.5

1

2.7

GP

4

17.4

1967

20

43.7

6

33.3

4

16.0

1

4.5

SWA

8

30.9

1971

20

43.2

15

38.5

-

6.9

-

1.8

SWA

3

15.9

1977

21

44.3

4

38.2

15

51.8

-

-

C PM

1

2.0

1980

21

46.3

20

56.1

-

14.1

—

-

JN P S

1

19.6

1984

21

56.3

20

57.5

1

32.0

-

-

C PM

-

1.8

1989

21

59.3

3

38.4

16

49.5

1

3.6

CPM

1

3.0

1991

21

53.8

13

44.1

6

34.6

1

3.1

C PM

1

2.1

1996

21

59.2

16

44.9

4

30.1

-

0.3

SM P

1

1.6

1998

21

58.0

5

41.0

9

27.5

-

1.0

BJP

7

21.2

1999

21

55.6

2

36.9

10

33.0

-

1.1

BJP

9

24.6

-

Note: Rem aining scats and shares o f the popiflar vote have gone to o th e r m inor parties and independents. Source: C S D S Data Unit.

Janata Regionalized

121

T h o u g h d u rin g the 1985 state assem bly elections C ongress dropped one seat fro m its 1980 tally, the party’s vote share increased to 51.1 p er cent. O rissa’s 1990 state assem bly election saw C ongress displaced by the Janata Dal, b u t it re-em erged as a political force d u rin g the 1995 state assem bly election, w hen it w on 82 seats and polled 39.4 per cent o f the vote. In 2000 the Biju Janata Dal, the descendant o f the Janata D al, came to power. C

o n t r a s t in g

S u p p o r t Bases

of

P o l it ic a l P a r t ie s

T h e discussion that follows analyses the changing su p p o rt bases o f political parties in B ihar and O rissa d u rin g the 1990s. In o rd er to analyse the voting behaviour o f various social groups in Bihar— that is, th eir choice o f party— I have used survey data fo r the Lok Sabha elections held in 1996, 1998 and 1999 and for the assem bly election held in 2000. T h e data for 1991, based o n the recollections o f those surveyed subsequently, broadens the tim e h o rizo n considerably. U nfortunately, there is n o authentic survey data for elections held in the late 1980s to help us analyse the support bases o f political parties. Similarly, for O rissa I have analysed the survey data for the Lok Sabha elections held in 1996, 1998 and 1999 and also the data from a special survey conducted in O rissa after the state assem bly elections held in 2000. T h e figures for 1995 are, like the 1991 figures for the parlia­ m entary elections, based o n the survey resp o n d en ts’ recollections. T h e survey data for elections held in different states after the year 1990 have been very useful in indicating the changes taking place in Indian politics follow ing the im plem entation o f the M andal C o m m is­ sion report, w h ich recom m ended reservations in central governm ent jo b s for people belonging to the O th e r Backward Classes (O B C s). T hese quotas w ere designed to com plem ent existing provisions in several states that ‘reserved’ a proportion o f state go v ern m en t jo b s for people belonging to groups officially classified as O B C s. T h e long­ term consequence o f this policy decision has b een a change in the nature o f politics, especially in the states o f n o rth India. In this context it w ould be useful to analyse the changes underw ay in B ihar and Orissa. Soon after the central governm ent announced th e im plem entation o f the M andal C om m ission rep o rt’s recom m endations, there w ere large-scale protests. T h e m ost visible w ere those led by upper-caste stu d en t associations, w hose m em bers’ em ploym ent prospects appeared likely to deteriorate d ue to the projected red u ctio n o f the general

T a b l e 4.3 Bihar—Summary of State Assembly Elections (1952-2000)

Year

Total

T urn

seats

out (%>

IN C Seats

Vote %

J N P (1977-85)

BJP

SWA (1962-72)

BJS (1952-72)

Seats

Vote %

Seats

State party I

S u te party 11

Vote %

Party

Scats

Vote %

Party

Scats

Vote %

1952

330

39.7

240

41.4

-

-

-

1.2

JK D

33

8.0

SOC

23

18.1

1957

318

40.6

210

42.1

-

-

-

1.2

JK D

30

6.9

PSP

31

16.0

1962

318

47.0

185

41.4

50

17.3

3

2.8

PSP

29

14.2

JK D

20

4.4

1967

318

51.5

128

33.1

3

2.3

26

10.4

SSP

68

17.6

C PI

24

6.9

1969

318

52.8

118

30.5

3

0.9

34

15.6

SSP

52

13.7

C PI

25

10.1

1972

318

52.8

168

33.1

1

0.7

25

11.7

C PI

35

6.9

SO C

33

16.4

1977

324

50.5

57

23.6

214

42.7

C PI

21

7.0

CPM

4

0.9

1980

324

57.3

169

34.2

13

7.4

21

8.4

J N P SC

42

15.5

C PI

23

9.1

1985

324

56.3

196

39.3

13

7.2

16

7.5

LKD

46

14.7

C PI

12

8.9

1990

324

62.0

71

24.7

122

25.7

39

11.6

C PI

23

6.6

JM M

19

3.1

1995

324

61.8

29

16.4

166

27.9

41

12.9

C PI

26

4.8

JM M

10

2.3

2000

324

62.6

24

11.1

124

28.2

66

14.5

SM P

34

8.8

JD (U )

21

6.4

-

-

Note: Rem aining seats and shares o f the popular vote have gone eith er to oth er m inor parties and independents. Source: C S D S Data Unit.

T a b l e 4 .4

Orissa—Summary o f State Assembly Elections (1952-2000) Year

Total seats

Turn out

IN C

BJD (2000) J D (1990-5) J N P (1977-35) SWA (1967-74)

(%) Seats

Vote %

Seats

Vote %

C PI

S u te party I

State party II

Seats

Vote %

Party

Seats

Vote %

Party

Seats

Vote %

1952

140

33.7

67

37.9

—

-

7

5.6

GP

31

20.5

SO C

10

11.8

1957

140

34.3

56

38.3

—

-

9

8.4

GP

51

28.7

PSP

11

10.4

1961

140

36.6

82

43.3

—

—

4

8.0

GP

37

22.0

PSP

10

11.0

1967

140

44.0

31

30.6

49

22.6

7

5.3

JA C

26

13.5

PSP

21

12.3

1971

140

43.3

51

28.2

36

17.4

4

4.8

UTC

33

24.0

PSP

4

6.1

1974

147

51.7

69

37.4

21

12.1

7

4.9

UTC

35

26.4

CPM

3

1.2

1977

147

41.7

26

31.0

110

49.2

1

3.6

CPM

1

0.9

1980

147

47.1

118

47.8

3

4.1

4

5.1

J N P SC

13

19.5

1985

147

52.3

117

51.1

21

30.6

1

3.3

BJP

1

2.6

1990

147

56.6

10

29.8

123

53.7

5

3.0

BJP

2

3.6

1995

147

73.6

82

39.4

46

35.2

—

1.7

BJP

9

2000

147

59.1

26

33.8

68

29.4

1

1.2

BJP

38

—

IN C U -

2

- 7.0

-

-

CPM

1

0.8

7.9

JM M

4

2.0

18.2

JM M

3

2.1

■

Note: R em aining seats and shares o f the popular vote have gone either to other m in o r parties and independents. Source: C S D S D a ta U n it.

—

-

124

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

(‘m erit’) pool o f open recruitm ent for go v ern m en t posts. To counter the anti-M andal agitations, the castes likely to benefit from the new reservation policy m obilized in support o f im p lem en tin g th e M andal C o m m issio n R eport. T h is process o f m o b ilizatio n and co u n term obilization continued for m ore than a year and subsided only w hen the S uprem e C o u rt ruled that reserved posts fo r O B C s, based o n the recom m endations o f the M andal C om m ission R eport (w ith som e m odifications), could proceed. W hile no political party openly opposed the policy o f reservations, it was w idely believed that the pro-reservation m ovem ent was su p ­ ported by the Janata Dal, the ruling party in N e w D elhi, and th at the anti-M andal m ovem ent was backed by the BJP T h e im plem entation o f the M andal C om m ission R eport, and its fallout, led to the polar­ ization o f society— for o r against M andal. It is w idely believed that this sharp polarization— into the m ulti-caste categories o f ‘forw ard’ and ‘backw ard’— subsequently narrow ed (though perhaps consolidated as well) th e support bases o f political parties. W hile over the years th e BJP has becom e a very popular choice o f upper-caste voters, the Janata Dal an d its splinters receive extensive support fro m voters belonging to the O B C group. T h e decline o f C ongress in Bihar, then, stem s from its ab an d o n m en t by the full spectrum o f society— u p p er castes, O B C s, Dalits, and even M uslim s— th o u g h these groups did n o t all head in th e sam e d irection. In O rissa, C ongress retained its su p p o rt base am o n g the voters belonging to the O B C group (despite being u p against a Janata D al-descended regional party, the BJD ). It also m anaged to hold o nto a good proportion o f th e D alit and scheduled tribe vote. T h e upper castes have been dividing their votes betw een the B JD and the BJP in O rissa. I now analyse changing patterns in political parties’ support bases. B ihar In Bihar, voting patterns d u rin g the 1990s reveal a sharp polarization along castes lines. T his is particularly true o f those belonging to the O B C s. T h o u g h there are h u n d red s o f castes in Bihar, for the purposes o f this analysis w e have classified th em into eight broad groups. All four o f the m ain u p p er castes (B rahm ins, R ajputs, B hum ihars, and Kayasthas) have been clubbed together as th ere is no sharp differen­ tiation am o n g their individual voting patterns.

Janata Regionalized

125

T h e O B C s have been divided into fo u r categories. T h e m ost ‘forw ard am ong th e backw ard’, to use a co m m o n political term , have been divided in to tw o groups. T h e num erically strong Yadavs (the largest single caste in term s o f population share) form their ow n category. T h e K urm is and Koeris, w hile enjoying sim ilar levels o f upw ard m obility as the Yadavs, are n o t as n u m e ro u s as the Yadavs, and so have b een com bined into a separate category. N o t only did prelim inary findings suggest very little differentiation in the voting pattern betw een K urm is and Koeris, b u t fu rth e r analysis indicated th eir voting patterns to deviate m arkedly from those o f the Yadavs. T h e rem aining O B C s have been classified into o n e o f tw o categories— eith er M iddle O B C o r Low er O B C . Separate categories for Dalits and scheduled tribes w ere also created, th o u g h there is o f course a fair degree o f social heterogeneity w ithin each grouping. T h e results o f the elections held in the 1980s suggest that C ongress had a very stro n g presence in the state until the en d o f the 1980s, and that it w as only d u rin g the early 1990s that the party began seriously to decline. T h e re is n o survey data for the elections held before the 1990s, b u t the data from subsequent elections suggests that there have been large-scale m ovem ents o f upper-caste voters away from C ongress, w ith a good n u m b er o f these co n trib u tin g to the BJP’s increased popularity. T h e BJP has also been helped by its alliance w ith Samata Party, w h ich attracts the low er reaches o f the social hierarchy. T h e Yadavs com prise nearly twelve per cent o f B ihar’s population and belong to th e upper layer o f th e O B C s, th o u g h they are given their ow n category in this analysis. It was obvious, even in 1990, that the Yadavs w o u ld be the biggest gainer from the new reservation policy; and it w as nearly as likely that the Janata Dal w ould receive th u n d ero u s su p p o rt from Yadav voters. It is indeed noticeable that the Yadavs in B ihar w ere firm ly b eh in d the Janata Dal d u rin g the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, and for the RJD since the 1998 Lok Sabha elections. D u rin g the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, the RJD contested in alliance w ith C ongress, and so in constituencies w here C ongress was contesting the elections, large nu m b ers o f Yadavs voted for C ongress as there had been n o candidate from the RJD. T h e polarization o f the Yadavs in favour o f th e RJD is to som e extent higher th an the su p p o rt for the BJP-Sam ata alliance am ong the upper castes. T h e K urm is and the Koeris are num erically n o t very large, b u t com pared to alm ost all o th er O B C s they are educationally and

126

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

econom ically m u ch better off. W hile the Janata D al in B ihar did obtain som e support from am ong the K urm is and the Koeris d u rin g the 1991 Lok Sabha elections, soon after the form ation o f the Samata Party in 1995 a m ajority o f K urm is and Koeris sw itched their allegiance to the BJP-Samata alliance. T h o u g h these tw o castes w ere am ong the m ain beneficiaries o f the new post-M andal reservation policy, their rivalry w ith the Yadavs had been so deep-rooted th at they voted for w hichever party seem ed m ost capable o f opposing the Yadav-dom inated RJD. T h e support o f the Koeris and K urm is for the BJP-Samata alliance played an im p o rtan t role in its im pressive electoral perform ance d u rin g the 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections. T h e M iddle O B C s include those backward castes that are educa­ tionally and econom ically n o t as w ell o ff as the Yadavs, Koeris o r K urm is, but that still have som e education and are econom ically slightly better o ff than those groups that fall into the Low er O B C category. T he M iddle O B C s d o n o t seem to be heavily tilted in favour o f any party. T h e ir support is divided betw een the BJP-Sam ata and the RJD . T h e voting pattern o f the people belonging to the Low er O B C s reveals a slight preference for the BJP-Samata alliance, th o u g h it did n o t com e close to the degree o f su p p o rt Yadavs offered the RJD. W hile the M uslim vote is sharply tilted tow ards the RJD, there is a three-w ay division o f the D alit vote betw een the RJD, the BJPSamata alliance and C ongress. Yet, because C ongress contested th e last tw o Lok Sabha elections in alliance w ith the RJD, som e p ro portion o f the Dalit vote m u st also be assigned to the RJD. T h e O B C s constitute a very large section o f B ihar’s population. T h o u g h obviously n o t all O B C s have seen such a spectacular rise in th eir political fortunes, the Yadavs, K urm is and Koeris have com e to play a very im portant role in state politics. T h e BJP-Samata alliance and the RJD have been the tw o m ain contenders for political pow er in Bihar, and these tw o forces have pushed C ongress and the Left parties into political near-oblivion in the state. T h e dow nfall o f the B ihar C ongress began w ith the desertion by the three advanced O B C castes, after w hich it was abandoned by the upper castes. T h e absolute dom inance o f the Janata Dal in the early 1990s is attributed to the com bined support o f these three key O B C castes. U ltim ately, how ­ ever, resentful at their m arginalization in political and bureaucratic life by the Yadavs, the K urm is and the Koeris deserted the Janata Dal. Since 1995, the K urm is and Koeris have supported the Samata Party,

Janata Regionalized

127

resu ltin g in the em ergence o f the BJP-Samata alliance as a serious force in Bihar politics. O ris s a T h e analysis o f voting patterns in O rissa classifies people belonging to a large set o f caste/com m unities into six broad categories. T h e U p p e r C aste group includes the three m ost politically salient tw iceb o rn com m unities (the B rahm ins, Karnas and Kshatriyas). W ith access to m odern education and governm ent jo b s, the Khandayats have becom e econom ically well o ff and arc the m ost upw ardly m obile, in addition to being the m ost n um erous, am ong all O B C groups. For th ese reasons, and in recognition o f the im portant role th ey have been playing in the politics o f the state in recent years, the K handayats have th u s been treated as a separate category. T h e rest o f the O B C s have b e e n grouped into the O th e r O B C category. As politically significant differentiation am ong D alit com m unities is negligible, these groups have been com bined into a single D alit category. Similarly, all the people belonging to tribal com m unities have been clu b b ed as one political group, the scheduled tribes. M uslim s, tho u g h th ey constitute a tin y section o f O rissa’s population, have been assigned th eir ow n separate category. T h e upper castes, according to the voter survey data, began seriously leaving the C ongress follow ing the 1996 Lok Sabha elec­ tions. A large n u m b er o f u p p er castes m oved to the Janata Dal even d u rin g the 1995 state assem bly elections, a tren d w hich co n tin u ed in th e polls the follow ing year. T h e n the Janata Dal split, b o th in Bihar and in O rissa. W hile in B ihar the new ly form ed R JD inherited a stro n g support base am ong the O B C s, m ainly because it was the successor to the Janata Dal, in O rissa the new ly form ed BJD drew huge support from the upper castes, b u t could not get backing from th e state’s O B C voters. D u rin g the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, nearly 65 per cent o f upper-caste voters voted for the BJD and an o th er 15 p e r cen t voted for the BJP O n ly ten per cen t o f the upper castes voted in favour o f C ongress d u rin g the 1999 Lok Sabha election. W hile in B ihar upper-caste voters shifted from C ongress to th e BJP (or its alliance partner, the Samata Party), in O rissa the shift am o n g uppercaste voters was from C ongress to the BJD. T h e Khandayats constitute the u p p er section o f O rissa’s O B C s. T h e y are num erically the largest and also the m ost upw ardly m obile

T a b l e 4.5

Bihar—Percentage of Social Groups’ Votes Going to Three Major Party Formations (1991-2000) Congress

BJP+Sam ata

Janata Dal/RJD

1991

1996

1998

1999

2000

1991

1996

1998

1999

2000

1991

1996

1998

1999

2000

32

10

9

8

15

25

60

78

77

61

14

29

12

2

11

8

2

8

36

2

4

16

18

22

9

88

81

66

39

80

K urm is+ Koeris

28

5

24

8

6

40

74

56

71

58

28

18

18

10

25

M iddle O B C s

32

3

—

7

10

26

41

23

52

43

32

50

23

31

32

Lower O B Cs

29

11

8

. 4

4

20

42

57

63

45

37

36

12

11

27

Dalits

19

19

14

17

9

2

25

25

47

39

32

31

24

26

33

Scheduled Tribes

27

24

70

-

-

-

34

8

8

28

M uslim s

29

23

15

7

-

6

4

40

69

U pper Castes Yadavs

34

-

13

—

8

-

60

-

48

-

61

Source: N ational Election Study 1996 (N E S’96), sample size 880, N ational Election Study 1998 (N E S ’98), sample size 833, N ational Election Study 1999 (N E S ’99), sample size 881. Bihar Assembly Election Study 2000, sample size 2225. Figures for the 1991 election arc based on recall.

Janata Regionalized

129

caste— socially, politically and economically. Because o f their n u m eri­ cal strength and upw ard m obility they constitute an im portant political factor in the state. U n til the 1996 Lok Sabha elections Khandayats had voted for C ongress in large num bers, b u t a shift occurred in the 1998 Lok Sabha election— bringing a n u m b er o f K handayat leaders, follow ed by voters, into the BJD cam p. T his shift was uneven, and later proved volatile. N early 58 per cent o f the Khandayats voted for the BJD d u rin g the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, b u t d u rin g the assem bly elections held in 2000 only 35 per cent voted for the BJD. In the 2000 assem bly election nearly 27 per cent o f the Khandayats voted for C ongress. T h e BJP has n o t been a popular choice am ong th e Khandayats d u rin g the last decade o f elections in O rissa. T h e key p o in t o f contrast betw een B ihar and O rissa, th en , is that in the post-M andal era the Yadavs o f Bihar voted en bloc for the RJD , w hile their closest equivalents in O rissa, the Khandayats, w ere n o t so clearly in favour o r against any particular political party. D u rin g the last decade in Bihar, the Yadavs have m obilized to m o u n t a challenge to the political dom inance o f the num erically sm all, b u t traditionally dom inant, upper castes. In O rissa, by contrast, the Khandayats have n o t m obilized to oppose the political dom inance o f the u p p er castes. T h ey have aligned w ith one o r the o th er u p p er caste in ord er to obtain a share o f political power. Voter surveys reveal that the Lower O B C s in O rissa— groups that, com pared to the Khandayats, are educationally and econom ically backward— do n o t overw helm ingly prefer any one political party. Instead, different sub-groups am ong these Low er O B C s have tended to shift their support from one political party to the next, depending o n the circum stances o f each election. T h e popularity o f the Janata D al am ong O B C voters in O rissa has in fact been very low th ro u g h o u t the 1990s, though there was a shift tow ards the BJD beginning w ith the 1999 Lok Sabha elections. Except for the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP has never been a popular choice am ong O rissa’s O B C voters. In sum mary, then, the contrast that can be draw n betw een Bihar and O rissa in term s o f O B C voting behaviour is as follows: In Bihar O B C s voted for the Janata Dal in large num b ers until the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, though the form ation o f the R JD w itnessed a decline in support for the RJD am ong O B C voters. In O rissa, few O B C voters voted for the Janata D al until the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, b u t after the form ation o f the BJD in 1998, the popularity o f the BJD am ong O B C voters has increased som ew hat.

130

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

If w e look at the voting pattern o f the Dalits in Orissa, w e find that thro u g h the 1998 Lok Sabha elections, their party o f choice h ad been C ongress, w hich captured nearly 80 p er cent o f the D alit vote in 1998. W hile the Dalits in O rissa had voted for C ongress in large nu m b ers through the 1998 Lok Sabha elections (and even during th e 2000 assem bly election a m ajority o f Dalits voted for C ongress), in B ihar there is alm ost no support for C ongress am ong Dalits. T h e D alit vote in Bihar is divided betw een the RJD , the Janata Dal, and the BJP-Samata alliance. T h e survey data also suggests that O rissa’s scheduled tribes c o n ­ stituted a solid vote bank for C ongress th ro u g h o u t m ost o f the 1990s. O v er the years there has been som e m ovem ent o f scheduled tribe voters away from C ongress and tow ards the BJP, tho u g h not exclu­ sively. T h e BJD has virtually no support am ong scheduled tribe voters in O rissa. O n e sim ilarity betw een Bihar and O rissa is that in b oth o f these states neither the RJD n o r the BJD has been the choice o f scheduled tribe voters: in B ihar the JM M attracted scheduled tribe voters, w hile in Orissa C ongress was th eir top choice. M uslim s do not constitute a sizeable population in O rissa and so have very little influence in the politics o f the state. T h e results o f the survey do, however, indicate that d u rin g the last decade o f Lok Sabha and assembly elections they largely supported Congress. T

he

M

o b il iz a t io n

Pattern: D

iv e r g e n t

T

rends

T h e survey data on the voting patterns o f social groups in B ihar and O rissa make clear that the tw o do m in an t political parties, the R JD in Bihar and the BJD in O rissa, though offspring o f the same parent political party, the Janata Dal, have substantially different support bases in their respective states. W hile the RJD in B ihar has a very strong presence am ong the state’s do m in an t O B C , the Yadavs, the BJD in O rissa is not very popular am ong the Khandayats, the d o m in an t O B C in O rissa. Indeed, the BJD relies heavily o n the electoral support o f O rissa’s upper castes, a social group w hose counterparts in Bihar are firm in their opposition to the RJD. T his section o f the paper explores why the R JD and BJD differ so m arkedly in this respect. T he question underlying this puzzle is: w hy have n o t the Khandayats (or indeed the O B C s in general) m obilized in support o f the BJD in O rissa? T h e answ er lies in the specific historical pattern o f social and political m obilization o f castes in Orissa, a process

T a b l e 4.6

Orissa—Percentage of Social Groups’ Votes Going to Three Major Party Formations (1995-2000) BJP

Congress

Janata Dal/BJD

1995

1996

1998

1999

2000

1995

1996

1998

1999

2000

1995

1996

1998

1999

2000

U p p er Castes

48

43

22

10

17

9

27

15

15

20

31

30

47

65

54

Khandayats

46

42

38

16

27

7

25

13

16

17

32

33

38

58

35

Lower O B C s

59

37

43

31

24

11

44

5

3

20

22

15

21

60

45

Dalits

76

79

81

44

39

6

10

4

5

15

11

10

6

21

35

Scheduled Tribes

69

34

57

42

37

12

2

17

28

31

6

15

2

3

15

M uslim s

72

99

99

99

44

5

7

23

-

—

—

—

—

—

38

Source: N ational Election Study 1996 (N E S ’96), sam ple size 373, N ational Election Study 1998 (N E S ’98), sample size 833, N ational Election Study 1999 (N E S ’99), sample size 365. O rissa Assembly Election Study 2000, sample size 3660. Figures for the 1995 election are based on rccall.

132

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

w hich differs considerably from that found in Bihar. T h ese diverging trajectories co nstitute the m ajor focus o f the paper’s explanatory fram ew ork. P attern o f Social D o m in a n c e T h e process o f political m obilization and em p o w erm en t o f the O B C s, w hich m anifested itself so vividly across n o rth India after the adoption o f the M andai C o m m issio n report, had o f course n o t sp ru n g from now here. T h o u g h it came to political fruition in the 1990s, m ovem ents am o n g politicized subaltern identities date back to th e p re-Independence period. W ith nearly 80 per cent o f the population d ep en d en t upon agricul­ tu re for its livelihood, agriculture rem ained th e key elem ent in B ihar’s econom y. B u t agricultural land rem ained largely m onopolized by the three m o st elite castes— the Rajputs, B hiim ihars, and B rahm ins. T h e upper layer o f the backward castes— namely, the Yadavs, K urm is, and Koeris— possessed very little agricultural land. W ith few excep­ tions, o th er low er castes w ere also overw helm ingly landless. D u rin g the p re-Independence period, the state w itnessed strong m ovem ents for land reform , w hich co ntinued in post-Independence politics. T h e m ost p ro m in en t m ovem ent took shape u n d e r the leadership o f the Kisan Sabha (form ed in 1920), built aro u n d such stalwarts as Sw am i Bidyanand, Sw am i Sahajanand Saraswati, and K aryanand Sharm a. T h e m ovem ent was strong m ainly in the n o rth and central regions o f Bihar. T h e leaders o f the Kisan Sabha dem an d ed abolition o f the zamindari system , m in im u m wages for agricultural labour, licensing o f m oneylenders’ security to the tenant-cultivator, and o th er reform s. Since it was m ainly upper castes w ho o w n ed land and w ielded social and political power, the agrarian reform m ovem ents inevitably got directed against them . C aste labels becam e unavoidable. O n the o th e r hand, the backbone o f th e m ovem ent was form ed m ainly by those backward castes that, uncharacteristically, did ow n som e land. T h ey could see a direct benefit from such reform s. T h o u g h land reform failed to take off, som e redistribution o f land did take place as a result o f the B hoodan m o v em en t led by Acharya V inoba Bhave, w h ich broke the hold o f the upper castes over agricultural land to at least som e extent. W ith the possession o f agricultural land, as well as diversification o f their occupational patterns, these backw ard castes w ere able to

Janata Regionalized

133

im prove their econom ic status em erging as a reasonably prosperous n e w agrarian class, som etim es derisively know n as Kulaks. T hese ‘bullock capitalists’, to em ploy the R udolphs’ phrase,14 started to play an im portant role in B ihar’s social and political spheres. T his assertiveness kept o n grow ing, in one form o r the other, w ith various social and political m ovem ents, b u t took o n a particularly intense form in the m id-1970s d u rin g the dem ocratic peoples’ m o v em en t led by Jaya Prakash N arayan. T h e ‘J P M o v em en t’ fought against the national Em ergency enacted by Prim e M in ister Indira G an d h i in 1975 ostensibly to protect the Indian state against threats to its survival. T h e effect o f the E m ergency o n C ongress’s popularity varied from state to state.15 B ut because C ongress generally had an upper-caste profile, in those states w here the anti-E m ergency m ove­ m e n t generated an and-C ongress electoral ‘w ave’, this anti-C ongress w ave drew in O B C s struggling to shake the foundations o f uppercaste political dom inance. T h o u g h the J P M ovem ent was in nam e an all-India m ovem ent, B ihar was its epicentre, providing the backbone o f its leadership. A succession o f high-profile protests, agitations, and rallies w ere led by an array o f leaders from n o n-C ongress political parties. M ore and m o re people jo in e d the anti-E m ergency m ovem ent and even som e C ongress leaders left the party to su p p o rt the cause. T h e m ovem ent co n tin u ed for m ore th an tw o years, and w h en the Lok Sabha elections w ere held in 1977, C ongress suffered a massive defeat. T h e Janata Party th e n form ed a national coalition governm ent in alliance w ith several o th e r parties. T h e new leadership was draw n largely from am o n g those w h o had taken active part in the anti-E m ergency m ovem ent. Large n u m b ers o f these leaders w ere from O B C groups. T h is sow ed the seeds o f em pow erm ent am ong leaders from O B C com m unities. T h e M andal C om m ission R eport inaugurated the second phase o f intense m obilization o f the O B C s. W hen the policy o f central go v ern m en t reservation for O B C s was announced, people belonging to the upper castes m obilized to oppose it. T h e m o v em en t gained m o m e n tu m day after day, and w ithin a couple o f w eeks it sw ept alm ost all the states o f n o rth India. T h ere w ere large n u m b ers o f rallies, 14. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H oeber Rudolph, In Pursuit o f Lakshmi: The Political Economy o f the Indian State (Chicago: University o f C hicago Press, 1987). 15. For an analysis o f how this affected politics in oth er Indian states, see James M an o r’s chapter on A ndhra Pradesh in this volume.

134

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

gheraos, dem onstrations, and strikes to oppose the policy o f reserva­ tion. T h e frenzy o f the anti-reservation m ovem ent reached its peak w h en students began publicly im m olating them selves in protest against the policy. Because the Janata Dal had im plem ented the reservation policy, th e anti-reservation m ovem ent was backed, naturally enough, by the nonJanata D al parties, m ainly the BJR In Bihar this served m ainly to reinforce the tren d o f O B C s consolidating behind the Janata Dal. N o political party openly opposed the policy o f reservation, b u t those social groups that resented the policy— m ainly the upper castes— extended their support to w hichever political parties m ost vocifer­ ously opposed the Janata Dal. T h e result was an electorate polarized on caste lines that corresponded m ore o r less to party lines. T h e O B C s in general, and the m ore advanced O B C s (Yadavs, K urm is, and Koeris) in particular, m obilized in favour o f the Janata Dal, w hile the u p p er castes voted for C ongress o r the BJP Later, after the first split in the Janata D al in 1995, the K urm is and Koeris extended th eir support to the new ly form ed Samata Party. To recapitulate, the econom ic struggle betw een the upper castes and th e O B C s, w hich began in the form o f disputes over inequities in land distribution (and m ovem ents for land reform ), resulted ultim ately in a political struggle structured around conflict betw een groups com posed o f large nu m b ers o f castes— in w hich the O B C s in general, and the Yadavs in particular, m anaged to assum e the reins o f governm ent in Bihar. In O rissa, o n the o th e r hand, land distribution at the tim e o f Independence was m arked by far few er disparities. T h o u g h the three upp er castes (the B rahm ins, Kshatriyas, and K am as) possessed m o re th an the average-sized agricultural land holding, the Khandayats also possessed larger-than-average quantities o f land. Historically, these castes w ere num erically large in the coastal region o f O rissa, w h ere agriculture has been the backbone o f the economy. W ith the abolition o f the zam indari system , a fair degree o f redistribution took place in this region, tho u g h clearly landless people co ntinued to exist th ere as well. T h e net result was that the agricultural land was m ore o r less evenly distributed. N early o n e-fo u rth o f all land holdings w ere less than 0.5 hectares in size. N early 87.7 per cent o f all holdings w ere three hectares o r less. B oth the upper castes and the Khandayats, an O B C caste, had a relatively equal stake in this system o f land control. As a result, there was far less potential for party conflict to centre o n

Janata Regionalized

135

th e issue o f agricultural land o r to pit K handayats (or o th e r O B C s) against one another. T h e w estern districts o f O rissa offer a stark contrast. O nce com prised o f princely states, w here rulers possessed large tracts o f agricultural land, w estern O rissa’s farm ers w ere given larger landho ld in g exem ptions w ithin the state’s land refo rm legislation. T h e abolition o f the zam indari system had very little effect in the w estern parts o f O rissa. C onsequently, the scheduled tribes, w h o constitute a sizeable proportion o f the population in the region, rem ained largely landless in this region. In Bihar the social conflicts betw een u p p er and low er castes m irrored econom ic conflicts in a way th at th ey sim ply did n o t in O rissa. T h ere was o f course a status hierarchy betw een K am as and B rahm ins, on the o n e hand, and the K handayats and their fellow O B C s o n th e other. B ut the econom ic disparities betw een the tw o castes w ere less substantial than sim ilar pairings in Bihar, w hich m ade political m obilization o f the backward castes in general, and the Khandayats in particular, very difficult in O rissa. T h is points to th e very different pattern o f political m obilization prevailing in O rissa— a factor, w hich helps to explain w hy its Janatadescended party en d ed up relying for electoral su p p o rt o n a social base so different from its cou n terp art in Bihar. P attern s o f Political D o m in a n c e W hile in Bihar, in any given election, each o f the upper O B C s (the Yadavs, Kurm is, and Koeris) tends to th ro w its co m m u n ity ’s electoral w eight behind one party, in O rissa the K handayat vote is usually divided am ong several com peting parties. W hy does this inter-state difference exist? T h e extrem e caste tensions that predom inate in Bihar, and w hich result in perpetual conflict, sim ply do n o t exist in O rissa, w here there is significantly less overlap betw een econom ic and caste status. C aste tension is deeply rooted in the social life o f people living in Bihar. In O rissa it is n o t caste, b u t region, w hich has provided the d o m in an t cleavage driving political m obilization and counter­ m obilization. O rissa has a high percentage o f scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. As per the 1991 census scheduled castes w ere 16.2 per cent o f the state’s population, and scheduled tribes 22.2 per cent. T h e 2001

136

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

census indicates that their proportion o f O rissa’s population has in­ creased, suggesting that nearly 40 per cen t o f O rissa’s people are either Dalits o r scheduled tribes. Each o f the state’s caste groups also tends to conform to its ow n distinctive settlem en t pattern. W hile Dalits are distributed fairly evenly, being fo u n d in alm ost all o f O rissa’s districts, the upper castes are concentrated m ainly in the coastal districts and the scheduled tribes m ainly in the w estern districts. As per th e C o n stitu tio n ’s provisions, as updated every ten years, the political representation o f D alits and scheduled tribes has been ensured th ro u g h reservation o f certain geographic constituencies, in b oth state assem bly and Lok Sabha elections, for m em bers o f these groups. O f O rissa’s 21 Lok Sabha seats, five are reserved for scheduled tribes and th ree for Dalits. Similarly, o f 147 state assem bly scats, 22 are reserved for Dalits and 34 for scheduled tribes. T h e n u m b er o f political representatives belonging to these tw o reserved categories is so large th at they can p u t adequate pressure o n the state’s policy­ m aking m achinery. B ut until very recently, in the absence o f socio­ econom ic resources, they have n o t been able to em erge as indep en d en t political representatives and have been guided by o th er politicians, m ostly belonging to the upper castes. M ost o f th e scheduled tribes’ representatives com e from O rissa’s w estern region, w hile the upper caste politicians hail m ainly from the coastal regions. Politicians from the coastal regions have long d o m i­ nated state politics in O rissa. T hese politicians have catered to the dev elopm ent o f the coastal region above all else. T h e w estern region was neglected, despite being rich in m ineral resources. T h u s, the pattern o f political m obilization has often revolved aro u n d the issue o f the w estern region’s neglect a t the hands o f politicians from the coastal region. T h e regional disparities w ith in O rissa are indeed glaring, and are so deep-rooted, th at they have rem ained the m ost im p o rtan t political issue in the state. T h is has stalled the full force o f caste politics, o f the sort w hich has taken hold in Bihar. C o n c l u s io n : W be

M

o b il iz e d

hy th e

O B C C ategory

P o l it i c a l l y

in

O

could n o t

r is s a

In Bihar, th e Yadavs, K urm is and Koeris to o k the lead in m obilizing the O B C s as an electoral bloc. In O rissa, no such force em erged. T his is largely th e result o f O rissa having m issed o u t o n tw o o f the great phases o f O B C m obilization— one in 1960s u n d er the leadership o f

Janata Regionalized

137

R am M an o h ar Lohia, and the o th er d u rin g the post-M andal period o f th e 1990s. D u rin g th e 1960s, the im pact o f Lohia’s form ula o f reservations for backward castes m eant that, w here O B C s w ere p u t in charge o f the Socialist Party organization in O rissa’s districts, the m ain represen­ tatives w ere from the C hasa com m unity, a low er O B C . U p p e r castes strongly disapproved o f th eir leadership. H aving alienated a key constituency in the state’s politics, the Socialists failed to act as a vehicle for O B C electoral m obilization in Orissa. As in o th e r states, O rissa’s post-M andal period provided another op p o rtu n ity for O B C m obilization. W hile the last decade o f the tw entieth cen tu ry w itnessed intense political m obilization o f the O B C s in B ihar (and U P and Tamil N ad u , am o n g o th er places), O rissa’s O B C s failed in their efforts tow ards political m obilization. T h e re are several reasons for this, b u t one o f the m o st im portant is th at the state’s num erically strong (and socially and educationally upw ardly m obile) O B C caste, the Khandayats, w ere excluded from the M andal list o f castes entitled to the benefits o f affirm ative action. T h is placed th e Khandayats in a sim ilar situation to the Jats o f U P and Rajasthan. Politicians such as Srikant Jena tried to m obilize the O B C s in O rissa d u rin g the post-M andal period, b u t since the Khandayats w ere excluded from the M andal list, the entire focus was shifted tow ards the inclusion o f the Khandayats in the O B C list. T h u s, d u rin g the years w hen parties in o th e r states w ere experiencing a phase o f intensive m obilization o f O B C s, the O B C leadership in O rissa was focused m erely o n getting the Khandayats included in the list o f eligible beneficiaries. Exclusion from the official O B C list led K handayat political leaders to seek a c c o m m o d a tio n s w ith u p p e r-c a s tc -d o m in a te d p arties: K handayat pledges o f electoral su p p o rt in exchange for prom ises from party leaders th at Khandayats w ould be included on th e O B C list. B ut the K handayats w ere repeatedly betrayed by parties that took their electoral su p p o rt b u t th en failed to fulfil their prom ises u p o n taking office. K handayats also backed the losing horse in an electoral race on m ore than o n e occasion. T h u s their strategy o f shifting allegiance from one political party to another, from one election to th e next, proved less than effectual. T h e Khandayats, especially those w ith better eco­ nom ic status, had tried to align w ith the upper-caste B rahm ins and Kamas, and had as a result shifted their political allegiance to the political party for w hich a m ajority o f O rissa’s upper castes had voted.

138

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

T h o se Khandayats o f low er econom ic status w ere excluded from the benefits o f alliance w ith the u p p er castes; th ey tried to associate them selves politically w ith O B C s o f m ore m odest econom ic status. As a result, the Khandayats rem ain a badly divided social group in O rissa, w hich has ham pered th eir developm ent as a distinct, effectual political entity. It sh o u ld also be noted that w hile the O B C m obilization in O rissa reflected m ainly the aspirations o f one caste, the Khandayats, little effort was expended to aw aken o th er O B C s politically. T hese consti­ tu te a large section o f O rissa’s population. T h e G auda, w hich resem ble the Yadavs o f U P o r Bihar, com prise roughly n in e per cent o f th e state’s p o p u latio n , and have th e advantage o f geographical spread. H ad th e G audas been m obilized, the core o f an O B C identity could have been forged. T h e re was, how ever, no trained and responsive leadership w ith in th e G auda com m unity. T h e B rahm ins and K arnas have long exploited the G audas, having reduced them to a service caste. W hile G auda males have w orked the agricultural land o w n ed by the u p p er castes, the G auda w om en have laboured as dom estic servants. In the absence o f any leadership, th e G audas could n o t be m obilized as a political force in O rissa. T h e o th er factor that contributed to the co n tin u ed dom inance o f the B rahm ins and the Kamas in O rissa politics is th e large share (22.2 per cent) o f scheduled tribes in the state’s population. C o n centrated in the w estern districts o f the state, the scheduled tribes have rem ained substantially cut o ff from contem porary social, political, and eco­ nom ic developm ents. Except for th eir reserved posts, scheduled tribes are hardly represented in any o th e r sphere o f public life. Even these lucky few are subjected to exploitation at the hands o f people belonging to either the B rahm in o r K am a caste. T h e benefits d u e to scheduled tribe com m unities rarely reach th em ; they are cornered prim arily by upper-caste officials and their upper-caste accom plices. U n less there is a strong leadership am ong th e scheduled tribes» this disproportionate distribution o f benefits w ill help to preserve the status q u o , w here the upper castes w ould rem ain pow erful enough to neutralize efforts at political m obilization am o n g O rissa’s O B C s.

5 Post-‘MandaV Politics in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh Christophe Jaffrelot and Jasmine Zerinini-Brotel

he decision by th e governm ent o f Prim e M inister VR Singh to im plem ent the M andal C om m ission R ep o rt in 1990 was a land­ m ark in th e history o f political assertion b y n o rth India’s O th e r Backward Classes, o r as they are com m only kn o w n in bo th juridical and co m m on parlance, the O B C s.1 T h e report, recom m ending a 27 per cent ‘reservation’ (or quota) for O B C s in governm ent jobs, u nited upper-caste H in d u s in their opposition to w hat they perceived as a threat to their dom inance o f India’s vast public sector. T h e violence o f their reaction, in tu rn , led political parties organized aro u n d O B C identity to p u t forw ard and articulate a justification for supporting the decision, and to ratchet up th e ir m obilizational efforts to an unprecedented level. T h e O B C s w ere no longer sim ply an adm inistrative category. T h ey had m arshaled statistical and historical

T

1. India’s C onstitution refers to social groups— ‘O th e r’ than the Scheduled Castes (or Dalits) and th e Scheduled Tribes (or Adivasis)— that suffer from econom ic, educational, and social ‘backwardness’. H ow ever, the first and the second ‘Backward Classes C om m issions’—b etter know n by the nam es o f their respective chairm en, Kalclkar and M andal— identified caste as the m ain criterion for defining the O B C s. As a result, they established a list o f O B C castes w hich coincided m ore o r less w ith the vama category o f the ‘shudras\ m inus the dom inant landow ning com m unities am ong them , such as the Jats in U ttar Pradesh and the M arathas in M aharashtra.

140

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

evidence in su p p o rt o f th eir dem and that the State’s upper-caste bias be forcibly dism antled. T h is helped the O B C political m ovem ent to coalesce. Political regrouping cam e as th e next step. T h e O B C s o f n o rth India started to fight collectively for reservations and, beyond that, to co n cen trate th e ir vote o n parties rep resen tin g th e ir interests. Occasionally, th e O B C s w ere jo in e d by the Scheduled C astes (or D alits) and Scheduled Tribes (or tribals o r adivasis) o f n o rth India, b oth o f w hich h ad already been aw arded legally protected quotas in governm ent em p lo y m en t as well as representation in elected bodies. T h ese groups had also organized politically in the years prior to the im plem entation o f the M andal C o m m issio n R eport. Focusing o n th e cases o f the low er castes and tribes o f U tta r Pradesh (U P ) and M adhya Pradesh (M P ),2 this ch ap ter d ocum ents and analy­ ses patterns in th e process by w hich this wave o f political assertion has unfolded. T h e tw o states have n o t follow ed the sam e political trajectory in th e recent past. Today’s U tta r Pradesh has in h erited m uch from an old socialist tradition o f low er-caste m obilization th a t is clearly m issing in M adhya Pradesh, a state w here the n u m e ro u s princely states exerted a strong conservative influence. B ut despite this historical contrast, the social profile o f the political leadership has undergone the sam e transform ation in b o th states: non-elite groups are increasingly represented in the legislative assem blies and in th e governm ents in L ucknow and Bhopal, the state capitals o f U P and MP, respectively. At th e sam e tim e, low er-caste-oriented parties, like th e Samajwadi Party (Socialist Party) and the B ahujan Samaj Party (Party o f the M asses— o r o f ‘the b ulk o f society’) have n o t been able to gain pow er in M adhya Pradesh o r to retain it o n their ow n in U tta r Pradesh. 2. Even though these two neighboring states have m uch in com m on, they have not been com pared often or systematically. In fact, the com parison is ham pered because o f the imbalance betw een the large n u m b e r o f studies o n U P and th e scarcity o f available literature on MR W hile U P has attracted several political scientists— from th e pioneering w ork o f Paul Brass (Factional Politics in India: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh, Berkeley: U niversity o f California Press, 1965) to the m ore recent book by Zoya Hasan (Quest for Power: Oppositional Movements and Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh, Delhi: O xford University Press, 1998)— M P has been marginalized in the study o f Indian politics. T h e two volum es edited by Francine Frankel and M . S. A. Rao largely ignore this state, whereas all the other major Indian states were covered in this landm ark study. See F. R. Frankel and M. S. A Rao (eds), Dominance and State Power in Modem India: Decline o f a Social Order, 2 vols (D elhi: O xford University Press, 1989 and 1990).

Post-‘Mandal’ Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

141

In b oth states, upper-caste-oriented parties w ere in office d u rin g the late 1990s and the early years o f the 21st C entury: the C ongress Party in M adhya Pradesh and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in U tta r Pradesh, though in the latter case in alliance w ith the BSP Since then, U P has started to diverge slightly. Yet even the SP’s political ‘co u p ’ o f 2003 was possible only because o f the BJP’s tacit support. T h e em ergence o f this sim ilar outcom e, despite the different political inheritances o f the D alit and O B C m ovem ents in these tw o states, is thus som ew hat unexpected. T h e explanation for this p u z­ zling result em erges from an analysis o f the strategies o f the dom inant parties in these tw o states. B oth the BJP and C ongress have been successful in broadening the social profile o f their leadership cadre in both states. B ut there rem ain striking differences in the m eans by w hich these parties have accom plished this shift. T h e differences are consistent across states, b u t the C ongress strategy is better suited to M adhya Pradesh, and the BJP’s to U tta r Pradesh. T h u s party-level variables explain political strategy, and these, com bined w ith statelevel variables, explain the electoral outcom es. T

he

A N

J anata D al orth

and the

I n d ia n O

Em po w

erm ent of th e

O B C s:

v e r v ie w

T h o u g h V P Singh’s tenure as prim e m inister was one o f the shortest in India’s history, it probably produced one o f the m ost durable social and political impacts. H is discourse o n social ju stice was loaded w ith socialist references, and the affirm ative action program m e o f his governm ent drew m ost o f its inspiration from the modus operandi o f R am M anohar Lohia,3 one o f India’s m ost influential socialist thinkers and leaders d u rin g and after the struggle for Independence. Even before the Janata Dal came to pow er, V. P Singh had prom ised to reserve 60 per cent o f posts w ithin the party to O B C s, an old socialist idea. H e considered positive discrim ination the m ost relevant tech­ nique as it provided for long-term upliftm ent.4 3. O n Lohia’s ‘quota-politics’, see C . Jaffrclot India's Silent Revolution: The Rise o f the Lower Castes in North India (N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 2003), chapter 8. 4. See V P. Singh, Tow ards a Ju st Society’— Abridged version o f his ‘First Address to the N ation’, 3 D ecem ber 1989 and ‘Independence Day Address. 15 August 1990’, in S. M ohan, H . D . Sharma, V R Singh and Sunilam (eds), Evolution o f Socialist Policy in India (N ew Delhi: Janata Dal, 1997), pp. 356-65.

142

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

T h e m ain achievem ent o f V. R Singh was to make a broad n u m b er o f castes coalesce u n d er the um brella o f th e O B C label, and conse­ quently to contest the elite groups’ d o m in atio n m ore than ever before. T h e O B C s first becam e a relevant category for the low er castes because o f th e vested interest they had in it— that is, the 27 per cent quota in the central adm inistration prom ised by the M andal C o m ­ m ission R eport. In the early 1990s m any o f those groups that had been classified ritually, w ith in the H in d u vama system , as shudras began to internalize their new administrative classification as O B C s. T h ey adopted this political identity m ainly in o rd e r to derive benefits from it. H ow ever, this category o f identification also crystallized for aw hile because o f the defiant attitude adopted by m any upper castes, particularly stu d en ts (and others) eager to retain their privileged status w ithin India’s bureaucracy. T h e cleavage betw een upper and low er castes was suddenly being reinforced by a collective, open hostility from the form er, w hich led ultim ately to violence. Ironically, this helped the O B C s to transform them selves in to an interest group. T h ey organized outside the vertical clientelistic pattern that had characterized their incorporation w ith in the C ongress Party. T h e C ongress m odel m aintained control in the hands o f the u p p er castes, w ho in exchange, provided protection and benefits targeted specifically at key groups am ong the O B C s. In a bid to transcend this pattern, O B C s began to vote for candidates from their m ilieu, instead o f supporting the traditional C ongress notables. W hile the p ro portion o f upper-caste M P s declined m uch earlier in the states o f south and w est India, it took far longer for change to occur in th e north. In the H in d i-b elt (U tta r Pradesh, Rajasthan, M adhya Pradesh, Bihar, D elhi, H aryana and H im achal Pradesh), the proportion o f upper-caste M Ps in the Lok Sabha (the low er cham ber o f parliam ent) did n o t fall below 50 per cent until 1977, and even then it rem ained betw een 40 per cent and 47 p e r cent. T h e real tu rn in g po in t was 1989 and the com ing to pow er o f the Janata Dal, w hich had given election nom inations (or ‘tickets’) to a great m any O B C s. In the Lok Sabha that em erged follow ing th e general election o f 1989 the p ro p o rtio n o f upper-caste M Ps fell for the first tim e below 40 per cent w hile the share o f O B C s rose from 11.1 per cent to 20.87 per cent. B ut m ore im portantly, in contrast to w hat had happened in the 1980s, the share o f O B C s am o n g M Ps co ntinued to grow in 1991 in spite o f the return to power of Congress. T h e O B C share grew again in 1996, despite the BJP— an even m ore transparently

T able 5.1 Caste and C o m m u n ity o f M Ps Elected to the Lok Sakha in the H indi Belt, 1952-99 (in per cent) 1952

1957

1962

1967

1971

1977

1980

1984

1989

1991

1996

1998

1999

65

59.35

56.14

56.2

53.9

48.2

40.88

46.9

38.2

37.11

35.3

34.67

30.9

Interm ediate Castes

1

2.39

2.83

3.22

8.89

6.4

OBCs

4.40

6.22

9.43

9.67

Scheduled Castes

15.60

18.67

18.85

Scheduled Tribes

5.80

6.22

M uslim s

5.40

O th e r M inorities

U pper Castes

4.11

6.64

5.33

5.31

8

5.43

7.53

11.1

20.87

22.6

24.8

23.56

22.2

17.97

18.26

17.7

17.78

17.26

17.78

18.1

18.14

18.22

17.8

6.6

7.83

7.31

7.08

7.56

7.52

7.56

8.14

7.52

7.56

7.3

4.78

3.77

4.57

4.57

5.75

11.56

9.73

5.78

4.52

3.54

5.33

5

1

0.96

0.47

0.46

0.46

0.44

0.89

0.44

0.44

0.9

0.89

0.89

0.9

Sadhus

-

-

0.47

0.46

0.46

-

0.44

—

-

0.9

-

—

0.9

U nidentified

2

0.96

0.47

0.46

0

0.89

0.89

2.21

0.89

2.21

0.89

9

100 N =206

100

100

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 N =218 N =219 N = 226 N =225 N = 226 N =225 N =221 N =226

100 in S II

Source: Fieldwork by C hristophe Jaflfrelot.

1.36

z

II

1!

Total

$

13.74

Z

13.3

z

10.1

100 N =221

144

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

upper-caste-dom inated party than the C ongress— becom ing th e larg­ est party in the Lok Sabha. S om ething changed over the 1990s th a t m ade all parties, irrespective o f ideology and social profile, d istrib u te an increasing n u m b e r o f tickets to O B C candidates— and n o t only in constituencies w h ere they had little hope o f w inning, a c o m m o n practice in earlier decades. T h is changing character o f the m ain parties is a central elem ent in w hat V P Singh called the ‘silent revolution’, a long-term transform ation u n d e r w hich m ore and m o re people from the politically m arginalized sections o f society w ere given access to power. W hile it is fairly undeniable that a ‘transfer o f p ow er’ took place d u rin g the 1990s, there are am ple inter-state variations— even w ith in north India. In B ihar the low er castes are now m uch m ore signifi­ cantly en tren ch ed in the pow er stru ctu re, w hereas in R ajasthan— at least until that state’s Jats w ere declared O B C s in late 1999— th e O B C s rem ained dram atically under-represented on the political scene. W hile in B ihar th e O B C M Ps represented about 34 per cen t (91 o u t o f 270) o f M Ps retu rn ed betw een 1989 and 1999, in Rajasthan th ey w ere only 10 p er cent (12 o u t o f 125). I f w e go by this criterion, M adhya Pradesh and U tta r Pradesh occupy a sort o f interm ediary position, w ith 21.5 per cen t (45 M Ps o u t o f 208) in M adhya Pradesh and 19 per cent (80 M Ps o u t o f 424) in U tta r Pradesh. T hese sim ilar proportions— especially in the context o f a m uch broader spectrum o f such p roportions across n o rth India as a w hole— m akes the com parison o f M adhya Pradesh and U tta r Pradesh particularly in ­ triguing. T h e different routes by w hich O B C politics arrived in these two states m akes the parallel result in term s o f O B C representation all the m ore interesting.

U

ttar

Two D

P radesh

and

M

if f e r e n t

R e g io n a l B a c k g r o u n d s

adhya

Pradesh:

V ariations in Social C o m p o sitio n M adhya Pradesh and U tta r Pradesh have contrasting b u t com parable caste com positions. In U P the upper castes represent a larger p ro p o r­ tion o f the population than they do in M P A ccording to the census o f 1931, the last one to ask questions ab o u t caste identification, the upper castes represented 20 per cent o f the population. T h e B rahm ins w ere 9.2 per cen t, the highest percentage o f B rahm ins in any Indian

Post-‘M andal’ Politics in U ttar Pradesh and M adhya Pradesh

145

state, and the R ajputs 7.2 per cent, w ith Banias accounting for the rem ainder. In M adhya Pradesh, the upper castes represent approxi­ m ately 13 per cen t o f the population: 5.7 per cen t B rahm ins, 5.3 per cent Rajputs, and roughly 2 per cent Banias. T h e low er and the interm ediate castes form tw o categories w hich m u st be carefully differentiated. T h e latter, w hich in vama term s belong to the shudras, in m any cases largely constitute the do m in an t landow ning castes. T h e socio-econom ic status o f interm ediate castes also varies betw een the tw o states. A m ong the interm ediate castes, the Jats are the m ost significant group in U tta r Pradesh. T h ey represent only 1.6 per c e n t o f the state’s population, b u t are concentrated in w estern UP, w h ere they are a m ainstay o f the farm ing co m m u n ity and com pete in m any localities w ith the R ajputs fo r the status o f the d o m in an t caste. T h e low er castes are either castes associated w ith service occuptions, such as the N ais (barbers) o r the Telis (toddy tappers), o r cultivating castes (K urm is, Lodhis, Koeris, G ujjars), or pastoral castes like the A hirs o r Yadavs (cow herds). T h e Yadavs on th eir ow n account for 8.7 per cen t o f U P ’s population. T h e situation is rather different in M R In b o th states, the low er and interm ediate castes represent about the sam e percentage— 42.3 p er cent in U P and 41.4 per cent in M P 5— b u t there is n o th in g in M adhya Pradesh o f com parable size to U P ’s Yadav block. A m ong M P ’s O B C s, o n ly the Yadavs represent m ore th a n five per cent o f the state’s population. A nd none o f these castes is evenly spread across all five o f M P ’s geographic regions. W hile the Yadavs account for m ore than 5 per cen t o f the population in C h h attisg arh 6 and Vindhya Pradesh regions, th ey are w eak in M adhya B harat. W hile the Telis are the largest caste in C hhattisgarh, they account for less th an 3 per cent o f the population o f the o th er regions. A sim ilar pattern can be found, though to a lesser extent, am ong the K urm is in V indhya Pradesh and the Lodhis in M ahakoshal. A far m ore striking difference betw een bo th states, in term s o f social com position, concerns the Scheduled Tribes and the Scheduled 5. For m ore details, see C . Jaffrclot, ‘T h e Sangh Parivar Between Sanskritization and Social Engineering’, in T. B. H ansen and C . Jaffrelot (cds), The BJP and the Compulsions o f Politics in India (Delhi: O xford U niversity Press, 1999), pp. 22-71. 6. In 2000, C hattisgarh was carved o u t o f M adhya Pradesh to form a new state. As Chattisgarh was part o f M P during the period in w hich the fieldwork for this research was carried out, it is included in the state-w ide statistics thro u g h o u t the chapter.

146

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

Castes. W hile Scheduled Tribes constitute a negligible fraction o f U P ’s population, according to the 1991 census th ey form an exceptionally high (22 per cent) p roportion o f the population in M P T h e tribal belt covers m ost o f C hhattisgarh in the east, an d is spread thro u g h S outh M ahakoshal, in to V indhya Pradesh and part o f M adhya Bharat. Before the creation o f C hhattisgarh, o f M P ’s 320 assem bly seats, 75 w ere reserved for Scheduled Tribes. T h e percentage o f Scheduled C astes varied less across the tw o states, w ith 14 p er cent in M adhya Pradesh and 21 per cen t in UP, th o u g h even a seven p o in t gap is a substantial difference. M oreover, am ong U P ’s D alits, one m ust give special significance to th e block form ed by the 11 per cent o f the state’s population th a t belongs to a single caste group, the C ham ars (tradi­ tionally shoe makers). C ham ars w ere politicized— in places like Agra and K anpur— long before m any o th er Scheduled Castes, as a result o f the organizational w o rk undertaken by D r A m bedkar, India’s forem ost D alit leader d u rin g the nationalist m o v em en t and for m any years thereafter. N o t surprisingly, the R epublican Party o f India (R PI), the party that A m bedkar conceived shortly before he died in 1956, rem ained a n o n -en tity in M adhya Pradesh, w hereas UP, along w ith M aharashtra, was one o f its strongholds— its support rem aining m ore o r less co n stan t for the subsequent decade. T able 5.2 T h e RPI Electoral Performance in 1962 and 1967 (num ber o f scats and per cent o f valid votes)

1962

1967

Vidhan Sabha

Lok Sabha

Vidhan Sabha

Lok Sabha

M adhya Pradesh

0 (1.84)

0 (1.26)

0 (1.70)

0 (0.84)

U ttar Pradesh

3 (4.27)

8 (3.74)

1 (4.07)

10 (4.14)

C ontrasts in the social com position o f U P and M P partly explain the unevenness o f social m obilization across the tw o states. In the form er, the u p p er caste elite lost pow er earlier because o f the leading part played by large castes like the Yadavs and C ham ars and/or by enterprising and locally do m in an t castes like the Jats. In M adhya Pradesh, th o u g h the low er castes w ere alm ost as n um erous, they w ere m ore fragm ented and m ore subm issive, partly because o f the w eaker influence o f m o d ern ideas in a region that w as subjected to princely rule for a substantially longer period o f tim e.

Post-'M andal’ Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

147

U n e v e n Socio-Political M o b ilizatio n T h e greater proportion o f princely states in M adhya Pradesh co m ­ pared to U P is the first elem ent that m ust be taken into account to understand the divergent political trajectories o f U tta r Pradesh and M adhya Pradesh. W hile U tta r Pradesh retained the borders o f the U n ited Provinces, M adhya Pradesh was b o m in 1956 by aggregating to the H indi-speaking districts o f the C entral Provinces m any areas th at had ceased being princely states only at Independence in 1947. T h e re w ere 25 in M adhya Bharat, the w estern part o f the state, 35 in V m dhya Pradesh and a dozen in C hhattisgarh. In the 1970s, 170 o f M adhya Pradesh’s (at that tim e) 296 assem bly constituencies and 20 o f its 37 parliam entary constituencies w ere located partially or entirely on the territory o f form er princely states.7 In M adhya Pradesh, the C ongress largely contented itself w ith co-opting form er princes and/or som e o f their form er jagirdars and zamindars. In 1957 in M adhya Bharat, the M aharani o f Gwalior, Vijaya Raje Scindia, was persuaded to contest the elections u n d er the C ongress banner,8 w hich she did repeatedly until 1967, w hen ‘the Palace’ left the ruling party and sided w ith the H in d u nationalist opposition. B ut the M aharajah o f the neighbouring state o f N arsingarh, B hanu Prakash Singh, w h o becam e one o f Prim e M inister Indira G andhi’s m inisters in the 1960s, rem ained w ith C ongress. In V indhya Pradesh, the party received, until Singh’s death, the backing o f the form er Raj Pram ukh (the provincial governor im m ediately after Independence), the M aha­ rajah o f Rewa, a state equal in size to all others o f this region. In C hhattisgarh, the C ongress obtained, from 1952 onw ards, the support o f the M aharajahs o f Sarangarh (in Raigarh district) and Surguja, both o f w hom contested elections u n d e r its banner, and the su p p o rt o f the Rani o f Khairagarh (Padm avati D evi) and the M aharajah o f Ranker.9 T h u s, the C ongress established its d o m ination over M adhya Pradesh by aggregating ‘vote banks’ controlled by form er princes or jagirdars. T h e key role o f the princely families in the C ongress Party helped to inhibit a politics o f subaltern politicization in M adhya Pradesh. 7. For m ore details, sec C . JafFrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics (N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 1996), p. 215. 8. V. Scindia w ith M. M algonkar, Princess— The Autobiography of the Dowager Maharani o f Gwalior (N ew Delhi: T im e Book International, 1988), pp. 172-3. 9. Hitauada, 5 January 1952, 10 N ovem ber 1956, p. 3; and Madhya Pradesh Chronicle, 1 M ay 1963, p. 3, and 19 January 1962, p. 6.

148

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

U tta r Pradesh experienced a different pattern o f social m obilization. T h e state served as a battleground for tw o conflicting m obilizational strategies, each o f w hich in its ow n way politically strengthened the low er castes. W hile the Lohiaite socialists p ro m o ted affirm ative action program s, C h aran Singh evolved a different approach by focusing on the defense o f the peasants as an identifiable group— the kisans. A lthough he was a Bania and had been influenced by M arxism , Lohia looked at the eradication o f caste as the prim ary objective o f any socialist program m e because, for him , caste was ‘the m ost over­ w helm ing factor in Indian life’.10 H e did n o t regard affirm ative action in the education system as desirable,11 b u t em phasized the need for quotas in th e adm inistration and for the election o f candidates for public office. In 1959 the third national conference o f the Socialist Party expressed the w ish that at least 60 p e r cen t o f the posts in the ad m in istratio n be reserved for O B C s. T h ese reservations w ere intended to give a share o f pow er to the low er castes; it was an em p o w ­ e rm en t schem e. To show the way, the SP n om inated a large n u m b e r o f candidates from non-elite groups, and th e socialists had a larger n u m b er o f O B C MLAs elected than did any o th er political party in U tta r Pradesh and Bihar, the tw o states w h ere they achieved th eir best results. M adhya Pradesh never experienced the sam e socialist tradition as U R N o t o n ly w ere the socialists n o t as stro n g as they w ere in U P from 1967 onw ards, b u t the Lohiaites w ere n o t as well established as o th e r brands o f socialism, such as those represented by the Praja Socialist Party. In th e 1960s, Lohia’s Socialist Party (and later the Sam yukta Socialist Party) m ade only lim ited inroads in V indhya Pradesh, a su b region o f M P w here caste conflicts betw een the B rahm in landow ners and the K urm i tenants w ere especially acute. For instance, these parties polled successively 21.3 per cent and 25.8 p er cent o f the valid votes in Rewa d u rin g the 1962 and 1967 parliam entary elections. B ut, in contrast to w h at happened in U tta r Pradesh, the socialists hardly 10. R. Lohia, ‘Towards the D estruction o f Castes and Classes’ (1958), in R. Lohia, The Caste System (Hyderabad: R am m anohar Lohia Samata Vidyalaya, 1979 [originally published in 1964]), p. 79. 11. H e tried to justify this stand in 1958 by saying: ‘Let the backward castes ask for two or three shifts in schools and colleges, i f necessary, b u t let them never ask for the exclusion o f any child o f India from the portals o f an educational institution’ (Ibid., p. 104). 12. Ibid., p. 135.

Post-‘Mandal’ Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

149

T able 5.3 Electoral Performance o f Socialist Parties D uring the First Four G eneral Elections (in percentage o f valid votes) 1952

1957

1967

1962

SP

K M PP

PSP

PSP

SP

PSP

SSP

All India

10.6

5.8

10.4

6.8

2.7

3.1

4.9

M adhya Pradesh

12.2

6.3

16.1

12.3

5.3

3.7

5

U ttar Pradesh

12.9

4.9

15.3

10.4

8.6

3.7

10.3

Source: D. B utler A. Lahiri, and P. Roy, India decides (N ew Delhi: Living Media, 1989).

projected them selves as defenders o f the low er castes. In fact, m o st o f th em w ere B rahm ins, including th eir leader, Yam una Prasad Shastri, w ho, contrary to Lohia’s recom m endations, did n o t m ake a concerted attem pt to prom ote low er-caste people in the party apparatus. Besides its socialist tradition, U tta r Pradesh also experienced the developm ent o f peasant m ovem ents— w hich rem ained m uch w eaker in M adhya Pradesh— u n d er the aegis o f C haran Singh. T h e C h au d h u ry — to use the Ja t title by w hich he was know n— did n o t share Lohia’s interest in caste; he projected h im self as the true advocate o f the kisans.13 H e w anted to em ancipate th em from the dom ination o f the landlords as well as the state, w hich he accused, am ong o th e r things, o f n o t providing the cultivators w ith regular o r fairly priced electricity and o f offering unrem unerative agricultural prices. C haran Singh’s political parties took root in U tta r Pradesh m ore successfully than anyw here else. Even tho u g h the inaugural convention o f his Bharatiya K ranti D al (BKD) took place in Indore (M adhya Pradesh) in the au tu m n o f 1967,14 the party m ostly relied on its U P branch, o f w hich C haran Singh h im self was the leader.15 In April 1969, C haran Singh 13. For m ore details, see T. Byres, ‘C haran Singh (1902-87): An Assessment’, Journal o f Peasant Studies, 15(2), January 1988, pp. 139-89; and P. Brass, ‘C haudhuri C haran Singh— An Indian political life’, Economic and Political Weekly, 25 Septem ber 1993, p. 2088. 14. L. P Fickctt Jr., ‘T h e Politics o f Regionalism in India’, Pacific Affairs, XLIV (2), S um m er 1971, pp. 201-3. 15. M . Johnson, Relation between Land Settlement and Fhrty Politics in Uttar Pradesh, P hD , Sussex University, 1975, p. 250.

150

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

becam e president o f the BKD. After this, the BK D appeared to be a regional party, confined prim arily to U P T h is evolution was c o n ­ firm ed d u rin g th e 1968-9 elections, in w hich the BKD w o n 21.3 p er cent o f the vote in U tta r Pradesh as against 1.5 per cent in H aryana, 2.1 per cent in B ihar and 1.7 per cen t in Punjab. In UP, the core o f th e party’s support was from C h aran Singh’s w estern region— particularly am ong his Ja t caste-fellow s.16 C haran Singh was, how ever, concerned w ith reaching o u t to the low er castes, w h o form ed the bulk o f th e cultivating castes. In the m id -term elections o f 1969 the BK D fielded 115 candidates from the backward and interm ediate castes, com pared to ju s t 23 nom inated by the C ongress.17 T h is strategy helped the BK D to becom e the second largest party in th e state assembly, w ith 98 seats, com pared to 211 for C ongress. In 1974, the BK D seat total w en t up to 106. Soon after, th e BKD and the breakaway faction o f the Lohiaite socialists led by Raj N arain m erged in to a new party, the Bharatiya Lok Dal (B LD ). As a result, U tta r Pradesh becam e the birthplace o f a political tradition representing the interests o f the ‘rural w o rk ers’, defined as people w h o w ere either from the low er castes o r w ere kisans, o r both. Such a tradition was absent from M adhya Pradesh. In MP, the B K D and the Lok Dal have always been electoral n o n ­ entities. C haran S ingh’s com ing to pow er as early as the m id-1960s helped to shape a new political o rd er in U P U p p e r caste-led clientelism was broken by the presence o f m em bers o f th e O B C s in the go v ern m en t and, to a larger extent than ever before,, in the state assembly. T h e C h a u d h u ry ’s m o v em en t could n o t be characterized as an O B C political force. It was spearheaded by m em b ers o f n o n -O B C castes and, m oreover, did n o t rely o n caste as the basis for political m obilization. A nd yet in a very im portant respect it sow ed the seeds for the O B C m ovem en t unleashed by the im plem entation o f th e M andal R eport m ore than 20 years later. 16. R. I. D uncan, Lewis, the Communication o f Programmes, and Sectional Strategies in Indian Politics with Special References to the Bharatiya Kranti Dal and the Republican Party o f India in Uttar Pradesh and Aligarh District (UP), PhD dissertation, U niversity o f Sussex, 1979, p. 156 and p. 175. 17. Z . Hasan, ‘Pow er and M obilization: Patterns o f Resilience and C hange in U ttar Pradesh’, in F. R. Frankel and M . S. A. Rao (eds), Dominance and State P ow er...vol. 1, p. 182.

Post-‘Mandal’ Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

T U

he

Po s t -M

pper -C aste

andal

C

onvergence:

T

he

D

151

e c l in e o f

P o l it ic a l R e p r e s e n t a t io n

T h o u g h the historical traditions o f low er-caste political m obilization w ere quite different in U tta r Pradesh and M adhya Pradesh, these tw o states converged in th e 1980s and 1990s in term s o f the social profiles o f their ruling elites. T his trend is evident fro m the caste com position o f the legislative assem blies and governm ents in the tw o states. T h e overall pictu re in M adhya Pradesh is very sim ilar to th at o f th e H in d i belt M Ps as a w hole. U pper-caste M LAs have declined from o n e -h a lf o f the assem bly m em bers in the period prior to the early 1970s, to o n e-th ird in 1998. O B C s have risen fro m o n e -te n th to o n efifth o f MLAs over th e same period. B ut the late 1980s and early 1990s d o n o t appear to have been as im portant a tu rn in g point for the M andalization o f political representation in M adhya Pradesh as it was for the H in d i belt M Ps. In fact, in M adhya P radesh the share o f O B C M LAs had already started to rise in the late 1970s and in the first h a lf o f the 1980s and did n o t increase m uch in the 1990s. T h is is probably due to the fact that th e ‘plebianization’ o f th e representative sphere began earlier at the state level than at the national level: the evolution o f the social profile o f the legislative assem blies foreshadow s that o f the Lok Sabha. In M adhya Prades h, the evolution o f the social com position o f the state governm ent is very sim ilar to that o f the assembly. H ow ever, this change did n o t o ccu r very steadily because it was largely a function o f w hich party was in office. Table 5.4 confirm s that 1993 was a tu rn in g p o in t in M adhya Pradesh in the erosion o f upper-caste dom inance o f political life: w hile upper castes represented 45 to 57 per cent o f the m em bers o f the governm ent in 1980-90, by 1993 their percentage had fallen to about o n e-th ird and rem ained belo w 40 p er cen t in the 1990s (except in 1998). O nce again the R ajputs—w ith 15 to 20 per cen t o f m inisterships in 1993-9— ‘resisted ’ m o re th an th e o th e r u p p e r castes, especially the B rahm ins (w ho accounted for 8 to 11 per cen t o f m inisterial posts over the sam e period) and the Banias (6 to 10 p er cent). T h e C ongress, m oreover, tended tow ards greater representation o f Rajputs, w hile th e BJP rem ained a ‘B ania/B rahm in’ party. In 1993-9, the m ain beneficiaries o f the decline o f the u p p er castes w ere n o t prim arily the O B C s (w ho rep resen t about one-fifth o f the m inisters) o r the Scheduled C astes (w h o rem ained largely u n d er-rep resen ted w ith

T a b l e 5.4

Castes and Communities in the Madhya Pradesh Assembly (in per cent) 1957

1962

1967

1972

1977

1980

1985

1990

1993

1998

41.2

48.4

44.9

49.6

46.6

40.3

40.7

40.9

37.1

35.6

Interm ediate Castes

1.1

0.6

0.6

0.3

0.9

0.9

0.3

0.3

0.6

0.9

OBCs

5.1

9.4

9.7

9.5

14.3

16.1

18.6

18.7

22.7

22.0

Scheduled Castes

15.9

14.4

12.8

13

13.4

14

13.3

13.7

14.3

14.7

Scheduled Tribes

18.3

20.1

20.4

22.2

20.4

24.4

24.4

23.7

23.4

23.4

—

—

-

-

0.3

-

—

0.3

0.3

2.4

0.6

2.1

0.9

1.9

1.6

0.9

—

1.6

U p p e r C astes

C hristians M uslim s

-

1.8 —

—

—

0.3

—

—

—

—

—

—

Sikhs

-

-

-

-

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.6

0.9

0.9

3.1

1.6

0.6

0.3

0.3

0.6

100

100

100

N =320

N =320

Total

16.5

4.2

10.6

2.7

100 N =284

100 N =289

100

100

Source: Fieldw ork by C hristophe Jaffrelot.

100 N = 2 9 3 N = 292 N =320

II

U nidentified

Z

Parsis

100 N =320

100 N =320

Post-‘Mandal’ Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

153

T able 5.5 Caste and C om m unity in the G overnm ents o f M P (in per cent) 1980 1985 Cong. Cong. U pper Castes Interm ediate Castes

45.2 -

57.1 —

1990 BJP

1993 1997 1998 1999 Cong. Cong. Cong. Cong.

51.7

33.4

-

• 2.8

35.9 —

42.9 —

39.4 —

OBCs

19.1

14.4

22.5

19.5

28.4

14.3

15.7

Scheduled Castes

11.9

9.5

6.5

8.3

3.8

8.6

10.5

Scheduled Tribes

16.7

‘ 4.8

9.7

26.4

25.7

26.3

2.9

2.6

25

Christians

-

-

-

2.8

M uslim s

2.4

4.8

3.2

2.8

1.9

2.9

2.6

Sikhs

2.4

4.8

—

2.8

1.9

—

—

U nidentified

-

4.8

6.5

-

1.9

—

-

Total

100 II

z

100 100 N =42 N =21

—

100 100 100 100 N =36 N =53 N =35 N =38

Source: Fieldwork by C hristophe Jaffrelot.

fo u r to ten per cent), b u t the Scheduled Tribes, w hose representation ju m p e d to betw een 25 and 26 per cen t d u rin g 1993-9. T his trend suggests once again that M adhya Pradesh C h ie f M inister Digvijay Singh was eager to curb th e influence o f the upper castes b u t via a n ew version o f the traditional ‘coalition o f extrem es’, in w h ich upper and low er castes joined forces to squeeze o u t interm ediate castes and O B C s. Singh offers an interesting variant o f this pattern, since the com ponents w ere not so m u ch the B rahm ins and the Scheduled C astes (the classic electoral form ula d u rin g the heyday o f the ‘C o n ­ gress system ’), b u t the R ajputs and the Scheduled Tribes. T h e caste profile o f U P ’s MLAs and M inisters has undergone a sim ilar evolution, as indicated in Table 5.6. In UP, as in M adhya Pradesh, the erosion in the n u m b er o f upper-caste MLAs has been very substantial, from nearly 60 per cent in 1952 to less than 40 per cen t in the 1990s. T he rising share o f O B C s was n o t as consistently high as in o th er states, b u t it peaked at higher levels. T h e represen­ tation o f O B C s in the U P assem bly has at tim es been m ore than double the level o f 1952, and occasionally triple. It started to rise at an earlier date than in MP, yet the change has been m ore chaotic. Jats and O B C s m ade their first inroads into pow er in th e 1960s under the

T a b l e 5.6

Castes and Communities in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly (in per cent) 1952

1957

1962

1967

1969

1974

1980

1985

1989

1991

1993

1996

U pper Castes

58

55

58

45.3*

43.9*

45.8*

41.3

39.7

35.7

39.1

27

34.5

Interm ediary Castes

3

3

2

1.3

2.1

2.6

3.1

3.1

3.7

OBCs

9

12

13

29.2

26.8

28.4

13.4

19.6

24.1

27.1

32.4

24.8

Scheduled Castes

20

21

22

19.8

20.9

16.3

21.7

21.9

22

22.1

22.3

22.1

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

12

12.1

9.6

5.5

7.5

8.8

Scheduled Tribes M uslim s

-

10

- '

-

9

7

—

—

5.6

—

—

8.2

—

—

9.6

Sikhs

—

—

—

—

—

—

0.9

0.7

0.2

0.2

0.7

0.5

U nidentified

—

-

-

-

-

—

9.1

3.3

5.2

2.4

6.6

5.3

99.9

99.6

99.6

99.7

99.8

99.9

Total

100

100

100

100

99.8

100.1

Note: * including Bhum ihar, Tyagi and Jat. Source: Richard Meyer, The Political Elite in an Under-Developed Society: The Case o f Uttar Pradesh in India, U niversity o f Pennsylvania, D epartm ent o f Political Science, 1969, p.189, reproduced in Zoya Hasan, ‘Pow er and M obilization.. . . ’, p. 176; and fieldw ork by Jasm ine Z6rinini-B rotel for the years 1980-96.

Post-‘Mandal’ Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

155

T able 5.7 Caste D istribution o f BJP MLAs in the U P Assembly (in per cent)

U pper Castes Interm ediate Castes

1989 BJP

1991 BJP

1993 BJP

1996 BJP

55.16

49.83

46.07

48.6

3.18

3.93

5.52

-

OBCs

20.67

19.53

21.34

21.51

Scheduled Castes

22.41

25.86

19.64

22.08

1.72

0.45

0.56

1.1

0.45

8.43

1.1

Sikhs U nidentified Total

-

99.96 (N = 5 8 )

99.93 (N = 2 2 0 )

99.97 (N = 178)

99.91 (N = 1 8 1 )

Source: Fieldwork by Jasm ine Zérinini-B rotel.

aegis o f C haran S ingh’s political parties and the socialists. T h e peculiar tren d o f agrarian politics in the state has co n trib u ted to setting it on a different path o f political m obilization than th a t found in M P T h e ‘party’ v a ria b le ^ th a t is, w hich party cam e to pow er o r was in a m ajority in the assem bly— can explain the sm all changes in the share o f O B C s. For instance, the electoral success o f the 1993 alliance betw een the Sam ajwadi Party (an O B C -o rie n te d party) and the B ahujan Samaj Party (BSP), w hich p ro m o tes the cause o f Dalits, accounts for the com paratively sm aller p ro p o rtio n o f upper-caste MLAs and the record percentage o f O B C MLAs. Yet this ‘party variable’ cannot be taken for granted as an explana­ tion for the overall tren d . T h o u g h the tren d has n o t been consistently upw ard, it is nevertheless indisputably clear that whichever party has com e to pow er in the post-M andal period has m aintained a high level o f O B C MLAs. T h is is evident from the rath er large proportion o f O B C MLAs in 1991 and 1996, w h en ¿he BJP— an uppcr-castedom inated party— w o n the largest n u m b er o f seats. T h e BJP, like o th er parties, had adapted to change. Indeed, w hile the p ro portion o f upper-caste MLAs in the BJP rem ained above 45 per cen t th ro u g h o u t the 1990s, the share o f O B C s stood at o r above 20 per cen t during this period. After M andal polarized H in d u society aro u n d an ‘upper versus low er caste’ dichotom y, the BJP becam e aware o f the divisive potential o f the rise o f O B C s. It chose to bu ild electoral su p p o rt by nom inating O B C candidates. T h e strategy w as quite successful, b u t

156

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

it did not go as far as changing the party’s overall profile: upper castes rem ained m o re n u m ero u s in its ranks and, above all, still in control o f its executive organs. In fact, th o u g h all w in n in g parties increased O B C representation in the V idhan Sabha, they did n o t give m inisterial berths to O B C s in equal m easure. T h is is one o f the lim its o f the dynam ics o f O B C representation that is even m ore p ro n o u n ced in U tta r Pradesh than in M adhya Pradesh. L ooking back to the 1980s, w e can analyse the changes in th e various castes present in governm ents ruled by C ongress, th e Janata Dal, the BSP and the BJP As can be seen from Table 5.8, until the last C ongress governm ent in the state th e p roportion o f upper-caste m inisters stood clearly above 50 per cent, w ith a share o f 8 to 13 p er cent going to the O B C s. T h e support base o f the C ongress (as w ell as its respresentative strategies w h en in pow er) is w ell captured in the data. T h e three core groups— u p p er castes, Scheduled C astes and M u slim s— have received the largest n u m b e r o f m inisterships. Yet there is no d o u b t about w h o is really in charge, as none o f the latter tw o can m atch the num erical dom inance o f the upper castes. T h e first real changes cam e w ith M ulayam Singh Yadav’s Janata Dal governm ent in 1989, w hich saw the p ro p o rtio n o f O B C m inisters going above 14 per cent, w hile upper castes co n tin u ed to cling to h a lf o f U P ’s m inisterships. T h a t the change w as n o t as trem en d o u s as could have b een expected can largely be ascribed to the fact th at the J D in U P in h erited a vast n u m b er o f fo rm er C ongressm en from the R ajput com m unity. C learly the Janata Dal w as n o t an O B C party in the way the Sam ajwadi Party was to becom e one. T h is is confirm ed by the 1993 w atershed. Even if w e assum e th a t all o f the unidentified m inisters w ere u p p er castes— ah unlikely hypothesis given the Ju n e 1995 data— th e overall share o f u p p er castes in governm ent w ould still represent an all-tim e low. For the first tim e, the p roportion o f O B C s h o ld in g posts as governm ent m inisters parallels their share o f the state’s population. T h e subsequent governm ent, w hich took office in J u n e 1995 u n d er the c h ie f m inistership o f the B SP’s M ayawati, m aintained a sim ilar balance. Interestingly, how ever, it is characterized by a m ore equal sharing o f the m inisterial spoils betw een O B C s and SCs. T h e first BJP governm ent in U P can be seen, som ew hat surpris­ ingly, to have provided considerable m o m e n tu m to the process o f O B C assertion. O w in g its political ascendancy to the Ayodhya

T a b l e 5.8

Caste Composition of Selected UP Governments (in per cent)

U pper C astes

02/1984 IN C

03/1985 IN C

01/1987 IN C

01/1990 JD

06^1991 BJP

12/1993 SP-BSP

06/1995 SP-BSP

03/1997 BSP-BJP

64.4

513

57.1

50

51.61

6.7

6.25

17.4

3.22

0

6.25

8.7

14.3

19.35

40

43.75

26.1

29.9

21

16.13

33.3

31.25

30.4

8.6

12

4.3

1

17.4

8.6

4

100 N =23

99.3 N =117

100 N =100

Interm ediate Castes

-

OBCs

8.9

13.5

15.6

21.6

20

14.3

M uslim s

8.9

10.8

14.3

21.4

U nidentified

2.2

2.7

Scheduled Castes

Total

100 N =45

—

100 N =37

Source: Fieldw ork by Jasm ine Zérinini-B rotcl.

-

8.6

-

100 N =35

—

—

100 N =14

0 9.67 99.98 N =31

0

0

20

12.5

100 N =15

100 N =16

—

11/1999 BJP 47 0.86

2001 BJP 50 1

158

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

m ovem ent, and oriented tow ards p ro m o tin g unity w ithin H in d u society, the BJP en d s up replicating the pattern set by the C ongress governm ents o f th e 1980s, w ith the p ro p o rtio n o f upper castes ho ld in g m inisterial positions going above 50 per cent. N evertheless, O B C m inisters still co rn ered nearly 20 per cen t o f positions, an indication that the tren d tow ards greater inclusiveness was too pow erful to be reversed. T his is even m ore evident in th e BJP governm ent form ed by R ajnath Singh in 1999, w here O B C s held nearly 30 per cent o f the m inisterships. Surprisingly, the background to this governm ent’s form ation— th e o u ster o f form er C h ie f M in ister Kalyan Singh (him ­ self an O B C ) to m ake way for the upper-caste Rajnath Singh, and th e resulting tensions betw een O B C s and u p p er castes w ithin the BJP— seem s to have had little influence over th e distribution o f pow er am ong social groups w ithin the governm ent. T h e proportion o f O B C m inisters u n d er R ajnath Singh in N o v em b er 1999 was virtually th e sam e as it was u n d e r Kalyan Singh, and the share o f upper-caste m inisters was on ly a shade below its previous level. T h is balance has been m aintained at the expense o f the Scheduled Castes, an indication that the BJP is w illing to do w ith o u t SC s, b u t n o t O B C s. It can nevertheless still h o p e to c o u n t on votes fro m those Scheduled C astes opposed to the political dom inance o f the C h am ar com m unity w ith in the larger SC category. T h e BJP in the post-K alyan period has used strategic appointm ents to key party posts as a way o f increasing th e visibility o f O B C leaders. W hile m in o r variations have rem ained in core areas, such as differences betw een parties in the degree to w hich they created space for O B C s to becom e MLAs or to hold m inisterial posts, the social com position o f th e assemblies and governm ents o f M P and U P have follow ed a very sim ilar evolutionary pattern, In both states the u p p er castes have been gradually dislodged fro m seats o f pow er— and in roughly the sam e proportions in M adhya Pradesh and U tta r Pradesh. B ut in spite o f this steady erosion, upper-caste-dom inated parties still m anaged to secure pow er in the late 1990s, a developm ent that requires explanation. T

he

U

nev en n ess o f

and the

R e l a t iv e ‘M

C

o m p e t it iv e

M

o b il iz a t io n

a n d a l iz a t io n ’ o f t h e

B JP

O n e o f the reasons for the success o f upper-caste-based parties in U P and M P has been th e division o f the O B C s. T h e notion that the O B C s

Post-'M andal’ Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

159

fo rm a ‘political co m m u n ity ’, 18 needs to be qualified indeed. W hen discussing the rise o f the O B C s in n o rth India, we are really speaking o f the Yadavs and K urm is. Together, they accounted for roughly 15 p e r cent o f n o rth Indian M Ps d u rin g the 1990s, as m u ch as R ajputs and B rahm ins. T h e ir share has grow n so m u ch that each g ro u p represents approxim ately o n e-th ird o f the O B C M Ps elected from n o rth India since 1989. In U tta r Pradesh, the O B C m obilization o f the 1990s was spear­ headed by the Yadavs. T h e rise to pow er o f M ulayam Singh Yadav in 1989, and again in 1993, was largely due to the support o f his ow n caste. H is reservation policy in the adm inistration also favoured Yadavs o ver o th er castes. O u t o f the 900 teachers appointed u n d e r his second governm ent, 720 w ere Yadavs. In the police, over o n e -th ird o f the new ly selected candidates w ere also Yadavs. T h is policy alienated o th e r O B C s, particularly the K urm is. T h o u g h M ulayam ’s successive parties did have p ro m in en t K urm i m em bers, such as B eni Prasad V erm a, he has always been careful n o t to give th em too m u c h political space in w hich to m anoeuvre. In 1993, only eight per cen t o f his p arty ’s MLAs w ere K urm is (o n e-th ird w ere Yadavs), and in 1996 the share o f K urm is was dow n to 3 per cent (as against the o n e-q u arter w h o w ere Yadavs). T his im balance provided the BJP an answ er to the rise o f the O B C s an d , in the process, to the dom inance o f the Yadavs. W hile the C ongress has n o t been able to take advantage o f the divisions w ithin th e O B C ‘social category’, the BJP has m ade an effort thro u g h its policy o f ‘social engineering’ to bring into its fold ‘o th e r’ O B C s— particularly those that resent the position o f the Yadavs.19 A poll taken p rio r to the 1996 assem bly elections p inpointed the deep political divide am ong O B C s in UP. W hile 75 per cen t o f Yadavs rem ained strongly behind M ulayam ’s Sam ajwadi Party, the Lodhis w ere m ostly behind the BJP— supporting Kalyan Singh in particular— w hile the K urm i votes got spread betw een th e BJP (37 p e r cent) and the BSP (27 per cent). T h e BJP had taken care to give tickets to K urm is as well as to Lodhis. H ence it was able to build a 18. Yogendra Yadav, ‘Reconfiguration in Indian Politics: State Assembly Elec­ tions 1995-95’, Economic and Political Weekly, 13 January 1996, p. 96. 19. T his approach has been successful not only w ith O B C s such as the Kurmis o r the Lodhis, but also beyond the O B C category w ith the Jats. T h e BJP exploited the Jats’ resentm ent at n o t being included in the O B C definition. 20. India Today, 31 August 1996.

160

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

su p p o rt base am o n g groups that do n o t form a large part o f any o th e r party’s base. In o th er w ords, the configuration o f the O B C com m unities in U P has had a tw ofold, virtually contradictory, im pact. O n the one hand, the presence o f a d o m in an t O B C co m m u n ity — the Yadavs— has helped to increase representation o f the low er castes. T his has led to disproportionate representation for the Yadavs, w hich has sp u rred counter-m obilization from resentful O B C groups, such as the K urm is and Lodhis. T h e co u n ter m obilization has taken place thro u g h th e agency o f som etim es unexpected political vehicles— like the BJP— th u s generating a higher percentage o f O B C legislators (w hen all parties are included) than m ight otherw ise have em erged. O n the o th er hand, therefore, this com petitive m obilization exac­ erbated the cleavages betw een the O B C castes, and the BJP exploited their rivalries to m aintain itself in office for m o st o f the 1990s, in a party dom inated by upper-caste leaders. T h e BJP p ro m o ted non-Yadav O B C leaders— m ost notably a Lodhi, Kalyan Singh— in ord er to broaden its base, particularly in the im m ediate post-M andal period, w h en low ercaste political m obilization was at its peak. T h is strategy has certainly hindered the form ation o f a unified O B C front. Kalyan Singh was prom oted as an O B C leader, and he took his jo b so seriously that h e b e c a m e th e a rc h ite c t o f th e B JP ’s M a n d a liz a tio n stra te g y in U P W hile O B C s did n o t increase their share am ong the BJP’s con­ tingent o f MLAs, Kalyan Singh was able to accom m odate th em w ith in his governm ent. T h e re is a striking difference betw een the cabinet h e headed prior to his departure in 1999 and th e one he form ed in 1991: the n u m b er o f O B C s had grow n at the expense o f the upper castes. W hile the B JP national leadership was happy to project Kalyan Singh as an O B C leader, influential upper-caste party operatives in U P did n o t in ten d to let their colleagues from the low er castes assum e real pow er w ithin the party. T h ey w ere keen to m aintain their control over the party apparatus. W hile the upper-caste bias o f the BJP in U P rem ains clear fro m the social profile o f its MLAs, it is even m o re obvious w hen o n e looks at the social profile o f its cadres and activists. T h e gap is best seen in the executive com m ittee that ran the party d u rin g Kalyan S in g h ’s c h ie f m inistership. W hile O B C s had gained visibility as cabinet m inisters, and even m o re so as Secretaries to G o v ern m en t (the highest-ranking civil service posts), d u rin g the sam e period their presence in the party’s key decision-m aking organs rem ained m inim al.

Post-‘Mandal’ Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

161

T able 5.9 Caste C om position o f the BJP State Executive, UP, 1998-9 (in per cent) U pper Castes 65.5

Interm ediate O B C s SCs M uslim s Sikhs Sadhus U nTotal Castes identified 3.8

21.9

6.1

1.1

0.5

0.5

0.5

100 ( N = 183)

Source: Fieldwork by Jasm ine Zérinini-B rotel.

U p p er castes still cornered a disproportionately large n u m b e r o f positions in the BJP’s executive. T h e rise o f th e backward castes had been lim ited to positions endow ed w ith visibility, b u t n o t at the centre o f the party’s decision-m aking process. Party positions are crucial to the form ation (and reform ation) o f a p a rty ’s identity. T h ey are undoubtedly m ore critical than nom inations fo r elective office. W ith th e increased com petition in politics and the necessity for large private cam paign-funding, parties have selected candidates notable for their personal w ealth o r aura rather than on the basis o f a long-term (ideological o r organizational) association w ith the party they com e to represent. Party w orkers, o n the o th er hand, are in m ore intim ate contact w ith the p arty ’s higher authorities an d need to be closer ideologically. T his distinction is especially im p o rtan t in the case o f the BJP, w hose key party w orkers com e from the R ashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the m o v em en t that is the ideological w ellspring o f the BJP and its o th er affiliated organizations. Gradually, the grow ing assertiveness o f C h ie f M in ister Kalyan Singh in U P led to the crystallization o f an upper-caste lobby com prising Kalraj M ishra (a B rahm in w h o was one o f th e m ost influential m in ­ isters), Lalji T andon (a K hattri w ho was also a m em b er o f his gov­ ern m en t) and R ajnath Singh (a R ajput w h o w as the c h ie f o f the BJP state unit). T hese leaders w ere w ell-en tren ch ed in the party apparatus. T h ey used the pretext o f the party’s setback in U P in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections to have the c h ie f m inister rem oved. Kalyan Singh was requested to resign by the party’s (national) high com m and in N o v em b er 1999. H e was replaced by a Bania, R am Prakash G upta, w ho was later replaced by R ajnath Singh him self. Kalyan Singh co m ­ plained that he was th e victim o f a brahm inical p lo t w hose architect was none o th er than P rim e M inister Atal B ehari Vajpayee. In D ecem ­ ber 1999, the BJP Parliam entary Board expelled Kalyan Singh from

162

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

the party for six years. H e launched a new party, the Rashtriya K ranti Dal (RK D ), o r Party o f N ational R evolution, and tried to project h im self as an O B C leader indep en d en t o f the m ain national parties. H e attacked Vajpayee for n o t including a single person from the O B C s in the C o n stitu tio n Review Panel form ed in February 2000, arguing that ‘Backward C astes constitute m ore than 50 per cent o f the co u n try ’s populace and any attem pt to alter the C o n stitu tio n w ith o u t having a representative from this section o f the society smacks o f a sectarian approach’.21 O n his ow n, Kalyan Singh has n o t been able to articulate th e grievances o f th e O B C s. B ut neith er has the BJR w hich has been losing ground in the state. It tried soon after the break w ith Kalyan Singh to m aintain its base am ong O B C s by appointing O m Prakash Singh, a K urm i, as c h ie f o f the U P unit, b u t he w as later replaced by R am Prakash G u p ta an upper-caste party leader in A ugust 2000. T h is again proved disastrous as G upta was an RSS m an, lacking any expe­ rience o f electoral politics. Voters tu rn ed away from the BJP in th e February 2002 elections. T h e party, w h ich cam e third w ith only 88 seats, after the Sam ajwadi Party (143 seats) and the B ahujan Samaj Party (98 seats), could only retu rn to office as a result o f its alliance w ith the BSP W h en the BJP-BSP alliance collapsed in S eptem ber 2003, so did the BJP’s hold o n power, w ith the Samajwadi Party President M ulayam Singh Yadav assum ing the c h ie f m in ister’s chair. In fact, the BJP an d the BSP seem ed to be using post-electoral alliances to accom m odate social groups w hich fo u n d little or no representation w ithin their ow n structures. T h ro u g h th is m eans, the BJP was able to reach o u t to th e Dalits w hile the BSP attem pted to shed part o f its anti-B rahm in image. B ut given the core ideological standings o f both parties, these alliances had little chance o f lasting very long. Even if the expulsion o f Kalyan Singh does not, in the long ru n , m ake m uch o f an im pact on the social profile o f the BJP’s leadership, it illustrates the lim ited integration o f th e O B C s w ith in the BJP apparatus. T h erefo re, the im pact o f the BJP’s strategy o f relative M andalization and its capacity to accom m odate O B C leaders in U P m u st n o t be overstated. In UP, the B JP’s policy o f relative M andalization was only possible because o f the resen tm en t felt by several u nder-represented backw ard castes at the Yadav dom inance o f the Samajwadi Party. T his kind o f 21. C ited in the Hindu, 28 February 200().

Post-‘M andal’ Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

163

com petitive m obilization could n o t take place in M adhya Pradesh because n o n e o f the backward castes had achieved the sam e preem i­ nence as th e Yadavs in U R N o n e o f M adhya Pradesh’s O B C groups had the sam e dem ographic w eight, and there was n o O B C -o rien tcd party advocating the cause o f one particular caste, as the SP u n d er M ulayam Singh Yadav had done in U P A nd yet, even though the socio­ political configuration o f M P was so vastly different, the B JP im plem ented the sam e strategy o f relative M andalization as it h ad in UP. In the 1990s, the M adhya Pradesh u n it o f th e BJP tended to nom inate a decreasing proportion o f upper-caste candidates for the elections to the state assembly22 (36.6 per cen t in 1998 com pared to 39.7 per cen t in 1993) and an increasing share o f interm ediate and low er castes (22.3 per cent in 1998 com pared to 19.6 per cen t in 1993). T able 5.10 Social Profile o f BJP Candidates in Madhya Pradesh Assembly Elections (in per cent) 1993 (N = 3 1 6 )

1998 (N = 3 2 0 )

U pper Castes

39.7

36.6

Interm ediate Castes

0.3

1.5

O th e r Backward Classes

19.3

20.8

Scheduled Castes

13.6

14.1

Scheduled Tribes

23.7

23.1

M uslims

0.3

0.3

Sikhs

0.6

0.9

U nidentified

1.9

2.5

Source: Fieldw ork by C hristophe Jaffrelot.

After th e BJP’s defeat in the 1993 M adhya Pradesh assembly election, V ikram Verma (from the Jat com m unity, w hich had been classified am o n g the O B C s in M P ) was appointed leader o f the opposition in the M P assembly; Bherulal Patidar (a K urm i) becam e deputy Speaker; and Babulal G au r (a Yadav, fam ous for his tradeu n io n background) was designated ch ief w hip. T h e next step cam e after the 1996 general election, in w hich the D alit-oriented BSP m ade a breakthrough in M adhya Pradesh w ith 8.18 per cen t o f the vote. T h e 22. In 1996, it appointed a large num ber o f O B C candidates at the tim e o f the Parliamentary elections— ten, com pared to only five in 1984.

164

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

BJP was so concerned about the rise o f th e BSP that it appointed a Janadhar B adhao Sam iti (com m ittee for broad en in g the base o f the party). T h e eig h t-m em b er com m ittee contained only tw o upper-caste m em bers. It w as headed by Babulal G aur, w h o increasingly projected h im self as an O B C leader. In its report the co m m ittee’s conclusions w ere that ‘th e political u n d erstanding and aw areness o f this group [SCs, STs an d O B C s] has greatly im proved because they have realized that social status and econom ic prosperity can only be acquired th rough political p o w er’.23 T h e com m ittee recom m ended that D alit, Adivasi and O B C leaders be show n greater respect and th at they be p rom oted in the political sphere. T h e rep o rt suggested that data concerning th e social com position o f electoral constituencies be collected, co m puterized and taken in to acco u n t before the distribu­ tion o f tickets. In addition, the BJP sh o u ld ‘dem and proportional representation in Parliam ent and state legislatures’ for the O B C s, som ething th e C ongress governm ent had already im plem ented at the local level th ro u g h the design o f the new panchayati raj institutions, b u t w hich represented a com pletely new dep artu re for the BJP In spite o f the alarm ist overtone o f the rep o rt regarding the rise o f the BSP in MP, the BJP did n o t go beyond relative M andalization. As in UP, the party leaders w ere prepared to n o m in ate a larger n u m b er o f O B C candidates, b u t they w ere very reluctant to allow th em to gain pow er w ith in the party. In fact, in the late 1990s and in 2000 the party apparatus w as still controlled by upper-caste leaders— eith er from the faction led by fo rm er C h ie f M inister S underlal Patwa (a Jain) and BJP N atio n al President K ushabhau T h ak re (a Kayasth), o r by its opponents, led by Laxmi N arayan Pandey an d form er C h ie f M inister Kailash Jo sh i, both B rahm ins. T h e upper-caste leaders at the helm tried to p ro m o te Dalits and tribals in the party hierarchy, m ainly w ith the in tention o f short-circuiting the rise w ith in the party o f the O B C s, w h o w ere gaining m o m e n tu m in electoral politics. B eginning in 1998 the p resid en t o f the BJP state executive w as from the Scheduled Tribes— N a n d k u m a r Sai, the M P from Raigarh. T h is was the first tim e in the state party’s history that its president was n o t from the upper castes. It is significant, how ever, that h e was n o t from the O B C s either. In fact, there w ere few low er-caste leaders w ith in the state executive o r am ong the presidents o f the district units o f the party. 23. For m ore details, see C. JafFrclot, ‘T h e BJP betw een Sanskritization and Social Engineering’, in T. B. H ansen and C. Jaffrelot (eds), The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India (D elhi: O xford U niversity Press, 1998).

Post-'MandaP Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

165

T able 5.11 Caste and C om m unity o f Presidents o f BJP D istrict U n its in M adhya Pradesh (in per cent) 1990

1994

1999

63.4

67.9

58

0

0

3.6

OBCs

22

19.6

26.4

Scheduled Castes

2.4

0

1.8

Scheduled Tribes

2.4

8.9

5.3

M uslim s

0

0

0

Sikhs

0

1.8

3.5

9.8

1.8

1.8

100 N =41

100 N =56

100 N =57

U pper Castes Interm ediate Castes

U nidentified Total

Source: Fieldwork by C hristophe Jaffrelot.

Tables 5.12 and 5.13 confirm that the upper castes rem ained very m uch in com m and o f the party structure: they occupied betw een 57 per cent and 67 per cent o f the seats o f the state executive betw een T able 5.12 Castes and C om m unities o f the M em bers o f the BJP State Executive in M adhya Pradesh (in per cent) 1991

1994.

1995

1997

2000

65.1

56.9

66.6

61.7

59.6

1

1.7

2.9

2.8

2.4

13

20.5

12.8

19.6

14.4

Scheduled Castes

4

5

1.4

4.8

Scheduled Tribes

8.1

8.3

4.3 2.9

13.9

9.5

1.7

1.4

1.2

1.4

1.2

U pper Castes Interm ediate Castes OBCs

C hristians 4

1.7

1.4

Sikhs

1

0.8

1.4

U nidentified

4

3.3

5.8

100 N =99

100

100 N =69

Total

Z II to

M uslim s

Source: Fieldwork by C hristophe Jaffrelot.

7.1 100 N =72

100 N =84

166

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

T a b le 5.13 Social C om position o f the M adhya Pradesh State C ongress C om m ittee, 1993 and 19% (in per cent)

1993

1996

Upper Castes

55.17

45.57

Banya/Jain

1034

8.7

B rahm in

27.59

20.65

Kayasth

3.45

1.09

Khatri

1.72

1.63

Rajput

12.07

11.41 1.09

O th e r Intermediate Castes

3.44

0.54

M aratha

1.72

—

Patidar

1.72

0.54

O BC s

15.49

15.19

Bairagi

1.72

0.54

Kirar

1.72

0.54

Kurmi

5.17

3.26

Mali

1.72

0.54

Pankha

1.72

—

Yadav

1.72

2.72

O th e r

1.72

7.59

Scheduled Castes

13.79

8.7

Scheduled Tribes

6.90

9.24

Muslims

3.45

6.52

Christians

0.54

Sikhs

1.09

Unidentified

1.72

Total

100

13.59

00 !/■> II 2

100 N =184*

Note: * Including ‘Special invitees’. Source: Fieldwork by C hristophe JafFrelot.

1991 and 1997. M oreover, the O B C s have tended to im prove th e ir position over tim e b u t less significantly th an they have in the d o m ain o f electoral politics, w here the share o f O B C s am ong the party’s

Post-M andal’ Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

167

candidates for th e state assem bly has risen m o re sharply. T h e group that registered th e m ost significant rise in its share o f key party posts d u rin g the 1990s was the Scheduled Tribes. T h is suggests that the BJP’s upper-caste leadership w ould rath er m ake an alliance w ith the STs, instead o f fu rth e r p rom oting O B C s, lest th e latter pose a threat to their traditional control over the party organization. Som ew hat suprisingly, the sam e pattern is at w ork o n the C ongress side. A N e w V e r s i o n o f t h e ‘C o a l i t i o n

o f

E x t r e m e s ’:

C O N G R E S S IN M P A N D U P

W hile the BJP initially reacted to M andal by accom m odating the low er castes to a very lim ited degree, the C ongress im m ediately chose to refurbish its m o re traditional strategy o f the ‘coalition o f extrem es’, to use the phrase coined by Paul Brass about the U P C ongress.24 T his pattern, indeed, first took shape in UP, w here it so happened that the ruling party ten d ed to attract voters w h o w ere poles apart in the social structure: besides a large n u m b er o f upper castes (especially B rah­ m ins), m any Scheduled C aste people voted for th e C ongress as w ell— either because th e party had co-opted popular D alit leaders o r because they had been w o o ed by the C ongress’s stated co m m itm en t to the policy o f reservations for Scheduled Castes. T h o u g h the n o tio n o f a ‘coalition o f extrem es’ was first used in a rather analytical context, one can also see it as a full-fledged political strategy. U pper-caste C ongress leaders have certainly tried to m ake an alliance w ith Scheduled C aste leaders in ord er to circum vent the rise o f O B C castes. T h e O B C s appeared to pose a m o re direct threat to the interests o f th e upper castes; th eir sheer n u m b ers and grow ing socio-econom ic assertiveness had already beg u n to translate into substantial political influence. In the villages, cultivating and pastoral O B C castes, such as the Yadavs, K urm is and L odhis, that benefited from (adm ittedly m odest) land reform and th e diffusion o f G reen R evolution agricultural technologies began to challenge the tradi­ tional political d o m ination o f Rajputs, B hum ihars o r Tyagis. T h e U P C ongress, as noted above, has always lagged b eh in d its rivals in term s o f O B C representation. N o n -C o n g ress governm ents often coincided w ith sudden increases in the share o f O B C MLAs in 24. P Brass, ‘T h e Politicization o f the Peasantry in a N o rth Indian State*,Journal o f Peasant Studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (O ctober 1980), pp. 3-3 6 .

168

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

the assembly. In the post-M andal context, the U P C ongress’s attem p t to reestablish a coalition o f extrem es was suggested by the com position o f the U P C C form ed in 1999. O f 48 m em bers, 22 w ere from the u p p e r castes; the second largest group was m ade o f Dalits. T h ere w ere n in e Scheduled Castes, seven O B C s, four M uslim s, tw o Sikhs and a Jat. T h o u g h upper castes n o longer constituted a majority, the O B C s w ere still far behind. C ongress tried to in d u ct m ore O B C s into the party, b u t SCs even m o re so. C ongress, w hich had lost m uch o f its D alit su p p o rt to the BSP, m ade special efforts to attract SC voters back to the party. O f the 25 vice presidential positions in the 1999 U tta r Pradesh C ongress C om m ittee, five w ere aw arded to O B C s and five to D alits (all C ham ars), w hile an o th er five w ere M uslim s. T his attem pt at diversifying the social com position o f the C ongress in U P was initiated by the th en U P C C c h ie f Salm an K hurshid, h im self a M uslim . It triggered reactions from the upper castes in th e C ongress U P C C , notably from Jiten d ra Prasad, a B rahm in and a fo rm er U P C C President. Very m uch like the situation in the BJR th e upper-caste lobby in the C ongress has since been fighting to prevent the intrusion o f o th er caste groups into the party apparatus. In th e U P C C that was appointed in 2000, 50 per cent o f the m em bers cam e from the upper castes, m ostly B rahm ins. O n ly about 15 per cen t w ere O B C s, w hile 22 per cent w ere SCs. T h e resilience o f upper-caste dom ination is evident from the large n u m b er o f upper-caste local leaders in the C ongress organization. In 2000, o f 130 district and city presidents, 81 w ere from the upper castes (including 43 B rahm ins), 11 w ere O B C s, and ju s t six w ere from the Scheduled Castes. In M adhya Pradesh, the C ongress, u n d er Digvijay Singh, has b een m uch m ore enterprising in p rom oting non-elite groups. Soon after he took over as c h ie f m inister in 1993, Digvijay Singh announced th a t 14 per cent o f posts in governm ent departm ents, public undertakings, and local bodies w ould be reserved for the O B C s. H e tried to extend this quota to 27 per cent in Septem ber 1995 thro u g h the M adhya Pradesh Public Service R eservation for the Scheduled C astes, S ched­ uled Tribes and O th e r Backward Classes (A m endm ent) Bill, 1995, in w hich reservations for the STs and O B C s w ere increased, respec­ tively, from 18 per cen t and 14 per cent to 23 and 27 per cent in th e tw o m ost senior ranks o f the adm inistration, and from 20 per cent and 25. Furtherm ore, his governm ent relaxed by five years the upper age lim it fo r the entry o f the O B C s in governm ent service (National Mail, 7 D ecem ber 1994).

Post-‘MandaP Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

169

14 p er cent to 23 and 27 per cent for class III and IV jobs, respectively. H ow ever, the co u rt gave a stay ord er because the total su m o f quotas n o w exceded 50 per cent, the ceiling set by an earlier S u prem e C o u rt precedent. Digvijay Singh prom ised to reserve 27 p er cen t o f the state adm inistration to the O B C s once again d u rin g the 2003 assem bly elections. T h is pledge becam e, in fact, one o f the m ain planks in his cam paign platform . Digvijay Singh was paying as m u ch attention to the STs as to the O B C s. T h is strategy was also evident from the way h e extended reservations to the local bodies. In tribal-dom inated districts such as Surguja, M andla, Bastar and Jhabua, all o f the chairm anships o f the first tw o tiers o f the local governm ent structure w ere reserved for Adivasis. Digvijay Singh sought to build a ‘coalition o f extrem es’, co m b in in g n o t only the party’s upper-caste base, b u t also his ow n personal R ajput-heavy follow ing, alongside the C ongress’s traditional tribal supporters. T h e latter had been largely lost to the BJP in the 1990 elections.26 O n e o f Digvijay’s objectives was probably to sand­ w ich rising O B C leaders w ith in the C ongress, especially Subhash Yadav, a leader o f the state’s large cooperative sector w h o m he had appointed as deputy c h ie f m inister, b u t w h o coveted th e top jo b . Digvijay Singh designed special policies for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. S tudents belonging to these categories w ere freed from the req u irem en t o f producing caste and incom e certificates every year. T h e ir scholarships w ere raised and linked to the price index. M ore im portantly, a special recru itm en t drive was launched in A pril 1995 to fill the backlog o f vacancies reserved for th e SCs and STs; three years later about 30,000 such vacancies w ere filled.27 A new reservation policy was p u t in place to increase the n u m b ers o f Scheduled C aste police officials.28 In 1995, the M adhya Pradesh go v ern m en t form ulated new rules u n d er the Scheduled C astes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention o f A trocities) Act, 1989: state- and district-level vigilance com m ittees w ere constituted to prevent atroci­ ties and m o n ito r relief and rehabilitation o f affected persons, and financial com pensation was increased in cases o f m u rd er, rape, or victim ization at the hands o f crim inal gangs.29 An A dditional D irector 26. In 1990, the BJP had w on 54 o f the 75 scats reserved for th e Scheduled Tribes. In 1993, it secured only 16 o f these seats. 27. Madhya Pradesh Chronicle, 13 M ay 1998. 28. Ibid., 8 January 1999. 29. National Mail, 8 M ay 1995.

170

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

G eneral o f Police headed a separate w ing dedicated to checking crim e against SC s and STs.30 N aturally, this official claim ed that this new set up was responsible for the slight decrease registered in 1998.31 Even th o u g h the level o f atrocities rem ained very high, Digvijay Singh m ade sure to be seen to be taking action. T h is was in stark contrast to Kalyan Singh, w h o in 1997 even introduced a G o v ern m en t O rd e r to check w hat he th o u g h t w ere D alit-biased abuses o f the U P (Atrocities) P revention A ct (1989)— a m ove w hich infuriated the BSP So far as the tribals are concerned, Digvijay Singh’s first govern­ m en t (1993-8) allowed th em to gather tendu leaves— used in the m aking ofbidis (local cigarettes)— from sanctuaries and reserved forest areas. Soon before the 1998 election his governm ent ensured the forest dw ellers’ th eir ow nership rights over forest produce, and increased the rem uneration o f the tendu-\caf gatherers.32 Finally, the state assem bly passed a resolution in favour o f the Sixth Schedule o f the C o n stitu tio n granting autonom y to Scheculed Tribes in districts w here they pre­ dom inate, som ething that was opposed by the central governm ent.33 U p o n becom ing c h ie f m inister in 1993, Digvijay Singh appointed tw o deputy c h ie f m inisters, one from the Scheduled Tribes (Piyarelal Kanwar) and o ne from the O B C s (Subhash Yadav). Soon thereafter, in 1994, Parasram Bhardwaj, a Scheduled C aste leader, was appointed as head o f the M adhya Pradesh C ongress C om m ittee. H e was replaced by a tribal w om an in 1997. A nother D alit took over from h er in 1999, as if the post o f M P C C president was no w unofficially reserved for SC s and STs. T h e share o f the STs in the governm ent o f Digvijay Singh increased substantially betw een 1993 and 1997, thro u g h a succession o f cabinet reshuffles (see table 5.5). H ow ever, the SC s w ere also represented, including by a leader o f the R PI, w ith w hich Digvijay m ade an alliance before the 1998 elections, as part o f his ostensibly p ro -D alit strategy. In the M P C ongress C o m m ittee appointed in 1992, w hile Digvijay (a R ajput) was president, there was o ne Scheduled C aste vice president as w ell as one each from the Scheduled Tribe and M u slim com m unity. A nd betw een 1992 and 1997 the share o f the Scheduled Tribes in the party’s executive com m ittee increased from 6.9 per cen t 30. 31. 32. 33.

Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Times

19 Ju n e 15 Ju n e 15 May o f India,

1998. 1999. 1998. 18 April 1995 and 12 Ju n e 1995.

Post-‘M andal’ Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

171

to 18.2 per cent. Sim ultaneously, the share o f the upper castes decreased from 55.2 per cen t in 1992 to 43.6 per cent in 1997. T h e above statistical data suggest that C ongress was striving to evolve a new version o f the ‘coalition o f extrem es’ in w hich the Scheduled Tribes w ould replace the Scheduled C astes o n the b o ttom pole. T h e O B C s rem ained massively u nder-represented in alm ost all sites o f decision-m aking pow er, indicating a stro n g desire o n th e part o f th e C ongress leadership to circum vent th e ir grow ing influence. Indeed, the O B C s posed a m u ch bigger th reat to th e upper castes’ interests than d id the Scheduled C astes o r Tribes. T h e O B C s also rem ain clearly under-rep resen ted am ong the C ongress candidates to the 1999 Lok Sabha elections: T able 5.14 Social Profile o f BJP and Congress Lok Sabha Candidates in M adhya Pradesh (in per cent) 19% BJP 1999 BJP 1996 C ongress 1999 Congress U p p er Castes

33.3

32.5

42.5

40

0

0

0

2.5

OBCs

25.6

30

15

15

Scheduled Castes

15.4

15

10

15

Scheduled TVibes

23.1

22.5

27.5

22.5

0

0

2.5

2.5

2.6

0

0

2.5

0

0

2.5

0

100 N =39

100 N =40

100 N =40

100 N =40

Interm ediate Castes

M uslim s Sikhs U nidentified Total

Source: Fieldwork by C hristophe Jaflfrelot.

T h e im balance in the distribution o f tickets to O B C candidates betw een the tw o parties helps to explain w h y the C ongress could attract only 44 p er cent o f the peasant O B C voters and 48 per cent o f the low er O B C voters as against, respectively, 53 per cent and 49 per cen t by the BJR34 H ow ever, the C ongress received about three34. These figures are draw n from the C SD S exit poll published in Frontline, 10 D ecem ber 1999, p. 42.

172

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

quarters o f th e tribal vote and 51 per cent o f the D alit vote. W hile these groups ten d to represent th e strongholds o f th e C ongress party all over India, in M adhya Pradesh they w ere also responding to D igvijay’s targeted policies— an im p o rtan t reason w hy C ongress has been able to attract fo rm er B SP voters. T hese data fu rth er su p p o rt th e im pression that th e M adhya Pradesh C ongress has been m ore inclined than its counterpart in U P to project a n o n -elite image. T h is strategy, however, rem ains biased in favour o f the SCs/STs, w hich suggests th a t th e C ongress w as eager to reestablish a new version o f its old coalition o f extrem es— th e sam e basic strategy it pu rsu ed in U R T h e creation o f C hhattisgarh as a separate state in 2000 led Digvijay Singh to am end his ‘coalition o f extrem es’ strategy. T h e ‘tribal card’ had been w eakened by th e carving o u t o f this tribal-dom inated region fro m w hich he expected m any seats. T herefore, he decided to focus o n th e S cheduled Castes to com pensate for this loss and to co u n ter the BSP, w h ich w as still a force to reckon w ith in n o rth e rn M adhya B harat and V indhya Pradesh. T h is approach helps to explain Digvijay S ingh’s visible role in the ‘D alit C o n v e n tio n ’ organized by associa­ tions o f Scheduled Castes in Bhopal in Jan u ary 2001. Digvijay Singh therefore included a ‘D alit agenda’ in his election cam paign d u rin g th e A u tu m n o f 2003. C

o n c l u s io n

T h e im plem entation o f th e M andal C om m ission R eport helped to catalyze a shift in the social profile o f the political leadership o f U tta r Pradesh and M adhya Pradesh. T h is has happened to sim ilar degrees across the tw o states despite th eir rather different dem ographic pro­ files and distinct political traditions. W hile th e legacy o f its princely states exerted a strong conservative influence over M adhya Pradesh, U tta r Pradesh was the b irth place o f both the socialist brand o f ‘quota politics’ and C haran Singh’s kisan politics. Prior to M andal, the com bination o f these tw o political repertoires had already enabled rural folk to shake the upper castes’ political hegemony. In spite o f these contrasting contexts, th e rise o f O B C politics— w hich cu lm i­ nated in M andal— resulted in a striking convergence o f the social profile o f the tw o states’ political classes, a process that has produced less radical outcom es than in B ihar b u t m ore substantial than in Rajasthan.

Post-‘M andal’ Politics in U ttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh

173

Surprisingly, th e political trajectories o f these tw o states have rem ained fairly parallel despite the fact that they have been ruled by different parties for m ost o f the 1990s, w ith the BJP in pow er in U P and the C ongress in control o f M P In U R the success o f the BJP at regaining pow er in 1996-7 is partly attributable to the divisions w ithin the O B C s, and in particular to the com petitive m obilization w hich enabled the party to pit K urm is and Lodhis against Yadavs. T h e accom m odation o f K urm is and Lodhis by the BJP am ounted to a form o f relative M andalization o f the party. T h is strategy has show n signs o f being untenable. T h e upper-caste leaders resented the grow ing assertiveness o f Kalyan Singh, w h o was ultim ately expelled. T h e BJP pursued the sam e strategy in MP, b u t stopped short o f p ro m o tin g a Kalyan-like leader w h o could don the m antle o f cham pion o f the state’s O B C s. W h en the BJP started to project U m a Bharti as its c h ie f m inisterial candidate, she continued to appear m ore as a H in d u leader than as an O B C . By the early years o f the n ew century, the BJP in M P was relying m o re on the old ‘coalition o f extrem es’ pattern associated w ith th e C ongress. R eturning to its coalition o f extrem es strategy was the im m ediate response o f the C ongress w hen it had to react to M andal. T h e party had never m ade m u ch room for the O B C s. It focussed instead on forging an alliance betw een its upper-caste su p p o rt base and the state’s Scheduled Caste voters. C ongress reverted to this approach in the late 1990s in UP, w h ere the BSP had already cut into its D alit vote bank. In M adhya Pradesh, Digvijay Singh tried to evolve a new version o f this old strategy by replacing the Scheduled C astes w ith Scheduled Tribes in the C ongress coalition, a m ove w h ich m ade sense given the large proportion o f tribals in M P until 2000. T h e carving o u t o f C hhattisgarh as a new state led Digvijay to focus m ore on the Scheduled Castes as evident from his D alit agenda. Be it the BJP or the C ongress, w h en these upper-caste dom inated parties o p t for the coalition-of-extrem es pattern, they pursue the same objective as w hen th ey im plem ent a strategy o f relative M andaliza­ tion: they try to defuse the grow ing m obilization o f the O B C s, o r to bypass them . B ut w ill these devices succeed? Relative M andalization has already show n its lim its in UP, w here th e expulsion o f Kalyan Singh— and the p arty ’s failure to p ro m o te an alternative O B C leadership cadre— cost the BJP dearly d u rin g the 2002 state assem bly elections. B uilding a coalition o f extrem es to contain the rise o f the O B C s will prove particularly difficult if low er-caste parties realize

174

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

that they can b roaden their base o f su p p o rt by incorporating u p p e r castes— in a m irro r image o f the strategy long follow ed by th e m ajo r national parties. M ulayam Singh Yadav’s Sam ajwadi Party triu m p h ed in U P ’s panchayat elections in 2000 by n o m in atin g far m ore u p p ercaste candidates th an it previously had. T h e sam e tactic served M ulayam well d u rin g the 2002 assem bly elections, allow ing th e Samajwadi Party to em erge as the single largest party in U R T h is outcom e led the BJP to re-establish the inter-party version o f th e ‘coalition o f extrem es’ that it had already p u t into practice d u rin g th e latter part o f the 1990s— its alliance w ith th e BSP having fu rn ish ed the low er extrem e o f this coalition until th e tw o parties fell o u t in Septem ber 2003.

Part III C ivic Engagement

6 States or Cities? Studying Hindu-Muslim Riots1 Ashutosh Varshney

s com m unal violence in India best studied at the state level o r the city level? O r sh o u ld an analytical fram ew ork be devised that incorporates b oth levels? I f w e find the latter path intellectually m ore m eaningful, w hat is the best way to achieve such synthesis? T h ese questions are n o t sim ply academic. T h e gruesom e co m m u ­ nal violence that eru p ted in the state o f G ujarat in 2002 brings them a poignant urgency. T h e violence co n tin u ed for several m onths, but w ith the exception o f a few relatively small episodes, it did n o t spill beyond G ujarat’s borders.2 N ew spapers and television stations thro u g h ­ o u t India reported and discussed the events in G ujarat for m uch o f the year, often presenting violence in its gory details. Yet the rest o f the country, by and large, avoided retaliatory rioting. T h ere were bom bings in M u m b ai m ore than a year later (in A ugust 2003), and

I

1. For their helpful com m ents on an earlier draft, I am grateful to Rob Jenkins, C hristophe Jaffrelot, Jim M anor and Jasm ine Zdrinini-B rotel. T his chapter relies on the argum ents in m y book. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (N ew Haven: Yale U niversity Press, 2002 and 2003 and N ew Delhi: O xford University Press, 2002), and my article, ‘E thnic C onflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond’, World Politics, April 2001. 2. T here was m in o r rioting in H yderabad (the capital o f A ndhra Pradesh) and some tow ns o f M aharashtra as well.

178

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

they m ay w ell have been related to G ujarat’s riots, b u t after all is said and done, the co m m u n al violence was m ostly confined to a single state. Should w e therefore conclude that th e state level is the m ost im portant level o f analysis for com m unal violence? Before G ujarat h it the headlines in 2002, a N o rth -S o u th divide had m arked perceptions o f com m unalism and com m unal violence in India. It was generally believed that N o rth Indian states w ere w orse affected by com m unal violence. H in d u -M u slim relations in South India w ere w idely considered peaceful, th e m ajor exception being H yderabad, the capital city o f A ndhra Pradesh.3 T h e contrast betw een com m unal tranquility in the state o f Kerala and the riot-proneness o f U tta r Pradesh (U P ) w as often draw n. M uslim s constitute over 20 per cen t o f Kerala’s population as against rou g h ly 16 p er cen t in U R Kerala thus has a h ig h er percentage o f M uslim s than UP, b u t H in d u M uslim relations in the tw o states have been polar opposites. T his contradicts the w idespread view that a h ig h er proportion o f m inority population increases the propensity to co m m u n al violence because higher dem ographic proportions m ake m inorities m ore assertive, or because higher percentages ren d er m inorities sim ply m ore visible. E ith er can increase a m in o rity ’s susceptibility to resen tm en t and reaction from the m ajority com m unity. T h is chapter exam ines the state-level conventional w isdom . It relies o n m y recent book, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India,4 and especially o n a data-set jo in tly created by Steven W ilkinson and m e for the period 1950-95. T h e overall statistics for 1950-95, the so-called ‘large-n’ o f H in d u -M u slim violence, allow us to answ er tw o h ith erto em pirically unresolved questions: H o w is India’s co m m u n al violence d istrib u ted across the nation? A nd at w h at level— state, tow n, village— sh o u ld com m unal violence be studied? M y argum ent in this chapter is that w hile state-level com parisons in India m ake a lot o f sense for a variety o f questions, the attem p t to com pare H in d u -M u slim relations at the state-level is n o t w rong, b u t incom plete. T h e city is the m ost logical and significant level o f analy­ sis. H ow ever, an exclusive city-level focus also leaves an im portant part 3. For an analysis o f w hy Hyderabad m ight be an exception, see Ashutosh Varshney, ‘Postm odernism , Civic Engagem ent and Ethnic Conflict: A Passage to India’, Comparative Politics, O ctober 1997. 4. Published by Yale U niversity Press (2002 and 2003) in -th e U S, and by O xford U niversity Press in India (2002) and Pakistan (2003).

States or Cities?

179

o f th e story uncovered and untold. M aking b oth o f these statem ents— the prim acy o f city-level m echanism s and th e im portance, if n o t primacy, o f state-level factors— m ay appear paradoxical. T h is requires a b rie f explanation. It tu rn s o u t th a t even India’s m ost violent states have m any tow ns and cities that are peaceful, and statistically one can show that the riotprone cities acco u n t for a disproportionate share o f H in d u -M u slim violence in th e ir respective states.5 In G ujarat, for exam ple, three tow ns— A hm edabad, Baroda and G odhra— accounted for about 76 per cen t o f the total riot-related deaths in the state betw een 1950»and 1995. O v er the sam e period, the city o f H yderabad experienced over 90 per cent o f all riot-related deaths in A ndhra Pradesh; fo u r urban areas in M aharashtra— Bombay, B hiw andi, Jalgaon and T h an e— accounted for 85 per cent o f all riot-related deaths in that state; and, six to w n s— M e e ru t, A ligarh, K anpur, M oradabad, Varanasi and Allahabad— accounted for about 55 per cen t o f the total riot-related deaths in U P In a state like UP, w ith over 50 districts and over a h u n d red tow ns, these figures, as in o th er states, show a high degree o f riot-concentration. V iolence, in short, was n o t concentrated in a particular state, b u t in various cities in d ifferen t states. O ften , cities separated by ju s t 40 o r 50 m iles displayed dram atically different propensities to H in d u -M u slim violence: A ligarh and B ulandshahar in UP, Baroda an d Surat in G ujarat, H yderabad and Warangal in A ndhra Pradesh. Variation betw een cities located w ith in a single state m eans that the search for causal factors cannot be confined to state-level politics alone. Any hypothesised state-level cause m u s t have been subjected to locally varying factors for a state to contain b oth peaceful and violent cities. By definition, a state-level constant cannot explain intra­ state variation. To attribute b o th A ligarh’s en d em ic violence and B ulandshahar’s rarely broken peace to factors associated w ith U P ’s state-level politics w ould violate standard m ethodological as w ell as routine analytical norm s. So long as A ligarh and B ulandshahar con tin u e to diverge so markedly, any explanatory fram ew ork m ust involve local-level dynam ics and factors. We need an account o f local m echanism s th a t produce such different outcom es. Even so, the fact rem ains that often, tho u g h n o t always, these local m echanism s get activated by an extra-local trigger: the desecration o f 5. In this chapter, the term s tow n and city will be used interchangeably.

180

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

a religious building; the b u rn in g o f a train; an attack o n a m o n u m e n t, institution, o r building o f great sym bolic significance to a com m unity; an apparently u n ju st electoral defeat o f a political party o r organiza­ tion; police brutality against a com m unity; even victories and defeats in sports. Som e o f these events, considered provocative in a particular city, m ay be traced to the national political arena, b u t others m ay well em erge w ithin state-level politics. Still others could be entirely local in origin. T h e im portant p o in t for o u r analysis is that if a given state’s political parties m obilize their support groups co m m u ­ nally (w hile in o th er states parties, for w hatever reason, concentrate on issues that are cross-religious); if a state’s police has a history o f bias, actual o r perceived, against a co m m u n ity (and police histories elsew here differ); if the m o n u m en ts attacked are o f sym bolic signifi­ cance only to the public sphere o f that state, instead o f entering the entire national public sphere (for instance, the G u ru v ay u r tem ple o f Kerala versus th e R am janm abhoom i o f A yodhya)— th en the spark m ay com e from state politics. H o w a locality responds to this extra-local spark— w h eth er w ith violence o r w ith the m aintenance o f peace— w ill depend on factors associated w ith the localities th em ­ selves. T herefore, to understand and explain the relationship betw een the local- and state-level factors, I use the m etaphor o f ‘sparks’ and ‘fires’. I conceptualize state politics as a spark, w hich may o r m ay n o t lead to a fire— i.e., a riot— in a given locality. To the ex ten t that a state has a history o f com m unal anim osities and violence and its politics are laden w ith com m unal sym bols, the sparks co n fro n tin g local m echa­ nism s will be that m uch m ore flam m able. W h eth er o r n o t they actually result in violence w ill depend o n the n atu re o f local-level m echanism s, b u t different states may deliver sparks o f different intensities, depending on their traditions o f co m m u n ity relations, the strategies o f their political parties, the behaviour o f th e ir police forces, and the presence o r absence o f buildings, m o n u m en ts, and figures o f com m unal significance. T h e higher the intensity o f the spark, the higher w ill be the pos­ sibility o f a change to the prevailing distribution o f peace and violence. T h e intensity o f the state-level spark, once fanned by the state’s political parties, police o r bureaucracy, m ay be such th a t it overw helm s local structures that had allowed som e tow ns, d u rin g earlier periods o f violence elsew here in the state, to rem ain peaceful. T his w ould, then, lead to a greater dispersion o f com m unal violence in a state than

States o r Cities?

181

has been historically observed. T h e latter, as w e w ill see, appears to have happened in G ujarat in 2002.6 To dem o n strate the prim acy o f local m echanism s, w ith o u t belit­ tlin g th e im portance o f state-level factors, this chapter concentrates o n a rio t-p ro n e city o f U P (Aligarh), and a peaceful city o f Kerala (C alicut). M y explanation fo r the variation betw een violence-prone and peaceful cities focuses o n civil society, w hich tends to be locally textured and therefore locally varying. By ‘civil society’ I m ean that space w hich: (a) exists som ew here betw een the family and th e state, (b) m akes interconnections betw een individuals o r fam ilies possible, and (c) is ind ep en d en t o f th e state.8 T h e re is an integral link betw een th e stru ctu re o f civic life in a m ulti-religious society and th e presence (or absence) o f com m unal violence. Two links are critical. First, there is rem arkable difference betw een the in ter-co m m u n al and in tra-co m m u n al netw orks o f civic engagem ent. In ter-co m m u n al netw orks are agents o f peace: they build bridges and m anage tensions. I f co m m u n ities are organized only o n in tra-co m m u n al lines and the interconnections w ith o th e r co m m u n ities are very w eak (o r d o not exist), such a society is highly susceptible to com m unal violence, given a spark. Second, in tra- and in ter-eth n ic netw o rk s can each take tw o form s: organized and quotidian. T h is distinction is based o n w h eth er civic interaction is form al o r not. I call the first associational forms o f 6. T his line o f reasoning leads to an analytically intriguing (and politically dangerous) possibility. I f repeated again and again, the state-level sparks could also enlarge the circle o f violence o n an enduring basis. In short, the larger dispersion w ould th en be n o t simply a one-sh o t affair, b u t a long-lasting one. T h e re is as yet insufficient evidence o f such m echanism s in operation, b u t if they w ere proven conclusively to exist, o u r understanding o f cause and effect in com m unal violence w ould need a serious reconsideration. Essentially, the pro o f o f this kind o f process w ould only com e from the study o f tow ns that w ere once com m unally peaceful b u t have routinely ceased to be so. Such a study has n o t yet been systematically conducted. 7. C pm m unal peace has been disrupted twice recently— in 2002 and 2003— in the Beypore fishing area, ju s t outside the city o f C alicut. Beypore was identified by m y research team as a peaceful b u t tense area, the continued peacefulness o f w hich could n o t be taken for granted. For the recent disturbances, see V inu Abraham , ‘T h e N ig h t o f Long Knives’, The Week, 18 May 2003, and ‘Beypore Tense’, The H indu, 5 January 2002. 8. For a longer discussion o f the various concepts o f civil society, see Virshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, C hapter 2.

182

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

engagement; and the second, ei'eryday forms o f engagement. Associational form s o f engagem ent include m em bership and participation in business associations, professional organizations, reading clubs, film clubs, sports clubs, N G O s, trade unions and cadre-based political parties. It should be noted that political parties in a m ulti-party dem ocratic system could be part o f b oth civil society and the state. R uling parties w ould be part o f the state, the opposition part o f civil society. Everyday form s o f engagem ent consist o f the routine inter­ actions o f life, in w hich families from across the com m unal divide visit each other, eat together reasonably often, jo in tly participate in festivals, and allow their children to play together in the neighbour­ hood. B oth form s o f engagem ent, if robust, can be foundations o f peace; their absence o r w eakness facilitates com m unal violence. O f the tw o, however, the associational form is a stronger bulw ark against violence, largely because organizational expressions o f engagem ent can often resist efforts by politicians, o r o th er political elem ents, to polarize people along com m unal lines. Vigorous organizational life, if it crosses com m unal lines, acts as a serious constraint o n the divisive strategies o f com m unal leaders and their organizations. In the process o f developing this argum ent, I will also perform another analytically neccssary task. I will use the new data-set to show that som e w idely believed explanations for com m unal violence d o not stand up to scrutiny. Two such argum ents have been especially popular: those that focus on the proportion o f a m inority in a city or state, and those that concentrate on the peaceful role o f tradition and the violent im pact o f ‘m o d ern ity ’ o n co m m u n ity relations. T h e latter, in m any intellectual circles, has becom e conventional w isdom for explaining contem porary H in d u -M u slim violence. O n the surface it appears plausible, b u t w hen analysed carefully it fails som e key em pirical tests. T h e rem ainder o f this chapter is organized as follows. Section II breaks dow n the 46-year tim c-series into the urban-rural, state-w ise and city/tow n-w ise distribution o f violence. It also establishes the city/ tow n as the appropriate u n it o f analysis for a study o f com m unal violence. Section III focuses on the G ujarat violence o f 2002, and argues that even this episode— in w hich violence was m ainly confined to one state— docs n o t detract from the prim acy o f local factors in accounting for the distribution o f H in d u -M u slim rioting. Section IV assesses a range o f popular explanations for com m unal violence and show s th em to be underspecified and unsustainable. Sections V

States or Cities?

183

th ro u g h VIII concentrate o n the com parison o f C alicut and Aligarh, draw ing o u t the civic factors that have led to a repeated peace in the form er and freq u en t violence in the latter. Section IX sum m arizes the conclusions.

H

in d u

-M

u s l im

V io l e n c e : W h a t Ar e

the

T

ren d s?

N atio n a l-le v el T ren d s H as the all-India pattern o f com m unal violence changed in the last fo u r decades? It is o ften said that the 1950s w ere a decade o f com m unal peace, and that since th en the m agnitude o f co m m u n al violence has increased. T h e statistics, in fact, show n o trend at all betw een th e early 1950s and the m id-1970s; the ups and dow ns are basically a random w alk (Figure 6.1). A fter the m id-to-late 1970s, how ever, w e do see an unam biguously rising curve o f violence, peaking in 1992, w h en the m osque in Ayodhya w as destroyed. In 1994 and 1995, H in d u -M u slim violence dropped to very low levels. I f w e w ere to update the series to 2002, the low level starting in 1994 w ould alm ost certainly continue until 2001, rising to w h a t could w ell be a new high in 2002, w h en the G ujarat violence broke out. Figure 6.2 show s the ru ral-u rb an breakdow n o f deaths betw een 1950 and 1995. H in d u -M u slim violence is essentially an urban phen o m en o n . At less than fo u r per cent in 46 years, the share o f rural deaths in the overall n u m b er o f deaths from com m unal rioting is very small. U n d e r-re p o rtin g o f incidents in rural areas m ay indeed have led to an underestim ation o f the rural share, b u t the difference is simply too large to be entirely an artifact o f reporting. Even after allow ing for som e und er-rep o rtin g , it is reasonable to conclude that urban India is the prim ary site o f H in d u -M u slim violence. State-level T rends As already reported, N o rth Indian states in general, and Bihar and U tta r P ra d e sh in p a rtic u la r, are g e n e ra lly b eliev ed to be th e w orst-affected by com m unal violence, and S o u th Indian states, espe­ cially Kerala, am ong the least com m unally violent. Figure 6.3 show s the ranking o f states after controlling for the size o f urban population. U tta r Pradesh is n o t the w orst state, tho u g h Kerala is indeed am ong the m ost peaceful. T h e West Indian state o f G ujarat, even before the

Number of Deaths

FIGURE

1950 1952

1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 I 1968 J Incident

1970

*

1972

•

1974

D eath

6.1: Number of Deaths in, and Incidents of, Hindu-Muslim

1954

1976 1978

Riots, 1950-95

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992

1994

N u m b e r o f Incidents

1995 1992 1989 1986 1983 1980 1977 1974 1971 1968 1965 1962

1959 1956 1953 1950

•

200

------------------------------ 1----------------------------------- 1------------------------------------1----------------------------------- 1----------------------------------- 1----------------------------------- 1

400

600

800

N u m b e r o f Deaths □ U rban ■ Rural 6.2: R ural/U rban Breakdown o f D eaths in H in d u -M u slim Riots, 1950-95

1000

1200

1400

Num ber of Deaths per 1,000,000 o f Urban Population

F igure 6.3: Deaths per 1,000,000 of State Urban

Punjab Haryana Tamil Nadu Kerala ] Rajasthan Delhi Karnataka

State

Populations in Hindu-Muslim

West Bengal AP Orissa MP

Riots, 1950-95

J&K UP

Assam Maharashtra Bihar

Gujarat

States or Cities?

187

2002 riots, had th e highest per capita rate o f deaths in com m unal incidents, at aro u n d 117 per m illion o f urban population. B ihar in the N o rth (78 deaths p er m illion) and M aharashtra in the W est (45 deaths per m illion) also have higher per capita rates than U ttar Pradesh (43 deaths per m illion). Clearly, com m unalism is n o t prim arily a N o rth Indian problem ; it has also been a serious issue for W estern India for a long tim e. T h e pattern o f rioting in U P for 1950-95 is presented separately in Figure 6.4. D id the preexisting state-w ise patterns co n tin u e o r change d u rin g the Ayodhya agitation (1986-93)? W hile, w ith the partial exception o f Bihar, the violence-prone states discussed above m aintained their patterns, it is w o rth noting that even states w here H in d u -M u slim peace norm ally prevailed w ere unable to escape the violence engen­ dered by the A yodhya agitation. T h is is dem onstrated by trends in the otherw ise co m m unally peaceful states o f Rajasthan and Kerala (Figures 6.5 and 6.6). C ity-level T rends By far the m ost revealing results are to be fo u n d at the to w n - o r citylevel. Table 6.1 show s tow ns w ith the w orst records o f com m unal vio­ lence betw een 1950 and 1995 in an increasing o rd er o f seriousness (C o lu m n s 2 to 5). H o w the orders o f seriousness w ere derived requires som e explanation. T h e first q u estio n in deriving any such m easure is: H o w does one define ‘rio t-p ro n en ess’? T h ere are problem s w ith using only deaths as a m easure. S hould a tow n like B hagalpur w hich has had one serious riot in 46 years— b u t a riot in w hich scores w ere killed— be viewed as m ore ‘rio t-p ro n e ’ than D elhi, w hich has had a large n u m b er o f riots b u t very few deaths per riot? O n e w o u ld , obviously, have to com bine b oth intensity and persistence. To develop such a com posite m easure for riot-proneness for the period 1950-95, four sim ple questions, m aking the benchm ark progressively m ore stringent, w ere asked: a. H o w m any to w n s in India had at least three com m unal riots, in w hich a m in im u m o f 15 deaths occurred, spread over at least tw o five-year periods? (Table 1, C o lu m n 2); b. H o w m any h ad at least four com m unal riots and a m in im u m o f 20 deaths over at least three five-year periods? (C o lu m n 3);

Number of D eaths

250 n

Year FIGURE 6.4: Total D eaths in H in d u -M u slim Riots in W hich O n e or M ore D eaths O ccu rred , 1950-95 (by year)—

Uttar Pradesh

250 i

100

1994

Number of D eaths

200

Year FIGURE 6.5: Total D eaths in H indu-M uslim Riots in W hich O n e or M ore D eaths O ccu rred , 1950-95 (by year)— Rajasthan

1950

O J m O'

^

m

O'«

NC 00 in O' O'

ui

8 O3' O'

[-"■ CM O' & o

£

r>

O'

jo

CO

O'

O'

r**

r***

Q

£ i

O'

O'

oo

oo

3 ;

oo

O'

so

CN

t J-

O'

S

S

oo

Year FIGURE 6 .6 : Total Deaths in H in d u -M u slim Riots in W hich O n e or M ore D eaths O ccurred, 1950-95 (b y year)— Kerala

T a b l e 6.1

India’s ‘Riot-Prone’ Cities, 1 9 5 0 -9 5

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

RP1

RP2

RP3

R P4

M in im u m o f 15 deaths in 3 riots over 2 five-year periods

M inim um o f 20 deaths in 4 riots over 3 five-year periods

M inim um o f 25 deaths in 5 riots over 4 five year periods

M in im u m o f 50 deaths in 10 riots over 5 five-year periods

Deaths 1950-95

1

2

3

4

5 1137 1119

Bombay

Bombay

Bombay

Bombay

A hm edabad

A hm edabad

Ahmedabad

A hm edabad

Aligarh

Aligarh

Aligarh

Aligarh

160

H yderabad

H yderabad

Hyderabad

H yderabad

312

M eerut

M eerut

M eerut

M eeru t

265

Jam shedpur

Jam shedpur

Jam shedpur

B hiw andi

Bhiwandi

198 194 194

Surat

149

M oradabad

M oradabad

Baroda

Baroda

Baroda

Bhopal

Bhopal

Bhopal

D elhi

D elhi

D elhi

K anpur

K anpur

K anpur

Calcutta

Calcutta

Calcutta

Baroda

109 108

Delhi

93 81

C alcutta

63

T a b l e 6.1 (co n td .)

2

1

3

4

5

6

7

59

79

11

Bangalore

56

81

14

Jalgaon

49

79

16

47

NA

18

15

Jabalpur

16

Bangalore

17

Jalgaon

18

Sitam arhi

19

Indore

Indore

Indore

45

78

13

20

Varanasi

Varanasi

Varanasi

42

64

24

21 22

Allahabad

Allahabad

37

73

22

N agpur

37

82

23

Jaip u r

N agpur Jaipur

Allahabad N agpur

32

70

10 18

24

Aurangabad

77

25

Srinagar

30 30

NA

26 27

Ranchi M alegaon

29 23

83 70

68

28

G odhra

18

76

40

D eaths in riot-prone cities

4706

4359

3887

A ll-India riot deaths 1950-95

7173

7173

7173

3263 7173

R iot-prone cities as a percentage o f all India riot deaths

66

61

54

45.5

R iot-prone cities as a percentage o f all urban riot deaths

69

64

58

49

Bangalore Jalgaon

Aurangabad Srinagar

Aurangabad Srinagar

Malegaon

31 89 15

States or Cities?

193

c. H o w m any had at least five riots and 25 deaths over fo u r fiveyear periods? (C o lu m n 4); and d. H o w m any had at least ten riots and 50 deaths over five fiveyears periods? (C o lu m n 5). T hese colum ns can be called RP1, RP2, RP3 and R P4 respectively, w here R represents riots and P proneness. I f m y reasoning above is right, the R P 4 category o f townslcities (Column 5) was truly riot-prone in the period 1950-95. O f the fo u r categories o f riot-proneness constructed, RP4 com bines intensity as w ell as persis­ tence in a m o st analytically dem anding way. In principle, RP3 (C o lu m n 4) could also be included in the category o f riot-proneness but, as w e w ill see later, that does n o t alter th e prim ary conclusion. T h e eight R P 4 cities account for about 49 p er cent o f total riotrelated deaths in urban India and about 46 per cen t o f all riot-related deaths in the en tire country (including bo th u rb an and rural areas). H ow ever, R P4 cities hold only about 18 per cen t o f India’s urban population, revealing ho w locally concentrated is H in d u -M u slim violence. I f b o th urban and rural subtotals are com bined, ‘riotproneness’ can be seen to be confined to localities containing a m ere 4.6 per cent o f India’s total population. As reported earlier, the deaths in rio t-p ro n e cities also constitute a disproportionately large share o f deaths in th e ir respective states: the tw o R P4 cities o f G ujarat— A hm edabad and Baroda— account for about 75 per cen t o f the riot-related deaths in th e state; the only R P4 city o f A ndhra Pradesh— H yderabad— for over 90 p er cen t o f that state’s total; and m etropolitan Bom bay for 63 p e r cent o f M aharashtra’s total. T h e unm istakable local concentration and th e relationship betw een state-level and city-level statistics clearly establish city o r to w n as the appropriate u n it o f analysis for studying the causes o f com m unal violence. India’s H in d u -M u slim violence is to w n - o r city-specific. State (and national) politics provide the context w ithin w hich the local m echanism s linked w ith violence get activated. T h e politics o f som e states m ay repeatedly provide ‘sparks’ to the local-level factors. G

u ja r a t

2002

H ave G ujarat’s riots o f 2002 u n d erm in ed the city-state relationship sum m arized above? D oes n o t the fact that the violence did n o t spread

194

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

to o th er states underscore th e need to focus o n the dynam ics o f statelevel politics, ra th e r than the m icro-politics o f the localities concerned, in ord er to u n d erstan d the underlying causes o f com m unal violence in India? In one respect, th e violence in G ujarat follow ed a highly predictable pattern. In the data-set analysed in the previous section, only three G ujarat tow ns— A hm edabad, Baroda and G o d h ra— had appeared in the list o f India’s rio t-p ro n e tow ns,9 accounting for as m u ch as 76 per cen t o f all riot-related deaths in G ujarat d u rin g 1950-95. T hese three tu rn ed o u t to be the w orst sites o f violence in 2002. C onsistent w ith its past pattern, Surat w itnessed m inim al violence in 2002, even th o u g h it is n o t very far from Baroda and A hm edabad, b oth o f w hich experienced shocking carnage. O f th e four regions o f G ujarat, S outh G ujarat and Saurashtra experienced very little rioting. V iolence was heavily concentrated in C entral and N o rth G ujarat. O n c e the statistics are fu rth er disaggregated, even these latter regions are likely to show fu rth er concentrations o f violence. In an o th er respect, how ever, the G ujarat violence o f 2002 was rem arkably different from previous patterns. T his indicates that state-level factors can influence severely th e intensity and spread o f com m unal violence. O nce the state g o v ern m en t begins fanning sparks, allow ing initial violence to go unchecked, the intensity o f the extra-local trigger provoking rioting rises significantly. T h is kind o f behaviour by governm ents is associated in the literature on ethnic violence w ith pogrom s, n o t riots. When riots become pogroms, the importance o f state-levelfactors increases, compared to the role such factors plays in riots. H o w is a pogrom defined? Was the G ujarat violence o f 2002 an exam ple o f a pogrom , or a series o f pogrom s, rather than an exam ple o f com m unal rioting? A ccording to th e B rittanica dictionary, a po g ro m is ‘a m ob attack, either approved o r condoned by authorities, against the persons and 9. See Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, pp. 104-5. N o disaggregated statistics on the distribution o f the G ujarat violence are yet available. I am currently engaged in putting together such data, b u t it will be som e time before full, reliable results arc known. W hat we can say for sure is th at tow n-w ise, Ahmedabad, Baroda and G odhra w ere the epicenter o f the violence, and that region-wise, N o rth and C entral G ujarat saw the greatest concentrations o f violence. It is statistically, o f course, quite likely that even though th ree towns were the epicenter, the dispersion o f violence was m uch greater than ever before in Gujarat.

States or Cities?

195

property o f a religious, racial, o r national m in o rity ’.10 T h e key differ­ ence betw een riots an d pogrom s is that riots rep resen t a violent clash betw een tw o civilian groups in w hich the go v ern m en t authorities are n o t dem onstrably involved on either side, w hile in a pogrom the governm ent either supports o r condones the actions o f th e m ajority group. R eports in alm ost all m ajor Indian new spapers, w ith the exception o f the vernacular press in G ujarat, show th a t once the spark was provided— the to rch in g o f a train containing cadres o f H in d u m ilitant organizations by a M u slim m ob in G odhra o n February 2 7 11— the state governm ent m ade n o attem pt to stop the killings, and even condoned them , at least in M arch, if n o t A pril.12 T h a t the state governm ent officially approved or sponsored an ti-M u slim violence is w idely believed, b u t has n o t been conclusively proved. F u tu re research m ay w ell provide a m o re d efin itiv e a c c o u n t o f the governm ent’s role. W hat is unquestionable is th a t the state condoned revenge killings, w hich qualifies at least part o f the G ujarat violence as a pogrom . A great deal has already been w ritten ab o u t w h at the state police or bureaucracy actually d id .13 B ut only India’s courts w ill be able to establish w h eth er th e state governm ent actually sponsored the vio­ lence. In the absence o f such a determ ination, o r unam biguous public statem ents by officials, the only route open to scholars is to infer the state’s role from the conduct o f its agencies d u rin g the riots, o r from the statem ents o f non-governm ental organizations closely associated w ith the state governm ent, b u t w hich the g o v ern m en t never contra­ dicted o r questioned. In a form al resolution passed after the G ujarat violence began, the RSS, w hich rem ains the ideological and organi­ zational centerpiece o f the ‘associational fam ily’ (or sangh parivar) to w hich the state’s ru lin g party is affiliated, said: ‘Let th e m inorities understand that th e ir real safety lies in the goodw ill o f the m ajority’.14 Laws alone, the RSS im plied, as it always has, cannot protect India’s 10. unmv.britannica.com 11. T his version o f events in G odhra was widely believed by G ujarat’s H indus, though certain aspects w ere questioned in oth er quarters. 12. T his is based on a close reading o f the Times o f India, the Indian Express and the Hindustan Times. 13. See especially Smita N arula, We Have No Orders to Save You (N ew York: H um an Rights Watch, 2002). 14. ‘M ajority’s G oodw ill Vital: RSS*, The Times o f India, 26 M arch 2002.

19 6

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

m inorities. T h is resolution, one should n o te, was n o t about th e political or economic welfare o f India’s m inorities, w hich as a pragm atic m atter m ay arguably require w orking o u t som e sort o f equilibrium w ith the m ajority com m unity. It was ab o u t the physical safety o f th e m inorities. M any M uslim s had already been killed in the roughly fo u r w eeks o f violence preceding the RSS m eeting. Yet n o m inisters o f the G ujarat g overnm ent, m any o f w h o m are m em bers o f the RSS, publicly criticized this resolution. C onsider an o th er exam ple. A ccording to the c h ie f o f the Vishwa H in d u Parishad (V H P), o r W orld H in d u C o u n cil, G ujarat was ‘the first positive response o f the H in d u s to M u slim fundam entalism in 1000 years’.15 T h e reference here was to th e arrival on th e Indian su b co n tin en t o f M uslim s from C entral Asia and the M iddle East, an event w h ich , according to H in d u nationalist historiography, ini­ tiated a period o f decline for H in d u civilization. H in d u decline is attributed to M uslim ascendancy, m aking violence against M uslim s an historically justified act o f vengeance— indeed, a p re-condition for civilizational renewal. T h e H in d u right believes that its elected governm ent did exactly w hat was required: namely, allow ing vio len t H in d u retaliation against M uslim s, including those w ho had n o th in g to d o w ith the m ob that originally to rch ed the train at G odhra. C ritics m aintain that it is n o t the jo b o f governm ent, w hatever its ideological persuasion, to allow public anger to express itself violently, regardless o f the provocation. N o elected go v ern m en t that has taken an o ath to protect the lives o f its citizens and to ensure d ue process o f law can condone retribution. T his is w hy the killings in G ujarat m ust be regarded as a pogrom . Should, ultim ately, m ore detailed evidence em erge to support the claim that th e state governm ent actively sponsored the violence, this w ill m ake th e ju d g m e n t harsher. B ut even the existing evidence is sufficient to conclude that the G ujarat riots o f 2002 constituted a pogrom . State-level factors acquire a prom inence in pogrom s that cannot be assigned to th e m in riots. Local bureaucrats and police forces, after all, are u n d e r state governm ent control in India. If the police and bureaucracy are directed to allow the killing o f M uslim s to continue, the outcom e will inevitably differ from o n e in w hich state agencies attem pt to halt the violence b u t are unable to succeed. 15. ‘Parivar Wars’, Times of India, 26 Ju n e 2002.

States or Cities?

197

W hat, th en , are th e im plications o f G ujarat 2002 for m y argum ent? I f riots becom e pogrom s, does the analogy o f sparks and fires break dow n? I f anything, G ujarat 2002 illustrates tw o points. First, the intensity o f sparks m atters. G ujarat experienced a frighteningly large n u m b er o f deaths, and a possibly larger spread o f violence th an ever before, to uching in som e cases villages that had previously rem ained largely free from H in d u -M u slim riots. T h e second im plication, how ever, is that even state-sponsored sparks o f severely increased intensity d o n o t inevitably lead to violence in all areas. T h e se sparks can be extin­ guished w here stru ctu res o f local civic integration are sufficiently durable. T h e fact th a t Surat (and several o th er tow ns in S outh G ujarat and Saurashtra) d id not explode in killings, even as Baroda and A hm edabad did, supports the validity o f the force-counterforce m odel im plied in the analogy o f sparks and fires. T h a t the balance betw een force and counterforce can change over tim e does n o t detract from this central finding. P o pu l a r b u t o n l y P artly R elev a n t: M o d e r n it y a n d C o m m u n a l V io l e n c e

T h e relationship betw een m odernity and com m unalism o r co m m u ­ nal violence has lo n g been debated in intellectual circles. U n til the 1960s, m odernization was view ed as an antidote to the problem o f com m unalism . Since the late 1980s, how ever, an ti-m o d ern ity theories have acquired striking popularity. India has h ad strong advocates on b oth sides. T h e custom ary view — that greater m odernity w ould solve the problem o f co m m unalism — is often associated w ith N e h ru and the Indian left. To th e ‘anti-secularists’ o r ‘an ti-m o d ern ists’, however, m odernity is a problem , n o t a solution.16 T h e M o d ern ists M odernization th eo ry was an article o f faith fo r m ost intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s. By the 1970s, it was clear that the expected erosion o f ethnicity and religion was n o t taking place. Since th en , the 16. Ashis Nandy, ‘T h e Politics o f Secularism and the Recovery o f Religious Tolerance’,Alternatives, vol. 13, no. 2 (1988), pp. 177-94; T. N . M adan, ‘Secularism in Its Place’, TheJournal of Asian Studies, N ovem ber 1987. N andy’s argum ents have becom e especially popular in cultural studies, anthropology and history.

198

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

persistence o f these identities, despite m odernization, has been taken m ore o r less for granted by scholars.17 T h o u g h few believe in the cru d er versions o f m odernization theory today, a new er and m ore sophisticated form o f the argum ent has em erged o f late. It relies o n ‘h u m an dev elo p m en t’ (as opposed to ‘econom ic developm ent’), especially h igher literacy (as opposed to higher incom e alone), w hich is expected to generate greater tolerance and rationality and a low er reliance o n biases and visceral interpre­ tations o f history. Sen, a p ro m in en t advocate o f the h u m an develop­ m en t school, holds u p the K erala-U P com parison as an exam ple o f how m ass literacy can b ring tolerance and rationality to the public sphere and political life.18 Kerala, w hich at the state level o f aggregation has suffered little com m unal rioting relative to o th e r Indian states, had a literacy rate o f 92 per cent in 1991, m u ch above the national average o f 52 p e r cent. By contrast, com m unal rio tin g is endem ic in UP, w hose literacy rate o f 41 per cen t in 1991 was substantially below the national average. I f w e take o u r com parison beyond U P and Kerala this argum ent breaks dow n. States w ith the low est co m m u n al violence happen to be at opposite ends o f the literacy spectrum . Kerala and R ajasthan are b oth am o n g the least com m unally violent states. Kerala, as is w idely know n, is the m ost literate state in India.19 H ow ever, Rajasthan, also com m unally peaceful, is am ong the least literate. At 38.81 p er cent in 1991, its literacy rate was am ong the low est in India. M oreover, in states like G ujarat and M aharashtra, high levels o f com m unal violence coexist w ith high literacy rates. At 63.05 and 60.91 p er cent respectively, the literacy rates o f both these states w ere considerably above th e national average in 1991. 17. A m ong the first to deal w ith this possibility w ere Lloyd I. R udolph and Susanne H oeber Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago: U niversity o f Chicago Press, 1967); Reinhard Bendix, ‘Tradition and M odernity Revisited’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, April 1967; and Rajni Kothari, ‘Tradition and M odernity Revisited’, Government and Opposition, S u m m er 1968. Building on this w ork, the m ost widely noted attack on the presum ed pow er o f m odernity came from Samuel H untington, ‘T h e Change to C hange: M odernization, D evelopm ent and Politics’, Comparative Politics, April 1971. 18. A m artya Sen, ‘Threats to Secular India’, The N ew York Review o f Books, 8 April 1993. In later writings Sen has m odified this view. 19. T h e statistics in this paragraph are from Ashis Bose, Demographic Diversity of India: 1991 Census (Delhi: B. R. Publishing C orporation, 1991), p. 62.

States or Cities?

199

D isaggregation at the tow n level also yields the sam e result. T h e RP3 o r R P4 tow ns in the riot-prone list (Table 6.1) had literacy rates in 1991 ranging fro m 60 per cent (Aligarh) to 80 per cent and above (Bombay, Baroda). T h e national average for urban literacy was over 70 per cent in 1991.20 N o te also th at rural India, w ith a considerably low er literacy rate th an that o f urban India, is n o t the prim ary site o f com m unal violence. In short, there is n o systematic relationship betw een literacy and com m unal violence. For a variety o f reasons, India o u g h t to im prove its literacy levels. B ut one should n o t expect th at an increase in literacy w ill reduce co m m u n al conflict. T h e A n ti-M o d e rn ists B ut d o the data presented above support th e argum ents o f antim odem ists? A ccording to anti-m odernists— o r at least a subspecies th at w e m ight identify as anti-secularists— m o d ern ity in its various m anifestations (rationality, urbanization, science and secularism ) is th e cause o f higher co m m u n al violence, n o t th e antidote. T h ree links are often proposed. First, m odernity tends to flatten the radical diversity o f traditional cultures. M any people resist hom ogenization, sticking instead to th e ir particularistic roots— be they religion, lan­ guage o r culture. India is am ong the m ost diverse societies in the w orld. A ttem pts at hom ogenizing India are b o u n d to lead to violence. Second, m o d ern ity attacks the values o f a religiously driven society like India, generating a reaction am ong the believers: hydroelectric dam s, even in a m o d e m age, cannot replace tem ples o f w orship. Finally, and m o st im portantly, m odernity, according to an ti­ secularists, m akes politicians im m oral. R eligion used to be a source o f in n er controls o n hum an behaviour. For m o d e m people n o th in g is sacred. In search o f pow er and profit, a m o d em politician, if necessary, will use com m unal violence as a strategic tool. T h e agonizing im m orality o f inflicting deaths does n o t hold h im back. T h e anti-secularist view has becom e very popular. Its theoretical grandeur and popularity notw ithstanding, it has never been p u t to a system atic em pirical test. N o r have its p ro p o n en ts specified w hat m ig h t constitute an appropriate test for its validity, given that the 20. Based on G overnm ent o fln d ia , India 1994 (D elhi: M inistry o f Inform ation and Broadcasting, 1995), pp. 16-8.

200

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

m odem ity-versus-tradition view, strictly speaking, is an epochal view— it speaks o f m o d em versus p re -m o d e m eras. Testability requires sh o rter tim e-horizons. T h e epochal sweep o f the anti-secular argum ent m ay create problem s o f testing, b u t a proxim ate test is possible and it begins to show cracks in the an ti-m o d em ist argum ent. In his writings, Ashis Nandy, am ong the m ost influential and intellectually serious anti-m odernists o f o u r tim es, has consistently m aintained that the link between tradition and rural India is considerably alive even today M odernity has taken over urban, n o t rural, India. T h e countryside m ay eventually fall to the m arch o f m odernity, b u t it has thus far rem ained less afflicted by m odernity: its traditional m echanism s for peacefully resolving religious disputes are, by and large, still alive. N an d y ’s argum ent against urban-industrial India is clear and forceful: As India gets modernized, religious violence is increasing__ In the earlier centuries... inter-religious riots were rare and localized__ (S)omewhere and somehow, religious violence has something to do with the urban-industrial vision of life and with the political process the vision lets loose.2' D oes the urban-rural distribution o f com m unal violence support anti-m odernists? It is tru e th at H in d u -M u slim violence prim arily takes place in the cities, n o t in the villages. B ut, as show n above, it is also true th at as m u c h as 82 p e r c e n t o f u rb a n In d ia is n o t p rone to such violence. W hile an overall urban-rural distribution may suggest that m odernity, proxied here by urbanization, m ay potentially be a cause, a greater disaggregation o f violence— reflecting the intra­ u rb an distribution— indicates that greater m odernity cannot be the reason for higher com m unal violence. U rb an violence can be disaggregated in yet an o th er way. It should be noted that all RP3 and RP4 4 tow ns are the so-called Class I cities o f India— in o th er w ords, their populations are above 100,000. Even in the least violent (RP1) category, there are only tw o tow ns— G odhra and Sitam arhi— that w ere n o t Class I in the period 1950-95. C o m ­ m unal violence at its m ost intense and persistent seem s to rock India’s larger tow ns. C o m m u n alism m ay exist in Class II tow ns (50,000 to 100,000 people) and Class III tow ns (25,000-50,000), b u t tensions and sm all clashes tend n o t to lead to high levels o f violence. 21. Ashis Nandy, ‘T h e Politics o f S e c u l a r i s m p . 185 (emphasis added).

States or Cides?

201

C an this observation support the anti-m odernist claim ? T h e largest cities, after all, are the furthest rem oved from traditional India, w hereas sm aller tow ns m aintain, to a considerable extent, th e inti­ macy o f village India and its peaceful resolution o f religious disputes. O f th e roughly 218 m illion urban people in India in 1991, 142.14 m illion (65.2 p er cent) lived in C lass-I cities. T h e population o f the eight RP4 cities, all C lass-I, was about 39.5 m illion, w hich was about 28 per cent o f th e total population in C lass-I cities.22 T h u s, only 28 per cen t o f th e overall population o f C lass-I cities lived in riot-prone areas. Even i f w e extend the definition o f riot-proneness to RP3 cities, we find th a t the aggregate population living there w as 37 per cent o f the total C lass-I population in 1991. In o th er w ords, 63 per cen t o f the m ost u rb an part o f the co u n try manages its life in a relatively peaceful m anner, broken at w o rst by the occasional riot. T h u s, regardless o f ho w w e disaggregate the data on H in d u M uslim violence since 1950, the an ti-m o d ern ist argum ents d o n o t appear em pirically sustainable. T h e ir argum ents are supported if w e aggregate o nly the cases that look similar, n o t if w e exam ine the variance th a t m arks the universe o f relevant cases. T h e anti-m odernist argum ent is b u ilt u p o n excessive aggregation. T hese tests are unlikely to satisfy the anti-secularists/m odernists. A rgum ents ab o u t m odernity, they m ay argue, are eith er n o t reducible to testing, o r if tests are conducted, they should cover the p re-m o d em and m o d em periods o f Indian history, n o t urban an d rural India after 1950. By this logic, only the form er can provide a conclusive test. We only have im pressionistic know ledge about co m m u n al violence in p re -m o d e m India, w hereas a great deal can be said ab o u t the m o d em period, especially the tw entieth Century. T h e incom plete evidence that historians have produced show s considerable H in d u -M u slim rioting in the eig h teen th C entury,23 tho u g h the levels o f violence do not appear to be com parable to those reached in the tw en tieth Century. S hort o f exhaustive data, is there a way o f resolving the debate? Let us suppose for the sake o f arg u m en t that the tw entieth C e n tu ry ’s levels o f co m m u n al violence are indeed historically unprecedented. T h is assum ption is very likely to be correct. B ut so long as w e are 22. T he nu m b ers in these paragraphs are calculated from th e 1991 census data. 23. See, fo r example, C . A. Bayly, ‘T h e Pre-H istory o f C om m unalism ? Religious C onflict in India, 1700-1860’, Modem Asian Studies, vol. 19, no. 2 (1985), pp. 177-203.

202

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

in a prim arily conceptual realm , this assum ption w ould n o t su p p o rt the an ti-m o d ern ist argum ent. For it m ay w ell be that the higher levels o f com m unal conflict sim ply reflect the breakdow n o f p re -m o d e m ascriptive hierarchies. T h e rise o f equality and self-respect as a behavioural idea can be show n to have u n d erm in ed caste hierarchies in m u ch o f India in the tw entieth C entury.24 South India experienced such a breakdow n in the first h a lf o f th e tw entieth C entury; m u ch o f N o rth India is experiencing it now. Is it that religious com m unities, like caste com m unities, in traditional India w ere placed in a hierar­ chical relationship o f lesser and higher w o rth , o f lesser and higher privileges, and su ch hierarchies w ere acceptable so long as notions o f deference held cultural and ideological sway? If true, th en the role o f m odernity is o f a different kind, for it is n o t the intolerance o f m odernity o r its penchant for cultural u n ifo rm ity that causes c o m ­ m unal conflict— o r at least n o t these aspects o f m odernity alone— b u t rather m o d ern ity ’s attack on ascriptive hierarchies.25 T h e fo rm er is th e argum ent o f anti-m odernists, n o t the latter. At any rate, i f places that, in spite of modernity, do n o t have com m unal violence exist in large num bers, and such tow ns have found a w ay to live peacefully w ith inter-religious differences, then the explanatory focus must shift from modernity to factors that make it possible for communities to live together and solve their problems in a peaceful way.26 T h ese peace­ keeping factors, rather than m odernity per sey will th en explain th e spatial d istribution o f peace and violence. C o m p a r in g C

i t i e s 27

Follow ing the reasoning above, m y research project selected six cities— three fro m the list o f eight rio t-p ro n e cities, and three classified 24. For w hat backward-caste m ovem ents represent, see Ashutosh Varshney ‘Has India Becom e M ore Democratic?’, Journal o f Asian Studies, February 2000. 25. For a forceful argum ent on these lines, see C harles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, N J: Princeton U niversity Press, 1993). 26. T here is, in addition, the famous argum ent that som e traditional associa­ tions— such as those based on caste or language groups— can provide m any ‘m odern’ goods (such as scholarships for college education), o r perform highly m odem roles (such as voter m obilization in party building in the context o f electoral politics). Rudolph and Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition. 27. T his and th e next three sections rely heavily on Varshney, ‘Ethnic C onflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond’, World Politics, April 2001.

States or Cities?

203

as peaceful— and arranged th em in three pairs. T h u s, each pair had a city w h ere co m m u n al violence is endem ic, and a city w h ere it is rare o r entirely absent. To ensure that w e did n o t com pare ‘apples and oranges’, roughly sim ilar H in d u -M u slim percentages in the city populations constituted the minimum control in each pair. T h e first pair—A ligarh and C alicut— was based o n population percentages only. T h e second pair— H yderabad and L ucknow — added tw o controls to population percentages, one o f previous M u slim rule and a second o f reasonable cultural sim ilarities. T h e th ird pair— A hm edabad and Surat— was the m o st tightly controlled. T h e first tw o pairs cam e from the N o rth and S outh. T h e third cam e from th e sam e state o f G ujarat, sharing history, language and culture, b u t n o t endem ic com m unal violence. All o f th ese cities, at this point, have a population o f above 500,000, and the biggest, H yderabad, is a m etropolis o f over 4.2 m illion people. W hy was sim ilarity in dem ographic p roportions chosen as the m in im u m control in each pair? T h e answ er allows us critically to evaluate an o th er p o p u lar thesis about the causes o f H in d u -M u slim violence. B oth in India’s p o p u lar political discourse and in theories about M uslim political behaviour, the size o f the m in o rity co m m u n ity is co n sid ered highly significant. M any p o litician s, especially those belonging to the H in d u nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), w ho have often subscribed to the idea o f ‘M uslim disloyalty’ to India, have argued that the dem ographic distribution o f M uslim s m akes th em critical to electoral outcom es. In 197, o u t o f In d ia’s 545 parliam entary constituencies M u slim s co nstitute m ore th a n 20 per cen t o f the electorate. In a first-past-the-post system , w h ere 30 per cent o f the vote is often enough to w in a seat in m ulti-party contests, these percentages m ake M uslim s electorally highly significant.28 T h e higher the percent­ age o f M uslim s in a given constituency, argue BJP politicians, the greater the inclination o f m ainstream political parties to pander to their sectional/com m unal dem ands, and the low er th e incentive, therefore, for M u slim s to b u ild bridges w ith H in d u s. T h u s, according to this argum ent, ‘M u slim appeasem ent’, based on the significance o f nu m b ers in a dem ocracy, is the cause o f co m m u n al conflicts in India.29 28. Lloyd I. R udolph and Susanne H ocber R udolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi (Chicago: U niversity o f Chicago Press, 1987), p. 196. 29. L. K. Advani, leader o f the BJP, interviewed in Sunday, 22 July 1990.

204

REGIONA L REFLECTIONS

T h a t M u slim dem ography has political conscqucnces is, how ever, n o t an arg u m en t confined to the H in d u nationalist BJR Leading M u slim politicians also m ake a dem ographic claim, tho u g h they reverse the causation in the argum ent. T h e h ig h er the n u m b er o f M uslim s in a city o r tow n, they argue, the greater the political threat felt by th e leaders o f the H in d u com m unity, w h o react w ith hostility to legitim ate M uslim anxieties about politics and identity. A n u n ju s­ tified, even self-serving, opposition o n the part o f H in d u leaders, they argue, is the source o f com m unal hostilities.30 B oth extrem es o f the political spectrum , therefore, rely heavily o n dem ography for their explanations o f com m unal violence. T h ese popular argum ents are shared by social scientists as well, tho u g h th eir reasons are different. It has, for exam ple, been argued that w h en a city/constituency has a M uslim m ajority o r plurality, M uslim s typically favor M uslim s-only, confessional parties, n o t cen­ trist, in ter-co m m u n al parties.31 M uslim s su p p o rt centrist parties w h en th e ir share o f the population/electorate is sm all in a given constituency. Sm aller num bers m ake it rational to seek the security o f a large, pow erful, m ainstream party. To test the validity o f these argum ents, the project com pared three pairs o f cities w h ere sim ilarity in dem ographic p ro p o rtio n s coexisted w ith variance in political outcom es— one peaceful and o ne violent.

T

he

R ole

of

C

iv il

S o c ie t y

T h e pre-existing local netw orks o f civic engagem ent betw een the H in d u s and M uslim s are the single m ost im p o rtan t proxim ate cause explaining the difference betw een peace and violence. W here such netw orks o f engagem ent exist, tensions m ay flare up and sm all clashes may occur, b u t they get regulated and m anaged; w here they are m issing, such tensions and clashes can lead to endem ic and ghastly violence. As already stated, these netw orks take tw o form s: associational forms o f engagement and everydayforms o f engagement. B oth form s, if intercom m unal, prom ote peace, b u t the capacity o f th e associational form s to w ithstand high-intensity sparks— such as In d ia’s partition in 1947, the televised dem olition o f the Ayodhya m osque by H in d u m ilitants 30. Sycd Shahabuddin, a prom inent M uslim leader, has often made this argum ent in lectures, discussions and political speeches. 31. R udolph and Rudolph, In Pursuit o f Lakshmi, p. 195.

States or Cities?

205

in D ecem ber 1992, th e torching o f a train in G o d h ra— is substantially higher. W hat m echanism s link civic netw orks and com m unal conflict? A nd w hy is associational engagem ent a stu rd ier bulw ark o f peace than everyday engagem ent? Two m echanism s connecting civil society and com m unal conflict can be easily identified. First, by p ro m o tin g com m u n icatio n betw een m em bers o f different religious com m unities, civic netw orks often m ake n eig h b o u rh o o d -le v e l peace possible. R o u tin e en g ag em en t perm its people to fo rm tem porary organizations in tim es o f tension. T hese peace com m ittees, consisting o f m em b ers o f b oth co m m u n i­ ties, policed neighbourhoods, scotched ru m o u rs, provided infor-m ation to the local adm inistration and facilitated com m u n icatio n betw een com m unities d u rin g crises. N eig h b o u rh o o d peace com m ittees w ere difficult to form in cities w here everyday interaction did n o t cross religious lines, or H in d u s and M uslim s lived in highly segregated neighbourhoods. In such segregated tow ns, such com m ittees could be im posed from above by the local adm inistration, b u t they w ere often ineffectual. Sustained prior interaction or cordiality allow ed appropri­ ate, crisis-m anaging organizations to em erge from below. T h e second m echanism reveals w hy associational form s o f engage­ m en t are sturdier th an everyday form s in dealing w ith ethnic tensions. If vibrant organizations serving the political, econom ic, cultural and social needs o f the tw o com m unities exist, the su p p o rt for com m unal peace n o t only tends to be strong, b u t can also be m ore solidly ex­ pressed. In ter-com m unal business organizations survive because they link the business interests o f m any H in d u s an d M uslim s, n o t because neighbourhood w arm th exists betw een H in d u and M uslim families. O rganized civic netw orks, w hen inter-com m unal, b etter w ithstand pow erful sparks— partitions, civil wars, desecration o f holy places— by constraining the strategic behaviour o f local politicians. Leaders w h o polarize H in d u s and M uslim s for political gain can tear the fabric o f everyday engagem ent thro u g h the organized m ight o f crim inal gangs. All violent cities in the research project displayed alliances betw een politicians and crim inals. O rganized gangs could easily d isru p t n eighbourhood peace, often causing m igration from co m m u ­ nally heterogeneous to com m unally h om ogenous neighbourhoods. People m oved for th e sake o f physical safety. W ith o u t organized gangs, large-scale riots that produce and tens and h u n d red s o f killings are m ost unlikely, and w ith o u t the protection afforded by politicians, such

206

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

crim inals cannot easily escape the law. Brass has rightly called this arrangem ent an institutionalized rio t system .32 In peaceful cities— som ething Brass’s focus on riots and violence alone could n o t detect— an institutionalized peace system exists. W hen organizations such as trade unions, associations o f businessm en, trad­ ers, teachers, doctors and lawyers, and at least som e cadre-based political parties are routinely integrated, countervailing forces are born. Associations that w ould lose from a com m unal split w ork for peace, m aking not only th eir m em bers, b u t also th e public at large, aware o f the dangers o f com m unal violence. Local adm inistrations are far m ore effective in such circum stances. C ivil society organizations, for all practical purposes, becom e the ears and arm s o f the local adm inistration. In rio t-p ro n e cities ru m o u rs and skirm ishes, often strategically planted and spread, tu rn quickly into riots. In peaceful cities, the relationships o f synergy betw een officials and com m unally integrated associations help to nip ru m o u rs (as well as small clashes and tensions) in the bud. U n d e r such circum stances, politicians do n o t succeed in polarizing com m unities by provoking com m unal violence. A fter a tim e, they m ay n o t even attem pt to d o so. N o t polarizing the people to engineer violence becom es the institutionalized com m on sense o f the tow n. Figure 6.7 represents the argum ent diagram m atically. It is the ‘spark’ part o f the m odel w here state politics are m ost relevant. T his argum ent, it should be clarified, is probabilistic, n o t law-like. It indicates the odds; exceptions to the generalization could exist. Indeed, p ending fu rth er enipirical investigation, law-like generaliza­ tions o n com m unal violence m ay n o t be possible at all. For exam ple, a state b en t u p o n com m unal pogrom s, deploying the m ight o f its police forces, can indeed succeed in stoking com m unal violence, n otw ithstanding the existence o f com m unally integrated associations. G ujarat 2002 cam e rather close to this frightening scenario. To p u t the m atter generally, som e states, if unchecked by India’s central governm ent, m ay end u p producing pogrom s rather th an riots. M y argum ent, therefore, w ould be less applicable to pogroms than to riots, and even less applicable to civil wars. Perhaps the best way to understand the relationship betw een civic life and political shocks is to use a m eteorological analogy. If the civic 32. 1997).

Paul Brass, Theft of an Idol (Princeton, N J: Princeton U niversity Press,

States or Cities?

207

FIGURE 6.7: H ow D ifferent Form s o f Civic Engagem ent Affect O utcom es from C om m unal Provocation

edifice is inter-com m unal and associational, it stands a good chance o f surviving ethnic earthquakes that rank quite high o n the R ichter scale (a partition, a desecration o f an im portant holy place). If intercom m unal and quotidian, structures o f civic engagem ent can be b ro u g h t dow n by earthquakes o f sm aller intensity (defeat o f a co m ­ m unal political party in elections, police brutality in a particular city). And if engagem ent is only intra-com m unal, n o t inter-com m unal, small trem ors (unconfirm ed rum ours, victories and defeats in sports) can unleash torrents o f violence. A m ultircligious society w ith few interconnections across religious boundaries is very vulnerable to com m unal disorders and violence. In the end, the intensity o f the spark, n o t ju s t the n ature o f civic relations, m atters. D espite this ch ap ter’s em phasis o n local factors, state politics rem ains im portant. T h e latter can deliver very severe jolts. E v id e n c e

that

C

iv il

So c ie t y M

atters

Sim ilar P rovocations, D iffere n t R esponses T h e tw o-route process outlined above m arked all th ree pairs in the project. In the peaceful tow n in each pair, civic links betw een the

208

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

H in d u and M uslim com m unities, com bined w ith the use o f such links by the local adm inistration, prevented tensions from tu rn in g into riots. Let m e concentrate only on the first pair o f cities, Aligarh and C alicut. A ligarh figures in the list o f the eight m ost riot-prone cities; C alicut has n o t had a single riot in this century. B oth cities are roughly 36 to 38 per cent M uslim , an overw helm ing part o f the rem aining population being H in d u .33 B etw een 1989-92, w h en the H in d u nationalist agitation to destroy the Babri m osque in Ayodhya led to unprecedented violence in m uch o f India, b oth cities experienced ru m o u rs, tensions and sm all clashes. B ut the final outcom es w ere very different. In C alicut, the local adm inistration was able to m aintain law and order. U n fo u n d e d ru m o u rs circulated in th e city that pigs had been th ro w n into M uslim m osques. Similarly, there w ere ru m o u rs that the fam ous G uruvayur tem ple, a site o f great veneration for Kerala’s H indus, was attacked by M uslim s. Such ru m o u rs have led to riots in several Indian cities, and have frequently done so in Aligarh. In C alicut, the peace com ­ m ittees, and the press, helped the adm inistration quash rum ours. T h e storm o f the Ayodhya agitation, the biggest since India’s partition, and one w hich left h u n d red s dead in several cities, left C alicut unscathed. T h e Ayodhya agitation plunged the city o f Aligarh into h o rren d o u s violence. U nlike in C alicut, w here new spapers neutralized ru m o u rs by investigating them and accurately reporting the facts, A ligarh’s local new spapers printed blatant falsehoods to incite passions. Two o f the largest-circulation H in d i new spapers w rote in lurid detail that M uslim nurses, doctors and staff o f the Aligarh M uslim U niversity (A M U ) hospital had killed H in d u patients in cold blood.34 Som e H in d u s w ere indeed killed outside the university cam pus,35 b u t nobody was m urd ered in the A M U hospital.36 B ut the ru m o u rs w ere 33. C alicut also has a small C hristian population. 34. Aajt 10 Decem ber 1990; Amar Ujala, 11 D ecem ber 1990. 35. ‘For an Aligarh o f Peace’, Interview w ith D istrict Magistrate A. K. M ishra, Frontline, 22 D ecem ber 1990, pp. 22-3. 36. Interviews with: Aligarh M uslim University V ice-Chancellor M . N aseem Farooqui, D elhi, 15 July 1994; several A M U professors, August 1994; and local journalists, August 1994. For a thoughtful review o f all such reports appearing in local H indi newspapers, sec N am ita Singh, ‘Sampradayitka ka khabar ban jana nahin, kahbron ka sampradayik ban jaana khatam ak hai’, Vartaman Sahitya, Septem ber 1991.

States or Cities?

209

believed, and gangs o f H in d u crim inals w en t on a killing spree. Som e o f th em stopped a train ju s t outside the city, dragged M uslim s out, and m urd ered them . T h e killings w ere under-rep o rted by the local press. T hese new spapers w ere later reprim anded for unprofessional behaviour by the Press C ouncil o f India, a governm ent-appointed w atchdog. T h e dam age had already been done. G ruesom e violence rocked the city for several days, leading to over 70 deaths and m any m ore injuries. A ligarh’s local m echanism s for coping w ith the exogenous shock o f the Ayodhya agitation w ere rem arkably fragile, as they had repeat­ edly show n them selves to be in the past. T h e crim inals w h o engaged in killings w ere n o t b ro u g h t to book. T h ey w ere n o t only protected by politicians; they also had rem arkable connections w ith the local m edia— M uslim crim inals w ith the U rd u press, and H in d u thugs w ith the H in d i press. Effective peace com m ittees could n o t be form ed at the city-level in Aligarh, for it was difficult to get the H in d u nationalists and M uslim politicians together. R um ours w ould often be started, and played upon, by political organizations. Instead o f investigating ru m o u rs professionally, the press printed them w ith u tte r recklessness. C o n trast this situation w ith C alicut. In C alicut, tw o points about th e m echanism s for keeping the peace w ere co m m o n to all accounts furnished, in interview s w ith the author, by adm inistrators w h o had served in C alicut betw een 1989 and 1992. T hese accounts w ere consistent w ith those provided by officials w h o had been posted in C alicut in the m id-1980s and had dealt w ith com m unal ten sio n s.' First, politicians o f all parties in C alicut helped establish peace in th e city, in stead o f p o la riz in g c o m m u n itie s , as th e y h ad in Aligarh. Second, city-level peace com m ittees w ere critical to the m anagem ent o f tensions.37 T h ey provided inform ation to the adm in­ istration, becam e a forum for people from all groups to speak and express th eir anger, and provided links all the way dow n to the 37. Interviews in Trivandrum with: Am itabh Kant, D istrict Collector, Calicut (1991-4), 20 July 1995; Shankar Reddy, Police C om m issioner, C alicut (1991-4), 22 July 1995; Siby M atthews, Police C om m issioner C alicut (1988-91), 21 July 1995; K. Jayakumar, Collector, Calicut, 21 July 1995; Rajeevan, Police C om m is­ sioner, C alicut (1986-8), 21 July 1995. Politicians o f the M uslim League and BJP confirm ed their participation in peace com m ittees. T h e political leaders inter­ viewed were: D r M uneer, M uslim League MLA since 1991, 23 July 1995; K. Sreedharan Pillai, President, BJP D istrict C om m ittee, Calicut, 25 Ju ly 1995.

210

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

neighbourhood level, w h ere sm aller peace com m ittees w ere also form ed by citizens. In Aligarh, o n the o th er hand, those com m ittees that have em erged o n the basis o f local initiative have tended to be intra-religious, n o t inter-religious. T h ey are form ed at the neighbourhood level to protect co-religionists from potential attacks by o th er com m unities. T h ey do n o t— and are n o t designed to— facilitate com m unication w ith o th er com m unities. T h ey serve instead to raise the perception o f risk and harden the attitudes o f those w h o participate in them . M em bers o f these com m ittees take tu rn s policing th eir com m unities. T h e process form s a very different kind o f consciousness than if the com m ittees w ere inter-religious. Intra-religious com m ittees are, by definition, not based on inter-religious trust, b u t o n a lack o f such trust. M oving w ithin one’s ow n com m unity, hearing ru m o u rs that no o ne can verify o r disprove, staying up in the m iddle o f the night for w eeks together, collecting firearm s and o th er small w eapons to ensure that retaliation is swift if attacks are m ade— these activities o f intra-religious co m m it­ tees fuel, and are reflections of, a com m unal consciousness, n o t a consciousness that builds bridges. T h e Variety o f C ivic N e tw o rk s W hy did the tw o cities respond so differently? W hy did politicians o f all kinds cooperate in C alicut, b u t n o t in Aligarh? M ost o f all, w h y did even those politicians o f C alicut, like the H in d u nationalists o f the BJP, w ho w ould benefit from H in d u -M u slim polarization, n o t inflam e com m unal passions, and instead aid peace-m aking efforts? T h e BJP leader o f C alicut adm its that H in d u -M u slim polarization w ould serve the BJP’s political interests by consolidating the H in d u vote behind the BJP, in m arked contrast to the cu rren t situation, w here the vast m ajority o f the H in d u vote is divided am ong n o n com m unal parties. B ut he also voices his party’s aversion to system ­ atically initiating the polarization process. T h e party perceives a high political cost if it is seen to have u n d erm in ed local peace.38 To understand w h y the BJP is unw illing to polarize C alicut on religious lines, one needs to survey the texture o f civic life in C alicut. H in d u -M u slim civic integration is so deep in C alicut (and m any 38. Interview, Sreedharan Pillai, President, BJP D istrict C om m ittee, Calicut, 25 July 1995.

States or Cities?

211

w ould argue, in the state as a w hole) that polarization is a highly risky strategy. If a party is show n as clearly linked w ith destroying the decades-long H in d u -M u slim peace, it stands a good chance o f being penalized by the electorate. T h e reverse is tru e in Aligarh, w here the w eakness o f cross-cutting links opens up space for com m unal politicians to w reak havoc. C o n sid er first the quotidian form s o f citizen engagem ent in the tw o cities. N early 83 per cent o f H in d u s and M uslim s in C alicut often eat together in social settings; only 54 per cent in Aligarh d o .39 A bout 90 per cen t o f H in d u and M uslim families in C alicut report that th eir children play together, com pared to only 42 per cent in Aligarh. C lose to 84 per cen t o f H in d u s and M uslim s in the C alicut survey visit each o th er regularly; in Aligarh, only 60 per cen t do, and that too, infrequently. A ligarh’s H in d u -M u slim interactions are com paratively th in . A ligarh’s statistics o n all o f these interactions w ould be m u ch low er if w e had concentrated only o n the violent neighbourhoods. T h e few peaceful b u t integrated neighbourhoods show that politics has not destroyed civic interaction in all parts o f the tow n. Som e o f the neighbourhoods m anage to buck the to w n ’s prevailing tren d o f violence. It should be noted, how ever, that an overw helm ing p ro p o r­ tio n o f resp o n d en ts ov er th e age o f sixty rep o rted th a t th eir neighbourhoods w ere m u ch m ore integrated in A ligarh in the 1930s and 1940s than they w ere in the 1990s.40 M igration to com m unally h om ogenous localities began in the 1930s, as politicians started using thugs to spread violence. N eighbourhood-level intim acy was unable to w ithstand, let alone offset, the depredations o f the em erging politician-crim inal nexus. W hat about the associational form s o f engagem ent? M u ch like Tocqueville’s A m erica, C alicut is a place o f ‘j o in e rs’. Associations o f all kinds— business, labour, professional, social, theatre, film , sports, art, reading— abound. From the u b iquitous traders’ associations and Lions and R otary C lubs, found in alm ost all tow ns in India, to the otherw ise rare reading clubs’, head-loaders’ and rickshaw -pullers’ associations and even som ething like an art-lovers association— 39. U nless otherwise reported, the statistics here and below are from the survey conducted in C alicut and Aligarh. For the methodology, see Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, Appendix O ne. 40. Forty per cent o f the sample in o u r survey was 60-plus in age, w hich allowed us to collcct ‘recalls’ o f the 1930s and 1940s.

212

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

citizens o f C alicut excel at jo in in g clubs and associations. R eligiously based organizations exist, as they do in Aligarh; w hat is distinctive is the extent o f inter-religious interaction in non-denom inational organizations. C o n sid er the econom ic life o f C alicut city. M erchandise trade is the heart o f C alicut’s econom y T h e city o f 700,000 people in 1995 had an estim ated 10,000 to 12,000 m erchants and traders,41 and ab o u t 100,000 people are partially o r w holly d ep en d en t on trade. It is a rare trader w h o does not jo in a trade association. T hese associations— representing everyone from foodgrain m erchants to bullion dealers— are, in turn, m em bers o f the Federation o f Traders Associations (Vyapari Vyavasayx Ekopana Samithi). In 1995 as m any as eleven o f the 26 trade associations that w ere registered w ith the Federation had H in d u , M uslim (and C hristian) office-bearers: if the President o f the Association was from one com ­ m unity, the G eneral Secretary was from the other. T hese associations function as non-partisan bodies. As one rice dealer put it, *We d o n ’t w ant to enter politics because o u r u n ity will be broken. We have debates in o u r association, so conflicts, if any, get resolved.’ M oreover, such is the depth o f engagem ent that m any transactions are w ith o u t any form al contracts. ‘O u r relationships w ith M uslim businessm en are entirely based on trust. Paym ents as large as Rs. 10 to 15 lakhs [$30,000-$35,000] are som etim es due. We send bills, but there are no prom issory notes valid in the courts o f law. ...T h e r e is no breach o f tru st.’42 Aligarh also has a Traders Association (Vyapar Mandal). In the late 1980s, it had about 6,000 m em bers. In th e 1970s it had even acquired a fair n u m b e r o f M uslim m em bers, after som e local M uslim families had acquired increased capital th ro u g h rem ittances. T h e Association, how ever, developed a history o f infighting o n w h eth er it should support, and w ork for, a political party. In the 1980s it was finally split into tw o bodies: a ‘secular’ organization, and a ‘non-secular’ one. T he non-secular faction jo in ed the BJR M uslim traders headed towards the secular faction. 41. C alicut has no industry cxcept tile production. M ost units are small; there are nine factories and about 2500 workers in all. 42. Interview, V Ram akrishna Erady, W holesale Rice Dealer, Calicut, 25 July 1995. 43. Interview, M oham m ed Sufiyan, ex-President, \fyapar Mandal, Aligarh, August 1995.

States or Cities?

213

W hy cannot Aligarh develop an econom ic sym biosis betw een H in d u s and M uslim s? U nlike trade-based C alicut, Aligarh has a significant industrial sector. Aligarh is am ong the largest producers o f locks in India. It is im possible to estim ate the n u m b er o f people w orking in Aligarh’s lock industry. N o surveys have been con­ ducted.44 We know, however, from ethnographic w o rk that w orkers are b oth M u slim and H in d u , and so are the firm ow ners. We also know that an inter-com m unal form o f civic engagem ent does n o t exist. O f late, rotating credit societies have em erged.45 B ut these are intra-M uslim societies. T h ey build tru st w ithin com m unities, not across them . Even if the businessm en are n o t integrated, are the workers? Trade unions hardly exist in Aligarh. T h e local branches o f national trade unions have decrepit offices, w ith no staff and little data. Trade unions, however, thrive in C alicut. T h e largest unions are linked to tw o m ajor national trade u n io n federations: C IT U (C entre for Indian Trade U n io n s), w hich is affiliated w ith the C o m m u n ist Party o f India (M arxist), and IN T U C (Indian N ational Trade U n io n C ongress), w hich is linked to the C ongress Party.46 B oth o f these u n io n s are intercom m unal. C alicut does have a M uslim political party, the M uslim League, w hich regularly w ins general elections. It also sponsors a trade union, w hich is neither as large as the local units o f C IT U o r IN T U C , n o r as vibrant. M uslim w orkers by and large vote for the M uslim League in assem bly elections, b u t they ten d typically to jo in IN T U C o r C IT U for protection o f th eir labour rights. T h e M arxist and atheistic character o f C IT U does n o t stop th em from jo in in g C IT U ’s unions, if they think that C IT U w ill fight m ore effectively for better rights and wages. In the process, they com e into contact w ith H in d u 44. It is in the interests o f industrial employers to underreport how m uch labor they employ: under Indian laws, the small, informal sector does not have to pay pension and other benefits to its workers. Official statistics are therefore unreli­ able. Foucault’s concept o f ‘popular illegality’, as one keen observer puts it, has caught the fascination o f Aligarh’s lock m anufacturers. Elizabeth M ann, Boundaries and Identities: Muslim, Work and Status in Aligarh (N ew Delhi: Sage, 1992), p. 83. 45. Ibid., pp. 101-2. 46. Reasonably precise data on num bers o f unionized m em bers and their religious distribution is almost impossible to obtain. Estimates based on interviews arc all that is available. T he description below is based on interviews with labor leaders in Calicut, especially a long and detailed interview w ith M . Sadiri Koya, State Secretary, IN T U C , 4 August 1993.

214

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

w orkers. In ter-com m unal links are form ed, and the w o rk force avoids a H in d u -M u slim split. A final and highly distinctive aspect o f associational life in C alicu t concerns its social and educational activities. T h e city has had an array o f popular theatre and science societies. W hile film clubs have been popular all over South India, societies devoted to taking theater and science to the masses are rather unco m m o n . Even m ore unusual are reading clubs. Kerala today has the highest literacy rate in India. ‘R eading room s’, a u n iq u e Kerala institution, accom panied Kerala’s rem arkable rise in literacy, and helped to form deep social netw orks betw een the 1930s and 1950s. Young people from m ost com m unities w ould get together several tim es every w eek to read new spapers and cultural and political books. T h e fascinating story o f the birth and role o f reading clubs has recently been told by M enon: B etw een 1901-31, t h e . .. g row in g n u m b e rs o f schools and th e rise in literacy fo u n d expressions in th e n u m b e rs o f read in g ro o m s th a t w ere established b o th in the co u n try sid e an d in th e to w n s__ O n e o f th e novelties in th e organization o f reading ro o m s w as th e (c o m m u n ita ria n ) d rin k in g o f tea, as o n e p erso n read th e new spapers and th e o th e rs listen ed __ Tea an d coffee lubricated discussions o n th e veracity o f th e new s an d o f political q u estio n s, a n d a n e w c u ltu re em erg ed a ro u n d th e read in g ro o m s. It w as p re m ised u p o n sobriety an d know ledge ra th e r th a n d ru n k e n c o m p an io n sh ip tra n sce n d in g consciousness w h ic h characterised th e to d d y shops. T h e im p o rtan c e o f tea and coffee lay in th e fact that th ey w ere recently in tro d u ce d beverages a n d d id n o t fit in to any taboos regarding w h a t c o u ld be shared b etw een castes. Tea sh ops and reading ro o m s all o v er M alabar p ro v id ed c o m m o n place for people to m e et and to d rin k to g e th e r regardless o f caste (and c o m m u n ity ).. . . T h e reading ro o m s em erg ed as cen tral to b o th form al attem p ts at organization by th e left w in g o f th e C o n g ress as w ell as local initiatives.47

T h e cum ulative outcom e o f the reading ro o m m ovem ent is w o rth noting. In o u r C alicut sam ple, as m any as 95 per cen t o f H in d u s and M uslim s reported reading new spapers— a statistic that is likely to be higher than in m ost cities o f the w o rld ’s richer countries. C alicut today, w ith a population o f over 700,000, has 20 new spapers and magazines! 47. Dilip M enon, Caste, Community and the Nation: Malabar 1900-1948 (Cambridge: C am bridge U niversity Press 1995), pp. 145-9. 48. T he state o f Kerala has ‘a library or a reading room w ithin walking distance o f every citizen’. K. A. Isaac, ‘Library M ovem ent and Bibliographic C ontrol in Kerala: An O verview ’, paper presented at the International Congress o f Kerala Studies, Trivandrum , August 1994.

States o r Cities?

215

In contrast, w hile m ost H indus in the Aligarh sam ple read new spapers, less th an 30 per cen t o f M uslim s did so. Inform ation travels in the M uslim co m m u n ity largely th ro u g h w o rd o f m o u th . As links w ith the o th er co m m u n ity are alm ost non-existent, a few people can often spread nasty ru m o u rs, and m ake th em stick. In sum m ary, the civic lives o f the tw o cities are a w orld apart. So m any M uslim s and H indus are interlocked in associational and neighbourhood relationships in C alicut that peace com m ittees at tim es o f tension are sim ply an extension o f pre-existing local networks o f engagement. A considerable reservoir o f social tru st is form ed from the associational and everyday interactions betw een M uslim s and H indus. R outine fam iliarity facilitates com m unication betw een the tw o com ­ m unities; ru m o u rs are quashed th ro u g h better com m unication; and all o f this helps the local adm inistration keep peace. In Aligarh, ordinary H in d u s and M uslim s do n o t m eet in a civic setting— econom ic, social, o r educational— w here m utual tru st can be form ed. Lacking the support o f such netw orks, even com petent and w ellm eaning police and civil adm inistrators are helpless to halt an already unfolding riot. T h e o th er pairs o f cities studied as part o f this research project w itnessed sim ilar processes. T h e difference was not an absence o f religious tensions, provocative rum ours, o r sm all clashes. T hese w ere present in all o f the case-study locations. T h e presence o f the intercom m unal netw orks o f engagem ent was decisive; intra-com m unal netw orks did n o t contain, o r stop, violence.

E n d o g e n e it y

and the

U

n d e r l y in g

C a u s a t io n

Before w e accept the argum ent about civic engagem ent, tw o m ore questions m u st be explored. First, how can o ne be sure that the causation was not the other way round? D id com m unal violence destroy the H in d u -M u slim civic netw orks in riot-prone tow ns, o r did the presence o f such netw orks prevent violence from occurring in those that w ere n o t prone to riots? D o w e have a case o f endogeneity here? Secondly, is the underlying causation different from proxim ate causation? Are there historical forces that explain the vitality or absence o f civic netw orks? W hat em erges if w e tu rn the independent variable o f the sh o rt-ru n analysis— civic netw orks— into a dependent variable, to be explained historically?

216

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

H istorical research conducted in the cities studied in this p ro ject d em onstrates that civic netw orks— quotidian and associational— determ ined the outcom e in the short to medium run, b u t in the long ru n inter-com m unal netw orks w ere politically constructed. M u ch o f the associational pillar o f India’s civic structure was p u t in place in the 1920s d u rin g the m ovem ent against B ritish rule. T h e 1920s w as a transform ative m om ent because mass politics em erged in India u n d e r M ahatm a G andhi’s leadership. Politics before th en w ere highly elitist. T h e Indian N ational C ongress before G andhi was largely a lawyers’ club, w hich advanced constitutional argum ents in th e Q u e e n ’s E n g lis h .

G andhi seized control o f the m ovem ent in 1920 and quietly revolutionized it by arguing that the British were unlikely to give independence to India until the Indian masses w ere involved in th e nationalist m ovem ent. T h e G andhi-led nationalist m ovem ent w as interested n o t only in political independence from the B ritish, b u t also the social transform ation o f India. G andhi argued that independence w ould be em pty unless India’s social evils w ere addressed, draw ing attention especially to three prim ary objectives: H in d u -M u slim unity, abolition o f untouchability, and swadeshi (buy Indian, w ear Indian, th in k Indian). To these w ere added several o th er projects o f social transform ation: the up liftm en t o f w om en and ‘tribals’, labour w elfare, prohibition, and so on. In the process, a great variety o f organizations cam e into being betw een the 1920s and the 1940s. T h e associational structure o f India prior to G andhi was m inim al. T he foundations o f India’s civic o rd er w ere laid by the G andhian shift in the nationalist m ovem ent. T h e biggest organization, o f course, was the C ongress itself, w hich d u rin g the 1920s led the m ovem ent politically and developed cadres all over India. T he pu rsu it o f social transform ation created a second set o f organizations, the voluntary agencies. T h e C ongress was prim arily political; organizations that dealt w ith education, w o m e n ’s issues, the w elfare o f tribals and ‘untouchables’, and the m ovem ent prom oting hom espun cloth w ere concerned w ith social projects. T h e civic ord er that em erged was not u niform across India. T h e m ovem ent had greater success in forging H in d u -M u slim unity in tow ns w here a H in d u -M u slim cleavage had not already em erged in local politics. British India’s tow ns had experienced local governm ent elections since the 1880s. If local politics em phasized som e o th er cleavages— for example, caste cleavages am ong H indus, o r S hia-S unni

States or Cities?

217

divisions am ong M uslim s— th en the C ongress and G andhian social w orkers found it easier to bring H in d u s and M uslim s together in local civic life. If, how ever, H in d u -M u slim differences were the dom inant axis o f local politics, the nationalist m ovem ent could n o t build integrated organizations with the sam e success. O n ce, how ever, such organizations w ere established, they acquired relative autonom y from com petitive politics based on the m obilization o f ethnic, linguistic, o r religious identities. In sum m ary, the role o f inter-com m unal civic netw orks has been crucial for peace. A space for th em was created by form s o f mass politics that em erged in the 1920s all over India.49 H istorical reason­ ing, therefore, requires that w e draw a distinction betw een proxim ate and underlying causation. For problem s o f endogeneity, this reasoning suggests a tw o-fold conclusion as well. T h e truly exogenous elem ent in a long-run, historical perspective was a transform ative shift in national politics. In the short- to m ed iu m -ru n , however, the civic structures p u t in place by the nationalist m ovem ent have been a constraint on the behaviour o f politicians, for they acquired a life and logic o f th eir ow n. C o n c l u s io n s I have m ade tw o argum ents in this paper. T h e first argum ent is m ethodological. W h eth er com parisons in Indian politics should be made at the state, o r som e other, level depends on the nature o f the problem at hand. I can think o f m any questions for w hich the best analytical results can be generated, and significant advances iii ^ o w l edge and understanding made, i f w e use the state level o f India’s federal system as the u n it o f analysis and com parison. C o m m u n al riots and peace, how ever, only partly belong to this category. A focus o n 49. T his reasoning suggests an im portant difference between this research and the approach pursued in Robert Putnam , Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Italy (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1993). In Putnam ’s form u­ lation, the existence o f social capital differentiates good governance from bad. T h e relationship between social capital and com m unal violence, however, yields a different form ulation. I f my argum ent is correct, civic networks determ ine the presence or absence o f riots in the short to m edium run, b u t arc the products o f deliberate acts o f political construction over a m uch longer period. P u tn am ’s study appears to emphasize the independent role o f social capital both in the short and long run.

218

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

local-level m echanism s o f peace and violence, supplem ented by s ta te level factors, m akes the greatest sense. H in d u -M u slim violence in India tends n o t to be spread evenly th ro u g h o u t the length and b re a d th o f a given state. Even the m ost violent states have m ore tow ns a n d cities that are peaceful th an are violent. M oreover, villages o n t h e w hole have very few H in d u -M u slim riots. Riots are heavily c o n c e n ­ trated in som e cities and tow ns, and the best insights are gained b y focusing on the local-level m echanism s than on m acro-level causes. T h e latter are n o t irrelevant. B ut the existing literature’s o v erw h elm ­ ing preoccupation w ith them has left an im p o rtan t puzzle unresolved: w hy d o som e tow ns and cities repeatedly have riots, w hereas o th e r d o not? T h is question is unansw erable if w e concentrate o n state-level factors alone. M y second argum ent is substantive. O n ce w e concentrate o n th e city-level m echanism s, w e find that state politics can best be co n cep ­ tualized as a ‘spark’, w hich activates the local m echanism s o f peace and violence. Peaceful cities have institutionalized peace system s w orking througji m ier-com m unal civic engagem ent— especially in form al associations, b u t in everyday form s o f engagem ent as w ell. R iot-prone cities have prim arily infra-H indu or infra-M uslim civic engagem ent, w hich u n d erm in es peace and transform s ru m o u rs a n d tensions into violence and riots. T hese netw orks th u s perform v ery different roles, even w h en confronted w ith the sam e spark, trigger, shock o r jo lt. D ifferences in state politics, history, and adm inistration often determ ine w hat these shocks and jo lts w ill be, how often th e y w ill be supplied and, m ost im portantly, w ith w hat intensity. A n integrated civil society can take a lot o f such shocks, b u t n o t in u n lim ited quantities. T h e intensity o f the shock m atters. So, th e re ­ fore, does state politics.

7 In Varying States o f Decay Anti-Corruption Politics in Maharashtra and Rajasthan Rob Jenkins'

his chapter exam ines India’s tw o m ost influential anti-corruption m ovem ents— one based in the state o f Rajasthan, the o th er in M aharashtra. B o th groups have received an unusually large am ount o f attention fro m journalists, academics, governm ent agencies, advo­ cacy org an izatio n s and in tern atio n al d ev elo p m en t in stitu tio n s. T h ro u g h o u t m o st o f the 1990s, the tw o m ovem ents shared a rem ark­ able n u m b er o f traits, displaying similarities in term s o f organizational form , operational m ethod, approach to institutionalization, and po­ litical style. It is the existence o f these sim ilarities, as m uch as the successes that each m ovem ent has achieved, that has caused them to be bracketed together in public discussions about corruption and the m eans by w h ich it can best be com bated. 1. T he field research on w hich this article is based was conducted jointly with Anne M arie G oetz. In addition to this obvious debt, I w ould like to thank Jean Dreze, Sunil Khilnani, Jam es M anor and A shutosh \k rsh n ey for helpful sugges­ tions on earlier incarnations o f this article. For help in contributing to and facilitating the field research, I am grateful to M ayank Bhatt, N ilu Damle, N ikhil Dcy, Anna H arare, Sanjay Lodha, N eelabh M ishra, Aruna Roy, A. Sabban, Sunny Sebastian and Kavita Srivastava. Any errors o f fact or interpretation are m y own responsibility.

220

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

A fter introducing the m ovem ents, and o u tlin in g their co m m o n characteristics, this chapter pursues tw o questions. T h e first is w h eth er the cm crgcncc o f these strikingly sim ilar m ovem ents in R ajasthan and M aharashtra (and now here else in India) m ight be due to structural similarities in the social, econom ic o r political life o f these tw o states. T h e answer, in brief, is no. M aharashtra and Rajasthan are in fact poles apart along several key dim ensions. State-w ide variables cannot account for the distinctive organizational profile shared by the tw o m ovem ents: they have taken ro o t in R ajasthan and M aharashtra despite, rather than because of, the characteristics displayed by these tw o states. To th e degree th at the sim ilarities betw een th e tw o m ovem ents w ere at all influenced by th eir respective settings, it was supra-local rather than state-level factors that played a role. T h e second question stem s from indications that the tw o m ove­ m ents began to pursue som ew hat different paths as the new m illen­ n iu m got underway. C o u ld the differences betw een the tw o states alluded to earlier account for these divergent trajectories? T h is question involves an assessm ent o f the outcom es achieved by th e tw o m ovem ents. N e ith e r m ovem ent has been either a com plete success o r a com plete failure, b u t the pattern o f success and failure has varied across the tw o m ovem ents. T his is at least partly d u e to the contrasting state contexts in w hich they have had to operate. Reacting to these divergent outcom e patterns, and taking stock o f the opportunities and constraints posed by the political environm ents in their respective states, the tw o m ovem ents have taken different directions o f late. T h e paper concludes by sum m arizing the m ain argum ent, and highlighting tw o examples o f how the com parative m eth o d helps to generate insights o f relevance to theory building in the study o f co rru p tio n and social m ovem ents. T

he

M

ovem ents a n d

T

h e ir

S i m i l a r i t ie s

T h e tw o anti-corruption m ovem ents exam ined in this chapter are the M aharashtra-based B rashtachar V irodhi Jan A ndolan (BVJA), or People’s M ovem ent A gainst C o rru p tio n , and the R ajasthan-based M azdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (M KSS), o r W orkers and Farm ers Pow er O rganization. Each group consists o f a core o f w orkers w ho are active on a range o f issues besides corruption, th o u g h it is their struggles against corru p tio n that have bro u g h t th em the m ost atten­ tion.

In Varying States o f Dccay

221

T h e w o rk undertaken by the MKSS and by the veteran social w orker M r A nna H azare— the leading light o f the BVJA— are often bracketed together, b o th in academic w ritings and in statem ents by officials and practitioners. T h e econom ists Jean D reze and Amartya Sen cited the MKSS and the struggles ‘initiated by A nna H azare in M aharashtra’ as ‘pioneering m ovem ents’ in the fight against co rru p ­ tion. B oth o f these m ovem ents had accom plished the extrem ely rare feat o f com bining a focus o n governm ent transparency w ith a co m m itm en t to sustained collective action. T h ey had, in the process, stim ulated ‘m any new offshoots’.2 India’s C entral Vigilance C o m m is­ sioner, the c o u n try ’s m ost senior official responsible for investigating co rru p tio n , has also cited b oth groups as ‘rays o f hope’ in an otherw ise bleak nation-w ide scenario.3 B oth A nna and the M K SS’s leading figure, A runa Roy, have received recognition from international developm ent agencies for th eir path-breaking w ork. B oth have been recipients o f the prestigious R am on Magsaysay Award, som etim es k now n as ‘the alternative N obel Prize’. T h e MKSS and the BVJA are far from identical, b u t the range o f characteristics these tw o m ovem ents have in co m m o n justifies their freq u en t pairing. T h e tw o m ovem ents— w hich b oth fit the description o f a ‘n o n-party political form ation’,4 and can usefully be described as ‘m ovem ent groups’5— are best in troduced th ro u g h an exam ination o f five such com m onalities. First, b oth m ovem ents present th eir respective an ti-corruption efforts as ju s t one aspect o f a larger project o f dem ocratic develop­ m ent, in w hich non-elite groups are m obilized to participate in the 2. See Jean D reze and Amartya Sen, India: Development and Participation (Delhi: O xford U niversity Press, 2002), p. 367. 3. N . Vittal, ‘Fight Against C orrup tio n ’, address delivered at the Forum o f A ntiC o rru p tio n , V isakhapatnam , 12 April 2002, http://cvc.nic.in/vscvc/cvcspeeches/ sp3apr02.pdf. 4. In using this descriptor, the MKSS follows a stream o f thinking on the role o f voluntary organizations in Indian politics w hich can be traced to the theorizing o f Rajni Kothari, w ho coined the term in the mid-1980s. See Rajni Kothari, T h e N on-P arty Political Process’, Economic and Political Weekly, 4 February 1984. 5. T his is the nom enclature adopted in one o f the m ost perceptive analyses o f the significance o f recent grassroots political activity in India. D. L. Sheth, ‘Globalizing D em ocracy versus D eepening Democracy: T h e Post-C old War D iscourse’, paper presented at the Lokayan Sem inar on ‘Globalization and South Asia’, C en tre for the Study o f D eveloping Societies, D elhi, 29-31 August 2001.

222

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

reinvention o f local politics. T h e BVJA em erged in the early 1990s as an outgrow th o f the village-developm ent w ork undertaken b y A nna, w hose efforts to rebuild the social, econom ic and political life o f his native village o f Ralegan Siddhi bro u g h t him international acclaim.6 T h e M KSS, based in the district o f R ajsam and, in central Rajasthan, also began life as som ething o th er than an an ti-co rru p tio n m ovem ent. T h e MKSS em erged from a sm all group o f co m m itted activists w h o sought to organize villagers to resist encroachm ents o n co m m o n lands by pow erful local elites. R esponding to w h a t it saw as the priorities o f m arginalized groups, the MKSS follow ed u p its land cam paign w ith efforts to assist w orkers o n go v ern m en t em ploym ent-generation program m es to obtain unpaid wages. T h is, in tu rn , led it to focus o n the reasons w h y the wages w ere n o t b ein g paid. T h e ft by local notables, acting in collusion w ith officials at various levels o f the adm inistrative hierarchy, was identified as th e m ajor cause. T h e BVJA began its w o rk o n corru p tio n from a sim ilar startin g point: the belief o f its founders w as n o t sim ply that corru p tio n w as w rong, b u t that it was im peding the local co m m u n ity ’s longstanding objective o f transform ing the area’s w asteland th ro u g h m in o r irriga­ tion w orks. T h e diversion o f resources that should have been available for irrigating land— thanks to a notoriously co rru p t irrigation b u reau ­ cracy in the g ro u p ’s hom e district o f A hm ednagar— led to th e conclusion that a frontal assault o n public graft was necessary. T h u s the MKSS and the BVJA cam e to the issue o f corru p tio n from th e experience o f m obilising and listening to the priorities o f the poor. C o m b atin g co rru p tio n was part and parcel o f the effort to co n stru ct an alternative m odel o f grassroots dem ocracy— one in w hich th e active participation o f ordinary people in th eir ow n developm ent was a central feature. t Second, both the MKSS and the BVJA concluded that any success­ ful cam paign against co rru p tio n w ould require access to official d o cu ­ m ents, particularly detailed, disaggregated records o f expenditure on public w orks program m es. W hile a n u m b er o f m ovem ents in India could be said to share the first characteristic outlined above— the concern w ith situating a fight against corruption w ithin a larger project o f grassroots m obilization— it is this second feature that narrow s the 6. A nna's account o f his cxpericncc is coIlcctcd in Anna Hazarc, Ralegan Siddhi: A Veritable Transformation (G utekdi: Ralegan Siddhi Pariwar, 1997).

In Varying States o f Decay

223

field considerably. T h e inform ation sought by b o th m ovem ents was local in nature, relating to g o vernm ent-funded construction projects undertaken w ithin their vicinities. T h is was in accordance w ith their shared principle o f facilitating local action. Even before launching the BVJA as a separate organization in 1991, A nna had used the expanding range o f connections that had accom panied his grow ing reputation as a social w orker to obtain governm ent docum ents. T hese provided detailed inform ation on the purchases o f eq u ip m en t by governm ent agencies responsible for coordinating social forestry projects in the area. A nna ‘fo u n d that som e item s o f eq u ip m en t w ere purchased even tho u g h they had n o practical utility in the field’— for instance, ‘a three inch augur to drill a narrow b o re’ and ‘a three stage plant carrier w hich could n o t be lifte d ... up the hill slopes’ on w hich it was to be used (‘even by fo u r m e n ’). H is conclusion was that the discrepancies w ere th e result o f graft, perpetrated by a nexus betw een the village elites w h o provided local backing for the projects, the governm ent officials w h o approved the eq u ip m en t purchases and the private-sector con­ tractors w h o supplied the goods. A nna’s investigations also revealed th at the prices for these publicly procured item s w ere inflated in order to increase the yield o f illicit funds: ‘I called for the rates at w hich these item s w ere purchased and w h en I com pared these w ith the six o r seven quotations I got from fabricators at A hm ednagar [the tow n for w hich the district was nam ed], I found that the purchases had been m ade at triple o r quadruple price levels’.7 T h is revelation led to fu rth er inquiries, and the system atic p u rsu it o f inform ation from governm ent agencies at the block, district and state level by team s o f volunteers draw n together u n d e r the BVJA banner. T h e M KSS was all the w hile involved in sim ilar activities. Its focus has been o n public-w orks projects undertaken u n d er R ajasthan’s annual fam ine-relief program m e. Teams o f MKSS volunteers sought— and in som e cases obtained— financial and technical records pertain­ ing to these local constructio n projects. A key d o cu m en t they sought was the ‘m u ster roll’, an em ploym ent register that lists the nam es o f people em ployed at each site, as well as the days o n w hich they w orked and the am o u n t paid to each labourer. T h e inform ation contained w ithin the m u ster rolls was th en systematically cross-checked by MKSS volunteers. T h ey interview ed people w hose nam es w ere listed as recipients o f paym ents to find o u t i f indeed they had been paid. 7. Hazarc, Ralegan Siddhi, pp. 106-7.

224

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

M any o f the w orkers to w hom the m uster rolls w ere show n stated that they had been listed as having been paid far m ore th an they had actually received. D octoring the records in this way tu rn ed o u t to be one o f the m ain m ethods by w hich local elites and their accom plices in the governm ent adm inistration illicitly siphoned m oney from th e schem es. In o th er cases labourers interview ed by MKSS volunteers verified that they had in fact been paid the am ounts listed on the m u ster roll, b u t com plained th at the n u m b er o f w o rk days listed was less than they had actually perform ed, w ith the paym ent reduced accordingly. T hese w orkers, because they had been at the w ork sites o n the days in question, w ere able to identify w hich o f the nam es listed o n th e m u ster roll w ere ‘bogus.’ T h e re w ere usually tw o m ain categories o f bogus em ployees listed. T h e first consisted o f the village sarpanch’s cronies, w h o w ere paid despite n o t tu rn in g u p to w ork. T h is was a way o f rew arding them for th eir loyalty, w hich was useful in building u p a base o f support to allow o th er form s o f corru p tio n to persist w ith im punity. T h e second category o f bogus em ployees included people w h o had either left the village long ago, w h o w ere far too infirm to engage in such dem anding m anual labour, o r w h o w ere deceased. It was by understating the w o rk perform ed (and therefore paym ent due) to the genuine w orkers that a surplus was created from w hich these bogus w orkers could be paid. Like the BVJA, the MKSS obtained governm ent d ocum ents m ainly by appealing to the virtue o f sym pa­ thetic bureaucrats, o r thro u g h public protest action aim ed at those w ith less active consciences. T h e th ird p o in t o f sim ilarity betw een the MKSS and th e BVJA concerns the strategic direction in w hich this type o f painstaking investigatory w ork was taken: in b oth cases, inform al and ad hoc access to inform ation bred cam paigns dem anding that their respective state governm ents enact legislation to recognize the citizen’s right to inform ation. B oth the BVJA and MKSS w ere instrum ental in launch­ ing these state-level cam paigns, and the M aharashtra and Rajasthan assem blies ultim ately passed relevant legislation. A nd yet b o th m ove­ m ents w ere driven by m ore than a theoretical belief in the idea o f transparency; m any organizations had long cam paigned for abolition o f India’s colonial-era Official Secrets Act, and its replacem ent by som ething resem bling the U S ’s Freedom o f Inform ation Act. T hese tw o m ovem ents, how ever, m ore so th an any o f the o th er advocates for legislative reform , w ere driven by their direct experience o f

In Varying States o f Dccay

225

operationalizing transparency in the context o f participatory dem oc­ racy. T h e BVJA and the MKSS saw the practical m erit o f allow ing ordinary people to gain first-hand experience o f the m eans by w hich state agencies use docum entary evidence to create an official, legally adm issible, narrative o f events, w hile at the sam e tim e providing them an opportunity to offer testim ony contradicting these official ac­ counts. T h e MKSS’s ow n reflection o n this process p u t it this way: W h e n privileged inform ation has been placed before the p e o p le . .. it has also given the poor and the oppressed a chance to expose the m ethods o f exploitation based on their g ro u n d reality’.8 B ut this kind o f political effect had dem onstrated its self-im posed limits: w ith o u t a legal regim e for perm itting access to governm ent docum ents, both m ovem ents w ere finding it increasingly difficult to pry inform ation o u t o f reluctant local and district officials, w h o had begun to recognize both the value o f governm ent d ocum ents to activists com m itted to investigating discrepancies and the effect that docum ented irregularities could have on local public opinion. It is one th in g to suspect generalized corruption, b u t quite another to have the specifics laid bare— the m echanism s o f theft, the brazenness w ith w hich they are exploited, the nam es nam ed, along w ith detailed inform ation on those w ho had been cheated o f their rightful benefits, including widows, Dalits, m igrant labourers and the physically handi­ capped. T h e BVJA and the MKSS had dem onstrated the pow er o f inform ation, but also the difficulty o f gaining access to it: hence the tu rn to dem anding the enactm ent o f a legal right to inform ation, the idea o f w hich, however, w ould likely have seem ed abstract and irrelevant to the supporters o f these groups had they n o t gained practical experience o f using access to official records to dem ystify the state and to ‘expose the lies, the contradictions, the double speak, and the hollow ness’ o f those w h o control it.9 T h e fourth com m onality betw een the BVJA and the M KSS is how they relate with o th er elem ents in civil society: w hile operating as m ovem ents, divorced from both conventional party politics and the m ainstream developm ent agenda, both groups are also directly linked thro u g h their respective leaderships to organizations w hich pursue m ore traditional N G O activities, such as literacy pro m o tio n , health 8. MKSS, ‘Beyond Inform ation: Brcaching the Wall o f State Inaction’ (type­ script, 1999), p. 3. 9. Ibid.

226

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

program m es, and livelihood diversification. T h e BVJA, tho u g h an independent voluntary organization, is propelled by the energy and vision o f A nna H azare, w h o is also the driving force behind the projects undertaken by the H in d Swaraj Trust. T h e H S T is the coordinating agency and the source o f m uch (though n o t all) o f the fu n d in g behind the village developm ent w orks that have m ade Ralegan Siddhi such an inspiration for so m any o th e r activist groups. M any o f the w orkers trained thro u g h A nna’s w atershed developm ent schem es have gone o n to be active in the BVJA, collecting allegations o f corru p tio n from m em bers o f the public, seeking official inform a­ tion that could verify or falsify these claims, and pressing the district adm inistration (and in som e cases the state governm ent) to take appropriate action against those alleged to have engaged in fraud. T h e MKSS is in a sim ilar position: it too is an independent group, p u rsuing its ow n form o f activism and its ow n advocacy agenda, based on an assessm ent o f local conditions and the desires o f its constituents. B ut, at the sam e tim e, it is clearly and visibly linked to the Social W ork and Research C en tre (SW RC), one o f R ajasthan’s— indeed India’s— m ost w ell-know n N G O s. T h e M KSS’s m ost high-profile leader— the m ovem ent shuns titles o r form al hierarchies— is M s A runa Roy, w hose husband, M r B unker Roy, is the fou n d er o f the SW RC. M s Roy at one tim e w prked for SW RC, after having becom e disillusioned w ith her career in the elite Indian A dm inistrative Service. W hile n o t form ally a recipient o f funds from the SW RC, certain o f the resources o f the N G O are on occasion inform ally placed at the disposal o f the MKSS in su p p o rt o f specific activities: vehicles, public address systems, even m em bers o f staff. B unker Roy has w ritten highly favourable opinion pieces about the MKSS in m ajor national new s­ papers and m agazines, w hich w ould have stood m u ch less chance o f being published had he not been heading one o f the c o u n try ’s m ost successful N G O s. T h e re is n o suggestion o f im propriety in any o f this, for the SW RC w orkers w h o take part in the M K SS’s activities share the ideals and co m m itm en t o f the MKSS. B ut there is no denying the existence o f a m utually supportive relationship betw een the MKSS and the SW RC, ju s t as it is im possible to conceive o f the BVJA in isolation from the N G O activities pursued u n d er the auspices o f the HST. B oth the BVJA and the MKSS have, m oreover, found that these close links w ith the N G O sector can have negative as well as positive im plications. T h e MKSS has been accused o f targeting (w ith charges

In Varying States o f Decay

227

o f corruption) officials that have ‘stood up to the m ight o f S W R C \ A nd the SW RC has been sim ilarly vulnerable: governm ent officials at one p o in t attem pted to sm ear the organization, stating that the SW RC supported dem ands for greater governm ent transparency w hile rem aining secretive about its ow n sources o f funding. O th e r form s o f criticism could be m ore subtle. O n e senior IAS officer, w hile n o t d o ubting the integrity o f the MKSS, stated that ‘A runa [Roy] was b etter o ff w hen she was still w ith Tilonia [SW RC] doing constructive w o rk w ith the handicrafts,’10 one o f the specialities for w h ich the SW RC is know n. T h e im plication was that the MKSS had begun to engage in m indless oppositionalism — ‘always tearing dow n rather than building up’.11 T h e BVJA has also been accused o f using its anti-corruption w ork to fu rth er the political agenda o f corporate groups that have provided funding for the H ST. A nd because o f his association w ith an N G O that received funding u n d e r M aharashtra’s C o n g ress-ru n governm ent in the early 1990s, in the latter part o f the decade ‘a vicious cam paign’ was ‘launched by the Shiv Sena to denigrate M r H azare and to question his personal integrity and character*.12 Fifth, both m ovem ents operate in w hat W. H . M orris-Jones has called the ‘idiom o f saintly politics’.13 By this, M orris-Jones intended to identify a style o f politics that could be distinguished from tw o other, m ore familiar, idiom s: the m o d em and the traditional, the form er representing the w orld o f parties, parliam ents, and plans; the latter the ‘feudal’ politics o f patron-client relationships built (prim a­ rily) around caste, clan, and com m unity. M orris-Jones’s in troduction o f a third category— that o f saintly politics— ru p tu red this conven­ tional dichotom y, w hich has been expressed over the years, w ith differences o f em phasis, by several students o f Indian politics. In 1963, the same year in w hich M orris-Jones published his piece o n India’s three political idiom s, M yron W einer noted the gap betw een India’s 10. Interview, 3 M arch 2003, Jaipur. 11. Ibid. 12. T h e charges against Anna were characterized in this way even by one o f his critics, a form er U nion H om e Secretary. See M adhav G odbole, ‘W ar Against C orruption’, The Hindu, 19 May 1997. 13. W. H. M orris-Jones, ‘India’s Political Idiom s’, in C . H . Philips (ed.),Politics and Society in India (London: George Allen and U n w in , 1963), pp. 133-54, reprinted in Thom as R. M etcalf (ed.), Modem India: A n Interpretive Anthology (N ew Delhi: Sterling Publishers 1990), pp. 273-91.

228

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

tw o ‘political cu ltu res’—o n e prevalent in the states and districts, th e o th e r in the upper echelons o f the political leadership in D elhi. A lm o st thirty years later Sudipta Kaviraj referred to an ‘upper discourse’ in Indian politics, espoused by ‘the ru lin g m o d ern ist elites’, and a n indigenous ‘low er discourse’.14 M orris-Jones’s approach tran scen d ed this dichotom y, w hile recognizing the different scales involved, e m ­ phasizing that the ‘language o f saintly politics is to be found “at th e m argin” o f Indian politics’. H e was, however, equally clear that it w as n o less im portant for that reason, equating its significance to that given to th a t term [m arginal] in econom ics: th ere m ay be few o r n o n e actu ally a t th e m argin b u t th e location o f th e p o in t has an effect o n all o p erato rs as a k in d o f reference m ark. In o th e r w o rd s, saintly politics is im p o rta n t as a language o f c o m m e n t ra th e r th a n o f d escrip tio n o r practical b eh av io u r.15

M orris-Jones was aware that very few people ‘engaged in political activity w ithin the o th er tw o idiom s arc striving to be saintly. Its influence is rather on the standards habitually used by the people a t large fo rju d g in g the perform ance o f politicians’.16 In India, he argues, there is ‘an ideal o f disinterested selflessness by contrast w ith w h ic h alm ost all norm al conduct can seem very shabby’.17 W hile n o t applied ‘to the exclusion o f o th er standards’, it nevertheless ‘c o n trib u te s pow erfully to several very prevalent attitudes to be found in In d ia n political life’, am ong w hich is ‘a certain w ithholding o f full approval from even the m ost popular leaders’, and to feelings o f ‘distrust o f a n d disgust w ith persons and institutions o f authority’.18 T h e im p o rta n t p o in t is that the idiom o f saintly politics is n o t ju s t an o th er guise fo r traditionalism ; it represents a m ode th rough w hich political activity can prom ote a healthy scepticism o f pow er and those w ho w ield it, in a form that can im press itself upon villager and city dw eller alike. 14. Sec M yron Weiner, ‘India’s Two Political C ultures’, in M yron W einer, Political Change in South Asia (Calcutta: Firma K.L. M ukhopadhyay, 1963); and Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘O n State, Society and D iscourse’, in Jam es M anor (cd.), Rethinking Third World Politics (London: Longm an, 1991). M y attention was brought to the persistence o f this analytical construct in the study o f Indian politics— through citations o f these and other w orks— by Paul Brass, ‘India, M yron W einer and the Political Science o f D evelopm ent’, Economic and Political Weekly, 20 July 2002, pp. 3026-40. 15. M orris-Jones, ‘India’s Political Idiom s’, p. 279. 16. Ibid, p. 280. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid.

In Varying States o f Decay

229

A pplying the term saintly politics to the w o rk o f the BVJA and the MKSS is m uch less o f a stretch than it w ould be for m any o th er Indian activists, w h o though possessing the same streak o f ethical behaviour and m oral com m itm ent, w ould n o t necessarily be accorded the term ‘saintly’. For A nna, w ho makes his hom e in a bare corner room o f the village tem ple, the descriptor takes on an alm ost literal quality. T he Indian news w ebsite tehelka.com , w hich m ade its nam e by exposing alleged cases o f high-level corruption (w ith, in som e cases, video­ taped evidence o f cash exchanging hands), described Anna H azare not only as ‘a saintly person’, b u t also as som eone w ho has ‘carried the fight against co rru p tio n from the socio-political dom ain to a spiritual plane’ by using ‘peaceful m ethods to bring about m oral pressure on people’. T his and other sources, including A nna himself, m ention the influence o f M ahatm a G andhi, V inoba Bhave20 and Swami Vivekananda— three o f the figures cited by M orris-Jones as archetypes o f this idiom . Part o f this association com es from th e fact that Anna habitually refers not only to earlier practitioners o f saintly politics, b u t also to th e saints them selves. A n nouncing his intention to undertake an eleven-day fast to publicize his allegations o f corruption against a ju d g e,21 Anna declared th at he w as ‘not m aking any dem and for an inquiry, b u t w ould search for answ ers at the feet o f Sant D y a n esh w a r...to questions lingering inside m e’.22 T h e leaders o f the MKSS can also be said to operate in the idiom o f saintly politics, though th eir egalitarian instincts w ould likely cause th em to recoil a t the connotations o f the label. T h e saintly dim ension o f their political style is revealed in the efforts taken to em body the values for w hich the m ovem ent stands by ‘living simply*. T h is does n o t m ean m erely residing in the village w here the m ovem ent is based 19. See uninv.tehelka.com/channels/ecologY/2000/july/i4/eh071400trail.htm , accessed on 20 Ju n e 2002. 20. It is also w o rth noting that Hazare has been com pared w ith Bhave in a negative sense as w ell, both having been allegedly coopted by illiberal govern­ m ents— Bhave by M rs Gandhi during the Emergency, and Hazare by the Shiv Sena governm ent in the period directly after it took pow er in M aharashtra in 1995. T his made them ‘Sarkari Sants’ (governm ent saints). See M adhav G odbole, *War Against C orruption’, The Hindu, 19 May 1997. 21. This judge had sentenced Anna to prison for allegedly having libelled a politician by accusing him o f financial irregularities. 22. A nna Casts Aspersions on M um bai Judge’, Indian Express (M um bai), 10 August 1999.

230

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

(D ev D ungri), as opposed to operating from the state o r even d is tric t capital. It also involves a conscious co m m itm en t on th e part o f all m em bers o f the m ovem ent to subsist o n the governm ent-stipulated m in im u m wage, the dem and for paym ent o f w hich was one o f th e issues that b ro u g h t the MKSS to p rom inence. T h e conviction expressed by the m ovem ent’s tw o m ain ‘o u tsid er’ leadership figures, M s A runa R oy and M r N ikhil Dey, is th at pursuing a struggle o n behalf o f ordinary people requires th e m to live in the same physical conditions as their com rades. H ailing fro m urban centres, and readily distinguished by th eir education and ease w ith in official circles, these tw o outsiders, as well as those others from beyond the area w h o com e to w ork w ith the m ovem ent— for greater o r lesser periods o f tim e— have articulated this belief in living sim ply n o t as a vow o f penance, o r a sym bol o f their ow n saintliness, b u t as necessary to m axim ize understanding and to build solidarity. B ut the message o f sacrifice23 is n o t far from the surface— an d at the very least is perceived as such. A ccounts o f how M s Roy and M r D ey ended up in D ev D ungri, fighting alongside the m arginalized, usually em phasize th eir renunciation o f privilege: M s Roy ‘left behind* her career in the IAS; M r D ey ‘gave u p ’ his studies in th e U S, both in order to engage in sewa, o r service.24 T h e sacrifice is em bodied, as it w ere, in the contrast betw een the hum ble su rro u n d ­ ings in w hich they live and w ork, and th e o th er urban, m o d em , elitist w orld to w hich they m ust retu rn regularly to subm it dem ands to, negotiate w ith , and even seek individual donations from th e holders o f power. C o m b in ed w ith extrem e courage in the face o f intim idation, including threats o f physical harm (w hich have been carried o u t in som e cases), the image left is one th at has invite^ com parisons w ith such saintly figures as G andhi, and even the divine. In one public hearing, a participant referred to M s R oy as the nyaya k i deviy o r th e goddess o f j ustice. At the very least, th e language o f sacrifice and the physical proxim ity w ith the d o w n tro d d en convey an ‘ideal o f d isin ­ terested selflessness’, to recall M orris-Jones’s phrase. A nd it is indeed 23. T h e idea o f ‘dem onstrated sacrifice’ as a necessary elem ent in successful grassroots m ovem ents in India was p u t forward byjam una Rao, a Bangalore-based political analyst, at a sem inar on A n ti-C o rru p tio n M ovem ents and the R ight to Inform ation in India’, held at the International C entre, Goa, 20-1 April 2000. 24. See the chapter on the MKSS (‘D evdoongri: Life Along the Black Tarred Road’) in Rajni Bakshi, Bapu Kuti: Journeys in Rediscovery o f Gandhi (N ew D elhi: Penguin, 1998), pp. 23-87.

In Varying States o f Decay

231

part o f the m o v em en t’s appeal that, by contrast, ‘alm ost all norm al conduct can seem very shabby’. By operating ‘at the m argin’ o f Indian politics— literally w ith and alongside the m arginalized— the MKSS is able to em body th e ethical dim ension o f politics,25 and to provide a point o f reference th at could draw o u t the suspicion o f authority to w hich M orris-Jones referred.

St a t e a n d L o c a l F a c t o r s I n f l u e n c in g th e

Sh a pe o f t h e M o v em en ts

In one o f the m o re perceptive analyses o f India’s social m ovem ents, Katzenstein, K othari, and M ehta argued that ‘issue-based Indian social m ovem ents have rem ained substantially lim ited to the regions w ithin w hich they o p e ra te ... even w hen the issues and interests they repre­ sent are national in their relevance’.26 W hile this is a useful observa­ tion, it describes a feature o f the activist landscape rather than proposing a causal relationship. It does n o t indicate the extent to w hich the philosophies, m obilizational strategies, and organizational form s o f these m ovem ents are shaped by th e peculiarities o f their respective regions. T h e MKSS and the BVJA are probably th e only tw o m ovem ents in India to share the full range o f features outlined in the previous section. M any others m ight display one or tw o o f the characteristics discussed. Like a n u m b er o f o th er activists, the N arm ada Bachao A ndolan’s M edha Patkar arguably operates w ithin the dom ain o f saintly politics, b u t w hile h er organization has sought official infor­ m ation— th ro u g h legal proceedings— Patkar herself has been ex­ trem ely critical o f the right to inform ation m o v em en t itself, at tim es dism issing it as a distraction from the m ore serious business o f issueoriented stru g g le 27 Tamil N a d u ’s Catalyst Trust, to take another 25. For one o f the m ore explicit statem ents o f the MKSS’s view o f democratic ethics, see Aruna Roy, in form ation , Democracy and Ethics’, Twelfth Shri B. V. Narayan Reddy M em orial Lecture, Indian Institute o f World C ulture, Bangalore, 1 February 2000. 26. M ary Katzenstein, Sm itu Kothari and U d ay M ehta, ‘Social M ovem ent Politics in India: Institutions, Interests and Identities’, in Atul Kohli (ed.), The Success o f India’s Democracy (Cambridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 2001), p. 245. 27. This view was stated forcefully at a public m eeting Patkar addressed at the School o f O riental and African Studies, U niversity o f London, 26 N ovem ber 1999.

232

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

exam ple, has n o t only analysed governm ent-supplied inform ation in o rd er to expose corruption, b u t has also used its findings as a m ean s thro u g h w hich to dem and freedom o f inform ation legislation; it d oes not, however, project o r em body a vision o f grassroots dem ocratic transform ation, and could in fact be accused o f elite bias in its choice o f issues. M ore th an one m ovem ent group has found it co n v en ien t to p u rsu e its social activism w hile m aintaining a parallel n o n ­ governm ental developm ent organization: S. R. H irem ath ’s Sam aj Parivartana Samudaya in Karnataka has achieved this feat o f d o u b le identity, b u t its contribu tion to the theory o r practice o f using access to inform ation to sustain a people’s m ovem ent is lacking. In o th e r w ords, despite efforts by m any groups to em ulate w hat they saw as th e secrets o f th eir success, the MKSS and the BVJA have stood in a class o f their ow n. B ut to w h at extent w ere the sim ilarities displayed by these tw o m ovem ents a reflection o f the regional contexts w ithin w hich th ey operated? T h is is n o t as straightforw ard a question to answ er— o r even to ask— as it m ight appear at first glance. Exam ining the characteristics o f the tw o states to identify sim ilarities is a necessary th o u g h n o t sufficient elem ent in the process o f providing an adequate response. It m u st also be show n that these characteristics contributed to th e em ergence o f these tw o groups, w hile their absence in o th er states w ould account for the failure o f such m ovem ents to take root there. T h e fact is that these tw o states share very little in com m on— economically, socially, and politically. M aharashtra is am ong India’s m ost developed states. Its diversified econom y includes n o t only a strong industrial base, and a grow ing service sector, b u t also a sizable degree o f cash-crop agriculture, in m any cases linked to value-added processing activities. M aharashtra is heavily oriented tow ards th e outside w orld: it is a m ajor recipient o f foreign investm ent; its capital (M um bai) hosts India’s m ain capital m arkets; and it is the base for a large n u m b er o f export industries— all o f w hich rely, to a greater o r lesser extent, upon the highly educated w orkforce to be found in the state’s principal cities (w hich boast several key centres o f higher learning). Landlocked Rajasthan, o n the o th er hand, is m ostly desert, and is one o f India’s least industrialized states, th o u g h inw ard investm ent (from India as well as fio m abroad) has picked up in recent years. N e ith e r does its agricultural sector possess anything like th e degree o f diversification found in M aharashtra. T h is has led b oth to a great degree o f out-m igration, especially am ong m en w h o end up

In Varying States o f Decay

233

w orking in D elhi, A hm edabad and, indeed, M um bai, and to a general lack o f dynam ism in the state’s economy. W hile there are sim ilarities betw een Rajasthan and M aharashtra in some aspects o f econom ic structure— such as the salience o f state-financed em ploym ent-generation program m es— these are n o t peculiar to this tw osom e. T h ese econom ic differences are m atched by, and indeed partly a reflection of, deeper differences in the societies o f M aharashtra and Rajasthan. Perhaps m ost notably, M aharashtra experienced d u rin g the late nin eteen th century and early tw entieth century a n u m b er o f social reform m ovem ents that transform ed the n ature o f its caste system. A strong n on-B rahm in m ovem ent, w ith m any stream s, ultim ately led to the consolidation o f political dom inance around the M aratha caste cluster. T h is m ovem ent took a different form from the earlier wave o f low er-caste political assertion in the south Indian states— the em phasis on reservations in state institutions, for one thing, was not as pronounced— b u t the dynam ics it unleashed w ere far-reaching, affecting the developm ent o f a range o f institutions, social and political, that have com e to shape M aharashtra’s political landscape. W hile som e n o rth Indian states (notably B ihar and U tta r Pradesh) have experienced sim ilar form s o f social change d u rin g the 1990s, these trends have largely bypassed Rajasthan, tho u g h R ajasthan’s caste and com m unity profile is m ore typical o f o th er n o rth Indian states than is M aharashtra’s. Linguistically, R ajasthan an d M ah arash tra n o t o n ly d o n o t share a language, b u t they fall into tw o different categories w h ere the relationship betw een language and state form ation is concerned. R ajasthan shares a language (H indi) w ith a n u m b er o f states, such as D elhi, UP, MP, Bihar, H aryana and H im achal Pradesh, tho u g h a range o f dialects (and often m ore than one) are found in these states. M aharashtra falls into the category o f states in w hich the m ain official language is relatively unique to that state. Ju s t as Karnataka is the only prim arily K annada-speaking state and A ndhra Pradesh the only prim arily Telugu-speaking state, M aharashtra is the only prim arily M arathi-speaking state. O th e r languages are spoken in M aharashtra, and there are M arathi-speaking m inorities in neighbouring states, notably Karnataka. B ut it is a far cry from Rajasthan, w hich is part o f the ‘H in d i-b elt’. In term s o f party and electoral politics— the discussion o f society in the previous paragraph having touched o n a n u m b er o f o th er aspects o f politics— M aharashtra and Rajasthan are n o t polar opposites, b u t

234

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

they are not an obvious pair either. M o st notably, the tw o states differ in term s o f the n u m b er o f serious contenders in th eir elections. D u rin g m ost o f the 1990s, there have been ju s t tw o m ain parties in Rajasthan, a rarity am ong Indian states. M aharashtra, w hile n o t having reached the extrem e party fragm entation o f som e o th er states, presents a far m ore com plex party-political map. T h e H in d u nationalist camp has long been divided betw een the all-India Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the m ainly regional (and indeed regional^*) Shiv Sena. In the latter part o f the 1990s, a faction o f M aharashtra’s C ongress party broke away to form its ow n political outfit. Also o n the scene is an array o f D alit-oriented parties, m ost notably th e R epublican Party o f India— and its m any splinter groups— b u t also at tim es a n u m b er o f o th er parties built aro u n d bahujan identity. Parties prim arily based in o th e r states, such as the Samajwadi Party (a m ainly U P outfit), have from tim e to tim e played a role in b oth state assem bly and national parliam entary elections, as have sm aller outfits, such as the farm ers' organization the Shetkari Sanghatana, w hich have p u t up candidates in selected regions o f M aharashtra. Rajasthan, in contrast, has been alm ost a purely tw o-party affair: a pretty straight fight betw een the C ongress and the BJP By 1992 the centre-left Janata D al had been all b u t decim ated in R ajasthan politics, its offshoots—su c h as the Janata D al(D )— having largely been ab­ sorbed into the BJP, w h ich controlled the state governm ent from 1990-8. As in m any o th er states. C ongress u n d erw en t m in o r splits at various times, m ost notably at the tim e o f the 1996 parliam entary elections, w h en a n u m b e r o f w ell-know n leaders from the Ja t co m ­ m u nity in particular form ed a breakaway party. T h is was a m u ch less significant developm ent than was the later division in the M aharashtra Congress, w hich was form ally a ‘national’ split in the C ongress, but w hich had its m ajor im pact m ainly in M aharashtra. Like m ost other state-level C ongress units, the Rajasthan C ongress was barely affected. C o m m u n ists o f various hues have occasionally found seats in the Rajasthan assembly, as have independents (m ost notably in the assem ­ bly elected in 1993), b u t the degree o f fragm entation in R ajasthan’s party system is now here near that found in M aharashtra. T h is is m irrored in the tw o states’ respective patterns o f party control: in M aharashtra the governm ents elected in 1995 and 1999 w ere both coalition governm ents, w hereas in Rajasthan the governm ents elected in 1993 and 1998 w ere b oth ruled by a single party (though w ith ad hoc support from independents in the case o f the 1993 governm ent).

In Varying States o f Dccay

235

W hile the social, political, and econom ic profiles o f M aharashtra and Rajasthan are different enough to discount the possibility that state-level contexts could adequately account for the em ergence o f tw o such similar m ovem ents w ithin their borders, a slightly different picture em erges at the level o f the regions within these states w here these m ovem ents w ere based. Arguably, locality-specific factors w ere far m ore im portant than state-level factors in n u rtu rin g and shaping these m ovem ents. W hile very different from o ne an o th er in m any respects, the areas adjoining M aharashtra’s A hm ednagar district, w here the BV|A is m ost active, and the general vicinity o f R ajasthan’s Rajsam and district, w here the MKSS has its base, have at least tw o relevant traits in com m on. T h e first is the caste profile o f these tw o regions— in particular the existence o f an especially n u m ero u s ‘d o m in an t caste’. T h e MKSS, th o u g h it lobbies the state governm ent and has initiated w o rk and forged alliances w ith like-m inded groups in all m ajor regions o f Rajasthan, has concentrated m ost o f its activities in an area adjoining Rajsam and district. T hese also happen to be the districts in w hich th e Rawat com m unity is located. Based o n official and o th e r sources, the historian and anthropologist Shail M ayaram , w h o has conducted research o n Rawats (as well as o th er lim inal groups that b lu r the H in d u -M u slim categorical divide), has estim ated their population at 1.5 m illion. Rawats reside ‘prim arily in the villages o f the central R ajasthan districts o f Pali, R ajsam and, A jm er and B hilw ara.’28 MKSS m em bers have them selves reflected o n this. O n e o f their docum ents states that the m ovem ent’s ‘w orking area covers about 60,000 square kilom etres which form s parts o f Ajmer, R ajsam and, Bhilwara and Pali D istricts. T hese are traditionally d ro u g h t prone areas, and are prim a­ rily inhabited by the Rawats, w h o form 80 per cent o f the population’. T h e M KSS estimates that ‘the percentage o f Rawats in the Sangathan w ould be over 70 per cen t’.29 Like the MKSS, the BVJA also considers itself a state-w ide m ove­ m ent, b u t is aware that its strength is concentrated in A hm ednagar and the su rro u n d in g districts. T h is is the heartland o f th e M aratha 28. Shail Mayaram, ‘C anonizing H induism : T h e Politics o f Vishva H in d u Parishad C onversion’, paper presented at the Annual M eeting o f the N etw ork on South Asian Politics and Political Econom y (N ETSA PPE), Bangalore, 30 J u n c 2 July 2003. 29. MKSS, ‘From Inform ation to A ccountability’, unpublished paper, January 2001, p. 26.

236

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

caste. T h e M arathas share tw o key characteristics w ith the R aw ats th a t are relevant to th e discussion o f the relationship betw een a region’s social profile and the ability o f certain types o f m ovem ents to take root w ithin it. T h e first is num erical preponderance. M arathas co n stitu te som e 3 5 -4 0 per cent o f M aharashtra’s population, a n exceptionally high figure w hen com pared to the social dem ography o f alm ost any o th er Indian state. In the parts o f ‘w estern M aharashtra’ adjoining Ahm ednagar, w here the BVJA is m o st active, the percentage is even higher— perhaps n o t to the level o f Rawats in the region w here the MKSS operates, b u t significantly higher than is the n o rm in India. W hy m ight this m atter to the functioning o f an anti-corruption m ovem ent? O n e explanation th at has been offered by observers in b o th Rajasthan and M aharashtra is that, at local levels, caste associa­ tions can serve as m ediating institutions, helping to defuse th e tensions betw een accuser and accused that arise in the sort o f n o n form al anti-corruption proceedings that the BVJA and the MKSS have b o th experim ented w ith— tensions that m ight otherw ise spin o u t o f control and make a continuation o f these m ethods untenable. T h is, o f course, has its flip side: m em bers o f a caste group may be less likely to level charges o f corruption against oth ers o f their brethren. B u t w h en a m ovem ent has developed a reputation for innovation, d ed i­ cation to the local com m unity and an ideology that de-em phasizes ascriptive difference, this problem is m itigated. M oreover, th e fact th at th e w orst case o f backlash faced by the M KSS cam e in a m ore socially fragm ented and econom ically unequal region o f Rajasthan reinforces th e im pression that the relative social hom ogeneity o f its hom e region played at least som e part in m aking possible its experim ents w ith people-led anti-corruption investigations.30 T he second key characteristic shared by the Rawats and the M arathas is their split personality. T h e M aratha co m m u n ity consists o f several sm aller sub-groups— a trait w hich has led to it som etim es being referred to as a ‘caste-cluster.’ O n e o f the key dividing lines w ithin th e com m unity— in addition, that is, to the salient divisions betw een M arathas hailing from different regions w ithin the state— is betw een an elite grouping claim ing tw ice-born Kshatriya status, and the far larger segm ent that falls m ore com fortably in to the Kunbi peasantry, 30. See ‘T he Seal o f the Sarpanch’, in H arsh M andcr, Unheard Voices: Stories o f Forgotten Lives (N ew Delhi: Penguin, 2001), pp. 137—48.

In Varying States o f Decay

237

fo r w hom such claims are m ore ten u o u s.31 T h e boundary betw een th e tw o is often rather fuzzy, n o t least because o f the tendency for virtually all lineage groups to claim higher status than genealogical analysis m ight support, b u t also because o f controversy su rro u n d in g th e figure o f Shivaji, the 17th century M aratha w arrior-prince w h o was to becom e the co m m u n ity ’s icon. It is doubtful that Shivaji was o f K shatriya stock, though it is alm ost im possible to m ake this statem ent publicly in M aharashtra w ith o u t inviting vocifcrous contradiction. T h e counterpart caste in central Rajasthan, the Rawats, also m anifest th is high-low status ambiguity. As the MKSS itself puts it, Rawats are divided o n the basis o f status claims, ‘w ith som e calling them selves R ajputs [the archetypal Kshatriya co m m u n ity ], and others feeling the need to call them selves “O th e r Backward C o m m u n ities” (O B C s) to get the benefits o f reservation quotas’ in public-sector em ploym ent.32 T h e claim ing o f R ajput status is a pattern o f social m obility in Rajasthan that has been term ed ‘Kshatriyanization,* and a reflection o f the region’s practice o f ‘R ajput H in d u ism .’33 T h e reason w hy this point o f sim ilarity is im p o rtan t from the perspective o f building and sustaining an an ti-corruption m ovem ent is that poor and disadvantaged people from such hybrid-status com m unities are often less reluctant to engage in political activity than are people from castes that are alm ost universally regarded as o f inferior social status. T h ey are also less likely to be view ed by econom ic elites as a threat to the established socio-political order. T h eir com plex and am biguous status profile, according to the MKSS, m eans that ‘the Rawats d o not have a tradition o f obeisance or a sense o f inferiority despite their econom ic poverty’.34 W hile the case o f econom ically depressed M arathas is different for a variety o f reasons (not least the fact that, unlike the Rawats, M arathas are the do m in an t caste politically in m ost o f rural M aharashtra, having produced a 31. O n the significance o f these elite-mass divisions, and the relevance o f regional difFercnces, sec Jayant Lcle, ‘Caste, Class and D om inance: Political M obilization in M aharashtra’, in Francinc R. Frankcl and M . S. A. Rao (eds), Dominance and State Poxver in Modem India: Decline o f a Social Order, vol. II (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 115-211. 32. Ibid. 33. See Iqbal N arain and P C . M athur, ‘T h e T housand Year Raj: Regional Isolation and Rajput H induism in Rajasthan before and after 1947’, in Francine Frankel and Rao (eds), Dominance and State Power, vol. II, pp. 1-58. 34. Ibid.

238

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

n u m b e r o f c h ie f m inisters), o n this question o f assertiveness th ere is an im portant degree o f convergence. T h e ‘catchm ent areas’ o f the MKSS and BVJA have a second trait in com m on: the form taken by corru p tio n in these tw o areas. T h ere are m any system s for classifying different types o f corruption. O n e distinction that is often invoked is betw een petty and grand c o rru p ­ tion, the form er consisting o f the sm all-tim e bribes exacted by clerks and other m in o r officials, the latter signifying the com m issions paid to high-level decision-m akers w h o award, for instance, defense co n ­ tracts. A nother co m m o n ly cited analytical approach distinguishes betw een, o n the o ne hand, system ic corruption, in w hich im proper behaviour is all b u t built into official roles (in the sense that illicit incom e is ‘req u ired ’ by officials in o rd er to earn back the am ounts expended to get them selves appointed to such lucrative posts), and on the other, personalized co rru p tio n , in w hich a rogue official exploits a o n e -o ff o p p o rtu n ity for illicit gain.35 O n e can also distinguish, theoretically speaking, betw een positive co rru p tio n , w here an official actively seeks personal gain from his public position, and negative corruption, w here an official takes biased decisions in o rd er to avoid incurring the w rath o f a pow erful actor, w h eth er a politician o r official higher up the chain o f com m and, o r a private businessm an with connections sufficient to get the official transferred, reprim anded o r even charged w ith a crim e w ere he to resist the dem ands made u p o n him .36 Based o n these distinctions, it can be said that in the regions o f M aharashtra and Rajasthan w here the BVJA and the MKSS, respec­ tively, operate corru p tio n is a hybrid betw een grand and petty, and is predom inantly system ic and positive in nature. T h is, how ever, can be said about m ost districts in India. It does n o t m ark o u t the environs o f A hm ednagar o r Rajsam and as special in any particular respect. O n an o th er analytical indicator related to corruption, how ever, these two regions are both at variance w ith w hat m ight fairly be asserted as the norm . T his concerns the extent to w hich co rru p tio n that afflicts poor 35. See Robert Wade, ‘T h e M arket for Public Office: W hy the Indian State Is N o t Better at D evelopm ent’, World Dewlopment, vol. 13, no. 4 (1985), pp. 46797. 36. This distinction between positive and negative corruption is draw n from a forthcom ing book w hich looks at different form s o f accountability failure. See Anne Marie G oetz and Rob Jenkins, Reinventing Accountability: Making Democracy Work for the Poor (Palgrave, forthcom ing).

In Varying States o f Decay

239

o r ordinary citizens expresses itself in an ‘accom m odative’ or an ‘exclusionary’ form. T h is is n o t a distinction found in the existing literature, and was developed as a result o f discussions w ith people associated w ith b oth m ovem ents, as w ell as o th er political observers in these tw o states. T his distinction is sim ilar to (and yet n o t quite precisely the sam e as) the distinction introduced by Shleifer and Vishny, w h o differentiate betw een w hat they call ‘corru p tio n w ith th eft’ and its opposite, ‘corru p tio n w ith o u t theft’.37 T h e basis o f this distinction is w h eth er the nature o f a co rru p t transaction im poses a loss on the public at large (‘w ith th eft’) o r w hether the illicit funds are taken directly from a specific individual or firm (‘w ith o u t theft’), such that the general public is n o w orse off. T h e term inology is rather confusing (since b oth are form s o f theft, and indeed w e tend to regard theft as som ething directed at individuals rath er than at society as a w hole), and the tw o types m ight better be distinguished as ‘diffuse’ versus ‘targeted’ impact. E ither way, it is a useful distinction. T h e distinction betw een ‘accom m odative’ and ‘exclusionary’ form s o f co rru p tio n is slightly different in that, unlike the w ith -th eft/ w ith o u t-th eft dichotom y, it does n o t view any given co rru p t trans­ action as inherently o f one o r another type. H o w a transaction is classified is n o t based on any essential characteristics o f the situation, b u t rather by the behaviour o f the officials them selves. T h e distinction betw een ‘accom m odative’ and ‘exclusionary’ form s o f corru p tio n recognizes that in certain (though n o t all) cases the behaviour o f officials is n o t preordained by the structural characteristics o f the econom ic activities involved— and n o t only in the sense that officials have a choice o f w h eth er to be co rru p t o r not, the constraints im posed by ‘system ic’ (investm ent-recouping) and ‘negative’ (p u n ish m en tavoiding) corruption notw ithstanding. Instead, officials at m any levels o f the bureaucratic hierarchy, b u t particularly those at the low est level— those at the p o in t o f interface w ith poor people— are presented w ith choices. Officials m ust d e q d e w h eth er to obtain their illicit rents directly from the poor (corruption w ith o u t theft), o r w h eth er to, in effect, shift the burden to the larger tax-paying, service-receiving public (corruption w ith theft). If they dem onstrate a bias tow ards obtaining illegal incom e directly from individual citizens even when 37. See A. Shleifer and R Vishny, ‘C o rru p tio n ’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108 (1993), pp. 599-612.

240

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

it is not the only option, th en they can be said to be engaging in a n ‘exclusionary’ form o f co rru p tio n — cu ttin g o u t the ordinary citizen from a share o f their ill-gotten gains. O fficials w ho obtain their illegal incom e at the expense o f the public at large, even w hen o th er o p tio n s are available, are engaged in an ‘accom m odative’ form o f c o rru p tio n , arriving at an accom m odation w ith the disadvantaged people w ith w h o m th eir w o rk has bro u g h t th em into contact. T h e em ploym ent-generating public-w orks schem es that both th e BVJA and the MKSS target in th eir anti-corruption investigations are revealing about the degree to w hich accom m odative o r exclusionary form s o f co rru p tio n are prevalent in the regions in w hich they w ork. T h is is because the structure o f these schem es offers ju n io r officials a choice o f m ethods for obtaining illegal incom e. W h eth er this w ill take the form o f corruption w ith theft o r corruption w ith o u t theft is no t predeterm ined. As w e learned in the discussion o f the M K SS’s m ethods for using governm ent records to cross-check official accounts o f how funds w ere expended, officials routinely doctor the paperw ork in ord er to conccal illegal appropriation o f funds. T he im portant point, from the perspective o f this com parative study o f the local contexts in w hich the MKSS and the BVJA em erged, is that in the regions in w hich b oth m ovem ents operate the m eans by w hich funds are siphoned into the pockets o f those w h o adm inister these schem es follows a sim ilar pattern. In both regions there is a tendency tow ards exclusionary, as opposed to accom m odative, form s o f corruption. In go v ern m en t-ru n w orks schem es that use daily-wage labour, the use o f bogus nam es to fill bloated daily em ploym ent registers is standard practice. T here are o th er ways, o f course, for contractors, officials, and politicians to m ake m oney, b u t this one is alm ost always present, w hereas big kickbacks for m aterial are n o t always possible, especially given the fixed ratio betw een labour and m aterial costs stipulated by governm ent regulations. T h o u g h adding bogus nam es to the list o f w orkers is the standard vehicle for extracting funds, there are, broadly speaking, tw o sources from w hich the funds extracted thro u g h this route can be draw n. T h e first is to dip into the am o u n t d ue to the ‘g enuine’ w orkers, those that actually break rocks, dig ditches or move earth for eight hours a day. T h ere is a daily w ork-ratc in effect on these schem es, w hich m eans that if the w ork done by ten genuine labourers m ust be divided am ong these ten genuine w orkers, plus five bogus nam es (the paym ents for w hom w ill be divided up am ong the colluding

In Varying States o f Decay

241

officials and politically connected local notables), th en the genuine w orkers will have th eir pay cu t by a third. T h is is the standard practice in b o th th e R ajsam and region o f R ajasthan a n d th e A h m cd n ag ar region o f M aharashtra. B ut interview s w ith know ledgeable observers in o th er regions o f each o f these tw o states— the B ikaner region o f n o rth e rn Rajasthan and the K onkan coast o f M aharashtra— indicates that alternative m ethods are som etim es used, as they are in o th er parts o f India. T h e alternative m ethod is for the bureaucratic and political co n ­ trollers o f these system s to derive th eir rents n o t at the expense (or disproportionate expense) o f poor labourers, b u t rather to pursue illicit rents at the expense o f the larger governm ent budget. T h a t is, rather than dividing the daily w ork-achievem ent m easurem ent by a larger n u m b er o f w orkers than actually w orked (to accom m odate the bogus nam es), w hich requires the expropriation o f part o f the genuine w orkers’ wages, officials m ay instead revert to o^er-m easurem ent o f the w orks them selves in o rd er to inflate the wage bill such that em ployees could still be paid alm ost all o f w hat they w ere due, even w hile a surplus is created to feed the officials and political notables. I say ‘almost* because the choice o f this accom m odative m ethod im plies an additional cost in the form o f to p -u p paym ents m ade to buy the acquiescence o f the ju n io r engineers w h o m u st fraudulently m easure the works. T h a t the MKSS and the BVJA both operate in regional environ­ m ents in w hich the standard practice o f officials and their political accom plices is to opt for exclusionary form s o f co rru p tio n that harm p o o r w orkers rather than accom m odative form s that rob the public at large— that is, they choose ‘co rru p tio n w ith o u t theft’— even w hen an accom m odative approach is available, and is indeed practiced w idely in other regions o f these sam e states, is relevant to the question o f how local contexts affect the prospects for an ti-co rru p tio n m ove­ m ents to take root. It is n o t difficult to im agine that w here accom ­ m odative form s o f co rru p tio n are in effect, it is all the m ore difficult for activists to m obilize poor people to take o n pow erful interests w h o control these system s o f institutionalized fraud. T hese cases do n o t provide a basis for concluding that the existence o f exclusionary form s o f corruption is a sufficient (or even a necessary) condition for the em ergence o f a grassroots m ovem ent against corruption. B ut it is n o t unreasonable to consider it a co n tributing factor that m ight help to account for the em ergence o f these m ovem ents in som e places

242

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

and n o t others. C o m bined w ith a conducive caste en v iro n m en t, w hich reduces the potential for accusations o f corruption to sto k e inter-caste conflict, they provide at least som e grounds for sh iftin g som e o f o u r attention to local and district levels, rather than relying on an assessm ent o f variables associated w ith state-w ide political systems.

T M

he

Im pa c t

of

ovem ents’

D

S t a t e - L e v e l V a r ia b l e s iv e r g e n t

T

on

the

r a je c t o r ie s

As w e have seen, variables aggregated to the state level have b een relatively u n im portant in explaining w hy India’s tw o m ost influential an ti-co rru p tio n m ovem ents (w hich share such a striking range o f sim ilarities) arose in M aharashtra and R ajasthan d u rin g th e 1990s. N evertheless, key differences betw een these tw o states may help to account for the subsequent divergence betw een the tw o m ovem ents, w hich m anifested itself as the tw entieth century cam e to a close. T his divergence has n o t seen the tw o m ovem ents shed any o f the com m on characteristics outlined earlier. T hese similarities rem ain largely intact. Rather, the divergence is in term s o f the strategic em phasis the tw o m ovem ents have adopted since roughly 1999. T hese responses have, in tu rn , been generated by the differing ways in w hich the governm ents o f these tw o states have tended to respond to the advocacy w o rk pursued by the M KSS and the BVJA. In Rajasthan, the culm ination o f th e M K SS’s agitations for access to inform ation was n o t m erely the passage o f a state-level R ight to Inform ation Act, though this was achieved in 2000. N o r was it the enactm ent o f national legislation, the cam paign for w hich involved the MKSS in a m ajor role. M ore im portant was the M KSS’s ability to see its vision o f participatory governance— or at least som ething approaching this ideal— institutionalized into the system o f law adm in­ istered by the Rajasthan governm ent. In contrast, the sim ilar approach advocated by Anna H azare has not been replicated state-w ide in the w ay th a t o n ce seem ed v irtu a lly assu red by th e M ah arash tra governm ent’s early support for H azare’s ‘m odel village programme*. T h is had used as its m odel the institutional arrangem ents— including transparency provisions su rro u n d in g the execution o f public w orks and direct involvem ent o f ordinary citizens in developm ent planning and im plem entation— pioneered by A nna in Ralegan Siddhi.

In Varying States o f Decay

243

It is puzzling that the M K SS’s attem pts to ‘institutionalize trans­ parency’— that is, to lobby for the inclusion o f ‘social au d it’ provisions in R ajasthan’s panchayati raj legislation— should have succeeded, w here sim ilar efforts undertaken by A nna in M aharashtra failed. M aharashtra should in theory have provided a m ore conducive setting for institutionalization than Rajasthan provided for the MKSS— n o t least because M aharashtra’s civil society is far m ore vibrant and diversified th an R ajasthan’s. T h e range o f non-governm ental organi­ zations w orking to prom ote participatory developm ent, the density o f civil society netw orks, and the tradition o f social activism — all are substantially greater in M aharashtra. T h e re are tw o m ain reasons w hy these advantages could not translate into the degree o f policy influence necessary to propel the BVJA’s proposals for institutional reform into law. T h e first concerns the nature o f civil society itself. W hile in theory the density o f associational life in M aharashtra is an asset to cam paign­ ers against corruption, in practice the picture is m ore am biguous. A good n u m b er o f the state’s ‘people’s organizations’, non-governm ental developm ent groups, and single-issue cam paigning netw orks have been at odds w ith A nna and th e BVJA. T h is has som etim es reflected differences in political style o r even ideology, such as the extent to w h ich opposition to com m unal politics is seen to be com prom ised by A nna’s w illingness to w o rk alongside individuals and organizations associated w ith o ne or an o th er strand o f the H in d u nationalist m ove­ m ent. T h e w illingness o f A nna to jo in forces, at one point, w ith a fo rm er IAS officer w ho was know n to be n o t only extrem ely am bi­ tious politically, b u t also close to the H in d u nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the parent organization o f the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), caused great consternation am ong activist groups seeking to p ro m o te a secular form o f politics. A nd w h en a BJP politician took the unusual step o f tabling a Private M em b er’s bill in the M aharashtra assembly, w hich w ould have codified citizens’ rights to governm ent-held inform ation, conflicts w ithin the coalition o f organizations that had form ed aro u n d A nna’s call for a Freedom o f Inform ation Bill prevented the m ovem ent from providing even tactical support to w hat m ight have been an im portant political open­ ing. A diversified civi! society can furnish the raw m aterial w ith w hich to press governm ents for change, b u t the divisions in its ranks can also act o n an obstacle to coherent collective action. T h e M KSS could co u n t o n few er staunch allies, given R ajasthan’s far less diversified

244

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

civil society. Indeed, the M K SS’s stance on issues— including its proposals for reform ing the state’s panchayati raj institutions— w ere often subjected to w ith erin g criticism by o th er non-governm ental groups. B ut w hat the MKSS lacked by way o f an extensive civil society netw ork it m ore than m ade up for by the com pactness o f its closeknit coalition o f activists. C ivil society in M aharashtra also displayed another characteristic that reduced its ability to co n trib u te to the kind o f campaign for institutional reform that w as possible in Rajasthan, but w hich th e BVJA was unable to m o u n t successfully. T h is was the degree to w h ich groups that made up civic life in M aharashtra w ere com prom ised by th eir relationships w ith the state. Trade unions are a particularly vivid exam ple. In m any Indian states, labour organizations are enm eshed in cosy relationships w ith holders o f state power, as w ell as w ith o th e r unsavoury elem ents in local society— co rru p t businessm en, the crim i­ nal underw orld, violent police forces. B ut the extent o f such unh o ly entanglem ents is far greater in M aharashtra than in Rajasthan, tho u g h it is perhaps not the m ost egregious case am ong all Indian states. T h e R ashtriya M ill M azdoor Sangh (R M M S), w hich represents (as a result o f state-level legislation) w orkers in the textile industry, has on several occasions fallen u n d er the direct control o f organized crime. T h a t it w ould prove an unreliable ally in struggles to make the state govern­ m en t m ore transparent and accountable is n o t particularly surprising to m ost observers in M aharashtra. Indeed, the alleged role o f the R M M S in allowing m any o f its ow n w orkers to be defrauded by their em ployers, w ho are w idely reported to have violated the term s o f their restru ctu rin g agreem ents w ith governm ent agencies, has m ade it a party to corruption. O n e o f the o th er key actors in M aharashtra’s civil society— the state’s agricultural cooperatives— has also becom e (despite the in ten ­ tions o f the cooperatives’ founders) intensely intertw ined w ith the operations o f the state governm ent, and indeed a key arena o f partisan com petition itself. T hese kinds o f problem s— o f bo th corru p tio n and co-optation, and o f the b lu rrin g o f boundaries betw een state and civil society— are not un k n o w n in Rajasthan. N or, for that m atter, are ‘briefcase N G O s’, a form o f ‘civil society’ that exists in b oth states as a vehicle for the en rich m en t o f form er bureaucrats and o th er w ellconnected elites. T h e ir standard operating procedure is to cream resources from g o v ern m en t- and d o n o r-fu n d ed program m es before folding up shop, never to be heard from again. B ut while they exist

In Varying States o f Decay

245

in b oth states, these and other types o f ‘com prom ising’ activities take place o n a m uch sm aller scale in R ajasthan than in M aharashtra.38 T h e second reason w hy the M K SS’s lobbying to institutionalize transparency w orked in Rajasthan, w hile the BVfA’s parallel efforts in M aharashtra fell o n d e a f ears, concerns the relative receptiveness o f these tw o states’ political cultures to the kinds o f pressure that can be exerted by ‘saintly politics’. D u rin g the 1960s, at the tim e M o rrisJones highlighted th e pow er o f this idiom , saintly politics could be practised m ore o r less th ro u g h o u t India— albeit as a m arginal style. B ut by the 1990s, there w ere regions in India w here it becam e all b u t im possible for saintly politics to perform its function as a standard against w hich im m oral public conduct could be show n up. By the m id-1990s M aharashtra was arguably am ong these regions. To p u t it som ew hat crudely, the pow er o f sham e is reduced in environm ents pervaded by sham eless political behaviour. M aharashtra, w hile n o t as norm less as, say, Bihar, began increasingly to abandon th e civility that had characterized its politics in earlier eras. T h e tendency had been grow ing over the previous tw o decades, corre­ sponding roughly (and not coincidentally) w ith the period d u rin g w hich the rabidly H in d u chauvinist Shiv Sena became a serious force in the state’s politics. Rajasthan, for all its problem s, is n o t afflicted by this syndrom e to anyw here near the sam e extent. R ajasthan has seen state-abetted com m unal rioting— m ost notably in Jaip u r d u rin g 1990 and 1992— and any n u m b er o f abuses o f public pow er. B ut a m o d icu m o f political and bureaucratic deco ru m continues to prevail in Rajasthan. An exam ple related to the politics o f co rru p tio n that dem onstrates th e depths to w hich M aharashtra’s political culture had descended concerns the state’s Public D istribution System (PD S). T h e PD S supplies subsidized foodgrains and o th er essential com m odities through a nationw ide netw ork o f ‘ration shops’. It suffers from chronic m ism anagem ent. Problem s include poor forecasting capacity, anti­ quated logistical system s to su p p o rt storage and delivery functions, cost inefficiencies, poor-quality food grain, harassm ent o f consum ers at the p o in t o f client interface, and exclusion o f large num b ers o f the 38. For further details on the degree to w hich M aharashtra’s civil society is corrupted, see Rob Jenkins and A nne M arie G oetz, ‘Constraints on Civil Society’s Capacity to C u rb C orruption: Lessons from the Indian Experience’, ID S Bulletin, vol. 29, no. 4 (O ctober 1999).

246

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

poor from th e system entirely, either through incapacity to process their claim s o r o u trig h t disqualification despite clear evidence o f need . M any (though not all) o f these problem s stem from system ic corruption, w hich infects virtually every com ponent o f the b u re a u ­ cratic m achinery responsible for operating the PD S. India’s C en tral V igilance C o m m iss io n e r su p p o rts his assertio n th a t in In d ia ‘[cjo rru p tio n is anti po o r’ by stating th a t ‘31 per cent o f the food grains and 36 per c e n t o f the sugar m eant for the [PD S], w hich is designed to provide food security to the people below the poverty line, gets diverted to the black m arket’.39 C o rru p tio n also plagues the process o f issuing ‘ration cards’, w hich households require in ord er to purchase stipulated quantities o f various com m odities at go v ern m en tdeterm ined prices. T hese problem s are not unique to M aharashtra. T hey can be fo u n d in any Indian state. B ut certain local political factors have exacerbated the situation in M aharashtra. T h e level o f bribe payable in o rd e r to obtain a ration card should, in theory, be m oderated by the very leakiness o f th e system. Poor people, in o th er w ords, will refuse to pay large su m s o f cash for a card th at buys them very few de facto benefits. A nd yet in M aharashtra’s capital o f M um bai, people are w illing to pay the going rate o f about $ 100 for a ration card because it can purchase, in addition to diluted kerosene and grains that in som e instances have been declared unfit fo r hu m an consum ption, basic citizenship rights. N o t only does possession o f a ration card help people gain access to m any public an d private services that w ould otherw ise rem ain beyond their reach— this is the case in m any o th er states as w ell— the ration card in M um bai functions as a de facto identity card, and obtaining one is a m ajor preoccupation o f m any poor families, especially those from m inority com m unities. D u rin g th e late 1990s, this preoccupation increased dram atically for M uslim slum dw ellers in M um bai, an d so (naturally) did the price they w ere w illing to pay for one, even as the level o f effective benefit provided w as being (officially) curtailed. T h is was because th e coalition governm ent that ruled the state from 1995 to 1999— w hich included th e Shiv Sena party— had begun an often violent drive to rid M um bai o f w hat it considered ‘illegal’ m igrants from Bangladesh. 39. N . Vittal, C entral Vigilance C om m issioner, G overnm ent o f India, ‘C o r­ ruption in Public Life: Steps to Improve India’s Image’, public address, M um bai, 14 February 2002, http://cuc.nu.in/vscvc/cucspeeches/sp5feb02.pdf.

In Varying States o f Decay

247

M uslim residents w ere required to prove th eir nationality (n o t ju s t th eir m unicipal residency), and the ration card was the standard m eans for doing so, th o u g h even this was often considered insufficient evidence. T h e ration card becam e, for M uslim s, a m eans n o t ju s t for food security, b u t for physical security as well. T h e resulting increase in d em and for ration cards m ean t that the ‘com m ission’ payable to obtain one w en t up— for H in d u s as w ell as M uslim s. Peoples* organizations that had w orked w ith th e BVJA b o th to seek increased transparency in governm ent and to fight corru p tio n (par­ ticularly w ith respect to the PD S) em ployed a range o f G andhian tactics to exert m oral pressure on M aharashtra’s politicians and officials to end the use o f ration cards as part o f w hat one organization called ‘eth n ic cleansing’. B ut street protests, sit-ins, and o th er form s o f n o n -v io len t action, o f a sort w hich had becom e part o f the political repertoire deployed by A nna H azare and o th er M aharashtrian social activists, achieved alm ost no concrete results. Efforts by N G O s to sham e the governm ent into fu nding program m es for w hich it claim ed to have n o resources— in one case by sending young people into the streets w ith buckets and signs claim ing that they w ere there to ‘beg fo r alm s for the c h ie f m in ister’— could n o t budge the adm inistration. O n m ore th an one occasion A nna called o ff a h u n g er strike— the ultim ate form o f sacrificial politics— w h en the state governm ent refused even to take official notice o f his actions. Such disregard for selfless protest w ould once have been unthinkable. An official rep­ resentative, if n o t a high-level politician him self, w ould have been required to at least visit the hunger-striker, particularly one o f A nna’s renow n, and to be seen bow ing before the sym bols o f m oral authority. B ut in a debased atm osphere o f greed, intolerance and political im p u n ity the idiom o f saintly politics, w hile n o t com pletely ex­ hausted, was n o m atch for a state determ ined to have its way. And lest it seem that the Shiv Sena-B JP governm ent was an aberration in this respect, it should be noted th at its C ongress predecessor displayed sim ilar tendencies— the police shooting o f a group o f tribal protestors in 1994 being ju s t the m ost politically notew orthy exam ple.40 Saintly politics is stripped o f its pow er in contexts w here the political cu ltu re has been degraded by com m unalism , crim inalization 40. T h e ease o f the PDS is discussed in greater detail in Rob Jenkins and Anne M arie G oetz, ‘Civil Society, Food Security and Accountability’, Background Paper prepared for a w orkshop on the W orld Bank’s Wbrid Development Report 2004, Eynsham Hall, O xfordshire, 4 -5 N ovem ber 2002.

248

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

and the decim ation o f norm s o f civil behaviour betw een bureaucrats and elected leaders, and betw een these officials and ordinary citizens o r their associations. Rajasthan has n o t been reduced to this state o f affairs. T h e repertoire o f protest politics— even w hen enacted on a m u ch sm aller scale than w hat one typically finds in M aharashtra— has been sufficient to prod the state governm ent into not ju s t gestures o f concern, b u t clear policy prom ises. An extended sit-in protest in a small m arket tow n in central Rajasthan in 1996 prom pted R ajasthan’s BJP c h ie f m inister to agree— on the floor o f the state assembly, n o less— to im plem ent the right to inform ation provisions dem anded b y the MKSS. T h is paved the way for m ore direct form s o f co m m u n i­ cation betw een the MKSS and the C ongress state governm ent th at succeeded the BJP on the social audit provisions the activists had proposed as am endm ents to draft panchayati raj legislation. T h e faceto-face com m unication was n o t lacking in the norm al hardball negotiating tactics and duplicitous public-relations diplom acy that one expects o f seasoned politicians and bureaucrats. B ut there was a level o f civility beneath w hich the state’s alm ost courtly political culture w ould not allow the proceedings to sink. Senior bureaucrats in Rajasthan w ere able to enter into discussions w ith social activist groups like the MKSS, an d to respond to the m oral pressure o f saintly politics (as well as to th e political calculations o f the m ore dom inant traditional and m o d em idiom s, it m u st be added) in a way that w ould n o t have been possible for th eir counterparts in M aharashtra, m any o f w hom d u rin g the late-1990s lived in fear o f the m inisters they served. A very senior IAS officer in M aharashtra, w hen verbally abused and m anhandled by a m inister, was reprim anded by the ch ief m inister for show ing insufficient ‘loyalty’ to ‘the people’s elected representatives’ and ultim ately transferred to another post. In Rajasthan, at roughly the same tim e, a m inister w ho slapped the face o f the highest-ranking civil servant in his d ep artm en t was th ro w n out o f the cabinet by the ch ief m inister before th e day was out. T h ese are anecdotes, b u t they indicate som ething o f the tenor o f elite-level politics in the tw o states; and despite th e grassroots base o f the individuals w hich this chapter claims as exem plars o f saintly politics, it is through inter-elite negotiations that th e ir proposals for reform are b rought to fruition. T his m ilieu has becom e seriously degraded in M aharashtra, w hereas a sort o f courtly dem eanour has managed to survive in Rajasthan. T his political space, an essential com plem ent to the ability to appeal to accepted m oral standards in public life,

In Varying States o f Decay

249

has allowed the MKSS to prod a reluctant-but-responsive state governm ent to institutionalize, in substantial m easure, its vision o f participatory democracy. T h e BVJA, on the o th er hand, found its proposals stalled by a succession o f state governm ents, including the coalition o f C ongress parties w hich in late 1999 replaced the Shiv Sena-BJP com bine. W hether the M KSS’s hard-w on reform s are exploited by R ajasthan’s people, and the civil society organizations w orking on th eir behalf, is o f course an o th er m atter entirely. To recapitulate, this pattern— o f state responsiveness to civil society-sponsored governance reform in R ajasthan, and fairly hostile governm ent resistance in M aharashtra— has b een largely the result o f tw o factors: the highly com prom ised nature o f civil society in M aharashtra (w hich deprived the BVJA o f effective allies), and the ability o f saintly politics (o f the sort that has been practiced by both the MKSS and th e BVJA) to influence the policy process in Rajasthan, b u t n o t in M aharashtra. B ut the story does not end there. T he different fates o f transparency reform efforts in these tw o states generated, in tu rn , a notable divergence betw een the agendas o f the tw o m ovem ents. T h e BVJA continues to investigate and follow -up cases o f local corruption, and to press the M aharashtra governm ent for a m ore transparent m eth o d o f im plem enting the w atershed developm ent schem es that by n o w have becom e a part o f th e anti-poverty landscape in m ost Indian states. B ut w ith little hope o f substantive institutional reform in the political environm ent that n o w prevails in M aharashtra, the BVJA has begun to rely m ore than ever on public relations gim m icks, and th e tendency for A nna to befuddle his follow ers w ith erratic decision-m aking has if anything increased. In o th er w ords, the state’s political pathologies have begun to shape the direction o f the m ovem ent by inform ing the expectations o f its leaders. T h o u g h statelevel variables w ere not, it may be recalled from the earlier discussion, a m ajor influence on cither m ovem ent’s profile d u rin g m ost o f the 1990s, the critical variable o f state responsiveness had begun to affect the rather different directions taken by the tw o m ovem ents by the end o f the decade. T h e MKSS, like the BVJA, has con tin u ed w ith m any o f its earlier activities, such as organizing public hearings into local-level corrup­ tion and taking u p local issues as they arise. It has also tried to build o n its institutional reform successes by supporting local experim ents in various parts o f Rajasthan that seek to m ake use o f the transparency

250

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

provisions added to Rajasthan’s panchayati raj legislation in 2000. B ut the MKSS has also em barked on a m ajor new direction: intensive participation in the national R ight to Food cam paign.41 T h is cam paign involves a range o f activities, b u t has as its focal p o in t the public interest litigation filed by the People’s U n io n fo r Civil Liberties in protest against the failure o f th e Indian state to provide effective food security for poor and m arginalized people. T h e Suprem e C o u rt’s interim o rd er directed a n u m b e r o f state governm ents to take im m ediate steps to ensure th at foodgrains stocked in governm ent w arehouses— a key part o f the PDS— -were distributed to people in need. T h e co u rt also took the som ew hat u nusual step o f appointing com m issioners for various states to report on th e im plem entation o f this order. T h e MKSS was active both in th e national cam paign and in successfully pressing the Rajasthan governm ent o f C ongress C h ie f M inister A shok G ehlot to increase delivery to the poor. T h is involved a great deal o f public protest— in m any cases sham ing district authorities into action— as well as negotiation w ith senior officials, all th e way up to Rajasthan’s ch ief m inister. T h e proposals m ade by the MKSS, w orking w ith o th er groups in the state, have included dem ands for an em ploym ent guarantee schem e that w ould provide a direct link betw een the right to food and the rig h t to w ork, an o th er dem and articulated by Rajasthan’s increasingly active civil society. T h e BVJA, w hile supportive o f the idea o f th e right to food in general, has been m uch less active on this cam paign in M aharashtra— voicing general support, b u t doing little concrete w o rk to advance the cause. O n e potential explanation for this is th a t the BVJA has less need to take up this issue because M aharashtra has not suffered starvation deaths o f the sort w hich earned R ajasthan’s governm ent such notoriety d u rin g 2002-03. M oreover, M aharashtra has had its ow n em ploym ent guarantee schem e since 1973, so its activists need not dem and one. O n closer exam ination, how ever, this explanation holds little w eight. M aharashtra is am ong the states to w hich the Suprem e C o u rt assigned a com m issioner, precisely because th e state governm ent had dem onstrated its unw illingness to im plem ent fully the co u rt’s orders on food security. As the R ight to Food cam paign has m ade clear, it is the role o f civil society groups concerned w ith accountability in each state— o f w hich the BVJA should in theory 41. For d etailed in fo rm atio n on th e c o u rse o f th is cam paign, see www. righttofood. com.

In Varying Sutes o f Decay

251

be a leading m em ber in M aharashtra— to use the m echanism o f th e com m issioner system to ensure that state governm ents take the necessary action to alleviate the needless suffering o f the poor, w ho as w e saw from the earlier discussion o f the PD S, are deprived access to subsidized food largely as a result o f co rru p tio n . A nd w hile M aharashtra m ay have its ow n E m ploym ent G uarantee Schem e, w h ich is indeed the m odel to w h ich the R ajasthan cam paigners aspire, its functioning has been disastrous in recent years. B oth in term s o f governm ent funding and the system s for ensu rin g im plem entation, the M aharashtra EGS is in a dire condition.42 T h e p o in t is that M aharashtra’s prevailing political culture has proven itself so u n re ­ sponsive to serious reform initiatives— the result o f a com prom ised civil society, a dem oralized bureaucracy and a disregard for norm s o f political civility— that the BVJA has becom e less w illing to engage in the kind o f protest-cum -negotiation strategy that underlies the MKSS’s approach to the Right to Food cam paign in Rajasthan. State-level variables have, in other w ords, begun to shape the nature o f civil society activism o n issues o f co rru p tio n and accountability. C

o n c l u s io n

T his chapter has argued th at state-level factors have been relatively u n im p o rtan t in explaining w h y R ajasthan and M aharashtra became th e h o st sû te s for India’s tw o m o st influential anti-corruption m ovem ents. W hile these m ovem ents share several unusual features, th e com bination o f w hich sets th em apart from India’s m any o th er an ti-co rru p tio n groups, there is little reason w hy the M KSS and the BVJA should have been located in these tw o states in particular. H ow ever, the regions within M aharashtra and R ajasthan w here the BVJA and MKSS, respectively, are based do have certain characteristics in co m m o n that h a v e been helpful (though perhaps n o t determ ina­ tive) in facilitating the em ergence o f these m ovem ents. It is w o rth noting that the identification o f one o f these features w ould not have been possible w ith o u t the aid o f com parative analysis betw een the prevailing practices o f co rru p tio n in different locations, though the relevant u n it o f analysis turn ed o u t n o t to be the state level. It was only w hen different locations w ithin each state w ere exam ined that it becam e possible to recognize variation in the structure o f corrupt 42. Lyla Badavam, ‘U nderm ining a Schem e’, Frontline, 2 -1 5 August 2003.

252

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

transactions. T his variation, in tu rn , helps us to arrive at an im p o rtan t theoretical insight: contrary to the existing literature’s tendency to classify varieties o f corru p tio n o n the basis o f w hat are presum ed to be a transaction’s in h eren t structural features, the com parative analysis developed in this chapter revealed that officials seeking illicit gains face choices as to ho w to obtain them . Because these choices can affect w ho bears the cost o f corru p tio n — individuals o r the public at large— there are fu rth er im plications for the en v iro n m en t w ith in w hich activist groups m obilize people to com bat corruption. T h e o th er finding o f theoretical interest that em erges as a result o f the com parative case-study m eth o d is that, to the extent that they affect the initial outcom es achieved by activist m ovem ents, regional political cultures also shape the direction o f m ovem ents them selves. M ovem ents respond to the pattern o f success and failure th at results from th eir w ork. T h e ir perceptions o f w hat is possible, and w hat is beyond the feasible lim its o f th eir capacities, is shaped by th eir direct experience o f the responsiveness o f the states w ith w hich they interact. W here these states have coopted key sectors o f civil society, w here protest action based o n appeals to norm s o f public m orality is unviable, o r w here the relationship betw een politicians and senior bureaucrats disem pow ers those officials w h o m ight otherw ise be inclined to use negotiation w ith m ovem ents as a m eans o f defusing social conflict and adjusting institutions to m eet new needs— in these circum stances, th e options facing m ovem ents are seriously curtailed, and the strategic directio n tow ards w h ich they channel th e ir energies is affected accordingly. T h is is a partial refinem ent o f theories o f civil society and m ovem ent politics that have gained currency in contem porary academ ic and policy debates.43 W ith o u t a com parative approach (in this case one reliant o n a u n it o f analysis below that o f the n ation­ state) and an appreciation o f politics that m oves beyond interest-based institutional analysis to encom pass issues such as regional political cultures, the ability o f research to generate insights capable o f deep­ ening existing theory will be severely constrained.

43. See, for instance, Peter P. H outzager and Jonathan Pattenden, ‘Finding the Shape o f the M ountain: W hen “the Poor” Set the N ational Agenda’, Paper prepared for ‘Responsiveness o f Political Systems to Poverty R eduction’, a research project com m issioned by the U K D epartm ent for International D evelopm ent (1999).

Part IV Political Leadership

«

8 Explaining Political Trajectories in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka James Manor

ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka, tw o adjacent states in south India, follow ed rem arkably sim ilar political trajectories until 1999. Each assum ed its present form d u rin g the m id-1950s w h en India’s state boundaries w ere re-draw n roughly along linguistic lines. In b oth cases, territories th at had been directly adm inistered by the B ritish before 1947 w ere b ro u g h t together w ith areas that had been included in m ajor princely states. In b oth states, the C ongress Party was initially the d o m in an t political force— w in n in g solid m ajorities at state and national elections— until C ongress split in 1969. T h e version o f the C ongress loyal to Indira G andhi triu m p h ed in bo th states at the 1971 national parliam entary election, and th en in state elections in 1972. T h e similarities persisted after the end o f C ongress dom inance. T his cam e in both states in January 1983, w h en popular disenchant­ m en t w ith C ongress gave state election victories to o th er parties. T hese w ere the Telugu D esam Party (T D P ) in A ndhra Pradesh and the Janata Party (later renam ed the Janata D al) in Karnataka. In 1985, those parties w on re-election. In 1989, b oth parties lost state elections to the C ongress party. B oth regained pow er at elections in 1994. Finally, during the 1990s in b oth states, the H in d u nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) becam e a significant, if still som ew hat

A

256

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

m arginal political force w hich aspires (so far in vain) to at least a sh are o f pow er at the state level.1 T h e extraordinary sim ilarity betw een these tw o trajectories is u n ­ m atched by any o th er pair o f Indian states. In O cto b er 1999, however, their trajectories diverged. At sim ulta­ neous state elections, b o th ruling parties— the Janata Dal in Karnataka and the T D P in A ndhra Pradesh— forged alliances w ith the BJR B u t w hile the form er suffered a crushing defeat, the latter was returned to pow er w ith a m ajority in its ow n right, so that it n o w governs w ith o u t depending on the BJR M ost o f this chapter is organized around tw o m ain questions. First, did the rem arkable sim ilarity betw een the political trajectories o f these states up to 1999 reflect deeper structural sim ilarities— similarities in social dynam ics, approaches to developm ent, m odes o f m anagem ent w ithin m ajor political parties, the parties’ em beddedness in society o r m ore general patterns o f governance? Second, did the sudden divergence in these states’ political trajectories in 1999 occur because underlying conditions in the states, o r their governm ents o r ruling parties, suddenly diverged? We shall see that the answ ers to these tw o questions are, for the m ost part, ‘n o ’. T h e sim ilar trajectories up to 1999 masked a n u m b er o f im portant differences. T h is is to say that differences betw een states, in term s o f social, political and other conditions, can coexist alongside striking sim ilarities at the level o f party systems and electoral outcom es. T h e reverse can also be true. In 1999 the political trajectories o f these tw o states diverged signifi­ cantly— ironically, after a period in w hich the tw o states and their ruling parties had begun to resem ble each o th er in certain im portant ways. We need, finally, to consider a third question. G iven the (let it be noted) fluctuating influence o f externalities on electoral outcom es at the state level (w hich are charted here), w hat do the stories o f these tw o states tell us about the regionalization o f national politics and the nationalization o f regional politics in India in recent years?2 1. For a detailed discussion o f its recent history (up to 1999) and its prospects in Karnataka, see J. Manor, ‘Southern Discomfort: T he BJP in Karnataka’, in T. B. H ansen and C. JafFrelot (eds). The BJP and the Compulsions o f Politics in India, second edition (Delhi: Oxford U niversity Press, forthcom ing). 2. M uch o f the material in the chapter is based on regular (at least annual) field research visits to Karnataka over the last 30 years, and on num erous research visits to A ndhra Pradesh since 1978— the latest being in M arch and O ctober 1999,

Explaining Political Trajectories

257

T h e rem ainder o f this chapter is divided into fo u r parts. T h e next section examines the different levels o f social conflict and tension in A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka. We th en analyse the contrasting d e­ velopm ent policies and m odes o f governance in these states betw een 1983 (w hen m ulti-party com petition replaced C ongress dom inance) and 1999. T h ere follows an assessm ent o f the differences in the degree to w hich m ajor parties have becom e em bedded w ithin th e societies o f the tw o states. T h e chapter concludes by explaining the parallel trajectories that these states follow ed up to 1999 (despite the differences catalogued in the previous three sections), and the divergence that occurred in that year.

Lev els

of

So c i a l T e n s i o n

and

C o n f l ic t

To understand the political differences betw een these tw o states, we m u st first grasp that w hile they are rather sim ilar in term s o f the composition o f their societies,3 A ndhra Pradesh has experienced m uch m o re social tension and conflict than has Karnataka over the last halfcentury. Relations am ong social groups in Karnataka have always been less conflictual than in m ost regions o f India, and far less so than in A ndhra Pradesh. T h is owes m uch to the fact that the (politically January 2000 and Ju n e 2001. Sec also the only recent book to com pare the politics o f these two states, G. K Prasad, D. J. Kumar, and K. C . Suri (eds), The Angry Voter. Assembly Elections in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, 1994 (M adras: Shanti Publications, 1995). 3. These similarities are especially evident in caste term s. C onsider the four vamas o f the traditional caste hierarchy— Brahm ins, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas and Shudras. Society in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, as well as the oth er tw o states in south India, differs markedly from that in m ost other parts o f the country. T here arc no indigenous Kshatriyas and Vaisyas in the south. B rahm ins are present only in very small num bers— less than four percent o f the population in each o f these states. T his means that the Shudra category accounts for roughly four-fifths o f the H in d u population in these states. N o n -B rah m in m ovem ents in both A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka, led mainly by land-ow ning Shudra groups, largely succeeded as early as 1952 in displacing B rahm ins from m ost positions o f political influence. As a result, the main conflicts in recent decades have occurred between Shudra groups, and not between vamas, as has often been true (especially since 1989) in the H indi belt. T he distinctive caste systems in A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka resemble one another m ore closely than either resembles the systems in the other southern states, Kerala and Tamil N adu.

258

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

influential) southern h a lf o f the state (‘old M ysore’) had, historically, the low est levels o f landlessness in S o u th Asia. T h a t bred a trad itio n o f social and— after Independence— political accom m odation (see below ). T h is has m ade Karnataka a relatively cohesive society by S outh Asian standards.4 T h e m u ch m ore intense conflicts in A ndhra Pradesh have m ade it m ore difficult for politicians there to sustain political parties and, at tim es, to govern. Four types o f conflict in A ndhra Pradesh are w o rth noting. S eparatist M o v em en ts in T elengana Since its creation in the m id-1950s, A ndhra Pradesh has tw ice w itnessed secessionist m ovem ents w ith in the econom ically u n d e r­ developed Telengana region o f the state. T h e first, w hich was deeply serious and eventually quite violent, occurred d u rin g the late 1960s and early 1970s. Its leaders w ere eventually bo u g h t o ff by the C ongress party w h en it offered th em very senior posts. B ut the concessions to Telengana politicians aroused resentm ents in the state’s o th e r tw o regions— Rayalaseema and C oastal A ndhra— and this com p o u n d ed the difficulties o f governing the state as a w hole. T h e second separatist m ovem ent em erged at the end o f the 1990s. It was sim m ering in the period before the 1999 elections, m ainly am ong C ongress politicians from the region w h o feared that the T D P w ould be re-elected (as it was), and w h o th u s saw separatism as th e ir m ost realistic hope o f capturing pow er (in a sm aller Telengana state). By the end o f 2001 this m ovem ent had gained greater m o m en tu m . T his was partly due to the encouragem ent received in 2000 w h en three o th er Indian states had portions o f their territories carved away to create three new states. B ut secessionism , or m obilization aro u n d the objective o f ‘separate statehood*, was also seen by m any opposition parties in A ndhra Pradesh as one o f the only ways to make life difficult for a T D P governm ent that appeared likely to rule w ith a com fortable m ajority in the state assem bly at least until 2004. T hese separatist m ovem ents have arisen only interm ittently, b u t they pose serious problem s for state governm ents. N o such m ove­ m en t has ever acquired m u ch support in Karnataka. 4. J. M anor, ‘Karnakata: Caste, Class, D om inance and Politics in a Cohesive Society’, in F. R. Frankel and M . S. A. Rao (eds), Dominance and State Power in Modem India: Decline o f a Social Order, vol. I (Delhi: O xford U niversity Press, 1989).

Explaining Political Trajectories

259

Armed Insurgency in Telengana A n arm ed insurgency against the A ndhra Pradesh governm ent has persisted over many years in several districts— again, m ainly in Telengana b u t w ith little connection to separatist sentim ent. It has been m o u n ted by leftists w orking am ong poorer rural dw ellers, and its targets are prosperous social groups as w ell as the governm ent. T h e authorities have sought— through a com bination o f arm ed police action and d evelopm ent projects— to subdue this disorder, b u t w ith little success. Several districts across the border in Karnataka suffered sim ilar deprivation and m isgovernm ent to these troubled districts before Indian independence, u n d er the autocratic governm ent o f the old H yderabad princely state. B ut those Karnataka districts have been alm ost entirely u n tro u b led by violent conflict. N o in-depth research has been published that reliably explains this difference. B ut it appears to owe m uch to the m ore accom m odative m odes o f governance that have prevailed at m ost tim es in Karnataka— a topic explored later in this chapter. O n e aspect o f that accom m o­ dative approach was a reasonably effective effort in Karnataka d u rin g the 1970s to prom ote land reform . T h is (together w ith historically low er levels o f landlessness in that state) helped to low er the p ro p o rtio n o f agricultural labourers— m any o f w h o m are landless— in Karnataka’s w orkforce to 28.9 per cent in 1991. In A ndhra Pradesh, th e figure is 40.9 per cent, the highest for any Indian state.5 S erio u s Social T ension w ith in R ayalaseem a A n o th er region o f A ndhra Pradesh, Rayalaseema, has experienced b itter tensions betw een castes and factions at bo th local and higher levels. T his has been m ost vividly dem onstrated at the local level by th e anthropologist M arguerite R obinson.6 T h ere is n o com parable study o f such tension at sub-district and district levels, b u t specialists in the study o f society and politics in the state have repeatedly stressed to this w riter, over three decades, that factional infighting at these 5. G. Parthasarathy, ‘Public Intervention and Rural Policy: Case o f N o n Sustainable Reduction in Andhra Pradesh’, Economic and Political Weekly, 14 O ctober 1995, p. 2574. 6. M . Robinson, Local Politics: The Law o f the Fishes: Development through Political Change in Medak District, Andhra Pradesh (South India) (O xford: O xford U niversity Press, 1989).

260

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

levels w ithin this region is particularly vicious. Political analysts h av e also consistently stressed the tendency o f Rayalaseem a’s politicians to struggle very aggressively for advantages for th e ir region w h e n operating at the state level. Tensions w ith in and betw een regions exist in Karnataka, but they have been far less intense than in A n d h ra Pradesh. T h u g g e ry in (and Lately B eyond) C oastal A n d h ra T h e third and by far the m ost prosperous region o f A ndhra Pradesh— coastal A ndhra— has w itnessed high levels o f violence by organized groups o f thugs, especially since the T D P em erged in 1983. M u c h o f it has m ore to do w ith conflicts betw een groups in society— o n th e basis o f caste identity, class and o th e r econom ic interests, o r factional affiliation— than w ith partisan rivalries. B ut it often acquires stro n g political overtones. A great deal o f it originates from organized crim e in the coastal city o f Vijayawada— w hich, rather oddly, is th e one city in south India w here the crim inal underw orld is a form idable force. T h is is an oddity because the sam e cannot be said o f tw o m u ch larger so u th Indian cities— C h en n ai (form erly M adras) and Bangalore (Karnataka’s capital). D u rin g the late 1990s, crim inal gangs o f coastal origin extended th eir activities m ore w idely across A ndhra Pradesh— often in league w ith politicians in the tw o m ain parties. T h e ir presence is particularly strong in and aro u n d H yderabad, w here an econom ic boom has created new opportunities for extortion from citizens and businesses. K arnataka’s even m ore prosperous capital, Bangalore, has suffered from a sim ilar trend since the early 1990s, b u t to n o th in g like the same degree. It should be apparent from the discussion above that social tensions and conflicts arc a good deal m ore serious in A ndhra Pradesh than in Karnataka. T hey m ake it m ore difficult in A ndhra Pradesh to develop political accom m odations (i) w ithin party organizations, (ii) betw een parties and (iii) betw een parties and governm ents on the o ne hand and social groups o n the other. T h e relative inability o f m ajor parties in A ndhra Pradesh to forge lasting political bargains w ith key constitu­ encies was an im portant reason w hy the state’s parties w ere so m uch less successful than their counterparts in Karnataka at em bedding them selves in society (see below ). T h e persistence o f the social con­ flicts outlined earlier also provides an explanation, o r perhaps an

Explaining Political Trajectories

261

excuse, for the em ergence w ith in the T D P o f a tradition o f one-m an dom inance over the party and the state governm ent w h en it has been in power. T hese im portant differences betw een the tw o states have b een partially m asked by the striking sim ilarities betw een th eir politi­ cal trajectories in the years before 1999.

1 9 8 3 -9 9 : DEVELOPM ENT POLICIES AND G

overnance u n d er th e

M

a in

P a r t ie s

In som e b u t n o t all Indian states, state-level units o f the C ongress have com e to resem ble, in certain respects, the m ain parties that oppose th em . T h is is true, for exam ple, in Kerala b u t n o t in W est Bengal. To a considerable extent, it is also tru e in A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka. (T his is one, som etim es overlooked, elem ent o f the regionalization o f national politics— a them e that reappears later in this chapter— since C ongress is a national party.) T h e m ain opponents o f C ongress in these tw o states— the T D P in A ndhra Pradesh and the Janata Dal in Karnataka— differ m arkedly from one an o th er in term s o f their developm ent policies and their m odes o f governance. As a result, the character o f C ongress itself and o f inter-party com petition have assum ed different form s in A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka since 1983, w h en form idable parties opposed to C ongress first arose in both states. T h is has im portant im plications o n three fronts. P arties’ D e v e lo p m e n t Policies Let us begin w ith parties’ developm ent policies, w here w e find significant differences m asked by sim ilar political trajectories in th e tw o states. Because C ongress in A ndhra Pradesh faced an opponent th at (until 1995) had a w eak, ovcr-ccntralizcd organization and relied o n populism , the C ongress organization (w hich by 1983 had been badly dam aged by its ow n national leaders) rem ained w eak and it developed populist policies o f its ow n. In Karnataka, by contrast, C ongress faced an opponent w ith a com paratively strong, som ew hat decentralized organization that successfully pursued grassroots devel­ o p m en t projects. In response, C ongress in Karnataka was forced to rebuild its organization (w hich, again, its national leaders had u n d erm in ed ) and to offer voters sim ilar program m es for grassroots developm ent.

262

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

We need to exam ine these differences in m ore detail. B etw een 1983 and 1995, C ongress in A ndhra Pradesh was opposed by the TDP, w hich was led by N . T. Rama Rao (N T R ), th e ex-film star w h o founded it. N T R ’s tw o m ain w eapons in the struggle against C ongress w ere populism and theatrics. H is brand o f populism stressed subsi­ dies, especially on rice. T h is appears to have helped to reduce poverty in A ndhra Pradesh m ore rapidly than did different approaches in Karnataka. H ow ever, th e vast funds com m itted to subsidies m ean t that less spectacular b u t still crucial developm ent program m es (in education, health, irrigation, agriculture, etc.) w ere sh o rt o f funds. T h e result was serious im balances in developm ent policy, w hich w ere o f deep concern to senior governm ent officials in A ndhra Pradesh as early as 1985.7 N T R took little note o f their anxieties and continued to stress subsidies. N T R ’s C ongress opponents could n o t m atch him at theatrics, but they still felt com pelled to offer som ething in this vein. T hey concentrated far m ore on slogans and sym bolism — and less on m undane developm ent initiatives— than did th e ir party colleagues in Karnataka and m ost o th er states. W hile in opposition, they also tended to com m it them selves publicly to N T R ’s subsidy schem es, and occasionally tried to outbid him on this front— positions from w hich it was difficult for C ongress leaders to retreat d u rin g the one period (1989-94) w hen they regained power. As a consequence, sym bolism , sloganeering and expensive populism becam e institutionalized in A ndhra Pradesh— m ore than in any o th er state except perhaps Tamil N adu, and far m ore than in Karnataka. From the early 1980s, the various incarnations o f the Janata Party that C ongress faced in Karnataka based th eir appeal to voters on creative developm ent program m es at the grassroots. Janata scored m ajor successes w ith these d u rin g its initial spell in pow er d u rin g the m id-1980s— m ost notably by sinking a huge n u m b e r o f tube wells, and by initiating one o f the m ost successful experim ents w ith dem ocratic decentralization (panchayati raj) ever seen in a developing country.8 7. See in this connection, J. M anor, ‘A ppearance and Reality in Politics: The 1984 General Election in the South’, in R R. Brass and F. Robinson (eds), The Indian National Congress and Indian Society, 1885-1985 (D elhi: Chanakya Publica­ tions, 1987), p. 416. 8. T his is dem onstrated in great detail in R. C rook and J. M anor, Democracy and Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance (Cambridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1998), chapter two.

Explaining Political Trajectorics

263

C ongress naturally felt com pelled to com pete w ith Janata on this score. T h e result in Karnataka was th at developm ent program m es that have a significant local im pact (but do not em pty the state exchequer) have becom e institutionalized as key w eapons in the electoral battle betw een parties. T h is is in m arked contrast w ith A ndhra Pradesh, w h ere the tendency was for state-level populism that strained fiscal lim its. T h e results o f this difference are reflected in various hum an devel­ o p m e n t indicators— for example, the literacy rates at the 1991 census: Females

Entire population

Andhra Pradesh

32.7%

44.1%

Karnataka

44.3

56.0

India

39.3

52.2

T h e rate for A ndhra Pradesh is low er even th a n exceedingly under­ developed Indian states such as O rissa and M adhya Pradesh. T h ese figures on the tw o states are o f course explained by a long history o f policies stretching back over several governm ents. B ut recent governm ents in A ndhra Pradesh have lagged behind Karnataka on indicators that m ight reduce this disparity, such as the percentage o f children in the m id-1990s attending prim ary schools9 and expen­ d itu re on education, both in p e r capita term s and as a proportion o f all developm ent expenditure. D u rin g the 1990s, Karnataka has also clearly led A ndhra Pradesh on developm ent spending per capita.11 D espite these shortcom ings, A ndhra Pradesh has done better than Karnataka and m ost Indian states at reducing rural poverty (urban poverty has grow n considerably w orse). Two reliable studies that haye ranked various states on rural poverty reduction betw een 1970 a n a 1988 (using tw o different m easurem ents) place A ndhra Pradesh first and second, and Karnataka eleventh and tw elfth.12 T h e explanation 9. Statistical Outline of India (Bombay: Tata Inform ation Services, 1999), pp. 11 and 34. 10. J. Harriss, ‘H ow M uch Difference Does Politics M ake? Regime Differences across Indian States and Rural Poverty Reduction’, m anuscript, 1999, pp. 32 and 33. 11. Statistical O utline..., p. 9. 12. T he two studies are B. S. M inhas, L. R .Ja in a n d S . D. Tendulkar,‘D eclin­ ing Poverty in the 1980s: Evidence versus Artifacts’, Economic and Political Weekly, 6 Ju ly 1991; and G. D u tt and M. Ravallion, ‘W hy Have Som e Indian States D one

264

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

for this is a m atter o f debate, b u t it appears to ow e m uch to the food subsidies provided by governm ents in A ndhra Pradesh since the T D P first cam e to power. H ow ever, those subsidies w ere hugely expensive, and seriously underm ined broader and m ore balanced efforts at developm ent in that state. Let us now tu rn to the period since 1995, the year in w h ich N T R ’s son-in-law — N . C handrababu N aid u — staged a breathtaking palace coup against the old m an and replaced him as leader o f the T D P an d as ch ief m inister. T h is occurred because N T R was becom ing increas­ ingly autocratic and, at tim es, delusional13— and because N aid u w as a gifted organizer w h o had cultivated close links w ith m ost T D P legislators. Som e observers hoped that N aidu, w ho had ru n a dairy business, w ould break w ith N T R ’s expensive populist schem es in o rd er to restore fiscal responsibility. H e certainly gave th e im pression— in his dealings w ith aid donors and potential investors, although n o t to th e voters o f the state— that he intended to pursue this goal in a forceful, businesslike m anner. A ttention focused n o t only on the heavy subsi­ dies th at N T R had initiated, b u t also on his in troduction o f p ro h ib i­ tion, w hich denied the exchequer a m ajor source o f revenue. (M ost Indian state governm ents derive large shares o f their revenues from taxes on the sale o f liquor.14 ) N aid u took a few m odest steps dow n this road— and m ade m u ch o f them to donors and investors. B ut in the period before the 1999 state election, his reform s did n o t make a substantial difference. Food su b ­ sidies w ere cu t a little, and electricity charges w ere raised for industry b u t n o t for farm ers (the subsidy for w h o m w as the m ain problem ). P rohibition was in small part rescinded, w ith only ‘Indian-m adeforeign liquor* (w hich is m ainly consum ed by w esternized urbanites Better than O thers at Reducing Rural Poverty?’, Economica (1998). Both are cited in Harriss, ‘H ow M uch D ifferen ce...’, pp. 4-5. 13. O n one occasion in that period, a leading Indian journalist visited N T R . T h e latter habitually dressed in saffron robes and struck theatrical postures on a huge chair in his receiving room . T he visitor, noting the pose, said to him , “W hen you sit like that, C h ie f M inister, you look remarkably like Swami Vivekananda (a great nineteenth century religious leader).’ N T R paused and then replied gravely, ‘I am Vivekananda’. Interview w ith C h o Ramaswamy, C hennai, 11 N ovem ber 1994. 14. Sec in this connection, J. M anor, Power, Poverty and Poison: Disaster and Response in an Indian City (Delhi: Sage, 1993), chapter three.

Explaining Political Trajectories

265

and brings in only lim ited revenues) being legalized.15 (Karnataka, by contrast, has only experim ented briefly w ith prohibition in a few parts o f th e state.) To m ake fiscal m atters w orse, N aid u th en began spending very heavily o n developm ent projects. T h ese efforts w ere pursued, and aggressively publicized, u n d er the ban n er o f his n ew jan m ab h o o m i program m e. T h e m anagem ent o f this exercise was carefully con­ trolled and tu rn ed to partisan advantage by N aid u , acting through T D P operatives. Projects funded by it w ere advertised as benefits flow ing directly from N aid u him self. Every th ree m onths, a new jan m ab h o o m i exercise w ould begin w ith officials reading o u t a personal letter from the c h ie f m inister in every village, explaining the th em e o f the exercise. (Each was carefully ‘b randed’, to focus o n the needs o f a particular group— w o m en , youth, artisans, the Scheduled C astes, sm all farm ers, etc.). M ost o f the contracts for public w orks projects that resulted w en t to T D P allies, w h o w ere expected to w ork for the party at election tim e. T h e jan m ab h o o m i program m e suffered from corruption. T h e ch ief m inister anticipated this, and told a gathering o f party activists— unwisely, in fro n t o f civil servants w h o told o th ers16— that he w ould p erm it th em to ‘eat* (steal) o n e-th ird o f the jan m ab h o o m i funds. D espite leakages, how ever, enough m oney was p u m p ed in to this effort for a great m any sm all-scale developm ent projects to be im ple­ m ented. C itizens’ ‘self-help groups’ w ere form ed and draw n into the exercise by a req u irem en t that they provide a portion o f the resources for projects. So m uch m oney was injected into this and certain o th er program m es betw een 1995 and the 1999 state election that the fiscal position o f the state governm ent deteriorated alarmingly. T h e result, after that election, was the crippling o f the state’s capacity to p u rsu e develop­ m e n t and m u ch else. In early 2000 the A ndhra Pradesh governm ent was borrow ing m oney to pay salaries. M any governm ent departm ents did n o t have funds to pay for fuel for th eir vehicles. M any contractors w ho had executed jan m ab h o o m i projects w en t unpaid, as did key T D P loyalists w h o helped sustain the program m e at the grassroots. 15. Interviews w ith an advisor to the Reserve Bank o f India, and a senior state civil servant, Hyderabad, 8 and 10 M arch 1999. 16. Interviews w ith tw o civil servants, H yderabad, 8 -9 M arch 1999. 17. Interview w ith a senior civil servant, Hyderabad, 11 January 2001.

266

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

T h e severe fiscal problem s w hich b o th the T D P and C ongress visited o n A ndhra Pradesh in N T R ’s tim e actually grew w orse u n d e r N aid u , his reputation for prudcncc notw ithstanding.18 T h e contrast w ith Karnataka is striking. Karnataka's ruling parties have sought to p resent their developm ental achievem ents in the best light, b u t there has been far less hype by the tw o m ain parties there than by both o f the m ajor parties in A ndhra Pradesh, particularly the T D P under N aidu. Karnataka’s developm ent program m es rem ained m ore m ulti-stranded and balanced than those o f A ndhra Pradesh. O verall spending o n developm ent in Karnataka has— except d u rin g N aid u ’s free-spending days betw een 1995 and 1999, and perhaps even th en — been greater than in A ndhra Pradesh. And it was substantially greater in the afterm ath o f the 1999 election because K arnataka’s fiscal position— and th u s its capacity to fund developm ent program m es— was m uch better than that o f its n eig h b o u r.19 G overnance within M ajo r Parties D espite their sim ilar political trajectories in the years up to 1999, we also discover clear differences betw een these tw o states w hen we consider intra-party m anagem ent. H ere again, w e find the C ongress party in each state to be strongly influenced by the nature o f its m ain adversary. T h e T D P in A ndhra Pradesh has always been extrem ely centralized and dom inated by its leader. W hen N T R was ch ief m inister it was said that it was ‘a party o f heroes and zeroes, and the n u m b er o f heroes 18. See for detailed figures, Economic and Political Weekly, 26 May 2001, p. 1905. T he m uch m ore encouraging figures on Karnataka’s deficit appear on p. 1908. Despite this rise in spending in A ndhra Pradesh, and despite janm abhoom i, developm ent expenditure per capita in A ndhra Pradesh has rem ained far less than in m ost comparable Indian states, including Karnataka. O n ly U ttar Pradesh and Bihar have worse figures. 19. U ntil the mid-1990s, m ost specialists in fiscal m anagem ent rated two states— Gujarat and M aharashtra— as especially strong. Two others— Rajasthan, and Karnataka—were placed ju s t behind them in the informal league table for prudence. Since the mid-1990s, M aharashtra has slipped far dow n the table, thanks to wildly incautious spending by the BJP-Shiv Sena governm ent that held pow er there until 1999. T h e other three rem ain solidly w here they were. (Interview w ith Reserve Bank o f India specialists, N ew D elhi, 6 January 2000.) So Karnataka has long occupied a stTong position, but as the discussion in the text has shown, since 1983, A ndhra Pradesh has not done so.

Explaining Political Trajectories

267

is o n e’.20 H is overw eening m an n er prevented even a gifted organizer such as his lieutenant, N aidu, from developing a solid organization for the TDP. It also led to N T R ’s undoing, since it inspired frustration am ong T D P legislators, w hich N aid u exploited in his takeover o f the party and the state governm ent in 1995. Since th en N aidu has built up the T D P ’s organization very impressively, b u t he still dom inates both the party and the governm ent at least as thoroughly as N T R did. T h e nature o f o n e-m an dom inance has differed under these tw o leaders. N T R was vastly inaccessible to his party follow ers and legislators. H e usually received visitors only for a couple o f hours beginning at fo u r o ’clock in the morning, and they w ere far m ore likely to be (in this order) senior policem en, top civil servants, and em in en t people from outside the state th an his ow n party loyalists. N aid u keeps m ore conventional hours and is m ore accessible, but he too tends m ainly to see civil servants. H e gathers inform ation less thro u g h his party— w hich still lacks the autonom y to provide reliable intelli­ gence— than th rough private polls and inform ation technology sys­ tem s staffed by bureaucrats and indep en d en t consultants.21 T h e T D P organization is stronger th an u n d er N T R , thanks partly to its control o f the w ell-funded jan m ab h o o m i system, w hich ch an ­ nels resources th ro u g h the party. B ut jan m ab h o o m i, like the party, is subject to quite rigorous control by the w orkaholic ch ief m inister. H e has, very effectively, prevented a second line o f party leadership from em erging— so that the aphorism about ‘heroes and zeroes’ continues to apply. O n e reason that he declined to have his party m em bers serve in the cabinet o f the coalition governm ent in N ew D elhi after the 1999 parliam entary election was his disinclination to see any lieu ten ­ ant becom e p ro m in en t enough to rival him . We m ight expect the C ongress in A ndhra Pradesh to em ulate the T D P and develop a system o f one-m an dom inance from the top. B ut this is im possible w ithin the C ongress because in those periods w h en m em bers o f the G andhi family have controlled the party, they have refused to tolerate p o ten t state-level leaders. Indeed, they have at m ost times systematically encouraged factional conflict w ithin state units o f the C ongress. Such conflict was sufficiently institutionalized to 20. Interview w ith G. Ram Reddy, H yderabad, 7 N ovem ber 1988. 21. T his is based on num erous interviews w ith political journalists, a leading academic analyst and a form er civil servant w ho has w orked closely w ith both N T R and N aidu, Hyderabad, January 2000 and Ju n e 2001.

268

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

survive th ro u g h o u t the period betw een 1991 and 1996 w hen R V N arasim ha R ao sought (m ost o f the tim e) to intrude less in state-level party affairs. H ow ever, the A ndhra Pradesh C ongress did com e to resem ble its m ain adversary in another im portant respect. It has at nearly all tim es been organizationally w eak, like the T D P was up to 1995, w h e n N aid u began to strengthen the party machinery. In Karnataka, h o w ­ ever, C ongressm en could n o t afford to allow organizational w eakness to persist as it did in the A ndhra Pradesh C ongress. T h a t was because th eir m ain rival, Janata, usually had a reasonably strong organization. T h u s, despite the sim ilarities in the political trajectories in these tw o states, in the years after 1983 the character and organizational strength o f the state-level units o f the C ongress party in A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka diverged considerably. To say this is n o t to deny that C ongress in Karnataka has gone thro u g h periods o f serious disarray T h is was true u n d e r G u n d u Rao w h o led it d u rin g the early 1980s. It w as tru e once again for a tim e in the late 1980s. In that period, this w riter visited the state party headquarters and found it abandoned, except for tw o m enial w orkers w h o w ere busy burn in g the mail— unopened. At that tim e, the state party president was a wayward M em b er o f Parliam ent w h o visited Bangalore only once or tw ice a m o n th and w ho was co n ten t to leave the headquarters badly understaffed, w ith only one telephone line and no filing cabinets. It was tru e yet again for tw o years d u rin g the early 1990s, w h en C ongress c h ie f m inister S. Bangarappa m isgoverned egregiously and w rought serious dam age to his party. B ut o n each occasion, m any Karnataka C ongressm en knew that to capture o r retain pow er a solid organization was crucial, since the party w ould need to im plem ent grassroots developm ent program m es w hich stand at the core o f political com petition in this state. T hey therefore pressed— successfully each tim e— for the replacem ent o f u n d er-p erfo rm in g leaders. A nd in every case, new leaders th en brought the organization back to life. In A ndhra Pradesh, the C ongress organization has been revived only once, by C henna Reddy in the late 1980s. H e organized n o n ­ violent protests against N T R ’s governm ent that drew som e idealists 22. J. M anor, ‘Blurring the Lines betw een Parties and Social Bases: G u n d u Rao and the Em ergence o f a Janata G overnm ent in Karnataka’, in J. W ood (cd.), State Politics in Contemporary India: Crisis or Continuity? (B oulder and London: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 139-68.

Explaining Political Trajectories

269

into C ongress and p u t m ost im portant m em bers thro u g h encounters w ith the police and tim e in jail, w hich bred considerable party solidarity. T his helped Reddy to gain a state election victory in 1989. B ut soon after he becam e c h ie f m inister, the prevailing norm lessness in his party— the result partly o f the m ore ram pant social conflicts in this state (discussed above)— overtook him . D issident C ongressm en w ent to the extent o f fom enting com m unal riots in H yderabad to force R eddy’s ouster. N o th in g rem otely like that has ever occurred w ith in C ongress in Karnataka. Such norm lessness has surfaced often in the A ndhra Pradesh C ongress. C alculated violence and even political killings w ith in b oth m ain parties have been far m ore co m m on than in Karnataka, w here such things are virtually unknow n. T h e A ndhra Pradesh C ongress is often afflicted by self-destructive factional infighting o f a kind seldom seen in its Karnataka counterpart. W hen, for exam ple, C ongress w as nom inating its candidates for one state election, the party leader had to sleep in a different house in H yderabad every night for a w eek to avoid being besieged by party m em bers agitating violently for nom inations. A nd in February 2000, w hen nom inations w ere being decided for com paratively u n im p o r­ tant urban council elections, the process was attended by ‘slogan sho u tin g party activists, dharnas [in this case m enacing sit-in p ro ­ tests], counter dharnas, and high dram a’. T his entailed threats by nu m ero u s C ongress leaders to resign if th eir favourites w ere not anointed, and action by ‘m obs’ o f party m em bers to curtail the m ovem ents o f their leader until he chose their preferred candidates. Rival groups ‘indulged in fisticuffs, broke flow er pots and destroyed office fu rn itu re’24 in the party headquarters. In Karnataka, C ongress has been afflicted by occasional spasm s o f factional squabbling and teacups w ere once throw n at a m eeting o f party legislators. B ut extrem e factional infighting o f the sort seen often in A ndhra Pradesh is far less com m on. M u ch o f the explanation for these differences betw een state-level units o f the C ongress party in the tw o states lies in the character o f the m ain parties that they faced— and, to a great extent, em ulated. T h e contrast is marked. 23. T h e occasion w hen Congress C h ie f M inister S. Bangarappa catalyzed violent attacks on the Tamil m inority in the state during a dispute w ith neighbouring Tamil N adu was intended not to attack rivals w ithin his ow n party, b u t to win concessions from N ew Delhi. 24. Economic Times, 1 M arch 2000.

270

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

Janata in Karnataka has had an organization w ith considerable substance and resilience. It seem ed dead and buried after losing to C ongress in 1989, b u t its collective leadership m anaged to rep air factional splits as the 1994 state election approached. T h e various factions had each sustained a solid second line o f leadership an d a reasonably strong, penetrative organization— b o th o f w hich w e re unknow n in the T D P in A ndhra Pradesh. (T he T D P ’s organization has becom e m uch m ore penetrative since 1995, although this all hinges on one m an, and there is still no second line o f leadership). T h is enabled the party to sweep to victory in 1994 and to govern very im pressively until Deve G ow da left to becom e p rim e m inister and was replaced by the diffident J. H . Patel. Collective leadership, a reasonably strong set o f interm ediate-level leaders below the state level, and a penetrative organization have been m aintained by both m ajor parties in Karnataka. T h is helped to explain the Janata victory in 1994, and it was true again w ithin C ongress before the 1999 election. In that latter case, a collective leadership— three leaders representing the landow ning Vokkaligas, the ‘O th e r Backward Classes’ (O B C s), and the Scheduled C astes—jo in tly re­ vived the party organization. Both o f these parties have been capable o f these things because a tradition o f political accom m odation w ithin them (see the discussion o f Devaraj U rs below ) has never been abandoned. T his stands in sharp contrast w ith A ndhra Pradesh, w here the T D P has always experienced one-m an dom inance, and the C ongress has consistently suffered from a w eak organization that perm its severe strife am ong leaders. G o v ern an ce M o re G enerally in th e Tw o States T h e sim ilar political trajectories in these tw o states up to 1999 also masked a contrast in the m odes o f governance and political m anage­ m en t w ithin the m achinery o f state m ore generally. Karnataka’s governm ents—w ith the grim exception o f the regim e o f the vastly corrupt but, fortunately, suprem ely lazy $. Bangarappa betw een 1990 and 1992— have long tended tow ards a rath er liberal, pluralist, accom m odative approach to governance. T h at is, they have been w illing to see resources— funds, goods and services— flow to institu­ tions controlled or strongly influenced by opposition parties and to independent citizens’ groups w ith no partisan attachm ents. T h is owes som ething to com paratively low levels o f social tension

Explaining Political Trajcctories

271

and conflict w ithin the state— com pared certainly to A ndhra Pradesh— and to the very low incidence o f inequality and landlessness in so u th ­ e rn Karnataka, w hich made it easier for prosperous and disadvantaged groups to develop accom m odations. B ut it is also traceable to the m odel o f pow er-sharing am ong diverse social groups, established by c h ie f m inister Devaraj U rs in the 1970s, w hich has been broadly sustained by both C ongress and Janata governm ents at m ost tim es since then. U rs, w h o was inserted as c h ie f m inister by Indira G andhi in 1971, cam e from the tiny Arasu com m unity, the caste o f the form er maharajas o f M ysore. It had no connection o r alliance w ith the tw o land-ow ning caste clusters that had dom inated the state’s politics since Independence, the Lingayats and the Vokkaligas. M rs G andhi’s p ro m ­ ise to abolish poverty enabled U rs’s C ongress to w in the 1972 state election that cam e o n the heels o f its sweep at the 1971 national election. B ut he knew that to sustain h im self in power, he had to m obilize support from less prosperous groups w h o o u tn u m b e r Lingayats and Vokkaligas. H e did so very adroitly, finding prom ising candidates from such groups, giving th em im portant m inisterial posts once they w ere elected, channelling substantial resources to those groups, and encouraging the developm ent o f caste associations by them . B ut he also reduced resistance from Lingayats and Vokkaligas by providing them w ith cabinet posts and political spoils— and by delivering benefits to the n u m ero u s poorer m em bers o f those groups w ho had been ignored previously. H e th en w en t fu rth er and extended generous treatm ent to legislators from opposition parties.25 T hese traditions o f pow er-sharing (am ong different social groups, b u t also am ong cabinet m inisters— hence the prevalence o f collective leader­ ship) and liberal treatm ent o f the opposition have been pursued by nearly all governm ents, headed by b oth o f the state’s m ain parties, ever since. T h e practice o f giving legislators from opposition parties at least som e influence over governm ent resources flow ing to their co n stitu ­ encies occurs in part because it m akes those legislators less co n fro n ­ tational on the floor o f the state assembly. B ut m ost leaders in both m ajor parties in Karnataka have also felt som e pressure to conform to the liberal norm s that loom large in this state, and especially in its 25. These com m ents are based on num erous interviews w ith Devaraj U rs and his lieutenants betw een 1978 and 1981.

272

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

assertive press. A nd a sizable n u m b er o f th em also tend to see th is as proper dem ocratic behaviour. Since 1987, politicians in pow er fro m b o th parties have also been prepared to fund and em pow er panchayati raj institutions— a form o f pow er-sharing betw een levels in th e system — even th ough m any o f these bodies are controlled by o p p o ­ sition parties. T h ey take this view for precisely the same reasons th a t cause governm ents to share resources w ith opposition legislators at th e state level— not least, the fear o f severe criticism in the press an d public opinion.26 T his is n o t to say that ruling parties in Karnataka have been eager o r even entirely content to pass resources to pow er centres controlled by their opponents. W hen a previous governm ent was considering h o w m uch pow er to bestow on panchayati institutions, this w rite r w as asked by a senior official how m any district panchayats he expected the ruling party to w in at an upcom ing election. W hen he estim ated that it m ight capture 14 o r 15 o u t o f 20, the official said th at in that case, the state governm ent w ould be quite generous in devolving powers. If, on the o th er hand, it w on only ten o r fewer, th e n it was likely to be less generous. (In th e event, 14 tu rn ed o u t to be correct, and reasonably substantial pow ers w ere indeed handed dow n.) T h ere was no eagerness to em pow er pockets o f opposition control, b u t leaders still felt pressure from the prevailing culture in th e state to adhere to pluralist norm s. It is w orth noting that both Devaraj U rs (the architect o f pow ersharing w ithin broad-based coalitions com prised o f both prosperous and poor groups) and Abdul N azir Sab (the architect o f strengthened panchayats) shared a com m on background w hich helped to produce th eir accom m odative tendencies. B oth cam e from M ysore district in so u th ern Karnataka, w here landlessness w as historically very low. Since even poorer groups there usually possess som e m inim al assets, and thus self-confidence, relations betw een high- and low-status groups w ere relatively free o f the gross exploitation, tension and spite that w e find in m any other regions— not least in m u ch o f A ndhra Pradesh. In recent tim es, A ndhra Pradesh has w itnessed far less in the way o f accom m odations and pluralist practices than has Karnataka. 26. T hese com m ents are based on interviews over 30 years w ith num erous politicians and journalists. T he com m ents may sound naive, but readers should understand that many politicians have restrained them selves from illiberal actions because o f hard-nosed. Machiavellian calculations that such actions w ould cost them m uch popular support.

Explaining Political Trajectories

273

A ndhra Pradesh had, until 1990, a reasonably solid system o f panchayati raj institutions. T h ey w ere far less strong than th eir Karnataka counterparts after 1987, b u t still m oderately w ell resourced and em pow ered w h en com pared w ith m ost Indian states. B ut th en the bitterness w hich attended relations betw een C ongress and the T D P inspired th e (C ongress) g o v ern m en t o f th e day to em asculate panchayats, in o rd er to deprive opposition parties o f the opportunity to control pow erful bodies at low er levels.27 W hen the T D P has been in power, this narrow ly partisan tendency has been even m ore m arked. N T R , w h o led the party betw een 1983 and 1995, was extrem ely suspicious o f his C ongress opponents. In 1985, w h en he was c h ie f m inister, he explained his reasons: ‘I am the people’s friend. I speak for the people. T h erefo re anyone w h o opposes m e opposes the people.’28 H is successor, C handrababu N aid u , w ould never m ake such a sim plistic statem ent. H e has a m u ch m ore nuanced understanding o f politics and is shrew d enough n o t to co m m en t o n such things at all. B ut he has w orked m ore assiduously th an N T R to u n d erm in e the pow er and resources o f panchayats precisely because the opposition parties are b o u n d to w in control o f at least som e o f them . H e has also sought to delay panchayat elections. H e prefers to w o rk thro u g h o th er non-elected com m ittees at the grass roots— w ater users’ co m ­ m ittees, education com m ittees, etc.— w hich he is able to pack w ith his ow n party loyalists. It is th ro u g h these bodies that the jan m ab h o o m i program m e— his m ain developm ent initiative— w orks. A nd w hereas the Karnataka governm ent seeks to build synergy betw een such com m ittees and panchayats,29 N aid u has set th em against one another. H e has also channelled m oney— illegally— from panchayati bodies to the jan m ab h o o m i program m e.30 T h e m ode o f governance and political m anagem ent w h ich he prac­ tises is highly partisan and illiberal. H e is n o t a ‘com m andist’, since he 27. T his w riter was in the office o f the Secretary to G overnm ent, Panchayati Raj, the day the decision to do so was revealed. T h e Secretary found it im m ensely depressing. 28. Interview w ith this w riter, H yderabad, 9 M arch 1999. 29. T his message has consistently em erged in interviews conducted by this w riter w ith politicians and bureaucrats (in line m inistries and in the panchayati raj sector) between 1993 and 2000. 30. T his was a finding (so far unpublished) o f a Reserve Bank o f India com m ittee. Interview w ith a m em ber o f the com m ittee, Hyderabad, 8 M arch 1999.

274

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

sees plenty o f scope for the private sector and does n o t w ish th e governm ent to dom inate everything. B ut he seeks personal d o m in an ce o f nearly everything w ithin reach o f the governm ent. So he offers n o t ‘com m andism ’ b u t ‘control freakery’. T h is has— so far— served h is sh o rt-term political interests reasonably well. B ut it em bitters o th e r parties, their supporters and anyone w ho is not w ell connected w ith his party. T

he

Em bed d ed n ess

in t h e ir

of

S t a t e - l e v e l P a r t ie s

R e s p e c t iv e S o c ie t ie s

T h e trends discussed above have influenced the degree to w hich th e tw o m ain parties in each o f these states w ere able to em bed them selves in society by establishing transactional links betw een their organiza­ tions and m ajor social groups. T h e tw o parties in Karnataka w ere a good deal m ore successful at this than th eir counterparts in A ndhra Pradesh (especially before 1995, w hen the ruling T D P in the latter state began to make headway). T hat did not prevent incu m b en t state governm ents from losing elections in Karnataka as well as in A ndhra Pradesh in 1983, 1989 and 1994. B ut the difference was real none­ theless. T h e higher levels o f social tension and conflict in A ndhra Pradesh made it m ore difficult than in Karnataka for parties to build broad coalitions o f support am ong social groups. B ut the m ain explanation for the com parative lack o f em beddedness in A ndhra Pradesh lies in the political sphere— and there are several strands to it. T h e tradition in Karnataka o f rainbow coalitions, o r pow er sharing am ong prosperous and disadvantaged groups at the level o f the state cabinet, w hich has persisted since the 1970s, provides part o f the explanation for the deeper em beddedness o f parties in society there. It ensured that every m ajor social group had significant representation in every governm ent— no m atter w hich party held pow er— and received at least som e share o f the political spoils available. T hat helped to forge reasonably firm transactional links betw een those parties and m ost key social groups. T h ere was less pow er sharing in A ndhra Pradesh, especially w hen N T R ’s T D P held pow er— mainly because he utterly dom inated the governm ent, so that m inisters and legislators had few opportunities to channel goods and services to the social groups from w hich they cam e and w hich thé T D P needed to cultivate.

Explaining Political Trajectories

275

C o n sid er also the greater institutionalization, accom m odation and organizational strength w ithin parties in Karnataka. T h e ir organiza­ tions gained in substance in part because the tradition o f collective leadership helped to foster party-building. A nd the state’s strong panchayati raj system provided a fram ew ork w ithin w hich party orga­ nizations could develop still greater substance and dow nw ard, pen­ etrative reach. It also provided a system for training new com ers to the ranks o f the tw o parties, so that th eir organizations w ere replenished w ith skilled personnel. T h ese things enabled those parties to supervise, effectively, the distribution o f goods and services to im portant target groups in society at low er levels in the system . N T R ’s o n e-m an dom inance w ithin the TD P, and the organizational strife w ith in the A ndhra Pradesh C ongress, m ade it far m ore difficult for those party organizations to perform this task. Som e social groups in A ndhra Pradesh have at tim es identified quite closely w ith one o r the o th e r m ajor party— although th ere has been considerable volatility to this, especially in recent years.31 B ut w h en they have done so, they have been responding m ore to leading personalities, th eir theatrical posturing and their populist prom ises th an to the delivery o f benefits targeted at specific interest groups— o f the kind w hich K arnataka’s parties provide, m ore effectively and in greater m easure. Since 1995, the differences betw een the tw o states have dim inished som ew hat, as N a id u ’s o rg an izatio n -b u ild in g and ja n m a b h o o m i program m e enabled the T D P to begin sinking firm er roots into society in A ndhra Pradesh, m aking it resem ble K arnataka’s political parties in this respect (although it has been m ore personalized and less institutionalized than in Karnataka). T h is convergence betw een the tw o states, ironically, preceded the divergence o f their political trajectories in 1999.

E x p l a in in g

the

P arallel T

r a je c t o r ie s u p t o

1999

We have seen that the extraordinary sim ilarity in the political trajec­ tories o f Karnataka and A ndhra Pradesh up to 1999 m asked several im portant contrasts. So how is the sim ilarity to be explained? T h e explanations varied at different tim es. Externalities— specifically politi­ cal changes and interventions from N e w D elhi— w ere often im portant 31. I am grateful to K. Srinivasulu for evidence on this point.

276

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

(and som etim es decisive) in producing sim ilar outcom es, despite th e contrast betw een the political dynam ics in the tw o states, discussed above. B ut m ore often, factors internal to these tw o states p red o m in ated . We will proceed, in the next section, to exam ine the divergence o f the states’ trajectories beginning in 1999 and to sum m arize, in ta b u la r form , the varying influence o f national-level externalities across th e tw o states and over tim e. T h is will yield insights into the (so m ew h at lim ited and varied) extent to w hich regional politics have been n a ­ tionalized and national politics have been regionalized in recent years. T h ere was nothing very rem arkable about these states’ trajectories ru n n in g in parallel before 1971— C ongress dom inance, w h ich p re ­ vailed in b o th A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka, w as then the n o rm in m ost Indian states. N o r was it surprising that the version o f C ongress that rem ained loyal to Indira G andhi follow ing th e split in the party should triu m p h in both states at the parliam entary election o f 1971 and state assembly elections the next year. O n b o th occasions, these tw o states m erely conform ed yet again to the national norm . T h e surprises began at the 1977 national election, w hen these states w ere tw o o f only five in w hich the C ongress w ithstood the national wave o f revulsion against the Emergency. C ongress survived in A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka for tw o m ain reasons. T h e first had to do w ith an internal factor that was com m on to both states. Both had ch ief m inisters w ith the sense to avoid the w orst excesses o f the Emergency. T hey told N ew D elhi that they w ere governing in a suitably draconian m anner, b u t they did n o t actually do so. For exam ple, they subm itted m onthly reports o f large num bers o f com pulsory vasectom ies— very few o f w hich w ere actually being perform ed. T h ey also carefully provided national C ongress leaders w ith huge tributary paym ents in order to m inim ize intrusions from on high.32 B ut a com m on externality also m attered. T h e reason w hy tributary paym ents w ere sufficient to buy autonom y for these tw o ch ief m inisters w as that their distance (geographically and culturally) from N ew D elhi ensured that Indira and Sanjay G andhi neither knew m uch about n o r bothered to inter­ vene m uch in these states du rin g the Emergency.33 So in 1977, political outcom es w ere produced by a m ixture o f internal and external factors. 32. These com m ents are based on interviews in 1980 and 1981 w ith (by then form er) C h ie f M inisters Devaraj U rs o f Karnataka and Vengal Rao o f Andhra Pradesh. 33. J. M anor, ‘W here Congress Survived: Five States at the Indian General Election o f 1977’, Asian Survey, August 1978.

Explaining Political Trajectories

277

T h e defeat o f C ongress in both A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka in 1983 was a fu rth e r surprise, w hich was explained n o t by factors internal to the tw o states, b u t by another com m on externality— self-destructive intrusions in to th e politics o f both by Indira G andhi. T hese intrusions took different form s in the tw o states. In A ndhra Pradesh, M rs G andhi’s inability to find a slavishly loyal state leader led her to change ch ief m inisters repeatedly and to m ete o u t insulting treatm ent to som e. In Karnataka, she stuck by one extravagantly loyal ch ief m inister (R. G u n d u R ao), b u t failed to notice that he w as m entally incom pe­ tent, vastly co rru p t and unresponsive even to crucial interest groups and C ongress legislators.34 B ut the intrusions from N e w D elhi in these tw o states had one th in g in com m on: they both alienated huge n um bers o f voters. So in 1983 externalities w ere decisive. T h e explanations for the re-elections in 1985 o f both the T D P in A ndhra Pradesh and Janata in Karnataka are m ore mixed. In the form er, external intrusions by C ongress leaders in N e w D elhi w ere decisive. In 1984, Indira G andhi engineered a successful attem pt to induce en o u g h T D P legislators to defect to th e C ongress to topple N T R from pow er. B ut this proved counterproductive w hen mass protests catapulted him back into office soon thereafter. In reality, M rs G andhi had unw ittingly throw n a lifeline to N T R , w hose inac­ cessibility an d total dom inance o f his g o v ern m en t had alienated m any legislators and had begun to make the T D P unpopular. In 1985, popular sym pathy for him after such m istreatm ent enabled him to w in a state election. In Karnataka, factors internal to th e state predom inated. T h e Janata governm ent there was n o t toppled; it resigned from office and sought a new m andate follow ing Rajiv G an d h i’s landslide victory in a national election in th e wake o f his m o th e r’s assassination. Janata had in tro d u ced enough im aginative developm ent initiatives since 1983 to enable it to w in the ensuing state election on its record. H ad internal processes been allowed to ru n th e ir course in both states, the C ongress could have defeated N T R in A ndhra Pradesh. B ut M rs G andhi’s ill-advised interventions kept h e r party from pow er and m aintained sym m etry in the political trajectories o f the tw o states. So in 1985, externalities predom inated in A ndhra Pradesh, and internal factors w ere crucial in Karnataka.. At state elections in 1989, the C ongress defeated both Janata in Karnataka and the T D P in A ndhra Pradesh. T hese results w ere largely 34. M anor, ‘Blurring the L in es...’.

278

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

explained by factors internal to the tw o states— although the tw o cases w ere quite different. In Karnataka, quarrels w ith in the Janata g o v e rn ­ m en t played a part. B ut m ore im portantly, S. R. B om m ai p ro v e d to be a lacklustre c h ie f m inister after the resignation o f the a d ro it Ram akrishna H egde. B om m ai and Janata w ere also u n fo rtu n a te to have been deprived, after the death in 1988 o f Rural D ev elo p m e n t M inister A bdul N azir Sab, o f one o f the m ost im aginative and b e st loved state-level leaders in India. In A ndhra Pradesh in 1989, the T D P ’s re-election hopes w e re dashed by popular im patience w ith N T R ’s grossly over-centralized approach, and his inaccessibility and capricious behaviour— notably the occasion on w hich he suddenly sacked 31 m inisters and th e n decam ped to Assam to cam paign in an election there w ith o u t ap p o in t­ ing a new governm ent. H is com placency d u rin g the 1989 election in A ndhra Pradesh also did great damage. N T R foolishly tim ed th at state election to coincide w ith a national election— w hich gave a national party like his C ongress rival greater salience— because he th o u g h t that a strong show ing w ould enable him to becom e India’s Prim e M inister at the head o f a coalition governm ent. H e spent very little m oney on the campaign, and forced his best organizer (N aid u , w h o later dis­ placed him ) to be a candidate, w hich m eant that the young m an was tied dow n to his constituency and unable to concentrate o n m anaging the party cam paign state-w ide. M eanw hile, the A ndhra Pradesh C o n ­ gress was— uniquely betw een 1988 and 1989— w ell led by C henna Reddy. In 1994, w hen C ongress lost state elections to these tw o parties in both states, internal factors again m ainly explained the outcom es, although interventions from N ew D elhi dam aged the Congress governm ents in b oth before the m u rd er o f Rajiv G andhi in 1991. In A ndhra Pradesh, C h en n a Reddy had been ousted by Rajiv Gandhi in 1990 after dissident C ongressm en fom ented ghastly com m unal riots to destabilize their ow n leader. H is successor lacked Reddy’s acuity. In Karnataka, Rajiv G andhi first selected V eerendra Patil as ch ief m inister— a serious blunder. Patil had last led a state govern­ m en t in 1972, and had so lost touch w ith changes in politics that he was dubbed ‘Rip Van W inkle’. Rajiv G andhi responded to the inevitable discontent am ong C ongress legislators w ith a far more grievous blunder, the ap p o in tm en t o f the norm less S. Bangarappa w ho led one o f the tw o w orst and m ost unpopular governm ents in the state’s history.

Explaining Political Trajectories

279

External interventions from N e w D elhi dim inished m arkedly w hile P V N arasim ha Rao was the C ongress prim e m inister betw een 1991 and 1996. H e acceded to an initiative by C ongressm en in Karnataka to o u st Bangarappa in 1992, and was glad to see him go.35 A nd for the m ost part, he allowed state-level units o f the party to m anage their ow n affairs. T h e ram pant factional infighting in the A ndhra Pradesh C o n ­ gress m ade it hugely unpopular. In Karnataka, the dam age done by the Bangarappa governm ent was partially repaired by the new c h ie f m in ­ ister, Veerappa Moily. B ut he often seem ed a rudderless leader and his party rem ained unpopular. So popular im patience w ith incum bent governm ents— w hich had been w eakened in bo th states by a com bi­ nation o f internal problem s and external blunders— provided the m ain explanation for the results in b oth states in 1994.

E x p l a i n i n g t h e D i v e r g e n c e i n 1999 At the state elections o f O cto b er 1999, the political trajectories o f A ndhra Pradesh and Karnataka diverged for the first tim e since Independence. In A ndhra Pradesh, the T D P governm ent defeated the C ongress opposition. T his was achieved th ro u g h an alliance w ith the H in d u nationalist BJP, b u t the electoral outcom e gave a solid m ajority o f seats in the state legislature to the T D P so that it could govern on its ow n. In Karnataka, the ruling Janata Dal (w hich also m ade an alliance w ith the BJP) was dealt a crushing defeat by C ongress. It is im portant to stress that this divergence in the states’ political trajectories was n o t the result o f a divergence betw een them in som e o th er respect. O n the contrary, in one im portant way, political practice in the tw o states had actually converged in the period before the 1999 election, w hile o th er factors rem ained roughly constant. T h e conver­ gence resulted from the energetic and successful effort by C handrababu N aid u in A ndhra Pradesh to strengthen the organization o f his party (the T D P ) after he becam e c h ie f m inister in 1995. We have seen that, betw een 1983 and 1995, both m ajor parties in that state (the T D P and C ongress) had w eaker organizations than the tw o m ain parties in Karnataka (Janata and C ongress). By building up the T D P organiza­ tion, and thereby em bedding it m ore effectively in society— a change that was not m atched by his C ongress rivals in A ndhra Pradesh— 35. H is views on Bangarappa were made clear by implication in an interview w ith this w riter in N ew Delhi, on 11 February 1992.

280

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

N aid u caused the politics o f his state to converge som ew hat w ith those o f Karnataka. So how do we explain the divergence o f the tw o states’ p o litic a l trajectories at the state elections o f 1999? Som e observers re g a rd N aid u ’s re-election in A ndhra Pradesh as a sign that the fiscally prudent, business-like p ursuit o f developm ent can now w in e le c tio n s in India. T h ey w ere unaw are o f his reckless pre-election sp e n d in g and o f the fiscal crisis that it had produced in the state. I f fiscal prudence clearly did not w in the 1999 election, can w e attribute th e v icto ry to d e v e lo p m e n t sp e n d in g th ro u g h th e ja n m a b h o o m i program m e? It certainly helped, and N aid u stressed it above all else du rin g the campaign. B ut it was insufficient. N aid u and the T D P w on the 1999 election thanks to an alliance w ith the BJP I f he had avoided such an alliance and faced b o th th e C ongress and the BJP in a three-cornered contest, the C ongress w ould have w on a m ajority o f seats. T h is is apparent from th e v o tin g figures. T h e T D P -B JP alliance polled six percent m ore votes th an did the C ongress. V irtually all analysts in the state agree that th e BJP brought betw een eight and twelve percent o f th e votes w ith it. It provided the T D P w ith its m argin o f victory. So the c h ie f m in ister’s spending on developm ent through jan m ab h o o m i and his careful im age-building w ould n o t have given him victory on his ow n. H e very nearly declined to form an alliance w ith the BJP In Ju n e, four m o n th s before the state election o f 1999, his pollsters told him that his party w ould w in 50 per cent o f the vote on its ow n. A t the eleventh hour, however, he decided to play things safe and jo in forces w ith the BJP T h is saved h im from defeat.36 T h e decisive im portance o f N aid u ’s link w ith the BJP indicates, o f course, that externalities from the national level figured prom inently in this state election, as they had done on som e previous occasions. But there is a key difference in this instance— the externalities involved not the C ongress party in N e w D elhi (w hich had always been the key external factor before) b u t the BJR Som e have seen the BJP’s inter­ ventions from the national level as less coercive and less contem ptuous o f the dem ocratic logic at the state level than those o f the Congress high com m and— or they have argued that they becam e coercive only 36. These com m ents are based on num erous interviews w ith journalists, politicians and political analysts in Hyderabad in 1999, 2000 and 2001. I am especially grateful to K. Srinivasulu and Jayaprakash N arayan for key insights.

Explaining Political Trajectories

281

in late 2001.37 B ut in reality, the interventions by national leaders o f th e BJP in 1999 w ere decidedly coercive. T h is was especially apparent in their dealings w ith their party colleagues in Karnataka. In that state, the BJP’s national leaders com pelled the party’s statelevel u n it to form a last-m inute electoral alliance w ith th e ru lin g jan ata Dal. T h is was ferociously opposed by the BJP in Karnataka. Karnataka’s BJP had been the official opposition in the state assem bly over the previous five years— the party’s first stint in that role in Karnataka— and had w on significant popular support for its very aggressive criticism o f the ru lin g ja n a ta Dal party. BJP leaders in Karnataka also knew that the ruling party was extrem ely unpopular— and they naturally expected to make gains at the state election as a result o f their slashing attacks on it. So they w ere alarm ed w hen their leaders in N ew D elhi ordered them to tu rn their strategy on its head and align w ith th e ruling party. T he BJP’s national leadership nevertheless insisted, because they believed that an all-India alliance w ith th e Janata Dal w ould w in them m ore seats in no rth India than they w ould lose in Karnataka. As expected, the electoral pact w ith the Janata Dal caused the Karnataka BJP severe damage in the state elections. It needs to be stressed that this pact did not decide th e outcom e in Karnataka, as it had in A ndhra Pradesh. It ensured th at the defeat o f the Janata D al-B JP alliance at the hands o f C ongress was crushing. B u t C ongress w o u ld alm ost certainly have w o n com fortably in Karnataka in the absence o f such a pact. C ongress w o n a m ajority o f seats in all regions o f the state— som ething that had not happened since the days o f C ongress dom inance. It also captured m ost o f the seats not ju s t in rural maidan (plains) areas— w here it had always been strong, and w here elections in the state are w on and lost— b u t also in urban and malnad (hill) areas, w here its opponents have traditionally been popular. G iven this form idable show ing by C ongress, it is highly unlikely that it w ould have lost the election had the Janata D al-B JP alliance not been form ed. So the influence o f the intervention by the BJP national leadership was significant, b u t less than decisive. C ongress in Karnataka did so well in that election for three m ain reasons. First, the accom m odative m ode o f intra-party m anagem ent that had persisted in Karnataka enabled it to retain far greater 37. See, for example, the editorial in The Hindu o f 5 O ctober 2001, w hich argues that the decision in that m onth to change the BJP ch ief m inister in Gujarat indicated that the BJP wa¿beginning to adopt the coercive m ethods o f the Congress high command.

282

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

organizational strength than C ongress had in A ndhra Pradesh. S ec­ ond, great care was taken by state C ongress leaders to m aintain an accom m odation am ong im portant party leaders from every im p o rta n t social group— a rainbow coalition. T h e trio that had rebuilt th e Karnataka C ongress included senior figures from the lan d o w n in g Vokkaliga caste-cluster, the O B C s and the Scheduled Castes. T h ird , pains w ere taken to bolster party un ity before and d u rin g th e campaign. A rrangem ents w ere m ade for all significant leaders in th e Karnataka C ongress to barnstorm the state, as a body, on a single cam paign bus— in o rd er b oth to exhibit and to build a sense o f solidarity.38 T h e election w as decided by these three things— and by m ism anagem ent and disastrous public relations blunders by th e incum bent Janata c h ie f m inister, J. H . Patel (despite a reasonably good record o f developm ent by his governm ent)— rather than by th e Janata D al-B JP alliance that was im posed from N ew D elhi. O n e th in g that had little im pact o n the result was the candidacy o f Sonia G andhi for a parliam entary seat in the far n o rth o f th e state— in the H yderabad Karnataka region. Even C ongressm en privately conceded that it m ay have helped to w in a few extra state assem bly seats nearby, but that it m ade little difference in the other tw o m ain regions w here m ore seats w ere at stake— Bom bay Karnataka and old M ysore.39

C

o n c l u s io n

N

ature of

: E x t e r n a l it ie s

and the

R e g io n a l iz e d P o l it ic s

To conclude, let us consider in a little m ore detail the interplay betw een national and regional politics over the period betw een 1972 and 1999. It is apparent that in 1999, an externality originating at the national level— the BJP and its involvem ent in electoral alliances— influenced election results in these states. It had great im portance in A ndhra Pradesh and rather m odest im portance in Karnataka. B ut we m u st take care to avoid exaggerated estim ates o f the influence o f national-level politics in the recent past, and expectations about this in the future. 38. I am grateful to E. Raghavan for briefings on these points in Bangalore as results em erged in O ctober 1999. 39. Interviews with seven C ongress strategists and leaders, Bangalore, O ctober 1999.

Explaining Political Trajectories

283

F our points are w orth noting in this connection. First, it is inac­ curate to say that externalities from the national level had a greater im pact on state-level politics at the 1999 elections th an ever before. T h e involvem ent o f the BJP in electoral alliances in 1999 clearly had less influence o n the result in Karnataka, and n o m o re influence on th e result in A ndhra Pradesh th an externalities had on the results in bo th states in 1972 and 1983. In 1972, the C ongress w on w ell in b oth states thanks to the popularity o f Indira G andhi and h er call to abolish poverty— a slogan that did n o t yet inspire disbelief, as it did after a few years o f non-delivery. In 1983, ill-considered interventions in the two states by M rs G andhi w ere decisive in ensu rin g the initial victories o f Janata in Karnataka and the T D P in A ndhra Pradesh. Second, w e should recognize that the period from 1972 to 1999 did n o t w itness a steady rise in the influence o f national-level externalities o n the politics o f these tw o states (or o f o th e r states). T h e table below, based o n the argum ents set fo rth above, dem onstrates that th e influence o f such externalities rose and fell at successive elections d u rin g that period. D egree o f influence o f national-level externalities o n state elections Election

Karnataka

A ndhra Pradesh

1972

high

high

1978

low to m edium

low to m edium

1983 1985

high low

high high

1989

low

low

1994

low to m edium

low to m edium

1999

m edium

m ed iu m to high

T h ere has been no ‘rising tide’ o f influence for national-level exter­ nalities. T h e ir influence fluctuated, and—o n this evidence— this is likely to continue at future elections. T h ird , even in 1999— w h en national-level externalities had a considerable im pact— the nature and extent o f that im pact depended very heavily o n conditions at the state level. In Karnataka in 1999, the disillusionm ent w ith Janata rule and th e rem arkable success o f C ongress leaders at rebuilding th eir organization and its links to a diverse social base w ould have guaranteed a C ongress victory no m atter w hat interventions from the BJP in N ew D elhi occurred. T h e

284

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

unw ise electoral alliance that the BJP forged there increased th e scale o f the C ongress victory, b u t it did not cause it. In A ndhra P radesh, the alliance betw een the T D P and the BJP determ ined the o u tco m e. B ut this was only possible because o f som ething internal to the state. T h e tw o m ain parties— the T D P and th e C ongress— enjoyed ro u g h ly equal am ounts o f popular support so th at a marginal force like th e BJP could tip the balance. C o n d itio n s at the state level had such im portance in 1999 that these tw o state elections serve m ore as exam ples o f th e regionalization o f national politics than o f the nationalization o f regional politics. Finally, th e table above indicates th at national-level externalities had a greater im pact in A ndhra Pradesh than in Karnataka on tw o occasions— in 1985 and 1999. T h is is n o accident. It occurred for tw o m ain reasons. Karnataka’s political system was better able to m inim ize the influence o f such externalities because its tw o m ain parties h a d stronger, m ore institutionalized, decentralized and penetrative orga­ nizations th a n their counterparts in A ndhra Pradesh. A nd th e m o re com prehensive, m ulti-stranded developm ent strategies o f the Karnataka parties enabled them to em bed them selves m ore deeply and effec­ tively w ith in society than could parties in A ndhra Pradesh. W h e n state-level parties can m aintain organizational strength and em b ed them selves in th eir respective regional societies, they enhance th e capacity o f state-level forces to curtail th e nationalization o f regional politics.

9 Populist Leadership in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu Mamata and Jayalalithaa Compared M ukulika Banerjee]

t first glance the states o f Tamil N a d u and W est Bengal d o n o t seem obvious candidates for political com parison. T h e fo rm er has been dom inated by tw o parties, w hich have alternated in pow er b u t share the ideal o f a D ravidian Tamil heartland. T h e success o f b oth parties has been heavily influenced by popular culture and im agination, n o ­ tably in the guise o f Tamil cinem a. Politics in W est Bengal, o n the o th er hand, has revolved around an alliance o f co m m u n ist parties, w hich has held pow er continuously since 1977. Its program m e, naturally enough, has been geared tow ards overcom ing w hat it sees as class divisions, and its leaders express disdain about m ost elem ents o f popular culture. D espite th eir profound differences, both states have in recent years th ro w n up colourful and u n o rth o d o x w o m en political leaders. In Tamil N ad u , J. Jayalalithaa has led the All India A nna D ravida 1 .1 w ould like to acknowledge the financial assistance o f the U K D epartm ent for International D evelopm ent and the N uffield Foundation w hich supported the research on w hich this paper is based. I thank Jo h n H arriss, Rob Jenkins, Sudipta Kaviraj, Sunil Khilnani, Jam es M anor, Yogendra Yadav and Julian Watts for their com m ents. T h e paper is based on my ow n fieldw ork in West Bengal and secondary literature on Tamil N adu.

286

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

M u n n etra Kazagham (AIADM K) to victories in state elections a n d served tw o stints as c h ie f m inister. In West Bengal M am ata B a n e ije e forged the T rinam ul (‘G rassroots’) C ongress Party, w hich w o n seats in the state and national parliam ent and propelled h er to the p o st o f Railway M inister in a coalition central governm ent. B oth w o m en are in th eir fifties and have led unconventional lives. N e ith e r has m arried. M ost o th er high-profile w om en in In d ia n politics w ere forced into politics m ore or less reluctantly as a re su lt o f th eir husbands’ careers. Sonia G andhi, the w idow o f Rajiv G an d h i, w en t on to becom e president o f the C ongress Party. Rabri D evi, th e w ife o f fo rm er B ihar c h ie f m inister Laloo Prasad Yadav, assum ed th e office o f c h ie f m inister w h en Laloo was indicted o n c o rru p tio n charges. M am ata and Jayalalithaa are o f a different ilk. M am ata is o f course the m ore norm -defyingly indep en d en t o f the tw o. B ut even Jayalalithaa— w h o clearly ow ed h er political ascendancy to the p a tro n ­ age o f film star-turned-politician M . G. R am achandran (M G R )— to o k a less-than-ordinary path into politics, the accepted role o f political w ife o r daughter having been unavailable to her. Jayalalithaa’s rela­ tionship w ith M G R was no th in g if n o t a challenge to convention: n o t only was she engaged in a highly visible from o f no n -d o m estic em ploym ent, w hich was a strike against m any aspiring w o m en politicians o f h er generation; she also had to overcom e the in h eren t disreputability o f h er position as M G R ’s alleged m istress. N e ith e r Jayalalithaa n o r M am ata conform to public standards o f fem inine behaviour and they share a reputation for unpredictability and ruthlessness. Both are know n to have volatile tem pers, b u t also display a m astery o f the tim ing o f public gestures and the m anipu­ lation o f public sentim ent and opinion. And both com m and syco­ phantic loyalty from th eir colleagues, dom inating their parties and w ielding com plete control over policy In their shifting alliance strategies, seat-sharing arrangem ents, and w illingness to deal w ith ideological enem ies, both display a flexibility that can be construed as either tactically m asterful w om en or sham elessly lacking in p rin ­ ciple, according to o n e’s taste. Above all, Jayalalithaa and M am ata have irrevocably changed the political landscapes o f their respective states, and done so w hile behaving quite differently from political and cultural orthodoxies. T h is leaves m any com m entators perplexed by their huge popular support bases, w hich get explained away by the ‘populist appeal’ o f their flam boyant personalities.

Populist Leadership in West Bengal and Tamil N adu

287

Intrigued by these individuals, I felt a com parison o f th eir political careers— in particular the ways in w hich they evoke, w ith varying degrees o f intention and design, cultural icons associated w ith their respective regions— could provide som e potentially helpful insights concerning the life o f the tw o states and o f populism and represen­ tation in the Indian polity as a w hole. B oth protagonists had to challenge the d o m in an t parties in their respective states. West Bengal’s I.eft F ront governm ent has been continuously in pow er in West Bengal since 1977, w in n in g five consecutive state assem bly elections and w eathering the vicissitudes o f nine intervening general elections. T h e Left F ront is a coalition o f six parties, the largest o f w hich is the C o m m u n ist Party o f India (M arxist), o r C P I(M ). T h e C P I(M ) was led until 2000 by Jyoti Basu, w ho by the tim e o f his retirem en t held the record as India’s longestserving ch ief m inister.2 M uch o f the Left F ro n t’s popularity stem s from ‘O peration Barga’, its far-reaching agrarian reform program m e, w hich seized estates from landow ners, divided them , and assigned ow nership o f plots to those sharecroppers (bargas) w h o had been w orking the land for m ore than three years. T h is dram atically reduced the pow er o f the landow ners and im proved the living standards o f the rural poor, w h o w ere also helped by the in troduction o f H ig h Yielding Varieties o f rice that produced tw o crops a year, and by the significant increase in the m in im u m daily wage for hired m anual labour. Land reform was com plem ented by the speedy im plem entation o f the 73rd A m en d m en t to the C o n stitu tio n , w hich devolved significant elem ents o f local governm ent decision-m aking o n finance and devel­ o p m en t issues to panchayats, local elected bodies representing groups o f villages. T h ese initiatives b ro u g h t genuine structural and social change to W est Bengal’s countryside, and w o n for the Left F ront the su p p o rt o f b oth the labourers w ho benefited directly, and the rural w hite-collar w orkers w ho found roles in the grow ing governm ent and quasi-govem m ent apparatus and in the burgeoning party organiza­ tion. T h e state-level C ongress party, m eanw hile, had n o answ er to such policies, o r the zeal and political efficiency w ith w hich they w ere carried out, and becam e increasingly m orib u n d , w ith endless internal pow er struggles and a w ithering organizational base. In Tamil N adu, the D M K (D ravida M u n n etra Kazagham) was the m ain political party to grow o u t o f the D ravidian revivalist m ovem ent 2. H e was succeeded in D ecem ber 2000 by Buddhadeb Bhattacharjce, previously H om e and Police M inister in the West Bengal G overnm ent.

288

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

th at began in the 1920s. T h is m ovem ent advocated greater ‘s e l f respect’ am ong the Dravidians, w ho it considered culturally d is tin c t from , and superior to, the descendants o f the ‘A ryans’, by w hich t h e y m eant n o t on ly n o rth Indians b u t Tamil B rahm ins as well. T h e D M K , w ith its exuberantly proclaim ed love o f the Tamil language a n d Tamil cu ltu re and its rejection o f caste-based Brahm inical H in d u is m , first cam e to pow er in Tamil N ad u in 1967, defeating the in c u m b e n t C ongress governm ent and decisively replacing the C o m m u n ist P a rty o f India (C P I) as C ongress’s principal rival. T h e D M K d ra w s resources and support from a proliferation o f formal and n o n -fo rm a l civic associations, including book clubs, debating societies, and film clubs, all o f w hich encourage discussion and debate about D ravidian cultural and social issues. D espite th eir obvious differences, and the contrasts betw een th e state-level political environm ents in w hich they operate, th e D M K and th e Left F ro n t have a n u m b er o f striking similarities. B oth replaced C ongress governm ents in the 1970s and have successfully prevented C ongress from retu rn in g to power. Both are cadre-based parties w ith w ide netw orks o f local cells, w ell-disciplined party com m and structures, and affiliated cultural and social organizations, all o f w hich are deployed to m obilize grassroots political support.3 B oth parties publish journals thro u g h w hich they appeal prim arily to literate supporters accustom ed to reading, w hich cannot be said for m ost Indian parties. Both are fam ously hostile to religious orthodoxy, stem m ing from their anti-B rahm anism and M arxism , respectively).4 3 O n e may, however, note the som ew hat different nature o f socialiiing and thinking am ong the tw o sets o f cadres. While lengthy and avid conversations (adda) are the hallm ark o f young C om m unists in W?st Bengal, these usually revolve around M arxist ideas, party issues or even m em ory games concerning past election results. N o self-respecting m em ber o f the Left Front would, for instance, willingly discuss popular cinema. In contrast, D M K activists’ conversations typically range m ore widely into Tamil cultural issues, including, indeed particularly, Tamil popular movies. 4. T he D M K has latterly weakened its anti-religion line in deference to middlecastc sensibility and following its tactical alliance w ith the BJP, b u t it remains significantly m ore anti-religious than its main rivals. T h e Left F ront has retained its strict ideological distance from religious parties and has been propelled onto the national stage as a key player in the ‘T h ird Front’, form ed to oppose the anti­ secularism o f the BJP and what it sees as the increasingly half-hearted secularism o f Congress.

Populist Leadership in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu

289

B oth have been dom inated by the long-tim e leadership o f one m an (M . K arunanidhi for the D M K , Jyoti Basu for the Left Front), and the w ider leadership o f b oth parties is overw helm ingly m ale. T h ere is, for instance, n o w om an in the politburo o f the C P I(M ), the tw o ruling parties’ leaders having positioned them selves as patriarchs o f self-consciously ‘hard’ m asculine political fam ilies.5 B oth parties have dealt harshly w ith opponents, using violence against opposing activists and denying loans and resources to individuals and areas supporting rival parties. N eith er has m ade m u ch effort even to pretend that its governm ent represents all constituents equally. T hese com m on characteristics m eant that, in eith er state, any potential challenger was going to have to com pete against a political force that had established a high degree o f local hegem ony through pow erful and appealing core ideas, access to governm ental resources and patronage, a w ell-established organization, effective m echanism s for com m unicating doctrinal and policy shifts, a dem onstrated w ill­ ingness to use intim idation, and, n o t least, a political force that had appropriated local values o f patriarchy and dignity. W hat th en o f their upstart opponents? J a y a l a l it h a a

and

T a m il N

adu

T h e A IA D M K cam e into being in 1972, w h en M G R by th en a hugely popular Tamil film star broke away from the D M K to form a rival party. T h o u g h he was actually a B rahm in from Kerala, M G R had been a m em ber o f the D M K from its inception, bringing w ith him en o rm o u s num bers o f votes thro u g h the vast m em bership o f his fan clubs, w hich also provided the bulk o f the p arty ’s activists.6 W hat provoked the split in the D M K was the apprehension by the party’s ch ief m inister, Karunanidhi, o fM G R ’s grow ing popularity. K aruninidhi refused to give M G R a cabinet position, and M G R w alked o u t o f the 5. Both leaders have been troubled by their sons. K arunanidhi caused his party to split (again) by prom oting his son as successor, while Basu’s hitherto honest reputation was tainted by allegations o f corruption against his son. T his biographi­ cal coincidence may reasonably be taken as an indicator o f a deeper, heavily m asculine malaise, as these self-proclaimed radicals appeared to capitulate to older ideals o f patriarchy. 6. For further details, see Sarah Dickey, ‘T h e Politics o f Adulation: Cinema and the Production o f Politicians in South India’, Journal o f Asian Studies, vol. 52, no. 2 (1993), pp. 340-72.

290

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

D M K . H is newly form ed A lA D M K w on the state assem bly e le c tio n s o f 1977. T his first AlADM K governm ent was later dissolved, o n t h e flim siest o f pretexts, by Prime M inister Indira G andhi, along w ith all o th er non-C ongress state governm ents. T h ree years later, in 1980, t h e A lA D M K w on a fresh mandate, despite an electoral alliance b e tw e e n the D M K and the Congress. M G R rem ained chief m inister o f T a m il N ad u until his death in 1987. Jayalalithaa was the last in a long line o f M G R ’s leading la d ie s, featuring alongside him on screen in w hat were then c o n sid e re d scandalously m odern and revealing clothes. T his racy image w a s bolstered by h er increasingly public role as his devoted c o m p a n io n in real life. N onetheless, Jayalalithaa always stressed h er c o n v e n t education and B rahm in caste identity in an effort to obliterate th e stigm a o f an actress’s ‘im pure’ life and w in the approval o f the p a rty ’s otherw ise m orally conservative supporters. She eventually becam e universally know n as anna’, elder b ro th e r’s wife. H e r political apprenticeship was a hard but valuable one, as M G R both ro u tin ely played her o ff against Vcerapan (the am bitious head o f his film fan clubs) and appointed her to the key post o f propaganda m inister in his cabinet. She soon learned the tact and slyness required for survival, pushing her case in private, w hile publicly repudiating any rebellious statem ents by her faction and affirm ing that she w ould always w ork in any way M G R instructed, because he was her god, his w ord her sacred text. U n d e r M G R , the AlADM K positioned itself as a party o f the lower castes, w ith M G R playing the role o f the great benefactor w h o pro­ tected and provided for the poor in the face o f the selfish and exploit­ ative interests o f the m iddle classes. It thus constituted an alliance o f w hat H arriss has called ‘those at the apex o f a pyram id o f pow er with those at the b o tto m ’, and w hat Sw am y has characterized as the ‘have-a-Iots allying w ith have-nothings against the have-a-littles’.7 T h is approach, epitom ized by the party’s vast handout o f free school lunches, exerted w ide appeal am ong socially marginalized groups, particularly w om en and the very poor. Swam y argues that given the high rates o f m ale and fem ale w a g e labour in the state (as opposed to subsistence agriculturalists) such welfare program mes 7. Arun Swamy. The Nation, the People and the Poor (unpublished PhD D issertation, U niversity o f California, Berkeley, 1996); and Jo h n Harriss’s excellent review article, ‘Populism, Tamil Style: Is it Really a Success?’, Development and Change, vol. 5, no. 2 (2000).

Populist Leadership in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu

291

had a w idespread and im m ediate appeal am ong the under-classes and indeed genuinely benefited th em nutritionally. H ow ever, in political term s, these groups rem ain unorganized, a mass o f individual petitioners. M G R ’s death led to a succession battle w ith in the AIADM K, as Jayalalithaa sought the position o f ch ief m inister, b u t was opposed by Veerappan, w h o pushed the claims o f M G R ’s w idow, V Janaki. T hese extrem ely bitter pow er struggles, and the disruption they caused to the governance o f the state, led the central governm ent to im pose President’s R ule in 1988. W hen fresh elections w ere held in 1989, the D M K took advantage o f the A IA D M K ’s internal divisions, w inning a m ajority in the state assem bly and retu rn in g K arunanidhi to the ch ief m inistership. D espite h er public hum iliation at M G R ’s funeral, w h en she was pulled— w eeping— o ff the cortege and pointedly replaced by Janaki, Jayalalithaa eventually w on the political battle. G iven the norm in Indian politics that w idows are the preferred successor in the absence o f an adult son, this was a considerable coup. At every stage Jayalalithaa sought to avoid charges o f petty politicking, stressing the alm ost divine unity that she had enjoyed w ith M G R in film and in real life. At an A IA D M K party conference in 1992, she told h e r audience: ‘M G R show ed m e as his political heir. I f I stand in fro n t o f you today, it is no ordinary incident. It is a historical event’.8 H e r successful inheritance was m arked by a change in her party honorific from ‘anna’ to ‘am m a’, or mother. Established as the A IA D M K ’s unchallenged leader, Jayalalithaa led the party to a landslide victory in the 1991 state assem bly elections. She served a full five-year term as ch ief m inister, in the process developing a persona that became ever larger than life. G lam orous and opulent, fair-skinned and intensely fem inine, she stands as an ageing b u t un m is­ takable incarnation o f the coquettish fem m e fatale o f h er younger days o n the silver screen. Beguiled by h er charm and com m and, m en have been said to stand awed in h er presence.9 Self-consciously enigm atic & Frontline, 31 July 1992, citcd in I. Widlund, Paths to Power and Patterns of Influence: The Dravidian Parties in South Indian Politics (Upsala: Acta Univcrsitatis Upsaliensis, 2000), pp. 133. 9. T here was a passionate desire am ong even the opposition D M K party w orkers to see her at least once, even w hen it m eant undertaking a lengthy and inconvenient jo u rn ey from northern Tamil N adu. I thank Joseph A run for sharing this inform ation from his ow n fieldwork site.

292

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

and sparing in her utterances, Jayalalithaa projects the stilln ess o f royalty, and h er m eetings and negotiations are discreetly a rra n g e d . H e r m oves are announced th ro u g h em issaries in the m an n er o f a royal court. H e r private life is a closely guarded secret and h er s u p p o r t ­ ers are raised to great excitem ent by the prospect o f an o c c a sio n a l glimpse. H aughty and im perious, surro u n d ed by her coterie, Jay alalith aa dem ands exaggerated gestures o f total loyalty, w ith m inisters a n d bureaucrats know n to prostrate them selves before her in greeting. T h e A IA D M K under Jayalalithaa operates as an elaborate sy stem o f patronage, w ith the spoils o f pow er filtering dow n from the le a d e r to h e r follow ers. T his, together w ith the large am ounts o f charity g iv e n away in h er nam e, reinforces Jayalalithaa’s image as a great b en efactress and u p h o ld er o f the faith, in the tradition o f the benign m o n a rc h s o f the past.10 In 1995 this was m ade clear to all w hen, w ith reckless self-confidence, she bestow ed o n th e son o f h e r female secretary (a n d ru m o u red lover)— a y oung m an Jayalalithaa had adopted as h er o w n son— a fantastically o p u len t w edding that d rew the attention o f th e national m edia and m ade plain the vast w ealth she had accru ed .11 In the wake o f this notorious event and the norm less behaviour o f h e r governm ent, n o t to m en tio n w idespread rum ours o f c o rru p ­ tion, Jayalalithaa’s A IA D M K was trounced in the 1996 state assem bly elections.12 T h e new D M K governm ent lost no tim e in bringing crim inal charges against her. After the national election in 1998, Jayalalithaa offered her party’s 18 M Ps to help support the precarious BJP-led coalition governm ent in N ew D elhi. W hat she w anted in retu rn was for the central governm ent to im pose President’s R ule in Tamil N ad u — b oth to settle scores w ith K arunanidhi and as a way o f getting the crim inal cases against h er dropped. Jayalalithaa also dem anded that she be allowed to select the national finance minister. 10. For an elaborate exposition o f this them e, see Widlund, Ihths to Power..., particularly C hapter 3. 11. Jayalalitha’s alleged lesbian relationship w ith Sasikala has caused some popular censure in what is considered a conservative society, b u t oth er people d is m is s it b y p o in tin g to th e fa ct th a t K a r u n a n id h i h a s tw o w iv es, im p ly in g that

homosexuality is no more ‘transgressive’ than polygamy. 12. As Subramanian puts it, ‘opposition to Jayalalitha’s attacks on pluralist norm s became the main concern o f m any voters in th e ... state assembly elections o f 1996, leading them to back the D M K .. . . ’, see N arendra Subramanian, Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and Democracy in South India (Delhi: O xford U niversity Press, 1999), p. 305.

Populist Leadership in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu

293

W hen the BJP baulked at these dem ands, she w ithdrew h e r party’s su p p o rt from the central coalition governm ent, aligning instead w ith the C ongress-led opposition bloc. T h is ended the governm ent’s m ajority and ultim ately forced fresh elections in 1999. T h e BJP’s coalition governm ent was rescued by none o th er than Jayalalithaa’s rival, the D M K , w hich pledged the support o f its M Ps to the Vajpayee governm ent. T h e investigations into Jayalalithaa’s financial affairs intensified and the D irectorate o f Vigilance and A nti-C orruption (DVAC) conducted a six-day search at h er residence and business establishm ents, seizing 28 kg o f jew ellery (w orth m ore than ten m illion U S dollars), 91 w rist w atches, 41 air-conditioners, 10,500 sarees, 750 pairs o f footw ear and m uch else. T h e authorities also confiscated docum ents pertaining to properties and business transac­ tions in w hich she had allegedly intervened d u rin g h er tenure as ch ief m inister, a period during w hich h e r publicly disclosed incom e alone had increased by th irty fold. T h e state assembly elections in M ay 2001 w ere th u s a test o f Jayalalithaa’s political resilience and w ere preceded by m uch m an ­ oeuvring. In M arch 2000 she entered into a seat-sharing agreem ent w ith the Paattali Makkal Katchi (a party dom inated by the Vanniar caste) and the Tamil M aanila C ongress, a breakaway C ongress faction. T h en , after weeks o f procrastination, the C ongress itself agreed to jo in h er electoral front against the ruling D M K . M eanw hile, the courts w ere considering w hether Jayalalithaa should be allow ed to stand for election at all, given the pending charges against her. B ut stand she did, and thro u g h her com bination o f tactical m achinations and insouciant defiance in the face o f grave co rru p tio n charges— as well as the genuine unpopularity o f the D M K governm ent— the A lA D M K w on a huge m ajority and retu rn ed to pow er. T h e victory proved beyond d o u b t Jayalalithaa’s skills in electoral arithm etic and cobbling together coalitions.13 M any voters said that they did n o t view her as having taken any o f their money, w hile others felt the charges against h er reflected the D M K establishm ent’s persecution o f an am bitious w o m an .14 A survey conducted by the D elhi-based C en tre for the Study o f D eveloping Societies d u rin g the 2001 assem bly elections revealed that w hile 61 per cent o f respondents considered Jayalalithaa 13. Yogendra Yadav, ‘C SD S Election Analysis— Tamil N adu: A M atter o f Arithmetic’, Frontline, 26 M ay-8 Ju n e 2001. 14. I thank Joseph Arun for this inform ation.

294

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

‘co rru p t’ o r ‘very co rru p t’, 51 per cent th o u g h t the sam e o f the D M K governm ent. So, as Yogendra Yadav concluded, it seem s that ‘c o r r u p ­ tion only becom es a decisive election issue w h en an obvious a n d effective alternative is available to voters*.15 Six m o n th s later the T a m il N ad u H igh C o u rt, u n d er im m ense ALADM K-fuelled popular p r e s ­ sure, cleared h er o f all charges.16 T h ro u g h all this, Jayalalithaa’s rep u tatio n as a m o d e rn d a y ‘Tam ilttaay’ seem s to have survived and grow n. Tamilttaay is a uniquely Tamilian ideal, w hich com bines the varied fem ale a ttrib u te s o f m other, desirable w om an, and virginal goddess, w hile also p e rso n i­ fying the Tamil language itself A Tamilttaay th u s provokes a suitably com plex m ix o f em o tio n and devotion in Tamil m en and w om en. I n her discussion o f the erotics o f Tamil nationalism , R am asw am y explores the pre-colonial poetic conceits and literary co n v en tio n s concerning Tamilttaay, and show s how these w ere developed an d deployed in the poetry o f the nationalist period to com pare th e unfulfilled desire for o n e’s m o th er w ith that for the unfree nation an d to inspire a passionate zeal for nationalist sacrifice w hich overpow ered all o th er loyalties.17 Against this background, o ne need only note th e pow erful resonance o f Jayalalithaa’s strenuous and m ulti-faceted selfpresentation— as an affectionate and kind m o th er (both to h er adopted son and to all h er party children), w ho yet ‘virginally’ has n o t given birth; as the rightful heir and w idow o f a m an she never m arried; as a beautiful and desirable w om an w ho poses now as physically chaste; and as the stern b u t politically passionate disciplinarian o f m en (especially h er enem ies). T h u s does she stand statuesquely as th e m o d ern day Tamil lover-m other-land. Subram anian,18 H arriss, and Sw am y each argue that the A IA D M K ’s success u n d er the leadership o f M G R , and now Jayalalithaa, relies o n 15. Yogendra Yadav, ‘C SD S Election Analysis— Tamil N adu: A M atter o f Arithmetic’, Frontline, 26 M ay-8 Ju n e 2001. 16. It was Indira G andhi w ho first showed the effectiveness o f using populist pressure to influence the courts or belittle their verdicts. See S. P. Sathe, ‘Suprem e C ourt, Jayalalitha and Crisis M anagem ent’, Economic and Political Weekly, 29 Septem ber 2001, pp. 3659-62. 17. Sum athi Ramaswamy, ‘Virgin M other, Beloved O ther: T h e Erotics o f Tamil N ationalism in Colonial and Post-Colonial India’, in S. Rajan, (ed.), Signposts: Gender Issues in Post-Independence India (N ew Brunswick, N J: Rutgers U niversity Press, 2001), pp. 17-56. 18. N . Subramanian, Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization—

Populist Leadership in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu

295

a skilful use o f w hat they variously d u b ‘paternalist’ o r ‘protection’ populism , w hereby elem ents o f the political elite seek to protect the poor against m iddle-level interests, prom ising to deliver social b en ­ efits directly to the m ost disenfranchised in society, notably w om en and the very poor. Such populism does not, how ever, expect the disenfranchised to perceive these goods as entitlem ents, o r to fight for th em them selves. R ather, they should m erely rely o n the good graces o f their leaders (and betters). Subram anian sees this m ode o f populism as the polar opposite o f ‘em p o w erm en t’ o r ‘assertive’ populism , w hich encourages the political m obilization o f disadvan­ taged groups in order to challenge the sources o f privilege.19 T his latter kind o f initiative pays m ore attention to the abstract values o f ‘rights’ and ‘dignity’ th an to m ere m aterial goods, and so typically appeals less to the underclass and m ore to those w ith at least som e ‘social capability’.20 E m p o w erm en t populism th erefo re typically em braces people from m iddle, m odestly propertied, strata, such as small shopkeepers and peasants, m em bers o f backward castes w h o have som ew hat im proved th eir individual social positions, or M us­ lim s estranged by religion from elite and masses alike. To generate this sentim ent o f em pow erm ent, how ever, requires sustained grassroots political activity to raise consciousness and instill the conviction that things can be changed for the better. Based o n this distinction betw een varieties o f populism , the consensus that em erges am ong these authors is that the A IAD M K essentially relies on paternalist populism , w hile the D M K manifests the m ore assertive kind.21 T h is, in tu rn , helps to explain the D M K ’s reliance o n disciplined cadres, in contrast to the m ore inform al set u p o f the AIADM K, w hose logistics need n o t stretch to m uch beyond ru n n in g soup kitchens. As is also characteristic o f assertive populism , the D M K continues to appeal to a notion o f com m unity and a shared system o f m eaning in order to b ind together its diverse m iddle-strata constituents, purveying notions and m eanings w hich are typically pitted against the hegem onic dom ination o f other, 19. ‘T he assertive populist outlook regards the activist’s self-willed activity as the basis o f m ovem ent and the social changes it introduces’ (Subramanian, Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization__ , p. 74). 20. Subramanian, Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization..., p. 48. 21. Swamy’s categories o f ‘em pow erm ent populism ’ and ‘protection populism ’ correlate approximately to Subram anian’s ‘assertive’ populism and ‘paternalist’ populism .

296

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

national, ideas. T h u s, it supports the Tamil language over H indi, th e culture and identity o f D ravidianism over Aryanism , and su b altem eity over elitism . Each o f these em otive ideas is designed to m otivate people to assert their rights. Initially th e A lA D M K favoured a sim ilar D ravidian ideology, b ut over tim e the pressure to differentiate itself from the D M K , and perhaps the inclinations (and personal identities) o f M G R and Jayalalithaa them selves, led to a gradual abandoning o f the an ti-B rah m in, anti-Sanskritic stance, a process w hich culm inated in Jayalalithaa’s enthusiastic im plem entation o f BJP cultural policies.22 As a result, th e A lA D M K has in practice long been defending the econom ic and cultural status qu o o f the state’s elite, binding th e party’s appeal ever m ore firm ly to its paternalist patronage o f the underclasses. M

am ata a n d

W

est

Bengal

M am ata Banerjee started o u t as a leader o f the Y outh C ongress in W est Bengal in the 1970s. She rose through the ranks, eventually enjoying the patronage o f Indira and Rajiv G andhi. M am ata was elected to the Lok Sabha in 1984, and drew attention alm ost im m ediately w ith h er fiery rhetoric and penchant for direct action tactics. She eventually w o n a place on the West Bengal State C ongress C om m ittee, w h ich provided her a platform w ith w hich to lam bast the state’s ru lin g C IP (M ). In the party elections held in 1997 she contested fo r the presidency o f the West Bengal State C ongress Executive, b u t was defeated as a result o f collusion betw een the national leadership and her rivals w ithin West Bengal. In retaliation— and feeling betrayed by 22. T hough Jayalalithaa maintained an im perious personal distance, negotiat­ ing through her emissaries and at m om ents o f crisis forcing senior BJP leaders to fly specially to C hennai to m eet her, during the alliance w ith the BJP she pandered to H in d u chauvinism by highlighting the neglect o f Tamil N a d u ’s temples. T his was a continuation o f trends initiated during her first period as ch ief m inister (1991-6), w hen the AlADM K governm ent actively prom oted a Sanskritic, Brahmanical H induism as if it were the official religion o f the state, ‘blatantly violating pluralist norm s’ (Subramanian, Ethnicity and Populist Mobiliza­ tion.... p. 247). In a complete reversal o f the policies o f previous D M K and AlADM K governm ents, she also sought control o f the H in d u M unnani (Front), prom oted the training o f Brahm in tem ple priests and sponsored the foundation o f the Institute o f Vedic Science. See also C hris Fuller, ‘Vinayak C h atu rth i’, Economic and Political Weekly, 11 May 2001, pp. 1607-76.

Populist Leadership in West Bengal and Tamil N adu

297

new ly arrived party leader Sonia G andhi— M am ata broke away and set up her ow n All India Trinam ul (‘G rassroots’) C ongress, w hich she proclaim ed was a radical and dynam ic alternative to the com placent and conservative C ongress establishm ent. A sizeable faction follow ed M am ata in to h er breakaway party, and in national elections held in M arch 1998, the new party w o n eight seats in the Lok Sabha. Like Jayalalithaa, she entered a seat-sharing arrangem ent23 w ith the BJP, b u t unlike h e r counterpart from Tamil N adu, M am ata continued the alliance again after the 1999 general election, for w h ich she was rew arded w ith the im portant portfolio o f national Railways M inister.24 T h e T rinam ul C ongress continued to lure support and activists away from the m ainstream C ongress, and in the spring o f 2001 nine C ongress MLAs25 crossed over to Trinam ul, m aking it the biggest opposition party w ithin the W est Bengal legislature.26 A fter resigning as national Railways M inister (to distance herself from th e Tehelka ‘bribes for arm s’ scandal), and w ithdraw ing her party’s su p p o rt from the BJP-led governm ent in N e w Delhi, M am ata proceeded to abandon her seat-sharing arrangem ent w ith the BJP She allied T rinam ul w ith h er erstw hile enem ies in the C ongress in the ru n up to the M ay 2001 state elections. She had long pro­ m oted th e idea o f a mahajot, o r ‘grand alliance’*o f all opposition parties against the Left Front, and hoped that th e nearly 40 per cent vote share w hich th e C ongress had retained th ro u g h all the years o f Left 23. ‘Scat sharing’ is a pre-election agreem ent by tw o parties n o t to put up candidates against each other in agreed constituencies. T he purpose is for allies to avoid splitting their votes in individual constituencies and thereby allowing a third party to w in a seat w ith only a plurality (rather than an outright majority) o f the vote. 24. It is the only departm ent that presents its own separate budget in parliam ent, and is a m u ch -so u g h t-after portfolio fo r politicians w an tin g to make an immediate im pression on their constituencies through new rail lines or improved services. Form er Railway M inister A B. A. G hani Khan Choudhary, w ho also hailed from West Bengal, strengthened his power base in his home district o f Malda in this way while serving in Congress governm ents in N ew Delhi during the 1980s. 25. M em ber o f Legislative (State-level) Assembly. 26. She also astutely attracted into her fold several smaller political parties including the Kam tapuri Liberation Party, the principal grievance o f w hich was the Left Front G overnm ent’s neglect o f the social and developm ental problems o f north Bengal.

298

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

Front rule, in com bination w ith the rapidly grow ing support for T rinam ul and the m any sm aller parties in the mahajot, w ould together b rin g victory. For the first tim e in m ore than a generation it was w idely believed (including by the C o m m u n ists them selves) that the Left Front faced the real possibility o f defeat. H ow ever, contrary to the close race predicted by com m entators and psephologists, the Left F ront ultim ately w on by an en o rm o u s m argin, w ith T rinam ul per­ form ing poorly. M am ata’s political career seem ed to have reached a dead end. N onetheless, despite this setback, it was an extraordinary achieve­ m en t for M am ata to have been able to take h er party, ju s t three years after its inception, to a p o in t w h ere even serious observers felt it had a good chance o f displacing the seem ingly invincible Left F ront regim e. H o w was this achieved? M am ata has been retu rn ed five tim es to the Lok Sabha from h er S outh Kolkata constituency (Trinam ul w o n all b u t one o f Kolkata’s seats in the 1999 general election), and she rem ains synonym ous w ith T rinam ul.27 It is M am ata w ho personally com m ands its mass support and sympathy. H e r public m eetings attract m am m o th crow ds. Yet in term s o f style she could hardly be m ore different from the regal Jayalalithaa. From a m odest low er-m iddle-class family o f sm all en tre­ p reneurs, she still lives, unm arried, w ith h er m o th er in a tiny house next to those o f h er brothers in Kalighat, a congested area in South Kolkata fam ous for containing bo th the oldest Kali tem ple in th e city and its m ain red light district. M am ata’s house itself is sparsely furnished and adjacent to her M P ’s office, w here she holds daily surgeries w hen in the city, and w hich unlike th e offices o f politicians in D elhi has only spartan plastic furniture and a tin roof. T h ere are few ceiling fans and n o air-conditioning. S h u n n in g jew ellery and make up, M am ata is usually dressed in inexpensive, slightly crum pled cotton saris w hich, unlike the ostentatious ‘austerity’ o f m any o th er leaders’ im m aculate (and actually very expensive) khadi linen, is nondescript and functional 28 R esolutely unglam ourous, she is an 27. Kolkata is the new official nam e for the city form erly know n as Calcutta. T he change was introduced by the Left Front G overnm ent in D ecem ber 2000. 28. T he wearing o f handloom cloth has been one o f the m ost potent symbols o f nationalist sentim ent in m odern India. But M am ata’s choice differs from other female Congress politicians, w ho dress in a style set by Indira G andhi— namely, expensive, elegant saris that arc immaculately starched and ironed. In contrast Mamata wears handloom saris, produced in the West Bengal village o f D honekhali—

Populist Leadership in West Bengal and Tamil N adu

299

asexual figure w h o m akes little use o f h er fem ininity, and as a career politician she has n o celebrity past o r fan club to draw on. M am ata’s m ovem ents are always open to scrutiny and she talks to the m edia frequently and frankly. She eschew s regal dignity o r enigm a in favour o f a flurry o f physicality in h er cam paigning. A nyone can drop in to h er daily surgeries. W hen she w ithdraw s tem porarily from the public eye, as in M ay 2001 after h e r party’s defeat in the state assem bly elections, her popularity rapidly drops; it is w h en she is o u t o n the streets addressing public m eetings in her energetic and pithy style that she is m ost effective. T h e sim plicity o f h er self-presentation is in stark contrast to her extravagant public persona. All Kolkatans rem em b er h e r dram atic actions— hitching up her saree to ju m p o n to the b o n n et o f a m in ister’s car to get his attention, lying prostrate o n the road outside the state’s m ain adm inistrative headquarters d u rin g a protest dem onstration, before being physically rem oved by the police, o r w h en h er skull was split open by a police baton in a skirm ish. She has m ade especially skilful use o f public sit-ins, usually in solidarity w ith the urban u n d er­ classes o f h er w ealthv Kolkata constituency, such as slum dw ellers and pavem ent hawkers, or w ith rural folk w h o have found them selves o n the w rong side o f the C o m m u n ist cadres. M em bers o f these groups laud her w illingness to stand up for the rights o f the com m on person trying to find som e shelter and m ake a living in extrem ely difficult circum stances. Seizing on M am ata’s vigorous participation in the rough and tum ble o f direct action, the left-leaning intellegentsia com pare her unfavourably w ith the polished, educated, m asculine bhadralok m anners o f Left Front politicians, o f w h o m Jyoti Basu is the paragon, w ith his statesm anlike aloofness, never a com rade, never an elder the preferred choice o f m iddle-class w om en th ro u g h o u t Bengal for their affordability and durability. See M . Baneijee and D. M iller, The Sari (London: Berg, 2003), especially C hapter 6. 29. These protests were against the m unicipality’s efforts to dem olish illegal encroachm ents on public and private property by squatters and petty business­ m en. T h e dem olitions had the support o f the m iddle classes, w ho shared a righteous sense o f the ‘legal’ and the ‘public’ sphere as spaces requiring state protection. For a detailed elaboration o f the distance betw een middle-class and o ther perceptions o f the ‘public sphere’ in Kolkata, see Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘Filth and the Public Sphere: C oncepts and Practices about space in C alcutta’, Public Culture, 10(1), 1997, pp 83-113.

300

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

brother ( clad in snow w hite dhoti, crisply ironed w hite kurta and polished casual shoes. Short, agile, brisk, sm art and firm w ith an unsm iling face and cold frozen look, he was distant even w hen he was physically near.30 Basu is also praised for having ‘converted the language o f colloquial dialogue o f south C alcutta salons into a fine oratorial idiom w hich the crow d relished and c h e e re d \31 In contrast, M am ata’s ordinariness, the high-pitched dram a o f her protests, her crum pled saris, halting English, and colloquial Bengali are constantly ridiculed by the media, and likened to that o f ‘a maid servant’ rather than a w ould-be leader o f the people. She is reproached for lacking an ‘aptitude for the dignified political tradition o f the Bengali bhadralok’ and even for suffering ‘infantile disorders’. H e r B rahm in caste status has no cachet, since the leadership o f the Left F ront is m ostly u p p er caste anyway. In any case, it is academic achievem ent w hich is the param ount virtue for m em bership o f this bhadralok class, and so M am ata’s average perform ance as a student (m arked by participation in the disruptive political activities o f the Youth C ongress) and her subsequent m uch publicized faking o f a doctorate from a non-existent A m erican u n i­ versity are repeatedly cited to prove her lack o f bhadralok credibility. A nd, yet, in contrast to the slick English-speaking technocrats, journalists, lawyers and partym en in the cabinet, M am ata has attracted m uch fame and nam e-recognition w ith her plain-speaking and public criticism s o f the governm ent. She argues th at th e Left F ront has destroyed West Bengal’s industrial base through m eddling and par­ tisan support o f the elite urban proletariat, fuelling its propensity to strike and thereby stifling econom ic grow th and creating w idespread unem ploym ent. She accuses the state governm ent o f neglecting and m ism anaging the state’s infrastructure, citing as evidence the paucity o f civic services in m ost urban areas. Above all, she argues that long years in pow er have m ade the Left Front com placent and corrupt. T he adm inistration and politics, M am ata claims, have been crim inalized; free reign has been given to party cadres to intim idate and exploit, particularly in rem ote rural areas; nepotism is ram pant throughout the state’s organs, notably in educational institutions.32 She ridicules 30. D. Bandopadhyay, ‘West Bengal : License to Kill?’, Economic and Political Weekly, 6-12 January 2001. 31. Ibid. 32. T he accuracy o f these accusations is hotly debated in academic and intellectual circles— for instance, in G. K. Lieten, ‘West Bengal after A Q uarter

Populist Leadership in West Bengal and Tamil N adu

301

the C o m m u n ist leadership for hiding away in air-conditioned offices, detached from the life o f the people. A lthough M am ata presents this m oral critique forcefully, she has n o t established any real alternative program m e. T h e m anifesto o f the Trinam ul C ongress contains little beyond a vaguely o utlined W est Bengal Plan’ devoid o f policy o r planning details. T h is lack o f ideological content is in stark contrast to h er C o m m u n ist opponents o r erstw hile m inisterial colleagues in the BJP Far from being a disadvantage, this lack o f specificity helps M am ata’s politics to rem ain conspicuously inclusionary. In her opposition to the Left F ro n t she is careful to avoid serious criticism o f the ideal o f C o m m u n ism itself, instead attacking the corruption am ong the cadres. H e r proposed G rand Alliance m aintains an open invitation to anyone (including reform -m inded C om m unists) critical o f the co rru p tin g influences o f the Left F ro n t’s hold on pow er and driven by a b elief in the need for change.33 It is precisely h er vague b u t single-m inded, o n e-p o in t antiLeft F ront program m e that has allowed h er to bring together and into the open the sim m ering discontent w hich has grow n u p d u rin g m ore than a quarter-century o f Left F ront rule. T h ere are, however, limits to ho w far M am ata w ill bend. W hile she entered into seat-sharing arrangem ents w ith the BJP, she m ade no secret o f h er purely tactical designs, and never refrained from expressing h er criticism o f the BJP’s chauvinist agenda and ideology. In addition to its lack o f concrete policies, T rinam ul’s organization rem ains nebulous and is only slowly extending its reach beyond the m ain urban centres. T h e party’s need to expand its base geographically m ade the influence M am ata was able to exert thro u g h h er role as national railway m inister especially vital. H e r railway budgets w ere C entury o f L F G \ paper presented at the European Association o f M o d em South Asian Studies conference, Edinburgh, Septem ber 2000; and D. Bandopadhyay, *Wcst Bengal: Enduring Status Q u o ’, Economic and Political Weekly, 26 M ay 2001, pp. 1784-5. It is fair to say that the success o f m easures such as land reform and the m inim um agricultural wage have not been uniform th roughout the State (B. Rogaly, ‘C ontaining C onflict and Reaping Votes: M anagem ent o f Rural Labour Relations in West Bengal’, Economic and Political Weekly, 17-23/24-30 O ctober 1998, pp. 2729-39). 33. In Bengal, caste has traditionally played less o f a role in determ ining political affiliations, w ith loyalties polarizing instead on m ainly cross-caste lines betw een the Left and the centrist Congress. See Partha C hatteijee, The Present History o f West Bengal (Delhi: O xford U niversity Press, 1997).

302

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

described as gestures o f ‘give-away populism ’, as she defied pressure from h er colleagues in the finance m inistry and attem pted to protect the interests o f the poorest travellers by refusing to increase train fares, balancing the books by raising freight charges o n com m ercial goods instead. She also played effectively o n the w id er Bengali grievance about the state’s long years o f neglect at the hands o f successive central governm ents (retribution, it is often claim ed, for the voters’ electoral su p p o rt o f C o m m u n ists) and began to rem edy it thro u g h new railway stations and the construction o f high-speed links from W est Bengal to the rest o f India. Even w ith such plans, however, M am ata ensured that the details w ould n o t adversely affect poor families that had pitched th eir shanties along the tracks, guar­ anteeing them com pensation for eviction despite th eir illegal occu­ pation o f governm ent land. H o w does M am ata’s railway budget com pare to Jayalalithaa’s free lunches? O n the surface there are obvious sim ilarities. B ut the differences are revealing. First, thro u g h the constitutional m eans o f the federal budget M am ata achieved a genuine transfer o f resources to poorer people, w hereas the poor o f Tamil N ad u , as Pandian show s, soon paid for their u n o rth o d o x ‘free’ noonday m eals from the A lA D M K thro u g h a taxation b u rd en that becam e increasingly regres­ sive d u rin g the course o f M G R ’s reign.34 Second, M am ata is arguably operating an alternative variety o f populism . Even if M am ata’s railways budget— and the rhetoric th ro u g h w hich th eir provisions w ere justified— had an elem ent o f paternalist populism by a local w om an m ade good, there is n o denying that T rinam ul’s day-to-day activity aim s at achieving an assertive populism . T rinam ul is attem pting to build a local organization that can m obilize and inspire people to assert their will and opinion in the face o f intim idation by local C o m m u n ist cadres, and to assert their dignity in the face o f m iddle-class reproach. T h e effectiveness and resilience o f this organization is yet to be proven, b u t in several parts o f rural Bengal these initiatives have been enthusiastically taken up by villagers. Perhaps it is by thus com bining elem ents o f b oth assertive and pater­ nalist populism that M am ata touched a nerve in both the m iddle and u n d er classes and thereby gave rise to the high electoral hopes o f 2001. C an w e com pare M am ata to a goddess? To som e com m entators, 34. M. S. S. Pandian, The Image Trap: M G R in Film and Politics (N ew Delhi: Sage, 1992).

Populist Leadership in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu

303

M am ata’s story recalls the serpent goddess M anasa w h o is very popular in Bengal and w hose story can J?e read as a divine ‘subaltern struggle’.35 Frustrated by the neglect she suffered w hile the devout w orshipped only the elite gods and goddesses such as Shiva and D urga, M anasa decided to strike w ith m isfortune those w ho did n o t w orship her. Shiva, in o rd er to keep the peace o f the heavens, brokered a com pro­ mise: the rule forbidding devotion to m ore than one divinity at a tim e w ould rem ain, b u t greater scope for w orship o f M anasa w ould be afforded. T hose w ho w ished to pay obeisance to h er in addition to o th er gods w ould be perm itted to d o so, b u t only w ith the im pure lefthand, rather than w ith the pure right hand required (and henceforth reserved) for the other gods. T his com prom ise furnished Manasa and h er devotees a divinely recognized space, b u t also preserved the divine establishm ent, leaving behind a m ark o f sham e for having dared to challenge the status quo. T h u s if Jayalalithaa— w h o enjoyed the pa­ tronage o f an incum bent leader and w hose B rahm in status and glam ­ orous past p u t h e r firmly am ong h er state’s elite— poses as Tamilttaay, the ultim ate Tamil insider, M am ata stands instead as Manasa— her background, education, and m an n er placing h er firm ly outside the circle o f bhadralok society and its political establishm ent, forcing h er to create her ow n party from scratch in ord er to claim w hat she felt was rightfully due to h er and h er constituents. M am ata’s followers, however, m ake a m ore straightforw ard co m ­ parison. For them , she is D urga, the w arrior queen, fearless and tireless in defence o f the underdog. A y oung male ad m irer described h er as ‘devi roopi ladki’, o r a goddess-like m aiden. ‘She is a tigress, a goddess’, he said. ‘She is C handi, D urga’. T hese im ages o f ‘tigress’ and ‘D urga’ seem to indicate the tw in qualities o f fem ale courage and intolerance for injustice, qualities w hich ordinary voters find rare in politicians. B ut while Jayalalithaa m ade the transition from ‘anna’ to ‘am m a’ am ong Tamils, M am ata (w hose nam e m eans ‘m aternal love’) is universally know n as D idi, the archetype o f the sacrificing and caring older sister in the Bengali im agination. P a r t ie s , P o p u l is m ,

and

R e g io n a l C

ontexts

H o w do the leadership styles o f these tw o w om en relate to the nature o f their organizations? T h e A IA D M K and T rinam ul are b o th breakaway 35. Thanks go to the film -m aker R itupam o G hosh, w ho has a film planned on this them e, for sharing w ith me his thoughts on the comparison.

304

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

parties entirely dom inated by their leaders, w hose individual perfor­ m ance, personality, and popularity largely determ ine th eir electoral fortunes. Both parties are loosely structured, their activities weakly coordinated. Pre-election cam paigning and voter registration is lax, in contrast to the m eticulous preparation and m obilization o f th eir o p p o ­ n en ts’ cadres. N eith er party has strict rules governing the selection o f leaders o r the form ation o f branches. W hile local leaders are acknow l­ edged for delivering their su p p o rt bases, ultim ately the key to recog­ n itio n w ithin the party is securing proxim ity to, and the patronage of, the m ain leader. N e ith e r party has an official regular new spaper, appealing as they do to publics little disposed to reading. T h e A lA D M K has used its organization o f film clubs as a m ode o f com m unication, w hile Trinam ul is still struggling to find a suitable m echanism .36 W eighed against the usual academ ic param eters for ju d g in g the efficacy and m aturity o f a political party, such as w ell-form ed political ideology and econom ic policies, disciplined organization o f cadres, coherence and depth o f leadership, and links to clearly defined con­ stituencies and interest groups, b oth the A lA D M K and T rinam ul seem deficient. As a result, b oth parties have found it necessary to bypass institutions altogether and attem pt to reach voters directly th ro u g h the forceful personalities o f th eir leaders. T h e ir successes are th u s fre­ quently and disdainfully attributed to the eternal appeal o f ‘populism ’, w hich ever since A ristotle has been dism issed as the cult o f person­ ality— reliant o n quick-fix slogans and grand gestures— w ith w hich irresponsible dem agogues pander to the baser instincts o f the naive and ignorant masses, an antithesis to eith er the republican ideal o f sagacious legislators or the dem ocratic ideal o f engaged citizens. In academic discourse, ‘populism ’ rem ains a m u ch -u sed sh o rt­ hand to describe political m ovem ents as oddly diverse as agricultural m ovem ents in the A m erican South, the Peronists in A rgentina and the n a ro d n ik s o f p re -re v o lu tio n a ry R ussia, rig h t th ro u g h to R oss Perot and V ladim ir Z hirinovsky in o u r ow n day.37 In contem porary India, m eanw hile, the label o f ‘populism ’ has been used to refer to and ‘explain’ the grow th o f a w ide range o f em ergent leaders and m ove­ m ents. T he patrician didacticism and gravitas w hich characterized 36. Both Jayalalithaa and M am ata also draw m ost o f their support am ong the petty bourgeoisie. W hile the AlA D M K deliberately appeals to m id-ranking castes (Thevars, Vanniars) and property ow ning M uslim s, the Trinam ul rem ains a mainly urban party enjoying the backing o f the lower m iddle classes and small business. 37. Paul Taggart, Populism (M ilton Keynes: O p en U niversity Press, 2000).

Populist Leadership in West Bengal and Tamil N adu

305

national and regional leaders from N e h ru to N arasim ha Rao in the first four decades o f Indian dem ocracy have been challenged since the early 1990s by candidates cu t from a quite different cloth, w ith an altogether noisier style. B oth M am ata and Jayalalithaa are know n for challenging their listeners w ith questions— rhetorical questions, b u t ones to w hich they dem and answ ers. ‘D o you really w ant to vote for the D M K w h o raped w om en? W ill you vote D M K ?’, Jayalalithaa th u n d ers at h er audience, w hich scream s back w ith a horrified ‘NO!*. M am ata regularly ended her speeches d u rin g the 2001 elections by chiding h er adm irers for being scared o f the co m m u n ist cadres w hose intim idatory tactics are w idely know n. Y ou w o n ’t be afraid anym ore, will you?’, she scream s over the m icrophone. *You will vote for m e w o n ’t you?’. T h e crow d shouts back w ith th eir m ost enthusiastic