Reflections on Technology for Educational Practitioners : Philosophers of Technology Inspiring Technology Education [1 ed.] 9789004405516, 9789004405509

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Reflections on Technology for Educational Practitioners

International Technology Education Studies Series Editors Rod Custer (Illinois State University, USA) Marc J. de Vries (Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands) Editorial Board Piet Ankiewicz (University of Johannesburg, South Africa) John R. Dakers (University of Glasgow, UK) Dov Kipperman (ORT Israel, Israel) Steven Lee (Taiwan National Normal University Taipei, Taiwan) Gene Martin (Technical Foundation of America, USA) Howard Middleton (Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia)

VOLUME 16

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ites

Reflections on Technology for Educational Practitioners Philosophers of Technology Inspiring Technology Education Edited by

John R. Dakers, Jonas Hallström and Marc J. de Vries

|

All chapters in this book have undergone peer review. The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov

ISSN 1879-8748 ISBN 978-90-04-40549-3 (paperback) ISBN 978-90-04-40550-9 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-40551-6 (e-book) Copyright 2019 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

CONTENTS

Preface

vii

List of Figures and Tables

ix

Notes on Contributors

xi

1.

Introduction John R. Dakers, Jonas Hallström and Marc J. de Vries

1

2.

Carl Mitcham: Descriptions of Technology Johan Svenningsson

13

3.

Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers: The Dual Nature of Artefacts Marc J. de Vries

25

4.

Günter Ropohl: Supporting a Technological Literacy for Future Citizenship Vicki Compton

37

5.

Pierre Rabardel: Instrumented Activity and Theory of Instrument Marjolaine Chatoney and Patrice Laisney

6.

Gilbert Simondon: On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects in Technology Education John R. Dakers

73

Bernard Stiegler: On the Origin of the Relationship between Technology and Humans John R. Dakers

87

7.

8.

Bruno Latour: Actor Network Theory John R. Dakers

9.

Andrew Feenberg: Implications of Critical Theory for Technology Education Piet J. Ankiewicz

55

101

115

10. Langdon Winner: A Call for a Critical Philosophy of Technology Cecilia Axell

131

11. Kevin Kelly: Technology Education for the Technium David Barlex

147

v

CONTENTS

12. Don Ihde: Praxis Philosophies and Design and Technology Education Steve Keirl

163

13. Albert Borgmann: The Device Paradigm John R. Dakers and Marc J. de Vries

179

14. Clive Staples Lewis: Social, Environmental and Biomedical Implications of Technology Jonas Hallström

vi

193

PREFACE

Philosophy of technology is an effort to develop a theoretical understanding of today’s complex world of technology. One of the primary aims of technology education is to help young people to develop such an understanding. Therefore, it makes perfect sense to expect that philosophy of technology has something to offer for technology education. This is the assumption on which our book is based. We believe that philosophers of technology have developed insights that can help technology educators rethink the goals of technology education, the content of curricula, the teaching methods and the way to assess its outcomes. We are not the first to publish a book in which philosophy of technology is connected to technology education. What is new in our book is that we have done it by focusing on individual philosophers rather than broad themes. In each chapter there are two parts. In the first part the overall oeuvre of the philosopher is discussed. In the second part the way the ideas developed by the philosopher have been or still can be made fruitful for technology education. Philosophy of technology is nowadays a well-established discipline in which many people work. We had to make a choice for this book. It is evident that there is no gender balance in our selection. Only male philosophers are in it. This is not due to a bias on our side, but to the fact that all philosophers of technology of name and fame are male. Whether this has to do with the male domination in most of technology itself or due to the fact that the discipline systematically ignores the work of its female members is something that we cannot even begin to speculate on. It is a fact of life and we had to deal with it. Another unbalance is that we have a higher percentage of French philosophers in our selection than the actual population of philosophers of technology would justify. This, however, was a conscious decision, because in previous books on philosophy of technology for technology educators, the French philosophers were underrepresented. There is a practical reason for that: many of their writings are available in French only. We made an effort to open up the possibility to get to know their work – which often is highly original and thoughtprovoking – in this book. We hope that readers of this book will appreciate the work of the philosophers we included in this selection and recognize the importance of taking into account their ideas when putting together technology education programs and activities. Technology education is no longer the craft-oriented school subject that it used to be in the past. Thanks to philosophy of technology, there is a sound theoretical basis for it and it is crucial for the future of the subject that we build upon that foundation. It is extremely important that young people learn to give technology a proper place in their lives and for that a good insight into the nature of technology and its relations

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PREFACE

to humans and society is indispensable. Therefore we simply cannot afford to leave precious material in philosophy of technology unused. It is our hope that this book may contribute to the philosophy of technology having a healthy impact on technology education. We want to thank all authors who were prepared to work with us and contribute to this book. Thanks also to Peter de Liefde, who accepted our proposal to write this book, and to the Brill | Sense people who made this book into what it is now.

viii

FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURES

2.1. 4.1. 5.1. 5.2. 6.1. 11.1.

Diagram of the four aspects of technology (from Mitcham, 1994, p. 160) 14 Characteristics of technology learning progression diagram (copyright Ministry of Education, 2010; reprinted with permission) 49 Rabardel’s model of instrumented activity, 1997 59 Instrumental genesis process (Rabardel, 1995) 62 Aesthetics, culture and technology (from Mills, 2017) 75 Tool for considering the impact of technology on society 156 TABLES

2.1. 4.1. 4.2. 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 5.6. 9.1.

Distribution of students’ Mitcham score and the different combinations of aspects that were present in student descriptions Ropohl and the characteristics of technology Ropohl and the technological knowledge strand Object of the activity depending on the subject Solutions’ analysis indicators Solutions developed by students Results in terms of “form” Results in terms of “structure” Results in terms of “materials” The relation between critical theory of technology and other views (Feenberg, 2006, 2009a, 2009b)

ix

21 47 50 65 66 67 67 68 68 117

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Piet J. Ankiewicz is full Professor of Technology Education in the Faculty of Education at the University of Johannesburg. His research interests include the affordances of the philosophy of technology for technology classroom pedagogy, teacher education, indigenous technology knowledge systems, and STEM education. He also has an interest in students’ attitudes towards technology. He has been rated by the National Research Foundation as an established researcher with international recognition. He is a member of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Technology and Design Education. Cecilia Axell is a senior lecturer and researcher in technology education at the Department of Social and Welfare Studies, Linköping University. She holds a PhD in technology education, and the focus in her thesis is the pedagogical content of children’s fiction which links to the relationships between humans, technology, nature and future perspectives. Her research interests include technology education in early years, gender and technology, and how literature contributes to developing learners’ critical thinking skills in technology education. She is also involved in a research project exploring how indigenous knowledge is implemented in technology education in a Swedish Sámi school. David Barlex is an acknowledged leader in design & technology education, curriculum design and curriculum materials development. He is well known for devising curriculum materials that develop young peoples’ ability to understand and critique the design decisions made by professional designers and those they make themselves. He directed the Nuffield Design & Technology Project which has been widely used in the UK and emulated abroad – in Russia, Sweden, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. Marjolaine Chatoney is a researcher in science and technology education at Aix Marseille University (France). Her research explores design and technology education, epistemology, teaching/learning process with special focus on the role of artifacts and efficiency and gender issues. She has published many books and articles including Perception by French Students of the Gendered Nature of Material Artifacts Studied in Technology Education (2015) and Les outils de l’analyse fonctionnelle dans les pratiques enseignantes en technologie (2016). Vicki Compton was involved in the research, curriculum and qualification development of technology education in New Zealand. Her classroom research was particularly focused on how student understanding and capability progressed

xi

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

and collectively contributed to an enhanced technological literacy. She is currently supporting the use and development of technology in New Zealand industries and in government policy thinking. She continues to engage with and support the technology education community. John R. Dakers is a researcher at Delft University of Technology. His research interests include education about technology, the philosophy of technology, technological literacy and gender issues relating to technology. He has published many books and articles including Defining Technological Literacy (second edition, 2014) and New Frontiers in Technology Education (2014). He is currently working on a new book about the history and philosophy of technology education. Marc J. de Vries, Delft University of Technology, is Professor of Philosophy of Technology and professor of Science and Technology Education. He is the editorin-chief of the International Journal of Technology Education (Springer) and author of, among other publications, the book Teaching about Technology. An Introduction to Philosophy of Technology for Non-philosophers (Springer, 2016, 2nd edition). Jonas Hallström, Linköping University, Sweden, is Professor of Technology Education at that university, and also has an M.A. in English literature. His research concerns historical, philosophical, and sociological aspects of technology education. Steve Keirl is Reader in Design Education at Goldsmiths, University of London. His research explores Design and Technology curricula and pedagogies that are holistic, critical, ethically rich, democracy-serving, and advance the general education of all children across the planet. As such, his work resists narrow, instrumental and purely economically-driven Technology curricula. Patrice Laisney, Ph.D. (2012), Senior Lecturer (2016) in Science and Technology education at Aix-Marseille University. His research interests deal with the role of the artifacts in the teaching learning process, with special focus on analyzing the efficiency. He has recently published an article in International Journal of Technology and Design Education: Role of Graphics Tools in the Learning Design Process (2015). Johan Svenningsson is a PhD student in technology education at Linköping University (Sweden). The research focuses on students´ attitudes toward technology and their descriptions of technology. He also teaches technology education in the teacher training programs for preschool teachers, elementary teachers and secondary teachers.

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JOHN R. DAKERS, JONAS HALLSTRÖM AND MARC J. DE VRIES

1. INTRODUCTION

A BOOK ON PHILOSOPHY FOR TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION

This volume concentrates on the philosophy of technology and how it may help to inspire technology education. It does so by bringing together thirteen chapters that discuss, principally, the work of several renowned philosophers of technology, together with a few chapters on the philosophical concepts of writers who, whilst not necessarily considered philosophers of technology per se, do nevertheless offer useful insights into the genre. The author(s) of each chapter, all of whom have a distinguished reputation in the field of technology education from around the world, then discuss how these various philosophies might, in some way, help to influence and transform the current technology education paradigm into a subject domain that can be considered more relevant for the ever changing, technologically textured world human beings now inhabit. Philosophical concepts are never easily digested. They challenge our thinking in many complex ways and use language that can often appear impenetrable. This is not restricted to philosophy: Finnegans Wake by James Joyce, or the study of complex numbers in mathematics can be equally difficult, as can learning a new language. However, engaging with these texts can offer useful insights into understanding technology and its place in the curriculum, especially in the technologically and digitally enhanced post-human trajectory human beings seem to be on. There are a number of books already published by Sense, and other publishers, that deal with many issues relating to technology education, including the philosophy of technology. Readers new to the philosophy of technology might, for example find the book Teaching about Technology: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Technology for Non-philosophers, written by Marc J. de Vries and published by Springer, to be a helpful guide. The work in this volume raises more questions than it answers. Whilst we talk about technology education as something tangible, we tend never to question what exactly it is that we actually mean when we use the term ‘technology’, or for that matter, ‘education’. In what might be described as the modern age, the sheer range of meanings and definitions ascribed to the concepts of both has become so multifarious, that no universally agreed definition is now possible. This collection will never resolve that dilemma. It will however, go some way to revealing some of the complex philosophical concepts that relate to technology

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_001

J. R. DAKERS ET AL.

education in the modern technologically texture lifeworld we inhabit, now and potentially into the future. WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

Deleuze and Guattari, in their final book published together in 1994, entitled What is Philosophy, suggest that philosophy is concerned with the creation of concepts. They reject the notion that philosophy is about asking questions and giving answers akin to being on a TV quiz show. They prefer instead to ask open ended questions like ‘how might …?’ or ‘how …?’ or ‘in which case …?’ or ‘what is …?’. These are all questions that culminate, not in any universal philosophical truths or solutions, but, rather, in variations on philosophical themes. In the context of technology education, philosophy expands the technological horizon from asking closed questions such as ‘what is a mortice and tenon joint?’ and ‘how do I fabricate one?’, to ‘what is technology education?’ and ‘how might it help me in life?’ In so doing they attempt to form a bridge between the two conflicting domains of science/technology and art, situating philosophy in relation to both rendering neither subordinate to the other. Within the domain of technology education, philosophy makes it possible to reveal and thus, to consider more deeply our personal values and how these drive the choices we make in relation to technology. Brian Eno, better known for his songwriting and political activity, sums up the kinds of questions we should perhaps be asking about the human technology relationship in technology education thus: … we have to eat, but we do not have to have ‘cuisines’, Big Macs or Tournedos Rossini. We have to cover ourselves against the weather, but we do not have to be so concerned as we are about whether we put on Levi’s or Yves SaintLaurent. We have to move about the face of the globe, but we do not have to dance. These other things, we choose to do …. (Eno, 1996, p. 317) The relationship between human needs and wishes, on the one hand, and technology on the other, could thus be explored. However, philosophy of technology also seeks to answer questions of the nature of technology itself, to discern concepts and their meanings. ANALYTIC VERSUS CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY

A standard view of the distinction between analytic and Continental philosophy has, since at least the early twentieth century, tended to emphasize the differing interests, specializations and attitudes to the common philosophical heritage that has resulted in this divergence (Chase & Reynolds, 2011, p. 1). In very simplistic terms, analytical philosophy is the creation of the English speaking countries whereas continental philosophy is the creation of France, Germany, Italy and other non-English speaking countries (ibid., p. 1). However, 2

INTRODUCTION

there are many examples of German philosophers, for example, who follow a more analytical approach. So the terms are not set in stone. The methodological difference between the two, again in simplistic terms, is that analytical philosophy adopts a more logical, empirical and problem solving analysis of concepts, whereas continental philosophy is closer to a humanistic and political analysis. Analytical variations include logic and positivism. Many variations of continental philosophy have also subsequently evolved such as existentialism, postmodernism and poststructuralism. Metaphysics is also considered to fall into the continental philosophical domain. In the chapters that follow, Chapter 2 on Carl Mitcham by Johan Svenningsson serves to bridge the gap between the two methodologies. Chapter 3 on Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers by Marc J de Vries, together with Chapter 4 on Günther Ropohl by Vicky Compton, both follow an analytical philosophical perspective. Chapter 5 on Pierre Rabardel by Marjolaine Chatoney and Patrice Lainsey introduces a French continental perspective. Whilst Rabardel specializes in psychology and ergonomics and is not strictly speaking considered to be a philosopher of technology, his contribution in his instrumented theory does present a philosophical perspective influenced very much by Simondon. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 on Gilbert Simondon, Bernard Stiegler and Bruno Latour respectively, all by John R Dakers, offer French continental perspectives, some leaning towards poststructuralism, most notably in the case of Stiegler. Chapter 9 on Andrew Feenberg by Piet J. Ankiewicz and Chapter 10 on Langdon Winner by Cecilia Axell focus upon the social critique of technology. It could be argued that their methodological framework situates them into either camp. Chapter 11 by David Barlex on Kevin Kelly introduces another non philosopher of technology but, again, one who offers an interesting perspective. Kelly considers technology from a social perspective but is very much deterministic in his presentation. This perspective suggests that technology constitutes a form of domination over nature and humans. Chapter 12 on Don Ihde by Steve Keirl shows Ihde as being a phenomenologist which situates him firmly within the continental genre. Chapter 13 on Albert Borgmann by John R Dakers and Marc J de Vries shows Borgmann as having a somewhat romantic worldview and most certainly a dystopic view of technology. It is difficult to locate Borgmann in either camp. Finally, Chapter 14 on Clive Staples Lewis by Jonas Hallström discusses another thinker who, whilst not being recognized as a philosopher of technology, does offer an interesting perspective delivered in the style of continental philosophy. MAJOR THEMES

One of the current key players in the field of philosophy of technology is Carl Mitcham. He came up with a division of this field is four domains. This is an often-quoted way of identifying four different ways of reflecting on the nature of technology: technology as artefacts, as knowledge, as activities and as volition (see Chapter 2). Well-known and useful as this division may be, our book shows how much these four domains are interrelated. The nature of artefacts can be used to 3

J. R. DAKERS ET AL.

describe types of knowledge. Artefacts are the outcome of technological processes and the use of technological knowledge in those processes. Artefacts have an intrinsic non-neutrality because of human volition being the driving force behind their development. Also the development processes themselves are impacted by this human volition. Even what counts as technological knowledge depends on human values and volition. But to describe the main themes that run through the chapters in this book, it makes sense to take artefacts as a starting point, as they connect all four domains very directly. By doing this, we can identify four main themes: the nature of the artefacts themselves, the way they come into being, the human and social values in the evolution and use of artefacts, and the knowledge that is used in and derived from their design, production and use. Several chapters deal with the nature of artefacts. Often these artefacts are complex and the term ‘systems’ is used to characterize them. A key idea in the philosophy of technology is that artefacts can be seen from two points of view (see the chapter on Kroes and Meijers): their physical characteristics (shape, color, weight, etcetera) and their functional characteristics (apart from their main function also other characteristics that humans ascribe to them, like beauty, economic value, ergonomic quality, etcetera). Due to the functional nature, which is dependent on human ascription of values, artefacts are never neutral (see the chapter on Winner). Their function is not an intrinsic property of the physical object, but something that emerges in the interaction between humans and the artefact (see the chapter on Rabardel, who uses the term ‘instrumented activity’ to indicate this notion). Because of this non-intrinsic user-dependency, the function can change according to the will of users (see the chapter on Ihde, who calls this ‘multistability’). As Winner shows, this multistability does have its limits (he describes the viaducts on Long Island, New York, as examples of how artefacts can serve the ideology of racial separation and in a way that cannot easily be undone). In that respect Feenberg (see the chapter on him) seems more optimistic about the possibilities of changing the artefacts function by society. The relational nature of artefacts, as far as their functioning is concerned, results in them serving as intermediaries between ourselves and our lifeworld. This can have both positive and negative effects. It can be positive when the artefacts enrich our view on reality or enable us to manipulate reality in ways we could not perform without them, or they can impoverish our experience with reality by taking away the intensity of our interaction with reality without their intermediary role (for instance, when we do not listen to a CD, but play an instrument ourselves). The work of Ihde and Borgmann (see the chapters on these two) focus particularly on this intermediary role of artefacts. Artefacts are the outcome of design and make processes and they are the object of using processes. Several philosophers of technology have written on the nature of these processes. Their work shows how much these processes have a collective rather than an individual nature (see the chapters on Winner and Feenberg). It is very much society, not individuals, that perform and guide these processes, and thereby determine their outcome: the artefacts and what can be done with them. Other authors have 4

INTRODUCTION

reflected on the evolutionary (rather than revolutionary) nature of the development processes, whereby humans and technology as it were ‘co-evolve’ (see the chapters on Simondon and Stiegler). A theme that has been dominant in the early Continental philosophy of technology is that of social values and technology. This is related to what Mitcham called ‘volition’ as one of the ways technology can be reflected on. Artefacts mirror these values, both in the way their evolution has been impacted by society and in the way they impacted society. One of the most important debates here is whether or not the social impact on technology is real or is just a matter of perception. Some writers claim that the latter is the case and technology in fact marches on whether we like it or not (see the chapter on Kelly). Others believe that society does have an impact on technology, even when we experience a lack of opportunities to make a difference as an individual or as a group, and that we as a society should take our responsibility and not let technology govern our lives in ways we do not want (see the chapter on Feenberg and Ihde). But the way society impacts technology is a very complex one, because many actors with different interests and different means of power try to determine the outcome of the development and implementation of new technologies (see the chapter on Latour, who use the term ‘network’ for this complexity). Even when there is real influence of society on technology, this has implications for the next generation and to some extent they will face aspects of determinism in the way technology is already there when they are born, without their consent. The influence people have on the development and use of technology can also be very consciously used to control other people’s lives. That can happen on the level of individuals, but also on a collective, social level. In particular when one ideology gets a dominant position in society, technology can become a vehicle through which this dominance can be sustained and enhanced (see the chapter on Lewis). Finally there is the relation between artefacts and knowledge. The previous considerations show how many aspects are involved in the way technological artefacts are developed, produced and used, and this has implications for the knowledge that is involved in these processes. That insight has led to several efforts to develop taxonomies for technological knowledge: what types of technological knowledge can be distinguished? One could take the dual nature of artefacts as a starting point and come up with four types of technological knowledge: knowledge of the physical nature, of the functional nature, of the relation between the two and of the processes that make the physical nature realize the functional nature. But there are also more complex taxonomies (see the chapter on Ropohl, for example, the concept of socio-technological understanding). Sometimes the knowledge has a rather systematic and academic nature (e.g., in engineering sciences) and sometimes the knowledge is more intuitive and experience-based (see the chapter on Simondon, who distinguishes between ‘childhood’ and ‘adult’ technological knowledge). It has become clear that most philosophers did not confine their work to one of the four domains as identified by Mitcham, but that they connected different domains to describe the nature of technology. 5

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CHAPTER OUTLINES

Probably the most frequently used philosopher of technology in technology education issues is the American philosopher Carl Mitcham (1941–). He is widely known for his book Thinking Through Technology in which he describes the emergence of the philosophy of technology and to which four themes for reflection has led and that we used in the previous section to identify main themes. In Chapter 2 Svenningsson shows how this division in four areas has been used by himself to develop an instrument for measuring students’ perceptions of technology. Apart from that application, Mitcham’s work has also been used in the development of standards and curricula for technology education. Mitcham’s overview is useful to check if all essential characteristics of technology are covered in curricula and in what students think about technology. Chapter 3 describes another widely used idea from philosophy of technology in technology education, namely that of artefacts as having a dual nature: a functional and a physical nature. This idea was elaborated in a research program at Delft University of Technology, led by Peter Kroes (1950–) and Anthonie Meijers (1953–). De Vries describes how this idea has been used to measure teachers’ abilities to identify those two natures in existing artefacts, but also how it has been used as an organizing principle for curriculum development and even more practical, for the development of course material. The dual nature idea is attractive because it reduces the sometimes enormous complexity of artefacts to a very elementary level, which provides a good opportunity to get a first impression of the nature of the artefact without getting lost in details. In Chapter 4 the German analytical philosopher Günther Ropohl (1939–2017) and his work on technological knowledge is discussed. Ropohl is a representative of the German ‘school’ of Allgemeine Technologie (General Technology) thinkers. Their interest was to describe the basic concepts and principles in technology and this started way back in the 1970s, when much of technology education internationally seen was still very much craft-oriented and lacked any sound theoretical foundation. Although the ‘school’ seems pretty much abandoned now, the ideas that had been developed are still useful for today’s developments in technology education, as Compton convincingly argues and illustrates in this chapter. Pierre Rabardel argues that technical objects and systems should be considered from more than their technical aspects alone. They need to be considered in relation to the activities of the humans who use them. Resting between human activity and the purpose of that activity lies the basis of what Rabardel calls his theory of instrumented activity. This theory is the subject of chapter 5 by Marjolaine Chatoney and Patrice Lainsey. The usual subject/object dichotomy is broken for Rabardel, by introducing the instrument as a mediating element between the two. This means that the original intended design of any instrument is not always what it is used for; a hammer might be used as a door stop for example. In this case, the intention of the activity – to keep the door open – is not driven by the technical object. Action is thus 6

INTRODUCTION

driven by the intended goal and not necessarily by the design intent of the mediating instrument. This suggests that it is any given situation that defines the context of the action, and situations can change. In terms of technology education, Chatoney and Lainsey analyze a learning/teaching situation in a French school using Rabardel’s theory of instrumented activity. They conclude, amongst other things, that practical intelligence is not subordinate to other types of intelligence. The instrumented approach reveals that where activity is goal directed, it requires cognitive input beyond the mere development of procedural knowledge alone. Dakers has written three chapters each dealing with French philosophers of technology. Whilst each chapter has a distinct philosophical perspective, the chapters on Stiegler and Latour can be seen to have been influenced to some degree by Simondon. Gilbert Simondon (1924–1989) has influenced a number of philosophers including the late celebrated and influential French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. Simondon’s influence can also be seen in the work of Andrew Feenberg (chapter 10), probably due to the fact that Feenberg speaks fluent French. Simondon is, however, only now coming to prominence in the English speaking world as more of his work becomes translated into English. It is only this year that one of his most important works, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects has been translated and published in full and in English. This is the essay that Dakers uses to inform his essay in Chapter 6. After outlining Simondon’s pre-historical account of the formation of the human and how that led, subsequently but inevitably to the duality we know today as academic versus vocational education, Dakers goes on to discuss Simondon’s ‘genetic pedagogy’ made manifest by a process called individuation, one of Simondon’s main theories. From an educational perspective, Dakers argues, in Simondonian terms, that the dual nature of academic – vocational education should no longer be sustained and that ways must be found to bridge the gap by introducing aesthetic ethical and philosophical thinking into the technology education milieu. This will create a threshold between nature and culture, resulting in a differentiation between object and subject, between thought and action, between the concept of academic and vocational. Bernard Stiegler (1952–) is a French philosopher who was mentored by Jacques Derrida and was also greatly influenced by Simondon. He has published many books on philosophy with three related volumes on Technics and Time. It is the first volume; Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus that Dakers uses as his principle text in Chapter 7. Stiegler commences his essay with a history of technology, using the myth of Prometheus as his opening. Whilst most of us will have been aware of Prometheus, few will have even heard of his brother Epimetheus. And yet, as a world renowned philosopher of technology, Stiegler argues that it is the fault of Epimetheus, as told in the myth, that caused human beings to be so differentiated from all other living animals as a result of not being given any essential qualities, such as flight was given to birds, speed to the leopard or fur to polar bears, all as mandated by the Gods. It was left to Prometheus to resolve the problem by giving humans a non-essential quality 7

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in the form of technology thereby enabling them to protect themselves against the wrath of nature. Stiegler, however, goes beyond the myth to argue that the evolution of the human could have occurred only in association with technology and that the evolution of technology could have occurred only in association with the human. Dakers relates the theories of Stiegler to technology education by highlighting that, whilst humans and technologies co-evolved together, and that consequently human beings simply cannot exist without technologies, technologies are now evolving at a much faster rate than humans are. This can have either wonderful or potentially serious consequences for human evolution. He argues that there is now, more than ever, a need to address the human/technology relationship in schools in order to establish a more informed and critically aware populace in the future. Bruno Latour (1947–) is another French philosopher who has been influenced by Simondon. He is generally known for being one of the founding fathers of a philosophy known as Actor-Network Theory (ANT). Latour has published extensively and his book Reassembling the Social serves as the principle text that Dakers uses in Chapter 8. Considered controversial by some, ANT affords agency to not just the human being, but to all non-human beings also, whether physical or metaphysical, whether, for example, a tree or a thought. He calls these beings actors, who coexist in a multitude of networks of relations, all of which are subject over time, to change resulting from the various possible dynamics of their relationships. Latour argues that all actors can affect and be affected by other actors within the network of relationships, and that this may be caused by some change within the network, or by the addition to or withdrawal of other actors from the network. In each case this will cause a change that will instigate a new series of relationships. These metastable relationships are subject to inevitable changes in nature over time, whether large or small. Dakers uses this theory to highlight a number of issues in terms of education generally, and to technology education in particular. One particular implication of ANT he argues, is that if networks of relations are dynamic and changing, as Latour postulates, then the actors in a technology classroom, which will be many and varied, cannot realistically be treated as some universal ensemble that will be exactly the same for every class of the same age group every time, across an entire culture or country. This holds true equally for design. To this end, standardization of planning, pedagogy and assessment is an impossible construct. Dakers calls for a more open and creative pedagogy, as influenced by ANT, that will enable students and teachers to develop their own personal value judgements by learning to be active and critical, rather that accepting, passive and conformist. In Chapter 9 we meet a Canadian philosopher of technology, namely Andrew Feenberg (1943–). His focus is the way society can and should turn the outcomes of the work of engineers to their own benefit, thereby making dramatic changes in the way the technology is used, when necessary. He even describes how this is done practically, namely though a process that he calls: secondary instrumentalization (following the primary instrumentalization that is led by the engineers). Ankiewicz discusses the relevance of this ‘critical theory of technology’ for technology 8

INTRODUCTION

education. Feenberg’s philosophy is a very useful way of introducing values in technology education, which is increasingly recognized as an essential element in technological literacy and should therefore also pervade technology education. Chapter 10 is about Langdon Winner (1944–), a philosopher whose primary concern was and is that we can get so mesmerized by the technology humans produce that we forget to appreciate the value of humans themselves and of nature. This is expressed in the title of one of his best-known books, The Whale and the Reactor. The story is that he is guided around on a power plant premise and is deeply impressed by the large building and the advanced technology. But suddenly behind the buildings he spots a whale rising from the water. That makes him realize that there is a whole different world which can be equally impressive when we have an eye for it. A second important issue in his work is the non-neutrality of technological artefacts: they do have politics in them. Axell, the author of this chapter, has done research into the way technology is presented in children’s books and she sees several reasons why Winner’s work offers opportunities to broaden that representation and make children aware of the fact that technology is very much a matter of human decision making. Kevin Kelly was born in 1952 and has, despite a minimal educational background, become an influential technology guru. In the mid-1980s he became editor in chief and publisher of the Whole Earth Review which produced compendiums of information on tools derived from science and technology, new and old. In the early nineties he co-founded Wired Magazine. This professional journey has led him to consider the nature of technology and write about this topic publishing a succession of books. In this chapter David Barlex explores Kelly’s ideas concerning the nature of technology, and then presents a critique from other philosophers and historians. Barlex also considers the worth of Kelly’s ideas with regard to technology education in the secondary school and the extent to which they might inform curriculum development and implementation. Barlex particularly explores the concept of technological trajectory, and implications for technology education in relation to the impact of technology on society. Don Ihde (1934–) is one of the most influential philosophers of technology of the Continental tradition. He has a distinct phenomenological focus that derives from his reflections on German philosopher Martin Heidegger. In this chapter Steve Keirl gives an outline of Ihde’s prodigious output and wide contributions to philosophy of technology, mainly focusing on the praxis aspects of Ihde’s work. Central to Ihde’s philosophy are (post-)phenomenology and existentialism and, in turn, these two come together with his applications of hermeneutics and pragmatism. Keirl puts these aspects of Ihde’s philosophy in relation to technology education, and thus, for example, argues for adopting Ihde’s phenomenological approach to human-technology-world relations, by considering technologies as key to lifeworlds. Design and technology education can make curricular adjustments in this direction to enrich its offering and value to students. The phenomenological act, properly conducted, is actually an educational act, Keirl argues. If the praxis philosophies are experientially focused 9

J. R. DAKERS ET AL.

then where better to articulate them than through the doing field of enlightened technology education (Keirl sees doing in multiple ways here – critiquing, designing, making, creating). Albert Borgmann (1937–) a German who moved to the U.S. in 1958, is an internationally recognized philosopher of technology and has written extensively on the subject. He is known to have been influenced by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, who held a somewhat dystopic view of the trajectory of modern technological development. Borgmann is well known for a number of theories that carry Heideggerian influences, one of which is his theory of focal practices. Chapter 13 discusses this theory which is, essentially, that life in the modern age tends to push us away from real world experiences towards a technologically hyper-reality. The art of the table, for example, is becoming reduced to simply reheating prepackaged fast food meals in the microwave, then sitting down and eating them, whilst watching pre prepared televised ‘reality’ programs. Eating is thus reduced to a utilitarian act, the consumption of fuel and TV shows are, for the most part, meaningless entertainment that require little thought. Life, in this sense for Borgmann, becomes mundane and disengaged from reality. Focal things and practices on the other hand, require some degree of effort by individuals: shopping for the raw ingredients required to prepare a meal from scratch; cooking the meal, setting the table, selecting the wine, discussing the food and having family conversations around the table when, taken together, lead to deeper, more meaningful experiences which, in turn result in feelings of happiness and accomplishment. From an educational perspective, Dakers and de Vries suggest that debating the concept of focal things and practices surrounding such issues as the environment, sustainability, design and craft skill development in the workshop, can lead to a more fulfilling set of democratic learning experiences in which students are taught about becoming more ethical designers, producers and consumers. Technology education within this framework becomes a learning experience that promotes debate about technology as something that meets people’s needs, not just their manufactured desires. C.S. Lewis (1898–1963) is perhaps best known for his theological writing and the Narnia children’s books. He was an Oxford don and later professor of medieval and renaissance English literature at Cambridge, but also taught philosophy. The aim of this chapter by Jonas Hallström is to outline some aspects of Lewis’ philosophy of technology in his book The Abolition of Man (1943), and provide some suggestions for how it can be applied in technology education. There are three types of implications of technology outlined by Lewis in The Abolition of Man that can be summarized under the theme of “Man’s power over Nature”: social class implications; environmental implications; and biomedical implications. The chapter deals with each of these and suggests ways for teachers to address them in the classroom in relation to the objectives of technology education and the aim of instilling a technological literacy in students. There are many more philosophers of technology, whose work could have implications for technology. Our apologies to (in random order) Ernst Kapp, Larry 10

INTRODUCTION

Hickman, Joe Pitt, Sven-Ove Hansson, Lewis Mumford, Egbert Schuurman, Deborah Johnson, Günther Anders, Jacques Ellul, Peter-Paul Verbeek, and the many, many more who did not make it into our book. We believe, however, that the collection of authors that is offered here gives a good, balanced impression of the main ideas that have been developed in the discipline of philosophy of technology and issues in technology education for which these ideas are relevant. REFERENCES Chase, J., & Reynolds, J. (2011). Analytic versus continental: Arguments on the methods and value of philosophy. Durham, NC: Acumen. Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1994). What is philosophy? New York, NY: Columbia University Press. De Vries, M. J. (2016). Teaching about technology: An introduction to the philosophy of technology for non-philosophers (2nd ed.). Dordrecht: Springer. Eno, B. (1996). A year with swollen appendices. London: Faber.

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2. CARL MITCHAM Descriptions of Technology

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will describe the philosophical work of Carl Mitcham. His book Thinking through Technology – The Path between Engineering and Philosophy (Mitcham, 1994) will serve as a foundation for this chapter. With this book, Mitcham intends to present a critical introduction to the philosophy of technology. It bridges the gap between the two branches of the philosophy of technology: engineering philosophy of technology and humanities philosophy of technology. The first tends to hold a more positive and analytic stand toward technology and the latter a more critical and interpretative (Mitcham, 1985). Mitcham himself has a background in philosophy with a focus on the ethics of science, engineering, medicine and technology (Colorado School of Mines, 2018). His background, coming from the humanities, contributes a perspective on technology where the human being is in the centre, and not technology, but he keeps his view from both engineering and humanities philosophy present. This makes his work suitable for technology education. For instance, in the New Zealand technology syllabus, we can read that; “The aim is for students to develop a broad technological literacy that will equip them to participate in society as informed citizens and give them access to technology-related careers” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 32). Moreover, the International technology and engineering educators association (ITEEA) describes that: “The goal is to produce students with a more conceptual understanding of technology and its place in society, who can thus grasp and evaluate new bits of technology that they might never have seen before” (ITEEA, 2007, p. 4). These quotes only grasp the technology syllabuses, but to fulfil these aims we need to make sure to address a broad spectrum of technology. This broad spectrum of technology, as a part of society, is difficult to teach and learn without a human point of view. It is clear that, in at least the ITEEA text, humanities have a natural position. In our technological intense world, we must find it important that our knowledge about technology is broad and in need of the critical aspects. Even though, many countries aim to find their future engineers and workforce in technology-related jobs through compulsory technology education (as hinted in the NZ syllabus). People, who do not want to work in technology intense jobs, still have to be able to participate as a democratic citizen. To do this, it is important that schools provide possibilities for students to gather knowledge in and about technology.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_002

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One way to explore students’ understanding of technology is to see what they consider technology to be. Most people (and students) think of technological objects when asked what they consider to be technology. This is, of course, the most obvious description, since it is something that is often both visible and touchable. Even more specifically, people often describe technology merely as modern electrical objects (Burns, 1992; De Vries, 2006; DiGironimo, 2011; Garmire & Pearson, 2006). Therefore, I intend to compare Mitcham’s (1994) broad descriptions of technology with students’ descriptions of technology (in this case, 13–14 year old students). The intention is to get a greater picture of what else (other than objects) students’ consider technology to be. This will be followed by an actual school example where I present how Mitcham’s work can be used to analyse students’ descriptions of technology. MITCHAM’S TYPOLOGY

Throughout Mitcham’s book (1994), he describes a background for the philosophy of technology. By reviewing and discussing previous work, he presents a broad conceptual framework of what technology is. This framework is expressed as technological knowledge, which, when considered alongside the human, will lead to creating, improving, developing, manufacturing and using new of technological objects (see Figure 2.1). This framework has four aspects, technological: Objects, activities, knowledge and volition which will be described below. Mitcham explains that this model is nor static or final. It is rather a work in progress, based on the thorough review and analysis of previous philosophers’ work. Notable is that in this typology the human being is central, which excludes the possibility of a non-human creation of technology.

Figure 2.1. Diagram of the four aspects of technology (from Mitcham, 1994, p. 160)

The Four Aspects of Technology For a further understanding of Mitcham’s philosophical framework, the four aspects are now discussed.

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Objects. Mitcham (1994) discusses technological objects in a broad way to include technological systems, as a series of objects. He further describes how technological objects could be either static (structures, such as buildings or roads) or dynamic (machines, such as cars or computers). A technological object can also be divided into networks and processes. As mentioned in the introduction this is the most common way people describe technology. Activities. Simplified, technological activities can be seen as making and using the technological objects. The making activities can be the action of crafting, inventing or designing technological objects. It can also be the process of manufacturing, working, operating, troubleshooting and maintaining technological objects. Mitcham (1994) describes different ways of using technological objects. For instance, you can, use an object, like a house, simply by being within its walls (passive use of technology) or you could use objects (or tools) to make new objects (active use of technology). Knowledge. Mitcham contrasts the knowledge of nature with technological knowledge. The first is knowledge about natural objects and the other about technological objects. Knowledge, in general, is seen as true beliefs that can be justified, this is not always the case regarding technological knowledge. Technological knowledge might be considered as seeking effectiveness, rather than justified true beliefs (De Vries, 2005). When applied to the framework in Figure 2.1, this is knowledge required for making and using technological objects (Mitcham, 1994). Mitcham further exemplifies several levels of technological knowledge as technological actions (empirical based knowledge), rules (lower level of conceptual entities) and theories (higher level of conceptual entities). Technological knowledge ranges from knowledge about using and making ancient technological objects as well as modern technological objects. Ancient technology often relies on sensorimotor skills, which are referred to as “know-how”. This is an intuitive, trial and error process or the imitative process of a master-apprentice type (Mitcham, 1994). Know-how is difficult to transfer from one to another since it often is an implicit knowledge that is gained through practice and difficult to explain (Ropohl, 1997). Knowledge to choose an appropriate material and tool for a specific task is an example of sensorimotor skills. These type of skills are difficult to see as justified true beliefs. A second distinction of technological knowledge that ancient technology relies upon, are technical maxims (rules of thumb and recipes). This is being able to articulate the strategies necessary to solve a problem, by successfully making or using a technological object. Another distinction of technological knowledge is known as descriptive laws or technological rules. This could be seen as further describing usable knowledge based upon scientific laws and accounting its effectiveness, like “if I do this, then that will happen, if I do it another way instead, something else will happen, but possibly in a more efficient way”. Modern technology is based on all these distinct types of knowledge described above by adding Technological theories. 15

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This last type of knowledge is close to technological knowledge as applied science, and it is constantly present in engineering (Mitcham, 1994). Volition. The three aspects described above, are all present in the act of engineering and when working with technology. Mitcham intends to include human will as an aspect of the philosophy of technology. The foundation for the volitional aspect is the human will to survive, control and make our life (or production process) more efficient, where technology is a way to extend human physical limitations. Furthermore, in a broader sense, volition can be seen “as technological desire, as technical motivation or movement and as consent to technology” (Mitcham, 1994, p. 255). Adding ethical and moral aspects to volition brings an extra dimension to the volition term. As human beings though, we have difficulties to separate our knowledge from distant negative effects if the short-term effects are positive. This could mean that your choice is not always based on knowledge; rather it is the will to reach the short-term positive effects. The volitional aspect can also be seen as the affective component of attitudes (Ankiewicz, 2018), where a student’s feelings about technology can lead to actions. Conclusions The model presented in Figure 2.1, is very suitable if to describe and discuss technology. Yet, there are examples of types of technology where one or more of the four aspects are absent. When playing with a toy, you can do this without using either technological knowledge or volition (Mitcham, 1994). However, one must not neglect that this toy playing can lead to gained knowledge about the construction of technological objects. However, technological knowledge in that case neither is an automatic outcome nor needed to actually play with the toy. This is something that should be taken into account in school practices as well. A building project where the activity does not enable students to reflect on what is built, may not automatically increase the students’ technological knowledge. TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION AND MITCHAM

Mitcham’s four aspects of technology have been used in technology education research for some time. Since the volitional aspect adds the humanities to technology, it fits well with compulsory technology education. Recently, Nia and De Vries used Mitcham’s four aspects of technology to analyse both the ITEEA “Standards for technological literacy” (2016a) and NZ technology curriculum (2016b). Their analysis shows that the aspect of technological knowledge is scarcely discussed in the NZ curricula and in Standards for technological literacy. They propose a clarification of, for instance, the content regarding know-how and knowing that (Nia & De Vries, 2016a). Technological activities and objects are considered more adequately discussed throughout both texts. 16

CARL MITCHAM

Students’ Descriptions and Mitcham The students’ descriptions of technology used in this study were gathered in a Swedish pilot study, with the intention to develop a method to classify the student descriptions. In this chapter, I present an analysis of student (ages 13–14) descriptions of technology from two school classes’, from one school. This will act as a first screening of a school class’ ontological understanding of technology. Further, I will discuss what types of objects, activities, knowledge and volition are present in the student descriptions, with considerations to Mitcham’s typology described earlier. Finally, implications of this screening and how to ease visualization of all four aspects of technology are discussed. Mitcham’s four aspects are used explore the potential width in students’ descriptions of technology, two open-ended questions were asked at the beginning of a survey for measuring attitudes. The questions were: • Describe what you consider to be technology (not the school subject technology)? • If you were to describe the school subject technology for anyone who has not studied it in school themselves, how would you describe it? The first question asked is commonly used in PATT-studies (Survey to study pupils’ attitudes toward technology, see e.g. Bame & Dugger, 1989, p. 51). Most students have at least some experience in technology education. Therefore, the second question does not exclude students who do not feel that they know what technology is. The second question makes it possible to extract other information as well. Since the students may have defined technology in class, by letting them describe technology education they are not fixed within that definition. The second question also allows the student to place themselves in the context of technology, thereby increasing the possibility to approach the human being in their descriptions (their knowledge and volitional aspect). When students’ add themselves in their description, some of the students describe their feelings about technology education (the affective component of attitudes), such as “boring”, “it is fun”. A typical example of how student’s descriptions of technology reach a broader description through both of the questions is: The answer to the first question: “Computers, Cell phones, TV-sets and windmills” and answer to the second question: “Electronics, like computers and to build things like cars and so on. You get to see how technical things function.” As seen in this example, the first answer alone does not really show the student’s ability to describe technology. However, the existence of the second question, allows the student to write a more comprehensive description of technology, by describing technology education this student place him/herself as the subject of the description. To get insight on what is actually done in their technology classes, a third question was answered too, to let students describe their best memory from a technology class. 17

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Analysis of Descriptions Mitcham’s (1994) four aspects of describing technology (objects-activities-knowledgevolition) can be used to quantify the answers concerning students’ descriptions of technology. Or it can be used to make qualitative analysis to, for instance, understand what types of knowledge they use in their descriptions. This conceptual framework was not intended to evaluate or classify students’ descriptions of technology. Hence, it provides a general description of technology that corresponds well with the intended content in technology education. The qualitative analysis of students’ deceptions of technology is presented as a part of the subsections (objects, activities, knowledge and volition) below. In the quantitative analysis, the respondent’s descriptions of technology and technology education are analysed in two steps. First, every description is classified and scores 0 or 1 point in each of the four aspects of technology that are present (technology as object, activities, knowledge and volition). Second, the sum of the different aspects of technology is calculated. The sum of aspects leads to a total score of 0–4 points. I choose to call this The Mitcham Score. There is no hierarchy between the different aspects, only the broader the description is, the more likely to score a higher Mitcham score. There are no negative scores given. Though it exists several examples of somewhat similar descriptions within the four aspects, at the same time, the description exposes several misconceptions. This is, of course, interesting on its own, though the focus in this classification is the broadness of descriptions and not potential misconceptions. Objects. For a description to be considered in the object category the respondent has to write what technology has to do with man-made objects. When for example, students describe technology as “stuff”, “things” or “gadgets”, the assumption is made that they refer to man-made objects, even though it might be possible for the student to mean a natural object. This assumption is made based on the context the survey is answered in (technology education) and that it is highly unlikely that they mean natural objects. As mentioned above technological systems are included in this aspect as well. Despite the system inclusion, no student had described (or mentioned) technological systems explicitly. The students rarely mention objects as systems, when it is done, it is described more implicit as demonstrated in the example following: “It is knowledge about electricity”. In this case, we do not really know if s/he refers to electricity as a physical phenomenon or the knowledge of how electricity is “produced” and distributed in the power grid (this could be either a potential misconception or a system seen as an object). As mentioned earlier, the most common descriptions of technology in previous research is modern electrical objects, such as TV or computer. The students in these school classes often describe technological objects in general terms, like “different kind of inventions”, “technical machines” or “things that run on electricity”. When they do specify their described objects, they often describe different dynamic 18

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objects, such as “computers”, “cars” and “windmills”. A few students describe static objects like “a bridge” or “light bulbs”. Activities. In the aspect of technological activities, the respondent has to mention the making or using of technological objects. A student description that for instance include technological activities without mentioning that it requires technological knowledge is still considered to be a technological activity, this to enable for students to be able to be included in every individual aspect (objects, activities, knowledge and volition). An example of this is the several students that describe technology as “to build things” “to invent”. Both of those making activities is in need of some technological knowledge, but that knowledge is not mentioned in their descriptions. In some cases of descriptions of activities, some technological knowledge is implicitly present, but not accounted for in their Mitcham Score. This to avoid potential over analysis. An example of this is: “I’m thinking of electronics”, where “thinking” in this case could mean that s/he implicitly mean that s/he thinks about how electronics work. Thinking, in this case, is probably only a filler to complete a full sentence. The students in these classes often describe technological activities as making activities, and more specifically, “constructing” or “programming”. The activity to actually use technology is rarely described, one of few examples is “connecting wires to a light bulb”. Knowledge. For an answer to be placed in the knowledge aspect of technology, a respondent needs to use technology as an example that requires knowledge. “How to/know how” are commonly used words in this aspect. Their own actual (procedural) knowledge is not relevant in this case. A description like “you learn how to program a machine” shows that the student see knowledge as a part of technology with a specific learning content, but not necessarily possesses the knowledge how to program a machine. The importance of this aspect in an educational view is if they describe knowledge as an aspect of technology and technology education. In responses to the questions, the students’ who describe technological knowledge tend to do so as sensorimotor skills or technical maxims. They often describe technological knowledge in a general sense as “to make things function” or “know how things function”. Or they describe the knowledge as “you learn how technical objects function and then you get to create some simple things on your own”. This answer implies that the student is building a repertoire of knowledge based on some objects and then uses this knowledge to create new objects. Volition. The final category, volition, includes respondents who express technology as a human will to improve or control technology consciously or express consequences of technology. This category is strongly connected to the human being, and one might consider the affective answers to be volitional (as proposed by Ankiewicz, 2018). This since their expressed feelings can lead to an activity. However in this 19

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analysis of student descriptions, only presenting a feeling that is not directed toward a technological activity is not analysed as technological volition. The Mitcham Score To understand the classification made, I present typical examples of Mitcham Score when only the first question is included. Analyse the technology description and read the description of technology education to see if it adds any aspects to the score. The “trigger words” that are observed in the examples that result in the Mitcham Score are marked by these elevated numbers: objects1, activities2, knowledge3 and volition4, followed by a short explanation. 0 (01+02+03+04) points – “Technology is technology” This if course a clever way to describe technology, letting technology explain itself. It is not possible to classify this student’s description within the Mitcham Score. A description like this receives 0 points in the Mitcham Score. 1 (11+02+03+04) point – “Computers1, Cellphones1 and Tablets1” placed in the aspect of technology as Objects and receives 1 point in the Mitcham Score. This student’s description includes a list of different modern electrical objects. 2 (11+12+03+04) points – “I’m thinking of electronics1 and to build2 things1” placed in the aspects Objects and Activities” In this description, “electronics” is considered as a technical object, even though it might be a mix-up with physics. And of course, the student mention “things”, which in a clearer view is meant as an object. 2 points in the Mitcham Score. 3 (11+12+13+04) points – “How3 things1 work3 and how3 to fix2 them” placed in the aspects Objects, Activities, and Knowledge This description is very short, but clearly includes three of the aspects of technology. One might also consider the implicit presence of volition in this description, but since the intention is to not over analyse the student description this response reaches 3 points in the Mitcham Score. 4 (11+12+13+14) points – “It is knowledge3 about electricity1, technical gadgets1, how3 they1 are made2, how3 they1 can become more environmentally friendly4, the evolution4 of technology, how3 things1 are built2 etc.” placed in all four aspects of technology. This description is considered to include all four aspects of technology. The main reason for this is the presence of volition through the ethical environmental thoughts that the student expresses. This description receives a full score of 4 in the Mitcham Score.

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Classroom use of the Mitcham score. Now that we have understood how the descriptions can be classified and quantified within the Mitcham’s four aspects of technology, the next step is to use the Mitcham Score to analyse a school class. The results of the Mitcham Score from the two school classes are presented and analysed. Both classes are part of a science profile program, meaning they have chosen this profile based on an interest in natural sciences. It is one class in school year 7 (16 students, age 13) and one class in school year 8 (16 students age 14). Table 2.1. Distribution of students’ Mitcham score and the different combinations of aspects that were present in student descriptions Mitcham score Frequency Valid percent Cumulative percent Combinations 0

3

9.4

9.4

–

1

3

9.4

18.8

3 object

2

11

34.4

53.1

6 object + activities 5 object + knowledge

3

13

40.6

93.8

13 object + knowledge + activities

4 Total

2 32

6.3

100

–

100

Results from the students’ Mitcham score tell us that 14 of the 32 students describes technology and technology education using objects by itself or objects together with activities or knowledge (see Table 2.1). The volitional aspect is rarely present in student descriptions of technology, this might have to do with the questions asked, and it may not come naturally for students to express this. Or they simply do not consider this as a part of technology or technology education. However, there are students who do so, even though there are only 2 (of 32) students in this study that describe volition as a part of technology. Technology education is often focused on building or creating (activities) objects (report by The Swedish School Inspectorate, Skolinspektionen, 2014). This is probably caused by the technology subject’s history as a hands-on subject, with focus on developing handicraft skills (De Vries & Tamir, 1997). In this case 8 (of the students who score at least 1 point) students did not write about technological activities and 9 students do not describe knowledge in their descriptions. So in this school class, it is almost as common to describe technological knowledge as it is describing activities. As a conclusion from the Mitcham Score in these classes, it must be acknowledged that most students do not see technology strictly as technological objects. Being aware of that can offer support for broadening the expectations from the students’ perceptions and try to increase their awareness of different types of knowledge, activities and objects. 21

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This used typology and scoring are, only to scan the students’ perceptions of technology. However, this is important knowledge to take into account, when trying to achieve the syllabus aims, for example, in New Zealand. One aspect that is important to consider when performing technical tasks in technology education, is that all four aspects of technology are present. These results can be used as a first screening of your class to build your forthcoming education upon. It can also serve as an evaluation after finishing a semester or specific theme, to see what content that the students’ met, is transferable to their description of technology. Awareness of Mitcham in task planning. So how can we use the screening of the classes’ Mitcham Score? The purpose of this kind of screening done is not to teach the perfect way to describe technology according to Mitcham’s framework. The intention is to highlight what might be missing in your teaching. By planning a task to include all four aspects manifested by Mitcham (1994) could improve students’ perception of technology. As a teacher, you probably know what your last technology lessons included. In this case, I have not interviewed their teacher to find out. However, as mentioned earlier, the students also answered a question about what their best memory from a technology lesson was. Even though the students came from two different classes, their descriptions were similar. They could, for instance, have “no recalled memory”, or that the best memory was “when the class ended”. Most of the students, 18 (of 32) though, describe the same task, where they built a wind-powered car. Several students also mentioned this car-building project when they answered the question about technology education (analysed in the Mitcham Score). By their descriptions, one can understand that it was a collaborative task. The aim was to create a car that could roll with help of the wind from a hairdryer. This is of course only one task. However, since it seems to affect the students a lot, we might want to focus on this task to improve students’ awareness of the four aspects of Mitcham’s model. To build and create things with their own hands is the most likeable aspect of the technology subject in Swedish compulsory school (report by The Swedish School Inspectorate, Skolinspektionen, 2014). A memorable activity is important and we have to use that opportunity when the students are active to enable a further learning that hopefully is transferable to other contexts. There are some overall aims in technology education that may be incorporated into this task (and others). One of the purposes (similar to the NZ and ITEEA texts, mentioned in the introduction) for technology education in Sweden is: “Teaching in technology should aim at helping the pupils to develop their technical expertise and technical awareness so that they can orient themselves and act in a technologically intensive world” (The Swedish National Agency for Education, 2011, p. 254). Reading this aim makes it difficult to see how the car-task could help people to orient themselves and be more aware of the technology surrounding them. Sensorimotor skills are certainly developed in the task when attaching parts to the car with glue and making the wheels spin freely (as long as this is a somewhat 22

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new task). By discussing what sensorimotor skills are developed can create an awareness of what they actually are learning. To develop knowledge like technical maxims or technical rules, the teacher could, for instance, provide different types of glue ways to attach different components. By including the variety of different ways to attach two components of a specific material, the students will have to test to find the best suitable glue for different purposes. One might also break the task into smaller components. In this case that might be: firstly, to choose wheels and complete an undercarriage with the purpose of making it roll as far as possible from a ramp. Secondly, they can focus on the forward movement and explore the best way to gather the power from the wind of a hairdryer. By constantly take notes of the changes made, students can write their own technical rules regarding how to, for example, reach the highest speed with the available material and test it. Lastly, the finished car is placed in a larger context; evaluate the model built and discuss how the newly gathered knowledge can be used in the “real world”. This designing and constructing lessons need to be discussed, analysed, evaluated and reflected upon in the classroom. To increase the presence of all four aspects it is important to provide a variety of materials and components. With the different possible (and perhaps impossible) variations, students can test which one is the best suitable for the specific task. To simplify the learning for the students, you can limit the number of choices possible. For instance, if wheels are used, provide three different types and three different sizes of wheels. By testing different solutions and discuss the tests, it allows the student to increase their technological knowledge base. Using the Mitcham Score to perform a screening of a school class is a quick way to get an image of a class’ perceptions of technology. The aim of technology education is not that students should be able to describe technology within Mitcham’s framework, hence it provides a benchmark of where you are heading. Constantly keep the four aspects in mind, when planning technology activities in school and how to visualize them. This may help students develop their technological awareness. As described at the beginning of the chapter, this typology bridges between humanities and engineering philosophy. Easing this bridging for your students, to see themselves as a part of technology and technological development, can make them more aware of their surrounding technological world. REFERENCES Ankiewicz, P. (2018). Alignment of the traditional approach to perceptions and attitudes with Mitcham’s philosophical framework of technology. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 29(2), 329–340. Bame, E., & Dugger, W. (1989). Pupils’ attitudes toward technology, PATT-USA, a first report of findings. Retrieved May 6, 2018, from https://www.iteea.org/File.aspx?id=40498&v=3084cd04 Colorado School of Mines. (2018). Carl Mitcham, presentation. Retrieved from http://inside.mines.edu/ Carl-Mitcham De Vries, M. J. (2005). Teaching about technology: An introduction to the philosophy of technology for non-philosophers. Dordrecht: Springer.

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J. SVENNINGSSON De Vries, M. J. (2006). Technological knowledge and artifacts. In J. Dakers (Ed.), Defining technological literacy: Towards an epistemological framework (pp. 17–30). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. De Vries, M. J., & Tamir, A. (1997). Shaping concepts of technology: What concepts and how to shape them. In M. J. de Vries & A. Tamir (Eds.), Shaping concepts of technology (pp. 3–10). Dordrecht: Springer. DiGironimo, N. (2011). What is technology? Investigating student conceptions about the nature of technology. International Journal of Science Education, 33(10), 1337–1352. Garmire, E., & Pearson, G. (2006). Tech tally: Approaches to assessing technological literacy. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. Hidi, S., & Renninger, K. A. (2006). The four-phase model of interest development. Educational Psychologist, 41(2), 111–127. ITEEA. (2007). Standards for technological literacy: Content for the study of technology. Retrieved from http://www.iteea.org/File.aspx?id=67767&v=b26b7852 Ministry of Education. (2007). The New Zealand curriculum. Retrieved from http://nzcurriculum.tki.org.nz/The-New-Zealand-Curriculum Mitcham, C. (1985). What is the philosophy of technology? International Philosophical Quarterly, 25(1), 73–88. Mitcham, C. (1994). Thinking through technology: The path between engineering and philosophy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Nia, M. G., & De Vries, M. J. (2016a). ‘Standards’ on the bench: Do standards for technological literacy render an adequate image of technology? Journal of Technology and Science Education, 6(1), 5–18. Nia, M. G., & De Vries, M. J. (2016b). The New Zealand curriculum’s approach to technological literacy through the lens of the philosophy of technology. Australasian Journal of Technology Education, 3(1), 5–18. Ropohl, G. (1997). Knowledge types in technology. In M. de Vries & A. Tamir (Eds.), Shaping concepts of technology: From philosophical perspectives to mental images (pp. 65–72). Dordrecht: Springer. Skolinspektionen. (2014). Teknik – gör det osynliga synligt. Om kvaliteten i grundskolans teknikundervisning. Stockholm: Skolinspektionen. The Swedish National Agency for Education. (2011). Curriculum for the compulsory school, preschool class and the recreation centre 2011. Retrieved from http://www.skolverket.se/publikationer?id=2687

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3. PETER KROES AND ANTHONIE MEIJERS The Dual Nature of Artefacts

INTRODUCTION

A charming characteristic of analytical philosophy is that it can reduce complex issues to their basics. That is particularly interesting for education, as one would like to start simple and only later move on to more complexity and more detail. An example of work in analytical philosophy of technology that has proven useful for technology education is the idea of artefacts having a twofold or dual nature. This idea was developed in a research program called the Dual Nature of Technical artefacts that was conducted at the Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands, and led by Peter Kroes. In this chapter Kroes’ work on this theme will be discussed and three examples of its application in technology education will be shown. PETER KROES AND HIS REFLECTIONS ON TECHNICAL ARTEFACTS

A Philosopher with a Dual Nature Analytical philosophy is a latecomer in the field of philosophy of technology. Philosophy of technology itself is a latecomer in the field of philosophy. Reasons for this are not quite clear, but it may be that the ‘technology as applied science’ paradigm that was long held by philosophers, prohibited philosophers from becoming interested in reflecting on this human activity. It was not worth studying as it was ‘merely’ the application of science, so the real thing happened in science and philosophy of science was therefore seen as more relevant. Fortunately this changed in the 1960s and philosophers became aware of the great impact technology had on society and the concern it raised among people in the late 1960s. The start of philosophy of technology was dominated by Continental philosophers, of whom probably Martin Heidegger and Jacques Ellul are the best known and certainly the most influential. They primarily gave voice to the social concern about technology. None of them had any background in technology. That is probably why their reflections focus on the impact of technology and not so much on the content and the development of technology. Today there is a lot of attention for the nature of technical artefacts, the nature of technological knowledge, the nature of design, but in the early years of philosophy of technology all attention went to the social impact of technology, and mostly the negative impact (De Vries, 2016). © KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_003

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In the 1980s, however, a new trend emerged in philosophy of technology, namely the analytical philosophy of technology. This type of philosophy aims at analysis of the nature of technology, artefacts and design. This type of philosophy requires analysis of concrete technologies and design processes. The ability to conduct such analyses requires a sound background in technology (or at least in natural science). Without that background, reflections on concrete technologies cannot be adequate and the essence of the design problem can easily be missed. At the same time a background in philosophy, of course, is needed, to make philosophical sense of these technologies and design processes. Peter A. Kroes is a typical example of an analytical philosopher of technology with a double background. He studied physical engineering at the Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands, and later wrote a dissertation on philosophical problems concerning the notion of time in physics (defended successfully at the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands). This combination of engineering and philosophy of science put him in a perfect position to do analytical studies in the philosophy of technology. The introduction of analytical philosophy in the field of philosophy of technology was seen as quite a dramatic development. The term ‘empirical turn in the philosophy of technology’ was coined for this by Kroes and his colleague Anthonie W. Meijers. In the late 1990s they organized a symposium in Delft with that title and in 2000 this resulted in a book, again with that title (Meijers & Kroes, 2000). In 1995 Kroes had been appointed at Delft to be in charge of the philosophy group there. In 2000, Meijers got the same position in Eindhoven. He, too, had a double disciplinary background. He had studied mechanical engineering in Delft and Philosophy in Utrecht and received his Ph.D. in Leiden on a thesis about Searle’s theory of speech acts. The term ‘empirical turn’ became a standard term in philosophy of technology to indicate the analytical ‘stream’ in that field. One of the first activities in Delft in the realm of this empirical turn was the Dual Nature program, for which funding was acquired from the Dutch National Science Foundation NWO. The Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts Research Program From April 2000 to December 2007, at Delft University of Technology, the Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts research program was conducted under Kroes’ leadership. The general aim of the program was to develop a coherent conceptualization of technical artefacts, taking into account their dual nature as (1) designed physical structures which realize (2) intentionality-bearing functions (quote from the original research program proposal). The program output consisted of several dissertations and books and numerous journal articles. It was the first major research program in the analytical philosophy of technology worldwide. The heart of the program is the idea that a technical artefact is an object with two natures (Kroes & Meijers, 2006). This positions the program in the domain of ontology: what is it for an artefact to exist as an artefact; what characterizes its existence? In the Dual Nature program a technical artefact is differentiated from a 26

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natural object in that the natural object only has a physical nature (it can be fully described by all its physical properties, like size and shape, weight, color, material properties, etcetera) and a technical artefact in addition to that physical nature also has a functional nature, a ‘for-ness (it is ‘for’ something). This functional nature, contrary to the physical nature, is not intrinsic, but relational. The physical properties can be observed and measured objectively. There can be a discussion about its exact description, but in principle the discussion can be settled by empirical data. This is not the case with the functional nature. It is a matter of ascription, not intrinsic properties. What an artefact is for is up to the user. Of course, the designer had a certain function in mind when designing the artefact, but the user can ascribe a different function to the artefact. In principle the user has complete freedom in ascribing functions to the artefact, but some ascriptions make more sense than others. The function that the artefact was designed for, is usually called the proper function. A different function that is ascribed to the artefact by the user, is called an accidental function. The user can ascribe this function based on an observation of the physical properties of the artefact. If the user observes that a hammer has enough weight to keep papers on a desk from being blown away by the wind, (s)he can ascribe the function of paperweight to the hammer and this will work without problems. If, however, the user ascribes a function that cannot be realized by the artefact because it lacks the properties that are necessary for that, we call this an improper function. If the user decides to use a screwdriver to open a tin can, this may work if the screwdriver is strong enough, but for weak screwdrivers this will not work well and the screwdriver will bend. The physical nature is purely descriptive. There is no normativity in the artefact’s size or shape or whatever other physical/structural property. That means that is does not depend on opinion or judgment. The artefact’s size is what it is, independent of what we think of it. In the functional nature, however, there is normativity. The function that is ascribed is meant to express what the artefact ‘ought to do’. The function of a car is that it ‘ought to’ enable us to get from A to B. The car has that function even when it is in the garage for repair. If the functional nature were purely descriptive, the car when parked would no longer be a car, as it does not take anyone from A to B. That, of course, holds even stronger when the car is in the garage and is not even able anymore to take from A to B. The normativity in the functional nature also enables the user to assess the artefact for its functioning. A car that does not move properly, is a ‘malfunctioning’ car. The normativity even has levels. One can say that this particular car is a good car (token level), or one can say that this type of car is good (type level) or one can say that cars are good for getting from A to B (artefact level). There has been debate about the difference between the use of the term ‘function’ in technology and in biology. Biologists talk about the ‘function’ of the heart. Is that the same as the engineering talking about the ‘function’ of the screwdriver? Probably it makes most sense to regard these to be two different ways of talking about functions. The biologist’s use of the term ‘function’ primarily refers to what 27

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the heart actually does: it pumps blood by contracting. Most biologists will see no designer behind this function, unless they are religious and see God as the Designer (obviously, this is philosophically a legitimate stance, but even then it makes sense to differentiate between God’s designs in nature and human designs in technology). As soon as the biologist starts talking about a ‘malfunctioning’ heart, (s)he has become a medical doctor, who has an opinion about the heart and goes beyond objectively describing what it actually does. In medical science, like in engineering science, normativity does play a role, because doctors deal with normative notions like healthy and sick. Functions can be ascribed individually, but to a large extent function ascription is a collective activity. We all tend to ascribe the function of driving screws to screwdrivers, not the function of keeping papers from being blown away from our desk. Although this collective function ascribing is not as easily changed as the individual function ascription, it can happen. Originally the pill was not designed for birth control but as a medicine for treating severe menstrual disorders. After some years, however, it was found out that it could also be used for birth control purposes and how we collectively ascribe that function to the drug, even though physically it is almost the same as it was when designed and made for the first time. Some caution is necessary in the understanding of the terms ‘physical’ and ‘functional’. The term ‘physical’ should be taken broadly to entail all the nonintentional aspects of the artefact: the mathematical (number of parts, size), geometrical (size), physical and chemical (material properties like strength, proper weight and solvability) and biological (growth, metabolism). The functional nature should also be taken broadly, namely to entail all intentional aspects (not only function, but also user-friendliness, maintainability, easisiness of recycling, moral properties). Philosophical Impact The original Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts project focused on the ontology of technical artefacts: what does it mean that something is a technical artefact? This approach has epistemological implications. One of the important notions that comes with the nature of technical artefacts, as we saw, is that of normativity. That means that part of knowledge about artefacts must be normative in nature. This normativity was the focus of a research project at Eindhoven University of Technology. De Vries used the dual nature approach to derive four types of artefact-related knowledge (De Vries, 2006): • Knowledge of the physical nature (e.g. knowledge of material properties); • Knowledge of the functional nature (e.g. knowledge of functions); • Knowledge of the relations between physical and functional nature (e.g., knowledge of the suitability of a material for a certain function); • Knowledge of processes (e.g. knowledge of working principles that turn structure into function). 28

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Knowledge of the physical nature is descriptive. It deals with reality as it is. Knowledge of functions, however, is normative. It deals with reality as we would like it to be or to become. Knowledge of the relation between structure and function is also normative. It deals with suitability, which is a normative notion. Knowledge of processes is descriptive when it is about the behavior that can be deduced from a given structure, or it can be normative when it is about desired behaviour that is derived from the function. The distinction between deduced behavior and desired behavior also features in the Function-Behavior-Structure model for design processes developed by John Gero (Gero, 1990). This model strongly reminds of the dual nature approach. o reference is made to that approach, probably because they were developed in parallel. The back and forth movement between desired function and possible structures is characteristic for the design process. In that respect the Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts also has methodological implications that can be reflected on in design methodology. Finally, there are ethical implications of the dual nature approach. The fact that all artefacts have this intentional functional nature with normativity inherent in it, no artefact can be morally neutral. In a way this supports the claim made by Langdon Winner that ‘artefacts have politics’. At first sight it may seem that the normativity is purely functional normativity. But what does it mean to say that a car is a ‘good’ car? Is that purely functional (it takes from A to B)? Probably we also want it to be a safe car, not only for the driver but also for other people on the road, or that it is an environmentally friendly car. Functional normativity and moral normativity can be distinguished, and they should be, but in practice the boundary between the two is thin. So the Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts is fruitful not only for the ontology of artefacts, but also for the epistemology and ethics of artefacts and for design methodology. THREE APPLICATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION

Artefacts and Technology Education Artefacts obviously play an important role in technology education. In design projects, usually it is an artefact that is designed. In making activities, pupils make artefacts. Understanding the artefacts that surround us is part and parcel of what is called ‘technological literacy’. Artefacts is the first thing pupils will mention when asked: “What do you think of when I say: technology?”. For all these reasons, enhancing pupils’ understanding of the nature of artefacts belongs to the aims of any technology education curriculum. Without that, pupils will not properly understand what designing and making is. To be able to reach this aim of technology education, teachers will need to have a good understanding of the nature of artefacts. They need to have a deeper understanding beyond just knowing the details about a range of different artefacts individually. 29

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In this section three applications of the dual nature of artefacts idea will be shown: its use in curriculum development, its use for investigating teachers’ understanding of the nature of artefacts and its use in developing primary school children’s understanding of technology. All three examples have been documented in literature, with explicit references to Kroes’ work. Together, the three examples indicate how fruitful this basic understanding of artefacts is for technology education in all its aspects. An Artefacts-Oriented Curricular Strand One the world’s most philosophy-inspired technology education curriculum is that of New Zealand. This is largely due to Vicky Compton’s efforts to engage with philosophers of technology personally to get a better understanding of the discipline. One of the ideas that was explicitly taken up in the development of the New Zealand technology education curriculum is the Dual Nature of Technical Artefact approach. The curriculum has three strands: Technological Practice (with sub-strands Brief Development, Planning for Practice, and Outcome Development and Evaluation), Nature of Technology (with sub-strands Characteristics of Technology and Characteristics of Technological Outcomes), and Technological Knowledge (with sub-strands Technological Modelling, Technological Products, and Technological Systems). Indicators of progression have been described for seven levels of achievement (Milne, 2017). We find the dual nature approach particularly in sub-strand Technological products and sub-strand Characteristics of Technological Outcomes. In these two sub-strands, the following achievement objectives have been formulated for level 1: • Technological products: Understand that technological products are made from materials that have performance properties. • Characteristics of technological outcomes: Understand that technological outcomes are products or systems developed by people and have a physical nature and a functional nature. For level 2 the following achievement objectives are in the curriculum: • Technological products: Understand that there is a relationship between a material used and its performance properties in a technological product. • Characteristics of technological outcomes: Understand that technological outcomes are developed through technological practice and have related physical and functional natures. For level 3: • Technological products: Understand the relationship between the materials used and their performance properties in technological products. • Characteristics of technological outcomes: Understand that technological outcomes are recognizable as fit for purpose by the relationship between their physical and functional natures. 30

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And for level 4: • Technological products: Understand that materials can be formed, manipulated, and/or transformed to enhance the fitness for purpose of a technological product. • Characteristics of technological outcomes: Understand that technological outcomes can be interpreted in terms of how they might be used and by whom and that each has a proper function as well as possible alternative functions. Clearly, for these basic levels the objectives in these two sub-strands have been stated explicitly in the line of the dual nature of technical artefacts approach. In the higher levels the focus in more on more detailed knowledge (such as the systems character of more complex artefacts). To support curriculum development, empirical studies have been conducted to see to what extent pupils make progress in their understanding of artefacts against the background of the consecutive levels (Compton, Compton, & Patterson, 2012). Almost 400 pupils from 19 schools, divided over grade levels, were interviewed by asking them to judge the fitness for purpose of a known artefact and to identify the possible purpose of an unknown artefact. Their responses were scored on a 4-point scale for the known artefacts and a 6-point scale for the unknown artefacts. Almost half of the pupils responding to the known artefact appeared not to understand what fitness for purpose meant. For the unknown artefact, about half of the pupils was able to make a reasoned, but wrong guess about its purpose. Only a quarter of the pupils was able to make a better guess. Encouraging, though, was that the understanding increased when two more interviews were held over a period of two years. This indicated that the implemented curriculum had an effect on their understanding of the nature of technical artefacts. The New Zealand case shows that it is possible to enhance pupils’ understanding of the nature of technical artefacts by paying very explicit attention to that topic. Technology Teachers and Mysterious Objects One can safely assume that technology teachers have knowledge about a range of technical artefacts. But do they also have an understanding of the nature of technical artefacts? Do they understand the difference between the two natures of technical artefacts, the functional and the physical nature? In the Netherlands an investigation was done to find this out for Dutch technology teachers in secondary education (Frederik, Sonneveld, & De Vries, 2011). At the time the study was done, technology education was a compulsory school subject for all lower secondary school pupils. It was taught on average two hours per week in the first year of secondary education and one hour per week in the second year. Attainment targets for technology education had been formulated in the national curriculum. Most teachers teaching technology education originally taught different school subjects. Only a minority taught science and the range of subjects they taught was large, ranging from physical education to geography and foreign languages. The professional development (PD) 31

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program that prepared them to become technology teachers was a two-year parttime (two evening a week) program with a focus on conceptual understanding of technology and developing and conducting design-and-make projects (apart from some basic skills in working with materials and equipment). At the time most of them had their PD for technology education, the Dual Nature of Technical artefacts program had not started yet, so none of the institutes that provided the PD program can have had the Dual nature idea explicitly in the content of that program. The research study that will be described now investigated to what extent they had an understanding of the difference between the functional and the physical nature of technical artefacts. The study was done with 25 experienced teachers and 21 novice teachers. The researchers had collected a number of artefacts of which it was unlikely that any of the teachers would recognize its function. In that sense they were ‘mysterious’ objects that they were entirely unfamiliar with. The teachers were provided a worksheet with two columns, one called ‘property’ (which refers to the physical nature of the artefact) and one called ‘task’ (referring to the functional nature). The teachers were given the assignment to describe the artefacts by filling in properties and from those deriving possible purposes of that property and thus trying to develop an understanding of what the artefact might have been designed for. One artefact, for instance, had a blade with a sharp edge. Teachers then would fill in ‘sharp surface’ in the ‘property’ column and ‘cutting’ in the ‘task’ column. By doing similar analyses of other parts of the artefact, gradually an understanding of the overall function of the artefact could develop. The results were striking. Least surprising perhaps was the experience that teachers greatly enjoyed doing this. There were lively discussions and great curiosity about the unknown artefacts. There was no lack of creativity in coming up with possible uses of the artefact. What appeared, however, is that the teachers had great difficulties in making proper decisions about what should be written in the ‘properties’ column and what in the ‘task’ column. Many times terms in the ‘property’ column referred to function rather than structure. The researchers found words like ‘handle’ or ‘comb’ in the properties column, while in fact these refer to functions more than to shape (unless one reads ‘handle’ as ‘handle-shaped’, but this was never written by the teachers). Another problem the teachers had was to make proper connections between a property and its assumed function. For the ‘handle’ property, the words ‘for shovel’. Of course a handle is one of the elements needed for this task, but it is not primarily the handle that enables the shoveling, but rather the blade. Another example of confused filling in the columns is ‘protection rubber’ in the ‘properties’ column and ‘greater surface’ for the corresponding ‘task’ column. The term ‘protection’ clearly belongs in the task column but is in the property column and the greater surface is a property, not a task. These are just some of the many cases in which teachers could not fill in the sheet properly. They had great difficulties in distinguishing properly between properties and tasks and also in making proper connections between a property and a task. 32

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The conclusion of the researchers was, of course, that more PD activities are needed to enable these teachers to teach technology education properly. They themselves had a lack of understanding of the dual nature of technical artefacts and surely were not able to help pupils acquire that understanding. In a consecutive activity, the researchers worked with artefacts that were more familiar to the teachers and gave them very structured assignments to stimulate their understanding. Also they used a task in which teachers used gloves to explore an unknown object in a sack and describing the properties they could identify by touching the object with the gloves. The advantage of that task was that the focus of that activity was almost entirely on properties as the teachers could not make any sophisticated guess about the artefact because they could not see it and therefore were forced to investigate property by property rather than guessing the function of the artefact based on an overall impression of its structure. The study shows how useful the Dual Nature idea was in investigating teachers’ understanding of the artefacts they were given and also to design assignments in a PD activity that was aimed at enhancing their understanding of artefacts. Artefacts and Primary School Pupils’ Understanding of Technology We have seen the applicability of the dual nature approach to curriculum development and teacher professional development. Now we turn to classroom level. Here, too, the dual nature approach has proven its value for technology education. This will be illustrated by the example of Marja-Ilona Koski’s work in primary technology education. In her Ph.D. work she introduced design activities to primary school children to investigate their learning about artefacts. Together with her supervisor Remke Klapwijk, she developed a model for educating about artefacts that is very much inspired by the dual nature approach (Koski, Klapwijk, & De Vries, 2011). She considers artefacts to be at the cutting edge of abstract (scientific) knowledge and knowledge concerning the social context. This approach reminds us of the French philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon, whose work is discussed elsewhere in this book (by Dakers). The educational advantage of using concrete artefacts is that pupils are familiar with them, can touch them and manipulate them, and by doing so, as Koski shows, can learn both about the abstract principles that determine their behavior and the functions they fulfil. The abstract principle can be studied in natural science as far as natural phenomena are concerned, but also in engineering sciences, as is the case in the concept of (technological) systems. The in-between position of the artefact enables pupils to move back and forth between the social world and the world of science and engineering. As we have seen in the previous section, this is precisely what designers also do: move back and forth between functional and physical nature. Koski sees designing as a context in which concepts can be learnt, as it is promoted in the so-called concept-context approach that was developed in the Netherlands. The idea is that concepts, because of their abstract nature, create a learning problem for children and can, therefore, best be learnt in 33

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a variety of concrete situations. These ‘contexts’ are more than just examples, but have the nature as a social practice in which pupils can take part (e.g. taking part in traffic when going from home to school and vice versa, or going to the doctor in a hospital). Designing is also a practice that children can take part in and because there are a variety of design challenges, one and the same concept can be brought into this variety of design contexts. Thus deep and versatile understanding of the concept can develop. That also holds for the concept of artefacts with their dual nature. By using design challenges in each of which children become aware of the need to move back and forth between the function and the physical realization, they gradually get to understand the nature of artefacts. She first tried out this approach with in-service teachers. Not unlike the teachers in the study by Frederik, Sonneveld and De Vries, they had difficulties distinguishing properly between the functional and physical nature, and a design activity appeared to help them get a better understanding. In another study, she worked with primary school children. Koski arranged one student-teacher and one experienced teacher to investigate the feasibility and the effect of this approach in primary technology education. Both teachers experienced the model as easy to understand and apply. Here we see the effect of analytical philosophy bringing complexity back to the very basics of the issue and thus creating an approach that is particularly suitable for educational situations. Both teachers acknowledged that using the model had been a very educative experience for themselves also. It gave them a much better understanding of the nature of artefacts. Although no post-test was done, teachers had a strong impression from the conversations with and among the pupils that their understanding had also increased (Koski, 2014). FINAL REMARKS

The work of Peter Kroes and his team in Delft, together with Meijers in Eindhoven, have delivered a very interesting approach for understanding technical artefacts, an approach that has also proven its value for education. It is a strong illustration of how the aim of analytical philosophy, as a method to bring complexity down to the very basics of a concept, is helpful for education, where one also wants to start at the level of basic understanding and only then gradually move on to more complexity. Artefacts can be very complex and difficult to understand. The Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts approach is a very helpful way of understanding artefacts because it starts at the most basic level of the artefacts’ nature. This makes it very attractive for educational purposes. The same holds for other outcomes of analytical philosophy of technology. There is, for instance, a lot of confusion about the nature of technological knowledge. The basic notion that there is normativity in much of technological knowledge helps to understand why teaching and learning technological knowledge probably needs specific approaches compared to the purely descriptive knowledge in science. Analytical philosophy may not always be the most accessible literature, but the insights it produces are mostly useful 34

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for education because they help to conceptualize at a very basic level. As concept learning increasingly is seen as an important aim in technology education, analytical philosophical reflections are mostly worthwhile to take into account when teaching about technology. REFERENCES Compton, V., Compton, A., & Patterson, M. (2012). Reading technological artifacts: Does technology education help? In T. Ginner, J. Hallström, & M. Hultén (Eds.), Technology education in the 21st century, The PATT 26 Conference, Stockholm, Sweden, 26–30 June 2012 (pp. 126–134). Linköping: Linköping University. De Vries, M. J. (2006). Technological knowledge and artifacts: An analytical view. In J. Dakers (Ed.), Defining technological literacy: Towards an epistemological framework (pp. 17–30). New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan. De Vries, M. J. (2016). Teaching about technology: An introduction to philosophy of technology for non-philosophers (2nd ed.). Dordrecht: Springer. Frederik, I., Sonneveld, W., & De Vries, M. J. (2011). Teaching and learning the nature of technical artefacts. International Journal of Technology & Design Education, 21, 277–290. Gero, J. S. (1990). Design prototypes: A knowledge representation schema for design. AI Magazine, 11(4), 26–36. Koski, M.-I. (2014). Connecting knowledge domains. An approach to concept learning in primary science and technology education. Delft: Delft University of Technology. Koski, M.-I., Klapwijk, R., & De Vries, M. J. (2011). Connecting domains in concept-context learning: A model to analyse education situations. Design and Technology Education: An International Journal, 16(3), 50–61. Kroes, P. A. (2012). Technical artefacts: Creations of mind and matter: A philosophy of engineering design. Dordrecht: Springer. Kroes, P. A., & Meijers, A. W. M. (2006). The dual nature of technical artefacts. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 37(1), 1–4. Meijers, A. W. M., & Kroes, P. A. (2000). Introduction: A discipline in search of its identity. In P. A. Kroes & A. W. M. Meijers (Eds.), The empirical turn in the philosophy of technology (pp. xvii–xxxv). London: JAI Press. Milne, L. (2017). Technology education in the New Zealand curriculum: History and rationale. In M. J. De Vries (Ed.), Handbook of technology education (pp. 125–140). Dordrecht: Springer. Winner, L. (1980). Do artefacts have politics? Daedalus, 109(1), 121–136.

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4. GÜNTER ROPOHL Supporting a Technological Literacy for Future Citizenship

INTRODUCTION

Günter Ropohl was born in Germany, and studied and worked in the areas of mechanical engineering, systems theory, sociology and the philosophy of technology. As such, Ropohl was a philosopher of technology coming from the ‘engineering’ rather than ‘humanities’ tradition (Mitcham, 1994). His major contributions to the philosophy of technology relate to his systems view of technology (Ropohl, 1997). His exploration of the implications of this view led to discussion of sociotechnical systems, ethics and responsibilities of engineers, the nature of knowledge in technology, and suggestions for a ‘body of knowledge’ for general education. He asserted that technological knowledge not only exists but is quite distinct from, and fundamentally different to, other domain knowledge. This was particularly important between the 1990s and mid 2000s when the existence of technological knowledge was under debate. At much the same time, technology education was becoming fashionable internationally with differing stances being taken regarding the nature of technological literacy and what should be included in school curricula. In New Zealand, curriculum developers initially focused on providing students opportunity to undertake technological practice. They positioned themselves within the technological knowledge debate as adhering to the view that technology had a knowledge base in its own right through the inclusion of the Technological Knowledge and Understanding strand in Technology in the New Zealand Curriculum (Ministry of Education, 1995). This was one of three interlinking strands identified as key to student’s undertaking technological practice to develop their technological literacy. The other two strands were Technological Capability and Technology and Society. In this first iteration, the curriculum did not provide an explanation as to the nature of technology or technological knowledge, showed no direct links to the philosophy of technology literature, and provided no specific guidance as to what technological literacy might look like as it progressed in sophistication from Level 1 to Level 8 of the New Zealand Curriculum Framework (NZCF) (Ministry of Education, 1993). Between 2004 and 2007, extensive work was begun to address this by exploring the philosophical literature. This focused on developing a stronger philosophical understanding of technology generally, as well as a better understanding of technological knowledge (Compton, 2004; Compton & Jones, 2004).

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_004

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This work provided a foundation for subsequent research to determine how contemporary philosophical concepts could be usefully mediated into technology education (Compton & France, 2007) resulting in a significantly revised technology learning area in the New Zealand Curriculum (NZC) (Ministry of Education, 2007). The 2007 technology curriculum ‘repackaged’ the 1995 strands into a Technological Practice strand, added a new philosophical strand named the Nature of Technology, and re-presented a philosophically-aligned Technological Knowledge strand. As will be illustrated later in this chapter, the work of Ropohl was drawn on extensively during this revision and development period. ROPOHL’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY

Technology and Philosophy Philosophy, or the ‘love’ of ‘wisdom’, has been an endeavor of humanity since the first rising of the conceptual powers we claim as a species help differentiate us from our animal kin. A mix of historians, psychologists and archaeologists have argued that the rise of communicative abilities and ultimately conceptual and philosophical thinking was a consequence of early technology, specifically, the tool making phase in human development (see for example, Burke & Ornstein, 1997; Taylor, 2010). Philosophers of technology reinforce the view that technology is a defining feature of the human condition (Pitt, 2000) and that a critical and philosophical understanding of technology incorporates knowing of and about technologies as well as how these change what it means to be human (see for example Ferre, 1988; Idhe, 1997; Mitcham, 1994). The relationship between philosophy and technology would therefore seem strong. However, in spite of technology’s historical and contemporary importance, philosophers have typically paid little attention to technology and even less to technological knowledge. This is reinforced by Arthur in his musing on ‘Missing: An-ology of Technology’, where he identifies that technology is ‘one of the most completely known parts of the human experience. Yet of its essence – the deep nature of its being – we know little’ (2009, p. 13). He goes on to suggest that because ‘technology stands in the shadow of its more prestigious sister, science, we honor it less – and therefore study it less’ (Arthur, 2009, p. 13). He also suggests that ‘We also feel vaguely that because we have created technology, we already understand it’ (Arthur, 2009, p. 14). Added to this are earlier observations that technologies have become so woven into the fabric of modern life that they have become all but invisible (Staudenmaier, 1985) leading to an automatic and uncritical acceptance of it into our lives (Postman, 1992). Ropohl identifies two kinds of philosophy, a ‘philosophy of philosophy’ and a ‘philosophy of the world’ (1999, p. 60). The first of these he describes as being ‘busy with book learning … and does not refer to anything else than to its own web of reasoning’ (Ropohl, 1999, p. 60). While not denying this is of value, he goes 38

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on to argue that the second of these – the philosophy of the world, is also worthy of attention. He states that ‘A philosophy that aims at comprehending the present age in thought must not neglect science and technology. Thinking is nourished by knowledge, and most of our knowledge nowadays originates from science’ (Ropohl, 1999, p. 60). However, Ropohl also makes clear that ‘thinking is nourished by practice as well, and most of human practice nowadays is affected by technology’. Therefore he strongly argues that ‘… science and technology are not only worthy objects, but, above all, indispensable sources of timely philosophy’ (Ropohl, 1999, p. 60, my emphasis). Philosophical interest in technology has steadily increased since 1969 when Picht asked the question of ‘when technics would come to reason’ (cited in Ropohl, 1997). Between the 1960s and late 1980s ‘… the philosophy of technology was dominated by metaphysical analyses of technology (under the influence of Heidegger), and by critical reflection of the consequences of science and technology for the individual and social forms of life’ (Kroes & Mejers, 2000, p. xvii). However, during this time and shortly afterwards, two key books provided a counter to this domination (Mitcham’s 1994 Thinking through Technology: The Path between Engineering and Philosophy and Pitt’s 2000 Thinking about Technology: Foundations of the Philosophy of Technology) and so began a re-framing of the philosophy of technology project to one more informed by an ‘empirical turn’ – see Kroes and Meijers (2000) for a discussion of this shift and its implications for the ontology and epistemology of technology as a discipline. Ropohl was a clear advocate for this ‘turn’ with his extensive work on developing a systems view of technology and explication of the nature of technological knowledge being firmly based on analysis of engineering practices in all their worldly complexities. The following sections explain how this manifested in his work over twenty years and outlines how this might be relevant to technology education. Socio-Technological Understanding Ropohl first presented his ‘systems theory of technique’ in a thesis developed in 1978 as part of his lecturer’s qualification which led to the concept of ‘Allgemeine Technologie’ or General Technology (Ropohl, 1979 cited in Ropohl, 1997). As discussed by Mitcham (1994), Lenk and Ropohl’s explanation of this view included an emphasis on the nature of the philosopher as much as the philosophy. For example, after arguing against traditional philosophical and technological approaches they went on to present their ‘new epistemological and social-philosophical approaches’ which they suggested rested on pragmatism and an interdisciplinary stance (Lenk & Ropohl, 1979 cited in Mitcham, 1994, p. 68). This supported Moser’s view that the ‘ideal philosopher of technology should be both a productive philosopher and an active engineer’ (cited in Mitcham, 1994, p. 68). Ropohl later explains the importance of this approach, and its resulting insights, as key to moving beyond contemporary social and environmental issues. He states, 39

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‘The ecological crisis and the wide-spread uneasiness towards the acceleration of innovation dynamics have come up. So, the strategies of technical development have to be revised, and this requires that both engineers and the public gain socio-technological understanding’ (Ropohl, 1997, p. 70). This understanding he describes as: … systemic knowledge about the interrelationship between technical objects, the natural environment, and social practice. This understanding will acknowledge that not only the single technical object has to be optimized, but also the ecological and the psycho-social context within which the artifact is located. In a word, not only technical systems have to be designed, but also eco-technical and socio-technical systems. Socio-technological understanding covers various elements of knowledge, regarding all the relevant fields which are affected by technics, and it recombines these elements into an interdisciplinary synthesis, which might be called general technology. (Ropohl, 1997, p. 70) This stance was well supported by other socio-cultural theorists working to describe the nature of technology in terms of its knowledge and practices being socially constructed, context dependent, and situated within their historical, cultural and institutional setting (for example, Wertsch, 1991). The focus on understanding the complexity of the impacts of and influences on technological development reflect an ‘integration of the social shaping and social impact perspectives on technology’ (Bijker, 1992, p. 97). In the past many theorists had taken a somewhat one sided view, electing to focus on social impact or social shaping of technology. Technological determinism has developed out of the social impact theories where technology, once it has been introduced into society is depicted as ‘taking on a life of its own’ (Marx & Smith, 1994). In contrast social determinism theories hold to a notion that ‘societies can employ ethical conceptions to exert conscious, willful control over the norms of practice involved in technological development’ (Bimber, 1994, pp. 81–82). Lenk and Ropohl’s fully integrative systems approach was based on reasoning and experiences that showed that, helpful as each may be, neither perspective in isolation can provide the full picture of technology and its ongoing intervention in nature and society. A system based socio-technological stance does more than bring technological and social determinist perspectives together whereby the technological and the social are retained as separate and stable categories (Bijker & Law, 1992). Instead, this stance supports what Bijker describes as a ‘seamless web view’, where the social and technological are mutually constitutive and unstable (1992, p. 98). Understanding this is fundamental to deliberate and ethical decision making. As explained by Cook, ‘Our lives are today suspended within a complex network of systems, increasingly dependent upon their sustenance and stability’ (2009, p. 268).

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Relevance to Technology Education Ropohl argues that understanding the complex relationship between technology and society from a socio-technological stance is essential for technology education and students should be given the skills and opportunities to develop such understanding (1997). He argues this will enable future citizens to participate in society in an informed and critical manner, as well as ensure future technologists/engineers practice from a more reflective and system-oriented foundation. Therefore, his notion of general technology is important to the overreaching aim of technology education, as well as providing clear guidance for socio-technological understanding to be included in technology education’s ‘body of knowledge’. Features of the Field of Technology Ropohl drew from the work of Banse/Wendt (1986); Jobst (1995); Knig (1995); and Rapp (1974) (cited in Ropohl, 1997) to present what he described as the features of the field of technology that allow it to be clearly differentiated from science. These features are outlined below. • Objective: The objective of natural science is theoretical cognition for its own sake. Technology is interested in cognition just as far as it is useful to optimize the function and the structure of technical systems. • Objects: The objects of scientific research are natural phenomena. Technology investigates technical processes and is beginning to consider the socio-technical and usage contexts as well. It deals with natural effects just as far as they are used in technical systems. • Methodology: Science prefers the isolating abstraction of ideal investigation objects and prioritizes scientific knowledge. Technology deals with real technical objects involved in multidimensional implications and therefore depends on multifactor models, simulations and the testing of real prototypes, and is interdisciplinary in principle. • Characteristics of Results: Science produces isolated hypotheses and idealized theories. Technology generates complex and realistic rules of design by transforming knowledge and integrating it into systematized experience. • Criteria of Quality: Science seeks experimental corroboration, theoretical consistency and approval by the scientific community. Technology seeks practical success of a technical solution and approval by the engineering and industrial practice. Technology is pragmatic in the philosophical sense of the word: it replaces truth by success (summarized from Ropohl, 1997, p. 67). The ‘criteria of quality’ feature is supported by Baird (2002) when he argues for the epistemic criteria for knowledge in the domain of technology being materialist in nature. He states that ‘the things we make bear our knowledge of the world, on a par with the words we speak’ (Baird, 2002, p. 1). Whereas other domains (science for 41

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example) may hold to a ‘justified true belief or similarly propositional criteria for knowledge, in technology this should be replaced by an intertwining of a ‘materials sense of truth with the notion of function’ (Baird, 2002, p. 4). More specifically he argues, ‘an artifact bears knowledge when it successfully accomplishes a function’ (Baird, 2002, p. 3). In keeping with Ropohl’s position, knowledge within the domain of technology therefore, can be viewed as validated not in relation to ‘truth’, but in relation to successful ‘function’. Relevance to Technology Education Ropohl presents his features as a means of differentiating technology from science, and ultimately arguing for technology to be identified as a discipline in its own right. While Ropohl himself does not reflect directly on the importance of these features for technology education, they provide useful points to draw on as part of adding further depth, or differentiating aspects, to support what socio-technological understanding might look like in technology education. Knowledge Types Ropohl identified five different types of knowledge and discussed each of these in terms of their usefulness for technology education. Ropohl’s fifth knowledge type, socio-technological understanding, derives from the philosophy of technology as discussed above. The four remaining types of technical knowledge categories derive from his analyses of engineering practice, and are summarized below: 1. Technological Laws: These are described as ‘the transformation of one or a few natural laws’ (Ropohl, 1997, p. 68). They could be argued as the operationalization of other domain knowledge or empirical data into ‘law’ for a specific purpose. In keeping with the epistemic criteria outlined above, the validity of technological laws is established in terms of what works. 2. Functional Rules: These rules specify ‘what to do, if a certain result is to be attained under given circumstances. These rules may be stated as verbal instructions, or diagrams, or charts of approximate values, thus serving as mere recipes which can be used successfully without being understood theoretically’ (Ropohl, 1997, p. 68). They relate to what has been termed by Pitt (2001) as ‘cookbook’ knowledge. 3. Structural Rules: This refers to rules underpinning ‘the assembly and interplay of components of a system’ (Ropohl, 1997, p. 69). They are important in ‘supporting the creation of novel realities’ through developing knowledge of ‘non-existing objects’ which are represented via mental images rather than discursive statements (Ropohl, 1997, p. 69). 4. Technical Know-how: This is explained as implicit (or tacit) knowledge and ‘implies cognitive resources that have sunk down into the subconscious … and can be gained by thorough practice only’ (Ropohl, 1997, p. 69). 42

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Relevance to Technology Education Ropohl argues against technological laws being included in the ‘body of knowledge’ for technology education. While they may be required as part of student’s technological practice, they will be specific to that practice, and therefore should not be explicitly included, as to do so would begin to dictate or prescribe contexts. He suggests that functional and structural rules may be appropriate to some extent in technology education. For example, they could be useful in developing an understanding of: basic principles of familiar products; how and why knowledge in technology is codified; how common material and products should be used; and how things can go together for the purposes of system construction, maintenance and repair. In this way the inclusion of a focus on functional and structural rules could add further depth to socio-technological understanding. Knowing about these rules would also support technological practice in general education as students would know to look out for them to help guide their own decision making and actions. With regards to technical knowhow, Ropohl explains that nobody would be able to grasp all of it and guards against over specializing in general education. He states ‘General technological education … must not aim at breeding half-skilled workers or pocket-size engineers’ (Ropohl, 1997, p. 71). That said, technical know-how can be accumulated over time as students undertake appropriate technological practice to solve problems and realize opportunities. As with Technological Laws, the key here is not to prescribe specific know-how, but rather provide opportunity to develop that which is required for the practice being undertaken. Socio-Technical Systems Ropohl draws from the notion of the socio-technical system as created in the context of labor studies by the Tavistock Institute in London (Emery/Trist, 1960 cited in Ropohl, 1999). He argues that there are three different interpretations of a system, one resting on a structural concept, another a functional concept, and the third a hierarchical concept. The structural concept presents a system as set of elements and a set of relations between these elements. The functional concept presents the system as an entity, sometimes called a black box, which transforms inputs into outputs, depending on specific internal states and this transformation is called a function. He then explains the structural concept may turn into the hierarchical concept, if the elements are regarded as subsystems. The original system may therefore be considered as a subsystem of a more extensive supersystem (Ropohl, 1999). He also presents technical system representations as ‘a cognitive map of reality’ or a ‘models’ and discusses their usefulness (Summarised from Ropohl, 1999, pp. 64–65).

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Relevance to Technology Education Ropohl does not reflect directly on the importance of socio-technical systems to technology education. However, his discussion of socio-technical systems helps to identify drivers in technical development, how things work together, and the importance and limitations of models. Ethics and Responsibilities In later discussion regarding engineering ethics, Ropohl explores the complex realm of ‘avoiding harms and increasing benefits of the technical development, particularly with regard to the environmental and social impacts’. He argues that engineering ethics assumes that the individual engineer is able to control technical practice autonomously, whereas ‘the competencies of engineers are very limited’ (2002, p. 149). He argues this assumption is based on the fact that, ‘In engineering ethics … one approach seems to be predominant, the idea of consequentialist ethics or ethics of responsibility (Kiepas, 1997; Lenk & Maring, 2001 cited in Ropohl, 2002). He particularly calls this into question as he argues that: … the individual engineer, independently acting on his or her own, has become a rare exception. Engineering work regularly is performed in teams (co-operative action), depending on objectives and orders of the corporation management (corporate action). Partly, technical development even goes beyond the corporation level and, then, turns out to be a social construction (collective action). So, there are at least three levels of responsible subjects: the individual, the corporation and the politically constituted society as a whole. (Ropohl, 2002, p. 150) He further explains that in the field of technology, responsibility means having an awareness of consequences and values for planning and controlling technical actions. In which case, responsibility requires the competence for: • values: to answer for a certain project or product implies to know which values are appropriate to the case, and to compare the possible consequences to the respective values; • factual knowledge: to identify the possible consequences implies knowledge and understanding in all of those fields in which consequences may occur; and • acting: to shape the project or product in such a way that the consequences match the values requires a respective sphere of influence and implies having everything under control (Ropohl, 2002, p. 151). There are obvious issues in assigning any one of these competencies to an individual and therefore, in keeping with earlier arguments for a system view, Ropohl argues that ethics and responsibility explorations must reflect an understanding of individuals, alongside the industrial corporations, and the societal, political and legal institutions in which all create and reside. 44

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Relevance to Technology Education Ropohl’s target in this discussion is on specialized engineering education and does not discuss the implications for general technology education. However, he raises many issues with regards to moral and ethical decision making and the complex world of individual and collective responsibility. This work therefore provides opportunity to add depth and a critical frame into the body of knowledge for technology education, particularly with regards to enabling students to understand and enact reasoning focused on what should be done as much as what can and could be done. APPLICATION TO TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION IN NEW ZEALAND

The Changing Face of Technology in New Zealand As outlined in the introduction, extensive work was undertaken between 2004 and 2007 to revise and re-develop the technology curriculum in New Zealand and this was published as part of the New Zealand Curriculum (2007). The resulting strands of the 2007 technology curriculum are introduced below. The Technological Practice Strand This strand enables students to undertake their own technological practice within a particular setting and to reflect on the technological practice of others. Within this strand students will develop their capability in terms of levelled achievement objectives derived from three key components of technological practice: Planning for Practice; Brief Development; and Outcome Development and Evaluation. The Nature of Technology Strand This strand provides students with an ability to develop a critical understanding of technology as an intervening force in the world, including an appreciation that technological developments are part of and influenced by historical, social and cultural contexts. Within this strand students will develop their philosophical view of technology in terms of levelled achievement objectives derived from two key components from the philosophy of technology: Characteristics of Technology; and Characteristics of Technological Outcomes. The Technological Knowledge Strand This strand provides students with a basis for the development of key generic concepts underpinning technological development and resulting technological outcomes. These concepts allow students to understand evidence that is required to defend not only the feasibility of a technological outcome, but also its acceptability 45

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in a wider societal sense. Within this strand students will be able to develop technological understandings in terms of levelled achievement objectives derived from three key components important in the field of technology: Technological Modelling; Technological Products and Technological Systems. Together these strands and components serve to structure learning programs that would encourage a technology literacy that is deep, broad and critical in nature (Compton & France, 2007) and in so doing begin to meet the purpose of general education as recommended by Ropohl (1997). The remainder of this section will focus on illustrating Rophol’s significant influence on the Characteristics of Technology component of the Nature of Technology strand, with reference also being made to his noteworthy influence on the three components of the Technological Knowledge strand. Ropohl’s socio-technological understanding and socio-technical systems also had some influence on the Characteristics of Technological Outcomes component. However, the development of this component drew more extensively from the work of Kroes & Meijers related to the ‘Dual Nature of Artifacts’ (2000), Vaesen’s discussion of Artifacts and Norms (2008) and De Vries explanations of physical and functional nature knowledge (2002; 2003) and therefore will not be discussed further in this chapter. All components of the Technological Practice strand provide opportunity to develop Ropohl’s Technical Know-how, but were not particularly developed from his work, and therefore further discussion of this strand is also outside the scope of this chapter. Ropohl’s Influence on the Characteristics of Technology Component In developing this component, Ropohl’s assertion that socio-technological understanding should be a key part of a body of knowledge for technology education was taken seriously and was used as its foundation. Links between the ‘key ideas’ of this component and socio-technological understanding, as well as other aspects of Ropohl’s work as discussed above, are presented in Table 4.1. The descriptions in Table 4.1 are excerpts taken from work available at http://technology.tki.org.nz/Technology-in-the-NZC/Nature-of-technology/ Characteristics-of-technology/(tab)/Key-ideas. For examples of student learning related to this component see Compton and Compton (2013). Ropohl’s influence is also clearly evident in the way these ‘key ideas’ were developed into levelled achievement objectives and indicators of progression. For illustration of this, see Figure 4.1, with further details available at http://technology.tki.org.nz/Technology-in-the-NZC/Technology-indicators/ Characteristics-of-technology-IOPs. Ropohl’s Influence on the Technological Knowledge Strand In developing the components under the Technological knowledge strand, all aspects of Ropohl’s work were used to support the development of the Technological 46

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Modelling component. His Functional Rules and views on Ethics and Responsibilities were used in the development of the Technological Products component, and his Functional and Structural Rules, explanations of Socio-technical systems and Ethics and Responsibilities were used to support the development of the Technological Systems component. See Table 4.2 for these links. Table 4.1. Ropohl and the characteristics of technology Characteristics of technology

Ropohl’s concepts

Purposefulness: Technology is a unique form of human activity, consisting of a group of socially embedded activities (technological practice) activated by need, desire and/or opportunity. What sets technological practice apart is its purposeful and productive nature: outcomes are arrived at through a deliberate process of design, decision making, production and manufacturing rather than by evolution (as in the natural world) or chance.

Socio-technological understanding Feature iii) Methodology

Extending human capability: Technology is inseparable from society and the environment and creates a space for looking at the world differently. Many technological outcomes enhance our sensory perception and/or physical ability, enabling the human body to go beyond what ‘natural’ functioning would otherwise permit. Some innovative technologies go much further, even altering our perception of what it is to be human.

Socio-technological understanding

Technology as a socially embedded activity: This means that the social world of culture, politics, and ideologies, together with the natural world, collectively influence technological development. This influence is however a two-way street: through its creation of the made world, technology has a profound and complex influence on the social and natural world. Such a socio-technological perspective argues that technology and society are intertwined in myriad and often difficult-to-determine ways.

Socio-technological understanding

Functional and practical reasoning: Functional reasoning focuses on how and why things work; practical reasoning focuses on what should or ought to be done – in other words, on what can be justified in terms of social and ethical standards or norms. This ‘normative’ reasoning is concerned with what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. It reflects the social and cultural mores and values of the particular society, environment, and era. Practical reasoning is necessary if people are to view technology as beneficial for humanity, and not a law unto itself.

Socio-technological understanding

Feature iii) Methodology Feature iv) Characteristics of Results Socio-technical systems

Ethics and Responsibilities

(cont.) 47

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Table 4.1. Ropohl and the characteristics of technology (cont.) Characteristics of technology

Ropohl’s concepts

Different impacts: While all technology seeks to enhance human capability, not everyone shares the benefits of these enhancements. This is most obviously true of war technologies, whose sole purpose is to put whole groups of people at a disadvantage. This means that, when seeking to understand technology, its power, and its limitations, we must recognize that technological practices and outcomes are of different value to different people, and in different places and times. The worth of a technological development needs to be established by critical analyses that take into account historical precedents and a multiplicity of social, cultural, and political perspectives.

Socio-technological understanding

Disciplinary knowledge: Technology is a discipline in its own right, with its own body of knowledge and skills. It is also interdisciplinary in nature, drawing widely on knowledge and skills from other disciplines (for example, science, mathematics, art, philosophy, psychology, and ethics). It is important to understand what is distinctive about technological knowledge so that it can be used in conjunction with other specialist knowledge in mutually supportive and enhancing ways.

Socio-technological understanding

Codified knowledge: Aspects of technological knowledge are often codified (translated into rules or regulations) when experts consider they have sufficient evidence to warrant it. These rules or regulations may consist of codes of practice, codes of ethics, intellectual property codes, codes of standards, acceptable tolerances, etc.

Functional Rules

Collaboration: Technology is becoming increasingly interdisciplinary, so successful outcomes typically require a great deal of collaboration between people and across disciplines. For this to happen technologists need to recognise that different disciplines have different bodies of knowledge, and know which disciplines to involve in a particular context.

Ethics and Responsibilities

Ethics and Responsibilities

Feature ii) Objects Feature iii) Methodology Feature iv) Characteristics of Results

Structural Rules

The descriptions in Table 4.2 are excerpts taken from work available at http://technology.tki.org.nz/Technology-in-the-NZC/Technological-knowledge CONCLUSION

The aim of Technology in the New Zealand Curriculum (Ministry of Education, 1995) was to develop students’ technological literacy. As described elsewhere (Compton & 48

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Figure 4.1. Characteristics of technology learning progression diagram (copyright Ministry of Education, 2010; reprinted with permission)

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Harwood, 2003, 2005), learning programs in technology sought to meet this aim by ensuring students were provided with regularly and progressive opportunities to undertake increasingly sophisticated technological practice. This approach was shown to be very successful in developing many instances of what Ropohl describes as Table 4.2. Ropohl and the technological knowledge strand Technological modelling

Ropohl’s concepts

Representations: All models are by definition representations of reality. By identifying possible risk factors in a development, technological modelling can inform risk management decisions to avoid, mitigate, transfer, or retain the risk.

Socio-technological understanding Ethics and Responsibilities Socio-technical systems

Functional Modelling: Functional models play a crucial role in identifying an outcome’s potential and probable impact on the world before it is fully realised as a technological outcome and implemented in situ. Functional modelling enables technologists to evaluate design concepts from different perspectives and assess their likely impact. They can then make justifiable decisions about the technical feasibility and social acceptability of proposed technological outcomes, taking into account specifications, materials and techniques, historical and sociocultural considerations, etc., any of which, if ignored, could potentially have negative consequences.

Socio-technological understanding

Prototyping: Prototypes enable technologists to explore factors that may have a bearing on the future development/manufacture of a technological outcome prior to its implementation in its destined location. The purpose of prototyping is to enable evaluation of a technological outcome’s fitness for purpose against the brief, and to determine whether it meets acceptability criteria or needs further development. Prototyping allows for in-depth exploration of the impacts (intended and unintended) that the outcome will have on people and/or the physical and social environment.

Socio-technological understanding

Types of reasoning: Technological modelling makes use of both functional and practical reasoning to provide a holistic evaluation of a technological outcome’s potential and likely impact on the world. Functional reasoning explores the technical feasibility of the design concept and outcome. Practical reasoning explores the acceptability (moral, ethical, social, political, economic, environmental, etc.) of the design concept and outcome testing.

Socio-technological understanding Functional Rules

Feature iii) Methodology Structural Rules

Feature iii) Methodology Functional Rules Structural Rules

Structural Rules Ethics and Responsibilities

(cont.) 50

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Table 4.2. Ropohl and the technological knowledge strand (cont.) Technological modelling

Ropohl’s concepts

Technological Products Performance properties: This component is primarily about the identification, description, use and development of materials, and the impact that selection of materials has on the fitness for purpose of technological outcomes.

Ethics and Responsibilities Functional Rules

Ethics and Impact of materials selection: Materials selection, evaluation Responsibilities and development has a major impact on product design, development, maintenance, and disposal. By exploring this Functional Rules impact students grow their understanding of sustainability, relating as it does to justifiable resource management, the designed-for-life cycle, and disposal, all of which are key factors to be considered when making product design decisions. Technological systems Technological systems: Technological systems are sets of interconnected components that transform, store, transport, or control materials, energy, and/or information for particular purposes. In any system, how the parts work together is as important as their individual characteristics. Important concepts include: input, output, transformation, and control ‘black box’ redundancy and reliability operational parameters.

Socio-technical systems

System design, development, maintenance, and troubleshooting require the use of specialized language and representations.

Structural Rules

Subsystems: Subsystems can be thought of as components of the whole, each having a specific function that supports the overall functioning of the system and enables it to achieve its intended purpose. The key properties of a subsystem are the particular transformation for which it is responsible and how it is integrated into the whole. A subsystem’s role can be determined by examining how inputs change to outputs in that part of the system. Effective interfaces between subsystems are critical if the overall system is to function successfully.

Socio-technical systems

Control: Control mechanisms are designed to enhance the efficiency of a technological system by maximizing desirable outputs and minimizing undesirable outputs.

Socio-technical systems Functional Rules

(cont.)

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Table 4.2. Ropohl and the technological knowledge strand (cont.) Technological modelling

Ropohl’s concepts

Operational parameters: All systems have operational parameters – boundaries and/or conditions within which they have been designed to function. Operational parameters are closely related to the concepts of redundancy and reliability, both of which influence the design and performance of systems. When budgets are tight, designers can find themselves under pressure to sacrifice redundancy and reliability (performance is not always the only priority in system design) to save costs, potentially raising ethical issues. Technological systems are often represented in diagrammatic form, with symbols for the various components.

Socio-technical systems Ethics and Responsibilities Structural Rules

student Technical Know-how. It enabled the development of ‘real world’ functioning technological outcomes that improved their own and other’s lives. This led to high levels of student engagement, increasing expertise in the use of tools and materials, and improved stakeholder interaction to support consideration of wider social factors than more ‘craft’ oriented programs. By 2004 however, research findings were showing that the nature of the technological literacy arising from students undertaking their own technological practice was, as predicted by Ropohl, not enough ‘to establish a reasonable body of basic knowledge patterns which will enable people to understand the principles of technics and to participate in political decisions about future developments’ (1997, p. 71). These findings were used to argue for an extended view (Compton, 2004; Compton & Jones, 2004) whereby learning programs should aim to develop a broad, deep, and critical technological literacy (Compton & France, 2007). This was enacted through the consolidation of the original technology curriculum strands into one Technological Practice strand and the addition of Technological Knowledge and Nature of Technology strands (Ministry of Education, 2007). Ropohl’s systems thinking and collective work as described above contributed significantly to this extended view of technological literacy, supporting the move to include a philosophical strand and a re-conceptualizing of what should be included in a technological knowledge strand. His socio-technological understandings in particular, had a major impact on the development of the Characteristics of Technology component, providing both philosophical rigour and progressive possibilities. A powerful legacy indeed. REFERENCES Arthur, W. B. (2009). The nature of technology: What it is and how it evolves. New York, NY: Free Press.

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GÜNTER ROPOHL Bijker, W. (1992). The social construction of fluorescent lighting or how an artifact was invented in its diffusion stage. In W. Bijker & J. Law (Eds.), Shaping technology/building society: Studies in technological change (pp. 75–102). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Bimber, B. (1994). Three faces of technological determinism. In L. Marx & M. Roe Smith (Eds.), Does technology drive history?: The dilemma of technological determinism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Burke, J., & Ornstein, R. (1997). The Axemakers gift: Technology’s capture and control of our minds and culture. New York, NY: Penguin Putnam, Inc. Compton, V. J. (2004). Technological knowledge: A developing framework for technology education in New Zealand. Briefing Paper prepared for the New Zealand Ministry of Education Curriculum Project. Compton, V. J., & Compton, A. (2013). Teaching the nature of technology: Determining and supporting student learning of the philosophy of technology. International Journal of Design and Technology Education, 23(2), 229–256. Compton, V. J., & France, B. (2007, June 21–25). Redefining technological literacy in New Zealand: From concepts to curriculum constructs. Paper presented at the Pupils’ Attitudes Towards Technology (PATT) international design & technology education conference: Teaching and learning technological literacy in the classroom, Glasgow, Scotland (Published in conference proceedings, 260–272). Compton, V. J., & Harwood, C. D. (2003). Enhancing technological practice: An assessment framework for technology education in New Zealand. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 13(1), 1–26. Compton, V. J., & Harwood, C. D. (2005). Progression in technology education in New Zealand: Components of practice as a way forward. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 15(3), 253–287. Compton, V. J., & Jones, A. T. (2004). Nature of technology: A developing framework for technology education in New Zealand. Briefing paper prepared for the New Zealand Ministry of Education Curriculum Project. De Vries, M. J. (2002, June 13–15). Integration of knowledge in technological developments: Philosophical reflections on an empirical case study. Paper presented at Technological Knowledge: Philosophical Reflections Conference, Boxmeer. De Vries, M. J. (2003). The nature of technological knowledge: Extending empirically informed studies into what engineers know. Techne: Journal of the Society for Philosophy and Technology, 6(3), 1–21. Ferre, F. (1988). Philosophy of technology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Idhe, D. (1997). The structure of technology knowledge. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 7(1–2), 73–79. Kroes, P. A., & Meijers, A. (Eds.). (2000). The empirical turn in the philosophy of technology. Oxford: Elsevier Science. Kroes, P. A., & Meijers, A. (2000). Introduction: A discipline in search of its identity. In P. A. Kroes & A. Meijers (Eds.), The empirical turn in the philosophy of technology. Oxford: Elsevier Science. Marx, L., & Roe Smith, M. (Eds.). (1994). Does technology drive history?: The dilemma of technological determinism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Mitcham, C. (1994). Thinking through technology: The path between engineering and philosophy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Ministry of Education. (1993). The New Zealand curriculum framework. Wellington: Learning Media. Ministry of Education. (1995). Technology in the New Zealand curriculum. Wellington: Learning Media. Ministry of Education. (2007). The New Zealand curriculum. Wellington: Learning Media. Noam Cook, S. D. (2009). Design and responsibility: The interdependence of natural, artifactual, and human systems. In P. Vermaas, P. Kroes, A. Light, & S. A. Moore (Eds.), Philosophy and design: From engineering to architecture. Dordrecht: Springer. Pitt, J. C. (2000). Thinking about technology: Foundations of the philosophy of technology. New York, NY: Seven Bridges Press. Postman, N. (1992). Technopoly: The surrender of culture to technology. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf. Ropohl, G. (1997). Knowledge types in technology. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 7(1–2), 65–72.

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V. COMPTON Ropohl, G. (1999). Philosophy of socio-technical systems. Philosophy & Technology, 4(3), 59–71. Ropohl, G. (2002). Mixed prospects of engineering ethics. European Journal of Engineering Education, 27(2), 149–155. Staudenmaier, J. M. (1985). Technology’s storytellers: Reweaving the human fabric. Cambridge, MA: Society for the History of Technology and the MIT Press. Taylor, T. (2010). The artificial ape: How technology changed the course of human evolution. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Vaesen, K. (2008). A philosophical essay on artifacts and norms. Eindhoven: Technische Universiteit Eindhoven. Wertsch, J. V. (1991). Voices of the mind: A sociocultural approach to mediated action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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5. PIERRE RABARDEL Instrumented Activity and Theory of Instrument

INTRODUCTION

This chapter starts with the presentation of who Pierre Rabardel is. The rest of the chapter is then devoted to his work and is divided into three parts: in the first part, we outline the theoretical basis of the instrumental approach to psychology used by Rabardel and to which he contributed by developing a generalized instrument theory. The second part presents the concepts that were worked out and developed by Rabardel: the distinction between technical objects, artefacts; the instrument, a mixed entity; the instrumental genesis; the instrumented activity in the instrumented action. The chapter concludes with an example of how the instrument theory is used to analyze a teaching situation focused on designing a product through easily recognizable and analyzable lines of action. PIERRE RABARDEL, A PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCHER

Pierre Rabardel is a French teacher-researcher specializing in psychology and ergonomics. Today, he is Honorary Professor at the University of Paris 8. He was successively: a university lecturer at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers (CNAM), a research officer at the Institut National de Recherche Pédagogique (INRP), and then a University Professor at the University of Paris 8. During his career, he was in charge of different national and international research teams and several research networks. He founded and led the research team C3U (Conception, Création, Compétences et Usages) that is part of the Psychology Department of the University of Paris 8. His work covers the relationships between humans and technical objects and technical systems; the instrumental genesis and the cognitive development of subjects. He has been interested in the instrumented activity and in the processes that enable subjects to act and complete a task. He has conducted numerous research studies in professional life and expanded his research to teaching and learning in a school context. His favorite themes relate to new forms and modalities of application in business; risks and health at work; the increased ability to act; the instrumental approach in ergonomics, psychology and didactics. He has published several books and taken part in many collective works. © KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_005

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THE INSTRUMENTED ACTIVITY: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Anthropocentric Approach of Technical Objects and Systems Rabardel calls for an anthropocentric approach to technical objects and systems as a complement to purely techno-centric approaches. He considers technological objects and systems as anthropological facts in the sense that man occupies a central place, which determines the relationships to techniques, as defined by Simondon (1958/1969/1989) and Leroi-Gourhan (1971, 1985/1991). The omnipresent technical objects and systems generated by technologies constitute a large part of the world in which we live. They are at the heart of our concerns and, hence, cannot be comprehended on the basis of the technologies alone that created them. These technical objects and systems are anthropocentric because they are in response to a human need, designed and made in a human environment. In ordinary life, humans are ubiquitous throughout the life cycle of these products. Therefore, the relationships humans establish with these systems in this life cycle must not be neglected. On the contrary, these relationships must be thought out and conceptualised so that characteristics and properties to serve humans can be understood and organised. But these relationships need also to be understood and conceptualised, since they are at the center of the relationship between cognition and action that contemporary psychology studies. Technical objects and systems do not involve just technical aspects and should not be considered from a technical point of view only. They must also be examined from the point of view of the people who use them, and be designed as such. This option places human activity at the heart of the analysis, and thus enables the necessary reversal so that it becomes possible to consider things according to humans (Rabardel, 1995). For this author, human, task and artefact form a whole which is driven by the intentional acts of the subject and which is directed towards a result. The Social Constructivist Theoretical Definition of the Activity Rabardel has drawn on the seminal work of Lev Vygotski that preceded activity theory (Clot, 1999; Engestrôm, 1990; Kaptelinin, 1996; Kuutti, 1996; Léontiev, 1976; Nardi, 1996; Rabardel 1995; Wertsh, 1997; Wertsh, 1998; etc). In this framework, activity is defined as the logical temporal and spatial organization of the actions and operations that aim at reaching a conscious goal. In other words, activity is an object. The purpose of the activity leads, directs and guides the activity of the subject towards its reason, its completion (Bedny & Meister, 1997). In summary, activity has a social and cultural dimension. It is mediated by artefacts; mediations are, thus, semiotic. Social and cultural dimension of the activity. To explain work as a human activity appropriate for a specific purpose, is not to simply say that it finds its origin in the goals and problems faced by humans. Work, as an activity, results from the use of 56

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tools and original ways of thinking without which the artefact could not have been made (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 198). Activity is expressed through goals and through means. Activity is determined by the associated milieu in which the subject acts (Simondon, 2017). The milieu is seen from both a material and social perspective. In this framework, human activity is a complex dialectic process which “is internal to individuals but external in nature” (Seve, 1999, p. 258), the tool being at the heart of the activity. In other words, activity both depends and evolves in the milieu and with the milieu. For Vygotsky subject activity interlace evolution and involution processes, intercrosses internal and external factors, is made of successive adaptations and victories over difficulties (1931/1983, p. 136). The role of instruments on activity. In this complex social-constructivist process, the role of psychological and technical instruments (tools, techniques and signs), as part of the socio-cultural heritage, marks the transition from basic activities to higher mental activities. The subject learns, conceptualizes within the instrumented action scheme. Two types of instruments coexist in the instrumental act. The psychological instrument differs fundamentally from the technical instrument with regard to its action orientation. The first one addresses mind and behavior, whereas the second one is designed to obtain a certain change in the object itself. The psychological instrument does not cause any change in the object itself; it tends to influence one’s own mind (or the minds of others) or behavior. It is not a means of influencing the object. Therefore, in the instrumental act, activity is seen as being directed towards oneself, and not towards the object (Vygotsky, 1931/1978). At the level of the cognitive development of the subject, practice, use of signs and intelligence operate together. The subject learns; the learner is an epistemic subject. Instrument – Objects under development. The instrument is an intermediate element that exists between human activity and the purpose of the activity. To take it over, the subject transforms the instrument and makes it evolve. It is an object under development (Cole, 1996; Leontiev, 1975, 1981). When a subject use a technical system, for example a computer system including the 3D printer, the subject develops a new set of competencies. Cognitive processes mediated by instruments. All higher psychological functions are mediated processes, which include, as part of their structure, the use of signs as a fundamental means of orientation and mastery of psychological processes (Vygotsky, 1997). The subject’s cognitive process takes place thanks to the semiotic mediations produced in the context of interactive exchanges, through the transformation of the social and communicative function of signs into an individual and intellectual function. In other words, the appropriation of the instruments (technical tools and signs) that marks the transition from basic activities to higher mental activities happens through the transformation of the interpersonal processes into intra-personal processes. 57

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The tool is oriented towards the transformation of objects. It is externally oriented. The sign is a mean of internal activity. It is internally oriented. The tool acts as a sign, and as a sign of action. Tool is sign. It has a dual nature, it is an object involved in action and an action framework. The instrumental approach is semiotic. The link between object and sign is inconceivable without the interpretive mental scheme (which relates to concept, meaning, interpretation grid). Behind the socio-constructivist vision of the instrumented activity, the instrumental act reveals the complexity of interactions where instruments are at the heart of the cognitive process. TOPIC ON, WHICH RABARDEL FOCUSES

Rabardel’s theoretical framework mixes the scientific findings of the activity theories. He goes back to the anthropological approach in psychology that recognized the fundamental role of language mediation. His studies report on the status of the instrument and on the activities it is linked to. They focus on the aspects that appear to be relevant in an instrumental perspective so as to develop a generalized conception of the instrument (Rabardel, 1995). As a central issue of the activity, Rabardel raises the question of the means and associates the instrument with all levels of cognitive functioning. The means are on one hand psychological instruments (as defined by Vygotsky, 1930/1985, 1931/1978, 1934/1985). They enable the subject to control and guide its behavior, in other words, they enable the subject to act on itself and others in action. On the other hand, instruments are made up of instruments that have emerged from production technologies and modes that determine action; here, activity is oriented towards the world of objects. Rabardel’s generalized conception of instrument opens up to the fields of work, education and daily life. His conception is based on several fundamental concepts: the artefact and the instrument he links with their functionality, the artefact’s instrumental field, mediation, instrumental genesis and social utilization schemes, situation. Rabardel’s model of instrumented activity breaks with the bipolar models Subject––Object. It provides space for a mediating element: the instrument (Figure 5.1). The arrows represent three types of mediation in the instrumented activity: mediations, which are directed towards the object of the activity (they are object mediations). Mediations are directed towards the other subjects (interpersonal mediations) and towards the subject itself (reflexive mediations). Mediation The use of artefacts can mediate the relationship of the subject with the object of the activity, with itself and with others. Practice carries three types pf mediation: object mediations are epistemic and pragmatic in nature. They are epistemic when they aim 58

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Figure 5.1. Rabardel’s model of instrumented activity, 1997

at getting to know the object, whether it is in relation to its intrinsic characteristics or its changes following the subject’s actions or the dynamics of situations. They are pragmatic when they aim for the subject’s action. Interpersonal mediations relate to activity directed to other subjects. Like object mediations, they are epistemic and pragmatic in nature. Reflexive mediations are the mediations established by the subject with itself in relation to the instrument. The three types of mediation are involved in the activity; however, some types of mediation are more prevalent than others or absent (Flocher & Rabardel, 2004; Rabardel, 2005; Rabardel & Bourmaud, 2003; Rabardel & Pastré, 2005). Distinction between Artefact and Instrument The terms “object, artefacts, instruments tools” are used in the scientific literature with different meanings. Rabardel clarifies the meaning of each of these terms (1995, 1997a, 1997b). He makes a distinction between the physical object and the physical object which is used. To distinguish them, he introduces the concept of instrument. The tool, which is called artefact, is a material and symbolic subject. It is firstly designed and produced by a person or a team of people so as to meet one or several precise goals. The artefact is a term that comes from the anthropological vocabulary. The artefact can be material or symbolic. The subject or other subjects produce it. The artefact when associated with the act that makes it effective, is the instrument. It is one of the instrument’s components. The notion of artefact makes 59

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it possible to think out the relationships between the Subject and the physical or semiotic Object. The instrument results from a use. The subject builds the instrument from the artefact when using the artefact during an activity. The instrument is not “given”. It must be built by the subject. The instrument can be enriched according to the way it is used, in the specificity of the situations encountered by the subject in its activities (Rabardel, 1995). The instrument is a mixed entity linked to both the artefact and the utilization schemes the subject associates with it. Schemes can result either from the subject’s own construction or from the appropriation of the social utilization schemes. Regardless of their source, they are considered as utilization schemes by Rabardel. In other words, the instrument is being built as the artefact is being used. The instrument has two dimensions: an artefactual dimension and a schematic dimension. The artefactual dimension of the instrument consists of constituent functions and constituted functions. The constituent functions, which are initially designed and planned by the tool designer, are changed into other “new” functions. In other words, during the process of using the artefact, sometimes the constituent functions are not used by the subject who makes a particular use of the artefact. The particular use of the artefact means that the subject has created new functions that are called “constituted functions” by Rabardel. The (new) constituted functions are created as the artefact is being used. Both are associated and work together. Both are not neutral and will have an impact on knowledge under construction and its conceptualization. They depend on the way the user will use an artefact, and on the cognitive structures he will build and develop (utilization schemes) to carry out a task when using the artefact. The Instrumental Field of an Artefact The artefact’s instrumental field corresponds to all functional and subjective values that the artefact can have within the activity of an individual (Rabardel, 1999). It gathers the different meanings that an artefact can have for a subject when action is ongoing. The instrumental field concept allows reporting on the level of re-use of the artefact a posteriori. Instrumental Genesis The search for understanding of the evolution of artefacts according to the user’s activity and the emergence of new uses as part of the same instrumental building process has led to the concept of instrumental genesis used by Rabardel. Instrumental genesis describes a process, which involves both the artefact and the subject. The user develops the instrument from the artefact during the activity in the process. The instrumental development concerns, on one hand, the tasks carried out by the user and the reorganization of its activity, and on the other hand, the transformations of the artefact and the evolution of the activity which accompanies 60

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these transformations (system tailoring) (Cook et al., 1996, 2006). The instrumental genesis process corresponds to a type of activity carried out by the subjects placed in a position of action vis-à-vis the artefacts. The generated activity is sufficiently constant and generalized to allow the subject to start anticipating the evolution of the artefact. The process described has to be analyzed from an ergonomic point of view (analysis of the contexts and situations, of the potential events and schemes that are available or that can be built). It also has to be analysed from a psychological perspective by referring to the subject who pursues goals in the action. The process of instrumental genesis has two dimensions (as the instrument). It comes from both the artefact and the utilization schemes. Both dimensions can be distinguished and are often joint: the instrumentalization directed towards the artefact and the instrumentalization related to the subject itself. During the instrumental genesis, a dual movement happens between the artefact and the subject: • Instrumentalization (movement from the subject towards the artefact): the user adapts the tools to his/her needs; thanks to his/her knowledge, he/she will be able to select and use the function she/she needs for the ongoing action. This process is based on the characteristics and intrinsic properties of the artefact. It can be defined as a process for the enhancement of the artefact’s properties by the subject. New functions can emerge that are not necessarily anticipated by the artefacts’ designers (catacresis: for example, using a wrench as a hammer). • Instrumentation (movement from the artefact towards the subject): the constraints and potential of the artefact influence and condition the action of the individual (its representations, its gesture, its procedures, etc.). The user changes its activity, its action and utilization schemes so as to use the tool’s functionalities. Schemes are constructed by the subject based on his/her experience, and allow him/her to act on the reality. The gradual discovery made by the subject of the intrinsic properties of the artefact is associated with the accommodation of its schemes and with changes of meaning of the instrument resulting from the association of the artefact with new schemes. We observe that schemes do not have only a private dimension, but they also have a social dimension as they partly result from a collective process. The study of the schemes helps explain the processes underpinning the activity, in particular the subject’s conceptualization of reality. Both the modifications of the artefact and of the subjects allow the instrumental genesis. The instrumental genesis addresses on one hand the subject that changes during the instrumentation process, and on the other hand, the artefact that changes during the instrumentalization process. The constituted instrument is linked to the unique circumstances of the situation and to the conditions faced by the subject. The instrumental genesis process is of varying durations. In this process, several types of schemes appear. Social utilization schemes are at the same time “organizing” the activity in the sense of Vergnaud (1991, 1996), but also “acting as a structure” 61

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Figure 5.2. Instrumental genesis process (Rabardel, 1995)

that has a history, that changes as it adapts to situations (past, lived experience) so as to interpret new data (Béguin & Rabardel, 2000). These utilization schemes refer to the interaction of the subject with the artefact. They have a private dimension that is proper to each subject, as well as a social dimension that has developed between the subjects. Instrumented action schemes are directed towards the object of the activity. To reach the objectives pursued, these schemes refer to utilization schemes. They carry the activity’s meaning. Schemes for collective action that have been instrumented in reference to the use of artefacts by several subjects’, function simultaneously or jointly. Situation, Types of Situation, Organization Plan of the Activity Action is oriented towards a goal. Reaching this goal depends on social circumstances and material resources (Suchman, 1987). The activity mediated by the instruments is always situated. It depends on the situations. The situation defines the context of the action. It is organized according to the main type of activity which depends on the subject’s action, in other words, which depends on the way the subject’s activity is organized. The families of activity gather types of situations having the same general aim. The families of activity are organized on higher levels than the 62

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types of situations. Areas of activity are organized around the characteristics of the environment or according to other factors (Rabardel & Bourmaud, 2003) and constitute activity organization plans. THE ‘PRACTICAL’ USE IN TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION

Rabardel’s instrumental approach is very often used for research in France. It is used less frequently in other countries. This is due to the fact that not many people read publications written in French. In technology, this approach is justified by the fact that the tools on which it is based are the components of the learning environment (Andreucci, Froment, & Verillon, 1996). The approach provides a certain number of analytical tools which allow one to study the activity of the actors (teachers and students) who are placed in a project situation (design of objects and technical systems, analysis of technical systems, use of technical systems) that are characteristic of technological education. These tools support the study of the construction of complex knowledge, for example, the conceptualization of materiality from a technological perspective. This is a concept too often studied from the perspective of the physical sciences and chemistry (Chatoney, 2003). They may also support the activity of students placed in project situations which require the use of: calculators (Trouche, 2005); Tableur (Haspekian, 2005); educative resources (Contamine, George, & Hotte, 2003); dynamic environments (Zanarelli, 2003) or CTBT (Brandt-Pomares & Boilevin, 2009; Laisney & Brandt-Pomares, 2015). As a further example, we will examine the design activity as the object of an actual learning-teaching situation in France. It concerns students aged 14–15 years old. This study, which is based on a research project aimed at studying the role that 3D printers have on the students’ abilities to develop solutions in a school context (that is to say in the presence of other subjects; students and teacher). This research project was conducted in 5 schools in the South of France and involved a sample of 270 students and 5 teachers. We will limit our discussion to the development of solutions, as proposed by the teacher, to design a protective cover for a smartphone and on the role of the material artefacts provided, in order to achieve the task. We will examine the situation using the concept of an instrumental approach, which will demonstrate how Rabardel’s theoretical framework assists us to understand the reality and to identify the structure of the instrumented activity. To understand the instrumented activity, we will use different tools to analyze the task. Preliminary analyses of the task and of the activity will enable us to identify the knowledge that is needed for the task, and then to define the space for possible solutions. The analysis of the outcomes reveals the way pupils seek solutions. They allow us to know more clearly, how the introduction of a 3D printer influences the creative process that students utilize in order to design objects. The analysis of the instrumented activity was carried out on the basis of the relevant

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areas identified by Rabardel: (subjects, object of the activity, artefact, mediation, structure of the activity), which highlight the interactions between subject-objecttechnology, which in turn, allow the subjects (teachers and students) to act, learn and conceptualize. The Task: Developing Solutions Developing solutions to problems is an activity that is very common in technology education. It happens at all teaching levels according to curriculum and institutional requirements. In middle school, where students are aged 14–15 years old, the requirements state that students should develop creative, aesthetic, functional, technical, scientific and technological design skills. The task, as discussed above, consists of designing a protective cover for a smartphone using a 3D printer. The students were provided with some initial specifications for the protective cover, traditional drawing tools (paper/pencil), a CAD program (SolidWorks® or Google Sketch Up®) and a 3D printer. The teacher’s guidance is necessary in the beginning to provide the specification for individual students to produce pencil sketches for the design of a smartphone cover. After collective discussion the students choose the most appropriate solutions. The students then transfer the selected drawing onto the CAD program. The computer model produced by students is then discussed and altered if necessary before printing on the 3D printer. Each stage is a determinant of the task. All the feedback between subjects (individual and collective) and objects (their designs) informs the next stage and leads to the emergence of a solution. In this situation, students have to choose the form, the dimensions, the structure and the used materials available at school. To achieve and finalise the task, they must use knowledge related to the physical characteristics of the materials and their forming processes, as well as procedural knowledge related to the use of traditional drawing tools and CAD tools. They must think out, invent and propose solutions using the representation resources and tools that are available to them. They must also take into account the constraints of the technical guidelines; knowing that there is, in principle, no formal specified procedure, that could give a universal solution to this type of design problem, and allow its actual conception. Subject and object of the activity. Subjects involved in the development of the protection covers for a smartphone were, in the first place, the individual students who looked for solutions, in the second place, the teacher who accompanied the student’s and in the third place, the other students who were present and who actively took part in the activity that was sometimes undertaken as an individual activity and sometimes as, a collective activity. The instrumental approach invites us to distinguish between the subjects of the activity and the object of the activity in the project. This is detailed in Table 5.1.

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Table 5.1. Object of the activity depending on the subject Phase 1 Object of the student’s activity

Getting familiar with specification and drawing protection covers

Object of the students’ activity

Object of the teacher’s activity

Phase 2

Phase 3 Drawing one’s model using CAD software and saving it

Making the last adjustments on the existing graphical model, printing, making adjustments, printing

Reviewing sketches, reformulating specification Drawing further protection covers Encouraging students to develop graphical tools

Phase 4

Reviewing sketches, encouraging students to reformulate specification Encouraging students to develop further graphical tools

Encouraging students to use available CAD tools, to save regularly the modelling traces, to make adjustments on their models

Encouraging the student to print his/ her model Encouraging the students to make adjustments on their graphical tools

The students must “effectively” seek a solution to the problem raised by the teacher. Effectiveness is not automatic. Some may wait for the solution to be found by another student; some may completely disengage from what goes on in the classroom; or prepare for another class. The teacher accompanies the students’ research work. To do this he let students act freely, either he guides them to the solution. The object of his activity is not given. Now it’s necessary to question and observe the subjects to understand the nature of their activity. Indeed, a similar type of action may be undertaken by the objects of a different activity. Therefore, the object of an activity that the technology teacher teaches, and the way that an artefact is designed to middle-school students, can vary according to the teacher, the students and the situation itself. The first goal of the teacher may be to find ways to have the students come to a solution and achieve a material result (a printed protection cover for example) for each student or group of students. However, this does not exclude other objects of the activity, such as developing the creativity of the students by letting them: test solutions that in principle won’t work but that will participate to the research process, and perhaps not produce an outcome with all students. This list is open and must be instantiated, through obtaining the point of view of the subject of the activity. 65

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Artefacts and mediation. The written, graphic or material outcomes of the activity of the students (workbook, documents, drafts, notes, sketches, object, etc.) are artefacts that are easily identifiable in the teaching-learning situation. These artefacts mediate between what preceded and what will follow, and transform the students’ activity. Students’ feelings, ideas, thoughts are being expressed in these artefacts. In this case, the outcomes of the activity are graphic (manual sketches), digital (3D models) and material (printed protection cover). To study the variety of the students’ work, we distinguish three notional fields defined by Rabardel and Vérillon (1987) and Rabardel (1989): geometry, technology and code. Geometry allows thinking out the forms of the represented protective cover for a smartphone; technology allows thinking out the characteristics of the material (in this case plastic), the movements related to the constituent parts, their structure and the functions of the forms; and finally, code interacts with the two previous notional fields by combining both the significant and the signified. From this perspective, all written and digital traces as well as prototypes made using the 3D printer will be collected and analysed. Table 5.2 shows the indicators that have been taken into account for analysing solutions with regard to the notional fields related to two functions of the specification (for instance). Table 5.2. Solutions’ analysis indicators Function (CDC)

Notional fields Form

Protecting the Geometry smartphone from shocks Technology of normal use

Adapting to smartphone without damaging it

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Structure

Materials Maximum thickness

Breakable areas of the Smartphone that need to be protected Shock absorption Attached to the Smartphone

Shock absorption Number of parts Mobility of pieces

Mechanical properties Shock absorption (ABS)

Code

2D/3D graphical representation

Texture

Geometry

Complying with the Smartphone’s dimensions

Technology

Get in place and easily remove from the smartphone

Number of pieces Mobility of pieces

Mechanical properties (flexibility, roughness)

Code

2D/3D graphical representation

2D/3D graphical representation

Texture

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The analysis of the traces of the students’ activity shows that the “swift transition” from the 3D digital model to the material manufactured object supports the modelling phase, the integration of the technical guidelines’ constraints and contributes to seeking solutions on a wider and more varied scale than when using manual sketches. Table 5.3 shows the number of solutions developed by the students, according to the tools used and the different phases of the design process, from the first sketches to the 3D printings and potential redesigning. Table 5.3. Solutions developed by students Sketched solutions

Modelled solutions

Printed solution

Redesigned solutions

250

120

51

2

Table 5.4. Results in terms of “form” Form

Sketches (n = 250)

3D Models (n = 120)

Geometry Lack of quotation

57%

0%

Partial quotation

37%

0%

Full quotation

6%

100%

Compliance with the smartphone’s dimensions

85%

78%

Compliance with the 3D printer’s dimensions

90%

78%

88%

96%

Technology Full protection of the Smartphone Protection of the breakable parts

12%

4%

Volume optimization

11%

7%

“Innovation”

21%

11%

Code 2D

46%

0%

3D

54%

100%

Textual information

36%

0%

Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 present the results obtained from the analysis of the intermediary graphs produced by the students during the process of seeking a solution. They allow comparing the solutions developed using sketches (phases 1 and 2) and the 3D modeler (phases 2 and 3) which correspond to the exploration, generation and modelling phases. 67

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Table 5.5. Results in terms of “structure” Structure

Sketches (n = 250)

3D Models (n = 120)

Geometry “Clutch bag”

12%

0%

“Envelope”

76%

100%

“Skeleton”

8%

0%

“Valve”

4%

0%

1 piece

94%

78%

2 pieces

5%

0%

3 pieces

1%

0%

Pieces mobility

4%

0%

Technology

Shock absorption Complementary functions

4%

4%

24%

11%

Code 2D

46%

0%

3D

54%

100%

Textual information

26%

0%

Table 5.6. Results in terms of “materials” Materials

Sketches (n = 250)

3D models (n = 120)

95%

33%

5%

66%

1 material

88%

100%

2 materials

12%

0%

3%

0%

Geometry Absence of definition Defined materials Technology

“Innovative” materials Code Absence

68

95%

33%

Colour

2%

44%

Texture

3%

23%

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In terms of “form” (Table 5.4), there is no significant difference regarding technology. However, one can see strong differences regarding geometry and code, which can be attributed to the specificities of the tools used, as for example, the small proportion of quoted sketches (6%) whereas the establishment of digital models requires oversizing. Regarding “structure” (Table 5.5), there are significant differences between the outlined solutions and the modelled solutions, in terms of both geometry and technology. The range of solutions developed by the students is wider, which enables the student to explore on a wider scale, the space of the problem raised. When using the 3D modeler, solutions focus exclusively on a unique piece with an envelope-shaped structure. These results confirm the results of Laisney and BrandtPomares (2015). Thus, one can see a greater variability of solutions when students use traditional drawing tools (manual sketches) than when they use a 3D modeler. In terms of “materials” (Table 5.6), here again the observed differences concern the specificities of the tools that promote the integration and the definition of the used materials or not. 95% of sketches do not define the nature of the materials, even if the represented solutions use different pieces requiring physical or mechanical properties adapted to their functions. Using the modeler allows students to represent more easily the materials thanks to the tools “color” or “texture”. In terms of forms and structures, one observes a wider variability of solutions developed during the exploration phase using sketches and a smaller variability of prebuilt solutions. Indeed, many sketched solutions are dropped during the modelling phase. The choice of materials is not discussed as it is forced due to the 3D printing process, which imposes fewer constraints and does not require as much knowledge of the manufacture and choice of materials as traditional processes using machine tools. This can have the benefit of making it easier for students to explore all the possible solutions to the problem raised: students seem to have more freedom in the exploration phase (fewer constraints linked to the forms and materials). However, students face difficulties during the modelling phase. These difficulties that have already been mentioned in our previous study (Laisney & Brandt-Pomares, 2015) are due to the fact that students are dealing with a double challenge. This challenge consists, on one hand, in using a complex software that they may not necessarily know very well, and on the other hand, in solving the design problem. At last, students rarely benefit from the back and forth movement that 3D printers are supposed to make possible given that the teacher does not favor this practice, which is expensive in terms of organization. In consequence, there is little or no redesign after 3D printing, which does not encourage the process of seeking a solution. The productive activity: Completing the activity. From the artefacts’ side: traditional drawing tools and the 3D pattern making software (Google SketchUp) are artefacts that have been identified initially. Each student represents (draws) a 69

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possible solution to the problem raised, with a possible variability. The software is a necessary artefact for modelling and then piloting the 3D printer, whereas the use of traditional drawing tools (free hand drawing with paper pencil) is variable. Observations may reveal that students are more comfortable drawing by hand, producing sketches using a paper pencil. After that, when they need to model it on the screen using a software, one notes that some of them do completely drop traditional drawing and others adjust their drawing as they conduct modelling. The utilization patterns of a pencil to draw on paper have been constructed and used by students before attending primary school, and are not the same patterns as those that allow screen modelling and that are still in construction and require to be instrumented. Some students’ drop traditional drawing in favor of software, others do not manage to model their sketches and get back to traditional drawing, and at last, others use both representation tools to develop their solutions. The constructive activity: Developing the subjects’ activity. From the teacher’s side: one notes that the use of 3D printers radically transforms the teacher’s activity, in comparison with the use of numerically controlled machines. Even if, in both cases, these hardware devices are connected to a computer network which ensures continuity of digital information from sketches to final manufacture (production tools), the 3D printer and its short prototyping process allow considering further uses. It contributes to improving the design process (search for solutions) as it allows more frequent back and forth movements between the digital model and the material model (printed object), which fosters validation of an object’s form or function. From the student’s side: one notes that 3D printer allows a “swift transition” from virtual (digital model) to real (printed object), which helps students to conceptualize shape and structure constraints, and beyond this, to consider the transformation of the digital model with the aim of redesigning the object and deepening his/her search for solutions. Thus, this new artefact transforms the activity of searching for solutions carried out by the student who does not use it only as a means of production but also as a “quick” testing tool that is under construction in an iterative process. This example reveals that when artefacts change or, as we have just seen, when introducing new artefacts, the subject’s activity evolves, changes and causes an invariant modification of the activity. The subject’s productive activity changes (instrumentalization process) but this assumes a constructive activity (instrumentation process) through real instrumental genesis. CONCLUSION

This chapter gives us the opportunity to present the theoretical and methodological contributions of Rabardel’s instrumental approach and to illustrate its use in school context. Interest is twofold. On one hand, it focuses on relevant aspects with a view to instrumental study of the link that exists between a subject and an object through a technology that places practical intelligence on the same level as other forms of intelligence. On the other 70

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hand, Rabardel provides a series of tools to analyze this link, notably in school context in which, as we know, activity is directed towards a purpose and determined learning goal. In a specific context in which activity is strongly instrumented and focused notably on issues relating to knowledge mediation and knowledge construction by students, this allows for cognitive development and capacity for student to act. REFERENCES Andreucci, C., Froment, J.-P., & Verillon, P. (1996). Contribution à l’analyse des situations d’enseignement/ apprentissage d’instruments sémiotiques de communication technique. Aster, 23, 181–211. Bedny, G., & Meister, D. (1997). The Russian theory of activity: Current applications to design and learning. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Beguin, P., & Rabardel, P. (2000). Designing for instrument mediated activity. Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 12, 173–190. Brandt-Pomares, P., & Boilevin, J.-M. (2009). Ordinateurs portables et médiations dans l’enseignement: le cas de deux situations en physique et en technologie. In J.-L. Rinaudo & F. Poyet (Eds.), Environnements numériques en milieu scolaire. Quels usages et quelles pratiques (pp. 64–83). Lyon: INRP. Chatoney, M. (2003). Construction du concept de matériau dans l’enseignement des «sciences et technologie» à l’école primaire: Perspectives curriculaires et didactiques. Marseille: Presses de l’université de Provence. Clot, Y. (1999). La fonction psychologique du travail. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Cole, M. (1996). Cultural psychology: Once and future discipline? Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press. Contamines, J., George, S., & Hotte, R. (2003). Approche instrumentale des banques de ressources éducatives. Sciences et Techniques Educatives, 10, hors série, pp. 157–178. Retrieved from https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00298189/document Cook et al. (1996). The CSC manufacturing industry handbook. Solihull: CSC. Cook, S., Harrison, R., Lehman, M. M., & Wernick, P. (2006). Evolution in software systems: Foundations of the SPE classification scheme. Journal of Software Maintenance and Evolution: Research and Practice, 18, 1–35. Engeström, Y. (1990). Learning, working and imagining, twelve studies in activity theory. Helsinki: Orienta-Konsultit OY. Folcher, V., & Rabardel, P. (2004). Artifacts as ‘design-for-use’ propositions for ‘design-in-use’ activity. International Journal of Psychology, 39(5–6), 386–386. Haspekian, M. (2005). Intégration d’outils informatiques dans l’enseignement des mathématiques, étude du cas des tableurs. Université Paris-Diderot, Paris VII. Retrieved from http://tel.archivesouvertes.fr/ tel-00011388 Kaptelinin, V. (1996). Computer mediated activity: Functional organs and developmental contexts. In B. A. Nardi (Ed.), Context and consciousness, activity theory and human computer interaction (pp. 45–68). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kuutti, K. (1996). Activity theory as a potential framework for human-computer interaction research. In B. Nardi (Ed.), Context and consciousness (pp. 17–44), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Laisney, P., & Brandt-Pomares, P. (2015). Role of graphics tools in the learning design process. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 25(1), 109–119. Leontiev, A. N. (1975). Activité, conscience, personnalité. Moscow: Editions du progres. Leontiev, A. N. (1976). Le développement du psychisme: Problèmes. Paris: Éd. sociales. Leontiev, A. N. (1981). Psychology and the language learning process. Oxford/New York, NY/Toronto: Pergamon Press. Leroi-Gourhan, A. (1971). Evolution des techniques, I. L’homme et la matière. Paris: Albin Michel. Leroi-Gourhan, A. (1985/1991). Le geste et la parole. Tome I, Technique et langage. Tome II, la mémoire et les rythmes, re-édition. Paris: Albin Michel.

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M. CHATONEY & P. LAISNEY Nardi, B. A. (1996). Context and consciousness: Activity theory and human-computer interaction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Rabardel, P. (1989). Recherche en psychologie et en didactique: Un exemple d’interaction dans l’enseignement du dessin technique. Revue française de pédagogie, 89, 55–62. Rabardel, P. (1995). Les hommes et les technologies; approche cognitive des instruments contemporains. Paris: Armand Colin Éditeurs. Rabardel, P. (1997a). Activités avec instruments et dynamique cognitive du sujet. In C. Moro, B. Schneuwly, & M. Brossard (Eds.), Outils et Signes, Perspectives actuelles de la théorie de Vygotski. Paris: Peter Lang. Rabardel, P. (1997b). Des instruments et des hommes: Propositions pour une conception centrée utilisateurs. Design Recherche, Research innovation revue, Revue scientifique de la conception et du développement des produits industriels, 10, 7–20. Rabardel, P. (2001). Instrument mediated activity in situations. In A. Blandford, J. Vanderdonckt, & P. Gray (Eds.), People and computers XV – interaction without frontiers (pp. 17–30). Berlin: Spring-Verlag. Rabardel, P. (2005). Instrument subjectif et développement du pouvoir d’agir. In P. Rabardel & P. Pastré (Eds.), Modèles du sujet pour la conception. Paris: Octarès. Rabardel, P., & Beguin, P. (2005). Instrument mediated activity: From subject development to anthropocentric design. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 6(5), 429–461. doi:10.1080/ 14639220500078179 Rabardel, P., & Bourmaud, G. T. (2003). From computer to instrument system: A developmental perspective. Interacting with Computers, 15(5), 665–691. doi:10.1016/s0953-5438(03)00058-4 Rabardel, P., & Pastré, P. (2005). Modèles du sujet pour la conception – Dialectiques activités développement. Toulouse: Editions Octares. Rabardel, P., & Vérillon, P. (1987). Approches fonctionnelles du dessin technique: Réflexions pour un cadre d’analyse. In P. Rabardel & A. Weill-Fasina (Eds.), Le dessin technique (pp. 209–217). Paris: Hermès. Seve, L. (1999). Quelles contradiction? À propos de Piaget, Vigotski et Marx. In Y. Clot (Ed.), Avec Vygotski (pp. 245–264). Paris: La Dispute. Simondon, G. (1958/1969/1989). Du monde d’existence des objets techniques (Rev. ed.). Paris: Aubier. Simondon, G. (2017). On the mode of existence of technical objects (C. Malaspina & J. Rogove, Trans.). Washington, DC: Univocal Publishing. Suchman, L. (1987). Plans and situated actions: The problem of human-machine interaction. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Trouche, L. (2005). Des artefacts aux instruments, une approche pour guider et intégrer les usages des outils de calcul dans l’enseignement des mathématiques. Actes de l’université d’été de Saint Flour, Le calcul sous toutes ses formes, 265–274. Retrieved from http://irem.univ-rouen.fr/sites/default/files/ u17/Trouche%20St%20Flour.doc Vergnaud, G. (1991). La théorie des champs conceptuels. Recherches en didactique des mathématiques, 10(2–3), 133–170. Vergnaud, G. (1996). Au fond de l’action, la conceptualisation. In J.-M. Barbier (Ed.), Savoirs théoriques et savoirs d’action (pp. 275–291). Paris: PUF. Vygotsky, L. S. (1930/1985). La méthode instrumentale en psychologie. In B. Schneuwly & J. P. Bronckart (Eds.), Vygotsky aujourd’hui (pp. 39–48). Paris: Delachaux et Niestlé. Vygotsky, L. S. (1931/1978). Mind and society, the development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1934/1985). Pensée et langage. Paris: Messidor. Wertsch, J. V. (1997). Mediated action. In W. Bechtel & G. Graham (Eds.), A companion to cognitive science. Oxford: Blackwell. Wertsch, J. V. (1998). Mind as action. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Zanarelli, C. (2003). Caractérisation des stratégies instrumentales de gestion d’environnements dynamiques: Analyse de l’activité de régulation du métro. Paris: PU Paris 8.

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6. GILBERT SIMONDON On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects in Technology Education

INTRODUCTION

Gilbert Simondon (1924–1989) was a student at the École Normal Supérieure (rue d’Ulm in Paris) from 1944–1948. Having attained the status of agégé de philosophie (an expert in philosophy), he began his career teaching philosophy at the lycée de Tours (teaching philosophy to high school students is still a common practice in the French educational system) and later on taught at the University of Poitiers. He defended his doctoral thesis (thése de doctorat) in 1958 and was then named professor at the Sorbonne in 1963. Only his two principle works were published while he was living, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects (Du mode d’existence des objets techniques) and L’Individuation à la lumiére des notions de forme et d’information (Individuation in light of notions of form and information). He was a student of Georges Canguhilhem, a philosopher of science, Martial Guéroult a philosopher of history and Maurice Merleau-Ponty a phenomenologist. He has influenced many others, in particular Gilles Deleuze, Bruno Latour and Bernard Stiegler. It is, perhaps, important at this stage in the chapter, to address some key distinctions in the terminology used in discussions relating to the concept of technology education, particularly when differentiating between French and English usage. In English speaking cultures, technology education, also referred to as technical education or industrial arts education, is, for the most part, perceived as a vocationally orientated subject, directed towards learning techniques associated with the practical application of industrially or domestically orientated concrete tasks. In French culture, technology education ultimately follows one of two routes. The first which I loosely term “éducation technique” (technical education), follows similar lines to that described above and is generally considered to be vocational training. However, there is also a more academically orientated concept of ‘éducation technologique’ (technology education) which leads towards a more ‘professionally’ orientated future. In French philosophy, the terminology utilized by Simondon (and others; Stiegler for example) is ‘technics’ and ‘technicity’ which “means the theory or study of industry and of the mechanical arts … which is usually a near synonym to technology” (Translators note in Simondon, 2017, p. 16). However, Simondon is motivated by his desire to raise awareness of the meaning of technical objects at a much deeper level than the study of industry and the mechanical © KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_006

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arts. In addition, the study of the meaning of technical objects, for Simondon, requires a paradigm shift away from the extant dominant orthodoxy that prevails to this day in the delivery of technology education, a pedagogical framework which orientates around the development of procedural and declarative knowledge. His philosophy also challenges contemporary thinking about the design or invention of technical objects which will be of interest to those involved in technology education. In the opening paragraph to the book On the Modes of Existence of Technical Objects Simondon begins his thesis thus; Culture has constituted itself as a defense system against technics; yet this defense presents itself as a defense of man, and presumes that technical objects do not contain a human reality within them. We would like to show that culture ignores a human reality within technical reality and that, in order to fully play its role, culture must incorporate technical beings in the form of knowledge and in the form of a sense of values. Awareness of the modes of existence of technical objects must be brought about through philosophical thought, which must fulfil a duty through this work analogous to the one fulfilled for the abolition of slavery and the affirmation of the value of the human person. (Simondon, 2017, p. 16) This opening paragraph sets the mood for what has become one of Simondon’s most celebrated work: On the Modes of Existence of Technical Objects. It is only last year (2017) that Univocal published a version of this work in the English language. Whilst there have been a small number of translations previously offered, they have not been in a published volume such as this. This chapter can offer only a partial perspective on the work of Simondon. In order to relate his thinking to technology education in some meaningful way, however, there are several key concepts that require investigation. The Genesis of Technicity (Simondon, 2017, pp. 174–190) From a Darwinian perspective, as the evolutionary process progressed, pre-human existence began its slow, but inexorable change, evolving into what we have come to understand as human being. Whilst various anthropological and paleontological perspectives make claims as to precisely when and how this was made manifest, Simondon shows less interest in these scientifically precise accounts, preferring instead, to consider the genesis of human being as taking place in an originary phase. It is not important to know exactly how long this phase lasted or when it began: it is only important in that it represents the phase-shift from pre-human existence to the originary phase that accommodated the genesis of human being. Simondon uses this point in human evolution as his starting point to develop his philosophical thesis On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects. The original mode of existence, in terms of the concept of the human being, emerges from what he refers to as the magical mode. The magical mode, for Simondon, represents the original phase 74

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from which human being emerges. It originates as a primitive mode where the relationship between the human and the rest of the world is indivisible. This original phase exists as a unified milieu, a world in harmony in which there is no distinction made between subject (human) and object (everything else). There are only natural causes. The evolution of human being, in this phase, starts out as purely biological. It is a unique mode of existence which forms the genesis of human being and, as we will discover later, the genesis of technicity also. However, within this original phase, transitions occurred, that over time, eventually marked the transformation from a purely biological evolution to a psychic and collective one. It is in this sense that the magical mode acts as a threshold between nature and culture which results in a differentiation between object and subject, between thought and action (Bardin, 2015) (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1. Aesthetics, culture and technology (from Mills, 2017)

The evolutionary process of any individual is what Simondon refers to as the process of individuation. It is important to note, however, that individuation refers to the processes that explain the coming into being of everything, whether material, organic, human and whether regarded as subject or object. It does this by “providing models for understanding how things, including living beings, are brought into existence as cohesive individuals, Simondon opens up new ways of understanding identity, transformation and creation – all central ingredients in a radical reconceptualization of thought” (Grosz, 2013, p. 37). Thus, individuation, or phase shift, from the magical mode to two new phases involving a differentiation 75

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between nature and culture, subject and object, thought and action, required a radical break in the unity of the magical mode into two separate and opposing modes of existence. The cultural/subject/thought mode became religion, whilst the nature/ object/action mode was made manifest in technics. We suppose that technicity results from a phase shift of a unique, central, and original mode of being in the world: the magical mode; the phase that balances out technicity is the religious mode of being. Aesthetic thought appears at the neutral point, between technics and religion, at the moment of the splitting of the primitive magical unity: it is not a phase, but rather a permanent reminder of the rupture of unity of the magical mode of being, as well as a reminder of the search for its future unity. (Simondon, 2017, p. 174) This dual phase shift from the unity of the magic mode of existence epitomizes the genesis of what, in educational terms, is now referred to as the academic/vocational divide. But what constituted this splitting away from the unified magical phase in the first place? For Simondon, the magical phase acted as a vital liaison between human being and world, their primitive unity being made without distinction of subject and object; the universe in this sense is experienced as an associated milieu. Through time, the magical phase is composed of many phase shifts resulting from the very many relationships encountered between human being and environment. The physical activity of experiencing mountains, summits, gorges, the heart of the forest, hunting, eating, simple tool use, sit alongside the metaphysical concepts of inaugurations, community, dogma etc., all of which conspire to form separate structural systems. The key-points of structure separate and objectivize themselves; technics turns it into [physical activity] and technical objects become functional, instrumental, whereas the powers of the [metaphysical] are subjectivated under the form of the divine and the sacred (gods, heroes, priests). A distance is introduced between human being and world. This distance is mediatized by technics on the one hand, and religion on the other. Where there was only a unity of the living being and its milieu, a difference between man and world appears. (Michaud, 2013, pp. 122–123) Ultimately, these opposing phases become so polarized that they could no longer survive together as part of a magical unity. The consequence is that they split away from the unified single mode by forming two new separate modes: religious subjectivity and technological objectivity. These twin tracks mutate further by incorporating social and political thought into the religious sector and evermore complex technics into the human world. The religious, social and political becomes metaphysical in essence. These essential qualities are considered to be transcendental, dogmatic, idealistic and hierarchical. Whereas, on the other hand, the technical is made manifest in its actuality. It becomes a technological prosthesis in the service of human being made possible by exploiting the material world. The religious, 76

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social and political guide humanity. The technical serves humanity. Whereas unity belonged to the magical world, “[t]he phase shift opposing technics and religion irreducibly leaves the content of technics with a status lower than unity and that of religion higher than unity (Simondon, 2015, p. 185). Bernard Stiegler, moreover, reinforces the longevity of this lack of status: At the beginning of its history philosophy separates technē from ēpistēmē … It is the inheritance of this conflict – in which the philosophical ēpistēmē is pitched against the sophistic technē, whereby all technical knowledge is devalued – that the essence of technical entities in general is conceived. (Stiegler, 1998, p. 1) This distinction continues to this day, in that the status of technology education, which is clearly embedded in the technics mode of existence, is considered inferior to the status of academic education, which is clearly embedded in the religious, social and political mode of existence. This distinction, moreover, resonates as strongly as it did at the genesis of human being. The Process of Becoming Other In philosophy the term ‘ontology’ refers to the nature of being something: a brick, a car, a human being. However, for Simondon, this implies a stable, enduring state of being ‘some-thing’, a concept which he rejects. For Simondon, no-thing in the universe is stable and enduring, every-thing is subject to change at some stage in its existence. Whether naturally or technologically, all ‘things’ become something else, something other, something beyond their original state. Cars become faster, land based telephones become wireless mobile phones, trees become furniture, mountains erode. Their mode of existence changes. They are not stable and enduring beings, they are perpetually in a state of becoming other, whether imperceptibly or by some appreciable rupture. They cannot therefore be considered to be stable ontological entities. They must, instead, be considered to be metastable entities; entities that may appear stable over a period of time but which will, as a result of some change of circumstances, change in some way. This fundamentally changes the way we think about ‘things’. This then, begs the questions; if something is changing, becoming something other, how can we define it? How can we know it? What is its mode of existence at any given time? This is what Simondon wants to explore. In terms of technology, he wants to become aware of the modes of existence of technical objects. Going through a process of ‘becoming aware’, requires, for Simondon, a first phase which “seeks to grasp the genesis of technical objects” (Simondon, 2017, p. xv). The classification of technical objects is normally defined by relating them to certain kinds or genres of object. In other words, they are categorized by their use, function or purpose. However, for Simondon, this classificatory system is illusory. It is, he says “an illusory specificity, because no fixed structure corresponds to a 77

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definite usage. The same result may be obtained from very different functionalities and structures: a steam engine, a gasoline engine, a turbine, and an engine powered by springs or weights are all equally engines, but there is in fact a more genuine analogy between a spring engine and a bow or cross-bow than between a spring engine and a steam engine” (Simondon, 2017, p. 25). I have observed, on many occasions, students and experienced technology education teachers asking their students to define the ‘function’ of a particular technical object. This question, according to Simondon is illusory. When asked to describe, for example, the function of a motor car, the most common response was, ‘to get from A to B’. This also presents a good example of the importance of associated milieu; within the formality of the school milieu, the function of a car was ‘in order to get from A to B’. However, in the milieu of the home, watching television, a car in 1950s and 60s movies, where young men ‘cruise’ the streets in their fancy cars to attract girls has a very different function. I suggest, however, that Simondon would consider both these responses narrow and incomplete. To consider a car as simply a technical object that gets from A to B, or even as a tool to pick up girls, is illusory. To get from A to B conflates all modes of transport to the same objective meaning in a purely technical sense. To pick up girls suggests a more subjective perspective introducing value judgements along aesthetic, ethical and political lines. Each perspective in the sense given above, offers a dogmatic ideology serving to classify the technical object in question as either subject or object. I contend that Simondon would have been more interested in applying a ‘genetic method’ of pedagogy, one that considers technical objects in terms of the process of individuality that is designed to explore and investigate the various iterations of the motor cars journey of ‘becoming’ into existence, as well as to how these processes informed the types of motor cars that exist today, together with their various relationships with human being and other entities, thus informing possible futures. However, this is not simply an investigation that considers a linear time-line that can be traced back the the first manifestation of a motor car. The genetic method requires that account be taken of the general evolution of the motor car, in association with the succession of elements, individuals and of individuations that contributed to the veritable progress of the motor car within any given associated milieu over time, resulting in the motor car we know today. Indeed this pedagogical framework offers students of technology a more informed insight into the possibilities for the future development of technical objects. This genetic pedagogy would, I propose, enable students of technology, more informed opportunities to develop a better understanding of, and in addition, form the basis of, a new way of thinking about the mode of existence of technical objects: one that will eliminate the reductive subject/object dichotomy and enable new ways to better demonstrate and understand how latent and new potentialities may emerge from within the existing elements, individuals and individuations, that together, form the associated milieu of a technical object’s mode of existence. In so doing it may be possible to enable a phase-shift in that technical object, one that presents a new mode of existence for that technical object. 78

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An example of this is the development of James Dyson’s vacuum cleaner. Dyson took one mode of existence of a vacuum cleaner, one incorporating a bag which had relatively poor suction and, through a process of individuation, invented another mode of existence; a vacuum cleaner without a bag that had exceptional suction. He did this by utilizing the potential of cyclonic technology that he had observed in a saw mill, as well as the potentialities offered by his own engineering skills and many other potentialities as well. In other words, he invented or designed a new mode of existence by way of a process of individuation in Simondon’s terms, for the development of the vacuum cleaner. … the individuation of the technical beings is the condition for technical progress. This individuation is possible by the recurrence of causality within a milieu that the technical object creates around itself and that conditions it, just as it is conditioned by it. This simultaneously technical and natural milieu can be called associated milieu. It is that through which the technical object conditions itself in its functioning. This milieu is not fabricated […] in its totality; it is a certain regime of natural elements surrounding the technical being, linked to a certain regime of elements that constitute the technical being. The associated milieu mediates the relation between the technical, fabricated elements and natural elements, at the heart of which the technical being functions. (Simondon, 2017, p. 59) What Dyson did not do was to consider the vacuum cleaner simply in terms of its function alone. He considered the concept of vacuum cleaners genetically and analogically. There were many other more complex issues, both actual (the cyclonic system in the saw mill) and abstract (his engineering experience, other experiences and memories) that combined to form an associated milieu, one that opened up new potentialities which enabled him to cause a serious rupture in the extant phase of vacuum cleaner development. His invention represented a phase-shift. Simondon and Technology Education In order to better understand the position Simondon takes on the relationship between human being, nature, technology and society, we need to understand some of the associated philosophical concepts developed by Simondon. These philosophical concepts should inform the underlying principles that guide the development of technology education. For Simondon, the evolutionary process, or in his terms the process of individuation which results in the actualization of an individual, whether a technical individual object or an individual human, does not follow a linear progression, as is generally accepted to be the received way of thinking. Rather, this process involves a network of, what Simondon refers to as a superabundant potentialities, only some of which will ever be realized in any given phase shift, but not necessarily in conjunction with the actualization of the individual in question. This suggests that the individual 79

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has the potential to become something other, something beyond its original intent. A human being like Einstein, for example, showed no potential whilst at school but went on to become a world famous physicist. Several associated milieu’s later, conspired to enable him to discover new modes of existence that, for him at least, the school phase lacked. Dyson’s vacuum cleaner, likewise, found itself in a social milieu that included, amongst many other things, the superabundant potentiality of incorporating a cyclonic system into the ongoing evolution of the vacuum cleaner. In other words, the process of individuation is an ongoing process that results in the actualization of an individual from one mode of existence into a new mode of existence. This, however, is not a permanent state of existence, but is, rather, a metastable state, a state which is open to the influence of other superabundant, or latent potentialities which, if revealed in some way, may cause the individual to go through another process of individuation, thus, entering into yet another mode of existence, such as Einstein’s second law of relativity, or yet another manifestation of a vacuum cleaner as yet undiscovered, and so on. In terms of technology education, rather than ask students to design something based upon the resources available and the taught technical skills already acquired, attempt to enable the formation of new associated milieu’s whereby several groups of students, in association with the teacher, select some pre-existing artefact that is of interest to the group, and attempt to research, contemplate and discover, collectively and in a pre-individuated sense, whether a new manifestation, a new phase-shift might evolve, and perhaps also, construct a non-functioning prototype. Discussions should be encouraged ranging from the technologies worth to society and as to whether the proposed design of the next phase might enhance that worth. All aspects of figure 1 can be incorporated into the pre-individual stage including areas relating to scientific thought, aesthetic thought, ethical thought and philosophical thought. These areas serve to bring together the two phases shown. An actual example may help to further clarify this process. Consider the evolution of the bicycle. It is generally accepted that Karl Drais, a German engineer, invented the bicycle around 1812. This, however, was not a eureka moment: there were many latent potentialities surrounding Drais at that time, potentialities that could help to influence and inspire him. These superabundant potentialities, which were abstract in nature, enabled Drais to select and reject various combinations in order to eventually come up with a design for a new technical object that would eventually became known as a bicycle. This phase of design or invention took place in what, as has been discussed above, is called an associated milieu. It is in this phase that Drais would have gone through the process of thinking about the concept of a bicycle. He probably did this in association with sketching ideas, considering new materials, talking to colleagues, reading journals relating to transport systems and observing other forms of self-propelled transport, one of which appears to have been ice skating; an activity that requires balance. He would have considered issues relating the science of materials and balance, aesthetic qualities, possibly some consideration of ethics (what impact might this have on existing modes of 80

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transport), and perhaps some philosophical perspectives. He no doubt tried out many combinations of potentialities, including the fabrication of prototypes, until eventually deciding upon one combination that would be fabricated. Many potentialities would be rejected in the process thereby leaving the possibility open for future variations to evolve, when some other combination of potentialities were revealed as part of the formation of a new associated milieu, including the latent potentiality of other materials and other inventors who may be inspired to improve the original invention by Drais. Simondon refers to this initial and complex abstract stage as the pre-individual stage. It is the stage before the technical object in question is actually built; made into an actualized individual technical object. The process from the pre-individual stage (which can also be considered as the process of design or invention), up to the formation of the actual individual object, is what Simondon refers to as individuation. What is important to realize is that the bicycle invented by Drais, is not even close to the technological sophistication of the ones we know today. In order to get from then to now and beyond, very many latent potentialities have emerged over time. These potentialities have combined as part of the formation of very many associated milieus, which have, in turn, enabled many new modes of existence of the technical object known as the bicycle to emerge (see Dakers, 2016, for a more detailed discussion on this). Individuation reveals that the process of the evolution of an individual is complex: evolution, in the technology education sense, involves exposing, or at least researching the network of relations that combined in order to individuate the particular individual. No individual technical object that is created, retains a permanent stable identity. It is in constant state of individuation whereby some phase-shifts may occur regularly, whilst others less so. This constitutes the concept of metastability. In terms of technology education, It is Simondons intention to: demonstrate the need for a complete change in in the general approach to the principle governing individuation. The process of individuation must be considered primordial, for it is this process that at once brings the individual into being and determines all the distinguishing characteristics of its development, organization and modalities. Thus the individual is to be understood as having a relative reality, occupying only a certain phase of the whole being in question – a phase that therefore carries the implication of a preceding preindividual state, and that, even after individuation, does not exit in isolation, since individuation does not exhaust in the single act of its appearance all the potentials embedded in the pre-individual state. (Simondon, 1992, p. 300) It is in Part two of The mode of Existence of Technical Objects; chapter one, that Simondon addresses matters relating directly to technology education. In this second phase he considers the “two fundamental modes of relation between man and the technical given” (ibid., p. xvi). In terms of the rapport between the individual and the technical object, there are two opposing ways: one minor, the other major. Simondon considers each of these 81

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roles in terms of the relationship they form and the opposing impacts that result as a consequence. The minor ensemble considers the technological object in its more primitive form in its various stages of development. Technical knowledge formed as part of a minor ensemble, thus, tends to be “implicit, non-reflective, and habitual” (ibid., p. 103). Conversely, the status of majority “corresponds to an operation of reflection and self-awareness by the free adult, who has at his disposal the means of rational knowledge, elaborated through the sciences: the knowledge of the apprentice is thus distinguished from that of the engineer” (ibid., p. 103). The implication made by Simondon is that minority technics does not naturally lead to majority technics. The learning of the minority, considered to be taken from the perspective of a child’ s learning, informs the adult. However, the adult, who may never become part of the majority will always be affected, as an adult, by the learning of the minority. This major shift in perspective as suggested, by Simondon, is made possible only by becoming cognizant of the various dualities that continue to prevail and that have prevailed from before biblical times. In early epochs, the craftsman, having only experienced minority technics in childhood, was considered to have an almost spiritual alliance with nature. He worked together in harmony with it as if still part of the magical mode. Indeed the term “craft” implies both an artisanal quality and a mystical quality; the craft of the witch for example or the magical girdle crafted by Hephaestus for Aphrodite in Homer’s Iliad. How many of us have watched in awe a skilled artisan craft a technical object, thought that the skills demonstrate a magical ability. The craftsperson, in artisanal terms, then, appears to maintain some spiritual connection with the natural world. It is the human artisan interacting in a concrete relation with nature, who produces technical objects, mediated by physical skills and with the aid of tools. This forms a symbiotic and sustainable relationship between artisan and nature. The craftsperson works and understands the world from a local perspective. Conversely, and especially as mechanization took hold around the eighteenth century when machine culture evolved and the concept of engineer as a profession was born, whereby “the object thought by the engineer [became evermore] an abstract technical object, unattached to the natural world” (ibid., p. 104), and understood in evermore universal terms. The professional engineer as a child, was introduced to majority technics as part of her childhood experiences, whereas the craftsman was not given access to majority experience. This holds true today where children are still streamed according to ability, albeit less conspicuously. What Simondon calls for, therefore, is the adaption of some means which will enable a unity of the technical world “through a representation that would incorporate both that of the craftsman and that of the engineer” (ibid., p. 105). It is by developing an understanding of the nature of the technical worlds that “man would be neither inferior nor superior to technical objects, but rather would be capable of approaching and getting to know them through entertaining a relation of equality with them, that is, a reciprocity of exchanges; a social relation of sorts” (ibid., p. 105). The technical object, therefore, is no longer considered to be some external object designed only 82

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to be useful to human subjects. Technology is, in this new paradigmatic relationship, considered to be in equal partnership with human beings, it is, and has always been integral to human existence. It is a necessary and vital component in making the human complete. Essentially, a human cannot exist without technology. Considered thus, the dichotomous relationship between the human subject and the technical object vanishes. Technology education is an ideal platform from which to resolve this dichotomy. Simondon declares that learning about technology purely through the development of declarative and procedural knowledge, or concrete knowledge, as is the case with the craftsperson is problematic. It externalizes and objectifies technology as separate from human being. Moreover, he considers what he refers to as the formation of purely encyclopedic knowledge or abstract knowledge, as with the engineer, as equally problematic. It does the same. Each paradigm, on its own, offers a distorted, and biased perspective of technics. In terms of the former, Simondon considers technological education delivered thus to be at the “level of sensorial and qualitative representations, very close to the concrete aspects of matter … that can only manifest itself in work and not in consciousness or discourse; the craftsman will be like a magician, and his technical knowledge will be operational rather than intellectual; it will be an ability rather than a knowing” (ibid., p. 106). Whilst this type of technical training is undoubtedly inflexible, it is nevertheless not inferior to training using symbols; minority technics must not be confused with stupidity, as can often be the case. The latter type of technical knowledge, the majority perspective, considered as rational, theoretical, scientific and universal, offers a new experience of technics in an abstract format. Technological knowledge is presented to the individual in the encyclopedic form which is now available universally through books and the internet (see The Encyclopedie of Diderot and D’Alembert for example). As such, everybody, as part of the majority, believes themselves capable of becoming master of everything they choose, from a theoretical perspective, by becoming autodidactic: by being self-taught with the aid of books or the internet. Technical knowledge in this sense becomes intellectual rather than operational. It is abstract rather than concrete. However, it is the concept of the universality of technical knowledge that offers a false paradigm. The universal quantifying of all technical knowledge serves to: neglect the temporal, successive, [aspects] of the discoveries that have led to the current state; one grasps all at once and in actuality what is progressively constructed, what is slowly and successfully elaborated; the idea of progress … presents as a fixed state what is merely a stage; by excluding historicity, encyclopedism introduces man to the possession of a false entelechy (realization of potential), because this stage is still rich in virtuality; there is no determinism that presides over invention, and where progress is thought as being continuous, it masks the very reality of invention. (ibid., p. 122) In other words, where encyclopedism, which is today most clearly represented by the internet, presents information that is universally accessible on virtually everything 83

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technological, it tends to present information, in terms of technological progress as inevitable. What encyclopedic information does not take account of, is the individuated evolution of any given technical objects, the many phase-shifts made possible by a variety of new ensembles that enable the formation of new associated milieus, thereby enabling the formation of new modes of existence for technical objects. Technology education today, at school level, is clearly levelled towards minority technics, whilst the encyclopedic majority perspective is reserved for the adult or much older or ‘more able’ child. For Simondon these two difficult-to-reconcile dynamisms can be resolved with what he calls information theory. Whilst a detailed investigation of information theory is beyond the scope of this chapter, suffice to say that the concept of ‘information’ closely approximates the concept of ‘genesis’ for Simondon. He claims it to be the formula for individuation whereby it represents the genesis of both the subject and object synchronously in any given associated milieu. The student, in Simondon’s genetic terms, does not, for example, fabricate some object which is then assessed separately from the student (technical and minority skill development), followed by some abstract examination which again assesses separately, abstract student knowledge development (encyclopedic majority), thereby serving to separate (or stream) subject from object, academic from vocational. Rather, in genetic terms, it is the process of individuation within the associated milieu that results in the manifestation of some change. In this sense, it overcomes the opposition between subject and object. (Barthélémy & Iliadis, 2015, p. 111). Information theory places technology at the center of a large number of diverse sciences, such as psychology, logic, aesthetics, phonetic or grammatical study, the theory of organization of groups and regimes of authority … [it] is an interscientific theory that enables a systematization of scientific concepts as much as a systematization of the schematisms of various technics. (Simondon, 2017, p. 125) Discussion For technology education to survive, it must diversify. It must do this by incorporating more general pedagogical approaches, approaches that aim to cultivate a more reflective and critical analysis of technology by way of individuation (See also chapter on Latour). This can be achieved only by considering technology through the lens of a variety of other subject domains, such as those outlined above. Technology education today, continues to align itself with many disciplines, but none more than with engineering and particularly with product design engineering. For Simondon, learning about technology as some form of appreciation, as in art appreciation, or as the history of design, or even as the history of technology, whilst at the same time, continuing to ‘design’ and mainly fabricate artifacts that do not articulate with any 84

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of the encyclopedic modes, is rigid and maintains the dualities discussed above. On the other hand, to study the mode of existence of an already existing technical object and then attempt to create a new mode of existence for that technical object, by redesigning or reinventing it, will enable a much richer learning environment and a better understanding of the technological world as it exists today. In addition, this pedagogical model allows for the learning of craft skills whilst simultaneously learning theoretical perspectives, as well as the many other superabundant potentialities involved. Learners can be introduced to technologies that interest them and that are age appropriate in terms of being analyzed. This represents the preindividual stage. They can then improve or invent new modes of existence, realistic or fantastic, for that technical object collectively as discussed above. This enables discussions which will enable the exploration of a variety of different perspectives, thereby revealing new potentialities that can form the basis of individuation. However, in terms of technology education, reconciliation between these difficultto-reconcile dynamisms comes at a price, one that will require a serious rupture in the delivery of technology education from its present form. We need to enter into an “egalitarian relation, without privilege, one between technics and man” (ibid., p. 104), one that includes the many various elements that surround technology education, thereby enabling the formation of a new and unique associated milieu. A milieu that considers technology education as a process of individuation and not purely in terms of functionality and the development of primitive craft skills is required: a milieu that broadens the concept of technology education, not from a utilitarian or an economic perspective, but rather, from one that is human and democratic. REFERENCES Bardin, A. (2015). Epistemology and political philosophy in Gilbert Simondon: Individuation, technics, social systems. Dordrecht: Springer. Barthélémy, J. H., & Iliadis, A. (2015). Gilbert Simondon and the philosophy of information: An interview with Jean-Hugues Barthélémy. Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy – Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française, XXIII(1), 102–112. Chabot, P. (2013). The philosophy of Simondon: Between technology and individuation (A. Krefetz Trans., Kindle ed.). New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing. Dakers, J. (2016). Taking a bicycle ride into the virtual with Simondon, Deleuze and Guattari. In M. C. A. van der Sanden & M. J. de Vries (Eds.), Science and technology education and communication; seeking synergy (pp. 9–26). Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers. Grosz, E. (2013). Identity and individuation: Some feminist reflections. In A. Boever, A. Murray, J. Roffe, & A. Woodward (Eds.), Gilbert Simondon: Being and technology (pp. 37–56). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Michaud, Y. (2013). The aesthetics of Gilbert Simondon: Anticipation of the contemporary aesthetic experience (J. Clemens, Trans.). In A. Boever, A. Murray, J. Roffe, & A. Woodward (Eds.), Gilbert Simondon: Being and technology (pp. 121–131). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Mills, S. (2017). Power point slide from a workshop to discuss Simondon’s 1958 on the mode of existence of technical objects new translation, May 17, 2017. The Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy (CRMEP), Kingston University, London. Presentation by Simon Mills (De Monfort University). Retrieved January 2018, from http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2017/05/ simondon-on-technics-on-the-mode-of-existence-of-technical-objects/

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J. R. DAKERS Simondon, G. (1992). The genesis of the individual. In J. Crary & S. Kwinter (Eds.), Incorporations (pp. 297–317). New York, NY: Zone. Simondon, G. (2017). On the mode of existence of technical objects (C. Malaspina & J. Rogove, Trans.). Washington, DC: Univocal. Stiegler, B. (1998). Technics and time, 1: The fault of Epimetheus (R. Beardsworth & G. Collins, Trans.). Standford, CA: Stanford University Press.

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7. BERNARD STIEGLER On the Origin of the Relationship between Technology and Humans

INTRODUCTION

Bernard Stiegler was born on the 1 April 1952. He is a French philosopher of technology although his more recent work has become more politically and culturally orientated. He is head of the Institut de recherche et d’innovation (IRI), which he founded in 2006 at the Centre Georges-Pomidou. He was also the founder in 2005 of the political and cultural group, Ars Industrialis, and the founder in 2010 of the philosophy school, pharmakon.fr, held at Épineuil-le Fleuriel. Arguably, his best known work is Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus. This is the book that forms the main influence on the writing of this chapter. It is in this chapter that he makes the claim, one that I very much support, that Technics most properly should be thought of as the key philosophical question of our time (Stiegler, 1998, p. 10). A CONSIDERATION OF HANDS AND FEET

More than eighty years ago, Oswald Spengler (2015) suggested it was hands. Today, Bernard Stiegler (1998) thinks it was feet. Whether hands, feet or both, anthropological evidence, coupled with ongoing philosophical debate, tends to support the idea that the evolution of the human being was, and continues to be, a direct result of its relationship with technology, and, significantly, vice versa; the evolution of technology was, and continues to be, a direct result of its relationship with human beings. Whilst this relationship is undoubtedly complex, as all relationships tend to be, biological human evolution and adaptation, in accordance with technological evolution and adaptation, have, according to Stiegler, always been co-evolutional. This is contrary to Spengler, who argues that the human form came about “suddenly [and] in its entirety” (Spengler, 2015, p. 42). Thus, for Spengler, the completely formed human, together with “hand, gait, and posture [came] into existence together, but – and this is a point that no one hitherto has observed – hand and tool also” (ibid., p. 42). Spengler goes on to suggest that whilst the human was suddenly formed in its entirety, there was an evolutionary process that articulated the formation of the hand in association with the tool or weapon: “As the implements took form from the shape of the hand, so also the shape of the hand from the shape of the tool” (ibid., p. 43). The concept of a completely formed hand being in any way active without being in

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_007

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relation to technological implements in the form of tools, is an anathema to Spengler. So, for Spengler, whilst the human form evolved suddenly and completely, the hands alone evolved in association with tools. Stiegler agrees with this up to a point. However, he parts company with Spengler on two significant issues: First, he argues that the evolution of feet preceded that of hands. In the human “everything begins with feet” (Stiegler, 1998, p. 148), and second, he disagrees that the human was fully formed before entering into a relationship with technology. Indeed, he suggests quite the reverse; technology is “The Invention of the Human” (ibid., pp. 134–179). The Myth of Prometheus In the first of his three books on Technics and Time, Bernard Stiegler discusses the myth of Prometheus. Using it as an analogy to set the scene, he postulates that the evolution of the human being and technology, was, and continues to be coevolutional. Most of those who study the philosophy of technology will be cognisant of Prometheus, who, according to the myth, was responsible for giving human beings fire and technology. However, many are not aware that Prometheus had a brother named Epimetheus, whose story, according to Stiegler, is vital to being able to form an understanding of the origins of the relationship between technology and humans. It is Protagoras who narrates the myth and I have reproduced it below. Once upon a time, there existed gods but no mortal creatures. When the appointed time came for these also to be born, the gods formed them within the earth out of a mixture of earth and fire and the substances which are compounded from earth and fire. And when they were ready to bring them to the light, they charged Prometheus and Epimetheus with the task of equipping them and allotting suitable powers to each kind. Now Epimetheus begged Prometheus to allow him to do the distribution himself – “and when I have done it”, he said, “you can review it”. So he persuaded him and set to work. In his allotment he gave some creatures strength without speed, and equipped the weaker kinds with speed. Some he armed with weapons, while to the unarmed he gave some other faculty and so contrived means for their preservation. To those that he endowed with smallness, he granted winged flight or a dwelling underground; to those which he increased in stature, their size itself was a protection. Thus he made his whole distribution on a principle of compensation, being careful by these devices that no species should be destroyed … Now Epimetheus was not a particularly clever person, and before he realized it he had used up all the available powers on the brute beasts, and being left with the human race on his hands unprovided for, did not know what to do with them. While he was puzzling about this, Prometheus came to inspect the work, and found the other animals well off for everything. But man, naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed, and already the appointed day had come, when man was to emerge 88

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from within the earth into the daylight. Prometheus therefore, being at a loss to provide any means of salvation for man, stole from Hephaestus and Athena the gift of skill in the arts together with fire – for without fire there was no means for anyone to possess or use this skill – and bestowed it upon man. In this way man acquired sufficient resources to keep himself alive … through this gift man had the means of life, but Prometheus, so the story says, thanks to Epimetheus, had later to stand his trial for theft. Since, then, man had … by the art which they possessed, soon discovered speech and names, and invented houses and clothes and shoes and bedding and got food from the earth (Plato, 1961). Protagoras, 320d-322a. (Stiegler, 1998, pp. 187–188) Stiegler uses and develops this myth to demonstrate a number of issues. One issue considers the question ‘what is a human being?’ The actual meaning of Epimetheus in modern language is “afterthought, “whereas Prometheus means “forethought”. A synonym for afterthought is “forgotten”. Stiegler highlights the fact that whilst Epimetheus furnished all other creatures with essential qualities, qualities that gave some defining essence forming part of their DNA, he forgot humans. Humans, thus, lack any essential quality that answers the question ‘what is a human being?’ Prior to Prometheus’s intervention, humans lacked any essence whatsoever. They were animals without any essential qualities; animals in the raw. Stiegler refers to this state as “une panne d’essence, a ‘lack of fuel’, an ‘empty tank’” (Stiegler, 1998, p. 121). The origin of the human is, according to the myth, a default of human origin as being forgotten, as lack. This lack must, therefore, be supplemented from some other source. It is the forethought of Prometheus that resolves this question of lack, up to a point. When Prometheus bestowed the gift of skill in the arts together with fire, he endowed humans with an essential quality that Stiegler calls technics. Unlike the essential qualities given to all other animal species, technics is a quality that is external to humans. It is not part of their DNA. It is a technical gift of prosthesis that enables the human to survive and adapt, not only to their environment, but ultimately, adapting and reforming their environment. However, the myth of Prometheus offers only a partial perspective on the origin of the relationship between technology and human. Humans, in the myth, follow the ideas conceptualized by Spengler and many others including Rousseau, who is subject to a major critique by Stiegler in Technics and Time 1. For Steigler, the issue of discordance relates to the idea promulgated by both Spengler and Rousseau that the human came into being fully formed. Criteria of Humanity Whilst Stiegler is very much influenced by Simondon (see chapter on Simondon), he also draws heavily upon the work of Andre Leroi-Gourhan, a French anthropologist, paleontologist and philosopher. Leroi-Gourhan supports Stiegler’s thesis against that offered by Rousseau who claims that: 89

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Comparative anatomy has as yet made too little progress … to afford an adequate basis for any solid reasoning … I shall suppose his [the human being’s] confirmation to have been at all times what it appears to us at this day; that he always walked on two legs and made use of his hands as we do. (Rousseau, 1973, p. 52) In contrast, Leroi-Gourhan and Stiegler offer a “criteria of humanity”, the evolution of which occurred over a vast period of time. The first, and most important criteria, is upright posture made possible by the development the feet. This in turn led to the freeing, and thus the development, of the hands. Upright posture also facilitated the development of language and writing. None of these given criteria, however, could have been made manifest without the co-evolution of technology. Eric Wulf, who was a highly regarded anthropologist, offers a succinct account of the development espoused by Leroi-Gourhan and subsequently by Stiegler; [T]he relationship between hands and words as conditioned by the structure of the human body is extremely important for the development of language. When humans began to walk upright, thus freeing the hands from their role in locomotion, this also allowed them to use their hands to grip objects. The next step was the handling of foodstuffs and then, gradually, the use and manufacture of tools. As humans began using their hand to grip objects, they no longer needed to use the mouth for this task. In the same way as the hands, once liberated, progressed to the use and manufacture of tools, the face now developed methods of symbolization, which, as they were articulated, turned into a system for producing sounds. These two developments are both part of one and the same process. “As soon as there are prehistoric tools, there is the possibility of language, for tools and language are neurologically linked and cannot be disassociated within the social structure of humankind” (Leroi-Gourhan, 1993, p. 114). In common with all primates, human beings also have a neuronal connection between the hand and facial organs. However, in contrast to other primates, humans, with their upright gait, can create symbols and tools. To put it another way, humans, though they started out with the same formula as primates, can make tools as well as symbols, both of which derive from the same process, or, rather, draw upon the same basic equipment in the brain. This leads us to conclude not only that language is as characteristic for humans as our tools, but also that both are the expression of the same intrinsically human property. (Wulf, 2013, p. 239) Leroi-Gourhan thus argues that the formation of tool fabrication and the codevelopment of language, ultimately resulted in the formation of psychomotor skills, intellectual and inventive capacity as a direct result of the process of erect posture, in distinct opposition to the concept promulgated by Rousseau, in which the formation 90

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of these capacities were already inherent within the fully evolved human who came into being ready made. In other words, for Rousseau, these essential qualities were genetically endowed as part of the process of human evolution and were independent of the technological potentialities that surrounded it. The fully formed human subject was then able to act independently upon the natural objective world, by inventing and fabricating technologies by wit alone. Just as in other species, the qualities endowed upon the human were internal, as are the internal qualities of speed to the leopard or flight to the bird. Leroi-Gourhan and now Stiegler disagree. They make a clear distinction between Rousseau’s perspective and their own. They introduce the concept of exteriorization, which, they argue, is entirely unique to human evolution, whereby physical, intellectual and inventive capacities, which are not internal and already given, are instead, made manifest as a direct result of their engagement with the natural world. It is from this interaction with nature that humans first develop technologies such as flint tools, the fabrication of which enabled the human to develop the technique of knapping. The development of knapping not only introduces a new physical technique, it also introduces the concept of anticipation, or thinking ahead about fabricating a technology (see below). In other words, as the human invents the technology, the technology invents the human: they coevolve. It is, thus, through the process of exteriorization that the brain develops intellectual capacity as well as the co-evolution of speech and writing. This is, in clear contrast to the concept of interiorization, as demonstrated by all other living creatures, where each living thing has inherent vital qualities that are not dependent upon external technological prosthetics. Whilst beavers construct dams and some species of monkeys use sticks and twigs to ‘fish’ for ants, and inner city crows use passing cars to run over and break open snails on their behalf, they do not co-evolve with these technologies. They do not ‘invent’ technologies nor, more importantly, do they develop and improve technologies, at least, not in any way that would cause them to evolve beyond their natural state, both in themselves (interiorization), and with their technologies (exteriorization) as humans do. Other species come ready made and only in some exceptional cases have they demonstrated primitive forms of exteriorization. It is the co-evolution of humans and technology that creates a criteria for humanity. Technical Consciousness and Anticipation Stiegler posits that the formation of a consciousness through the development of the cerebral cortex, cannot be strictly biological. Nor can it be strictly technological. Its formation presupposes the concept of anticipation. In other words, both the biological and the techno-logical evolved synchronously. “neither one precedes the other, neither is the origin of the other, the origin being then […] the simultaneous arrival of the two – which are in truth the same considered from two different points of view” (Stiegler, 1998, p. 152). “A ‘prosthesis’ [like a flint tool]”, in this sense, “does not supplement something, does not replace what would have been there before 91

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and would have been lost: it is added” (ibid., p. 152). Whilst the shaping of a flint tool, for example, into a tool with a cutting edge, may have emerged initially, by way of accident, whether by discovering an already formed one (past), or by accidentally hitting one pebble with another (present), it clearly required anticipation (foresight) in order to be fabricated again and again, thus becoming a form of intended fabrication. This is, for Stiegler, the formation of a technical consciousness which necessitates anticipation. “[I]f there can only be a technical consciousness that is nevertheless not the simple automatic or programmatic-genetic behavior of a fabricating animal, then there must be anticipation … Anticipation means the realization of a possibility that is not determined by the neurophysiological characteristics of the individual [alone]” (1998, p. 151). In other words, the realization of a possibility, requires the simultaneous co-determination between a human and something external to that human. It requires a ‘transitional space’ which is neither inside nor outside (Winnicot, 1971) A space that Simondon refers to as a milieu. A transitional space where relationships are formed, mostly unintentional, and where a number of actants, which include humans and technologies, form relationships from which something novel is generated (Latour, 2005). Stiegler, … [thus, interprets] … the human as the species that evolves not simply genetically but extra-genetically (or, as [Stiegler] puts it, epiphylogenetically, ‘by means other than life … the human evolves by exteriorizing itself in tools, artists, language, and technical memory banks. Technology on this account is not something external and contingent, but rather and essentially – indeed, the essential – dimension of the Human. (Hansen, 2010, p. 65) Artificial Memory Stiegler goes on to relate technology to human memory by deploying the same philosophical forms of argument discussed above. For Stiegler there are three forms of memory. First, genetic memory; memory that exists in all living things and resembles the essential qualities handed out by Epimetheus. This is essentially, a genetic code which is passed on from parent to child, and both resides and dies within the biological creature (interiorization). Second, the epi-memory evolves as a result of experience. The experience of a humans lived experiences may combine and involve, for example, expertise in mathematics as a result of memorizing formula, and utilizing that memory to understand more complex mathematics as time goes on. However, this will not change the genetic make of the individual, nor will her progeny inherit her advanced mathematical skills. These skills die with the individual. Finally, artificial memory, or what Stiegler refers to as epiphylogenetic memory, is a memory that resembles the technological gift given to humans by Prometheus (exteriorization). For example, when a human wants to remember something they might tie a knot around their finger as an aid memoir, an externalized and artificial

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aid to memory. This constitutes a technical prosthetic; a mnemotechnique designed to help a human to remember something. The philosophy espoused by Stiegler is, thus, an account for the formation and evolution of the human as distinct from all other species. For Stiegler, the human can only ever be thought of in terms of the co-evolution of the interior (biology) in conjunction with the exterior (technology). One informs the other and vice versa: the interior first made possible the exteriorization of memory (through attaining upright posture) but the exterior subsequently started to influence the interior set-up (the brain, and human body in general), which started evolving in relation to the once exteriorized ‘organized inorganic’. As Stiegler (1998, p. 158) puts it: “… a mirror effect whereby one, looking at itself in the other, is both deformed and formed in the process”. (Zwier, 2011, p. 17) The exterior (technology) is therefore, just as much a part of the humans essential qualities as is the interior (biology). Thus, for Stiegler, humans are originally technical. Stiegler’s Impact on Technology Education in the 21st Century Many of the philosophers in this book are not easy to read or understand. Their relationship with technology education is not always readily apparent. This is certainly the case with Stiegler. However, as a philosopher of technology, he does take an interest in education, and although he does not explicitly address technology education per se, there are connections that can be made that are important in the development of technology education. Stiegler offers first, a conceptual analysis of a pre-history that outlines the genesis of the human as inextricably linked to technology. Whilst he follows a different path, there are common elements and clear influences deriving from Simondon. For Stiegler, the human and technology co-evolved; he suggests that there is not, and never has been, any entity considered to be human, that has not had a discernable relationship with technology. This, for him, is what distinguishes the human from all other life forms on the earth. This convincing philosophical perspective, offers a strong argument for the need to study the sociological aspects of the relationship between technology and humans and in particular to study and debate the way in which technology impacts, not only the individual, but the ways in which cultures are affected by their association with technology. The sociological and cultural aspects of this relationship, bring into stark relief other crucially important issues that relate to the ongoing development and progression of human being, which by definition, also means the simultaneous development and progression of technology. These issues, which are relevant to both the human and the technical, continue to shape, impact and problematize the ethical, environmental, and political dimension of the human/technical interface, not to mention issues relating to the sustainability 93

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of the planet. Stiegler’s thesis differentiates from the model of technology education as it is delivered today, in which the concept of what many regard to be technological literacy is, for the most part, considered to be an add-on, having little relevance or importance. This is in stark contrast to recognizing the importance of cultivating a more reflective and critical analysis of technology. This aspect of the human technology relationship is very much in line with that espoused by Simondon (See his chapter). Stiegler is, however, further concerned that the co-evolution of human and technology has undergone a radical phase-shift or rupture. While human being and technology continued to co-evolve there existed a state of equilibrium between human evolution and technological evolution, an almost naturally occurring synchronicity, whereby the relationship between human and technical appeared symbiotic. What appears to have happened, however, is that this balance has become de-phased over time. The transformation in human evolution since the appearance of Homo Sapien has not physically changed dramatically over time. It is their ability to reason that has undergone the most distinctive change, but even this is nowhere remotely close to the evolution and transformation that has happen to technology, especially since the digital revolution in the late 1950s and beyond. Given that technology is inextricably linked to human evolution, and given that technology is today developing at an exponential rate, beyond that of the human, especially in the technologies of mass communication, driven by capitalism, and those technologies that exteriorize memory, the ‘progress’ of modern technology, as elucidated by Stiegler, is now having a detrimental affect on young people’s ability to reason and be critically aware (Stiegler, 2010a). This is where Stiegler goes beyond Simondon. He reconceptualizes Simondon’s thesis by revealing how an adverse hegemonic affect is being perpetrated, particularly on the young, by social media technologies that are being deployed on behalf of large corporate global organisations. The constant upgrading of technological hardware and software, which is disturbingly becoming addictive, is all done in the interests of what these corporations allege to be technological ‘progress’. Perhaps ‘profit’ would be a more appropriate term. This, Stiegler claims, has a seriously negative impact on the cognitive functioning of the consumers of these social media technologies, an impact that is deleterious to the ability to concentrate. Borrowing from Katherine Hayles, Stiegler terms this cognitive change in the attention level as hyperattention which is the opposite of deep attention, and which Hayles herself terms generational mutation: “we find ourselves in the midst of a generational mutation regarding cognitive behavior, one that poses serious challenges to every level of education, including universities” (Hayles, 2007). Hayles goes on to characterize hyper-attention, caused by constantly flicking through the flux of multiple sources of information, as a result of a low attention span. Quoting from several studies undertaken over the years, Stiegler points out that, on average, young Americans spend over six hours a day on some form of digital media. These studies also report that printed books are the least utilized form of media among young people 94

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(Stiegler, 2010a, p. 73). The impact on cognitive development in young human beings is clearly linked to technology and technological development. This form of human/technological relationship, can no longer be considered as co-evolutional in a positive constructive way. Technology is manipulating its human counterpart in a negative way, one that is slowly, although not inexorably, enabling the mutation of a new generation that is less able to reason and critically analyze the very technologies that are causing the problem in the first place. From a Kantian perspective, it is reason that creates access to critique as the mode of transition from minority to maturity. It is its lack thereof, that has serious implications for both human development and democracy. When asked the question “what is enlightenment” Kant replied: For this enlightenment, however, nothing more is required than freedom; and indeed the most harmless form of all the things that may be called freedom: namely, the freedom to make a public use of one’s reason in all matters. But I hear from all sides the cry: don’t argue. The officer says: “Don’t argue, but rather march!” The tax collector says: “Don’t argue, but rather pay!” The clergyman says: “Don’t argue, but rather believe!” … Here freedom is restricted everywhere. Which restriction, however, hinders enlightenment? Which does not, but instead even promotes it? I answer: the public use of reason must at all times be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men; the private use of reason, however, may often be very narrowly restricted without the progress of enlightenment being particularly hindered. I understand, however, under the public use of his own reason, that use which anyone makes of it as a scholar […] before the entire public of the reading world. The private use I designate as that use which one makes of his reason in a certain civil post or office which is entrusted to him. Now a certain mechanism is necessary in many affairs which are run in the interest of the commonwealth by means of which some members of the commonwealth must conduct themselves passively in order that the government may direct them, through an artificial unanimity, to public ends, or at least restrain them from the destruction of these ends. Here one is certainly not allowed to argue; rather, one must obey. (Kant, 1996, pp. 59–60) The use of reason and argument, must for Kant, be made public, since to use it privately renders it passive. Thus, to mostly limit learning about technology to psychomotor skill development as directed by the teacher on behalf of the curriculum, and then later examined in order to measure the level of conformity of action, is to say ‘don’t argue, but rather do as instructed’! In other words, obey. This represses the transition from childhood to adulthood, from minority to majority as discussed in the chapter by Simondon. Moreover, a lack in the development of open and public reasoning and argument is disempowering. It negates the taking responsibility for expressing ones actions and thoughts. It separates us from our capacity to act by removing our power to act: disempowerment by way of conformity 95

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versus empowerment by way of creativity. It is in this respect that the fundamental question as posed by Deleuze is thus: … not “What must I do?” (the question of morality) but rather “What can I do?” Given my degree of power, what are my capabilities and capacities? How can I come into active possession of my power? How can I go to the limit of what I “can do?” The political question follows from this, since those in power have an obvious interest in separating us from our capacity to act. (Smith, 2012, p. 285) Technology and Memory Following on from Kant, Stiegler uses the relationship between human memory and technical memory to explain further, how this imbalance between human development and technological development affects the reasoning of young people today. Memory is defined as being a faculty of the mind which enables the storage and retrieval of information. However, it appears that, thus far, the human has a limited ability in this respect. Humans have, consequentially, developed ways to store memory technologically. Initially, these took the form of mnemotechniques such as tying a string around a finger in order to remember to do something. Eventually, more sophisticated methods were developed, such as keeping a diary. The evolution of these primitive technologies was very much in harmony with human evolution. It is when mnemotechniques transitioned into becoming mnemotechnologies that more significant disruptions became evident (Stiegler, 2010b, p. 67). Stiegler calls this phase the ‘industrial model’ in which memory undergoes a fundamental transformation. From his perspective “what is crucial about today’s technical memory aids – iPods, smart phones, GPS navigators, and PDAs, not to mention the internet – is their intimate articulation with anamnesis, a term Stiegler borrows from Plato which he uses to designate the embodied act of remembering. Everything hinges [now] on […] hypomnesis, the technical exteriorization of memory” (Hansen, 2010, p. 64). Given that the acquisition of knowledge is linked inextricably to memory (what is the point of exams otherwise), the exteriorization of memory through the use of technology, must simultaneously embed what was human knowledge, and place it into technical devices. Knowledge, thus, becomes technical and humans rely more and more on technologically produced knowledge in order to better understand the world. “But the new technological forms of knowledge, objectified in equipment and apparatus, conversely engender a loss of knowledge at the very moment one begins to speak of ‘knowledge societies’, ‘knowledge industries’ and what has become known as ‘cognitive’ or ‘cultural’ capitalism” (Stiegler, 2010b, p. 67). Objectified technical knowledge, most prominently when delivered in digital form, is thus open to manipulation by those that produce it and then post it, whether on a personal social 96

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media site or on a large commercial organization website. It is social media together with the informational strategy known as noopolitics, for example, that influenced young people’s political perspective. Barack Obama’s technologically astute supporters were able to use social media to raise his profile and enthuse potential supporters. It is alleged that social media was used to ‘rig’ the recent elections in the United States. This is social media, made possible by digital technology, being used to manipulate knowledge. Marshall McLuhan, in 1964, famously said: The medium is the message because it is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action. The content or uses of such media are as diverse as they are ineffectual in shaping the form of human association. Indeed, it is only too typical that the “content” of any medium blinds us to the character of the medium. (McLuhan, 2013, p. 9) What McLuhan proposed was that it is the medium itself that affects societies, not the content. That was his perspective in 1964 – fifty four years ago and this still resonates today. However, the content today has, perhaps, a more insidious impact than McLuhan suggested then. It is clear from the perspective elucidated by Stiegler, as well as Simondon, that a major shift in the emphasis given to education about technology is vital. We are in a new age, a new era in which there is a need to engage not just young people, but all people, in a form of education that is much more than the transmission model that still prevails today. This will require a major reformation in particular in our thinking about the delivery of education about technology: a Nouveau Enlightenment demanding that the concept of sapere aude be integrated into every curriculum document: an educational reformation that will involve a battle for the development of reason. And it will be a battle: But further, this battle must reengage a politics of the mind and spirit – a noopolitics – that, in this age of psychotechnologies, must also be an industrial politics focusing on technologies of the spirit: these are the conditions without which any necessary reform of our educational institutions will be made entirely in vain, if it really is a battle to take intelligence to a higher level – and individual and collective responsibility along with it – not just to overdevelop, in the framework of economic ‘growth’ that has become malignant and is increasingly perceived to be a cancerous excrescence. (Stiegler, 2010a, p. 51) Discussion Stiegler uses an ancient myth to introduce his argument. It is clear that the myth of Prometheus offers an argument to suggest that we humans simply cannot exist without our technologies. It is also clear that we have always found new ways to develop them, both for good, and in many cases, for not such good reasons. It is this co-evolutional relationship as promulgated by Stiegler, that has led us to this place 97

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and this time. However, this is an area that, I would argue, is profoundly lacking in the delivery of technology education today. The craft orientated aspects of technology education seem to persist dogmatically, whilst the technological literacy aspects are often sidelined (see the chapter on Simondon for a more elaborate discussion on the seemingly difficult-to-reconcile dynamism that continues to pervade). This seems ironic when we consider the technologically textured world that human beings today inhabit. An appreciation of the relationship between human and technology, as outlined by Stiegler is, and always has been, a vital component for the survival of the human race, both socially and physically. Without technology it is not likely that the human race could survive. Equally ironic, is the distinct possibility that the development of technology, particularly those related to weapons of mass destruction, may well also, ultimately, cause the extinction of the human race. As I write this chapter, the temperature outside is minus ten degrees. I am very happy to have the technologies of a warm fire, a well-insulated house and a woolen jumper to offer addition comfort. I have, however, also been reading in the press about the potential of a nuclear war between America and North Korea or Iran, as well as the mass murder of up to seventeen school children at a school in America. All these are made possible by technologies. It simply beggars belief that, in this globalized world, there does not appear to be an established educational forum to address the human/technology relationship, a relationship that clearly, not only has a major impact on human life, but which forms an integral and necessary component for the ongoing survival of the human race. Curriculum developers should take note: Stiegler suggested, at the beginning of this chapter, technics should most properly be thought of as the key philosophical question of our time. Perhaps we should expand this to include education about technology as being the key philosophical/ educational question of our time. REFERENCES Hansen, M. (2010). Introduction to memory by Bernard Stiegler. In W. J. T. Mitchell & M. Hansen (Eds.), Critical terms for media studies (pp. 64–87). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Hayles, K. (2007). Hyper and deep attention: The generational divide in cognitive modes. Modern Language Association Journal, 187–199. Retrieved February 15, 2018, from http://www.jessicapressman.com/ CAT_winter2013/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Hayles-attention.pdf Kant, I. (1996). An answer to the question: What is enlightenment? In J. Schmidt (Trans.) & J. Schmidt (Ed.), What is enlightenment? Eighteenth-century answers and twentieth-century questions (pp. 58– 64). Berkley, CA: University of California Press. (First published 1784) Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social. An introduction to actor-network theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Leroi-Gourhan, A. (1993). Gesture and speech (A. B. Berger, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. McLuhan, M. (2013). Understanding media: The extensions of man. Berkeley, CA: Ginko Press, Inc. Plato. (1961). The collected dialogues (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns, Eds., Bollinger Series LXX). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rousseau, J. J. (1973). Discourse on the origin of inequality. In J.-J. Rousseau (Ed.), ‘The social contract’ and ‘discourses’ (J. H. Moran, Trans., J. H. Brufitt & J. C. Hall, Rev.). London: Everyman’s Library.

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BERNARD STIEGLER Smith, D. (2012). Essay 16: Jacques Derrida; Deleuze and Derrida, immanence and transcendence: Two directions in recent French thought. Essays on Deleuze (pp. 271–286). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Stiegler, B. (1998). Technics and time, 1: The fault of Epimetheus (R. Beardsworth & G. Collins, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Stiegler, B. (2006). Anamnesis and hypomnesis: The memories of desire. In A. Bradley & L. Armand (Eds.), Technicity. Prague: Litteraria Pragensia. Stiegler, B. (2010a). Taking care of youth and the generations (S. Barker, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Stiegler, B. (2010b). Memory. In W. J. T. Mitchell & M. Hansen (Eds.), Critical terms for media studies (pp. 64–87). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Stiegler, B., & Rogoff, I. (2010, March). Transindividuation. E-flux Journal, 14. Retrieved February 14, 2018, from http://www.e-flux.com/journal/14/61314/transindividuation/ Winnicot, D. W. (1971). Playing and reality. London: Routledge. Wulf, C. (2013). Anthropology: A continental perspective (D. Winter, E. H. Margitta, & R. J. Rouse, Trans.). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Zwier, J. (2011). On originary technical mediation: A synthesis of Stiegler and post-phenomenolgy (Master’s thesis). Philosophy of Science, Technology, and Society, University of Twente, The Netherlands. Retrieved from January 13, 2018, http://essay.utwente.nl/61175/1/Zwier,_Jochem_-_ S0206318_-_Master_Thesis.pdf

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8. BRUNO LATOUR Actor Network Theory

INTRODUCTION

Born in 1947 in Beaune (France), to a family that has owned Maison Louis Latour, world-famous growers and merchants of the finest Burgundy wines since 1789, Bruno Latour left a possible future in the wine-business to attend Jesuit school and later the University of Dijon to study for a master’s degree. In 1972 he gained a first in the agrégation de philosophie (a national exam). In the Ivory Coast, whilst engaging in ‘cooperation’, a sort of French Peace Corps which, at the time, acted as an alternative to military service, he completed his thèse de troisième siècle (PhD) Exégèse et Ontologie (1975, L’Université de Tours). In 1987 he obtained the habilitation à la direction des recherches at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, a second PhD. Latour has written on many subjects including technology, science, law, religion, cosmopolitics, anthropology of the moderns and, perhaps most notably, actor-network theory which will form the basis of this chapter. TECHNOLOGY-HUMAN HYBRIDISATION IN SUPERHEROES

Comic book superheroes, for the most part, have been invested with their exotic powers through being exposed to some form of radiation or some magical element beyond our understanding. Many, however, rely upon some form of technological prosthetic, whether chemical or physical, that enables them to undertake their superhero function. The mere mortal is thus transformed into superhero by entering into a network of relations, an ensemble, with non-human entities that serve to enhance her abilities to extraordinary levels. Whatever alliance is formed and in whatever way, it is always an alliance between human and nonhuman entities, or actors in Latour’s terms, that hybridize the various actors into something other, something transformed, whether subtly or obviously. Significantly, the behavior of the superheroes’ former mere mortal status, after the process of transformation, radically changes. The hybridization causes them to be affected in some way and, as a result, they then go on to affect others. They become, in virtually every case, either super-heroes or super-villains, certainly radically different from their pretransformation days. These transformations, as represented in comic books and subsequent movies of this genre, serve as examples of Actor-Network Theory.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_008

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The heroes or villains experience a change in circumstances which in turn, leads to a change in circumstances within the Actor-Network for other proximal actors, depending on the set of circumstances that prevail at any given time. Humans live in fear of the villains and super-heroes use their super powers to fight the bad guys. When a new set of baddies is conceived, new sets of powers evolve to balance the equation. Fortunately, the heroes usually prevail in the end. Whilst these fictional technoscientific Actor-Networks clearly presage a cyborg or post-human future, the prevailing, more mundane actor networks that actually exist today also have a profound impact in shaping our behavior, perhaps not as obvious as in the case of superheroes, but significant nevertheless. This chapter will explore the concept of Actor-Network Theory and how it might aid in the delivery of technology education. ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY VERSUS ACTIVITY THEORY

It is important to make a clear distinction between actor-network theory (ANT), the concept of which was first developed by Latour, along with the French sociologist Michel Callon and the British sociologist John Law, and activity theory. In ANT, humans and non-humans have agency, whereas in activity theory, only humans have agency. For example, Latour suggests that artefacts have, what he refers to as “delegated competencies” (1993, p. 389). In other words, artefacts have varying degrees of agency that can affect human behavior. It is reasonably well understood that human beings have agency and can both affect and be affected by the behavior of other human beings. What is not so well understood, from an ANT perspective, is that nonhuman entities can also delegate to humans. In ANT, “actors” are defined as “entities that do things” (Latour, 1992, p. 163). For example, the entity known as “a cell phone demands fresh batteries. It enlists the human to put them in by beeping when the battery is low” (Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006, p. 249). In other words, the cell phone is an entity that, in association or relationship with other actors, such as a human, collectively does things that cause an existing event to change in some way; putting new batteries in to the cell phone thus enables forms of communication to continue. Activity theory, on the other hand, considers this in a different way. There is no delegation from the artefact to the human. The decision to change the battery is entirely at the discretion of the human. She may decide to turn off the beeper or throw the phone away or cancel her contract with the phone company. She is the only one in the human/technology relationship to have any agency and is able to modify her relationship with the technology based upon her own desires: the cell phone simply does what it was designed to do. “The cell phone’s agency is manifest in its ability to beep but it is an agency designed and delegated by humans” (ibid., p. 250). (For a more detailed discussion on activity theory in relation to technology education, see Dakers, 2011). Latour, however, disagrees with the concepts set out in activity theory, particularly in relation to non human agency. Although, ANT is considered by some to be a controversial philosophy and as such, has not been without its critics over time, many others continue to support and further develop the concept. Ironically, 102

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even the very name ANT has been subject to ongoing debate by both critics and advocates who have, between them, suggested a variety of different nomenclatures including ‘actant-rhyzome ontology’ and the ‘sociology of translation’ (Latour, 2005, p. 9). Indeed, even Latour himself questioned the appropriateness of the acronym. He suggested that there were only four things wrong with actor-network theory: the word actor, the word network, the word theory and the hyphen (1999a, p. 15). He later recanted and in 2005 defended the name, including the hyphen, when it was suggested to him that the “acronym A.N.T. was perfectly fit for a blind, myopic, workaholic, trail-sniffing, and collective traveler. An ant writing for other ants, this fits my project very well!” he postulated (p. 9). Whatever views may have been expressed about the concept of ANT over the years, it has, nevertheless, endured as a philosophy that has an important role to play in the philosophy of technology. REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL

First published in 2005, Reassembling the Social: An introduction to Actor-Network Theory, (hereinafter referred to as RES) is probably the most detailed book to date that Latour has written specifically about ANT. It is the culmination of almost thirty years work. His influences are many and varied and, perhaps an early influence that is relevant to technology education will help to set out the trajectory that Latour was to follow towards defining ANT. During his time in the Ivory Coast, Latour turned his attention to education. Interviewing white French teachers, he noted their complaints that their African students were unable to reach the levels of competence needed required to meet the French standards. After interviewing the teachers and the students themselves; he found teachers at the Lycée Technique in Abidjan reporting their pupils to be unable to read technical drawings as representing three dimensional objects, obviously a serious deficiency for future technicians. When he interviewed the pupils and started looking into school practices, however, Latour found a much simpler explanation. The school system (an exact copy of the French system) introduced students to engineering before they had done any practical work on engines. Since most of the pupils had never seen or handled an engine before, it was not surprising that the interpretation of technical drawings presented them with quite a puzzle. The cause of the problems the students had with reading technical drawings was not their “African Mind’, but the lack of appropriate connections required to interpret such drawings. Exporting the French school systems to Africa without exporting the many links to engines that French pupils have established even before entering school, made the boys in Abidjan ‘incompetent’. (De Vries, 2016, pp. 12–13) This insight begins to reveal the genesis of the actor-network. An actor, for Latour, is any-thing, whether human or nonhuman, that forms a relationship with other actors that will, in some way, transform the existing situation in which they find themselves. 103

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In the example above, the white French teachers had concluded that the students from Abidjan were simply incompetent. This was based upon their understanding of a network of relations that was limited to human beings only. From a research perspective, Latour expanded the network of relations to include nonhuman actors, in this case in the form of actual engines. He deduced that the French students’ ability levels in terms of reading technical drawings was clearly enhanced by their previous ‘hands-on’ interaction with actual physical engines, that they would later be visualizing in the form of abstract technical drawings. This gave them a clear advantage over those students from Abidjan who had never interacted in any way with actual engines; in other words, with related nonhuman actors. They were, rather, supposed to understand the concept of engines by reading abstract drawings, without having previously experienced any actual physical interaction with actual engines, which would better enable them to relate the abstract drawing symbolizations with concrete examples. This reminds me of being both a school student and later, a teacher in a technical drawing class, first learning, and subsequently teaching, how to draw conic sections. I am now aware of some applications that involve the use of an eclipse, an hyperbola or a parabola. For example, I distinctly remember being in awe when I first saw the hyperbolic paraboloid roof covering the Tokyo Olympic stadium that was designed in 1964 by the architect Kenzō Tange. However, as a student at school or even later as a teacher, I was never engaged in a network of relations, that actually included a variety of nonhuman examples of the practical application of conic sections. It was simply presented as an advanced drawing exercise that was likely to come up in an exam question. And it did, a lot. ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY

The term actor and the term network are often misconstrued in ANT. The term actor tends to orientate thought towards the concept of a human being acting, whereas it refers to all entities, human and non-human, that come together to form networks of relationships in what Simondon refers to as an associated milieu (see chapter on Simondon), or Deleuze and Guattari refer to as an assemblage (2008). In ANT, actors are both human and nonhuman, and this is a crucial element of the theory. “Actors” are defined as “entities that do things” (Latour, 1992, p. 163). “An actor in ANT is a semiotic definition – an actant – that is something that acts or to which activity is granted by another … an actant can literally be anything provided it is granted to be the source of action” (Latour 1996, p. 373). An ‘actor-network’ is not just a network or collection of actors as in a social network like Facebook (although it can be). It is much more complex than that. It is “an assembly of actants who (by way of the translations they are involved in) are ‘networked’ and defined by the other actants” (De Vries, 2016, p. 92). These translations act as a series of continuous processes that constitute change in the actor-network milieu. Essentially, everything is an actor-network “reducible neither to an actor alone nor to a network … An actor-network is simultaneously an actor 104

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whose activity is networking heterogeneous elements and a network that is able to redefine and transform what it is made of” (Callon, 1987, p. 93). This is not entirely dissimilar to Whitehead, who, according to Shapiro (2014, p. 2), articulated a vision of cosmological scope. The world, says Whitehead, is composed of processes, not things. Nothing is given in advance; everything must first become what it is … “How an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is … Its ‘being’ is constituted by its ‘becoming’” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 23). ANT is an alternative to the ‘sociology of the social’, an alternative social science, a technique for redescribing the social world by tracing the associations of humans and nonhumans that make up a ‘collective’. Given ANT’s provenance in science, a further misunderstanding is imminent. The most visible – and controversial – aspect of Latour’s work in science studies is the role he attributes to ‘nonhumans’. Extending the lessons from this subfield to the whole of social science might suggest that when sociologists study other domains than science – politics, religion, the art-world, health care or whatever other subject might interest them – they just have to learn to take some ‘material’ objects into account. No doubt, they have to. But ‘nonhumans’ is not just an odd name for what used to be referred to as nature, or the material world. The term is introduced to allow agency for anything nonhuman. It may also refer to entities of an entirely different nature than the ones one encounters in Latour’s analysis of science and technology. For example, some religious people insist that they are being moved by divinities, spirits and voices (RES: 235); these are ‘nonhumans’, no doubt, but quite different ones from – say – microbes and doorbells. Likewise, in art, when actors explain at length that they are attached to, moved, or affected by works of art that ‘make them feel things (RAS: 236) they are certainly not referring to the chemistry of the paint, or the wooden frame of the picture. Actor-network theory is a technique for detecting how connections between heterogeneous, human and non-human, entities make up a state of affairs that we used to call ‘social’. It is a technique for making descriptions, not a shopping-list for reminding you that you have to include also a few ‘material’ objects in your accounts. (De Vries, 2016, p. 88) Thinking in terms of ANT, therefore, leads one to conclude that the world can no longer be divided into an external world that can be known and human subjects who know (Michael, 2017, p. 17). The human being is inextricably linked to nature and the material world in a complex multiplicity of ways. There is simply no event, particularly in the technologically textured world we now occupy, that involves a human being, or a collection of human beings, that does not also involve nonhuman actors. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, these non-human actors combine with human actors in an associated milieu, which together may constitute some novel event. Any event, any network of relations, whether technological, religious, political, educational, any event at all, will affect the various actors and be affected by the various actors involved, all to varying degrees depending upon the circumstances and the outcomes. 105

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As an example, consider the network of relations that forms the basis of a technology education lesson on fabricating a dovetail joint. This will involve a number of actors: teacher and students (human actors), wood, hand tools, machine tools, workbenches, physical structure of the workshop, safety attire such as aprons and goggles (nonhuman physical actors), a lesson plan on how to form a dovetail joint, (perhaps actual examples of artefacts that have been fabricated using dovetail joints, artefacts that are external to the school), a variety of experiences in working with wood based materials and tools, safety rules and regulations, school based rules and regulations for behavior, student expectations, teacher expectations, parent expectations (non-human non-physical actors) and many more. This relationship of actors forms a momentary event, an actor-network lasting, perhaps, for about one hour, but relying very much upon the past experiences and interests of the human actors, the historical aspects of woodworking, the skills associated with the tools and materials which will have changed over time as well as the development of the associated tools and machines, in other words, the historicity of the associated technological development. Other associated issues might include the deforestation necessary in order to supply the wood, the sawmills, the logistics of delivery, all forming a network of relations that can potentially influence the presentation and learning experience of fabricating a dovetail joint. When these numerous other actors, which can also include critical aspects such as the political, religious, sociological and environmental that may form part of the associated relationships, are ignored, the learning experience becomes reductive. It becomes an exercise in developing only a partial understanding of the relationships, of the associated milieu, that may come together in the fabrication of a dovetail joint. This reduces technology education to the learning of hitherto pre-established motor skills associated with the formation of a dovetail joint. This reductive pedagogy which relies upon conformity to established skill based development, tends to continue to form the dominant orthodoxy in the delivery of technology education to this day. In this current decontextualized model, there is little space allowed for criticality, for debate, for creative thought. On the other hand, according to ANT the many associations, together with hitherto undiscovered potentialities of all the actors’ future trajectories combine, and will be different, in varying degrees, when different actors combine even when trying to achieve the same learning outcome. Michael (2017) describes this in terms of Whitehead’s philosophy in order to illuminate ANT: They [the technology education class] are constituted from ‘prehensions’ – a heterogeneity of elements that span the material and the social, the conscious and the unconscious, the nonhuman and the human. These prehensions come together to combine – to ‘concresce’ [into becoming the technology education learning experience]; in the process of that concrescence, the ‘actual entity’ [learning how or why, or how and why to fabricate a dovetail joint, or perhaps just keeping everyone occupied for an hour] is forged. In due course that 106

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‘actual entity’ itself becomes a prehension concresced with other prehensions [possibly becoming a skilled craftsperson or an architect or a furniture historian for example, or perhaps becoming disillusioned with craft orientated domains altogether] to form other actual entities. (p. 18) It is important to note, however, that not all prehensions result in satisfactory concrescences: some students may feel inhibited whilst working in the workshop, others may welcome it, but perhaps for the wrong reason, at least from the teacher’s perspective; it may simply be considered by the student that a technical workshop lesson is much better than attending a maths or history lesson. The example given above demonstrates the complex and heterogeneous nature of the relationships between humans and nonhumans. Latour seeks to change our particular philosophy or view of life, our Weltanschauung (world view), and replace it, indeed almost completely reverse it, with a philosophy that involves the hybridization of society. He is dissatisfied with the dogmatic ideology that continues to prevail in the bifurcation of human and nonhuman, nature and society. Like Whitehead, he prefers instead a more heterogeneous version of society; one in which these bifurcations unite in a hybridization of human and nonhuman, of nature and society. The human can, after all, only ever be perceived of, in a relational context with nature and the material world, including the world of technology (see chapters on Stiegler and Simondon for example). The variety of social milieus and events that occupy human life all, without exception, involve a complex nexus of relationships, relationships that can be considered to be hybrid in nature. The carpenter cannot exist without her associated mindset, skills, tools and materials. Nor should she exist without having an informed perspective on the relationship of her affect, as a carpenter, on nature and vice versa. By ignoring this, history tells us that she, and others like her, will cause irreparable damage to the ecosystem that constitutes the world she occupies. This aspect of living more in harmony with the world is more than an environmental issue. It is political. It determines, and is determined by her view on the relationships between humans and non-humans. Without a critical and informed perspective she will see the world as simply something to exploit. This applies equally to students in technology education. There is much more to learning about technology than learning how to fabricate some prescribed artefact. As humans we do not act in isolation; We are all hybrids. Latour, writing in 1991, indeed exemplifies how shallow our thinking can be when offered in only anthropocentric and indeed, political terms: The smallest AIDS virus takes you from sex to the unconscious, then to Africa, tissue cultures, DNA and San Francisco, but the analysts, thinkers, journalists and decision-makers will slice the delicate network traced by the virus for you into tidy compartments where you will find only science, only economy, only social phenomena, only local news, only sentiment, only sex. Press the most innocent aerosol button and you’ll be heading for the Antarctic, and from there to the University of California at Irvine, the mountain ranges of Lyon, the 107

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chemistry of inert gases, and then maybe to the United Nations, but this fragile thread will be broken into as many segments as there are pure disciplines. By all means, they seem to say, let us not mix up knowledge, interest, justice and power. Let us not mix up heaven and earth, the global stage and the local scene, the human and the nonhuman. (Latour, 1991, pp. 2–3) Michel Serres, a French philosopher and an early pioneer of ANT who worked with Latour, offers an interesting example outlining the agency role of nonhuman actors in a game of soccer. In order to blur the boundaries between subject and object, Serres uses the terms quasi-subject and quasi-object. As the ball moves, so all the players orient toward it, their movements are fundamentally influenced by the ball’s trajectories. Of course, these trajectories are in part affected by the players’ kicks and headers, but also by a myriad of other determinants (the length of the grass, the speed of the wind, the build of the ball itself). In all this, the ball is a messenger between the players, and in its circulation amongst those players, it shapes the ‘society’ of the game. Of course, this ‘shaping’ is not always faithful: the ball will do things that the sending or receiving player does not expect – it will sometimes ‘betray’ them. (Michael, 2017, p. 15) A professional game of soccer would be somewhat meaningless without a ball, a pitch, a referee, a set of rules and regulations, players, a stadium even a lawnmower and grounds-people, entry tickets and fans to name just a few of the myriad of actors involved: human and nonhuman. Remove just one, the ball for instance, and the relationship changes; seriously in the case of having no soccer ball, less so by removing a couple of fans, but it change nonetheless. ANT AND TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION

Schools are notorious for separating out, standardizing and universalizing the knowledge relating to subject domains: science and technology are two prime examples, where knowledge relating to science education is seen to be privileged over the knowledge associated with technology education; the old academic vocational divide enshrined in Descartes famous cogito ergo sum that separates and privileges the mind over the body: “I think therefore I am” (2006, p. 73). This divide is symptomatic of the subject object divide where science is about discovery and the scientific method is the only way to reach objective truth, whereas technology is, wrongly, considered to be the application of scientific knowledge. Technology existed long before the concept of science ever emerged. However, the philosophy of technology has gone some way to blur this bifurcation by recognising that science, post Kuhn, and technology today, are becoming ever more difficult to differentiate. This is why philosophers of technology now refer to technoscience rather than science and technology separately. This represents a new heterogeneous 108

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network of relations in which two formerly distinct prehensions have entered into a new relationship, one that constitutes a new prehension resulting largely from the inexorable developments made possible in the socio-scientific-technological milieu in which they find themselves. This actor-network opens up technoscience to a multiplicity of actors including politicians, philosophers, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats and many more. This, I argue, must be reflected in school based science and technology studies. The question is, how can this be achieved? TEACHING AND LEARNING IN TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION

Michael suggests that “knowledge is constructed as an heterogeneous process […] and entails the marshalling of a panoply of human and nonhuman elements, each of which are ascribed particular roles. This ascription involves the translation of the interests of those elements, a translation which rests on associating those elements to one another” (2017, p. 39). For the purposes of this section I want to concentrate on the relationship between four associated issues regarding the delivery of technology education by using ANT as my pedagogical framework: issues relating to teaching, learning, the curriculum and assessment in the delivery of technology education. Given that technology education covers a number of subject areas, which may or may not, include the development of workshop skills in wood, metal and plastic, domestic skills in cooking and working with textiles, technical drawing or graphic communication both manual and digital, technological studies in electronics, pneumatics, structures and digital systems, there is, as Michael suggests, a series of heterogeneous processes which involve a panoply of human and non-human actors. The technology curriculum and assessment protocols which are non-physical and non-human, together with learning and teaching, as well as the many non-human actors such as tools, machines and materials, thus involves a number of actors coming together to form an associated milieu involving any one, or any combination of the subject areas mentioned above. In terms of education, and in particular, technology education, ANT does not offer guidance in terms of pedagogy, curriculum design or even a theoretical perspective that can be inserted into or fashioned around the subject matter. ANT simply states that equality of status must be given to non-human and human actors. Whilst this may appear simple as a statement of intent, it is in fact difficult in application. This is due to the complexity of any relationships that arise in any given situation, including the relationships that are formed in a technology education setting. These relationships are complex, chaotic and, most importantly, can never be prescribed in advance. For example, relationships can be specified but outcomes always remain unclear: Human-horse-racetrack, other human-horse-racetrack combinations, weather conditions, ground conditions, spectators-betting, training of horses, and many other actors combine to form an event called a horse race. If the outcome could be prescribed in advance, bookies could not exist. Bookies may offer odds which, to some extent, 109

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might be considered as forming a sort of deterministic outcome, but given that many people lose money on betting, it seems that there is no deterministic certainty given in any horse racing event. This is also the case for football, Olympic events, speculation on money markets, etc. From an ANT perspective, this is true for all emergent relationships, and all relationships are emergent. In other words, nothing ever remains in a stable state: every state, existing and novel is emergent, or metastable (see Simondon). This has clear implications for lesson planning. Whilst planning a lesson is important, absolute precision planning would require the behavior of all actors to be predictable, consistent and conformist. However, as every teacher knows, students, resources, the effect of a full moon or students having just attended a physical education class beforehand, to mention but a few, tend to impact negatively on issues such as predictability, consistency and conformity. Lesson planning would, thus, better be described as a lesson guide, a way forward which allows for more freedom of expression by all actors in the teaching and learning process. ANT is a theory about how to learn what makes up collective life – by letting the actors have some room to express themselves and by being attentive to their enunciations. In engaging ANT, one has to start as undecided as possible about what makes up the social. Forget everything you thought you knew about collective life; be undecided as to what makes up the social; be prepared for surprises. “Recording not filtering out, describing not disciplining, these are the law and the prophets” (RAS: 55). (De Vries, 2016, pp. 88–89) To this end, teaching and learning becomes a process that has no predicted, standardized universal set of outcomes as dictated by the curriculum. Much more flexibility is required in order to enable the inclusion of a critical pedagogy that enables students to engage with issues surrounding technology that go beyond preestablished skill based learning. Issues that are political, environmental, belief based must be addressed, issues that both affect and are affected by all actors: human and non-human. Methodologically, ANT approaches “science and technology in the making” as opposed to “ready-made science and technology” (Latour, 1987, p. 4). As the world, and the world of education in particular, succumbs to an ongoing process of standardization in the interest of efficiency, ANT helps to reveal emergent patterns that evolve out of any network of relations that standardization and standardization of assessment does not, indeed cannot account for beforehand. In any given classroom setting for example, why do some students act in a way that causes the system to exclude them from the learning process, whether by physical exclusion or simply ignoring them. Fenwick and Edwards offer an analogous account that helps to reveal this kind of scenario: Star’s (1991) oft-quoted story of McDonald’s hamburger with onions standards is but one example. The standard McDonalds hamburger excludes onionallergy sufferers. Like Star herself, these excluded actors may nonetheless 110

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include themselves in the network of McDonald’s customers, but scrape away the onions. Thus, Star translates herself into becoming part of the network but changes the standards, and therefore the terms of enrolment, in one simple action. Star’s analysis shows something else that the network accounts bring to bear, which is the interruptions and unruliness of standards in action. Star describes her encounter and negotiations with the standards travelling through the McDonald’s network for her as chaotic, confusing and unpredictable. This is far from the smooth enrolment into a network where particular standards seek to translate her behavior in particular ways. As a space for learning that is inherently unpredictable, educational practice is filled with these sorts of interruptions and inventions, with difference that refuses or misunderstands or circumvents any attempt at standardization. (Fenwick & Edwards, 2010, p. 86) In terms of technology education, a suitable analogy might be the concept of blackboxing, where the curriculum dictates that the internal complexity of a system is ignored and only the inputs and outputs matter. In terms of teaching and learning, the teacher acts as the actor who inputs information, whilst the students act as the outputs of information measured by way of assessment usually in the form of an examination. This is what Paulo Freire (1993) refers to as the banking method in his book Pedagogy of the Oppressed. For technology education, black-boxing is “the way scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own success. When a machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one need focus only on its inputs and outputs and not on its internal complexity. Thus, paradoxically, the more science and technology succeed, the more opaque and obscure they become” (Latour, 1999b, p. 304). It could also be argued that learning about technology becomes more opaque and obscure in this pedagogical method also. CONCLUSION

Latour suggests that we need a new way to see the world, one that offers a new world view, a new philosophy that gives equal agency to everything; human and non-human. He calls this Actor-Network Theory. In terms of education, it would be simple to try to offer a new prescribed system whereby ANT can be mapped on to the existing technology education paradigmatic framework, thereby offering a more open and critical pedagogical framework that utilizes ANT as its theoretical underpinning. Alas, this cannot be done given that ANT does not offer guidance in terms of pedagogy, curriculum design or even a theoretical perspective that can be inserted into, or fashioned around, the subject matter. ANT, remember, simply states that equality of status must be given to non-human and human actors. Given the entrenched anthropocentrism that prevails in the technology education curriculum, where human actors act upon and learn about the external world which is presented as a separate entity, as a resource, where no discussion about the human technology relationship is ever discussed in any meaningful way, the establishment of equality 111

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of status between human and non-human actors is clearly fraught with difficulty. This applies equally to the concept of entertaining the inclusion of technological literacy into the subject domain, for very similar reasons. Perhaps the only way to reconceptualize technology education is to attempt to form a new Actor-Network that includes human and non-human actors. What might arise from this ensemble – and I say might arise because we can never predict in advance, we can only speculate and guide – might be simply asking questions such as: What do you consider the purpose of technology education to be at the present time? Has there been a paradigm shift in the knowledge related to technology that should be considered important in technology education? Does current research in technology education suggest new models for the delivery of technology education? Is technology education today fit for purpose? Perhaps the actors associated with technology education need to become collectively more proactive, become ‘entities that do things’. Perhaps these actors have to form an assembly of actants, human and non-human, who are ‘networked’ and defined by the various associated actants, thereby translating technology education in something other, something different, something relevant. Perhaps this needs to be done by way of a series of continuous processes that will transform and reconstitute much needed change in the prevailing technology education milieu. How that might manifest itself can only ever be known by observing and critically examining these processes as they continue to unfold. REFERENCES Callon, M. (1987). Society in the making: The study of technology as a tool for sociological analysis. In W. Bijker, T. Hughes, & T. Pinch, (Eds.), The social construction of technological systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Dakers, J. R. (2011). Activity theory as a pedagogical framework for the delivery of technology education. In M. Barak & M. Hacker (Eds.), Fostering human development though engineering and technology education (pp. 19–34). Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers. Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (2008). A thousand plateaus (B. Massumi, Trans.). London: Continuum Press. Descartes, R. (2006). A discourse on the method of correctly conducting one’s reason and seeking truth in the sciences (I. MacLean, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. De Vries, G. (2016). Bruno Latour. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press. Fenwick, T., & Edwards, R. (2010). Actor-network theory in education. Oxon: Routledge. Freire, P. (1993). Pedagogy of the oppressed. London: Penguin Books. Kaptelinin, V., & Nardi, B. A. (2006). Acting with technology: Activity theory and interaction design. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Latour, B. (1991). We have never been modern (C. Porter, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Latour, B. (1992). Where are the missing masses, sociology of a few mundane artifacts. In W. Bijker & J. Law (Eds.), Shaping technology-building society: Studies in sociotechnical change (pp. 225–259). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Latour, B. (1993). Ethnography of high-tech: About the Aramis case. In P. Lemonnier (Ed.), Technological choices – Transformations in material culture since the Neolithic (pp. 372–398). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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BRUNO LATOUR Latour, B. (1996). On actor-network theory: A few clarifications. Soziale Welt, 47, 369–381. Latour, B. (1999a). On recalling ANT. In J. Law & J. Hassard (Eds.), Actor network theory and after (pp. 15–25). Oxford: Blackwell. Latour, B. (1999b). Pandora’s hope: Essays on the realty of science studies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Michael, M. (2000). Reconnecting culture, technology and nature: From society to heterogeneity. London: Routledge. Michael, M. (2014). How to understand mundane technology: New ways of thinking about humantechnology relations. In J. R. Dakers (Ed.), Defining technological literacy: Towards and epistemological framework (pp. 41–56). New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan. Michael, M. (2017). Actor-network theory: Trials, trails and translations (Kindle ed.). London: Sage Publications. Shaviro, S. (2014). The universe of things: On speculative realism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Whitehead, A. N. (1978). Process and reality (Corrected ed. & Kindle ed.) (D. R. Griffin & D. W. Sherburne, Eds.). New York, NY: The Free Press.

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9. ANDREW FEENBERG Implications of Critical Theory for Technology Education

AN INTRODUCTION TO FEENBERG’S CRITICAL THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY

Introduction and Orientation The philosophy of technology as a discipline has existed for probably about five decades. From the analytical tradition’s point of view, philosophy of technology is particularly interested in the manifestations of technology as artefacts, as knowledge, as activities, and as an aspect of humanity or volition1 (Ankiewicz, De Swardt, & De Vries, 2006; Jones, Buntting, & De Vries, 2013; Mitcham, 1994). These manifestations are all relevant for technology education, and it is not implied that they are independent from each other and ought to be taught separately. The fourth manifestation of technology in the analytical tradition, as volition, informs how technology is shaped by and in turn shapes humans, human culture and society. The continental tradition, which is primarily concerned with how technology impacts individuals and society, is therefore particularly informative for the fourth manifestation of technology as conceptualised and described in the analytical tradition. The analytical and continental traditions clearly complement each other (De Vries, 2017; Jones et al., 2013). Various approaches may be distinguished within the continental tradition, for example existentialism, post-phenomenology, Marxism and neo-Marxism. The socalled critical theory philosophers are more interested in the social than the individual level. Andrew Feenberg is one of the key philosophers of technology in the continental tradition and prominent in the critical theory approach. Feenberg is Canada Research Chair in Philosophy of Technology in the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University where he directs the Applied Communication and Technology Lab. His primary interest is the role of technology in society as a whole and not only in the lives of individuals (De Vries, 2017; Feng & Feenberg, 2008; Jones et al., 2013). He also has an interest in online education. Feenberg’s (1999, 2002) major contributions to the philosophy of technology are his critical theory of technology in general and his instrumentalization theory in particular. The aim of the chapter is to give a simplified and condensed exposition of Feenberg’s critical theory of technology including his instrumentalization theory and to point out implications of these theories for technology education.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_009

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Critical Theory of Technology Critical theory of technology combines insights from two seemingly opposed fields, namely contemporary philosophy and sociology of technology (Feenberg, 2005, 2009a). It links Marcuse’s version of Frankfurt School Critical Theory as an approach within the continental tradition on the one hand, and science, technology and society (STS) studies2 on the other (Feenberg, 2009a, 2009b). Based on his claim that “Technological rationality has become political rationality”, Marcuse (1964, pp. xv–xvi) argued that modern technology of the time formed a quasi-dystopian system that could be changed through political action (Feenberg, 2009a). The rationality that steers technology is a choice, not a necessity (De Vries, 2017). The major critical theorists argue that we live in a technocratic society with a culture colonised by technical rationality. Not only is the culture technological but the actual technology that we employ is adapted to technocratic control of the underlying population (Feenberg, 2017a). Critical theory of technology relies on the complementarity between the substantivist critique by continental philosophers in the existentialist tradition and constructivism in contemporary studies of technology by social scientists and historians. Substantivism is critical of modernity and even anti-modern, while constructivism ignores the larger issue of modernity and thus appears uncritical, even conformist, to social critics (Feenberg, 2005, 2009a). While many philosophers continue to make impressive normative claims, sociologists and historians without a theory of the intrinsic structure of the technical, lack a normative perspective on the consequences and limits of technology. Critical theory of technology has attempted to bridge this disparity in normativity between the two fields (Feenberg, 2009a). Stemming from the continental tradition Feenberg (2005) focuses especially on the way actors in the design process perceive the meanings of the devices and systems they design and use. Design studies which show a certain affinity for an instrumentalist philosophy of technology have focused predominantly on the work of proximate designers as key actors who follow a strong intentionality approach that views design as a technical task. On the contrary, constructivist studies of technology, specifically in the field of STS studies have focused on the role of non-designers such as clients, stakeholders and other socially relevant interest groups close to the design process. In this instance proximate designers are viewed as influential actors engaged in conflict and negotiation with non-designers. When proximate designers follow a weak intentionality approach, they become so-called weak designers who view design as a political task. Technology is then designed to conform not only to the interests or plans of actors, but also to the cultural background of the society, which provides some of the decision rules under which technically underdetermined design choices are made (Feng & Feenberg, 2008). In aid of consistency I will use the construct of “expert designers” for what Feenberg calls key, expert and dominant actors, as well as proximate designers. In the remainder of the chapter I will also use the construct of “lay designers” for lay actors or experts, technical outsiders and non-designers (Feenberg, 2005, 2017a; Feng & Feenberg, 2008). 116

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What is lacking in both the above underpinnings of Feenberg’s critical theory of technology is an acknowledgement of designers’ background assumptions about their technical heritage, thus how past technologies and practices shape current design. The impact of historical and cultural developments on the design of technology has subsequently been under-theorised. Critical theory of technology has also attempted to address this oversight of technical heritage and focuses on culture and the broader society, where design is conceptualised as embedded in history and culture. This theory draws attention to the assumptions about their technical heritage that people take for granted (Feng & Feenberg, 2008), thus representing a unique synthesis of ideas drawn from an approach within the continental tradition and contemporary STS studies. Critical theory of technology is thus a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension (Feenberg, 2009a). Feenberg (2006, 2009b) contrasts the impact of critical theory of technology with the impact of determinism, instrumentalism and substantivism as the dominant views in the field of technology. He represents the relation between critical theory of technology and these other views in a table (matrix) (refer to Table 9.1) with two axes – a vertical axis (the left column) representing the relation of technology to values, and a horizontal axis (the top row) representing the relation of technology to control or agency (Feenberg, 2006, 2009a, 2009b). Based on the underpinnings of his critical theory of technology discussed earlier, it seems that the notion of agency or control stems largely from contemporary philosophy and the notion of values from the sociology of technology. Table 9.1. The relation between critical theory of technology and other views (Feenberg, 2006, 2009a, 2009b) Technology is

Autonomous

Neutral (complete separation Determinism (e.g. of means and ends) modernisation theory)

Humanly controlled Instrumentalism (liberal faith in progress)

Value-laden (means form a Substantivism (means and Critical theory (choice of way of life that includes ends) ends linked in systems) alternative means-ends systems)

The determinist view holds that technology is a neutral, rationally-constructed tool serving universal human needs and requiring humans to adapt to it. Instrumentalism is the notion that technology as a tool or instrument is the neutral servant of our desires, while substantivism is the contrasting notion that technology is autonomous and inherently biased toward domination. According to determinist and instrumentalist views of technology, efficiency is the only formal value that serves as the unique principle of discrimination between successful and failed technical initiatives. Substantivism, on the contrary, attributes values to technology for the pursuit of power and domination (Feenberg, 2006, 2009b). 117

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Table 9.1 indicates that critical theory of technology shares traits with both instrumentalism and substantivism. Like instrumentalism, critical theory argues that technology is in some sense controllable, but it also agrees with substantivism that technology is value-laden. This appears to be a contrasting position since, in the substantivist view, the values embodied in technology, such as efficiency and domination are precisely what cannot be controlled. Critical theory is sceptical about the capacity of human beings to get technological civilisation under reasonable control. It can however, be reasonably controlled by being submitted to a more democratic process of design and development, also referred to as democratic intervention (Feenberg, 2006, 2009b). Critical theory holds that the values embodied in technology, referred to as technical codes, are socially specific and not adequately represented by such abstractions as efficiency or control evident in the dominant rationality. Technology can frame not just one way of life but many different possible ways of life or alternative rationalities, each of which leads to a different choice of designs and a different range of technological mediation (Feenberg, 2009b). It has already been mentioned that Feenberg’s (1999, 2002) critical theory of technology combines insights from substantivist critique by continental philosophers and constructivism of contemporary STS studies by social scientists and historians (Feng & Feenberg, 2008). Based on these insights, Feenberg (2005) developed a common framework called “instrumentalization theory”, which will be discussed next particularly as a contribution to the philosophy of technology. F EENBERG’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY

Instrumentalization Theory Feenberg’s instrumentalization theory holds that the cultural study of technology must operate at two levels. The primary level is that of man’s original functional relation to reality or the level of the basic technical operations or activity. The secondary level is that of design and implementation or the level of the current power relations or socio-cultural conditions that specify definite designs (Feenberg, 2005, 2009a; Feng & Feenberg, 2008). Primary instrumentalization. Analysis at the first level of instrumentalization theory was inspired by substantivist critique by continental philosophers. At this level, objects of technical activity, also called technical elements, are defined and isolated from their natural context. This de-contextualizes them from people and either reduces them to their useful properties or simplifies them to highlight those affordances by which they are assigned a function. Such technical insight appears to have very limited social character and elements may be employed in a wide variety of social contexts. In this sense they are relatively neutral with respect to different social values (Feenberg, 2005, 2009a; Feng & Feenberg, 2008). However, 118

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the choice of “best” design is never a purely technical matter, as designs are always underdetermined, and it is only through the application of the secondary instrumentalization that the actual form of a device is resolved (Feng & Feenberg, 2008). Secondary instrumentalization. Analysis at the second level is inspired by constructivism of contemporary STS studies by social scientists and historians. At this level the underdetermined aspects of the technical objects or elements are given socially acceptable form and are combined to make a technical device through a process of social determination. Re-contextualization of the simplified objects is achieved by reorienting and integrating them into a given natural, technical and social environment (Feenberg, 2005, 2009a; Feng & Feenberg, 2008). The social aspect appears in the technical domain in two principal dimensions, namely systematisations and mediations. Systematisations are the causal interconnections and compatibility between the various components or elements of a new device and between the new device and other features of the technical, human and natural environments, also known as technical networks. Mediations point to the various social constraints such as ethical and aesthetic principles or criteria of the surrounding social world under which simplified technical elements may be integrated with other existing devices and systems (Feenberg, 2005, 2009a; Feng & Feenberg, 2008). The interaction of these two dimensions is an iterative process in which the meaning that technologies take on in society feeds back into their design from one stage of their development to the next. Thus, the technical design of an artefact (systematisations) depends on the social design of society (mediations) (Feng & Feenberg, 2008). These two levels of primary and secondary instrumentalization are analytically distinguished and have a complex relationship. Relationship between primary and secondary instrumentalization. No implementation of a simplified technical element is possible without some minimum secondary instrumentalization contextualizing it. Similarly, secondary instrumentalizations such as design specifications presuppose the identification of the affordances to be assembled and concretised at the level of primary instrumentalization. Once the designer begins to combine technical elements to form a device, more and more constraints relating to either systematisations or mediations weigh on design decisions. Hence, technology should not be viewed in isolation from society, and fully developed technologies should not be interpreted in terms of the stripped-down primary instrumentalization of the initial technical elements (Feenberg, 2005, 2009a; Feng & Feenberg, 2008). Some important aspects of the standard configuration of primary and secondary instrumentalizations, specifically those which translate between social demands and technical requirements in the development of technical devices, are prescribed by so-called technical codes. On the one hand values are realised in designs and on the other hand, design impacts on values (Feenberg, 2009a; Feng & Feenberg, 2008). 119

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Technical Codes and Bias Current technical methods or standards were once broadly formulated as values and have at some time in the past been translated into the technical codes or social standards reflecting specific social demands that have shaped design which is taken for granted today. In sociological terms technical codes thus are values (Riggs & Conway, 1991) and reflect secondary instrumentalizations, such as ethical and aesthetic mediations. In critical theory of technology, a technical code directs the selection of a “best” design from a multitude of design possibilities. Technical codes are at times explicitly formulated as design requirements or policies but are often implicit in culture and training and need to be extracted from their context by means of sociological analysis. In either case, the designer should ideally formulate the technical code as a norm directing design (Feenberg, 2005, 2009a; Feng & Feenberg, 2008). Technical codes operate at several levels of generality. Firstly, general or domain codes cover whole ambits of technology. Feenberg, for example, sees the general code or dominant rationality that determines current technological development as mostly that of capitalism and economic growth (De Vries, 2017). The entire development of modern societies is thus marked by the paradigm of unqualified control over the labour process on which capitalist industrialism rests. This control orientates technical development towards disempowering workers and the massification of the public (Feenberg, 2005). According to Feenberg (2005, 2017a) domain codes express the formal bias of capitalist technology. Marcuse’s (1964) argument could be reformulated on these terms as advocating an alternative domain code for a society that is no longer dominated by capitalism. Secondly, specific codes determine the meaning of particular devices (Feenberg, 2009a, 2017a). Critical theory of technology introduces the concept of formal bias to understand how a technical device or system that is rationally coherent and well designed and operated may nevertheless discriminate in a given social context. The formal bias of technology is reflected in the technical code that translates between specific social demands and technical specifications (Feenberg, 1999). Certain tools such as a pair of scissors are for example hard for the left-handed to use. These tools exhibit formal bias in the design of technology, independent of myth and prejudice. As formal bias is ubiquitous, it is inherent in all practical applications of rationality and not confined to politically salient forms of discrimination (Feenberg, 2009a, 2017a). Critical theory of technology also introduces the concept of substantive bias, which addresses a substantive content of belief that is not effective against systems based on rationality, such as the techno-system, the market, the administration, and technology. The techno-system is “a field of technical practices aimed at control of the environment, whether natural, economic, or administrative” (Feenberg, 2017b, p. 159). These require a different kind of critique, which Feenberg (2009a, 2017a) calls formal bias, as the outcome is prejudiced by the rational form of social arrangements rather than any particular belief. Technical codes are always biased to some extent 120

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by the values imposed by expert designers, and critical theory of technology aims to uncover these biases. Identifying and changing formally biased technical codes is essential for democratic advance in modern societies (Feenberg, 2005, 2009a). Feenberg (2009a) uses instrumentalization theory to distinguish between premodern and modern societies as well as an alternative modernity. Premodernity, Modernity, Alternative Modernity Premodern and modern societies ascribe different relative weights to systematisations and mediations as the two dimensions of secondary instrumentalization. In premodern societies, technical networks or systemisations are relatively short and their nodes are loosely coupled. Elaborate mediations, however, control every aspect of technical life (Feenberg, 2009a). Modern societies, on the contrary, emphasise systematisations and build long networks through tightly coupling links between vastly different types of things and people over huge distances. This can only be achieved by stripping technical objects as much as possible of ethical and aesthetic mediations. The resulting overemphasis on primary instrumentalization and systematisation makes both large-scale hierarchical organisation and technical disciplines possible (Feenberg, 2005, 2009a). An alternative modernity would recover the mediating power of ethics and aesthetics at the level of technical disciplines and design (primary instrumentalization). It would devolve power to the members of technical networks (systematisations) and would result in new technical designs and new ways of achieving the efficiencies that characterise modern technological activity generally. Critical theory of technology however, argues that modern societies would only be able to realise their democratic values once public control of technology becomes routine (Feenberg, 2009a). Democratic Interventions, Politics of Technology, Alternative Rationalities Democratic interventions. From the perspective of STS studies, public or political control over technology can only be attained through people’s participation in what Feenberg calls democratic interventions. Feenberg distinguishes three types, namely controversies, which include protests, boycotts, litigation and online petitions; creative appropriations such as hacking, in which technologies are repurposed for different uses than those intended by their creators or owners; and thirdly various kinds of participatory dialogue between lay and expert designers in command of the institutions. Based on more recent developments in STS studies Feenberg argues that anti-programmes, which are related to controversies, are a means for the public to express its will as lay designers by articulating values different from the designed-in values of the expert designers confined in the dominant programmes (Feenberg, 2017a). Democratic interventions have enlarged the public sphere (Feenberg, 1999). The movements that challenge dominant technological rationality are no longer 121

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found mainly in factories (Feenberg, 2009b, 2017a). The public may employ democratic interventions to express its will or values as well as its agency or control in a technical democracy in which democracy has also been extended to technology. Critical theory of technology thus projects a future in which the politics of technology is recognised as a natural aspect of public life (Feenberg, 2005, 2009a, 2009b). Politics of technology. Technical politics reveals the existence of knowledge “from above” among the dominant participants which knowledge is conditioned by problems of technical control of potentially uncooperative subordinates (Feenberg, 2017a). But it also reveals the existence of a qualitative knowledge “from below” reflecting the experience of subordinate participants in technical networks. Unlike the knowledge from above, this knowledge has not been formalised in specialised technical disciplines. It is responsive to a broad range of values – not simply efficiency and control – and inspires resistance to the dominant organisation of technical networks (Feenberg, 1999, 2017a). Lay designers’ knowledge from below which emanates from technical politics seems to share traits with the anti-programmes of STS studies discussed earlier. The early critique by critical theory of technological rationality might thus be reconceived as an attempt to provide anti-programmes or knowledge from below which mobilises around technical networks with a response to the charge of irrationality (Feenberg, 2017a). Alternative rationalities. Alternative rationalities emerge due to the resistance based on a broad range of politically legitimate human values or codes to a technocratic rationality. Technological rationality would subsequently no longer be defined as purely instrumental but would become conscious of its value-laden character and as such open a space within its compass for moral and political rationality (Feenberg, 2009a). Based on Adorno’s (1973) view that the goal of critical theory is a rational critique of reason, Feenberg (2017a) advocates a rational critique of reason that validates the rationality of actual resistance to technical arrangements from which the public feels alienated. There is every reason to believe in the existence of alternative rationalities. Their validity has been proven repeatedly by democratic interventions. The dominant rationality does not represent humanity in general due to the social relativity of rationality as applied in the real world. The theory of formal bias provides a way of thinking about the context-dependent nature of rationality, which suggests an evaluation of multiple rationalities emerging from different viewpoints of the formal bias of technical systems (Feenberg, 2017a). Based on the above insights, critical theory of technology may augment the limited attention given to volition in technology education (Ankiewicz, 2013; Spendlove, 2017). Some implications of Feenberg’s critical theory of technology for values in technology education will be discussed next.

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IMPLICATIONS OF FEENBERG’S CRITICAL THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY FOR TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION

Introduction Critical theory as such assists in reflecting on power relationships in technology. A technology education based on critical theory would focus on the values and predispositions inscribed into technological artefacts and teach students how to interpret technical culture or heritage. It would, however, underplay the process of technological development, the social choices involved in technology and the choices offered by the methods of design. Social constructivism which views technology as a sequence of social choices set within a framework of technical alternatives allows for discussing the impact of cultural developments and values on design decisions. This would require a pedagogy which encourages students to both reflect and act on the values affecting such choices (Hansen, 1997). It is argued that Feenberg’s critical theory of technology, for similar reasons but perhaps for different ends, does not only support but also expand the rationale given for including values, specifically moral values, as a vital aspect of technology education (e.g. Barlex, 1993; Breckon, 1998; Conway, 1994; Holdsworth & Conway, 1999; Layton, 1991; Martin, 2002; McLaren, 1997; Middleton, 2005; Pavlova, 2005; Prime, 1993; Rekus, 1991; Riggs & Conway, 1991). The notion that technology is value-laden is largely acknowledged in the literature. Technology exists because of human activity and is developed and used in social and environmental contexts. As such, it is shaped by the communal beliefs, values and attitudes of individuals, organisations and society and, in turn, has a significant effect on shaping culture and the environment (Conway, 1994; Martin, 2002; Stables, 2017). Technology education based on Feenberg’s critical theory of technology does not reduce technology education to technical education, such as education based on determinism and instrumentalism that views technology as value neutral (Conway & Riggs, 1994; Hansen, 1997; Martin, 2002; Stables, 2017). Unlike substantivism it will also not fall short of a critical assessment that might explain, for instance, why some technologies, but not others, are developed in a society (Hansen, 1997). Critical theory of technology employs the notion of technical codes for the various values embodied in culture and technology. Types of values will be discussed in the next section. Types of Values in Technology Education An analysis of relevant literature reveals various values in technology and in technology education, for example aesthetic, economic, social, moral, environmental, political and spiritual values (Jones et al., 2013; Martin, 2002; Pavlova, 2005). Various scholars have classified these values into broader categories. Rekus (1991) distinguishes between values of function and values of usage. Values of function incorporate all value judgements concerning the functionality and 123

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effectiveness of technological techniques or objects to a given task. Values of function relate to what Feenberg (2006, 2009b) calls formal values embedded in determinism and instrumentalism. Values of usage, on the contrary, are assessments concerning the morality of action related to the usage of technological techniques or objects, which may only be done by the acting individuals themselves (Rekus, 1991). Pavlova (2005) relates practical values (i.e. not aesthetic or moral) to efficiency in technology. She also distinguishes between technical and non-technical values. Values of function and formal, practical and technical values are synonymous and will be referred to as technical values. Technical values are strongly dominating in most approaches in technology education, but without explicitly referring to them as values (Pavlova, 2005). Technical values should not however be equated to Feenberg’s technical codes as part of secondary instrumentalizations, which are not adequately represented by technical values such as efficiency. Teachers put the highest priority on teaching technical values (Holdsworth & Conway, 1999; Pavlova, 2005), with their hierarchy of values resembling the following: technical, aesthetical, economic, environmental, social, cultural, moral and political (Pavlova, 2005). It has already been mentioned that values of usage relate to moral values. Although some non-technical values (for example aesthetics) are mentioned as part of technological knowledge, moral values are not. To explain the position of moral values Pavlova (2005) distinguishes between the intrinsic and non-intrinsic nature of values. She also distinguishes epistemologically between knowledge about and knowledge within technology. The former is aimed at understanding the nature, values and ethical issues of technology in the complex relationship between person, society and nature. It is thus closely related to STS studies and includes analyses of technology at inter-disciplinary, disciplinary and practical levels within different areas. Knowledge within technology includes knowledge about objects and processes, and requires of students to design and make, analyse, use and maintain products (Pavlova, 2005). Intrinsic (good in itself) and non-intrinsic or instrumental values (as a means to an end) correlate with knowledge about and knowledge within technology respectively (Pavlova, 2005). Instrumental values play an important role in technological activity and may be classified as moral and competence-based. Instrumental values encompass such concepts as ambitious, open-minded, capable, helpful, honest, imaginative, intellectual, logical, responsible and self-controlled. Technology education mostly deals with instrumental values, of which two major kinds are those with a moral focus and those related to competence or self-actualisation. In the practice of technology education, values related to competence take priority over moral values (Holdsworth & Conway, 1999; Pavlova, 2005). Pavlova (2005) argues that moral values should take priority in the hierarchy, which is in line with critical theory which proposes that rationality and effectiveness (technical values) should be framed by moral considerations. Moral education will be emphasised if technology education includes technical (formal, practical or values of function) and non-technical values (non-intrinsic, 124

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instrumental or values of usage) in technological methods and objects (Rekus, 1991). Teachers need to introduce students to the kinds of moral dilemmas they will face in everyday life as a direct result of the spread of technology (Dakers, 2005). Making values explicit. It has already been mentioned that in sociological terms values are referred to as codes, and that technical codes are always biased by the values imposed by expert designers. Critical theory of technology aims at uncovering these biases and to change them to the advantage of modern democratic societies (Feenberg, 2009a). The question arises how these technical codes or values may be uncovered in technology education. As moral values are inherently part of the acting individuals themselves (Rekus, 1991), the most frequently proposed way of dealing with values in technology education is to encourage students to think about values themselves (Pavlova, 2005). Technology teachers and students need to be explicit about the values involved at all levels of technology and to clarify, justify and debate their choices (Conway, 1994; Conway & Riggs, 1994; McLaren, 1997; Riggs & Conway, 1991). Technology teachers should be upfront about the collective values or domain codes guiding technological development in society and in technology education, as well as the specific codes which guide both technologists and prospective technologists in schools (Riggs & Conway, 1991). Students should have opportunities of valuing technology independently without teachers imposing their own sets of values and norms (Rekus, 1991). There are three apparent stages during the technological process to encourage students to explore value judgements, which relate to knowledge within technology (Pavlova, 2005), namely: • during exploration of the context for designing and making; • at the point of making decisions during planning and making; • while evaluating the outcomes of their own work (Martin, 2002). Exploring the context for designing and making. The choice of the starting point of a technology project is important to show the connections between context, technology and value judgments (Conway & Riggs, 1994; Martin, 2002). The teacher should choose an issue or project brief that relates to the current value system of the students, taking psychological and sociological aspects of the students’ situation into consideration (Rekus, 1991). In this regard technology teachers may capitalise on the pedagogies associated with STS studies as an important underpinning of Feenberg’s critical theory of technology. STS studies may promote a critical approach to technology in curriculum documents by considering the relationship between society and technology (Pavlova, 2005). Some affordances of an analytical philosophy of technology for STS studies were identified earlier (Ankiewicz et al., 2006). STS teaching commences with everyday issues instead of organizing technology lessons around concepts and processes. Furthermore, interdisciplinary project work and integrated STS programmes may create a context in which students construct their relationship with technology and learn about its topical, motivational 125

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and interpretative meaning (Hansen, 1997). It may also require some integration across artificial subject boundaries of the school curriculum (McLaren, 1997). It is important for technology teachers to encourage critical thinking and questioning so that students are aware that technology is related to people, society and the environment. How students value technology will shape their future and they are entitled to discuss such issues in the classroom (Jones et al., 2013; Martin, 2002). Decision making during planning and making. The most important, and perhaps most difficult times in which to teach values are when students are engaged in individual design and make activities (Martin, 2002). The design process provides a natural setting for the consideration of values (Middleton, 2005). Dakers (2005) cautions however, that because of the so-called narrow functionalist model, many technology students, when faced with a problem, attempt to proceed directly from problem statement to solution. Students are consequently unable to engage with the social and political ramifications provoked by the spread of new and emerging technologies. Learning in this model aims at the assimilation of students into an already established value system which is more concerned with control than with liberation. Based on the instrumental role of technology and its social and cultural implications according to Feenberg’s critical theory of technology, Dakers (2005) argues for a new pedagogy for technology education that engages students with questions concerning technology. The current authoritarian transmission model of instruction should be replaced by one in which values relating to technology and technology education are co-constructed rather than imposed. The above may be achieved when technology teachers emphasise the complex relationship between primary and secondary instrumentalization. One of the best ways of assessing the impact of values or moral education is to look at the way in which students’ designing and making are informed by applying value judgements and a sensitivity towards non-designers (Martin, 2002). It is therefore crucial that students are given the opportunity to reflect on their explorations of a value-based appraisal of technology in society by identifying the general or domain codes and allowing their reflections to influence their own approach (or technical code) to design (McLaren, 1997). Students should be accorded opportunities to not only act as expert designers, following a strong intentionality approach as part of the narrow behavioural approach (Dakers, 2005), but also to follow a weak intentionality approach during negotiations with lay designers. They should be exposed to knowledge from above, formalised in technical disciplines and associated with expert designers as well as qualitative knowledge from below associated with the technical politics of lay designers. From a primary instrumentalization perspective, technology teachers should be cautious not to overemphasise the role of expert designers and the way they decontextualise technical objects or elements. As was previously argued, an overemphasis on teaching technical values and values related to competence (Holdsworth & Conway, 1999; Pavlova, 2005) at the expense of moral values reduces technology education to technical 126

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education. Students need to look beyond immediate usefulness and profitability to effects on non-designers, perhaps through environmental impact (Riggs & Conway, 1991). By attending to the context and the experience of all those involved, the range of values may be made explicit and confidence in handling value-judgments may be encouraged (Conway, 1994). According to Dakers (2005) a narrow functionalist model of learning and teaching within the technology education curriculum is more concerned with the processes embedded within the methods of a technology’s production and manipulation, than with a critical analysis of the social consequences involved. It follows from secondary instrumentalization that the iterative interaction of systematisations, when integrating new technologies into existing networks under mediations of ethical and aesthetical social constraints should also be emphasised in technology education. These include a shift from teaching content matter in isolation from social considerations, towards a dialectic engagement with the technical and social dimensions of technological activity, in order to make technology education meaningful to all students (Hansen, 1997; Rekus, 1991). Students also need to examine relevant ethical and moral choices as well as factors that enable or influence critical design decisions (McLaren, 1997). Letting students themselves uncover the specific and general or domain codes that influence technological design and are embedded in technology will help them become better informed of the dominant character or rationality of the technological culture they inhabit. Without such an ideological shift, technology education will remain a narrow and limited curricular area, restricted to the production of a technologically subservient and compliant underclass (Dakers, 2005). The design or technological process furthermore involves a great deal of decision making. Choices are made before every stage, for instance choosing what to make (Martin, 2002). Values provide a basis for choice, decision making and action in a wider context (Pavlova, 2005). These value-based choices and decisions carry the potential to create alternative rationalities. In addition, students should be sensitised to how democratic interventions are a means for the public to express its values and agency or political control over technology as lay designers, by articulating values that differ from those designed-in values of the expert designers confined in the dominant programmes. Students should know that technological development depends on values on the one hand and has its own laws of development on the other hand (Pavlova, 2005). Subsequently, and as part of a critical and democratic pedagogy within technology education (Dakers, 2005) students should also be introduced to politics of technology that is essential for a technical democracy. Students’ ability to make value judgements will not only enable them to handle present technology, but also empower them to cope with future ethical demands of a rationally structured society when they have to make responsible political decisions as citizens or politicians (Rekus, 1991). Students should also be sensitised to how the public’s resistance based on a broad range of politically legitimated human values or technical codes to a technocratic rationality may give rise to alternative rationalities. This opens the opportunity to develop technology beyond the technical values of economics and effectiveness only (Pavlova, 2005). 127

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Evaluating the outcomes of their own work. Technology education seems preoccupied with evaluating products at the end of a capability task, in terms of finish, the accuracy of manufacture, efficiency and aesthetic look (McLaren, 1997; Rekus, 1991). Issues such as to whom the product is aesthetically pleasing and acceptable are rarely considered. The consequences and potential impact in a wider economic, societal or environmental sense, of what the student has designed or proposed are rarely examined (McLaren, 1997). An alternative approach would be to emphasise the process of evaluation as part of the technological process throughout the learning experience (McLaren, 1997). There is higher educational value in product evaluation that considers not just technical values and aesthetics, but also whether the product meets an identified need from the point of view of lay designers (Martin, 2002; Riggs & Conway, 1991). Sensitivity to the cultural background of the society concerned will contribute to students’ ability to evaluate the effect of their own and others’ technological activities on the natural, technical and social environment. Mature technological capability therefore will include students’ ability to balance conflicting factors and to justify choices in terms of their own values and beliefs and those of others (Conway & Riggs, 1994). CONCLUSION

In the first part of the chapter Feenberg’s philosophy of technology was linked to the continental tradition of philosophy, after which the two complementary underpinnings of his critical theory of technology were discussed. The relationship between his critical theory of technology and other dominant views in the field was described. Feenberg’s instrumentalization theory as an important contribution to the philosophy of technology was then discussed. The second part of the chapter indicated how Feenberg’s critical theory of technology not only supports but expands the rationale for including values, specifically moral values, as a vital aspect of technology education (refer to Chapter 14 by Hallström). Various types of values in technology education were linked to Feenberg’s notion of technical codes. Some implications of specifically his instrumentalization theory for classroom pedagogy were also pointed out by relating these to pedagogical aspects of the existing limited and stagnant theoretical framework of values in technology education. Feenberg’s instrumentalization theory can actually develop such existing frameworks in technology education. NOTES 1

2

Mitcham’s philosophical framework of technology partly resembles the analytical tradition. However, Mitcham has established himself more in the realm of continental rather than analytical philosophy. Feenberg uses the construct of Science and Technology studies. Science, technology and society (STS) studies, however, are grounded in a socio-technological rather than a philosophical understanding (Ankiewicz et al., 2006). Strictly speaking, the two constructs are not identical but the differences between them are not immediately obvious.

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REFERENCES Adorno, T. (1973). Negative dialectics (E. B. Ashton, Trans.). New York, NY: Seabury. Ankiewicz, P. J. (2013). ’n Teoretiese besinning oor die implikasies van die filosofie van tegnologie vir klaskamerpraktyk / A theoretical reflection on the implications of the philosophy of technology for classroom pedagogy. Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Natuurwetenskap en Tegnologie, 32(1), Art.#386. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/satnt.v32i1.386 Ankiewicz, P., De Swardt, E., & De Vries, M. (2006). Some implications of the philosophy of technology for Science, Technology and Society (STS) studies. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 16(2), 117–141. Barlex, D. (1993). The Nuffield approach to values in design and technology. Design and Technology Teaching, 26(1), 42–45. Breckon, A. (1998). National curriculum review in design and technology for the year 2000. The Journal of Design and Technology Education, 3(2), 101–105. Conway, R. (1994). Values in technology education. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 4(1), 109–116. Conway, R., & Riggs, A. (1994). Valuing in technology education. In F. Banks (Ed.), Teaching technology. London & New York, NY: Routledge. Dakers, J. R. (2005). The hegemonic behaviorist cycle. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 15(2), 111–126. De Vries, M. (2017). Philosophy as critique. In P. J. Williams & K. Stables (Eds.), Critique in design and technology education: Contemporary issues in technology education. Dordrecht: Springer. Feenberg, A. (1999). Questioning technology. New York, NY: Routledge. Feenberg, A. (2002). Transforming technology: A critical theory revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Feenberg, A. (2005). Critical theory of technology: An overview. Tailoring Biotechnologies, 1(1), 47–64. Feenberg, A. (2006). What is philosophy of technology? In J. R. Dakers (Ed.), Defining technological literacy: Towards an epistemological framework. New York, NY & London: Palgrave Macmillan. Feenberg, A. (2009a). Critical theory of technology. In J. K. B. Olsen, S. A. Pedersen, & V. F. Hendricks (Eds.), A companion to the philosophy of technology. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Feenberg, A. (2009b). What is philosophy of technology? In A. Jones & M. de Vries (Eds.), International handbook of research and development in technology education. Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers. Feenberg, A. (2017a). Critical theory of technology and STS. Thesis Eleven, 138(1), 3–12. Feenberg, A. (2017b). Technosystem: The social life of reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Feng, P., & Feenberg, A. (2008). Thinking about design: Critical theory of technology and the design process. In P. Vermaas, P. Kroes, A. Light, & S. A. Moore (Eds.), Philosophy and design: From engineering to architecture. Dordrecht: Springer. Hansen, K.-H. (1997). Science and technology as social relations towards a philosophy of technology for liberal education. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 7(1–2), 49–63. Holdsworth, I., & Conway, B. (1999). Investigating values in secondary design and technology education. The Journal of Design and Technology Education, 4(3), 205–214. Jones, A., Buntting, C., & De Vries, M. J. (2013). The developing field of technology education: A review to look forward. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 23(2), 191–212. Layton, D. (1991). Aspects of national curriculum: Design & technology. New York, NY: National Curriculum Council. Marcuse, H. (1964). One-dimensional man. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Martin, M. (2002). Values and attitudes in design and technology. In S. Sayers, J. Morley, & B. Barnes (Eds.), Issues in design and technology teaching. London & New York, NY: RoutledgeFalmer. McLaren, S. V. (1997). Value judgements: Evaluating design – A Scottish perspective on a global issue. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 7(3), 259–278. Middleton, H. (2005). Creative thinking, values and design and technology education. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 15(1), 61–71.

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P. J. ANKIEWICZ Mitcham, C. (1994). Thinking through technology. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Pavlova, M. (2005). Knowledge and values in technology education. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 15(2), 127–147. Prime, G. M. (1993). Values in technology: Approaches to learning. Design and Technology Teaching, 26(1), 30–36. Rekus, J. (1991). Teaching technology with a focus on moral education. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 2(2), 41–46. Riggs, A., & Conway, R. (1991). Values and technology education. Design & Technology Teaching, 24(1), 31–33. Spendlove, D. (2017). The identification and location of critical thinking and critiquing in design and technology education. In P. J. Williams & K. Stables (Eds.), Critique in design and technology education: Contemporary issues in technology education. Dordrecht: Springer. Stables, K. (2017). Critiquing design: Perspectives and world views on design and design and technology education, for the common good. In P. J. Williams & K. Stables (Eds.), Critique in design and technology education: Contemporary issues in technology education. Dordrecht: Springer.

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10. LANGDON WINNER A Call for a Critical Philosophy of Technology

INTRODUCTION

The map of the world shows no country called Technopolis, yet in many ways we are already its citizens. (Winner, 1986, p. ix) Langdon Winner is a political theorist who focuses in his research on social and political issues related to modern technological changes. He is the former President of the Society for Philosophy and Technology and the current Thomas Phelan Chair of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Department of Science and Technology Studies at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York. In his two books, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-control as a Theme in Political Thought (1977) and The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (1986), he emphasises that important insights can be gained by applying the categories of political philosophy to the study of technology itself, which involves understanding technologies as “political phenomena in their own right” (Winner, 1986, p. 22). He also edited Democracy in a Technological Society (1992). His work is characterised by insights into how technology and technological change form modern society and its connections to democratic and political issues. Winner’s purpose is to explore the meaning of technology for the way we live, and his main focus is on the way we think about technology. The reason why this is so important, according to Winner, is due to the fact that the technology of today has become a non-separable part of our lives. He problematizes our unquestioning faith in technology and his conviction is that artefacts do indeed have politics, and technology is therefore something that we can and must shape. Winner justifies his view by stating that technologies are not merely aids to human activity. The things we call ‘technologies’ are ways of building order in our world – they are powerful forces that give meaning and direction to our lives. Power conditions, authority, freedom, and social justice are often deeply embedded in technical devices and systems. Technological systems like industrial production, warfare, communications, etc., have transformed the exercise of power and the experience of citizenship. But there are also inherently political technologies and Winner describes them as human-made systems that require or are strongly compatible with particular kinds of political relationships: “[S] ome kinds of technology require their social environments to be structured in a

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_010

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particular way in much the same sense that an automobile requires wheels in order to move” (Winner, 1986, p. 32). The main task for a philosophy of technology, according to Winner, is “to examine critically the nature and significance of artificial aids to human activity” (Winner, 1986, p. 4). Since the underlying purpose is positive, criticism in technology should afford the same value as in any other area. Critics of literature or music for example, Winner notes, analyse its features and evaluate its qualities, serving as a bridge between artists and audience. Hence, a critical analysis of technology is not equivalent to being ‘anti-technology’. To clarify his view, Winner describes his basic position as regularly praising “technologies that reflect reasonable practices of democracy, justice, ecological sustainability, and human dignity. Unfortunately, a great many of the technical devices and systems that surround us are designed, built and deployed in flagrant disregard of humane, ecologically sound principles. To an astonishing degree, today’s technological society is based upon a collection of bad habits inherited from a reckless industrial past … we are urged to celebrate the latest so-called ‘innovations’ regardless of the deranged commitments and disastrous consequences they often involve” (Winner, n.d., para. 2). From an educational perspective, since the late 20th century there have been significant changes in what skills are needed, for both work and leisure, as the emergence of new technologies – especially digital technologies – changes both how we can learn, and what we need to learn. As the world changes, the school curriculum must reflect these changes to prepare young people for the world they will inherit, as they, as citizens, will be responsible for the democratic choices in their societies (e.g. Dakers, 2014; Higgins, 2014). Critical thinking is thus necessary for a 21st century education, but based on existing definitions of what this means, this is not sufficient. What is needed, according to Higgins (2014), is a curriculum that does not need to be changed as technology evolves throughout the 21st century – a balance between a ‘timelessness’ content and more practical and applicable skills for the contemporary world. Consequently, a 21st century technological literacy implies more than interpreting, analysing, evaluating and synthesising information. Young people need to develop critical thinking skills that will allow them to make decisions regarding issues related to technology and its impact on individuals, society and the environment. An essential task for teachers is to support young people in developing these abilities. The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to Winner’s philosophy of technology, and to discuss how his thoughts and ideas might be useful to technology education. The fact that critique is seen as significant part of technology education (Williams & Stables, 2017) indicates that philosophy of technology may be a relevant learning area. Since the philosophy of technology relates to our relationship to our technological world, as well as the interactions between humans, nature and society, it can provide students with material for critical reflections on the nature of technology (de Vries, 2005, 2017). In the first part of this chapter I explain the main features of Winner’s ideas about technology. In the second part, I discuss how and why Winner’s thoughts 132

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about technology can be considered relevant for technology education. Building on Winner’s critical philosophical discussions about issues surrounding modern technology and technological change, I will highlight aspects that I find valuable to incorporate as parts of technology education. WINNER’S PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY

Winner puts forth the idea that we are in a state of ‘technological somnambulism’ in our mediations with technology and that we need to awaken and end our sleepwalking by constructing the conditions of human existence. According to Winner, there are several reasons for our state of ‘sleepwalking’. One is the idea of ‘progress’ that has permeated social thought during the industrial age. This idea rests on a belief that the modern is always superior to the old fashioned, and that the only reliable source for improving human conditions derives from new machines, technologies and chemicals. In this view, progress is driven by technology itself rather than societal visions and human innovations. Another reason for our sleepwalking is our general approach to technology, which is an inheritance from much earlier times; our concerns with technology as ‘how things work’, ‘making things work’ and the ‘use’ of things. However, only seeing technology as ‘tools’ and ‘objects’ results in a conception that technology is something that we can easily separate ourselves from. This approach to technology is limiting, and we miss the moral and political significance of technology itself (Winner, 1986). Winner notes that social scientists have tried to awaken ‘the sleeper’ by shedding a light on phenomena that have previously been overlooked. But an unfortunate shortcoming of technology assessment is that it tends to see technological change as a ‘cause’ and everything that follows as an ‘effect’ or ‘impact’. The problem is then, according to Winner, that we act as if we are one step behind: “After the bulldozer has rolled over us, we can pick ourselves up and carefully measure the treadmarks” (Winner, 1986, p. 10). Winner uses the Diablo Canyon nuclear reactor in California as a metaphor to illustrate the importance of this. While touring the power plant, located on a beautiful beach, he sees a grey whale surface, spout water, and disappear. This specific moment, the whale and the reactor in the same image, makes him realise that in proceeding along this path we are following, “we risk losing something of inestimable value that we may later begin to miss” (Winner, 1986, p. 176). Winner describes the reactor as an insult to its natural and cultural surroundings. The reactor is not only intrusive, it is also a technological solution that that can cause catastrophic accidents and it releases radiation and thermal pollution into the surrounding ocean. Moreover, it was built without a coherent plan for storing the long-lasting radioactive waste, and it turned out that an active earthquake fault is located just offshore. Winner’s conclusion is that the power plant was a terrible mistake: “The thing should never have been put there, regardless of what the most elegant cost/benefit, risk/benefit calculations may have shown” (p. 176). 133

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By using Diablo Canyon as an example, he problematizes our over-reliance on and faith in progress. Yet his own conviction is that we can and must shape technology; a crucial insight that we must achieve. However, this is a challenge. Technology has become such a feature of our everyday life that it has become virtually invisible to us, and even if there is no country called ‘Technopolis’, we are much already its citizens (Winner, 1986). When technologies are created and put to use, significant changes in patterns of human activity and institutions take place. New worlds are created, which is the most important achievement of any new technology. The construction of technological systems that involves human beings as operating parts, leads to a reconstruction of social roles and relationships. Winner strengthens his argument by noting that: “We do indeed ‘use’ telephones, automobiles, electric lights, and computers in the conventional sense of picking them up and putting them down. But our world soon becomes one in which telephony, automobility, electric lighting, and computing are forms of life in the most powerful sense: life would scarcely be thinkable without them” (Winner, 1986, p. 11). Thus, technologies do have impacts, but they also reorganise our physical and social worlds. Therefore, asserts Winner, the understanding of technologies as forms of life needs to be incorporated into our evaluations and choices regarding technological innovation, as well as our adoption of them. Technologies as Forms of Life Winner’s view of technologies as forms of life has its beginnings in Karl Marx’s conception of technological innovation and its relationship to changes in social forms and human lives. The term ‘forms of life’ derives from the philosopher of language Ludwig Wittgenstein who sought to overcome an extremely narrow view that language was primarily a matter of naming things and events. Winner finds Wittgenstein’s concept helpful to overcome the widespread and extremely narrow conception of the meaning of technology in human life. As Winner points out, many changes in everyday life brought on by technologies can be recognised as versions of earlier patterns. But new technologies can also radically alter common patterns and generate entirely new ones. Therefore, it is important to ask: “[Where] have modern technologies added fundamentally new activities to the range of things human beings do? Where and how have innovations in science and technology begun to alter the very conditions of life itself?” (Winner, 1986, p. 13). For example, when a sophisticated new technology “is adopted in medical practice, it transforms not only what doctors do, but also the ways people think about health, sickness, and medical care” (p. 6). To illustrate how the introduction of a single technology can change a whole society, Winner refers to a study of how the snowmobile changed the lives of the Skolt Sámi people in Finland during the 1960s (Pelto, 1973). The Sámi people “deliberately chose to use snowmobiles as a replacement for dogsleds and skis in 134

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the basis of their economy – reindeer herding. But they neither chose nor intended the effects this change would have in totally reshaping the ecological and social relationships upon which their traditional culture depended” (Winner, 1977, p. 86). This single-technology adaption was followed by a series of major consequences, and even if there were economic benefits from the use of the new machine, there were also a number of side effects: (1) the machine made it possible to do the annual reindeer roundup more efficiently and in one single operation. Consequently, the ageold winter herding practices that had created close contact between humans and their animals became unnecessary and were abandoned. The previously tame reindeer became wild, (2) (probably) due to the regularly timed mechanised round-ups and the stress they caused, the fertility and breeding cycle was broken and the population of herds fell sharply, (3) since fewer people were needed for snowmobile-based herding and the care of the smaller herds, many families were forced out of business. This is an example, asserts Winner, of how one single technology can reform entire societal structures, and in many ways this story reflects in miniature the whole course of the industrial revolution. Winner refers to Karl Marx and concludes that “human beings do make their world, but they are also made by it” (p. 88). Autonomous technology. In his works, Winner brings together the ideas of several observers of industrial society, including Karl Marx, Lewis Mumford and Jacques Ellul, pointing out the importance as well as the shortcomings of their thinking on technological development. Similar to Ellul, Winner defines the idea of ‘autonomous technology’ as “the belief that somehow technology has gotten out of control and follows its own course, independent of human direction” (Winner, 1977, p. 13). However, several aspects differentiate Winner’s thoughts from Ellul’s. As Merritt Roe Smith notes: “Whereas Ellul depicted technique as a highly rational, all-embracing governing force, Winner detected a much more erratic and volatile phenomenon” (Smith, 1994, p. 31). Winner’s conclusion is that two hypotheses can be said to characterise technological determinism: “(1) that the technical base of a society is the fundamental condition affecting all patterns of social existence and (2) that changes in technology are the single most important source of change in society” (Winner, 1977, p. 76). However, what this view disregards, notes Winner, is that the implementation of new technologies often has unpredictable consequences. This means that even if new technology opens up a range of possibilities, the direction of its applications is difficult to know in advance. Winner asserts that the autonomous view often stems from a lack of understanding. In our modern society technological knowledge is highly specialised and most people can only grasp a small segment of it – the rest remains largely incomprehensible. For example, fragile and unpredictable large-scale systems have become an essential part of our modern life. We have a nominal presence in the networks, but we have lost our roles as active agents and we tend to uncritically ‘obey’ the requirements of the systems (Winner, 1977). Mumford expresses a similar view when he claims that 135

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even though technology might be perceived as uncontrollable, it is in fact something that is influenced by the social groups that use it. Human choices and actions, however, have unexpected consequences (Mumford, 1934/1963). As Vermaas et al. (2011) note, for Winner our modern technology is not a just a collection of implements that we can control and use without any danger. Due to the structure of modern technology, we cannot use our technological devices or tools freely – we are forced to use them in the ‘right’ way to ensure that the specified conditions for their implementation are met. We are thus expected to adapt to our technological environment. The reins of power are in the hands of the technological order. Therefore, the essential question is not ‘who’ is in power, but ‘what’. Vermaas et al. conclude that in Winner’s view the technological development is not steered by a technocracy. It is rather that the technological elite have no alternative but to obey the technological imperative. Technology is not neutral. Does technology itself incorporate values, or is it just the way in which we humans apply technology and innovation that can be considered ‘good’, or ‘bad’? Some philosophers of technology, such as Joseph C. Pitt, claim that technology is essentially neutral in terms of value because it is a tool in the service of humanity. What humans do with tools is to use them – either well or poorly. Therefore, it cannot have any moral agent (Pitt, 2014). Winner, on the other hand, takes the opposite stand and argues that since technology is a result of a targeted process, artefacts, by definition, have certain functions. The link between artefact, function and objectives makes it difficult to argue that technology could be neutral. Winner agrees that tools can be used well or poorly and for good or bad purposes; a knife can be used to slice bread but also to stab the next person that walks by. But he questions the conventional idea that human-made objects are taken to be fundamentally neutral as regards their moral standing, as it disregards the many ways in which technologies provide structure for human activity. If we only see technology as a neutral tool that can be used for either good or bad, we fail to consider whether at the time it was constructed (and through its design) there were any intended or unintended consequences. Seeing technology as entirely neutral and only evaluating it as a tool that has some utility, we risk becoming blind to much that is of importance. “Consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or inadvertently, societies choose structures for technologies that influence how people are going to work, communicate, travel, consume, and so forth over a very long time” (Winner, 1986, p. 28). This means that even if technology is not intentional, it affects society anyway. Winner gives the example that, in the 1970s, organisations for disabled people in the USA had drawn attention to flaws in the design of buses, buildings and sidewalks which made it impossible for disabled people to move about freely. Whilst the design of these artefacts favoured the majority of people, there were some unintended consequences for a smaller group of people resulting in them becoming largely excluded from the public. Winner’s conclusion is that since “conditions of power, 136

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authority, freedom, and social justice are deeply embedded in technical structures … no part of modern technology can be judged neutral a priori” (Winner, 1986, p. 40). By stating that technology cannot be seen as neutral, Winner also connects to its political dimension. The political aspect of technology. In his influential article Do Artifacts Have Politics? (1980, 1986), Winner discusses different views of technology. The first is that since technology is created by society, all technology is determined by which social and economic system it is embedded in. That means that what matters is not technology itself, but rather that technology is a result of a social construction, a consequence of how society is constructed. The opposite argument is the idea that technology develops as the sole result of internal dynamics; we cannot do anything but follow what technology ‘wants’. According to Winner, neither of these assumptions is good enough; it is not just the one or the other. Often technology, by how it is constructed, determines how we are able to act. Therefore, technology often also has a political dimension. The most obvious example of an inherently political artefact is the atom bomb (Winner, 1980, 1986). There are also technological solutions that can be described as deliberately political as they are designed to achieve a particular social effect. As an example Winner gives the low bridges on the Long Island parkways in New York City. The urban planner Robert Moses designed the bridges to be low enough to drive an automobile through, but too low for trucks or buses. Moses was, in this way, building a politics into the bridge system that, according to Winner, was designed to keep poor and lower-class people, who rely on public transportation, from going to Long Island. Another example Winner mentions is the boulevards of Paris. After the riots in the 19th century, protesters built barricades in the small and narrow streets of the city. Napoleon instructed the architect Haussmann to create a new city plan with no narrow streets, and the boulevards of Paris are now so wide that they impossible to barricade, but there is plenty of room for military tanks. These are examples of technological solutions that are designed to have specific cultural and societal effects (Winner, 1980, 1986). All in all, Winner believes that there are two basic ways in which technology affects us: (1) Technology is deliberately created in order to make us behave in a specific way, (2) Technology always carries with it certain effects: intended and unintended. Thus, when introducing a new technology, it is important to make a careful evaluation of its consequences and then decide whether it should be introduced or not. Democratic vs authoritarian technology. Mumford argues that “from late Neolithic times in the Near East, right down to our own day, two technologies have recurrently existed side by side: one authoritarian, the other democratic, the first system-centred, immensely powerful, but inherently unstable, the other man-centred, relatively 137

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weak, but resourceful and durable” (Mumford, 1964, p. 2). When Mumford thinks of democratic technics, he refers to small agricultural and craft communities where technologies were always in their own hands. Authoritarian technics, on the contrary, are inherently system-centred as they require a high degree of organisation and social control. Mumford agrees that there are benefits that arose with these centralised technics, but he questions the price we are paying. We have created complex human machines which are “composed of specialized, standardized, replaceable, interdependent parts – the work army, the military army, the bureaucracy” (p. 3). A possible interpretation of Mumford’s authoritarian technology is that it turns humans from individuals into resources in a greater system. Winner starts with Mumford’s democratic and authoritarian technology, but develops his ideas further when he draws a connection between political and technological decisions. Some technologies, claims Winner, are explicitly political whereas others are inherently political and certain technologies are by their very nature democratic, whilst others are authoritarian. This means that they have consequences that can be qualified in political terms. Since certain technologies, like nuclear weapons, require particular social structures for their implementation, besides the immediate effects of centralised technologies, there are also larger political dangers. They necessitate an authoritarian system, as they require a centralised and hierarchical chain of command to prevent all influences that might make them work unpredictably. “The internal social system of the bomb must be authoritarian; there is no other way” (Winner, 1986, p. 34). Winner argues that nuclear power is similar, as it also requires centralised systems with facilities, technicians, and security. Consequently, democratic societies have to find ways to ensure the social structures and mentality that characterise the management of nuclear weapons or nuclear power do not have spin-off or spill-over effects on the societal system as a whole. Winner gives solar power as an example of a democratic technological system. Technologies of this kind are more compatible with a democratic, egalitarian society – they are more accessible, comprehensible, and controllable compared to huge centralised sources, as they do not require technical expertise to the same extent and do not pose a security risk. They can also be created with a more flexible structure and are more likely to be a part of other areas of public life. In “Mythinformation” (The Whale and the Reactor, 1986) Winner deconstructs the arguments for the enthusiasts of the ‘computer revolution’. He questions the notion that a digitised society will increase democratisation, participation and social equality and claims that digitisation will hardly lead to a democratisation process, but rather increase the power of those already in power. This in turn leads to a centralised control. Winner wrote this essay about 30 years ago, but today, in an increasingly digitised world, Winner’s questions can be considered more topical than ever. A Decentralised democratic politics of technology. Contrary to Mumford, Winner is convinced that even larger modern technological systems can be democratic, and that one major shortcoming in the technologies of our modern society is that the 138

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people who are touched by technologies have little or no control at all over their operation or design (Winner, 1977). The problem, asserts Winner, is that our modern technology is not tailored to suit our needs. The development is rather concerned with renovating human needs to match modern technology (Winner, 1986). Technology in our modern society has become so complex that technology itself appears like a black box that has taken control of political power and moves forward of its own will-power. In contrast to this political view of autonomous technology, Winner proposes a more coequal relationship by using Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein as a starting point. The story is often interpreted as an example of when a creator loses control of his or her creation. Winner, however, interprets the story somewhat differently: “that we are dealing with an unfinished creation, largely forgotten and uncared for, which is forced to make its own way in the world” (Winner, 1977, p. 316). As Victor Frankenstein did not find a place for his creation in the world, it caused him trouble. The solution to the problems we face today is not to be against the development, but to pay more attention to issues like the contexts in which technology develops as well as the social, political and economic contexts. Winner’s argument is that to win back control, we need to make all present technologies more legible, but we must also find the right place for them. Winner presents his vision based on a more decentralised democratic politics of technology. First of all, he argues, we have to find new kinds of technology that avoid the human problems of the current set. This would give birth to a new sort of inventiveness and innovation in our civilization. This development must be built on direct and active participation of those concerned with these technologies in their everyday employment. The process and construction, as well as control, should be opened up to those who are “destined to experience the final products and full range of social consequences” (Winner, 1977, p. 326). One crucial principle is thus that the technologies are given a structure of the kind that would be immediately understandable, even for non-experts; technological systems ought to be accessible, both intellectually and physically, to those they are likely to affect. Another essential principle, claims Winner, is that the technologies have to be built with a high degree of flexibility and variability. In this way we would avoid technologies that have a rigid imprint on people’s lives. Instead, technologies should be judged in relation to the degree of dependency they tend to foster – the greater the dependency, the more inferior they are. Summary. In conclusion, Winner’s message is that technology is never neutral as it is always created with an intrinsic intention or purpose and/or has consequences that go far beyond the intended or predicted. However, in our highly technological society, technology has become a non-separable part of our lives and has virtually become invisible to us – we do not reflect on the impact it has on us in our lives. Consequently, the technologies cannot be examined or valued using a simple causeand-effect model. Winner thus calls for a critical philosophy of technology that analyses and discusses technology from new perspectives, including the perspective 139

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of ‘technologies as forms of life’. In the footsteps of the prevailing belief in the ‘religion of progress’, we see technological development as something that lives its own ‘life’ beyond our control (a deterministic view), and we also have too much faith in what technology can achieve. We are more spectators and consumers of change than actively involved citizens: we are slaves to our technology instead of technology being our slave. Hence, according to Winner, new kinds of innovations and order must be created in a way where those who are affected by them have an influence on their creation and use. The technological solutions must be designed so that they are directly intelligible even for non-experts and are based on a high degree of flexibility. Instead of people having to change and adapt to the technological systems, the systems should instead be based on people’s needs and wants – not only on efficiency and economical interest. When we start using a specific technology, it is crucial that we consider its impact in terms of ‘risks taken’ and ‘price paid’. As Winner illustrates with the disastrous Diablo Canyon nuclear reactor, there are values that are of greater importance than technological solutions based solely on short-term economic, societal or political interests. TECHNOLOGIES AS FORMS OF LIFE – IMPLICATIONS FOR TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION

A strong argument for an application of Winner’s philosophy of technology is his emphasis on the importance of a critical analysis of technology from multiple perspectives. Critical thinking as a concept has long been recognised as a valuable skill and has been established within educational discourse since the mid-twentieth century. For example, it has been identified as one of the 21st century skills that students need to succeed in a modern society (e.g. European Commission, 2018; Higgins, 2014; Rotherham & Willingham, 2010; Voogt & Roblin, 2012). The overarching aim of the school subject of technology is that students learn to understand and act in a responsible way in the technological culture they are a part of. Since technology is such a pervasive part of our lives, it is important to understand how it shapes society and which factors influence its development. To navigate their day-to-day life students thus need technological skills in the form of a highly developed technological literacy (Dakers, 2014; Garmire & Pearson, 2006; Turja, Endepohls-Ulpe, & Chatoney, 2009; Williams, 2009). However, a technological literacy of today and for the future implies more than the ability to create technological artefacts or to use or understand the function of certain technologies – young people also need to develop their critical thinking skills and be open to seeing the technological world from many different perspectives (e.g. Axell, 2017; Dakers, 2006; Keirl, 2006, 2011; Petrina; 2000; Williams, 2009). This approach is in line with Winner’s view. Even if it is difficult to predict what knowledge and skills future generations will need, we can assume that technological literacy implies that citizens are able to make well-informed and sophisticated judgements about various aspects of technology, 140

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such as comparing evidence, evaluating competing proposals and making responsible decisions. Without this kind of knowledge they will not be able to make deliberate democratic choices (Garmire & Pearson, 2006; Keirl, 2006). What characterises a person with highly developed critical-thinking and decisionmaking skills is, according to Garmire and Pearson (2006), that when “confronted with a new technology, he or she asks questions about risks and benefits and can participate in discussions and debates about the uses of that technology” (pp. 2–3). Garmire and Pearson’s description can be interpreted as having much in common with Winner’s call for a more critical philosophy of technology. Winner’s emphasis on a critical perspective of technology can also be linked to researchers like John Dakers, who believes that technology education must place more emphasis on issues relating to values and attitudes in terms of technology, such as ethics, environmental impact, social impact, sustainability, and the interface between humans and their active involvement with technologies. Dakers’ conclusion is that a more philosophically oriented pedagogical framework is thus needed (Dakers, 2011). Stephen Petrina is another example of a researcher in technology education who emphasises the importance of a critical perspective. He calls for the development of a critical technological literacy, which he describes as “a critical engagement with, and appropriation of, the built world and its signs of the times, the use of critical discourses, genres, or language to confront that world, and the mobilisation of resources to politically transform what’s built” (Petrina, 2000, p. 201). Over time, critical thinking has also become a part of the technology curricula in many countries. Critiquing as a key component of Design and Technology education made its global debut in the redesigned South Australian curriculum in 2001, and it has since gained international recognition (Keirl, 2017). In the compulsory aspects of the Swedish National Curriculum there is no explicit direction that critique should be included as an important part of technology education, but it is stated that teaching in technology should give pupils the opportunities to develop their ability to assess the consequences of different technological choices and to “analyse the driving forces of technological development and how technology has changed over time” (Swedish National Agency for Education, 2018, p. 292). However, despite this endeavour, for many people technology remains strongly associated with various artefacts or human-made objects. As Winner argues, we often act more as spectators and consumers of change than actively involved citizens (Winner, 1977, 1986). This is something that is also reflected in school, and previous research indicates an emphasis on artefacts and the making of objects in technology education. Likewise, studies into pupils’ attitudes towards technology indicate that many pupils are unable to give balanced opinions in which positive as well as negative effects of technology are taken into account. They rather act as uncritical consumers of technology (de Vries, 2005). By failing to place technology in a broader context, the connections between artefacts and human intention, as well as the implications of artefacts in a societal context, are disregarded (e.g. Axell, 2015; Mawson, 2010; Siu & Lam, 2005; Turja, Endepohls-Ulpe, & Chatoney, 2009). 141

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What Winner’s philosophy can contribute here is that he deepens the critical perspective by going beyond the artefact focus and the cause-effect-impact perspective. Although he wrote his books some time ago, they remain highly relevant. The issues and questions he raises may be applied to any technology, in any culture and any age. In this way, Winner’s philosophy of technology can be described as enduring and thus represent a framework for a more ‘timelessness’ content (Higgins, 2014) of the technology curricula, since it can be used as a starting point for analysis and reflection on any technology. An important question Winner raises is: “As we ‘make things work’, what kind of world are we making? This suggests that we pay attention not only to the making of physical instruments and processes … but also to the production of psychological, social, and political conditions as a part of any significant technical change. Are we going to design and build circumstances that enlarge possibilities for growth in human freedom, sociability, intelligence, creativity, and self-government? Or are we headed in an altogether different direction?” (Winner, 1986, p. 17). Thus, a useful starting point for incorporating the critical perspective in technology education is Winner’s approach to technologies as forms of life. As Don Ihde points out, Winner’s approach offers a mode of analysis for technologies: “[W]hat are the forms of life which emerge? How are they interrelated? What worlds are made through technologies? To make a technology is not simply to make a tool or an artefact – it is to make a world” (Ihde, 1993, p. 103). This understanding of technologies needs to be incorporated into our evaluations and choices regarding technological innovation, as well as our adoption of them. As Winner notes, even if we know how automobiles are made, how they operate, how they are used and about traffic laws and urban transportation policies, this knowledge does little to make us understand how automobiles affect the texture of modern life. A strictly instrumental or functional understanding is not enough. What is needed, according to Winner, “is an interpretation of the ways, both obvious and subtle, in which everyday life is transformed by the mediating role of technical devices” (Winner, 1986, p. 9). However, in technology education, the critical aspect is often limited to analysing a technical solution itself in its design, construction or materiality. In simple terms, one could say that this involves investigating whether the ‘blue’ or ‘red’ version of a technological artefact is superior. We rarely question whether this technology should be used at all, or what consequences implementation could have from multiple perspectives. A completely different technological solution might be better in the long run if we look at its consequences. Winner considers that since technology creates changes in society, we need knowledge to be able to determine whether or not we want these changes. Making informed decisions requires not only knowledge of how the technology should be handled, but also knowledge of the technology itself and what impact it has. This knowledge is essential for democratic and sustainable citizen engagement. As technology is created by humans, we must be able to judge it based on an analysis 142

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of many different contexts. Technology enables us to find new and better solutions to a problem or satisfy human needs. At the same time it is something that causes accidents and emissions, and can be a threat not only to humans but also to other species and damage entire ecosystems. This duality is highly topical in our ambition to create a sustainable future. Technology is future-oriented, but we need to think about it critically to identify its benefits and risks. On the basis on these aspects that Winner highlights, there are some key questions that may be considered relevant for technology education: • Does technology itself incorporate values, or is it just the way in which we humans apply technology and innovation that can be considered ‘good’ or ‘bad’? • When new forms of technologies are introduced, what are the social consequences? The cultural consequences? The consequences for other species? For ecosystems? • What are the intended consequences? What might the unintended consequences be? • Does this technology resolve our problems, and if so does it create new problems that need to be solved? • Are the technological systems we depend on designed with an intention to subsidise an authoritarian society? Whom does this technology serve? Who are the stakeholders and beneficiaries? • What forms of life emerge from specific technologies? How are they interrelated? • What worlds are made through the implementation of these technologies? As mentioned earlier, to illustrate how the introduction of a single technological artefact can change social conditions, Winner uses the example of how the snowmobile changed the lives of the Skolt Sámi people in Finland. The adaption of the snowmobile had major and unexpected consequences – it changed the lives of individuals as well as the entire societal and economical structure of the Sámi community, but it also changed the relationship between herders and reindeers (Pelto, 1973). There were both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the process, as some individuals were better than others at adopting and mastering the new necessary skills that accompanied the new technology (Winner, 1977). This example can serve as a starting point for analyses of the role of different technological artefacts and the impact they have on us as individuals, our social relations, society, the environment and the planet as a whole. Winner uses television as another illustration and states that: “None of those who worked to perfect the technology of television in its early years and few of those who brought television sets into their homes ever intended the device to be employed as the universal babysitter” (Winner, 1986, p. 12). A similar view can be applied to the smartphone, and many of us would say that “life would scarcely be thinkable without them” (p. 11). The pervasive presence of mobile smart devices and mobile internet has changed the way we do things and how we connect with other people – sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse. Have smartphones added fundamentally new activities to the range of things human beings do? In what way do these technologies affect us, our relationships, education, business, equality, the environment, etc.? 143

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Who are the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’? What ‘forms of life’ have emerged from mobile smart devices? If all smartphones disappeared in a moment, what would happen? On the basis of Winner’s critique of the conviction that adoption of electronic information and communication systems will automatically produce a better world (Winner, 1986), technology teachers may also reflect on the new content that enters the technology curricula, such as programming and digital technology: • What is the purpose of introducing digital competence and programming in education? What are the driving forces behind this new content? • In what ways can digitisation contribute to a more democratic society? In what ways can it contribute to a more authoritarian society? • What kind of world or forms of life is digitisation creating? Who are the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ in this technological change? Moreover, as Winner asks: “Is computer programming only a powerful recombination of forms of life known for ages – doing mathematics, listing, sorting, planning, organizing etc. – or is it something unprecedented?” (Winner, 1986, p. 13). However, despite his call for a critical thinking about technology, Winner is convinced that we are able to develop a more democratic technology that we as citizens are involved with. In this way, his thoughts contribute to a positive view of the future and counteract technological determinism. His message can also be interpreted as an invitation to engage in social and political issues related to technology. His crucial question, which runs through his philosophy of technology, is: “How we can limit modern technology to match our best sense of who we are and the kind of world we would like to build?” (Winner, 1986, p. xi). We need to end our overconfidence in technological progress and belief that any effects of new technologies (both foreseen and unforeseen) can subsequently be solved with future inventions. As Winner concludes, “Much more than we have acknowledged in the past, we must admit our responsibility for what we are making” (p. 18). Just like Frankenstein, we have to find the right place for our creations in the world – an insight that is important to help our students to achieve. REFERENCES Axell, C. (2015). Barnlitteraturens tekniklandskap: En didaktisk vandring från Nils Holgersson till Pettson och Findus [Technology Landscapes of Children’s Literature: A Didactic Journey from Nils Holgersson to Pettson and Findus] (Dissertation). Linköping University, Linköping. Axell, C. (2017). Critiquing literature: Children’s literature as a learning tool for critical awareness. In P. J. Williams & K. Stables (Eds.), Critique in design and technology education (pp. 237–254). Singapore: Springer. Dakers, J. R. (2006). Towards a philosophy for technology education. In J. R. Dakers (Ed.), Defining technological literacy: Towards an epistemological framework (pp. 145–158). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Dakers, J. R. (2011). The rise of technological literacy in primary education. In C. Benson & J. Lunt (Eds.), International handbook of primary technology education: Reviewing the past twenty years (pp. 181–193). Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers.

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LANGDON WINNER Dakers, J. R. (Ed.). (2014). New frontiers in technological literacy: Breaking with the past. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. De Vries, M. J. (2005). Teaching about technology: An introduction to the philosophy of technology for non-philosophers. Dordrecht: Springer. De Vries, M. J. (2017). Philosophy as critique. In P. J. Williams & K. Stables (Eds.), Critique in design and technology education (pp. 15–30). Singapore: Springer. European Commission. (2018). Proposal for a council recommendation on key competences for life long learning. Education and Training: Key Competences. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/education/ sites/education/files/swd-recommendation-key-competences-lifelong-learning.pdf Garmire, E., & Pearson, G. (2006). Tech tally: Approaches to assessing technological literacy. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. Higgins, S. (2014). Critical thinking for 21st-century education: A cyber-tooth curriculum? Prospects: Quarterly Review of Comparative Education, 44(4), 559–574. Ihde, D. (1993). Philosophy of technology: An introduction. New York, NY: Paragon House Publishers. Keirl, S. (2006). Ethical technological literacy as democratic curriculum keystone. In J. R. Dakers (Ed.), Defining technological literacy: Towards an epistemological framework (pp. 81–102). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Keirl, S. (2011). Primary design and technology education and ethical technological literacy. In C. Benson & J. Lunt (Eds.), International handbook of primary technology education: Reviewing the past twenty years (pp. 235–246). Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers. Keirl, S. (2017). Critiquing as design and technology curriculum journey: History, theory, politics and potential. In J. P. Williams & K. Stables (Eds.), Critique in design and technology education (pp. 109–133). Singapore: Springer. Mawson, B. (2010). Children’s developing understanding of technology. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 20(1), 1–13. Mumford, L. (1934/1963). Technics and civilization. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World. Mumford, L. (1964). Authoritarian and democratic technics. Technology & Culture, 5(1), 1–8. Pelto, P. J. (1973). The snowmobile revolution: Technology and social change in the arctic. Menlo Park, CA: Cummings Pub. Co. Petrina, S. (2000). The politics of technological literacy. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 10(2), 181–206. Pitt, J. C. (2014). ‘Guns don’t kill, people kill’; Values in and/or around technologies. In P. Kroes & P.-P. Verbeek (Eds.), The moral status of technical artefacts (pp. 89–101). Dordrecht: Springer. Rotherham, A. J., & Willingham, D. T. (2010). “21st-century” skills: Not new, but a worthy challenge. American Educator, 34(1), 17–20. Siu, K. W. M., & Lam, M. S. (2005). Early childhood technology education: A sociocultural perspective. Early Childhood Education Journal, 32(6), 353–358. Smith, M. R. (1994). Technological determinism in American culture. In M. R. Smith & L. Marx (Eds.), Does technology drive history? The dilemma of technological determinism (pp. 1–35). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Swedish National Agency for Education. (2018). Curriculum for the compulsory school system, the pre-school class and the leisure-time centre 2011. Revised 2018. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik AB. Turja, L., Endepohls-Ulpe, M., & Chatoney, M. (2009). A conceptual framework for developing the curriculum and delivery of technology education in early childhood. International Journal of Design and Technology Education, 19(4), 353–365. Vermaas, P., Kroes, P., Poel, V. D. I., Franssen, M., & Houkes, W. (2011). A philosophy of technology: From technical artefacts to sociotechnical system. San Rafael: Morgan & Claypool Publishers. Voogt, J., & Roblin, N. P. (2012). A comparative analysis of international frameworks for 21st century competences: Implications for national curriculum policies. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 44(3), 299–321. Williams, P. J. (2009). Technological literacy: A multiliteracies approach for democracy. International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 19(3), 237–254. Williams, P. J., & Stables, K. (Eds.). (2017). Critique in design and technology education. Singapore: Springer. Winner, L. (1980). Do artifacts have politics? Daedalus, 109(1), 121–136.

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C. AXELL Winner, L. (1977). Autonomous technology: Technics-out-of-control as a theme in political thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Winner, L. (1986). The whale and the reactor: A search of limits in an age of high technology. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Winner, L. (Ed.). (1992). Democracy in a technological society. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Winner, L. (n.d.). About Langdon. Langdon Winner – on Politics, Technology and the Arts. Retrieved from https://www.langdonwinner.com/about/

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11. KEVIN KELLY Technology Education for the Technium

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is in two parts. The first part begins with a short biography of Kevin Kelly and continues with an exploration of his ideas concerning the nature of technology. It then presents a critique of his ideas from others in the field. The second part considers the worth of Kelly’s ideas with regard to technology education in the secondary school and the extent to which they might inform curriculum development and implementation. A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY

Kevin Kelly was born in 1952 in Pennsylvania and he is unusual. His educational background is minimal. He dropped out of college and went to Asia where he travelled in the 1970s as a poor, solo photographer in the hinterlands and villages of Asia, between Iran and Japan. He came back with 36,000 slides some of which he eventually assembled into a highly unconventional photographic book called Asia Grace published in 2002. He returned to the US in 1979, and rode a bicycle 5,000 miles across the US. He kept a journal and sketchbook on the 3-month trip. In the mid eighties he became editor in chief and publisher of the Whole Earth Review which produced compendiums of information on tools derived from science and technology, new and old. In the early nineties he co-founded Wired Magazine. His journey from a nomadic existence to a technology guru has led him to consider the nature of technology and write about this topic publishing a succession of books including Out of control (1994), What Technology Wants (2010), Cool Tools (2013) and The Inevitable (2016). Currently he is Senior Maverick for Wired and is well known for his provocative and unconventional views on the nature of technology. More details of his extraordinary life and work can be found at http://kk.org/biography. TECHNOLOGIES AS THE TECHNIUM

As he has lived his life Kelly has become more and more intrigued by the nature of technology and his exploration led him to view technology as a conglomeration of individual technologies linked together into an overall system which he called

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_011

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the ‘technium’ that has the properties we associate with a complex living being and as such has needs and wants which it tries to meet. Kelly (2010) explores this idea in depth is his book What technology wants. He sees technology as the emerging seventh kingdom of life on earth embodied in the technium and being to a large extent autonomous although this autonomy is mitigated to some extent. He identifies three interacting influences that govern the technium: The primary driver is pre-ordained development – what technology wants. The second driver is the influence of technological history, the gravity of the past, as in the way the size of a horse’s yoke determines the size of a space rocket. The third force is society’s collective free will in shaping the technium, or our choices. (p. 181) The seemingly unlikely connection of the size of a horse’s yoke is justified in that horses were used to pull carts along rails so the width of the rails depended on the size of the yoke that connected the horse to the cart. This influenced width of subsequent railways including those used to move space rockets to their launching pad. Kelly argues that under the first force of pre-ordained development, the path of technological evolution is steered by both the laws of science and by the self organizing tendencies within its large, complex, adaptive system. This ‘steerage’ by the laws of science is in agreement with the ideas of Arthur (2009) who argues that technology can be viewed as the exploitation of phenomena revealed by science. He rejects a simplistic “technology is applied science” view but is adamant that it is from the discovery and understanding of phenomena that technologies spring. He notes that: It should be clear that technologies cannot exist without phenomena. But the reverse is not true. Phenomena purely in themselves have nothing to do with technology. They simply exist in our world (the physical ones at least) and we have no control over their form and existence. All we can do is use them where usable. Had our species been born into a universe with different phenomena we would have developed different technologies. And had we uncovered phenomena over historical times in a different sequence, we would have developed different technologies. (p. 66) Kelly argues that what has already happened technologically will inevitably have some impact on what happens next. The way technology plays out will always depend, to some extent, on previous technological activity even when such activity at first sight might appear unrelated. Kelly argues that these two forces channel the technium along a limited path and severely restrict the influence we might have on what technological developments takes place. He does however acknowledge that the third influence society’s collective free will and individuals’ personal choices do have an influence on the technium. Here he notes a seeming paradox. Today we seem to have many more choices with regard to technology than previous generations, as there is so much more technology available to us so inevitably we have a wider 148

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range of choices. But the underlying direction the technium takes, governed mainly by what technology wants and historical precedent, is swayed very little by what we as individuals or as a society might want. At the fine level of detail various technological initiatives thrive and then decline whilst other thrive and become part of the fabric of society such that they are seen as ‘just the way things are’ and not considered technology in the sense of a new innovation manifesting itself in society. Douglas Adams (2005) captured this well in the set of rules he devised to describe our reactions to technologies: 1. Anything that is in the world when you’re born is normal and ordinary and is just a natural part of the way the world works. 2. Anything that’s invented between when you’re fifteen and thirty-five is new and exciting and revolutionary and you can probably get a career in it. 3. Anything invented after you’re thirty-five is against the natural order of things (p. 95). Much of the technology developed in England and the U S in the 19th and early 20th centuries would at the time of their development be seen as highly innovative and life changing – sanitation, transport, the ready availability of gas and electricity, radio and television became common place. Indeed we can go further with the relatively recent development of the computer, the Internet and global communications networks enabling the rise of social media such we have a generation of young people who have never experienced life without a mobile device that links them instantly to friends and family, enables consumerism and provides information about happenings across the globe. And of course the already developed common-place technologies are not immune from these developments. Transportation (see https://www.mckinsey.com/ features/mckinsey-center-for-future-mobility/overview/autonomous-driving) is set to absorb these more recent developments in autonomous vehicles that appear set to change the urban landscape and reduce employment possibilities for those who earned their living through driving cars, buses and lorries and selling car insurance. TECHNOLOGICAL TRAJECTORIES

Is Kelly’s idea of the technium as moving forward in ways that enable it to ‘get what it wants’ mediated to some extent by history and to a much lesser extent by human intervention plausible? Before we make a judgement it is worth considering the various trajectories that Kelly identifies as important in understanding the nature of the technium and our role in contributing to its ‘evolution’. They are as follows: • • • • •

Increasing efficiency Increasing opportunity Increasing emergence Increasing complexity Increasing diversity 149

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• • • • • • • •

Increasing specialisation Increasing ubiquity Increasing freedom Increasing mutualism Increasing beauty Increasing sentience Increasing structure Increasing evolvability

Kelly suggests that a technology ‘serenity’ prayer similar to that ascribed to the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr (Crouter, 2010) would be a useful guide: God grant me the serenity To accept the things I cannot change Courage to change the things I can And wisdom to know the difference. Kelly is suggesting here that while we cannot change the nature of technology we can both as individuals and society contribute human influence to how technology plays out. Kelly argues that humans individually and collectively can align themselves with particular technological trajectories, that reflect the nature of technology in order to ‘change the things we can’ for the good. What constitutes ‘for the good’ is always debatable but Kelly’s position is optimistic in that it is one in which we have some influence. We are not at the mercy of an autonomous technology over which we have no control but can be collaborators in co-evolution. Key questions are, “Who amongst us have influence?” and “What will they see as a change for the good?” Two trajectories have particular relevance to school technology: increasing complexity (Kelly, 2010, pp. 274–282) and increasing ubiquity (Kelly, 2010, pp. 296–306). Increasing complexity is particularly relevant because although becoming increasingly complex the complexity is hidden and it is important that young people realise the extent of this complexity and the way individual applications are dependent on a large number of different technologies that are embedded in the supporting infrastructure. Increasing ubiquity is particularly relevant as it considers the way in which technologies become pervasive throughout society. Increasing Complexity Kelly draws the analogy between the way living creatures evolve into evermore increasingly complex forms and the way technologies become increasingly more complex. Over a two centuries time scale the number of parts in individual relatively simple manufactured good has increased from under 100 to tens of thousands. Just look under the cover of a central heating boiler and compare this with a fire grate if you need convincing. And on a scale of tens of years the refrigerators, cars and even windows are more complicated than they were twenty years ago. How will 150

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this increasing complexity play out over time in the future? Kelly argues that the most likely scenario is that the complexity whilst increasing will largely remain hidden; life will continue to look pretty much as it does now with us living in rooms in houses in cities. A feature of concern for those designing technologies will be the user interface. Consider how the control of the central heating boiler can now take place over the Internet via a graphic user interface and voice control is almost certain to become available soon via the Amazon voice controlled assistant Alexa for example. “Alexa, I’ll be home at eight, please switch the heating on at 7.30”. Alexa can only turn on the central heating if it is part of the Internet of Things. Alexa can only receive the message if the mobile phone network is functioning. The mobile phone network can only function if the electricity-generating network is functioning. The central heating system may be gas fired so this will only work if the gas supply system is functioning. All these systems are costly to install and maintain and it requires large numbers of skilled technical workers to achieve this. And of course our mobile phone will only work if you have access to rechargeable batteries the raw materials for which are in increasingly short supply. Increasing Ubiquity Kelly argues that just as living things spread from their point of origin so do technologies. This spread in terms of living things is subject to a set of checks and balances provided by competition from other species and availability of resources; hence although life is ubiquitous particular forms of life are not. He suggests that this is not the case for some technologies and that some of them spread to reach nearly 100 per cent ubiquity. This is relevant because as a technology approaches ubiquity it becomes such a part of the normal, simply the way things are, that it disappears from view and as such becomes invisible to critique. Kelly mounts an interesting discussion with regard to the haves and have-nots of technology as a technology spreads. He argues that it is better to consider this as haves and have-laters and that in most situations the have-laters will catch up and probably get a technology that is better than that used by first adopters where there were still ‘bugs’ of various sorts to be ironed out. His most telling point is that the question “What should be done about the divide between those who do and do not have access to a technology?” is the wrong question. The much more important question is “What will happen when a technology approaches ubiquity and almost everyone has access to it?” He suggests that the range of second and third order effects that result will give rise to a large number of unintended and largely unforeseen consequences. This is certainly a matter for curriculum consideration. SOME CRITIQUES OF KELLY’S THINKING

Kelly largely avoids the role that capitalism of varying sorts has played in the development of technology and it is worth considering this in the light of Kelly’s view 151

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of the nature of technology. Technology has a strong relationship with capitalism. The Enlightenment gave rise to the realisation that humankind is ignorant and that there are vast quantities of new knowledge waiting to be discovered. The quest for this knowledge which could then be exploited through technological endeavour was an expensive exercise. This led those with money to support both the discovery and the exploitation with a view to making more money. Hence science, technology and capitalism became intertwined and interdependent (Harari, 2014). Feenberg, discussed in Chapter 9 of this book, also acknowledges the intimate relationship between capitalism, economic growth and technology. He argues that technology is complicit in the unqualified control over the labour process on which capitalist industrialism rests leading to a disempowerment of workers. Few significant technological endeavours can now take place without the investment of very large sums of money. Sometimes these come from venture capitalists, sometimes from governments, sometimes from a combination. These investments are made with the expectation of significant financial return for those who have invested: the venture capitalists, governments and ultimately shareholders in the companies that deploy the technologies as providing goods or services for which customers pay. Small technological endeavours can take place with much less investment and Eric von Hippel (2015) has written about this ‘democratization of innovation’. The examples he quotes are at a very small scale when compared with the operations of the so called ‘tech giants’ such as Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Amazon. We must ask here about the place of such companies as collaborators in co-evolution of the technium. They are surely placed to have influence and one would imagine that they would want their activities in such collaboration as supporting ‘change for the good’. It is instructive to reflect on the words of Jeff Bezos CEO of Amazon: We see our customers as invited guests to a party, and we are the hosts. It’s our job to make the customer experience a little bit better. According to an article in the September 2017 edition of Wired, authored by Liat Clark, Amazon wants to introduce Alexa (an intelligent personal assistant that is capable of voice interaction, music playback, making to-do lists, setting alarms, streaming podcasts, playing audiobooks, and providing weather, traffic, and other real-time information, such as news) into every area of your life: your home, car, hospital, workplace. To summarize her views (Clark, 2017) the ‘everything’ store, as Amazon is sometimes known, is about to be everywhere. Alexa has to be human like because it is essential that people trust her, enough to let visual and audio ‘surveillance’ into their homes and lives. Alexa can try to empathise with words alone at the moment but when she has cameras at her disposal she will be able to respond to visual clues as well as aural input. And in response Alexa is becoming more human like. Alexa can whisper, pause, take a breath, adjust its pitch and allow for key words such as ‘ahem’ and ‘yay’ to be emphasised in more engaging ways. Forging an apparently ‘emotional’ response from Alexa is the goal. An AI will need to know a person well to engage in a relationship based on emotional response. 152

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Amazon may well know more about you than your closest friends and so, of course, will Alexa and be able to use both what you say and do to forge, maintain and extend that relationship. The insightful film Robot and Frank asked the question, “Can an AI be your friend?” Amazon has the answer, “Of course, if you trust the AI as you might another human”. And that is Amazon’s overriding intention – to get us to trust Alexa as we might a human friend in the knowledge that she is not in fact another human and hence will not pry into your life or betray you as a human friend might. Is the availability and uptake of Alexa, or similar devices, a change for good? It is likely to be good for Amazon in terms of profitability but what about the rest of us? To what extent are the users of any technology or upgrading of a technology they already use asked if this is what they want? The founder of Apple Computer founder Steve Jobs famously said, “It’s really hard to design products by focus groups. A lot of times, people don’t know what they want until you show it to them. You can’t just ask customers what they want and then try to give that to them. By the time you get it built, they’ll want something new”. Tim O’Reilly (2017), echoing Feenberg’s concerns, writes an interesting critique of capitalism and the way it has most recently used technology in the pursuit of profitability. He notes that algorithm based attempts to maximise shareholder profits in the short term treat humans as a cost to be eliminated paying little if any attention to the impact of such decisions on opportunities for workers and the lives of actual people. A superb irony is that the ubiquity of technology, its very success, may lead to the downfall of the capitalism that is essential for it existence (Cameron, 2017; Frase, 2016). Kelly’s view of the nature of technology, neglecting the role of capitalism in providing the life blood of the technium as it were, fails to engage with the possibility that his identified trajectories may falter. This we must see as a significant weakness in his view of the nature of technology. Kelly is a technological optimist and views the technologies emerging through the technium as providing ever-increasing opportunities for humans to ‘self realise’ in ways not available to those in previous generations. In chapter 14 of What technology wants he refers to this ‘playing the infinite game’. Others are less sanguine. Arthur (2009) suggests that our relationship with technology is one in which there is a conflict between our trust for the natural compared to our suspicion of the artificial: These two views, that technology is a thing directing our lives, and simultaneously a thing blessedly serving our lives are simultaneously valid. But together they cause unease, an ongoing tension, that plays out in our attitudes to technology and in the politics that surrounds it. (p. 214) … we trust nature, not technology. And yet we look to technology to take care of our future – we hope in technology. So we hope in something we do not quite trust. (p. 215) The thinking of Jacques Ellul (1964) is in direct contrast to that of Kelly in that he is most definitely a technological pessimist. He views the intrinsic nature of technology 153

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with its emphasis on efficiency and standardisation as inimitable to the human spirit and the wide ranging influence that technology is having, and continuing to have, on society as both dehumanising and outside human control. Thomas Hughes (1994) offers an intermediate path between Ellul’s pessimism and Kelly’s optimism. He has developed the idea of technological momentum, particularly with regard to the large technological systems that underpin much of modern life. He argues that as such systems come into being it is relatively easy for society to have an influence on their development but once they become established this is much more difficult requiring significant disruption and at that stage in their development these technologies become autonomous and outside human control. Hence in considering Kelly’s view that humanity can exert an influence on technology, albeit limited, by aligning itself with particular trajectories in order to achieve good, Hughes’ idea of technological momentum suggests that to be effective this alignment needs to be at the beginning of the trajectory. Once the technology is established it will not be possible for any alignment to give rise to change. Human involvement will become acquiescence. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SCHOOL TECHNOLOGY CURRICULUM

One of the arguments for teaching technology in schools is that it develops capability that for some young people will lead them into careers in which they develop new technologies which other people then innovate. This seems a necessity for technology to ‘get what it wants’. Without humans being technological the technium could not evolve. Jacob Bronowski (1973) has argued that such activity is fundamental to being human and that humans have, and always will, exploit the phenomena around them to meet their needs and wants in response to a variety of circumstances. In the past such activity sprang from human ingenuity that was often not informed by formal education. Thomas Newcomen, James Watt and Richard Trevithick who developed steam engines in the 18th century and laid the foundation for the Industrial Revolution in Britain were such people. Nowadays we deliberately teach young people science, mathematics and technology in order to increase the pool of talent on which technological development depends. The development of steam power in the 18th and 19th centuries provides an interesting example of the impact of a technology becoming ubiquitous and giving rise to a range of second and third order effects with a large number of unintended and largely unforeseen consequences. Initially designed to pump water, steam engines soon found other applications especially in transport on both land and sea. These we might describe as first order effects in line with the intentions of their inventors. It also provided power for manufacturing leading to the creation of considerable wealth, for a few, and employment for many. Such employment was often dangerous and involved significant child labour. The migration of agricultural workers to centres of employment made available through steam power gave rise to large industrial cities; a second order effect. This in their turn created large problems of public health and the transmission of infectious diseases. Sanitation and the availability of water 154

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to ordinary households resulted. Crime was common in cities and law and order were maintained by the introduction of a constabulary or police force. In response to poor working conditions working people organised trade unions. These can be seen as third order effects. The relationship between these first, second and third order effects is complex but their consequences were unintended and unforeseen. It seems highly unlikely that Thomas Newcomen or those around him had any idea of what they were starting when he developed his steam engine in 1712. Steam power became increasingly complex as it developed and this increased complexity led to increased efficiency and eventually to steam turbines which are used in power plants to generate electricity. Such complexity is largely hidden from those who benefit from the way steam power is utilised. We have to ask to what extent should Kelly’s ideas inform what is taught in the school technology curriculum? There is no doubt that he is a provocative and, in some circles, a well-regarded thinker with regard to the nature of technology. We must ask just how significant are Kelly’s ideas about the nature of technology and which of them should we teach young people? For the purpose of this discussion we will leave aside the weakness of his position with regard to considering the role of capitalism and concentrate on the implications of considering trajectories. Kelly believes that human influence on the technium is likely to be minimal but he does acknowledge that a limited influence is possible and couches this in terms of humans, both at the individual and societal levels, aligning themselves with particular technological trajectories in order to ‘change the things we can’ for the good. Will teaching about the nature of technology as viewed by Kelly, in particular the idea of trajectories and how we might align ourselves with specific trajectories, be worthwhile? The author remembers attending a seminar some 14 years ago when the highly successful industrial designer Richard Seymour said very forcefully that the product design students he taught had little idea as to what they might do with the technologies at their disposal. He said, and I quote, “I ask them ‘What the f**k are you going to do with these technologies?’” Now whilst we might not put this question to young people at school in the same words it is certainly a question we would want them to consider if they are going to develop technological perspective by which I mean insight into the nature of technology, particularly “how it works”. This would help them form a constructively critical view of technology, pre-empting alienation from our technologically-based society and enabling consideration of how technology might be used to provide products and systems that help create the sort of society in which they aspire to live. Progress in technological perspective will require learners to develop an understanding of unfamiliar technologies and to develop critical skills in challenging value positions. Learners will be able to develop technological perspective by considering the economic and social impact of particular technologies and artefacts on both groups and individuals and their environmental impact on both the made and natural worlds. In developing progression, the teacher should begin with relatively simple artefacts used by learners and their families and move to considering more 155

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complex technologies and artefacts that will require systems thinking for their critical evaluation. An immediate question arises. What tools are available for such learning to take immediate question arises, What tools are available for such learning to take place? Barlex (2003) described a simple tool that could be used for this purpose. It is represented diagrammatically in Figure 11.1.

Figure 11.1. Tool for considering the impact of technology on society

The product or technology is placed at the centre of the tetrahedron and each of the vertices is used to interrogate the product from a particular perspective. In the case of technology the learner would ask how the technology worked and to what extent it was well established. In the case of people the learner would ask which needs and wants would the technology be likely to meet. In the case of society the learner would ask if meeting such needs and wants was acceptable to society. And in the case of markets the learner would ask how the technology was made available to those who wanted to use it. At one extreme a teacher might leave answering these questions very much to the learners who would have a range of research tools at their disposal. At the other extreme a teacher might provide links to various websites where such information could easily be found. A teacher might even go so far as to produce a document which contained the answers ready for the students to find. Whatever approach a teacher adopted a key ingredient would be the conversations that the learners had through the questions they asked and the teacher would be responsible for maintaining these conversations so that the learners were required to be reflective of their own views and those of their peers. Let us consider the questions and answers that might arise if we put autonomous electrical vehicles (AEVs) at the centre of the tetrahedron. It will not be possible for the discussion to be definitive in the sense of identifying a set of ‘correct’ answers but it will be possible for the discussion to raise important issues that need to be considered in tackling the ‘wicked’ problem of sustainable transport systems.

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At the Technology Vertex With regard to how AEVs work in terms of its autonomy the students might think about how the car works by analogy to the activities of human drivers: seeing the road ahead, avoiding obstacles, adjusting speed, knowing the directions they wish to go to reach their destination, etc. The teacher might encourage the students to describe this in terms of a systems diagram and then overlay on this the subsystems that are in fact in an autonomous vehicle. The extent to which this technology is well established is not in dispute; the google car has travelled many thousands of miles over several years with only very few accidents although these do create some concern (see https://www.wired.com/story/waymo-crash-self-driving-google-arizona/). The recent death of a pedestrian by a Tesla self driving car is giving serious cause for concern (see https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jun/07/tesla-fatalcrash-silicon-valley-autopilot-mode-report). With regard to how the car moves the students would need to consider the differences between a petrol driven car and one powered by batteries. The teacher might encourage the students to consider the different complexity in terms of number of parts and maintenance requirements, the difference in ‘tail pipe’ emissions, battery life and recharging facilities. In terms of being well established battery driven cars are a proven concept and have existed since the late 1800s and are now being seen as a serious alternative to cars that use the internal combustion engine (MacKay, 2009). At the People Vertex The discussion would need to acknowledge that people both need and want transport but in order to achieve this they do not necessarily need to own a vehicle. The teacher might suggest to the students the possibilities of public transport or businesses that provide transport as an on demand service. The difference between transport requirements and possibilities in rural and urban areas would need to be discussed. The teacher might encourage the students to discuss the pros and cons of owning or not owning a vehicle. The discussion would also need to consider the availability of charging and the length of journeys that can be carried out on one charge. At many points in these discussions the teacher can encourage the students to find out more. At the Society Vertex The discussion would need to address the fears that many have with regard to both automation and AI. The teacher might point students to fears about unemployment (Frey & Osborne, 2013), in this case initially the unemployment of any who drive for a living or sell car insurance. The teacher might also point students to the comments of those who have suggested that AI poses an existential threat; the late Stephen Hawkins is a good example (see https://theconversation.com/ 157

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stephen-hawking-warned-about-the-perils-of-artificial-intelligence-yet-ai-gavehim-a-voice-93416); and those who have warned about the malicious uses of AI (Brundage, 2018). The students should also discuss the distrust that some have towards a technology in which they ‘hand over’ control; although autonomous driving is in the future likely to be much more accident free compared with human driving (see https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/are-autonomous-cars-really-safer-thanhuman-drivers/). However introducing students to the dilemma of whom to save if an accident was inevitable e.g. pedestrians or the driver – would lead to interesting conversations about the ethics of decisions made by algorithms. The discussion would need to address the role of electric vehicles as a response to the consequences of global warming and the need to mitigate this by lowering CO2 emission levels. The teacher might suggest that this requires action by government, motor manufacturers, and local authorities if individuals are to be able respond by changing from petrol driven to electric powered vehicles. The actions of the Chinese government and motor manufacturers are relevant here (see https://www.thechargingpoint.com/ magazine/articles/how-china-is-winning-the-electric-car-race/). At the Market Vertex The discussion would need to consider the time that markets take to respond to the various influences that might have an impact. In some cases this can be very short but not in others. The costs involved in motorists changing their modes of transport and the incentives that might be provided by both governments and manufacturers will need to be considered. There will almost certainly be a long, albeit diminishing tail of continued use with regard to petrol driven and hybrid cars. AEV manufacturers will have to turn their attention to designing for the passenger as opposed to the driver. The combination of the political and economic achieved through collaboration between government and industry and perhaps the coercion by government of industry should be discussed. The rise of the AEV market might find itself opposed by those who see it as a threat to their own employment and well-being. It becomes difficult to separate the response of the market to the issues faced by society, discussed above. This resistance to AEV s will be part of a wider resistance to the deployment of automation and AI and this is serious problem which both governments and industry will need to address. Teachers might point learners to O’Reilly’s critique noted above. Once learners have carried out this four point exploration it would be useful to introduce Kelly’s idea of trajectory to enable further consideration. This will require the deliberate teaching of Kelly’s idea of trajectories in general and complexity and ubiquity in particular. Complexity is often deliberately hidden from view by designers so this may be difficult to consider. Ubiquity, however, will make its presence felt in a highly observable way. So now the teacher can ask the students to consider what the second and third order effects of AEVs becoming the norm for urban and inter city travel might be especially with particular regard to ubiquity but perhaps with 158

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some consideration of complexity also. It is not uncommon for those considering the impact of new and emerging technologies to concentrate on technical developments and identify mainly first order effects. Often these developments are cast in different scenarios which show how different societies might emerge in response. This was the case with the investigation into transport infrastructure futures carried out by Foresight (2006). Recently several commentators have considered second and third order effects of electric autonomous vehicles as they become ubiquitous (Blute, 2017; Cameron, 2017; Evans, 2017; Hyatt, 2017; Smith, 2017). They note a number of possibilities as follows. Disruption of the car insurance business because autonomous vehicles will be much safer and people will hire these on an as needed basis rather than own them. Disruption of parking leading to loss of parking income to local authorities, a massive reduction in the need for parking spaces, and a change in the layout and organisation of cities resulting from the availability of parking spaces and buildings that are no longer needed. The need for emergency physicians and nurses might decrease due to there being many fewer accidents. Employment in the petroleum industry and in farming for biofuels would decrease as these materials would no longer be required. The idea of learning to drive and owning a car, as a rite of passage for young people, would disappear. All of this does require a complete change in the relationship many people have with their cars and the way they use them so these suggestions are highly speculative and some of these changes may meet resistance from a public used to owning cars. A feature of such discussions is that they are of necessity speculative but speculation is an essential part of developing technological perspective. It is important the students realise that their speculation cannot be definitive in the sense that they will lead to a ‘single right answer’, rather that they will identify different possibilities which may, or may not, come to pass. An effective way of enabling such speculation is through class discussion. Successful class discussion has a good effect on learning (Hattie, 2012) but orchestrating such discussion is demanding. Assuming the teacher is the initiator of the discussion, this may not always be the case, it is important that the topic(s) to be discussed are clarified and that the purpose of the discussion is made clear. The teacher needs to establish firm rules of conduct to which students conform e.g. who speaks, when they speak, the nature of comments, how students indicate they want to speak etc. Some thought needs to be given to how the discussion will be structured: questions given by the teacher followed by questions emerging from the discussion. The teacher will need to consider what if any stimulus to use in order to engage the students: contentious questions combined with audio clips, still images, and video clips, are all possibilities. The students need to know how they should record their discussions and how the talking in the various groups will be shared by presentation to the rest of the class. So, an activity that is complex to organise but one that, if successful, will surely play dividends in developing technological perspective. It is possible for the teacher to use these lessons regarding technological perspective as the springboard into lessons that develop technological capability i.e. designer159

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maker capability, capturing the essence of technological activity as intervention in the made and natural worlds. Having explored the use of AEVs to confront the wicked problem of sustainable transport the teacher might engage the class with a designing without making exercise in which they are tasked to develop design proposals to provide comfort and activity for passengers within an AEV. The design proposals might be presented in the form of annotated sketches, a PowerPoint presentation or as a video of 3D models with an accompanying audio commentary. Often in such activities the students work collaboratively and present their ideas to the rest of the class justifying them in terms of feasibility, the needs and wants that they meet, their acceptability to society and how they might be marketed (Barlex, 2012). A more concrete approach to developing technological capability would be to task the students with designing and making a model of a very simple AEV. The starting materials and components could be little more that timber strips, dowel and wheels, gear wheels of different sizes and small D.C. electric motors plus batteries. These would enable the construction of a model electric vehicle and to this could be added a PIC board that could be programmed to provide control instructions to the motors so that the model could move to some extent autonomously. The addition of sensors would add to this autonomy. A far cry from the AEVs that are already operating in some cities but an intriguing introduction for students none the less and one in which they can begin to wrestle with the technicalities of providing movement electrically and autonomously. This consideration of how a particular technology might play out initiated by the ‘tetrahedron’ approach and extended by the students wondering about the trajectories the technology might take has the potential to reveal to the teacher the extent to which students adopt a deterministic view of technology (what will happen will happen and neither individuals nor society can do anything about it) or a view that we can intervene through critique in the way individuals and society align themselves with the way the technology develops – its trajectory. It is worth teachers having this broad debate with students if we wish young people to develop a technological perspective that empowers them to want to make a difference to their society. It will be necessary for them to appreciate another of Kelly’s ideas, that all ‘new’ technologies have their antecedents in previous technologies and are influenced them. Such an appreciation will give young people a sense of the time taken by technologies in the past to emerge and develop and how this is decreasing in the present. If young people are to become adults who have a voice in determining the way technologies play out it is important that they realise the importance of early engagement with the trajectory as required by Hughes; idea of technological momentum. CONCLUSION

So what are we to make of Kevin Kelly’s views of technology? At first sight his main idea that the technium is the seventh kingdom of life on the planet may appear ridiculous but within this there are interesting and useful sub ideas that are worthy 160

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of curriculum consideration. The idea that future technologies will depend to a large extent on previous technologies and the idea of technological trajectories are both useful in that they allow learners to speculate on where technologies come from and how they might develop. The idea that humans can have very little control over the direction of technology will be repellent to those who reject the idea of autonomous technology. Thomas Hughes’ idea of technological momentum goes some way to dispelling the idea of technological autonomy and provides a counterpoint to Kelly’s view of technology being autonomous to a great degree. The idea that we might choose to align ourselves with the trajectories of particular technologies (or not) is interesting as it provides a means to develop technological perspective. The key questions for learners to consider are “We can but should we?” and “What might the consequences be if we do given the nature of possible trajectories?” This provides an interest volte-face for curriculum development. Designing and making is often seen as the heartland of technology education and a significant learning activity to develop technological capability with the development of technological perspective being a minor component of technology education. Here we have seen that learning activities designed to achieve technological perspective extended by Kelly’s ideas can in fact provide a springboard for learning activities concerned with technological capability. This approach could go some way to restoring a more equitable balance to these two purposes for technology education. REFERENCES Adams, D. (2002). The Salmon of doubt. New York, NY: Ballantine. Arthur, W. B. (2009). The nature of technology. London: Allen Lane. Barlex, D. (2003). Considering the impact of design & technology on society – The experience of the young foresight project. In J. Dakers & M. de Vries (Eds.), PATT-13 International Design & Technology Conference Proceedings (pp. 140–144). Glasgow: University of Glasgow. Barlex, D. (2012). The young foresight project: A UK Initiative in design creativity involving mentors from industry. In B. France & V. Compton (Eds.), Bringing communities together: Connecting learners with scientists or technologists. Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers. Blute, T. (2017). Preparing for the inevitable: The future of autonomous vehicles. Retrieved August 25, 2018, from https://medium.com/nga-future/preparing-for-the-inevitable-the-future-of-autonomousvehicles-e8e7af23b3e6 Bronowski, J. (1973). The ascent of man. London: BBC. Brundage, M. (2018). The malicious use of artificial intelligence: Forecasting. prevention, and mitigation. Retrieved June 28, 2018, from https://www.eff.org/files/2018/02/20/malicious_ai_report_final.pdf Cameron, N. (2017). Will robots take your job? Cambridge: Polity Press. Clark, L. (2017, September/October). The everywhere store: Amazon’s AI-powered mater plan to be the world’s biggest company wired magazine. London: Wired. Retrieved June 30, 2018, from http://www.wired.co.uk/article/amazon-alexa-jeff-bezos-worlds-biggest-company Crouter, R. (2010). Reinhold Niebuhr on politics, religion and the Christian faith. Oxford: OUP. Ellul, J. (1964). The technological society. New York, NY: Vintage. Evans, B. (2017). Cars and second order consequences. Retrieved August 25, 2018, from https://www.ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2017/3/20/cars-and-second-order-consequences Foresight. (2006). Intelligent infrastructure systems. Retrieved August 25, 2018, from https://www.gov.uk/ government/collections/intelligent-infrastructure-systems and https://www.gov.uk/government/

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D. BARLEX publications/intelligent-infrastructure-futures. Related curriculum material for secondary schools available at https://dandtfordandt.wordpress.com/resources/foresight-resources/ Frase, P. (2016). Four futures. London: Verso. Frey, C., & Osborne, M. (2013). The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to computerisation? Oxford: Oxford Martin School. Harari, Y. N. (2014). Homo sapiens. London: Harvill Secker. Hattie, J. (2012). Visible learning for teachers. Oxford: Routledge. Hughes, T. (1994). Technological momentum. In M. R. Smith & L. Marx (Eds.), Does technology drive history? Cambridge, MA: MIT. Hyatt, N. (2017). Autonomous driving is here and it’s going to change everything. Retrieved August 25, 2018, from https://www.recode.net/2017/4/19/15364608/autonomous-self-driving-cars-impactdisruption-society-mobility Kelly, K. (1994). Out of control. New York, NY: Perseus. Kelly, K. (2010). What technology wants. New York, NY: Penguin. Kelly, K. (2013). Cool tools. Northridge: Cool Tools Lab. Kelly, K. (2016). The inevitable. New York, NY: Penguin Books. MacKay, D. (2009). Sustainable energy without the hot air. Cambridge: UIT Cambridge. Retrieved June 28, 2018, from https://www.withouthotair.com/download.html O’Reilly, T. (2017). WTF what’s the future and why it’s up to us. London: Penguin. Smith, S. (2017). Third order effects of autonomous cars. Retrieved August 25, 2018, from https://blog.seanssmith.com/posts/autonomous-cars.html Von Hippel, E. (2015). Democratizing innovation. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Retrieved June 28, 2018, from http://web.mit.edu/evhippel/www/books/DI/DemocInn.pdf

Websites Production of electric vehicles. Retrieved June 30, 2018, from https://www.thechargingpoint.com/ magazine/articles/how-china-is-winning-the-electric-car-race/ Safety of autonomous vehicles. Retrieved June 28, 2018, from https://www.scientificamerican.com/ article/are-autonomous-cars-really-safer-than-human-drivers/

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12. DON IHDE Praxis Philosophies and Design and Technology Education

INTRODUCTION

Don Ihde, now in his seventh decade of academic life as teacher, philosopher and writer received his BA in 1956, M. Divinity in 1959, and PhD in 1964. Max van Manen references Ihde as a phenomenological philosopher in no lesser company than Husserl, Scheler, Sartre, Levinas, Foucault and Ricoeur (van Manen, 1990, p. 181). In his comprehensive overview of philosophy of technology, Carl Mitcham documents Ihde as the author of the first monograph on philosophy of technology in the English language (Technics and Praxis) and as someone who has ‘… produced the most extensive corpus devoted to the subject’ (Mitcham, 1994, p. 78). Albert Borgmann describes Ihde as ‘… among the most interesting and provocative contemporary American philosophers. His investigations of how we make sense of reality by means of technology are original and illuminating. He writes with flair and wit’ (Borgman, 2002). More recently, introducing a new (fourth) generation of phenomenological philosophers of technology, Ihde locates himself as third generation which Achterhuis (1999/2001) had described as ‘… less dystopian, more pragmatic, pro-democratic, and above all each had taken an “empirical turn” or a turn to the analyses of concrete technologies’ (Ihde, 2009a, p. x). Martin Heidegger, one of the 20th Century’s most influential thinkers radically refocussed attention on technology and how our lives and perceptions are shaped by it and Ihde’s work grew directly out of his reflections on Heidegger. As Cohen and Wartofsky (1979) say, Ihde, like Heidegger, ‘… puts technology in the middle of things …’. Also after Heidegger, as we will see, Ihde has worked to distance any philosophy of technology away from orthodox philosophical models or interpretations. However, there is a sombre codicil to appreciate regarding Heidegger whose role in relation to National Socialism in Germany from the 1930s remains controversial. Ihde, I believe, cares deeply about the matter, at times talking of Heidegger’s long or dark shadow and of his ‘ghost’ still present (Ihde, 2009a, p. xi). Care is central to Ihde’s work. Given Ihde’s prodigious output and wide contributions to philosophy of technology I have been necessarily selective in which work to use and which approach to take. Forty years after Technics and Praxis not only does Ihde’s work have something special to say but its resistance to orthodoxies and its creative influences remain both timely and vibrant.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_012

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PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT TO IHDE

For many decades a broad distinction has been made between ‘analytic’ (sometimes ‘Anglo-American’) and ‘Continental’ philosophy. While the distinction is problematic today (see e.g. Critchley, 2001) it can help us understand both Ihde’s philosophy and the ways his work can apply to Design and Technology Education. Other distinctions occur too; for example, Mitcham’s (1994) juxtaposition of an ‘engineering philosophy of technology’ with a ‘humanities philosophy of technology’; and, Snow’s (1959/1993) thesis on the cultural communication gulf between ‘the arts’ and ‘the sciences’. Broadly, the analytic ‘family’ of philosophies might embrace: explanation of the world through natural science; valuing theory over practice; analysing using logic to test propositions and concepts; precise use of language; and, using prescription; while the continental family seeks to: describe the world as it is humanly experienced; is praxis-focussed – on doing and action-in-the-world; and, maintains human agency as a key interest. Within and across such contrasts are familiar philosophical dualisms: mind-body; subject-object; materialism-idealism; theory-practice; and so on. While we might expect to find philosophy of technology in the analytic school because of technology’s historical associations with science, a group of praxis philosophies (as applied by Ihde) offer quite different fruits. Central to Ihde’s philosophical work are phenomenology and existentialism (see e.g. Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2009) and, in turn, these two come together with his applications of hermeneutics and pragmatism. A significant development from the interplay of these four has been Ihde’s leadership in shaping post-phenomenology. I’ll now explore such terms in more depth. Phenomenology is perhaps best described as a philosophical movement rather than a ‘school’ of philosophy. The movement defies close definition so it is for phenomenologists to articulate their respective stances. Founded by Edmund Husserl around 1900 it was originally foremost a theory of knowledge distinguishing between perceptual and abstract properties of objects and came to be understood as a new way of doing philosophy – the phenomenological method. Phenomenology can be considered the study of essences and involves deep reflection. It distinguishes between appearance and essence and is concerned with judgments, perceptions, emotions. While it probes the meaning or nature of phenomena (events or things), it does not produce empirical or theoretical observations. It offers accounts of our lives and worlds as we experience them through conscious acts. Husserls’s original formulation, viewed as transcendental phenomenology, called for description of what immediate experience tells us through a ‘reflective attentiveness’. To achieve this it is necessary to bracket, or suspend, any pre-conceptions, theories or already-held explanations about the phenomenon encountered; hence Husserl’s famous dictum: “To the things themselves”. He established the discourse around Lebenswelt, the lifeworld, the everyday world in which we live in our natural, takenfor-granted state; that is, not the theorised and already-explained, already-given world. Here, rationalism hinders the cause; it constitutes a form of bias. As Selinger 164

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says: ‘Phenomenologists … have always tried to circumvent doxic presuppositions that constrain how open one can be toward pragmatically encountered phenomena’ (Selinger, 2003, p. 12). Building on the idea of lifeworld as our locus of being in the world, Heidegger developed his existential phenomenology (which is not existentialism), a study of modes of ‘being-in-the-world’, that is, of human being. Here, the shift is from Husserl’s more psychological to an ontological engagement, the latter allowing for consideration of more peripheral aspects of one’s existence to be considered – things perhaps not immediately available to our senses but nonetheless aspects of our lifeworld. Other concepts relating to reflections on our lifeworlds are the background and the horizon; on which, more below. Collectively, lifeworld, background and horizon are engaged in the field of hermeneutics: the theory and practice of interpretation (see e.g. Gadamer, 1975/2004, 1977; Palmer, 1969; and, on D&T, Keirl, 2015b). Historically, hermeneutics was concerned with ascertaining the meaning of scriptures and in time the hermeneutic method was applied to any humanities-type creation. Questions around true meaning are derived through interpretation rather than from facts produced by ‘scientific’ analysis. So hermeneutic phenomenology ‘… is a descriptive … methodology because it wants to be attentive to how things appear, it wants to let things speak for themselves; it is an interpretive … methodology because it claims that there are no such things as un-interpreted phenomena’ (van Manen, 1990, p. 180). This brings us to the concepts of consciousness, intention and intentional acts. In phenomenology, the subject is the person perceiving while the object (thing, event, idea) is that which is perceived and the phenomenological method is grounded in intentionality. Husserl argued that when we are conscious of an object what is happening is precisely that – we are conscious of the object, so our consciousness cannot occur without an attendant object. In short, objects constitute consciousness. Rather than saying that we perceive reality through representations of objects ‘in the mind’, we can put things otherwise and say that our consciousness is always towards an object. Such an object, whether material or imagined, is the intentional object. Pragmatism is also a praxis philosophy concerned with our practical experiencing of the world. Ideas and concepts only become valid in the context of experience. In pragmatic philosophy, experience plays a central role in analysis because: ‘… efficacy in practical action … provides a standard for the determination of truth in the case of statements, rightness in the case of actions, and value in the case of appraisals’ (Rescher, 1995, p. 710). Putting it otherwise, Ihde cites Richard Rorty: ‘The pragmatists tell us it is the vocabulary of practice rather than theory, of action rather than contemplation, in which one can say something about truth …’ (Ihde, 2009b, p. 10). (For more on engagements of pragmatism with philosophy of technology see Hickman, 2001; Mitcham, 2006). This Ihdean-philosophical overview now turns to postphenomenology. ‘The central mode of investigation for postphenomenology is the application and analysis of the framework of concepts developed by Don Ihde, the founding figure of this 165

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perspective. Over a long and continuing career, Ihde has adapted insights from the phenomenological tradition for use in the concrete description of human relations to technology, and has developed his own account of humanity’s contemporary situation’ (Rosenberger & Verbeek, 2015, p. 2). Rosenberger (2009) suggests that postphenomenology departs from phenomenology in several respects. One is in its pragmatic underpinnings – it is explicitly non-foundational: ‘… rather than make claims about the nature of reality as phenomenologists have, postphenomenology focuses on relations between humans and the world’. Another is because ‘… the spotlight of analysis falls heavily on the technologies which mediate our experience of the world’ (Rosenberger, 2009, p. 66). He draws on Verbeek (2005) who describes how things are not neutral intermediaries but mediators that actively mediate our technological relations. (Instrument-as-mediator was a chapter in Ihde’s Technics and Praxis.) To the question ‘What is Postphenomenology?’ Ihde says: Postphenomenology is a modified, hybrid phenomenology. On the one side, it recognizes the role of pragmatism in the overcoming of early modern epistemology and metaphysics. It sees in classical pragmatism a way to avoid the problems and misunderstandings of phenomenology as a subjectivist philosophy, sometimes taken as antiscientific, locked into idealism or solipsism. Pragmatism has never been thought of this way, and I regard this as a positive feature. On the other side, it sees in the history of phenomenology a development of a rigorous style of analysis through the use of variational theory, the deeper phenomenological understanding of embodiment and human active bodily perception, and a dynamic understanding of a lifeworld as a fruitful enrichment of pragmatism. And, finally, with the emergence of the philosophy of technology, it finds a way to probe and analyse the role of technologies in social, personal, and cultural life that it undertakes by concrete – empirical – studies of technologies in the plural. This then, is a minimal outline of what constitutes postphenomenology. (Ihde, 2009b, p. 23) IHDE’S APPROACH AND KEY CONCEPTS

Turning to Ihde more closely we can elaborate some of the concepts and approaches he has developed since Technics and Praxis. Ihde only selectively addresses Technology (big ‘T’) thus avoiding a monolithic view – one that sees all technologies in some universal way, for example, as artefacts. He works with concrete examples of particular technologies using praxical philosophical methods to help us better understand our technologically mediated lifeworlds and the intimate and co-constituted multiple realities that exist amongst us, technologies, and society. In navigating the field of technology and its relations, Ihde engages many significant questions and debates, evidence indeed of the philosophical richness of our field. Thus: how like or unlike is life within our technosystem from previous 166

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forms of life that humans have taken up? What is the relationship between science and technology? Are technologies neutral? Do we accept or reject the concepts of social and technological determinism? Where is technology in the background or in the foreground? Is technology autonomous? Is there a dualism of naturalartificial? What are the dystopian/utopian interpretations of technology in different historical moments and locations? Does a technological fix favour utopianism (or dystopianism)? What do technological developments mean for our species? Is technology controllable? If so, under whose authority? Is control democratic or technocratic or totalitarian? Is control centralised or local? Does hi-tech colonialism disrupt other cultures and/or corrupt of tradition(al cultures)? As Ihde shows continuously, philosophy cannot provide formulaic answers to such questions, nor are there any simple answers. However, there are two things a philosophy can do: it can provide a perspective from which to view the phenomenon of technology, or better, the phenomenon of human-technology relations. Second, it can provide a framework or “paradigm” for understanding’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 9). In seeking perspective, he says, the right amount of distance is needed in order to see the uniqueness and the peculiarity of technological culture. Likening critical thinking to seeing, he notes that both what is at the tip of one’s nose and what is beyond the horizon ‘are simply not discernable’. He points out that taking static positions to view and interpret technologies is rarely completely helpful. Better, he says, that we see ourselves as navigators in oft-changing situations, rather than static observers, when considering our relations with technologies. Eschewing theory-practice distinctions associated with deeper mind-body dualisms, Ihde calls for a praxis approach capable of evaluating positively ‘...the phenomena of perception and embodiment’ (Ihde, 1979, p. xix) and, specifically: ‘Phenomenology with its rediscovery of the ‘primacy of perception’ and its emphasis upon concrete forms of objectification … becomes a praxis philosophy from which a ‘materialist’ interpretation of technology can arise’ (Ihde, 1979, p. xxv). In developing his position out of the ‘so-called Continental philosophies’, he cites existentialism, phenomenology, ‘some strains of pragmatism’, along with dialectical Marxian forms. Of these, he shows how the work of Marx articulated issues around alienation, modes of production, utopian/dystopian takes on technology, and the question of technologies’ (non-)neutrality. He also signals the way existentialism confronts human-technology relations in enlightened or unenlightened; optimistic or pessimistic; empowering or disempowering ways (Ihde, 1979, pp. xxiv–xxv). Technology-Science Relations Describing the need to find new ways of understanding technologies, Ihde noted ‘… a long previous silence on the part of most philosophical traditions …’ and advanced the praxis philosophies which ‘… broadly defined, are those which in some way make a theory of action primary. Theory of action precedes or grounds a theory of knowledge’ (1979, p. xv). This last point draws in the question of the 167

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relationship of philosophy of technology to philosophy of science. In counterposing analytic philosophy (derived from logical positivism) with phenomenology Ihde speculated that, in the origins of both, technology would have been of little interest having largely been considered ‘at best’ applied science (Ihde, 1979, p. xviii). As he notes, ‘To assume that technology is applied science, that engineering is dependent upon science, that technology is made possible by science – all revolves around a presumed primacy of ‘theory’ over ‘practice’, of ‘mind’ over ‘body’… adding that ‘… if there is a “paradigm” within the dominant tradition regarding a sciencetechnology relation, it is one which simply takes for granted the primacy of science’ (Ihde, 1979, p. xxii). Ihde (1979) notes that many ethical and political-social questions concerning technology are directed toward the effects of technologies. Having noted that ethics comes too late to technology (see also Keirl, 2009) and that, by tradition, technology is inadequately positioned as ‘a merely neutral instrument’ of science, Ihde took to contemplating a different interpretation of the science-technology relation. In drawing the analogy of the mind-body relation, he suggested that each relation could be inverted. That is, we might talk of a technology-science relation with (after Heidegger) technology as the origin or cause of science and a body-mind relation with body as likewise source of, or inspiration for, mind. In philosophical terms Ihde was developing a shift from an idealist primacy to a materialist primacy. In 1979, Cohen and Wartofsky speculated that ‘More than likely, inherited parochialisms and prejudices deriving from the dominant tradition in philosophy of science will continue to shape contemporary work. All the more reason for the anti-parochial and broadening impact of Ihde’s studies …’ (1979, p. xii). Philosophy of technology could never stand a reasonable chance of either clear identity or success as a discipline so long as it was tied to the apron strings of a philosophy of science any more, I would argue, than if it were tied to the apron strings of any other discipline (sociology comes to mind). However, there are clear links and parallels across disciplines and Ihde’s work, engaging with earlier Latour (1987) explored, en route to a philosophy of technology, ways of looking at both fields as well as promoting the concept of technoscience. Ihde (1991) argued that a principal shift in how science had been practised resulted from the development of increasingly sophisticated (technological) instrumentation. ‘I thus read the philosophy of science through its need for and neglect of a concern for technology’ (Ihde, 1991, p. xii). In developing his praxisperception model of the philosophies of both fields he shows how science is what it is because it became technologically embodied through instrumentation. Science cannot ‘be’ without technology. Ihde, here, was bringing phenomenology and ontology to interface the philosophies of technology and science. Furthermore, his work was shifting the dominant view of a science-driven technology toward one of technology-driven science, in fact one of technologically-embedded science. In his summary position, written almost three decades ago, Ihde comments; ‘Today’s Big Science is so closely tied to Big Technology that one can meaningfully speak of a 168

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single, complex phenomenon which is both scientific technology and technological science: technoscience’ (Ihde, 1991, p. 138). Twelve years later came the publication of the teasingly entitled Chasing Technoscience: Matrix for materiality (Ihde & Selinger, 2003). The text’s explorations of the material dimension of technoscience are enlightening for how they engage the thinking of four leading theorists and authors: Donna Haraway (cyborgs); Ihde (postphenomenology); Bruno Latour (actor-network theory); and, Andrew Pickering (the dance of agency and the mangle of practice). Technology and the Lifeworld In the early 1990s, two Ihde texts came in close succession. Prior to Instrumental Realism (1991) was Technology and the Lifeworld (1990) which offers us a useful overview of Ihde’s thinking and approach to the challenges facing philosophy of technology in the context of major global and existential concerns. Using the subtitle From garden to earth Ihde draws a thread from a non-technological Eden to an imaginative New Garden applying, as usual, rich and concrete examples. In setting out his philosophical stance he never betrays his sense of care for the planet, for people and for inter-cultural, inter-faith wellbeing. For Ihde, lifeworld ‘… locate(s) the inquiry within the traditions of phenomenology and its related hermeneutic origins’ while interpreting human experience with a concern for perception and bodily activity and his approach moves from a phenomenology of human-technology relations to a hermeneutics of technologycultural embeddedness (Ihde, 1990, p. 21). Ihde distinguishes perception in two senses – microperception which is immediate, and focussed bodily through the senses – and macroperception which he describes as cultural or hermeneutic. These two dimensions of perception ‘… belong equally to the lifeworld … are intertwined … There is no microperception (sensory-bodily) without its location within a field of macroperception and no macroperception without its microperceptual foci’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 29). Technology Relations and Our Lifeworld Ihde deepens our understandings of how we are technologically situated in our lifeworlds by articulating four sets of relations and the concept of horizontal phenomena. Embodiment relations. ‘If much of early modern science gained its new vision of the world through optical technologies, the process of embodiment itself is both much older and more pervasive. To embody one’s praxis through technologies is ultimately an existential relation with the world. It is something humans have always … done’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 72). Whether citing spectacles, a hearing aid or a blind person’s cane, Ihde calls such existential technological relations with the world embodiment relations. The technologies are adopted into one’s way of perceiving the 169

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world through such technologies. One’s perceptual and bodily sense is transformed in reflexive ways by engaging with them. Hermeneutic technics. Whereas, in his embodiment relations, the self and the technology work together in relation to the world, in his hermeneutic relations, the self is in relation to the technology-in-the-world combination. While the self in these respective scenarios is in differing perceptual positions, Ihde notes that ‘… in the broader sense, interpretation pervades both embodiment and hermeneutic action’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 93). He also notes that a possible confusion can arise from the fact that there is a double sense in which a technology can be used: ‘It may be used simultaneously both as something through which one experiences and as something to which one relates’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 93). (Spectacles offer an example where they are worn ‘to see’ yet also bring the ‘self’ into a special relationship with a focussedon technology-in-the-world). Alterity relations. Alterity is about otherness, about alternatives (as in alter ego, that is, a state of being that is radically different form one’s regular, conscious self.) In phenomenological terms there is distinction between the self and that which is not self, that is, that which is other; and there is an assumption of being able to detach oneself in order to attain alternative ways of ‘seeing’ a technology. Ihde characterises alterity relations as relations to or with a technology and notes how strange this must seem to anyone limited to ‘… the habits of objectivist accounts (in which) technologies as objects usually come first rather than last’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 97) and where ‘definition’ is sought solely by reference to an object’s characteristics and technical properties. Ihde works to avoid what he sees as a Heideggerian tendency to see the otherness of technology in negative terms. Rather he espouses ‘… an analysis of the positive or presentential senses in which humans relate to technologies … to technology-as-other’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 98). Background relations. Here, Ihde addresses not technologies in the foreground of one’s life and technology relations, immediate and to-hand but, rather, ‘… those which remain in the background or become a kind of near-technological environment itself’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 108). Setting aside discarded or no-longer-used technologies (loosely, junk) he gives examples of technologies designed to function in the background such as semi-automatic and automatic machines and systems. Another example he proffers is that of human-made forms of shelter (of whatever type may be found around the planet) which are not with us at all times but are part of what he calls a ‘field-like background’. While, individually, all such technologies are in the background, collectively they contribute to what Ihde calls our technologically textured world/s. He also usefully talks of the ‘absent presence’ of such technologies. Horizonal phenomena. ‘… (H)orizonal phenomena … mark the boundaries of a phenomenology’ Here, horizon, for Ihde, is a ‘… limit concept … beyond which

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the inquiry ceases to display its internal characteristics’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 112). As with the common understanding of the term, the horizon never comes nearer although he admits that ‘… the question of the extremities beyond which there is no recovery, where perhaps technologies cease to be technologies, remains intriguing’ (Ihde, 1990, pp. 112–113). He explains further that ‘… whether we refer to a kind of inner horizon (the fringes of embodiment) or the extremities of the external horizon (the ultimate form of texturing that a specific technological culture may take), the result is one of “atmosphere”’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 114). Examples of such atmospheres could be pessimism around nuclear threat or the optimism once prevalent that technology could save us from the great ills of the world such as war, famine, and disease. Thus, ultimately, Ihde brings us fully through a continuum from our tangible body relations with technologies to relations which are present, ‘out there’ and atmospherecreating. All such human-technology relations are shapers of our lifeworld/s. Equally, all such lifeworlds constitute our technologically textured cultures. Cultural Hermeneutics Ihde moves away from the immediate human experience of technologies to take a perspective on cultural hermeneutics, on how cultures embed technologies. He breaks these into the following inquiries: Technology transfer – technologies as cultural instruments. Here Ihde engages with how we (and cultures) both adopt technologies and adapt to them in new ways – ways that alter our behaviours and cultural norms. Obvious illustrations come from ancient tribal and Aboriginal cultures encountering technologies from colonising or invasive other cultures (e.g. Diamond, 1998) but, as Ihde cautions, the adaptation of a transferred technology ‘… depends upon its being able to fit into an extant praxis. But even when it is adapted, the context of significations may differ quite radically relative to the sedimented type of praxis in the recipient culture’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 127). In other words, adoptions and adaptations are never assuredly consistent or known (Ihde, 2006; viz Nixon, 1996; Tenner, 1997). Neocolonialism as the failure of transfer. Whilst there are issues around technology transfer in a cultural-instrumental sense, Ihde also points to the kind of resistances that can be encountered regarding the associated infrastructure necessary for successful transfer to occur. It is often not simply a matter of embedding ‘the technology’ but culturally acceptable changes are needed to ways of working, being, maintaining, and so on. Supportive public awareness and education systems are needed too. If a public is under-educated about the related consequences then ethical arguments arise around the agendas of those committing the transfer. While more technicians may be needed to support the introduction of a particular technology, there is also at play

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an ethically problematic argument around whether education might be expected to enculturate a populace towards acceptance of the incoming technology. “Controlling” technology. While Ihde argues that the idea of ‘controlling’ technology is misconceived, he urges that the debates around any such control should not be dismissed and signals the ‘serious politics surrounding technological development’, pointing to the ethics of matters too. ‘The type and degree of technology assessment currently practiced is clearly too minimal and primitive – as well as too controlled by those who need to be “controlled”’. Regarding the quantitative thinking applied to risk assessment, he argues: ‘The very agencies whose practices must be assessed insist that the terms of assessment be technocratic in form. In turn, the style of assessment becomes modelled upon the most quantitative of ethical and political theory – some variation of utilitarianism’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 143). He suggests that the question of controlling technologies be re-framed because it ‘… either assumes that technologies are “merely” instrumental and thus implicitly neutral, or it assumes that technologies are fully determinative and uncontrollable. Both extremities … miss the point of the human-technology and the culturetechnology relativities that would reconstitute the debate’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 140). As he says, even if the analogous question were put: ‘Can cultures be controlled?’ the degree of complexity to be considered reveals how a positive answer becomes nigh impossible. He neatly adds: ‘There is even good reason to see the twentiethcentury concern for “control” of technology as the contemporary equivalent of the nineteenth-century obsession with the “control” of nature. Neither question, in my estimation, is posed properly’ (Ihde, 1990, p. 140). Technology-culture embeddedness as multistable. At one point of developing his lifeworld take on technologies, Ihde summarises his position thus: Negatively, I have argued that there is no single or unified trajectory to “Technology” (with the capital “T”), that technologies … are not “autonomous”, and that the very framing of the question of “control” is put wrongly. Positively I have argued that technologies are non-neutral and essentially, but structurally, ambiguous … (T)echnologies transform experience and its variations … (and) that at the complex level of a cultural hermeneutics, technologies may be variantly embedded …. (Ihde, 1990, p. 144) He draws explicitly on the phenomenology of perception work of Merleau-Ponty (1945/1965) and introduces the term multistability. Ihde shows how common examples of psychologies of perception are essentially bi-stable (the Necker cube is a favourite – it can be perceived ‘this way or that’). However, as with the phenomenological method in general, ‘Phenomenology goes much further in the analysis of perceptual multistability. Its aim is to examine the variations exhaustively to show structural or invariant features. With the search of possibility-structures in

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mind, such an analysis further deconstructs such multistable objects’ (‘object’ here being the object of phenomenological attention) (Ihde, 1990, p. 144). Further Iterations Finally, I share three Ihdean iterations which further reflect his postphenomenology. The designer fallacy. Ihde also uses the multistability concept to resist ideas of technological, or social, determinism. In a succinct and useful contribution to discussions of design-as-intention he presents ‘The Designer Fallacy’ (Ihde, 2006, p. 121) drawing on a notion espoused a century earlier regarding literature and much of the arts in general – that of the ‘intentional fallacy’. The thinking was that we would understand meanings of texts and artworks if we could uncover an author’s or artist’s intentions. Ihde identifies and explores two ‘interstices in a three-part relation’. These spaces or in-betweens are, first that between designer-inventor and materiality and, second, between the artefact and user. In the first there is no simple control by designer over material – the situation is exploratory, iterative and interactive – and in the second, the designer has even less control and the user becomes the more important. As he says: ‘The indeterminacy here is multistable in terms of the possible range of uses fantasized or actualized … Both the designermateriality and the artefact-user relations are complex and multistable … (and) … are not of any simple “deterministic” pattern’ (Ihde, 2006, p. 130). Bodies in technology (Ihde, 2002). At the turn of the 21st Century emergent technologies were not only throwing up new possibilities of empowerment but they were giving rise to new existential reflections and research possibilities across disciplines. Ihde articulates how ‘(w)e are our body in the sense in which phenomenology understands our motile, perceptual, and emotive being-in-theworld’ but we are also bodies in socially and culturally constructed ways. Traversing these two ‘dimensions’ is the technological dimension – Ihde’s embodiment relation – how we experience our worlds through technologies. Witnessing the convergence of virtual, simulation and computer-modelled technologies in media, medicine and science more generally, he concludes thus: ‘We are our bodies – but in that very basic notion one also discovers that our bodies have an amazing plasticity and polymorphism that is often brought out precisely in our relations with technologies. We are bodies in technologies’ (Ihde, 2002, p. 138). Towards posthumanity? In his foreword to the Olsen, Selinger, and Riis (2009) text, Ihde writes of new and emergent issues and arguments. He notes how the ‘posts’ of postphenomenology, posthumanism and postmodernism are ‘all on stage’ and he asks: ‘From the range of fashionable enhancement to virtual species manipulation, where do our nano-, bio-, and medical technologies lead?’ (Ihde, 2009, p. xi). As we once again face unknown futures which will assuredly be technological, to say that 173

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we are becoming, or are already, ‘bodies in technologies’ is to invoke discussion of the trans- or post-human (see Bostrom, 2009). In typical ubiquitous style, Ihde had already shaken the tree by turning the question back on itself in his essay: ‘Of which human are we post?’ (Ihde, 2008). Drawing on Francis Bacon’s notion of four idols to be avoided as a (then) new era was dawning, Ihde offers his own four idols to be avoided when discussing human, posthuman and transhuman issues: • the idol of Paradise (technofantasies) • the idol of Intelligent Design (design arrogance) • the idol of the Cyborg (hybridising ourselves with machine and animal combinations) • the idol of Prediction (gambling on futures) ‘I suggest here, that only if humans are stupid enough to end up worshipping the very idols they create, could the fantasized replacement of humans by machines take place. Rather, the changing technologies with which we interact, form collectives, (or) experience the dances of agencies, do forecast vastly changed conditions of work and play and even love, but it is not them versus us’ (Ihde, 2008, pp. 56–57). What, then, can education make of Ihde’s work and his ways of looking at our technological being? BRINGING IHDE TO TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION

My own curriculum inquiry is driven by one question: ‘Why is it … when the phenomenon of technology constitutes such a pervasive and hegemonic part of life on the planet, that it is so ill-addressed in education?’ (Keirl, 2007, p. 77). How can we help students really see and understand the roles technologies play in their lives? That Ihde has much to offer Design and Technology (D&T) Education I have absolutely no doubt. How to realise this raises two broad questions. First, to what extent is D&T willing to adopt and adapt phenomenological approaches into its way of being? Second, in what ways is it inhibited from doing so? To answer these we have both to take stock of where we are now and to assess our potential to adopt and adapt. Such assessments are necessarily philosophical, political, professional, and pedagogical. Philosophically, ‘Western-style’ education systems are historically grounded in the analytic/logical-positivist mode, and despite many countries practising alternative religio-philosophical traditions (Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism), there is an increasingly ‘Western’ influence across the globe whereby knowledge is seen as readily identifiable, quantifiable, teachable, and assessable. The epistemological frame is prescriptive and praxis-type philosophical approaches are peripheral to the main game. Despite Deweyan pragmatism (e.g. Dewey, 1916/1966), nascent AngloAmerican philosophy of education from the 1960s onwards was strongly analytic (witness Phenix’s (1964) Realms of Meaning or Hirst’s (1974) Forms of Knowledge and their inability to accommodate anything like D&T other than as, perhaps, craft or applied science). Today, matters are compounded politically by the Organisation 174

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for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) thinly-veiled agenda on education for capitalism by competitive assessment regimes in the valorised three ‘subjects’ of first language (at a functional level), mathematics and science. (Keirl, 2015a) Notable by their absence are the very subjects which resist positivist assessment – we might call them the humanities, which might include D&T. This said, for some decades now there have been moves towards at post-modern curricular innovation and these have opened up some curriculum controversies which, I have argued, apply to D&T (Keirl, 2012). Apart from any philosophical differences, such controversies emanate from critiques of the very purposes of education, that is, they are political and engage questions of the role of education for democracy; education’s relationship with economies; the preparation of young people for active citizenship; and so on. D&T finds itself caught up in all such matters to some degree or other (Keirl, 2006) and it can choose to be marginalised, be a passive onlooker, or it can be a mainstream player in the curriculum game. There is a spectrum we can consider that runs from indoctrination, to enculturation, to training, to education. What differentiates these are the degrees of critical thinking, capacity for autonomy, reflection and responsibility achieved (or not), that is, they are the kinds of attributes that can create fulfilled individuals and strong, participatory democracy. D&T in many of its orthodox guises has undoubtedly operated in a positivist mode of utilitarian skilling, training and industry preparation. Ironically, D&T is potentially an educationally exciting beast that remains trapped in an educational straitjacket. To see where Ihde and (post)phenomenology comes in we turn to how he so cogently brings the technological world out of the background. His interrogations of technologies are such that we begin to ‘see’ them in their fullness far more than as mere object or thing (in the utilitarian sense). This at once provides opportunities for students to learn more fully about technologies’ multiple and diverse society-, culture- and existence-shaping roles. By adopting/adapting Ihde’s phenomenological approach to human-technology-world relations, by considering technologies as key to lifeworlds, and by anticipating his idols, D&T can make curricular adjustments to enrich its offering and value to students. How then can a holistic conceptualisation of Ihde’s technological world be brought to the classroom? Here, the concept of technological literacy arises. In simple terms, three possibilities occur: (a) D&T remains a subject of utility and training while art, science and social studies attempt to take on other aspects of technology ‘education’ (fragmented approach); (b) a whole-school technological literacy approach is taken where every teacher’s responsibility is towards a programme rich enough to articulate Ihde’s holism; or, (c) a comprehensive approach which articulates both (a) and (b). Clearly, this isn’t going to happen overnight but Ihde would be the first to examine every possible option and invert the challenges to create opportunities. So far as curriculum and pedagogy are concerned there are some immediate advantages. First, we are currently free from the OECD-style testing regimes and thus have some, relative curriculum freedom. Second, design is a magnificent educational enabler. Like 175

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phenomenology it has no prescriptive strategies or ‘right’ answers; it can allow for suspension of judgment (bracketing as ‘what if’) to amplify possibilities; and, it sharpens intellectual capacities for seeing and being. Third, competing complex values systems and relations can be foregrounded to facilitate democratic discussion of technological presences and possibilities. Fourth, the currently pernicious STEM agenda of positivist instrumentalism can have its weak epistemological basis challenged. Fifth, we can erode the orthodoxies of technology as objects; as hi-tech; as applied science; and, as inevitable (Keirl, 2006). Sixth, we can articulate a publicly defensible form of D&T education that resists popular stereotyping – of either the subject or technologies-in-theworld. Finally, D&T can be, if not a curriculum leader, then at least a serious and central curriculum player – not at the horizon of matters. In all such ways D&T can make rich contributions to the education of each student and to the wellbeing of democratic life. Perhaps the simplest starting point I could advocate is that of, first, seeing education itself as a technology (in that it is a human-designed-and-made entity) and, second, applying Ihde’s (post) phenomenological methods to it to see what emerges. Ihde would not see as a crisis all the major problems facing us globally today. Nor would he ever neglect them. His way is to at all times journey with curiosity and optimism. Phenomenology can help all D&T players see and be in new ways because it is a method of looking otherwise at problematic phenomena which humans have created and which are now challenging existences locally and globally. If it has taken forty years of Ihde’s work to move phenomenology centre-stage of Technology’s drama, then we can either say ‘there’s no point because we can’t wait that long for education to change’ or we can start now in our pedagogy, school policy making, community actions and political arrangements. If lived experience is what counts for persons’, for cultures’ and for societies’ wellbeing then the praxis philosophies time must have come for education. The phenomenological act, properly conducted, is an educational act. If the praxis philosophies are experientially focussed then where better to articulate them than through the doing field of enlightened D&T education (I see doing in multiple ways here – critiquing, designing, making, creating). As van Manen says: ‘Phenomenology demands of us re-learning to look at the world as we meet it in immediate experience’ (1990, p. 184) and he reports that Merleau-Ponty describes the work of phenomenology as ‘painstaking’. ‘Making’ the invisible visible is no small task but if our relations with each other and with the planet matter then we must find ways to educate about technologies’ intimate roles in our lifeworlds. Ihde offers us rich possibilities. Is Design and Technology Education up to the challenge? REFERENCES Borgmann, A. (2002). ‘Sleevenote’ to Ihde, D. Bodies in technology. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Critchley, S. (2001). Continental philosophy: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dewey, J. (1916/1966). Democracy and education: An introduction to the philosophy of education. New York, NY: Free Press.

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DON IHDE Diamond, J. (1998). Guns, germs and steel: A short history of everybody for the last 13000 years. London: Vintage. Dreyfus, H. L., & Wrathall, M. A. (Eds.). (2009). A Companion to phenomenology and existentialism. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. Gadamer, H.-G. (1975/2004). Truth and method (J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, Trans.). London: Continuum. Gadamer, H.-G. (1977). Philosophical hermeneutics (D. E. Linge, Trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Hickman, L. A. (2001). Philosophical tools for technological culture: Putting pragmatism to work. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Hirst, P. (1974). Knowledge and the curriculum. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ihde, D. (1979). Technics and praxis. Dordrecht: Reidel. Ihde, D. (1983). Existential technics. Albany, NY: State University of New York. Ihde, D. (1990). Technology and the lifeworld: From garden to earth. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Ihde, D. (1991). Instrumental realism: The interface between philosophy of science and philosophy of technology. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Ihde, D. (1993). Philosophy of technology: An introduction. New York, NY: Paragon House. Ihde, D. (1993). Postphenomenology: Essays in the postmodern context. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Ihde, D. (2002). Bodies in technology. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Ihde, D. (2003). Introduction part one. In D. Ihde & E. Selinger (Eds.), Chasing technoscience: Matrix for materiality (pp. 1–7). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Ihde, D. (2006). The designer fallacy and technological imagination. In J. R. Dakers (Ed.), Defining technological literacy: Towards an epistemological framework (pp. 121–131). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ihde, D. (2008). Of which human are we post? In D. Ihde (Ed.), Ironic technics (pp. 43–57). Copenhagen: Vince Inc. Retrieved from http://www.vince-inc.com Ihde, D. (2009a). Foreword. In J. K. B. Olsen, E. Selinger, & S. Riis (Eds.), New waves in philosophy of technology (pp. viii–xiii). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ihde, D. (2009b). What is postphenomenology? In D. Ihde (Ed.), Postphenomenology and technoscience: The peking university lectures (pp. 5–23). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Ihde, D., & Selinger, E. (Eds.). (2003). Chasing technoscience: Matrix for materiality. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Keirl, S. (2006). Ethical technological literacy as democratic curriculum keystone. In J. R. Dakers (Ed.), Defining technological literacy: Towards an epistemological framework (pp. 81–102). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Keirl, S. (2007). ‘Within-it/without-it’ and the search for ethical technological literacy. Curriculum Perspectives, 27(3), 77–80. Keirl, S. (2009). Seeing technology through five phases: A theoretical framing to articulate holism, ethics and critique in, and for, technological literacy. Design and Technology Education: An International Journal, 14(3), 37–46. Retrieved from http://jil.lboro.ac.uk/ojs/index.php/DATE/article/ view/1274/1239 Keirl, S. (2012, June 26–30). Technology education as “controversy celebrated” in the cause of democratic education. In T. Ginner, J. Hallström, & M. Hulten (Eds.), Technology education in the 21st century: Proceedings of the PATT 26 conference (pp. 239–246). Stockholm, Sweden: Linköping Electronic Conference Proceedings No 73, Linköping University. Retrieved from http://www.ep.liu.se/ecp/073/ 028/ecp12073028.pdf Keirl, S. (2015a). Against neoliberalism; for sustainable-democratic curriculum; through design and technology education. In K. Stables & S. Keirl (Eds.), Environment, ethics and cultures: Design and technology education’s contribution to sustainable global futures (pp. 153–174). Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers. Keirl, S. (2015b). ‘Seeing’ and ‘interpreting’ the human-technology phenomenon. In P. J. Williams, A. Jones, & C. Buntting (Eds.), The future of technology education (pp. 13–34). Dordrecht: Springer.

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S. KEIRL Latour, B. (1987). Science in action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/1965). Phenomenology of perception (C. Smith, Trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Mitcham, C. (1994). Thinking through technology: The path between engineering and philosophy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Mitcham, C. (2006). From phenomenology to pragmatism: Using technology as an instrument. In E. Selinger (Ed.), Postphenomenology: A critical companion to Ihde (pp. 21–33). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Nixon, M. (1996). Dataveillance. In 21.C Scanning the Future, #2, 30–36. Olsen, J. K. B., Selinger, E., & Riis, S. (Eds.). (2009). New waves in philosophy of technology. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Olsen-Friis, J. K. B., & Crease, R. (2015). Technoscience and postphenomenology: The Manhattan papers. Lanham: Lexington Books. Palmer, R. E. (1969). Hermeneutics: Interpretation theory in Schleiermacher, Dithey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Phenix, P. H. (1964). Realms of meaning: A philosophy of the curriculum for general education. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. Rescher, N. (1995). Pragmatism. In T. Honderich (Ed.), The oxford companion to philosophy (pp. 710–713). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rosenberger, R. (2009). Quick-freezing philosophy: An analysis of imaging technologies in neurobiology. In J. K. B. Olsen, E. Selinger, & S. Riis (Eds.), New waves in philosophy of technology (pp. 65–82). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Rosenberger, R., & Verbeek, P.-P. (Eds.). (2015). Postphenomenological investigations: Essays on human-technology relations. London: Lexington Books. Selinger, E. (2003). Introduction part two. In D. Ihde & E. Selinger (Eds.), Chasing technoscience: Matrix for materiality (pp. 7–12). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Selinger, E. (Ed.). (2006). Postphenomenology: A critical companion to Ihde. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Snow, C. P. (1959/1993). The two cultures. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Tenner, E. (1997). Why things bite back: Technology and the revenge of unintended consequences. New York, NY: Vintage. van Manen, M. (1990). Researching lived experience: Human science for an action sensitive pedagogy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Verbeek, P.-P. (2005). What things do: Philosophical reflections on technology, agency, and design. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

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13. ALBERT BORGMANN The Device Paradigm

We owe young people an understanding of the moral and cultural quality of the world they are about to enter. There is much excellent schooling in modern liberal democracies around the world. We train and educate our students well. But although the skills we teach them help them to succeed, the education we give them in the arts, the letters, and the sciences leaves them unprepared for a society that values their skills, but is indifferent to their education and finally suffocates it. If we can teach our students technological literacy, we not only enrich their education, we also enable them to see what obstacles and opportunities they face in trying to remain educated persons once they have left school and for the rest of their lives. – Borgmann (2014, p. ix) INTRODUCTION

One of the important roles of philosophy of technology is to critique the role of technology in contemporary culture and society. The term critique differs from critical and so does not necessarily mean giving a negative judgment about issues relating to technology, although a significant number of philosophers of technology do hold highly dystopian views about the relationship between society and technology. Philosophers such as Heidegger, Ellul and Illich hold prominent positions in this respect. They are paralleled in literature by writers such as Orwell, Huxley and Butler, who are also considered to hold dystopian views about future cultures impacted by technology. Others take a more balanced view. Don Ihde (see Chapter 12) for example believes that “technologies can do very bad things, but they can also do very good things” (Ihde, 2003, p. 117). Albert Borgmann, however is considered by many to lean towards a ‘can do very bad things’ perspective, largely because he remains under the influence of Heidegger. The work of Borgmann is certainly critical in the sense that he expresses serious concerns about the relationship between humans and technology. Consequently, his contribution to the philosophy of technology, whilst dystopian, offers an interesting balance against those philosophers who hold a more utopian perspective. From a technology education perspective, this in turn offers a more balanced and thus, enhanced approach to the development of technological literacy. A technologically

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_013

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literate society is more able to make informed decisions as to whether technologies, as suggested by Ihde above, can do very bad things, or do very good things. An informed awareness of the impact technological devices have on our engagement with reality, which is Borgmann’s focus, plays a significant and important role in this respect. ALBERT BORGMANN AND HIS REFLECTIONS OF THE DEVICE PARADIGM

Borgmann’s Background Albert Borgmann is a philosopher of the Continental tradition in the philosophy of technology. Two of his main sources of inspiration are the philosophers Martin Heidegger and John Rawls. As Borgmann himself puts it; “Heidegger had shown me the problem that needed attention. Rawls set the standard for solving it” (Borgmann, 1993, p. 158). It seems that Rawls acted as his model for how to do philosophy, which is a little odd, given that Rawls’ domain is political philosophy and this certainly has not become Borgmann’s domain. Rawls’ focus was on the theory of justice, and that, too, is not a primary concern for Borgmann. Unlike the writing of Heidegger, which is very difficult and idiosyncratic, Borgmann admired Rawls for his more accessible style of writing, his ability to put together a good narrative, something that Borgmann was able to emulate. Borgmann also liked Rawls’ positive attitude towards the natural sciences. When it comes, however, to the content of his philosophical reflections, Borgmann is much more oriented towards the work of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was concerned about the way technology reveals the way that we see the reality of the world as being simply a resource, or in Heideggerian terms; standing reserve. For Heidegger, our view on the reality of the world has become so distorted that when we see a tree for example, we are less inclined to comprehend it as natural object in its own right. Rather, our thoughts orientate towards its potential utility, in other words, how we can exploit it in order to serve our needs: how many planks of wood can we make out of it? According to Heidegger we will never be able to escape from this dystopic way of perceiving reality. The only thing we can do, for Heidegger, is abstain from cutting down every last tree to make yet even more planks of wood. We must find ways to stop ravishing the natural world in the interests of technological advancement. In his last interview with the German newspaper Der Spiegel, Nr. 23, in 1976, Heidegger, who was so disillusioned with modern technologies’ relentless exploitation of nature, claimed that “Only a god can save us”. Given that in his early life, Heidegger was a catholic seminarian and later, became a non-practicing catholic, eventually erring towards atheism, this tends to suggest that he thought: nothing can save us. The philosophy of Borgmann resonates strongly with Heidegger’s perspective on the relationship between human beings and the natural world. However, Borgmann’s philosophy, as we will discuss later, offers a different conceptualization to that proffered by Heidegger. 180

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Borgmann grew up in Germany and moved to the USA in 1958 in order to study philosophy. In 1961 he returned to Munich in Germany to complete his PhD. Upon completion in 1964, he returned once more to the USA, where he has resided to this day. In 1970 he was appointed to the University of Montana, and is now Regents professor emeritus of philosophy. His best known work is his book entitled Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A Philosophical inquiry, published in 1984. Writing in 1996, Borgmann wrote a paper entitled Technology and the Crisis of Contemporary Culture in which he provided a new summary of his thinking (Borgmann, 1996). Another important publication was the book Crossing the Post-Modern Divide, which came out in 1992, in which he characterizes contemporary life as hyperreal and hyperactive. In this book he explicitly blames modernity, hence modern technological development, for being responsible for the break-up of society and community spirit. Later, he took a specific interest in applying his ideas to information technology, which led to a third important book, Holding on to Reality: The Nature of Information at the Turn of the Millennium (1999). Borgmann did not change many of his ideas in the course of his career, but kept exploring new domains in which to apply them. The core of Borgmann’s philosophical “interpretations of technology and technological culture is rich and inspired and offers a complete research program for the philosophy of technology that can be fruitfully explored” (Tijmes, 2001, p. 33). The Device Paradigm We are all surrounded by devices, day and night. We may think that they are neutral objects, but they are not. Whilst, as another philosopher of technology, Don Ihde suggested, they can be used for good or for bad, that perspective alone, which is clearly subjective, highlights the argument that they are not neutral but are subject to various interpretations. They have an influence upon us and persuade us, sometimes overtly, sometimes subliminally, to make choices that we perhaps would not have made, had these devices not been ready to hand and at our disposal. The mobile phone in my pocket invites me to use it when it vibrates or I hear it buzzing. Even when it does not summon me to answer, the mere awareness that I have it ready to hand, invites me, almost calls upon me to use it. This effect is evidenced by how ubiquitous the mobile phone has become. We see it being used as people walk the streets, sit in restaurants or on public transport systems. For Borgmann, before the rise of modernity and the ubiquity of the mobile device, people would focus on more communicative practices which Borgmann termed, focal practices. They would be much more aware of each others’ immediate presence as well as the surrounding environment. They would engage in conversation with each other in restaurants or on the train. But now, almost everyone seems to be pre-occupied with their mobile device, totally focused on the contents of the little screen. The sort of conversation that can be overheard in trains or buses is usually minimal and frequently 181

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punctuated by the regular checking for emails, texts or social media. Often the phone is not used because there is important information to be received or passed on, but merely as an instrument for killing time. The same can be said for social media such as sms’ and WhatsApp: much of the messages that are sent appear to be superficial. The shallowness of our social media use can also be illustrated by reflecting on the concept of ‘friends’ in Facebook. In ‘offline life’, it takes time and some degree of effort to make real friends. One needs to develop trust and discover mutual interests. In Facebook, acquiring a hundred friends can be done in days and without knowing anything about them. Likewise, they can be ‘unfriended’ with a simple mouse click. What kind of ‘friendship’ can that be? What sense is there in having friends that cost nothing, but also do not yield anything? Yes, having many friends in Facebook has become a sort of status symbol and is highly valued, particularly by the young. Borgmann sees this as a loss of what he calls ‘engagement’: the contact between myself and my Facebook ‘friends’ takes no real effort and keeps them at a comfortable distance. Dis-engaged friendship is a characteristic of this Facebook component. Borgmann identifies many more of these disengaged contacts with reality (Borgmann, 1984). Instead of preparing a meal from basic ingredients, we go to the supermarket, buy a standardized microwave oven meal, put it in the microwave device and push a button. Little effort is required, the result is predictable and does not, usually, produce a healthy and satisfying meal. Instead of playing a musical instrument, we put a CD device into the player device and earplug devices in our ears. Little effort is required and the result is again predictable and unchanging. Attending a live concert, on the other hand, is a unique event shared with others and subject to variation. Instead of playing a sport ourselves, we sit down before the television and watch others doing it. Again, little effort is required and while the result may not be entirely predictable, neither is there the excitement of participating in the sport nor the possibility of perhaps, scoring a goal oneself. We do not use the term ‘couch potato’ for when we sit passively glued to our television devices for nothing. All this results in our many modern technological devices providing a commodity that requires almost no physical or cerebral activity on our part. Our meals are pre-prepared and cooked at the touch of a button, television takes up considerable hours of our time as we watch pre-made shows designed to entertain us. Our reality is pre-fabricated for us by others. Reality, thus, becomes hyperreal. It disengages us from having any meaningful and tactile relationship with the world. This phenomenon is so omnipresent that Borgmann uses the term ‘commodification’ to indicate what devices do with activities that used to demand effort and yielded deep experiences of happiness and accomplishment (Borgmann, 2010). What Facebook does is commodify friendship. What the microwave oven does, is commodify food and eating. What the CD player does is commodify music. It is a real transformation that takes place, because the activity is not remotely the same as it was prior to modernity. It has become a shallow experience, with unification as its trademark. The hamburger tastes the same in all McDonald restaurants, whether in the USA, China, South-Africa or Mexico. 182

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Each time you hear the Birmingham City Symphony Orchestra perform Mahler’s second symphony under the baton of Simon Rattle, on a CD device, it sounds exactly the same, unlike hearing it live at a concert. In Borgmann’s terms: machine pleasure is commodified pleasure (Borgmann, 2011). This disengagement goes hand in hand with the question of purpose and sense disappearing from the foreground into the background. This can be illustrated by an Internet provider’s advertisement that could be seen in bus shelters and train platforms in the Netherlands for months. It has the following text (translated from Dutch obviously): “I am going to pull everything from the Internet. Because I can”. Apart from the fact that the ambition suggested downloading every bit of information that exists on the Internet, which sounds like a pretty hopeless endeavour, it is the last part of the advertisement that is most revealing: the only reason for doing this, is that it is now available for me through the device of the internet, not necessarily because I need the information but, rather, because it is directly available to me. Commodification directs our attention away from the question of sense and purpose. It is available, and for that reason I will use it. Why take the car in glorious weather to go to the shop that is just around the corner? Because it stands in front of the house as standing reserve, ready to hand, always ready and willing to be used by me. In this sense, Borgmann considers the power of the device as retrograde: if we indulge it, will it be sufficient to attenuate our substance greatly. It has already begun to transform the social fabric, our commerce with reality, and the sense we have of our place in the world. At length it will lead to a disconnected, disembodied, and disorientated sort of life. (ibid., 1992, p. 108) Yet another effect of disengagement that the device paradigm highlights, Borgmann suggests, is that I do not need to know much about the way a device works in order to use it. How my mobile phone, my CD-player or my car actually works, is of no real concern to me. Consequently, I do not even try, nor indeed even want, to understand the workings of the device. It is the classic black box syndrome: only the input and output are of relevance to the consumer. Borrowing from Heidegger, it is only when the device breaks down that it is is actually revealed. It is only when my television breaks down for example, that I become aware that the program I was previously enjoying, whilst relaxing in my armchair with a glass of wine, is suddenly no longer available to me. I am now aware of the device called a television, by virtue of the fact that it no longer functions as it should, My passive disengagement with the world has rendered me helpless as I shake and bump devices associated with the television in an attempt to restore my previous tranquility. My state of anxiety becomes increasingly heightened as my desperate attempts to restore my television to working order diminish. I begin to realise that my only recourse is to find an expert who has the skill-set to diagnose the problem and prescribe a way to rectify it. Or perhaps, the prescription will be that it is not repairable and needs to be replaced. Given my lack of knowledge I am, therefore, totally dependent upon the counsel offered to me by the experts, as well as my ability to pay for the repair/renewal. This 183

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is why becoming technologically literate is inextricably linked to social concern. It is when we realise that we have lost the ability to master the technology, rather than be mastered by it, that enables us to be more and more able to critique technology. This, however, requires a little effort. In contrast to Heidegger, who claimed that the escape could be provided by a god – of which he believed there was none – Borgmann suggests a way to escape the disconnected, disembodied, and disorientated way of life made manifest by the device paradigm, albeit in a limited way. This escape is what he calls: ‘focal things’ and ‘focal practices’. In this, he borrows from the Latin focus which translates to hearth or fireplace in English. Thus a stove was used to furnish more than mere warmth. It was a focus, a hearth, a place that gathered the work and leisure of a family and gave the house a center. Its coldness marked the morning, and the spreading of its warmth marked the beginning of the day. It assigned to various family members tasks that defined their places in the household … It provided the entire family a regular and bodily engagement with the rhythm of the seasons that was woven together with the threat of cold and the solace of warmth, the smell of wood smoke, the exertion of sawing and carrying, the teaching of skills, and the fidelity to daily tasks … Physical engagement is not simply physical contact but the experience of the world through the manifold sensibility of the body. That sensibility is sharpened and strengthened in skill. Skill is intensive and refined world engagement. (ibid., 1984, pp. 41–42) These focal things or practices constitute activities that force us to focus our attention on reality and thus get back the intense experience that we had before submitting ourselves to the evermore passive utility of modern devices. Examples for this can easily be derived from the examples of the device paradigm: preparing a meal from basic ingredients, playing a musical instrument, doing some kind of sports, but also going to the forest to gather wood for the open fire as described above. Borgmann does not, however, necessarily advocate a return to: wood burning stoves or the like, rather, he challenges the limitless and unreflective employment of devices. If we are spellbound by the promise of technological enrichment – a world that happily demands less and less of us in terms of skill, effort, patience, or any kind of risk – the logic of the device results in a disburdened and disengaged way of life. (Strong & Higgs, 2000, p. 30) This is not something that most reasonable human beings, whether philosophers of technology or craftspeople, would have a particular problem with. But once again Borgmann introduces us to his Catholic religious perspective in terms of focal practices. An episcopal service, and indeed other religious services, serve as examples of focal practices. They direct attention, he claims, to a state of deeper thought, thought that invokes sense and purposeful questions for life. The church building itself can enhance that, and for that reason is not a device, but a ‘focal thing’ 184

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in Borgmann’s terminology. Entering a Gothic cathedral is an intense experience. Immediately one is impressed by the enormous space and height and the festival of coloured light that shines throughout the building. This almost necessarily leads to reflection upon one’s own position in a vast universe, which literally, has an uplifting effect on one’s view, owing to the many ogives that are like as many fingers pointing upward. The architect’s play with light and space cannot but make an impression on the cathedral’s visitor. The spatial experience of visiting a cathedral simply cannot occur when we visit the cathedral through the virtual lens of a website, even when enhanced with 360 degree pictures and a short introductory video. There is a danger also that the device paradigm has influenced us so much that we take the visual simulation for granted and so do not bother to visit physically. The medieval cathedral was a focal point of its time because it embodied the unified vision of the world that the medievals had attained from different traditions and through many trials. Though the cathedrals were built on and represented intricate theoretical principles that were incomprehensible to lay people, the crucial points of those principles were open to all: the beginning, middle, and end of the history of salvation; the hierarchical order of reality that culminated in divine majesty; and the place one occupied in history and hierarchy. The cathedrals were accessible to all in the practices of construction, extending over many generations, and then in the practices of celebration. Though a simple person would not have a sophisticated understanding of the cathedral as a model of the cosmos and as the embodiment of the City of God, that persons grasp of its meaning and participation in its presence could still be profound and direct. (Borgmann, 1984, pp. 159–160) Of course other people, when visiting a cathedral, although acknowledging that it is an awesome religious building full of architectural majesty, will not be convinced that their visit will lead, inexorably, to focus upon the divine. People can be uplifted by its splendor whether they are catholic, Muslim, atheist or Jew. For the same reasons They can also appreciate the wonder of the great Dohany synagogue in Budapest, or the Hagia Sophia in Turkey. This started out as a church, then became a mosque and is now a museum. They are all focal things in their own right, whether church or museum. Focal practices involve many diverse practices, otherwise how could we “discover and communicate eloquently new things and focal practices such as snowboarding, mountain biking, hang gliding, windsurfing, and scuba diving? (Strong, 2000, p. 337). One can attain pleasure, happiness and fulfilment in terms of skill, effort, patience, or any kind of risk, by becoming involved in the many focal practices that exist, including those that have not yet been discovered. Borgmann, however, does not advocate that we destroy our devices in order to attain this focal state. He is well aware of the fact that it is not realistic to expect that we get rid of devices and perform only focal practices. Our whole modern economy is based upon capitalism, thus upon quick and efficient processes that involve increasingly sophisticated forms of technology. This does not lend itself 185

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to time-consuming focal practices alone. Although Borgmann would clearly prefer a world in which focal practices and things prevailed, he does concede that a twotrack economy should exist: on the one hand, there is the unavoidable track of quick and efficient technological progress; the device paradigm, which, for Borgmann, is dehumanizing. The second track must make way for a better understanding of the need for focal practices. This way involves self-reflection and effort. That second track is required in order to keep us aware of the existence of a much needed accompaniment to the device paradigm. In addition, his emphasis on religion as some sort of panacea against all technological devices should not overwhelm his philosophy. Rather, focal things and focal practices should not be restricted to one rigid ideology, but should, rather, be seen as things and practices in their own right and as applicable in different contexts. This will serve to mitigate the religious prejudice that tends to permeate Borgmann’s theory of focal things and practices, into becoming, essentially, a highly original and inventive philosophy, in its own right. A Brief Comparison to Don Ihde The intermediary role of technology – the device that has been placed in between ourselves and reality – is also the focus of Don Ihde’s post-phenomenological approach to the philosophy of technology. Ihde particularly writes about the way technology intermediates our perception of technology. He distinguishes four different ways in which this can happen: 1. The embodiment relation in which technology in our experience becomes almost part of our bodies (example: wearing glasses); 2. The hermeneutic relation, in which the image we see through technology needs to be interpreted in order to see what reality looks like (example: reading the MRI image by a neurologist or an oncologist); 3. The alterity relation in which the reality behind the technology is different from what we see (example: a science fiction movie in which we think we see people in space, but in reality they are in a studio) or no reality is behind the technology at all (example: a computer game or virtual reality); 4. The background relation in which technology is in the background so that we do not perceive it as such but it does influence our observation (example: the ‘optical pollution’ by street lights that hampers our view on the sky in a clear summer evening). Ihde’s evaluation of this intermediating device role is not as negative as Borgmann’s. According to Ihde, it can become a problem when we are not aware of the relation that is at stake in a certain situation. If we see a Hubble image of the sky and do not realize that in the picture colors mostly stand for temperatures, we may think we see green, yellow, blue and red stars. As long as we are aware of the effect of technology being in between ourselves and reality, however, we can gain from the advantage of technology (seeing things sharply with our glasses on) without 186

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suffering from possible misunderstandings. Ihde does not show as much concern for the possibility of disengagement, as Borgmann does. Although both are in the realm of a phenomenological philosophical approach to technology and its effects on humans and society, Borgmann is much closer to Heidegger’s gloomy vision than Ihde is. For Ihde the remedy for getting trapped in technology is not by escaping into focal activities, but by changing the role of technology (which he identifies with the term ‘multi-stability’ of devices). Now that we have seen the contribution of Albert Borgmann (and to a lesser extent of Don Ihde) to the philosophy of technology, we now turn to the way this can be made fruitful for technology education. APPLICATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION

As seen from a technology education perspective, the device paradigm and issues relating to focal things and practices, can have a profound effect on the development of technological literacy. They can also impact upon the affective domain of the craft subject content. Furthermore, they can impact upon issues relating to the environment and sustainability, areas which can also profit from Borgmann’s philosophy. Environment and Sustainability as Focal Practices One aspect of the environment, which might be described as raw unspoilt nature, or the wilderness as Borgmann likes to call it, “speaks out of the past into a present that is largely technological. No one who ventures into the wilderness can ever entirely forget that technology envelopes the wilderness and could at any time strangle it” (Borgmann, 1995, p. 120). Whilst this type of thinking causes critics to label Borgmann as somewhat romantic in his philosophy, through a longing for a return to the good old pre-modern-technology days, perhaps one should pause this thought for moment. Rain forests; a form of wilderness for Borgmann, continue to be massively deforested each year in order to clear land for cattle production, which in turn produces the raw materials needed for the roughly 50 billion burgers that McDonalds alone is estimated to sell each year (Priyaksh, 2016). These are decidedly device orientated activities. There is clear evidence too, that as the inexorable proliferation of the motor car, yet another device, continues, this exacerbates the dangerously negative impact of climate change (Biello, 2010). These are issues relating to sustainability that most technology education programs support in their respective curriculum documentation. But this is hardly ever done in practice. Borgmann makes a plea for us to become aware of the effects that device paradigms have on our lives and on the fragile stability of the planet we occupy. The destruction of rain forests, moreover can be linked, not only to climate change, to environmental change, to change in the rain forest eco-system, but also to the production of low grade foodstuff, issues connected to obesity and health, as well as issues linked to poverty. As these issues continue to proliferate, moreover, 187

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they cause undue strain on health provision and on quality of life. Even more seriously, they impact upon life expectancy itself. Issues relating to sustainability must therefore be taken more seriously in educational settings. However, to simply discuss and debate the ways in which we are collectively destroying the planet is not enough. Borgmann offers alternatives in the form of focal practices and focal things: “To focus on something or to bring it into focus is to make it central, clear, and articulate” (Borgmann, 1984, p. 197). Thus, by focusing on the practice of eating hamburgers for example, at the rate we do, certainly reveals the negative impacts discussed above. Technology education, in many curricula from around the world offers food technology as a subject area. This is a perfect domain to focus upon these issues but also, and perhaps more importantly, it offers a perfect forum to discuss and retrain not only the palate, but the joy of cuisine, the culture of the table, the pleasure of cooking and eating and conversation. All of these are focal practices. Learning in this way must reach beyond the simple utility of scientific food preparation, it must engage learners in the focal aspects; the gathering of food, some vegetables grown from their own garden perhaps, the preparation of food, selecting the accompanying drinks, the dressing of the table, the ensuing conversations, the joy of communication and the pleasure of eating delicious home prepared food: eating as an enjoyable and lasting focal event rather that the utility of fast food consumption. It is important to note that Borgmann is not suggesting that we step back to pretechnological times. He suggests, rather that “[a] reform of technology that issues from focal concerns will be radical not in imposing a new and unified master plan on the technological universe, but in discovering those sources of strength that will nourish principled and confident beginnings, measures, i.e., which will neither rival nor deny technology” (Borgmann, 1984, pp. 199–200). The culture of the table in France is a perfect example of this type of focal practice. Eating is taken seriously in this country, but alas, the recent introduction of fast food is having a negative impact, for all the reasons given above, including a significant rise in the number of people in France who are now obese. The many philosophers, including Borgmann, who offer us a more dystopic view of the way we treat, or perhaps more accurately, disregard our planet, must not simply be rejected. Challenged yes, but not rejected. More thoughtful debate is needed on the very many important environmental and sustainability issues they raise and technology education offers a perfect platform to engage in these debates. The American architect, inventor, philosopher and environmentalist R. Buckminster Fuller, who is associated with the invention of the geodesic dome, is also known for his environmental book the; Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth, first published in 1969, in which he remarks: One of the interesting things to me about our spaceship is that it is a mechanical vehicle, just as is an automobile. If you own an automobile, you realise that you must put oil and gas into it, and you must put water in the radiator and take care of the car as a whole. You know that you are either going to have 188

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to keep your machine in good order or it’s going to be in trouble and fail to function. We have not been seeing our Spaceship Earth as an integrallydesigned machine which to be persistently successful must be comprehended and serviced in total. (2008, p. 52) Craft as a Focal Practice From a craft orientated perspective, Borgmanns philosophy directs technology education towards a more progressive route than is currently being undertaken. The concept of craft as a focal practice follows, to a large extent, the progressive thinking of Célestine Freinet, David Pye and the Swedish educationalist Otto Salomon who was very much inspired by the Finnish educationalist Uno Cygneus, who, in 1865 started a system of handicraft education which was essentially the birth of technology education. Salomon refined the work of Cygneus into what became known as educational Sloyd (Slöjd). The philosophy of Sloyd parallels the concept of Borgmann’s focal practices. It is also very much influenced by Comenius, Locke, Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Fröbel. At its core, for Salomon: education is not limited to learning as such, but rather consists of developing the child through his or her own learning … Salomon separated material education from formative education … real cultivation of the mind has nothing to with learning vast amounts of facts. (Thorbjörnsson, 1994, p. 3) This concept sits comfortably alongside Borgmann’s focal things and practices where each learner is considered to be an individual in their own right. They are taught formatively, according to their own interests and capabilities. Learners are not taught en mass, a pedagogy that Borgmann would consider to constitute a device paradigm. Salomon created a system of handicraft education that, according to Thorbjörnsson (1994, p. 4) included the following aims: (numbers 1 to 8 are of a formative character which closely align with the concept of focal practices. Numbers 9 and 10 can be classified as utilitarian): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

To instill a taste for and an appreciation of work in general. To create a respect for hard, honest, physical labor. To develop independence and self-reliance. To provide training in the habits of order, accuracy, cleanliness and neatness. To train the eye to see accurately and to appreciate the sense of beauty in form. To develop the sense of touch and to give general dexterity to the hands. To inculcate the habits of attention, industry, perseverance and patience. To promote the development of the body’s physical powers. To acquire dexterity in the use of tools. To execute precise work and to produce useful products.

Technology education in its present form is more related to Borgmann’s device paradigm where the content of learning is imposed and measured by the state rather 189

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than being a focal practice that includes issues that articulate the ethical dimensions that impact upon the technological world we inhabit. These are issues that can only be regarded formatively. FINAL REMARKS

In the technologically textured world that we inhabit today, technology education should lead to the ongoing formation of a better society in which learners become emancipated and critical thinkers. The curriculum needs to “help teach people how to become more ethical producers, as well as consumers, and thus it can help to redesign and reconstruct modern technology towards making it more applicable to people’s needs and not just their manufactured desires” (Khan & Kellner, 2014, p. 183). Borgmann’s philosophical concerns about the dangers to the environment, the eco-system, and essentially, the character of contemporary life, are made manifest in his theory of the device paradigm. Moreover, his theory of focal things and practices offers learners in the technology education domain, a useful methodological structure that can form a framework that enables learners to explore, debate and discuss, how technology can better enhance contemporary life by designing a more useful and meaningful future through the lens of a restructured technology education. However, as Kellner puts it, “whether education will be restructured to promote democracy and human needs [focal practices], or whether education will be transformed primarily to serve the needs of business and the global economy [device paradigm]” is, perhaps, the crucial question (2000, p. 247). REFERENCES Biello, D. (2010). U.S. bid to combat climate change starts with cars and trucks. Scientific American. com. Retrieved February 2018, from https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ us-bid-to-combat-climate-change-starts-with-cars Borgmann, A. (1984). Technology and the character of contemporary life: A philosophical inquiry. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Borgmann. A. (1993). Finding philosophy. In D. D. Karnos & R. G. Shoemaker (Eds.). Falling in love with wisdom (pp. 157–160). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Borgmann. A. (1992). Crossing the postmodern divide. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Borgmann, A. (1996). Technology and the crisis of contemporary culture. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 70, 33–44. Borgmann, A. (2010). Reality and technology. Cambridge Journal of Economy, 34(1), 27–35. Borgmann, A. (2011). The here and now: Theory, technology and actuality. Philosophy & Technology, 24(1), 5–17. Borgmann, A. (2014). Preface. In J. R. Dakers (Ed.), Defining technological literacy: Towards an epistemological framework (2nd ed., pp. ix–x). New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan. Buckminster Fuller, R. (2008). Operating manual for spaceship earth. Zurich: Lars Müller Publishers. Ihde, D. (2003). Interview with Don Ihde. In D. Ihde & E. Selinger (Eds.), Chasing technoscience: Matrix for materiality. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Kahn, R., & Kellner, D. (2014). Reconstructing technoliteracy: A multiple literacies approach. In J. R. Dakers (Ed.), Defining technological literacy: Towards an epistemological framework (2nd ed., pp. 165–192). New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.

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ALBERT BORGMANN Kellner, D. (2000). New technologies/new literacies: Reconstructing education for the new millennium. Teaching Education, 11(3), 245–265. Priyaksh, S. (2016, July 25). Beef production is killing the Amazon rainforest. One Green Planet, 21, n.p. (March 2014, Web) Strong, D. (2000). Philosophy in the service of things. In E. Higgs, A. Light, & D. Strong (Eds.), Technology and the good life (pp. 316–338). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Strong, D., & Higgs, E. (2000). Borgmanns philosophy of technology. In E. Higgs, A. Light, & D. Strong (Eds.), Technology and the good life (pp. 19–37). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Thorbjörnsson, H. (1994). Otto Salomon (1849–1907). Prospects: The Quarterly Review of Comparative Education, XXIV(3–4), 471–485. Tijmes, P. (2001). Albert Borgmann: Technology and the character of everyday life. In H. Achterhuis (Ed.) & R. P. Crease (Trans.), American philosophy of technology: The empirical turn (pp. 11–36). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

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14. CLIVE STAPLES LEWIS Social, Environmental and Biomedical Implications of Technology

INTRODUCTION

[W]hat we call Man’s power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men with Nature as its instrument. (Lewis, 1943/1978, p. 35) The above quote appeared in 1943 in a short book entitled The Abolition of Man: Or Reflections on Education with Special Reference to the Teaching of English in the Upper Forms of Schools, by Oxford academic Clive Staples (C.S.) Lewis. It might seem that a book with such a title has little to do with the philosophy of technology or technology education, but The Abolition of Man has been part of the scientific discourse of both the history, sociology and philosophy of technology in the past decades. The introductory quote can be found in important historical works, surprisingly often without the original reference, in discussions about technology in relation to social class, the environment and ethics (e.g. Hård, 1993; Pacey, 1983). The third part of the book was also included in its entirety in an early anthology in the emerging field of philosophy of technology (Mitcham & Mackay, 1972/1983). Jennings (2010) claimed, with reference to The Abolition of Man, that “Lewis’ writings have inspired much of the work in contemporary bioethics that critically questions some aspects of biotechnology, particularly the prospect of human cloning” (p. 28; cf. Meilaender, 2014; Phillips, 2012). Lewis’ analysis of technology as a means of exercising power also predates the emergence of the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), in which such analyses became ubiquitous (Tatum, 1995). Thus, although Lewis’ work has not (yet) achieved a prominent position in the official philosophy of technology canon, this book still left an important imprint on the field.1 The aim of this chapter is to outline some aspects of Lewis’ philosophy of technology in The Abolition of Man, and provide some suggestions for how it can be applied in technology education. … C.S. Lewis was born in 1898 in Belfast, Northern Ireland. He was educated at Oxford University and subsequently became tutor there in the mid-1920s. In 1954, Lewis became professor of medieval and renaissance English literature at Cambridge University, and stayed there until his death in 1963 (McGrath, 2013; Wilson, 1990). He is best known for his theological and religious writing, the Narnia children’s books, and a Wellsian and Second World War-inspired science-fiction

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2019 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004405516_014

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trilogy – including Out of the Silent Planet, Perelandra and That Hideous Strength (cf. Schwartz, 2009). However, he also wrote other novels, poetry, philosophy, autobiography, and literary criticism. Throughout Lewis’ writing, the relationship between science, technology and society is a recurring theme. For example, the ideas that philosopher of science Thomas S. Kuhn presented in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) were echoed in Lewis’ The Discarded Image, in which he expounds on something similar to Kuhn’s concept of paradigm shift of scientific models of the universe, as seen in medieval and renaissance literature (Kuhn, 1962; Lewis, 1964, pp. 216–223). So, even though The Abolition of Man is quite unique in elaborating on an explicit philosophy of technology, Lewis’ philosophical ideas related to science and technology can be found in much of his other writing, even the fiction (Hooper, 1996). The main ideas of The Abolition of Man were turned into fictional form in Lewis’ third science fiction installment That Hideous Strength, for instance (Lewis, 1945/1983, p. 7). The breadth of Lewis’ scholarship causes certain difficulties for a researcher. First of all, he influenced so many fields that one has to search very broadly to cover the current literature; from health and bioethics to religious studies and theology to science fiction studies to philosophy (of science) to history of literature and literary criticism. Furthermore, because of his – certainly well-deserved – status as influential children’s and science-fiction writer and “house theologian” across Christendom, a literature search will also include articles and books written in tribute to Lewis rather than as critical scholarship. I have done my best to address both these difficulties by doing extensive literature searches and applying a critical eye to the selected research. Although there is an enormous amount of research on Lewis and his work generally, there is still very little by way of scholarly studies written about The Abolition of Man, despite the fact that it has proven to be so influential on later literary scholars, philosophers, bioethicists2 and even economists (cf. Daly, 1980; Jennings, 2010). Part of the reason for the anonymity of The Abolition of Man may lie in the high profile of Lewis’ other works coupled with a stealth-like spread of some ideas from the book, such as the introductory quote. The few studies of the book that exist are presented and used in the analysis below. The method of analysis employed is, as is common in literary research and philosophy, a qualitative method of text interpretation – hermeneutics (MacLean, 1986). THE ABOLITION OF MAN AND ITS PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY

The Abolition of Man, and the three lectures on which it was built, must be set against the background of the, in 1943, ongoing Second World War, but also some ideological and philosophical debates among intellectuals that Lewis was influenced by and participated in at the time. These debates concerned the relationship between scientific progress, technological advancement, and the future of the human race. The book was in itself part of a futurist debate about eugenics and how science and technology could alter the future of humanity, in relation to ideas of the science fiction 194

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novelist Olaf Stapledon, biologist J.B.S. Haldane and scientist turned historian and activist J.D. Bernal (Herrick, 2017; McGrath, 2013; Poole, 2012). After the parallel publication in 1943 of both The Abolition of Man and the second science fiction installment Perelandra, Lewis also became engaged in a debate with science fiction novelist Arthur C. Clarke about whether humankind should engage in rocket-powered travel in space and conquer other planets (Poole, 2012). The issues of eugenics and space travel were related for some of the writers that Lewis engaged with, particularly Haldane and Bernal, because conquering other planets was for them seen as a logical next step in the evolution of a technologically modified human race (Herrick, 2017). The argument of The Abolition of Man has many different layers; Lewis simultaneously juggles several topics under the common theme of the impending abolition of man. In the following, primarily the parts of his arguments relating to social, environmental and biomedical implications of technology are focused. The book is about education in general, and the teaching of English in secondary schools in particular. The book begins with a review of two anonymous textbooks in English literature, which, according to Lewis, convey the implicit message that human feelings and traditional values are contrary to reason. At the outset, the argument is about the difficulties of literary criticism, and Lewis thinks that the authors fail in conveying “why a bad treatment of some basic human emotion is bad literature” (p. 13). Lewis claims that “the task of the modern educator is not to cut down jungles but to irrigate deserts. The right defense against false sentiments is to inculcate just sentiments” (p. 13). He then goes on to introduce to the reader the concept of the Tao, an umbrella concept for universally accepted values. The part of the book that is particularly interesting from a philosophy of technology point of view is part 3, the first section of which can be said to deal with social class implications of technology. Lewis here claims that the Tao, embodied in the human conscience, is the last bit to be conquered for an enlightened humankind in its quest for “power over Nature”: “Having mastered our environment, let us now master ourselves and choose our own destiny”, so the argument goes, according to Lewis (p. 33). Lewis equates “man’s conquest of Nature” with the “progress of applied science”, by which he means technology and offers three examples thereof: the airplane, the wireless, and the contraceptive. In peacetime in the Western world, anyone who is able to pay for these technologies may use them, but it does not therefore follow that this person is really exercising his or her individual power over Nature, although it may seem so. To support this argument, Lewis offers an analogy: “If I pay you to carry me, I am not therefore myself a strong man” (p. 34). Furthermore, access to any of the three technologies can be withheld by other individuals, according to Lewis: those who own the sources of production, those who make the goods, or those who sell, or allow the sale, of the technologies (p. 34). Although not a Marxist himself, Lewis undoubtedly owes a great deal to Marxist thought for this part of the analysis (cf. Bimber, 1994; Dusek, 2006; McGrath, 2014; Williams, 1994). There is also another aspect, according to Lewis, namely that the powers invested in these technologies are double-edged: 195

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Again, as regards the powers manifested in the aeroplane or the wireless, Man is as much the patient or subject as the possessor, since he is the target both for bombs and for propaganda. And as regards contraceptives, there is a paradoxical, negative sense in which all possible future generations are the patients or subjects of a power wielded by those already alive. By contraception simply, they are denied existence; by contraception used as a means of selective breeding, they are, without their concurring voice, made to be what one generation, for its own reasons, may choose to prefer. (pp. 34–35) It is in this sense that “Man’s power over Nature”, in Lewis’ view, is a power wielded by some individuals over other individuals, with nature as their instrument. In a second section, Lewis goes on to argue that the social implications of technology also have environmental implications. Lewis does not mean here that the uneven social power relation appears only when someone abuses power. On the contrary, it is inherent in this development that some groups will wield power over others, be it social groups, nations or generations. It is thus inevitable that technology, over time, has both social and environmental implications: In order to understand fully what Man’s power over Nature, and therefore the power of some men over other men, really means, we must picture the race extended in time from the date of its emergence to that of its extinction. Each generation exercises power over its successors: and each, in so far as it modifies the environment bequeathed to it and rebels against tradition, resists and limits the power of its predecessors. This modifies the picture which is sometimes painted of a progressive emancipation from tradition and a progressive control of natural processes resulting in a continual increase of human power. In reality, of course, if any one age really attains, by eugenics and scientific education, the power to make its descendants what it pleases, all men who live after it are the patients of that power. They are weaker, not stronger: for though we may have put wonderful machines in their hands, we have pre-ordained how they are to use them. (pp. 35–36) Each new increase in power will only result in fewer people attaining that power, and then exercising it over even more other people, be it, so to speak, in space or in time: “Each new power won by man is a power over man as well. Each advance leaves him weaker as well as stronger” (p. 36). The third and last section deals with biomedical implications of technology. According to Lewis, “Man’s conquest of Nature”, or technology if we will, is eventually going to be applied to humans themselves, e.g. in eugenics, education or propaganda, and human nature will thus be the last part of nature to surrender to human power. However, since this human power is executed by fewer and fewer people, and because these people may only follow their “natural” impulses in executing this power, Lewis claims that “Man’s conquest of Nature turns out, in the moment of its consummation, to be Nature’s conquest of Man. […] The wresting of powers from 196

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Nature is also the surrendering of things to Nature” (pp. 41, 43). In fact, he goes so far as to say that the subjects of this final conquest – a “world of post-humanity” (p. 45; cf. Hayles, 1999) – become dehumanized; they become “artefacts” (p. 40): Man’s final conquest has proved to be the abolition of Man. […] We shall in fact be the slaves and puppets of that to which we have given our souls. It is in Man’s power to treat himself as a mere ‘natural object’ and his own judgements of value as raw material for scientific manipulation to alter at will. (pp. 40, 43–45) The technological imagery here alludes to the fact that humans, at this final stage, treat themselves in the same way that they have treated nature, as something artificial or as an artefact. This was one of the reasons that Lewis thought that humankind was morally ill-equipped for space travel, because it would result in an extension of this kind of thinking also to other planets and their possible inhabitants (Poole, 2012). “Mere nature” or “natural object”, in this sense, are expressions of what humans have conquered, because we reduce nature to an artificial abstraction or, by extension, an object, in order that it may be conquered, epistemologically or ontologically (pp. 41–44; cf. Meilaender, 2014). Lewis is of the view that Francis Bacon’s goal for humankind to perform, through science, “all things possible” (p. 46) will lead to this post-human condition, unless surrendered to the Tao. C.S. LEWIS’ PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY – IMPLICATIONS FOR TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION

Although Lewis was part of a first mid-20th century wave of philosophy of technology in which philosophers mainly critiqued the negative impacts of technology on society (de Vries, 2017; Mitcham, 1994), he essentially went beyond that and pointed to the human and moral dimension behind such impacts (cf. Ellul, 1962). His philosophy is therefore very consistent with present-day conceptions of technological literacy where critiquing technology-in-society is an integral part (Williams & Stables, 2017). Because technology education emerged out of a practical, craft-based educational tradition in many countries (Hallström, 2018; Jones, Buntting, & de Vries, 2013), the broader technological literacy with focus on social, environmental and biomedical implications of technology still needs developing. The philosophy of technology outlined in The Abolition of Man could therefore be used to inform and elaborate the notion of technological literacy for the early 21st century. The conception of technological literacy today consequently includes a critique of technology in society which is both research based (e.g. Dakers, 2006; Jenkins, 1997) and based on curriculum development (e.g. Pearson & Young, 2002). Several technology curricula around the world have subsequently adopted these aspects of technology as part of the technological literacy that is to be learned. The New Zealand technology curriculum, for instance, states under the Nature of Technology strand that: 197

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[S]tudents develop an understanding of technology as a discipline and of how it differs from other disciplines. They learn to critique the impact of technology on societies and the environment and to explore how developments and outcomes are valued by different peoples in different times. As they do so, they come to appreciate the socially embedded nature of technology and become increasingly able to engage with current and historical issues and to explore future scenarios. (Ministry of Education, New Zealand, 2007, p. 32) A similar sentiment permeates also the American Standards for Technological Literacy: “Besides understanding how particular technologies are developed and used, students should be able to evaluate their effects on other technologies, on the environment, and on society itself. The benefits of a technology are usually obvious […] but the disadvantages and dangers are often hidden (ITEA, 2007, p. 4). “Design and Technologies” in the Australian Curriculum has the following rationale: In an increasingly technological and complex world, it is important to develop knowledge and confidence to critically analyze and creatively respond to design challenges. Knowledge, understanding and skills involved in the design, development and use of technologies are influenced by and can play a role in enriching and transforming societies and our natural, managed and constructed environments. (ACARA, 2017) The above curriculum examples show, first of all, that critiquing technology and its social and environmental implications is indeed an important component of technological literacy. Secondly, they also show that these implications are in some way related. However, what is missing in these curricular examples is a clear rationale for looking at them as part of the same phenomenon, which would be necessary for an application in technology classrooms. Curricular documents are by nature concise and sketchy, so this should come as no surprise. A recent study shows, however, that technology teachers do not really know how to involve elements of critique in students’ design and make activities (Schooner et al., 2017), so the absence of such a rationale seems to have an impact also at the classroom level. It is here that the philosophy of C.S. Lewis can assist. The three aspects of The Abolition of Man that were outlined above can be summarized as three types of implications of technology under the theme of “Man’s power over Nature”: • Social class implications: human innovation and use of technology involves a power element, and technology thereby confirms, and even exacerbates, class relations and class boundaries. • Environmental implications: human power over nature affects not only people and social groups but also the environment, by causing, for example, health problems and environmental pollution. • Biomedical implications: the endpoint of human power over nature is the power to alter human nature, which could mean a number of things. Here I will focus on various forms of biotechnology, for example, genetic modification and cloning, 198

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but also different kinds of technological modifications of the human body above the cell level, such as digital implants. Furthermore, there are unintended results of environmental pollution such as genetic disturbances of various kinds. Lewis’ great contribution to the philosophy of technology was to connect these three implications by bringing them all together under the same umbrella – as a single techno-ethical problematic – that also follows a kind of chronology, which was outlined in the previous section. Here I will divide Lewis’ three kinds of implications into two areas that could both inform and develop technological literacy and make up a rationale for dealing with these kinds of issues in the classroom. The first area, social and environmental implications of technology, was evident in history up until Lewis’ day, whereas the second area, biomedical implications of technology, was still something of a future, possible scenario from Lewis’ vantage point. The first area is of paramount importance; Ihde (1993) even considers the environment as a foundational issue in the philosophy of technology, and argues: [T]he quality of the environment is a foundational issue and […] must be addressed. But this issue is also enmeshed in a complex cultural philosophical set of issues which entail nests of interrelated concepts. For example, the concepts technology, environment, and nature are all interrelated. […] our very concept of environment is related to our notion of, and attitude towards nature, which in turn, entails a concept of what it means to be human, and into all of which must be fitted our means of interaction with each of these dimensions, technology. (Ihde, 1993, p. 124) Social and environmental implications of technology have a long tradition of being viewed as a common problematic in Marxist thought (e.g. Engels, 1845; cf. Harvey, 1990; Lefebvre, 1991), which Lewis was familiar with but did not sympathize with in its entirety (McGrath, 2014). Today there is the so-called environmental justice movement, which started out as a social movement in the United States in the 1980s but also became an interdisciplinary field of scientific inquiry (Colten, 2002; Washington, 2008). The core of this way of viewing environmental problems is that hazards in the environment have to do with inequitable distribution of resources and land, where minorities, poor and underprivileged populations often lose (Arney, 2017). Washington writes that: A key concern then and now in environmental justice (EJ) struggles and debates has therefore centered on the ethics and legality of societal decision making that leads to disparate environmental health risks carried by already marginalized communities. Professional and academic scholarship to study these issues emerged almost concomitantly with the movement itself from multiple disciplines especially those of law, sociology, and public health. (Washington, 2008, p. 1) The list of environmental injustices that could be addressed in technology education is extensive; from historical environmental inequity during industrialization in 199

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which workers and poor missed out on environmental technologies such as water supply and sewerage systems (e.g. Hallström, 2011) to present-day injustices such as the fact that poor and minority neighborhoods and infrastructure suffered more from the consequences of hurricane Katrina than the well-to-do in New Orleans did (Kates et al., 2006). The environmental justice ideas can also be extrapolated to a global level, where some countries could be considered as poor or underprivileged compared to others economically and environmentally. The bottom line of Lewis’ argument is that environmental injustices always boil down to social issues and power of some humans over others, with nature and the environment as the instrument, in one way or another. In the technology classroom this means that the teacher can focus on the connections and interactions between social and environmental issues, when talking about the implications of technology. For example, the above extract from the American Standards mentions evaluation of technology’s “effects on other technologies, on the environment, and on society itself. The benefits of a technology are usually obvious […] but the disadvantages and dangers are often hidden (ITEA, 2007, p. 4). These dangers may not only be obscure urban air pollution or miniscule particles from diesel engines, but also the fact that poor neighborhoods actually suffer more from these dangers than do the richer ones. The second area of biomedical implications is as foundational to the philosophy of technology as the first one because these implications can be seen as a direct result of the social and environmental implications. Various medical technologies raised ethical questions as humans became increasingly capable of altering the human body and affecting human health. Lewis distinguished himself here as a natural law philosopher, in contrast to the dominating utilitarian medical ethicists (Ihde, 1993; Mitcham, 1994). He was also particularly perceptive about the philosophical and ethical concerns of – from his standpoint – future possibilities of altering the human body, despite the eugenics of his own time being very limited compared to the development in genetic improvement and technological implants in the 2010s. However, it is clear that the philosophical underpinning of human enhancement was already in place in the 1930s and 1940s, through Bernal, Haldane and others. Today, these ideas have become even more elaborated and widespread through, for instance, the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford (Bostrom, 2005; Herrick, 2017). The philosopher Nick Bostrom, director of the latter and co-founder of the World Transhumanist Association, describes a transhumanist agenda for a posthuman future: Transhumanism is a loosely defined movement that has developed gradually over the past two decades. It promotes an interdisciplinary approach to understanding and evaluating the opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the human organism opened up by the advancement of technology. Attention is given to both present technologies, like genetic engineering and information 200

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technology, and anticipated future ones, such as molecular nanotechnology and artificial intelligence. The enhancement options being discussed include radical extension of human health-span, eradication of disease, elimination of unnecessary suffering, and augmentation of human intellectual, physical, and emotional capacities. Other transhumanist themes include space colonization and the possibility of creating superintelligent machines, along with other potential developments that could profoundly alter the human condition. […] Transhumanists view human nature as a work-in-progress, a half-baked beginning that we can learn to remold in desirable ways. Current humanity need not be the endpoint of evolution. Transhumanists hope that by responsible use of science, technology, and other rational means we shall eventually manage to become posthuman, beings with vastly greater capacities than present human beings have. (Bostrom, 2003, pp. 3–4) In recent years, Bostrom has warned of the dangers of artificial intelligence and superintelligent machines, so although essentially positive to human technological enhancement he has also taken a critical stance (e.g. Bostrom, 2014). The general idea of transhumanists is that it is by embracing new technology that humankind can be protected from, for instance, superintelligence, not by banning certain technological advancements (Bostrom, 2005). Scholars from various disciplines and traditions have also critiqued Bostrom’s views of human enhancement. Some, like Herrick (2017), criticize the altering of human nature on religious grounds, not so far from Lewis’ natural law arguments. Others, like Fukuyama (2009), critique transhumanism on liberal, democratic grounds, with arguments very similar to Lewis’ where social power and inequality are central. Still others criticize an over-reliance on technology, but the core of the criticisms has to do more with ethics than technology itself. Lewis was not skeptical of technology in itself but of the social dangers of human enhancement, because it would lead to some (enhanced?) people with power controlling the enhancement of people with less power. It is here that a discussion of transhumanism and a posthuman society can begin in the technology classroom. Sentiments such as the following one from the New Zealand technology curriculum could guide such discussions: “[Students] learn to critique the impact of technology on societies and the environment and to explore how developments and outcomes are valued by different peoples in different times” (Ministry of Education, New Zealand, 2007, p. 32). Since this second area of biomedical implications of technology is still to some extent about exploring “future scenarios” (p. 32), technology teaching must necessarily be about what might possibly happen. Ethical questions that the teacher could engage the students with include: What good and/or bad could come from human enhancement? Who should control the evolution of genetic engineering and human implants? What happens if humanity loses control over, for example, artificial intelligence? 201

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CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

Lewis’ philosophy had evolved from an explicit scientific materialism in the 1920s into a conservative idealism in the 1930s and 1940s that was no doubt affected by his religious conversion (McGrath, 2014). However, The Abolition of Man arguably shows that Lewis the philosopher was open to ideas on the state of society, technology and nature regardless of origin, as shown, for example, in his Marxist-inspired critique of technology in the hands of those in power. In this sense, the transition described by McGrath (2014) is not the whole truth on this matter. As a philosopher but perhaps even more so as a literary historian, Lewis was eclectic and broadminded, which can be seen also in his later writing (e.g. Lewis, 1964). As we have seen Lewis’ ideas were also subsequently taken up by philosophers, historians, sociologists, educationists etc. from all facets of the political spectrum, which tells us that the ideas and problematics he dealt with were in many ways universal. This goes both for the environmental justice ideas and the natural law bioethics, where power relations are at the heart of his argument. As stated earlier Lewis was one of several contemporary philosophers who critiqued technology from a societal point of view – in a Continental, or what Mitcham (1994) would call a humanities philosophy of technology, tradition. But the question is whether Lewis really had the negative outlook of, for example, Heidegger or Ellul? In many ways Lewis resembled Ellul in that he suggested an alternative, religious ethics, a kind of ethics of non-power (Mitcham, 1994, p. 61). Lewis’ view of technology was also ambivalent, however, which can be said of his sources of inspiration, Christianity and Marxism, as well. In Christian thought technology is partly something negative because worldly possessions are seen as something hindering a good Christian life (Petrina, 2017). On the other hand, there are also passages in the Bible with very positive views, for instance, the book of Nehemiah which narrates the rebuilding of the Jerusalem wall and details the important contributions of craftsmen from various social classes. Similarly, Marxism has a built-in ambivalence since the material base is seen as the most important factor of societal change. While technology was corrupted in the hands of the bourgeoisie it was also considered a potentially positive force for the working class revolution (de Vries, 2017). In a sense it is the social context of technology that Lewis critiques, not technology in itself, since it is the few people with power over the majority that is considered the problem in The Abolition of Man. Although Ellul acknowledges the social context, his view of human control in a technological society is much more negative (Ellul, 1962). On the other hand, Lewis also specifies eugenics, contraception and “scientific education” as technologies that, in the hands of the powerful Conditioners, are particularly destructive in that they can alter the human nature of future generations, the environment and ultimately also the development and use of future technologies. So, in conclusion, Lewis’ ambivalence to technology is yet more optimistic than Ellul’s; technology is potentially good but its uses must be subordinated to the Tao, much like all other human activities. 202

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In Feenberg’s view it was the social context that even Marx critiqued. This is therefore the basis for a rather hopeful view of technology: Modern technology as we know it is no more neutral than medieval cathedrals or the Great Wall of China; it embodies the values of a particular industrial civilization and especially those of elites that rest their claims to hegemony on technical mastery. We must articulate and judge these values in a cultural critique of technology. By so doing, we can begin to grasp the outlines of another possible industrial civilization based on other values. (Feenberg, 2002, p. v) Although Feenberg has a very clear Marxist standpoint, the values on the basis of which to critique technology are seen as democratic values (Feenberg, 1999), which may not be so far off from Lewis’ Tao. Finally, the take home message for technology education is to let students engage in Feenberg’s (2002) cultural critique of technology, with the ultimate goal of imagining alternative future societies with alternative technological regimes, which are under democratic human control. The “tools” for this have been provided by Lewis: the social, environmental and biomedical implications of technology should be seen as one and the same ethical problem, namely a result of some people wielding power of other, often in various ways disadvantaged, people. A cultural critique of technology is therefore also a critique of social relations and (political) power. As often in philosophy, however, its spokespersons have not provided answers so much as questions. Questioning and critiquing are therefore an important contribution of the philosophy of technology to technology education. It is now up to the teachers to provide an educational milieu which promotes a “cultural critique of technology”, so that the students may acquire a technological literacy and be a part of bringing about a democratic socio-technological future society. NOTES 1

2

The same can be said also about other philosophers not immediately associated with technology such as Jacques Derrida (see Sjöstrand, 2015). Although influenced by Lewis, they were not always in agreement with him. See, for example, Fukuyama (2002) and Jordan (2008).

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