Refugee Crises and Third-World Economies : Policies and Perspectives [1 ed.] 9781839821905, 9781839821912

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Refugee Crises and Third-world Economies

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Refugee Crises and Third-world Economies: Policies and Perspectives EDITED BY SOURAV KUMAR DAS NIDHI CHOWDHARY

In collaboration with Belur Research Association of Social Science

www.brassindia.org Email: [email protected]

United Kingdom – North America – Japan – India – Malaysia – China

Emerald Publishing Limited Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK First edition 2020 Copyright © 2020 Emerald Publishing Limited Reprints and permissions service Contact: [email protected] No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without either the prior written permission of the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying issued in the UK by The Copyright Licensing Agency and in the USA by The Copyright Clearance Center. Any opinions expressed in the chapters are those of the authors. Whilst Emerald makes every effort to ensure the quality and accuracy of its content, Emerald makes no representation implied or otherwise, as to the chapters’ suitability and application and disclaims any warranties, express or implied, to their use. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-83982-191-2 (Print) ISBN: 978-1-83982-190-5 (Online) ISBN: 978-1-83982-192-9 (Epub)

Table of Contents

About the Editors

vii

About the Contributors

ix

List of Contributors Preface

xiii xv

Acknowledgements

xvii

Introduction

xix

Section I: Theoretical Framework of Refugee Crisis Chapter 1 Why Does Refugee Generates? An Empirical Perspective Sourav Kumar Das, Kishor Naskar and Chandra Sekhar Sahu Chapter 2 Eco-political Stability and Refugee Crisis: Some Queries Tonmoy Chatterjee

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Section II: Climate Refugees Chapter 3 Environmental Refugees: A Humanitarian Crisis in India and Bangladesh Nidhi Chowdhary Chapter 4 Problems of Refugee and the Climate Change Debesh Bhowmik

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45

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Table of Contents

Section III: Refugee Crisis and Economical Concern Chapter 5 Global Refugee Crisis: A Quantitative Approach with Focus on Major Producing and Hosting Countries Arundhati Bhattacharya Chapter 6 Impact of Refugees on Host Developing Countries Bhajan Chandra Barman

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Section IV: Major Refugee Crisis in India Chapter 7 A Socio-economic Study of the Choephelling Tibetan Settlement in Miao, Arunachal Pradesh Sabina Yasmin

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Chapter 8 An Insight into the Immediate Crisis of Ecological Refugees: A Retrospective Study on Tehri Dam Project Chhatradhar Das and Raunak Das

123

Chapter 9 Chakma Refugees in Arunachal Pradesh: Their Inclusion and Setback Kallol Debnath and Kunal Debnath

137

Chapter 10 Life of the Afghan Refugee Women in Delhi Region: Highlighting Their Miserable Conditions and Possible Legal Assistance Shusneha Sarkar Index

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159

About the Editors

Sourav Kumar Das is pursuing a PhD at Vidyasagar University and is currently teaching Economics at Lalbaba College, Howrah, India. His area of interest includes rural development, tribal livelihood, consumption pattern and terrorism. He also edited books on tribal development and issues on globalization. He has contributed to numerous reputable national and international journals and has also edited a number of handbooks in the areas of tribal affairs, globalization and economic development. Nidhi Chowdhary is presently pursuing a PhD from Presidency University and works as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Lalbaba College, Howrah, India. Her research interest lies in the field of global concern which includes human rights, peace studies, tribal studies, migration and terrorism. She has also contributed to several national and international edited volumes.

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About the Contributors

Bhajan Chandra Barman is Associate Professor of Economics, Netaji Nagar College, Kolkata. He has completed his PhD from North Bengal University. He mainly works on microfinance, environmental issues and rural development. His work has been published in many reputed journals. Arundhati Bhattacharya is an Assistant Professor of Economics in West Bengal Education Service, Govt. of West Bengal and is currently posted in Sister Nibedita Government General Degree College for Girls, Kolkata. She has completed her MA and MPhil in Economics and BEd from The University of Burdwan. Debesh Bhowmik completed his BA (Honours) and MA in Economics from Kalyani University and obtained a PhD from Rabindra Bharati University. He has written eight books, edited two books himself and edited two books with other co-authors. He has contributed more than 150 papers in national and international journals and edited books. In 2006, he received a gold medal from the Indian Economic Association as the best paper writer. In 1992, his paper was selected in the 10th World Congress of International Economic Association in Moscow. Presently, he is a retired principal. He is associated with Lincoln University College, Malaysia. He is life member of IEA, BEA, TIES, EAB, UPUEA and BRASS. Tonmoy Chatterjee is Assistant Professor of Economics at Ananda Chandra College, India, and publishes mainly in the field of international trade and development. He is the recipient of Prof. M. J. Manohar Rao Award (2012) of The Indian Econometric Society. His research interests include international trade theory, development economics, health economics and panel data analysis. Chhatradhar Das is an energetic and amicable personality, devoted to his work with a fair and moral lifestyle. He has been working as a College Teacher for almost three decades. He does his research works in the field of environmental movements and published valued papers in various national and international journals. Dr Das regularly participates in different seminars at national and international levels. He has authored different textbooks. His edited book contained various research papers. He is the life member of Indian Science Congress Association, Indian Science News Association, Belur Research Association of Social Science, etc. He is a distinguished actor. His performances in various plays have been notable. His endeavours towards development activities of different organizations is held in high esteem.

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About the Contributors

Raunak Das is a student in the Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering. He carries a moral and cordial character. His research-based outlooks are expressed in his day-to-day activities. Besides studies, his efforts in initiating various types of works are very significant. While studying in college, his final year research project was encouraged by the teachers. In addition to research, he is fond of photography. He has a research perspective and fellow feeling mentality. His enthusiasm for environmental protection and research activities is particularly noteworthy. At present, he is engaged in completing an eco-friendly research project on IOT-based power management system. Kallol Debnath is presently engaged as Assistant Professor (WBES) in Political Science at Government General Degree College, Manbazar II, Purulia, India. He received his MA from the University of Burdwan. In his 10-year career he served different colleges of West Bengal. He had been engaged as guest faculty in Kazi Nazrul University from 2015 to 2018. His fundamental areas of interest are state and society in India, thinkers of modern India, and policy studies. He contributed a number of articles in different national and international acclaimed journals and chapters in books and edited volumes. He is currently working on the impacts of neo-liberal policies in welfare states with special reference to India. He can be contacted at [email protected]. Kunal Debnath is an Assistant Professor and teaches Political Science at Rabindra Bharati University, Kolkata, India. Before joining Rabindra Bharati University he taught at Kazi Nazrul University, Asansol, India, for more than three years, and Murshidabad Adarsha Mahavidyalaya, India, for one year. He is currently pursuing his PhD on “A Comparative Study of the Naths of West Bengal and Assam”. His interest in research covers political philosophy, theories of comparative politics, political sociology, and state politics in India. Debnath contributed several research articles in some edited volumes like Politics, Trend and Issues in India (published by Levant, Kolkata) and also in some national and international peer-reviewed refereed journals including Studies in Peoples History (Sage), Sexuality, Gender, and Policy (Wiley & Policy Studies Organization, USA). He can be contacted at [email protected]. Kishor Naskar is presently an Associate Professor, Department of Economics at Budge Budge College. He is pursuing his PhD in Labour Economics from Vidyasagar University, West Midnapore, West Bengal. He has about five research articles to his credit in reputed national and international journals (Journal of Bengal Economic Association, Indian Economic Journal, Assam Economic Review and SocioEconomic Challenges). He has also published three book chapters (Aaheli Publications, Regal Publication and Serials Publications PVT. LTD). Chandra Sekhar Sahu teaches Mathematics in Techno India Group. His area of interest is applied mathematics and applied statistics. His work has been published in many volumes.

About the Contributors

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Shusneha Sarkar completed her LLB (honours) from Calcutta University and LLM from Hidayatullah National Law University, with specialization in IPR. She later joined Ishan Educational Group as an Assistant Professor in Law and is presently pursuing a PhD from NIU. She has numerous publications and attended various seminars of national and international levels. Sabina Yasmin is an Assistant Professor in SRM University, Amravati, in the Department of Economics, School of Liberal Arts and Basic Sciences and Research Fellow at LEAD-Krea University. She received her doctorate on Crop Insurance Program in India from Gauhati University, Assam. Her interest in experimental economics also led her to pursue a crash course in Experimental Economics from Tinbergen Institute, University of Amsterdam. Her research interests are in the areas of development economics, applied microeconomics and agricultural economics.

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List of Contributors

Bhajan Chandra Barman Arundhati Bhattacharya

Debesh Bhowmik Tonmoy Chatterjee Nidhi Chowdhary Chhatradhar Das Raunak Das Sourav Kumar Das

Kallol Debnath

Kunal Debnath Kishor Naskar Chandra Sekhar Sahu Shusneha Sarkar

Department of Economics, Netaji Nagar College, India Department of Economics, Sister Nibedita Government General Degree College for Girls, India Lincoln University College, Malaysia Department of Economics, Ananda Chandra College, India Department of Political Science, Lalbaba College, Belur, Howrah, India Department of Physics, Lalbaba College, India Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, SJBIT, India Department of Economics, Lalbaba College, Belur, Howrah, India and owrah and Research Scholar, Department of Economics with Rural Developement, Vidyasagar University, Midnapur, India Department of Political Science, WBES, Government General Degree College, West Bengal, India Department of Political Science, Rabindra Bharati University, West Bengal, India Department of Economics, Budge Budge College, India Department of Mathematics, Techno International, India Ishan Educational Group, India

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List of Contributors

Sabina Yasmin

Department of Economics, Shree Ramaswamy Memorial University, Amravati, India and LEAD - Krea University, India.

Preface

This volume began to take shape during an extension lecture on human rights in crisis, most of which had reflections on refugee crisis. We conceived of ‘Refugee and Migration’ in relation to the concern and actions being taken to deal with this crisis particularly in third-world economies. The need to understand different political, economic and geographical situations leading to such a crisis inspired this project from its inception. Hence this volume is dedicated to expanding our understanding of the pursuit of refugees in third-world economies, but in identifying the cause and effect relationship of this crisis, it looks beyond the boundaries of many states. Very often refugees have been clubbed in the category of forced migration, but the basic difference that lies between them is that in case of migration, an individual’s destination is pre-planned, which is not the case with refugees. They do not have that choice of destination; rather, they are in most cases completely left at the mercy of asylum countries. This book contains a number of features that commend it to the reader. The entire work is divided into 10 chapters. The introductory chapter throws light on several policy documents and agencies who have been less active on their part in dealing with this crisis and also illustrates as to how global efforts are needed to look for a solution. The first chapter tries to identify the major parameters responsible for refugee generation. The lack of economic activities such as growth of GDP through improvement of industrial production and other facilities like social safety net and medical facilities help to generate refugees in a region. But it mostly depends on the political instability, unemployment and distress of availability of drinking water. The second chapter deals with integrating issues like refugee crisis and eco-political instability. Broadly speaking, here we want to examine the major cause of refugee formation and how it will affect the size of the so-called potential refugees. To categorize, the author has introduced a hybrid model which entails both the flavour of strategic game theory and rational expectations theory of macroeconomics. The third chapter examines the case study of environmental refugees of Bangladesh creating economic impact on neighbouring countries and also highlights the weaknesses of legislations to deal with such a major global crisis. The fifth chapter focusses on the program of action and provides a blueprint to coordinate with the relevant states, other UN agencies, refugees, NGOs and other stakeholders and support host countries and communities so that they can ensure the refugees have better access to health, education and labour markets and enjoy the opportunity of being included in

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their host territories without any delay. The sixth chapter explores that countries that host refugees for long periods can experience long-term economic, social, environmental, and political and security impacts. While the impacts of a refugee presence on neighbouring countries are complex and context-specific, they are not necessarily only negative. The seventh chapter tries to examine the socioeconomic status of the Tibetan refugees of the Choephelling Miao settlement and also to highlight the problems faced by the settlement. The eight chapter explores a retrospective study on the status of ecological refugees in respect to the Tehri Dam Project and their dilemmas pertaining to such a crisis. The ninth chapter addresses the present crisis of the Chakma refugees in the state of Arunachal Pradesh and looks into the causes of the current crisis to assess the impact of ethno-political issues on the refugee problem there. The last chapter highlights the need for possible legal protection that needs to be offered to refugees of all nature, with particular focus on the case study of Afghan women in Delhi, many of whom have been living in miserable conditions. This text explores the broad and complicated ramifications of crisis by looking comparatively at most of the developing and under-developed economies. The chapters here include various case studies to understand the complexities of refugee crisis in different countries, with a resulting interdisciplinary orientation of the subject. We hope and expect the readers to get a wholesome scenario of the refugee crisis occurring across the globe.

Acknowledgements

This work Refugee Crises and Third World Economies: Policies and Perspectives has been a product of long discussion and articulation which could not have been possible without the contributing authors from all across India. We thank them for adding their valuable chapter to the matter of emerging concern through this volume. We are most grateful to the Emerald publishing team for approving the proposal. We also express our gratitude to the academicians for their seamless efforts in guiding us throughout this project. Lastly, we thank our family and friends for their continuous support in carrying out this project. Sourav Kumar Das Nidhi Chowdhary Editors

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Introduction

Refugees are specifically defined and protected in international law. Refugees are people outside their country of origin because of feared persecution, conflict, violence or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order and who, as a result, require ‘international protection’. Their situation is often so perilous and intolerable that they cross national borders to seek safety in nearby countries, and thus become internationally recognized as ‘refugees’ with access to assistance from states, UNHCR and relevant organizations. They are so recognized precisely because it is too dangerous for them to return home, and they therefore need sanctuary elsewhere. These are people for whom denial of asylum has potentially deadly consequences. There is a significant boundary between refugees and migrants. As migration is a purely social and psychological phenomenon, it is difficult to enunciate general and rigorous principles and laws of migration. Migration is not merely the shift of people from one place to another, but it is a fundamental factor helping to understand the ever-changing space content and space relations of a region or country. Migration may be classified on the basis of three criteria, namely, duration, boundary and motivation. There are permanent, periodic, seasonal and temporary migrations identified on the basis of duration. On the basis of boundary, internal and international subvarieties, such as interdistrict, interstate, interregional and intracontinental, international, intercontinental migrations, have been recognized. Likewise economic, political, religious and marital motivations may give rise to similar migrations. However, the most commonly used classification is that which is based on the type of defining boundary and comprises two major categories, namely, internal when the migrants remain within the national territory, and international when they cross international boundaries. A migrant is a person who makes a conscious choice to leave their country to seek a better life elsewhere. Before they decide to leave their country, migrants can seek information about their new home, study the language and explore employment opportunities. They can plan their travel, take their belongings with them and say goodbye to the important people in their lives. They are free to return home at any time if things don’t work out as they had hoped, if they get homesick or if they wish to visit family members and friends left behind. Refugees are forced to leave their country because they are at risk of, or have experienced, persecution. The concerns of refugees are human rights and safety, not economic advantage. They leave behind their homes, most or all of their belongings, family

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Introduction

members and friends. Some are forced to flee with no warning, and many have experienced significant trauma or been tortured or otherwise ill-treated. The journey to safety is fraught with hazard, and many refugees risk their lives in search of protection. They cannot return unless the situation that forced them to leave improves (RCOA). The specific legal regime protecting the rights of refugees is referred to as ‘International Refugee Protection’. The rationale behind the need for this regime lies in the fact that refugees are people in a specific predicament which calls for additional safeguards. Asylum seekers and refugees lack the protection of their own country. Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts the right of everyone to seek and enjoy asylum. However, no clear content was given to the notion of asylum at the international level until the 1951 Convention related to the Status of Refugees [the ‘1951 Convention’] was adopted, and UNHCR was tasked to supervise its implementation. The 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as regional legal instruments, such as the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, are the cornerstones of the modern refugee protection regime.1,2 They set forth a universal refugee definition and incorporate the basic rights and obligations of refugees. The provisions of the 1951 Convention remain the primary international standard against which any measures for the protection and treatment of refugees are judged. Its most important provision, the principle of non-refoulement (meaning no forced returns) contained in Article 33, is the bedrock of the regime. According to this principle, refugees must not be expelled or returned to situations where their life or freedom would be under threat. States bear the primary responsibility for this protection. UNHCR works closely with governments, advising and supporting them as needed, to implement their responsibilities. A uniform legal definition of the term ‘migrant’ does not exist at the international level. Some policy makers, international organizations and media outlets understand and use the word ‘migrant’ as an umbrella term to cover both migrants and refugees. For instance, global statistics on international migration typically use a definition of ‘international migrant’ that would include many asylum seekers and refugees. In public discussion, however, this practice can easily lead to confusion and can also have serious consequences for the lives and safety of refugees. ‘Migration’ is often understood to imply a voluntary process, for example, someone who crosses a border in search of better economic opportunities. This is not the case for refugees, who cannot return home safely, and accordingly are owed specific protections under international law. Blurring the terms ‘refugees’ and ‘migrants’ takes attention away from the specific legal protections refugees require, such as protection from refoulement and from being penalized for crossing borders without authorization in order to seek safety. There is nothing illegal about seeking asylum – on the contrary, it is a universal human right. Conflating ‘refugees’ and ‘migrants’ can undermine public

1

https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html. https://www.unhcr.org/45dc1a682.html.

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Introduction

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support for refugees and the institution of asylum at a time when more refugees need such protection than ever before. We need to treat all human beings with respect and dignity. We need to ensure that the human rights of migrants are respected. At the same time, we also need to provide an appropriate legal and operational response for refugees because of their particular predicament and to avoid diluting state responsibilities towards them. For this reason, UNHCR always refers to ‘refugees’ and ‘migrants’ separately, to maintain clarity about the causes and character of refugee movements and not to lose sight of the specific obligations owed to refugees under international law. Migrants – including those in irregular situations – are protected by international human rights law. This protection derives from their fundamental dignity as human beings. For some, failure to accord them human rights protection can have serious consequences. It may result in human rights violations, such as serious discrimination; arbitrary arrest or detention; or forced labour, servitude, or highly exploitative working conditions. In addition, some migrants, such as unaccompanied or separated migrant children, or migrants who become victims of trafficking or are otherwise in a situation of vulnerability, may have specific needs for assistance and have the right to have those needs met. UNHCR fully supports approaches to migration management that respect the human rights of all people on the move. UNHCR’s preferred practice is to refer to groups of people travelling in mixed movements as ‘refugees and migrants’. This is the best way to allow for acknowledgement that all people on the move have human rights which should be respected, protected and fulfilled; and that refugees and asylum seekers have specific needs and rights which are protected by a particular legal framework. Sometimes in policy discussions, phrases like ‘mixed movements’, ‘mixed flows’ or ‘composite movements’ are used to refer to the phenomenon of refugees and others on the move (including migrants, who may be in situations of vulnerability) travelling side by side along the same routes, using the same facilitators. ‘Mixed migration’ has also been used this way, but has sometimes been a source of confusion and is best avoided. The term ‘mixed migrant’, which has been used by some as a shorthand way of referring to a person travelling in a mixed movement whose individual status is unknown or who may have multiple, overlapping reasons for moving, is unclear. It can cause confusion and mask the specific needs of refugees and migrants. It is not recommended. Sourav Kumar Das Nidhi Chowdhary Editors

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Section I Theoretical Framework of Refugee Crisis

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Chapter 1

Why Does Refugee Generates? An Empirical Perspective Sourav Kumar Das, Kishor Naskar and Chandra Sekhar Sahu

Abstract Refugee can refer to movements of large groups of displaced people, who could be either internally displaced persons or other migrants. According to UN High Commissioner Report for refugees (2017), 65.6 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide because of persecution, conflict, violence or human rights violation alone. Now we are witnessing a massive shift of humanity unlike any seen before. A huge population around the world, which is equivalent to the entire population of the UK, is displaced from their homes. More than 23 million of them are from five places: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, the Lake Chad Basin and Somalia. And the astonishing figures are 11.5 million people in five years between 2011 and 2016 in Syria, 4 million displaced from 2013 in South Sudan, 3.8 million in Afghanistan, 2.3 million in Africa’s Lake Chad basin and 1.6 million in Somalia. All of the above have the reasons either being unemployment, insecurity and political instability or civil war or droughtlike phenomena, all of which can be summarized as economic crisis. Most of the time, we do our research on the subject about the wake of the crisis, but nobody do the prefacing matter analysis. This chapter is mainly based on the secondary data of the World Bank and the UNHCR and various governments’ official data. In this chapter, we are trying to identify the major parameters responsible for refugee generation and also we are analyzing the cause of these phenomena, whereas no research has been done yet about the era prefacing that crisis. Keywords: Refugee crisis; causes of refugee generation; last-decade refugees; African refugees; Asian refugees; host country refugees

Refugee Crises and Third-World Economies, 3–19 Copyright © 2020 Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-190-520201004

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Introduction The word ‘refugee’, like the people it explain, can cover a lot of ground. Politicians, aid workers, academics and the press often approach the word from different points of view, and with varying concepts, roles and responsibilities the term implies. Such divergent views induce the global debate about how best to manage and protect refugees. The crux of the problem, as well as the many and vocal interest groups concerned, makes it difficult to sort out global refugee issues without answering two main questions. First, who qualifies as a refugee? Second, what are the most pressing issues facing them and the many institutions with which they interact? The most accurate answers can be had by zeroing in on the legal definition of ‘refugee’, then backing away for a broader look at those whom the definition encompasses and the issues associated to their situation. Now the question is that Who are the Refugees? Understanding the problems facing refugees – and those striving to protect them – depends on grasping precise legal definitions. These definitions identify who qualifies for the protections, both legal and physical, that national and international bodies have developed to deal with people pushed across borders by conflict and persecution. They also play an important role in efforts to collect and interpret refugee statistics. The core definition of a ‘refugee’ is contained in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which define a refugee as an individual who ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or – unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’. A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of ill treatment, war or violence. A refugee has a common fear or persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War and ethnic, tribal and religious violence are leading factors of refugees fleeing their countries. More than half of the refugees worldwide come from just three countries: Syria, Afghanistan and South Sudan. Crises in Syria, Afghanistan and South Sudan have displaced more than 10 million people around the world – more than half of the refugee population worldwide (Mercycorps.org, 2019). Meanwhile, instability in Venezuela and violence in Myanmar have forced millions more to leave their homes behind. The 1951 Geneva Convention is the main international platform of refugee law. The Convention clearly explained who a refugee is and the kind of legal protection, other assistance and social rights he or she should receive from the countries who have signed the document. The Convention also defines a refugee’s obligation to host governments and certain categories or people, such as war criminals, who do not qualify for refugee status. The Convention was limited to protecting mainly European refugees in the aftermath of World War II, but another document, the 1967 Protocol, extended the scope of the Convention as the problem of displacement spread around the world.

Why Does Refugee Generates? An Empirical Perspective

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In the last decade the refugee generation has been taking up pace compared to the past decades. Particularly in the last five years, that is, between 2016 and 2011, more than 23 million of people have become refugees. Now among them 11.5 million refugees are from Syria, 4 million displaced from 2013 in South Sudan, 3.8 million in Afghanistan, 2.3 million in Africa’s Lake Chad basin and 1.6 million in Somalia (World Migration Report, 2018). As we know, mostly economic and political instabilities are the reasons for refugee generation, but the major parameters for how refugees are generated have not been analyzed properly. This chapter will highlight the major parameters for which refugee crisis has been generated within an economy. Again the implications of those parameters have been analyzed on the five above-mentioned economies. This chapter is mainly based on the secondary data of the World Bank and UNHCR and various governments’ official data of the studied country. So the main objective of this chapter is to analyze the cause of these phenomena, whereas no research has been done yet about the era prefacing that crisis.

Refugee Crisis in the Last Decade Several decades later, the world is currently experiencing the greatest refugee crisis since World War II. The most recent report from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) figures a total refugee and displaced person population at approximately 55 million people, the result of conflicts from South Sudan to Syria. This considers over 14 million refugees, 1.8 million asylum seekers and 32 million internally displaced persons. The prime cause of increased displacement is the ongoing Syrian Civil War, a conflict that has killed between 250,000 and 470,000 people and forcibly displaced approximately 11.3 million people (World Report, 2019). The scope of the Syrian crisis is dangerous, with the country now comprising the world’s largest source of refugees, while Turkey, which shares the longest common border with Syria, is now home to the world’s largest refugee population. Despite the enormity of the Syrian Refugee Crisis, many Western states have once again given up their moral duty to grant asylum to refugees. England has recorded less than 5,000 refugees, Canada has just recently accepted 25,000 refugees, Germany has provided asylum to 800000 migrants which has been expected to increase to 1 million, and the US has pledged to accept a total of 100,000 refugees by 2017. Turkey, Lebanon, Germany and Jordan have so far registered 2.5 million, 1 million, 800,000 and 630,000 refugees, respectively; it is clear that affluent Western states have a moral duty to accept more refugees (UNHCR, 2018). Many countries that have signed and ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention have repeatedly violated the principle of rehabilitation. Specifically, at the borders of Greece and Turkey, Spain and Morocco as well as Europe guards have forcibly repatriated asylum seekers. In Australia, asylum seekers who arrive clandestinely are imprisoned in remote detention centres. State’s unwillingness to accept refugees can yet again be largely give importance

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to discrimination, specifically racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia. Fears and moral panics about the ‘other’, coupled with the emerging consensus that countries must control its borders and protect its territory resulted in the rise of xenophobic and nationalist political parties in the US, Australia and across Europe, and the further entrenchment of an aggressive anti-migration regimes. Critics of granting asylum to refugees often use the consequentialist rationale, as well as the language of economics when considering the case of migration. Arguments are made that focus on the consequences of refugee flows for those who already reside in the destination country. In response to the claim that increased migration harms domestic workers, proponents of freer international migration argue that migrants add value to the domestic economy. Clearly, both sides ignore the welfare of the people and families they are speaking of, as if their lives were of no concern. Furthermore, critics and advocates disregard the meaningful issues of ethics and justice beyond the primacy of economic consequential. Nor do they attend to the question of whether protecting the interests of citizens of destination countries justifies treating others inequitable. Ultimately, the international communities’ refusal to accept refugees is a tragic point in the history of migration, and future scholars will likely look back on this current crisis with horror (Table 1.1).

Global Refugee Crisis By the end of 2016, 65.6 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, violence or human rights violations (UNHCR, 2018). That was an increase of 300,000 people over the previous year, and the world’s forcibly displaced population remained at a record high. This includes:

• • •

22.5 million refugees in the world – the highest ever seen; 40.3 million internally displaced people and 2.8 million asylum seekers.

New displacement remains very high. One person becomes displaced every three seconds – less than the time it takes to read this sentence. That is 20 people are newly displaced every minute. One in every 113 people globally is either an asylum seeker, internally displaced or a refugee. Let review the region specific refugee scenario.

Central African Republic Region Since 2013, nearly 1 million men, women and children have fled their homes in desperation, seeking refuge within mosques and churches, as well as in neighbouring countries (Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and the Republic of the Congo).

Region

Africa Asia Europe Latin America and Caribbean Northern America Oceania Total

2008

2009

2010

DNA 2,106,300 10,176,423 803,500 18,567,061 6,112,716 3,596,100 3,069,748 2,992,734 1,621,723 3,740,389 4,117,369

700

569,868

487,433

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

13,054,069 14,525,986 3,022,529 4,315,819

12,546,381 15,448,253 2,956,456 4,351,990

13,552,429 20,071,389 2,655,496 5,995,468

17,755,821 25,940,393 3,901,936 6,669,992

20,277,162 29,704,046 5,487,592 7,659,144

21,288,728 31,168,078 6,210,994 8,061,269

483,219

477,388

530,502

620,922

714,900

936,875

DNA 38,148 37,801 40,243 52,868 60,113 69,780 69,894 83,894 42,000,000 36,460,806 33,924,476 35,441,865 35,833,362 42,865,397 54,958,844 63,912,738 67,749,838

Source: www.unhcr.org.

Why Does Refugee Generates? An Empirical Perspective

Table 1.1. Refugees, Total Population of Concern, by UN Region, 2008–2016.

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Central American Region In recent years, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras have experienced a dramatic escalation in violence by organized criminal groups, locally called maras. Current homicide rates are among the highest ever recorded in the region. The number of people fleeing for their lives from Central America has grown by 10 times in the past five years. A total of 90% of asylum seekers in Mexico are from NTCA countries.

European Region The ongoing conflict and violence in Syria, Iraq and other parts of the world is causing large-scale displacement, and refugees are seeking safety beyond the immediate region. The lack of an increased number of legal pathways leaves so many people fleeing persecution with few choices, including many trying to reunite with family members in Europe. More than 1.4 million people take their chances aboard unseaworthy boats and dinghies in a desperate attempt to reach Greece, Italy and Spain en route to Europe since 2015.

Iraq Region More than 3 million Iraqis have been displaced across the country since the start of 2014 and more than 240,000 are refugees in other countries, including Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Germany.

South Sudan Region South Sudan has the world’s fastest growing refugee crisis. Since December 2013, brutal conflict in South Sudan has claimed thousands of lives and driven 3.3 million people from their homes. While an estimated 1.9 million people remain displaced inside the country, 1.4 million have fled as refugees to neighbouring countries in a desperate bid to reach safety. Uganda currently hosts the most South Sudanese refugees, having taken in more than 1 million people.

Syria Region Syrians continued to be the largest forcibly displaced population in the world, with 12 million people at the end of 2016. That’s more than half of the Syrian population. More than 5 million people have fled Syria seeking safety in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and beyond. In Lebanon, where more than 1 million Syrian refugees reside, there are no formal refugee camps and approximately 70% of Syrian refugees live below the poverty line. In Jordan, over 660,000 Syrian refugees are trapped in exile. Approximately 80% of them live outside camps, while more than 140,000 have found sanctuary at

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the Za’atari and Azraq refugee camps. A total of 93% of refugees in Jordan live below the poverty line.

Impact of Livelihood on Refugees The Economic Impact From the moment of arrival, refugees compete with the local citizens for scarce basic resources such as land, water, shelter, food and health. Over time, their presence leads to more substantial demands on natural resources, education and health facilities, energy, transportation, social services and employment. The presence of a large refugee population in rural areas inevitably also means a strain on the local administration. Host country national and regional authorities divert considerable resources and manpower from the pressing demands of their own development to the urgent task of keeping refugees alive, alleviating their sufferings and ensuring the security of the whole community. The economic impact of refugees on host areas, however, is not necessarily negative. An economic stimulus may be generated by the presence of refugees and can lead to the opening and development of the host regions. This stimulus takes place, inter alia, through the local purchase of food, non-food items, shelter materials by agencies supplying relief items, disbursements made by aid workers, the assets brought by refugees themselves, as well as employment and income accrued to local population, directly or indirectly, through assistance projects for refugee areas. A number of refugees turn to subsistence farming as a coping mechanism. However, the development of rural livelihoods such as agriculture and pastoralism depends on the availability of and access to land and natural resources. When insufficient land is available, many refugees may still engage in agriculture by encroaching on land which they have no right to use. Or because refugees hope for a quick return, they could resort to unsustainable farming practices such as, for example, indiscriminate land clearance. Conditions allowing – such as access to farmland, irrigation water, liberty of movement, etc. – humanitarian agencies provide refugees with seeds, tools and sometimes technical support. In many cases, agriculture could indeed allow refugees to develop sustainable livelihoods. Furthermore, unchecked and unaided production can lead towards saturation of already limited markets.

Impact on Local Ecology and Infrastructure Modifications of eco-systems can be controlled or uncontrolled. If a modification of one or more factors is carried out to serve a special goal, such as land clearance for crop cultivation or land levelling for irrigation, and if this modification is based on sound planning, taking into account the impact on environmental conditions, the newly established eco-system is not necessarily inferior to the old one. The development of the new system can, in this instance, be called a controlled development. But if a sudden and unplanned change takes place, it may lead to a serious, uncontrolled imbalance with an impact on the whole ecosystem, both in the directly affected area and beyond. The mass movement of

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refugees is an example of a situation where the impact on the ecology is not fully under control because the emergency character of the movement normally does not allow for early and proper planning of the new habitat. The addition of a sizable group of refugees to an existing population creates a sudden and massive demand for scarce natural resources such as land, fuel, water, food and shelter materials, with long-term implications on their sustainable regeneration. Other longer term problems relate to erosion, decreased soil fertility and landslides. Problems related to rural wood consumption are invariably serious. Estimates of rural wood consumption in Somalia indicate that the wood requirement for a family of five, for hut construction, is 2.4 m per head per year for cooking (World Migration Report, 2018). Supplementary food gathering through hunting, foraging and collecting local food stocks adds to the pressure on the environment. Additionally, human waste disposal can contaminate local groundwater and cause the spread of disease.

The Social Impact If refugees are from the same cultural and linguistic group as the local population, there is often identification with and sympathy for their situation. There are many examples of refugees being given shelter in local people’s houses. Over 400,000 refugees have been housed with family or friends in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (World Migration Report, 2018). There are commonly complaints that refugees have added to security problems in general and crime rates, theft, murder etc., in particular. Concomitantly, other social problems such as prostitution and alcoholism are also claimed to rise in the refugee areas. On the one hand, enforced idleness and poverty within a refugee camp may cause an escalation of such tendencies, particularly if there are groups of young men who are not meaningfully occupied. On the other hand, refugees, as an ‘out’ group, can be blamed for all untoward activities. Incidence of crime may rise no more than would be expected in a population group of the new size, but in a remote and previously quiet area, this would not go unnoticed. If the area has become a hub of economic activity, as the presence of large-scale aid would indicate, it may have attracted a group of people who will profit from the current situation and may not be constrained by the social and legal safeguards of the region. In a border area, this could include cross-border problems.

The Educational Condition of Refugees Refugee’s children are five times more likely to be out of school than their nonrefugee peers. Only 2.9 million of the 6.4 million refugees of school-age were enrolled in primary or secondary education in 2016. More than half of them – 3.5 million – did not go to school. Primary education enrolment for refugees increased from 50% in 2015 to 61% in 2016, in large part due to improvements for Syrian refugee children, thanks to increased international efforts and measures taken by host governments (World Migration Report, 2018).

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•

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Primary, Secondary and Higher Educational Scenario A total of 1.5 million refugee children were not in primary school, and 2 million refugee adolescents were not in secondary school. A total of 61% of refugee children, and less than 50% of refugee children in low-income countries, attend primary school. Globally, 91% of children attend primary school. A total of 23% of refugee adolescents, and 9% of refugee adolescents in lowincome countries, attend secondary school. Globally, 84% of adolescents attend secondary school. Only 1% of refugees enrol in college or university. Across the world, enrolment in college or university stands at 36% (World Migration Report, 2018). Gender Gap in Education For every 10 refugee boys in primary school, there are fewer than eight refugee girls. For every 10 refugee boys in secondary school there are fewer than seven refugee girls (World Migration Report, 2018).

Brief Scenario of the Study Area Zolberg (1989) analyzed the contemporary refugee populations in three distinct sociological types of refugees: the activist; the target and the victim. The characteristics that unite these types under the category (and concept) of refugees depict both causes and consequences of their condition as individuals uprooted from their habitat. On the causal side, for instance, one general characteristic of their condition is fear of violence. As was observed with insight, ‘what all three (types) have in common is fear of immediate violence – violence resulting from conflict between state and civil society, between opposing armies, or conflict among ethnic groups or class formations that the state is unable or unwilling to control’ (Zolberg, 1989, p. 269). On the consequences’ side, in turn, there are other sociologically important components that these three types share as refugees: for instance, abrupt destitution, residence loss, loss of economic self-sufficiency, cultural separation, identity deprivation, and socio-psychological stress. So analyzing Zolberg’s conception, we can categorize the causal agent in four sets of factors leading to rapid internal and international refugees: (1) (2) (3) (4)

wars and political chaos; harassment (or fear of) based on ethnicity, race or religion; natural calamities: floods, earthquakes, droughts, etc. and development projects that cause significant changes in land and water use.

The first three of these general causes are common to both flows of refugees. Indeed, when wars, harassment and/or natural disasters force people to flee their homelands, the push factors are much the same for external refugees who cross an international border and look for shelter in a different country. The US Council for Refugees has estimated that by the end of 1987 the number of cross-border refugees worldwide stood at about 15.4 million (cf. Zolberg, 1989).

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Syria An estimated 11 million Syrians have fled their homes since the outbreak of the civil war in March 2011. Now, in the sixth year of war, 13.5 million are in need of humanitarian assistance within the country. Among those escaping the conflict, the majority have sought refuge in neighbouring countries or within Syria itself. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 4.8 million have fled to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, and 6.6 million are internally displaced within Syria. Meanwhile, about 1 million have requested asylum to Europe. Germany, with more than 300,000 cumulated applications, and Sweden with 100,000, are EU’s top receiving countries. Human rights in Syria under the rule of the Ba’ath Party (continuous since 1963) is considered to be in exceptionally poor conditions by international observers and has been deteriorating further since 2008. The 2010–2011 Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Yemen inspired major protests in Syria (World Migration Report, 2018). The Syrian Army intervened in March 2011, and the Syrian government crackdown gradually increased in violence, escalating to major military operations to suppress resistance. In April, hundreds died in clashes between the Syrian Army and opposition forces, which included armed protestors and defected soldiers. As Syria descended into civil war, it quickly became divided into a complex patchwork of shifting alliances and territories between the Assad government, rebel groups, the majority-Kurdish SDF, and Salafi jihadist groups (including ISIL). Up to half a million people died in the war, including around a 100,000 civilians (UNHCR, 2018). By May 2011, thousands of people had fled from the war to neighbouring countries, with even larger numbers displaced within Syria itself. As armies assaulted various locations and battled, entire villages were trying to escape, with thousands of refugees a day crossing borders. Other reasons for displacement in the region, often adding to the Syrian Civil War, target the refugees of the Iraqi Civil War, Kurdish refugees and Palestinian refugees. As of mid-2017, an estimated 260,000 refugees returned to Syria since 2015 and more than 440,000 internally displaced persons returned to their homes, to search for family, check on property and, in some cases, due to improved security in parts of the country. The Syrian foreign minister called on the country’s refugees to return home (UNHCR, 2018). Nevertheless, the UNHCR stated that conditions in Syria are still unsafe and destitute; improvements in many areas are uncertain and many basic services are absent; access of aid convoys is also a challenge. Less than a half of the returnees have access to water or health services, due to extremely damaged infrastructure. An estimated, 10% ended up as internally displaced persons once again.

Afghanistan Afghan refugees are nationals of Afghanistan who left their country as a result of major wars or persecution. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marks the first wave of internal displacement and refugee flow from Afghanistan to neighbouring Pakistan and Iran that began providing shelter to Afghan refugees. When

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the Soviet war ended in 1989, these refugees started to return to their homeland. In April 1992, a major civil war began after the mujahideen took over control of Kabul and the other major cities (UNHCR, 2018). Afghans again fled to neighbouring countries. A total of 6 million Afghan refugees were hosted in Pakistan and Iran, making Afghanistan the largest refugee-producing country in the world, a title held for 32 years. Afghans are currently the second largest refugee group after Syrian refugees. The majority of Afghan refugees (95%) are located in Iran and Pakistan. Some countries that were part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took in small number of Afghans who worked with their respective forces. Ethnic minorities, like Afghan Sikhs and Hindus, often fled to India (UNHCR, 2018). There are over 1 million internally displaced people in Afghanistan. The majority of the IDPs in Afghanistan are as a direct and indirect result of conflict and violence, although there are also reasons of natural disasters. The Soviet invasion caused approximately 2 million Afghans to be internally displaced, mostly from rural areas into urban areas. The Afghan Civil War (1992–1996) caused a new wave of internal displacement, with many Afghans moving to northern cities in order to get away from the Taliban-ruled areas. Afghanistan continues to suffer from insecurity and conflict, which has led to an increase in internal displacement. After the removal of the Taliban regime in late 2001, over 5 million Afghans were repatriated through the UNHCR from Pakistan and Iran to Afghanistan. Hundreds of thousands of Afghans began returning to Afghanistan in recent years. According to the United Nations, by the end of 2016, about 600,000 documented and undocumented Afghans were repatriated from Pakistan. The returns of undocumented Afghan refugees from Pakistan in 2016 were more than twice the number of 2015, increased by 108% from 2015 (around 248,054 versus 119,279). The remaining registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan numbers around 1.3 million. In the same year, UNHCR reported that 951,142 Afghans were living in Iran. Most of them were born and raised in Pakistan and Iran in the last three and a half decades but are still considered citizens of Afghanistan.

Somalia The 1977–1978 Ogaden War caused a massive influx of Somalis who had been living in eastern Ethiopia (and to a lesser extent from other areas) into Somalia. Most refugees were ethnic Somalis, but there were also many Oromo, an ethnic group that resided primarily in Ethiopia. In its first public appeal to the UN, the Somali government estimated 310,000 in the camps in September 1979. By mid1980s, estimates had risen to 750,000 persons in camps and at least half that number outside them. In early 1981, Mogadishu estimated that there were more than 1.3 million refugees in the camps and an additional 700,000 to 800,000 refugees at large, either attempting to carry on their nomadic way of life or quartered in towns and cities. In 1990, there were refugee camps in four of Somalia’s 16 regions, or administrative districts. The number of persons in these camps ranged from under 3,000 to more than 70,000, but most held 35,000 to

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45,000 refugees. According to a government document, the camps in Gedo held a total of more than 450,000 persons, in Hiiraan more than 375,000, in Woqooyi Galbeed well over 400,000 and in Shabeellaha Hoose nearly 70,000 (Eitzgerald, 2002). The burden of the refugee influx on Somalia was heavy. Somalia was one of the world’s poorest countries, an importer of food in ordinary circumstances and lacking crucial elements of physical and social infrastructure such as transportation and health facilities. In a country with limited arable land and fuels and visited fairly often by drought or flash floods, refugees were hard put to contribute to their own support. Some refugee camps were so located that transportation of food and medical supplies was fairly easy, but that was not true for many other camps. Some were in or near areas where, in a year of good rain, crops could be grown, but others were not. In almost all cases, easily accessible firewood had been rapidly depleted by early 1981, and the refugees had to go long distances for what little could be found. Age and sex composition, camp conditions and refugee needs remained roughly constant until 1988, when the civil war, particularly in the north, produced a new and massive wave of refugees. This time the refugees went from Somalia to Ethiopia, where a large number of displaced northerners, mainly members of the Isaaq clan-family fleeing the violence and persecution from the Somali Army’s ‘pacification’ campaigns, sought sanctuary in Ethiopia’s eastern province, Harerge Kifle Hager. The new wave of asylum seekers almost doubled the number of displaced persons in the region. A significant number of Somali refugees emigrated to European countries, in particular Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland (where Somalis constituted the largest number of refugees) and Canada. Britain had a particularly generous asylum policy toward Isaaq refugees. With the flight of Siad Barre and consequent fall of his government in late January 1991, significant population shifts occurred. According to sketchy UNHCR reports, there were more than 50,000 Somali refugees in various camps in Mombasa, Kenya. Another 150,000 were scattered in the North Eastern Province of Kenya, especially in and around the border town of Liboi and slightly farther in land. Other thousands had fled to eastern Ethiopia, where the UNHCR stated it was feeding more than 400,000 ethnic Somalis. Many others were dispersed throughout the border areas.

South Sudan South Sudanese refugees are persons originating from the African country of South Sudan, but seeking refuge outside the borders of their native country. The world’s youngest independent country has a recent and troubled history of prolonged conflicts and climate change, namely desertification. These forces have resulted not only in violence and famine, but also the forced migration of large numbers of the population, both inside and outside the country’s borders. South Sudan was cited as the largest refugee crisis in 2016, being the world’s third largest, followed by Syria and Afghanistan. At least 2 million people in South Sudan became internally displaced persons as a result of the South Sudanese Civil War, which began in 2013.

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Most of the Sudanese refugees that arrive to Chad are escaping from the Darfur crisis. The UNHCR has established 12 camps to house them near along the border with Sudan. The camps are organized in different sectors divided by wide dirt roads, which are at the same time divided in blocks. Every refugee camp has a medical centre, schools and a market, where refugees can buy or sell clothes, vegetables and goat meat. There is also a point for food distribution in each camp, to where World Food Program trucks bring the food rations (packages consisting of flour, vegetable oil, some cereal grains, sugar and salt) that are distributed to women on a monthly basis. Each family is provided a tent, which has an open fireplace for cooking and a storage place for firewood. As of October 2017, an estimated 2,073,105 South Sudanese people were refugees in neighbouring countries. About 272,000 refugees from South Sudan were living in the Gambela Region of Ethiopia, as of April 2016. Most of them live in these refugee camps. According to the UNHCR, the number of registered South Sudanese refugees in Uganda has crossed the one million thresholds as of fall 2017 (World Migration Report, 2018). In Kenya, 44,000 South Sudanese refugees arrived between the years 2013 and 2015.

Chad Sudan and Chad are both guests and hosts to thousands of refugees from the other country. There are 304,650 Sudanese refugees in Chad as of April 2016 and 8,000 Chadian refugees in Sudan, the majority of which sought refuge escaping from violence and conflicts (World Migration Report, 2018). Droughts, famines and political and armed conflicts have pushed Chadians and Sudanese alike in and out of their territories. For instance, Chadians have sought refuge in Sudan during the 1913–1914 famine, the 1973 drought, and between 1979 and 1982 Sudan hosted 16,000 supporters of the Chadian leader Hissene Habre (World Migration Report, 2018). Sudan and Chad have also shared seasonal migratory pattern, in particular the area inhabited by the Masalit people, an ethnic group that shares a common language and that was separated when the contemporary borders of the states of Sudan and Chad were drawn. This seasonal migration entails the displacement of people between southeastern Chad and Darfur (Sudan); being the dry season when people are more mobile, roads are open and regional markets are integrated. Chadians move to southeastern areas into Sudan looking for food, water and income until the rainy seasons, when they return to their villages and sow their crops.

Econometric Analysis of Refugee Generation To find out the factors which influence a person to be a refugee, we have considered some factors which may have some possible influence over the fact. The lack of basic facilities which determine the standard of living, the lack of some rights related to identity of a person and the political as well as environmental stability of a country determine the refugee from a country. So we have considered all those

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factors trying to avoid the problem of multicollinearity problem as far as possible. Most of the people live in rural area, and their standard of living depends on the agriculture and agricultural related activity. So employment in agriculture (EMA) and the value added from agriculture (EVA) is an important factor for analysis. The industrial production determines the level of employment and the increase in industrial production (IVA) essential for growth of an economy. Education is the human capita which augment the production skill of a person and enhances the standard of living. So household’s literacy rate (LR) is an impotent variable for analysis. Droughts (DFET) and stress on available freshwater (LES) drive the people from one place to other, and the civilization developed nearby the water bodies from the ancient era. Food production index (FPI) is directly linked with the availability of food. The poverty head count ratio (HI) and poverty gap reflects the standard of living of the people of country. The standard of living can be enhanced through social safety nets (SSNs). Any increase in population density (PD) is expected to decrease the availability of resources in per capita sense and will reduce the level of consumption. It is expected that rate of unemployment (UEM) in any given region reduces the level of income which leads to decrease in consumption (Englera et al., 2015) Consumption is a function of income (Keynes, 1935). So we have considered GDP per capita (GDP) and household final consumption expenditure (HCE) as determinants of refugee. Life expectancy at birth (LE) ensures the availability of medical facility of a nation. On the other hand, resource allocation index (IDA) is an important determinant of entitlement of resources. School enrolment gender parity index measures the equality of male and female child in respect of education which is a mirror of a society in respect of perception about women. Livestock production index (LPI) gives a picture about the earning from livestock. So this is other impotent variable for analysis. Political stability is essential for inhabitance in a region. So political instability index (PII) is an important determinant. In order to trace out the factors which influence refugee population by country or territory of origin (RPC) and international migrant stock as percentage of population (IMS), panel regressions for five selected countries, i.e. Afghanistan, Chad, South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic and Somalia, have been attempted by regressing RPC and IMS for the period 1999 to 2016. Panel data regression model can be defined as: Yit ¼ b0 1 b1 X1it 1 b2 X2it 1 b3 X3it 1 ⋯ 1 bn Xnit 1 «it

We also consider «it as the error term distributed normally with mean 0 and variance 1 (Table 1.2). Now let us analyze the data by Panel regression model (Table 1.3). Estimation states that IVA, SSN, GDP, LE and IDA have negatively related with refugee population by country or territory of origin (RPC) and all are statistically significant. IVA and GDP are negatively related means, increase in industrial production, and GDP will reduce the level of migration from a country. SSNs are negatively statistically significant, which implies these schemes provide basic benefits in minimal price and/or cashless which have a direct impact on livelihood security of the households of the studied country and will mitigate

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Table 1.2. Notation, Mean, and SD of the Variables Used in Panel Regression Model to Find the Factors Stimulating the Refugee Problem. Variable

Obs

Mean

Dependent variable IMS 90 2.73 RPC 90 930,729.80 Independent variable EMA 90 64.31 EVA 90 38.17 IVA 90 1,490 million LR 90 38.36 DFET 90 2.52 FPI 90 107.04 HI 90 44.83 PG 90 16.37 PD 90 34.82 UEM 90 8.71 SSN 90 1.78 LWS 90 31.95 GDP 90 2,206.47 HCE 90 553.46 CPI 90 109.95 LE 90 57.50 SLRI 90 3.60 IDA 90 2.43 SE 90 0.65 LPI 90 100.95 PII 90 5.37

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

2.39 1,285,352.00

0.23 4,869.00

8.02 5,524,333.00

24.53 12.87 906 million 21.78 1.79 23.33 8.98 7.21 36.61 3.03 2.04 42.16 1,010.36 55.52 32.82 8.51 3.40 0.34 0.21 10.91 7.29

13.23 17.94 795 million 21.31 0.51 65.98 30.10 7.40 6.19 2.30 0.69 1.33 903.18 441.03 54.90 47.59 0.00 1.58 0.00 69.84 0.00

87.52 56.79 4,410 million 82.89 5.60 171.88 57.80 24.80 114.46 14.99 6.69 109.41 3,789.92 672.57 195.14 74.43 9.00 2.89 0.99 123.67 43.43

Source: www.unhcr.org and authors’ calculation.

migration. LE and Resource Allocation Index (IDA) are negatively statistically significant. That means as their source of income generates, their standard of living will also increase and along with better medical facilities their LE will expand which attract the people to live within the country and deter from migration. But PD is significantly and positively related to migration. The PD is positively related with poverty and statistically significant means that the available per capita resource decreases which leads to migrate. The empirical result relating to the effect of unemployment rate over migration indicates that migration is significantly

Table 1.3. Panel Regression Model to Find the Factors Stimulating the Refugee Problem. Std. Error

z

P>z

9,784,052 218,440.4 12,488.56 20.001234 221,463.2 1,152,805 88.50413 224,536.3 143,159.2 45,257.5 93,779.53 222,308.6 141,627.4 2572.633 2237.821 26,709.98 2192377 305,054.4 22,141,101 2220,973 5,476.684 29,163

1.13E107 41,248.28 9,364.339 0.000329 75,598.49 765,219.1 19,171.22 50,944.08 210,003.4 25,069.61 47,967.33 201,713.8 66,777.93 177.3689 3,116.093 12,867.66 98,270.59 390,226 543,314.2 826,396.6 13,152.57 13,634.15

0.87 20.45 1.33 3.75*** 20.28 1.51 0 20.48 0.68 1.81* 1.96* 20.11 2.12** 23.23*** 20.08 20.52 21.96** 0.78 23.94*** 20.27 0.42 2.148**

0.385 0.655 0.182 0 0.776 0.132 0.996 0.63 0.495 0.071 0.051 0.912 0.034 0.001 0.939 0.602 0.05 0.434 0 0.789 0.677 0.032

pAsterisk means level of significance. Source: www.unhcr.org and authors’ calculation.

Number of observation 5 90 R-sq within 5 0.7633 R-sq between 5 0.9999 R-sq overall 5 0.8936 Wald chi2(21) 5 571.38 Prob . chi2 5 0.0000

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Constant EMA EVA IVA LR DFET FPI HI PG PD UEM SSN LWS GDP HCE CPI LE SLRI IDA SE LPI PII

Coefficient

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RPC

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influenced by the unemployment rate. LES and PII are also positively related with migration and statistically significant. These empirical results have established that lack of freshwater and political instability will induce the level of migration.

Conclusion A refugee has a common fear or persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group as well as in region. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War and ethnic, tribal and religious violence are leading factors of refugees fleeing their countries. More than 23 million of total refugees are from five places: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, the Lake Chad Basin and Somalia. And the astonishing figures are 11.5 million people in five years between 2011 and 2016 in Syria, 4 million displaced from 2013 in South Sudan, 3.8 million in Afghanistan, 2.3 million in Africa’s Lake Chad basin and 1.6 million in Somalia (UNHCR, 2018). So we have selected these areas for our study. This chapter is mainly based on the secondary data of the UNHCR and the World Bank and various governments’ official data. In this chapter, we are trying to identify the major parameters responsible for refugee generation. The lack of economic activities such as growth of GDP through improvement of industrial production and other facilities like SSN and medical facilities helps to generate refugee in a region. But it mostly depends on the political instability, unemployment and distress of availability of drinking water.

References Englera, et al. (2015). The Nexus between Unemployment and Consumption. Journal of Refugee Studies, 29(2), 43–61. Eitzgerald, J. N. (2002). Somalia: Issues, history, and bibliography. Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers. IOM. (2018). World migration report. International Organization for Migration, Geneva. Keynes, J. M. (1935). The general theory of employment, interest and money. Palgrave Macmillam. Mercy Crops. (2019). Worlds five biggest refugee crisis. Retrieved from https:// www.mercycorps.org/articles/worlds-5-biggest-refugee-crises. Accessed on March 21, 2019. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2017). Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/docid/ 59c8d9594.html/. Accessed on March 16, 2018. UNHCR. (2018). Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/excom/unhcrannual/3ae68c414/reportunited-nations-high-commissioner-refugees.html. Accessed on March 19, 2019. World Report. (2019). Syria. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/ country-chapters/syria. Accessed on March 28, 2019. Zolberg, A. R. (1989). The next waves: Migration theory for a changing world. International Migration Review, 23(3, Fall), 230–272.

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Chapter 2

Eco-political Stability and Refugee Crisis: Some Queries Tonmoy Chatterjee

Abstract Presence of refugees in our world is very common and historically admitted also. Refugees are heterogeneous as a group, many asylum seekers are relatively young, the vast majority is of working age, and increasingly more people come from countries considered crisis accumulated or unsafe. Refugee crisis is recently hindering the developmental paths of several emerging economies across the globe and therefore generates curiosity among both economists and political scientists. Under such a backdrop, findings of any substantive plausible economic reasons behind such hitherto commonly ascribed issue become crucial from the angle of policy making. Broadly speaking, here we want to examine the major cause of refugee formation and how it will affect the size of the so-called potential refugees owing to eco-political instability. To perform this, here we have used a hybrid model which entails the flavours of both dynamic game theory and rational expectations theory of macroeconomics. From such a setup and under the presence of rational expectations, we have shown that a movement from a regime of REPE to non-REPE may lead to an increase in the level of nuisance or uncertainty in the South, which in turn raises the cost of life associated with high-quality quality-differentiated product of the South and thereby increases the number of potential refugees. Keywords: Refugee crisis; quality-differentiated product; two-stage game; rational expectations; recession; eco-political stability

Introduction Almost daily, worldwide news reports intense violence, large-scale human suffering and destruction in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria and Yemen. These conflicts have fundamentally restructured the regions’ physical, Refugee Crises and Third-World Economies, 21–33 Copyright © 2020 Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-190-520201005

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economical and social landscape structure by creating a new religion known as refugees. Their root causes in social and political polarization fuelled by strong population growth, income inequality and massive unemployment are deeply entrenched. For instance, GDP in Syria in 2015, after four years of fighting, accounted for less than half of its pre-conflict level in 2010. Yemen lost an estimated 25–35% of its GDP in 2015 alone, while in Libya – where dependence on oil has made GDP growth extremely volatile – GDP fell by 24% in 2014 as violence picked up. West Bank and Gaza offers a longer-term perspective on what can happen to growth in a fragile situation (World Bank, 2015). Refugee crisis is recently hindering the developmental paths of several economies specifically in the Middle East. Refugees are heterogeneous as a group; many asylum seekers are relatively young, the vast majority is of working age (unemployed), and increasingly more people come from countries considered unsafe. Note that, based on the information available, the number of asylum seekers in the EU more than doubled between 2014 and 2015 to reach about 1.26 million persons. Given such statistics, almost 70% of asylum seekers are unemployed as their working age (between 18- and 64-years-old) compared to 63% in the EU’s population in 2014, their arrival has somewhat altered the age distribution in the countries most concerned. More individuals are coming from countries deemed by EU Member States to be ‘unsafe’, such as Syria. As a result, there has been an increase in the share of applicants claimed as refugees (in 2015 the first instance recognition rate was 52% compared to 46% in 2014). Hence, unsafe land becomes a crucial point to generate conflict risk among the nations. Conflict refers to the problems mainly caused by deviation among the people owing to the economic, cultural, social and religious motives (Andersen ¨ et al., 2001; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, & Soderbom, 2008). Moreover, conflict risk guides to many difficulties for the economy. The main reason for this matter is that because of the conflict risk, volatility in the market will rise. In other words, financial stability in the country will be damaged due to this uncertainty. As a result of this situation, credit rating of the country may be decreased, and this condition affects foreign investors to reduce their investments. While considering the issues emphasized above, it can be said that it is very crucial to identify the determinants of conflict risk. First of all, social and cultural differences may cause conflict in the country. Within this context, difference in educational levels among the nations is assumed as the main cause of the conflict (Østby, 2008). Furthermore, religious reasons are the other aspects that may lead to conflict risk. For an instance, religious force to a small group in a country enhances conflict in that very nation. As a consequence of this, it is possible for this group to become more radical and produce some troubles in that country (Kunovich & Hodson, 1999). In addition to these, economic factors also play a significant role for the conflict in the representative country (Abadie ¨ & Gardeazabal, 2003; Yildirim, Sezgin, & Ocal, 2005). Within this scope, international capital outflows are accepted as an influencing factor of this risk. More specifically, after globalization leading to liberalization, the movement of international capital can be very fast. Because of this aspect, a sudden fall in

Eco-political Stability and Refugee Crisis: Some Queries

23

international capital reasons some financial difficulties for the representative economy, such as unemployment, inflation and economic slowdown. This situation overlay the way for a social crisis. Another economic element of the conflict risk is the financial instability for a representative nation. For instance, when a country has high amount of budget deficit, indebtedness of that country will enlarge. It is to be noted that in case of dearth of the internal resources to pay such debt, country has to find foreign reserves in order to pay this debt. This situation swells the fragility of the economy. This issue has an augmenting effect on the conflict for the representative nation. In fact, present literature has examined conflict risks only by linking with the social, cultural, political and religious factors. However, effects of such risk on the international migration issues have been rarely analyzed (Dakurah, Davies, & Sampath, 2001; Deger & Sen, 1995; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Moreover, risk can be transferred from developed to developing nations through international capital mobility, and such mobility may create enough space for risk and thereby creates international migration in the form of refugees (Dincer & Hacioglu, 2015; Fontanel, 1995). In fact, globalization eliminated economic borders among the countries, and hence, investors had a chance to access new markets. Thus, globalization contributes economic growth by increasing the investment amount in the countries. On the other hand, this condition causes many risks for the economies; because globalization increased international trade, this aspect also caused currency risk for the countries. Due to the fact that this risk could not be managed, many financial crises were occurred. As a result of this situation, lots of ¨ people became unemployed and many companies went bankruptcy (Yuksel, Dincer, & Hacioglu, 2015). Again, since every nation could not have the same chance to access natural resources, globalization also increased income inequalities between the countries (Smeeding, 2002). More precisely, while some economies had higher economic improvement, some others were not as successful as the others. This is such an argument that according to United Nations Warming Report, global competition for energy sources will cause significant problem in the world, such as international migration. Especially after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, it was seen that there was a radical increase in the number of conflicts in the world. This led to many economic crisis in the world that caused significant financial problems for these countries. Because of this issue, the number of conflicts in the world increased very much (Hacioglu, Dincer, & Celik, 2013). While considering these aspects, it can be said that globalization leads to conflict risk for some countries. It refers to the risk of violence in a country or a region due to the disagreement among people regarding social, cultural, ethnic, religious and economic reasons (O’Loughlin et al., 2012). It is such a significant type of the risk that it has many adverse effects on different areas. Although it is mainly associated with the social and political factors, it also affects the financial variables in the market negatively. In other words, it increases volatility in the market which is not a preferred condition by the investors. Owing to this issue, country may have some financial and socio-economical problems and form more unemployment, which may create the scope of legal or illegal international migration.

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Conflict risk leads to increase in the defence expenses because of the security problem. This situation negatively influences budget balance of the country (Hacioglu et al., 2013). As a result of this issue, this country has to increase the debt amount in order to close the budget deficit. Consequently, higher defence expenses cause economic growth to reduce. On the other side, when there is a conflict in the country, there is a risk of capital outflow from this country due to the financial risk caused by conflict. In other words, parties do not prefer to make investment in a country in which there is a conflict risk. Hence, so as to prevent this problem, this country has to increase its defence expenses. As it can be understood from the aspects emphasized above, it is very important to determine the economic results of the conflict risk on the issue of international migration or on refugee crisis. However, there are a few studies in the literature which focused on this subject. Within this context, the purpose of this study is to correlate the issues like conflict risk and refugee crisis on the economic instability. In order to reach this objective, we have used a unique hybrid model with special emphasis on dynamic game theory and rational expectations theory of macroeconomics. In fact, initially we have considered a two-stage strategic game to determine the socio-economic status of the potential refugees and also try to explain the reason behind the formation of refugees and their probable volume and we all have done for the motherland of the said refugees. Next we consider the presence of random policies or political instabilities in terms of random disturbance, and we have tried to examine its significance to determine the socio-economic status and also explain the potential cause behind the issue of refugee crisis. As a result of this analysis, it will be possible to understand this complex relationship between eco-political instability and refugee phenomenon and make a proper recommendation to the economies that have conflict risk. Therefore, this study will make an important contribution to the literature by making analysis of a significant subject that was not considered very much. Apart from this, in the present chapter, we have mixed the flavour of both dynamic game and rational expectation theory to examine the root cause behind the creation of refugee phenomena and its schematic structure. As per our knowledge, this kind of study is also missing in the present literature, and we are trying to fill up these lacunas also. This chapter consists of five different parts. This chapter is organized in the following manner. After the introduction, in the second part, we consider the basic model with strategic game in detail. Furthermore, in the third part, the rational expectations theory has been discussed. The fourth part considers the presence of host economy and the formation of the refugees. Finally, the concluding remarks are made in the last section.

The Model In this section, we emphasize on the determination of price and quantity of our quality-differentiated goods producing MNC under autarky (in the presence high and low risk), i.e. we consider here only the South (motherland of the refugees).

Eco-political Stability and Refugee Crisis: Some Queries

25

To analyze the model, we have considered a dynamic game. The timing of the game is as follows. Here we consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, the MNC decides price of quality-differentiated product (QDP) under risky ecopolitical environment (REPE) and also takes care about international market coverage. In the second stage, the consumers (with special emphasis on refugees) in both countries choose the QDP. The solution is obtained by backward induction.

Stage 2: Refugees Select QDP under REPE Here we assume income distribution of a representative in the South as Y, and it is assumed that Y is uniformly distributed between YM and 0. Then probability density function of income distribution in the South can be written as 8 < NR1 f ðYÞ ¼ N : P1 0

for YM $ Y $ YRf for YRf . Y . 0 otherwise:

where NR1 and NP1 are, respectively, the frequencies of rich and poor in the South, YRf is the critical level of income at which potential refugees (or poor) will be indifferent between high and low QDP under REPE, that is, at least YRf amount of income is required to get high QDP, and YM is the highest level of income of the society. Thus NR1(YM 2 YRf ) and NP1YRf are the income of rich and poor, respectively, in the South. The representative individual’s utility function can be written as W ðY 2 eðQÞ; QÞ ¼ ln U½Y 2 eðQÞ; Q ¼ ln½Y 2 eðQÞ 1 lnQ

(2.1)

Here, W(Y 2 e(Q), Q) implies utility derived from both QDP and also as a result of expenditure on other commodities. The expenditure on QDP is given by e(Q). The first component of the utility function on the right-hand side of equation (2.1) implies utility derived from commodities other than QDP. Second component of the utility function on the right-hand side of equation (2.1) implies utility derived from the QDP. To obtain the proper level of QDP, the representative individuals take into account of their expenditure for different levels of QDP. It is to be noted that degree of QDP is positively associated with its prices (or expenditure), and hence we can have the following impressions: Expenditure for no QDP: e0(Q0) 5 0. Expenditure on moderated QDP: Q1 5 e1(Q1) 5 P1. Expenditure on higher QDP: Q2 5 e2(Q2) 5 P2. It is to be noted that QRf is the threshold level of QDP and 0 , P1 , P2. It is also to be noted that Q2 . Q1 as the level of high-quality QDP is always greater than the level of low-quality or moderated level of QDP. We can rewrite the utility function W(Y 2 e(Q), Q) for all individuals (instead of only the representative refugees) for two categories. The first category is the

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utility function of all individuals of South who can spend on high-quality QDP. The second category is the utility function of all individuals of South (or motherlands of all refugees) who can only spend on low-quality QDP. The specifications of the utility functions for an individual are as follows.            W Y 2 e2 Q2 ; Q2 ¼ ln U Y 2 e2 Q2 ; Q2 ¼ ln Y 2 e2 Q2 1 lnQ2

(2.2)

           W Y 2 e1 Q1 ; Q1 ¼ ln U Y 2 e1 Q1 ; Q1 ¼ ln Y 2 e1 Q1 1 lnQ1

(2.3)

Equation (2.2) corresponds to the utility function of an individual for highquality QDP and equation (2.3) corresponds to the utility function of an individual for low-quality or no QDP. Let YRf be the threshold level of income where refugees are indifferent between high- and low-quality (or no) QDP. In this case, we compare equations (2.2) and (2.3) by equating them and also by using the fact e1(Q1) 5 P1 and e2(Q2) 5 P2, we get  2 Rf    Q Y 2 P2 Q2 ¼ Q1 YRf 2 P1 Q1   2  YRf ¼ Q2 P2 2 Q1 P1 Q 2 Q1

(2.4)

Here YRf . 0 as Q2 . Q1 and P2 . P1. It can be shown that for all Y 2 (0, YRf ), the potential refugees will prefer lowquality or no QDP, whereas for all Y 2 (YRf, YM) the individuals of South will prefer high-quality QDP. This can also be explained with the help of Fig. 2.1. Fig. 2.1 has been drawn on the basis of equations (2.2) and (2.3). Using the fact that e2(Q2) 5 P2, one can rewrite equation (2.2) as       W Y 2 e2 Q2 ; Q2 ¼ 2 P2 Q2 1 YQ2 ¼ W Y; Q2

(2.2.1)

Similarly, using the fact that e1(Q1) 5 P1, one can rewrite equation (2.3) as       W Y 2 e1 Q1 ; Q1 ¼ 2 P1 Q11 1 YQ1 ¼ W Y; Q1

(2.3.1)

W (Y,Q2), W (Y,Q1) W (Y,Q2) U(Y,Q1)

O -P1Q1

S YRf

YM

Y

-P2 Q2

Fig. 2.1.

Determination of Threshold Level of Income for the Potential Refugees.

Eco-political Stability and Refugee Crisis: Some Queries

27

From equation (2.2.1), we find that the slope of W(Y,Q2) function is given by ðdW =dYÞfor ðhighquality QDP; REPEÞ ¼ Q2

Again from equation (2.3.1), we find that the slope of W(Y,Q1) function is given by ðdW =dYÞfor ðlowquality QDP; REPEÞ ¼ Q1

As Q2 . Q1, the W(Y,Q2) function is steeper than the W(Y,Q1) function. In Fig. 2.1, individuals whose income lies within the area OS will not buy any QDP (the number of consumers who will prefer no QDP or they are unable to afford QDP). We refer this region as the Region of Potential Refugees (RPR). It is to be noted that in Fig. 2.1 SYRf is the region where NP1YRf number of individuals will consume low-quality QDP, whereas YRfYM is the region where NR1(YM 2 YRf) number of individuals will consume high-quality QDP. Suppose due to adaptation of some volatile socio-economic steps by the state of South may disappear the existing level of high-quality QDP, that is, a fall in the level of Q2. This fall in Q2 causes a rightward shift of the W(Y,Q2) locus, and hence we get a decrease in the number of consumers of high-quality QDP as critical level of income to buy highquality QDP become higher and an uprise in the number of consumers of lowquality or no-quality QDP as more consumer cannot afford high-quality QDP. In short, more vulnerability may generate in the society due to the adaptation of above-mentioned policies. Further, it insists more individuals to move to the region of RPR. In fact, adapting such policies by the government of South is actually enhancing the probability of formation of the world of refugees. Thus we can make the following proposition. Proposition 1: Given the REPE-augmented prices of different level of QDP, adaptation of volatile steps by the state may discourage the demand for high-quality QDP and enhance the probability of getting more refugees. We next move to stage 1 of the game.

Stage 1: Selection of REPE-augmented Price of the Profit Maximizing MNC From stage 2 of the game we have found that YRf is the threshold level of income at which refugees are indifferent between high- and low-quality QDP. From our model, we also find a range for the number of potential refugees who will prefer low-quality or no QDP. However, we can say that NP1YRf is the maximum number of individuals who can be converted to refugee.1 The number of individuals who will prefer high-quality QDP can be definitely determined and is given by NR1(YM 2 YRf ). Given the fact that Southern people usually prefer highquality QDP, we assume that the number of persons who will prefer low-quality QDP is NB1YRf because after YRf level of income individuals will switch over to high-quality QDP and until YRf is achieved people of South will opt for low1

We can also interpret YRf as the minimum level of income at which individuals will prefer high quality QDP.

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quality QDP. Throughout we have assumed a given level of quality of the said product, and they are indexed in such a manner so that the following inequality Q1 , Q2 , 2 must also satisfied. The degree of availability of QDP is positively related with its cost of production, and hence we can write the following distribution: Cost of No QDP: C0(Q0). Cost of moderated QDP: C1(Q1) 5 C1. Cost of high-quality QDP: C2(Q2) 5 C2. It is to be assumed that C1 and C2 are fixed as quality of QDP is given. We also assume that 0 , C1 , C2. If NP1YRf number of individuals selects low-quality QDP, for given quality, the MNC will produce low-quality QDP and will attempt to maximize its profit, i.e.     H  MaxpL Q1 ; Q2 ; Y; P2 ;P1 ¼ P1 NP1 YRf 2 C1 ¼ P1 NP1 Q2 P2 2 Q1 P1 Qh 2 QLh 2 CL P1

If we set ∂pL/∂P1 5 0 we get

 P1 ¼ Q2 P2 2Q1

(2.5)

If NR1(YM 2 YRf ) persons select high-quality QDP, for given quality, the MNC will produce high-quality QDP and will attempt to maximize its profit, i.e.     MaxpH Q1 ; Q2 ; Y; P2 ;P1 ¼ P2 NR1 YM 2 YRf 2 C2 P2

   2  ¼ P2 NR1 YM 2 Q2 P2 2 Q1 P1 Q 2 Q1 2 C2

If we set ∂pH/∂P2 5 0, we get using equation (2.5)   P2 ¼ 2YM Q2 2 Q1 3Q2

(2.6)

Using equation (2.6) in equation (2.5), we get   P1 ¼ YM Q2 2 Q1 3Q1

(2.7)

Equations (2.5) and (2.6) imply that the game is complete as the prices are selected by the MNC. It is to be noted that using the fact Q1 , Q2 , 2, one can check by comparing equations (2.5) and (2.6) that 0 , P1 , P2.

Macro-foundation of REPE-augmented Price Level Here, we shall present a simple form of New Classical Rational Expectations model to explain the impact of volatile or uncertain economic scenarios of the said South. Let us start with Aggregate Demand ðYdt Þ and Aggregate Supply ðYst Þ of our representative economy, and they are given as Ydt ¼ a 2 bPt

(2.8)

Eco-political Stability and Refugee Crisis: Some Queries   Yst ¼ YN 1 a Pt 2 Pet 1 «t

29 (2.9)

Pt ; Pet

N

where, Y is the natural rate of output and are the price level and the expected price of QDP in period t. Here, we also assume the following: a,b,a . 0 and «t is the random disturbance term. It is to be noted that rational expectations theory claims Pet ¼ EðPt Þ

(2.10)

At national equilibrium, we can get   a 2 bPt ¼ YN 1 a Pt 2 Pet 1 «t

(2.11)

Thus we can close this model. From the equilibrium, we can solve for Pt and we get   Pt ¼ a 2 YN 1 aPet 1 «t ðb 1 aÞ

(2.12)

Labours (with potential refugees) with rational expectations will calculate E(Pt) EðPt Þ ¼

   a 2 YN 1 aE Pet ðb 1 aÞ

(2.13)

Here, we implicitly assume that E(«t) 5 0. Hence, by assuming the fact that EðPt Þ 5 Pet , we can solve for Pet :   Pet ¼ a 2 YN 1 aPet ðb 1 aÞ

(2.14)

  Pet ¼ a 2 YN b

(2.15)

Therefore,

Using equation (2.15) in equation (2.12), we can get   Pt ¼ ða 1 bÞa 2 ða 1 bÞYN 2 b«t bðb 1 aÞ

(2.16)

The characteristic of equation (2.16) is very interesting. Equation (2.16) tells us that the value of «t . 0 implies the economy in question is in boom and the same economy will be in the trap of recession if «t , 0. Hence, in the presence of recession the price level will goes up due to the positive error term. In our present case, the South is a poor one and suffering from eco-political instability; in short our South is in recession and hence the price will go up due to the existence of REPE. This leads to us the following proposition. Proposition 2: High risk or uncertainty set the price level of our QDP at a very high level iff our economy lies under the state of recession.

The Model with Host Economy of the Refugees We now consider the economy of the host nation. For this purpose, we consider the host country as a developed one and we refer to it as the ‘North’. For North, we assume that individuals’ income is YN, and it is assumed to be uniformly

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distributed between YM and 2YRf. Then probability density function of income distribution in North can be written as   f YN ¼



NR2 0

for YM $ YN $ 2YRf : otherwise

where NR2 is the frequency of rich in the North, 2YRf is income required to buy high-quality QDP and YM is highest level of income of the society. Thus NR2(YM 2 2YRf ) is the income of rich in the North.2 Individuals of the South will move to the North (specifically from the RPR) to secure their life as there exist no REPE, and it can be explained with the help of the following inequality (it is derived from the equation (2.16) of the last section). PN 2 , P2 1 «

(2.17)

PN 2

where represents the price of high-quality QDP in the North. It is to be noted that persons of South (preferably from RPR) can enjoy U(Y 2 e2(Q2),Q2) 5 2 (P2 1 «)Q2 1 YQ2 level of utility from the consumption of high-quality QDP at the motherland of the potential refugees. Whereas, the consumers of south, that is, the same consumers, specifically from RPR can enjoy a higher level of utility, 2 2 2 N 2 that is, UðY 2 eN 2 ðQ Þ; Q Þ 5 2 P2 Q 1 YQ from the consumption of same level of quality of QDP at North. It implies for given pdf of income distribution of north we get   2 2   H H U Y 2 eN 2 Q ; Q . U Y 2 eH Qh ; Qh 2 2 2 2 2 PN 2 Q 1 YQ . 2 ðP2 1 «ÞQ 1 YQ

This expression basically justifies the rationality of the inequality (equation 2.17). Thus we can set the following inequality regarding prices of different levels of QDP: 0 , P1 , P2 1 « . PN 2

(2.18)

From equation (2.18), we can say that P1 is less than the price of high-quality QDP, that is, (P2 1 «). Here, (P2 1 «) is greater than PN 2 basically due to the fact that to produce the same quality QDP, the MNC has to incur higher production cost in South as there exists risk or uncertainty in the market system of South. Moreover, an increase in « will shift the U (Y,Q2) schedule to the rightward direction, leads to an expansion of the RPR, which in turn causes an increase in the number of refugees those want to move from South to North for their life security. This is shown in Fig. 2.2. The intuition behind the result can be explained on the basis of the fact that a move from a regime of REPE to non-REPE may lead to an increase in probable formation of refugees for the South, since the willingness to pay for high-quality

2

As income required to buy high quality QDP in the South (YRf ) must be less than the income required to buy the same services in the North we have assumed that income for the North as 2YRf.

Eco-political Stability and Refugee Crisis: Some Queries

31

U (Y,Q2), U (Y,Q1) U (Y,Q2)

O S -P1Q1

U (Y,Q1)

S/ YH

YM

Y

2

-P2 Q

Fig. 2.2.

Threshold Level of Income at Low Level of P2.

or low-quality QDP in the South is much higher and uncertain relative to its Northern counterpart. It is to be noted that PN 2 , ðP2 1 «Þ implies the patients of South (only the potential refugees) enjoy higher level of utility from the consumption of high-quality QDP of North. As a consequence, refugees of South will move from their motherland to the host nation (North) to live alive and hence as a by-product the demand for high-quality QDP in North will go up. We summarize our results in the form of the following proposition. Proposition 3: A movement from a regime of REPE to non-REPE may lead to the following: (i) an increase in the level of nuisance or uncertainty in the South increase the cost of life associated with high-quality QDP of the South and thereby increases the number of potential refugees, (ii) overall increase in the level of demand for high-quality QDP in the North. It increases only for the movement of refugees (from the South) who demand such high-quality QDP.

Concluding Remarks International migration in the form of accumulated refugees is not new in the present context. Several theoreticians specifically from the bulk of economists and political scientists have engaged themselves in the research to find out the root cause and its consequences for the above-said issue. However, from the existing literature we have found that several components from the baskets of society, economics and politics are claimed as the major causes behind the formation of refugees. More specifically, volatile components of society, economics and politics create more vulnerable situations with more risks and we can refer them as the source of conflicts among the stakeholders of a nation. These conflict risks create such ambience among the poor which forces the potential refugees to move to the safe land to save their life. In this chapter, we have tried to integrate the issues like

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refugee crisis and eco-political instability. Broadly speaking, here we want to examine the major cause of refugee formation and how it will affect the size of the so-called potential refugees. To categorize this, here we have introduced a hybrid model which entails both the flavour of strategic game theory and rational expectations theory of macroeconomics. From such a setup we have found that for a given level of REPE-augmented prices of different level of QDPs, adaptation of volatile steps by the government may discourage the demand for high-quality QDPs and enhance the probability of getting more refugees. Moreover, in the presence of rational expectation, the model claims that a movement from a regime of REPE to non-REPE may lead to an increase in the level of nuisance or uncertainty in the South, which again increases the cost of life associated with high-quality QDP of the South and thereby increases the number of potential refugees. Apart from this the same model also concludes that due to such regime switch, that is, a movement from a regime of REPE to non-REPE leads to an overall improvement in the level of demand for high-quality QDP in the North and it increases only for the movement of refugees (from the South) who demand such high-quality QDP. Irrespective of all of this, the macro-economic foundation claims that higher price level of QDP is quite certain under the state of recession.

References Abadie, A., & Gardeazabal, J. (2003). The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the Basque Country. The American Economic Review, 93(1), 113–132. Andersen, P., Bumgardner, J., Greig, J. M., & Diehl, P. F. (2001). Turning down the heat: Influences on conflict management in enduring rivalries. International Interactions, 27(3), 239–274. doi:10.1080/03050620108434985 Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict societies. European Economic Review, 48(5), 1125–1145. doi:10.1016/ j.euroecorev.2003.11.005 ¨ Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Soderbom, M. (2008). Post-conflict risks. Journal of Peace Research, 45(4), 461–478. Dakurah, A. H., Davies, S. P., & Sampath, R. K. (2001). Defense spending and economic growth in developing countries: A causality analysis. Journal of Policy Modeling, 23(6), 651–658. doi:10.1016/S0161-8938(01)00079-5 Deger, S., & Sen, S. (1995). Military expenditure and developing countries. Handbook of Defense Economics, 1, 275–307. doi:10.1016/S1574-0013(05)80013-4 Dincer, H., & Hacioglu, U. (2015). A comparative performance evaluation on bipolar risks in emerging capital markets using fuzzy AHP-TOPSIS and VIKOR approaches. Engineering Economics, 26(2), 118–129. doi:10.5755/j01.ee.26.2.3591 Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review, 97(01), 75–90. doi:10.1017/S0003055403000534 Fontanel, J. (1995). The economics of disarmament. Handbook of Defense Economics, 1, 563–590. doi:10.1016/S1574-0013(05)80021-3 Hacioglu, U., Dincer, H., & Celik, I. E. (2013). Conflict risk and its implications on economy and financial system. International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, 2(2), 109–123.

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Kunovich, R. M., & Hodson, R. (1999). Conflict, religious identity, and ethnic intolerance in Croatia. Social Forces, 78(2), 643–668. O’Loughlin, J., Witmer, F. D., Linke, A. M., Laing, A., Gettelman, A., & Dudhia, J. (2012). Climate variability and conflict risk in East Africa, 1990–2009. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109(45), 18344–18349. Østby, G. (2008). Inequalities, the political environment and civil conflict: Evidence from 55 developing countries. In F.Stewart (Ed.), Horizontal inequalities and conflict (pp. 136–159). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Smeeding, T. M. (2002). Globalization, inequality, and the rich countries of the G-20: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Syracuse, NY: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. World Bank. (2015). Global monitoring report 2015/2016: Development in an era of demographic change. Washington, DC: The World Bank. ¨ Yildirim, J., Sezgin, S., & Ocal, N. (2005). Military expenditure and economic growth in Middle Eastern countries: A dynamic panel data analysis. Defence and Peace Economics, 16(4), 283–295. doi:10.1080/10242690500114751 Yuksel, S., Dincer, H., & Hacioglu, U. (2015). CAMELS-based determinants for the credit rating of Turkish deposit banks. International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, 4(4), 1–17.

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Section II Climate Refugees

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Chapter 3

Environmental Refugees: A Humanitarian Crisis in India and Bangladesh Nidhi Chowdhary

Abstract Refugee crisis has been often seen as a matter owing its occurrence to political instability of different countries. The study on refugee crisis has very recently come up with climate becoming a major factor in playing an advanced role in this alarming crisis. Climate change as a phenomenon has been a much debatable issue, but its direct relation to the refugee crisis has been noticed very recently. It has been noted that due to marked temperature changes and sea level rise many countries with large coastal outlines are facing risks of submergence and salinity. In this study the case of Bangladesh, which is slowly subsiding into the waters of the Bay of Bengal and facing severe consequences due to effects of climate change, is highlighted. This has well affected the coastal population of Bangladesh, who have been grouped under the category of what geographers term as climate refugees. Due to the inaction of state authorities, such population is forced to first migrate internally and then externally. The fragile border of Bangladesh and India thus pushes such refugees to the Indian subcontinent, which in turn creates socio-economic and political impact on India. This study argues that despite several legislative measures at international level, the refugee crisis is not dealt with seriously and concerns need to be adopted to give protection. Keywords: Forced migration; humanitarian crisis; sea level rise; climate change; international protection; climate displacees

Introduction Migration is not a new phenomenon in this world. ‘From the antiquity, people are found to move from one place to another, sometimes in search of better opportunities, when they see some of their needs and desires are not adequately fulfilled in their present location, sometimes just to maintain the status quo when they see Refugee Crises and Third-World Economies, 37–43 Copyright © 2020 Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-190-520201007

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their present situation seems to be a declining one.’ It can be voluntary as well as involuntary. The basic difference between the two kinds is that in the case of voluntary migration, the migrants have the scope to make their own decisions whether or not to move, but in cases of involuntary ones, the migrants do not retain any scope of independent decisions. Involuntary migration can be called forced migration in political terms. Any kind of migration occurs because of certain reasons. Battered against the natural urge for survival, ‘nation’ and ‘border’ are easily marginalised in the minds of the people who have received continuous threats to their existence from persecution and discrimination in their country. Forced migration can be defined as the movements of refugees and internally displaced people as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects. Forced migration is a complex and persistent set of phenomena. In this literature I seek to explain the nexus between climate refugees, their humanitarian crisis and also the economic burden of the host country with special reference to Bangladesh and India. In this study I preferably wish to highlight the case of Bangladesh, which is slowly subsiding in the waters of Bay of Bengal and facing severe consequences due to climate change effects. This has well affected the coastal population of Bangladesh, who have been grouped under the category of what geographers term as climate refugees. In my opinion I would prefer denoting them as environmental refugees as climate is not the sole factor which is causing this crisis but various other factors too like salination due to flooding, crop loss and submergence. Though the overall cause is climatic influence, yet due to the unsafe environment, population of this region are forced to move and seek asylum in other countries, a large part of whom move to India.

Alarming Crisis in Bangladesh Climate change, as projected in the work of Karim, Hussain and Ahmed (1996), may affect human patterns of migration in several ways; firstly, it may lead to warming up of atmosphere which causes late arrival of monsoons leading to decline in agricultural productivity; secondly, rapid weather changes and frequent occurrence of disasters and thirdly, it may also lead to rise in sea level which is slowly gobbling up the landscapes of earth, and this is particularly relevant in case of Bangladesh. Notably, Bangladesh is one of such countries which is most potentially prone to increasing climate change. Its high density of population most of whom are largely dependent on natural resources are facing threats due to its geographic location. Most of the country’s mainland actually comprises flood plains, increased precipitation, rapid glacial retreat into the Himalayas and rise in sea level which will increase the likelihood of flooding in the future. This is particularly the reason why life in Bangladesh is the worst affected due to climate change. In the opinion of Mahtab (1989), Bangladesh is facing threats largely from the Bay of Bengal which is slowly encroaching upon and engulfing landscapes of Bangladesh. The increase in the level of waters in the Bay of Bengal is largely

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caused by increased global warming. This global warming is actually resulting in melting of ice caps as well as glaciers in the Himalayas. Not only these but a chain of factors like tropical cyclones and storm surges, coastal erosion, monsoon wind, evaporation or monsoon rainfall, floods and droughts have been largely responsible for the changing climate pattern of Bangladesh. According to a World Bank report (2000) on climate change in Bangladesh, future changes in the climate caused by global warming will complicate water resource management beyond present climate variability. The sea level along the coast is rising at about 3 mm each year, and the surface temperature is showing a rising trend. Bangladesh is particularly vulnerable to climatic changes in its coastal zones, which cover about 30% of the country. The coastal zone is home to 35 million people – over a quarter of the national population (as per IPCC Report; McCarthy, Canziani, Leary, Dokken, & White, 2001). The country is highly vulnerable to environmental and climatic factors affecting a large number of people. Environmental crisis combined with high population growth, high level of density, overdependence on agriculture, the possibility of people migrating internally in cases of sea level rise, cyclones and floods have been highlighted by the IPCC in its latest report (Parry, Canziani, Palutikof, Van der Linden, & Hanson, 2007). Large population size, constantly widening socioeconomic inequality and degrading natural environments comprise the three most important reasons that force people across various socio-economic groups to relocate permanently or temporarily to other areas within and outside Bangladesh. The main causes of concern for Bangladesh are largely coastal erosion, sea level rise, rising temperatures, changing rainfall patterns and saltwater intrusion. Slow-onset environmental processes, which also include phenomena such as desertification, reduction of soil fertility and coastal erosion, impact existing livelihood patterns and systems of production and may trigger different types of migration. Crucially, not only may the numbers of people affected be larger, but migration may be more permanent owing to the long-lasting impact.

International Migration The movement of people as a result of changes in the environment is not a new phenomenon. People have been moving in response to changes in their environment, often seasonally, for centuries. In the face of the above-mentioned environmental crisis that Bangladesh is already facing now, several researchers have argued that climate change will play a major role in inducing people to migrate from Bangladesh to India in large scale. The future effects of climate change are likely to increase the flow of population from Bangladesh to India. Cross-border migration due to environmental factors and the fact that India shares a large porous border with Bangladesh, the chances of large influx of population from Bangladesh to India cannot be denied. It can be expected that bulk of the people who are under the pressure to move would migrate to India because of pre-existing family ties, economic opportunities and cultural affinity. However, there is a significant gap in studying the vulnerability of the people who are migrating from Bangladesh and

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the vulnerability of people in the receiving regions in India. Till now the issue of migration from Bangladesh has largely been addressed as a political issue only touching tangentially the issue of climate change and impacts on migration to India. The following section attempts to understand and investigate the vulnerability of people and the links with migration. In the literature generally three types of drivers have been identified in inducing migration from one place to another: (1) Factors related to the region or country of origin, including political instability and conflict, lack of economic opportunities and lack of access to resources (‘push’ factors); (2) factors related to the region or country of destination, including the availability of employment and demand for workers, higher wages, political stability or access to resources (‘pull’ factors); (3) intervening factors that facilitate or restrict migration, including ease of transportation, family or social networks, government immigration or emigration policies, economic ties such as trade and investment linkages, or social and cultural exchanges. However, climate change will bring additional forces into play beyond push and pull factors which till now have not been rigorously taken into account while studying migration and its impacts on social vulnerability. It is important to understand the role of climate change– induced effects and their interaction with migration decision of the people. From a policy perspective, there is a need to understand the implications of environmentalinduced displacement for the origin and receiving communities as well as consequences for the displaced population.

Looking for Protection Environmental migrants and displaced persons are entitled to enjoy, equally and without discrimination, the same rights and freedoms under international and national laws, as do other persons in their country. The existing international legal framework does afford a degree of protection for certain segments of environmental migrants. Protection is not limited to merely securing the survival and physical security of those displaced, but encompasses civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights as attributed by international human rights and international humanitarian law. The principles of equality and nondiscrimination are central to all international human rights law and humanitarian principles. Under the broader framework of the international human rights regime, the rights which are particularly relevant for persons displaced by environmental and climatic factors include the right to adequate healthcare; the right to life and dignity; the right to adequate housing; the right to security of tenure; the right not to be arbitrarily evicted; the right to land and the rights in land; the right to property and the peaceful enjoyment of possessions; the right to privacy and respect for the home; the right to security of the person, freedom of movement and the choice of residence; and housing, land and property restitution and/or compensation following displacement. While these rights for all are well established in the key international human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Climate Change

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induced Displacement and Migration in Bangladesh Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, there are certain human rights instruments which can be applied more specifically for the protection of displaced persons, such as the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families (1990), the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961), the Convention on Status of Stateless People (1954), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981), and the ILO Convention on the Rights of Indigenous People (1989). Bangladesh has signed many key international human rights treaties that provide protection for the climate displaced persons, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and the International Convention on the-Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families (1990). This means that the international human rights standards contained in these international instruments apply to all climate-induced displaced people in Bangladesh and that they must be applied without discrimination. Although, the environment has been regarded as an important factor for crossborder migration by many authors, there has been no attempt on the part of both the countries to deal with environmental migrants. This is due to several reasons, first, till now there has been no clear understanding about the relations between climate change and migration. Agreement in this field seems to be limited to the acknowledgement that a relationship exists. The attribution of population displacement to environmental stressors is a delicate task, as many and very diverse scientific disciplines are involved. In case of climate-induced migration from Bangladesh to India there are also no available evidence of how climate change might induce migration from Bangladesh to India and to what extent. The lack of scientific evidence about the impact of climate change on migration and the number of people who will migrate is the greatest challenge so far. Second, according to Braun (2010), India has always seen the issue from a political perspective and considered it as a threat to national security of India. Till now India has not recognized migration as an adaptation strategy to deal with the impacts of climate change for the people of Bangladesh. This recognition may give a new way of looking at the issue of migration from a climate change perspective, rather than simply as an issue of migration. Third, as there are no international obligations on the part of India to protect those people who are being displaced due to climate change because it is not a party to international treaties so far. It is now widely accepted that climate will likely displace a lot of people from Bangladesh, and there are high chances that current flow of migration to India may increase in the future. Under these circumstances what type of institutional structure should be put in place internationally, regionally and

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locally is a pertinent question. At the international level many existing legal and normative frameworks exist in providing effective protection to environmental migrants, and there is also scope for enhancing the frameworks to accommodate the new concerns.

Conclusion Climate change is likely to expose hundreds of millions of people to increasing environmental risks displacing a large number of people and forcing them to migrate. There is an emerging view that these people should be recognized as climate refugees by international laws, and proper institutional arrangements should be made to address their problems. Despite several protections there still remain gaps and challenges. Various studies show that the existing United Nations and international policies for protecting internally displaced persons are insufficient. As per the normative frameworks under the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the respective states have the primary responsibility to help internally displaced persons. However, there are challenges on the ground to ensuring the protection of internally displaced persons. This is because the affected countries are sometimes unable to protect the displaced people, and in some cases even deny the entry of international protection and assistance agencies, referring to the principle of national sovereignty and non-interference. The international migration policies do not adequately support the protection of environmental or climate migrants. As the numbers of climate or environmental migrants are expected to rise in the coming years due to climate change and sea level rise, developed countries may face demands to accept climate displacees from vulnerable and affected countries. Accepting climate displacees already faces opposition in some countries. For example, India has been fencing off the Bangladesh–India border by erecting a 2,500-mile-long barbed wire barrier to prevent the entry of terrorists and illegal immigrants. A gap between disaster research and practice exists. Disaster management strategies are often not adopted on the basis of intensive and in-depth disaster research and analysis. The lack of proper vulnerability assessment to climate change impacts in vulnerable communities is a major drawback. Additionally, there are the challenges of raising necessary funds and implementing adaptation programs for the most vulnerable countries.

References Braun, D. (2010). Bangladesh, India most threatened by climate change, risk study finds. National Geographic, October 20. Accessed on December 21, 2011. Karim, Z., Hussain, S. G., & Ahmed, M. (1996). Assessing impacts of climate variations on foodgrains production in Bangladesh. Journal of Water, Air and Soil Pollution, 92, 53–62.

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Mahtab, F. (1989). Effect of climate change and sea level rise on Bangladesh, (for expert group on climate change and sea level rise). London: Commonwealth Secretariat. McCarthy, J. J., Canziani, O. F., Leary, N. A., Dokken, D. J., & White, K. S. (Eds.). (2001). Climate change 2001: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. InterGovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Work Group II Input to the Third Assessment Report. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Parry, M. L., Canziani, O. F., Palutikof, J. P., Van der Linden, P. J. & Hanson, C. E. (Eds.). (2007). Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. WB. (2000). Bangladesh: Climate change and sustainable development. Report No. 21104-BD. Rural Development Unit, South Asia Region, The World Bank (WB), Dhaka, p. 95.

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Chapter 4

Problems of Refugee and the Climate Change Debesh Bhowmik

Abstract In this chapter, the author has described the nexus between climate change and the evolution of refugee problems. The concept of climate refugee and the controversy between refugee and climate refugee were extensively elaborated. The estimates of climate refugees under various dimensions in different parts of the world were exemplified with statistical figures. The solutions of the refugee problems, funding, directions of estimates and social responsibilities towards refugees are described in the activities of international institutions like UNHCR, CCDO, UNFCCC, IPCC, the Red Cross and many others. The chapter also highlights some important policy issues such as charters, funds, response strategy to disaster and disaster recovery plans, support capacity building and climate change adaptation and so on and also cited policies taken by the G20 summit to care for refugees. Besides, the recommendations of COP23 were also included. In conclusion, ‘no climate change, no climate refugees’ slogan is incorporated with suggestions of taking care of sizable percentage shares of refugees by the rich nations. Keywords: Refugee; climate refugee; climate change; migration; displacement; international institutions

Introduction According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), climate change refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. On the other hand, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines climate change as ‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to Refugee Crises and Third-World Economies, 45–72 Copyright © 2020 Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-190-520201008

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natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods’. The IPCC’s First Assessment Report (FAR) in 1990 on simple energy balance/upwelling diffusion ocean models estimated changes in global air temperatures. Their featured business-as-usual (BAU) scenario assumed rapid growth of atmospheric CO2, reaching 418 ppm CO2 in 2016, compared to 404 ppm in observations. The FAR gave a best estimate of climate sensitivity as 2.5°C warming for doubled CO2, with a range of 1.5–4.5°C. These estimates are applied to the BAU scenario during 1970–2016 by around 17% in their BAU scenario, showing 1°C warming over that period vs 0.85°C. IPCC (2013) estimated global surface air temperatures in CMIP5 models have warmed about 16% faster than observations since 1970. About 40% of this difference is due to air temperatures over the ocean warming faster than sea surface temperatures in the model. The Paris Agreement goal of IPCC set on keeping global warming below 1.5°C (2.7°F). The international target of 2°C with a rise of 1.2°C from 2012 rather than the 2°C rise was projected by the General Circulation Models (GCMs, commonly known as Global Climate Models). The pattern and projection of world temperature rise during 1950–2100 is plotted in Fig. 4.1. Global average sea level has risen eight inches since 1880. Several locations along the East Coast and Gulf of Mexico have experienced more than 8 in. of local sea level rise in only the past 50 years. However, the annual rate of rise over the past 20 years has been 0.13 in. (3.2 mm) a year, roughly twice the average speed of the preceding 80 years. This is clearly visible in Fig. 4.2. Projections suggest that the world’s glaciers will disappear within next 100 years. As like the Polar ice cap and huge Antarctic ice shelf, Greenland may be green again and snow will have become a rare phenomenon at what are now the world’s most popular ski resorts. Hurricanes and typhoons will increase in power, and flooding will become more common. Despite downpours in some places, droughts and prolonged heat waves will become common. Increasingly, however, hot, dry places will get hotter and drier, and places that were once temperate and had regular

Fig. 4.1.

Global Average Surface Temperature Change. Source: IPCC (2013).

Problems of Refugee and the Climate Change 7

Sea Level Change (feet)

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6.6 ft

Proxy Records Tide Gauge Data Satellite Data

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4 ft

3 2 1 ft 0.66 ft

1 0 –1 1800

Fig. 4.2.

1850

1900

1950 Year

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Past and Projected Changes in Global Sea Level. Source: IPCC (2013).

rainfall will become much hotter and much drier. Farmers in temperate zones are finding drier conditions difficult for crops such as corn and wheat, and once prime growing zones are now threatened. Some areas may see complete ecological change. In California and on the East Coast, for example, climate change impacts and warming will soon fundamentally change the forests. In Europe, hundreds of plants species will disappear and hundreds more will move thousands of miles. The productivity of rice, the staple food of more than one-third of the world’s population, declines 10% with every 1°C increase in temperature. We can observe that agriculture and the deforestation it causes were responsible for one-fifth (21%) of all CO2 emissions in the decade from 2000 to 2010 (approximately 44 billion tonnes). Production of food grains will reduce 25% by 2050. Rising temperatures favour agricultural pests, diseases and disease vectors. Allergies, asthma and infectious disease outbreaks will become more common due to increased growth of pollen-producing ragweed, higher levels of air pollution and the spread of conditions favorable to pathogens and mosquitoes. Pest populations are on the rise, and illnesses once found only in limited, tropical areas are now becoming endemic in much wider zones. Rising temperature and rising CO2 levels are making the world’s oceans more acidic (lowering their pH). More acidic seawater damages the ability of sea creatures to make shells. Shelled species, tiny and large, are the base of the ocean food pyramid, and their loss threatens the food producing potential of the oceans. Certain scenarios projected in the IPCC AR4 report would witness massive

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migration as low-lying countries were flooded. Disruptions to global trade, transport, energy supplies and labour markets, banking and finance, investment and insurance would all wreak havoc on the stability of both developed and developing nations. Markets would endure increased volatility, and institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies would experience considerable difficulty. Developing countries, some of which are already embroiled in military conflict, may be drawn into larger and more protracted disputes over water, energy supplies or food, all of which may disrupt economic growth at a time when developing countries are beset by more egregious manifestations of climate change. It is widely accepted that the detrimental effects of climate change will be visited largely on the countries least equipped to adapt, socially or economically. The threat to humanity for climate change is the crisis of the refugee. Climate change is poised to become the largest driver of human migration in the world. Even if we hold the line at a global temperature rise of 1.5°C, the United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM) projects 30 to 60 million people will still be living in very strong heat stress by the end of the twenty-first century. If it is 2°C, that number passes 100 million. But climate change is a threat multiplier, meaning the heat–migration nexus is just one manifestation that’s causing mass displacement. Beyond global temperature rise and acute heat waves and civil war, migration is being accelerated by drought and diminished access to clean water, coastal erosion, wildfires, melting icecaps, forest dieback, disappearing food and natural resources and violent, almost Biblical weather, often at the wrong time of year. Climate change played a part in the buildup to the Syrian War, with successive droughts causing 1.5 million people to migrate to the country’s cities between 2006 and 2011. Many of these people then had no reliable access to food, water or jobs. Whatever may be the concept of climate refugee/environmental refugee, the impacts of climate change, such as temperature rises, glacial melt, drought and sea level rise may ultimately force people away from their homes.

The Concept of Climate Refugee The term refugee is defined very precisely in international law. In US law, for example, refugees are defined as individuals persecuted because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular group or political opinion. The definition of a refugee in the Refugee Convention is a person who ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’ (1951 Refugee Convention, Article 1(A) (2)).

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The UNICEF defines a refugee as ‘someone who has been forced to leave their country because they are unable to live in their home or they fear they will be harmed. This can be due to a number of reasons, including fighting or natural disasters, like earthquakes and floods’. The UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees describes a refugee as someone who:

• •

is outside his/her country of nationality or habitual residence;

•

and is unable or unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution.

has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion;

In Africa, the refugee definition has been broadened to encompass persons compelled to leave their country not only as a result of persecution, but also ‘owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality’. (Art. 1(2) Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969) In Latin America, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees adds the criterion ‘massive violation of human rights’. (Section III(3) Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama) Sometimes a stateless person is considered as stateless refugee. Additionally, stateless refugees are defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention as persons ‘who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’. Stateless refugees are protected under the 1951 Refugee Convention. In comparing refugee with migrants, we can recall the definition of the Red Cross which stated ‘Migrants are persons who leave or flee their habitual residence to go to new places – usually abroad – to seek opportunities or safer and better prospects. Migration can be voluntary or involuntary, but most of the time a combination of choices and constraints are involved. Thus, this policy includes, among others, labour migrants, stateless migrants, and migrants deemed irregular by public authorities. It also concerns refugees and asylum seekers, notwithstanding the fact that they constitute a special category under international law’. (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2009) The term ‘ecological refugee’ first appeared in the 1970s. Besides other terms also developed to describe this population of people include ‘environmental migrants’, ‘environmentally displaced persons’, ‘climate refugees’, ‘climate change refugees’, ‘environmental refugees’. The term ‘environmental refugee’ was first coined by Essam El-Hinnawi in a 1985 United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) report. He defined environmental refugees as: ‘…those people

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who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life’. Norman Myers (1995) described environmental refugees as: ‘persons who no longer gain a secure livelihood in their traditional homelands because of environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages and climate change, also natural disasters as cyclones, storm surges and floods’. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has moved towards a definition of ‘environmentally displaced persons’ as those: ‘who are displaced from or who feel obliged to leave their usual place of residence, because their lives, livelihoods and welfare have been placed at serious risk as a result of adverse environmental, ecological or climatic processes and events’.

Controversy among Refugee and Climate Refugee The term remains controversial among experts. Some do not want the label ‘refugee’ – with its link to persecution and specific meaning in international policy and law and rights for the individuals – to be attached to a group with very diverse reasons to migrate and dynamics of migration (Toussaint, 2016). Some prefer to classify those affected under the category ‘forced displacement’ or use more narrowly descriptive terms such as ‘climate-induced migration’, ‘forced migration’ or ‘forced displacement due to climate change’. The use of such terms shifts the focus away from the people and their need to migrate or flee, and toward the larger phenomenon where migrants are a commodity. Historically, the term ‘environmental refugee’ was used, avoiding the term ‘climate’ in view of those who continue to deny climate change, especially in the US. The term ‘environmental refugee’ is often credited to Essam El-Hinnawi’s UNEP paper (1985). First, the key aspect of the accepted refugee definition, set out in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, is of a person with a well-founded fear of persecution. ‘Persecution’ means violations of human rights that are sufficiently serious, thus there are difficulties in characterizing ‘climate change’ as ‘persecution’. Storms, earthquakes and floods may be harmful, but they do not constitute ‘persecution’. Secondly, the refugee definition only applies to people who have already crossed an international border, but many of those displaced by climate change are ‘internally displaced people’. Though the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the lead agency for internally displaced people, it deals only with those forced to move as a result of a conflict. According to the UNHCR, these persons forced to move because of climate change may need some form of international protection; it would be wrong to identify them as ‘refugees’ or to equate their status and needs with those of refugees. Thus it states that the phrase ‘climate refugee’ is a misnomer. In 1951, the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees set out the rights and responsibilities of the individual and the state but did not

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explicitly express that climate refugees might be also considered as refugees. However, some argue that climate refugee is part of a particular social group which is explicitly included in a definition of refugees. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the Geneva Convention is not adequate and progressive enough to adapt to changing environmental conditions and therefore is suggested an extension of the Convention. The second principal framework is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where among others are defined protection norms including freedom of movement. Nevertheless, it is not wise leaving the protection of climate refugees only on the Declaration since climate change might affect already weak states’ capabilities that will not be able to protect their civilians. In December 2010 an Agreement on Long-term Cooperative Action under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was created at ´ where the understanding and the effort to address the conference in Cancun climate change’s damage and loss including the climate-induced migration was expressed. The Office of the UNHCR has responded to the international community’s expectations repeatedly. Recently, in 2010, international cooperation and protection gaps were addressed in the cross-border movement agenda of the international law during a dialogue of the High Commissioner on Protection Challenges. During the 60th anniversary of the Refugee Convention and the 50th anniversary of the Statelessness Convention in a first expert meeting in Bellagio the UNHCR focused on protection and normative gaps regarding the crossborder movement. The outcome emphasized the need of coordination and unification of the approaches to this issue of the whole international community so that it is possible to create an adaptation strategy and face this challenge effectively. A few months later, these efforts led to a debate in Oslo during the Nansen Conference on Climate Change, the so-called Nansen Principles addressing the protection of displaced people in the context of climate change. Despite the anniversary, the climate-related displacement was not adopted in the UNHCR Ministerial Communiqu´e in December 2011. According to UNHCR, an international or regional instrument should be created with a soft law character which is more appropriate to the issue. Jacobson’s estimate of 10 million existing ‘environmental refugees’ – based on an assessment of the number of people displaced by the drought(s) in the African Sahel in the 1980s – was, in turn, important for lending legitimacy to the notion, allowing the media, charities and even other academics to refer to ‘environmental refugees’ as an existing rather than hypothetical category (Islam, 1992; Otunnu, 1992). In addition, Jacobson’s recognition of the potential role of climate change in human displacement was a harbinger to what would become the dominant concern in writing and thinking on ‘environmental refugees’ during the first decade of the twenty-first century. For Myers, like other authors from the 1990s, such large numbers of ‘environmental refugees’ are hypothesized to result from the combined impacts of population growth and climate change. Migration is the outcome of diminished agricultural production, reduced water availability and damage to physical

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infrastructure. Myers’ sizeable predictions of ‘environmental refugees’ are bolstered by his view that population growth, which is not only responsible for degrading the environment but also for leaving more people residing in dry lands and low-lying areas, renders people vulnerable to climate change and more sensitive to pressure on resources (Myers & Kent, 1995). Bilsborrow (1992) suggests that the term ‘environmental refugee’ should not be scrapped entirely, but rather that it be used discerningly to describe only those migrants fleeing rapid and/or drastic changes in the physical environment. Bilsborrow (1992) and McGregor (1994) emphasize the complexity of the interaction between environmental and social systems, and thus question the assumption of a direct causal link between environmental change and migration. While it should be noted that the characterization of the ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximilist’ perspective shaped how the literature on environmental change and human migration would evolve for the next 15 years. From the literature on environmental refugees one can identify three major critiques of the ‘maximilist’ position. The first is that it problematically labels all migrants as ‘refugees’, when in fact there are important distinctions. The second is that it wrongly assumes that the natural environment is easily distinguishable from the social, political and economic context in which it coexists; and the third is that empirical evidence on migration in response to environmental stress shows it to be dominated by short distance, temporary and cyclical movements. Environmentally induced migration is not, as the maximilists suggest, long distance and permanent. Islam (1992) argues that there is a difference between individuals migrating in search of a better life and migrants having to leave an area for fear of dying as a result of environmental destruction. The former he describes as ‘migrants’ while the latter, he claims, are effectively conceived of as ‘refugees’. Similarly, Ramlogan (1996), another ‘maximilist’ argues that who is an ‘environmental refugee’ lies in the decision making process of the migrant. It is possible to distinguish whether that migrant is ‘forced’ or ‘voluntary’ and thus whether the title ‘environmental refugee’ is appropriate. In addition, Otunnu (1992) blames the conditions generating ‘environmental refugees’, in sub-Saharan Africa on ‘the nature of the state, the political economy of sub-Saharan Africa, and the international economic system’. Similarly, Islam (1992) places ‘environmental refugees’ on the continuum of economic refugees and then blames the impending environmental refugee crisis, in Bangladesh, on the laws of peripheral capitalism and the nature of the aid industry. Black (2001) made the objection that the term ‘environmental refugee’ does not lie with the notion of a link between environmental change/stress and human mobility, but rather with how the environmental politics of the ‘environmental refugee’ has the potential to undermine the protections currently afforded to refugees (as defined in the 1951 Convention) as well to as buttress growing antiimmigration sentiment. Black fears that the evocation of large numbers of ‘environmental refugees’ could allow states to shirk on their Convention-defined responsibilities to asylum seekers. The problem, he argues, is that the lack of

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reference to ‘environment’ in the 1951 Convention means that receiving states could, citing the huge numbers of ‘environmental refugees’ forecast to exist, reasonably claim that at least some of the asylum claimants they receive are fleeing environmental catastrophe, not political persecutions since signatory states to the 1951 Convention have no obligation to address issues of environmentally motivated migration. Finally, despite it forming a fundamental feature of ‘minimalist’ critiques, ‘maximilist’ scholars openly acknowledge that migrations made in response to environmental change may well occur over short distances. In this regard, Ramlogan (1996) acknowledges that environmental change will generate both internal and international migrants, while Myers (1993) is explicit about the complications of defining ‘migration’ in terms of geography. It seems that the criticisms leveled at the ‘maximilist’ position are misplaced. Their account of environmental refugees has not described them as all moving long distances and being permanent migrants, neither has it homogenized all migrants as refugees, but it has acknowledged the porous boundaries between the conceptual constructions of society, politics, economics and environment. There appears, therefore, to be a problematization of the relationship between environmental change and human migration in different camps. Since there appears to be a highly polarized debate over a subject matter about which there is a large amount of agreement. Disagreement pertains to the use of the term ‘environmental refugee’ and not to the link between environmental change and human migration. The fact is that the ‘debate on environmental refugees’ is really a debate about how a relationship is represented, and less about the nature of the relationship itself. The second sense in which the ‘maximilist’ literature casts ‘environmental refugees’ as a problem pertains to their representation as a social problem. This is achieved in two ways. The first focuses on the vulnerability of migrants, presenting ‘environmental refugees’ as a humanitarian problem, while the second focuses on security and stability, casting environmental refugees as problematic in receiving areas. Notable in this second sense of environmental-refugees-as-aproblem is the manner in which it draws on the paradoxical nature of the ‘refugee’ as, at one and the same time: hapless victim and resourceful agent. The former is being acutely vulnerable and incapable of responding to changes in the social context or physical environment, while the latter is capable of destabilizing entire nation states. We therefore have the ‘environmental refugee’ cast as both an environmental and a social problem, as well as being both the result of a problem and a problem in and of itself. The second argument in favour of environmental protection is to present the ‘environmental refugee problem’ as occurring on a scale which would make it impossible to address in any palliative fashion. Proponents of the ‘environmental refugee’ focus on the impossibility of absorbing migrants or on the great suffering such migrants would undergo during their movement. Since one cannot safely absorb the migrants or mitigate their suffering, policy prescriptions aimed at addressing the cause of the problem – environmental degradation – are presented as the only rational action. Stop them needing to migrate.

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It appears that the notion of an environmental refugee has been deployed as a means to garner support for environmental protection for some time. Although this analysis is revealing, it does not present an explanation as to why there has been such a forceful dismissal of the term ‘environmental refugee’. One might well ask ‘What’s wrong with trying to protect the environment?’ To answer this question, we turn to a brief exploration of the changing political context around issues of asylum and migration, in which the portrayal of asylum seekers and migrants as problems has been an issue of long-standing concern.

Estimates of Climate Refugees or Refugees Agencies including the IDMC, the Red Cross/Red Crescent and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) collect annual data on refugees regularly. The following are the estimates and reports of the international institutions and organizations or agents about the refugee or climate refugee. Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) reported that since 2008, an average of 21.7 million people have been displaced each year by extreme weather-related disasters – the equivalent of 41 people every minute. This does not include the people forced to flee their homes as a consequence of slow-onset environmental degradation, such as droughts. About 23 years ago, the UNEP reported that as many as 50 million people could become environmental refugees by 2050 if the world did not act to support sustainable development. UNICEF estimates that 500 million children live in flood-prone areas, 160 million children are exposed to severe drought and 115 million children are exposed to tropical cyclones. The WHO estimates that every year, environmental risks take the lives of 1.7 million children under five years of age, representing the biggest global threat to children’s lives at the moment. At the same time, there are 50 million children in migration worldwide. One in every 200 children is a refugee. 20 million people were facing the threat of famine in Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia and Yemen early this year due to severe droughts and massive food shortages, combined with conflict and extreme poverty. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees stated that 36 million people were displaced by natural disasters in 2009, and about 20 million of those were forced to move due to climate change–related issues. According to other estimates, there could be as many as 150 million by 2050. In 2015, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030) stated that more than 1.5 billion people were affected by disasters worldwide from 2005 to 2015. In addition, around 144 million people were displaced by disasters in between 2008 and 2014, and many of them were exacerbated by climate change with increasing frequency and intensity. Ten percent of the global human population presently live within 10 m of sea level, including many of the world’s largest urban centres, and is thereby potentially exposed to new risks associated with rising sea levels. In Table 4.1, some estimates of refugee or displaced persons in various years from international institutions are given.

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Table 4.1. Estimates of Displaced Persons. Author/Source

Estimated Number to Be Displaced with Climate Change as Key Driver

Christian aid Myers

1 billion displaced persons 200 billion additional environmental refugees UNU-EHS 50 million additional environmental refugees Number of people currently displaced worldwide

Time Period

By 2050 By 2010 2010

Agency

Estimates

Year

Christian aid UNHCR

165 million displaced persons 20.8 million refugees and displaced persons of concern

2007 2005

Source: McLeman (2008).

In 2015, the number of global international migrants, those living for one year or longer outside their country of birth, was 3.3% of the world population, or around 244 million individuals (United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016). In 2012, an estimated 32.4 million people were displaced by natural disasters – 98% of which were climate- and weather-related events. Habitation in many parts of the world is becoming increasingly challenging. By 2050 between 200 and 250 million people will be displaced by climate change – approximately a fivefold increase over current numbers of documented refugees and internally displaced people. Other estimates vary from between 25 million to 1 billion climate migrants by 2050. IPCC (2007) predicted that sea levels will rise worldwide by 0.18–0.59 m by the end of this century. Sea level rise could cause greater erosion and flooding in coastal and delta regions. Warner, Ehrhart, de Sherbinin, and Adamo (2009) identified in their report In Search of Shelter that 1 m rise in the sea level could affect nearly 24 million people in the densely populated Ganges, Mekong and Nile river deltas, and significantly reduce the production of life sustenance in those areas. Table 4.2 provides a summary of estimates and forecasts of peoples displaced by climate change. Some researchers suspect that these figures lack any empirical basis and are put forward with the sole purpose of raising awareness and gaining media attention around the issue of climate change or climate refugees. However, the figures are important, as they are often requested by policy makers in order to assess the importance of the phenomenon and develop policy responses (Gemenne, 2011).

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Table 4.2. Estimates and Forecasts of the Number of People Displaced by Climate Changes. Source

Estimates at the Time of Publication of the Report

Predictions by 2010

UNEP (Tolba, 1989; Milan, 2004) Jacobson (1988) Myers (1993, 2002)

30 million

50 million

Myers and Kent (1995) Red Cross (2001)

25 million

50 million

150, then 200 million 212 million

More than people displaced by war 10 million per year

50 million

200 million

UNU-EHS (Adam, 2005; Renaud et al., 2007) Stern (2007) Christian Aid (2007) Biermann and Boas (2010)

10 million 25 million

25 million

Predictions by 2050

150–200 million 300 million 200 million

Source: Gemenne (2011).

Between 1990 and 2010, climate refugees increased from 41.4 million (1990–1995) to 41.5 million (2005–2010) (Abel & Sander, 2014). Looking at crossborder migration and refugee flows over a longer period (1965–2015), the total number of cross-border movements has only slightly increased in proportional relation to overall population growth, from 2.5% in 1965 to 3.3% in 2015 (Angenendt & Koch, 2017). Refugee numbers are fairly consistent at 20.6 million in 1992 and 21.3 million in 2015. Recent estimates suggest that by 2050, 1 in every 45 people in the world (Brown, 2008) and one in every seven people in Bangladesh will be displaced by climate change (CDMP II, 2014). In Table 4.3, the index of vulnerability to climate change and the number of climate-related displacement in 2016 in various regional countries were arranged. The Philippines, India and Indonesia scored higher and showed huge displacement persons in 2016. The world’s largest refugee camp in Kenya, Dadaab, with its over 10,000 climate refugees coming every week and seeking for some help, is overcrowded. ‘The current number of registered refugees, 353,921, is four times its capacity’, the

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Table 4.3. Countries with High Internal Sudden-onset Disaster Displacement Numbers for 2016 and Their Climate Change Vulnerability and Readiness Score. Country

Region

Vulnerability to Climate Changea

2016 Climate-related Displacement

Philippines India Indonesia Myanmar Ethiopia Democratic Republic of Congo Nigeria Yemen Colombia Afghanistan

South-East Asia South Asia South Asia South-East Asia East Africa Central Africa

50.8 46.4 50.9 37.6 40 32.5

5,930,000 2,400,000 1,246,000 509,000 347,000 130,000

West Africa Middle East South America Central Asia

40.1 32.2 56.2 32.4

78,000 45,000 31,000 7,400

Source: Data from IDMC Database, 2017; ND-GAIN, 2017; Chen et al., 2015. a

The ND-GAIN Index, which ranges from 0 to 100, measures a country’s vulnerability to climate change in combination with its readiness to improve resilience. The lower the number, the more vulnerable the country. IDMC, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre; ND-GAIN Index, Norte-Dam-Global Adaptation Index.

UN’s humanitarian affairs agency said. The drought has hit the poorest people living in this region, in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs says that 10 million people in the Horn of Africa are affected by the failed rains, and more than half of the refugees are children. Bangladesh is staying less than 5 m above the mean sea level. It is predicted that Bangladesh will lose 17% of its land by 2050 due to flooding caused by climate change, and this will trigger around 20 million climate refugees. Addressing climate refugees and climate migration, it is projected that over the next 40 years (from 2011 to 2050) around 16 to 26 million people are likely to migrate long-term from areas affected by inland flooding, storm surges and riverbank erosion in Bangladesh. According to some estimation, there is about a 68% probability of the sea level change between 1.1 and 2.7 mm/year. Some researchers state that Tuvalu will be practically inhabitable by 2050. In May 2016, five islands were lost due to sea level rise in the Solomon Islands. Kiribati purchased 20 sq. km of land in Fiji in 2014, and the Maldives are also planning to purchase land in another country.

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The UN Paris Agreement declared that there are an estimated 65 million refugees worldwide, and the impacts of a changing climate will only increase that number. This is driven by rising sea levels, proliferation of extreme weather events, increasing pressure on food and water resources and ultimately, reshaping the landscape of human habitable zones. Approximately 180–500 million people are at risk for continuous flooding and rising sea levels due to climate change. New Zealand is also one of 26 countries that take part in the UNHCR resettlement programme, taking 750 refugees a year. Over the years more than 33,000 refugees have been resettled in New Zealand. In 2015 the Government announced 750 refugees from Syria would also be accepted, with 600 as a special intake above the quota, and 150 within the quota. Maldives, an island nation in the Indian Ocean, is perhaps the country most threatened by sea level rise. Maldives rises only 2.4 metres (8 ft) above sea level at its highest point. Sea level rise will likely create climate refugees because of changes in both economy and habitat. Venice, Italy, is also threatened by sea level rise. In 1900, the city’s main piazza was underwater seven times. In 1996, it flooded 99 times. Many other coastal cities throughout the world are located in low-lying areas vulnerable to sea level rise: Manhattan, London, Shanghai, Hamburg, Bangkok, Jakarta, Mumbai, Manila, and Buenos Aires. As per ADB, roughly 37 million people from India, 22 million from China and 21 million from Indonesia will be at risk from sea levels rising by 2050. It was found that between 2008 and 2016, an average of 21.8 million people per year were newly internally displaced by sudden-onset extreme weather disasters. Such instances include the destruction wrought by Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu in 2015, and Cyclone Winston, which displaced more than 55,000 people in Fiji in 2016. Fiji, which is hosting this year’s climate summit in Bonn, lost around a fifth of its GDP as a result of the storm. The Gobi Desert in China expands more than 3,600 square kilometres (1,390 square miles) every year. Farmers and merchants in the area surrounding the Gobi migrate to China’s crowded urban areas as grasslands are overtaken by desert. Morocco, Tunisia and Libya each lose more than 1,000 square kilometres (386 square miles) of productive land every year to desertification. Thousands of Somalis and Ethiopians, threatened by starvation and poverty, have already fled to refugee camps in Kenya. Camps that were designed to provide temporary shelter for 90,000 people are now home to twice that number. The report highlights the situation in the Middle East and Africa, including the worst drought to hit Syria in 900 years. It caused farmers to lose their livestock and livelihoods, which were desperately needed in the context of the war. The report notes that 1 million Syrians were already on the move because of the drought before a single gunshot was fired in the conflict. According to the specialists, in 2015, relocations were particularly triggered by floods (56%) or storms (43%), or associated with conflict and disasters (Africa, Middle East) or natural disasters (India). However, droughts and other gradual or recurring slow environmental disasters were not integrated in the databases, since the data are too anecdotal to be aggregated.

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Fig. 4.3. Weather-related and Geophysical Displaced Persons. Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and Norwegian Refugee Council.

In Fig. 4.3, weather-related and geophysical-related displaced persons have been shown by histogram during 2008–2015 which showed that a total 172.3 million or 85% are weather related and 31.1 million or 15% are geophysical displaced persons as reported by IDMC and the Norwegian Refugee Council. It is observed that weather-related displaced persons are cyclical in nature. According to estimates of the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 17.5 million people were displaced by weather-related disasters in 2014. At an average, 22.5 million people have been displaced each year as a result of climate- or weather-related disasters in the last seven years – that is equivalent to 62,000 people every day. When it comes to historical trends, the IDMC says that reviewing data from 1970 to 2014 suggests that ‘the likelihood of being displaced by a disaster today is 60% higher than it was four decades ago’ (IDMC, 2015, p. 8). Due to its size of population Asia is the continent most affected by various forms of disaster. The IDMC estimated that in 2014, ‘16.7 million people were forced to flee their homes, accounting for 87% of the global total. The region was also disproportionately affected relative to its population size’ (2015, p. 30; see also IPCC, 2014a, p. 1346). China, India and the Philippines were the worst affected countries worldwide in 2014. They not only had to cope with the highest number of displaced people in 2014 and during the period between 2008 and 2014 but also suffered from 15 of the 20 largest events in 2014. Zorzeta Bakaki (2016) contributes to the literature on the environment and conflict, transnational diffusion, and migration. Empirically, the corresponding arguments are analyzed with time-series cross-section data from

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1960 to 2000. He focuses on how climate change variables, i.e. temperature and precipitation patterns, affect emigration levels for capturing the conditions that force people to leave their country. The results do indeed suggest that high levels of temperature make people to emigrate from their countries, which is likely to have crucial implications globally – and not only within specific countries. Data on migrants are taken from the World Bank whose estimates are derived from over 1,100 national individual census and population register records for more than 230 destination countries and territories over the last five decades (i.e. 1960–2000). He took explanatory variables as Temperature, Precipitation, Democracy, Unemployment, GDP per Capita, Population and emigrants as dependent variable. The results strongly and robustly suggest that if temperature continues to rise at the current rate, migration is not only to occur at the domestic level, but across countries. The findings further highlight a significant difference between the short- and long-term effects of temperature on emigration. Given the consequences of migration at larger scales, many countries will face problems, and as my results suggest indirectly due to climate change as well. With regards to the indicator of precipitation, the results indicate statistically significant impact on transnational migration only when not applying country and year fixed effects. The indicator for unemployment is positive and statistically significant when applying country and year fixed effects while there is statistically significant relationship on emigration without the country and year fixed effects. The predictors for GDP per capita and population do not have a significant impact emigration.

Role of International Institutions on Climate Refugees United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees It was created in 1950, during the aftermath of World War II. Its headquarters are in Geneva, Switzerland, and it is a member of the United Nations Development Group. The UNHCR has won two Nobel Peace Prizes, once in 1954 and again in 1981. Soon after the signing of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, it became clear that refugees were not solely restricted to Europe. In 1956, UNHCR was involved in coordinating the response to the uprising in Hungary. Just a year later, UNHCR was tasked with dealing with Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, while also responding to Algerian refugees who had fled to Morocco and Tunisia in the wake of Algeria’s war for independence. The responses marked the beginning of a wider, global mandate in refugee protection and humanitarian assistance. In 1967, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees was ratified to remove the geographical and temporal restrictions of UNHCR under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. In the 1970s, UNHCR refugee operations continued to spread around the globe, with the mass exodus of East Pakistanis to India shortly before the birth of Bangladesh. Adding to the woes in Asia was the Vietnam War, with millions fleeing the war-torn country.

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The 1980s saw new challenges for UNHCR in Asia, Central America or Africa, these conflicts, fueled by superpower rivalry and aggravated by socioeconomic problems within the concerned countries, durable solutions continued to prove a massive challenge for the UNHCR. As a result, the UNHCR became more heavily involved with assistance programs within refugee camps, often located in hostile environments. UNHCR presently has major missions in Lebanon, South Sudan, Chad/Darfur, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Afghanistan as well as Kenya to assist and provide services to internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees in camps and in urban settings. Since 2009, the UNHCR acknowledged a large presence of migration and refugees in the Caribbean, where the refugee crisis remained largely unreported. Many refugees in search for asylum in the US are unable to reach their destination and end up in the Caribbean. However, migrant laws in most of these nations lacked any protections for asylum seekers, even the ability to be recognized as a refugee or asylum seeker itself. The UNHCR organized talks with these nations in Costa Rica in 2009, in an effort to bring forward the lack of protections for refugees, who are often labeled as ‘illegal’ and prosecuted as unauthorized migrants. As UNHCR is a program governed by the UN General Assembly, and the UN Economic and Social Council, it cooperates with many other programs and agencies under the United Nations in order to effectively protect the rights of refugees. On 28 September 2016, the UNHCR partnered with the UN Food and Agricultural Organization in Tehran for the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees. FAO highlighted the contributions to be made by FAO towards SSAR objectives on livelihood-related activities including livestock and fishery initiatives as well as nutritional projects in Iranian schools. FAO and UNHCR are committed towards increasing refugees’ access to livelihood opportunities and reducing dependency on humanitarian aid. Of late, a joint livelihood strategy for South Sudan was launched looking to address this issue with a clearly defined action plan. The strategy targets both refugees (70%) and local communities (30%) in refugee-hosting areas across the country. In Table 4.4, following are the Persons of Concern include refugees and asylum seekers, people in refugee-like conditions, IDPs, stateless persons and ‘others of concern to the UNHCR’ as on June 2015.

Climate Change Displacement Organization Hodgkinson, Burton, Young, and Anderson (2010) proposed to set up a Climate Change Displacement Organization (CCDO) consisting of four core bodies: Assembly, a Council, a Climate Change Displacement Fund, and a Climate Change Displacement Environment and Science Organization. Climate Change Displacement Implementation Groups would also be formed to facilitate resettlement. The Convention framework contemplates that states providing displacement assistance funding and states receiving such funding would be parties to the

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Debesh Bhowmik Table 4.4. Refugee as on June 2015. Regions

Middle East and North Africa Asia and Pacific bureau East and Horn of Africa Americas Europe Central Africa – Great Lakes Western Africa Southern Africa

Number of Refugee

16,796,426 9,694,535 8,451,275 7,726,594 7,585,581 3,580,181 2,754,893 1,370,217

Source: UNHCR.

Convention. The Convention limits the provision of assistance to developing state parties. A developing state party to the convention would make a request to the CCDO for internal or international resettlement assistance (in the case of a host state, referencing a relevant home state request, if any). That state party would, at the time of making a request for assistance, also request en masse designation of the status of CCDPs. The Convention makes mandatory financial contributions to the Climate Change Displacement Fund, and such contributions are made on the basis that states and state parties to the Convention have common but differentiated responsibilities. In determining the hard issue of the level of specific state party contributions to the Fund, the CCDESO would advise the Fund with regard to those contributions, with reference to emissions levels (whether historical or current, per capita, etc.), the capacity of states to pay, and other matters. The Fund would then propose the level of state parties’ biannual contributions to the Council for ratification by the Assembly. Climate change–induced displacement is also a matter of global responsibility, regardless of whether such displacement crosses a national border. The international community should therefore be obliged to cooperate in the provision of protection and assistance to internally displaced CCDPs. Upon request by the home State and in accordance with the Convention, other parties to the Convention would be required to provide assistance in cases of internal displacement.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change The UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March 1994. Parties to the UNFCCC should aim to contribute to developments of the ‘global compacts’ under the Office of the UNHCR and the IOM in order to ensure the scale of expected challenges is adequately taken into account.

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Neither the UNFCCC process nor the Copenhagen Accord contemplate or address the issue of displacement. In our view, the UNFCCC – notwithstanding its focus on adaptation – has limitations as a framework for dealing with climate change displacement. Finally, although the UNFCCC has an initiative to help states with adaptation to climate change, that program does not specifically deal with the situation of climate change refugees. Like the refugee regime, the UNFCCC was not designed for, and to date has not adequately dealt with, the problem of climate change refugees. In terms of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change the agreement provides that developed countries shall provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology and capacity building to support the implementation of adaptation action in developing countries … [and] especially in those that are particularly vulnerable … least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa’ (UNFCCC, 2009, Article 3). Developed countries commit USD 30 billion for the first Kyoto ‘commitment period’ from 2010 to 2012 for adaptation and mitigation measures, and commit to a goal of ‘mobilizing jointly USD 100 million dollars a year by 2020’ (UNFCCC, 2009, Article 8). Notwithstanding the agreement’s focus on climate change adaptation, no specific provisions deal with the issue of climate change displacement. Such displacement is a form of adaptation that creates particular vulnerabilities requiring protection as well as assistance through international cooperation. And migration as a result of displacement is best understood as a form of adaptation to climate change. Paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Adaptation Framework (decision 1/CP.16) constitutes the first mention of human mobility under the UNFCCC. It reads as follows: Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels (Serdeczny, 2017). It can be expected that the main work on human mobility in the context of climate change under the UNFCCC will be conducted by the socalled task force on displacement. This task force is the result of negotiations on the Paris Agreement in 2015. In COP21, 2015, Adoption of the Paris Agreement – task force on displacement (decision 1/CP.21) develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change. Both the academic and humanitarian actors in the field of human mobility continue to play an important role in recommending policies on human mobility under the UNFCCC. Current members of the task force on displacement, for example, include representatives from the UNHCR, the UNDP, the IOM, the International Labour Organization, the Platform on Disaster Displacement, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and a yet-to-be-determined member of the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility.

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Although the task force will be guided by the Executive Committee of the WIM, it can be expected that positions and arguments brought forward by these actors will shape much of the policies that will be recommended. UNO assured, ‘We acknowledge a shared responsibility to manage large movements of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, compassionate and people-centred manner’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2016). During the latest UN Climate Change Conference in Bonn by a group of experts on human migration key findings about the link between climate change and migration were presented. At the event ‘Human Mobility and the Paris Agreement: What’s Next?’, speakers from the University of Li`ege, the IOM, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the UN University highlighted the importance of reliable data, able to measure climate migration. With adaptation to climate change recognized as a crucial part of climate action in last year’s Paris Agreement, minimizing these human impacts presents a challenge to governments acting to fulfill their contributions to the agreement. The panel stressed that this is not just an issue for the developing world, and that displacement happens everywhere. Of important note is that the Paris Agreement establishes a task force to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change. COP22 (Marrakesh, November, 2016) is also an important event for future action on climate migration. IOM hosted the Technical Meeting on Migration, Displacement and Human Mobility (Environmental Migration Portal, 2016) in Morocco in July to support the work of ExCom WIM and responded to the call on sharing existing knowledge and information on human mobility and climate change (IOM, 2016). The Paris Agreement does not commit countries to address the legal needs of climate-displaced migrants, leaving broader gaps in rights and funding, and these legal gaps should be remedied. Panelists agreed that the international community must capitalize on current momentum and political will to address climate migration and for policy coherence in addressing climate migration. Morocco experiences many different forms of migration as a country of origin, transit and destination with large occurrence of internal migration; whilst being hit by a variety of climate and environmental impacts, such as desertification, floods etc. The workshop demonstrated that there is a strong interest in better understanding the evidence on the climate migration nexus and a willingness to work across policy areas to find concrete solutions. In that respect, the workshop focused on identifying concrete follow-up action in Morocco to support COP22 and Morocco’s Chairmanship of the COP throughout 2017. COP22 is expected to be the COP of Action. IOM has been actively involved in the preparatory phase of COP22 in the Kingdom of Morocco, by leading research and enhancing capacities (Tangermann & Chazalnoel, 2016) and participating at all the events organized by the COP22 Steering Committee and its partners. As the leading IOM, the IOM contributes to the integration of migration in climate action – climate migration being a key thematic area revealing the human face of climate change.

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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change The IPCC was set up in 1988 as a daughter organization of the World Meteorological Organization and United Nations Environment Programme and endorsed by the UN General Assembly. Its task was ‘to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts’. Already in 1990, in its first assessment report, the IPCC noted that ‘migration and resettlement may be the most threatening short-term effects of climate change on human settlements. People may decide to migrate in any of the following cases: loss of housing, loss of living resources, loss of social and cultural resources’ (IPCC, 1990). Twenty-four years later, the IPCC states that ‘climate change over the twenty-first century is projected to increase displacement of people. Changes in migration patterns can be responses to both extreme weather events and longer-term climate variability and change, and migration can also be an effective adaptation strategy. There is low confidence in quantitative projection of changes in mobility, due to its complex, multicausal nature’ (IPCC, 2014a, p. 73). The IPCC notes in its last report: Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development (IPCC, 2014b, p. 13). Also the IPCC stresses that the human influence on the climate system is evident, the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history and the warming of the system is unequivocal und unprecedented over decades to millennia (IPCC, 2014b, p. 40). The observed impacts attributed to climate change include: (1) Changing precipitation or melting snow and ice are altering hydrological systems, having a qualitative and quantitative effect on water resources (2) Negative impacts on crop yields (3) Changes in extreme weather and climate events (4) Refugees and Migration in Asia and Europe (5) Decrease in the number of cold days and nights and increase in the number of warm days and nights (6) Increase in heavy precipitation events (7) Increase in extreme sea levels (8) Impacts from climate-related extremes such as heat waves, droughts, floods, cyclones and wildfires on some ecosystems and many human systems (9) Direct and insured losses from weather-related disasters have increased substantially in recent decades (IPCC, 2014b, pp. 49–53). The IPCC further highlights that Asia will be particularly affected by this kind of environmental threat as cities ‘identified for both population and asset exposure’ are concentrated in Asia. The IPCC has defined vulnerability as ‘the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change,

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including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity’ (Parry et al., 2007). Vulnerability has increasingly been used in regard to Climate Change and Migration – Dimensions, Concepts and Policy Responses from a Human Rights Perspective in the field of human rights as the concept is compatible to integrate a human rights language. Most of the issues which make an individual person, a community, a region or a state susceptible to negative effects of climate changes are human rights issues such as poverty, discrimination and political hardships or other socio-economic characteristics described in the following quote: Our analysis also point out the importance of the socio-economic characteristics of the origin country (such as the level of development and the vulnerability of the agricultural sector) in shaping the nexus between climate shocks and international migration flows. In general, countries with a lower level of development and a relatively larger agricultural sector are more sensitive to climate shocks. (Coniglio & Pesce, 2015) In AR(4),WG-II, the relationship, if any, between climate change and conflict via migration is presented in vague terms, with reference to ‘interaction of climate change, disaster, conflict, displacement, and migration’. No more detail is given regarding the nature of this interaction. For instance, Human Security Report (Mack, 2005), widely read but not cited in the WG II report, limits human security to the protection of individuals from the threat of violence. This approach allows statistical tracking of the ups and downs of human security through numbers on interstate and civil war, group conflicts and one-sided violence, and violent crime. By contrast, the definition in the Human security chapter is too wide to allow serious attempts to assess the secular trend. For some forms of human security that are close to the narrower definition (such as fatal victims of climate-related natural disasters, Ch 12: 25), one can obtain a yardstick for measuring whether human security is generally increasing or decreasing, but for even broader aspects it becomes very difficult. Although the term ‘climate refugee’ occurs frequently in the references in the Human Security chapter, in the main text it only turns up once in order for the authors to note that the term is ‘scientifically and legally problematic’.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) It sets in February 1863 in Geneva, Switzerland. It directs and coordinates the international activities conducted by the movement in armed conflicts and other situations of violence. The work of ICRC is based on the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It works on relief activities, livelihood support activities, capacity building

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activities, economic security in food, shelter, clothing and hygiene. In 2016, it helped 398,409 people (7% more than the previous year) benefit from various services provided by ICRC-supported physical rehabilitation centres, women, children, detainees, internally displaced people, migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, people with disabilities and missing people by providing economic security, restoring family links, water and habitat, health, sexual violence, forensic science, mining action and building aspect for law. The ICRC seeks to ensure that states fulfill their obligations to protect the lives, preserve the dignity and alleviate the suffering of vulnerable migrants. The ICRC also provides expertise and support to National Societies that work with detained migrants. Workshops on immigrationrelated detention are held. Its assistance to vulnerable migrants along migration routes is often provided in close collaboration with other partners, such as National Societies. The ICRC has gradually acquired a position of leadership in the area of physical rehabilitation. In 2016, 398,409 people (7% more than the previous year) benefited from various services provided by ICRC-supported physical rehabilitation centres. Out of 230 million world migrants, it looks after over more than 50%. In Syria, 22 million are living in hard-to-reach and besieged areas or have sought refuge elsewhere in Syria. Meanwhile, 1.7 million Syrians have fled to Turkey, while 1.2 million have gone to Lebanon, another 625,000 have sought refuge in Jordan and 245,000 went to Iraq. In Syria, during the first six months in 2017, the ICRC and SARC provided food to 4.7 million people, clean water for 16 million (almost the entire population), health care for 32,000 displaced people, hygiene kits (soap, blankets, towels, etc.) to 800,000 people and learning supplies to over 19,000 children displaced by the fighting.

Policy Recommendations for Climate Refugees The following climate refugee’s adaptation policies have been identified and could be pursued by the international community to deal with this ensuing global problem: (1) Develop a charter that will offer some international protection or assistance to climate refugees. (2) Pursue disaster risk reduction particularly at the vulnerability communities rather than just reacting to emergencies. Set up both national and international funds for climate refugees. (3) Promote and encourage migration as one of the adaptation responses to some vulnerability. The current barriers to migration have to be relaxed for migration to achieve its full potential as an adaptation strategy, particularly for vulnerable small island states in the Pacific Ocean. (4) Develop a faster and efficient response strategy towards disaster. Invest in early warning systems, drought and flood resistant crops and build elevated storm shelters with flood and medical storage at vulnerable communities. (5) Pursue strategies that do not only prevent displacement at the origin of climate refugees, but also develop policies that build capacity at the destinations to facilitate accommodation and integration of the additional population.

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(6) Support capacity building and climate change adaptation initiatives by the local people and avoid providing assistance which will potentially destroy the local economy and leave the people poor and worse off. (7) Develop timely and efficient disaster recovery and reconstruction strategies. Building on the G20’s earlier commitment expressed in the communiqu´e following the Hangzhou summit in 2016, the G20 summit in Hamburg in 2017 should: (1) Call on the IOM, the IDMC, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage and the Platform for Disaster Displacement to submit (joint) annual reports to the G20 on the dynamics of global environmental change and the temporary, protracted or permanent displacement of people. The governments of the G20 countries should commit the necessary resources and establish clear responsibilities for climate migrants and other permanently displaced people in their governments as a precondition for improved international coordination, including planned relocations and resettlements. (2) Call on all relevant international organizations for improved coordination of (short- and medium-term) humanitarian assistance following catastrophic events, having anticipated that these will occur with higher frequency and greater severity. The G20 should push not only for better preparedness and more investment in response capabilities but also improved coordination in capacity building. Some recommendations are made that should be incorporated in the COP23 or other UN (UNHCR) platform agendas. There should be: (1) A method for considering the relevant parameters and assigning weights to the indicators to calculate the climate refugee distribution. (2) An internationally recognized legal convention for climate refugees to resettle them in responsible countries considering relevant social, cultural and ecological aspects. (3) An immediate short-term shelter plan in neighbouring countries in case of urgency, and a long-term resettlement plan in the liable countries, as needed. (4) A monitoring system for identifying disasters solely triggered by climate change, and calculating the number of displaced people without sustainable livelihood and adaptation options to survive in affected areas or in the country of origin. (5) A cumulative monitoring system for measuring those countries consuming more resources and producing more CO2 within a given timeframe. (6) A system for penalizing the responsible countries immediately to provide humanitarian assistance in the victim countries. (7) A system to compensate the victim countries for the loss and damages occurred due to disasters induced by climate change, and finally to undertake plans to resettle them and so forth.

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Biermann and Boas (2010) suggested five principles to address the climate refugee problems: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Planned relocation and resettlement; Resettlement instead of temporary asylum; Collective rights for local populations; International assistance for domestic measures and International burden sharing.

Conclusion The problems of refugee, migrants and climate refugee/environmental displaced people are complex and internationally related issues which might be considered through international law, politics and economics. Motivation of imperialistic attitude, doing international business with war weapon, international cooperation and conflicts for energy including atomic energy, trade war compatible with space war, international disagreements with climate policies and finances are the vital causes of catapulting refugee or climate refugee or migration problems. We need to be cautious about misdiagnosis about refugee conventions. The convention provides a principled, predictable, universal and solutions-oriented system. It remains fit for the purpose for which it was created. It just needs political will to be able to do its job. Humanitarian actors have thus developed considerable expertise in identifying the needs of displaced populations and of developing mechanisms to respond to them. The humanitarian agencies were thus not very interested in working seriously on issues of climate change and displacement when the discourse ran counter to well-established legal principles. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the IOM, International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies, The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), EJF,UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery’s work on disaster risk reduction are all efforts to reduce the effects of future natural hazards on human populations but in different voices, languages and ways. The first problem in bridging the different fields was simply terminology. The problems are fraught with emotion, human agency and political controversy. For anyone with a refugee background, the word ‘resettlement’ can only refer to the resettlement of refugees to a third country. Interdisciplinary approaches for resettlement can be encouraged because it may minimize financial constraints. The issue of climate change and human mobility has already inspired important interdisciplinary efforts. Lastly, we are optimistic on the result of the slogan ‘No climate change, no climate refugees’ which suggest that under present circumstances, Australia and the US each should take responsibility of 10% each of the overall global share of climate refugees, followed by Canada and Saudi Arabia (9% each), South Korea (7%) and Russia, Germany and Japan (6% each), respectively.

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References Abel, G. J., & Sander, N. (2014, March). Quantifying global international migration flows. Science, 343(6178), 1520–1528. doi:10.1126/science.1248676 Adam, D. (2005). 50m environmental refugees by end of decade, UN warns. The Guardian, London. Angenendt, S., & Koch, A. (2017, June). Global migration governance and mixed flow. SWP Research Paper. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin. Biermann, F., & Boas, I. (2010). Preparing for a warmer world: Towards a global governance system to protect climate refugees. Global Environmental Politics, 10(1), 60–68. Bilsborrow, R. (1992). Rural poverty, migration, and the environment in developing countries: Three case studies. Background paper for World Development Report. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Black, R. (2001). Environmental refugees: Myth or reality? Working Paper No. 34. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva. Brown, O. (2008). Migration and climate change. IOM Migration Research Series No31, International organization for Migration, Geneva. Retrieved from https:// www.ipcc.ch/apps/njlite/srex/njlite_download.php?id55866 Chen, C., Noble, I., Hellmann, J., Coffee, J., Murillo, M., & Chawla, N. (2015). A global index to quantify vulnerability to climate change and assess readiness to use adaptation investment effectively. Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index Working Paper 53. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame. Christian Aid. (2007). Human tide. The real migration crisis. London: Christian Aid. Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP II) (2014). One in every seven people in Bangladesh will be displaced due to climate change by 2050. Retrieved from http://www.brac.net/latest-news/item/1261-brac-and-kfw-jointlylaunch-the-climate-bridge-fund Coniglio, N. D., & Pesce, G. (2015, August). Climate variability and international migration: An empirical analysis. Environment and Development Economics, 20(4), 434–468. doi:10.1017/S1355770x14000722 Environmental Migration Portal. (2016). Technical Meeting on Action Area 6: Migration, displacement and human mobility. Retrieved from https:// environmentalmigration.iom.int/technical-meeting#_blank Gemenne, F. (2011, December). Why the numbers don’t add up: A review of estimates and predictions of people displaced by environmental changes. Global Environmental Change, 21(S1), 541–549. Hodgkinson, D., Burton, T., Young, L., & Anderson, H. (2010). Copenhagen, climate change refugees and the need for a global agreement. Retrieved from www.ccdpconvention.com IDMC (2015, July). Global Estimates 2015: People displaced by disaster. Retrieved from https://internal-displacement.org/database/displacemene-data IDMC. Database. (2017). Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Retrieved from https://data.humdata.org/organization/international-displacement-monitoringcentre-idmc International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2009). Policy on migration. In 17th General Assembly of International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, November, Nairobi, Kenya. Retrieved from www.ifrc.org

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IOM. (2016). Warsaw international mechanism. Executive committee call for submission. Action Area 6: Migration, displacement and human mobility. Retrieved from https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/groups_committees/loss_and_damage_ executive_committee/application/pdf/excom_wim_aa6_iom_submission_submitted_ 16_may_2016_1.pdf#_blank IPCC. (1990). First assessment report. Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch IPCC. (2007). Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Fourth assessment report. Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch IPCC. (2013). Fifth assessment report. Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch IPCC. (2014a). Climate change 2014, impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: Global aspects, and sectoral aspects. Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. IPCC. (2014b). Fifth assessment report, AR4. Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch Islam, M. (1992). Natural calamities and environmental refugees in Bangladesh. Refugee: Canada’s Periodical on Refugees, 12(1), 5–10. Jacobson, J. (1988). Environmental refugees: A yardstick of habitability. Washington, DC: World Watch Institute. Mack, A. (2005). Human security report 2005: War and peace in 21st century. Die Friedens-Warte, Schwerpunktthema: Friedenskonsolidierung in Nachkriegsgesellschaften, 80(1/2), 177–191. McGregor, J. (1994). Climate change and involuntary migration: Implications for food security. Food Policy, 19(2), 120–132. McLeman, R. (2008). Climate change migration, refugee protection, and adaptive capacity-building. McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy/Revue internationale de droit et politique du d´eveloppement durable de McGill, 4(1), 1–18. Retrieved from https://www.mcgill.ca/mjsdl/files/mjsdl/ 4_1_1_mcleman.pdf Milan, S. (2004). Searching for a place under the sun. Rieti: Inter Press Service. Myers, N. (1993). Environmental refugees. Population and Environment, 19(2), 167–182. Myers, N. (2002). Environmental refugees: A growing phenomenon of the 21st century. Philisophical Transactions of the Royal Societies, B357(1420), 609–613. Myers, N., & Kent, J. (1995). Environmental exodus: An emergent crisis in the global arena. Washington, DC: The Climate Institute. ND-GAIN. (2017). Norte-Dam-Global Adaptation Index. Retrieved from https://gainnew.crc.nd.edu/ Otunnu, O. (1992). Environmental refugees in sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and effects. Refugee: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, 12(1), 11–14. Parry, M., Canziani, O., Palutikof, J., van der Linden, P., Hanson, C. (2007). Climate change 2007: Impact, adaptation and vulnerability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ramlogan, R. (1996). Environmental refugees: A review. Environmental Conservation, 23, 81–88. Red Cross. (2001). World disaster report: Focus on recovery. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Renaud, F. G., Bogardi, J. J., Dun, O., & Warner, K. (2007). Control, adapt or fleet. How to face environmental migration? Intersections, No-5, United Nations University Institute for Environmental and Human Society (UNU-EHS), Bonn.

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Serdeczny, O. (2017). What does it mean to “address displacement” under UNFCCC? An analysis of the negotiations process and the role of research. Discussion Paper. Deutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn. Retrieved from https:// www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_12.2017.pdf Stern, N. (2007). The economics of climate change. The Stern review. Cambridge University Press. Tangermann, J. S., & Chazalnoel, M. T. (2016, March). La migration environmentale au Maroc: bilan, enjeux et opportunites. Serie de bulletins politiques: Migration, environment et changement climatique, 2(3). Retrieved from https://morocco. iom.int/sites/default/files/Fiche%20Environnement%20LK.pdf Tolba, M. (1989). Our biological heritage under siege. Bio Science, 39, 725–728. Toussaint, P. (2016). Climate migration post-Paris. Retrieved from https:// blog.potsdam.de/2016/03/climate-migration-post-paris/ United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2016, January 12). 244 million international migrants living abroad worldwide. New York, NY. Retrieved from https://www.un.org UNFCCC. (2009). Report of the conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held in copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009. Retrieved from https://unfccc.int/resource/ docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf Warner, K., Ehrhart, C., de Sherbinin, A., & Adamo, S. (2009, May). In search of shelter: Mapping the effects of climate change on human migration and displacement. UNU-EHS, UNHACR. Zorzeta Bakaki, Z. (2016). Environmental refugees: The impact of climate change on emigration. Paper presented at the 2016 meeting of ENCoRe in Geneva

Section III Refugee Crisis and Economical Concern

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Chapter 5

Global Refugee Crisis: A Quantitative Approach with Focus on Major Producing and Hosting Countries Arundhati Bhattacharya

Abstract One of the serious crises faced chiefly by the developing countries is the large influx of people from neighbouring poor and less developed countries as a result of civil wars, political and social turbulence, to name some. Following UNHCR’s latest available publication of data on refugees (2016), this chapter attempts to highlight the world’s major refugee producing countries, inherent causes of such generation and destination of the emigrants on one hand and the scenario of world’s major refugee hosting countries, refugees from countries received by them and their present condition, on the other. Disaggregation of data is done in each case to provide further insightful analysis. Keywords: Civil war; influx; refugee crisis; refugee hosting countries; refugee producing countries; UNHCR

Introduction One of the gravest global crises faced by the national and international economies is that of refugees. The United Nations defines a refugee as ‘… owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’ (UNHCR, 1967). According to USA for UNHCR, ‘a refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a Refugee Crises and Third-World Economies, 75–101 Copyright © 2020 Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-190-520201010

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well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group’ (USA for UNHCR). Civil wars, clashes between groups, political and social unrest, tension, torture and violence, economic vulnerability, famines – all the factors, working jointly or individually in least developed and poorest countries force mass exodus of inhabitants from their native soil and seek shelter to other territories. The mass departure is showing a continuous uprising global trend revealing it as one of the most serious crises to tackle. According to the estimate of UNHCR, the number of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced people around the world are nearly 25.4 million, 3.1 million and 40 million, respectively (http://www.unhcr.org. Accessed on May 13, 2018). The global refugee crisis highlights the human rights approach from a new perspective; protection of human rights of refugees does not embody that of own nationals, but of others, thereby necessitating a broader understanding of the problem and outlook. The irony is that the poorer nations are providing homes to the forcibly displaced, while the richer counterparts have turned their blind eyes over the humanitarian issue. UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi commented, ‘Today we face not so much a crisis of numbers but of cooperation and solidarity – especially given that most refugees stay in the countries neighbouring their war-torn homelands… The biggest contributors providing a safe haven to the world’s uprooted people are poorer communities’ (UNHCR Staff, 2017).

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the Resolution 2198 (XXI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1967, ratified by 145 states parties, serve as the key legal document that laid the cornerstones of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Refugee Agency. It was founded on 14 December 1950 with the objective to ‘protect refugees, forcibly displaced communities and stateless people and assist in their voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country’. UNHCR acts as the ‘guardian’ of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. According to the legislation, states are expected to cooperate with it in ensuring that the rights of refugees are respected and protected. The UNHCR follows the core principle of non-refoulement, which asserts that a refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom. This is now considered a rule of customary international law. Over the years, UNHCR is maintaining a database of refugee information. UNHCR’s Statistics Database provides data, reports and other information on people of concern essential for field operations and publishes Statistical Yearbooks, the latest being in 2016.

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This chapter consults with the most recent available data, collected from UNHCR database (that of 2016). After shortlisting the major refugee producing and hosting countries in that particular year, it attempts to deliver an overview of the facts and figures for those particular nations in the context of the parameter of discussion.

Major Refugee Producing Countries Syrian Arab Republic Arab Spring (History Channel) inspired protests in Syria against the country leadership and was dominated forcibly and brutally by the Syrian Arab Army, leading to the onset of the Syrian Civil War (officially on 15 March 2011). The ongoing war is the root cause of migration of Syrian people to the neighbouring countries, turning them into refugees. With increasing inner conflict and deteriorating liveability, bulks of Syrian inhabitants are still registering themselves as refugees, mainly in the countries of Turkey (hosting more than 50% Syrian displaced people), Lebanon, Jordan, Germany and Iraq. Total number of refugees, as estimated by UNHCR, 2016, is about 5.5 million and still counting. The Syrian Refugee Crisis is the most gravest and serious crisis United Nations has encountered since its inception. Fig. 5.1 gives an idea of the countries that seem to be the destinations of the ill-fated Syrian refugees.

Islamic State of Afghanistan Another country that is harrowingly experiencing the refugee crisis is Afghanistan. The external flow of Afghan citizens started from the late 1970s,

Fig. 5.1.

Registered Refugees from Syrian Arab Republic in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

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marking the Soviet invasion. Though the flow reversed for a short period after the end of cold war, mujahideen-led civil war (after the Taliban takeover) played catalyst in the outflux again from the early 1990s. Afghan refugees pose one of the most serious refugee crises, considered just after that of Syria. Pakistan and Islamic Republic of Iran have continued to provide shelter to the maximum number of Afghan asylum seekers since the last 40 years. Ethnic minorities, like Afghan Sikhs and Hindus, are destined to India. Total number of registered and unregistered Afghan refugees till the end of 2016 is estimated to be 1 million and 1.5 million, respectively, in Pakistan alone (United States Institute of Peace). Fig. 5.2 depicts the whereabouts of the displaced Afghan nationals.

Republic of South Sudan Just within two years of independence (July 2011), South Sudan’s ruling party was broken into factions, and intra-faction conflict spread violence over the newborn country resulting in civil war and causing displacement of over 2.4 million and 1.7 million people externally and internally turning South Sudan into an African country with fastest growing refugee crisis and the third-most fled country in the world (behind Syria and Afghanistan) (Reuters). Over 80% of the migrants are female and children. The ongoing famine has made the situation more disastrous. Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan are the prime hosting countries of South Sudanese refugees. Fig. 5.3 illustrates the fact that 2016 alone has observed more than 1.4 million registered people taking shelter in neighbouring countries while escaping from South Sudan.

Somalia Republic Somalia, declared as a ‘failed state’ (Anderson, 2009; Fergusson, 2013), is inflicted by political unrest, terrorism, civil and clan war, thereby causing thousands of civilian casualties for decades (since the early 1990s). The UNHCR reported the number of registered Somalian refugees to exceed 1 million in 2016 and that of internally displaced persons (IDPs) more than outgoing migrants. Majority of

Fig. 5.2.

Registered Refugees from Islamic State of Afghanistan in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

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Fig. 5.3.

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Registered Refugees from Republic of South Sudan in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

these ousted people migrated to Kenya, Yemen and Ethiopia, the neighbouring states. Country-wise dispersion of refugees from Somalia is shown in Fig. 5.4.

Republic of Sudan Though earlier it was a regular phenomenon, regional and ethnic tensions, prolonged civil war (War in Darfur that began in 2003), subsequent famines and encroaching desertification for nearly one and half decades have intensified the forced migration of Sudanese population within and outside their geographical boundary. But extensive territorial vastness resulted in movement chiefly in the form of internal displacement. The number of internally displaced people in Sudan is estimated to be almost 3.2 million. Taking into account, the aspect of foreign migration from Sudan, Chad is the primary recipient (holding 77.24% of total Sudanese refugees in 2016). Fig. 5.5 demonstrates the diffusion of migrants from Sudan to the recipient countries.

Fig. 5.4.

Registered Refugees from Somalia Republic in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

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Chad Egypt Ethiopia France United Kingdom Other Countries

Fig. 5.5.

Registered Refugees from Republic of Sudan in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

Democratic Republic of the Congo A large number of Congolese is driven towards neighbouring Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania to escape from the upsurge of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), military operations against Mai-Mai armed groups in South Kivu province, conflicts in northern DRC, inter-communal violence in Ituri province, escalating brutality in Kasai province and armed group activities and military offensives in North Kivu (ReliefWeb – Informing humanitarians worldwide). Multiple regional clashes have led to re-emergence of the departure crisis after a sigh of relief was sought when long-driven civil war was put to an end in 2003. Total number of refugees from DRC till date amounts to 5.4 million. Country-wise spreading of migrant people arriving from DRC in 2016 is illustrated in Fig. 5.6.

Central African Republic Central African Republic (CAR) is one of the poorest countries of the world. Followed by a violent capture of state power by Seleka in 2013, thousands of people left their homes and sought refuge in other countries, mainly in Cameroon, Chad and DRC. After a brief phase of peace and stability, fresh violence and conflicts between armed rebellion groups including ex-Seleka factions and antiBalaka militias from the end of 2016 regenerated the mass evacuation of insecure inhabitants in the centre, northwest, east and southeast of CAR (Conciliation Resources, 2013). As of now, over half a million of CAR refugees have fled to other countries while 0.7 million are departed from their homes to somewhere else inland. The 2016 dispersion of CAR refugees are diagrammatized in Fig. 5.7.

Republic of the Union of Myanmar Though the persecution of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar dates back to the 1970s, migration from Myanmar at a massive scale started from 2015. Claiming the Rohingya Muslims (a minority group residing in the western state of Rakhine,

Global Refugee Crisis

Fig. 5.6.

Fig. 5.7.

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Registered Refugees from Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

Registered Refugees from Central African Republic in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

Myanmar) as illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, the Government of Republic of the Union of Myanmar denied their citizenship – employment, education and freedom of movement. Persistent discrimination, military oppression and organized gang rape, mass killing led the stateless group of people flee their land where they inhabited for generations (Al Jazeera, 2017; The Hindu, 2017; BBC News, 2017). Human rights group, Amnesty International described the Rohingya as ‘one of the most persecuted minorities in the world’, and the UN referred to the 2015 Rohingya refugee crisis as ‘the world’s fastest growing refugee crisis’ and ‘a textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ (Sky News, 2017). As evident from the UNHCR 2016 report, the mass exodus of Rohingya Muslims is enrouted chiefly to Malaysia, followed by Thailand and Bangladesh.

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Fig. 5.8.

Registered Refugees from Republic of the Union of Myanmar in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

The pie chart in Fig. 5.8 illustrates the distribution of Burmese refugees in different countries. Informal reports reveal that along with Rohingya refugees, poverty-stricken Bangladeshis join the march.

The State of Eritrea Eritrea, the second newest state in Africa freed itself from Ethiopia in 1991 following turbulent decades of struggle under the leadership of Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), renamed as People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). But independent Eritrea is undergoing severe oppression; freedom of movement and speech are offensively curbed turning it into a ‘police state’ and ‘one of the world’s fastest-emptying nations’ (Council on Foreign Relations). Ethiopia and Sudan are the most-sought destinations of impoverished, malnourished Eritreans, others gather in different European countries. Following are the nations where the bulk of natives from Eritrea have mostly shifted in 2016 and it counted about 0.43 million (Fig. 5.9).

Fig. 5.9.

Registered Refugees from the State of Eritrea in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

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Republic of Burundi Burundi, one of the least developed countries of the world, is facing political tension along with economic backwardness amidst the anarchic rule. Terrible torture, rape, assault, execution, repression and violence by the ruling party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), especially by its youth wing, Imbonerakure, are cited as reasons to leave the homeland (African Arguments). Since April 2015, hundreds of Burundians have been killed and more than 0.4 million have crossed the borders ending up in Tanzania, Rwanda, DRC and Uganda. Kenya, Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi and South Africa have also hosted refugees in smaller numbers (denoted by ‘Other Countries’ in the pie chart) (Fig. 5.10).

Major Refugee Hosting Countries Republic of Turkey The Republic of Turkey is performing as the host of the world’s largest number of refugees (about 3.5 million), 70% of them being women and children and 90% of whom reside outside camps. In the provinces of Hatay, Urfa, Gaziantep, Kilis, Kahramanmaras¸, Malatya, the refugees chiefly concentrate in camps. The lion’s share of total refugees arrives from Syria. UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi stated, ‘Turkey and its people have provided safety and refuge to millions of Syrians fleeing war and destruction back home… As a host to more refugees than many of the world’s major economies combined, the international community must do its part to support Turkey’s continuing generosity’ (http://www.unhcr.org. Accessed on May 13, 2018). Turkey’s role, as a host of refugees can be explained by Fig. 5.11.

Fig. 5.10.

Registered Refugees from the Republic of Burundi in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

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Fig. 5.11.

Refugees Registered in Republic of Turkey in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

Pakistan Pakistan is hosting 1.45 million refugees, more than 99% of whom hail from Afghanistan (as shown in Fig. 5.12), and is home for the Afghanis for over three decades. The country has provided the best possible facilities to affected people fleeing homeland particularly during Taliban rule. At the same time, the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan to their own country was also the largest in the world (http://www.unhcr.org. Accessed on May 13, 2018). Afghan refugee camps are mostly found in Pashtun-dominated areas of Pakistan, which includes Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the city of Quetta in northern Balochistan.

Lebanese Republic (Lebanon) Lebanon comes third as taking 1.5 million Syrians and Palestine refugees from Syria, accounting for 30% of Lebanon’s population; the highest concentration of

Fig. 5.12.

Refugees Registered in Pakistan in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

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per capita refugees in the world. As a share of the population, Lebanon hosts the most refugees with 173 per 1,000 of its inhabitants. It should be mentioned here that, Lebanon contained a mere 8,000 refugees before the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011; the foreign turmoil has added a major strain on Lebanon’s economy and infrastructure; competition for jobs and resources have increased pushing the country’s socio-economic absorption capacity to the very limit (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, European Commission; Forbes). According to the 2016 data, Syrian refugees constitute more than 99% of total refugees registered in Lebanon in the same year (Fig. 5.13).

Islamic Republic of Iran The Tehran government shelters around 1 million registered Afghans, Iraqis and nearly 2 millions more are estimated to be living in the country, turning Iran home to the world’s fourth largest refugee population. The Iranian government has shown generosity in providing education, health care facilities and legal assistance irrespective of the documentation status of the people (The Borgen Project, Downsize Poverty). As quoted by Sivanka Dhanapala, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Tehran, ‘The leadership demonstrated by the Iranian government has been exemplary in hosting refugees and keeping borders open’ (The Independent). Afghan refugee camp in Saveh, Niatak refugee camp, Torbat-e-Jam (refugee camp) and Iraqi refugee camp in Khuzestan are some of the well-known settlements in Iran built to receive refugees and people in refugee-like situations. As in 2016, the incoming of emigrants (registered) primarily from Afghanistan and Iraq is categorized in Fig. 5.14.

Republic of Uganda According to the latest figures released from United Nations, Uganda is among the major countries hosting refugees; an escalating influx of refugees into

Fig. 5.13.

Refugees Registered in Lebanese Republic in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

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Fig. 5.14.

Refugees Registered in Islamic Republic of Iran in 2016.

Uganda during the recent years, mostly from South Sudan is followed by DRC (as shown in Fig. 5.15) (New Vision-Uganda news). Crisis in South Sudan, chronic and exacerbated instability in the DRC, the conflict in Burundi, all these factors increased the influx at a dangerously high level making the country the largest asylum in Africa. The 2016 figures reveal that Uganda has given shelter to about 0.95 million people. If this trend continues, Uganda is likely to host 1.8 million refugees by the end of 2018. An extensive network of border collection points, transit and reception centres has been put in place to provide emergency assistance to newly arriving refugees (The Democratic Republic of the Congo Regional refugee response plan, 2018). Due to adoption of open-door policy, the migrants are almost free to move in, but the continuous inflow in greater numbers is putting this developing country’s existing resource stock under severe pressure. The major refugee settlements in Uganda are Achol-Pii, Bidi Bidi, Imvepi, Kiryandongo, Kyaka II, Kyangwali, Nakivale, Nyumanzi, Oruchinga, Pagirinya, Palorinya, Rhino Camp and Rwamwanja.

Fig. 5.15.

Refugees Registered in Uganda in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

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Fig. 5.16.

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Refugees Registered in Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ethiopia, having a long history of hosting refugees is the second largest refugeehosting country in Africa. If the current trend of arrival from South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan persists, the refugee population in Ethiopia will cross the 1 million mark in 2018 (ReliefWeb – Informing humanitarians worldwide). 2016 phenomenon is shown in Fig. 5.16. Ethiopia maintains an open-door asylum policy, giving humanitarian access and protection to those seeking refuge. It is one of the participants in the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) which entails its commitment to the migrants: registers birth, death, marriage and divorce of refugees, provides health service and educational facilities to all and work permits to qualifying refugees, facilitates local integration according to feasibility and earmarks a percentage of jobs within industrial parks to refugees; thereby setting a global example. The government of Ethiopia has a decennial planning to close all 27 refugee camps in its territory with the objective to integrate residents into local communities. UNHCR High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi has described Ethiopia’s refugee protection regime as ‘a shining example of African hospitality’. His predecessor and current UN Secretary General Ant´onio Guterres praised Ethiopia was ‘a pillar of refugee protection’ (ReliefWeb – Informing humanitarians worldwide).

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Jordan provides shelter to 89 refugees out of 1,000 per capita of the population, accruing the second position as refugee absorbing country when compared to the size of its population (http://www.unhcr.org. Accessed on May 13, 2018). Till the recent available report, 657,621 Syrians and 62,445 Iraqis (most of them are women and children) are registered with UNHCR in Jordan. The 2016 UNHCR data of registered refugees in Jordan are figuratively displayed below. Jordan’s Zaatari refugee camp is the largest of its kind in the region and currently hosts 80,000 Syrian refugees (Fig. 5.17). Cash assistance is given to the registered refugees to help them meet essential needs like food and shelter, along with necessary articles required for protection

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Fig. 5.17.

Refugees Registered in Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 2016.

against the cold. Moreover, the Government of Jordan issued or renewed 46,000 work permits to the Syrians. But with the excessive influx of refugees, Jordanian economy has reached ‘saturation point’ and fear collapse (Jordan: UNHCR operational update, 2017).

Federal Republic of Germany Responding positively to the migrant crisis with the motto, ‘We can do this’, Germany has opened its door to thousands of asylum seekers who have escaped war and persecution in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Eritrea and Afghanistan (2016 figures are represented by the pie chart in Fig. 5.18). According to the most recent statistics from Germany’s Office of Migration and Refugees (BAMF), about 0.7 million registered refugees are accommodated in Germany in 2016 (InfoMigrants). The German federal government has announced that it is capable of accepting half a million refugees annually for some years to come (The Atlantic).

Fig. 5.18.

Refugees Registered in Federal Republic of Germany in 2016. Source: UNHCR (2016).

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Democratic Republic of the Congo Despite the fact that DRC is among the world’s poorest countries and is undergoing crisis situation itself, refugees from neighbouring countries (chiefly from Rwanda, Central African Republic and South Sudan) have been arriving in some areas, especially in Nord-Ubangi and Bas-Uele provinces. Assistance provided to these people is highly insufficient, poor infrastructure is aggravating the problem (The Democratic Republic of the Congo Regional refugee response plan, 2018). The refugee influx in DRC in 2016 is from the countries mentioned in Fig. 5.19.

Republic of Kenya Kenya is the host of almost half a million of refugees that mostly originate from Somalia (consult Fig. 5.20), seconded by South Sudan. Providing cover to Somalis from the 1990s, Government of Kenya has now assumed a non-friendly and restrictive approach towards the refugee influx debarring them from entitlements on the ground of security, environmental and economic concerns and also announced closure of the Dadaab complex of refugee camps (parts of which are Hagadera, Dagahaley, Ifo and two others and Kakuma being the world’s largest refugee camp) (http://www.unhcr.org. Accessed on May 13, 2018).

Fig. 5.19.

Refugees Registered in Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2016.

Fig. 5.20.

Refugees in Republic of Kenya in 2016.

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Conclusion New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, 2016, compiled the agreement of all 193 Member States of the United Nations in considering protection, support and provision of shelter to those who are forced to flee as ‘shared international responsibilities that must be borne more equitably and predictably’ – ‘We commit to a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees’. (United Nations General Assembly, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, 19 September 2016) The Declaration entrusted UNHCR with the task of designing the ‘Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)’, contained in Annex I of the New York Declaration, to develop a ‘global compact on refugees’. The global compact for safe, regular and orderly migration of refugees provides an opportunity to unite the international response to large movements of refugees and protracted refugee situations and places on strong foothold. The fundamental objectives of this initiative are to: (1) (2) (3) (4)

ease the pressures on host countries; enhance refugee self-reliance; expand access to third-country solutions; support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity (UNHCR; Global CRRF).

The proposal of the text of the global compact on refugees is scheduled to be presented by the High Commissioner in his 2018 annual report to the General Assembly. Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia are the countries participating in the CRPF and have each agreed to apply the comprehensive framework. The programme of action provides a blueprint to coordinate with the relevant states, other UN agencies, refugees, NGOs and other stakeholders and support host countries and communities so that they can ensure the refugees to have better access to health, education and labour markets and enjoy the opportunity of being included in their host territories without any delay. Formulation of national development plans where both refugees and the nationals of host countries are treated with equal importance and helping refugees ‘thrive, not just survive’ will pave the way to human development and will be consistent with the pledge to ‘leave no one behind’ in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Human Development Report, 2016).

Appendix Country-wise dispersion of refugees from major refugee producing countries in 2016.

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Table A1. Number of Registered Refugees from Syrian Arab Republic to Different Countries of Asylum in 2016. Country or Territory of Asylum or Residence

Armenia Austria Bulgaria Denmark Egypt Germany Iraq Jordan Lebanon Sweden Switzerland Netherlands Norway Turkey Other countries Total

Registered Refugees from Syrian Arab Republic in Countries of Asylum

14,626 30,958 15,027 18,215 116,013 375,122 230,836 648,836 1,005,503 96,914 11,159 28,394 11,537 2,823,987 67,899 5,495,026

Percentage of Registered Refugees from Syrian Arab Republic in Countries of Asylum

0.27 0.56 0.27 0.33 2.11 6.83 4.20 11.81 18.30 1.76 0.20 0.52 0.21 51.39 1.24 100.00

Source: UNHCR (2016).

Table A2. Number of Registered Refugees from Islamic State of Afghanistan to Different Countries of Asylum in 2016. Country or Territory of Asylum or Residence

Austria Germany Islamic Republic of Iran Italy Pakistan Sweden Other countries Total Source: UNHCR (2016).

Registered Refugees from Islamic State of Afghanistan in Countries of Asylum

20,220 46,292 951,142 16,033 1,352,160 16,558 86,245 2,488,650

Percentage of Registered Refugees from Islamic State of Afghanistan in Countries of Asylum

0.81 1.86 38.22 0.64 54.33 0.67 3.47 100.00

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Table A3. Number of Registered Refugees from Republic of South Sudan to Different Countries of Asylum in 2016. Country or Territory of Asylum or Residence

Dem. Republic of the Congo Ethiopia Kenya Sudan Uganda Other countries Total

Registered Refugees from Percentage of Registered Republic of South Sudan Refugees from Republic of in Countries of Asylum South Sudan in Countries of Asylum

66,672 338,774 87,141 297,168 639,007 7,889 1,436,651

4.64 23.58 6.07 20.68 44.48 0.55 100.00

Source: UNHCR (2016).

Table A4. Number of Registered Refugees from Somalia Republic to Different Countries of Asylum in 2016. Country or Territory of Asylum or Residence

Djibouti Ethiopia Italy Kenya Netherlands South Africa Sweden Uganda Yemen Other countries Total Source: UNHCR (2016).

Registered Refugees from Somalia Republic in Countries of Asylum

13,021 242,014 14,336 324,448 16,512 28,695 22,548 30,689 255,121 64,789 1,012,173

Percentage of Registered Refugees from Somalia Republic in Countries of Asylum

1.29 23.91 1.42 32.05 1.63 2.83 2.23 3.03 25.21 6.40 100.00

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Table A5. Number of Registered Refugees from Republic of Sudan to Different Countries of Asylum in 2016. Country or Territory of Asylum or Residence

Chad Egypt Ethiopia France United Kingdom Other Countries Total

Registered Refugees from Percentage of Registered Republic of Sudan in Refugees from Republic of Countries of Asylum Sudan in Countries of Asylum

312,468 13,848 39,896 7,049 7,326 23,939 404,526

77.24 3.42 9.86 1.74 1.81 5.92 100.00

Source: UNHCR (2016).

Table A6. Number of Registered Refugees from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Different Countries of Asylum in 2016. Country or Territory of Asylum or Residence

Angola Burundi Congo France Kenya Rwanda South Africa South Sudan Uganda United Republic of Tanzania Zambia Other countries Total Source: UNHCR (2016).

Registered Refugees from DRC in Countries of Asylum

Percentage of Registered Refugees from DRC in Countries of Asylum

12,944 57,055 12,284 15,037 13,328 73,147 26,156 14,476 205,363 50,324

2.41 10.62 2.29 2.80 2.48 13.61 4.87 2.69 38.21 9.36

21,338 36,021 537,473

3.97 6.70 100.00

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Table A7. Number of Registered Refugees from Central African Republic to Different Countries of Asylum in 2016. Country or Territory of Asylum or Residence

Cameroon Chad Congo Democratic Republic of the Congo Other countries Total

Registered Refugees from Central African Republic in Countries of Asylum

Percentage of Registered Refugees from Central African Republic in Countries of Asylum

283,602 70,223 24,474 102,489

57.77 14.31 4.99 20.88

10,104 490,892

2.06 100.00

Source: UNHCR (2016).

Table A8. Number of Registered Refugees from Union of Myanmar to Different Countries of Asylum in 2016. Country or Territory of Asylum or Residence

Bangladesh India Malaysia Thailand Other countries Total

Registered Refugees from Percentage of Registered Union of Myanmar in Refugees from Union of Countries of Asylum Myanmar in Countries of Asylum

33,198 15,561 87,029 50,437 8,861 195,086

17.02 7.98 44.61 25.85 4.54 100.00

Source: UNHCR (2016).

Table A9. Number of Registered Refugees from State of Eritrea to Different Countries of Asylum in 2016. Country or Territory of Asylum or Residence

Ethiopia Germany

Registered Refugees from State of Eritrea in Countries of Asylum

Percentage of Registered Refugees from State of Eritrea in Countries of Asylum

165,548 30,020

38.36 6.96

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Table A9. (Continued) Country or Territory of Asylum or Residence

Italy Netherlands Norway Sudan Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom Other countries Total

Registered Refugees from State of Eritrea in Countries of Asylum

10,049 13,488 15,062 103,176 25,968 26,264 13,720 28,295 431,590

Percentage of Registered Refugees from State of Eritrea in Countries of Asylum

2.33 3.13 3.49 23.91 6.02 6.09 3.18 6.56 100.00

Source: UNHCR (2016).

Table A10. Number of Registered Refugees from Republic of Burundi to Different Countries of Asylum in 2016. Country or Territory of Asylum or Residence

Democratic Republic of the Congo Rwanda Uganda United Republic of Tanzania Other countries Total Turkey Other countries Total Source: UNHCR (2016).

Registered Refugees from Percentage of Registered Republic of Burundi in Refugees from Republic of Countries of Asylum Burundi in Countries of Asylum

36,332

8.90

82,886 41,012 230,850

20.31 10.05 56.57

17,005 408,085 2,823,987 67,899 5,495,026

4.17 100.00 51.39 1.24 100.00

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Countries of origin from where refugees came to the major refugee hosting countries.

Table A11. Number of Refugees from Different Countries Registered to Republic of Turkey in 2016. Country or Territory of Origin

Iraq Syrian Arab Republic Other countries Total

Refugees Registered in Republic of Turkey in 2016

Percentage of Refugees Registered in Republic of Turkey in 2016

30,398 2,823,987 15,036 2,869,421

1.06 98.42 0.52 100

Source: UNHCR (2016).

Table A12. Number of Refugees from Different Countries Registered to Pakistan in 2016. Country or Territory of Origin

Afghanistan Other countries Total

Refugees Registered in Pakistan in 2016

Percentage of Refugees Registered in Pakistan in 2016

1,352,160 400 1,352,560

99.97 0.03 100

Source: UNHCR (2016).

Table A13. Number of Refugees from Different Countries Registered to Lebanese Republic in 2016. Country or Territory of Origin

Iraq Syrian Arab Republic Other countries Total Source: UNHCR (2016).

Refugees Registered in Lebanese Republic in 2016

Percentage of Refugees Registered in Lebanese Republic in 2016

6,454 1,005,503 1,012 1,012,969

0.64 99.26 0.10 100.00

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Table A14. Number of Refugees from Different Countries Registered to Islamic Republic of Iran in 2016. Country or Territory of Origin

Afghanistan Iraq Other countries Total

Refugees Registered in Islamic Republic of Iran in 2016

951,142 28,268 25 979,435

Percentage of Refugees Registered in Islamic Republic of Iran in 2016

97.111 2.886 0.003 100.00

Source: UNHCR (2016).

Table A15. Number of Refugees from Different Countries Registered to Republic of Uganda in 2016. Country or Territory of Origin

Burundi Democratic Republic of the Congo Rwanda Somalia South Sudan Other countries Total

Refugees Registered in Republic of Uganda in 2016

Percentage of Refugees Registered in Republic of Uganda in 2016

41,012 205,363

4.36 21.83

15,231 30,689 639,007 9,533 940,835

1.62 3.26 67.92 1.01 100.00

Source: UNHCR (2016).

Table A16. Number of Refugees from Different Countries Registered to Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 2016. Country or Territory of Origin

Eritrea Somalia South Sudan Sudan Other countries Total Source: UNHCR (2016).

Refugees Registered in Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 2016

165,548 242,014 338,774 39,896 650 786,882

Percentage of Refugees Registered in Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 2016

21.038 30.756 43.053 5.070 0.083 100.000

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Table A17. Number of Refugees from Different Countries Registered to Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 2016. Country or Territory of Origin

Iraq Syrian Arab Republic Other countries Total

Refugees Registered in Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 2016

33,118 648,836 3,243 685,197

Percentage of Refugees Registered in Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 2016

4.83 94.69 0.47 100.00

Source: UNHCR (2016).

Table A18. Number of Refugees from Different Countries Registered to Federal Republic of Germany in 2016. Country or Territory of Origin

Afghanistan Eritrea Iraq Islamic Republic of Iran Syrian Arab Republic Turkey Other countries Total

Refugees Registered in Federal Republic of Germany in 2016

46,292 30,020 86,045 22,910 375,122 19,136 69,047 648,572

Percentage of Refugees Registered in Federal Republic of Germany in 2016

7.14 4.63 13.27 3.53 57.84 2.95 10.65 100.00

Source: UNHCR (2016).

Table A19. Number of Refugees from Different Countries Registered to Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2016. Country or Territory of Origin

Burundi Central African Republic Rwanda South Sudan Other countries Total Source: UNHCR (2016).

Refugees Registered in DRC in 2016

36,332 102,489 245,052 66,672 1,411 451,956

Percentage of Refugees Registered in DRC in 2016

8.04 22.68 54.22 14.75 0.31 100.00

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Table A20. Number of Refugees from Different Countries Registered to Republic of Kenya in 2016. Country or Territory of Origin

Democratic Republic of the Congo Ethiopia Somalia South Sudan Other countries Total

Refugees Registered in Republic of Kenya in 2016

Percentage of Refugees Registered in Republic of Kenya in 2016

13,328

2.95

19,064 324,448 87,141 7,118 451,099

4.23 71.92 19.32 1.58 100.00

Source: UNHCR (2016).

References African Arguments. Retrieved from http://africanarguments.org. Accessed on May 4, 2018. Al Jazeera. (2017). Hundreds of Rohingyas’ killed in Myanmar crackdown. Al Jazeera, February 3. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/ rohingyas-killed-myanmar-crackdown-170203101817841.html. Accessed on April 16, 2018. Amnesty International. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org. Accessed on April 7, 2018. Anderson, J. (2009). The most failed state. Is Somalia’s new President a viable ally? The New Yorker, December 14. Retrieved from https://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2009/12/14/the-most-failed-state Barna, J. (2013). Coup in the Central African Republic: Chronicle of a fall foretold. Quick Policy Insight. Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, European Parliament. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/491491/EXPO-DEVE_SP%282013%294 91491_EN.pdf. Accessed on May 22, 2018. BBC News. (2017). UN condemns ‘devastating’ Rohingya abuse in Myanmar. BBC News, February 3. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38858655. Accessed on May 7, 2018. Betts, A., Omata, N., & Sterck, O. (2018). Refugee economies in Kenya, refugee studies centre. Oxford: Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford. Buzi, J. (2015). Refugee Nation: A radical solution to the global refugee crisis. Jason Buzi. Conciliation Resources. (2013, August). Briefing: Crisis in the Central African Republic. Retrieved from http://www.c-r.org/downloads/CAR_briefing_Conciliation Resources201308.pdf. Accessed on May 10, 2018.

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Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org. Accessed on May 31, 2018. European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, European Commission, Lebanon. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/middle-east/lebanon_en. Accessed on March 28, 2018. Fergusson, J. (2013). Somalia: A failed state is back from the dead. The Independent, January 13. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ somalia-a-failed-state-is-back-from-the-dead-8449310.html. Accessed on April 6, 2018. Forbes. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com. Accessed on April 23, 2018. Gibney, M. (2010). Global refugee crisis. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group. Global CRRF. Retrieved from www.globalcrrf.org. Accessed on May 29, 2018. History Channel. Retrieved from www.history.com. Accessed on March 8, 2018. Human Development Report (2016). Human development report 2016. New York, NY: UNDP. Retrieved from hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_ report.pdf. Accessed on April 30, 2018. InfoMigrants. InfoMigrants: reliable and verified news for migrants. Retrieved from http://www.infomigrants.net. Accessed on May 7, 2018. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org. Accessed on May 20, 2018. Jordan: UNHCR operational update. (2017, April). Report from UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/ jordan-unhcr-operational-update-april-2017. Accessed on March 19, 2018. New Vision-Uganda news. Retrieved from https://www.newvision.co.ug. Accessed on June 1, 2018. OCHA. Retrieved from https://www.unocha.org. Accessed on June 3, 2018. Refugee Coucil USA. Retrieved from https://www.refugeecouncilusa.org. Accessed on April 26, 2018. ReliefWeb – Informing humanitarians worldwide. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int. Accessed on March 19, 2018. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com. Accessed on April 17, 2018. Sky News. (2017). Explained: The Rohingya refugee crisis. Sky News, November 15. Retrieved from https://news.sky.com/feature/rohingya-crisis-11121896. Accessed on May 6, 2018. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com The Borgen Project, Downsize Poverty. Retrieved from https://www.borgenproject.org. Accessed on May 27, 2018. The Democratic Republic of the Congo Regional refugee response plan, January– December 2018. (2018). Report from UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/partners/donors/5ab8e2647/2018-democraticrepublic-congo-regional-refugee-response-plan-jan-dec-2018.html. Accessed on April 12, 2018. The Hindu. (2017). Myanmar army committed crimes against humanity: UN. The Hindu, February 4. Retrieved from https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/ Myanmar-Army-committed-crimes-against-humanity-UN/article17191102.ece. Accessed on May 4, 2018.

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Chapter 6

Impact of Refugees on Host Developing Countries Bhajan Chandra Barman

Abstract A refugee is a displaced person who has been forced to cross national boundary and who cannot return home safely. No one likes or chooses to be a refugee. Being a refugee means more than being an alien. It means living in exile and depending on others for such basic needs as food, clothing and shelter. The problem of refugees is the problem of human rights involving a flow of people from places of denial to the regions of guarantee. Today refugee problem is one of the core problems all over the world. It is the most complicated issue. When refugees are hosted in the neighbouring countries, economic, social, political and environment impacts are created on these host countries. The main objective of this chapter is to analyze these impacts created by refugees on the developing host countries. From the moment of arrival, refugees may compete with local citizens for scarce resources such as water, food, housing and medical services. Their presence increases the demands for education, health services, infrastructure such as water supply, sanitation and transportation, and also in some cases, for natural resources such as grazing and firewood. Keywords: Host countries; refugees; developing countries; refugee problem; basic eminities; water crisis

Introduction There are many problems in the world such as poverty, hunger, malnutrition, unemployment, violence, refugee etc. Among these, refugee problem is a complicated issue. There are many causes of refugee problem. A refugee crisis is mostly caused by enlarged international conflicts, massive violations of human rights, violence of the world wars, reorganization of the boundaries of nation states, intensification of ideological differences, international power politics, Refugee Crises and Third-World Economies, 103–111 Copyright © 2020 Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-190-520201011

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ethnic and religious strife, direct political persecution and economic and national disasters, etc. Nevertheless, most refugee movements today are caused by conflict (Loescher, 1992). There is a difference between refugee problem in the present day and the refugee problem of the earlier times because of its much enlarged orbit, variety of causes, political complexities and almost interminably wide range of problem-solving efforts. It is to be noted that in recent years, the refugee movements and forced movements not only increase in number but also assumed religious, racial and ideological characters. The refugee movements in the South Asian region emerged with the birth of the nation state with the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 and later due to the birth of Bangladesh in 1971. The refugee problem is a phenomenon of our age. It is the product not only of World War I and World War II but also of socio-economic inequalities. There are many definitions of refugees. Among these the most recognized and acceptable is the ones given by the United Nations. According to the United Nations, a refugee is any person who as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to the well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to or owing to such a fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country or who does not have a nationality and being outside of his country of his former habitual residence as a result of such event is unable or owing to such fear is unwilling to return to it (Loescher, 1992; Peter, 1997). The number of refugees worldwide is on the rise, reaching 22.5 million at the end of 2016 (UNHCR, 2017). The large majority, 84%, are hosted by developing countries (i.e. low- and middle-income countries), some of them among the poorest countries in the world.

Objective The main objective of this chapter is to analyze the impact of refugees on the host developing countries.

Methodology The chapter is descriptive and analytical in nature. It is mainly based on secondary data collected from various sources such as the existing literature, book, journals, newspapers, articles, government documents and reports, on refugees.

Impact of Refugees on Host Developing Countries Refugees are often perceived as a burden for the host country, putting pressure on public budget and service provision. However, refugees can also contribute to development by providing skills and resources, spurring production capacity and consumption demand. It is therefore important to complement short-term humanitarian responses to refugee crises with more long-term development-oriented responses to strengthen the positive impacts of forced

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displacement. Policy makers are increasingly acknowledging the importance of connecting humanitarian assistance to longer-term development planning (OECD, 2017). Developing countries that host refugees experience long-term economic, social, political and environmental impacts. From the moment of arrival, refugees may compete with local citizens for scarce resources such as water, food, housing and medical services. Their presence increases the demands for education, health services, infrastructure such as water supply, sanitation and transportation, and also in some cases, for natural resources such as grazing and firewood. The impacts of the refugee presence are both positive and negative (UNHCR Standing Committee, 2004). The majority of countries hosting large numbers of refugees are developing and poor countries. These countries hosted two-thirds of the global population of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The host government often largely ignores refugee-hosting communities in remote areas. Developing countries that host refugees for protracted periods can experience long-term, economic, social and environmental consequences (UNHCR Standing Committee, 1997). Vas Dev (2002) explored the socio-cultural impact of refugees on developing or host communities. This study encompasses the issues of social or relational as well as religious, linguistic and ethnic character which arise when large groups of refugees arrive within a given host community. She also observed that many developing host communities often face forms of socio-cultural change, including a challenged sense of identity and the increased visibility of ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic or ideological tensions between refugees and locals apart from economic and security problems. The socio-cultural impact of refugees on the receiving community can occur simply through their presence, in that they can play a role in altering the ethnic balance of the host community, and if the influx is sizeable, pose a threat to the cultural values and norms of the nation.

Economic Impact By economic impact we mean the impact of refugees on labour market, price and local trade of the host developing countries. Existing literature shows that there is positive as well as negative impact of refugees on these indicators of the host developing countries. We explain them one by one below:

Impact on Labour Market Many reports and case studies (Whitaker, 2002) show that due to the presence of refugees in the host developing countries, supply of labour increases in the local market of the host countries. The large increase in labour supply decreases wage rate of the local market. The refugees accept lower wage than locals. In this way, refugees help to reduce wage rate in the labour market. Apart from that, the existence of refugees in host countries helps in increasing job competition.

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Impact on Prices The presence of refugees in the host countries affects the price of commodities in the host market (Whitaker, 2002). From the previous literature it is found that higher number of displaced persons correlate with food prices (Alix-Garcia & Saah, 2009). Whitaker (2002) in his study on western Tanzania found that the presence of refugees in the mid-1990s caused price increase for basic foodstuff from between 100 and 400%. Alix-Garcia and Saah (2009), studying the impact of refugee influxes from Rwanda and Burindi in the same region, found increases in the market prices of agricultural goods. However, these effects on commodity prices are not uniform across all refugee contexts.

Impact of Local Trade Inflow of refugees affects the local trade of the host countries (Jacobsen, 2005). Several literature show that incoming of refugees increases the demand for goods and services. As a result production of goods increases. More economic activities generate. As a result, local business owners and self-employed farmers will benefit from both the increased demand and cheap labour force.

Social Impact If refugees are from the same cultural and linguistic group as the local population, there is often identification with and sympathy for their situation. There are many examples of refugees being given shelter in local people’s houses. Over 400,000 refugees have been housed with family or friends in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Different ethnicities, however, can be a basis for problems. Traditional animosities may exist between groups. Even if it is not the case, failures in communication and understanding caused by language and/or culture can form serious barriers. In some cases, the presence of one (ethnic) group of refugees may affect ethnic balances within the local population and exacerbate conflicts. There are commonly complaints that refugees have added to security problems in general and crime rates, theft, murder etc., in particular. Other social problems such as prostitution and alcoholism are also claimed to rise in the refugee areas. On the one hand, enforced idleness and poverty within a refugee camp may cause an escalation of such tendencies, particularly if there are groups of young men who are not meaningfully occupied. Moreover, refugees, as an ‘out’ group, can be blamed for all unwanted activities. Incidence of crime may rise no more than would be expected in a population group of the new size, but in a remote and previously quiet area, this would not go unnoticed. If the area has become a hub of economic activity, as the presence of large-scale aid would indicate, it may have attracted a group of people who will profit from the current situation and may not be constrained by the social and legal safeguards of the region. In a border area, this could include cross-border problems. Not only that, refugees can bring assets to the hosting area. Refugees indeed bring skills and knowledge with them that can be utilized to the benefit of local

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people. These skills vary, but do often include those of the more educated group, such as health professionals and teachers, who, even in limited numbers, can make a significant contribution in remote areas. An additional range of skills that can be brought by refugees may include an enterprise culture which can stimulate the local economy or offer innovative agricultural techniques previously unknown to the host areas. .

Political Impact In most cases, the presence of refugees does not have a significant negative impact on the political situation of the host countries. According to Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006), the incoming of refugees from neighbouring countries can destabilize neighbouring countries in the following ways: (1) Expansion of rebel social networks and diffusion of violence: Refugee camps Located close to the boundary of the country of origin can provide sanctuary to rebel organizations, and a base from which to carry out operations and fertile grounds for recruitment. (2) Facilitation of transnational spreading of arms, combatants and ideologies conducive to conflict: Refugees can serve as domestic opposition groups in the host country with material resources and motivation to wage their own armed battles. (3) Creation of bilateral tensions: At times, refugees can pose a security and political threat to the host country; and this, in turn, can create tensions in bilateral relations between neighbouring countries.

Environmental Impact There is an environmental impact of refugees on host country. By environmental impact we mean the impact of refugees on land, water, natural resources and slum growth. Various studies provide examples of different types of environmental impact (Jacobsen, 1997). The initial arrival phase of refugees may be caused by severe environmental impacts (UNHCR&FAO, 1998). Some of these immediate effects include fuel wood crises and water pollution in refugee camp areas. As the emergency period passes and refugees become settled, the nature of the environmental impact changes, but can still be significant. The most evident environmental impacts include: (i) deforestation and firewood depletion, (ii) land degradation, (iii) unsustainable groundwater extraction and (iv) water pollution. In addition, human waste disposal by displaced persons can contaminate local groundwater and cause the spread of diseases (UNEP, 2005). On sanitation issues, the impact has been serious. As we all know bad sanitation in a society affects the people who live within that society, and they are likely to suffer from diseases like cholera, malaria, diarrhoea or any related diseases. Still toilets are particularly problematic as was observed by Dick (2002).

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The problem of bad sanitation poses a serious health threat to the residents at the village. The sanitation condition is very bad and yet to be addressed by relevant agencies. Drainages are clogged, garbage not properly disposed of causing mosquitoes and flies all over and from the information I gathered malaria, diarrhoea, cholera among others are common sickness in the community.

Impact of Refugees on African Developing Countries There are currently 10 million individuals who meet the UNHCR’s definition of a refugee. These are individuals who are not able to return to their country of origin because of a well-grounded fear of persecution. A majority of these people will be settled into neighbouring countries and many will ultimately be repatriated. However, each year approximately 100,000 individuals will seek a more durable solution and will be resettled into a developed country, with the US accepting up to 70,000 individuals per year. Increasingly, the resettled population is being dominated by African refugees, with 29,000 individuals being resettled in 2004 alone, and the number of complex humanitarian emergencies in Africa promising to produce more refugees over the coming years. Although the food insecurity situation is described well for refugee camps, little is known about the food security situation of refugees once they have been resettled in the US, where most research on these groups has focused on health at the time of entry or mental health outcomes. This is unfortunate as secure access to sufficient food at all times is a basic human right and an important dimension of individual and family wellbeing. In developed country settings, where its occurrence has been linked with a range of poor health outcomes and poor dietary practice, food insecurity may serve as a key indicator of one aspect of the transition into life in the US and provide insight into the period following initial resettlement which has not yet received much attention. The objectives of the present study were to use an exploratory ethnographic approach to examine food insecurity and its manifestations among members of a resettled West African refugee community and then to assess the magnitude and severity of food insecurity using a survey of West African refugees living in a mid-sized US city. Secondary objectives were to examine the relationships between socio-economic status and indicators of acculturation and household food insecurity. Food security exists when people have predictable access at all times to nutritious and culturally appropriate foods. Food insecurity occurs whenever appropriate and safe foods are unavailable or the ability to acquire such foods is limited or uncertain. Conceptually, food insecurity is a more direct measure of inadequate or unreliable dietary supply than is low income because it more closely taps into the phenomena of interest. Food insecurity represents a major public health concern and is a useful index of health and well-being because it is associated with poverty, ill health, poor dietary intake (e.g. low intake of fruits and vegetables), limited social capital, depressive disorders and, paradoxically, overweight and obesity among females. Given the links between food insecurity and

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negative health, behavioural and schooling outcomes, food insecurity may serve as a barrier to successful integration in US society, an occurrence that produces health inequalities and a useful marker of overall health and well-being among this vulnerable subpopulation. In the US, where approximately 11% of households are food-insecure, food insecurity and its more severe form – hunger – ultimately results from insufficient income. The income–food insecurity relationship may be modified by differences in shopping practices, food preferences and budget management. Refugees resettled into the US and other developed countries are hypothesised to be at high risk of food insecurity because upon arrival they face high levels of unemployment and often have low incomes. Dietary acculturation, which is both the outcome and the process through which immigrants acquire and react to food-related habits of the dominant society, might also be linked to the occurrence and severity of food insecurity, and this might occur through multiple pathways. For instance, newcomers from developing countries are likely to face tremendous shifts in budget management and diet and food-related practices (e.g. shopping, preparation). Home budget management may, for example, predispose to early completion of income, either before the next pay cheque or before the next food stamp cycle begins. Food shoppers may seek out food items commonly consumed in their country of origin, the prices of which may not be compatible with their current monetary situation. These difficulties may be coupled with and exacerbated by language barriers, which have been shown to be associated with food insecurity among other lowincome populations. Thus, measures of socio-economics as well as indicators of acculturation, such as difficulty in the new shopping environment and language difficulties, may contribute to food insecurity. In line with this expectation, pilot evidence from this population and other refugee populations suggests that food insecurity is a potential public health concern, and one that is related to social, economic and cultural factors. However, we are aware of no other studies of food insecurity among Liberian refugees living in the US. On the basis of this short review, we hypothesised that food insecurity among this convenience sample of resettled African refugees would be associated with measures of acculturation and socio-economics. Specifically, we hypothesised that food insecurity would be greater among women who reported (1) lower income and education, and related to several measures of acculturation including (2) a shorter duration in the US, (3) difficulties in understanding others and (4) greater reported difficulties in the foodrelated environment. African refugees who have sought resettlement in the US are successfully managing at least some of the many challenges that come with relocation into a Westernised country. For instance, it is encouraging that those caregivers who had been in the US for longer amounts of time were far less likely to be participants in the FSP, especially in light of the fact that some measures of immigrant health often show declines with increasing amounts of time in the US29,30. Also encouraging were the clear associations between length of time in the US and the likelihood that a caregiver was employed. It is discouraging, however, that nearly one of three caregivers indicated food insecurity even after having lived in the US for more than two years. This is well past the point at which refugees are

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considered self-sufficient. Finally, the outcomes suggest that acculturation but not proxy measures of income drive the food insecurity decline. Identifying the barriers to food security after extended stays in the US will be an important next research step, as will investigating the potential impact of food insecurity on other domains of health and well-being.

Conclusion Countries that host refugees for long periods can experience long-term economic, social, environmental, and political and security impacts. While the impacts of a refugee presence on neighbouring countries are complex and context-specific, they are not necessarily only negative. The economic impacts of refugee presence on neighbouring countries have been both negative (e.g. uncompensated public expenditure and burden on the economic infrastructure) and positive (e.g. stimulated local economies by increasing the size of local markets and reducing commodity prices). The positive contributions that refugees can make to the economy of host countries should be viewed in terms of winners and losers among both refugees and host populations. The social impact of refugees is also context specific and includes inequalities between refugees and non-refugees and the resulting social tensions, which can be reduced by development projects targeting both refugees and the host communities. The environmental impact of refugees can also be alleviated through a combination of dispersed refugee settlement and targeted area development interventions. Similarly, some of the political and security impacts associated with the presence of refugees can be mitigated by a comprehensive framework to secure stability and development through sustainable solutions for displaced people. Furthermore, the growing number of refugees in urban settings also requires new approaches to effectively address the needs of the displaced in the context of urban planning and development.

References Alix-Garcia, J., & Saah, D. (2009). The effect of refugee inflows on host country population: Evidence from Tanzania. The World Bank Economic Review, 24(1), 148–170. Dick, S. (2002). Responding to protracted refugee situations: A case study of Liberian refugees in Ghana. UNHCR-Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit. EPAU/2002/ 06, Geneva. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.ch Jacobsen, K. (1997). Refugee’s environmental impact: The effect of patterns of settlement. Journal of Refugee Studies, 10(1), 19–36. Jacobsen, K. (2005). The economic life of the refugees. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Loescher, G. (1992). Refugee movements and international security. London: Brassey’s for The International Institute for Strategic Study (Adelphi Paper 268).

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OECD. (2017). Responding to refugee crises in developing countries: What can we learn from evaluations? Working Paper. OECD Publishing, Paris. Peter, C. M. (1997). Rights and duties of refugees under municipal law in Tanzania: Examining a proposed new legislation. Journal of African Law, 41(1), 81–99. Cambridge University Press. Salehyan, I., & Gleditsch, K. (2006). Refugees and the spread of civil war. International Organization, 60, 335–366. UNHCR. (2017). Global trends: Forced displacement in 2016. Retrieved from http:// www.unhcr.org/statistics UNHCR Standing Committee. (1997). Economic and social impact of massive refugee populations on host developing countries, as well as other countries. 6th Meeting. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/basics.html UNHCR Standing Committee. (2004). Economic and social impact of massive refugee populations on host developing countries, as well as other countries. 29th Meeting. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/excom/EXCOM/3ae68d0e10.html United Nations Environmental Program. (2005). Population displacement and the environment. In Sudan, post-conflict environmental assessment. Nairobi: UNEP. Retrieved from http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/sudan/05_displacement.pdf United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Food and Agricultural Organization. (1998). Tanzania: Environmental assessment report of the Rwandanese refugee camps and the affected local communities in Kagera region, 2–30 June 1994. PTSS Mission Report 94/29N. Geneva: UNHCR. Vas Dev, S. (2002, May). The reluctant host: The socio-cultural impact of refugees on developing communities. Mots Pluries, 21. Retrieved from http://motspluriels. arts.uwa.edu.au/MP2102s.html Whitaker, B. E. (2002). Refugees in Western Tanzania: The distribution of burdens and benefits among local hosts. Journal of Refugee Studies, 15(4), 339–358.

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Section IV Major Refugee Crisis in India

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Chapter 7

A Socio-economic Study of the Choephelling Tibetan Settlement in Miao, Arunachal Pradesh Sabina Yasmin

Abstract Soon after the first refugees started coming to India from Tibet, the Department of Home was established to coordinate the immediate relief assistance for them and to find a long-term solution for the resettlement of refugees. The resettlement of refugees, however, also involves providing basic amenities and adequate source of livelihood. As a result, towards the end, the Department of Home had established 58 Tibetan settlements in India, Nepal and Bhutan, and the welfare and interests of these settlements are looked after by their respective representative or welfare officers. These settlements are primarily assisted by the Government of India and other voluntary aid organizations. There are a total of 58 settlements, out of which there are 39 major and minor settlements in India, 12 in Nepal and 7 in Bhutan based either on agriculture or agro-industries or handicrafts. Of these, 39 major and minor settlements spread across the length and breadth of the country; 11 settlements are found in the north-eastern part of the country, most of which is concentrated in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Sikkim and West Bengal. The present study discusses the socioeconomic status of the Choephelling Tibetan settlement in Miao, Arunachal Pradesh, established in 1975. As per the 2008–2009 annual report, the current population is 2,816. The major source of livelihood for the settlers is farming. Alternatively, some of the settlers have also started carpet weaving as an alternate source of income. However, one of the greatest problems in the settlements is that the population is rapidly growing, due to the number of births in the community and the steady streams of new refugees, which has increased since 1980 when travel restrictions from Tibet became more relaxed. This has put a strain on the already fragile economy and infrastructure of the settlements, and the housing, sanitation, health clinics, Refugee Crises and Third-World Economies, 115–121 Copyright © 2020 Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-190-520201013

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schools and other facilities are no longer equipped to deal with the number of people in the settlements. This study attempts to address and discuss some of the major socio-economic issues faced by the settlers. Keywords: Tibetan refugees; fragile economy; refugee settlements; socioeconomic problem of refugees; refugee crisis; refugee settlers

Introduction The Tibetan exodus began in 1959, the same year His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama was forced to seek political asylum in India, along with his entire government and tens of thousands of ordinary Tibetans. Most of the people who ended in Miao-Choephelling lived in the isolated southeastern Tibetan region of Pemako. The elders in Miao-Choephelling recounted their experience from that time. They said that from Pemako, it took a month to walk from Lhasa to their village, and reports of the invasion were slow to reach their community. Then they saw the invasion first hand when some Chinese soldiers reached their settlement, which was why some decided it was time to leave (Hasmath & Hsu, 2007). In 1962, a temporary settlement was set up in Changlang for about 1,500 refugees. The Government of India perceiving the difficulties faced by the settlers, later shifted this settlement to Miao in 1975. The settlement falls under a protected area, and free movement of foreigners is not permitted in this settlement. It is situated at a distance of 120 km from Tinsukia and is located at Miao in the Changlang district of Arunachal Pradesh. Total area of the settlement is 2,000 acres (Magnusson, 2011; Magnusson, Childs, & Nagarajarao, 2009). The settlement that had an initial population of 1,133 (313 households), now has a current population of 2,888 (as in the 2016–2017 annual report). The broad objective of the chapter is to examine the socio-economic status of the Tibetan refugees of the Choephelling Miao settlement and also to highlight the problems faced by the settlement. The study is based on both primary and secondary data. The secondary data have been collected from the Central Tibetan Relief Committee, and the primary data have been collected with the help of personal interviews and questionnaires. A survey was conducted with 150 households as a sample from a population of 500 households. The sample size was selected using Taro Yamane’s formulae for sample size determination for a known population as given below: n ¼

N 1 1 Ne2

where, n 5 sample size required N 5 number of people in the population e 5 permissible error

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Data Analysis The results obtained are expressed with the help of percentage figures. Moreover, a Garrett ranking analysis was done to identify the problems faced by the villagers. As per this method, respondents were asked to assign a rank for all factors, and the outcome of such ranking was converted into a score value with the help of the following formula: Percentage position ¼ 100 Rij 2 0:5




Nj

where, Rij 5 Rank given for the ith variable by jth respondents Nj 5 Number of variable ranked by jth respondents With the help of Garrett’s Table, the percent position estimated is converted into scores. Then for each factor, the scores of each individual are added, and then total value of scores and mean values of score is calculated. The factors having highest mean value is considered to be the most important factor.

Results and Discussion Miao-Choephelling in the north-east state of Arunachal Pradesh is home to around 2,888 Tibetan settlers living in five camps. There are around 500 households. Each household received one acre of land from the Indian government for agricultural work (https://www.centraltibetanreliefcommittee.org/doh/tibetansettlements.html). They use their land to grow corn, rice and millet. Some women work in the handicraft centre in Choephelling Tibetan Service Cooperative society ltd. and weave rugs for the rare tourists. Some people also have small businesses, like selling garments or having a restaurant. The socioeconomic status of the sample population is given below (Table 7.1): Majority of the settlers are engaged in farming. Total area under cultivation is 1,371 acres. They cultivate maize, millet, barley, potatoes and chilli. Due to low per capita land holding, lack of irrigation facilities and poor technical know-how, yield is very low and do not fetch enough income. Some of the settlers also do carpet weaving in the settlement carpet centre to supplement their living. There are five villages with an average of 80 families in each village. Over decades the settlers in Choephelling were dependent on some small stores, the ‘Tibet Market’ to buy food like rice, salt, wheat flour or tea as well as non-food articles like sanitary goods or cigarettes. The ‘Tibet Market’ as well as all other houses and buildings like the school or the Old People Home exist since the settlement was founded in 1972. It was not until 2016 that on the auspicious occasion of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama’s 81st birth anniversary on 6 July, a new constructed ‘Mini Complex’ was inaugurated and replaced the ‘Tibet Market’ (Samaddar, 2003). It has a number of shops like one small family restaurant, a travel agency, a cyber cafe, a game zone and garment shops, a motor bike spare parts workshop and a shop for fresh

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Table 7.1. Socio-economic Indicators of the Refugees. Characteristics

Statistic

Head of the household Occupation (primary) Access to non-farm income Number of years of schooling (average) Farming experience (average) Distance of financial institution(average) Age (average) Annual consumption expenditure (average) Land holdings(average) (in acres) Crop diversification

89.29% male headed 73.94% are farmers 70% have access to non-farm income 3.9 years 13.7 years 4.79 km 46.2 years Rs. 122,300 0.898 ac. 69% practice crop diversification

Source: Author’s calculations from primary data.

vegetables, hardware shop etc. A Garrett ranking analysis of the problems and constraints are as shown below (Table 7.2): CST Miao (now STS Miao) was first established in 1963 situated in the midst of lush green vegetation and beautiful surroundings, providing an excellent environment for learning but is definitely not enough to cater to the needs of the community (Bentz, 2012). The school has an enrolment of around 400 students.

Table 7.2. Garrett Ranking Analysis of the Constraints. Constraints

Lack of proper educational facilities and institutions Shortage of financial institutions Lack of proper transportation and other infrastructural provisions Lack of employment opportunities Lack of cooperation from state government Lack of vocational and skillbased training Source: Author’s calculations from primary data.

Average Score

Garrett Rank

59.9

1

50.2 44.4

2 3

39

4

38.6

5

37.2

6

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The medium of instruction in the school is Tibetan up to class V and English from class VI to VIII with English and Tibetan as the main languages. From class VI onwards Hindi is taught to the Tibetan children as a third language. The school has made some progress in recent years with regard to infrastructure and in other desired fields. Today the school has a well-maintained computer lab with 09 computers, science lab, resource centre, music and dance room, library, sports room etc. The villagers do not have access to higher education. In order to pursue higher education, the student has to travel more than 30 km to reach the nearest higher education institution. Therefore, many students are sent to other parts of the country or to the central Tibetan Monastery in Dharamshala to pursue further studies. The average years of formal education among the sample group was found to be 10 years (approximately). Nearly 89% of the households were male-headed households, and 82% of these households practice farming as a primary occupation, 12% engage in carpet weaving and the rest are engaged in activities like small business, vendors, electricians etc. The camp boasts of producing superior quality carpets, a larger portion of which goes to the global market. The raw materials mainly cotton yarn (Rs.150/ kg) and wool (Rs. 200/kg), procured from Panipat in Haryana and some quantum from New Zealand, are exotically weaved to international standard and sold at Rs. 190 per square feet in the global market. There are 26 highly skilled women weavers and 6 male counterparts in the carpet industry, who on average earn around Rs. 20 lakhs annually as informed by the settlement officer of the camp. Farming practices among the villagers are mostly traditional while the majority of crops are grown in the Kharif season. There is lack of irrigational facilities and also credit to the farmers. They are largely dependent on the Tibetan co-operatives for their finance and other assistance. Besides two financial institutions, the settlement now also has a Western Union money transfer to enable them to transfer cash back and forth. Under the Lottery to Canada program (Tibetan Refugee Project in Canada), nearly 15% of the population have been sent to Canada to set up a career there and help establish their families by working in Canada. With the help of Garrett ranking analysis it was found that the main problems or obstacles faced by the settlement in order of the ranks are lack of infrastructure, communication and connectivity, lack of proper credit facilities, negligence from the local government and authorities and lack of vocational and skill-based training. The first and the most important challenge faced by the settlement is infrastructure, both social and economic infrastructure. The settlement does not have proper and adequate building, houses and sanitation facilities, and there is also a lack of proper health and educational infrastructure. However, with external assistance only few make it to higher education and beyond. The inaccessibility of the settlements alone means that providing for the education of children close to home is impossible. Aid supports hundreds of children in their education, but they must attend boarding schools many days’ journey from their families, with visits home every three to five years at most. The cost of education is family separation. In the absence of proper financial institution, the settlers resort to other informal sources of credit as mentioned in the Table 7.3:

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Table 7.3. Response of Uninsured Farmers on the Loss Compensation Measures. Response to Measures of Loss Compensation

Response Percentage

(1) Sale of fixed assets (2) Borrow from friends and relatives (3) Government aid/relief (4) Sale of livestock (5) Bank loan (6) Borrow from money lender (7) Hypothecation of house/ jewelry

40.10 20.31 15.63 10.42 7.81 4.69 1.04

Source: Primary data from field survey.

Lack of communication and proper infrastructure also leads to lack of proper information and unawareness about various programs and facilities available to the settlers. The most preferred source of information that they rely on are as given below in Table 7.4. Therefore, the impediments faced by the settlers can be overcome with the target programs that aim to improve the social and economic infrastructure of the region. Connectivity and network is one of the major causes of concern along with education and vocational training.

Table 7.4. Response of the Settlers on the Preferred Media. Media Preferred

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Radio Village sabha Mobile/sms Television Farmers’ sabha or meetings and discussions (6) NGOs (7) Post office (8) Agricultural banks (9) Insurance agents (10) Advertisements/hoardings

Source: Primary data from field survey.

Response Percentage

32.81 11.46 9.89 9.38 7.29 6.77 5.21 5.21 3.65 3.12

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Conclusion We have seen that the Miao-Choephelling Tibetan settlement is one of the largest settlements in Arunachal Pradesh in India. The major source of livelihood for the settlers is farming. Alternatively, some of the settlers have also started carpet weaving as an alternate source of income. However, one of the greatest problems in the settlements is that the population is rapidly growing, due to the number of births in the community and the steady streams of new refugees, which have increased since 1980 when travel restrictions from Tibet became more relaxed. This has put strain on the already fragile economy and infrastructure of the settlements, and the housing, sanitation, health clinics, schools and other facilities are no longer equipped to deal with the number of people in the settlements. Though agriculture is the primary source of livelihood, it is unable to generate enough food and income for the settlement. The agricultural practices itself need revamping with modern methods of cultivation, improved credit facilities, multiple cropping and education of the farmers. There is an urgent need to address these important needs for the proper and healthy development of the community, which in turn will contribute to the Indian Economic Development as well. The entrepreneurship ventures by the refugee settlements need to be encouraged, and proper credit and other facilities need to be provided to stimulate the process of growth.

References Bentz, A.-S. (2012). Being a Tibetan refugee in India. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 31(1), 80–107. Hasmath, R., & Hsu, J. (2007). Social development in the Tibet Autonomous Region: A contemporary and historical analysis. International Journal of Development Issues, 6(2), 125–141. Magnusson, J. (2011). Tibetan refugees as objects of development, Indian development philosophy and refugee, resistance in the establishment of Lukzung Samdrupling, the first Tibetan refugee settlement in India. Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies, 30(1), 114–125. Magnusson, J., Childs, G., & Nagarajarao, S. (2009). South Indian Tibetans: Development dynamics in the early stages of the Tibetan refugee settlement Lugs zungbsam grub gling, Bylakuppe. Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, 4, 1–31. Samaddar, R. (2003). Status of refugees in India: Strategic ambiguity. In R. Samaddar (Ed.), Refugees and the state: Practices of asylum and care in India, 1947–2000. New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

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Chapter 8

An Insight into the Immediate Crisis of Ecological Refugees: A Retrospective Study on Tehri Dam Project Chhatradhar Das and Raunak Das

Abstract Large dams have played a key role in the economic development of a country. They serve a variety of purposes, including electricity generation, flood control and irrigation. Nevertheless, development-induced forced migration of human population for the construction of Tehri Dam in Old Tehri of Garhwal–Himalayan region of Uttarakhand has invited lot of controversy in the recent past. A new city has been designed and presented by the government as a solution for the new settlement of migrated people. A large dam has enormous consequences for people’s lives and livelihoods. Tehri Dam transforms landscapes of the region greatly, creates risks of irreversible impacts including controversial issues such as displacement and resettlement and also alters the natural functioning of the entire ecosystem. As a consequence of ecological disruption, a large number of human populations lost their migratory routes and considered as ecological refugees in their new habitat. The present study aims to understand how the forced migration has changed people’s daily lives in social, cultural, religious and economic aspects. People’s perceptions were discerned through participatory discussions. The field work has been carried out through direct communion with the villagers to explore how the government has reacted to the voices of the resettled citizens and how the development process has affected traditional livelihoods of the rural communities. Keywords: Ecological refugee; forced migration; landscapes; irreversible impacts; ecological disruption; traditional livelihoods

Refugee Crises and Third-World Economies, 123–135 Copyright © 2020 Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-190-520201014

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Introduction Involuntary displacement of human population is always traumatic irrespective of the causes. Leading to such migrations, the degree of suffering experienced by those people can never be quantified in money values. Development-induced forced displacement is a social problem affecting multiple levels of human activity. In recent years, construction of a dam has invited lot of controversy. Forced migration has also been associated with the construction of dams for hydroelectric power generation and irrigation and also related to the result of various developmental projects. Development is really a comprehensive term, and from the holistic point of view, it means the fulfilment of the material, moral and aesthetic aspirations of man and his society (Das, 2013). One very important aspect of development is the construction of huge dams, big barrages and other irrigation networks. High dams alter the landscape greatly and many unforeseen problems may crop up as a result of habitat modification. Since development is a must for the developing countries, so as to improve the quality of life of the people, it is imperative that it should not disrupt the ecological harmony. Development activity is also considered as an inevitable step towards modernization and economic growth in developing countries. However, for those who are displaced, the ultimate result is most often loss of livelihood and impoverishment. The Garhwal Himalayan region has already experienced two environmental movements during last few decades. The great Chipko Movement lit the lamp of environmentalism in the Garhwal Himalayan region. Later on, people belonging to the grass-roots level launched a united revolt being inspired by the agitation against the construction of Tehri Dam. Indeed, Chipko Movement was a sensible effort of man which has an example of fight for ecological tranquillity and sustainability. The movement against the Tehri Dam is projected as a milestone for desired development in the region. Counteraction has led the agitation to take up a new dimension – the slogan against ecological destruction, the voice necessitating Himalayan safety for the development of the hill people and to a greater extent a slogan for the security and stability of the Himalayas. Though the movement against Tehri Dam Project could not prevent construction of Dam, the movement could build up a spontaneous human response against the construction of the dam. An introspection of the mode and manner of the movements reveals that the spirit of organization played more important role in case of Anti-Tehri Dam Movement. The ‘Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangharsh Samiti’ (TBVSS) aptly amalgamated the individual discontent to lead the Anti-Tehri Dam Movement in a unified form. The original residents of Tehri town, who became homeless for dam project, became the members of the Samiti out of their natural zeal, as they were the direct victims of the Project. The Anti-Tehri Dam Movement was colossal in course of time when other two sections joined themselves in the movement. The sections were (i) the environmentalist group and (ii) a section of common people, driven by their religious sentiment, nurtured by TBVSS. There too, the TBVSS in terms of organizational capacity played signal role. The movement led by TBVSS clearly indicates that organization based on concrete ground does not necessitate strong leadership in all cases. However, the presence of Bahuguna was an added

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privilege to develop momentum in movement. He challenged the Dam Project by fasting unto death on three occasions. The apprehension of environmental degradation, though scheduled in agenda, could not be popular as homeless people were indignantly concerned of their rehabilitation. Besides, political diplomacy moved stealthily to bedevil the movement. A number of direct sufferers alleged that money was used as bet to a section of leadership to divert them from mainstream of the movement. However, some people still believe that the Anti-Tehri Dam Movement in India was a successful environmental movement to build a concrete base throughout the world against construction of dam.

Material and Methods A retrospective study on status of ecological refugees in respect of Tehri Dam Project was carried out. The majority of the people of Old Tehri were rehabilitated to New Tehri District and other nearby locations for the construction of Tehri Dam. People’s perceptions were discerned through participatory discussions. Perception of the local people as well as that of environmental activists and leaders of the movement has been recorded through field survey. A total of 80 common people were interrogated who were rehabilitated at New Tehri Town, Baurari and Bhagirathipuram of Garhwal Himalayan Region. Most of the respondents are jobless at present though they had cultivable lands in Old Tehri. A few of them also were, however, shop owners. Among them one was a photographer. He had a passion for photography, and his collections on Old Tehri, both on natural topography and life, have been much helpful to the dam authority as well as to the others in comparing the situation of the past to the present. The respondents included people belonging to varied professions, viz., the dam personnel, persons of engineering profession, school teachers, political leaders, staff of panchayat office, general volunteers of the association of Anti-Tehri Dam Movement, as well as activists of the association, the leaders of the said movement, common shop-owners, staff of the transport department, even simple taxi-drivers with a view to ascertain a representative perception in general against the Dam Project. All of them once lived in Old Tehri, and now they are the residents of New Tehri and nearby locations. The process of interview was based on random sampling. Breaking the way of conventional method, the researcher darted at the person whoever was available without discriminating his/her status or qualification; but the researcher considered the respondents of not less than 45 years of age to judge their personal attachment and/or experience with the movement.

Results and Discussion Displacement of human populations from their natural habitat results in a host of socio-economic impacts as well as climatic and other behavioural implications. The issue of displacement is seen as a necessary evil in order to construct a dam for irrigation and power project, which are intended to serve ‘greater good’. Here displacement is the consequence of pre-planned developmental projects

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undertaken by the government. Moreover, a deeper evaluation on this issue provides different picture about the disastrous impact on local communities, who have been forced to move. As a consequence of ecological disruption, a large number of human populations lost their migratory routes and were considered as ecological refugees in their new habitat. Displacement is described as dislocation of people from their native place and region. It often exacerbates rather than mitigates economic insecurity, helplessness and alienation. This could mean loss of economic livelihoods and communities. After independence, the developmental projects were launched by the government, which were formulated, designed and carried out by the engineers and bureaucrats, who had no concern for environmental and rehabilitation issues. Involuntary displacement occurred due to the need to build dams, transportation, power generation, urban development and so on. Big dams also have serious implications on the cultural bonds of the local habitats. It is claimed that such a project creates employment and improves services. However, it also displaces people from their land, community and cultural heritage and raises major issues on social justice and equity. This chapter looks into not only the traditional challenges posed by big dams but also aims to understand how the forced migration has changed people’s daily lives in social, cultural, religious and economic aspects. The field work has been carried out through direct communion with the villagers to explore how the government has reacted to the voices of the resettled citizens and how the development process has affected traditional livelihoods of the rural communities.

Table 8.1. Perceptions on Different Issues. Issues

Responses

[A] Perception on the project No benefit for local people and its benefits Beneficial for Delhi and other states It has improved the economy of this region Project is beneficial to us Project generated more employment [B] Perception regarding Benefits increased in other state benefits of power Benefits not received generation No idea Perception regarding Benefits increased in other state benefits of agriculture Benefits not received No idea

% of Responses

81.3 62.5 18.8 18.8 12.5 75 93.8 6.3 75 68.8 18.8

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Table 8.1. (Continued) Issues

Responses

[C] Perception on Movement Important role to protect environment of this region Political movement Unsuccessful movement Environmental movement Successful movement [D] Perception on principal Availability of job opportunity challenges Maintenance of environmental integrity/harmony Distance between places Sustainable development Stabilization of Himalayan ecology Disaster mitigation plan [E] Perception on present Extreme climatic condition place of residence Unemployment Distance between places Inadequate transportation facility Lack of fellow feeling Drinking water facility Lack of business opportunity Inadequate agricultural land Inadequate hospital facility Geographical barrier Trust and confidence Security for women [F] Views and suggestions No big dam Impartial rehabilitation Plantation for stabilization of Himalayan ecology Rope way

% of Responses

87.5 81.2 81.2 18.8 18.8 88.8 78.8 71.2 41.2 35 11.2 73.8 70 66.3 58.8 55 51.3 41.3 22.5 16.3 10 5 0.2 80 73.8 63.8 46.3

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Perception on the Project and Its Benefits The respondents rehabilitated from Old Tehri by the Tehri Hydro Development Corporation (THDC) could have their own perception on the project and its benefits. Over 80% of the responses indicate that the project in no way benefits them. Such a perception is due to the impression that they had not been compensated adequately. The authorities rehabilitated individual families and not the village as a whole with the principle ‘cash for Land, and nothing for the Landless’. The authorities also weakened the strong opposition to the dam by exploiting the caste and class differences amongst the oustees (Paranjpye, 1988). According to Table 8.1, 81.3% respondents opined that the dam is not beneficial for local people at all. According to 62.5% of the respondents, the Dam Project in Tehri has been beneficial for Delhi and Uttar Pradesh for the provision of abundant supply of water and electricity while Tehri itself has been looser. On the contrary, 18.8% people do not agree and they consider that the Tehri Dam Project has improved the economy of this region. According to them there has been much development in Tehri and Himalayan regions for the dam. Dam project authority demanded large amounts of skilled and unskilled labour, which can benefit the surrounding communities. But, in the study, it is found that only 12.5% people have expert job potentiality due to dam project. They consider that a few or very few rehabilitated people are fortunate to earn their livelihood directly or indirectly from the project, although many of the dam construction projects promise to provide employment opportunities for local people.

Perception Regarding Benefits of Power Generation and Agriculture Irrigation to cultivable land and power generation were the main two objects of Tehri Dam Project. But the residents of New Tehri did not conceal their frustration that the Project yielded no benefit to them. According to Table 8.1, most of the people of New Tehri (93.8%) are aggrieved of being deprived of the hydro-electric power. They consider that in spite of the government’s assurance of providing electricity free of cost for 10 years besides rehabilitation, supply of power remains in dark still today. They believe that it was a trick to get the dam project executed and finally forget all assurance forever. According to the local residents, the Dam Project, which yields benefits in irrigation in New Tehri, cannot serve the village as there is no vast stretches of cultivable land. As a result, the question of agricultural development in New Tehri is a utopian scheme. Instead, the benefits yielded thereupon is comfortably transferred and enjoyed by other neighbouring states. However, still there were a few respondents who expressed ‘No idea’ regarding both the benefits.

Perception on Movement It comes out from the field survey that the majority of the respondents (87.5%) confirm the Anti-Tehri Dam Movement as a great weapon in safeguarding the environment on the Himalayas.

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But 81.2% of the people consider that the Anti-Tehri Dam Movement in no way can be identified as environmental movement; rather it can be well recognized as a political movement as the matter of rehabilitation crept in its usual course of action. The involvement of political parties, gave the movement an antigovernment dimension. It is observed in field survey that the most ordinary people, who did not suffer the hardship for Tehri Dam Project Construction, did not participate in the Anti-Tehri Dam Movement. Environmental aspects due to dam construction also were not much popular. Therefore, in the absence of the popular and acceptable environmental slogan as well, the movement failed to take the shape of environmental movement to the common folk. The other resentment was observed in the policy of governmental fund allotment in the matters of rehabilitation. Justice and equality were the other questions raised by the common people against the government in cases of rehabilitation. Because, initially those who came forward spontaneously with their own pieces of land for dam construction keeping in view of speedy development of the locality, were the worst sufferers ultimately. They did not get adequate help from the government for the rehabilitation; only a token money was offered to them for transfer of land. On the contrary, those, who were conservative from the very beginning and hesitating in transferring land, were fortunate to get coveted compensation. They were also lucky to get sufficient financial aid for building construction. Hence, the question of fairness and justice as perceived by the residents in fund allotment cannot be ignored. It also observed in Table 8.1 that an average of 18.8% out of 80 respondents opined in favour of Anti-Tehri Dam Movement as a real environmental movement. According to them, the slogan ‘rehabilitation’ is an inclusion in later course of agitation, but initially it meant only against the construction of dam. Construction of big dam will destabilize Himalaya’s geographical/topographical entity. The reservoirs for large dam will cause earthquake on the Himalayan region. Moreover, the repairing works of reservoirs, if necessary, is not possible in any way. Therefore, they suggest construction of a number of small dams which could adjust with the ecology of the Himalayas as well as could achieve its target of power generation. However, the Anti-Tehri Dam Movement begets the benefits of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) mandatory before undertaking any project by the government. Herein lies the success of the movement as deemed by 18.8% respondents.

Perception on Principal Challenges In course of studying human perception towards Anti-Tehri Dam Movement, another aspect of research was conducted simultaneously. It was the basic challenge that the residents of New Tehri faced the maintenance of tranquillity on the hills as well as ways in which people can lead a healthy life. The respondents identified those challenges which have been shown in Table 8.1. A majority of the respondents (88.8%) face unemployment as a big challenge to normal life. The unemployed youths are compelled to pass their valuable time idly

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for want of job. They become worried for the money they received as compensation which will be exhausted soon. Thus they will be frustrated. They also accused the authority of THDC for non-compliance of their promise for providing employment at least one member per family. As a consequence of dam construction, ecological balance on the hills gets utterly disturbed. A total of 78.8% respondents consider it as a big challenge and argue that construction of dam on the hill is responsible for a number of disasters such as excessive soil erosion, increase of occurrence of earthquake, destruction of forests, loss of biodiversity, etc. In addition to it, destruction of forest for rehabilitation in New Tehri causes a number of ecological maladies. However, they appreciate the newly setting up of Botanical Garden in that locality by THDC; but at the same time criticize their unwise policy. A majority of respondents as good as 71.2% mentioned ‘distance’ as a great barrier in leading normal social life in New Tehri. It has made the lifestyle expensive. In Old Tehri, the bridge over the river was the easiest means of communication, while in New Tehri absence of such facility has caused great disadvantages to the people. Among the respondents, 41.2% solicit the need of sustainable development on the hill which can solve their problems to some extent. There are 35% people who advocate the stabilization of Himalayan ecology which is now facing a challenge. According to them the Himalayas being relatively tender in age, its topography is subject to frequent change. Therefore, any short sighted and unplanned scheme for development may eventually harm Himalayan stability. Hence, low-capacity hydel power stations by constructing small dams instead of a big one are solicited. The 11.2% respondents suggest that an anti-disaster plan should be made ready before adopting any developmental scheme.

Perception on Present Place of Residence During field survey, views of the households, already rehabilitated, have been collected. Of the 80 persons interviewed, majority of respondents are not satisfied with the facilities provided there. However, some of the respondents face some serious problems, in terms of water availability, extreme climate, lack of employment opportunity and inadequate medical facilities (Table 8.1). The discussion with the respondents of New Tehri where they have been rehabilitated expresses their discomfort at the new place for the reasons manifold. The reasons have been identified in 12 categories, shown in Table 8.1, taking into majority’s view on the subject. Among them, the extreme climate of New Tehri is chiefly responsible for their discomfort according to most of the respondents (73.8%). They think the climate of Old Tehri was much better than New Tehri. The residents of Old Tehri where people were habituated with a temperate climate have now been forced to shift to New Tehri where extreme cold climatic condition persists, resulting in discomfort and dissatisfaction both physically and mentally. To them, the Old Tehri with treasures of congenial topography, plenty of water and soothing atmosphere is still indispensable, while shifting to new habitation can hardly be a substitute for having heart to heart relation with the old place. The affluent river of Old Tehri where life was exuberant now seems to be a pool of stagnant water to them in New

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Tehri. Here, the river fails to cause any pleasure to the people. Consequently, the air has become moisture laden and the sky remains foggy in most periods of the year. The captivated charm of the Himalayan peaks glittering in the sun beam is no more visible due to foggy weather prevailing most of the time. Among the respondents, 70% residents who have been shifted to New Tehri take it sinister ones. In Old Tehri, everybody had his or her particular job for earning livelihood. In New Tehri, the people have some pocket money for passing the days temporarily. But a farmer without his land has to suffer the brunt of life. Similarly, the workers are jobless as there is no factory. There are sparsely few shops but that too are without buyers. According to the feelings of the people, Old Tehri was advantageous to them for many reasons. A total of 66.3% respondents of present New Tehri consider that geographical distance among the villages has been a great barrier for direct communication. The river served them as mother to the baby. Her freshwater was used for bathing, domestic work and even quenching their thirst. Closeness, proximity to river provided them convenience in carrying water. The civilization of Old Tehri was more than hundred years old where amenities like shops, markets, schools, colleges and hospitals were easily accessible. The town was nicely equipped with a number of playgrounds, Ghanta Ghar, temples, Gurdwara, cenotaph, palace, primary health centre, district offices and other establishments like studio, TV shops, etc. – all lying in a stone’s throw distance. Almost all the residents in Old Tehri had their own pieces of cultivable land which were used in cultivation. The relatives they had, lived nearby with kith and kin relationship. The town was also well connected with the surrounding villages. Shifting to New Tehri has caused barrier in communicating from one hill to another as a result of increasing distance. The distance has been doubled due to construction of large pool. The New Tehri has only one playground, but to reach there means a tedious journey of more than an hour. The shops and markets are not easily accessible to the buyers; hence there is hardly any sale. Hospital facility remains beyond accessible of the people for distant location. In New Tehri, everybody has been allotted residential plot. Therefore, there is no scarcity of residential unit, but the people have no job in their hand. In Old Tehri, the in-between distance among the villages was within comfortable range. The both sides of the river were well connected by bridge that would facilitate easy communication. The location of New Tehri is such that it can hardly be communicated with the neighbouring villages easily. In hilly tracks, the normal activities like shopping, marketing, attending to schools and hospitals usually become troublesome due to distance factor besides uneven topography. Again, the number of vehicles in New Tehri is scanty. The 58.8% respondents complained that inadequate transportation system is responsible for poor communication. According to 55% respondents, the congenial neighbourly attitude is almost absent in the inhabitants of New Tehri, whereas in Old Tehri people lived in amicable understanding and cooperation. The other major problem is the crisis of drinking water which was mentioned by 51.3% respondents. In New Tehri, water supply depends on pumping from stagnant pool which is being supplied to the domestic houses, but it is not at all safe for drinking purpose as reported by the respondents. Situation becomes worse when there is mechanical defect in the

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pumping station. The area remains dry for several days till further repairing work is executed. Hence, the people have to fetch water by employing harder toil over the rough mountain which is a mammoth task for the individual household and therefore, many of the residents are to manage by buying water at their own cost. Unemployment of the migrated people of the New Tehri is not only a social scar but also poses physical and mental threat to them resulting in depression and fatigue. A total of 41.3% respondents alleged that government did not keep its promise about employment. According to them, the government had earlier promised employment of single member from each migrated family, but this promise has not been materialized till such time. As such, the young generation is frustrated and runs in errands due to deprivation of job. All time becomes their leisure hour which is wasted by watching TV. The new settlement was merely a scheme of residential complex in New Tehri without making provision for cultivable land. The migrated people who possessed farming land in Old Tehri were compensated merely in cash but nowhere allotted farming land in new settlement. As per the view of the 22.5% respondents, such rehabilitation scheme affects the traditional standard of life of the newly settled people. They point out that all food and vegetables are to be gathered from outside. There was almost no indigenous cultivation, and thereby the cost of essential commodities soared high. People did not conceal their frustration on health service. According to 16.3% respondents, the infrastructure of the hospital in New Tehri is not modernized. Patient with critical syndrome is shifted to Dehradun for proper treatment. Hardly any patient can bear such tiresome long journey. Besides this, the location of the hospital, on the top of the hill, is another disadvantage to the villagers of the foothills. Transportation problems also aggravate the situation. A section of people (10%) complained that uneven topography of hilly region is responsible for smooth leading of life in New Tehri. Only 5% people complain the absence of mutual trust and confidence among people is another cause of discontent. Only 0.2% residents point out regarding the safety of women during post evening period.

Views and Suggestions The Anti-Tehri Dam Movement was not merely a regional movement to stir up the local people, but it also took up a national shape as well as drew global attention against unwise developmental scheme. A study on 80 people for the present research work was conducted to adjudge people’s view regarding their new settlement and its problems. They put forward some remedial suggestions to tackle the problems of smooth leading of life as well as rehabilitation in New Tehri. Their opinions have been exhibited in Table 8.1. According to 80% respondents, construction of the big dam may damage the topographical harmony of the area. They opine that the resulting damage might not be experienced by the present generation, but it would be felt by the future generation. A total of 73.8% of the respondents opine that the rehabilitation scheme in New Tehri was not impartial and free from all vices. According to them the Dam Movement

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initiated only with the object to safeguard environment, but later on the problem of rehabilitation became a prominent issue in the movement. Consequently, the movement which was being nourished by the environmental organizations now slipped off to the political quarters. Hence, the flow of movement went on astray and emerged as a fight between the government and anti-government associations. The common people referred to governmental policy of creating confusion and depredation among them to nullify the movement though the leaders did not accept it. Therefore, the rule of justice in case of rehabilitation in New Tehri could not be established. A section of people was cleverly used to weaken the force of agitation. Few people had been kept abashed by sanctioning fabulous compensation. As it would have been, the movement lost its vitality; common people had no faith upon a section of leaders. They strongly believed that such leaders enjoyed a lion’s share of the fruit of rehabilitation. Having no trust upon the movement, a section of people was compelled to appeal before the Court. There are 63.8% respondents who stressed on forestation in organized way to ensure Himalayan ecology unhurt. According to them, one or two botanical gardens sparsely sprouted cannot do away with the problem. The vast stretches of the Himalayan region should be made green under an organized forestation programme. In order to improve communication system, THDC already started ferry service. 46.3% respondents solicit introduction of ropeway to facilitate the communication network more comfortable.

Conclusion Big dams and other development projects are often associated with progress and prosperous economic development for many countries, including India (Khagram, 2005). But construction of dam has always been controversial and thereupon has generated serious opposition from common masses. The development of effective economic instruments to compensate and rehabilitate the displaced people is one of the most important issues where policy makers need to ensure their life style at least as it was before. But the people of this region have discontent regarding the economic development of the region as they are mostly jobless at present. The consequences for the construction of Tehri Dam also affect the livelihood of people to a greater extent. A lack of transportation and inefficient travel routes also prevent easy access to district headquarters, health centre, markets and so many other everyday necessities for the communities of New Tehri. The migrated people also have to suffer on part of their domestic needs, which earlier were available within the village itself. The activists of Anti-Tehri Dam Movement had opined against construction of dam on Garhwal–Himalayan region. According to them the region is seismologically sensitive and the construction of dam will eventually destabilize geological characteristics of the locality inviting occasional earthquake (Das, 2013). Bandyopadhyay (1992) mentioned that the high seismicity of the Himalayan region is rooted in its orogenic evolution, as a result of which the Himalaya is still rising. The social cost of involuntary resettlement also varies greatly between projects. However, a disproportionate number of oustees are landless people who in

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many instances were resettled with force and violence. According to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which lays down that all oustees should be paid an additional amount equivalent to 15% of the total value of compensation as ‘solatium’, on grounds that all such acquisition is involuntary. The project authorities, on the other hand, have paid solatium to only those oustees who have protested by appealing to the courts (Paranjpye, 1988). They reason that whoever does not litigate in court has accepted land acquisition voluntarily. This can only be a distortion of the spirit of the Act. Development through dam is regarded by many as anti-people which are solely focused on benefiting the government. The discussion with the respondents of New Tehri where they have been rehabilitated expresses their discomfort at the new place for the reasons manifold. Some of the respondents treated themselves as ecological refugees and they face some serious problems in terms of water availability, extreme climate, lack of employment opportunity and inadequate medical facilities (Das, 2013). According to them, the extreme climate of New Tehri is chiefly responsible for their discomfort. As a consequence of ecological disruption, a large number of human populations lost their migratory routes and considered as ecological refugees in their new habitat. Other major consequence of the Tehri Dam project is the increasing numbers of project affected people. Many displaced people claim that this is due to lack of sufficient scientific studies carried out before the project began. Those who received official designation as Project Affected People (PAP) have received some form of compensation from the government for their loss of land (Joy, Gujja, Vispute, Paranjape, & Goud, 2008). But the authorities have weakened the strong opposition to the dam by exploiting the caste and class differences among the oustees. The authorities also applied psychological pressures, and those who vacated the land late were threatened with not getting land as compensation (Paranjpye, 1988). Unemployment of the migrated people of the New Tehri is considered as a social scar and poses physical as well as mental threat to them resulting in depression and fatigue. Thus the development dilemma reconciling economic needs of the ecological refugees which can be solved only through an integrated approach to development taking into account all the myriad factors like ecological, economic, social, cultural and governmental factors involved in the functioning of such system. Development as it is said pro-people, the benefits of the progress should serve everyone equally – not only some with least disruption of the ecological, social and cultural life of the people and a larger benefit to the people as a whole (Chand, 2014).

References Bandyopadhyay, J. (1992). From environmental conflicts to sustainable mountain transformation: Ecological action in the Garhwal Himalaya. In D. Ghai & J. M. Vivian (Eds.), Grassroots environmental action: People’s participation in sustainable development. London: Routledge.

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Chand, J. (2014). Socio-economic and physical impact of Tehri Dam: A geographical review. Review of Research, 4(3), 1–6. Retrieved from www.ror.isrj.org. Accessed on February 14, 2018. Das, C. (2013). Role of environmentalism towards sustainable development – A retrospective study on Anti Tehri Dam movement. In International conference on environment and its impact on society (pp. 243–247). Kolkata: J. D. Birla Institute. Joy, K. J., Gujja, B., Vispute, S., Paranjape, S., & Goud, V. (2008). Water conflicts in India: A million revolts in the making. New Delhi: Routledge. Khagram, S. (2005). Dams and development: Transnational struggles for water and power. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Paranjpye, V. (1988). Evaluating the Tehri Dam. Studies in Ecology and Sustainable Development (Vol. 1, An INTACH Series). New Delhi: Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage.

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Chapter 9

Chakma Refugees in Arunachal Pradesh: Their Inclusion and Setback Kallol Debnath and Kunal Debnath

Abstract In 2015, the Supreme Court of India directed the Government of India to confer the citizenship right to the Chakma refugees, who settled in NorthEastern States in India. Arunachal Pradesh, the former North Eastern Frontier Agency, holds a large number of Chakma refugees who had migrated to India from the erstwhile East Pakistan during the late 1960s. The present benevolent approach of the Government of India towards this ethnorefugee community is having domestic as well as external implication in the backdrop of rampant deportation of refugees from its neighbouring state, Bangladesh. Mere citizenship right may result in the administrative integration of the Chakmas but could not resolve their crises as alien versus indigenous debate intensifies the refugee crises today. Over the decades, political alienation of the Chakma refugees extended their sense of deprivation and marginalization. A separate perspective is required to assess the Chakmas’ claim that they are after all not alien to India since their ancestral land Chittagong Hill Tracts were under Indian territory and they have had a deep allegiance to this territory because of India’s accommodative pluralistic outlook and multi-ethnic characters. Permanent means of livelihood, legal rights over land holding and bridging social capital would help ethnic integration, not merely ‘limited’ citizenship right. This study from ethno-political perspective would assess the crises of the Chakma refugees in Arunachal Pradesh in India. Keywords: Chakma; Arunachal Pradesh; migration; refugee; ethnic integration; citizenship right; inclusion

Refugee Crises and Third-World Economies, 137–148 Copyright © 2020 Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-190-520201015

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Introduction The Chakmas were the single largest tribal dwellers in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of the erstwhile East Pakistan. Ethnically, they belonged to TibetoBurman race. Long before the creation of the East Pakistan, leaving the Arakan kingdom they had settled in the CHT, the southern part of the present Bangladesh. The earlier generation of the tribes of Arakan and Burma were known by the local parlance Tsak, Shak or Thek. The Chakmas had a very strong affinity with the tribes of the both regions as Arakanes and Burmes tribes were connected with the Tibeto-Burman race. These ethnic tribes were called Chakmas in the CHT. In the Indio-Bangladesh subcontinent, they are accounted as a small minority tribe in terms of their ethno-religious character (Talukdar, 1988). Most of them are religious pursuers of Buddhism and their social customs, administrative system were in a substantive manner differed from that of main land population. However, when they had entered the CHT, the land was under the undivided territory of India. As a result, the Chakmas were very much allegiant to the Indian Territory. The partition of 1947, for the first time, resulted in the breaching of their psychological bonding of nationhood as the CHT was brought under the territory of the then East Pakistan. Like many other Asian states, the creation of Pakistan was the triumph of an ethnic model of political nationhood, which absorbs the homo-ethnic groups and secluded the hetero-ethnic communities on the pretext of national integrity. The Chakmas were completely different from the main land population. But the regular intervention by the Pakistani rulers in the social and administrative affairs of the CHT caused violation of their tribal rights. Pakistan Government’s policy of forced migration of ethnic minorities later displaced a large number of Chakmas from their original homeland. Most of them were settled in the erstwhile North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA), which was renamed as India’s Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh in 1972. Since 1964, the Chakma refugees have been residing there but having no citizenship yet. In spite of the Supreme Court order of 1996 in support of granting them citizenship, no progressive effort was made in this regard. As India is not the signatory to the International Refugee Convention of 1951, it did not frame any comprehensive rehabilitation policy for the protection of the refugees. The lack of legal responsibility of the state to the protection of refugee rights in fact led to a mounting refugee crisis while the legally settled refugees claimed citizenship status. No migrated people or communities in India succeed in establishing their distinct ethnic identity without citizenship. The unrelenting protest led by the All Arunachal Pradesh Student Union (AAPSU) against the decision of granting citizenship status to the Chakmas, and subsequent legislative resolution to prevent the registration process, evidenced that when the indigenous ethnic identities converged towards the power direction, the alien identity went on to resist it. This study will be based on two basic objectives: (1) The primary objective of this chapter is to find out the causes of current crisis for the Chakma refugees in Arunachal Pradesh; (2) Another objective of it is to assess the impact of ethnopolitical issues on the refugee problem in the state of Arunachal Pradesh.

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Data are mainly collected from secondary sources. The qualitative methodology has been followed for assessing the plight of an ethnic migrated population with an aim of laying some valid recommendation at the end of this study. It follows a power discourse analysis to address the present crisis of the Chakma refugees in the state of Arunachal Pradesh.

The Saga of Migration from the Homeland The tribal Chakma refugees were a tiny migrated ethnic group when they sought for a settlement in the Indian Territory in around the 1960s. As per the decision of the then Central Government of India, this foreign stranger group was given an instant relief by settling them at the Abhyapur Block of Diyun circle in Tirap district of the erstwhile NEFA. It was taken into account by the then Central Government that further refugee settlement in North-Eastern states other than NEFA would create an ethnic ruckus, because the Tirap division of the latter was much more suitable for the rehabilitation of the Chakma refugees. As the district had enough number of vacant lands and, additionally, on the ground of a subtle ethno-religious link between the native ethnic groups, like Singphos and Khamtis, and the migrated Chakmas, the latter were allowed by the government to settle in the NEFA (Chakma, 2015). However, the NEFA was an integral part of the then composite state of Assam until 1972, when it was constitutionally recognized as a Union Territory in 1972 and subsequently became a separate state of Arunachal Pradesh in 1987. According to the claim of the AAPSU, during the 1960s only 57 families of Chakma and Hajongs1 sought a temporary shelter in the government camps at Ledo in Dibrugarh, Assam. But within a couple of years, the refugee population has been largely increased because enormous number of Chakmas left their ancestral land, the CHT, and moved to NEFA with an intension to permanently stay there. In Arunachal Pradesh, though their number was sharply increased, their recognition even as citizens is a distant dream, while in the neighbouring other North-Eastern states, namely Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Tripura, the Chakmas are recognized as Scheduled Tribe. In the Census Report 2001, the Chakmas constitute the third largest ethnic group in Arunachal Pradesh (Prasad, 2007). Most of them inhabit in the districts of Lohit, Changlang and Papumpare of Arunachal Pradesh. It would be interesting to note that until the last half of the 1970s, no radical demands for the deportation of the illegal settlers were raised. The state reorganization issue since the last half of the twentieth century and All Assam Student’s Union (AASU)-led campaign to expel the illegal settlers from their land had intensified AAPSU’s claim over their territory. Since the beginning of the later decade, the AAPSU campaigned for the permanent solution to the Assam–Arunachal boundary conflict and political integration of the indigenous tribes. It is worthwhile to mention that as the cultural integration of the Arunachali identity is very much difficult to melt because of its multifarious ethnic characters, the aim of the indigenous elites is to develop an exclusive politics of the land in which the Chakmas are only aliens. Unlike other North-Eastern states, 1

A small group of migrated Hindus from the erstwhile East Pakistan.

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where the promotion of a homogenous ethnic culture had no bar due to less number of tribes, but in Arunachal Pradesh, the sharp rise in the number of migrant people on the one hand, and an unsteady nature of the politics of ethnicity on the other, had unfolded that the expulsion of the outsiders from Arunachal Pradesh became entangled in the regional politics of the native people. It was manifested in their claim that the development of indigenous people, poverty eradication, and the employment generation in this state had been disrupted for long time due to the presence of a large number of foreigners there. In Arunachal Pradesh, a common ethnic identity in terms of linguistic or cultural uniformity was almost hard to be grown because the state was acquainted with a deep range of linguistic and cultural heterogeneity. Today Arunachal Pradesh has nearly 26 major tribal communities. There are huge dissimilarities in terms of customs, dialects and religions of these indigenous tribes. Undoubtedly, the increase in the number of migrated population in Arunachal Pradesh was resulted from its heterogeneous ethnic culture. The intrusion of Chakma refugees in the NEFA was basically unopposed by the local inhabitants during the 1960s. But when the political parties and the members of many non-political civil organizations became keen in articulating the demands of the indigenous community, the social milieus of the land became connected with their political agenda. The subjugation of the independent heterogeneous cultural orientation that the NEFA once had was begun with the process of political integration of the native people. Consequently, it has excluded the nonArunachalis, especially the Chakma, and the Hajong refugees, from the whole political process, particularly on two grounds. The first one is that they are stateless in Arunachal Pradesh and the second ground is their population growth which the indigenous Arunachalis deem as a threat to their existence. In order to explore the causes of the Chakmas migration and the settlement in the erstwhile NEFA, this chapter must have an account of the history of the persecution in their indigenous land in the then East Pakistan. It is well known that when the Islamic state of Pakistan was created based on the religious zeal of some sections of the population, the emotive issues of the ethnic minorities were never considered. Also, after the formation of Bangladesh, the Bengali ethnic identity did not admit the separate identity of the hill-based smaller tribes. However, in any authoritarian state it was common that the ethnic heterogeneity or poly ethnic rights were always trampled by the majority. It was really the mockery of the colonial legacy that the partition laid the creation of two separate nations namely India and Pakistan, both of which retained the religious consciousness of the majority of their people. The unavoidable consequence was the constant persecution of the people in their homeland because they had distinct ethno religious root from the rest of the society. Such irrevocable circumstance was growing up when the CHT was brought under the erstwhile East Pakistan of the Islamic State of Pakistan. Originally, the permanent inhabitant of the CHT was a large number of ethnic tribes. Their culture and religion were extensively different from the mainland people to an extent. The largest tribe of the CHT was the Chakmas. Though there was no unanimous view in respect to the original ethnic origin, but observing their many

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similarities with the tribes of Arakan kingdom, many of the historians claimed that the Chakmas had an ethnic affinity with Tibeto-Burman groups in the Northeast India and also to East Asia. However, their deep allegiance to Indian Territory was expressed long before the partition when the CHT was a part of the Indian Territory. It can rightly be pointed out that their preference for roping the CHT in the independent territory of India was not resulted from their ethnic root. It seemed that their early aim at establishing Chakma nationhood could have materialized only in territory of a multi-ethnic nation. They perceived that the exclusive dignity of the CHT would have been protected had it brought under the territory of independent India. Chakma (2015) points out several reasons for quitting their indigenous land. These were multi-ethnic nature of India with a secular, democratic Constitution, an ethno-cultural base of North-East India with which they had many similarities. However, the Chakma refugees have been in Arunachal Pradesh since 1964, but they have no legal identity as yet on account of not having any ethno-social linkage with Indian Territory. Before concentrating on their fight for legal entitlement in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, it is worthwhile to give a brief description of causes of their migration from the erstwhile East Pakistan.

Construction of the Kaptai Dam and Displacement Though the Chakmas constituted a small minority group in terms of their religion in the erstwhile East Pakistan, after the People’s Republic of Bangladesh was born in 1971, their population strength had been constantly downsized due to excessive number of outward migration from the CHT. It has generated a massive refugee crisis in the neighbouring countries especially in India. Since the early days of the formation of the then East Pakistan several rounds of mischievous acts were triggered by the Pakistani rulers to capture the natural resources of this hilly region. As the Chakmas were the majority in this tribal inhabited region followed by the Marma, Tripura, Mru, amongst others, and the most stringent task of the then Pakistan Government, having collaborated with some social miscreants, was to radically transform the demographic structure of the hill region. Several administrative orders, which had an adverse effect on the livelihood of the tribal people were enforced. As the Chakmas’ dominant means of subsistence was jhum cultivation (shifting agriculture), it needed a large chunk of cultivable land. But the Pakistan Government in an attempt to oust them had ordered to erect Kaptai Hydroelectricity Project on the Karnafuli River. It was reported that while the Kaptai Dam was built up, a sizable quantity of land (approximately 22,000 hectares of cultivable land) was inundated due to flood. As a result, as many as 100,000 indigenous people along with their families were forced to vacate their land. The Government of Bangladesh in its report, The Chittagong Hill Tracts District Gazette of 1975, disclosed that the construction of dam had resulted in the displacement of huge number of indigenous people and among them 70% was from the Chakma tribe. In addition to it, the unwillingness of the government to properly rehabilitate this landless people caused a great

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exodus of the indigenous tribes, who leaving their ancestral land had migrated to different countries. Chakmas entered the then NEFA where they were recognized as ‘environmental refugees’ (Parveen & Faisal, 2002).

From a Protected Zone to an Open Tribal Land As the undivided Pakistan was a Muslim majority country, the strategy for controlling the CHT witnessed a massive change after the partition. In the early era of post-partition period, the people of the CHT had expressed their dissatisfaction over the Pakistan Government policies of administrative intervention into the political affairs of the hill areas even though the Constitution of Pakistan of 1956 putting up the CHT as an ‘excluded area’ retained its status quo. It could be called up that since 1900 the CHT had been ruled according to a separate regulation in order to keep the ownership of the tribal land out of purchasing by the mainland people (Amnesty International, 1986). However, in 1958, when Pakistani armed forces took over the reign by declaring coup d’´etat, the CHT underwent a radical change because the protected zone was renamed ‘Tribal Area’, and finally the 1963 amendment to the 1962 Constitution resulted in the repeal of its earlier status thereby laying it open to every non-tribal. In consequence of it, Chakmas’ jhum cultivation was disrupted and a large number of illegal settlers encroached on this area. This oriental colonization process with an aim at ethnic cleansing forced the tribal people to quit their homeland. As the Chakmas were over half of the total population in the CHT, their migration from the then East Pakistan had implicitly catalyzed the formation of Bengali nationalism in which the ethnic demand of the tribal people, including the Chakmas, was entirely banished. The motto of Bengali nationalism led by Sheik Mujibur Rahman was to live and die as a Bengali, leaving the other noncontrasting identities.

Communal Violence of Majority over Minor Religious Groups Since 1950s, a sort of communal terror had been unleashed against the members of minority religion in the erstwhile East Pakistan. Apart from the Hindus, many ethnic tribal groups who had separate religion were also targeted by the majority Muslim population. The communal stir in the subsequent period was deteriorated on account of the expulsion of many Muslim settlers from the Indian state of Assam and that of Tripura. While both governments were very much defensive in their respective stand, since the 1960s a large number of tribal refugees sought political asylum to the Government of India. While arm forces of East Pakistan were indulged in triggering heavy atrocities over the tribal men of the CHT, the East Pakistan Government, strategically evading the issue of get back, had labelled the charges against the Government of India. It was alleged that by circulating the false propaganda, India had encouraged the mass exodus of minority Hindus, Christians and Buddhists from Pakistan. In response to it, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Government of India, emphatically denied the

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Pakistan Government’s allegation of the ‘exchange of population’ and asserted that settlement to the refugees was provided only on humanitarian ground. According to the report of the Government of India, in aggregation, 75,000 nonMoslem tribesmen from East Pakistan intruded the state of Assam in the latter half of January and February in 1964. Among them 20,000 were Roman Catholics and 15,000 Baptist and the remaining population was either from animist or Hindus (Rosenberger & Tobin, 1964, p. 20185).

The Fight for Legal Recognition in India As India is not the signatory to the International Refugee Convention of 1951, the refugee settlement issue in the country is mostly guided by the Constitutional mechanisms of the Union itself. The country’s obligation to uphold the refugee rights is ensured by several articles of the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution and the ratification for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the principle of non-refoulement. According to this principle, the foreign country is bound to protect the human rights of the migrated people as it does not allow the former to forcefully push back its illegal settlers to their home country in which their lives and human rights would be jeopardized (Chowdhory, 2013). The Indian Constitution ensures several fundamental rights not for its citizens alone, but the foreigners who are granted asylum in the refugee camp, are also eligible to enjoy right to equality before law (Article 14), the right to life and personal liberty (Article 21) and the right to freedom of conscience (Article 25). As the provisions of International Refugee Convention are inapplicable to India, the refugees there in this territory are often forced to seek judicial intervention for adequate compensation and for the recognition of their legal entitlement. However, India’s policy of refugee settlement is mostly directed by a liberal outlook on the promotion of human rights and guided by the bilateral relations with neighbouring countries. This could be endorsed by an agreement of 1972 between India and the newly born Bangladesh when the former was willing to facilitate its neighbouring counterpart Bangladesh by giving some unilateral concession. According to the provision of the treaty, India would be responsible for all migrants who entered its territory before 25 March 1971. Apart from it, the then Government of India admitted that the Chakmas and the Hajong refugees deserved to be legally recognized groups in the Indian Territory. It was evidenced that since the 1980s, the Central Government’s measure to grant citizenship to the Chakma refugees was firmly thwarted by Arunachal Pradesh Assembly. Instead of securing the lives and dignity of the Chakma refugees, the Arunachal Pradesh Government, with the support of its Legislative Assembly, completely disapproved many government sponsored facilities, forced them to vacate the land. As a result, a consensus was built up among the migrated Chakmas in this state that until and unless the citizenship status would be granted, they must leave Arunachal Pradesh. It was considered that only a judicial settlement could absolve them from this crisis. The Supreme Court of India while delivering its judgement in the case between the State of Arunachal Pradesh vs. Khudiram

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Chakma (1993), though denied the latter’s plea for providing the citizenship to the Chakma refugees because the claim was illegitimate in accordance with the Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, but indicated that no one shall be deprived of his or her life and liberty without the due process of law. However, no progress was observed regarding the Chakmas legal recognition in spite of the alarming voice of the highest judiciary over the protection of their lives and dignity. The Arunachal Pradesh Government’s decision to stop the basic facilities for the Chakmas like the seizure of their ration card, trade permit and the end of providing educational scholarship, equal opportunity for their entry into the mainland educational institutions and to the government job, is followed by a sort of civil strife. After the 1990s, it was erupted between the Chakma, Hajong refugees and the indigenous clique led by the AAPSU. While the judicial intervention would have prevented the government in carrying out many discriminatory practices against the Chakmas, the AAPSU intending to break the government’s present inertia with regard to refugee settlement in the state of Arunachal Pradesh called for a ‘direct action’ plan in order to displace them away from their native land. It resulted in bringing out the ‘quit’ land notice for the refugees and an economic blockade by which indigenous people were asked for not being involved in any economic or financial transactions with the members of the Chakma and Hajong refugees. However, when the indigenous ethnic wrath was intensified by the relentless effort of the AAPSU and with the government inaction, it panicked the Chakmas and other migrated groups as their lives and liberty were under constant threat. In response to their appeal before the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) claiming that the human rights of the migrated population were endangered under the current situation, the former submitted a writ petition in the Supreme Court against Arunachal Pradesh Government. Finally, on 9 January 1996, when the Supreme Court of India, pronouncing its landmark verdict in the case of NHRC vs. the State of Arunachal Pradesh, ordered the state government to undertake several protective measures in pursuit of the promotion of the life and personal liberty of Chakmas who once had settled in this state (Prasad, 2007). Apart from this, the highest judiciary also instructed the government to start the application process for granting them citizenship status under Section 5(1)(a) in the Citizenship Act of 1955 (Prasad, 2006).2

Legal Fight Turns into Social Resistance The Supreme Court’s verdict in 1996 laid the reasonable grounds for granting the Chakma refugees citizenship status, but the reality was entirely different because 2

This Section 5 deals with the citizenship by registration. Its clause 1(a) provides the citizenship for those persons of Indian origin, who are ordinary resident in India or have been resident for seven years immediately before making an application for registration. See, the Citizenship Act, 1955. Retrieved from http://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/ A1955-57.pdf. Accessed on April 14, 2018.

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between the year 1999 and 2002, almost 4,637 of the Chakma and Hajong refugees applied for citizenship right but no one was granted it (Seetharaman, 2017). It was observed that in most cases the Chakma refugees were not allowed by the local authorities to join the verification process. In another instance, when the administrative order was issued by the Central Government for the collection of citizenship application, the AAPSU with an explicit support of the state government, unleashed regular torture and intimidation against the tribal refugees especially the Chakmas because in Arunachal Pradesh, only the Chakma refugees, in the backdrop of their constant fight against the discriminatory policies of the State government, were succeeded in developing a sort of counter resistance vis-`a-vis the native ethnic integration campaign of the AAPSU. Since the last half of the twentieth century, when the AAPSU went on a mass scale anti-Chakma movement, in 1991 the Chakma refugees formed the Committee for Citizenship Rights of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh, and in the same year, Arunachal Pradesh Chakma Student’s Union was launched by the Chakma Students. It means that ceaseless struggle for a judicial settlement to their crisis and tireless effort for strengthening the social solidarity among the Chakma refugees projected them as the threat to the indigenous tribes of Arunachal Pradesh. Most importantly, the discriminatory treatment of the government against a particular migrated group or groups in comparison to others worsened the situation. In Arunachal Pradesh, the Tibetan refugees are not eligible for enjoying citizenship right, but they have basic opportunities for their rehabilitation over this land. In respect of the Chakma refugees, as their settlement process was followed by the Indira and Mujib agreement of 1972, in which India had admitted the legitimate claim of the Chakma and the Hajong refugees to the Indian citizenship, but the successive state government denied the fundamental social rights, which in accordance with the Indian Constitution, shall equally be enjoyed both by the citizens and foreigners in this territory. The legal process for providing the citizenship to the Chakmas was promoted by the highest judiciary, but the political marginalization process threatened them to be recognized as the citizen of India. The native vs alien contest became diluted because today Chakmas are legally entitled to be granted the citizenship in India, but they are socially unacceptable. It referred that an ethnic social pressure is simmering to exclude them from the native land of the Arunachalis. The worst consequence of social exclusion begins when the Chakmas were characterized as like as social ‘criminals’ by the indigenous student union (Parameswaran & Gaedtke, 2012). The plight of the Chakma refugees in Arunachal Pradesh has gradually been worsening because of the social discrimination policies of the state government. As they were debarred from holding government jobs and ownership of the land in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, it necessarily led to ethnic scuffle between the native ethnic groups namely, the Singphos, Khamtis and Chakma refugees regarding the ownership of the land. It was observed that a large number of Chakma refugees in the districts of Chalang and Lohit were booked under the criminal cases and land encroachment cases. In response to a Right to Information application in 2014, by Rahant Chakma, the Ministry of Home Affairs, North-East Division, the Government of India, provided the fact that apart from

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a large number of land encroachment cases, there were 220 registered criminal cases against the Chakmas and Hajongs in the state of Arunachal Pradesh. The report further confirmed that the Chakma concentrated in Changlang and Lohit districts were severely affected with ‘organized crime’.3 However, the ground-level discord between the native ethnic groups and the Chakmas is mostly occurred on account of land ownership and sharing of benefits. As the Chakmas has no indigenous ethnic identity, it facilitates the AAPSU to articulate the demands of the native ethnic group in the form of their marginalization and deprivation in their own land. That is why, AAPSU’s campaign for protesting the government decision of granting the Chakmas citizenship earned the popular support from all the political parties of Arunachal Pradesh, and the native ethnic groups. While entire Arunachal Pradesh pursued the ‘anthropoemic’ strategy to expulse the Chakma refugees from their land, the approval for offering them citizenship is mere a political euphoria especially in Arunachal Pradesh.4 The members of indigenous ethnic group have expressed utter disregard even of the judgement of the Supreme Court, as according to their view, the verdict ultimately break the demographic structure of the state. However, in India, the major obstacle in granting the citizenship to the Chakmas is not the lack of stiff legislations for the protection of refugee right because the Constitution of India itself arranges several fundamental rights for the foreign nationals. Basically, the crisis for the aliens and migrants in the state of Arunachal Pradesh springs from a sort of social and cultural ‘ghettoization’ process.5 When the Chakma refugee entered in India, they were settled by an administrative decision in Diyaun circle of Tirap district. In later period, largest number of Chakma people built their shelter particularly in the Tirap district followed by Lohit and Chalang. Barring these three districts, in the rest of the part of Arunachal Pradesh the Chakma refugees virtually has no opportunity for settlement and employment. While spatial ghettoization process between the Chakma refugees and indigenous natives gradually expanded the ethnic split, it ultimately benefited indigenous 3

This is based on the letter (No. 9/5/2014-NE-II, Dated 16 April 2014) consisting the report sent by the Ministry of Home Affairs, North-East Division, the Government of India, against the RTI request (MHO/ME/R/2014/80251) of Sri Rahant Chakma. Retrieved from https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/39_RTI_NE_JPS_280714.PDF. Accessed on October 10, 2019. 4 It is the strategy to eliminate the others, as advocated by Claude Levi-Strauss. This strategy ‘consisted in “vomiting”, spitting out the others seen as incurably strange and alien: barring physical contact, dialogue, social intercourse and all varieties of commercium, commensality or connubium’ (Bauman, 2000, p. 101). 5 The term ‘ghetto’ connotes a secluded area within a given territory, but it was developed as a social engineering process through which the Jewish inhabited areas within the European cities were compartmentalized from the rest of the territory. The aim was to thwart them ˇ zek (1997) propounded from social intercourse with mainland European people. Slavoj Ziˇ that this strategy is now followed by the multicultural nation, in which the racial differences between the communities are naturalized through spatial and social ghettoization. As a result, multiculturalism, instead of removing differences, approves the exercise of racial characteristics from distance.

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ethnic backed state government because most of time, the Chakma-concentrated district was not brought under the government social service scheme. However, the seclusion of the Chakma population in one or two districts was one of the major causes of their failure in forming a strong tie with the whole territory of Arunachal Pradesh. Their deportation would be almost impossible because those who had entered in the Indian Territory during 1964 were legally entitled for being granted citizenship. The citizenship right is most precious for their dignity. It approves their right to permanently stay in India, but to end the discrimination, India needs to recognize the Chakmas as local ethnic group and as socially equal as the other native Arunachalis.

Conclusion Summarizing the state of the Chakma refugees in Arunachal Pradesh, it was observed that any further legal recognition including citizenship status for them in this territory could escalate political unrest because the political authority in granting the citizenship status to the Chakmas cannot be exclusively defined in terms of rational – legal character of the ruling elite. Despite their reasonable claim in the citizenship status, the generation of ‘social capital’ at the intercommunity level of the society is required. It refers to a strong social connectivity through intra- and inter-community network, trust building among the neighbouring communities as advocated by Putnam (2000). Only some worthy social values could break the present impasse between the native ethnic groups and the Chakmas. Every administrative decision with regard to the refugee settlement should be proclaimed considering that the strategy of political assimilation, instead of bridging up the cleavages between the native and the refugees, is quite incompatible for ending the decade-long refugee crisis in the state of Arunachal Pradesh.

References Amnesty International. (1986). Bangladesh: Unlawful killings and torture in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. New York, NY: Amnesty International. Retrieved from https:// www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/200000/asa130211986en.pdf. Accessed on March 18, 2018. Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity. Malden, MA: Polity Press. Chakma, B. R. (2015). Between agony and hope: The Chakmas refugees of Arunachal Pradesh of India. International Journal of Advance Research, 3(9), 1–10. Retrieved from http://www.ijoar.org/journals/IJOARHS/papers/BETWEEN-AGONY-ANDHOPE-THE-CHAKMAS-REFUGEES-OF-ARUNACHAL-PRADESH-OFINDIA.pdf. Accessed on March 25, 2018. Chowdhory, N. (2013). Marginalization and exclusion: Politics of non-citizen rights in postcolonial South Asia. Refugee Watch: A South Asian Journal on Forced Migration, 42, 1–16. Retrieved from http://www.mcrg.ac.in/rw%20files/RW42.pdf. Accessed on March 27, 2018.

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Rosenberger, W., & Tobin, H. C. (1964, July 18–25). The Dacca Riots. - Mass flight of hindus and tribal people from East Pakistan. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 14. London, England: Keesing's Limited. Retrieved from http://web.stanford.edu/ group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/1310-1962-xx-xx-KS-a-JZW.pdf. Accessed on October 8, 2019. Parameswaran, G., & Gaedtke, F. (2012, June 22). Little to cheer for Chakma refugees in India. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/ 2012/06/20126207955292695.html. Accessed on February 4, 2018. Parveen, S., & Faisal, I. M. (2002). People versus power: The geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in Bangladesh. Water Resources Development, 18(1), 197–208. doi:10.1080/ 07900620220121756 Prasad, C. (2006). Migration and the question of citizenship: People of Chittagong Hill Tract in Arunachal Pradesh. Indian Journal of Political Science, 67(3), 471–490. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/41856235. Accessed on February 4, 2018. Prasad, C. (2007). Students’ movements in Arunachal Pradesh and the Chakma-Hajong refugee problem. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(15), 1373–1379. Retrieved from https://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2007_42/15/ Students_Movements_in_Arunachal_Pradesh_and_the_ChakmaHajong_Refugee_ Problem.pdf. Accessed on February 3, 2018. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. Seetharaman, G. (2017). Government’s flip-flop leaves Chakma and Hajong refugees on wings of hope. The Economic Times, September 24. Retrieved from https:// economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/governments-flip-flopleaves-chakma-and-hajong-refugees-on-wings-of-hope/articleshow/60810196.cms. Accessed on April 11, 2018. Talukdar, S. P. (1988). The Chakmas life and struggle. New Delhi, India: Gian Publishing House. ˇ zek, S. (1997). Multiculturalism, or, the cultural logic of multinational capitalism. New Ziˇ Left Review, (225), 28–51. Retrieved from http://clarkbuckner.com/wp-content/ uploads/2018/04/www.Zizek_MultiCulturalism.org_.pdf. Accessed on January 3, 2019.

Chapter 10

Life of the Afghan Refugee Women in Delhi Region: Highlighting Their Miserable Conditions and Possible Legal Assistance Shusneha Sarkar

Abstract According to a report by the Afghan embassy in Delhi, refugees from Afghanistan, estimated at around 30,000 families, have, over the past two and a half decades, fled from their home towns due to large-scale conflicts, seeking safety in India’s capital city. Many outsiders call Delhi home, but the Afghan people can claim a special relationship with India and her capital. To understand why, we must recall the history, both the ancient and the modern, of the two nations. There are nearly 11,000 Afghan refugees registered with the UNHCR in India, mainly living in Delhi and bordering areas. The refugees in Delhi face considerable hardships and difficulties. The Indian government and UNHCR should make it a priority to protect these Afghan refugees. While recognition of UNHCR-recognized China and Afghan refugees is greatly appreciated, the Indian government must be sensitive and sensitize others about their situation in Delhi and ensure timely attainment of recognition, registration, residential permits and exit permits without unnecessary cost or delay or corruption. The resettlement program must also be expanded and prioritized for Afghan refugees living in Delhi, particularly within large resettlement countries such as the US without any discrimination based on culture, language or religion. Without adequate and timely protection mechanisms and proper community support structures in place, the protection and assistance to the vulnerable section of society would be hard to attain and resolve. Keywords: Afghan refugees; UNHCR; life of refugees; vulnerable section; resettlement program; community support

Refugee Crises and Third-World Economies, 149–157 Copyright © 2020 Emerald Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-190-520201016

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Introduction According to a report by the Afghan embassy in Delhi, refugees from Afghanistan, estimated at around 30,000 families, have, over the past two and a half decades, fled from their home towns due to large-scale conflicts, seeking safety in India’s capital city. Many outsiders call Delhi home, but the Afghan people can claim a special relationship with India and her capital. To understand why, we must recall the history, both the ancient and the modern, of the two nations. There are nearly 11,000 Afghan refugees registered with the UNHCR in India, mainly living in Delhi and bordering areas (DNA India, 2015). The influx rate started in the year 1979 just after Kabul was invaded by the Soviets, and it continued through the fall of the Taliban era. The early refugees were mainly Hindus and Sikhs but with the security situation getting worse, more ethnic Afghans started coming in. Historically too, India has been a favoured destination for Afghan traders also popularly known as the Kabuliwalas, who would travel across the mountains to sell spices, dry fruits and attars (perfumes). This association has been immortalized in many Bollywood films and works of literature, including a popular short story, Kabuliwala, by Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore. According to Shuchita Mehta, a spokesperson at UNHCR India, ‘India is also an obvious choice because the government allows UNHCR mandate refugees to apply for long term visas that regularises their stay and enhances employment opportunities and enables easier access to higher education’.1 According to reports, of August 2015, there were a total of 27,000 refugees in India registered with the UNHCR (Banerjee, 2015). The sum total population of refugees dwelling across the country runs into much over 200,000 or so. India’s liberal approach towards asylum seekers attracts large numbers, but there is no specific policy or legal framework regarding refugees. The country has not ratified the 1951 convention on refugees (UNHCR, 2018). Refugees registered with the UNHCR find it easier to get long-term visas and work permits. They are entitled to free education in government-run schools and free healthcare. Others face a miserable existence, confined to illegal settlements, where access to water and electricity is irregular.

Historical Overview India and Afghanistan have behaved mostly as friends and adversaries since the period of Chandragupta Maurya extended up to the western reaches of the Mauryan Empire to Kandahar, in Afghanistan’s western reaches, 200 years before the birth of Christ. Babur, born in 1483 in what is Uzbekistan today, would consolidate his power in a newly toppled Kabul before extending the Mughal Dynasty that would eventually, under Aurangzeb, reach as far as Tamil Nadu. Until Afghanistan’s independence in 1919, large numbers of Hindus and Sikhs migrated from Punjab to become a vital part of the country’s trader 1

https://www.unhcr.org/uk/india.html.

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community. A Gurudwara continues to stand in Kabul today. And until the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, Amritsar served as the primary wholesale market for Afghan fruits and dry fruits, with direct flights between the two cities. This history, alongside India’s proximity and relative peace, made the country a destination for many refugees after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 led to the 1992 Mujahideen takeover of the country and, soon, Taliban rule. The flood of refugees to India centred in Delhi, with many basing themselves in Lajpat Nagar. While some Afghans would return back to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, many families among them chose to remain in their new home town of India. This started giving way to a permanent Afghan settlement in the heart of South Delhi. Those who returned took a piece of India back with them, often in the form of a fondness for Bollywood and Hindi serials, newly blooming in a country that, thanks to the Taliban, lacked a domestic entertainment industry. That influence has gone both ways; the figure of the Kabuliwala, drawn from Tagore’s 1892 story about a Kolkata dry fruit seller’s friendship with a young girl who reminds him of a daughter left behind in Afghanistan, was remade into the popular 1961 Hindi movie. The film industry in India has also been greatly benefitted from many greats of Afghan heritage, ranging from Dilip Kumar to Shah Rukh Khan, and has tried to repay the favours, by helping in the development of a novel film industry of the Afghans. But cultural imports were not the only Indian contribution to a post-Taliban Afghanistan. India, not traditionally a major aid donor, is the fifth-largest contributor to the Afghan reconstruction effort. It’s a trend that’s set to continue: Last August, in a speech unveiling America’s strategy for Afghanistan, Donald Trump emphasized the need for India to ‘help us more’, in particular with ‘economic assistance and development’. While it’s not yet clear what new programs the Indian government will roll out, so far it has rebuilt hospitals, schools, roads, constructed the new Afghan Parliament, a massive new dam and trained doctors, teachers and engineers. India has also had a far more subtle but profound impact on the psyche of Afghanistan’s political leadership. Like many prominent Afghans, former President Hamid Karzai studied in India, receiving his MA in Political Science in Shimla from Himachal University. Then, beginning in 2006, the American military’s increasing focus on its war in Iraq contributed to a worsening security situation in Afghanistan: SUVs navigated broken roads and embassies built their own petrol pumps, the only way to ensure a regular supply. The deteriorating situation led to a second exodus of refugees. Many of those rich enough to leave but too poor or poorly connected to obtain visas to European or North American countries looked to Delhi as an escape, often believing that it would be a first stop on the way to Europe, Australia or North America.

Present Scenario of the Afghan Women Finding a steady, well-paid job is hard too. For instance, even some schoolteachers in Afghanistan had to work as a domestic help in Delhi for years before

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becoming a part of Ilham. It was a struggle to communicate as many of them were unable to speak English or Hindi, with an average of four to five children to feed and educate so they were desperate. That school teacher lives in Lajpat Nagar, which is also home to a large number of Afghan refugees. The community is concentrated in small pockets in parts of Delhi, preferable than in living in a mixed colony where they stand out, their accents and clothes regarded with open curiosity, and occasionally some hostility. The idea of starting a catering initiative was born after hours of talks between ACCESS and the Afghan women enlisted with them. People in Delhi are open to trying out different cuisines but there were very few that served Afghan food, as remarked by Sabbarwal an active member of the ACCESS team helping the Afghan refugee women to become self-dependent and earn their own bread. So she decided to try some dishes out at a fair last winter, in Delhi. They were sold out in less than an hour. With this she realized that starting this on a larger scale could guarantee them fixed employment and financial independence. The range of dishes is limited but great effort is taken to source the original ingredients to ensure authenticity. The American embassy in New Delhi is among their most regular customers. The women cook the dishes at their homes and deliver to the designated pickup centres. Given the growing demand, there are plans to set up a community kitchen. They make a profit of Rs 3,000–4,000 a month, which is much more than what they used to earn working odd jobs, as highlighted by another Afghan woman. She narrated that she left Herat in west Afghanistan six years ago after she was lashed in public for not covering her face properly and inflicted different kinds of physical and mental torture, so she made up her mind and fled all the way to India. The orders are growing every day and the money is good and she is able to pay her daughters’ school fees and buy them what they want. She feels happy when she enjoys the freedom that was never felt by her in Afghanistan. Ziyagul is the most vocal of the group, who has dreams of starting her own restaurant. She feels so happy that she is able to share some of her culture with people here. When customers praise her dishes, she feels so confident. She realizes that she is as capable and independent as a man. ‘There is an urgent need for sensitisation programmes’, says Aditi Sabbarwal, project manager at ACCESS. ‘People have no idea what they are fleeing from, their back stories, so there is a perception among some that they are freeloaders. The government should conduct awareness campaigns so people come to know what’s going on in their countries’. She points to stray comments on Ilham’s Facebook page pointing to the turmoil in Europe over the refugee crises and making the case that India should not take in outsiders. On a cold Saturday afternoon at a packed cultural fair in New Delhi, hundreds of visitors check out stalls selling traditional arts and crafts, clothes, furniture and food. Moving from one stand to another, they are hit by a tempting aroma wafting from the far end of the fair. Drawn by the smell, a line of people wait for their turn at the counter behind which four Afghan women are busy doing what they are best at cooking up traditional delicacies from home. From aromatic

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Kabuli Pulao rice to Afghan dessert Firni, there is something for everyone to feast on. Started last year by the women all refugees from conflict-torn Afghanistan, their culinary venture has gained popularity among foodies in New Delhi and is giving its four founders both financial independence and a measure of respect. It is so satisfying to see the contented faces of the customers, as held by Zameera, a co-founder of the venture called Ilham, a word which means ‘positive’ in the Dari language. It is not just about doing business but also earning respect through their work which is like the cherry on top of a cake. A widow who lost her husband in Afghanistan’s ongoing conflict, Zameera fled to India three years ago with the scars of the war still fresh in her mind. Teaming up with her partners Naadirah, Zeenat and Sania, who all share similar backgrounds, the women were initially fearful about starting over.

Assistance Provided by UNESCO to the Afghan Refugee Women to Make Them Self-sufficient Several Afghan refugee women are being trained in yoga by ACCESS, a Delhibased NGO, in collaboration with the UNHCR. As a result many of the Afghan refuge women have started earning their livelihood as first class yoga teachers in many yoga institutions or even individually. Helped by UNHCR, the UN Refuge Agency, and its partner ACCESS Development Services, a national livelihoods promotion organization, the four women together cooked up an idea that would give them and their families a measure of much-needed financial independence. Zameera was working as a domestic helper and the money she earned was not enough to manage her household expenses, and then she heard about the livelihood program offered by ACCESS and got herself registered. The ACCESS team worked with the women to identify their skills and aspirations and found out that cooking came naturally to them. A culinary training program was arranged for the team, where they picked up professional skills and an array of cooking techniques. The organization also went a step further and helped the women to take their products to the market. They wanted to create an income-generating activity for refugee women that recognize their skills, interest and capacities. When the idea of starting a catering line was floated, they accepted it with a spirit of alacrity, says Aditi Sabharwal, project manager at ACCESS. Never did they imagine that their food would be such a big hit. The women first experienced commercial success at a food kiosk held at the popular Dastkar fair in New Delhi last year. Impressed by their food, they started getting orders from embassies and organized more food stalls at fairs in Delhi. Initially they were nervous as none of them had prior experience of working commercially at a public level. But gradually they acquired business acumen that enabled them to make use of their newly acquired skills to establish a successful catering service, as beautifully narrated by Sania who believes cooking and selling

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Afghan food brings her closer to her home country. The theme of International Women’s Day was for achieving global gender parity, an issue close to these four women’s lives. Before they founded Ilham, they had no reliable means of supporting their families. In addition, most of them were struggling with physical and psychological problems, including depression and stress. This catering business has worked wonders for them. It not only helps them to be financially independent but it also is therapeutic. Especially for people like them who escaped the scars of war. This venture is also acting as a stress buster and is building their self-esteem said Zeenat, who came to India from Herāt, Afghanistan’s third largest city, along with her six children in 2000, and now manages to pay rent and school fees thanks to the venture. And Sania, who fled to India five years ago with her eight children, is clear about the benefits that the venture has brought her, for which she says that this venture is much better than medicine.

Possible Legal Help for Their Healthy Survival The Social Legal Information Center (SLIC) is the UNHCR’s implementing partner responsible for providing legal services and general assistance to refugees living in Delhi. Refugees are able to renew their refugee certificate through the SLIC office. SLIC is also meant to assist refugees in obtaining the residential permit from the Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO). When problems arise within the refugee community or between refugees and the local community, SLIC provides help in filing reports with the police and provides mediation services. If the case is serious, such as a rape or arrest case, SLIC provides a lawyer to represent refugees in court. SLIC responds to about two to seven cases per month. Altogether, SLIC employs six staff – two Indian women oversee the project, two serve as administrative workers and two are case workers from the refugee community. There is only one Indian lawyer working for SLIC on a part-time basis. In reality, SLIC’s assistance to the refugee community is quite limited. Most of the work is done by the refugee case workers, who have difficulty dealing with the local community and Indian authorities. Refugee case workers are not as effective in negotiating with the local community during interventions and mediations. Higher-level Indian SLIC workers who are more familiar with Indian society and comfortable dealing with the Indian authorities are typically not available to provide assistance to the refugee community. As a result, most abuse against the Chin community is perpetrated with impunity, regardless of SLIC intervention. SLIC is also hesitant to get involved in certain cases, such as unwarranted evictions, exploitative work environments, harassment and severe discrimination. In addition, SLIC has failed to develop strong connections within the refugee communities and does not coordinate its activities with community-based organizations, such as the Chin Refugee Committee. Such lack of communication and coordination with the refugee communities limits the effectiveness of SLIC’s activities.

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Conclusion Though there are many refugees who have fled from their places of origin, only few have found some form of protection in India. Refuge in Delhi is hard to find. Therefore, these refugees in Delhi face considerable hardships and difficulties. The Indian government and UNHCR should make it a priority to protect these Afghan refugees. While recognition of UNHCR-recognized Chin and Afghan refugees is greatly appreciated, the Indian government must be sensitive and sensitize others about their situation in Delhi and ensure timely attainment of recognition, registration, residential permits and exit permits without unnecessary cost or delay or corruption. Two to three years, the average time it takes to receive UNHCR recognition, is too long for refugees to wait for access to much-needed benefits and services. The resettlement program must also be expanded and prioritized for Afghan refugees living in Delhi, particularly within large resettlement countries such as the US without any discrimination based on culture, language or religion. This is too long for Afghan refugees to wait in difficult conditions in Delhi without any certain future. Considering the prolonged wait periods that refugees and asylum seekers experience before receiving protection from UNHCR and an opportunity to resettle to a third country, it is necessary to develop and improve on current support structures to ensure a basic standard of living for all refugees in Delhi. These refugees must have access to necessary amenities, such as clean and potable water, food, electricity and proper accommodations. Employment must be safe, stable and properly paid. Those without or unable to secure an adequate source of income should be allowed to benefit from the subsistence support for as long as necessary. All refugees and asylum seekers including those not yet recognized by UNHCR should have access to affordable and quality medical facilities and educational institutions in Delhi. While UNHCR and UNHCR’s implementing partners are accorded a large degree of responsibility to assist and provide for the basic needs of the Afghan community, these programs must be reviewed to reduce the gap between reality and theory. As community-based projects are often more effective and efficient to provide services within a particular community, implementing partners should work in closer cooperation with them. Without adequate and timely protection mechanisms and proper community support structures in place, the protection and assistance to the vulnerable section of society would be hard to attain and resolve.

Suggestive Measures The suggestive measures are threefold, i.e. one directing the Government of India, the other directing the UNHRC and another directing the NGOs and the implementing machineries of the UNHRC. The guidelines laid down for the Government of India are as follows:

•

Accede to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol;

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Develop a national law protecting the refugees. A legal framework should be developed to process matters in respect of determination of refugee status, protection from refoulement and treatment during stay of refugees; Some provisions of the framework can be:

– A person shall be excluded from refugee status if he or she is convicted for a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity;

– no refugee or asylum seeker shall be expelled or returned to a place where there are reasons to believe his or her life or freedom would be threatened;

– where an application is made by an asylum seeker for the determination of

• • • • • • • • •

refugee status, pending such determination, he shall not be deported nor any restrictions imposed save and except those that are necessary in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India or maintenance of public peace and order; – the determination of refugee status shall be by a Refugee Committee to be presided over by the Commissioner of Refugees who shall be a sitting or retired High Court Judge; – during the determination of his refugee status, the asylum seeker shall be entitled to all assistance including that of an interpreter and legal practitioner; – an appeal shall lie against the order of the Refugee Committee. Increase funding of UNHCR; Minimize the number of documents necessary to demonstrate residency in Delhi; Elimination of verification with police departments. Investigate and prosecute the local police departments and government officials; Increase the validity of residence permit to 18 months; Establishment of a process providing work permit and ensuring labour protections; Concession or free access to refugee children in schools; Increase awareness about refugees in local communities; Hire more staff; Pressurize the UN to make efforts to restore peace and order in such areas of conflict. The guidelines laid down for the UNHCR are as follows:

• •

Urge the government to follow the 1951 Convention and encourage the development of a domestic law; Reduce prolonged delays in the registration and recognition process by increasing staff and resources.

– While cases are pending with UNHCR, mechanisms are to be developed to ensure protection

– Expand and promote the resettlement process along with increase in number of referrals.

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Develop closer working relations and coordination with community-based refugee committees ensuring protection, information sharing and opportunities for work by increasing its presence in West Delhi; Allotting more public hours and advance notices to ensure that all refugees including the ones unrecognized by UNHCR have access to basic amenities; Review and reform eligibility requirements to obtain subsistence allowance; Determine payments based on household needs and continuation till beneficiaries obtain adequate source of income; Arrange for accommodations for the most vulnerable women.

The guidelines laid down for the Implementing Partners of the UNHCR and other NGOs are as follows:

• • • • •

Review and reform programs to ensure objectives are met and gaps in services are filled; Consult with beneficiaries and community representatives to critique current activities and develop feasible solutions; Pressurize the government and UNHCR to ensure protection and provision of adequate social services; Assist the refugees with filling RSD applications; Implement programs to increase understanding among locals and decrease discrimination and exploitation

References Banerjee, P. (2015). Falling short: How India treats those seeking refuge. Hindustan Times, September 14. Retrieved from https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/ falling-short-how-india-treats-those-seeking-refuge/story-Y96NXag08KXxzaNjk OND5M.html. Accessed on April 10, 2018. DNA India. (2015). Afghan refugees in India getting skill development training. Daily News and Analysis India, July 9. Retrieved from https://www.dnaindia.com/ india/report-afghan-refugees-in-india-getting-skill-development-training-2103122. Accessed on April 10, 2018. UNHCR. (2018). 38th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, June 18–July 6, 2018.

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Index Afghan refugees, 12–13, 61, 78, 148, 153 African refugees, 106, 107 Arunachal Pradesh, 113–119 Asian refugees, 135–145 Basic eminities, 106 Causes of Refugee generation, 5, 15–19 Central African Republic region, 6 Central American region, 8 Chakma, 135–145 Citizenship right, 143, 145 Civil war Afghan, 13 Iraq, 12 Lebanon, 85 South Sudan, 14 Syria, 5, 12, 77 Climate change migration, 38–39, 42 refugee problems, 45–69 South Sudan, 14 Climate displacees, 42 Climate refugee, 38, 42 climate change, 45–69 controversies, 50–54 environmental refugees, 37–42 estimations, 54–60 policy recommendations, 67–69 Community support, 147, 153 Democratic Republic of the Congo, 89 Developing countries, 48, 63, 101–108, 122 Displacement, 4, 5, 8, 12, 13, 41, 42, 50, 51, 56–57, 63, 64, 78, 103

Ecological disruption, 124, 132 Ecological refugee, 49, 121–132 Eco-political stability, 21–32 Educational condition of refugees, 10–11, 21–32 Environmental refugees Bangladesh, 38–39 international migration, 39–40 protection, 40–42 Ethnic integration, 143 European region, 8 Forced migration, 14, 38, 79, 122, 136, 139 Fragile economy, 113, 119 Geneva Convention, 1951, 4 Host countries, 90, 103, 105, 108 Host developing countries economic impact, 103–104 environmental impact, 105–106 political impact, 105 reugees, 102–103 social impact, 104–105 Humanitarian crisis Bangladesh, 38–39 India, 37–42 international migration, 39–40 protection, 40–42 Inclusion, 127, 135–145 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 45–46, 65–66 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 66–67 International institutions, 54, 60–67

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International Organization for Migration (IOM), 48 International protection, 49, 50, 67 Iraq region, 8 Landscapes, 22, 38, 121 Life of refugees, 147–155 Local ecology, 9–10 Migration climate migration, 64 cross-border migration, 41, 55 definition, 53 domestic economy, 6 forced migration, 124 GDP, 16 from homeland, 137–139 international migration, 23, 31, 39–40 involuntary migration, 38 South Sudan, 14–15 voluntary migration, 38 Rational expectations theory, 24, 29, 32 Recession and eco-political stability, 29, 32 Refugee, 3, 4, 13–19, 22, 24, 25–27, 50–54 Afghan refugees, 13, 147–155 Chakma refugees, 135–145 climate refugee, 48–69 econometric analysis, 15–19 environmental refugees, 37–42

host developing countries, 101–108 last decade, 5–9 Refugee crisis eco-political stability, 21–32 global refugee crisis, 6, 75–99 last decade, 5–9 Refugee hosting countries, 83–90 Refugee problem, 17, 18, 53, 69, 102 Refugee producing countries, 77–83 Refugee settlements, 86, 119 Refugee settlers, 114 Resettlement program, 58, 153 Sea level rise, 39, 42, 48, 55, 58 Socio economic problem of refugees, 61 South Sudan region, 8 Syria region, 8–9 Tibetan refugees, 114, 143 Traditional livelihoods, 121, 124 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 62–64 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 3, 5, 12–15, 50, 51, 54, 58, 60, 61, 63, 76, 79, 81, 84, 87, 90, 106, 148, 151, 153–155 Water crisis, 15, 39, 48, 103, 105, 126, 128–130, 132, 153

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