Regional Integration and National Disintegration in the Post-Arab Spring Middle East [1 ed.] 9781443896351, 9781443897600

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Regional Integration and National Disintegration in the Post-Arab Spring Middle East

Regional Integration and National Disintegration in the Post-Arab Spring Middle East Edited by

Imad H. El-Anis and Natasha Underhill

Regional Integration and National Disintegration in the Post-Arab Spring Middle East Edited by Imad H. El-Anis and Natasha Underhill This book first published 2016 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2016 by Imad H. El-Anis, Natasha Underhill and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-9760-4 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-9760-0

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures and Tables ......................................................................... vii Foreword .................................................................................................... ix List of Abbreviations................................................................................... xi Section 1: Security, Securitization and the Transformative Effects of the Arab Spring Chapter One ................................................................................................. 2 Iraq Syndrome and its Implications for US Foreign Policy in Iraq and Syria Natasha Underhill Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 16 On Revolution and Revolutionary Situations: The Cases of Syria and Egypt during the Arab Uprisings Konstantinos C. Zarras Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 32 A Clash of Identities: The Islamic State and the United States Zeynep Kaya Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 50 Iranian Foreign Policy Ambitions and Aspirations: A Case Study of Iranian-Saudi Arabian Relations Sahra Joharchi Section 2: Political Economy: Understanding Regional (Dis)Integration Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 72 Foreign Aid and the Arab Spring Beata Paragi

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Chapter Six ................................................................................................ 98 Trade Liberalization in the Middle East and North Africa: Promoting Peace and Stability Tarik Oumazzane Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 130 The Growth of Unconventional Gas Supply in the Persian Gulf: The Role of Iran’s Future Liquefied Natural Gas Supply to the EU Mohammed Houshisadat Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 149 The Political Economy of Aid and Foreign Policy Making: The Case of U.S. Aid to Jordan Tarfah Elfayez Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 170 The Growing Interest of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa: A New Approach or Business as Usual? Ali Sen, Imad El-Anis and M. Ozan Saray Section 3: Society and the State in the MENA Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 196 The Role of Civil Society in the Transformations of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia Adela Jirankova Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 223 Fury and Soldiery of Non-God: ISIS’s Psycho-Structural Dysfunctions and the Future of Counter-Terrorism Maria Gloria Polimeno Contributors ............................................................................................. 244 Index ........................................................................................................ 248

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures Fig. 5.1. US military and economic assistance per capita (USD), Jordan, Egypt, Israel, 1991-2013 Fig. 5.2. US military assistance to Egypt, Jordan, Israel, USD, 2009-2014 Fig. 6.1. Historical “integrative” agreements Fig. 6.2. GDP growth of Agadir member states Fig. 6.3. Agadir imports and exports of goods and services (current US$) Fig. 6.4. SWOT analysis of Agadir member states Fig. 6.5. Morocco’s imports from Agadir member states (2001-2014) Fig. 6.6. Morocco’s exports to Agadir member states (2001 -2014) Fig. 6.7. Tunisia’s imports from Agadir member states (2001-2013) Fig. 6.8. Tunisia’s exports to Agadir member states (2001-2014) Fig. 6.9. Egypt’s imports from Agadir member states (2001-2014) Fig. 6.10. Egypt’s exports to Agadir member states (2001-2014) Fig. 6.11. Jordan’s imports from Agadir member states (2001-2014) Fig. 6.12. Jordan’s exports to Agadir member states (2001-2014) Fig. 6.13. Imports and exports within the Agadir Agreement vs. the world (2001-2014) (USD) Fig. 6.14. Imports and exports within the Agadir Agreement vs. the MENA region (2001-2014) (USD) Fig. 7.1. Iran’s actual and potential gas projects Fig. 9.1. The AK Party’s electoral victories in comparative perspective Fig. 9.2. Turkey’s foreign trade with the MENA (2002-2014) (millions USD) Fig. 9.3. The MENA’s share in total Turkey exports and imports (20022014) (%) Fig. 9.4. Turkey’s FDI stock (inflow + outflow) with MENA countries (Millions USD) Fig. 9.5. Visitors arriving in Turkey from MENA countries (2002-2013) Fig. 11.1. ISIS territorial control and operability as of June 2015.

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List of Figures and Tables

Tables Table 5.1. Net ODA received per capita (current USS), Jordan, Egypt, Palestine, various years (1960-2012) Table 6.1. Agadir member states indicators (2015) Table 7.1. Iran’s South Pars phases Table 7.2. Iran’s LNG projects Table 8.1. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis (in US$ millions) Table 9.1. Turkey’s trade by selected export destinations and import resources (1973-2000) (%) Table 9.2. Overview of Turkey’s economic performance (2002-2013) Table 9.3. The share of geographic regions in total Turkish exports Table 9.4. Turkey’s FDI stock with MENA countries (2002-2013) (Millions USD) Table 9.5. Construction projects of Turkish firms in MENA countries and share to total (1972-2014 (first 6 months)) Table 11.1. Source and numbers of foreign fighters with ISIS (2014-2015)

FOREWORD

This edited collection draws together an eclectic collection of research papers presented at an interdisciplinary conference organized by Nottingham Trent University’s Middle East and North Africa Research Cluster in April 2015. The conference was titled “Regional Integration and National Disintegration in the Post-Arab Spring Middle East and North Africa” and was held at the Nottingham Conference Centre at Nottingham Trent University. The aim of the conference was to bring together a broad network of scholars, practitioners and stakeholders to explore the processes of change currently shaping the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In particular, the conference sought to investigate the national and transnational challenges that have emerged since the uprisings in 2011, commonly referred to as the “Arab Spring”. The increase in extremism and the emergence and intensification of civil wars have garnered significant attention in both media coverage and academic research. However, simultaneous (and far older) processes of regional integration in varying forms, from free trade agreements like the Greater Arab Free Trade Area to economic and political union like the Gulf Cooperation Council, have also been influenced by the changes of the past few years. The conference brought together researchers working in different fields including Politics, International Relations, International Political Economy, Middle Eastern Studies and History, to explore how far the changes shaping the MENA are leading to the region’s polarization between states that are integrating politically and economically with each other on the one hand, and states that are disintegrating internally on the other. Overall, the conference was well received by delegates presenting their research as well as the public in attendance. Over fifty scholars, stakeholders from the public and private sector, and members of the general public attended this event leading to invaluable networking opportunities and informed discussion, enabling the further advancement of the research being conducted by those involved. This volume presents eleven of the research papers delivered at the conference. Each chapter included here investigates some of the most relevant contemporary issues and processes shaping the region, and are grouped together in three themes. The first section explores security,

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securitization and the transformative effects of the Arab Spring. This section has chapters on the Iraq Syndrome and international military intervention in Syria, the revolutions in Syria and Egypt, the role of identity in interactions between ISIS and the West, and Iranian-Saudi Arabian rivalry and interactions. The second section of this volume explores the political economy of regional integration and disintegration in the MENA. This section’s chapters analyze the relationship between foreign aid and the Arab Spring, trade liberalization and institutional peace in the region, geo-politics in the Persian Gulf, foreign aid and policy making in small states, and Turkey’s growing interest in the MENA. The final section of the volume investigates society-state relations in the region with chapters that explore the role of civil society in Arab Spring era Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, and the emergence of Islamist terrorism in the region. This volume would not have been possible without the work of Nottingham Trent University’s MENA Research Cluster. This research group is housed in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Nottingham Trent University and was formed in 2013. The cluster offers established scholars, early career researchers and postgraduate researchers the platform to develop research that explores the politics, international relations, society and political economy of the MENA. The cluster has rapidly expanded in scope and membership since 2013 and now draws together scholars conducting internationally recognized research on various aspects of the historical and contemporary MENA from a range of theoretical and methodological approaches. As a research group, the MENA Cluster has benefitted from the financial support of Nottingham Trent University’s School of Social Sciences, the International Studies Association, the British International Studies Association, the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, the European Consortium for Political Research, and the European International Studies Association.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM–Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis APERC–Asia-Pacific Energy Research Centre BIWGTM–Baker Institute World Gas Trade Model CSOs–civil society organizations EUA–Economic Unity Agreement FTA–Free Trade Agreement GAA–Greater Arab Free Trade Area GEA–General Energy Asessment GID–General Intelligence Directorate HDI–Human Development Index IS (ISIS)–Islamic State ISI–Islamic State in Iraq JCPOA–Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action JRC–Joint Research Centre JTWJ–Jama’at al Tawhid wa al Jihad LNG–Liquified Natural Gas MNE–multinational enterprises NAFTA–North American Free Trade Area NIGEC–National Iranian Gas Export Company NITC–National Iranian Tanker Company NPOs–non-profit organizations ODA–Official Development Assistance ODA–overseas development assistance RESCT–Regional Energy Security Complex Theory RSCT–Regional Security Complex Theory SCAF–Supreme Council of the Armed Forces THY–Turkish Airlines

SECTION ONE: SECURITY, SECURITIZATION AND THE TRANSFORMATIVE EFFECTS OF THE ARAB SPRING

CHAPTER ONE IRAQ SYNDROME AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR US FOREIGN POLICY IN IRAQ AND SYRIA NATASHA UNDERHILL

Introduction The long-term legacy of the US misadventure in Iraq, or what has been termed “Iraq Syndrome”, is now having severe implications for U.S. policy towards not just Iraq but also towards the ongoing issues occurring in Syria. With the over decade-long entrenchment of the U.S. in Iraq and the subsequent war weariness of the U.S. public, the prospect of a further intervention into the Middle East today is an apparent non-option for action. However, with the emergence of Islamic State (IS) we have now seen a shift by President Obama towards possible military intervention, not just in Iraq, but also in Syria. The aim of this chapter is to assess the impact of “Iraq syndrome” on U.S. foreign policy, especially in terms of its shift towards a non-interventionist stance in regards to the current situation in Iraq and Syria. The main objective of this chapter is to ascertain how much of an impact Iraq Syndrome is actually having on the creation of U.S. foreign policy in terms of action against IS in Iraq and Syria. There are many similarities between the situations in Iraq (pre-2003) and Syria including the fact that both have had a violent dictatorship in power, both have been party to the direct use of chemical weapons against their citizenry, both face a growing insurgency and/or a civil war, and both bear witness to a massive expansion of radical extremists, most significantly in the form of Islamic State. This chapter will begin with a brief overview of some of the main impacts on U.S. foreign policy development through a historical perspective. A focus will be placed on what has been called the “fear factor” that past foreign policy failures have had on the likelihood of action or inaction in Iraq and Syria. This will be followed by an assessment of events, the aim of which is to develop an understanding of what the current phenomenon of “Iraq Syndrome”

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actually is in context. Following this, the chapter will move on to look at the links between the events in Iraq and Syria in a modern context. Finally, it will develop some conclusions and possible alternatives to the current policies in terms of the pathways to action by the U.S. in both Iraq and Syria in the face of the increasing threat from IS.

The Modern History of U.S. Foreign Policy: Facing the fear factor Iraq, in its post-9/11 context, has not been the first case of a fear factor impacting on the development of U.S. foreign policy. In the modern historical context, the Vietnam War and its aftermath is argued to be the most influential war-related factor influencing U.S. foreign policy, especially in terms of (non-) intervention. The Vietnam War claimed the lives of over 58,000 U.S. soldiers, seriously damaged Washington's prestige as an imperial power and caused untold hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths. In this case, America's military defeat produced what came to be called a “Vietnam Syndrome”, which has had an extremely influential impact on U.S. foreign policy development even to this day. Acknowledging the failure of the U.S. campaign brought about angry recriminations and second-guessing of the decisions made by political leaders. This resulted in an apparent return to an anti-interventionist sentiment both in the government and within the opinions of the populace. According to Wearing, for President Carter, his first two years in office marked the high point of détente and the military drawdown from the Vietnam years. However, even though he turned considerably more hawkish in the second half of his term, Carter became a symbol of everything weak about the Democratic Party and its foreign policy (Wearing 2012). Following the events of 1979–namely the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution–Carter's opponent in the 1980 Presidential election, Ronald Reagan, promised to stand up to the Russians, the Iranians, and anyone else who dared challenge Old Glory (ibid.). Also, in more recent years, President Bill Clinton presided over a reduction of the US military leviathan in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Clinton was by no means a pacifist, but the United States was involved in the wars in former Yugoslavia and several attacks on Al-Qaeda and its ilk during the 1990s, which weighed heavily on Clinton’s political decisions in terms of interventionism and global security. It has been argued that the great sin of the Clinton administration, to its critics on the right, was its commitment to multilateralism, which became seen as a method of weakening the U.S.’s position as world leader in the post-Cold War world (ibid.).

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As a result, those who wanted to see the US exert its military might in the world were faced with what was termed a “Vietnam Syndrome” among the public and many policymakers. The latter were increasingly unconvinced of the practical feasibility of military action, while the former saw the potential human costs as intolerable and, in many cases, were resolved to actively opposing a repeat of the Vietnam experience (Boot 2013). The term “Never Again” was also powerfully used at this time in relation to U.S. foreign policy and intervention both from opposition party members and the general public. It is interesting that we are now hearing these calls emerge once more in the context of the U.S. foreign policy in the post-2003 Iraq invasion context. One of the reasons for this stance may be linked to the fact that Americans, in general, are “defeat-phobic” rather than “casualty-phobic”. In this context, it is argued that they essentially do not really care how many casualties are suffered so long as their side comes out the overall clear-cut winner in the situation (Mueller 2011). This was obvious in the case of Iraq where the apparent failures of the mission had more of an impact on public opinion to withdraw from Iraq than the actual number of casualties involved. As a result of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the inherent failures that followed, it is now argued that an “Iraq Syndrome” has emerged; a syndrome which is now having direct implications on the U.S. policy towards the possible intervention in Syria and in the ongoing fight against Islamic State. Aside from the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, practically the entire 2003 campaign in Iraq has been a failure of sorts: Iraq remains far from being a strong or stable state post-invasion and is in fact even more unstable today than it has been since 2006-2007 at the peak of post-U.S. invasion violence. In Iraq, where the geo-strategic stakes are considerably higher than in Southeast Asia, the U.S. failed both to install a reliably friendly government in Baghdad and to secure long-term military bases in the heart of the world's major energy-producing region (Wearing 2012). These failures are now having a detrimental impact on both Iraq and Syria and, with the growing threat from IS, one has to question how long this “Syndrome” can realistically hold the U.S. back from making definitive decisions before instability in the Middle East becomes too far entrenched to be addressed. The aim here then is to assess whether or not Iraq Syndrome will have a deeper and longer-lasting impact on the national psyche and U.S. prestige in the world than Vietnam Syndrome did.

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Iraq Syndrome in Context In the context of Iraq, the U.S. invaded the country in 2003, following a campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and remained in place as an occupying force for over a decade. Once on the ground in Iraq, the U.S. Army found itself in the middle of a deepening insurgency and civil war, both of which it was unprepared to adequately deal with. Following the 2011 withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq under the edict of President Obama, the U.S. presented itself as the “winner” in the situation declaring that it had handed over the capacity of leadership of the country back to the Iraqis. This, of course, was not the case and many have argued that the U.S. prematurely withdrew from Iraq. Following the withdrawal, it was clear that the fear of re-entering the Middle East was having a massive impact on foreign policy decisions being made by the Obama administration, especially in the context of the situation that was now playing out in Syria. Syria borders Iraq and many of the sectarian issues that impacted on the failures of the U.S. campaign in Iraq are also to be found across the border in Syria. As a result of this Iraq Syndrome, the “light footprint” approach to interventionism and foreign policy in general is becoming as much of an intellectual straitjacket for President Obama as the post-Vietnam era limitations were on his predecessors (Boot 2013). According to Boot, this does not suggest that Obama is a pacifist; in fact he has shown on numerous occasions his willingness to use force, mostly through the use of drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, which all but eliminate risks on the US side (ibid.). However, the problem with this approach is that there are sharp limits to what drones can accomplish as the core toolkit for action in the global context. They can kill a few terrorist leaders, but they cannot prevent their replacement with equally malign successors. That would require a more prolonged intervention that Obama will not entertain as a viable foreign policy objective, perhaps rightly so. For Syria, the situation is growing worse and more toxic by the day. The country has been pushed to the brink of failure by the civil war that has raged since 2011. As long as the Assad regime stays in power and as long as the fighting continues, the prospects of reestablishing any form of stability in the wake of the violence diminish by the day. The most likely outcome now is a collapse of the country into different tribal and ethnic fiefdoms, with IS and Al-Qaeda-linked extremists likely to exert significant sway. The conflict has already spilled over into neighboring states with the spread of IS, the stoking of sectarian fighting in Lebanon between Shias and Sunnis, enticing Al-Qaeda in Iraq to expand its operations across the border, and flooding Lebanon, Turkey,

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and Jordan with refugees (Boot 2013). It is argued here that perhaps some of these consequences might have been avoided if the Obama administration had taken a more active role from the start by, for example, declaring a no-fly zone and providing arms to the more moderate rebel factions much earlier than the U.S. had done (Katzman 2014). Such a proactive policy might have hastened Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s downfall, shortened the term of the conflict, and increased the chances of assembling a new government that could control its own territory. Obama has, however, clearly and definitively limited US involvement to an airstrike campaign to target IS and other extremist elements in the Syrian borders, to the provision of humanitarian aid, and to publicly making broad sweeping statements denouncing Assad, his regime and the methods that he has used against his own citizens. Obama is not, however, doing much to prove his points through action, mainly because the last thing he wants is to get sucked into another complicated Middle Eastern conflict and there is, thus, no doubt that memories of Iraq shape the White House’s reticence on Syria (Boot 2013). Iraq round two has been made all the worse, not just because of the invasion and subsequent war but also because, as Boot notes, when the United States withdrew from Iraq it lost leverage to shape its future (ibid.). Additionally, by sitting practically idly by while Nouri al-Maliki pushed the sectarian issues even further than ever before, it allowed the emergence of further rifts between the Sunni and Shia communities while also leading to a revival of extremism and jihadism now led by IS. The broader problem is that the administration today, since the Iraq Syndrome kicked in, has had a blinkered view of its role in the historical record of Iraq and this is tainting all of its actions of the world stage. The U.S. has obviously paid a heavy price for this last fifteen years of interventionism in the Middle East, in lives, dollars and reputation, but this cannot be the way forward when deciding on any actions for possible intervention in the coming weeks, months and years.

Iraq and Syria: A shared legacy No matter how much Western governments may try to ignore the fact that the similarities between the events in Syria and Iraq have shared legacies, it cannot be denied that the dangers posed by Syria under the Bashar al-Assad regime are, in today’s world, more significant than those posed by Iraq under Saddam Hussein in the post-9/11 and pre-2003 U.S.led invasion period. Possibly the most significant of legacies of the events of Iraq are that attempts to demand normal standards of truthfulness and clarity from a government like Syria will now be undermined (Geoghegan

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2013). This, coupled with the notion that the U.S. needs to keep as far away as possible from direct military intervention, means that the civil war in Syria may be a long one with no real clear end in sight for the near future. Iraq Syndrome has already had quite significant impacts on U.S. foreign policy with the “lead from behind” approach in Libya being a key example. Obama had also openly acknowledged regrets about Libya but unfortunately has drawn the wrong lesson. “I think we underestimated […] the need to come in full force” the president told the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman in August 2014. “If you're gonna do this”, he elaborated, “there has to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies” (Friedman 2014). One of the most recent examples of Iraq Syndrome impacting on the decisions of the U.S. in terms of foreign policy came with Barak Obama’s initial signaling that he would use direct military force against the Syrian government for its use of chemical weapons against its citizens (an act he deemed as crossing the line in the sand,) but then swiftly backtracked when his plans were met with intense hostility from the American public. The main reason for such a backlash was the determination not to be dragged back into another war in the Middle East. In terms of public opinion in relation to possible intervention or action in Syria, the American public can be divided into two clear anti-action movements, both of which are highly influenced by the long-term entrenchments in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first group in this context is basically exhausted by the apparent quest of the U.S. in a global context to “fix” other country’s problems with little gains being made. The second group are those who have been directly impacted by previous military action, i.e. the families of soldiers who feel that the levels of casualties and deaths related to the Middle East have reached their peak and as a result they have become beyond war-weary (Mueller 2011). Thus, Iraq Syndrome and the fear of re-entrenchment in the Middle East will undoubtedly have wider implications for the region as a whole; much wider than those playing out in Syria today. According to Geoghegan, Obama has done a good job in resetting the tone of the American foreign policy machine, i.e. the policy of withdrawal and disengagement rather than intervention and engagement. As a result, we are now witnessing a foreign policy that has been too focused about the risks of action over the risks of inaction (Geoghegan 2013). According to Mueller, Iraq Syndrome has a very potent implication for Iraq, especially with regard to the growing threat from Islamic State and the loss of control of the country by the government due to growing sectarian violence. The general U.S. mentality towards Iraq is blatantly

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obvious: never again. With Iraq Syndrome in full force, political leaders, not just in the U.S. but in a global context, have done a lot of tough talking when it comes to issues such as the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government and the rise of Islamic State, but none seem willing to advocate boots on the ground just yet (Mueller 2011). This hesitance to act is having a massive impact, not just in Iraq but also, and possibly more worryingly, in Syria and the broader MENA. This could be a very sad legacy for the Obama administration if things worsen and the U.S. is then forced into action and does not decide to act of its own accord. For Obama to be drawn into another war in the Middle East would be a disaster for his legacy. He has made and kept his promise to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, and it is argued here that he will try to the best of his capability to remain removed from direct military action in Iraq and Syria for as long as is realistically possible. This is going to be extremely difficult to continue, however, with the growing IS threat and the level of state failure being witnessed across the region. Iraq’s recent history infuses the current debates over Syria in that, for a start, it has generated extreme caution among policy makers who remain undecided about the possibility of direct military intervention. Iraq today is far from being a stable state post-invasion and as a result the consensus is that the entire U.S.-led campaign, the removal of Saddam Hussein aside, was a failure. It is this negativity about Iraq that is now shaping opinion on Syria. One of the other fears is that of the US having to become a nation builder in Syria if the regime and/or state were to fail. This is one of the most off-putting elements of the suggestion of intervention in Syria mainly due to the experiences in Iraq post-2003. In the most basic terms, the U.S. cannot afford to become the patron of yet another failed state. As a result of Iraq Syndrome, Obama now has a more limited range of foreign policy options and will therefore have more difficulty in gaining support both domestically and internationally in terms of the use of military power. Essentially, we are now witnessing the direct implications of Iraq Syndrome and this is having important consequences for U.S. foreign policy (ibid.). Since the initial stages and failures of the 2003 Iraq War, the invading forces were too small to establish order, and some of the early administrative policies (specifically the de-Ba’athification program which involved the U.S. essentially removing from power and position all of the military, security forces, administration personnel, government officials, and so on, who were affiliated with Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party, triggering the insurgency and subsequently causing the Iraqi state to collapse due to the ensuing power vacuum) proved to be fatally misguided

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at best and at worst a trigger for state failure. In effect, the US created an instant failed state which means that removing themselves from the situation would be extremely difficult (Geoghegan 2013). Mirroring the situation during the Vietnam War, U.S. troops faced an armed opposition that was hyper-dedicated, massively resourceful and tactful, capable and, most significantly, a force that was determined to fight as long as necessary. As argued by Mueller, in Vietnam the hope was that after suffering enough punishment, the enemy would reach its “breaking point” and then either fade away or seek accommodation. In this case, great punishment was inflicted but the enemy never broke; instead it was the U.S. that faded away and this left ‘a bad taste in the mouth of the American public’ thus creating the initial Vietnam Syndrome (Mueller 2011). The insurgents in Iraq have the same mentality and the signs are thus far showing that the insurgency is not going anywhere any time soon and is in actual fact becoming an even more potent problem for the stability of Iraq, especially since the emergence of IS.

How to Treat the Iraq Syndrome: A new direction in foreign policy The debate is intensifying over how the U.S. should respond to Syria’s escalating crisis and the ongoing issues facing Iraq. The emergence and rapid expansion of IS is adding yet another layer to the quandary facing the U.S. in terms of its foreign policy options. The Obama Administration’s current policy of non-intervention in the Syria crisis has been highly criticized for a number of reasons, central of which are that it has permitted the Assad regime to continue oppressing the Sunni Arab majority, thus prolonging a civil war, and that it has also allowed the growth and expansion of radical jihadist groups such as Islamic State. What, then, should U.S. policy be in Iraq and Syria in light of the growing levels of instability and the expansion of the IS threat? One of the more realistic answers for the case of Syria would be that even with direct military intervention by the U.S., a stable Syrian government post-conflict is highly unlikely to emerge. The longer the Syrian crisis rages on, the deeper the sectarian division becomes and the higher the risk of long-term sectarian conflict. It is clear that the Obama Administration realizes that a policy of non-intervention in Syria carries some major hazards, maybe more so than a policy of intervention. Could the situation have been halted if the Obama Administration had taken a more active role from the start by, for example, declaring a no-fly zone and providing arms to the more moderate rebel factions? Such a proactive policy might have hastened

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Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s downfall, shortened the term of the conflict, and increased the chances of assembling a new government that could control its own territory. There is no doubt memories of Iraq shape the White House’s reticence on Syria (Boot 2013). At a NATO summit in Wales which took place 4-5th September 2014, the Obama Administration discussed with its allies a broad strategy to counter the IS gains. It was noted that the U.S. airstrikes against IS targets and other terrorist groups in Syria were illuminating several dilemmas faced by the Administration. On the one hand, Syrian opposition forces who have been fighting IS welcome U.S. and coalition assistance in their campaign. On the other hand, they question why the U.S. does not take military action against the Assad government or take more robust action to degrade IS capabilities in Syria (Katzman 2014). Advocates of continued U.S. support for select opposing groups in Syria argue that the withdrawal or reduction of such assistance would bolster less cooperative or friendly groups. Additionally, they have argued that if the U.S. withdraws or reduces its support, then it may force moderate groups to turn to extremist groups for funding and support, thereby increasing the influence of extremists while reducing U.S. leverage (Katzman 2014). On 10th September 2014, Obama announced his strategy for dealing with IS, describing the seriousness of the threat in terms ranging from moderate to extreme and identifying objectives ranging from containing IS to destroying it. It was at this point that he outlined his administration’s plan, which consisted mainly of U.S. air support to Iraqi and Kurdish ground forces, a humanitarian mission, a train and assist mission to build the capacity of Iraqi and Kurdish forces, and an intelligence-based counterterrorism mission (Kagan et al. 2014). This plan was no surprise and held no real change to the previous failed counterterrorism strategy that was in place for years prior to the threat of IS. The plan also involved the expansion of a coalition against IS, which the U.S. would lead–a policy very similar to that against Al-Qaeda post 9/11. In Syria, airstrikes have taken place but the overall campaign there has been stalled by inaction by the U.S. on a number of significant events, including the aforementioned “line in the sand” debacle in the use of chemical weapons by Assad. The U.S. intervention of Syria would, however, almost certainly be met with escalation by Assad’s allies, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the Levant without providing a resolution to the War, which is why the policy developed by the U.S. needs to be hyper-strategic in nature (Stuster and French 2015). In this regard, realistically only a small minority of analysts advocate the full entry of the U.S. into the Syrian civil war. Airstrikes alone are not the

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answer to the IS question, though it seems the US is pinning its hopes on these being the core anti-IS strategy tool. According to Barrett, it seems likely that IS fears that U.S. and allied airstrikes could tip the balance against it. Coalition airstrikes have made moving men and material harder for IS, as well as impacting on the safe storage of military equipment and attacks on targets with conventional tactics. They have also boosted the morale of opposing Iraqi and Kurdish forces while sapping that of its own (Barrett 2014). Paradoxically, IS would no doubt feel more comfortable facing U.S. ground troops, as it is familiar with their capabilities and can leverage its own advantages of local knowledge and guerrilla tactics. Obama has continually ruled out the option of combat troops being deployed in either Iraq or Syria and has continuously stated that intervention by the U.S. combat troops is not capable of fixing the underlying political problems that caused the insurrection which, it is argued here, is completely correct. However, non-action or an overly light touch is also not a viable option. The Obama Administration has argued time and time again that any strategy will take a long time to reach its objectives, but it is argued here that the impact of Iraq Syndrome on decisions of inaction being made are actually prolonging the events rather than slowing them down or addressing them to the full potential of the U.S. The focus on the international coalition has also been heralded as the way to defeat IS and thus stabilize Iraq and Syria. It needs to be noted, however, that any success of this coalition will still highly depend on the U.S. As of midOctober 2015, 60 countries are listed as members of the coalition, many of which have been participating since 2012 in response to the evolving conflict in Syria. According to Katzman, the subset of the broad coalition that is attempting to coordinate military operations in Iraq and Syria faces significant challenges. Past attempts at coordination have exposed rifts among regional actors, prompting situations in which the common goal of supporting the Syrian opposition was not enough to overcome other, competing priorities among ostensibly partner states (Katzman 2014). This does not bode well for the U.S.’s ability to place the bulk of the responsibility of dealing with IS and preventing state failure in Syria and Iraq in this coalition. What is failing to be understood by the Obama Administration at this time is that it is impossible to address Iraq first and Syria second, or conduct air attacks before using other military instruments. According to Kagan et al., any strategy to degrade and destroy IS requires actions across Iraq and Syria that contends with the expansive threat of IS in the full context of two complex internal security

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situations (Kagan et al. 2014). The engagement of the U.S. and its allies in a coalition against IS since August 2014 has brought about a dramatic change in the dynamics of the battlefield, more so in Iraq where the majority of the action has taken place. Having essentially neglected the events in Iraq and Syria for much too long, the U.S. now lacks core intelligence and contextual understandings necessary to build a coherent counter-strategy. Additionally, it remains dependent on a “one size fits all” approach to its counter-strategy and has forgotten one of the most important points in terms of the fight against IS, namely that IS is not Al-Qaeda and therefore any strategy or policy developed to address them needs to be newly developed not re-hashed from older policies. Nobody can debate the fact that IS needs to be defeated in Iraq and Syria but, the fact is that Syria faces more problems and, the removal of the Assad regime from power needs to occur in order for any strategy to work. Any successful strategy for dealing with IS in Syria must therefore address the Assad issue, marginalize it, and ultimately defeat it along with IS. This all needs to be done while also setting the conditions necessary for an inclusive post-Assad government that can prevent any Al-Qaeda affiliate from re-establishing itself in Syria (ibid.). The collapse of the Iraqi and Syrian states would be disastrous not only to those countries affected but also to the MENA region at large and also to the global international order. Therefore, the strategy to defeat and destroy IS must be determined, deliberate, and phased, allowing for iterative decisions that adjust the plan in response to the actual realities on the ground. It cannot be tainted by the fear factor associated with Iraq Syndrome; to do so would be detrimental to the survival of both Iraq and Syria and the long-term legacies of inaction may be felt in the MENA region for decades to come.

Conclusion Obama’s policy of non-intervention is heavily impacted by the ongoing Iraq Syndrome. With Iraq Syndrome playing its part in the nonaction of the U.S. in Iraq and Syria, it appears that political leaders have done a lot of tough taking, but no one seems willing to advocate any tough action such as direct military action or “sending in the troops” (Mueller 2014). Although many argue that this policy is pragmatic and rational, there are a number of issues that may have a long term negative impact, not just in Iraq and Syria, but in the larger MENA region. Obama is highly constrained by public opinion and it is quite understandable that he would not want to intervene directly in the ongoing Iraq sectarian war nor the

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Syrian civil war. Nor would he want to become re-entrenched in another decade long war which would taint the legacy of his presidency. However, the policy of non-intervention that is being applied is now providing a longer life to the Assad regime that continues to persecute its citizens, while also allowing the rapid expansion of radical extremist groups such as IS that could potentially destabilize the entire region. If the U.S. decides to use force, it should do so with clear, pre-defined objectives and with the commitment to see them through to victory; if it cannot muster this, it should not use force at all. One thing stands though, the fact that the U.S. got it wrong in Iraq and the heavy price they paid during the decade-long entrenchment there should not stand in the way of creating a coherent and realistic policy option for dealing with the issues in today’s MENA region. The U.S. can no longer stand by and hope that others will solve the problems; it has a responsibility for action in Iraq, if not also in Syria. Iraq Syndrome will have implications much wider than those playing out in Syria. At least some of these perilous consequences might have been avoided if the Obama Administration had taken a more active role from the start by, for example, declaring a no-fly zone and providing arms to the more moderate rebel factions. Such a proactive policy might have hastened al-Assad’s downfall, shortened the term of the conflict, and increased the chances of assembling a new government that could control its own territory. But Obama has limited U.S. involvement to a small amount of humanitarian aid and a large number of statements denouncing Assad. The president is not doing much to back up his words because the last thing he wants is to get sucked into another complicated Middle Eastern conflict. No doubt memories of Iraq shape the White House’s reticence on Syria (Boot 2013). Obama has done a good job in resetting the tone of the American foreign policy machine, i.e. the policy of withdrawal and disengagement rather than intervention and engagement. As a result, we are now witnessing a foreign policy that has been too focused on the risks of action over the risks of inaction. This could be a very sad legacy for the Obama Administration if things were to worsen and the U.S. is forced into action and does not decide to act of its own accord. The U.S. needs to remove itself from the sidelines and define its foreign policy in a clearer manner, but the implications of Iraq Syndrome are going to make this a lot more difficult especially with the war-weariness of the American public and its now obvious turn against direct action on the ground in the Middle East. The Administration has ruled out deploying combat forces to either Iraq or Syria, but it has not necessarily ruled out providing forward aircraft controllers, additional military advisors, or other related ground military

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assets. However, many experts assert that coalition partners inside Iraq and Syria are too weak to defeat IS and will eventually require help from U.S. combat troops (Katzman 2014). There will be no happy ending in Syria nor in Iraq in the near future, but the longer that the U.S. drags its feet in terms of developing a clear and concise foreign policy the worse the longterm effects of these wars are going to be. If both Syria and Iraq were to fail there is no telling what kind of instability would spill over into the region. Therefore, inaction and soft-touch foreign policy can no longer be the main options for future U.S. policy development. Essentially, we are seeing a demonstration of the dangers of policymaking on the rebound through the impact of the Iraq War on US foreign policy development and on its outlook on its role in the international system in general.

References Barrett, Richard. 2014. “The Islamic State.” The Soufan Group. Accessed January 12 2016. http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf Boot, Max. 2013. “The Iraq Syndrome.” The Weekly Standard, Vol. 18, No. 19: 1-2. Friedman, Thomas L. 2014. “President Obama Talks to Thomas L. Friedman About Iraq and World Affairs.” New York Times. Accessed November 10 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/opinion/president-obama-thomasl-friedman-iraq-and-world-affairs.html Geoghegan, Tom. 2013. “Shadow of Iraq Looms over Syria.” BBC News. Accessed August 23 2015. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middleeast-23869127 Kagan, Kimberley, Frederick W. Kagan and Jessica D. Lewis. 2014. “A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State.” Institute for the Study of War: Middle East Security Report, No. 23: 1-31. Katzman, Kenneth, Christopher M. Blanchard, Carla E. Humud, Matthew C. Weed, Rhoda Margeson and Alex Tiersky. 2014. The Islamic State Crisis and US Policy, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Mueller, John. 2011. “The Iraq Syndrome Revisited: US intervention from Kosovo to Libya.” Foreign Affairs. Accessed April 11 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2011-03-28/iraqsyndrome-revisited Mueller, John. 2014. “Iraq Syndrome Redux: Behind the Tough Talk.” Foreign Affairs. Accessed April 12 2015.

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https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2014-06-18/iraqsyndrome-redux Stuster, J. Dana and Bill French. 2015. Confronting the Islamic State: An assessment of US strategic options, Washington, DC: National Security Network. Wearing, David. 2012. “‘In Defence of Iraq Syndrome: Liberal values never drive intervention.” The Guardian Online. Accessed April 11 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/03/in-defence-ofiraq-syndrome

CHAPTER TWO ON REVOLUTION AND REVOLUTIONARY SITUATIONS: ASSESSING THE CASES OF SYRIA AND EGYPT DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS KONSTANTINOS C. ZARRAS

Introduction Throughout the Arab Uprisings and the subsequent wave of revolts that swept the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the term “revolution” has been employed in various instances by scholars, journalists and political activists. It was used during public political speeches and in social media posts globally, while in the streets of Cairo, Aleppo and Damascus demonstrators chanted “thawra” in anticipation of a revolution that would bring about a new order. There is a vast and diverse scholarship on the phenomenon and questions remain about what constitutes a revolution in the social sciences. The aim of this chapter is to tackle the issue from a Realist perspective in IR theory. Due to the intricate character of the political nature involved, there is a constant need to revise our theories and ameliorate our tools for understanding the social world. After elaborating the theoretical approach on the issue, the analysis will examine the cases of the Syrian and Egyptian revolutionary mobilization during the ongoing and open-ended process of the Arab Uprisings. These two case studies, it is argued, will reaffirm the close relationship that revolutions share with war and counter-revolution.

Conceptualizing Revolution and Revolutionary Situations In an attempt to grasp the meaning of the word “revolution” as a concept of political science, beyond its various uses in the media or

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everyday discussions, it must be understood that there is no general agreement among scholars on its semantic content. The ambiguity of the term is partly a result of its polemical and symbolic significance. Invoking a revolution or inciting revolutionary situations, which are associated with influential ideas of social change, can raise the political consciousness and sometimes ignite political action. Thus a revolutionary rhetoric can turn into a powerful weapon in the hands of interested groups. In this light, the concept has often become a parameter of power struggles which have spawned a number of contested interpretations, under which definitions turn out to be fields of competition between collective entities and the struggle for power takes the form of a struggle for the exclusive interpretation of social and political phenomena. The aim here is to conceive of revolution as a political phenomenon from a Realist perspective and highlight the usefulness of distinguishing between revolution and revolutionary situations in order to describe the unfolding situation in Syria and Egypt. Before investigating the key concepts surrounding the notion of revolution it is first essential to outline the basic assumptions of the Realist perspective in IR theory. In broad terms, it is argued that anarchy is designated as the overarching ordering principle of international affairs. Contrary to the domestic order of consolidated states, the international environment is seen by Realists as a world of “collectivities” in which the shadow of war is omnipresent (Aron 2003, 337). The fundamental unit of political analysis is the independent polity whose survival within the anarchic international system can only be ensured through an inevitable pursuit and application of power. At a deeper level of analysis, social reality consists of political actors, struggling for their survival in a perennially insecure environment. According to the Realist perspective, power-seeking behavior of collective entities is rooted in human nature and represents a permanent feature of international relations. In the absence of a central authority, and due to the uncertainty concerning the intentions of the “Others”, collective actors can only rely on “self-help”; otherwise known as the principle of action. In this regard, the Realist vision of international politics emphasizes the competitive and conflictual character of social life, with the notions of anarchy, self-preservation and power at its core; they are interlinked and are considered as fundamental at the domestic level of states. Having addressed the above contextual issues, the discussion will now focus on the characteristics of revolution, i.e. what is the set of criteria that a process of socio-political transformation needs to achieve in order to qualify as a revolution? In the most basic of contexts, a revolution is a

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multi-dimensional phenomenon and this is why specific theoretical choices are imperative in order to articulate a logically coherent definition. It is not a static object of analysis and what is excluded in the current analysis is the idea that an invariable theory can be elaborated which could then be applied to any observed specific historical case. According to Panayiotis Kondylis, any theory in the social sciences should take into account two basic features of social relations: the heteronomy of ends and the unanticipated consequences of social action (Kondylis 2007). These features contribute to the inherent complexity of the social world and, as a consequence, a construction of a predictive, all-encompassing theoretical model is inconceivable. This way of theorizing has been designated by Charles Tilly as “the chimera of an invariant model of revolution” (Tilly 1995b, 1597). In particular, Stephen Walt described revolution as “the destruction of an existing state by members of its own society, followed by the creation of a new political order” (Walt 1997, 14). The definition of revolution has been further refined by Samuel P. Huntington who argues that this “rapid, fundamental and violent domestic change” concerns not only state institutions but also the “dominant values and myths of a society”, its “social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies” (Huntington 1968, 264). Jack Goldstone specified this transformation as a “forcible overthrow of a government through mass mobilization (whether military or civilian or both) in the name of social justice, to create new political institutions” (Goldstone 2014, 4). Analyzing the above definitions can prove convenient in identifying fundamental elements of the phenomenon: transformation, violence, revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcome. It is now essential to investigate the key aspect of transformation in relation to revolution, asking questions such as: what degree and pace of change are required for a revolution to occur? Could it be limited to the seizure of power by a new political regime? Or does it imply the alteration of state institutions or even a deep change in social relations in general? In most cases, the impetuous and rapid character of a revolutionary process causes a sudden break up of long-standing political structures. The effected change in the social order is abrupt; nevertheless it is “an acceleration of previously existing rates of change” (Kumar 1971, 10). Scholars disagree, however, on the extent of change that is needed to define revolution in a given situation. Differing theoretical interpretations can be identified in addressing this theoretical challenge. Many theorists adopt a broad definition of revolution and then classify them into different types, depending on the degree of transformation and outcome. Others, however, perceive the phenomenon as a specific form of collective political violence and articulate its

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conceptual differences in comparison to various types of violence such as rebellions, uprisings, coup d’états or insurrections. It is this perspective which, it is argued here, is more relevant to understand revolutions as this chapter focuses on the morphological characteristics of revolution. The concept of transformation presupposes the existence of a sovereign political body. A preliminary map of a revolution should include a political entity which fails at a certain time to fulfill its basic functions and to justify its Weberian definition as the holder of the monopoly of the legitimate use of force, also known as the monopoly on violence (Weber 2004, 33). By employing the term “political entity” or “polity”, which describes an organized political group that exercises authority over a particular territory and population, a theorist can place revolutionary change in a wider historical context beyond the modern era. From this perspective, a failure of a state and its coercive apparatus to maintain social cohesion and order is a necessary condition for a revolutionary change to occur. This was the situation in pre-revolutionary France where the ancien régime headed by Luis XVI failed to deal with the economic crisis, or in pre-1979 Iran where the Pahlavi dynasty was overthrown after a widespread popular mobilization. Another question that arises focuses on whether the described collective effort to bring about a change in the political system is necessarily accompanied by violence? In other words, does revolution involve the necessity of violent action? As mentioned above, Tilly delineates revolution as a subcategory of the wider category of political violence. He stresses that the reasons behind this assessment can be found in the fluidity of the situation that precedes the revolutionary change and which compels human beings to employ unlimited means of coercion in the struggle for power (Tilly 1995a, 33). In other words, it can be argued that revolutions are violent because previous non-violent methods to change are generally not successful in implementing the changes necessary by the masses. In that sense, the element of change is associated with collective violence (or a potential threat of violence) and provokes a forcible alteration of the political order. Based upon the criterion of the transformation’s magnitude, Aristotle identified two types of revolution: the first is associated with the notion of cyclical alterations in the forms of government and refers to the complete change of a polity’s constitution. The second criterion corresponds to its modification and implies a mere change of the ruling power (Sinclair 1964, 90). Skocpol’s approach distinguishes further between social and political revolutions. The first category entails foundational social, political and cultural transformation of a society while a political revolution has a more limited impact which

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mainly affects the political architecture of a state (Skocpol 1979). From this point of view, exemplary cases of social revolutions are noted as including the French Revolution of 1789, the 1917 October Revolution in Russia and the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The extent of transformation is also employed as a classifying criterion by Stanislav Andreski who labels the social or great revolutions as transformative and differentiates them from reiterative revolutions “which do not end by establishing a social order which is sufficiently different from what existed before to be called new” (Andreski 1988, 39). Beyond the different types of revolutions that could be identified, a further question that needs to be addressed is which are the unique properties of the phenomenon that differentiates it from other forms of political violence? For Charles Tilly a "great revolution" provokes a fundamental reordering of the relationship between state and society and should be differentiated from other phenomena of organized human violence (Tilly 1995a). Huntington, alternatively, underlines the element of radical political change which is a defining parameter of a revolutionary process, arguing that “a full-scale revolution thus involves the rapid and violent destruction of existing political institutions, the mobilization of new groups into politics, and the creation of new political institutions. The sequence and the relations among these three aspects may vary from one revolution to another” (Huntington 2004, 271). Andreski finds these unique characteristics in four necessary conditions: an overthrow of the government from within the state; a replacement of the old ruling elite by a new one which has emerged inside the state; mass mobilization; and a transformation of the social system (Andreski 1988). It should be noted here that these conditions are fully met only at a higher level of abstraction and there are variations in the degree that each of the above criteria is satisfied in specific cases. Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from coup d’états, rebellions, wars of independence or civil wars. A coup d’état corresponds to a topdown seizure of power without mass mobilization where the previous ruling elite may be replaced only partially and institutional changes are not necessarily materialized. As for rebellions, they could evolve into a revolution or a war of independence but there is a difference of degree and kind with them. Rebellions could have a local character and be limited to a mere protest to a specific restriction, requirement, or ideology placed by the authority. The identification of the phenomenon could become a difficult task “in feudal or other states with unclear boundaries or without a firmly established government” where “it is often difficult to decide whether we are looking at a conflict between independent polities or

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something that ought to be called a rebellion” (Andreski 1988, 19). Revolutions should also be theoretically separated from civil wars, even though the two concepts are not mutually exclusive. This is evident, for instance, when the outcome of a civil war is a permanent division of a territory previously controlled by a single government and the emergence of a new polity. It is about a war of independence rather than a revolution. It is the outcome of the transformational process that determines the phenomenon and in a case where the conditions are met, a civil war is retrospectively labeled as a revolution. Many great revolutions like the French, the Chinese and the Russian revolutions, were accomplished after bloody civil wars. So, are these theoretical concepts and categories useful in order to describe what is going on in Egypt and Syria after December 2010? In order to address this question, it is essential here to add two more elements to the analysis: the first focuses on the international context and its role on the internal political architecture of a state. It is argued here that revolutions should not be approached exclusively at the domestic level of analysis because they are linked with processes at the regional and international level. Fred Halliday comments that “revolutionary situations tend to emerge in eras of international upheaval, in which state effectiveness is threatened not just by internal processes but also by pressures from outside: international conflicts, economic crisis and shifts in prevailing patterns of hierarchy, authority and rule” (Lawson 2011, 13). The relationship between war and revolution is of key importance for understanding the political dynamics in a given area and time: revolutions were born of war and have also been the cause of wars. The second element corresponds to the concept of “revolutionary situation” which was juxtaposed by Charles Tilly to that of a “revolutionary outcome” (Tilly 1978, 190-199). All the above ideal types of organized political violence have in common a revolutionary situation which precedes the unfolding of events. A revolutionary condition is often described as a situation that emerges in a context of crisis and comes when a regime in power fails to fulfil its basic functions. It is a situation indicative of the possibility of revolution. Every revolution is preceded by a revolutionary situation, however, a revolutionary situation does not necessarily lead to a revolution. There are common properties in the condition that predate civil wars, coups and fullscale revolutions. Revolutionary situations are moments of deep fragmentation in state power and differ from revolutionary outcomes which are linked with rapid, forcible, durable transfers of state power. A full-fledged revolution is an extensive combination of the two (Tilly

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1995a). A revolutionary situation can lead to a long civil war, where order and cohesion are absent, or alternatively to a coup d’état. The following are some of the specific factors that enhance the revolutionary situation, including a high level of discontent or a division within the elite sector, a social group with an ideology to mobilize and motivate the masses, a unifying motive to overthrow the existing regime, the deterioration of the legitimacy and coercive capacity of the state or finally the international factor. Tilly names this revolutionary situation a condition of multiple sovereignties. To sum up, in order to qualify as a revolution, a social phenomenon of organized collective violence must fulfil certain criteria—or with a different terminology—it should satisfy certain necessary and sufficient conditions. Among the necessary conditions is an organized movement by a social group from within the state which aims at overthrowing a constituted authority and altering the existing socio-political institutions. What differentiates revolutions from rebellions or coups are mainly their aims and outcomes, i.e. the type, scope and extent of change that they provoke. During revolutions there is mass mobilization, the extent of change is severe and its development rate rapid; keeping in mind that these qualifications are elastic. Revolutions constitute dramatic moments in the history of international relations: they transform borders, give rise to new political elites and provoke the disappearance of old ones. Moreover, high levels of violence are present, as manifested in most historical cases. Above all, they result in the establishment of a new political order, which is radically different from the preceding one. The existence of an organized group with political goals which orchestrates an uprising against the established authority and provokes a violent disturbance of the political life is considered a necessary condition. The sufficient condition for a revolution to occur is also linked with the outcome. From this perspective, an upheaval that does not lead to a radical transformation of the political power system cannot be considered a revolution.

The Syrian Case: From a popular uprising to a civil war In January 2011, two months before the outbreak of violence in the southern province of Daraa, the Syrian President gave an interview to the Wall Street Journal expressing his certainty that Syria would not be affected by the wave of Arab Uprisings. A few months later, the peaceful protest movement had gradually transformed into a devastating civil war. According to UN sources and human rights organizations, the death toll had likely reached 250,000 people by August 2015. It is also estimated

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that almost half the country’s population has been displaced, while 4 million Syrians had fled to nearby countries by the summer of 2015, creating an enormous humanitarian crisis. International diplomatic efforts have failed to achieve a negotiated political settlement, sectarian divides have been heightened and the prospect of a protracted civil war seems probable. This situation, which could lead to the disintegration of the state, is an exemplary manifestation of the unexpected consequences of social action that often characterize revolutions. Contrary to the revolutionary aspirations of political activists who initially organized the peaceful wave of protests in order to establish a democratic, constitutional and pluralistic state, the country has descended into chaos. In light of ongoing developments in the region the aim of this section is to examine the case study of revolutionary dynamics in Syria, focusing on questions such as: do the dramatic events of the Syrian Uprising and the socio-political transformation that followed justify its designation as a revolution? What is imperative to emphasize, first, is that in the Syrian case it is premature to assess the full impact of socio-political developments. The transformational process is ongoing and the regime of Bashar alAssad is still in power, although it has lost control of large parts of the country. It is essential here to first focus on what the situation in the country was like before the eruption of violence in 2011 in order to provide context to the analysis. Prior to the revolt, the socio-political conditions were indicative of a clear case of a revolutionary situation. Unemployment, social inequalities, and deprivation of political participation, combined with the 2008-2010 food price crisis and a persistent drought, affected the population whose largest proportion consisted of youths aged between 15 and 29. In addition, long-lasting internal political problems including oppression from the authoritarian regime, corruption and the absence of democratic rights and political freedoms, have further reinforced the causal factors of the social uprising. The conditions for the outbreak of a political and social upheaval were thus present and the brutality with which the coercive apparatus of the state responded to peaceful demonstrations was the catalyst for the development of an armed uprising. There was a massive popular mobilization, but political grievances were channeled into an armed insurgency and the non-violent opposition that initially led the protests was marginalized. The regime’s counter-insurgency approach had failed and, as a consequence, the opposition forces gained control of large swaths of territory in northern and eastern Syria, including provincial capitals and strongholds in neighborhoods around the city centers of Aleppo, Damascus and Homs.

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During the Syrian civil conflict, which can be characterized as being asymmetric in nature, neither side has seemed able to achieve a decisive military victory (Sayigh 2015). Despite the rapid expansion of the rebellion all over the country at the initial stage of the crisis, the regime has displayed remarkable resilience. Undoubtedly, this coherence is based on the support of segments of the Syrian society, mainly of the Allawite community, as well as that of several members of the middle and upper classes in the urban areas. Due to the gradual expansion of the conflict and the fear for sectarian violence in a post-Assad Syria, many Allawites and Christians have chosen to join the camp of the counter-revolution. The bulk of the Army which constituted, along with the Ba’ath party, the pillars of the Assad Administration has remained loyal to the regime during the war and its cohesiveness has increased. On the other side of the confrontation, the opposition did not exploit the initial advantageous moment to overthrow the Assad regime. Secular, pro-democratic political activists who inspired and supported the Uprising agreed on a nonviolent struggle approach. However, the situation on the ground turned things around and the revolutionary process descended into a civil war and the revolutionaries were politically marginalized. This was mainly due to their failure to form a unified and cohesive political and military front that would provoke the overthrow of the ruling elite and establish a new government. Indeed, the rebel movement has been deeply fractured and different groups are fighting to advance their own agendas. Furthermore, the situation has been aggravated by the rise of powerful radical groups that evolved into the main players and contributed to the marginalization of moderate actors that opposed the Ba’athist regime and envisioned a more democratic future for their country (Zisser 2014, 55-67). Among a wide array of players and forces active in Syria, radical Islamist groups have come to the forefront of the Syrian Uprising in terms of influence. The Islamic State, which controls large swaths of territory along the Euphrates valley in both Syria and Iraq at the time of writing also threatens the regime’s control of areas east of Homs. The Syrian AlQaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, which managed to expel the regime’s forces from the Idlib province, constitutes a menace for the Allawite Coast and the Southern provinces of the country. To a lesser degree, Jaysh alIslam in Eastern Ghouta, Ahrar as-Sham and other groups have been empowered during the conflict. These Salafist-Jihadist groups share a different narrative of revolutionary transformation and envision the reestablishment of a political entity called the “caliphate”. The Islamic State has already instituted their interpretation of Sharia laws, opened Sharia courts, provided law enforcement, imposed the jizya tax on non-Muslim

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residents and promoted its own educational activities in an attempt to establish institutions of a proto-state in the areas that it exercises authority. At the same time Kurdish forces are active in northern and north-eastern areas of the country, where they control enclaves and aspire to establish an autonomous entity in the so-called Rojava, the Western Kurdistan (Zisser 2014, 193-214). Under these circumstances, a disintegration of the Syrian state cannot be excluded as a possibility. The ongoing conflict together with the active—direct or indirect—involvement of foreign actors in the civil war renders the establishment of a new political administration within Syria’s borders, a prerequisite for a revolution to occur, a less possible scenario. The Syrian conflict is often depicted as a proxy war with a sectarian context, where the confrontation has taken the form of Sunni versus Shia. In fact, this description covers only part of the highly localized, externally penetrated and complicated war where a number of interconnected conflicts are embedded (Sayigh 2014). During 2015, the Assad regime suffered a number of defeats and a manpower shortage that forced it to be on the defensive, and which limited its objectives in different areas of the country in compliance with its strategic objective of survival. Relying on external support, the regime’s forces maintain control over the urban areas as well as over the strategic corridor running from the capital to the Mediterranean coast, which includes Tartus and Latakia. Assad seeks to preserve his rule in post-war Syria with the valuable assistance of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah which aims at securing the Syrian-Lebanese border region and preventing the spread of insecurity on Lebanese soil. As a result of this ongoing support, the overthrow of the regime which constitutes a necessary condition for the completion of a revolutionary process cannot be characterized as imminent. With regard to the chapter’s central question—whether events in Syria constitute a revolution—the answer would be negative under the current circumstances. Even though there was a mass popular mobilization accompanied by a high level of violence, elements that constitute necessary conditions for a revolution to occur, the situation did not evolve into a revolution. The minimum condition of the takeover of state power has not happened yet. It is a case of a revolutionary situation that led to the ongoing and seemingly open-ended civil war. The main obstacle for establishing a new political order is the lack of a single, unified and cohesive organized opposition group that would replace the Assad regime. The spread of violence and the atrocities committed by both sides of the confrontation have increased polarization in Syrian society. In a selfperpetuating cycle of violence the civil strife has intensified and fault lines

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are deepening. The war has already caused a deep transformation of the Syrian society and it is impossible to predict the outcome of this highly complicated conflict.

The Egyptian Case: Revolutionary movement and counter-revolution On the 25th of January 2011, Tahrir Square in Cairo became the epicenter of a political earthquake in the MENA. After a series of demonstrations and clashes in the streets, the Egyptian revolutionary movement, inspired by similar protests in Tunisia, had put an end to the 30-year autocratic rule of Hosni Mubarak. A popular mass mobilization succeeded and the unexpected ouster of Mubarak was undeniably a development of great significance for Egypt and the region as a whole. The question remains, however, does the political transformation that followed the Egyptian Uprising satisfy the criteria that have been determined as necessary to define the phenomenon as a revolution? One of the central arguments of this case study is that the conditions required for a revolution to occur have not been met in the case of Egypt. The rise to power of the Egyptian Army Chief, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, after the overthrow of the elected President Mohammed Morsi, signifies the completion of the first phase of a deep counter-revolutionary process. After providing an outline of political evolutions in Egypt during the four years that followed the so-called “January 25 Revolution”, this section will focus on the main reasons behind the failure of the revolutionary process. The underlying factors behind the revolutionary situation that has arisen over Egypt can be outlined in the following points: political repression, economic structural problems and the new regional context. Mubarak’s autocratic rule was based on a powerful security apparatus which has been used to control political opposition. Under the emergency law, his National Democratic Party (NDP) dominated Egyptian politics for decades while corruption was endemic. With regard to the declining socioeconomic conditions, high unemployment levels and food price inflation have affected large strata of the society, especially its youth population (Lesch 2011). The state was no longer capable of absorbing the large pool of unemployed civilians, while health and educational services deteriorated and social inequalities were exacerbated. At the end of 2010, the regional environment underwent a significant change after the events in Tunisia. The Tunisian uprising which succeeded in ousting President Ben Ali, became the trigger for a chain reaction in the MENA and created favorable conditions for the outbreak of the upheaval in Egypt.

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During the early weeks of the uprising, a new sense of solidarity developed among Egyptians, based on the hope for a better future. The “fear barrier” was broken, self-confidence was enhanced and a space for mass politics opened in the streets and squares. The narrative about young bloggers and human rights activists who were calling for the end of the autocratic regime has, to this day, dominated the representation of the popular movement by Western media. Indeed, among the most important political actors who inspired and shaped the protest movement were many young, mostly secular-oriented Egyptians who have employed the internet and social media to introduce new ways of communication and interaction. Opposition organizations and groups like the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kefaya), the April 6 Movement, the Youth of the Tomorrow Party, and Labor Unions have played a crucial role in calling for and organizing protests in the streets of Cairo and other major cities. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood, the most powerful organization that opposed the regime, did not formally participate in the protests, although many of its members were allowed to take part. The overthrow of Mubarak after the decision of the leadership of the Army to facilitate his removal, has spread hope and high expectations for the establishment of a more open, transparent and democratic political system (El-Alaoui 2014). Nevertheless, the situation in post-revolutionary Egypt was far from stable. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) maintained its control on civil society and its influence over political developments. The enthusiasm that accompanied the announcement of the first democratic parliamentary elections in decades in the country gave way to concern for the secular revolutionaries. The electoral procedure brought the Muslim Brotherhood to the forefront of the political scene, with the Islamist political forces winning more than 60% of the votes (37.5% for the candidates affiliated to the Alliance under the Freedom and Justice Party and 27.8% for the Salafists of Al-Nour). Following the presidential elections in June 2012, Mohamed Morsi was declared the first democratically elected Head of State in Egypt’s history. Morsi’s rise to power was considered a defeat for the protagonists of the “January 25 Revolution”. The revolutionaries’ main goal was the establishment of a pluralistic and democratic state, where the military would be under civilian control and the security sector would be reformed. Contrary to their expectations, the role of the Army remained crucial in the Egyptian political game and the Muslim Brotherhood seemed to exploit the situation in order to strengthen its position and promote its agenda. This can be considered another historic manifestation of the dynamics of the unintended consequences of collective human action.

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If the Brotherhood had managed to consolidate its power and promote the constitutional changes that it had planned, the political change would have been foundational. Relying upon this hypothesis, this transformational process would have been classified as a revolution, similar to the Iranian experience in 1979. However, the opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood’s vision of the Egyptian state proved to be very powerful. A growing secular social movement, led by broad segments of the Egyptian society, was opposed to the constitutional changes promoted by the Freedom and Justice Party, which were seen as a constitutional coup against the judiciary. The Morsi Administration was confronted with grassroots movements such as the Tamarod, who organized a new series of protests accusing the president of increasing authoritarianism and disregard of the predominantly secular opposition and calling for early elections. One year after his rise to the presidency, Morsi was removed from office by a military intervention and a new round of turmoil was initiated. The coup d’état, led by General al-Sisi, was backed by a wide range of social and political powers and marked the completion of the first phase of a counter-revolution (Brown and Dunne 2015). The military takeover was accompanied by extreme violence against Muslim Brotherhood supporters who were calling for the return of the deposed President Morsi. The bloodiest and most characteristic incident of the counter-revolution has been the violent dispersal of the Rabaa alAdawiya sit-in in August 2013. In early 2014, Egypt’s SCAF announced that it would allow Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to run for President. Al-Sisi’s rise to the presidency in June 2014 marked a new triumph for the military in the political game in Egypt. After the defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was subsequently outlawed, the al-Sisi Administration initiated the second phase of the counter-revolution and directed his efforts against the revolutionaries. The establishment has taken advantage of the turmoil, to diminish the power of the political parties and organizations that constituted the revolutionary movement, and render the parliament a passive player to his decision-making. Under the guise of a “war on terror” and “restoring stability”, President al-Sisi has enshrined unprecedented authoritarian measures into law. Four and a half years after the “January 25 Revolution”, it can be argued that the prerequisites for a revolution, i.e. the overthrow of the governing elite and the foundational transformation of the political system, have not been met in the case of Egypt. In fact, the pillars of the old regime, above all the military, the police and the vast security apparatus, the judiciary and the bureaucracy, are still in power. The Army controls a vast economic empire, and throughout the turmoil it managed to control

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the presidency and protect its interests. It is clear that under Hosni Mubarak, the prospect of the rise of his son Gamal to power was perceived by Army officials as a threat to their powerful position. President al-Sisi has already emphasized the role of the state in the economy and suggested that the private sector would have to accept a smaller role to that which it had under Mubarak. The so-called “deep state” has masterly played the political game by exploiting the antagonism between its competitors. During the first months of Morsi’s rule, the Army kept a very cautious attitude towards the Brotherhood before staging the coup that removed it from power. Shifting alliances between political groups who struggle for power is a common feature during revolutionary periods. It is worth mentioning the controversial support that the Islamist Al-Nour party gave to the Army in July 2013. Having dealt with the Brotherhood and the Islamists, the new regime moved on to target the revolutionary groups. The SCAF accused the April 6 Youth Movement and the Kefaya of being funded by foreign countries and turning the people against the Army. Those who struggled against autocracy found themselves restrained and there was a return to the status quo ante bellum. Further, the al-Sisi regime’s narrative emphasizes the June 2013 protests against the Morsi government, instead of the 25th of January 2011 Uprising. Moreover, in a symbolic action, Hosni Mubarak was released from prison.

Conclusion Having analyzed the cases above, it can be argued that despite the mass mobilization of the Egyptian people, the idealization of the Tahrir Square events and the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, the January 25 Uprising suffered a serious setback. The change of the governing elite did not indicate a foundational transformation of the political system, since the constituents of the deep state are still in power. It can be argued that the uprising in Egypt resulted in a mere reiterative revolution in Andreski’s terms. After four years, Egypt remains divided and faces numerous problems and threats including economic stagnation and unemployment. Additionally, the state’s reliance on emergency inflows from the GCC, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, is not a sustainable solution. Meanwhile, excessive force being used against Islamists has fueled the radicalization of the Egyptian youth. Sinai has become a grey zone where the group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), an IS affiliate now renamed Wilayat Sinai, constitutes the biggest threat to security. In brief, the demands of the majority of the revolutionaries of January 25 have not been met and their disappointment has grown after the attempts for a re-

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establishment of the top-down, controlled politics of pre-revolution Egypt. The situation remains unstable, and the total rift with the Muslim Brotherhood is a permanent source of crisis and instability for the new administration. What is undeniable is that the army reaffirmed and updated its central role in the Egyptian political scene. To summarize, the socio-political transformations that have taken place in Syria and Egypt throughout the last five years do not satisfy the criteria to be qualified as revolutions. Despite the revolutionary situation that emerged in both countries after the outbreak of the uprisings, revolutions did not occur and the political outcome remains uncertain. In the Syrian case, the new balance of power will be determined by developments on the battlefront, while the prolonged civil war could even lead to the disintegration of the state. As for Egypt, the counter-revolution process prevented a durable transformation of the political system and resulted in the reconstitution of the security state. Nevertheless, as long as social grievances are not addressed, the two countries will be under the conditions of a revolutionary situation and revolutionary aspirations will continue to constitute a fundamental aspect of domestic politics.

References Andreski, Stanislav. 1988. “A Typology of Revolutions From a Morphological Viewpoint.” International Journal of World Peace, Vol. 5, No. 1: 25-43. Aron, Raymond. 2003. Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. Bayat, Asef. 2007. Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Bengio, Ofra. 2014. Kurdish Awakening, National Building in a Fragmented Homeland. Austin: University of Texas Press. El-Alaoui, Hicham Ben Abdallah. “Le printemps arabe toujours vivant.” Manieres de voir, Le Monde Diplomatique, 135. Foran, John. 1997. “The Future of Revolutions at the Fin-du Siècle.” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 5: 791-820. Goldstone, Jack. 1991. Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. Los Angeles: University of California Press. —. 2014. Revolutions: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goodwin, Jeff. 1994. “Toward a New Sociology of Revolutions.” Theory and Society, Vol.23, No. 6: 731-766.

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Halliday, Fred. 1999. Revolution and World Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Hinnebusch, Raymond. 2012. “Syria: from ‘authoritarian upgrading’ to revolution?” International Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 1: 95–113. Lawson, George. 2011. “Halliday’s Revenge: revolutions and international relations.” International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5: 1067-1085. Lesch, Ann M. 2011. “Egypt’s Spring: Causes of the revolution.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 18, No. 3: 35-48. Sayigh, Yezid. 2014. “Syria’s Very Local Regional Conflict.” Global Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict, June 9, http://carnegie-mec.org/2014 /06/09/syria-s-very-local-regional-conflict/hd7i. —. 2015. “Syria in 2015: Political Stalemate Again, or Compromise?” Al Hayat, January 8. Sinclair, T.A. 1964. Aristotle: The Politics V. Baltimore: Penguin Books. Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. New York: MacGraw Hill. —. 1995a. European Revolutions, 1492-1992. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. —. 1995b. “To Explain Political Processes.” The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 100, No. 6: 1594-1610 Walt, Stephen. 1997. Revolution and War. Ithaca and London: Cornel University Press. Zisser, Eyal. 2014. “The End of the Syrian Revolution: between Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's Islamic Caliphate and Bashar al-Assad's Baath Regime" Strategic Assessment, Vol. 17, No. 3: 55-67.

CHAPTER THREE A CLASH OF IDENTITIES: THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE UNITED STATES ZEYNEP KAYA

Introduction Observers and decision-makers alike now view the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as an immediate threat to international security. International responses to the group have been somewhat consistent in terms of considerations for broader international security. This chapter aims to analyze the claim that the U.S. policy of countering ISIS has been developed as a foreign policy vehicle which is being used by the U.S. to achieve broader interests in the region, which are informed by its foreign policy traditions. The first section of this chapter discusses constructivism and identity formation as the theoretical framework used to examine the dichotomy of identities shaping ISIS as an organization and U.S. policy responses to it. The second section of the chapter explores the key U.S. foreign policy traditions that are used in shaping U.S. national identity. The chapter then moves on to highlight the key phases in the establishment of ISIS, relating these to its resilience. Finally, a discussion of U.S. policy approaches towards ISIS is presented.

Theoretical Framework Constructivism Constructivism is a structural theory of international systems. Its insistence on the importance of identity makes it one of the most suitable theories to understand why states act in the way they do, without getting involved in the quagmire of power politics. Constructivists argue that change in the distribution of power does not result in arms races, alliance formations, or economic mobilizations; instead it is only when change

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becomes a threat to states’ interests that governments choose the power politics strategies (Fawcett 2013, 29). This is what Hopf (1998, 187) calls the “threat perception”. Threats can be conflicts of interest, ideological incompatibilities, and hostile discourses directed at one or more states. However, while constructivist theory remains an important analytical approach to regional affairs, it is not without its critics. The major criticism against constructivism is that it has difficulties in explaining particular events or processes of change, especially in regional politics. Constructivists criticize neoliberal institutionalists and neo-realists for over-emphasizing the importance of international structures which are provided as a priori in understanding how states interact with one another (Fawcett 2013, 28-29). Instead they claim states as actors and structural features of the international arena arise together and are “mutually constituted” (Hopf 1998). Key to constructivism is the role of discourse, which refers to language, rhetoric and symbols that states use to express their identities and interests, and the practices that they take in order to achieve their strategic goals (Fawcett 2013, 29). Constructivists claim that material power must be combined with “discursive power” and that “it is important to recognize that ideas, consciousness, culture, and ideology are bound up with more immediately visible kinds of political, military and economic power” (Walker 1984).

Identity and the State Wendt (1994, 385) highlights the major claims for constructivism in that states are the main units of analysis for international political theory. Secondly, the structures in the state system are inter-subjective, rather than material and finally, that state identities are constructed by social structures and are not provided by human nature or domestic politics. Wendt (ibid.) also distinguishes four different sets of identities for states. First, is the corporate identity which denotes the identity that gives the actor its individuality and uniqueness. This is what makes a state and its people act as one group (or, in other words, as “we”). Common interests and common viewpoints arise from this identity which in turn generates four different basic interests: it installs physical security and provides predictability in relation to the world (where does the state see itself in the world system? What are its attributes in relation to others?); it facilitates it being recognized as an actor by others; it develops to see the human aspiration of a better life for which states are responsible at the collective level; how a state satisfies its corporate interest depends on how it defines itself in relation to the other/others.

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Social Identities are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to it while taking the perspective of others as a social object (Wendt 1994). This is a combination of self-view and views of others. Corporate identity may be singular but social identities may be divergent and many. Social identities may be inter-subjective. It can also be cooperative or conflicting. Following this is Collective Identity which leads to the identification of Self with Other through blurring the distinction between them. Self is the Other, in other words Self and Other are merged into a “single identity” where actors define “the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self” (Wendt 1999, 227). Finally there is Role Identity, which is dependent upon culture and shared expectations. This identity exists only in relation to others and therefore cannot be enacted alone (ibid.). Wendt continues with the identity argument by designating the difference between identity and interest. Identity denotes “who or what actors are” whereas interests denote “what actors want”. He also believes that identity precedes interest because an actor cannot know what it wants before it knows who it is. Adding to this, Keyman (2012, 41) argues that from an epistemological view, identity can be used as a tool in understanding the world in international relations theory from a cultural point of view. Ontologically, identity facilitates understanding problems that are part of the non-western world. Identity also requires us to contemplate our understanding of concepts like colonization, imperialism and globalization which tend to be reference points for international relations theory.

U.S. Foreign Policy Traditions Sümer (2008, 120) defines foreign political culture as a dominant behavioral code that directs a state’s foreign policy. It is also noted that every state has a different foreign policy approach because each state experiences a different outer world reality. Foreign policy culture shapes actual foreign policies, while in turn foreign policy shapes the identity of the state that is introduced to the world. U.S. foreign policy is unique in the sense that it has not traditionally been bounded by foreign policy traditions or any red lines that cannot be crossed. It has a free hand in making modifications and additions according to each case. This can be looked upon as a disadvantage but in fact is an advantage. Policy directions can change, yet U.S. interests do not change in the same ways. Instead, it goes with the popular dictum of realism: there are no imminent friends or enemies but only interests.

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Religion is one of the important factors of U.S. foreign policy: the founding fathers were Puritans and they had immigrated so that they could have freedom in their religious practices (Sumer 2008, 122). Thomas Jefferson claimed that the American people were chosen by God (La Feber 1994, 46). James Madison also stated that “the period before the United States was established could be described as a period of dark ages where brutality was the dominant force” (McDougall 1997, 16). John Adams also stated that if the United States wants to extend its territory to the rest of North America this would be its natural right. God blessed the United States and understanding this tradition helps our understanding of contemporary U.S. foreign policy (La Feber 1994, 76-77). The same message resonates in George Washington’s farewell message: “European politics is strange to the Americans. The United States must abstain from forming alliances with European powers” (McDougall 1997, 47). The idea that the United States is exceptional led to a policy of unilateralism, the rationale being that no state could match the qualities of the United States, therefore it had to stand by itself. James Monroe declared his doctrine in 1823, where he emphasized the fact that the United States and continental Europe are separated from each other by thick borders. The trouble that the European continent was experiencing had to be kept away from the United States (Sumer 2008, 23). Another important aspect is the notion of “manifest destiny” coined by John O. Sullivan. The Americans had the privilege of expanding in their continent. This privilege was given by God. If one was to deny the United States its right, then she/he would be questioning and denying God. This is a very powerful statement, placing Americans on a pedestal so high that doubting its actions can mean defying God (McDougall 1997, 69-70). The United States also had the mission to free the world, an idea that would formulate itself into U.S. interest in playing a greater role in international affairs. Later, in the 1850s, the expansion idea grew into “progressive imperialism”, or the notion that the U.S. had a “civilizing” effect on other states. Its strong economy and political philosophy catalyzed a new foreign policy tradition in which, as long as the U.S. remained a strong economic power, it would remain part of world affairs. Its decision to enter the two World Wars, the restructuring and fostering of the European economy during the interwar period and the post-war period, made it almost impossible to not be part of Europe or any other part of the world. Its economic power has naturally guided it towards becoming a world political power as well. It was evident that, in the interwar period, if the U.S. did not adopt a leading the role in international affairs, it was feared that some other state would and this would then undermine US interests.

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After the Second World War another foreign policy tradition became apparent: global meliorism. This was the construction of a long-term foreign policy strategy. Democracy would be brought to regions in despair, which would be in the interest of people living in the conflicting states/regions. Democracy would be transferred via economic means and this would be no different than “soft imperialism” (Sümer 2008, 128). During the Cold War, the United States had to fight against communism. The notion that the Soviet Union had an expansionist foreign policy reinforced the anti-communist ideology evident in U.S. foreign policy. Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze, in particular, painted a horrific image of the communist threat (La Feber 1994, 510-511). After the Cold War and the downfall of the Soviet Union, the United States sought a new foreign policy culture, presenting the view that, in being the only remaining superpower there needed to be a leading state and if none existed/took up its role, there would be a lack of authority and governance. In order to avoid such a power vacuum, a leader was needed and this leader could only be the United States. In the 1992 U.S. Defense Plan, the need to maintain the United States as the only remaining superpower was noted as a priority, and if other candidates appeared, they had to be stopped (Layne 1993, 15). Kissinger (1969, 92-95) also noted that the United States was only interested in value-oriented objectives. As the post-Cold War international setting embedded (with only one superpower) the United States was motivated into producing its own foreign policy culture. Since then, a new U.S. culture has been evident. According to this new political culture the United States, being the bastion of freedom, never makes a mistake (Monbiot 2003). Another point in the new culture is that U.S. foreign policy is permeated by a mission and this alone can be used as a powerful ideological tool; which is to say, no other nation in the world has this inherent mission in foreign policy. It also provides a justification for policy motives. In other words, U.S. forces are stationed abroad for specific reasons and serve a purpose. In this view, U.S. foreign policy is heavily determined by the mission to promote peace and security and achieve stability. According to U.S. political culture, the United States intervenes whenever it deems it necessary to do so. Even if it serves others states’ interests, the United States can still provide its support. Another important factor in this culture is that the United States needs to maintain a defensive posture and has to endure any attack that might come. During the Cold War, the United States sought to promote capitalism or at least maintain the status quo where capitalism was ascendant, whereas the Soviet Union

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was presented as being aggressive and expansionist in nature (Sumer 2008, 132). Personalization of enemies is also important for political culture. Personalization provides policy makers with the justification that they seek. Public opinion abroad can give credit for intervention when it is deemed helpful, national public opinion is aware of the fact that there are enemies abroad and the United States promotes freedom and seeks to undermine tyranny (ibid.). The United States went through the havoc of September 11 and survived it with constructing itself a more aggressive foreign policy. Now that Al-Qaeda is no longer the immediate threat that it was, the United States needs to build a threat perception in order to pursue its national interests. The United States also uses its soft power to demonstrate that it need not be feared by others but should be respected. Theoretically, any state can possess some of the attributes of the United States but they cannot be the United States itself (Lieven 2005). The United States is divinely ordained to serve as the only political, cultural and economic model for the rest of the world (Nayak and Malone 2009, 260). This would be a direct reference to the Frontier Thesis (1893) which was coined by Fredric Johnson Turner and states that American democracy was formed by the American Frontier (Turner 1996). The American psyche was formed by the forests of the Frontier as it liberated itself from the disentanglements of the European mind set. It was distinct and different from the rest of the world. Turner also pointed out that the meeting point between savagery (natives) and civilization (pioneers) on the American continent had resulted in the development of a distinctly American character. Utilizing this culture, President Roosevelt justified American aggression outside of its borders to protect economic interests (Hoff 2007).

American Foreign Policy and Orientalism 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests “over there” should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America “over here.” In this sense, the American homeland is the planet. (9/11 Commission 2002)

The world view that is expressed in the 9/11 commission report is that the whole world becomes the Other while the entire planet becomes the U.S. homeland. Any society that is a stranger to American Society is the Other. The Other can be Middle Eastern, Asian and North African societies. The policy of patronizing non-western societies based on Western attitudes can be defined as Orientalism. If the Other is the threat,

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American exceptionalism is best tool in eliminating it. Exceptionalism and orientalism represent the foundation of U.S. foreign policy. Many post-9/11 theoretical debates have centered on the one key problematic aspect of identity, which has become an important issue in foreign policy making. A supposed clash of civilizations and the fear of Islamist actors and ideology are the major issues contained within in this view. Orientalism, as developed by Edward Said, can be broadly defined as the marginalization of identities that are non-western (Keyman 2012, 45). Said (2003, 1) provides a definition of the Orient: The Orient isn’t only adjacent to Europe [...] its cultural contestant and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.

Said explains that orientalism as a “western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the orient” acts “dynamically along with brute political, economic and military rationales. He also claimed that Orientalism has much less to do with the “orient” and much more to do with the making of our world. Orientalism is the source of the inaccurate cultural representations that are at the heart of Western thought towards the Middle East. It is an explanation of how the West perceives and represents the East. The thesis of Orientalism is the existence of a "subtle and persistent Eurocentric prejudice against Arab-Islamic peoples and their culture" (ibid.). Perceptions, and the consequent cultural representations that develop, have served as implicit justifications for the colonial and imperialist ambitions of the European powers and of the United States. Said also criticized and denounced the political and cultural malpractices of the ruling Arab elites who have internalized the false representations of Arabic culture that were constructed by AngloAmerican Orientalists (Windschutte 2008). As far as the United States is concerned, it can be claimed that it is only a slight overstatement to say that Muslims and Arabs are essentially seen as either oil suppliers or potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, or the passion of Arab-Muslim life has entered into the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Arab world. What we have, instead, is a series of crude caricatures of the Islamic world presented in such a way as to make that world vulnerable to military aggression (Said 1998). In Orientalism, Said argued that much of the Western study of Islamic civilization was based on political intellectualism rather than the objective intellectual enquiry and academic study of Eastern cultures. Hence,

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Orientalism functioned as a method of practical cultural discrimination applied as a means of imperialist domination, producing the claim that the Western Orientalist knows more about the Orient than do the Orientals (Said 2003). Said argues that the history of European colonial rule, and of the political domination of the civilizations of the East, distorts the writing of even the most knowledgeable, well-meaning, and culturally sympathetic Western Orientalists; thus was the term "Orientalism" rendered into a pejorative word (Buruma 2008). Orientalism concluded that Western writing about the Orient depicts it as an irrational, weak Other, or as an existential condition contrasted with the rational, strong, and masculine West. This binary relation derives from the European psychological need to create a cultural inequality between the West and East; a cultural difference which is attributed to immutable cultural "essences" inherent to Oriental peoples and things (Said 2003, 6567). Huntington’s cult work The Clash of Civilizations (1993) states that a future clash of civilizations will not remain at the inter-state level, but will also be between groups belonging to different civilizations, and would see them also clash with each other. The future of world politics would center upon cooperation within, and conflict between, these civilizations. The West must exploit the differences within civilizations in order to prevent anti-West coalitions. For a long-term strategy, Huntington (1993) accepts a more accommodational policy and calls for reaching an understanding of other civilizations and of the commonalities with them. He argues that a long-term strategy is a must but it has a contradiction on its own (Bilgin 2010). How can one exploit the differences and yet understand the commonalities? Tibi (1993) has concluded that Huntington’s scenario could “unwittingly play into the hands of the fundamentalists” or create the fertile ground for interventions by non-regional actors. Bilgin (2010, 174) supports Tibi by furthering two points. The first point is that Huntington’s arguments have been adopted by radicals and terrorist organizations to justify their causes. The intolerance for different civilizations has become a justification for using violence to reach political goals. For extremists, Islam and Western civilization cannot peacefully co-exist and therefore, they must strengthen their side to prepare for the coming clash by integrating with their own civilization. The second point is that if people do rally around those with a similar ancestry, religion, history and so on then they will distance themselves from those that are different. Huntington believed that the best foreign policy would be for the U.S. policy makers to maximize friction among Muslims, and between Muslim and non-Muslim civilizations.

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While they are kept apart, the West will be kept together (Huntington 1998). Huntington may have suggested a different approach on civilization in that this clash in civilizations will result in conflicts. Whether or not this thesis is actually part of U.S. policy, as was suggested by Huntington, is controversial. This policy would evidently center on dividing Muslim societies, and continuing to put a wedge between Muslim and non-Muslim societies. If this is the case, then conflict would be likely in many areas of the world, and U.S. foreign policy would be irreparably damaged.

The Islamic State The Origins According to a recent report prepared by the Brooking Institute, “IS commands as many as 31,000 fighters, approximately 20,000-25,000 are ideologically loyal full time members. By September 2014 it was earning 2 million dollars per day” (Lister 2014). It is recorded that it makes $2 million per day by smuggling oil from Iraq and Syria (al-Khateeb 2014). IS is perhaps the wealthiest and one of the most lethal terrorist organizations in the world today (Vasudevran 2014). It perpetrates tough measures and uses repression against its enemies and yet provides key services and assistance to the public. It has developed from a loosely structured organization into a huge terrorist organization that aims to govern an Islamic state. Al-Qaeda affiliates around the world after the 9/11 attacks, and more effectively after Osama Bin Laden’s capture, established local bases to attack the “near enemy”, namely local governments. Attacking the near enemy not only disrupted the status quo among Middle Eastern countries (Riedel 2010) but also disrupted Western interests in the region. Radical groups became more apparent. The Jordanian extremist Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, for example, made his first contact with Al-Qaeda in 1992. Zarqawi’s prison years served him like a university (Kavalek 2015, 8). After serving five years in a Jordanian prison for the illegal possession of weapons, he was released, and then acquired a reference letter form Abu Qatada al Filistini (Riedel 2010). He received a loan to establish a training camp and permission to establish a new cell for the terrorist group (Musings on Iraq 2014). Shortly after gaining recognition, the terrorist group led by Zarqawi, named itself Jama’at al Tawhid wa al Jihad (JTWJ). The new group consisted of Palestinians and Jordanians and plotted to attack Amman’s Radisson Hotel and two other popular tourist spots (Riedel 2010, 96). It was to be carried out during the Millennium celebrations in Jordan and in the U.S. Once the

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Jordanian intelligence services tightened the security measures around the JTWJ, the terrorist organization found shelter in Afghanistan. It fought alongside Al-Qaeda up until the U.S. invasion following 9/11. The U.S. presence in Afghanistan left JTWJ with no alternative but to flee to Iran in December 2001 (Napoleoni 2005). Shortly after, JTWJ moved to northern Iraq, to cooperate with Ansar Al Islam (Al-Adel 2003). During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. forces once again targeted the JTWJ (Rahphaeli 2005). The terrorist organization was based in the Kurdish province of Suleymaniya, and led attacks against the occupying forces. JTWJ fought against the coalition forces but its principal targets were more influenced by Zarqawi’s threat perception. He had three enemies in mind: Jordan; the international community; and the Shia (the arch enemy of Sunni powers) in Iraq and the rest of the world (Lister 2014, 7). His plan was to fight the foreign invaders while at the same time creating a sectarian divide. The JTWJ would establish Sunni power in the region and then could easily turn this power ultimately into an Islamic State. Between 2003 and 2006, Zarqawi planned and ordered bombings of Shia mosques, suicide attacks against Shia civilians and militias, and coalition forces, and the beheading of foreigners. In 2004, Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda (Muskar Al Batter 2004). The group then became known as Tanzim Qa’idat al Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, simply known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Although Zarqawi pledged allegiance, fundamental differences in identifying the enemy and fighting the war became apparent. Zarqawi viewed the society as corrupt and in need of purification through violent measures. In his view this corruption resulted from the civilian Shia population. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, believed in fighting the apostate regimes and not the civilian Muslim population. AQI desired fast results through brutality, whereas Al Qaeda adopted more patient strategies (CTCW 2005). In 2006, AQI merged with five other Islamic groups to act as the leader of an umbrella group named Majlis Shura al Mujahideen. Zarqawi was killed in an attack by coalition forces in June 2006. This should have come as a blow to the terrorist organization since its founder and main ideologue had been killed but instead it became a catalyst in strengthening the organization. Within five days of Zarqawi’s assassination, AQI appointed a new leader Hamza Al Muhajir and in four months it merged with the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). Al Muhajir pledged allegiance to ISI leader Abu Omar al Baghdadi. ISI did not pledge allegiance to Al-Qaeda, and AlQaeda continued to view ISI as its subordinate and gave orders to attack specific strategic points. By 2010 the relationship between Al-Qaeda and ISI worsened severely (McCants 2014).

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ISI was not only attacked by U.S. forces but also by local tribal groups as part of the Sahwa (Awakening). The Sahwa formed councils to combat ISI for control over their lands. The Sahwa was supported by local security forces and U.S. forces as well which lead to a decline in the power of ISI during 2007-2009. As the U.S. forces started to withdraw from Iraq in June 2009, the Sahwa was no longer an option in countering ISI. As the authority was transferred from the U.S. to the Iraqi security forces, it became apparent that the Sahwa was no longer in control. By 2010, ISI was offering jobs to Sahwa members with better and higher wages than the Iraqi government itself (Williams and Duraid 2010). ISI also tried to legitimize its bid to create an Islamic State by claiming that Abu Omar al Baghdadi was a member of the Quraysh tribe which, according to Islamic tradition, will produce the next caliph (Lister 2014). After the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, ISI’s operations extended from Iraq to Syria as well. By 2011, while the Arab Spring was in full swing, ISI escalated its attacks in the Kurdish regions of Iraq (TRUST ORG 2011). Most of the attacks were carried out to diminish the morale of the Iraqi security forces. In July 2012, ISI started its “Breaking the Walls “campaign which involved attacks on prisons in order to free its captured leaders (Lewis 2013). Soon after this campaign started, ISI evolved into a full-fledged terrorist organization that was capable of conquering and governing territory. It expanded into Syria and exploited the civil war there to take over more territory and resources (Lister 2014). In April 2013, an offshoot of ISI, Jabahat al Nusra, became part of ISI and the organization was renamed ISIS. Al-Qaeda declared that ISIS was no longer part of its organization and Al-Qaeda was not responsible for its actions (Al Fahjr Media 2014).

ISIS’ Aims and Goals ISIS’ aim is radical political and social change. It controls territory and desires to create a “pure” Sunni Islamist state governed by a brutal interpretation of Sharia (Cronin 2015). It operates a tightly controlled bureaucratic organization whose local administration is described as fast and efficient and where everything is coordinated and all parts of the administration linked. It seeks to establish law and order following the capture of territory. Police forces are formed and deployed to patrol the streets (Lister 2014, 30). ISIS is not just providing disciplinary justice services but also provides justice in social services. It has taken over the municipal authorities for electricity, water, and gas supplies. It has sought to lower the prices of products such as bread, an example being its attempt

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to reduce the average price of bread in Syria from 200 Syrian pounds to 45, while bakeries provide compulsory zekat to the poor) (Lister 2014, 27). Bus services are offered free of charge, and infrastructure has been repaired in some places. Free health care and vaccinations for children have also been provided, while soup kitchens for the poor have been established. Perhaps even more noteworthy is that a consumer protection office has been opened to respond to poor services. As Cronin (2015) argues, “ISIS is not a terrorist group”, it is a pseudo state led by a conventional army. It has approximately 30,000 fighters, commands territory, controls communication lines, directs infrastructure and funds itself. Overall, IS has sought to offer most services that a recognized and fully functioning state offers to its citizens. People living under IS rule have in many ways been brutally punished but in some cases have also been generously rewarded. Providing justice, security and management to locals is a reward given in return for living a life that is ordained by ISIS. While it is fundamentally structured as a terrorist organization, its military, objectives and practices look more like a proto-state that is built and defended across Syria and Iraq. The organization’s five step process consists of migration, congregation, tyranny, consolidation and caliphate. Many other terrorist organizations (like Boko Haram), extremist movements, and tribal groups have joined forces with IS. A splinter group of Pakistan’s Taliban has pledged support to IS (Mehsud 2014). A spokesman of central IS announced that an Afghan affiliate was formed in January 2014 (Boghani 2015). There are accounts that IS in Afghanistan is formed of groups formerly from within the Taliban (and other groups) that are unhappy with the current Taliban authority. Since the Taliban’s leader Molla Omer was confirmed dead in July 2015 there had been problems of authority in the group. Rumors of the newly appointed leader being killed are also effective in converting Taliban members to ISIS (Logan 2015). ISIS will continue to be a point of attraction for most of the terrorist organizations. Support from foreign fighters is also another facilitating factor for ISIS recruitment policies. Foreign fighters constantly pledge their allegiance to ISIS and 15,000 foreign fighters are reported to be active in Syria alone (UN Security Council 2014). Previous UN reports point to 25,000 foreign fighters being involved and the fear from this is a blowback of these fighters going back home and attacking domestically. The organization positions itself as an alternative to Al-Qaeda, controlling territory, governing populations with an effective bureaucracy and a dominant social role. It continues to be a point of attraction and inspiration for many terrorist groups.

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U.S. Policy Approaches to ISIS A public opinion poll conducted in November 2014 among 1008 Americans concluded that a large proportion of Americans see ISIS as the biggest threat facing the United States, with 70% of Americans rating ISIS as the biggest threat in the Middle East compared to 12% for Iran and 13% for Palestinian-Israeli violence (Telhami 2015, 1-3). 43% of Americans saw IS as an extension of Al-Qaeda, 16% saw ISIS as threat to vital US interests, and 33% viewed IS as being ruthless. These are the reasons that encourage some support for sending U.S. ground forces to combat ISIS. Additionally, 56% of Americans thought that the United States could defeat ISIS but also that the group could return, 22% believed that the United States is unlikely to defeat IS and 20% believed that the United States could defeat IS and that the group could not return (ibid.). In the 2013 winter issue of Foreign Affairs, a rhetorical question is asked about what the United States’s new foreign policy strategy should be. There were two different approaches to the problem. The first article was by Barry Posen and titled “Pull Back” (Posen 2013). This article mainly concentrated on a less active foreign policy whereby the United States was more involved in its own regional sphere of influence rather than its sphere of influence being seen as global. The second article offers an opposing view, stressing the fact that the United States must “Lean Forward” (Brooks et al. 2013). The second article emphasizes that the United States must insist on being engaged in global affairs, by sending troops to troubled spots, for example. This article not only backs an active foreign policy but also insists on “deep engagement”. The United States has to continue to redefine itself in the world. Is it going to be a hegemonic power that can intervene almost anywhere in the world? Or an isolationist state that only concerns itself with its immediate surroundings? (Kardas 2014, 440) So far, it has chosen the path of being a hegemonic power. On 10th September 2014, President Obama declared that the United States intended to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State. The United States has tried to achieve this goal by building a multi-state military coalition that takes action as necessary, provides support for Iraqi and Syrian partner ground forces, gathers and shares intelligence, and tries to restrict the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq, and disrupts the Islamic State’s finances (Katzman et al. 2014, 15-17).

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Conclusion Due to its continued interest in the Middle East, ISIS will continue to be perceived as a threat. Acting as an international provider of security and stability is a key component of U.S. foreign policy. The United States has the mission to free the world from tyrants and terrorists. IS’s bid to be the protector of Sunni communities and the enemy of others emphasizes and reinforces sectarian divides which have helped to create a power vacuum in parts of the Middle East. It can be inferred from this ongoing threat that global interest in the Middle East will continue. Since the U.S. attempt to form an international coalition has not yet been fruitful in countering IS in Syria, other measures have to be taken. Russia has sent its planes to bomb IS targets. Rather than thinking whether or not ISIS is a constructed threat for the United States, it is more sensible to think that the Syrian conflict and ISIS have turned into a global problem. The United States cannot, and likely will not, stay away from the region as other external actors begin to interfere. This global showdown will nonetheless need U.S. foreign policy to take more serious steps to help resolve the conflict. Instead of emphasizing the fear of global powers intervening, it will reiterate the threat of terrorism and it will seek to portray its foreign policy as countering this threat.

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Walker, R.B.J. 1984. Culture, Ideology, World Order. Boulder: West View Press. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2: 391-425. —. 1994. “Collective Identity Formation and the International State.” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2: 384-396. —. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, Timothy and Adnan Duraid. 2010. “Sunnis in Iraq Allied with U.S Rejoin Rebels.” The New York Times. Accessed October 10 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/world/middleeast/17awakening.h tml?_r=0 Windschuttle, Keith. 2008. “Edward Said’s Orientalism Revisited.” The New Criterion Online. Accessed October 14 2014. http://web.archive.org/web/20080501055657/http://www.newcriterion. com/archive/17/jan99/said.htm

CHAPTER FOUR IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY AMBITIONS AND ASPIRATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF IRANIAN-SAUDI ARABIAN RELATIONS SAHRA JOHARCHI

Introduction When thinking of Iranian foreign policy, we are dealing with multiple and diverse sources of evidence and different interpretations of history. This results in myriad diverse meanings and interpretations which cannot be reduced down to a single narrative. Conventional approaches to foreign policy analysis suffer from a range of problems which limit their ability to provide coherent or convincing accounts, although the questions which they ask may have some value as the starting point for a more carefully grounded research agenda. This chapter explores some alternatives with a view to finding more nuanced understandings of Iranian foreign policy, in relation to the cognitive factors that influence the decision-making processes within an analysis of Iranian-Saudi Arabian relations. Conventional approaches tend to focus on rationality, are Western-centric, ignore distinctive cultural variations, and (even when they are explicitly considered) under-estimate the importance of specific value systems, identities and histories. These points are made in summary since there is a substantial literature to support them in general which has been used, for example, to re-assess Indian, Chinese and Indonesian foreign policies. But relatively little attention has been given to a more critical account of the foreign policies of Iran since the 1979 revolution. Equally, relatively little attention has been given to the distinctive character of Iranian political and social processes in foreign policy debates, not least because so much of the academic literature on foreign policy has its origins in the United States,

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and the evolution of U.S.-Iranian relations since 1979 has discouraged the kinds of critical thinking that might open new avenues of explanation rather than closing them down. The external, predominantly Western, perceptions of Iran today are that it is a state held within the vice-like grip of tyrannical Islamist hardliners, where dissent of any kind is crushed, perpetrators “disappear”, women are hidden behind the black veil of the chador and provocative books and media sources are banned (Farndon 2006, 15). The USA is the greatest enemy–the “Great Satan”—and Israel is an illegitimate state that needs to be wiped off the map (MacAskill and McGreal 2005). This is only one way of looking at Iran. In reality, since the 1979 revolution, the governmental and leadership structure is a complex competition between different factions with specific push and pull factors, with both elected and non-elected institutions as well as those that are appointed by elected and unelected officials. Contrary to popular (media-framed) belief, Iran does have a long history of democratic practices and interests that directly impact on the legitimacy of its governments, past and present. A discussion and analysis of key Iranian foreign policy interests and the cognitive processes that influence their development and/or implementation, as well as their relationship with key domestic and societal interests follows below. Precedent will be given to overarching foreign policy drivers over specific decisions where applicable. As such, the chapter focuses on identity and the way that Iran is identified by others and how it identifies itself, and the effect that this has on its foreign policy interests, such as territorial integrity with neighbors (specifically Saudi Arabia), nuclear ambitions and historical residue in relation to perceptions of both past humiliations and past glories.

Post-colonial Suspicions and Identity Iran has a long and rich history of culture, civilization, internationalization and diplomacy (Fischel 1951, 31). It also has a long history of having been at the mercy of invasion, interference and domination. As a nation it has been at the mercy of the Greeks, Arabs, Mongols and Turks, and exploited and subjugated by the Russian and European empires and invaded yet again during World Wars One and Two (Ramazani 2009). In the modern era, Iranians’ natural inclination to home-grown democracy was perverted by the 1953 Coup that ousted Prime Minister Musaddeq in favor of the return of the autocratic Shah, a leader best suited to maintaining allegiance to the neo-colonial powers that had a vested interest in the country and its

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rich energy reserves (Ramazani 2009). These events are ingrained in the Iranian collective psyche and directly affect their interpretations of events and processes. Iran, in the contemporary arena, is very much at the mercy of globalization. A growing population must be supported, economically, politically and socially. It has difficulties due to inherent mismanagement, both as a result of the 1980-88 war with Iraq which put longer-term structural development on hold, as well as a result of stalemates amongst the ruling elites (Aminmansour 2007). Economic sanctions and limited trading and investment opportunities with the external world have also led to the retardation of economic growth. A direct result of this is the rapid urbanization of the Iranian population in a climate of international economic stagnation which has a direct domestic effect (Axworthy 2011, 109). Iranian advancement and development is an area of concern both regionally with regard to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and internationally, especially with Iran’s development of nuclear technology. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Iran has been hindered by unfavorable and complex operating requirements and by international sanctions (Freeman 2012). In relation to foreign policy analysis, Holistic Constructivism offers important considerations with regard to the nature and importance of identity politics and the historical experiences influential in the foreign policy-making process (Chopra 2007). This critical discourse consists of reactions to the post-colonial legacy, lending it to anti-conquest narratives (Patrikarakos 2013, xxv). The national narratives of a state are significantly shaped by their past experiences, such as that of colonial domination, uniquely so in the MENA, where the nation state system was implanted, altering the very landscape of the region at the whim of distant powers. In this respect, the nuclear issue for Iran is founded on and represents its perceptions of previous injustices (Patrikarakos 2013, xxvi). Here the concept of the “Other” is highly important. Colonies were created in opposition to the European powers: uncivilized, under-developed peoples in contrast to European advancement and glory; all that the West was not, nor wanted to be, yet crucial for its ideological unity. The reactions to the experience of interference and intervention can be many, from states still seeking imperial patronage and to emulate the Western model, to states such as Iran whose reaction is to seek greater identification with its pre-colonial heritage (Garver 2006, 4). Iran is relatively unique in that it has a clear sense of past identity and culture, unlike (and in sharp contrast to) Saudi Arabia which shuns it pre-Islamic

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history to reinforce the legitimacy of its monarchical sheik rulership and sovereignty. In this respect, Iran is seeking to foster regional diplomatic and security ties that bind (Nia 2007, 283-4). Identity plays an important role in this endeavor. Indeed, it could be suggested that not only is Iran’s foreign policy reactionary but so is its national identity, which is also dependent on external forces. Iran is a state with experience of colonialism in its various forms of interference and manipulation, though it was not colonized by any one power it was controlled by several (Britain, Russia and France). This naturally colors its perceptions of itself and of its old imperial rivals. Iran is not a weak, new state with an inadequately formed sense of Self, but an ancient civilization wanting to take its rightful place in the MENA arena as an important power (Fischel 1951). This mindset, combined with an anti-hegemonic constitution and multiple domestic identities, has important implications for decision-makers who see Saudi Arabia as a key U.S. ally. Iran is suspicious of external interest in its affairs, specifically by Western states or regional powers deemed to be their puppets, such as Israel or Saudi Arabia. Criticism and interference are assimilated into, and compared to, existing knowledge frameworks that recall previous similar shows of interest. In this case, such experiences include the 1953 coup to install a puppet leader in Iran as well as similar acts in regional states such as Libya (pre-Ghaddafi); the Iraqi monarchy in the 1950s; insultingly low concessions on hydrocarbon production under the Shah; and Western support of Iraq during the 1980-88 war, to name just a few.

Cooperation and Competition Iran has long believed itself to have an important regional security role to tackle issues such as drug trafficking, terrorism and to maintain stability generally, insisting that if they “wanted to cause problems then they would have done” (Sabet-Saeidi 2011, 65). The events of 9/11 and the more recent uprisings in the MENA, coined by the media as the Arab Spring, however, have had a significant effect on both the political environment and power structures of the MENA (Freeman 2013, 1). The growing democratic movements, coupled with the ongoing conflicts in Bahrain, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen have, arguably, opened up the space and need for a more comprehensive and consolidated form of leadership in the Persian Gulf (Jahner 2012, 38). This is also underwritten by the decline of Iraq, previously a significant regional power. These issues have had a

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direct effect on Iran and its regional relations generally and with Saudi Arabia in particular. Iran follows a path of aligning interest to previous identity perceptions as a great regional power prior to external colonial intervention. Iran also identifies itself, as it is identified by its neighbors, as the non-Arab, nonSunni interloper in the region. This identity also affects its perceptions of aims and interests as it heightens suspicions over the actions of others, again based on the assimilation of new information into existing schemas. Saudi Arabia and Iran have long running rivalries which directly influence Iran’s perceptions of its behavior and thus motivates its actions and decision-making practices. An assessment of Saudi-Iranian relations reveals that cooperation is hindered by the conditions of mistrust and suspicion which have been rhetorically constructed and politically fostered (Amiri et al. 2010, 50). This is not to say that the rhetoric is entirely fabricated but that it reproduces, and is reproduced by, images and memories of negative relations of suspicion, ill intent and interference. There is conflict in the histories of the two states and tensions in the contemporary era but they are reinforced by the language and representations of the two powers and their fears and suspicions of one another. Interpretations and understandings of security have evolved as internationalization and globalization have transformed the nature of conflicts and contentions, as well as how they are interpreted. Traditional politics tended to be synonymous with territory and its defense or expansion (Miller 2010, 639). Threats and confrontations were tangible. States that were able to, built up their stores in preparation and to deter interlopers or invaders. Whilst this may seem to be a rather crude outline of classical realist conceptions of security as a sub-topic or motivator of hard power generally, the point fits. In the contemporary era, born out of the advancement of liberal economics and economic interdependence, security is no longer a predominantly unilateral issue. The world order has shifted, and so with it, have conceptualizations of what constitutes a security issue, and what tools can be called upon to manage it, and the role of constructed interpretations of trust and risk in analyzing it. The contemporary globalized world of economic and political interdependence has seen a shift from deterrence to reassurance, from “active confrontation to co-operative agreements” (Coker 2002, 54). This is particularly relevant to the field of security and definitions of risk which are interlinked with both the promotion and defense of legal norms. In this respect, risk is no longer a variable but a way of thinking, a result of an impervious vulnerability which is an inherent condition of the

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international system. This can be best seen in the new wars that have been waged in recent years, the “War on Terror” being a prime example. Terror, once a tool of the state, is now borderless. It is not a tangible entity that can be secured against but rather a risk that must be managed, through surveillance and the control of panic or fear escalation (Coker 2002, 61). In this respect, the new security agenda is one that manages not security but insecurity. To manage these challenges states cannot work alone. Coalitions, alliances, agreements and cooperation are essential for any attempt at harmony and stability, in both political and economic terms, as is trust.

The Iranian-Saudi Dynamic Iran and Saudi Arabia have a mutual interest in a stable and secure MENA. They also share some challenges in the contemporary era, such as the fall-out of 9/11 and the “War on Terror”, as well as the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the recent series of regional upheavals popularly referred to as the “Arab Spring” (Zweiri 2011, 115). Specifically, with regard to the last of these, a keen interest of Iran and Saudi Arabia is the crises currently gripping Syria and Yemen. Whilst these issues, concerns and challenges are common to both states, their responses to them differ considerably, and their relationship is far from easy, with many material conditions and political interests influencing rivalry between the two powers. These rivalries are regularly formulated in speeches and addresses between the two states and calls for pragmatic cooperation between the two. It also runs parallel to continual fears of members of the international community, such as the USA, regarding Iran’s nuclear program, concerns echoed by Saudi Arabia and followed by assurances that the Saudi government would have no option but to develop its own nuclear program, if this is truly Iran’s intention (Vale 2012). This comes despite both official claims by Iran that its nuclear program is purely for domestic purposes, and the apparently successful nuclear negotiations that have taken place (Scott 2015, 15). Here, then, interesting questions arise regarding the nature of Iranian-Saudi relations and the degrees and assessments of trust and risk, present and anticipated. Saudi Arabia and Iran clearly do not appear to trust one another, which is evident in a review of the rhetoric present in official and media discourse, such as that relating to Iranian nuclear ambitions noted above. Equally important is the role that rhetoric specifically has to play in such assessments. The rhetoric used appears to support a condition of mistrust of one in the other, underpinning interactions and to an extent hindering cooperation. It is also interesting to

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note that despite much dialogue between them, calling for greater cooperation, there is a notable lack of reference to trust. Iranian-Saudi ties were at their closest in the run up to the 1979 revolution when the monarchical Saud and Pahlavi dynasties came together in support of regional security, citing shared commonalities of governance and mutual interest (Amiri et al. 2010, 50). There was, however, an ongoing bone of contention with regard to ownership of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, three small islands of the upper Persian Gulf that were under Iranian control until British intervention in the late 19th century, after which they were transferred to the United Arab Emirates (Young 1970, 152). This was a continual source of tension between the two powers and efforts to resolve it centered on equitable solutions, cooperation and discourse–on soft power and diplomacy. Though an agreement was eventually reached in 1965 it was never ratified by Tehran due to the discovery of important mineral deposits on what was to become the Saudi side and the agreement was finally abandoned in 19681 (Young 1970, 153). This was underpinned by a lack of trust and transparency between the two states with regard to existing knowledge of these deposits. The upper Gulf Islands, though overshadowed in the contemporary era by more pressing foreign policy issues relating to the economy and nuclear plans, are a very real issue to Iran, within the framework of historical experience of foreign invasion and control, to lose the islands–and more importantly, their potential resource revenue–would be seen as a further humiliation at the hands of rival, hegemonic powers and their perceived puppets (Rakel 2007, 160). Leading up to the 1979 revolution, therefore, Iran and Saudi Arabia experienced warm relations based on shared identification as monarchical, major regional powers with a common interest in regional security and geo-political interest as hydrocarbon exporters (Jaffe and Lewis 2002, 115). The Islamic revolution and Iran’s resultant anti-Western/antihegemonic policy, raised tensions with Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the USA (Mahruqi 2014). This was further hindered by Iran’s insistence on the illegitimacy of monarchical rule, aimed at its Arab neighbors but also a justification of its own disavowal and overthrow of the Shah and commitment to the exportation of the Islamic revolution (Rakel 2007, 167). Tensions have also been exacerbated by the Sunni attempts to destroy the Imam Hussain Mosque in Iraq, an important sight for Shia communities. The Hajj clash in Mecca on July 31st 1987, when over 400 1

Though a new, final agreement of a zig-zag equitable division was reached on October 24th 1968.

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people, most of them Iranian pilgrims but also many Saudi policemen, were killed and many more injured at a demonstration that led to a stampede outside the Great Mosque in Mecca, also soured relations between the two states (Wallace 1987). Iran and Saudi Arabia each blamed the other for the clashes, leading to a severe deterioration in relations. Although the incident mainly involved Iranians, some had alleged links to Saudi Shia organizations (Kifner 1987) and Iranian pilgrims were unable to obtain travel visas to Saudi Arabia until 1991. The Second Gulf War, instigated by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in August 1990, came to an end in 1991 as a result of international military intervention and it should be noted that this resolution was achieved, in part, through the combined efforts of Saudi Arabia and Iran, in the interest of regional security which is a key feature in each of their foreign policies. This cooperation and collusion was short lived, however, due to the outbreak of the Yemen war. Saudi Arabia with its dominant Sunni majority and large Shia minority has a vested interest in the isolation of potentially conflictual Shia uprisings, particularly in light of its own domestic issues of poor human and women’s rights and limited freedoms. Iranian actions, therefore, are securitized, based on actions and specifically underpinned by the rhetorical construction of rivalry and competition with Saudi Arabia and allusions to regional, and potential (if you regard the nuclear issue) global domination. Iran sees Saudi support of rebels in the Syrian civil war as an intention, evident in the contemporary rhetoric but, also in light of previous rhetoric concerning their mutual rivalry, as attempts by the former to intimidate Iran, and to hinder its influence through the overthrow of one of its remaining regional allies, again framed within the Sunni-Shia split. As a result, both countries sought to influence Muslim public opinion abroad and discredit the other party. The weak relations of the Movement of Vanguard Missionaries (MVM) and the Islamic Revolutionary Organization (IRO) to the new centers of power in the Iranian regime, their refusal to carry out military operations in Saudi Arabia, and the Hajj incident in 1987 were the main reasons for the formation and strengthening of Hezbollah al-Hijaz. Iran wanted to have small, controllable organizations that could be used as pressure tools on the Saudi regime but would not endanger Iran’s foreign policy objectives. This is a policy that has been reproduced in numerous forms in Syria and arguably Yemen, as will be discussed below. There are also elements of influence on their relations deriving from the division in their worldviews and they have both used the Sunni-Shia division to support their policies and steer public opinion and foreign policy decisions. Their political and religious differences seem to play the

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prime role in the political domain and the international community, however, the division between Sunni and Shia, as well as the competition for regional domination, are often exaggerated (Rakel 2007, 168). These are elements that influence their relations, but there are also many other facets to their relationship which are down-played. These include their previous cooperation for security and peace in the region after colonial withdrawal, and their trade relations (Amiri and Samsu 2011, 247). It appears true that both Saudi Arabia and Iran have aspirations for Islamic rule and leadership, aspirations which drew them closer together under King Faisal and Shah Reza Pahlavi (Amiri and Samsu 2011, 249). Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been pursuing an anti-hegemonic (and specifically anti-USA) foreign policy and condemns Saudi Arabia for being a close U.S. ally. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, is concerned about Iran's dominance and interference in neighboring countries, especially in Iraq after Saddam Hussein, in Syria currently (Ghorbani 2012), as well as in Yemen which is a key geo-strategic concern. There is also regional concern regarding the continuing development of Iran's nuclear program, however, rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia incorporate much more than merely a potential proliferation agenda. The fight to consolidate regional power has spilled over, as stated above, into existing regional disputes which can be seen as proxy competitions, each state choosing and supporting an opposing side as can be seen in Yemen. Despite being the poorest state in the region, and receiving little western media attention, the Yemen crisis is of key strategic concern to both powers as it affects the security of Gulf trade in the Indian Ocean (Salisbury 2014, 3). Saudi relations with Yemen are long and complex, the former viewing the latter as problematic at best and advocating the need for a policy of containment. As such, Saudi Arabia has opted to support whichever party is in power in order to secure against state collapse which would result in a security threat in the form of an influx of Yemeni economic migrants (Salibury 2014, 3). Iranian relations with Yemen have been equally complex as it had, prior to 1979, joined Saudi Arabia in supporting the imamate. Following Iran’s revolution Yemen retained ties with Saudi Arabia and sat in opposition to Iran. Following 2011, the Houthis, a political and military group, has risen and expanded, taking control of the capital, Sana’a. This is a Shia group and now a formidable force (Salisbury 2014, 2). Whilst the Yemen crisis within itself is not the central focus here, what is important is the rhetorical framework within which it takes place, in relation to Saudi-Iranian images of one another and perceptions of threat. Each is fighting for regional dominance though both are equally pragmatic

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in their approach. Whilst Saudi Arabia is more open and explicit in its opposition to the Houthis, Iran’s role is far less transparent. Though there is much suspicion in Saudi Arabia that Iran is supporting the Houthis there is, in practice, very little evidence of this beyond rhetorical commendation for the cause and recognition of Shia identity affiliation (Salisbury 2015, 7). Saudi perceptions are articulated rhetorically to support existing perceptions and fear of Iranian expansionism regionally, as posited by Khomeini in early 1980. In Syria, the Assad regime is supported by Iran whilst the rebels are supported by the Saudis. Though Iranian support can be seen as part of a wider, longer running positive relationship between Syria and Iran, it is framed as expansionism, fueling Saudi (and Sunni) fears of Iranian regional ambitions and so offsetting the diplomatic efforts of Iran to improve its soft power which is needed for domestic legitimacy, security and development. An all-out war is not feasible in light of more pressing policy concerns for both states and so, following the examples of the Cold War era, the two states can be seen to be executing competition via proxy conflicts to garner support on ideological and religious grounds through identity politics. While most literature points to competition over regional hegemony, their differences are underpinned by religion/sectarian identity differences. Within the remit of dominant foreign policy interests relating to the maintenance and consolidation of regional power in soft and hard measure, there are several domestic issues which play a significant role in shaping the underlying security concerns, such as the presence of a sizeable Shia minority in eastern Saudi Arabia, and this region has seen far less investment than the rest of the country (Beranek 2009, 4). However, their sectarian differences alone do not justify and explain their relationship and the tensions between them. Iran constructs a narrative of opposition to Saudi Arabia and its monarchical rule, as being against the central tenets of Islamic rule (De luca 2016, 1). Likewise, Saudi Arabia uses rhetorical devices such as “suspicion”, “lack of transparency”, and “rival” to describe Iran (Vatanka 2015, 1). The use of such rhetoric to frame these differences in opposition to one another is important in shaping public and international perceptions and narratives of legitimacy to justify relevant actions. Since the Arab Spring, the struggle and rivalry between the two parties have intensified. This has been further exacerbated by declining oil prices and the conclusion of nuclear negotiations between Iran, the USA and Europe, which have very real economic implications for Saudi Arabia (Bremmer 2016, 1). As well as the recent attack on Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Tehran, following the execution of a prominent Saudi Shia cleric, these events have resulted in Saudi perceptions of its own greater

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isolation. The fall in oil prices from $115 per barrel to $40 is significant for a state reliant on hydrocarbons for 80% of its GDP and to support its citizens (Bremmer 2015, 2). This has the potential to cause very real unrest in the kingdom, which has been somewhat offset by recent clashes with Iran over the execution of cleric, Nimr al-Nimr. Whilst it is not suggested that this was intentional, the backlash has legitimized the further demonization of Shia Iran and its role as a common Sunni enemy, to unite and distract the Saudi populace (Bremmer 2015, 2). The execution also holds a silver lining for Iran, and specifically its hardliners who have expressed concern that the lifting of sanctions following the nuclear negotiations would result in an influx of Western influence in the Islamic state. Unable to go against the deal that has been brokered, due to large scale public support for it, the hardliners have received a much needed issue on which to debate and secure public legitimacy. They can frame their security in relation to regional threats, in the absence of international threats, and the need to support the deal and lift sanctions. Moderate President Rouhani, in contrast, was careful, also in support of sanctions avoidance, to criticize the embassy attack which followed the execution of the cleric, and supported the arrest of 40 rioters. An escalation of tensions between these two powers to the point of war would have the potential to prevent the lifting of sanctions, which is the underpinning commitment of his presidency, and so the key policy issue upon which his legitimacy rests (Bremmer 2015, 2). Despite this, there is also a common belief that the riots and embassy attack were sanctioned by the Iranian supreme leader, a narrative endorsed by Riyadh. Again, the actions and rhetoric, regardless of disparities, are wedded to create a discourse of suspicion and non-transparency vis-à-vis Iranian foreign policy ambitions and aspirations which heighten perceptions of risk, lowering the capacity for trust and confidence building measures which ultimately works to promote and maintain Iranian-Saudi competition and animosity. In reality, though, very little of this is direct or explicit. As shown in the case of Yemen, for some years both states have placed actors across the region in order to realize their interests, which is evidenced by their military and financial backing of groups such as Hezbollah (Berti and Guzansky 2014, 30). Saudi Arabia and Iran also play out their rivalry byproxy, using developing crises to support opposing factions, by means of finance or arms. This is a policy mirrored also in Syria. The civil war in Syria, which began in 2011, is a prime example of such proxy competition. As the rebellion continued, Saudi Arabia chose to align with the rebel forces, providing financial and military aid. Iran, in turn, came out in support of the Assad regime, a long-standing ally, in

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opposition to Egyptian, Israeli and US challenges in the region (for a discussion of the history of this relationship see: Goodarzi 2006). Concern is, of course, warranted regarding the potential regional fall-out of the crisis. Certainly Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan have already experienced the pressures that an influx of refugees can cause (Hale 1992 679; O’Donnell and Newland 2008, 5). The conflict in Syria has become a sectarian issue; Sunni rebels versus the Shia government and its Shia allies. This has intensified with the further involvement of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah. Saudi Arabia, along with its western allies, has denounced this organization as a terrorist group and condemned the arrival of some 400 Iranian revolutionary guards in Syria (Berti and Guzansky 2014, 26), though it is openly debated whether these are in fact military personnel or “experts”. Each has internalized the roots of the Syrian conflict and reacted in a way that supports their own separatist concerns and reactions to any connected uprisings (Morin 2014). In the contemporary era, with the rise of the hardline fundamentalist entity known as the Islamic State, Iranian-Saudi relations are again converging to assess and respond to the potential threat that is, in part, a response to long running sectarian tensions and regional conflicts (Dakroub 2014) The condemnation of Iranian involvement, and that of Hezbollah, is also set within the continuing rhetoric regarding Iran’s inclination to interfere in the domestic issues of its neighbors and its intent to spread the Shia Islamic revolution and regional instability. The perception may be that Iran is not transparent, cannot be trusted, and always tries to meddle in support of Shia development and growth, in the interests of regional hegemony which is expansionist in nature and a threat to all (Rakel 2007, 168). The past activities and opposing ideology of Iran is offered within a framework of mistrust which views the support it offers to its Syrian ally as a regional security issue which must be countered.

Assessments of Trust and Risk Despite the existence of an expanding body of work on the concept of trust, it is in essence, a normative term. Though its definitions have been highly debated across the social sciences in the previous decade, no single definition of exact fit has been achieved. Despite this, a degree of convergence has developed with regard to the constitutive elements of trust. It is generally accepted that trust can be identified as the willingness to take risks, being the sum total of risk assessment and self-interest (Kydd 2007, 379). This rationalist approach has limitations in its applicability as it omits consideration of the role played by information and information

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flows. Game theory, as Joseph Abbott points out in his 1993 article “Trust But Verify”, specifically highlights the strategic structure of interdependent relationships. Abbott goes further to outline the two strategies used to produce information: verification and assurance. Information here is of particular importance in the construction of trust with regard to the absence of formal alliances. To talk of levels of trust between states that are highly interdependent and signatories of legally binding treaties or agreements is a complex topic. Trust is of limited concern, or rather is offset, in this respect because the level of risk concerned is also limited by binding agreements. This is not to say that the agreements themselves have any physical power. They are, after all, only binding if the relevant parties recognize them as such, and so legitimize them. It could be argued, and Abbott appears to tacitly assume, that this is where trust becomes an issue or plays a role. The interdependent nature of treaties and agreements, generally amongst likeminded states, makes backing out of an agreement highly problematic. The old adage that liberal democracies do not go to war with one another may be based on a degree of trust between them but it is also the result of high levels of interdependence with one another and dependence on the status quo and the world system which offsets the risks of betrayal. A better understanding of “trust”, and the ways in which it is constructed, is considerably more informative, and arguably more important, when applied to relations between states which lack the formal and legal articulations of cooperation. A competing view of trust adds to this belief in the willingness to take risks, an expectation that the trustee will honor its obligations. This concept of trust offers a more comprehensive understanding of the potential follow-through of actions. On the back of this, in relation to risk, it can be codified as a reluctance to take risk and/or a belief or expectation that the potential trustee will be disinclined to honor its obligations or even acknowledge them. As stated above, Saudi Arabia and Iran share many commonalities and mutual interests. They also have a complex history of cooperation and tension influenced by their governmental frameworks, religious inclinations and political allies. There is a history of minor conflict, such as the 1968 offshore boundaries dispute and the 1987 demonstrations outside the Grand Mosque, and there is an underpinning view of each state’s claim, or ambition, to regional hegemony as geopolitical heavyweights and important exporters of hydrocarbons, which underwrites much of the rhetoric of competition and distrust between the two powers. With the fall of the Shah in 1979 and Iran’s move away from monarchical rule, there are significant ideological tensions and perceived threats as Iran has

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challenged the legitimacy of the Saud dynasty. Saudi Arabia, in turn, builds a picture of Iran as a regional meddler in the affairs of neighboring states, citing support of Hezbollah and the posting of Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syria. In this respect, the construction of norms, values and ambitions are underpinned by rhetoric with regard to the enemy and the friend. Iran’s role in Syria is interpreted within the framework of the existing rhetoric of past interference and anti-hegemonic policies which see this act as interpreted in terms of a security, or securitized, issue rather than a politicized one based on the use of such rhetorical underpinnings of calculations of mistrust and risk with regard to Iranian intentions. Aaron Hoffman (2002) highlights the use of the rhetoric of trust by individuals as diverse as Karl Deutsch (1957) and Kofi Annan (2000) to promote peace and security, in which trust is seen as the tie that enables and binds such commitments. Hoffman raises the important point that cooperation is not dependent on trust but rather can be coerced. The aim of international sanctions, as posited by the U.S. government, was to pressure Iran into abandoning uranium enrichment, or rather to enter into a binding agreement to do so. If Iran were to comply, to effectively “cooperate”, as it appears to have done, with the international community, it would be the result of coercion–cooperation without trust. Hoffman identified the need to be aware of the alternate structures of relations and degrees of risk and obligation involved in order to better assess the nature of trust, risk and security (Hoffman 2002, 376). This offers important considerations and contrasts with Abbott, who recognizes trust as being of lower importance in formal, binding agreements and alliances. Formal agreements, then, are more stable and less inclined to fail or be aborted by either party, unless of course one member has been coerced into compliance, in which case trust may not be lost for it was never present in the first place, which can be highly destabilizing for security. Under conditions of coercion, hoodwinking should also be included. During the Khatami presidency, Iran suspended nuclear development as a goodwill gesture to the EU which requested six months to present a “safer” alternative. Three years later, Iran called for the end of this suspension as it became clear that no such alternative would be offered, other than Iran’s total abandonment of the endeavor. This specific interaction between Iran and the EU can also be explained within the framework of a study by Deborah Larson (1997), though for different (but equally pertinent) reasons. Larson (1997) applies social psychology to identify issues with trust in the international relations between states and the negative effects and “missed opportunities” that can arise from inadequate interpretations of

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behavior. The article highlights the tendency of policy-makers, preoccupied by the realist lens of self-interest and power politics, to incorrectly analyze an opponent’s aims and interests. A point to note here is the way in which Larson assumes that states meeting to evaluate trust/risk benefits view each other as “opponents” (ibid. 701) rather than as, for instance, peers. Larson suggests that prudent policy-making rests on the need to be able to adequately assess the level to which an “Other” state is interested in entering into an agreement, as well as its past and present reputation regarding similar endeavors elsewhere. Like Hoffman, Larson agrees that distrust has the ability to hinder or prevent cooperation. Difficulties can be bridged by lower risk “test” agreements and “good faith” concessions, and past reputations can be overcome in order to pursue common interests. It is important to note here that though such issues can be overcome, this does not mean that they will be. Though offering a social psychological analysis to trust and risk, the article would benefit from an acknowledgement of the cognitive factors at play within the schemas of the policy makers concerned. With such a consideration, questions necessarily arise with regard to the conditions and perceptions that require reassessment in order to develop previously contentious relations. It is interesting to see, in the case of Iranian-Saudi relations, that regardless of the convergence or divergence of interests or similarities/differences in histories, cultures or experiences, in the rhetoric used to frame relations between the two there is little talk of friendship or shared history, just as there are few attempts at confidence-building measures and greater transparency of intentions. The steps required for Saudi Arabia and Iran to develop closer, less suspicious, more confident ties with one another, for instance, would be considerably steeper and unstable than those required between Iran and, say, China. This is based not only on the physical proximity of Saudi Arabia being in direct competition with Iran, whilst China is geographically farther away with its own development and regional interests closer to home, but also upon significant psychological dispositions, underpinned by historical experiences and feelings of betrayal. This also echoes the reception received by Iranian actions in Iraq postSaddam, where it has sought to support Shia factions and exercise soft power in the form of diplomacy and guidance (Rezaei 2011, 40). This is not simply about regional hegemony and a power hungry state, however. Iraq and Afghanistan are both direct, border sharing, neighbors of Iran and so the potential for crises to spill across these borders is a very real concern. Therefore, there is the desire to have a stable and friendly neighbor (Rezaei 2011, 38). This is, in part, a basic security interest.

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However, it is also framed by the pre-existing knowledge frameworks that are able to assimilate the potential threat within the existing framework of previous relations with Iraq, specifically the debilitating 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war that ravaged the country. The commitment to the export of the Islamic revolution largely died with Ayatollah Khomeini (Rakel 2007, 160). Presidents such as Rafsanjani were, and continue to be, faced with domestic concerns relating to a population boom in the post-revolution decade, high unemployment, and severed ties with dominant economic players (Rakel 2007, 160). As a result, they saw the importance of a more pragmatic foreign policy, one that would seek to foster positive relations in reaction to external perceptions of the state, as a pariah seeking regional domination in the form of a pan-Islamic regional revolution that would oust the existing governing structures of neighboring states (Ramazani 2011, 11). In the wake of 9/11, the government in Tehran publicly condemned the attacks and allied itself with the West in the “War on Terror” (Kozhanov 2011, 2). Tehran also supported strikes against terrorist groups in Afghanistan and played a significant role in the Bonn Peace Conference (Middle East/Gulf, 171). In the build-up to the 1991 Iraq War, Iran exercised diplomatic power, encouraging cooperation and mediating between different factions and external powers (Ramcharan 2015, 3). Despite this, Iran was still labelled a member of the “Axis of Evil” (Chomsky and Achcar 2007, 151; Rezai 2011, 17). Another reading or interpretation could be that the ultimate ideal for the current superpower (the USA) is regime change in the Islamic Republic and nothing less (Rezaei 2011, 40). In this respect, the 2003 invasion of Iraq has been viewed as a U.S. threat to Iran, in that it may be next, despite containing the silver lining of removing the biggest threat to Iranian survival (Rezaei 2011, 40). Therefore, actions and policies are forced into existing frameworks of bias which silence alternative interpretations or readings that would enable us to view any actions by Iran in a positive light. Such deep suspicion and mistrust has a significant impact on Iranian foreign economic and security policy, for it would appear imprudent to offer any degree of faith to states incapable of returning the compliment.

Conclusions The inherent problem with any analysis of Iranian foreign policy is not the policies themselves but rather the interpretations that they produce, and the interpretations which produce them. Foreign policy analysis, formation

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and/or implementation does not occur in a vacuum. In order to analyze foreign policy behavior, it is necessary to first recognize and address the inextricable problem of how decision-makers view and react to their environment, problems framed by perception, knowledge structures, predetermined biases and existing behavior patterns. Foreign policy analysis has traditionally centered on a structureoriented study of state-to-state interactions at the regional or global level. The popular view here is of a macro-political system in which the actions of states are ruled by a system of constraints and/or incentives (Walker et al. 2011, 3). There is much missing from such an approach though, that must be considered in the interests of a more comprehensive, multilayered approach to understanding, such as the ideologies involved, domestic pressures, international standing, and goals and requirements of states. For too long, the study of international relations has been Western in focus. This misses important developments in other regions which can have profound effects on the international system. In the contemporary era foreign policy analysis is ever more hindered by the dichotomy between a world of neighbors, ever closer and more interactive due to technological advances, and a world of strangers who are unwilling, or unable, to understand one another (ibid. 2). This gives rise to difficulties in understanding which are retarded by conceptual and historical prejudices (Ciuta 1991, 1). Equally, relatively little attention has been given to the distinctive character of Saudi Arabian-Iranian political and social processes in foreign policy debates, not least because so much of the academic literature on foreign policy has its origins in the United States, and the evolution of USIranian relations since 1979 has discouraged the kinds of critical thinking which might lead to new explanations. U.S.-Iranian and U.S.-Saudi relations have colored many forms of discussion through the medium of the New Cold War in which the three have engaged; there are, of course, notable exceptions to this, but the general statement nonetheless stands up to scrutiny well. An abstract model of actor rationality does not consider such psychological dispositions, nor does it consider behavioral motivations. Rather, the focus tends to be on the policy process and the organizational context surrounding decisions to explain behavior (Garrison 2003, 158); yet it is impossible to assess a state without considering its representation of the world. This is especially so with regard to Iran, with its unique history and civilization, it is also a theocracy with specific, socially constructed rules and operations, born out of a reaction to U.S. and European control and manipulation. It does not see itself as the evil arch

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villain intent on taking over the world but rather a power looking to return to its rightful, historical place as a regional superpower. Iran wants respect, it wants to develop and progress, but at the same time it will not allow itself to once again fall prey to the whims of a greater power (Rundle 2011, 95). In order to assess and analyze the foreign policy-making practices of states and the intentions behind them it is necessary, in the interest of a comprehensive account of agents and processes, to adopt a Constructivist approach which addresses issues of norms and values, identity and history, language and self-representation (Kaarbo 2003, 158). Interestingly, some of these factors are also present in post-colonial discourse which addresses the relationship between a state and its “Other”, though arguably, giving more importance to the power of the narrative of an “Other”. A hermeneutic approach which enables the study of the theory and practice of interpretation is invaluable. It allows the consideration of all aspects of interpretation–tangible and intangible–tacit and overt with regard to presupposition, pre-understandings, language and semiotics. This chapter has explored the possibility, not so much of a different kind of understanding of Iranian-Saudi foreign policy and security, but rather of a return to greater recognition of the power and influence of “rhetoric”.

References Abbott, Kenneth. 1993. “’Trust but Verify’: The production of information in arms control treaties and other international agreements.” Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1: 2-58. Afrasiabi, Kaveh and Abbas Maleki. 2003. “Iran’s Foreign Policy After 11 September.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2: 255265. Amiri, Reza, E. and Ku Hasnita Ku Samsu. 2011. “Security Cooperation of Iran and Saudi Arabia.” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 16: 246-252. Amiri, Reza, E. and Ku Hasnita Ku Samsu. 2010. “Iran’s Economic Considerations After the War and its Role in Renewing of Iran-Saudi Diplomatic Relations.” Cross-Cultural Communications, Vol. 6, No. 3: 45-54. Aminmansour, Morteza. 2007. Uneven urbanization in Iran/Globalization. Accessed February 12 2016. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0712/S00104.htm Axworthy, Michael. 2011. Empire of the Mind: A history of Iran. London: Hurst and Co.

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Beranek, Ondrej. 2009. “Divided We Survive: A landscape of fragmentation in Saudi Arabia.” Crown Centre for Middle East Studies. No. 33: 1-8. Berti, Bernedette and Yoel Guzansky. 2014. “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy on Iran and the Proxy war in Syria: Toward a new chapter?” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3: 25-34. Ciuta, Felix. 2007. “Regions, Areas and Exception: IR and the hermeneutics of context. Paper prepared for the 6th ECPR-SGIR Conference, Turin, Italy. Chomsky, Noam and Gilbert Achcar. 2007. Perilous Power. London: Penguin Books. Chopra, Deepak. 2007. “Curing the Post-Colonial Hangover.” The Huffington Post. Accessed March 2 2016. http://huffingtonpost.com/deepak-chopra/curing-the-postcolonialh_b_73049.html Coker, Christopher. 2002. “Globalization and Insecurity in the Twentyfirst Century: NATO and the management of risk.” The international Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Papers, No. 345. Dakroub, Hussein. 2014. “ISIS Brings Saudi Arabia and Iran Closer.” Lebanon News. Accessed January 13 2016. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Sep06/269754-isis-brings-saudi-arabia-and-iran-closer.ashx De Luca, Derek. 2016. “Saudi Arabia and Iran: Behind the Rivalry.” The American Thinker. Accessed January 13 2015 http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2016/01/saudi_arabia_and_ir an_behind_the_rivalry_comments.html Deutsch, Karl. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. London: Greenwood Press. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Mahjoob Zweiri. 2011. Iran’s Foreign Policy; From Khatami to Ahmadinejad, New York: Ithaca Press. Farndon, John. 2006. Iran. Cambridge: Icon Books. Fischel, Walter J. 1951. Semitic and Oriental Studies: a volume presented to William Popper, professor of Semitic languages, emeritus, on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday, Berkley: University of California Press. Freeman, Chas W. 2013. “Coping with Kaleidoscopic Change in the Middle East.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, No. 4: 1-6. Garrison, Jean A. 2003. “Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20: A Symposium.” International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2: 155-202. Garver, John W. 2006. China and Iran: Ancient partners in a post-

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imperial world. Washington, DC: Washington University Press. Ghorbani, Fahimeh. 2012. “Roots of Tensions Between Iran and Saudi Arabia.” Iran Review. Accessed September 15th 2016. http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Roots-of-Tensionsbetween-Iran-and-Saudi-Arabia.htm Goodarzi, Jubin. 2016. “Iran and Syria.” The Iran primer. Accessed March 25 2016. http://iranprimer.usip.org/ resource/iran-and-syria Hale, William. 1992. “Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis.” International Affairs. Vol. 68, No. 4: 679-692. Jaffe, Amy M. and Steven W. Lewis. 2002. “Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy.” Survival. Vol. 44, No. 1: 115-134. Jahner, Ariel. 2012. “Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Struggle for Power and Influence in the Gulf.” International Affairs Review, Vol. 20, No. 3: 38-50. Kaarbo, Juliet. 2003. “Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Back to comparison, forward to identity and ideas.” International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 2: 155-202. Kifner, John. 1987. “400 Die as Iranian Marchers Battle Saudi Police in Mecca; Embassies Smashed in Tehran.” The New York Times. Accessed November 20 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/02/world/400-die-iranian-marchersbattle-saudi-police-mecca-embassies-smashedteheran.html?pagewanted=all. Kozhanov, Nickolay. A. 2011. “U.S. Sanctions Against Iran: Undermined by external factors.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 18, No. 3: 144-160. Kydd, Andrew. 2007. “Trust and Mistrust in International Relations.” Political Psychology, Vol. 28, no. 3: 378-381. MacAskill, Ewan and Chris McGreal. 2005. “Israel Should Be Wiped off the Map, Says Iran’s President.” The Guardian. Accessed April 4 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/27 /israel.iran Mahruqi, Zaher. 2014. “Where Has Iran Gone Right and Saudi Arabia Gone Terribly Wrong?” Foreign Policy. Accessed October 20 2014. http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/09/24/where-has-irangone-right-and-saudi-arabia-terribly-wrong/ Miller, Steven E. 2010. “The Hegemonic Illusion? Traditional strategic studies in context.” Security Dialogue, Vol. 41, No. 6: 639-648. Nia, Mahdi M. 2011. “A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy.” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4: 279-294. O’Donnell, Kelly and Newland, Kathleen. 2008. The Iraqi Refugee Crisis: The need for action. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

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Patrikarakos, David. 2013. Nuclear Iran: The birth of an atomic state. London: I.B. Taurus. Rezaei. Farhad and Ronen A. Cohn. 2014. “Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Israeli-Iranian Rivalry in the Post-Revolutionary Era.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4: 442-460. Ramazani, Rouhollah K. 2009. “Understanding Iranian Foreign Policy.” The Middle East Institute. Accessed October 1st 2015. http://www.mei.edu/content/understanding-iranian-foreign-policy Ramcharan, Bertrand. 2015. International Peace Conferences. Leiden: Brill Publishers. Rakel, Eva. 2007. “Iranian Foreign Policy Since the Iranian Islamic Revolution: 1979-2006.” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology. Vol. 6, No. 1: 159-187. Rundle, Michael. 2011. “Iran Warns US to Keep Navy Out of Persian Gulf.” The Huffington Post. Accessed October 1st 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/news/iran/21/ Scott, Emma. 2015. “A Nuclear Deal with Chinese Characteristics: China’s role in the P5+1 talks with Iran.” Jamestown Foundation. Accessed October 11st 2015. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5B tt_news%5D=44172&cHash=a196bde88d782a0173dbd4793a06104f#. VwO6zPkrJQI Vale, Paul. 2014. “Saudi Arabia to 'Immediately' Go Nuclear Should Iran Develop Bomb.” The Huffington Post. Accessed March 25 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/02/10/saudi-arabia-nuclearbomb_n_1267571.html Vatanka. Alex. 2015. “Will Saudi Arabia and Iran Take Fight into the Open?” Middle East Institute. Accessed May 21 2015. http://www.mei.edu/content/article/will-saudi-arabia-and-iran-takefight-open Wallis, Charles P. 1987. “402 Die in Clashes of Saudi Arabia, Iranians: Killings at the Shrine in Mecca Trigger Attacks on Four Embassies in Tehran.” Los Angeles Times online. Accessed October 1st 2015. http://articles.latimes.com/1987-08-02/news/mn-971_1_saudi-arabia. Accessed Young, Richard. 1970. “Equitable Solutions for Offshore Boundaries: The 1968 Saudi Arabia-Iran Agreement.” American Society of International Law, Vol. 64, No. 1: 152-157.

SECTION TWO: POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING REGIONAL (DIS)INTEGRATION

CHAPTER FIVE FOREIGN AID AND THE ARAB SPRING BEATA PARAGI

Introduction The main objective of this chapter is to analyze the nature of foreign aid interactions and the dilemmas Western donors face in the countries being the main beneficiaries of Western foreign aid (military aid, development and humanitarian aid) in the Middle East (more precisely in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Israel). These are the only countries in the region that have been tied to each other by bilateral peace treaties and agreements. As the Preamble of the Camp David Frameworks for Peace agreement (1978) says illustratively: Security is enhanced by a relationship pf peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoys normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree on special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces , liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other agreements that they agree are useful. […] Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. […] [T]he principles and provisions […] should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors–Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

The purpose of the framework agreement has been to achieve peace and mutually beneficial relations between Israel and Egypt, as well as their neighbors. The Oslo Peace Process and agreements between Israel and the PLO (1993-2000) and the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement (1994) reiterated this conviction. In many cases such major agreements assumed mutual cooperation guaranteed by third parties (Kim 2005, 5). Indeed, the agreements ensuring regional stability have been supported by unprecedented U.S. military and economic assistance to both Israel and Egypt (since the 1970s) and Jordan (since 1994). Within the (mainly

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bilateral) frameworks of development cooperation, civil and security related-aid has been provided to Egypt, Jordan and to the PNA not only by the US, but also by the EU and its member states. Foreign aid has been concerned with calm, silence and stability in a region hosting not only Israel but neighboring Europe simultaneously. Democracy-building in practice was of marginal interest, contrary to official EU and U.S. declarations and various communications issued since the early 1990s. It was the “Arab Spring” in 2011, mass demonstrations calling for real democracy, political, economic and human rights, that made the Western powers recognize both the power of local public opinion (expressed against their long-supported allies) and the existence of genuine demands for democracy (Brynen 2012; El-Din Haseeb 2013). The U.S. has been hesitating thus far but the EU has opted for backing the demonstrators’ demands by formulating conditions in exchange for channeling further budgetary aid (“more for more” principle) (Balfour 2012; Hollis 2012). However, the unfinished being of the Arab Spring– weak and/or oppressed demonstrations in Palestine and Jordan (during the course of 2011-2012), the 2013 military coup in Egypt–and the weakness of pro-democracy demonstrators to seize and keep power, have questioned the viability of immediate (verbal) changes in donor strategies pursuing democracy-promotion. In hindsight, donor practices have more or less remained the same as before (Behr 2012; Bicchi 2014). Publications dealing with “foreign aid” describe and explain the main donor motives and interests, objectives, channels and forms of foreign aid, as well as its economic and negative political impacts, such as rent-seeking or corruption in the recipient country. They either investigate the objectives and economic, political and social consequences of foreign aid in Middle Eastern context (see: Burns 1985; Nonneman 1988; Rabi 1988; Lavy and Sheffer 1991; Bangura 1995; Drysdale 1998; Brynen 2000; Keaton et al. 2005; Le More 2008; Tagdishi-Rad 2011; Carapico 2013; Bouris 2014; Challand 2014); or attempt to analyze international relations by emphasizing, among others, the role played by rents, foreign aid alike in the region (see: Brown 1984; Brynen et al. 1998; Beblawi and Luciani 1990; Nieblock et al. 1999; Tessler et al. 1999; Hinnebusch et al. 2002; Halliday 2006; Fawcett 2013). Rarely, if at all, do they offer any analysis of the invisible, yet existing political trade-off (social exchange) taking place between recipients when an aid contract or grant agreement is signed. However, foreign aid has been a means (a sort of currency) to buy “stability” or “democracy” depending on the donors’ and recipient governments’ political concerns.

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This chapter is concerned with the political dilemmas embodied in foreign aid (supporting stability vs. democracy) by applying terms related to social exchange and gift-giving reciprocity to contemporary donorrecipient relations in the Middle Eastern context, namely Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Israel. Applying social exchange, gift-relations and related terms are needed to analyze the role that “foreign aid” may play in creating and maintaining bonds between the donor and the recipient and strengthening or weakening social cohesion within the recipient societies, both in general IR context (Section 1) and in the Middle East (Section 2). The contemporary international system is considered similar to a society (Bull 1995) and international politics is seen as “a realm of human experience” (Wight 1991). Understanding international relations as a form of “social behavior”, both as social exchange and reciprocity, has been used to explore international relations (Keohane 1986; Baldwin 1998; Druckman 1998; Leng 1998; Kim 2005). Gift-economies, understood as a form of social exchange (initially explored by Marcel Mauss in archaic societies) have also been discussed in the context of foreign aid, to investigate how international interactions (social bonds) between the donor and the recipient have been shaped by foreign aid (Stirrat and Henkel 1997; Hattori 2001; Karagiannis 2004; Hattori 2006; Eyben 2006; Kaapor 2008; Da Silva 2008; Kowalski 2011; Mawdsley 2011; Furia 2015). Indeed, societies in general and the international community in particular are similar in the extent to which “it is not individuals but collectivities that impose obligations of exchange and contract upon each other” (Mauss 2002, 5). The decision to apply the exchange—and gift-related concepts to foreign aid relations can be justified (i) by the general similarities between archaic societies and the international system, as well as (ii) by the very fact that various traditional identity affiliations (kinship, family, religion) observed in the Middle Eastern societies continue to be significant in terms of how people think about social interactions, relations between governments and the foreign aid supported alliances included.

Exchange, Gift, Reciprocity and Conditionality in Donor-recipient Relations With reference to the rationale behind international assistance it is widely accepted that governments do not provide foreign aid unless they intend to achieve something of interest to them (Morgenthau 1963; Lumsdaine 1993: 30-72; Hook 1995; Little and Clifford 1996: 78-92; Degnbol-Martinussen et al 2003: 7-25). Even if foreign aid is mostly grant without monetary obligations to return, individual perceptions on foreign

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aid within the region seem to justify the notion that “there are no free gifts” and the “donors always expect something in return” (Anderson 2012; Elagati 2012; Wildeman et al 2014). The literature on the concept of social exchange concerns various theories in the field of economics, anthropology, sociology, socio-psychology and psychology, as well as their interdisciplinary combinations (Polanyi 1944/2001; Blau 1964; Homans 1974; Emerson 1976; Sahlins 1972; others). Both empirical and conceptual questions are raised and, explanations are offered on the differences between market and social exchange as well as on the role of power and dependency, which latterly is widely seen as the source of one actor’s power over the other. The main difference between social and market exchange is the durability (endurance) of relations established by exchange. In most cases, market exchange is a prompt interaction between actors without long-term consequences. The notion of social exchange, however, entails consequences in the long-run, builds on the principle of reciprocity, and emphasizes the importance of relationships and that of non-monetary gains. Compared to market exchange, it is more closely related to power and dependency. Gift-giving is a specific form of social exchange described most illustratively by Marcel Mauss (1925/2002). Mauss studied forms of exchange and contract in “archaic” societies arguing that the phenomenon of exchange has always existed in these societies and anything which is returned is part of an economic exchange between equals (Mauss 2002, 5). The durability of the relationship established by exchange, as well as the equality of the parties, depends on the nature of the “return-gift”. A gift is “what should be done [given], what should be received, and yet, what is dangerous to take” (ibid. 76). The act of giving, and that of receiving, mirrors power and hierarchical relations where “the recipient puts himself in a position of dependence vis-à-vis the donor” (ibid.). Gifts not only create subordination, but also maintain social cohesion within the community of the giver and the receiver simultaneously, as long as hierarchy is needed to cultivate long-run relationships (ibid.). It is the constant and uninterrupted circulation of gifts and return-gifts which provides equality between the donor (the future recipient or creditor) and the recipient (the future donor). For Mauss, social cohesion is maintained by the “swinging” nature of power between the actors. According to Mauss’s findings, all gifts produce return or counter-gifts, which keep the gesture moving and constantly circulating. While gifts are voluntary in theory, “in reality they are given and reciprocated obligatorily” (Mauss 2002: 3). As long as the receiver is willing and capable to reciprocate, he proves his equality (Mauss 2002, 16-17; 50-55). Mauss’s theory has not

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only been influential in social anthropology, but also criticized by some (Derrida 1994; Pyyhtinen 2014) mainly on the basis that not every gift (relation) can be conceptualized as (social) exchange. As concluded by Annalisa Furia, foreign aid cannot work as a real Maussian, solidaritybased gift “for it is constructed as a peculiar form of gracious gift”, failing “to create a space of reciprocal recognition” (Furia 2015, 112). It must be emphasized, however, that social exchange theories do not identify reciprocity with the strict equivalence of benefits. While “rough equivalence” is the usual expectation “among equals”, reciprocity can also characterize relations among “unequals” (Keohane 1986, 6), which makes it possible to apply social exchange theories to foreign aid relations, even in cases when the donor and the recipient are not really “like-minded” nor equal or similar in size (population, GDP, political-economic power and so on). Indeed, transactions (social exchange, gift-giving) between adversaries are more likely to be guided by the norm of reciprocity (Druckman 1998, 255) since reciprocal (social) exchange may serve not only as a cohesive force (internally), but also as a substitute (externally) for war (Mauss 1925, 2002). Referring to the role played by foreign aid in Arab-Israeli relations, it is worthwhile to stress that “the need for parity is quite strong among adversaries who are sensitive to the perceived consequences of an unfair advantage” (Druckman 1998, 255). In light of the above referred theoretical context, the most relevant social exchange and gift-related terms will be explored in the context of IR and foreign aid in this section, such as (i) the nature of “social exchange” relations governed by the norm of reciprocity; (ii) the meaning of indebtedness, with reference to obligations and reciprocity and the related role of conditions; and (iii) the understanding of “sacrifice” on the recipient side.

Relations Established by Social Exchange Concepts such as exchange and reciprocity are widely used, mainly in international trade and negotiations. However, they are not only symbols in politics, but also concepts for scholars. While Baldwin defines social exchange in the field of IR as “mutually rewarding behavior” yielding mutual gains and cooperation (Baldwin 1998, 140), the term “reciprocity” is equally associated with “an appropriate standard of behavior which can produce cooperation among sovereign states” (Keohane 1986, 1). They are somewhat overlapping and ambiguous terms appearing in so many literatures in social sciences (ibid. 3). In addition, Keohane distinguished “specific reciprocity” from “diffuse reciprocity”, whereby the former

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refers to situations in which “specific partners exchange items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited sequence”, and the latter definition is much more elusive because one’s partners rather form an unspecified group than one or more particular actor(s), and the sequence of events is less narrowly bounded (ibid., 4). For Keohane it is only “diffuse reciprocity” which is about adjusting to generally accepted standards of behavior during an unspecified period of time. It entails obligation and a sense of indebtedness alike. Recalling Mauss, Blau, Gouldner, Homans, Shalins and others, “reciprocal obligations” are important because they hold societies together whereby coercion and consensus complete each other. They explain “an ongoing series of sequential actions” never balancing but “continuing to entail mutual concessions within the context of shared commitments and values” (ibid.). Indeed, reciprocity implies that “people [actors, societies, states] should help those who have helped them and (2) people [actors, societies, states] should not injure those who have helped them” (Gouldner 1960, 171). Characteristics of social exchange (theories) also allow us to understand foreign aid as an instrument of state power enabling states to get other states to do things they would otherwise not. It is not coercion, rather, consensus promising gains, which leads to cooperation. Reciprocity in aid relations can take a variety of forms (see below) and is often expected even when the donor explicitly denies having any such expectations (Baldwin 1998, 141-142). Foreign aid can be conceptualized as gift, a unique (albeit imperfect) form of social exchange (Stirrat and Henkel 1997; Hattori 2001; Karagiannis 2004; Hattori 2006; Eyben 2006; Kaapor 2008; Da Silva 2008; Kowalski 2011; Mawdsley 2011; Furia 2015). By integrating the concept of power into the exchange approach, Baldwin recognized the simultaneous appearance of the donor’s influence and the recipient’s gains in foreign aid relations (Hattori 2006, 157). Foreign aid can also, however, be seen as an instrument–a poisonous gift–to control or dominate the rest of the world by the developed countries or elites interested in global development (Rist 2003; Escobar 2004; Duffield 2001; Kapoor 2008; Mosse 2005) as long as aid creates and maintains social bonds with hierarchies (following Mauss (2002)). Regardless of the broad spectrum of donor motives, foreign aid relations are based on the following rule: no government can be forced to provide (development, military) assistance or to receive it; the aid relationship between donor and recipient is an asymmetric (i.e. unequal) relationship in most cases; and foreign aid represents an intervention in the recipient country. Intervention is not “coerced” or violent, but “approved” by the recipient government. It is mainly embodied in the practice of

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conditionality, a key element of which is “the use of pressure, by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or actually terminating or reducing it”, if conditions are not met by the recipient (Stokke 1995, 31-32). It is important to emphasize that states are equal only “on paper” (in international law principles or in the UN General Assembly) and that if the donor and the recipient were equal and independent in reality, the question of intervention would be much less relevant. The sense of indebtedness is closely related to the norm of reciprocity and to the option for intervention and it also forms an important component of social exchange. All these are needed to understand the role conditions (non-monetary obligations) play in relations established by foreign aid.

Indebtedness and Conditionality If reciprocity reflects a sort of mutual reinforcement by two parties of each other's actions (Polanyi 2001; Gouldner 1960; Sahlins 1972), indebtedness can be defined as a state of obligation to repay another (provided that the norm of reciprocity exists in a given society). Clarifying the theoretical and empirical status of the term “indebtedness” and its utility for understanding social interaction, Greenberg assumes that the “discomfort associated with indebtedness” is related to early socialization experiences with the norm of reciprocity, “during which individuals associate being indebted with, (a) restrictions on their freedom of action, (b) loss of power and status relative to the donor (Blau 1964; Homans 1961), and (c) anticipated costs of repayment” (Greenberg 1980, 4). Concerned with the magnitude of experienced or perceived indebtedness, Greenberg identified four potential determinants: the donor’s motives; the costs and benefits incurred by the recipient and the donors as a result of the exchange; the “locus of causality” of the donor’s action; and cues emitted by comparison with others (ibid., 5-11). In terms of individual experiences, the magnitude of indebtedness can be measured by selfreports as well as various attempts to reduce indebtedness (Greenberg 1980, 11-21). The paragraphs that follow attempt to capture and measure these beliefs and perceptions at social and political level in general and in particular in the field of IR, while the second section will be about analyzing donor-recipient relations in the Middle East. Hattori argued that bilateral grant aid is rarely reciprocated in a material sense in that givers remain givers, and recipients remain recipients (Hattori 2001; Hattori 2006, 158). However, from the point of view of the recipient, the very accepting of the gift (aid) may imply certain sense of indebtedness (Kolm 2006a, 29), even if not in a material sense.

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The debt is something which is owed, usually an asset which can be money (foreign aid/loan to be paid back), moral or other obligation not requiring money (Ingham 2004, 12-19). Conditions and conditionality enter the scene when the magnitude of indebtedness (experienced and exhibited by the recipient) is assumed to be less than the “price” the donor wants to get in exchange for the given thing. But not only the experience of indebtedness, reciprocity also implies that exchange actions “are contingent on rewarding reactions from others and cease when these expected reactions are not forthcoming” (Blau 1964, 6). By the same token, unconditionally is “at variance with the basic character of reciprocity norm which imposes obligations only contingently, that is, in response to benefits conferred by others” (Gouldner 1960, 171). In the context of IR, conditions are said to have been effectively exercised only if the recipient undertakes a policy change it would not have undertaken by itself, without the pressure made to bear upon it by the donor (Uvin 1993, 68). Whether this pressure is gentle (carrot, such as foreign aid/grants for example), coercive (stick, such as sanctions) or the combination of them (conditional aid for example) depends on the judgment of the donor, and usually the option which is considered more effective is chosen. Foreign aid, just as sanctions, is used as a lever to promote objectives (being different from the stated objectives of the foreign aid itself) set by the donor and that “the recipient would not otherwise have agreed to” (Stokke 1995, 11-12). With relevance to conditions, the emphasis is placed on the coercive element, on the denial of aid (‘gift’) resulting from non-compliance or non-contingency. Conditions are attached to the ‘given’ thing (an asset, a gesture, a gift, foreign aid, etc...) when the recipient cannot return it immediately. Conditions can be applied both in the context of market and social exchange; they can be formulated implicitly or explicitly and can even be denied on the side of the donor (Baldwin 1998, 145). Financial conditions, for example, ensure that the recipient will return more money (principal and interest) within a given period of time as it has been provided by the giver. For example, the cost of a credit is the additional amount–over and above the amount given–that the recipient has to pay back. This cost (the price) is embodied in the interest rate (i). The interest is a sort of compensation to the donor (lender or giver), for the risk of principal loss and for the forgoing of other useful investments that could have been realized with the given asset. Setting financial conditions in the form of interest rate (i) and number of years (n) within which the debt must be paid back is the best way to maximize utility. All this applies to foreign aid–to an (im)possible gift (Pyyhtinen 2014, 15-38)–the price of which (pFA) is:

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pFA = f (Cf, Ce, Cp, Cpe). While Cf denotes the financial conditions (such as i based on n, arrangement fees and any other charges), Ce, Cp and Cpe refer to the various economic, political and peace conditions attached to the foreign aid provided as “grant”. In the case of grants it is Ce, Cp or Cpe which ensures that the grant will be used in the most effective way from the perspective of the donor. In case of foreign aid/grants where the recipient is not expected to pay back the received ‘asset’ (in form of money), Ce, Cp or Cpe provide the only opportunity to redeem the debt. To comply with conditions being different from Cf, such as Ce, Cp or Cpe , is not only a moral obligation, but also well-established self-interest of the recipient if it wants to see the game to be continued and receive further aid in the future. To put it bluntly, the recipient can return foreign aid–i.e. redeem the debt and reduce the sense of indebtedness–only by complying with the stated and hidden conditions alike. Otherwise it will not be eligible for further aid and, while reciprocity in the context of gift/aid economy is a sort of mutual reinforcement by two parties of each other's actions, the price of this compliance (reciprocity, debt redemption, good IR relations) means “extra costs” to the recipient country. As long as the borders between states (i.e. donor and recipient countries) are clearly defined by international law, both compliance and reciprocity (in exchange for foreign aid) will have an impact on statesociety relations in the recipient country (in the donor states too). This impact can be both positive and negative in theory but, in practice, social cohesion within the recipient is usually harmed due to the facts that, (i) states are represented by their governments at international level, and (ii) even if elected, governments in recipient countries are not necessarily democratic ones representing their population and their social, political, economic concerns. This was well illustrated by the slogans used by the demonstrators during the Arab Spring, but before moving to the Middle East, let us take a brief look at the potential domestic consequences of international reciprocity.

Attempts to Reduce the Sense of Indebtedness, the Importance of Sacrifice Recalling Mauss’s gift-theory, exchange may serve not only as a cohesive force (internally), but also as a substitute for war (externally) at least up to a certain point (Mauss 1925/2002). Olli Pyyhtinen’s major conceptual problem with Mauss’s theory is that it does not try to

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problematize the connection between the gift and exchange. In other words, “by subsuming the gift within the order of exchange, Mauss ultimately subjects the gift to the logic of debt […] he always interprets it in the framework of exchange [but] as soon as there is a guarantee that a gift once given will be compensated, we are no longer dealing with the gift, but with exchange” (Pyyhtinen 2014, 21-23). It is the difference between gift and exchange (overlooked by Mauss 1925/2002, but identified by Derrida (1994) and Pyyhtinen (2014, 21-24)) which explains the side effects of foreign aid in recipient countries and on recipient societies. The “difference between gift and exchange is a certain sort of ‘necessary’ loss, there always has to be a sacrifice of some sort (i.e. expenditure) involved” (ibid., 25). For there to be a gift, the donor should not profit from the gift (foreign aid/grant alike) otherwise the given thing becomes merely a means of exchange or an instrument for gaining profit (ibid., 25). Or, as implied in this logic, for there to be an exchange the recipient should be able to return the given thing. If “foreign gifts” are considered returned by recipient compliance with non-monetary conditions having been set externally by the donor/giver, there must be a price. This price is closely related to the internal power relations inside the recipient since it is to be paid by the population of the recipient state somehow. It is the very being of internal social cohesion which is affected by foreign aid (interventions) and conditions attached, especially in those cases where the recipient government is more liable to (or more indebted to and interested in) the donor than to (in) its own electorate or population. Even if the “Arab Spring” in general (or at cross-country level) by no means can be explained simply by foreign (aid) interventions, demonstrations and slogans formulated against the pro-Western governments in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine (Brynen et al. 2012, 22-27, 47-32, 56-59; Telhami 2013; Christophersen 2013; Samour 2014; Wildeman 2014) illustrated the merits of this argument. It is the very being—core identity—of the recipient which is threatened by (the very acceptance of) external assistance, as long as the quality of relationship between the donor and recipient (giverreceiver, helper-helped) is defined by inequality, asymmetry and unwillingness to share a particular set of norms, values and interests. To sum up, construing IR and foreign aid relations as a sort of social exchange is more about regulating than changing relationships, “maintaining a conservative space in which transformation is always yet to come” (Furia 2015, 112), and the emphasis is placed on managing relations (conflict) rather than transforming the nature of relationships (Druckman 1998, 257). International foreign aid relations can be compared to social exchange (relations) and gift-giving in Maussean terms, in as much as they

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also imply reciprocity, a sort of demand for commitment and evolve around concepts such as power, domination and subordination. One may conclude that social exchange (aid relations included) equally reflects dominance and subordination on the one hand and maintains social cohesion, at least the illusion of social cohesion, between the donor and the recipient on the other hand. The next section of this chapter will discuss how foreign aid may contribute to stability (by strengthening international social bonds and cohesion) and instability (by evoking a sort of “sacrifice” in weakened internal social cohesion and political legitimacy) simultaneously.

Social Exchange and Community Bonds Between Donors and Recipients in the Middle East In the context of Arab-Israeli relations, the main objectives of foreign aid have been to strengthen regional (and European) stability by facilitating cooperation between “enemies” tied by peace treaties (EgyptIsrael, Israel-Jordan); or to support the peace process (Israel and the PNA) and to secure Israel’s stability by keeping the two-state solution alive and offsetting the consequences of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While Europe has a historical responsibility for shaping the modern Middle East, the United States has played a unique role in supporting Israel’s security and regional stability since the 1970s. The European Union (EU) has been the main donor of the Palestinian Authority (in the form of development and humanitarian aid) since the beginning (Brynen 2000; Le More 2008; Bouris 2014), whereas the main beneficiaries of U.S. military (and economic) assistance have been Israel, Egypt and Jordan (Burns 1985; Rabi 1988; Lavy and Sheffer 1991; Bangura 1995; Drysdale 1998; Sharp 2014a; Sharp 2014b; Sharp 2015). The very logic of foreign support offered and provided to adversaries has apparently been built on the assumption that the norm of reciprocity and the practice of reciprocation may be even stronger in interactions between rivals than between friends or allies, as long as it provides a predictable framework of interaction and interstate relations, equally avoiding war and closer ties (Druckman 1998, 259). Measuring the impacts and efficiency of foreign aid is not easy, especially not in political or security terms. To estimate how much security or stability a dollar can buy in the form of military or securityrelated assistance, one should be able to measure the level of insecurity in a given country or region, the prevailing threats, their associated costs and the likelihood of unknown threats and their probable costs among others.

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In general, this chapter is much less ambitious in that the following paragraphs will “only” compare the initial objectives of foreign aid (agreements) both on military and development counts with the size of aid channeled to the parties, to illustrate how recipient-donor relations have developed and what exchange and reciprocity means vis-à-vis the Middle East (i and ii), while the last part of this section (iii) will attempt to link them to certain recent issues, mainly demands and developments of the “Arab Spring”.

International Social Bonds, Reciprocity and Conditionality for Ensuring Regional Stability and Israeli Security The main donor aims of military and development cooperation with Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the PNA alike have been to ensure peace, security and regional stability by supporting normal relations between nations which were envisioned in bilateral peace agreements. Although the concerned Arab countries have been received for other purposes as well, both from bilateral and multilateral (UN, World Bank) sources, the common purpose of donor policies has been to keep calm, to prevent hostilities, violence, unnecessary deaths and suffering in the region in general and in the areas surrounding Israel in particular. While Israel, Egypt and Jordan are the main beneficiaries of U.S. military assistance, the PNA receives “only” official development assistance (ODA) disbursements (from the DAC donors), part of which is spent on security related issues. Israel has not been eligible for ODA since 1997, but both Jordan and Egypt receives development (economic) assistance from OECD DAC donors. Perhaps with the exception of Palestine, development aid (humanitarian and emergency aid included) is much less closely contingent on normal relations and cooperation with Israel (and the donor country) than military assistance and security-related ODA. As far as the magnitude of foreign assistance is concerned “aid per capita” reveals the relative significance of foreign aid within the recipient country. With reference to U.S. aid (economic and military assistance), it is clear that aid per capita is the lowest in Egypt (compared to Jordan and Israel) and it decreased from $11 (1991) to $18.5 (2013) mainly due to demographic trends (population growth).

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e assisttance per capitta (USD), Jordaan, Egypt, Fig. 5.1. US military and economic Israel, 1991-22013

Source: US M Military Aid to Egypt, E DCODE E, http://dcodeeffc.com/military y-aid/

Data preesented in Fiigure 5.1 con ntains both m military and economic e assistance; the former is i closely lin nked to peacce agreementss signed. Especially in the Egypptian case, military m aid ((budget supp port) and equipment hhas been chaanneled on the condition th that Egypt resspects its obligations vis-à-vis Isrrael (formulatted in the ppeace agreem ments and MoUs). Thee U.S. signed two memoraandums of undderstanding on foreign assistance w with Israel and a Egypt reespectively inn 1979. As the first memorandum m of agreemeent (article 2) between b the U U.S. and Israell states: if a violaation of the Treeaty of Peace iss deemed to thrreaten the securrity of Israel [… …] the United States S will be prepared to coonsider, on an urgent u basis, succh measures as the strengtheniing of the Uniteed States preseence in the area, the providing of o emergency su upplies to Israeel, and the exerccise of maritime rights in order to put an end to o the violation.

As indiccated by thee paragraph above, the U.S. has no ot simply supported ““mutual coopperation” betw ween the Egyypt and Israeel, but it simply “boought” Israel’’s security by b channelingg foreign aid d to the cooperating parties (to Egypt, E in this case, at a raatio of 3 to 2 favoring Israel). Takking a closerr look at thee past few yyears it is clear c that “historical” trends have not changed that much. O On the contrarry, it has been extendded to other parties, p such as a Jordan and the PNA. Th he biggest

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recipients have been Israel and Egypt, while Jordan has received significantly less military assistance. Fig. 5.2. US military assistance to Egypt, Jordan, Israel, USD, 2009-2014

3,500,000.00 3,000,000.00 2,500,000.00 2,000,000.00 Egypt

1,500,000.00

Israel

1,000,000.00

Jordan

500,000.00 0.00 FY 2009

FY 2010

FY 2011

FY 2012

FY 2013

FY 2014 (est)

Source of data: U.S. GOV (2014)

Although data presented in Figure 5.2 does not take into consideration the size of the economy or that of the population, it shows that the absolute volume of aid has increased (Israel) or remained at the same level contrary to (or regardless of) the “Arab Spring”. Since the late 1970s (Israel, Egypt) and early 1990s (Jordan) respectively, U.S. military assistance has been channeled to the recipients recognizing the significance of the peace treaties and the importance of regional peace and security. The biggest beneficiary is clearly Israel, both in relative and absolute terms. Since 1949, it has received more than $120 billion in the form of military and economic aid (grants, loans, guarantees) from the U.S. Military aid (grants) to Israel increased from $1.8 billion (1997) to $3.1 billion (2014) in addition to the economic grants (official aid, not ODA) it received from the U.S. up to 2007 (Sharp 2014a, 27; Zanotti 2015, 33). Egypt received $76 billion in the form of bilateral foreign aid from the US from 1948 to 2015 (calculated in historical dollars, i.e. not adjusted for inflation), including an average of $1.3 billion per year in military aid from 1987 to the present (Sharp 2015, 11). The U.S.-Egyptian cooperation was instrumental in enabling the pro-Western Mubarak regime to maintain itself in power despite its limited interests and achievements in democratization by 2011 (Brynen et al. 2012, 265).

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As far as Jordan is concerned, the U.S. had cooperation agreements with Jordan already established in the 1950s. However, it was the peace agreement with Israel (1994)–and the “instabilities” on the eastern Jordanian borders for the past decade–which led to gradual but significant changes in the size of aid. While in 1993 Washington provided Amman with just $35 million in economic support, the 2014 figure was $700 million. In addition, military assistance increased from $9 million (1993) to $300 million in the past number of years (Sharp 2014b, 17). Peace with Israel was followed by the “first sustained setback” in Jordanian liberalization, and the regime started to weaken the opposition systematically by preventing NGOs from becoming involved in political mobilization. Demonstrations and protests were not only discouraged, but actively contained. Both King Hussein and his son “advanced political reforms only to suspend them when convinced that they pose risk to stability” (Brynen et al. 2012, 48-49). And even if not directly linked to the IsraeliJordanian relations, since the early 2000s the Jordanian secret service (General Intelligence Directorate, GID) has become “America's most effective allied counter-terrorism agency in the Middle East”, so much so that “the CIA has had technical personnel ‘virtually embedded’ at GID headquarters” (Silverstein 2005). As far as the “exchange” perspective and reciprocity is concerned, according to Marc Lynch “Amman has received a free pass on human rights because it has been so useful strategically [to the US]” (Silverstein 2005). Indeed, the Jordanian-U.S. cooperation has reached historical levels. The renewed memorandum of understanding (signed in February 2015) reflects the intention to increase U.S. assistance to the Jordanian government from $660 million per year to $1 billion per year for the years 2015-2017 (U.S. GOV 2015). In the case of Palestine, the Oslo Peace Process (1993-2000) repeated/reiterated the “aid for stability” trade-off with one particular feature: the Oslo agreements aimed at regulating the interim period with the implied objective to create a Palestinian state as the end-result of the “final status” negotiations. For the past twenty years, the “interim” has become “permanent” and there is no Palestinian state on the horizon. The PNA is not eligible for military aid, but receives the highest ODA per capita in the region, which is fairly comparable to the per capita military assistance received by Israel (cf. Figure 5.1).

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Table 5.1. Net ODA received per capita (current USS), Jordan, Egypt, Palestine, various years (1960-2012) 1960 1975 1983 1992 1993 1995 2000 2006 2009 2010 2011 2012 Egypt

6

62

30

64

42

33

21

12

13

8

5

22

Jordan

105

272

348

114

79

129

115

103

125

158

158

224

79

208

234

399

761

661

622

495

WBGS Source: OECD DAC online database

Security-related peace conditionality has been complementary to economic and political conditions since the 1980s (Boyce 2002, 7-14, 6172). Its general aim has been facilitating the short term implementation of various peace accords and the long term consolidation of peace between adversaries (Boyce 2002, 9). It applies to the Oslo agreements too: ODA has been committed in order to make the Palestinians “behave well” by adjusting to Declaration of Principles and the implementing agreements signed between 1993 and 1998. Officially, foreign aid channeled to the Palestinians within the Oslo Peace Process has aimed at improving the Palestinian socio-economic conditions and building the institutional system of the PNA (Brynen 2000; Le More 2008 and Tagdishi-Rad 2011). Its utmost objective has been to sustain the Oslo Peace Process (19932000) and support Israeli-Palestinian efforts for returning to the negotiation table since the second intifada. Since the implementation of the Oslo Agreements were not in full harmony with the expectations, supporting foreign aid disbursements soon become scrutinized. According to researchers and local perceptions, donors provided foreign aid, in the form of official development assistance and humanitarian aid, for getting something back since the early 1990s, to see their agendas and conditions met (Nakhleh 2004; Said 2005; Keating et al 2005; Le More 2008; Turner 2011; Tagdishi-Rad 2011; Wildeman and Tartir 2014). Indeed, implicit conditions–to go on with the implementation of the Oslo agreements and to keep the territories quiet and peaceful–were set for the sake of keeping peace since the early 1990s. Setting conditions may have been aimed at improving the Palestinian institutional capacity to absorb foreign aid and comply with the developments of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations since 2003. The frustration and hopelessness experienced by the Palestinians were direct results of the slow (if any) progress on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations about a Palestinian state. Under the given political circumstances, international assistance was considered to be a mechanism financing the

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Israeli occupation. Indeed, the term donor complicity has been used widely by local human rights organizations to describe the situation after 2006. Conditions became open and visible after the elections when the donor community (the Quartet) set three conditions, in exchange for accepting the results of the parliamentary elections, which led to the Hamas electoral victory. Since then, foreign aid has been channeled to “cooperative” or “collaborative” partners, with the aim of isolating or removing those Palestinian political and social elites that were not seen as real “partners for peace” (Turner 2011). In other words, by setting conditions to reverse the outcome of the elections, the U.S. and the EU effectively strengthened the moderate actors, while simultaneously weakening the otherwise fragile social cohesion and “encouraged the emergence of rival armed camps and militarization of national politics” (Yezid Sayigh is quoted by Brynen et al. 2012, 59). Due to the consequences of the elections (Hamas takeover in Gaza, Israeli measures and restrictions, Fayyad’s development and reconstruction plans), and perhaps due to the “senseless” being of the conditions formulated in 2006, the donor community has been very cautious to ask anything formally in exchange for aid since 2008. The structure, channels, and forms of international assistance–provided partly through the PEGASE mechanism and from EU budget–have not changed, regardless of the Arab Spring and the “more for more” principle, conditionality (officially and intentionally) is not applied in the PNA (ECA 2013). However, the international community’s belief that the peace process is contingent on political stability and non-violence resulted in foreign support for a strong central authority and for enhancing the PNA’s capacity to meet its security obligations vis-à-vis Israel (Brynen et al. 2012, 57). In reality, foreign assistance is available only to those actors, “partners in peace” (the PNA and NGOs alike), that accept the “two state” idea, support the peace process and denounce “active” political participation.

The Price (the “Sacrifice”) The paragraphs above elaborate on the objectives of security-related and peace-contingent agreements, as well as of the size of foreign aid supporting peaceful relations between Israel and Egypt, and Jordan and Palestine respectively. But how much security, or what sort of stability, could foreign aid buy in the countries concerned? The answer depends on the timeframe, but the Arab Spring has clearly been a landmark. From a historical perspective, foreign assistance (external support in broader terms) has been an important element of regime survival, especially in proWestern states, since Western countries have been interested in supporting

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regime stability for the sake of regional stability (Brynen et al. 2012, 184). The Arab Spring illustrated the dilemmas donor countries had to face. Regional stability, one of the most important rationales behind military and development assistance, was challenged all of a sudden in 2011. Its aftermath, however, indicated that foreign aid (especially military- and security-related aid) can indeed play a “bonding” role between donors and “cooperative recipient governments” pursuing common goals. The millions of people demonstrating on the Arab streets mostly targeted their own governments’ failures to bring prosperity and democracy to their population. The “Arab Spring” was not about the Israeli-Arab relations but the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty and the Oslo Agreements on one hand, and foreign aid for their support on the other hand, equally failed to create widespread normalization and “people to people” relations. A significant portion of the population (in all the three countries) continues to oppose normalization of relations with Israel (see, for example, results of the third wave of the Arab Barometer, 2012-14) partially due to the continuing occupation of the Palestinian population and territories. However, the prevailing negative views of Israel are not simply the product of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Western donors have not only been accused of “donor complicity” with the Israeli occupation (in Palestine) but, by the same logic, serving authoritarian governments and facilitating oppression in Egypt and Jordan as well. The West has become part of the game since the Egyptian, Jordanian and Palestinian governments have equally enjoyed the benefits of Western foreign support in the form of foreign aid inflows. The Arab Spring made Western public opinion realize that foreign aid (channeled for the sake of stability) has not created real democracies in the recipient countries or mitigated genuine demands for democracy. On the contrary, foreign aid (just as rents from oil revenues) reinforced the notion that rent impedes democratic reforms (Brynen et al. 2012, 200). They may have provided for provisional, but not sustainable, stability for authoritarian rentier regimes in the region (Abulof 2015). Indeed, it is very likely that the combination of “chronic violent conflict in a region with widespread access to rents (foreign aid, oil, phosphate, etc.)” influenced the durability of authoritarian regimes (Brynen et al. 2012, 203) in Egypt, Jordan and the PNA alike. These regimes have usually been more concerned with internal threats than external threats (in 2011 too), partially due to the various peace agreements signed with Israel. These agreements have led not only to economic (development) aid inflows (or their increase in volume), but also

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military or security-driven foreign assistance (since the late 1970s) available in various forms (weapon supplies, long-term assistance for military industries, state-owned enterprises, intelligence and surveillance technologies) (Brynen et al. 2012, 204). The regimes have never been shy in using these means against their own population, which clearly prevented greater political participation, real democratization and created “barriers of fear” (Salamey et al. 2012). Neither Amman nor Cairo (nor Ramallah) could be very proud of the close working relations with the West in the field of military, security and intelligence (and development) cooperation, as long as these are seen as a sort of “sale of national dignity” by large segments of their population. Regional violence, armed conflicts, peace treaties (with Israel) and “supportive” foreign assistance affected not only regime stability; they also created conditions that increased the state’s capacity to maintain a monopoly on the means of coercion and survival in the name of stability. International support allowed the Egyptian regime to manage a favorable internal balance of power while keeping the increasingly restless society away from it (Brynen et al. 2012, 262-266). Demonstrations during the Arab Spring illustrated extremely well the level of popular illegitimacy and discontent with such policies and their domestic consequences, not only in Egypt, but in Jordan and Palestine as well. They have had serious consequences in Egypt and may have contributed to the legitimacy crises in the region elsewhere too (Telhami 2013; Salamey et al. 2012). The unfinished being of the Arab Spring–weak and/or oppressed demonstrations in Palestine and Jordan, the military coup in Egypt, general unrest and instability throughout the region–and the weakness of prodemocracy demonstrators to seize power have questioned the viability of strategies pursuing democracy-promotion with or without conditions. The dilemma (supporting democracy vs. strengthening stability) is still on the table, especially in light of the tense relations between Israel and the general Arab public. However, as indicated by the theoretical analysis presented in the first part of this chapter and illustrated by this section, the quality of aid relationships–ties and bonds between the donor(s) and the recipient–matters more than the quantity of aid or certain officially stated goals, such as supporting democracy transition.

Conclusion Foreign aid relations in the Middle East reflect on the complicated relationship between (the concepts of) reciprocity and equality. On the one hand, as Keohane puts it, reciprocity per se assumes “exchanges of

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roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of others in such a way that good is returned for good, bad for bad” (1986, 8). These exchanges–such as military alliance and assistance between the U.S. and Israel or the R&D cooperation (representing an atypical foreign aid/grant) between the EU and Israel–are mutually beneficial and may be based on either self-interest or shared concepts of rights and duties, while the value of what is exchanged may or may not be comparable. On the other hand, certain aid relations–like the ones between Western donors and Arab states–are based on the fact that there is little prospect of equivalent exchange. However, these relations can also be mutually beneficial. In these cases, reciprocity may characterize relations between “unequals” (patron, client) in which mutually valued but non-comparable goods and services are exchanged (such as security cooperation) and states do not have identical obligations (Keohane 1986, 6-7). In these cases, the (dominated) recipient’s dependence on the (superior) donor is created and maintained by gains the recipient can realize in exchange for certain benefits, including foreign aid (Baldwin 1998, 145). Without inequality and dependence there is no real chance for intervention in the recipient state. Relations between Israel and the United States are balanced and strengthened by military aid, resembling both market and social exchange. The benefits are mutual and the gains are common, at least by and large. The nature of relations between the U.S. and the Arab recipients of military aid is less obvious, partially because these regimes can return the “foreign gifts” only by “gestures” alienating their own societies. The same applies to development aid, the acceptance of which, in many cases, creates tensions between various segments of the recipient society (between governments and NGOs, within the NGO community). Unlike relations established and maintained by gifts circulating in (archaic) societies, contemporary foreign aid relationships mostly reflect inequality regardless of the official rhetoric emphasizing “partnership” between the donor and the recipient. Recipients are subordinated since they always stand at the “recipient end” of “aid economy” relations and can hardly return the “foreign gifts” without confronting their own societies on further grounds and various levels. While donor solidarity is conditional on stability and security, the benefits gained by the cooperative governments are not widely appreciated by the population. At the end of the day, this is the price, or sacrifice, which is to be undertaken by governments accepting foreign aid and returning it by complying with “non-honorable” conditions, and the loss of popularity and legitimacy within its population. Foreign aid is widely

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perceived as an imperfect, “poisonous” gift which is not a real gift from donor countries, but rather, a calculated instrument for gaining profits. This logic, of course, implies something else too: if donor countries provided “unconditional” foreign aid, real gifts, and money to be spent without conditions or expectations, the “sacrifice” should be undertaken by their own populations.

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Polanyi, Karl. 2001. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Pyyhtinen, Olli. 2014. The Gift and its Paradoxes: beyond Mauss. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. Rabi, Mohammed. 1988. The Politics of Foreign Aid: U.S. foreign assistance and aid to Israel. London: Praeger. Rist, Gilbert. 2003. The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith. London: Zed Books. Sahlins, Marshall. 1972. Stone Age Economics. Piscataway: Aldine Transaction. Salamé, Ghassan, ed. 1994. Democracy Without Democrats? The renewal of politics in the Muslim world. London: I. B. Tauris. Salamey, Imad and Frederic S. Pearson. 2012. “The Collapse of Middle Eastern Authoritarianism, Breaking the Barriers of Fear and Power.” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 5: 931-948. Samour, Sobi. 2014. “The Promises and Limitations of Economic Protests in the West Bank.” In Kjetil Fossheim, ed. Arab Spring. Uprisings, Powers and Interventions. New York: Berghahn. Schenker, David. 2014a. “It's Been 20 Years Since One of the Middle East Peace Process's Biggest Success Stories.” Business Insider. Accessed January 12 2015. http://www.businessinsider.com/its-been-20-yearssince-the-israel-jordan-treaty-2014-10#ixzz3V6sspHKc —. 2014b. “Twenty Years of Israeli-Jordanian Peace, A Brief Assessment’.” POLICYWATCH 2328, Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Accessed January 12 2015. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/twenty-yearsof-israeli-jordanian-peace-a-brief-assessment Sharp, Jeremy M. 2014a. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Accessed January 12 2015. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf (12 January, 2015). —. 2014b Jordan, Background and U.S. Relations. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Accessed January 12 2015. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33546.pdf —. 2015. Egypt, Background and U.S. Relations. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Accessed April 12 2015. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf Silverstein, K. 2005. “U.S., Jordan Forge Closer Ties in Covert War on Terrorism.” Los Angeles Times. Accessed January 12 2015. http://articles.latimes.com/2005/nov/11/world/fg-gid11

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Stirrat, R. L. and Heiko Henkel. 1997. “The Development Gift: the Problem of Reciprocity in the NGO World.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 554: 66-80. Stokke, Olav, ed. 1995. Aid and Political Conditionality. London: Frank Cass. Tagdishi-Rad, Sahar. 2011. The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine: Relief from conflict or development delayed? London: Routledge. Telhami, Shibley. 2013. The World Through Arab Eyes: Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East. New York: Basic Books. Tessler, Mark, ed. 1999. Area studies and Social Science: strategies for understanding Middle East politics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Tessler, Mark. 2011. Public Opinion in the Middle East, Survey Research and the Political Orientations of Ordinary Citizens. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Turner, Mandy. 2011. “Aid and the 'Partners for Peace' Paradigm in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.” Bulletin of the Council for British Research in the Levant, Vol. 6, No. 1: 35-42. US GOV. 2014. “Foreign Military Financing Account Summary (2014)” prepared by the USA Government. Accessed March 2 2015. http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm —. 2015. The United States and Jordan Sign a Memorandum of Understanding on U.S. Assistance. Accessed March 5 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237128.htm Wight, Martin. 1991. International Theory: The three traditions. Leicester: Leicester University Press. Wildeman, Jeremy and Alaa Tartir. 2014. “Unwilling to Change, Determined to Fail: Donor aid in occupied Palestine in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings.” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3: 431-449. Zanotti, Jim. 2015. “Israel, Background and U.S. Relations.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Accessed March 5 2015. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33476.pdf

CHAPTER SIX TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: PROMOTING PEACE AND STABILITY TARIK OUMAZZANE

Introduction The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has been experiencing unprecedented national, and regional challenges since the uprisings of 2011, commonly referred to in the media as the “Arab Spring”. The increase in extremism, the emergence and intensification of civil wars and conflict within states and between state and non-state actors, and the mass displacement of refugees have become increasingly salient features of the political and economic landscape of the region. These events have garnered major attention in both media coverage and academic research. Nevertheless, simultaneous (and far older) processes of regional integration–in varying forms, from free trade agreements like the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), to economic and political union like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Maghreb Union (MU)–have been attempted since the end of the Second World War. The last in the sequence is the free trade agreement (FTA) known as the Agadir Agreement, signed in 2004 by Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. This chapter evaluates the economic impact of the Agadir Agreement. In so doing, it assesses changes in trade volume, growth in intra-regional trade and effects on economic integration between the four member states. In addition, this chapter sheds light on the attempted economic and political processes of integration shaping the MENA since World War Two, as well as the obstacles that have hindered the region’s political and economic integration. This chapter fills a gap in the International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) literature. Research that has

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investigated integration in the MENA is limited in number (Maliniak and Tierney 2009; Snider 2015; Baumann 2015). Most studies have focused on the political economy of integration in the Global North (for example, the EU and NAFTA) and in a few cases the implications of processes in the Global South for the North (Hobson 2007; Anand 2007). Contrary to that approach, this chapter focuses on the Agadir Agreement, an FTA signed by four states of the Global South. Furthermore, this chapter focuses on “low politics” 1 in the study of MENA integration processes by linking issues of trade, economics and poverty, to issues of peace and security in the region. This focus contributes to balance the current discourse on the MENA, which tends to concentrate excessively on security, fundamentalism and a “clash of civilizations” narrative whilst ignoring economic, social and economic factors that have evidently contributed to the disintegration of the region.

Methodology This chapter adapts a positivist method of analyzing changes in trade patterns between Agadir member states, and compares this with trade with the world economy as a whole, and with the broader MENA market. The collection of datasets on bilateral and multilateral trade between Agadir member states has been completed using the UN Comtrade Database. Only merchandise goods between Agadir member states between 2001 and 2014 are analyzed. Services are not included since data is not available from reliable sources for the period studied. The variables examined are the Agadir Agreement as an independent variable and trade volume as the dependent variable. Trade volume can be defined as the amount of goods and services exchanged between two actors. It can also be referred to as the total sum of all imports and exports traded between two agents. Trade volume is an important measure of economic integration. It indicates the degree of interdependence, and is used to measure the worth of trade between different countries (Chirico 2013). This chapter will examine trade volume between Agadir member states to determine if there has been significant change in trade and to assess how effective the Agreement has been in fostering economic integration between its members. The argument tested is: the higher the

1

In International Relations, “low politics” refers to economics and social affairs as opposed to “high politics” which refers to state's survival and its national security (Hobbes 1996; Keohane and Nye 1977).

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trade volume between member states, the more significant the Agadir Agreement has been.

Defining Economic Integration Economic integration does not have a clear-cut meaning (Jovanovic 2015; Balassa 2011). Balassa defines economic integration as a “process and a state of affairs. Regarded as a process, it encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies” (Balassa 2011, 1). Jovanovic defines economic integration as “a process and a means by which a group of countries strives to increase its level of welfare. It involves the recognition that a weak or strong partnership between countries can achieve this goal in a more efficient way than by unilateral and independent pursuance of policy in each country” (2015, 6). According to the above definitions, economic integration can be understood as the organization of economic activities in a way that national boundaries become redundant. It implies free trade in goods and services and the free movement of capital, labor and businesses. This is achieved via the removal of all trade impediments between participating states. Economic integration manifests itself in different ways: FTAs, preferential trade agreements (PTAs), customs unions, common markets, economic unions and monetary unions. These manifestations vary in scale and depth. “The more integrated the economies become, the fewer trade barriers exist and the more economic and political coordination there is between the member countries” (Bartsevich 2015, 2). Simultaneously, the more integrated the economies become, the less national sovereignty is pronounced (Haas 1958). Smith, El-Anis and Farrands refer to this as a phenomenon that is a key characteristic of life in the 21st century: “governments and citizens are increasingly affected by structures and processes beyond their immediate locality and control” (2013, 2).

Exploring Regional Integration Regional integration has become a key feature and one of the major developments of international relations and international political economy since the end of World War Two. Governments have sought alliances in different forms and shapes. Bilateral, multilateral and regionwide projects including economic unions and FTAs have been signed and

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established. Effectively, the majority of states are now members of at least one regional bloc. In joining unions and FTAs, member states wish to facilitate intra-regional trade, support political cooperation, improve social welfare and promote peace and stability in their regions (El-Anis 2015). The MENA is no different in this respect. Like other regions, the process of economic integration began towards the end of World War Two with the establishment of the Arab League in 1945. This was soon followed by a series of economic and political, bilateral and multilateral agreements between MENA states. Whilst the MENA has preceded other regional blocs (including the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR), it has largely failed to integrate economically or politically (Brock 2012; Cammett et al. 2015). An IPE approach provides the means of contextualizing the political economy of integration between Agadir member states. Theories of institutional peace provide the theoretical perspective underpinning this research. Liberal institutionalists argue that states can no longer act unilaterally since they are increasingly interdependent (Oneal et al. 2003). They believe in the relevance of institutions and recommend their establishment. They argue that institutions reduce uncertainty, promote negotiations, lessen transaction costs, promote information sharing and affect the behavior of states (Keohane 1998; Keohane and Nye 1985). Neofunctionalism focuses on the progressive development of regional integration arguing that integration develops its own internal dynamic referred to as “spill-over” (Rosamond 2006). It concentrates on “low politics”, such as economic and social issues, considering them the very source of international conflict. It argues that cooperation could emerge in a non-political context and that it is possible to go beyond the nation-state to a peaceful, orderly and productive system (Haas 1958). Commercial institutional peace theory, inspired by both liberal institutionalism and neofunctionalism, argues that international institutions, especially FTAs, help reduce the incidence of militarized interstate conflict (Bearce 2003). These theories have been developed within the liberal tradition. Liberalism emphasizes the importance of fostering economic interdependence among states and highlights the positive effects of economic integration on development, peace and stability (Oneal 1997). Bolbol argues in favor not only of intraregional trade among MENA states, but also the latter's integration into the broader world economy: “the Arab World should take renewed advantage of its geographical position as an ‘open’ trading region between Europe and the rest of Asia–something that it did with remarkable success in premodern times” (1999, 15).

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Nevertheless, Bolbol links the lack of economic integration in MENA to the lack of a political will. On the one hand, McDonald (2004) argues that higher levels of free trade, rather than trade alone, reduce military conflict between states. On the other hand, Bearce and Omori (2005) argue that economic integration is associated with more, not less, military conflict. To support their argument, they reference the Central American Common Market and how its deepest regional commercial arrangements led to the “Football War” of 1969. Yet, Bearce and Omori's empirical evidence suggests that commercial institutions with more forums for state leaders can contribute significantly to regional peace. Using an augmented gravity model, Ekanayake and Ledgerwood (2009) have demonstrated the importance of language and culture as factors affecting trade and investment. In a similar context, Hoffmann's (2007) experimental economics work shows how cooperation increases between members of the same religion. In his article “Is God Good for Trade”, Helble’s (2007) experiments indicate that sharing a common religion is trade-promoting. Momani explains that the U.S. promotion of intraregional trade and investment in the MENA will raise the economic costs of disloyalty. This will create in Momani's words: “a hub and spoke relationship”, hence, a reluctant acceptance of U.S. hegemony in the region. She further argues that “Middle East economies do not complement one another to build an effective economic bloc on their own” (2007, 1698). In this interdisciplinary context, the political economy of integration in the MENA is assessed here. The initial assumption underpinning this chapter is: joining a FTA will enhance economic integration and interdependence. The latter will promote political cooperation, peace and stability.

The MENA’s Historical “Integration” Process MENA governments have long regarded regional economic integration to be a chief policy objective. They have adopted policies aimed not only at integrating their economies with each other, but also at integrating their domestic economies with the global economy. Similar to other world trade blocs, MENA countries have established these unions and FTAs to facilitate intra-regional trade, support political cooperation, improve social welfare and promote peace and stability in their region (El-Anis 2015). Indeed, attempts to integrate the MENA economically and politically began almost immediately after World War Two. With the establishment

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of the Arab League in 1945, the prospects for economic and political integration between MENA states were positive. Within a short time bilateral, multilateral and region-wide projects, including economic unions and FTAs, were established (see Figure 1). Fig. 6.1. Historical “integrative” agreements

1945 1953 1957 1958 1964 1981 1981 1989 1997 2004

The Arab League Transit Agreement The Arab Unity Agreement United Arab Republic Arab Common Market Trade Facilitation and Trade Promotion Accord The Gulf Cooperation Council The Maghreb Union Greater Arab Free Trade Area Agadir Agreement

Attempts to integrate the MENA have been numerous. This puts forward the argument for two things: firstly, states in the region (in particular Arab states) have clearly demonstrated their desire to integrate with each other, and secondly, that their attempts have largely failed—as evidenced by the fact that they keep having to create new projects and sign new agreements. Below is a brief background of these economic and political attempts. Predating the establishment of the UN, the Arab League was founded in Cairo in March 1945. It is an association of 22 states. The Arab League aims to strengthen economic and political ties among member states, coordinate their policies and direct them towards a common good (Charter of Arab League, ARTICLE II). In 1953, the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League approved The Treaty on Transit. It was the first agreement meant to facilitate intra-regional trade among member states through the creation of preferential tariffs for some agricultural and industrial products in the MENA (Jovanovic 2011). In 1957, the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League approved the Economic Unity Agreement (EUA). It aimed to provide the “best conditions for flourishing its member states economies, developing their resources and ensuring the prosperity of their countries” (BoutrosGhali 1972, 45). In its constituting document, the EUA included ambitious language. It aspired to establish complete economic unity that intended to promote the “free movement of persons and capital; the free exchange of goods and products; freedom of residence, use of modes of transport and

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civil ports and airports for all Arab citizens” (EUA Agreement 1957). It is important to note that the very year the EUA was approved (1957), six European countries decided to establish the European Economic Community which, over five decades later, has become a full-fledged Union composed of 28 member states. On the other hand, it could be argued that divisions and differences between the Arab states have made the 1957 EUA a distant memory. Despite many years in operation, the Arab League has failed to coordinate foreign, political or economic policies. Divisions among member states have hindered its effectiveness (Ehteshami 2007). Differing ideological orientations, rivalry over positions of leadership, and hostility between traditional monarchies and revisionist republics have impeded the work of the Arab League in particular and cooperation between MENA states in general (Rodriguez 2011). Between 1958 and 1961, a three year political union between Egypt and Syria was created. The United Arab Republic was the product of Arab nationalism which assumed more influence in Nasser’s Egypt and the greater Arab world (Jankowski 2001). At the time, many Arabs hoped that the union would signal the realization of the pan-Arab dream (Podeh 1999). However, Nasser’s reluctance to share power and failure to find a suitable political system for new union soon led to its collapse (ibid.). Podeh (ibid.) argues that its disintegration shattered the pan-Arab dream beyond repair. A further attempt to nurture cooperation between Arab states in the MENA was signed in 1964 by Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Libya, who agreed on an Arab Common Market (ACM). The ACM aimed to establish a full customs union that would abolish trade restrictions, trade quotas, and restrictions on residence, employment, labor, and transportation amongst its members. Despite eliminating some customs duties and taxes, the ACM never came close to reaching its ultimate goal of a full customs union (Yousri 1988). In 1981, the GCC was founded as a regional intergovernmental organization which consists of the oil rich states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (Low and Salazar 2011). According to its General Secretary Charter, it aims to coordinate integration between its member states in all fields, including: macro-economics, trade, finance, industry, agriculture, water, religion, research and development. In 2009, the GCC announced the creation of a Monetary Council to introduce a single currency for the union (ibid.). Soon after, Oman and the UAE announced their withdrawal of the proposed currency (Villalta and Al-Khoudry 2012). Though the GCC has

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not expanded since its creation in 1981, invitations to join the GCC were sent to Jordan and Morocco in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring (Colombo 2012). Noticeably, neither of these states progressed to join the GCC. Though some observers have considered the GCC a success story (Low and Salazar 2011; Hossain and Naser 2008), economically, the GCC remains much more integrated with the world’s economy than with MENA because of the role of hydrocarbons in trade patterns (Akhtar and Rouis 2010). Established in 1989, the Maghreb Union consists of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya. It aims to establish a trading bloc and a common market by means of integrating the economies of the member states (Darrat and Pennathur 2002). Twenty-six years after its establishment, political obstacles (mainly between Algeria and Morocco) have almost brought the Maghreb Union to a stand-still, a condition that became known in international relations as the “Non-Maghreb” (Ghiles 2010; Oueslati 2013). Yet another example of renewed attempts at regional integration in the MENA is the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) signed in 1997 by the Arab League (Zarroul 2000). Abedini and Péridy stated that its “main provisions concerned the progressive removal of tariff barriers on intraGAFTA trade” (2008, 849). GAFTA aims to boost the economies of the member states by forming a bigger and more homogenous market, attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), strengthening the member countries’ negotiating power when dealing with powerful economic blocs, increase economic interdependence between Arab countries and thus increase the region’s stability and security (Peridy and Ghoneim 2009). Despite the progress made, the implementation of tariff exemptions (UN 2007) and a noticeable progress in customs clearance-related procedures (Hoekman and Zarrouk 2009), GAFTA is far from realizing its goals. Ten years after its signature, inter-Arab trade remains modest. The percentage of inter-Arab trade was less than 12% in terms of imports and exports in 2008 (Abdmoulah 2011). Abedini and Péridy concluded that “the GAFTA agreement should go deeper and wider” (2008, 17).

The MENA: Between integration and disintegration Despite the bilateral and multilateral agreements, economic and political unions, and FTAs mentioned above, and despite sharing a common language, religion, culture, and historical sense of identity, overall, the MENA is the least economically and politically integrated region in the world (Rouis and Tabor 2013). Nsour argues that “the Arab

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states that were one country for more than 1000 years […] were not able to achieve any noticeable form of economic integration” (2010, 218).

The MENA’s Economic Disintegration A report produced by the International Institutions and Global Governance Programme stated that intra-regional trade in the region is somewhere between 5% and 10% of the region’s total trade, and the region’s global share of non-hydrocarbon exports is less than 1% (Brock 2012). Trade in goods is limited and trade in services is extremely limited. According to the Tariff-only Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index, the level of tariff protection in the MENA remains high compared to the rest of the world (Rouis and Tabor 2013). The high level of tariff protection ranks MENA unfavorably compared to Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and East Asia and the Pacific (ibid.). In addition, nontariff measures have become the most important barriers to trade in goods in the MENA (Hoekman and Zarrouk 2009). The introduction of risk management, the little effort to monitor customs performance, and the insufficiently improved facilities at border crossings have all contributed to slow logistics performance in the region (Rouis and Tabor 2013). Considering these hurdles and obstacles, the MENA’s aspiration to establish a common market by 2020 is highly dubious. It is worth noting that the phenomenon expressed above is particularly problematic considering that the MENA’s population is approximately 351 million (World Bank 2015) doubling every 25 years, and ranking first globally in terms of the proportion of the total population under the age of 30. This means that youth employment is one of the most critical issues facing the region (UN 2011). In this context, Rouis and Tabor (2013) argue that adopting policies that promote economic integration in the MENA could help address the critical development challenges that have been brought to the forefront by the “Arab Spring”.

The MENA’s Political Disintegration Divisions among MENA states have hindered the coordination of foreign, political and economic policies. Some divisions have arisen due to different states adopting contrasting ideologies since their independence in the mid-twentieth century. Whilst some states were revisionist, somewhat socialist and Soviet-leaning (such as Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria), others fell within the more conservative, status quo and Western-leaning camp (including Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE).

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Regional conflicts and a lack of trust deepened the differences between MENA states. Most states have had territorial or border disputes following independence. For example, the border between Algeria and Morocco remains closed since 1994 as a result of concerns about cross-border clandestine activities as well as differing policies vis-à-vis the enduring Sahara Conflict. For much of the Cold War era the region was starkly divided between those in the pro-West camp and those in the Soviet camp, as well as rivalry over regional leadership between Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran and to an extent Israel. Historically, hostilities between traditional monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco) and new republics or "revolutionary" states (Egypt, Libya and Iraq) have been severe. In his book, La Mémoire D'un Roi, Hassan II stated that several attempts to assassinate him were ordered by Colonel Qaddafi (Hassan 1993). The political divisions between MENA states became indistinct during the first and second Iraq Wars with some supporting the war, some opposing it and others standing on the sidelines (Gause 2013).

The Agadir Agreement: A new perspective Realizing the shortcomings of the various integrative processes, four MENA countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan,) signed the Agadir Agreement in 2004. This agreement came into force in 2007. To date, it stands as the last multilateral FTA in the MENA. Not only does it aim to promote faster economic integration and coordination between its members, but also to consolidate economic liberalization at a broader regional level, and with the EU as part of the Barcelona Process. The Agadir Agreement is open to further membership by members of the Arab League and the GAFTA, and is linked to the EU through an Association Agreement (Peridy 2005). The questions that arise here are: will the Agadir Agreement resolve the limitations on previous economic integration attempts that have been unsuccessful? And, secondly, could it act as a transitory stage towards deeper economic integration within the MENA? It is worth highlighting some indicators about the four Agadir member states at this stage. Table 6.1 summarizes key macro-economic indicators for these states.

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Table 6.1. Agadir member states indicators (2015) Morocco

Tunisia

Egypt

Jordan

Population (millions) (2014)

33.92

10.99

89.57

6.6

GDP (billions of $) (2014)

110

48.61

286.5

35.8

GDP Growth (2014)

2.4%

2.7%

2.2%

3.1%

Inflation

0.5%

4.92%

11.5%

3.4%

Total Export (billions of $)

32

21

47

14

Total Import (billions of $)

47

26

73

23

Unemployment (2013)

9.2%

13.3%

12.7%

12.6%

Life expectancy

71

70

71

74

Source: World Bank (2016)

In terms of GDP Growth (see Figure 3) we notice an inconsistency over the last 15 years. Whilst it is evident that Agadir member states can reach staggering figures of 8% (Jordan and Morocco), 7% (Tunisia), and 6% (Egypt) in certain years, the challenge lies in not being able to maintain these figures for a prolonged period of time. This could be explained by several factors: financial (international financial crises), environmental (periods of heavy droughts and other effects of climate change), and domestic and regional security (internal conflicts and instability in the region).

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Fig. 6.2. GDP growth of Agadir member states 10 8 6 4 2 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 -2 -4

Morocco

Tunisia

Data from the World Bank (see Figure 4) shows that trade (both imports and exports) from Agadir member states to the world economy noticed a steady growth from 2000 until 2008 when they decreased, before they began to pick up in 2010. It is interesting to note that an increase was witnessed in both the imports and exports of Agadir member states during the two years after the Agadir Agreement came into force was. Whilst it could be argued that the sharp drop in the volume of imports and exports of 2008 could be explained by the global financial crisis of 2008, it may also be possible to argue that the increase in trade volume of Agadir member states is the consequence of the Agadir Agreement.

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Fig. 6.3. Agadir imports and exports of goods and services (current US$)

Imports 8E+10 7E+10 6E+10 5E+10 4E+10 3E+10 2E+10 1E+10 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

0

Morocco

Tunisia

Egypt

Jordan

Exports 6E+10 5E+10 4E+10 3E+10 2E+10 1E+10 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

0

Morocco

Tunisia

Egypt

Jordan

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A SWOT analysis (see Figure 5) of Agadir member states demonstrates that they have several advantages. A major one is their geographical position between the European, African and Asian markets. The cost of labor is relatively cheap compared to Europe, and their domestic markets have been growing overall for much of the past two decades, making them relatively attractive to FDI. The main threats are the growing instability in the region and the inability of governments in the region to act as a unified bloc. Fig. 6.4. SWOT analysis of Agadir member states

Strengths x Geographic proximity x Bilateral agreements signed with other countries/regions x Quality and cost of labor

Opportunities x Strategic position of the Agadir countries x Domestic markets x Growing interest of manufacturers in the Agadir area (especially those based in China, South Korea, and India).

Weaknesses x Non-complementary products x Weakness of inter-state infrastructures x Low R&D capacity and technological delay x Intra-regional investment is low x Isolated national actions (political and economic) Threats x Instability in the MENA x A non-unified standards system x The competitiveness of China

The Agadir Agreement’s Impact on Intra-regional Trade and Economic Integration Rania Nabil, the person in charge of the Agadir Agreement at the Egyptian Ministry of Trade and Industry, stated: the figures prove it [the success of the Agadir Agreement]. Each country’s export and import volume has increased, which helped some of them reduce their negative balance of trade, while others managed to increase their positive balance of trade. Everyone is a winner, especially as SouthSouth cooperation is considered the main growth factor in the 21st century. Not to mention that the EU offers large trade and investment

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Makableh explains that the Agadir Agreement has been successful in a relatively short period of time. The Agadir Agreement has been described as a milestone in the progress of South-South integration: “Il marque une étape dans la progression de l’intégration sud-sud et constitue une démarche volontaire entreprise par ces quatre partenaires” (Chafik et al. 2008, 44). In order to evaluate the Agadir Agreement’s impact on the economic integration between participating states, data on trade volume has been analyzed for each member state between 2001 and 2014. The time frame was chosen in order to assess the situation before and after the Agadir Agreement came into force in 2007.

Morocco Morocco’s Imports from Agadir Member States Figure 6.5 shows Morocco’s imports from Agadir member states between 2001 and 2014. At first sight, it is noticeable that trade increased in 2007 (the year the Agreement entered into force) with the other three partners. The change is more noticeable with Egypt. Imports from Egypt tripled from $209.149 million in 2006 to $548.840 million in 2014. Tunisian imports grew continuously during the following four years after 2007, to reach $282.126 million from $133.849 million in 2006; however, imports began to decrease after 2011 to reach $206.993 million in 2014. Though imports from Jordan quadrupled from $4.982 million in 2006 to reach $19.984 million in 2011, it remains insignificant. Comparing the percentage of Morocco’s share of imports from the other Agadir member states, it is noticeable that Egypt’s share of exports increased from 50% in 2001 to 71% in 2014.

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Fig. 6.5. Morocco’s imports from Agadir member m states (22001-2014)

600000

Million of $

500000 400000 300000

Egypt

200000

Tunisia

100000

Jordan

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

0 Yea ars

Morocco’s Exports E to Agadir A Membber States Figure 7 summarizess Morocco’s exports to A Agadir memb ber states between 20001 and 2014. It I is noticeable that exportss increased in 2007, the year the Aggreement enttered into forrce, with thee other three partners. Morocco’s eexports to Egyypt increased 344% from $337.510 million n in 2006 to $166.6933 million in 2013. 2 With Tu unisia, exportts increased 32% 3 from £92.043 milllion in 2006 to t £121.624 million m in 20122. With Jordan n, exports doubled from $23.769 million m in 200 06 to $42.2877 million in 2012. 2 The important oobservation is that exports to Jordan beegan to decreease from 2013 onwarrds, and to Egypt in 2014. Comparinng the perceentage of Morocco’s sshare of exporrts to other Ag gadir memberr states, it is noticeable n that share off exports to Eggypt increased d from 31% inn 2001 to 50% % in 2014.

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mber states (200 1 -2014) Fig. 6.6. Morocco’s exports to Agadir mem

180000 160000

Million of $

140000 120000 100000 80000

Egypt

60000

Tunisia

40000

Jordan

20000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

0 Yea ars

Tunisia T Tunisia’s Im mports from Agadir A Mem mber States Figure 82 demonstratees Tunisia’s imports from Agadir memb ber states between 20001 and 20133. It is noticceable that ttrade with Egypt E has substantiallyy increased since s the Agrreement camee into force in 2007. Imports from m Egypt incrreased 135% from $106.3886 million in n 2006 to $249.603 m million in 20088. Imports decreased the folllowing three years but picked up inn 2012. With Morocco, im mports grew s lowly and steeadily the following fiive years afteer 2007 to reaach $129.684 million in 20 012 from $70.945 milllion in 2006. However, im mports decreassed in 2013 to o $95.868 million. Thoough imports from Jordan almost tripledd from $8.741 million in 2006 to $$22.395 milliion in 2012, it i remains minnor compared d to trade with other partners. Coomparing the percentage oof Tunisia’s share of imports from m Agadir member states,, it is noticeaable that its share of imports from m Egypt has inncreased from m 43% in 20011 to 67% in 20 013. 2

Figures werre not provided for 2014

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Fig. 6.7. Tuniisia’s imports from fr Agadir member states (20001-2013)

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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

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Tunisia’s Exports E to Ag gadir Membber States Figure 9 summarizes Tunisia’s exports to A Agadir memb ber states between 20001 and 20133. The most notable deveelopment is that t with Morocco. E Exports to Moorocco increassed 115% from m $108.666 million m in 2006 to $2234.151 millioon in 2008. This developpment in exp ports was sustained unntil 2012 whenn it began to fall. Exports tto Egypt doub bled from $49.856 milllion in 2006 to $87.065 million m in 20007 and remain ned at the same averagge for the foollowing six years. Tunisiia’s exports to t Jordan tripled from m $5.751 milllion in 2006 6 to $16.2444 million, bu ut remain insignificantt compared to t other partn ners. Comparring the perceentage of Tunisia’s shhare of expoorts to the other o Agadir member stattes, it is noticeable thhat Tunisia’s share of expo orts to Moroccco increased from f 52% in 2001 to 70% in 2013.

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Fig. 6.8. Tuniisia’s exports too Agadir member states (2001--2014)

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Morocco Egypt

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Egyp pt Egypt’s Impports from Agadir A Membber States Figure 110 3 summarizees Egypt’s im mports from A Agadir memb ber states between 20001 and 2013. It is noticeab ble that there was not an im mmediate effect in 20007, the year thhe agreement came c into forcce. The develo opment is noted from 2008 onwards. Imports fro om Tunisia inccreased 675% % to reach $93.643 milllion in 20088 from the modest figure of $12.377 million m in 2005. In 20112, it increaseed 2363% to reach r $304.8000 million beffore it fell back to the average figuures after 200 07. Imports fr from Morocco o steadily increased affter 2007: theyy increased 972% 9 from $110.950 million n in 2005 to reach $1117.336 millioon in 2014. It is observabble that impo orts from Morocco coontinued to grow g whilst imports from m Tunisia an nd Jordan decreased affter 2012. Egyypt’s imports from Jordan stayed similarr the year before and aafter the Agreement came in nto force. Theey increased 49% 4 from 3

Data was noot provided for 2006.

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$72.607 miillion in 20005 to $107.9 988 million iin 2008 and d reached $212.245 million in 2012, then fell by half h to $123.8812 million in 2013. Compariing the percenntage of Egyp pt’s share of iimports from the other Agadir mem mber states inn 2001 and 20 014, Egypt’s import sharee from its three partnerrs has not radiically changed d. Fig. 6.9. Egyppt’s imports froom Agadir mem mber states (20001-2014)

350000 300000

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Tunisia Jordan

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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

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Egypt’s Exxports to Ag gadir Membeer States member states between Figure 111 shows Egyypt’s exports to Agadir m 2001 and 20014. It is clear from the graaph that Egyppt’s exports to o its three partners havve been augm mented since th he Agreemennt entered into o force in 2007. Egyptt’s exports too Jordan moree than tripledd, growing 216% from $196.349 m million in 20005 to $851.817 million in 2014. Ex xports to Morocco greew 468% from m $85.930 million in 2005 to $487.935 million m in 2014. It is recognizablee that exportts to Moroccco continued to grow

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steadily. Exxports to Tuniisia grew 450% % from $39.5513 million in n 2005 to $217.244 m million in 20088 and maintaiined more or less the samee average since. Compparing the peercentage of Egypt’s sharre of exports to other Agadir mem mber states, itt is noticeablle that Egypt ’s share of exports e to Jordan grew w from 35% inn 2001 to 48% in 2014. Fig. 6.10. Egyypt’s exports too Agadir membeer states (2001--2014)

1000000 0 9000000 8000000

Million of $

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Morocco

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Tunisia

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2000000 1000000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

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Jordan JJordan’s Imp mports from Agadir A Mem mber States Figure 12 shows Jordaan’s imports from f Agadir m member statess between 2001 and 22014. It is clear that Jord dan’s main ppartner in the Agadir Agreement is Egypt. Thee shift in Jordan’s volume oof imports fro om Egypt happened inn 2004. This is i the year thee Agadir Agreeement was siigned but had not yett come into force. f Importss tripled from m $117.886 million m in 2003 to $3300.498 million in 2004. It continuedd to grow affterwards.

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Though impports from Tuunisia and Morocco M grew,, it is evidentt that the Agadir Agreeement has noot had a majorr impact. Impoorts from both h partners have remainned extremely low. Comparring the percenntage of Jordaan’s share of imports from its parrtners clearly demonstratess Egypt‘s do ominance. Share of impports from Eggypt grew from m 80% in 20011 to 94% in 20 014. Fig. 6.11. Jordan’s imports from f Agadir meember states (20001-2014)

1000000 0 9000000 8000000 Million of $

7000000 6000000 5000000

Morocco

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Tunisia

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Egypt

2000000 1000000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

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Jordan’s Exports E to Ag gadir Membeer States Figure 113 shows Jorddan’s exports to Agadir m member states between 2001 and 20014. It is clearr from the grap ph that Egypt is the main deestination for Jordaniaan exports wiithin the Agad dir Agreemennt. Jordan’s exports e to Egypt noticed a major shhift in 2008, increasing byy 140% from m $56.915 million in 20006 to $136.7709 million in n 2014. Thouggh Jordanian exports e to Morocco triipled from $4.014 million in i 2006 to $1 2.792 million n in 2014, and exports to Tunisia doubled d from $9.633 millioon in 2006 to o $20.241 million in 20014, these rem main extremely low. Compaaring the perccentage of Jordan’s shaare of exportts to its partn ners within th the Agadir Agreement A clearly dem monstrates thaat the main destination d foor Jordan’s exports e is

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Egypt. Jordaan’s share of exports to Egypt grew from m 71% in 200 01 to 81% in 2014. Fig. 6.12. Jordan’s exports too Agadir memb ber states (2001 -2014)

180000 160000 140000 Million of $

120000 100000 Morocco

80000

Tunisia

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Egypt

40000 20000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

0 Yearrs

Reesults and Discussion D From thhe above anallysis, it can be argued thhat there is a positive correlation between signning the Agad dir Agreemennt and the in ncrease in trade volum me between meember states. Trade T has exppanded betweeen Agadir Agreement member statees since the agreement a cam me into forcee. Figures recorded aft fter 2007 show w imports an nd exports dooubled, tripled d or even quadrupled in some casess. This is relaative to each sstate. Egypt appears a to have reapedd the benefits of the FTA more m than thee other memb ber states. Within the A Agadir Agreeement, Egypt’s exports havve expanded 306% 3 and imports 2144% between 2005 and 2014 4. Morocco’s exports grew 72% and imports 121% in 2014 compared to 2006. Tunisia’s exports grew 66% and imports 89% % between 2006 2 and 201 14. Jordan m managed to ex xpand its exports 141% % and imports 15% in 2014 4 compared w with 2006.

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To conclude at this point that the Agadir Agreement has had a positive impact on intra-regional trade and the economic integration of the four member states would be short-sighted. It is true that imports and exports have increased between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan since the agreement came into force. However, other questions present themselves at this point. For example, how did imports and exports between the member states develop compared to their imports and exports with the MENA region as a whole? Has the development in their volume of trade been significant compared to their overall world trade? Comparing Agadir member states’ trade volume with each other and their worldwide trade volume (Figure 6.13) tells us unexpected results: intra-regional trade between Agadir member states remains extremely low compared to their worldwide trade. Whilst their intra-regional exports grew from 1% in 2001 to a modest 3% in 2014 compared with their worldwide exports, their intra-regional imports remained 1% in 2014, as it was in 2001, compared with their worldwide imports. Thus, it could be argued that the Agadir Agreement has not had a major impact on intraregional trade between the member states, compared to their worldwide trade, since the agreement came into force in 2007.

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Fig. 6.13. Imports and exports within the Agadir Agreement vs. the world (20012014) (USD) 180000000 160000000 140000000 120000000 100000000 80000000 60000000 40000000 20000000 0 2001 Export

2007 Export

Import

2014 Import

One reason the Agadir Agreement was created was that economic integration has been slow in the MENA compared with other regions (such as MERCOSUR, ASEAN, NAFTA). By focusing on four states, the aim was to speed up the economic integration between them and expand the agreement to include other MENA states. Comparing intra-Agadir trade with broader MENA trade (Figure 6.14), it is difficult to argue that the Agadir Agreement has led to a significant impact. However, it is true that intra-Agadir imports grew 494% compared with 450% for trade with the MENA as a whole, and their intra-Agadir exports grew 437% compared to 401% for the region in the period 2002-2013. The difference between intra-Agadir trade and their intra-MENA trade remains low, though, at 44% for imports and 36% for exports. This is a positive result for the FTA, but we could argue that it is not particularly substantial. This is especially true when we consider that the share of imports between Agadir member states compared with that of the MENA grew from 7% in 2002 to 9% in 2007, only to regress to the previous status quo of 7% in 2013. Share of intraAgadir exports grew from 10% in 2002 to 14% in 2007 and regressed to

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12% in 2013, compared to the share of intra-Agadir exports with the MENA. As a matter of fact, trade volume with some individual MENA states performed better in comparison to intra-Agadir trade. Fig. 6.14. Imports and exports within the Agadir Agreement vs. the MENA region (2001-2014) (USD) 35000000 30000000 25000000 20000000 15000000 10000000 5000000 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 20092010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Import

Import

Export

Export

Conclusion The Agadir Agreement is the last multinational FTA signed in the MENA after a long history of treaties aiming to foster intra-regional economic integration and political cooperation. Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan have hoped–via the Agreement–to create a free trade zone where they can liberalize commercial exchanges and strengthen their economic integration. Concentrating intra-regional trade between four states, it was anticipated that a dynamic “spill-over” process would emerge that not only would deepen economic integration but also promote political cooperation within the MENA as a whole.

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Whilst it could be argued that trade between the four member states has increased, it is short-sighted to conclude that the Agadir Agreement has reached its aims or has had a major impact on the economic integration between Agadir member states or within the MENA as a whole. First, the result for each Agadir member state has been relative. There are several factors that could explain this relativity. For Egypt, the size of its GDP compared to the other states could explain how it has managed to expand its exports and imports further. Jordan’s proximity to Egypt could explain why Egypt became its main partner within the Agadir Agreement. Tunisia and Morocco share linguistics (Arabic-French speaking), and belong to the Maghreb Union which could explain their higher trade with each other. Second, trade between the Agadir states continues to be low overall. This reflects the characteristics of MENA intra-regional trade compared to worldwide trade or other regions’ trade patterns. It is important to notice here that though many political and economic agreements have been signed between MENA states since World War Two, little has been achieved in fostering regional integration. One could argue that the agreements signed, including the Agadir Agreement, are no more than declarations of intent on the part of the participating signatories. They lack the binding and comprehensive conditions that characterize agreements of other economic regional blocs. Another reason could be the instability in the region following the first and second Iraq wars and the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, while some explanations are given as to why the process of economic integration has been slow-moving and inactive, there are other variables that could be analyzed to explain the low volume of trade, such as: the scarcity of high-tech products from member states; the similarity of products; distance, transport links and logistics; customs procedures; the size of economies; political will; forms of governance; cultural affinity and alliances. These variables merit exploration and analysis to better understand the political economy of integration of the Agadir Agreement specifically and the MENA generally. The methodology pursued in this chapter analyzed one independent variable, the Agadir Agreement, and one dependent variable, trade volume. This methodology proves a positive correlation between the two variables, meaning that signing the Agadir Agreement has led to an increase in trade volume. This, to a certain extent, supports the liberal institutionalist’s viewpoint that, in an increasingly interdependent world, institutions are relevant. Nonetheless, it is clear that liberal theories, that promote fostering economic interdependence among states and highlight the positive effects of economic integration on development, peace and

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stability (Oneal and Russett 1999), have failed by far in the MENA. This is demonstrated by the insignificance of intra-Agadir trade when compared with other economic regions’ trade, the failure of Arab states to integrate their economies despite signing numerous agreements since World War Two, and the inability to create a “spill-over” political economy process of integration such as is the case with the EU. All of these realities create doubt concerning the validity of liberal theories as far as the political economy of integration in the MENA context. This calls for, one would argue, a new IPE theory that embraces and emphasizes distinctive regional characteristics to promote the economic and political integration of the MENA.

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CHAPTER SEVEN THE GROWTH OF UNCONVENTIONAL GAS SUPPLY IN THE PERSIAN GULF: THE ROLE OF IRAN’S FUTURE LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS SUPPLY TO THE EU MOHAMMAD HOUSHISADAT

Introduction Natural gas is, and is predicted to remain, the fastest growing fossil fuel in the global energy mix between 2010 and 2030 (EIA 2013a, 41) with nearly a 50% increase in production predicted by the end of the next decade (IEA 2013b, 7-8). As it stands, today’s share of fossil fuels in the global energy mix, at 82%, is the same as it was 25 years ago, but the rise of renewables will likely reduce this to around 75% by 2035 (IEA 2013c, 4). The global gas supply’s share in the energy mix, it is estimated, will rise from its standing of 21% in 2010 to 25% in 2030. It is expected that global Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) trading will also double by 2020 (CEDIGAZ 2011, 6) as its demand grows globally with the rise in prices (IGU 2013, 35). The EU as a whole is predicted to be the top gas importer by 2030 (EC 2011, 2), importing roughly 80% of the gas it needs after 2020 (BP 2012, 78-79). The rate of EU LNG imports will rise up to 90% in 2020, compared to 2010 figures. The EU is expected to import vast quantities of LNG in the coming years, with the more than 31 terminals in the region in place to facilitate this process. Of those 31 terminals, 24 (or roughly 80%) are located in the UK, France, Spain and Italy, which are the entry points for nearly 87% of the region’s LNG (IGU 2010, 8). Energy security, in the traditional sense, has been focused on oil supply. However, since the end of the Cold War, natural gas has gradually become the world’s “fuel of choice”, mainly due to its flexibility, abundance, technological advances, and extensive use in power generation, thermal

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efficiencies, as well as environmental friendliness compared to other fossil fuels. This has led to the introduction of the term “security of gas supply” to the global energy literature (Luft and Korine 2009, 55). Iran’s role in this process is key to the analysis being carried out here. In this study, the role of Iran’s potential in LNG supply for the future energy security of the EU, in general, and the UK, France, Spain and Italy, in particular, as well as its mutual effects, will be analyzed. Iran currently holds close to 18% of total global gas reserves (BP 2013, 20). In order to carry out this analysis, the independent variable of the hypothesis is Iran’s LNG exports in the future, while the dependent variable is the EU’s energy security. This study is, furthermore, the combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods and will be descriptive-exploratory and descriptive-analytical, methodologically. This chapter will be focused around four specific sections, followed by a final conclusion. In the first section, the areas receiving specific attention are the current literature reviews in the present knowledge on natural gas, with particular emphasis on LNG supply. It will then move on to assessing the main applied theoretical frameworks along with the core terminology of the energy security. The second section is devoted specifically to EU energy matters and policy. The third section will focus on geo-politics and more closely on Iran’s gas-related issues. It aims to highlight the challenges facing Iran, both from development within the global gas and LNG markets, as well as from outside issues such as the application of sanctions. However, by fulfilling the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)1 between Iran and P5+1 and the start of the post-sanctions period, Iran could dramatically increase its gas and even LNG production. Finally, the fourth section will examine the Iranian-EU LNG relationship in the future context and will be based on the four-indicators of energy security.

Literature Review Over the past decade, there have been a number of core publications that estimate that gas consumption and demand will grow faster worldwide than for other hydrocarbons. These sources include BP’s Energy Outlook 2030 in 2013, the IEA’s special report in 2011 titled “Are we entering the Golden Age of Gas?”, and OPEC Energy Outlook in 2011 and International 1

On July 14, 2015, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, comprising China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, plus Germany), the European Union, and Iran agreed on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA limits the Islamic Republic's nuclear program in return for relief from energy and financial sanctions.

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Energy Outlook in 2013. In its latest report, the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) suggested that natural gas is the major bridge, or transitional technology, to renewable sources of energy (GEA 2014, 10). In the context of energy security within the EU, security essentially means “security of gas supply” (CER 2011, 83). Natural gas can be transported either by pipeline, or turned into a liquid in the form of LNG, shipped by tankers and re-gasified at the destination, known as “the floating pipeline” (Soligo and Jaffe 2006, 437-469). In fact, LNG trading has more globalized suppliers than it does pipeline suppliers and has become more popular in recent years because of its flexibility over distances, the shorter duration of contracts, and reduction in costs in the LNG value chain due to technological advances (Palm 2003, 7). Furthermore, it is argued that new energy relations will emerge from direct contact between LNG producers and consumers without transit players and are profitable compared to pipelines over long distances (Luft and Korine 2009, 13). According to statistics provided by the Baker Institute World Gas Trade Model (BIWGTM), the main LNG consumers will be as follows: the USA and the EU, followed by Mexico, Japan and China (these are predicted for the period from 2018 until 2038). It was also outlined in the report by BIWGTM that LNG trading, compared to piped gas flows, will increase to above 46% of total gas supply by 2035 (BP 2014, 57). The current European market for gas is in what has been described as an “expansionist mode” (Odell 2002). It is predicted that another surge in LNG trade may be witnessed in the 2015-2025 timeframe. This means that the world’s gas producers will need to increase supplies by around 65% during the next two decades to meet demands (EIA 2013, 49-57). Mert Bilgin believes that more LNG supply in the future could ensure the EU’s energy security even further (Bilgin 2009). Bilgin examined different gas corridors towards the EU and concluded that the Union should prioritize the Republic of Azerbaijan’s gas supply, followed by Iraq and Iran, because of the likelihood of there being more political disputes within the Persian Gulf than the Caspian Sea. Hartley and Medlock also acknowledged that the Russian pipeline and Persian Gulf’s gas would be critical in the future, particularly for Asia and Europe (Hartley and Medlock 2006). Lochner and Bothe argued that because of Europe’s LNG demands, particularly from 2020 onwards, the main gas holders within the Persian Gulf and North Africa will be much more important in terms of strategic relationships. Peimani and Bahgat (Peimani 2011, 13-14) all believe that the field size and the amount of natural gas in the region, particularly in shared fields between Iran and Qatar, have led to some of the world’s lowest production costs. Prof. Paul Rogers mentions the significance of

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this in terms of the fact that the price of natural gas will play a significant role in the future (Rogers 2012, 168-174). Richard Young, moreover, believes that the EU has been slow in competition with its global rivals to draw more gas, and he therefore advises that the EU should concentrate further on the mentioned ellipse with its less-stable countries (Young 2009). That ellipse is mirrored by Kemp and Harkavy who state that the “Persian Gulf–-Caspian Energy Ellipse”, with the centrality of Iran, has become “one of the most significant geo-strategic realities of our time” (Kemp and Harkavy 1997, 111). The EU Green Paper has also emphasized, in its statement of 3 August 2006, that the construction of new pipelines, LNG routes and infrastructures will be essential to ensure access to gas-rich regions. The research herein aims to address the gap in the existing academic works by exploring the level of mutual effect(s) of Iran’s potential LNG supply within the Persian Gulf, on the EU security of gas supply in the years to come. This will be based on the indicators of the energy security through which the following question has been developed: How can the EU secure its LNG demands in the future and what role can Iran’s coming LNG supply play for the Union’s quest for security of gas supplies, based on the four indicators of energy security?

Theoretical Framework The EU is the most integrated region in the worldwide context, the energy policy of which concentrates on the “Pan-European energy market” (Muller-Kraenner 2007, 33). The peripheral state of Iran within the Persian Gulf, in context, is defined within the framework of Louis Cantori, and Steven Spiegel’s Subordinate System Theory, that consists of the core or center sector, a peripheral section and intrusive player(s) (Cantori and Spiegel 1979, 5). In this regard, it is argued here that the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) (Buzan and Waever 2003, 27), can be seen as an appropriate context to analyze Iran’s future LNG relationships with the EU and its mutual impacts on the energy security of both. According to Buzan, the sectors of security in the RSCT are military, political, economic, societal and environmental security. Buzan, in context here, describes these four main concepts as forming the structure of the security complex: maintenance of the status quo; internal transformation; external transformation; and overlay (Buzan 1991, 215-220). As mentioned previously, recent and current literature employs energy as a matter of security and Buzan believes that energy policy has been securitized (Buzan et al. 1998, 105), thus it could be argued, for the context of this research, that RSCT could

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be applied to energy as a sixth security sector (Palonkorpi 2007, 17). The main school of literature that examines the current hypothesis, that of the Regional Energy Security Complex Theory (RESCT), focuses on these complexes that are formed by energy interaction between two or more states or regions in a limited geographical area with different players, comprising exporter(s), importer(s) and transit state(s).

Terminology of Energy Security According to the Global Energy Assessment in 2012, energy is the backbone of all economies for further growth and also development of human civilization, and is viewed as a “crucial entry point” for dealing with the global challenges of the 21stcentury. Energy has been regarded as a matter of security to a state or people and has been defined as being one of the world’s major challenges during the current century (Bahgat 2011, 1). The notion of energy security sometimes differs based on personal and institutional perspectives and has been described in various literatures through nearly 45 core overlapping definitions of this concept (Sovacool and Tai Wei 2011, 3). From the importers’ perspective, energy security means security of supply without any shortage at reasonable and even competitive prices without further deterioration in the state of the environment. For exporters, however, energy security equates to security of demand at competitive prices that will guarantee significant profits for the exporter with no excessive cost to the environment (Proedrou 2012, 9). As a result of an analysis of the various definitions of energy security, four major standard indicators can be observed: acceptability (environmental and social aspects); availability (geological elements); affordability (economic criteria); and accessibility (geo-political dimensions) (Kruyt et al. 2009, 2166-2181). The Institute for Energy Security Unit of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) for the European Commission in 2010, the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) (APERC 2007) and a number of other energy experts’ conceptualizations, such as that of Prof. Gawdat Bahgat, in addition to Jessica Jewell’s in “the IEA Model of Short-term Energy Security”, have taken into account these indicators and the context will be assessed in the section that follows.

EU Energy Matters Energy concerns have played a clear role in the foundation of European integration after World War Two. Apart from the European Energy Charter in December 1994 for diversifying exporters, a key

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element of the EU energy supply strategy has been to shift to a greater use of natural gas, leading to publication of the Green Paper on Security of Supply in 2000. Energy security was put on the EU political agenda in December 2005 and led to the adoption of a Green Paper on 8 March 2006. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty on Functioning of the EU (TFEU), provided a legal basis for EU energy policy. Aspects of energy security and its indicators have been, moreover, laid down in the EU Energy Strategy for 2020 (EC 2010, 2). The EU holds less than 1.3% of proven global gas reserves; nonetheless, EU gas production in 2010 was 5.5% of the global share, while its consumption has been 15.5% of total world demand (BP 2011, 22-23). Moreover, the share of natural gas in Europe’s total primary energy sources demand grew from 18% in 1990 to 24% in 2009 and is expected to rise to 30% by 2030. The EU is a net gas importer, excluding Denmark and the Netherlands (Eurostat 2011, 10-11). So, natural gas will be the “Achilles heel of the EU energy security”, according to Herbert Ungerer (2007, 2). The EU imports its gas through pipelines and LNG, mainly from Russia, Norway and, Algeria, in total amounting to 85% of its gas imports. It also receives some smaller LNG volumes from Oman, Libya and Trinidad and Tobago (EC 2011, 3). However, the EU’s gas imports by pipelines face some challenges, mainly transit risks, Russian domination on the regional gas market, delays in the construction of new gas pipelines, and the lack of a coherent European energy foreign policy with a single voice (CER 2011, 3). Günther Oettinger, the EU's ex-Commissioner for Energy, is expected to develop plans to enhance the volume of LNG imported up to 24% by 2020, a 60% increase compared to 2010 (Oettinger 2010). However, this percentage will more likely rise by approximately 40% by 2030 (BP 2012, 34). Consequently, a high number of new LNG import terminals have been proposed for the EU in recent years in response to the increase in the Union’s growing LNG demand. Some 24 of these facilities, or nearly 80% of the total, are situated in Spain, the UK, France, and Italy, ranking 4th, 7th, 8th and 10th as global importers respectively (IGU 2013, 10). In context, LNG ports offer greater resilience than pipelines as the former can receive from different suppliers, while the latter should import generally from fixed exporters (Jewell 2011, 26). Therefore, diversification of LNG suppliers has also been high on the EU’s priority list, particularly since the early 2000s and the publication of the Green Paper on Security of Supply (EC 2000, 44). This diversification process is seen as being essential for improving the Union’s security of gas supply and easing the aforementioned supply risks. In regards to this, the European Commission, in a non-published study, in preparation for its Energy Green Paper

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emphasized that “competition with Japan, China, India, etc. over oil and gas from the Persian Gulf and Russia will become tougher in future” (Muller-Kraenner 2007, 24).

The Energy Geo-politics of Iran The Islamic Republic of Iran is situated at the center of the “Energy Ellipse” (Kemp and Harkavy 1997, 111) and has some prominent features that make it attractive in terms of energy supply, including its enviable geo-political position and geo-strategic importance based on its hydrocarbon reserves. It also acts as the only bridge and cheap energy corridor between the Persian Gulf in the south and Central Asia/the Caspian Sea in the north (Rogers 2012). Iran owns the world’s second biggest natural gas reserves with 17.7% of the global known reserves located within its territory. In 2013, BP also ranked Iran’s reserves of natural gas at number one in the world with 17.9% of the global reserves. Major natural gas fields within Iran include South Pars, North Pars (adjacent to South Pars), Kish, Kangan, Tabnak, Forouz, Lavan, Golshan and Ferdowsi. Approximately 62% of these deposits, however, remain unexploited and underdeveloped, being mostly used to meet domestic demands. Furthermore, 61% of the Middle East’s gas deposits are situated in a single giant field shared between Qatar and Iran known as the “North Field” in Qatar and the “South Pars” in Iran. This field is located 62 miles off-shore in the Persian Gulf, and is seen as the world’s largest nonassociated natural gas field. Iran’s gas reserves are predominantly located off-shore and are non-associated (almost 61%) followed by on-shore associated and on-shore non-associated, each with 19%, as well as 1% for off-shore associated. The giant South Pars comprises over 26% of Iran’s total proved gas deposits, followed by Kish gas field (EIA 2013). Under Article 229 of the “Fifth Development Program 2010–2015”, 10% of Iran’s annual oil income has been devoted to the development of the South Pars, which started production in early 2002, and the 24 phases should be in operation by the end of the program. According to Table 1 below, five of the first eight blocks in the South Pars are designated for domestic markets, including three for oil field reinjection.

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Table 7.1. Iran’s South Pars phases

Phase 1 2;3 4;5 6;7;8 9; 10 12

11 13 14 15;16 17;18 19 20;21 22;23;24 25-28

Completed Phases Gas Capacity Participating Start-up (bcf/d) Companies 1 PetroPars, Petronas 2004 2 Total, Petronas, 2002 Gazprom 2 ENI, PetroPars, 2004 NaftIran 3.9 Statoil, PetroPars 2009 2 PetroPars 2011 3 POGC, NIOC, 2014 PDVSA Future, Ongoing Phases 2 PetroPars 2020+ 2 Mapna,Sadra,Pedro 2020+ Pidar 2 IDRO, IEOCC, 2017 NIDC 2 POGC, ISOICO 2015 2 PetroPars, OIEC, 2016 IOEC 2 PetroPars, IOEC 2018 2 OIEC 2017 2 Petro Sina Arian, 2016 Sadra Recent Discovered

Sources: EIA (2014), countries/ Iran; NIOC; Pars Oil & Gas Company

Any more exports primarily depend on blocks 9 and 10. So, the first 12 phases of the South Pars, apart from phase 11, were inaugurated between 2002 and 2014 and the phases of this huge complex will probably increase to 28. Notable is the fact that the development of the South Pars has shifted the focus of Iran’s energy policy from oil to a balance between oil and gas exports. Luft and Korine believe that “without LNG there would be no way for Iran to sell its gas to some far-distance importers in the east like China, and to the West, like EU countries in order to increase its share in the global gas market in the future” (Luft and Korine 2009, 13). Iran’s LNG aspiration to build a liquefaction facility dates back to the 1970s. A number of LNG projects have been proposed as well, yet only one LNG

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project still remains in place: the Iran LNG in phase 12 (though sanctions continue to delay the development of these projects). The other LNG projects in the South Pars, including Pars LNG (the South Pars’ phase 11) and Persian LNG (the South Pars’ phases 13 and 14), as shown in the Table 7.2 below, have been on hold as a result of financing difficulties and political disputes. Table 7.2. Iran’s LNG projects Project

Gas feed from South Pars: phase 12

Shareholder(s)

Status

Markets

Iran LNG

Volume (mtpa) 10.6 (2 trains)

NIOC (40%0; Persian Funds (51%)

Under Development (2015+)

Persian LNG

16.2 (2 trains)

South Pars: phases 13;14

NIOC (50%); Shell (25%); Sinopec (25%)

Proposed (2017+)

Pars LNG

10 (2 trains)

South Pars: phase 11

NIOC (50%); Total (40%); Petronas (10%)

Proposed (2017+)

Golshan and Ferdowsi

10.6 (2 trains)

Malaysian Petrofield (100%)

Speculative

North Pars Qeshm LNG Lavan LNG

20

Golshan and Ferdowsi field North Pars field Kish field

Asia (China; India); EU Asia (China; India; Thailand); EU Asia (China; India; Thailand); EU EU; Malaysia

Chinese CNOOC&SITOK Australian LNG Ltd. European Companies

Speculative

China

Speculative

dia; East Africa EU

3.5 4

_

Speculative

Sources: World’s LNG Plants (2015), via: www.globallnginfo.com; National Iranian Gas Export Company.

Since May 2010, the National Iranian Gas Export Company (NIGEC) has had the main responsibility for carrying out LNG investments and projects, together with taking responsibility for Iran’s gas marketing and sales in the global markets. Howard Rogers explains that many “International Oil Companies have long hoped to be able to access the onshore and off-shore oil and gas development opportunities in Iran,

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particularly LNG development on the South Pars field, as an attractive opportunity” (Rogers 2012). Iran’s gas production, on the other hand, has increased by over 550% since 1990, according to the EIA. Iran’s production of gas increased strongly in 2009 and 2010 (BP 2011), ranking it as the fourth largest global supplier and also the Middle East’s largest gas producer EIA 2013, 52). This was mostly due to the increase of production from the 6th, 7th, and 8th phases, as well as the inauguration of the 9th and 10th phases of the South Pars. The South Pars field accounts for about 35% of Iran’s total gas production, with sizeable generation coming from the Kangan and Tabnak fields. In addition, associated gas production originates mainly from the Khuzestan, Ilam, and Kermanshah provinces, and off-shore oil fields, while approximately 30% of associated gas production was flared (ibid.). Its gas production has, furthermore, risen strongly since 2002 and there are a number of regional and inter-regional plans under consideration, including pipelines and LNG networks that are set to be online for a further sharp rise in gas production and to begin exporting gas on a large scale. Iran exports its piped gas to Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan, while receiving pipeline imports from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. There are a number of new export proposals, including the Iran-UAE contract, the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, as well as proposed projects such as the Iran-Oman cooperation plan and the Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon-Europe project, the so-called Islamic pipeline. Iranian production of gas is expected to increase over the next few years due to continuing discoveries in Persian Gulf reserves, particularly the South Pars (O&G 2011, 1075). On the basis of “Iran’s 20-Year Outlook Document”, issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader in 2003 (1382.09.11 in the Solar Calendar), followed by “Iran’s Energy Outlook on the Horizon of 1404/2025” and “Iran’s 20-year Energy Grand Strategy Document”, it was outlined that as Iran’s energy roadmap, the country should be converted into the third largest gas supplier in the world, raising its current 1% share to 8% to 10% of global market by 2025 and putting Iran in the second position of gas exporters worldwide. Iran’s “Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (2010–2015)” is part of the “20-Year Outlook Plan (2005-2025)”, which is the country’s main blueprint for long-term sustainable growth. On the basis of the aforementioned documents, in the context of the whole of Iran’s current and forthcoming pipelines and LNG projects, Europe is a substantial destination for Tehran’s LNG in the future. The EU is a strategic partner for Iran and was Tehran’s largest trading partner prior to the recent imposition of sanctions in 2012. This trade accounted for a third of all Iranian exports, 90% of which are energy related. Overall, it is the EU’s

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sixth largest energy supplier. Nonetheless, Iran’s goal to become a major global gas and LNG exporter in such a globalized energy market has been restricted and hindered by two main impediments: foreign sanctions and high domestic consumption (Bahgat 2011, 65). Consequently, some of these plans are already behind schedule or held up because of political and technological concerns. Fig. 7.1. Iran’s actual and potential gas projects

Peimani and Bahgat (Bahgat 2012) insist that the current political disputes with the West, mainly the U.S. regarding Iran’s nuclear program, is now the biggest foreign policy challenge facing Iran since 1979. In addition, Iran’s parliament (Majlis) on 5th January 2010 ratified the subsidy reform plan which aimed to bring prices to the real market level by the end of the fifth development plan, 2010-2015. As a result, high domestic gas consumption in Iran has started to ease since 2010 (BP 2011). Therefore, it is argued that Iran’s LNG export potential could only be realized by 2020 if the problems of large domestic consumption, massive gas reinjection requirements and lack of access to foreign investments for development of its gas reserves and industries can be resolved (Bahgat 2011, 65). Following several years of declining European investment in

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Iran, China, Russia and Malaysia, among other investors, have signed a number of deals to develop Iran’s portion of the massive South Pars gas field (Carter 2014, 44). Tehran cannot fully utilize its massive gas resources without foreign investment and technology. The Iranian gas sector is, moreover, in need of modernization, alternative sources of energy, and more energy efficiency in order to fulfill its domestic energy demands without endangering export capacity. It is not surprising then that Russia and Qatar, to some extent, perceive Iran as a huge competitor for gas exports to the EU.

Iran and the EU LNG Relationship, Based on the Four-Indicators of Energy Security The European Commission has defined its energy security in the 2000 Green Paper on “Security of Energy Supply”, as follows: “Energy supply security must be geared to ensuring […] the proper functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical availability […] at a price which is affordable […] while respecting environmental concerns […] security of supply must seek to reduce the risks of energy dependence”. These characteristics mirror those raised by the Institute for Energy Security Unit of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) for the European Commission in 2010, which argued that energy security has four major standard indicators: acceptability; availability; affordability; and accessibility. In this regard, LNG, from a logistics perspective in Europe, might be considered a superior quality fuel to pipeline gas (EC 2009, 14). The Official Journal of the EU on March 6, 2012, with reference to the “European Economic and Social Committee” meeting on 14th June 2011, proposed that “any energy pact within the Union should enshrine the strategic and vital nature of energy, including accessibility, affordability, reliability and regularity, so such a European social energy could respond to public concerns”. As a result, any secure LNG supply to the EU should be based on the aforementioned criteria. On the basis of the Energy Security Unit, the Joint Research Centre for the European Commission focuses on environmental and social concerns and sees these as being two key elements for acceptability of any energy resource (Costescu Badea 2010, 4). Climate change via the level of greenhouse gas emissions is seen as being the biggest challenge in terms of sustainability (BP 2014, 21), with emissions expected to continue to grow by 26% between 2011 and 2030 (BP 2013, 79). Natural gas, as a colorless and odorless material, continues to be favored as an environmentally attractive fuel, compared with other hydrocarbon fuels, as

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it does not lead to any production of sulphur dioxide and generates considerably less carbon dioxide (CO2), toxic gases and carbon intensity per unit of energy, at 40-50% less than coal and 25-30% less than oil (GEA 2014, 73). LNG, as its name suggests, is a non-corrosive, non-toxic liquid that is formed when natural gas is cooled to around -160C, shrinking by 600 times. The liquefaction process requires the removal of some non-methane components, such as water and carbon dioxide, to prevent them from forming solids. The second aspect of acceptability or sustainability is the social dimension, meaning everyone within a community, even the poor, can afford access to more affordable energy at the best price. In terms of acceptability and the percentage of methane of LNG among the various suppliers, Russian gas is first in terms of supply, followed by Egypt and Trinidad and Tobago, with the percentage of LNG cleanliness in other suppliers, such as Iran, at a relatively similar level (EC 2009, 18). The availability (geological feature) and sufficiency of the fossil and fissile energy sources is described in terms of discovered and undiscovered conventional and unconventional reserves, with the probability of further exploration in the future, along with the size of these fields (Costescu Badea 2010, 4). It is argued here then, that the best gas reserves are those with easy access and shallow off-shore access, but also those close to the coastline with enough accessible liquefaction facilities. The size and depth of the gas fields are the other factors both in the availability and affordability indicators. On this basis, Iran, together with Qatar, holds the widest shallow gas fields in the world, with almost 26% of the global deposits just in one restricted area. The Energy Security Unit, Joint Research Centre for the European Commission, defines affordability as being when, “the consumers are able to afford energy services, capital and operating cost structures for developing various energy sources” in order to achieve more reasonable LNG prices (ibid.). The cost of production is the first criterion of affordability and the third indicator of energy security. The lowest production costs belong to large non-associated on-shore gas fields, while production from smaller off-shore fields in deep waters is the most expensive (Lochner and Bothe 2009). The IEA estimates that more than half of the investments should be allocated to finding and developing gas fields (to the production stage), so that any undeveloped region with huge and less-expensive gas reserves, such as those in the Persian Gulf, could see at least a 50% drop in production costs (OIEA 2003). As a result of this, the lowest production costs for gas reserves in the world apply to Iran and Qatar (Anon 2001, 10). Supply cost is the second part of the affordability indicator and is divided into liquefaction, transportation and

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re-gasification processes (Lochner and Bothe 2009). The main cost is in the liquefaction process with 47% of the LNG supply chain cost being allocated to this, followed by 38% for shipping and 15% for re-gasification (Palm 2007, 20). The IEA compared this cost in 37 minor and major gas holders globally and found that Iran, in addition to Qatar, benefited most from the cheapest liquefaction costs worldwide (Hartley and Medlock 2006). As a result, the proximity of the Persian Gulf to Europe, in addition to the cheaper costs of production and liquefaction, are the other factors to decrease the cost of LNG imports for the EU, having been in search of less expensive fuels (OME 2001, 27). Accessibility is the fourth indicator of energy security and the main criteria of the International Country Risk Guide/Composite Political, Financial, Economic Risk Rating. The ICRG rating comprises 22 variables, and 100 indicators, and is divided into three subcategories of risk: political, financial, and economic. The composite scores, ranging from zero to 100, are then broken into categories from Very Low Risk (80 to 100 points) to Very High Risk (zero to 49.5 points). Therefore, the higher the points received, the lower the risk. Furthermore, the lowest risk category is attached to countries without any armed oppositions and where governments do not treat their citizens violently, whereas the highest risk is applied to states where there is violent conflict, while the middle score is assigned to countries where kidnapping and terrorist actions are likely to happen (Hartley and Medlock 2006). According to the PRS Group’s monthly assessments of September 2012 and June 2013, Iran is situated in the middle of this ranking, with moderate risk investment and, therefore, it is argued that Tehran should further try to improve its political conditions, such as with its nuclear dossier. According to predictions made by major energy bodies including the IGU, BP, IEA, and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at the University of Rice, Qatar and Iran will be the top Middle East gas producers between 2010 and 2040, with Australia holding access to around 50% of global LNG exports by 2040 (EIA 2013, 52). While Qatar and Algeria have been the main LNG suppliers to Europe, the continental imports in the future will, mainly, originate from the Persian Gulf and North/West Africa (CEDIGAZ 2011, 15). Iran, therefore, could assume an important role in supplying LNG to the EU in the future, as the EU does not take advantage of the shortage of Iran’s gas capacity (Peimani 2012). In a similar way, it is argued here, Asian gas and LNG needs have possibly hastened the demise of sanctions and, as a result, natural gas will accelerate the shift of power from the West towards both the Persian Gulf and a rising Asia (Carter 2014, 44-45). The European Commission has

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been eyeing gas imports from Iran. The EU could import between 25 and 35 bn m³/yr by 2030. While pipeline capacities from Iran to Europe are limited, the Wall Street Journal reported on 18th January 2016 that most of that would likely come in the form of LNG,. Following the lifting of decade-long sanctions against Iran, imposed in September 2005, Iranian oil and gas have attracted unprecedented attention from the EU. For instance, Italy’s Eni has proposed investing $4bn in phase 11 of Iran’s South Pars gas field during the coming three years (2016-2019), while it has already developed phases 4 and 5 of this gas field. According to the Iranian Fars news agency on 13th January 2016, companies from Germany, France, and Belgium have been negotiating with the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) to build the LNG tankers. However, a number of major issues still need to be clarified, especially regarding the new international petroleum contract (IPC), whose terms are yet to be fully disclosed (Roberts, 2016).

Conclusion The European Commission has concentrated more on energy security during the period 2000 to 2016 than ever before, with Green Papers arguing that “Europe has entered into a new energy era with increasing dependence on natural gas imports from unstable regions, mostly the ellipse between the Mediterranean Sea to the Hindu Kush mountain range.” Global gas demand is expected to see an increase of approximately 50% by 2030 and more than 50% of all inter-regional gas trading will be conducted by LNG carriers. Additionally, it is argued that LNG might be considered as a superior quality fuel and that the Union must import around 80% of the gas and LNG it will need during the next decade. With regard to the four criteria of the Regional Security Complex Theory (maintenance of the status quo, overlay, internal transformation, and external transformation) being redefined in the Regional Energy Security Complexes, the EU has become dissatisfied with its large dependency on Russian gas and cannot tolerate dependence on special gas suppliers (overlay). This essentially means then that the EU is not interested in supporting the status quo in its gas and LNG policies. For this reason, diversification of gas and LNG suppliers is at the top of the EU energy agenda. Based on the current EU energy policies, a decision was made to increase its LNG imports in the future and to increase the number of facilities. There can be no question from the perspective of the EU that the quickest way to ensure its security of LNG supply is the primary diversification of its suppliers. In the 2000 Green Paper and in the

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European Economic and Social Committee meeting on 14th June 2012, the EU placed significant emphasis on acceptability, availability, affordability, accessibility or reliability and regularity, in any energy pact with other suppliers. These factors were outlined as significant in order to maintain the uninterrupted physical availability of energy at a price which is affordable, while respecting environmental concerns with the fewest geopolitical risks. Iran’s LNG supply is best in terms of availability, affordability and the main criteria for both indicators, compared to other global actual and potential suppliers. The acceptability of its LNG, moreover, stands behind Russian gas, followed by Egypt and Trinidad and Tobago. However, Iran, with its moderate risk investment, is situated in the middle of the ranking of the various suppliers. Therefore, Tehran should further attempt to improve its accessibility indicator of energy security to increase its position in the rankings. Iran is currently dissatisfied with its share in the global gas market. For this reason, diversification of LNG suppliers is at the top of Tehran’s energy outlook and grand strategy. On this basis, then the seven LNG facilities under construction and consideration should be operational in the near future to start exporting (internal transformation). In this context, when gas and LNG corridors are essential for security of supply, but are hindered by political uncertainty, the EU can play an important role in removing the obstacle or making resolution easier. As such, the P5+1, the EU, and Iran agreed on the JCPOA. This agreement restricts the Islamic Republic's nuclear program in return for relief from oil and gas sanctions, with a promising outlook. In conclusion, the pursuit of diversified LNG routes, based on the above-mentioned indicators of the security of LNG supply, as well as more investments in the main gas holders’ LNG facilities could be significant in minimizing risks and vulnerabilities for the EU in the mid- and long-terms.

References Anon. 2001. Observatoire Me´diterrane´en de l’E´ nergie–OME, “Assessment of future supply costs to Europe.” http://www.ome.org/PDF/Etudes/gas_study/documents/chapter_3.pdf APERC (Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre). 2007. A quest for Energy Security in the 21st Century, Tokyo: Institute of Energy Economics. www.ieej.or.jp/aperc Bahgat, Gawdat. 2010. “Iran’s Role in Europe’s Energy Security: An Assessment.” Iranian Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3: 333–347.

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Eurostat. 2011. The DG ENERGY of the European Commission’s Market Observatory for Energy and Key Figures. GEA (Global Energy Assessment). 2014. Global Energy Assessment– Toward a Sustainable Future, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hartley, Peter and Kenneth B. Medlock. 2006. “Political and economic influences on the future world market for natural gas.” In David G. Victor, Amy M. Jaffe and Mark H. Hayes, eds. Natural Gas and Geopolitics, from 1970 to 2040, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. IEA (International Energy Agency) 2003. World Energy Investment Outlook, Paris: IEA. —. 2013a. World Energy Outlook, Paris: IEA. —. 2013b. Are we entering a golden age of gas? Paris: IEA. IGU (International Gas Union). 2010. World LNG Report, Oslo: IGU. Jewell, Jessica. 2011. IEA Model of Short–term Energy Security (MOSES), Primary Energy Sources and Secondary Fuels, Paris: IEA. Kemp, Geoffrey and Robert E. Harkavy. 1997. Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Kruyt, Bert, D. P. van Vuuren, H. J. M. de Vries and H. Groenenberg. 2009. “Indicators for energy security.” Energy Policy, Vol. 37, No. 6: 2166–2181. Lochner, Stefan and David Bothe. 2009. “The Development of Natural Gas Supply Costs to Europe, the United States and Japan in a Globalizing Gas Market—Model-based analysis until 2030.” Energy Policy, Vol. 37, No. 4: 1518–1528. Luft, Gal and Anne Korine. 2009. Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century, Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group. Muller–Kraenner, Sascha. 2014. Energy Security: Re-measuring the world, London: Earthscan. O&G (Oil & Gas). 2011. Directory Middle East. Odell, Peter O. 2002. Oil and Gas: Crises and Controversies 1961–2000, Vol. 2: Europe’s Entanglement, Brentwood: Multi–Science Publishing Company. Oettinger, Gunther. 2010. Energy Strategy for Europe 2010–2020, Brussels: EC. Palm, Thomas F. 2007. The Future of LNG in Europe and the Potential Impact on the Market Power of the Gas Suppliers, Oslo: Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.

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Palonkorpi, Mikko. 2007. Energy Security and the Regional Security Complex Theory, Aleksanteri Institute: University of Helsinki. Peimani, Herbert. 2012 (March 12). Private communication with the author. Peimani, Hooman. The Challenges of Energy Security in the 21st Century: Trends of Significance, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. Proedrou, Filippos. 2012. EU Energy Security in the Gas Sector Evolving Dynamics, Policy Dilemmas and Prospects, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Rogers, P. 2012. “Energy Security and Iran’s role in international system.” In: Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Reza. Molavi, eds. Iran and the International System, London: Routledge. Soligo, R., A.M. Jaffe. 2006. “Market structure in the new gas economy: is cartelization possible?” In David G. Victor, Amy M. Jaffe and Mark H. Hayes, eds. Natural Gas and Geopolitics, from 1970 to 2040, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Robert, John. 2016. “Iran: Opportunities and Problems Await After Sanctions.” Natural Gas Europe, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/iran-opportunities-and-problems27813 Rogers, Howard. 2012 (February 15). Private communication with the author. Sovacool, Benjamin L. and Lim Tai Wei. 2011. “Exploring the contested and convergent nature of energy security.” In Benjamin K. Sovacool, ed. The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security, New York: Routledge. Ungerer, Herbert. 2007. “Some comments on the relationship of competition policy and European energy security.” European Review of Energy Markets, Vol. 2, Issue. 5 (2007). Youngs, Richard. 2009. Energy Security: Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge, Abingdon: Routledge.

CHAPTER EIGHT THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AID AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING: THE CASE OF U.S. AID TO JORDAN TARFAH ELFAYEZ

Introduction The chapter explores the relationship between Jordan’s political economy and U.S. foreign aid to Jordan. with a focus on the national and transnational challenges that have emerged since the start of the Arab Spring in 2011. The changes brought about by the Arab Spring have been driven by the juxtaposed process of peaceful democratization and the extreme violence of groups such as ISIS. These opposing processes are having the twin effect of the disintegration of some states, such as Syria, Yemen and Iraq, and the concurrent boost to regional integration, such as increased cooperation between groupings of more stable states in the region, like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). With regards to the processes of regional integration and the close economic relationship between Jordan and the USA, this chapter examines how Jordan has been influenced by the inward flow of U.S. foreign aid. The main focus here is Jordan’s policy towards the influx of refugees coming from Syria, and how this affects the Jordanian economy and domestic stability. This chapter will argue that U.S. foreign aid has had a strong relationship with Jordanian decision-making and that, as a result, the USA has an influence on Jordanian policy-making as a result. The reason for the inclusion of a chapter on Jordan lies in the unique relationship it has with the United States. The factors that make this relationship important to the U.S. have been ascribed to Jordan’s traditionally moderate, non-ideological, revolution-averse political culture, its pro-West strategic orientation, its commitment to peace with Israel, and its cooperation on counter-terrorism and security matters (CFR 2013).

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Consequently, any risk of destabilization that could lead to the fall of the monarchy and its replacement with a potentially anti-Western government would have profound regional repercussions. It is, therefore, in the interests of the United States to ensure that Jordan remains as stable and secure as possible. This chapter examines the significant impact that U.S. foreign aid has had on the Jordanian monarchy and how it has affected the government’s decision-making and long-term survival. Many of Jordan’s current decisions have involved the need to cope with the large numbers of Syrian refugees coming into the country while at the same time placating the many Jordanians who have called for a change in Jordan. In particular, the government has focused on providing greater socio-economic services so as to maintain regime security. The issue of Syrian refugees has been shaped by Jordan’s long tradition of hospitality toward asylum-seekers and refugees, first with Palestinian refugees displaced by Arab-Israeli violence since 1948, then with Iraqis following the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis and War, and the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, and now with Syrians displaced by the highly destructive civil war in Syria. This chapter will first explore Jordan's history as a refugee haven and the impacts that refugees have had on its domestic stability. It will demonstrate the context of Jordanian policy-making and U.S. foreign aid. It will then explore the direct impact on the policy-making of the Jordanian government regarding the Syrian refugee influx. Finally, the chapter will analyze the influence of U.S. foreign aid since 2011.

Jordan as a Refugee Haven Many observers state that Jordan’s location is more of an asset than a liability to its leaders, in terms of its geostrategic position. This assessment is based on a range of factors. For example, maintaining peaceful relationships with its neighbors is vital to U.S. interests in the Middle East. In this sense, Jordan acts not just as a buffer between Israel and its more hostile neighbors, including Iraq pre-2003, and Iran, but also as a buffer between Syrian and Iranian interests on the one hand, and Saudi interests on the other. Jordan is located at the center of a vulnerable region and over the years it has experienced the severe consequences of regional instability. In addition to the influx of refugees, Jordan has worked towards balancing between both domestic and foreign policy goals to enable the survival of the Hashemite regime. Over the years, Jordan has exploited its geostrategic position to secure the inflow of foreign assistance. The country’s position

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has helped Jordan to make up for the limitations of its domestic economy (Barari and Satkowski 2012). Jordan has a history of hosting and integrating refugees from neighboring countries into its society. Following independence from the British mandate in 1946, the state has contended with large influxes of refugees escaping wars. First, the 1947-1949 creation of Israel led to the first Arab-Israeli conflict, which resulted in approximately 700,000 Palestinians being displaced, primarily to Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Kuwait, and Jordan. Secondly, there was the 1967 war between Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel. Following the 1949 armistice that ended this first ArabIsraeli war, Jordan annexed the West Bank, thus absorbing not only Palestinian refugees from what would become Israel proper but also West Bank Palestinians. Following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in the course of the 1967 Six Day War, several hundred thousand more Palestinians were evacuated or fled to the East Bank of the Jordan River, into Jordan proper (Beinin and Hajjar 2014, 5). Besides Palestinians, Iraqis have also constituted an important refugee population in Jordan. The first influx followed the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis and War, where many fled following popular uprisings in the south and north of Iraq, dissatisfied with Saddam’s regime (Fagen 2009). The main influx of Iraqi refugees in Jordan occurred following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Many sought to flee both fighting between coalition forces and Saddam’s regime, and later inter-communal fighting and the insurgency. Adnegard has come to prescribe the term “refugee haven” to Jordan (Adnegard 2014, 6) because of these large refugee influxes. Indeed, significant portions of Jordan’s population are refugees from several countries and several wars. Foremost are the Palestinians who, with their Jordanian-born descendants, constitute over half the country’s population (Lust 2011, 428-29). While Adnegard argues that many have integrated into Jordanian society, including holding Jordanian citizenship, many continue to maintain refugee status, hoping a resolution to the longstanding Palestinian-Israeli conflict will eventually facilitate the “right of return” for refugees dating back to 1948 (Adnegard 2014, 7). Jordan is a small country with few natural resources besides some very limited gas and oil shale reserves (Owen 2009, 121). With its original (and small) East Bank population sustainable, we could argue that decades of refugee influxes have put an incredible strain on Jordan’s social cohesion, the country’s politics, economy, and security, as well as regime stability. Adnegard correctly argues that “since the Palestinian exodus of 1948, migration to and from Jordan has played a pivotal role in Jordanian politics, economy and society” (Adnegard 2014, 7). As such, Jordan has

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long been a major recipient of “political rents”, aid provided to a given country to maintain regime stability, which has manifested largely in foreign aid to help alleviate these issues and secure regime survival. Jordan has benefited immensely from U.S. foreign aid provisions in alleviating problems associated with large refugee influxes. It has used aid to provide healthcare, education, housing, and social security for many refugees throughout the past seven decades. Indeed, the need to alleviate problems facing refugees in the country is significant. Past failures to adequately accommodate refugees have led to major social and even political tension both within Jordan and with foreign actors. Chief amongst these was the “Black September” Civil War in 1970-71 between the monarchy and various militant Palestinian factions, based mainly in Palestinian refugee camps (Adnegard 2014, 17). The regime has therefore been very conscious that neglecting assistance to refugees can seriously threaten regime survival. The recent influx of Syrian refugees escaping civil war will be yet another challenge.

National and Transnational Challenges and the U.S.Jordanian Relationship Jordan is among the smallest states in the global system. It is a lowermiddle income country situated in a violent and troubled part of the Middle East, and as introduced above has significant (often overwhelming) refugee problems. Jordan has long been regarded as an island of stability in a tumultuous region, through its adoption of different policy approaches that are in keeping with its small size. Many observers of Middle Eastern affairs have recognized that Jordan has played a pivotal role in the Middle East’s prospects, during times of both peace and war, especially as a buffer between adversaries (CARE 2013). This is because Jordan has always directed its foreign policy at increasing its influence while promoting stability abroad where possible. Fikra Forum (2014) asserts that in “the midst of regional political and economic turmoil, Jordan has surprisingly managed to remain stable”. Jordan has played and continues to play a role that is disproportionate to its geographical, military and economic size (Fikraforum.org 2014). It is worth pointing out that Jordan’s foreign policy is a product of the interaction between internal and external environmental elements, whether regional or international. Also, the factors influencing its policy-making process do not continuously exist simultaneously or have the same degree of influence on all the issues that Jordan faces. Most of the internal variables are often characterized by related factors that increase Jordan’s

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weakness. Thus, the geographical location and the characteristics of its economic, military and population size have been prominent determinants of decision-making, whereas the external variables are characterized mostly as threats to Jordan’s security, or challenges to its development. Consequently, the inherent limitations of Jordan itself, regarding its “smallness”, are magnified by its scarcity of natural resources, especially freshwater and arable land: Jordan is “the fourth most water-poor country in the world” (World Bank 2013b). These disparities between Jordan and other states in the region have increased pressure on decision makers in Amman. Jordan acts on its status as a small located in a permeable regional system, by endeavoring to survive both domestic and regional threats at the heart of Jordanian decision-making. It lends itself to an exploration of the existing domestic determinants of foreign policy behavior, as well as regime consolidation, legitimization and survival (Salloukh 1996). Jordan's paramount aim in the region has always been to control its borders and ensure domestic security. It has secured its stability to a large extent through external monetary and military support, which helps pay the military and intelligence expenses needed to support refugee influxes, especially the spill-over of Syrian refugees. U.S. foreign aid has been necessary for the maintenance of the Hashemite regime politically and economically for several decades, and especially since Jordan’s 1994 Treaty of Peace with Israel. Jordan's need for such aid is a necessity; Jordan is highly dependent on U.S. foreign aid especially due to its rather weak national economy and its shortage of economic resources. U.S. foreign aid has also been essential to respond to Jordan’s limited ability to provide itself with military supplies in a way that can cover its military needs and increase its defense capabilities (this despite an emerging domestic military-industry complex). It receives all types of economic, military and humanitarian aid. The USA realized that Jordan could help to provide stability in a region considered inherently unstable. Thus, it has supported Jordan in the form of security assistance and financial and military aid. It has helped the government in Amman to achieve its goals on a relatively consistent basis. Washington has created and/or supported strategies for broad-based political and economic reforms in Jordan to increase prosperity, accountability and equality in a more stable society (MOPIC 2012). It has also increased its intelligence-sharing cooperation with Jordan, although not necessarily its trade in sophisticated weapons, in which the Jordanian regime has expressed an interest. Thus, Jordan has benefited from U.S. security aid and has also had to tread a fine line between its reliance on the USA for its security, and domestic

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challenges, particularly the threat from homegrown Islamist militants and its overstretched economy that is dependent on foreign aid to cover the costs of housing the vast number of Syrian refugees. The USA has annually committed large sums of money to Jordan, primarily through cash transfers and developmental agencies like USAID, which has been used to develop the Jordanian economy, infrastructure, and security apparatus (Beck and Hüser 2015, 88-89). The aid is in some ways a zero-sum game for Jordan though, as the USA has, in return, exacted influence over Jordanian domestic and foreign policy-making. The following table shows the levels of aid that Jordan has received from the United States since the Gulf War in 1991. Table 8.1. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis (in US$ millions)

Fiscal (FY) 1991

Economic Assistance Military Assistance Year EconSpt Food Devel PeaceCp FMF IMET Totals 35.0a

0

0

0

20.0a

1.3

56.30

1992

30.0b

20.0 0

0

20.0b

.6

70.60

1993c

5.0

30.0 0

0

9.0

.5

44.50

1994d

9.0

15.0 4.0

0

9.0

.8

37.80

1995

7.2

15.0 6.7

0

7.3

1.0

37.20

1996

7.2

21.0 7.9

0

200.0e

1.2

237.30

1997f

112.2

2.6

4.5

1.1

30.0

1.7

152.10

1998f

150.0

0

0

1.2

75.0g

1.6

227.80

1999

150.0

0

0

1.4

70.0g

1.6

223.00

1999 (Wye)

50.0

0

0

0

50.0

0

100.00

2000

150.0

0

0

1.7

75.0

1.6

228.30

2000 (Wye)

50.0

0

0

0

150.0

0

200.00h

2001

150.0

0

0

1.7

75.0

1.7

228.40

2002

150.0

0

0

1.6

75.0

2.0

228.60

2002 (Suppl.)

100.0

0

0

0

25.0

0

125.00

2003

250.0

0

0

1.0

198.0

2.4

451.40

2003 (Suppl.)

700.0

0

0

0

406.0

0

1,106.00

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2004

250.0

0

0

2.3

206.0

2.9

461.20

2004 (Suppl.)

100.0

0

0

0

0

0

100.00

2005

250.0

0

0

1.6

206.0

3.0

460.60

2005 (Suppl.)

100.0

0

0

0

100.0

0

200.00

2006

247.5

0

0

1.6

207.9

3.0

460.00

2006 (Suppl.)

50.0

0

0

0

0

0

50.00

2007

245.0

0

0

0

206.0

3.1

454.10

2007 (Suppl.)

10.3

0

0

0

45.0

0

55.30i

2008

361.4

0

0

0

298.3

2.9

662.60

2008 (Suppl.)

200.0

0

0

0

50.0

0

250.00

2009

263.5

0

0

0

235.0

3.1

501.60

2009 (Suppl.)

150.0

0

0

0

0

150.00

2010

363.0

0

0

0

(150.0 in FY2010 Advanced funding) 300.0

3.8

666.8

2010 (Suppl.)

100.0

0

0

0

50.0

0

150.0

2011

362.0

0

0

0

299.4

3.7

665.1

2012

460.0

0

0

0

300.0

3.7

763.7

2013

564.404 0

0

0

284.829

3.608 852.841

2014

700.0j

0

0

0

300.0

3.588 1,003.588

2015 est.

700.0

0

0

300.0

3.888 1,003.888

(Source: Sharp 2015: 18-19)

However, Jordan is not entirely free in using the aid it receives, nor is it free to manage funds according to its own political and economic goals/plans. This assistance is accomplished and invested in a way that reflects the U.S. strategic interests and the broader global purpose of U.S. foreign aid. Aid is an essential tool of U.S. foreign policy, which can be used in its foreign political relations to achieve its goals in the Middle East in general, and in Jordan in particular. There is no doubt that, for several decades, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has been anchored by the somewhat competing goals of supporting Israel and having close relations with other Middle Eastern states. Thus, the primary objectives for the USA are Israel's existence and its security within the context of pursuing Arab-

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Israeli peace. The USA has, in return, exacted influence over Jordanian domestic and foreign policy-making. By providing aid, the USA has managed to maintain a pro-West stance regarding Jordanian foreign policy, support for the 1994 peace treaty with Israel, and to a limited degree, domestic political liberalization. One of the main issues is that the USA imposes conditions on the aid that it provides, and the continuance of such aid is dependent on Jordan’s acceptance of these conditions. Consequently, Jordan’s policies are usually in line with those of the USA. Aligning policies is often in Jordan’s interests, as the USA is its closest and strongest partner and the main guarantor of its security. Jordan has also played a vital role as a U.S. regional ally, especially in relation to Israel, in areas such as diplomatic support, military training and exchanges, and intelligence exchange. It has also been a valued partner in countering terrorism in the region, as well as being part of the coalition operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has, however, had to take an pronounced approach to its support for the USA by providing support rather than direct action. In this way, it has been able to balance its commitments with tempering the hostile views and procedures of extremist groups within its borders. This juxtaposition can be understood within the context of the globalized nature of contemporary international relations. The interconnected nature of globalization means that external events and processes can have an impact on national decision making, and are often outside the control of state governments (OECD 1996). In this respect, policymaking by the Jordanian government will be influenced by external factors, such as the needs of its hegemonic partner, as much as it will be by domestic factors. It can also be argued that Jordan’s exposure to the global economic system is a key factor in its decision-making (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2005). Another key factor is its need for economic reforms that address the budget deficit and inflation. By having to service foreign debt, Jordan can only apply these reforms by depending on aid as a tool for economic development. These problems are solved by coordinating Jordanian policies with the principal U.S. policy goals in a framework of international relations (Al-Khazendar 1997). The most significant evidence of the influence of U.S. foreign aid on Jordanian political decision-making is the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement. Since 1990, the USA used aid as a tool to encourage Jordan to sign the peace accord with Israel (Sharp 2014). The Palestinian cause has been viewed in Jordan as a national cause that cannot be ignored, and forms part of a broader Arab-Israeli relationship characterized by hostility, mistrust and conflict, the ramifications of which impact on Jordanian

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discourse on Israel’s very existence, rather than just being an issue concerning borders (Al Bdaren 2002). Despite Jordan’s need for economic and military assistance, its reluctance to support the U.S. position in the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis and War, as well as its hesitation to sign a peace treaty with Israel before progress in Palestinian-Israeli relations, resulted in the USA cutting this much-needed assistance as a form of policy leverage between 1990 and 1994 (Prados 2006). Consequently, Jordan found that signing the peace agreement with Israel was the only logical strategic solution to its economic and security problems. The main aim of the USA was to maintain Israel’s security as a condition of the disbursement of aid and shared strategic goals in the Middle East (Sharp 2015, 1). This interest was based on a recognition that a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan would set a precedent, and set the example that it was possible for other states in the region to co-exist with Israel. Changing the Jordanian political climate from one of hostility to one of peace resulted in the increase of U.S. foreign aid to Jordan in 1996, with aid reaching its highest level in 2001. For instance, in the FY1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, the U.S. Congress provided Jordan with tanks valuing $100 million (including 50 M60A3 tanks). In 1997, Jordan received F-16 fighter planes. This aid, in turn, enhanced Jordan’s ability to maintain border security and implement the terms of the peace treaty with Israel, and encouraged enhanced business and trade relations between the two states. This alliance also led to the enhanced U.S.-Jordanian cooperation in the global fight against terrorism, as well as broader security and intelligence cooperation (Smith 1997; Prados 2006, 13-15). This significant change in Jordanian political policy is a result of the impact of aid and it impacts on practically all political parties involved in Jordanian decision-making. The Jordanian government is unlikely to be entirely free to form its policy decisions independently of consideration of U.S. policy (especially aid policy); it depends on the participation of civilian community institutions in a framework of democracy and political multiplicity. These have been basic requirements for Jordan to receive aid from the USA. For example, through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the USA has provided funds for a range of issues such as increasing citizen participation and transparency; empowering women, especially female parliamentarians; and promoting human rights and democratization through both local and international non-governmental organizations (Mepi.state.gov, 2016). In conjunction with the Jordan First Initiative, key agencies such as parliament, civil society organizations, and the media are required to cooperate in fulfilling these functions (Alsoudi

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2007). However, aid dependency has weakened the government's role. Furthermore, aid has seen the Jordanian government’s role reduced to the political and economic landscape as its commitment to open-market policies has permeated much policy-making. Encouraging competitive free trading, and applying independence in administrative decision making as a basis for all economic reforms, have led to a decreasing governmental role. Jordan has had to commit to all these new policies as a pre-condition for receiving aid, since most public sectors have been sold to foreign companies and investors, mostly American (Carapico 2002, 38). All these companies invest in Jordan and seek to widen the horizons of their power and business relations, either with Israel or other countries in the region, regardless of the existence of any diplomatic, political ties. Such requirements are a common with the neo-liberal nature of the economic policies that the United States imposes as conditions on recipient countries in return for aid. Neo-liberalism is essentially a modified form of classical liberalism which places emphasis on the primacy of the market in economic governance. The market is viewed as a mechanism that is capable of independently regulating itself (Thorsen 2011). Undue interference by the state only obstructs what is perceived to be a totally autonomous process. The state is therefore expected to play a limited role in economic governance, particularly in terms of imposing regulations. Typical neo-liberal policies also include trade and capital liberalization that opens up the host economy to free trade and FDI, privatization, reductions in the expenditure of areas of public service provision such as welfare and healthcare, and sometimes currency devaluation. This process is also enabled by the globalized nature of global economic relations, which means that states such as Jordan are unable to shield themselves from the effects of economic decisions and consequences from elsewhere, which has the knock-on effect of reducing the sovereign autonomy of these states (Harvey, 2005:1-2). When imposed on governments, these conditions may result in decisions being taken which benefit the USA, international financial institutions and multinational corporations, but that are not necessarily in the best interests of the recipient country. For example, Kamrava makes the point that the neo-liberal requirement for reductions in subsidies in conjunction with rising global food prices “have had important negative consequences for average Jordanians in that their purchasing power has decreased while rates of both employment and poverty have increased” (Kamrava 2014, 292). This leads to one of the main criticisms of the neoliberal conditionality attached to U.S. foreign aid. While it is tremendously successful in maximizing profits for large corporations, these do not filter

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downward into society by the discredited economic “trickle-down theory”. Instead, it leads to significant increases in inequality while transferring power away from the government of receiving states to corporate decision makers.

The Impact of Regional Instability and the Syrian Refugee Crisis Jordan's King Abdullah faces a combination of rising national and transnational challenges. The spillover effect from neighboring countries is the main external source of instability. Examples of this can be found in Syria’s civil war and Iraq’s international wars and insurgencies over the past two-plus decades, including possible military entanglement in border zones. The spread of Salafist radicalization, and the potential interference inside Jordan by Islamist movements from other regional countries (CFR 2013) are also very real threats. All these external factors have affected Jordan. Therefore, it is evident that Jordan cannot meet the challenges alone. While this argument may not be new, it will form the basis of the following discussion, which will assume that U.S. foreign aid has had a strong influence on Jordanian policy-making during the current Syrian refugees crisis. For this reason, the provision of U.S. foreign aid to Jordan has played a decisive role in determining the integration process between Jordan and the USA. In considering this issue, it is important to look at the strength and dependence of Jordanian foreign policy-making, and how this has been influenced by the massive influx of refugees from Syria. Much of this strength is predicated on the political and economic support it receives from foreign actors and patrons, with particular emphasis on the United States. This includes the stability it enjoys as a result of peaceful relations with Israel and its role as a buffer state between Syria and Iran on one hand, and Saudi Arabia on the other. Its dependence on the USA, however, also means that it is often constrained to follow any changes in its foreign policy. One prime example is the recent change in the view of President Assad’s role in Syria as part of any settlement in peace talks. While Assad’s removal is still desirable in Amman and Washington decisionmaking circles, the removal of this as a pre-condition is a recognition of the overriding importance of defeating ISIS. Since the Syrian civil war erupted in March 2011, there has been a constant flow of refugees into neighboring countries, to escape the fighting. As of late 2014, Adnegard (2014) argued that Jordanian foreign policy towards Syrian refugees seeking sanctuary has been largely one of

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accommodation. Adnegard with others like Sharp (2014) and Fishman (2014) have argued that the refugee crisis has reached a breaking point for the regime’s ability to handle the impacts of so many entering the country: “Tensions between Jordanians and their Syrian ‘guests’ are growing as the crisis persists” (Adnegard 2014, 11). Jordan is now the world’s third largest host of refugees (King Abdullah II 2014) as a percentage of the total population. It is “one of five host countries for nearly four million Syrian war refugees” (Gavlak 2015). According to UNHCR, there are over 620,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan, “of which approximately 84% live outside refugee camps, in urban and rural areas across the country. Two-thirds of these refugees are now living below the poverty line, and one in six refugee household is living on less than $40 per person per month” (UNHCR 2015). The fiscal cost for Jordan of hosting Syrian refugees is astounding: equivalent to 2.4% of Jordan’s GDP (Romanowski 2014). Despite media portrayals of many Syrians surviving day-by-day in refugee camps, less than 20% of Syrian refugees are so housed (Fishman 2014, 124). Most are dispersed across the country, renting houses in Jordan’s cities. The Jordan Economic Monitor maintains that the main influxes of refugees occurred from late-2012 with the Syrian conflict’s escalation (World Bank 2013a). In reality, the actual number of refugees is unknown. Many have moved to Jordan without registering their asylum with the UNHCR. At the time of writing, there is no end in sight to the Syrian conflict. Jordan is hosting unprecedented numbers of Syrian refugees, which now constitute somewhere between 10-20% of Jordan’s population (Fishman 2014, 40). As such, they have impacted hugely on socio-economic and political stability in Jordan. In some senses, host communities have been negatively affected by the presence of so many refugees. For example, “[i]ncreased rents, price hikes and strains on public services and public order have left local inhabitants feeling increasingly disenfranchised and neglected by the Jordanian government and international donors” (Carrion 2015, 2). Furthermore, Carrions makes the point that [t]he quality and availability of education and healthcare have declined as overburdened facilities have struggled to cope with the significant increase in numbers of students and patients. Schools are overcrowded, and people face increased waiting times before receiving medical attention. Local water shortages have also increased. Municipalities lack sufficient capacity and funding to deliver and maintain essential services for the hundreds of thousands of new residents, the arrival of whom has created a need to build new roads, expand the electricity infrastructure and collect much more waste. (Carrion 2015, 2-4)

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Pre-influx Jordan suffered high levels of youth unemployment, the prevalence of low-quality and low-productivity jobs, and low wages (Ajluni and Kawar 2014). Paradoxically, the Jordanian economy has arguably benefited from the Syrian refugees in some ways, as many have been willing to take on low-productivity jobs for low wages that have had an adverse drawback, by placing downward pressure on recently popular Jordanian demands for minimum wage increases (ibid, 11). While Jordan did not witness large-scale protests such as those in Egypt and Tunisia in early 2011, or demands for the toppling of the monarchy, there was a marked increase in labor protests and action 2011-2013. Indeed, the main demand of approximately 1,700 labor protests in 2011, and 901 in 2012, was wage increases (ibid, 13). With many Syrians willing to take on the few jobs with lower wages, this has created a major dilemma for the Jordanian labor market. It is estimated that 36% of Syrian refugees in Jordan were employed as of mid-2013 (ibid, 16). Naturally, a major problem for the regime is growing social instability over tensions between Jordanians struggling to find sustainable work and the Syrian refugees. Other areas have also suffered as a result. In housing, rents have tripled in northern cities in recent years because many Syrian families seek housing outside the UNHCR-administered refugee camps (Sharp 2014, 2). This has implications for many poor Jordanian families seeking affordable housing. Water supplies, healthcare, and children’s education have also come under considerable strain because the rapidly expanding demand has not been met by a similar expansion of supply. Jordanian policy-making towards Syrian refugees has overall been rather uncoordinated and uncalculated, contributing towards its negative impacts. While King Abdullah has repeatedly stated the importance of Jordanian hospitality and a moral duty to welcome and accommodate refugees (Fishman 2014), the regime has badly mismanaged the situation. First, while the regime liberally conferred residency status to refugees they initially did little to curb Syrians trying to work illegally without work permits (Ajluni and Kawar 2014, 15). It was only from mid-2013 that labor laws were enforced to curb Syrians attempting to work. However, because of the informal nature of the labor market, only new legislation will adequately address this. Secondly, the government has manifestly failed to adequately address major socio-economic issues confounding many Jordanians, such as wage increases and affordable housing. Seemingly many such issues have been brushed aside, where overall “competition over livelihoods and incomes is rising, especially irregular jobs requiring unskilled labor” (ibid, 22), contributing to future domestic instability.

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This study argues that Jordanian foreign policy has been able to exploit the plight of Syrian refugees to acquire additional foreign aid, especially from the USA. Indeed, since the start of the Syrian civil war, U.S. foreign aid to Jordan has increased significantly (Ryan 2014, 146-47). For example, U.S. foreign assistance was approximately $665.1 million in 2011, $763.7 million in 2012, $852.814 million in 2013, and just over $1 billion in 2014 (Sharp 2014, 13). To understand Jordanian motives behind using such an opportunity/crisis to extract more money through foreign aid, one has to understand the domestic socio-political pressures. Jordan did not escape the Arab Spring: many protests across Jordan demanded greater socio-economic opportunities, affordable housing, government subsidies, and greater democratization. The regime preempted further protests by restoring government subsidies on basic goods, pledging greater housing and job creation alongside promised political reform. This will cost money for an already seriously indebted country that had an enormous budget deficit in 2011 (Adnegard 2014, 9). Arguably, the Syrian refugee crisis was exploited by the regime to acquire greater aid, and it then used that money to offset further political instability. Indeed, the crisis arguably “came as a gift package from above to Jordan” (ibid., 9). Overall, Jordanian policy-making towards the refugee crisis has seemed to have significantly featured the use of it as a means to acquire greater funding on the international stage, to offset domestic instability. There is compelling evidence suggesting strong links in this crisis between Jordan’s policy-making and U.S. foreign aid. First, as explored above, has been the use of the refugee crisis to demand greater aid to invest domestically, to placate popular demands by Arab Spring protestors. Indeed, Ryan (2014), Adnegard (2014), and Beck and Hüser (2015, 88) all agree that Jordan has for decades used political rent, especially from the USA, to stave off domestic challenges to regime survival, and that the current Arab Spring and refugee crisis is no different. Adnegard (2014) and Fishman (2014, 42-34), argue that there has long been a strong U.S. imperative to maintain the Hashemite throne and Jordan’s pro-Western foreign policy, especially in recent years with the escalation of conflict in the Levant. This imperative has increased to levels not seen since the Arab Cold War in the 1950-60s. Whenever there is a major crisis befalling the small kingdom, aid has increased. For example, by the end of 2013 “Jordan’s total amount of U.S. foreign aid reached $13.83 billion and was mainly used for the establishment of distributive institutions” (Beck and Hüser 2015, 89). Additionally, Sharp highlights that the President signed into law P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2014, which Congress passed several days earlier. The

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law provides Jordan with $360 million in economic aid and $300 million in military aid (Sharp 2014, 15). Moreover, concerning the Syrian crisis, U.S. foreign aid is set to double between 2015 and 2017, from $660 million to $1 billion in low-interest loans per year, as well as a renewal of a five-year aid package to help in keeping Jordan’s unstable economy afloat. President Barack Obama said “[i]t is crucial for us to make sure that we are supportive of the kingdom in accommodating all these refugees” (Albawaba 2015). There has been a past tendency for the regime to repress human rights and civil liberties when facing internal and external threats. However, the Arab Spring arguably showed this to now be unviable. Haseeb theorized that, now Arab citizens have broken “the barrier of fear”, they are more willing to return to demanding reform from the regime (Haseeb 2012). Indeed, King Abdullah and the USA realized that domestic stability could only be maintained if the regime addressed some of the protestors’ demands to provide greater welfare provisions. Thus, Jordanian domestic policy was arguably influenced by the USA, which provided greater aid during the refugee crisis to prop up the regime and offset further domestic instability, and thus threats to regime survival. Fishman agrees, saying King Abdullah had to maintain a delicate balance between a purported desire to pursue such reforms, stability and security (Fishman 2014, 44). Secondly, from a U.S. foreign policy outlook, apparently foreign aid has been used more in recent years to influence other governments. Stevenson argues that the Obama Administration has preferred the carrot, rather than the stick approach of the Bush Administration (Stevenson, 2014). The USA has sought to avert domestic instability in various MENA countries affected by the Arab Spring, by committing billions of dollars in foreign aid (both economic and military aid). The main recipients have included Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan (Beck and Hüser 2015, 89-90). In Jordan’s case, this aid has been used both to provide for Syrian refugees and to try to avert domestic instability/strain on the economy and society from such a massive influx. Finally, given the international dimension of the refugee crisis, it is worth considering liberal institutionalism. The theory holds that international organizations such as the UN or Arab League, “play the main mediating role and act as the principal means to achieve and maintain cooperation between states” (Nuruzzaman 2008, 2). With U.S.-Jordanian relations, there is little evidence of this being the case. While the UN has been significantly involved in the administration of refugee camps and service provision in Jordan, most of the humanitarian aid has also been negotiated directly between the Jordanian and U.S. governments with

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little/no third-party involvement. Thus, theoretically this provided more proof for the applicability of realism than it does for liberal institutionalism. One possible reason is that power lies more with national governments than it does with international organizations. Realism posits that states use their power on the international stage to further their narrow self-interests. They are virtually forced to do this because there is no true global form of governance that has the supranational power to deal with intrastate issues and conflicts. While national governments may adhere to certain norms and values such as respect for human rights, the rule of law or democratic institutions and practices, ultimately their actions will be based on what is in their interest, even if this means contradicting these principles. Where a state such as the USA holds hegemonic power, it will also be prepared to use that power, be it military or economic to impose its wishes on other states. In reality, there has never been much need for such coercive means, as the USA and Jordan have long held a strong relationship through political rents since the 1950s. The rentierism emerged as a means to provide both regime security and economic assistance to maintain Hashemite control of the kingdom during a time of heightened Cold War tensions between Jordan and other Arab states (Owen 2009). This rentierism has continued to this date, even after the end of the Cold War. The USA has continued throughout the Syrian crisis to exert strong influence over Jordan and its policy-making, both domestically and externally, in particular through providing increased aid to cope with the increasing domestic pressures brought on by the refugee influx. This support has often been negotiated directly and includes being used to develop housing, provide education for Syrian children, and create job security (Fishman 2014, 41-43). Conversely, there is some evidence that indicates that U.S. foreign aid does not entirely influence Jordanian policy-making. Also, it is important to highlight that Jordan has become a major recipient of other foreign humanitarian assistance as a result of the Syrian refugee influx, primarily from GCC countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Fishman argues that the impetus has been the same: to provide relief to Jordan’s domestic pressures created by population increase while allowing the government to continue pursuing socio-economic policies to placate Jordanians (Fishman 2014, 43-44). Jordanian foreign policy has not entirely concurred with the vehement anti-Assad U.S. position on Syria, despite receiving much U.S. foreign aid. Ma’oz contends that Jordanian foreign policy towards Syria has been cautious and ambivalent, despite the vocal support for anti-Assad forces in Syria and Jordan’s willingness to allow a limited U.S. military presence

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near the border (Ma’oz 2014, 54-55). Maintaining a deliberately ambivalent policy benefits Jordanian security as it lessens criticism of the regime for being pro-Western, in turn reducing possible domestic instability.

Conclusion In conclusion, this chapter has explored the key themes and impacts of the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan alongside the country’s political economy relating directly to U.S. foreign aid. While Jordan has a long history of accommodating refugees, the recent Syrian influx has had many wide-ranging impacts on the Jordanian economy, society, political system, and indeed overall domestic stability. This, in conjunction with Jordan’s experience of the Arab Spring, has created a pressing need for the regime to seek an increase in political rents, to cope with the domestic and foreign pressures and maintain security. Indeed, it has been the main argument in this work that the regime has exploited the refugee crisis as a means to acquire further aid from its main patron, the USA, to guarantee continued domestic stability. As such, U.S. foreign aid has undoubtedly had a significant impact during this time, where the provision of assistance to the small kingdom has highly influenced the regime’s domestic policy to pursue socio-economic reform, to placate the demands of its citizens. This is as opposed to pursuing past policies of increased domestic repression as a response to crises. It has also allowed it to alleviate tension and the impacts of the influx of Syrian refugees. With no clear sign of an end to the Syrian civil war, Jordan must be prepared to continue to respond to the influx of refugees while remaining a beacon of stability in a volatile region (CARE 2013). It should also be noted, however, that during the Syrian crisis, Jordan has also come to rely more on other foreign aid. Besides the aid issued by the USA, such as that from the GCC, the request for membership to the organization in 2013 will undoubtedly mean that countries like Saudi Arabia will extend influence over Jordanian policy-making in the future (ibid.). However, Jordan remains arguably the most reliable close partner for the USA in the Arab world (Sharp 2016). Overall, there is clear evidence to indicate that aid from the USA has indeed had a major influence on Jordanian policymaking during the refugee crisis.

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References Adnegard, Elisabeth. 2014. Jordan: Surprisingly stable (Unpublished Masters Thesis). Oslo: University of Oslo. Ajluni, Salem and Mary Kawar. 2014. The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Labour Market in Jordan: A preliminary analysis. Beirut: International Labor Organization. Albawaba. 2015. “The Region’s Beacon of Strength and Stability: The U.S. to up aid to Jordan as it deals with regional instability.” Albawaba. Accessed March 9 2015. http://www.albawaba.com/business/american-aid-jordan-652536 Al-Khazendar, Sami. 1997. Jordan and the Palestine Question. Reading: Ithaca Press. Alsoudi, Abdel Mahdi. 2007. “The Impact of U.S. Aid Policy on Democracy and Political Reform in Jordan and Other Arab Countries.” International Journal of the Humanities, Vol. 4, No. 10: 113-125. Barari, Hassan A. and Christina A. Satkowski. 2012. “The Arab Spring: The case of Jordan.” Ortadogu Etutleri, Vol. 3, No. 2: 41-57. Beck, Martin and Simone Hüser. 2015. “Jordan and the ‘Arab Spring’: No challenge, no change?” Middle East Critique, Vol. 24, No. 1: 38-97. Beinin, Joel and Lisa Hajjar. 2014. Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A primer. Washington, DC: Middle East Research and Information Project. Accessed January 20 2016. http://www.merip.org/sites/default/files/Primer_on_PalestineIsrael%28MERIP_February2014%29final.pdf Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2005. Transformation: Jordan. Accessed March 23 2016. http://bti2006.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/141.0.html?L=1 Carapico, S. 2002. “Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy in the Arab World.” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3: 379-395. CARE. 2013. The Syrian Humanitarian Crisis: The impact on Jordan's long-term development and women and girls. Accessed July 21 2014. http://www.care.org/syrian-humanitarian-crisis-impact-jordans-longterm-development-women-and-girls-0 Carrion, Doris. 2015. Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Confronting Difficult Truths, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Fagen, Patricia Weiss. 2009. Iraqi Refugees: Seeking Stability in Syria and Jordan. Doha: Center for International and Regional Studies, pp.1-49. Accessed January 21 2016. https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/558297

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Fishman, Ben. 2014. “Jordan: Caught in the middle again.” Survival, Vol. 56, No. 6: 39-48. Gavlak, Dale. 2015. “Jordan Faces a Shortfall in Aid to Support 1.4 Million Syrian Refugees. Catholic Herald. Accessed Jun 8 2015. http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2015/05/06/jordan-facesshortfall-in-aid-to-support-1-4-million-syrian-refugees/ Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Haseeb, Khair El-Din. 2012. “The Arab Spring Revisited.” Contemporary Arab Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2: 185-197. Hussain, Zaara Z. 2011. “The Effect of Domestic Politics on Foreign Policy Decision Making.” E-International Relations. Accessed February 25 2015. http://www.e-ir.info/2011/02/07/the-effect-ofdomestic-politics-on-foreign-policy-decision-making/ Kamrava, Mehran, ed. 2014. Beyond the Arab Spring: The evolving ruling bargain in the Middle East, Oxford: Oxford University Press. King Abdullah II. 2014. “Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II at the Plenary Session of the 69th United Nations General Assembly.” Accessed July 5 2015. http://www.kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/speeches/view/id/546/vi deoDisplay/0.html Korany, Bahgat and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki. 2008. The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The challenge of globalization, 1st ed. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press. Lilley, Jeff. 2014. “Jordan’s Stability in a Tumultuous Middle East.” Fikra Forum. Accessed March 1 2015. http://fikraforum.org/?p=5464#.VhPiEPlVhBc Lust, Ellen. 2011. “Opposition Cooperation and Uprisings in the Arab World.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3: 425-434. Malik, Nikita. 2013. “The Cost of Syrian Refugees.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed February 25 2015. http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/09/19/cost-of-syrianrefugees/gnmy Ma'oz, Moshe. 2014. “The Arab Spring in Syria: Domestic and regional developments.” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, Vol. 7, No. 1: 49-57. Mepi.state.gov. 2016. “The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI).” Accessed March 2 2016. http://mepi.state.gov/med-region/jordan/ MOPIC. 2012. “2013-2017 USAID Jordan Country Development Cooperation Strategy.” Accessed August 25 2014.

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http://inform.gov.jo/en-us/By-Date/Report-Details/ArticleId/11/20132017-USAID-Jordan-Country-Development-Cooperation-Strategy Nahar, Ghazi Saleh and Rima Lutfi Abu Humaidan. 2013. “The Factors Affecting the Foreign Political Behaviors in Jordan on its Strategic Position in the Middle East, and Especially its Conflict and Peace Process with Israel during the 1990s.” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 3, No. 4: 66-78. Nuruzzaman, M. 2008. “Liberal Institutionalism and International Cooperation after 11 September 2001.” International Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3: 193-213. OECD. 1996. “Globalization: What Challenges and Opportunities for Governments?” Accessed March 23 2015. http://www.oecd.org/general/searchresults/?q=GLOBALISATION:%2 0WHAT%20CHALLENGES%20AND%20OPPORTUNITIES%20FO R%20GOVERNMENTS?&cx=012432601748511391518:xzeadub0b0 a&cof=FORID:11&ie=UTF-8 Owen, Roger. 2009. State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ed. Abingdon: Routledge. Prados, Alfred B. 2006. Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Accessed August 28 2015. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IB93085.pdf Romanowski, A. 2014. “For Jordan, U.S. Support ‘Guaranteed.’” USAID. Accessed March 28 2015. http://blog.usaid.gov/2014/06/for-jordan-us-support-guaranteed/ Ryan, Curtis R. 2014. “Jordanian Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 21, No. 1: 144-153. Salloukh, Basel F. 1996. “State Strength, Permeability, and Foreign Policy Behaviour: Jordan in theoretical perspective.” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2: 39-65. Sharp, Jeremy. 2014. Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. —. 2015. Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. —. 2015. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. —. 2016. Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Sherlock, Ruth. 2014. “Jordan Repeals Free Medical Aid for Syrian Refugees.” The Telegraph. Accessed February 25 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/1126146 8/Jordan-repeals-free-medical-aid-for-Syrian-refugees.html

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Smith, Jimmy V. 1997. “U.S. Military Drawdown for Jordan.” DISAM Journal, Spring: 97-102. Stevenson, Jonathan. 2014. “The Syrian Tragedy and Precedent.” Survival, Vol. 56, No. 3: 121-140. Sweis, Rana F. 2014. “Jordan’s Open Door Is Now Only Cracked, Leaving Syrians Stranded.” The New York Times. Accessed February 26 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/world/middleeast/jordans-opendoor-is-now-only-cracked-leaving-syrians-stranded.html Thorsen, Dag Einar. 2011. “The Neoliberal Challenge: What is Neoliberalism?” Contemporary Readings in Law & Social Justice, Vol. 2, No. 2: 188-214. UNHCR. 2015. Country Operations Profile: Jordan. Accessed October 17 2015. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486566.html —. 2015. Syria Regional Refugee Response. Accessed March 18 2015. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107 World Banka. 2013. Jordan Economic Monitor: Maintaining stability and fostering shared prosperity amid regional turmoil. Accessed June 25 2014. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/publication/jordaneconomic-monitor-spring-201 World Bankb. 2013. Coordinating Stakeholders in Jordan on Crucial Water Issues. Accessed November 26 2014. https://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/stories/coordinating-stakeholdersjordan-crucial-water-issue

CHAPTER NINE THE GROWING INTEREST OF TURKEY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: A NEW APPROACH OR BUSINESS AS USUAL? ALI SEN, IMAD EL-ANIS AND M. OZAN SARAY

Introduction This chapter examines the development of relations between Turkey and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 1 by investigating commercial and economic inter-state cooperation in the last decade, and evaluates the economic performance of Turkey in the MENA. It first provides a brief review of modern Turkey’s economic relations in a historical perspective and goes on to discusses the extent of regional changes in Turkey’s foreign economic policy over the past decade, particularly during the AK Party’s rule. Then, in the final section it assesses the changing nature of the relationships between Turkey and states in the MENA. It argues that Turkey’s interests towards the region are the continuation of a multidimensional approach in Turkey’s external relations, that started with a 1980 reform program which has gained momentum, particularly with the AK Party’s “vision” of increasing economic relations with the MENA. Over the past decade, the AK Party government, with a religious-conservative stance, has actively pursued a policy of increasing engagement in the MENA, while the aim of full membership of the EU is still important. The success of the Turkish economy and its emerging private sector with an increasing orientation to the MENA has helped to diversify its external relations. Frustration over 1

Here the MENA region includes the following states in addition to Turkey: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE and Yemen.

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the accession negotiations with the EU, and the stagnation of European markets as a result of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, have also provided extra impetus to strengthen Turkey’s relations with the MENA.

Turkey’s Economic Relations in Historical Context In Turkey, as in most of the other countries of the region, the past has undoubtedly played a significant role in determining its economic policy changes in general and its foreign economic relations in particular. Indeed, one also needs to pay attention to the impact of domestic political factors and international influence for a better understanding of the structural changes in the foreign economic policies of Turkey. The historical background of Turkey’s economic relations can be divided into five main phases: the liberal era of the 1920s; etatism in 1933-1949; the predominantly liberal policies of the 1950s; the era of inward-oriented development policies based on the national planning and importsubstituting industrialization of 1960-1979; and neo-liberal outwardoriented development policies of the post-1980 period. In the early years of the Republic, Turkey had little control over the foreign trade regime before 1929 because the Lausanne Treaty, which concluded the war of independence, contained some serious restrictions. For instance, Turkey was forced to keep the low Ottoman tariffs until 1929. This meant that the government was unable to adopt trade policies in line with the needs of domestic enterprises, thereby resulting in an unfavorable trade balance and hindering industrial development (Hershlag 1968, 22). Therefore, the first years of the young republic could realize relatively little industrialization. From the 1920s onwards, Turkey’s main European trading partners remained the same as during the late Ottoman era, including Germany, France, the UK and Italy. Until the beginning of the 1930s, Italy was the most important trade partner among them because of the Greek merchants who settled in the port city of Trieste (ùahin 2012, 46). Greek merchants were engaged in foreign trade before they had to leave Turkey after the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922). By contrast, the attitude towards foreign capital was cautious in light of the unfavorable experiences during the Ottoman Empire. The etatist policies in which the state’s role in finance, industry and foreign trade increased was mainly a pragmatic response to earlier disappointments, related to previous liberal economic policies and the negative effects of the external environment. The impact of the Great Depression, in particular, squeezed the Turkish economy on two fronts.

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On the one hand, general decline in world trade volume decreased the prices of Turkey’s traditional agricultural exports. This, in turn, significantly reduced Turkey’s export revenues. On the other hand, curtailment of foreign trade cut down traditional agricultural imports. Foreign trade policy in this period showed mercantilist features under the mono-party system, and can be recognized by the famous slogan in the Republican People’s Party Program in 1935: “Our principle in foreign trade and commercial agreements is to buy the products of those who buy our products” (Hershlag 1968, 75). However, this kind of mercantilist stance was eclipsed with increasing foreign debt during the Second World War. 1950 marked the transition to multi-party democracy in Turkey. The Democrat Party was initially in favor of a more liberal economic order. A greater scope for private enterprise, trade liberalization and encouragement of foreign capital were key elements. However, foreign trade policies can be divided into three periods. The first, from the election until 1954, was a very liberal period. The second period (1954-1958) witnessed an increasingly interventionist government policy in the sense of controls over imports and foreign exchange, when faced with mounting short-term indebtedness and a large current account deficit. The third period marked the first major macroeconomic crisis that the Turkish Republic experienced after its foundation, and entailed liberalizing foreign trade by removing quantitative import restrictions, as the government had to launch a stabilization program in August 1958, Turkey’s first ever encounter with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). An unfortunate episode was the collapse of the democratic regime. The Democrat Party government was overthrown by a group of military leaders in May 1960. Law 5583, enacted in 1950, was the first law under the Republic to address the issue of foreign direct investment (FDI). It guaranteed profit transfers but under very restrictive conditions. In 1954, another law, titled, the Law to Encourage Foreign Capital, was accepted to attract more FDI. Even though the law had a “liberal” stance, in practice it was not implemented in a liberal manner until 1980, when the 24th January structural reform program was launched. Indeed, Turkey did not perform well in terms of FDI inflows in the second half of the 1950s. In the aftermath of the 1960 military coup, Turkey also entered an era of planned economic development, through which a series of five-year development plans were put into effect in 1963. Another dimension of this phase was that industrialization in Turkey should be achieved as rapidly as possible through import substitution within the context of the five-year plans. The foreign trade regime with instruments of import permits, the allocation of foreign exchange, quota limits and tariffs were of great

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importance with respect to the pursuit of import substitution industrialization (ISI). Turkey was successful in achieving high rates of economic growth under ISI in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. Yet, the implementation of ISI is intrinsically unsustainable, owing to its heavy domestic market bias and a fundamental neglect of exports (Onis 1999, 460), and this was apparent in Turkey. Indeed, following the completion of the “easy phase” of ISI, Turkey experienced an economic crisis. With ISI undermined, the excessive rates of protection and the overvalued exchange rates contributed to the failure of Turkey’s industrialization strategy. The oil crisis of 1973-74 and the U.S. arms embargo, followed by the 1974 Cyprus intervention, aggravated the ISI strategy further. These events led to a heavy foreign exchange bottleneck which was one of the most influential factors leading to a switch in the industrialization strategy away from ISI to an export-oriented industrialization strategy. The period of 1963-1979 marked a significant breakthrough in Turkey’s foreign economic relations. Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963, in order to initiate an association regime. According to the agreement, there were three stages in the way of full integration with the EU, which included preparatory, transitional and final stages. In accordance with this regime, in 1970 Turkey was committed to reducing the customs duties to zero within a specified period (22 years). The 24th January 1980 measures, as a major stabilization and reform program, represented a decisive turning point for the Turkish economy. The program, in a neo-liberal vision, was based on the principles of free market economy, which entailed economic liberalization and expressed a transformation from an inward-looking development strategy into an outward-looking development strategy. Neo-liberal economic reforms have, in particular, led to rapid growth in exports for much of the period since 1980. Between 1980-1990, exports rose rapidly, increasing from $2.9 billion to $12.7 billion at an average annual rate of 17.2%, while imports also grew sharply, increasing from $7.9 billion to $22.3 billion in the same period. The share of exports in GDP rose from 3% in 1980 to 24.5% in 1990. The share of foreign trade volume in the GNP also rose from 18.6% to 32.4% in the same period (Sen 1996, 239-240). The share of manufactured exports increased from 36% in 1980 to 76.7% in 1988. Turkey’s export boom contributed to an economic recovery, with GNP growth averaging nearly 6% in the period of 1980-1990, compared to an average growth rate of 0.5% between 1978 and 1980 (ibid., 217). The 1990s were the worst decade for the Turkish economy after World War Two. A highly unstable economic trajectory was accompanied by

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political instability, as the average life of governments was less than one and half years. While economic growth showed dramatic increases and decreases, the average inflation rate was more than 80% per year. The 1990s have been regarded as the lost decade for Turkey in terms of the failure to establish economic and political stability. During this decade Turkey had nine coalition governments. Economic growth was increasingly sporadic, with sharp rises and falls, including a financial crisis in 1994, followed by a severe recession. Inflation raged at more than 80% per year. Turkey’s foreign trade, however, gained momentum in the 1990s. In particular, the customs union agreement with the EU, that was implemented in January 1996, contributed to a further surge in Turkey’s trade volume. Owing to the far greater external orientation of the economy after the customs union, foreign trade represented an even higher proportion of the national income in comparison to the 1980s. As a percentage of GDP, total trade increased from 33.7% in 1995 to 41.2% in 2000. The increase in this ratio resulted from the increase in both exports and imports. Exports which totaled $21.6 billion in 1995 increased to $27.7 billion in 2000. Imports which totaled $35.5 billion in 1995 rose to $54.5 billion in 2000 (Kocyigit and Sen 2007, 64). Table 9.1. Turkey’s trade by selected export destinations and import resources (1973-2000) (%) Regions 1973 72.0 46.4

Exports 1980 1990 57.7 69.9 42.7 55.4

2000 68.3 52.2

1973 77.9 54.8

Imports 1980 1990 46.7 66.7 28.7 44.4

2000 69.6 48.9

14.5 7.5 30.1

16.1 11.3 31.7

23.1 8.9 22.1

18.1 5.8 53.3

22.3 10.2 33.3

20.7 7.2 30.4

13.8

8.0

9.9

39.5

12.1

5.7

16.3 -

15.7 2.3

12.2 -

11.5 2.3

21.2 -

17.6 7.1

OECD Countries The EEC / The EU The Other OECD 25.6 15.0 USA 9.9 3.4 28.0 42.7 Non OECD Countries Middle Eastern 12.3 18.9 Countries Other Countries 15.7 18.0 USSR / Russian 5.8 Fed. Source: Kocyigit and Sen 2007, 66.

As far as foreign trading partners are concerned, Turkey’s international trade has been dominated by the OECD countries for decades, within

The Growing Interest of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa

175

which the European Economic Community (EEC) and EU have nearly constituted half of Turkish trade (see Table 9.I). Conventionally, another important group in Turkey’s foreign trade has been Middle Eastern countries, but the shares of both exports and imports slowed down in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991. On an individual basis, except with the major countries of the EU (Germany, the UK, France and Italy), the shares of Turkish exports and imports with the USA have also been important, although they declined in terms of the percentage of Turkey’s total trade after 2000. Russia’s share in total Turkish imports is evidently striking after the late 1990s because of Turkey’s dependence on natural gas (Table 9.I).

The Political Economy of Turkey’s Changing External Economic Relations Under the AKP The 1990s in Turkey were characterized by a series of economic crises as a result of chronic macroeconomic instability. High inflation, volatile rates of economic growth, enormous levels of domestic debt and an increasing current account deficit made the Turkish economy extremely fragile and sensitive to domestic and international shocks. Indeed, the Turkish economy experienced three crises in 1994, 2000 and 2001. The crisis of 2001 was the most serious, which caused drastic declines in output, severe unemployment and negative distributional effects. However, this crisis also paved the way for a new program, “The Transition to a Strong Economy”, establishing the policy and reform framework. Kemal Dervis, who was at that time Vice President at the World Bank, was appointed as Minister of State responsible for the economy. Under his leadership, the coalition government of 1999-2002 had to take the necessary steps for fiscal and monetary discipline accompanying structural reforms. Following the 2001 crisis, the November 2002 general elections represented a major turning point and opened a new chapter in the political history of Turkey, after a decade of political instability under consecutive coalition governments. The Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi; hereinafter, the AK Party) which entered the Turkish political scene on 14th August 2001, won a sweeping victory in this general election, earning an absolute majority of the 550 parliamentary seats. The extraordinary electoral success of the AK Party continued in three consecutive parliamentary elections in 2002, 2007 and 2011. Even more importantly, its vote share rose in each election cycle (from 34%, to 47%, and just under 50% respectively).

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Fig. 9.1. The AK Party’s eleectoral victories in comparativee perspective

Source: The S Supreme Electooral Council, 20 014.

Althoughh the origins of o the AK Parrty are based oon the half-ceentury-old Islamic Nattional Outloook Movementt, the foundeers of the Paarty have succeeded iin transformiing the origin nal political Islamist partty into a conservativee democratic party. There is no doubt that the consservativereligious chharacter of thee AK Party iss paramount in its politicall identity. However, thhe AK Party has h aimed to create c a politiical identity in n order to embrace diffferent segments of Turkissh society. Inddeed, one of the main reasons for the AK Partty’s success has h been view wed as its caapacity to attract the ddifferent segm ments of societty, ranging froom the religio ous to the conservativee, the urban and the liberal. Thhrough this type of cosmopolitissm, the AK Party was in i pursuit off reconciling the new opportunitiees of globalizzation with th he traditionall Islamic and d national values of Tuurkey. This poolitical stance has, in turn, enabled it to look l both East and W West at the same time (K Kaln 2013, 4425; Onis 200 06, 229). Therefore, aas the next seection will ex xplore, the viision of reinv vigorating Turkey’s role in the MEN NA as well ass other neighbboring zones under u the AK Party iss, to a large extent, a con ntinuation of iits multilateraal policymaking apprroach.

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Turkey’s active and increasing engagement with the MENA, in terms of economic relations since the beginning of the 2000s, can be attributed to the “new foreign policy vision” put forward by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who served as a chief adviser and later Foreign Minister in subsequent AK Party governments. He played a central role in designing the present parameters of the new assertive foreign policy activism. According to him, Turkey’s new foreign policy constitutes five principles as follows: “a balance between security and democracy”; “a zero problems policy towards Turkey’s neighbors”; “developing relations with the neighboring regions and beyond”; “a multi-dimensional foreign policy” and “rhythmic diplomacy” (Davutoglu 2008, 79-82). In accordance with these principles, he emphasizes the role of economic interdependence and furthermore argues that “order in the Middle East cannot be achieved in an atmosphere of isolated economies” (Davutoglu 2008, 85). There is no doubt that the expected outcome of increasing interdependence, through economic and other human interactions, is not only to gain new markets for Turkey’s exports and business activities, but also to achieve a durable peace in the region. As the next section will show, increases in the volume of trade, investment and the movement of people between the two sides are instrumental in reaching these objectives. The successful performance of the Turkish economy over the past decade has been an important driving force behind the expansion of Turkey’s relations with the MENA. As can be seen from Table 9.2, Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by an average of 5% between 2003 and 2013, making it the fastest among the OECD countries which grew at an average of 1.7%. Turkey’s GDP increased significantly to $822 billion in 2013, up from $231bn in 2002 at current prices, making Turkey the 18th largest economy in the world (WB 2015). Similarly, its GDP per capita also rose more than threefold, increasing from nearly $3,400 to $11,000 for the same time span. Simultaneously, Turkish foreign trade grew more than fourfold, rendering Turkey increasingly integrated with the world economy. Price stability has been one of the main parts in the economic stability of Turkey during the AK Party period. The inflation rate has declined to single digit figures from an average of 80% in the 1990s, as mentioned above. Turkey managed to keep the unemployment rate between 9% and 10%. One would regard this as a significant success, given the atmosphere of global economic crisis, while many EU countries are afflicted with double-digit unemployment rates. Thanks to prudent fiscal policies, the AK Party governments have managed to reduce the budget deficit to GDP ratio from 12% in 2002 to 1.1% in 2014, which is one of the lowest rates in Europe and is also lower

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than the Maastricht criterion for a budget deficit of 3%. Similarly, public debt to GDP ratio fell to 33% in 2014, down from 74% in 2002, which also provides the 60% threshold of the Maastricht criterion for public debt stock since 2004. In terms of poverty, economic growth in a low inflation environment has had some significant trickle-down effects in Turkey. For example, the population living below $4.30 per capita per day as the percentage of total population dropped from 30.30% in 2002 to 2.06% in 2013. Undoubtedly, these positive developments show that the rising economic strength of the Turkish economy over the past decade has enabled the AK Party to diversify its trade and investment linkages in the greater MENA with some degree of autonomy, as a result of a “new” assertive foreign policy, while maintaining its engagement with its traditional Western economic partners. The development of Turkey’s relations with the EU has also contributed to the acceleration of Turkey’s engagement with the MENA countries. Since the very foundation of the EU, Turkey has been eagerly interested in the integration process in Europe and has considered it a way of achieving its modernization. Therefore, Turkey applied for associated membership in 1959 and signed the Ankara Agreement with the EU in 1963. The Ankara Agreement envisaged a progressive and gradual model of integration with Turkey through the three phases mentioned above (“preparatory”, “transition” and “completion”). At the end of the transitional stage, the customs union between Turkey and the EU was put into effect in 1996. The customs union still constitutes a unique step for Turkey´s EU integration, without attaining full membership, as opposed to the full membership processes of previous candidates. Turkey was officially recognized as a “candidate state” at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, which marked a breakthrough in Turkey-EU relations. Following the steps taken towards democracy, and the rule of law and respect for human rights, EU-Turkey relations finally reached a historic stage at the Brussels Summit in December 2004 as the European Council decided to start the accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. However, the EU has exclusively referred to the “open-ended” nature of accession negotiations and implied that the results of these negotiations cannot be guaranteed in advance (Arkan 2006, 3).

6.2

17.1

18.3

51.5

Investment (% of GDP)

Savings (% of GDP)

Imports (US$ billions)

3403

232.7

2002

Real GDP growth (%)

GDP per capita (US$, current prices)

GDP (Current prices) (US$ billions)

69.3

15.1

17.4

5.3

4393

304.6

2003

97.5

15.6

20.7

9.4

5595

393

2004

116.8

15.7

21.4

8.4

6801

484

2005

139.6

16.2

22.6

6.9

7351

529.9

2006

170.1

15.8

21.8

4.6

8984

655.9

2007

201

6.8

20.02

0.7

10745

742.1

2008

Table 9.2. Overview of Turkey’s economic performance (2002-2013)

140.9

13.1

17.2

-4.7

8559

617.6

2009

185.5

12.6

18.9

9

10067

735.8

2010

The Growing Interest of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa

240.8

13.8

23.8

8.5

10469

772.3

2011

236.5

14.7

20.6

2.2

10609

794.5

2012

251.6

12.6

20.07

4.1

10972

822.1

2013

179

-8.8

67.7

10.5

32.18

74

10.3

38.82

1.75

-2.47

-11.5

1.08

-0.27

Sources: TURKSTAT 2015; IMF 2015.

Fiscal balance (% of GDP) Public debt (% of GDP) Unemployment (%) Below $4.30 per capita per day (% to total population)

FDI (US$ billions)

Current Account Balance (CAB)(% of GDP)

32.62

10.3

59.6

-5.22

2.79

-3.67

63.2

26.39

10.3

52.7

-1.3

8.97

-4.57

73.5

25.35

9.9

46.5

-0.61

19.26

-6.02

17.59

9.9

40

-1.62

19.94

-5.75

107.3

85.5

47.3

Exports (US$ billions)

36.1

Chapter Nine

180

15.33

11

40

-1.8

16.96

-5.25

132

11.92

14

46.1

-5.5

6.86

-2.24

102.1

9.61

11.9

42.4

-3.6

7.81

-6.49

113.9

6.83

9.8

39.2

-1.4

16

-9.7

135

5.88

10.1

36.1

-2

12.6

-6

152.5

5.13

9.7

36.03

-2.2

12.9

-7.3

151.8

The Growing Interest of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa

181

Indeed, this half-hearted attitude reflected Turkey–EU relations during the AK Party era, which can be divided into two distinct phases. In the first phase, between the end of 2002 and the end of 2005, determined and strenuous efforts were made by the AK Party government for fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, which involves a set of economic and democratization reforms in pursuit of starting the accession negotiations. Yet, in the second phase, the AK Party displayed a certain loss of enthusiasm and commitment to the efforts to join the EU as a full member. Among the problems in the EU process, some of the key decisions taken have led to a significant impact with respect to eroding enthusiasm, not only at the government level, but also among the public at large. The first such decision was concerned with the possibility of permanent safeguards on full labor mobility after Turkey’s full membership. The second decision was the failure of the EU to fulfil its promises to the Turkish Cypriots. The EU’s failure to deal with the Cyprus matter on an equitable basis was interpreted as somewhat unfair treatment among some EU members (Öniú and Ylmaz 2009, 13-15). And finally, the practice of the EU’s Schengen visa policy has long been a source of massive complaint and objections in Turkey. Turkish nationals have regarded the Schengen visa regime as a practice that puts them at particular disadvantage in relation to their European counterparts, who enjoy visa-free travel to Turkey. The businessmen and the government have argued that this visa regime constituted a form of unfair competition in trading between the EU and Turkey, and made it much more difficult for Turkish business people to promote their goods and expand their markets within the EU (Kirisci and Kaptanoglu 2011, 712-713). Frustrated with these decisions and the practices of the EU, and with the stagnation of the EU membership process, the AK Party increased efforts to diversify its foreign policies in an attempt to strengthen relations with other regions, including the MENA (Altunúk and Martin 2011, 578; Hürsoy 2013, 505). The process of diversification in Turkey’s external relations was also a continuation of the growing strength and diversification of Turkish private business activities (Onis 2014; Kutlay 2011; Kirisci and Kaptanoglu 2011). It is noteworthy in this context that one should recognize the differences of two leading business organizations. On the one hand, the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD, Türk Sanayicileri ve Isadamlari Dernegi) founded in 1971, consists of large firms and holdings mostly based in the Marmara region, and represents the politically Western-oriented and the pro-secular economic establishment. On the other hand, the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD, Müstakil Sanayici ve Is Adamlari Dernegi),

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founded in 1990, constitutes mainly small-to medium-sized businesses in Turkey representing the conservative bourgeoisie, and is known as the Anatolian Tigers. This term refers to cities in Anatolia where a boom has occurred in production and capital accumulation led by companies in and around cities such as Bursa, Konya, Kayseri, Gaziantep, Denizli, Çorum and Malatya. These are the cities where the public has tended to be more conservative and pious, comprising a natural electoral base for the AK Party (Kirisci and Kaptanoglu 2011, 714). In addition to these organizations, the foundation of the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSCON, Turkiye Isadamlari ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu) in 2005, as a private business organization comprising mostly small-and medium-sized businesses, has also contributed to this diversification process, as TUSCON organizes the annual Turkey-Middle East Trade Bridge which brings together businessmen in the region of MENA. As the newly emerged Anatolian Tigers under these business organizations are located in inland Anatolia, and have improved their economic internationalization, Turkey has strengthened business ties further with MENA markets. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009, and the following stagnation in the European markets, also rendered the tendency of Anatolian Tigers toward the MENA region to gain additional momentum.

The Changing Nature of Turkey’s Economic Relations With the MENA In recent years, Turkey, under the AK Party governments, has actively pursued far-ranging engagement with MENA countries by encouraging trade and other interactions. In line with its assertive and proactive foreign policy, the governments of the AK Party have sought to develop state-tostate strategic cooperation and frequent contact with the countries in the region, in order to foster greater economic activity. In doing so, they have used a set of instruments in stimulating the economic exchanges at the regional level, by establishing free trade agreements, preferential trade regimes, and liberalizing visa requirements to facilitate the free movement of people. This process was also boosted by the intense efforts of the Turkish private sector in diversifying its partners as it tried to avert external demand shocks emanating from the global economic crisis of 2008-2009, and the following recession in EU countries. Therefore, it has become evident that the MENA region was seen as a way of compensating for the decline in Turkish exports to European markets.

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183

Fig. 9.2. Turkkey’s foreign traade with the ME ENA (2002-20 14) (millions USD) U

Source: Authhors’ calculationns based on TU URKSTAT, 20155.

As Tablle 9.2 and Figure F 9.3 suggests, whilee Turkey’s to otal trade volume rosee more than foourfold from $87.6 $ billion iin 2002 to neaarly $400 billion in 20014, trade betw ween Turkey and the MEN NA increased more m than eightfold inn the same peeriod, namely from $7.3 biillion to $64.2 billion. After Turkeey’s exports too the MENA markets m reachhed a historic record at $48 billion iin 2012, it stilll remained hiigh at $40.8 bbillion in 2014 4. Turkish imports from m the region between 2002 2 and 2014 allso showed an n upward trend, exceppt in 2009, frrom $2.9 billion to $23.4 billion. Simiilarly, the share of ME ENA countriess in Turkey’s total exports, which was arround 4.4% in 2002, incrreased considderably to nearrly 26% in 20114 (see Figuree 9.3). As Table 9.3 shows, Turkey’s exp ports predomiinantly conceentrate on two econom mic regions: thhe EU and the MENA. Thesse two regions account for nearly 770% of Turkkey’s total exports. It is nnotable that th here is a significant cchange in the relative r markeet size of Turkkey vis-a-vis these t two regions. Thee EU still plaays a leading role, despite the significaant fall in Turkey’s tottal exports to the region (du ue to econom mic crisis in the EU and the dramaticc contracting of its domesttic demand). B By contrast, it i is clear that the ME ENA representts a growing market for Tuurkish exportss and has become onee of the prom mising destinaations for Turrkish goods, thanks t to various agreeements signeed between thee two sides, aas well as other factors such as the relatively rappid population n growth in thhe MENA, un nsatisfied demand, andd cultural and geographical proximity.

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otal exports andd imports (2002 2-2014) (%) Fig. 9.3. The MENA’s sharee in Turkey’s to

URKSTAT 20155. Source: Authhors’ calculationns based on TU

Table 9.3. T The share of geographic g reegions in totaal Turkish exports Years M MENA EU 2002 1 12.12 56.62 2005 1 16.23 56.30 2010 2 24.59 46.26 2014 2 25.90 43.29 Source: Autthors’ calculattions based on n TURKSTAT T 2015.

OTH HER 31 1.26 27 7.47 29 9.15 30 0.81

The groowing interesst of Turkey y towards thhe MENA has h other dimensions beyond merchandise trad de. Non-tradee aspects of Turkey’s economic reelations with the region in nvolve primaarily FDI, con nstruction activities, toourism, develoopment assistaance and hum manitarian aid. Bilateral FDI betweenn Turkey andd the MENA blossomed b aftter the AK Paarty came to power. A As Figure 9.4 shows, s the total volume of F FDI stock bettween the two sides roose more thann twelvefold from f $985 miillion in 2003 to $12.4 billion in 20013.

The G Growing Interestt of Turkey in the t Middle Eastt and North Afrrica

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Fig. 9.4. Turkkey’s FDI stocck (inflow + ou utflow) with ME ENA countriess (Millions USD)

Source: Centrral Bank of thee Republic of Turkey (CBRT):: Statistical Datta (EDDS) 2015

Althoughh the greater part of Turk kish FDI conntinues to flow to EU countries, T Turkish investm ments in the MENA M have nnotably increaased from $100 millionn in 2002 to $871 $ million in 2013. In thiis context, FD DI inflows from MENA A countries too Turkey show wed a dramattic increase during d the same periodd, reaching a record level of $15.3 billlion in 2010, up from $338 millionn in 2002, andd maintained a level of annnual FDI inflows above $10 billion iin the followinng three yearss (2011-2013) (see Table 9.4 4). Turkish outflow FDI ranged r from small s bakeriess and restauran nts set up by individuaals to large Turrkish multinatio onal enterprisees (MNE). Acccording to a survey pubblished in 20114, in 2012 53 3 affiliates off the largest 28 8 Turkish MNEs in tthe MENA operated o in a wide rang e of fields including infrastructurre, oil and gass related investments, energgy, fertilizer, food and beverage, gllass, textile annd consumer products p (DEIK K 2014, 15-25 5).

Chapter Nine

186

Table 9.4. Turkey’s FDI stock with MENA countries (2002-2013) (Millions USD) Years

FDI Inflow

FDI Outflow

Total

2000 2002

392

57

449

338

100

438

2003

877

108

985

2004

625

114

739

2005

4.336

130

4.466

2006

7.213

138

7.351

2007

10.290

230

10.520

2008

7.244

332

7.576

2009

10.962

623

11.585

2010

15.390

242

15.632

2011

10.830

477

11.307

2012

14.409

883

15.292

2013

11.557

871

12.428

Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT): Statistical Data (EVDS) 2015

Construction and contracting industry is one of the major parts of Turkish outward FDI. Turkish companies realized nearly 7500 construction projects in 103 countries between 1972 and 2014 (Muteahhitler Birligi 2014, 13). The total volume of work undertaken by Turkish contractors has reached approximately $285 billion. The total cost of the projects realized in the MENA also climbed to $119.4 billion by the first half of 2014, accounting for nearly 42% of the total cost of Turkish construction projects worldwide (see Table 9.5). In the period 2010-2013, projects in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran and Qatar represented 32% of total contract value of total foreign Turkish construction activities (ibid. 7). However, Turkish companies still have major projects in almost all countries in the MENA, which includes the building of highways, airports, bridges, tunnels, hotels, shopping centers and housing and sports complexes.

The Growing Interest of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa

187

Table 9.5. Construction projects of Turkish firms in MENA countries and share to total (1972-2014 (first 6 months)) Country Libya Iraq Qatar Saudi Arabia Algeria UAE Oman Iran Morocco Jordan Yemen Kuwait Israel Egypt Tunisia Lebanon Bahrain Syria Palestine Total

Number of Projects 565 853 117 212 231 104 41 45 48 38 15 24 157 26 11 10 4 24 1 2526

Total Project Costs ($) 28819029791 20855749588 15085321033 13523285914 9830917444 9126399009 5590691316 4077133087 3339491196 2298803862 1565399965 1400037504 1226253549 981782857 772959772 364979157 284752200 258415791 35000000 119436403035

Share (%) 10.13 7.33 5.30 4.75 3.45 3.21 1.97 1.43 1.17 0.81 0.55 0.49 0.43 0.35 0.27 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.01 41,97

Source: Türk Muteahhitler Birligi 2014.

The growing activism of Turkish external policies has also been observed in its increasing role in development aid in the MENA, especially in neighboring countries. Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Turkey has grown remarkably over the past decade. It rose to $2.5 billion in 2012 from $200 million in 2002, almost doubling between 2011 and 2012. In 2013, Turkey was the third largest humanitarian donor country among G20 states, with $1.6 billion given in foreign aid, and the most generous country in terms of share of GNI (0.21%). It is clear that a large proportion of humanitarian assistance from Turkey was, in particular, associated with the escalating Syrian crisis on its southern border, and housing refugees within Turkey constitutes an important part of this aid (GHA 2013, 36; GHA 2014, 27-30). Another dimension of Turkey’s increasing interaction with the MENA is the growth in the contact and engagement between peoples and cultures.

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The increase in the movvement of peo ople over the past decade has been boosted by tthe conscioussly liberal visaa policy of thee AK Party in n order to ease restricttions on travvel. The visass were mutuaally removed between Turkey and nine countriees in the MEN NA (Republic of Turkey Ministry M of Foreign Afffairs 2015).Thhe removal off visa barrierss has led to ev ver-larger numbers of people from the MENA travelling t to T Turkey. As Figure F 9.5 shows, the nnumber of touurists from MENA countriees travelling to t Turkey rose to nearlly 4.7 million in 2013, up frrom 1.1 millioon in 2002. Fig. 9.5. Visittors arriving in Turkey from MENA M countriees (2002-2013)

Source: Repuublic of Turkeyy Ministry of Culture and Touurism General Directorate D of Investmentt and Enterprisees 2013.

The connnections betw ween Turkey an nd other MEN NA countries stemming s from this m movement of people p can be best observeed by the expansion of Turkish Airrlines (THY) flights in the region. By S September 20 014, THY flew to 260 destinations worldwide, w 44 4 of which arre in the MEN NA (THY 2015). Addditionally, Turrkish TV soaap operas havve been broaadcast on prime-time Arabic TV and have gaiined widesprread popularitty in the region whicch, in turn, has h not only helped to inncrease Arab b tourism activities inn Turkey butt also to elim minate psychhological and d cultural barriers betw ween peoples in the region (Kirisci and K Kaptanoglu 20 011, 709). Althoughh many poinnts made so o far suggestt that ever-in ncreasing interaction bbetween Turkkey and the MENA M is likeely to continu ue in the longer-term,, both regionnal and domeestic challengges that would d qualify Turkey’s peerformance in the region neeed to be consiidered. On thee regional

The Growing Interest of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa

189

side, the impact of the Arab Uprisings is significant when regarding the performance of the bilateral relations of Turkey in the region. As Tables 9.4 and 9.5 indicate, overall trade and investment between Turkey and the countries most affected by the Arab Spring, especially Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, did not actually suffer greatly, apart from a few exceptions such as the loss in trade volume with Syria in 2012, and with Libya in 2011. Interestingly enough, even Turkey’s trade with Syria during the Syrian civil war recovered slowly in 2013, and almost reached pre-war levels in 2014. In achieving this, the efforts of Syrian businessmen who have fled their country to escape the civil war, and who reside mainly in eastern cities in Turkey close to the Turkish-Syrian border, have been especially effective. They have revitalized trade with Syria through the companies they have set up in Turkey. However, it should be noted that the expectations related to Turkey’s foreign trade with Syria before the war were so high, that it was hoped that annual bilateral trade with Syria would have reached $5 billion (Sonmez 2014). Similar observations can be made more strikingly for Turkish investment in Libya. As Table 9.5 indicates, the level of Turkish investment projects in Libya reached $175 million in 2011 and $176 million in 2012, but in 2013 and 2014 the expansion of Turkish FDI in Libya, especially in the construction sector, came almost to a halt at $7 million and $8 million respectively. The significant decline of Turkish investments in Libya was, therefore, the biggest loss for Turkey’s bilateral economic relations experienced in the region following the Arab Uprisings. Consequently, on the whole, it can be said that the loss in Turkey’s bilateral economic relations with the countries of the Arab Uprisings is the greatest challenge for the mediumterm, if not long-term. On the domestic side, several major and interrelated constraints–the current account deficit, extensive energy dependence, and a low savings rate–faced by the Turkish economy, comprise the domestic challenges for the maintenance of Turkey’s economic performance in the MENA. As Table 9.2 indicates, the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP was, in particular, high between 2010 and 2013, registering 6% in 2012 and 9.7% in 2011. The main reason for this current account deficit is the large foreign trade deficit. As with the foreign trade deficit, annual energy imports (nearly $60 billion) are blamed for the high current account deficit (Edgerley 2013). An analytical macroeconomic history of the Turkish economy since the Second World War underlines quite convincingly that economic crises follow the same pattern: high economic growth aggravates the current account deficit, and a sudden interruption of capital inflows, together with

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other structural problems, triggers economic crises (Onis 2013, 1416). The underlying causes of Turkey’s current account deficits present two important factors: exceptionally low saving rates and extensive energyimport dependence. On the one hand, as savings fall short of investments Turkey needs foreign capital to finance its current account deficit. On the other hand, Turkey’s current account balance is highly sensitive to changes in energy prices because it must import almost all of its energy needs. The country's dependence on foreign energy continues to increase in parallel with its fast economic growth. Hence, high degrees of energy dependence and low savings rates constitute the major structural root causes of Turkey’s chronic account deficit. These constraints, in turn, might limit the expansion and the sustainability of Turkey’s external relations towards the MENA.

Conclusion Turkey is becoming increasingly interested in the MENA, emerging as a regional economic power thanks to its successful economic performance. Although Turkey’s multidimensional approach to its external relations began with a reform program in 1980, the pace of policy reform increased following the AK Party’s rise to power in November 2002. The AK Party’s foreign policy activism under Davutoglu’s “new foreign policy vision” especially complemented the “vision” of increasing economic relations with the MENA. Over the past decade, the AK Party government, with a religious-conservative stance, has actively pursued a policy of increasing engagement in the MENA, while the aim of full membership in the EU remains important. The political stability Turkey has enjoyed since 2002 has underpinned its impressive economic performance. The success of the Turkish economy and its emerging private sector, with an increasing orientation to the MENA, has helped to diversify the external relations of Turkey. Frustration over the accession negotiations with the EU, and the stagnation of European markets as a result of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, provided extra impetus to strengthen Turkey’s relations with the MENA. Over the past decade, MENA countries have represented a growing market for Turkish exports and have become some of the most promising destinations, thanks to the facilities offered by the recently established liberal bilateral agreements. The growing interest of Turkey towards the MENA has also been reinforced by other dimensions beyond merchandise trade such as FDI, construction activities, tourism, development assistance and humanitarian aid. Turkey under the AK Party has set out a 2023 vision

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which has ambitious goals. Accordingly, the government’s main objective is to make Turkey a top ten economy in the world by the centenary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic. To do this, the government plans to increase GDP to $2 trillion and GDP per capita to $25,000 by 2023. Furthermore, the government aims to develop a $500 billion export sector and to increase the total number of exporters to 100,000 companies (mfa.gov.tr). In accomplishing these objectives, Turkey must address its overdependence on foreign energy and low levels of domestic savings, not only to overcome its long-standing current account deficit, but also to come to terms with current and future challenges presented by the Arab Uprisings. In the long term, there is no doubt that Turkey seeks to promote a peaceful, stable, prosperous and more democratic environment, for the countries of the Arab Uprisings, in particular, and the MENA as a whole. Such developments in this direction would mean a win-win outcome for all the parties in the region.

References Altunúk, Meliha B. and Lenore G. Martin. 2011. “Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East Under AKP.” Turkish Studies, Vol.12, No.4: 569-587. Arkan, Harun. 2006. Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership? Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT). 2015. EVDS (Electronic Data Distribution System), http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html Davutoglu, Ahmet. 2008. “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007.” Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No 1: 79-82. Edgerley, David. 2013. “Turkey’s Current Account Deficit is Economy’s Achilles Heel.” Financial Times. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f3389efe-4d40-11e3-9f4000144feabdc0.html#axzz3e4d8Vvyw GHA. 2013. Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013, Bristol: Global Humanitarian Assistance. —. 2014. Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2014, Bristol: Global Humanitarian Assistance. Hershlag, Zvi Yehuda. 1968. Turkey: The Challenge of Growth. Leiden: E.J. Brill. http://www.tmb.org.tr/doc/file/2014_Turk_Yurtdisi_Muteahhitlik_Hiz metleri_tr.pdf

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Hürsoy, Siret. 2013. “Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Economic Interests in the Gulf,” Turkish Studies, Vol.14, No. 3: 503-519. IMF. 2015. IMF World Economic Outlook database, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx Kaln, Ibrahim. 2013. “The AK Party in Turkey.” In John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, New York: Oxford University Press. Kirisci, Kemal and Neslihan Kaptanoglu. 2011. “The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.47, No.5: 705724. Kocyigit, Ali and Ali Sen. 2007. “The Extent of Intra-Industry Trade between Turkey and the European Union: The Impact of Customs Union.” Journal of Economic and Social Research Vol.9, No. 2: 61-85. Kutlay, Mustafa. 2011. “Economy as the ‘Practical Hand’ of ‘New Turkish Foreign Policy’: A political economy explanation.” Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 1: 67-88. Onis, Ziya and Mustafa Kutlay. 2013. “Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order: The political economy of Turkey in the age of BRICS.” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 8: 1409-1426. Oniú, Ziya and ùuhnaz Ylmaz. 2009. “Between Europeanization and Euro—Asianism: Foreign policy activism in Turkey during the AKP era,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 10, No.1: 7-24. Oniú, Ziya. 1999. State and Market: The Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective, Istanbul: Bo÷aziçi University Press. —. 2006. “The Political Economy of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party.” In Hakan Yavuz, ed. The Emergence of a New Turkey: Islam, Democracy and the AK Party, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. —. 2014. “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of regional power influence in a turbulent Middle East.” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2: 203–219. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism General Directorate of Investment and Enterprises. 2013. Snr østatistikleri [in Turkish]. http://yigm.kulturturizm.gov.tr/TR,9854/sinir-giris-cikisistatistikleri.html Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2015. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turk-vatandaslarinin-tabi-oldugu-vizeuygulamalari.tr.mfa ùahin, Huyesin. 2012. Türkiye Ekonomisi (Turkish Economy), Bursa: Ezgi Kitabevi.

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Sen, Ali. 1996. The Political Economy of Development in Turkey: A study of its progress in comparison with Brazil and South Korea. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Nottingham: University of Nottingham. Sonmez, Mustafa. 2014. “Turkey's Trade Shrinks with War-torn Neighbors Iraq and Syria.” http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeystrade-shrinks-with-war-torn-neighbors-iraqandsyria.aspx?pageID=238&nID=71682&NewsCatID=345 The Supreme Electoral Council (Yüksek Secim Kurulu). 2014. https://sonuc.ysk.gov.tr/module/GirisEkrani.jsf THY (Turkish Airlines). 2015. www.turkishairlines.com Turk Muteahhitler Birligi (The Turkish Contractors Association. 2014. Türk Yurtdú Müteahhit Hizmetleri. TURKSTAT. 2015. http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=kategorist WB. 2015. World Development Indicators Database. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf

SECTION THREE: SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN THE MENA

CHAPTER TEN THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF EGYPT, LIBYA AND TUNISIA ADELA JIRANKOVA

The wave of uprisings, which have spilled across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and which have been considered as the fourth wave of democratization, will likely continue in the short- to mid-term. Within this process, civil society is considered one of the main players in the transition to democracy. Through analysis and the use of case studies, this chapter aims to identify the changes in the dynamics of civil society in the region, as well as assess which factors have influenced its role in nondemocratic regimes, and during the revolutions and subsequent processes of democratization. Two paradigms of research will be applied. The first one is based on the liberal modernization framework, which holds the premise that, in the context of inevitable modernization, the civil sector strengthens and thus gains enough capacity to become a major driving force for change. Conversely, the second paradigm is connected with stagnation and socio-economic deprivation caused by stagnant regimes and their unsuccessful structural reforms. It is argued here that this unique combination of both paradigms has contributed to the transformations taking place in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia and therefore will be the focal point of analysis of this chapter. The process tracing method will be applied in this research with the main argument being that path dependency in the qualitative search for causal mechanisms regarding the role of civil society in Arab authoritarian regimes, revolutions, and subsequent processes of democratization, is path-dependent (in other words, the democratization of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia is dependent on the previous authoritarian regimes). The dynamics of civil society will be divided into six independent variables: civil society organizations, social media and networks, youth education, political environment, economic deprivation, and social capital. This chapter will

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also observe how the independent variables have changed since the prerevolution period through the revolutions, and how they have influenced the current processes of democratization.

Operationalization of the Variables Each of the independent variables are operationalized according to several factors. Firstly, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are operationalized according to the number of CSOs established per 100,000 people; membership in CSOs; paid employment in CSOs per 1000 employed; and volunteering in CSOs as a percentage of total adult population. Data for these factors was extracted from surveys made by national statistical offices and other organizations, where available. Moreover, international comparative indicators examined by the UN, the World Bank and Freedom House were also used (Anheier 2004, 38-42). Secondly, social media and networks are operationalized according to users of the internet in general, social networks in particular, and fans of concrete groups. Data was acquired from Socialbakers; the Ecco International Communication Network; the Arab social media report; among other sources. Thirdly, youth education was operationalized according to adult literacy rates; school enrolment; mean years of schooling; expected years of schooling (“the number of years of schooling that today’s children can expect to have once they grow up, given current enrollment ratios” (HDP 2010, 36)) and so on. Moreover, it is focused on satisfaction with education: the quality of education as well as access to education. The data for these indicators provided the UNDP Human Development Report, the UNESCO, the Global Competitiveness Report, and so on. Following this, the political environment category was evaluated according to civil liberties; freedom of association; political freedom; and the Corruption Perceptions Index. The data for these variables are provided by Freedom House, the UNDP, and the Corruption Perceptions Index, which is annually compiled by Transparency International. Measuring political freedom is based on the following five aspects: political participation, rule of law, freedom of expression, equality before law, and integrity of self. For the purpose of this article, greater emphasis needs to be put on freedom of association because it is closely linked to the function of civil society, despite the fact that it is part of civil liberties, it is examined separately (Anheier 2004, 140-195). Economic deprivation is operationalized according to the Human Development Index (HDI), which consists of several factors including:

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overall life satisfaction, life expectancy at birth, GNI per capita (PPP) and rate of unemployment. Despite the fact that these indicators are part of the general indicator HDI, they are evaluated separately as well. The data for these indicators are provided by the UNDP Human Development Report and the World Bank (ibid.). Finally, social capital is operationalized according to trust, tolerance, confidence in the selected institutions (government, religious organizations, labor unions, police, parliament, and army), and religion and belief systems. The data was extracted from the World Values Survey (2010-2014), Arab Opinion Index, the Pew Research Centre, the Government Restrictions Index (“measures government laws, policies and actions that restrict religious beliefs or practices” (Pew 2012a)), and the Social Hostilities Index (“measures acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations and social groups” (ibid.)). The last two sources are part of the wider Religious Restrictions Index, which is measured on the scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is the best evaluation and 10 the worst, with the highest restrictions on religion (Pew 2012b). Thus the research scheme is based on six independent variables, which are derived from the initial authoritarian regimes, and the dynamics of civil society, and these are correlated. They have both direct and indirect effects, through the revolutions, on the attempted transition to democracy. This chapter observes how the initial key points have changed following the revolutions and how they have influenced current processes of democratization. The empirical part of this chapter is based on three case studies: Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.

Egypt Civil Society Organizations Despite the fact that the pre-revolutionary regime in Egypt was nondemocratic, civil society as a whole was vibrant. The expansion of civil society began in the 1990s and in 2005 it reached approximately 27,000 CSOs. In 1999, the number of CSOs members was around 14 million, and about 3% of the CSOs’ members were volunteers. Moreover, CSOs employed around 630,000 full-time equivalent workers, which was 2.8% of the economically active population. Generally, the Egyptian CSOs suffered from low participation and funding, thus the most common form of civil society participation was charitable donations and the most active group was the youth (Sika 2012; ICNL 2015; CIVICUS 2005; CIVICUS 2009; Salomon 2006; Al-Sayyid 1993; Amani et al. 2004, 217-226).

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Even though there were many obstacles to the CSOs during the Mubarak regime, they were relatively active in their challenging of this regime. One of the most famous movements acting against the Mubarak regime was The Egyptian Movement for Change, also known as the Kifaya, which means “enough”. This movement acted under the common label, Movements for Change. Their primary goal was democratization, and the group’s activities took the form of protests, demonstrations, and meetings that were met with severe punishments. The Kifaya movement, together with the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups, participated in the Egyptian revolution in 2011 (El-Mahdi 2009, 87-102). The Egyptian revolution contributed to a significant boom in the establishment of CSOs. In 2011 there were approximately 45,000 CSOs and, moreover, probably 50,000 unregistered CSOs with an estimated 16.1 million members. The percentage of volunteers to paid workers and fulltime equivalent workers to economically active population remained more or less the same (Abdel Wahab 2012, 71-77; Amani et al. 2004; USAID 2011). After the Egyptian revolution had officially ended, it soon became apparent that the fight for freedom and democracy had not yet been terminated. This fact is supported by the behavior of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (the power-holder in Egypt after the revolution) which started to arrest CSOs members and activists for various reasons, mainly for (according to them) illegal funding. This indicates that Egyptian civil society still has a long journey before becoming really vibrant, effective and mainly independent from the state (Sika 2012; Morayef 2013).

Social Media Networks The main mobilization tool for the revolution in Egypt was social media and networks. Egypt had around 82 million inhabitants and in 2008 it had 12.57 million internet users, which is not a large proportion but, it needs to be kept in mind that there is a high illiteracy rate and often poor accessibility to IT in general. Censorship of the internet was also widespread. By 2011, however, the number of internet users in Egypt had risen to 29.3 million. Of the social networks, Facebook is the most popular. Between 2008 and 2010, it had between 3 and 4.5 million users and 78% of them were under 30 years old (ECCO 2010). In June 2012, the number of Facebook users reached 10.7 million. During the Uprising the internet was totally disconnected several times and censorship of many webpages, including Facebook, took place. However, people found ways to connect themselves and, as a result of the role of the internet, the Egyptian

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revolution has been referred to as the Facebook or Twitter revolution. Generally, it can be said that social media “gave powerful weapons to those organizing protests and helped them shape international views of their struggle” (Lynch 2011). The main advantage of the utilization of social networks was the rapid dissemination of information among many people either within the country or abroad. Social networks also served as a forum for the moral support of the protests and, from the practical side, also as a source of advice, or as a source of immediate information about events at real places. It essentially gave people “free voices” to express themselves, which was previously very limited due to the non-democratic nature of the Mubarak regime, which significantly limited freedom of speech and expression. The social media and networks became a tool for fighting oppression (Freedom House 2012; Eltantway and Wiest 2011; Russell 2011). It is interesting to note that “since 2011, counterrevolutionary forces in Egypt have made highly effective use of the social media in parallel with their efforts to regain control of the traditional state media, which was temporarily disrupted during the early phases of the revolution” (Alexander and Aouragh 2014). The use of social media networks by both the promoters of the revolution and the counter-revolution has remained a general trend in the years following the revolution. Therefore, it is argued here that the power of the social media and social networks has remained strong, but the role of the traditional media should also not be marginalized, because it serves the people who do not have access to the new media (Iskander 2011, 1226-1235; Freedom House 2012).

Youth Education Generally, at the beginning of the 21st century, Egypt improved conditions for education in terms of accessibility, mainly to primary education for both boys and girls. However, despite this progress, many challenges regarding the Egyptian education system still exist. In terms of youth education, in 2010, 61% of Egyptians were satisfied with the education system and schools, yet this trend did not correspond with the adult literacy rate, which was relatively low at 66.4%. Moreover, only 36.1% of people had at least secondary education, and of this group, 43.4% were women and 61.1% were men. In the period 2001-2009, the primary enrolment ratio was 99.7% (gross) or 93.6% (net). In the case of secondary enrolment ratio, it was 79.3% (gross) or 71.2% (net). And tertiary enrolment ratio was 31.2% (gross). On average, the mean years of schooling was 6.5 and expected years of schooling 11. One of the main

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issues is also the overall quality of education and quality of schools’ equipment. In the Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, the quality of the education system in Egypt is rated very low, being placed 131st out of 139 (UNICEF 2005; WEF 2011; UNDP 2010). By 2013, however, the adult literacy rate in Egypt was 72%, which represents a significant increase in comparison to 2010. The percentage of the population with at least secondary education was 51.2%, but only 42.6% of people were satisfied with the quality of education (UNDP 2013, 171). The quality of education is still low in 2013, with Egypt ranked 145th place out of 148, according to the Global Competitiveness Report. Next to the issue of the education system´s quality, another significant challenge exists: the Egyptian education system does not reflect demographic factors within the population or the demands of the market. This leads to other problems such as unemployment, poverty and overall economic deprivation, mainly among young people. Overall, it is argued here that the problems of the Egyptian education system are due to poor reforms regarding education and, mainly, their poor implementation. However, these reforms are necessary for a successful transition to democracy (ibid.; Loveluck 2012).

Political Environment Under President Mubarak's regime, freedom of association was at a very low level, a fact which is supported in the context that the foundation and longevity of the majority of CSOs were significantly limited. Moreover, the expressions of the many CSOs in the form of protests and demonstrations were harshly punished by the regime. After the revolution, the situation regarding the freedom of association did not significantly change. The only significant change was that people began to express themselves more often than before the revolution. The situation had become even worse by 2013, because the regime started to respond even more harshly to these expressions, especially in connection with the overthrow of President Morsi in the summer of 2013. The overall situation led to the establishment of the new emergency law, which again restricted freedom of association. In October 2013, this all culminated in the ban of the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood (ibid.). In 2010, the Freedom House evaluated Egypt at 5.5, because political rights gained 6 and civil liberties 5. This means that Egypt was classed as an unfree country. In 2013, Egypt had an overall score of 5.0 because political freedoms were evaluated at 5 and civil liberties also at 5. This score shifted Egypt into a partly free country category according to Freedom House. Nevertheless, the situation changed again in 2014 when

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Egypt became not a free country again with a freedom rating of 5.5. Furthermore, political rights were evaluated at 6 and civil liberties at 5 (Freedom House 2010; Freedom House 2013; Freedom House 2014). In 2010, Egypt gained a score of 3.1 and was ranked 98th out of 178 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index. Population growth, inflation and unemployment contributed to the high rate of corruption, which spread to all layers of Egyptian society. Mubarak himself was labeled as “the protector of the powerful and corrupt”, which means that corruption, clientelism, and nepotism were widespread. In 2013, Egypt scored 32, hence it was ranked 114th out of 177. This data shows that the state of corruption is more or less the same, or has even slightly deteriorated since 2011 (Osman 2011; Transparency International 2010; Transparency International 2013).

Economic Deprivation According to the Human Development Report published in 2010, Egyptian HDI was 0.620 and the overall life satisfaction was evaluated as 5.8. However, other indicators are important in the connection with economic deprivation. For example, life expectancy at birth, which was 70.5 years and gross national income per capita in the international dollars presented by the World Bank that was 10,360. Moreover, 16-20% of Egyptians lived below the poverty line. The Gini coefficient was then 32.1. All of these factors, and many others described below, caused that intensity of deprivation in 2010 to reach 40.4% (UNDP 2010; World Bank 2015; CIA 2015). The rate of unemployment in Egypt has a major role to play in causing the revolution. In 2010, unemployment had reached 9.7%. However, this official number did not correspond with the reality, where unemployment likely exceeded 20%. Moreover, the official figure also did not include people who were under-employed or employed in unskilled jobs and who thus experienced a quality of their life similar to those who were unemployed. Simultaneous increases in the unemployment rates, as well as inflation of the basic goods and the virtual non-existence of the welfare system of insurance for unemployed people, all added together to amount to such a high percentage of people who lived below the poverty line. Moreover, young people, in particular, are threatened by this situation (Evans 2011; EL-Naggar 2009, 74-75; Osman 2011; Ismael and Ismael 2011). The Human Development Report, published in 2013, evaluated HDI at 0.662 and the overall life satisfaction at 4.1. The life expectancy at birth increased from 70.5 to 73.5 years, and gross national income per capita in

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the international dollars presented by the World Bank was 10,850. The unemployment rate was 13.4% at the beginning of 2014 and the youth unemployment rate (meaning people between 15 and 24 years) reached 54.1%. The Gini coefficient was 30.8 and the overall national poverty level was 22%. These facts fueled the intensity of deprivation in 2010, which reached 40.7%. The intensity of deprivation remains more or less the same but the overall life satisfaction has significantly deteriorated (UNDP 2013; World Bank 2015).

Social Capital In terms of trust among people within the Egyptian society, the World Values Survey in its 6th survey covering the period from 2010 until 2014, reported that only 21.5% of Egyptians answered that most people can be trusted. In terms of tolerance, 62.3% of Egyptians said that tolerance is important. The third examined factor is confidence in selected institutions. In this regard, 47.9% of people said that they have a great deal of confidence in religious organizations and 26% that they have quite a lot of confidence in religious organizations. Only 4.6% of Egyptians have a great deal of confidence, and 20.7% have quite a lot of confidence in labor unions. In terms of confidence in police, 11.1% have a great deal of confidence, and 39.2% have quite a lot of confidence. The percentage regarding confidence in the police is quite surprising given the fact that the level of police violence, especially during demonstrations, was high. With respect to the government, 7.9% of Egyptians have a great deal of confidence, and 31.8% have quite a lot of confidence. In terms of confidence in the parliament, 3.9% of people said that they have a great deal of confidence and 21.4% quite a lot of confidence. The relatively low confidence in the government and the parliament is created by the long-lasting political instability. In terms of confidence in the army, 81% of Egyptians answered that they have a great deal of confidence in the army. These outcomes are not surprising because the army has always had great influence in Egyptian society, which is supported by the fact that all Egyptian presidents came from the army, with the exception of Morsi. However, with the new president al-Sisi, this trend has returned. And finally, the fourth indicator, religion and belief systems, also records some interesting results. For 94.1% of Egyptians religion is very important. Moreover, 28% of Egyptians strongly agree with the separation of religion from politics, and 24% somewhat agree. Additionally, in mid-2010, the governmental restrictions index was 8.7 and the social hostilities index was 7.6, which means there was a very high

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level of religious restrictions, perhaps largely due to the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the first post-revolutionary elections, and especially by the overthrow of President Morsi, which launched another wave of demonstrations (WVS 2014; Doha Institute 2011; Pew 2013).

Libya Civil Society Organizations The evaluation of civil society and its organizations in Qaddafi's Libya is simple, because civil society in the true sense of that term did not exist under Qaddafi's rule. Thus it is possible to date the birth of Libyan civil society to 2011. In the time of Qaddafi, there existed only several CSOs, but all of them were obedient to Qaddafi. In 2010, Qaddafi claimed that: “there is no place for a civil society as Libyan society is already entirely civil” (St John 2012). Throughout his rule, Qaddafi rejected any hint of civil society because he feared the opposition, which could disrupt his regime. On the other hand, Qaddafi's son, Saif Al-Islam, identified himself as the leader of Libyan civil society. He officially established a charitable organization, called the Qaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations, through which he primarily consolidated his power and influence in the country. Nevertheless, he was considered to be the only force supporting civil society. There existed around 90-95 CSOs in Libya but they were completely subjected to the ruling regime (ibid.; Pargeter 2012; BTI 2012). After the Libyan revolution, civil war and the fall of Qaddafi's regime, the first CSOs began to emerge. They were mainly humanitarian and charitable organizations, whose main purpose was to help people deal with their complicated situations, mainly with the trauma of the revolution and the subsequent civil war. Later, these organizations transferred their interests to different topics such as state-building, democratization, and political and social issues in general. As there is no tradition of civil society in Libya, some CSOs dissolved shortly after their establishment. The latest report published by the Foundation for the Future estimates that there are around 3,000 registered CSOs in Libya, with thousands of members. 1 On the other hand, the majority of CSOs members are volunteers, which has decreased the quality of these organizations that 1

The Foundation for Future is a non-governmental organization that has been supporting the CSOs initiatives and, thus, promoting democracy in the MENA countries. More information is available at http://www.foundationforfuture.org/en/.

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have also been lacking clear guidance and experienced staff; yet it must be noted that “so far, civil society has been the most effective channel towards empowering young Libyans and integrating them in the political process” (British Council 2013; Hamza and Zamut 2012, 17-20; Foundation for the Future 2011).

Social Media and Networks The level of autocracy in Libya was far higher than in the case of Egypt. There was almost no freedom of expression. “During the Qadhafi era, Libya’s media environment was among the most tightly controlled in the world” (Freedom House 2012). Internet access in Libya began to spread among ordinary people after 2000, but nevertheless, remained under the strict control of the regime; censorship was widespread and cyber activists were often arrested. Despite this, the number of internet users significantly increased from 4% of the population in 2007 to 17% in 2011, which was equivalent to 1.1 million people. During the revolution and the subsequent civil war, social media and networks were used to mobilize, spread information and provide moral support. There remains some censorship, however, and there are cases of surveillance of the internet and censorship, even though the government claimed that the internet is free (ibid.). In 2010, Libya had 6.5 million inhabitants and from them approximately 260,000 were Facebook users, with 67% of that number being younger than 30 years of age. In contrast, in 2013 around 860,000 Libyans used Facebook and it became the most visited webpage. The social media and networks in general remain a main mobilization tool for protests and for other purposes (Anon. 2011; Pargeter 2012).

Youth Education In 2010, the adult literacy rate was 88.4%, which is a relatively high percentage in comparison with Egypt. The average mean years of schooling were 7.3 and expected years of schooling were 16.5. Moreover, 55.6% of women and 44% of men had at least secondary education. Gross primary education enrolment was 110.3%, gross secondary education enrolment was 93.5%, and gross tertiary education enrolment was 55.7%. However, in terms of the quality of the educational system, Libya ranked 138th out of 139 states. Qaddafi adopted some positive steps regarding education, extending compulsory education from six to nine years as well as supporting education for women. Moreover, Qaddafi's regime financed the studies abroad for Libyan students (Hilsum 2012; Vandewalle 2012; St

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John 2012; Pargeter 2012). By 2013, the adult literacy rate was 89.2%. Mean years of schooling were 7.3 and expected years of schooling were 16.2. Moreover, 49.6% of Libyans had at least secondary education. In terms of the quality of the educational system, Libya ranked 148th place out of 148. The situation is currently even worse because 40% of schools were destroyed during the civil war and the majority of schools have poor quality equipment, often lacking the most basic services, such as access to hygiene facilities or electricity. Currently, Libya is cooperating with the UN (UNICEF) and the EU on the improvement of its educational system (UNDP 2013, 145-171).

Political Environment There was practically no freedom of association during Qaddafi's regime. Therefore, expressions of public opinions in the form of demonstrations were illegal unless they were in favor of the ruling regime. However, the situation changed after the revolution and the civil war in Libya. There has been a huge boom in the establishment of CSOs, as well as in the organization of various events regarding political life and culture in the country. Nevertheless, there was no tradition of democracy and so, firstly, Libyans need to understand the proper meaning of CSOs' activities and of all things connected with them. In 2010, Freedom House evaluated Libya at 7, because political rights gained 7 and civil liberties gained 7. This means that Libya was not a free country. In 2013, Libya had an overall score of 4.5 with political freedoms evaluated at 4 and civil liberties at 5. This score shifted Libya into the partly free country category. However, in 2015, Freedom House again classed Libya as not a free country with an overall evaluation of 6, with political rights and civil liberties both scored as 6 (Freedom House 2010; Freedom House 2013; Freedom House 2015). In 2010, Libya had a score of 2.2 and was ranked 146th out of 178 places in the Corruption Perceptions Index, which means it had the highest corruption rate from the examined countries. The Libyan economy is based on oil exports, which represents the majority of capital flowing into the country from abroad. Clientelism and nepotism were widespread and the most important businesses were controlled by Qaddafi and his relatives. In 2013 Libya scored 15 on this index and hence was ranked 172nd out of 177, which shows that the state of corruption significantly deteriorated after the revolution (Transparency International 2013; Gombar 2001; Lichtblau et al. 2011).

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Economic Deprivation According to the Human Development Report published in 2010, Libya’s HDI was 0.755. The life expectancy at birth was 74.5 years and gross national income per capita in the international dollars presented by the World Bank was 28,110. Data for the Gini coefficient, the overall life satisfaction, and intensity of deprivation are not available for Libya but around one third of Libyans live below the poverty line (UNDP 2010; World Bank 2015). The issue of unemployment in Libya became really serious when its rate reached 20.7%, according to the government sources, but the real unemployment rate was estimated at 30% in 2009. As was the case with Egypt and Tunisia, unemployment concerned primarily young people because population growth was constantly increasing and the regime was unable to create new jobs (Evans 2011; CIA 2015)). In the 1970s, given the quick transformation of Libyan society, Qaddafi decided to label private property as theft, which caused extensive waves of confiscations. Some people lost all their property during this time. It is not surprising that these steps would normally lead to the collapse of an economy. However, the oil shocks of the 1970s helped alleviate some of the negative economic ramifications of these economic policies. This led to the significant growth of the Libyan economy. Thus, at the beginning of his rule, Qaddafi financed welfare programs, improved medical care and increased the quality of education. However, after the establishment of the revolutionary commissions, the quality of these services decreased. After 2001, Qaddafi attempted economic liberalization, privatization, diversification and the overall modernization of the country, but this was unsuccessful (Hilsum 2012; St John 2012; Pargeter 2012; Gombar 2001). The Human Development Report, published in 2013, evaluated Libya’s HDI, giving a score of 0.769 and rating overall life satisfaction at 4.9. The life expectancy at birth was 75 years and gross national income per capita in the international dollars presented by the World Bank was 28,110. This data is the same as in 2010 because the last data available is from 2009. The HDI offers another data for GNI per capita at $17,068 in 2010 and 13,765 in 2013. This data shows the gap regarding GNI per capita in reports by the different organizations. The official unemployment rate was 19.5% in 2011 but in reality it reached around 30%. Data for the Gini coefficient and intensity of deprivation are not available and estimates regarding the number of Libyans who live below the poverty line remains at around one third. Available data shows that in the overall evaluation of indicators influencing the economic deprivation of people,

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not much has changed (UNDP 2010, 144; UNDP 2013, 145-175; World Bank 2015).

Social Capital In terms of trust among people within the Libyan society, the World Values Survey covering the period 2010-2014 reported that only 10% of Libyans answered that most people can be trusted. In terms of tolerance and respect for other people, 80% of Libyans said that tolerance is important. The third examined factor is confidence in selected institutions. In this regard, 31.5% of people said that they have a great deal of confidence in religious organizations, 15.6% that they have quite a lot of confidence in religious organizations. Only 7% of Libyans have a great deal of confidence and 13.4% have quite a lot of confidence in labor unions. In terms of confidence in the police, 32.7% have a great deal of confidence, 22.5% have quite a lot of confidence. With respect to the government, 13.2% of Libyans have a great deal of confidence and 9.3% have quite a lot of confidence in the government. In terms of confidence in the parliament, 6.9% of people said that they have a great deal of confidence in the parliament and 6.7% quite a lot of confidence. The low level of confidence, as in the case of Egypt, is created by the long-lasting political crisis in the country. In terms of the confidence in the army, 29.9% of Libyans answered that they have a great deal of confidence, and 19.5% have quite a lot of confidence. And finally the fourth indicator—religion and belief systems. For 94.9% of Libyans, religion is very important. Moreover, in mid-2010, the results of the Religious Restrictions Index, reported the Government Restrictions Index was 5.8 and the Social Hostilities Index was 0.2, which means religious restrictions but decreasing. This is understandable, considering the fact that Qaddafi suppressed religious movements because they were one of the main opponents of the ruling regime. The situation is quite different nowadays, due to the fact that the country has slipped into chaos (Pew 2013, 52-62).

Tunisia Civil Society Organizations The history of cooperation between opposition parties and the CSOs dates back to 1988, when they signed the so called National Pact. Nevertheless, some CSOs which tended to democracy, succumbed to the

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political setup of the country and began to behave according to the rules of the regime. Despite these CSOs, which were connected to the regime, many other CSOs were challenging the regime and demanded democratic reforms. The Tunisian CSOs were and remain characterized by a deep interdependence thanks to which networks of the CSOs have emerged. During President Ben Ali's regime, many CSOs already existed, but were weak. All CSOs needed to be registered at the Tunisian Ministry of Interior because the regime required control over all CSOs. Moreover, they were not able to legally participate in the political culture in the country. However, despite these obstacles, the number of CSOs in Tunisia was increasing. It reached 7,321 in 2003 and 9,969 in 2010. The work and labor unions and some humanitarian and women's organizations were exceptions because they were more or less independent from the government (Moheb 2007, 170-171; Foundation of the Future 2013; Freedom House 2012; British Council 2013; Deane 2013, 9-15; Alexander 2010). In 2013, there were 14,966 CSOs in Tunisia, which is a significant increase in comparison to the situation in 2010, the year when the revolution started in Tunisia. These newly founded organizations have focused predominantly on the transition to democracy. The overall picture of the current CSOs shows that the Tunisian CSOs are very active, which is also due to law 88/2011 adopted in 2011, that significantly simplified the foundation and work of CSOs and increased the level of freedom of association. On the other hand, there are existing shortcomings regarding the dialogue between CSOs and the Tunisian government. Moreover, there are other obstacles which need to be overcome, particularly with regards to funding, lack of professionalism, strong links to politics, ideology or religion, the low level of connectivity between CSOs with the same field of interests, the small number of women, volatility of members, and many others. To conclude, it has to be emphasized that if the revolutionary trend of the high level of social capital and tolerance will endure, the Tunisian path to democracy can be successful (ibid.).

Social Media and Networks The internet in Tunisia began to spread after 2000. However, as in other non-democratic regimes, the Tunisian government also controlled and censored it. Nevertheless, the number of internet users has been increasing, together with ways of control bypassing development. In 2007, for example, 17% of Tunisians were internet users and by 2012 the number reached 42%. In the case of Facebook, the number of users

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between November 2010 and mid-January 2011 increased from 1.7 million to almost 2 million. Additionally, 78% of Facebook users are younger than 30 years old (Freedom House 2013; Breuer et al. 2012). Utilization of social media and networks during the Tunisian revolution was extensive with the main purpose being the mobilization of people and the spreading of information. The utilization of social media and networks during the revolution was possible, also due to a relatively long tradition of cyber-activism (since the end of the 1990s) (ibid.). After Ben Ali's regime fell, the accessibility of the internet significantly increased but cases of internet censorship are still reported even though they are not as common. Many laws which support freedom of internet expression were adopted but many old non-democratic laws are still valid. Moreover, political parties discovered the benefits of social media and they have been using the social media and networks for a variety of purposes from spreading information, organizing events, to the expression of people's feelings about the situation in their country. The popularity of social media is also demonstrated by the fact that in 2012, Tunisia had more than 2.5 million Facebook users and around 12,000 Twitter users (Anon. 2012, 1-24; Social Bakers 2014, 61-62).

Youth Education Generally, education was, and still is, an important value in Tunisia. Therefore, President Ben Ali focused on this issue very carefully, illustrated by the implementation of compulsory schooling. The combination of highly educated people who want modernization and who have higher demands for the quality of their lives, and the same people, who are economically deprived and dissatisfied, was one of the trigger mechanisms of the revolution in Tunisia. In 2010, the adult literacy rate in Tunisia was 78% and 72% of Tunisians were satisfied with the education system. Mean years of schooling were 6.5 and expected years of schooling were 14.5. Moreover, 33.5% of women and 48% of men had at least secondary education. Gross primary education enrolment was 107.6% and net enrolment was 97.7%, while gross secondary education enrollment was 90.2% and net enrolment was 65.8%. Gross tertiary education enrolment was 31.6%. In terms of the quality of the educational system, Tunisia ranked 20th out of 139. This place is supported by the fact that progress in the development of education in Tunisia was really significant during Ben Ali's regime (UNDP 2010, 54, 144, 157, 181, 193; WEF 2011, 329; Anon. 2008, 1; Alexander 2010). By 2013, adult literacy rates in Tunisia were

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77.6% with the mean years of schooling being 6.5 and the expected years of schooling being 14.5. Moreover, 29.9% of women and 44.4% of men had at least secondary education. In terms of the quality of the educational system, Tunisia was ranked 71st out of 148. These data show that some aspects of education remain more or less the same as during Ben Ali's regime. Nevertheless, the decrease of the quality of education highlights existing problems with education in Tunisia, which are then mirrored in other spheres of ordinary Tunisians' lives (UNDP 2013, 145, 157, 171; WEF 2014, 371; OECD 2013, 49-57).

Political Environment Freedom of association is anchored in the Tunisian constitution. Nevertheless, its practice looked completely different: no expression of dissatisfaction was allowed and, therefore, all demonstrations and protests against the regime were suppressed. Even after the revolution, some demonstrations had to face police interventions. In 2014, Freedom House evaluated the situation as having slightly improved but there are still many aspects regarding the freedom of association which are far from democratic. In 2010, Freedom House evaluated Tunisia at 6.0, with political rights scored as 7 and civil liberties 5. This means that Tunisia was not a free country. The situation changed in 2013 when Tunisia had an overall score of 3.5 because political freedoms were evaluated at 3 and civil liberties at 4. This score shifted Tunisia into the partly free country category. The state of the political culture in Tunisia improved in the 2014 evaluation because Tunisia's freedom rating was 3.0, and political rights as well as civil liberties were assessed at 3. The progress of Tunisia is observable even in 2015, when it became a free country with an overall score of 2, where political rights gained 1 and civil liberties 3 (Freedom House 2010; Freedom House 2012; Freedom House2014; Freedom House 2015). In 2010, Tunisia was ranked 59th out of 178 in the Corruption Perceptions Index with a score of 4.3. President Ben Ali and his family spent huge amounts of money on luxury goods and controlled all important businesses in the country. The regime of Ben Ali was based on nepotism and clientelism, which helped people connected with the regime to gain financial benefits and to be prioritized in all aspects of life. In 2013, Tunisia scored 41, hence it was located 77th out of 177. This data shows that there is less corruption than before the revolution, which is also a good sign that the overall situation in Tunisia has been improving (Anon. 2011; Transparency International 2013).

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Economic Deprivation According to the Human Development Report published in 2010, Tunisia’s HDI was 0.683 and the overall life satisfaction was evaluated as 5.9. However, other indicators are important in the connection with economic deprivation, including life expectancy at birth, which was 74.3 years and gross national income per capita in the international dollars presented by the World Bank, which was 9,660. This contributed to the fact that around 15.5% of Tunisians lived below the poverty line. The Gini coefficient was 40.8. All of these factors and many others described below caused the intensity of deprivation in 2010 which reached 37.1% (UNDP 2010, 144-177; World Bank 2015). In the case of Tunisia, it is possible to label unemployment as the most significant trigger of the revolution and its subsequent spreading to other states in the MENA. In 2010, the rate of unemployment was high, around 14%, according to the governmental documents, but the reality in non-democratic countries is always higher. Unemployment in Tunisia especially impacted on the young generation— mainly students who had graduated and could not find adequate jobs (EIU 2011; Evans 2011). In the 1990s, the Tunisian government launched the privatization of state companies. The overall economic situation was improving under Ben Ali's regime even though the negative elements had appeared. The regime tried to mitigate the effect of these challenges by increasing the quality of education and training programs. During Ben Ali's government, incomes almost doubled and poverty decreased but was not eliminated completely (Abadi 2013; Alexander 2010). The Human Development Report, published in 2013, evaluated the HDI as 0.712 and overall life satisfaction at 4.7. Life expectancy at birth was 74.7 years and gross national income per capita in the international dollars presented by the World Bank was 10,960. The unemployment rate increased to 15.2% at the beginning of 2014 and youth unemployment of people between 15 and 24 years was 31.4%. The Gini coefficient was 41.4 and the national poverty line decreased to 3.8%. The overall intensity of deprivation also decreased to 31.7% in 2013. Nevertheless, the data shows that the overall evaluation of indicators influencing economic deprivation of people did not change much. However, some indicators changed more significantly, such as overall life satisfaction, which decreased (UNDP 2013, 145-175).

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Social Capital In terms of trust among people in Tunisia, the World Values Survey for the period 2010-2014 reported that only 15.5% of Tunisians answered that most people can be trusted. In terms of tolerance and respect for other people, 54.9% of Tunisians said that tolerance is important. The third examined factor is confidence in selected institutions. In this regard, 25.6% of people said that they have a great deal of confidence in religious organizations, and 19.4% that they have quite a lot of confidence in religious organizations. Only 6.2% of Tunisians have a great deal of confidence and 12% have quite a lot of confidence in labor unions. In terms of the police, 28.2% reported a great deal of confidence, and 30.9% have quite a lot of confidence. With respect to the government, 6.6% of Tunisians have a great deal of confidence, and 11.2% have quite a lot of confidence. In terms of confidence in the parliament, 2.4% of people said that they have a great deal of confidence in the parliament, and 3.5% have quite a lot of confidence. In the case of state institutions, it is the same as in Egypt and Libya. The overall low confidence is caused by the long-lasting political instability. In terms of the army, 28.1% of Tunisians reported that they have a great deal of confidence, and 31.8% have quite a lot of confidence, which is quite high given the fact that the army was marginalized during the Ben Ali era. And finally, the fourth indicator–religion and belief systems. For 95.4% of Tunisians, religion is very important and as was already mentioned, represents an important part of Tunisians' lives, as it does in Egyptian’s and Libyan’s. However, only 28% of Tunisians strongly agree with the separation of religion from politics, and 24% somewhat agree. Additionally, in mid-2010 the government restrictions index was 7.7 and the social hostilities index was 1.0, which means very high levels of religious restrictions. This is again created by the fact that the country has been going through turbulent times (WVS 2014; Pew 2013, 52, 62).

Conclusion To summarize the role of civil society in the transformations of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia we need to start at the beginning of the whole process, specifically with the initial non-democratic regimes, because these regimes themselves, whether willingly or not, created a specific political environment. This environment became a breeding ground for the emergence of elements of democracy, which eventually contributed to

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their overthrow. Thus, the main paradox of these regimes was the fact that the majority of the steps they took were for the purpose of strengthening their legitimacy but that, in fact, these steps actually led to their demise. This occurred because on the one hand, this mix consisted of the high level of public discontent and, on the other hand, of development bringing about higher demands for quality of life and freedoms. In more detailed description, dissatisfaction is represented by economic deprivation, an unsatisfactory political environment and often by a low level of social capital. In terms of economic deprivation, there was a great gap between rich and poor people. The poorer people, living mainly in the rural areas, often did not have access to basic services such as education, healthcare, electricity, and so on. Then young people, predominantly those with higher levels of education, were not able to find adequate employment for their qualification and, for that reason, their social status decreased. Moreover, the political environment showed all the signs of authoritarianism, in which basic political rights and freedoms were restricted. Finally, the overall dissatisfaction often caused low levels of social capital because the whole society was fragmented and people were sometimes significantly affected by the atmosphere of fear that was reinforced by the huge apparatus of the state security forces. Following this, there was the other side of the coin represented by development and modernization. In terms of education, despite the fact that its quality is still low, significant improvements can be observed during the period of rule for all three regimes. The existence of CSOs as well as their constant increase, in turn, helped to fight for a better political environment within the nondemocratic regimes. This process was a part of inevitable modernization. Moreover, the development of the internet and its spread across the examined countries is also considered part of this modernization. Thanks to the great boom in social media and networks, the revolutions had a chance of success because social networks became the most effective tool for resource mobilization. Ultimately, this was “the imaginary cocktail” of causes and conditions, regarded as the dynamics of civil society, which contributed to the fall of the non-democratic regimes in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Those regimes presented themselves as democratic and with the most appropriate political, social and economic conditions for their CSOs. In reality, the voices of civil society, or the voices of ordinary citizens themselves, were not heard, so they took their future into their own hands and began the process of transformation. However, the complexity of the whole process can be observed from its very beginning because there was

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a huge polarization within societies during the revolutions, whereby the masses of people lacked common leadership and even common vision. This did not hamper them in overthrowing the old regimes, but it can negatively affect the future stages of transformation. The main advantage in the Egypt case was the deeply rooted and vigorous civil society, which was actively challenging Mubarak´s regime. Therefore, it was then able to effectively participate in the revolution. Egyptian civil society even developed in the post-revolutionary period thus becoming a major player in the political environment and it has since been contributing to the democratization of the country. The overall dynamics of civil society have undergone significant changes regarding some indicators but, on the other hand, some important aspects have remained unchanged. Firstly, the base of the CSOs is more robust and vigorous. Secondly, the political environment shifted significantly towards freedom and democracy, especially after the first presidential elections. However, the living conditions, including economic security, quality of education and the overall satisfaction, have not improved much or even deteriorated. Social capital is also at a relatively low level, but this is understandable due to the fact that Egyptian society came through a stormy period in the last couple of years, but the changes in identities go hand in hand with changes of the regime. Finally, it needs to be emphasized that the recent events, as well as the recent evaluation of the Egyptian political environment, show that since President Morsi was overthrown the country has again been slipping back into authoritarianism, which is not a good sign. Libya is the most interesting and controversial case because no independent civil society existed in Qaddafi´s era, therefore, it could not participate in the revolution, hence Libyan people alone had to give an impetus for changing the old rigid regime. Libya is also unique in the brutality of the regime in responding to the people´s demands for reforms. The subsequent civil war destroyed the country. Therefore, the birth and development of vigorous civil society is even more crucial in Libya for a successful process of transition. One of the most significant changes in the dynamics of civil society is the boom in the number of CSOs being established, as well as in the political environment, because Libya experienced the toughest regime of all and now Libyans can exercise a certain, albeit still very low, level of civil liberties and political rights. On the other hand, basic living conditions, such as education and economic security, have not improved much and sometimes have even deteriorated. Nevertheless, the most serious problem is the dire security situation in the country. This factor, together with the fragmentation of the society visible

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in the social capital evaluation, predominantly on the indicator of trust, can negatively affect the democratization process. Civil society has a long tradition in Tunisia and thus has been a major player in the Tunisian revolution, as well as in the process of democratization. In the post-revolutionary period, the number of CSOs has increased by almost half. Moreover, civil society in Tunisia is vigorous and has been actively participating in political and social events, although some elements of the dynamics of Tunisian civil society have not changed much: they have either slightly improved or deteriorated. These elements are education, economic security and the overall satisfaction with the living conditions in the country. Additionally, social capital, especially the level of trust and confidence in the state institutions, is at a very low level, which is again largely due to the fact that the last couple of years have been turbulent in Tunisia, both in the political and social sphere. This trend is similar to both previous cases. Although Tunisia is currently not generally classed as a true democratic country, it is considered as the only positive and successful case from the three examined countries. In spite of the fact that Tunisia is on its way to democracy, the path is, and will be, complicated because the transition to democracy itself is a complex and often long-lasting process. Finally, one of the most important aspects in Tunisia´s path to democracy is a stable political environment and vibrant civil society. To conclude, it is argued here that democratization in the MENA is a significant phenomenon both from the domestic and foreign perspectives. It is also a transnational phenomenon with many common, as well as unique, denominators. On the one hand, it is a chain of reactions because people learn from the experiences of others and, on the other hand, the trajectories of the transition processes in given countries are unique. This process of transition is also interesting because it has already shown its inscrutability, which has contributed to our understanding of revolutionary change as a complicated and long-lasting process. In this transformation, civil society is one of the most important actors and, any changes in its dynamics, which have been determining and influencing it, can totally change history. The only question remaining is whether or not we are witnessing a mere exchange of one non-democratic regime by another.

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Osman, Tarek. 2011. Egypt on the Brink: From the rise of Nasser to the fall of Mubarak, London: Yale University Press. Pargeter, Alison. 2012. Libya: The rise and fall of Qaddafi, New Haven: Yale University Press. Pew. 2012a. “Rising Tide of Restrictions on Religion.” Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project. http://www.pewforum.org/2012/09/20/rising-tide-of-restrictions-onreligion-findings/. Pew. 2012b. “Religious Restriction Index Scores by Region.” Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project. http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/09/RisingTideIndexbyRegion.pdf Pew. 2013. “Religious Restrictions Index.” Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project. http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/09/RisingTideIndexbyRegion.pdf. Qandil, Mohamed Mokhtar. 2013. “The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Democratization of Egypt.” Ahewar. http://www.ahewar.org/eng/show.art.asp?aid=1815 Russell, Adrienne. 2011. “Extra-National Information Flows, Social Media, and the 2011 Egyptian Uprising.” International Journal of Communication, Vol. 5, No. 1: 1238-1247. Salomon, Lester M. 2006. “Global Civil Society: An overview.” The John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project. http://www.frivillighed.dk/Webnodes/da/Web/Public/Om+os/English Sika, Nadine. 2012. “Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt: The Road Not Yet Traveled” Muftah. http://muftah.org/civil-society-anddemocratization-in-egypt-the-road-not-yet-traveled/#.U8pUmUD_KSp Social Bakers. 2014. http://www.socialbakers.com/ St. John, Ronald Bruce. 2012. Libya: From colony to revolution, Oxford: Oneworld. Transparency International. 2010. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2010.” http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results. —. 2013. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013.” http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results. UNDP. 2010. Human Development Report 2010: The real wealth of nations–pathways to human development, New York: UN. —. 2013. Human Development Report 2013: The rise of the South–human progress in a diverse world, New York: UN. UNICEF. 2005. “Education–Egypt” http://www.unicef.org/egypt/education.html

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USAID. 2011. The 2011 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Report for the Middle East and North Africa, Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development. Vandewalle, Dirk. 2012. A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge: Cambridge University. Wahab, Ayman Abdel. 2012. “The January 25th Uprisings: Through or in spite of civil society?” IDS Bulletin, Vol. 43, No. 1: 71-77. WEF. 2011. The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011. Davos: World Economic Forum. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2 010-11.pdf —. 2014. The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014, Davos: World Economic Forum, 2013-2014. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2 013-14.pdf World Bank. 2015. DataBank. http://data.worldbank.org/country/tunisia. WVS (World Values Survey). 2013. “Libya.” http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp —. 2014. World Values Survey–Egypt. http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp —. 2014. World Values Survey–Tunisia. http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp Zaki, Moheb. 2007. Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: Annual report, Cairo: Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies. http://www.geocities.ws/leahdyanne/annual-report-en07.pdf

CHAPTER ELEVEN FURY AND SOLDIERY OF NON-GOD: ISIS’ PSYCHO-STRUCTURAL DYSFUNCTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM MARIA GLORIA POLIMENO

Introduction Religion and terrorism share a long history, as the former in some way remains inscribed in the latter. The increased role of religion as a source of violence has been discussed theoretically, from the Hegelian idealist philosophy to the existentialist approach to violence. It has also been further developed by Sartre in terms of the idea of an existing bad faith scenario. Sartre, in his 1946 essay “Materialism and Revolution”, justified the use of “revolutionary” violence as a tool used by the oppressed against the oppressor, as an instrument to set up radical transformation and as a replacement of a social system to the one that dehumanizes and dominates from the top down (Sartre 1946). In a more modern context, Hoffman argues that the etymology of “zealot” can be traced back to a millenarian Jewish sect that existed between 66-73 A.D. and which fought against the Roman occupation of what is now “the state of Israel” (Hoffman 1995, 271). In Hoffman’s view, religion has for centuries provided the only justifiable measure for terror (ibid. 272). It is argued in this chapter that the study of Islamic jihadism and terrorism has homogeneously considered faith as being the explanatory folder of context. This chapter aims to decentralize the role of religion in the context of terrorism, as the concept itself, it is argued here, has been subjected to power-building influences applied on a macro scale since the invention of Al-Qaeda. The chapter respectively draws on social psychology, sociology and security studies in the effort to provide a scientific response to the escalation of de-humanization set up by groups such as Islamic State (ISIS). The theory of sociopathy and psychopathy will also be

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disentangled to understand the extent that terrorism and political violence, as theorized in social movement theories, has been embedded into a clear and rational plan corresponding to political goals. Additionally, this will be applied in the context of the extent to which the joining of ISIS by foreign fighters has to be, rather, analyzed in different terms, while hypothesizing the existence of psychiatric diseases behind aggregation (psychiatric theories dating back to the 1970s invalidated the connection between mental illness and political violence). However, terrorism underwent major changes during the last two centuries. To some extent, the call of revolution spread by Sayyid Qutb in the 1960s, could be interpreted as more secular than the proposed goals at the regional level. Following this line of reasoning, contributions in the field of psychology argue that one foreign fighter out of five showed evidence of psychological diseases behind the act of becoming a foreign fighter. It is argued here that psychopathy behind aggregation of resources could be considered in the case study of IS, regarding the response to a process of de-humanization resulting from direct or cyber-exposition to the group’s practices, rather than something previously inscribed in the individual. In spite of structural incongruences discussed in the second part of this work, since airstrikes were carried out on Syria the number of foreign fighters increased by up to 5,000 since October 2015. ISIS has created its campaign through beastly abuses, rapes, discrimination and slavery of women. However, what seems illogical, but at the same time needs to be questioned in sociological terms, is why the Islamic State is now gaining support from those very people targeted by this violence, specifically women? Another key question is, what has changed in the European Muslim communities that is facilitating such support? The third part of the work then shifts to economics and examines the apparatus corresponding to the organization’s growing economic strength. Infiltrated terrorists operate behind donations through Non-Profit Organizations helping refugees, tax extortions and tax-havens. The overall aim, though, is to analyze the theory that military interference through airstrikes alone can disrupt ISIS. In the concluding remarks, the work focusses on the risks behind the power-marriages between terrorist groups prevalently based in the North African context, and deconstructs the rhetoric behind military security. Since the overall aim of the work is twofold: a) providing a response to the fascination for violence and abuses behind faith; and b) comparing and contrasting ISIS’s structural sources of weakness and strength, as driving dispositive behind fascination for violence; this chapter suggests that the current counter-terrorism approaches may be more ephemeral than

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commonly understood and may risk influencing upcoming crises, should a comprehensive solution not merely focused on power-building be found.

The Social Psychology of Terrorism Within Islamic terrorism there is an assumed transcendental dimension to the act, and its perpetrators become unconstrained by the political, moral, or practical constraints that seem to affect other violent extremists (ibid.). Islam essentially serves as a legitimizing force in which sacred text interpretations are conveyed. Doctrinally, Islamic terrorism rejects all contemporary ideologies in their various forms; instead it is conceived and conducted as a form of Holy War, which can only end when total victory in the world of reality (matching with the political project) is achieved. Islamic terrorism is therefore a thought form on the basis of a whole theory, both of individual conduct and of state policy. This ties to the current success of groups such as ISIS, which is overwhelmingly attributed to a unique self-projection propagated on strength, disseminated through a skillful media strategy. According to Berger, ISIS resembles a transnationalist movement in its marketing strategy and structure. ISIS has developed a set of mechanisms to “create” what Berger calls “a new human being capable of horrific violence”; in other words ISIS has operated a process of moral de-humanization through which rapes, abuses, tortures, beheadings, crucifixions and misogynist practices are celebrated. This section will attempt to bring together social psychology with resource mobilization theory, while also examining social psychology’s literature on structured violence. In the academic literature on terrorism and political violence, economic grievances and low education have so far been debated as being root causes of terrorism. Sprinzak and Denny (2003) conducted semi-structured interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern extremists, including 21 members of Hamas, Izz al-Din al-Qassam, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah. The findings showed that most of them had at least a high school education and that some had additional further education. Most came from respected families that supported their activism, with 30% of the families of religious terrorists and 15% of the families of secular terrorists reporting their own radical involvement. At the end of one spectrum is the popular opinion that terrorists must be insane or psychopathic (Hacker 1976; Cooper 1977; Pearce 1988). In this saying, two axes exist, whereby Axis I refers to the major clinical mental illness while Axis II refers to personality disorders. In regard to Axis I, very little research has been done involving comprehensive psychiatric examinations, rather the

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majority of the literature attributing clinical mental disorders to terrorists speaks of the remorseless personality type, psychopathy or sociopathy (Taylor 1988). The claim of sociopathy is advanced without evidence from any empirical study yet raises the important question of whether terrorism is usually antisocial or pro-social behavior. Several lines of reasoning tend to discredit the claim that terrorists are antisocial. If most terrorists do not meet diagnostic criteria for a major mental illness or for sociopathy, can we say then that they are rational actors? Building on the explanatory power of rational choice theory, the distinction should be made between rational strategic choices–usually driven by economics which rules obey to a “game”–and group psychological theories of terrorism. In modern social psychology, one of the most well developed areas of study is group identity and intergroup conflict (Hewstone et al. 2002; Kelman 2006). Oppression theory contends that political violence is a response to the former. Actors often cite the injustice of their treatment by governments that rob them of identity, dignity, security and freedom, as motive for joining a terrorist group (Crenshaw 1986; Taylor and Quayle 1994; Post et al. 2003). Hence, devoted to the study of in-group loyalty and the creation of animus between groups, theories begin from the empirical observation that individuals are motivated to belong to groups to fulfill basic needs for belonging and identity (Baumeister and Leary 1995). Additionally, it is noted that their motivation to maintain a positive self-identity drives them to favor their fellow group members over others in society (Brewer 1999; Hogg et al. 2008). Identification with an in-group motivates individuals to contribute material and psychological resources to the group, and thus creates a preference for fellow group members over others. However, intergroup conflict does not spring automatically from this “in-group love” but rather, follows from resource scarcity (Blumer 1958; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Intergroup competition over resources is recognized as the root of intergroup conflict. The group identity and intergroup conflict literature does not, however, provide evidence demonstrating when group members will actually adopt violence against another group on behalf of their group identity (Green et al. 1998). Situationist studies on the group identity and conflict literature are highly compatible, and many researchers use both perspectives. Recently, however, some psychologists who study conflict and social identity have argued that the situationists’ focus on obedience to authority and the power of institutional roles, downplays the critical predictive role of group identification for individuals’ participation in collective violence (Reicher and Haslam 2011). These scholars theorize

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that individual group members come to identify with violent groups and the authority figures who govern these groups, and then willingly engage in violent behavior on behalf of these figures or groups. This theoretical perspective from social identity theory informs our present synthesis, by placing identification with a violent group at the center of the cycle of individual perpetration of collective violence–identification with a violent group can be a motivator and also a result of the violence. The persisting question that remains, is how a human becomes dehumanized to such an extent that it enables them to become so directly involved in such extreme levels of violence. Existing interdisciplinary studies show that despite the fact that the experience is unpleasant, participating in violence makes people more likely to engage in subsequent violence. Individuals treat violence as aversive and actively seek to avoid engaging in violent behavior and harming others. To varying degrees, individuals are socialized from a young age to believe that harming others is wrong, and that those who do should be punished and, in some cases, ostracized from society. Additionally, interpersonal violence goes against the human need to connect with others (Collins 2009). Resistance to killing one’s fellow man exists as a result of a powerful combination of instinctive, rational, environmental, hereditary, cultural, and social factors. Individuals may also need to disengage from their moral reasoning about their targets in order to persist with violent behaviors. They can do this by excluding the targets from the category of humans and other beings that deserve moral consideration (Opotow 2005), or by disengaging from moral reasoning altogether during and after the violent act (Bandura, 1999). Existing scholarship in Social Psychology argues that one particularly powerful strategy for motivating collective violence is generating outgroup hate. Group leaders can construct or raise the salience of an “us” versus “them” divide, to strengthen the identity of the in-group and homogenize and demonize the out-group (Glick 2002). Leaders strategically blame negative economic and social outcomes on out-groups in order to increase out-group hate. When individuals then come to see the out-group as the enemy with whom they are competing over resources or power, they will feel more motivated to engage in violent behavior in an effort to protect their group. Violent groups motivate their members to engage in violent behavior by incentivizing violence with material and social rewards. Groups directly offer material rewards such as cash and in-kind goods like food, clothing, better housing, drugs, weapons, and even sexual partners to members who perpetrate violence (Weinstein 2007). Group leaders condone or actively encourage looting during violent episodes, as a way to

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provide additional material rewards (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), or withdraw material rewards as a form of punishment for failing to participate in violence. Instead of material incentives, groups can also use social rewards or punishment to induce individual members to engage in violence. The social structure of violent groups generally incentivizes violent behavior, as violence is associated with power, status, and a sense of belonging (Goldman et al. 2014). New and peripheral members can gain recognition, respect, and status from their peers by perpetrating violence. Those who fail to engage in violent behavior may be punished for their lack of action, experiencing shame and rejection by other group members. More radical forms of social sanctions include physical punishment, threats to the safety of oneself and one’s family, and threats of banishment from the group. When groups explicitly incentivize violence through rewards or punishment, then violent behavior may be seen as aversive by individual members. In the view of pre-1970s Social Movement theorists, however, it is argued that shared grievances and ideologies can be traced as the causes before the emergence of contentious social movements in societies. At the core of each of these perspectives it is held that discontent, produced by a combination and range of reasons, acts as precondition for violence. However, it must be noted here that the post-1970s studies have reassessed the correlation between relative deprivation and the rise in contentious politics (Snyder and Tilly 1972; Bowen 1968). The success of social movements precludes their strength and the ability to be attractive from the outside, and to increase the pool of followers, which in the case of terrorist movements is translated as the pool of fighters. Theories on what is commonly referred to as “relative deprivation” argue that the gap between individuals’ expected and achieved welfare on some criterion, produces the variations in collective discontent (such as frustration, anger and potential aggression) that are attributed as a major determinant of variations in collective violence. Another premise relates to the sets of individuals who become identifiable collectivities or not, fluctuations in existing groups’ mobilization, or collective control of resources. This last aspect exerts important constraints on the group’s capacity to undertake violent actions of any kind (Snyder and Tilly 1997, 505).

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From the Caliphate as Secular and Tolerant System to the Invention of the ISIS Project An Islamic State is essentially an “ideological state and it thus is radically different from a national state” (Maududi 1982). Maududi’s understanding of the Islamic state was marked by the theory of a superior economic system. He believed that economic exploitation or poverty were not brought about by private wealth and property, but by the lack of "virtue and public welfare" among the wealthy, which in turn was brought about by the lack of adherence to the Shari’a (Malise 2000, 329-330). In an attempt to disentangle the most radical thought, Maududi offers spaces for disentangling what is behind the Islamic State, both in terms of citizenry dysfunctions and the role of faith in governance. From a doctrinal perspective, under the Caliphate the benefits of protection derived from the dhimmiyya did not oblige the individual to embrace Islam. Hence, a dhimmi was prohibited from building new churches or synagogues but was allowed to renovate new ones, as freedom of worship under the Caliphate was provided. The regulation was historically imposed to enable Islam to remain the dominant religion in the Empire (Maududi, 1967). Another parameter to be considered while criticizing the status of dhimmi is freedom of expression. With regards to this, the coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims in a Caliphate did not differ in terms of rights recognized by the political apparatus, as both were subjected to the same limitations imposed by Shari’a on Muslims (Shahid). The structural organization, as embedded into the Omayyad caliphates or the Ottoman Empire, does not reflect Al-Baghdadi’s recalling of a Caliphate, apart from the jizya imposition. From a theoretical explanation, ISIS’s governance project led by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, acts as an extension of what is called imamah (leadership) in Shi’a Islam. However, quite surprisingly, this is in contradiction to ISIS’s religious influxes as it is “technically” assumed that the group’s majority is made up of Sunni Muslims. The debate on imamah essentially internalizes Al-Baghgadi’s senior statesman of ISIS into his religious authority of self-declared Khalifa. While shifting from a historical overview of, to some extent, a more secular political system, such as a Caliphate to the worrisome contemporary debate on ISIS, two questions remain unanswered: who are ISIS and is there a theory of psychopathy that could be supported behind it? A number of differing perspectives discuss the circumstances surrounding the emergence of ISIS. The first one is internal to the scholarly literature on terrorism in which psychopathy is considered peripheral to a terrorist organization; the second is much more political

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and encapsulates Nouri Al-Maliki’s authoritarian communitarianism and corruption in Iraq’s elites. The Islamic State began as a Jordanian jihadi project back in the 1990s when the Jordanian Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, whose real name was Ahmed Fadhil al-Khalaylah, belonging to the Jund Al-Sham formed the Jamaat Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad in Afghanistan. In 2002, Al-Zarqawi moved to the Kurdish borders of Latakiya, where he joined the Ansar al-Islam. The U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003 set in motion processes that transformed the Iraqi state and society, leading directly (although not inevitably) to the resurgence of the Islamic State in 2014. In 2003, Al-Zarqawi moved back to Baghdad in concomitance of the U.S.-invasion of Iraq. After Al-Zarqawi accepted Bin Laden’s leadership, the group changed its name to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In Iraq, U.S. officials strove to create a “consociational democracy”, where power would be shared between representatives of different religious and national communities, according to a quota system. The consociational approach to governing Iraq reacted with the extreme neoliberalism espoused by figures such as Paul Bremer, appointed to run the Coalition Provisional Authority in the wake of the invasion. This mix resulted in a toxic combination in a society shattered by sanctions, war corruption and occupation. U.S. officials confidently expected that they would be able to keep the mechanisms set in motion in 2003 working in their favor, nudging the balance of sectarian power in the “right” direction from time to time as necessary. In reality, the system they created quickly got out of their control, and could only be temporarily corrected by an enormous infusion of money and troops during the “surge” of 2007-2008. Iraqi society before 2003 was certainly not free of sectarianism; in fact the Ba’athist regime had long used it and encouraged ethnic conflicts in its efforts to maintain power. However, the impact of sectarianism on society was blunted by a number of factors. Baghdad retained a large Kurdish population, even at the height of Saddam Hussein’s brutal war against the Kurdish insurgency in the north, and, despite the efforts of some Shia Islamist forces to persuade them otherwise, the majority of Iraqi Shia conscript soldiers did not break ranks and side with their Iranian coreligionists during the Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, the legacy of the great political struggles of the 1940s to the 1960s, dominated by competition between secular currents such as the Communist Party and the Ba’ath Party itself in the context of high levels of strikes and social protests, was still influential among an older generation of activists still in the mid2000s. The defeat of Iraqi forces in 1991, and the impoverishment of Iraqi society as a result of the subsequent sanctions regime, created a much more fertile ground for sectarianism to take root in society. Reeling from

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the impact of the uprising that began in the South, the Ba’athist regime desperately sought allies who could exercise military and political power on behalf of the state. At the same time, the weakening of state institutions under the crushing pressure of international sanctions created spaces into which religious institutions expanded their activities, providing welfare, education and health services to an increasingly desperate population. It is worth noting here that the sectarian issue is not embedded into any religious and theological domain as it has existed for centuries, but the issue as it is today shaping the face of the region remains much more oriented into the bipolarism between Saudi Arabia and the Iranian regional influence, which since 1979 used “religion” as propagandistic tool applied to its foreign policy (Roy 2013). Following the toppling of Saddam Hussein, the sense of alienation and exclusion grew between Sunni Iraqi in the Western provinces of the country between 2005 and 2006. The refusal by Sunni communities and the other existing minorities in the Iraqi territories to accept Nouri Maliki’s “authoritarian communitarianism”, next to the elites’ corruption, allowed Al-Qaeda in Iraq to step in by gaining the consensus between Sunni communities, while the post Saddam scenario represented a historical moment for the Shia community to run the country. Thus, the spread of ISIS was not intrinsically linked to ideological indoctrinations penetrated from the outside, but organically emerged from the socio-political apparatus accelerated by the U.S. invasion. This invasion consequently implemented a policy of “deBa’athification” of the loyalists and ranked military officers from the Ba’ath party who started joining Al-Qaeda. The notoriety of the jihadist groups by Al-Zarqawi called Jama’at AlTawhid wa Al-Jihad grew in the wake of 2004, when the movement linked its existence to Al-Qaeda’s network, by changing into Tanzim Qaidat alJihad fi Bilad al-Rafidaiyn (or Al-Qaeda in Iraq). It was in 2006 that Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidaiyn emerged as a group under the umbrella of the Mujahedeen Shura Council, confirming the distance taken from Al-Qaeda’s authority, and by declaring an unofficial Islamic State in Iraq, known at that time as Islamic State in Iraq (Al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi Iraq), led by Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi until 2010. A year later, in 2011, the command of IS passed to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Thus, what today is called Al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi El-Sham wa Iraq, is the product of the dissolution of the Shura Council. After 2010, the command passed to Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali Al-Badri, who became who is known as Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.

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ISIS’ Dysfunctional Aspects: Where possible weaknesses start The political organization of the main Islamic Caliphates was based on a participatory and representative body for consultation called majlis alShura, corresponding in modern political systems to the parliament. ISIS’s system, instead, does not internalize a civil participatory political organ. Even though ISIS has been so far described as the strongest and richest organization in this context, drawing on a combined approach based on a comparative analysis between the Islamic doctrines and the organizations there are three main weaknesses that could be used against the organization. The first builds on the structural arbitrariness linked to the political assets of the Shura Council project. In ISIS, an un-egalitarian socio-political and economic system replicated in the occupied territories in Iraq and Syria, corresponds to the top-up hierarchy rather than civilian representation (the work hypothesizes that the Shura Council may be an adaptation of the Mujahedeen Shura Council, rather than a genuine replication of the Upper Houses of Parliament, as existing in the majority of Arab countries). It is not clear to what extent the political exclusionary asset may, in the long run, become a basis for discontent from within the thin portion of territory controlled. A second major factor relates to the department structure. Under the Ottoman Empire, the structuration and elaboration of departments and their delegates was politically organized to assure the correct function of the system under the principle of cohesion and unity, as set up by the Millet system. In the case of ISIS, the creation of departments is mainly based on the military, financial, intelligence and media principle, which has at its core the recruitment of foreign fighters as part of the ex-novo department “Fighters Assistance Council”. In spite of its attempts at modern reinterpretation, the division into Wilayat and Qata’t invalidates the Caliphate led by Al-Baghdadi as a unitary entity, appealing to the reunification of the “Umma” and aimed at the cohesion of the empire. In other words, the structure of Wilayat and Qata’t does not emulate the “Millet System”, as it was active under the Ottoman Empire. In Al-Dawla Al-Islamiyya, each wilaya (governorate) has an administrative unit called Diwan al-Khidamat (service administration), which are given the task of being responsible for providing public services to those civilians prevalently living within the Islamic State’s territory in Syria rather than in Iraq. Yet again, the Diwan al-Khidamat, does not provide them free, as within occupied territories; the cash people pay for expected social services goes instead right into ISIS’s top up hierarchy, rather than being

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redistributed as aid to civilians. The concept of a threefold citizenship and its rights is therefore hard to be replicated and thus hard to be believed. These incongruences may raise discontent in people living in the territories, however, not until the organization will be economically strong enough to resist. The Islamic State has argued that it has the duty to govern both the religious and political lives of Muslims. Under this model, Abu Bakr alBaghdadi, is both ISIS’s chief religious official and its scheduled politician. Though maintaining some practical state functions, effective urban management may not be within his capacity. ISIS’s sweeping yet exclusionary method is potentially one of the organization’s greatest strengths, but it may also become one of ISIS’s greatest weaknesses. In strategic terms, the terrorist organization maintains social control by eliminating resistance, but this in turn places technical skills that are essential to run modern cities in short supply. In the process of establishing its governance project, Al-Baghdadi has attempted to dismantle state institutions without replacing them with sustainable alternatives. The immediate provision of aid and electricity, for example, does not translate into the creation of a durable economy. The consequence of ISIS’s failure, however, may not be the dismantling of the Caliphate per se, but rather the devastation of the cities and systems that comprise the areas they expand into, such that they never recover. Contrary to the case of Iraq, in Syria ISIS is characterized by the overt pursuit of physical control prior to gaining (forced) social acceptance. The way it has imposed itself is essentially based on three key-structural assets: Da’wa, Hisba, Ta’lim; the capitalism of humanitarian aid; and the hierarchy of the governance apparatus based on Wilayat (governorates) and Qata’t (sectors). However, this model has not been replicated in the Iraqi territory, which is an endeavor for business and capitalism. The creation of Qata’t, or provinces, is discrepant when considering the thin portion of territory ISIS has conquered between Iraq and Syria, particularly with regards to the departments ISIS operates, either on proactive or reactionary bases. Al-Hisba (religious police), Da’wa (call) and Ta’alim (education) can be considered as proactive components. Further alterations with regards to the concept of Al-Hisba have come to be added to the illegitimacy of the group. According to the usool al-fiqh (the Islamic jurisprudence), hisba is defined under a political umbrella as “command the right and forbid the wrong” and is approached as duty addressed to the ruler. The jurisprudence assesses hisba as a duty reserved for Muslims that is listed as an obligation to Muslims and of the state, to ensure its citizens comply with hisba. It is from a broader perspective of

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investigation into the modern interpretation of the fiqh that hisba that is meant at a practical level as “supervision of practical and more secular affairs” (Emon 2012). However, the word “secular” must not be misunderstood, as under the main historical Caliphates society, this term was more secular inclined than Western public debate about Islam and recognized Caliphates could today expect. The difference between main and parallel Caliphates is meant to distinguish the historical period and geographical areas interested by the establishment of an Islamic State. Under ISIS’s idea of Caliphate, however, Al-Hisba means the religious police acting according to the Shari’a, in order to promote what has been defined as “virtues”, and forbidding the “evils”. However, not surprisingly, Al-Hisba sometimes moves beyond security-duties and it is reported to be part of a system of sink-economy controlling ISIS’s patrol vehicles (Jihadology 2014). The way the Islamic State works is based on a strong hierarchy, at the top of which stands the self-proclaimed Caliph, followed by 70% restoration of the historical Caliphate’s structure, although severe alterations have occurred. In spite of international mobilization, ISIS keeps counting on the pool of foreign fighters to assure its expansionistic goals in the MENA region.

Economies of Power and Consensus After the fall of Mosul, it was widely reported that in 2014, the fall of what is considered the second most important city in Iraq resulted in ISIS gaining an additional $430 million from the Central Bank in Mosul. Extortions do play a central role in assuring revenues. The organization of ISIS into wilayat and departments technically based on the distribution of humanitarian aid, does not correspond to the activity of the terroristcapitalist organization on the ground. The terrorist organization manages a sophisticated extortion racket by robbing, looting, and demanding a portion of the economic resources in areas where it operates, but which have to be necessarily considered under its control. In this sense, ISIS is more similar to a capitalist group that generates funds and operates through e-wallets. Oil production from facilities is estimated between 30,000 and 80,000 b/d. This data does not consider what it is syphoning from the closed pipelines linking Iraq to Syria. Even if sold at the heavily discounted price of $25-50 per barrel, this would provide a daily income of between $2-4 million. But it is not just oil that lays behind the Islamic State, even though in Western politics it is given less attention in agendas. A second source of income is represented by resource extraction and production facilities that are located in territory where ISIS currently

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operates. The control of Akashat Phosphate Mine and the Al-Qaim manufacturing plan, both located in Iraq’s Al-Anbar province and owned by the Iraqi’s State Company for Phosphate Manufacture, is another meaningful internal source of income (Brisard, Martinez, 2014). In addition, ISIS benefits from the shipment of cash entering into territory where it operates. Even though the Iraqi government pitted efforts to prevent such practices, it is the transferring of hard currency to bank branches where IS operates, and the government’s struggles, that were bypassed by the organization, as Iraqi government salaries are in any cases subjected to up 50% of taxation by IS in the controlled territories, which is providing a core monetary pool for the organization. This practice implies that ISIS is able to profit hundreds of millions of dollars annually from taxing salary payments. A third source of income is robbing passing traffic at checkpoints, while the most significant remains the smuggling of raw materials stolen from the government depots and antiquities estimated at $36 million. ISIS occupies more than 4,500 archaeological sites, some of them UNESCO World Heritage sites in Syria and Iraq, where 90% of the country’s cultural artefacts are located. This has allowed large-scale looting. However, little is done to disrupt this. A fourth source of income is kidnapping. Some victims are killed, the aim being to send political messages. Others guarantee the extraction of ransom payments to the organization, varying from $20 to $45 million. Donations addressed to hypothetically support refugees and displaced persons in the region, represent a fragile topic while considering ISIS income. In September 2014, the organization received a $2 million donation emanating from the Gulf. Since wilayat have recently been extended to the Philippines with the Abu Sayyaf Group, Egypt with Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis and Daesh’s wilayat in Libya operating nearby Sirte, the implications of the expansionism of this big-project relates to the funds channeled from the peripheral wilayat to the central organization. Next to loyalties and intra-terrorist donations, another source of money is distance adoptions or related donations performed by a FTF and Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs). Two cases study shed light on the internationalization of IS’s finance and both are concerned with donations through EU-based Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs). Russian research into Western-transferred money into ISIS’s accounts brought evidence that collected donations for Syrian refugees, people in need of medical and financial aid, were sent to a group of individuals related to Mr. Bashir instead of the foundation’s account. Money was first sent through remitters and then transported in cash. The money was then transferred to credit card accounts and e-wallets belonging to terrorist profiles, rather

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than humanitarian organizations operating for the protection of refugees in the region. ISIS appears to have sufficiently diverse sources of income to survive the loss of one or another of these sources of income. Even though the disruption of oil trade with neighboring countries was believed to be a core strategy to weaken IS, the many sources of income on which the organization has structurally been built, guarantee it a substantial inflow of cash and assets even with this disruption. In this regard, strategies addressed to disrupt financial channels and the smuggling of antiquities can be considered very limited, or not developed enough to have a significant long-term impact.

Counter-terrorism, Foreign Fighters and Women-ISIS Support: A critique Countering most of the international mainstream media, maps of ISIS territories can be shown as the organization is—officially—in control of a small percentage of territory in Iraq and a slightly bigger area in Syria, as becomes evident in the following image. In the Iraqi context, by January 2015 ISIS controlled areas are more projected towards zones interested by refineries, oil conducts and gas pipelines surrounding Mosul, Kirkuk and Raqqa’s areas. The portion of effectively controlled territory could be estimated at 25% of the whole of Iraq which can subsequently be split up into ISIS support and controlled areas, where the former corresponds to 17% while the latter to 8% out of 25%. The map above shows ISIS’s loss since January 2015, estimated at 9.4% of its once claimed territory. The loss is shown more in proximity to Kurdistan’s gains, dating back to 2014, and in the nearby areas of Ramadi, Tikrit and Kobane. Clearly, the intent behind the Pentagon’s map is to show ISIS’s weaknesses in the face of the USA-led airstrike campaign. However, in spite of the symbolic loss of ground, dictated by specific internal conditions rather than by the success of “Western military antiISIS measures”, ISIS has more than enough manpower and financial sources to continue its wargame on a transnational level. According to Fawaz Gerges (2014), there is increasing evidence that the U.S.-led airstrikes have not slowed down the flow of foreign recruits to Syria. The Washington Post reported that more than 1,000 fighters are streaming into Syria each month. Data should, in theory, show the inefficiency of wargame-counterterrorism strategies as planned by Western coalitions. Hence, the discourse of security seems to erroneously being built on drones and boots on the ground strategies. Whether the Western military security option wins or loses, should go beyond the philosophy of numbers

Fuury and Soldiery y of Non-God Fig. 11.1. ISIS territorial conntrol and operab bility as of Junee 2015.

Source: The P Pentagon USA

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of fighters killed. What should matter, instead, is whether or not a military force is achieving the pre-imposed strategic objectives, i.e. the comprehensive dismantling of the organization. Taking a look at the following table, current strategies are producing counter-effects: the number of foreign fighters has exponentially increased, and European women are ready to join the terrorist organization, in spite of horrid gender-oriented violence conducted. Table 11.1. Source and numbers of foreign fighters with ISIS (20142015) Foreign Fighters Netherland Belgium Denmark Austria France Spain Italy United Kingdom Russia Germany Bosnia Kosovo Tunisia Saudi Arabia Jordan Libya Morocco

2014 150 300 100 60 700 51 45-50 500 800 330 60 120 3000 2500 1500 600 1500

2015 250 440 150 150 1550 100 80 700 1800-2400 (updated to December 2015) 500-700 330 100-150 6000 2500 2089 600 1500

Source: Data combination by the author from Soufan Group 2014: December 2015, U.S. National Governments & International Centre for the Study of Radicalization. Wire Agencies.

ISIS’s ultimate strategic goal is maximalist in the long-term rather than in the short term: it seeks to establish a Caliphate that will ultimately bring all Muslims under its rule. Obviously, it is far away from achieving this long-term objective. However, it is achieving many of its short-term strategic objectives and the radicalization of European fighters is the most direct consequence.

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Conclusion Existing scholarship contributions and mainstream media want to categorize ISIS as the postmodern evolution of Al-Qaeda (Byman 2014). Contending perspectives, however, argue that ISIS should not be considered as simply an extension of Al-Qaeda. Rather, ISIS intends to build a state and, in this sense, the motto “baqiya wa tatamadad” which means “lasting and expanding”, would not be surprising. The most relevant problem with ISIS, aside from the case of Al-Qaeda, is the maximalist expectation in the area. Even if the organization is apparently losing territory on the ground because of joint counter-terrorism measures, the organization is clearly building the project in the long run by counting on future generations (see: Gutfraind 2010). ISIS is not close to achieving a global Caliphate but, it does have an increasingly presence in a growing number of places and to some extent, is winning. In looking at the evolution of jihadist regional movements and the fragmentation of the regional jihadi order, internal fragmentations with the recent supremacy of ISIS over Al-Qaeda could lead to a fusion between groups and limit contentions which otherwise would result in groups weakness and inefficiency. The risk of witnessing an Al-Qaeda-ISIS alliance may be more destructive than expected, either politically and socially. The economic implications behind it would add into ISIS’s accounts more cash and assets which, consequently, would enrich the organization irrespective of oil and territory loss. The power-marriages between ISIS and the evolution of jihadi movements could seem even more appealing to disenfranchised generations in their 20s, who may decide to join the “marriage of power” with those psychological consequences explained in the opening part of this work. Even though not considered here, a solution but a strategy for containment, a program of de-radicalization needs to be developed. In that regard, strategies seem too anchored to the logic of unproductive and military security at the moment, and a superficial approach to human rights promotion and social justice in the region at large. As long as corrupted re-distribution of regional resources, bad-management of aid allocation in the field of development, education and political transition and post-2011 consolidation are continued, irrespective of the support from humanitarian channels, it is more unlikely that we could talk about stability processes in the area. As shown in this work, ISIS suffers from many internal structural dysfunctions and sources of possible weakness, most significant that it counts on dissatisfaction-dehumanization versus Western policies, in the region more inclined to reshape the power-

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building in the area. Until these lines are followed, it is unlikely that the number of foreign fighters will decrease, especially if it comes as a direct response to future airstrikes or the possibility of boots on the ground strategies in Syria, Iraq or Libya. This aspect widens the risk of meeting a return to a second uprising, and new upcoming migratory crises in the severely destabilized MENA region.

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CONTRIBUTORS

Imad El-Anis Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Nottingham Trent University and the author of several books including Jordan and the United States: The Political Economy of Trade and Economic Reform in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, 2011), A New A-Z of International Relations Theory (I.B. Tauris, 2015), and International Political Economy in the 21st Century: contemporary Issues and Analyses, 2nd edition (Routledge, 2016). Dr El-Anis holds a BA (Hons) in International Relations and Global Politics (Nottingham Trent University), MA in International Political Economy (University of Sheffield) and a PhD in International Political Economy (Nottingham Trent University). His research focuses on various aspects of the international relations of the Middle East and North Africa including: trade policies; international institutions; resource scarcity; nuclear technology proliferation; revolutionary change; and crisis management. Tarfah Elfayez is a PhD candidate in International Relations at the Nottingham Trent University, currently working on a project titled: The Impact of U.S. Aid on Jordanian Foreign Policy-Making 2000-2014. Tarfah joined NTU in 2011 after having gained a BA (Hons) in Political Science from the University of Jordan, and an MA in International Relations and Politics with Commendation at NTU in 2009. Tarfah’s research interests include: International Relations, foreign affairs, foreign policy, national security, International Political Economy, theories of International Relations, and the Middle East and North Africa. Mohammed Houshisadat graduated from the Islamic and Middle East Institute at the University of Durham, under the supervision of Prof. Anoush Ehteshami in August 2013 and currently works as an Assistant Professor in Middle East Politics and Area Studies at the University of Tehran. Adela Jirankova is a PhD candidate in International Relations and European Studies at the Metropolitan University in Prague. She focuses on security, transition to democracy and civil society´s role in regime change, with a specific focus on the Middle East and North Africa. She holds a BA

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(Hons) in History from the Masaryk University in Brno and International Territorial Studies (Middle Eastern Studies) from the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen. She graduated with a Master’s Degree in International Security Studies from Charles University in Prague and in International Relations and European Studies at the Metropolitan University in Prague. Sahra Joharchi is Lecturer in International Relations, and a final year PhD candidate at Nottingham Trent University. She holds a BA (Hons) and an MA in International Relations. Sahra’s research interests include the following areas: the international relations of the MENA; MENA-Asia relations; International Political Economy; trust, risk and security in Iranian foreign relations; cognitive foreign policy; and Iranian and Chinese foreign policy. Her PhD research focuses on the Political Economy of Iranian foreign policy and the ways in which discourse is utilized to construct both positive and negative relations with other states. Sahra has presented papers at various conferences, is a member of ISA, BISA ECPR, Nottingham Trent University’s MENA cluster research events, and BRISMES. Sahra has published articles in the Maghreb Review (December 2013) and China in the World. Zeynep Kaya is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Gedik University, Istanbul. She completed her PhD at the Turkish Military Academy, Defense Sciences Institute, Faculty of Security Sciences. Her research focuses on international security and terrorism, and her PhD thesis was titled: Globalization of Terrorism: Al-Qaeda. Zeynep also holds an MSc in International Relations from Bilkent University and a BA (Hons) in English Literature and Language from the Eastern Mediterranean University. Tarik Oumazzane is a PhD candidate in International Relations at Nottingham Trent University. His thesis focuses on the political economy of trade policies and the impact of trade relations and institutional engagement in the Middle East and North Africa. He holds a BA (Hons) degree in English Literature from the Moulay Ismail University, Morocco, an MA in American Studies from the University of Nottingham, and an Executive MBA from the University of Nottingham. He has also studied at the Alliance Française and the U.S. Institute of Peace. Tarik has advised the UK Parliament on Human Rights in Morocco and has also worked for the Ministry of Energy in Morocco as a researcher, where he conducted a project titled: “Morocco’s Renewable Energy Policy: a critical analysis of

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its sustainable competitive advantage, a consideration of its sustainable development and provision of policy recommendations to policy makers”. Beata Paragi is an EU Marie Curie fellow at the Norwegian research institute, Fafo, and an Assistant Professor at the Corvinus University of Budapest. In 2003, she graduated as an economist, and holds a PhD in International Relations (2008) from the Corvinus University of Budapest (former Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences). Her main fields of interest, in terms of research and teaching, cover Israeli-Palestinian relations and international development cooperation. She has co-authored the first book on international development published in Hungarian (Nemzetkozi fejlesztesi segélyezes, Budapest: Tett Consult, 2007, with Balazs Szent-Ivanyi and Sara Vari), among other texts. Beata has also worked as a visiting researcher at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem as well as at Fafo AIS (Oslo, Norway). Maria Gloria Polimeno is a PhD candidate at the Department of International Politics, City University London where, in 2014, she was temporarily appointed as an Honorary Research Fellow. She has integrated her academic education in Arabic, being based between the Middle East and North Africa. Maria has received a National Scholarship and a Research Scholarship, awarded by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of Egypt to Rome. In 2012, Maria was based at the Department of Arabic Studies at Cairo University. Her research focuses on Egypt and, specifically, on social movements with an emphasis on Fundamentalist Islamist movements, social justice, Islamic identities, urban politics and decision-making from below in manatiq al-ashwaiyya. Her research interests also consider the EU’s foreign policy in the Southern Mediterranean neighborhood, terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies. M. Ozan Saray is Lecturer in Economics at Inonu University, Turkey. He holds a PhD in Economics and his current research focuses on trade, development and integration between Turkey and Europe. Ali Sen is Professor of Economics at Inonu University, Malatya in Turkey. He holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Nottingham, with a specialization in the political economy of development in modern Turkey. His research interests broadly lie in development economics and international economy. His published work includes areas such as foreign

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trade, regional economic integration, and foreign direct investment, with special reference to Turkey. Natasha Underhill is Lecturer in International Relations at Nottingham Trent University, with teaching responsibilities on the BA (Hons) International Relations and MA International Relations, teaching modules at all levels. Natasha is module leader for International Relations in Context and is involved in a number of BA and MA modules, including in the following areas: International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy, International Security, International Relations of the Middle East and South Asia, The International Relations of the Middle East and South Asia, International Terrorism, State Failure, and Insurgency/Counter-Insurgency. Natasha is the author of several works, most recently Countering Global Terrorism and Insurgency: Calculating the risk of state failure in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). Konstantinos C. Zarras is a Visiting Researcher at the Laboratory of International Relations and European Integration at the University of Macedonia, Greece. His research interests include IR Philosophy and Theory, and Middle East politics. His current research explores the conflict in Syria.

INDEX 9/11 (September 11th 2001) 3, 6, 10, 37, 40, 45, 53, 55, 64 Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi 229, 231 Afghanistan 3-8, 40-47, 64, 156, 229, 247 Agadir Agreement 98-101, 103, 107-124, 128 Ahrar as-Sham 24 AK Party 27, 170, 175-177, 181184, 188, 190, 192 Al-Assad, Bashar 5- 9, 10-13, 23-25, 31, 58-60, 159, 164 Aleppo, Syria 16, 23 Algeria 105, 106, 135, 143, 170, 187 Allawite 23-24 Al-Maliki, Nouri 229, 231, 242 Al-Nour 27 Al-Qaeda 3, 5, 10, 12, 24, 37, 40-43, 223, 229, 231, 239, 240, 245 al-Sisi, Abdul Fatah 26-28, 203 Al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab 40, 229, 231 Amman, Jordan 40, 86, 90, 153, 159, 220 Anatolian Tigers 182 Ankara Agreement 173, 178 Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis 29 Arab League 101-107, 128, 163 Arab Spring 1, 16, 22, 42, 53, 55, 59, 72, 73, 80-85, 88-98, 104, 106, 124, 126, 149, 162-168, 189-191 Arab-Israeli relations 76, 82 Azerbaijan 132

Ba’ath Party 8, 24, 230, 231 Bahrain 53, 104, 106, 170, 187 Ben Ali, Zine El-Abidine 26, 208213 Black September 152 Brussels Summit 178 Cairo 16, 25, 27, 90, 103, 126, 167, 217, 222, 246 Caliphate, Islamic 24, 31, 43, 228, 229, 232, 233, 238, 239 Camp David 72 Caspian Sea 132, 136 China 31, 64, 68, 69, 111, 131-140, 245 CIA 46, 86, 202, 207, 218 Civil wars 2, 5, 7, 9-12, 20-25, 29, 42, 57, 60, 150, 152, 159-161, 165, 189, 204-206, 215 Clinton, Bill 3 Cold War 3, 36, 59, 66, 106, 130, 146, 162, 164 Corruption 197, 201, 206, 211, 217, 221, 243 Counterterrorism 10, 46, 236 Coups 18, 20, 21, 27, 28, 53, 73, 90, 172 Civil Soceity Organiszations 197201, 204-209, 214, 215 Cyprus Intervention 173 Damascus, Syria 16, 23 Daraa, Syria 22 Davutoglu, Ahmet 177, 190, 191 Democratization 85, 90, 149, 157, 162, 181, 196-199, 204, 214-221

Regional Integration and National Disintegration in the Post-Arab Spring Middle East Economic Unity Agreement 103 EU 63, 73, 82, 88, 91, 92, 95, 99, 101, 107, 112, 125, 128, 130-147, 170, 173-178, 181-85, 190, 191, 206, 235, 246 European Commission 134, 135, 141-146 European Council 178 Facebook 199, 205-210, 217-220 Foreign Direct Investment 52, 105, 111, 158, 172, 180-190 Foreign aid 72-91, 149-165, 187 France 19, 31, 53, 130-135, 144, 171-175, 238 Free Trade Agreements 100-105 Fundamentalism 99 Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement 98, 105, 107, 125, 126 Gulf Cooperation Council 29, 98, 104, 125-127, 149, 164, 165 Ghaddafi (Qaddafi), Muammer 53, 107, 204-208, 215, 220, 221 Genereal Intellegence Directorate, Jordan 86 Greco-Turkish War 171 Gulf Crisis and War, 1990-1991 56, 68, 126, 150-154, 157, 175 Hamas 88, 225 Hashemite Monarchy 127, 150-153, 162-164 Hegemony 59-61, 62-64, 102 Helsinki Summit 178 Hezbollah 25, 57, 60-62, 225 Homs, Syria 23, 24 Houthis 58 Human Development 197, 202, 206207, 211-212, 221 Hussein, Saddam 4, 6, 8, 58, 230

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International Monetary Fund 172, 180, 191 Iran 19, 25, 40, 43, 50-70, 107, 130133, 136-150, 159, 170, 186, 187, 230 Iran-Iraq War 1980-88 52, 53, 64 Iranian foreign policy 50, 51, 60, 65, 245 Iraq 2-14, 24, 32, 40-48, 52-56, 58, 64, 65, 104-107, 124, 132, 139, 149, 150, 151, 156, 159, 170, 186, 187, 192, 229-236, 240-243, 247 Iraq, 2003 invasion of 40, 55, 65, 150 Iraq Syndrome 2-14 Iraqi refugees 151 Islamic State / IS / ISIS 2-14, 24, 29, 32, 40-47, 60, 67, 149, 159, 223225, 228-242, 224, 231-235 Islamic Jihad 225 Islamic National Outlook Movement 176 Islamic Revolution (Iran) 19, 57, 69 Islamist (Polituical Islam) 24, 27-30, 37, 42, 51, 153, 159, 176, 230, 246 Israel 51, 53, 67, 69, 72-74, 82-91, 96, 97, 107, 149-159, 166-168, 170, 187, 223 Israeli-Palestinian conflict 89 Italy 67, 130, 135, 143, 171, 175, 238, 241 Izz al-Din al-Qassam 225 Jabhat al-Nusra 24 January 25th Revolution (Egypt) 2629, 220 Japan 132, 135, 147 Jaysh al-Islam 24 Jihadism 6, 223

250 Jordan 5, 40, 41, 60, 72-98, 104108, 112-124, 127, 149-170, 187, 238, 244 Kefaya Movement, Egypt 27-29 Khatami, Mohammad 63, 68 King Abdullah II 159-163, 167 Kurdistan 24, 236 Kuwait 29, 56, 104, 151, 170, 187 Latakia, Syria 25 Lebanon 5, 60, 67, 68, 72, 139, 151, 170, 187 Libya 7, 14, 53, 104-107, 135, 170, 186-189, 196, 198, 204-207, 213-215, 217-222, 235, 238, 240 Liquified Natural Gas 130-135, 137147 Maghreb Union 98, 103, 105, 124, 128 Mecca, Saudi Arabia 56, 68, 70 Middle East Peace Initiative 157, 167 MERCOSUR 101, 122 Morocco 98, 104-108, 112-124, 170, 187, 238, 245 Morsi, Mohammed 26-28, 201, 203, 215 Mubarak, Hosni 26-29, 85, 198-202, 214, 217, 220 Musaddeq, Mohammed 51 Muslim Brotherhood 27-29, 199201, 203 North American Free Trade Agreement 99-101, 122 Nasser, Gamal Abdul 104, 127, 220 North Alantic Treaty Organization 10, 67 National Ddemocratic Party, Egypt 26

Index Neofunctionalism 101, 128 Nimr al-Nimr 59 Obama, Barack 2, 5-14, 44, 95, 163 OECD 83, 87, 156, 168, 174, 177, 210, 220 Oil 68, 137, 138, 147, 234 Oman 104, 135, 139, 170, 187 OPEC 131 Orientalism 37-39, 45, 47-49 Oslo Peace Process 72, 86, 87 Ottoman Empire 171, 229, 232, 241 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza 19, 55, 57 Pakistan 5, 43, 47, 139, 247 Palestine 72-74, 81, 83, 86-90, 94, 97, 166, 170, 187 Palestinian Authority 73, 82-89, 93 Palestinian refugees150, 151 Persian Gulf 53, 55, 69, 130-136, 139, 142, 143 Palestine Liberation Organization 72 Qatar 104, 132, 136, 141-143, 170, 186, 187 Revolution 3, 16-30, 50-58, 61, 64, 149, 197-215, 220-224 Russia 19, 25, 31, 44, 53, 131, 135, 140, 145, 175, 238 Saudi Arabia 29, 51-62, 64-70, 104107, 159, 164, 165, 170, 186, 187, 230, 238 Supreme Ccouncil of the Armed Forces (Egypt) 27-29 Shari’a 228, 229, 233 Six Day War (1967) 151 Spain 130, 135, 238

Regional Integration and National Disintegration in the Post-Arab Spring Middle East Syrian refugees 150-154, 159-163, 165, 235 Tahrir Square 25, 29 Taliban 5, 43, 47 Tamarod 27 Tartus, Syria 25 Tehran, Iran 56, 59, 64, 68, 70, 139, 140, 143, 145, 244 Terrorism 37, 45, 53, 86, 149, 156, 157, 223-229, 235, 239, 245, 246 Tunisia 25, 26, 98, 105, 107, 108, 113-119, 120-124, 161, 163, 170, 187, 189, 196, 198, 207-222, 238 Turkey 5, 60, 68, 139, 170-192, 240, 243, 246 Turkish Cypriots 181 U.S. foreign policy 2-4, 7, 8, 32-37, 39, 44, 155, 163

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UK 130, 135, 171, 175, 245 UN General Assembly 78 UNHCR 160, 161, 169 United Arab Emirates 55, 104 USA 51, 55-57, 59, 65, 97, 132, 149, 153-165, 174, 175, 236, 237 USAID 154, 167-169, 222 Vietnam Syndrome 3, 4, 9 War on Terror 54, 55, 64 World Bank 83, 106-109, 125-128, 153, 160, 175, 193, 197, 198, 202-207, 211, 212, 222 World War Two 98, 100-102, 124, 125, 134, 173 Yemen 5, 53, 55, 57-60, 149, 170, 187