Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia : The challenge of succession 9780415693349, 9780203147801

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Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia

This book examines the structure of political power amongst elites inside Saudi Arabia and how they might cope with the very serious challenge posed by succession. Presenting a new and refreshing theoretical approach that links elite integration with regime stability, the author shows that the kingdom’s royal elite is far more integrated than it has generally been given credit for. Based on extensive field work inside Saudi Arabia, the book offers a detailed, up-to-date survey and assessment of all the key sectors of the elites in the country. The author examines how the succession process has been used in highly different circumstances – including deposition, assassination, and death by old age – and demonstrates how regime stability in Saudi Arabia rests on the royal family’s ability to unite and to solve the challenge of succession. He offers a strong analysis of intra-ruling family mechanisms and dynamics in this notoriously private royal family, and addresses the question of whether, as the number of royals rapidly grows, the elite is able to remain integrated. Providing a rare insight into the issues facing the royal family and ruling elite in Saudi Arabia, this book will be of great interest to scholars and students of Middle Eastern politics, and Saudi Arabia in particular. Stig Stenslie specialises in Middle Eastern and Asian affairs at the Norwegian Defence Staff in Oslo. He holds a doctoral degree in Political Science from the University of Oslo, and is also the author of Stability and Change in the Modern Middle East (with Kjetil Selvik).

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Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia The challenge of succession

Stig Stenslie

First published 2012 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2012 Stig Stenslie The right of Stig Stenslie to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Stenslie, Stig. Regime stability in Saudi Arabia : the challenge of succession / Stig Stenslie. p. cm.—(Routledge studies in Middle Eastern politics ; 40) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Saudi Arabia—Politics and government. 2. Elite (Social sciences)— Saudi Arabia. 3. Political stability—Saudi Arabia. 4. Saudi Arabia— Kings and rulers—Succession. I. Title. JQ1841.A58S74 2012 320.9538—dc23 2011024989 ISBN: 978–0–415–69334–9 (hbk) ISBN: 978–0–203–14780–1 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk

To my grandfather, Harry

Contents

List of figures, tables and boxes Preface Acknowledgements Notes on transcription

xiii xiv xv xvi

1

Introduction

1

2

Elite integration and regime stability

5

3

The royal strategic elite

25

4

Non-royal segment elites

42

5

Mechanisms of elite integration

76

6

The challenge of succession

104

7

Conclusion

133

Appendix 1: The Allegiance Council Law Appendix 2: Principal second-generation princes Appendix 3: Important third-generation princes Appendix 4: Prominent religious scholars Appendix 5: Key technocrats Bibliography Index

136 142 146 150 153 155 165

List of figures, tables and boxes

Figures 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1

Rulers of the House of Saʿud Structure of the political system in Saudi Arabia Main circles of power within the royal family Main elite segments

26 27 32 43

Tables 2.1 4.1

Three traditional perspectives on the Al Saʿud’s stability summarized Influences of the four segment elites

14 71

Boxes 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 6.1

The Sudayri Seven Provincial governors as of September 2010 Members of the Royal Family Council Members of the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars Members of the SEC Members of the Council of Ministers Members of the SPMA Members of the Allegiance Council

31 34 36 45 62 66 69 128

Preface

Analysing the House of Saʿud brings to mind the Cold War art of ‘Kremlinology’. As a student of ‘Saudiology’, I have been confronted with many of the same methodological challenges as the people who strove to understand the inner workings of the political elite in the former Soviet Union. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the most fundamental challenge is gaining access to valid and reliable data: few nonSaudi scholars have been blessed with the opportunity to do fieldwork inside the country; there are strong norms among regime leaders that they should not talk extensively with outsiders; any publication of information about the royal family is prohibited; and there is no culture within the elite for writing biographies, which would otherwise have been valuable sources of information. Even less favourable, there are plenty of uninformed people continuously gossiping about the royal family, the ‘Saudi national sport’. In addition, interviewees with a political agenda may ‘plant’ information that they hope will enter the public domain. Although the mechanisms of royal family politics seem impenetrable, this should not hinder studying elite politics. As there are very few relevant written sources, the findings presented in this book are largely based on interviews. I conducted interviews between August 2003 and April 2009. Half of my interviews were conducted in Saudi Arabia, the others in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Geneva, Kuwait, London, Oslo, Muscat, Singapore and Teheran. My around 100 informants included princes and princesses, officials, businessmen (and women), scholars, diplomats, journalists, activists and others. Among these were a few key informants who were particularly well informed and close to the kingdom’s strategic elite; I interviewed them several times during the period of the study. Given their direct access to the ‘inner circle’ and their willingness to share their in-depth knowledge, these informants contributed significantly to my understanding of the inner workings of the Saudi political system. As the House of Saʿud’s unity is among the most politically sensitive issues in Saudi Arabia, some interviewees explicitly asked not to be directly quoted or mentioned by name: all informants are thus anonymous.

Acknowledgements

This book has its origins in my doctoral thesis at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. In this regard, I am grateful to my supervisors, Trygve J. Gulbrandsen and Nils A. Butenschøn, who patiently guided me through methodological minefields. No less I am in debt of gratitude to Kjetil Selvik, who read and commented on my manuscript in all its phases. In Saudi Arabia, I owe special thanks to Fahd al-Semmari at the King ‘Abd al-ʿAziz Foundation for Archives and Research, who provided valuable access to the Documents and Manuscripts Centre, research specialists and other facilities. He also kindly set up several interviews. Prince ʿAbdallah bin Faysal bin Turki generously introduced me to the foundation and helped me with arranging meetings. Abdul Kareem A. al-Zaid and Ibrahim A. al-Yahya at King Abd al-Aziz Public Library in Riyadh were exceptionally supportive. As a visitor to the kingdom I was treated highly hospitably and politely, and my Saudi hosts never tried to intervene in my research or influence my conclusions. I owe thanks as well to the librarians at the Arab World Documentation Unit, University of Exeter, and at the National Archives in Washington, DC. Paul Aarts, Kåre Annaniassen, Per Erik Bjærtnes, Michael Field, Marte Kjær Galtung, Lars Haugom, Thomas Hegghammer, Amber Khan, Sean Keeling, Tim Niblock, Mahwish Nasir, Øystein Noreng, Tehmina Sarwar, Charles Tripp, Bjørn Olav Utvik, Audun Kolstad Wiig, Knut Vikør and Kari Vogt have all supported my research project in various ways. Mary Moubarak kindly corrected my Arabic transcriptions, while Peter Glen corrected my ‘Norwenglish’. The Norwegian Defence Staff, the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, StatoilHydro, as well as Lise and Arnfinn Heje’s Foundation generously funded my research. My greatest debts though are to my family and friends. Their love and support truly eased the frustrations of writing. Stig Stenslie Oslo, February 2011

Notes on transcription

I have aimed to introduce the reader to central words, expressions and proper nouns used in the language of Saudi Arabia. For words in Arabic, indicated by ‘Arab.’, I have consistently tried to use the standard Arabic norm, which means that I have tried to use the vowel phonemes /a/, /u/ and /i/ in transcription, disregarding variations in phonetic value in the various Arabic dialects. The characteristic Arabic laryngeal consonant ayn is indicated by /’/ and the glottal stop, hamza, by /’/. For the sake of simplicity I have not used the diacritic signs. For certain proper nouns I have made exceptions from the transcription rules, for example when well-established English written forms exist and whenever transcription may confuse the reader. I do not, for example, correct the spelling of personal names such as Effat and Osama bin Laden, nor do I transcribe the names of well-known geographical places such as Jeddah, Medina and Riyadh. Neither have I changed established names of historical empires such as the Ottoman Empire. Arabic words such as ‘ulama’, jihad, shari’a and sharif, on the other hand, are printed in italics.

1

Introduction

In the late spring of 2007 I visited Riyadh’s diplomatic quarter, where all foreign embassies are located. Here, I was confronted with the most amazing story by a well-dressed Westerner with an amused expression on his face. According to the diplomat, when King Fahd died in the summer of 2005, internal conflict broke out within the royal family. The late King was thrown into the fridge, where he spent three weeks while the family consulted and money changed hands!1 Such fairy tales flourished years before, and in the wake of, the late King Fahd’s death. Western observers, roused by the speculations of exiled Saudi dissidents, agreed that the royals faced serious internal rifts. The major conflict line, most believed, was between the Sudayri brothers Sultan, Nayef and Salman on the one hand, and their half-brother King ʿAbdallah on the other – all sons of King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Faysal al-Saʿud (hereafter referred to as Ibn Saʿud), who established the kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. Also in the literature, the conventional wisdom of royal-family politics is that there are deep cleavages within the House of Saʿud (Arab. Al Saʿud) – which today numbers thousands of royals. Steve Coll, as an example, writes with reference to royal-family affairs in the mid-1990s: ‘In November 1995, Fahd suffered a massive stroke. . . . He almost died, but his doctors, so long the beneficiaries of his patronage and largesse, worked to save him. By doing so they inaugurated an Elizabethan-inged drama of rivalry and succession manoeuvring within the Saudi royal family.’2 Reading Joseph A. Kechichian’s Succession in Saudi Arabia, one comes to the understanding that ʿAbdallah is a rather reactionary man with ‘a rather cool attitude toward the Western powers in general and the United States in particular’, while his half-brother, Salman, is a man who ‘combines modernising and traditional qualities’.3 Michael Scott Doran, advocating the opposite view, projects an image of ʿAbdallah as a reformist and friend of the West, while another half-brother, Nayef, ‘. . . sides with an anti-American Wahhabi religious establishment that has much in common with al-Qaʿida. ʿAbdallah cuts a higher profile abroad – but at home Nayef casts a longer and darker shadow.’4 Madawi al-Rasheed argues, in fact, that ‘[t]he royal family itself is best seen as a headless tribe within which several groups have connecting claims to leadership’.5 Why, then, has the monarchy remained one of the most stable regimes of the Arab world since its founding?

2

Introduction

The reason, this book argues, is that the Al Saʿud is far more united than what is commonly believed. The integrated character of the ruling elite is due to strong mechanisms, informal as well as formal, that foster elite integration and prevent fragmentation. Thanks to these mechanisms, the royals have been able to overcome successions from one king to another, which is the most acute collective action challenge faced by family dynasties. Elite unity is generally considered one of the most important factors in determining the stability of a regime. Obviously, deep division within the ruling elite is often a source of political conflict and paralysis decision-making. In other words, elite cohesion explains the effective and stable government in Saudi Arabia. My approach addresses an issue close to the theme in Michael Herb’s book, All in the Family, published in 1999. His book, which has been a great inspiration for my work, represents a refreshing contribution to the study of Saudi Arabia’s stability by making the elite the focal point of the analysis.6 Traditional approaches to the regime’s resilience focus – as will be examined in the next chapter – on ‘externalities’ such as oil revenues, Islam and Western military support. Herb’s central thesis is that the main reason for the survival of Arab monarchies – Saudi Arabia included – is because numerous members of the royal family hold key positions in government. In this type of regime, the ruler (king or amir) typically installs members of the royal family as prime minister, minister of the interior, minister of foreign affairs, minister of defence and other key positions. Benefits ranging from influential positions in the state apparatus to money – made possible by oil income and the expansion of the state apparatus – are used by the monarch as consolation-prize bargaining chips to dole out to dissatisfied members of the royal family as a means of building consensus. Herb’s study shows that these regimes, which he calls ‘dynastic monarchies’, have proved to be remarkably stable. According to Herb, dynastic monarchies are well equipped to resist revolution. It is difficult for potential adversaries to build up a power base within such apparatuses as all key positions are controlled by royals, and it would be almost impossible to kill or take hostage all of the princes in a first strike. None of the dynastic monarchies has so far been overthrown, while the regime of the Iranian shah collapsed as a consequence of the ‘Islamic Revolution’ in 1978–79. The Iranian constitution prior to the revolution underlined that the shah’s relatives were excluded from senior positions in the state apparatus. Iran’s last shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, trusted no one and never delegated power. At the time of the revolution he was suffering from cancer, which led to the paralysis of the Iranian state apparatus. Consequently, the shah’s ‘one-bullet-regime’, in Herb’s terminology, was no match for the revolutionaries. The other monarchies in the region that have excluded the rest of the royal family from power – Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq and Libya – have all fallen to revolutionary movements. While Herb’s book takes the study of Saudi Arabia’s stability a huge step forward, he leaves behind a number of unanswered questions: why are not ambitious members of the royal family, who have already got positions and money as a means of building consensus, searching for even more power and wealth?

Introduction

3

Although the senior princes are very rich, they can be motivated by the desire for more wealth. Some might be satisfied with what they have, but it is implausible as a generalization meant to apply to all members of the Al Saʿud – or any other collection of human beings. Moreover, why are not all the royals without positions and with limited richness, which make up the big majority of the family, revolting against the few highly privileged seniors at the top of the hierarchy? These questions makes one ask: All in the Family – so what? Herb does not pay enough attention to the fact that harsh fighting between relatives is in the nature of giant extended Arab families. In other words, family rule is in itself an inadequate explanation for unity and stability – even the for the modern-day family dynasties on the Arabian Peninsula. Herb’s explanation for the dynastic monarchies’ grip on the power is far more convincing than the reasons he presents for elite unity. It is simply not plausible that the distribution of positions and money – made possible by oil revenues and the creation of modern state apparatuses – is enough to build consensus. Herb certainly has a lot to say on intra-elite bargaining mechanisms. He also hints that there exist norms that clearly define what sort of behaviour is legitimate for royals, as well as mechanisms for consultation and mediation. But he does not say much about the operation of these norms and mechanisms, and to what extent these are about to change as the society grows more complex. Herb neither mentions unifying symbols and perceptions that there are good reasons to believe affect unity among the royals. In this respect it is opportune to put elite integration in focus. The elite integration perspective will strengthen the case of those who argue that internal aspects of the monarchies make them robust. Chapter 2 outlines the conceptual and analytical framework of this book. Next, the kingdom’s elite is mapped and the influence of different elite groups assessed. Distinct elite sectors are identified, their historical origin within the context of the formation of the kingdom studied and the relationship between these sectors analysed. Within each of these elite sectors the most influential individuals and groups of individuals are singled out based on their position in the power hierarchy and/or reputation of power. An important observation in Chapter 3, titled ‘The royal strategic elite’, is that the House of Saʿud is the centre of gravity of the political system. Yet, as argued in Chapter 4, titled ‘Non-royal segment elites’, the royals also rely on a number of other elite groups – religious leaders (Arab. ʿulamaʾ), tribal leaders, business leaders and bureaucracy leaders – which constitute bases of support. Chapter 5 is titled ‘Mechanisms of elite integration’. Here, the dynamics behind elite integration in the kingdom are discussed by looking at sociological preconditions, unifying symbols and threat perceptions, as well as institutional arrangements. Three different sets of variables that are expected to cause variation in the level of elite integration are studied. The first is ‘sociological preconditions’. It is commonly assumed in the academic literature that social homogeneity is a precondition for elite integration. Key variables in this respect include family background, education, social values and norms, and social interaction. ‘Unifying symbols and threat perceptions’ is the second variable set. The existence of a

4

Introduction

symbol, such as a charismatic leader or an ideology, which commands the loyalty of the ruling elite, might cause integration. Shared threat perceptions can also add to the level of integration. Threats, real or imagined, might come from various sources, both from within and outside Saudi Arabia’s borders. Some examples are political mass movements under charismatic leadership, terrorism, subversive activities by hostile powers, military aggression and threats of political and socioeconomic sanctions. The final set of variables is ‘institutional arrangements’, which refers to factors that regulate and define the framework of intra-elite interaction. Among such institutional arrangements are recruitment patterns, arenas for bringing the elite together, mechanisms for conflict solution and consensus-building, as well as deterrents and decoys that are used to hinder factionalism within the elite. Chapter 6, titled ‘The challenge of succession’, analyses the process of royal succession. Throughout this study I look at the way in which various mechanisms help stakeholders to overcome ‘collective action dilemmas’, which are situations when cooperation avoids suboptimal outcomes for the cooperators. Similar to theories of power balance, this is a realistic approach to politics: elite integration also depends on individuals acting rationally. This is particularly important in terms of the process of royal succession, which is the single most serious challenge to the Saudi elite’s unity. Historical experiences from several Arab-Islamic dynastic states, as well as the early days of modern Saudi Arabia, clearly demonstrate how conflicts surrounding succession may tear apart ruling elites and threaten regime stability. If the royals fail to cooperate, they all run the risk of losing their power and wealth. The final chapter, Chapter 7, draws together the discussion pursued in the book and provides an overall assessment of the importance of elite integration to the stability of the Al Saʿud.

Notes 1 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, April 2007. 2 Steve Coll, The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century, New York: The Penguin Press, 2008, p. 434. 3 Joseph A. Kechichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia, New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 5–6, 61–2, 73–5. 4 Michael Scott Doran, ‘The Saudi Paradox’, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2004, p. 35. 5 Madawi al-Rasheed, ‘Circles of Power: Royals and Saudi Society’, in Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (eds), Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society and Foreign Affairs, London and New York: Hurst and Company/New York University Press, 2005, p. 188. 6 Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999.

2

Elite integration and regime stability

Oil-wealth fuelled Saudi Arabia’s rapid socio-economic development, which began in earnest in the 1960s and accelerated spectacularly in the 1970s. This new wealth made it possible to jump from a traditional pre-oil society into hyper-modern times within just one generation. Many prominent researchers predicted that this rapid socio-economic revolution would undermine the ‘traditional’ political order, which in turn would lead to the monarchy’s fall. Samuel P. Huntington was one of them when, in 1968, he wrote about ‘the king’s dilemma’ in Political Order in Changing Societies. Huntington was of the opinion that a king could hardly avoid fulfilling his subjects’ desires for social and economic progress. To facilitate development in this direction, the king had to strengthen the state apparatus. Soon such a build-up would inevitably cause the king to face a serious dilemma: on the one hand, he had to comply with the demands of the ‘new middle class’, a social class created by modernization and comprising modern professionals such as engineers, teachers and doctors, but without repelling his traditional power base composed of big landowners, tribal chiefs and wealthy merchants. According to Huntington, the new middle class would sooner or later ask for political power. If the king complied with this demand, he would offend his traditional support base. But if the king refused to accept the aspirations of the new middle class, he would risk being toppled by revolution. Huntington argued that in the short term the king could co-opt the new middle class, though in the longer term the only way he could solve this dilemma was either to stop or curb the process of modernization.1 Manfred Halpern was also pessimistic about the future of the monarchies in the Middle East. He, like Huntingdon, claimed in The Politics of Change in the Middle East and North Africa that class formations created by socio-economic modernization threatened the monarchies’ survival. Halpern argued that the monarchs could avoid, or at least postpone, the threat posed by the new middle class by not implementing changes and reforms. Additionally, he suggested two alternative escape routes: either the king could assume the role of ‘chief moderniser’ to control the social forces for his own benefit, or he could make someone other than himself responsible for political decision-making within the framework of a new constitution. Through this latter course, the king could retain some of his privileges as well as power as a unifying symbol raised above divisive

6

Elite integration and regime stability

party issues. He would, however, no longer have the final say in decision-making processes.2 Huntington and Halpern wrote their books during the turbulent times following the Middle Eastern states’ newly won independence in the 1950s and 1960s. Nonetheless, as many as eight of the Middle Eastern monarchies not only survived, but seem today to be better functioning forms of governments than many of the republics in this region. How can this be explained?

Theorizing regime stability Most writing about regime stability in the post-colonial world is to be found within this post-modernization theory paradigm. The point of departure has been a desire to explain how ‘traditional’ regimes such as the Saudi Arabian, contrary to the expectations of the modernization theorists such as Huntington and Halpern, managed to remain stable despite rapid socio-economic modernization. Before discussing alternative explanations for this, two key concepts are defined: ‘regime’ and ‘regime stability’. Regime According to Webster’s Dictionary, a ‘regime’ can be understood as ‘a mode or system of rule or government’.3 Studies of regimes in terms of the way in which power is organized within the borders of a state is one of the classic topics of political science. Power can be organized in many different ways. Plato and Aristotle constructed regime typologies that have been the starting point for categorization up to modern times. Both divided forms of government into six main types: three legitimate types: ‘monarchy’, ‘aristocracy’ and ‘moderate democracy’; and three perverted types: ‘tyranny’, ‘oligarchy’ (rule by the few) and ‘extreme democracy’ (rule by the mob). Today it is usual to distinguish between ‘authoritarian’ and ‘democratic’ regimes, a clear continuation of the classical typologies. With the growth of the modern state, it has also become common to distinguish between ‘government’, ‘regime’ and ‘state’. Robert M. Fishman claims that a regime is a more permanent form of political organization than a government, but usually less permanent than a state. The state is normally a more permanent structure for dominance and coordination, which includes a repressive apparatus and the means to administer a society and extract resources from it.4 In most countries in the Middle East, it is hard to separate the rulers from the state. This is particularly clear in Saudi Arabia. As Ahn Nga Longva puts it, for a Saudi the notion of belonging to a land or an ‘imagined community’ is unthinkable because the royal family whose name the state bears appropriates the kingdom itself.5 David Easton breaks the regime concept into three components: ‘values’ (aims and principles), ‘norms’ and ‘authority structures’.6 The values define the boundaries of what one can do in day-to-day politics without offending the deeply felt feelings of important groups in society. Norms specify which procedures are expected and accepted in political decision-making processes. Authority

Elite integration and regime stability 7 structures refer to the formal and informal patterns of the way power is distributed and organized. The values, norms and authority structures regulate and legitimize political acts, thus creating a framework of political interaction. In most states this framework is set out in writing in a single document, the country’s ‘constitution’. Regime stability Easton believes that the framework of political interaction changes more slowly than other political relations.7 Here we are approaching the question of ‘regime stability’, which I use to mean that a regime maintains its characteristic features – values, norms and authority structures – over a certain period of time. There are various ways to measure regime stability: one of them is to look at the age of its constitution, or constitutional amendments introduced since a given date. Another method is to focus on regime change, which refers to a fundamental change in the system of government. As Øyvind Østerud has put it, adjusting the constitution, for instance by introducing a new electoral law, is not enough. Regime changes may vary in both direction and speed. Some mark the transition from dictatorship to democracy; others go in the opposite direction; yet others entail one authoritarian regime being replaced by another. The change may be sudden, the result of a coup, revolution or external intervention, or more gradual.8 A third method to measure a regime’s stability is to examine elite circulation – the turnover among those holding commanding posts. Most democracies are stable, but because there is steady turnover of the elite through elections, democracies do not freeze on the top. Stable authoritarian regimes, by contrast, tend to have slow elite circulation. As will be clear in the later analysis, the monarchy in Saudi Arabia has maintained its characteristic features since the time of the late King Faysal (1964–75). Under his leadership, the values, norms and authority structures underlying contemporary Saudi politics were cemented. Faysal initiated the establishment of modern state institutions, balanced the power of the various royal family branches and sought to maintain the kingdom’s traditional Islamic values, while continuing the process of rapid modernization facilitated by the nation’s abundant oil resources.9

Theorizing Al Saʿud’s stabiilty The resilience of the House of Saʿud is well documented. The three approaches – as indicated in Chapter 1 – to Saudi Arabia’s stability may be sorted into three different categories: the first emphasizes oil rent. Saudi Arabia is today the world’s sole ‘oil super-power’, and income from sale has enabled the state to allocate welfare, dominate the local economy, create a powerful repressive apparatus and co-opt political rivals. The second focuses on the importance of Islam. Saudi Arabia is the centre of the Muslim world, as every single day Muslims turn in prayer towards Islam’s two Holy Cities, Mecca and Medina. Islam – as interpreted by the kingdom’s religious establishment – has been an important identity marker in the nation-building process, a basis for establishing and maintaining political

8

Elite integration and regime stability

legitimacy and a tool for retaining social control. The final stresses the military, economic and political relations with the West. Since the end of the Second World War, Saudi Arabia has been a key ally of the USA in the Middle East. This alliance has improved the monarchy’s capacity to resist both external and internal threats. Oil rent In 1938, the American company Chevron found oil beneath the Saudi desert sand and during the Second World War production blossomed. However, it was not until the price jump following what in the West is known as ‘the Oil Crisis’ in 1973–74 that oil income seriously began to fill the House of Saʿud’s exchequer. According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, the country held in 2009 as much as 19.8 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves and contributed 12 per cent of the world’s total production (on average 9.7 million barrels a day).10 Enormous oil incomes have resulted in a distinct regime form, ‘the rentier state’. According to Giacomo Luciani, this is a state that acquires 40 per cent or more of its total income through external transfers and that is devoted to an active redistribution policy.11 Saudi Arabia is the rentier state par excellence. The royal family’s rent incomes are first and foremost from oil sales, but also from profit from overseas investments made possible by the petro-dollars. Rent incomes produce nearly 90 per cent of Saudi Arabia’s total income.12 Accordingly, only a marginal part of the kingdom’s income is derived from taxes and levies. In addition, the government is very much devoted to an active redistribution policy. Numerous researchers have explained the survival of the Saudi monarchy by referring to the oil income.13 First, the vast oil resources allowed the Al Saʿud to build up a large governmental apparatus serving both the civil and military spheres. A few decades ago the monarchy’s formal authority structures were poorly developed. Then, the most important institution was the Royal Court (Arab. diwan) in Riyadh. The king ruled by issuing royal decrees and by consulting the oligarchs of the society in daily or weekly public audiences. Ibn Saʿud relied on some relatives and a few trusted advisors to take care of the affairs of the new state. When the oil wealth filled the exchequer and the state grew in complexity, the state apparatus was gradually expanded. This bureaucracy has given the rulers a powerful instrument to carry out development projects and allocate ‘carrots’ to their subjects. Beside this the police, security establishment and intelligence apparatus have provided the ruling house with a strong ‘stick’ to watch over society and tame potential dissidents. Second, thanks to the state apparatus, the House of Saʿud has been able to provide a wide array of services directly to its citizens, in the form of free or heavily subsidized education, health care, housing, consumer goods and other services. The relationship between the rulers and the people in a rentier state is frequently described as an ‘unwritten pact’, which involves the people being given a cradle-to-grave welfare system in return for their political loyalty. In

Elite integration and regime stability 9 Saudi Arabia, the Basic Law of Government formalizes these rights. For instance, Article 28 clarifies that ‘[t]he state provides job opportunities for who-ever is capable of working’.14 Saudi citizens are provided with welfare services without paying taxes. The only exception, as laid down by Article 21, is the Islamic alms tax (Arab. zakat) that is collected by the state. A person insulting the House of Saʿud obviously risks losing his welfare benefits through the confiscation of his citizenship. Withdrawal of citizenship as a political threat is exceedingly rare, but the fear of this is a strong incentive for people to cultivate good relations with their rulers. Since the 1960s and 1970s, millions of foreign guest workers have searched for material happiness in the kingdom. An estimated 7–8 million guest workers reside in Saudi Arabia. The great majority of these are from India, Pakistan, Egypt, Yemen, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Philippines.15 Few expatriates have been naturalized and consequently the majority are excluded from the right to enjoy the welfare state. In this way the state’s privileges have also become more exclusive. The several million guest workers are by and large apolitical due to fear of deportation and the loss of means of living. Third, the rentier economy has directly and indirectly weakened, if not destroyed, the economic foundation of political groups that have historically been sources of political opposition, including business families, religious communities and tribes. All have gradually been transformed into clients of the state. The destiny of the business community is telling: oil income made the House of Saʿud the dominant actor in the local economy. The royals initiated expansive infrastructure development, such as roads, waterworks and pipelines, airports and harbours. To delegate some of the responsibility for economic development, the state granted concessions to local trading and entrepreneurial families. These families thus gained an interest in retaining the favour of the royal family to ensure access to lucrative concessions. Wahhabi Islam Islam has often been brought into the discussion of the stability of the monarchy.16 Madawi al-Rasheed underlines that religion is the ideological backbone of the regime and that it penetrates every sphere.17 Article 1 of the Basic Law of Government proclaims that Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state, which is a state governed by Islamic Law (Arab./shariʿa/) Throughout history, religion has often been used to legitimize and sustain the prevailing political order. Islam – as interpreted by the Wahhabi-ʿulamaʾ – has been instrumental in the nation-building process and has provided the House of Saʿud with legitimacy. The roots of the Saudi Islamic state can be traced back to the mid-eighteenth century. Then, Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, also known as the Shaykh, whose followers preferred to call themselves ‘the Unitarians’ (Arab. tawhid or muwahhidun) rather than Wahhabis, formulated his Islamic revival doctrine. He developed both religious and political doctrines aimed at correcting the anarchical state and the moral decline that blighted the Arabian Peninsula at that time. To underline his point, he compared the conditions with the ‘Era of Ignorance’ (Arab. jahiliyya) – the

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Elite integration and regime stability

time before the Prophet’s awakening. The heart of his religious doctrine was strict monotheism (Arab. alh al-tawhid). Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s political doctrines derived in part from the teachings of Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, who was an Islamic scholar who lived in Baghdad 1263–1328. Taymiyya argued that the ideal Islamic state was to be based on two equal authorities: the princes (Arab. umaraʾ) and the specialist in Islamic law (Arab. fuqahaʾ). The secular rulers’ responsibility was to govern, while the religious scholars’ responsibility was to supervise the political decision-making process. Gradually Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab won a significant body of followers. His call for unity under God was appealing to people tired of lawlessness. In 1740 he gathered his supporters and declared ‘holy war’ (Arab. jihad) against all those who violated his doctrine. The Shaykh, however, had to wait four more years for his movement’s final breakthrough. In 1744 he made a decisive move by allying himself with Muhammad ibn Saʿud, the ruler of the Dirʿiyyah oasis in the interior of the Arabian Peninsula. Thanks to this alliance these two ambitious Muhammads managed to establish the first Saudi emirate. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Ibn Saʿud revitalized the alliance between his family and the Wahhabi movement. ‘The Brothers’ (Arab. ikhwan), also known as the White Army, an Islamic religious militia consisting of tribesmen, formed the backbone of Ibn Saʿud’s military force and played a key role in establishing him as ruler of most of the Arabian Peninsula. To him this alliance was also useful in the nation-building process. His newly won kingdom was a patchwork of peoples and regions, each with distinct characteristics and identities. Ibn Saʿud introduced Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s teaching as state religion. This was the first move aimed at constructing a Saudi identity on the basis of Wahhabi Islam. Ibn Saʿud, as well as his sons, gave senior religious leaders a key role in the process of legitimizing political decisions related to important issues such as succession, war and peace. The Supreme Council of Senior Scholars (hayʾat kubar al-ʿulama) legitimizes decisions by issuing fatwas, religious edicts by Islamic scholars based on their interpretation of the Qurʾan and the Prophet’s tradition, Sunna. Islam has proved useful in countering secular, anti-Saʿud ideologies such as Communism, Nasserism and Ba’thism. To counter such challenges, the Al Saʿud has actively championed its Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. Saudi Arabia became a safe haven for exiled Islamists from neighbouring countries during the 1950s and 1960s, and many of these found jobs within the Saudi educational system. From all over the world, young Muslims, tempted by lucrative scholarships, flocked to the kingdom’s universities. While settled in Saudi Arabia, the students became acquainted with Wahhabi doctrines, which they brought back to their respective homelands. Thanks to oil revenues the royal family was able to use Wahhabi Islam as a tool to spread Saudi Arabia’s influence within the global Muslim community by funding Islamic activities across the world. Saudi charity trusts, both governmental and private, have distributed billions of US dollars, and the most conspicuous supporter of Islamic charities has been the royal family.18 The House of Saʿud has also taken advantage of Islam as an instrument for social control. Control is gained through institutions such as the shariʿa courts, the

Elite integration and regime stability 11 ‘Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Evil’ (Arab. al-ʾamr bi-l-maʿruf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar) and the 5,000-strong Moral Police (Arab. al-mutawwaʿ). The Ministry of Justice, established by King Faysal in 1970, is responsible for the administration of Saudi Arabia’s more than 300 shariʿa courts. These courts pass sentence on the basis of the Wahhabi scholars’ strict interpretation of God’s law. Those found guilty of committing crimes classified under hudud (‘limit’, or ‘restriction’), the most serious of crimes, are punished severely. Murder leads to beheading, theft to the amputation of hands and legs, and adultery to stoning. Throughout history, Muslim rulers have used Islam to prevent opposition and rebellion (Arab. fitna). Generally, religious scholars have argued that fitna, and the disruption of the Muslim community (Arab./umma/), are far worse than an unjust ruler. Western aid Paul Aarts underlines the importance of US support in order to explain the stability of Saudi Arabia: ‘The House of Saud’s survivability can only be understood after bringing into focus the international environment, in particular its relationship with the Unites States’ government.’19 In the literature the importance of the kingdom’s close diplomatic and security relationship with the United States is universally recognized. Much has been written about these two countries’ ‘special relationship’, or ‘the deal’, trading oil for security.20 A key moment with regard to this deal was the meeting between Ibn Saʿud and the US President Franklin D. Roosevelt on board the warship USS Quincy on Great Bitter Lake on 14 February 1945. The meeting is often mentioned as the start of a ‘strategic alliance’ between Saudi Arabia and the USA, but bilateral relations date back to the 1930s. In 1933, Ibn Saʿud signed a concessionary agreement with Standard Oil of California allowing the company to explore Saudi Arabia for oil. This deal also marks the birth of Saudi Aramco. Ibn Saʿud’s sons have cultivated US–Saudi relations ever since. Saudi Arabia and the United States have strong interests in common: David E. Long argues that the House of Saʿud suffers from an ‘encircling syndrome’, which is a notion of deep insecurity based on being an isolated people surrounded by stronger military powers.21 There is a fundamental imbalance between Saudi Arabia’s geographical territory and the size of its population. While the kingdom controls an area equal to two-thirds the size of India or four times the size of France, it is demographically outnumbered by neighbouring countries such as Egypt, Iran and Iraq. Long further claims that because Saudi Arabia was spared from the psychological trauma associated with European colonization, the royal family is less sceptical about establishing close diplomatic and security bonds with Western powers.22 Hence, cooperation with non-Muslim Western powers could also be justified by the Wahhabi-ʿulamaʾ. The Islamic leaders condemned the revolutionary and atheist ideology of the Soviet Union, Egypt, Syria and Iraq on the one hand; and defined the Christian Westerners as ‘the People of the Book’ (Arab. ahl al-kitab) on the other. From such a perspective the alliance with the

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USA could be represented as a necessity in order to resist threats from ‘the House of War’ (Arab. dar al-harb), which included Communists and Zionists, as well as Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic republic in Iran.23 In 1950 President Harry S. Truman defined US control over Saudi Arabia’s oil fields as essential within the context of the global fight against Communism. While the Americans guaranteed protection from external threats, trained the Saudi military apparatus and supplied arms, the Saudis committed themselves to producing sufficient oil at reasonable prices and to recycle a significant portion of its oil income through the economies and banks of the developed world, prominently the United States.24 With the exception of the oil boycott of 1973–74, Saudi Arabia has secured stable oil supplies for the world market, thereby holding prices at an acceptable level for the Americans. In 2007 the kingdom supplied 11 per cent (1.5 million barrels a day) of the USA’s total import needs for oil (13.5 million barrels a day).25 To improve the trade balance, the Saudis import American manufactured goods, arms in particular. From 1950 through 2006, the kingdom purchased and received from the United States weapons, military equipment and related services worth more than $62.7 billion.26 US foreign policy has also been directly underpinned by Saudi petro-dollars. The House of Saʿud funded anti-Communist militias in both Afghanistan and Latin America during the 1980s and covered an estimated $50–70 billion, more than half of the total costs of the Americans, to liberate Kuwait in 1990–91.27 In addition, the Al Saʿud has indirectly supported US Middle East policy by taking a moderate position in the so-called Middle East conflict. Likewise, the Americans have provided security in time of intervention of external forces. The House of Saʿud called for help in 1963 and again in 1990. In 1962, Egyptian planes began a series of daily attacks on the Saudi border with Yemen. The then ruler, Faysal, asked the United States for help. The Americans immediately deployed warships and aircraft to Saudi Arabia. In 1990, the royal family was afraid that Iraqi forces would attack Saudi Arabia and the USA responded quickly by sending as many as 550,000 soldiers to the kingdom. After 9/11, Saudi Arabia’s standing fell among Americans and members of the administration in Washington, DC, went so far as to suggest the Saʿud family were involved in the terror attacks. A wave of sensationalistic and poorly researched books, seemingly demonizing Saudi Arabia, were published.28 Many observers predicted the end of the special relationship after the successful military campaign against Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. The United States had already withdrawn its troops from the kingdom and dependence on Saudi oil seemed likely to diminish once the full potential of Iraqi oil was realized. In addition, some speculated, China would possibly enter into a ‘security-for-energy swap’ with Saudi Arabia.29 Likewise, in the wake of the so-called Jasmine Revolutions in the early spring of 2011, which forced Egypt’s Husni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Zine al-ʿAbidine ben ʿAli to give up power, many Western observers have predicted a crisis in the US–Saudi relationship. King ʿAbdallah – fearful of the spillover effects of regime change in two Arab countries – was clearly opposed

Elite integration and regime stability 13 to the Obama Administration’s decision to put pressure on these presidents to step down. However, it is important not to underestimate the strength of the US–Saudi alliance. Paul Aarts argues that the Saudis and the Americans do not find themselves at a crossroad and the historic oil-for-security pact is not coming apart.30 Although anti-Western sentiments have grown strong in Saudi Arabia and the Saudis have earned a bad name among Americans, the governments in both countries are convinced that the special relationship is still worth pursuing. They have strong common interests linked to oil prices and trade, fighting militant Islamism, stabilizing Iraq and containing Iran. As a matter of fact, the trade ties between the two countries have even been strengthened since 9/11.31 Longstanding defence ties remain intact and Saudi Arabia was the world’s largest buyer of US weapons during 2005–08, with $11.2 billion in deals.32 Concerning China, the House of Saʿud is well aware that the country does not have the capacity to replace the United States as security guarantor, and that it therefore has to rely on American protection also in the years to come. Although the US pulled its forces from the kingdom, American forces in Qatar and Bahrain are close enough to give the Saudis immediate military assistance if needed. Assessment of the three perspectives The three perspectives discussed above have both strengths and shortcomings. The first seeks to explain how rent, more precisely oil revenues, has strengthened the Saudi state vis-à-vis society. Oil wealth has doubtlessly enabled the state to allocate welfare, dominate the local economy, create a powerful repressive apparatus and co-opt political rivals, so it is reasonable to believe that rent income has had an overall positive effect on the regime’s stability. And, apparently, the royals themselves believe that they can buy support with money. During the turbulent winter of 2010–11, the royals clearly tried to bolster stability through cash outlay to the people. King ʿAbdallah announced a huge spending package worth $60 million in December 2010, and another worth $120 million in March 2011. The latter package included: a one-time cash payment of two months’ salary to all government employees; a minimum wage for Saudis employed in the government; monthly unemployment benefit for jobseekers; and funding for the construction of new houses, hospitals and health centres across the country. In addition, it included money for 60,000 new security jobs under the Ministry of Interior, as well as significant funds allocated to the religious establishment. Through these subsidies the king spent as much as one-third of the state’s cash reserves. Yet, there is one fundamental weakness with this approach: the rentier theory rests on the highly simplistic notion that it is possible for an authoritarian ruler to ‘buy off ’ political demands. This is problematic, because people are rarely that apolitical or, let us say, naïve. Although people are provided with all kinds of welfare, it is still not likely that they will turn their blind side to obvious nepotism, corruption, lack of rule of law, absence of transparency and non-existence of democracy. Given that the Saudis are very much exposed to the outside world, it

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is completely unlikely that ideas of an alternative political order do not find fertile ground. And there are indeed Saudis opposing the Al Saʿud. Furthermore, looking at the history of dissent in the kingdom, it is hard to see that the level of political opposition correlates to changes in oil revenues. Contrary to the theoretical expectation, which is that dissent is less likely when rent is flowing into the treasury, the two major challenges to the Al Saʿud’s rule in recent years, Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi’s occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979 and the wave of Islamist violence in 2003–05, both occurred at times of extraordinarily high and rapidly rising oil prices. At times of low and falling oil prices, notably in the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, there were no surges of dissent of a similar scale. The second perspective emphasizes the impact of Wahhabi Islam as an important identity marker in the nation-building process, a basis for establishing and maintaining political legitimacy and a tool for retaining social control. Islam has clearly been instrumental for the House of Saʿud in its struggle to hold on to power. But its relative importance is less clear. The validity of the argument that the Saudi kingdom is stable due to its Islamic legitimacy needs to be subject to far more critical examination. The simple fact that opposition movements have repeatedly questioned the Islamic legitimacy of the Al Saʿud shows that alternative notions of legitimate authority do exist within segments of society. How broad these segments are remains unknown as opinion polls for obvious reasons have not been used to investigate the legitimacy of the House of Saʿud. The third perspective focuses on the military, economic and political relations with the West to secure the continuous existence of the kingdom. These relations have obviously improved the Al Saʿud’s capacity to resist external and internal threats, but the effect of the alliance with the Westerners on overall regime stability must be questioned. For Saudi Arabia, the close relationship with the West has become a double-edged sword, because popular anti-Western sentiments have grown stronger there than in most other countries. For instance, in an opinion poll undertaken by the Arab American Institute in 2006, only 12 per cent of the Saudi respondents had a favourable view of the United States, while as many as 82 per cent expressed an unfavourable view.33 Islamists opposed to the House of Saʿud have repeatedly used the unpopular alliance with the Americans,

Table 2.1 Three traditional perspectives on the Al Saʿud’s stability summarized Source of stability

Explains

Fails to explain

Rent (oil revenues)

Strong state/vis-à-vis/weak society

Opposition calling for political reforms and rights

Ideology (Wahhabi Islam) National identity, legitimate Alternative notions of authority and social control legitimate authority Security (Western support) Capacity to resist external and internal threats

Anti-Western sentiments as a source of political opposition

Elite integration and regime stability 15 a political issue unifying most Saudis, to attack the legitimacy of the monarchy. By far the most famous of these, Osama bin Laden, began in the late 1990s, issuing fatwas that called for jihad against the ‘crusaders occupying the two holy cities’, referring to the United States’ military bases which were set up in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War in 1990–91.34 In this respect, the apparently firm ties between Riyadh and Washington, DC, have probably caused as much political instability as stability.

An alternative theoretical approach Concerning explanatory power, none of the three theoretical approaches alone provides a sufficient explanation for the stability of the House of Saʿud. Yet, each one is relevant as they focus on very different aspects of the regime: the political economy, political ideology and foreign relations. With my book, I aim to add a new theoretical explanation that complements the perspectives examined above. Like Michael Herb, I put internal factors explaining the regime’s stability at the forefront of my analysis. But unlike Herb, my focus is on elite integration. Then, what is an ‘elite’? What is elite integration? And how is this linked to regime stability? Elite Elite theory was developed by Western scholars from the late nineteenth century and based upon experiences from European countries and the USA. The term ‘elite’ goes back to the seventeenth century and was used to describe commodities of particular excellence. Later the usage was extended to refer to groups of people that were outstanding within their own field, including politics.35 Yet, various forms of the term have also been in use in Saudi Arabia. The general term used for an elite is nukhba, which according to Nasr M. Arif means variously superiority, distinction and ethical conduct. In this respect, being a member of an elite is regarded as an advantage or a positive characteristic.36 Another term, though not that commonly used, is al-tabaqat al-ʿulya, referring to ‘the higher strata’ or ‘the upper classes (of society)’. When people refer to a prince or tribal chief, they use either the terms amir or, more rarely, raʾis; while the umaraʾ, the plural form of amir, is used to refer to the political elite as a collective unit. The classical Arab Islamic term, ahl al-hall wa-l-ʿaqd, literally meaning ‘those who loosen and bind’, is often used within the context of royal succession to refer to leading figures of Saudi society, including princes, religious leaders and tribal leaders. The educated class of legal scholars engaged in the various fields of Islamic studies is referred to as ʿulamaʾ – the plural form of ʿalim – which literally means ‘scholars’. Broadly defined, the term is used to describe the body of Muslim scholars who have completed several years of training and who have studied Islamic sciences. A tribal leader, a religious scholar, or other prominent member of society, is often given the honorific title shaykh. The wealthy merchant houses,

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another prominent elite group, are commonly referred to as buyut tijariyya (Arab. sing. bayt tijariyy). The new educated class of technocrats is known as mudir fi-l dawla (Arab. pl. mudirun fi-l dawla), meaning ‘governmental officials’. Although far from all can be considered liberal, the technocrats are also sometimes referred to as libiraliyyun, or ‘liberals’. Mai Yamani provides an interesting account of the local Hijazi elite in the urban centres of Mecca and Medina. Here, an elite group known as the ʿawaʾil (Arab. sing. ʿaʾila), ‘the families’, claims group solidarity based on past family connections, wealth and lifestyle. Families of such good social standing (Arab. sira tayyiba) come from diverse backgrounds. The Hijazi ʿawaʾil, Yamani writes, ‘are conscious of their past as descendants of tujjar (merchants), having lost their positions as ʿulamaʾ and mutawwifun (guides to the pilgrims)’.37 In her study, she also refers to Hijazi elites as nas afadil, ‘eminent or distinguished people’, and nas kubar, ‘big people’.38 An elite can be defined in many ways. In this book, I use the term ‘elite’ or, sometimes, ‘political elite’ to refer to those individuals or groups of individuals that influence decision-making and the allocation of wealth in Saudi Arabia. As politics in the kingdom is of a rather informal nature, I need a definition that does not restrict the elite to formal institutions and positions at the top of institutions. Regarding the size of the elite in Saudi Arabia, it is reasonable to think in terms of a few thousand individuals that have influence on decision-making and the allocation of wealth. However, some individuals or groups clearly have more political weight than others because their activities have greater political significance. Robert A. Dahl divided leadership between leaders – citizens capable of wide-scale influence – and sub-leaders – citizens who influence their own specialized social sector.39 Likewise, Suzanne Keller introduced the terms ‘strategic elites’ with reference to those elites which claim or are assigned responsibilities for and influence over their society as a whole, in contrast to ‘segment elites’, which have major responsibilities in sub-sectors of a society.40 Elite differentiation refers to the extent elites are socially heterogeneous, organizationally diverse and relatively autonomous from the state and each other. In the case of Saudi Arabia, as in all other countries, such differentiation manifests itself by way of functionally distinct elite sectors – political, economic, administrative, military, religious, etc. – each with its own boundaries, organizations and internal codes of conduct. Elite integration Another key concept in this book is ‘elite integration’, which can be defined and measured in several ways. Here, I present this phenomenon in line with the Norwegian Sociologist Trygve Gulbrandsen’s definition: ‘In general, integration means that different elements are combined into a whole, that a kind of unity is created among the elements. Elite integration thus implies that the different elites are unified in one way or another.’41 This unity is, according to Gulbrandsen, manifested in various ways: as consensus on significant social values and norms;

Elite integration and regime stability 17 as subjective feelings of belonging to the same community; as perceptions across different elite groups of being complementary or mutually dependent upon each other; or through instances of collective action.42 There are three sets of integrating mechanisms that it is reasonable to believe affect elite integration in Saudi Arabia. Sociological preconditions The first set of mechanisms is ‘sociological preconditions’. It is commonly assumed in the academic literature that social homogeneity is a precondition for elite integration. William Domhoff, G. Wright Mills and others emphasize basic variables such as the elite members’ ethnicity, social class and education. Domhoff added that bonds of kinship through blood and marriage can provide a particularly strong type of elite integration.43 In the 1950s and 1960s, these scholars claimed to identify an American elite consisting of individuals with a shared social background. Such shared background might strengthen elite integration in several ways: first, it is favourable for solidarity and trust. Smaller groups based on family relationships, friendship, and so on, are better adapted to promote inner solidarity and trust. G. Wright Mills, as an example, traces the unity of the members of the American power elite to the psychological affinities that make it possible for them to say of one another: ‘He is, of course, one of us. . . .’44 Within any elite there are often tensions of one sort or another. The hallmark of unified elites is, according to Mills, not the absence of disagreements, but rather sufficient mutual trust so that their members, if required, forego short-term personal or partisan advantage to ensure stable rule.45 More recently, and in line with these observations, John Higley, Gwen Moore and Trygve Gulbrandsen have all argued that trust is a core aspect of elite integration.46 Second, another by-product of social homogeneity is shared values and norms. In a number of recent studies, G. Lowell Field and John Higley stress the importance of social values and norms on political behaviour within the elite.47 Values are what are valued – things that people see as worth striving for in society; norms are what are regarded as normal – acceptable and appropriate types of behaviour. The elite in any society is expected to act in accordance to these: noblesse oblige requires that those who have attained high positions in a social hierarchy, and thus enjoy high esteem, behave in accordance with existing norms and values. Within the elite itself there are also certain values and norms: Edgar H. Schein has analysed how the oligarchs of family businesses create a certain culture that tends to remain an aspect of their companies.48 The Al Saʿud, like other ‘family businesses’, has produced a political culture that defines the rules of the political game – rules that every single member of the elite are expected to obey. Third, people of same origin and education background intermingle more easily. Domhoff and Mills claimed to identify an elite that was integrated through contacts established at elite educational institutions, at elite clubs, through family ties, etc. As the elite is composed of men of similar origin, according to Mills, the psychological and social bases for their unity helping them to blend together.49

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In line with this argument, G. Lowell Field and John Higley stress that personal interaction through formal or informal social networks affects elite integration: personal interaction facilitates coordination, and the link between interaction and shared values and norms is often close.50 In other words, they presume that the greater the interaction among diverse types of leaders, the more they will comprehend each other’s attitudes and thus the readier they will be to join together in support of a particular policy. Moreover, according to general theories about trust, this gradually evolves and is extended the more frequently individuals see each other and the longer their relationship lasts.51 Robert D. Putnam argues that social integration in general is stronger within each sector of the elite than cross-sector ties, meaning that politicians talk mostly to other politicians, businessmen to other businessmen, and so on.52 However, according to Putnam, two factors connected to personal interaction might impact on elite integration: the geographical location and the size of the elite. It is plausible, according to him, to assume that physical co-localization, for instance if a single city is the locus of national elites, favours personal interaction, while smaller groups tend to demonstrate greater solidarity and consensus than larger ones do.53 Symbols and threat perceptions ‘Symbols and threats’ is the second set of integrating mechanisms. Although elite theorists rarely have linked unifying symbols and threat perceptions to elite integration, the hypothesis that these phenomena increase cohesion holds a strong position across the social sciences. In the literature it is commonly agreed that the existence of a symbol, such as a charismatic leader or an ideology, which commands the loyalty of the ruling elite, might strengthen integration. Putnam referred to the elites in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as examples of united elites due to their commitment to Marxist–Leninist ideology.54 Likewise, religion can enhance cohesion. Threats might have the same effect as symbols. Georg Simmel argued that conflict can bring together people who would otherwise have nothing to do with one another.55 Lewis A. Closer concluded in another study that external conflict does not necessarily increase cohesion. According to him, there are two intervening variables involved: a degree of group identification and solidarity predating the conflict must exist, and the outside threat must be recognized and seen as a menace to the whole group.56 A popular hypothesis in the alliance literature is that external threats increase internal alliance cohesion. George Liska argues that the existence of an external threat is necessary for alliance cohesion, but that for this to be true, the threat must be manageable for the alliance and directed towards all members.57 While these and other scholars have focused on societies as such, or alliances at state level, this perspective might perfectly well be applied to elite groups. Institutional mechanisms The third set of integrating mechanisms, ‘institutional arrangements’, refers to factors that regulate and define an elite’s composition and internal workings. Its

Elite integration and regime stability 19 social composition is a product of recruitment patterns. This is an important dimension of elite integration, emphasized by G. Wright Mills, Thomas R. Dye and John W. Pickering, Robert D. Putnam, and others.58 According to them, those who select prospective recruits for elite posts are likely to choose those who share the same social values and norms. These recruits are also more easily socialized into the established culture within the elite. As a consequence, narrow and unified elites are reproduced. Another institutional element that Mills and Putnam identify as fundamental for elite integration is the extent to which individuals hold key posts simultaneously in more than one organization and sector and can thus coordinate diverse activities. An even more important factor is, according to Putnam, sequential overlap, which is the successive holding of top posts in diverse sectors.59 If the members of the elite have overlapping command posts, they might be led to take complementary actions without regard to their social origin, contacts and affinities. Contrary, if institutions have conflicting interests, elite integration in terms of social background, solidarity, trust and so on is soon undermined. As a consequence of functional specialization and organizational loyalties, leaders often view national problems from a particularistic perspective. Putnam notes that even noncompetitive political systems – such as in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany – are not spared from intense institutional rivalries behind the façade of unity. Elites may also be fragmented by the necessity to respond to their respective constituencies. In many cases, constituency pressure will pull elites in opposing directions.60 Last, but not least, various consultative arrangements, mechanisms for conflict management, as well as deterrents and decoys, might hinder elite factionalism. Such important mechanisms are more or less formalized, depending on how institutionalized a certain regime is. As examined in the following chapters, these kinds of mechanism are basically informal in the case of Saudi Arabia. Elite integration and regime stability As stated in Chapter 1, it can be argued that unified national elites are a precondition for both effective and stable government. Elites are fragmented by the onset of socio-economic modernization, according to Robert D. Putnam. Population growth and economic development foster a division of labour and produce a highly differentiated elite structure. New members are added to the elite, such as technocrats and wealthy industrialists, and integration declines within the traditional elite. In post-colonial states, Putnam concludes, elite integration is therefore difficult to achieve.61 For these reasons, the modernization theorists of the 1950s and 1960s believed that regime stability in the new states could be groomed by increasing the group cohesiveness of its elites. Some saw the single party or military leaders as the key to elite unity, while others held that revolutionary elites, at least temporarily, could solve the problem of cohesion.62 Contemporary elite theory, by contrast, focuses on the role of integrated elites in establishing and upholding democratic government. Unified national elites are

20

Elite integration and regime stability

generally seen as a precondition for such regimes.63 Historically speaking, democracies have come into being under three circumstances. The first is ‘settlements’, in which warring elite factions through compromises settle their most basic disputes and establish informal networks to secure each other’s vital interests, thus laying the basis for political stability and an evolution towards democracy. ‘Colonial opportunities’, meaning that local elites get the chance to practise limited representative politics during a long period of home rule while simultaneously grooming national independence, is another way in which consensually unified elites might originate. Finally, ‘convergences’ may produce consensually unified elites. Disunited elites that compete for support among economic prosperous electorates may produce consensually united elites. This is because prosperous electorates are reluctant to change status quo, and in competing for support, the elites develop shared norms of behaviour.64 In Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, Higley and Burton present a typology of basic elite types on the basis of two dimensions: structural integration and value consensus.65 ‘Structural integration’ is the degree of inclusiveness of formal and informal networks among the elite individuals and groups, while ‘value consensus’ is the level of agreement among these individuals and groups in terms of norms of political behaviour and the legitimacy of political institutions. First is ‘disunited elites’, characterized by minimal structural integration and value consensus. Different elite persons and factions distrust each other and engage in unrestrained, often violent struggles for dominance that has a zero-sum or politics of war character. Second, ‘consensually united elites’ have the features of extensive structural integration in the sense that all influential factions are tied together with no single faction or sector elite dominating the networks. Value consensus is also extensive in the sense that while factions openly oppose each other on ideological and policy matters, their actions over time suggest an underlying consensus when it comes to most norms of political behaviour and the legitimacy of existing political institutions. Elite persons and factions accord each other significant trust, they cooperate tactically to contain explosive issues and conflicts, and their competitions for political power have a positive-sum or politics of bargaining character. Third is ‘ideologically united elites’, marked by extensive structural integration in the sense that a single network encompasses all elite members and is sharply centralised in a few top leaders. Likewise, value consensus is extensive in the sense that elite members never express any substantial disagreements in public and instead communicated public statements confirming the official line through the uppermost leaders. Outwardly, the elite strives to display a monolithic character and its members ostensibly perceive politics and other political outcomes as resulting from ideological truths, rather than from bargaining or war. Higley and Burton argue that these three basic elite types are associated with particular political regimes: consensually united elites go hand in hand with stable democratic regimes; ideological united elites are associated with stable undemocratic regimes; and disunited elites are linked to unstable representative or unrepresentative regimes.66 Then, what about Saudi Arabia?

Elite integration and regime stability 21 The kingdom is, beyond doubt, a stable and unrepresentative regime, and its elite has remained united despite rapid socio-economic modernization and the emergence of a more complex elite structure. The nature of this elite, however, is more debatable. As the book shows, it can be seen as partly ‘consensually’ and partly ‘ideological’ united. In the following two chapters Saudi Arabia’s elite is mapped. The establishment of the kingdom was the outcome of 30 years of military conquest. Elite formations reflect the strategic alliances made by Saudi Arabia’s founding father, Ibn Saʿud. His most important support base was his own relatives. The king also made alliances with different non-royal elite groups, including the Wahhabi establishment, tribal leaders and merchant families. In addition he initiated the creation of a new technocrat elite that became important in the process of modernizing the new kingdom.

Notes 1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 87–92, 126–37, 168–91, 406. 2 Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 41–3, 51–78. 3 Webster’s Encyclopaedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, New Revised Edition, New York and Avenel: Gramercy Books, 1994, p. 1208. 4 Robert M. Fishman, ‘Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe’s Transition to Democracy’, World Politics, vol. 42, no. 3, April, 1990, p. 428. 5 Ahn Nga Longva, ‘Citizenship in the Gulf States: Conceptualization and Practice’, in Nils A. Butenschøn, Uri Davis and Manuel Hassassian (eds), Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000, pp. 192–3. 6 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York: Wiley, 1965, p. 193. 7 Ibid. 8 Øyvind Østerud, Statsvitenskap: Innføring i politisk analyse, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996, pp. 137–8. 9 See, among others, Willard A. Beling, King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia, London: Croom Helm/Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980; and Joseph Kostiner and Joshua Teitelbaum, ‘State-Formation and the Saudi Monarchy’, in Joseph Kostiner (ed.), The Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, pp. 131–49. 10 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2010, available online, http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_ energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2010_downloads/oil_section_2010.pdf. 11 Giacomo Luciani, ‘Allocation versus Production States: A Theoretical Framework’, in Giacomo Luciani (ed.), The Arab State, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, p. 87. 12 Author’s own estimate. 13 Among those are, Giacomo Luciani and Hazem Beblawi, The Rentier State, London: Croom Helm, 1987; Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997; and F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States, New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1994. 14 ‘The Basic Law of Government’, available online, http://www.SaudiEmbassy.net.

22

Elite integration and regime stability

15 N. Janardhan, ‘Redefining the Rules of Engagement for Expatriates in the GCC Countries’, paper presented at the Global Gulf, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter, 4–6 July 2006. 16 For example, see Alexander Bligh, ‘The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as Participant in the Political System of the Kingdom’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 17, 1985, pp. 37–50; Joseph K. Kechichian, ‘The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 18, 1986, pp. 53–71; Ayman al-Yassini, Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985; Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, London: Macmillan Press, 1999, pp. 36–8; Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000; Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, Cairo, Egypt: The American University in Cairo Press, 2005; David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London: I.B. Tauris, 2006; and Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 17 Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State. 18 For an overview of the House of Saʿud’s charitable interests, see J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 28. 19 Paul Aarts, ‘The Internal and the External: The House of Saud’s Resilience Explained’, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS no. 2004/33, 2004, p. vii. 20 For example, see Adeed I. Dawisha, Saudi Arabia’s Search for Security, Adelphi Paper, no. 158, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979–80; William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981; David E. Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985; Rex J. Cassilas, Oil and Diplomacy: The Evolution of American Foreign Policy in Saudi Arabia, 1933–1945, New York: Garland, 1988; Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985; Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom, CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997; Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the TwentyFirst Century: The Political, Foreign and Energy Dimensions, Westport, CT, and London: Praeger, 2003; Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Military and International Security Dimensions, Westport, CT, and London: Praeger, 2003; and Paul Aarts, ‘The Longevity of the House of Saud: Looking outside the Box’, in Oliver Schlumberger (ed.), Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007, pp. 251–67. 21 David E. Long, ‘Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’, in D.E. Long and Bernard Reich, The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, p. 84. 22 David E. Long, ‘Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’, pp. 83–4. 23 Bahgat Korany, ‘Defending the Faith amid Change: The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia’, in Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds), The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, pp. 310–53. 24 Paul Aarts, ‘The Longevity of the House of Saud: Looking outside the Box’, p. 257. 25 ‘How dependent are we on foreign oil?’, Energy Information Administration, 23 April 2009, available online, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence. cfm. 26 Christopher M. Blanchard, ‘Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations’, Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2009, available online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ mideast/RL33533.pdf.

Elite integration and regime stability 23 27 Thomas B. Lippman, ‘Obituary: King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz’, Washington Post, 1 August 2005, available online, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2005/08/01/AR2005080100241.html. 28 See, for example, Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude, New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004; Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism, Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2004; Laurent Murawiec, Princes of Darkness: The Saudi Assault on the West, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005; John R. Bradley, Saudi Arabia Exposed: Inside a Kingdom in Crises, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; and Mark Hollingsworth and Sandy Mitchell, Saudi Babylon: Torture, Corruption and Cover-Up Inside the House of Saud, Edinburgh and London: Mainstream Publishing, 2005. 29 For this debate, see Thomas W. Lippman, Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004; Gerald L. Posner, Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Secret Saudi-U.S. Connection, New York: Random House, 2005; Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud: The Secret Relationship between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties, London: Gibson Square Books, 2005; Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006; and Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. 30 Paul Aarts, ‘The Longevity of the House of Saud: Looking outside the Box’, p. 256. 31 Paul Aarts, ‘The Internal and the External: The House of Saud’s Resilience Explained’, p. 17. 32 Christopher M. Blanchard, ‘Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations’, available online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf. 33 ‘Five Nation Survey of the Middle East’, Arab American Institute, December 2006, available online, http://aai.3cdn.net/96d8eeaec55ef4c217_m9m6b97wo.pdf. 34 See for instance, ‘Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places’, first published in al-Quds al-arabi (London), August 1996; and ‘Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders’, first published in al-Quds al-arabi, 1998. 35 Tom Bottomore, Élites and Society, 2nd ed., London and New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 1. 36 Nasr M. Arif, Western Political Science in a Non-Western Context: Theories of Comparative Politics in the Arab Academia, Lanham, New York and Oxford: University Press of America, Inc., 2001, p. 62. 37 Mai Yamani, Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for an Arabian Identity, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004. 38 Mai Yamani, Cradle of Islam, p. 23. 39 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961. 40 Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society, New York: Random House, 1963. 41 See, for example, Trygve Gulbrandsen, ‘Norway: Trust among Elites in a Corporatist Democracy’, Comparative Sociology, no. 6, 2007, p. 194. 42 Ibid. 43 G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America?, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967. 44 G. Wright Mills, quoted in Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976, p. 121. 45 Ibid. 46 For instance, see John Higley, and Gwen Moore, ‘Elite Integration in the United States and Australia’, The American Political Science Review, vol. 75, no. 3, 1981, pp. 581–97; and Trygve Gulbrandsen, ‘Norway: Trust among Elites in a Corporatist Democracy’.

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47 See for instance, G. Lowell Field and John Higley, ‘National Elites and Political Stability’, in Gwen Moore (ed.), Research in Politics and Society: The Structure of National Elite Groups Vol. 1, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985. 48 Edgar H. Schein, ‘The Role of the Founders in Creating Organizational Culture’, Family Business Review, vol. 8, no. 3, September 1995, pp. 221–38. 49 G. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 19. 50 See for instance, G. Lowell Field and John Higley, ‘National Elites and Political Stability’. 51 Trygve Gulbrandsen, ‘Norway: Trust among Elites in a Corporatist Democracy’, p. 198. 52 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, p. 113. 53 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, pp. 114–15. 54 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, p. 115. 55 Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations, New York: Free Press, 1955. 56 Lewis A. Closer, The Functions of Social Conflict, New York: Free Press, 1956. 57 George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. 58 See G. Wright Mills: The Power Elite; Thomas R. Dye and John W. Pickering, ‘Governmental and Corporate Elites: Convergence and Differentiation’, Journal of Politics, vol. 36, 1974, pp. 900–925; and Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites. 59 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, p. 110. 60 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, p. 123. 61 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, p. 124. 62 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, pp. 125–6. 63 See, among others, G. Lowell Field and John Higley, Elitism, London: Routledge and Kegal Paul, 1980; G. Lowell Field and John Higley, ‘National Elites and Political Stability’; Michael G. Burton and John Higley, ‘Invitation to Elite Theory’, in G. William Domhoff and Thomas R. Dye (eds), Power Elites and Organizations, Newbury Park: Sage Publishers, CA, 1987; John Higley and Michael G. Burton, ‘The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns’, American Sociological Review, vol. 54, 1989, pp. 17–32; Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds), Elites, Crises and the Origins of Regimes, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998; and John Higley and Michael G. Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. 64 See John Higley and Michael G. Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy; Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds), Elites, Crises and the Origins of Regimes; Michael G. Burton and John Higley, ‘Elite Settlements’, American Sociological Review, 52, 1987, pp. 295–307. 65 John Higley and Michael G. Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. 66 Ibid.

3

The royal strategic elite

I am a prominent member of the royal family and have held several important positions in the government. Yet, I still understand nothing of the inner dynamics of the family!1 The kingdom of Saudi Arabia fits into the Arab Islamic tradition, where the concept of the state parallels that of the elite. Similar to the way in which the modern state is identified with the Al Saʿud, historical states and eras were identified with the names of families such as the Umayyads, the Abbasids and the Fatimids. The Al Saʿud has been the driving force behind three state formations on the Arabian Peninsula: the first Saudi dynasty (1745–1811); the second Saudi dynasty (1843–65); and the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1932–). Ibn Saʿud’s creation of the contemporary monarchical regime radically transformed Saudi society’s power structure, leaving the political arena dominated by the Najd-based House of Saʿud. Ever since, the royal family has been the undisputed centre of gravity of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saʿud married numerous women – though without violating Islam’s prohibition on having more than four wives simultaneously.2 It is often claimed that he married into the major tribes to unite his new kingdom.3 Michael Field questions this truism. According to him, the king mostly married ‘not for diplomatic reasons but because he liked women’.4 During the late years of Ibn Saʿud’s reign, Field continues, the king turned his attention increasingly to concubines.5 Gary Samore and Michael Herb, who have both studied the pattern of Ibn Saʿud’s marriages, have reached the same conclusion, emphasizing the king’s propensity for Armenian women.6 The exact number of the king’s marriages is disputed, but it is known that 16 different women gave him sons. These women gave birth to Ibn Saʿud’s 36 sons (and 21 daughters). At the time of his death in 1953, the 34 sons who survived their father inherited the kingdom.7 Five of Ibn Saʿud’s sons have so far succeeded him as king: the late Kings Saʿud, Faysal, Khalid, Fahd, as well as the current King ʿAbdallah. The sons not only inherited his power – but also their father’s virility. As a result, the House of Saʿud today numbers thousands of royals. It is often claimed that the precise number of royals is a well-protected state secret. Consequently, the figure is much discussed and different guesstimates range between a few

26

The royal strategic elite Sa‘ud 1720−1725

Thunayyan

Muhammad 1725−1765 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz 1765−1800

Ibrahim ‘Abdallah

Sa‘ud 1800−1814

‘Abdallah 1814−1818

Mashari 1820−1824

Turki 1824−1834 Khalid 1838−1842

‘Abdallah 1865−71/1875−89

Faysal 1834-38/1843-65

‘Abd al-Rahman 1889−1891

Thunayyan

‘Abdallah 1842−1843

Sa‘ud 1871−1875

‘Abd al-‘Aziz 1932−1953

Sa‘ud 1953−1964

Faysal 1964−1975

Khalid 1975−1982

Fahd 1982−2005

‘Abdallah 2005−

Amirs of the first Saudi state Amirs of the second Saudi state Amirs of the third Saudi state

Figure 3.1 Rulers of the House of Saʿud.

thousands and up to 25,000 individuals. However, the number is not a secret. According to Shaykh ʿAbd a-Rahman S. al-Ruwaishid, the Al Saʿud’s unofficial genealogist, the ruling house, counting men and women of all branches, has grown to a little more than 4,500 members. The genealogist starts with Muhammad ibn Saʿud, the founder of the first Saudi dynasty, and includes all his surviving descendants.8

Basic structures of the political system Saudi Arabia’s legal and institutional framework is rather embryonic and political decision-making is mostly informal. Saudi Arabia is one of the few countries in the world still with no written constitution. The laws linked to the government are mainly the Basic Law of Government (Arab. al-nizam al-asasiyy), the Council of Ministers Law, the Law of the Consultative Council, the Law of the Provinces, the National Security Council Law and the Allegiance Council Law. The most important of these, the Basic Law of Government, was adopted as late as 1 March 1992 through a royal decree by the late King Fahd (1982–2005). The level of formality,

The royal strategic elite 27

Appointed by the King

Basic Law of Government

King (Prime Minister)

Appointed by the

Crown Prince (Deputy Prime Minister)

King

Royal Family Council Allegiance Council

Open audiences

Appointed by the King

Council of Minister Consult, advise

Appointed by the King

Consultative Council

Appointed by the King/elected

Municipal Councils

by ‘the People’

‘The People’

Foreign Workers

Figure 3.2 Structure of the political system in Saudi Arabia.

however, differs from case to case, and from social group to social group involved. The most formal processes of decision-making may be found within the bureaucracy. Within the business community, such processes are less formalized, and the least formalized decision-making processes are to be found within the royal family and the religious establishment.9 The king is at the top of the political structure. He appoints and replaces all key officials, including the crown prince, ministers, members of the Consultative Council (Arab. majlis al-shura), and half of the municipal council members. The Council of Ministers is advised on the formulation of general policy and directs the activities of the bureaucracy. Legislation is by resolution of the Council of Ministers, which is then ratified by royal decree (Arab. marsum or ʾamr), and must be in accordance with Islamic law. In line with the informal nature of the decision-making body, no special religious institution has any formal role in this process. Frank E. Vogel notes that, to avoid passing decrees in conflict with Islam, consultation with the ʿulamaʾ during the process of legislating takes place in various forms: the king has religious scholars among his retinue; he meets with prominent religious leaders once a week; the minister of justice, who is a religious scholar, sits on the Council of Ministers; and if formal advice is needed on a point

28

The royal strategic elite

of law, the king can submit a request for a religious opinion on Islamic law (Arab. fatwa) to the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars.10 Justice is administered according to shariʿa law through a system of religious courts whose judges are appointed by the king at the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council (also known as the Higher Council of the Judiciary), an 11-member body composed of senior jurists. The king acts as the highest court of appeal and has the power to grant pardons. The king arranges ‘open audiences’ (Arab. majlis). Here, ordinary people can come to debate different issues and make petitions. Informal consultations are still very important, but various consultatative arrangements have also been gradually codified and institutionalized. The Consultative Council was created in 1993. Its primary function is to advise the king on important issues, and it may examine government policies and propose decrees or amendments to existing laws. The Consultative Council is nominated and re-nominated by the king, not by popular election. In June 2000, the Royal Family Council was set up, which is constituted by representatives of all the royal branches. It attends to the family’s welfare, e.g. family affairs such as education, marriages, etc. The council is not a political body and never announces its meetings. In contrast, the Allegiance Council, created in 2007, addresses only those entitled to be king or crown prince. Both councils are headed by the king. Furthermore, there are royal family gatherings at which the oligarchs of the main branches meet one another informally and ad hoc. Such meetings are still very important. In addition to the central councils, there are also municipal councils. Half of the members of the 179 municipal councils were elected between February and April 2005: neither women nor foreign workers could vote.

The king’s powers The king is – at least in theory – the primus inter pares, ‘the first among equals’. Faysal once said: Brothers, there is one small remark I would like to make. I keep hearing repeated the words ‘Your Majesty’ and ‘seated on the throne’ and such like. I beg you, brothers, to look upon me as both brother and servant.11 Irrespective of who becomes king, the king is obeyed by his brothers, sons, nephews and other relatives. In the official hierarchy of the Saudi state, the king is the supreme executive and legislative authority, and may occasionally exercise judicial authority. He has the power to veto all decrees issued by the Council of Ministers. The primary executive office of the king is the Royal Court in the Saudi capital. Here are the private offices of the king and the crown prince, and the offices of all the king’s most important advisors in domestic politics, religious affairs and international relations. The king conducts most routine governmental affairs from this office, including drafting regulations and royal decrees. In addition, the heads of several government departments have their offices at the court: the chief of protocol, the Office of Tribal Affairs; the Department of Religious

The royal strategic elite 29 Research, Missionary Activities, and Guidance; and the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Evil. The king also holds his regular majlis, ‘public receptions’, in the Royal Court. At the time of writing, King ʿAbdallah’s advisors include his own son, Prince Miʿtab bin ʿAbdallah; special advisor to the king, Prince Turki bin ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud; advisor to the king and assistant chief of general intelligence, Prince Faysal bin ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud; advisor to the king, Prince Mansur bin Nasir bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud; head of special affairs at the King’s Court and member of the board of trustees of the King ʿAbdallah Foundation, ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Tassan; chief of the King’s Court and private secretary with the rank of minister, Khalid bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Tuwaijiri; and deputy chief of the King’s Court with the rank of minister, Khalid bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-ʿIsa. Before becoming king, ʿAbdallah used to consult with a rather narrow circle of men whom he knew and trusted from the Saudi Arabian National Guard. ʿAbdallah now consults with a much broader circle of people. As he has few close relatives, according to Saudi standards, he consults more with his ministers. Foreign policy illustrates this: while King Fahd, who had six full brothers in addition to his own sons, used to delegate areas of responsibility to his relatives, ʿAbdallah relies far more on Prince Saʿud bin Faysal and his Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to the Royal Court, each senior prince has a Special Office (Arab. maktab al-khass) handling his personal affairs, staffed by trusted secretaries and advisors. The advisors, and especially the king’s advisors, are in a position to use their privileged access to the decision-makers and information to promote their own agendas, whatever they might be. The king’s real power, however, depends not on his staff, but on his personality, political skills and the strength of his power base within the family. The last of these elements is often positively correlated with the number of his full brothers and sons. It is repeatedly claimed that King ʿAbdallah is close to the tribes, that Prince Nayef draws on the Wahhabi establishment’s support and that Prince Salman has a strong position within the business community. But this is both simplistic and misleading. Due to the relative growth of the House of Saʿud’s power vis-à-vis other elite groups, the relative importance of domestic support bases has gradually declined. Today the senior princes’ constituencies are very much within the House of Saʿud.12 Relations to non-royals are therefore of secondary concern. Neither will the royal family accept the authority of a king who is incompetent or abuses his power, and will move to have him dethroned. The obvious example is King Saʿud, dethroned by family opponents.13 The Saudi Basic Law of Government, adopted by King Fahd’s royal decree on 1 March 1992, affirms the absolute rule of the House of Saʿud. The Basic Law of Government in particular strengthens the king’s position. According to Article 6, citizens must submit to the king’s rule in accordance with the Qurʾan and the Sunna and obey him. Article 46 underlines that the judiciary is an independent authority, but this is modified by Article 52 stating that appointing judges and terminating their duties is by royal decree. Article 57 provides the king with the

30

The royal strategic elite

right to appoint and relieve deputies of the prime minister, ministers and members of the Council of Ministers by royal decree, while Article 58 ensures that the king also appoints deputy ministers, and those of higher rank, and relieves them of their posts by royal decree. Article 60 makes the king the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces. He appoints officers and ends their duties in accordance with the law. Finally, Article 61 gives the king the right to declare a state of emergency, general mobilization and war, and the law defines the rules for this.

Major branches The royal family consists of several main and sub-branches. The biggest and by far most influential is the ʿAbd al-ʿAziz branch, the descendants of Ibn Saʿud (1932–53), the first king of Saudi Arabia. While the branch’s exact size is unknown, it includes the king’s surviving sons and grandsons. Other branches are: ʿAbd al-Rahman, the descendants of Ibn Saʿud’s brothers; Saʿud bin Faysal, the descendants of Ibn Saʿud’s uncle and ruler of the second Saudi dynasty (1871, 1873–75), including the sub-branches of Saʿud al-Kabir, Al Muhammad, Al ʿAbdallah and Al Faysal (not to be confused with the sons of King Faysal, also known as Al Faysal); Al Juluwi; Al Turki, the descendants of ʿAbdallah, the son of amir Turki (1823–34); Al Thunayyan; Al Mishari; and Al Fahran.14 The Al al-Sudayri The first of these branches, the ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, may be divided into sub-branches. Over the past 30 years, the so-called Sudayri Seven has been the primary focus of Western political analyses of the Saudi kingdom. Ibn Saʿud had three wives who came from the Sudayri family.15 The stature of the family, one of the oldest and noblest tribal families of Central Arabia, was heightened through these intermarriages with the Al Saʿud. The Sudayri Seven, also known as the Al Fahd, include seven full brothers who are all the sons of Ibn Saʿud and Hassa bint Ahmad al-Sudayri, later known as Umm Fahd (Mother of Fahd). The brothers seized control of the Ministry of Defence and Aviation and the governorate of the Riyadh Province in 1963, the Ministry of Interior in 1975 and became the single most powerful alliance within the royal family on Fahd’s ascent to the throne in 1982. These key positions also made it possible for the Sudayris to accumulate huge wealth. With the death of Fahd in 2005, the Sudayri Seven became the Sudayri Six. King ʿAbdallah appointed his half-brother, Prince Sultan, the oldest of the surviving Sudayri brothers, crown prince. Treating the Sudayri Clan as a distinct power block was of some meaning one or two decades ago, but the many scholars and observers who still adhere to this perspective today are on the wrong analytical track. In recent decades, there has been a gradual shift within the House of Saʿud implying that the interaction at top level has become less horizontal (brother to brother) and more vertical (father to son). The senior ‘second-generation princes’, which I use here to denote the sons of Ibn Saʿud, have established their own dynasties within the Saʿud dynasty.16

The royal strategic elite 31 Box 3.1 The Sudayri Seven • •

• • • • •

King Fahd bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (born 1921), the fifth king of Saudi Arabia, 1982=N2005 Crown Prince Sultan bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (born 1925), Defence Minister since 1963, and Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister since August 2005 Prince ʿAbd al-Rahman bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (born 1928), Vice Minister of Defence since 1982 Prince Nayef bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (born 1933), Interior Minister since 1975 and Second Deputy Prime Minister since April 2009 Prince Turki bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (born 1934), without portfolio Prince Salman bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (born 1936), Governor of the Riyadh Province since 1963 Prince Ahmad bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (born 1940), Vice Minister of Interior since 1978

Other sub-branches The most powerful of these second-generation patriarchs hold influential positions within the state apparatus and control important institutions. On this basis, the princes act as patrons of huge client networks that include all segments of Saudi society. These senior royals have staffed their institutions with their younger brothers, typically as vice-ministers, and their favourite sons as assistant ministers: King ʿAbdallah controls the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) through his trusted half-brother Prince Badr, who served as the Guards deputy commander from 1968 to 2010, as well as his sons Mitʿab and Turki; Crown Prince Sultan runs the Ministry of Defence and Aviation through his younger full brother Prince ʿAbd al-Rahman, as well as his son Khalid; Prince Nayef is in charge of the Ministry of Interior through his younger full brother Prince Ahmad and his son Muhammad; Prince Salman governs the important Riyadh Province, and the media empire Saudi Research and Marketing – which publishes the newspapers al-Sharq al-Awsat and Arab News – through his youngest son Prince Faysal; and the sons of King Faysal possess great influence over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is run by Prince Saʿud bin Faysal as well as the Mecca Province, which is governed by Prince Khalid bin Faysal. The individual senior princes retain considerable power of veto based on controlling their institutions. In between these circles of power, there are a number of highly influential senior princes, such as ʿAbd al-Rahman and Mishʿal, who do not have any institutionalized support bases, but who are still very much respected and maintain client networks thanks to their personal wealth.

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Prince Nayef Prince Muhammad b. Nayef Ministry of Interior

Crown Prince Sultan

King ‘Abdallah

Prince Salman

Prince Khalid b. Sultan

Prince Mit ‘ab b. ’Abdallah

Riyadh Province

Ministry of Defence

Prince Turki b. ’Abdallah SANG

Al Faysal Prince Khalid b. Faysal Prince Sa ‘ud b. Faysal Prince Turki b. Faysal

Figure 3.3 Main circles of power within the royal family.

Interestingly, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, as well as Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s national oil and gas company, have always been headed by non-royal technocrats. The rationale for this, Iris Glosemeyer suggests, is to counter any suspicion that the House of Saʿud steals the oil wealth. Another reason, and probably even more important, is to avoid one prince or branch of the family gaining control over revenues.17 Also, the Ministry of Finance has through most of its history been handled by commoners, with the exception of Prince Musaʿid’s years in charge (1962–75). The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, however, is ruled by a royal, Prince Mansour bin Mitʿab bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud. He succeeded his father as minister of municipal and rural affairs in November 2009. This ministry is important because it deals with land ownership and distribution, a controversial issue because many plots are handed out to royals.

Brothers in arms An estimated 200 princes hold positions in the government; some of these have commanding posts in the military. Saudi Arabia’s military forces are currently

The royal strategic elite 33 divided into four major branches: the Army, the SANG, the Navy and the Air Force. In addition, the kingdom has large paramilitary and internal security forces. All the top military commanders are members of the royal family. Coercive powers are commanded by different branches of the House of Saʿud, a 50-yearold policy to avoid control of the armed forces being monopolized by one family branch. Accordingly, there is no military elite in Saudi Arabia, unlike in several other Arab countries, such as Algeria and Egypt.18 Saudi military forces are formally under the direct control of King ʿAbdallah. He served between 1963 and 2010 as the commander of the SANG, which is under a separate chain of command and, according to Anthony H. Cordesman, commonly regarded as the most professional of the Saudi military branches, serving as the monarchy’s Praetorian Guard.19 ʿAbdallah still controls the guard through his most trusted relatives and friends: Mitʿab bin ʿAbdallah, the king’s most prominent son, now commands the SANG, while ʿAbd al-Muhsin alTuwaijiri, the king’s personal advisor and a key ally of Mitʿab, is the deputy commander of the guard.20 General Prince Turki, the King’s youngest son, is important in the SANG. Crown Prince Sultan, the minister of defence and aviation, takes care of the day-to-day decision-making affecting the regular forces. His son, General-Prince Khalid bin Sultan, is assistant minister of defence and aviation. Prince Nayef, the minister of interior, commands the complex web of Saudi paramilitary and internal security forces. The ministry’s day-to-day operations are run by the Nayef-loyal undersecretary, Ahmad al-Salam. The real deputy, however, is assistant interior minister for security affairs, Prince Muhammad bin Nayef. In July 2007, Prince Nayef announced a plan to set up a force to guard oil and other important installations. The Facilities Security Force was intended to reach a capacity of 35,000 troops by 2009. The new force will assume the responsibilities of the 5,000 security agents currently employed by Saudi Aramco. The commander of the Facilities Security Force will report directly to the assistant interior minister for security affairs. Prince Turki bin Faysal was appointed director general of Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Directorate in 1977. His replacement by Prince Nawaf in September 2001 led to the Al Faysal losing their coercive power base. In October 2005, King ʿAbdallah appointed his brother Prince Muqrin director general. He is very close to the king. Saudi Arabia’s provincial structure is regulated by the Law of the Provinces.21 The kingdom is divided into 13 provinces, or emirates, each governed by an amir (governor) appointed by the king for a four-year, renewable period. At the time of writing, these emirates are Riyadh, Mecca, Medina, al-Hasa, ʿAsir, al-Bahah, Tabuk, Qasim, Haʾil, al-Jawf, Northern Borders, Jizan and Najran. According to the law, the governors report to the minister of interior. In practice, however, the governors usually report directly to the king.22 All governors and most of their deputies are members of the House of Saʿud. Traditionally, the king’s brothers, sons and nephews used to rule the most politically important emirates, while relatives belonging to the sub-branches ruled the smaller emirates. Today, however, only the Northern Borders are governed by a member of a sub-branch, Prince ʿAbdallah bin Musaʿid al-Juluwi.

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Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy-making is in the hands of a handful of senior princes and their advisors. The country’s foreign policy is not made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by the king, who delegates different areas of responsibility. All important decisions are made exclusively by the king and the inner circle of royals. The royal family’s dominance means that the decisionmaking process does not follow rational-bureaucratic principles.23 King Fahd used to delegate areas of responsibility to a handful of his closest relatives. In foreign policy, he gave certain senior princes responsibilities for relations with specific countries. One Western consultant identified the following ‘diplomatic fiefdoms’: ʿAbdallah was responsible for dealing with Syria and Lebanon (he has several wives from these two countries as well as family ties with the Syrian Shammar tribal confederation); Sultan was responsible for Yemen; Nayef was responsible for Gulf matters; Prince Bandar bin Sultan, as ambassador to the United States, was the king’s man in Washington, DC; and Turki bin Faysal, as the director general of the General Intelligence Directorate, dealt with his Pakistani ISI, the American CIA and the mujahidun in Afghanistan.24 King ʿAbdallah, as the ultimate decision-maker, has relied far more on Prince Saʿud bin Faysal than did his predecessor. The foreign minister is an old trusted friend and ally of ʿAbdallah. At the time of writing, none of the senior princes has any semi-autonomous fiefdoms. Nevertheless, the king still relies heavily on Sultan – his expertise and extensive contact networks – in issues related to Yemen.25 After he was forced to resign as ambassador in 2005, Bandar bin Sultan tried to transform himself into the king’s secret mediator, spending his time between Teheran, Damascus and Washington, DC. He was used as a mediator in the Lebanese crisis in the summer of 2006; he was entrusted with a role in recent contacts with Israel; and he facilitated the meeting between King ʿAbdallah and the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in Riyadh in March 2007. Yet, Bandar bin Sultan is not to be included among the major foreign policy players anymore.

Box 3.2 Provincial governors as of September 2010 • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Riyadh =N Prince Salman bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Mecca =N Prince Khalid bin Faysal bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Medina =N Prince ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Majid bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Eastern Province =N Prince Muhammad bin Fahd bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud ʿAsir =N Prince Faysal bin Khalid bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Al-Bahah =N Prince Mishari bin Saʿud bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Tabuk =N Prince Fahd bin Sultan bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Qasim =N Prince Faysal bin Bandar bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Haʾil =N Prince Saʿud bin ʿAbd al-Muhsin bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Al-Jawf =N Prince Fahd bin Badr bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Northern Borders =N Prince ʿAbdallah bin Musaʿid al-Juluwi Jizan =N Prince Muhammad bin Nasir bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Najran =N Prince Mishʿal bin ʿAbdallah bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud

The royal strategic elite 35 Within foreign policy-making, the king and the senior princes delegate almost no power at all to the bureaucracy. There are few advisors, foreign-policy experts and diplomats who are in a position to influence policy-making. In many cases, Saudi Arabia also lacks well-established diplomatic channels. In the Arab Middle East, the Saudis therefore often have to lean on the diplomatic initiatives of Egypt – a country that has both the necessary experience and diplomatic ties. Consequently, as one diplomat in Riyadh has noted, ‘the kingdom’s foreign-policy apparatus is easily overstretched when it has to handle more than one important question over a longer period of time’.26 This weakness has to a certain degree been exposed by the very offensive diplomacy that King ʿAbdallah has run as an attempt to influence development in several regional hotspots such as Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran. Nevertheless, the king’s active foreign policy has not reduced the key decision-makers’ capacity to initiate and implement domestic reforms.

Structures of authority Herb describes the way in which the senior princes in the dynastic monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula are embedded in two parallel authority hierarchies: one is the visible and easily identifiable state hierarchy that expanded rapidly with the rise of the petro-state; the other, and far less transparent, is within the royal family.27 The royal family constitutes a pool from which the political leadership is coming. Yet, it is important to not confuse the royal family and government. Out of 4,500, there are probably around 200 royals that work in the public sector. In other words, being a member of the royal family does not mean that one is involved with politics.28 While most Saʿud princes do not hold any position in the state apparatus, the family hierarchy includes every single male member of the royal family. Within the House of Saʿud, a certain prince’s political influence is determined by several factors, including family branch kinship, matrimonial descent, age and various personal qualities. The ruling hierarchy is reflected in the system of honorific titles, in which the sons and grandsons of King Ibn Saʿud, the ʿAbd al-ʿAziz branch, are referred to as ‘His Royal Highness’ (Arab. sahib al-sumuw al-malaki), thus distinguishing them from the princes belonging to the cadet lines such as the Saʿud al-Kabir, Al Juluwi, Al Thunayyan and Al Fahran, who are entitled ‘His Highness’ (Arab. sahib al-sumuw). King ʿAbdallah has endeavoured to set clear limits for the eligibility for royal titles and hence limit the number of people entitled to stipends.29 Nevertheless, princes possessing no formal position may still be very powerful. The best example is Prince Muhammad, pressured in 1964 by his brothers to renounce his right to succeed to allow his younger and only full brother, Khalid, to become crown prince. His family was apparently concerned about Muhammad’s drinking and bad temper, often concurrent, and this explains his nickname abu sharrayn, the ‘father of two evils’.30 In 1977, a raging Muhammad ordered the execution of one of his granddaughters, Princess Mishʿal bint Fahd, under charges of adultery. He still remained one of the most influential and wealthiest members of the House of Saʿud, as well as its ‘kingmaker’.

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The decision-making structures within the Al Saʿud are informal and not very transparent. Strategically important decision-making remains a discreet affair, with a handful of senior princes and their advisors discussing issues in private with the aim of reaching consensus.31 Decisions affecting daily life in Saudi Arabia are made by the Council of Ministers. But here again the royal family is strongly represented: the king serves as prime minister, the crown prince as deputy prime minister, and other senior princes control the key ‘ministries of sovereignty’ (Arab. wizarat al-siyada), which are those of foreign affairs, defence and interior. An institutionalized decision-making body has never existed within the royal family. In June 2000, as mentioned, the Royal Family Council was established, chaired by Crown Prince ʿAbdallah and including 18 princes representing each of the Al Saʿud’s major branches.32 Sons of each of the recent kings were also included as were other princes important in their own right and who hold senior positions in the government or family hierarchy.

Box 3.3 Members of the Royal Family Council (appointed June 2000) • • • • • •

• • • • • • • • •

King ʿAbdallah bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (Head) Crown Prince Sultan bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (Deputy Head) Prince Salman bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Prince Talal bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Prince Badr bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud, former Deputy Commander of the SANG and a close ally of King ʿAbdallah Prince Muhammad bin Saʿud bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud, former Governor of the al-Bahah Province and son of King Saʿud; due to poor health represented through Prince Mishʿal bin Saʿud bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud, son of King Saʿud Prince Khalid bin Faysal bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud, Governor of the Mecca Province and the son of King Faysal Prince ʿAbdelʾilah bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud, Governor of the al-Jawf Province until 2002 and close to King ʿAbdallah Prince ʿAbd al-Majid bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud, Governor of Mecca Province until 2007, close to King ʿAbdallah Prince Muhammad bin Fahd bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud, Governor of the al-Hasa Province and son of King Fahd Prince ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud al-Kabir, member of the al-Kabir sub-branch of the House of Saʿud Prince Faysal bin Turki bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud al-Turki, member of the al-Turki sub-branch of the House of Saʿud Prince Bandar bin Khalid bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud, son of King Khalid Prince Muhammad bin ʿAbdallah bin al-Juluwi, member of the al-Juluwi sub-branch of the House of Saʿud Prince ʿAbdallah bin Fahd bin Faysal al-Fahran, member of the al-Fahran sub-branch of the House of Saʿud

The royal strategic elite 37 •

• • • •

Prince Saʿud bin ʿAbdallah al-Thunayyan, member of the al-Thunayyan sub-branch of the House of Saʿud and Chairman of the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu Prince ʿAbd al-Rahman bin ʿAbdallah bin ʿAbd al-Rahman Prince Bandar bin Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Rahman Prince Fahd bin Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud, son of the late Prince Muhammad, close to King ʿAbdallah Prince ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad bin Muqrin al-Mishari, member of the al-Mishari sub-branch of the House of Saʿud

The Royal Family Council is, however, not a politically significant institution. Rather than functioning as a decision-making body, the Council’s role, as will be debated more thoroughly in the following chapters, is to address various interfamilial issues; it is also a formal institution bringing together the different branches of the House of Saʿud.33

Royal women Saudi Arabia’s royal women do not hold any formal senior governmental positions – like most non-royal women – and are legally barred from succession. Viewed from the outside, men are running the show. Nonetheless, there are several influential princesses in the kingdom behind closed palace walls. Strong royal women have put their stamp on every era of modern Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saʿud was very close to Nora, his elder sister. On several occasions, he was known for identifying himself by proclaiming, ‘I am the brother of Nora.’ The most important woman during Ibn Saʿud’s reign, however, was his father’s sister, al-Johara bint Faysal. She was well educated in Islam and was among the king’s most trusted advisors. Among Ibn Saʿud’s wives, Hessa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri, his favourite wife, had considerable political influence. She gave birth to the powerful so-called ‘Sudayri Seven’. Her support also helped them to rise to top positions in the state apparatus. While men have been preoccupied with ruling, women of the royal family have succeeded to become pioneers of reform in certain fields. A well-known example is King Faysal’s wife, Effat. She was among King Faysal’s closest advisors and played a prominent role in promoting girls’ education in the kingdom. Likewise, all the daughters of King Faysal are well educated, active and outspoken. Princess Lolwah bint Faysal is the public voice of Saudi women and the most publicly visible female member of the royal family today. By some, she is even spoken of as the kingdom’s ‘first lady’.34 Among King ʿAbdallah’s wives, Princess Aida and Princess Hassa are known to be particularly close to him. The former gave birth to Princess ʿAdila, who has actively promoted public health awareness and women’s legal rights. Adila enjoys significant political influence through her father – as well as her husband. Adila is

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the wife of Prince Faysal bin ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad, the newly appointed Minister of Education.35 Faysal bin ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad, whom Adila married in her early 20s, is said to be close to the king. He is the son of the king’s full sister, Nouf. Faysal is regularly seen in King Abdallah’s entourage when meeting important dignitaries and has travelled with the king abroad. Adila – who holds a BA in English Literature from King Saud University and has a daughter with a degree from King’s College in London – is very concerned with women’s education. According to her, her husband shares her concerns. Adila has in public stated that ‘[Prince Faysal] encourages Saudi women to play an active role in the labour market. He feels that the energy of Saudi women is being wasted and should be used for the benefit of the society.’36 The hierarchy among the princesses shadows that of the princes – and is likewise rooted on the principles of age and seniority. The most influential women today are the few surviving daughters of ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, such as Princess Luluwa, Princess al-Johara and Princess Latifa. Because of their patrimonial origin and age, these princesses enjoy the greatest respect and honour. Princes as well as the king will very much respect an older sister. King ʿAbdallah had two younger full sisters: Sita, who passed away in April 2010, and Nouf. Both were very much respected within the family and were very close to the king. The latter is the mother of Faysal, the Minister of Education and husband of the king’s favourite daughter, Adila.37 The royal women also have their own institutions. Six years ago, Princess Sita, the sister of King ʿAbdallah, initiated the creation of the Princesses’ Council, which included one member of each of the royal family’s sub-branches. This is the first time a family council for female royals has existed. All the appointed members are involved in social work within different spheres, including health, children, women and business.38 The women’s council has become a permanent fixture in the House of Saʿud. The council meets twice a month, every second week, to discuss issues related to society in general and to women in particular. Each gathering lasts for two or three hours. The council does not deal with funding; it is not a charity. It is more like a think-tank and lobbying body. The council debates, comes up with suggestions for solving certain issues and delivers petitions to relevant governmental institutions, such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labour and sometimes even the king. The Princesses’ Council has its own Department for Studies, which supports the council by providing information and statistics related to the different topics that are on the agenda. The royal women’s council’s petitions are submitted to the decisionmakers, but are far from always accepted.39 The council started with 22 founding members, but today has expanded to count 30 royal women. The council is based on teamwork, no matter how close to Saudi Arabia’s top decision-makers – the king and the senior princes – the individual members are. Some younger princesses, such as some of the daughters of ʿAbd al-ʿAziz’s grand-daughters, have also been allowed to participate in the gatherings. By including younger princesses, these women gain knowledge about

The royal strategic elite 39 the important value of serving society and learn about being a role model for other royal and non-royal Saudi women.40 The Princesses’ Council does not submit suggestions related to ‘hard policy’, such as economy, security and foreign policy. Nor do the female members of the royal family take part in informal family consultations on these issues, as these important fields are in the hands of the king and an exclusive group of senior princes.41 Somewhat simplistic, one can argue that this reflects traditional ArabMuslim gender roles prescribing that men are predominant outside the home, while women are, to a large degree, dominant within the home.

Conclusion The elite system is wholly dominated by one family, the House of Saʿud. The number of family members has multiplied over the last few decades and today there are thousands of royals. The royal family consists of several main and subbranches. Among these the biggest and by far most influential is the ʿAbd al-ʿAziz branch, the descendants of King Ibn Saʿud. The hallmark of the royal family is its sheer size, its strict authority structures and hierarchy, as well as its many experienced and competent leaders and administrators. As many princes have been in their commanding posts for decades, elite circulation is very slow. A few senior princes make all important decisions related to security, the economy and foreign relations. In other words, the elite system is very centralized. In Saudi Arabia, even minor decisions are brought all the way to the top of the decision-making hierarchy. Saudi Arabia’s strategic elite is constituted of the king as well as a handful of princes. Most important today are the sons of Ibn Saʿud, first and foremost King ʿAbdallah, Crown Prince Sultan, as well as their brothers Nayef and Salman. But also some of the late king’s grandsons have gained much influence. This small group of gentlemen has exclusive political power to make strategic decisions affecting Saudi society as a whole. It is important to note that the vast majority of princes are not members of the strategic elite: most royals have little or no influence at all over decision-making processes. A few princesses are in a position to pull the strings from behind the scenes – basically through their male relatives. Strong women closely related to Saudi Arabia’s rulers have influenced the political development of the kingdom in certain fields. Today, those in the best position to do so are King ʿAbdallah’s sister Nouf, his wives, in particular Aida Fustuq and Hassa bint Trad al-Sha’lan, as well as his daughter, Adila. The areas that these actively seek to influence are related to women’s education and job opportunities, and women’s health and legal rights. But economy, security and foreign policy remain male-exclusive domains.

Notes 1 Interview with member of the royal family, Riyadh, May 2009. 2 Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom: Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform, London: Hurst and Company, 2003, p. 68. 3 See, for instance, Joseph A. Kechichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia, p. 24.

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The royal strategic elite

4 Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. 5 Ibid. 6 Gary Samuel Samore, ‘Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia’, unpublished doctoral thesis, Harvard University, 1984, pp. 528–32; and Michael Herb, All in the Family, pp. 37–40. 7 Gary Samuel Samore, ‘Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia’, pp. 528–32; Michael Herb, All in the Family, pp. 37–40; and Joseph A. Kechichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia, pp. 175–9. 8 ʿAbd al-Rahman S. al-Ruwaishid, The Genealogical Charts of the Royal Saudi Family, Riyadh: al-Shibil Press, (1421) 2001, p. 19. 9 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, April 2007. 10 Frank E. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia, Leiden, Boston, and Köln: Brill, 2000, pp. 281–90. 11 David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981, p. 255. 12 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, May 2006. 13 Interviews with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005, and official/scholar, Riyadh, April 2007. 14 Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. 15 Michael Herb, All in the Family, p. 39. 16 Various interviews. 17 Iris Glosemeyer, ‘Saudi Arabia: Dynamism Uncovered’, in Volker Perthes (ed.), Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change, Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, p. 166. 18 See, for instance, Steven A. Cook, Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007. 19 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Military and International Security Dimensions, p. 169; Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 29, issue 759, 10 June 2005, p. 4; and interview with diplomat, Riyadh, April 2007. 20 Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 34, issue 890, 29 November 2010, p. 3. 21 ‘The Law of the Provinces’, available online, http://www.saudiembassy.net/Country/ Government/law%20of%20the%20provinces.asp. 22 Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), Saudi Arabia: A Country Study, 1992, available online, http://countrystudies.us/saudi-arabia/29.htm. 23 Various interviews. 24 Interviews with independent consultant, London, May 2008, and official/scholar, Riyadh, April 2008. 25 Ibid. 26 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, April 2007. 27 Michael Herb, All in the Family, pp. 33–4. 28 Ibid. 29 Interview with member of the royal family, Riyadh, November 2009. 30 Michael Herb, All in the Family, p. 102. 31 Interviews with diplomats, Riyadh, November 2005, official/scholar, Riyadh, April 2007, and independent consultant, London, May 2008. 32 The names of the Royal Family Council’s members were made public by al-Riyadh (in Arabic), 5 June 2000. 33 Interviews with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005, and diplomat, Riyadh, November 2005. 34 Interviews in Riyadh and Jeddah, April 2009. 35 Ibid 36 Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 33, issue 854, 29 May 2009.

The royal strategic elite 41 37 38 39 40 41

Interview in Riyadh, April 2009. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Interviews in Riyadh, April 2009.

4

Non-royal segment elites

In addition to the royal family, there are four other important elite groups – the Wahhabi ʿulamaʾ, tribal leaders, merchant families and technocrats, all of whom rose to prominence by virtue of strategic alliances made by King Ibn Saʿud.1 Each and every one of these alliances has since helped the ruling family to stay in power. The role and influence of the different elite groups have not been static, but have changed according to the needs of the House of Saʿud. Nonetheless, as this chapter highlights, the general trend is that these alliances have all become very asymmetrical. In the oil era, the Al Saʿud has been in a position to subdue non-royal elite groups – thanks to its economic resources. Hence, these have become segment elites. In order to maintain its exclusive role as strategic elite, the royal family has gradually given each of the non-royal elite groups their institutional power bases within the framework of the Saudi state. This representation fragments and weakens non-royal elite groups and helps the royals maintain their power monopoly. Khaldun al-Naqib and Steffen Hertog both argue that this policy gives the House of Saʿud a ‘corporative character’.2 The leaders of the different nonroyal elite groups are not represented in any formal corporative chambers, but rather in governmental institutions at national and local levels, including the police and the military forces. The Al Saʿud has created parallel arenas where it consults its various clienteles. Such consultations do not only take place within the framework of state institutions, but also in informal meetings between senior royals and prominent members of the clienteles. The various interest groups might here express their views, but they will rarely be consulted on political issues. Hertog refers to this as the ‘policy of segmented clientelism’. The numerous consultative arrangements obstruct the emergence of corporative identities and can even make it difficult for interest groups to coordinate their claims vis-à-vis the state as communication is far more vertical than horizontal.

Religious leaders While conquering and later consolidating Saudi Arabia, the House of Saʿud had an important support base in the Wahhabi ʿulamaʾ. From King Ibn Saʿud to the present day, the relationship between the royal family and the religious establishment

Non-royal segment elites 43

Tribal leaders

Religious leaders

Strategic alliance

Strategic alliance

AL SA ‘UD

Strategic alliance

Leaders of the bureaucracy

Strategic alliance

Business leaders

Figure 4.1 Main elite segments.

has remained of a symbiotic, yet asymmetric, nature. Religious leaders are clearly subordinate to the princes in the elite hierarchy. Political practice in modern Saudi Arabia has thus fallen out of step with Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s ideal Islamic state, which was founded on two equal authorities: the umaraʾ and the ʿulamaʾ. Nonetheless, religious leaders still constitute an elite group within the cultural sphere in the contemporary kingdom. Size and structure Saudi Arabia’s Islamic society consists of a manifold spectrum of institutions: from departments to various educational institutions to mosques. The religious establishment is a broad social class ranging from specialists within the different Islamic sciences, such as jurists (Arab. sing. mufti), the highest religious authority, judges (Arab. sing. qadi) or jurists (Arab. sing. faqih), to semi-skilled prayer leaders (Arab. sing. imam), Qurʾanic reciters, seminary teachers, those calling people to prayer (Arab. muʾazzin) and caretakers who have reached only the lowest rungs on the ladder of Islamic scholarship. Shmuel Bachar et al. estimate that ‘the ʿulamaʾ and their families include an estimated 7,000 to 10,000 people, though only thirty to forty of them have substantial political influence’,3 while one diplomat’s assessment is that half of these are based in Riyadh.4 Adding the group of semi-skilled religious individuals greatly increases this figure. There are, for example, an estimated 75,000 mosques in Saudi Arabia.5

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Non-royal segment elites

When times are good, each mosque employs several skilled and semi-skilled individuals. While small mosques employ two to four men, larger ones may provide dozens with work. Mosques alone may thus provide full- or part-time employment to several hundred thousands of men in Saudi Arabia. The institutional structure of the religious establishment has developed gradually since the 1970s and has been fuelled by oil money. The Al Saʿud invests huge resources in training Islamic scholars, developing a Wahhabi-oriented teaching system and creating new ministries, universities and other religious institutions. This institutionalization was a turning point in the position of the ʿulamaʾ in relation to the government. The religious scholars were, Bachar et al. continue, transformed into ‘a more loyal element in the kingdom, with a vested interest in the survival of the Saudi regime’.6 Regarding organizational structures, Saudi Arabia’s Islamic society is less hierarchical than most other Muslim countries. Members of the religious establishment are always men who have frequent contact with each other based on both a mutual institutional belonging and personal contacts, established for instance through study circles and different types of charity work organized by the mosque. Generally, religious scholars interact with each other in a very collegial manner.7 The Al al-Shaykh Historically, the House of Saʿud has cultivated firm ties with the members of the Al al-Shaykh, which includes the several hundred male descendants of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (al-Shaykh). To seal their alliance, Muhammad bin Saʿud (1744–65), the founder of the first Saudi dynasty, married one of the Shaykh’s daughters, and up to this day intra-marriages have symbolized the political alliance between the two families. The mother of King Faysal, Tarfah bint ʿAbdallah al-Shaykh ʿAbd al-Wahhab, to mention one example, was the daughter of a qadi belonging to the Al al-Shaykh. The al-Shaykh family’s political influence has traditionally rested on three pillars: the family’s reputation for knowledge about Islam; its direct access to the king and the senior Saʿud princes; and its positions in the state hierarchy. In modern Saudi Arabia, the family has made its mark on the country’s religious establishment. Members of the Al al-Shaykh have also been recruited to influential posts in various sectors of the Saudi society. Nowadays, the Shaykh’s descendants are to be found in government, education, national security and private business. The family’s influence began to wane during the reign of King Faysal. He appointed a minister of justice who was not a descendant of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. The gradual decline of the Al al-Shaykh continued during the reigns of Khalid and Fahd. The latter even appointed ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Baz, who did not belong to the Al al-Shaykh, as Grand Mufti (Arab. mufti ‘am). Most of his predecessors, including respected grand muftis such as ʿAbdallah bin Humayd and Muhammad bin Ibrahim, were all recruited from the House of the al-Shaykh.8 Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia’s current Grand Mufti, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad al-Shaykh, is a descendant of Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab.

Non-royal segment elites 45 Several other members of the family also hold prominent positions within Islamic society, including the Minister of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call and Guidance, Salih bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Shaykh, speaker of the Consultative Council, Dr ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad bin Ibrahim al-Shaykh, and member of the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars, Muhammad bin Hassan bin ʿAbd al-Rahman bin ʿAbd al-Latif al-Shaykh. Five influential segments Despite the egalitarian nature of the Saudi Wahhabi establishment, some religious scholars have more political influence than most others. Such belong to five particularly important segments of the religious community. The Supreme Council of Senior Scholars At the top of the Saudi religious pyramid is the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars, established as an official institution by King Faysal in 1971, its purpose being to act as a forum for regular consultation between the king and religious leaders. It is composed of 19 senior Islamic scholars appointed by the king for a period of four years. As stipulated by the Basic Law of Government’s Article 45, the Council’s duty is to issue fatwas on all matters submitted to it by the king.

Box 4.1 Members of the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars (appointed February 2009)1 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad al-Shaykh Shaykh Salih bin Muhammad al-Luhaydan Shaykh Dr ʿAbdallah bin ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-Turki Shaykh Dr Salih bin ʿAbdallah bin Humayd Shaykh Dr ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad bin Ibrahim al-Shaykh Shaykh ʿAbdallah bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Ghudayyan Shaykh ʿAbdallah bin Sulayman al-Maneiʾ Shaykh Dr Salih bin Fawzan al-Fawzan Shaykh Dr ʿAbdul Wahhab bin Ibrahim Abu Sulayman Shaykh Dr ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad al-Mutlaq Shaykh Dr Ahmad bin ʿAli Sair Mubaraki Shaykh ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad bin Saʿd al-Khenein Shaykh Muhammad bin Hassan bin ʿAbd al-Rahman bin ʿAbd al-Latif al-Shaykh Shaykh Dr Saʿd bin Nasir bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Shithri Shaykh Salih bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Husayn Shaykh Dr Yaʿqub bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab bin Yousef al-Bahusayn Shaykh Dr ʿAbd al-Karim bin ʿAbduallah bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Khudayr

46

Non-royal segment elites • • • •

Shaykh Dr ʿAli bin Abbas bin ʿUthman Hakami Shaykh Dr Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Mukhtar Muhammad Shaykh Dr Qays bin Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Latif Al al-Shaykh Mubarak Shaykh Dr Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Karim bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-ʿIsa 1 Data taken from Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 February, 2009, available online, http://www.mofa.gov.sa/Detail.asp?InNewsItemID=89557.

The Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinion (Arab. al-lajna al-daʾima lil-buhuth al-ʿilmiyya wal-iftaʾ) provides bureaucratic support to the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars, and is responsible for conducting research and administering private iftaʾ (legal opinion). Both institutions are chaired by the office of the Grand Mufti, currently ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad al-Shaykh, the most important religious authority in Saudi Arabia. In 1994, two other important Islamic institutions were created: the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs and the Council for Islamic Mission and Guidance. They became responsible for religious guidance over Saudis abroad, for the moral behaviour and proper conduct of mosque employees and for the activities of mosques domestically. Minister of Defence and Aviation, Crown Prince Sultan, and the Minister for Islamic Affairs, Religious Guidance and Endowments, were nominated as the heads of these two councils.9 The dozens of religious scholars who are members of the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars and its affiliated governmental agencies are among the most influential individuals of the religious elite. In addition, there are thousands of less senior ʿulamaʾ who hold various posts at various agencies. The Ministry for Islamic Affairs, Endowment, Prayer and Guidance The Ministry for Islamic Affairs, Endowment, Prayer and Guidance, created in 1993, is another very important institution. Salih bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Shaykh has led the ministry since 1999. Its remit may be perused on the governmental website, Saudi Arabia Market Information Resource and Directory: ‘The ministry is responsible for all Islamic affairs other than the hajj. Included in its remit are the building and maintenance of mosques throughout the kingdom, the administration of land held by religious trust.’10 The ministry’s budget is said to be spent almost entirely on the salaries of the more than 50,000 missionaries and preachers at home and abroad who are on the ministry’s payroll.11 The Ministry of Pilgrimage has less influence because the ministry is in practice controlled by the Ministry of Interior. Although there is a ministry devoted to the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina required of Muslims, Prince Nayef chairs the Supreme Committee on the Hajj. According to the official website of the Ministry of Pilgrimage, ‘[the] Committee supervises the drafting of the annual General Hajj Master Plan, the studies, proposals and recommendations submitted

Non-royal segment elites 47 by sub-committee for developing Hajj facilities and working out the required arrangements to achieve the maximum comfort for pilgrims.’12 Prince Nayef is accordingly responsible for ensuring that everything runs smoothly, a way to burnish his Islamic credentials. The Minister of Pilgrimage, Dr Fu’ad bin ʿAbd al-Salam bin Muhammad al-Farsi, has held the position since only 2005 and would therefore defer to the senior minister.13 Imam Muhammad bin Saʿud Islamic University in Riyadh The third important elite segment is the Islamic scholars affiliated to the al-Imam Muhammad bin Saʿud University in Riyadh, commonly known as the Imam University. This institution is the ‘nerve centre’ of the Saudi Wahhabi community, where the majority of the kingdom’s religious scholars are trained. The institution was founded in 1953 and given university status in 1974. The Imam University offers courses in the Islamic disciplines and in Arabic. In 2000, it had more than 1,300 teachers and more than 23,000 registered students, including 643 female students.14 There are other Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, including the Umm al-Qura University in Mecca and the Islamic University in Medina, although the scholars affiliated to these universities have less political weight than do those in Riyadh.15 Islamic charities The religious scholars managing the biggest Islamic charities are also important. Most Saudi charities are semi-governmental; they come into being with the blessing of the regime and are affiliated to the kingdom’s official religious institutions. Among the major charities are: the International Islamic Relief Organisation; the World Islamic Welfare Organisation; and the World Assembly of Islamic Youth, also known as the Youth Committee of the Saudi World Assembly. There are also hundreds of private charities established by business enterprises or wealthy merchants. Some of the larger ones are: the al-Wafa Humanitarian Organisation, the Muwaffaq Foundation and the al-Haramayn Islamic Foundation. Some Islamic charities receive governmental funding: the largest charities are awarded tens of millions of US dollars annually and are subject to a certain degree of governmental supervision. Broadly, the purpose of the Islamic charities is providing aid to indigent Muslims in Saudi Arabia, as well as in countries hit by natural disasters and war such as Afghanistan, Lebanon and Palestine. Such charity work is also known to serve as a springboard for the missionary activities of the Wahhabi establishment abroad.16 In the wake of 9/11, Saudi authorities came under Western pressure to improve their checks on the activities of both semi-governmental and private charities. The al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, for example, is now banned worldwide by United Nations’ Security Council Committee Resolution 1267.

48

Non-royal segment elites

Activist preachers Saudi scholars with no position in the official Islamic establishment have also become just as, or perhaps even more, influential than those belonging to the above-mentioned segments. Generally, the official religious leaders do not express any political views, except for issuing pro-government fatwas that for example condemn terror or prohibit Saudis from fighting in Iraq. The non-official shaykhs are, by contrast, far more politically outspoken and controversial. Their activist role is the root of their prominence as well as of their exclusion from the official Wahhabi establishment. Many of the activist Islamic scholars have been associated with the Islamic Awakening (Arab. al-sahwa al-islamiyya), a movement that has gradually developed since the 1960s. The most prominent members in the 1990s, a decade marked by Islamist activism in Saudi Arabia, were Salman al-’Awda and Safar al-Hawali. More marginal groups of activist preachers represented various other ideological trends. One of these was al-wasatiyyun, a group of modernist Islamic intellectuals, which included former al-sahwa shaykhs such as ʿAbd al-Aziz al-Qasim, ʿAbdallah al-Hamid and Hasan al-Maliki. Another group was the al-takfir, militant Islamic preachers who had declared takfir (calling a Muslim an apostate) against the House of Saʿud and its supporters. Among these were shaykhs such as Humud ibn ‘Uqla al-Shu’aybi, ‘Ali al-Khudayr, Nasir al-Fahd and ‘Ayidh al-Qurni.17 Political influence The House of Saʿud has doubtless limited the power of the Wahhabi scholars. The marginalization of religious leaders is most visible in foreign policy. Al Saʿud looks to the ʿulamaʾ to validate important decisions. King Fahd, for example, sought fatwas from the late Grand Mufti ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Baz (1993–99) to legitimize both his inviting American soldiers to the kingdom and the attack on Iraq. The king, however, did not ask the religious leaders for their permission. According to F. Gregory Gause III, never in modern Saudi Arabia’s history has a foreign-policy decision been rescinded or dropped due to the publicly expressed disapproval of the Wahhabi establishment.18 But rarely have members of the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars refused to sign a fatwa because they would regard doing so as violating their integrity. However, neither the fatwa legitimizing storming the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islam’s holiest shrine, occupied by militant Islamists in 1979, nor the fatwa approving deploying 550,000 Western soldiers in Saudi Arabia, regarded by many Muslims as Islam’s Holy Land, in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, were signed by all members of the council. The king intervened in both of these cases and replaced the senior religious scholars who had failed to sign the fatwa, clearly underlining his superior position vis-à-vis the Wahhabi ʿulamaʾ. With reference to the political influence of the ʿulamaʾ, Ayman al-Yassini states that in modern Saudi Arabia, religious scholars have been transformed into

Non-royal segment elites 49 ‘paid civil servants’ appointed by the state, which also regulates their income and oversees their activities.19 Madawi al-Rasheed adds that under the guidance of shaykhs such as ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Baz, Muhammad al-Uthaymin, ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-ʿUbayqan, Salih al-Fawzan and the current Grand Mufti ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad al-Shaykh, the Wahhabi ceased to be an Islamic revivalist movement. Rather it became an ‘apologetic institutionalised religious discourse’ tied to the authority of the royals.20 Yet, the religious establishment’s position has changed according to the needs of the Al Saʿud. In wake of the oil boom, by the late 1970s the religious elite had been partially marginalized as a political force. While the scholars of Islam had been useful in the process of territorial consolidation and nation-building in the first part of the nineteenth century, they were seen as an obstacle to building a strong centralized state, which became the royal family’s main objective later on. Events in the late 1970s brought the ʿulamaʾ back to the fore. This tendency must be understood in the context of the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by the dissident group led by Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi, as well as the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. To outmanoeuvre the dangerous critique of home-grown Islamists and Ayatollah Khomeini’s anti-Saʿud rhetoric, the royals sought direct help from the kingdom’s religious leaders. In exchange, the Al Saʿud rewarded the ʿulamaʾ with an influx of financial and political support.21 As the royals were compelled to accommodate the religious establishment’s interests ever since, the political expenditure was high. During King Fahd’s reign, Wahhabi scholars came to control large parts of the judicial system and have considerable influence within the cultural sphere, especially in the educational system. The Minister for Islamic Affairs, Endowment, Prayer and Guidance, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Education were all Islamic scholars. As much as 30–40 per cent of the curriculum focused on religious doctrine.22 After 9/11, due to immense external pressure, the royal family launched an educational reform aimed at changing the ‘jihadi curricula’ and hostility towards the West. Establishing the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs and the Council for Islamic Mission and Guidance was also an attempt to regulate the mosques and thus impose stricter control on the ʿulamaʾ.23 Some people also interpreted appointing the current grand mufti as a part of this process. Although he had the right family credentials, he was not one of the preachers who had most followers and was widely regarded as a weaker personality than his predecessor, Bin Baz.24 When he came to power in 2005, King ʿAbdallah took further measures to check the religious scholars’ post-1979 power. He called for greater oversight of the judicial system, challenged the rulings of judges and sacked prominent religious figures from their official posts. In February 2009, the king announced his first major cabinet reshuffle. ʿAbdallah dismissed hard-line Shaykh Salih bin Muhammad al-Luhaydan as the head of the Supreme Council of Justice and Shaykh Ibrahim bin ʿAbdallah al-Ghaith as the head of the religious police. Both were replaced by more moderate religious scholars. The king also made his own nephew and son-in-law, Prince Faisal bin ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad, new minister of education, replacing another religious scholar, Dr ʿAbdallah bin Salih al-Obaid.

50

Non-royal segment elites

The reshuffle was intended to speed up the implementation of the judicial and educational reforms introduced by the king. History is repeating itself. Following the unrest in the Middle East in the spring of 2011, in addition to doling out cash and issuing threats, the royal family has again burnished its relationship with the ʿulamaʾ. A significant part of King ʿAbdallah’s spending packages were directed towards the religious establishment. Millions of US dollars will in the years to come be spent on the renovation of mosques across the kingdom and be poured into the coffers of the religious police. To influence the kingdom’s policy, religious leaders have two major mechanisms at their disposal: first, the senior religious leadership may influence Saudi Arabia’s policy through their privileged access to key decision-making authorities, namely the king and the crown prince, as well as to various different ministries. King Faysal established the practice of having regular weekly meetings on Thursday afternoons with the members of the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars settled in Riyadh. This tradition was retained by Kings Khalid and Fahd, and by King ʿAbdallah.25 Second, religious scholars can shape public opinion, thereby limiting political decision-makers’ room for manoeuvre. The religious establishment has privileged access to the means needed to shape public discourse in Saudi Arabia, which it has used, for example, to manipulate important issues related to socio-political reform. Through the regular Friday sermons, which are usually well attended, religious leaders have a public forum at which to address both religious and social issues. In addition, they can disseminate their views via educational institutions, television channels, radio stations, various publications and the Internet. The Wahhabi ʿulamaʾ has recently gone online to counter interpretations of Islam that contradict the official line. In October 2007, during Ramadan, it was announced in Saudi newspapers that the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars had set up an Arabic website to publish the fatwas of its well-known clerics. Except for a section devoted to Grand Mufti Bin Baz, the fatwas were arranged by topic for the believers to browse through.26 No other elite group has the same channels for communication at its disposal. This explains the relatively strong political position of the ’ulama’ vis-à-vis other non-royal elite groups. However, the religious leaders do not control public opinion, but have to adjust to it. For example, the Islamic establishment cannot appear more liberal than the deeply conservative Saudi society. Liberal scholars will inevitably face strong pressure to move in a conservative direction from both public opinion and conservative colleagues.27

Tribal leaders Ibn Saʿud’s kingdom would hardly have seen the light of day without the support of the large tribal confederations in the interior of the Arabian Peninsula. The shaykhs came to play a key role in consolidating the new state. In modern Saudi Arabia, tribal leaders have never gained political influence equal to that of the Islamic establishment, although they constitute a distinct elite group.

Non-royal segment elites 51 Size and structure Geographically, the tribal heartland is the interior of the peninsula. Among the major tribes here are the ‘Anizza, Bani Yam, Banu Khalid, al-Buqum, Duwasir, Ghamid, Harb, al-Murra, Mughad, Mutayr, Qahtan, Shammar and ‘Utayba, the largest, with more than 1 million members. In addition, there are also some two dozen minor tribes, including the more weakly defined tribes outside the interior. On Ibn Saʿud’s conquest, society was tribally structured. Most people living in Najd, al-Qasim and al-Hasa were nomadic or semi-nomadic. Branches of tribal groups lived in agricultural settlements, at least for parts of the year, while others were permanently settled in towns.28 The exact percentage of the contemporary Saudi population of tribal belonging (Arab. qabaliyy) is unknown and debated. The Al Saʿud’s settlement policy, driven by a desire to enforce law, consolidate state borders and impose its authority, has effectively undermined tribal structures. It is reasonable to assume that the bulk of the population in ʿAsir and less so in the interior still claims tribal affiliation, while tribal identification is weaker in the major cities of the Hijaz and the towns of the Gulf. Even camel-rearing Bedouins have by and large settled in towns today. The nomadic population is no more than 2–5 per cent of the Saudi total population.29 Regardless of the government’s policy, tribal identity is still alive in Saudi Arabia. There are two areas in which tribal belonging are still particularly meaningful. Marriage is one of these: tribal belonging is firmly linked to social status and most Saudis still wed within their own ‘social class’. Social identity is the second such area: for many people, tribal ties are more important than belonging to a religious group or country, for example, because tribal affiliation is often the key to accessing social goods such as scholarships and jobs.30 The largest Saudi tribes, like the religious leaders of the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars, have gone online. For example, Saudis claiming affiliation to Shammar and ‘Utayba, two of the largest and most prominent tribes, have recently created their own web pages, respectively shmmr.net and otaibh.net. Among youths there are subcultures that have developed various tribal symbols, such as tattoos, which conflict with strict Islamic tradition, to communicate with each other and create a notion of brotherhood.31 Its importance must not be exaggerated, but globalization seems to have strengthened tribal identity among some Saudis. The tribe is led by a chief, or shaykh. Within their own tribal communities, Saudi chiefs have traditionally been responsible for securing the economic wellbeing of their tribespeople, enforcing law and order, and mediating between the tribe and the government’s local representatives.32 Tribal leadership is for generations often recruited from a distinct family, but this depends on the consent of the tribe. Nicholas S. Hopkins writes with reference to the al-Murra that ‘[t]he amir (chief) generally emerges from the same leading family from one generation to the next, but continuity in one family requires political success’.33 This position has for many generations belonged to the al-Murra tribe’s noblest family, the al-Shuraym. While the al-Shuraym is so large that a worthy chieftain can always be supplied from among its members, no bearer of the family name is guaranteed to succeed to the leadership of the al-Murra.

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Tribal hierarchy Saudi Arabia’s tribal hierarchy is complex and difficult to penetrate. Tribal notions of social status are still strong, even among settled Bedouins, and this social hierarchy is cultivated by its higher stratas in particular. Traditionally, purity of blood and origin (Arab. asl) determined a tribesman’s social status. Within the tribal hierarchy, those who claim descent from noble tribes, which are the camel-rearing tribes, are at the top.34 Doumato describes the way in which tribal people divide themselves into superior and inferior tribes. The most prominent of the Saudi superior tribes are the Najd-based ‘Anizza, Shammar, Harb, Mutayr, Banu Khalid, al-Murra, Qahtan and ‘Utayba, while the main tribes considered inferior are the Awazim, Rashayda, Hutaym and ʿUqayl.35 At the bottom of the tribal hierarchy come the slubi, a pariah tribe of handicraftsmen that used to travel with the more well-off tribes on their migrations. This social hierarchy was traditionally reproduced through marriage. One could not marry across different ‘social classes’ without causing a scandal. For a tribesman it was less scandalous, though not entirely acceptable, to marry a foreigner than a non-tribal woman (Arab. khadiri) or a woman belonging to an inferior tribe. The children of such a marriage would suffer the taint of mixed blood and hence degrade the status of the tribe as a whole.36 In addition, in the context of the Saudi state, closeness to the royal family has become a very important factor defining social prestige among tribes. Ibn Saʿud did not marry many tribal women. In this respect the al-Sudayri family, a part of the al-Dawasir tribe located in southern Najd, is an exception. For decades, this family has been very close to the House of Saʿud. Ibn Saʿud twice married Hessa bint Ahmad al-Sudayri, who bore him seven sons (the Sudayri Seven), while his marriages with two other Sudayri women resulted in six more sons.37 Beside the Sudayris, Ibn Saʿud married three tribal women belonging respectively to the Banu Khalid, Ruwala and Shammar. Together, these women bore him six sons.38 The king’s marriage into the powerful Shammar tribe after his conquering of the Rashidi emirate in Haʾil, which derived from the Shammar, was clearly intended to create a link to his former enemy.39 Ibn Saʿud married Fahda bint al-ʿAsi al-Shuraym of the ʿAbde branch of the Shammar. She had previously been married to the Rashidi ruler, who was killed in 1920. She bore him one son, the current King ʿAbdallah. The Al Saʿud has reinforced the ties between the state and the major tribes by marrying tribal women to government officials and Saudi princes.40 According to William Lancaster’s study of the al-Saar Bedouins in southern Arabia in 1981, such marriages were encouraged by tribal leaders because they were regarded as a means of ensuring continued access to government officials.41 Al Saʿud – ‘the super tribe’ Although the Al Saʿud has long been sedentary, this in no way bars a claim of descent from a noble tribe. The earliest recorded ancestor of the family is

Non-royal segment elites 53 Mani’ ibn Rabi’a al-Muraydi, who, according to chroniclers of Najd, settled in Dirʿiyyah in 1446–47 with his clan, the Mrudah. The tribal origin of the royal family’s ancestors is subject to some dispute. The Mrudahs are known to be descendants of the pre-Islamic tribal confederation of Rabi’a, particularly the branch of Wa’il. What is unclear is to which tribe of Wa’il they belong. Many genealogists of their native Najd claim that they are descendants of the tribe of Bani Hanifa, while others believe that they are descendants of the large ‘Anizza confederation of northern Arabian Peninsula and the Syrian Desert.42 Many observers claim that the royal family has sought to establish itself as a ‘super tribe’ in the tribal hierarchy through intermarriages with noble Saudi tribes.43 In this tribal ‘imagined community’, the king is the shaykh al-mashayikh.44 The image of the king as a tribal chief is cultivated through a broad spectrum of symbolic acts. Consequently, the royals are promoting selected tribal values and traditions, and hence the king and other senior princes are often seen in public taking part in tribal sword dances (Arab. ʿarda), desert camps, falconry, etc. The strategy of promoting the House of Saʿud as the tribe above all other tribes has apparently had some effect. Hopkins, for example, observes in his study of the Murra tribe that its members view the authority of the royal family as superior to that of its shaykhs. Loyalty to the state is, for the tribesmen, not related to the state apparatus; rather it is linked to following the princes. In Hopkins’ own words: ‘The Rwala and the Murrah make a distinction between al-dawlah (the state or bureaucracy) and al-hukumah (the Saudi royal family or governors); they are loyal to the latter and fearful of the former, but fear that the state is taking over the government.’45 The Saudi Arabian National Guard After the conquest of the Hijaz in 1926, Ibn Saʿud found himself in conflict with some ikhwan leaders. These challenged the king’s authority by accusing him of betraying the cause for which they had fought and opposing the taxes levied upon their followers. More precisely, the rebels sought to stop power being centralized in the hands of Ibn Saʿud and keep the purity of Wahhabi practices, which were challenged by the innovations advocated by the king. The majority of the population chose to side with the king, and this, along with the support of the Najdi ʿulamaʾ, enabled him to mobilize the forces needed to crush the rebels. Ibn Saʿud defeated the dissidents at the battle of Sibla in 1929, after which victory the militia was reorganized into the National Guard. The Saudi Arabian National Guard is today one of five branches of the Saudi Arabian National Forces. SANG is both a standing force and a tribal militia. In the past, the SANG largely consisted of personnel drawn from pro-Saʿud tribes in the Najd and al-Hasa, and mirrored the tribal hierarchy in the composition of its ranks. Its recruiting base later expanded to include other regions, and now even has some Shiʿa Muslims in its ranks.46 The National Guard is the House of Saʿud’s Praetorian Guard. Although not stated explicitly, the SANG clearly functions as a counterweight to the regular army. According to Anthony H. Cordesman, the military strength of the guard

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approaches that of the Saudi army.47 In addition, the SANG ensures that the military forces are not commanded by one single branch of the royal family. Since 1963, the guard has been controlled by current King ʿAbdallah and is often seen as his private army – it is now commanded by his son, Mitʿab; while Crown Prince Sultan, the king’s half-brother, has power over the Saudi army. Political influence The political influence of the tribal leadership in contemporary Saudi Arabia is much debated. Although the Al Saʿud has established itself as a ‘super-tribe’, for decades it has tried to weaken tribal society. The government has encouraged Bedouins to settle permanently and provided welfare directly to the tribesmen to undermine the position of chiefs within tribal social security networks. Moreover, the most prominent chiefs have been co-opted by the royal family through the promotion of their family members to high military ranks in the SANG, the House of Saʿud’s Praetorian Guard. Hence, they have been integrated in King ʿAbdallah’s network of patronage.48 The royal family still cultivates personal contact with prominent tribal leaders. The Najdi tribal families, traditionally the leading ones, are frequently attendants at the courts of the king and senior princes, and the shaykhs often travel as part of the royals’ personal entourage. The princes sometimes also visit tribal chiefs.49 P. Marcel Kurpershoek argues that such personal contacts have a dual function: they reinforce the chiefs’ eminence among their own tribesmen, and enable the royals to keep a discrete finger on the pulse of popular feeling. In addition, this helps sustain the notion of a ‘desert democracy’.50 Although tribal identity still exists in different forms, the government’s policy has clearly weakened the shaykhs’ political influence, which is today very limited. Currently, neither the king nor the senior princes consult any tribal chiefs before making decisions affecting national policy. The leaders of smaller tribes are even more marginalized. Neither is there any tribal balance in the Council of Ministers, nor in the Consultative Council, though there is a regional balance in the latter institution. In the municipal elections held from February to April 2005, tribal leaders were swept away by conservative Islamist candidates in all urban constituencies and even in some electoral districts where tribal structures remain strong.51 A shaykh’s authority does not generally extend beyond the borders of his tribe. One diplomat illustrates this point: If a random Saudi on the street was asked to identify the leaders of the country’s largest tribes by name, it is very unlikely that the person would be able to bring about any name at all.52 In local politics, by contrast, the House of Saʿud routinely asks for the advice of tribal chiefs. This consultation process has nowadays been institutionalized, the main arena being regional councils spread across the country on which many tribal leaders are represented. Here, provincial governors and municipal authorities

Non-royal segment elites 55 consult tribal leaders on most matters affecting their local communities. At the king’s court there is an office for tribal affairs, but the princes serving as governors are usually responsible for the tribes in their provinces. Each governor has an office for tribal affairs which tribesmen can visit to ask for things they need, such as roads, hospitals and schools, or if they need help solving disputes.53

Business leaders Indeed, the House of Saʿud is the kingdom’s richest family – and by the late 1970s it had become the richest family in the world.54 Forbes Magazine estimates that King Fahd acquired a personal fortune of $30 billion during his 23-year reign, while King ʿAbdallah was in 2006 the world’s third-richest head of state, behind the rulers of Brunei and the United Arab Emirates, with an estimated fortune of $21 billion.55 The family’s combined wealth is obviously difficult to estimate, but it must be hundreds of billions of dollars. Many non-royal business families are also among the wealthiest in the world. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the financial wealth of these families has not been converted into political power. Size and structure Saudi business culture is deeply rooted in the culture of the Arabian Peninsula. The nature and the composition of the Saudi business elite, as well as its relationship with the state, have varied substantially over time. Saudi Arabian business enterprises have traditionally been – and still are – centred on families.56 Tim Niblock and Monica Malik describe in The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia the growth and structure of the kingdom’s private sector. They identify four groups according to the way in which the various business families established their wealth.57 First are the families whose wealth pre-dates the establishment of modern Saudi Arabia. Under King Ibn Saʿud, there were several families as wealthy as the House of Saʿud. The king depended heavily on such families’ financial support to consolidate his state. The business scene was very cosmopolitan, involving families from India, Iran, Central Arabia, Hadhramawt, etc. The oldest business enterprises are to be found in the Hijaz, run by families that made their fortunes from the lucrative pilgrimage industry. During Ibn Saʿud’s reign, the richest Jeddah-based families were ‘Ali Reza, al-Atta, ‘Attar, Ba’eshan, Bin Himd, Bin Zagr, Dabbagh, Hafiz, Jamil, Jamjum, Naji, Nashar, Nassif, Sanie, Shobokshis, Shinkar and Zahid. The largest business families in al-Hasa included al-Qusaybi, al-Turki, Babtain, Seihaiti and Tamimi, while the families dominating business in Central Arabia were al-Rajihi, al-Rashid and ‘Umran. Second, there are business families who established good links to Ibn Saʿud during the 1940s and 1950s. Despite a limited resource base, they obtained contracts through their personal contacts with the ruler. These families became important in trade, banking and construction. Among them were Abu Nayyan, al-Esayi, al-Khereiji, Juffali, Kaki, al-Rajihi, Rajab, Sharbatli and Silsilah. The new Saudi state also gave opportunities to Hadhrami families,

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mostly from Wadi Do’an, such as Bin Mahfouz, Bin Laden, Buqshan, Ba Khashab and Banu Najih. Third, there are families in al-Hasa that became involved with Saudi Aramco and built their wealth on supplying goods to the company. One of these was the Olayan family. Finally, there are individuals who served as Ibn Saʿud’s advisors and who entered into business on this basis. Two examples are ‘Adnan Khashoggi and Ghaith Rashid Pharaon. More recently, the enormous development projects initiated by King ʿAbdallah, including the ambitious plans to create six so-called economic cities, have given new economic opportunities to families particularly close to the king. Among these are al-Tuwaijiri and al-Dabbagh.58 Former president and chief executive officer of the Dabbagh Group, Amr ʿAbdallah al-Dabbagh, who is trusted by King ʿAbdallah, was in March 2004 appointed governor and chairman of the board of directors of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) – which is the main facilitator of the economic cities – with the rank of minister. Other noble families have also been given business opportunities through the king’s projects. For example, tribal business families, such as the al-Rashid, are actively involved in creating the Prince ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Musaʿid Economic City in Haʾil in the Northern Province.59 Kiren Aziz Chaudhry argues in The Price of Wealth that the royals’ policy since the oil boom has changed the composition of the Saudi business elite and its relationship to the House of Saʿud. According to her, the royal family directed large amounts of the enormous financial surpluses of the 1970s and early 1980s to strengthen new business families of Najdi origin, such as themselves, to balance the influence of the better established commercial elites in the Hijaz and the Eastern Province.60 Nevertheless, the Al Saʿud did not marginalize the traditional commercial and entrepreneurial families, who had supported Ibn Saʿud’s state project and who were also able to take advantage of the oil boom, amassing huge fortunes.61 Al al-ʿAli Reza Although the ‘Ali Rezas are not the richest or most important family anymore, it is interesting that the family’s history mirrors that of the kingdom. Haji ʿAbdallah ‘Ali Reza & Co Ltd is believed to be the oldest family business in Saudi Arabia. Its founding father, Zainal ‘Ali Reza, emigrated from Iran to Jeddah in the late nineteenth century, where he imported food, textiles and other merchandise from other Middle Eastern countries and India. The ‘Ali Reza family soon expanded its activities by buying shipping companies to carry these commodities. The ‘Ali Rezas lent money to Ibn Saʿud and his sons. Later, the family won several major governmental contracts, such as the installation of the first broadcasting and radio telegraph system; the supply and installation of the first automatic telex exchange, followed by a computerized electronic exchange for the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone; the management and operation of the Jeddah sea port for ten years; the first hyperbolic navigation system for the Port

Non-royal segment elites 57 Authority; a computer centre for the National Information Centre; land mobile radio system; and the flight information display systems at King Fahd International Airport, Dhahran. Within civil construction, the company participated in the construction of several airports, military cantonments and commercial buildings.62 The family nowadays makes money from many sectors of the Saudi Arabian economy, including oil, telecoms, shipping, travel, manufacturing, construction, real estate, jewellery and watches.63 The ‘Ali Rezas were among the first Saudis to have a Western education and were soon recruited to positions in the new and expanding state apparatus. One of the first non-royals to be appointed member of the Council of Ministers came from this family. In the 1950s, Muhammad bin ʿAbdallah Zainal ‘Ali Reza served as minister of commerce and industry, and was later appointed ambassador to Cairo and then Paris. His brother, ‘Ali bin ʿAbdallah Zainal ‘Ali Reza, served as Saudi ambassador to the United States during the 1970s. Four of Zainal ‘Ali Reza’s great grandchildren – Muhammad, ʿAbdallah, Hisham and Khalid – founded Xenel Industries in 1973. These brothers, all educated in the United States, have also been appointed to important political positions: on 3 March 2008, King ʿAbdallah appointed ʿAbdallah bin Ahmad Zainal ‘Ali Reza to the post of minister of commerce and industry. His brother, Muhammad bin Ahmad Zainal ‘Ali Reza, is a former member of the Consultative Council. Princes in business According to F. Gregory Gause III, the ruling families in the Gulf have historically maintained a distance from the commercial sector.64 Even the Al Saʿud is rather new to business. Later, however, the royals have entered the world of Saudi commerce and entrepreneurship, and are today among its most successful figures. Many second- and third-generation princes who held prominent government positions during the reigns of successive kings took up private business when they realized they would have no chance of advancing through the system. Some of King Saʿud’s sons went into business as early as the 1950s. As the number of princes was growing and competition for influential political positions hardened, the only respectable profession remaining for the majority of royals was the private sector. Moreover, many princes were brought in by foreign concerns wishing to do business in the kingdom and that saw a royal family partner as the best political insurance. Within business, the ordinary and royal merchants sometimes interact as partners and sometimes as rivals. It is not unusual today for a Saudi businessman to know three or four princes. Such personal acquaintances often work as the key to contracts. Sharaf Sabri’s The House of Saud in Commerce is the first systematic and comprehensive study of the royal family’s involvement in private business. In the 1990s, the royals invested in about 1,050 small- and large-scale companies. This number, Sabri argues, is low compared with the total of 375,000 business establishments and 8,000 medium and large companies registered by the government in 1993. The royals’ investments did not constitute more than 10 per cent of total investments in

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the private sector. Taking Saudi Arabia’s top 100 companies in 1994 as an example, members of the royal family held major stakes in 15 companies.65 All in all, Sabri estimates, there were around 600 princes and princesses holding business stakes in the private sector. More than 100 of the 1,050 companies in which the royals had invested their money were fully owned by individual members of the Al Saʿud.66 Prince Walid bin Talal, born in 1957, is the best known royal entrepreneur. In October 2001 he offered a gift of $10 million to the victims of the World Trade Centre. This offer, though promptly turned down by New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, made the prince famous outside of the Middle East and international business circles. Prior to that, Prince Walid remained what Business Week once called ‘the most important financial kingpin that you’ve never heard of’.67 As the king’s nephew, Prince Walid took up business in much the same way as other well-connected Saudis. In the early 1980s, he became an agent for foreign companies operating in the kingdom and established a strong foundation for his growing financial empire, basically by landing lucrative construction deals in the military sector and acquiring shares in the poorly managed banking sector. In the late 1980s, Prince Walid expanded his activities to the United States by investing in Citigroup, followed in the next decade by making major acquisitions in other ailing blue-chip American and European companies. Prince Walid bought stakes in many high-profile enterprises, including the Euro Disney theme park outside of Paris, New York’s Plaza Hotel, Canary Wharf in London and Apple. In 2000, he began focusing on high-tech companies, such as Compaq, Kodak, eBay, Priceline.com, Amazon.com and WorldCom.68 Forbes Magazine ranked him in 2003 as the world’s fifth-richest person, with an estimated fortune of $17.7 billion.69 Prince Walid has to a certain degree translated his wealth into political influence. He is the son of Prince Talal, who is close to King ʿAbdallah. It was rumoured that during the financial crisis in the late 1990s, Walid bin Talal twice intervened with his private finances to guarantee the payment of public salaries, thereby underpinning the position of ʿAbdallah.70 Whether this is true is difficult to assess. Nonetheless, thanks to his ties to ʿAbdallah, Prince Walid had enough freedom to publicly advocate his father’s political views. In 2003, he demanded in public the introduction of elections to the Consultative Council, and called soon after for an end to the system of allowances that provide even peripheral members of the House of Saʿud with thousands of dollars per month from state coffers.71 There are also several other important royal businessmen in Saudi Arabia: among the second-generation princes, Prince Mitʿab, who is very rich in real estate, Prince Mishʿal, who has large land holdings and real estate, and Prince Nawwaf, who has numerous financial interests but is not really a serious businessman, are all known to have substantial private business interests. Besides Prince Walid bin Talal, there are also many third-generation princes involved in Saudi business, such as Prince Muhammad bin Faysal, who is a pioneer of Islamic banking in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries, Prince Khalid bin Fahd, who alone has business stakes in around 50 companies, Prince ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Fahd, who is stone-rich and acts as the representative of several foreign companies, and

Non-royal segment elites 59 Prince Ahmad bin Salman, who had substantial marketing interests until his death in 2002. This list could have been made much longer. Royals entering into Saudi business life have caused some friction. According to a lawyer, ‘there are thousands of cases where royals have violated the rights of ordinary citizens’.72 The huge majority of these cases are related to financial matters. Many royals have abused property rights, contracts and judicial procedures vis-à-vis both Saudis and foreign businessmen. Princes have among others used their influence to obtain shares of private businesses, interfered in contract awards and expropriated the property of others.73 A few princes have made big money by becoming the legally required Saudi partners of foreign companies. All major companies have royal business agents who negotiate and procure their government contracts and then collect a percentage of the profits and/or a commission. It is widely known that Crown Prince Sultan has taken huge commissions for various arms purchases. In charge of aviation, he has also profited from the purchasing of airliners. Sultan’s oldest son, Prince Khalid, owns the National Aviation Services and is believed to have profited from this.74 Another of Sultan’s sons, Prince Bandar, who negotiated a £40 billion arms deal (the al-Yamamah deal) between BAE Systems, the UK’s biggest arms dealer, and Saudi Arabia, has been accused by Western media of having received secret payments for over a decade worth up to £120 million a year. In 2004 BAE Systems was subject to an investigation by the Serious Fraud Office, but the investigation was dropped two years later to secure the interests of BAE Systems, which had agreed to supply Saudi Arabia with 72 Eurofighters.75 Businesswomen Businesswomen have a long tradition in Arab-Islamic culture. As an example, Khadija bint Khwailid, the Prophet’s wife, was a businesswoman blessed with a large fortune, and she put all her wealth and property at her husband’s disposal to help the spread of Islam. Some royal women are among Saudi Arabia’s foremost private business investors.76 Princesses do not need a guardian (Arab. wali amr) to open and run a business establishment and they get licenses easier. Their status also makes it possible for them to operate within sectors that are off limits for ordinary Saudi women. An example is Luthan Trading Company, whose 20-member, all-female board is chaired by Princess Madawi bint Muhammad bin ʿAbdallah. Another wealthy co-owner is Princess Reema bint Bandar bint Sultan. The first has in public emphasized that the private sector needs to play a leading role in providing education and training to the younger generation of Saudi women that aim to enter the labour market.77 In 2008, the princesses created international headlines by opening the Luthan Hotel & Spa, Saudi Arabia’s first women-only hotel. Non-royal women could never have established these kinds of businesses.78 Yet, some women, also non-royal, also have quite extensive business interests. Saudi Arabia’s richest woman, Lubna Olayan, was in 2006 ranked by Fortune Magazine as the most powerful Arab businesswoman and the ninety-seventh most powerful

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woman in the world. At the age of 50, Olayan became the first woman ever to serve on the board of a Saudi public company. She co-chaired the World Economic Forum and she joined the board of WPP, the global advertising giant. Her main job is as chief executive officer and chair of the Olayan Financial Group, a conglomerate of some 50 companies founded by her father.79 She is a member of the Effat College’s advisory board80 and was appointed member of the board of the new King ʿAbdallah University of Science and Technology by King ʿAbdallah in October 2008.81 Dr Nahed Taher, the first woman chief executive of Saudi Arabia’s Gulf One Investment Bank, was ranked by Fortune Magazine in 2006 as the world’s seventy-second most influential businesswoman in a ranking of 100 women. For more than three years, the 41-year-old Taher was the senior economist at Saudi Arabia’s National Commercial Bank, where she was the only woman among 4,000 men. In 2005, tapping into her extensive contacts, she entered the lucrative field of investment banking by forming Gulf One. Taher then became the first woman to head a Saudi investment bank. Su’ad al-Husayni Juffali, the widow of the late Ahmad Juffali, is today the informal head of the Juffali Group, one of Saudi Arabia’s largest commercial enterprises. She established and organized the first Women’s Welfare Society and the al-Faysaliyya Women’s Society, both of which deal with the education and health of women and children. Suad Juffali is a member of the board of trustees of the International Academy of Amman, Jordan, of the Arab Thought Foundation in Beirut, and also of the board of supervisors at the Lebanese American University in Beirut. She is also a member of the board of several other organizations, such as Dar al-Hanan, the Saudi Institute for Health Services and Effat College.82 Some religious leaders are also very wealthy. The main source of their wealth is support from rich religious business families. As mentioned, many members of the Al al-Shaykh are involved in business, also some of the women. The niece of the justice minister, Dr Asya Al al-Shaykh, is an outspoken businesswoman. She is the founder and president of Tamkeen Development and Management Consulting, the first Saudi company dedicated to corporate social responsibility. Two businesswomen, Dr Lama al-Sulayman and Nashwa Taher, made history by being elected to the board of directors of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry in November 2005, the first time women had ever been admitted to an elected body in Saudi Arabia. As the two were supported by male voters, they clearly had the backing of the strong merchant families in Jeddah. The result, covered extensively by the media, was symbolically important because it demonstrated that Saudi women could participate as voters and candidates, and win. This may make it easier for women to take part in future elections, both for the municipal councils or the Consultative Council. Later, Madawi A. al-Hassoun and Olfet Qabani were also elected board members. Political influence The political role of the non-royal business elite in modern Saudi Arabia – like that of the tribal elite – is very much debated. Oil revenues doubtless allowed the

Non-royal segment elites 61 House of Saʿud to become the dominant player in the local economy. The rulers initiated extensive infrastructure development programmes and gave contracts to local commercial/merchant families, whose business interests became heavily vested in the royal family. But lucrative contracts depended entirely on the whims of the king. Salem bin Laden, a very successful businessman of Yemeni origin, said once about Prince Fahd: ‘He can break me or he can make me – one word out of his mouth.’83 Irrespective of the oil rentier economy, Giacomo Luciani argues that the kingdom’s commercial/merchant families have managed to transform themselves into a bourgeoisie which ‘is today largely autonomous from the state, increasingly class conscious and ready to play a political role’.84 Although the king and the senior princes still make all important decisions, they allow for the business community’s views within certain issues, as they do for other elite groups. The consultation process between the royals and the business elite has been institutionalized and now takes place in three main arenas: the Saudi Council of Commercial and Industrial Chambers; the Council of Ministers; and the Consultative Council. There are many individuals from the big business families in these institutions: at the time of writing, ʿAbdallah bin Ahmad Zainal ‘Ali Reza serves as minister of commerce and industry. Dr ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Zamil is a member of the Consultative Council, while there are two members of the al-Qusaybi family serving on the Council of Ministers: Dr Ghazi bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Qusaybi as minister of labour, and Khalid bin Muhammad al-Qusaybi as minister of national economy and planning. These are just a few examples. While King ʿAbdallah initially limited the influence of the religious establishment, his door has been particularly open to the private sector. The king, who came to power with a vision of modernization and industrialization, has relied heavily on the merchants and technocrats to realize these aims. In line with this, Tim Niblock and Monica Malik observe that King ʿAbdallah attaches great importance to the views of the Saudi commercial elite.85 In 1999 ʿAbdallah created the 12-member Supreme Economic Council (SEC), ‘which shall be responsible for assisting the Council of Ministers in carrying out its duties and making decisions with respect to economic issues’.86 The SEC, chaired by King ʿAbdallah and Crown Prince Sultan, is composed of heads of the pertinent ministries and agencies. Businessmen are represented in the council’s 16-member advisory committee.87 It has thus provided the business community with an additional arena for consultation with the strategic elite. Luciani refers to the development of a more sophisticated legal framework regulating private business to illustrate the political influence of the business elite in Saudi Arabia. The commercial/merchant families have at their disposal vast capital which they want to invest. The kingdom’s legal framework regulating private business has been so underdeveloped that merchants have shied away from investing domestically and have invested in Dubai, other Gulf countries and the West. To stop this capital drain, the king has taken steps to introduce a number of essential laws. The same development can also be seen in

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Non-royal segment elites Box 4.2 Members of the SEC (appointed 16 August 2005) • • • • • • • • • • • •

King ʿAbdallah bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (President) Crown Prince Sultan bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (Vice-President) Minister of State and member of the Council of Ministers – Dr ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbdallah al-Khuwaytir Minister of Labour – Dr Ghazi bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Qusaybi Minister of State and member of the Council of Ministers – Dr Matlab bin ʿAbdallah al-Nafisa Minister of Commerce and Industry – Dr Hashim bin ʿAbdallah bin Hashim al-Yamani Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources – ʿAli bin Ibrahim al-Naʿimi Minister of Finance – Dr Ibrahim bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbdallah al-ʿAssaf Minister of National Economy and Planning – Khalid bin Muhammad al-Qusaybi Minister of Water and Electricity – ʿAbdallah bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Husayn Minister of State and member of the Council of Ministers – ʿAbdallah bin Ahmad Zainal ʿAli Reza Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency – Hamad bin Saʿud alSayyari

other monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula. Now, according to Luciani, we are witnessing a ‘reform race’ in the Gulf, for instance a focus on being top of the WTO’s rankings and aiming to improve the legal framework to attract home private investors.88 In 2007, the World Bank recognized Saudi Arabia as one of the world’s top reformers in its annual ‘Ease of Doing Business’ report. Recent reforms improved the kingdom’s position from thirty-eighth to twenty-third of the 178 countries in the World Bank’s rankings. The report ranked Saudi Arabia as the best place to do business in the entire Middle East and Arab world.89 Nonetheless, the relationship between the royals and the business elite is still that of master and servant. The business elite has never developed into a state elite. The House of Saʿud has recruited governmental employees from other segments of society, and the businessmen that have been brought into the state apparatus are generally recruited to positions directly related to their concerns. Therefore, as Michael Herb notes, most businessmen in governmental positions are to be found in such ministries as those of commerce, industry, electricity, as well as in the management of state corporations.90 The overall political influence of business families is, Herb continues, very limited. Even when the state ran out of money in the 1990s and took up loans from them, they were not given any more power.91

Non-royal segment elites 63

Leaders of the bureaucracy Ibn Saʿud’s sons created a state bureaucracy, which came to play a key role in developing and consolidating the new kingdom. State-initiated development projects, funded by the flow of petro-dollars, triggered the rise of a new broad social segment comprising Saudis possessing professional and technical expertise. Their skills were needed to serve the growing needs of the state, and on that basis they bore influence. Today, due to the rapidly increasing complexity of the Saudi state, the bureaucracy has become even more important. The leaders of the bureaucracy constitute the final segment elite. Size and structure Ibn Saʿud relied on some relatives and a few trusted advisors, many of them foreigners. He governed from his Royal Court by issuing royal decrees, and consulted prominent members of different segments of society through his majlis. Ibn Saʿud held an open house between 2pm and 8pm every single day of his life. In the wake of the proclamation of the kingdom, he created a division of the Royal Court called the Political Committee. This committee consisted of six advisors: an Egyptian, Hafiz Wahba; two Syrians, Khalid al-Hakim and Yusuf Yasin; a Lebanese national, Fu’ad Hamza; a Libyan, Khalid al-Ghargini; and an Englishman, H. St John Philby.92 These men all had administrative knowledge from their homelands, which they employed to serve the king as local experience was then absent. The committee did not deal with financial matters. Those were exclusively in the hands of the king’s loyal friend and ‘factotum minister’, ʿAbdallah al-Sulayman, born into an ordinary Najdi family.93 As long as Ibn Saʿud reigned, the state apparatus was poorly developed. Saudi Aramco, which later became the country’s national oil and gas company, was established in 1933. That year the king signed a concessionary agreement with Standard Oil of California allowing it to explore Saudi Arabia for oil. Due to the lack of a well-developed state apparatus, it was Saudi Aramco that first provided health services and education to the Saudis. This remained so during Ibn Saʿud’s lifetime. As late as 1952, Ibn Saʿud established the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Saudi Arabia’s central bank. In 1953, the year the king died, he created the Council of Ministers. The council’s members, appointed by the king, were given the important task of advising on the formulation of general policy and direct the activities of the bureaucracy. Ibn Saʿud appointed men from prominent Najdi families to govern the various provinces of his new kingdom. Some of these posts were given to his brothers and nephews. However, driven by his concern that the throne go to his sons, Ibn Saʿud made his sons governors as soon as they were old enough. Towards the end of his reign, more of the king’s sons took up posts in the administration, occupying almost all posts on the Council of Ministers as well as other key positions in the state apparatus.94

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Ibn Saʿud left a bankrupt kingdom in administrative chaos.95 The state apparatus was too small to effectively take care of state affairs and the growing oil industry. His modest administration contrasts sharply with contemporary Saudi Arabia’s extensive bureaucratic apparatus. Crown Prince Faysal’s 1962 10-point reform programme led to administrative growth, as the government sought to make good on its promises to foster educational, economic and infrastructural development. During the 1960s, four ministries were established: Oil; Labour and Social Affairs; Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments; and Information. Accordingly, the growth of government in Saudi Arabia did not begin with the oil boom of the 1970s. The oil boom of 1973, however, fuelled the growth of government, to the extent that by the end of the 1980s the Saudis had built a vast administrative apparatus. Seven more ministries were created in the 1970s: Justice; Higher Education; Industry and Electricity; Municipal and Rural Affairs; Planning; Housing and Public Works; and Post, Telephone and Telegraph. During the rapid expansion of the 1970s, employment in the public sector was virtually guaranteed for Saudi citizens possessing technical skills and for those with a Western education. It is during this time period, according to Mark Heller and Nadav Safran, that Saudi Arabia’s new middle class was created.96 In 1998, approximately 670,000 people were employed by the Saudi state, including some 89,000 foreign workers.97 Referring to the top level of the bureaucracy, Anthony H. Cordesman writes that ‘much of the planning and management of the kingdom is conducted by Western-educated experts, who are supported by roughly 250 other senior appointments and a network of approximately 700 senior civil servants’.98 The key technocrats, those with real political influence, consist first and foremost of the advisors currently favoured by the king and the other senior royals, the members of the Council of Ministers, as well as the heads of other important state institutions such as Saudi Aramco and the SAMA. The majority of the Consultative Council’s members are also to be considered technocrats. Membership in this council, however, is far from synonymous with political influence. The Al al-Tuwaijiri Among the technocratic families, the Al al-Tuwaijiri is among the most prominent in Saudi Arabia. The family, with its origins in al-Majmaʿ, the capital city in the district of Sudayr in Qasim, has been at the Royal Court for decades. This family of royal retainers is particularly close to King ʿAbdallah. None of the al-Tuwaijiris have played a more prominent role than ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-Tuwaijiri. Al-Tuwaijiri, born in 1917, the son of one of Ibn Saʿud’s companions, was orphaned early and had no formal education. Nonetheless, he inherited his father’s position as treasurer of the district of Sudayr in 1938, while a young man of barely 21 years old. In 1961, al-Tuwaijiri moved to Riyadh to work for the Saudi Arabian National Guard. He managed to rise to assistant deputy commander and right hand of ʿAbdallah, who was then the head of the

Non-royal segment elites 65 National Guard. He remained ʿAbdallah’s most trusted advisor and friend until his death at the age of 90 in 2007.99 At the time of writing, the late al-Tuwaijiri’s son, Khalid al-Tuwaijiri, is King ʿAbdallah’s most powerful personal advisor, while another son, ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-Tuwaijiri, was made SANG deputy commander in November 2010. The late al-Tuwaijiri’s nephew, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Tuwaijiri, is the manager of the king’s personal office.100 The newly formed Allegiance Council is headed by ʿAbdallah’s brother Mishʿal and managed by Khalid al-Tuwaijiri. Several other members of the Al al-Tuwaijiri hold other influential positions in Saudi Arabia’s state apparatus: Dr ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Tuwaijiri is currently secretary general of the SEC; Muhammad Ibrahim al-Tuwaijiri is director of weapons and administration of the SANG; General Saʿd bin ʿAbdallah al-Tuwaijiri is director general of civil defence; Hamad bin Hamad bin Nasir al-Tuwaijiri serves as director general of administrative and financial affairs at the Ministry of Labour; and Dr Ahmad al-Tuwaijiri has served as member of the Consultative Council. As mentioned, the family also has substantial economic interests. The al-Tuwaijiri Group, founded in 1976 by Muhammad Salih al-Tuwaijiri, is today among the largest privately owned business establishments in Saudi Arabia. The Council of Ministers and the Consultative Council While tribal leaders and members of prominent merchant families serve on the regional councils, mainly former technocrats/bureaucrats serve on the Council of Ministers and the Consultative Council. The former, the most important of the two, was established by Ibn Saʿud in 1953. Since the 1962 cabinet most of the ministers have been commoners. The Saudi kings have recruited Westerneducated technocrats to key governmental posts on the basis of their professional expertise and, not to forget, their long loyalty to the House of Saʿud. Since 1964 the king has served as prime minister and the crown prince as deputy prime minister, but this practice has not yet been mentioned in any law. According to the Law of the Council of Ministers, promulgated by King Fahd in September 1993,101 the council is responsible for drafting and overseeing the implementation of internal, external, financial, economic, educational and defence policies and general affairs of the state. The council meets weekly and is presided over by the king or one of his deputies. In April 2003, King Fahd issued decrees renaming a number of ministries and dissolving two of them, to produce a cabinet of 20 ministers with portfolio and five ministers of state, in addition to himself as prime minister and Crown Prince ʿAbdallah as deputy prime minister. In December 2003, he decreed a sixth minister of state with special responsibilities for the affairs of the Consultative Council. In March 2004, the Ministry of Labour and Social Services was divided into two, so there were now 21 ministers with portfolio. In July 2005, a new minister of state was appointed, with special responsibilities for foreign affairs. There were then seven ministers of state in total. The Council of Ministers’ members are all very

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experienced administrators. Among the council’s non-royal representatives, more than half have PhD degrees, most from respected American universities. The Consultative Council was established by King Fahd in December 1993. He launched the first term of the council with a speaker and 60 members. In the second term, the council consisted of a speaker and 90 members, in the third term, the council included a speaker and 120 members, and in the fourth term the council was expanded to a speaker and 150 members. Representatives are appointed for four-year terms and meet in closed sessions at least every second week. Members are charged with suggesting new regulatory decrees, as well as reviewing and evaluating domestic and foreign policies. Based on their experience, members are assigned to committees. There are 12 committees dealing with human rights, education, culture, information, health and social affairs, services

Box 4.3 Members of the Council of Ministers (as of June 2010) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Prime Minister – King ʿAbdallah bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Minister of Defence and Aviation – Crown Prince Sultan bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Minister of Interior – Prince Nayef bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Minister of Foreign Affairs – Prince Saʿud bin Faysal bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs – Prince Mansour bin Mitʿab bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Minister of Agriculture – Dr Fahd bin ʿAbd al-Rahman Balghanaym Minister of Water and Electricity – ʿAbdallah bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Husayn Minister of Civil Service – Muhammad bin ʿAli al-Fayez Minister of Education – Prince Faisal bin ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad Minister of Finance – Dr Ibrahim bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbdallah al-ʿAssaf Minister of Health – Dr ʿAbdallah al-Rabiʿa Minister of Higher Education – Dr Khalid bin Muhammad al-Angari Minister of Commerce and Industry – ʿAbdallah bin Ahmad Zainal ʿAli Reza Minister of Culture and Information – ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Khowja Minister for Islamic Affairs, Endowment, Prayer and Guidance – Salih bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Shaykh Minister of Justice – Shaykh Dr Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Karim bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Isa Minister of Labour – Dr Ghazi bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Qusaybi Minister of Social Affairs – Dr Yousuf bin Ahmad al-Othaimeen Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources – ʿAli bin Ibrahim al-Naʿimi Minister of Pilgrimage – Dr Fuʾad bin ʿAbd al-Salam bin Muhammad al-Farsi Minister of National Economy and Planning – Khalid bin Muhammad al-Qusaybi Minister of Communications and Information Technology – Muhammad bin Jamil Mulla Minister of Transport – Dr Jubarah bin Eid al-Suraiseri

Non-royal segment elites 67 and public utilities, foreign affairs, security, administration, Islamic affairs, economy and industry, and finance.102 The council’s fourth term began in December 2005. An examination of the current members reveals that there are neither any royals nor tribal chiefs, while there are a handful of Islamic scholars and a few businessmen represented. The council is composed largely of former technocrats. Of those, the overwhelming majority have long-term professional experience from either economics and administration or higher education. More than half of the members of the Consultative Council have PhD degrees and two-thirds have at some point been enrolled at American or European universities. One finds members from all parts of the kingdom.103 Political influence Government ministers and other key figures in the state apparatus are all appointed by the king. Appointments to governmental positions are not based on the principle of meritocracy alone, but on that of loyalty also. Loyalty is measured on the basis of kinship and tribal belonging.104 Neither ministers, except for a few royal ones, nor the bureaucracy have the political weight to make important decisions.105 Day-to-day decision-making tends to take place at the highest level within the different ministries. Individual ministers generally feel that they lack sufficient authority to make decisions without first consulting the Council of Ministers.106 Nonetheless, among the technocrats some people are more influential than others. A few senior bureaucrats gain access to the political leadership during their work, and they bear influence as their expertise and advice are needed. Nawaf E. Obaid claims that the royal family leans upon its advisors possessing ‘technical expertise and professional experience, especially in the petroleum and banking sectors where Saudi expertise is relatively deep’.107 This has become particularly clear during the reign of King ʿAbdallah, who, as mentioned, came to power with a vision of modernization and industrialization. ʿAbdallah demonstrated this as early as 1995 when he replaced as many as 15 of 29 government members. Most of the new ministers, unlike their predecessors, were experienced, Western-educated technocrats. In 1999, at the next round of governmental appointments, ʿAbdallah brought even more technocrats into the government.108 The establishment of the SEC in 1999 and the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral Resources (SPMA) in January 2000 illustrated ʿAbdallah’s desire to delegate more power to technocrats possessing technical expertise and professional experience.109 As king, ʿAbdallah has relied heavily on technocrats in the running of the kingdom. The influence of the leadership at the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and Saudi Aramco, two institutions that always have been headed by non-royal technocrats, are interesting cases. The oil sector is the stronghold of the technocratic class in Saudi Arabia, and thus an interesting case to illustrate the political role of the kingdom’s technocrats. Two questions will be addressed: who has the real power to make important oil- and gas-policy decisions in Saudi

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Arabia? And what level of authority do the technocrats possess vis-à-vis the Saudi royal family in such matters? The role of technocrats within the oil and gas sector In Saudi Arabia, it is the king’s prerogative to make all principal political decisions related to oil and gas production, investments, external relations – including the relationship to OPEC – and domestic energy pricing and subsidizing. Neither the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources nor Saudi Aramco has the authority or formal mechanisms to question the king’s decisions.110 King ʿAbdallah normally reaches a decision in oil and gas policy after consulting the foreign minister, Prince Saʿud bin Faysal, and petroleum and mineral resources minister, ‘Ali bin Ibrahim al-Na’imi. The other top princes in the family hierarchy also exert considerable influence on important oil and gas matters, and they would not accept sudden dramatic changes in oil and gas policy without first having had their say. Oil and gas issues are considered too important by the members of the Saudi ruling house to let the king do as he pleases. As Nawaf E. Obaid puts it, ‘[b]ecause oil policy has such an enormous effect on the health of the kingdom, it is not set by the whim of any individual but instead by consensus among the influential royal family members after considerable debate and consultation with Saudi experts’.111 At the end of the 1990s, ʿAbdallah, who acted on behalf of the king at that time, argued that an institutional reform was necessary for Saudi Arabia to be accepted as a member of the WTO, and that the kingdom’s economy needed to be strengthened by developing the private sector. To realize these goals in part, ʿAbdallah created the SEC in 1999 and the SPMA in 2000.112 The SPMA, which had existed previously, was given on paper the last word in all oil- and gas-related matters, including the authority to determine production and price policies, and lay down regulations both for the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and Saudi Aramco. The SPMA consists of four members of the Saʿud family: King ʿAbdallah (president), Crown Prince Sultan (vice-president), Prince Nayef (second vicepresident) and Prince Saʿud bin Faysal. This composition means that the three most powerful family branches of the ruling house are represented on the council. Apart from these four royal members, the SPMA is dominated by technocrats having Western university degrees and long and broad experience from the Saudi state apparatus.113 In spite of the SPMA’s formal authority, the council does not make important decisions on oil and gas policy. The council convenes at irregular intervals to consider general budgetary issues and Saudi Aramco’s budgetary goals. The SPMA functions as a rubber-stamp body that makes decisions routinely with hardly any debate. The council is nevertheless an important political instrument for the king: it has been claimed that ʿAbdallah revitalized the SPMA due to a need to create a body designed first of all to legitimize his policies, and, second, to facilitate bypassing his fellow family members in oil and gas policy. This

Non-royal segment elites 69 Box 4.4 Members of the SPMA (appointed in December 2003) • • • • • • • • • • • •

King ʿAbdallah bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (President) Crown Prince Sultan bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (Vice-President) Prince Nayef bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud (Second Vice-President) Foreign Minister – Prince Saʿud bin Faysal bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud Minister of Labour – Dr Ghazi bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Qusaybi Former President and Chief Executive of Saudi Aramco – ʿAbdallah bin Salih Jum'a Former Commerce and Industry Minister – Dr Hashim bin ʿAbdallah Yamani Petroleum and Mineral Resources Minister – ʿAli bin Ibrahim al-Naʿimi Finance Minister – Dr Ibrahim bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-ʿAssaf Economy and Planning Minister – Khalid bin Muhammad al-Qusaybi Former President of the King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz City of Science and Technology – Dr Salih bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Adhel Minister of State – Dr Matlab bin ʿAbdallah al-Nafisa (General Secretary)

argument is substantiated by the fact that the council’s first decision in January 2000 was to approve ʿAbdallah’s Natural Gas Initiative, thus revitalizing an initiative which had encountered substantial opposition from Saudi Aramco, ‘Ali bin Ibrahim al-Na’imi and members of the royal family.114 In addition to the SPMA, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources has been given formal responsibility for determining strategic goals for the Saudi oil and gas industry. King ʿAbdallah gives direct orders to ‘Ali bin Ibrahim al-Na’imi on an ad hoc basis, who then presents the king’s directives to Saudi Aramco’s board. The minister then reports back to the king. As a non-royal, the minister has to obey the king’s commands, while trying to avoid being made scapegoat should palace intrigues arise or the market drop and then be removed, as was the fate of former minister of petroleum and mineral resources, Zaki al-Yamani. Al-Na’imi has so far managed to keep on good terms with ʿAbdallah, despite the minister’s opposition to the Natural Gas Initiative. Ministers have traditionally functioned as the king’s most important advisors in the formulation of oil and gas policy, and have thus had the opportunity to exert considerable influence on the king’s decisions. Such was the case with Zaki al-Yamani and King Faysal, with Hisham Nazir and King Fahd, and today with al-Na’imi and King ʿAbdallah.115 Saudi Aramco does however enjoy considerable freedom to determine how to execute the king’s decrees, a tradition that may be traced all the way back to the reign of Ibn Saʿud. The company draws up five-year plans for its activities, which are presented to the SPMA for approval. The plans are invariably approved. The company’s technocrats have sole responsibility for daily operation, including decisions about to whom Saudi Aramco should sell oil, setting prices and contractual terms. Saudi Aramco also supervises licensing and tendering processes when

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other companies attempt to gain access to the Saudi oil and gas sector. The kings have banned political intervention in Saudi Aramco’s activities, and all communication between the ruling house and the company runs via the ministry. Furthermore, the ministry is under clear instructions from the king not to intervene in the company’s daily operation.116

Conclusion Thanks to its resources and corporative mechanisms, the royal family has successfully marginalized all non-royal elite groups. As demonstrated, these groups are given influence only when their resources and support are critically needed. None of these groups today has any political power to influence strategic decisions related to economy, security and foreign policy. Yet, they have some power limited to their respective spheres of Saudi society. They may accordingly be considered as segment elites. The various non-royal elites have their distinct institutional arenas, sources and channels of influence. The religious leaders’ influence is related to the fields of culture, legislation and education, while the source of their weight is their knowledge in the Islamic sciences. Religious leaders have several important channels through which they can influence the decisions of the strategic elite, including the Council of Senior Scholars, the Ministry for Islamic Affairs, Endowment, Prayer and Guidance, the nationwide network of mosques, Islamic schools and universities, as well as television, radio, publications and the Internet. Tribal leaders have relatively much less influence, which is limited to local politics. As ‘guardians’ of traditional tribal culture and notions of social status, the shaykhs exert influence through their being represented on regional councils across the country. The influence of business leaders, who possess attractive investment capital, is limited basically to the issue of domestic private-sector reform. Business oligarchs have access to the strategic elite through their being represented on the SEC as well as in the Saudi Council of Commercial and Industrial Chambers. Regarding the technocrats, their influence is most visible in the banking and petroleum industries, where their technical expertise and professional experience are particularly needed. This elite segment is represented in important state institutions such as the Council of Ministers, the Consultative Council and the SPMA. Members of one elite group are sometimes also parts of other elites, such as the couple of hundred royals that hold key positions in the state bureaucracy and the military apparatus; and, even more strikingly, the many royals that have entered the world of Saudi business. Another example is the many businessmen and Islamic scholars that hold senior positions in the state bureaucracy, as well as the tribal chiefs that have been recruited as officers in the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Some elite segments, however, are closed to outsiders. Obsessed by blood ties, the House of Saʿud itself, and, thus, the strategic elite, is closed to commoners. Only a few ‘aristocratic’ families – such as the Al al-Sudayri and the Al al-Shaykh – have a tradition for intermarrying with the royal family. The Islamic establishment is likewise blocked to anyone not adhering to Wahhabi doctrines.

Non-royal segment elites 71 Table 4.1 Influences of the four segment elites Religious leaders

Tribal leaders Business leaders

Leaders of the bureaucracy

Arenas of influence

Culture; Legislation; Local politics Private-sector Education reform

Banking and petroleum

Sources of influence

Islamic knowledge

Channels Council of Senior of influence Scholars; Ministry for Islamic Affairs; Mosques; Islamic universities; Media

Traditional tribal culture

Investment capital

Technical expertise and professional experience

Regional councils; SANG

SEC; Saudi Council of Commercial and Industrial Chambers

Council of Ministers; Consultative Council; SPMA

Elite circulation in Saudi Arabia is very limited also when non-royal groups are considered. The House of Saʿud remains the system’s circle of gravity. As the family grows, more and more princes are turning to business or lower governmental positions, pushing out non-royals. The tribal elite, though information is patchy, and the commercial/merchant elite also appear to be static, with the same families dominating from one generation to another. More dynamic elite systems are the religious elite and the bureaucratic elite. Here, well-educated, competent and ambitious individuals have been able to challenge the establishment and enter the higher strata. As a logical consequence of these findings, clearly showing that the strategic elite exclusively consists of members of the Al Saʿud, the discussions in the two subsequent analytical chapters, which focus on mechanisms of elite integration, centre mainly on the royal family.

Notes 1 Among others, see Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 13–17. 2 See, for example, Khaldun al-Naqib, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula: A Different Perspective, London and New York: Routledge and the Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1990; Steffen Hertog, ‘Segmented Clientelism: The Politics of Economic Reform in Saudi Arabia’, unpublished doctoral thesis, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 2006; and Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010. 3 Shmuel Bachar, Shmuel Bar, Rachel Machtiger and Yair Minzili, ‘Establishment Ulama and Radicalism in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan’, Hudson Institute, 2006, p. 16, available online, http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/docLib/20061226_Ulama andRadicalismfinal.pdf. 4 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, April 2007. 5 Ibid.

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6 Shmuel Bachar, Shmuel Bar, Rachel Machtiger and Yair Minzili, ‘Establishment Ulama and Radicalism in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan’, p. 13. 7 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, April 2007. 8 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005. 9 Shmuel Bachar, Shmuel Bar, Rachel Machtiger and Yair Minzili, ‘Establishment Ulama and Radicalism in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan’, p. 15. 10 Saudi Arabia Market Information Resource and Directory, available online, http:// saudinf.com/main/c6q.htm. 11 David B. Ottaway, ‘U.S. Eyes Money Trails of Saudi-Backed Charities’, Washington Post, 19 August 2004, available online, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/ A13266-2004Aug18?language=printer. 12 Ministry of Hajj, available online, http://www.hajinformation.com/main/u1.htm. 13 Interview with diplomat, April 2007. 14 Saudi Arabia Market Information Resource and Directory, available online, http:// saudinf.com/main/j44.htm. 15 Interviews with scholar, Oslo, April 2004, and diplomat, Riyadh, April 2007. 16 J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Alms for Jihad. 17 For Islamist activism in Saudi Arabia, see Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1970, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge and New York, 2010; Thomas Hegghammer, ‘Violent Islamism in Saudi Arabia, 1979–2006: The Power and Perils of Pan-Islamic Nationalism’, unpublished doctoral thesis, Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris, 2007; Joshua Teitelbaum, ‘The Next Generation of Saudi ‘Ulama: A New Pillar of Support for the Regime?’, in The Middle East: The Impact of Generational Change, The Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, 2005, pp. 135–44; and Shmuel Bachar, Shmuel Bar, Rachel Machtiger and Yair Minzili, ‘Establishment Ulama and Radicalism in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan’. 18 F. Gregory Gause III, ‘The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia’, p. 205. 19 Ayman al-Yassini, Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 59–68. 20 Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, p. 32. 21 Interviews with scholar, Oslo, April 2004, November 2005 and February 2007, and Saudi scholar, London, July 2006. 22 Angel M. Rabasa et al., ‘The Muslim World after 9/11’, RAND Corporation, 2004, available online, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG246.pdf. 23 Shmuel Bachar, Shmuel Bar, Rachel Machtiger and Yair Minzili, ‘Establishment Ulama and Radicalism in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan’. 24 Interview with political analyst, Dubai, November 2008. 25 Ibid. 26 Al-Ifta, available online, http://www.alifta.com/. 27 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, April 2007. 28 Joseph Kostiner, ‘Transforming Dualities: Tribe and State Formation in Saudi Arabia’, in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1990, p. 226. 29 See, for instance, P. Marcel Kurpershoek, Oral Poetry and Narratives from Central Arabia: II The Story of a Desert King, Leiden, New York, and Köln: E.J. Brill, 1995, p. 46; Pascal Ménoret, The Saudi Enigma: A History, London: Zed Books, 2005, p. 91; and Elanor A. Doumato, ‘Tribes and Tribalism: Arabian Peninsula’, available online, http://www.answers.com/topic/tribes-and-tribalism-arabian-peninsula-4. 30 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, April 2007. 31 Interview with political analyst, Dubai, November 2008. 32 Donald P. Cole, Nomadism and the Nomads: the al-Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter, Chicago: Aldine, 1975; and William Lancaster, The Rwala Bedouin Today, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Non-royal segment elites 73 33 Nicholas S. Hopkins, ‘Class and State in Rural Arab Communities’, in Adeed Dawisha and William I. Zartman (eds), Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State, London: Croom Helm, 1988, p. 253. 34 Michael Herb, All in the Family, pp. 53–5. 35 Elanor A. Doumato, ‘Tribes and Tribalism’. 36 Elanor A. Doumato, ‘Tribes and Tribalism’ and P. Marcel Kurpershoek, Oral Poetry and Narratives from Central Arabia: II The Story of a Desert King, pp. 44–5. 37 Michael Herb, All in the Family, p. 39. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 See, for instance, Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom, p. 68. 41 William Lancaster, The Rwala Bedouin Today. 42 For information on the Al Saʿud’s tribal descent, see for instance P.J. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam, available online, http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=7560. 43 For example, see David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, p. 530; James P. Piscatori, ‘Ideological Politics in Saʿudi Arabia’, in J.P. Piscatori (ed.), Islam in the Political Process, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 68; and Pascal Ménoret, The Saudi Enigma, p. 85. 44 Enver M. Koury, The Saudi Decision-Making Body: The House al Al-Saud, Hyattsville, Maryland and Beirut: Institute of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, 1978, p. 16. 45 Nicholas S. Hopkins, ‘Class and State in Rural Arab Communities’, p. 255. 46 Ibid. 47 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Military and International Security Dimensions, p. 170. 48 Interviews with scholar, Singapore, November 2007, Saudi official/scholar, Dubai, November 2008, and political analyst, Dubai, November 2008. 49 Interviews with diplomat, Riyadh, November 2005, and political analyst, Dubai, November 2008. 50 P. Marcel Kurpershoek, Oral Poetry and Narratives from Central Arabia: II The Story of a Desert King, pp. 31–2. 51 Interviews with diplomats, Riyadh, November 2005. 52 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, April 2007. 53 Interviews with Saudi official/scholar, Dubai, November 2008, and political analyst, Dubai, November 2008. 54 Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, London: al-Saqi Books, 2000, p. 439. 55 Forbes Magazine, 10 October 2007, available online, http://xpigs.wordpress. com/2007/10/10/top-10-richest-men-of-all-time1st-part/ and http://www.forbes.com/ business/forbes/2007/0917/054.html?partner=whiteglove_google. 56 For an interesting historical survey of some of these families, see John Carter, Leading Merchant Families of Saudi Arabia, Scorpion Publications in association with the D.R. Llewellyn Group, 1979; Michael Field, The Merchants: The Big Business Families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 1984; and Steve Coll, The Bin Ladens. 57 Tim Niblock with Monica Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 49–50. 58 Interview with political analyst, Dubai, November 2008. 59 For a short list of investors, see Gulf News, 15 June 2006, available online, http:// archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/06/15/10046936.html. 60 Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth, pp. 92–6. 61 For a list of the leading trading houses in Saudi Arabia, see Tim Niblock with Monica Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, pp. 133–5. 62 Michael Field, The Merchants.

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63 Haji ʿAbdallah Ali Reza & Co. Ltd., available online, http://www.alireza.com/history. htm and Xenel Industries, available online, http://www.xenel.com/. 64 F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies, p. 57. 65 Sharaf Sabri, The House of Saud in Commerce, New Delhi: I.S. Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2001, p. 25. 66 Ibid. 67 Business Week, 25 September 1995. 68 Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 9, September 2002; and Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 29, issue 772, 23 December 2005, p. 20. 69 Forbes Magazine, 26 February 2003, available online, http://www.forbes.com/2003/ 02/26/billonaireland.html. 70 Interview with businessman/advisor to the royal family, Dubai, May 2006. 71 Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 9, September 2002. 72 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, August 2006. 73 Various interviews. 74 Joshua Teitelbaum, ‘A Family Affair: Civil-Military Relations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Draft)’, paper presented at the Fourth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, Montecatini Terme, 9–23 March 2003, p. 3, available online, http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/RestrictedPapers/conmed2003free/200303Teitel baum12.pdf, p. 25. 75 See, for instance, ‘Timeline: BAE Corruption Probe’, BBC, 26 June 2007, available online, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6182137.stm. 76 For the largest individual female investors of the House of Saʿud, see Sharaf Sabri, The House of Saud in Commerce, p. 263. 77 Arab News, 18 June 2010, available online, http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/ article67823.ece. 78 Interviews, Riyadh and Jeddah, April 2009. 79 Forbes Magazine, 31 August 2006, available online, http://www.forbes.com/ lists/2006/11/06women_Lubna-Olayan_TVR4.html. 80 Effat College, available online, http://www.effatcollege.edu.sa/index.php?option=com_ content&task=view&id=1&Itemid=14. 81 King ʿAbdallah University of Science and Technology, 6 October 2008, available online, http://www.kaust.edu.sa/news-releases/board-of-trustees.aspx. 82 Effat College. 83 Steve Coll, The Bin Ladens, pp. 163–4. 84 Giacomo Luciani, ‘From Private Sector to National Bourgeoisie: Saudi Arabian Business’, in Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman, Saudi Arabia in the Balance, pp. 144–8. 85 Tim Niblock with Monica Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, p. 148. 86 Regulations for establishing the Supreme Economic Council, Article 2, available online, http://www.sec.gov.sa/english/page.asp?s_contentid=1. 87 Supreme Economic Council, available online, http://www.sec.gov.sa/english/page. asp?s_contentid=19. 88 Giacomo Luciani, ‘From Private Sector to National Bourgeoisie’, pp. 173–81; and interview with scholar, Singapore, November 2007. 89 World Bank, available online, http://www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings/. 90 Michael Herb, All in the Family, p. 58. 91 Interview with independent consultant, London, May 2008; and Michael Herb, All in the Family, p. 59. 92 Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 87. 93 Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 87–8; Michael Herb, All in the Family, pp. 88, 90–2. 94 Michael Herb, All in the Family, pp. 88–90.

Non-royal segment elites 75 95 See, for example, As’ad Abukhalil, The Battle for Saudi Arabia: Royalty, Fundamentalism, and Global Power, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004, p. 90; and Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia, p. 41. 96 Mark Heller and Nadav Safran, The New Middle Class and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center Middle Eastern, 1985. 97 Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2001, available online, http://www. csis.org/burke/saudi21/index.htm. 98 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Political, Foreign Policy, Economic, and Energy Dimensions, p. 144. 99 Obituary by Saʿd A. Sowayn, published by Saudi Debate, 19 June 2007, available online, http://www.saudidebate.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie w&id=799&Itemid=119. 100 Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 31, issue 808, 22 June 2007, p. 3; Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 34, issue 890, 29 November 2010, p. 3. 101 ‘The Law of the Council of Ministers’, available online, http://saudinf.com/main/ c513.htm. 102 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (Washington, DC), available online, http://www. saudiembassy.net/Country/Government/GovDetail3.asp. 103 The Consultative Council, available online, http://www.shura.gov.sa/EnglishSite/ Ecv/Ecv.htm. 104 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, August 2006. 105 Interviews with diplomats, Riyadh, April 2007, and businessman, Dubai, April 2007. 106 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, November 2005. 107 Nawaf E. Obaid, The Oil Kingdom at 100: Petroleum Policymaking in Saudi Arabia, Policy Papers, no. 55, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000, p. 11. 108 Nawaf E. Obaid, The Oil Kingdom at 100, p. 11. 109 Nawaf E. Obaid, The Oil Kingdom at 100, pp. 11–12, 21. 110 Amy Myers Jaffe and Jareer Elass, Saudi Aramco: National Flagship with Global Responsibilities, The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, March 2007, pp. 2–3. 111 Nawaf E. Obaid, The Oil Kingdom at 100, 2000, p. 18. 112 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Political, Foreign Policy, Economic, and Energy Dimensions, pp. 326–8. 113 Ain al-Yaqeen (Riyadh), available online, http://www.ain-al-yaqeen.com/. 114 Amy Myers Jaffe and Jareer Elass, Saudi Aramco, p. 49. 115 Amy Myers Jaffe and Jareer Elass, Saudi Aramco, p. 50. 116 Interviews with businessman, Oslo, December 2003, and scholar/advisor to Saudi Aramco, Oslo, June 2007; Valérie Marcel, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East, London: Chatham House/Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006, pp. 84–5; and Amy Myers Jaffe and Jareer Elass, Saudi Aramco, pp. 60–1.

5

Mechanisms of elite integration

I against my brothers; I and my brothers against my cousins; I and my brothers and my cousins against the world!1 Once in Riyadh, I attended a small royal family gathering. The host was not among the most influential princes. Yet, he was much respected as one among the surviving sons of Ibn Saʿud. The reception hall was filled with royals of different ages, all dressed in traditional white ankle-length garments, thawb, and the red and white headdress, ghutrah. Junior princes fell silent every time a more senior prince entered the room, and the princes immediately reorganized themselves according to age. The system was simple: the older the prince was, the closer he would be seated to the host. I was fascinated by how each and every one of the royals apparently knew the exact age of all their relatives and their respective places in the family hierarchy. To express their respect, the junior princes kissed older relatives on their cheeks, noses and shoulders. Respect was also shown in numerous other ways: when older princes spoke, the younger ones lowered their eyes. When older family members spoke, words of respect were repeated, such as samaʿ, labbayk and hadir (‘at your service’). Younger princes never raised their voices. A prince would not leave the reception hall without obtaining permission from an older family member. Some even backed out of the room in order not to turn their backs to the host. What I found paradoxical was that the behaviour of the younger princes was so different in other social contexts. I had met some of them outside the formal context of the family gathering. Among relatives and friends of their own age, they appeared to be highly self-confident and cosmopolitan – in the meaning Westernized. All spoke fluent English, a result of the many travels and years of studies in Europe and the USA. It is important not to over-interpret the importance of the display of respectful gestures in the reception hall. But one should at the same time not completely disregard it as pure showing-off. Could the gathering for example tell us something about mechanisms of elite integration in Saudi Arabia?

Sociological preconditions As outlined by Chapter 2, the first set of mechanisms behind elite integration is what I call ‘sociological preconditions’. They include factors that I assume foster

Mechanisms of elite integration 77 social homogeneity such as ethnicity, religion, class and education. Also to be included are the values and norms of political behaviour, as well as the patterns of social interaction within the elite. Blood ties and education The members of the kingdom’s strategic elite all belong to the same family, the Al Saʿud. Those in the inner circle are brothers, sons, uncles and nephews. The elite is, in other words, united by blood ties. Saudi tradition says that one’s loyalty and obligations must correspond to the strength of the blood relationship. Every month Saudi national newspapers announce weddings between members of the royal family. While most marriages are between royals, princes also take wives from ‘aristocratic families’, such as the Al Sudayri and the Al al-Shaykh. Princesses certainly do not marry outside the royal circle. Most royal marriages are arranged. While Ibn Saʿud decided all marriages, these are a much more private affair nowadays. Marriages, although no longer a political tool, are still an important mechanism behind elite integration. The older sons of King Ibn Saʿud, the second-generation princes, were educated at the Royal Court, where the focus was on Islamic sciences and basic training in history and political affairs.2 The third-generation princes, by contrast, had a more organized education. Prince Khalid bin Sultan’s book, Desert Warrior, provides an interesting and unique insider’s account of the early schooling of the young royals of his generation. He writes: I spent my entire school career at a school for the education of young princes founded in the early 1950s by King Saʿud and housed, in its early years, in al-Nasiriya, his palace in Riyadh. It was called Maʿhad al-anjal, the Institute for (Royal) Sons.3 King Saʿud appointed Dr Othman al-Salih as the institute’s headmaster. He ran the institution from its formation and for its first 31 years. Khalid bin Sultan recalls that Dr al-Salih was a rather authoritarian figure, but egalitarian in philosophy. He was, however, much respected and admired by his former students. The pupils, according to Khalid bin Sultan, were known simply by their names with no princely titles. Among his classmates was his cousin, Prince Muhammad bin Fahd, King Fahd’s son, who eventually became the powerful governor of the Eastern Province. During their early school days, the two princes developed a close friendship that has remained ever since and proved politically important. Khalid bin Sultan writes: During the Gulf War [when Khalid bin Sultan served as commander of the Joint Forces], my close friendship with Muhammad proved of great value to me. As we knew each other’s minds, we were able to solve problems easily as they rose.4

78 Mechanisms of elite integration In 1964, Faysal moved the institute out of the palace and it was renamed the Capital Institute High School in Riyadh, and the al-Thaghr (‘the Haven’) Model School in Jeddah was established. Both elite schools had individual budgets from the Ministry of Education. Most students were the sons of wealthy businessmen and the royal family. The Capital Institute had a single class of some 25 princelings when it was opened, while about 60 boys graduated from al-Thaghr.5 The number of students grew rapidly and both have become large institutions with hundreds of pupils. Separate girls’ sections were also added. Nowadays, royal students are outnumbered by commoners. Several other private elite schools have been opened, including Jil al-Faysal (‘Generation of Faysal’) and the Najd National School in Riyadh. There are also two elite schools for girls in Saudi Arabia: Effat College and Dar al-hikma (‘House of Wisdom’) College. These schools complement each other: while the first offers courses in arts, architecture, etc., the latter focuses on engineering, medicine, etc. But not only are the daughters of wealthy families to be found at these colleges, as there are many opportunities to win scholarships.6 While royals traditionally have been educated at public schools, the royal family today send their sons and daughters to all kind of schools, at home and abroad, depending on what kind of education they desire for their children.7 Some members of the Al Saʿud, apparently as a demonstration of egalitarianism, still pride themselves in sending their offspring to the country’s public schools.8 Prince ʿAbd al-Rahman, the vice minister of defence, was the first of Ibn Saʿud’s sons to study in the West; but most of the second-generation princes never studied abroad. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, progressive members of the royal family started to send their sons to America and Britain for high school and university education. Most of the third-generation princes included in the strategic elite are Western-educated. The sons of King Faysal and Prince Salman represent the ‘intellectual elite’ within the House of Saʿud. Prince Khalid bin Faysal has a degree in political economy from New College, Oxford; Prince Saʿud bin Faysal graduated with a bachelor in economics from Princeton University in 1964; and Prince Turki bin Faysal has studied at the prestigious universities of Princeton and Georgetown. Faysal’s daughters are also acknowledged for being well educated and for their efforts to encourage women’s education in the kingdom. Prince Sultan bin Salman was educated at the United States International University, San Diego, trained as a pilot with the Saudi Air Force, and later was a space-shuttle astronaut on the Discovery in 1985. His brother, Prince Faysal bin Salman, graduated with a DPhil in political studies from St Anthony’s, Oxford, in 1999. He later became a teacher at the international relations department at King Saʿud University in Riyadh. Social values and norms As indicated in the introduction of this chapter, although the society is changing rapidly and is heavily exposed to outside influence, there is still a strong system of social values and norms in Saudi Arabia. Members of the society are expected to

Mechanisms of elite integration 79 behave in accordance with them. There are particularly strict social expectations concerning the behaviour of a member of the House of Saʿud. Honour, justice and loyalty Saudis are, generally speaking, from their birth socialized into values and norms through their upbringing and education – traditionally, the social codes derived from the kingdom’s Islamic and Bedouin heritages. Although the Saudi society does not exist in a vacuum, and there are substantial variations from one family to another, these codes are beyond doubt still important. At the heart of this value and norm system is the recognition of the importance of honour (Arab. sharaf). Losing face must be avoided at all costs, as a person who falls into dishonour brings shame over the kinship group or wider community to whom he or she belongs. The family is the centre of honour and reputation. Traditionally, a son can bring a family honour, whereas a daughter can only bring shame (Arab.ʿayb). The need to defend women’s honour is, therefore, an important obligation of all. Justice is another key component of the value system. An individual whose honour, or that of a member of his kinship group, has been compromised has traditionally sought some sort of redress from the sinner and his or her family. Although often described as ‘an eye for an eye’, or vengeance, this is more about restoring balanced social relations after a dispute. Loyalty to the people closest to one – one’s kin group, religious community, etc. – is also a main component of the norm and value system. Breaking this principle implies loss of honour for both parties and is likely to lead to disciplinary action. The extended family (Arab. ʿaʾila) is the most important social unit. Mamoun Fandy sees Saudi Arabia as permeated by what he refers to as ‘familialism’ (Arab. ʿaʾiliyya), which he explains in two sentences: ‘By familialism I mean the concept that the private domain is what matters most. Doing good means doing good for one’s family, nuclear and extended alike, but it also suggests responsibility.’9 The family is the primary basis of identity and status for the individual and the immediate focus of individual loyalty. Individuals tend to socialize within the circle of their own extended families. The structure of the family in Saudi Arabia is generally compatible with the structure of tribal lineage. Families are patrilineal, meaning that the boundaries of family membership are drawn around lines of descent through males. Relations with maternal relatives are important, but family identity is tied to the father and children are considered to belong to him and not to the mother. In Saudi Arabia laws of personal status are based on shariʿa, and the patriarchal character of the family is compatible with and supported by Islamic family laws. An individual is expected to honour unreservedly his or her older relatives. Noblesse oblige Although only a small fraction of the royal family works in the public sector, nobody is relieved from the responsibilities and expectations related to being a

80 Mechanisms of elite integration royal. The Al Saʿud’s authority is for most citizens a priori, meaning that very few question the position of the royals as the legitimate rulers. Yet, the Saudis assess the individual princes on the basis of various criteria, such as position in the state hierarchy, behaviour towards the people and generosity. Although the Al Saʿud’s non-royal support constituencies have gradually declined in importance, as concluded in Chapter 3, royals are still very concerned about their popularity, and, as an example, ʿAbdallah’s excellent reputation has certainly helped him establish his standing as king. In other words, a good personal name is paramount to every single royal. Prince Khalid bin Sultan, Crown Prince Sultan’s prominent son, lists in his book which social norms regulate the behaviour of the members of the royal family. He emphasizes the following rules: First and foremost, strict adherence to and defence of Islam, as a faith and a legal system. Respect and appreciation for the King, the head of the family, who is considered the father of every single member of the family. Dedication to public service and to raising high the name of the kingdom in the world. Concern to husband the kingdom’s wealth, to spread its benefits widely among the citizens, and put it to the best possible use in the internal development of the country, which has resulted in the great leap forward of recent years. Respect by younger members of the family for their seniors, however small the age gap between them might be. A determination to solve disputes within the framework of the family, and the nurturing bonds between family members on the understanding that the interest of the family is greater than that of any individual member. The application of the shariʿa to members of the family on the same basis as it is applied to the Saudi population as a whole. The allocation of some of the top government jobs to the most qualified members of the family, on the understanding that those with and those without jobs are entitled to equal respect.10 Khalid bin Sultan identifies respect as the central family norm.11 The family youngsters are brought up to respect each other, as well as to respect age and seniority. To me, this became clear in the royal family gathering that I attended. Every aspect of the Al Saʿud has a sense of hierarchy built into it. It is a family of deference: sons defer to their fathers while juniors defer to their elders. Airing controversies in public is a taboo. In line with this norm, publishing information about the royal family is forbidden apart from official reports. Also, very few royals have written about themselves or about their own family. Prince Saif al-Islam bin Saʿud – one of King Saʿud’s sons – is a rare exception. He has published a handful of books about King Saʿud, his Baluchi mother, the royal family and the royals’ relations with the Saudi people – in the shape of novels. All

Mechanisms of elite integration 81 the books are 100 per cent about politics and are published outside the kingdom in Arabic by al-Saqi Books. The books are not very appreciated by the family. Yet, Prince Saif al-Islam bin Saʿud still lives in the country, where he has lectured at the King Saʿud University. King ʿAbdallah is said to closely watch the behaviour of the members of the House of Saʿud and is particularly concerned with protecting the honour of female family members. It is common that princesses are accompanied by male ‘guards’ while travelling abroad. These men are trusted by the women’s male relatives and are said to be less attractive from a female perspective.12 The most scary court scenario is that a ruler is unable to maintain the loyalty of his women. Beyond question, the greatest threat is evidence that royal women have deviated from accepted sexual norms. For the royal theatre, even suspicions about such illegal behaviour will have cosmic implications. The destiny of Princess Mishʿal, who was executed after admitting adultery, confirmed one of the rules that a princess must never break. The king, considered the ‘father’ of every single member of the family, as well as all other Saudis, must be respected and his decisions followed. Ultimately, the will of the king will always prevail.13 All royal decrees have to be strictly obeyed. If a king does not suppress opposition within his own ranks, then his subordinates will think him weak and he will lose their respect. At the time of writing, only a handful of senior princes, his senior half-brothers, have the power to ignore or delay the implementation of a decree from King ʿAbdallah. Should the king oppose a decision favoured by his subordinate, he will often avoid making a decision and simply let the issue ‘die’ gradually.14 The royal women play an important – and too often ignored – role when it comes to maintaining the unity of the House of Saʿud. Women are vital when it comes to socialization of children. Socialization of children is perhaps the most basic, important and universally performed function of a family. This is because it teaches its younger members the rules and expectations for behaviour within their society, which creates a psychological and social base for unity. One wellknown example is King Ibn Saʿud’s sister, Nora, who played a critical role in raising the king’s sons; whenever one of them misbehaved as a child he would send them to their aunt for discipline.15 Social interaction Social life in Saudi Arabia still revolves around the home and the family. The royal oligarchs live and interact as a close collective body. Within the inner circle there are two sets of relations: first, between brothers at the very top of the family hierarchy, who often meet. According to a royal advisor, King ʿAbdallah and Crown Prince Sultan, the two most powerful individuals, see each other nearly every day.16 Since 2005 both have had their offices at the Royal Court. The Minister of Interior, Prince Nayef, and Governor of Riyadh, Prince Salman, meet ʿAbdallah every second or third day. As a symbol of respect and status in the family hierarchy, the princes always come to the king. The second set of relations

82 Mechanisms of elite integration is between senior royals and their sons. Everyday fathers lunch with their sons and their respective families.17 Most sub-branches gather regularly. The family’s women are responsible for maintaining these regular gatherings. Hessa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri, King Ibn Saʿud’s favourite wife, was known for her weekly dinner gatherings at her home for her sons and their families. Before dying in 1970, she played an important role in maintaining an idea of unity among her sons through these dinner gatherings. Her daughters are said to have continued this tradition.18 As an example, the closest family of King ʿAbdallah, Al ʿAbdallah, gathers two or three times a year. These meetings take place either in the house of King ʿAbdallah or one of his two sisters. There is no age limit on these events. The Al Faysal also has its own gatherings, which might include between 10 and 50 members of the sub-branch.19 There are several other social events that bring together members of the royal family across branches, such as weddings, funerals and visits related to Eid. The summer season is also important. Many princes maintain luxury estates abroad in Paris, Geneva, Marbella, Aspen and other jet-set places. Other royals prefer to spend the summer in Middle Eastern countries such as Lebanon, Egypt and Morocco. Those non-royal Saudis that can afford it also flock to these hotspots.20 In addition to this, all the family’s women gather once a year. Until she passed away, these large gatherings used to take place in Princess Sita’s palace, the sister of King ʿAbdallah and then the family’s most senior woman. The men envy the women’s annual gatherings, as they have not been able to establish a similar tradition of their own.21 The royal women’s council also brings together the royal family. The council has added a lot of value to the royal women, as it has bonded the different members of the family closer together. It is an important network. Members of the elite are devoted to all kinds of social activities. The royals have traditionally gathered for social events such as horse racing and falconry, the two traditional Saudi ‘national sports’ (besides gossiping about the royal family). Falconry, qans, is an ancient, noble sport on the Arabian Peninsula. Like foxhunting in Britain, it has attracted royal patrons for generations. Each winter, when the weather was cool and it rained occasionally, many senior princes and their entourages used to drive out in convoys to camp for weeks in the desert. The camps attracted local tribal leaders, businessmen and others that tried to spend as much time with the king and his brothers as possible. Many princes and other wealthy people also gather at hunting camps abroad, in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Royals also have a passion for horse breeding and racing. King ʿAbdallah is known to spend much time with his close relatives and friends at his al-Jenadriyya horse farm on the outskirts of Riyadh. The complex is home to the king’s 500 or so Arabian and thoroughbred horses. During the winter months of January and February, the princes gather every Monday afternoon following the third prayer call at the Equestrian Club in Riyadh. The club is responsible for conducting thoroughbred horse racing at its racetrack. King ʿAbdallah is chairman of the club, founded in 1965.22

Mechanisms of elite integration 83 Outside the framework of the family, Saudis often gather in informal groups of close friends of the same age, social background and profession. One such group is commonly referred to as shilla or majmuʿa. Jalsa, ‘session’ or ‘meeting’ (from the root of ‘to sit’), refers to a more formal and exclusive gathering of people that like to discuss literature, history and other topics. Gatherings often carry the name of a certain day, for example talut-ia or raboo-ia. There are no gatherings during the weekends, from Thursday to Saturday. Both men and women have a lot of such gatherings. Friends agree to meet once a week, always on the same day. There are gatherings for men, women and (liberal) couples. The weekly meetings take place in private homes, or more recently in restaurants and coffee shops. Those who gather come from the same or different professions. These gatherings sometimes serve as forums where current events are debated and information is shared.23 One typical example is the younger Al Faysals that gather every Wednesday in the house of Prince Abd al-Rahman Al Faysal. These meetings are informal; the princes watch TV and sometimes debate current political, social and economic issues. There are royals from various branches, as well as non-royal friends, working in government, business, etc. These gatherings have taken place for more than 10 years. Those who gather sometimes present their views to senior members of the royal family. Two or three people will ask for a meeting to give the presentation. Such meetings secure the flow of information to the political elite, which is very important.24 The majlis is also an arena that brings people together. Men of power and influence – the king, the crown prince, other princes in government, ministers, provincial governors, prominent Islamic scholars, tribal leaders, wealthy businessmen, etc. – hold open audiences. Here, family members, friends, followers and clients can gather, debate different issues and make petitions. Access to the king and other governmental officials and the right to petition them directly is a well-established tradition. Implications for elite integration Saudi Arabia’s political elite consists exclusively of close relatives. Marriage within the elite is common. The only sociological factor that first and foremost divides the strategic elite is education. While the senior princes have been traditionally educated, almost all of the younger princes are Western-educated. The fact that the kingdom’s strategic elite is composed of men of similar origin creates a psychological basis for elite unity. As several elite theorists argue, bonds of kinship through blood and marriage provide a particularly strong type of elite integration. The sons of Ibn Saʿud grew up together and have governed together for decades. Accordingly, it is plausible to assume that they understand one another’s needs perfectly well and that there is a sense of mutual trust among them. Moreover, there exists a strong system of values and norms – which dictates important people’s political behaviour. There are particularly strict social expectations regarding the behaviour of royals. The members of the Al Saʿud, acutely

84 Mechanisms of elite integration sensitive to their public image, are most observant of these social norms. Moreover, there is close social interaction between the senior royals. Finally, there is a high level of personal interaction within the elite. Elite theorists believe that such interaction facilitates coordination and promotes friendship and shared values. Face-to-face interaction among the members of the strategic elite is intensive in Saudi Arabia. In contrast to Western elites, which often interact through membership of elite clubs, the family is the Saudi elite’s most important arena of interaction. The elite is brought together through various family networks and gatherings, as well as various leisure activities such as falconry and horse racing. Personal interaction is eased by the fact that one single city, Riyadh, is the locus of the strategic elite, though the senior princes spend months abroad in different countries and continents. In addition, the fact that the elite includes rather few individuals favours greater solidarity and consensus. In sum, it is reasonable to conclude that sociological preconditions clearly have a positive effect on elite integration in Saudi Arabia.

Unifying symbols and threats The existence of ‘unifying symbols and threats’ might strengthen the level of integration among individuals and groups that comprise the political elite. The Al Saʿud and Wahhabi Islam – both pillars of the kingdom – are visibly two important symbols. The House of Saʿud and Wahhabi Islam Saudi Arabia is unique in the sense that it is one of only two countries in the world that bears the name of its royal family, Al Saʿud. The second is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Saudi royals are very proud of ‘their’ kingdom, as a rare example of indigenous Arab-Islamic state-building and the country’s role as the geopolitical centre of the Muslim world. They often underline that Saudi Arabia was not the creation of former European colonial powers, unlike neighbouring countries such as Jordan and Iraq. It was rather the outcome of the royal family’s own achievements: decades of military conquests and state-building.25 Moreover, when talking to the royals, it soon becomes obvious that they regard the country and its resources as their rightful property and consider themselves to be generous in sharing their wealth with the people. An extreme expression of this attitude is the commentary of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, former ambassador to Washington, DC: If you tell me that building this whole country, and spending $350 billion out of $400 billion, that we misused or got corrupted with $50 billion, I’ll tell you, ‘Yes.’ But I’ll take that any time. There are so many countries in the Third World that have oil that are still 30 years behind. But, more important, more important – who are you to tell me this? . . . What I’m trying to tell you is, so what? We did not invent corruption, nor did those dissidents, who are so genius, discover it. This happened since Adam and Eve. . . .I mean, this is human nature. But we are not as bad as you think.26

Mechanisms of elite integration 85 The royals have also developed a cult of personality around the kingdom’s founder, Ibn Saʿud. He has become a powerful symbol of the royal family’s achievements and unity. National Day in Saudi Arabia is 23 September, marking the unification of the country by Ibn Saʿud in 1932. Pictures of the late king hang in public buildings, shops and even private homes. Museum exhibitions emphasize his courage, grandeur and wisdom, while books of his life and achievements fill the bookshops and libraries. Streets, universities and other public places are named after him. Authors and poets produce panegyrics praising the kingdom’s founding father. Later kings have, however, not achieved a similar status as unifying symbols. In order to emphasize the House of Saʿud’s prominent position within the Islamic world, kings have been represented as the leader (Arab. imam) of the kingdom’s Wahhabi community, answerable only to God’s law. In 1986 King Fahd adopted the title of ‘Guardian of the Two Holy Places’ (Arab. khadim al-haramayn al-sharifayn) to underline his position as the leader of the Muslim umma. As highly symbolic acts, oaths unite the elite. Traditionally, these are the explicit and formal vehicle by which one man commits himself to another. One form of oath is the bayʿa, an unwritten oath of allegiance given in God’s name to the king, which is sworn by the leading figures of the society. When these representatives make such a pact with their ruler, they do so with the understanding that as long as the ruler complies with certain responsibilities towards his subjects, they uphold their allegiance to him. These leading figures include princes, top ʿulamaʾ, tribal shaykhs and sometimes family elders. The bayʿa also involves bestowing God’s blessings on the ruler. According to various suras in the Qurʾan, God looks with favour upon a ruler who is given the bayʿa by his subjects. The Prophet Muhammad also received individual oaths of allegiance from his contemporary followers.27 The bayʿa is still practised in contemporary Saudi Arabia on various occasions, especially when a king ascends to the throne. The classical Arab-Islamic term, ahl al-hall wa-l-ʿaqd, literally meaning ‘those who loosen and bind’, is often used in the context of royal succession to refer to those leading figures – royals and commoners – who swear the bayʿa. In 1964, in the final stage of the fierce power struggle between King Saʿud and his brother Faysal, the latter was able to secure the throne thanks to the bayʿa from his family, the religious establishment and other leading Saudis. Immediately after the assassination of King Faysal in 1975, his brother and heir apparent Khalid was given a similar oath of allegiance, as did Fahd in 1982 upon the death of King Khalid and ʿAbdallah in 2005 after the death of King Fahd. There are several other forms of oaths practised in Saudi Arabia. It is common for newly appointed representatives to governmental posts to swear a codified oath of allegiance to king and country, with God as witness to the truth, before starting work. As an example, according to the Law of the Consultative Council’s Article 11, prior to assuming their duties, speakers, members and secretaries shall take the following oath before the king:

86 Mechanisms of elite integration I swear to Allah Almighty to be loyal to my religion, then to my King and Country, and not to reveal any of the State’s secrets, to preserve its interests and laws, and to perform my duties with sincerity, integrity, loyalty, and fairness.28 Likewise, members and the secretary general of the Allegiance Council will swear an oath before the king prior to assuming their duties. The oath is specified by Article 5 of the Allegiance Council Law: I swear to Allah the Almighty to be loyal to my religion, King and Country and not to divulge any of the country’s secrets. I also swear that I will preserve the interests and laws of my country, protect the royal family’s unity and cooperation and my country’s national unity, as well as performing the duties assigned to me with all truthfulness, integrity, dedication, and fairness.29 The basic idea behind the bayʿa is that a new king has to establish a social contract with his own subjects, which is sealed when representatives from different elite groups of society swear their oath of allegiance. Hence, the bayʿa still has an important symbolic meaning because it ties Saudi society together and gives the king and the royal family legitimacy. The other formal oaths of allegiance are also important as unifying symbols. Saudis who without legitimate reason disrespect an oath that they have sworn will lose honour, the worst thing that could happen. The bayʿa and other oaths of allegiance bear only a comparatively marginal part of the weight of the factors that in sum hold the Saudi elite together. Yet, because oaths are formal statements of obligation, they make explicit some of the presuppositions that underlie elite unity. Threat perceptions For decades the Al Saʿud has been encircled by powerful and hostile regimes and experienced times of internal revolts. The existence of such challenges from both within and outside has caused uniform threat perceptions to form among the elite, which in turn have increased internal cohesion. External threats The House of Saʿud’s regional main competitor during the 1950s and 1960s was Egypt and its strategic challenge was North Yemen. Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser seized power through a coup dʾétat in 1952 and aimed to spread his secular socialist ideology to the Arabian monarchies in the Middle East. The Egyptian president underpinned an attempted military coup against Saudi Arabia’s royal family in 1957. Nasser also supported the officers in North Yemen that overthrew the imam, al-Badr, in 1962. During the following civil war between the revolutionary republicans and the followers of the ousted imam, Egypt sent an expeditionary force numbering as many as 70,000 men to the war-torn country to strengthen the rebels.30

Mechanisms of elite integration 87 In 1979 Iran overnight became the Saudi monarchy’s foremost regional rival and the Eastern Province the new strategic challenge. That year, Ayatollah Khomeini seized power in Iran and initiated a revival of Islam throughout the Muslim world under the aegis of Shiʿa Islam, which challenged Saudi Arabia’s position as the heartland of Islam. Revolutionary Iran also backed Shiʿa dissidents in the oil-rich al-Hasa province during the 1980s.31 A decade later, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq suddenly became the new main threat, with Kuwait the new strategic challenge due to the Iraqi occupation in 1990. King Fahd, fearing that the Iraqi war-machine would move on to Saudi Arabian soil, allowed more than 500,000 Western soldiers to use the ‘Holy Land’ as a marchingup area before the campaign to liberate the Kuwaitis. This controversial decision paradoxically gave Iraq’s secular president an opportunity to challenge the Islamic legitimacy of the Al Saʿud as the host of ‘infidel’ soldiers on its soil. Today, Iran is seen as the main threat.32 Iran’s nuclear programme and regional ambitions, fuelled by the aggressive rhetoric of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have caused much concern at the top of the Al Saʿud. Saudi fears were summed up by a royal advisor: The Shiʿa Muslims aim at re-establishing the Safavide Dynasty, in other words to create a Shiʿa crescent stretching from Pakistan, via Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, into Saudi Arabia. The best case scenario for the Iranians is chaos and civil war in Iraq. They know perfectly well that time works in their favour, as US soldiers will not stay in Iraq forever. The Iranians are ready to support their Shiʿa brothers in the neighbouring country.33 Growing Iranian influence in Iraq is of concern. The Saudi government has even warned senior US officials such as Dick Cheney that the kingdom may provide backing – financial or other – to Iraqi Sunnis should war break out against Iraq’s Iranian-backed Shiʿa militias.34 In a comment to ABC News on 14 October 2005, King ʿAbdallah commented on Iran’s role in Iraq: ‘Iran is a friendly country. Iran is a Muslim country. We hope that Iran will not become an obstacle to peace and security in Iraq. This is what we hope for and this is what we believe the Iraqi people hope for.’35 On 20 September 2005, expressing similar views, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Saʿud bin Faysal, voiced his concerns at the US Council of Foreign Relations: The Iranians now go in this pacified area that the American forces have pacified, and they go into every government of Iraq, pay money, install their own people, put their own – even establish police forces for them, arms and militias that are there and reinforce their presence in these areas. And they are being protected in doing this by the British and the American forces in the area. . . . [T]o us it seems out of this world that you do this. We fought a war together to keep Iran from occupying Iraq after Iraq was driven out of Kuwait. Now we are handing the whole country over to Iran without reason.36

88 Mechanisms of elite integration On 16 January 2006, the foreign minister told The Times: ‘We are urging Iran to accept the position that we have taken to make the Gulf, as part of the Middle East, nuclear free and free of weapons of mass destruction. We hope that they will join us in this policy and assure that no new threat of arms race happens in this region.’37 Much more directly, according to confidential American diplomatic cables unleashed by WikiLeaks, King ʿAbdallah repeatedly urged the Bush administration in Washington, DC, to ‘cut off the head of the snake’ by launching military raids to wipe out Iran’s nuclear programme. A copy of a cable dated 20 April 2008, clearly indicated that the Saudis feared Iran’s rising influence in the region, particularly in neighbouring Iraq. Prince Saʿud bin Faysal, however, called for tougher sanctions on Iran rather than military action, including a travel ban and further restrictions on bank lending. Yet, he did not rule out the need for military strikes to halt Iran’s nuclear programme.38 The House of Saʿud also fears a revival of domestic Shiʿa nationalism fuelled by Iran. In the Saʿdah province in north-western Yemen, which has a majority of Zaydi Shiʿa, a civil war has taken place from 2004. Among the Zaydis, an agenda grew from an expression of religious identity and frustration with neglect by the central government, into open criticism of President ‘Ali ʿAbdallah. The Salih regime has repeatedly claimed that the well-armed rebels receive aid from Iran, allegations that must be seen as a strategy to get political, financial and military support from the United States, Egypt and – in particular – Saudi Arabia. In November 2009, the Royal Saudi Air Force bombed the positions of rebels that had crossed the border, drawing the kingdom directly into the conflict. This is the first time ever that the kingdom fought directly and not by proxies. Saudi Arabia’s royal family responded harshly due to fears that the Zaydi rebellion would spill across the border and destabilize the southern provinces that are populated by Shiʿas. Other elite segments are also concerned about Iran, first and foremost the influential religious leaders. Saʿd bin ʿAbdallah al-Barik, a contributor to the website of Salman al-’Awda, wrote an article with the heading ‘The Tribulation of the Sunnis: Is Iraq the Gateway for Iranian Shi’ism?’ The article was significant because it indicated the interest of Saudi Arabia’s official religious establishment in the issue. ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Burak, one of the kingdom’s senior religious scholars, issued a fatwa at the end of December 2006 in which he said that ‘The general ruling is that they [Shiʿa Muslims] are infidels, apostates and hypocrites. . . . They are more dangerous than Jews or Christians.’ That month, 30 Saudi scholars called on Sunnis in the Middle East to support the Iraqi militias against the Shiʿas.39 According to Musa bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, editor of the self-styled moderate Islamist magazine al-Salafi, ‘Iran has become more dangerous than Israel itself.’ He went on: ‘The Iranian revolution has come to renew Persian presence in the region. This is the real clash of civilization.’40 ʿAbd al-Rahman Rashid, managing director of the satellite news channel al-ʿArabiyya and a respected columnist, claimed that ‘[t]he possibility of having conflict is very high.’ Further, he stated:

Mechanisms of elite integration 89 ‘Who will face the Iranians tomorrow? Just the Israelis alone? I don’t think that is possible.’41 Israel is also seen as a threat by the elite, but interestingly less of one than that posed by Muslim regional powers. As a charter member of the Arab League, Saudi Arabia supports the position that Israel must withdraw from territory occupied in June 1967 and still does not recognize the state. Domestic and regional opinion has repeatedly demanded that the country use its position as the world’s most important oil producer to take action for the Arab cause. In addition, the obvious dependence on the USA, Israel’s most important ally, is a major issue for the House of Saʿud, especially for domestic political reasons. Guido Steinberg argues that the royal family has tried to solve its dilemma by adopting an antiIsraeli rhetoric while trying to find a solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict, and has twice (in 1981 and 2002) offered its own peace plans. Saudi Arabia has continued its quiet talks with Israel ever since.42 Internal threats The internal threats are no less real. So far, the most serious domestic challenge was Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi’s occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca on 20 November 1979 – the first day of the Islamic year 1400. The rebel’s justification was that the royal family had lost its legitimacy through ‘corruption’ and ‘blind imitation of the West’. Through the occupation, Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi and his group probably hoped to trigger a nationwide popular revolt. But this never occurred. Nonetheless, his well-organized group of 1,300 to 1,500 men – and some women – managed to hold the holy site for two weeks before Saudi Arabian special forces made to break into the Mosque. Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi and 67 of his followers were subsequently beheaded by the government. Around 1990, the royals faced a new wave of domestic criticism, an echo of the charges expressed one decade earlier. Among the most outspoken critics were Islamic scholars associated with al-sahwa al-islamiyya, including Salman al-’Awda and Safar al-Hawali. There were also militant preachers who declared war against the House of Saʿud and its supporters, including Humud ibn ‘Uqla al-Shu’aybi and ‘Ali al-Khudayr. This is when Osama bin Laden also began to criticize the Al Saʿud in public. These activists obviously radicalized the domestic Islamist movement, a process which culminated in the wave of violence in Saudi Arabia between 2003 and 2005. A group later known as al-Qaʿida in the Arabian Peninsula (Arab. al-qaʿida fi jazirat al-ʿarab) claimed responsibility for most of the attacks. The regime succeeded in suppressing the Islamists after first having instructed the religious authorities to denounce the opposition’s political objectives and actions as contrary to the ‘true’ Islam.43 Al-Qaʿida in the Arabian Peninsula has also tried to assassinate, and have had plans for kidnapping, members of the House of Saʿud. In August 2010, security authorities foiled a fourth assassination attempt against Prince Muhammad Bin Naif Bin Abdul Aziz, Assistant Minister of Interior for Security Affairs. Prince Muhammad had earlier survived three assassination attempts – one of which

90 Mechanisms of elite integration took place the year before at his palace in Jeddah when a terrorist, ʿAbdullah ʿAsiri, detonated an explosive capsule inside his body. The blast killed ʿAsiri and slightly injured Prince Muhammad. The first attempt, which took place in 2004, involved a bomb-laden vehicle that was used to target the Ministry of Interior building in Riyadh. In the second attempt, which took place in Yemen, a missile was fired at Prince Muhammad’s plane and the pilot was successful in taking evasive action.44 In June 2010, the al-Arabiya television network reported that ‘al-Qaʿida regional commander’, Saʿd al-Shehri, threatened to ‘kidnap . . . princes, ministers and officials including military commanders’ in order to secure the release of a female al-Qaʿida operative, Haylah al-Qassir, arrested by Saudi forces in February the same year.45 Haylah al-Qassir was arrested for apparently playing a significant role in handling money issues for the organization. She was married to a wellknown religious figure in the city of Buraida, known as a stronghold for militant Islamists, called ʿAbd al-Karim al-Humayed, who was arrested by Saudi authorities a while before. After they divorced, al-Qassir married one of al Humayed’s students, Muhammad al-Wakil, who was killed during clashes with Saudi security forces in December 2004.46 At the time of writing, the wave of pro-democracy demonstrations across the Middle East is obviously the royals’ main concern. In the early spring of 2011, Egypt’s Husni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Zine al-ʿAbidine ben ʿAli both lost their power through the so-called Jasmine Revolutions. Also, these rulers’ families lost their privileges and are facing legal prosecution. At the same time the rulers of Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen are under immense pressure by their own people and the international community to step down. Their futures seem grim. Worried that similar protests might materialize in Saudi Arabia, the royals have apparently closed their ranks and sent clear signals that public displays would not be tolerated. Even the usually reserved Foreign Minister, Saʿud bin Faysal, warned that the government would ‘cut off any finger’ raised against it in protest.47 History provides many examples of former heads of state being brought to trial before national or international tribunals, as Chile’s General August Pinochet and Iraq’s ex-president, Saddam Hussein, painfully experienced. The hanging of the latter was even videoed and the tape distributed all over the world. The Saudi royals and their allies are fearful about these prospects, which give them little reason to give in to public pressure. Implications for elite integration Unifying symbols command the loyalty of the elite. The royals share an identity and pride vested in their country as a rare example of indigenous Arab-Islamic state-building, and the country’s role as the geopolitical centre of the Muslim world. Ibn Saʿud has become the personification of the royal family’s achievements and unity. The bayʿa and other oaths of allegiance have an important symbolic meaning because they tie society’s elite groups together and give the king and his family legitimacy.

Mechanisms of elite integration 91 In addition, elite cohesion is strengthened by threats. According to alliance theorists, the integrating effect of threats rests on two preconditions: a degree of group identification and solidarity predating the conflict have to exist, and the outside threat must be recognized and seen as a menace to the whole group. There is obviously a high level of group identification and solidarity within the Saudi elite, which clearly predated contemporary threat perceptions. At the time of writing, Iran, coupled with the notion of Shiʿa expansionism, is widely perceived as the external threat, while the most serious internal threat is that posed by militant Islamists. These threats are clearly directed towards the whole elite, and the members of the House of Saʿud are well aware of these dangers. Accordingly, the royals and their allies know that they have to stick together in order not to lose their power, privileges and even lives.

Institutional arrangements The pattern of recruitment to elite positions, the various mechanisms for conflict management, consultative arrangements, arbitration laws and tribunals, as well as deterrents and decoys, are also important mechanisms of elite integration. Most of these mechanisms are not institutionalized and, hence, informal. Recruitment patterns The homogenous nature of the strategic elite is a product of recruitment patterns. In Saudi Arabia, it is the king’s prerogative to appoint people to leading positions in the state apparatus: according to the Basic Law of Government Article 52, appointing judges and terminating their duties are carried out by the king; Article 57 provides the king with the right to appoint and relieve deputies of the prime minister, ministers and members of the Council of Ministers; while Article 58 ensures that the king also appoints those who enjoy the rank of minister, including all provincial governors, deputy ministers and those of higher rank, and he relieves them of their posts by royal decree. Article 60 declares that the king, the commanderin-chief of the armed forces, appoints officers and ends their duties in accordance with the law; and Article 63 states that the king appoints his representatives to states. According to the Law of the Consultative Council, Article 3, the king selects all the council’s members; and according to the Allegiance Council Law, Article 1, the king appoints the members of the council by royal decree. The Basic Law of Government establishes that a few positions are exclusively reserved for the House of Saʿud, most notably the posts of king and crown prince. Article 5(B) underlines that rule passes to the sons of Ibn Saʿud and to their children’s children. But in accordance with established practice, the top posts at the Ministry of Defence and Aviation, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Saudi Arabian National Guard, the Intelligence Service and the provincial administrations are also exclusively for the royals. Although law grants the Saudi king the right to appoint and dismiss all the holders of key positions, his freedom to manoeuvre is in reality rather limited

92 Mechanisms of elite integration when it comes to the four or five most important positions. For example, King ʿAbdallah has commanded the Saudi Arabian National Guard ever since 1963; Crown Prince Sultan has been minister of defence and aviation since 1962; Prince Nayef has held the important position as interior minister since 1975; Prince Salman has served as governor of the Riyadh Province since 1963; and Prince Saʿud bin Faysal has held the post of minister of foreign affairs since 1975. The sons of these senior princes have been recruited to top positions within their fathers’ respective fiefdoms. Given the emphasis on harmony within the Al Saʿud, as will be elaborated upon later in this chapter, it is almost unthinkable that the king would make any move to have any of the senior princes replaced. Accordingly, they remain in their posts until they either voluntarily retire or die. The result is an extremely slow elite circulation, which makes Saudi top officials among the longest serving in the world. Informal mechanisms Once in Riyadh, I asked a Saudi judicial expert to assess the formal mechanisms of dispute resolution in the kingdom. He abruptly replied that he ‘[could] not think of one single formal process that had led to the solution of a conflict’.48 If one aims to understand political dynamics in Saudi Arabia, one has to look beyond the tradition and theory of Western conflict resolution and scrutinize Arab-Islamic cultural methods. These methods are basically of a non-codified and non-institutionalized nature. Tahkim and wastaʾ Saudi culture is very consensus-oriented. The importance of this principle is underlined by the fact that in most traditional Saudi households a physical space is dedicated for a diwaniyya, a place where one ‘holds court’, listens to concerns, complaints and where decisions are vetted with stakeholders. Collective social and political action is emphasized through shura and ijmaʿ: two principles that stem from Islamic and Bedouin traditions. Yet, from time to time conflicts are unavoidable. Saudis generally do not focus on problem-solving; when a dispute occurs, people tend to avoid solving it. But some conflicts cannot be ignored. Central to Arab-Islamic cultural methods of managing disputes is the process of arbitration (Arab. tahkim). The process of conflict management, however, still primarily takes place outside the public sphere. Kathleen M. Meilahn writes that arbitrators are chosen for their wisdom, justness/fairness, knowledge of customs and traditions, knowledge of genealogies, as well as good rhetoric. Each party involved in the dispute will have an arbitrator and the two arbitrators collectively decide the outcome. Their decisions are binding.49 The Western and Arab-Islamic traditions differ in their emphasis on the instrumental and relational dimensions of mediation, Meilahn argues. The Western approach is direct, step-by-step problem-solving between disputants who ideally

Mechanisms of elite integration 93 separate the person from the problem and work to satisfy various individual and shared interests through a fair deal sealed by a formal, written agreement. In contrast, the Arab-Islamic approach emphasizes relational issues, such as restoring harmony and solidarity and restoring the dignity and prestige of individuals and groups. Saudis are people-oriented and personalization of behaviour is very important. Feelings and emotions are recognized. Fitna, another concept derived from tribal custom and Islam, is viewed as harmful to society, and there is a strong focus on repairing and healing relationships, on restorative justice through public apologies, compensation, face-saving, etc.50 Often a third-party mediator (Arab. wastaʾ) is brought in to resolve interpersonal conflicts. This term is associated with the verb yatawassat, meaning to steer conflicting parties towards a middle point or compromise.51 The middleman (Arab. wasit or jaha), either an individual or a delegation of mediators, must, according to Meilahn, normally be perceived as a legitimate intervener or intermediary. The mediator, or mediators, should be an older and/or wiser person who is respected by the community hierarchy, such as the head of a village, a tribal chief or a religious leader. The mediator should come from within the local community, know the parties and their history, family relationships, etc., and have a vested interest in the outcome. It is important to note that the mediator has no sanctioning authority and his decisions are not binding.52 Musalaha and sulha Other important mechanisms for conflict resolution in the Arab-Islamic tradition are peace-making (Arab. sulha) and reconciliation (Arab. musalaha), both of which are often referred to as sulha. The mediator tries to help the parties make a truce (Arab. hudna or ’atwa). Sulha is an important term in the vocabulary of the shariʿa and the language of tribal tradition. According to Meilahn, sulha is a ritualistic conflict-management process that can be used either privately, intercommunally or inter-personally, or publicly, between governments or at high political levels.53 It is a mechanism for resolving ‘frozen’ disputes if, for instance, families are caught in a cycle of blood feuding. George E. Irani and Nathan C. Funk sketch the various steps of a typical sulha process:54 (1) An offence is committed, resulting in an injury, grievance or death. (2) To prevent retributive action, the family of the offender or attacker immediately seeks the help of local leaders, esteemed mediators, and notables, who form a jaha and prepare to investigate the case. (3) The jaha visits the family of the victim to hear grievances. The members of the jaha request full permission to intervene and arbitrate. (4) The aggrieved family agrees to renounce retaliation and comply with a truce. This marks the formal beginning of the sulha ritual. (5) Following a period of mourning (perhaps forty days), the jaha makes arrangements for the payment of diyya, or ‘blood money’, a just and

94 Mechanisms of elite integration symbolic compensation determined by the severity and unique demands of the case and by historical precedent. (6) The families gather for the ritual of musafaha, the shaking of hands. The offender must shake hands with each member of the victim’s extended family. After this is completed, leaders tie knots in a white flag borne by the offender, symbolizing the consolidation of peace. (7) To demonstrate forgiveness and further musalaha, or reconciliation, the family of the victim offers bitter coffee to the family of the offender. (8) The family of the offender serves a meal to the family of the victim. This breaking of bread together, referred to as mumalaha, completes the ritual of reconciliation. Irani and Funk have observed across the Middle East how local communities continue to make recourse to the sulha ritual as a means of controlling conflict and maintaining harmony within and between tightly knit social groups.55 The sulha is often effective because it saves face and avoids shame. All involved simply decide to wash their hands of the matter and stop being at conflict. It is a necessary mechanism to preserve social order and move on. Hence, violation of a sulha truce is viewed as an affront against the community as a whole. Conflict management within the House of Saʿud The royals are, like Saudis generally, not focused on getting to the bottom of disputes. As one consultant explains: ‘When the princes face disagreements, they go on vacation and simply forget about the problem.’56 When needed, however, conflict management within the House of Saʿud draws on traditional Arab-Islamic mechanisms. Conflicts are typically triggered when two or more princes enter into a struggle, often backed by their respective full brothers and sons, due to personal differences, money or political issues. Each party involved then seeks first the support of the rest of the family primarily, then of external groups. The middle and junior princes of the royal family do not need to pick sides early and can switch sides late in the process to secure their positions and privileges. All conflicts within the family are generally solved behind closed doors without any outside involvement. To prevent internal rifts, the family searches for compromises, sometimes with the help of a respected senior royal that is not seen as a major stakeholder.57 Prince Salman, the Governor of Riyadh, gained his reputation as the royal family’s wastaʾ during the reign of King Fahd. Because most royals are settled in the capital, he was frequently asked to find solutions when royals ran into serious trouble and to mediate in conflicts within the family. Hence, Salman played a more important role within the Al Saʿud than within the Saudi political system as such, as the position of governor carries less weight. Salman has demonstrated over many years his unique personal skills as an effective power-broker within the House of Saʿud.58 Prince Salman is able to manipulate difficult situations, such as conflicts between the senior princes. He is an intelligent player of tribal traditions; he

Mechanisms of elite integration 95 knows how to behave correctly towards his own family as well as the people. Salman is also self-controlled, in contrast to, for example, King ʿAbdallah. Instead of siding with one part in conflicts, Salman remains neutral and is thereby in a position to manoeuvre the family clear from crises. One senior Saudi official ascribed Salman the following personal characteristics: Prince Salman is a father-like figure. He is intelligent, a learner and a reader of history, very patient, and does not harbour any ill feelings against anybody. He is a strong personality and the ruler within the family. Salman is the one who solves problems within the inner circle. He is also a public man. Journalists and scholars will go to him.59 Salman has intervened in several family disputes, for example as mediator in the conflicts between Prince Turki and the rest of the Al Saʿud. Turki, full brother of Salman, has lived in self-imposed exile in a suite in the Cairo Ramses Hilton with his wife Princess Hend al-Fassi since the mid-1990s. The decadent lifestyle of the couple, and their entourage of more than 100, has been a persistent source of embarrassment for the House of Saʿud. Salman is also said to have intervened several times when tensions have arisen between ʿAbdallah, to whom he is close, and his full brother Nayef.60 As mentioned in Chapter 3, commoners also go to him if they are in dispute with members of the royal family. Other senior members of the family without formal positions are also known to have intervened in family conflicts. As one of the most senior princes, Talal has for example acted as a middleman. The elderly descendants of Saʿud al-Kabir, one of the Al Saʿud’s sub-branches, as well as Prince ʿAbd al-Rahman bin ʿAbdallah bin ʿAbdallah, have also intervened in family disputes.61 Today, within the council of royal women, there is also a smaller and more exclusive group that deals with more serious family disputes and problems. This group spots and discusses problems that, in particular, men are unable to see. According to one princess, men are occupied by ruling and business and tend not to see all the small issues in the family.62 The group of royal women also communicates with men that are involved in certain family disputes. Through this function, the council plays a crucial role when it comes to keeping the royal family united.63 Some conflicts are solved when the king sides with one part, while others are never solved, such as when there is general disagreement which makes compromising difficult.64 One example is the conflict concerning the controversial issue of how to organize the activities of Saudi religious charities. After 9/11 these organizations have repeatedly been accused of funding al-Qaʿida and like-minded militant Islamists. Some argue that all charities should be subject to one public institution so that the government can directly oversee their activities, while others maintain that monitoring through a licensing arrangement, instead of through a central institution, is better. This latter solution, its proponents argue, would provide the government with a mechanism for monitoring and supervision, while securing some flexibility needed due to the large number of charities with different

96 Mechanisms of elite integration profiles. At the time of writing, this controversy has raged for years without the king choosing any side or pushing through a compromise.65 Formal institutions Informal traditional consultative arrangements and mechanisms for conflict management remain important as indigenous responses to threats against internal cohesion because they meet the needs of the Saudi community in ways that formal state institutions cannot. Conflicts are solved through mediation and compromises in the private sphere. This is not to say that no formal institutions exist. Some elements of the majlis tradition and various arbitration arrangements have gradually been codified and institutionalized in the modern kingdom. Formalizing the Majlis tradition The majlis tradition has gradually been translated into the national political life of Saudi Arabia. The Basic Law of Government emphasizes ‘consultation’ as one of three governmental principles. In Chapter 2, Article 8, one reads: ‘Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on the premise of justice, consultation, and equality in accordance with the Islamic shariʿa.’ At the Royal Court, King ʿAbdallah meets the people twice a week and sees the senior ʿulamaʾ once a week. Crown Prince Sultan also receives citizens twice a week at court and sees people at the Ministry of Defence and Aviation once a week. Both often have dinner with prominent figures at their palaces in the evening. Interior Minister Nayef, or his deputy, meets people daily and these gatherings are often overcrowded due to his ministry’s close relations with the people, especially concerning local and security matters. The other members of the government generally receive fewer people and therefore hold majlis in their respective offices. Provincial governors, city mayors and chiefs of smaller towns and villages also have open councils at which they receive people and deal with their day-to-day problems.66 At such meetings, various problems can be discussed, such as tribal disputes, municipal and property matters, confidential needs such as asking for financial aid, etc. Criticizing the Saudi government’s policies at the majlis is officially prohibited, but there is still certain room for expressing political viewpoints. According to Prince Salman, such matters are often discussed as a way of gauging public opinion.67 Another clear manifestation of the formalization of the majlis tradition is that two political institutions, the Council of Ministers and the Consultative Council, have been named the majlis al-wuzara and the majlis al-shura respectively. Moreover, the king and the senior princes confer regularly with the leading Wahhabi scholars through the Council of Senior Scholars and prominent representatives of the business community through the Saudi Council of Commercial and Industrial Chambers. These consultations were earlier to a large extent unofficial. The Law of the Consultative Council does not provide the council with much power. This

Mechanisms of elite integration 97 fact is underlined by a former member who states that ‘the Consultative Council has all the shapes of a parliament, but it has none of its functions’.68 The council’s members are nominated and re-nominated exclusively by the king and are not elected by the people. It is interesting to note that the king has accepted all of the council’s drafts with only three or four exceptions,69 perhaps because the members are hand-picked by the king. But of the council’s 150 members, there are many honourable men with a high degree of personal integrity who are led by their independent judgements and whose drafts are not just a reflection of the king’s will. The Royal Family Council In June 2000, the Royal Family Council was established. The council is chaired by the king and comprises 18 princes. The members represent each of the Al Saʿud’s major branches, along with sons of the previous kings and other princes who are important in their own right and who hold senior positions in government or the family hierarchy. Many Western observers have interpreted its creation as a move to give the informal consultation process within the family a more formal structure. Iris Glosemeyer, for example, argues that the council aims at strengthening internal cohesion by creating a formal arena reflecting family branches and their interests. According to her, the council resembles the upper chamber of a parliament in a constitutional monarchy. By including ‘more progressive and liberal princes’, Glosemeyer continues – referring to ʿAbdallah, Badr and Talal – the royal family has underlined its reformist agenda and signalled a shift in power relationships within the family in favour of the ‘liberal camp’.70 But the Royal Family Council’s aim was never to address political issues such as reform, nor to arrange the line of succession. All important decisions are still made behind closed doors by the exclusive inner circle of royals and their advisors.71 The council’s importance was that it provided an institutional framework with which to resolve internal problems within basically the lower strata of the House of Saʿud without risking public exposure. These were inter-familial problems related for example to the uneven distribution of royal stipends, debt, crime and related matters. Many royals felt that they were not taken care of satisfactorily and sensed that they were being pushed aside. Some had also fallen into heavy debt, while others had committed various crimes. In addition, the council was a response to the need to establish a formal institution bringing together the various branches of the House of Saʿud. The more peripheral family branches and members wished for an arena at which to voice their views.72 More specifically, according to a royal advisor, the council met the need to give the returned Prince Talal, who was appointed a member, an official position.73 Deterrents and decoys Ignoring social rules and overstepping boundaries will strip a person of his ability to interact with, or influence, others. The members of the royal family, acutely sensitive

98 Mechanisms of elite integration to their public image, are most observant of these norms. From time to time, however, royals make mistakes and overstep boundaries. There are some known incidents of princes getting drunk in public, involving themselves in public disturbances, dealing drugs or committing murder, while some have rejected royal decrees or committed other political acts of protest. They are then immediately disciplined by their closest family or the senior prince in the region where the offender lives. Punishment varies from a verbal warning via fines to imprisonment, according to the seriousness of the offence committed. Even senior royals might be disciplined. King Saʿud, for example, was deposed partly because of his nepotism, while Prince Talal, the founder of the Free Princes, was forced to spend time in exile in Egypt.74 Imprisonment is used as a response to grave criminal acts such as murder. There is a block of villas within the Emarat compound in the capital dedicated to princely suspects and convicts. The level of comfort here is said to be well above that of the average Saudi jail and visiting conditions are generous.75 Alternatively princes might be placed under house arrest.76 Politically subversive actions are also punished with imprisonment. In December 2003, for example, Prince Sultan bin Turki, the son of the notorious Prince Turki, told the BBC from his house arrest in Riyadh that he had been kidnapped by Saudi agents in Geneva. His crime was reportedly to have founded a group aimed at combating corruption among royals and top officials. According to the prince, a specially hired Boeing 747 was used to smuggle him out of the country after he had been drugged and gagged.77 There are also a few known examples of royals who have been executed. Prince Faysal bin Musaʿid, who assassinated his uncle King Faysal in 1975, was found guilty of regicide and hours later was publicly beheaded in Riyadh. The prince’s motives are still not clear. Faysal was a rather wild youth. As a student in the USA he was arrested in 1970 for selling LSD, but could leave the country due to diplomatic immunity. After leaving America, Faysal spent some time in Lebanon where he, it was said, was also involved in drugs. There has been speculation that he sought to avenge the death of his elder brother, Khalid, who died in a clash with security forces in 1966 after a demonstration against a television station in Riyadh. Khalid was regarded as a religious extremist and his protest was due to his view of the depiction of images being against Islam. Another example is Princess Mishʿal bint Fahd bin Muhammad, who was executed in 1977. This episode was the basis of the BBC’s rendition of the event, Death of a Princess, in 1980. Princess Mishʿal, who was married to an older relative, apparently became romantically involved with Khalid Muhalhal. He happened to be the nephew of Saudi Arabia’s special envoy to Lebanon. Many members of the royal family heard rumours of their love affair, which was a major violation of the social norms. When the young couple was on the brink of discovery, they made a fatal decision to run off together. Mishʿal, fearing the wrath of her family, attempted to stage her own death. She told her family that she was going for a swim at their private beach on the Red Sea. Mishʿal piled her clothes on the shore, then dressed herself as a Saudi man and tried to flee the kingdom. Unfortunately for Mishʿal, she was caught trying to catch a flight from the airport in Jeddah. Her grandfather, Prince Muhammad, one of the country’s

Mechanisms of elite integration 99 most powerful men, ordered her execution under charges of adultery. She was shot in public by a firing squad, while her lover was apparently forced to watch her die. He was then beheaded by sword. Imprisonment of a prince means in practice that he might continue his comfortable lifestyle either within the walls of a royal prison villa or his private home. If a prince runs into deep trouble, senior princes might intervene and convince the victim’s family not to press the case too hard. The case of Prince Fahd bin Nayef is illustrative. The young prince gunned down a young man known as Mundhir al-Qadi in September 2002. After hearing from all parties, the shariʿa court ordered the murderer be executed. A royal decree was issued to carry out the execution on 1 May 2004. Prince Fahd was, however, pardoned just 30 minutes before he was due to be executed. The decision of the victim’s father – who, instead of insisting on the death penalty, now demanded that Fahd learn the Qurʾan by heart – surprised everybody as he had previously rejected all mediation. The father stated to the press that ‘he took the decision on his own without bowing to any outside pressure’.78 It is far more likely, however, that royal intervention was what persuaded him to pardon the murderer. Another known example of royals slipping away from the law is the handful of princes, the exact number is debated, that were among 300 youths arrested for causing disturbances during eid al-fitr in Jeddah’s cornice in January 2002. The princes were said to be among the rioters that blocked roads and harassed families celebrating the end of Ramadan. Saudi newspapers soon dropped the story and none of the princes involved was ever prosecuted. By contrast, the commoners found guilty were meted out prison sentences and up to 200 lashes. The Al Saʿud is also sensitive to public criticism. All of those who question the rule of the king or the role of the royal family risk sanctions such as imprisonment, travel bans or deportation.79 For example, five initiative-takers behind the ‘liberal petition’ in February 2004 calling for an elected parliament and rights for women were imprisoned, including the publisher Muhammad Sa’id Tayib, two academics, Matruq al-Falih and Khalid al-Hamid, as well as two Islamists, ʿAbdallah al-Hamid and Tawfiq al-Qasir. Some of the activists were pardoned by King ʿAbdallah in 2005, but remained banned from travelling abroad. Deportation is also practised. In 1994, King Fahd announced that Osama bin Laden had been stripped of his citizenship and that his remaining assets in the country had been frozen because of his irresponsible behaviour that contradicted the interests of Saudi Arabia and harmed brotherly countries, and because of his refusal to obey instructions issued to him.80 It is important to underline, however, that the regime is not particularly repressive by nature, at least not in comparison with other regimes in the Middle East. In Saudi Arabia deterrents work hand in hand with decoys. Everyone who challenges the established order is immediately disciplined, but strong efforts are also made to bring him back into the fold. Most Saudis give in to such pressure. Two examples are Salman al-’Awda and Safar al-Hawali, who both assumed a pro-regime stance in the late 1990s. There are two main mechanisms that are decisive in the process of re-integrating dissidents: the first is leverage. Saudi

100 Mechanisms of elite integration Arabia is a strong state with the financial capacity to co-opt opposition, and it is not forced to take refuge in raw suppression as most weak states are. The former Islamist militants who attend the government’s programme of rehabilitation and counselling are given jobs, subsidized houses and cars, and even arranged marriages. The second mechanism is loyalty to family and tribe. For a Saudi, the family is the most important source of identification and a large part of his life centres on this social unit. A break with these structures is agonizing for him and makes him feel insecure. In the kingdom, this combination of leverage and loyalty helps preserve the social harmony. These mechanisms are obviously more effective with members of the elite, because even more is at stake for them. For an elite individual who is considering breaking with the House of Saʿud, there is a substantial socio-economic price to pay. He and his family are most likely used to an expensive lifestyle abroad and at home in Saudi Arabia. Cutting ties with the establishment leads to a dramatic reduction in this standard of living. The more influential the family the person belongs to, the stronger the pressure for re-integration will be. A Saudi would in other words have to be strongly ideologically convinced before he would consider breaking with his family and tribe. Osama bin Laden, whose family is among the kingdom’s wealthiest and most influential, possessed such a belief: but he is a very rare case. Implications for elite integration The various institutional mechanisms have an overall positive effect on elite integration, though to a varying degree: first, the homogenous nature of the strategic elite is a product of recruitment patterns. The king makes all important appointments – a prerogative prescribed by law and accepted by the royal family. Prospective candidates to the top posts are selected on the traditional dynastic principles of descent, age and proven competence. As members of the same family, there are minimal variations in loyalties and perspectives among those that are recruited to senior positions. Such recruitment patterns foster elite integration. Moreover, elite theorists identify as fundamental for elite integration the extent to which individuals hold key posts in more than one organization and sector, simultaneously or sequentially, and are thus able to coordinate diverse activities. As shown, the members of one of the kingdom’s elite groups are also often parts of others, which is particularly true of the highest strata of the elite. Senior princes hold numerous top posts in different organizations and sectors. Second, consensus-building is institutionalized at all levels of the decisionmaking process. Saudi political culture is very much consensus-oriented. Although the system is far from a participatory government in the Western sense of the concept, the king will always establish consensus within the elite before he makes any decisions. If consensus is not reached, the king will often simply avoid making or delay a decision to avoid conflicts. This profound focus on harmony within the elite obviously hinders differences from escalating into serious conflicts, which is essential to avoid elite fragmentation.

Mechanisms of elite integration 101 Third, the various Arab-Islamic methods of conflict management provide the political elite with tools to handle internal conflicts. According to these principles, conflicts are often solved through the intervention of a third party. Several senior princes are known to act as mediators – as well as some royal women. In Saudi Arabia, solving conflicts means making compromises so all parties involved save face and keep their honour intact. This principle, coupled with obligatory efforts to repair and heal relationships, makes the indigenous system of conflict management efficient in a Saudi cultural context. Although a gradual institutionalization is taking place, the processes of consensus-building and conflict management still take place basically outside the domain of formal political institutions.

Notes 1 Arab proverb. 2 Interviews with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005, and members of the royal family, Riyadh, April 2009. 3 Khalid bin Sultan and Patrick Seale, Desert Warrior, New York: Harper Collins, 1995, p. 50. 4 Khalid bin Sultan and Patrick Seale, Desert Warrior, p. 53. 5 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Dubai, November 2008; Khalid bin Sultan and Patrick Seale, Desert Warrior, p. 50; and Steve Coll, The Bin Ladens, pp. 142–4. 6 Interview with members of the royal family, Riyadh, April 2009. 7 Interviews with Saudi official/scholar, Dubai, November 2008, scholar, Dubai, November 2008, and members of the royal family, Riyadh, April 2009. 8 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, April 2007. 9 Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, p. 24. 10 Khalid bin Sultan and Patrick Seale, Desert Warrior, p. 48. 11 Khalid bin Sultan and Patrick Seale, Desert Warrior, p. 47. 12 Interview in Oslo, August 2009. 13 Interviews with members of the royal family, Riyadh, April 2009. 14 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, August 2006. 15 Ibid. 16 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, November 2005. 17 Ibid. 18 Michael Herb, All in the Family, p. 105. 19 Interviews with members of the royal family, Riyadh, April 2009. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Interview with businessman/advisor to the royal family, Oslo, April 2008. 23 Various interviews, Riyadh, April 2009. 24 Interview with member of the royal family, Riyadh, April, 2009. 25 Interviews with members of the royal family, Riyadh, April 2009. 26 Interview in PBS’s Frontline Program, September 2003. 27 John L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, vol. 1, 1995, pp. 205–6. 28 ‘The Law of the Consultative Council’, available online, http://www.shura.gov.sa/ EnglishSite/Elaw/law1.htm. 29 ‘The Allegiance Council Law’, see Appendix 1. 30 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 210. 31 For Al Saʿud–Shiʿa relations, see ‘The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia’, International Crises Group, Middle East Report No. 45, 19 September 2005, available online, http://

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44 45 46 47 48 49

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www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3678; Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab Shiʿa: The Forgotten Muslims, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006; and Fouad N. Ibrahim, The Shiʿas of Saudi Arabia, London and San Francisco: al-Saqi Books, 2006. Various interviews with members of the royal family, officials and scholars. Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005. Helene Cooper, ‘Saudis Role in Iraq Frustrates U.S. Officials’, New York Times, 26 July 2007, available online, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/27/world/middleeast/27saudi. html. ABC News, 14 October 2005, available online, http://www.saudiembassy. net/2005News/Statements/TransDetail.asp?cIndex=559. Prince Saud al-Faisal, ‘The Fight against Extremism and the Search for Peace’, address to Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 20 September 2005, available online, http://www.dfr.org/publication/8908/fight_against_extremism_and_the_search_for_ peace_rush_transcript_federal_news_service_inc.html. Richard Beeston, ‘Saudis Warn Iran that it’s Nuclear Plan Risks Disaster’, The Times, 16 January 2006, available online, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ middle_east/article789045.ece. Reuters, 28 November 2010, available online, http://www.reuters.com/article/ idUSN2862745120101128. ‘Top Saudi Cleric Issues Religious Edict Declaring Shiites to be Infidels’, International Herald Tribune, 29 December 2006, available online, http://www.iht.com/articles/ ap/2006/12/29/africa/ME_GEN_Saudi_Shiites.php. Quoted in Hassan M. Fattah, ‘Talk in Saudi Arabia turns to “Iranian Threat” ’, International Herald Tribune, 21 December 2006, available online, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/21/news/saudi.php. Ibid. Guido Steinberg, ‘Saudi Arabia and the Middle East Conflict: Not an Enemy of Israel’, Qantara, 2007, available online, http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c476/_nr-726/i.html. See for instance R. Hrair Dekmejian, ‘The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia’, Middle East Journal, 48, 1994, pp. 627–43; Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent; Joshua Teitelbaum, ‘A Family Affair’; Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Political, Foreign and Energy Dimensions, pp. 161–223; ‘Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?’, International Crises Group, Middle East Report No. 31, 21 September 2004, available online, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3021&l=1; and Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia. Zawya, 16 August 2010, available online, http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/ sidZAWYA20100816041310/Fourth%20Assassination%20Attempt%20Against%20 Saudi%20Prince%20Foiled. Reuters, 3 June 2010, available online, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6523 FI20100603. Al-sharq al-awsat, 4 June 2010, available online, http://www.aawsat.com/english/ news.asp?section=1&id=21183. Toby S. Jones, ‘Saudi Anxieties’, Foreign Policy, 23 March 2011, available online, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/23/high_anxiety. Interview with official/scholar, Riyadh, April 2007. Kathleen M. Meilahn, ‘Cultural Understanding within Context as a Tool for Countering Irregular Threats and as a Force for Peace’, Strategic Insights, vol. VI, issue 2, March 2007, available online, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Mar/meilahnMar07. asp#author. Ibid.

Mechanisms of elite integration 103 51 Robert B. Cunningham and Yasin K. Sarayrah, Wasta: The Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society, Westport, CT, and London: Praeger, 1993, p. 1. 52 Kathleen M. Meilahn, ‘Cultural Understanding’. 53 Ibid. 54 George E. Irani and Nathan C. Funk, ‘Rituals of Reconciliation: Arab-Islamic Perspectives’, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper, No. 19: OP: 2, August 2000, p. 28, available online, http://kroc.nd.edu/ocpapers/op_19_2.pdf. 55 Ibid. 56 Interview with independent consultant, London, May 2008. 57 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, August 2006. 58 Interviews with diplomat, Riyadh, May 2006, and member of the royal family, June 2008. 59 Interview with official, Riyadh, April 2009. 60 Interview with Saudi scholar, London, July 2006. 61 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, August 2006. 62 Interview in Riyadh, April 2009. 63 Ibid. 64 Interview with official/scholar, Riyadh, April 2007. 65 Ibid. 66 For an overview of the majlis arrangements in Saudi Arabia, see Faisal bin Mishʿal bin Saʿud bin ʿAbdul-’Aziz Al-Saʿud, The ‘Open Councils’ and the Islamic Concept of Rule in Saudi Arabian Politics, London: Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, 2003. 67 Faisal bin Mishʿal bin Saʿud bin ʿAbdul-’Aziz Al-Saʿud, The ‘Open Councils’, p. 65. 68 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, August 2006. 69 Interview with official/scholar, Riyadh, April 2007. 70 Iris Glosemeyer, ‘Saudi Arabia: Dynamism Uncovered’, pp. 151–2. 71 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, November 2005. 72 Interviews with diplomat, Riyadh, November 2005, and Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005. 73 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005. 74 Interviews with businessman, Abu Dhabi, December 2004, and Dubai, December 2005, and Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, August 2006. 75 Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 30, no. 792, 27 October 2006, p. 4. 76 Interviews with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, August 2006, and official/scholar, Riyadh, April 2007. 77 BBC, 21 January 2004, available online, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_ east/3416877.stm. 78 Arab News (Jeddah), 2 May 2004, available online, http://www.arabnews.com/?page= 1§ion=0&article=44193&d=2&m=5&y=2004. 79 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, August 2006. 80 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, April 2007.

6

The challenge of succession

It heartened us to see this marvellous agreement (within the royal family) on pledging allegiance to ʿAbdallah bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz as monarch of the Kingdom and Custodian of the two Holy Mosques and on King ʿAbdallah’s choice of his brother Sultan bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz as crown prince. We call on Muslims to pledge allegiance to them!1 [H]istory has proved that the royal family is the family of unity, solidarity, cooperation, cordiality, and love. Your brothers, the royal family and people are all united behind you. We pin great hope on you. Your actions in the past foretold of a bright future.2 I can assure you and everyone else that the royal family is united in one hand and one heart!3 The House of Saʿud’s oligarchs and their allies repeatedly reaffirm in public the unity of the royals. Such statements must be understood as responses to the neverending gossip about intrigues at the Royal Court. Western diplomats, journalists and researchers, no less than Saudi exiled dissidents, are obsessed by divisions within the royal family. The lack of institutionalized succession procedures has often been identified as the most glaring threat to elite unity. Ever since the death of Ibn Saʿud, numerous observers have predicted a looming succession crisis, resulting in the disintegration of the royal family. As the sons of the late founding father grow older, warnings of succession struggles become louder. A new book is published every tenth year or so, addressing the dynamics of succession within the Al Saʿud. The books of Alexander Bligh, Simon Henderson and Joseph A. Kechichian (as well as my own book) all fit perfectly into this interval.4 As stressed in Chapter 1, since the mid-1990s, during King Fahd’s 10 years of illness and even after, numerous rumours have indicated a power struggle between the heir apparent, ʿAbdallah, on the one hand, and Sultan and the other Sudayri brothers on the other. By contrast to such speculations, this chapter argues that succession demonstrates the unity of the House of Saʿud. As described in Chapter 2, elite unity is manifested in various ways, among others through instances of collective action. In line with this observation, this chapter looks at succession, which is the royal

The challenge of succession 105 elite’s major ‘collective action dilemma’. Collective action is the pursuit of a goal or set of goals by more than one person,5 while collective action dilemmas are situations when cooperation hinders suboptimal outcomes for the cooperators.

Intrigues at the royal court Succession is the major challenge for the stability of family dynasties. Unlike the European tradition from the Middle Ages, the Arab-Islamic tradition does not emphasize the principle of primogeniture, whereby power and wealth are handed down to the first-born son. Shari’a law dictates that a man’s sons are all to be considered legitimate and have to be treated as equals. Pre-Islamic tribal custom prescribed that power within a family dynasty could not only pass from father to son, but also to the ruler’s brother, uncle or cousin. The decisive factor was the principle of ‘the eldest and most able’, a system implying that power should pass to the eldest male relative of the deceased ruler regarded as the most qualified leader. Personal qualities that were particularly highly esteemed in Arab tribal culture were, according to Gary Samuel Samore, ‘success in battle, generosity in victory, and wisdom in mediation’.6 While the historical record shows that the principle of primogeniture has often resulted in incompetent leadership, the meritocratic idea of choosing the most competent heir is a mechanism intended to avoid hopeless rulers. This is a precondition for stable and prosperous dynastic rule. Looking at the factual historical experiences, however, there are also problems related to the Arab-Islamic traditions of succession: the criteria for identifying the most capable heir have always been very diffuse. This problem was made even more acute as rulers generally left numerous male relatives as a result of polygamous marital customs, and the pool from which the heir was to be chosen was consequently large. Unless a strong ruler had arranged the line of succession before his death, generally by nominating one of his eldest sons the heir apparent, power struggles would often occur. The system’s weakness has caused numerous succession conflicts throughout the history of Arab-Islamic empires and brought many family dynasties to an end. Although Islamic law dictates that a man’s sons are all legitimate and have to be treated as equals, this was generally far from the case when the successor was to be chosen. Blood lines have been another decisive element in succession. Traditional Arabic tribal societies were obsessed by origin, and still are. At the top of the social hierarchy, as I described in Chapter 4, were descendants of noble tribes. In practice only those with ‘blue blood’ pumping through their veins could inherit power. Choosing the son of a concubine or foreign wife as successor was regarded as a major social taboo.7 Finally, mothers tended to position their own sons. The sons of women that were among the ruler’s favourites, or mothers equipped with a good nose for politics and the personal skills to manipulate their husband, obviously had a competitive edge. Moreover, full brothers could create strong alliances to outflank their half-brothers. Those possessing many full brothers hence had another advantage.

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Historically, the lack of institutional mechanisms to regulate the process of succession has compounded the problems. Without an effective state apparatus, it was generally difficult for the designated heir apparent to enforce his claim to power, deter his rivals and consolidate his position. In pre-modern states, successors did not have the opportunity to allocate attractive governmental positions as a tool to reward their supporters and buy out their competitors. Nor was there an abundance of economic resources available that could be spent to make compromises. This situation is dramatically different today. Michael Herb argues that the distribution of positions within the vast state apparatuses to different senior royals as a strategy to oil the issue of succession is the hallmark of the ‘dynastic monarchies’. In addition, these regimes control enormous oil revenues. Such resources make it much easier for contemporary family dynasties to bargain and make compromises between ambitious royals competing for power and wealth.8 A complete list of examples of Arab-Islamic empires that have experienced serious turmoil, or passed into history, due to succession struggles would be very long: the Prophet Muhammad’s death triggered a crisis of succession that led to the Sunni–Shiʿa rift; the Kharijites, a third major Islamic branch, came into being as a result of succession disagreements; and the history of the powerful Muslim family dynasties that followed the first Islamic caliphate is marked by internal intrigues and power struggles, including the Umayyads, Abbasids and Ottomans. These are just a few examples. An identical pattern is found in the emirates on the Arabian Peninsula: while the first Saudi state enjoyed uncontested lineal successions and stability, the second state was ravaged by internal conflicts that ultimately brought it to an end. After the assassination of Amir Turki in 1834, the House of Saʿud devolved into a series of competing factions. The constant in-fighting ultimately led to the decline of the family and the rise of the rival al-Rashid family. The Al Saʿud were driven out of Riyadh and forced to take refuge in Kuwait. The Rashidi dynasty in Haʾil, which rose and fell from 1835 to 1921, is probably the dynasty in Arab recorded history most plagued by succession struggles. It was blighted by succession crisis after succession crisis throughout its rather short existence. The internal divisions within the family led to bloody in-fighting. In the last years of the nineteenth century, as many as 10 Rashid leaders died violently.9 Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that Western observers of Saudi politics are obsessed by princes jostling for power and influence. It is repeatedly claimed that the apparent smoothness of succession processes in reality masks fierce intra-family rivalries that often fester for years. Within all families, regardless of size, there are tensions and conflicts from time to time, and the Al Saʿud is no exception. There are differences at all levels of the enormous family hierarchy that at times can be very sharp. The princes, like other close relatives, sometimes offend and become angry with one another. Disagreements among the princes are generally more related to personal differences or money than politics.10 The royal family’s hierarchical power structure, which is typical of Saudi families, is the root of much tension. Jealousy and rivalry among siblings are apparently promoted through the socialization process. Fathers often have their favourite

The challenge of succession 107 sons, and such favouritism, often highly explicit and which manifests itself for instance in the practice of nicknaming children, causes conflicts between brothers. A Westerner who spent more than 20 years with the House of Saʿud comments: As the crowd of children grows, the father gets the ‘apple of his eye’. The chosen one might even be one of the youngest – or the youngest – of the siblings. This often leads to jealousy and conflict. Within such a system there is a hairline between love and hate.11 Although intrigues are at the heart of royal-family politics, it is important not to confuse this dynamic with elite fragmentation. The true unity of the political elite is revealed when it faces serious collective action challenges, such as succession.

From King Saʿud to Faysal King Ibn Saʿud died on 9 November 1953. On the same day some 100 princes gathered around his body and swore allegiance to the heir apparent, Saʿud, as the new king, and his half-brother, Faysal, as crown prince. The reign of Saʿud represents the most politically turbulent period in the history of the kingdom, with fierce in-fighting between various groups of royals. The conflicts nearly brought the young dynasty to an abrupt end. Brother against brother Ibn Saʿud named his oldest surviving son, Saʿud, as heir apparent in 1933. The late king also made it clear that his second-oldest son, Faysal, would succeed his brother. The reason why Ibn Saʿud chose Saʿud is unclear and debated: David Holden and Richard Johns suggest that the king, seeking international recognition, wanted to name a crown prince in accordance with the European principle of primogeniture rather than traditional Arab-Islamic principles of succession. In addition, aware of the potential destabilizing effect of the coming succession, the king might have considered choosing his eldest son as the safest move to secure lineal succession and avoid any divisions within the family.12 Gary Samuel Samore, by contrast, argues that Ibn Saʿud named his eldest son crown prince because Saʿud, of his sons, had displayed most proficiency in warfare and tribal politics. The king considered these qualities essential for maintaining dynastic rule.13 From my point of view, Ibn Saʿud’s desire to secure lineal succession explains his choice. The king’s elder half-brother, Muhammad, also had dynastic ambitions. Muhammad played a major role in subsequent military expeditions, but his importance was gradually overshadowed as Ibn Saʿud’s own sons grew older and began to assume important positions. As it became apparent that the king was grooming his elder sons for succession in the 1920s and 1930s, Muhammad began proposing the candidacy of his own eldest son, Khalid. Muhammad maintained

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that Khalid was ‘the most able’ of candidates, but failed to mobilize the support of the family. In 1927, there were accusations that Khalid had attempted to assassinate Saʿud.14 Khalid died in a car accident in 1938, while his father was excluded from public life until his death in 1943. Obeying their father’s provisions, Ibn Saʿud’s surviving brothers and 34 sons were able to forge an orderly succession. But the potential for disarray and conflict was still formidable. On the death of the king, the royal family lost its patriarch. Ibn Saʿud’s undisputed authority was the glue that had tied together the family dynasty for half a century. According to N.I. Proshin, ‘[t]he numerous royal family was always heterogeneous. Its individual members occupied different social positions and received different allowances from the exchequer. However, during Ibn Saʿud’s lifetime the frictions within the family did not turn into open enmity. The princes were afraid of Ibn Saʿud, for he might deprive them of their allowances, as he did more than once when he was disobeyed. After Ibn Saʿud’s death, the royal family split into different groups.’15 In the late 1950s and early 1960s three different power blocks began to crystallize within the House of Saʿud: the first was King Saʿud and his sons; the second was Crown Prince Faysal and his half-brothers, including the Sudayri brothers; and the third was Prince Talal and the Free Princes, who were supported by members of the non-royal Western-educated intelligentsia. The battle to determine the future of the kingdom was to occur between Saʿud and Faysal. Madawi al-Rasheed notes that Saʿud and his brother and heir apparent, Faysal, have often been portrayed as binary opposites. The former is often associated with ‘traditional tribal government, plundering of oil revenues, palace luxuries, conspiracy inside and outside Saudi Arabia, and vice’, while the latter is associated with ‘sobriety, piety, puritanism, financial wisdom, and modernisation’.16 The origin of conflict between the brothers is often depicted as Faysal’s attempts to curb his brother’s spending and save the country from bankruptcy. The crisis, al-Rasheed continues, was as much about personal rivalry. Saʿud sought to dominate the Council of Ministers and abolished the post of prime minister. In addition, he began to promote his own sons at the expense of his brothers – as his father had done – and placed these in key posts in the military apparatus.17 King Saʿud’s half-brothers had sworn allegiance to him. Faysal took his oath of loyalty particularly seriously and feared that any move against the king would split the House of Saʿud.18 In March 1958, however, Princes Muhammad and Fahd took the initiative in pressing for Saʿud’s abdication in favour of Faysal. Behind them were Princes Khalid and ʿAbdallah, as well as Fahd’s six full brothers. Older members of the Al Saʿud intervened to preserve unity within the royal family. In the 1950s and 1960s the elder branch of the royal family was represented by the three remaining brothers of Ibn Saʿud: ʿAbdallah, Ahmad and Musaʿid. The first of these played a crucial role in bringing about a compromise involving the king accepting appointing Faysal to the position of prime minister, thereby giving him wide executive powers.19 ʿAbdallah had for years served as a member of Ibn Saʿud’s council and as one of the late king’s official advisors. Until

The challenge of succession 109 he died in 1977, he enjoyed the role of an influential ‘behind-the-scenes mediator’ and respected family elder. In December 1960, King Saʿud managed to restore his executive power through a strategic alliance with Talal and the Free Princes. The king limited Faysal’s powers and became de facto prime minister and formed a new Council of Ministers. But the crown prince neither formally resigned nor left the country. Talal was appointed finance minister, and Saʿud’s son, Muhammad, defence minister. Most new ministers were commoners, illustrating Saʿud’s limited support base within the royal family. Talal tried to place into order the kingdom’s financial affairs, but was resisted by Saʿud and his sons. The following year the king published a decree removing Talal as minister.20 In August 1962, King Saʿud confiscated Talal’s property, cancelled his passport and denounced his reform movement as consisting of ‘quite mad, irresponsible boys who are deliberately trying to break the Saudi family tradition and hold it up to ridicule’.21 Talal’s half-brothers and fellow partisans, Fawwaz and Badr, together with their cousin Saʿud bin Fahd, handed in their passports in sympathy. All settled in Cairo. This open family rift was a major embarrassment for the royal family. King Saʿud was now even more isolated and had also discredited himself through his connection to the Free Princes. Two incidents in the autumn of 1962 tipped the power struggle to the advantage of Faysal further: the coup in Yemen and Saʿud’s weakened health. In September, the imam was overthrown in neighbouring Yemen. Four years earlier, in July 1958, Iraq’s young King Faysal and most of his family had been slaughtered by revolutionaries. The coup in Baghdad had come as a shock to the House of Saʿud and the revolution in Yemen was another source of acute concern. Many royals shared the fear that Egypt’s powerful and aggressive president, Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser, would use the revolution combined with threats of armed force to bring the Al Saʿud to an end. Al-Nasser sent thousands of soldiers to support the new regime in Sanaa, and the Egyptian air force also bombed the Saudi border towns of Najran and Jizan. Alexei Vassiliev writes that ‘[t]he royal family decided to close ranks in the face of the danger’.22 The royals gathered behind Faysal, who in this critical situation was widely regarded as the most competent leader and the only one that could save the family from the impending danger. In October 1962, during King Saʿud’s absence abroad for medical treatment, Faysal rallied enough support within the royal family to install himself as prime minister for a second time and established a new government. Faysal’s ministers included his half-brothers Fahd, as minister of the interior, and Sultan, as minister of defence, both among his most loyal supporters.23 In January 1963, ʿAbdallah replaced one of Saʿud’s sons as commander of the National Guard. As prime minister, Faysal had the power to replace ministers and other key officials. By the middle of that year he had pushed all of the king’s sons out of their posts and controlled both the regular military forces and the Saudi Arabian National Guard. The only exception was Mansur bin Saʿud, the commander of the Royal Guard.

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Women sometimes enter into the family disputes. In the late summer of 1963, Crown Prince Faysal and Prince Talal made peace through the mediation of the latter’s mother, Munayer, better known as Umm Tallal. She was among King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz’s favourite wives24 and was as known for her intelligence as for her beauty. Her son, Talal, embarrassed his own family by showing sympathy with President Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser, Saudi Arabia’s foremost enemy. On 8 September 1963, the Sunday Telegraph’s correspondent in Cairo reported that Talal’s mother, Munayer, kept telling her son that he was behaving foolishly, while Princess Madawi, his younger sister, to whom he was extremely attached, kept asking him to return home.25 A few days later he returned. Faysal never forgave Talal, but privately assured Munayer that her son’s assets would be unfrozen and that he could safely return home to the kingdom.26 Immediately after these incidents, the king returned home determined to re-establish his government. As a desperate final move, Saʿud travelled across the kingdom and distributed money among influential tribes, such as the Harb, Shammar and ‘Utayba, with the hope of mobilizing their support against his brothers.27 In December 1963, the isolated King Saʿud barricaded himself in his Nasariyya Palace in Riyadh, protected by the Royal Guard. Only his own sons, as well as a few tribesmen, came to rescue him. In March 1964, the king sent a letter to Faysal, demanding that his prerogatives be restored and that at least two of his sons should be allowed to return to their positions on the Council of Ministers. He also shocked his family by threatening to turn the Royal Guard’s artillery on the crown prince’s private home.28 The king’s threats were a huge failure and miscalculation, and all princes of any importance now finally sided with Faysal. The battle was lost for Saʿud. Later the same year, he was stripped of his remaining authority and exiled, and his powers were transferred to Faysal. In November 1964, 68 princes signed the royal family’s formal decision to appoint Faysal king. This list of signatures indicates the number of princes that took part in the decision-making and its implementation. To give this process legitimacy, the royals had sought the approval of the Wahhabi establishment a few months earlier. Saʿud died in exile in Greece in 1969. ‘King Faysal’s order’ King Faysal united the royal family and consolidated the position of the monarchy during his reign. Important in this process was his distribution of key positions to his closest allies: in his first government, established in 1962, Faysal made Fahd interior minister and Sultan defence minister. Ahmad Zaki Yamani, a close aide of Faysal, became minister of petroleum, a post he retained for more than two decades. In 1963, as mentioned, ʿAbdallah was appointed commander of the Saudi Arabian National Guard and Salman was appointed governor of Riyadh. Faysal named Khalid heir apparent in 1965, while Fahd was pronounced third in line in 1967. The former was appointed crown prince and deputy prime minister, while the latter was appointed second deputy prime minister. Moreover, Turki

The challenge of succession 111 was appointed deputy minister of defence in 1969, and Nayef was made minister of state for internal affairs in 1970 and became minister of interior in 1975. As the example of Prince Talal’s mother, Munayer, illustrates, the women’s networks are often crucial as the women may be associated with the mothers, wives and daughters of the disputing parties and, hence, are able to heal bad relations within the palace. Another example is the political rehabilitation of Prince Muhammad bin Saʿud, the third son of ex-king Saʿud. Appointed commander of his father’s bodyguard in 1953 and minister of defence in December 1960, he was among King Saʿud’s most important supporters. Following a power struggle with his half-brother, Crown Prince Faysal, the king was deposed and forced into exile. In November 1964, Prince Muhammad pledged his allegiance to Faysal. He was the first of the sons of the deposed king to do so, a fact, according to contemporary reporting from the British Embassy in Jeddah, explained by the fact that he was married to one of Faysal’s daughters, Sara.29 Since being rehabilitated in the mid1960s, Prince Muhammad bin Saʿud has held several important positions, and served between 1987 and September 2010 as governor of the al-Bahah Province. Faysal also included some of the Free Princes into his administration, including Badr, appointed deputy commander of the National Guard in 1965, ʿAbd al-Muhsin, appointed governor of Medina in 1965, Nawwaf, appointed advisor to the king in 1968, and Fawwaz, appointed governor of Mecca in 1971. The king’s rule, which Joseph Kostiner and Joshua Teitelbaum have called ‘Faysal’s order’, was based on delicately balancing competing forces in Saudi society.30 Well aware of the acute need to regulate the succession, Faysal persuaded his brothers to observe the principle of birth and set the standards required of a king. He also succeeded in obtaining his family’s consent to create a balance between the two major branches: the Sudayri brothers, including Fahd, Sultan, Nayef, Turki and the rest of the brothers, most prominently later Kings Khalid and ʿAbdallah. The princes from these factions alternated in important positions, thereby preventing the absolute concentration of power in the hands of one branch, as King Saʿud had tried to do, only to provoke a princely rebellion. Most importantly, the command of coercive powers was divided between the Sudayri brothers and ʿAbdallah. Faysal also tried to heal troubled relationships within his own family. He sought to recreate the unity by rehabilitating Talal and his supporters, and even included some of the Free Princes in his government. During the first half of his reign, the conflict with Egypt continued. Faysal decided to supply money and arms to the forces in Yemen loyal to the imam, and Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser replied by sponsoring attacks inside Saudi Arabia. In November 1966 Yemeni infiltrators set off bombs at the palace of Prince Fahd, then Saudi interior minister. Later, infiltrators bombed the house of a prominent Islamic scholar in Najran. In 1969, the government arrested several hundred Saudis, including 60–70 military officers, who were suspected of plotting to kill King Faysal and overthrow the monarchy. After a nephew murdered Faysal in 1975, the royals dealt with succession quickly. The senior princes immediately gathered and – obeying the informal succession principles established by the late king – appointed Khalid the new king

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and Fahd as crown prince and deputy prime minister. ʿAbdallah was appointed second deputy prime minister. The choice of Fahd meant that two of his elder brothers, Nasir and Saʿd, who would have been next in line of succession according to age, were bypassed in favour of their younger brother. This was unproblematic, since none of them had held any position for decades nor possessed the necessary status within the Al Saʿud. Nasir had been governor of Riyadh for a few years in the late 1940s. In 1947, however, his career ended abruptly when seven of his guests died from alcohol poisoning after a party. His father reportedly beat Nasir in person, fired him from his post and imprisoned him.31 As king, Khalid gained a reputation of being a very pleasant man, but he displayed no interest in government, politics or foreign affairs. He often dropped out of public life to devote himself to his passion, farming. By his own wish and with the support of his senior brothers, Khalid became a ‘figurehead king’ and turned management of the government over to Fahd.32 At the end of Khalid’s reign, the royal family faced two serious crises. The first was Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution in Iran in 1978–79, which triggered a revival of Islam throughout the Muslim world under the aegis of Shiʿa Islam. The second was Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi’s occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca during the hajj in 1979. These incidents challenged Saudi Arabia’s position as the heartland of Islam and the royal family as the Guardian of the Two Holy Places. Fahd’s assent to the throne in 1982, after Khalid had suffered a fatal heart attack, was smooth. The monarch’s death was no surprise as he had long been ill. Within minutes of Khalid’s death, an official statement from the Royal Court declared that members of the royal family, led by the powerful Prince Muhammad, had pledged allegiance to the heir apparent, Fahd, and that Fahd had, in consultation with his family, nominated ʿAbdallah as new crown prince.33 Choosing ʿAbdallah secured the power balance between him and the Sudayri branch – and was in this respect in line with Faysal’s succession order. Before the end of the day, Sultan was appointed new second deputy prime minister and third in line. The appointment of Sultan skipped another three senior princes, Bandar, Musaʿid and Mishʿal: Bandar had not held any important post in the state apparatus for decades; Musaʿid had never served in a formal position; while Mishʿal had not held a government post for decades until he was appointed chairman of the Allegiance Council in 2007. He was also disqualified due to the fact that he was the son of an Armenian woman.34 Michael Herb – as well as many other Western observers – claims that senior princes have been given money for withdrawing their claim to the throne. But there is in fact little evidence for this.35 The historical record shows that personal, non-economic motives are what have been decisive, such as full brother loyalties. As an example, Prince Muhammad agreed to step aside as long as his only full brother, Khalid, became crown prince. This also made it possible for Faysal to mobilize enough support to force King Saʿud to step aside in 1964. Muhammad remained, until his death in 1987, a close and influential confidante and trusted advisor to Kings Khalid and Fahd. He also played a key role in securing ʿAbdallah as crown prince in 1982.

The challenge of succession 113 Discussion of the findings The confrontation between Ibn Saʿud’s sons took place when the new dynastic state had not yet been secured and was therefore vulnerable. Ibn Saʿud had for decades been the undisputed patriarch who disciplined and knitted together the members of the royal family. But he never institutionalized any mechanisms for an orderly succession. Nor was there established any consensus within the family regarding the legitimate criteria and procedures regulating the transfer of power. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the conflict broke out. The conflict taught the royals an important lesson: if they did not stand united, external actors might manipulate divisions to bring the dynasty to an end. The senior princes were all deeply involved in the power struggle between King Saʿud and heir apparent Faysal, a struggle that Egypt’s revolutionary president, Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser, used to play different alliances against each other to undermine the monarchical regime. This great embarrassment has never been forgotten by the senior royals. Influential figures intervened and attempted to end the power struggle through informal mediation. Ibn Saʿud’s brother, ʿAbdallah, the family’s most senior prince at that time, played an important role in this respect. The struggle between King Saʿud and Faysal, however, illustrates the limits of mediation. Saʿud did not accept mediation. He was not willing to mediate because he believed in his right to rule as king and was not willing to give up his authority. In the end, the power struggle was solved by the strongest coalition, that of Faysal, outflanking the weaker, that of Saʿud. Apparently royal women, such as Umm Talal, had far more success as a mediator. She made peace with her own son and Faysal. The latter rehabilitated Talal to neutralize him politically and restore the family unit. The power struggle between Ibn Saʿud’s sons revealed that political power in Saudi Arabia is generated by the formation of alliances and not, for instance, by mobilizing the majority of voters. The rule that determined which side a prince took in the dispute is summarized by the proverb ana wa-akhi ʿala ibn ʿammi, wa ana wa-ibn ʿammi ʿala al-gharib, always side with your closest relatives. The senior princes mobilized the support of their brothers and sons and that of the more distant relatives lower down the family hierarchy. The majority of the middle and junior princes were not willing to put their positions, wealth and privileges at risk and kept their heads low. After the outcome had been decided, they gave their oath of allegiance, bayʿa, to the winning alliance of Faysal. Non-royal elite groups were brought into the conflict by the contending parties in its very last stages, and only when their resources were needed. When he realized that he was isolated within his own family, Saʿud attempted to buy the political support of important tribal leaders as a desperate final move to retain power. But Faysal and his allied brothers mobilized the Wahhabi establishment when they needed religious legitimacy to dethrone the king and take over his authority. The minor role that the tribal leaders and the ʿulamaʾ played in the power struggle shows that these elite groups had very limited influence.

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Moreover, the conflict demonstrated the impact of external threats on elite integration. The imminent danger of Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser helped strengthen Faysal. The fall of the Yemeni imamate underlined the seriousness of the danger that the royal family faced and made many princes throw their support behind Faysal, who was widely regarded as the most competent leader to confront Egypt and save the monarchy. ‘Faysal’s order’ established general principles for succession: first, power should pass to the descendants of Ibn Saʿud, meaning that all branches other than the ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, the offspring of the late king, were effectively excluded from the line of succession. Second, power should pass horizontally: the king should be chosen from the surviving sons of the monarchy’s founder. In line with this, the greatest sin for a king would be to groom his own sons at the expense of his brothers, as Saʿud did. Third, the eldest and most able should be king, which in practice meant bypassing some of the elder brothers. Finally, power should be balanced between the different sub-branches belonging to the ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, a strategy to avoid the Sudayri branch becoming too influential. In addition to these principles for choosing a successor, the conflict established the important norm that the king could not rule without the consent of the royal family. Through these principles, Faysal laid the foundation for a well-regulated succession line. His order has been respected to this day. Later successions, from Faysal, via Khalid, to Fahd, have not caused any turbulence within the royal family. This reflects the fact that the sons of Ibn Saʿud agree on the general unwritten principles guiding the succession process. The princes that have been bypassed, including Prince Muhammad, have all acted as responsible stakeholders by accepting the decision of their family. Hence, the princes have avoided internal divisions and destructive conflicts. Faysal’s succession principles, however, were not to be codified before three decades had passed.

From King Fahd to ʿAbdallah On 1 January 1996, King Fahd formally passed his authority to Crown Prince ʿAbdallah, after having been struck by an incapacitating stroke the year before. Immediately rumours began circulating about a power struggle between ʿAbdallah on the one side and his half-brother and third in line, Sultan, supported by the Sudayri branch, on the other. Many predicted the fall of ‘Faysal’s order’, which had been the basis for the royal family’s unity and the regime’s stability for more than three decades, and a repetition of the in-fighting of the 1950s and 1960s.36 The issue of succession In 1992, King Fahd announced the Basic Law of Government, with the need to regulate royal succession the main reason for introducing this constitutional text.37 Fahd was thus taking the first step towards formalizing the procedure for designating future kings. Article 5(B) of the new law establishes that:

The challenge of succession 115 Rule passes to the sons of the founding King, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Faysal al-Saʿud, and to their children’s children. The most upright among them is to receive allegiance in accordance with the principles of the Holy Qurʾan and the Tradition of the Venerable Prophet.38 Further, according to Article 5(C): The King chooses the Heir Apparent and relieves him of his duties by Royal order.39 From a legal point of view, the law meant that the 200 or so third-generation princes could now claim the right to be king. In addition, the king reserved the right to appoint and relieve the crown prince. The only exception was ʿAbdallah, who was named heir apparent prior to the law’s entry into force. GlobalSecurity. com states that the succession edict brought the kingdom close to civil war: King Fahd’s March 1992 edict on succession initiated a contentious struggle for power. Resolved in the fall of 1996, Saudi Arabia endured three years of internecine conflict between ʿAbdallah, the heir apparent and commander-inchief of the Saudi Arabian National Guard, pitted against Prince Sultan, second deputy prime minister and after Fahd the eldest of the Sudayri Seven. In December 1995 Sultan summoned members of the ʿulamaʾ to seek their sanction of his claim to the throne and to dismiss ʿAbdallah as commander in chief of the National Guard. In the aftermath of the failed coup, ʿAbdallah ordered the National Guard’s well trained Bedouins to engage in highly visible military manoeuvres. The prospect of ʿAbdallah’s National Guard engaging the better equipped regular Saudi armed forces was intolerable. On 1 January 1996, Fahd ended the crisis by announcing that because of ill health he was temporarily transferring the powers of state to ʿAbdallah. Since 1997, Crown Prince ʿAbdallah has taken on much of the day-to-day responsibilities of running the government.40 However, there are few indications that there was a serious succession struggle between ʿAbdallah and Sultan in the late 1990s – and absolutely no signs of a looming civil war. The new law was respected and there is no evidence supporting the rumours mentioned above. The half-brothers, who have commanded their respective branches of the military apparatus for 45 years, had learned from history and knew perfectly well that an open power struggle would have devastating consequences for the dynasty. Moreover, Sultan would never have won support from the family, the Wahhabi establishment or any other elite segments to seize the throne. In other words, the rumours about a succession struggle was more fiction than reality. According to a royal advisor close to ʿAbdallah, when the Saudis learned of Fahd’s deteriorating health three years before he died, many expected that the crown prince would call together the royal family, the leading ʿulamaʾ, as well as

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other prominent figures and ask for their support to become the new king. The crown prince, however, made no such move. A royal retainer provides the following explanation: Given the context of King Fahd’s serious illness, ʿAbdallah would beyond doubt have got the backing of important branches of the House of Saʿud, the religious scholars, and the whole nation. Despite the fact that it would have been completely understandable if ʿAbdallah had made such a move, he did not. This simple fact reflects ʿAbdallah’s high moral standards and honest personality.41 So what were ʿAbdallah and Sultan fighting about? Their rivalry – it would be an exaggeration to speak of a ‘power struggle’ – was never related to the issue of succession. No one within the Saudi strategic elite ever questioned the established order of succession. The ruling was clear: as long as ʿAbdallah survived his halfbrother, Fahd, he would be the new king and Sultan heir apparent. Not that there were no tensions between brothers. There were strains – basically on a personal level. ʿAbdallah, Sultan, Nayef and Salman are different personalities. But the differences are much less than Western observers often argue. The senior princes are neither particularly liberal nor conservative. In this respect it is interesting to note how Kechichian’s and Doran’s analyses – quoted in Chapter 7 – are reminiscent of the rather simplistic Western discourse of the 1950s and 1960s, when Saʿud and Faysal were given similar binary opposite tags. As crown prince, ʿAbdallah was also forced into some humiliating retreats from initiatives he had sponsored. One example is the high-profile trial against three liberal reformists in 2004–05. ʿAbdallah met with the three activists – ‘Ali al-Demayni, ʿAbdallah al-Hamad and Matruq al-Falih – 18 months prior to their arrest. At this meeting he declared: ‘Your demands are my programme.’42 But that the three reformists were nonetheless arrested illustrates the limits on ʿAbdallah’s powers as crown prince. One informant claims that Sultan was the man behind the arrests and the trial,43 while others indicate that Nayef was responsible.44 Whatever the truth, ʿAbdallah released the three prisoners as his first formal decision as king. King Fahd was ill for 10 years, critically so for the last three of them. According to a Saudi official, Sultan and his close relatives and clients long hoped that Fahd would survive ʿAbdallah.45 Nonetheless, Fahd was gradually weakened, while ʿAbdallah gradually strengthened his support base within the House of Saʿud. The crown prince managed to build a strong support base within the royal family partly thanks to the widespread scepticism towards Sultan and Nayef. The former is associated with corruption, while the latter is regarded as a rather unpleasant and difficult person. The brothers and their clienteles could do little to prevent this from happening and power was in reality transferred to ʿAbdallah two to three years before the death of Fahd.46 Nayef, though, consolidated his position during these years due to the ‘War on Terror’. Domestic militant Islamists that claimed loyalty to al-Qaʿida were behind a wave of violence in Saudi Arabia in 2003–05.

The challenge of succession 117 As the head of the successful counterterrorism campaign, Nayef’s son, Muhammad, earned much respect and popularity within the royal family and among ordinary Saudis. He even miraculously escaped unhurt from an assault on his life by militant Islamists in December 2004 and a second attack in August 2009. His successful campaign increased both his visibility and reputation for competence. In Saudi Arabia’s state-controlled media, he is an emerging hero, a man who is seen as protecting the nation as well as the House of Saʿud. King Fahd died on 1 August 2005. The following official statement was read out on Saudi state television: ‘With deep sorrow and pain, the royal court . . . mourns the death of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd due to illness.’ The royal family gathered for a private ceremony at Riyadh’s Imam Turki bin ʿAbdallah Mosque the following day. After prayers, the King’s body, draped in a brown robe, was carried on a wooden plank by his sons and buried in an unmarked grave at the al-Oud cemetery in keeping with the Wahhabi tradition. Immediately after the death of King Fahd, thousands of mourners gathered at a royal palace in Riyadh to pay their condolences and swear allegiance to the new King ʿAbdallah and Crown Prince Sultan. Through this formal bayʿa ceremony, princes, clerics, tribal chiefs and Saudi officials demonstrated their loyalty and unity. The highly symbolic ceremony started one day after Fahd’s burial, on Wednesday after noon prayers, and lasted until Friday after prayers. In the meantime, all foreign dignitaries that had flocked to the Saudi capital to offer their condolences and pay respects to the new king and crown prince had to wait patiently, including US Vice President Dick Cheney and former President George Bush Senior. The White House announced that the two were expected to meet ʿAbdallah on Wednesday, but according to a diplomat even these prominent men had to turn back to the United States and return on Friday.47 Three days after Fahd’s death, ʿAbdallah himself swore his oath to the people in his first address to the nation as king: I promise Allah and you that I will adopt the Qurʾan as the constitution and Islam as the course, and that all my concerns will be to establish righteousness and justice. I appeal to you to support me and help me carry this trust and don’t hesitate to advise me.48 All the Saudi oligarchs both respected and supported the new king. The established norms among the royals are clear: a king is a king. The behaviour of the senior princes immediately after the succession underpins this assessment. A Saudi official made the following observations one month after the succession: Both Sultan and Nayef have started to attend all important meetings in the Royal Court. The princes have also started to come to the Royal Terminal at King Fahd International Airport to show respect to ʿAbdallah at his homecoming from visits abroad. Until recently it was unthinkable that the King’s half brothers would have met him at the airport.49

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Soon after the succession, Sultan took over ʿAbdallah’s former office at the Royal Court, the initial indication of the crown prince’s intention to establish a good practical working relationship with the new king. ʿAbdallah’s personal relations with Nayef were long distant at best, and he often stayed away from the weekly cabinet meetings. But there has been a certain normalization between ʿAbdallah and Nayef in the wake of the succession.50 ʿAbdallah – like most other royals – works well together with Salman.51 Money In Saudi Arabia, access to money and other privileges is positively correlated with one’s position in the royal family’s hierarchy. The higher up the hierarchy one is, the easier is the access to the monarchy’s enormous wealth. The family’s expenditure does not appear in state accounts. Salman, as discussed in previous chapters, oversees the work of the office at the Royal Court responsible for distributing ‘royal stipends’. Stipends are distributed according to a predetermined scale, and the size of the stipends given to the different princes varies substantially. According to confidential American diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks, the sons of Ibn Saʿud get as much as between $200,000 and $270,000 per month as a handout by the government, his grandchildren receive $27,000, his greatgrandchildren obtain $13,000, while his great-great-grandchildren put $8,000 in their pockets. In addition, according to the diplomatic reports, the princes get extra stipends worth up to $3 million when they are getting married or are building a new palace. The Americans estimate that 5 per cent of the state’s total budget is spent on the royals.52 Less-fortunate princes of the sub-branches get $2,000–2,500. The challenge for the latter princes is that because they are still seen as members of the royal family, people expect that they get a huge salary and are well connected, but far from all have such privileges.53 Land and business contracts given as gifts by the king are much more lucrative than the stipends. Some princes have made their fortunes from developing and leasing land. As examples, Prince Salman has developed the capital’s diplomatic quarter, while Prince Walid bin Talal owns a real-estate empire in the Olaya business district in downtown Riyadh.54 Only a very few princes are in a position to claim commissions. Crown Prince Sultan is known as the main taker of commission and is therefore associated by the West with corruption. In the literature, it is often claimed that some princes have even been given quantities of crude oil to sell on their own,55 though this is denied by the family itself.56 However, it costs being a prince. The princes are expected by the Saudi society to patronize huge personal client networks and people from all segments of the society ask the royals for financial support. As one of the top 10 military spenders in the world, huge resources are distributed via Saudi Arabia’s coercive organizations. For instance, Defence Minister Sultan’s network includes thousands of Saudis across the country who rely on his economic support. Likewise, ʿAbdallah’s most important client network is the Saudi Arabian National Guard, while Nayef ’s is the Ministry of Interior.

The challenge of succession 119 In the 1990s, however, declining oil revenues in combination with a demographic explosion began to press this system of clientelism. In 1998, Saudi Arabia’s oil income fell by 40 per cent because of a worldwide decline in prices: the price of oil plummeted to $10 a barrel. No single family was growing more rapidly than the Al Saʿud itself. ʿAbdallah understood that at some point, Saudi Arabia would not be able to afford to subsidize its rapidly expanding number of royals and their client networks. In the late 1990s, he started the process of taking control of the finances with the backing of Ibrahim ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-ʿAssaf, his loyal finance minister. The minister would not authorise a single payment without ʿAbdallah’s approval. As long as King Fahd was still alive, however, his full brothers were off-limits. Defence Minister Sultan, Interior Minister Nayef and his deputy Ahmad at the Interior Ministry, as well as Riyadh’s Governor Salman, remained by and large unchallenged in their lucrative ministerial fiefdoms and free to supervise their own contracts and cultivate their own patronage networks. Also off-limits was the king’s favourite son, young ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, who continued to enrich himself and those around him. In 1997, ʿAbdallah issued a decree declaring that his own sons would not be permitted to go into partnership with foreign companies operating in the kingdom. Establishing the Royal Family Council in 2000 was another initial step to clean up the corruption and abuse within the House of Saʿud. In addition, the 18-man council began examining the behaviour of family members. The Royal Family Council was formally appointed by King Fahd, but it was controlled by Crown Prince ʿAbdallah. In 2005, the Council of Ministers completed a draft anti-corruption law, and in April 2007, the king announced in a speech to the Consultative Council the creation of a new national commission for anticorruption.57 Moreover, ʿAbdallah took various steps to restrict royal subsidies, place clear limits on eligibility for state support, as well as put a firm end to the corruption and abuse of power of the thousands of middle and junior princes. Although many royals provide public services and engage in legitimate business, there are also many who are parasites and whose abuse of power and waste of state money undermine the monarchy’s popular support. When the crown prince assumed King Fahd’s powers, he immediately imposed restrictions on the widespread use of private jets. During Fahd’s rule, even a minor prince would sometimes fly alone by jumbo jet to the United States. ʿAbdallah ended this extravagancy: all royals now had to ask the ruler for permission if they intended to fly by private jet. ʿAbdallah also ordered that members of the royal family pay their own telephone bills.58 ʿAbdallah’s strictness in financial matters upset many junior princes, who now had to pay their own bills and found it much more difficult to obtain handouts from the royal treasury. During Fahd’s reign, royals ran to his court to ask for financial benefits. In the final three to four years of Fahd’s reign, he let his son, Prince ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, administrate the Royal Court. The king also transferred accounts and properties to him. During these years everyone came to ʿAbd al-ʿAziz to ask for his support. The prince, who sought to consolidate

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his position by buying support from all camps, had distributed money willingly and widely.59 In addition, the crown prince attacked the subsidies and the numerous special accounts and commissions given to many of the princes. ʿAbdallah also instructed that all payments from the offices of the crown prince and the other senior princes now be coordinated with the court to prevent smart princes from claiming payment twice. One such special account targeted by ʿAbdallah was in the hands of Sultan. The minister of defence and aviation was responsible for handling relations with Yemen, which until a few years ago had been tense. But according to a royal advisor, Sultan was never interested in reaching a final solution capable of bringing the border dispute to an end. In the 1990s, a secret special account was earmarked for Yemen: money from this budget was to be spent on buying support from Yemeni tribes and other political groups and on arming opposition movements, etc. Sultan and his loyal supporters within the Ministry of Defence and Aviation became billionaires by embezzling this budget. In the late 1990s, after Fahd had passed his authority to ʿAbdallah, the crown prince demanded a briefing on the Yemen issue by the leader of Saudi Arabia’s negotiation delegation. ʿAbdallah asked to be informed about the minimum demand of the Yemeni side and ordered immediately after this orientation that this claim should be accepted. ʿAbdallah was convinced that the conflict with Yemen had to be brought to an end regardless of the costs. The Yemenis were apparently very surprised by this outcome.60 On 12 June 2000, Saudi Arabia and Yemen finally signed the border agreement and the settlement was relatively generous to Yemen. The country gained some 40,000 square kilometres in the disputed land area, as well as 3,000 square kilometres in the Red Sea area and four disputed islands.61 Money caused some tensions within the royal family. ʿAbdallah, however, carefully avoided undercutting his brothers’ ministries. Nayef’s Interior Ministry even got an open budget to fight the ‘War on Terrorism’.62 ʿAbdallah’s drive to control the royals’ spending did not affect Sultan directly, but his clients at the Defence Ministry suffered. ʿAbdallah has been sincere in his attempts to limit the spending of the royal family and curb corruption. He has been supported by other senior princes such as Nayef, Salman and Ahmad, who are generally known as honest and less corrupt.63 As a result of ʿAbdallah’s tough line in financial matters, there was visibly improved monitoring of expenditure, achieved sometime between 2001 and 2002. The government made budget surpluses every year between 2003 and 2006: indeed, in 2006 the ratio surplus was as high as 22.2 per cent.64 Appointments The tensions between ʿAbdallah and Sultan were basically related to appointments, which was the ‘battle ground’ of the senior royals. People in the circles of Sultan and his full brothers were no longer given influential positions. ʿAbdallah appointed men that he personally trusted – though not always the most competent

The challenge of succession 121 individuals. His first major appointment, after formally taking office as king, illustrates this. The king replaced Prince Turki bin Faysal with Prince Muhammad bin Nawwaf, the son of former intelligence chief Nawwaf, a close ally of ʿAbdallah, as ambassador to the UK and Ireland. In October 2005, the king issued a royal decree ordering that Muhammad bin ʿAbdallah al-Nuwaysir was to be replaced by Khalid al-Tuwaijiri, the son of his old friend ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-Tuwaijiri, as head of the Royal Court. Khalid bin ʿAbd al-Rahman al-ʿIsa was appointed deputy head. In October 2005, ʿAbdallah appointed Prince Muqrin, a close confidante of the king, as chief of the General Intelligence Directorate. Governor appointments are another example. None of the four provincial governors appointed from 2005 up to today were recruited from the al-Sudayri branch: those were Prince Khalid bin Faysal, appointed governor of Mecca, 16 May 2007; Prince ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Saʿud bin Majid, appointed governor of Medina, 22 October 2005; Prince Faysal bin Khalid, appointed governor of ʿAsir, 16 May 2007; and Prince Mishʿal bin ʿAbdallah, appointed governor of Najran, 27 March 2009. The latter is among king ʿAbdallah’s sons. In November 2010, King ʿAbdallah stepped down as the head of the SANG and transferred the influential position to another of his sons, Mitʿab. ʿAbdallah’s initial moves to place trusted relatives and friends in key positions triggered speculation among Western observers that other and deeper changes were to come. The king was rumoured to have wanted to appoint either Prince Mishʿal as deputy to Interior Minister Prince Nayef, or to replace Nayef with Mishʿal. There was also talk that ʿAbdallah intended to bring Prince Talal and his son Prince Walid into government, as well as some of the sons of King Saʿud.65 Other rumours indicated that ʿAbdallah attempted to push aside the Al Faysal brothers. According to one rumour, the king would appoint Prince Bandar bin Sultan new foreign minister, due to Prince Saʿud bin Faysal’s poor health. Bandar’s role as a special envoy was said to greatly trouble Saʿud bin Faysal. It is plausible to assume that Prince Turki bin Faysal resigned from his post as ambassador to the United States in December 2006 partly because he felt that Bandar undermined his position in Washington, DC, and partly due to discord over the question of Iran. Bandar was in favour of containment and confrontation, while Turki advocated moderation and dialogue. Finally, it was rumoured that the king did not intend to appoint Prince Khalid bin Faysal to any new position after relieving him of his post as governor of ʿAsir early in 2007.66 In May the same year, however, ʿAbdallah appointed him as the new governor of Mecca. In February 2009, King ʿAbdallah announced his first major cabinet reshuffle. The reshuffle involved new appointments at the ministries of education, information and culture, justice and health – the key ministries of petroleum, commerce and industry, finance and labour were not affected. ʿAbdallah made his own sonin-law, Prince Faisal bin ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad, new minister of education. For the first time ever a Saudi woman, Nora bint ʿAbdallah al-Faiz, was named to the post of deputy education minister. In addition, the king dismissed hard-line

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Shaykh Salih bin Muhammad al-Luhaydan as the head of the Supreme Council of Justice and Shaykh Ibrahim bin ʿAbdallah al-Ghaith as the head of the religious police. Although the cabinet changes were significant, the reign of ʿAbdallah has been characterized by more continuity than change. One may of course argue that the lack of governmental changes reveals the king’s political weakness, that ʿAbdallah has been restrained by his powerful Sudayri half-brothers. But a more plausible explanation is that ʿAbdallah has not in fact intended to make any major changes in his government. He has respected and played in accordance with the established rules of the political game. Just as he avoided pushing aside King Fahd, he has also steered clear of making any moves that could have provoked his relatives’ wrath, and hence threaten the unity of the political elite and the stability of the regime. The senior princes are well aware that external and internal rivals, such as Western observers, closely watch royal dissent. They have obviously learned valuable lessons from incidents such as Egyptian President Gamal ʿAbd alNasser’s attempt to exploit the chaos caused by King Saʿud’s refusal to abdicate to Crown Prince Faysal, and the events in 1979 with the forceful takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The danger of opponents taking advantage of rifts within the royal family is more relevant than ever before, which makes it very important for the princes to contain all differences and stand united. Two examples underline this point: first, the 10 years King Fahd spent in his sickbed coincided with the re-emergence of domestic militant Islamism. In the early 1990s, Osama bin Laden and other dissidents started to condemn the Saudi government for permitting the Holy Land to be ‘polluted’ by the presence of American ‘infidels’. While Bin Laden and Saudi dissidents in London explicitly attacked the king and his full brothers for their ‘abuse of power’ and ‘corruption’, they were silent about Crown Prince ʿAbdallah, who was presumed by many Saudis to be estranged from the Sudayris. It is reasonable to assume that Bin Laden and other opponents of the regime in the 1990s believed that the combined pressure from Islamist dissidents in exile and jailed activists abroad would trigger a silent coup dʾétat within the Al Saʿud, forcing Fahd to step aside in favour of ʿAbdallah, similar to the way in which Faysal had been brought to the throne three decades earlier. Second, in August 2008, as mentioned above, there were rumours circulating of an attempted plot to force ʿAbdallah into retirement or to take a marginalized role. A Sudayri prince had apparently patronized a dissident network within the Saudi Arabian National Guard, the guard that owes its loyalty directly to the king. It is interesting to note that these rumours were disseminated by websites linked to Iran in particular,67 where anti-Saʿud sentiments run deep. While some members of the Iranian regime want to cultivate cooperation with Saudi Arabia, others still harbour revolutionary visions and would seize any signs of internal tension to embarrass the royal family and weaken its standing among Saudis.

The challenge of succession 123 Discussion of the findings In 1992, King Fahd took a tentative first step towards codifying the rules regulating succession to the throne. The Basic Law of Government specified only the king’s legal right to appoint his successor, who must be chosen from the sons and grandsons of Ibn Saʿud. It did not prescribe any institutional arrangements for succession. The Royal Family Council, created in 2000, was never intended to play such a role, contrary to what some Western observers have argued. Nothing indicates there was conflict over succession within the royal family – or between ʿAbdallah and Sultan more specifically – in the wake of King Fahd’s fatal stroke. In the late 1990s, and until today, power has remained and remains in the hands of the same people who played key roles during the family conflict in the 1950s and 1960s. The same small collective of brothers has, in other words, ruled the kingdom together for nearly half a century. In spite of the absence of codified laws and institutional structures, the sons of Ibn Saʿud are still able to reach compromises and act together even within the difficult issue of succession. This is first and foremost the outcome of strongly shared values and norms, which emphasize inter alia the importance of respecting the family patriarch, whosoever he may be. Money caused some tensions within the royal family during the hard economic times of the late 1990s. Middle and junior princes lower down the family hierarchy, as well as those in Sultan’s circle, undoubtedly suffered from ʿAbdallah’s drive to tighten royal spending. None of these, however, belonged to the strategic elite. In implementing his restrictive economic policy, ʿAbdallah worked closely with Salman, as well as other senior princes. Nayef was entrusted with the important task of fighting domestic groups that expressed their sympathy with al-Qaʿida and other militant Islamist icons, and his Ministry of Interior was given considerable political and financial freedom. Against this background, it is difficult to see any sign of serious divisions between ʿAbdallah on the one hand and the Sudayri block on the other. Even talking about the Sudayris as one united family faction is rather irrelevant today. Appointments caused most tensions within the House of Saʿud. With ʿAbdallah on the throne, no member of the Sudayri branch has been named provincial governor. Instead, the king has appointed people he regards as loyal to him. Although ʿAbdallah has forbidden his sons to enter into partnership with foreign companies operating in Saudi Arabia, he has advanced their interests through appointments. The king has made his sons Mishʿal governor of Najran and Mitʿab new commander of SANG. However, ʿAbdallah has not undermined the power bases of his brothers Sultan, Nayef and Salman. This indicates that he so far respects the consensus established within the royal family during the reign of Faysal, which was based on the lessons learned from the power struggle in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It is interesting to note that the high level of integration is upheld even at times without significant external threats. Although opponents have attempted to take advantage of presumed rifts within the royal family during the past few years,

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such as home-grown Islamists and Iran, none of these threats has been nearly as dangerous as that represented by Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser’s Egypt. The current cohesion within the political elite can therefore hardly be explained without reference to external threats.

After King ʿAbdallah The biggest area of future differences is nonetheless related to succession. The process of choosing the third in line is unlikely to destabilize the House of Saʿud, while the coming transfer of power from the second- to the third-generation princes is more problematic. This generational shift will be the test of the mechanisms of elite integration. ʿAbdallah, well aware of these challenges, has made important moves aimed at solidifying the institutional framework guiding the process of succession. The third in line Saudi kings have appointed second deputy prime ministers since 1967, a post that has been bestowed on the third prince in the line of succession. Upon ascending to the throne, King Khalid named Fahd crown prince and nominated ʿAbdallah to be second deputy prime minister. Following this tradition, King Fahd made Prince Sultan second deputy prime minister in 1982. King ʿAbdallah named Prince Sultan crown prince in 2005, but did not appoint any third in line. In the winter of 2006–07, rumours were circulating in Riyadh that Princes ʿAbd al-Rahman and Nayef had been given financial compensation for withdrawing their claims to the throne.68 These rumours were not plausible and Nayef was appointed second deputy prime minister in April 2009. The king bypassed a number of half-brothers by making Nayef third in line. If the principle of age was taken as a basis, Prince ʿAbd al-Rahman, Sultan’s younger full brother and vice minister of defence since 1982, was the obvious one to succeed Sultan. ʿAbd al-Rahman, however, did not possess any personal ambitions of becoming king and he has never held a top position. Then there are Princes Mitʿab, Talal and Nawwaf. Mitʿab served as minister of municipal and rural affairs until November 2009, which is not among the most important portfolios, while Talal’s past political adventures have diluted his hopes of promotion to senior positions. Nawwaf was appointed director of the General Intelligence Department in August 2001, suffered a stroke a year later, and has not fully recovered since. He resigned from his post in January 2005. In addition, their matrimonial origin – all three are sons of Christian Armenian women – works in their disfavour.69 Looking at age in combination with matrimonial origin, experience and power, Nayef was obviously third in line. Nayef is viewed by both liberal and conservative Saudis, and even a few royals, as a strict and difficult person. As interior minister, Nayef has for decades been the one responsible for making unpopular decisions and taming domestic critics and opposition. But this role does not necessarily tell much about his personality.70

The challenge of succession 125 Salman has all the qualities of a king. He has charisma and is respected by his relatives and is popular with the people. His personal ambitions, however, are unclear. Salman is known as a modest man and the loss of his two most politically active sons might have weakened his ambitions.71 After Nayef and Salman, Prince Ahmad, Deputy Minister of Interior, is probably next in line. It is difficult to identify any strong candidates after him. Prince Muqrin, Head of Intelligence, is an unthinkable choice because his mother was a Yemeni concubine. The Saudi royals are very snobbish when it comes to blood lines and only an extraordinary crisis in the succession could bring him to the throne.72 In other words, time may test the patience of Ibn Saʿud’s grandsons. If Ahmad or Muqrin, both of whom are in their sixties and the same age as the oldest thirdgeneration princes, ever become kings, a move to the next generation might still be 10–15 years away. The generation shift In Saudi Arabia, sons of dead kings have often become politically marginalized. Yet, they are not completely marginalized. Since his father’s death, Prince ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, King Fahd’s favourite son, has been considered part of King ʿAbdallah’s inner circle, while Prince Muhammad, Fahd’s oldest son, is still governor of the Eastern Province. The Al Faysals are also prominent on the political scene in Riyadh. Due to their unique competence and political skills, the brothers have preserved their prominent positions. Prince Khalid bin Faysal was appointed governor of Mecca in May 2007, one of the most important governorships in the kingdom. His brother, the charismatic Prince Saʿud bin Faysal, serves as minister of foreign affairs. Prince Turki bin Faysal, who abruptly quit his post in Washington, DC, in December 2006, has, at the time of writing, no official position, except for heading the King Faysal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh. But none of these are likely future kings. Among the next-generation princes, the sons of ʿAbdallah, Sultan, Nayef and Salman are those best positioned to become kings. All have for decades been groomed by their fathers. Now, they have a strong standing within their fathers’ respective power bases, which might function as their institutional springboards for reaching to the top of the Al Saʿud. In addition, they have all become high-profile public figures. As an example, Saudi news agencies report almost weekly about Mitʿab bin ʿAbdallah, Khalid bin Sultan and Muhammad bin Nayef holding various meetings with important foreign dignitaries, at home and abroad. Five years after he became king, ʿAbdallah was in a position to name his son Mitʿab as commander of the SANG, and thereby securing the future influence of his son – and family branch – within the royal family. By contrast to the sons of dead kings that do not rule any institutional power bases – neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled by Prince Saʿud bin Faysal nor the Mecca Province controlled by Prince Khalid bin Faysal are important bases – it is less likely that

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Mitʿab will become politically marginalized as the head of SANG. King ʿAbdallah’s son, however, is not regarded as one of the most competent of the third-generation princes and is often described as ‘a shadow of his father’.73 In addition, Mitʿab’s narrow experience, more or less only from the SANG, might disfavour him in the line of succession. It is plausible to assume that King Abdallah’s senior brothers – Sultan, Nayef and, perhaps, Salman – also aim at becoming kings, despite being weakened by age and illness. A king has the authority to appoint ministers, governors and other senior positions. On the basis of this position, they can follow in the footsteps of ʿAbdallah and transfer their power bases to their favoured sons. As king, Sultan can name his son, Khalid, Minister of Defence, while Prince Nayef will be in a position to make his favoured son, Muhammad, Minister of Interior. Prince Khalid bin Sultan was criticized due to his handling of the military campaign in Yemen. In November 2009, the Royal Saudi Air Force bombed Zaydi rebel positions in Northern Yemen, drawing the kingdom directly into the conflict. More than 100 Saudi soldiers were killed during the campaign. By contrast, Prince Muhammad bin Nayef has a very good standing within the royal family – and is seen by most Western diplomats as very capable – thanks to his successful crackdown on al-Qaʿida-inspired militants in Saudi-Arabia.74 Nonetheless, as long as they inherit their fathers’ institutional power bases, both princes might very well be future kings. Although Salman’s personal ambitions appear to be weaker than those of his brothers, one cannot rule out that he hopes to transfer his power base, the important Riyadh Governorship, to his most prominent son, Prince Sultan. Salman is close to Sultan and Nayef, both among his full brothers. When Sultan is in New York and Morocco for medical treatment, Salman is always travelling with him, indicating their close ties. One cannot rule out that Sultan, given that he becomes king, appoints Sultan bin Salman as governor. Sultan bin Salman is an inexperienced leader; he was appointed Secretary-General of the Supreme Commission for Tourism and Antiquities in 2000. Yet, he is very charismatic, is popular among the royals as well as ordinary Saudis. He can therefore be a future compromise candidate for the position of king. A big question is whether the royals will be able to manage the generation shift in a smooth way, so that internal power struggles are avoided and regime stability sustained. In spite of personal differences, the sons of Ibn Saʿud generally treat each other respectfully. Once the older among the brothers lived the hard life, and as youths their horizons barely extended beyond the shores of the Arabian Peninsula. Some of them even commanded their father’s military campaigns. The second-generation princes grew up together in a traditional and materially poor society where the governing principles were honour, loyalty to one’s family and respect for seniority. As a result Ibn Saʿud’s sons were hardened and acquired certain important skills, most importantly knowledge about and respect for the people. The second-generation princes know much about and revere the status of an older man or a prominent religious scholar, as examples. Obviously members of the older generation within the House of Saʿud often

The challenge of succession 127 disagree with their subjects, but they still listen patiently and respectfully to their views.75 The brothers endeavour to keep all conflicts behind closed doors. There is a strong historical awareness among the royals. As the family lost its second dynasty due to fighting between brothers, the senior royals are perfectly aware of the profound consequences of losing their grip on power, and therefore make sure that differences are tamed so they do not escalate into serious internal conflicts.76 Ibn Saʿud’s numerous grandsons constitute a more diverse group. The age span between the around 200 princes is around 60 years, meaning that while some are as old as their younger uncles, others are young kids. The younger thirdgeneration princes, by contrast to their fathers, as well as their oldest brothers and nephews, grew up in a very different society. Many younger third-generation princes have dealt far less with Saudi society than their older relatives and some are therefore strangers to the norms of correct behaviour. This might cause a growing gap between the royal elite on the one side and non-royal elite groups and ordinary people on the other.77 Moreover, the third-generation princes do not harbour their fathers’ strong notion of ‘being in the same boat’. It is therefore plausible to assume that it will be much more difficult for the third-generation princes to act as one collective, build consensus around one political line and balance various non-royal elite segments in the future. Another development that might put pressure on the elite’s cohesion is more structural than behavioural. The ongoing process of senior princes establishing their own sub-dynasties based on their own ‘turfs’ within the state apparatus, as described in Chapter 3, might gradually make cooperation and coordination more difficult between the various princes. Given the power of each of these oligarchs, there is a risk that the decision-making body will be paralysed if these fail to find common ground. Institutionalizing the succession process While the norms of political behaviour apparently are being weakened, the institutional framework guiding the succession process has been strengthened, initiated by King Fahd through the introduction of the Basic Law of Government, and wisely brought further by his successor ʿAbdallah close to 15 years later. The Allegiance Council Law, adopted by royal decree by King ʿAbdallah on 20 October 2006, stipulates the establishment of a new body, the Allegiance Council (Arab. hayʿat al-bayʿa), consisting exclusively of male heirs to King Ibn Saʿud.78 This council’s remit is to ensure a smooth transferral of power. Its members include 15 of Ibn Saʿud’s surviving sons, as well as 19 of his grandsons.79 ʿAbdallah named his brother Prince Mishʿal head of the Allegiance Council and appointed his long-time personal assistant Khalid al-Tuwaijiri as its general secretary. Prince Talal, the founder of the Free Princes, was named as one of the members of the Royal Family Council that was formed in 2000, while Prince Muhammad

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bin Saʿud, the then governor of the al-Bahah Province, represented the sons of King Saʿud. Due to poor health, however, Muhammad was represented through Prince Mishʿal bin Saʿud. In 2006, both Talal and Muhammad bin Saʿud were among those appointed members of the newly created Allegiance Council. Their inclusion in these royal bodies officially marked Talal’s as well as some of the sons of the dethroned Saʿud’s final rehabilitation. The new law, which does not apply to the current king or crown prince, prescribes that as soon as the king becomes too ill to do his job, a newly formed

Box 6.1 Members of the Allegiance Council (Appointed in October 2006) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Prince Mishʿal (chairman) Prince ʿAbd al-Rahman Prince Mitʿab Prince Talal Prince Badr Prince Turki Prince Nayef Prince Fawwaz Prince Salman Prince Mamduh Prince ʿAbd al-Ilah Prince Sattam Prince Ahmad Prince Mashhour Prince Hadhlool Prince Muqrin Prince Muhammad bin Saʿud Prince Khalid bin Faysal Prince Muhammad bin Saʿd Prince Turki bin Faysal bin Turki Prince Muhammad bin Nasir Prince Faysal bin Bandar Prince Saʿud bin ʿAbd al-Muhsin Prince Muhammad bin Fahd Prince Khalid bin Sultan Prince Talal bin Mansur Prince Khalid bin ʿAbdallah Prince Muhammad bin Mashari Prince Faysal bin Khalid Prince Badr bin Muhammad Prince Faysal bin Thamir Prince Mishʿal bin Majid Prince ʿAbdallah bin Musaʿid Prince Faysal bin ʿAbd al-Majid Prince ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Nawwaf

The challenge of succession 129 medical committee will submit a report to the Allegiance Council on the king’s health. If he is diagnosed as permanently incapacitated, the crown prince steps in. If the council finds that both the king and the crown prince are found permanently incapable of exercising their powers for health reasons, the Transitory Ruling Council, consisting of five members of the Allegiance Council, will temporarily assume administration of the affairs of state and oversee the interests of the people. Then the council’s members will, within a maximum of one week, select by voting a suitable candidate from among the sons or grandsons of Ibn Saʿud and call on the one chosen to take over as king in accordance with the Allegiance Council Law and the Basic Law of Government. The new law means that the decision to choose future heads of state will no longer be in the hands of one person alone – the king – but a collective of princes. It is important to note that decisions over succession remain within the Al Saʿud. Neither the religious leaders nor the Consultative Council play any role in the important process of choosing the heir apparent according to the law. Discussion of the findings As long as power remains in the hands of the second generation, it is most likely that the senior princes will continue to reach consensus on who is ‘the eldest and most able’. The 10 years spent by Fahd in his sickbed taught the royal family an important lesson: no legal mechanisms existed whereby he could be declared incapable of performing his duties and declare the crown prince king. The Allegiance Council Law is clearly intended to solve this problem. It is an open question whether cohesion will survive as the sons of Ibn Saʿud grow older and the late king’s descendants become more numerous and impatient for power. Although it is too early to speak of a fragmentation of the royal family as such, there is a clear tendency for senior royals to establish their own subdynasties within the Saʿud dynasty. The most powerful royals have turned whole ministries into their personal fiefdoms, which they control through their younger brothers and sons. The gradual emergence of various sub-dynasties within the House of Saʿud might make cooperation and coordination more difficult between the various princes in the future. As the family explodes in size, this fragmentation is likely to increase in the decades to come. The third-generation princes are more numerous and heterogeneous, and will probably find it more difficult to stand united than their fathers. There is also a widening gap between the elite and the masses. A commoner will find it much more difficult today to gain personal access to and consult directly the king and the senior princes than it used to be. This is a consequence of the growing complexity of the Saudi state, but still a break with the established Arab-Islamic political tradition and ideal. At the same time, non-royal elites have also been distanced from the House of Saʿud. Nowadays, the royals put much more effort into the never-ending process of alliance-building within their own family, than into the cultivation of the ties to their non-royal alliance partners.

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As the basic preconditions behind value consensus gradually weaken and the family dynasty fragments, collective action will rely more on institutional arrangements. In this respect, the introduction of the Allegiance Council Law and the Allegiance Council are crucial steps to prevent succession conflicts and elite fragmentation as the third generation inherits the kingdom.

Notes 1 Grand Mufti ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al Shaykh calling on all citizens to pledge allegiance to newly proclaimed King ʿAbdallah and Crown Prince Sultan, quoted in the Sydney Morning Herald, 3 August 2005, available online, http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/ saudi-arabia-buries-king-in-austere-ceremony/2005/08/03/1122748646010.html. 2 Prince Salman addressing King ʿAbdallah on a festival celebrating the monarch, quoted in Ain al-Yaqeen, 2 December 2005, available online, http://www.ain-al-yaqeen.com/ issues/20051202/feat6en.htm. 3 Crown Prince Sultan addressing reporters, quoted in Arab News (Jeddah), 4 April 2006, available online, http://www.arabnews.com/services/print/print.asp?artid=8020 5&d=4&m=4&y=2006. 4 Alexander Blight, From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century, New York: New York University Press, 1984; Simon Henderson, After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia, Washington Institute Policy Papers, no. 37, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994; and Joseph A. Kechichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia. 5 Two frequently quoted works on collective action are Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965; Russel Hardin, Collective Action, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 6 Gary Samuel Samore, ‘Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia’, p. 3. 7 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, November 2005. 8 Michael Herb, All in the Family. 9 Gary Samuel Samore, ‘Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia’, pp. 11–12. 10 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, November 2005. 11 Interview with businessman, Oslo, August 2006. 12 David Holden and Richard Jones, The House of Saud, p. 178. 13 Gary Samuel Samore, ‘Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia’, p. 46. 14 Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. 15 Quoted in Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 355. 16 Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 107. 17 Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 107–9. 18 David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, p. 200. 19 David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, p. 201; and Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 437. 20 Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 358–60. 21 Time Magazine, 24 August 1962, available online, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,896516,00.html. 22 Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 364. 23 Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 107. 24 Confidential correspondence from the British Embassy in Beirut to the Arabian Department, Foreign Office, dated 6 June 1962, reproduced by A. Burdett (ed.), Annual Records 1964: Saudi Arabia, Cambridge Archive Editions Ltd., 1997, p. 45. 25 ‘Prince Talal Ends Feud’, Sunday Telegraph, 8 September 1963, reproduced by A. Burdett (ed.), Annual Records 1963, p. 38. 26 David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, p. 237.

The challenge of succession 131 27 Ibid. 28 David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, p. 238. 29 Unclassified correspondence from the British Embassy in Jeddah to the Foreign Office, dated 1 December 1964, reproduced by A. Burdett (ed.), Annual Records 1964, p. 74. 30 Joseph Kostiner and Joshua Teitelbaum, ‘State-Formation and the Saudi Monarchy’, p. 136. 31 Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. 32 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005. 33 Joseph A. Kechichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia, p. 57. 34 Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. 35 Various interviews. 36 See for instance, Joseph A. Kechichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia, p. 57. 37 Nathan J. Brown, Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government, New York: State University of New York Press, 2002, pp. 64–5. 38 See Appendix 1. 39 Ibid. 40 Global.Security.com, available online, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ gulf/sa-leader.htm. 41 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005. 42 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, November 2005. 43 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005. 44 Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 29, no. 759, 10 June 2005, p. 1; and Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 31, no. 799, 16 February 2007, p. 5. 45 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, November 2005. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 USA Today, 3 August 2005, available online, http://www.usatoday.com/news/ world/2005-08-03-saudi-king_x.htm. 49 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005. 50 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, November 2005. 51 Interview with independent consultant, London, May 2008. 52 Aftenposten (Oslo), 16 April 2009, available online, http://www.aftenposten.no/ nyheter/uriks/wikileaks/article4094916.ece. 53 Interview with member of the royal family, Riyadh, April 2009. 54 Various interviews. 55 Said K. Aburish, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995, p. 297; and Michael Herb, All in the Family, p. 102. 56 Interview with member of the royal family, June 2008. 57 The Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (Washington, DC), available online, http://www. saudiembassy.net/2007News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=689. 58 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005. 59 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, August 2006. 60 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005. 61 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the 21 Century: The Political, Foreign Policy, Economic, and Energy Dimensions, p. 67. 62 Interview with scholar, Oslo, February 2007. 63 Interview with independent consultant, London, May 2008. 64 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, available online, http://www.sama.gov.sa/newreports/ annual/en/section5/files/tab5-2.pdf. 65 See for instance, Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 31, no. 805, 11 May 2007, p. 1. 66 Various interviews. 67 Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 32, issue 836, 15 September 2008, p. 20. 68 Various interviews.

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Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. Interview with members of the royal family, Riyadh, April 2009. Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, May 2006. Interview with independent consultant, London, May 2008. Various interviews. Ibid. Interviews with Saudi official/scholar, Geneva, September 2005, businessman/advisor to the royal family, Dubai, May 2006, and members of the royal family, Riyadh, April 2009. Interviews with members of the royal family, Riyadh, April 2009. Various interviews. See Appendix 1. Arab News (Jeddah), 11 December 2007, available online, http://www.arabnews.com/ ?page=1§ion=0&article=104507&d=11&m=12&a mp;y=2007.

7

Conclusion

As this book shows, the House of Saʿud is far more integrated than it has generally been given credit for. Elite integration is undervalued in the literature. A revision of the existing literature on the subject is therefore needed in order to fully understand the stability of the regime. It is obviously fascinating to speculate around intrigues and succession struggles in the Royal Court of Riyadh, but it does not tell us much about the inner workings of the royal family. All the members of the kingdom’s strategic elite belong to the Al Saʿud. Chapter 3 shows that a few senior princes make all important decisions related to security, the economy and foreign-relations issues. The thousands of royals constitute a rich pool from which prospective leaders are recruited based on the traditional principles of matrimonial origin, age and proven experience. Senior royals tend to remain in their posts for decades. As a consequence, elite circulation is very slow. In addition to the royal family, there are four other elite groups – religious leaders, tribal leaders, merchant families and key technocrats – all of which rose to prominence by virtue of strategic alliances made by the kingdom’s founding father, Ibn Saʿud. As Chapter 4 shows, these alliances are by nature very asymmetrical. The royal family has marginalized all non-royal elite groups, thanks to its huge economic resources and corporatist mechanisms. The Al Saʿud is the only cross-cutting elite – above functionally segmented sub-elites that communicate little. Today, the influences of these factions are limited to their respective spheres of the Saudi society. They may accordingly be considered as segment elites. Two-hundred royals hold positions in the state bureaucracy and even more have turned themselves into businessmen. But the royal family itself is obsessed by blood ties and, as a consequence, the opportunity to become a member of the strategic elite is closed to commoners. Chapter 5 identifies mechanisms of elite integration in Saudi Arabia. Obviously, the strategic elite is united by blood ties. All members of the elite belong to the same extended family and most family members get married within the royal circle. Specific concepts of honour, justice, loyalty, respect for age and seniority, and familialism characterize the Al Saʿuds, but do not necessarily integrate them as an elite. This kind of large family also harbours the seeds of jealousy and rivalry. History is full of other ‘traditional’ Arab family regimes that have fallen due to

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internal disputes, which carried many of the same characteristics. Also, the nineteenth-century Saudi state was defined by social homogeneity and normative consensus, yet senior princes killed each other. Neither did traditional mechanisms of dispute settlement prevent bloody regime break-ups in the pre-oil past. Why, then, is the contemporary House of Saʿud different? Clearly, one might argue that the absence of regime-threatening rivalries between senior princes is due to their deep institutional embeddedness, which has to do with the size and power of the bureaucratic and informal fiefdoms they run rather than with a specific leadership culture or homogeneity. This embeddedness has to do with Saudi patterns of state growth and the distributional structures and clienteles that have emerged in the process. That intra-family rivalry was a lot more vicious in the 1950s and 1960s, when the state was smaller and institutions less stable and less deeply tied to the princes on top of them, would seem to corroborate this argument. The problem with this perspective, however, is that stability based on pure power balance would paralyse decision-making. The fact that the senior princes repeatedly have been able to solve collective action challenges, such as succession, undermines this argument. It is therefore more fruitful to look to the distinct political culture that has remained an aspect of the ‘family businesses’ ever since the reign of the then King Faysal. Consensus on the political rules of the game was established in the wake of the internal power struggle in the 1960s, which nearly brought the family dynasty to an abrupt end. This crisis was a wake-up call: the brothers realized that they had to stand together to stay in power. The conflict resulted in a settlement in which the sons of Ibn Saʿud secured the family’s vital interests by supporting ‘Faysal’s order’, thus laying the basis for a well-organized line of succession up to the present day. The characteristics which are strengths of the Al Saʿud include absolute respect for the king, the respect of elders, resolution of internal disputes within the family, as well as allocation of top government jobs to the most qualified family members. The extensive personal interaction within the elite is also important. In Saudi Arabia, the family is the most important arena of elite interaction. The women of the royal family play a key role in creating arenas that bring together the elite. Such interaction facilitates coordination and promotes friendship and shared values. Moreover, symbols and threat perceptions are shared by the senior princes, which, it is reasonable to assume, strengthens cohesion within the royal family. Important symbols are the House of Saʿud and Wahhabi Islam, while Iran and the ‘Shiʿa threat’, militant Islamism and ‘Jasmine Revolutions’ are seen as existential threats to the family dynasty. In addition, a wide network of consultative mechanisms penetrates the whole elite system and there is a rich variety of mechanisms of conflict management. A dynastic monarchy such as the House of Saʿud presents interior rules and values which determine succession and moral behaviour. As Chapter 6 illustrates, these values are respected, even in situations of trouble, such as in 1995 when King Fahd’s stroke and his temporary substitution with Prince ʿAbdallah was dealt with by the family with apparent sincerity and unity. The succession process

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has been used in highly different circumstances, including deposition (Saʿud), assassination (Faysal) and death by old age (Khalid and Fahd). The general smoothness of these transfers of power shows that the senior princes are able to act as a collective body, which in turn reflects a consensus on the political rules on a very fundamental level. Furthermore, the royals have been good at closing their ranks when dealing with outside threats. The crisis in the 1960s clearly shows how external actors might manipulate divisions to bring the dynasty to an end. Egypt’s Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser taught the royals an important lesson by playing different alliances against each other to undermine the House of Saʿud. Today, dissidents are obviously eager to use all signs of internal rifts to undermine the regime. Informal institutional mechanisms are also important. Although the Saʿud– Fayal conflict shoved the limits of mediation, third-party intervention helped heal bad relations in the wake of the conflict. All tensions within the family are attempted to be solved through mediation. Most notably, Prince Salman, the governor of Riyadh, is frequently asked to find solutions when royals run into serious trouble and to mediate in conflicts within the family. Formal institutional arrangements at the strategic elite level are still embryonic. The Royal Family Council, which was established in 2000, points towards an institutionalizing of the arbitration practice. Likewise, the recent introduction of the Allegiance Council Law and the Allegiance Council indicates that the senior princes have realized the need for implementing a more formal framework for future royal successions. The big question in the long term is whether the Al Saʿud is able to remain integrated, as the number of royals grows rapidly and the power must someday soon be passed from the second to the third generation of princes. It will not be an easy task. As an advisor to the royal family observed: The generational shift poses a major challenge to the cohesion of the elite. It is an open question whether the third-generation princes share the older generation’s norms of political behaviour, agree on what legitimate processes for making decisions are, and understand the importance of standing together. The primary concern is that Ibn Saʿud’s many grandsons might prove unable to forge an orderly succession, raising fears that the dynasty will collapse.1

Note 1 Interview with advisor to the royal family, Geneva, September 2005.

Appendix 1: The Allegiance Council Law1

The Allegiance Council Law was adopted by royal decree of King ʿAbdallah on 20 October 2006.

Article 1 A royal decree announced the establishment of the Allegiance Council, which comprises: (1) Sons of King Ibn Saʿud, the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; (2) grandsons of King Ibn Saʿud whose fathers are deceased, incapacitated (as determined by a medical report) or otherwise unwilling to assume the throne. Members appointed by the King must be capable and known for their integrity. (3) A son of the King and a son of the Crown Prince, both to be appointed by the King. They should be capable and known for their integrity. If a vacancy arises on the Allegiance Council committee, the King will appoint a new member in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of this Article.

Article 2 The Allegiance Council shall exercise its duties in accordance with this Law, as well as with the Basic Law of Government.

Article 3 The Allegiance Council will abide by the teachings of the Qurʾan and the Sunna. It will also preserve the state’s entity; protect the royal family’s unity and cooperation as well as the national unity and the interests of the people.

Article 4 The Allegiance Council will be based in Riyadh and will hold its meetings at the Royal Court. It may convene at any of the Royal Court’s locations within the Kingdom subject to the King’s approval, or at any location specified by the King.

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Article 5 Members and Secretary-General will swear an oath before the King prior to assuming their duties. The oath is as follows: I swear to Allah the Almighty to be loyal to my religion, King and country and not to divulge any of the country’s secrets. I also swear that I will preserve the interests and laws of my country, protect the royal family’s unity and cooperation and my country’s national unity, as well as performing the duties assigned to me with all truthfulness, integrity, dedication and fairness.

Article 6 If the King dies, the Allegiance Council will pledge allegiance to the Crown Prince in accordance with this Law and the Basic Law of Government.

Article 7 A) After consultation with the members of the Allegiance Council, the King will choose one, two or three candidates for the position of Crown Prince. He will present his nominees before the Allegiance Council, which is required to designate one of them as Crown Prince. In the event the committee rejects all of the nominees, it will name a Crown Prince whom it considers to be suitable. B) The King may ask the Allegiance Council to nominate a suitable Crown Prince at any time. In the event that the King rejects the committee’s nominee, the Allegiance Council will hold a vote to choose between the King’s candidate and its own in accordance with Sections A and B of this Article. The nominee who secures the majority of votes will be named Crown Prince.

Article 8 The nominee for Crown Prince should satisfy the conditions set forth in Section B of Article 5 of the Basic Law of Government.

Article 9 The appointment of a new Crown Prince must be completed within 30 days of the accession of a new King in accordance with Article 7.

Article 10 The Allegiance Council will set up a five-member Transitory Ruling Council which will temporarily assume the running of State affairs as provided for in this Law.

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The Transitory Ruling Council will not have the right to amend the Basic Law of Government, this Law, the Council of Ministers Law, the Law of the Consultative Council, the Law of the Provinces, the National Security Council Law or any other laws that are linked to the rule. It will not have the right to dissolve or reshuffle the Cabinet or the Consultative Council. During the transition period, the Transitory Ruling Council should also protect the State’s unity and laws in addition to its internal and external interests.

Article 11 In the event the Allegiance Institution is convinced that the King is incapable of carrying out his duties for health reasons, it will issue a request to a medical committee in accordance with this Law to prepare a report on the condition of the King’s health. If the report finds that the King’s inability to exercise his power is temporary, the Allegiance Council will certify this finding and power will be temporarily transferred to the Crown Prince until the King recovers. If the King informs the Allegiance Council’s chairman in writing that he has recovered and the Allegiance Council is convinced as such, it will authorise the medical committee to prepare a report on the King’s health within 24 hours. If the medical report finds that the King is capable of exercising his powers, the Allegiance Council will certify this finding and the King will resume his powers. If the medical report finds that the King’s inability to exercise his powers is permanent, the Allegiance Council will certify that finding and invite the Crown Prince to assume the position of King of the country after receiving pledges of allegiance. These procedures must be carried out in accordance with this Law and with the Basic Law of Government within 24 hours.

Article 12 If the Allegiance Council finds that both the King and the Crown Prince are not capable of exercising their powers for health reasons, it will ask the medical committee to prepare a report on the health conditions of both. If the report finds that their incapacitations are temporary, the Allegiance Council will certify that finding. In this situation, the Transitory Ruling Council will assume administration of the affairs of State and oversee the interests of the people until either the King or the Crown Prince recovers. If either the King or the Crown Prince informs the Allegiance Council in writing that he has recovered, and if the Allegiance Council is convinced as such, it will request that the medical committee prepare a report within 24 hours. If the report finds that either the King or the Crown Prince is capable of exercising his powers then the Allegiance Council will certify that finding, and the individual in question will resume exercising his powers. If the medical report finds that the King and Crown Prince are permanently incapacitated, then the Allegiance Council will certify as such, and the Transitory

Appendix 1 139 Ruling Council will assume administration of the State. The Allegiance Council will select a suitable candidate from among the sons or grandsons of King Ibn Saʿud within seven days and call on him to take over as the King of the country in accordance with this Law and the Basic Law of Government.

Article 13 If the King and the Crown Prince die simultaneously, the Allegiance Council will select a suitable candidate for governance from among the sons or grandsons of King Ibn Saʿud. It will call for a pledge of allegiance to the new King in accordance with this Law and the Basic Law of Government. The Transitory Ruling Council will then take over administration of the affairs of State until the new King ascends the throne.

Article 14 The medical committee will include: (1) The supervisor of the Royal Clinics; (2) the medical director of the King Faysal Specialist Hospital; (3) three medical college deans, to be selected by the Allegiance Council. The medical committee shall issue the medical reports mentioned in this Law. It may, at its discretion, seek assistance from any doctors as it deems appropriate.

Article 15 The Allegiance Council will be chaired by the eldest son of King Ibn Saʿud, with the second oldest brother as his deputy. In case neither is available, it will be chaired by the eldest grandson of King Ibn Saʿud.

Article 16 All meetings of the Allegiance Council will be held behind closed doors, after the King’s approval. The meetings will be attended exclusively by the members of the Allegiance Council, its Secretary-General, and its rapporteur. With the King’s approval, the Institution may invite individuals to provide explanations or information at the meetings, but those individuals will not have the right to vote.

Article 17 The Chairman of the Allegiance Council will call meetings in accordance with Articles 6, 11, 12 and 13 of this Law.

Article 18 All members should attend the meetings and should not leave before the conclusion of any meeting without the permission of the chairman. If a

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member is unable to attend the meeting, he should inform the chairman as such in writing.

Article 19 The chairman opens and closes the meetings, moderates discussion, gives permission to members to speak, determines the agenda, ends discussions and presents issues for vote. A new item can be included in the agenda with the approval of ten members.

Article 20 For any meeting to be valid it should have a quorum of two-thirds of the members of the Institution, including its chairman or his deputy. In accordance with Article 7, the Institution will approve its decisions with the consent of the majority of members present. In the event of a tie, the chairman will cast the deciding vote. In emergency situations in which the quorum has not been met, meetings may be held with half of the members present. Decisions may be passed with the approval of two-thirds of the members present.

Article 21 For each meeting there should be a record that indicates the time and location of the meeting; the name of its chairman; the names of members present; the names of absent members and the reasons for their absence, if any; the name of the Secretary-General; the summary of discussion; the number of yea and nay votes; the result of the vote and the full text of the decisions. The record should show whether the meeting was postponed or adjourned, and if so, the time when this took place. The record should also include anything that the chairman deems necessary. It should be signed by the chairman, present members and the Secretary-General.

Article 22 Votes by the Allegiance Council will be cast by secret ballot in accordance with a form to be prepared for this purpose.

Article 23 Members of the Allegiance Council may only review the agenda and all pertinent documents at the location in which the meeting is convened, and will not be permitted to remove any documents from the meeting hall.

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Article 24 The King appoints the Secretary-General who will assume the responsibilities of inviting members of the Allegiance Council, supervising the process of preparing minutes and decisions and announcing the results of its meetings as decided by the chairman. After obtaining the King’s approval, the Secretary-General may seek assistance as he sees fit. The King will appoint a deputy to the Secretary-General to take over during the Secretary-General’s absence.

Article 25 The provisions of this Law will be amended by royal decree after approval of the Allegiance Council.

Note 1 ‘The Allegiance Council Law’, http://www.SaudiEmbassy.net.

Appendix 2: Principal second-generation princes

In the royal family, some men are either at the centre of power or have influence through their direct access to others who are at the centre. Most princes, however, have no or very limited influence. Currently, it is possible to identify an inner circle consisting of a small collective of three to four second-generation princes. These oligarchs, belonging exclusively to the ʿAbd al-ʿAziz branch, make all strategically important decisions after consulting their relevant advisors and other senior members of the royal family. The most powerful royals are King ʿAbdallah, Crown Prince Sultan, Prince Nayef and Prince Salman. These men hold the most influential formal positions in the Saudi state hierarchy and are well-known power-brokers. King ʿAbdallah, born in Riyadh in 1923, is the son of Fahda bint Asi al-Shuraym, the widow of an al-Rashidi shaykh killed when Ibn Saʿud took Haʾil in 1921. As a young prince, ʿAbdallah was traditionally educated by religious scholars and intellectuals at his father’s court. He holds several senior positions, including prime minister, chairman of the Supreme Economic Council (SEC), a ‘mini-cabinet’ comprising the most important ministers dealing with economic issues, president of the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral Resources (SPMA), president of the King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Centre for National Dialogue, chairman of the Council of Civil Service and head of the Military Service Council. King ʿAbdallah assumed the leadership of Saudi Arabia on 1 August 2005, on the death of King Fahd. He served as crown prince from 1982–2005, though he served as de facto regent since Fahd was incapacitated by a major stroke in 1995. ʿAbdallah has a special position among the tribes due to his matrimonial descent and the Saudi Arabian National Guard, over which he took command in 1963. In November 2010, however, the king transferred this influential position to his son. He is also widely respected within the House of Saʿud, by different segments of Saudi society and abroad. As a champion of dialogue and reform, the king has earned a particularly good reputation in the West. Crown Prince Sultan, born in Riyadh in 1925, was traditionally educated with his brothers at the Royal Court. His first post was governor of Riyadh in 1947. When the Council of Ministers was formed in 1953, Sultan was appointed minister of agriculture in 1953, and he served as minister of communications and oversaw the establishment of Saudi Arabia’s first railway system from 1955–60. His

Appendix 2 143 current positions include deputy prime minister and minister of defence and aviation. Sultan was second deputy prime minister (1982–2005), and has been minister of defence and aviation since 1962. Sultan was appointed crown prince by King ʿAbdallah in August 2005. He is one of the richest princes and patron to many Saudis both within and outside the royal family.1 In the West, however, Sultan and his sons are associated with corruption due to their roles as middlemen in most major arms purchases. Prince Nayef, born in Taʾif in 1933, has studied religion, diplomacy and security affairs. He has held the important position of interior minister since 1975 and was appointed second deputy prime minister in April 2009. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for all aspects of government related to security and the protection of human life and property. Within its jurisdiction fall public security, civil defence, the fire service, the police, the passports division and special security, border control, domestic intelligence and investigation forces. In addition, the ministry’s prime responsibility is to maintain the kingdom’s laws, based on Islam, and one of its functions is to execute sentences handed down to offenders by the courts.2 Prince Nayef has previously served as governor of Riyadh (1953–54); deputy minister of interior; minister of state for internal affairs since 1970; and president of the Supreme Council for Information.3 He also chairs the important Supreme Committee for the Pilgrimage. Prince Salman, born in 1936, was appointed governor of the Riyadh Province in 1963 and has remained in this important post ever since. Salman is among King ʿAbdallah’s most trusted advisors and is widely respected by royals. Due to his position as governor and his personal qualities, for decades Salman has managed the internal affairs of the royal family and the family’s relations with Saudi society. He is the ‘father in charge’ of all junior princes. The only exceptions are the sons of King ʿAbdallah and the sons of his full brothers, including Crown Prince Sultan and Prince Nayef, who answer to their fathers.4 Royals must address him if they need a proposed marriage to be approved or if they fall into any kind of trouble, etc. He also oversees the important office at the Royal Court that allocates stipends to the royals.5 Commoners also go to Salman if they find themselves in dispute with members of the royal family. Salman lost two of his eldest sons within a short period, Fahd in 2001 and Ahmad in 2002, while his youngest son, Faysal, is today chairman of Saudi Research and Marketing, which publishes the newspapers Al-Sharq al-Awsat and Arab News. Salman is conventionally regarded next in the succession line, after his brothers Sultan and Nayef.6 Prince ʿAbd al-Rahman, born in 1928, was the first of King Ibn Saʿud’s sons to be educated in the West. He studied at the Californian Military Academy and graduated with a bachelor’s degree in commerce from the University of California.7 ʿAbd al-Rahman has served as vice minister of defence and aviation since 1982, but his real power is debated. Some would argue that he plays only a marginal role at the ministry, controlled by Sultan.8 Others would claim that the true extent of ʿAbd al-Rahman’s power goes far beyond his position as deputy and that he has a strong position in the family hierarchy. In public, the

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prince has always appeared to be a firm supporter of his elder full brothers, late King Fahd and Crown Prince Sultan. ʿAbd al-Rahman is also known for his work to maintain the image of Sudayri unity by ensuring that his full brothers, and their respective sons, express in public support for one another in their words and actions. Prince Ahmad, born in 1940, is the youngest of the Sudayri brothers and has served as vice minister of interior since 1978. He studied political science at Redlands in California and was also one of the first princes to study abroad. Prior to being appointed vice minister, he served as deputy governor of Mecca (1975–78). Prince Ahmad is very well regarded and popular.9 In October 2005, King ʿAbdallah appointed his brother Prince Muqrin, born in Riyadh in 1943, head of the General Intelligence Directorate. He started at the Ideal Academy in Riyadh. Later he joined the Saudi Air Force and studied at the British Royal Air Force College in Cranwell, graduating with a bachelor’s degree in aeronautics in 1968. Muqrin was appointed governor of Haʾil in 1980 and served as governor of Medina (1999–2000). He has a reputation for being an effective ruler and is a popular figure among the Saudis.10 Muqrin is considered to be among King ʿAbdallah’s closest aides.11 As intelligence chief he reports directly to the king and has extensive funding. According to Anthony H. Cordesman, Muqrin’s directorate is the best-funded intelligence service in the Middle East with a budget even larger than that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.12 He assumed greater importance on the death of ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-Tuwaijiri in 2007, King ʿAbdallah’s most trusted advisor for 60 years.13 Prince Mitʿab, born in 1931, has previously served as governor of Mecca; deputy minister of defence and aviation; minister of housing and public works from 1975–2003 (until the ministry was dissolved and its functions redistributed); and minister of municipal and rural affairs since 2003. His ministry is responsible for land ownership and distribution. He also has substantial stakes in Saudi business enterprises. Despite his age, extensive governmental tenure and wealth, Mitʿab has less political weight than his younger brothers Princes Nayef and Salman. Next follows a group of princes who do not hold any official role in government, but who are still key players due to their age and seniority. The three most influential of these are: Prince Bandar, born in 1923. After King ʿAbdallah, he is the oldest living second-generation prince. He served a period as director general of the Ministry of Interior, but has been reluctant to participate in government. Prince Bandar is nevertheless known for exerting a great deal of influence within the House of Saʿud. Three of his six sons hold senior positions within the military apparatus.14 Prince Mishʿal, born in 1925, has held no official position since 1971. He served as minister of defence and aviation (1951–56) and governor of Mecca (1963–71). Today, he is prominent in the kingdom’s business scene, with substantial interests in real estate, insurance, electrical utilities, oil trading and cement manufacture, etc. Although Mishʿal is far less influential than his brothers

Appendix 2 145 mentioned above, he is nonetheless respected by the different branches of the House of Saʿud and is said to be close to King ʿAbdallah.15 The king raised some eyebrows by selecting the low-profile Mishʿal as chairman of the newly established Allegiance Council in 2007. Prince Talal, born in 1931, is known as the ‘Red Prince’ as the founder of a group of liberal reformers within the royal family who advocated a constitutional monarchy in the 1950s and 1960s, the ‘Free Princes’ (Arab. al-umaraʾ al-ahrar). Due to his activities he has spent a shorter time in exile in Egypt. For years, Talal was a successful businessman, but he has resumed pushing for reform in Saudi Arabia during the reign of King ʿAbdallah. He was appointed to the Royal Family Council in 2000, but his power is limited compared with his more senior brothers. His political comeback was probably a consequence of ʿAbdallah’s strategy to strengthen his position within the royal family. The prince is described as ‘close to the King, at a distance’.16 Talal’s first wife, Mona al-Solh, the daughter of Lebanon’s first prime minister, Riadh el-Solh, gave birth to his son, Prince Walid bin Talal, considered to be one of the world’s richest businessmen.

Notes 1 Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. 2 Saudi Arabia Market Information Resource and Directory, http://www.saudinf.com/ MAIN/c6p.htm. 3 Ibid. 4 Interview with Saudi official/scholar, Dubai, November 2008. 5 Interviews with diplomat, Riyadh, May 2006, independent consultant, London, May 2008, and Saudi official/scholar, Dubai, November 2008. 6 Various interviews. 7 Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. 8 Interviews with diplomat, Riyadh, May 2006, and independent consultant, London, May 2008. 9 Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. 10 Ibid. 11 Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 31, issue 808, 22 June 2007, p. 3. 12 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Military and International Security Dimensions, p. 263. 13 Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 31, issue 808, 22 June, 2007, p. 3. 14 Interview with diplomat, Riyadh, May 2006; and Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. 15 Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. 16 See, for instance, Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 31, issue 818, 23 November 2007, p. 6.

Appendix 3: Important third-generation princes

Also included in the inner circle of royals are some of the ‘third-generation princes’, the grandsons of Ibn Saʿud. The sons of the late Kings Faysal, Khalid, Fahd and, to a lesser extent, Saʿud, including those not in government, retain substantial political power. Most important today are Faysal’s descendents. His eight sons and three daughters are collectively known as the Al Faysal. They are well educated and usually regarded as very able. Prince Khalid bin Faysal, born in 1941, has a degree in political economy from New College, Oxford. He was appointed governor of Mecca in May 2007. Prior to this, Khalid served as governor of ʿAsir from 1971–2007. In addition to this important position, he has solid political credentials: he is the son of Faysal, the son of a woman of good tribal status, he has served in the military and none of his sons has ever embarrassed him. He also heads the King Faysal Foundation established in 1976, one of the world’s largest charitable organizations, as well as the Arab Thought Foundation established in 2002, intended to project a more positive image of Islam in the West and promote political evolution in the Arab world.1 Prince Saʿud bin Faysal, born in Taʾif in 1941, graduated with a bachelor degree in economics from Princeton University in 1964. He is one of the world’s longest-serving foreign ministers, appointed in 1975, and is widely respected internationally for his diplomatic skills. The prince held the post of deputy governor of PETROMIN (1970–71) and served as deputy minister of petroleum and mineral resources (1971–75). He has worked closely with the late Kings Khalid and Fahd, and with ʿAbdallah since the late 1990s. He was entrusted with developing ʿAbdallah’s natural gas initiative in 1998. Saʿud is often mentioned within the context of succession, although his health problems in recent years may hinder any such promotion.2 Prince Turki bin Faysal, born in 1945, studied at the prestigious universities of Princeton and Georgetown, and in London. He began working for the government in 1973 and served as director general of the General Intelligence Directorate for 25 years (1977–2001). Turki represented Saudi Arabia when dealing with his Pakistani counterpart, the CIA and the mujahidun in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and helped negotiate the Soviet withdrawal in 1988. After his replacement, he served briefly as the kingdom’s ambassador to Great Britain

Appendix 3 147 (2002–05) and the United States (2005–06). In December 2006, Prince Turki abruptly quit his post in Washington, DC. Currently he is chairman of the board of the King Faysal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh.3 Prince Muhammad bin Fahd, born in Riyadh in 1950, is the eldest of King Fahd’s six sons. His early schooling was at the Capital Institute High School in Riyadh. Later he graduated with a bachelor’s degree in international relations from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He entered business as soon as he returned to Saudi Arabia in 1974. Muhammad was appointed governor of the oil-rich Eastern Province in 1985, a post in which he has remained ever since, and he became a member of the Royal Family Council in 2000. His political influence today is also partly a result of his marriage to Jawaher bint Nayef, the daughter of the powerful interior minister.4 But King Fahd’s favourite son was Prince ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Fahd, born in 1973. As a child, the late king’s youngest son was known as ‘the richest kid in the world’. The prince was appointed royal advisor in the early 1990s and later minister of state and head of the Council of Ministerial Affairs. As his father’s personal secretary, he acted as a link between King Fahd and the government, and updated his father about what happened in the Council of Ministers. He has been stripped of much of his influence since the death of his father, but he is still one of the richest royals. It is said that King Fahd opened a bank account of $10 billion in his son’s name in Switzerland to prevent him from experiencing any hardships in the future and from being dependent on his elder brothers. He has several super yachts, including Prince ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, the world’s fourth largest. In addition, he has very large palaces all over Saudi Arabia and certain parts of Europe, including a large private stately residential complex with a replica of Alhambra and several other well-known castles set within splendid gardens in Hay al-Huda, Riyadh. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Fahd is married to one of King ʿAbdallah’s daughters. Prince Mitʿab bin ʿAbdallah, born in 1943, is the most prominent of King ʿAbdallah’s 34 children (14 sons and 20 daughters in all). Mitʿab was trained at Sandhurst Royal Military Academy and is today a full general. As assistant deputy commander for military affairs, he was for years prepared to assume official command of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. In November 2010, King ʿAbdallah stepped down as the head of the guard and transferred the influential position to his son. Mitʿab’s younger brother, Prince Turki bin ʿAbdallah, has carved out a career as an officer in the Saudi Air Force. Turki is a general and is widely assumed to have a key position in the Saudi Arabian National Guard.5 Prince Khalid bin Sultan, born in 1949, is the oldest male of the crown prince’s more than 30 children. His initial schooling was at the Capital Institute High School: Khalid later trained at Sandhurst Royal Military Academy; the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He has served for decades in different branches of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces. During the 1990–91 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Khalid was appointed commander of the joint forces and promoted to general. The same year the campaign ended, he retired due to a disagreement with King Fahd. Khalid fell into disfavour because he had sought to

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force his ideas for military reform on the king.6 Khalid then focused on business as well as on publishing his memoirs, Desert Warrior. In 2001, Khalid returned to government service and was appointed assistant defence minister for military affairs. Khalid is seen as an able, hardworking and ambitious man who has revitalized the Ministry of Defence and Aviation. As his father’s favourite son, he is regarded by many as a likely future defence minister.7 Khalids’s younger brother, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, born in Taʾif in 1950, is also regarded as highly influential.8 Bandar was trained at the RAF College, Cranwell; Maxwell Air War College; and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Later he earned a master’s degree in international public policy from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He served as ambassador to the United States and held the rank of minister for more than 20 years (1983–2005), until he was appointed secretary general to the National Security Council by King ʿAbdallah in 2005.9 Bandar, the son of a Sudanese concubine, was disowned by his father due to his inferior lineage. For the first 11 years of his life he was isolated from his father’s family. King Faysal, however, forced Sultan to recognize Bandar as a legitimate prince when he gave him his daughter, Princess Hayfa bint Faysal, as wife. Bandar later became a trusted envoy of both his uncles, King Fahd and King ʿAbdallah.10 He appears to be a rather gifted political player and diplomat and still has good personal ties to important politicians in the United States. Bandar is particularly close to former president George W. Bush, who calls him ‘Bandar Bush’.11 His name, like his father’s, is associated with corruption in the West. Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, born in 1957, is among the interior minister’s 10 children. He studied for his master’s degree in political science in the United States, graduating in 1981; followed courses on security issues with the FBI (1985–88); and has trained with Scotland Yard’s anti-terrorist units in London (1992–94). In 1994, he began working regularly with his father, Interior Minister Nayef, in Riyadh.12 Muhammad was appointed assistant minister of interior for security affairs in 1999 and officially became number two at the ministry in 2004, with the rank of minister. The prince has revitalized the Ministry of Interior, which is today recognized as the least corrupt and most effective ministry.13 He was not that well known prior to the wave of terror that swept the kingdom between 2003 and 2005. Muhammad was in charge of the Saudi counterterrorism campaign.14 This successful campaign increased both his visibility and reputation for competence, but it also made him a main target for militant Islamists that four times have tried to assassinate him. He has also been on successful official missions abroad. One of his first major missions was to improve security cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.15 Muhammad has probably been groomed to succeed his father as interior minister.16 As the oldest surviving son of the powerful Riyadh governor, Prince Sultan bin Salman, born in 1955, is also among the principal third-generation princes. He was educated at the United States International University, San Diego, trained as a pilot with the Saudi Air Force and later was a Space Shuttle astronaut on the Discovery in 1985. Sultan is an air force officer and has served in various

Appendix 3 149 positions within the cultural sector of the Saudi state. He became the secretarygeneral of the Supreme Commission for Tourism and Antiquities in 2000.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Intelligence Online, 24 March – 6 April 2006, p. 3. Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. Various interviews. For a biography on Prince Bandar, see William Simpson, The Prince: The Secret Story of the World’s Most Intriguing Royal, With forewords by Nelson Mandela and Margaret Thatcher. William Morrow, 2006. Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’. Interview with Saudi scholar, London, July 2006. Guardian Unlimited, 7 June 2007, available online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ baefiles/story/0,,2091199,00.html. Intelligence Online, 26 May – 8 June 2006, p. 2. Various interviews. Ibid. Ibid. Michael Field, ‘Tree of Al-Saud’.

Appendix 4: Prominent religious scholars

Within the various influential segments of the Islamic establishment there are religious leaders who have both the institutional tools for shaping public opinion at their disposal and who have privileged access to the king and other senior royals. Among the most influential are the following. Grand Mufti Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad al-Shaykh, born in 1941, is said to have memorized the entire text of the Qurʾan by the time he was 12. In 1954 he began studying at the Imam al-Dawah Institute, graduating from the faculty of shariʿa in 1962. He became member of the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars in 1986, after which he was made a member of the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinion and was appointed deputy to Grand Mufti Bin Baz in 1995. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Shaykh has also held other important positions: he was appointed imam for jumuʿah prayers at the Mosque of ʿAbdallah ibn ʿAbd al-Latif in 1969; imam at Mecca’s Masjid Namirah Mosque in 1981; and imam at the Central Mosque of al-Imam Turki ibn ʿAbdallah in 1991.1 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Shaykh was appointed grand mufti in 1999. He also chairs the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars and the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinion. The Shaykh’s official positions doubtless make him the single most prominent member of the Saudi Islamic establishment. Another influential religious leader is Shaykh Salih bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Shaykh, born in Riyadh in 1958, who holds the important post of minister for Islamic affairs, endowment, prayer and guidance. He studied the principles of religion at the Imam University. In 1995, he was appointed deputy minister for Islamic affairs, endowment, prayer and guidance and was promoted to minister in 1999. Salih bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Shaykh currently also holds a number of other trusted positions within Saudi Arabia’s Islamic society. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Ibn Baz Foundation; and chairman of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. Shaykh Dr Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Karim bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Isa, born in Riyadh in 1965, holds a master’s degree and a doctorate from Imam Muhammad bin Saʿud University. He served as vice-president to the Board of Grievances (a legal arbitration body), 2007–09, and before that taught at Imam University in Riyadh. He was appointed minister of justice in February 2009.

Appendix 4 151 Speaker of the Consultative Council, Shaykh Dr ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad bin Ibrahim al-Shaykh, was born in Riyadh in 1949. He has a degree from the Shariʿa college at the Imam University; a degree from al-Azhar University in Cairo; and a doctorate from the Imam University. The Shaykh was appointed Dean of the Imam University in 1975; Assistant Professor (1988–92); and served as minister of justice from 1992–2009. He is also a member of the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars. Shaykh Dr Salih bin Fawzan al-Fawzan, born in Dirʿiyyah in 1933, earned his master’s and doctorate from Imam Muhammad bin Saʿud University. After the completion of his doctorate, he was a teacher at the same university in various Islamic disciplines. He later became the head of Saudi Arabia’s Supreme Court of Justice. When his leadership period came to an end, he returned to teaching. He is currently a member of the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinion. Besides this role, he is a member of the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars. Shaykh Dr ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Sudays, imam at Mecca’s Grand Mosque, was born in Riyadh in 1961 and is another influential figure. He studied at the al-Muthana bin Harith elementary school, and afterwards at the Riyadh Scientific Institution. Al-Sudays was awarded a degree in Islamic studies from Riyadh University in 1983, a degree from the Shariʿa College of the Imam University in 1987 and his doctorate in Islamic studies from Umm al-Qura University in 1995. He is particularly respected for his precise, controlled and emotional recitation of the Qurʾan in accordance with tajwid, the rules of beautiful recitation. Al-Sudays’ sermons are broadcast to millions of Muslims around the world by television or radio. He is also known for his calls to believers to aid fellow Muslims in war-torn regions, especially Palestine and Iraq. Al-Sudays was made ‘Islamic Personality of the Year’ in 2005 by the Dubai International Holy Qurʾan Awards. Shaykh Salman al-ʿAwda, born in 1955 in al-Basr in Qasim, is probably the most popular and respected activist preacher in Saudi Arabia. He appeals in particular to the politically conscious segment of the kingdom’s population.2 Al-ʿAwda first studied religion at the Buraydah Institute and later at Riyadh’s Imam University. After graduation, he returned to teaching at the Buraydah Institute and the Imam University. As a knowledgeable, well-spoken and charismatic preacher, he soon won respect and popularity. The politically active al-ʿAwda also became a leading member of al-sahwa al-islamiyya. Early in the 1990s, he became a strident critic of the House of Saʿud and one of the spiritual advisors to al-Qaʿida and its leader, Osama bin Laden. Grand Mufti Bin Baz consequently issued a fatwa condemning al-ʿAwda’s teaching as un-Islamic. In 1994 he was jailed with 1,300 of his supporters and spent two years in prison.3 Al-ʿAwda has assumed a more pro-regime stance since his release in 1999. The Shaykh has even distanced himself from Osama bin Laden, as he expressed on his Middle Eastern Broadcasting Channel. The wealthy al-ʿAwda also runs the popular website Islamtoday.com. In recent years, the regime has managed to gain his support and participation in the ‘National Dialogue’ talks to help rein in Saudi militant Islamists.4

152

Appendix 4

Another highly influential Saudi religious scholar is Shaykh Safar al-Hawali, born in 1954 in ʿAsir. This former dean of the faculty of theology at the Umm al-Qura University became, with Salman al-ʿAwda, one of the most prominent members of al-sahwa al-islamiyya. Like al-ʿAwda, he was jailed in 1994 and spent two years in prison. After release, al-Hawali was also co-opted by the regime. He has acted as mediator between the government and Saudi militant Islamists and offered an amnesty on several occasions. Al-Hawali is a similarly well-regarded Islamic scholar, both in Saudi Arabia and internationally, but does not have the same influence as al-ʿAwda. Al-Hawali hails from the much poorer ʿAsir region in the south. In general, Najdis tend to look down on southerners. In addition, al-Hawali has recently suffered from serious health problems.5

Notes 1 Fatwa Online, available online, http://www.fatwa-online.com/scholarsbiographies/ 15thcentury/abdulazeez.htm. 2 Interview with scholar, Oslo, January 2008. 3 Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, p. 90. 4 Interview with scholar, Oslo, January 2008. 5 Ibid.

Appendix 5: Key technocrats

While members of the House of Saʿud hold key positions within the state bureaucracy, most technocrats today are from non-royal families. Those listed here are among the most experienced and influential. ʿAli bin Ibrahim al-Naʿimi was born in the city of al-Raka in 1935. He has a bachelor’s degree in geology from Lehigh University and a master’s degree in geology from Stanford University. ʿAli bin Ibrahim al-Naʿimi joined Saudi Aramco in 1947 and rapidly rose through the ranks: supervisor of the production department, Abqaiq, 1969; assistant director to the then director of production, Northern Province (1972–75); vice-president, production affairs, 1975; vicepresident, petroleum affairs, 1978; member of the board of directors, 1980; executive vice-president, oil and gas affairs, 1981; president of Saudi Aramco, 1983; and, finally, minister of petroleum and mineral resources in 1995. He is also a member of the SEC and the SPMA. Dr Ibrahim bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbdallah al-ʿAssaf, born in 1949, has a bachelor’s degree in economics and political science from King Saʿud University, Riyadh, a master’s degree in economics from Denver University, Colorado, and a PhD in economics from Colorado State University. He has broad professional experience: lecturer in economic principles (1971–82), associate professor of economics and head of the department of administrative sciences (1982–86), King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Military College, Riyadh; guest lecturer (1982–83), the College of Command and Staff; advisor to the Saudi Development Fund (1982–86); Saudi executive director at the International Monetary Fund (1986–89); Saudi executive director on the executive board of the World Bank Group (1989–95); vice-governor of the Saudi Monetary Agency (1995); minister of state and member of the Council of Ministers (1995–96); and minister of finance and national economy since 1996. He is also a member of the SEC and the SPMA. Khalid bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Falih, born in 1959 in Riyadh, holds the important post of president and chief executive of Saudi Aramco. He joined the company in 1979 and was sponsored to study at Texas A&M University, where he earned a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering in 1982 and received an MBA at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals in 1991. Falih has since held different posts in exploration, production, refining and international operations.

154

Appendix 5

He has also been a member of Saudi Aramco’s board since October 2004. On 1 January 2009, Faleh succeeded ʿAbdallah bin Salih Jumʾa, who had held the position as president and chief executive of Saudi Aremco for 14 years. Adel A. al-Jubayr, born in 1962 in al-Majmaʿ (the hometown of the alTuwaijiri family), is one of the most experienced Saudi diplomats. He has studied in Saudi Arabia, Germany, Yemen, Lebanon and the United States. He has a bachelor’s degree in political science and economy from the University of North Texas (1982) and a master’s degree in international relations from Georgetown University (1984). In 1987, al-Jubayr was appointed to the Saudi Diplomatic Service and posted to the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC, where he served as special assistant to the ambassador. In 1990–91, he was part of the Saudi team that established the Joint Information Bureau at Dhahran during ‘Operation Desert Shield’/‘Desert Storm’. He was a member of the GCC delegation to the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991 and a member of the Saudi delegation to the Multilateral Arms Control Talks in Washington, DC, in 1992. In December 1992 he was despatched with the Saudi Armed Forces to Somalia as part of ‘Operation Restore Hope’. Al-Jubayr was appointed director of the Saudi Information and Congressional Affairs Office in Washington in 2000 and was appointed foreign affairs advisor to ʿAbdallah’s court in autumn 2000. In August 2005, King ʿAbdallah appointed al-Jubayr to the position of advisor at the Royal Court, and Saudi ambassador to the United States in January 2007, replacing Prince Turki bin Faysal.1 Dr ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Tuwaijiri serves as the secretary general to the SEC, one of the most senior bodies in the kingdom, pursuing the key tasks of privatization and economic reform. He is also a board member and deputy chairman of the Saudi Economic Association. Dr al-Tuwaijiri has a bachelor’s degree in economics from King Saʿud University and a PhD in economics from Iowa State University. He has formerly been economic advisor to the general secretariat of the GCC and Saudi representative at the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization.2 Dr al-Tuwaijiri is seen by some as a future minister of finance.3

Notes 1 The Royal Saudi Embassy (Washington, DC), available online, http://www.saudiembassy.net/Country/Government/AdelBio.asp. 2 Arabian Events Net, available online, http://www.arabianevents.net/EVENTS/2005/ Privat/SPEAKERS.HTM. 3 Various interviews.

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Index

Bold numbers indicate figures, tables and boxes Aarts, P. 11, 13 ʿAbdallah, King 1, 12–13, 29, 32, 33, 34, 55, 61, 67, 96, 114–24, 142 ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Shaykh 151 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbdallah bin Muhammad al-Shaykh, Shaykh 44, 46, 150 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Fahd, Prince 119, 125, 147 ʿAbd al-Rahman, Prince 31, 78, 124, 128, 143–4 ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Tuwaijiri 65, 154 ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Sudays, Shaykh 151 activist preachers 48 Adel A. al-Jubayr 154 ahl al-hall wa-l-ʿaqd 15, 85 Ahmad, Prince 31, 125, 144 Al al-Shaykh 44–5 Al al-Sudayri 30 al-dawlah 53 Al Fahd 30 al-Haramain Islamic Foundation 47 al-hukumah 53 ʿAli bin Ibrahim al-Naʿimi 68, 69, 153 al-Naqib, K. 42 al-Nasser, G. 86, 109, 113, 122, 135 al-Qaʿida in the Arabian Peninsula 89–90 al-Rasheed, M. 1, 108 al-Thaghr Model School 78 All in the Family 2–3 Allegiance Council 28, 65, 86, 127; members 128, 135 Allegiance Council Law 127–9, 135, 136–41 Arif, N.M. 15 Bandar bin Sultan, Prince 33, 34, 84, 121, 148

Basic Law of Government 9, 26, 29, 91, 96, 114–15, 123, 127 bayʿa 85–6, 117 bin Laden, O. 15, 89, 99, 122 business leaders 55–62; Al al-ʿAli Reza 56–7; businesswomen 59–60; political influence 60–2; princes in business 57–9; size and structure 55–6 Capital Institute High School 78 Closer, L.A. 18 Coll, S. 1 collective action 105 ‘consensually united elites’ 20 Consultative Council 27, 28, 65–7, 96–7 Cordesman, A.H. 33, 53–4, 64, 144 corruption 84, 116, 118–20 Council of Ministers 27, 36, 65–7; members 66 Dahl, R.A. 16 Dal al-hikma College 78 Desert Warrior 77 ‘diplomatic fiefdoms’ 34 ‘disunited elites’ 20 diwaniyya 92 Doran, M.S. 1 ‘dynastic monarchies’ 2–3, 35, 106 Easton, D. 6 Effat College 78 elite 15–16 Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy 20 elite integration 3, 16–19, 133–4; institutional mechanisms 18–19, 91–101; regime stability and 3, 19–21; sociological preconditions 17–18, 76–84; symbols and threat perceptions 18, 84–91

166

Index

elite theory 15, 19–20 ‘encircling syndrome’ 11 Fahd, King 1, 34, 55; ‘Guardian of the Two Holy Places’ 85; issue of succession 114–24 ‘familialism’ 79 Faysal, King 7, 28, 50, 64, 107–14 ‘Faysal’s order’ 110–12, 114, 134 Field, M. 25 Fishman, R.M. 6 fitna 93 Free Princes 108–9, 111, 145 generation shift 125–7 ghutrah 76 Glosemeyer, I. 32, 97 Halpern, M. 5 Herb, M. 2–3, 25, 35, 62, 106, 112 Hertog, S. 42 Higher Council of the Judiciary see Supreme Judicial Council ‘His Highness’ 35 ‘His Royal Highness’ 35 Hopkins, N.S. 51 House of Saʿud 25–6, 29–39, 42, 84–6, 94–6, 97; stability 7–15 Huntington, S.P. 5 Ibn Saʿud, King 25, 85, 107–8, 113 Ibrahim bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin ʿAbdallah al-ʿAssaf 153 ‘ideologically united elites’ 20 Imam Muhammad bin Saʿud Islamic University 47 institutional arrangements 18–19, 91–101; conflict management with the House of Saʿud 94–6; deterrents and decoys 97–100; formal institutions 96–7; formalizing the Majlis tradition 96–7; implications for elite integration 100–1; informal mechanisms 92–6; Musalaha and sulha 93–4; recruitment patterns 91–2; the Royal Family Council 97; tahkim and wastaʿ 92–3 ‘intellectual elite’ 78 Islamic charities 47 jalsa 83 Jasmine Revolutions 12, 90 Jil al-Faysal 78 Juhayman al-ʿUytabi 89

Kechichian, J.A. 1 Keller, S. 16 Khalid, King 111–12 Khalid bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Falih 153–4 Khalid bin Faysal, Prince 32, 34, 36, 78, 121, 125, 128, 146 Khalid bin Sultan, Prince 32, 33, 77, 80, 125–6, 128, 147–8 Khomeini, A. 49, 87, 112 leaders of the bureaucracy 63–70, 153–4; the Al al-Tuwaijiri 64–5; Council of Ministers and the Consultative Council 65–7; political influence 67–8; role of technocrats within the oil and gas sector 68–70; size and structure 63–4 Liska, G. 18 Long, D.E. 11 Longva, A.N. 6 Luciani, G. 8, 61 Luthan Hotel & Spa 59 Luthan Trading Company 59 Maʿhad al-anjal 77 majlis 28, 29, 63, 83; formalizing majlis tradition 96–7 Majlis al-shura see Consultative Council majmuʿa 83 Meilahn, K.M. 92–3 Middle East Conflict 12 Ministry for Islamic Affairs, Endowment, Prayer and Guidance 46–7 Ministry of Pilgrimage 46–7 Mishʿal, Prince 58, 121, 127, 128, 144–5 Mitʿab, Prince 58, 128, 144 Mitʿab bin ʿAbdallah, Prince 31, 32, 33, 125–6, 147 Muhammad, Prince 35, 98–9, 112, 127–8 Muhammad (Prophet) 106 Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Karim bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Isa, Shaykh 66, 150 Muhammad bin Fahd, Prince 34, 36, 77, 125, 128, 147 Muhammad bin Nayef, Prince 32, 33, 125, 126, 148 mumalaha 94 musafaha 94 musalaha 93–4 Najd National School in Riyadh 78 Nayef, Prince 1, 31, 32, 33, 34, 96, 116, 124–5, 143 non-royal segment elites 42–71; business leaders 55–62; influences of the four

Index segment elites 71; leaders of the bureaucracy 63–70; main elite segments 43; members of the Council of Ministers as of June 2010 66; members of the SEC 62; members of the SPMA 69; religious leaders 42–50; tribal leaders 50–5 norms 6 nukhba 15 ‘Oil Crisis’ 8 oil rent 8–9 ‘oil super-power’ 7 ‘open audiences’ see majlis Østerud, Ø. 7 Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinion 46 Political Order in Changing Societies 5 Princesses’ Council 38–9 principle of primogeniture 105, 107 Proshin, N.I. 108 Putnam, R.D. 18, 19 regime 6–7 regime stability 7; an alternative theoretical approach 15–21; elite 15–16; elite integration 16–19; elite integration and 5–21; oil rent 8–9; theorizing Al Saʿud’s stability 7–15; three perspectives assessment 13–15; three traditional perspectives on the Al Saʿud’s stability summarized 14; Wahhabi Islam 9–11; Western aid 11–13 religious leaders 42–50, 150–2; activist preachers 48; the Al al-Shaykh 44–5; five influential segments 45–8; Imam Muhammad bin Saʿud Islamic University in Riyadh 47; Islamic charities 47; members of the Supreme Council of Senior Scholars 45–6; Ministry for Islamic Affairs, Endowment, Prayer and Guidance 46–7; political influence 48–50; size and structure 43–4; Supreme Council of Senior Scholars 45–6 religious scholars see religious leaders rentier state 8–9 rentier theory 13–14 royal court 8, 28, 29, 63, 81, 96; intrigues at 105–7 Royal Family Council 28, 36–7, 97, 119, 123, 135; members 36–7 ‘royal stipends’ 118

167

royal strategic elite 25–39; Al al-Sudayri 30; basic structures of the political system 26–8; brothers in arms 32–5; king’s powers 28–30; main circles of power within the royal family 32; major branches 30–2; members of the Royal Family Council 36–7; other sub-branches 31–2; provincial governors as of September 2010 34; royal women 37–9; rulers of the House of Saʿud 26; structure of the political system in Saudi Arabia 27; structures of authority 35–7; the Sudayri Seven 31 royal women 37–9, 78, 79, 81, 82, 95, 105, 110, 111 Sabri, S. 57 Safar al-Hawali, Shaykh 48, 89, 99, 152 Salih bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Shaykh, Shaykh 46, 66, 150 Salih bin Fawzan al-Fawzan, Shaykh 151 Salman, Prince 1, 31, 32, 94–5, 118, 120, 125, 126, 143 Salman al-ʿAwda, Shaykh 48, 88, 89, 99, 151 Saʿud, King 107–14 Saʿud bin Faysal, Prince 29, 32, 34, 66, 68, 78, 87–8, 90, 121, 125, 146 Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) 56 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 63 Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) 31, 33, 53–4, 125–6 Schein, E.H. 17 second-generation princes 30, 31, 58, 77–8, 126–7, 129, 142–5 ‘segment elites’ 16 shariʿa 27–8, 79, 105 shilla 83 Simmel, G. 18 slubi 52 sociological preconditions 17–18, 76–84; blood ties and education 77–8; honor, justice and loyalty 79; implications for elite integration 83–4; noblesse oblige 79–81; social interaction 81–3; social values and norms 78–81 Steinberg, G. 89 ‘strategic elites’ 16 structural integration 20 succession 104–30; after King ʿAbdallah 124–30; appointments 120–2; generation shift 125–7; intrigues at the

168

Index

royal court 105–7; from King Fahd to ʿAbdallah 114–24; from King Ibn Saʿud to Faysal 107–14; members of the Allegiance Council 128; monetary issues 118–20, 123; process institutionalization 127–9; third in line 124–5 Succession in Saudi Arabia 1 Sudayri Seven 30, 37; members 31 sulha 93–4 Sultan, Prince 1, 31, 32, 33, 34, 96, 114–24, 142–3 Sultan bin Salman, Prince 78, 126, 148–9 Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral Resources (SPMA) 67, 68–9 Supreme Council of Senior Scholars 10, 45–6, 48, 50 Supreme Economic Council (SEC) 61, 67 Supreme Judicial Council 28 tahkim 92–3 Talal, Prince 98, 108–9, 110, 124, 127–8, 145 technocrats see leaders of the bureaucracy thawb 76 The House of Sand in Commerce 57 The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia 55 The Politics of Change in the Middle East and North Africa 5

third-generation princes 125–7, 146–9 Transitory Ruling Council 129 tribal identity 51, 54 tribal leaders 50–5; Al Saʿud 52–3; political influence 54–5; Saudi Arabian National Guard 53–4; size and structure 51; tribal hierarchy 52 Turki bin Faysal, Prince 32, 33, 34, 78, 121, 125, 146–7 Umm Fahd 30 Umm Talal 110, 113 unifying symbols and threats 18, 84–91; external threats 86–9; House of Saʿud and Wahhabi Islam 84–6; implications for elite integration 90–1; internal threats 89–90; threat perceptions 86–90 value consensus 20 values 6 Vogel, F.E. 27 Wahhabi Islam 9–11, 84–6 Wahhabi scholars 48–50 Walid bin Talal, Prince 58, 118 ‘War on Terror’ 116–17, 120 wastaʾ 92–3 Western aid 11–13 Yamani, M. 16