Reframing the Buffer State in Contemporary International Relations [1 ed.] 1032014172, 9781032014173

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Reframing the Buffer State in Contemporary International Relations

This book explores buffer states’ agency beyond being highly interactive spaces for the competing strategic and security interests of larger powers. Analyzing 21 political events, the author offers a new conceptual framework for the buffer state, which emphasizes its strategic utility and agency. Applying this to the case study of Nepal as a buffer state between India and China, he offers a systematic analysis of Sino-Indian interests in the wider region, and Nepal’s interactions with and reactions to them, and argues that the buffer state in contemporary international relations is characterized by intense competitive overtures from its contending neighboring states. However, the buffer state is not just a spectator but an active participant that consistently assesses and reassesses its geopolitical position in between much larger competing powers. This reading offers a new understanding of the buffer state as a highly dynamic political space wherein the levels of influence and strategies of bigger powers can be examined. Aimed at a multidisciplinary audience, this book will be of particular interest to scholars, practitioners, and students of international relations, security studies, strategic studies, and Asian studies. Bibek Chand is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Affairs at the University of North Georgia, USA. His research interests include Sino-Indian interactions in Asia, international relations of small states, the emerging notion of the Indo-Pacific, Nepal’s foreign policy, and geopolitics.

Rethinking Asia and International Relations Series Editor: Emilian Kavalski

Li Dak Sum Chair Professor in China–Eurasia Relations and International Studies, University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China

This series seeks to provide thoughtful consideration both of the growing prominence of Asian actors on the global stage and the changes in the study and practice of world affairs that they provoke. It intends to offer a comprehensive parallel assessment of the full spectrum of Asian states, organisations, and regions and their impact on the dynamics of global politics. The series seeks to encourage conversation on: • • • •

what rules, norms, and strategic cultures are likely to dominate international life in the ‘Asian Century’; how will global problems be reframed and addressed by a ‘rising Asia’; which institutions, actors, and states are likely to provide leadership during such ‘shifts to the East’; whether there is something distinctly ‘Asian’ about the emerging patterns of global politics.

Such comprehensive engagement not only aims to offer a critical assessment of the actual and prospective roles of Asian actors, but also seeks to rethink the concepts, practices, and frameworks of analysis of world politics. This series invites proposals for interdisciplinary research monographs undertaking comparative studies of Asian actors and their impact on the current patterns and likely future trajectories of international relations. Furthermore, it offers a platform for pioneering explorations of the ongoing transformations in global politics as a result of Asia’s increasing centrality to the patterns and practices of world affairs. China and Eurasion Powers in a Multipolar World Order 2.0 Security, Diplomacy, Economy and Cyberspace Edited by Mher Sahakyan Reframing the Buffer State in Contemporary International Relations Nepal’s Relations with India and China Bibek Chand For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ Rethinking-Asia-and-International-Relations/book-series/ASHSER1384

Reframing the Buffer State in Contemporary International Relations

Nepal’s Relations with India and China Bibek Chand

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 Bibek Chand The right of Bibek Chand to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Chand, Bibek, author. Title: Reframing the buffer state in contemporary international relations :   Nepal’s relations with India and China / Bibek Chand. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2023. |   Series: Rethinking Asia and international relations | Includes   bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022054913 (print) | LCCN 2022054914 (ebook) |   ISBN 9781032014173 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032014180 (paperback) |   ISBN 9781003178538 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Buffer states. | Geopolitics—Himalaya Mountains   Regions. | Nepal—Foreign relations—China. | China—Foreign relations—   Nepal. | Nepal—Foreign relations—India. | India—Foreign relations—   China. | China—Foreign relations—India. | India—Foreign relations—China. Classification: LCC JC323 .C328 2023 (print) | LCC JC323 (ebook) |   DDC 327.5496051—dc23/eng/20221118 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022054913 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022054914 ISBN: 978-1-032-01417-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-01418-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-17853-8 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003178538 Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To my parents, Durga and Mohan Bahadur Chand, for providing endless love, support, and inspiration.

Contents

List of Figuresx List of Tablesxi Acknowledgmentsxii List of Abbreviations xiv 1 Introduction

1

I. The Conundrum of the Swan  1 II. Imagining the Buffer State: Rekindling the Old and on to the New  2 III. Case Selection: Nepal as a Buffer State  3 IV. Organization of the Book  4 2

Discussing the Buffer State Concept: Old and New Frameworks

8

I. On Small States  8 II. On Buffer States  14 A. The Buffer State as a Form of State Strategy  16 B. The Academic History of the Buffer State Concept  17 III. The New Buffer State Concept  22 A. Strategic Utility of the Buffer State  23 B. Agency of Buffer States  23 IV. Critical Junctures: Discussion and Application  24 3

Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State I. Evolution of Nepal’s Political Self-Perception  31 A. The Early Years of the Shah Dynasty  31 B. The Rana Regime  33 C. Reign of Kings Mahendra and Birendra  36 D. Post-democratization Period  37 II. Nepal in the Foreign Policy Imagination of Its Neighbors  39

31

viii  Contents A. Imagining Nepal: Evolving Perceptions from British India to the Republic of India  39 B. Imagining Nepal: Evolving Perceptions from the Qing Empire to the People’s Republic of China  43 III. Conceptualizing Nepal in Geopolitics: Contending or Congruent Conceptions?  47 4

Timeframe I: Critical Junctures 1947–1962

54

I. 1950–1951: Tibet’s Inclusion into the People’s Republic of China  54 II. 1951: End of the Rana Regime in Nepal  58 III. 1951–1960: Nepal’s First Democratic Experience  60 IV. 1960: King Mahendra’s Seizure of Power and Diplomatic Internationalization Efforts  64 V. Conclusion  70 5

Timeframe II: Critical Junctures 1962–1990

75

I. 1962: The Sino-Indian War  75 II. 1971: Bangladesh Liberation War  78 III. 1975: King Birendra’s Zone of Peace Proposal  82 IV. 1975: Sikkim’s Accession to India  84 V. 1989: The Blockade of Nepal under Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi  88 VI. Conclusion  92 6

Timeframe III: Critical Junctures 1990–2008

99

I. 1990: Second Democratic Experience in Nepal  99 II. 1996: The Maoist Insurgency  103 III. 2001: King Birendra’s Assassination and Crowning of King Gyanendra  106 IV. 2002: Suspension of Parliamentary Democracy and the Royal Coup  108 V. 2006–08: Jana Andolan II and Abolishment of Nepal’s Monarchy  111 VI. 2008: Riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region  116 VII. Conclusion  119 7

Timeframe IV: Critical Junctures 2009–2022 I. 2015: The Nepal Earthquakes  126 II. 2015: Nepal’s Border Closures with India  128

126

Contents ix III. 2017: Nepal’s Entry into China’s Belt and Road Initiative  133 IV. 2020: The Lipulekh–Kalapani–Limpiyadhura Border Disputes  136 V. 2020: Sino-Indian Border Clashes in Ladakh  139 VI. 2022: Nepal Joins the Millennium Challenge Corporation  141 VII. Conclusion  142 8

Conclusion

149

I. Survival Is Key  149 II. Lopsided Buffer Systems  150 III. Implicit Limits  151 IV. Agency Maximization  152 A. Neutrality  152 B. Internationalization of Diplomacy  153 C. Forging Closer Ties with One of the Buffered States  153 V. Domestic Actors Matter  155 VI. The New Buffer Concept in Context  156 A. Strategic Utility of the Buffer State  156 B. Agency of the Buffer State  158 VII. Revisiting the Conundrum of the Swan  158 Index

160

Figures

2.1 Donnelly and Hogan’s Conception of Critical Junctures 2.2 Modified Conception of Critical Junctures 3.1 Application of the New Buffer Concept to the China–India–Nepal (CIN) Buffer System

24 25 49

Tables

2.1 Major Critical Junctures in the China–India–Nepal (CIN) Buffer System 3.1 The Geopolitical Conceptions of Nepal 4.1 Applying the New Buffer State Concept to Timeframe I 5.1 Applying the New Buffer State Concept to Timeframe II 6.1 Applying the New Buffer State Concept to Timeframe III 7.1 Applying the New Buffer State Concept to Timeframe IV

27 47 71 93 120 143

Acknowledgments

It would have been impossible to complete this book without the support of several individuals and institutions. This book evolved out of my dissertation that I defended in April 2018. First, I extend my gratitude to the Department of Politics and International Relations of the Steven J. Green of International and Public Affairs at FIU for providing funding throughout the years of my graduate work. Additionally, I thank the University Graduate School for providing the Doctoral Evidence Acquisition Fellowship and the Dissertation Year Fellowship that tremendously helped in the completion of this book. I  also extend my thanks to the Morris and Anita Broad Research Fellowship from SIPA. Funding from the Graduate and Professional Student Committee, the College of Arts and Sciences, the Department of Politics and International Relations as well as SIPA and the International Studies Association have all contributed to financially aiding and making conference presentations possible, which contributed to the writing process of this book. Additionally, I thank the Department of Political Science and International Affairs at the University of North Georgia for their continued support. I extend special thanks to my UNG colleagues Dr. Haelim Suh, Dr. Dwight Wilson, Dr. Efren Velazquez, Dr. Nathan Price, Dr. Dlynn Armstrong Williams, Dr. Craig Greathouse, and Dr. Jonathan Miner. While writing this book, I was encouraged and inspired by many individuals, to whom I am deeply indebted. Dr. Félix E. Martín, who was my faculty mentor and is now a dear friend, went above and beyond to support my endeavors throughout graduate school and beyond. I would not have been successful in writing this book without his consistent words of encouragement, relentless confidence in my work, and valuable feedback. I also thank other faculty members including Drs. Iqbal Akhtar, Thomas A. Breslin, and Lynne M. Webb for their support throughout the writing process. Additionally, I extend my thanks to Drs. Harry Gould, Markus Thiel, and Susanne Zwingel for their support in their capacity as Graduate Program Directors of International Relations at FIU. Furthermore, I am thankful to Dr. Marcie Washington for always encouraging me to do my best and being a source of positivity. Drs. Ron Cox and John F. Clark have also aided me in my academic endeavors at FIU. Additionally, many thanks to the always supportive and positive team of the PIR administrative staff, particularly María Wilkinson

Acknowledgments xiii Díaz. I would be lost without all of your love and support. Many thanks to Robert Sorsby at Routledge for being so kind and patient as well others who made the publication process so smooth. Last but not least, my heartfelt thanks to my family and friends who consistently cheered me on. My parents, Durga (mamu) and Mohan Bahadur Chand (buwa), have always been supportive and loving. Thank you for being an unending source of inspiration and love; I  do this all for you. Special thanks to my friends Anupam Bhusal, Sewan Gurung, Liza Gashi, Maria Gabryszweksa, Luis Chongo, Chintan Bhatt, Prakash Manandhar, Biva Shrestha, Ranjita Poudel, Ana von Podcameni, Zenel Garcia, Nicolas Terradas, Lukas K. Danner, Zenel García, Onur Erpul, Mandy Guist, Chris Davis, Raquel Soto, Raquel Sedano, Siremorn Asvapromtada, Christine Bianco, Linea Cutter, Pragya Shah, Tae-whan Kim, Eunho Kim, Shipra Karmacharya, Umer Rahman, Kevin Modlin, Dhiraj Roka, and Gaurav Thapa. I also extend my thanks to Preshu Neupane, T.J. Liguori, Phil Guerreiro, Jessy Abouarab, Dwight Wilson, Ethan Trinh, Melvin Contreras, Sajoni Nakarmi, Manish Lama, Carlos Gerena, Brianna Hernandez, and Hussein Sayani. Without all of your unending support and encouragement, I would not have come this far. Furthermore, my family including cousins Prayash, Prasanna, Prachesta, Roshan, Rakesh, Nisha dijju, Usha dijju, Asha dijju, Heema dijju, Seema dijju, Bikash da, Binayak da, Ganesh da, Astha, and Krishna dijju, thank you for always being there for me. My thanks also to uncle Bal; aunts Ishwori (sano mamu), Kahani (maiju), and Uma (thulomuwa); and cousins-in-law Bobby da, Manish da, Hari da, Bijay da, and Tommy da. I also want to thank my nieces and nephews Avaani, Shivali, Ishani, Shuvani, Shuvam, Rashmita, Pranav, Sulav, and Avash for always making me laugh and keeping my spirits high. Thanks to everyone else in my extended family and friends circle as well. A specific thank you to my undergraduate adviser Dr. Bret L. Billet at Wartburg College for encouraging me to pursue graduate school. Last, I convey my love and remembrance for my late uncles, Madan Jung Rana and Mohan Bahadur Pande, along with other family and friends who have passed.

Abbreviations

AL APF BJP BRF BRI CA CCP CGGC CPA CPEC CPN CPN-M CIA CIN buffer system FDI FM INC ISI LAC MCC NAM NC NCNA NDA NDRF NEFA NGO OBOR PLA PM PoWs PPP PRC

Awami League Armed Police Force Bharatiya Janata Party Belt and Road Forum Belt and Road Initiative Constituent Assembly Chinese Communist Party China Gezhouba Group Corporation Comprehensive Peace Accord China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Communist Party of Nepal Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist Central Intelligence Agency China–India–Nepal buffer system Foreign Direct Investment Foreign Minister Indian National Congress Inter-Services Intelligence Line of Actual Control Millennium Challenge Corporation Nonaligned Movement Nepali Congress New China News Agency National Democratic Alliance National Disaster Response Force Northeast Frontier Agency Non-governmental organization One Belt, One Road Initiative People’s Liberation Army Prime Minister Prisoners of war Pakistan People’s Party People’s Republic of China

Abbreviations  xv RNA Royal Nepali Army SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SNC Sikkim National Congress SOE State-owned enterprise SPA Seven Party Alliance The UN The United Nations TAR Tibetan Autonomous Region UDMF United Democratic Madhesi Front UML United Marxists Leninists UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNSC United Nations Security Council UPA United Progressive Alliance UPFN United People’s Front Nepal USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ZoP Zone of Peace

1 Introduction

I.  The Conundrum of the Swan A swan,” said the Ameer, “was once swimming in a pond, watched with hungry eyes from one bank by a pack of wolves, and from the other by an old tigress. From fright or curiosity, the swan incautiously approached the latter. The tiger clawed at him and tore out some of his feathers. In his distress he swam over to the other bank, when the wolves made a rush and would have torn him to pieces, had he not escaped into deep water. Finding himself secure, he resolved to confine his movements to the middle of the pond. There resting at his ease, he noticed how the wolves snarled at each other, and how very shallow the water was near the edge. He reflected that were the pond to dry up, the tigress might and the wolves certainly would devour him.1

Ameer Abdur Rahman Khan’s musings of the swan, an allegory for his state of Afghanistan, capture the conundrum of a buffer state. In the simplest of terms, buffer states are small states straddled between rival middle or great powers. These are states that “lessen the shocks emanating from some mightier state in the process of violent upheaval.”2 The precariousness with which buffer states have historically had to balance contending powers much larger than themselves is aptly captured by their comparisons to the tigress and the wolves. However, the context of the buffer state has rapidly changed since the 19th century when Ameer Khan ruled Afghanistan. The advent of new means of transport, the dissemination of information, and the expansion of information interconnectedness have extensively changed the means by which we perceive our political reality. The same is true for the buffer state; it can no longer be conceptualized as a simple geographic space to separate contending larger powers. Its importance as a strategic space for competition for those contending powers has grown as the use of force in interstate politics is not as widespread due to changes in international norms. The buffer states’ agency is also important to consider as they are not static political entities without political choices. As much as the wolves and the tigress get their importance highlighted, what is the swan contemplating? What options can it partake in for it to emerge as unscathed as possible? Is the swan capable of using its agency to play the tigress against the wolves? These questions form DOI: 10.4324/9781003178538-1

2  Introduction the basis for this book’s approach toward the buffer state. The rekindling of the buffer state concept emphasizes its agency amidst the contending interests of its neighbors. It seeks to reinvigorate the concept of the buffer state within the current context of the field of international relations. Although small states have historically garnered limited attention within the discipline, this book delves into one of their historically significant functions, that is, acting as buffers between rival interests. This rekindling of the buffer state concept also highlights the agency of such states rather than assuming them to be static political actors without foreign policy choices.

II. Imagining the Buffer State: Rekindling the Old and on to the New In its simplest form, a buffer state is defined as a small state located in between two contending states that are much more powerful than itself. The classical approach to buffer states is deeply rooted in geopolitics, which emerged as a field to assess the influence of geographical factors on the human realm of politics. It is evident that the early formulation of the buffer state concept is geopolitical in nature, given the emphasis on its spatial importance. While geography played a key role in state strategy,3 the classical conceptualization of the buffer state’s utility as a geographic discontinuity or an “early warning system” evolved with changes in technological advent. The technological innovation and military advent in the aftermath of World War I greatly depreciated the strategic value of geographic distance.4 As a result, the relevance of buffer states should have diminished with such a change in strategic culture, as their utility is tied to their geographical disposition. Yet, some buffer states, such as Nepal, continue to maintain relevance today through the interaction of larger rival states and their crucial role in the dynamics of regional stability. This calls for a deeper exploration of why buffer states remain relevant in the interaction of regional rivals despite the decline of strategic utility of spatial distance. Additionally, there is a dearth of studies concerning the agency of buffer states, which can also illustrate the nature of interactions between rival powers in smaller states. In a modern context wherein geography does not serve the same spatial and security function due to advances in military and transportation technologies, the book’s goal is to offer a new conception of the buffer state concept based on two concepts: (i) strategic utility of the buffer state and (ii) the agency of buffer states. First, the renewed conceptual framework tackles the outdated conceptual framework of buffer states based on their strategic utility for the contending powers they separate. The new conception of the buffer state is the notion of a dynamic political space wherein contending powers that are separated by the buffer actively showcase competitive overtures and may use such overtures as a means of assessing the extent of the contender’s influence in the buffer state. Given the reduced utility of buffer states as geographic discontinuities or early warning systems, the new buffer state concept emphasizes their importance, wherein the larger contending

Introduction  3 powers showcase their power status and also use these spaces as ways to measure the contending power’s foreign policy formidability and capability. Second, the new conception of the buffer state offered by this book emphasizes the agency of buffer states. The traditional conception only offers limited insights into the agency of buffer states as their static geographic importance is highlighted. Such states are cast as lacking any meaningful capability to interact with the dynamic relations of their more powerful neighbors. The new conception challenges this static notion of the buffer state and argues that such states, despite being limited in agency due to its relatively weak position in the international system, can utilize its agency. Given the competitive nature of the contending powers when it comes to the buffer state, such a strategic context provides buffer states the agency to shape their relations with the contending neighboring powers. Thus, the new conceptual framework of the buffer state is premised on two factors: The buffer state’s strategic utility for its contending neighbors and its agency within the buffer system.5 This new conceptual framework also offers a renewed approach to understanding buffer states and aims to maintain the concept’s relevance in contemporary international relations. Furthermore, it also adds to the scant literature on the buffer concept within this academic discipline.

III.  Case Selection: Nepal as a Buffer State Nepal has served as a buffer state between India and China since before the decolonization of India and the resurgence of an independent China. Given the country’s geographic ruggedness due to the Himalayan mountain range that runs across its northern region, Nepal has naturally served that role. There has been an understanding since the inception of Nepali national identity that the country is a smaller power between much larger neighbors; Nepal’s founding monarch King Prithvi Narayan Shah called it the “yam between two boulders.” Neither China nor India have made active endeavors to annex Nepal although it has remained within their orbit of influence and their contending influences have become more pronounced since the emergence of Nepal as a federal republic in 2008. Further discussions on Nepal’s buffer status can be found in Chapter 3. The selection of Nepal as the case study for this work is due to its current relevance in Sino-Indian interactions and its continued evolution in its role as a buffer state. While historically a geographic buffer given that the country contains the Himalayas, it continues to capture the attention of foreign policymakers in both China and India. As such, Nepal is a feasible case to extrapolate the new concept of the buffer state as a high dynamic political space due to the increased overtures in the country from both China and India.6 Furthermore, Nepal remains central in the foreign policy discourses of China and India vis-à-vis regional security. Finally, Nepal showcases agency as its foreign policy elites have repeatedly displayed closeness to either New Delhi or Beijing, depending on who is in charge of the Nepali Government. The study of Nepal through the lens of this new buffer concept also adds another dimension to Sino-Indian relations, a topic which has

4  Introduction garnered extensive interests in international relations. Further discussions on Chinese and Indian interests in Nepal are found in Chapter 4. This book offers a novel approach to the study of buffer states. First, it offers a renewed conception of the buffer state in the contemporary context of international relations. It systematically offers a new conceptualization of the buffer state as a highly dynamic political space wherein the nature of competitive interactions and strategies of bigger powers can be analyzed. This new conception also adds a new dimension to the buffer state’s agency as a small state between larger powers and not just a spectator to their interactions. It also adds to the scant literature on the buffer concept in the academic discipline of international relations. Second, the book offers a systematic study of Chinese and Indian influences in Nepal. There has been renewed interest in studying Sino-Indian dynamics in Nepal, where both are vying for political influence, but none use the analytical framework of the buffer state. As such, this book operationalizes the conceptual framework of the buffer state to analyze Sino-Indian influences in Nepal. Third, the book also contributes to the understanding of the interplay of contending influences of bigger powers such as India and China in smaller neighboring states such as Nepal. It offers a deeper understanding of the strategies and tools used by bigger regional powers in geopolitical areas of contention.

IV.  Organization of the Book There are seven other chapters following the Introduction. Given that buffer states are overwhelmingly small states, Chapter  2 initially examines the existing literature on various theoretical perspectives on small states. Then, it covers the history of the buffer state concept. As the buffer state is an ancient geopolitical concept, the chapter highlights its importance in the ancient world such as the Roman usage of march states and the medieval period when the British monarchs used Welsh marchlords in the periphery of their realm. The chapter then moves on to more modern operationalization of the buffer state such as the Anglo-Russian contentions in Afghanistan during the Great Game and the British Empire’s usage of the Himalayan mountain kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim as buffers against the Qing Empire. Finally, the chapter problematizes the older concepts of the buffer state and highlights the need for a new concept that highlights advances in technologies related to communication and transportation as well as the impact of normative changes in international politics. Within this changed context, this chapter explains the new buffer state concept as a dynamic political space wherein the buffer state also exercises agency as a distinct political actor. The chapter also includes a discussion on the critical junctures, which are events that set processes of institutional/policy change in motion.7 These specific events are flashpoints that had the potential to change policy orientations or policy posturing. Given that the new buffer state concept emphasizes dynamism in relations, which includes change/adaptation of national foreign policies, the concept of critical junctures is utilized to illustrate the conceptual framework within the case study consisting of the China–India–Nepal (CIN) buffer system. The critical junctures are chosen based on their impact on the CIN buffer system.

Introduction  5 Chapter 3 discusses the conception of Nepal as a buffer state tracing its historical genealogy. As such, both old and new conceptions of Nepal’s roles are discussed. This discussion includes Nepal’s conceptual evolution including the need for a new conceptual framework for buffer states. It highlights Nepal’s founding and the acceptance by Nepali elites of its geopolitical predisposition between major powers. Furthermore, the chapter analyzes how this role conception impacted Nepali foreign policy posturing vis-à-vis China and India. The chapter illustrates Nepal within the geopolitical imagination of India and China, emphasizing their official public posturing. It also situates Nepal in Chinese and Indian strategic thinking. Chapter 3 further traces the postcolonial foreign policy of India toward Nepal, including the legacy of Nehruvian thinking toward the Himalayan kingdoms on India’s frontiers with China. The chapter also touches on Nepal’s democratization and India’s interactions with the process. Then, it discusses China’s strategic interests in Nepal. Since the 1950 incorporation of Tibet, the People’s Republic of China has shared a lengthy rugged border with Nepal. Given the Tibetan Autonomous Region’s sensitivity in regard to security, Nepal became an important state to stabilize China’s southern frontier. As such, this chapter also delves into Mao’s legacy on strategy toward Nepal and the lingering importance of Nepal to Chinese strategic interests. The extension of the Belt and Road Initiative is also discussed within the context of Sino-Nepali relations. This chapter also highlights the strategic utility of Nepal for India and China, specifically focusing on the new conception of the buffer concept where Nepal has emerged as a dynamic political space for Sino-Indo interactions. Overall, Chapter 3 highlights the evolving strategic utility of Nepal from a static buffer to one where India and China seek dynamic interactions as a means of assessing the capability and formidability of the contending state. Then, the discussion moves to Nepal’s experiences based on the new conceptual framework of the buffer state. It delves into how Nepal is not merely a spectator but also an active player in the dynamics between India and China in the country. Chapter 4 covers the first timeframe proposed in the book, called Timeframe I, which includes four critical junctures between the years 1947 and 1962. The year 1947 is significant as India emerged as an independent state, and Nepal now had to reestablish ties with a neighbor that was politically very distinct from the British Empire yet socioculturally very close. As for China, it became a geographically contiguous neighbor of Nepal’s in 1950 with Tibet’s incorporation into the People’s Republic of China. The year 1962, on the other hand, signifies the beginning of Sino-Indian interactions based on realpolitik, which was a result of their border war. As such, the years between 1947 and 1962 signify a timeframe of new geopolitical realities for the chosen buffer system. The latter half of Chapter  4 covers the following critical junctures: • • • •

1950–1951: Tibet’s Inclusion into the People’s Republic of China 1951: End of the Rana Regime in Nepal 1951–1960: Nepal’s First Democratic Experience 1960: King Mahendra’s Seizure of Power and Diplomatic Internationalization Efforts

6  Introduction Chapter 5 covers the critical junctures from the 1962 Sino-Indian War until Nepal’s democratization in 1990; this period is titled Timeframe II. The border war was a major shift in Sino-Indian relations, and it initiated contentions in those relations that continue into the present. As such, Chapter 5 covers five critical junctures, beginning with the event that sparked a major shift in geopolitical thinking within India and China vis-à-vis each other: • • • • •

1962: The Sino-Indian War 1971: Bangladesh Liberation War 1975: King Birendra’s Zone of Peace Proposal 1975: Sikkim’s Accession to India 1989: The Blockade of Nepal under Indian Prime Minister (PM) Rajiv Gandhi

Chapters  6 covers the critical junctures during Nepal’s second democratization process between 1990 and 2008. Called Timeframe III, the six critical junctures within this period are marred by democratic disruptions in Nepal by the direct rule of the monarchy and the civil war led by the Maoists between 1996 and 2006, which subsequently led to the abolishment of the monarchy in 2008. The democratization of Nepal opened it to a wide variety of foreign policy posturing; thus, the 1990–2008 timeframe highlights the dynamic nature of Nepal’s agency as a buffer state, which was largely concentrated to the Rana Regime and the monarchy during the pre-democratization period: • • • • • •

1990: Second Democratic Experience in Nepal 1996: The Maoist Insurgency 2001: King Birendra’s Assassination and Crowning of King Gyanendra 2002: Suspension of Parliamentary Democracy and the Royal Coup 2006–2008: Jana Andolan II and Abolishment of Nepal’s Monarchy 2008: Riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region

Chapter 7 includes assessments of critical junctures post-2008 after Nepal transitioned into a federal democratic republic following the abolishment of the monarchy in 2008. Called Timeframe IV, it includes six critical junctures: • • • • • •

2015: The Nepal Earthquakes 2015: Nepal’s Border Closures with India 2017: Nepal’s Entry into China’s Belt and Road Initiative 2020: The Lipulekh–Kalapani–Limpiyadhura Border Disputes 2020: Sino-Indian Border Clashes in Ladakh 2022: Nepal Joins the Millennium Challenge Corporation

All the critical junctures in Chapters  4–7 are discussed and analyzed using the new buffer state concept.

Introduction  7 Chapter 8 is the conclusion, which ties together the new conception of the buffer state and its assessment in all the critical junctures. Overall, the chapter “brings it together” by providing a broad assessment of the new buffer state concept and how the critical junctures illustrate the renewed buffer state concept through the case of the CIN buffer system.

Notes 1 Stephen Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman (London: Bliss, Sands, and Foster, 1895), 137. 2  Anicetas Simutis, “Buffer States: A Worn-out Myth,” America 70, no. 14 (1944): 376. 3 Geography continues to be important in the strategy of states but in a different form. While spatial distance does figure as an important aspect of military strategy, it does not hold the same importance as it did before the advent of planes and motorized weapons systems. In the contemporary era, geography remains an aspect of security strategy, as showcased by the importance played by Pakistan during the military endeavors into Afghanistan in 2001. 4 Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, Neo-statecraft and Meta-geopolitics: Reconciliation of Power, Interests, and Justice in the 21st Century (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2009), 45; Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History (New York: Routledge, 2012), 322; Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 20; Nicholas J. Spykman, “Geography and Foreign Policy, I,” The American Political Science Review 32, no. 1 (1938): 33; Spykman discusses the depreciation of geographic distance as a strategic tool due to technological innovation in the context of all states in the international system, while Rothstein discusses it within the context of small states. 5 A buffer system consists of the buffer state and the contending powers it separates; the contending powers the buffer state separates are known as buffered states. 6 Anbarasan Ethirajan, “India and China: How Nepal’s New Map is Stirring Old Rivalries,” BBC News, June 10, 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52967452; Arun Budhathoki, “Nepal Slips Toward Anarchy as India and China Seek Himalayan Edge,” Nikkei Asia, December 31, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Nepal-slips-toward-anarchy-as-Indiaand-China-seek-Himalayan-edge; Arif Rafiq, “Nepal is Walking a Tightrope between India and China,” Al Jazeera, July 29, 2020, www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/7/29/nepal-iswalking-a-tightrope-between-india-and-china; Bhadra Sharma, “Nepal Falls into Political Turmoil. China and India are Watching,” The New York Times, December 20, 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/12/20/world/asia/nepal-parliament.html; Bibek Chand, “Disaster Relief as a Political Tool: Analysing Indian and Chinese Responses after the Nepal Earthquakes,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 6 (2017): 535–545. 7 Paul F. Donnelly and John Hogan, “Understanding Policy Change Using a Critical Junctures Theory in Comparative Context: The Cases of Ireland and Sweden,” Policy Studies Journal 40, no. 2 (2012): 324.

2 Discussing the Buffer State Concept Old and New Frameworks

Given that most buffer states tend to be smaller states in international politics, this chapter starts out by examining the existing literature on various theoretical perspectives on small states. Then, it covers the historical usage of the buffer state concept in international relations, including the illustrations that cover the Roman usage of the march states, the medieval British monarchs and their marchlords, the Anglo-Russian contentions in Afghanistan during the Great Game, and finally, the British Empire’s conceptualization of the Himalayan states as buffers against the Qing Empire. Finally, the chapter discusses the limitations of the old buffer concept in analyzing contemporary international relations as it pertains to buffer states and the need for a new conceptual framework. It offers a new buffer state concept as a dynamic political space wherein the buffer state’s agency is an important factor to consider.

I.  On Small States The literature on small states is pertinent to the discussion on buffer states, as most buffer states tend to be small states in the international system. But it is also essential to note that not all buffer states are small states. The issue with this line of thinking, however, rests on defining what a small state is. Since there is no consensus on the definition of small states, it is a highly contested concept in both theory and practice.1 While the contemporary system of states accords legal equality to all states, big and small, there is inherent inequality of other forms that are expressed formally and informally in international affairs. While small states were largely sidelined in academic endeavors in international relations, there has been increasing attention on such states after the end of the Cold War. The conclusion of the bipolar split based on ideology created political space for many small states to pursue foreign policies without many of the Cold War’s systemic constraints. David Vital’s preliminary definition of small powers rests on measures such as population,2 which authors like William E. Paterson and Robert Keohane criticize as cursory and lacking analytical depth.3 Vital’s usage of population as a marker for small powers runs the problem of lumping states like Sweden and Rwanda in the same category while remaining ambiguous toward larger underdeveloped DOI: 10.4324/9781003178538-2

Discussing the Buffer State Concept  9 states with significant populations but limited power capabilities. Vital revises his definition in his later work titled The Survival of Small States (1971) by describing a small power as: that state which, in the long term, in itself and as a satellite or client or close ally – i.e. as a non-autonomous participant in international politics – can constitute more than a dispensable and non-decisive increment to a primary state’s total array of political and military resources, regardless of whatever short-term, contingent weight as an auxiliary (or obstacle) to the primary power it may have in certain circumstances.4 In other words, Vital proposes a definition that is not contingent on population size; in fact, he presents an approach that is more nuanced and tied to the dynamic nature of small states in the international system. Another perspective on small states rests on their alliance formation; specifically, Robert Rothstein ties the role of small states to balance of power. He defines small states as those states that cannot obtain security through their own capabilities.5 Such states attain security by forming alliances with larger powers. But then again, this definition does not accurately depict the various types of states that exist in the international system; there is also the possibility of bifurcating the states of the world into Great Powers – states capable of attaining security and the other states – all non-Great Powers that have the potential to face insecurity emanating from the Great Powers. Keohane rightly raises the concern that Great Powers too could face security threats despite being materially capable. He proposes an approach based on systemic roles, categorizing states into the following: • • • •

System determining: States that are considered superpowers and can act unilaterally without major threats to their own security System influencing: States that can impact the system through multinational organizations System affecting: States that can influence the system through alliance formations and regional organizations and System ineffectual: States that have minimal impact on the system or are dominated by larger powers6

Despite the lack of systemic influence, small states can play key roles at the regional subsystemic levels. Since small states exert limited international influence, their interests tend to be limited as well. Given this reality, their international relations are concerned with subsystemic security dynamics.7 This holds true for buffer states as well, as they tend to be mostly concerned with the security relations of the buffered states rather than systemic level politics. This is largely due to their limited material capabilities and immediate importance placed on relations with geographically contiguous neighbors. Raimo Vayrynen focuses on this approach and proposes another definition of a small power:

10  Discussing the Buffer State Concept A small power is a state which has a low objective and/or a low perceived rank in the context where it is acting. Furthermore, small powers are expected to behave in a given way, i.e. their role prescriptions differ from those of middle and great powers, which affect together with their low rank upon their behavior and possibilities of influence. Finally, the interests of small powers are at least to some extent different from the interests of great powers, a fact which denotes the latent or manifest conflict of interests between these two classes of states.8 Vayrynen’s approach is based on a multifaceted analysis of what constitutes a small power. Regardless, the authors provide numerous analytical perspectives on small states but not necessarily on buffer states. They set the premise for small states, which most buffer states are, but the distinct nature of a buffer state’s disposition between two rival powers makes it a unique type of small state. Keohane does raise important points on the systemic role of the small states and how that impacts their behavior as well as strategies. But he does not use this conception to analyze the behavior of buffer states or how they fit into regional patterns of security and insecurity. Veenendaal and Corbett (2015) showcase the biases against small states in the subfield of comparative politics. Although not directly related to the buffer state system, their argument highlights the biases against small states in the academic setting. They put forth a list of explanations for why small states are largely left out of major academic endeavors in comparative politics: • • • • •

Small states represent only a tiny proportion of the world’s population (e.g., Huntington, 1991; Moore, 1995) Small states are not “real” or fully independent states (e.g., Vanhanen, 1997) Other authors in this academic field exclude small states as well (e.g., LeDuc, Niemi, & Norris, 2002; Lijphart, 1999) There is a structural lack of data on small states (e.g., Powell, 1984; Vanhanen, 1997) and The principle of “most similar” comparison is more appropriate in some circumstances (e.g., Rhodes, Wanna, & Weller, 2009, p. 11)”9

The argument made by Veenendaal and Corbett not only showcases the need for deeper extrapolation on the role of small states but also the academic biases that may prevent a complete explanation of political dynamics occurring in the international system. More academic attention to small states does not entail less importance to larger powers; rather, the argument is that greater analytical attention to small states would facilitate a more complete understanding of politics of the larger powers. Further academic attention to small states would be beneficial not only for comparative politics but also for international relations; study of small states contributes to covering more case studies and may lend more validity to theorizing within comparative politics and international relations. While these authors do not directly contribute to the literature on buffer states, they make a

Discussing the Buffer State Concept 11 crucial point regarding the need to conduct more research on small states to better understand their behaviors. While small states have been traditionally sidelined by mainstream studies in Political Science and International Relations, the trend is changing. There is an increased interest in the study of small states, particularly in relation to their security and foreign policy approaches.10 Even within the subfield of security studies, there is a lack of a consistent and comprehensive approach to security-related academic endeavors in the study of small states.11 Anders Wivel et al. seek to do just that; they offer a comprehensive approach to understanding the security challenges and opportunities of small states in the contemporary international system. Their work runs into the same issue as others: How to define a small state. They settle on material power capabilities as the parameter to define small states. Their case is supported by three benefits: First, if we are to analyze the opportunities, challenges and limitations of a specific state, indications of absolute and relative capacity are important, because they inform us of the absolute and relative limitations on these states’ capacity to handle different types of challenges. Second, an absolute and universal threshold between big and small states of, for example, a population size of 15 million people, or a GDP of €500 billion, has the benefit of creating a clear and easily applicable definition of small states . . . . Third, starting from a power possession definition allows us to draw on the comprehensive literature on power and security in international relations in order to identify why, when and how the security challenges of small states are distinct from those faced by stronger states.12 Anders Wivel et al.’s characterization touches upon the novel idea of state limitations as a means of assessing its smallness. They add nuance to their definition of small states by including the relational dimension and asymmetry. Adding to this line of thinking, Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006) argue that a state’s smallness is not just a matter of material capabilities; it also depends on soft power and the understandings of foreign policy elites and the general public of the proper role of the state in global and regional affairs.13 So, a small state is not just defined by its material capabilities, but also by how elites and general populace perceive its role in international relations. Another line of thinking on small states uses the asymmetric approach. According to this approach, a small state is defined as the weaker actor in such a power relationship.14 Asymmetric relationships are characterized by a substantial power differential between the two actors involved, hence the name. Given its weaker status in the dyadic relationship, the small state is unable to change the nature or functioning of its relations with the larger power on its own.15 This dyadic approach to assessing the smallness of a state is highly subjective and may not always be useful for overarching arguments. For instance, a Middle Power would be designated as a small power if it is in a dyadic relationship with a Great Power, which is not accurate in the depiction of the nature of the Middle Power.

12  Discussing the Buffer State Concept Nevertheless, it adds nuance to the traditionally broad reaching conceptions of what constitutes a small state. While small states have traditionally been academically sidelined, there is an emerging body of literature that examines the role of such states in contemporary international politics. The small states of the European Union have garnered the most attention, especially after the end of the Cold War;16 work on non-Western small states continues to be limited but growing.17 The new wave of small-state authors emphasizes the agency of such actors, going beyond their conceptualization as marginal or peripheral players in the international system. Gibert and Grzelczyk (2017) critique the traditional academic endeavors of small states for portraying them as passive participants; they argue that: Small states have often been considered as interesting only in their relations within an institutional setting they could contribute to, or receive advantages from, or in how they would attempt to avoid collapse and disappearance, being absorbed by a larger state.18 The authors infer the focus on small-state voting behavior in the United Nations, without much attention being paid to the motivations and interests of such states in the international system outside of the institutional frameworks of intergovernmental organizations. Kassimeris (2009) makes a similar case by arguing that small powers do not lack power per se; what they lack is the opportunity to display it.19 Small states are not studied for their agency; rather, they are usually included in academic discourses that focus on larger powers – the crux of most of the studies is on how small states fit as minor players or mere additions to Great Power politics. However, the end of the Cold War heralded a new era for the study of small states. It opened up the international political space for more dynamic interactions of the small powers with bigger powers and also with each other. Thus, there have been emerging calls for more extensive analyses on the agency of small states in international politics as the systemic constrains of the Cold War were lifted. On the other hand, Maas (2017) offers a framework focused on small state survival wherein that phenomenon is anchored in the state system, specifically the dependency of small states for their survival on the system of states.20 There is also a push to include other regions of the world to garner a more global understanding of the role of small states in international politics. A  collection of journal articles published by Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal makes a fresh push for the study of small states outside of the West. Titled NonWestern Small States, the special issue opens a new avenue for the study of small states, which were traditionally marginalized. Bailes et al. (2017) make the case that small states are inherently different; using the case studies of Cuba, Armenia, and Singapore, the authors make the case that small state diplomacy is tied to flexibility in their approach to changing power dynamics in the international system and unity of action in the domestic realm.21 They further critique Alliance Theory for not incorporating the differentiated behavior of small states; instead,

Discussing the Buffer State Concept  13 they propose Alliance Shelter Theory. This theory is based on the idea that the functional logic of small states is different as these states seek shelter from larger states, and to do this, they emphasize international cooperation.22 Jesse and Dreyer (2016) offer a systematic and logical understanding of a small state within contemporary international relations. The authors argue for a relative definition of such states, defining “smallness” by placing it within a regional context for each case.23 The authors situate small states within the frameworks of theories in international relations and offer the influences of identity, norms, public opinions, and domestic political predicaments in explaining the behavior of small states. While not particularly about buffer states, Jesse and Dreyer offer a coherent concept of small states in contemporary international politics. Gigleux (2017) uses role theory to analyze small-state behavior. He argues that small states have multiple self-understandings that are shaped by the perceptions, demands, and expectations of other actors in the system.24 Role theory suggests that the international policies of small states are largely reflective of national identity. In another work, David Styan uses the case study of Djibouti to analyze its strategies as a small state. He takes issue with the Alliance Shelter Theory and argues that his case study, Djibouti, has not adopted policies that reflect the safety in numbers approach propagated by the theory.25 Rather, Djibouti has maintained cordial relations with its much larger neighbor, Ethiopia, which in turn relies heavily on its smaller neighbor for access to oceanic trade lanes. It also showcases no desire to become part of a coalition of small states, as inferred by the Alliance Shelter Theory. Other works on non-Western small states include that of Kadira Pethiyagoda. He makes the case for Sri Lanka’s importance to China, the United States, and India, given its strategic location in the busy Indian Ocean sea lanes. His write-up argues that small states are capable of forming alliances with regional or global powers, there by changing international political dynamics, or as the author points, the emerging multipolar world has given small states more room to diversify their partnerships.26 Pethiyagoda adds that, “In the future, small states, particularly with strategic relevance like those around the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, will have more options to switch between multiple poles. Great powers will have less leverage.”27 Pethiyagoda’s argument rests on Sri Lanka’s case, where he highlights the transition from a pro-China Government under Mahinda Rajapaksa to a more pro-US and pro-India Government of Mathila Sirisena. His argument is a novel perspective in the post-Cold War period and has implications for the study of small states. He does not simply assume the small state (in this case, Sri Lanka) as merely an extension of Great Power interactions; rather, Sri Lanka is studied as an actor with agency, capable of making decisions that have ramifications for Great Powers. While Pethiyagoda touches on the increasing agency of small states in international politics, Tom Long (2017) creates an analytical framework for assessing the agency of small states. His argument is that small states do not have the means to exercise power in the same manner as Great Powers. Given this impediment, small states use nonconventional means, wherein military force becomes

14  Discussing the Buffer State Concept less acceptable; instead, there is greater emphasis on interdependence, norms, and institutions.28 While Gibert and Grzelczyk (2017) criticized the limits of studying small states within institutional frameworks, Long conceptualizes such behavior as an expression of the small states’ agency, which is extremely limited outside of institutional frameworks that are guided by interdependence and norms. Bernal (2015) also emphasizes the agency of small states and its links to intrastate politics within larger powers. Using the case study of Jamaica’s role in influencing US foreign policy, Bernal makes the case that smaller states can use their agency individually or in conjunction with other small states to push for their preferred foreign policy outcomes vis-à-vis bigger powers.29 Experts on small states, including the likes of David Vital, Robert Rothstein, and Niels Amstrup, have all presented contending analytical structures to classify and understand such states. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an inherent push to study small states. While much of the literature on such states is focused on those that belong to the European Union, work on non-Western small states has garnered increased attention. The likes of Kassimeris, Bailes et  al., Gigleux, and Pethiyagoda have put forth novel means of assessing non-Western powers in the international system. However, work on the analytical utility of buffer states is still extremely limited. While small states as the objects of study have garnered some traction within academic circles, attention to buffer states remains scant. Nevertheless, there is a very small group of academics who have written on the subject, including relatively novel approaches to assessing the role of buffer states. These works are extrapolated in the following section.

II.  On Buffer States Any discussion on buffer states needs to address its roots in the field of Geopolitics given that its political meaning is derived from its geographic disposition.30 Geopolitics developed as a novel discipline in Europe just before World War I. Deliberations over the political utility of studying geography led to the development of the field. In its early stages, Geopolitics sought to make sense of the influence of geography on the human political realm. The erstwhile focus of the discipline of Geography on the physical topography of the Earth was reaching its limit of utility. Also, geography was increasingly seen as an innate aspect of human civilization. Friedrich Ratzel, the pioneer thinker in Geopolitics, attempted to bridge the gap between pure geography and history.31 Translation of Ratzel’s work from German to English by Ellen Churchill Semple was the first analytical attempt at linking what was until then two disparate disciplines. In Ratzel’s own words, “the national history of any state is influenced by local climate, soil, rivers, and boundaries of mountains or deserts.”32 Thus, he deemed it necessary to include human interactions with nature when studying geography. Early geopolitical writings such as Ratzel’s and Semple’s argued for a causal linkage that promoted a deterministic view of geography; they argued that human interactions, including innovation and culture, were shaped by the topography that they resided in.33 This deterministic approach has long been criticized for being too simplistic

Discussing the Buffer State Concept  15 and narrowly conceptualized. Nevertheless, it cannot be discounted that Ratzel pioneered a new avenue for analyzing state behavior – one that considered geography as an important aspect of statecraft, which had immense implications for the study of buffer states. Thus, the discipline of Geopolitics emerged to analyze how geography influences state policy, that is, how a state’s geographic disposition impacts its role conceptualization and the subsequent policies that it adopts as part of its statecraft. It formalized the study of geography and its links to the political realm of human civilization. Other Classical Geopolitical writers, including Halford Mackinder, Robert Strausz-Hupe, and Richard Spykman, further pursued the linkages between geography and foreign policy of states. Given that the very existence and purpose of the buffer state is defined by its geographic disposition between larger powers, this linkage between geography and foreign policy remains of utmost importance for its study. Mackinder’s Heartland Theory provided strategists with a unique means of assessing political strategy, an approach that emphasized the control of the Eurasian heartland as key to the establishment of a global empire.34 Mackinder moved beyond the deterministic linkages between geography and the political realm of humanity; he emphasized a more nuanced approach to the discipline of Geography, one that sought to explain the political behavior of humans. Mackinder revolutionized Geography from a discipline strictly concerned with the topography of the world to one that accounted for how it can be related to humanity. Essentially, Mackinder developed Ratzel’s conceptual foundations even further and established Geopolitics as a separate subfield. Topography no longer remained apolitical as it took on political significance and meaning. Robert Strausz-Hupe took Mackinder’s argument further by not only emphasizing the importance of the Heartland for strategic value but the very importance of living space, which remained an integral part of German Geopolitik and later contributed to the Nazi concept of the Lebensraum.35 Thus, the living space as a conception was as political as it was geographic; its usage during the World War II was tragic. The crucial importance of geographic space for state development had become a quintessential aspect of classical geopolitics but it was Nicholas J. Spykman who directly linked geography with foreign policy-making. He argued that geography was one of many factors that determined the foreign policy of a state. Spykman adds that: Topography affects strength because of its influence on unity and internal coherence. Climate, affecting transportation and setting limits to the possibility of agricultural production, conditions the economic structure of the state, and thus, indirectly but unmistakably, foreign policy.36 In essence, he undermined the deterministic aspect of geopolitics that dominated the earlier years of the discipline. But, not unlike his predecessors in Geopolitics, Spykman asserts that topography does influence economic relations and, subsequently, the political structure and foreign policy-making of states. Geographic layout has implications for state development and its overall capacity to transform

16  Discussing the Buffer State Concept its material potential to capability. Spkyman modified classical Geopolitics from a purely deterministic discipline to a more complex and multilayered approach in understanding the links between geography and politics. Geographic difficulty was gradually overcome due to technological innovation, but topography could not be ruled out of politics. Geographic location played an important role in the strategy of states, and it was especially important for dispersion of technology, which would in turn lead to increased overcoming of geographic remoteness. A.  The Buffer State as a Form of State Strategy Discussing buffer states requires acknowledgment of the fact that the concept is an ancient form of state strategy, particularly used by Empires or other forms of Great Powers. In ancient periods, buffer states have also been historically used for the ontological security of larger powers. The political strategy of using buffer zones as cushions for the political core from external threats, such as barbarians and other major powers, can be traced back to the era of the Roman Empire. Utilizing march states37 and wastelands to demarcate and secure their boundaries, the Romans were one of the earliest to deploy the concept of buffer zones.38 Such marches denoted the borderlands or frontiers, which shielded the core of the empire.39 Such buffer states or zones also served as geographic discontinuities between larger powers, which is again connected to the notion of ontological security. For example, in the 3rd century BCE, the Palmyrene Empire served as a key buffer zone between the Roman Empire and the Sassanid Empire,40 separating the two major powers and serving as a key geographic discontinuity to foster ontological security as well as prevent direct contact which could escalate to conflict. Geographic discontinuities prevent contiguity and, logically, any direct confrontation between contending powers. In the Middle Ages, major European powers such as Britain and the Holy Roman Empire used this concept in the form of march states or markgrafs, who controlled the march states but time and again successfully asserted their own independence.41 The Holy Roman Empire utilized the markgrafs as safeguards against Slavic advances in the east.42 In the 10th and 11th centuries, Normans established lordships on the border between England and Wales; called the marcher-lords, they were independent barons who could wage war, erect castles, and hold courts without reference to the crown.43 These marcher-lords were responsible for protecting the frontiers of English territory and safeguarding core English territories from external attacks.44 The marcher-lords were de facto semiindependent, and they separated Wales proper from England by acting as a geographic barrier separating the two entities.45 However, given the disposition of such entities in the frontiers, such march states would also be characterized by overlapping and sometimes, conflicting lordships making such frontiers insecure. It is a characteristic that is later ascribed to the buffer state as well. The concept of spatial cushions or frontier security was not limited to the European powers. The Ottoman Empire utilized a similar concept; on its northern frontiers with Europe, the Empire used vassal states such as the Principality of Erdel,

Discussing the Buffer State Concept  17 Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Crimean Khanates as buffers.46 Overall, the idea of frontier regions in areas of contention is not modern and has a long history rooted in the security strategies of empires. Nevertheless, it must be noted that it was the formalized study of Geopolitics and its eventual development as an analytical framework that allowed us to analyze these old strategies from a modern academic lens. Despite its existence for an elaborate period of human history, the modern day concept and nomenclature of the buffer state as a geographic space separating larger powers or serving as territorial discontinuities between them was first used in 1876 while the buffer state as a distinct political terminology emerged in 1883.47 However, in the early modern period, the importance of buffer states was emphasized because of the strategic environment, including balance of power. While the notion of geographic security persisted, its importance had diminished in comparison to the balance of power calculations. Within this context, buffer states were given such status based on the interests of larger states, including their strategic function in the competition between rival powers.48 In the context of the modern international system, the British were one of the first to employ the concept of the buffer state in Afghanistan to separate British and Russian spheres of influence during the Great Game.49 Tsarist Russia had absorbed much of Central Asia into its burgeoning empire while the British colonial interests coalesced in India. These imperial tensions subsequently led to the understanding that Afghanistan would serve as a buffer state. The AngloAfghan Wars in 1838–1842 and 1878–1880 reflected the geopolitical tensions in the region and the British fear that imperial Russia would seek access to warm water ports in the Indian Ocean.50 It would not be a stretch to ascertain that the modern concept of the buffer state emerged out of European geopolitics and was widely employed by Britain throughout its imperial interests, most importantly in the areas around British India, its Crown Jewel.51 The British also employed a similar geopolitical policy in colonial India. Instead of fully integrating states in the frontiers, British India instituted a policy of allowing the mountain states such as Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim, and Kashmir to continue their roles as autonomous kingdoms.52 In fact, British India served as a guarantor for Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim’s autonomy.53 This allowed Britain to maintain firm control over India proper while maintaining geographic distance from the competing Qing Empire in China. The British conception of the Himalayan region was that of a physical buffer zone that separated its interests in India from the competition that emanated from Qing-controlled China. B.  The Academic History of the Buffer State Concept As Geopolitics emerged as a separate academic discipline, so too did the buffer state become relevant as a concept with analytical utility. Mary Gear’s work remains one of the first to directly address the buffer state as an analytical concept. She categorized buffers into three categories: Natural, politico-natural, and political buffers.54 Her affirmation that buffer states are products of politics alludes

18  Discussing the Buffer State Concept to the strategic nature of such states; they fulfill a political function in the strategy of states. Gear goes to the extent of mentioning that buffers can change roles with changes in regional power levels and that such states can transform from a purely natural buffer to politico-natural buffers as well as purely political buffers. But Gear only merely mentions this without any details on how changes in the type of buffer state occur or what dynamics are inherent within the buffer state when such changes occur? How does a change in neighboring power capabilities affect the role of the buffer state? These are some questions that Gear does not address in her short but foundational work on buffer states. While Gear narrows down the conception of buffer states, Michael Greenfield Partem further develops it. Pointing to the limitations of Trygve Mathisen’s definition of buffer states as any small state lying in between two larger states, often rivals, Partem introduces more qualifications to identify such states, namely geography, capability distribution, and foreign policy orientation.55 While Mathisen addresses the predicament of the buffer state within the context of the role of small states in the strategy of larger powers, his assessment is limited to defining the buffer state. Mathisen does not refer to the buffer state’s role in regional security dynamics. As for Partem, he asserts that geography entails the fixation of the buffer state’s geopolitical significance, a fact that remains a reality for all of that state’s existence. Partem also operates Bueno de Mesquita’s framework for analyzing the calculations of rational unitary actors during conflict situations. Basically, the argument he is forwarding rests on relative capability distribution; through probability and utility calculations, a state’s likelihood of initiating conflict can be measured.56 A more specific indicator of a buffer state’s existence is the relative disparity in capability between the buffer state and the two buffered states it separates. The buffer state is simply “smaller” than the two larger buffered states while assessed relatively. Partem adds a critical nuance to the literature on buffer states: The notion of deutilization. It entails the conscious effort by the buffer state to remain comparatively weak to ensure that any action against it is viewed as a blatant act of aggression in the international arena.57 In addition, the utility of a buffer is framed in the wider context of the larger powers’ strategic calculations – a buffer state might become highly important for the larger powers if it fulfills their strategic needs. Partem’s third characteristic of buffer states rests on foreign policy orientations. His characterization rests on alliance formation; buffers can remain aloof of involvement between the larger powers or choose a side. What the buffer chooses to pursue determines the military strategy of both of the larger buffered states. Nevertheless, buffers do recognize the dangers inherent in choosing a side – the reason why many of them declare neutrality. As for buffer diplomacy, Afghan king Amir Abdur Rahman compared his country to a swan on a lake, with a tigress on one shore and wolves on the opposite shore.58 The metaphor of Afghanistan as a swan poetically captures the delicate balancing act inherent in buffer state diplomacy. However, buffers do not always maintain neutrality, and factors such as changes in the capabilities of the buffered states, domestic upheavals, and intense regional rivalries can push buffers to lean

Discussing the Buffer State Concept  19 to one side. Overall, Partem elaborates on Gear’s definition of the buffer state, providing more nuance to its regional predicament and foreign policy. Despite these additions to the literature, Partem does not provide a detailed account of how rivalries between the buffered states unravel within the buffer state; he does mention the changing stance of the buffer in response to changes in capabilities of the buffered states, but Partem does not elaborate on how such changes take place. One of the most systematic and comprehensive books on the specific topic of buffer states is titled Buffer States in World Politics, edited by John Chay and Thomas E. Ross. This work probes the conditions, problems, and prospects of buffer states and buffer zones. The book further seeks to address the nature, characteristics, structure, and operation of a buffer state. The major objective of the edited volume rests on its attempt at explaining problems experienced in politically troubled areas through the study of the structure and operation of the buffer state. Thomas E. Ross extends the definition of the buffer state, linking it to how it could be explained from the perspective of a geographer. Ross furthers the case that geographic location is paramount despite technological advancement but from the perspective of geography; he asserts the primacy of geography, particularly hostile terrain, as being critical in the designation of a buffer state. As for the buffer’s foreign policy, Joseph Maila argues that it espouses the notions of sovereignty, autonomy, neutrality, and freedom. In the chapter by Philip Kelly, it is argued that buffer states contribute to regional political dynamics and that such states remain permanent fixtures despite political changes in the region. What Kelly does not incorporate is the changing nature of the buffer state’s role in the regional setting; they may be permanent fixtures, but how they interact with the buffered states may change with evolving regional politics. Despite the limits on the evolution of buffer’s role and its relation to subsystemic changes, Gerald L. Ingall’s chapter does acknowledge the changing nature of buffer states. Furthermore, he concisely rounds up the literature section of the chapter by addressing the systemic requirement of a buffer system – that the buffered states need to be significantly more powerful than the buffer itself and they need to be able to maintain some degree of sovereignty. Overall, Chay and Ross’s work provides a much needed and detailed definition of a buffer state, including its systemic role and an explanation for why many of the troubled regions in the world are buffer systems. Despite this groundbreaking work on buffer states, the book’s scope does not cover the changing roles of buffer states. Phillip Kelly does touch on regionally stabilizing role played by buffer states, but none of the authors in the edited volume address how changing regional power capabilities in the adjacent states leads to transformations within the buffer state. To understand their roles in regional security, it is critical to assess what accounts for buffer states shifting their affinity from one power to neutrality or vice versa, and as well as how regional power competition plays out in the buffer state. These questions are not directly addressed in any of the chapters in the book. In essence, the authors do not account for changes in power capabilities and how they affect the status of the buffer state, a crucial point in maintaining its relevance in contemporary international relations.

20  Discussing the Buffer State Concept Lawrence Ziring approaches the topic from a perspective that emphasizes the military-political conditions of the international system, which is in line with the Classical Geopolitical approach toward buffer states. According to him, buffer states are not buffers by choice; it is thrust onto them by a hostile international environment.59 Such states are “extensions of balances of power, not international law”; it is implied that buffer states are outgrowths of necessities borne out of peculiar conditions in military and political relations. He adds that buffer states are usually the first victims due to their geographic disposition. Thus, their status oscillates between a loss of national pride on one hand and extinction on the other. In essence, Ziring presents a rather bleak diagnosis, one that is mired with lack of prospects of agency for the buffer state. While Ziring’s approach to buffer states was relevant during the 18–20th centuries when borders changed constantly, it may not hold much weight in the post-World War II period. It is even more unlikely after the end of the Cold War. The emphasis on national sovereignty and the norm of noninterference largely make the extinction of the buffer state an exception rather than a norm. As such, the context surrounding buffer states has changed. They may be small states in precarious geopolitical predicaments, but they do have limited agency to influence the interplay of the buffered states. This typification of buffer states renders them to be passive players in interstate politics, and it does not adhere to the norm of upholding territorial integrity while sidelining the agency (albeit limited) of buffer states in the buffer system. Another book, which is the most recent one, exclusively dealing with the concept of the buffer state is Tornike Turmanidze’s Buffer States: Power Policies, Foreign Policies, and Concepts. He provides a good review of the limited literature on the concept of the buffer state but also adds to it. His work extends the concept of a quasi-buffer – a buffer state that only fulfills the security function of one of the bigger powers it shares borders with. These are states that are not entirely buffers as they hold strategic significance for only one of the two powers it separates. While Turmanidze offers a concise and compressed review of the majority of the authors discussed in the preceding paragraphs, his work mainly seeks to further the concept of the quasi-buffer while distinguishing it from the traditional buffer state. As for the foreign policy of buffer states, Turmanidze asserts that neutrality is the preferred policy, especially during conflicts between the buffered states. Turmanidze argues that quasi-buffers go against the notion of neutrality by allying themselves with one of the two larger powers. But what seems to be lacking is the notion of changes in power capability – what happens to the quasibuffer if the power against which it is allied raises its power capability? The rising buffered state has a high chance of increasing its influence in the buffer, which is no longer what Turmanidze refers to as a quasi-buffer. Thus, his work centers on the quasi-buffer and does not address the dynamic nature of subsystems and the subsystemic interactions within the buffer state. Tanisha M. Fazal offers a very different perspective on the buffer state. Her book State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation has a whole section on the buffer state concept within the context of demise of states. Fazal comes to the conclusion that buffer states will be in a

Discussing the Buffer State Concept 21 higher risk group for violent state death; her exception is that in the post-1945 period, a state is 92  percent more likely to survive than a state did in the pre1945 period.60 In summary, the chances of a buffer state (or any other state for that matter) being destroyed are almost nil in the post-1945 period, showcasing the strengthening norm of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Of course, this does not take into account territorial disputes that have endured in the post-1945 period, but the idea of a whole state disappearing is unthinkable in the present context. Nevertheless, her research emphasizes the shift in international norms pre- and post-1945: the end of the World War II and the beginning of decolonization entrenched sovereignty and severe negative sanctions in forceful change of territorial status-quo. However, Fazal maintains skepticism of the viability of the buffer state. She states that . . . states engaged in enduring rivalries form security dilemmas around the states that lie between them – buffer states. And it seems that these buffer states are born to lose. Each rival fears the possibility that its opponent will take over the buffer. This fear produces a strategic imperative that leads to a fatal outcome: Buffer state death. Buffer states are likely to die because surrounding rivals are typically unable to make credible commitments not to take them over. But in certain, atypical situations, the security dilemma can be resolved such that buffer states survive. If rivals’ resources are simultaneously constrained, they cannot take over buffer states. If rivals must become temporary allies in another theater, they prefer not to sap each other’s resources by fighting over buffer states. And if a more powerful third party intervenes to protect the buffer state, rivals will refrain from conquest because costs will exceed benefits.61 Fazal’s work is important within the context of this book as the normative underpinnings of the current international system are strongly against violation of state sovereignty. As such, a new concept of the buffer state is evidently necessary to understand its role in international relations and to maintain its relevance within the field. Martin J. Bayly writes a refreshing piece on the buffer state concept. His work is perhaps the latest one that seeks to tackle the predicament of buffer states. Bayly offers an alternative to the structural-functionalist approach to buffers that renders them heavily dependent on the Great Powers for maintaining any semblance of relevance.62 He proposes using ontological security, that is, moving beyond just physical security to security of the self when analyzing buffer states. He categorizes such structural-functionalist approaches as ahistorical and limited to understanding the buffer system in terms of “two rival powers straining over an intervening state, a classic security dilemma in which neither wishes to provoke war, yet where both are weary of each other making strategic gains.”63 Bayly’s deployment of ontological security as a lens for analyzing buffer systems promotes their representational forms as “zones of competition” or as “imaginative geographies.” In essence, Bayly’s process takes into account the identities of states, including British ontological

22  Discussing the Buffer State Concept insecurity in Afghanistan which resulted after failed routinization attempts. While Bayly’s argument adds a fresh perspective to the slim amount of literature on buffer states, it does not take the material forces into account. Ontological security does figure profoundly in the foreign policy of the buffer states as well as the buffered states, but both material and rhetorical forces are important in deciphering the dynamics of relations. While identity could be a prelude to the occurrence of political maneuvering, it is quintessential in accounting for the importance of rhetoric and the usage of material forces for strategic gain. The buffer state concept has maintained its relevance in international politics in more than one form. Paul Poast uses buffer states as test cases for assessing the credibility of alliance commitments.64 His argument is that buffer states have a contentious existence given their proneness to invasion and occupation; while this may not hold true in totality in the contemporary normative structure of international politics, his argument is focused on whether issue linkages bolster treaty obligations. His findings allude that buffer states in alliances with trade provisions experience fewer willful violations of alliance obligations, fewer attacks, and almost no experience of invasion and occupation than those in alliances without trade provisions.65 The literature on buffer states covers a wide variety of arguments. Due to the relative lack of theoretical attention to the concept, much of the preceding decades have been spent on providing a sound conceptual basis for the buffer state. Chay, Ross, and Partem have delved deeper, attempting to foster a deeper understanding of the buffer state. Foreign policy orientations as well as centrality of state contextualization at the regional level have been covered. But a major gap in the field pertains to the changing role of buffer states; while the definition of the buffer does not change due to its vicinal geography, its political meaning and importance can change. A buffer may be within the security umbrella of one of the powers, but such political tilting could change, pertinent to increase or decrease in power capability. Endeavors in linking changes in capabilities of buffered states to the changing importance of buffer state remain limited to mere descriptions and lacks analytical depth. In addition, little has been done to investigate how such changes in capability of one of the buffered states plays out in the buffer state. Since the buffer state is based on regional power competitions, it is highly likely that the same could play out in the buffer state as well.

III.  The New Buffer State Concept The buffer state as an “early warning system” or as a “geographic discontinuity” was predicated on the notion of geography as a prominent factor in conceptions of security. However, with changes in geopolitical contexts, specifically to the relative decline of geography as the overwhelming feature of strategic thinking,66 the buffer state as a static geopolitical factor also needs a reassessment to ensure a sound analytical approach to understand the role of buffer states in international relations and the decisions that they partake in. The proposed concept of the buffer state is based on the following two factors.

Discussing the Buffer State Concept  23 A.  Strategic Utility of the Buffer State First, the renewed conceptual framework tackles the conceptual framework of buffer states based on their static strategic utility for the contenting powers they separate. Traditionally, the preponderant notion of the buffer state is understood through the lens of them being small states in a precarious position between contending larger powers. As such, their utility included their role as a geographic discontinuity between contending powers and also as early warning systems. The new conception of the buffer state is the notion of a dynamic political space wherein contending buffered states actively showcase competitive overtures and may use such overtures as means of assessing the extent of the contender’s influence in the buffer state. Given the reduced utility of buffer states as geographic discontinuities or early warning systems, the new buffer state concept emphasizes their importance, wherein the larger contending powers showcase their power status. The buffer state may also become venues to measure the contending powers’ foreign policy formidability and capability. As such, the new conception of the buffer state premises it at the center of the dynamic relations between itself and the buffered states.67 B.  Agency of Buffer States Agency of the buffer state is the second factor that forms the basis for the new conception of the buffer state. Within this context, agency is understood as the capability of the states for making decisions/performing acts. The traditional conception only marginally accounts for the agency of buffer states as their static geographic importance is highlighted. Such states are cast as lacking any meaningful capability to interact with the dynamic relations of their more powerful neighbors. The new conception challenges this overwhelmingly static notion of the buffer state. It argues that such a state, despite being limited in agency due to its relatively weak position in the international system, can chart its own course within the limits presented to them within a buffer system. Given the competitive nature of the contending powers when it comes to the buffer state, such a strategic context provides buffer states the agency to shape its relations with its contending neighboring powers. The second factor within this new conception of the buffer state premises the buffer state as an active participant in the buffer system, which makes decisions based on its assessments of the contentious relations between the buffered states. Collectively, the strategic utility and the agency of the buffer state form the framework for the new conception of the buffer state. The very existence of the buffer state is based on its strategic utility to the buffered states; yet, the new conception focuses on its changed strategic utility from a largely static geopolitical space to a highly dynamic space that is used by the buffered states to externalize their competitiveness and also to assess the scope of the stakes of the contending power. This new concept also highlights that the strategic utility of the buffer

24  Discussing the Buffer State Concept state to the buffered states occurs within a context where the buffer state actively participates in making its policy choices vis-à-vis its neighbors. The buffer states can, to a certain extent, define their relations with the buffered states due to their contending nature with each other. As such, the new conceptual framework of the buffer state defines a buffer state as “a state geographically positioned between larger contending powers wherein it is an active participant in the buffer system characterized by dynamic and competitive overtures of the buffered states within the buffer state.”

IV.  Critical Junctures: Discussion and Application To fully utilize this new proposed concept of the buffer state, specific events in the buffer system are chosen based on their implications for the states within it. These events, called critical junctures, help to provide a concise timeline for the analysis of the new framework of the buffer state. The study of critical junctures is an ongoing academic endeavor with many contextual definitions and uses. One of the earliest uses of the concept was by David Collier, who defined it as “(1) a major episode of institutional innovation, (2) occurring in distinct ways, (3) and generating an enduring legacy.”68 Historical critical junctures are “events that set processes of institutional/policy change in motion.”69 They are points within a timeframe which lead to changes in policies or strategies. A  critical juncture usually consists of a “crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change.”70 Such crisis situations or political events lead to the creation of contexts where “change agents contest extant ideas and the policies based upon them.”71 Figure  2.1 depicts Donnelly and Hogan’s conception of critical junctures, which is the base model for the modified conception of the critical junctures used here to choose specific events that were imperative for the China–India–Nepal (CIN) buffer system. Figure 2.1 illustrates the notion that a sudden crisis may trigger ideational change among actors/agents who then pursue a path of policy change to adapt to the changes incurred due to the crises. Another perspective considers critical junctures as: .  .  . choice points when a particular option is adopted from among two or more alternatives. These junctures are critical because once an option is chosen, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available.72

Crisis

Ideational change

Radical policy change

Figure 2.1  Donnelly and Hogan’s Conception of Critical Junctures.

Discussing the Buffer State Concept  25 The logic behind the critical juncture concept rests on the idea that any shocks or aberrations in the system, directly or indirectly, lead to changes in policies or strategies based on ideational changes, which also include state-based role conceptions. Such critical junctures are points in historical trajectories wherein states are faced with critical policy choices. In essence, policy change remains an inherent part of these definitions as institutions are impacted by critical junctures. This concept is specifically important for the new buffer concept as it emphasizes the dynamism of the inherent relations between the states in the buffer system. It also includes the agency of buffer states and the strategic utility of the buffered states, which are also in flux based on the decisions taken by the buffer state. Critical junctures are also important for the analysis of the buffer state as the level of strategic rivalry dictates the increased or decreased strategic value of the buffer state. The critical juncture concept is particularly applicable in buffer systems as the buffered states engage in dynamic political interactions. As the buffer state is a highly contested geopolitical space, frequent strategic calculations are pertinent to ensure the other buffered state does not have the upper hand. Additionally, the critical junctures also allow for the analysis of the agency of buffer states as the ideational changes incurred due to specific crises/ events provide insights into the decisions taken by buffer states as responses to such crises. Within the context of this book, critical junctures are operationalized as policy choice points in the timeline of the buffer system. Focusing on the model proposed by Donnelly and Hogan, a modified conception of Figure 2.1 is used to adapt it to the discipline of International Relations. Thus, the critical junctures in this dissertation are instances in history that are characterized by ideational or policy changes emanating from the states in the buffer system. These critical junctures include events in the buffer system that had the probability of triggering policy or strategic changes among one or many actors within it. A modified version of Donnelly and Hogan’s conception of critical junctures as historical points consisting of crisis/major political event, ideational change, and radical policy change is used in this book as it is the most prudent conceptual structure to analyze bilateral rivalry of the buffered states and the conundrums of the trilateral buffer system. Figure 2.2 showcases this modified approach to Donnelly and Hogan’s model of critical junctures. For the purpose of this book, major political events within the states of the buffer system are added as not all events

Crisis / Major Political Event

Ideational change

Figure 2.2  Modified Conception of Critical Junctures.

Policy change

26  Discussing the Buffer State Concept that bring the attention of the buffered states are based on crises; subtle changes in the overture from “buffered state A” might also invoke policy changes from “buffered state B.” Ideational change emphasizes any shifts in minor or major roles invoked by any of the states in the buffer system. Moreover, radical policy change is altered to policy changes as any radical changes in the buffer system are highly dangerous and highly unlikely to occur. Attention is paid to historical events that had the potential to shift interests or disrupt the “normal state of affairs” within the buffer system. Thus, Figure 2.2 showcases the critical juncture model utilized to illustrate the new buffer state concept through critical junctures within the buffer system consisting of CIN. Table 2.1 lists the critical junctures chosen for the buffer system based on the model illustrated in Figure 2.2. These major crises or major political events are those that occurred within the buffer state that had implications for the buffered states or those that occurred in the buffered states that would also impact the buffer state. These events are organized into four timeframes. Timeframe I: 1947–1962 highlights the critical junctures that have occurred since India’s independence in 1947 until 1962 when India and China went to war, permanently changing the way the two states interact with each other and the heightened importance of Nepal as a buffer between the two. Timeframe II: 1962–1990 is based on the period between 1962, the year that the Sino-Indian War broke out, and 1990, which is used as a cutoff for this timeframe as Nepal transitioned into a constitutional monarchy this year, democratizing its domestic space and also giving civil parties control over its foreign policy. Timeframe III: 1990–2008 highlights the post-democratic political context of Nepal, while 2008 is considered a cutoff point due to the eruption of riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These riots altered the political dynamics of the buffer system as it bolstered China’s interest in Nepal, given the country’s extensive shard land border with the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). The same year, Nepal abolished the monarchy and transitioned into a federal republic, permanently changing the domestic political context with extensive room for foreign policy changes and maneuvering. Timeframe IV: 2009–present includes major political changes/crises in the post-monarchy period in Nepal, characterized by extensive Chinese activities and dynamic interactions between China and India. As illustrated in Table 2.1, the critical junctures are chosen based on changes within the buffer system states with implications for the buffer system itself. These events are instrumental in analyzing the agency of buffer states and also in assessing the strategic utility of the buffer state illustrated by the buffered states.

Discussing the Buffer State Concept  27 Table 2.1  Major Critical Junctures in the China–India–Nepal (CIN) Buffer System Timeframe I: Critical Junctures 1947–1962 Year(s) Critical Juncture 1950–1951 Tibet’s Inclusion into the People’s Republic of China 1951 End of the Rana Regime in Nepal 1951–1960 Nepal’s First Democratic Experience 1960 King Mahendra’s Seizure of Power & Diplomatic Internationalization Efforts Timeframe II: Critical Junctures 1962–1990 1962 The Sino-Indian War 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War 1975 King Birendra’s Zone of Peace Proposal 1975 Sikkim’s Accession to India 1989 The Blockade of Nepal under Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi Timeframe III: Critical Junctures 1990–2008 1990 Second Democratic Experience in Nepal 1996 The Maoist Insurgency 2001 King Birendra’s Assassination and Crowning of King Gyanendra 2002 Suspension of Parliamentary Democracy and the Royal Coup 2006-08 Jana Andolan II and Abolishment of Nepal’s Monarchy 2008 Riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region Timeframe IV: Critical Junctures 2009–Present 2015 The Nepal Earthquakes 2015 Nepal’s Border Closures with India 2017 Nepal’s Entry into China’s Belt and Road Initiative 2020 The Lipulekh–Kalapani–Limpiyadhura Border Disputes 2020 Sino-Indian Border Clashes in Ladakh 2022 Nepal Joins the Millennium Challenge Corporation

Notes 1 Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel, “Small States in the European Union : What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know ?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19, no. 4 (2006): 652. 2 David Vital, The Inequality of States: A  Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 7–8; Vital defines small powers as those states with an upper limit of population of 10–15 million if economically advanced or a population of 20–30 million for an underdeveloped country. 3 William E. Paterson, “Small States in International Politics,” Cooperation and Conflict 4, no. 1 (1969): 119; Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International Organization 23, no. 2 (1969): 294. 4 David Vital, The Survival of Small States (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 9; Vital describes tertiary powers as those states with miniscule impact on the international system. 5 Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 29. 6 Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International Organization 23, no. 2 (1969): 295–296. 7 William E. Paterson, “Small States in International Politics,” Cooperation and Conflict 4, no. 1 (1969): 122.

28  Discussing the Buffer State Concept 8 Raimo Vayrynen, “On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power Status,” Cooperation and Conflict 6, no. 1 (1971): 99. 9 Wouter P. Veenendaal and Jack Corbett, “Why Small States Offer Important Answers to Large Questions,” Comparative Political Studies 48, no. 4 (2015): 530 10 Anders Wivel, Alyson J.K. Bailes and Clive Archer, “Setting the Scene: Small States and International Security,” in Small States and International Security, eds. Clive Archer, Alyson J.K. Bailes and Anders Wivel (New York: Routledge, 2014), 4. 11 Christos Kassimeris, “The Foreign Policy of Small Powers,” International Politics 46, no. 1 (2009): 84; Anders Wivel et al., “Setting the Scene,” 5. 12 Anders Wivel, Alyson J.K. Bailes and Clive Archer, “Setting the Scene: Small States and International Security,” in Small States and International Security, eds. Clive Archer, Alyson J.K. Bailes and Anders Wivel (New York: Routledge, 2014), 6–7. 13 Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel, “Small States in the European Union : What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know ?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19, no. 4 (2006): 664–665. 14 Anders Wivel, Alyson J.K. Bailes and Clive Archer, “Setting the Scene: Small States and International Security,” in Small States and International Security, eds. Clive Archer, Alyson J.K. Bailes and Anders Wivel (New York: Routledge, 2014), 9. 15 Caroline Howard Grøn and Anders Wivel, “Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty : From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty,” Jounal of European Integration 33, no. 5 (2011): 524; Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel, “Introduction,” in The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration, eds. Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 4. 16 Examples of such works include but are not limited to the following: Caroline Howard Grøn & Anders Wivel, “Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy,” Journal of European Integration 33, no. 5 (2011): 523–539; Jean-Marc Rickli, “European Small States’ Military Policies After the Cold War: From Territorial to Niche Strategies,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21, no. 3 (2008): 307–325; Anders Wivel, “The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor,” Journal of Common Market Studies 43, no. 2 (2005): 393–412. 17 Marie V Gibert and Virginie Grzelczyk, “Non-Western Small States : Activists or Survivors ?” Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 1, no. 1 (2017): 1–2. 18 Ibid. 19 Christos Kassimeris, “The Foreign Policy of Small Powers,” International Politics 46, no. 1 (2009): 85. 20 Matthias Maas, Small States in World Politics: The Story of Small State Survival (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017). 21 Alyson J K Bailes, Bradley A Thayer and Baldur Thorhallsson, “Alliance Theory and Alliance’Shelter’: The Complexities of Small State Alliance Behaviour Small State Alliance Behaviour,” Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 1, no. 1 (2017): 21. 22 Ibid., 13. 23 Neal G. Jesse and John R. Dreyer, Small States in the International System: At Peace and at War (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), 16. 24 Victor Gigleux, “Explaining the Diversity of Small States’ Foreign Policies through Role Theory,” Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 1, no. 1 (2017): 39. 25 David Styan, “Djibouti: Small State Strategy at a Crossroads Djibouti: Small State Strategy at a Crossroads,” Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 1, no. 1 (2017): 80. 26 Kadira Pethiyagoda, “Order from Chaos: Why Small States matter in International Politics: The Case of Sri Lanka,” The Brookings Institute, September  3, 2015, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/09/03/why-small-states-matterin-international-politics-the-case-of-sri-lanka/.

Discussing the Buffer State Concept  29 27 Pethiyagoda, “Order from Chaos.” 28 Tom Long, “Small States, Great Power ? Gaining Influence through Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collective Power,” International Studies Review 19, no. 2 (2017): 200. 29 Richard L. Bernal, The Influence of Small States on Superpowers: Jamaica and U.S. Foreign Policy (London: Lexington Books, 2015). 30 The names Geopolitics and Geography as opposed to geography and geopolitics refer to the names of the respective disciplines. 31 Pure geography dealt with just the physical topography of the earth, with limited connections made with the realm of human civilization. 32 Ellen Churchill Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment on the Basis of Ratzel’s System of Anthropo-Geography (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911), 4. 33 Ibid., 12. 34 Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Journal XXIII, no. 4 (1904): 421–444. 35 Robert Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power (New York: Putnam, 1942). 36 Ibid. 37 Chay and Ross describe march states as peripheral states that served to cushion external threats to the core of the Roman Empire, which included Germanic tribes such as the Goths. 38 John Chay and Thomas E. Ross, “Introduction,” in Buffer States in World Politics, eds. John Chay and Thomas E. Ross (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 1. 39 Thomas Heebøll-Holm, Ports, Piracy and Maritime War: Piracy in the English Channel and the Atlantic, c.1290 – c.1330 (Boston, MA: Brill, 2013), 161. 40 David S. Potter, The Roman Empire at Bay: AD 180–395 (New York: Routledge, 2004), 268. 41 Mary Gear, “Role of Buffer States in International Relations,” The Journal of Geography XL, no. 3 (1941): 82. 42 Nicholas J. Spykman and Abbie A. Rollins, “Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy, I,” The American Political Science Review 33, no. 3 (1939): 404. 43 Robert Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power (New York: Putnam, 1942). 44 “Marcher Lords,” The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia with Atlas and Weather Guide (Abington: Helicon, 2016). 45 Heebøll-Holm, Ports, Piracy and Maritime War, 164. 46 C. M. Kortepeter, “Ġāzī Girāy II, Khan of the Crimea, and Ottoman Policy in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, 1588–1594,” The Slavonic and East European Review 44, no.102 (1966): 140. 47 Thomas E. Ross, “Buffer States: A  Geographer’s Perspective,” in Buffer States in World Politics, eds. John Chay and Thomas E. Ross (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 16. 48 Lawrence Ziring, “Buffer States on the Rim of Asia: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and the Superpowers,” in Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, ed. Hafeez Malik (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987), 90. 49 Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 20; Ross, “Buffer States,” 20. 50 Ziring, “Buffer States on the Rim of Asia: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and the Superpowers,” 91. 51 British India was known as the Crown Jewel of the Empire due to its economic and strategic value. As such, its security was of paramount interest and value to London. 52 Bernard Debarbieux and Gilles Rudaz, The Mountain: A Political History From the Enlightenment to the Present (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 149.

30  Discussing the Buffer State Concept 53 Ibid., 150. 54 Gear, “Role of Buffer States in International Relations,” 81–86. 55 Michael G. Partem, “The Buffer System in International Relations,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 1 (1969): 4. 56 Ibid., 6–7; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Measuring Systemic Polarity,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 19, no. 2 (1975): 187–188. 57 Mesquita, “Measuring Systemic Polarity,” 9. 58 Stephen Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman (London: Bliss, Sands, and Foster, 1895), 137. 59 Ziring, “Buffer States on the Rim of Asia,” 90. 60 Fazal, State Death, 79–80. 61 Ibid., 229. 62 Martin J. Bayly, “Imperial Ontological (In)security: ‘Buffer States’, International Relations and the Case of Anglo-Afghan Relations, 1808–1878,” European Journal of International Relations 21, no. 4 (2015): 819. 63 Ibid., 834. 64 Tornike Turmanidze, Buffer States: Power Policies, Foreign Policies and Concepts (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2012). 65 Ibid., 58. 66 This is not to say that geography does not feature in strategic thinking but its relative importance has declined with the advent of new military technologies. 67 Buffered states are the contending states geographically separated by the buffer state. 68 David Nachmias and Chava Nachmias, “Content Analysis,” in Research Methods in the Social Sciences (London: Edward Arnold, 1976), 132–139. 69 Paul F. Donnelly and John Hogan, “Understanding Policy Change Using a Critical Junctures Theory in Comparative Context: The Cases of Ireland and Sweden,” Policy Studies Journal 40, no. 2 (2012): 324; David Nachmias and Chava Nachmias, “Content Analysis,” in Research Methods in the Social Sciences (London: Edward Arnold, 1976), 132–139. 70 Ibid., 324. 71 Ibid., 325. 72 James Mahoney, The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).

3 Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State

This chapter illustrates Nepal’s status as a buffer state. It showcases the historical contextualizing of the country as a buffer between its contending neighbors, India and China. Nepal’s buffer state status is discussed as not just a role ascribed by its neighbors to it but also one that includes self-acceptance (and deliberation of that role by its elites). As such, this chapter focuses on the historical and rhetorical genealogy of Nepal’s role as a buffer state since its founding as a modern state. First, the conception of the “self” as a buffer state by Nepal is discussed. Then, the geopolitical conceptions about Nepal emanating from India and China are contextualized within the concept of the buffer system. For the sake of context and proper timeframe of comparison, geopolitical imagining of Nepal is discussed from the perspective of the British Empire and the Republic of India as well as the Qing Empire and the People’s Republic of China. While the idea of a buffer system or buffer state may not be explicitly discussed by Nepal, India, or China, the inferences to the buffer system are deduced based on official foreign policy statements, speeches by political leaders, and other official documents from the three countries. At the end of the chapter, the three conceptions of Nepal are collectively discussed, and they are connected to the new buffer state framework on the basis of its strategic utility and agency.

I.  Evolution of Nepal’s Political Self-Perception This section covers the evolution of self-perception among Nepal’s political elites regarding the country’s position in the region and the wider world. A.  The Early Years of the Shah Dynasty The modern state of Nepal has been a unified entity since the mid-18th century. The history of the region before this period was characterized by the existence of numerous tiny principalities including the baise rajyas (22 kingdoms) and chaubise rajyas (24 kingdoms) along with the Rai and Limbu tribal areas (in modern-day eastern Nepal) and the three kingdoms of the Kathmandu Valley.1 It was King Prithvi Narayan Shah of the Kingdom of Gorkha who initiated the unification of these principalities into what would later become a unified Nepal. DOI: 10.4324/9781003178538-3

32  Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State Shah was privy to the geopolitical condition of his nascent unified kingdom as highlighted in his collection of policies related to Nepali statecraft called the Dibyopadesh (िदोपदेश). In it, he calls Nepal a “yam sprouting between two huge boulders.”2 In essence, the founding monarch of Nepal understood the predicament that the small state faced given its geopolitical position between the Qing Empire to the north and the British Empire in India to the south. Yet, his early political rhetoric is directly in reference to Great Britain, which had effectively colonized almost all of South Asia. This sentiment is expressly noted in the following statement that King Prithvi Narayan Shah made: Great friendship should be maintained with the emperor beyond the Southern Seas,3 but he is very clever. He kept India suppressed and is entrenching himself on the plains. One day that army will come.4 King Prithvi Narayan’s concerns regarding British interests also externalized in the form of an isolationist foreign policy that was characterized by limited diplomatic interactions. He banished all Christian missionaries from the newly unified Kingdom of Nepal in 1770, wary of Western influence and fears of subsequent imperial domination by the British.5 Overall, King Prithvi Narayan pursued an expansionist policy that eventually unified most principalities of the central Himalayas, laying the foundations of a unified Kingdom of Nepal. His vision of a unified Nepali state did not ignore the fact that it was a small state between the two huge boulders, India and China, and as such, he was privy to the fact that his kingdom would have to navigate a precarious geopolitical context. Nevertheless, his own personal political concerns emanated from the United Kingdom (and not explicitly the Qing Empire), given the swift and successful colonization of large parts of South Asia by the British. Despite the self-perception of Nepal as a yam between two huge boulders visà-vis British India and Qing-ruled China, the Gorkha Dynasty in Nepal was eager for territorial expansion. Eventually, the Kingdom of Nepal invaded Tibet twice – once in 1788 and a second time over trade disputes in 1791.6 Both times, the Qing Emperor dispatched military assistance to Tibet given the former’s suzerainty over the latter.7 In 1814, Nepal’s southward expansion led to tensions with British India, which subsequently led to the Anglo-Nepal War. Just as King Prithvi Narayan’s premonition had warned “one day that (British) army will come,” Nepal was defeated, and the war ended with the signing of the Sugauli Treaty in 1816, which stipulated the relinquishment of one-third of its territory to British India.8 Interestingly, the Nepali elites time and again used tactics highlighting its precarious (and sometimes advantageous) position between British India and Qing-ruled China. To feign Chinese overtures, the Nepali army wore uniforms closely resembling that of British India. Captain H.Y. Hearsey noted in his correspondence to John Adams, Secretary to the Government, that: The Nepalese had so long kept up a threatening countenance towards the Chinese Government, pretending to be a part of our (British) Government,

Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State  33 dressing their troops out in red uniforms, arming them with muskets and aping the name of the subordinate officers.9 Captain Hearsey goes on to write that during the war against the British, the Nepali soldiers “. . . acted with great reserve, imitating the Chinese address and forms and wishing to inculcate in their minds, that they were tributary to the Chinese.”10 The limitations of Nepal’s capabilities when compared to its neighbors were not overlooked by the Nepali elites, who used simple means such as changing mannerisms and clothes as suitable for the context. The symbols of the neighboring powers were used as deemed appropriate to pursue Nepal’s own interests, which in this case is to ensure independence and perhaps expand its territories. Such measures, however, were not always viable or successful. Given its humiliating defeat against the British, Nepal continued the policy of the country’s isolation. However, the Nepali elites were concerned about future British overtures, which led the Shah kings to drum up its nominal status as a tributary state of China.11 Overall, the self-perception of Nepal’s ruling elites once it unified was one that sought to balance its small-state status with its expansionist ambitions. The latter were soundly put on hold with Nepal’s defeat by British India in 1816 and the stationing of a British resident in Kathmandu, who represented British interests in Nepal’s ruling court. The Shah dynasty continued to pursue isolationism until the Rana dynasty limited the monarch’s powers and established a hereditary prime ministership system called the Rana Regime. B.  The Rana Regime In 1846, Jung Bahadur Rana established the Rana Regime in Nepal, which effectively made the Shah monarchs figureheads rather than absolute monarchs. Jung Bahadur was acutely aware of the difficult predicament of Nepal; he also understood the importance of Britain to maintain his regime in Nepal.12 Thus, he pursued a pro-British foreign policy and became the first Nepali political leader to visit the United Kingdom in 1850. Nepal also provided Britain with Gurkha soldiers and actively helped quell the Sepoy Rebellion against British India in 1857.13 As for relations with China, Jung Bahadur was aware of the weakening of the Qing Empire under domestic and foreign pressures. Thus, British India was a ticket to successful maintenance of political power of the Ranas and to ensure continued independence of Nepal. Subsequent Rana prime ministers (PMs) continued the foreign policy set by Jung Bahadur. A letter sent on April 1, 1916, by the then PM of Nepal, Chandra Shamsher Rana, to British Colonel Manners Smith addresses the confidence on the Nepali side regarding British commitment to its independence. PM Chandra Shamsher, acknowledging British support for Nepali sovereignty, wrote the following: I am also very thankful for the reiteration of the assurance given in 1911 impressing on us the earnest desire of the Government of India to scrupulously

34  Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State respect the status of Nepal as an independent kingdom. I am no less thankful for the king’s promise of the sympathetic consideration of any complaints or suggestions we might have to make at any time in that connection and I am very sensible of the friendly spirit which dictated it. As an indication of the cordial feelings which the Government of India entertains towards us, we do certainly value all these quite as much as we do our friendship with them.14 The Government of Nepal under Chandra Shamsher was aware of Britain’s preponderance in India and Nepal’s vulnerabilities as a small state between much larger powers. As such, the status of Nepal as an independent kingdom was reiterated to ensure its autonomy while also appearing to be in an asymmetric relationship with the British. The Nepal–UK relations largely stemmed from mutual security concerns; while Nepal maintained a semblance of geographic security for British India, the United Kingdom was concerned over Russian interests in Tibet and the possible spillover into Nepal – an extension of the Great Game that was taking place in Central Asia.15 Nepal was concerned about the activities of several political outfits operating in India that sought to oust the Rana Regime.16 Thus, the alliance between Nepal and British India was natural as both states had security concerns that could translate into an opportunity for issue linkage. Nepal’s commitments to British-centric foreign policy were not simply rhetorical; over 100,000 Nepali soldiers (either as part of the British Gurkha regiments or the Royal Nepali Army) fought on the side of the allies in World War I.17 Around 120,000 Nepali soldiers fought in World War II as well.18 Despite the asymmetric nature of the relationship, Nepal’s independence was maintained. Thus, the Rana Regime sought closer ties with the more powerful neighbor, British India, over Qing China to pursue two major goals: (i) maintain political power within Nepal by rallying British support and (ii) maintain Nepal’s independence and its agency by committing to the role of a state that is of strategic value to British India. The Rana Regime’s role conception of an independent Nepal was further bolstered in 1923 when Britain accorded diplomatic recognition to the country as a separate state, followed by the establishment of a Nepali legation in London in 1932.19 Much of these overtures from the Ranas can be attributed to growing nationalist movements in India, which had increasingly become more strident. As a small state, Nepal had to establish an independent status in international politics given the uncertainties pertaining to British rule in India. There were fears that Nepal would be treated as one of the princely states in British India that were given the choice of acceding to either India or Pakistan as the British eventually left India. Such a designation had the possibility of resulting in the loss of Nepali sovereignty and agency, which was a grave concern for the Nepali political elites of the Rana Regime. Eventually on August  15, 1947, India gained independence, and the Rana Regime had to come to terms with the fact that their British allies were replaced by a newly independent and democratic India. Even before India’s independence, the Rana Regime sought to internationalize Nepal’s foreign relations. In April 1947, it approached the United States to establish diplomatic relations, which bore fruition

Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State  35 10 months later.20 The same year, Nepal and the United Kingdom’s legations in each other’s capitals were upgraded to embassies.21 Nepal also established diplomatic ties with France in April  1949.22 While overtures with the Nationalist Government in China did not bear any results nor did Nepal’s formal application to be a member of the United Nations in 1949,23 the country’s internationalization efforts were to ensure its independent status in international politics. While internationalizing Nepal’s international status as an independent state through its diplomatic ties with India, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, the Rana Regime also acknowledged the importance of India. The signing of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India cemented relations. Article 5 of the Treaty stated that Nepal could import arms and ammunition through India in consultation with India, which could be argued to have given India some leverage in Nepali affairs.24 The Treaty also established an open border between the two countries. Coincidentally in 1950, the newly established People’s Republic of China had begun incorporating Tibet. Thus, from Nepal’s perspective, the fears of loss of sovereignty also emanated from the north as the People’s Republic of China now had geographically contiguous borders with Nepal. As such, Nepal’s foreign policy during this period showcased an astute understanding of its buffer status. Additionally, China’s actions had made India concerned about its northern frontiers, which heightened Nepal’s strategic importance. As such, the 1950 Treaty made strategic sense for both Nepal and India. In this instance, Nepal’s self-perception as a buffer status is further strengthened as it sought to allude fears about Beijing’s actions by promoting closer ties with New Delhi. A year later in 1951, Nepal further strengthened its independent status by opening its borders to foreign visitors. The independence movements in India had also bolstered the democratic fervor among the Nepali diaspora in the country, who had closely witnessed the nonviolent movements that ultimately ousted the British from South Asia. In 1946, members of the Nepali diaspora in India formed the Nepali National Congress and later the Nepali Democratic Congress; both parties advocated for Nepal’s democratization and would eventually merge in 1950 to form the Nepali Congress.25 In 1950, King Tribhuvan Shah, whose position had been reduced to a ceremonial role under the Rana Regime, fled to the Indian embassy and sought political asylum. Under Indian pressure, the then Rana PM Mohan Shamsher allowed King Tribhuvan to travel to New Delhi.26 The Nepali Congress then launched several armed attacks across southern Nepal, which eventually led to the ouster of the Rana Regime amidst growing international pressure, specifically from India.27 During this period, the Rana Regime had limited foreign policy choices given that Nepal was yet to establish ties with the People’s Republic of China. The 1950–1951 revolution led to Nepal’s first democratic experience, which was largely characterized by strong alignment with India. It was also characterized by strong Indian influence in the creation of a new Nepali bureaucracy; Indian citizens also held important positions in the newly created administrative offices including the position of Nepal’s first attorney-general.28 Overall, the initial years of this period was characterized by an India-centered foreign policy which would

36  Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State eventually undergo an evolution after King Tribhuvan’s death in 1955. His son, King Mahendra, eventually dissolved Nepal’s first democratic government in 1960 and established absolute monarchy once again. This system was called the Panchayat system, and independent political parties were not allowed to participate in the politics of the country.29 C.  Reign of Kings Mahendra and Birendra Under King Mahendra’s rule, Nepal’s role conception and foreign policy approach underwent extensive changes. The foreign policy posturing of Nepal during this era showcases a strong willingness to diversify the status of the country, which could be argued as an effort to break the mold of Indian preponderance in the country that characterized Nepal’s political situation in 1951–1960. King Mahendra spearheaded Nepal’s internationalization and established its status as an independent state by establishing diplomatic ties with 33 countries.30 His foreign policy approach can be surmised from his speech in 1959 after the Tibetan uprising in 1959 against the incorporation of Tibet into the People’s Republic of China: Nepal is a test case as to whether a small country situated between two big countries (India and China) can in the realities of power relations in the midtwentieth century would preserve its independence, freedom and sovereignty in its own way and manner.31 King Mahendra was acutely aware of Nepal’s precarious buffer status between two major powers and the realities of political changes inherent in the political context of the 20th century. Despite concerns over the absorption of Tibet into the People’s Republic of China (PRC), King Mahendra’s foreign policy saw the dangers of overreliance on India and its implications for Nepal’s independence. As such, Mahendra bolstered Nepalese nationalism to develop a peculiar political identity distinct from its neighbors. In 1961, Nepal and China inaugurated the Araniko Highway which now connected the two countries; India protested and argued that such a move was a violation of Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship.32 For Nepal, the opening up of this alternative highway was a move toward greater closeness with China while still maintaining its close relations with India. The idea was to ensure that Nepal was not exclusively reliant on India, but at the same time, maintaining close ties with India was important given its economic importance to Nepal. The notion of Nepal’s importance to both its neighbors was held by Nepali political elites. For example, Pashupati Shamsher Rana, a Nepali politician who held political sway during the Panchayat, stated that, “our (Nepal’s) independence from both China and India is a part of the status-quo of the balance of power.”33 This emphasis on independence became an existential issue when the SinoIndian border war erupted in 1962, which heightened security concerns across the region, specifically in Nepal and Bhutan given their geopolitical position between India and China.

Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State  37 After King Mahendra’s death in 1972, King Birendra ascended to the throne. The concerns of state survival became more pronounced in 1975 when a majority of the Kingdom of Sikkim’s citizens voted to become a part of India. As a small state, the dwindling number of countries in the region was a concern for Nepal and neighboring Bhutan – both small states in between China and India. In the same year, 1975, the erstwhile King Birendra declared the proposal of Nepal as a Zone of Peace (ZoP); it is no surprise that this move coincided with the same year Sikkim became a state of India. This ZoP proposal entailed that Nepal could not host any foreign militaries on its soil, but it failed to garner India’s support.34 In essence, the ZoP proposal can be considered an attempt at reinforcing Nepal’s status as an independent state without the prospects of foreign military presence, which in all likelihood was directed at its rival neighboring states. Again in 1988, Nepal bought military equipment from China, asserting its agency; subsequently, India refused to renew trade and transit treaties that the two countries signed in 1976, which ultimately led to New Delhi sealing 13 out of the 15 transit points between the two countries.35 Thus, Birendra’s attempts at emphasizing Nepal’s agency were not fully accepted by India, which saw Nepal as an important consideration for its security. Overall, both Mahendra and Birendra sought to assert Nepal’s independence and were aware of the precarious geopolitical position the country was in. Whether through internationalization and opening of ties with China as Mahendra did or through normative approaches like the ZoP proposal under Birendra, the era between 1960 and 1990 is defined by a monarch-led era where Nepal continued to play the role of buffer and also showcased its agency as inherent within the decisions made by the two monarchs. D.  Post-democratization Period In 1990, following large-scale prodemocracy movements called the Jana Andolan I, King Birendra acceded to the role of constitutional monarch. With the democratization of Nepal’s political space, its role conception also became more diffused. India had long supported democratic forces in Nepal, including one of its oldest political parties – the Nepali Congress.36 On June 1, 2001, Nepal faced its first major political crisis since the Jana Andolan I of 1990. The erstwhile Crown Prince Dipendra massacred over a dozen members of the royal family, including King Birendra and Queen Aishwarya. King Birendra’s brother, Gyanendra, had survived the murderous rampage due to his absence from the weekly dinner during which time the massacre occurred.37 The government, already weakened by a Maoist guerrilla group that controlled more than half of the country by 2001, found itself in a precarious position given that King Birendra enjoyed immense support from the populace.38 King Gyanendra was not very popular among the Nepalis; his son Paras, who was soon to be Crown Prince, much less so.39 He became even more unpopular when he suspended parliamentary democracy in 2005, which ultimately led to the second mass popular protest called Jana Andolan II, which also brought the Maoists and political parties to join forces. The

38  Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State Jana Andolan II culminated in the eventual banishment of the monarchy in 2008 and the establishment of a federal republic.40 Since the transition to a republic, Nepal has continued to emphasize its relations with India and China. Nepal’s current foreign policy officially states that it: . . . emphasizes the dignity of the nation by safeguarding sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and promoting economic wellbeing and prosperity of Nepal. It is also aimed at contributing to global peace, harmony and security.41 Officially, Nepal’s democratic governments since 2008 have sought to maintain precarious yet balanced relations with both India and China. Some authors assessed this approach as equi-proximity wherein there is a balance between Nepal’s relations with India and China, which also calls for mutual trust, equal benefits, and cooperation with the neighboring states.42 As such, this notion of equi-proximity emphasizes Nepal’s agency as a small state to consciously promote a foreign policy rooted in engaging with both neighbors, which also implies the precarious condition the country finds itself in between two contending powers. Other iterations of Nepal’s foreign policy role conception include the notion of a “bridge between India and China.” In 2016, the erstwhile Nepali PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal stated that: Nepal lies in between two giant neighbors – India and China. We wish to reap benefits of this geographical specialty by working as a dynamic bridge between the two countries.43 This sentiment was reiterated by the Nepali PM K.P. Oli in 2018 when he stated the following: We believe that Nepal can serve as a bridge between our two neighbors. In fact, we want to move from the state of a land-locked to a land-linked country through the development of adequate cross-border connectivity. Our friendship with both neighbors places us in an advantageous position to realize this goal.44 Successive democratic governments have emphasized the equi-proximity that Nepal wants to engage in dynamic relations with both its neighbors while maintaining an independent foreign policy. These statements imply that Nepal’s foreign policy makers understand the interests of both India and China in Nepal while also ascertaining the role it can play in this buffer system. As such, the contemporary conception of Nepal’s self-role is one that acknowledges the importance of India and China while not limiting its role within this buffer system. The foreign policy elites, as illustrated by their statements, continue to showcase the understanding that both India and China have interests in Nepal. Yet, these elites also highlight that Nepal is not merely a space for its neighbors to act on but rather an active participant in this dynamic.

Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State  39

II.  Nepal in the Foreign Policy Imagination of Its Neighbors In this section, the Indian and Chinese perceptions of Nepal’s buffer roles are discussed. The first section covers the evolution of the buffer role played by Nepal from the British Indian perspectives to those of the Republic of India. In the succeeding section, the evolution of Chinese perspectives is highlighted as the Qing Empire transitioned to the People’s Republic of China. A.  I magining Nepal: Evolving Perceptions from British India to the Republic of India The deployment of the buffer concept with regards to Nepal was formally conducted by British India. Specifically after the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814–1816, the British instituted a policy that allowed the mountain kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim to maintain their autonomy and went so far as acting as their security guarantor.45 These kingdoms were neither annexed nor incorporated under the umbrella of British India. The British feared that doing so would lead to “contiguity with Tibet, a Chinese protectorate, which would spark off border clashes.”46 Another factor driving Britain’s Forward Policy was tied to increased Russian influence in Afghanistan; there were concerns regarding Russian influence making its way into Tibet and then eventually spilling into Nepal – a country that was geographically contiguous with British India. Thus, British India followed the Forward Policy that integrated the mountain kingdoms of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan into the defense system of the Empire. Such a move prevented the area around British India from external control or subjugation.47 Essentially, the British used the Forward Policy as a means to create a buffer zone encompassing Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim –nominally independent smaller countries in the northern periphery of the Empire. Overall, these states provided geographic discontinuities from Tibet, which was considered a vassal of the Qing Dynasty. It could also be argued that the British policy vis-à-vis the Himalayan kingdoms and their utility as buffer states also drew heavily from British concerns in Afghanistan, which directly feed into the notion of ontological security.48 The notion of ontological security entails security of the self and continuity of routine relationships between actors.49 Russian advances into Afghanistan and possibly Tibet could threaten to disrupt British preponderance in South Asia. The British attitude toward Nepal is evidence of the deployment of a classical buffer state conception of the latter. As defined by Chay and Ross, buffer states are “countries geographically and/or politically situated between two or more large powers whose function is to maintain peace between the larger powers.”50 British acknowledgment of Chinese sensitivities in Tibet vis-à-vis Nepal showcases that both Tibet and Nepal acted as buffers between the erstwhile Great Powers, Imperial Britain and China. It is Britain’s ascertainment of Chinese interests in Tibet that affirms the buffer system between Britain, China, and the two smaller powers – Nepal and Tibet. Furthermore, official British correspondence also acknowledged that China may not be as directly involved in Nepal’s affairs, the notion that there were chances of Chinese concerns vis-à-vis British actions was evident. In 1852,

40  Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State George Campbell, who was a Scottish Liberal Party politician and later the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal between 1871–1874, wrote that: It will be seen that Nepal alone retains any remains of independence, and, standing isolated, encompassed by our territories, that state has, as regards external politics, as little independent action as any other. But in its internal affairs we have never attempted to interfere. The Resident is rather an ambassador than a supervisor. Nepal, therefore, might be formidable if it had the means, but our security is in the smallness of its revenue. Its territory is almost entirely mountain, yields a comparatively small sum, and its army is very small. It is formidable on the defensive, but would be contemptible on the offensive.51 Campbell’s view affirms the geographic notion of the buffer, which emphasizes the formidability of the topography (i.e., the Himalayan mountains) as a source of security for Nepal. His statement also affirms the British perspective that Nepal, despite not being fully independent, was an outlier in the region as it retained an extensive measure of internal administrative powers without direct British control. In 1883, British Foreign Secretary in British India, Henry Mortimer Durand, in an interdepartmental note stated that: Nepal is not absolutely independent . . . . but practically we have treated her as an independent State, having power to declare war and make treaties. She is nominally tributary to China, but China evidently regards her as outside the limits of the Celestial Empire.52 He further states that interfering with or influencing Nepal’s decisions could “give us much trouble diplomatically, and might end in our finding ourselves involved in differences with China on behalf of Nepal.”53 While British influence in Nepal after the 1816 conclusion of the war evidently increased, the United Kingdom considered Chinese interests in Nepal, affirming its status as a buffer between the United Kingdom and China. British acknowledgment of the nominal independence of the Kingdom of Nepal is another factor that reaffirms its approach to keeping Nepal as an autonomous buffer state. The central theme of the buffer system rests on the premise that it maintains its independence, even though it is highly susceptible to intrusion from the buffered states. The UK perspective presented by Durand affirms this nominally; he confirms Nepal’s independent status but also acknowledges at the same time that it is prone to pressures from China and the United Kingdom itself. Sir William Lee-Warner wrote in his 1910 volume called The Native States of India that: The number of Native states included in the Indian Empire is reckoned at 693 in the latest edition of the Imperial Gazetteer of India, but this calculation places the territory of Nepal which is independent in matters of internal administration.54

Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State  41 Within the British administration in India, there were also concerns about China gaining a footing in Nepal, which would undermine British interests. This showcases the notion of Nepal as a buffer state in Britain’s perspective as it is crucial for the Qing Empire’s security in Tibet but at the same time is also important for British India’s security as well. The Government of India wrote a telegram to the British Secretary of State for India, Viscount John Morley, that: There are advantages in leaving Nepal free to act in the event of China becoming aggressive. But Nepal should not be allowed by us to suffer at China’s hands, and instructions might be sent to Resident that, if subject is referred to by Prime Minister, we should be prepared, if Nepal gave us control of her external relations, to guarantee Nepal’s territorial integrity and independence in internal affairs.55 The British conception of the buffer system in the region maintained its relevance even after the independence of India. The post-independence Indian administration inherited the British colonial apparatus including its geopolitical conceptualization of the region and the importance of the Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim as important lines of defense.56 Nepal continued to serve as a buffer state; Tibet acted as a buffer state too but very briefly. Nepal’s buffer role became especially pronounced since Tibet’s incorporation into the People’s Republic of China.57 As such, New Delhi sought to maintain the Himalayan frontier policy in Nepal, by keeping it under India’s sphere of influence. The first PM of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru, highlighted Nepal’s importance to India’s security. His rhetoric affirmed Nepal’s sovereignty yet showcased concerns regarding Chinese activities in Tibet. Nehru iterated that “India would not tolerate any invasion of Nepal from anywhere.”58 On December 7, 1950, Nehru’s speech initiating the debate on foreign affairs in the Indian Parliament highlighted Nepal’s significant role for the security of postindependence India. Titled Peace or War, Nehru highlighted the following points regarding Nepal’s importance to Indian security: We (India) recognize Nepal as an independent country and wish her well. But even a child knows that one cannot go to Nepal without passing through India . . . We wished to treat Nepal as an independent country but, at the same time, saw that, unless some steps were taken in the internal sphere, difficulties might arise . . . . During the last fortnight, some new developments have taken place in Nepal. Our interest in the internal conditions of Nepal has become still more acute and personal, because of the developments across our borders, to be frank, especially those in China and Tibet. Besides our sympathetic interest in Nepal, we were also interested in the security of our own country. From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier. Of course, they are no longer as impassable as they used to be but are still very effective. We shall not allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India. Therefore, much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go

42  Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security . . . . 59 Nehru’s speech reinforces India’s conception of Nepal as a buffer state – one that became even more prominent with Tibet’s incorporation into the People’s Republic of China. It highlights the predicament of the buffer state that it may not truly enjoy external intrusion as its geopolitical position makes it susceptible to the security concerns of its neighbors. The long border shared between Tibet and Nepal made the latter very sensitive to Indian security concerns as the former ceased to exist as a buffer. Thus, Nepal retained a prominent place in Indian foreign policy. In fact, its importance as a geopolitical buffer increased after the 1950 incursions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into Tibet, a continuation and perhaps an exacerbation of Nepal’s importance for India’s own geopolitical security, which was further solidified following the Sino-Indian War of 1962. Subsequent Indian administrations continued to emphasize the important geopolitical role Nepal played for India’s security. Following PM Indira Gandhi’s imposition of emergency rule in India, her government emphasized close relations with Nepal, which was then under the direct rule of King Birendra. This renewed closeness to the monarchy over democratic forces like the Nepali Congress was largely based on PM Gandhi’s fears of her opponents using Nepal for shelter and in support of movements against her emergency rule.60 Under PM Rajiv Gandhi, the notion of India’s discomfort with Nepal’s closeness to China was demonstrated when two separate trade and transit treaties were not renewed in 1989. India sought to have one single treaty while Nepal refused to do so; as a result, 13 out of the 15 transit routes were closed, and Nepal faced energy and economic crises. While India maintained it was due to the failure to sign on to the treaties, the Nepali side argued that it was an economic blockade that coincided with Nepal buying anti-aircraft guns from China.61 Nepal’s overtures to China were conceived as detrimental to India’s security, which highlights the deep entrenchment of Nepal as an important piece of Indian foreign policy. Nepal’s open border with India as per the 1950 Treaty has also been a source of contention for India’s security. Specifically, India has long linked Pakistan to influx of fake currency into India from Nepal. The ease of movement due to the open border and Nepal’s lax visa policy have been cited as reasons by India as to why Pakistan has been keen on using this to their advantage. India had time and again raised concerns and pressured Nepal to act against the Pakistani InterServices Intelligence (ISI) affiliates and terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba that have been reported to have operations in the country.62 Thus, Nepal has continued to be an important security piece for India’s foreign policymaking and is inherently important for India’s domestic security interests. The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and PM Narendra Modi has garnered a renewed symbolic value for relations with Nepal. Given its affiliation with Hindu groups and an emphasis on India’s Hindu identity, PM Modi’s Government has emphasized the common preponderant religion in both countries – Hinduism and the historical ties of both countries to Buddhism. PM Modi’s second international trip after assuming office in 2014 was to Nepal. During the

Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State  43 visit, he gave a speech at the Constituent Assembly where he stated that relations between the two countries were “as timeless as the Himalayas and the Ganga (Ganges). They were relations built on the bonding of hearts, and a shared cultural heritage.”63 During the same speech, he emphasized the important role played by Nepal in India’s security; he states that “when adverse wind blows in Nepal, India too feels the cold.” He also said that “the India-Nepal border should not be a barrier but a bridge which helps bring prosperity to both sides.”64 These sentiments were reiterated in the May 2022 visit by PM Modi on the occasion of Buddha’s birthday to Lumbini in Nepal, the birthplace of Buddha. He stated that “the civilizational and people-to-people contacts between India and Nepal form the enduring edifice of ‘our close relationship’.”65 The strategic timing also involved laying the foundation stone for India International Centre for Buddhist Culture and Heritage, which also signaled a response to China’s $3 billion project to develop Lumbini.66 Overall, the BJP administration in India has emphasized the civilizational and cultural ties between the two countries while also highlighting the innate importance of security for India. From British India to the Republic of India, Nepal continued to garner special interest. The geographical buffer concept under the British stemmed from fears of Qing and Russian incursions and was intended to bolster ontological security. Eventually, the Republic of India continued this conception but also realized over time that Nepal is willing to diversify its foreign relations when necessary. Nevertheless, Nepal continued to play an important role for India due to the open borders between the two states, and the strong civilizational and cultural ties became the bedrock for relations for the BJP. Nepal has increasingly become more crucial for India’s security and geopolitical interests given China’s increased influence in the country. B.  I magining Nepal: Evolving Perceptions from the Qing Empire to the People’s Republic of China The Qing Empire, for an extended period of its history, had little contact with Nepal or its successor states. The attack by the newly unified Gorkha Kingdom (which would later be renamed as the Kingdom of Nepal) against Tibet in 1788 prompted concerns from the Qing Empire.67 Nepal posed a threat to Tibet, which the Qing conceived to be part of its imperial possessions, albeit with relative autonomy. The first Tibet–Nepal War came to an end when the Qing Empire intervened and acted as a mediator. To conclude the war, the three sides signed a treaty in 1789, albeit the details of this treaty remain inconsistent throughout the three versions.68 Tibet’s failure to implement the 1789 treaty created resentment in the Nepali court, which eventually culminated in the second Tibet–Nepal War in 1791. The Qing Emperor, after numerous attempts at accommodation with the Nepalis, finally authorized an invasion. As for the Emperor himself, Tibet occupied a special and particularly personal interest in his geopolitical imagination; in an edict issued in 1791, he states: Tibet is the place that my grandfather and father had repeatedly used force to pacify. There is no way (for us) to abandon it because of the harassment of

44  Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State the Gurkhas. If we give away Tibet without a fight, where do we place the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Erdeni, and their people? . . . . How can we open our door and let enemies in only because of the threat from those petty devils?69 The Qing military joined the Tibetan military to clear Nepali soldiers from all previously occupied areas in Tibet.70 This was the first instance in which the Qing Empire mobilized its military to defend its outer Himalayan frontier with the assumption that the campaign would settle the border along Tibet’s frontier.71 As the joint Qing-Tibetan forces started to cross over into Nepal, Kathmandu sued for peace in 1792, eventually ending the war. The treaty signed on September 30, 1792, is instrumental in the Qing attitudes toward Nepal. The treaty stipulated Nepal to send a mission to Beijing every five years, effectively establishing a tributary system between the Qing Empire and the Kingdom of Nepal.72 The treaty also stated that the Qing Empire would come to Nepal’s aid in case of foreign aggression, which was not fulfilled when the country went to war against the British in 1814. Overall, the early years of Nepal’s unified history were characterized by the Qing conception of Nepal as an entity that needed to be checked in order to safeguard its frontier regions, that is, Tibet. Furthermore, the Himalayan region would also serve as a “buffer layer” as Liu (2020) puts it, with the hopes of creating a stable frontier.73 The Qing perception of Nepal as an important frontier region for the stability of Tibet is further bolstered when assessing official correspondence between Chinese officials. Specifically as British commercial interests increased in Tibet, the Qing also assessed the threats such foreign interests posed to the region. A  letter sent by the governor of Sichuan to Beijing in 1877 states that: Now fortunately we still have Nepal and Bhutan which both border Tibet and could become our buffer states . . . . If now we do not associate with Bhutan and Nepal the British surely would try to establish connections with them, and thus Tibet would be exposed and even Sichuan province would have its door opened.74 In 1910, the Qing Amban in Tibet wrote: We China, Tibet and Gurkha are like members of the same family. If any one of them is injured any way the others too become affected.75 Similar to British India, the Qing Empire saw the Himalayan states as geographic discontinuities and spaces that would offer some level of ontological security. The tributary status established by the 1792 treaty further cemented the conception of Nepal as a frontier neighbor that acted as a cushion or geographic buffer against British interests. Despite the characterization of Nepal as a buffer and a geographic discontinuity, it is also situated as an inherent part of the security considerations of the Qing Empire. However, the weakening of the Qing Empire

Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State  45 due to tensions with the Western powers had eventually allowed Tibet to ascertain high degrees of autonomy and eventually declare independence in 1913 after the Qing Empire disintegrated in 1911. Nepal also eventually terminated its fiveyear tributes, effectively signaling an end to this relationship, albeit at the indirect behest of British India.76 The fall of the Qing Empire ushered in the era of the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek. Under the Nationalists, China started reasserting its claims over territories that had previously garnered large-scale autonomy or outright independence during the final years of the Qing Empire. In 1912, President Yuan Shikai announced Tibet, Mongolia (which would later include only the region of Inner Mongolia), and Xinjiang as innate parts of China and on equal footing as the rest of the provinces.77 The Nationalists sought to reinstate China’s status in world politics, which had been compromised under the Qing Empire, especially since the beginning of the 20th century. As for its policy toward Nepal, some rhetoric from high-ranking officials sought to bring it closer to China’s fold. Nationalist Leader Sun Yat-sen considered Nepal to be one of the “lost” territories.78 While some in Nepal found it troubling, the Nationalist government pursued policies that treated Nepal as an independent entity, including goodwill delegations dispatched by Chiang Kai-shek.79 For the new government, reclaiming authority over Tibet was important as it was a central part of the Nationalist vision for the “new” China – territorial integrity that was violated by Western powers and Japan were not be compromised and Tibet was an integral part of that imagination. As such, Nepal became an important part of the strategic calculation as it exercised extensive influence in Tibet, specifically in matters of trade. The subsequent victory of the communists under Mao Zedong in 1949 would eventually change the course of China’s position in international politics. The PRC under Mao to a large extent continued the geopolitical imagination laid out by the Nationalists. It was during this time that there was speculation that the PRC elites viewed lost territories as the “five fingers of the Tibetan palm,” the five fingers being Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and the North East Frontier Agency (known as Arunachal Pradesh today).80 The fears of the PRC permeating the Himalayan frontiers into the sub-Himalayan kingdoms became even more real when it incorporated Tibet based on the notion of it being a “lost territory” of the historical Chinese state, which extended to Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia as well. Despite such speculations, Nepal and the PRC formally established diplomatic ties in 1955. Since then, the PRC has sought to form closer ties affirmed by political statements made by Chinese leaders. Premier Zhou Enlai in 1956 stated that Nepal: . . . has had friendly relations with China for over a thousand years . . . . In the past hundred years or more, owing to the evils of colonialism, the normal relations between our two peoples had been disrupted and obstructed.81 Premeir Zhou went on further to describe Sino-Nepali relations as “blood ties,” which some argue was a challenge to India’s emphasis on civilizational

46  Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State Indo-Nepal ties.82 Thus, during the Cold War, the PRC established closer ties with Nepal, emphasizing historical ties between the two states. Nevertheless, it must be noted that China had strategic interests in Nepal given that the United States had funded Tibetan rebels who were based in the northern regions of Nepal; furthermore, Nepal was a conduit for Tibetan refugees fleeing the PRC which made it strategically important and sensitive for the PRC.83 Within the context of the Cold War, China feared that the United Sates would form a firm position within Nepal, which shared an extensive land border with Tibet and the ongoing Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support for Tibetan khampa rebels who had launched armed attacks from northern Nepal. The rebels were eventually forced to surrender when King Mahendra mobilized the Royal Nepal Army, significantly improving ties with the PRC. In 1962, Vice Premier Chen Yi stated that “when a handful of reactionaries in China’s Tibet region launched a rebellion in 1959, Nepal persevered in its correct stand of non-interference in China’s internal affairs.”84 Highlighting the importance of Nepal to the stability of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) and sensing apprehension within Nepal about India’s preponderant influence, China sought to persuade Nepal to pursue closer ties, which eventually led to the 1960 Sino-Nepalese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The Tibet factor remained important in China’s geopolitical imagination of Nepal which garnered a central component in diplomatic relations after the 2008 riots in the TAR. On March 10, 2008, Tibetans in the TAR staged widespread protests against Beijing, a few months before the Summer Olympics were to begin. Tibetan refugees in Nepal, who numbered around 20,000 since the PRC’s incorporation of Tibet, had long been able to protest freely. Unlike previous interactions between China and Nepal, Beijing appeared to be more strident in controlling the activities of Tibetan refugees in Nepal, which subsequently led to the banning of all political protests by Tibetans. Tibetan cultural festivals within Nepal, including celebrations of the Dalai Lama’s birthday, were also heavily regulated.85 China’s Nepal policy has also reinvigorated under President Xi Jinping. Similar to PM Modi, President Xi highlighted the importance of cultural ties between the two countries. In an article from President Xi before his first trip to Nepal in 2019, he writes the two countries are “close neighbors linked by the same mountains and rivers and enjoy a long-standing friendship.”86 He goes on to state that “China firmly supports Nepal in safeguarding national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and in pursuing a development path tailored to its national reality.”87 Again in 2021, when speaking to the Nepali President Bidya Devi Bhandari, President Xi said that China would “support Nepal in safeguarding national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, respect the Nepali people’s independent choice of development path, and support Nepal’s economic and social development.”88 Overall, the Qing nominally considered Nepal as a tributary, but it also served as a buffer against British India. As for the PRC, Nepal became an important state for stability in its restive TAR. China is cognizant of close ties between India and Nepal including extensive economic reliance of Nepal on India, specifically for trade. Beijing’s extensive emphasis on independence and territorial integrity of Nepal also highlights the sensitivities that the PRC pays attention to when dealing with smaller states like Nepal.

Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State  47

III. Conceptualizing Nepal in Geopolitics: Contending or Congruent Conceptions? Nepal’s self-conception and those of its neighbors offer insights into the role the country plays in their geopolitical imaginations, which are important for their strategic decisions. Table 3.1 illustrates the different role conceptions of Nepal emanating from its own political elites and neighboring states. The two columns of Table 3.1 highlight the evolution of these conceptions, while the rest of this section discusses the modern concepts and how they tie into the proposed new buffer state concept. Based on the historical conceptions, the notion of geography features prominently. The Himalayan Mountains in Nepal served as a convenient buffer between India and China. Nepal’s self-conceptualization in the context of its geopolitics has shifted to a dynamic understanding of itself as a bridge rather than simply a yam stuck between two boulders. The official rhetoric from Nepali ruling elites has shifted to the understanding of the self as capable of conceiving a particular role for Nepal, which is defined by the political establishment of the country. Table 3.1  The Geopolitical Conceptions of Nepal Conceiving Actor

Historical Conceptions

Contemporary Conceptions

Nepal’s Self-Conception

• Yam between two boulders • Choose close ties between British India or the Qing Empire as appropriate • Geographic buffer against the Qing Empire • Emphasis on keeping Nepal independent but maintaining influence • Centered on ontological security

• Dynamic bridge between India and China • Emphasis on equiproximity and independent foreign policy • Continuation of British policy of geographic buffer + emphasis on civilizational links • Emphasis on civilizational links • Maintaining Indian security through securing open border with Nepal • Keep Chinese influence to a limit • Geographic buffer + frontier neighbor • Some attempts at cultural ties • Importance for security in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) • Challenge Indian influence in Nepal • Assess extent/ formidability of Indian influence in Nepal

India’s Conception of Nepal

China’s Conception of Nepal

• Geographic buffer against British India + tributary state • Emphasis on keeping Nepal as a tributary state to ensure security in Tibet • Keep the British in check through influence in Nepal

48  Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State Additionally, the concept of equi-proximity is more than just balancing interests between India and China; it calls for fulfillment of mutual interests through interactions between not just Nepal and its neighbors but the neighboring (or buffered) states interacting with each other in the Nepali geopolitical space.89 Despite its weak capabilities compared to its neighboring states, Nepal emphasizes independence in its foreign policy while also proposing close ties with the buffered states, China and India. Nepal in the contemporary political context conceptualizes its role as a bridge between competing Chinese and Indian interests as its limited capabilities offer limited foreign policy choices, but it is a conscious decision to maximize the utility of the context by arguing that Nepal does not side with either buffered state. This self-concept of the dynamic bridge offers Nepal the opportunity to maximize its independent foreign policy posturing while also giving it space to arbitrate against preponderance from one buffered state over the other. As such, this self-conceptualization offers Nepal the agency, however limited, to negotiate its geopolitical role within the China–India–Nepal (CIN) buffer system. As for India’s conception, the British colonial administration offered a very geographically defined approach toward Nepal. The Himalayan kingdoms had historically served as a buffer zone to protect Indian ontological security from Qing and Russian threats. While the Republic of India inherited this notion, it has continued to increasingly emphasize civilizational and cultural ties with Nepal. Indian geopolitical conception toward Nepal emanates from threats posed by China, specifically given the contentious Sino-Indian relations. Additionally, the open border between India and Nepal also adds to India’s geopolitical conception vis-à-vis Nepal; any intrusion of contending influence in Nepal has the possibility of spillover into India. As such, the ontological security of the Republic of India is emphasized in the new geopolitical conception toward Nepal, but it also emphasizes the dynamism of interests. This has especially been the case as China’s influence in Nepal has grown since the Tibetan riots in 2008. Overall, Nepal’s status as a buffer state is of strategic utility to India to reduce the risks of contiguity; additionally, the country presents itself as a strategic case study to assess the extent/limits of Chinese influence and foreign policy formidability and capability. Given that China is India’s number one strategic concern, Nepal’s buffer status is of immense strategic utility to assess China’s capabilities, specifically nonmilitary ones so as to prevent a formidable establishment of Beijing’s influence in Nepal. As for China, Nepal’s limited geographic conception as a buffer or tributary has given way to a more strategically motivated yet dynamic conception. While the focus on Tibetan security is not novel for the PRC as the Qing Empire pursued a similar approach in Nepal, Beijing has increasingly perceived Nepal as a space wherein it can push back Indian interests. Given India’s historical preponderant influence in Nepal, China has increasingly pushed into the country. As such, the strategic utility of Nepal as a buffer for China emanates from geographic proximity to the TAR coupled with the dynamic yet contentious ties between India and China. As such, Nepal has emerged as a geopolitical space wherein China can assess the extent/limits of Indian influence and foreign policy formidability and capability. Overall, the CIN buffer system illustrates the new concept of the buffer state based on its strategic utility to buffered states and its agency. For both China and

Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State  49 India, Nepal fulfills the strategic utility as a geographic discontinuity; but, unlike this traditional notion of a buffer state, both India and China showcase dynamism vis-à-vis Nepal as India seeks to maintain its preponderant role while China pushes to reduce it. For both India and China, the buffer state has transformed from merely a static space to a more dynamic space wherein competing interests interact with the buffer state and challenge each other. Figure 3.1 illustrates the application of the new buffer concept in the case study of the CIN buffer system. As stated above, the new concept proposes that the buffer state is not just a space that separates rival powers or a space for contending interests. It goes further by centering a buffer state, in this case Nepal, as a dynamic political space where China and India assess the foreign policy formidability and

The Buffer System

China (Buffered State)

Nepal (Buffer State)

India (Buffered State)

Figure 3.1 Application of the New Buffer Concept to the China–India–Nepal (CIN) Buffer System.

50  Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State capability of each other. This dynamic space is not just a venue for overtures from India and China as it also centers Nepal as an active player in this buffer system, wherein it uses its agency to negotiate its role as showcased by its foreign policy posturing highlighted in this chapter.

Notes 1 Krishna Kant Adhikari, “The Status, Powers and Functions of Rajas and Rajautas during the Nineteenth Century Nepal in the Light of Contemporary Documents,” Contributions to Nepalese Studies VIII, no. 1 (1980); the three kingdoms of the Kathmandu Valley included Kantipur, Patan (Lalitpur), and Bhaktapur (Bhadgoan), which were ruled by monarchs belonging to the Malla dynasty. 2 Daman R. Tuladhar, Contemporary Nepal (1945–1955) (Kathmandu: Laxmi Publications, 1980), 11. Accessed at the Ministry of Archaeology, Kathmandu, Nepal, on June 24, 2016. 3 This refers to the British monarch at the time, King George III. 4 Rishikesh Shaha, Nepali Politics: Retrospect and Prospect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 5 Jayantakumar Dasgupta, “Nepal’s Relations with the Outer World,” The Calcutta Review, no. 3 (1930): 388. 6 D.B. Diskalkar, “Tibeto-Nepalese War, 1788–1793,” Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society XIX, no. 4 (1933). Accessed at the British Library, London on August 12, 2016. 7 The Qing Empire’s suzerainty over Tibet resulted in the stationing of the ambans who fulfilled imperial duties in the region and acted as intermediaries between the imperial center in Beijing and the periphery. After the two wars between Tibet and Nepal, the ambans were given extensive control over Tibetan affairs. As such, Qing control over Tibet as a vassal ebbed and flowed until the collapse of the Qing Empire in 1911 and the subsequent declaration of independence by the Dalai Lama on February 13, 1913; Ryosuke Kobayashi, “Tibet in the Era of 1911 Revolution,” Journal of Contemporary East Asian Studies 3, no. 1 (2014); Sabine Dabringhaus, “The Ambans of Tibet – Imperial Rule at the Inner Asian Periphery,” in The Dynastic Centre and the Provinces: Agents and Interactions, eds. Jeroen Duindam and Sabine Dabringhaus (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 8 Ravuri Dhanlaxmi, British Attitude to Nepal’s Relations with Tibet and China (1814– 1914) (Delhi: Bahri Publications Private Limited, 1981), 34. Accessed at the British Library, UK on August 12, 2016 9 Captain H.Y. Hearsey, “Anglo Nepal Relations (1814–1816),” in Historical Papers Relating to Kumaun, 1809–1842, ed. Banarsi Prasad Saksena (Allahabad: Universal Press, 1956), Section 1: 3. 10 Ibid. 11 Dhanlaxmi, British Attitude to Nepal’s Relations with Tibet and China, 33. 12 Gopal Khanal, “Foreign Policy of Nepal: Continuity and Changes,” Journal of APF Command and Staff College 2, no. 1 (2019): 98. 13 Leo E. Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1971), 106. 14 “Nepal – Independent Status of, Correspondence from Nepali Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher Rana to Lieutenant-Colonel J. Manners Smith, Resident in Nepal,” April 1 1916, File No. 2/1960, British Embassy F.O. 766/2. Accessed at The National Archives, UK on August 4, 2016. 15 Madan Kumar Bhattarai, Diplomatic History of Nepal (1901–1929): A  Critical Appraisal of Nepal-British-Indian Relations (New Delhi: Ashoka Printers, 1990), 8. Accessed at the Ministry of Archaeology, Nepal on June 10, 2016. 16 The Rana Regime of Nepal (1846–1950) was the absolute rule of the Rana oligarchs, who reduced the Shah monarchy to mere figureheads. Several political outfits, including

Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State  51

17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

the Nepali Congress Party, had initiated armed revolts against the Ranas. Before the departure of the British from India in 1947, Nepal had time and again appealed for the quelling of democratic armed forces based in India. In 1950, King Tribhuvan, who was under house arrest, fled to the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu and subsequently to India to seek asylum. The King’s departure was followed by armed attacks by Nepali Congress launched across Nepal, resulting in Nepal’s emergence as a constitutional monarchy; Adhikari, “The Status, Powers and Functions of Rajas and Rajautas during the Nineteenth Century Nepal in the Light of Contemporary Documents.” Srinivas Mazumdaru, “Gurkhas: Nepalese Soldiers in World War I,” Deutsche Welle, May 13, 2014, www.dw.com/en/gurkhas-nepalese-warriors-in-world-war-i/a-17632181 Gurkhas and the Second World War, The Gurkha Museum, 2021, https://thegurkhamuseum.co.uk/blog/gurkhas-and-ww2/ Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 171–172. Ibid., 179. Ibid. “Nepal-France Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Government of Nepal, 2020, https://mofa.gov.np/nepal-france-relations/#:~:text=Nepal%20%E2%80%93%20 France%20Relations&text=The%20bilateral%20relations%20between%20 Nepal,mutual%20respect%20on%20both%20sides. Ibid., 180. The Soviet Union blocked Nepal’s efforts to join the UN questioning its sovereign status. “Treaty of Peace and Friendship,” Ministry of External Affairs – Government of India, July  31, 1950, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6295/Treaty+of+Peace +and+Friendship Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 183. Ibid., 188. Ganga B. Thapa and Jan Sharma, “From Insurgency to Democracy: The Challenges of Peace and Democracy-Building in Nepal,” International Political Science Review 30, no. 2 (2009): 207. Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 198. Thapa and Sharma, “From Insurgency to Democracy,” 207. “Bilateral Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Government of Nepal, 2020, https://mofa.gov.np/foreign-policy/bilateral-relation/; Rama Kant, “Nepal’s Foreign Policy and China,” India Quarterly 27, no. 3 (1971): 207. Monalisa Adhikari, “Between the Dragon and the Elephant: Nepal’s Neutrality Conundrum,” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs 25, no. 1–2 (2012): 83–97. Pashupati Shumsher, “India and Nepal,” Indian Express, April 3, 1970. John Scholz, “Nepal in 1976: Problems with India Threaten Birendra’s New Order,” Asian Survey 17, no. 2 (1977): 203. Swarna Rajagoplan, “South Asia’s Small States in World Politics,” in South Asia in World Politics, ed. Devin T. Hagerty (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 98. Fritz Tucker, “Jana Andolan: The People’s Movement in Nepal,” Zeteo: The Journal of Interdisciplinary Writing, (2012): 7. Karl Taro Greenfield, “The Death of Vishnu,” Time, 2001, http://content.time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,128973,00.html Ibid. Barbara Crossette, “Nepal: The Politics of Failure,” World Policy Journal 22, no. 4 (2005): 70. John Whelpton, “Nepal and Bhutan in 2008: A New Beginning?” Asian Survey 49, no. 1 (2008). “Nepal’s Foreign Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Government of Nepal, https:// mofa.gov.np/foreign-policy/#:~:text=The%20fundamental%20objective%20of%20 Nepal’s,global%20peace%2C%20harmony%20and%20security. Bhim Nath Baral, “Changing Dynamics of Nepalese Foreign Policy: Patterns and Trends,” Journal of Political Science, no. XVIII (2018): 36–37.

52  Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State 43 “Nepal Wants to be a Dynamic Bridge Between India and China: Prachanda,” The Times of India, October 17, 2016, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/nepal-wants-tobe-a-dynamic-bridge-between-india-china-prachanda/articleshow/54887300.cms. 44 Sutirtho Patranobis, “KP Oli says Nepal can be a bridge between India, China,” The Hindustan Times, June  23, 2018, www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/kp-oli-saysnepal-can-be-a-bridge-between-india-china/story-glOV6esX0fVgyuDHLxzW9H.html 45 Bernard Debarbieux and Gilles Rudaz, The Mountain : A Political History From the Enlightenment to the Present (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 149. 46 Adhikari, “The Status, Powers and Functions of Rajas and Rajautas during the Nineteenth Century Nepal in the Light of Contemporary Documents,” 30. 47 Ibid. 48 Martin J. Bayly, “Imperial Ontological (In)security: ‘Buffer States’, International Relations and the Case of Anglo-Afghan Relations, 1808–1878,” European Journal of International Relations 21, no. 4 (2015). 49 Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 341. 50 John Chay and Thomas E. Ross, “Preface,” in Buffer States in World Politics, eds. John Chay and Thomas E. Ross (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), xiii. 51 George Campbell, Modern India: A Sketch of the System of Civil Government (First published in 1852; republished by Arkose Press, 2015), 160. 52 Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 141. 53 Ibid. 54 Sir William Lee-Warner, The Native States of India (London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1910): vii. 55 “Thibet – Confidential: India Office to Foreign Office,” May 1, 1910, L/PS/10/151–1. Accessed at The British Library, UK on 12 August, 2016. 56 Partha S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1989), 125–126. 57 Werner Levi, “Bhutan and Sikkim : Two Buffer States,” The World Today 15, no. 12 (1959): 492. 58 Avtar Singh Bhasin, “Nehru’s Speech Delivered to Parliament on March 17, 1950,” in Nepal-India, Nepal-China Relations Volume 1, ed. Avtar Singh Bhasin (Delhi: Geetika Publishers, 2005), 84. 59 “Peace or War,” in Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches: Volume Two (August 1949-February 1953) (New Delhi: Publications Division: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1963), 256–257. 60 S.D. Muni, India’s Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 59. 61 Ibid., 60–61. 62 Ashley J. Tellis, “The Menace that is Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/LeT_menace.pdf 63 “Summary of Prime Minister’s address to Constituent Assembly of Nepal,” Ministry of External Affairs – Government of India, August 3, 2014, www.mea.gov.in/SpeechesStatements.htm?dtl/23817/Summary+of+Prime+Min 64 Ibid. 65 Manjiri Sachin Chitre, “ ‘Ties Unparalleled’: PM Modi Ahead of His Nepal Visit,” Deccan Herald, May 16, 2022, www.deccanherald.com/national/india-nepal-relationsunshakable-like-himalayas-pm-modi-says-during-lumbini-visit-1109731.html. 66 Anirban Bhaumik, “India-Nepal Relations Unshakable like Himalayas, PM Modi says during Lumbini Visit,” Deccan Herald, May 16, 2022, www.deccanherald.com/ national/india-nepal-relations-unshakable-like-himalayas-pm-modi-says-duringlumbini-visit-1109731.html.

Contextualizing Nepal as a Buffer State  53 67 Yuri Komatsubara, “A Study of the Treaty of the First Tibet-Gorkha War of 1789,” in Social Regulation: Case Studies from Tibetan History, eds. Jeannine Bischoff and Sal Mullard (Leiden: Brill), 181. 68 Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 43. 69 Yingcong Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press), 117. 70 Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 56. 71 Xiaoyuan Liu, To the End of Revolution: The Chinese Communist Party and Tibet, 1949–1959 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 17. 72 Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 65. 73 Liu, To the End of Revolution, 17–18. 74 Ibid., 138. 75 Manner Smith to Government, February 2, 1910. Available in Dhanlaxmi, British Attitude to Nepal’s Relations with Tibet and China (1814–1914), 141. 76 Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 167. 77 Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 31. 78 Sanjay Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India (New York: Routledge, 2012), 60. 79 Ibid., 62–63. 80 Suhasini Haidar, “History, the Standoff, and Policy Worth Rereading,” The Hindu, June  18, 2020, www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/history-the-stand-off-and-policyworth-rereading/article31854822.ece 81 Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, New Developments in Friendly Relations between China and Nepal (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), 37. 82 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 76. 83 Narayan Khadka, “Chinese Foreign Policy toward Nepal in the Cold War Period: An Assessment,” China Report 31, no. 1 (1999): 62. 84 Ibid., 64. 85 Gopal Sharma, “Nepal Targets Tibetan Exiles, under Pressure from China: Rights Body,” Reuters, April  1, 2014, www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/ us-nepal-china-tibetidUSBREA300X420140401. 86 Xi Jinping, “Full Text of Xi’s Signed Article on Nepali Newspapers,” China Daily, October  11, 2019, www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201910/11/WS5da026bba310cf3e3556ff60.html 87 Ibid. 88 “Xi Jinping Speaks with Nepali President Bidya Devi Bhandari on the Phone,” Embassy of the People’s Republic pf China in the United States of America, May 26, 2021, www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus/eng/zgyw/t1879038.htm 89 Baral, “Changing Dynamics of Nepalese Foreign Policy: Patterns and Trends,” 36–37.

4 Timeframe I Critical Junctures 1947–1962

This chapter covers the assessment of four critical junctures of the buffer system between 1947 and 1962. These events occurred prior to the 1962 War between India and China that consolidated their rivalry and contentious relations that exists till the contemporary period.

I. 1950–1951: Tibet’s Inclusion into the People’s Republic of China In 1949, the Communist Revolution in China succeeded, which led to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As a new government established itself in China, the status of its frontier provinces which had declared independence since the fall of the Qing Empire in 1911 once again garnered attention. As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized power, it inherited the geostrategic notions of unifying all of China’s “national territories,” referring to Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan.1 Modeled after the “regional autonomy” approach that was applied to Inner Mongolia, this notion of reintegrating alienated frontier territories into the Chinese nation gained momentum right after the Communist Revolution. On October  6, 1950, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officially crossed the Jinsha River, which was the de-facto border between Chinese and Tibetan political realms.2 Soon, the national integration program began and the Seventeen-Point Agreement was signed in 1951, which Liu (2020) argues was “a political arrangement designed by the CCP to fortify Chinese sovereignty in Tibet in a modern sense.”3 Tibet figured as an important part of the CCP’s drive to represent the Chinese state under its rule, which also aimed at reversing the “century of national humiliation” the country had suffered between 1839 and 1949 at the hands of foreign powers. As such, Tibet became a central component of the PRC’s national sovereignty and incorporating it was not up for debate. With Tibet’s defacto incorporation into the PRC, China now had contiguous borders with Nepal, Bhutan, and India. This major political event impacted the China–India–Nepal (CIN) buffer system given the new geopolitical realities Nepal and India found themselves in. This new development was a major political shock to Prime Minister (PM) Jawaharlal DOI: 10.4324/9781003178538-4

Timeframe I  55 Nehru who had favored Tibet to be an autonomous buffer state under Chinese suzerainty.4 Furthermore, it created complications in Sino-Indian relations as the McMahon Line along India’s province of Arunachal Pradesh was not accepted by China as the Treaty was signed by Tibet during Qing rule; Beijing refused to recognize Tibet’s agency as an independent state during the Simla Conference, and as such, the border demarcation as per the McMahon Line did not hold true for Beijing. Nehruvian idealism, which had directed Indian foreign policy after independence in 1947, found itself in a situation where realpolitik dominated the geopolitical landscape. Nehru, who had long held a rather benign view of China especially toward the Nationalists, was faced with the reality of an imminent security threat on its northern border.5 Given the changing cartographic map of the region, India under Nehru turned its attention to the three Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim. As Tibet no longer existed as a buffer, the last line of geographic buffers for India were these three kingdoms. In the December 7, 1950 speech, just two months after the PLA incursions into Tibet, Nehru called the Himalayas a “magnificent frontier” that should be allowed to be “to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India.”6 In the same speech, he explicitly mentions that even though Nepal is independent, India “cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security.” The state highlights a changed context wherein India under Nehru developed caution vis-à-vis China given its actions in Tibet. This position was affirmed again in 1968 during Nehru’s visit to Bhutan where he said that “freedom of both India and Bhutan should be safeguarded so that no one from outside can do harm to it.”7 As such, the Himalayan kingdoms were of acute importance for India and became important aspects of security. In essence, their strategic utility as buffer states heightened in Indian strategic thinking due to the changed status of Tibet. The probability of Chinese incursions beyond Tibet was a major concern for India as it sought to establish security in its frontier provinces. The Indian strategic conception at the time centered on denying any external power to garner a foothold in South Asia, which would directly impact India’s goal as a newly emerging regional and perhaps global power.8 Additionally, India considered the small peripheral states around it as central components of its emerging security architecture, which was strongly influenced by the previous British colonial administration. As for Nepal, the fate of Tibet was a concern for its own sovereignty. Since its founding, the country had found itself precariously maintaining its sovereignty, however limited it may be. The actions by the PRC heightened concerns as Nepal was considered a tributary of the Qing Empire, despite the lack of explicit actions as it weakened since the beginning of the 20th century. Furthermore, speculation about concepts such as Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and the North East Frontier Agency being the five fingers of the Tibetan palm made the Rana Regime in Nepal nervous.9 Statements from important political figures like Yang Shangkun, chief of the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party, who stated that “after

56  Timeframe I the liberation of Tibet, the Chinese people and Nepalese people will be united in close solidarity for the sake of defending Asia and preserving world peace” made both Nepali and Indian officials nervous about the intent of the PRC.10 In Nepal, the Rana Regime had gotten close to British India to maintain its sovereignty; in the context of possible threats from the PRC, Nepal sought to once again turn to India as a security guarantee. As such, the incorporation of Tibet into the PRC prompted Nepal to seek closer ties to New Delhi with thwart any possibility of military threats from the PRC. For India, Nepal’s strategic utility at this critical juncture was to ensure its frontiers. The Himalayas served as a natural barrier, and to ensure its own security, maintaining the buffer states in its northern frontier was crucial. As such, Nepal’s status as a buffer state became paramount for India and its strategic value increased. For Nepal, close ties with New Delhi made sense given the experiences of Tibet and the uncertainties that loomed in the northern frontier. These convergent interests resulted in the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which solidified two main points of interest: (i) the separate status of Nepal was acknowledged by India and (ii) it recognized India’s special interests in the country given the geopolitical shifts emanating from the PRC’s actions.11 Article 2 of the Treaty states that: The two Governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighboring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.12 Within the context of this critical juncture, Article 2 establishes a firm Indian interest in Nepal that is codified by this Treaty. Nepal’s agreement to it showcases the concerns raised due to the incorporation of Tibet into the PRC. Article 5 of the Treaty further affirms Indian security concerns in Nepal vis-à-vis China and also showcases Nepal’s urgent concerns about Chinese actions in the region: The Government of Nepal shall be free to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal. The procedure for giving effect to this arrangement shall be worked out by the two Governments acting in consultation.13 Article 5 gives extensive oversight powers to India when it comes to weapons purchases procured by Nepal. Given that Nepal in 1950 depended exclusively on India for third-country trade, all procurements of weapons would be carried out with the consent of New Delhi. The Rana Regime in Nepal, despite a compromise on some of its sovereign rights, signed the Treaty given the urgency of this critical juncture. Thus, the incorporation of Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) into the PRC is a major political event in the CIN buffer system. This triggered a change in the idealistic notions of foreign policy that PM Nehru had espoused since India’s independence. Given the threat to India’s northern frontier and its peripheral

Timeframe I  57 neighbors in the Himalayas, it prompted an ideational change that sought to forge closer ties with them. Mere acknowledgments were not adequate, and the reality was to incorporate these smaller kingdoms into a concerted Indian strategy. As for Nepal, this critical juncture reaffirmed its status as a small buffer state between larger powers. However, in this context, the threat from one of the buffered states, China, outweighed an outright narrow interpretation of sovereign rights. As the Rana Regime had done during British rule in India, Nepal sought closer ties with India to safeguard its sovereignty despite the 1950 Treaty compromising it to a limited extent. The threat of outright absorption by the PRC trumped limited compromises with India. Thus, the inclusion of Tibet into the PRC is characterized by a dynamic shift in relations within the buffer system, as one buffered state, that is, China, triggered a change or affirmation of roles among the two states. For Nepal, it further strengthened its already close ties with New Delhi; for India, the ideational shift in its foreign policy from Nehruvian idealism to realpolitik toward the other Asian power was evident in the overtures toward Nepal and Bhutan to sign the Treaty of Friendship with both these states. These also signal policy shifts as India sought a more traditional notion of power politics in its South Asian affairs, while Nepal sought much closer ties with New Delhi to stave off possible threats from Beijing. Based on the first critical juncture discussed here, it can be deduced that Nepal’s strategic utility as a buffer state heightened in the aftermath of Tibet’s incorporation into the PRC. Nepal and China had yet to forge official diplomatic ties; however, Indo-Nepali relations showcase that Nehru aired immense concerns about China gaining a foothold in the country, as his speeches regarding Nepal and Bhutan illustrate. As such, India preemptively sought to bring the Himalayan kingdoms into its fold to prevent any competitive dynamism between New Delhi and Beijing from emerging. The first critical juncture showcases the emerging notion of Nepal as a buffer state, which is a dynamic political space wherein India sought to keep the PRC out of. To ensure Nepal’s India-facing foreign policy, the 1950 Treaty allowed Nepali citizens to work and live in India along with an open border between the two countries.14 India signaled to the Nepali side that it was willing to make concessions despite the asymmetric power difference between the two states. However, these overtures also confirm that India sought to prevent China’s foothold in the country by preemptively enticing Nepal to remain committed to New Delhi’s security concerns. As for the second factor of the new buffer concept, this critical juncture highlights the agency of the buffer state. While maintaining the notion of sovereignty and independence, the Rana Regime signed the 1950 Treaty with India, which limited Nepal’s freedom to purchase arms from whoever it chooses to. Despite this limitation, Nepal’s strategic calculation considered the events in Tibet to be a grave existential threat. India’s signaling of compromise in the Treaty also eased Nepali concerns while the experiences of Tibet demonstrated a more powerful dimension that was deemed more threatening to the sovereignty of Nepal. Despite limitations in foreign policy choices and limited international acknowledgment of its sovereignty, the first critical juncture showcases the importance of Nepal’s

58  Timeframe I agency as a buffer state. It signed the 1950 Treaty despite implications for sovereignty as the threat from the other buffered state, that is, China, was graver. The Rana Regime also wanted to bolster New Delhi’s support for its rule in Nepal, which seemed to be a recasting of its relations with Britain before India’s independence.15 As such, Nepal consciously chose to garner closer ties with India, which not only illustrates the cost/benefit calculations by Nepali foreign policy elites but also showcases the competitive dynamism within the buffer system during instances of critical junctures such as the PRC’s incorporation of Tibet.

II.  1951: End of the Rana Regime in Nepal The Rana Regime, which maintained absolute hereditary control over Nepal since 1846, increasingly found itself in a position where domestic and international pressures amplified.16 The Rana PMs had drastically reduced the powers of the Shah monarchs of Nepal and made them figureheads. To ensure Nepal’s independence and also their own political survival, the Ranas had closely worked with the British administration in India. However, India’s decolonization and establishment as a democratic republic under Nehru thrust the Ranas into a new political reality. Despite the fact that the 1950 Treaty had legitimized Rana rule in Nepal, given the precarious and urgent political needs due to Tibet’s incorporation into the PRC, Nehru was a staunch democrat and was in favor of democratization. The Indian movements for independence had inspired not just the citizens of British India, but also the Nepali diaspora in India, who mostly went to India for education and had increasingly become attuned to democracy and the problems with the authoritarian Rana Regime in Nepal. The Nepali Congress (NC), which was formed in 1950 after the merger of the Nepali National Congress and the Nepali Democratic Congress, called for an end to the Rana Regime.17 The NC had called for India to pressure the Ranas to allow for liberalization of Nepal’s political space. Yet, the security threats from China warranted that New Delhi stay close to the Ranas and ensure that Nepal would remain within the security umbrella of India. Fearing that the 1950 Treaty would coalesce Rana power, given tacit India support for the regime, the NC announced an armed struggle in 1950 to topple the regime. On November 6, 1950, King Tribhuvan of Nepal sought asylum at the Indian embassy in Kathmandu; New Delhi pressured the government of erstwhile PM Mohan Shamsher Rana to allow the king and his family to leave Nepal.18 The NC finally launched armed attacks across Nepal’s southern plains, effectively initiating the armed revolution to oust the Rana Regime. Eventually, King Tribhuvan, the Ranas, and the NC agreed to what was called the Delhi Compromise which would result in a coalition cabinet under the supervision of the king.19 While the 1950 Treaty had asserted Nepali independence, the Delhi Compromise and India’s role in the fall of the Rana Regime signaled a strong influence in the country’s political affairs. New Delhi also implicitly assumed responsibility to ensure that the tripartite deal was implemented.

Timeframe I  59 This critical juncture emphasizes domestic political shifts within Nepal, which for India was a major concern given the contentions arising from the PRC’s actions. Furthermore, India’s main concerns regarding Nepal were the possibility of ties between the PRC and the now increasingly desperate Rana administration under Mohan Shamsher. India’s concerns also extended to overtures from the PRC toward the NC given that Nehru had initially been reluctant to allow an armed struggle against the Rana Regime fearing instability in Nepal.20 Furthermore, the Cold War was in full swing, which raised concerns in India, the United States, and Nepal about the possibility that the PRC could fund communist movements within Nepal as its domestic political space had continued to open up.21 This line of thought was bolstered when the CCP called K.I. Singh, who was heavily critical of the Delhi Compromise and the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty, a “potential leader of a Free Nepal.”22 As such, Nepal’s strategic utility as an India-facing friendly natural buffer state that was recently formalized through the 1950 Treaty faced a tumultuous political development emanating from Nepali democratic forces. For India, the main concerns were tied to the possibility of development of ties between the democratic political parties of Nepal and the PRC if India were to fail in supporting them. On the flip side, the Rana Regime, which had reached an accommodation with New Delhi through the 1950 Treaty, found itself increasingly desperate as India (and specifically Nehru) slowly shifted support toward the democratic movement, albeit Nehru was critical of the violent methods adopted by the NC. After King Tribhuvan’s flight from Nepal, Mohan Shamsher had deposed him and crowned his grandson Gyanendra as Nepal’s king. Within this context, the Indian administration increasingly found itself in a bind; Nehru’s ideological commitments to democracy contended with an increasingly violent revolution and a desperate Rana administration in Kathmandu. For India, maintaining the status-quo of supporting the Rana Regime became increasingly problematic. As such, accommodation between the different contending groups under the Delhi Compromise made sense as a middle path between the Ranas and the NC. As for the strategic utility of Nepal, the country’s first democratization attempt was heavily influenced by New Delhi, as showcased by King Tribhuvan’s flight to India, the influence of Indian nonviolent movements against colonial rule, and the Rana Regime’s agreement to the Delhi Compromise. Similar to the critical juncture relating to Tibet’s incorporation into the PRC, India preemptively sought to dominate the new Nepali political landscape uncertain about the political context in Nepal. While the PRC could still not engage in any meaningful overtures in Nepal due to lack of diplomatic ties, it did invite Singh who was known for being openly critical of India’s political role in Nepal. Thus, to ensure that India’s strategic concerns in Nepal were intact, New Delhi supported a compromise that brought both the Rana Regime and the NC to a compromise. In essence, Nehru was acutely aware of Nepal’s importance for India’s security; a stable transition to a democratic setup was preferable, specifically given the threat of possible Chinese support for communists in Nepal.

60  Timeframe I This critical juncture did not include contending competition from India and China within Nepal’s domestic political changes. However, it did showcase the dynamic role that Nepal played in India’s strategic approach to the country. To ensure that the physical buffer state was maintained and well within the influence of New Delhi, India pushed for democratization of Nepal to ensure its preponderance was maintained in the country. Nepal’s democratization, which is a major political shift in the buffer state, required India to change its approach toward the Rana Regime and act as a political facilitator to ensure a smooth transition of power, as New Delhi did with the Delhi Compromise. The policy change here is evident since India openly supported Nepal’s democratization, which Nehru had previously been very reluctant to do. Thus, India supported the democratization of Nepal to ensure that a political establishment friendly to it would be in place in Kathmandu. Furthermore, it sought to deny China any political space that had the possibility of opening up in Nepal given its democratization. New Delhi oversaw the democratization of Nepal as a facilitator, ensuring its enduring role in Nepali politics. The second factor of the new buffer state concept, which focuses on its agency, is illustrated in the context of this critical juncture. The Rana Regime, despite facing the extensive possibility of being overthrown, refused to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC despite Beijing extending the offer to do so.23 It understood that such a move would reduce the chances of accommodation with New Delhi, as India had increasingly expressed concerns about the PRC’s actions and their impact on the Himalayan kingdoms. The democratic movement in Nepal was a political event that led to changes in the political ideology of the state and opened space for democracy to take root. As such, the eventual dissolution of the Rana Regime changed the political identity of Nepal, which would have implications for the policies it chose given the change in political ideology. The democratization process also showcases the agency of the buffer state; despite being able to open up diplomatic channels with China, Nepal under the Rana Regime refused to do so despite existential threats to the regime.

III.  1951–60: Nepal’s First Democratic Experience In the aftermath of the Delhi Compromise, the new Nepali Government reflected the accommodation between the Rana Regime and the NC. On February 15, 1951, King Tribhuvan returned to Nepal, heralding a new political reality for Nepal. However, the Ranas maintained influence in Nepal’s political and economic sectors, despite the end of their regime. As a result, the NC sought support from King Tribhuvan to counteract the influence of the Ranas.24 As such, the new democratic Government in Nepal under PM Matrika Prasad Koirala contended to establish itself as a stable political force in the country. As for Nepal’s foreign policy, India continued to exercise extensive influence in Nepal, helping the country build up its bureaucracy and also guiding its foreign policy.25 Authors such as Leo E. Rose even argue that to talk about Nepali foreign policy in the aftermath of the 1950–1951 revolution against the Ranas was

Timeframe I 61 redundant as the influence of India was so extensively pervasive.26 He further adds that resentment toward India’s preponderance was further exacerbated due to the appointment of Indian citizens to top positions in the nascent bureaucratic order of Nepal, which had remained a largely semi-feudal society before the end of the Rana Regime. For example, the first attorney-general of Nepal was an Indian citizen.27 Nepal’s international relations were conducted through India; New Delhi represented Nepal in major international forums, and major foreign policy decisions had to be consulted with India before any actions were taken.28 Overall, the resentment toward India’s dominance in a post-Rana Regime Nepal had gradually increased among Nepali political elites and general populace alike. It did not help that the Indian Ambassador to Nepal since 1949, C.P.N. Singh, was known to pit Nepali politicians against one another and became infamous for maintaining extensive influence in the country.29 The presence of Indian military advisers to help train the Nepali armed forces and the Indian Military Liaision Group along Nepal’s northern border with the PRC had also raised eyebrows about its implications for Nepali sovereignty.30 The military had also expressed dissatisfaction as the reorganization and training of the Nepali army included a reduction of the number of personnel from 25,000 to 6,000 men.31 The presence of Indian military advisers beyond the agreed one-year term also contributed to the resentment. Domestic changes in Nepal also had widespread implications for Indo-Nepali relations. The opening up of Nepal’s political space led to the creation of over 30 political parties, including those with communist leanings such as the Communist Party of Nepal. In 1952, Nepali officials found 14 individuals on Nepal’s northern border who had been in regular contact with communist groups in China.32 Some communists within Nepal had characterized the Delhi Compromise as a direct compromise of Nepal’s sovereignty, claiming that Nepal had effectively become a satellite and a colony of India as well as the “Anglo-American imperialists.”33 The Cold War dimension was an inherent part of Nepal’s political transition to a democracy. India’s concerns about China’s links to Nepali political parties also extensively influenced New Delhi’s policies toward Kathmandu. Growing American interests in Nepal were a major concern for New Delhi as well; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had connections to the Tibetan Khampa Warriors who had led an armed resistance against the PRC from Nepal’s Mustang region. As such, Nepal refrained from establishing diplomatic ties with China as the influence of the communist parties remained limited and the NC continued to dominate the political landscape along with its pro-India stance. The Nepali political landscape remained tumultuous in the early 1950s, resulting in unstable civilian government control. The armed forces of Nepal continued to remain loyal to King Tribhuvan, further creating a certain level of distrust of the monarchy among Nepal’s political parties. As such, the first democratic experience in Nepal was marred by political differences internally, extensive influence from New Delhi, and a growing resentment of such preponderance from India. Despite budding resentments, Nepal continued to heed India’s security interests and rebuffed any attempts by the PRC to establish diplomatic ties. However, in 1953, China proposed a new official approach to its ties with its neighbors, aptly

62  Timeframe I named the Panchasheel Agreement (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence). The agreement was driven by China’s interest in weakening Tibet’s strong economic ties with Nepal and India.34 It emphasized the principles of “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.”35 These principles became preamble to the Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet Region, which officially affirmed India’s recognition of Tibet as an inherent part of the PRC; this agreement was signed on April 29, 1954.36 The agreement entailed handing over Indian Government installations in Tibet to the PRC, along with mutual trade facilities.37 Nepal saw an opportunity to foster closer ties with China, but the idea of diplomatic recognition was shot down by India; Nehru in April 1954 expressed that “Nepal should coordinates its foreign policy with India,” signaling unwillingness to share the preponderance it maintained within the country.38 However, Nehru’s public rhetoric on the matter underwent change after his official state visit to China in October 1954. On the matter of Sino-Nepali relations, Nehru opined “that is a matter which the Nepalese Government no doubt will deal with in its own way.”39 From Nehru’s perspective, he had received ample assurance that Nepal would remain within the sphere of India, without any overtures from the PRC.40 The buffer system in this instance showed signs of extensive change as the relations with China had increasingly been normalized by Nehru; the prudence of Nehru’s policy toward the PRC during this period is contentious as some consider it a blunder to acquiesce to Chinese interest, which eventually led to the 1962 border war between the two states.41 Nevertheless, in the fall session of the National People’s Congress in China in 1954, Premier Zhou Enlai announced efforts to “normalize” relations with Nepal and forgo any irredentist claims on the country.42 This paved the way for Nepal to establish ties with the PRC, which was completed on August 1, 1955, wherein Nepal and China agreed to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Nepal’s agreement to recognize Tibet as an integral part of the PRC.43 However, India was still not fully out of the picture as the Nepali and Chinese Ambassadors accredited to New Delhi would serve as the Ambassadors for China and Nepal, respectively. This signaled a major shift in the buffer system, as China was now fully acknowledged by the other two states within it as a viable and recognized political actor, which is a stark departure from the previous critical junctures. The buffer system underwent further extensive changes after the death of King Tribhuvan on March 13, 1955. His son, King Mahendra, ascended to the throne. Unlike his father, King Mahendra represented a different outlook on Nepal’s foreign policy; he wanted to stress Nepal’s independence, which entailed strong efforts to internationalize the country’s diplomatic relations as well as its status in the world. One of the first major decisions he made was to appoint Tanka Prasad Acharya as prime minister in 1956; Acharya was known to have expressed antiIndia sentiments and was a self-proclaimed leftist.44 His reign also finally led to the formal establishment of diplomatic ties between Nepal and the PRC in September 1956 following the signing of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1955. King Mahendra increasingly perceived China as a viable counterweight

Timeframe I  63 to India’s preponderance in Nepal.45 Thus, Nepal’s status as a buffer state increasingly evolved as China had now established itself as a buffered state that maintained diplomatic ties with the buffer state and the other buffered state, India. King Mahendra also spearheaded Nepal’s admission to the United Nations (UN), which reaffirmed his commitment to maintaining Nepal’s autonomy in international relations. The admission to the UN would also ensure that Nepal maintained its status as an independent state given the precariousness of small states, specifically for those between much larger contending powers. When King Mahendra came to power in 1955, Nepal had diplomatic ties with only five states; by 1959, that number had risen to 24 and reached 33 by the time of his death in 1972.46 Nepal’s first democratic experience was marred with political infighting and issues tied to the monarch’s power. It coincided with growing resentment toward India’s preponderance and the opening of new avenues to establish diplomatic ties, including the PRC. The major political event of this critical juncture is Nepal’s democratization, which was supported extensively by India. This led to a new notion of Nepal’s political space and also growing rhetoric within the country that India had excessive influence. While this ideational change vis-à-vis India’s role in a democratic Nepal was measured under King Tribhuvan as Nepal refrained from forming ties with China despite its overtures, King Mahendra drastically changed the role of Nepal within this buffer system. The governments under King Tribhuvan had largely continued to focus on Nepal’s “special relationship” with India; King Mahendra offered a new notion of Nepali foreign policy that was independent, drastically changing its diplomatic ties. As such, the first democratic experience of Nepal is characterized by a gradual ideational change away from a “special relationship” with India that was dominant in the first two critical junctures due to the threats from the PRC, with a drastic shift under King Mahendra who pushed for extensive policy changes to ensure and promote Nepal’s agency. It is clear that the dynamism in relations between India and China in Nepal began at this critical juncture after the Panchasheel Agreement between the two and the establishment of Sino-Nepali diplomatic ties. The strategic utility of Nepal continued to remain important for India as China had now entered the geopolitical space as a legitimate power. India was aware of the increasing resentment within Nepal; nevertheless, Nehru’s considerations vis-à-vis normalization of ties with China overshadowed the growing restlessness among Nepali political elites regarding New Delhi’s role in the country’s politics. Thus, the implications of the normalization of Sino-Indian ties sent a signal to Nepal that moving forward with ties with China was acceptable to New Delhi. This was only possible after Nehru insisted to the Chinese that Nepal was indeed within its sphere of influence, a point that Beijing neither acknowledged nor rejected. As such, the dynamism of competitive interactions was de facto established during this critical juncture and also signaled the strategic importance of Nepal for both India and China. India wanted to continue its “special relationship” with Nepal and ensure it remains within its security umbrella. On the other hand, China was also aware of the resentment within Nepal and sought to act to increase its presence in the country. Coupled with this motivation, China wanted to stabilize Tibet,

64  Timeframe I which remained tumultuous as showcased by the 1959 failed uprising and the subsequent departure of the Dalai Lama to India. Furthermore, upward of 20,000 Tibetan refugees fled to Nepal, making it the destination for the second largest community of Tibetans outside the PRC.47 Tibetan groups outside the PRC would continue to be a major concern for Beijing as these groups actively engaged in public discourses about the plight of Tibetan people and culture under the PRC; thus, the Tibetan refugees would later emerge as a major aspect of China’s policy toward Nepal, specifically since its democratization in 1990.48 Thus, this critical juncture signals the beginning of a dynamic and competitive Sino-Indian interaction within the buffer state of Nepal. As for the agency of the buffer state, Nepal had so far projected itself as a state firmly within India’s sphere of influence. During this critical juncture period, Nepal began with the same role for the country, but internal grievances tied to India’s preponderance in the country had developed across political elites and the citizenry. Successive governments under King Tribhuvan remained loyal to the “special relationship” with India despite these grievances. However, the succession of King Mahendra showcases that internal political elites and their perceptions matter in how they conceptualize the role of the state; under him, Nepal asserted its agency as an independent actor and sought to carve out a specific status for itself in the international community. Furthermore, King Mahendra also sought to reduce India’s influence by forging closer ties with China and other states in the international system, as evidenced by his activism in increasing Nepal’s diplomatic relations and spearheading its admission to the UN. Overall, this critical juncture illustrates the importance of the agency of the buffer state. Nepal’s concerted efforts to internationalize interactions with the outside world and the specific context that existed due to India and China’s normalization of relations led to the evolution of the CIN buffer system. The buffer system transitioned from India’s attempts at keeping China at bay in Nepal to one where China could now interact with Nepal and challenge India’s preponderance in the buffer state.

IV. 1960: King Mahendra’s Seizure of Power and Diplomatic Internationalization Efforts After King Mahendra’s ascension to the throne in 1955, his influence over the politics of Nepal was evident. His internationalization of Nepal’s diplomatic ties, including pushing for ties with the PRC and the country’s ascension to the UN, were reflections of his emphasis on Nepal’s sovereignty that had increasingly come under pressure since the 1951 Treaty with India. King Mahendra heavily influenced the democratic governments of the country and exercised much greater political control than his father, King Tribhuvan. However, Mahendra sought greater control over the polity and finally dismissed the democratically elected government on December 16, 1960. He eventually disbanded the multiparty parliamentary system and declared himself absolute monarch, signaling the end of Nepal’s first democratic experience.49 He perceived the democratic system

Timeframe I  65 of government inefficient and ill-equipped to deal with the precarious geopolitical situation that Nepal was situated in. As already stated, King Mahendra was the architect of Nepal’s independent foreign policy that sought to shun overdependence on India and assert its agency as a sovereign state.50 The logic behind the push for Nepal’s membership in the UN was to affirm its sovereignty. Being part of the UN and maintaining extensive international ties affirmed this status. By the time of his death, King Mahendra had successfully established diplomatic ties with 33 states.51 Nepal had also joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), signaling no commitment to either the United States or Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War.52 King Mahendra also proceeded to forge close ties with Pakistan, which had tumultuous relations with India over Kashmir. In 1961, he became the first head of state/government from Nepal to visit Pakistan; diplomatic ties had been established a year earlier in 1960.53 Apart from internationalization efforts, King Mahendra sought closer ties with China. Even before King Mahendra’s usurpation of power, China agreed to establish a Joint Boundary Committee to resolve border disputes with Nepal.54 A year prior in 1959, China had started amassing troops in Tibet along the border with Nepal and published maps showing parts of Nepali territory under China, including the entirety of Mount Everest.55 However, to diffuse further escalation of strains in ties, Beijing and Kathmandu agreed to resolve these border disputes. The Joint Boundary Committee finally resolved all border disputes between the two states, which included affirmation of Mount Everest belonging to both.56 In 1960, Nepal also signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China, which reaffirmed the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence firmly committing Nepal to the One-China Policy.57 Under King Mahendra’s tutelage, Nepal had started showcasing overtures toward China. The most drastic decision within this buffer system was the 1961 decision by King Mahendra to allow the construction of a highway linking Nepal and China, the first of its kind. The 104-kilometer highway linking Nepal’s capital Kathmandu to the town of Kodari on China’s border would be the first major infrastructure project linking the two countries. Aptly named the Araniko Highway after the 13th-century Nepali artist who served as a court artisan for Emperor Kublai Khan, the road would allow Nepal to trade with China and not exclusively rely on India.58 Under this agreement, China would provide monetary aid of £3.5 million along with experts, technicians, and equipment.59 From the perspective of Nepal under King Mahendra, the demarcation of borders with China and the establishment of road links were welcome developments as bulwarks against Indian preponderance in the county. Rose (1971) even argues that the road would be “a means by which past glories and profits could be recaptured,” referring to the Kathmandu Valley’s importance in the historic trade route between India and Tibet which had significantly reduced importance following the opening up of trade routes through Sikkim in 1905.60 India’s reactions to the developments in Nepal since the 1960 royal coup were those of concern. The democratic governments under the NC had largely been

66  Timeframe I perceived to be pro-India given its historic ties to India’s independence movements. Although King Tribhuvan had also espoused a very pro-India sentiment, as showcased by him seeking asylum in the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu, King Mahendra’s strident emphasis on Nepal’s independence and sovereignty meant the “special relationship” with India did not always figure prominently in his visions for Nepal. Despite differences with the democratic government under B.P. Koirala in Nepal, Nehru publicly denounced the royal coup as a setback to democracy and a complete reversal of the democratic process.61 The Indian media and politicians were also highly critical of the coup, criticizing it for doing away with representative democracy. The common democratic credentials between India and Nepal, which also gave New Delhi extensive influence in Nepali politics through the NC, had given way to King Mahendra’s strong-willed approach to foreign policy that emphasized its agency. For India, this meant that the buffer state was now not firmly within its sphere as it had been since 1947; Nepal was now affirming its agency by forging ties with the rest of the world (including China and Pakistan with which India had tense relations). Despite these developments in Nepal, India did not adopt a hardline approach toward King Mahendra’s regime; it could be speculated that any strong overtures would further push Nepal toward China.62 The 1961 agreement to build the Araniko Highway, however, evoked strong reactions from New Delhi. Nehru expressed that “India’s security interests would be adversely affected by the road.”63 The fear of a direct highway linking China to Nepal’s capital was a major concern for India as Nepal and India had open borders; the relative ease of movement of soldiers became a major concern. While King Mahendra seemed increasingly belligerent vis-à-vis India, his regime was cognizant of Nepal’s dependence on India. The buffer state for India had increasingly sought to move past New Delhi’s preponderance and toward a more independent foreign policy. The 1960 Treaty between Nepal and China signaled this, but the 1961 agreement to a highway between the two confirmed the emerging Sino-India overtures in Nepal, which had increasingly taken a competitive turn. Nepal’s action implies that it preferred not to be under the preponderance of one of its buffered states by forging ties with both. China had increasingly perceived Nepal’s importance for its own security interests in Tibet, which remained restive after its incorporation into the PRC. Beijing remained committed to supporting any government that came to power in Nepal as it did not have democratic affinities like India. As such, the royal coup of 1960 was met with “business as usual” from China’s side; in fact, the strong independent-minded King Mahendra was perhaps a segue into Nepal, as envisioned by Beijing’s willingness to settle its border disputes with Nepal. Particularly with regards to Mount Everest, which China had claimed entirely, Beijing sought to compromise and settle on it to be the demarcation of boundary between Nepal and China. Such a compromise, according to Beijing’s strategic calculations, would ensure a more favorable balance of power for China within Nepal, specifically since India had grown considerably close to the Soviet Union (with which China had tense relations) and heightened actions of the United States in South Asia.64 Furthermore, in Beijing’s perspective, a more stridently independent Nepal was

Timeframe I  67 important to reduce Indian influence in the country; a more prosperous and stable Nepal would be in China’s geopolitical interests.65 As China remained unfazed by the changing dynamics within Nepal, the Araniko Highway plan was the perfect means to consolidate Beijing’s geopolitical interests in Nepal. However, there are conflicting perspectives on how this agreement came about. One account states that the draft agreement was a “surprise” during King Mahendra’s visit to China as a pressure tactic by Beijing; the other perspective states that both sides had preplanned the agreement but wanted to keep it low-key to not ruffle India’s feathers prematurely.66 The end result was that the road would be constructed. For China, the road was a means of strengthening ties with Nepal while also signaling to India that the buffer system now had a contending buffered state competing for influence in the buffer state. The Araniko Highway project was also reflective of China’s domestic interests. First, China had extensive security concerns in Tibet; its hold on the region remained precarious and Beijing feared that Nepal would be used as a base for launching anti-Chinese activities into Tibet. These concerns were exacerbated when the John F. Kennedy administration further concentrated its efforts to spruce up Khampa rebels located in the Mustang district of Nepal by aiding them through the CIA. Touting close ties between Mustang and Tibet, the Khampa rebels sought to use guerrilla tactics to frustrate the PLA in the region. Since 1958, the CIA has trained such warriors at Camp Hale in Colorado, USA, and has routinely provided them with material assistance.67 For China, the road would better consolidate its ties with Nepal while also providing open logistical possibilities for keeping tabs on the Khampa rebels. Beijing needed cordial ties with Nepal to ensure its cooperation in dealing with the rebels and spruce up security in Tibet. Second, India had de facto put a blockade on Chinese forces in Tibet; Nepal, ascertaining the sensitivities toward New Delhi, had done the same without any formal declarations. This list included strategic goods including cement, petrol, kerosene, and coal.68 Ascertaining sensitivities toward India, Nepal on its own volition also curbed exports of Indian manufactured goods to Tibet. However, the ban did not include non-prohibited goods exported to Nepal from third countries. As such, the Araniko Highway could be a conduit for resupplying the armed forces in Tibet.69 Thus, China also had domestic political considerations as it proposed the Araniko Highway project to Nepal. King Mahendra’s rule can be characterized as a major political event that signaled a change in Nepal’s conception of itself as well as its relations with the buffered states and other states in the international system. It sparked India’s concerns about the increasingly unpopular “special relationship” with Nepal and the Nepali political leadership that sought to diversify its external relations. The 1960 royal coup was a major political event in the CIN buffer system as the idea of Nepal as a buffer state with a “special relationship” became undermined by King Mahendra who emphasized Nepal’s sovereignty and autonomy in international relations. Thus, his rule sparked an ideational change insofar as Nepal’s ruling elites now sought to internationalize its presence and check Indian preponderance. As such, there were numerous policy changes as King Mahendra spearheaded establishing diplomatic ties with extraregional states and also heavily encouraged

68  Timeframe I Nepal’s accession into the UN. Furthermore, he sought concrete ties with China, which resulted in the signing of the 1960 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the two countries and the agreement for the construction of the Araniko Highway linking the two countries in 1961. These policies signal a departure from the very carefully crafted foreign policy of Nepal wherein India had extensive influence and room for negotiation. King Mahendra’s royal coup is a critical juncture in the buffer system as it unbounded Nepal’s India-faced buffer role and led to an ideational change to a more agency-driven foreign policy. The buffer system, which had seen limited Chinese engagements due to the special relations between India and Nepal, now incorporated China’s interests that competed with India’s in the buffer state of Nepal. While Nepal’s first democratic experience signaled the normalization of relations and the beginning of China’s entry as a dynamic and competitive player in the buffer system, King Mahendra’s direct rule consolidated the competitive dynamism between India and China within Nepal. The critical juncture characterized by King Mahendra’s royal coup elevated Nepal’s strategic utility for both India and China. The previous critical juncture of Nepal’s first democratic experience had signaled the preponderance of IndoNepali special relations. King Mahendra’s rule was the concrete first step in the undermining of India’s exclusive influence in Nepal. As such, India’s concerns were an increasingly independent Nepali foreign policy that could undermine Indian interests. New Delhi’s concerns were validated by the 1961 agreement to construct the Araniko Highway. Thus, Nepal’s strategic utility as a buffer state was immensely important in this context, but New Delhi also increasingly ascertained that China’s overtures in Nepal had been initiated and were here to stay. As such, Nepal continued to be of strategic importance to India as a highway from China to Nepal undermined India’s security interests due to the open border between India and Nepal. The establishment of Nepal as a buffer state that is characterized by dynamic overtures between the buffered states was affirmed as India was very measured in its interactions with King Mahendra’s coup despite the strong support among Indian political elites for democracy in Nepal. While expressing concerns, Nehru also did not strongly react to the Araniko Highway agreement; these policies from India showcase that New Delhi was concerned about driving Nepal toward China by pressuring the ruling Nepali elites and instead emphasized how to maintain as much influence in the country as possible. For China, the strategic utility of Nepal is tied to its contiguity with Tibet. Nepal shared an extensive border with the TAR, which was not fully demarcated. China’s decision to forgo the inclusion of Mount Everest within its borders during the Joint Boundary Committee in 1960 highlighted the increasing importance Nepal had for China; fostering goodwill and garnering political currency were important if Beijing wanted to make inroads into Nepal. Furthermore, its handsoff reaction to the 1960 royal coup also showcases the Chinese side’s efforts to foster cordial relations despite the type of government in Nepal. The presence of Tibetan Khampa rebels in Nepal and the covert American and Indian support for them also figured significantly with regard to Nepal’s strategic utility for China. As such, China sought to foster goodwill with Nepal to stabilize Tibet. However,

Timeframe I  69 King Mahendra’s strong emphasis on sovereignty of Nepal also provided China the opportunity to maintain some semblance of influence within Nepal, which was denied to it before due to India’s preponderance in the country. The Araniko Highway project, on the other hand, was of strategic value to potentially provide alternative supply routes to Chinese forces in Tibet. The road also consolidated China’s increasingly important role in Nepal and the willingness of Beijing to make strategic overtures to Kathmandu and check New Delhi’s foreign policy formidability. The lack of a strong official backlash from New Delhi indicated to Beijing that it could further press into Nepal, and as a result, this critical juncture signaled the end of an India-centered buffer system to one wherein both India and China increasingly contended for influence. This critical juncture showcases a strong emphasis on the agency of the buffer state. King Mahendra’s foreign policy approach, despite heavily relying on India economically, showcases his maneuvering of the precarious geopolitical context with astute resolve and cunningness. He staged a coup despite reservations from India, knowing full well that any concrete action from India would push Nepal toward China, as Beijing had increasingly signaled its overtures toward Nepal as highlighted in the previous critical juncture, 1951–1960: Nepal’s First Democratic Experience. The entry of Nepal into the UN and its diplomatic internalization were also the characteristics emphasizing the country’s agency despite its limited strategic options within the buffer system. King Mahendra understood the reservations India had about growing ties between Nepal and China; nevertheless, he pushed for the 1960 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Nepal and China as well as the Araniko Highway project. However, King Mahendra was cognizant of India’s security concerns; Nepal voluntarily prevented the export of strategic supplies from its territory to Chinese garrisons in Tibet. Nepal’s decisions under King Mahendra did showcase extensive use of its agency as a sovereign state, yet its buffer status entails limitations as this example illustrates. The other case where Nepal showcased a measured policy approach was the route of the Araniko Highway; the Chinese survey teams identified two possible routes: one through Rasuwa-Gadi and the other through Kodari.70 Despite the former being 20 kilometers shorter and having much better terrain, Nepal insisted on the latter. Thus, despite the fact that Nepal had increasingly sought to reduce India’s preponderance in the country, it had at the same time also used the same agency to ensure that it did not push New Delhi beyond its limits. Thus, the agency of the buffer state in this instance is one of self-imposed restraint as a course of the most rational policy choice. While pushing back on Indian preponderance by stronger links with China, Nepal still used nuances such as aligning with India on its blockade on strategic supplies to Chinese forces in Tibet and the choice for a longer highway route between China and Nepal to signal to India that Kathmandu still heeded its concerns albeit not as much as the previous critical junctures. These policies under King Mahendra showcase the limits to the agency of buffer states within the buffer system and a self-realization on the buffer state’s part that its agency is best utilized when the contending interests of the buffered states are acknowledged.

70  Timeframe I

V.  Conclusion Timeframe I included critical junctures that characterized the buffer system within the early years of the Republic of India and the PRC. The first two critical junctures, as illustrated in Table 4.1, showcased that the strategic utility of the buffer state Nepal is one wherein India maintained preponderance as a continuation of its role imagined under the British Empire. The changing political map in the region, specifically the incorporation of Tibet into the PRC, highlighted the importance of Nepal and the other Himalayan kingdoms as buffer states against the PRC’s expansion. India continued to preemptively deny any Chinese influence in Nepal through the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and then in the second critical juncture by strengthening and facilitating Nepal’s democratization. A democratic Nepal under the NC would remain pro-India and would not allow China to foster a stronghold in the country. However, the third critical juncture, 1951–1960: Nepal’s First Democratic Experience, is characterized by the growing resentment toward India’s preponderance, which New Delhi sought to placate by allowing Nepal to forge diplomatic ties with China. The strategic utility of Nepal was the same for India as it served as a natural buffer state against China; however, India increasingly showcased that it was cognizant of the possibility of Nepal becoming a dynamic political space where Chinese interests could challenge those of India. These concerns became reality in the next critical juncture, 1960: King Mahendra’s Seizure of Power & Diplomatic Internationalization Efforts, wherein King Mahendra staged a royal coup. India continued to foster close ties with Nepal and keep it within its security umbrella by forgoing drastic policies even when Nepal signed the 1960 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China and also agreed to the construction of the Araniko Highway. This fourth critical juncture under Timeframe I signals that the preemptive moves by India to deny China influence in Nepal could not hold as the old geographic concepts of buffer states had been eroded with the advent of technology in communications and transportation. As such, the dynamic space approach toward the buffer state is instrumental in understanding the evolution of strategic utility of the buffer states (i.e., Nepal) for its two buffered neighbors. The fourth critical juncture showcases the arrival of this dynamic space concept wherein India’s preponderance would be challenged in a dynamic “tug of war” between Indian and Chinese actions and reactions vis-à-vis Nepal. As shown in Table 4.1, China’s strategic utility of the buffer state Nepal was also mostly geographic, at least initially. Nepal served as a geographic discontinuity from India as it prevented direct contact between the two neighbors in large stretches across the Himalayan mountain range. Due to India’s preponderance in Nepal and the concerted efforts New Delhi took to ensure China did not garner a foothold, the limited geographic concept remained acceptable for China. As a result, not many overtures from China toward Nepal are to be found in the first and second critical junctures. However, the third and fourth critical junctures illustrated increased Chinese interest in engaging with Nepal, and in the fourth one, it was characterized by efforts to erode India’s influence in the country. As

Timeframe I  71 Table 4.1  Applying the New Buffer State Concept to Timeframe I Critical Juncture

Strategic Utility of the Buffer State

Agency of the Buffer State

Tibet’s inclusion into the PRC (1950)

• India: Preponderant buffered state • China: Arrival as a modern buffered state • India: Maintenance of preponderance in Nepal preemptively denying China political influence • China: Uninvolved buffered state • India: Normalization of ties with the PRC but sought guarantee for Nepal’s status as a state within its security sphere • China: Normalization of ties with both India and Nepal; relinquished Qing era claim and focused on bilateral ties; importance of Nepal as a crucial state for stability in Tibet

• Forged closer ties to India due to fears of China’s intentions

Movement against the Rana Regime in Nepal (1951)

Nepal’s first democratic experience (1951–1960)

King Mahendra’s seizure of power and diplomatic internationalization efforts (1960)

• India: Realization of increased Chinese presence in Nepal; sought to accommodate King Mahendra’s direct rule to not push Nepal toward China • China: Stability for Tibet; importance of Nepal to curb antiChinese activities; measure Indian responses as Beijing pushed into Nepal

• Nepal’s refusal to open diplomatic channels with China despite the window of opportunity • Due to extensive Indian preponderance, Nepal established diplomatic ties with China as soon as India’s normalization of relations with it. Under King Mahendra, Nepal joined the UN and increased its diplomatic presence to assert its sovereignty but India still heavily influenced its foreign policy • Extensive diplomatic ties since King Mahendra’s ascension to throne; entry into the UN; extension of ties to China despite concerns from India; self-imposed limitations to appease India

India normalized ties with China in 1954, it also paved the way for Nepal to do the same. Fearing that the growing anti-Indian sentiments would be exacerbated further, Nehru greenlit Nepal’s effort to open diplomatic ties with the PRC. The third juncture showcases increased Chinese eagerness to expand political currency with Nepal by forgoing any historical claims to the country. In the fourth critical juncture of Timeframe I, China finally presents itself as a dynamic buffered state in the buffer system by outmaneuvering Nepal and India by offering the Araniko

72  Timeframe I Highway project. Overall, the strategic utility of Nepal as a buffer state for China has evolved from the historical geographic buffer, imposed largely due to preemptive Indian actions, to that of an increasingly apt player in the buffer system. The agency of Nepal within the critical junctures presented in Timeframe I is quintessential for understanding the dynamics of the buffer system as a whole. Nepal was not merely a small buffer state at the whims of policies made by India and China. In the first critical juncture, Nepal signed the 1950 Treaty with India as a guarantee of its sovereignty due to the recent incorporation of Tibet into the PRC. It was a conscious decision for the state’s survival, which was congruent with India’s interests vis-à-vis the Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim. Cognizant of its extensive reliance on India, Nepal continued to thwart attempts by Beijing to establish diplomatic ties, as illustrated in the second critical juncture of Timeframe I. Nepal’s agency, of course, is not merely a reflection of its geopolitical context but also the perceptions and interests of its ruling elites. The third critical juncture shows that King Mahendra conceptualized the agency of Nepal away from that of an India-centered buffer state that served as a geographic buffer for China to one wherein Nepal could make independent foreign policy choices. The diplomatic internationalization efforts, successful membership in the UN, and increased ties with China and Pakistan signal this affirmation of agency rooted in sovereignty and independence. Yet, it was the fourth critical juncture within this timeframe that fully consolidated the dynamic political space concept of Nepal’s buffer status. Nepal under King Mahendra increasingly sought to check Indian influence by forging closer ties with China, which was eager for closer ties with Nepal because of its own interests in Tibet. However, even within the stridently independent reign under King Mahendra, Nepal had self-imposed restraints such as policy congruence complementing India’s blockade of strategic goods to Chinese forces in Tibet and opting for a longer and topographically more challenging road linking Nepal and China. Thus, the buffer state Nepal exercises varying degrees of its agency throughout the critical junctures discussed in Timeframe I. Yet, the agency is highly contingent on the varying degrees of interactions between the buffered states; Nepal remained cognizant of India’s security interests (albeit in varying degrees) despite extensive agency in the third and fourth critical junctures. Nevertheless, these critical junctures showcase an evolving buffer system that emphasizes contending interests in the buffer state while also centering the importance of its agency.

Notes 1 Xiaoyuan Liu, To the End of Revolution: The Chinese Communist Party and Tibet, 1949–1959 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 8. 2 Ibid., 45. 3 Ibid., 56, 4 Steven Hoffman, “Rethinking the Linkage between Tibet and the China-India Border Conflict,” Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. 2 (2006): 177. 5 Rajiv Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 2 (2011): 57.

Timeframe I  73 6 “Peace or War” in Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches: Volume Two (August  1949February  1953) (New Delhi: Publications Division: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1963), 256–257. 7 “Bhutan and India: Evolving Ties in Changing Times Part 2,” The Bhutanese, June 13, 2022, https://thebhutanese.bt/bhutan-and-india-evolving-ties-in-changing-times-part-2/ 8 George K. Tanham, “Indian Strategic Culture,” The Washington Quarterly 15, no. 1 (1992): 133. 9 Suhasini Haidar, “History, the Standoff, and Policy Worth Rereading,” The Hindu, June 18, 2020, www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/history-the-stand-off-and-policy-worthrereading/article31854822.ece 10 Girilal Jain, India Meets China in Nepal (Mumbai: Asia Publishing House, 1959), 108. 11 Sanjay Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India (New York: Routledge, 2012), 69. 12 “Treaty of Peace and Friendship,” Ministry of External Affairs – Government of India, July  31, 1950, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6295/Treaty+of+Peace +and+Friendship 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 T. Louise Brown, The Challenge to Democracy in Nepal (New York: Routledge, 1996), 17. 16 For more details on the Rana Regime in Nepal, see Chapter 3. 17 Leo E. Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1971), 183. 18 Ibid., 189. 19 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 70. 20 Ibid., 70; Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 191. 21 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 72. 22 “Nepal: Robin Hood of the Himalayas,” Time, August  5, 1957, http://content.time. com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,867789-1,00.html 23 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 71. 24 Brown, The Challenge to Democracy in Nepal, 24. 25 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 72. 26 Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 195. 27 Ibid., 198. 28 Leo E. Rose and Roger Dial, “Can a Ministate Find True Happiness in a World Dominated by Protagonist Powers?: The Case of Nepal,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 386, no. 1 (1969). 29 Zahir Suhrwardy, “India’s Relations with Nepal,” Pakistan Horizon 49, no. 1 (1996): 40. 30 Deeptima Shukla, “India-Nepal Relations: Problems and Prospects,” The Indian Journal of Political Science 67, no. 2 (2006): 361; Werner Levi, “Nepal in World Politics,” Pacific Affairs 30, no. 3 (1957): 239. 31 Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 197. 32 Werner Levi, “Government and Politics in Nepal: II,” Far Eastern Survey 22, no. 1 (1953): 7. 33 Ibid. 34 Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” 60. 35 “Build a New International Order on the Basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs – People’s Republic of China, 1953, www.mfa. gov.cn/ce/cein//eng/ssygd/fiveprinciple/t82103.htm 36 “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet Region,” Ministry of External Affairs – Government of India, April 29, 1954, www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents. htm?dtl/7807/Agreement+on+Trade+and+Intercourse+with+Tibet+Region 37 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 73. 38 Rishikesh Shaha, Modern Nepal: A  Political History, 1769–1955, Volume 1 (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1990).

74  Timeframe I 39 Jain, India Meets China in Nepal, 112. 40 Rose and Dial, “Can a Ministate Find True Happiness in a World Dominated by Protagonist Powers?” 92. 41 Avtar Singh Bhasin, “How PM Nehru Mishandled China,” The Hindustan Times, July  11, 2021, www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/how-pm-nehru-mishandledchina-101626017738446.html 42 Levi, “Nepal in World Politics,” 243. 43 Ibid., 244. 44 Rose and Dial, “Can a Ministate Find True Happiness in a World Dominated by Protagonist Powers?” 92. 45 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 74. 46 Rose and Dial, “Can a Ministate Find True Happiness in a World Dominated by Protagonist Powers?” 96. 47 Arun Kumar Sahu “Future of India-Nepal Relations: Is China a Factor?” Strategic Analysis 39, no. 2 (2015): 197 48 Bibek Chand and Lukas K. Danner, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Border Minorities in China’s Foreign Relations with South Asia,” Journal of Borderlands Studies 34, no. 3 (2019): 12. 49 Pramod K. Kantha, “India’s Troubled Relations with Kathmandu: Nepal’s Republican Turn and the China Factor,” Journal of Global South Studies 38, no. 2 (2021): 319. 50 Gopal Khanal, “Foreign Policy of Nepal: Continuity and Changes,” Journal of APF Command and Staff College 2, no. 1 (2019): 99. 51 “Bilateral Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Government of Nepal, November 21, 2020, https://mofa.gov.np/foreign-policy/bilateral-relation/ 52 Khanal, “Foreign Policy of Nepal,” 99. 53 Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 237. 54 Manish Dabhade and Harsh V. Pant, “Coping with Challenges to Sovereignty: SinoIndian Rivalry and Nepal’s Foreign Policy,” Contemporary South Asia 13, no. 2 (2004): 161. 55 Ibid. 56 “China-Nepal Boundary,” Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research – Department of State, The United States of America, May 30, 1965, http:// library.law.fsu.edu/Digital-Collections/LimitsinSeas/pdf/ibs050.pdf 57 Binoj Basnyat, “A New Hope,” The Kathmandu Post, June 21, 2022, https://kathmandupost.com/opinion/2018/06/13/a-new-hope-20180613075158 58 Monalisa Adhikari, “Between the Dragon and the Elephant: Nepal’s Neutrality Conundrum,” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs 25, no. 1–2 (2012): 85. 59 Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 240. 60 Ibid., 241. 61 Ibid., 233–234. 62 Kantha, “India’s Troubled Relations with Kathmandu,” 321. 63 Adhikari, “Between the Dragon and the Elephant,” 64 Eric Hyer, The Pragmatic Dragon: China’s Grand Strategy and Boundary Settlements (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2015), 94. 65 Ibid., 93. 66 Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 239. 67 Prem Singh Basnyat, “A  Forgotten History,” MyRepublica, June  22, 2019, https:// myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/a-forgotten-history/ 68 Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 242. 69 Ibid., Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 88. 70 Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, 242.

5 Timeframe II Critical Junctures 1962–90

Timeframe II includes major events between 1962 and 1990 that either directly impacted the entire buffer system or had a significant impact in one (or more) of the states in the buffer system that had implications for the system as a whole. The year 1962 is chosen for this timeframe given the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border war that affirmed the rivalry between the two countries. The cutoff point is the year 1990, which is when Nepal’s absolute monarchy ended and the second era of democratic experience began.

I.  1962: The Sino-Indian War The Sino-Indian War of 1962 was a major shock to the buffer system as it affirmed the emerging differences between the two powers. The brief border war would have long-term implications as it consolidated the rivalry between China and India. Thus, this War is pertinent for the buffer system as it formalized the contending interests of the buffered states and increased the stakes in the buffer state. The muddled rivalry had clear implications since the 1962 War as the two states affirmed their distrust of each other, and the escalation to the extent of the use of violence was concerning for the stability of the entire region. Jawaharlal Nehru’s attempts at normalization of relations with China in 1954 had given rise to the slogan of “Hindi-Chini bhai bhai” or “India and China are brothers.” This slogan coincided with the signing of the Panchsheel Agreement. The two newly emerging powers of Asia had found a common ground on antiimperialism. Nehru had stated in his meeting with Mao that “the imperialist powers still down upon us” and that the two states have an “instinctive feeling of solidarity.”1 However, each saw itself as the leader of the Third World which eventually led to them seeking to influence the newly emergent states as decolonization was in full swing. Thus, the disagreement on which state was to lead the Third World had increasingly marred relations between the two, but it remained largely ideologically motivated and had not significantly disrupted bilateral ties. The major point of conflict between India and China was over unresolved borders. The source of contention can be traced back to the Simla Conference of 1914; British India imposed the border demarcation with Tibet along the McMahon Line.2 This boundary demarcation included the Northeast Frontier Agency DOI: 10.4324/9781003178538-5

76  Timeframe II (NEFA; later renamed as Arunachal Pradesh) under British administration. China had refused to acknowledge the stipulations of the Simla Conference stating that Tibet was still under its suzerainty and as such, could not sign such agreements acting as an independent political actor. China also charged Britain of imposing an unequal treaty at a time when China was experiencing extensive internal turmoil and weakness.3 The incorporation of Tibet into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) further complicated matters as Beijing continued to refuse to accept the border demarcations stipulated by the McMahon Line and claimed Arunachal Pradesh as part of “southern Tibet,” which rightfully and historically belonged to China.4 Aksai Chin in northeastern Jammu and Kashmir was also claimed by China, declaring that it was once part of Tibet’s Zinjiang and Ngari districts.5 By 1957, China had already established military and police posts in Aksai Chin. To complicate relations further, India granted asylum to the Dalai Lama after the failed Tibetan uprising of 1959, whom Beijing claims to be a separatist.6 In Arunachal Pradesh, the town of Tawang was the site of a great monastery that was controlled by Tibet; fearing that China would move into the region, India ordered Tibetan officials to leave Tawang in 1951 after Tibet’s incorporation into the PRC.7 Overall, the border disputes figured extensively in Sino-Indian relations exacerbated by Tibet becoming part of the PRC. The disagreements over these borders set the stage for the 1962 War and the continuous contentions that followed in Sino-Indian relations. Before the outbreak of War, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had proposed that China would drop its claims on NEFA if India was willing to do the same with Aksai Chin; domestically in a precarious political position, Nehru did not agree to the proposal.8 India had also recently established military outposts along the McMahon Line, including 40 forward military positions in Ladakh.9 Eventually on October 20, 1962, Chinese PLA forces launched large-scale attacks both on the western front in Ladakh (part of the erstwhile state of Jammu & Kashmir) and the eastern front in NEFA. From the scale and astuteness of attacks by the PLA, it was deduced that the military actions were preplanned; it came as a shock for India as the PLA easily pushed into NEFA and overran the central town of Tawang.10 By November 19, 1962, the PLA had essentially pushed out Indian presence from the disputed areas but eventually declared unilateral ceasefire. In the aftermath, China now controlled Aksai Chin in the western frontier; Beijing, however, withdrew behind the McMahon Line in NEFA including the symbolically important town of Tawang.11 While Nepal remained largely untouched by the events related to this conflict, the implications for the buffer system it was a part of remained immense. China and India had formally become rivals and that rivalry was bound to externalize in the buffer state. The War came as an extensively challenging development for Nepal given its geopolitical location. First, the War was a disaster for India as the PLA essentially defeated the Indian armed forces. This led to some questions about India’s capabilities given its inability to effectively push back against China.12 Second, the swift and efficient performance of the PLA also made Nepal’s political elites nervous; survival of the state was at stake, and if a state as large as India had

Timeframe II  77 challenges dealing with the PLA, the prognosis for Nepal was bleak. Officially, Nepal declared its neutrality and called for a swift end to hostilities; King Mahendra refused to take sides and stated, “Mr. Nehru’s hair has grown grey striving for peace . . . and I know the Chinese Premier has faith in Pancha Shila.”13 The King further stated that “Nepal would not meekly submit to aggression from any quarter,” which was an implicit posturing toward China.14 A  few weeks before the beginning of hostilities by China in October 1962, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated at the first anniversary of Sino-Nepali border treaty that “in case any foreign army makes a foolhardy attempt to at Nepal . . . China will side with the Nepalese people.”15 This statement had limited impact on Nepal’s decisions to garner closer ties with India despite previous issues with New Delhi’s preponderance; the PRC’s actions in Tibet and, later on, during the Sino-Indian War had fostered concerns for Nepal’s security. In accordance with these concerns, Nepal received India’s rapprochement positively as New Delhi sought to mend ties with King Mahendra and needed Nepal to be cordial given the precariousness of the context. The reluctance in India’s acceptance of the King Mahendra’s Government and the semi-crisis in Indo-Nepali relations were to be ameliorated as India sought closer ties to Nepal by accepting the absolute rule of the king.16 Aware of the delicate geopolitical context, India sought to win King Mahendra’s support by ramping up foreign aid and becoming Nepal’s largest aid donor until the 1970s.17 Thus, Nepal during the Sino-Indian War officially maintained neutrality and also sought to reestablish close ties with India due to the efficient display of force by China, which despite assurances months prior to the War, still garnered some level of anxiety from Nepal. In this critical juncture, the outbreak of War served as the crisis that prompted changes in the roles played by the states within the buffer system. The War showcased the formidability of the PLA and the glaring weaknesses of the Indian armed forces. China now increasingly saw itself as a more formidable power than India and as such could further press New Delhi if need be. For India, the War was a devastating realization of its underpreparedness and the need to bolster its capabilities to protect its territorial integrity, let alone maintain the security umbrella within South Asia. India’s defeat in this War illustrated to China that it could further make inroads into South Asia. Within this context, Nepal’s status as a buffer state continued to be important; despite not being a central component of the conflict, both India and China had concerns of one side gaining a foothold. As Foreign Minister Chen Yi’s statement showcases, China wanted to reassure Nepal that its independence was important and Beijing would do whatever it takes to protect it. India on the other hand understood the prudence of accommodating the royal government despite its reservations about its undemocratic credentials. In a critical juncture that entailed the possibility of extensive changes in the status-quo India’s decision to foster closer ties to Nepal showcases the country’s importance for New Delhi’s security architecture and a turn toward pragmatism. As long as Nepal remained friendly to India, the buffer state would continue to serve India’s security interests. Thus, Nepal’s strategic utility for India as a buffer increased since the 1962 War; the incorporation of hard power in Sino-Indian

78  Timeframe II relations compelled India to increasingly turn to pragmatic foreign policy choices, including overlooking Nepal’s domestic political context for the security objectives of New Delhi. Given recent overtures from China toward Nepal, India’s concerns were directly tied to its defeat by China in the War. For China, the increased engagements with Nepal right before the outbreak of the 1962 conflict had already shown the limits to India’s influence in the country. The War, however, consolidated the idea that India was underprepared to protect its interests; this also signaled to China that perhaps it could also make inroads into the smaller states of South Asia, where China could press India. As such, Nepal maintained strategic utility for China as a buffer state wherein it could test India’s capabilities and foreign policy limits, specifically since Nepal was of strategic importance for India as well. The agency of the buffer state, as we discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, is limited due to its geopolitical contexts. During periods of extensive disturbances in the status-quo the agency is further constrained as Nepal illustrates during this War. Due to domestic security implications, Nepal’s neutrality was the safest bet as taking sides would have permanently damaged relations with one side over the other. The decision of neutrality also illustrates the characteristic of a buffer state which seeks to opt out of taking sides to bolster its own survival. While officially declaring neutrality, Nepal as a small buffer state also had concerns regarding China’s actions. The use of force by China to settle the border disputes and India’s swift defeat was a shock to the buffer system; Nepal’s decision to publicly declare neutrality but also positively receive India’s rapprochement is reminiscent of the critical juncture 1950–1951: Tibet’s Inclusion into the People’s Republic of China in Timeframe I when Nepal signed the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India. The threat to the buffer system itself emanated from China; as a result, the maintenance of the buffer system as well as survival of the buffer state required Nepal to balance the threat by fostering closer ties with the other buffered state, India. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that Nepal had extremely limited choices in this critical juncture due to the immense risks associated with the use of force by the buffered states.

II.  1971: Bangladesh Liberation War The emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state from Pakistan in 1971 was another major political crisis that impacted the China–India–Nepal (CIN) buffer system. The decision to partition British India into two separate entities had led to the creation of Pakistan. However, due to the concentration of Muslims in two geographically disparate regions, Pakistan existed in the form of West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan) and East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh). East Pakistan had little cultural and linguistic ties with West Pakistan, as the former largely spoke Bengali. Attempts at introducing the Arabic script, Persian words into Bengali, and imposition of Urdu as the only national language had linguistically motivated identity to take shape since 1952.18 The differences between the two parts of Pakistan, separated by over a thousand miles of Indian territory, were immense.

Timeframe II  79 The two nation theory that influenced the partition of British India and dominated the discourses surrounding it did not fully encompass the identity-related markers such as linguistic and cultural diversity.19 East Pakistan, despite being majority Muslim, was linguistically, culturally, and historically distinct; the elites and population would simply not tolerate the erasure of their identity despite sharing religious commonalities with West Pakistan. The simmering tensions between East and West Pakistan came to a major political impasse in the general elections of 1970. The Awami League (AL), under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, emerged as the single majority party in Pakistani elections; the AL had dominated East Pakistani politics at the time. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) from West Pakistan emerged as the second largest party.20 The results were a shock to the civilian and military leaders of West Pakistan, who had for long treated East Pakistan as the junior partner in the union. The refusal to hand over power to Sheikh Mujibur and the AL affirmed this notion; instead, the military leader of Pakistan, General Yahya Khan, opted for a military solution by mobilizing the army and crushing dissent in East Pakistan.21 Called Operation Searchlight, the military crackdown that began on March 26, 1971, was indiscriminate and brutal. It also effectively signaled the beginning of secession of East Pakistan; the AL leadership formed a government-in-exile in April 1971 and sought refuge in India. As for India, the Bangladesh Liberation War was an opportunity to weaken Pakistan by bifurcating it into two; it would make West Pakistan weak while also having the opportunity to have close ties to the newly emergent Bangladesh. Apart from the glaring strategic opportunity, India was facing a humanitarian crisis due to the violence in East Pakistan. The refugee numbers in the Indian states of West Bengal (7.5 million), Tripura (1.4 million), and Meghalaya (600,000) had overwhelmed their institutional capacities and started to create communal tensions.22 As such, India was presented with a strategic opportunity to strengthen its position in South Asia while also facing a humanitarian crisis in the provinces surrounding East Pakistan. The time was prudent for India to act, as it did. The guerilla movement under the name of Mukti Bahini (Bengali for freedom fighters) had already started mobilizing. By mid-June 1971, India had started supporting the Mukti Bahini with field artillery; by December, India was supporting them with military logistics through Indian commandos and marines.23 On December  3, 1971, India announced full-scale military intervention in East Pakistan; Prime Minister (PM) Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency and announced air and naval blockade of both East and West Pakistan.24 The swift action by the Indian armed forces forced the Pakistani military to surrender on December 16, 1971, officially ending the War. Approximately 91,549 Pakistani soldiers were captured as Prisoners of War (PoWs) in a humiliating defeat for the country.25 The War heralded India’s entry into the world stage as a formidable power that was successful in dividing its archrival Pakistan into two and perhaps, counted on the goodwill from Bangladesh as it emerged as a new country. Overall, India, which had been humiliated in the 1962 border war with China, was able to recuperate some of its international standing and emerge as a regional power in South Asia.

80  Timeframe II The events of the Bangladesh Liberation War were carefully followed by other South Asian actors as well as China. S.D. Muni (1972) notes that Nepal under Mahendra had long favored a status-quo in South Asia, maintaining neutrality during the Indo-Pakistani conflicts in 1965; he argues that it was a secondary counterweight to India after China.26 Officially, Nepal continued to call for a resolution to the situation in East Bengal by specifically focusing on refugees in India.27 On the matter of Bangladeshi liberation, Nepal remained pretty evenhanded in its official rhetoric. At the UN General Assembly meeting held on December 7, 1971, the Nepali representative called for an “end to all hostilities and effect the withdrawal of forces” and “those measures should be designed to put an end to the armed conflict and at the same time create not only the physical condition but the political will on the part of the parties concerned” while also still using the name East Bengal.28 Nepal’s reaction to the unfolding crisis was one that was measured and called for the end of hostilities through reconciliation of all sides. Nevertheless, Nepal became the seventh country in the world to recognize an independent Bangladesh despite a largely muted official stance during the War.29 The important role of India in the War along with the swift and effective performance of the Indian armed forces heralded the country as the regional power of South Asia. Nepal’s swift recognition of Bangladesh, despite pressure from China and Pakistan, signals Kathmandu’s acknowledgment of an emergent India after the 1962 War with China. Furthermore, Bangladesh was geographically closer than Pakistan, which made it prudent for Nepal to support diplomatic recognition. As for China, the reality of the Cold War motivated its reactions to the Bangladesh Liberation War. Relations between China and the Soviet Union had worsened; it coincided with growing Indo-Soviet ties. In fact, the two had signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971, just short of two months before India’s armed intervention in East Pakistan. As for Pakistan, it had significantly elevated its status by acting as an intermediary between China and the United States; given the Sino-Soviet split, China and the United States had sought closer ties.30 Premier Zhou Enlai criticized India for gross interference in Pakistani affairs through armed intervention and also criticized the Soviet Union and the United States.31 China’s bind was that it was close to Pakistan, but the Bangladeshi liberation war was one tied to anti-imperialist and pro-revolutionary image China had presented across the Third World. China also repeatedly vetoed Bangladesh’s attempts to join the UN, once in December 1971 and again in August 1972.32 China did not recognize Bangladesh until August 1975, even after Pakistan. The Bangladesh Liberation War was a major political event because it led to two significant results. First, Pakistan split into two, severely weakening it and giving India a strategic upper hand, and second, it heralded the emergence of India as the regional power in South Asia, which was a major turnaround since its swift defeat against China in the 1962 War. These developments spurred ideational changes in the region among the states involved as well as those within South Asia not directly impacted by the War. The emergence of Bangladesh as a new state changed the geopolitical pressures felt by India on two fronts; given New

Timeframe II  81 Delhi’s direct involvement in Bangladesh’s liberation, it was expected that the two countries would maintain close ties. As such, India’s position was strengthened, and its self-perception as South Asia’s regional power was further consolidated by its swift victory in the War. Thus, India’s confidence to fulfill the role of South Asia’s regional power was bolstered. This included policy changes such as a greater role in the region as a security provider, as it did with the civil war in Sri Lanka in the 1980s and 1990s. The impact of this critical juncture was not limited to India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Nepal also realized that India was no longer the same country as it was during the 1962 War. Despite officially calling on all sides to come to a peaceful solution, King Mahendra’s Government was the world’s seventh country to recognize Bangladesh. It is no coincidence that Nepal was willing to extend this diplomatic recognition early on. It was responding to the critical juncture of the reemergence of India as the regional power in South Asia, and despite relatively muted official rhetoric during the War, the realization of a changed geopolitical context in South Asia was not overlooked by King Mahendra’s Government. While this critical juncture did not directly entail Sino-Indian interactions in Nepal, it signals a change in the self-perceptions and entails the trajectory of actions based on the reactions of China to the Bangladesh Liberation War. The 1962 War had established China as the militarily more formidable actor; however, the swift Indian victory in Bangladesh against China’s close partner Pakistan signaled that New Delhi had emerged from its previously lackluster military engagements. Also, the smaller South Asian countries were swift to recognize the emergence of Bangladesh as the extensive shifts in geopolitics were inevitable. Bhutan became the first country in the world to recognize Bangladesh on December 6, 1971;33 despite extensive reservations and close ties with Pakistan, Sri Lanka did the same on March 4, 1972,34 and Nepal followed suit on April 8, 1972.35 One by one, all of India’s smaller neighbors recognized Bangladesh despite countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka maintaining levels of restrain in official rhetoric during the War. Thus, the discussion on strategic utility in this critical juncture centers on the evaluation of India’s emergence as a regional power and how the smaller South Asian states, including Nepal, are reacting to the changed geopolitical context. Despite protests from China, this critical juncture signals that India was capable of reasserting its preponderance in South Asia. While the Sino-Indian War of 1962 had showcased India’s weakness, the Bangladesh Liberation War signaled the heralding of its preponderance in South Asia. Nepal’s agency was largely constrained during the 1962 War, which had led to it declaring neutrality. During the Bangladesh Liberation War, Nepal did not declare neutrality per se but maintained the official line that all belligerent sides need to resolve the issue. Despite this line of official rhetoric, Nepal was quick to recognize Bangladesh as an independent state just like other smaller South Asian states. Thus, in this context, Nepal realized that it had little option but to go along with the developments following the War. The preponderance of India was a glaring reality that Nepal had to accept, and the role of China within this context remained limited. The War led to Nepal’s acceptance of India’s increased influence in South

82  Timeframe II Asia as shown by its actions; yet, its rhetoric during the War still showcases that Nepal would not simply support one buffered state or the other. King Mahendra’s Government maintained its agency as an independent buffer state by not fully backing India in Bangladesh during the War, cognizant of sensitivities tied to China and its close ties to Pakistan. Yet, the aftermath of the War signals the realization that recognizing Bangladesh was the prudent action despite Pakistan breaking ties in its aftermath.

III.  1975: King Birendra’s Zone of Peace Proposal Following King Mahendra’s death on January  31, 1972, his son King Birendra succeeded him as the King of Nepal. Similar to his father, King Birendra attempted to foster an independent foreign policy for Nepal. At the commencement speech of his coronation on February 25, 1975, he announced that Nepal would be proposed as a Zone of Peace (ZoP). This proposal entailed that no foreign bases would be stationed in Nepal and that no foreign armed forces could operate within the country; the proposal would affirm that Nepal would not join any alliances and, as such, was de facto affirming neutrality.36 The proposal also stated that “no states endorsing the peace zone should permit any hostile activities on their soil” (against Nepal).37 At his coronation, he declared that “we need peace for our security, we need peace for our independence and we need peace for our development.”38 Essentially, he tied his proposal to maintaining the sovereignty of Nepal through peace and development, which rhetorically remained uncontroversial. After the proposal, Nepali diplomatic delegations started seeking international support for the ZoP proposal. By 1986, 70 countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China had endorsed the proposal.39 Internationally and regionally, the ZoP proposal garnered extensive support with the notable exception of India. The ZoP proposal was received with silence from India. From New Delhi’s point of view, the proposal was targeted to undermine the 1950 Treaty and would severely weaken India’s influence in Nepal. The proposal would also directly threaten India’s existing security structure and undo the special relationship it had with Nepal.40 The swift endorsement of the proposal by China and Pakistan also raised concerns in New Delhi; New Delhi perceived the ZoP proposal as a means by which its international rivals could weaken its position in South Asia. As such, India never endorsed the proposal; while diplomatically New Delhi maintained silence, the press in India heavily criticized the proposal for undermining the close ties between the two countries. These stories were followed by retorts from Nepali newspapers, aptly termed the “paper war” by Zahir Suhrwarhy.41 China, on the other hand, endorsed the proposal along with Pakistan. The preponderance of India within South Asia is highlighted by this decision as India had more to lose by endorsing the ZoP proposal. As such, India’s preponderance in Nepal could be challenged to some extent by supporting the proposal, as done by China and Pakistan. The ZoP proposal is a critical juncture as it signals an attempt by Nepal to change the status-quo of Indian preponderance in South Asia (and Nepal)

Timeframe II  83 following the Bangladesh Liberation War. It also signals the arrival of the new royal administration under King Birendra, who used his coronation ceremony as a platform to launch this proposal. While the aftermath of the Bangladesh Liberation War had firmly planted India as the regional power in South Asia, the ZoP proposal challenged this as well as the special relationship in Indo-Nepali relations. The proposal signals a harking back to attempts by King Mahendra to assert an independent Nepali foreign policy, which Birendra sought to reinvigorate along the uncontroversial lines of national sovereignty, peace, and development. It sought to change the Nepali policy of accepting Indian preponderance following the 1971 War. For India, the proposal would undermine the strategic utility of Nepal as a buffer state within the security fold of New Delhi. The 1971 War had affirmed this security structure, and the proposal from Nepal to be named a ZoP would effectively affirm its neutrality, denying India the special relationship it had with Nepal. This would have implications for its security along the northern frontier as China was still a formidable threat to Indian interests and Sino-Indian relations continued to remain strained. Furthermore, the acceptance of the proposal had the possibility of eroding Indian influence in Nepal, which would have negative implications for security given the open borders between India and Nepal. For China, Nepal continued to remain an important space for pushing back against India. In this critical juncture, China (and Pakistan) enthusiastically supported the proposal as it would undermine India’s role in Nepal. Chinese PM Hua Guofeng, while hosting a banquet for Pakistani PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Beijing in May 1975, said, “We firmly support the just stand taken by His Majesty the King of Nepal in declaring a zone of peace. We are ready to assume appropriate commitments arising therefrom.”42 Concurrently, it also highlighted China’s support for Nepal’s pursuit for independence and sovereignty, which lent to its ideological commitment of anti-imperialism internationally. As the proposal presented itself to be promoting Nepal’s sovereignty, self-determination, and a want for peace, supporting such “harmless” ideals remained unproblematic for China. Nevertheless, the implications the proposal would have for India’s special relationship with Nepal are the driving factors for the strong support from China, further highlighting the importance of Nepal as a buffer state. This critical juncture illustrates the strong case of agency of the buffer state. Nepal, seeking to lessen India’s influence, sought to internationalize its efforts of maintaining an independent foreign policy through the ZoP proposal. The removal of all foreign armed forces effectively affirms the country’s neutrality, rolling back the special relations between India and Nepal since the 1950 Treaty. King Birendra sought to reduce India’s influence through international diplomatic mobilization, which gained traction for some time as over 70 countries accepted the proposal. While the idea eventually failed due to India’s refusal to accept it, the proposal itself presents the notion that buffer states can and will seek to maintain agency. In this case, it sought to roll back one of the buffered state’s preponderance through internationalization and the support of the other buffered state. This critical juncture affirms that buffer states are dynamic political spaces

84  Timeframe II wherein the buffered states compete, but it also emphasizes the importance of the buffer state’s agency as it can impact the type of relations the buffered states have within the buffer state. At the same time, the buffer state also consciously decides on what type of role it wants to play within the buffer system and may seek to induce change in the behavior of a buffered state as showcased by Nepal’s attempts at internationalizing the ZoP proposal to reduce India’s influence in the country.

IV.  1975: Sikkim’s Accession to India Sikkim was one of the Himalayan kingdoms that, along with Bhutan and Nepal, formed the buffer zone between British India and the Qing Empire. After being overrun by Nepal (then known as the Kingdom of Gorkha), the Sikkimese allied with the British against Nepal. By 1889, the Chogyal (King of Sikkim) was deposed by the British Political Officer John Clause White; the Chogyal would be later allowed to return to Sikkim and reestablish his political power.43 Sikkim retained an important status for Britain as it was the gateway to Tibet where it had economic interests. The legal status of Sikkim, however, remained uncertain. Unlike Nepal and Bhutan, Sikkim was considered a dependency of the British attaining the status of a “princely state.”44 This status meant that the British extensively controlled the internal and external affairs of Sikkim while allowing the Chogyal to maintain his status. When India gained independence from Britain, it inherited the protectorate status accorded to Sikkim; however, unlike other princely states, it did not accede to India (or Pakistan for that matter). Sikkim insisted that India was a “new juristic person” and could not “claim to the rights and obligation of the British Government.”45 It continued to exist as an independent kingdom under the Chogyal albeit as a protectorate of India, as per the 1950 Indo-Sikkimese Treaty. The precarious northern frontier after the PRC incorporated Tibet became a major concern for India, which also led to greater emphasis on security within Sikkim. Within Sikkim, the search for an independent Sikkimese identity became quintessential for its survival. The Chogyal faced limitations as India arbitrated Sikkim’s foreign affairs, stifling the emergence of an international identity.46 The focus on domestic identity was also contentious; ethnic groups such as the Bhutias (to which the Chogyal belonged to) and the Lepchas, who were considered the “original” inhabitants, were collectively only 25% of the population in the 1970s.47 The vast majority of Sikkim’s population were various Nepali ethnicities, who were the descendants of laborers brought in by Sikkimese landlords since 1860 to fill employee shortages; another large group of Nepali migrants had moved to Darjeeling in British India to find better employment conditions.48 The Bhutia and Lepcha ethnicities were considered “native” subjects while the Nepali ethnicities were categorized as “others.” Numerous political parties emerged, including the Sikkim National Congress (SNC) that sought greater representation for the Nepali ethnicities, which also had a strong resentment for the Chogyals, who had continued to underplay the

Timeframe II  85 demographic makeup of Sikkim. The relations between New Delhi and the Chogyal had also remained tense as the latter had demanded a revision of the 1950 Indo-Sikkim Treaty to bolster Sikkimese autonomy.49 Furthermore, India had close ties with the SNC. In 1974, following agitation from the political parties, the Chogyal had to accede to conduct elections; the resulting Sikkim Assembly on May 11, 1974, raised the idea of acceding to India.50 On April 6, 1975, Indian forces surrounded the palace of the Chogyal in Sikkim’s capital Gangtok. On April 14, a “special poll” was conducted, which resulted in an overwhelming vote in support of joining the Republic of India as its 22nd state.51 There are arguments that the referendum as well as the elections in 1974 were conducted under duress as the Indian Army was mobilized in 1973 to deal with the political agitation.52 On April 26, India passed the 36th Amendment Bill making Sikkim a part of the Republic of India; eventually on May 16, 1975, Sikkim was officially declared as a state of India and the Chogyal’s position was abolished.53 The accession of Sikkim as India’s 22nd state led to sharp reactions from China. It was historically considered as a kingdom within the Tibetan cultural sphere. Furthermore, the erosion of the buffer zone was also of concern for Beijing. The official statement from the PRC released on April 29, 1975, reads as such: The Chinese Government solemnly states once again that it absolutely does not recognize India’s illegal annexation of Sikkim and firmly supports the people of Sikkim in their struggle for national independence and in defense of state sovereignty against Indian expansion.54 The statement came directly on behalf of the Chinese Government rather than through the Foreign Ministry or press releases, which were customary.55 As such, the above official statement was a break from the usual norm and a reiteration of the strong reservations China had regarding the development. Apart from a strong rebuke, China also refused to recognize Sikkim as a part of India. It was only in 2005 that the PRC formally recognized Sikkim as one of the states of India. Nevertheless, in the direct aftermath of Sikkim’s accession, anti-Indian statements and sentiments were rife in Chinese-controlled media and official statements.56 The accession of Sikkim remained at the center of these attacks. After China, perhaps the most concerned about this development was Nepal. Since its founding, Nepal’s political elites maintained a precarious position to ensure the country’s independence. The gradual disappearance of states in the region, first with Tibet and then Sikkim, raised extensive concerns within Nepal. The events in Sikkim led to the coining of a terminology that is used quite extensively in Nepal’s foreign policy circles – Sikkimization. The term meant that the possibility of becoming a part of India just like Sikkim did exist, and as such, Nepal needed to check India’s preponderance in the country.57 Such perceptions dominated King Birendra’s reign and continues to implicitly inform current Nepali foreign policy. The fact that only Nepal and Bhutan remained independent in the Himalayan region’s precarious geopolitical context invigorated Nepal to seek ways to limit Indian influence. The fear of infringements to Nepal’s autonomy

86  Timeframe II and sovereignty took center stage since the accession of Sikkim. Official rhetoric within Nepal remained negative to the developments in Sikkim; a member of the Nepali legislature (Rastriya Panchayat) said: Sikkim, a small state which was a protectorate of India is being incorporated into the Indian Union. It is a matter of concern that even in the twentieth century, a big nation is swallowing up a small nation in this manner.58 Nepal’s fear as a small state was that it had the possibility of following Sikkim’s fate, and as such, more strident assertion of independence and autonomy were emphasized. The previous critical juncture titled 1975: King Birendra’s Zone of Peace Proposal, some argue, was a reaction to the role played by India in Sikkim’s domestic politics in 1974, leading up to its accession in 1975.59 Nepal did not want a repeat of that within its borders and the ZoP proposal was a means of assuring that it did not occur. Nepal’s status as a buffer state, albeit within India’s security umbrella, was evident as China made overtures toward Nepal in the aftermath of Sikkim’s accession. Anti-Indian rhetoric from Chinese state-owned media like the New China News Agency (NCNA; now known as Xinhua News Agency) and Radio Beijing condemned India’s actions in Sikkim and some news reports even went to the extent of reporting that Nepal and Bhutan would be next.60 Such rhetoric fueled widespread protests in Kathmandu; mobs attacked the Indian embassy and cultural center. New Delhi alleged that the protests had official backing and called on Nepal to curb the protests.61 The departure of Indian Ambassador to Nepal, M.L. Rasgotra, in the aftermath of the protests prompted extensive concerns in Kathmandu.62 However, the Nepali Government did not officially condemn India’s actions and maintained silence. While the media and foreign policy circles expressed concerns, the Nepali Government’s muted response showcases the limits Nepal had in terms of its foreign policy maneuvering. Any explicit rhetoric would antagonize India, which had already expressed strong discontent with the protests in Kathmandu. While the Bangladesh Liberation War heralded the emergence of India as a regional power in South Asia, the accession of Sikkim affirmed it as a geopolitical reality. India’s turn away from Nehruvian idealism to a more realpolitik-oriented foreign policy had led to a more strident foreign policy, which results in successes in Bangladesh and Sikkim. As such, the accession of Sikkim is a major political event that reaffirmed the new foreign policy approach India had increasingly adopted since the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, under the auspices of PM Indira Gandhi. This event is not characterized by an ideational change within India per se, but it consolidates and reaffirms India’s confidence in its role as a regional power in South Asia. As for Nepal, similar to the Bangladesh Liberation War, official rhetoric remained muted, but unlike the previous critical juncture, Sikkim’s fate kindled fear and concern in the Nepali psyche among elites and public alike. So extensive was the impact that Sikkimization became an inherent lens of assessing Indo-Nepali relations. While official posturing did not signal a

Timeframe II  87 change in Nepal’s policy toward India, the leniency in dealing with the protests in Kathmandu and the heightened expression of concerns in the media capture the new reality that Nepal’s sovereignty was precarious, and as such, vigilance is key in foreign policymaking. This situation also highlights the precariousness of the buffer state, inherently always within the competing dynamics of the buffered states and the possibility of loss of agency (and in worse cases, sovereignty). The disappearance of Tibet and Sikkim as independent entities was a wakeup call for the remaining Himalayan buffer states, Nepal and Bhutan. For the former, India’s actions were perceived as a part of the reality that Kathmandu was dependent on New Delhi and needed to either go the Bhutan route by affirming a relationship of absolute dependency or forge closer ties with other actors, including the other buffered state, China. While not explicit, the accession of Sikkim showcased the influence India had managed to ascertain since the 1972 War. Its forthcoming actions in Sikkim since the political crisis of 1973 affirms this. Given Sikkim’s geopolitical importance for the stability of India’s then restive northeastern states, the opportunity for accession was a major victory for its political objectives in the region. As such, Sikkim ceased to exist as a buffer state, which was conceptually established by British India. Bhutan was firmly within India’s security orbit as the royal governments had continued to pursue the notion that the foreign policy of the country would be guided by India. Relations with Nepal were complicated as it had extensively increased its international presence and time and again reached out to China when strategically convenient. Nepal remained strategically important to India still, and the accession of Sikkim had given India the confidence to affirm its special relationship. New Delhi’s strong reaction to protests in Nepal and the unofficial recalling of its ambassador shows that India was more than likely to use more strong-armed tactics with Nepal if need be. As a result, the muted official response from Nepal despite widespread concerns highlights the acknowledgment from the country that India was the preponderant power in the region and its agency would be heavily influenced by India. For China, Nepal’s strategic utility as a dynamic political space is illustrated from its official stance against “Indian aggression and expansionism” in Sikkim followed by the utilization of anti-Indian rhetoric through its state-controlled media. This critical juncture was a suitable opportunity to drum up concerns about India endangering Nepal’s sovereignty while making space for China’s influence in the country by offering itself as an alternative. It is also not a coincidence that in the year 1976–1977, a year after Sikkim’s accession, Chinese aid to Nepal reached $2 million a year, which was almost equal to India’s aid and it set a new high.63 China could easily point to its history of official commitment to noninterference in Bangladesh and Sikkim to stave concerns and offer Nepal the option to bolster ties to reduce Indian preponderance in Nepal. It would not only weaken India’s position in Nepal but Beijing could also assess its foreign policy formidability and capability. In this critical juncture, it was clear that India maintained both policy formidability, and expansive regional influence and capability within South Asia despite China’s attempts to compromise it.

88  Timeframe II Despite the strong case of agency shown by Nepal in declaring itself as a ZoP, the accession of Sikkim challenged the maneuverability available to Nepal as a buffer state. One of the buffered states, India, had showed strong reaction to challenging its course of action in Sikkim. As such, Nepal had to official maintain a muted response despite heightened concerns. Despite constraints on its agency, Nepal continued to promote the ZoP idea with support from the other buffered state, China. Furthermore, it was receptive to increased Chinese aid, which also forged closer development ties between the two states. This critical juncture highlights the dynamic relations between India, China, and Nepal within the buffer system. India sought to reinforce its preponderance in Nepal and was successful enough to garner no official backlash from it. China went on the diplomatic offensive, criticizing India internationally and seeking to erode its influence in Nepal by tying its national sovereignty with events in Sikkim. It further bolstered its presence in the country by increasing foreign aid. Nepal, constrained by this critical juncture, maintained official silence on the issue but continued to extensively promote the ZoP proposal and forge closer ties with China. It showcased its agency by refusing to accept the preponderance of one buffered state (India) and sought to reduce it through closer ties with the other buffered state (China). It also reaffirmed its agency through international efforts like the ZoP.

V. 1989: The Blockade of Nepal under Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi The economic blockade of Nepal in 1989–1990 under PM Rajiv Gandhi’s Government highlighted a major lull in Indo-Nepali relations. The breakdown in relations can be traced back to the 1960 Treaty of Trade and Transit. This treaty sought to promote free trade, maintenance of separate foreign exchange accounts, and better transit facilities for Nepal in India.64 The central component of this treaty was for the facilitation of better trade access for Nepal given its landlocked status. India’s ports, particularly the Mongla Port in Kolkata, were viable transit points for Nepal’s trade with extraregional states. Nepal had also long called for two separate treaties for trade and transit rather than the incumbent one that combined the two issues. The treaty was subject to periodic renewal with successful renewals in 1971 and 1978; the next one was set to expire on March 23, 1988.65 The treaty formally expired on that date as India and Nepal failed to reach a satisfactory agreement on the terms tied to its renewal; Nepal requested two separate treaties for trade and transit while India proposed a merged one.66 Kathmandu insisted that transit to third countries was a fundamental and permanent right of landlocked countries while trade had a bilateral dimension and was dynamic.67 The failure of renewing this treaty, however, can be traced back to two prior causes. First, in 1987, Nepal introduced a work permit system for Indian nationals working within the country.68 India argued that this was a direct violation of the 1950 Treaty that allowed Indian and Nepali nationals to work in each other’s countries freely. Requiring permits was not part of the 1950 Treaty. Second, in 1988, Nepal had purchased anti-aircraft guns from China after failed attempts at

Timeframe II  89 getting them from India.69 Beijing had previously offered to sell arms to Nepal but the latter had declined fearing implications regarding ties with India. While the overall figures are uncertain, it is certain that 500 truckloads of arms worth $20 million were sent to Nepal;70 a report by the South China Morning Post stated that the total sale consisted of over 3,000 truckloads of weapons, which included light arms and ammunition, uniforms, and 16 antiaircraft guns.71 India perceived this growing closeness between Nepal and China as detrimental to its security interests as the arms sale was the first of its kind between the two states. Thus, some arguments link the growing security closeness in Sino-Nepali relations as a major factor in the lapse of the trade and transit treaty. India also maintained that it was a violation of the 1950 Treaty, while Nepal retorted that the treaty was only applicable to arms that transited through India.72 In the aftermath of the arms purchase, India’s Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh personally handed a letter to King Birendra from PM Gandhi seeking assurances that Nepal would not purchase any more arms from China and the arms already purchased would not be used against India. Birendra retorted reaffirming it was Nepal’s sovereign rights to purchase any form of weapons it wished and that they were to be used for internal security and antiterrorism.73 The failure to come to an agreement eventually led to the lapse of the Treaty of Trade and Transit; India closed 19 out of 21 trade routes with Nepal and 13 of the 15 transit routes through India.74 Interestingly, the few open routes were in regards to international law which states that a landlocked country has a right to at least one transit route to sea which, left room for New Delhi to deny a blockade on grounds of technicality.75 From China’s perspective, the opportunity to provide arms to Nepal and further make inroads into the country would aid in its undermining of Indian preponderance. It would also open new security avenues with Nepal bringing the two states closer. Officially, it was a deal between two sovereign and independent states, which remained unproblematic on Beijing’s side. As the economic blockade of Nepal began, China provided modest assistance. It included 300 tons of petroleum products and other forms of aid such as food; China also pushed for greater trade as it sent a Tibetan trade delegation promoting Chinese industrial products and consumer goods.76 Nevertheless, China’s criticisms remained modest and opaque. Its media, however, seemed to emphasize Nepal’s position as just while criticizing India for heavy-handedness. In July  1989, a Beijing Review article stated that “India wants its security interests to take priority in its relations with Nepal, while Nepal persists in keeping friendly relations with India on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, equality, and mutual benefit.” Overall, the unofficial line of public rhetoric cast the blockade as a reaction to Nepal’s exercising of its sovereign rights, which indirectly pointed to India for its unjust actions that undermined the international norm of sovereign equality. The blockade caused the country’s transportation system to be paralyzed and educational institutions to shut down. Pharmaceutical companies also appealed for vital chemicals which are required for the production of medicines.77 Economic growth rate plummeted from 9.75% in 1987–1988 to 1.5% in 1988–1989

90  Timeframe II signaling major economic stress.78 A Western diplomat went on to say that, “There was a feeling among the Nepalese that they had to take steps that would demonstrate their independence,” which was specifically pertinent as India under Rajiv Gandhi had recently mobilized its armed forces in two other smaller South Asian states, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.79 Furthermore, India’s line of thinking was that if Nepal wanted special economic treatment for trade and transit, it also had to accept a special security relationship that implied that India was going to be the dominant security provider in the country.80 In December 1989, a new government came to power in India; V.P. Singh was chosen as the PM. However, for King Birendra’s Government, this new development was disconcerting as the new government under the Janata Dal was sympathetic to the democratic forces within Nepal.81 As such, the change in Government in India was a major source of concern for the absolute monarchy in Nepal given its prodemocratic affinities. King Birendra’s Government was also under increased economic pressure, which was culminating into dissatisfaction with his rule. Eventually, Nepali Congress and other political forces in Nepal would launch prodemocracy protests called Jana Andolan I to move toward a democratic system, which will be discussed under Timeframe III. Only after the successful establishment of a constitutional monarchy was the economic blockade lifted in June 1990. The blockade can be ascertained as a critical juncture as it was a major political event that elicited changes in the buffer system. The crisis was a result of the tensions between the buffer state Nepal and one of the buffered states, India emanating from Nepal’s relations with China, the other buffered state. Nepal continued to acknowledge Indian preponderance in the country, but it also sought to continue its independent foreign policy approach. As showcased, King Birendra sought arms purchases from China despite the common knowledge at the time that such a move would antagonize India. Nevertheless, Nepal pressed on to chart its independent foreign policy. While not officially tied to the arms purchases, the economic blockade was a major critical juncture as it entailed a strong reaction from India to the growing material and security ties between China and Nepal. China had increasingly made its material ties stronger; the arms purchases and subsequent modest help during the blockade showcase a turn from a largely symbolic and rhetorically driven relationship to one where material help was increasingly part of the relationship. From India’s perspective, this critical juncture was a culmination of a strong stance vis-à-vis Nepal where economics and security had become tied to each other. As such, despite Nepal’s attempts to delineate between the two, India’s insistence on keeping them linked eventually led to the major political event in the form of the blockade. Thus, this major political event showcases a major ideational shift in India wherein it is comfortable using hard measures including economic statecraft for its security goals. As such, its policy on the issue of the Treaty of Trade and Transit with Nepal was a major step in a different direction which caused an extensive lull in relations. This critical juncture also caused India to reassess its relations with the king; New Delhi increasingly perceived democratic parties as more viable alternatives

Timeframe II  91 to the monarch to ensure stable Indo-Nepali relations.82 For China, this major political event signaled the fact the Nepal was willing to engage with it despite the strong reaction from India. It further changed its policies by forging closer ties by sending relief materials albeit the amount was modest. Within Nepal, the economic blockade prompted calls for a change in governance; with mounting pressure from the economic stress and an increasingly unhappy populace, King Birendra faced a growing demand for democratization, which India was happy to support. Eventually, the absolute rule of the monarchy would be curtailed with the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in 1990. Overall, the economic blockade of Nepal in 1989 signals a major critical juncture that showcased the precarious existence of the buffer state. Pushing for security independence elicited strong reactions from the preponderant buffered state, which was increasingly linking economic and security interests. Overall, the buffer system shows a turn for increased material linkages and the absence of hesitance in India as a buffered state to assert its interests vis-à-vis the other buffered state in its relations with the buffer state. Nepal’s blockade of 1989 presented specific strategic utility for China and India in the country. For India, it was a challenge to its preponderance that it maintained through the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War and later, the 1975 accession of Sikkim. The disregard for the 1950 Treaty that affirmed special relations with Nepal (and also extensive Indian influence) was seen as an attempt to undermine Indian interests. First, the requirement of permit papers for Indian citizens to live and work in Nepal followed by armed purchases from China were affronts to India’s security interests in the country, which was presented publicly as violations of the 1950 Treaty. This critical juncture is characterized by India’s strong-willed attempt to affirm its position in Nepal by using a drastic foreign policy tool in the form of economic blockade. Any special relations in economics did not come for free; it also entailed guarantees from Nepal about India’s own security interests. For China, the request from Nepal to purchase arms was an opportunity to strengthen its position in the country. Given the precarious relations with India since 1962, maintaining and extending a foothold in a buffer state that had for long been under the influence of the contending buffered state was strategically important for China. Its willingness to sell the arms to Nepal and follow-up later after the imposition of the economic blockade showcases China’s attempts to push back against Indian influence in Nepal. It tested the Indian resolve in its foreign policy approach toward Nepal which did not escalate to a blatant Sino-Indian fallout. Nevertheless, it is evident that this critical juncture showcases competitive overtures from India and China. The former’s was a method of arm-twisting to get its security objectives while the latter sought to undermine the former’s position within the buffer state. The extensive limits on Nepal’s agency as a buffer state in the critical junctures tied to the Bangladesh Liberation War and Sikkim’s accession to India seemed to have changed right before the economic blockade. Unlike any other time in Nepal’s modern history, the government sought to buy arms from China without consulting India. Furthermore, highlighting integrity of the country, it imposed

92  Timeframe II work permits for Indian citizens working within its borders. Such steps showcase the agency to chart an independent foreign policy; to bolster its position, it sought Chinese support as it bought weapons from them. Thus, the buffer state when faced with preponderance from one buffered state seeks to curtail it by forging closer ties with the other buffered state. In this case, Nepal’s agency could be maximized by seeking help from China; the willingness of China in the aftermath of the blockade showcases its interests in closer ties to Nepal and curtails India’s influence. While King Birendra may not have predicted a reaction from India as strong as a full-blown economic blockade, his government did exercise a high degree of autonomy and paid a political price for it, as the economic turbulence eventually led to the democratization of Nepal. Overall, this critical juncture is important for the analysis of the buffer system as it showcases that buffer states do attempt to maximize agency by seeking support from one buffered state against the other. In this case, the buffer state sought to reduce the preponderant buffered state’s influence by opening up new avenues (in this case, security links) with the other buffered state, but it led to a strong blowback that eventually reinstated the statusquo of India’s preponderance. However, this critical juncture opened China’s increased role in Nepal as it was now showing signs of material support, as it did after the initiation of the blockade.

VI.  Conclusion Timeframe II included tumultuous critical junctures that characterized extensive geopolitical changes and tensions. Table 5.1 includes the application of the new buffer state concept to all critical junctures within Timeframe II. At the beginning of this timeframe in 1962, India faced a grave challenge to its international stature as it was heavily defeated by China. This event paved the way for smaller South Asian states, including Nepal, to deduce that India was not infallible as South Asia’s dominant power. As such, Nepal increasingly sought to assert its Indiacentric security considerations but was faced with three major challenges from India – its swift and efficient performance in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, its successful role in the accession of Sikkim into India, and the strong reaction against King Birendra’s actions by blockading Nepal in 1989. As such, within this timeframe, India’s defeat in 1962 spurred it to take a harder foreign policy approach in South Asia. However, this timeframe also signals the arrival of China as a more interactive buffered state. Unlike in Timeframe I  where China still focused on a more geographically oriented approach to understanding Nepal’s buffer status, Timeframe II elicited stronger Chinese overtures. Perhaps spurred by its swift victory in the 1962 conflict, Beijing sought increasing economic and other materially oriented ties with Nepal, highlighting the emergence of a fully dynamic buffer system that is characterized by competing overtures from the buffered states, as increasingly illustrated by India and China in Timeframe II. India’s conception of Nepal’s strategic utility during Timeframe II is characterized by heavy-handedness as its role as the preponderant buffered state

Timeframe II  93 Table 5.1  Applying the New Buffer State Concept to Timeframe II Critical Juncture

Strategic Utility of the Buffer State

Agency of the Buffer State

1962: The Sino-Indian War

India: Direct threat to India’s security if Nepal was undermined China: Heightened role as a buffer state to test India’s capability and formidability No direct interactions between India and China within Nepal; smaller South Asian states recognize emergence of India as a regional power; reassertion of Indian preponderance in South Asia India: Refusal to accept ZoP due to the negative implications for its security China: Supported it for international posturing and reduction of Indian influence in Nepal India: Assertion of its status as a regional power in South Asia – strongarm approach to discontent in Nepal China: Saw this as an opportunity to drum up support in Nepal – sought to reduce Indian influence and test its formidability India: Sought to reassert control and prevent expansion of Chinese influence China: Sought opportunity to push into Nepal and establish foothold

Public declaration of neutrality but positive to closer ties with India to thwart threats from China

1971: Bangladesh Liberation War

1975: King Birendra’s Zone of Peace Proposal

1975: Sikkim’s Accession to India

1989: The Blockade of Nepal under Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi

Nepal publicly declared a measured resolution of the War but was quick to recognize Bangladesh diplomatically

Nepal sought internationalization of the proposal to roll back Indian preponderance

Nepal accepted India’s preponderance rhetorically; continued to foster close ties with China and promote ZoP proposal

Nepal sought greater agency but was severely limited due to the economic blockade; openness to security ties with China

was extensively compromised by its defeat in the 1962 War. The conflict was a major low point for India’s foreign policy standing and its weaknesses were made apparent. As a result, India’s strong reactions to the Bangladesh Liberation War, Sikkim’s political unrest, and Nepal’s purchasing of weapons from China are testaments to the necessity to take a firm stance to maintain its preponderance in South Asia and within the buffer state, Nepal. These three critical junctures showcased India’s emergence as a state that strongly adhered to realpolitik, which

94  Timeframe II was a departure from Nehruvian idealism. Furthermore, India’s refusal to acquiesce to Nepal’s ZoP proposal also affirms that it did not have any intentions of forgoing the 1950 Treaty and the special relationship it had with Nepal. Overall, Timeframe II highlighted the rising Chinese activities in Nepal and a realization of Beijing’s capabilities to permeate into South Asia, which India had for long considered its security backyard. Overall, this timeframe began with a shock to India, which then made up for its weaknesses through swift actions in South Asia and explicit rebuffs at challenging its preponderance in the region, as it did by rejecting Nepal’s ZoP proposal. China’s strategic utility of the buffer state moved away from a more geographically and rhetorically oriented approach to making explicit overtures toward Nepal. This included increased economic and development aid. The Chinese approach toward Nepal was more muted and measured during Timeframe I. However, the 1962 victory against India perhaps gave China the notion that it could push into Nepal (and South Asia) more extensively. As such, the critical juncture became a litmus test to check India’s capability. Its relative weakness gave China confidence in greater engagement with Nepal. The geographic buffer concept gave way to that of a dynamic political space in China’s geopolitical imagination. China also started a public posturing that was heavily critical of India after the War. During the Bangladesh Liberation War and Sikkim’s accession, China was explicit in its criticism of India’s actions, trying to internationalize the issues at both times with limited success. With the critical juncture on the ZoP proposal by Nepal, China extended support along with Pakistan, as an implicit affront to India’s refusal to accept it as a breach of the 1950 Treaty. The economic blockade also elicited a reaction from China as it sent economic aid to Nepal with a gradual increase in development assistance. Throughout the critical junctures of Timeframe II following the 1962 War, China has gradually increased its interactions in all of them. Whether it be during the ZoP proposal or Sikkim’s accession, China sought to align itself with Nepal’s interests, whether by extending support or rhetorical warnings as it did during Sikkim’s accession to drum up Nepal’s concerns. Overall, Timeframe II highlights the confidence of China to assert its buffered state status in Nepal by seeking to reduce Indian influence. Whether it be international events or events directly related to Nepal, China sought to push back against India’s influence in Nepal using economic tools to back its political goals. Unlike in Timeframe I  when Nepal faced extensive pressure from India to ensure it maintained its distance from China, its buffer state status as a dynamic political space became more prominent and nuanced as China made inroads. After the 1962 War, the infallible role of India in South Asia was compromised, which was an opportunity for Nepal to expand its agency. However, the event in Bangladesh came as a realization that such a compromise in India’s role in South Asia was temporary as Nepal’s swift recognition of Bangladesh illustrated. However, Nepal did maintain neutrality during both the 1962 War and the Bangladesh Liberation War to ensure it maintained its agency as a buffer state without officially taking a side; noncommitment provided more options of foreign policy if one side was preponderant. However, the unfolding events in Sikkim in the early 1970s

Timeframe II  95 showed how a small buffer state’s agency could be easily quashed if only one buffered state maintained preponderance. To prevent Sikkimization, Nepal sought to push back by calling for the ZoP, which was an attempt by Nepal to move toward formal neutrality, which would mean India would have to roll back its influence rooted in the 1950 Treaty. Thus, Timeframe II also showcases Nepal’s attempts to maintain and, perhaps, expand its agency, specifically in a geopolitical context where another buffer state ceased to exist due to its absorption into one of its buffered states. Nepal’s use of its limited agency is largely externalized through its increased closeness to China. To ensure survival, reducing preponderance of one buffered state by seeking support from the other is illustrated in Timeframe II. Yet, it must be noted that the preponderant buffered state may actively seek to safeguard its upper hand in the buffer system. India’s rejection of the ZoP is an example, because without its approval, the concept would be dead on arrival. This decision was to ensure that the 1950 Treaty remained intact. Furthermore, the 1989 blockade was also a reaction to the heightened use of agency by Nepal to seek closer ties with China. India’s displeasure was evident, which resulted in the blockade. In these two critical junctures, the preponderant buffered state used hard-hitting measures to bring back the buffer state into its fold; however, the buffer state sought to resist such overtures by turning to the other contending buffered state with limited success. While China’s role had increased in the buffer system, Nepal was still dependent on India economically for trade and transit with third party states. Nevertheless, it was clear from Timeframe II that Nepal’s agency could only be maximized by making use of the dynamism inherent in the buffer system, which entailed using the rivalry between the buffered states to its advantage.

Notes 1 Sergey Radchenko, “The Rise and Fall of Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai,” Foreign Policy, September  18, 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/18/the-rise-and-fall-of-hindichini-bhai-bhai/ 2 Neville Maxwell, “China and India: Un-Negotiated Dispute,” The China Quarterly, no. 43 (1970): 48. 3 Ratham Indurthy, “India and China: Conflict, Competition, Cooperation and Prospects for Peace,” International Journal on World Peace 33, no. 1 (2016): 49. 4 Zhiqun Zhu, “China-India Relations in the 21st Century: A Critical Inquiry,” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs 24, no. 1–2 (2011): 8. 5 Ibid., 51. 6 “China Calls Dalai Lama a ‘Separatist’, Says he Fled after Failed Armed Rebellion,” The Hindustan Times, April  8, 2017, www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/chinacalls-dalai-lama-a-separatist-says-he-fled-after-failed-armed-rebellion/story-zDQ7oFcG4D7UFNdblP3DlK.html. 7 Maxwell, “China and India: Un-Negotiated Dispute,” 52. 8 Willem van Kemenade, “Détente between China and India: The Delicate Balance of Geopolitics in Asia,” Clingendael Institute, (2008): 38. 9 Ibid., 41. 10 Ibid., 40; Michael Brecher, “Non-Alignment Under Stress: The West and the IndiaChina Border War,” Pacific Affairs 52, no. 4 (1979–1980): 617.

96  Timeframe II 11 Kemenade, “Détente between China and India,” 41. 12 Trimbak Ramrao Ghoble, “India and China – Nepal Relations, 1950–1980,” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, no. 53 (1992): 602. 13 Sanjay Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India (New York: Routledge, 2012), 90. 14 Leo E. Rose, “The Himalayan Border States: ‘Buffers’ in Transition,” Asian Survey 3, no. 2 (1962): 121. 15 Leo E. Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1971), 248. 16 Ibid., 250. 17 Narayan Khadka, “Foreign Aid to Nepal Donor Motivations in the Post-Cold War Period,” Asian Survey 37, no. 11 (1997): 1048. 18 Zaglul Haider, “A Revisit to the Indian Role in the Bangladesh Liberation War,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 44, no. 5 (2009): 538. 19 Amit Ranjan, “Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971: Narratives, Impacts and the Actors,” India Quarterly 72, no. 2 (2016): 133. 20 Craig Baxter, Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting (Boulder, CO: West View Press, 1989). 21 Golam Wahed Chowdhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1974). 22 Caf Dowlah, The Bangladesh Liberation War, the Sheikh Mujib Regime, and Contemporary Controversies (New York: Lexington Books, 2016), 57. 23 Ibid., 59. 24 Ibid., 60. 25 Donald N. Zillman, “Prisoners in the Bangladesh War: Humanitarian Concerns and Political Demands,” The International Lawyer 8, no. 1 (1974): 124; Dowlah, The Bangladesh Liberation War, the Sheikh Mujib Regime, and Contemporary Controversies, 64. 26 Sukh Deo Muni, “Ceylon, Nepal and the Emergence of Bangladesh,” Economic and Political Weekly 7, no. 8 (1972): 473. 27 Ibid., 472. 28 “2003rd Plenary Meeting,” United Nations General Assembly, December  7, 1971, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/716161?ln=en 29 “Nepal-Bangladesh Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Government of Nepal, 2022, https://mofa.gov.np/nepal-bangladesh-relations/ 30 Jitendra Nath Mahanty, “China and the Emergence of Bangladesh: Role of Great Power Global Perceptions,” India Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1983): 140. 31 Ibid., 142. 32 Ibid., 147. 33 “Bhutan-Bangladesh Relations,” Royal Bhutanese Embassy – Bangladesh, 2022, www.mfa.gov.bt/rbedhaka/bhutan-bangladesh-relations/ 34 “PM Hasina: Bangladesh’s Relations with Sri Lanka Will Grow Further,” Dhaka Tribune, March  4, 2022, www.dhakatribune.com/foreign-affairs/2022/03/04/ pm-hasina-wants-further-growth-of-bangladesh-sri-lanka-bilateral-cooperation 35 “Nepal-Bangladesh Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Government of Nepal, 2022. 36 John T. Scholz, “Nepal in 1976: Problems with India Threaten Birendra’s New Order,” Asian Survey 17, no. 2 (1977): 203. 37 Lok Raj Baral, “Nepal’s Security Policy and South Asian Regionalism,” Asian Survey 26, no. 11 (1986): 1214. 38 J.P. Anand, “Nepal’s Zone of Peace Concept and China,” China Report 13, no. 1 (1977): 6. 39 Baral, “Nepal’s Security Policy and South Asian Regionalism,” 1213. 40 Ibid.

Timeframe II  97 41 Zahir Suhrwardy, “India’s Relations with Nepal,” Pakistan Horizon 49, no. 1 (1996): 44. 42 Jagadish Sharma, Nepal: Struggle for Existence (Kathmandu: Communications Incorporated, 1986), 242. 43 Alex McKay, “Indian Structures, Sikkimese Processes: On Being Unprepared for the (Indian) Nation,” Asian Ethnicity 22, no. 2 (2021): 273. 44 Ibid. 45 Sirdar D. K. Sen, “Memorandum of the Government of Sikkim: Claims in Respect of Darjeeling,” Government of Sikkim, (1947): 11; Leo E. Rose, “India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship,” Pacific Affairs 42, no. 1 (1969): 33. 46 Ranjan Gupta, “Sikkim: The Merger with India,” Asian Survey 15, no. 9 (1975): 786. 47 Ibid. 48 McKay, “Indian Structures, Sikkimese Processes,” 277–278. 49 Jigme N. Kazi, Songs of Sikkim: The Rise and Fall of the Namgyal Dynasty of Sikkim (New Delhi: Notion Press, 2020). 50 Ibid. 51 Gupta, “Sikkim: The Merger with India,” 795. 52 Sudheer Sharma, “25 Years After Sikkim,” The Nepali Times, March  23–29, 2001, http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=9621#.YrYDLXbMJPZ 53 Kazi, Songs of Sikkim. 54 Alka Acharya and G.P. Deshpande, “Talk of and with China,” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no. 28 (2003): 2942. 55 Bernard Weinraub, “Peking Reaction is Worrying India,” The New York Times, May 4, 1975, www.nytimes.com/1975/05/04/archives/peiking-reaction-is-worryingindia-criticism-of-sikkim-seizure-seen.html 56 Ibid. 57 Vijay Gokhale, “India’s Fog of Misunderstanding Surrounding Nepal-China Relations,” Carnegie India, September  2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ Gokhale%20-%20India%20Nepal%20China_final.pdf 58 Suhrwardy, “India’s Relations with Nepal,” 53. 59 Pramod K. Kantha, “India’s Troubled Relations with Kathmandu: Nepal’s Republican Turn and the China Factor,” Journal of Global South Studies 38, no. 2 (2021): 321. 60 Ghoble, “India and China-Nepal Relations, 1950–1880: An Appraisal,” 603. 61 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 102. 62 Prashant Jha, “Nepal is Not Sikkim,” The Hindu, April 16, 2013, www.thehindu.com/ news/international/south-asia//article60482184.ece 63 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 105. 64 Ramanuj Prasad Singh and Vijay Narayan Singh, “Economic Interactions between India and Nepal,” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, no. 60 (1999): 996. 65 Shree Govind Mishra and Asha Mishra, “Indo-Nepal Relations (1951–1990),” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, no. 56 (1995): 849. 66 Monalisa Adhikari, “Between the Dragon and the Elephant: Nepal’s Neutrality Conundrum,” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs 25, no. 1–2 (2012): 86. 67 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2002), 156. 68 Shree Govind Mishra and Asha Mishra, “Indo-Nepal Relations,” 849. 69 John W. Garver, “China-India Rivalry in Nepal: The Clash Over Chinese Arms Sales,” Asian Survey 31, no. 10 (1991): 960. 70 Ibid., 961. 71 Ibid. 72 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 113. 73 Ibid., 963 74 Adhikari, “Between the Dragon and the Elephant,” 86. 75 Garver, “China-India Rivalry in Nepal,” 959

98  Timeframe II 76 Ibid., 165. 77 Mark Fineman, “Trade Embargo Wreaks Havoc: Nepal is Paying the Price for Standing Up to India,” Los Angeles Times, April  10, 1989, www.latimes.com/archives/ la-xpm-1989-04-10-mn-1692-story.html 78 Niranjan Koirala, “Nepal in 1989: A  Very Difficult Year,” Asian Survey 30, no. 2 (1990): 142. 79 Ibid. 80 Garver, “China-India Rivalry in Nepal,” 960 81 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 116.

6 Timeframe III Critical Junctures 1990–2008

Timeframe III includes upheavals in the buffer system, including substantive changes in the domestic politics of Nepal. While the strategic importance of Nepal remains unchanged despite the changes in domestic political landscapes, the way in which India and China interact with Nepal certainly had to heed the changes within the country. Thus, Timeframe III largely includes domestic changes within Nepal, but it also includes one international event such as the riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), which fundamentally established China as a prominent political actor in Nepal. The year 1990 is taken as the starting point for this timeframe given the firm implanting of democracy as a part of the political discourse within Nepal; the first attempt at democracy had failed to institutionalize democracy, while the second democratic experience was characterized by extensive institutionalization. The year 2008 is considered a cutoff point due to the eruption of riots in the TAR of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These riots altered the political dynamics of the buffer system as they bolstered China’s interest in Nepal, given the country’s extensive shared land border with the TAR. The same year, Nepal abolished the monarchy and transitioned into a federal republic, permanently changing the domestic political context with extensive room for foreign policy changes and maneuvering.

I.  1990: Second Democratic Experience in Nepal India’s on and off commitment to democracy in Nepal had long contributed to the monarchy’s tumultuous relationship with New Delhi. As such, the democratization of Nepal is an important event to consider in the buffer system as the opening up of political space and the curtailing of power of the monarchy with its pro-China bent had implications for the country’s relations with its two neighbors. Following the border blockade in 1989, King Birendra’s Panchayat Government came under increased pressure from political parties to democratize the political space. Calls for democracy had been ongoing since King Mahendra’s seizure of power in 1960. This had resulted in a 1980 referendum where people were asked to choose between continuing the Panchayat regime of King Birendra or move toward a multiparty democracy; the former was victorious with a thin majority, and the Panchayat continued to rule.1 However, the calls for democracy continued DOI: 10.4324/9781003178538-6

100  Timeframe III and intensified as Nepal faced economic upheaval due to the blockade. Similar to his father, King Birendra sought to balance Indian preponderance by seeking support from China and, by proxy, Pakistan. The Panchayat also encouraged antiIndia sentiments in the form of popular protests in the face of the economic blockade.2 However, the anti-India sentiments soon transformed into anti-Panchayat demonstrations in the form of Jana Andolan I or People’s Movement I as the king was blamed for the failure to ameliorate the economic hardship faced by the Nepali populace. Despite attempts at harking to China to manage the protests, the public pressure eventually led to King Birendra relinquishing power on April 8, 1990, and declaring the reintroduction of political parties that were banned by his father.3 The interim government would be led by the Nepali Congress (NC) leader Krishna Prasad Bhattarai. The political parties were informally supported by New Delhi while the monarchy had time and again played the “China Card” to check India’s preponderance. As such, the democratization of Nepal was a critical juncture in the China–India–Nepal (CIN) buffer system as the political parties of Nepal were viewed as more pro-India than the monarchy. The end result of the prodemocracy protests was the transition of Nepal from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. From India’s perspective, the assertive foreign policy initiated by King Mahendra and then carried on by his son King Birendra had created on and off tensions with Nepal. The return of democracy especially under the auspices of the proIndia Nepali Congress Party was a welcome relief despite the fact that numerous communist parties skeptical of India were also part of the Jana Andolan I. In June  1990, interim Prime Minster (PM) Krishna Prasad Bhattarai called for a return to “normal” ties with India and visited New Delhi; his government also withdrew the Zone of Peace (ZoP) proposal calling it “irrelevant in the new political context of Nepal.”4 To normalize relations with India, PM Bhattarai also requested Beijing to withhold the last shipment of weapons that had been a primary cause of the 1989 blockade. Further reversing King Birendra’s policy toward India, Bhattarai also ended the work permit system for Indian nationals working within Nepal.5 Overall, the new democratic government was intent on mending ties with New Delhi and bolstering its hold on the political institutions within Nepal. Having the backing of India as a supporter of democracy in Nepal would placate those in New Delhi who preferred to see a democratic government in the country and also directly appeal to the Nepali people that the Indian Government is on their side. The democratization of Nepal seemed to be a victory for Indian interests as the king’s powers were curtailed significantly; the appeals to China yielded limited results. In fact, China had informed Nepal during the 1989 blockade that it could provide limited support due to transportation difficulties and its own financial constraints.6 The support was limited but unprecedented as it was the first time China had provided such levels of support, despite falling short of Nepal’s needs. China’s explicit reaction remained hands-off. When faced with the protests, King Birendra had sought support from China. Beijing had assured that they would support the monarch. But the massive demonstrations that began in Nepal

Timeframe III  101 and the monarch’s suppression of the movement garnered international criticism from major world actors like India, the US, and West Germany; China found itself in a difficult predicament. On April 9, 1989, in the immediate aftermath of police firing at demonstrators, China’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that the events were Nepal’s internal affairs and that Beijing hoped to see a swift end to the instability.7 Within China’s press, the attitude was one that blamed the problems faced by Nepal on the recent economic difficulties, alluding to the blockade by India in 1989.8 While China assured King Birendra of support, it maintained a very neutral official position as indicated by the statement from the Foreign Ministry. It insisted that cordial relations be maintained with Nepal regardless of its domestic political changes.9 The developments in Nepal were its internal affairs, and China did not want to interfere. In an interview to the Japanese reporters, PM Bhattarai stated that he was satisfied with China’s attitude toward Nepal’s democratization as it maintained neutrality and had not intervened on behalf of King Birendra’s Panchayat Government.10 The new democratic government was poised to be a pro-Indian bloc as affirmed by Bhattarai’s concessions to India. However, China was still a geopolitical actor that mattered as Bhattarai stated in his interview. The democratization of Nepal was a major political event as it changed the political space and opened it for civilian-led political parties. The November 1990 constitution established Nepal as a constitutional monarchy wherein the king remained the ceremonial head of state. As a compromise with the monarch, Nepal remained an officially Hindu state, and the King of Nepal remained the supreme commander of the Royal Nepali Army.11 It was a major political event in the buffer system as Nepal’s political space was transformed, opening up space for political parties to operate. While the Panchayat under Kings Mahendra and Birendra used what is now termed the “China card,” the democratization that was largely backed by India heralded a new political reality. The democratic parties were now open to competing overtures from India and China while the Panchayat had largely constrained such possibilities. With competing political parties, India could influence the prodemocratic Nepali Congress which had long dominated democratic discourses in Nepal. The ideational change was in the form of the opening up of political space; the political parties in the direct aftermath of the democratization process sought to reverse policies of the Panchayat that were deemed problematic for relations with India. The other ideational change came in the form of the evolution of Nepal’s political space. It went from a space that had been politically monopolized by the monarchy to one wherein the buffered states could compete using political parties as proxies if need be. For India, the anti-Panchayat aspirations of Nepal’s public were an opportunity to push back against the monarchy that had time and again undermined its position. As anti-India protests transformed into anti-Panchayat demonstrations, it was strategically sound for India to seek to undermine the monarch’s power. For India, keeping Nepal under its influence was important, and as the Panchayat had shown that it was willing to allow greater Chinese influence to counter India, it was central for New Delhi to make the most out of Nepal’s domestic political

102  Timeframe III tumult. Supporting democratic parties, especially the dominant NC Party, would allow India a powerful proxy within the new political landscape, and as PM Bhattarai’s actions had already showcased, it would closely align with India’s interests. Thus, democratization of Nepal was a strategic win for India, at least as long as the NC remained in power. However, the communist parties of Nepal, which had long remained critical of India, would later challenge India’s interests as the Nepali political parties would eventually also seek to do what the Panchayat had long done to balance India’s influence; this will be covered when discussing the succeeding critical junctures. As for China, it sought to provide support for King Birendra’s Panchayat Government as long as it could. As the international rhetoric turned against the king’s repression of pro-democracy forces, China’s public rhetoric focused on democratization as Nepal’s internal affair. Such an approach makes sense as China was facing international criticism and sanctions due to the developments of the prodemocracy protests in 1989 at Tiananmen Square and the subsequent crackdown that led to the deaths of thousands of protestors. As China faced international isolation, its actions in Nepal that emphasized a focus on heeding international rhetoric made sense; it did not want to take drastic actions that would raise concerns in the international arena. Furthermore, the developments within Nepal indicated that democracy was a given, and as such, China had to work with whoever came to power in Kathmandu to ensure stability in Tibet. As such, Nepal maintained strategic utility for China; however, its policy options were constrained due to widespread domestic support for democracy in Nepal and the international support for the movement. In this critical juncture, India seemed to have maintained its preponderance within the buffer system while China had to acknowledge the resurgence of Indian influence in a newly democratized political space in Nepal. The agency of Nepal within this critical juncture is largely contingent upon its own domestic changes. Given the disarray tied to political instability, the strongly independent foreign policy of Nepal was compromised as the new democratic government under the NC sought to emphasize the special relationship with India. Despite the resurgence of Indian influence during this critical juncture, Nepal’s new PM Bhattarai still iterated that the country would continue cordial relations with China. The political parties understood that despite the democratization of Nepal, its geopolitical context had not changed; while India’s support was quintessential during democratization, Nepal could not completely ignore its northern neighbor. Overall, this critical juncture showcases the dynamism of the buffer system where the previously dominant buffered state utilized instability within the buffer state to reassert its position. The other buffered state had its own structural issues that prevented it from taking any definitive position and, as such, acknowledged the preponderance of the other buffered state in the buffer state. This notion is aptly captured by the statement by China’s Ambassador to Nepal Shao Jiongchu in 1993, when he said that improved relations between India and Nepal were “natural” and “appropriate” due to their religious, cultural, and social affinities.12 This critical juncture was a major pushback against Chinese overtures in Nepal,

Timeframe III  103 yet the dynamism of the buffer system showcases that the status-quo would be challenged as new critical junctures emerged.

II.  1996: The Maoist Insurgency Despite the political change in Nepal and the liberalization of its political space, historical grievances of structural inequity were largely unaddressed. The new constitution also failed to address the interests of Nepal’s numerous ethnic and caste groups that had remained on the margins during the absolute rule of the Shah monarchy.13 The political space had undergone change, but its impact was yet to be felt by a large majority of the country’s population. The Nepali state continued to remain deeply patrimonial with development centered on the capital city of Kathmandu.14 These grievances continued to plague the newly democratic Nepal. On the political front, radical leftist parties expressed dissatisfaction with the system in place. The NC remained vigilant of leftist parties despite their participation in Jana Andolan I. The radical United People’s Front Nepal (UPFN), which was the third largest political party in the 1991 general elections, became increasingly disruptive in parliament and had openly expressed disdain for the mainstream parties and the monarchy for being feudal.15 After several political splits, the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) was formed, which remained radical in its approach. Expressing dissatisfaction with the political status-quo CPN-M’s Chairman Baburam Bhattarai presented 40-Point Demands to PM Sher Bahadur Deuba on February 4, 1996. The demands included the removal of all unequal stipulations and agreements from the 1950 Treaty, regulation of the open border between the two states, and scrapping of the Mahakali Treaty on water-sharing between the two countries.16 The demands also included an extensive overhaul of Nepal’s socioeconomic and political institutions, including a declaration of secularism in place of the country’s status as a Hindu kingdom, promotion of women’s rights, and prohibition of discrimination of disadvantaged communities. Interestingly, the Maoists combined extreme leftist ideology with Nepali nationalism for their platform. The CPN-M’s 40-Point Demands were not met, and they announced a People’s War or Janayuddha on February  13, 1996. The Maoists aimed to “smash the existing semi-feudal and semi-colonial state and build a people’s New Democratic State.”17 Thus, the goal was to establish a “people’s republic” by abolishing the monarchy and transforming Nepal into a secular communist republic.18 It also sought to address vast inequities in Nepal’s socioeconomic landscape and, as such, started building bottom-up support in Nepal’s rural areas. The Maoists called for a protracted people’s war based on the countryside as the status-quo constitutional monarchy system had failed to improve the social and economic conditions of a majority of Nepal’s population. The initial movement was small in scale. King Birendra, who was the commander of the armed forces, had long refused to deploy the Royal Nepali Army, arguing that he could not mobilize the army against his own subjects and feared an escalation of violence.19 The Nepali Government had to create a separate branch of the police called the Armed Police

104  Timeframe III Force (APF) to counter the Maoists. While the insurgency was small scale in its early days, by 2001 the war had spread all across the middle hills and had become a national security emergency.20 The Janayuddha continued until 2006 when the royal government under King Gyanendra was deposed; this critical juncture will be discussed later in this chapter. Thus, the Maoist insurgency was a major political development in Nepal that threatened its stability. This is a major critical juncture in the buffer system as the buffer state appeared to be extensively weak and struggled to maintain monopoly of violence. The beginning of the Janayuddha by the Maoists was a major concern for India. Their 40-Point Demands included very explicit criticism of Nepal’s treaties with India, which were deemed to be unequal and an imposition of India’s “hegemonic aspirations.” As such, the anti-Indian platform of the Maoists was explicit from the beginning of the conflict. The open border with India concerned New Delhi regarding the security implications of the civil war in Nepal. The other major concern for India was the burgeoning links between the Maoists in Nepal and those in India, which included the Naxalite movements in rural tribal regions.21 Such links could destabilize India’s restive tribal regions while also facing insecurity from across the border in Nepal. Structural affinities of institutions like the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which sought to tackle leftist extremism, became increasingly concerned about these growing cross-border links between the Maoists in India and Nepal.22 Additionally, given the Maoists’ open disdain for India’s role, their increased influence would undermine Indian interests in Nepal. Undermining of multiparty democracy in Nepal would also be detrimental to Indian interests as the previous experiences with authoritarian leadership under the monarchy were willing to play China against India as needed; a democratic system had competing interests and as such, it was more susceptible to overtures from India. As such, the Indian government initially sought to back the Nepali Government by providing technical and material support for the APF. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal could not only destabilize India’s influence in Nepal but also pose security concerns within its borders. As such, the buffered state India sought to maintain its preponderance in the buffer state while also being mindful of the possibility of the buffer state’s domestic political instability undermining the buffered state’s own security. Despite the fact that the movement bore Mao Zedong’s name, China largely remained silent on the ongoing insurgency in Nepal. It largely delegated it as an internal political affair of Nepal while calling for a swift resolution of the issue. The first clear stance by China on Nepal’s civil war was made in May 2001, a week before the visit of Premier Zhu Rongji. China’s Ambassador to Nepal Zeng Xuyong commented that the rebels were dishonoring Mao’s name.23 It was largely to dispel arguments that the PRC was backing the Maoists due to ideological affinities although these links were not substantiated. For China, the stability of Tibet preceded all other concerns, and as such, Beijing made overtures to the Nepali Government and King Birendra. In fact, infrastructure and economic links between Nepal and China were bolstered when Zhu visited Nepal. Both sides signed an agreement to construct the Syabrubesi–Rasuwagadi road, which would

Timeframe III  105 be the second road link between the two states.24 Thus, China continued to maintain a distance from the Maoists and sought to support the government in power. Despite charges of links to the Maoists, no such allegations were substantiated. The launch of the Janayuddha by the Maoists was a major political event as it threatened to uproot the nascent democratic system that was established in 1990. Such an event would destabilize Nepal as a buffer state and leave room for either of the buffered state to extend their influence. The civil war also required India to bolster its ties with the civilian Government in Nepal as the Maoists threatened to uproot a system that New Delhi had thrown so much weight behind. As for China, maintenance of the status-quo made sense as it provided some semblance of security vis-à-vis Tibet. Overall, this critical juncture did not signal any radical ideational or policy changes. For both India and China, an unstable Nepal was undesirable. For India, it would mean the possibility of reduction of its influence that it garnered with the political parties during Nepal’s democratization. As for China, it would entail implications for Tibet’s stability, which was an innate part of its policy toward Nepal. Regardless, the domestic political developments during the Maoist insurgency were troubling for all states in this buffer system as they could destabilize the regional security framework and geopolitical interactions between the states within the system. This critical juncture had a strong linkage between the domestic political and security concerns of the buffered state with those of the buffer state. An unstable Nepal would impact China’s concerns in Tibet and the looming concerns about Tibetan refugees within Nepal. For India, it would entail loss of influence and an even graver concern about Maoist connections to its own Naxalite rebels. Furthermore, a Maoist victory was undesirable given its strong anti-Indian stances against New Delhi’s “hegemony” and “expansionism.” While not directly competitive, the dynamism of Indian and Chinese overtures can be ascertained in this critical juncture. India bolstered its support for the democratic Government in Nepal against the Maoists; China also openly criticized the Maoists for misusing Mao’s name, signaling explicit support for the democratically elected Governments in Nepal. Overall, the buffer remained important for both China and India, specifically the stability of the incumbent political system. During this period, their actions were more convergent than divergent, despite disparate interests, given the shared concern for the stability of the Nepali state. Nepal’s agency in this critical juncture is largely discussed based on its domestic developments. The civil war severely curtailed the capability of the Nepali Government, and as such, its attention largely focused on domestic affairs. Successive democratic governments continued to foster close security ties with India, the United States, and the United Kingdom, who provided extensive logistical, technological, and material support to Nepali security forces. China also maintained close ties with the successive democratic governments. Overall, this critical juncture did not entail any extensive maneuverings from Nepal vis-à-vis its neighbors. The buffer state in this critical juncture remained marred with domestic instability and exercised very little of its agency in the buffer system as the buffered states continued to support the incumbent government institutions. It was

106  Timeframe III not until the 2001 massacre of King Birendra that the buffer system once again entailed dynamic overtures between India and China in Nepal.

III. 2001: King Birendra’s Assassination and Crowning of King Gyanendra On June 2, 2001, King Birendra along with his family and half a dozen members of the royal family were murdered by the Crown Prince Dipendra who then shot himself.25 Nepal was thrust into another political crisis; King Birendra, despite facing prodemocracy protests in 1990, remained popular with a vast majority of Nepalis. The backdrop of Nepal’s raging Maoist rebellion made the royal family massacre a politically sensitive and disastrous development. The government, already weakened by a Maoist guerrilla group that controlled more than half of the country by 2001, found itself in a precarious position as King Birendra enjoyed immense support from the populace.26 Next in line for the throne was Birendra’s brother Gyanendra who was not very popular among the Nepalis; his son Paras, who was soon to be Crown Prince, much less so.27 Paras had long been known for disregarding public law and also killing a famous musician in a hit-and-run case.28 As for Gyanendra, he was long considered to be disgruntled with Birendra over the cessation of power to the civil political parties in 1990 as he thought the monarch should retain extensive political power.29 Gyanendra and his son did not enjoy the goodwill that was extended to Birendra despite facing prodemocracy protests. This led to the speculation that the monarchy faced a tumultuous future in Nepal. It also did not help that King Gyanendra was perceived to be more aggressive, assertive, and ambitious than his late brother.30 Regardless of these sentiments, Gyanendra was crowned King of Nepal on June 4, 2001, as per the traditions of the Shah dynasty. The shift of the largely ceremonial role of the King of Nepal from Birendra to Gyanendra is a critical juncture as it highlighted the shift in the role of the Royal Nepali Army. The 1990 constitution had established a constitutional monarchy in Nepal, but the king remained the head of the Royal Nepali Army (RNA). King Birendra’s refusal to mobilize the armed forces had forced the civilian government to create the APF; some even argued that if King Birendra had mobilized the army early on in the civil war, it would not have the opportunity to grow to the scale where the Maoists controlled almost half of the country when King Gyanendra assumed the throne. The end of King Birendra’s reign had serious implications for the Nepali Civil War; King Gyanendra had the predisposition to use the armed forces against the Maoists, which he did after being crowned the King of Nepal.31 The calls by the Maoists to abolish the monarchy were perceived as a direct threat by King Gyanendra, who perceived that the threat can only be resolved through use of force. The willingness of Gyanendra to utilize the RNA against the Maoists and his dissatisfaction with his brother’s acquiescence to democratic reforms signaled a change in the ideational outlook of the monarchy, which would have ramifications for the buffer system given that the monarchy had a history of using the “China card” and the political parties enjoyed support from India. The ideational change

Timeframe III  107 that accompanied the royal family massacre was the political disposition of the new monarch. Thus, the policy changes after the royal family massacre were tied to domestic politics in Nepal, namely changes toward the Maoists. Gyanendra had long favored the use of a military solution to the civil war, which would be a stark departure from Birendra’s refusal to mobilize the RNA. The mobilization of the RNA resulted in an escalation of violence further destabilizing Nepal. The Maoists, who had largely been operating in the rural hinterlands of Nepal, increasingly targeted urban centers in major cities like Kathmandu and Pokhara; they also started touting themselves as the only guarantors of security.32 Just as in Nepal, reactions in India were of shock. The External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, declaring a three-day state mourning, said: The government and people of India are stunned and deeply shocked at the tragic and untimely demise of his majesty the King of Nepal, her majesty the Queen and other members of the royal family . . . . As a close neighbor and friend, India conveys its heartfelt condolences to the mourning nation of the royal kingdom of Nepal.33 India’s main concerns now were tied to the influence the Maoists might have as Nepal faced tumult. New Delhi was particularly concerned about the rise of China’s influence despite the latter distancing itself from the Nepali Maoists.34 The monarchy had long used the “China card” when politically expedient to push back against Indian overtures but had provided a semblance of stability in Nepal’s difficult political climate. A few months into King Gyanendra’s reign, the September 11 attacks in New York City also changed the context for the Nepali Civil War. The Maoists were declared a terrorist group by the US, which provided the RNA with technical and military assistance. Fearful of the consequences of a successful Maoist takeover, India also offered military assistance to the RNA and declared the Maoists to be a terrorist group.35 Overall, the immediate period after King Gyanendra’s coronation entailed extensive mobilization of the RNA backed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and India. For India, a weak Nepali state in the aftermath of the royal family massacre meant that the Maoists enjoyed an upper hand and a Maoist takeover would weaken India’s influence in Nepal given their blatant anti-Indian ideology, as illustrated in the 40-Point Demands. Propping up the democratic government was the safest bet. Similarly, Chinese perspective on the royal family massacre was one of shock and concern. An unstable Nepali state meant that the Maoists, who Beijing had criticized as misusing Mao’s name, could propel into power. The Maoists had also criticized Beijing’s leadership as being reactionaries; an unstable Nepal next to the sensitive TAR meant that China was extensively concerned about the post-royal family massacre context in Nepal.36 Also concerning to China was the growing presence of American, British, and Indian military support for the RNA. Despite these concerns, the Chinese Government continued to support the constitutional monarchy of King Gyanendra led by PM Deuba. Maintaining stability in Nepal took precedence for the stability of the TAR.

108  Timeframe III The royal family massacre entailed ideational change within Nepal. King Gyanendra saw the RNA as an important actor to ensure a victory over the Maoists; he was willing to escalate the conflict to safeguard the monarchical system. This also meant that the civilian government came under increased pressure to toe the line; PM Deuba’s Government was receptive to international support not just from India but also from the United States and the United Kingom. Thus, the crisis following the royal family massacre entailed an ideational change in the role of the RNA and the need to use a more intense military solution to the Maoist problem. Policy changes that followed included full mobilization of the RNA and the increased role of international actors to bolster its capabilities. As such, the royal family massacre of 2001 is a critical juncture for the buffer system as the buffer state underwent changes vis-à-vis its security, which had implications for both the buffered states. Instability in Nepal could easily spillover into India through the open border and bolster its own Naxalite movements. For China, an unstable Nepal would undermine its security in the TAR. While not necessarily tied to its buffer role, Nepal did exercise agency to ensure stability of the existing political system in the aftermath of the massacre. While King Gyanendra was a constitutional monarch until October 2002, he mobilized the armed forces to ensure the survival of the system. The global War on Terror in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also provided the Nepali Government, then under Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, the rhetorical tools to take a hardline military approach against the Maoists.37 The Nepali Government during this period increasingly used the War on Terror rhetoric to deal with the Maoist insurgency, which also included extensive military support from the United States, the United Kingdom, and India. Thus, Nepal used its agency to ensure the survival of the incumbent political system by appealing to the internationally emerging anti-terrorist stance for its own domestic security predicament. It also played into the concerns of the buffered states by presenting the issue as a terrorist threat. A Maoist victory would be perceived as a victory for terrorism, and it would not only destabilize the buffer state but also have grave ramifications for the buffer system as a whole given the Maoists’ strong rhetoric against both buffered states.

IV. 2002: Suspension of Parliamentary Democracy and the Royal Coup By 2002, the Nepali state faced extensive pressures from the Maoists who had now taken control over two-thirds of the country’s territory and a heightened criticism from the international community for human rights violations committed by the armed forces. Furthermore, the government increasingly turned to authoritarian tendencies to maintain control and fight the Maoists.38 King Gyanendra took the drastic step of dissolving the democratically elected parliament under PM Deuba on October 4, 2002.39 The reasoning behind the dissolution of parliament was the failure of the civilian government to negotiate with the Maoists.40 Citing the ineffectiveness of the Deuba Government, King Gyanendra handpicked Panchayatera political leader Lokendra Bahadur Chand as the caretaker PM. Despite the fact

Timeframe III  109 that a new head of government was instated, constitutional democracy had been severely weakened due to the concentration of power in the monarchy. Chand’s tenure as PM did not last for long as he resigned in June 2003; King Gyanendra picked Surya Bahadur Thapa to become the PM, who was once again replaced by PM Deuba in June 2, 2004. The political tumult coincided with an extensive exacerbation of violence by the Maoists, who were now openly threatening urban centers including the capital city of Kathmandu. Citing failures by preceding governments to bring the Maoists to the negotiating table, King Gyanendra assumed absolute power on February 1, 2005, ending the era of constitutional monarchy established in 1990.41 During his proclamation of absolute rule, King Gyanendra declared: Nepal’s independence, national unity and sovereignty are best safe-guarded by the intimate relationship between the King and people. An institution of monarchy ever devoted to the country and people and a people with an innate love for their land is the glorious history of the kingdom of Nepal, its present and also its future.42 King Gyanendra not only dissolved elected representatives, he sought to curtail the freedom of the media. According to an interview with Julia Heming of the Columbia Journalism Review, Kunda Dixit, one of Nepal’s most prominent journalists and the founding editor of the Nepali Times stated that “for the first two weeks (after the coup), there were actual soldiers in the newsroom with guns, especially in radio stations, TV stations, internet service providers and daily newspapers.”43 Thus, the 2005 coup witnessed the suspension of all forms of civil rights accorded by the 1990 constitution; Nepal effectively became an absolute monarchy. In the aftermath of the dissolution of parliament in October 2002, India along with the United States and the United Kingdom had remained largely muted despite King Gyanendra’s turn toward increasing authoritarianism.44 The security threats posed by a Maoist takeover had subsumed the conversation. However, the 2005 coup was met with intense criticism from the Government of India, which had long supported the establishment of democracy in Nepal.45 India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated that the developments in Nepal “constitute a serious setback to the cause of democracy” and that New Delhi had “grave concerns” about the events.46 As a sign of displeasure, Indian PM Manmohan Singh pulled out of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) meeting to be held in Bangladesh; the chief of the Indian Army, General J.J. Singh who was invited to visit Kathmandu, turned it down.47 The Indian Ambassador, along with those from the United Kingdom and the United States, also left Kathmandu for consultations. Similar to previous critical junctures, China expressed that the development was an internal matter of Nepal. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said during the press conference on February 2, 2005, that Gyanendra’s decision was “an internal affair of Nepal” and that China would “respect Nepalese people’s option on how to develop their own country.”48 Thus, unlike India, China’s public rhetoric continued to support the party in power; in this instance, it was King Gyanendra.

110  Timeframe III The royal coup was a major political event that changed the political system in Nepal. Multiparty democracy was officially abolished and the centralized absolute monarchy made a comeback. The most significant ideational change here was the manner in which King Gyanendra perceived the role of the military and the threat the Maoists posed to the institution of the monarchy. Since 2002, Gyanendra had increasingly perceived the democratic parties to be lackluster in resolving the Maoist issue. A  military option was deemed to be the most viable as other methods had yielded little to successfully bring the Maoists to a political settlement. As such, Gyanendra’s usurpation of power followed more intense use of the military. He fundamentally changed the way the monarchy was perceived not just by the Nepalis but also by the international community. Countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, which had previously supported anti-Maoist efforts, suddenly were thrown into a difficult disposition as Nepal was no longer a democratic country. Given their own domestic democratic leanings, these countries faced the difficult choice of continuing to support Nepal’s efforts against the Maoists while also remaining cognizant that it was no longer a democracy. Thus, the royal coup was a critical juncture as it signaled a change in Nepal’s Government system, and accordingly, its domestic and foreign policies were expected to change. Similarly, the way in which the international community perceived it also changed as Nepal emerged as an authoritarian state with the monarchy at its helm. This political development had extensive impact in the buffer system as the buffer state underwent a domestic political change that had implications of changing its relations with the buffered states. The change in the government system from a multiparty democracy to an absolute monarchy alarmed India. Kings Mahendra and Birendra had not shied away from using the “China card” when they felt that India was pushing its influence too much in Nepal. Having power consolidated in a single institution gave New Delhi little room to influence groups within Nepal, which was more likely under a multiparty democratic system. As such, King Gyanendra’s absolute monarchy was a possible blow to Indian influence in Nepal. Further complicating matters was that due to the political upheaval in Nepal, the Maoist specter within the country seemed plausible. Overall, this critical juncture presented a significant challenge for India as it preferred to deal with a multiparty system over an authoritarian monarchy that had historically turned to China when apt. For China, its muted response was a reflection of its “hands-off” approach in Nepal, calling political developments within the country as its own internal matters. This is not to say that China was not concerned; Gyanendra’s Government ordered the shutting down of two important offices in Kathmandu tied to the Tibetan Government-in-exile – the Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office and the Office of the Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.49 While publicly not stating its stance, Beijing sought to use the new development in Nepal to its advantage. For King Gyanendra, the closing of the offices was a step to ensure Beijing’s support, given the increasing criticism and diplomatic isolation his government faced internationally. Nevertheless, the reactions of India and China to this critical juncture are significantly different. India was blunt and explicit about its dissatisfaction while China maintained its

Timeframe III 111 distance and gambled to support whoever emerged as the victor, as it had been doing since establishing diplomatic ties with Nepal in 1955. The royal coup as a critical juncture was a reassertion of Nepali sovereignty tied to the monarch. As his statement on February 1, 2005, highlighted, King Gyanendra tied the notion of Nepali nationalism to the monarch. While no explicit references are made to either India or China, this critical juncture could be interpreted as one wherein Nepal’s buffer status is tied to the survival of King Gyanendra’s rule; his government emphasizes the existential threat to the monarchy (which is directly tied to Nepal as a whole) by the Maoists. While the royal coup itself did not lend itself to illustrating Nepal’s role as a buffer state, the actions taken by Nepal, including the shutting down of two Tibet-related offices to appease to China, showcase that it sought to use its agency to prop up support from one buffered state when the other buffered state and the international community shunned it. This critical juncture sets the stage for how the buffered states would react to the political developments within the buffer state and how the buffer state navigates international reactions to its domestic political developments.

V. 2006–2008: Jana Andolan II and Abolishment of Nepal’s Monarchy The aftermath of the 2005 suspension of parliamentary democracy thrust Nepal into political chaos. With his drastic actions, King Gyanendra had managed to isolate himself inside and outside of Nepal. International actors such as the US and the EU criticized his move as well and postponed military support that they had offered to fight against the Maoists.50 India, as already discussed, was also highly critical of the move. Domestically, the suspension of democracy by Gyanendra spurred collaboration between the major civilian political parties (called the Seven Party Alliance or SPA). Incidentally, King Gyanendra’s actions brought together factions that were long separated by ideological cleavages, including the Maoists. Briefly after King Gyanendra’s coup in 2005, the second-in-command of the Maoists, Baburam Bhattarai, declared: A brief recapitulation of the incessant struggle between the monarchy and democracy since the 1950s in the country should leave no one in any doubt that without the complete abolition of the archaic institution of feudal monarchy and its puppet army, no form of democracy can be secure and institutional in Nepal.51 The Maoists seemed likely to forge ties with other political parties. The Maoists eventually indicated to the SPA that they would commit to a democratic multiparty republic, a major deviation from their original commitment to establishing a communist republic.52 In November 22, 2005, the SPA and the Maoists reached a 12-point agreement that reaffirmed the latter’s support for a multiparty democracy; India played a major role in this, and the agreement was signed in New Delhi.53 The royal coup encouraged both democratic forces and the Maoists to collaborate

112  Timeframe III in ousting the monarchy. Subsequently, in April 2006, over three million Nepali people, out of a total population of 23 million, took part in Jana Andolan II – the second mass uprising for democracy. Unlike Jana Andolan I, the second People’s Movement rallied around republicanism. Abolishment of the monarchy was the only way to ensure a democratic future for Nepal.54 The 19-day Jana Andolan II brought the support of all sectors of Nepali society and, at times, became violent leading to the deaths of 22 participants in total.55 On April 28, 2006, given enormous domestic and international pressure, King Gyanendra conceded and handed power back to the parliament that was dissolved by him on February 1, 2005.56 During a speech he had made on April 24, King Gyanendra stated the following: Convinced that the source of state authority and sovereignty of the kingdom of Nepal is inherent in the people of Nepal and cognizant of the spirit of the ongoing people’s movement as well as to resolve the ongoing violent conflict and other problems facing the country according to the road map of the agitating seven-party alliance, we, through this proclamation, reinstate the House of Representatives which was dissolved on 22 May 2002 on the advice of the then prime minister in accordance with the constitution of the kingdom of Nepal-1990. We call upon the seven-party alliance to bear the responsibility of taking the nation on the path to national unity and prosperity, while ensuring permanent peace and safeguarding multiparty democracy. We also summon the session of the reinstated House of Representatives at the Sansad Bhawan, Singha Durbar at 1300 (0745GMT) on Friday 28 April 2006.57 Following the success of Jana Andolan II, an interim government by NC leader Girija Prasad Koirala as prime minister was formed. The Maoists and the civilian Government of Nepal also signed the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) on November 22, 2006, effectively ending the civil war that had raged in the country since 1996.58 The Maoists agreed to lay down arms and joined the political mainstream becoming a prominent player in Nepal’s post-civil war multiparty democracy. The movement not only led to the end of the Nepali Civil War, but a strong wave of anti-monarchy fervor was present and political parties acted on its behest. The interim parliament, which Gyanendra restored, drafted an interim constitution on August 24, 2006.59 The interim constitution had one crucial omission: The mention of anything related to the monarchy. It also fixed the first Constituent Assembly election to be held on April  10, 2008.60 The interim parliament also proceeded to remove the “royal” from all institutions associated with the state. Proclamations were issued that removed the words “His Majesty’s” and “Royal” from all organs of the state. “His Majesty’s Government of Nepal” became “the Government of Nepal” and the only state institution still loyal to the king until his last days as absolute monarch, the “Royal Nepali Army” became “the Nepal Army.”61 The Government of Nepal further curtailed the rights of the monarch by revoking all of his powers and declaring Nepal a secular state in 2006. This declaration stripped the agency of the King of Nepal as the head of the Hindu Kingdom of

Timeframe III  113 Nepal. The Constituent Assembly (CA) elections in April  2008 resulted in the surprise victory of the Maoists, who won 30% of the popular vote.62 With the Maoists leading in the first CA polls, the question of the monarchy became even more precarious given their vocal opposition to the institution since the initiation of the civil war. As expected, the May 28, 2008, convening of the CA of Nepal voted to abolish the monarchy; 560 out of the 575 members of the CA voted for its abolishment.63 Thus, the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal was declared a secular, federal, democratic, and republican state, ending 240 years of the Shah Dynasty that had united the country.64 India, which had been vocally against King Gyanendra’s coup, explicitly supported the democratic parties in Nepal. The CPA between the SPA and the Maoists was signed in New Delhi; it cannot be denied that India played an instrumental role in uniting the two sides against the monarchy. India had traditionally emphasized that the twin pillars of Nepal’s political stability were the monarchy and multiparty democracy; the monarchy was also viewed as a bulwark against the Maoists.65 But, King Gyanendra’s coup reversed that support. India along with Western powers like the United Kingdom and the United States, which had long supported the anti-Maoist struggles, were largely against the coup. The Maoists since 2002 had sought to reach out to India to establish contacts seeing the increasing support of the RNA by the US along the War on Terror discourse with limited success. Yet by the time of the 2005 royal coup, India realized that a military solution put forth by King Gyanendra would not bear fruition. It now emphasized “broad national consensus” among the political actors of Nepal and stopped arms support for the RNA.66 The Indian PM Manmohan Singh also met King Gyanendra twice in April and November  2005; both times, he urged the king to reverse the curtailment of democratic rights. India was also increasingly uneasy with the king’s actions. In August 2005, Nepal initiated talks with China to buy ammunition worth $1.2 million, which coincided with Nepal’s delegation pushing for China’s participation in the upcoming SAARC summit.67 India had also sought Nepal’s support for its bid for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Nepal expressed blatantly that it had reservations about India’s bid.68 Furthermore, Nepal had for a long time maintained close ties with international organizations such as the UN; India had increasingly become wary of the increasingly important roles played by the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Humanitarian Dialogue and the Carter Center.69 India increasingly saw the best policy approach was to back democratic forces and as such prodded the SPA and the Maoists to agree on a common agenda. The willingness of the Nepali mainstream parties to integrate the Maoists into a democratic constitutional framework and the increasingly positive overtures from the Maoists had allowed India to pressure both sides to a common agenda. This effectively culminated into the 12-Point Understanding signed on November 22, 2005. India was instrumental in pressuring King Gyanendra’s Government. For New Delhi, the royal government was undemocratic, but more importantly, it had increased ties with China and sought more direct support from the US, which was still willing to focus on a military solution to the civil war.

114  Timeframe III Unlike India that had been vocal about its criticism of King Gyanendra’s coup, China had started out with a measured response by calling it an internal affair of Nepal. China had also criticized the Maoists and had supported the Nepali Government. However, Beijing’s role became increasingly important for King Gyanendra as he was increasingly isolated given the criticism from much of Nepal’s close international partners including the United Kingdom and the EU. China, given its own domestic political system, did not heed to the need for democracy in Nepal and sought to prop up the royal regime that had now begun to use the “China card” as India had made it explicitly clear that democratization was the only way forward. During King Gyanendra’s absolute rule, China was the only country willing to provide military supplies.70 On October 2005, China pledged to provide military assistance worth $989,000 to Nepal.71 A month later, China was alleged to have supplied 18 truckloads of arms and ammunition to Nepal through the northern road connection in Kodari.72 To further prop up support and extend diplomatic legitimacy to King Gyanendra, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited Kathmandu in April 2005, two months after the royal coup and met the king.73 China (and Pakistan) had also actively opposed any actions from the UN Human Rights Commission about the worsening human rights situation under the royal government.74 Furthermore, China used this opportunity to make further inroads into South Asia; during the 2005 SAARC Summit in Bangladesh, Nepal along with Pakistan and Sri Lanka pushed for China’s membership.75 However, as the democratic forces along with the Maoists were poised for victory, Beijing had to recalibrate its relations with the royal government. As the monarch stepped down and SPA announced a new government, China welcomed the news. The Maoists became a dominant political force in the 2008 CA elections; Beijing definitely needed to move away from its previous rhetoric and rethink its policy toward a Nepal that no longer had a monarchy. For China, this was a matter of grave importance, not just for the stability of the TAR. For the first time in 2008, China was poised to host the Summer Olympics to signal its “arrival” as a major world power. Beijing had to ensure a smooth Olympics to signal its capability, and that meant stability in border regions was quintessential for its success. The end of the Nepalese monarchy is a major critical juncture in the CIN buffer system as Nepal’s domestic political institutions changed significantly with the abolishment of the monarchy. As stated earlier, the monarchy had long been considered a strong actor for maintaining a balance between India and China, repeatedly using the “China card.” With the abolishment of that institution, the dynamics for change within Nepal were obvious as all of the political parties that contested the first CA elections had forged a deal in New Delhi in 2005, under the behest of the Government of India. While China had backed King Gyanendra, citing it as an internal matter of Nepal, it did tacitly support the monarchy by providing limited military support to the RNA. With the new secular and republican system of governance, both India and China had to reformulate their foreign policy objectives in a radically different domestic political context in Nepal. The ideational change of Nepal from a monarchy to a multiparty republic would also entail a departure in policy. There no longer existed

Timeframe III  115 a centralized institution that could effectively balance China and India. Instead, the fractionalized and competing political parties would once again provide the buffered states with opportunities to pursue their interests by supporting particular political groups within the buffer state. The Jana Andolan II and subsequent transition of Nepal’s Government system were perhaps the events that heralded the arrival of a very dynamic buffer system. Both China and India showcased extensive levels of competitive overtures toward Nepal. India sought to maintain its ties with the political parties and feared an autocratic monarch would leave little room for its overtures, given its history of using the “China card.” As the king turned toward a military solution, India also realized that such an approach was futile and that backing a political solution was preferable. New Delhi also positioned itself as a harbinger of democracy, which would give India political currency with Nepali political parties, including the Maoists. King Gyanendra had challenged India’s preponderance as he increasingly came under criticism from New Delhi. Having his agency curtailed was the best way for India to reestablish its preponderance in Nepal, which had increasingly sought Chinese support to make up for the support it had lost from New Delhi and the West. For India, Nepal had become a de facto proxy of China as Kathmandu lobbied for China’s inclusion in SAARC and had also openly bought weapons. For China, it was an opportunity to further its influence by supporting the king. While primarily driven by stability in the TAR, supporting whoever was in power made sense as publicly it showcased that China would not intervene in other states’ internal affairs while also pursuing its most important interest in Nepal, that is, control over Tibetan refugees there and stability in the TAR. India’s support and active participation in bringing the SPA and Maoists as well as China’s active support for the monarchy in Nepal showcase competitive overtures, each driven by their respective interests. Nevertheless, these events tied to this critical juncture highlight the emergence of a very dynamic and competitive buffer system wherein China emerged more confident and interactive compared to previous critical junctures. This further made Nepal more important for India as its influence within the buffer system was extensively pushed back on by the buffer state and the contending buffered state. The heralding of a republic in Nepal perhaps provided some respite for New Delhi about China’s rise in the country. However, later events discussed in Timeframe IV in Chapter 7 illustrate that Nepal continues to be a dynamic political space wherein China and India continue their competitive overtures. During this critical juncture, Nepal as a buffer state exercised extensive agency. As King Gyanendra found himself increasingly isolated in the aftermath of the royal coup, he reached out to China and actively positioned Nepal to support Beijing’s overtures. China also saw this as an opportunity to pursue greater influence in Nepal. This convergence of interests allowed Nepal to push back against international pressures by reaching out to China; it sought to balance one buffered state’s lack of support by seeking greater support from the contending buffered state. As King Gyanendra had retorted when asked about criticism from India following his coup, “they (India) must say what they must say and we must do what

116  Timeframe III we must do.”76 While his regime would not last and the monarchy would eventually be banished, this critical juncture illustrates the connections between shifting congruence or divergence of interests between the buffer and buffered states and the agency of buffer states. It also highlights the connections between domestic regime in the buffer state and its interests in the way in which it behaves within the buffer system. For the survival of his regime, King Gyanendra sought to balance one buffered state against the other.

VI.  2008: Riots in the TAR The TAR has been a critical frontier province for the PRC. Along with Xinjiang, the TAR is a domestic security challenge with a significant ethnic dimension. Since 1992, China began releasing White Papers that highlight the important domestic and international security concerns and visions for the country. Out of the 87 White Papers the PRC has released since 1992, 10 have dealt with Tibet or Tibetans.77 Thus, Tibet has remained a central internal security concern for Beijing, which eventually came true in 2008. Riots erupted in the TAR on March 10, 2008, which were the worst protests to hit the region since the Tibetan Uprising of 1959. It erupted in March  2008 after protests by supporters of Tibetan Buddhist monks, arrested for celebrating the conferring of the US Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama, escalated into full-fledged riots.78 It coincided with the 49th anniversary of the failed Tibetan Uprising in 1959, which eventually led to the departure of the Dalai Lama from Tibet to India. The situation in the TAR in 2008 was the gravest for Beijing’s internal security since the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. The government quickly deployed riot police and took control of the provincial capital Lhasa; tanks and soldiers were deployed and all lines of communication with the city were blocked.79 The riots also assumed an ethnic dimension as tensions rose between the ethnic Tibetans and Han Chinese. The riots spread outside of the TAR into other provinces with ethnic Tibetan populations, namely Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu.80 The protests were also characterized by the participation of a wide array of social groups, including disparate socioeconomic classes of Tibetans.81 Many of the protests were led by Buddhist monks, who were placed under strict surveillance after the riots subsided. Ethnic Han migrants and their businesses were attacked by groups of Tibetans, which led to the burning down of over a thousand Han-owned shops and the death of 19 individuals, including 18 ethnic Han Chinese citizens.82 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took the riots seriously, given that the Olympic Games were to be held the same year in Beijing. However, the riots were a public relations disaster for the Chinese Government as the riots coincided with numerous disruptions during the Olympics torch rallies by pro-Tibetan groups throughout the world, highlighting serious charges of human rights abuses in the TAR.83 Beijing wanted to ensure that the event went smoothly, but it faced international criticism over its human rights situation and domestic discontent that erupted in the form of the riots in the TAR. Given the sensitive nature of the TAR, Chinese authorities banned climbers from the northern side of Mount Everest.84 China also banned the entry of foreign travelers and journalists into the TAR.

Timeframe III  117 The riots extensively transformed China’s policy toward Nepal. While Nepal had been central to the stability of the TAR, the riots signaled that Beijing had to take a more hardline stance to ensure stability in the region. It was certainly telling that right after China temporarily banned expeditions to Mount Everest from its side, the Government in Nepal followed suit swiftly. Nepalese authorities dispatched two dozen armed security personnel, enforced a climbing ban above 6,500 meters, and temporarily banned laptops and satellite and internet communication from Everest Base Camp.85 This development comes within the backdrop of the presence of 20,000 Tibetan refugees in Nepal, which is the second largest population of the Tibetan diaspora after India.86 Since the establishment of diplomatic ties, China had long used the set of policies called the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence toward Nepal. Just like its interactions with other developing states, China maintained preference for noninterference, emphasizing the diplomatic line of political developments in Nepal as its internal affair.87 However, China was also cognizant of the large Tibetan population within Nepal, who unlike Tibetans in the TAR could freely protest and congregate as they had done throughout the years. With the 2008 riots, Beijing increasingly sought to curb the activities of the Tibetan community within Nepal, which meant more direct pressure on the Nepali Government. Chinese officials sought to adopt a hard-handed approach to the tumultuous relationship with ethnic Tibetans, be it within the TAR or neighboring states. Thus, 2008 was the watershed year for Sino-Nepali relations; Beijing had long maintained an arm’s distance in dealing with Kathmandu. The aftermath of the 2008 riots in TAR witnessed a more active foreign policy approach. In the aftermath of the 2008 riots, the Embassy of China in Nepal arranged USD 10 million to be granted to the Nepali police for purchase of Chinese riot shields and batons.88 This move is evidently tied to periodic protests by Tibetan groups in front of the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu, coinciding with the riots in the TAR and China hosting the Summer Olympics. Additionally, coordination between the security apparatus in China and Nepal became closer; the evidence of this is the number of Tibetans fleeing from TAR into Nepal. Between 1991 and 2008, the number of Tibetan refugees fleeing into Nepal averaged 2,200 individuals per year; the number had dropped to 171 individuals per year between 2008 and 2013.89 Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, Zheng Xianglin, publicly urged the Nepali Government to take sterner actions against Tibetan protestors, labeling them as “separatists.”90 Thus, the year 2008 represents a major critical juncture in the buffer system, as China increasingly projected its interests in Nepal. India’s response emphasized the death toll of civilians. Erstwhile Indian Foreign Minister (FM) Pranab Mukherjee said that: We hope all those involved will work to improve the situation and remove the causes of such trouble in Tibet, which is an autonomous region of China, through dialogue and non-violent means.91 FM Mukherjee’s official statement is a reflection of the then United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress (INC), who wanted to toe

118  Timeframe III the line of the riots as an internal matter of China; the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) wanted to raise the issue at the UN and other international avenues.92 India’s domestic political actors remained divided on whether the “Tibet card” could be used as a strategic chip or to continue to foster stable relations with China by considering the protests as an internal matter. The ruling UPA chose the latter; India went so far as to detain protestors who came out in support of the riots in the TAR fearing diplomatic lulls with Beijing.93 Even after the abolishment of the monarchy, Nepal sought close ties with China, and given Beijing’s increasingly hands-on approach, Kathmandu could not effectively resist such overtures. Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal (referred to as Prachanda) called the riots “separatist violence” and supported the crackdown against dissidence.94 In the months following the March  2008 riots in the TAR, Human Rights Watch accused the Nepali police of using extensive violence against Tibetan protestors and at times preemptively arresting those who were on their way to the protests or even those affiliated with human rights organizations such as Amnesty International – Nepal.95 In May 2008, the Nepali police detained over 500 Tibetan women participating in demonstrations against Chinese rule in Tibet.96 In the April  2008 CA elections, the Maoists emerged as the victors, and Prachanda was elected prime minister. Despite the Maoists not having the favor of China during the civil war, Prachanda visited Beijing for the closing ceremony of the Olympics, which was a stark departure from the traditional norm that the first foreign trip of a Nepali PM was to India.97 After his visit, Prachanda defended his actions stating that they were important for improving relations between the two countries. He went on to say that equidistance between China and India was important for the country and that he would be happy to partake in discussions with New Delhi about the peace process and constitution-drafting process.98 Despite the suspicions about China, the Maoists acknowledged the increased strategic importance for Nepal related to Beijing’s policy toward the TAR. It is evident that there was an ideational change, particularly regarding China’s conception of Nepal in its foreign policy after the TAR riots. The crisis was the riots in China, which set off a scurry of concerns and led to increased interest in Nepal due to its large Tibetan refugee population. The ideational change was largely connected to China’s perception of Nepal as a country of strategic security concern due to its proximity to the TAR. This ideational change culminated in policy changes, wherein China’s pledges to Nepal increased substantially and the curbs on Tibetan refugees in Nepal became more intense. This importance was externalized in the form of rhetorical pressure and material support to suppress dissident voices from the Tibetan community within Nepal. As an extension of this, Nepal became strategically more crucial for China’s policy vis-à-vis the TAR. This ascendant importance of Nepal entailed making stronger overtures, be it in the form of diplomatic pressure as applied by China right after the riots or by supporting the riot police expected to quell anti-China protests in Nepal. As such, the preponderance of India came under increased pressure despite the strong pro-India stance of the Nepali political parties during the anti-monarchy protests.

Timeframe III  119 The political actors of Nepal under a multiparty democracy quickly changed their relations with their neighbors. The Maoists had initially been very critical of India but had welcomed its role in bringing it to the negotiating table with the SPA against King Gyanendra’s rule. However, Prachanda’s first foreign visit to China instead of India sent a signal to New Delhi that the political parties would not be as easily pro-India as some might have conceived. The first CA government under Maoist leader Prachanda emphasized equidistance instead of a heavy tilt toward India. His government pursued a path similar to those of the preceding royal governments, albeit he did say that Nepal had deep civilizational and cultural ties with India. However, he brought up the need to review unequal treaties between the two countries.99 Overall, Nepal acknowledged the increased interest of China in Nepal, and the Maoists used this to prop up the agency of the country and perhaps bring the Maoists closer to China given the historically contentious relations between the two. Overall, the TAR riots were a major turn in the buffer system. The preponderant buffered state (India) was increasingly challenged by the other buffered state (China) in the buffer state (Nepal) largely driven by internal security concerns. Nevertheless, it was a critical juncture that is characterized by increased role of China in the buffer state, which was a departure from previous critical junctures. China had arrived as a dynamic political influence in Nepal, fundamentally becoming a competitive actor in the buffer state as the preponderant buffered state had sought to maintain its preponderance, counting on the support afforded to the democratic political actors in the buffer state.

VII.  Conclusion Timeframe III overwhelmingly included critical junctures within the buffer state that had implications for its interactions with the buffered states. All the critical junctures except for the 2008 riots in the TAR entailed political upheavals in Nepal that led to domestic political changes. As illustrated in Table  6.1, the new buffer state concept is applied to all these critical junctures in Timeframe III. This timeframe highlights the importance of domestic political dynamics within the buffer state in its relations with the buffered states; Nepal’s political changes included dynamic relations with India and China, which at times backed different actors during critical junctures. For example, China supported King Gyanendra’s rule while India criticized it when parliamentary democracy was suspended in 2005. This timeframe also includes the critical juncture that eventually led to China’s direct links to Nepal’s political dynamics – the riots in the TAR. This event signals China’s comfort with not just being a “hands-off” actor in the buffer system seeking to only push into the buffer state with reservations. The riots propelled China as a major influence in Nepal, and it impacts all the critical junctures in Timeframe IV substantially. Timeframe III entailed tumultuous relations between India and Nepal. The latter continued to be of strategic importance for New Delhi, and its support of democratic forces during the 1990 democracy movement in Nepal was testament that it interpreted democratic political parties as more preferable than the monarchy

120  Timeframe III Table 6.1  Applying the New Buffer State Concept to Timeframe III Critical Juncture

Strategic Utility of the Buffer State

Agency of the Buffer State

1990: Second Democratic Experience in Nepal

India: Pressured Nepal to democratize as democratic forces were perceived as being more pro-India China: Declared the democratic movement as Nepal’s internal affair; supported the actor in power India: Initial security fears due to implications for domestic security; support for anti-Maoist forces China: Vehemently antiMaoists; supported antiMaoist forces India: Reiterated close ties; fears of escalation of violence in Nepal China: Continued the policy of maintaining ties with status-quo actor in power India: Strong negative reaction; suspension of military aid China: Continued the policy of maintaining ties with status-quo actor in power; supported King Gyanendra’s Government

Severe compromise of agency due to internal instability

1996: The Maoist Insurgency

2001: King Birendra’s Assassination and Crowning of King Gyanendra

2002: Suspension of Parliamentary Democracy and the Royal Coup

2006–08: Jana Andolan II and Abolishment of Nepal’s Monarchy

2008: Riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region

India: Supported democratic groups and helped the SPA; China: Continued to emphasize all events within Nepal as its internal matters India: Emphasized it as an internal matter of China China: Immense pressure to deal with the riots swiftly due to the upcoming Beijing Olympics; became a matter of grave internal matter

Severe compromise of agency due to a civil war but a strong propensity to foster ties with players who had strong anti-Maoist bent

Internal instability yet limited use of agency within the buffer system

Royal government sought closer ties with China as it lost support from India and major Western partners; strong crackdown on Tibetan refugee groups and anti-China activities to foster closer ties with Beijing Acknowledgment of support from India by the democratic forces; King Gyanendra sought China’s support but proved inadequate Despite the initial support for India, growing Chinese concerns vis-à-vis the TAR led to closer ties with Beijing; open to closer security ties with Beijing

Timeframe III 121 to represent its interests. Despite the strong-handed policy of economic blockade that preceded the democracy movement, most Nepali parties welcomed India’s support and pressure on King Birendra to democratize. In all the critical junctures that entailed domestic political changes in Nepal, India explicitly picked a side and sought to maximize its influence. New Delhi’s most preferable actors to back were the Nepali political parties, largely barring the Maoists. While not outright in favor of abolishing the monarchy, India time and again supported a democratic system in Nepal due to political affinities to democracy as well as the notion that disparate and competing interests would be easier to manage than dealing with an authoritarian monarch whom had time and again used the “China card” against India to prop itself up. Overall, Timeframe III entailed India’s continued support for democracy, as it showed during the 1990 and 2005 democratic movements in Nepal – both times New Delhi explicitly supported Nepal’s democratic actors and put pressure on the monarch. It also heavily criticized King Gyanendra’s coup and suspended material support against the Maoists, who New Delhi at one time considered a threat to stability in some parts of India. Overall, India as a buffered state sought to support political changes in the buffer state that would allow it to further expand and maintain influence. The democratic political parties were the most obvious actors to back as a multiparty system allowed India to pick which party to back due to the competitive nature of multiparty politics. The riots in the TAR did not directly lead to any concerns for India vis-à-vis Nepal, but as Timeframe IV showcases, it was the beginning of extensive challenges to India’s influence in Nepal and the emergence of an extensively dynamic buffer system. China had initiated explicit overtures toward Nepal during the critical junctures in Timeframe II. In Timeframe III, China remained low-key toward Nepal, extending support for whoever remained in power and rhetorically emphasizing the critical junctures as the buffer state’s “internal matter.” During the democratic movements in Nepal in 1990 and 2005, China continued to support the monarchy as it was the government in place; China had long supported whoever was in power in Nepal and called all political changes domestic developments. However, Timeframe III also signals the ascendance of China as a buffered state that deviated from the “hands-off” approach it maintained despite making low-key overtures toward the buffer state since critical junctures in Timeframe II. The riots in the TAR signaled the heralding of China as a “hands-on” buffered state as showcased by its explicit funding of Nepal’s riot police and pressure on Nepali political leaders to deal with Tibetan protestors in the aftermath of the riots in the TAR. Overall, this timeframe showcased the largely “hands-off” approach of China toward Nepal throughout the 1990s and early 2000s and support for whichever actor was in power. The only critical juncture is the riot in the TAR. which fundamentally changed China’s policy toward Nepal. Overall, these critical junctures highlight the preponderance of the buffered state India within the buffer system as it could pick sides as it deemed fit for its interests. However, the other buffered state was ascendant in 2008 propelled by its own domestic security interests. Furthermore, China was materially in a much better position in 2008 than previous years, which means its influence could also be backed by economic tools.

122  Timeframe III In Timeframe III, the agency of the buffer state is largely defined by the interest of the political actor in power to maintain its hold in government. In 1990, King Birendra sought support from China to prop up his regime but failed as China was not a viable economic alternative and offered limited support. In 2005, King Gyanendra sought to do the same but also failed due to international pressure, despite increased support from China than in 1990. Time and again, the buffer state’s government in power sought to maintain control by playing one side against the other. In both cases relating to the democratic movements, the kings sought support from China against Indian pressure but failed. However, the political parties, who India had long thought would largely align itself with New Delhi, also showcased similar trajectories to the monarchy. For example, the first democratic government post-royal coup, under Maoist leader Prachanda, implicitly snubbed India by going to China for the PM’s first foreign visit. Overall, Timeframe III illustrates the links between domestic political interests and how they impact the agency of the buffer state. Nepal’s relations with China and India were defined by the interests of its government, and it did use this agency to garner the most support, even if it entailed playing one buffered state against the other or seeking help from one buffered state when the other refused to.

Notes 1 S.D. Muni, India’s Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 59. 2 Ibid., 61–62. 3 Ibid. 4 Sanjay Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India (New York: Routledge, 2012), 119; Muni, India’s Foreign Policy, 64. 5 Niranjan Koirala, “Nepal in 1990: End of an Era,” Asian Survey 31, no. 2 (1990): 138. 6 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2002), 157. 7 Ibid., 163. 8 Ibid. 9 Jeffrey Reeves, “China’s Self-Defeating Tactics in Nepal,” Contemporary South Asia 20, no. 4 (2012): 526; Bibek Chand and Lukas K. Danner, “Implications of the Dragon’s Rise for South Asia: Assessing China’s Nepal Policy,” Strategic Analysis 40, no. 1 (2016): 31. 10 Garver, Protracted Contest, 157. 11 Steven von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan, “Introduction,” in Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace, eds. Steven von Einsiedel, David M. Malone and Suman Pradhan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 7 12 Jan Sharma, Democracy Without Roots (New Delhi: Book Faith India, 1998), 202. 13 Prakash Adhikari and Steven Samford, “The Nepali State and the Dynamics of the Maoist Insurgency,” Studies in Comparative International Development, no. 48 (2013): 463. 14 Kalpana Khanal and Natalia Bracarense, “Institutional Change in Nepal: Liberalization, Maoist Movement, Rise of Political Consciousness and Constitutional Change,” Review of Political Economy 33, no. 1 (2021): 146. 15 Winne Gobyn, “From War to Peace: The Nepalese Maoists’s Strategic and Ideological Thinking,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 420 (2009): 421. 16 Rabindra Mishra, “India’s Role in Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency,” Asian Survey 44, no. 5 (2004): 634.

Timeframe III  123 17 Fahmida Ashraf, “Maoist Uprising in Nepal,” Strategic Studies 22, no. 2 (2002): 67. 18 Michael Hutt, “Monarchy, Maoism and Democracy in Nepal,” Conflict, Security  & Development 1, no. 2 (2001): 96. 19 Ibid. 20 Gobyn, “From War to Peace,” 423. 21 Mishra, “India’s Role in Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency,” 635. 22 S. D. Muni, “Bringing the Maoists Down from the Hills: India’s Role,” in Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace, eds. Steven von Einsiedel, David M. Malone and Suman Pradhan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 318. 23 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 131. 24 Ibid. 25 Karl Taro Greenfeld, “The Death of Vishnu,” Time, 2001, http://content.time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,128973,00.html. 26 Ibid. 27 Barbara Crossette, “Nepal: The Politics of Failure,” World Policy Journal 22, no. 4 (2005): 70. 28 Greenfeld, “The Death of Vishnu.” 29 Rhoderick Chalmers, “Toward a New Nepal?” Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs 106, no. 699 (2007): 165. 30 Krishna Hachhethu, “Legitimacy Crisis of Nepali Monarchy,” Economic and Political Weekly 42, no. 20 (2007): 1831. 31 John Mage, “The Nepali Revolution and International Relations,” Economic and Political Weekly 42, no. 20 (2007): 1835. 32 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 133. 33 “Nepal: Pope Leads World Shock,” CNN, June 2, 2001, www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/ asiapcf/south/06/02/nepal.reaction/ 34 “India’s Nepal Worries,” Bloomberg, June  18, 2001, www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2001-06-18/indias-nepal-worries 35 Mishra, “India’s Role in Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency,” 637. 36 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 133. 37 Gobyn, “From War to Peace,” 428. 38 Ibid. 39 Sumit Ganguly and Brian Shoup, “Nepal” Between Dictatorship and Anarchy,” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 4 (2005): 137. 40 Chitra Tiwari, “Red Star over the Himalayas,” Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs 104, no. 683 (2005): 296. 41 Sandra Destradi, “India as a democracy promoter? New Delhi’s Involvement in Nepal’s Return to Democracy,” Democratization 19, no. 2 (2012): 294. 42 Michael Hutt, “A Nepalese Triangle: Monarchy, Maoists and Political Parties,” Asian Affairs 38, no. 1 (2007): 12. 43 Crossette, “Nepal: The Politics of Failure,” 74. 44 Gobyn, “From War to Peace,” 424. 45 Destradi, “India as a Democracy Promoter?” 295. 46 “Nepalese King Accused of Staging Coup,” CBC News, February 1, 2005, www.cbc. ca/news/world/nepalese-king-accused-of-staging-coup-1.547331 47 Michael Hutt, “King Gyanendra’s Coup and Its Implications for Nepal’s Future,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 12, no. 1 (2005): 117. 48 “China Hopes Nepal to Realize Social Security: FM Spokesman,” Xinhua, February 2, 2005, http://en.people.cn/200502/02/eng20050202_172642.html 49 Bibek Chand and Lukas K. Danner, “Implications of the Dragon’s Rise for South Asia,” 13; Sheru Thapliyal, “Tibet: The Real Issue,” Indian Defence Review 22, no. 4 (2007): 84. 50 Hachhethu, “Legitimacy Crisis of Nepali Monarchy,” 1831. 51 Hutt, “A Nepalese Triangle,” 12. 52 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 141.

124  Timeframe III 53 Hachhethu, “Legitimacy Crisis of Nepali Monarchy,” 1833. 54 Krishna Hacchethu, Sanjay Kumar, and Jiwan Subedi, “Nepal in Transition: A Study on the State of Democracy,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, (2008): 2. 55 Kanak Mani Dixit, “The Spring of Dissent: People’s Movement in Nepal,” India International Centre Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2006): 114. 56 Hutt, “A Nepalese Triangle,” 19. 57 “Full Text: King Gyanendra’s Speech,” BBC News, April 24, 2006, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4940876.stm 58 “Comprehensive Peace Accord,” The United Nations, November  22, 2006, https:// peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/NP_061122_Comprehensive%20 Peace%20Agreement%20between%20the%20Government%20and%20the%20 CPN%20%28Maoist%29.pdf 59 Hutt, “A Nepalese Triangle,” 20. 60 Bal Gopal Shrestha, “The End of Monarchy in Nepal and Its Delicate Journey Towards a Republic,” Contributions to Nepalese Studies 35, no. 1 (2008). 61 Hutt, “A Nepalese Triangle,” 19. 62 Shrestha, “The End of Monarchy in Nepal and Its Delicate Journey Towards a Republic.” 63 John Whelpton, “Nepal and Bhutan in 2008: A New Beginning?” Asian Survey 49, no. 1 (2008): 55. 64 J. S. Singh, “From Hindu Monarchy to Secular Republic: Challenges before Nepal’s Constituent Assembly,” India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 3 (2010): 310. 65 S. D. Muni, “Bringing the Maoists Down from the Hills,” 316. 66 Ibid., 323. 67 Ibid., 324. 68 Ramesh Nath Pandey’s speech on August 16, 2005 in Beijing, China. 69 S. D. Muni, “Bringing the Maoists Down from the Hills,” 325. 70 Monalisa Adhikari, “Between the Dragon and the Elephant: Nepal’s Neutrality Conundrum,” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs 25, no. 1–2 (2012): 91. 71 Pramod Jaiswal, “Caught in the India-China Rivalry: Policy Options for Nepal,” Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, no. 249 (2014), www.files.ethz.ch/isn/178444/ IB249-Pramod-NepalChinaIndia.pdf 72 “China ‘Aiding Nepal’s Fight with Maoists’,” Al-Jazeera, November 25, 2005, www. aljazeera.com/news/2005/11/25/china-aiding-nepals-fight-with-maoists\ 73 Jehangir S. Pocha, “China Rolls out Red Carpet for King,” The Telegraph, April 24, 2005, www.telegraphindia.com/india/china-rolls-out-red-carpet-for-king/cid/662252 74 Ibid. 75 Srikanth Kondapalli, “SAARC Summit: China’s Role Will be Keenly Watched by South Asian Countries,” The Economic Times, November  28, 2014, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/et-commentary/saarc-summit-chinas-role-willbe-keenly-watched-by-the-south-asian-countries/ 76 “King Says He’ll Restore Democracy in Nepal,” The New York Times, February 26, 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/02/26/world/asia/king-says-hell-restore-democracy-innepal.html 77 Robert Barnett, “Tibet,” in Politics in China: An Introduction (2nd edition), ed. William A. Joseph (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 404. 78 The CNN Write Staff, “Time of Tibetan Protests in China,” CNN, January 31, 2012, www.cnn.com/2012/01/31/world/asia/tibet-protests-timeline/index.html 79 Ibid. 80 Allegra Stratton and Agencies, “Tibet Protesters Disrupt Olympic Flame Ceremony,” The Guardian, March  24, 2008, www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/24/tibet. olympicgames2008

Timeframe III  125 81 Disket Angmo, “A Brief History of Tibetan Protest and its Implication of the Nature of the Nature of Tibetan Independence Movement,” Tibet Journal 44, no. 1 (2019): 6. 82 Robert Barnett, “Tibet,” 419. 83 Ibid. 84 Jonathan Watts, “Beijing Locks down Lhasa as Crisis Grows,” The Guardian, March 16, 2008, www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/16/tibet.china 85 Robert Ayson and Brendan Taylor, “Carrying China’s Torch,” Survival 50, no. 4 (2008): 6. 86 “Tibetan Riots Spread Outside Region,” The New York Times, March 16, 2008, www. nytimes.com/2008/03/16/world/asia/16iht-tibet.4.11148124.html. 87 Marleen Heuer, “China Increases Influence over Tibetan Refugees in Nepal,” Deutsche Welle, August  29, 2016, www.dw.com/en/china-increases-influence-over-tibetanrefugees-in-nepal/a-19511365. 88 Jeffrey Reeves, “China’s Self-Defeating Tactics in Nepal,” Contemporary South Asia 20, no. 4 (2012): 527. 89 “Nepal Shuts Down Tibetan Offices,” BBC News, January 28, 2005, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4214933.stm. 90 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 152. 91 “Tibet Violence ‘Concerns’ India,” BBC News, March  17, 2008, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7300661.stm 92 S.D. Muni, “The Tibetan ‘Uprising’ 2008: India’s Response,” ISAS Working Paper, no. 59 (2009), www.files.ethz.ch/isn/101950/59.pdf 93 “India Detains Tibetan Protesters,” Al-Jazeera, March 13, 2008, www.aljazeera.com/ news/2008/3/13/india-detains-tibetan-protesters 94 Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India, 152. 95 “Appeasing China: Restricting the Rights of Tibetans in Nepal,” Human Rights Watch, July 23, 2008, www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/23/appeasing-china/restrictingrights-tibetans-nepal 96 “Over 500 Tibetan Women Detained in Nepal,” France 24, May  11, 2008, www. france24.com/en/20080511-over-500-tibetan-women-detained-nepal-nepal-protests 97 Amish Raj Mulmi, All Road Lead North: China, Nepal and the Contest for the Himalayas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022). 98 Prerana Marasini, “China Visit Was Important: Prachanda,” The Hindu, October 19, 2009, www.thehindu.com/news/international/China-visit-was-important-Prachanda/ article16887508.ece 99 “Nepal Says it Will Maintain Equal Ties With India, China,” Voice of America, October 27, 2009, www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2008-08-25-voa21-66677332/558025.html

7 Timeframe IV Critical Junctures 2009–2022

Timeframe IV is characterized by events largely within the buffer state Nepal that had implications for the buffer system as a whole. Overall, these are major political changes or crises in the post-monarchy period in Nepal, characterized by extensive Chinese activities and dynamic interactions between China and India.

I.  2015: The Nepal Earthquakes Nepal is not only a space for geopolitical competition; it is also located in one of the most seismically active regions in the world, right on the confluence of the Indian and Asian tectonic plates. On April 25, 2015, an earthquake measuring 7.8 on the Richter Scale struck Nepal. The epicenter was the district of Gorkha in central Nepal.1 The country was already one of the most impoverished in the world with weak infrastructure and institutional capacity. The second earthquake occurred on May 12, 2015, further exacerbating concerns over recovery efforts. India and China were swift in deploying disaster relief. Official reports from Nepal indicated over 9,000 deaths and the collapse of over 600,000 homes, rendering three million people homeless.2 The earthquakes also damaged and destroyed important cultural sites, including significant impact on the Durbar Squares, which have contributed to the Kathmandu Valley’s designation as a World Heritage Site by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Overall, the total value of the impact of these earthquakes is equivalent to USD 8.7 billion.3 Within two hours, the Home Ministry of Nepal activated the National Emergency Operation Centre, but the responses were considered to be slow and disorganized, hampering effective rescue and operations, particularly in remote areas of the country.4 Furthermore, Nepal remained one of the least developed countries in Asia which further prevented effective responses to the earthquakes. However, the international community’s responses were swift and played an important role in the direct aftermath of the earthquakes. Natural disasters have the potential to change the nature of relationships. Thus, such occurrences are potential critical junctures.5 Both India and China sought to extend their influence through this critical juncture; the earthquakes presented both the buffered states with the opportunity to bolster their influence in the buffer. Despite humanitarian concerns, the underlying strategic competition tied DOI: 10.4324/9781003178538-7

Timeframe IV  127 to disaster diplomacy cannot be ignored in this case.6 In the immediate aftermath, India’s response was swift as it mobilized rescue teams within two hours of the earthquake and was the largest of any country that responded to the disaster. Named Operation Maitri,7 India mobilized 295 members of its National Disaster Response Force (NDRF); it was also the first responder to the disaster.8 Indian Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi tweeted in the aftermath of the April  25 earthquake that “Nepal’s pain is our pain . . . India will wipe their tears. We will hold their hands. We’ll support them in this hour of pain.”9 Thus, the Indian leadership also emphasized rhetoric that highlighted the close sociocultural relations between the two states. Apart from the humanitarian motivations based on close people-to-people ties and cultural affinities, such actions also have to be contextualized within the wider security situation in the region. The earthquakes also occurred at a time when China’s influence had steadily increased in Nepal since the 2008 riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). Indian PM Modi had visited Nepal twice in 2014 and had committed a one-billion dollar line of credit.10 As Louise K. Comfort (2000) argues, large-scale natural disasters can be used to reset ties between states.11 Thus, the earthquakes provided the opportunity for India to reassert its ties with Nepal and push back against growing Chinese influence as well. As for technical support, India deployed over 13 military aircrafts, including one C-130J, two C-17s, and one IL-76.12 As for active personnel, China and India had 370 and 962 members, respectively.13 China deployed a 62-member International Search and Rescue Team; alongside, Beijing arranged for emergency relief materials, including 20 million yuan’s worth of tents, blankets, and generators.14 A notable absence was that of Chinese military aircraft; while India deployed its air force without much delay, China’s relief operations largely relied on cargo planes. This could perhaps be a function of India’s sensitivities regarding China’s activities in Nepal. China also sent a large relief team including 40 rescuers, 10 medical workers, 12 seismic experts, and an emergency relief fund of $3.3 million with pledges for 186 tons of emergency supplies.15 This was the largest relief effort carried by China overseas. Nevertheless, political maneuvering was inherently tied to the relief efforts. Kathmandu rejected teams from Taiwan from aiding in the relief efforts but did accept medical relief.16 Both China and India made pledges for Nepal’s long-term reconstruction as well. At the International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction held on June 25, 2015, in Kathmandu, India pledged $1 billion and China $500 million for the long-term reconstruction efforts in the country.17 Despite India’s responses being much larger than China’s, the benefits from such maneuverings were limited. Directed at the Indian media outlets for crude conduct and overstepping professional conduct, the hashtag “#GoHomeIndianMedia” trended in Nepal during the relief efforts.18 Chinese efforts were much more muted and focused on the technicalities of the relief efforts. They were carried out without much fanfare; however, they were successful in keeping away Taiwanese relief efforts in Nepal.19 The Indian relief effort was the largest contingent among all the countries that participated in the relief efforts. Nevertheless,

128  Timeframe IV the public backlash against the Indian media houses undercut much of the goodwill garnered from disaster diplomacy. On the other hand, China quietly reaped the benefits of its quiet diplomacy, despite investing less than India in the rescue and reconstruction efforts in Nepal. The Nepal earthquakes presented themselves as possible points of departure for the states in the buffer system. It was a prime opportunity for the buffered states to woo the buffer. It is a critical juncture as the natural disaster was the crisis that had the potential to set-off ideational change, particularly regarding strategic gains made by India and China in Nepal. Natural disasters can be points of departure from the “normal” or a point of time wherein relations can be “reset.” During the earthquakes, India sought to do just that which is reflected in its relief efforts, the largest of any state to Nepal. The name of the relief effort Operation Maitri sought to highlight the special relationship with Nepal, which had come under pressure from growing Chinese influence since 2008. Disaster relief was a means to bolster political and people-to-people ties and dissuade popular perceptions of Indian “heavy-handedness.” While India approached it in terms of quantity, China strategically used disaster diplomacy to its advantage. Prospects for policy change from the Indian side are paramount as investment in disaster diplomacy did not reap the full extent of intended benefits. Nevertheless, China was cognizant of Indian sensitivities in Nepal as it did not deploy military airplanes during the relief efforts, which would be an unprecedented action. Overall, the 2015 earthquakes entailed strong reactions from both India and China; the latter’s actions and commitments were quite surprising given that it was the largest relief effort it had sent abroad. More so, it was a signal that China had continued interests in Nepal and would not shy away from explicitly showcasing it through material support. It was also a showcase of China’s “arrival” as an international power that could shoulder international responsibilities and duties.20 Focusing on the technicalities in the aftermath of the earthquakes served to build public goodwill from Nepali citizens as these actions signified dissociation from politics and emphasized the emergency at hand. Nepal’s agency as a buffer state during this critical juncture is limited given that its domestic capabilities were overstretched due to the unprecedented disaster. Despite the precarious context, the country did manage to ensure continued support from both buffered states. While keeping itself open to foreign aid from all actors, Nepal explicitly prevented the Taiwanese delegation from doing so. Despite the need for relief supplies and disaster expertise, Nepal sought to ensure support from its buffered states, steering away from any form of controversial moves that would disrupt the relations within the buffer system. Overall, this critical juncture was one where the buffer state found itself relying extensively on the international community and, more specifically, on its buffered states.

II.  2015: Nepal’s Border Closures with India Natural disasters can trigger political changes, especially in low-income and foreign aid-dependent countries, which includes Nepal.21 Large-scale disasters can be a tipping point for sociopolitical changes including the opening up of spaces

Timeframe IV  129 for negotiation and transformation of political power.22 The Nepal earthquakes had their impact on the overall politics in its aftermath. The Constituent Assembly (CA), which was in its second iteration since the first elections in 2008 (followed by the second one in 2013), had failed to formulate a new constitution for the new federal republic. These earthquakes exacerbated the internal political issues within the country as public anger grew against government ineffectiveness in the face of a major natural disaster. The Nepali political parties, in an unusual show of cooperation, finally promulgated a new constitution on September 20, 2015, in the aftermath of the earthquakes.23 The earthquakes served as sources of motivation and pressure for completing it, which the parties finally did. Moreover, there was a general political consensus that finalizing the constitution would provide political stability and aid in the reconstruction process.24 The constitution also entailed strong support across the disparate political parties in the CA; it was approved by 507 out of 598 members of the CA.25 The 2015 constitution, however, was not received positively by all sectors of Nepali society nor by all political parties. The Maoist rebellion had highlighted ethnic, caste, and economic hierarchies as problems plaguing the old Nepali state. These grievances continued to be discussed in the aftermath of the abolition of the monarchy in 2008.26 Even before this, the ethnic groups residing in southern Nepal, collectively called the Madhesis, had been calling for greater representation and the formation of an ethnically autonomous state within the new federal structure.27 Madhesi groups had long complained of discrimination, both politically and personally, within Nepal. Some political discourses accused the Madhesis, due to their affinities to the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, for being “Indian agents.” Organizations were formed seeking to represent Madhesi interests, including the Madheshi Jana Adhikar Forum, which later contested elections as a political party. In 2007, Madhesi groups staged a movement calling for constituency delimitation based on population, a federal system of governance, and proportionate representation of Madhesis in various state organs including the bureaucracy and the military.28 Overall, the end of the Maoist rebellion and the subsequent abolishment of the monarchy had opened Nepal’s political space for negotiation and had empowered groups that had historically been marginalized by the state. Thus, despite overwhelming political support for the 2015 constitution within the CA, concerns were expressed by Madhesi organizations. Decentralization was a major theme of the new federal structure adopted in 2008; the new 2015 constitution had failed to accord proportional representation of all of Nepal’s ethnic groups, most prominently the Madhesis.29 The new constitution was perceived by Madhesi and Tharu30 groups as a means of maintaining the dominance of Nepal’s high-caste Hindu hill elites who had traditionally held the most extensive socioeconomic influence in the country. The main gripe for the Madhesis was that the 2015 constitution demarcated provinces in such a way that hill groups were still dominant in almost all of them. Additionally, naturalized citizens – including those with mixed Indian and Nepali parentage (which a significant portion of Madhesis share) – were barred from running for a range of public positions, including the presidency and the heads

130  Timeframe IV of security agencies.31 The adoption of the new constitution prompted Madhesi based political parties to form the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), which led waves of agitations against the promulgation of the new constitution. Citing domination from the hill elites, the UDMF sought to champion the rights of marginalized Madhesis in southern Nepal. The UDMF launched agitation in the south, crippling the movement of goods and services across the Indo-Nepali border. Nepal relies almost exclusively on India for trade. As such, the agitation by Madhesi groups led to a widespread shortage of gas, diesel, kerosene, and cooking gas in all of Nepal’s’ hilly and mountainous regions – areas already severely impacted by the earthquakes in April of 2015. Nepal accused India of orchestrating a blockade; India’s displeasure was evident when the passing of the new constitution was simply “noted.”32 India urged the political parties in Nepal to make the new constitution as inclusive as possible, including incorporating the demands of the Madhesi groups. Nevertheless, the lack of enthusiasm in New Delhi was perceived as a covert attempt at Indian interference by Nepal’s populace and political parties. Additionally, India sought to influence changes to the constitution, which was seen as blatant interference in Nepal’s internal affairs. PM Modi dispatched Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar after the voting on the constitution was complete, which was perceived in Nepal as an attempt at blatant interference.33 Nepal’s Government rebuffed such calls and emphasized the matter as a domestic issue.34 Ironically, these events helped in bringing together traditionally opposing political parties together to singularly state that it is Nepal’s internal matter. The Madhesis had long been considered as being pro-India due to the group’s strong sociocultural ties with the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.35 As such, their agitation was speculated to have ties to New Delhi. While the Madhesi groups launched agitations throughout southern Nepal, the Indian security personnel prevented cargo trucks from crossing into Nepal.36 India refused to acknowledge that it had initiated an economic blockade while Nepal claimed so. Coincidentally, the Indian Oil Corporation reduced fuel quota below normal levels in conjunction with the blockade.37 The perceptions in Nepal were that India was the actor behind the blockade, which was similar to the 1989 blockade under PM Rajiv Gandhi. The standoff prompted a lull in bilateral relations between India and Nepal, touted as being at its worst in decades. The blockade led to widespread shortage of essential fuels in major cities across Nepal. The economic hardship during this period prompted the Nepali Government to reduce its dependence on India. In December 2015, the Government of Nepal announced plans to construct three fuel depots, each with a capacity of 6,000 kiloliters of petrol with the aid of the Chinese Government.38 The Nepali Government also requested Beijing to expand the Araniko Highway which connects the two countries.39 While Nepal was increasingly looking to China for respite, the humanitarian crisis within the county exacerbated. Due to shortages of essential vaccines and medications, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) projected over three million children under the age of five would be adversely affected.40 Risk of hypothermia and malnutrition existed, especially in

Timeframe IV  131 the immediate aftermath of the devastating earthquakes of April and May. Goodwill for India garnered during the earthquake relief efforts evaporated; a whole new generation of Nepalis were faced with the reality wherein their day to day activities were disrupted due to the Indian efforts to dictate its way into Nepal’s constitution (albeit using the proxy of the Madhesi groups). Rajan Bhattarai, a member of parliament and a Central Committee member of the United Marxists Leninists (UML) party in Nepal, stated the following: We have a rich, multidimensional relationship with India as a result of our shared geography, culture and history, and we want to continue it. But India must recognize that we are two different sovereign nations. We have a right to choose our own constitution, which was passed by an overwhelming majority. India cannot demand an amendment. We will decide what’s best for us.41 The blockade brought to the fore the perpetual question in Nepal – that of overdependence on India. Nepal turned to China to alleviate some of its problems with fuel shortages. Beijing agreed to provide 1.3 million liters of gasoline to Nepal, the first time that such a supply was delivered.42 It was only on February 8, 2016, after five months of its initiation, that the UDMF lifted the blockade and officially ended shortages of essential fuels in the country. The blockade cost Nepal $5 billion in financial loss, on top of the $7 billion damage caused by the earthquake.43 While India and Nepal moved forward to mend ties, the damage was apparent. In October 2015, Nepali Oil Corporation and PetroChina – both state-run companies – signed a memorandum of understanding of future trade, which would break India’s 40-year old monopoly on Nepal’s oil imports. Thus, the blockade of Nepal was a significant departure, particularly over the question of fuel transportation. There was an inherent realization in Nepal’s political elites of its vulnerability to Indian pressures. Further integration with China, albeit more challenging due to topographic and demographic considerations, would prove fruitful for decreasing reliance on Indian preponderance in Nepal. For New Delhi, having a pro-India bloc in Nepal is beneficial to keep Chinese influence in check while also pushing for its interests. It made sense for India to back Madhesi interests given the group’s strong ties to India but the subsequent economic blockade which was never officially acknowledged by New Delhi, created a lot of anti-Indian sentiment within Nepal which had recently experienced the earthquakes. As Yubaraj Ghimire pointed out: Neither Beijing nor the average Nepalese believes that China is ready to substitute India with which Nepal shares civilizational, cultural, religious and geographical ties . . . but India’s vision of Nepal is shrinking, as it talks more of the plains.44 The move to maintain a hold in the Madhesi realm by India was alienating the rest of Nepal, which increasingly turned to China. India’s strategic interests during this phase of consolidation of Nepal’s republican and democratic identities were

132  Timeframe IV focused on garnering a foothold by backing a group that had close ties to India but also felt marginalized in Nepal. However, India’s actions were not without critical voices from within. Tunku Varadarajan argues that: India’s de facto denial to the Nepalese of essential supplies of fuel has driven Kathmandu into the arms of China. A crippled, impoverished nation has been handed a lifeline by Beijing, gift wrapped in New Delhi.45 The efforts by India to maintain its preponderance in Nepal in a novel multiparty political context did not bear the intended results. New Delhi’s failure to acknowledge the successful passing of the constitution and later efforts to change its content along with tacit support for agitating Madhesi groups had been perceived in Nepal as a means to force changes along India’s interests. In fact, such efforts led to a lull in relations not seen since the 1989 blockade and the alienation of a majority of Nepali citizens. This served as a major political crisis that led to growing resentment of dependence on India and the need to diversify Nepal’s supply of essentials which externalized in the form of policies to forge closer ties with China. As for China, it readily endorsed the promulgation of the new constitution. The Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu released a statement stating that “Chinese side supports and respects the social system and development path determined by Nepali side.”46 However, after Chinese flags were burned during the Madhesi agitations, China stated that it was not anti-Madhesi and that Madhesis need to be accommodated.47 Beijing maintained a balanced approach, welcoming the new constitution while also stating that Madhesi demands need to be acknowledged. In the meantime, China was also receptive to overtures from Nepal as it sought to garner supplies in the face of the economic blockade. The anti-Indian sentiments within Nepal along with the perception of China that does not directly interfere in Nepal’s politics extensively helped in developing closer ties between the two countries. The 2015 blockade served as an entry point for China to bolster its presence in Nepal as the social context remained positive toward Beijing’s overtures at a time when India was perceived as a heavy-handed influence that sought to arm-twist Nepal’s political leaders and directly influence political outcomes in the country. As for Nepal’s agency, it was extensively under pressure to move forward with the demands made by India regarding the rights of the Madhesis. Eventually, Province 2 was carved out to placate Madhesi interests, but Nepal did push back; its opposing political parties, including the traditional pro-India Nepali Congress, the United Marxists-Leninists, and the Communist Part of Nepal (Maoists), all banded together to oppose India’s demands initially. Much of it was related to the public perception that any pro-India political party would be seen as working against Nepal’s interests. As such, Nepal’s agency was largely tied to its domestic politics; its overtures toward China illustrate that it did not fully fall under India’s preponderant influence. In fact, the buffer state was willing to turn to the opposing buffered state when the preponderant buffered state

Timeframe IV  133 sought to consolidate its influence within the buffer state. Thus, Nepal exercised its agency to move closer to China and sought to reduce dependency on India. This critical juncture served China with the opportunity to become a more formidable buffered state within the buffer system as the buffer state’s public trust in other buffered state (i.e., India) had overwhelmingly become negative. Despite India’s favorable position during the Jana Andolan II, the buffer system continued to operate, wherein the buffer state was the site of continuous contending overtures from the buffered states.

III. 2017: Nepal’s Entry into China’s Belt and Road Initiative China’s massive infrastructure integration program called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was first proposed in 2013 by President Xi Jinping during his visit to Kazakhstan with an initial pledge of $40 billion.48 Initially called the One Belt, One Road Initiative (OBOR), it was later rechristened to BRI. The initiative is based on the reimagining of the historical Silk Roads and seeks to connect road and sea routes between China and the countries in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Europe, with South Asia being included later. The land-based Silk Road Economic Belt was the one that was first proposed in Kazakhstan; a month later in October  2013, President Xi proposed the sea-based part of the BRI called the Maritime Silk Road during his visit to Indonesia.49 The maritime route was touted to go from China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other.50 The BRI started out with an emphasis on “hard infrastructure” with majority investments in the energy sector and transportation links. However, the scope of BRI is broad as new iterations such as the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road are now being informally touted by policy experts and researchers.51 China presented the BRI as a means of integrating the economies of Asia, Africa, and Europe while also emphasizing its importance for filling the gaps in investment shortfalls in developing countries. The BRI looked promising to many developing states as it could be a source of much-needed financing for infrastructure projects.52 China does not publish aggregate investment numbers related to the BRI. Given the multitude of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Chinese state agencies that participate in BRI, as well as the different scales of investments, the exact investment numbers are difficult to ascertain with certainty. Approximate investments are projected to amount to around $200 billion while Morgan Stanley projects the overall expenses as part of the BRI could reach $1.2–1.3 trillion by 2027.53 One of the biggest landmark projects under the BRI is the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is currently valued at $62 billion and includes a major port in the Pakistani city of Gwadar, construction of coal-fired power plants as well as a metro system in Lahore among others.54 As of March  2022, 147 countries have signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to join the BRI.55 Overall, the BRI has been characterized as a

134  Timeframe IV long-term tool of statecraft that is designed to appeal to a large array of states, both developing and developed. However, BRI projects are not without controversy. Some scholars argue that the BRI is a front for debt traps – Chinese investments are usually done through low-interest loans which small states may sometimes find difficult to pay as was the case with the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, which included $1.1 billion in loans from China.56 When Sri Lanka could not pay the interest on the loan and defaulted, a Chinese SOE offered to lease it out for 99 years and physically take over the port. As such, some skeptics of the BRI argue that smaller economies are vulnerable to such investments from China, and some have questioned the intent of Beijing in relation to such investments. Others have argued that the Hambantota Port fiasco was a mix of mismanagement from the Sri Lankan Rajapaksa Government and risky investments from Chinese SOEs, which are finally adapting to a competitive international construction market dominated by Europe. Such authors argue that rather than China being a conniving actor that explicitly uses debt diplomacy, cases such as Hambantota Port are part of a learning curve for Chinese SOEs in a world where China seeks to have a larger economic footprint.57 The BRI was institutionalized through the Belt and Road Forum (BRF), which convened for the first time on May 14, 2017. Over fifty countries sent their heads of states or government representatives to the Forum, including Nepal. Just two days before on May 12, Nepal had signed a MoU with China to participate in the BRI.58 This occurred within the backdrop of the blockade in 2015 and the ballooning of Chinese foreign direct investments (FDI) into Nepal, which reached USD 621 million in 2015–16, which accounted for 42% of FDI coming into Nepal during that timeframe.59 The Government of India remained very concerned about Nepal’s joining the BRI, particularly since India has refused to become a part of the BRI.60 India also refused to send official delegates to the first BRF. A statement by the Ministry of External Affairs stated that: We are of firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency, and equality. Connectivity projects must be pursued in a manner that respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity . . . . Regarding the so-called “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” which is being projected as the flagship project of the BRI/OBOR, the international community is well aware of India’s position. No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.61 Since the entry of Nepal into the BRI, China has proposed to expand a high-speed railway line up to Nepal’s border and expand it into the country’s south. The plan is to build a railway line to Lumbini, which is Buddha’s birthplace and a major site of the religion’s pilgrimage circuit.62 The prospects of such an extension of the railroad are problematic for India as Lumbini is less than an hour away from its border. Thus, Nepal’s entry into the BRI was a major critical juncture as it joined the initiative despite India’s security concerns.

Timeframe IV  135 So far, the impact of the BRI is limited as numerous projects have been facing issues with implementation. Nepal has raised concerns about the type of financing and has preferred grants and soft loans over commercial loans used under the BRI.63 Nepal has also preferred the interest rates on loans to be in line with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.64 Strong reservations about feasibility, such as with the trans-Himalayan railway, has also caused it to remain in a state of uncertainty. Another major BRI project called the Budi Gandaki Hydropower Project, which was estimated to cost around $2.73 billion, was scrapped by the Nepali Government and was earlier given to the Chinese state-owned China Gezhouba Group Corporation (CGGC).65 Nevertheless, willingness to join the BRI despite India explicitly expressing concerns about it showcases Nepal’s emphasis on its independent foreign policy. It also highlights a departure in the country’s foreign policy as China, which was in a much better economic position than in 1989, could be a means of pushing back against India’s preponderance. Furthermore, China’s willingness and viable economic means entailed that the country could also exert more influence in Nepal through economic statecraft. The enthusiastic embrace of BRI by Nepal is closely aligned with its foreign policy since 2008 when it emphasized equi-proximity toward both its neighbors and the emphasis on Nepal as a dynamic bridge connecting its neighbors.66 While the BRI would help in attaining the goal of a dynamic bridge, India’s reservations showcase that it is wary of increasing interconnectivity between Nepal and China. Even more concerning is the deliberation of extending those links to India’s bordering areas with Nepal, which is perceived in New Delhi as a grave compromise of its security given the open Indo-Nepal borders and strategic concerns about China’s ease of access to transport links up to the Indian border. For India, Nepal joining the BRI was of strategic concern as it was a follow-up after the 2015 economic blockade. The two countries had tense relations during the 2015 blockade, which continued to inform Nepal’s foreign policy. Its equiproximity foreign policy approach fit with the BRI as it had the possibility of investments in Nepal’s limited infrastructure. India’s main concerns have been security issues along economic corridors in frontier regions, which also include disputed territories with China and Pakistan; other concerns include the close China–Pakistan relations within the BRI given that CPEC is perceived as the hallmark of BRI, and also, the growth of China in South Asia which has traditionally been India’s natural sphere of influence. These concerns have contributed to India’s suspicions about the intentions of China’s BRI projects.67 As such, Nepal joining the BRI certainly elicited strong reactions in New Delhi as it signaled increased Chinese influence in the country and indicated Nepal’s willingness to engage China more closely even after the country’s democratic transition that was done under the auspices of Indian support. As for China, BRI served as a means of integrating its frontier provinces, including restive regions such as the TAR with the markets of the neighboring states. Given the TAR’s contiguity with Nepal, BRI projects could help spur growth in poorer inland provinces of China such as the TAR, Xinjiang, and Yunnan. In 2016, the 10th Tibet People’s Congress proposed the Himalayan Economic Rim Project which would spur economic growth

136  Timeframe IV in Tibet by directing manufacturing toward Nepal, India, and Bhutan.68 As India and Bhutan remained sensitive to China, Nepal remains the only viable option to move forward with the effort to further spur economic growth in Tibet, and infrastructure links remain central to the idea. Concurrently, the BRI’s inroads into Nepal and other South Asian countries challenge India’s conception as the region’s imminent power. Inroads into Nepal would also strategically make India more insecure given the open Indo-Nepali borders. Thus, China’s conception of Nepal’s strategic utility is driven by economic statecraft, internal security concerns, and an effort to emerge as a buffered state on equal footing with India in the China–India–Nepal (CIN) buffer system. While India had traditionally maintained preponderance in the system, China’s increased economic capability and willingness to emerge as a global power has its implications for the buffer system. It is increasingly pushing its influence into Nepal and has emerged as a more formidable buffered state than in previous critical junctures. China’s heightened capabilities, aspirations for global power status, and internal security concerns that may emerge from unequal economic development have all contributed to extending its economic statecraft toward Nepal. As for Nepal’s agency as a buffer state, its experiences with the 2015 blockade was a reminder of its limitations as a small state. Yet, it was also a wake-up call to expand its foreign policy options and bolster the stability of its economy which is heavily India-centered. The implications of its domestic decisions on relations with India and New Delhi’s negative reactions to the 2015 constitution spurred Nepal to forge closer ties with China, which had been uncertain given Beijing’s backing of the monarchy. However, the political parties in Nepal continued to maintain ties with China and fostered closer ties after the 2015 blockade. The logic was to lessen dependency on India as to ensure it does not hold extensive sway over Nepal’s domestic policies. Furthermore, joining the BRI also publicly affirmed Nepal’s support for China as an emerging global power. The BRI also seemed a plausible source of investment for Nepal’s severely underdeveloped infrastructure. Concurrently, signing the BRI also signals to India that Nepal seeks to maintain equi-proximity, which could be perceived as an implicit manner of expressing to New Delhi that Nepal can push back against Indian preponderance. China’s economic rise has created a context where it can engage more closely with Nepal economically than in previous critical junctures.

IV. 2020: The Lipulekh–Kalapani–Limpiyadhura Border Disputes On November  2, 2019, India published an updated political map showing the newly created Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh following the revocation of Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution.69 The map included the disputed territories of Kalapani, Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura, and Susta, which India claims as its territory. India claims Kalapani as part of its Pithoragarh district in the state of Uttarakhand, while Nepal considers the territory as an inalienable part of Nepal.70 The Kalapani area remains strategically very important as a

Timeframe IV  137 tri-junction area for India, China, and Nepal. The dispute can be traced back to the 1816 Suguali Treaty signed between the Kingdom of Nepal and British India at the end of the Anglo-Nepal War. The treaty did not clearly define the place of origin of the Kali River, which was to demarcate Nepal and British India (subsequently, the Republic of India).71 Nepal published several maps over the years, highlighting the source of the Kali River, which was considered to be the demarcation of the border between the two states. One of the big problems was that Kali was also called Kuti and later Kuti Yangti, which created confusions over where the Kali River specifically originated.72 Some iterations of the maps originating in Nepal show the Kali River to originate 16 kilometers northwest of Kalapani at Limpiyadhura. India had not officially endorsed the maps produced by Nepal. In 1962, India had deployed security forces in the region; however, Nepal had been collecting land revenues and conducting elections in the area until 1961.73 Overall, the disputes were never resolved despite efforts in 1991 between the two sides. The issue flared up again on May 8, 2020 when Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh inaugurated a road linking Dharchula in Uttarakhand state and Lipulekh; the road was designed to ease travel to Kailash–Mansarovar, which is a major Hindu pilgrimage site.74 Immediately, Nepal protested and requested diplomatic resolution to the issue without any Indian responses.75 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Nepal also issued a press release: The Government of Nepal has consistently maintained that as per the Sugauli Treaty (1816), all the territories east of Kali (Mahakali) River, including Limpiyadhura, Kalapani and Lipu Lekh, belong to Nepal. This was reiterated by the Government of Nepal several times in the past and most recently through a diplomatic note addressed to the Government of India dated 20 November 2019 in response to the new political map issued by the latter . . . . The Government of Nepal reemphasizes that pending boundary issues between the two countries should be resolved through diplomatic means. With this in mind, the Government of Nepal has proposed twice the dates for holding the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries, as mandated by their leaders, for which the response from the Indian side is still awaited.76 For India, the Lipulekh Pass is essential for its geostrategic interest vis-à-vis China. It is the most flexible and shortest route to reach Taklakot, which is a Chinese township in the TAR. The Pass also includes a 6,180 meters high hill which is strategic for India to control as it gives it geoeconomic security as well as strategic advantage close to the Chinese border.77 Thus, the whole disputed region is of immense geostrategic importance for India as it gives New Delhi an upper hand in the region, a fact that can be traced back to the time of the 1962 border war with China. As such, any efforts by Nepal to resolve the disputes were met with silence or rebuke from India. On May 11, Nepal handed over a diplomatic note to Indian Ambassador Vinay Mohan Kwatra expressing displeasure over the road construction in Lipulekh.78 Following almost unanimous support in both houses of the

138  Timeframe IV legislature, Nepal followed up by unveiling a new political map that showed the disputed territories as integral parts of the country on May 18, 2020. It initiated a new lull in relations since 2015 and the Official Spokesperson of the Government of India, Mr. Anurag Srivastava, said: The Government of Nepal has released a revised official map of Nepal today that includes parts of Indian territory. This unilateral act is not based on historical facts and evidence. It is contrary to the bilateral understanding to resolve the outstanding boundary issues through diplomatic dialogue. Such artificial enlargement of territorial claims will not be accepted by India.79 Protests also erupted throughout Nepal calling for India to respect its sovereignty. Some argued that the issue was fostered by China to put pressure on India. Indian Army Chief General M.M. Naravane stated that Nepal’s objections regarding the inauguration of the road in Lipulekh were at the behest of “someone else, ” which implicitly referred to China.80 Others have argued that it is a bilateral issue and the issue was not pushed forward by China; Constantino Xavier argues that the border disputes have been brewing for a long period of time and that hyping China’s role would not extend merit to Nepal’s repeated attempts at diplomatic solution for the border disputes.81 Amit Ranjan also argues that blaming China would be a simplistic way of looking at the issue, wherein India (and Nepal) cannot shirk from their responsibility to resolve the issue.82 Officially, China refused to take a stance on the issue. Zhao Lijian, Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), stated that: The issue of Kalapani is between Nepal and India. We hope the two countries will resolve their differences properly through friendly consultations and refrain from taking any unilateral action that may complicate the situation.83 While China did not directly get involved in the dispute, several authors have argued that such a context opens avenues for China to make more inroads into Nepal. Former official foreign affairs adviser to Nepal’s PM and Ambassador to the UN Dinesh Bhattarai expressed that: The border dispute looks minor, but allowing it to fester is likely to sow the seeds of immense competition and intense rivalry in the sensitive Himalayan frontier with far-reaching geopolitical implications. Nepal wants to prosper as an independent and sovereign state and be helpful to its neighbors, emerging as the main pillar of a world order that is struggling to be born, and remain productively and constructively engaged with the wider international community.84 Bhattarai highlights the disputes as a context that may foster greater competition through more intense participation from China. However, he also stresses that all Indo-Nepal disputes cannot be seen as being tied to China; the Kalapani dispute

Timeframe IV  139 is one such disagreement that needs to be addressed a bilateral issue and efforts to incorporate China diminishes Nepal’s sovereign status and its agency. In a similar line of thinking, Sukh Deo Muni says: Prolonging this stand-off is not in the interest of either Nepal or India. It will be exploited by the third parties to their advantage. India and Nepal, keeping in mind their mutual stakes and concerns, should through resilient and mutually accommodative diplomacy, resolve this.85 Thus, the disputes were not directly engineered by China, as some argued. Rather, it was a festering dispute that needed to be dealt with bilaterally. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the implications of the geopolitical context could set the stage for China to play a bigger role in Nepal, as it had in the aftermath of the 2015 blockade. The border disputes served as a major point of contention in IndoNepali relations and a reaffirmation that Nepal needed to continue its independent foreign policymaking that it had pursued since the 2015 blockade. The protests by Nepal were seen as “unusual” as they were strident and consistent, but it must not be discounted that the country had expressed concerns about Kalapani before. The subsequent policy of Nepal to adopt a new official map including the disputed territories showcases the importance of the issue for the country. For India, the Kalapani region is of geostrategic value given its advantageous position right on the border with China; as such, its hold on the area is essential for its security in the contentious Sino-Indian borderlands. For China, the matter is perceived as a bilateral dispute albeit the strains in Indo-Nepali relations could open up opportunities for it to make closer overtures toward Nepal. Overall, the dispute is characterized by the buffer state’s attempts to reconcile its differences with one of the buffered states and asserting its sovereignty and agency. This critical juncture does not showcase extensive Sino-Indian interactions, but it is telling that China sought to maintain an arm’s length regarding the disputes explicitly. It is possible that the tensed relations between India and Nepal did open opportunities for China to push further into the latter. Yet, this critical juncture remained largely focused on the ties between Nepal and India, with implicit concerns in New Delhi about the prospects of China using this development to its advantage.

V.  2020: Sino-Indian Border Clashes in Ladakh As the Indo-Nepali tensions over the Lipulekh–Kalapani–Limpiyadhura border disputes had started to settle in slightly, another major political crisis erupted within the buffer system. India’s decision to end the autonomy of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and instead create two union territories directly controlled by the central government in New Delhi had angered Pakistan and China, as both had territorial disputes with India in the region.86 Both China and India have disputes in the region of Ladakh as China administers Aksai Chin, which is claimed by India as its territory. Beginning in May 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) initiated incursions into customarily Indian-held territory across the Line of

140  Timeframe IV Actual Control (LAC), which was the de facto poorly demarcated border between the two states. On June  15, 2020, severe clashes erupted in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh between Indian and Chinese soldiers, leading to the deaths of at least 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers.87 India accused China of violating all prior agreements between the two countries and considered this an attempt by Beijing to change the status-quo.88 China retorted that it had not violated the status-quo and that the border troops never crossed the LAC.89 The clash was the most serious confrontation between the two states since the 1962 border war, and the calls for de-escalation were swift as tensions between the two sides rose. On February 2021, China announced a phased disengagement plan to de-escalate the situation.90 In the aftermath of the clashes, China had gained 600 square miles of territory in Ladakh, changing the status-quo.91 However, the disputes are yet to be settled. Even after 14 rounds of military and diplomatic talks, not much has been achieved and the territorial disputes remain.92 Nepal, once again, was in a predicament. In an official press statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the following: Nepal maintains that disputes between the countries should be resolved through peaceful means. Nepal has always stood firmly for regional and world peace. In the context of recent developments in the Galwan valley area between our friendly neighbors India and China, Nepal is confident that both the neighboring countries will resolve, in the spirit of good neighborliness, their mutual differences through peaceful means in favor of bilateral, regional and world peace and stability.93 While Nepal had done the same in the past, notably in the 1962 war, the Galwan Valley confrontations coincided with the ongoing Indo-Nepali territorial disputes. This made the situation precarious for Nepal as the Sino-Indian clashes overshadowed its contentions with the Kalapani disputes. Nevertheless, this critical juncture was centered on the escalation of tensions between the buffered states as both experienced direct confrontation rather than competitive dynamics that characterized a majority of their interactions. This was a dangerous predicament for the buffer state as its position between the two buffered states is precarious to begin with; any direct confrontation between the buffered states has a propensity to also negatively impact the buffer state as well. In this case, the two states were successful in de-escalation, and the buffer state maintained its sovereignty but its disputes with India were overshadowed. Overall, this critical juncture affirmed the Sino-Indian rivalry which dangerously manifested in the form of armed clashes. In its aftermath, India was explicit in banning Chinese mobile phone applications citing security concerns. Thus, this critical juncture normalized outward expressions of discontent as Indian protestors expressed their anger with China and India officially took policy steps to push back against China despite strong economic ties between the two states. In this critical juncture, Nepal as a buffer state had no option but to declare neutrality and

Timeframe IV  141 encourage de-escalation as the lengthening of such tensions could have extensive security problems for the buffer state.

VI. 2022: Nepal Joins the Millennium Challenge Corporation The last critical juncture that is covered is Nepal’s ratification of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2022. The MCC is defined as an American assistance agency that is focused on fighting against global poverty; it provides time-limited grants to states to promote economic growth, reduce poverty, and strengthen institutions.94 The MCC has operated in 50 countries including Nepal. The incorporation of this particular empirical case is pertinent as it includes an extra-buffer system actor. Given the security implications of the MCC, specifically for China, it is important to incorporate this political event. On September  14, 2017, Nepal and the US (via the MCC) signed a compact worth $500  million with two focus areas: Energy and transportation.95 The compact included plans to address Nepal’s chronic electricity shortage and maintenance of roads to ensure smooth flow of goods and people. The signing of the compact led to protests in Nepal; some political parties argued that it would endanger Nepal’s sovereignty. Eventually, the compact was ratified in Nepal’s parliament on February 27, 2022, after extensive political wrangling and years of delay.96 The ratification prompted more protests, specifically from the country’s communist parties. Some argued the MCC would undermine Nepal’s sovereignty while others worried that the MCC is a part of the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy with strategic objectives aimed at containing China.97 Regardless, the MCC remained a politically divisive subject in Nepal since the 2017 compact, but it was eventually ratified by the Nepali Government. The road to MCC’s ratification was characterized by extensive international dynamics. The US Assistant Secretary of State Donald Lu had pressed Nepal’s Government to ratify the MCC compact by the end of February or the US would terminate it.98 He further added that failure to ratify it would lead to a review of bilateral ties in US–Nepal relations while implicitly implying China’s influence in the tumultuous political process that had marred the MCC ratification in Nepal. China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Wang Wenbin, stated before the compact’s ratification that China opposes “coercive diplomacy” and that any development cooperation should come with “no political strings attached.”99 While the US was not directly mentioned in his response, Wang’s reply was to a question about China’s position on US Assistant Secretary Lu’s warning about reviewing US–Nepal bilateral ties if Nepal failed to ratify the MCC compact. In essence, China’s official position was one that did not view the MCC favorably, and it was expressed through its reference to American overtures as interfering with the sovereignty of Nepal as the country struggled to find consensus on the MCC. Overall, the ratification process of the MCC was marred by political wrangling, both domestically in Nepal and internationally between the US and China. There were no official comments from India on the matter.

142  Timeframe IV This political event is a critical juncture as it highlights Nepal’s agency outside of the buffer system. It also showcases how buffered states react to extraregional intrusions into the buffer system. It is also the first instance where Nepal sought a politically sensitive compact with an extraregional power that did not enjoy good relations with one of the buffered states, China. For China, the ratification of the MCC by Nepal signaled the US’s arrival in the region and was perceived as a direct challenge to the BRI. It was also perceived as an attempt by the US to push back against China globally. For the US, it made sense to push for the MCC into Nepal as the two countries enjoyed good relations; the end of February deadline for the MCC ratification was coercive in the sense that Nepal could not afford a “review” of relations as the US remained a close development partner for the country. For Nepal, the signing of the MCC in 2017 was voluntary, which signals that the country wanted to exercise its agency despite concerns from China. Furthermore, the $500  million investment was much needed for Nepal’s infrastructure development. As for India, it remained mum given its burgeoning ties with the US vis-à-vis China. India is also strengthening its ties in the Indo-Pacific through initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Thus, this critical juncture showcases a unique political event wherein an extraregional power sought to increase its presence in the regional buffer system. One of the buffered states with contentious ties with the extraregional power sought unsuccessfully to thwart such intrusions as the buffer state itself also remained open to fostering closer ties with the extraregional power.

VII.  Conclusion Timeframe IV overwhelmingly included events in the buffer state with the exception of the Sino-Indian border clashes in Ladakh, as illustrated in Table 7.1, which covers the application of the new buffer state concept to all critical junctures. The critical junctures included in this timeframe showcase an extensive increase in China’s influence in Nepal, highlighting the rise of the non-preponderant buffered state within the buffer system. This timeframe also included a lull in relations between Nepal and India, which had been bolstered when Nepal experienced two major earthquakes and India sent the largest foreign relief package to the country in response. Overall, Timeframe IV is characterized by significant disruptions in the preponderant position of India in Nepal, beginning with the border closures in 2015. While India has continued to seek to maintain its disposition in the buffer state, its contentions with Nepal and additional overtures from China have challenged its traditional position. The buffer system in Timeframe IV showcases transformation as China made inroads through the BRI projects and supported Nepal during the border closure. Despite these overtures, China also showcases prudence; it remained mum during the Lipulekh–Kalapani–Limpiyadhura border disputes but was willing to raise the issue when necessary, as it did when Nepal ratified the MCC compact under American pressure. Nepal’s agency as a buffer state is highlighted throughout the events of Timeframe IV. While it remained vulnerable during the earthquakes in 2015, the border

Timeframe IV  143 Table 7.1  Applying the New Buffer State Concept to Timeframe IV Critical Juncture

Strategic Utility of the Buffer State

Agency of the Buffer State

2015: The Nepal Earthquakes

India: Biggest relief effort; strong emphasis on special ties China: Biggest foreign relief operation; sign of willingness to invest extensively in Nepal India: Attempted to utilize its preponderant position ◊ intense negative reaction from Nepal China: Overall emphasis on Nepal’s internal stability; opportunity to foster closer ties India: Negative reaction due to the geostrategic concerns regarding the BRI China: Emphasis on infrastructure development India: Geostrategic interests in keeping the disputed territories under Indian control China: Muted response India: Heightened alert and intense tensions with China China: Heightened alert and intense tensions with India India: Muted response; China: Called on the US to not use “coercive diplomacy”; display of concerns

Limited agency due to national emergency; still cognizant of interest of the buffered states as showcased by refusal of Taiwanese aid

2015: Nepal’s Border Closures with India

2017: Nepal’s Entry into China’s Belt and Road Initiative

2020: The Lipulekh– Kalapani–Limpiyadhura Border Disputes 2020: Sino-Indian Border Clashes in Ladakh

2022: Nepal Joins the Millennium Challenge Corporation

Nepal sought closer economic and security ties with China to counter Indian pressure; first instance of oil delivery from the country’s northern border with China Opportunity to garner more investments in infrastructure; a means to counter any situation similar to the 2015 border closures with India Attempt to assert independent agency with limited success Maintenance of neutrality and a call for swift resolution of the tensions Nepal sought to chart its independent agency through ties with extrabuffer system actors

closure showcases that the buffer state can seek to push back against pressure from the buffered state as Nepal did when India pressured to bring constitutional changes and implicitly shut the border. Nepal sought closer ties to China as a result, which the latter enthusiastically embraced given that it sought to increase its influence in the buffer state. While Nepal attempted to do the same with the Lipulekh–Kalapani–Limpiyadhura border disputes, it was met with limited

144  Timeframe IV results. As such, geostrategic concerns and border disputes seem to be off the table when it comes to interactions between the buffered states in the buffer state as it was deemed too sensitive. China refrained from commenting and iterated the dispute to be a strictly bilateral issue. Nevertheless, the buffered states may be concerned about extraregional intrusions in the buffer state, which may use its agency by inviting extraregional powers if it is in their own interest. Nepal’s willingness to join the MCC was seen as a major concern for China as it perceived it as a bulwark against the BRI. Nevertheless, Nepal ratified the MCC compact despite being aware of China’s concerns. It can be implied that the buffer state may not just seek to balance one buffered state against the other; in fact, it may seek support from extraregional powers if necessary to pursue its interests and also leverage its agency within the buffer system.

Notes 1 “Nepal Earthquake – Fact Sheet #1,” USAID, 2015, www.usaid.gov/nepal-earthquake/ fy15/fs01 2 “The Nepal Earthquake and Human Trafficking,” Australian Human Rights Commission, May  6, 2016, https://humanrights.gov.au/about/news/nepal-earthquake-andhuman-trafficking 3 Isha Sharma, “Citizens’ Reflection on Democracy and Disaster in Nepal in the Wake of the 2015 Earthquake,” Dhaulagiri Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, 14 (2020): 70. 4 Ibid., 71. 5 Louise K. Comfort, “Disaster: Agent of Diplomacy or Change in International Affairs?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 14, no. 1 (2000): 291. 6 “Nepal Earthquake – Fact Sheet #1; Bibek Chand, “Disaster Relief as a Political Tool: Analysing Indian and Chinese Responses after the Nepal Earthquakes,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 6 (2017): 541; Dinesh Paudel and Philippe Le Billon, “Geo-Logics of Power: Disaster Capitalism, Himalayan Materialities, and the Geopolitical Economy of Reconstruction in Post-Earthquale Nepal,” Geopolitics 25, no. 4 (2020): 839. 7 Maitri means “friendship” in Sanskrit, which is the liturgical language in Hinduism – A religion that is followed by a majority of people in both India and Nepal; Chand, “Disaster Relief as a Political Tool,” 540. 8 Panda, “In Nepal Earthquake’s Aftermath, India and China Respond.” 9 Niharika Mandhana and Charles Hutzler, “Nepal Earthquake: India and China Send Rescue Teams to Himalayan Nation,” The Wall Street Journal, April  26, 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/nepal-earthquake-china-sends-search-and-rescue-team-tokatmandu-1430032246. 10 Chand, “Disaster Relief as a Political Tool,” 540. 11 Louise K. Comfort, “Disaster: Agent of Diplomacy or Change in International Affairs?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 14, no. 1 (2000): 291. 12 Panda, “In Nepal Earthquake’s Aftermath, India and China Respond.” 13 “India’s ‘Operation Maitri’ in Earthquake-Hit Nepal Ends,” NDTV, 2015, www.ndtv. com/india-news/indias-operation-maitri-in-earthquake-hit-nepal-ends-768795. 14 Ankit Panda, “In Nepal Earthquake’s Aftermath, India and China Respond,” The Diplomat, April  27, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/in-earthquakes-aftermathindia-and-china-respond/ 15 Shannon Tiezzi, “After Devastating Earthquake, China Rushes Aid to Nepal,” The Diplomat, April 28, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/after-devasating-earthquakechina-rushesaid-to-nepal/

Timeframe IV  145 16 “India’s ‘Operation Maitri’ in Earthquake-Hit Nepal Ends,” NDTV. 17 Ashlyn Anderson and Alyssa Ayres, “Disaster Relief: China and India Come Together,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 30, 2015, www.cfr.org/expert-brief/ disaster-relief-china-and-india-come-together. 18 Tsering Shakya and Ashok Gurung, “Was Nepal a Soft Power Victory for China?” Foreign Policy, May  1, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/01/nepal-chinaearthquake-aid-taiwan-power/. 19 Chand, “Disaster Relief as a Political Tool,” 541. 20 “Disaster Politics: India, China, Pakistan Compete in Quake-hit Nepal,” The Hindustan Times, April  28, 2015, www.hindustantimes.com/world/disaster-politics-indiachina-pak-compete-in-quake-hit-nepal/story-mMK83K8HQq2TwmnW0TwwlK.html 21 Dinesh Paudel and Philippe Le Billon, “Geo-Logics of Power,” 844; Richard Olson, “Toward a Politics of Disaster Losses, Values, Agendas, and Blame,” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 18, no. 1 (2000). 22 Ayesha Siddiqi, “Climatic Disasters and Radical Politics in Southern Pakistan: The Non-linear Connection,” Geopolitics 19, no. 4 (2014): 888. 23 Dinesh Paudel and Philippe Le Billon, “Geo-Logics of Power,” 844. 24 Ibid., 850. 25 Sukh Dev Muni, “Nepal’s New Constitution: Towards Progress or Chaos?” Economic and Political Weekly 50, no. 20 (2015): 16. 26 Dinesh Paudel, “Ethnic Identity Politics in Nepal: Liberation from, or Restoration of, Elite Interest?” Asian Ethnicity 17, no. 4 (2016): 552. 27 Ibid., 550. 28 Pramod K. Kantha, “India’s Troubled Relations with Kathmandu: Nepal’s Republican Turn and the China Factor,” Journal of Global South Studies 38, no. 2 (2021): 326. 29 “Nepal Earthquake: India and China Pledge Millions in Aid,” BBC News, June  25, 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33266422 30 Tharus are one of the oldest indigenous groups of Nepal who are primarily settled in the southern Terai plains of the country. 31 Soutik Biswas, “Why Is Indian Media Facing a Backlash in Nepal?” BBC News, May 4, 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-32579561. 32 Ibid. 33 Rakesh Sood, “Making Friends, Influencing Nepal,” The Hindu, September 26, 2015, www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Rakesh-Sood-writes-making-friends-influencingNepal/article62119743.ece 34 Yubaraj Ghimire, “Next Door Nepal: Advantage Beijing,” The Indian Express, November 3, 2015, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/nepal-fuel-crisisadvantage-beijing/ 35 Anjoo Sharan Upadhyayay, “Rise Above Prejudices and Suspicions: Build a ‘Naya Nepal’,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 11, no. 2 (2016): 122. 36 Bikash Sangraula, “Nepal Accuses India of an Economic Blockade as Border Trade Freezes Up,” Christian Science Monitor, September 28, 2015, www. csmonitor.com/World/AsiaSouth-Central/2015/0928/Nepal-accuses-India-of-aneconomic-blockade-as-border-trade-freezes-up. 37 Ghimire, “Next Door Nepal.” 38 Prashant Jha, “Nepal’s Contested Constitution Deepens Crisis at Home and With India,” World Politics Review, 2015, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/17126/ nepal-s-contested-constitution-deepens-crisis-at-home-and-with-india. 39 Sangraula, “Nepal Accuses India of an Economic Blockade.” 40 Nepal Plans to Build Three More Fuel Depots,” The Himalayan Times, December 8, 2015, https://thehimalayantimes.com/business/nepal-plans-to-build-three-more-fuel-depots/. 41 Nepal to Request China to Expand Araniko Highway,” E-Kantipur, November  29, 2015, http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2015-11-29/nepal-to-request-chinato-expand-araniko-highway.html.

146  Timeframe IV 42 Rishi Iyengar, “Millions of Children Are At Risk Because of the Nepal Blockade, UNICEF Warns,” Time, November  30, 2015, http://time.com/4130341/nepalblockade-vaccine-shortage-children-unicef/ 43 Debashish Roy Chowdhury, “China Scores as Nepal Plays Hardball with India Over Border ‘Blockade,’ ” South China Morning Post, January  5, 2016, www. scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1898210/china-scores-nepalplays-hardball-india-over-border. 44 Ghimire, “Next Door Nepal.” 45 Tunku Varadarajan, “Reverse Swing: Modi’s Biggest Failure to Date is One of Foreign Policy,” The Indian Express, November  1, 2015, https://indianexpress.com/article/ opinion/columns/india-nepal-relations-himalayan-blunder/ 46 “China Welcomes Endorsement of New Constitution,” The Kathmandu Post, September  17, 2015, https://kathmandupost.com/miscellaneous/2015/09/17/chinawelcomes-endorsement-of-new-constitution 47 Prashant Jha, “China ‘Assures’ Agitating Tarai Leaders it is Not Anti-Madhesi,” The Hindustan Times, October  8, 2015, www.hindustantimes.com/world/china-saysnot-anti-madhesi-stable-nepal-not-possible-without-us/story-hjVEACt6ZyBHdWmHitmU5L.html 48 With Blockade Lifted, India Can Influence Nepal,” Stratfor, February 15, 2016, https:// worldview.stratfor.com/article/blockade-lifted-india-can-influence-nepal. 49 Lukas K. Danner, China’s Grand Strategy: Contradictory Foreign Policy? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), 78–79. 50 Ibid., 77; “Chronology of China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Xinhua, March 28, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/28/c_134105435. 51 Vera Schulhof, Detlef van Vuuren and Julian Kirchherr, “The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): What Will it Look Like in the Future?” Technological Forecasting & Social Change, no. 175 (2022): 2. 52 Jennifer Hillman and David Sacks, “China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021, www.cfr.org/report/chinas-beltand-road-implications-for-the-united-states/findings#:~:text=63%20CDB%2C%20 the%20world’s%20largest,64 53 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, January  28, 2020, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinasmassive-belt-and-road-initiative; “Inside China’s Plan to Create a Modern Silk Road,” Morgan Stanley, March 14, 2018, www.morganstanley.com/ideas/china-belt-and-road. 54 David Sacks, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – Hard Reality Greets BRI’s Signature Initiative,” The Council on Foreign Relations, March 30, 2021, www.cfr.org/ blog/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-hard-reality-greets-bris-signature-initiative 55 “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” The Green Finance & Development Center at Fudan University, 2022, https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-thebelt-and-road-initiative-bri/?cookie-state-change=1657304939554 56 Lauren Frayer, “In Sri Lanka, China’s Building Spree is Raising Questions about Sovereignty,” NPR, December  13, 2019, www.npr.org/2019/12/13/784084567/ in-sri-lanka-chinas-building-spree-is-raising-questions-about-sovereignty 57 Deborah Brautigam and Meg Rithmire, “The Chinese ‘Debt Trap’ is a Myth,” The Atlantic, February  6, 2021, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/ china-debt-trap-diplomacy/617953/ 58 Bishal Chalise, “China’s Belt and Road Reaches Nepal,” East Asia Forum, June 17, 2017, www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/17/chinas-belt-and-road-reaches-nepal/ 59 Ibid. 60 Rupak Sapkota, “Nepal’s Role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative Highlights Balancing Act between Beijing and Delhi,” South China Morning Post, September 9, 2017, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2110474/nepals-rolechinas-belt-and-road-initiative-highlights

Timeframe IV  147 61 “Official Spokesperson’s Response to a Query on Participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum,” Ministry of External Affairs – Government of India, May 13, 2017, https:// mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28463/Official+Spokespersons+response+to+a+q uery+on+participation+of+India+in+OBORBRI+Forum 62 Chalise, “China’s Belt and Road Reaches Nepal.” 63 Lekhanath Pandey, “Nepal: What Happened to China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Projects?” Deutsche Welle, May  26, 2022, www.dw.com/en/nepal-what-happenedto-chinas-belt-and-road-projects/a-61941737 64 Ibid. 65 Abiral Khatri and Raunab Singh Khatri, “BRI Enters the Tenth Year,” The Nepali Times, May 13, 2022, www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/bri-enters-the-tenth-year/ 66 “Nepal Wants to be a Dynamic Bridge between India and China: Prachanda,” The Times of India, October 17, 2016. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/nepal-wants-tobe-a-dynamic-bridge-between-india-china-prachanda/articleshow/54887300.cms; see Chapter 3 for details on the “equi-proximity” in Nepal’s foreign policy. 67 S.Y. Surendra Kumar, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): India’s Concerns, Responses, and Strategies,” International Journal of China Studies 10, no. 1 (2019): 32–34. 68 Tshering Chonzom Bhutia, “Tibet and China’s ‘Belt and Road’,” The Diplomat, August 30, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/tibet-and-chinas-belt-and-road/ 69 “Maps of Newly Formed Union Territories of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, with the Map of India,” Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, November 2, 2019, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1590112 70 Amit Ranjan, “India-Nepal Tensions: The Issue of Lipulekh,” ISAS Working Paper, no. 325 (2020): 1. 71 Ibid., 5. 72 Sohini Nayak, “India and Nepal’s Kalapani Border Dispute: An Explainer,” Observer Research Foundation, no. 356 (2020): 3. 73 “Maps of Newly Formed Union Territories of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, with the Map of India,” Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs – Government of India, November 2, 2019, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1590112 74 Amit Ranjan, “India-Nepal Tensions,” 1. 75 Bharat Khanal, “Geo-Strategic Imperative of North-Western Border: Triangular Region Kalapani-Lipulekh and Limpiadhura of Nepal,” Unity Journal, no. II (2021): 32. 76 “Press Releae on Lipu Lekh,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Government of Nepal, May 9, 2020, https://mofa.gov.np/press-release-regarding-lipu-lekh/ 77 Nayak, “India and Nepal’s Kalapani Border Dispute,” 8. 78 “Nepal Hands Over Diplomatic Note to Indian Ambassador Expressing Displeasure Over India’s Opening of a Road Via Lipulekh,” The Kathmandu Post, May 11, 2020, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2020/05/11/nepal-hands-over-diplomatic-noteto-indian-ambassador-expressing-displeasure-over-india-s-opening-of-a-road-vialipulekh 79 “Official Spokesperson’s Response to Media Queries on the Revised Map of Nepal Released Today by Government of Nepal,” Ministry of External Affairs – Government of India, May  20, 2020, www.mea.gov.in/response-to-queries.htm?dtl/32697/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_media_queries_on_the_revised_map_of_Nepal_ released_today_by_Government_of_Nepal 80 India Rejects Nepal’s New Map: ‘Artificial Enlargement of Territorial Claims Unacceptable’,” The Indian Express, May 20, 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/ india-nepal-kalapani-map-border-k-p-oli-6419788/ 81 Constantino Xavier, “Interpreting the India-Nepal Border Dispute,” Brookings, June  11, 2020, www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/11/interpreting-the-indianepal-border-dispute/ 82 Amit Ranjan, “India-Nepal Tensions,” 6.

148  Timeframe IV 83 “Kalapani issue is Between Nepal and India, Says Chinese Foreign Ministry,” The Kathmandu Post, May  19, 2020, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2020/05/19/ kalapani-issue-is-between-nepal-and-india-says-chinese-foreign-ministry 84 Dinesh Bhattarai, “India-Nepal Ties Must be Dominated by Opportunities of Future, Not Frustrations of Past,” The Indian Express, June 10, 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/ opinion/columns/rajnath-singh-nepal-india-relations-road-to-mansarovar-6451070/ 85 Sukh Deo Muni, “Lipu Lekh: The Past, Present and Future of the Nepal-India Standoff,” The Hindustan Times, May  22, 2020, www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/ lipu-lekh-the-past-present-and-future-of-the-nepal-india-stand-off-analysis/storywy3OvSD0G0nkxtGQTOIp2I.html 86 Alyssa Ayres, “The China-India Border Dispute: What to Know,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 18, 2020, www.cfr.org/in-brief/china-india-border-dispute-what-know 87 Brude Riedel, “As India and China Clash, JFK’s ‘Forgotten Crisis’ is Back,” Brookings, June 17, 2020, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/17/as-indiaand-china-clash-jfks-forgotten-crisis-is-back/ 88 Ayres, “The China-India Border Dispute.” 89 “India Accuses China of ‘Provocative Military Movements’ at Border,” BBC News, August 31, 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-53971397. 90 Arzan Tarapore, “The Crisis After the Crisis: How Ladakh Will Shape India’s Competition with China,” Lowy Institute, May 6, 2021, www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/ crisis-after-crisis-how-ladakh-will-shape-india-s-competition-china 91 Sushant Singh, “Why China is Winning Against India,” Foreign Policy, January  1, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/01/india-china-himalayas-ladakh-standoff/ 92 Aditya Sharma, “What is Next in the China-India Border Conflict?” Deutsche Welle, January  28, 2022, www.dw.com/en/what-is-next-in-the-china-india-borderconflict/a-60586745 93 “Press Statement on recent development in Galwan Valley area between India and China,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Government of Nepal, June  20, 2020, https:// mofa.gov.np/press-statement-on-recent-development-in-galwan-valley-area-betweenindia-and-china/ 94 “About MCC,” Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2022, www.mcc.gov/about 95 Ibid. 96 Tika R. Pradhan, Parliament Ratifies MCC Compact After Years of Delay, February 27, 2022, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2022/02/27/nepal-parliament-ratifies-mcccompact 97 Gopal Sharma, “Explainer” Why is a US Infrastructure Grant Behind Protests in Nepal?” Reuters, February  24, 2022, www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/why-isus-infrastructure-grant-behind-protests-nepal-2022-02-24/ 98 Lekhanath Pandey, “US Grant to Nepal Puts Spotlight on Geopolitical Rivalry with China,” Deutsche Welle, February  23, 2022, www.dw.com/en/us-grant-to-nepalputs-spotlight-on-geopolitical-rivalry-with-china/a-60889582 99 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on February  18, 2022,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, February  18, 2022, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/ 2511_665403/202202/t20220218_10643446.html

8 Conclusion

The 21 critical junctures covered in Timeframes I, II, III, and IV showcase a dynamic buffer system wherein the two buffered states exhibit varying degrees of increase or decrease in their overtures within the buffer state. These critical junctures also illustrate the new buffer state concept based on strategic utility and agency of the buffer states. The 21 instances of major political events or crises that fostered policy changes within the buffer system showcase that the buffer system itself is not simply two buffered states jockeying for influence within the buffer state. Rather, they also actively seek to undermine each other within the buffer state while concurrently the buffer state uses its agency as deemed fit to pursue its interests. The following sections discuss the major patterns within the China–India–Nepal (CIN) buffer system. First, four major themes are ascertained based on the analyses of the critical junctures: Survival is Key, Implicit Limits, Lopsided Buffer Systems, Agency Maximization, and Domestic Politics Matters. Then, the new buffer state concept is revisited by collectively discussing all of the critical junctures within this new framework.

I.  Survival Is Key Throughout the critical junctures, the actions of Nepal as a buffer state emphasizes a need for expanding its agency. However, the notion of survival is innate to its behavior. Staying true to the behavior of buffer states, the critical junctures highlight that such states are cognizant of the existential threats posed by their much larger neighbors. In Timeframe I, Tibet’s inclusion into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) prompted Nepal to seek closer ties to India to ensure its survival; the existential fear existed in Nepal until the country’s first democratic experience in 1951, when it finally opened diplomatic channels with China after India’s normalization of relations and relinquishing of Qing-era claims on Nepal by Beijing.1 Similarly, during Timeframe II, the critical juncture 1962: Sino-Indian War was another instance where existential threats were paramount. Given that the status-quo was changing, the uncertainty prompted Nepal to declare neutrality and maintain a rather muted diplomatic presence. Another instance was in Timeframe IV during the critical juncture 2020: Sino-Indian Border Clashes in Ladakh, which prompted Nepal to declare neutrality and call DOI: 10.4324/9781003178538-8

150  Conclusion for a swift resolution to the tensions. During both these instances, wherein the buffered states were faced with direct armed conflict (albeit in varying degrees), the buffer state Nepal declared neutrality and focused on maintenance of the status-quo vis-à-vis its buffer status. The Bangladesh Liberation War of 1972 highlighted the reassertion of India as the regional power in South Asia. Despite measured rhetoric during the war, Nepal quickly recognized Bangladesh. Again, the notion of survival is key here as Nepal overwhelmingly depended on India for trade and transit. As such, the viability and survival of Nepal meant that it had to acknowledge Indian preponderance. Sikkim’s accession into India in 1975 also prompted concerns in Nepal, which led to the Zone of Peace (ZoP) proposal and strengthening of ties with China. Thus, Nepal sought to either internationalize its stature as a zone of peace or closer ties with the other buffered states. Overall, these actions showcase a strong commitment to survival. If one buffered state postured itself as a threat to the buffer state’s survival, it sought to emphasize its sovereignty either through international recognition or by inviting the other buffered state to have a bigger stake. During direct confrontations between the buffered states, the buffer state remained neutral to maximize its chances of survival; explicitly choosing a side would entail that the buffer state would no longer be able to jockey interactions with the two buffered states. As such, the survival of the buffer state takes centrality in its foreign policy approach vis-à-vis the buffer system.

II.  Lopsided Buffer Systems Buffer systems are typically characterized by a buffer state separated by two (sometimes more) contending buffered states. Nevertheless, the case of the CIN buffer system demonstrates that such buffer systems may be lopsided in favor of one buffered state over the other. In this case, India maintains preponderance in a majority of the critical junctures given Nepal’s overwhelming reliance on India for trade coupled with strong sociocultural affinities. China’s influence, despite its gradual growth over time, is limited due to the topographic challenges posed by the sparsely populated Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) and weaker sociocultural ties with Nepal. While the case does illustrate a buffer system where India and China compete for influence, the system itself is lopsided toward India despite increased Chinese overtures since the 2008 riots in the TAR. The critical junctures related to the economic blockades in 1989 and 2015 showcase the economic influence that India has over Nepal, which can easily foster policy changes in the latter. Nevertheless, the critical junctures do showcase that Nepal realizes this and has time and again acquiesced to Indian demands but has at the same time also opened other avenues with China to limit the impact of such events in the future. Overall, the current case of the CIN buffer system does illustrate a buffer system wherein one of the buffered states (India) enjoys preponderance, but the contentions from the contending buffered state (China) still exist to challenge that preponderance with varying results.

Conclusion  151

III.  Implicit Limits Lopsided buffer systems, such as the case study covered in this book, may also foster implicit limits on what the non-preponderant buffer state can or cannot do within the system. Throughout the critical junctures, China has overwhelmingly remained hands-off when it comes to the internal politics of Nepal. The instances of Nepal’s democratic movements in 1951, 1990, and 2005 are characterized by India’s support for democratic forces, while China largely remained mum and called them “internal matters” of Nepal. It can be ascertained from these instances that China acknowledges India’s preponderant position in Nepal and draws implicit limits to what it can or cannot do with regard to the buffer state. As such, these rather constrained positions of the non-preponderant buffered state showcase that it is aware of its position within the buffer system and maintains restraint through implicit limits on its actions toward the buffer state during critical junctures. Furthermore, during critical junctures like the 1996: Maoist insurgency, 2002: Suspension of Parliamentary Democracy and the Royal Coup (2002), and 2006–2008: Jana Andolan II and Abolishment of Nepal’s Monarchy, China maintained a restrained public rhetoric, calling these events matters of “internal affairs,” while India initially explicitly supported anti-Maoist forces, criticized the royal coup, and openly supported Nepal’s democratic forces during Jana Andolan II. Furthermore, China also did not express anything officially during the 2020: Lipulekh–Kalapani–Limpiyadhura Border Disputes. There is a threshold that China seeks to maintain, and the border disputes between India and Nepal would be overstepping it. The restrained approaches of China during these critical junctures illustrate its acknowledgment of India’s preponderance in Nepal, bolstering the notion that the CIN buffer system is lopsided. Thus, China imposes implicit limits on its rhetoric and actions accordingly. An important caveat to note here is that a lopsided buffer system does not mean that the non-preponderant buffered state does not make any overtures toward the buffer state. The analysis of the critical junctures showcases that China is restrained in its approach when it comes to taking sides with regards to Nepal’s domestic political actors; instead, Beijing opts to support whoever is in power. This is illustrated in the critical junctures 1990: Second Democratic Experience in Nepal, 1996: The Maoist Insurgency, 2001: King Birendra’s Assassination and Crowning of King Gyanendra, 2002: Suspension of Parliamentary Democracy and the Royal Coup, and 2008: Jana Andolan II and Abolishment of Nepal’s Monarchy. China declared these critical junctures as internal matters of Nepal and continued to support the status-quo. However, China is unafraid to make overtures toward Nepal using less politically sensitive tools of statecraft wherein the discussion of implicit limits is important. It is specifically pertinent to the question of China’s domestic security concerns. While explicit calls for political changes in Nepal or border disputes between India and Nepal are not explicitly referred to, China has mobilized resources to influence Nepal during other critical junctures. For example, China was positive to overtures from Nepal during the blockades in 1989 and 2015 as well as in the aftermath of the 2015: Nepal’s

152  Conclusion Border Closures with India. During both instances, China and Nepal forged closer security ties while the 2015 border closure opened more expansive Chinese support. Also, after 2008: Riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, China was forthcoming in its security ties with Nepal to bolster the TAR’s stability. Thus, the CIN buffer system illustrates that the non-preponderant buffered state is cognizant of the preponderance of the competing buffered state, and as such, there are implicit limits that exist, which result in self-restrained approaches that may put pressure on the preponderant buffered state but do not drastically alter the buffer system. Interestingly, the only instance when China explicitly raises concerns vis-à-vis the buffer system is when Nepal joined the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2022. China has not explicitly mentioned India regarding its policy toward Nepal in any of the critical junctures, but Beijing was explicit about “coercive diplomacy” of the United States in Nepal. Such an action can be tied to the systemic rivalry between the United States and China, wherein the latter seeks to prevent the former from making inroads into a buffer system where the only other formidable competing interest emanates from India. The entry of the United States complicates the buffer system further and may invoke greater security concerns for China, one which is very close to home.

IV.  Agency Maximization Whether be it a critical juncture that is characterized by direct Sino-Indian confrontations or Nepal’s tumultuous relations with India, the buffer state sought to maximize its agency in all critical junctures, except during 1996: The Maoist Insurgency, and 2001: King Birendra’s Assassination and Crowning of King Gyanendra. Apart from these two critical junctures that characterized extensive internal stability within Nepal to foster a consistent form of agency, Nepal as a buffer state has sought to jockey favor from the buffered states to maximize its agency. Based on the critical junctures analyzed, there appear to be three ways in which buffer states maximize agency: Neutrality, Internationalization of Diplomacy, and Forging Closer Ties with One of the Buffered States. A.  Neutrality To ensure survival, Nepal refused to open diplomatic channels with China until the latter’s relinquishing of Qing-era claims over Nepal and normalization of ties with India.2 During the Sino-Indian War (1962)3 and the Sino-Indian border clashes in Ladakh (2020),4 Nepal declared neutrality to preserve its autonomy and sovereignty. Taking a side meant forfeiting agency by aligning with one side. To maintain the space to maneuver between the buffered states, Nepal had to declare neutrality as it maximized its foreign policy options. Adopting neutrality signals no special affinities from the buffer state, which allows for a return to normal relations with the buffered states once they de-escalate their tensed relations. In the peculiar case of the critical juncture 1971: Bangladesh Liberation War, Nepal remained neutral during the warring stage but quickly recognized the emergence of Bangladesh.5 Taking this course of action, Nepal did not appear to support

Conclusion  153 India’s actions during the unfolding of the violence; yet, at the conclusion of the war, it was evident that Bangladesh would be internationally recognized and India was to emerge as South Asia’s regional power. As such, Nepal sought to signal to India its acceptance of the new geopolitical reality to ensure smooth relations. However, neutrality during these two critical junctures also raised strategic concerns in the buffered states, particularly in the preponderant buffered state (i.e., India) regarding Nepal’s intentions and its susceptibility to forge closer ties with China. B.  Internationalization of Diplomacy Nepal as a buffer state showcases awareness about Indian preponderance, which time and again also bolsters attempts at agency maximization. For example, under the critical juncture 1960: King Mahendra’s Seizure of Power & Diplomatic Internationalization Efforts, Nepal internationalized its diplomatic presence in order to affirm its sovereignty; this meant that Nepal had increased international recognition despite preponderant Indian influence. To further limit India’s influence, Nepal under King Mahendra also opened its first direct highway link to China in 1961 and established ties with 33 other states in the international system.6 Similarly, King Birendra also sought to internationalize Nepal’s status to affirm its agency through the ZoP proposal. The ZoP would remove all external influences in Nepal including the special relationship with India. As such, it was an attempt to push back against Indian preponderance and create space for more agency; this became specifically pertinent after Sikkim’s accession to India in 1975 as a sovereign state adjacent to it ceased to exist. Extension of agency was important to ensure survival in a geopolitical context that was marred by changing borders. Thus, internationalization of diplomatic efforts is one of the tools used by Nepal as a buffer state to guarantee its survival while also pushing for more room for its agency. Ties with international players affirmed the buffer state’s existence and ensured state survival while also leaving room for the buffer state to pursue ties with extra-buffer system actors. This was the case for the critical juncture 2022: Nepal Joins the Millennium Challenge Corporation when Nepal sought to forge closer ties with the United States, which despite protests from China went ahead. As such, buffer states may take risks and internationalize their diplomatic efforts to affirm their agency and sovereignty. Nepal’s close ties with the UN, the EU, and the United States signal the importance of internationalization to maximize agency as such efforts impact pressure on the buffered states in their relations with the buffer state. Diplomatic internationalization affirms the sovereignty of the buffer state, which affords it more flexibility in its exercise of agency. C.  Forging Closer Ties with One of the Buffered States The buffer state’s context is precarious given its relative size and the contending nature of relations between the buffered states. To ensure maximization of agency, buffer states may seek to forge closer ties with one buffered state over the

154  Conclusion other. As highlighted in the previous sections, in critical junctures 1950: Tibet’s Inclusion into the People’s Republic of China, 1951: Movement Against the Rana Regime in Nepal, and in the early years of 1951–1960: Nepal’s First Democratic Experience, Nepal forged close ties with India despite New Delhi’s explicit support for democratic forces against Nepal’s ruling Rana elites. For Nepal as a buffer state, its survival superseded all domestic considerations including regime security and as such; Nepal forged “special relations” with India by signing the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The move was to establish Indian preponderance, but for Nepal, it was a matter of state survival given the TAR’s incorporation into the PRC. Nepal did not want to face a similar fate and as such, forged closer ties with India. However, during the critical juncture 1960: King Mahendra’s Direct Rule and Emphasis on Nepal’s Agency, Nepal sought to reduce what was perceived as Indian meddling in its domestic politics by opening diplomatic ties with China in 1955 and also agreeing to have a road linking the countries.7 Given the lopsided buffer system in favor of India, Nepal’s history as a modern buffer state has been characterized by pushing back against Indian preponderance. During the critical juncture 1975: King Birendra’s Zone of Peace Proposal, India refused to endorse the ZoP proposal as it would remove the “special relations” with Nepal and undermine its position in the buffer state. Instead, Nepal internationalized the issue and actually was backed by China and Pakistan, two states with which India has historically had strained ties. As such, Nepal sought to reduce Indian preponderance during King Birendra’s rule through the ZoP; by forging closer ties with China on the ZoP, Nepal sought to internationalize it but with limited success. Nevertheless, the rhetorical gesture of the ZoP rests on the pursuit of maximizing agency. Reducing Indian preponderance was the key to this process. The forging of close ties to one buffered state over the other to maximize agency is witnessed again during the critical juncture 1989: The Blockade of Nepal under Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi. As India sought to put a brake on Nepal’s closer security ties to China, the blockade prompted Nepal to turn to China, which at the time could do little due to internal political pressures tied to the events in Tiananmen Square. Nevertheless, Nepal did seek to bring international attention to its plight and was successful in getting verbal support from China, but it led to no substantial recourse on the issue that ultimately led to the country’s democratization. In the critical juncture 2002: Suspension of Parliamentary Democracy and the Royal Coup, India explicitly criticized the undemocratic moves from King Gyanendra; the monarch naturally turned to the other buffered state, China, and closed the Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office and the Office of the Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to forge closer ties with Beijing.8 China had its own interests in Nepal which were to stabilize it to ensure stability in the TAR. Thus, Nepal under King Gyanendra sought to forge closer ties with China by enacting policies that closely aligned with Beijing’s interests. The critical juncture 2015: Nepal’s Border Closures with India also demonstrates that the buffer state seeks to garner the support of one buffered state if the other seeks to pressurize the buffer state. The 2015 border blockade showcases that India’s attempt at forcing Nepal to bring about policy changes in its domestic

Conclusion  155 politics comes at a cost; it opened the avenue for closer Sino-Nepali relations which eventually led to the other critical juncture, 2017: Nepal’s Entry into China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, India’s attempts at pressuring Nepal in 2015 eventually pushed Kathmandu to seek help from Beijing in the form of greater economic collaboration and closer diplomatic ties, as illustrated by Nepal’s enthusiasm to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2017 amidst concerns from India. Overall, the critical junctures discussed here illustrate that the buffer state aims to maximize its agency and ascertain its own policy trajectory. It may seek to have closer affinities with one buffered state over the other during critical juncture periods to pushback against pressures from either one of the buffered states. Given the lopsided nature of the CIN buffer system, the pressures largely emanated from India. As such, a majority of Nepal’s attempts as a buffer state to maximize its agency through forging of closer ties with one of the buffered states have been by forging closer ties with China.

V.  Domestic Actors Matter A major factor in the CIN buffer system was the role of domestic political actors. The critical junctures showcase that the domestic political changes in the buffer state were instrumental in determining whether Nepal moved closer to India or China. The monarchy, whether it be under Kings Mahendra, Birendra, or Gyanendra, sought to reduce India’s influence or garner political support from China to bolster their control domestically and internationally. For example, King Mahendra, during the critical juncture 1960: King Mahendra’s Seizure of Power & Diplomatic Internationalization Efforts, sought closer ties with China as a means of internationalizing Nepal’s diplomacy while also reducing the influence of India which traditionally favored a democratic Government in Nepal. Similarly, during the 1990: Second Democratic Experience in Nepal critical juncture, King Birendra sought to forge closer ties with China to pushback against pressures from India as democratic forces called for an end to the absolute monarchy. However, the pressure from India acted as a catalyst for democratization. King Gyanendra sought to do something similar in the critical junctures 2002: Suspension of Parliamentary Democracy and the Royal Coup and 2006–2008: Jana Andolan II and Abolishment of Nepal’s Monarchy; he cracked down on the activities of the Tibetan refugees in Nepal and strengthened security ties with Beijing. As India criticized King Gyanendra’s royal coup and faced increased international criticism, his overtures to China were to offset them. It did work as China vetoed any attempt by the UN Human Rights Commission to discuss the human rights situation in Nepal.9 On the other hand, the democratic political parties (including the previously warring Maoists) were supported by India. As such, the monarchy in Nepal has traditionally been considered to use the “China card” to prop up its regime while the political parties (particularly the Nepali Congress) are viewed as having the tacit support of India. After the success of Jana Andolan II, the Maoists emerged as a major winner. Despite enjoying India’s support during the movement against King Gyanendra,

156  Conclusion the Maoists had a rhetoric of anti-Indian hegemony in Nepal which came to the forefront when Maoist leader Prachanda came to power after the first Constituent Assembly elections in 2008. He showcased affinity toward Beijing, influencing Nepal’s foreign policy. The case of the Maoists showcases that political parties within the buffer state may seek to curry favor with one buffered state over the other. The Maoists’ pro-China posturing was particularly well-received as the Nepali populace has long conceived India’s influence as being hegemonic. ProChina posturing allowed the Maoists to garner public support, and as the critical junctures illustrate, domestic politics are important to assess the buffer state’s relations with its buffered states. However, this is not always the case. During the critical junctures 2015: Nepal’s Border Closures with India and 2020: The Lipulekh–Kalapani–Limpiyadhura Border Disputes, political parties from a wide spectrum criticized India. Thus, the internal politics of buffer states do matter when it comes to closer ties with either of the buffered states as the incumbent political actor seeks to maintain hold on power in a precarious democratic context of Nepal. However, the political actors may unite and go against their preferred buffered states in matters of national sovereignty as was the case in the aforementioned critical junctures. These political actors need the support of the Nepali populace, which may take a hit if they are not perceived as being patriotic or acting in the best interests of Nepal. The domestic political dynamics in the buffer state are important in the course of action it takes vis-à-vis the buffered states. Nepal’s monarchy traditionally looked to China to prop up their government while the political parties have historically received support from India. However, the post-monarchy context in Nepal showcases fractionalization based on political parties as some parties like the Maoists and the United Marxists Leninists (UML) have sought greater support from China while the Nepali Congress has largely maintained its close ties with India. Thus, ties to buffered states may be used as posturing by political parties to attain support from the public which has implications for the dynamic political relations within the buffer system.

VI.  The New Buffer Concept in Context As discussed in Chapter 2, the new buffer state concept is premised on two factors: Strategic utility of the buffer state and agency of the buffer state. The critical junctures assessed in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 illustrate both of these factors associated with the new buffer state concept. A.  Strategic Utility of the Buffer State The critical junctures assessed in the previous chapters showcase the dynamic nature of the buffer system wherein all the actors in the CIN buffer state demonstrate flux in their ties with each other. The buffer state is not situated in a stationary geopolitical context but is an active participant. Furthermore, the buffered states also showcase their power status within the buffer system by pushing and

Conclusion  157 pulling back as necessary. India pushed for greater influence during the 1950: Tibet’s Inclusion into the People’s Republic of China, 1951: End of the Rana Regime in Nepal, 1989: The Blockade of Nepal under Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi, 1990: Second Democratic Experience in Nepal, 2002: Suspension of Parliamentary Democracy and the Royal Coup, 2006–2008: Jana Andolan II and Abolishment of Nepal’s Monarchy, and 2015: Nepal’s Border Closures with India. In all these critical junctures, India sought to bolster its position within the buffer state by actively supporting actors that it deemed to support its bidding, specifically the democratic political parties. China, on the other hand, pushed into the buffer state in the following critical junctures: 2008: Riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, 2015: The Nepal Earthquakes, 2015: Nepal’s Border Closures with India, 2017: Nepal’s Entry into China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and 2022: Nepal Joins the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The critical juncture on the MCC is the only one during which China was explicitly negative toward a decision taken by Nepal. These instances of critical junctures highlight push by one buffered state into the buffer state, usually at the cost of influence for the other buffered state. The competitive overtures can also be witnessed in the aftermath of the 2015: Nepal Earthquakes. In the reconstruction process, China and India have made competitive overtures through measured aid; reconstruction of important heritage sites are also characterized by competition between China and India on who would help with the restoration. During the 2002: Suspension of Parliamentary Democracy and the Royal Coup and 2006–2008: Jana Andolan II and Abolishment of Nepal’s Monarchy, India and China supported different domestic political actors in Nepal, showcasing a dynamic interaction which is competitive as these domestic political actors were challenging each other for dominance within Nepal. The lopsided nature of the CIN buffer system is also characterized by implicit limits set by China itself. These implicit limits illustrated by China during the 2020: The Lipulekh–Kalapani–Limpiyadhura Border Disputes critical juncture showcases that there are limits to China’s overtures in the buffer system, and while China has made competitive overtures in other critical junctures, it was restrained in this case. As such, the strategic utility of the buffer state particularly within a lopsided buffer system may entail restrained action by one of the buffered states as it may serve to maximize the policy options later. Such restraint also serves to prevent extensive destabilization of the buffer system. Overall, analyses of the critical junctures affirm that the buffer state is indeed a dynamic political space wherein buffered states make competitive overtures. This includes competitive overtures to reduce the influence of the competing buffered state or to garner more favor with the buffer state. The buffered state may also encourage the buffer state to take actions that align with the buffered state’s interests. Implicit limits indicate that buffered states are aware of “no-go” areas in critical junctures, further adding nuance to the dynamism of the buffer system. Overall, the critical junctures assessed in the previous chapters lend to the argument that the contemporary buffer state system in international relations is characterized by dynamic competitive interactions between the buffered states as well as between the buffer state and the buffered states.

158  Conclusion B.  Agency of the Buffer State The assessment of the 21 critical junctures challenges the traditional concept of the buffer state that only marginally accounted for the agency of the buffer state. As stated earlier in the chapter, these critical junctures showcase three patterns of agency maximization: Neutrality, Internationalization of Diplomacy, and Forging Closer Ties with One of the Buffered States. While the agency of the buffer state is limited when compared to the buffered states, the pursuit of agency maximization is inherent to a majority of the critical junctures. Survival itself is a form of agency maximization despite extreme pressures and limited room for policy maneuvering as witnessed in Nepal’s case when TAR became part of the PRC. As Nepal did by declaring neutrality during wars and disputes involving the buffered states, such expansive changes entail a more low-key posturing from the buffer state to ensure survival. Furthermore, as covered in the ways in which buffer states maximize agency earlier in this chapter, buffer states also seek international status and engagement with multilateral organizations and political actors to reaffirm their sovereign identity. This allows such states to hedge if necessary if buffered states were to increase pressure. The decisions taken by the buffer states are important factors for the decisions that are to be taken by the buffered states. For example, India’s attempts at maintaining preponderance in Nepal, as showcased by the 1989 and 2015 economic blockades, did signal to Nepali elites that the country had to look for alternatives if it was to maintain its sovereignty without extensive pressure emanating from one buffered state. As such, moving close to China meant some level of pushback against Indian influence, which eventually also feeds back to India’s foreign policy toward Nepal. As China increasingly uses economic statecraft in Nepal through the BRI (and beyond), India is also reassessing its approach as it seeks to maintain its influence in the CIN buffer system. Thus, agency is central to the new concept of the buffer state as illustrated through the critical junctures covered in this book. The buffered states certainly enjoy more agency, but they ought to be mindful of the decisions made by the buffer state to maximize attaining their respective foreign policy goals.

VII.  Revisiting the Conundrum of the Swan As discussed in Chapter 1, Ameer Abdur Rahman Khan contemplated the predicament of his country Afghanistan as a swan which was “watched with hungry eyes from one bank by a pack of wolves, and from the other by an old tigress.”10 His musings showcase the difficulties of a buffer state situated within difficult geopolitical predicaments. The case of Nepal, however, shows that the concerns about the wolves and the tigress are not the only factors to be considered by the swan. The new conception asks the question about the agency of the swan despite the limited choices it has in this context. Could the swan maneuver itself in the pond to hedge the wolves against the tigress? Could it attempt to take flight? Ameer Khan’s allegory illustrates the buffer state concept as understood in a traditional

Conclusion  159 sense – one that is static and helpless. The new conception of the buffer state focuses on the wolves and the tigress but also centers the swan as a part of that equation. The swan does not exist apart from the context but is a part of it. The new buffer state concept asks “What can the swan do in this situation?” rather than “What will happen to it in this situation?”

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

See Chapter 4 for more details. Ibid. See Chapter 5 for more details. See Chapter 7 for more details. See Chapter 5 for more details. See Chapter 4 for more details. Ibid. See Chapter 6 for more details. Ibid. Stephen Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman (London: Bliss, Sands, and Foster, 1895), 137.

Index

The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship (between Nepal and India) 35, 70, 88, 103; anti-aircraft guns 88–89; buffer system 72, 78, 154; King Mahendra 36; Nepal’s strategic utility 56; Rana Regime 58–59; security concerns 42, 57; Zone of Peace 82–83, 94–95 The 1960 Treaty of Peace and Friendship (between Nepal and China) 46, 65–66, 68–70 Afghanistan 1, 4, 7, 8, 17–18, 22, 39, 158 agency maximization 149, 152–53, 158 The Ambans 44 analytical utility 14, 17 Araniko Highway 36, 65–71, 130 Armed Police Force (of Nepal) 103–04, 106 Arunachal Pradesh 45, 55, 76 Asian Development Bank 135 asymmetric relations 11, 34, 57 Awami League (AL) 79 Baise rajyas (22 kingdoms) 31 The Bangladesh Liberation War 6, 27, 78, 86, 93; buffer system 152; China’s reaction to 94; history of 79–81; India’s role 91, 150; Nepal’s reaction to 83, 92 Belt and Road Forum 134 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 5–6, 27, 133–36, 142–44, 155, 157–58 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 42–43, 118 Bhattarai, Baburam 103, 111, Bhattarai, Krishna Prasad 100–3 Bhutan 4, 17, 54, 85, 136; British Empire’s attitudes 39; concerns for survival 36–37, 87; Indian attitudes 41, 44–45, 54–55, 57, 72; Sikkim’s accession to India 81, 86

Birendra, King of Nepal 6, 27; blockade of Nepal (1989) 89–93; democratization of Nepal (1990) 99–105; links to the buffer system 110, 120, 121–22; royal family massacre 106–7; ties to the buffer concept 36–37, 42, 151–55; Zone of Peace 82–83, 85–86 blockade of Nepal (1989) 6, 27, 42, 88–90, 93, 101; China 92, 94–95; democratization of Nepal (1990) 99–100, 121, 132; links to the buffer system 150–51, 154, 158 blockade of Nepal (2015) 130, 139; China’s reaction 131–32; connections to the BRI 134–36, links to the buffer concept 150–51, 154, 157–58 bridge between India and China 38, 43, 47–48, 135 The British Empire 4, 31, 70; buffer concepts in South Asia 17, 32; conceptions of buffer states 8; influence in Sikkim 84; influence in Tibet 55, 70; observations of Gurkha soldiers 33; perceptions towards Nepal 39–43, 43–45 The British Gurkhas 34 Chaubise rajyas (24 kingdoms) 31 Central Intelligence Agency 46, 61, 67 China-India-Nepal (CIN) buffer system 4, 7, 149–52, 155–58; conception of critical junctures 24, 26–27; links to figure 3.1 48–49; Timeframe I 54,56, 64, 67; Timeframe II 78; Timeframe III 100, 114, 136 The China card 100–01, 106–07, 110, 114–15, 121, 155 China Gezhouba Group Corporation 135

Index  161 China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 133–35 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 54–55, 59, 72, 116 Chogyal, King of Sikkim 84, 85; see also Sikkim classical concept (of buffer state) 2, 15, 16, 20, 39 Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) 61 Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) 103; see also Maoists Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) 112–13 Constituent Assembly (CA) 43, 112–14, 118–19, 129, 156 contiguity 16, 39, 48, 68, 135 The Delhi Compromise 58–61 democratization 6; Jana Andolan I 37, 64, 70; Jana Andolan II 114; Nepal’s first democratic experience 58–60, 63, 91–92; ties to the buffer concept 100–02, 105, 154–55 Dibyopadesh 32 Dipendra, Prince of Nepal 37, 106 Donnelly and Hogan’c conception of critical junctures 24–25 dynamic political space 2–5, 8, 23, 49, 115, 157; buffer system 57, 70, 72; China 87, 94; India 94 dynamic bridge (Nepal as) 38, 47–48, 135 early warning system 2, 22–23 East Pakistan 78–80 Enlai, Zhou 45, 62, 76, 80 equi-proximity 38, 48, 135–36 equidistance 118–19 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 62, 65, 117 France 35, 82 Galwan Valley 140 Gandhi, Indira 42, 79, 86 Gandhi, Rajiv 6, 27, 42, 88, 90, 93, 130 geographic discontinuity 2, 16, 22–23, 44, 49, 70 geographic distance 2, 7, 17 geographic frontier(s) 16–17, 47, 83, 135, 138; China 54, 76, 84, 116; Himalayas 44–45, 55–56; India 35, 41 geopolitics 2, 14–17, 47, 81 Gorkha: district of 126; Dynasty 32; Kingdom of 31, 43, 84

The Great Game 4, 8, 17, 34 Gyanendra, King of Nepal 6, 27, 59, 116, 120, 122, 151–52, 155; royal coup 108–111, 113; royal family massacre 37, 106–8; overthrow of 104, 112; ties to China 114–15, 154 The Hambantota Port 134 The Heartland Theory 15 The Himalayas 3, 32, 41, 43, 55–57 implicit limits 149, 151–52, 157 Indian National Congress (INC) 117 Infrastructure 65, 126; China 104, 133, 135–36, 143; MCC 142 insecurity 9–10, 22, 104 Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 42 Indian Oil Corporation 130 The Indo-Pacific 141–42 Jaishankar, Subrahmanyam 130 Jana Andolan I 37, 90, 100, 103, 112 Jana Andolan II 37–38, 111–12, 115, 120, 133, 151, 155, 157 Janayuddha (Nepali Civil War) 103–7, 112–13, 118 Joint Boundary Committee (between Nepal and China) 65, 68 Kathmandu 31, 60–61, 102, 126,132: accession of Sikkim into India 86–87; Bangladesh Liberation War 80, British Resident 33; economic blockade (1989) 88; King Gyanendra 110, 114–15; King Mahendra 65, 69; King Tribhuvan 58–59, 66; the Nepal earthquakes 127; the Nepali Civil War 103, 107, 109; riots in Tibet 117–18; war with Tibet 44; Kashmir 17, 65, 76, 136, 139, Khan, Ameer Abdur Rahman 1, 158 Khan, Kublai 65 Khan, Yahya 79 Koirala, Girija Prasad 112 Ladakh 6, 27, 136; China 45, 55; Sino-Indian border clashes of 2020 139–40, 142, 143, 149, 152; Sino-Indian War of 1962 76 Lebensraum 15 Limbu, ethnic group of Nepal 31 Lipulekh-Kalapani-Limpiyadhura border disputes 6, 27, 136–39, 142–43, 151, 156–57 Lopsided buffer systems 149–51, 154–55, 157

162 Index Mackinder, Haalford J. 15 Madhesis 129–32 Mahendra, King of Nepal 5, 27, 36–37, 100–01, 110; Conclusion 153–55; Khampa rebels 46; Sino-Indian War 77; Timeframe I 62–72; Timeframe II 80–83 Maoists 6, 27, 37, 103–22, 132, 155–56 march states 4, 8, 16, 29 marchlords 4, 8 marcher-lords 16 markgrafs 16 material capabilities 9, 11 McMahon Line 55, 75–76 Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 6, 27, 141–42, 143–144, 152, 157 Modi, Narendra 42–43, 46, 127, 130 Mount Everest 65–66, 68, 116–17 Mukti Bahini 79 muted response: from China 110, 127, 143; from India 109, 143; from Nepal 80–81, 86–88, 94, 149 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 118 Nehru, Jawaharlal: on Nepal 41–42, 55, 57–60, 66; on Sino-Nepali relations 62–63, 68, 71; Sino-Indian War of 1962 75–77; Tibet’s incorporation into the PRC 56 Nehruvian: thinking 5; idealism 55, 57, 86, 94 The Nepal Earthquakes 126–31, 142–43, 157 Nepali Congress (NC) 35, 37, 132, 155–56; contextualizing Nepal as a buffer state 42; end of the Rana Regime 58–62, 70; Jana Andolan I 90, 100–3; 112, 117; King Mahendra 65–66, 70 neutrality 77–78; Bangladesh Liberation War 80; China’s attitude towards democratization of Nepal 101; literature review 18–20; Sino-Indian border clashes in Galwan 140; Sino-Indian War of 1962 81, 94; ties to the buffer concept 149–50, 152–53, 158; Zone of Peace 82–83, 95 Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) 75–76 ontological security: buffer states 16, 21; of the British Empire 22, 39, 43, 48; of India 47; of the Qing Empire 44 Operation Maitri 127–28, 144 The Ottoman Empire 16

Pakistan 34, 42, 65–66, 72, 135, 139; Bangladesh Liberation War 78–82; King Birendra 100; King Gyanendra 114; Zone of Peace 83–84, 154 Panchasheel 63–64; see also Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence Panchayat (in Nepal) 36, 99–102, 108 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 42, 54–55, 67, 76–77, 139 power difference 11, 57 Prachanda 118–19, 122, 156 princely state 34, 84 Prithvi Narayan Shah 3, 31–32 Qing Empire 4, 8, 31, 47, 54, 84; ties to the British Empire 17, 41, 48; ties to the buffer concept 149, 152; ties to Nepal 32–34, 39, 43–46, 54–55 Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur 79 Rai, ethnic group of Nepal 31 Rana, Chandra Shamsher 33–34 Rana, Jung Bahadur 33 The Rana Regime 5–6, 27; foreign relations 56–60; history of 33–36; incorporation of Tibet into the PRC 55; overthrow of 61, 71; ties to buffer concept 154–55, 157 Rastriya Panchayat 86 realpolitik 86 relief efforts 127–28, 131; see also The Nepal Earthquakes and Operation Maitri Riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region 6, 26–27, 46, 119–20; buffer system 150, 152, 157; ethnic tensions 116; increased Chinese influence in Nepal 48, 99, 117–18, 121, 127; The Romans 4, 8, 16 The royal family massacre 37, 106–8 Royal Nepali Army (RNA) 34, 101, 103, 106–8, 112–14 Russia 4, 8, 17, 34, 39, 43, 48; see also The Great Game Seven Party Alliance 111–14, 119–120 Shah Dynasty 31, 33, 106, 113; see also Gorkha Sikkim 4, 65; British conception of buffer states 17, 39, 41; China 45; India 55, 72, 84–88, 91–92, 94; National Congress 84; Zone of Peace 37 Sikkimization 85–86, 95

Index  163 The Sino-Indian War (1962) 6, 26, 27, 42, 75, 77, 81, 93, 149, 152 small state 1 2, 4, 23, 93; China 78, 134; India 55, 57, 81, 90; literature review 8–14, 18, 20; Nepal as 32–34, 36–40, 46, 63, 72, 86, 92, 136; Sikkim 95 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 109, 113–15 spatial distance 2, 7 special relationship (between India and Nepal) 94, 102, 128; King Mahendra 63, 66–67; King Tribhuvan 64; Sikkim’s accession into India 87; Zone of Peace 82–83, 153 strategic utility 3, 23, 25–26, 71, 81, 120, 143, 149, 156–57: King Mahendra 68, 70; of the Himalayan Kingdoms 55; of Nepal 5, 31, 48–49, 56, 59, 63, 72, 77, 83, 87, 92, 94, 102, 136; spatial distance 2, 23; Tibet’s incorporation into the PRC 57 survival 9, 12, 72, 78, 95, 149–50, 152–54, 158; King Gyanendra 108, 111, 116; King Mahendra 37; Rana Regime 58; Sikkim 84; Sino-Indian War of 1962 76; suspension of parliamentary democracy (royal coup of 2002) 6, 27, 108, 111, 120, 151, 154–55, 157 Taiwan 54, 127–28, 143 Tawang 76 technological innovation 2, 14, 16, 24 territorial integrity 20–21, 38, 41, 45–46, 62, 77, 134 The Tibet card 118 Tibetan Autonomous Region (Tibet, TAR) 5–6, 26–27, 46, 48, 71, 135–37, 150, 158; Araniko Highway 67; blockade of Nepal (1989) 89; five principles of mutual coexistence 62; the Great Game 34; incorporation into the PRC 35, 54–59, 70, 72, 77–78, 149, 154, 157; invasion by Nepal 32; Khampa rebels 46, 61, 68; King Mahendra 36, 65–66, 69; King Gyanendra 107–08, 110–11, 120–21; Nehru 42; the Qing Empire 41,

43–45, 47; refugees 64, 115, 155; riots 99, 102, 104–05, 114–19, 152; Sikkim 84–85, 87; ties to British India 39, 75–76; ties to India 118, 121 Tibetan Khampa rebels 46, 61, 67, 68 Tibetan uprising 36, 76, 116 Trans-Himalayan railway 135 Tribhuvan, King of Nepal 35–36, 58–64, 66 United Marxists Leninists (UML) 131–32, 156 The United States 13; the Cold War 59, 65, 66, 80; diplomatic ties with Nepal 34, 35, 105; Nepali Civil War 107–10, 110, 113; Tibetan (Khampa) rebels 46; ties to the buffer concept 152–53; Zone of Peace 82 United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) 130; see also Madhesis The United Kingdom 82, 105, 107–10, 113–14; see also The British Empire The United Nations 12, 35, 113, 126 The United Nations Children’s Fund 130 The United Nations Security Council 113 The War on Terror 108, 113 The White Papers (of China) 116 World War I 2, 14, 34 World War II 15, 20–21, 34 Xi, Jinping 46, 133 Xinjiang 45, 54, 116, 135 Yam between two boulders 3, 32, 47 Yang, Shangkun 55 Yi, Chen 46 Yunnan 135 Zedong, Mao 45, 75, 104 Zeng, Xuyong 104 Zhou, Enlai 45, 62, 76, 80 Zhu, Rongji 104 Zone of Peace (ZoP) 6, 27, 82–84, 93–95, 153–54; China 88; democratization of Nepal (1990) 100; Sikkim 37, 86, 150