Reflections on the Collapse of Democracy in Thailand 9789814377393

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

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REFLECTIONS ON THE

COLLAPSE OF OEMOCltACY IN ntAil..AJ"'ffi

by

Ro~rt

F.

Zim m ~nnan

Occuional Paper No. 50 lastitut~

o f Southeut Asian Studies

l'rltt:

ss 12.00

Publications Review Committee

Professor Kernial

s.

S andhu (Chairman)

Dr. Corazon M. Siddayao (Co-ordinator) Dr. Huynh Kirn Khanh Mrs. P. Lirn Pui Huen Mr . M. Rajaretnarn Mrs. Christine Tan

RefLection s on the CoZZan~e of Democ racy in ThaiLand is the fiftiet h in the Oc casional Papers series published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Occasional Papers are professional papers issued periodically on a variety of topics of regional interest. The responsibi lity for facts and opinions expressed in the work that fo llows rests exc lusively with Dr. Robert F . Zimmerman and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views o r the po licy of the I nstitute or its supporters , nor the views or the policy of the U. S . State Department or the Agency for Inte rnational Development whe re the author is currently the Programme Evaluation Officer in Jakarta .

*

*

*

The Institute also pub lishes books and papers from time to time in the following series : BOOKS/MONOGRAPHS: speciali zed studies on topics relating to Southeast Asia . SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS: an annual review of significant political, economic and social developments in the region, wi t h emphasis on the ASEAN countries. Contents include analyses in depth of topics of regional concern and of specific issues on a country-by- country basis . FIELD REPORTS: studies embodying the results of , and based exclusively on , the Institute's research p r ogramme; RESEARCH NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS: contributions which represent the tentative results of ongoing research, and of discussions, printed for the purpose of stimulating further thought on specific subjects. TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA : papers and proceedings of Tre n ds seminars held on individual Southeast Asian countries; INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES: pub li cations based on proceedings of International Conferences sponsored by the Institute itself or in conjunction with o ther organizations; CURRENT ISSUES SEMINARS: publications growing out of the Institute ' s Current Issues series of seminars , the objective of which is to bring t ogether know l edgeable and i n terested people to discuss topics of current concern and importance to the region.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: aimed at wider ci rculat i on of Southeast Asian thinking, these publications are origi nal contributions in English of Southeast Asians or translat i ons of their significant papers and monographs appearing in one of the local or national languages of the region; ORAL HISTORY PROGRAMME: publications based on the oral memoirs of persons who have made notable contribution t o , or have first-hand information to impart on, certain aspects of the de velopment of Singapore and Malaysia; LIBRARY BULLETINS: papers on Southeast Asian librarianship and bibliography. 7 March 1978

Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

CONTENTS

1

INTRODUCTION I:

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL

II:

THAI POLITICAL

4

CHA~GE

CULTU~

k~D

TRADITION

3UREAUCRATIC III: THE OCTOBER 1973 UPRISING: POLITICAL AND .ULITARY po·~F.:R CSALLENGED AND OVER"THEL:~D

13

28

IV:

T!IE 1974-76 THAI P0LITICAL PROCESS

33

V:

CAUSES OF THE COLLAPSE OF DEMOCRACY

58

VI:

:mERE ARE THE THAIS AS THE DUST SETTLES?

87

VII: THAILAND AND SOUT:-IEAST ASIA

112

INTRODUCTION During the ten-day period from 6 October to 15 October 1973, Thailand experienced the beginning of a revolution. Thai students, who had been developing into a political pressure group throughout 1973, were able - given a unique convergence of fortuitous events and some rather irrational reactions on the part of Col. Narong Kittikachorn and ~arshals Prapass Charusathien and Thanom Kittikachorn - to overthrow their government. The King of Thailand played a key moral and psychological role in both creating the environment which led to the uprising , including student power , and in resolving the final confrontation. The "revolution " - a relatively peaceful process towards the development of a constitutionally based, representative political system died on 6 October 1976 three years to the day from its birth. The "institutionalization" of this democratically inclined process had barely begun by October 1976 when its continuation became seriously jeopardized from intense political polarization not only within the student activist forces but between some of these student and political activists and the new emerging political "system" they themselves had created the opportunity for three years earlier . Thailand was a land of abundant dreams and high hopes in October 1973. Surnal ee Viraviadya, a leading Thai journalist wrote, "For the first time in my life ... I sense freedom in my native land." She then warned her readers This unaccustomed liberty of ours is, however, so precious and fragile that my joy is clouded with apprehension . .•• I fear it may die a premature death because too many people may not fully appreciate its worth and so deprive it of the care and attention which it cannot do without .... It is vitally important for us to remember that while the trinity of the old regime (the father, the son and the unholy gross) have fled, the evils which are inherent in their oppressive administration have not yet been swept away with them.l

1

Sumalee Viraviadya, "Strike While the Iron is Hot," 21 October 1973, p. 20.

Bangkok Post,

2

Seksan Prasertkul, a leading student organizer in 1973 and political activist since his graduation in 1974, echoed Sumalee's concerns only two weeks after the uprising: People want the Constitution, want real democracy so much, that if they are not patient and politicians do not aim our new democratic system at solving the nation's problems, the most dangerous thing will happen . That is, those who. fought for democracy w ~ ll abandon the ideals they fought for and turn instead towards one of the two extremes: left wing dictatorship or right wing dictatorship . 2 Seksan was prophetic . He is an example in microcosm of the crisis that Thailand's attempt to develop a viable democratic political system finally proved unable to overcome. Seksan at the time of this writing has joined a united front with the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and is either in Laos or near there in Northeast Thailand; the military now governs his country. Thailand, in essence, has become a case study of what can happen when too little or no attention is paid to problems of political integration and the need to develop and expand the political process and its opportunities and institutions. The October 1973 student uprising was a result of the widening gap between economic development and political underdevelopment and, in turn , the inability of the Thai bureaucratic policy to cope with the resulting problems of political integration, of legitimizing its social power. The subsequent collapse of the attempt to develop a viable democratic political process was, in retro·spect , doomed to failure precisely because the Thai political activists of both the right and the left were unable and, in some cases, unwilling to responsibly exercise their newly won freedom and take up their opportunities . This inability was also a function of the characteristics and patterns of action of traditional Thai political culture that were so conducive to the development of the previous bureaucratic polity. The Thai, however , still face the fundamental lesson of October 1973: long term economic development and political stability cannot occur and be maintained without corresponding development of the political structure and 2

Quoted by Claudia Ross, "Why Thailand 1s at a very Crucia l Stage,

Bangkok Post, 28 October 1973, p. 13.

3

proce ss that ultimately will develop and define the policies mo st conducive to steady econ omic progress. This paper b egins with a general discussi o n o f this hypothesis and a descr ip t ion of the poli tical values, attitudes a l patterns o f acti on that characteri ze d the Thai b u reau c ratic polity but which by 19 73 were n o longer able to sustai n t h a t poli t y in the face of publ ic p ressures led by students f o r a re structuri ng o f the polit ical pro cess.3 The remainder of this paper will discuss the re a son s f o r the fail ure o f the Thai t o e s tablish a n d mai nta in a const itutionally based democ ratic poli t ical system a n d as sess the n ature o f the curre nt p o litical pr oce ss a nd its pro apects re devel op i ng a democ ratic p o l i t ical process in the future .

3

For furcher di s c u~s ion o f the Octobe r 1973 student uprising, see Robert F . Zi ~J~~De nnan , "The Oc t obe r 1977 Student Uprising: End o f the Bureauc rati c Poli ty ? " and Prudhisan J uat>al an , "Toward a Theo ry o f Group Fo rmat ion in Thai Society and P ressure Groups in Thailand af ter the Oc tob er 1973 Uprising , " As ian $u1~ey , June 19 74.

4

I:

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE

Riggs , 4 in his 1966 description of the "Thai Bureaucratic Polity ," provides an especially useful conceptual framework for understanding the basic weaknesses of not only the pre - October 1973 polity but a l so those of the current Thai Government. In his discussion of the changes which have accompanied modernization in Thailand and had the greatest impact on ci:lt.: poli tical - adrninistrative process , Riggs focuses on four different dimensions of development: diffraction , power distribution , growth and integration. All but growth are particul arly relevan t to the focus of this paper.

Diffraation suggests a relationship between degrees of variation in differentiation and levels of performance of a political- bureaucratic system . Diffraction refers to a type of change which combines increasing performance and differentiation . Negative development - a "prismatic " as opposed to a "diffracted" situation - occurs when differentiation increases but political-economic performance declines. One of the fundamental failures of the Thai bucreaucratic po l ity was its incapacity to " di f fract " - to attain higher levels of both differentiation and performance. Differentiation clearly occurred in economic , social, bureaucratic and even political terms under the bureaucratic polity. What did not occur was "reciprocal adjustment of highly interdependent structures"5 that could cope with political pressures from outside the bu r eaucratic polity. Riggs suggests that there had to be someone - some institutions or roles standing out.side the interdependent units - to define the rules of the game and ensure their observance. Put another way , a diffracted polity is a constitutional regime in the sense that the holders of authority operated under effective restraints. These restraints not only provide

4

Fred W. Riggs, ThaiLand: The Modernization of a Bureauaratia Polity (Honolulu: East West Center Press, 1966), pp. 367- 396 .

5

Ibid., p. 376.

5

the necessary sanctions to induce the officlals of government to mesh their interdependent activities in a reasonably coherent fashion, but also prevent powerful persons fr om using their power arbitrarily to threaten, intimidate , or abuse those who wish to focu s their energies on a specialized type of activity, provided the y abide by the known rules established in advance for the regulati on of this type of activity . Such constitutional res traints upo n the key authority figures in a government would sca r cely be possible without the rise of powe r f ul institutions outside the formal government and the official state bureaucracy. A diff r acted polity, therefore , is capable of being not onl y complex but also efficient , because it has institutionalized constitutional restraint s on the exercise of power by the elite.6 Thailand's modernization within the confines of the bureaucratic polity 's process resulted in considerable imbalance between (a) that process and its structure and the differentiation of structures within the government bureaucracy and (b) the slow or nonexistent growth of institutions outside of the bureaucracy and " the polity" that could assure a high level of performance by the polity and the new functionally specialized units within the bureaucracy, as well as (c) creative opportunities for broadening the base for participation by the incre asi ngly politically active youth of Thailand. A related second major weakness of the pre-October 1973 Thai political process was its narrow oono entra~ io n of poL iti caL power . Though the Thai bureaucratic polity was not a single-party dictatorship and could n o t impose as tight a system of centralized control it neverthe les s would not permit the r ise of autonomous centres of power such as interest groups or political partie s outside the Riggs classified the Thai political bureaucracy itself. system (even though power and its use was "en capsulated" wi thin a small group of cliques at the top of Thai society ) as "intermedi ate" on a scale between democrati c and totalitarian. He then wonde red whether such a political system was conducive to economic growth and reiterated an earlier theme: 6

Ibid.

6

I t is not the power distribution as such which constitutes the basic obstacle to further diffraction and , hence , t0 the emergence of an efficiently differentiated - i.e ., diffracted - society . The difficulty lies in the pattern of allocation , the lack of effective centres of institutionaLized power outside the bureaucracy , rather than in the exten t to which a re l ative l y small or large number of individuals share substantially in the exerci se of power . This, of course, is not to dismiss the question of democratization as a proper and important subject to analysis. It is mere l y to say that changes in the distribution of power , as one dimension of development , may have little to do with changes in the level of differentiation of function and efficien cy of per formance. The. latter type of chan ge has much to do with econ omic growth , whereas the former may have little relevance to the prospects of a country for indu strial ization7 [emphasis added ]. · Industrialization , perhaps , but not effective economic and social development. It is a major contention of this paper that the bureaucratic poLity coLLapsed preciseLy because it couLd not cope with the rise jn new economic and sociaL pressures that its earlier development "successes " create:d . The needs of small businessmen , rural farmers and the politically a n d socially conscious students who could articulate those needs and call for new policies for allocation and use of resources therefore could only be met by a political process that permitted the deveLopment and integration of new centres of power. that ,

P.T. Bauer in Dissent on DeveLopment reminds us When state con trol over social and e~onomic life is extensive and close the achievement and the exercise of political power become all - important. Such a situation creates widespread anxiety and concern with the processes and results of political life ,

7

Ioid., p. 381.

7

especially among the active elements of the population. The stakes in the fight for political power increase and the struggle for i t intensifies. Mo~eove~, when state cont~ol ove~ economic life is extensive the population is ce~tain to be especially p~one to blame the gove~nment fo~ all economic g~ievances, whethe~ genuine o~ spu~ious~ including adve~se effects of economic change; and p~actiaally all change affeats adve~sely some g~oups. This allocation of responsibility and of blame may or may not be justified in specific instances. But superficial plausibility is lent to it, both by extensive state control over economic life and by the claims advanced for state action by its advocates8 [emphasis added]. The instability that can develop under highly centralized authoritarian governments even when such governments do achieve initial success in their economic development programmes arises because development planners too often pay little more than "lip service attention" to the imbalances and instability that can and do occur where economic development policies and programmes begin to succeed. For example, when people are stimulated economically but at the same time restrained politically in the national system, structural tension and more social conflict are inevitable. Economic development tends to stratify and fracture rural societies . Urbanization, increases in literacy, education and physical mobility and media exposure all lead to increased capacity to compare one's status , wealth and opportunities with others. Aspirations and expectations are increased and generate pressure for further social and economic mobilization. Even more comprehensive economic development may be required to meet these demands and provide economic opportunities that will alleviate the social frustration that arises where aspirations are high but economic development is low or not being shared widely enough. r4ore comprehensive development programmes, however, can be increasingly canplicated and require political decisions which are beyond the capabilities of the developing state's political process. 8

P. T. Bauer, Dissent on Development (Mass.: 1972)' p. 87.

Harvard University Press,

8

Often overlooked is the fact that social and economic development itself is not enough if political mobility channels are not also opened. For example, political instability can occur when the political process denies the people opportuni~ies and institutions to channel their increasing need for political participation as the most effeo~ive means of ensuring the prevention or media~ion of the socio -economic squeeze put on the poor peasant by capital-infrastructure-oriented economic development projects such as roads (that is, provide l he poor the opportunity through political mechanisms such as elections and pressure groups to bring their perspectives and pressure to bear on, say, the development policy decision-making process). There are, after all, in every society, at all levels , people who seek more than simply expanded economic opportunity and well -being. The political integration of these people must be considered equally as important as their economic development. Lucian Pye defines the problem of integration as ... the extent to which the entire polity is organized as a system of interaction relationships, first among the offices and agencies of government, and then among various groups and interests seeking to make demands upon the system, and finally in the regulationships between officials and articulating citizens . 9 It seems clear that the political process in a country has a direct role to play in m::hilizing -and rrotivatil)gpeople; the nature of that mobiliz ~tion and motivation will affect economic development. Riggs uses the concept "level of integration" to "designate the extent to which the actual PE?rformance levels of a given social system are adequate to maintain that system at its established level of differentiation." Low level integration results in disinteg~ation whereas a mode rately low level can be called malintegration. Riggs sugges ted that

9

Luci an W. Py e, Aspects of Polir.ical Development (Boscon: Brown & Co . , l 9 6 6 ) , ·p . 6 5 .

Little

9

a well-integrated system will resist change. It will be in a state of equilibrium. However, a malintegrated system might precipitate forces of dissatisfaction and a restless search for alternatives which could lead to system c h ange. If this reasoning makes sense, then a necessary condition for the propensity to seek fundament a l changes - such as an increase in the le vel o f differentiation of a society - might b e a degree of malintegration.i0 Malintegration in a society would be evident in t he degree to which its members felt dissatisfied with the prevailing state of affairs and resorted to movements of pro test, reform, outbreaks of violence or even revolution. The prevalence of violence in a society, by this reasoning, would not be a measure o f underdevelopment, but rather a possible indicator of the extent of malintegration: One should, of course, recognize that other variables would also affect the incidence of violence, such as the existence of external threats or a culturally conditioned predisposition to resort to or avoid displays of violence.ll Writing in 1966, Riggs concluded that the Thai system had apparently become a relatively stable bureaucratic polity. He cited the low level of tension in Thai society and noted that the successive coups d'etat by which ruling circles are modified and replaced have become as much a constitutional formula for changing elites as the periodic electoral battles in the United States, or the cabinet crises o f 12 France during the Third and Fourth Repub l ics.

10

Riggs. op.cit., p. 386.

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid., p. 307.

10

Nevertheless, Riggs did identify the rising output of university graduates as one of the most likely sources of increasing tension in the Thai polity and he suggested that Thailand needed fundamental change in the structure of the polity, not merely administrative or legal manipulations. He felt that the flow of university graduates into commercial and industrial enterprise in mounting numbers would heighten the intercommunal tensions in Thai society and politics. Alternatively, college graduates could gravitate into unemployment or low-paying jobs, either in government or elsewhere. The result would be the rise of a disaffected intelligentsia, which could be further complicated by the infiltration by communist agents from neighbouring countries. is today a small and "querulous" group of intellectuals could, in the future, become a large and revolutionary intelligentsia. To prevent the formation of such a group, the government must either retrench in the provision of educational opportunities for its people - a course of action also fraught with dangerous consequences - or expand opportunities for employment along the lines which we have already reviewed, each of which again opens up dangerous consequences:l3 ~Vhat

- dangerous for the continuation of the encapsulated bureaucratic polity which cannot, by its very nature, cope with the forces of modernization that makes expanded political participation a necessity. Writing in 1973, Dr. Titaya Suvanajata defined integration in Thailand as "the degree of authenticity which citizens develop t~rough the course of interaction with representatives of the national po.li ty. "14 He went on to develop eight different types of political man in Thailand, each defined by utilizing different combinations of the consequences, · commitment and a feeling of holding a share of soc~etal power. He de·fined ):hese concepts as follows: 13

Ibid.

14

Titaya Suvanajata, PoLit i cal Authent i city:

An AppraisaL of the the Integrat ion of Rural Thai Vil lagers i nto t he Thai Bureauaratia Po li ty (Bangkok: National Research Council, 1973), p. 17.

11

of knowledge of the structure of the system and of the interreLationship of its parts. Cons~iousness

Commitment is an obligation to engage in the activities carried on by the members of the system. It incorporates the feeling of an obligation to participate. In this case, it may or may not imply affect in either a negative or positive sense. That is, the affective aspect of commitment to the activity does not determine its significance. Thus , we may have commitment either by forced or voluntary engagement. A feeLing of hoLding a share of societaL power refers here to the evaluative sense derived from interaction with the society as a whole. It is a "world view" that involves one 's perception of his capacity to attain what he wants when he interacts with the systemlS (emphasis added]. An extensive discussion of Titaya's eight types of political man is beyond the scope of this pape r. But, by defining his "authentic" political man as one who

.•. knows the structure of the system, and the relationship between its subunits, considers himself to be involved·in the activities of the system and is convinced that he has the capacity to deal with it and to get what he wants within the system,l6 Titaya found that slightly less than one-fi fth of Thai villagers of his sample in Northeast Thailand could be classified as "authentic" citizens. It is unfortunate that similar effort has never been made to look at the areas in Thailand where economic development has had its greatest success and where the social -political imbalances have been the greatest:

15

Ibid., pp. 18-19.

16

Ibid., p. 312.

12

Bangkok and other urban areas. Dr. Titaya and others might have found that even fewer of the people in the urban areas considered themselves as "authentic" citizens. Certainly , as we now see, this would have been true among the students. Imbalance and instability in the Thai socio-political process began to increase as the Royal Thai Government under Field Marshals Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapass Charusathien tried to extend in a substantive sense its power , administrative system and economic development activities. Development, however, was always defined primarily in economic and administrative terms and resulted therefore in a gross imbalance between Thailand's economic development "success" and its social/political underdevelopment. The Thanom Government paid no attention to the chain of events and pressure economic development sets in motion. Indeed, as noted above, the Thai bureaucratic polity as a political process was probably incapable in any case of coping with the contradictions and discontinuities this chain of events was creating. Riggs and Wilson 17 described the Thai bureaucratic polity as a political system wherein clique-groups within the top echelons of ruling circles of the government bureaucracy competed for power, and then exercised this power in response to the demands and expectations of the various constituencies which were of the bureaucracy itself. Military leaders played the dominant role within the polity but sought and received willing support from the civilian sectors of the government bureaucracy , as well as from leading Sino-Thai businessmen outside the bureaucracy itself. It seems appropriate at this point to describe some of the major characteristics of the bureaucratic polity that developed in Thailand between 1932 and 1973, including the basic values, attitudes and patterns of action of traditional Thai political culture which were so conducive to the development of this polity - and which Surnalee tried to warn her readers were still operative after the October 1973 uprising.

17

Riggs, op.cit., and David A. Wi1son, University Press, 1962).

Po~itias

in

Thai~and

(Corne11

13

II:

THAI POLITICAL CULTURE AND TRADITION

The Thai Bureaucratic Polity It is impossible to discuss the significance of the October 1973 uprising and the ultimate failure of the subsequent attempt to develop a democratic political process without some understanding of the predominant characteristics of the pre- October 1973 Thai political system. Such a discussion must begin with a definition of power in the Thai context. Power defined. Thailand is a status oriented society in which men are classified by birth, position, wealth , education and age. Status differences are explained by differences in an individual's merit and fate or destiny. But status is based on power more than anything else. Dr. Kamol Somvichien of Chulalongkorn University, writing in 1971, suggested that .•• differences in power make a man different in status. The more power the higher the status. The less the power the lower the status. The leader of royal lineage has high status because in the past he has had more power . The farmer or worker has low status because he has never had power. The power to vote at present [1971] is meaningless because the government creates its stability outside of the election process, that is, the greater power of the armed forces and police.l8 For the Thais, a leader, a man with power, is "a man with influence." He is, to begin with , an individual in a high - ranking position or he has a close, friendly or intimate relationship with such a person. The influential person has to have a lot of followers, that is, relatives , pupils, or subordinates. (It is possible, therefore , for

18

Kamol Somvichien, "Thai Political Culture and Political Development," As translated and edited by Robert F. Zimmerman, USOM Thailand, November 1973, p. 15. (The translator accepts responsibility for mistakes and possible misinterpretation resulting from such mistakes.)

Wanna Waithayakorn, 25 August 1971, p. 60.

14

some people to have high positions but little or no influence if they do not have followe rs or subordinates . ) The influential person tends to be the man of action, a doer, rather than a talker. He is the kind of person who becomes involved in solving a problem while others stand around. The influential person must also be able to protect the people under his supervision or in his entourage . Concludes Somvichien, ... the influential ~e~ son has to be generous to his entourage and the people he knows , meaning he has to be in a position to feed , offer gifts and money to close friends and others. I f he does not do this , he will be accused of being selfish and less "respectable" than his predecessors . By whatever means such a person must find a way to get things and money for distribution.l9 Somvichien was not impressed with these requirements for the influential leader in Thailand . It was , in his view , "apparent that the person whom Thai society respects as having such characteristics bear no relationship to honesty, ideals or intelligence . " 20 Thai political culture places more trust in the person than the system. In this sense it possesses a Confucianist strain where government is concerned. Unlike the Westerner who tends to believe that if the system is good the administrator will also be good , the Thai believe that, •. . if the person is good it doesn ' t make any difference what the system is . The system , ideal , or principal is not important , or if it is important , it is secondary to the person . 2l Power exercised : the Thai bureaucratic polity . Political power i n Thailand , defined in terms of a base and a capacity to bring pressure on decision-making at the central leve l , has never existed anywhere but in t he capito l

19

Ibid., pp . 63-64 .

20

Ibid.

21

Ibid.

15

city. From the Sukhothai and Ayudhaya periods to the coup i n 1 932 , politics was centred in and around the Royal Court - wherever that was, and not found at all in the rural areas o u tside the capitol city. In 1932 there occurred a " shift" in the focal point of political activity - manifested in a coup against the Monarchy . The Thai Government bureaucracy , created and even "modernized" on the initiative of the Thai Monarchy, had become more powerful than the Royal Court or , at least those individuals and institutions with direct control of the instruments of pv w~ r had become more concerned about the political interests of the bureaucracy itself than of the King or the Royal Court . In any event , in the coup of 1932 the King became a "constitutional monarch" who reigned at the pleasure of the new commanders of power in the Thai bureaucracy. They ushered in a "new" era of clique/coup politics in Thailand. But politics remained the preserve and concern of high government officials located in Bangkok. Province government in Thailand even today remains restricted in the nature and scope of its power and responsibility over (a) the collection and allocation of local revenues without reference t o the central authority in Bangkok , and (b) selection and implementation of development projects based solely on priorities identified and determined at province level or below. There has been no locally "autonomous" political activity or process that permits the development of political power, r ,e sponsibili ty an.d responsiveness based on the province itself or at district and village levels. The government programmes have concentrated on rural development th~ough central government agencies . Foreign assistance to Thailand in the mid-60s encouraged and supported the expansion of functions and resources from central government to ahang wat (province) , amphoe (district) and tamboZ (village) governments. Dece ntralize d balancing of rural needs and government resources was the desired outcome. But concentration on rural development programmes ne glected requi~ed changes in local government organization and finance . A report of the u.s. Agency for International Development prepared in 1972 concluded , of the planning and financing deveLopment have not been a high the Royal Tha~ Government . Government of the people , by the government, f o~ the government is the theme Popular Deaen~~aLization

elements of

~uraZ priori~y for

16

participation is an insecure and sporadic co unter-point22 [emphasis added]. The Bangk ok Po st itself on 22 August 1973 editorialized on Thai political/ administrative imbalan ces: THE WHEEL TURNETH ... AGAIN It was pleasant to read that Field Marshal Prapass Charusathir a , in his capacity as Interi o r Minister, has ordered a kind of selfrule at the rural le vel. But it'• always nice t o read that o ur farmers are being given selfrule. It would be nicer to read that they can actually exercise it. But that, o f course, is for the future.23 Power, even in Bangkok, was never delegated t o anyone o utside the clique at the top. Indeed, this was never, apparently, the intention of the promoters of the 1972 ~ o u p d ' ita t. Riggs suggests that the g o al of their "revolution" was not to establish a po pular constitutional government but rather to place commoner officials in the cockpit of power and to organize a polity that would rule on behalf of the bureaucracy.24 He points out that even if those who seized power in 1932 were really dedicated to the establishment of effective organs of parliamentary and popular government •.• there was not yet available a body of organized Siamese groups capable of representing popular interests or of capturing and holding any substantial power base from which to impose their will upon the government.25 22

David Frederick and .Opath Juta Sirivongse. Prinoip Zes of Rural Government i n Thai Zand, USOM Thailand. 1972. pp. 53-54.

23

Bangkok Post, 22 August 1972. p . 4.

24

Riggs, op.cit., p. 312.

25

Ibid., p. 313.

17

In the system of "coup group politics" that emerged, the ruling clique seized its power by a sudden coup and then used this position to establish and maintain its authority. The constituenci es of the members of the clique were, and to some degree today still are, of the military and civilian bureaucratic es. According to Wilson, A minister, when he steps into his ministry, possesses the traditional authority of the office, and he can expect to get the deference , respect, and obedience from his subordinates which tradition demands. He is obligated by tradition to look out for these subordinates , In order not to disturb his authority however. and perhaps that of the whole clique, he must l ook to this obligation. His ministry then becomes his constituency , and he represents it in the cabinet. He fights for its budget, and he protects its employees. The success with which he does this depends upon his relative position within the ruling clique, although the best he can expect is a compromise with his fellow ministers.26 Clique groups extended to some degree beyond the bureaucracy and permitted, at least, "associate status" to the Sino-Thai business community. Indeed, in many respects the final outcome of rival clique /coup group confrontatio ns often depended upon Sino-Thai businessmen who provided a major share of the funds that clique leaders used in developing and retaining the l oyalty of their supporters. Coups in Thailand were very much a function of how many bankers a given clique leader could draw upon and control in competition with other opposing clique leaders. These businessmen were later rewarded with government contracts, positions on the boards of state enterprises, special lice~ses for business activities or even "protection" from application of possibly restrictive laws or regulations. Brief interludes of "participato ry politics" with a Parliament occurred in 1947, 1957-58, 1969-71. But power n eve r existed in the Parliament itself - which might be said to have been "permitted" to exist more for appearances

26

Wilson, op . cit., p . 277.

18

vis -a-vis the Western world than for the interests of the ruling elite in determining and r~sponding to the needs o f the people of Thailand. This is not to say that the Parliament, even when app oi nted in whole or in part, did not seek to make demands and apply pressure on the Cabinet. Every assembly eventually tried to exercise power. Such an attempt was in fact one of the main reasons for the 1971 "coup against the Legislature." Such outcome~ ~f struggle between the legislature and the leading clique/coup group officials in the Cabinet were not explicable in terms of the tensions which arose between these two bodies but by the forces which gave political supremacy to the Cabinet rather than to the assembly. The Cabinet was as foreign to Siamese tradition as an assembly. Prior to the 1932 coup the King h ad been the centre both of authority and of effective power - which were wrested from him in the name of the "peop le". Following the example of the Western democracies the assembly was designed t o be the spokesman of the people, and t he Cab inet its executive arm. But as Riggs points out, •.. it proved impossible for the assembly to control the cabinet. The aabinet, instead, gain e d aontrol over the assembly . It was able to do so because the aabinet had an effective aonstituen ay , the bureauaraay (military and civil), whereas the assembly laaked any effeative aonstituenay (electorate and political parties)27 [emphasis added]. Riggs decided to call the resultant system of government a "bure aucratic polity" and ascribe to it thereby a basis of political legitimacy which corresponded to the facts of effective control. Mezey ascribes the failure of legislatures in Thailand to patterns o f acti on and values reflective of the Thai concept of power as defined earlier by Somvichien, Fo r the legislator . • . (the] main hope of advancement is through association with a clique of a powerful person, likely to gain an important cabinet position ••• when he is confron te d with the inevitable choice of 27

Ri ggs. o p.cit.. pp. 322 -323.

19

supporting a clique leader or acting in a way best calculated to maintain the legislative institution his choice is usually the former. For thirty-nine years legislatures and constitutions have come and gone, while the cabinet cliques have continued to exerci s e power. Therefore, the participant in the Thai political system must view the legislature as simply a short-run phenomenon which should be used for immediate personal advantage.28 Legislators, however, are not alone in their generally low commitment to the legislature; Thai citizens have long tended to have low regard for the legislature - as a haven for corrupt politicians and arrogant men. Bunchu Rojanasathien told this writer shortly after the January 1975 elections that the most important lesson for him in the campaign was the Thai farmer's lack of faith in Parliament as an institution. Bunchu, who was Minister of Finance in the government led by M.R. Kukrit Prarnoj, concluded that "the most important task for the new Thai Parliament was to demonstrate that it could represent the people's interests and force the Thai bureaucracy to serve the people." The 1975 and 1976 Parliaments, however, were unable to function as representative of the people. Mezey 's explanation of the cause of earlier failures applied to some degree to this last failure. The true democrats in ThaiLand had no organized base of power . Votes were more like preferences f o r ideals by people outside the real political process and its cliques which still were able to control their candidates. These traditional clique leaders had enough popular support to get some of their followers elected, as well as themselves, and then were able to use the traditional clique oriented process within a democratic framework to help destroy that framework befo re it could legislate and institutionalize new processes that would destroy the old sources of power and create new ones.

28

Michael J. Mezey, "The 1971 Coup in Thailand: Understanding Why the Legislature Fails," Asian Survey , March 1973, p. 314 .

20

It is c learly significant in retro spect that neither Kukrit Pramoj n o r h is elder brother, Seni Pramoj, held or even believed in p ower as defined in terms o f the traditi onal bureauc rati c po lity. They rejected these definitions and prac ti c es but had n o power from which t o change the rules o f the game. Finally, the King o f Thailand and the Thai people as a whole stood o utside o f this b ureauc ratic po lity - o r "circle" as Kukr i t Pramo j des ct lted i t for USOM S emi nar participants in Mar c h 1973 , the bureauc racy i n this co untry has a life and missi o n o f it s own, it's an a nimal with its own s o ul , it trie s t o build up lts own eg o an d t o expand t h at. That' s how lt has been since tne beginning o f time. To c hange th a t is a rather diffi c ult j o b. Every o ne o f us, edu c ated peo ple, with degrees fr o m ab r o ad co me b ack t o this c ountry and n o rm.:1 lly enter the bure aucracy. As s oon as we enter the bureaucracy we are sub me rge d by it. No mo re the di s senting voice. No mo re t he independent thinker. We 're submerged in thi s wh o le system. Eve n the elected politician , o nce he is selected t o be a Minister and enters his Ministry , he is submerged by the bureaucracy , by all the paper work, all the kowtow , by all the "yes sir ," "as you say sir," and he becomes o ne with the bureaucracy, this big animal '"'hich is now amo ng us. To change that animal into s o mething good, beneficient and wo rking for the good of the peasantry i s rather hard to visualize unless we have a leader on the scale of Chairman Moa Tse-tung [much laughter] to c ome and change things for us.29 Until 1932 the King was right in the middle of the circ~e. He controlled the bureaucracy. As noted above, the 1932 coup and all cons.t i tutions since then stripped the King of

29

USOM Seminar VIII, Transcript, "Dialogue on Thai Politics," 29 March 1973. The USOM Seminars and their transcripts were prepared by the author during his tenure as USOM Research Officer in Bangkok from January 1972-December 1973.

21

his power and position within the bureaucratic polity , but , as Kukrit described it in 1973, •.. the present King being what he is , has gone and done something which is quite original. Now he is with the people outside the circle . The gap is between the bureaucracy and the rest of the country with the King as its head . That is the situation. It is a dangerous situation , full of tension . 30 The Apolitical Tradition of Rural Thailand 31 The lack of a tradition of political organization or interest at the local level in Thailand contributed to the development of this bureaucratic polity . The students and activists who had successfully challenged this polity in 1973 then had to face the rural Thai apolitical "tradition" and the values , attitudes and patterns of action inherent therein. Villager attitudes and expectations . In the rural areas there has been no history , experience or interest in political organization. Where political matters are concerned , deference has always been given to the central government which could act or not act as it saw fit. In most cases not choosing to act has not resulted in extensive long term political protest. Instead , having protested by delivering their petitions or letters , the villagers generally have tended to return to normal life and wait for the people with power (the government) to act. The villager viewed himself as a phuun ooj , a little person without power and unable to initiate activities - most especially, probably, political action a ga i n s t a government. As Rubin defines him ,

30

USOM Seminar, op.cit . , p. 3.

31

The observations and conclusions presented in this section should be accepted as generalizations that are applicable in the broad sense. Exceptions, to one degree or another, can be found for many of these observations as no scholar on Thailand has been able to define once and for all the Thai social-political-cultural value and attitudinal framewo rk.

22

The Ph uun oo j [is] the powerless person who [ feels] that he [ can ] do little , [ is] unimportant, lacks knowledge and [is] excluded from all af fairs of importanc e.32 Rubi n also found t hat mo st villagers had no desire to be a village leader. Vil lagers lacked con fide n ce in their own l eadership ability . Fo r othe rs the answer was simply o ne o f practical ity - the benefits were not worth the cost. Still o thers did not want t o be faced with th e i nte r pers o nal re sponsib ilities o f the supe r io r - con t r o ll i n g pe o ple , re con ci l i ng dif fering groups an d in gen eral providing unity. 33 Dr. Somchai Rakwijit's findi n g s in the Nor t heast furth er confirm t h e generally apoliti ca l nature o f villagers . Bot h leaders an d n onleade r s b elieve po l i t i cs and government are t oo complex and elusive f o r t hem t o co mprehend . The vi l l ager s ' po litical desi r e was "to have a 'good ' an d effective government whi ch really cares f o r the pe o ple like a great and b enevo lent father actively teaching and helping his own sons • ••. "34 Somch ai f o und that the peop~ e really had strong reservations about political p art i e s . Only 27% of t he village leaders and 15% of me n be tween the ages of 18 an d 32 thought p o litical parties were important. The remainder did n o t care or did no t know whether part ies were good o r n ot. Many farmers f elt that pa rties contributed t o trouble , division and d i s un i ty. Howe ver , Somchai finally concluded , Thus far, the main proble m of cre ating party o rganizati o n at the village level is not that the villagers are resisting it . Rather , the main obstacles lie in : (a) inadeq uate political 32

Herbert J. Rubin , "Will and Awe: Illustrations of Thai Vi llager Dependency Upon Offici als, " JournaL of Asian Studies, May 1973, p. 433.

33

Ibid. , p. 434.

34

Somchai Rakwijit , ViLLage Leadership in Northeast ThaiLand (Bangk ok:

Military Research and Development Center, 1971) , p. xxxii .

23

communication; (b) the absence of real "substantive efforts made by the authorities and the government to convince the villagers that they have a real stake in the government and their opinions do count; and (c) the absence of meaningful initiatives of any national political parties to build such a political base.35 Village and family institutions. The lack of a tradition of political organization , is paralleled in other areas and results, in part , from the strength of Thai individualism and the villagers ' lack of interest in or commitment to political organizations. Herbert Phillips in his study on Bang Chan Village in the Central Plains found that, In aver¥ real sense , the village is comprised of [s i c. J 11,771 individualists whose major goals in life are to obtain sufficient land to support themselves, their growing children, and their religion free from physical insecurities and unencumbered by entanglinq social obligations. When they enter into relationships with other people they do so with an awareness that they are always acting on their own free will.36 The Thai villager reserves the right to break these relationships at any time. Phillips suggests that the "functioning of the entire Thai social system is ultimately dependent on 'the quid pro quo nature of Thai social relationships.'" Individuals become involved with others and do things for them because they consciously expect others to respond in kind. When others do not respond in kind, the Thai feels free to terminate the relationship. This applies even to the family relationship itself which functions primarily for the instrumental and symbiotic satisfactions that its participants can gain from it .

35

Ibid .

36

Herbert Phillips, The Thai Peasant Pers onali ty (Berkeley: of California Press, 1975), p. 23 .

University

24

Nor is the lar ger kin group as important a social institution in Thailand as it is , for example, in Vietnam . Cremation eliminates the possibility of an immovable tomb and thereby "unbreak able " attachment to particular ancestral locality. This makes it easier for the Thai peasant to move from a location if life becomes difficult and/or confrontation with his neighbours begins to develop. He is not "trapped " by either kin group tie s or ancestral respons i bilities and loyaltie s t hat would force him to seek allies and develop alliances to deal with other kin groups or political- social rivals . He remains an individualist to th e core. There are , no caste , age - grade societies , occupational groups (other than the family) , neighbourh o od groups , or groups expressive of village solidari ty (such as councils or governing boards) which migh t impose a s en se o f obLi ga tion on th e v i LLager s , or to whose norms or functions the villagers might have to conform3 7 [emphasis added ] . Finally , the belief that each locality has its own spirit , while common to both Vietnam and Thailand, has not become institutionalized in Thailand to the degree it h as in Vietnam . The wa t in Thailand and the di nh in Vietnam both tend to bind villagers together into a community that is religious as wel l as functional .. .. But whereas Thai Buddhism is united by a single spiritual focus , each Vietnamese village has its own cult.38 In Vietnam the dinh contributed to the great sense of independence from the central government and its officials that had existed over the centuries . The Thai village has never had an "independent " existence that could compare with its Vietnamese counterpart , that is, its own village council , taxation register and its own communal land - all of which , in Vietnam,

37

Ph illips, op.cit., p. 22.

38

R.B . Smith, "Thailand and Vietnam July 1972 , p . 21.

11

JournaL of t he Siam Soaiety,

25

..• derived ultimately from the fact that it was the village rather than the individual or a personal patron , who was responsible for the fulfilment of the ordinary peoples ' obligation to the state .... In the traditional Thai system of government, the responsibility for the performance o f service lay with the nai wh ose role was that of a patron of men rather than a territoriat tord .•. and the Thai village has probably never had quite the same sense of corporate inde~endence as one finds in Vietnam39 [ emphasis addedJ. Phillips ' findings regarding the "strikingly simple" social structure of Bang Chan in Central Thailand collaborate Smith 's observations. Thai Buddhism and social political concern. Thai Buddhism has also contributed to the apolitical nature of rural Thai society. The ultimate Thai farmer's objective is nirvana which can be achieved only through personal acquisition of wisdom. Wisdom comes only after passing through many existences and reincarnations . Each existence will, hopefully , be better than the last because one has accumulated enough merit to improve the station of life to which he will be born next time . Merit is a function of wisdom. To achieve wisdom , one must ignore [that is, escape from] the entrapment of society. Society creates temptations which lead to suffering, which leads to continued existence in the society, which is the true cause of religious imperfectability , and hence , in many ways , impedes an individual in his quest for wisdom Because the search f or religious perfection is an i ndividual, moral intellectual quest , ideally free of s ocial influences, the ideat human is one who t ransoends but does n ot reform society •..• [emphasis added]

39

Smith, op.cit. , p. 21.

26

Individuals are not required to do anything about c han g i n g society • s ru tes to better their opportunities to serve others while serving themselves •••. In sum , there is nothi n g i n Th a i r e t igi o us r eas on i ng that would positively d i ~·ect personal interests into channels which would commi t i ndivid uat s definitely to open e nded ~ tong term ob Li gat ions to o th ers or to abstract sociat cause [ •no matter what • the consequences . •• the religion offers no social ethic or p r es cripti on for committed social responsibility40 [emphasis added] . This does not mean that Thai Buddhism is active agai nst involvement in society. Even monks get involved in community development projects. But Thai Buddhism definitely does not prescri be a sense of social responsi bility that would lead one to be concerned with getting involved in social- political movements to change r utes and obtain "justice". Thai monks , unlike their contemporaries in Vietnam , up until late 1974 have been conspicuous by their absence from the political arena . 41 Western democracy , on the other hand , is in a sense supported by Western religions which p o s i tivety sanction and encourage one ' s participation in social- political movements that will lead to reform in the society . Democracy implies involvement and an active seeking after means to participate. It fails when the people it is supposed to serve are apathetic or do not want to accept responsibility or get "involved". The Thai students and educated elite who were good Buddhists and ~lso sought involvement in the political social process were obviously an entirely different breed from the apathetic phuunooj in Thai villages . It does not

40

Jacobs, op . cit. , pp . 286- 290.

41

Thai Buddhist mon~s for the first . time in Thai history helped lead a farmers• demonstration in Bangkok in late November 1974. Subsequent pr otests in December and then in January 1975 revealed a degree of participation in challenges to hierarchical authority in the monkhood that seemed to parallel that occurring i n the secular society . But the monks have not participated actively in subsequent popular demonstrations and the younger monks currentl y seem w~llirig to work out their differences with older , senior monks within the monasteries rather than on the streets .

27

really matter whether the Thai villager may have justified his lack of concern or willingness to accept responsibility on the basis of a conscious understanding of Buddhist thought o r n o t. What does matter is that his religion has not been there in a positive sense encouraging him to take part in reforming society. Any attempt to develop democracy in Thailand must, therefore, deal with the Thai villager ' s apathy and attit udes without the assistance of a motivating religio us force . Democ r acy is as foreign an implant as is communism and the CPT ' s insurgency which has in the past been "circumscribed " as much by Thai peasant values and attit ud e s as it has with the Thai Government counterinsurg ency programmes , probab ly more. Jacobs , moreover , would add that, .. . absolute creeds sanctify uncompromising soci al movemen ts opposed to radical evil in the existing social o rder are alien to Thai religious be lie f and social action. Should such creeds and acti o ns stumble upon the social scene, most typically as elements in millennium movements, t hey are suppressed by a clerica+-political alliance as being simultaneously, religiously and politically heterodox. To challenge the moral, patrimonial-political order is to challenge t he religion , and vice versa.42 Perh a ps here we als o have a clue to the loss of support and enthusiasm for the s tudent-led, and later communist-influenced, drive for uncompromising , rapid political change that led, in t urn t o in i t ial t ole rance for return to military dominated authori tar i an g overnment o n 6 October 1976.

42

Jacobs. op .cit . • p. 261.

28

Il l:

THE OCTOBER 1973 UPRISING: BUREAUCRATIC POLITI CAL AND MILITARY POWER CHALLENGED AN D OVE RrtmELMED

Ch a irma1 Mao di d not come as Kukrit had expected in March 1973. Instead, Seksan Prasertkul, Thirayuth Boonmee, Somat Tharnrongthanyawongse and other university and technical training school stude~ ts forced the confrontation that reached a bloody climax and threatened to become even bloodier, until His Majesty King Bhumibol Adunyadet stepped in to end the bloodshed and enable a new political process to get underway. Ironicall y , Kukrit Pramoj himself became the first leader o f t h at process - after playing the leading role in writing the new Constitution under which that process subsequently failed. The October 1973 Uprising The first rumblings o f Thai student unrest and potential began in November 1972 when the students organized and led, with tacit government supp ort, a week-long demonstration against, and boycott of, Japanese imported goods. The most significant aspect of this demonstration was that it gave the students an opportunity t o test their organizational skills and demonstration techniques. From this point on, however, the basic theme and purpose for student acti vity became the need for a restructuring or at least renewed delimiting of the Thai political process. Arbitrary military rule was their target; a new constitution their objective. The students ended 1972 and began 1973 with successful p rotests against the Nati onal Executi ve Co unc i l (NEC) Order No . 299, which would have compromised t h e integrity and i ndependence of the Judi c iary by placi ng i t under the control of the NEC led by Marshals Prapass and Than om. In May the Th ung Yai Hunting The Decree was rescinded. Scandal gave the students an opportuni ty t o j o in with th e press in putting pressure on the Th ai Go vernment t o see that justice was ach i eved and t h a t government officials be punished for using the prerogati ves o f p osi tion f o r t hei r own personal enjoyment. In June, the National S tudent Center o f Thailand (NSCT) le d an d o rgan i zed, the larges t d emo ns trat ions ever seen in

29

Thailand. The student protested against the expulsion of nine Ramkhamhaeng University students who had written a satire on the recent decision by Thanom and Prapass to extend their terms in office for yet another year. The Cabinet, which approved t his decision, was identified as the "Animal Council of Thung Yai". There were irony and omen late on the evening of 21 June 1973 , when a bolt of lightning lit up the sky as a student dropped a black shroud over the Constituti on on th e Democracy Monument. He and his followers then demanded a Constitution in six mo nths, n ot three years as Prapass had promised the week before . Two days later . Thirayudh Boonmee calling this demonstration "only a beginning", said , We must win. If the students and the Thai public are not brave enough to fight for the Constitution we would not be gathered here . But the fight must be won with reason. We must fight for the Constitution because the government of our country must be run by the people not by the military. ~e want to show the government that we are not satisfied with the p resent government and want a permanent Constitution . 43 Ultimately, the nine students were reinstated while the Rector o f Ramkhamhaeng Unive rsity was forced to resign . The NSCT announced o n 10 July that the students 44 would begin drafting a national Constitution themselves . The revolution had now truly beg an . During July, August, and September the iss ue of demonstrations and the Constitution were subjects of student seminars and much editorial comment in the press. The Thanom- Prapass Governme nt arrested thirteen political activists on 5 Oct ober 1973 for passing o ut leaflets calling for early promulgating of a Constitution. Thirayudh Boonmee was among them and five others were students. The government accused seve ral of these activists, including a f o rmer Member of Parliament, Khaisaeng Suksai, of being involved in a communis t plot to overthrow the government. Thanorn and Prapass claimed there was a "third hand" behind these activities - the communis ts. The "third 43

Bangkok Poat , "Future Leaders ,"

44

Ibid .

23 June 1973, p . 1.

30

hand" , h owever, was more l ikely a small but dedicate d and infl uent ial group o f university p r ofessors who had b een telling their students for years that Thailand needed a mo re responsive system o f g ove rnment. The arrests sparked a week of peaceful protests and "Hyde Park" style S?eeches . Among the pamphlets di s tributed by the students during the week of 6-13 October 1973 was o ne called "Constitution" that included an article entitled "Constitution and National Security" by the NSCT. Across the top o f the page was a quote from S t. Augustine , Ci ty o f God , Book I V: "And s o , justice remo ved, what are kingdoms but great r o bber bands? And what a re r obber bands but s mal l ki ngdoms?" Within the article Ro usseau was quoted , Even the strongest of men is n ot strong eno ugh to remain i n p ower forever if he cannot change his strength into righ t and (cause] obedience (to be seen] as a duty . (Changing the strength into right means building the f oundation for a lawful g overnment.] 45 The rallying cry was a call for a constitution and , quoting Abraham Lincoln, a government "o f the people, by the people and for the people." By the day and hour their ranks swelled. About 400 , 000 stude nts and their supporters marched to Democracy Monument on Saturday , 13 October 1973, threatening violence if the arrestees were n ot released and a shorter time frame for drawing up a new Con stit uti o n not promised . The "Constitution 13" were re l eased and the charges were dropped. Prapass promised a constitution by Oc tober 1974. The moderate students led by the NSCT , now under the leadership of Sornbat Thamr o ngthanyawongse , were prepared t o call off the demonstration feeling they had achieved their obj ectives. But other students, comprised mainly of nonuniversity technical stu dents were not prepared to leave the s treets. Poor communications may , in part, have been a problem and certainly contributed to a decision by Seksan Prasertkul, who was managing the crowds while the rest of the NSCT leadership was negotiating with the government , not to announce

45

Pongpen Skuntaphai , "Democracy and Politics in Thailand," as quoted b y the NSCT in the Constitution and NationaL Security, p. 14.

31

unilaterally the terms of the announcement. Further complicating the situation were conflicting reports t h a t the "Constitution 13" had been killed. In the early morning hours o f 14 October, the bloodshed began - reportedly sparked by tear gas fired at students trying to return home via Rajavithi and Rama V Roads after seeking an audience with the King. The poli c e had blocked these streets un der 0 rders not to let demo nstrat ors near Prapass' home. During spo rad i c violence through o ut t he day characterized more by thrust and parry between student s and the soldiers than actual co mbat, tanks and even a helicopter fired on the students. Thanom's son Colonel Narong Kittikachorn was alleged to have been in this helicopter.46 The bloodshed continued for another day. The students finally forced the "Terrible Trio" o f Than om , his son, Narong, and Prapass into exile and brought t o a conclusion the first phase of their "revolution." On the evening of 15 October 1973, five student leaders appe a re d on television at 9.00 p.m. They all spoke of their intentions and hopes now and in the future. Briefly, the se included: 1. A s t atement o f thei r ori gi naL a i ms . "We were not out to destroy Thailand or her people. Our objective was freedom and democracy for her people;" 2. An aaaep t anae o f t he n e w governme n t. The King had nominated Professor Sanya Tharnrnasak and appealed f o r support. They were now prepared to accept this as a government committed to democracy for Thailand and, in the sense that it came into being as a result of the demonstrations of the people and with the blessing of the King, a democratic government; 3.

st udent s.

Th e i r h opes fo r th a f u tu re an d th e ir r o Le as

They appealed for support from people i n t h e provinces to keep buildings on this beginning f o r demo c ra cy and they felt it their duty as students to continue to struggle to protect true democracy in Thailand. Finally, they regretted that so much blood and so many lives had t o be paid for this new government. 46

To this writer's knowledge, no final proof has ever been of fered t o support this allegation. The important point, however, i s t h at t he belief that Narong h ad f ired on students further inflamed them and made inevitable the departure into exile of the "Terrib le Tr io" .

32

Two or three of the students appeared on the verge of tears . One could hardly doubt the sincerity and commitment in their hearts and minds. And one could not help but think they had won a great victory . There is no precedent in Thai history for these events . It must be one of the most significant ironies in recent Southeast Asian history that the students of Bangkok , with their calls for democracy and a constitution , quotations from Rousseau , Locke, St . Augustine, Abraham Lincoln , et al., were able to mobilize approximately 400,000 active partici pants, including students from up- country , and accomplish the overthrow of a government which the CPT , with its quotations from Mao Tse- tung and seven years of active guerrilla psycho-political warfare, had never even come close to threatenin g. The communists did not instigate , initiate or control these events . The communists were as surprised as everyone else at what had happened. They certainly had no similar record of success through their efforts among the Thai peasants in the rice paddies of Northeast Thailand or the hill tribes of the North. In the end , the thought of Mao Tse- tung appears to have had less impact on Thai students and professors than those of Rousseau and Abraham Lincoln. The Thanom- Prapass Govern ment was destroyed not by a communist revolution, but by a democratic revolution led, in part, by the children of its leading bureaucrats . In the three years that followed, the democratic revolution devoured itself. Part IV below will briefly review the essential characteristics of the emerging democratic political process that came to an end on 6 October 19 7 6; Part V will summarize the causes of the collapse of democracy in Thailand .

33

IV:

THE 197 4- 76 THAI POLITICAL PROCESS

Notes on the Diagrams The diagram depicting the 1975-76 process 1. (Diagram 1) does not show all the political parties. Those that are shown captured 267 out of a possible 279 seats in the April 1976 elections for the Lower House of Parliament. These parties were the Democrat , Thai , Socialist United Front (SUF) , Socialist Party of Thailand (SPT) , Social Action Party (SAP) , Social Agrarian Party (SA) , New Force (N F), National Revival (NR) , Social Justice (SJ) , Thai Nation (TN) and Social Nationalist (SN) . The lines between actors represent sources of 2. support and /o r conflict. Political parties , for example , the Democrats , Thai, SUF , SPT , NF and SAP , tended to seek and ~eaeive most of their political support from the people . With the exception of SAP and perhaps the Democrats , none of the s e parties had stron g links, with co rrespon ding substantial financial support, with the Sino- Thai business community clique groups or sources in the government bureaucracy . The SA , NR , SJ, TN and SN parties on the other hand drew their primary political and financial support from these t r aditional •sources of political power It is signi f icant , therefore, that in both in Thailand. the January 1975 and April 1976 e l ections these more newly o rganized parties outpolled the most conservative parties which , according to conventional political wisdom, had the major advantages: money, experienced politicians, strong links with powerful government individuals or organizations . Intellectuals , the press, the political parties, Parliament , the Prime Minister and his Cabinet all had vested interests in the Constitution which protected their rights t o existence. The King , t oo , had strong links to the people and great support from them. Though n ot shown on the diagram, however , he also had considerable vested interest in and support from the traditional sources of power in Thailand - and these ties became more important and even strongest as the "chaos" of democracy represented in the diagram seemed to threaten the stability of the state and the Monarchy itself. This "chaos ", coupled with

considerable communist oriented infiltration and agitation,

the establishment of three communist governments in Indochina and the communist treatment of the Monarchy in Laos were all

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48

Bangkok Post, " New Rulers Set Plans for the Future," 25 October 1977 ; and Nation , "Three Tier Administrative Sys tem Set Up , " 25 October 19 77.

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49

General Krit Siwara's position i n the Krit Siwara. configuratio n of political-mi litary-busin ess powe r i n Thailand from Octobe r 1973 to April 1976 was unparalleled by that of any other major political figure. Within the military, Krit stood far above all potential coup l eaders in terms of officers k nown to be l oyal friends and/or in debt to him for favou rs i n the past. He had carefully o r chestr a te d the positioning of officers known to be loyal to him who would fol l ow in positions of power after he retire d . Krit als o appeared to be especially effective in cultiva t ing positive relati onshi ps even with the man most often cite d as a poten t ial coup leader: Lt . - Gen. Prase r t Thammasi r i . For example, he and Prasert share d at least tw o common business in terests (the Thai Mineral Enterprises Company and the Thai Internationa l Petroleum Company , TIPCO), both of which were backed by Krit ' s " ban ke r", Yang Hsi Kun. In the political arena Krit hedged his bets and created friends in s e vera l direc tions . He reportedly provided fi nan cia l support to Prasit Kanchanawat ' s Social Nati onal ist Party, Thawit Klinprathum ' s Social Justice P arty, Maj. Gen. Parmarn Adireksan ' s Th ai Nation Party, and a new party c omposed of y o ung moderate political activists , The Thai Pa rty . I n all of thes e part ies Krit related di rectly in some way t o the party l eader and/or to regular members withi n each party. This is particularly true of Pramarn Adi rek s an's Th ai Nation Party. MG Siri Siriyothin , MG Krit Punnakun , and MG Phai thun Inkhetan uwat were longtime friend s and suppo r t ers of Krit.53 Krit had a close relati onsh ip with Prasit Kanchanawat , and through him Bunchu Rojanasathie n and Chi n Sophonpanit both of whom were leading Chin was members o f the Si n o-Thai business community. This relationship also President of the Bangkok Bank. served as a bridge to M. R. Kukri t Pramoj for whom Bunchu Roj anasathien, the Vice-Preside nt o f the Bangkok Bank, was In additi on , Krit had for some time primary backer. reportedl y co-operated with Pong Sarasin, in various stock purch ases and other business de alings in the Thai Oi l

53

There is conside rab le diffi culty in dete rminin g the accurate spell i ng f or many Th ai names. Newspapers will often spell them diffe rently from the way the indivi dual himsel f would or does. I have tended t o use t he spelling of my sources - books, newspape r s , or friends.

50

Refining Company (TORC) I The Thai Marine Transport eo. I and TIPCO. Pong Sarasin was Treasurer of Kukrit ' s Social Action Party . In terms of business connections and interests , Krit Siwara had no peer. Diagram 4 clearly demonstrates his twelve most important business associates. While the exact nature and degree of all of his interests and business contacts remain somewhat unclear, Krit was known to have some common business interest with at least thi rty two of Thailand's leading Sino- Thai families , including all seven of the largest families - whose heads were known popularly as the "Seven Gentlemen ". As late as 1973 Krit, according to a list prepared by the Democrat Party, reportedly had interests in fifty - two companies . Though Krit had often states his intention to divest himself of these interests and probably to some extent did so, it is more likely that he would have utilized the time tested Thai device for transferring shares rather than totally cutting himself off from his lucrative business connections. Under this device the original owner gives up legal ownership of his shares in a given business to various individuals who in return provide the original owner with a signed , undated transfer certificate in blank . The original owner can then complete and negotiate the blank certificates in his own favour at some later date . Krit Siwara had political ambitions and interests to protect. For these reasons alone , if not also because of the role money plays in Thai coup politics , Krit was unlikely to cut his links with the Sino- Thai business community - links he had carefully developed since at lest 1960 . The most important of Krit ' s Sino- Thai associates was Yang Hsi Kun .who was reported to be "Kri t' s banker" . Krit had served at one time or another as board chairman on no fewer than five of Yang Hsi Kun's major business enterprises/interests , including , for example, the Thai Development Bank, Thai Mineral Enterprise eo. , and the Sidaeng Shipping eo. More interesting , in terms of the current and potential importance of oil in Thailand , Krit had been deeply involved with Yang Hsi Kun in the purchasing or manipulation of stocks in at least three oil related companies: The Thai Marine Transport Company, which was originally set up to purchase controlling shares in TORC in the mid- 1960s, and more recently in TIPCO. It is possible, for example , that Yang Hsi Kun held shares i n

51

his name for which Krit Siwara held the transfer certificates. Krit Siwara's various connections or linkages within and across ma.n y clique , party and business lines were of crucial significance to the p o litical situation in Thailand . Krit Siwara had substantial influen ce and /or control over the political manoe uvr ing amo ng Tha i land's elite . No coups were likely s o long as he was Commander of the RTA simply because coups in Thailana r equire money and Krit had his links to nearly all potential sour ces of funds for any coup maker. He was certainly in a position to know when something was planned and would have had both the time and the res o urces to nip in the bud any coups that he would not himself lead. Beyond his retirement, moreover , Krit Siwara continue d his political-busin ess links and thr o ugh them his influence among key military officers. He had the res ou rces, in simple terms, t o "ensure" his rise to Prime Minister of Thailand after he retired in Oc tober 197 5 . At an opportune time, probably determined by Krit himself (but with the h elp o f an astro l oger n o doubt) , he could have run in a by-election to fill a vacated seat in the assembly or take advantage of a vote o f no-confidence in the legislature and run in the elections thereafter. When a new governmen t was formed, Krit Siwara would have been an odds - o n favourite to become Prime Ministe r . That Kri t had not decided on such an open cour se prior to his death in April 1976 is testimony to his p o liti ca l sensitivity and sense of timing . He may have recognized that he coul d be a s tabilizing influence from behind the scenes without setting himself up as a target for radical activists o r irresponsible pol it icians wh o often appeared to have more interest in politica l chaos than political development . At the very least , Krit Siw ara was willing to g i ve democracy a chance - unlike many of his friends fr om t he old polity who stepped up their efforts after his death to try to rest ore all power and privilege to themselve s. Prasert Ruchirawon g stood a cl os e second t o Krit in terms of business links and certainly had resources to b ring to bear in the p o l i tics of the election campaign and within the Legislature that f ollowed thereupon . Pr asert, however, had l ittle or no meaningful mi l itary support . He was much too compromise d by his past activity and associat ions to act openly and i ndependently. Moreover ,

52

most of his business contacts were identical to Krit Siwara's , and Krit was in a better pos i tion to prot ect the interests of the businessmen in question than Prasert . Prasert Ruchirawong , in short, could be a useful ally for Krit , or any who followed him but he needed Krit and others more than they needed him . Thawi Chunlasap had links in all three spheres: military , political and business , but they did not equal Krit ' s in any of these spheres . Thawi also suffered from his public image as a close associate of the "Terrible Trio" (Prapass Charusathien, Thanom Kittikachorn and Narong Kitti kachorn) and the widespread sus piaion that most of his money was derived from corruption . Thawi, however, must have had more lin ks than those shown on the diagram, particularly in the business sphere where he is shown linked directly only to Suphasit Mahakun in the distillery business. Both Thawi and Prasert might have more to gain from Prapass Charusathien ' s return in 1977 than they did with Krit i n power . Maj. General Prarnarn Adirek s an has significant business links with the Mahakun Distill ers Grou p of businessmen, and with the Japanese investors (particularly Mitsubishi and Asahi) . He is wealthy . He is reportedly well connected with some senior and recently retired military officers , but appears not we ll connected to military officers with control over forces either current or future. Moreover , most of those officers in his party were also identified as close associates of Krit Siwara's, particularl y MGs Krit Punnakun and Prasit Ingkhatanuwat . Pramarn Adireksan , like Prasert Ruchirawong and Thawi Chunlasap , made good allies for General Krit Siwara , and their best interes t s were probably most efficiently served by working with him rather than against him . This fact is demonstrated by Prarnarn ' s current isolation from the new political process. His prospects for eventual rise to Prime Ministership were far better under an open electoral process than via coup politics , though this latter route is not ruled out even today. Indeed , some observers suspect that Pramarn was on the verge of launching a coup of his own in October 1976 , and that he might have even been peripherally involved in General Chalat Hiransiri ' s abortive coup attempt in March 1977 .

53

General Prasert Thamrnasiri. Throughout 1974-76 many observers considered General Prasert Thammasiri, the Commander of the 1st Army Division, to be a potential coup leader. His control over the troops around Bangkok in 1974-75 was a point in his favour. He did not appear , however, to have an independent and secure resource base in the business and political community from which to operate . Most of his business contacts were shared with General Krit Siwara - businessmen who had far more extensive interests with Krit than with Prasert or any For example, other major military or political figure. Yang Hsi Kun and Prasert share interests in TORC and TIPCO, and with Chin Sophonpanit in the Bangkok Bank. But both men would probably have sided with Krit in any competition for resources for use in a coup . Prasert had strong support in the military, with both o fficers and his men , but he still did not rival Krit Siwara in either the number or in the key positions of his contacts. P rasert Thammasiri would have been hard pressed to launch a coup or prepare for one without Krit Siwara ' s knowing about it far in advance, even after he retired from active military duty . As noted above , Krit was not l ikely to give up his business contacts or lose his capacity to act as mediator between them and any new patrons they may need after Krit left the active military scene. On the other hand , it is true that Krit Siwara himself began the development of his reso urce base in much the same manner as appeared t o be the case with Prasert while Krit was alive . Prapass Char usathien assisted Krit ' s early entree i nto the business community just as Kr it later seemed to be he l ping Praser t. M.R . Kukrit Pramoj was somewhat of a "royalist centrist" in the aborted democratic political process . His "political p resen ce " was more overt than Kri t Siwara' s though , taken as a whole, still less influential. Kukrit was, and is, a strong supporter of the Monarchy and especially King Phumiphon . King Phumiphon, moreover , accepted Kukrit as one of his closest advis o rs - a s he did Krit Siwara . Kukrit served as Chairman of the Board of the Bangkok Bank of Commerce and is a member of the boards of Pepsi Cola Company and the Indra Hotel. Two of his most import ant supporters, Bunchu Rojanasathien and Pong Sarasin , and t heir relationship with Krit Siwara, have been discussed above.

54

Kukrit's other primary Sino-Thai business links are with the Lamsam Family and Yip In-tsoi. Both of those families are somewhat independent of the rest of the SinoThai business community and have instead close relationships with the royal family. Kukrit does link directly to Lenglert Baiyoke through the Indra Hotel. Lenglert, in turn, is reportedly close to Prasert Ruchirawong who also owns stock in the Indra Hotel and serves on its board with Kukrit. Kukrit Pramoj is, however, an institution in his own right. He was .not dependent upon nor beholden to Krit Siwara or any other elements among the rightist political parties. He remained a firm supporter of the Constitution and was long .before October 1973 .a critic - the only resident major public critic - of the Thanom-Prapass Government. Kukrit could, however, because of his own "involvement" in the traditional Thai political-business polity, coalesce with elements in Krit's sphere to form a government when the latter did not win enough seats on its own and needed to go elsewhere for support, as occurred after the January 1975 elections. The price was the Prime Ministership for Kukrit and probably some acquiescence by the rightist parties to some of Kukrit's policy and programme directions.. Kukri t ultimately, however, was unable to cope with the self-interested political machinations of the rightists', he left himself be pushed too far by the leftists and finally was defeated by rightist elements who could not overcome their paranoia about communist infiltration and threats to their personal prerogatives in the long term interests of the state. Kukrit's defeat in the April 1976 elections and Krit Siwara's death shortly thereafter removed the two most important leaders - indeed "forces" in their own .right - from the democratic political process just when they were needed most. The Sino-Thai business community. Diagram 4 shows twenty-one leading Chinese or Sino-Thai businessmen. There are more, to be sure, but the ones identified are and have been the primary sources of financial support/reward for leading political figures and clique groups. Most of the Sino-Thai businessmen began to develop their ties to Thai political leaders in the 1950s and during the 1960s they solidified their· ties with Thai leaders, including most notably Prapass Charusathien, Thanom Kittikachorn, Narong Kittikachorn, Krit Siwara, Prarnarn Adireksan, Prasert Ruchirawong and Prasert Thammasiri. General Krit Siwara began in the mid-60s, however, to develop ties and

ss manoeuvre with them in competition with Prapass. Krit's primary Chinese business associates were those who were once also very close to Prapass - only Krit had no other apparent potential political-m ilitary rival with an independent resource base that even closely resembled that which Krit had during Prapass tenure. Prasert Tharnrnasiri remained a very distant potential competitor. He controlled troops but troops alone are not the stuff of In a sense they are but which coups are made in Thailand. in the brew. More pe~per and salt of the final touch and financing supporters of essential is the marshalling whom come the from among the Sino-Thai business community, funds to buy the other political-m ilitary allies necessary for a coup. It is against this background that General Kr it Siwara's unparalleled links to the Sino- Thai community nee d to be underst ood. Of twenty-one leading Sino-Thai businessmen, Krit had strong l inks to twelve , Prasert Ruchirawong eight, Prasert Moreover, Tharnrnasiri three, and Prarnarn Adireksan four. Sinomajor Krit's links were secure in both of the two Thai business blocs - the Mahakun Distillery group and the Bank of Ayuthaya group. Through his relationship with Phot Sarasin , Krit even links to the three more independent families who themselves link closely to the Royal Family: U Chu Liang, Lam Sarn and Yip In-tsoi . Krit Siwara died in April 1976. Thanom Kittikachorn returned to Thailand in September 1976 and entered a His return, which Krit would have Buddhist monastery . been able to prevent, directly led to the chaos that resulted in the 6 October 1976 coup by the Thai Supreme Command, later joined in by Royal Thai Army troop commanders. Prapass Charusathien returned in January 1977 from his exile in Taiwan and may be today trying to restore t he very same linkages with the Sino-Thai business community that Krit had picked up when Prapass left for Taiwan in October 1973. How effective Prapass will be, and whether he can use these resources as he did in the past , remain to be seen. Much has changed in Thailand sin ce October 1973. In the three years of democratic politics many new act o rs began t o participate in the Thai political process. These new actors - political parties, pressure groups and individuals - had few ties to and drew little support from the Sino-Thai business community.

56

The new actors . Kukrit Pramoj and his brother Seni Pramoj were only the leading edge of "new" actors in Thai politics. Diagram 4, even though no effort is made to portray all the political parties, pressure groups or personalities, clearly identifies the potentially most powerful of the new actors . Most of the new actors including political parties and pressure groups that emerged in 1974-75 were separate from the traditional actors and their traditional sources of power among the Sino-Thai business community and the military. The Democratic Party which was never really a wholly united party but a coalition of political interests from the left to right compounded by strong personality conflicts was not a new actor on the scene. It (or its members) had almost always been present as the major opposition to the clique groups who held actual power. Many of the Democrats, nevertheless, were elite themselves - a clique group that has never quite been able to get into power and then keep itself there . Their apparent lack of a financial support base even remotely paralleling that of the former UTPP parties must certainly be part of the explanation for their ineffectiveness as a political force. One cause of disunity in the party was Seni Pramoj ' s attempt to bring in new and younger personnel. The older established party figures saw themselves being put out of action just when the prospects looked best for having one more "go" at real political power. The split in the Democratic Party then served really as a case study in microcosm of the split between the older established political forces among which Krit Siwara held such sway and the new forces that entered the fray. Among the truly "new" forces were the New Force Party, the Socialist Party of Thailand, the Socialist United Front Party, the moderate student based Thai Party (even though it apparently had links to "the establishment" through Krit Siwara) and the Social Action Party (even though i t too had members well connected with the established forces) . All of these parties had individual members who had been around for some time and served as members of previous Parliaments. Klaew Norapati of the Socialist United Front Party, Col. Sornkit Sisangkom of the Socialist Party of Thailand, and Kukrit Pramoj of the Social Action Party were cases in point. But none of these parties - with the exception of the New Force Party through Kraisi Nirnrnanhaemin, and SAP -

57

appear to have had any meaningful financial support base. What then were the sources of strength of these new actors? One was obviously the youth and enthusiasm of many of their members - people who wanted change and believed they had a real chance to bring it about. Another was intellect and education. Taken as a whole , the personalities in the new parties were far better educated with higher degrees of learning , many from abroad (particularly the U. S . ) than were their counterparts in "the establishment" parties. Yet another source of strength was their role and/or image as spokesmen for grievances of the little people in Thailand. The strength of these new faces and parties with no apparent base of .support in the "old system" became apparent in the January 1975 elections when they occupied over half the seats in the new Parliament . Though they did not run the government , under the new Constitution and in new political circumstances , these new actors provided impressive pressure for change in the traditional nature of Thai politics. These new parties forced realignment of political forces and took more and more power away from the older established parties, which then had to accept coalition with former outsiders in order to retain access to power. The April 1976 elections forced even greater realignments in political power but unfortunate l y Kukrit Pramoj , who had attempted to orchestrate the realignments necessary for a .stable .political process , lost . And then Kukrit Siwara died. The resulting vacuum of power behind the scenes placed too great .a strain on a political process still too much influenced by clique oriented thinkers and personal power seekers who , in turn , were competing with new forces for fundamental socio- economic change and increased communist infiltration and agitation .

58

V:

CAUSES OF THE COLLAPSE OF DEMOCRACY

A Thai military junta moved back into power in Thailand at 6.00 p.m. on 6 October 1976. Ea~lier in the day, Thai border Patrol Police and the regular police forces operating under Prime Minister Seni Pramoj 's Government had moved into the Thammasat University campus to quell bloody warfare between right and left wing "students"54 that left 46 people i ncluding students , police and members of the public dead and over 180 injured. The police arrested a total of 3,059 persons , most of them students.SS Many others were set upon by the people surrounding the campus , killing some and injuring others . Many more students escapeg from Thammasat and some of t hese joined other students and f l ed to the jungles and Laos . Thus, the three - year effort to develop a viable constitutional democracy in Thailand came to an end - ironically , on the very campus and among many of the students where it had all begun during 6 -15 October 1973. This event and its aftermath has implications that go far beyond Thailand to the rest of Southeast Asia, and ultimately to the u. s . which failed during a three - year oppo rtunity to find an imaginative way to assist and inspire the Thai when they so clearly needed mo r a l and psychological support for their effort to build a democrat ic system. What happened? Why could not the Thais keep alive their inspiring example as the only country in Southeast Asia engaged i n an open and unfettered attempt to build democracy? And, does this l atest cou p mean a resurrection of the o ld pre-October 1973 bureaucratic polity? The remainder of this paper will discuss the most basic causes of the fai lure of democracy in Thai l and: student factionalism, rightist and communist infi l tration of the student movement , political party factionalism and selfish interests , lack of civilian leadership , academic/intelle ctual effectism and 54

I use the term students advisedly . While the majority of protestors in this and other protests may wel l have been students, there was always a small number of agitators (nak laeng or bullies) who posed as students but really acted for others just to s tir things up. This was particularly true among some right-wing groups, such as the Red Gaur. Indeed , many of these students were really the flotsam and jetsam of Bangkok stree t life.

55

National Administrative Reform Council , "Facts of the Incident on October 6 , 1976," (21 October 1976) .

59

irresponsibility and external pressures that arose from the communist victories in Indochina and considerable insensitivity from the u.s. to Thailand's needs. Student Activism, Factionalism and Ideological Polarization Seksan, we recall, had warned in October 1973 that failure to implement "real demo cracy" would eventually cause those who fought for democracy to abandon the ideals they fought for and turn instead towards one of two left-wing dictatorship or right-wing extremes: dictatorship.S6 A leading cause, indeed, of the collapse of Thailand's democratic experiment - or certainly the military's tolerance - was the steady increase in leftist o riented radicalism of many prominent university student activists.S7 Student radicalism, however, was in many ways caught up in a vi cious c ircle. The more left the NSCT, the Federation of Independent Stuqents (FIST) or the Thammasat University Student Group moved, the more they became targets of right-wing vocational and technical student activists. At the same time, t he rightist elements themselves helped push the NSCT and other activist groups The right-wing "student" group, the Red towards the left. Gaur, for example, was supported by elements in the Thai military and police - and probably other conservative sources. Every time the NSCT launched a protest against an "injustice" of some kind it was opposed, often with violence, by the Red Gaur or other right-wing groups. The NSCT and other university based student activist organizations, nevertheless, were too often unwilling to moderate their demands or to move towards social, political

56

Claudia Ross, op.cit.

57

Indeed, Seksan himself may have become a prime examp l e of his own October 197 3 perception. He had not appeared publicly in Thailand since August 1975 and was last seen in Paris in September 1975. The speculation was that he had gone underground shortly after to join the communist movement in Thailand via Hanoi. It now appears that he has surfaced as at least a participant in a communist inspired " United Front" along with some of the student leaders and former activists who fled to Northe ast Thailand and Laos after the 6 October 1976 coup. Norman Peagam, Far Eastern Eaonomia Review, 19 November 1976, p. 16.

60

and economic reform a step at a time. The university activists demanded, and expected that their government's leaders should automaticall y accept and acquiesce. The NSCT and FIST, moreover, never tried to curtail the spread of communist literature on university campuses - literature that help up Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevarra as models for Thai activists to follow. Criticism by university activists of the archaic nature of the Thai Monarchy engendered even more fear among Thailand's predominantl y conservative population that ultimately the student activists were a threat to the King and Thai Buddhism. The university activist groups, moreover, simply refused to co-operate with elements they considered conservative , lackeys of the old regime, "fascists " or whatever. They considered these other elements less committed to democracy than themselves and therefore unworthy of the same consideratio n under a democratic process that the students claimed for themselves. Moreover, even though the Thai Constitution promulgated on 7 October 1974 provided more guarantee and its clauses outlined more possible targets for reform than any other before it, the university activists did not consider the Constitution modern enough. This confusing situation developed because Thailand was, in the words of M.R. Prudhisan Chumpol (pen name Jumbala}, a lecturer at Chulalongko rn University, in a "state of value anomie" .58 The students, academics and others who freely proposed the establishmen t of socialism or social democracy in Thailand did not appear to understand these concepts and systems and their implications , or how they could be applied in the Thai environment. This condition continued to considerable degree throughout 1975. By 1976 the activists in fact had become even more convinced that "s ocialism" and antiimperial ism were the only answers to Thailand ' s problems. They tended to blame all of Thailand's ills on capitalism , foreign investment and "U.S. imperialism. " A major catalyst to the more radical thinking on the part of university activists and ideological conflict among student groups was the first secret return of former Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn to Thailand on 26 December 1974, ostensib ly to see his seriously i ll father. Thanom obviously had to have help from his former clique group but the nature and extent of this help has never been 58

Seve ral times

~n

private conversations with the author throughout 1974.

61

fully revealed. Whatever his source of assistance and the real purpose of Thanom's return, he did not remain long. He became, instead, once again a trenscending cause for the students who came together rapidly and began to prepare massive demonstrations all over again. Thanom left Thailand l ess than forty-eight hours after he arrived. The government and the Royal Thai Army under General Kri t Siwara all "rallied" against him. They had to. The students , (Many of even divided, were simply too powerful to resist. themselves might , moreover cers, offi the leading military have felt threatened had Thanom been permitted to remain at that time.) Thanom's return, however, he lped catalyze the formation of a new leftist oriented student-activist group: the Anti-Dictatorship Front (ADF) which supposedly represente d o ver twenty student and activist groups. The ADF eight - man executive committee was a virtual "who's who" of the university student movement. It was made up primarily of the leaders of the NSCT, People for Democracy Group (PDG) and FIST. The ADF did not exercise iron control over all the students though i t remained a viable "co-ordinating body" for most of the leading activist university student organizations. The NSCT announced on 1 January 197 5 that it would itself no longer lead public campaigns and would instead support efforts undertaken by the "Anti-Dictatorship National Joint Front". 59 The formation of this "front" coincided with clear evidence that if the communists were caught unawares in October 1973 and their thoughts of little overt impact at that time, such was not the case by 1975. The CPT had indeed clearly entered a "national united front building phase, infiltrating ••• new organi zations in the ' university campuses, and among organized labors, farmers, and even the lower ranking civil service."60 As early as May 1974, the thoughts of Mao, Lenin, Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevarra and, of course, Marx, were filtering through the Thai students minds as freely as the air they breathed. By the summer of 1975 there could no longer be any doubt that the CPT (Maoist)

Rallies," 1 January

59

Bangkok Post , "NSCT Wi thdraws From Lead Role 1975.

60

Justus M. van der Kroef, "CotmnUnism and Political Stability ~n Thailand," Issues and Studies , vol. XXI, no. 9, September 1976, p. 94.

~n

62

and the USSR were trying to infiltrate and use the student movement . I n some cases students had actual ly sought out communist guerrillas during their forays into rura l areas to look at farmers' problems. The students' intent, initially at least, had been to determine why rural people support or become guerrillas , not necessarily to become guerrillas themselves. Such activities however , gave the communists opportunities to contact and begin to influence students.61 Finally , there were reports that the CPT and its youth organization , the Thai Democratic Yout h League (TDYL) had been trying to expand CPT recruitment operations in North Thailand , particularly Chiang Mai , Lamphun and Lampang provinces , and in South Thailand among students at Prince of Songkla University. ~'lhile the act ivist university students appeared to continue to move left , the vocati onal students moved to the right , inspired no doubt by conservative elements from the old .clique groups who provided funds and weapons in a successful effort to split the students and use some of them for their own ends. Many vocational and technical school students became active members of an organization of their own outside of the National Vocational Student Center of Thailand (NVSCT) : the Red Gaur (g aur means wild buffalo) . The Red Gaur had made its first significant showing during the September- October 1974 university student demonstration against the draft Constitution which , among other things , did not provide for an 18 year old voting age or a clause giving Parliament the power to approve or reje c t the pre s en c e o f foreign t ro op s on Thai soi~ . The Red Gaur chailenged the NSCT and brok e up t heir demonstrations in front of Parliament , vowing to protect the new Constitution and the King against all corners.

The Red Gaur made their second major appearance during the anti - Thanom rallies in late December 1974 when they, according to the ADF, threw bottle bombs to break up an anti - Thanom rally at Thammasat University. The police promised to investigate but later admitted failure in their search for the bomb throwers . This failure to find perpetrators of violence against the leftists, it should

61

Bangkok Post , "Northeast Reds Seek Student Support , " 27 January 1974.

63

be noted, became a regular pattern and undoubtedly contributed to the feeling of many leftists that the old regime was trying to make a comeback. University students and the ADF charged in early January 1975 that the Red Gaur were supported by the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), particularly RTA Special Colonel Sudsai Thepasdin and the Thai National Police Department and that they had received arms training and radio equipment from these ~ ources . Sudsai denied the charges but admitted that he sympathized with the Red Gaur objectives: protection of the Monarchy, Buddhism, t he Consti tution and the Nation.62 There was no doubt, however, that the conservative forces in the Thai political spectrum did provide substantial support to the Red Gaur. Polarization between leftist and rightist students in Thailand reached fever pitch in August 1975 when the Red Gaur and supporters of the new conservative organization, NAWAPOL sacked several buildings in Tharnrnasat University in reaction to NSCT led university student rallies on 12 August protesting against government arrests of farmer and student activists in North Thailand, as well as its failure at the same time to pur~ue the killers of other farmer activists in the region.63 The NSCT, ADF and other student leaders charged that the government had failed to do anything about the mysterious murders of eight other farmer activists in the preceding months. All eight of the murdered farmers were members of the Farmers Federation of Thailand which was considered leftist in the eyes .o f Thai conservatives. The Kukrit Pramoj Government releaseq the activists but protests continued in Bangkok_ at Thamrnasat University. When a vocational student was shot hy NSCT rally guards while trying to listen to antigovernrne~t speeches at Tharnrnasat, the Red Gaur and their leaders had a cause. The sacking of Tharnrnasat followed four days later in what the Bangkok Post editorialized was "an attempt by the right wing . . • to destroy the NSCT Is power base. n64

62

The Nation, "ISOC Colonel Voices Support for Red Gaur," 6 January

63

Robert F. ZiDJDerman, "Thailand 1975: Transition to Constitutional Democracy Continues," Asian Su!'Vey, February 1976, pp. 165-166.

64

Bangkok Pos t, "Students

1975.

.

Go

On Wild Rampage," 21 August 1975.

64

The year 1975 , thus, ended with the Thai student activists (as opposed to the majority of students who were neither right nor left - nor activists) divided between rightists and leftists. The students brought down a government in 1973 . Many believed the students had not built anything in 19 7 4 and 1975 . Certainly they had not been l oyal in a creative and constructive sense to the democratic objective that had inspired them during the October 1973 uprising and events leading to this: "A Government of the people , by the people and for the p e ople." They had in fact become corrupted by their own power and had come to feel that they knew what was best for everybody. They failed, as Seksan noted in a speech before the Foreign Correspondent ' s Club of Thailand in early 1975 , to recognize that their proper place was not leading others but encouraging others to lead themselves. Seksan characterized the students as immature extremists and too dogmatic. They had tried to act as patrons of the people and spent so much time taking care of them that they could not stimulate leadership from the people themselves. Their actions distracted public attention from the issues of better working conditions or higher wages , or whatever , to students vs government. Another mistake was adventurism . Student organizations neve r thought twice before acting. They never anal yzed the situation to determine the true nature of the issues involved.65 Ideological radicalism, however , was only one element in the problem . Factionalism characterized by an incredible proliferation of student groups led by ego- oriented indivi duals who often concentrated more on competition with others they considered rivals than on hard work towards recognition for or achievement of some social pol itical or economic reform , became the norm . Instead of serving as different models of organization and training grounds for many leaders,66 the student groups became small clique

65

Seksan Prasertkul, "Errors Tarnished Student Image," Bangkok Post , 20 January 1975, and the author's own tape recording of the speech.

66

As this writer had hopefully expected in an article for the Asi an Surve y, June 1974 .

65

groups organized around an individual leader. In thi s sense, these groups were much like the clique groups found among their elders. Indeed, many students simply became tools for some of these old clique groups. Their factionalism in this sense was a function of their being used by outsiders. The April 1976 election, which resulted in an over-67 whelming victory for moderate and creative conservative forces and isolation for leftis~ s and ultra rightis ts, seemed to create a lull in .the polarization process that had become a dominant characteristic in Thai politics by late 1975. The secret return .of former Field Marshal Prapass Charusathien in August 1976, however, rekindled this polarization and gave the leftist stude nt groups "a just cause." Prapass returned in exile after two students died in clashes between student groups over his return. Then in September 1976, former Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn returned a second time and entered the monkhood to earn merit for his dying father. Thanom's return was the final straw. People began to .wonder whether there was a planned connection between these returns. Were they supposed to be preludes to a coup? The leftists again had a cause. Thanom's suppo rters undoubtedly encouraged the right-wing students to oppose the NSCT protest against Thanom and demand that he leave the country. The hanging by police in Nakhon Pathom province of two anti-Thanom students on the outskirts o f Bangkok in early October 1976 added fuel to the fire - and added a greater sense of justice to the demands of the university students who wanted Thanom to leave.68 When these students, during . a protest at Tharnrnasat

67

Creative conservatives are those leaders such as Kukrit Pramoj and Bunchu Rojanasathien of the SAP and Seni Pramoj and Kamo l Somvichien of the Democratic Party who recognized the need for the development of a responsive, free political process that includes interest and pressure groups which can bring pressure on that bureaucracy. These people do not, however, desire wholesale restructuring or personality purges of the old elite.

68

Bangkok Post , "Police Chief Gen. Srisuk Mah intorathep Admits Police

behind Garrotings," 5 October 1976. It is interesting to note t hat after the 6 October coup the policemen who had been arrested for these murders were released and cleared. The courts decided there was insufficient evidence to prose cu te them- despite their confessions .

66

University , however, hung i n effigy two other students , one of whom in newspaper pictures looked like the Crown Prince, the rightists outside stormed the camp us . Prime Minister Seni Pramoj finally acted - o r appeared to at least . The Thai Border Patrol Police and Bangko k Police reacted immediately and efficiently to quell the violence. But it was too late . The Thai S upreme Command had already decided to put an end to the chaos of democracy i n Thailand. The speed and e f fici e ncy of subsequent arrests by the junta indicates careful, long term planning for just such a contingency. Some observers argue that it is, thus , n ot inco nceivable that the sequence of events from at least August 1976 , with Prapass' return through Thanom's return in September, was roughly "orchestrated" or encou raged by ultra r igh t-wing elements who had hoped thereby to create the kind o f public disorder that developed on 5 and 6 Oc t obe r 1976 and that would justify a military coup. Some Thai academic s also believe that the Ki n g and Queen themse 1 ves indirectly at least wanted the military to return to power . There is considerable other evidence , including that from over the previous two years, however, that the events at Thammasat University were (perhaps even more than the right-wing agitation) the successful culmination of communist ~nfiltration - both from the Sovi ets and Vietnamese on the one hand and the "Maoist" CPT on th e other. The mock hanging , according to Dr. Somchai Rakwijit (p robably Thailand's most experienced and capable analyst of the communist political process in Thailand), was "CPT Policy" aimed at further polarizing the situation and hoping thereby to provoke a coup, and probably was carried out by a small group of communists who wo uld have had no trouble penetrating the masses at Thammasat o~ 4-5 Oc tober 1976 . 69 Somchai suggests, however, that the CPT and the Soviet Embassy had been competing for influence within the student and labour movements throughout 1975-76 , and the Thammasat campus during the first week of October 1 976. The Soviets, for example, provided funds for student trips to Europe and the USSR, for student protests in Bangkok, and for university publications. Moreover, the virtual flood of communist literature on campuses and in

69

In conversation wich the author on 18 October 1976.

67

bookstores also suggests funding and inspiration f r om sources beyond those availab l e from noncommunist organizations and individuals in Thailand . Soviet objectives according to other sources included the development of a pro- Soviet urban movement of students , workers and intellectuals; stern the growth of Chinese influence and infiltrate the large and well assimilated Chinese community for operations against China; to counter Western influence ; and to ferment unrest in order to discredit the bourgeois democratic systern.70 If Sornchai is right about the CPT activities on the Thammasat campus and, further , that the hanging was a " victory by the CPT over the Soviets" , it is ironical that the coup provoked thereby has , temporarily at least , driven many students and activists into the arms of the Vietnamese , who tended to be pro- Soviet , in Laos . In the final analysis, and whatever the inspiration for the coup , the rightists ' success remained a direct function of the failure of the noncommunist influenced university activists to cope with factionalisrn , disillusion ment , ideological polari z ation , violence and the tendency to take on too many issues . The activists lost perspective on what had been accompl ished and the potential for the future, let themselves be used directly and indirectly by outsiders on both the left and the right and , in sum , failed precisely at a point when their sources of strength in many respects should have been greater than ever. To wit: 1. Experience . After three years of development their organizations should have developed (a) more effective leaders and cadres, (b) a capacity to pick issues to work on which would have popular support , and (c) an awareness of the reorganization they needed to pursue these fewer issues . 2. ALLies among Labourers and farmers who had benefitted from student organizational activities and 70

Andre Amatrik, "The KGB in Asia (Part II) , " Far Eastern Economic Review , 31 December 1976, pp. 24-25. This article provides an excellent perspective on the nature and scope of Soviet intelligence activities in Thailand.

68

capacity to help articulate the farmers ' interests. The students need never have stood alone if they had had the patience to carry on low profile , organizational activities in rural areas, and to develop greater ability to relate to peasants. Seksan ' s earlier criticism was directed at this very failure . He felt the students should have helped peasants lead themselves rather than to try to get them to fottow the students. The Pa r Li ament and politi cal parties on which the 3. activists and their farmer allies could have bought pressure to bear for further reform of the bureaucracy that the students found so unresponsive . The Constitution which creative thinkers among 4. the students could have used more effectively, had they really tried.

Obviously, theory is one thing, reality something else. Perhaps the students succeeded too quickly at first. The exit of Thanom Kittikachorn, Prapass Charusathien and Narong Kittikachorn in 1973 was not even an original goal. The students found freedom on 15 October 1973 but , as could probably be expected, did not know what to do with it. Their elders, including the "creative conservatives" created the Constitution, the parties and the Parliament which the students and so many Thais had demanded but the students and activists were unable or unwilling to use these instruments to force further change . The student activists were unable to use the new institutions , including the Constitution because they had become factionalized; they had no single leader who understood the processes of democracy , particularly the uses of pressure groups and approaches to MPs and who could bring enduring organization and develop orderly, sustainable long term "campaigns " for the changes or programme they desired. All of these requirements we have already seen were alien to traditional Thai political culture and thus worked against the students in this regard as effectively as did the old elite. The activists, moreover, were unwilling to work with the democratic system because they believed the old elite In a sense this perception was dominated its processes. accurate to some degree. Yet, over half the MPs elected in January 1975 had never been in Parliament before . The former elite politicians in the three major parties formed

69

out of the United Thai People's Party (UTPP) in fact, captured only eighty seats. The terrible trio was gone. The UTPP was shattered. There was a new Constitution that provided for free speech, organization, political parties and so on . New parties did elect significant numbers to Parliament. The students ' lack of perspective on the momentum they had created was also a factor in this inability to proceed ration a~ly towards steady change. Instead they wanted "revoluti'on", socialism without ever really understanding the implications of their immediate expectations. Prudhisan Chumpol identified the "value anomie" so characteristic among the .students in Thailand. Dr. Tunyathep Suwannajindat, a young lecturer at Chulalongkorn Unive rsity in early 1975, expressed in verse, perhaps more accurately than many realize, the uncertain "reality" in the young Thai mind: ' 1't y 71 'b ~~~

7 I mposs ~ • 7 • D~a~ect~ca~

I don't believe; therefore I am. The dialectical me. Rainbow, bouquet, teardrop and the state of being free. I walked past the Revolution Anachronism is Present Tense Anarchism is a government by telepathy My subjectivity is brainwashed I am conditioned for "value-free" The river of integrity and the eternal equilibrium swept by the tide of history eras, years, months, and days moving left or right, downward or upward or just encircling me. Learning to unlearn is learning the dialectical me. Travelling to nowhere • •. longing not to belong The impossible to me .

71

Dr. Suwannajindat gave this writer a copy of this poem 1n early 1975 .

70

There is today something haunting about these lines. For, regardless of which faction may have provoked or "orchestrated" which events, there can no longer be any denying the unprecedented opportunity the communists now have to recruit political cadres from the host (estimated at from 600- 1,000) of activists who fled into the jungle and to Laos after 6 October 1976. These activists, moreover, are totally primed by three years of political activism; they are frustrated , humiliated and denied any alternative legal opportunities for political organization and expression. The new Thai Government has even forbidden the teaching of any political theory in the universities. The communist organizations could hardly ask for more fertile minds to work on - towards a transcedent cause. Thai Academia. A second major cause of the collapse of democracy in Thailand was the failure of Thai academia to provide the kind of leadership in classrooms that might have limited the growth of the irresponsible political activism that led, in turn , to violence in the streets and a growing weariness among more conservative Thais of the " chaos" of democracy . Thai university lecturers played a key role in creating the political consciousness and commitment that students used to bring down the ThanomPrapass dictatorship. These same lecturers then failed to encourage their students to proceed carefully and methodically to make the new Constitution and institutions like Parliament and political parties work. This failure might well have been due to the lecturers ' own value anomie - or , perhaps since so many of them had been trained abroad , primarily in the u.s. , they were completely out of touch with their own country's traditional values and patterns of action . They were in a sense not really Thai . Or, they were new Thais who did not understand the depth of the culture they sought to change. In addition , of course , the lecturers were not themselves a single united group . They had as many differing views as to what types of political ideologies and processes were most appropriate to Thailand , and were as much caught off guard by the new opportunities created by the October 1973 uprising as were the students. Perhaps the students ' success in October 1973 went to many heads and they could not or would not listen to their former mentors in any case . Nevertheless , except for Prudhisan Chumpol , this observer does not recall ever hearing or reading of serious attempts by leading Thai

71

academicians to bring reason and rationality to bear on their students . Moreover , intellectuals , like the press, condemned Parliament , politicians and political parties. They con sidered democracy as out of date and not effective enough to deal with remnants of the past who could still participate in a democratic political process . Socialism and classless societies were more " chic" . 72 Egoism in this sen se also con tributed to the failure to provide quiet , rational advice and perhaps thereby restraint to the activists - just as it contributed , on the other hand , to the factionalization of student organization . Whatever the reasons , Thai academia was unable to create among the student activists a set of values that were clearly enough defined to overcome the value anomie and to serve as reference paints .from which to select one of the new ideologies about which they spoke so freely. Instead, many lecturers and professors abandoned their roles and responsibilities as teachers to become activists themselves . They , too , wanted in on the action - to stand on the platforms surrounded by thousands of spectators and shout rousing slogans and demands , a process not nearly as effective in creating a coherent , appropriate and attainabte political process within the realities of the existing , albeit changing political situation , as might have been seminars in classrooms. Finally, there were undoubtedly some professors and lecturers who had already entered at least a loose alliance with the CPT through united front organizations or were heavily influence d by the funding activities of the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok. 73 Prudhisan, the young lecturer at Chulalongkorn University , however, remained an exception . He felt that the students would be better advised to turn their attention to their own education and demand that those among their professors who were trying to build political power bases for themselves would serve better if they turned away from political activism to preparing others to play this role. The professors would have helped the students understand more clearly the implications of the ideologies they had been exposed to. Prudhisan asked:

72

Kamo1 Somvichien in conversation with the author on 18 October 1976.

73

Andre Amatrik , op . cit . , p. 25.

72

If it is true that we cannot have democracy without education, is it not time that students and lecturers come together to discuss what is education? How are we going to organize our educational goals? Is it possible to build strong academic .integrity among members of the profession? If we do not ask these questions now, we will not have a university worth its name · and in the long run, we will not have democracy either. What we will have is brainwashing. 74 Prudhisan remained a rational voice in the wilderness. Status Quo Oriented Conservatives These, including many military officers who were close colleagues of Thanom and Prapass, certainly played a major activist role in the death of democracy in Thailand. The Red Gaur organization was one of their tools. A more impressive and better organization was NAWAPOL. NAWAPOL developed a cadre structure that targetted on village chiefs, district chiefs, youth and young adults, labour unions, civil servants at province and central level and even political parties . It tried to organize its followers on an ideological basis and in a cell structure much like that of the communists who it considered the prime enemy of the Thai Nation, the Monarchy, Buddhism and traditional Thai values. By late 1975 NAWAPOL claimed 50,000 members in 39 different provinces.75 Watana Keowimon was its most articulate and committed ideologue and organizer, but he alone could not have provided the funding necessary to develop such a widespread organization. The major support for NAWAPOL has remained behind the scenes, though it is known to have received some encouragement from officers in the

Isoc.76 74

Prudhisan Jumbala (Pen Name), "Professors Seek Power," Bangkok

Pos t, 11 February 1974.

75

Zimmerman, "Thailand 1975," op.cit., p . 165.

76

Justus M. van der Kroef, "Communism," op.cit., p. 89.

73

Key Thai military officers who were active members of the old clique groups in the Thai bureaucratic polity certainly played a role in the collapse of democracy in Thailand. These officers could work through official military institutions like ISOC but it is more likely they worked directly as individuals or small cabals with right-wing groups such as the Red Gaur and NAWAPOL. It is difficult indeed, however, to suggest that "the Thai Army" as a cohesive institution with entrenched antidemocratic interests worked to Jcst roy democracy. The Thai military has seldom, if ever, acted as a single, cohesive group or force in the Thai political process. Many military officers have played leading roles in the political pro.c ess, to be sure, but they have done so as leaders or key members in clique groups in which civilians from both the government bureaucracy and the business community have also played important roles. Moreover , these military officers have been more "political" than "professiona l military" in the tradition of the military in other Southeast Asian countries. For these reasons, as well as the sometimes intense competition between the higher politi zed officers, it is not possible to address "the military" as a force separated from the Indeed, there are "status quo oriented" conservative s. other younger and truly professional soldiers in Thailand who could decide t o replace all of the old elite politicians. A leftist oriented military coup is by no means impossible in Thailand - any more than was the October 1977 semicoup by officers who now apparently want a democratic process restored sooner than appeared to be likely with the government of Prime Minister Thanin Kraivichien which they themselves installed only one year earlier. 77 In addition to the overt activities of right-wing organization s throughout 1975 and 1976 there occurred many assassinatio ns of people active in political parties, student groups, farmers and labourers' organization s that were pushing for reform or speaking out against corruption. Few, if any, of the mysterious assassinatio ns were ever solved - or judicially pursued - even though the circumstantial evidence in most of the murders pointed in the direction of the rightists whose action groups were far 11

In the section on external causes for the failure of democracy in Thailand, I address some other aspects of the military's disillusionment with the democratic political process.

74

more prone to initiate violence than were the ''leftists". Failure to bring any of these assassins to trial and punishment was a key element in the drive to the more radical left of students and activists who had begun the democratic process with quotes . from Abraharn Lincoln. The sacking of Tharnrnasat University in August 1975 was probably the final warning for several activists, including particularly Seksan Prasertkul, who left Thailand in that month, surfaced briefly in Paris in September 1975 and then "disappeared". The decision of these activists to leave was further confirmed when two gunmen on a motorbicycle on 28 February 1976 assassinated a key leader of the SPT, Dr. Boonsanong Punyodyana.78 The killers were never found. The killing of Boonsanong, other threats against the "leftists" and Thai paranoia moreover, caused many candidates for the S PT and the New Force Party to cut back or cease campaigning for the April 1976 Parliamentary elections. To be identified as leftist had come to mean one was a target of opportunity for any rightist who could afford fifty dollars or more to hire an assassin. The left was almost totally eliminated in the April 1976 elections. These parties held thirty-nine seats after the 1975 ele ctions but only six after April 1976. In all probability, the death of Boonsanong was also the end of any hope that the "leftist" activists , most of whom were certainly not communist at that time, would participate responsibly in the political process then evolving in Thailand. These activists fell strangely silent and did not come forward again until Prapass ' return in August 1976. Ironically, nevertheless, the April 1976 ~lections may also have contributed to more reactionary action on the part of the remnants of the pre-October 1973 polity. While the leftist and liberal political parties were all but wiped out in terms of Parliamentary representation, the far right also suffered - particularly the two parties most closely identified with the Thanom Government (the Social Justice and Social Nationalist Parties). These two parties held sixty-one seats in the first Parliament and

78

Lewis M. Simons, "Thai Socialist Leader Assassinated, 11 Washington Post, 29 February 1976, p. 8.

75

only thirty - five after April 1976. The civilian centrist and "creative conservatives" parties, the SAP and the Democrat Party on the other hand increased their combined representation ~n Parliament from 90 seats in 1975 and 160 in 1976. Some of these seats belonged to members of other parties (such as the Soci al Justice and Social Nationalist) who had switched to the SAP , the Democrats and even t he Thai Nation Party (which captured fifty-six seats as opposed to twenty-eight th e first time) . The flow of power certai nly did not appear to be in the direction of s tatus quo conservatives even though some still managed to hold cabinet posts in coalition with the Democrat Party, and within the party itself. Seni Pramoj, moreover, had begun to move against corruption among th e po lice f o rces . Several high-ranking o fficers were arrested o r r emoved from their posts and placed under investigation for alleged misconduct ranging from smuggling to murder . The mood in Parliament appeared more favourable to further socio-economic and pol it ical reform . In any event, true democracy was definitely a threat to the privileges of many of those who had been close to Thanom and Prapas s. "Nhatever the ultimate nature and scope of their suppo rt and encouragement for groups like the Red Gaur and ~A".-JAPOL (and it was considerable by any measure ) , remnants of Thanom-Prapass era clique groups did not creatively support the development of a viable democratic political process in Thailand. They tolerated its early stages, used its loop-holes and institutions to protect their own interests and block those of the activists, contributed to the violence among left and right-w i ng activists and bided thei r time until the people as a whole became weary of all the disorderly and confusing "politics". The leftists, thus, had an unwitting "ally" on the far right. In describing this situation in Oc tober 1975, Prudhisan Chumpol (pen name Jurnbala) wrote, the present situation is consequently one of a swing t owar ds the already engrained authoritarian sentiments on the part of the urban population. In this situat~on, it is no wonder that the heroes of October 1973, the radical students, have become more and more cautious in their activities. The continuance of such a trend would logicall y force their activities into the

76

rural areas and the adoption of more extreme leftist ideology on the part of committed radicals. In the face of this and the presence of the communist-led insurgent movement in the rural areas and, most importantly the objective conditions of increasing land tenureship and a commodity pricing and marketing system which is unfair to the rural producer, it may come as a surprise to the traditional elements that, contrary to their expectations, a rise in authoritarianism, possibly resulting in a military coup d'etat, is in fact the catalyst of, rather than an obstacle . to, a Marxist revolution. 79 The Proliferation of Political Parties This also contributed to the collapse of democracy in Thailand. Indeed, most of these parties were merely individual- oriented clique groups, all of which saw in the new democratic situation an opportunity to try to cut themselves in for a share of power and its perquisites (not the responsibilities). The primary objective of many of the new parliamentary politicians was to sel l their votes as often as possible whenever the ruling party needed them to pass a bill or survive a vote of no-confidence . Few of the parties were truly i nte rested in serving the Thai people or building a true democratic political process. For example, it is worth n oting that only the Democrat Party, the SAP, the Thai Nation Party , NAWAPOL (which was really a political party in all but name) and the SPT appear to have seriously engaged in any substantial or sustained effort to develop organizational structures with the personnel, resources, and power in the provinces. Except for elections, the party leaders remained in and focused on Bangkok where all the action and comforts were l ocated. Prime Ministe r Kt~k rit Prarnoj recognized this lack of commitment on the part of the political .·parties. This realization appears to have played a major part in 79

Prudhisan Jumbala, "October 14 •• • 2 Years After: Belief in Democracy is Not Enough," Bangkok Post, 14 October 1975, p. 8.

77

his decision in January 1976 to call for new elections in April 1976. Kukrit had grown weary of the continued interclique group struggles between Thawit Klinprathoom, leader of the Social Justice Party and Pramarn Adireksan, leader of the Thai Nation Party. These men and their supporters appeared to care little for Kukri t 1 s re form programmes and the development of the Thai nation. Nor could Kukrit tolerate any longer the necessary practice of massive vote-buying to keep unproductive, splinter parties and individuals in line. Meanwhile, polarization and paralysis of the Thai political process has intensified at a faster pace than earlier expected under the existing balance of forces in Thailand. Finally, Kukrit had also undermined himself when he announced a hike in the price of rice in order to help the rural peasant farmers but then backed off when urban labour and students protes ted against the price increase. If there was to be a shift towards a more stable balance with creative, performance oriented "conservatives" still in cont r ol , Kukrit could wait no longer to dissolve Parliament. He had, after all, on 3 October 1975 before the Foreign Correspondent 1 s Club of Thailand called for a new "political front" that would unite into one party "those pol itical leaders who are genuinely sincere in changing Thai society and leave behind those politicians who are more interested in advancing their own political careers at the expense of Thai society." By dissolving Parliament, Kukrit could hope to realign the balance of forces in both Parliament and his own party . He could create conditions for a new, more stable coalition In the process he dominated by creative conservatives . could even hope to isolate the socialists and other radical activists, thus slowing the further polarization and paralysis of the political process. Kukrit ' s strategy almost worked. The number of parties holding small numbers of seats i n Parliament declined considerably after the April 1976 elections. Four parties dominated the Parliament , including his own which more than doubled its representation (18 to 46 seats) But Kukrit himself lost to an ultra conservative, Samak Sundaravej (who was to become Mi nister of the In teri or after the 6 October 1976 coup) , of the right-wing of the Democrat Party. Samak was now backed by Thai military officers who had earlier been willing to give full support to Kukrit but had deserted him when he yielded to leftist political pressure and pressed too hard for complete

78

American military withdrawal from Thailand. (See, below, the u.s. approach to relations with Thailand). Samak's victory, in turn, strengthened him within the Democr.at Party and heightened his personal political ambitions . He ultimately became an outspoken critic of his party leader, Seni Pramoj, and a cause of incessant infighting with more liberal or moderate members of the Democrat Party. Samak thus undermined Seni Pramoj's already limited capacity as a leader at precisely the point in time when the Thai .nation could have used all the civilian democratic leadership i t could muster. Leadership This was conspicuous by its absence almost throughout the entire three years and thereby a key cause of the collapse of democracy .in Thailand . The October uprising occurred so quickly and succeeded so easily that there was no time for a single, widely respected figure to emerge as a movement leader who had a plan of action and support .for it • . This leader less situation was never overcome, .though the Social Action Party came closer than any other party to preparing a comprehensive set of economic and political development policies. As noted above , Kukri t Pramoj , the leader of SAP and the fir st elected Prime Minister, however , could not provide strong leadership in governing the country simply because he had to spend so much time trying to hold together a nineteenparty coalition of party leaders who had less interest in governing the country than merely occupying positions with privilege. Seni Pramoj , on the other hand , and the Democrat Party had an Wlparalleled opportuni.t y to lead from an overwhelming position of strength in Parliament - 115 seats. Seni , however , never l ed - even though he needed only one other party to govern the country. The Democrat Party could not enter a coalition with the SAP , which possessed the highest calibre of leadership and expertise of any of the parties, in the interests of taking effective control of the leadership of the country. Seni and K~krit, though brothers, do not g·e t along well politically. Moreover , the Democrats had co-operated with [the] Thai military officer.s and .the Thai Nation Party to ensure Kukrit's defeat in the April elections. Seni , thus, had to coalesce with status quo-oriented, rightist political parties (Social

79

Justice, Social Nationalist, Thai Nation). In the end, Seni ended up with a weak Cabinet and position from which to exercise leadership because he could not resist the demands of the rightist parties f or cabinet positions even though these parties had few men really qualified to occupy such positions of leadership. His own party, moreover, was a coalition between conservatives and liberals and leftists. Seni's victory did not increase confidence in the democratic political process; itt in fact, destroyed it -with help ~~om the far right.~O Just as Seni and his party, therefore, could not develop momentum towards the solution of economic and social problems, neither could they deal effectively with critical, ad hoc, mostly rightist inspired threats to the new political process - threats such as the Prapass and Thanom affairs in August and late September 1976. Seni 's personal leaders hip weaknesses and his undermined pos ~ tion in his own party prevented him from exercising his authority to order the immediate arrest and deportation of these former leaders - in the interests of the stability (S&mak Sundaravej, for example, reportedly of the state. claimed privately and in Cabinet sessions that he himself had been asked by the King to help Thanom return and enter the Monkhood.) Seni was unable or unwilling to argue effect ively against the rightists (or the King) that he had to ignore the constitutional provision against deporting a native Thai in the case of the former leaders simply because their presence in the country would create precisely the kind of chaos that would bring down democracy. Instead, pressure continued t o build from the now highly motivated activists (two of whom, as we have noted, the police in Nakhon Phanom hanged) and even intens ified the aplit within his own party between liberal and right wingers . In retrospect 1 perhaps, democracy's chances in Thailand suffered grevious damage when Samak defeated Kukrit in the Apri l elections. Those chances were then mortally wounded when General Krit Siwara d i ed only hours after Seni named him Minister of Defence. Krit Siwara would never have l et Prapass or Thanom return to Thailand to begin with. His death created a leadership vacuum not only

80

Rarvay Stockwin, "Criai a of Confidence, " Faro Eastem Economic Revi ew, 23 July 1976, pp . 10-12 .

80

among active and retired military officers but also in terms of a behind-the-scenes "king maker" with the financial base necessary to keep opposing clique groups in check. As noted earlier, no other Thai leader could match Krit Siwara's connections with the Sino-Thai business community, particularly the Bank of Ayudthaya Group and the Mahakun Distillery Group (Diagram 4) • External Factors Communist success in Indochina also contributed to the collapse of democracy in Thailand by raising considerably the anxiety of Thai conservative elements, particularly in the military. Suddenly, communist governments and their armed forces totally dominated Thai frontiers to the East and North . The Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies, moreover, had long been providing support to communist insurgents in Northeast Thailand. Their access to and support facilities for these insurgents after April 1975 became direct and relatively unhindered. The rapid, unceremonious abolition by the Pathet Lao of the Lao Monarchy reinforced the fears of those Thai who revere and love their King. Even a coalition government with communists that might preserve a monarchy now became an unviable hope for Thais who did not relish a long drawn out war with communist insurgents. Leftists and liberals in Thailand appeared to many conservatives as really communists or easily duped by the communists. Concurrently, the democratic political process in Thailand created too much opportunity for communist infiltration.81 As mentioned above, the CPT and, particularly, the USSR and the Vietnamese wasted no time in trying to exploit this opportunity. Even the King of Thailand, who had played a key role in the creation of the opportunity for democracy in October 1973 and shortly thereafter, had

81

See Robert F. Zimmerman, "Insurgency in Thailand," Pr>obtems of Communism, May-June 1976, for a more detailed analysis of these opportunities for a communist switch to an urban oriented united front strategy .and an outline of two possible sceneries for communist activity in Bangkok, one of which it now appears actually occurred; and Justus M. van aer Kroef, "Communism and Political Instabilityin Thailand," Issues and Studies, vol. XII, no. 9, September 1976, pp. 96-102. ·

81

grown weary with their street protests. On 14 December 1975, the King addressed the Royal Guards at their oathtaking ceremony. He noted that Thailand had managed to safeguard its independence and liberty in the past because the people had stood united and supported each other when danger threatened the state. He continued, At the present time, however, a campaign of subversion by various means has been systematically fermented in o~ r land and has gained in intensity each day even as far as to reach open aggression. It is now quite apparent that the Thai Nation has become a major threat which host ile parties certainly aim to take over and dominate in order to exploit and appropriate our riches for their own advantages and superiority. All soldiers ..• should be fully aware and careful of the dangers which are creeping in nearer and nearer to us.82 The King did not identify the enemies he spoke of but it seemed clear he was referring to communist infiltration of ideas and funds and to the incessant political protests. The general Thai public shared this weariness and feared the increasingly anti-Thai tradition orientation This speech must certainly have encouraged of the protests. the rightists to step up their activities against the leftists - even though the King himself condemned violence in all forms. The near obliteration of the leftist Socialist Party of Thailand and the liberal New Force Party in the April 1976 elections confirmed th e ~epth of anticommunist and Indeed, it is antileftist feeling among the Thai people . possible that these defeats and the murders of peoples like Boonsanong caused the leftists and their communist supporters to work even harder against the emerging democratic process . The CPT has long opposed open parli amen tary politics in Thailand simply because it recognized that such a p olitical process offered an alternative route t o political participation for people who might otherwise be tempted or

82

Bangkok Post , "King Warns: 1975 .

Thailand Now the Target ," 15 December

82 83 persuaded to become members of the party. The Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT) declared in January 1 975, for example , that Thailand could never solve its problems through peaceful , parliamentary methods. "Seizing state power with weapons" was the only alternative . 84 In any event , communist success in Indochina and increasingly intense communist guerrilla attacks in Thailand certainly undermined the already weak military tolerance for the "chaos " inherent in the emerging political process. The evidence of further communist penetration of the Thammasat campu s activities and the hanging in effigy of the Crown Prince provided the best opportunity for the Supreme Command led coup. The communists , with considerable help from the activities of rightist groups and Thai paranoia , had successfully turned the contradictions inherent in any democratic political process to their at least temporary advant age. The U. S. approach to its relations with Thailand may also have contributed , indirectly, to the collapse of democracy in Thailand . The u.s. Government never developed an empathy for what was happening and for how certain American actions or lack thereof could affect the prospects of the emerging democratic political process. Instead , Americans remained skeptical. They doubted that the Thais could ever succeed; anyway , a coup was always a threat at any moment . Attempts by the U.S . Embassy i n Bangkok from as early as January 1974 and at least up until March 1975 to explain the fundamental changes in the political process and how the U. S. posture and approach to relations with Thailand had to change, appeared to have no impact on Washington , D.C. which somehow never ceased operating on the assumption that a few key Thai military leaders behind the scenes were in control and no heed had to be paid to what protesters in the streets were saying. As things turned out , these fears became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Nevertheless , from October 1973 to October 1976 there was no other country in Asia, except Japan , that could claim that i t was as engaged in as active , comprehensive

83

Robert F. Zinunerman, " Insurgency in Thailand," op . cit ., pp. 33-34 .

84

FBIS, 27 January 1975 , quoting the VOPT on 24 January .

83

an effort towards development in freedom and human rights as was Thailand. The slogan that Thai students chose for their October 1973 uprising against the military dictatorship was "of the people, by the people, for the people." And yet, Ameri ca as a nation never even came close to the deeds implied in the words of Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act: It is the policy of the United States, in accordance with its i t, t c rnational obligations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the Constitutional heritage and tradit ion of the United States to pr omote an d e ncourage the increased re spect for human rights an d fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. To this end a principle goal of the foreign policy o f the United States is to promote increased observance of internally recognized human rights by all nations [emphasis added]. Open moral, economic and political support for Thailand could have contributed to the achievement of this goal in Instead, the u.s. continued over the three years Thailand. to operate on decisions made prior to the October uprising and to cut its economic and military assistance programmes almost willy-nilly, in total disregard of any possible new opportunities that might have provided viable, useful projects in the new situations. No serious official effort was ever made to cease the unilateral cutting and reshaping of the u.s. assistance programme, pause, think about new possibilities and inform the Thais that the u.s. would be open t o new approaches in devel opment assistance programmes when they had de ci ded on their new interests and priorities, and how American assistance might help. The u.s. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission to Thailand, for example, could never be accused of substituting resources for thought during this period; neither could it be -commended for its thought. The contrasts could not, however, have been more glaring. There were resources when the U.S. needed bases ~d Thai support for its effort in Vietnam. There were resources for the Thai police and army generals to use for prebendary purposes ~n the pre-October 1973 bureaucratic polity. When, however, there was an opportunity to help a government for Thailand "of t h e people, by the people and for the people"

84

or at least better prospects for this than ever before , there were fewer and fewer resources , less interest and empathy to help make up for America's lack of perspective and understanding in the past. Eventually, the U.S. removed its military forces as the most vocal Thai leftists desired but not graceful ly , and it was n ever willing to compromise on relatively minor judicial issues to keep some facilities that even the majority of the Thai people as well as the Thai military wanted -to keep , but under conditions that would enable the government to demonstrate that it was not an American " l ackey". The Thai Military watched help l essly as their last hope for some viable security link with the u.s . dissolved in the air. They blamed the students for their protests and Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj for pressurizing the Americans but they cou l d not themselves understand the incredible American insensitivity to Thai internal political needs in the negotiations over the Ramasun Inte l ligence facility to Northeast Thailand and the Utapao naval air base.. No Thai Government or mi l itary leader , however~ could defend a continued u.s . presence before their own people without clear proof of Thai sovereignty over their .own bases or foreign military forces stationed there. A. C. Culbeaux was absol utely correct in his observation that American foreign affairs authorities failed to foresee that to allow the matter of legal status of American intelligence personnel to enter the arena of Thai electoral politics was to furnish anti-American elements with a symbolic issue: a judicial gap • .. American diplomats should have realized that this judicial issue was only a symbol of Thai nationalism and e l ectoral unease.85 Thus , the American failure to creatively respond to these needs and instead " force" the Thai to ask u. s. forces to leave after long negotiations that also provided grist for protesters in the streets, contributed to the failure of democracy in Thailand - in direct proportion to the degree to which the disappearance of these links

85

A. C. Culbeaux , "Thailand:

The Probable Discontinuity," Foreign

Affairs JournaL, October 1976, p. 22.

85

for the Thai military (who had watched in utter disbelief the victory of the communist s in Indochina ) increased their anxiety and anger over the leftist political trends in their country. These lefti s t trends and American lack of perspectiv e and understan ding of the emerging Thai political process and the consequen t pressures on Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj eventuall y combined to force him to press for a complete U.S . military withdrawa i. This decision was a "politica lly fatal mistake" for Kukrit. The Bangkok Po st editorial ized the day after Kukrit's defeat in the April 1976 election: His constitue nts deserted him just as they felt he had deserted them. They were mainly the conservat ives, the merchants , the industria lists, those who believe in law and order, who feel strongly over threats to national security, who are concerned over the deteriora ting investmen t climate, who are fed up with t he demonstra tions by minority activist groups, who are disturbed over the acts of violence and who are fearful of Communist and leftist activitie s. They also included the military who were all ready at one time to give M.R. Kukrit full support.8 6 American officials .never understoo d that these bases and a meaningfu l level of continued military assistanc e, however, might well have increased the Thai military ' s level for the instabili ties of democracy . Certainly , the u.s. would have been in a far better position to encourage Thai military leaders not to move against a constitut ionally and fully elected governmen t . The State Departmen t and the Departmen t of Defence failures notwithst anding , the U.S . Congress was no paragon of virtue or imaginati on either. Congressm an Donald Fraser's Human Rights Committee hearings provided ample opportuni ty for U.S. politician s to berate the Administr atio n for its support to "dictators hips" in South Korea , the Philippin es , S~uth Vietnam and elsewhere . No member of the U.S. Congress, Senator or Represen tative, however, ever stood up to draw attention or praise to what the Thais

86 The Bangkok Post , 5 April 1976 .

86

were trying to do -build a government of the people, by the people and for the people - and to offer considerable u.s. moral , political and economic support to them. One of the great tragedies in this indifference is that the u.s . missed an excellent opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to and .intrinsic interest in a world order conducive to its own political and economic system . America was blind to .the possibility that it could still have a creative political relationship with Thailand that did not necessarily have to rest on access to military bases but rather on .an imaginative assistance programme and continuing dialogue (particularly between the U.S. Congress and the Thai Parliament) designed to help the Thais continue their effort to develop a viable, representative system of government. In sum, this narrow vision, buttressed by a desire to get out of mainland Southeast Asia entirely after the Vietnam deb&ble, prevented the U.S. from ever sincerely trying to find out if there was anything it could do, on Thai terms, to help and demonstrate that America was their ally for their purposes in a creative and constructive fashion, in keeping, one might conclude, with the American democratic heritage.

87

VI:

WHERE ARE THE THAI AS THE DUST SETTLES?

Overview The group of military men - formerly the National Administrative Reform Council (NARC), later an Advisory Council to the Prime Minister (PMAC) - that stood behind a civilian led .government in Thailand until 20 October 1977 when they decided to remove Prime Minister Thanin and take direct power once again, were, and possibly still are, in a marriage of convenience. After the 20 October ~977 "semicoup" these same military officers organized themselves into the Revolutionary Party and named retired Admiral Sangad Chaloryo their party leader with General Kriangsak Chamanand as Secretary General of the party. On 16 November 1977 the Revolutionary Party underwent yet another transformation and became the National Policy Council with authority to set state policy and recommend the dismissal of the Prime Minister.E7 At the same time General Kri angsak Chamanand became Prime Minister. He retained his position as Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces while also assuming the portfolio of Minister of the Interior. General Kriangsak thus comes forward officially as the new man-on-a-white-horse for the Thais. He had long been considered the key organizer within the Supreme Command. Group that led the October 1976 coup and the October 1977 "readjustment". The Thai press and most academics have openly welcomed this latest change. The Nation, a liberal newspaper, described Kriangsak as "liberal and pragmatic" and the Daily News claimed that "the country would be led by an intelligent soldier."88 Many Thai academics believe that the Supreme Command group with Kriangsak as a key organizer acted in Ogtober 1976 because there was another coup in the offing,B9

87

Indonesian Observer (AFP), 16 November 1977.

88

Indonesian Observer (Reuter), 14 November 1977.

89

Based on conversations (28 December 1976-4 January 1977) with Thai friends of long acquaintance who mus~ remain unnamed at this time.

88

supposedly led by the leaders of the Thai Nation Party, Major General .Pramarn Adireksan and Chatichai Choonavan. In addition to their fears of communist infiltration and general disgust with the "chaos" of democracy, another primary motivation for these promoters might have been to avoid losing their jobs. General Vitoon Yasawat , the popular former Commander of Thai forces in Laos and reportedly a supporter of the Village Scouts . (actually founded by the Royal Family) who began to appear in force in and outside of Bangkok on 5 and 6 October, was believed to be a potential leader of yet another coup group. Vitoon left Thailand after the coup and has served in a form of "exile" as advisor to Thai students in Japan. (He returned in early March 1977, however , for a month's home leave. His current assignment is unknown to this writer . ) Further supporting the appearance that the Supreme Command Group under General Kriangsak acted in October 1976 without extensive preparation for action beyong the mere seizure of power is the manner in which this group acted, immediately after taking power. In addition to Vitoon ' s exile, the original eighteen-man National Reform Council was expanded to twenty- four - the six newcomers being Royal Thai Army troop commanders. Admiral Sangad Chaloryo, moreover, gave a bri~fing to government officials on the morning of .7 .October in which he said that he expected the military would be in power only three months an~ a new Premier would be appointed in several days , or a w~ek ' s time. Yet , barely three hours later the coup group announced the .appointment of Thanin Kraivichien as Prime Minister . These actions suggest confusion among the coup leaders - who, in addition, had no long range plan for governing the country. Certainly, a clearer delineation of who really did what must await the retirement or replacement of the current leadership . This October .1976 coup _group, moreover, was divided into at least three aifferent groups: Kriangsak ' s (he is clearly now the real power and organizer) ; Air Chief Marshal Kamol Detjatunga's and Admiral Sangad Chaloryo's (both professional soldiers who reportedly did not want to play politics but did want to protect their King and their nation); and the major RTA Commanders' , including particularly their Deputy Army Commander General Yos Thephasdin and Major General Tep . Kranlert, the head of the Army Field Forces at that time.

89

By October 1977 these groups had shifted into two major groups: one headed by General Kriangsak and Army Commander-in-Chie f Serm Na Nakorn and the other headed by Admiral S angad backed by Gene ral Yos TheT;)h :1sdln who is a strong supporter of the cl i que group headed by Former Field Marshal Prapass Charusathi en and Thanom Kittikachorn until October 1973.90 The depth and durability of the support of these RTA Commanders remain uncertain f or any group even after the October 1977 coup though perhaps far less than was true in the first year after the 1976 coup. Tep, for example, had reportedly aligned himself with a group of field grade officers now classified as Young Turks. These Young Turks helped force their superiors to make the decision to remove General Kriangsak backed the Young Turks' ultimatum Thanin. to Thanin to remove seven. o f hi s Cabinet ministers (which Thanin refused to do and was then removed). This move in turn led t o a split between Kriangsak and Admiral S angad who was backed by General Yos Thephasdin to become Prime Minister until the younger officers finally forced the decision in form of General Kriangsak.91 In any event, the RTA Commanders' co-operation is useful because it is t he best way to watch the Supreme Command Group and keep their opti o ns open for the future when troops may be needed - perhaps for their own coup. Not all of these latter, however, like Kriangsak, are necessarily ag ainst democracy - at some future date "when the people are ready." Kriangsak for his part has already decided in removing Thanin that the Thais must return to an open, democratically oriented political process as soon as possible in 1978 or early 1979. Prime Minister Thanin Kraivichien who headed the government for one year was a civilian but viewed as a trusted, hard line anticommunist who was also honest. The Military Advisory Council decided to let him tackle many of the development and administration problems on his own, but finally grew weary of Thanin's excessive conservatism and obsessive anticommun ism that resulted in neglect of other fundamental development programmes. Taken

90

Asia 19'18 Ysarbook; Far Eastsm Eoonomio Het>iew . ''Thailan~ '

91

Ibid.

pp. 321-327.

90

together , however, the entire October 1976 coup group was clearly without a single leader or a clear sense of purpose that was common to all and ,representative of whatever it is the Thai people may want. It remains to be seen whether this situation is improved after .the October 1977 coup. When he refused to accept changes .proposed by his military leaders in his Cabinet, which would hopefully result in more effective action on economic .and social problems , Thanin was simply removed . . This change was even welcomed by leading Thai businessmen,. many from the "Group 99" that formed after the October 1973 upr isin g. These had become incr easingly dissatisfied with Thanin ' s leadership which had done little to inspire foreign investment and a more secure busin ess atmosphere.92 The situation from October 1976 to October 1 977 was depressing. Parties were banned. The universities were forbidden to teach democracy and political theory . The p r ess was silenced - censored and less free than under Thanom and Prapass prior to October 1973. There could be no organization . No labour strikes. No elections . Leftist books .were burned . There were mass and continuing selective arrests under NARC Decree 22 which permitted the po l ice to arrest and detain people without trial as "persons dangerous to society ." The government claimed that only sixty- four of those held under Decree 22 were detained on political grounds; most are criminals, prostitutes , or persons charged with corruption . The Thanin Government , nevertheless , had gone out of its way to assure Thai and foreigners alike that we don ' t have political prisoners as such, we don't have any Aquinos [former Philippine Senator recently sentenced to death for treason in Manila] in our jails.93 It is true that no former MPs (including me~ers of the Socialist Party of Thailand) were arrested. General 92

Newsweek, "Holding 1t Together," 11 July 1977.

These reports are supported by the author's own private conversations with l eading

Thai academics in Bangkok in June 1977. 93

Bangkok Post, "Samak:

No Aquinos in Thailand," 9 Novembe r 1976.

91

Kriangsak assured these same MPs that "we are only looking for hard-core communists against whom evidence has been gathered over the years." 9 4 Approximatel y 3,000 students were arrested during The government, and right after the Tharnrnasat fighting. however, finally released without further investigatio n or charges all but seventy-four activists and students. It completed its investigatio n of these in late August 1977. Of these seventy-four , eighteen s t udent leaders and activists, including the Secretary General of the now defunct NSCT, Sutharn Saengprathum , were charged with various crimes such as les e majeste , communism , illegal possession of fire arms, ri o ting, rebelling against the Kingdom and killing government officials .9 5 These activists are under trial in a military court as this paper goes to press. The trial could become another "just cause" creating further political unrest in Thailand. Sutharn has charged in his defence that the military leaders have no authority to try him and his fellow activists because they were arrested while the 1974 Constitution was still in effect - and that Constitution provided for free speech and free assembly the rights Sutharn claims he was exercising at Tharnrnasat on S-6 October 1976.96 Sutham may have a legal point. Ironically, however, he and many of his colleagues were also among those activists who so often criticized and condemned as "undemocrati c" or "reactionary " that same 1974 Constitution while it was in effect. The October 1977 change of government, it should be noted, may also eventually affect the nature and scope of any judgements against these students. An amnesty for students involved in the S-6 October 1976 activities at Tharnrnasat is possible and probably even desirable as one of several steps towards a freer political process with public s upport and participatio n. Such an amnesty has reportedly already been offered to the hundreds of Thai students who fled to the jungles and Laos and Kampuchea

94

Ibid.

95

Indonesian Obs erver (AFP), "Thai Oct . 6 Investigation Completed;

96

Indonesi an Observer (AFP), 6 September 1977.

18 Charged," 25 August 1977 .

92 after the October 1976 coup. 97 In the meantime, the Revolutionary Party before it became the National Policy Council, had already amended the Military Court Act to permit defendants not under court martial to have lawyers.98 The eighteen activists thus now have their own lawyers and the government has .also opened the trial to the public and is providing tents with facilities "to accommodate several thousands" outside the court room in Nonthaburi Province about twenty kilometres north of Bangkok.99 The government clearly intends to see that justice is done and clearly seen to be done in this case. At this writing it appears probable that even .if .the activists are found guilty of some charges their sentences will be light or suspended altogether. Prime Minister Kriangsak himself indicated in January 1978 that any amnesty could only come after the court hands down .its decision.lOO Such an act would go a long way towards creating a co-operative bond between the Kriangsak Government and the very people who have the most to gain in a successful transition to a democratic political process in Thailand: the younger generation now eager for some power themselves. The message remained clear enough under Thanin, however, that those who spoke up and sounded like "leftists" ran the risk of arrest. This restriction was particularly discouraging because Thailand's best hope in its struggle against communist insurgency and for social and economic development may still be a democratic political process that can mobilize all of its people's talents - not a process that .drives even the creative centre to looking for ways to leave the country or simply withdraw into inactive, mute silence. In the end, however, and to their credit, less conservative elements in the Military Advisory Council, led by General Kriangsak, finally decided that Thailand could .not afford the harsh and single-minded approaches of the Thanin Government any more than they could

97

Newsweek, "Thailand :

98

Bangkok Post, "Defence Lawyers for October 6 Case," 17 November

99

Indonesian Obsel'Vel' (AFP), 16 November 1977.

lOO

A New Tone," 28 November 1977.

1977.

I ndonesian Obsel'Vel', "Controversial Trial Begins in Bangkok," 14 January 1978.

9)

the chaotic politic al process of democra cy during the 1973-76 period. At this writing (Februar y 1978) the Thai military leaders appear to be serious ly continui ng their eff o rt t o find a way hack to a more effectiv e democra tic form o f governm ent. The Commun ist Threat The country and Bangkok remain particu larly ri pe for communi st inspired terroris m. Since the Octo ber 1976 coup the CPT has had no nongove rnmenta l competi tion - ide o l ogical , politic al or organiz ational - precise ly the situati on the Viet Cong and the Hanoi Politbur o faced in South Vietnam . The CPT probably welcome d the coming military confron tati o n because it was well aware of the politica l-psych ologica l benefit s that can accrue to the commun ists. The leftists , prior to 6 October 1976 at least, h ad For three year s alterna tives to communi st o rganiza tions. they further honed their politic al instinc ts. These former activis ts remain suscept ible to a communi st united front appeal not only because they believe that democ ra ti c process es are too easily corrupte d by the rightist s but a ls o because they are looking for revenge . Kaisaeng Suksai, former MP (SPT) soon after the coup announc ed over the VOPT that he and three o ther members of the SPT had joined t h e CPT. Perhaps most ominous of all in this regard was the reappear ance o f Seks an Prasertk ul (who played the key role on the speaker 's platform s surround ed by 400, 000 demonstrators at the height of the October 1973 uprising ) in a new appeal with the CPT that calls f o r •armed struggle based in the rural areas as the way to achieve a genuine ly indepen dent, democra tic and civilize d s o ciety " in Thailand .l 0 l Seksan and Thirayud Bunmi, another leading activ1s t in 1973, have apparen tly signed a long declara ti on that compare s the bloody events of 6 October 1976 to similar occurren ces in South Korea, Chile and Indones ia (1965-66 ) . The declara tion blamed the America n CIA, called the Thanin Governm ent a fascist military junta and then defined the

101

Norman Peaaam, Far East.l m EcCMOifria Review, 19 Novellber 1976, p . 16 .

94

transcendant cause that sets the stage for what could become a new and active front for communist political warfare in Southeast Asia: The youth and students of Thailand have always fought for independence , democracy, and the basic needs of the poorest in society, in a peaceful way , within the letter of the law and the Constitution .• . our friends were brutal ly threatened, killed and arrested one by one, we have always been patient . . . but our .. . peaceful struggle has only been met with bombs and bullets. We have raised our bare hands to cal l for justice , but we have been covered with blood • .•• It is now the end of the peaceful struggle with bare hands against armed political gangsters. It is now the end of the legitimate struggle within the laws fixed by a reactionary ruling class which p l aces itse l f outside those laws • . • •• Independence and democracy for our people can never be obtained by reforms within an unjust and corrupt -society •. . • We , the people , have no other choice but to unit e forces • •. and establish a new popular and revolutionary state. We must fight the enemy with arms . . . and· pursue this strategy in the country- side and surround the cities in order to finally take them.l02 This l ast line is Maoist and consisten t with the CPT ' s approach since the mid- 1960s. It may indicate that, for the present, the CPT has succeeded in bringing many of the key former student activists under its influence. Nevertheless, new opportunities also still exist for the Vietnamese and Pathet Lao (PL) . Their theme is predictabl e : " These coups are a CIA plot to prepare the ground to return to Southeast Asia. We must renew our antiimperialist, antifascist struggle." It is difficul t , indeed, to beli eve that the PL and Vietnamese will pass u p such opportunities for continuing "political war" and not try to use as many Thai students as they can for this purpose. 102

Ibid. (Peagam quoting FBIS ).

95

It is especiall y difficult to believe (the initial intention s of the new Kriangsak Governmen t to promote friendly relations with the communist states of Indochina notwithst anding)lOJ that the Th ai communist s and the i r Vietnames e and Pathet Lao supporter s are going to readily accept the developme nt and success of a truly democrati c political process in Thailand. The Vietnames e and Laotian communist s have more to fear in political- psycholo gical terms from a successfu l and prosperou s democrati c Thailand than they do a military domina . . .: i, strugglin g "rightist " governmen t. Whatever may be the necessary initial efforts at some form of rap pr oc h e men t or detente, including official diplomati c relations , between Thailand and its communist neighbou rs,l04 efforts to subvert and sabotage the new attempt to develop democracy in Thailand will continue and perhaps even be accelerat ed. Radio Hanoi has continued t o broadcast support for Thai insurgent s and even after the r ap proc h ement between Kampuchea and Thailand in early February 19 7 8 Thai autho rities adrni tted that "Red Thais" in Kampuchea were continuin g their terrorist activitie s in four border provinces .lOS The communist s might even permit open evidence of such subversio n in the hope that it will provoke yet another rightist counterac tion on the order of the October 1976 coup. The Kriangsak .Governme nt and the Thai people are in for a time of testing. This next year will be, as Kriangsak himself has said, "the most difficult in forty years of democrati c [sic . ] experienc e in this country." l06 An important unknown at this time is whether there

is or will be competiti on between the Maoist oriented CPT and the Vietnames e and Pathet Lao which could result in

103 Bangkok Post and I ndonesian Obs ei"Ver , "Turning Enemies into Friends ," 17 November 1977. 104 KOMPAS, "Thailand Reestabliah ea Relations with Vie tnam, " 5 Decemer 1977. 105 I~sian ObseMJe r (AFP) , "Thai land Has More Luck Than Vietnam," 3 February 1978 . 106 Indonesian ObseMJer (Reuter) ·, 14 November 1977.

1'Thai

New Premier Seeks Support,"

96

people like Seksan trying to lead a New People ' s Army in competition withthe CPT. Indeed, it is still even possible that these l eftists will try to mount a new movement entirely of their own making. Equal l y unknown are the attitude and intentions of the People ' s Republic of China (PRC) - and whether or not the Vietnamese will want to risk confrontation or competition with the PRC for control of the communist movement in Thai l and. Thailand , thus , as a resul t of the 1976 coup which created unprecedented opportunity for the communists, threatened to and could still become a test case for the true intentions of external communist powers in Southeast Asia . Meanwhi l e , communist insurgent attacks on pol ice outposts and assassinations of government officials intensified after 6 October 1976 and continued throughout 1977. In addition, there have been hundreds of clashes with Pathet Lao and Khmer Rouge forces along Thai frontiers. The worst attack on Thailand by Khmer Rouge forces since the fall of Phnom Penh in 1975 occurred on 28 January 1977 . Khmer Rouge troops estimated that from 200-500 attacked three hamlets in Aranyaprathet District with machine guns and automatic weapons and l eft 30 villagers dead (8 men , 11 women and 1 1 children) with most of the women casualties having their throats slit . l07 A subsequent report said the cause of the attack was the failure of a Thai middleman to deliver supplies , including cattle , that the Khmer Rouge had paid for several weeks earlier.l08 (Subsequently , the Thanin Government did arrest several local government officials on charges of corruption . ) The Kampuchean Government finally admitted the attack on the three hamlets but stated that all three were in Kampuchean territory and that the Khmer troops were merely a r ranging Kampuchea ' s internal affairs . l09 Since January 1977 the Kampucheans have continued their attacks on border villages in the Aranyaprathet region and killed scores of Thai soldiers and vi llagers. Leaflets predicting further attacks result ed in over 1,000 villagers fleeing these villages during the first week of

107

Indonesian ObsePVeP (UPI) , 1 February 1977.

108

Indonesian ObsePVeP (Antara-AFP) , 3 February 1977.

109

Indonesian ObsePVeP (Antara-AFP), 3 March 1977.

97

August 1977. The Thais have protested against these attacks, engaged in brief fire flights but had no effect These attacks have apparentl y continued in preventin g them. after the Thai-Karnp uchean rapproahe ment of February 1978.110 Thanin threatene d stronger action but it is difficult to see what the RTA could do, given the magnitude of its efforts against the communist s on the Thai-Mala ysian borders in South Thailand, and the limited combat experienc e of the Thai armed forces in general. The future thus depends mo re on Karnpuche a's intention s than Thailand' s hopes.lll Potential ly more serious than these attacks over the long term are the reports based on Khmer Rouge defectors that Thai communist insurgent s calling themselve s Siam Rouge (Red Siame se) recruited from Surin and Buriram provinces ar~ training in Karnpuchea in Sarnrong, Bovieng, Successfu l actions by these An lung Veng and Chao Khasan. insurgent s thus far are minimal. A security chief in Surin Province, however, said that hundreds of high school students had joined the training camps after the 6 October 1976 coup.ll2 For its part, Radio Hanoi has often demanded that the Thai Governmen t stop arresting and harassing Vietnames e refugees in Northeast Thailand, and charged that the "Bangkok Militaris t Junta i s a tool of the U.S." In August, the Vietname se in a major commentar y in Nhan Dan praised the successfu l spre ad o f the commun i st g uerrilla activitie s not only in South Thailand but also in North and Nhan Dan claimed that the liberatio n Northeast Thailand. were expanding and consolida ting areas forces in all these Vietnames e ridiculed the joint The their areas of control. Thai-Mala ysian military effort in South Thailand, accused Thailand of continuin g hostile acts against Laos, Karnpuchea and Vietnam in co-operat ion with the u.s., criticize d Thai

llO I ndone s i an Observe r (AFPO, 16 February 19 78. Khmer soldie rs on 9 and 10 February attacked in Ubon Ratchatani Province and abduct ed 300 Thai villagers. Prime M~nister Kriangsak has tried to low key the Th ai respons e at this time by contendi ng that there is confusion ove r whether these attacks are supported by the Khmer Government or are even the .work of Thai communist rebels operating out of Thailand. "Doe& Cad>odia Want War?" 19 August 1977.

111

Asill2Jeek,

112

Indon~sian Obs~rve~

(Antara-AFP ), 21 January 1977.

98

acceptance of u.s. military and economic assistance and, finally, again charged that the Americans were encouraging ASEAN to become a military pact to replace the recently disbanded SEATO. This entire theme can be viewed as a rationale for active Vietnamese support for the communist cause in Thailand and could in time prove to be the initiation of increased psychological political and military pressure on the Thais. Meanwhile, in South Thailand, Thai-Malaysian co-operation began in earnest in January 1977 when Malaysian and Thai troops with air and artillery support attempted to destroy communist sanctuaries. Several camps were destroyed and hundreds of guerrillas reported killed or wounded but few bodies were ,. actually found. Direct contact with guerrillas was minimal. 11 w Again, beginning in July 1977, Thailand and Malaysia launched major assaults into the communist controlled Betong salient on the Thai-Malaysian border. This operation code-named "Sacred Ray" continued for over a month. The Thai and Malaysian armies shelled and bombed the jungle, set up road blocks and tried to isolate the insurgents.ll4 Direct, sustained contact with guerrillas was rare, however, and while the disruption caused to the CPT and Malaysians over the short term is indeed serious, history has demonstrated that the communists somehow always come back to their old haunts. Thai and Malaysian authorities are determined to continue their co-operation, nevertheless, and only time will tell whether the currently predominant military approach will be enough to destroy communist hopes and influence in the area. Though Bangkok is ripe for urban insurgency, terrorist acts are not necessarily imminent, particularly since the new Kriangsak Government has lifted the seige mentality that dominated the Thai Government. The communists, moreover, have needed some time to undertake a careful screening and training programme and to try to organize and turn around the students who have rushed to their camps. The governor of Nakhon Phanon province on the Mekong River border with Laos believed this process would take at least five to six months before "those students who have the nerve to remain in the jungle will be trained combat troops and that's when we will have to worry."ll5

Indonesi an Observer (Antara-AFP) , 31 January 1977. 114 The Economist, "Into the Ax-head," 9 July 1977, p. 80.

113 115

Lewis M. Simons, "Thai Insurgents Stepping up Activity Since Military

99

The psychological political initiative, thus, certainly appeared to favour the communists during the tenure of the Thanin Government. Whether t h e October 1977 "coup " wi 11 change this situation remains to be seen and will certainly depend on how actively the Revolutionary Party leaders pursue their stated intention to re store democ racy to Thailand and to combat insurgency by political means and rural development. Even so, s uccess for the communists may still be n o more guaranteed than it was or is for democracy - particularly if the CPT pursues the tradit ional Maoist, totally rural insurgency approach of the past. The obstacles for the communists remain formidable: none o f the students or activists are as p opular with the mas s of Th a i people, or as c apable as was Ho Chi-minh or Mao Tse-tung with the possible p o ten tia l exception of Seksan Prasertkul, who was the most perceptive and self-disciplined political analyst of all Moreover, many o f these t he young activists. activists are still ego ists . They remain Thai i ndividualists and are unlikely to accept e asily the discipline an d tight control th at h as been the hall-mark of Communist movements elsewhere in Asia . .•• His Majesty the King though somewhat c ompromised in el1te circles remains t he p rimary nationalist symbol for Thailand: the Communists have no comparable figure. The i nsurgency is clearly identified as under s trong Vietnamese and Chi nese influences. The s tudents may well find themselves tagged by the Thai people as traitor s to foreign powers. Coup . " . ntemationa L HeraLd Tribune, 8 November 1976; and Indonesi an Obseroe1· (AFP), "Thai Leftists Refugees be ing used by Indochinese to Unde rmi ne Th ailand," 25 August 1977. Thai authorities r epo r t ed on 24 August 1977 that Thai st udent s who fle d t he country on 6 October 1976 were n ow teaching the Thai language to Vietnamese officers in Xeno , a town in Savanakhet Province in Laos. Another 100 Th ai students have completed training in the Kampuche an-based "School o f October 6 . " Finally, an "Independence Bri gade " co~riaing some 50 Vietnamese, lOO Pathet Lao and 300 Thai is rep o r tedly working on the Lao-Thai border near Ubon Ratchathani Provin ce to maintain liais on and support Thai communists.

lOO

.. . Thailand has no history of village-based and controlled political organizations and processes - or interest therein. The Thais have never been noted for their capacity for or interest in developing unbreakable ties to a given organization, political or otherwise. The strong sense of individualism which permits the Thai to enter and sustain relationships primarily on a quid- pro-quo basis and to break these ties whenever he feels such action is in his best personal self interest is not conducive to the tight communist organizational style that worked so well in Indochina . .•. Thai Buddhism, which has long taught that the best way to achieve nirvana is through a personal quest for wisdom free from any entanglement with society, has not been an active force positively encouraging Thais to engage in social political organizations or fanatically follow a particular ideology in order to change society. On the contrary, the best Thai Buddhis~ has been one who withdraws from society to seek wisdom through personal contemplation in a monastery. (Though this particular perspective has begun to change among younger, urban oriented Thai Buddhist monks.) .•. Finally, the "phuunoj perspective" wherein the average Thai villager has considered politics and government beyond his ken or responsibility has worked, and does work against, the development of local political organization. Thai villagers have generally felt that they were "little people" who received government assistance on grace that it was improper to do more than prepare and deliver an occasional petition outlining their needs, which the government could then act on or not as it saw fit with no further protest from the villagers. Certainly violent protest via insurgency is still very much abhorred by the majority of the Thai people.ll6 116

See Robert F. Zimmerman, "Insurgency in Thailand," op.cit., pp. 30-35, for a more detailed discussion of these aspects of Thai political culture that have inhibited the development of communist insurgency in the past.

101

A Return to the Pre-Octob er 1973 Political Process? A significa nt proportio n of the superstru cture of the pre-Octob er 1973 Thai polity appears to have restored itself. Certainly most of the key power figures in the National Policy Council - the men who led the October 1976 coup and the October 1977 "readjustm ent" - under General Kriangsak are from the Thanom-P rapass clique that governed Thailand from Marshal Sarit Thanarat' s death in 1963 to October 1973. Former Field Marshal Prapass himself returned to Thailand in January 1977 and was followed by "The his son-in-law Narong Kittikach orn in July 1977. returned. all have Terrible Trio", as Sumalee called them, While Prapass has ruled out an active role in politics for now,ll7 it is difficult to believe that he will not play some role, at least as "resource mobilizer " behind the scenes. Prapass, for example, could try to call in a great many political debts and will probably be able to resurrect most of his business- banking connectio ns with the Sino-Thai business community (see Diagram 3) . If he is successfu l in this effort Prapass could, in effect, restore to himself a position in the cliquebusiness financial power structure similar to that Krit Siwara occupied after the October 1973 uprising and which Krit essential ly had taken over from Prapass when the latter was forced into exile in Taiwan in 1973. Prapass' f i nancial power base would certainly be stronger than that o f any other single political leader - including General Kriangsak or Genera.l Yos Thephasdi n (who is close to Prapass and who remains a potential ly serious rival of Kriangsak ) .ll8 At a minimum, there is little reason to doubt that Prapass' former clique members will at least try•to use him and his resources (financia l-politica lclique relationsh ips) in their struggles with rival clique groups. Whi le the personali ty superstru cture of the pre-Octob er 1973 p o lity exists, however, the objective and subjectiv e

117

The Nation Review , "Prapaaa Sp8ak& Out," 15 January 1977.

118

Norman Peagam, "Prapass Comes Back to the Fold," Far Eastem Eaonomia Revi ew, 21 January 1977, p. 13; and "Political Stability at Stake," 11 February 1977, pp. 8-9 .

102

conditions on which both the personality and political structure survived for so long no longer obtain. Thai radical students lost a battle on 6 October 1976. They and the more moderate students and· young people have not necessarily lost a war. Over 62 ~ of Thailand's population is under the age of 25. In addition to these youth and other young adults in the 25-35 year-old range, a large number _of the Thai elite are no longer representative of the traditional Thai political culture wherein the mass of people just accepted without question the interclique group struggles of the political leaders who paid no attention .to the development needs of the country or to individuals or groups outside of their own encapsulated political process. The October 1973-0ctober 1976 experiment with democracy, moreover, accelerated the political consciousness of the people. It provided ample oppo.r tuni ty to begin developing techniques .of political organization. New interest groups were created. More than ever before, people began to discuss openly alternative political ideas and processes for dealing with population problems, land problems, unemployment, demands for social services, and inadequacy of the educational process and system, corruption, bureaucratic inertia and unresponsiveness and even how to handle communist insurgency. The pre-October 1973 bureaucratic polity collapsed because it was unable to inspire and mobilize significant elements of the Thai population particularly in the academic world - to work with the government to solve or at least cope with these problems. It was unable to permit and encourage the development of sources and centres of power and authority in the provinces to .deal with specific development problems. If the current military leaders, particularly the men who led the October 1976 coup and the October 1977 readjustment, were .to attempt to restore the s t at u s q u o a n t e, to go back to the old process whe~e personal and clique oriented interests take top priority, they would ultimately be no more successful than was the Thanom-Prapass Government in merely trying to hold onto power they already exercised. The reaction could be far more bloody, however, and radical than any previous political change in Thailand's history. Fortunately, General Kriangsak, who is now both Prime. Minister and Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, and many of his other colleagues, including Lt. Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol, who heads the ISOC and who has long

10 3

been an advocate of political democracy as the only effe ct i ve way to combat c o mmunist political war, appear t o reco gnize, as have others, t h at the pressure of unresolved social and econ omic problems has created a broad mood of pub l ic disaffection with established proced u res o f government and concomi ttant tendency t oward an uncritical popularity o f undefined, sweep i n g , radical s olu ti ons which can only benefit t he advocates of the extreme Left and Ri ght .ll9 Further confirming thi s apparent sensitivi ty t owards t h eir p olitical problems, Admiral S angad, in a nation-wi de addres s on 15 November 1977 announced that the new governmen t under General Kriangsak would counter the communist insurgen cy through political means and rural development suppo r ted as necessary by military operations.l 20 One elemen t o f that Right is now back in power - but it appears t o be less conservative than many o bservers had expected. The crucial question since 6 October 1977 has been whether the next coup or power shift would be further t o In answering the Right or a drastic swing t o the Left. this question it is necessary to examine several other conditions underlying the October 1976 coup, its adjustmen t in Oc t ober 1977 and the overt intentions of the promo ters that are, however, different from their predecess ors in several important respects. To begin with, the general population initially, at least, welcomed the restoration The mass of the Thai people had grown weary of of order. "disorder" and could be expected to accept the new political system at least until it became apparent that Thanin Kraivichien 's civilian government (and military backers ) c ould not solve t h e endemic problems of corruption, maladminist ration, unequal income distribution , unemploymen t and, eventually, show more pro gress in a return to greater democratic freedom, albeit with more order than that which existed prior to t he coup.

119

Justus M. van der Kroef, op.cit . , p. 94.

120

Indonesian Obser ver, "Thai Govarn•nt to Pro_,ta Friendly Ralati ona. " 17 November 1977 .

104

A second difference is that the military officers who staged the coups ' - though some are personalities from the old Thanom-Prapass era - currently appear to accept that they cannot solve Thailand's development problems without civilian technocrats . They initially supported Thanin's plan to return to democracy and broadly outlined the process they intended to follow over a twelve to sixteen year period, the first stage of which had barely begun when these same officers decided to remove Thanin. The Thanin Government, on 20 November 1976, established an appointed National Administrative Reform Assembly (NARA). The Assembly .. had .340 members, one-third of whom were military officers. The Assembly, however, was esseptially advisory. (See Diagram 3) All power remained wit~ ' the Prime Minister .and the .twenty-four- man military council (now, the National Policy Council with twenty-three members since one Police General voluntarily dropped out of the group) • There were no .political .party leaders from the previous Parliament in this new Assembly.l21 (This fact alone attested to the narrowness of the political base of the Thanin Government which was even more to the right than was the Thanom~Prapass Government overthrown by the students three years earlier.) In four years, elections supposedly were to be held for an assembly that would share power with an appointed Senate. Gradually, this Senate was to give way to an entirely elected legislature that would run the country.l22 No previous Thai military government ever attempted to provide such a broad scheme for development towards democracy. And yet, these same military leaders in October 1977 eventually decided with some pressure from "young turks" within the Thai Armed Forces . that even this process was too slow and removed the now too conservative Prime Minister when he resisted suggestions for a freer political process and more capable men in Cabinet posts. The result is a clear commitment by Kriangsak to try to establish a fully elected government and functi o ning democratic political process by 1978 or 1979.

121

"Assembly Formed in Thailand," KOMPAS , Jakarta, Indonesia, 22 November 1976.

122

"Democracy: A 16 Year Sentence," Far Eas t ern Economic Review, 22 October 1976, p. 30.

105

A third difference was the apparent free hand Thanin and his Cabinet were given to try to deal with economic and social development problems - including corruption. Theoretically, if, indeed, Thanin and his Cabinet had exercised their authority to address these problems with performance oriented commitment, they could have prevented the redevelopment of economic, social, and political frustrations that led to their own removal from power in October 1977. In .truth, however, there has simply been no precedent for such expectations in Thailand. Thai leaders have long been especially articulate at presenting development plans or issuing moral decrees.l43 There has always been considerable slippage between the word and deed. With the exception of increasingly effective suppression of narcotics trafficking and the arrest and punishment (imprisonment or execution by firing .squad) of several mid to lower level government bureaucrats involved in smuggling or narcotics and some armed communist suppression operations, this slippage continued. The Thai Government bureaucracy, perhaps because of the fragility of Thanin's power base, did not show much enthusiasm for implementing any government programmes. Most of Thanin's Cabinet Ministers were not especially outstanding and dynamic le aders. The civilians, moreover, had already had an unparalleled opportunity and freedom to act for three years; they failed . Thanin, in turn, proved no exception. Finally, the tight restrictions on the press, assembly, political education and the arrests under NARC Decree 22 were particularly ill-suited to the mobilization of creative, performance oriented technocrats and intellectuals . Thanin, in fact, was unable and unwilling to recruit any cabinet ministe.rs of the calibre of Bunchu Roj an as athien, Minister of Finance in Kukrit's Cabinet . Nor was Thanin himself a Kukrit Pramoj. Perhaps Kukrit's position during the tenure of the Thanin Government best summed up the role and attitude of the truly capable Thai who remained isolated and underutilized by that government. Kukrit returned to writing for his paper, S am Rath and initially titled his column, "From a Rice Field Afar." He spent his time playing ping-pong.l24 123 Norman Jacobs, Modemiaation Without D~veZopment: Asian Case Study) , (New York: Praeaer, 1971.) 124 IndOnesian Observer, 15 January 1977.

(Thailand as an

106

In addition, given the political restrictions in force under the thanin Government it was difficult, indeed, to believe that there could be steady and responsible progress towards democracy over the next twelve to sixteen years as promised. We have addressed the problem of the value anornie that quickly surfaced after the October 1973 uprising and helped facilitate the infiltration of communist literature and prescriptions for reordering society . How , if there was to be .no .teaching of political theory , including democracy , in Thai universities , was this value anomie ever to .be .overcome? It is also significant that no cabinet member of Thanin's Government incl uding Thanin himse l f appeared .on "the Kin g ' s .list" prepared for Coronation Day, 5 May, by the King •' Inclusion in this list is usually a great honour. Local speculation was t hat His Majesty may have been expressing some displeasure of his own regarding .the character o r narrow base of the Thanin Government . Finally , there was , and perhaps still is, another fundamenta l difference in the coup group - one that bodes ill for its own future . The twenty-four-man military advisory group that scrutinized Thanin and his Cabinet ahd which now governs Thail and directl y as the National Policy Council may not be , as noted earlier , a wholly united group. The marriage of convenience could still break down any time and continue a series of revolving door governments that will be no more effective than were those during Thailand's three - year e xperience with democracy . Manifestations of disun ity were evident by early February 1977 when serious cracks began appearing in the government ' s power base: Prapass' return certainly drew some support away from Thanin; the Thanin Government closed down right wing newspapers that had pub·lished stories about power conflicts in the "ruling" junta; Thanin ' s anti corruption drive met stiff resistance from the Thai Army; and , in January and February 1977 the Armoured Division Radio Station , managed by Col. Utharn Senitwong (a relative of the Queen) ~ launched radi o attacks against the Thanin ' s Government.l2::> Final ly, as indicated earlier, the "semicoup of October 1977 which removed Thanin was in part also the result of dissension within the armed forces ."

125

Peagam, op . cit., Far Eastern Economic Review , 11 Feb ruary 1977.

107

The most spectacul ar manifesta tion of the inherent weakness of the political process in Thailand during the year of Thanin's military backed rule, however, was the attempted coup on 27 March 1977 by General Chalard Hiransiri . General Chalard was executed without trial on 20 April 1977. Eighteen othe r eo-conspi rators were sentenced , in early May 1977, to prison terms rangin g from five to twenty years while two others, including the manager of the .Ousit Thani Hotel, were sentenced t o life in abstent i a : ele ven of these c onspirato rs were police and army officers .l26 It i s difficult , neverthel ess, to believe that Chalard and these other military officers and civi lians were t h e only "promoter s". This coup attempt, in any event, undo ubtedly increased the tension f or those who still held power and who were likely to be more c oncerned about the next attempt from whatever source than attending to efficient and creative administr ation of g o vernment services f o r the people. For the people, o n the other hand, the attempted coup contribute d to expectatio ns that there would be ano ther attempt after sufficien t reflection on the reas ons for the failure of Chalard's coup. The October 1977 semicoup notwithst anding, this possibili ty still exists today - from Young Tu rks to the Old Guard possibly led by General Yos Thephasdi n or some other member o f the Prapass clique group. The political process under Thanin had no legitimacy in the form of truly willing and creative psycholog ical and moral support from the people o r other political actors both within the current power structure or outside it . The argument o ften made in commenta ries on the 6 Octobe r 1976 coup that the Thai people wel comed a return to authorita rian rule is too simple. Even , if it is true that the Thai people might pre fer one- man authoritari an rule (provided there is indeed strength of pu rpose and will at the centre tempered with a sense of justice in the administr atio n of gove rnment relations with the people J , such is not yet t h e case in Thailand today - or perhaps at any time in the last forty years, though Marshal Sarit Thanarat probably came c l osest to providing such a leadersh1 p than any othe r ruler since the overthrow of the Monar chy in 19 32. 126

In December 1977, the the people who participate d to amnesty an Kriangsak G~ernmant granted that such an amnesty frustration e in this coup. There is considerabl now unde r activists was not extended i mmediately to the 18 student University. trial for the Oct ober 1976 disturbance s at Thammasat

I ndonesi an Observsr (AFP ), 11 May 1977.

108

Until, perhaps, General Kriangsak's emergence as a new man-on~a~white-horse .it has been difficult indeed , however, to .identify a potential leader, other than possibly the King himself, who could mobilize enough willing support from all sectors of the society to, in effect, legitimize the government leaders in the eyes of the people and -make ."unthinkable" another coup- as wel l as .mobilize creative support and participation from men like Kukrit Pramoj or Bunchu Rojanasathien. The sense of malaise and .disillusionment that was growing because there was no such single leader capable of taking the country in a defined direction was, and could still be an inherent weakness of the centre of political power that seriously compromises the future of a political process now more besieged than ever by communist insurgency in the Northern, Northeastern and Southern reaches of the country, and external communist attacks, verbal and military from .Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea. General Kriangs.ak may have resolved this problem but only time will teil. The current political system and process in Thailand is in sum, thus, not a resurrection of the pre-October 1973 bureaucratic polity. The conditions for such a system ceased to exist with the 1973 uprising.l~7 The government under Thanin, perhaps, might best have been described in Liddle's terms, as a cross between "encapsulated authoritarianism" and, in pUblic intention at least, "developmental authoritarianism." 128

•

Briefly stated, in ' an encapsulated authorita~ian system the bureaucracy is only in legal fiction an instrument of policy .implementation. As the dominant political arena in society, its principal characteristics are (a) a tightly controlled political arena, (b) a leadership psychology of amoralism or self-interest narrowly defined, and (c) inability

127

Robert F. Zimmerman, "Student Revolution in Thailand: of the Bureaucratic 'Po lity," Asian Su.revey, June 1974.

The End

128

R. William Liddle, "Models of Indonesian Politics," unpublished manus crip.t, March 1977 . Liddle' s presentation of these models against which to analyze the Indonesian'political process is excellent and should be applied to other governments in Asia. Such an effort is beyond the.scope of this paper, however.

10 9

on the part of those outside the system to do anything about it. This system is, essentiall y , the bureauc rat ic polity that Riggs and '.filson des cribed s o well and that (Liddle draws heavily o n Ri ggs collapsed in October 1973. ntal autho ritar i an developme a In for his own models.) are g overnment al concepts al c politi primary the system rly ec on omic ) i n (particula experts on reliance , stability es s. effectiven tic bureaucra and planning, policy In behaviour al terms, t h e Th an in Governmen t a p peare d to approxima te encapsula ted autho r i tari anism tho u gh i ts public intention s for the future tended towards deve l opment authoritar ianism. A democrat ically "inclined, cons tituti on al ly based (and limited) system, neve r the l e s s, could still have emergep if the leaders were truly as committed t o such a Indeed, some members o f the system as they sai d they were. Prime Minister' s Advisory Council led b y General Kr l ang sak as early as May and · June 1977 repo rte dly began cons iderin g an accelerati on of the twelve-ye ar pro g ramme they and IroniThanin put forward when he became Prime Minister. cally, however, they were trapped by their own resurrect io n of the coup-cliqu e oriented political proceas. There was fear that changing the top leadershi p and ground r u les f o r political participa tion would create new uncertain ty n ot only within Thailand but abroad as we ll . · Changing the Prime Minister, for example, could h a ve been misinterp rete d as a sign of instabili ty and resulted i n even less foreign confidenc e and correspon ding investmen t tnan Thailand could then generate. In the end, these milit ary officers c ou ld wait no longer to ' remove Thanin . His governmen t was only growing weaker and this in itself contr ibuted to loss o f confidenc e both at home and abroad. The October 1977 ch'a nges are clearly intended t o accelerate Thailand' s move ba~k t owards a democrati c political process . Success i s n ot guaranteed but current leaders at least also appear to n ow recognize (as t hey may n o t have between October 1973 and October 1976) t h at a return to a pol itical process such a s existed in Thailand from 1932 to 1973 is impossibl e. The c hoice seems t o be more democrati c governnen t o r ultimate inevitable co llapse into a communist political process. The old Thai bureaucra t1 c polity, at least, is already dead; democracy will get an o t h er chance. The Kriangsak Governmen t can d efinitely be considered a "developm ent authorita rian" governmen t. . The Revoluti onary Party iifted press censorship inunediate ly aft'e r tak ing power from Thanin, and promised

110

elections in 1978. .The National Policy Council and General Kriangsak .have .offici ally .pexmitted political groups to organize and .invited a public dialogue on the nature and structure of a democratic process best suited .to the current state and nature of Thai political culture.l29 A n ew permanent Constitution is to be drawn up by the new National· .Legislative Assembly which was appointed by the National .Rolicy Council with approval from His Majesty the King. This Assembly is composed of 360 members many of whom are active or retired military officers (125 Army, 39 Navy, 36 Air Force) .130 The government and this Assembly will govern under an interim constitution drawn up by the Revolutionary Party. It is significant, indeed, ·-that the Kriangsak Government has asked seven .poli tic.a l leaders from political parties abolished after the Octoper 1976 coup to join the twentyfive-member parliamentary cornrni ttee to draw· up the. new Constitution~ - Particularly encouraging is the inclusion of M. R. Kukrit Pramoj and his elder brother M. R. Seni Prarnoj on this committee. Kukrit is one of Thailand's most creative political thinkers and leaders. His and his brother's _personal experiences with the chaotic parliamentary process that developed under the 1974 Constitution should help them draw up·a potentially more stable constit-u tional fr~ework ·for this .next attempt to develop a viable democratic political process in Thailand. One of the early proposed changes ·is ~ limit on the number of political parties. Such . a change would remove one of the major causes -of instability dpring the first attempt to establish a viable democratic political process betwee~ 1973 and 1976 . The Kr:!angsak . ·Government also intends to give immediate hi9h prioriby to rural political, social and agriculture development . The new government has already decided to resume the Village . ·(Tambon ) Development Programme initiated by former Prime• Minister Kukrit Pramoj in 1975 but abolished by Thanin •· This programme allotted a development budget to the villages for use according to priorities and projects -established py the village themselves.l31 129

Bangkok Pos t , "A Ti me For Publi c Opinion" (Editorial) 17 November

130

Bangkok Post , " 360 Named to Assembly," 17 Novelli>er 1977.

131

I ndonesi an Obse~ve~ and KQMPAS (AFP), "Thai Premier to Submit List of Legislato rs," 16 November 1977.

1977.

111

Finally, Kriangsak's new Cabinet, the largest in Thailand's forty-five years as a constitutional monarchy, also appears to be a much more performance oriented collection of bureaucrats and technocrats, some of whom have outstanding credentials. Kasame Chatikavanij, for example, is the new Minister of Industry. Kasame has served as general manager of the highly efficient and successful Electricity Generating Authority for the past ten years. And Sunthorn Hongladarom, last Secretary General of SEATO, will be a second deputy premier who will function as the government's economic czar.l32

112

V'II:

TBAliA'iD AND SOlmmAST ASIA

ASEAII: Source of Political, Payc::tloloqical .-ld lconcaic Security? ftlai Aabuaador to the ~i ted s t tea , An and Panyarac:hun, apeu inCJ before the ~ri can Asaociation for Aai.-l Studiea 1n April 1974, atated that ASEh'i must become a political fact of life in Aaia. The ASEAN states nee~d to 80Ye ~re purpoeefully towards cloae political and econoalc co-operation within Southe st Aai and 1 rger world bodiea auc:h u the U.N. Thailand o ver the past two yeara, h . . in~ed accelerated ita effort tow rda much c loaer wo r1t1n9 arranqe-nta with the ASEAN at tea, bilaterally, aa with Malayaia aqainat communiat inaurgenta on the Tha1-Malayai.-l border, and with in the ASEAN framewon. 'n\ail.-ld hopea for atrenqth in nunt>era and that ita fellow ASI~ •tatea will all recoqn i ~ that their beat 1ntereata deeand far cloaer co-oper ti o n and i nterDevelopment dependence than h . . been the oaae in t he p at. greatly would lite of faot political a into ABEAM of enhance the pr pecta f o r reta.ining 'n\ i p o litical integrity and lonv tera ae c ur1 ty . ASCM • a futur e and Th !land' • c reative parti ci pation ttt.rein u well • the viability of a f o reiCJn policy o f • active neutrality " , however, will be very auch affecud by the intentione and ction a of other ~aj o r a c t o ra in Southeast Aaia - moat eape ci lly the se. Vietn Fo~ r

The In teptlons o f Othera

Th ree ye&rs h ave passed aince the coll pae o f S igon and t h e Aaerl c &n effort t o prevent ooamuniat d o mination o t lndo chl na. Kany observer• have expreaaed conaiderable rmy h aa not ·1 ~ o ld yo u s o • satlsfaction that Hanoi'a pi)e r t o be ~ve d on t o 'ftl al. l and o r th at there does not a &asl ve V 1e~amese 1nf1lt ration o f we apon• o r men t o 1 nlst lnsurqenciea in Th~ land o r Southeast auppor ~ eo Aala. 1.'he cxn~ popular wiadoa up until the f ull and K~uche s c ale ou tbreAk o f fightin9 betw. .n Vietn 1n Deoellllber 1977, J an "'"a.ry and February 1978 t" • that the Vl etnaMae eo m i•~• were ( and tor the t ture '" Ould reAUn ) coooemed w1 th coo•olidatinCJ their ~1t1on in Sout.h Vletnua .nd Laos. -z'hare vould tn.J• be no et t o rt o r t o •ddle •mia~ etate 1A 'ft\Ailan t.o ••~Abl1ah a ex nw 1ll t..be aft u ra of ot.her •~•te• iD t..b.e r 9ion.

113

Kampuch eans now claLm that Vietnam is trying to force their inclusio n into .a commun ist, Vietnam ese led Indochin ese Federat ion. The real threat, however , to a creative stabilit y balance in Southea st Asia that encoura ges social, economi c and politic al developm ent among the noncomm unist states in the region, is not an open, aggress ive militar istic policy by any of the commun ist ·powers, includin g Vietnam . The use or threat of military force whether it be via insurgen cy or convent ional warfare is designe d to divert attentio n from commun ist politic al objectiv es and activit ies. The most effectiv e weapon for the commun ist arsenal is politica l-psych ologica l warfare - both open and subvers ive. The Vietnam ese commun ists won the war in Vietnam because they defeate d the u.s. and the Saigon Governm ent in the politica l-psych ologica l war. The efficien cy, the commitm ent, the discipl ine in pay war terms of the Lao Oong Party of North Vietnam are now stronge r than ever. The attempte d low profile of the Vietnam ese commun ists was a necessa ry but no less clever tactic . The Lao Dong Party did and still does need to consoli date its . power in South Vietnam and prepare a strong domesti c base for an It is difficu lt to say effectiv e foreign policy abroad. it would be foolish But take. how long this process will are not going to ists commun to assume that the Vietnam ese make an effort at some point in the future to try to establis h a predomi nant politic al and psychol ogical position in Southea st Asia. Indeed, this process may have already begun though prematu rely because of Kampuch ean resistan ce to and almost paranoi d fear of the Vietnam ese. The Vi etnames e have the stronge st military and politic al organiz ation in the entire region. They can mobiliz e their human resourc es more effectiv ely than any of the other states in Southea st Asia (with the possible exceptio n of Singapo re). They defeate d the u.s. in a war. Indeed, the Vietnam ese are not likely to kow-tow to the USSR o r the PRC either. Moreove r, an import~t element in this capacity to resist pressur e from these states will be the nature and scope of the politica l-psych ologica l posi~ion the Vi etnames e can establis h for themsel ves not only in Southea st Asia but through out the Third World. If the Vietnam ese can now demons trate success in the economi c field, their claim to a leaders hip position in the Third World might be nearly unassai lable and the troub le that can cause the noncomm unist world, and even the PRC and the USSR, could be enormou s.

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The most immediate obstacle and potential long term limit to Vietnamese communist political-psychological predominance in Southeast Asia is ASEAN - and successful noncommunist economic, social and political development in the ASEAN states. And ThaiLand is · the aurrent key to

ASEAN's potentiaL as a nonao~munist dominated regionaL organization. The potential tragedy today, however, is that Thailand '.s capacity to contribute to the creation of a stable psychological-political balance between communist and noncommunist states in Southeast Asia has been severely limited by recent and still possible domestic political instability. A military dominated, coup-counter-coup oriented political process gives the Indochinese Communist Party under the leadership of the Vietnamese a new cause with considerably more hope for further extending its · psychological-political impact in Southeast Asia than would be possible if the Thais could establish a truly democratic political proces·s . The communists can, for example, try to develop the same kind of international support for political war against a "corrupt fascist . dictatorship" that they developed in Vietnam . This process began at least as early as 5 February 1977 when the Vietnamese national newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan and Radio Hanoi launched a bitter attack on the u.s. and Thailand. The August commentary in Nhan Dan on the extension of communist activity in Thailand is a continuation of this process. And in February 19~8 Radio Hanoi broadcast its support for the "anti-government insurgents calling them 'Thai Patriotic Forces' and reporting on their recent victories over government forces in several different provinces."l33 Laos has also charged the u.s. several times with shipping arms to Thailand for use against the communist states of Indochina. This time•the Thai communists and their leftist allies in a Thai United Front would be the Vietnamese proxy. The Vietnam War stands as a stark reminder of how futile a military response with "f:ree fi.re zcnes" is to communist insurgency. The Thai Government under Thanin had virtually no political programme or process for countering the political war Thailand now faces; under General K~iangsak there is clearly more intention to

133

Bangkok Post, "Hanoi Lands Their Rebels," 4 February 1978, p. 5.

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combat the communist insurgency with political means. S uccess, however , will depend on the patience and perserverance of these military officers in the face of communist attempts to subvert the democratic political process and force these of ficers to continue arbitrary military rule on their own terms in the fa i nt hope that they can thereby control or contain communist activity and preserve "stability". S ubstan tially increased insurgency, however, in the No rth, Northeast an d South Thailand with new, y o unger political cadres c an slowly but inexorably drain a narrowly Furthermore, if the CPT or leftist based Thai body politic. an urban terro rist campaign , undertake to decide sts i v act i sequences could be catascon itical psychological-pol the dry up. More creative will nt vestme Fo reign i n trophic. positions o r responsible o n have o and capable Thais wh t o leave begin will process litical o commitments in t h e p capacity Thai the more even rmining the country , thus unde is that process ocial political-s to develop a creative of the needs and truly responsive t o t h e basic human rights development economic and Self-sus taining social Thai people. Thus weakened , will , in sho rt, become impossible t o achieve. and creative active an Th ailand would n ot be able to maintain role i n ASEAN.

An anemic Thailand , o r o ne ultimately forced to buy peace ( t h at is , the withdrawal of Vie tnamese / Pathet Lao suppo rt for insurgents) by withdrawing from ASEAN or becomi ng a nonactive member will signal the end of that o rganizati on as a potential noncommunist political counte r· weight in Southeast Asia. Increased i nsurgency in Sou th Thailand as is now h appening, moreover , could certainly intensify the insurgency i n No rthern Malaysia , the repo rtedly successful joint Thai-Malaysian military o perati ons n o tw iths tanding. It i s difficult , indeed, t o believe that the Chi ne se will not someh ow become more deeply involved in competition with the Vi etnamese, an d the Soviets, in both the Thai and In fact th e Thai already belie ve Malaysian insurgencies . who are inviting the communists nese Chi that it is the both Vietnam and Thailand llenge cha o t Kampuchean communists The motive for the . with attacks a cross their borders i Rfluen ce in Indochina . l 34 et Sovi e c terbalan coun Ch inese is t o 134

XOMPAS , "Cina Komunis Gerakkan Bentrokan Di Pe rbatas an Kamboja , 12 Au gus t 1 9 7 7 •

11

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Such involvement will only increase tension and fear· throughout the region. Meanwhile, the u.s. remains extremely reluctant to become involved in yet another bout with communist political war in Southeast Asia. Aside from these probable effects of increased communist insurgency and political instability in Thailand, there are other possible region-wide effects from the collapse of democracy in Thailand. The clear demons.t ration .o f the tragedy to which irresponsible student activism can lead can further reinforce the conviction on the past of other noncommunist governments in Southeast Asia, such a3 the Philippines or Indonesia, that they must restrain or quell totally any increase in student activism in their countries. In these countries, however, where 60% -or d • more of the population are aged twenty-five or younger, there is considerable cause for concern about how long the government · can control pressure from the younger generations for fundamental change in the socio-political process - the same pressures, i t should be noted, that led to the October 1973 student uprising in Thailand. Conclusion Thailand is at a critical watershed in its political history. The 6 October 1976 coup became inevitable as Thai activists of both the right and the left forgot about the long term interests of their people in a responsive and effective political process, and of the need to exercise discipline, patience and a little humility as they tried to get the fragile democratic structure to react to and protect each faction's rights and goals. Compromise was a word unknown and a process apparently beyond the ken of many of the activists, some of whom now hide in Thailand's jungles or seek protection from the communist authorities in neighbouring countries, and others who th.i nk they won by chasing their brother Thai out of Bangkok. Thailand's fate now depends on the capacity of its current leaders in the National Policy Council led by General Kriangsak Chamanaiid, with "stability" restored, to find ways to recatalyze a political process that can mobilize the willing and creative support of many of the leaders of the 1973-76 political process who never really had time to get their programmes implemented - men like Kukrit Pramoj, Dr. Krasae Chanawong and, perhaps, even

117

rekindle the hope and l oyalty of Seksan Prasertkul and others of his generation who are potentially creative contributors to the future o f Thailand , but who now appear to side with the communists. Fortunately , this process may have in fact begun with the 20 October 1977 "semicoup". Democracy died in Thailand on 6 October 1976; it may now be in the process of resurrection under the men who could not tolerate its earlier excesses, but who have over the past year also learned the futility of try ing to return to a more orderly but excessively conservative political process. The Revolutionary Party has already begun reaching out for ideas and active participation by more liberal Thai academics, technocrats and businessmen who were isolated under the Thanin Gov ernment. Admiral Sangad and Prime Minister Kriang s ak, for example , want ideas for developing an appropriate political structure and effective policies for resolving the plight of Thai rice and corn farmers. The civilians and democracy currently appear to have yet another chance in Thailand and there is great relief and expectation in Thailand as this manuscript goes to press . Even Kukrit Pramo j has come in from the coldl35 and urged people to co-o perate with the new leaders. Ayumongol Sonakul at the same time warns his readers in The Nat ion ... when we have democratic rule again , remember this - remember it with all our hearts: Freedom means responsibility. Freedom means responsibility . Freedo m means responsibility.l36 He urges the Th ai peo ple t o learn from their past mi stakes an d t h en, quo t i ng Rabindranath Tagore, prays: " Where the mind is led fo rward by Thee into ever wi d ening t hought and act ion: into that heaven of free d om, my

1 35

Bangkok Post , "Kukrit Comes in From the Cold , " 24 October 1977.

136

Ayumongo l Sonakul, "So liloquies," The Nation , 25 October 1977.

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Father, let my country awake." Thailand thus, if current words can become .deeds, could well become over the next year a new hope for democracy in Asia. And, once again, the United States of America may have a chance to psychologically and materially support this process towards a political .system that promotes and protects the human rights of all the people .••.

lNSTITU flo: OF SOU'rl lEAST ASI AN STUOlES LIST OF PUBLICATIONS IN THE

Occasional Papers Series 1

Harry J. Benda, Rese a rch i n Sou t heast As ian Studies i n Singapo r e , 1970 . lOpp. Gr a tis (Out of print)

2

P . Lim Pui Huen , Newspa pe rs published in the MaLaysian Area: Wi th a unio,1 Lis t o f Lo aaL ho Ldings , 1970 . 42pp. Gratis (Out o f print)

3

Chan Heng Chee , Nati o n-Bu i Lding i n S ou theast Asia: The Si ngapore Cas e, 1971 . 19pp. S$2.00 (Out o f prin t)

4

Eva Ho rak ova , Pr oblems o f Fi Lip i no SettLers , 1971. 24pp. S $ 2 . 00 (Out o f print)

5

Mochtar Na irn , Nsran~au : Causes and Effe at e of Mi nan gkaba u VoLu n ta ry Mi grati on, 1971. 19pp. S $ 2. 00 (Out o f print)

6

Paul Pedersen, comp., You t h i n S o uth e adt As ia : A BibLiog ra phy . Modified and expanded by Joseph B. Tamney and o thers , 1971. 69pp . S$4.00 (Out of print)

7

J .

8

R.P. Do re, Ja panes e J ndu at r i aLi~ati on and t he Ueve Lopi ng Co untri e: M o d e L ~ Wa rn i n g o r So ur o ~ o f HeaLth y Do ubts ? s $ 3 . 00 1 8pp . 19 71.

9

Michae1 S ten son , Th e 1948 Commuuist Ue v oLt in Ma La ya: A No t e o f Histor i au L Sou rces und Int e rpret atio n and A RepLy by Gera1 d de Cr uz, 19 71. 30pp. S $ 3 .00 (Out of print)

10

Riaz Has s an, S o ciaL S tatus and Bureauarat i o