Reconstructing Empedocles' Thought 1009392573, 9781009392570

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The Idea of Human Rights

Reconstructing Empedocles’ Thought

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Chiara Ferella

RECONSTRUCTING EMPEDOCLES ’ T H OU GHT

To understand Empedocles’ thought, one must view his work as a unified whole of religion and physics. Only a few interpreters, however, recognize rebirth as a positive doctrine within Empedocles’ physics and attempt to reconcile its details with the cosmological account. This study shows how rebirth underlies Empedocles’ cosmic system, being a structuring principle of his physics. It reconstructs the proem to his physical poem and then shows that claims to disembodied existence, individual identity and personal survival at death(s) prove central to his physics; that knowledge of the cosmos is a major path to escape rebirth; that purifications are essential to understanding the world and changing one’s being, and that the cosmic cycle, with its ethical import, is the ideal backdrop for Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth. This title is part of the Flip it Open Programme and may also be available Open Access. Check our website Cambridge Core for details. chiara ferella is a research associate in the project ‘Early Concepts of Humans and Nature: Universal, Specific, Interchanged’ (RTG 1876) at the Institute of Ancient Studies of Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.

RECONSTRUCTING EMPEDOCLES’ THOUGHT CHIARA FERELLA Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany

Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge cb2 8ea, United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, ny 10006, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, vic 3207, Australia 314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India 103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467 Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment, a department of the University of Cambridge. We share the University’s mission to contribute to society through the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009392570 doi: 10.1017/9781009392600 © Chiara Ferella 2024 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment. First published 2024 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data names: Ferella, Chiara, author. title: Reconstructing Empedocles’ thought / Chiara Ferella, Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz, Germany. description: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2023. | Includes bibliographical references and index. identifiers: lccn 2023029570 | isbn 9781009392570 (hardback) | isbn 9781009392617 (paperback) | isbn 9781009392600 (ebook) subjects: lcsh: Empedocles – Criticism and interpretation. | Philosophy of nature. classification: lcc b218.z7 f47 2023 | ddc 113–dc23/eng/20230823 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023029570 isbn 978-1-009-39257-0 Hardback Cambridge University Press & Assessment has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

To Moritz vagliami ’l lungo studio e ’l grande amore (Dante, Inf. 1.83)

Contents

Acknowledgements

page viii 1

Introduction 1

Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature

24

2 The Proem to On Nature

62

3 Daimones between Plato and Pythagoras

138

4 Divine Beings

185

5 Changes of Form, Personal Survival and Rebirth

217

6 Knowing Nature as a God

246

7 Cosmic Cycle, Moral Import and Rebirth

307

8 Epilogue

363

Bibliography Index

372 396

vii

Acknowledgements

The conception and realization of this book owe a great deal to the rich corpus of published works on Empedocles and, more generally, on early Greek philosophy, as well as to the stimulating questions, inspiring ideas and insightful suggestions of a large number of colleagues, fellow researchers, conference participants, friends and acquaintances, Classics enthusiasts or any person interested in my work. To all of them I am deeply and sincerely grateful. Special thanks go to Franco Ferrari, Riccardo Di Donato, Alberto Bernabé, David Sedley, Jean-Claude Picot, the two anonymous readers of this book and Melinda Johnston for their invaluable support in reading, discussing, commenting on and editing some or all of the chapters of this book during the various drafting stages. I am also very grateful to Michael Sharp and Cambridge University Press for their valuable assistance and advice during the publication process. The completion of this project has been made possible thanks to the funds made available by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) as part of the project Early Concepts of Humans and Nature: Universal, Specific, Interchanged (RTG 1876) as well as thanks to the digital resources of Harvard’s Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, DC, from which I could benefit first as a Fellow in 2017–2018 and then as an Associate in early Greek philosophy in 2018–2020. This book is dedicated to my husband, Moritz, for his constant support, encouragement and love throughout every stage of this project.

viii

Introduction

In the fifth century BCE,1 the early Greek thinker Empedocles of Acragas, present-day Agrigento in the southern region of Sicily, authored two poems in hexametrical verses: Katharmoi, ‘Purifications’, in two books, and Peri Physeos or Physika, ‘On Nature’, in three books.2 In these, he put forward a philosophical project aiming at a comprehensive explanation of the cosmos3 and its living beings. His extant verses deal with the dynamic of the four elements – fire, ether (or air),4 water and earth – which are described as ‘the roots of all things’,5 since they form all that exists by mixtures and separations. Their working shapes a cosmic cycle in which the elements, under the influence of the two opposite powers of Love and Strife, are eternally and regularly brought together into one thing alone (the divine and blissful form of the Sphairos) at the hands of unifying Love (Greek, Φιλότης), and are separated again into many things 1

2

3 4

5

According to the most recent study about the chronology of early Greek philosophers by Thibodeau (2019: 177–87), Empedocles was born in 496 BCE and died in 436 BCE. Throughout this book, the fragments of Empedocles and other early Greek philosophers will be quoted following the edition by Diels-Kranz (1951), with reference to the more recent edition by Laks-Most (2016) added in parentheses. For the verses of the Strasbourg papyrus the edition used is Laks-Most (2016). Translations from Greek and Latin sources are my own, but I regularly consulted existing translations. In particular, translations of Empedocles’ fragments follow Wright (1995), Inwood (2001) and Laks-Most (2016). For other early thinkers I also used the translations by McKirahan (2010) and Graham (2010). The most important sources for Empedocles’ two works are Diog. Laert. 8.54, 61–2 and 77 (= Lobon Frag. 12 Garulli). In 8.54 and 8.61–62 Diogenes associates the titles On Nature and Purifications with different Empedoclean verses; specifically, he attributes B 1 (= EMP D 41 Laks-Most) to the poem on natural philosophy and B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) to the Katharmoi. In 8.77 Diogenes reports that, according to the list of Empedocles’ works compiled by Lobon of Argos, On Nature and Purifications amount to five thousand lines in all. As for how many books each of the two poems comprises, see Primavesi (2006b). Against a reconstruction of Empedocles as the author of two poems, see below. While with the word ‘Cosmos’ I shall refer to the cosmic phase opposed to the Sphairos (see Chapter 7.1.4), I will use ‘cosmos’ (without capitalization) throughout as synonymous of ‘world’. As the lists of the names of the roots by Wright (1995: 23) show, air and ether refer to the same element of air. As O’Brien (1969: 292) argues, Aristotle treats Empedocles’ air and ether as equivalent when he describes the subject of B 53 (= EMP D 105 Laks-Most) in one place as ether (De gen. et. corr. 334a 1–5) and in another place as air (Phys. 196a 20–3). They are defined as τῶν πάντων ῥιζώματα in B 6.1 (= EMP D 57.1 Laks-Most).

1

2

Introduction

by the dividing force of Strife (Greek, Νεῖκος).6 However, Empedocles is also the poet who teaches a more religious doctrine of rebirth and purifications, urges abstinence from sexual intercourse as well as from some kinds of food and depicts himself as a god, being reborn in human form and exiled to our world. Although we can rely on a relatively large number of fragments,7 the details of Empedocles’ thought, especially concerning the relationship among his different and apparently contradictory philosophical interests, remain controversial. As C. Kahn put it: ‘Empedocles the philosopher of nature and Empedocles the prophet of transmigration are each intelligible when taken separately. Together they seem to compose a split personality whose two sections are not united by any essential link’.8 Thus, the fundamental question behind the study of Empedocles is still that posed by E. Zeller at the end of the nineteenth century:9 if Empedocles’ religious teachings ‘stand in no visible connection with the scientific principles’ of his physics, and the doctrine of rebirth and purification appears to be ‘imperfectly appended to his philosophical scheme’,10 how, then, can we explain what seems to be a doctrinal antinomy in one and the same author? This book takes on the challenge of making sense of this controversial material by reconstructing a textual base upon which Empedocles’ thought can be re-evaluated in terms of a philosophical system aspiring to doctrinal unity. The argument running throughout the book is that in Empedocles’ physical system, religious and philosophical interests11 interrelate with and illuminate each other. Indeed, the doctrine of rebirth is a positive and central doctrine of Empedocles’ physics. Methodologically, this study is based on the assumption that Empedocles’ thought made sense with respect to his time and, also in virtue of its eschatological value, it influenced Greek philosophy and thought. Adopting this perspective, this book 6

Whereas Φιλότης and Νεῖκος are the most common Greek names to call the powers of Love and Strife in Empedocles, it is worth noting that, as we will see in the course of this book, they are also referred to by other names. 7 In the Diels-Kranz edition of Presocratic thinkers, 154 B-fragments (i.e., Empedocles’ own words in contrast to the A-fragments, which are Berichte [reports], from secondary sources) are attributed to him. To them, the exceptional findings of the Strasbourg papyrus added over seventy new verses. 8 9 Kahn (1960: 3). See also Primavesi (2013: 667). 10 Zeller (1920: 1001, 1004–16). See also Primavesi (2013: 667). 11 By ‘religious interests’ (or even ‘religion’ more generally) I refer to Empedocles’ concern with matters of an otherworldly nature and what Socrates would have called ‘the care of one’s soul’ and for behaviour consistent with that. By ‘philosophical interests’, I mean interests in the principles of the physical world and, more generally, in the nature and order of things; that is, the kind of research topics that Aristotle attributed to the physiologoi and that we usually consider to be proper to early Greek philosophy.

Introduction

3

will show the ways in which Empedocles’ physics accommodates, on a textual and contextual basis, the details of his doctrine of rebirth, thus demonstrating the centrality of this doctrine to his physical system. Indeed, it will even go beyond showing accommodation, pointing out that some pivotal aspects of Empedocles’ physics seem to be premised and even structured on his concept of rebirth. In presenting this argument, I also aim to shed new light on longstanding questions regarding the relationship between the different and apparently conflicting areas of Empedocles’ thought. I will thus show that in On Nature Empedocles implemented a philosophical project with the main aim of indicating the way through which human beings can escape rebirth, transcend their mortal nature and become gods. To this end, I will correct previous research by reconstructing various topics and verses that scholars have usually attributed to the Purifications within On Nature, challenging thereby the standard apportionment of extant fragments between the two poems. In doing so, it will be shown that concerns about the place and fate of human beings in this world, claims for individual existence beyond the body, moral agency and personal survival through many deaths and different lives, as well as pursuit of true knowledge and solicitations for a pure way of life are not merely added to Empedocles’ interests in natural philosophy, but are instead integral to his physical system. Beyond offering a new reading of Empedocles’ thought, this book also bears relevance to early Greek philosophy in general. As J. Warren claims, ‘Empedocles is . . . an excellent case in which we have to think carefully about what we assume to be the nature of early Greek philosophy.’12 My main standpoint in this book is that Empedocles is primarily concerned with human beings’ pragmatic approach to their life in this world and thus focuses his enquiry into the nature of things around questions such as: what is our place in the world? What should we do with our lives and how should we face the prospect of death? Accordingly, this book may then offer an interpretative key to approach and possibly re-evaluate other preSocratics – including but not limited to Heraclitus, Parmenides and the Derveni author – who display similar interests to Empedocles. It may also help us to rethink early Greek philosophy primarily as a philosophy of humans rather than of nature.13 12 13

Warren (2007: 137). Since antiquity, early Greek philosophy has been described as a philosophy of nature (or Presocratic naturalism) in contrast to a philosophy of humans, initiated by Socrates (or Socratic humanism). On this, see Laks (2018: 1–18).

4

Introduction

The choice to devote an entire monograph to Empedocles is dictated not only by the fact that, as I have just noted, he can be considered an exemplary case for a reassessment of early Greek philosophy; it is also motivated by the as-yet unresolved questions raised by his philosophy, which have drawn the interest of scholars for centuries. An indication of the relevance he has in the history of Greek philosophy is given, first, by the largest number, among pre-Socratic thinkers besides Democritus, of ancient quotations and thus of surviving fragments that have come down to us. Additionally, the extant fragments of his work do not merely come from excerpts of citations of later authors; rather, a considerable portion of his verses are transmitted directly in a papyrus dated between the first and second century CE,14 which is evidence of the circulation of his poem – hence, of the interest it still aroused – even centuries after his death.15 Second, Empedocles’ philosophy must have already gained great popularity shortly after his death given the earliest mention of his name is by his near-contemporary, the Hippocratic author of Ancient Medicine (fifth century BCE).16 Some generations later, moreover, Plato (428–347 BCE) regularly refers to Empedocles by name; composes, in his Symposium, a parody of Empedocles’ generation of human beings (put in the mouth of the comic poet Aristophanes)17 and, in his Timaeus, constructs his cosmological and biological theories through several reminiscences of Empedoclean theories.18 This is without even mentioning the Platonic 14 15

16 17

18

Martin-Primavesi (1999: 14–15). As I am about to complete the final manuscript of this book, news reaches me of a papyrus finding from Cairo awaiting publication, containing thirty new verses by Empedocles: yet another proof of the interest aroused by this philosopher, whose work continued to be copied even centuries after his death. See Hippocrates Vet. med. 20. Specifically, Aristophanes accounts for proto-humans as self-sufficient spheres that were then cut into two, a male and a female being, who come together thanks to the influence of erotic Love (Symp. 189d 5–191d 5). In this account Plato is reminiscent of Empedocles’ hypothesis of the origin of men and women as the result of the separation of proto-human and asexual whole-natured beings (B 62 [= EMP D 157 Laks-Most]); see O’Brien (2002). To recall just two, the depiction of the cosmos in the Timaeus echoes the description of the Sphairos of Empedocles: both are spherical, symmetrical, unique, in no need of human limbs and happy. See Plat. Tim. 34b and Empedocles B 27 (= EMP D 89 Laks-Most), B 28 (= EMP D 90 Laks-Most) and B 29 (= EMP D 92 Laks-Most). On Empedocles’ Sphairos, see my investigation in Chapter 4.3. Second, the theory of the composition of bodily tissues in the Timaeus displays undeniable Empedoclean influences. In fact, both Timaeus and Empedocles postulate that tissues such as marrow, bone and flesh are proportioned mixtures of the four elements. Most remarkably, the composition of blood in Empedocles, which is the tissue through which we think and know, is comparable to that of marrow for Timaeus (in 73b–c), which is the first and basic tissue and is a composition of most harmoniously mixed elements. Plato’s Empedoclean reminiscences in the Timaeus have been well examined, see Bignone (1916: Appendice IV). According to Taylor (1928: 11), the Timaeus is ‘a deliberate attempt to amalgamate Pythagorean religion and mathematics with

Introduction

5

myths on the ultramundane journeys of souls, which are very likely reminiscent of Empedocles’ story of the guilty gods and doctrine of rebirth.19 Similarly, Empedocles also excited great interest within the Peripatetic school. Aristotle (384–322 BCE) mentions no other philosopher with greater frequency, except Plato. While his criticism includes several Empedoclean theories, ranging from his conception of the elements and their generation to his theory of motion, his debt to Empedocles, and in particular to his biological theories, is undeniable. Among the first Peripatetics, moreover, Theophrastus (ca. 369–ca. 285 BCE) dedicates a long section of On the Senses to challenging the theories of Empedocles on sense organs, perception and knowledge acquisition and, if we are to judge from what is preserved of this work, with the exception of his treatment of Democritus, the section dedicated to Empedocles is Theophrastus’ longest and most comprehensive discussion of his predecessors. While Stoics and Epicureans were also influenced by Empedocles,20 engagement with his philosophy continued in commentaries written on Plato’s dialogues and Aristotle’s works as well as by the early Christians into late antiquity. In particular, two of the most important sources for Empedocles’ fragments should be mentioned. First, Plutarch (ca. 45–ca. 125 CE) is credited with a major work on Empedocles in ten books, which is a strong indication, together with his numerous Empedoclean quotations, that Empedocles’ poems were held in high esteem by him.21 Second, the Neoplatonist and Aristotelian commentator Simplicius (ca. 480–ca. 560 CE) almost certainly had access to a large part, probably all, of Empedocles’ physical poem. This is shown

19 20

21

Empedoclean biology’. Cornford (1937), too, saw Empedoclean influences in several passages of the Timaeus; e.g., at 32c. Moreover, Solmsen (1950: esp. 446–58) is important for an assessment of Empedocles’ influence on Timaeus’ views on tissues of the human body. See also Guthrie (1965: 217) for ‘Timaeus ow[ing] an obvious debt to Empedocles’. Similarly, O’Brien (1969: 22–23, 144–45). For an opposing attempt to diminish the weight and value of Empedocles’ influence on Plato’s Timaeus, see Hershbell (1974). Contra, see the recent article by Hladký (2015: 73–82). As we will see especially in Chapter 3.3.1. On the one hand, Hermarchus (third century BCE), disciple of Epicurus and his successor as head of the Epicurean school, is said to have written a treatise Against Empedocles in twenty-two books (see Obbink [1988]), while it is renowned that the Latin poet Lucretius (first century BCE) praised Empedocles’ poetical abilities and his De Rerum Natura was also reminiscent of several of Empedocles’ philosophical theories (Furley [1970], Sedley [1989, 1998, 2003], Garani [2007] and, more recently, Nethercut [2017]). On the other hand, Galen, Plac. Hipp. Plat. 3.3.25 and 3.5.22 tells us that the Stoic Chrysippus (ca. 281–ca. 208 BCE) cited and interpreted passages of Empedocles’ poem, whereas Cicero, Ad Quest. 2.9.3 compares Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura with an Empedoclea composed by a certain Sallustius – possibly a translation or interpretation of Empedocles’ work: see Sedley (1989: 269). Plutarch’s work on Empedocles is listed in the so-called Lamprias Catalogue of Plutarch’s writings, number 43. It is also mentioned by Hipp. Ref. 5.20.6.

6

Introduction

by the extent of Simplicius’ Empedoclean quotations, which account for nearly 8 per cent of the whole poem and include over 150 verses or part verses, often repeating them.22 Additionally, Simplicius’ familiarity with Empedocles’ work is also shown by the fact that he often cites verses together with a precise reference to the parts and books of On Nature from which they are derived.23 This is evidence that in late antiquity Empedocles continued to arouse interest among philosophers, who still cared to copy and cite his work. Lastly, Empedocles’ great fascination endures even in the modern era. For instance, the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843) wrote an unfinished tragedy concerning the legendary death of Empedocles,24 while the crucial role that Presocratic thought, and that of Empedocles in particular, played in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) is well recognized and studied.25 All of this serves to display the sheer appeal and popularity the challenging philosophy of Empedocles and his curious personality have always and consistently wielded. In short, the number of open questions his work still raises, his status as a thinker who prompts reassessment of what we mean in the first place by ‘early Greek philosophy’ and his important legacy for later thinkers all ensure that his thought still wields an enduring claim on our attention today. The starting point of the present study is a critical approach towards the traditional criteria according to which scholars have attributed Empedocles’ fragments to On Nature and the Purifications. These criteria can be traced back to the nineteenth century with the work of H. Stein, whose division of Empedoclean fragments between On Nature and the Purifications was essentially taken up by H. Diels first in his 1901 Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta and then in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker in 1903. The latter work, which soon became the reference edition for early Greek philosophers, ended up defining a standard strategy in dealing with Empedocles’ alleged doctrinal antinomy. As only a few of the extent fragments are explicitly assigned by our sources to either poem,26 Diels considered verses related to the story of the guilty gods, individual 22 23

24 26

Most notably, B 17.7–8 (= EMP D 73.240–1) are repeated as many as half a dozen times: see O’Brien (1969: 150). For instance, we owe to him the precious evidence, among various other indications, that B 17 (= EMP D 73.233–66 Laks-Most) comes from the first book of the physical poem: see Phys. 157, 25 Diels. Tod des Empedokles. See Primavesi (2014). 25 See Most (2005) and Rapp (2011). DK 31 B 1 (= EMP D 41 Laks-Most), B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most), B 17 (= EMP D 73.233–66 LaksMost), B 34 (= EMP D 71 Laks-Most), B 62 (= EMP D 157 Laks-Most), B 96 (= EMP D 192 LaksMost), B 103 (= EMP D 242 Laks-Most) and B 134 (= EMP D 93 Laks-Most) are explicitly connected

Introduction

7

rebirth and purificatory rules as distinct from verses of a more physical character, connected to the four elements and the two forces of Love and Strife, the cosmic cycle, the origin and development of our world, zoogony, anthropogony, biology and epistemology. According to this standard, Diels reconstructed Empedocles’ thought into two profoundly different poems: the Purifications were made a religious composition, whereas On Nature became a work dealing with topics that Diels considered appropriate to fifth-century natural philosophy. The apparently contradictory nature of Empedocles’ poems that resulted from this reconstruction was then explained away by his ‘spiritual development’.27 According to Diels, Empedocles devoted his youth to physical research and writing On Nature, but it was only later, when oppressed by the pains of old age and the further misfortune of exile,28 that he finally turned to religious consolation and wrote his Purifications.29 The subjective character of this hypothesis, which nonetheless knew a considerable following, is displayed by the fact that the direction of Empedocles’ spiritual development could be reversed at will and so a few scholars argued that he wrote his Katharmoi when he was a ‘young prophet’, and turned to physical topics when he became old and disillusioned.30 The first substantial criticism against the assumption of Empedocles’ doctrinal conflict came from Kahn in his foundational study of 1960. By emphasizing that the antinomy between Empedoclean religious and physical interests cannot be resolved by assuming a difference in date and outlook between the two poems, Kahn observed that the religious poem presupposes Empedocles’ physics. For instance, Empedocles employs the scenario of the four elements as places in the world where the guilty gods are compelled to wander (B 115 [= EMP D 10 Laks-Most]). Moreover, he depicts the powers of Love and Strife upon the guilty gods as functioning in the same way as they work upon the elements within the physical fragments. Above all, Kahn highlighted that Empedocles’ conception of the principle of Love as a complex reality, ‘at once physical and spiritual’, is

27 28

29 30

with On Nature, whereas only B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) and F 26 Mansfeld-Primavesi (= EMP D 37 Laks-Most) are quoted as coming from the Purifications. The definition is by Kahn (1960: 5). There is no sure evidence that Empedocles was exiled. However, this may be implied from the reference to his κάθοδος in Diog. Laert. 8.67 and from the fact that in B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) Empedocles describes himself as one who travels from city to city, whereas in B 115: 13–14 (= EMP D 10.13–14 Laks-Most) he describes himself as an exile from the gods. Diels (1898: 406). See also Wilamowitz (1929: 655–6). According to Bidez (1894: 159–74) and Kranz (1935: 111–9). On the subjective nature of these interpretations see Primavesi (2013: 669).

8

Introduction

substantially unchanged between the Purifications and On Nature and this makes the two poems fundamentally compatible with each other.31 Additionally, Kahn showed that the physical poem is also a profoundly religious work. In fact, the form of On Nature suggests the spirit of mysterious revelation entrusted to his disciple Pausanias, to whom the physical poem is dedicated and who is urged to keep it ‘mute in his heart’.32 This invites the reading of a ‘preliminary initiation, which reserves the final disclosure for a later ἐποπτεία’.33 Moreover, Kahn argued that the doctrinal content of the physical poem also betrays ‘a religious orientation’, with Empedocles’ prayer to the gods and the Muse (B 3 [= EMP D 44 LaksMost]), his belief in life after death as well as in evil and the good things that come with it (B 15 [= EMP D 52 Laks-Most]) and, even more remarkably, with his promise to teach his disciple how to control the forces of nature (B 111 [= EMP D 43 Laks-Most]).34 Thus, as Kahn concluded, ‘there is no room for a “conversion” between the physical poem and the Purifications, for the author of On Nature is already a religious mystic who hints at his belief in immortality’.35 Kahn’s pivotal revision opened a new pathway in Empedocles studies. Scholars gradually dismissed as anachronistic the nineteenth-century assumption that the philosopher’s physical theories and religious interests were incompatible and began instead to look at points of contact between them. Indeed, scholars have made headway in showing that the different areas of Empedocles’ thought are not contradictory but display striking analogies. This innovative approach has its most radical representatives in C. Rowett and P. Kingsley. Yet, by working on the analogous premise of superseding the dualism between Empedocles the systematic, rational philosopher and Empedocles the religious mystic, they came up with substantially different conclusions. On the one hand, in a 1987 article, Rowett argued for a rejection not merely of the idea of Empedocles as a divided character, but even of the tradition of Empedocles as author of two poems.36 Specifically, Rowett challenged the common view that ancient sources that name Purifications and On Nature in connection to Empedocles’ verses refer therewith to two separate poems. She pointed out that no ancient authors quoting Empedocles describe the work from which they quote, 31 32 34 36

Kahn (1960: 24). B 5 (= EMP D 258 Laks-Most). See also B 111.2 (= EMP D 43.2 Laks-Most). 33 Kahn (1960: 8). Ibid. 7–8. 35 Ibid. 10. Rowett’s hypothesis was embraced by Inwood in his 1992 edition of Empedocles’ fragments (revised in 2001).

Introduction

9

none are concerned to distinguish poems of different content, none use both ‘physika’ and ‘katharmoi’ as titles nor mention any distinction between the titles in terms of the subject matter of the poem and none summarize or describe the general content of the poem designated by the title used.37 Thus, Rowett concludes that, in line with the practice in antiquity of occasionally referring to one and the same literary work, or various parts of the same work, by different names, the two titles are alternative ways of naming one and the same poem. However, the report of Diogenes Laertius (8.77), τὰ μὲν οὖν Περὶ φύσεως αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ Καθαρμοὶ εἰς ἔπη τείνουσι πεντακισχίλια (‘the books of On Nature and the Katharmoi span five thousand lines in all’), challenges Rowett’s reconstruction. Here Empedocles’ two poems are mentioned in one breath in relation to their total number of verses. Moreover, a few chapters before, Diogenes Laertius quoted not only the opening lines of the Purifications (B 112 [= EMP D 4 Laks-Most]), where Empedocles addresses his fellow citizens of Agrigento, but also the dedicatory line of On Nature, in which he speaks to his disciple Pausanias (B 1 [= EMP D 41 Laks-Most]).38 This suggests that Diogenes Laertius is aware not merely of Empedocles’ different titles, but also of separate works that he distinguishes in terms of their address. Thus, as Kingsley explains, although Rowett’s hypothesis remains ‘a theoretical possibility . . . we are obliged on balance to accept what Diogenes says in the absence of any genuine reasons for doubting him’.39 This leaves the hypothesis that Empedocles wrote two poems. Nevertheless, Rowett’s reconstruction has the merit of having questioned the long-standing distribution of Empedocles’ fragments between the two, highlighting that it was grounded on an anachronistic nineteenth-century reconstruction of Empedocles’ doctrinal dualism. On the other hand, in his 1995 book, Kingsley approached Empedocles’ thought from a perspective that aimed to encompass ‘unorthodox’ elements, such as magic, but ended up dismissing any genuine interest in natural philosophy or physics by Empedocles. Kingsley argued that, since Empedocles’ self-definition as an iatromantis was in accord with the agonistic and pragmatic context in which he worked,40 he was simply an itinerant purifier, similar to an oriental magos. Kingsley’s approach has the merit of having highlighted, through a meticulous analysis of different 37 39 40

38 Rowett (1987a: 27). Diog. Laert. 8.54. Kingsley (1995: 363–64). Against Rowett’s reconstruction, see also Sedley (1989: 270–76), Edwards (1991: 283 n.6) and Primavesi (2006b, 2007, 2013: 681–82, 685–89). See also Gemelli Marciano (2002: 106–7).

10

Introduction

kinds of sources, that magic is among Empedocles’ concerns; yet his dismissal of the philosopher’s genuine interest in natural philosophy is as inadequate in the description of fifth-century thought as were nineteenthcentury standpoints. In contrast, my approach avoids unilateral and radical classifications and assumes, instead, that fifth-century thought, and Empedocles’ philosophy in particular, consisted of a synergy among natural philosophy and concerns for more religious beliefs and ritual purity, and that it can even extend, as Kingsley showed, to include magic. For this reason, my investigation makes extensive use of the background in which Empedocles lived and worked and of the relationships he established with traditional ideas as well as with the innovative thought of his time. His fragments will thus be contextualized in their poetical, religious, intellectual and historical settings and also considered in light of their legacy to later thought. For instance, Chapter 2 investigates diverse aspects of lyric poetry, which illuminates the interpretation of several elements included in Empedocles’ proem to On Nature. Chapter 3 draws attention to Empedocles’ verses in dialogue with Plato, Pythagoras and later Platonizing interpretations, while Chapter 6 explores Empedocles’ epistemological views in relation to other early Greek epistemic reflections, notably those of Xenophanes, Alcmaeon, the Hippocratic author of Ancient Medicine and Parmenides. In addition, epic poetry, especially Homer and Hesiod, reports on legendary or semilegendary characters and trends of thought expressed by new rituals and cults are also considered throughout. Beyond this contested background, a key point in the history of Empedocles studies for reconsidering his thought (and, as we shall see, for reconstructing his physical poem) occurred in 1999, when an extraordinary publication entered the scene via a previously unknown papyrus. This had been bought at the beginning of the twentieth century by the Bibliothèque Nationale et Universitaire de Strasbourg, but was entrusted many years later to A. Martin and O. Primavesi for study and publication.41 From its fiftytwo fragments, each containing no more than a few letters, Martin and Primavesi reconstructed eleven ensembles, classified in alphabetical order,42 which attest over seventy-four lines of Empedocles’ physical poem. In the first visible lines of the first column of ensemble a, nine verses can be read, 41 42

Martin-Primavesi (1999). That is, ensembles a–k: see Martin-Primavesi (1999: 3–6). In a seminal 2004 article, Janko proposed that ens. c belongs to the same papyrus section as ens. a, representing its immediate continuation, while ens. f was shown to be the inferior and right portion of the same column attested by ens. d. Janko’s reconstruction is endorsed by Primavesi (2008a).

Introduction

11

which Simplicius quoted as coming from the first book of Empedocles’ On Nature (DK 31 B 17 [= EMP D 73. 233–66 Laks-Most]).43 The Strasbourg papyrus thus returns an integral piece of the direct tradition of Empedocles and, therewith, pre-Socratic philosophy.44 Furthermore, it bears important evidence that, if correctly understood, supports a rethinking of Empedocles’ thought in terms of his doctrinal unity, as well as a new reconstruction of the fragments within On Nature. Specifically, ens. d–f displays two remarkable lines dealing with the consumption of food deemed unfit for eating and the painful fate deriving from eating it.45 These lines were already known from a quotation by Porphyry,46 and because of their religious character, all pre-papyrus editors allocated them within the Purifications.47 Yet the direct tradition unquestionably shows that Empedocles’ physics included purificatory material; indeed, religious lines with a strongly purificatory connotation are integrated within a physical discourse in the first book of On Nature.48 This evidence highlights the need to rethink the topics and scope of Empedocles’ physical poem and, more generally, of fifth-century natural philosophy as a whole. While the papyrus evidence has inevitably lent new popularity to Rowett’s hypothesis that Empedocles was the author of just one poem,49 for those post-papyrus editors who do not undermine the report of our sources (especially Diogenes Laertius, as mentioned above) and consequently assume that Empedocles wrote two works, the Strasbourg papyrus should have led to a reconsideration of the criteria according to which they allocate Empedocles’ fragments between On Nature and the Purifications. Yet the significance of this evidence for a new apportioning of the fragments and, consequently, for a novel reconstruction of Empedocles’ poems has been overlooked. Indeed, although the first editors 43 44

45 46 47 48 49

Phys. 157, 25 Diels. However, Kingsley (2002: 334) is skeptical about the novelty represented by the papyrus verses: over half of them tell us little or nothing new: around 27 of them either are lines of Empedocles’ poetry already known from other sources or have been painstakingly reconstructed by editors in detailed imitation of lines we already knew. This leaves us with only about 25 lines of which we can say that they offer us the promise of something genuinely fresh in terms of substance and content . . . what is so striking here, when all has been said and done is how little fresh information these fresh lines contain. PStrasb. d–f 5–6 (= EMP D 76. 5–6 Laks-Most): ‘Alas that the pitiless day did not destroy me earlier, / before I contrived terrible deeds about feeding with my claws’. De Abst. 2.31 = B 139 (= EMP D 34 Laks-Most). With the exception of van der Ben (1975), whose reconstruction will be discussed further below. For a thorough discussion of the Strasbourg papyrus with reference to this topic, see Chapter 1.1. On Rowett’s hypothesis, see above. This is now advocated by Inwood (2001), Trépanier (2004), Janko (2005) and McKirahan (2010: 230–92).

12

Introduction

of the Strasbourg papyrus recommended reconstructing within the physical poem50 the reference to rebirth and, therefore, the story of the gods being exiled to earth and reborn as mortal beings (notably the story narrated in B 115 [= EMP D 10 Laks-Most]), from 2001 onwards Primavesi has vehemently advocated the conservative hypothesis that B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) belongs to the Purifications. This conclusion has since been followed by all editors who argue for two poems.51 However, as D. Sedley has pointed out,52 this stance created a curious scenario in Empedocles studies. On the one hand, the old dogma that Empedocles’ physical and religious doctrines belong to distinct areas of his thought has now been discredited as an anachronistic imposition on fifth-century thought. On the other hand, ‘the conventional apportionment of fragments between the two poems, which was founded on that dogma, remains largely unchallenged, as if it had some independent authority’.53 In Chapter 1 I will show that it has none. Thus, by paying due attention to the Strasbourg evidence, the first two chapters of this book fundamentally challenge the standard apportionment of extant fragments between On Nature and the Purifications and in contrast offer an original version of the proem to On Nature, which includes topics and verses dealing with the story of the guilty gods and rebirth. Because my reconstruction of the proem to On Nature includes many of the topics and verses that have traditionally been attributed to the Purifications, especially those that focus on the exile of the daimon and Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth, a question may arise as to what I take the Purifications to be in terms of its content and intent. For this reason, it is worth briefly setting out my stance. In this regard, I have considerable sympathy with the hypothesis of Sedley that the Purifications were originally a collection of heterogeneous material, of ritual oracles and healing utterances as well as purificatory rules for everyday life.54 Specifically, Sedley notes that this hypothesis is suggested by the verses introducing the Purifications, B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most),55 through which 50 51

52 55

Martin-Primavesi (1999: e.g., 113). Or at least by all of them that I am aware of: Tonelli (2002), Bollack (2003), Vítek (2006), Gemelli Marciano (2009), Graham (2010), Montevecchi (2010), Mansfeld-Primavesi (2011 and 2021) and Laks-Most (2016). Although in his 2004 reconstruction of Empedocles’ fragments, Trépanier argues for only one poem, in later contributions, by remarking on the need to read Empedocles’ physics and doctrine of rebirth as aspiring to theoretical unity, he stresses the point of B 115 (=EMP D 10 LaksMost) having its place in Empedocles’ physics – see, e.g., Trépanier (2014: 174, 2017a: 165). Sedley (1989). 53 Ibid. 271. 54 Sedley (1989: 271–73). According to Diog. Laert. 8.54, B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) constitutes the proem to the Purifications. For a detailed interpretation of this fragment, see Chapter 1.4.

Introduction

13

Empedocles tells us that wherever he goes, people keep asking ‘where their advantage lies, some seeking prophecies, others, long pierced by harsh pains, ask to hear the word of healing for all kinds of illnesses’.56 As Sedley argues, in light of the programmatic character of these introductory lines, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Purifications were simply a response to ‘these requests, a set of purificatory oracles and “healing utterances”’.57 In this regard, Sedley shows that those scant fragments that our sources attributed to the Purifications or can be considered as part of them by virtue of their content agree with this conclusion. Two fragments are explicitly connected with Empedocles’ Purifications by our sources, but they are highly fragmentary and for this reason difficult to contextualize. One fragment focuses on plants with dense roots and rare shoots,58 whereas the other fragment consists of just three words, ‘seven times seven’, which our source connects with the notion that the foetus is completely formed after seven weeks.59 Admittedly, there is little to be inferred in terms of content and context from these quotations, but it is not impossible to assume, as Sedley does, that they did not contain any discursive exposition on plants or embryology/childbirth, simply offering instructions for purifications that include the medical and even magical power of some plants, or mystical utterances (as ‘seven times seven’ seems to be) useful ‘in the course of a purificatory advice’ concerning childbirth.60 Other sets of verses, which are not explicitly connected to the Purifications by our sources but can nonetheless be attributed to this poem, consist of what seem to be ritual prescriptions of abstinence from some kinds of food, notably laurel leaves or beans, or advice on abstaining from evil actions.61 Lastly, Theon of Smyrna62 quotes some Empedoclean words, involving five springs and the ‘indestructible bronze’ that must be used to cut something, in connection with a purificatory and mysterious context, which indicates that they might originally be part of some ritual/purificatory utterances. From all these instances, as Sedley concludes, the idea we gain about the Purifications is not that of a discursive exposition of Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth, but rather a collection of heterogeneous material including instructions for rituals, healing advice and purificatory oracles. 56 58 59 60 61 62

The translation is by Wright (1995: 264). 57 Sedley (1989: 271–72). F 26 Mansfeld-Primavesi (= EMP D 37 Laks-Most). ἐν ἑπτὰ ἑβδομάσιν: B 153a (not in Laks-Most). The source is Theon of Smyrna 104.1 Hill. Sedley (1989: 272). See B 140 (= EMP D 32 Laks-Most), B 141 (= EMP D 31 Laks-Most) and B 144 (= EMP D 33 Laks-Most). Theo. Smyrn. 15.7 Hill. (= B 143 [= EMP D 35 Laks-Most]).

14

Introduction

Finally, Sedley shows that this conclusion is supported by three further reports of Katharmoi as a kind of composition.63 The first is with reference to Epimenides of Crete (seventh century BCE), a semi-legendary figure of a purifier, who is credited with the composition of a work entitled Purifications.64 We do not have any specific indications of what this work was about but, considering Epimenides’ fame as a purifier and the report Plutarch offers of him as a man ‘learned in religion in the sphere connected with divination and initiatory rites’ (ἐνθουσιαστικὴ καὶ τελεστικὴ σοφία),65 it can be assumed that his Purifications were a heterogeneous set of purificatory advices, divinatory utterances and oracles useful in initiatory rites. Second, a line from the pseudoPythagorean Golden Verses reads: ‘but abstain from the food that I spoke of in my Katharmoi and Absolution of the Soul’,66 which clearly connects these kinds of compositions with abstention from certain sorts of food and some ritual ‘absolutions’ – themes that are associated with Empedocles’ Purifications too, as we have just seen. Third, in the Frogs 1033, the remark of the comic poet Aristophanes on Musaeus’ expertise in ‘healing and oracles’ is glossed by the scholiast with the information that Musaeus ‘composes absolutions, initiations and katharmoi’ (DK 2 A 6 [not in Laks-Most]). The legendary figure of Musaeus was famous in antiquity as a chresmologist or ‘oracle-gatherer’, namely ‘a man who went about looking for people who would reward him for reciting to them oracles which he knew and which had a bearing on their affairs’67 – a description that could be appropriate to Empedocles too who, as we have seen above, wanders from city to city, giving profitable oracles, advice and healing utterances and receiving for this divine honours from people (B 112 [= EMP D 4 Laks-Most]). Thus, compositions called Purifications are clearly linked with collections of ritual advices, healing oracles and purificatory utterances. The answer then, in terms of what I take Empedocles’ Purifications to be, is that, as Sedley showed, this poem and On Nature are distinct works not in terms of their content (philosophy vs. religion) or addressees (Pausanias vs. citizens of Acragas; that is, an esoteric vs. exoteric poem),68 but rather on the formal 63 66

67 68

65 Sedley (1989: 273–74). 64 DK 3 A 2–3 (not in Laks-Most). Plut. Sol. 12.7. Car. Aur. 67f. Sedley also highlights that three lines later the author concludes this composition with ἔσσεαι ἀθάνατος θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός, which is a clear reminiscence of Empedocles’ opening of the Purifications at B 112.4 (= EMP D 4.4 Laks-Most). West (1983: 40). Although the second person singular is generally used as a criterion for attributing the fragments to the physical poem, the impotence of this criterion is demonstrated by Rowett (1987a: 31–32), Sedley (1989: 273 with n.17) and Inwood (2001: 15 n.34). Thus, in Chapter 2 my reconstruction of the

Introduction

15

level of their composition. That is, whereas the Purifications are a collection of heterogeneous and rather brief sayings, On Nature is a doctrinal exposition69 in which, as I show in this book, religious concerns related to the doctrine of rebirth and purifications are central to understanding Empedocles’ physical system. In setting out this main argument, the first two chapters of this book will work together to demonstrate that verses related to Empedocles’ fault, punishment, exile and rebirths, starting from B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost) and continuing with all other fragments related to it (the so-called demonological fragments), are integral to the proem to On Nature. In this respect, my reconstruction of the introductory section of the physical poem shares similarities with that by N. van der Ben, who in 1975 allocated the story of the guilty gods in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and several other fragments related to it to the opening section of Empedocles’ physical poem. However, van der Ben’s reconstruction of the proemial fragments failed to gain a following, as his interpretation of both the story of the guilty gods and Empedocles’ cosmos were fervidly criticized as an anachronistic attempt to explain Empedocles in Neoplatonic terms. Specifically, on the one hand, van der Ben rejected the cyclical interpretation of Empedocles’ cosmic cycle which, as D. O’Brien demonstrated,70 is indicated by both Empedocles’ own words and their earliest interpreters, such as Plato and Aristotle.71 On the other hand, van der Ben’s interpretation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) also betrays a strongly Neoplatonist connotation that is clearly anachronistic when applied to Empedocles.72 Thus, in his 1981 essay dedicated to a detailed criticism of van der Ben’s study, O’Brien restored the importance of the cyclical description of the cosmos in Empedocles’ system as well as the need to read his philosophy without turning the history of ancient thought upside down.73 In doing so, O’Brien rejected van der Ben’s reconstruction of the proem to On Nature in favour of Diels’ apportionment of the fragments. However, his rejection of van der Ben’s allocation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) within

69

70 71 73

opening verses of On Nature is based on the assumption that Empedocles, in his physical poem, shifts the addressee turning to different interlocutors. If I may make a rather daring comparison, I would say that the Purifications are to On Nature what Hesiod’s Days are to his Work or, even better, to his Theogony: a collection of heterogeneous advice on the one hand and a discursive, didactic narrative on the other. With his monumental book on Empedocles’ cosmic cycle in 1969 and again in a 1981 essay that is dedicated to a rejection of van der Ben’s hypothesis. On this, see Chapter 7.1. 72 See O’Brien (1981: 73–90). Ibid. 90, where O’Brien concludes that B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) could only be part of the physical poem if the history of ancient philosophy is turned upside down.

16

Introduction

Empedocles’ physical poem draws on a reading of its testimonia that has become problematic – not to say untenable – in light of the Strasbourg papyrus, as I will show in Chapter 1. In this respect, Chapter 1 will show first how the papyrus evidence changes the way we approach our secondary sources for B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), none of which can now be taken as evidence for the attribution of this fragment to the Purifications. Second, the recent suggestion that the attribution of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to the religious poem is corroborated by reasons of similar content with the proem to the Purifications, and by the assumption that On Nature contains no hints at Empedocles’ divine nature,74 is demonstrably flawed. Third, the attribution of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to the physical poem is established by PStrasb. d–f 3–10 (= EMP D 76.3–10), which is an internal echo, indeed a literary allusion, to the story of Empedocles’ guilt and punishment narrated in B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost). Thus, in order to make sense of the content of these papyrus verses and their poetic function, B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) needs to precede them in the poem, while Plutarch tells us that its lines constitute the prelude to the doctrine proper. The inference is that the story of the guilty gods and Empedocles’ claim that he is one of them belongs to the proem to On Nature. Having then shown that a reappraisal of Empedocles’ doctrinal unity is not only prompted by the nature of fifth-century philosophy, but also and above all by Empedocles’ physical poem itself, which thematizes topics concerning the consumption of food deemed unfit to be eaten, certain faults very likely related to it and the concept of punishment and rebirth, Chapter 2 will follow up on this conclusion and offer a new sequence of fragments introducing On Nature. Having already established in Chapter 1 the allocation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) at the incipit of the physical poem, in Chapter 2 I will then argue that the proem to On Nature consists of lines that the sources quoted as closely related to the story of Empedocles’ fault, exile and rebirths mentioned in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). This series, commonly known as the demonological fragments and generally reconstructed within the Purifications, adds important details to Empedocles’ own portrayal as an exceptional individual, by narrating the first leg of his journey of exile as a katabasis to the realm of the dead.75 It will 74 75

See Primavesi (2013: e.g., 688). As early as 1975, van der Ben (e.g., 57–59) suggested that the prologue to Empedocles’ On Nature begins with his katabasis. Zuntz (1971: e.g., 263) also reconstructed Empedocles’ katabasis out of the

Introduction

17

be argued that, in introducing his physical poem with the narration of an extraordinary journey to the underworld, Empedocles aims at validating his authority on matters beyond ordinary human ken. Additionally, his katabasis stages, against a nearly mythical background, his belief in rebirth: it is because he has seen the dead and their destiny in Hades that what he professes concerning the place and destiny of human beings in this world can be trusted as true. Thus, while the proem to On Nature begins with the story of Empedocles’ fault and katabasis, the second part of Chapter 2 is intended to reconstruct those themes that might have followed this narration. They include traditional topics such as the dedication of his poem to his disciple Pausanias, the invocation to the gods and the Muse and the description of the miserable inanity of ordinary human beings, along with the promise that Pausanias will be able to overcome human condition by following Empedocles’ teachings. In addition to traditional proemial fragments, however, my reconstruction of the physical proem is such that it also includes verses on Empedocles’ rejection of ritual sacrifices and hints at his concept of rebirth as an integral element of some of his more physical principles. Indeed, I will show the way in which these topics are consistently presented in synergy with the rudiments and the tenet of his physics. In conclusion, we will see that the proem to On Nature according to my new reconstruction displays a programmatic structure of a surprising internal coherence, in which religious themes intertwine with physical topics, making sense of many of the most debated and fundamental Empedoclean fragments. This result is significant for a number of reasons, most importantly because we are dealing with fragments that are crucial for a comprehensive and impartial understanding of Empedocles’ thought. A proem so reconstructed then offers us a textual basis to rethink the interrelation and interaction among myth, religion and natural philosophy in Empedocles’ physical system. However, it also raises a chain of questions that I will attempt to answer in the rest of the book. In particular, my investigation in Chapters 3 to 7 will build on issues already identified by Warren, but will also extend to include further long-standing and still unresolved questions about the unitary nature of Empedocles’ thought and doctrine. Specifically, in his 2007 work on the pre-Socratics, Warren claimed that, although the diverse aspects of Empedocles’ thought and, therefore, the highly heterogeneous material the extant fragments returned to us may demonological fragments, but claimed this narration constituted the prologue to Empedocles’ Purifications.

18

Introduction

seem added to one another, it is not really difficult to consider Empedocles’ religious interests as part of his physical system.76 As Warren continued, the real difficulty lies ‘in attempting to marry the details of the daimon’s story with the cosmological account’. Put another way, it basically means combining the details of Empedocles’ belief in rebirth with the principles of his physical system. In particular, Warren listed some of the most controversial questions that this ‘marriage’ raises: In what ways does the process of reincarnation fit the cosmic change from the Sphere to Love to the factionalized world of Strife and back again? How should we combine the cosmic role of Love and Strife with their roles in the story of the daimon? And who, precisely, are the daimones? Are all we human beings in fact daimones [. . .]? Or are there two races: mortal human beings and daimones? Are the gods and the daimones the same?77

Thus, in addressing Warren’s questions via the reconstruction of the fragments offered in Chapters 1 and 2, I will also ask: what role does B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) play in the reconstruction of Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth? What is the status of the daimon in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and its relation to individuals (and souls) and gods? In this respect, when can something be said to be divine in Empedocles’ system; or, put in more general terms, what is ‘godhood’ for him? Does his physics, whose tenet entails the negation that something could utterly die, envisage strictly immortal entities alongside beings with a life cycle? Additionally, how can Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth coexist with a physical system that is chiefly materialistic; that is, based on the ratio of fire, air, water and earth? What is behind Empedocles’ rejection of birth and death? With specific reference to rebirth, what does this doctrine imply in terms of personal identity and its continuity upon death? Furthermore, what does Empedocles’ revelation of truth entail in terms of the divine knowledge promised to Pausanias? What defines knowledge as divine? What epistemic effort is required of Pausanias and what does it entail for him to gain divine knowledge? Does Empedocles’ physics tell us anything about the individual’s release from rebirth? Lastly, what is the place of gods and mortals in Empedocles’ cosmic cycle? In what ways does the process of rebirth accord with the cosmic change from two consecutive Sphairoi? How could we combine the cosmic role of Love and Strife with their roles in the story of the reincarnated individuals? 76

Warren (2007: 147).

77

Ibid. 147–48.

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In order to answer questions related more broadly to notions of godhood in Empedocles’ physics, Chapters 3 and 4 will be devoted to the exploration of theological issues, which are directly or indirectly connected to his belief in rebirth. The investigation conducted here aims to provide linguistic and conceptual tools crucial to the reconstruction of Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth. It is therefore a necessary groundwork for the restoration of his doctrinal unity, which will be thoroughly undertaken in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In Chapter 3, I will begin with the analysis of Empedocles’ concept of δαίμων (daimon) and look at the way in which it delivers important meanings with reference to Empedocles’ concept of rebirth. First, it will be shown that the standard interpretation according to which Empedocles’ story as an exiled δαίμων is a myth that founds his doctrine of rebirth is flawed. While the core idea behind this interpretation derives from Plutarch’s anachronistic reading of the story of the guilty gods, in order to define which notion of δαίμων Empedocles may have had in mind when composing the lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), I will look at those texts in which this notion recurs in conjunction with the belief in rebirth: first in Plato’s dialogues and then in the Pythagorean fragments. As will be seen, Plato worked on a traditional concept of δαίμονες as divine guides and protectors of souls in this life and beyond, whereas Pythagorean sources exploited the traditional notion of δαίμων as a divine being to articulate a twofold idea: first that Pythagoras was more than an ordinary human being and, second, that a god could exceptionally undergo rebirths, although these are usually reserved for ordinary souls. Following Pythagoras and anticipating Plato my concluding argument in Chapter 3 will be that Empedocles depicts himself as a divine guide and protector of human beings in this world and beyond. In doing so, moreover, he construes his own demonology, which was bound to his doctrine of general rebirth, but never overlapped with it. After having delved into the concept of δαίμων, its divine status and its role in Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth, Chapter 4 will explore further concepts – mostly introduced in the proemial fragments – that translate Empedocles’ notion of godhood. As with Chapter 3, the analysis of Empedocles’ key concepts related to the divine offered in Chapter 4 is fundamental background for a comprehensive understanding of his religious thought and for a later evaluation of the import it has on his physical theories. My analysis here will focus on those concepts to which Empedocles explicitly refers as gods, showing that divine entities (such as, for instance, the four elements, Love and Strife, the Sphairos

20

Introduction

and long-lived gods) differ significantly in their divine nature. However, with regard to living beings released from rebirth, we will see that their obtained divinity is based on the characteristics of the Sphairos, the prototype of all integrated entities and the ideal model of the divine. Most importantly, it will be shown that the notion of divinity elaborated with reference to integrated beings is closely related to the antinomy Love/Strife, and this has considerable bearing on the assessment, in Chapter 7, of the mortal/immortal (i.e., rebirth/liberation) dichotomy and its implications in the cosmic cycle. Once pivotal notions connected with more theological aspects of Empedocles’ natural philosophy have been considered and clarified, providing us with the linguistic and conceptual instruments to better understand some of the details of his belief in rebirth, starting with Chapter 5 I will set out a closer exploration of the interconnection of religious and physical principles. To do so, I will incorporate the rest of the proemial section in which themes and motifs related to the doctrine of rebirth are programmatically intertwined with Empedocles’ strictly physical tenets. Thus, considering Empedocles’ rejection of ordinary notions of birth and death in a group of fragments that make up the final part of the proem of On Nature, Chapter 5 will then highlight that this chiefly physical tenet is articulated with his doctrine of rebirth in mind. By expanding on this, it will be shown that Empedocles formulates his notion of elemental mixtures that bring about living beings in terms similar to those used to depict processes of rebirth and this betrays Empedocles’ intention to explain his concept of rebirth at the level of physical principles. Related to this, Chapter 5 will also show that concerns about disembodied existence, individual identity and personal survival upon death are not just added to Empedocles’ physical system but are central to it. However, although our extant fragments quite clearly establish continuity of self upon death, foregrounding individuals who are potentially recognizable despite their changed form, scholars generally dismiss the possibility of personal survival, and subsequently of a positive doctrine of rebirth in Empedocles’ physical system. For this is thought not to align with his ideas on psychological and mental functions, which are depicted as mechanical processes steered by the body’s organs and tissues that dissolve upon death. On the contrary, this chapter will offer an explanation of the way in which Empedocles’ conceptualization of rebirth as a series of bodily transformations has led him to marginalize the notion of soul, overlooking a reflection on how the person could persist from an embodied to a disembodied

Introduction

21

state of existence and which role the soul plays in this context. Instead, Empedocles is at ease with a traditional, Homeric and Pythagorean notion of psyche, which can not only sustain the notion of disembodied existence, as it stands for personal survival upon the death of the body. It can also be reconciled with the principles of his physics. While claims to disembodied existence and personal survival are central to Empedocles’ physical system, the general aim of On Nature is to teach the way to escape rebirth, transcend mortal nature and become a god. Being a god himself, re-born as a ‘master of truth’,78 as established in Chapters 2 and 3, Empedocles becomes the teacher of a super-human wisdom, primarily directed to his disciple Pausanias, with the final promise that he will know (and even control) the forces of nature just like a god. Indeed, thanks to Empedocles’ philosophy, Pausanias will transcend his mortal nature and become divine. The general aim of Chapter 6 is thus to explore the relationship among true knowledge of the physical world, release from rebirths and the change of one’s mortal nature into a divine being. After investigating what Empedocles could have regarded as divine wisdom, by discussing the most relevant epistemic reflections about human and divine cognitive potential developed in the sixth and fifth century BCE, it will be shown that Empedocles explains the change of being into divine nature at the level of the elements and takes knowledge of the physical world as impacting a person’s bodily constitution. The possibility to change one’s being is tightly connected to processes of perception, thought and knowledge acquisition which enable us to internalize Empedocles’ philosophical revelation and change the elemental mixture of our mind to the point that it will become a divine mind. The possibility of becoming divine through genuine knowledge of the physical world goes along with the training one must undergo to be adequately prepared to receive it. As this training coincides with processes of purification, Empedocles explains from a physiological standpoint how these enable the structure of the elements in our mind to be enhanced to the point where it becomes attuned to the divine. Since purifications are, above all, a means to a more ‘religious’ purpose – the release of the individual from the chain of rebirths – Empedocles’ theory on knowledge acquisition shows how deeply interwoven and mutually enlightening his concept of rebirth and his physics are. Indeed, it is a life of both purity and knowledge 78

This definition refers to the title of a 1967 essay by Detienne.

22

Introduction

that will allow the person to change to the point where the individual will be ready to be released from rebirths. Continuing along the line of investigating the relationship between religious doctrines and physical principles, and on this basis establishing the doctrinal unity of Empedocles’ philosophy, in Chapter 7 I will turn to the cosmic cycle, with the primary goal of establishing the ways in which it accommodates Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth. After having provided my reconstruction of the cosmic cycle – one of the most controversial issues of Empedocles studies – as a regular alternation of only two phases, Sphairos and Cosmos (thus representing the Empedoclean version of the One/ Many problem), I will then explore the place allocated to gods and mortals in it. By concentrating on the metaphorical scenario of the everlasting conflict between Love and Strife, I will argue that, in conformity with traditional anthropogonic accounts, Empedocles describes the history of the world as a series of different ages, in which Strife’s miserable humankind replaced a past ‘golden’ age ruled by Love, whose inhabitants then become gods ‘greatest in honours’. This will display the way in which the spatial and conceptual gods/humans antinomy structures the action of Love and Strife in the cycle, thus showing the interconnection between rebirth and physics. By expanding on this, the final part of Chapter 7 will address the question – already raised by Warren – of whether the function of Love and Strife in the cosmic cycle can be combined with their role in the history of reincarnated individuals. In addressing this issue, two related questions will be examined: first, whether cosmic cycles are morally neutral and, second, whether moral agency has any influence on the shape of our world. By returning to the metaphorical domain of conflict, it will be shown that Empedocles’ narrative of the cosmos is set against a strongly moral backdrop. Even more importantly, however, it will be argued that the moral import of the cosmic cycle is intended to ground Empedocles’ concept of rebirth on the level of physical principles, thus highlighting that individuals’ moral agency has large-scale effects on the cosmos. Against this background, Chapter 7 is the final step towards demonstrating the doctrinal unity of Empedocles’ philosophy, establishing that his physics does not merely accommodate, but can even be seen as being premised and structured on his belief in rebirth. The present book is the outcome of a long project, which has attempted to examine many ingredients of Empedoclean thought, along with their interrelation and interconnection, systematically and within a unified structure. In doing so I have tried, as much as possible, to remain faithful

Introduction

23

to the ipsissima verba and to refrain from reading into them modern reconstructions that may have anachronistically imposed on ancient texts the issues, beliefs and even intentions of another time. I will undoubtedly have made mistakes, since a good bit of creativity, and even imagination, is inevitable; indeed, I would say that it is required when making sense of questions for which evidence fails at almost every crucial point. Nevertheless, by shedding fresh light on old readings, offering new ways to look at long-standing problems and through a constant dialogue with the texts, I hope to reopen discussion on unsettled questions and to challenge received opinions, largely dictated by outdated notions, which have by now been presented as dogmas in the scholarly debate. In doing so, I make no claim to cover all the issues surrounding Empedocles’ philosophy or to offer a final word on those I do consider. Rather, this book wishes to be seen as a voice, among many other voices, in an ongoing conversation about the way we understand early Greek philosophy and its legacy in the history of ancient thought as a whole. Instead of offering limiting solutions, therefore, I hope that it will continue to prompt new questions and to highlight, in turn, the challenging and, therefore, extremely engaging legacy of Empedocles, whose philosophy still repays study today.

chapter 1

Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature

In the Introduction to this book, we have seen that Empedocles’ thought has traditionally been reconstructed in two different poems: one is religious in content and goes under the title Purifications, while the other, titled On Nature, is on topics connected with what may be considered as fifthcentury natural philosophy. This reconstruction can be traced back to nineteenth-century approaches to Empedocles’ thought which, by considering his philosophical theories and religious doctrines as belonging to distinct and irreconcilable areas, sharply separated all religious material from the more strictly physical fragments. However, by 1960 Kahn had already demonstrated that there is no doctrinal conflict between the two poems, since the Purifications presuppose Empedocles’ cosmology, while On Nature is a profoundly religious work. Kahn’s pivotal revision ensured that scholars gradually discredited the idea of Empedocles’ doctrinal dichotomy as an anachronistic imposition on fifth-century thought and began instead to point out that the philosopher’s physical theories in On Nature and the religious concerns of the Purifications display analogies. Nevertheless, this ongoing reconsideration of the relationship between Empedocles’ religious and physical interests seems to have had no impact on how scholars assign his fragments to one or the other poem. Modern editions of Empedocles’ verses still present a conventional apportionment: verses related to the concept of rebirth and purificatory rules are generally separated from fragments of a more physical character, connected to the four elements and the two forces of Love and Strife, the cosmic cycle, the origin and development of our world, zoogony, anthropogony, biology and epistemology. In this way, scholars de facto perpetuate the nineteenthcentury distinction, as if it had some independent authority. In the present chapter I will demonstrate that it has none. Following the path opened by Kahn concerning a reading of Empedocles’ philosophy that is unified, in the first two chapters of this book my aim is to go even further: by reconsidering the place of several 24

Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature

25

religious fragments by locating them within the proem to On Nature, I will provide that reading with a concrete textual basis. Thus, aiming at showing that the prologue to Empedocles’ On Nature can be reconstructed out of several topics and verses traditionally attributed to the Purifications,1 the major claim of Chapters 1 and 2 is that the need to rethink the interrelation and interaction among myth, religion and natural philosophy in Empedocles’ thought is not only prompted by the context of fifthcentury thought in which Empedocles happened to live and work or by the doctrinal background of his verses; rather, it is primarily urged by the text of On Nature, which returns us verses and topics concerning guilty gods and rebirths in synergy with more strictly physical theories. More specifically, whereas in the next chapter I will reconstruct the whole sequence of verses and topics that introduce On Nature, my argument here is a justification of the apportionment of B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost) to the very incipit of the physical proem. The re-allocation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) is no small matter, but significant for a number of reasons, most importantly, because its verses are crucial for our understanding of Empedocles’ thought and therefore it is one of the most quoted fragments by ancient authors from the whole Empedoclean corpus.2 Through its lines, Empedocles tells the story of the gods who, because of crimes committed while trusting Strife, are banished from the divine community and exiled to our world where, for many years, they are obliged to be reborn as other forms of living beings. At the end of the fragment, Empedocles declares he himself is one of these gods, an exile and a wanderer because of Strife. Thus, the relevance of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) for a rounded understanding of Empedoclean philosophy lies in the fact that its verses are the place where Empedocles speaks, on the one hand, of the chain of rebirths and, on the other hand, of his exceptional nature as a god. Precisely because of its mythical-religious content, the relocation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost) within the proem to On Nature will set the stage for a re-evaluation of Empedocles’ physical poem and natural philosophy in their entirety.

1

2

For the standard apportionment of Empedocles’ fragments between his two poems, and consequently the interpretation of Empedocles’ apparent doctrinal antinomy, see my Introduction to this book. In his Index fontium, O’Brien lists about twenty-four authors who quote or recall one or more of its lines and he mentions further passages of ancient works, which either do or might hint at it, see O’Brien (1981: 111–14, p. 115 index alphabeticum), on the basis of Diels (1901: 150–53). See also Rowett (1987b: 113 n.120).

26

Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature

The chapter begins with a look at the Strasbourg papyrus and the evidence it has uncovered that is relevant to the question of the nature and content of the physical poem, followed by a fresh reading of the verses of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). Having set up this necessary background, I will then challenge the basis on which scholars have located B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) within the Purifications, discussing the indirect tradition through a close survey of its major sources: Plutarch, Hippolytus and Simplicius. Thereby, it will be shown that neither Plutarch nor Hippolytus can be taken as evidence for a sure allocation of B 115 within the Purifications, whereas Simplicius seems to have read it within Empedocles’ On Nature. In Section 1.4, I will address scholars’ claims that B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) and B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) belong together for thematic reasons and show, in contrast, that Empedocles’ claim to be a god in B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) is perfectly comprehensible in its own terms and does not need, therefore, to be elucidated through the story recounted in B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost). Finally, in the last section, I will return to the direct tradition of the Strasbourg papyrus and show that it provides evidence for the location of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) within On Nature.

1.1

Evidence from the Strasbourg Papyrus

Before delving into a close analysis of the lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost), it is necessary to introduce the extraordinary finding of the Strasbourg papyrus.3 Shedding new light on the issue of the doctrinal unity of Empedocles’ thought, this finding also provides evidence for a new reconstruction of the proem to Empedocles’ physical poem and the allocation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) within it. The present section therefore provides a general outline of the papyrus fragments relevant to the main aim of this chapter, along with a survey of their background scholarship. As I mentioned in the Introduction to this book, the Strasbourg papyrus is an extraordinary document for a number of reasons, but most importantly because it hands down to us a piece of the work of a pre-Socratic author, hitherto known only through indirect tradition; that is, through quotations from much later authors. The Strasbourg papyrus is dated between the first and the second century CE and was purchased in 1904 3

The editio princeps is by A. Martin and O. Primavesi for the German press De Gruyter: see MartinPrimavesi (1999).

1.1 Evidence from the Strasbourg Papyrus

27

by the German archaeologist Otto Rubensohn from the boutique of an antiquarian dealer in Achmîm, Upper Egypt, on behalf of the Deutsches Papyruskartell. At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was then sold to the Bibliothèque Nationale et Universitaire de Strasbourg. However, it was only in 1992 that it was identified as Empedoclean by the Belgian scholar A. Martin who, together with the German colleague O. Primavesi, restored from its fiftytwo fragments, each containing no more than a few letters, eleven ensembles, classified in alphabetical order,4 comprising verses from Empedocles’ physical poem.5 Two of the ensembles stand out due to their size: ens. a is restored out of twenty-four papyrus fragments, ens. d out of eleven fragments.6 The other ensembles are in contrast much smaller.7 The sum of the visible lines on the six major ensembles is approximately seventy-four. Several verses, visible on the first column of ens. a, coincide with the last lines of an already known Empedoclean fragment, DK 31 B 17 (= EMP D 73.233–66 Laks-Most), which is quoted by Simplicius from the first book of On Nature8 and represents one of the most important pieces for the interpretation of Empedocles’ cosmic cycle.9 In fact, the thirty-five lines forming B 17 (= EMP D 73.233–66 Laks-Most) are generally considered to be the beginning of Empedocles’ genuinely physical exposition, indeed the first introduction of the cosmic cycle after the proemial section.10 Thus, the rest 4 5

6 7

8

9 10

Ens. a–k, see Martin-Primavesi (1999: 3–6). Since all papyrus fragments derive from the same papyrus scroll, Martin-Primavesi (1999: e.g., 8) argued that the verses of the Strasbourg papyrus derive from Empedocles’ physical poem, and more precisely from Books I and II. Janko (2004: 3), on the contrary, has convincingly demonstrated that all the fragments attested on the papyrus come from the same book, namely the first book of On Nature. Moreover, ens. a presents the traces of two papyrus columns. From the first we can read the rest of the last nine lines, the second contains all thirty lines. Ens. d contains the first eighteen lines of another column. Specifically, ens. f is restored out of six fragments, while ens. b, c and g out of just two fragments each. Moreover, on ens. b the lower edge of a column can be clearly seen, while ens. c, d and e present the top margin of a column. In addition, ens. f is to be placed between two columns, as it contains traces from the right edge of one column and the left edge of the following column. In a 2004 article, Janko proposed that ens. c be reconstructed as the rest of the column following the second column of ens. a, while he also showed that ens. f represents the inferior and right portion of the same column attested by ens. d. Janko’s reconstruction is endorsed by Primavesi (2008a). Simplicius, Phys. 157.25, by quoting the lines of B 17, reports that they are to be found ἐν τῶι πρώτωι τῶν Φυσικῶν. Since all papyrus fragments derive from the same papyrus scroll, Martin-Primavesi (1999: e.g., 8) argued that the verses of the Strasbourg papyrus derive from Empedocles’ physical poem, namely Books I and II. Janko (2004: 3), on the contrary, has convincingly demonstrated that all the fragments attested on the papyrus come from the same book, namely the first book of On Nature. Portions of this fragment will be examined in Chapters 5.1 and 7.1. In Phys. 161.14–15 Simplicius quotes B 17.1–2 (= EMP D 73.233–4 Laks-Most) and notes that these lines come εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ. O’Brien (1981: 23) takes it as an indication that these lines belong ‘“au tout début” du poème’. In light of the evidence of the papyrus that, as we are going to see, enables us to reconstruct B 17.1 as line 232 (or 233, see n.12 below) of the first book of Empedocles’ On Nature, Simplicius’ indication can be taken as referring to the beginning of the physical exposition, rather than to the incipit of the poem.

28

Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature

of the text displayed on ens. a and on all other reconstructed papyrus fragments is to be taken as the continuation of this cosmological exposition. Moreover, on the left margin, in correspondence to the last line of the second column of ens. a (= a[ii]30), we can read a stichometric sign, a Γ, indicating that the verse corresponds to the three-hundredth line of Empedocles’ poem.11 This indication enables the exact collocation of the lines of B 17 (= EMP D 73.233–66 Laks-Most) within the first book of On Nature and thus we can now consider B 17.1 (= EMP D 73.233 Laks-Most) to correspond to line 232.12 In parallel, the stichometric sign indirectly reveals that the proem to On Nature included over two-hundred lines and, by virtue of its considerable length, very likely comprised a broad variety of topics and verses besides those that have generally been considered part of the proem.13 As mentioned in the Introduction, the indication of a theme that likely belonged to this prologue comes from another papyrus fragment, labelled ens. d–f. Here we find two lines (ens. d–f 5–6 [= EMP D 76.5–6 Laks-Most]) that correspond to an already known Empedoclean fragment, DK 31 B 139 (= EMP D 34 Laks-Most): └Οἴ┘μ̣οι

ὅτ(ι) οὐ πρόσθεν με δι̣ └ώλεσε νη┘λεὲς ἦμαρ, πρὶν χηλαῖς ̣ └σχέ┘τ̣λι᾿ ἔργα βορ̣└ᾶς πέρι μητ┘ί̣ σ̣α̣└σθαι·┘ └ ┘

5

Alas that the pitiless day did not destroy me earlier, before I contrived terrible deeds about feeding with my claws.

5

By quoting these two lines, the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry of Tyre related Empedocles’ ‘terrible deeds’ with a ‘sin concerning food’ that requires healing ‘by means of purifications’.14 Because of their pathosfilled tone, their thematic connection to food deemed unfit to be eaten, and their contextualization in our source against a purifying backdrop, scholars have generally attributed these two verses to the Purifications. On the contrary, the papyrus demonstrates that they are part of a physical context dealing with biology and the origin of living beings. 11 12

13

14

See Martin-Primavesi (1999: 22): ‘La lettre Γ que présente le papyrus d’Empédocle, en regard de a(ii) 30, signifie donc que le copiste en est à la 300e ligne de son labeur’. Primavesi (2008a: 64). According to Janko (2004), Martin-Primavesi (1999: 104) and Laks-Most (2016: EMP D 73), B 17.1 corresponds to line 233. The different numbering of the verses is based on whether the line reconstructed by Berg, οὕτως ἧι μὲν ἓν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι, which in the edition by Diels-Kranz corresponds to line 9, is accepted or not. Therefore, the proem to On Nature must be considered much longer and more elaborate in terms of content than the introductions reconstructed by recent scholars in their editions (all post Strasbourg papyrus), such as Tonelli (2002), Viték (2006), Montevecchi (2010), Graham (2010), MansfeldPrimavesi (2011) and Laks-Most (2016). De Abst. 2.31 = DK 31 B 139 (= EMP D 34 Laks-Most).

1.1 Evidence from the Strasbourg Papyrus

29

The crucial importance of this evidence lies in the fact that it bridges the gap between what have been regarded as religious and physical topics, showing that Empedocles’ physics can accommodate themes of personal responsibility and guilt regarding the consumption of forbidden foods, as well as the topic of the resulting miserable condition as human beings in this world. As P. Curd emphasized, ‘the Strasbourg evidence shows pretty clearly that one can no longer allocate lines of text because they seem to an interpreter “purificatory” or “physical”’, instead ‘that evidence suggests that some purificatory material appeared in On Nature’.15 Thus, the Strasbourg evidence is a strong indication that Empedocles’ philosophy accommodates both religious and physical doctrines, indeed, On Nature discloses a fundamental doctrinal unity. Empedocles’ thought needs therefore to be reinterpreted and reassessed in the light of this crucial evidence. Consequently, the publication of the papyrus has lent new popularity to the proposition, promoted in 1987 by C. Rowett, that we consider Empedocles as the author of a single poem, which our ancient sources indifferently referred to by the titles Purifications and On Nature. Since the publication of the papyrus, a growing number of scholars have supported Rowett’s assumption, even though, as I pointed out in the Introduction, the account of at least one ancient source, notably Diogenes Laertius, suggests that Empedocles wrote two distinct poems.16 In any case, the papyrus evidence prompts a reconsideration of the criteria according to which Empedocles’ fragments should be allocated between On Nature and the Purifications. Indeed, it invites us to rethink the collocation within On Nature of topics that have generally been considered religious and therefore attributed to the Purifications. For this reason, the first editors of the Strasbourg papyrus, Martin and Primavesi, suggested reconstructing B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) within the prologue of the physical 15 16

Curd (2005: 139). See Diog. Laert. 8.77: τὰ μὲν οὖν Περὶ φύσεως αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ Καθαρμοὶ εἰς ἔπη τείνουσι πεντακισχίλια. As I argued in the Introduction, in this passage Empedocles’ two poems are mentioned in one breath in relation to the number of verses they amount to. Moreover, at 8.54 Diogenes Laertius quoted the opening lines of the Purifications (B 112 [= EMP D 4 Laks-Most]), where Empedocles addresses his fellow citizens of Agrigento, and at 8.60 the dedicatory line of On Nature is cited, in which he speaks to his disciple Pausanias, son of Ankytos (B 1 [= EMP D 41 LaksMost]). This suggests that Diogenes Laertius is aware not merely of Empedocles’ different titles, but also of separate works that he distinguishes in terms of address. Therefore, although Rowett’s pivotal study has the merit of having challenged the traditional allocation of Empedocles’ fragments that was based on an anachronistic interpretation of his doctrinal dualism, my point is that Diogenes Laertius’ report on Empedocles’ two poems cannot be dismissed easily.

30

Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature

poem.17 However, from 2001 onwards Primavesi changed his view and vehemently advocated the conservative collocation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) among the fragments of the Purifications. This conclusion has since been followed by other Empedoclean editors; in fact, it has been followed by all those who argue for Empedocles as the author of two poems.18 Yet, why do they continue advocating an old arrangement of the fragments despite the new evidence? On the one hand, scholars ground their conservative reconstruction in the indirect tradition, which is generally thought to provide evidence for the attribution of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to the Purifications. For instance, O’Brien in 1981 used Plutarch’s quotation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to reconstruct a sort of standard criterion according to which Empedoclean verses could be attributed to the Purifications with a greater level of certainty. In 2001, however, O’Brien dismissed Plutarch as conclusive evidence for the attribution of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to the Purifications in favour of Hippolytus. Yet, as I will show in 1.3, a close reading of the Strasbourg papyrus challenges both O’Brien’s 1981 reconstruction and his 2001 interpretation. On the other hand, scholars generally consider that the similarity in content between B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and the proem to the Purifications (B 112 [= EMP D 4 Laks-Most]) – namely the fact that, in both fragments, Empedocles claims to be a god – is a major reason to allocate B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) in the religious poem. In this respect, Primavesi maintains that Empedocles’ claim to divine nature in B 112 can only be understood on the basis of the doctrine of reincarnation enunciated through the lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) which, for this reason, must be read within the same context. Additionally, Primavesi distinguishes the two poems according to two different fictional narrators, a god in the Purifications and a human being in On Nature.19 In contrast, in 1.4 it will be shown that Empedocles’ claims to be a god in B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) and B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) are perfectly comprehensible in their own terms and do not need, therefore, to be read together, while the way in which Empedocles styled himself in On Nature is 17 18

19

Martin-Primavesi (1999: e.g., 113). See Tonelli (2002), Bollack (2003), Vítek (2006), Gemelli-Marciano (2009), Graham (2010), Montevecchi (2010), Mansfeld-Primavesi (2011 and 2021) and Laks-Most (2016). It is worth noting that, even before the publication of the Strasbourg papyrus, two scholars argued for apportioning Empedocles’ B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and other religious verses related to it within On Nature: van der Ben (1975) and Sedley (1989, 1998). Their reconstructions have been discussed in the Introduction. Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021: 392–93; see already Primavesi [2013: 687–88]).

1.2 B 115 and the Story of the Guilty God

31

comparable to his portrait as a god in the Purifications. For this reason, B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) can well be part of the physical poem. Finally, in contrast to those scholars advocating an old arrangement of fragments, in Section 1.5 I argue that the question of the attribution of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to Empedocles’ physical poem is conclusively settled by the Strasbourg evidence and precisely, by PStrasb. d–f 3–10 (= EMP D 76.3–10 Laks-Most), which I have already partially discussed above. This result will be then compared with a report of Plutarch on some lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to conclude that the story of the guilty gods belongs to the incipit of On Nature.

1.2 B 115 and the Story of the Guilty God Having now introduced the papyrus fragments in question and the scholarly background to their study, let us look more closely at B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), which reads as follows: ἔστιν Ἀνάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν, ἀΐδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὅρκοις· εὖτέ τις ἀμπλακίηισι φόνωι φίλα γυῖα μιν †ὅς καὶ ἐπίορκον ἁμαρτήσας ἐπομόσσηι†, δαίμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο τρίς μιν μυρίας ὧρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι, φυόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἴδεα θνητῶν ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους. αἰθέριον μὲν γάρ σφε μένος πόντονδε διώκει, πόντος δ᾽ ἐς χθονὸς οὖδας ἀπέπτυσε, γαῖα δ᾽ ἐς αὐγὰς ἠελίου ἀκάμαντος, ὁ δ᾽ αἰθέρος ἔμβαλε δίναις· ἄλλος δ᾽ ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται, στυγέουσι δὲ πάντες. τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης, νείκεϊ μαινομένωι πίσυνος.

5

10

There is an oracle of Necessity, an ancient decree of the gods eternal, sealed with broad oaths: whenever a god nefariously stains his limbs with blood, (and/or) takes by his error a false oath – gods who have won long-lasting life – 5 this wanders for thrice ten thousand seasons away from the blessed ones being born throughout the time as all kinds of mortal forms interchanging the hard paths of life. For the strength of Ether pursues him into Sea, and Sea spits him onto the surface of Earth and Earth into the rays 10 of tireless Sun, and this throws him into the eddies of Ether;

32

Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature and one after another they receive him, but all hate him. I too am now one of these, an exile from the gods and a wanderer, trusting in mad Strife.

As mentioned above, B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) is one of the most quoted fragments by ancient authors from the whole Empedoclean corpus. The text I printed above follows the reconstruction of Diels-Kranz, to which modern editions of Empedocles essentially conform, except for some minor variations.20 Diels-Kranz’s text of B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost) derives from the comparison and integration of two major quotations, that by Plutarch in De exilio – which preserves the original sequence of lines, but omits some of them – and that by Hippolytus in the seventh book of his Refutatio Omnium Heresium – which quotes thirteen of its fourteen lines but not in the original order.21 However, despite the standard set by Diels-Kranz, its reconstruction and interpretation remain problematic, especially with regard to questions of text and meaning.22 Nevertheless, its content is clear in its broad outline. An oracle of Necessity, followed by an ancient and eternal decree of the gods, which was sealed by broad oaths, has established that gods who commit certain kinds of crimes, on which we shall return below, are banished from the divine abode for a very long time, during which they must wander the earth and be re-born as every kind of mortal being. In the last two lines, moreover, Empedocles declares that he is one of these guilty gods: he is a wanderer and an exile because of his trust in Strife. The juxtaposition, in asyndeton, of the divine oracle of Necessity (ἔστιν Ἀνάγκης χρῆμα), the ancient and eternal decree of the gods (θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν,/ἀΐδιον) and the broad oaths (πλατέεσσι . . . ὅρκοις) bestows a solemn tone to the ensuing story. This impression is strengthened by the fact that it is constructed upon a Hesiodic reminiscence. The expression πλατέεσσι ὅρκοις calls to mind Hesiod’s notion of the ‘great oath of the gods’, θεῶν μέγαν ὅρκον, which he introduced in his Theogony to complete the depiction of Styx and Hades.23 In order to unmask and ward off those who lie, Zeus demands that the gods take the great oath, which 20 21 22 23

But see Gallavotti (1975: 74–77 = Fr. 103) and Rashed (2008), which assume variations in the sequence of verses. Hipp. Ref. 7.29.14–23 quotes, in this order, ll. 13, 14, 4–5, 6, 7–8, 9–12, 1–2. Plut. De exil. 607c quotes ll. 1, 3, 5–6 and 13. For a philological discussion of this fragment see van der Ben (1975: 128–40), Wright (1995: 270–75), Primavesi (2001: 30–43), Bollack (2003: 60–69) and Ferella (2013). Theog. 784–806. It has long been acknowledged that these Empedoclean lines are reminiscent of Hesiod’s account of the perjured gods: see Wright (1995: 275); Most (2007: 284–92); A. Long (2019: 26) and Santamaría (2022).

1.2 B 115 and the Story of the Guilty God

33

Iris then brings to Styx. Then, Hesiod describes what happens to gods who swear a false oath: they must lie, breathless and speechless, for a long year, without ambrosia and nectar and surrounded by a terrible numbness, their condition effectively resembling that of the dead. When eventually recovered, they must remain apart from the gods’ community, their assemblies and feasts for another nine years. Only in the tenth year can they come back and join their divine abode.24 The analogies with Empedocles’ guilty gods are striking: not only the concepts of oaths and perjurers, but Empedocles also takes up the notion of the exile of the gods from the divine community as a punishment for their wrongdoing.25 The idea that gods could be punished through the temporary loss of their divine abode is a traditional motif, which is also elaborated in the story of Apollo’s exile, as is narrated in the ps.-Hesiodic Catalogue of Women.26 According to this myth, Apollo was banished from the assembly of the gods because he was guilty of the murder of the Cyclops, whom he killed to avenge the death of his son Asclepius. In fact, the Cyclops forged the thunderbolt that, through Zeus’ hand, killed Asclepius. For his murder Apollo was sentenced to a term of penance in our world as a servant of the mortal Admetus. Like Apollo, Empedocles’ gods are similarly banished from the divine community and punished through a very long exile on earth,27 during which they are compelled to be reborn as all kinds of living beings. Whereas the notion of reincarnation as a punishment for the guilty gods is absent from the myth of Apollo’s exile, it is worth noting – briefly, as I shall return to this in the next two chapters – that the idea of a god working through rebirths refers to Pythagoras, who was said to be a god

24 25

26 27

See esp. Theog. 784–93. Other Empedocles’ reminiscences of the Hesiodic passage highlight that Empedocles wrote B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) with Hesiod in mind. In fact, B 115.12 (= EMP D 10.12 Laks-Most), ἄλλος δ’ ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται, στυγέουσι δὲ πάντες, is constructed on the model of Theog. 800, ἄλλος δ’ ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται χαλεπώτερος ἆθλος. Note that also B 115.4 (= EMP D 10.4 Laks-Most), ὅς κ(ε) ἐπίορκον ἁμαρτήσας ἐπομόσσηι, could be taken as a parallel of Theog. 793, ὅς κεν τὴν ἐπίορκον ἀπολλείψας ἐπομόσσῃ. On B 115.4 (= EMP D 10.4 Laks-Most) and its Hesiodic counterpart, see below. Fr. 51–52 and 54a–c Merkelbach-West. This myth is alluded to by Aesch. Suppl. 214. Shall we interpret Empedocles’ reference to ‘thrice ten thousand seasons’ literally? Gemelli Marciano (2001: 226–27) pointed out that for Empedocles, as indeed for other esoteric doctrines, whether Orphic or Pythagorean, the definition of the exact time of punishment [has] a very relative importance and a much lower significance than that attributed to them by modern commentators. The value of these numbers is symbolic and lies rather in being key numbers (‘numeri-chiave’) such as three and its multiples or ten and its multiples, and not in the exact temporal determination.

34

Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature

(according to some sources he is the Hyperborean Apollo),28 reborn several times as diverse mortal forms. Returning to the lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), we can see that Empedocles clarifies that exile and rebirths are punishment for a guilt that seems to be personally and voluntarily committed. Yet it is not at all clear what type of fault the god is punished for. The lines as printed here point to slaughter (l. 3) and perjury (l. 4). However, they present textual problems.29 On the one hand, line 3 is only transmitted by Plutarch’s manuscripts, which have φόβωι, ‘fear’, instead of φόνωι, ‘slaughter’. The latter is the emendation by Stephanus, which must be accepted in the text, despite several attempts to maintain the transmitted term.30 Indeed, other Plutarchean passages prove that Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth is connected to slaughter, consumption of fleshes and cannibalism (or allelophagia).31 With regard to perjury as a guilt deserving exile, on the other hand, the textual tradition is more complicated. While line 3 is only attested by Plutarch, line 4 is transmitted by Hippolytus’ manuscripts, which offer the line in a damaged form: ὅς καὶ ἐπίορκον ἁμαρτήσας ἐπομώσσει. Specifically, the transmitted line does not fit the hexameter, which has to be restored in the first foot, and it displays a dubious ἁμαρτήσας, a late form of the participle of ἁμαρτάνω, which does not appear in Greek texts before the Greek Old Testament, or Septuagint (completed by 132 BCE). Homer and Hesiod, who are Empedocles’ linguistic models, only knew the second aorist ἥμαρτον. For these reasons, scholars have advocated opposite views concerning this line. Those who argue for its authenticity defend in various ways the sigmatic aorist of ἀμαρτάνω as a possible form 28

29 30 31

For Pythagoras as the reincarnation of Apollo, see Arist. Περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων Fr. 1 Ross (= Fr. 191 Rose [Ael. VH 2.26; Diog. Laert. 8.11; Iamb. VP 28.140–43]); see Burkert (1972: 141–43). For the series of incarnations Apollo-Euphorbus-Pythagoras, which is probably the earliest, see Heracl. Pont. fr. 89 Wehrli. See also Kerényi (1940: 12–23) and Burkert (1972: 138–43). On Pythagoras’ legend as a model for Empedocles’ self-representation, see Primavesi (2008b: 261–62) and Chapters 2.3 and 3.4. See Wilamowitz (1929: 634), van der Ben (1975: esp. 130–33), Wright (1995: 272–73), Primavesi (2001: 33–42), Bollack (2003: 66–67), Picot (2007: 47–50) and Rashed (2008: 8–18). See above all Picot (2007: 47–50), who assigns to the term the meaning of ‘flight (from danger)’, and Rashed (2008: 9–10). Cf. e.g., De esu. carn. 996 b–c: οὐ χεῖρον δ᾽ ἴσως καὶ προανακρούσασθαι καὶ προαναφωνῆσαι τὰ τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους· . . . ἀλληγορεῖ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα τὰς ψυχάς, ὅτι φόνων καὶ βρώσεως σαρκῶν καὶ ἀλληλοφαγίας δίκην τίνουσαι σώμασι θνητοῖς ἐνδέδενται. On this particular point, see the discussion in Primavesi (2001: 33–38). According to an interpretation by Zuntz (1971: 273), the gods’ act of slaughter occurred when they accepted the honour of ritual sacrifice for the first time. It is worth noting that, as is also evident from Plutarch’s passage quoted here, the concept of phonos in Empedocles refers not only to the killing of a living being but, given the almost direct reference to the practice of sacrifice, also to the eating of meat, since these constitute stages of the same ritual act.

1.2 B 115 and the Story of the Guilty God

35

in a poet of the fifth century BCE.32 In contrast, those who argue that the line is not Empedoclean usually take it as a later insertion; indeed, as a bad adaptation of a Hesiodic line.33 In fact, line 4 closely resembles Hesiod’s Theogony 783, ὅς κεν τὴν ἐπίορκον ἀπολλείψας ἐπομόσσῃ, a line from the passage on the great oath of the gods to Styx which, as we have seen above, Empedocles intentionally recalls through his verses. However, the fact that the gods’ oath depicted by Hesiod stay in the background of Empedocles’ story may cast doubts on the authenticity of a badly transmitted line. Specifically, it may be argued that an ancient reader of Hippolytus noted the parallel between Empedocles’ lines and Hesiod’s Theogony and wrote the Hesiodic line as a margin note to Empedocles’ verses. A careless copyist may then have inserted the Hesiodic line within Empedocles’ verses, (poorly) adjusting it to the new context. According to this reading, both the fact that the line does not accord with the metrical system and the oddly weak aorist ἁμαρτήσας are taken as signals of a later insertion and a bad adaptation of the Hesiodic line. However, it can also be argued that Empedocles wanted to compose a literary reference to his model to offer something of his own version of ‘the great oath of the gods’. According to this reading, line 4 is genuinely Empedoclean but underwent corruption at some point in its transmission. Be that as it may, we still need to explain perjury as a crime deserving exile, as our sources are silent on this. One explanation could be related to the fact that, as we read in lines 1–2, the gods seal with an oath the divine decree, which, presumably, ratifies the prohibition on slaughter. Thus, a god who commits slaughter is ipso facto a perjurer.34 Alternatively, we could relate the Empedoclean idea of perjury as a crime leading to rebirths to a famous passage of Pindar’s second Olympian Ode – a composition written for the tyrant of Acragas, in which Pindar offers his own perspective on the belief in rebirth.35 While I will explore Pindar’s poem more attentively in the next chapter, for now it is worth observing

32 33

34 35

The participle can be accepted according to van der Ben (1975: 132–33), Wright (1995: 273), Bollack (2003: 66–67) and Rashed (2008: 18). According to Wilamowitz (1929) the form of the verb is a barbarism, while Zuntz (1971: 195) argues that ‘no one would dream of defending it in the text of Empedocles’. Primavesi (2008a: 50 n.136) is of the same opinion and in the edition of Empedocles’ fragments by Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021), B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) is printed without the problematic line: see F 8. This point was made by van der Ben (1975: 131–32). For a more extensive discussion of the parallels between Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth and Pindar’s second Olympian Ode, see Chapter 2.2.2.

36

Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature

that, through lines 57–75, Pindar voices the opinion that the dead pay the price for their behaviour in life and, because of a terrible necessity (see Empedocles’ oracle of Necessity), they must be punished for their guilt or rewarded for a just life. Indeed, ‘a tearless existence’ is assured to those ‘who joyfully kept their oaths’ (my emphasis). Thus, according to Pindar, loyalty to oaths – a traditional instrument to distinguish liars from just people – is taken as a criterion to establish a commensurate destiny of punishment or reward after death. As Pindar’s passage attests to doctrines of rebirth spread in Acragas in the fifth century BCE, it can be assumed that these doctrines held loyalty to oaths in high esteem. Moreover, since Empedocles was accustomed to those doctrines and the beliefs they spread, Pindar’s version constitutes an important parallel for Empedocles’ own doctrine of rebirth. For this reason, I am inclined to accept line 4 as genuinely Empedoclean, indeed as an attestation of the importance reserved to oaths in doctrines of rebirth spread in fifth-century Sicily. However, the cruces enclosing the line are necessary to indicate that its textual problems are not solved yet, above all with reference to ἁμαρτήσας, since the weak form of the aorist in Empedocles is not convincing. Moving on in the interpretation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), throughout lines 9–12, the guilty gods are depicted as compelled to wander everywhere in our world, being reborn as every kind of mortal form. Indeed, they wander through the cosmic masses of the universe, from Ether to Sea, from Sea to Earth, from Earth to Sun and from Sun to Ether. As has already been observed, Empedocles refers here to the four elements of earth, water, air and fire, principles of his physical system. These are depicted as the personified masses of the cosmos that first welcome and then reject the guilty gods. In the context of a doctrine of rebirth, this can be taken as a hint at the regions of the universe the guilty gods under a certain mortal form will inhabit from time to time, hence indirectly to the mortal forms the gods will take during their exile. Accordingly, earth and water could refer to terrestrial and aquatic plants and animals, while air, sun and ether could indicate the sky as a whole and refer to all sorts of winged beings. Finally, we turn to the last two lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most): τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης, νείκεϊ μαινομένωι πίσυνος. I too am now one of these, an exile from the gods and a wanderer, trusting in mad Strife.

1.3 The testimonia of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most)

37

These two lines constitute Empedocles’ poetical signature. By means of it, the mythical, impersonal account of the guilty gods becomes the story of Empedocles himself: because of his trust in Strife, he is now exiled to this world. The antecedent of the pronoun τῶν at line 1336 is δαίμονες mentioned at line 5. This is strongly suggested by the expression φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης in the same line. Indeed, this phrase, by resembling the wording ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι at line 6, hints at the ‘gods who have won longlasting life’, δαίμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο in line 5.37 As a result, Empedocles claims to be a god who, because of his fault, is exiled from the divine community and temporarily compelled to be reborn as every kind of living being. Moreover, the reference to Strife as the evil power that permits the crime connects Empedocles’ personal story to that of the whole cosmos, which is under the influence of Love and Strife. In fact, while these forces rule over the elements in the cosmic cycle, so too do they govern the destiny of the individual person (as we will see more thoroughly in Chapter 7). Finally, at line 13, the present tense εἰμι and the temporal specification through the adverb νῦν indicate that exile and rebirths correspond to Empedocles’ present situation. Yet, despite the present mortal form, Empedocles is truly a god who is currently but temporarily wandering our earth.

1.3

The testimonia of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most)

Having established the necessary background information on the fragment and its transmission, as well as outlining its content, I am now going to look at the first of the reasons, mentioned above, why scholars continue to maintain a nineteenth-century position with regard to the allocation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to Empedocles’ Purifications. This approach is best exemplified by O’Brien and the present section is, therefore, largely a reaction to his thesis. Specifically, it aims to show that our major sources for the reconstruction of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) cannot provide conclusive evidence that the story of the guilty gods was part of the Purifications, whereas there are reasons to believe that one of them, Simplicius, may 36

37

Note that τῶν is the variant reading of Hippolytus’ manuscripts, while Plutarch’s tradition transmits τήν, which, in context, gives the following meaning: ‘on this (scil. road) now I am, an exile and a wanderer’. For this reason, any attempt to reconstruct another referent by virtue of a different arrangement of the lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), as Rashed (2008: 29) proposed, remains unconvincing.

38

Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature

have read it in the physical poem.38 However, from the outset I submit the view that the Strasbourg evidence, once attentively examined, undermines the indirect tradition with reference to the question in hand. Thus, after having analyzed separately Plutarch, Hippolytus and Simplicius, I shall return to the papyrus lines and show that they settle the question of the attribution of the story of the guilty gods to On Nature with a good level of certainty. 1.3.1

Plutarch

Plutarch was an expert on Empedocles’ work. He is credited with a tenbook treatise on his philosophy,39 which is quoted as a source by later authors, among them by Hippolytus.40 Such a treatise, together with Plutarch’s numerous Empedoclean quotations, is an indication that he held Empedocles’ poems in great esteem and, presumably, read them firsthand. For this reason, he can be considered a reliable source for Empedocles’ thought. In De exilio 17.607c, Plutarch quotes five lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) – specifically lines 1, 3, 5–6 and 13 – and introduces them by indicating that they were found ‘at the beginning of Empedocles’ philosophy, by way of prelude’: ὁ δ’ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν ἀρχῆι τῆς φιλοσοφίας προαναφωνήσας. Plutarch’s use of the verb προαναφωνεῖν suggests that the Empedoclean lines served as an introduction to the doctrine proper. The prefix προανα- defines the concept of anticipation, emphasizing the notion of something preceding, preluding or preparing the main action.41 By using this word, therefore, Plutarch accentuated the introductory character of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) – a prelude to the exposition of the poem’s central themes. Yet to which poem are these verses the prelude? What Plutarch intended by the term philosophia is not self-evident. Rather, as scholars have already emphasized, because his philosophical conception connects physics and 38 39 40 41

Simplicius is not mentioned as a source for B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) in Diels-Kranz. Lamprias’ catalogue number 43. Hippolytus mentions Plutarch’s work on Empedocles in Ref. 5.20.6. On Plutarch as a source for Hippolytus, see the discussion in Rowett (1987b: 92–94, 96). See also Mansfeld (1992: 50–52). Cf., e.g., προανα-βάλλομαι (‘say or sing by way of prelude’), προανα-βλέπω (‘look up before’), προανα-γυμνάζω (‘exercise before’), προανα-ζωγραφέω (‘delineate first’), προανα-κεφαλαίωσις (‘anticipatory summary’), προανα-κηρύσσω (‘announce beforehand’) and προανα-κρούμαι (‘introduce by way of a [musical] prelude’, cf. Plutarch, De es. 996b: τὰ τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους) and προαναφθέγγομαι (‘say by way of preface’). For an accurate analysis of the main compounds of προανα- see van der Ben (1975: 19).

1.3 The testimonia of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most)

39

demonology, Plutarch could have used the term philosophia to refer to Empedocles’ physical theories as well as to the story of the exiled god and the doctrine of rebirth42 – topics that are generally considered as part of the religious poem. Consequently, Plutarch’s remark ‘in the beginning of his philosophy’ provides no evidence to attribute B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost) to either poem. Scholars have also argued that evidence for an attribution of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to the Purifications can be found in a passage of De Iside et Osiride (361c), in which Plutarch quotes and comments upon B 115.9–12 (= EMP D 10.9–12 Laks-Most). There Empedocles’ verses are introduced and commented upon as follows: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ καὶ δίκας φησὶ διδόναι τοὺς δαίμονας ὧν ἂν ἐξαμάρτωσι καὶ πλημμελήσωσιν αἰθέριον μὲν γάρ σφε μένος πόντονδε διώκει, πόντος δ’ ἐς χθονὸς οὖδας ἀπέπτυσε, γαῖα δ’ ἐς αὐγὰς 10 ἠελίου φαέθοντος, ὁ δ’ αἰθέρος ἔμβαλε δίναις· ἄλλος δ’ ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται, στυγέουσι δὲ πάντες, ἄχρι οὗ κολασθέντες οὕτω καὶ καθαρθέντες αὖθις τὴν κατὰ φύσιν χώραν καὶ τάξιν ἀπολάβωσι. Empedocles says that the gods make amends for their errors and faults For the strength of Ether pursues them into Sea, and Sea spits them onto the surface of Earth and Earth into the rays 10 of shining Sun, and this throws them into the eddies of Ether; and one after another receives him, but all hate him, until being punished in this way and again purified, they recover their natural place and status.

In his 1981 essay, O’Brien considers that Plutarch’s use of the participles κολασθέντες . . . καὶ καθαρθέντες, ‘being punished and . . . purified’, in his commentary upon Empedocles’ quotation provides ‘eloquent proof’ (‘[p]reuve éloquente’) that B 115 belongs to the Purifications.43 In more general terms, O’Brien argued that a source’s reference to guilt, punishment and purifications when introducing or commenting on 42

43

E.g., Primavesi (2001: 12): ‘Precisely the designation as “philosophy” of a combination of demonology (“daimonologia”) and physics corresponds exactly to Plutarch’s own conception, as seems to be derived from his writing De facie in orbe lunae: a speculation of natural philosophy with an ethical-parenetic destination’. However, if we work under the hypothesis that only On Nature is a narrative exposition, while the Purifications are merely a collection of purifying oracles, ritual prescriptions and ascetic rules, as I argued in the Introduction by following Sedley’s 1989 hypothesis, then the notion of ‘philosophy’ used by Plutarch can only refer to the physical poem. O’Brien (1981: 18).

40

Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature

Empedocles’ lines can be taken as a standard criterion to attribute these to the Purifications with greater certainty. However, this criterion is invalidated by the Strasbourg papyrus. As we have seen above, ens. d–f 5–6 has a highly religious character but belongs to a physical context. Moreover, when quoting the two papyrus lines, Porphyry connects them with the context of meat eating and purifications through the expression διὰ τῶν καθαρμῶν. Before the publication of the Strasbourg papyrus, Porphyry’s phrase was considered as a clear reference to the Purifications as the poem to which the Empedoclean lines belong. However, the Strasbourg papyrus unmistakably shows that neither Empedocles’ focus on a topic such as guilt for consuming a prohibited food (hence, indirectly his reference to rebirth, as it may be argued), nor our sources’ link between his fragments and the notion of punishment and purifications ensure that Empedocles’ lines belong to the religious poem.44 Indeed, as we can now appreciate, Empedocles inserted lines of a rather religious tone that our source connected with his purifications within a physical discourse belonging to the first book of On Nature. To sum up, first, Plutarch’s words ‘by way of prelude’ in his De Exilio indicate that the lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) are lines premising and introducing the doctrine proper. Plutarch’s phrase ‘in the beginning of his philosophy’, however, does not disclose to which poems they belong, as Plutarch could have labelled as ‘philosophy’ both Empedocles’ strictly physical themes and his demonology. Second, in De Iside et Osiride, Plutarch’s use of notions related to the concepts of punishment and purifications in connection with Empedocles’ verses is no firm criterion to attribute those verses to the Purifications. Indeed, the Strasbourg evidence displays that our sources can relate religious themes to religious, purificatory practices, even when they are found within On Nature. It is probably because of the Strasbourg evidence that, in his 2001 contribution, O’Brien made no case for Plutarch’s De Iside et Osiride as attesting to the allocation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) within the Purifications. Nevertheless, as we will now see, O’Brien applied a similar standard to the words of Hippolytus and argued that he could find therein elements for a secure attribution of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to the Purifications. 44

Contra Laks-Most who attribute B 139 within the Purifications as fragment EMP D 34. However, their proposal can only be justified by evaluating Porphyry’s commentary on the Empedoclean quotation at the same level as the evidence from the Strasbourg papyrus. But it is methodologically questionable to equate a piece of direct papyrus testimony with a report from an indirect source, who lived centuries after Empedocles and most likely did not even have access to his poem, but was acquainted with it through third-party authors.

1.3 The testimonia of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most)

41

Let us therefore move on to the analysis of (O’Brien’s reading of) Hippolytus’ passage. 1.3.2

Hippolytus

In his Refutation of All Heresies 7.29–30, Hippolytus extensively discusses Empedocles’ theories in order to refute the heresy of Marcion of Sinope, an influential leader of early Christianity, whose beliefs knew a significant following in the second century CE. Hippolytus reports that Marcion professed an anti-cosmic dualism,45 according to which there is not only a good and perfect god, who inhabits heaven and whose existence was proven by Jesus, but also an evil and bad god – the god of the Old Testament and the creator of this world. In order to refute the evil god, therefore, Marcion professes a rigorous asceticism that demands abstinence from animal flesh and sexual intercourse. According to Hippolytus, there is a suspicious coincidence between Marcion’s doctrines, so far as Hippolytus presents them, and the doctrines Empedocles professed many centuries before. Indeed, Hippolytus accused Marcion of plagiarism, suggesting he derived his theology from Empedocles rather than from the Holy Scriptures. Undoubtedly, it was Empedocles who first postulated the existence of two opposite gods (good Love and evil Strife), believed that our world was the product of the evil god and taught purifications through an ascetic way of life. Thus, after a brief overview of Marcion’s main doctrines, Hippolytus presents the rudiments of Empedocles’ philosophy, correlated by the quotation of Empedocles’ own words.46 Specifically, Hippolytus first quotes some Empedoclean lines depicting the main components of Empedocles’ system: the four elements and the two opposite forces of Love and Strife (B 6 [= EMP D 57 Laks-Most] and 16 [= EMP D 63 Laks-Most]). He emphasizes that the 45 46

According to the definition by Rowett (1987b: 108). Specifically, DK 31 B 6 (= EMP D 57 Laks-Most), B 16 (= EMP D 63 Laks-Most), B 29 (= EMP D 92 Laks-Most), B 110 (= EMP D 257 Laks-Most) and B 131 (= EMP D 7 Laks-Most). It is worth noting that they all come from On Nature. Diels was largely of the same opinion, except for the lines numbered as B 131 (Hipp. Ref. 7. 30. 4 [= EMP D 7 Laks-Most]), which correspond to Empedocles’ invocation to the Muse Calliope in order that she stands by him as he reveals ‘a good account about the blessed gods’. It is probably Empedocles’ claim to reveal a discourse about the gods that led Diels to set this fragment within the Purifications. Yet Empedocles’ On Nature is a very appropriate place for a ‘good account’ of the gods and the divine. Moreover, the invocation to the Muse connects B 131 (= EMP D 7 Laks-Most) with B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most), which Diels rightly considered as part of On Nature. This supports the collocation of B 131 (= EMP D 7 Laks-Most) within Empedocles’ physical poem, as has already been advocated by Bignone (1916: 636–39), Kingsley (1996: 111) and Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021). Contra recently Laks-Most (2016), who assign the fragment to the Purifications.

42

Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature

opposition between Love and Strife corresponds to the opposition of One due to Love, ‘the most beautiful form’, and Many due to Strife. Then, Hippolytus quotes and discusses in detail the verses of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), beginning with the last couplet of the fragment (ll. 13–14) as an instance of Empedocles’ claim to his own origin.47 Why did Hippolytus choose to quote the last two lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) at this point in the discussion? Possibly, Hippolytus was in search of some Empedoclean lines that could corroborate the notion of the demiurgic action of the evil god and therefore of Strife’s generative function. Thus, as Empedocles associates his ‘birth’ into this world with Strife’s influence,48 Hippolytus could take the two Empedoclean lines as attesting to Strife’s creative role. Moreover, after having depicted Sphairos as Love’s most beautiful product, Hippolytus connects Strife with the existence of the world as a result of wrongdoings that were punished with banishment. It is worth noting that Hippolytus interprets B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) as an allegory of the cosmic cycle. In particular, he envisaged the crime of slaughter committed by the gods in terms of Strife’s separation of the One, whereas the gods who committed the crime were taken as souls being torn apart from the One and ‘manufactured’ by Strife as mortals in this world (7.29.15). In other words, Hippolytus seems to read the story of the guilty gods narrated in B 115 as accounting for the cosmic opposition between Love’s One and Strife’s Many. On the one hand, the guilty souls that take mortal bodies are read as proofs of Strife’s creative action at the expense of Love’s union; on the other hand, the divine community that the guilty gods must leave because of Strife (ἀπὸ μακάρων at l. 6) is interpreted as a conceptual place where Love strives to gather together souls out of Strife’s Many ‘into the unity of the intelligible Cosmos’ (7.29.17). Finally, the birth of Empedocles, with the explicit mention of Strife’s influence, must have appeared to Hippolytus as a clear indication of Strife’s power of separation and generation at the expense of Love and the One (7.29.14–15). Furthermore, in Hippolytus’ view of Empedocles’ philosophy, the moral rules of abstention from meat and sexual intercourse, connected to the souls’ rebirths and B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), are deeply intertwined with the cosmic order governed by the good and evil forces (7.22.1–3). Indeed, they derive from it. Thus, people are required to conduct an ascetic way of life, by especially abstaining from killing animals and from having sexual intercourse, in order not to ‘aid and 47 48

Ref. 7.29.14: τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ λέγει περὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γεννήσεως. See Empedocles’ phrase νείκεϊ μαινομένωι πίσυνος in B 115.14 (= EMP D 10.14 Laks-Most).

1.3 The testimonia of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most)

43

contribute towards the works Strife creates, always dissolving and scattering the work of Love’. However, instead of quoting those Empedoclean verses that include ascetic rules, Hippolytus quotes the first two lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most): There is an oracle of Necessity, an ancient decree of the gods eternal, sealed with broad oaths

Why then did he prefer to quote two lines thematizing Necessity’s oracle, the gods’ decree and the broad oaths over lines attesting Empedocles’ ascetic rules against the killing of animals and sexual intercourse? The answer to this question lies in Hippolytus’ interpretation of these two lines, whereby he elucidates the oracle of Necessity and the ancient decree of the gods as referring to the cosmological transition from One to Many under the opposite forces of Love and Strife. Simply put, the oracle of Necessity and the decree of the gods are understood as proclaiming the exchange of power between Love and Strife in the cycle. By quoting these lines, therefore, Hippolytus meant to zoom in on this turn of power and, therefore, on the cosmic transition from good to evil. It seems, in other words, that Hippolytus was more interested in the theoretical background (the cosmic alternation between Love and Strife) against which he assumed Empedocles’ purificatory rules are played out, rather than in those rules themselves. Moreover, at the end of his summary of the three major points of criticism against Marcion, Hippolytus explicitly connects Marcion’s ascetic prohibitions with the Empedoclean purifications. The entire passage reads as follows: Come Marcion, just as you make a comparative juxtaposition of good and evil, so today, following your doctrines as you understand, I will myself make such a juxtaposition. You say the creator of the world is wicked; well then are you not concealing the fact that you are teaching the church the doctrines of Empedocles? You say that the god who undoes the things made by the creator is good; well then are you not blatantly evangelising Empedocles’ Love to those who hear about the good god? You issue prohibitions on marriage and procreation and on abstention from food which God created for the partaking of the faithful and those who know the truth; you are secretly teaching the purifications of Empedocles (τοὺς Ἐμπεδοκλέους λανθάνεις διδάσκων καθαρμούς).49

49

Hipp. Ref. 7.30.2–4. Text and translation are according to Rowett (1987b: 320–23).

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In 2001, O’Brien took Hippolytus’ last sentence as a clear indication that the lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) came from the Purifications.50 According to him, Hippolytus’ explicit mention of τοὺς Ἐμπεδοκλέους καθαρμούς in reference to the ascetic prohibitions on meat and sexual intercourse, which were previously connected with the first two lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), is a clear indication that it comes from the Purifications.51 However, O’Brien’s conclusion faces two main objections. First, Hippolytus can be a further case of an indirect source that reads verses with a religious tone and connects them to Empedocles’ purifications. The example of Porphyry examined above has shown that similar links are no criterion for a secure attribution of religious lines to the Purifications. Indeed, as the Strasbourg evidence highlights, ancient sources may refer Empedoclean verses with a religious touch to his purifications even though they read them within the physical poem. Second, by his quotation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), as we have seen above, Hippolytus claimed to establish not as much Empedocles’ ascetic prohibitions as Empedocles’ physical theories about the exchange of power between the evil and good god; that is, the theoretical background which, according to Hippolytus, ultimately substantiates those prohibitions. In this respect, Hippolytus considers B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) as a deeply cosmological fragment; indeed, he takes it as the fragment that summarizes the essential tenet of Empedocles’ cosmic cycle, with Strife being able to tear apart the δαίμονες/souls from the One and to create the Many, and Love working towards the reunification of ‘the blessed gods’ out of the Many into the One. Moreover, despite O’Brien’s reconstruction, Hippolytus uses B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) in connection to all three main points of criticism against Marcion’s plagiarisms. In fact, as O’Brien acknowledges, B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) is certainly thought to substantiate the abstention from eating meat and having sexual intercourse (third point of criticism). However, as we have seen, Hippolytus did not relate those rules to the fault, punishment or 50 51

According to O’Brien (2001: esp. 104–6), τοὺς Ἐμπεδοκλέους λανθάνεις διδάσκων καθαρμούς refers to the title of Empedocles’ religious poem. O’Brien (2001: 104–5): Abstinence from killing animals and from sexual intercourse with women were precisely the two points that Hippolytus had claimed to establish by his quotation of verses where Empedocles tells the story ‘of his own birth’ . . . By far, the most natural inference will be that the verses which Hippolytus had quoted, to establish precisely those two points of Empedocles’ teaching (fr. 115.10–12), have been taken, so at least Hippolytus believes, from the Katharmoi.

1.3 The testimonia of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most)

45

rebirths of the guilty gods, but rather to those verses of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) that, by presenting the oracle of Necessity and the divine decree, are taken to introduce one of Empedocles’ major cosmological tenets: the exchange of power between Love and Strife. Furthermore, B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) also serves Hippolytus to substantiate his first and second point of criticism. In fact, the last lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) are precisely employed to demonstrate that our world and our existence is brought about by evil Strife and therefore to argue that Empedocles preceded Marcion’s claim that the demiurge of the world is an evil god (first point). Finally, Hippolytus read B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) in such a way as to claim that the god who undoes the works of the demiurge is good (second claim). As mentioned above, this is specifically shown by his interpretation of ἀπὸ μακάρων in l. 6 which is taken to illustrate the beneficial influence of Love who brings back the blessed ones (that is, the souls, according to Hippolytus) out of Strife’s Many into the One.52 In conclusion, the fresh reading of Hippolytus’ commentary on B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) provided here challenges O’Brien’s assumption that it is proven to come from the Purifications. It shows, in contrast, that Hippolytus takes this fragment as fundamentally physical. This does not prove, however, that B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) comes from the physical poem and we are then left with the conclusion that Hippolytus offers no evidence for its sure attribution of either one of Empedocles’ poems. 1.3.3 Simplicius In line with Hippolytus’ interpretation, the author who more than any other source seems to read B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) within On Nature is Simplicius. His citation is confined to the first lines of this fragment, which are quoted within a broader comment on Aristotle’s Physics 8.1.252a 5–19. Here, Aristotle puts forward a criticism against 52

See, e.g., 7.29.21–22: after the quotation of B 115.10–12 (= EMP D 10.10–12 Laks-Most), Hippolytus remarks: The souls are, therefore, hated and tortured and punished in the world according to Empedocles, but Love brings them together. She is a good thing and pities their misery and the bad disorderly set-up of ‘raving Strife’ and she is keen to bring them out of the world little by little and adapt them to the one and she strives to bring it about that everything be brought out by her and return to the unity. This is a clear example of Love undoing Strife’s demiurgic works.

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Empedocles’ theory of motion and concluded that Empedocles did not properly argue for the cause governing the alternation of movement and rest in the cosmic cycle, but merely said that this occurs by necessity, ἐξ ἀνάγκης. In his commentary upon the Aristotelian criticism and particularly with reference to Aristotle’s mention of necessity, Simplicius quotes the first two lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), in which the oracle of Necessity (Ananke) plays a major role. Moreover, Simplicius cites them in conjunction with other Empedoclean fragments53 to corroborate Aristotle’s criticism of Empedocles’ theory of motion through Empedocles’ own words. According to O’Brien, Simplicius’ quotation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost) is not motivated by the content of Aristotle’s criticism against Empedocles’ theory of motion, but rather by the sole mention of Ananke.54 Simply put, Simplicius aims to quote those verses that give prominence to Empedocles’ notion of necessity even though these have nothing to do with the reasons and arguments of Aristotle’s criticism. In fact, according to O’Brien, Simplicius’ purpose ‘is to quote verses that will illustrate whatever concept Aristotle has called into question’.55 Accordingly, Simplicius’ comment upon Aristotle’s criticism to Empedocles ‘in no way implies that the reference to Necessity in fr. 115 came from the context which Aristotle draws upon in formulating his criticism’.56 According to O’Brien, the fact that Aristotle is criticizing an aspect of Empedocles’ physical theories does not entail that Simplicius, who intends to corroborate Aristotle’s criticism by quoting Empedoclean fragments, takes B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) from the same context or the same poem, namely On Nature, to which those theories belong. In fact, O’Brien had already settled the issue of the provenance of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) from the Purifications by arguing that Hippolytus explicitly said so. However, while we have seen above that Hippolytus cannot be taken as evidence for the attribution of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to the Purifications, it is worth noting that O’Brien’s reading of Simplicius presents a few problems. First, all other Empedoclean fragments Simplicius quotes in the context of Aristotle’s criticism of Empedocles’ theory of motion are appropriate to that criticism. For instance, when explaining that, in Empedocles’ cycle, rest occurs in the period of the Sphairos as 53 54

Specifically, B 27 (= EMP D 89 Laks-Most), B 31 (= EMP D 95 Laks-Most), B 17.29 (= EMP D 73.259 Laks-Most) and B 30 (= EMP D 94 Laks-Most). O’Brien (2001: 84–88). 55 Ibid. 84. 56 Ibid. 86.

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a consequence of Love’s total union, Simplicius quotes B 27 (= EMP D 89 Laks-Most), namely Empedocles’ verses depicting the Sphairos as the unmovable form of the universe. Motion occurs because of Strife’s intervention into the Sphairos, as Simplicius’ quotation of B 31 (= EMP D 95 LaksMost), with its illustration of the shaking limbs of the Sphairos, is made to substantiate. This runs counter to O’Brien’s assumption that Simplicius may have quoted whatever verses of Empedocles, independently from the Aristotelian context he was commenting upon. Moreover, when quoting B 115.1–2 (= EMP D 10.1–2 Laks-Most) to comment upon Aristotle’s words that the alternation between rest and motion happens ἐξ ἀνάγκης, Simplicius adds that Empedocles ‘says that because of necessity and these oaths each (force) predominates in turn’. Put differently, Simplicius interprets Ananke and the divine oaths in B 115 as regulating the cyclical oscillation between Love and Strife. This means that, according to Simplicius, B 115.1–2 (= EMP D 10. 1–2 Laks-Most) attests to precisely that alternation between One and Many (that is, between rest and movement), of which Aristotle was speaking in his critique of Empedocles’ theory of motion. Simplicius’ claim is then followed by the quotation of B 30 (= EMP D 94 Laks-Most) which, by depicting Strife regaining power, destroying the Sphairos and setting things in motion, indicates the exact moment in which the exchange of power from Love’s One to Strife’s Many begins.57 Moreover, B 30 (= EMP D 94 Laks-Most) also states that this exchange is established by a divine oath. Thus, Simplicius does not seem merely to be quoting ‘verses that will illustrate whatever concept Aristotle has called into question’. Rather, he is explaining Aristotle by making Empedocles’ verses concerning the transition between rest and movement more accessible to Aristotelian readers who are not familiar with Empedoclean philosophy. Furthermore, his remark on B 115.1–2 (= EMP D 10.1–2 Laks-Most), namely the clarification that Love and Strife predominate in turn according to necessity, suggests that these lines are quoted not merely because of the role that Ananke plays in them; rather, Simplicius seems to believe that they precisely thematize what Aristotle is criticizing. His comment invites the reading that, in line with a Neoplatonic line of interpretation of Empedocles’ philosophy, Simplicius takes Necessity’s oracle and the gods’ ancient decree as proclaiming the exchange of power between Love and Strife in the cycle. It seems that, just like Hippolytus, Simplicius takes B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) as 57

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μέγα Νεῖκος ἐνὶμμελέεσσιν ἐθρέφθη / ἐς τιμάς τ’ ἀνόρουσε τελειομένοιο χρόνοιο, / ὅς σφιν ἀμοιβαῖος πλατέος παρ’ ἐλήλαται ὅρκου.

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a profoundly physical fragment, which illustrates one of the central tenets of Empedocles’ cosmic cycle: the exchange of power between Love and Strife and the transition from rest to movement. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, as mentioned in the Introduction to this book, Simplicius had a detailed knowledge of Empedocles’ On Nature, which he frequently quoted,58 often together with the precise reference to the parts and books of On Nature from where the cited verses come from.59 This is evidence of the great esteem he reserved for Empedocles’ physical poem, whereas he seemed to have no interest in the Purifications, which he never quoted or referred to. According to O’Brien’s interpretation, therefore, Simplicius’ quotation of B 115.1–2 (= EMP D 10.1–2 Laks-Most) would be the sole exception. However, there is no indication in Simplicius’ passage that B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) is part of the religious poem, as O’Brien assumed. In fact, O’Brien’s interpretation requires an accumulation of evidence: not merely Simplicius, but Simplicius in light of Plutarch (1981) and Hippolytus (2001). Since we have already seen that neither Plutarch nor Hippolytus provide evidence for a certain attribution of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to the Purifications, O’Brien’s reconstruction fails to hold. Additionally, although Simplicius did not explicitly connect B 115.1–2 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to On Nature, in his criticism against van der Ben – who took Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics as the main source attesting to the collocation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) within Empedocles’ physical poem60 – O’Brien was willing to concede that, if we ought to judge this fragment exclusively on the basis of Simplicius, the conclusion that seems obvious (‘la conclusion qui pourrait s’imposer’) is precisely that it is part of On Nature.61 Indeed, Simplicius’ emphasis on the physical character of B 115.1–2 (= EMP D 10. 1–2 Laks-Most), his quotation in the same context of other very physical fragments being appropriate to Aristotle’s criticism towards a major aspect of Empedocles’ physics and his general preference for Empedocles’ physical poem in contrast to the Purifications are indications that he could find B 115 in the only Empedoclean poem he cared to quote from: On Nature. 58 59

60 61

Simplicius’ Empedoclean quotations account for nearly 8 per cent of the whole poem and include over 150 verses or parts of verses, often repeating them: see O’Brien (1969: 150). For instance, we owe to him the precious evidence, among various other indications, that B 17 (= EMP D 73.233–66 Laks-Most) comes from the first book of the physical poem: see Phys. p. 157.25 Diels. On van der Ben’s reconstruction of Empedocles’ fragment, see my Introduction. O’Brien (1981: 73).

1.4 Empedocles, Divine Narrator of On Nature

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To summarize the discussion on the three major sources for B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), we have seen that neither Plutarch, nor Hippolytus nor Simplicius give us firm clues to establish the provenance of this fragment. On the one hand, the Strasbourg papyrus clearly displays that our sources could and in fact did relate themes such as fault, punishment and rebirth to purificatory rules when commenting upon verses coming from On Nature. This evidence invalidates O’Brien’s standard criterion to attribute to the Purifications those verses our sources explicitly relate to more religious aspects, while ultimately undermining the weight of both Plutarch and Hippolytus as sources for a sure attribution of B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost) to Empedocles’ religious poem. On the other hand, one of the most reliable sources for Empedocles’ thought and fragments, Simplicius, seems to suggest that he took B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) as a fundamentally physical fragment, which he most probably found in On Nature.

1.4 Empedocles, Divine Narrator of On Nature Despite the fact, as I have just shown, that there is no firm clue in our sources to settle the issue of the allocation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to either one of Empedocles’ poems, scholars have remained determined in allocating it to the Purifications. As I mentioned in Section 1.1, another reason they justify this view is based on the claim that B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) presents striking similarities with the lines of B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most), the proem to the Purifications. Undoubtedly, both fragments focus on an essential element of Empedocles’ self-presentation: his claim to divine nature. In virtue of this, Primavesi maintains that the attribution of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to the Purifications is required by the analogy between Empedocles’ self-proclaimed divine nature in both sets of verses; indeed, Empedocles’ claim to divine nature in B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) can only be comprehended – so argues Primavesi – if it is read together with the story of Empedocles’ fault and punishment in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). In contrast, I will challenge this reading by arguing that Empedocles’ claim to divine nature in the Purifications is perfectly comprehensible in its own terms, and therefore does not require the story recounted in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). Moreover, I will show that the similarities between B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) and B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) do not indicate that they come from the same context and poem; rather, they suggest that the two sets of verses were designed with an analogous function as introductions to different poems: B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) to the Purifications and B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to On Nature.

50

Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature Let us first look at B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most), which reads as follows: ὦ φίλοι, οἳ μέγα ἄστυ κατὰ ξανθοῦ Ἀκράγαντος ναίετ’ ἀν’ ἄκρα πόλεος, ἀγαθῶν μελεδήμονες ἔργων, ξείνων αἰδοῖοι λιμένες, κακότητος ἄπειροι, χαίρετ’· ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικα, ταινίαις τε περίστεπτος στέφεσίν τε θαλείοις. τοῖσιν † ἅμ’ † ἂν ἵκωμαι ἄστεα τηλεθάοντα, ἀνδράσιν ἠδὲ γυναιξί, σεβίζομαι· οἱ δ’ ἅμ’ ἕπονται μυρίοι ἐξερέοντες, ὅπηι πρὸς κέρδος ἀταρπός, οἱ μὲν μαντοσυνέων κεχρημένοι, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ νούσων παντοίων ἐπύθοντο κλυεῖν εὐηκέα βάξιν, δηρὸν δὴ χαλεπῆισι πεπαρμένοι . Friends who dwell in the great town of the tawny Acragas on the heights of the citadel, caring for good deeds, havens of kindness for strangers, inexperienced in evil things greetings! I will tell you: I, an immortal god, mortal no longer travel, honoured by all, as is fitting, wreathed with ribbons and fresh garlands. Whenever I enter prospering cities I am revered by every man and woman. They follow me in their thousands asking where their advantage lies some seeking prophecies, others in all sorts of illnesses ask to hear the word of healing having pierced about by harsh pains for too long time.

5

10

5

10

Empedocles introduces himself as a glorious god (‘I, an immortal god, mortal no longer’), being followed and revered by everyone wherever he goes. People honoured him ‘as is fitting’ for a deity with divine garments such as ribbons and garlands. Moreover, they pray to him for his divine wisdom and aid, seeking prophecies and words of healing for all kinds of illnesses. It is worth noting that Empedocles’ greeting to the citizens of Acragas in line 4, χαίρετ’· ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, imitates divine speeches, such as Demeter’s greeting in the Homeric Hymn dedicated to her, χαίρετ᾿˙ ἐγὼ δ᾿ ὑμῖν μυθήσομαι,62 and Hermes’ divine epiphany when, upon entering Achilles’ tent, he reveals himself to be a god disguised as a human: ἐγὼ θεὸς ἄμβροτος εἰλήλυθα.63 The imitation of epic, divine speeches invites the reading that Empedocles aims to ascribe to himself the same divine status attributed to traditional gods.64 62 64

Hymn. in Cerer. 120. 63 Il. 24.460. It has been argued – mistakenly in my view – that Empedocles does not really commit himself to self-presentation. In particular, the phrases ὑμῖν θεός at line 4 and ὥσπερ ἔοικα at line 5 are taken to show that here Empedocles is not saying that he is a god, but only that the people of Acragas perceive

1.4 Empedocles, Divine Narrator of On Nature

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In contrast, in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), Empedocles’ claim to divine nature is mitigated by the depiction of his present condition of fault and exile. His status is still that of an exceptional, divine individual with superior power and wisdom,65 but his actual situation undermines his divine nature by confronting him with the wretched circumstances of an ordinary mortal: a miserable terrestrial existence and a series of rebirths under the influence of Strife.66 Moreover, as we will see in the next chapter, in the so-called demonological fragments, which are closely related to the story narrated in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), Empedocles affirms that he is greatly suffering for his present condition.67 Admittedly, we gain two different pictures of godhood from Empedocles’ self-representations in B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) and B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most).68 Whereas the former highlights his blissful condition with no allusion to sufferance, fault or exile, the latter draws precisely on these elements to convey the notion of a god reborn as a mortal. Moreover, in B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) Empedocles does not relate his dwelling on earth to punishment and rebirths or to his trust in Strife. Even more relevant, in B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) Empedocles does not provide an explanation or justification to his claim to divine nature, which is instead given as an established and acknowledged fact: everyone, everywhere, recognizes and honours Empedocles’ divine nature and the wisdom he is able and eager to offer. This granted him a significant following. Nor does his claim to godhood need to be substantiated further; for instance, through the story of the gods’ fault and exile. Rather, this is perfectly comprehensible in its own terms as a traditional divine epiphany. Because ‘the acknowledgment of a deity is a matter, not of the god’s claim but of man’s perception’, as G. Zuntz has pointed out,69 Empedocles in B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) makes it clear that every person who meets him perceives and recognizes that he is a god.

65 66 67 68 69

him as such (Trépanier 2004: e.g., 84). However, ὑμῖν in this context can be explained as an ‘ethical’ dative (see Wright [1995: 266] with her translation ‘I tell you’). The phrase ὥσπερ ἔοικα points to what the speaker deserves rather than to what the audience perceives. In other words, Empedocles is honoured as he deserves; that is, as is fitting or appropriate. Therefore, any interpretation such as ‘as I seem to you’ must be rejected: see Ferella (2013). He can perform and teach extraordinary things: see, e.g., B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) with my commentary in Chapter 2.5. Tor (2017: 335) argues that this divergent representation of Empedocles as a divine being and a mortal, ephemeral creature is a paradox that we should embrace rather than try to explain away. See the comparable suffering condition Empedocles describes in PStrasb. d–f 1–10a (= EMP D 76.1– 10 Laks-Most), which I will analyze below. This point was already made by Sedley (1989: 275–76). On Sedley’s reading, see below. Zuntz (1971: 190).

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Clearly the same does not hold true with reference to the woeful picture Empedocles offers of himself as an exile and wanderer working through rebirths in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). In fact, following a suggestion by Sedley, I maintain that this difference in divine condition suggests that the two self-presentations, although not contradictory, are better allocated within different contexts. As Sedley puts it: The most natural interpretation is that B 115 comes from a poem in which Empedocles classed himself as a fallen daimon still working through its long cycle of transmigrations, whereas in the Katharmoi, opening as he does with his confident self-proclamation as a god ‘no longer mortal’, he presented himself as having now completed the cycle and recovered his divinity.70

In these respects, I would argue that Empedocles’ different but comparable depiction of godhood in both sets of verses invites the reading that B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) and B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) were designed with a similar function as prologues to his poems: the former to the Purifications and the latter to On Nature. This suggests that Empedocles intended to open both his works through an analogous pattern of motifs, which give prominence to the poet’s self-presentation as an extraordinary individual with exceptional wisdom. In the next chapter we will see that the fundamental idea behind these kinds of introductions is, for the poet, to claim authority on matters well beyond ordinary human ken. However, in his 2011 edition of Empedocles’ fragments (reprinted in 2021), Primavesi suggested that On Nature and the Purifications are distinguished by the way in which Empedocles portrays himself as a fictional narrator. In the Purifications, Empedocles, by establishing a mythical perspective, styled himself as a narrator who appears in the role of an incarnated god and communicates, in writing, a mythical law as part of a farewell letter. In On Nature, on the other hand, Empedocles portrayed himself as a human narrator who – so argues Primavesi – recites by word of mouth his ideas on natural philosophy to his beloved disciple Pausanias.71 70 71

Sedley (1989: 276, 1998: 9–10). Similarly, A. Long (2017: 16). See Primavesi in Mansfeld-Primavesi (2011: 392–93): Regardless of his consistent epic form, the author faces us in the mask of two very different textimmanent narrators: on the mythological side, he acts as the narrative instantiation (‘Erzählinstanz’) of the divine writer of an open letter to his mortal friends, whereas on the physical side the narrator is the narrative instantiation (‘Erzählinstanz’) of a teacher who gives his chosen disciple Pausanias exclusive oral instruction and who, as a human, is dependent on the help of the Muse. Analogously, Primavesi (2013: esp. 667–68) and Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021: 392–93).

1.4 Empedocles, Divine Narrator of On Nature

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As the two fictional narrators ‘cannot write or speak side by side within a single work, but are in fact associated with different poems’,72 Primavesi’s reconstruction entails that Empedocles in his physical poem never alludes to himself as a god and this would assure an allocation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) within the Purifications. However, Primavesi’s hypothesis of two distinct fictional narrators is called into question by many poetical elements – above all Homeric echoes and epic parallels evoking gods in action – which are scattered throughout On Nature and contribute to Empedocles’ selfrepresentation as a god. For instance, in B 2.8 (= EMP D 42.8 LaksMost), after having pointed out the cognitive weakness of ordinary people who are unable to understand the physical world, Empedocles turns to his disciple Pausanias and reveals that he will know the truth. For Pausanias, ‘turned aside’, σὺ δ᾽ οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ᾽ ἐλιάσθης. This expression echoes a Homeric line (Il. 22.12: σὺ δὲ δεῦρο λιάσθης) within a scene in which Apollo, disguised as the Trojan Agenor, turns to Achilles and reveals his truly divine nature. Because of the audience’s great familiarity with Homer, it is likely that Empedocles’ public, on hearing the Empedoclean line for the first time, was moved first to recall the more familiar Homeric scene, in which a similar line was put in the mouth of a god, and second to link Empedocles’ speech to Pausanias with Apollo addressing Achilles. Similarly, in B 17.26 (= EMP D 73.256 Laks-Most), Empedocles urges Pausanias to listen to his non-deceitful discourse: σὺ δ᾿ ἄκουε λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν. Empedocles’ words evoke two Homeric lines (Il. 1.526–27: οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν παλινάγρετον οὐδ’ ἀπατηλὸν / οὐδ’ ἀτελεύτητον ὅ τί κεν κεφαλῇ κατανεύσω) in which Zeus asserts that what he decrees is ‘not deceitful’. Therefore, the expression οὐκ ἀπατηλόν in the same metric position as in Homer very likely called to mind, for Empedocles’ public, the Homeric passage, thereby prompting a comparison between Empedocles and Zeus. The expression λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν in B 17.26 (= EMP D 73.256 Laks-Most) also evokes the words of Parmenides’ goddess, who defined her own cosmology as a deceitful discourse: δόξας δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας / μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων (DK 28 B 8.51–52 [= PARM D 8.56–57 Laks-Most]). Scholars usually take Empedocles’ echo as his way to characterize his own cosmology in opposition to Parmenides’. 72

Mansfeld-Primavesi (2011: 393): ‘diese beiden Erzählinstanzen können klarerweise nicht innerhalb ein und desselben Werkes nebeneinander schreiben bzw. sprechen’. In a similar vein, see also Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021: 393).

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While I will return, in Chapter 6.2.1, to Empedocles’ claim to a non-deceitful account, also in relation to his Parmenidean reminiscence, it is here worth noting that Empedocles’ re-use of the words Parmenides attributed to his goddess can be taken as an intentional echo of a divine speech. In fact, Empedocles’ use of Parmenides is extensive in didactic passages in which he addresses Pausanias through expressions deliberately evoking the words of Parmenides’ goddess.73 By calling to the audiences’ mind an epic speech of Hermes or Zeus, as well as by echoing the speeches of Parmenides’ goddess, Empedocles has his own agenda: he is ascribing to himself the same status and authority that traditionally belongs to gods. Thus, Empedocles’ Homeric and Parmenidean reminiscences, scattered throughout his physical poem, are a highly evocative way to portray himself as a god. Another very clear argument in this regard is the last line of fragment B 23 (= EMP D 60 Laks-Most): ἀλλὰ τορῶς ταῦτ’ ἴσθι, θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον ἀκούσας But know this clearly, having heard the word of the god.

This line, by attesting that the source of Empedocles’ philosophy is a θεός (theos), raises the question of the identity of the god. Numerous scholars, in particular, interpret θεοῦ, despite the masculine form, as referring to the Muse,74 on account of the fact that Empedocles recurs to her aid for inspiration elsewhere in his physical poem.75 Although the Homeric poems display several uses of θεός instead of θεά to indicate a goddess,76 the Homeric passages clearly show that the option for the masculine follows metrical criteria: it replaces the feminine form when this is forbidden by the metrical scheme, whilst the feminine form is generally preferred when metrically possible.77 In the Empedoclean line, the feminine form is as possible as the masculine. Why then would Empedocles have preferred the masculine θεοῦ to refer to the Muse, if he could have used θεᾶς and dispelled any ambiguity? Most simply, the use of θεός attests that Empedocles is referring here to a male god; that is, to himself as the divine source of his philosophy. 73 74

75 76 77

On this aspect of Empedocles’ poetry, see my detailed discussion in Chapter 6.2.1. See e.g., Bignone (1916), Wright (1995) and Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021). Bollack (1965: 265 with n.2, 310 with n.2) refers it to Aphrodite. Contra e.g., Bidez (1894: 102), Nestle (1906: 545–57) and Trépanier (2004: 38). B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most) and B 131 (= EMP D 7 Laks-Most), whose collocation in On Nature I discussed above in 1.3.2, n.46. See, e.g., Il. 8.7: μήτέ τις οὖν θήλεια θεὸς τό γε μήτέ τις ἄρσην. Cf. Willi (2008: 240 and n.32): ‘where in the early Greek epic θεά is metrically possible, the feminine is preferred to θεός’ (‘wo im frühgriechischen Epos θεά metrisch möglich ist, wird es femininem θεός vorgezogen’).

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On the same tone, fragment B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) rather clearly displays Empedocles’ divine nature. As we will see in detail in the next chapter,78 through these verses Empedocles promises to his disciple that he will gain divine powers and wisdom at the end of his learning process. The training in Empedocles’ philosophy will result not only in knowledge of the forces of nature but also in their control: You shall learn all remedies which there are for ills and defence against old age . . . You will calm the force of tireless winds . . . and then, if you so wish,79 you shall bring the winds back again. From black rain you shall make a draught timely for humans, and from summer draught you shall make tree-nourishing streams that will dwell in ether; and from Hades you shall bring back the strength of a dead man.

Mastering the forces of nature in the way Empedocles promises is a divine prerogative. Whereas control over winds and rains traditionally belongs to Zeus’ sphere of power, the ability to ‘bring from Hades the force of a dead man’ is outrageous even for a god. For instance, Asclepius, the son of Apollo and a god himself, was incinerated by Zeus’ thunder precisely because he favoured mortals by bringing them back from Hades, delaying their death. Furthermore, Orpheus, the divine singer, although he was allowed by the gods to go to Hades to retrieve his dead wife, failed at the task and lost her forever. Analogously, old age and mortal ills were imposed on human beings as a mark of gods’ superior power. By teaching how to delay or remove them, Empedocles was, according to Kingsley, issuing a flagrant challenge to the standard Greek view, embodied in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, of humanity as ‘senseless and helpless, incapable of finding a remedy for death and a defence against old age (γήραος ἄλκαρ, 192–3)’. In turning the words of the hymn on their head Empedocles was affronting not only literary tradition but also . . . the most fundamental of religious attitudes and assumptions. Essentially there is little to choose between his implied message here and his declaration elsewhere that he was no longer a human but a god.80

78

79

80

Scholars of Empedocles generally allocate B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) within On Nature – with the only exception of Sedley (1989: 273). In Chapter 2.5 I reconstruct these lines within the proem to the physical poem. The epic formula ἢν ἐθέληισθα at line 5 was deliberately chosen, as Kingsley (1995: 224 with n.23) argues, ‘because of its frequent use in Homer and Hesiod when referring to the special divine powers of gods and goddesses’. See also Bollack (1969: vol. 3, 24): ‘the formula constantly refers to the goodwill of the gods’ (‘La formule se réfère constamment au bon vouloir des dieux’). Kingsley (1995: 223); my emphasis.

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Reconstructing Empedocles’ On Nature

Our sources report that Empedocles himself accomplished several of the extraordinary deeds mentioned in B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most).81 Diogenes Laertius, for instance, attests that Empedocles was known by the nickname ‘wind tamer’, a clear reference to his promise to Pausanias that he will control the force of winds and rain. Indeed, Diogenes explains Empedocles’ alleged engineering ability to capture and thereby reduce the wind by setting donkey leathers on high grounds.82 Analogously, Diogenes reports that Empedocles diverted and bound the path of two rivers in order to soothe their water and contain a lethal pestilence (Diog. Laert. 8.70). Similarly, Plutarch linked Empedocles’ ability to capture the winds to the necessity of containing a pestilence.83 Along the same line, Empedocles’ promise to bring the dead back to life has been linked to the miraculous case of the so-called ‘lifeless woman’, who remained ‘without breath and pulse for thirty days’.84 By a similar standard, the stories about Empedocles’ death, collected by Diogenes Laertius,85 show that part of Empedocles’ biographical tradition tended to ridicule his claim to divine nature. The story that Empedocles threw himself into the crater of the Sicilian volcano Aetna, ‘aiming at confirming the rumour that he was a god’, displays an unmistakably sarcastic tone,86 which is clearly revealed at the end: the volcano spat out one of Empedocles’ boots and finally disclosed his truly human nature. Analogously, other sources, such as Timaeus,87 considered Empedocles ‘boastful and eccentric’ with reference to his claim to divine nature. Other authors mentioned his extravagant clothing, his purple robe, his bronze sandals (a symbol of divinity88) and the crowns that he wore on his head or held in his hand ‘to benefit from the great esteem which is usually attributed to the gods’ (see Suidas). All this is a strong indication that Empedocles contributed through his verses to create his own reputation. Indeed, he was the creator of his own legend,89 which is clearly 81 82 83 85 86 87 89

On Empedocles’ biography see Bidez (1894: 159–74); Lefkowitz (1981) and Chitwood (1986, 2004: 12–58). The same version by Sudas s.v. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. 84 See De curios. 1. 515c and Adv. Colot. 32.4 p. 1126b. See Diog. Laert. 8.61. Ibid. 8.67–73. Horace (Ars Poet. 463–67 = DK 31 A 16) knows the story: Siculique poetae/narrabo interitum. Deus immortalis haberi / dum cupit Empedocles, ardentem frigidus Aetnam / insiluit. See Diog. Laert. 8.66. 88 Ibid. 8.73; Sudas s.v. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. Dodds (1951: 145). See also Burkert (1972: 153–54). Kingsley (1995: 228): ‘we do not have to be told that Diogenes Laertius “says that Satyrus believed that Empedocles laid claim to the power mentioned in fragment 111” [according to Chitwood 1986, 184]; we know that Empedocles laid claim to the powers in question from the fragment itself’. Analogously, Trépanier (2004: 199 n.50): [I]f one can easily produce a more secular Empedocles by simple omission of his supernatural aspects, it is difficult to imagine why he should have inspired such fabulist elaboration had this element not been present from the beginning. No such legends gathered around Anaxagoras.

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connected with his physical poem too, as our sources’ praise of Empedocles’ engineering and medical abilities, being closely linked to B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most), show. A reference to Empedocles’ claim to divine nature can also be read in Lucretius (De Rerum Natura 1.731–33): carmina quin etiam divini pectoris eius vociferantur et exponunt praeclara reperta ut vix humana videatur stirpe creatus. Moreover, the poems of his divine mind utter a loud voice and declare illustrious discoveries, so that he seems hardly to be born of mortal stock. (transl. Rouse [1975])

Lucretius’ praise of Empedocles as one that hardly seems to belong to the human stock could be seen as Lucretius’ hint at Empedocles’ own claim to divine nature. It is worth noting, however, that there is no hint of sarcasm towards Lucretius’ verses, nor the intention to ridicule Empedocles’ claim.90 To sum up, whereas Empedocles’ claim that he is a god is explicit in B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) and B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), several fragments that are chiefly physical abound in reminiscences of epic scenes with gods in action and in echoes of divine speeches. Through these, Empedocles constructs his own image as a god. Additionally, the lines of B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) ascribe to Empedocles not merely knowledge of, but also control over, the forces of nature. As scholars have already observed, this is essentially comparable to his explicit claim elsewhere that he is a god. Further, as we have seen, such a claim is also found in a physical fragment, B 23.11 (= EMP D 60.11 Laks-Most), where Empedocles affirms that the source of his philosophy is a god, namely himself. Finally, plenty of stories about Empedocles’ allegedly divine nature show that he was the maker of his own legend. These tales are associated with both his explicit claim to be a god in B 112 (= EMP D 4 Laks-Most) and B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and the representation of his exceptional power over the forces of nature in B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most). Therefore, pace Primavesi, there seems to be no dichotomy between the fictional narrators of the Purifications and On Nature. Indeed, Empedocles is consistent in depicting himself as a god in both poems. Thus, as I will show below, it only remains to place due value on 90

This claim is echoed in Proclus’ description of Empedocles as a ‘divine dogmatic’; that is, a person who can attain knowledge without intermediary people, just like a god (in Timaeus 29d 351).

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the papyrus evidence before we can conclusively allocate B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) where it almost certainly belonged: in the proem to On Nature.

1.5

The Guilty God and the Proem to On Nature

We are gradually bringing this chapter to a conclusion by unravelling the knotty problem concerning the provenance of B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost) from Empedocles’ On Nature. All that now remains is to return to the Strasbourg papyrus, showing that decisive evidence for the attribution of this fragment to On Nature comes from it. In the following, I shall show that in the papyrus verses we can read an internal echo, indeed a literary allusion, to the story of the guilty god narrated in B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost), which necessitates that this story be prefaced in the physical poem. In one of the largest ensembles of the Strasbourg papyrus, namely ens. d– f (= EMP D 76 Laks-Most), we can read some remarkable verses: [ἄν]διχ᾿ ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλω[ν] π̣εσέ̣ [ει]ν̣ καὶ π̣[ότ]μ̣ον ἐπισπε̣ ῖν [πό]λλ᾿ ἀεκαζομέν[ο]ισιν ἀ[να]γκα[ίης ὕ]π̣ο λυγρῆς [ση]πο[μ]έ̣ νοις· Φιλίην δ᾿ ἐ[ρατ]ὴ̣ ν̣ [ἡμῖ]ν̣ νυν ἔχουσιν [Ἅρ]π̣υιαι θανάτοιο πάλοις̣ [ἤδη παρέσ]ονται. └Οἴ┘μ̣οι ὅτ(ι) οὐ πρόσθεν με δι̣ └ώλεσε νη┘λεὲς ἦμαρ, └πρὶν┘ χηλαῖς̣ └σχέ┘τ̣λι᾿ ἔργα βορ̣└ᾶς πέρι μητ┘ί̣ σ̣α̣└σθαι·┘ [νῦν δ]ὲ μάτη[ν ἐν] τῶιδε νότ̣[ωι κατέδ]ε̣ υσα παρειάς· [ἐξικ]ν̣ούμε[θα γὰ]ρ̣ πολυβενθ̣[έα χῶρον], ὀ̣ ΐω, [μυρία τ(ε) οὐκ] ἐθέλουσι παρέσσε[ται ἄλγ]ε̣ α θυμῶι [ἀνθρώποις·

5

10

To fall apart from one another and to encounter their lot putrefying most unwillingly, under dire necessity. As for us, who now possess desirable Love, the Harpies will soon be present with the destinies of death. Alas, that the pitiless day did not destroy me earlier, 5 before I contrived terrible deeds about feeding with my claws! But as it is, in vain have I wetted my cheeks in this squall (?) [scil. of tears]; for we are arriving at the region of enormous depth, I suppose, and myriads of pains will be present to the heart of unwilling 10 humans.]91 91

The reconstruction of these lines follows Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021), precisely F 87 at p. 484 which I accept in my text except for line 8, where I fill the last lacuna with the word χῶρον, following a proposal by Balaudé (accepted by Rashed [2011: 36 with n.3]). In contrast, Martin-Primavesi (1999) and Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021) have Δῖνον (also accepted in the text by Laks-Most [2016: see EMP D 76.8 at p. 428]). Primavesi justifies his conjecture by assuming that the word Δῖνον was a technical term in Empedocles’ physical system, indeed a proper noun that designates the vortex of four homogeneous elements at the end of Strife’s dominance. Primavesi assumes that Empedocles coined

1.5 The Guilty God and the Proem to On Nature

59

Throughout these lines, Empedocles observes, and suffers for, the alternating vicissitudes that mortal beings must undergo. The fragment opens with an image of death: something ‘falls apart’ and dies. The phrase ἄνδιχ᾿ ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων and the image of death evoke the separating power of Strife. The second line strengthens the notion of dying by adding putrefaction and dire necessity. The Harpies, an allusion to Strife,92 are said to be approaching, ‘with the destinies of death’. At lines 5–6 Empedocles curses ‘the pitiless day’ when he stains his hands – but the text has the word ‘claws’ (χηλαῖς̣) – with ‘terrible deeds about feeding’. The detail of Empedocles’ claws in connection to his ‘deeds about feeding’ have invited the reading that he was referring to a previous life, when he was reborn as a beast.93 Alternatively, the reference to Empedocles’ claws could suggest a close connection to the mythical characters of the Harpies, evoked at the outset of the fragment. On this reading, Empedocles seems to suggest that Strife is working upon him as it works upon the Harpies, by rendering him a monstrous being, overwhelmed by its power and therefore capable of horrifying deeds. For this reason, Empedocles would have preferred his own annihilation94 to the awful life, in the hands of Strife, he is now compelled to live. What do ‘the pitiless day’ and ‘the terrible deeds about feeding’ represent? Arguably, these verses can be better comprehended in conjunction with the story of Empedocles’ fault and exile depicted in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). Specifically, the reference to ‘terrible deeds about feeding’ in the papyrus can be related to the crime of slaughter (φόνος) mentioned in B 115.3 (= EMP D 10.3 Laks-Most) and most likely equated with the killing of the sacrificial victim, for which he deserved to be punished through exile and rebirths.95 In this respect, it is worth noting that the mention of the Harpies in the papyrus lines (l. 4) that approach with destinies of death can be compared to the reference to Strife in B 115.14 (= EMP D 10.14 LaksMost) as the ultimate cause of Empedocles’ exile and rebirths; that is, of his

92

93 94 95

this neologism as a linguistic calque of the analogous Sphairos (simply put, Δῖνον> δίνη like Σφαῖρος> σφαῖρα) in order to indicate the opposite phase in the cosmic cycle: see MartinPrimavesi (1999: 305–6). However, in the whole corpus of Empedoclean fragments as well as in the doxographical tradition there is no reference to a Dinon opposed to the Sphairos. Primavesi’s conjecture is, therefore, purely speculative. Martin-Primavesi (1999: 287–88) show that here the Harpies’ role blends into that of Ἔριδες (and therefore of Strife) in PStrasb. c 4 (= EMP D 73.305 Laks-Most: └ἄλλοτε δ᾽ αὖτε κακῆισι διατμηθέντ᾽ ἐρίδεσσιν┘). See Inwood (2007: 238) and Tor (2017: 332 and 336). The verb διώλεσε suggests a complete destruction, rather than a simple death (which, according to Empedocles, is not the final end): see Trépanier (2014: 202). Empedocles describes ritual sacrifice as a φόνος comparable to murder and cannibalism: see B 136 (= EMP D 28 Laks-Most) and B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) with my discussion in Chapter 2.6.

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mortality. Analogously, πολυβενθ̣[έα χῶρον in PStrab. d–f 8 (= EMP D 76.8 Laks-Most) could be taken as a reference to the ἀσυνήθεα χῶρον of B 118 (= EMP D 14 Laks-Most) that, as I will argue in the next chapter, is related to B 115 and is a hint at the first leg of Empedocles’ journey of exile. In light of these parallelisms between the papyrus verses quoted above and B 115, it is not difficult to equate ‘the pitiless day’ Empedocles curses in PStrasb. d–f 5 (= EMP D 76.5) with the day he lost his divine abode and condition to become an exile and wanderer because of his trust in Strife (B 115.13–14 [= EMP D 10.13–14 Laks-Most]).96 The nature of the parallelisms between B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and the papyrus passage, moreover, suggests the conclusion that in the latter Empedocles constructs a literary allusion to his story of fault and punishment narrated in the former. In fact, the key to understanding the rather obscure image in the papyrus lines is to read it through the verses of B 115. Therefore, in order for this literary allusion to be effected, the verses of B 115 must precede those of the papyrus in the poetic narrative. In other words, to grasp the literary function of this allusion in the poetic interplay, the audience must have already learned about the story of the guilty gods and above all about Empedocles’ claim to be one of them. Against this background, it can finally be concluded that B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost) is to be allocated within On Nature.

1.6

Conclusions

This chapter has chiefly concerned itself with the location of a fundamental Empedoclean fragment, B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), within On Nature. My argument has started from the analysis of some new pieces of evidence, brought to light by the publication of the Strasbourg papyrus, which have proven crucial for my reconstruction. In particular, a papyrus fragment, labelled as ens. d–f (= EMP D 76 Laks-Most), constitutes important evidence for placing B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) within 96

It is worth noting that Trépanier (2017a: 158–65) proposes a reconstruction of PStrasb. d–f 7 (= EMP D 76.7 Laks-Most) which adds force to my hypothesis of Empedocles’ literary allusion to B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). Specifically, whereas Martin-Primavesi’s reconstruction, which is generally accepted by the editors of Empedocles (see, e.g., EMP D 76.7 Laks-Most) reads as follows, νῦν δ]ὲ μάτη[ν ἐν] τῶιδε νότ̣[ωι κατέδ]ε̣ υσα παρειάς, Trépanier proposes, [νῦν δ]ὲ μάτη[ν ἐπὶ] τῶιδε νό[μωι κατέδ]ε̣ υσα παρειάς. According to Trépanier, the notion of νόμος that can be reconstructed within the papyrus line is a reference to the oracle of Necessity; that is, to the exile of the guilty gods in B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost). As Trépanier concludes, PStrasb. d–f 7 (= EMP D 76.7 Laks-Most) according to his reconstruction ‘either directly refers back to B 115 or, at a minimum, presupposes it. Either way B 115 should henceforth be attributed to the proem of the On Nature.’

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the physical poem. There we find Empedocles deploring ‘the pitiless day’ and his ‘terrible deeds about feeding’, which would remain without clear reference if one were not to be reminded of the story of the guilty gods narrated in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). Indeed, the close parallels between B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and the papyrus verses strongly indicate that Empedocles constructs in the papyrus lines a literary allusion to the story of guilt and divine punishment narrated in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). This must therefore precede the papyrus passage for the latter to be understood in its entirety. In light of this and following Plutarch’s remark that B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) is a prelude to the doctrine proper, the inference is that it belongs to the proem to On Nature, which, just like the Purifications, opens with Empedocles’ presentation as a god. This conclusion invites the reading that he intended to introduce both poems with a similar claim to his divine nature. In the next chapter, we will see that the reason behind these kinds of introductions is to claim poetical authority on matters beyond ordinary human knowledge. In conclusion, having established that B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) opens On Nature, I have built a sound basis for a new reconstruction of the text of Empedocles’ physical proem. By following up on this conclusion, in the next chapter I will argue that this is reconstructed out of a synergy between what are generally considered as religious themes and more strictly physical principles. Because of its complex nature, the proem to On Nature then prompts us to rethink the interrelation and interaction among myth, religion and natural philosophy in Empedocles’ physical system and poem.

chapter 2

The Proem to On Nature

Having analyzed the evidence brought to light by the Strasbourg papyrus, the previous chapter has shown that B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) can be allocated within Empedocles’ physical poem with a good level of certainty and, following an indication by Plutarch, it can be placed within the proem to On Nature and, as I would argue, at its very start. The physical poem thus opens with Empedocles’ claim to be a god, banished from the community of blessed deities and sent to earth because of his trust in Strife. By following up on this conclusion, in this chapter I am going to propose a novel reconstruction of the verses and topics constituting the entire introductory section of Empedocles’ physical poem.1 My aim is to show that the proem to On Nature is composed, for the most part, of several topics and verses traditionally attributed to the Purifications. In this way, I will draw attention to the fact that the need, emphasized since the second half of the last century, to rethink the interrelation between myth, religion and physics in Empedocles’ thought is prompted in the first place by the textual data offered by his fragments. Starting precisely from its prologue, it will be shown that On Nature is composed by verses and themes related to Empedocles’ belief in rebirth in synergy with more strictly physical theories. The chapter begins with a brief introduction to my method of allocating the fragments covered here and is thereafter divided into two key sections. In the first part, I will focus on the location within the proem of verses and topics that are closely related to B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most): the so-called demonological fragments. My argument is that, by expanding on the theme of Empedocles’ exile introduced at B 115 (= EMP D 10 1

As we have seen in Chapter 1.1, the stichometric sign in ens. a of the Strasbourg papyrus indicates that, before the very physical exposition (which begins with B 17.1 [= EMP D 73.233 Laks-Most]), the prologue to On Nature encompasses over 230 lines. Being of considerable length, it invites the reconstruction within it of several topics and verses that scholars do not generally consider as introductory to the physical poem.

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Laks-Most) and by depicting the first and most relevant leg of his exile journey as a katabasis into the realm of the dead, the demonological fragments add important details to Empedocles’ own portrait as an exceptional individual.2 Furthermore, as katabaseis were recognized in antiquity as a privileged way to obtain extraordinary knowledge,3 my claim here is that the narration of this exceptional journey serves Empedocles to validate his authority on matters beyond ordinary human ken. These coincide with the subjects he covers in his philosophical poem and concern, as I am going to show, not only topics on what we may now regard as natural philosophy, but also themes related to ethical and religious questions around the place and destiny of the individuals in this world and beyond. Additionally, by representing himself on a journey to the underworld and assimilating thereby elements recognizable in the biographies of legendary or semi-legendary sages who were famous in the fifth century BCE for having contact with the realm of the dead through katabaseis of sorts, it will be argued that Empedocles assumes the role of a legendary seeker of truth. Moreover, in introducing his physical poem with the narration of such a mythical experience, he follows a traditional pattern that is well attested in epic-didactic poetry, as Hesiod’s Theogony (Hymn to the Muse) and, above all, Parmenides’s journey to the House of Night (DK 28 B 1 [= PARM D 4 Laks-Most]) show. Narrations of this sort at the outset of epic-didactic poems serve as authorial validation, by making the poet a ‘master of truth’4 and retrospectively support the assumption made here that an analogous narration opened Empedocles’ physical poem to legitimize him as an author of extraordinary wisdom. The rest of Chapter 2 will then be dedicated to the reconstruction of those verses and themes that, in the original layout of the opening to On Nature, might have followed the narration of Empedocles’ journey to Hades. First, the dedication of his poem to his beloved disciple Pausanias and the promise of divine reward he will gain at the end of his philosophical training. Related to this, second, is the promise offered to Pausanias to overcome human epistemic limitations, in contrast to the inanity of ordinary human beings, 2

3 4

The idea that this group of fragments related to B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) depict Empedocles’ katabasis is not new. See, e.g., Zuntz (1971: 263), who nevertheless suggested that the narration of Empedocles’ journey to the underworld was to be read within the Purifications. Moreover, van der Ben (1975) reconstructed Empedocles’ descent into Hades out of his demonological fragments and suggested that these constitute the prologue to Empedocles’ On Nature. On van der Ben’s reconstruction, see my discussion in the Introduction to this book. The point was made by Morrison (1955: 60). Following the definition offered by Detienne (1967).

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who are incapable of true knowledge and therefore prone to commit terrible deeds, as evidenced by the widespread practice of ritual sacrifice. There follow, third, traditionally introductory elements, such as the invocation to the Muse and the enunciation of the central tenets of Empedocles’ philosophical system: the four basic elements of fire, air, water and earth as well as the opposing forces of Love and Strife and the unconditional rejection of the ordinary notion of birth and death. Two major arguments are adduced for this claim, which show the interrelation of religion and physics in Empedocles’ philosophy: on the one hand, that every existing thing can be traced back to the basic elements involved in processes of mixing and separation; on the other hand, that individual existence (with positive and negative aspects) extends beyond mere embodied life. As we will see, the proem so reconstructed presents a programmatic structure of a surprising internal coherence and makes sense of several of the most fundamental Empedoclean fragments, which have been the object of great debate among modern scholars. Such an outcome is significant for a number of reasons, but most importantly, it matters because we are dealing with verses that are essential for a comprehensive and impartial understanding of Empedocles’ thought. The result is an opening section in which religious themes are integrated into the rudiments and principles of Empedocles’ physical system, thus offering a novel textual basis for rethinking the interplay between myth, religion and natural philosophy in his physical system.

2.1 The Allocation of the Fragments To begin, it is worthwhile to set out the method behind the allocation of fragments, which also provides the structure for this chapter. Specifically, following Wright,5 the method put forward here is to set out fragments in groups graded according to the certainty of their place in the proem to On Nature. My reconstruction of the opening of the physical poem then includes six major groups of fragments, as follows: (1) Fragments related to B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and dealing with themes such as Empedocles’ fault, exile and rebirth, which are often referred to as the demonological fragments. These will be covered in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 and include, in this order, fragments B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), B 117 (= EMP D 13 Laks-Most), B 119 (= EMP D 15 Laks-Most), B 118 (= EMP D 14 Laks-Most), B 129 5

See Wright (1995: 77–84).

2.1 The Allocation of the Fragments

(2)

(3) (4) (5) (6)

65

(= EMP D 38 Laks-Most), B 121 (= EMP D 24 Laks-Most), B 120 (= EMP D 16 Laks-Most), B 122–3 (= EMP D 21 and D 22 LaksMost), B 126 (= EMP D 19 Laks-Most), B 127 (= EMP D 36 LaksMost) and B 146–7 (= EMP D 39 and D 40 Laks-Most). Sections 2.3 and 2.4 address models for the journey recounted through these fragments. Fragments related to Empedocles’ dedication of his poem to his disciple Pausanias, the promise of what he can expect to achieve as a result of his philosophical training and the inanity of ordinary people who, in contrast, are not going to learn from Empedocles’ philosophy. These topics are covered in Section 2.5 and consist of fragments B 1 (= EMP D 41 Laks-Most), B 111 (= EMP D 43 LaksMost) and B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most). Fragments dealing with ritual sacrifice as the main outcome of human madness. These are covered in Section 2.6 and include fragments B 136 (= EMP D 28 Laks-Most) and B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most). Verses focusing on the invocation to the gods and the Muse, such as fragment B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most), analyzed in Section 2.7. Fragments introducing the principles of Empedocles’ physics, which I cover in Section 2.8 and include fragments B 6 (= EMP D 57 LaksMost) and B 16 (= EMP D 63 Laks-Most). Verses dealing with one of the central tenets of Empedocles’ physical system, namely his rejection of the ordinary notions of birth and death. This theme is covered in Section 2.9 and includes fragments B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most), B 12 (= EMP D 48 Laks-Most), B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most), B 11 (= EMP D 51 Laks-Most) and B 15 (= EMP D 52 Laks-Most).

My aim in this chapter is thus to reconstruct all these fragments within an introductory and programmatic narrative which, I argue, makes best sense of each. The level of certainty for the allocation of fragments to the proem is established by following either the indication of our sources – for instance, B 1 (= EMP D 41 Laks-Most) is explicitly placed in On Nature by Diogenes Laertius – or other external criteria, such as contextual reasons, as for instance in the case of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most, examined in the previous chapter). Moreover, thematic criteria are also taken into consideration for a safer attribution of a certain fragment to the proemial section, as for instance in the case of B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most), which is cited without any indication of its location but, as it includes the traditionally

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introductory topic of the poet’s appeal to the Muse for inspiration, can well be considered as a fragment of the proem to On Nature.6 Other fragments that do not present similar elements for a secure attribution are assigned to each of the groups according to the criterion of content or contextual proximity with the fragments already assigned. By content proximity I mean the possibility of associating Empedoclean fragments by virtue of their similar subjects, either in conjunction with the indications of the authors who quote them or even independently from their sources. This is the case for most of the fragments of the first group, which relate to B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and also to one another because they all refer, either directly or indirectly, to elements present in the story narrated in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), such as Empedocles’ fault, punishment, exile and rebirths. By contextual proximity I mean the context of the fragments’ quotation by our sources, who may cite a few or several sets of Empedoclean verses in sequence. According to this criterion, for instance, I put together most fragments of what I consider to be the last section of the physical proem, which are quoted in sequence by the same source.7 Having argued in the last chapter that, thanks to the new evidence of the Strasbourg papyrus, the issue of the allocation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) to Empedocles’ physical poem is settled, I take Plutarch’s remark that it belongs to the beginning of Empedocles’ philosophy8 as an indication that it represents the very overture of On Nature, which then opens with Empedocles presenting himself as a guilty god sent to exile. The notion in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) of guilty gods being punished through rebirths brings with it the reference to the diverse lives Empedocles had to live before being reborn as the person he is now. This is the topic of B 117 (= EMP D 13 Laks-Most), which I take as closely following Empedocles’ self-presentation in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). The collocation of fragments B 119 (= EMP D 15 Laks-Most) and B 121 (= EMP D 24 Laks-Most) in the same context of B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost) is due to our sources, who explicitly connected them with the story of Empedocles’ exile. B 118 (= EMP D 14 Laks-Most), which I speculatively 6

7 8

The allocation within On Nature rather than the Purifications is assured by the theme covered by B 3.9–13 (= EMP D 44.9–13 Laks-Most), which deals with the powers of sense organs in knowledge acquisition, a topic which, as we will see in Chapter 6.3, is also covered by other physical fragments. Additionally, Empedocles’ allocution in the second person singular at B 3.9 (= EMP D 44.9 LaksMost) can be taken as an indication that he is addressing his disciple Pausanias, to whom On Nature is dedicated. That is, Plutarch in Against Colotes, as we will see in due course. De ex. 607c: ὁ δ’ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν ἀρχῆι τῆς φιλοσοφίας προαναφωνήσας.

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collocate between them can in any case be considered as part of the same context because it elaborates on the notions of Empedocles’ sorrows as a consequence of his loss of a merrier state for a much lesser condition. Additionally, there we find the mention of an ‘unwonted’ place that coincides, as we will see in Section 2.2.2, with the underworld. Moreover, because they elaborate on elements associated with the traditional topography of the underworld, such as the cave and the meadow of Ate, B 120 (= EMP D 16 Laks-Most) and B 122–3 (= EMP D 21 and D 22 Laks-Most) may well belong to the same context too. Lastly, the sequence of fragments B 126 (= EMP D 19 Laks-Most), B 127 (= EMP D 36 LaksMost) and B 146–7 (= EMP D 39 and D 40 Laks-Most), because they expand on the notion of rebirth and different lives, is also very likely related to the verses of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and should be added to the same section and context. While we have just seen that there are contextual and content elements that allow us to place most of these fragments together and in the same context as B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), for other lines, notably those of B 129 (= EMP D 38 Laks-Most), we do not have any hint as to where they originally belonged. I acknowledge that, in this case, my placing them within a certain section of the physical proem, and above all within a specific narrative, is speculative. However, it is worth noting that the grouping of all fragments listed above as Group 1, including the lines of B 129 (= EMP D 38 Laks-Most), is generally accepted by modern editors of Empedocles,9 who at most have proposed minor variations on this scheme consisting in the addition or omission of just some lines. It is the bulk of these verses that scholars frequently refer to as the demonological fragments; that is, all those lines that directly or indirectly deal with elements related to the story of the δαίμων narrated in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). With this given, the novelty of my reconstruction concerning these fragments really consists in placing them in the opening section of the proem to On Nature, whereas the majority of scholars, as we have seen in the Introduction and in Chapter 1 with reference to B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) in particular, still advocate a conventional apportionment within the Purifications.10 9

10

See already their arrangement in Diels-Kranz. See also Bignone (1916), van der Ben (1975), Gallavotti (1975), Wright (1995), Tonelli (2002), Bollack (2003), Trépanier (2004), Vítek (2006), Gemelli Marciano (2009), Graham (2010), Montevecchi (2010) and Mansfeld-Primavesi (2011) and (2021). For a different reconstruction, see Inwood (2001). But see van der Ben (1975), who already reconstructed them within the proem to On Nature. For a scrutiny of his reconstruction, a discussion of its limits and the aspects in which my proposal improves upon van der Ben’s, see my Introduction.

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Before moving on to a close analysis of each of the demonological fragments as well as to their reconstruction in a coherently proemial narration, a brief introduction to the method and criteria I used in putting together and organizing the remaining groups within the proemial section is in order. In this respect, fragments B 1 (= EMP D 41 Laks-Most) and B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most), which constitute Group 2, are generally accepted as proemial fragments in modern editions, partly by virtue of their content, which well fits an introduction – this is mainly true for B 1 (= EMP D 41 Laks-Most), which represents the dedication to the disciple, but B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most) also focuses on a subject (the inanity of ordinary humans) that can be found, for instance, in the proem to Hesiod’s Theogony or in the opening of Heraclitus’ book11 – partly because our source cites B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most) as preceding Empedocles’ invocation to the gods and the Muse, which is a traditionally proemial topic. In the case of B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most), which I take as belonging to this group, it will be shown that some formal elements of its text point to its location in an introductory section. For this reason, the most recent editions of Empedoclean fragments run counter to Diels-Kranz’s edition, in which B 111 (= EMP D 43 LaksMost) is placed at the end of the physical poem, and are in contrast inclined to locate it earlier in the poem, before the physical exposition beginning with B 17 (= EMP D 73.233–66 Laks-Most).12 Group 4 includes B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most), which, as we have seen above, is Empedocles’ prayer for divine inspiration and, for this reason, is usually considered, correctly in my view, as part of the proem to On Nature. The novel element introduced by my proemial reconstruction is Group 3 formed out of B 136 (= EMP D 28 Laks-Most) and B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks–Most), which are generally located in the Purifications. The different collocation I advocate, whereby they precede B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most), is prompted by the mention of human madness in B 3.1 (= EMP D 44.1 Laks-Most), which raises the question of defining more specifically what it refers to. B 136 (= EMP D 28 Laks-Most) and, above all, B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most), with their thematic focus on the rejection of ritual sacrifice as a case of murder and cannibalism that humans commit unwittingly, could therefore shed some new light on this point, as is also validated by the method of placing the proemial fragments of Empedocles developed by Sedley. 11 12

See Theog. 26 and Heraclitus DK 22 B 1–2 (= HER D 1 and D2 Laks-Most). Inwood (2001: 211), Laks-Most (2016: 388 [= EMP D 43]) and Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021: 442 [= F 42]) But see already Bollack (1969: vol. 3, 22) and Kingsley (1995: 218 and 228–29).

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Specifically, Sedley’s method consists of comparing the topics treated in Lucretius’ prologue to his De Rerum Natura with similar contents thematized in Empedocles’ fragments. Since, as Sedley demonstrated, Lucretius’ prologue imitates the proem to Empedocles’ On Nature, by detecting in Empedocles’ fragments topics that Lucretius has in his proem, we are able to isolate Empedocles’ proemial verses.13 There is a particular topic in Lucretius’ proem that is chiefly connected to human madness: the madness of traditional religio, exemplified by the ritual sacrifice of Iphigeneia (DRN 1.80–101). As Sedley points out, Lucretius’ lines are reminiscent of Empedocles’ B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) and suggests it is Empedocles’ own exemplification of human madness, which will later be imitated by the Roman poet. Following this line of argument, I contend that B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) presents ritual sacrifice as a paradigmatic instance of human madness and is to be placed before the reference to that madness we find in B 3.1 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most). Lastly, the placement of B 136 (= EMP D 28 Laks-Most) in the same context follows both the source citing it as immediately preceding B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) and criteria of thematic consistency. Indeed, B 136 (= EMP D 28 Laks-Most) refers to people devouring each other because of their ignorance, which can be compared to the notion of unconscious cannibalism of which those who participate in animal sacrifices are guilty, as stated in B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most). As for the fragments forming the remaining groups, we are on safer ground as regards their placement in the proem to On Nature, since their content can be considered introductory and their function programmatic. Specifically, fragments B 6 (= EMP D 57 Laks-Most) and B 16 (= EMP D 63 Laks-Most) of Group 5 zoom in on Empedocles’ introduction of the principles of his physical system – the four elements and the two forces of Love and Strife. Lastly, fragments B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most), B 12 (= EMP D 48 Laks-Most), B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most), B 11 (= EMP D 51 Laks-Most) and B 15 (= EMP D 52 Laks-Most), constituting Group 6, focus on one of the main tenets of Empedocles’ physics – the rejection of the ordinary notions of birth and death – which underlies his physical system and needs therefore to be introduced before its exposition. For these reasons, scholars generally agree on placing these fragments before the very beginning of Empedocles’ physical account; that is, before B 17 (= EMP D 73.233–66 Laks-Most). In reconstructing them within the proemial 13

Sedley (1989: esp. 287–94).

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section, therefore, I am not introducing any substantial novelty with respect to modern editions of Empedocles’ fragments.

2.2 The Demonological Fragments Having explained the methodology that guides my reconstruction of the whole proemial section, I will now consider the demonological fragments. Because this group consists of a considerable number of fragments, my explanation of each will be undertaken, for reasons of clarity, in different subsections: B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and B 117 (= EMP D 13 LaksMost) are examined in Section 2.2.1; B 119 (= EMP D 15 Laks-Most), B 118 (= EMP D 14 Laks-Most), B 129 (= EMP D 38 Laks-Most) and B 121 (= EMP D 24 Laks-Most) are considered in Section 2.2.2; Section 2.2.3 then explores B 120 (= EMP D 16 Laks-Most) and B 122–3 (= EMP D 21 and D 22 Laks-Most); while Section 2.2.4 is dedicated to the analysis of B 126 (= EMP D 19 Laks-Most), B 127 (= EMP D 36 Laks-Most) and B 146–7 (= EMP D 39 and D 40 Laks-Most). While this structuring principle basically follows the order in which I want each fragment to be allocated, I am going to make clear in each subsection which specific criterion I take into consideration for the location of each of the fragments analyzed. The main reason for grouping these fragments together is that they all refer, directly or indirectly, to elements related to the story of the daimon narrated in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), such as fault, punishment, rebirth, expulsion from the divine community, exile and the ensuing sorrows connected to the new mortal condition. Moreover, as has been pointed out above, the grouping of these fragments also follows the indications of our sources, who quoted many of them as part of the same narrative section. For all these reasons, modern editors have generally regarded them as a group and reconstructed them as the main body of the narration concerning the story of the daimon. However, whereas most scholars maintain they are part of the Purifications, the innovative element introduced by my reconstruction is that they constitute the first section of Empedocles’ proem to On Nature.14 They contribute to the portrait of Empedocles as a guilty and exiled god, thematizing, as I will argue below, the events that occurred during the first 14

But see n.10 above and Sedley (1989). Moreover, Martin-Primavesi (1999, e.g., 13) suggested that the story of the gods being exiled to earth (B 115 [= EMP D 10 Laks-Most]) be reconstructed within the physical poem. However, from 2001 onwards Primavesi has advocated the conservative hypothesis that B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) belongs to the Purifications.

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stage of his journey of exile, which coincides with a katabasis into the realm of the dead. In what follows, I will not only analyze each of the demonological fragments, but also reconstruct a narrative that could make best sense of them, while justifying why a poem on natural philosophy opens with a section that is prominently religious, indeed decidedly mythical in tone. My argument is that the narration at the outset of a physical poem of such an exceptional experience is intended to legitimize Empedocles as the one who knows and can therefore reveal the nature of things and the fate of human beings. In this way, Empedocles establishes that what he is going to say in the rest of the poem can be believed as true. Furthermore, the narrative of his mythical journey to the underworld sets the stage for how Empedocles became an expert in such out-of-theordinary matters of knowledge as the fate of the dead, their judgement in Hades and their eventual rebirth in the form of another mortal. My thesis is that it is precisely because Empedocles saw the fate of the dead in Hades that he was able to come to our world as a prophet of a true doctrine of rebirth. 2.2.1 Empedocles’ Signature and B 117 (= EMP D 13 Laks-Most) If we take up where I left off in Chapter 1, we saw that B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) not only belongs in the prologue to On Nature, but that following Plutarch, this fragment can be taken as its very overture. To briefly recap on that fragment, B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) introduces the oracle of Necessity, the eternal decree of the gods and the broad oaths, which are then followed by the narration of the crimes gods may commit and for which they are going to be banished from the divine community and sent to earth. Here they are compelled to be reborn as all forms of mortals for many thousands of years.15 At the end of the fragment, Empedocles declares himself to be one of those gods and offers the impersonal narration of divine fault, punishment, rebirths and exile, put forward in the preceding verses, as the story of his own life: τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης, νείκεϊ μαινομένωι πίσυνος.

(B 115.13–14 [= EMP D 10.13–14 Laks-Most])

15

For a philological and interpretative analysis of the verses forming B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), see Chapter 1.2.

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The Proem to On Nature I too am now one of these, an exile from the gods and a wanderer, trusting in mad Strife.

As we can appreciate, B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) closes with Empedocles announcing that he is now an exiled god because of his trust in Strife. This declaration constitutes Empedocles’ poetical signature: at the outset of his philosophical poem, Empedocles introduces himself as a deity, currently but temporarily banished from the community of the other gods and exiled to our earth. This introductory signature has been clearly established in Chapter 1.2; however, if we are now to think more speculatively, it is possible that after his claim to divine nature, Empedocles might have wanted to offer a brief recollection of the series of rebirths he went through. Indeed, it is the notion we find in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) of gods working through rebirths that invites the association with the reference to the diverse lives Empedocles had to live before his present form as an adult, male human. These forms of lives are described in B 117 (= EMP D 13 Laks-Most), which reads: ἤδη γάρ ποτ’ ἐγὼ γενόμην κοῦρός τε κόρη τε θάμνος τ’ οἰωνός τε καὶ ἔξαλος ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς. For I was already a boy and a girl And a bush and a bird and a sea-fish rising high out of the water.

As a bush, bird and fish are examples of lives on earth, in the air and under the water, these lines can be linked to B 115.9–12 (= EMP D 10.9–12 LaksMost), in which Empedocles illustrates how a guilty god, reborn as a mortal being, is compelled to pass from one cosmic region to the next (each exemplified by an element: sun/fire, ether or air, water and earth) and, in providing a vivid image of the wanderings exiled gods may go through, he hints at their rebirths. On the other hand, boy and girl, κοῦρός τε κόρη, in addition to being instances of earthly lives (indeed, human lives), are meant to cover both the male and the female sex and are ‘examples of lives that are not properly settled, because they are cut off before maturity’.16 Alternatively, the lives of a boy and girl may be connected to an initiatory context, in which the title of κοῦρος/κόρη remarks on the subordination of the initiate with respect to the gods. In parallel, however, it indicates the special status of the initiate, as a person who is going to receive the revelation 16

The quotation is from Wright (1995: 276).

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of truth. Thus, by calling himself a κοῦρος, Empedocles could have wanted to highlight a phase or moment in his lifetime that was preparatory to his current existence as a wisdom-expert (on which, see below).17 Empedocles’ enumeration of his past lives might also suggest a reference to a practice of recollection of past lives, which is connected to the doctrine of rebirth, above all in Pythagorean contexts. Pythagoras is usually credited with the ability to enumerate his past existences18 and later sources connected the Pythagorean way of life with memory exercises aiming at calling to mind all events one could experience during the day.19 Be that as it may, it is fair to say that a reference to the practice or exercises of remembering one’s past lives is not required to make sense of the Empedoclean lines. In fact, Empedocles’ claim to have been a boy, a girl, a bush and a bird may have been more simply prompted by his belief that the guilty gods, once in exile, operate through rebirths as all kinds of living beings.20 2.2.2

The katabasis of Empedocles

I would now like to turn to two fragments, B 119 (= EMP D 15 Laks-Most) and B 118 (= EMP D 14 Laks-Most), both consisting of a single line, because they presumably belong to the depiction of the very first moment of Empedocles’ experience after his banishment from the gods. As we have mentioned above, their collocation in the same context of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) is partly due to our sources, who quoted B 119 (= EMP D 15 Laks-Most) after B 115 (= EMP 10 Laks-Most) and explicitly connected it with the story of Empedocles’ exile, partly because they elaborate on the notion of Empedocles’ sorrows as a consequence of his loss of a happy, divine state for the mortal condition. That is, they very likely 17

18 19

20

It is worth noting that in the prologue to Parmenides’ physical poem, when we are told that he is in front of the goddess in the House of Night (DK 28 B 1.24 [= PARM D 4.24 Laks-Most]), Parmenides is addressed as a κοῦρος. In contrast, at the beginning of the prologue (DK 28 B 1.3 [= PARM D 4.3 Laks-Most]), he calls himself a ‘man who knows’, εἰδὼς φώς. As we will see below, scholars have suggested that Parmenides’ presentation as εἰδὼς φώς indicates a mystery-initiatory context and highlights the special status of Parmenides who will receive a divine revelation from the goddess and so become a ‘man who knows’. Thus, by referring to himself through the designation of both κοῦρος and εἰδὼς φώς, Parmenides may well have hinted at two stages of his initiation: he is a κοῦρος when he first meets the goddess and becomes an εἰδὼς φώς once he has received her revelation (on this reading of the Parmenidean proem, see below). On Pythagoras’ ability to remember his past reincarnations, see Burkert (1972: 138). Pythagoreans tried in the morning or in the evening, to recall all the events of the past day and even of the day before: see Diod. Sic. 10.5.1, Iamb. VP 165, Cic. Sen. 38 and Proph. VP 40. Note, moreover, that Pythagoras can recollect his previous incarnations: see Diog. Laert. 8.5, Iambl. VP 7 = Xenocr. fr. 22 Heinze. See also Porph. VP 2. See the discussion by Burkert (1972: 213–15). See Wright (1995: 59).

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elaborate on the imagery of banishment, exile and rebirth depicted in B 115 (= EMP 10 Laks-Most). In this respect, the line corresponding to B 119 (= EMP 15 Laks-Most) reads as follows: ἐξ οἵης τιμῆς τε καὶ ὅσσου μήκεος ὄλβου . . . From what honour and from what a height of bliss . . .

Plutarch quotes these few words closely after B 115 (= EMP 10 Laks-Most),21 and connects them with the exile of the guilty gods Empedocles has just described. Specifically, Plutarch refers this line to the depiction of the wonderful place and perfect happiness gods enjoy before their fault. Accordingly, B 119 (= EMP 15 Laks-Most) could be interpreted as Empedocles’ realization that he has just lost a blissful, divine existence. This idea of exile and the suffering it causes is reinforced by B 118 (= EMP 14 Laks-Most), which presents us with an ‘unwonted place’ that moves Empedocles to despair: κλαῦσά τε καὶ κώκυσα ἰδὼν ἀσυνήθεα χῶρον I wept and wailed when I saw the unwonted place.

Empedocles’ suffering offers the measure of the distance, both spatial and emotional, that separates the place of his exile from the divine abode and blissful condition he joined before his fault.22 Some clues introduced by this line, as well as several elements scattered throughout other demonological fragments we are going to see in due course, suggest that the first leg of Empedocles’ exile after his banishment from the divine abode is a katabasis to the underworld. To begin with, the above-quoted line of B 118 (= EMP 14 Laks-Most) is clearly modelled upon a passage from the beginning of Odysseus’ Nekyia (Od. 11.93–4): τίπτ’ αὖτ’, ὦ δύστηνε, λιπὼν φάος ἠελίοιο ἤλυθες, ὄφρα ἴδῃ νέκυας καὶ ἀτερπέα χῶρον; What now, hapless man? Why hast thou left the light of the sun and come hither to behold the dead and a region in which there is no joy? 21 22

De ex. 17.607d. In reference to clues for a possible collocation of the demonological fragments within the physical poem, it is worth noting that Empedocles’ despair for having lost a divine condition for a mortal life links B 118 (= EMP D 14 Laks-Most) with PStrasb. d–f 3–10 (= EMP D 76.3–10 Laks-Most) where, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Empedocles analogously relates his suffering to his present condition as a mortal man because of a fault concerning food deemed unfit to be eaten.

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These words are spoken by the soul of Teiresias, once Odysseus reached Hades, ‘a region in which there is no joy’. The Empedoclean expression ἀσυνήθεα χῶρον is a plain echo of Homer’s ἀτερπέα χῶρον, which invites the reading that Empedocles is referring to the same place described by Homer: the realm of the dead. Nevertheless, an alternative reading of this fragment maintains that the Homeric reminiscence evoking Hades serves Empedocles to depict our world. In fact, according to an idea derived from Plato, true life is only possible when the soul is disentangled from the body, while a life within the body corresponds to death. Following this line of interpretation, reincarnated individuals resemble dead people and the place where they live, our world, coincides with the realm of the dead.23 In contrast to this interpretation, however, further elements scattered in the fragments that compose this section strengthen the hypothesis that Empedocles in fact reached the underworld before being reborn as a mortal in our world. For instance, Hierocles, in his comment on line 54 of the Pythagorean Golden Verses, connects Empedocles’ ἀσυνήθεα χῶρον mentioned in B 118 (= EMP D 14 Laks-Most) with the Homeric ἀτερπέα χῶρον,24 in conjunction with the quotation of two further Empedoclean lines (B 121 [= EMP D 24 Laks-Most]): (ἀσυνήθεα χῶρον) ἔνθα Φόνος τε Κότος τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα Κηρῶν25 ... Ἄτης ἀν λειμῶνα κατὰ σκότος ἠλάσκουσιν. (. . . unwonted region) where there are Slaughter, Rancour and the races of other Deaths ... They (i.e., the dead) wander in darkness along in the meadow of Blindness.

23

24

25

Hierocles seems to read B 118 (= EMP D 14 Laks-Most), B 119 (= EMP D 15 Laks-Most), B 121 (= EMP D 24 Laks-Most) and B 120 (= EMP D 16 Laks-Most) as indicating that the joyless place where Empedocles arrives after his banishment is our earth. Hierocles’ passage reads as follows: ‘For man descends and falls away from the happy region, as Empedocles the Pythagorean says . . . But he ascends and takes on his ancient disposition once again if he flees the terrestrial region and the joyless place.’ Hierocles’ reading is followed by modern scholars; e.g., by Trépanier (2017a: 134), who, by arguing that our current life is in Hades, de facto picks up the ancient identification between Hades and our world. Instead of ἀσυνήθεα χῶρον, Hierocles’ manuscripts have ἀτερπέα χῶρον, which Diels-Kranz accepted as genuinely Empedoclean. I agree with Zuntz (1971: 200–201; following Wilamowitz), who suggests that ἀτερπέα χῶρον in the text is Hierocles’ Homeric reminiscence arisen from the Empedoclean ἀσυνήθεα χῶρον. For an analogous group of Κῆρες, see the depiction of Heracles’ shield in Hes. Scutum 154–60.

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The connection of B 121 (= EMP D 24 Laks-Most) with the ‘unwonted region’ mentioned in B 118 (= EMP D 14 Laks-Most) indicates that the two sets of verses are to be grouped together. Moreover, Hierocles quotes B 121 (= EMP D 24 Laks-Most) in connection with B 115.13–14 (= EMP D 10.13– 14 Laks-Most), which is an indication that they are associated and thus must be placed in the same proemial section. Furthermore, both the reminiscence of the ‘unwonted region’ of B 118 (= EMP D 14 Laks-Most) and the mention of the meadow of Ate, covered by darkness, can be taken as referring to regions of the underworld. Following a suggestion made by Zuntz, I would contend that the mention of the unwonted place where there are all kinds of evil powers marks a region in Empedocles’ underworld that is located before the meadow of Ate, referred to in the last line.26 That Empedocles is depicting here two different regions of the underworld is suggested by the fact that, according to Hierocles, the subject of ἠλάσκουσιν in the last line is not to be identified with the evil powers mentioned just before, but is rather οἱ ἐμπεσόντες, ‘those who fell’; that is, the dead. The change of subjects between lines 1 and 2 invites the reading that some lines must originally have intervened between the mention of the ἀσυνήθεα χῶρον with its evil powers and the reference to Ἄτης λειμῶνα, populated by the dead. As Zuntz also observed, the picture we gain from Empedocles’ journey finds echoes in the katabasis of Aeneas in the sixth book of Virgil’s Aeneid (ll. 273ff).27 Specifically, at the beginning of his journey to the underworld, Aeneas is faced with a series of personified evil forces, analogous to the Empedoclean Κῆρες, which habitant (l. 275) at the entrance of the Orcus. Only later does Aeneas reach the campus (l. 709; see the Empedoclean λειμών) by the river Lethe where the innumerae gentes of dead awaiting rebirth ‘fly around’ like swarms of bees. Virgil’s Empedoclean reminiscences can be taken as an indication that Empedocles is involved in a katabasis, the unwonted region is the entrance of Hades inhabited by all kinds of evil powers and the meadow of Ate, by specifying the topography of the underworld, describes a further place populated by the souls of the dead. It is worth noting that the Greek term κήρ means the ‘doom of death’ and in Homer it stands for the hero’s desire for everlasting glory. 26 27

See Zuntz (1971: 201–3) and van der Ben (1975: 168); contra Laks-Most (2016: 374–75), who instead equate the unwonted region with the meadow of Blindness. Zuntz (1971: 201). On this, see also van der Ben (1975: 169).

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Moreover, a person’s κήρ characterizes their own specific fate of death. In comparison to other terms meaning ‘destiny’, ‘fate’ or ‘lot’ such as μοῖρα and αἶσα, κήρ does not relate to the notion of a life ended in or leading to death but rather to the manner and timing of death itself.28 This idea grounds the translation given in the context of our fragment, namely ‘Deaths’, whose ‘races’ include Φόνος and Κότος. In contrast, Virgil’s catalogue of Roman Κῆρες presents several terrifying forces, including vengeful Cares, Old Age, Diseases, Fear, Hunger, Want, Bondage, Death, Sleep and Dreams of Guilty Joy. Even more remarkable is the presence of death-dealing War, the beds of steel of the Furies and wildeyed Strife, connected to the conceptual and linguistic domain of the Empedoclean Strife.29 Virgil’s mention of War, Furies and wild-eyed Strife among the Roman Κῆρες invites the hypothesis that he is depicting his underworld with Empedocles in mind. Moreover, Virgil’s catalogue of evil powers suggests that Empedocles’ own list was also originally longer than the single line transmitted by Hierocles. This hypothesis fits well with the assumption made earlier on the basis of the change of subject in the last line, namely that some lines of text that originally intervened between the two extant lines of the Empedoclean fragment must have been lost. Having seen the unwonted region populated by evil powers, Empedocles finally reached the meadow, where he found the dead wandering in the dark. Besides the Vergilian parallel mentioned above, the image of the meadow is reminiscent of Homer’s ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα, ‘where the souls of the dead dwell’ (Od. 24.14). From Homer onwards, the meadow became a characteristic place of the underworld, as the numerous depictions in Plato’s dialogues show. For instance, in Plato’s myths of the Gorgias, the dead await their judgement and allotted destiny of punishment or reward in the meadow (λειμών). Analogously, in the myth of Er in the tenth book of Plato’s Republic, an underworld meadow is depicted, where myriad souls joined the presence of Lachesis, daughter of 28 29

See Roberts (2020: 31). In this respect, it is worth noting that Κότος mentioned in B 121 (= EMP D 24 Laks-Most) is a name for the principle of Strife in B 21.7 (= EMP D 77a Laks-Most). Moreover, Empedocles’ mention of Κῆρες echoes Hesiod’s catalogue of Night’s offspring, which includes the Κῆρες as her daughters and also Ἄτης as her granddaughter: see Theog. 217 (Κῆρες) and 230 (Ἄτης). Also, Night’s offspring includes Ἔρις (Theog. 226) and Nεῖκος (Theog. 229), two names for Empedocles’ evil principle. Moreover, the connection with the domain of strife and conflict is prominent in the depiction of Heracles’ shield in Hesiod’s Scutum 154–60, where baneful Κήρ is put together with Προΐωξις (pursuit), Παλίωξις (retreat), Ὅμαδος (tumult), Φόνος (slaughter), Ἀνδροκτασίη (murder), Ἔρις (strife) and Κυδοιμός (din of battle).

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Necessity, in order to receive the new life assigned as a result of a previous underworld judgement. By following the Platonic model, it can be assumed that in Empedocles’ narration, the meadow of Ate analogously welcomes the dead who are going to receive judgement and punishment (or reward) before being reborn as mortals. Whereas the punishment for unjust souls coincides with a new birth (therefore, with a new mortal body) in Plato’s dialogues, Empedocles’ fragment B 15 (= EMP D 52 Laks-Most) suggests that the punishment for the dead already takes place in the underworld. I will analyze B 15 (= EMP D 52 LaksMost) below, when I allocate it within a later section of the proem, but for now it is worth observing that it refers to the idea that people are confronted with good and bad things even beyond embodied life. This notion suggests in turn that the dead not only have some kind of existence beyond the body, but they even experience some sort of punishment or reward in Hades. The idea of punishment in Hades seems to play a significant role in doctrines of rebirth professed in Empedocles’ time in Sicily, as can be deduced from Pindar’ s second Olympian Ode, written for the victory of the chariot race by Theron, tyrant of Acragas, in 476 BCE. Empedocles was a young man at the time and it cannot be excluded that he had the opportunity to hear it live. Here Pindar narrates how of those who have died on earth immediately / the wicked souls pay the penalty – and upon sins committed herein Zeus’ realm, a judge beneath the earth / pronounces sentence with hateful necessity; / but always having sunshine for the same number of nights and days / and in always-equal days, good people / receive a life of less toil, / for they do not vex the earth / or the water of the sea with the strength of their hands / to earn a paltry living. No, in company with the honored / gods, those who joyfully kept their oaths / spend a tearless / existence, whereas the others endure pains too terrible to behold. / But those with the courage to have lived / three times in each realm, / while keeping their souls / free from all unjust deeds, travel the road of Zeus / to the tower of Cronus, / where ocean breezes / blow round / the Isle of the Blessed, and flowers of gold are ablaze, / some from radiant trees on land, while the water / nurtures others; with these they weave / garlands for their hands and crowns for their heads, / in obedience to the just counsels of Rhadamanthys, / whom the great father / keeps ever seated at his side, / the husband of Rhea, she who has / the highest throne of all. / Peleus and Cadmus are numbered among them.30 30

O. 2.57–78: ὅτι θανόντων μὲν ἐν- / θάδ᾿ αὐτίκ᾿ ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες / ποινὰς ἔτεισαν – τὰ δ᾿ ἐν τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχᾷ / ἀλιτρὰ κατὰ γᾶς δικάζει τις ἐχθρᾷ / λόγον φράσαις ἀνάγκᾳ· / ἴσαις δὲ νύκτεσσιν αἰεί, / ἴσαις δ᾿ ἁμέραις ἅλιον ἔχοντες, ἀπονέστερον / ἐσλοὶ δέκονται βίοτον, οὐ χθόνα τα- / ράσσοντες ἐν χερὸς ἀκμᾷ / οὐδὲ πόντιον ὕδωρ / κεινὰν παρὰ δίαιταν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ μὲν τιμίοις / θεῶν οἵτινες

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The elaborate vision of life after death Pindar depicts through these lines and the many interpretative problems these verses present have received much attention among scholars.31 Within the scope of the present study – the reconstruction of Empedocles’ katabasis and therewith of his belief in rebirth – I will now offer my (necessarily summary) interpretation of the Pindaric lines with a special focus on the parallels with Empedocles’ fragments, above all with B 15 (= EMP D 63 Laks-Most). Pindar depicts the way in which the dead (‘those who have died on earth’) receive judgement in the underworld (‘a judge beneath the earth pronounces sentences’) upon transgressions accomplished ‘herein in Zeus’ realm’, which can be identified with our world (as opposed to Hades’ realm beneath the earth). Whereas the transgressions are committed during embodied life, upon an underworld judgement, souls are rewarded or punished depending on whether or not their way of life conformed to certain standard. Thus, while people who behaved justly and are therefore considered good are rewarded with a tearless existence ‘in company with the honoured / gods . . .’, those who lived unethically and are therefore regarded as wicked souls endure terrible punishments. It is worth noting that, while the dead are judged for deeds committed on earth, the mention of a tearless existence with the gods suggests that their reward does not merely consists in a new and better rebirth, but rather occurs earlier in the otherworldly existence. Accordingly, the notion of ‘pains too terrible to behold’ befalling the wicked souls can be identified with the proverbial terrors of Hades. Thus, Pindar attested to a doctrine of rebirth that professes otherworldly punishments or rewards in addition to those that occur through a worse or better rebirth on earth. In fact, the punishment or reward in the afterlife is just temporary and is followed by a new birth. This reading is suggested by Pindar’s mention of those who ‘have lived / three times in each realm’ (my emphasis). The mention of ‘each realm’ almost certainly refer to those realms which are

31

ἔχαιρον εὐορκίαις / ἄδακρυν νέμονται / αἰῶνα, τοὶ δ᾿ ἀπροσόρατον ὀκχέοντι πόνον. / ὅσοι δ᾿ ἐτόλμασαν ἐστρίς / ἑκατέρωθι μείναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν / ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρό / -νου τύρσιν· ἔνθα μακάρων / νᾶσον ὠκεανίδες / αὖραι περιπνέοισιν· ἄνθεμα δὲ χρυσοῦ φλέγει, / τὰ μὲν χερσόθεν ἀπ᾿ ἀγλαῶν δενδρέων, / ὕδωρ δ᾿ ἄλλα φέρβει, / ὅρμοισι τῶν χέρας ἀναπλέκοντι καὶ στεφάνους / βουλαῖς ἐν ὀρθαῖσι Ῥαδαμάνθυος, / ὃν πατὴρ ἔχει μέγας ἑτοῖμον αὐτῷ πάρεδρον, / πόσις ὁ πάντων Ῥέας / ὑπέρτατον ἐχοίσας θρόνον. / Πηλεύς τε καὶ Κάδμος ἐν τοῖσιν ἀλέγονται. For a thorough analysis of the Pindaric lines, refer to H. S. Long (1948, chapter 3), Hampe (1952), von Fritz (1957), Gianotti (1971), Zuntz (1971: 84–89), Lloyd-Jones (1985), Nisetich (1988), Drew Griffith (1991), Ferrari (1998: 94–95 n.29) and the commentary of these lines by Catenacci in Gentili (2013).

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spoken of so far, namely our world (the realm of Zeus) and the realm ‘beneath the earth’ (that is, Hades). Thus, Pindar’s verses suggest the following afterlife scenario: people are judged in the underworld based on the life they have just spent on earth. Consequently, they receive appropriate punishments or rewards, which take place on a twofold level: first, souls are subjected to terrible punishments or to a blissful existence with the gods in the afterlife. Subsequently, they obtain a new life and are reborn as mortal beings in our world. Pindar’s idea of underworld punishments can be connected with B 15 (= EMP D 52 Laks-Most) and its hint at good and evil things befalling people beyond embodied life. Both in Pindar and in Empedocles, these are then followed by rebirths as new mortal beings, which are also part of the punitive or expiatory design. Finally, Pindar refers to the notion of eternal reward after final liberation from rebirths. This is granted to those who keep their souls free from unjust actions three times in a row in each of the two realms, namely, as we have seen above, our world and the underworld. In other words, those who achieve a flawless and just existence both during three reincarnations in a row and during the intermediate periods in Hades achieve final liberation from the cycle of rebirths and travel the road of Zeus to the tower of Cronos.32 There, being crowned like gods, they live eternally without any toil or sorrow on the Isles of the Blessed – an afterlife abode that is traditionally reserved for those heroes favoured by the gods. In fact, ‘Peleus and Cadmus are numbered among them.’33 Below we will see that Empedocles professes a similar belief in an everlasting blessing among the gods for some distinguished people, such as leaders, doctors, poets and prophets, who escape the chain of rebirths and become gods. To sum up, Empedocles’ and Pindar’s ideas of rebirth present striking similarities. Like Pindar, Empedocles professes the belief that the dead are judged in the underworld for their behaviour in this life. Then, as a consequence of that judgement, they are punished or rewarded first in the underworld and, second, by obtaining a new body and life. Finally, just 32

33

See H. S. Long (1948: 37): ‘the Διὸς ὁδόν . . . is a route here provided for the first time to take souls to the Island of the Blessed situated far away in Ocean, inaccessible to ships or other human means of transport’. See the Parmenidean ὁδὸν . . . δαίμονος of B 1.2–3 (= PARM D 4.2–3 Laks-Most), the way of the god, along which Parmenides is led to the House of Night. The idea of an honoured and blissful afterlife for souls that escape rebirths can be related to Pindar’s fragment 133 Snell-Maehler, which, as we will see below, enumerated ‘proud kings and men who are swift in strength and greatest in wisdom’ among the best reincarnations. These are called ‘for the rest of time . . . sacred heroes by mortals’.

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like Pindar, Empedocles envisages final liberation from the chain of rebirths and everlasting blessings for several categories of distinguished people, as we will see below. Given that Pindar’s second Olympian Ode played against the background of beliefs and doctrines professed in Acragas at the time Empedocles was a young boy, the inference is either that Empedocles’ doctrine is modelled upon the Pindaric idea of rebirth or, alternatively, that both the Empedoclean and Pindaric beliefs adhere to the same domain of creeds spread in fifth-century Sicily. Returning to the traditional image of the meadow and the parallels with Plato’s depiction of his underworld topography, it is worth noting that in the myth of Er in the tenth book of Plato’s Republic, the meadow is said to be the place where Er encountered several souls of heroes of the past, such as Orpheus, Thamyras, Ajax, Agamemnon and many others. Clearly Plato borrows the idea of extraordinary encounters with the souls of past heroes from the Homeric Nekyia in Book 11 of the Odyssey and Odysseus’ special encounters with the souls of his companions. Following this line of thought, it is not impossible to imagine that Empedocles also depicted extraordinary encounters, during his journey through the underworld, with his own ‘heroes’. In this respect, the lines of B 129 (= EMP D 38 Laks-Most) describe a very special hero who, like Tiresias for Odysseus, will offer Empedocles his aid: ἦν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς, ὃς δὴ μήκιστον πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον, παντοίων τε μάλιστα σοφῶν ἐπιήρανος ἔργων· ὁππότε γὰρ πάσηισιν ὀρέξαιτο πραπίδεσσιν, ῥεῖ’ ὅ γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον καί τε δέκ’ ἀνθρώπων καί τ’ εἴκοσιν αἰώνεσσιν. And there was among them a hero knowing an immense amount who had obtained the greatest wealth of mind master especially of every kind of wise deed. For whenever he reached out with all his mind, easily he saw each of all the things that there are in ten and even in twenty generations of humans.

According to my reconstruction, the expression ἐν κείνοισιν in line 1 points to the dead and possibly to those wandering in the meadow of Ate: ‘among them’ there was an ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς, who ‘obtained the greatest wealth of mind’. I concur with the major sources of this fragment – namely Porphyry, Iamblichus and Diogenes Laertius34 – in identifying the ‘hero 34

Porph. VP 30, Iambl. VP 67 and Diog. Laert. 8.54 (= DK 31 A 1 [= EMP P 10 Laks-Most]).

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knowing an immense amount’ with Pythagoras. Admittedly, Diogenes Laertius also mentions Parmenides as a possibility,35 which confirms Empedocles intentionally left his praised man anonymous.36 Clearly the lack of a name served to bestow upon the praise an air of mystery.37 Yet the Pythagoreans customarily referred to Pythagoras as ‘that man’, ἐκείνος ὁ ἀνήρ, and never mentioned him by name,38 which suggests that Empedocles may here be abiding by the same custom. Furthermore, the particular wisdom of the ἀνὴρ εἰδώς of seeing ‘in ten or even twenty generations of humans’ may be linked with Pythagoras’ special ability to recollect his previous lives – a kind of knowledge that plays a role in his doctrine of rebirths.39 In this respect, the expression ‘reaching out with all his mind’ could be taken as a hint at memory exercises that can favour the recollection of past lives.40 It is also worth noting that praise of Pythagoras creates the perfect counterpart to Empedocles’ claim to be a god undergoing a series of rebirths and embarking on a journey to the underworld. Pythagoras was considered by his disciples as a favourable god (ἀγαθὸς δαίμων) and, more precisely, as the reincarnation of Apollo. Moreover, he was famous in antiquity for his rebirths, which he could perfectly recollect. In particular, Diogenes Laertius (8.5), by quoting Heraclides from Pontus, reports that 35

36

37 38

39

40

Diog. Laert. 8.54. Elements that may indicate Parmenides as the referent of Empedocles’ praise are: first, the fact that ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς in B 129.1 (= EMP D 38.1 Laks-Most) resembles εἰδότα φῶτα of Parmenides’ B 1.3 (= PARM D 4.3 Laks-Most); second, van der Ben (1975: 180) notes that Empedocles’ B 129.3 (= EMP D 38.3 Laks-Most) could be an echo of Parmenides’ B 4.1 (= EMP D 10.1 Laks-Most), λεῦσσε δ’ ὅμως ἀπεόντα νόωι παρεόντα βεβαίως. In contrast, Macris and Skarsouli (2012) suggest that the referent of Empedocles’ praise is neither Pythagoras nor Parmenides; rather, Empedocles let the wise man remain anonymous because he did not want to praise anyone in particular, so much as praise all human beings that embody his ideal of perfect knowledge. Lucretius DRN 1.62–71 analogously praises an anonymous Graius homo (l. 66), Lucretius’ philosophical father Epicurus. Virgil also gave no name when he praised Lucretius in Georg. 2.490. See moreover Ovid Met. 15.60, who left Pythagoras unnamed when introducing him. See Kingsley (1995: 163). See Iambl. VP 88, 150 and 255. It is worth noting, moreover, that Pythagorean circles apparently used to call their master θεῖος ἀνήρ (see also Iambl. VP 155 and 76 with Detienne 1963: 134). Empedocles’ expression ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς at l. 1 may hint at precisely this. See nn.18 and 19 above. It cannot be excluded that the ability to see ‘in ten and even twenty generations of humans’ indicates the ability to see into the future, and that the wise man, therefore, is praised for his prophetic knowledge: see Wright (1995: 258). Macris and Skarsouli (2012) read the fragment as presenting a kind of knowledge that, like that of Calcas in the Iliad, reaches the past, present and future. See Gemelli Marciano (2009: 438), who interprets them as special respiration exercises which, through the holding of one’s breath, induce a cataleptic state. Pythagoras’ memory training is attested by later sources: Diod. Sic. 10.5.1, Iambl. VP 165 and 174, Cic. Sen. 38 and Diog. Laert. 6.22. See also Carm. Aur. 40ff. See Burkert (1972: 213–15) for the Pythagorean practice in concentration and memory, also related to a rebirth eschatology.

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Pythagoras used to say that he once was Aethalides, the son of Hermes. When Hermes granted him the possibility to choose any divine gift, except immortality, he asked for the ability to recollect everything both in life and in death. Moreover, once Aethalides died, his soul entered Euphorbus. Then, after some further reincarnations, the same soul of Aethalides and Euphorbus became Pythagoras. Scholars have correctly highlighted that the story of Pythagoras’ past rebirths is a way of claiming his divine origin, when linking his soul, indirectly and successively, with two singularly important Olympic gods in Homeric times, Hermes and Apollo. Thus, indeed, when proclaiming that he had been Hermes’ son Aethalides, Pythagoras related himself, as direct descendant, to the most multifaceted and complex god, whose assignment included accompanying the dead to Hades . . . On the other hand, the reincarnation of Pythagoras’ soul in Euphorbus connected him directly with Apollo.41

Additionally, as we will see in more detail below, Pythagoras is also credited with a journey to the realm of the dead. Indeed, it has been argued that a katabasis story constituted the archaic core of Pythagoras’ legend.42 All this is a strong indication that the legend of Pythagoras sits as the backdrop of Empedocles’ own story, making Pythagoras a very good candidate for Empedocles’ praise in B 129 (= EMP D 38 Laks-Most). Wrapping up our reconstruction of Empedocles’ fragments thus far, we can see these are connected with his claim to be a guilty and exiled god in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and aim to depict the first leg of his journey of exile: his katabasis to the realm of the dead. As we have seen, many elements scattered throughout the fragments examined thus far, by representing instances of Empedocles’ reminiscence to Odysseus’ Nekyia in the eleventh book of the Odyssey or being themselves objects of later reminiscences in Plato’s myths of the soul in the afterlife or in Aeneas’ descent to Hades in Virgil’s epics, very likely point to the depiction of the underworld and its topography. As I have shown, these fragments can be reconstructed within a coherent narrative section which depicts a detailed journey to the realm of the dead and is constructed around a traditional topography that includes various sites like the ‘unwonted place’ with its Κῆρες and the

41

42

Casadesús (2013: 165). See also Kerényi (1940: 12): ‘through his identity with Euphorbos, Pythagoras comes very close to Apollo’ (‘durch die Identität mit Euphorbos gelangt Pythagoras ganz in der Nähe von Apollon’); Burkert (1972: 140–41). Burkert (1969: 25) and (1972: 155). See, more recently, Santamaría (2016).

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meadow of Ate populated by the dead who are awaiting their judgement of punishment or reward. Moreover, Empedocles picks up traditional elements related to the underworld journey of Odysseus, such as the extraordinary encounter with a practitioner of wisdom who will instruct the hero about his destiny. For Empedocles, this hero is Pythagoras who, as we will see in the following section, guides him through the underworld and instructs him on what awaits souls about to be reborn. Thus, the journey of Empedocles in the underworld will end with Pythagoras at his side, who shows him the gate to the world of living beings, namely a roofed cave, where the dead are about to obtain a new life and body. It is there that Empedocles learns additional key aspects of the concept of rebirths and so become an expert on such matters of extra-ordinary knowledge. 2.2.3 The Roofed Cave Having seen that several of the demonological fragments examined thus far elaborate on Empedocles’ banishment from the divine community and his exile, which begins with a journey to Hades, I will now move on to the analysis of a group of fragments that focus on a particular element of the topography of the underworld: the cave. As we will see, this represents the gateway between the realm of the dead and the world of the living and offers Empedocles the opportunity to stage a crucial episode of his extraordinary journey. It is here, in fact, that he could have first-hand experience of the way in which the dead are about to be reborn. According to Porphyry, On the Cave of the Nymphs,43 the underworld cave Empedocles passes through is introduced as follows: ἠλύθομεν τόδ’ ὑπ’ ἄντρον ὑπόστεγον . . .

(B 120 [= EMP D 16 Laks-Most])

We came under this roofed cave . . .

First, it is worth noting that caves are traditionally considered places particularly associated with the underworld; indeed, they are regarded as gateways to the realm of the dead.44 This may suggest that the Empedoclean ἄντρον ὑπόστεγον is the entrance to Hades and, as such, the first place he saw after his banishment. However, and second, the line 43 44

De antro nymph. 8 p. 61, 19 Nauck. On this, see Ustinova (2009: 68–89). Aeneas’ descent to Hades is through the cave in Lake Avernus: see Aen. 6.237–42.

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quoted above is intended as direct speech, which, according to Porphyry, was pronounced by one of the ψυχοπομποὶ δυνάμεις45 who guide the souls to the ἄντρον. If we are to give credence to Porphyry, therefore, we should conclude that the cave cannot coincide with the entrance to Hades; however, since it must be located somewhere else in the underworld and in view of its traditional function, it can be assumed it is the gateway through which the dead leave the underworld and return to earth.46 The mention of ψυχοπομποὶ δυνάμεις in Porphyry relates to the popular lore concerning spirits assigned to each person at birth, who guard and guide them, influencing their behaviour and fulfilling their destiny over their whole lifetime. This notion can be found, for instance, in some verses by Menander: ‘by every man’s side there is a god (δαίμων), / a good guide for the life of the new-born’.47 A similar idea is already hinted at in Hesiod’s myth of the races and, specifically, in his representation of the people of the Golden race who become, after death, good daimones dwelling on earth and watching over human beings (Erga 109–26). In his myths on the journeys of souls in the afterlife, Plato develops this traditional idea by representing souls as always having a daimon nearby who guides them even after the death of the body, leading them on the passage from this world to Hades.48 Analogously, it can be assumed that, in Empedocles’ verses, the speaker is a ψυχοπομπός whose task is to guide Empedocles on his journey to the underworld. It is not difficult to identify such a figure with Pythagoras. As we will see in Chapter 3.4, Pythagoras was considered by his disciples as a benevolent daimon for human beings. Moreover, as we have seen above, he is credited with a journey to Hades, thanks to which he was able to have first-hand experience of the realm of the dead. Because of this, he could be considered as a ψυχοπομπός δαίμων and therefore the perfect guide for Empedocles in the underworld.49 This conclusion links B 120 (= EMP D 16 Laks-Most) with the previous B 129 45

46 47 48 49

The identification of Porphyry’s ψυχοπομποὶ δυνάμεις is unclear. Bignone (1916: 492) proposed that these δυνάμεις be identified with the personified abstracta we read throughout the lines of B 122 (= EMP D 21 Laks-Most) and B 123 (= EMP D 22 Laks-Most) for which see below, whereas Wright (1995: 280) maintains that little can be deduced from the anonymous and anachronistic mention of forces which guide the souls. However, as Zuntz (1971: 204) correctly points out, Empedocles ‘would not have introduced any δυνάμεις, but concrete mythical persons – or, rather, a person’. On my reading, this person is Pythagoras. So already Wilamowitz (1929: 638), Zuntz (1971: 254) and van der Ben (1975: 194). Fr. 500.1 Kassel-Austin. See, e.g., Phaed. 107d, Rep. 10.620 d–e and Phdr. 249b. See moreover Chapter 3.3. This suggests that Pythagoras and Empedocles met already in some places of the underworld before reaching the cave together. This point was already made by van der Ben (1975: 194).

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(= EMP D 38 Laks-Most) and construes a narrative in which it is Pythagoras as a sort of spiritual mentor who instructs Empedocles about the rest of the journey he needs to undertake in order to return to the world. Moreover, Porphyry’s mention, in his introduction to B 120 (= EMP D 16 Laks-Most), of ‘powers who guide the souls’ and their traditional connection with divine spirits or daimones guarding, guiding and influencing the soul of each human being, connects this fragment with a series of verses – notably, fragments B 122–3 (= EMP D 21 and D 22 Laks-Most)50 – that specifically elaborate on the notion of daimones assigned to everybody. They run as follows: ἔνθ᾽ ἦσαν Χθονίη τε καὶ Ἡλιόπη ταναῶπις, Δῆρίς θ᾽ αἱματόεσσα καὶ Ἁρμονίη θεμερῶπις, Καλλιστώ τ᾽ Αἰσχρή τε Θόωσά τε Δηναίη τε, Νημερτής τ᾽ ἐρόεσσα μελάγκουρός τ᾽ Ἀσάφεια· Φυσώ τε Φθιμένη τε καὶ Εὐναίη καὶ Ἔγερσις, Κινώ τ᾽ Ἀστεμφής τε πολυστέφανός τε Μεγιστώ καὶ Φορύη, Σωπή τε καὶ Ὀμφαίη

5

There were Earth and far-seeing Sun and bloody Discord and serene Harmony and Beauty and Ugliness, Speed and Slowness, lovely Truth and blind Uncertainty. Birth and Death, Sleep and Wakefulness, Motion and Rest and much-crowned Greatness and Vileness and Silence and Prophecy.

As these verses are admittedly difficult to interpret, we need to turn to our source Plutarch51 to try to make sense of them. In introducing them, Plutarch reported that Empedocles in a sense corrected the popular belief according to which a benevolent guiding spirit stands by each person as soon as they are born, by arguing that each person at birth receives not one, but ‘two destinies and daimones’ (διτταί τινες . . . μοῖραι καὶ δαίμονες): one good and one evil. In other words, from the moment of their birth, human beings are subject to what we can paraphrase as opposite impulses and inclinations. While the relation of the ‘two destinies and daimones’ to the 50

51

Although in Diels-Kranz’s edition B 122 (= EMP D 21 Laks-Most) and B 123 (= EMP D 22 LaksMost) are printed as two separate fragments, Kranz hypothesized that they originally constituted a single fragment. Wright (1995) also printed them separately but acknowledged that the lines of B 123 (= EMP D 22 Laks-Most) ‘continue the catalogue of female personifications in the previous fragment’. Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021: 426 [= F 14]) print the lines as a single fragment, whereas Laks-Most (2016: 372–75 [= EMP D 21 and D 22]) print them separately but consecutively. De tranq. an. 474b.

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person’s (re)births supports their collocation within the rest of the demonological fragments and therefore in this section of the proem, we can more speculatively assume that they specifically belonged to the depiction of the roofed cave, where the dead await rebirth. In this respect, it is not impossible to think that Empedocles could have lingered on describing those particular powers which, assigned to each individual at every (re)birth, influence their life and destiny. According to this reading, the adverb ἔνθ(α) at the outset of the fragment may well be taken as a link to the cave of B 120. Zooming in on the above-quoted verses’ content, the first pair of the series, Χθονίη τε καὶ Ἡλιόπη, may indicate opposite ways of life, perhaps connected with areas of the cosmos the new mortal form will be assigned to (that is, earth and heaven).52 The second pair of opposites, Discord and Harmony (Δῆρίς . . . καὶ Ἁρμονίη), can easily be aligned with Strife and Love.53 The subsequent abstracta, Truth and Uncertainty (Νημερτής and Ἀσάφεια), considered together with the following Birth and Death (Φυσώ τε Φθιμένη τε), and Sleep and Wakefulness (Εὐναίη καὶ Ἔγερσις), seem to hint at a mysteryinitiatory context. In particular, line 5 could be read as a parallelism between birth and sleep, death and wakefulness, which draws on the conceptual metaphor of dying as sleeping.54 More precisely, whereas dying is conventionally seen as sleeping, in mystery contexts that spread the belief that true existence is disentangled from the body and perceive embodied life as a sort of ‘dying’, this conceptual metaphor can be reversed to compare birth and (embodied) life to sleeping, while death is true awakening. A very similar conception is already found in Heraclitus’ riddle on human beings approaching a dead person while sleeping, whereas once awake they approach a sleeper.55 Moreover, the gold tablets, which are connected to Orphic and Pythagorean circles,56 draw from the same 52

53

54 55

56

Whereas Ἡλιόπη is clearly linked with the sun and, consequently, sky/heaven, Χθονίη is generally interpreted as the earth, both intuitively and in parallel to Pherecydes, who also refers to it by the name of Γῆ (fr. 1 Schibli). See Plut. Is. et Os. 370d. Love is called ‘Harmonie’ in B 96 (= EMP D 192 Laks-Most) and B 27 (= EMP D 89 Laks-Most). On the alignment of the pairs in B 122–23 (= EMP D 21 and 22 LaksMost) with Love and Strife, see Mackenzie (2021: 116–18). On the conventional character of this metaphor in Greek literature and its instantiations in Homer, see Horn (2015). DK 22 B 26 (= HER D 71 Laks-Most). Compare with Euripides, fr. 638 in which he challenged the very nature of death and life: ‘who knows whether living is dying and dying living?’ (τίς δ’ οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;). It is debated which spiritual milieu the tablets are from. According to Bernabé-Jiménez (2008: 179–205) the gold tablets are all Orphic; contra Edmonds (2004) and Ferrari (2007: 115–40). On a history of scholarship on the tablet, see Graf-Johnston (2013: 50–65).

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domain of beliefs. These are small pieces of gold, deposited within tombs and engraved with brief texts, which were intended to provide instructions for the journey of the dead to the underworld.57 In the gold tablet from Pelinna (fourth century BCE), for example, the initiate is addressed as the one who has died and now has come into being. Furthermore, in the tablets from Olbia on the Black Sea (fifth century BCE) the series ψεῦδος ἀλεθεία, σῶμα ψυχή (Olbia 3 recto) could be read as suggesting that body and soul are conceived as a pair of opposites, with the soul being linked with truth and the body with falsehood. In Olbia 1 recto a further series, βίος θάνατος βίος, could highlight that death is a halfway step between two lives. Within belief in rebirth, it could indicate either a series of rebirths or the overall parabola of a soul, with βίος coinciding with the disembodied existence that rebirth temporarily ends. In this respect, θάνατος indicates terrestrial life as death for the soul, while βίος refers to life before and after rebirth. This overturning of the concepts of sleep and wakefulness, birth and death can also be compared to Plato’s speculations in the Gorgias,58 where temporal life is associated with the death of the soul, and our body with its grave. Analogously, in the Cratylus we are told that Plato heard from some wise men who gathered in the name of Orpheus59 the notion that ‘the soul is buried in the present life’, inviting the reading that, since embodied life is associated with death, disembodied existence, insofar as it frees our soul from its grave, coincides with real life. With all this considered, it could be assumed that this novel conception of birth and death was professed within Orphic and probably also Pythagorean circles, and was connected to doctrines of rebirth, akin to that of Empedocles. In conclusion, however enigmatic, the lines of B 122–23 (= EMP D 21 and D 22 Laks-Most) were likely aimed at introducing, in mythical terms, the context of beliefs within which Empedocles wanted to frame his own experience and teachings, especially those reformulating common concepts of life (and birth) and death. As we will see below, Empedocles returns to a similar topic later in the proem in order to offer physical arguments that reject the traditional notions of coming into being and perishing.

57

58 59

Most of the gold tablets come from South Italy, especially from Thurii on the Tarentine gulf in Apulia, but there are others that come from elsewhere in the Graeco-Roman world (e.g., from Rome, Thessaly, etc.). They are dated differently: from the fifth century BCE to the second century CE. See also n. 70 below. Gorg. 492e–493a. On the relationship between Heraclitus’ B 22 (= HER D 39 Laks-Most) and B 26 (= HER D 71 Laks-Most) with Plato’s speculations in the Gorgia, see Finkelberg (2013: 153–54). οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα. See Crat. 400c.

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To sum up, the verses examined in this section, just like most of the demonological fragments investigated thus far, elaborate on the imagery of Empedocles’ katabasis by presenting further elements connected to the underworld: namely, the roofed cave (B 120 [= EMP D 16 Laks-Most]) and the notion of opposite impulses and inclinations that souls receive at their (re)birth (B 122–23 [= EMP D 21 and D 22 Laks-Most]). This specific subject associates these verses with the other fragments analyzed in the previous section, thereby supporting their collocation in the same portion of the physical proem. The narrative so created presents Empedocles who, after having reached the ‘unwonted place’ populated by Kēres, and having met Pythagoras in the meadow of Ate, under the guidance of his mentor finally arrives at a cave that is the gateway to the world of the living. Here Empedocles can see the dead receive their destined lot and obtain, lastly, a new body and life. In the next section, I will look into the details of the way in which the new births occur and further aspects connected to the doctrine of rebirth, such as the ranking among forms of life and the final mortal forms a person obtains before final liberation. 2.2.4

The Body as a Tunic and the Ranking of Rebirths

While under the roofed cave Empedocles saw the dead receive a new lot and life, it is through fragment B 126 (= EMP D 19 Laks-Most)60 that he explains how the dead receive a new body. Whereas I will focus on the textual and interpretative details of this fragment in Chapter 5.2, for now it is worth noting that it attests to a goddess61 who dresses the souls with an alien garment of flesh, a metaphor that illustrates the new body received at birth: σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι . . . χιτῶνι.62 Plutarch and Porphyry, authors of the quotation of B 126 (= EMP D 19 Laks-Most), seem to identify the goddess with Φύσις.63 In this respect, it is worth 60 61

62 63

Quoted by Plutarch, De esu carn. 2.3 p. 998c and Porphyry F 382 F, 24–25, p. 463 Smith. The fragment consists of a single line: σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι. The subject of περιστέλλουσα is deduced from Porphyry’s introduction to the fragment, who speaks of a female δαίμων who dresses the soul with a new body. It is worth noting that, according to Simpl. Phys. 9.39.19–21, Parmenides talks of a female δαίμων who ‘conveys the souls (τὰς ψυχάς) now from the visible to the invisible and then back again’. This is a hint at rebirth according to Ferrari (2010: 92–102) and Tor (2017: 233). Interestingly enough, whereas the deity governing birth is a female principle, B 125 (= EMP D 18 Laks-Most) mentions a male force responsible for death, ἐκ μὲν γὰρ ζωῶν ἐτίθει νεκρὰ εἴδε’ ἀμείβων. This may be identified with Θάνατος. It is not impossible to see here a metaphorical representation of the powers of Love and Strife. The new body the person received at death is elsewhere defined as ἀμφιβρότην χθόνα (B 148 [= EMP D 20 Laks-Most]). Plutarch, De esu carn. 2.3 p. 998c: φύσις ἅπαντα καὶ μετοικίζει: ‘σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι’. See also Porphyry F 382 F, 24–25, p. 463 Smith: αὐτῆς γὰρ τῆς μετακοσμήσεως εἱμαρμένη καὶ φύσις ὑπὸ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δαίμων ἀνηγόρευται ‘σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι’.

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noting that Empedocles mentions Φυσώ among the διτταί . . . δαίμονες of B 122–23 (= EMP D 21 and D 22 Laks-Most).64 With reference to the chain of rebirths, there is a further group of fragments – precisely, B 127 (= EMP D 36 Laks-Most) and 146–47 (= EMP D 39 and D 40 Laks-Most) – that elaborate on this specific subject and, as we have seen in Section 2.1, can be considered – in fact were considered by the majority of modern interpreters – as belonging to the narration of the story of the guilty god. More speculatively, they could be allocated among the verses illustrating the episode of the roofed cave. In this respect, it could be assumed that Empedocles, by directly experiencing how the dead are reborn, was also instructed about the fact that not all forms of life that souls receive at birth are equal, but there is a ranking among the plant, animal and human kingdom. While a human’s life is ranked higher than an animal’s, which is in turn ranked higher than a plant’s, Empedocles also learned that there is also a ranking internal to the animal, plant and human kingdom.65 Specifically, Empedocles maintains that the life of a lion is the best possible birth within the animal kingdom, whereas being born as a laurel is the highest life among plants:66 ἐν θήρεσσι λέοντες ὀρειλεχέες χαμαιεῦναι γίγνονται, δάφναι δ’ ἐνὶ δένδρεσιν ἠυκόμοισιν.

(B 127 [= EMP D 36 Laks-Most])

Among animals, they are born as lions that make their lairs in the mountains and bed on the ground and among fair-leafed trees they are born as laurels

Employing the same line of reasoning applied to the fragments just examined, it is not impossible to imagine that Empedocles in the roofed 64

65 66

Other possible candidates as goddesses of birth and life are Persephone, also in conjunction with the underworld, and Aphrodite. For Persephone’s role in rebirth, see Pindar fr. 133 Snell-Maehler. See also her role in the gold tablets from Thurii 1, 4 and 5, Pelinna a, b, Pella/Dion 1 and from Eleutherna and Rhetymnon, where Persephone is greeted together with Pluton. See also the ‘Chtonian queen’ of Thurii 3, who can be identified with Persephone on the basis of Thurii 4 and 5 where the ‘Queen of the Chtonian ones’ at l. 1 is called Persephone at l. 6. The Chtonian Queen is also mentioned in the tablet from Entella in Sicily, and in that from Rome. As for Aphrodite, the best parallel is the female δαίμων who steers all things and rules over the hateful birth in Parmenides’ B 12 (= PARM D 14b Laks-Most, see n.61 above). For the identification of the δαίμων with Aphrodite in the Parmenidean passage, see Plutarch Amat. 13.756. See also Cerri (1999: 267–68) and Ferrari (2010: 103–6). Connected to this, Theophrastus, Sens. 11 attests that Empedocles postulated different levels of abilities and intelligence for human beings. On this, see my Chapter 6.3. Ael. Nat. Hist. 12.7, who quotes B 127 (= EMP D 36 Laks-Most), says that according to Empedocles ‘the best move is into a human being, but if its lot transfers him to a beast, then a lion, or if to a plant, then the laurel’.

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cave and under the guidance of Pythagoras also learned in which way the individual can be released from rebirths. Some Empedoclean verses reveal that there are final births that enable special people to escape their mortal condition and become ‘gods greatest in honours’ (B 146–47 [= EMP D 39 and D 40 Laks-Most]):67 εἰς δὲ τέλος μάντεις τε καὶ ὑμνοπόλοι καὶ ἰητροί καὶ πρόμοι ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισι πέλονται, ἔνθεν ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ τιμῆισι φέριστοι. ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι, αὐτοτράπεζοι ἐόντες, ἀνδρείων ἀχέων ἀπόκληροι, ἀτειρεῖς. At the end they are seers and poets and doctors and leaders among earth-dwelling men. Then they arise as gods greatest in honour, with other immortals they share hearth and table having no parts in human sorrows, indestructible.

The subject of the main verb is missing. Clement of Alexandria, author of the quotation,68 suggests that Empedocles is speaking of ‘the souls of wise people’, τῶν σοφῶν τὰς ψυχάς. As we have seen in Section 2.2.2, this idea relates to the notion we found in Pindar’s second Olympian Ode of ‘eternal reward’ for those who live justly for a given amount of time. According to Pindar, just souls can travel the road of Zeus to the tower of Cronos, where, being crowned like gods, they live eternally without toil or sorrow on the Isles of the Blessed together with heroes of the past, such as Peleus and Cadmus. A similar belief is expressed in another Pindaric fragment, 133 Snell-Maehler: οἷσι δὲ Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος δέξεται, ἐς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἅλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτεϊ ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν, ἐκ τᾶν βασιλῆες ἀγαυοί καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σοφίᾳ τε μέγιστοι ἄνδρες αὔξοντ’· ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥροες ἁγνοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλέονται. But for those whom Persephone accepts retribution for her ancient grief, in the ninth year she returns their souls to the upper sunlight; from them arise proud kings and men who are swift in strength 67

68

Clement of Alexandria quotes B 146 (= EMP D 39 Laks-Most) and B 147 (= EMP D 40 Laks-Most) close to each other in Strom. 4.150 and 5.122 respectively. This suggests they are consecutive: see Zuntz (1971: 232), Bollack (2003: 111–12), Santaniello (2009: 343) and Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021: 428 [F 21]). Strom. 4.150.

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The Proem to On Nature and greatest in wisdom, and for the rest of time they are called sacred heroes by mortals.

(transl. Graf-Johnston 2013)

Through these lines we are told that Persephone, divine queen of the underworld, having accepted retribution for her ancient grief,69 returns after a certain amount of time the souls of the dead ‘to the upper sunlight’; that is, to our world. These are then reborn as proud kings, valorous athletes and sages. Above all, they are called sacred heroes among people for the rest of time. As we can appreciate, the final births attested in the Pindaric fragment display striking analogies with the lives of a seer, poet, doctor and political leader who, in the above-quoted Empedoclean lines, deserve to arise as gods greatest in honour and, free from sorrows, partake in divine feasts and banquets. Exceptional, divine honours following liberation from rebirths were also promised to the initiates of mystery circles active in South Italy and Sicily, as attested in the gold tablets. A group of these tablets coming from Thurii, on the Tarentine gulf in Apulia,70 reveals that initiates, who suffered painful things71 or expiated the guilt for their impious deeds,72 can declare their own purity73 as well as their divine kinship,74 while proclaiming

69

70

71

72 73 74

Scholars have pointed out that παλαιοῦ πένθεος could refer to Persephone’s grief in the Orphic myth which narrates how the Titans killed Persephones’ son Dionysus, dismembered him and ate his flesh. In order to vindicate Dionysus and punish the Titans, Zeus struck the latter with his lightning and gave the former back his life. Then, from the Titans’ ashes, Zeus formed human beings. As these ashes were made out of the flesh not only of the Titans, but also of Dionysus, human beings inherited two natures, one ‘Dionysian’ and one ‘Titanic’. Moreover, they also inherited the Titans’ crime, for which they must make amends through a given period of reincarnations. Graf-Johnston (2013: 68–69 esp. n.12) argue that Persephone’s ancient grief in Pindar’s fragment cannot but be associated with this tradition, since ‘no other incident in Persephone’s biography has any connection with the human race, no other incident could require humans to pay Persephone’s requital’. See also West (1983: 137), Bernabé (2002b: 416–18) and Heinrichs (2011); contra H. S. Long (1948: 41) and Edmonds (1999: 47–49), who remark that the sources who attested to this Orphic myth are as late as Plutarch and Olympiodorus. OFF 487–92 Bernabé. For an interpretation of this and other tablets, see Pugliese Carratelli (2001), Tortorelli Ghidini (2006), Bernabé-Jiménez (2008) and Graf-Johnston (2013). For an analysis of the relationship between them and Empedocles, see Riedweg (1995) and, more recently, Bernabé (2002a; 2004). OF 487 Bernabé. Can the painful things mentioned here be related to the terrors of Hades? Or are they to be identified with sufferings of a previous life? The texts do not provide any answer to these questions. OFF 489 and 490 Bernabé. OFF 488.1, 489.1 and 490.1 Bernabé. See also OF 491.1 Bernabé. OFF 488.3, 489.3 and 490.3 Bernabé. Comparably, the initiate’s declaration of his own divine nature within other tablets is made by the assertion: ‘I am the son of the Earth and the starry Heaven’ or through comparable expressions: see OFF 474.9, 478–84 Bernabé (each time at line 3).

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themselves free from ‘the heavy, difficult cycle’ (κύκλου δ᾿ἐξέπταν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλέοιο).75 Then, they are called ‘happy and blessed’76 and the mystē can be proclaimed ‘a god instead of a mortal’. Analogously, in the gold tablet from Pelinna in Thessaly (fourth century BCE),77 the blissful destiny of the initiate is proclaimed from the outset: ‘now you have died and now you have come into being, o thrice happy one, on this same day’ (l. 1: νῦν ἔθανες καὶ νῦν ἐγένου, τρισόλβιε, ἄματι τῶιδε). Indeed, the initiate can tell Persephone that he was released by the Bacchic god himself (l. 2: εἰπεῖν Φερσεφόναι σ’ὅτι Βχιος αὐτὸς ἔλυσε). The verb ἔλυσε in the second line likely refers to the liberation from the cycle of rebirths. Through his final death the initiate is said truly to come into being, since he is now finally released from his mortal condition and, consequently, from a further destiny of death. Moreover, the initiate is addressed as τρισόλβιε, which is typically said of gods. Related to this, in the last two lines of the same tablet, the initiate is said to be rewarded with ‘the same prizes [or rites] as the other blessed gods’.78 Wrapping up, Pindar, Empedocles and the mystery circles connected with the gold tablets from Thurii and Pelinna79 attest to doctrines of rebirth whose final promise is release from the chain of rebirths, the transcending of the mortal condition and the achievement of divine rewards. Specifically, they indicate that initiates into mystery cults or people exceptional in a particular area of wisdom (for instance, poetry, statecraft, prophecy, medicine or athletics) are experiencing their final birth and forthcoming divine honours. Whereas Pindar makes exceptional people become sacred heroes, who will eternally live on the Isles of the

75

76 77 78

79

See OFF 488.4, 489.4–5 and 490.4–5 Bernabé. Scholars have interpreted κύκλος in these contexts as a technical term to refer to the cycle of rebirths: see Casadio (1991: 135 and n.42) for bibliography and loci similes, also Burkert (1999: 68), Ferrari (2007: 143–44) and Betegh (2014b: 157), the last of whom considers this the most explicit reference to metempsychosis within earlier Orphic sources. Θεὸς ἐγένου ἐξ ἀνθρώπου; or analogously ὄλβιε καὶ μακαριστέ, θεὸς δ᾿ ἔσηι ἀντὶ βροτοῖο. See OF 488.9 Bernabé. See OFF 485 and 486 Bernabé. The initiate is also rewarded with ‘wine as your fortunate honour’. In Rep. 363c, Plato shows his disagreement with respect to the doctrines of Musaeus and his son, who teach that the souls of righteous mortals, once they have left the cycle of rebirths, will eternally drink and feast. Plutarch, by referring to this passage, explicitly attributes the same doctrine to Orpheus: Comp. Cim. Luc. 1.2. Aristophanes (fr. 504 Kassel-Austin.) ridicules this belief. See also Bernabé (2004: 89–90). The same promise seems also to be attested in the oldest tablet, that from Hipponion (fifth century BCE; OF 474 Bernabé), in which the initiate is told the way, once in the underworld, in which they should reply to the question about their origin: ‘I am the son of Earth and starry Sky’, Γῆς παῖς εἰμι Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος. See also the tablets from Petelia (OF 476 Bernabé), Pharsalos (OF 477 Bernabé) and the later tablets from Eleutherna (OFF 478–83 Bernabé).

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Blessed,80 Empedocles depicts his ‘gods greatest in honour’ as joining a perennial feast without human sorrows.81 In conclusion, the reconstructed section of the proem to On Nature presents Empedocles first announcing and then impersonating the destiny of exile and rebirth that an oracle of Necessity decreed for all those gods who committed bloodshed and perjury. Because of his trust in Strife, Empedocles is now compelled to leave the divine community and, to his great regret and sorrow, to live in our world where he will be reborn as diverse forms of mortals for a very long time. In fact, he was already a boy, a girl, a bush, a beast on the mountain and a bird, before becoming the wise prophet of rebirth he is now. However, the first leg of his journey of exile led him to the unwonted realm of the underworld, where he met the souls of the dead and learned about their destiny beyond embodied life. In the underworld, Empedocles experienced first-hand how the souls are judged in Hades for their behaviour during their previous life and, according to this judgement, are sentenced to a period of penance or reward first in the underworld and then in our world. Here their destiny consists in dying many times and in receiving every time a new body and life. As we can appreciate, the series of topics and verses I have reconstructed thus far displays a high level of internal coherence. The fragments examined are meant to complete Empedocles’ self-portrait after his claim to divine nature (B 115.13 [= EMP D 10.13 Laks-Most]) by offering the description of an extraordinary journey to Hades. The narration of such an exceptional experience is intended to legitimize Empedocles as a poet who knows things beyond normal human ken; more precisely, the first part of his proem intends to stage the way in which he became an expert on matters such as the fate of the dead, their judgement in Hades and their rebirths as all forms of mortals. Because he has seen the dead and their fate in Hades, he can now present himself to his audience as the true prophet of rebirth. As we shall see in the next section, by depicting himself as an extraordinary individual entering and exiting Hades, Empedocles imitates a well-attested tradition of legendary or semi-legendary figures who are known to have made similar journeys to the underworld – such as Orpheus, Epimenides 80 81

As we have already seen, this is the fate of just souls attested in Pind. O. 2.56–78. It is worth noting that, in Empedocles’ fragments, suffering and misery are always connected to Strife, the force responsible for Empedocles’ fault, exile and rebirths. In contrast, as Love is the principle of good and joy, it can be inferred that liberation from rebirth and a divine state are associated with her. On this, see my discussion on godhood in Empedocles in Chapter 4 and, for the role of Love and Strife in the cosmic cycle as well as in the fate of individuals, see Chapter 7.3.

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and Pythagoras. Further, by opening a physical poem with the narration of his katabasis, he adheres to a convention that is displayed in epic-didactic poetry. As will be shown, both Hesiod’s Theogony and Parmenides’ philosophical poem open with the narration of divine encounters and extraordinary journeys which, in the case of Parmenides, might even coincide with a katabasis. As will be argued, the reason behind prologues of this sort, which stage mythical encounters and pivotal life-changing experiences, is the poet’s authorial validation as the one who knows and can therefore legitimately speak about things beyond ordinary human perception.

2.3

A Legendary Master of Wisdom

Having posited a new reconstruction of topics and verses dealing with Empedocles’ journey to the underworld within the first section of the proem to his physical poem, I will now argue that, in the narration of his katabasis, Empedocles assimilates elements that are recognizable in the biographies of legendary or semi-legendary ‘wisdom-heroes’, such as Orpheus, Epimenides and Pythagoras. They were all credited in antiquity with an exceptional, extra-ordinary life experience, a katabasis, which, by putting them in contact with the underworld, expanded their range of knowledge. In fact, as katabaseis ‘were a recognised method of obtaining a revelation of truth’,82 those almost mythical wisdom-figures were known and acclaimed for their superhuman wisdom and were considered, and often even revered, as gods. If we look at specific instances, then we see that the mythical poet Orpheus, born from the Muse Calliope and a Thracian king or, as in several accounts, from the god Apollo himself,83 was credited with verses possessing a power beyond that of beautiful songs: they not only captivated and charmed the souls of listeners, even trees and rocks gathered around.84 This aspect is associated with another element of archaic song-culture, including the practice of goēteia, the song that connects the living with the dead.85 Diodorus of Sicily reports that Orpheus was trained by Phrygian goētes and then brought initiations and mystery cults to the Greeks.86 Moreover, Orpheus’ legend gives prominence to the story of his descent into Hades to fetch his dead wife Eurydice and bring her back to the world 82 83 85 86

Morrison (1955: 60). See also Bremmer (2017) for katabasis-tales as a means to obtain extraordinary wisdom from Gilgamesh to Christian Late Antiquity. 84 See OF 874, 890–906, 908 and 910–11 Bernabé. See Graf-Johnston (2013: 172–73). See also Johnston (1999: 102–23). Diod. Sic. 5.64.4 (= Ephorus, FGrH 70 F 104). See Strabo 7a.1.18 Meineke.

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of the living.87 Notoriously, Orpheus’ quest failed and he was not able to bring his beloved wife back to life. Nonetheless, the story is paradigmatic of the relationship between divine wisdom, connection to the realm of the dead and the power to bring the dead back to life – all elements that we also find in Empedocles’ fragments.88 The narration of Orpheus’ quest is premised upon the fact that Orpheus came back from Hades and recounted his experience, a detail that prompted the creation of hexametrical katabasis poems, attributed to Orpheus and narrated in the first person singular as if they were autobiographical.89 This is comparable with Empedocles who, through the demonological fragments, tells his own story in the first person. In this respect, it is worth noting that more than one poem was known in the fifth and fourth century BCE that addressed Orpheus’ descent into Hades.90 It is very likely then that Empedocles knew such hexametrical, fictionally autobiographical poems, to which not only his own katabasis but also his entire activity as a miracle worker and prophet of rebirth relates. Katabasis, wonderworks and rebirths are also associated with other semi-legendary wisdom-heroes, including Epimenides and Pythagoras. Epimenides’ fame in antiquity was especially connected with his activity as a purifier91 and with the authorship of several poems, among them a Theogony and Purifications,92 a striking parallel with Empedocles’ works. Moreover, sources attributed many miracles and legends to Epimenides,93 the most relevant of which is his mythical sleep in a Cretan cave for over fifty years when he was a young man.94 Since we have seen above that caves are traditionally associated with the underworld and sleep is conceptually related to death, Epimenides’ long sleep can thus be compared to a katabasis to the realm of the dead. Moreover, Diogenes Laertius (1.114) reports that Epimenides claimed that he has often died and has come back

87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94

The first reference to this myth is in Eurip. Alc. 357–62. For the power to bring the dead back to life, see B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) with my analysis at Section 2.5. Graf-Johnston (2013: 174–76). Such poems can be reconstructed with some plausibility: see most recently OFF 707–17 with Bernabé’s commentary. Bowra (1952: 122). Arist. Ath. Pol. 1.1, Diog. Laert. 1.109, Suda, s.v. Epimenidēs, Plut. Solon 12.7–12, Plato Leg. 1.642d and Paus. 1.14.4. See also FgrHist 457 T 1–2, 4. Diog. Laert. 1.112, Plato Leg. 1.642d and Suda, s.v. Epimenidēs. See West (1983: 45–53). FGrH 457 T 1–11. This story was in circulation as early as the sixth century BCE: see Xenoph. DK 21 A 1. See moreover later sources such as Diog. Laert. 1.109, Paus. 1.14.4, Plut. Mor. 784A and Plin. Hist. Nat. 7.175.

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to life – a clear hint at rebirths.95 For all these reasons, Epimenides was worshipped as a god96 – a further parallel with Empedocles’ claim to divine nature. As for Pythagoras, the sources attributed him with a divine nature and a series of rebirths, as we have seen above. Moreover, he was also credited with a journey to Hades.97 For instance, Hermippus narrates that Pythagoras hid himself in an underground chamber for many years until he rose, thin as a skeleton, went to the assembly and claimed that he had just came back from Hades. Taken in by his word, people believed that Pythagoras was possessed of some kind of divinity.98 Hermippus’ mention of Pythagoras’ underground chamber is reminiscent of ἄντρα leading to the underworld and also comparable to Epimenides’ cave. Given caves’ association with the underworld,99 W. Burkert has cogently argued that Hermippus purposely misunderstood or ridiculed a katabasis story belonging to the archaic core of Pythagoras’ legend.100 In this regard, it is worth noting that underground chambers and secret grottos, such as the Idaean cave of Crete,101 are a reiterated motif of his legend.102 As Y. Ustinova convincingly argues, the persistent attribution of katabasis stories to Pythagoras belongs to a traditional motif accounting for his divine nature and wisdom: Even if some accounts of Pythagoras’ catabaseis, as well as other abnormal deeds, are late elaborations of his legend, they reflect the fundamental idea that a true sage’s way to wisdom comprises withdrawals to cave and/or underground chambers.103

Put differently, true sages’ routes to wisdom include, indeed give prominence to, their descent to the underworld, as ancient thought straightforwardly connected their association to grottos, caves and chambers to the realm of Hades. Clearly, Empedocles is recalling a well-attested tradition 95

‘The idea of multiple reincarnations is reminiscent of Pythagoras’ doctrine of metempsychosis’, as pointed out by Ustinova (2009: 181). 96 And called a Kouretes, Ibid. 97 This story was known to Hieronymous of Rhodes: see Diog. Laert. 8.21; 38; fr. 42 Wehrli. See Burkert (1972: 103, 147, 155–56) and Ustinova (2009: 188–89). 98 Diog. Laert. 8.41. Tert. An. 28, Schol. Soph. El. 62 (= Suda, s.v. ēdē). See Delatte (1922: 244–46). For Pythagoras as a superhuman figure who went on a katabasis-journey and the assumed shamanic background of this idea, see Burkert (1972: 137–65), Riedweg (2002: 52) and Ustinova (2009: 189). 99 On this, see Ustinova (2009: 68–89). 100 Burkert (1969: 26 and 1972: 155–6). 101 Pythagoras was said to have descended into the Idaean Cave either alone or together with Epimenides: Diod. Sic. 5.64. See Ustinova (2009: 189). 102 Pythagoras was said to have acquired knowledge of the gods by descending into a grotto either in Egypt or in another unspecified place: Diog. Laert. 8.3 and Iambl. VP 19. See Ustinova (2009: 190). 103 Ustinova (2009: 191).

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when he depicts himself as an exceptional individual who went in and out of Hades. This, together with his claim that he is a god who was born many times, demonstrates Empedocles’ intention to emulate semi-legendary wisdom heroes and, above all, his master Pythagoras.104 Furthermore, as access to the underworld means introduction to a knowledge well beyond ordinary human ken, by the narration of his own katabasis and the imitation of legendary examples of the past, Empedocles aimed to prove he is entitled to teach the things he will illustrate in his poem. In parallel, his claim to divine wisdom is also a declaration that his philosophy coincides with truth.

2.4

Authorial Legitimation

As well as recalling the stories associated with wisdom-heroes and thereby claiming the same authority that tradition bestowed to them, in opening his poem on natural philosophy with the depiction of an extraordinary, mythical experience, Empedocles also follows a well-attested tradition in epicdidactic poetry. As I will now show, both Hesiod and Parmenides open their poems with the narration of their exceptional stories that coincide with two different, yet equally mythical journeys and encounters. As will be argued, for both poets the accounts of their pivotal life experience are meant to validate them as authorities on matters beyond ordinary knowledge. The placement of these stories at the beginning of their poem, then, serves the purpose of constructing the background against which the extraordinary wisdom that Hesiod and Parmenides are about to recount can be staged and thus be trusted. Following these precedents of self-validation, we can appreciate a valid reason for opening a physical-didactic poem with the account of an out-of-the-ordinary experience. In parallel Hesiod’s and Parmenides’ openings support, in retrospect, the reconstruction of the proem I am here proposing, with a mythical incipit thematizing Empedocles’ claim to be a god who went in and out of Hades. 2.4.1

Hesiod

Hesiod opens his Theogony with a long prologue (ll. 1–115) in praise of the Muses for their art of singing. After having mentioned Mount Helicon as their abode, their dances at Zeus’ spring and altar, their baths in the rivers 104

According to Alcidamas in Diog. Laert. 8.56 (DK 14 A 5), Empedocles imitates Pythagoras ‘in the solemnity of his way of life and appearance’. Moreover, Empedocles offers his followers a set of rules similar to those associated with a Pythagorean way of life: see B 140 (= EMP D 32 Laks-Most) and B 141 (= EMP D 31 Laks-Most).

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near the Helicon and their nocturnal songs celebrating Zeus and the rest of the Olympian gods (ll. 2–21), Hesiod narrates how the Muses once met him personally and taught him ‘beautiful song’: αἵ νύ ποθ’ Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν, ἄρνας ποιμαίνονθ’ Ἑλικῶνος ὕπο ζαθέοιο. τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον, Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο· ‘ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ’ ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον, ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, ἴδμεν δ’ εὖτ’ ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.’ ὣς ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαι, καί μοι σκῆπτρον ἔδον δάφνης ἐριθηλέος ὄζον δρέψασαι, θηητόν· ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα, καί μ’ ἐκέλονθ’ ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων, σφᾶς δ’ αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν.

25

30

(Theog. 22–34)

One time they taught Hesiod beautiful song while he was pasturing lambs under holy Helicon. And this speech the goddess spoke first of all to me, the Olympian Muses, the daughters of aegis-holding Zeus: 25 ‘Fields-dwelling shepherds, ignoble disgraces, mere bellies: we know how to say many false things similar to genuine ones, but we know, when we wish, how to proclaim true things’. So spoke great Zeus’ ready-speaking daughters, and they plucked a staff, a branch of luxuriant laurel, 30 a marvel, and gave it to me; and they breathed a divine voice into me, so that I might glorify what will be and what was before, and they commanded me to sing of the race of the blessed ones who always are, but always to sing of themselves first and last. (transl. G. Most 2006)

Throughout these lines, Hesiod narrates his own poetic investiture by the Muses, who once descended to Hesiod on the slopes of Mount Helicon to offer him the gift of song. Scholars have not failed to highlight that the original character of this passage lies in the fact that both Hesiod’s reference to himself as an author and the detailed narration of his extraordinary experience are novel in the context of epic poetry and contrast with Homer’s anonymity.105 This detail 105

The significance of Hesiod’s authority is not undermined by an interpretation of his name as fictional, with the meaning of ‘the one who throws the voice’, being therefore, in principle, appropriate for anybody who would sing the Theogony (see Pucci 2007: 22). It is the presence itself of a name that is innovative with respect to epic bards’ anonymity.

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is in service of Hesiod’s self-legitimation106 and, in this respect, his divine encounter is not merely biographical information, but the very foundation of Hesiod’s poetic art: the shepherd without the gift of words is now guaranteed divine eloquence. While this pivotal life breakthrough is described in detail in the Theogony, it is also recalled in the Erga. There Hesiod introduces a tripod that he once won during a poetic competition, and which he dedicated to the Muses, who set their beloved poet ‘upon the path of clear-sounding songs’ and taught him ‘to sing an inconceivable hymn’ (Erga 658–62). At line 24 of his Hymn to the Muses in the Theogony, a formal device conveying self-legitimation – namely the first-person singular107 – leads to the direct speech of the Muses at line 26. They first address Hesiod with derogatory words, reminding him of his humble origin as a field-dwelling shepherd: an ignoble disgrace and a mere belly. This is intended to remark upon the distance between the mortal Hesiod and the divine Muses – a gap that only the goddesses can bridge. Then, the Muses introduce themselves as those who know how to utter not only true things, but also many lies that resemble the truth – a peculiar claim,108 as why should they lie? Above all, why do they choose to meet Hesiod in the first place, if they are going to deceive him by recounting false stories resembling true ones? And if they do not want to lie on the present occasion, why do they mention that they can if only they want to? Attempts to address these questions converge on two main interpretations. On the one hand, scholars have understood the distinction between truth and falsehood as a distinction between epic and didactic poetry.109 However, early Greeks do not generally consider the epic tales unreliable, 106 107

108 109

Most (2006: xxii). See τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον. This finds a parallel in Empedocles’ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι in B 115.13 (= EMP D 10.13 Laks-Most) and is recalled, as will be shown below, by ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν in the first line of Parmenides’ proem. Moreover, literary devices conveying selflegitimation can be found from the very first line of Hesiod’s Theogony: Μουσάων Ἑλικωνιάδων ἀρχώμεθ’ ἀείδειν, ‘let us begin to sing from the Heliconian Muses’. Strauss Clay (2003: 50–53) has pointed out that this line untypically presents the first-person plural of the verb ἄρχομαι. By virtue of this, Hesiod could begin from the Muses, as they commanded him to do on the occasion of their encounter (see Theog. 24), but ἀρχώμεθ(α) expresses Hesiod’s involvement in the poetical act. De facto it is Hesiod, rather than the Muses, who opens the song. See Pucci (2007: 33). This is considerably different from Homeric epics, where the Muse has absolute prominence and the bard is a mere intermediary. Pucci (2007: 62) talks of the ‘scandal’ of the Muses’ declaration, which consists in the fact that the Muses can lie, while their lies are similar to, and therefore undistinguishable from, the truth. See Paley (1883), Luther (1935: 25), Latte (1946: 159ff.) and Arrighetti (1987: 41), who consider that the Muses are referring here to heroic songs and to the Homeric epic in particular (since l. 27 parallels Od. 19.203, which refers to Odysseus’ lies to Penelope).

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and Hesiod in particular is found elsewhere to approve Homeric themes. Additionally, the fact that the Muses can sing the truth confirms that Hesiod believed that they could in principle have told Homer, who invokes them, true stories.110 On the other hand, scholars have considered the notion of ‘similarity’ in the Muses’ words as a manifestation of the poetics of fiction,111 but this implies a specific reflection concerning the nature of poetry, which becomes a central theme of discussion only three centuries after Hesiod’s poetry and, specifically, within Plato’s dialogues (e.g., Phaedr. 272d 2).112 While the question of the Muses’ claim to be able to invent lies similar to the truth is destined to remain one of the most debated issues in Hesiod studies, their declared ability to deceive can be explained as Hesiod’s intention to emphasize the unbridgeable distance between gods and human beings, divine wisdom and human knowledge.113 By saying that they can utter lies resembling the truth, Hesiod makes the Muses declare that they alone know what of their inspiration is true and what is false. Poets (and even more so ordinary people) only know what they hear, being unable to say whether what they are listening to is true or false. Thus, through their declaration that they can lie if they want to, the Muses state that knowledge and communication of the truth is an exclusively divine prerogative and so proclaim themselves the only source of truth.114 This element can be read as a further detail in service of Hesiod’s selflegitimation. Specifically, the fact that the source of truth chose Hesiod and taught him a divine song can be taken as an indication that the Muses now want Hesiod to sing the truth.115 The metaphysical atmosphere surrounding Hesiod’s investiture confirms this conclusion.116 We are told that the Muses give him a laurel σκῆπτρον together with the gift of beautiful song. The skēptron, usually carried by kings, priests and prophets as the symbol they are god’s representatives, indicates that Hesiod is singing on 110

111

112 114 115

116

Reactions to this hypothesis thus propose to read the Muses’ words as hinting not merely at Homeric epics, but at all poetry before Hesiod as a mix of truth and lies. Consequently, modern interpretations in line with this reading have tried to pinpoint which themes the Muses’ words could have referred to: see Svenbro (1976: 59), Nagy (1990: 44–47) and Vasta (2004: 72). See Detienne (1967), Stroh (1976: 85–112), Pucci (1977: 12–14), Leclerc (1993: 71ff., 204–21), Pratt (1993: 106–13) and Wheeler (2002: 33–49). For a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the main opinions, see Brillante (2006: 40–45) and Pucci (2007: 60–65). This point was made by Brillante (2009: 188). 113 See Ibid. 35–37. On divine vs human knowledge, see also my discussion in Chapter 6.1. Even the expression ‘when we wish’ (l. 28), which often qualifies the administration by the gods of their own powers (see Kingsley 1995: 224; Pucci 2007: 69–70), might intentionally have been used here to indicate that the Muses now want Hesiod to sing the truth. On this see especially Nagy (1996).

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behalf of the gods. Moreover, it is worth noting that the main topics of Hesiod’s Theogony – the genealogy of the gods and the consolidation of Zeus’ kingdom – coincide with those stories the Muses themselves usually sing to Zeus. We know from a fragment of Pindar that the Muses were generated by Zeus, once he completed the arrangement of the universe, in order that they could celebrate with songs and music the great works of their father and the whole of his cosmic arrangement.117 Accordingly, Hesiod reveals that the voice of the Muses first celebrates the race of the gods ἐξ ἀρχῆς (ll. 44–45), then Zeus and finally the human race and the Giants (47–52). On closer inspection, the themes of the divine song of the Muses are remarkably similar to those of the Theogony, to the extent that the goddesses can be said to have inspired Hesiod to sing their own song.118 This detail is crucial, because it emphasizes the exceptional consideration the Muses gave to Hesiod as well as the divinely inspired nature of his Theogony, thus confirming that he is now entitled to speak on divine matters. It also assures the listener/reader that the themes addressed in the rest of the poem, coinciding with the words of the goddesses, conform with truth. Thus, Hesiod’s divine encounter and his authorial investiture by the Muses serve to legitimize him as the poet favoured by the goddesses, who empowered him to sing the true genealogy of the gods. 2.4.2

Parmenides

In a way that is analogous to the narration of Hesiod’s encounter with the Muses,119 Parmenides opens his philosophical poem with an account of his exceptional journey to the House of Night in order to meet a goddess,120 117 118

119

120

Fr. 31 Snell-Maehler. Scholars have highlighted that the song of the Muses as described at ll. 11–21 presents a number of differences and variations with respect to that of Hesiod: see Ramnoux (1986: 173–230) and Strauss Clay (2003: 54–55). However, in his Hymn to the Muses, Hesiod tells us that the Muses usually sing to Zeus to glorify his rise to power and his kingdom. Thus, any tale related to this major saga, hence specifically the tales narrated in Hesiod’s Theogony, could be regarded as a pertinent topic of their song. For an analysis of the parallels between Parmenides’ and Hesiod’s poetry see Pellikaan Engel (1978) and Tulli (2000). A comprehensive comparison between Hesiod’s encounter with the Muses and Parmenides’ encounter with the goddess can be read in Sassi (2009: 220–23). The identification of the goddess is problematic. There have been a number of suggestions, among which we can include: (a) Justice, Deichgräber (1958: 6, 7, 37); (b) Day (Hēmera), Gomperz (1924: 4, 9); (c) Peitho, Mourelatos (2008: 161); (d) Mnemosyne, Pugliese Carratelli (1988);(e) Persephone, Cerri (1999) and Kingsley (1999: 92–100); (f) Night, Ferrari (2007: 107–8) and Palmer (2009: 58–61); and (g) intentionally anonymous, Tarán (1965: 16) and Conche (1996: 56).

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who is presented as the source of Parmenides’ philosophy.121 His prologue begins in medias res, without the traditional hint at the Muses, at Apollo or at any other addressees (see B 1.1–5 [= PARM D 4.1–5 Laks-Most]):122 ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ’ ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι, πέμπον, ἐπεί μ’ ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι δαίμονος,123 ἣ κατὰ πάντ’ ἄστη φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα· τῆι φερόμην· τῆι γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι ἅρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ’ ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον.

5

The mares who carry me as far as the soul could reach were leading the way, once they stepped guiding me upon the path of many songs124 of the divinity, which carries over all cities the man who knows. On it was I borne, for on it were the headstrong mares carrying me, drawing the chariot along, and maidens were leading the way.

5

(transl. Palmer 2009, lightly modified)

As we can see, Parmenides depicts himself carried along the route of the Sun125 on a chariot driven by mares, while divine escorts, the Daughters of the Sun, indicate the direction towards the House of Night. Scholars have already noted that the chariot on which Parmenides is borne is a metaphor indicating poetry,126 which travels along the path of divinely inspired 121 122 123

124

125

126

Parmenides’ proem is quoted in its entirety by Sext. Emp. Adv. math. 7.111 (= DK 28 B 1 [= PARM D 4 Laks-Most]). The unusual character of Parmenides’ incipit has been highlighted by Ferrari (2007: 105). The term δαίμονος is the manuscript reading, which is accepted by all recent editors. For parallels, see Burkert (1969: 4 with n.9). Diels-Kranz followed Wilamowitz in accepting Stein’s conjecture δαίμονες (1857: 803), but see Tarán (1965: 10–11). Palmer translates πολύφημον as ‘far-fabled’, following Diels-Kranz ‘vielberühmt’; Guthrie (1965: 7) and Kirk-Raven-Schofield (1983: 243). In contrast, Mourelatos (2008: 41 n.93) and Cerri (1999: 167) translate ‘of many songs’ on the basis of the fact that the adjective πολύφημος qualifying the path along which Parmenides is borne (B 1.2 [= PARM D 4.2 Laks-Most]) has two occurrences in earlier literature, in connection with the idea of poetic composition: in Od. 22.75–6 the word is an epithet of Phemius, the poet ‘of many songs’ of Odysseus’ house, while in Pind. I. 8.56a–61 it characterizes the Muses’ thrēnos on Achilles’ corpse. The metaphors of the path of the god and the chariot of poetry have been developed by D’Alessio (1995), Cerri (1999: esp. 96–8) and Ranzato (2015: 25–31). That the ὁδὸς . . . δαίμονος (ll. 2–3) coincides with the route of Helios has been suggested by Cornford (1952: 118 n.1), Burkert (1969: 7) and, more recently, Palmer (2009: 56) and Cosgrove (2011: 30). Nevertheless, ὁδὸς . . . δαίμονος can also mean ‘the route of the goddess’ with reference to the goddess whom Parmenides meets in the House of Night, at the end of his journey: see Ferrari (2005: 120–21). However, as Burkert has pointed out, this identification reflects the method of the commentators, for one hearing Parmenides’ story for the first time has no reason at this point to think of the goddess who is first mentioned at l. 22, whereas plenty of elements in the lines thus far suggest that the deity is Helios. As such, this motive is found in: Pind. O. 1.112–5 and 6.1–4, 22–8; P. 10.64; Pae. 7b 10–20 SnellMaehler; I. 1.6; 2.1–5 and 8.61. See also Sim. Fr. 79.3–4 Diehl and Bacch. Ep. 5.176–86. It will moreover be recalled by Empedocles in B 3.3–5 (= EMP D 44.3–5 Laks-Most) as we shall see below.

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songs.127 Consequently, Parmenides is the beloved poet who, thanks to divine inspiration, could boast proximity with the god. Indeed, he is allowed to travel on a road usually not open to the living. This is meant to convey self-legitimation, as is confirmed by some formal details, such as the personal pronoun με, the second word of the whole poem, repeated thrice within the first five lines,128 and Parmenides’ self-definition as a ‘man who knows’, εἰδὼς φώς, at line 3. It has been noted that the status of wise man, εἰδώς, without the specification of an object, is evidence of a Sonderbedeutung: it indicates the myste who, by undergoing initiation, achieves extraordinary knowledge.129 This invites the reading that Parmenides depicts himself as undertaking a journey of initiation into a super-human wisdom. The mythical destination of Parmenides’ journey corroborates this conclusion: ἔνθα πύλαι Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἤματός εἰσι κελεύθων, καί σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός· αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις· τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς. τὴν δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν. πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα ἀπτερέως ὤσειε πυλέων ἄπο· ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων χάσμ’ ἀχανὲς ποίησαν . . .

35

40

(B 1.11–18 [= PARM D 4.11–18 Laks-Most])

There are the gates of the paths of Night and Day, and a lintel and a stone threshold hold them on both sides. And they themselves high in the air130 are filled with great doors; And hard-pushing Justice holds their alternating bolts. 127

128

129

130

Scholars have already observed that the unusual incipit of Parmenides’ poem almost automatically invites the audience hearing Parmenides’ poem for the first time to associate Parmenides’ chariot being led by female deities with the chariot of the Muses, who traditionally drive the poet along the path of songs. On this, see Cerri (1999: 102–3) and Ranzato (2015: 25–28). Compare Hesiod’s Theog. 22–24 with my analysis in Section 2.4.1. As Mansfeld (1995: 228) points out, ‘the “me” in the first line is the sphragis’. See also Empedocles’ B 115.13–14 (= EMP D 10.13–14 Laks-Most). Burkert (1969: 5 and n.11). See also Ferrari (2007: 103). The same use of εἰδώς without an object and pointing to a context of initiation is attested in [Eur.] Rh. 973; Aristoph. Nu. 1241; Andocydes Myst. 30. Scholars have highlighted that Parmenides’ journey can be compared to the journey of the soul depicted in coeval mystery texts like the gold tablets and in Plato’s dialogues. See Feyerabend (1984), Pugliese Carratelli (1988), Sassi (1988), Kingsley (1999: 71–76), Edmonds (2004: 32), Battezzato (2005: 90), Ferrari (2005: 115–17), Palmer (2009: 58–61), Kraus (2013: 455), Ranzato (2015: 93–95) and Tor (2017: 265–77). For the meaning of αἰθέριαι, see Aesch. Sept. 81 where αἰθέρια κόνις means ‘dust rising up to the sky’: see Cerri (1999: 177).

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2.4 Authorial Legitimation Appeasing her with gentle words, the maidens shrewdly persuaded her to push the pin-fastened bolt for them swiftly back from the gates. And in the doorframe these made a yawning chasm as they swung open . . .

(transl. Palmer 2009)

We are told that the Daughters of the Sun drive Parmenides to the high gates of the paths of Night and Day, which are held together by a lintel and a stone threshold and are filled with great doors, whose key is entrusted to Dike. Once the Daughters of the Sun persuade her to open the doors, a yawning chasm appears before Parmenides’ eyes. Through it, Parmenides can finally reach the House of Night, where he meets the goddess who, after having warmly welcomed him, reveals to him the true nature of things as described by Parmenides’ philosophy. In fact, Parmenides’ philosophy coincides with the revelation of the goddess. Whereas the journey of Parmenides runs on a path that leads him to the revelation of the truth coinciding with the exposition of his philosophy, the location of the journey’s destination, namely the House of Night, is greatly controversial. Specifically, by adhering to an ancient line of interpretation, which can be traced back to Sextus Empiricus, scholars have attempted to read Parmenides’ journey as a journey to light and his poem, consequently, as an allegory to indicate enlightenment.131 Yet it has been objected that plenty of traditional motifs, skilfully employed by Parmenides to describe the geography of the places he went through, indicate that Parmenides’ journey is not a way up to light, but rather a katabasis to the underworld.132 In this respect, the description of the gates of the paths of Night and Day calls to mind the familiar region of the underworld frequently depicted in traditional epic poetry.133 Notably, in the Theogony, Hesiod describes ‘the awful house of murky Night’ and, in front of it, the place ‘where Night and Day draw near and greet each other as they pass the great threshold of bronze:134 and while the one is about to go down into the house, the other comes out at the door’ (ll. 744–57).135 Elsewhere Hesiod tells us the House 131 132

133 134 135

Diels (1897), Kranz (1916), Bowra (1937), Guthrie (1965: 9–10) and more recently Kahn (2009: 210–15). This point was first made by Morrison (1955), was then developed by Burkert (1969) and is now accepted by the majority of scholars: see Tor (2017: 347 n.1) for extensive references to secondary literature. Il 8.13–6, Od. 24.11–4 and Hes. Theog. 740–57 and 811–14. Compare the ‘stone threshold’ that held the doors of the gates to the paths of Night and Day in Parmenides at l. 12. It has been noted that some details of Parmenides’ description are different from Hesiod’s topography of the underworld. This is so because, as Palmer (2009: 55) has correctly highlighted,

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of Night is at the world’s end, beyond glorious Ocean (Theog. 274–75). This corresponds to the way to Hades according to Homer: Odysseus is instructed to go with his ship across Ocean to reach it (Od. 10.508). Additionally, the χάσμα ἀχανές that appears in front of Parmenides once the gates of the paths of Night and Day are opened (ll. 16–18) recalls the χάσμα μέγα at the limits of the world, right there where we find the House of Night, which Hesiod describes in Theog. 740. We can then say that Parmenides’ use of the traditional topography of the underworld when depicting the place he goes through in his proem is a strong indication that his journey is a katabasis.136 Admittedly, almost every word in Parmenides’ prologue seems to be there expressly to evoke mythical places and epic scenes conveying the idea of a journey to the underworld.137 Scholars have made headway in showing analogies between Parmenides’ journey with Odysseus’ Nekyia,138 and with the legendary katabasis of Pythagoras.139 As katabaseis were a means to gain true knowledge, all Parmenides’ echoes and parallels are meant to convey his authorial self-legitimation: Parmenides is a hero who, like Odysseus, Orpheus, Epimenides and Pythagoras, was allowed to go in and out of Hades, where he could obtain a knowledge that is far beyond ordinary human ken. By virtue of his katabasis, Parmenides is now entitled to speak about the true nature of things. Indeed, his philosophy is entrusted to the goddess and coincides with her words. To sum up, from the analysis of the prologues to Hesiod’s Theogony and Parmenides’ philosophical poem it emerges that both opened their works with a claim to authority. This is conveyed through the narration of a pivotal life experience, which granted them an extraordinary knowledge, qualifying them as masters of truth, entitled to speak on divine matters. The metaphysical atmosphere that surrounds both Hesiod’s investiture by the Muses and Parmenides’ journey to the House of Night is meant to emphasize the exceptional character of their experiences. At the same time, the wealth of details and rhetorical devices displayed in both selfrepresentations serve to re-create and re-actualize that experience on the

136

137 138 139

‘Parmenides is not slavishly copying Hesiod. Instead, it appears that both he and Hesiod are elaborating a very old motif with deeper roots in Babylonian mythology.’ Other traditional elements indicating that Parmenides’ journey is a katabasis are collected by Burkert (1969: esp. at 1–22). See also Palmer (2009: 54–61). Tor (2017) suggests different ways to read Parmenides’ journey: as (1) a katabasis (350–52); (2) anabasis (352–56); (3) anabasis – katabasis (358) and as a journey whose topography is blurred and incoherent (359), by following a proposal by Mourelatos (2008: 16–25). Already in Diels (1897: 11ff.) but see, more recently, Ranzato (2015: esp. 25–118). See Havelock (1958), Mourelatos (2008: 21–25) and Cerri (1995: esp. 465–67). See Burkert (1969).

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occasion it is heard/read.140 Thus, we are invited to trust the poet because we now know him, having appreciated what he had undergone. The poet’s reference to his own example, in conclusion, accounts for the truth of the doctrine he is going to spread. Looking at the examples of Hesiod and Parmenides, his poetic and philosophical models, we gain a better understanding of why Empedocles might also have wanted to open On Nature with the narration of an exceptional and pivotal life experience, indeed with an extraordinary journey to the underworld. As we have seen, the depiction of this katabasis follows Empedocles’ claim to divine nature and is meant to complete, accordingly, his portrait as an exiled god. Thanks to his journey through the realm of the dead, his encounter with Pythagoras and his first-hand experience of what it means for mortals to die and to be born again, the god Empedocles obtains knowledge on matters beyond ordinary perception. Indeed, Empedocles’ katabasis sets the stage for his doctrine of rebirth: through the account of his mythical journey, Empedocles tells us that he has directly seen what he now professes. For this reason, we are encouraged to believe that what he now professes is entirely reliable. Moreover, like Parmenides’ katabasis, Empedocles’ journey to Hades is conveyed with a wealth of details concerning, for instance, the topography of the underworld and the unusual things he saw there, which serve to reactualize Empedocles’ experience in the audience of his listeners/readers. This element serves to provide evidence that Empedocles can be trusted, that he is, in other words, the god and the poet of truth he claims to be. In conclusion, by opening his poem on natural philosophy with his exceptional adventure, Empedocles, just like Hesiod and Parmenides before him, creates a selfvalidating narrative with the aim of providing evidence that he is entitled to speak on matters beyond normal human knowledge, matters that will be themed in the rest of On Nature. These comprise not only the principles of nature and the structure and functioning of the cosmos and its inhabitants, but also the place and fate of the individual in and beyond embodied life.

2.5

Dedication to Pausanias and Promise of Divine Power

Thus far, the reconstruction of the incipit of the proem to On Nature in terms of a divine law sanctioning the punishment of guilty gods and, above all, as Empedocles’ claim he is one of those, banished from the divine 140

It is worth noting, moreover, that, as Elmer (2010) has emphasized, the poets’ addition of details and ornaments to their song is essential to their representation of the truth.

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community and journeying through the realm of the dead, has been built upon an accumulation of evidence. First, as we have seen in Chapter 1, the Strasbourg papyrus establishes with a good degree of certainty the attribution to the physical poem of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) which, by following what Plutarch tells us, is to be placed at the beginning of On Nature. Second, the allocation of other demonological fragments after B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) follows both contextual and content criteria, which indicate that they build a topic-based group of verses belonging to the same thematic and narrative context. Third, the investigation of comparable stories of legendary or semi-legendary wisdom-heroes, who established themselves as divine authorities after a katabasis to the underworld, and the analysis of Hesiod’s and Parmenides’ exceptional experiences and divine encounters at the opening of their poems as a means to authorial legitimation concerning extra-ordinary topics have retrospectively provided further evidence for my reconstruction. Thus, having argued that On Nature begins with Empedocles’ katabasis to the underworld, in the second half of this chapter, I will reconstruct the rest of the proem to the physical poem, putting together different themes and verses following distinct methods and approaches. To begin, the present section will deal with those fragments that in Section 2.1 I put together as Group 2; that is, with verses and themes dealing with the dedication of the poem to the disciple Pausanias and the result he should expect to gain in terms of wisdom acquisition at the end of his philosophical training, in contrast to all other people who are not going to receive the doctrine. In comparison to the first half of this chapter, the collocation of this group of fragments to the proem of the physical poem is less controversial than the allocation of the demonological fragments; first because two fragments of this group, namely B 1 (= EMP D 41 Laks-Most) and B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most), thematizes topics that fit well an introduction and for this reason, they are made proemial fragments in all modern editions. Second, our sources cite B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most) as preceding Empedocles’ invocation to the gods and the Muse, which is a traditionally proemial topic. For these reasons it is generally agreed that B 1 (= EMP D 41 Laks-Most) and B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most) belong to the proem to On Nature. A different case must be made for B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most), which is generally taken as a physical fragment,141 but is allocated differently within On Nature. Thus, whereas Diels-Kranz reconstructed it as the last 141

The sole exception I know is Sedley (1989), who allocates B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) to the Purifications.

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fragment of the physical poem, the allocation of this fragment in the proemial context is prompted by certain elements in its verses which give it a remarkably programmatic tone. Because of this, some among the most recent editions of the Empedoclean fragments take B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) as part of the prologue to the physical exposition beginning with B 17 (= EMP D 73.233–66 Laks-Most).142 If we look more closely into the fragments of this group, then we see that with B 1 (= EMP D 41 Laks-Most), Empedocles’ dedication to Pausanias143 recalls Hesiod, who dedicated his Erga to his brother Perses.144 Indeed, like Perses, Pausanias is not only the addressee, but also the first recipient of Empedocles’ teaching. Although the dedicatory allocution is absent in Parmenides’ poem, his rhetorical strategy to let the goddess address him and reveal her philosophical discourse is meant to achieve analogous didactic purposes: Parmenides is the recipient of the goddess’s revelation. As we shall see in Chapter 6.2.1, the ways in which Empedocles often interrupts the narrative flow to address Pausanias directly in the secondperson singular are imitations of the ways in which the goddess addresses Parmenides in the second-person singular. Moving beyond the agreed location of the dedication to the disciple, it is reasonable to think that Empedocles might have then wanted to mention what Pausanias could expect to learn from his earnest acceptance of Empedocles’ doctrines. Accordingly, I would argue that the lines of B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) closely follow B 1 (= EMP D 41 Laks-Most). 142

143 144

See already Bollack (1969: vol. 3, 22), who wrote that ‘the proem is the most suitable place to contain these statements’, and van der Ben (1975: 87 n.71), who rejected the reading by Diels (1903), according to whom B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) is to be placed at the end of the physical poem, as if it were a poetic epilogue that hints at a future, ‘magical’ work: the Purifications. Van der Ben (1975: 87 n.71) demonstrated that, in Empedocles’ time, we have no model for a poetic epilogue like the one Diels has in mind. Similarly, Kingsley (1995: 218–32) compellingly shows both formal and content elements that indicate the introductory character of B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most). Inwood (2001: 211) analogously placed it in an early section of the poem and before B 17 (= EMP D 73.233–66 Laks-Most). More recently, both the editions by Laks-Most (2016: 388 [=EMP D 43]) and Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021: 442 [= F 42]) allocate this fragment within the proem to the physical poem (both editions place it immediately after B 1 [= EMP D 41 Laks-Most] and B 2 [= EMP D 42 Laks-Most]). As Diog. Laert. tells us in 8.60 by quoting the line now constituting B 1 (= EMP D 41 Laks-Most). Hesiod’s first dedication to his brother Perses is in Erga 10: ἐγὼ δέ κε Πέρσῃ ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην. Empedocles writes his own dedication upon the model of Hesiod’s Erga 26: Ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα τεῷ ἐνικάτθεο θυμῷ (l. 26). West (1978: 3–40), based on his comprehensive analysis of didactic literature in Greek, Sumerian, Indian, Akkadian, Egyptian, Jewish, Aramaic, Latin and Medieval cultures, concludes that the dedication to a beloved person, such as that of a father to his son, a wise man to his king or to a beloved disciple, is a traditional motive within didactic poetry in general.

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The Proem to On Nature φάρμακα δ᾽ ὅσσα γεγᾶσι κακῶν καὶ γήραος ἄλκαρ πεύσηι, ἐπεὶ μούνωι σοὶ ἐγὼ κρανέω τάδε πάντα. παύσεις δ᾽ ἀκαμάτων ἀνέμων μένος οἵ τ᾽ ἐπὶ γαῖαν ὀρνύμενοι πνοιαῖσι καταφθινύθουσιν ἀρούρας· καὶ πάλιν, ἢν ἐθέληισθα, παλίντιτα πνεύματ’ ἐπάξεις· θήσεις δ᾽ ἐξ ὄμβροιο κελαινοῦ καίριον αὐχμόν ἀνθρώποις, θήσεις δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐχμοῖο θερείου ῥεύματα δενδρεόθρεπτα, τά τ᾽ αἰθέρι ναιήσονται. ἄξεις δ᾽ ἐξ Ἀίδαο καταφθιμένου μένος ἀνδρός.

5

You shall learn all remedies which there are for ills and defense against old age, since for you alone will I accomplish all these things. You will calm the force of tireless winds which sweep over the earth and lay waste to the fields with their blasts; and then, if you so wish, you shall bring the winds back again. From black rain you shall make a draught timely for humans, and from summer draught you shall make tree-nourishing streams that will dwell in ether; and from Hades you shall bring the strength of a dead man.

5

These verses define, in the form of a promise, what Pausanias shall expect as a result of Empedocles’ teachings. The content of the promise is striking: Pausanias will learn remedies for ills and old age, the faculty to calm or shake the winds and to regulate rainfall, as well as the ability to retrieve the dead from Hades. In short, Pausanias will learn to control the forces of nature. As has already been argued in the previous chapter, this kind of knowledge is traditionally a prerogative of the gods: control over the winds and rain is Zeus’s traditional privilege, whereas only gods have the power to postpone, or take away, old age and death. With his claim that Pausanias will have this kind of power, Empedocles, as Kingsley has emphasized, was challenging the standard Greek view of humanity as helpless against death and old age and, at the same time, he was also indicating a way to become divine.145 In this respect, the phrase ἢν ἐθέληισθα, ‘if you so wish’ (l. 5) is a remark on the fact that Pausanias will gain divine powers, as in epic poetry this phrase constantly refers to the exercise of power by gods and goddesses, when and if they so wish.146 As mentioned above, several modern interpreters have already pointed out that the introductory character of these lines is displayed by their 145 146

Kingsley (1995: 222–23). Ibid. 224 n.23. See Bollack (1969: vol. 3, 24): ‘The formula constantly refers to the goodwill of the gods.’

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formal construction. Empedocles’ promise is formulated in the secondperson singular and with verbs in the future tense: πεύσηι, παύσεις, ἐπάξεις, θήσεις and ἄξεις. These betray a programmatic intent, which well suits an introductory context. In fact, an analogous use of the future tense in the second-person singular is displayed by Parmenides’ goddess in the introductory lines to his poem (μαθήσεαι at B 1.31 [= PARM D 4.3 Laks-Most]).147 Notably, Empedocles’ lines resemble Parmenides’ fragment B 10 (= PARM D 12 Laks-Most) : εἴσηι δ’ αἰθερίαν τε φύσιν . . . ἔργα τε κύκλωπος πεύσηι περίφοιτα σελήνης / καὶ φύσιν, εἰδήσεις δὲ καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀμφὶς ἔχοντα. The programmatic intent of the Parmenidean lines is undeniable and for this reason some interpreters suggested they may be part of the proem of the Doxa.148 Furthermore, the wording πεύσηι ἐπεί at Empedocles’ B 111.2 (= EMP D 43.2 Laks-Most), ‘you will apprehend, because’, closely parallels ἐπεί . . . πεύσεαι in B 2.8–9 (= EMP D 42 LaksMost), which, as we will see below, can be located in the proem to On Nature with a greater level of certainty. Besides the issue of their allocation within the physical poem, the verses of B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) have prompted discussion among scholars, above all because, despite all possible interpretations, Empedocles’ promise to Pausanias that he will control the forces of nature seems to be more appropriate to the context of magic, rather than to that of natural philosophy.149 Yet, as Kingsley emphasized, the collocation of B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) in the proem to On Nature invites a reconsideration of Empedocles’ philosophical project in its entirety and, consequently, of what the concept of ‘natural philosophy’ may have meant in fifth-century thought. With fragment 111 placed where it almost certainly belongs, at the beginning of the cosmological poem, we are given a clear indication of the way in which we are meant to understand the poem as a whole. Learning about the elements, about the history and constitution of man, about the nature of plants, animals, metals, physical phenomena, astronomy, and the structure

147 148 149

See also the imperative μάνθανε in what is considered the proem to Parmenides’ Doxa (B 8.52 [= PARM D 8.57 Laks-Most]). That is, its verses are to be allocated between B 8.61 (= PARM D 8.66 Laks-Most) and B 9 (= PARM D 13 Laks-Most), see Reale-Ruggiu (2003: 332). Because of its relation to magic, van Groenigen (1956) doubted the authenticity of B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) and argued, on stylistic grounds, that it is a parody of Empedocles’ lines written for Sicilian or Attic comedy. In contrast, Bollack (1969, vol. 3: 20–21) showed that any attempt to establish the non-authenticity of this fragment upon stylistic grounds is destined to fail, as its style and language are prominently Empedoclean.

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The Proem to On Nature of the universe is not some end in itself: not the satisfaction of some theoretical desire of knowledge. On the contrary, . . . the disciple will eventually gain the ability not just to understand the powers of nature but also to control them.150

The promise that Pausanias will not only know but also control the forces of nature goes hand in hand with the notion of the disciple’s complete devotion to Empedocles’ philosophy. Clearly Empedocles feels the need to reiterate that the attainment of godlike powers is only achieved through his teachings and the learning of his philosophy. In this respect, it is worth noting that the phrase at line 2, μούνωι σοὶ ἐγὼ κρανέω τάδε πάντα, ‘for you alone will I accomplish all these things’, conveys a promise that is meant to be understood as esoteric and thus hints at a context of initiation.151 Similarly in B 5 (= EMP D 258 Laks-Most), Empedocles recommends Pausanias keep secret his master’s revelation and Plutarch, who quotes these words, relates them to a (Pythagorean) initiatory context.152 This impression gains force when considering another proemial fragment, B 2.8–9 (= EMP D 42.8–9 Laks-Most), which will be examined below, in which it is demanded that Pausanias, in order to gain divine wisdom, must turn to Empedocles and follow his philosophy. Thus, we can appreciate that Empedocles’ philosophy is not presented as a mere exposition of the natural world, but is seen as a way to divine knowlegde and powers. On this basis, it can fairly be assumed that Empedocles’ project is to indicate the pathway by which, through knowledge of the physical world, Pausanias – and all who, like Pausanias, adhere and initiate themselves to his philosophy – can ultimately transcend mortal nature and become gods.153 The divine knowledge and powers guaranteed to Pausanias at the end of his philosophical training play on the contrast with the depiction of ordinary human ineptitude to genuinely know, described in B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most). Sextus Empiricus, who quoted these lines,154 reported that, in the layout of Empedocles’ poem, they closely precede the verses of B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most), which include the distinctively introductory motif of Empedocles’ invocation to the gods and the Muse. This comment

150 151 152 153 154

Kingsley (1995: 218 and 228–29). See Bidez (1894: 161–62), Diels (1898: 407), Kingsley (1995: 359–70) and Primavesi (2001: 3–6; 2013: 687–88). See Plut. Quaest. conviv. 8.8.1 p. 728 E. While the proem suggests this reading, I will explore the possibility of a philosophy leading to the transcendence of mortal nature more thoroughly in Chapter 6.3–6.4. In Adv. math. 7.122–24.

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by our source is therefore an indication that B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most) belongs to the proem.155 The fragment runs as follows: στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται· πολλὰ δὲ δείλ᾽ ἔμπαια, τά τ᾽ ἀμβλύνουσι μέριμνας· παῦρον δὲ ζωῆισι βίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν, αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτωι προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος πάντοσ᾽ ἐλαυνόμενοι· τὸ δ᾽ ὅλον εὔχεται εὑρεῖν;156 οὕτως οὔτ᾽ ἐπιδερκτὰ τὰδ᾽ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ᾽ ἐπακουστά οὔτε νόωι περιληπτά. σὺ δ᾽ οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ᾽ ἐλιάσθης,157 πεύσεαι· οὐ πλεῖόν γε βροτείη μῆτις ὄρωρεν.

5

For narrow devices are spread through their limbs, and many wretched things strike in and dull their solicitudes. And having seen a small portion of life in their lifetime, swiftly dying, carried up like smoke they fly away convinced only of that which each has chanced to experience 5 being driven in all directions. Who then boasts that they have found the whole? These things are not so to be seen or heard by humans or grasped with mind. But you then, since you turned aside, shall learn: mortal intelligence has certainly never risen higher.

Through these lines, ordinary people’s ineptitude to know the truth is related to their inadequate tools for understanding. On the one hand, sense organs158 are narrow, while wretched things may dull human solicitudes, causing their thoughts – so one can argue – to be turned to worthless things. On the other hand, too short a human lifespan may lead people, who are generally ‘convinced only of that which each has chanced to experience’ and are ‘driven in all directions’ by their sensations, to believe that their merely sensory impressions coincide with the true nature of things.159 155

156 157 158

159

Therefore, as far as I know, no interpreters have doubted this collocation. However, Gallavotti (1975: 9), although he places the lines of B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most) among the proemial fragments, collocates it after B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most). The reconstruction of this line follows Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021: 440 [= F 41.6]). For the textual problems of this line, see below. The term παλάμη, which originally means ‘the palm of the hand’ and is commonly used as synecdoche to indicate the open hand in opposition to the fist – hence with the meaning of hand in more general terms – is used here metonymically to indicate sense organs. With regard to sensation, this term conveys the idea that sense organs are able to ‘grasp’ reality, as if sensation were a form of contact. As we will see in Chapter 6.3.1, Empedocles argues for perception occurring because of contact, mediated by effluences, between sense organs and the objects of perception. According to Sextus, here Empedocles discredits sense organs as a criterion to gain genuine knowledge. In Chapter 6.3, by investigating Empedocles’ theory of sensation and knowledge acquisition, I will show the extent to which sense organs are fundamental, though not sufficient,

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At line 4, the adjective ὠκύμοροι, ‘destined to prompt death’ or ‘bearer of prompt death’, is Homeric. In epic poetry, it denotes the sudden destiny overcoming heroes who, still far from their natural age of death, hurl themselves upon the enemy and die. The notion of death coming too soon upon human beings remarks upon the distance between mortals who see only ‘a small portion of life in their lifetime’ and gods who are elsewhere depicted as δολιχαίωνες, ‘long-lived’.160 Related to this, it is worth noting that human beings are also characterized as many-times-dying (θνητῶν . . . πολυφθερέων ἀνθρώπων, B 113.2 [= EMP D 5.2 Laks-Most]). While the small portion of life granted to humans leads them to an erroneous understanding of the physical world, as they can only count on their partial sensory impressions, it can be inferred that, due to their long lives, gods have a potentially more complete perspective on reality, based on a larger number of evaluative data. The inference is, in other words, that cognitive abilities that do not meet the limitation of too short a lifespan are not harnessed to necessarily fragmentary and partial sensory impressions, but are able to know things more comprehensively. However, since by their very nature humans are hindered from knowing things as they really are, even when these are revealed to them (ll. 7–8), it follows that in order to know the truth about the physical world, Pausanias must overcome human limitations. While we will explore Empedocles’ way of transcending human nature and becoming god in Chapter 6.4, it is worth noting that derogatory remarks about human cognitive capacities, such as those we find in B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most), serve at least two purposes. On the one hand, the emphasis on people’s insufficient cognitive tools focuses, by contrast, on the extra-ordinary character of the subject matters examined. On the other hand, by highlighting in a proemial context that under normal circumstances humans are unable to know such matters, the author can contrastingly emphasize the promise of the unexplored potential his words

160

in order to obtain knowledge of the physical world. Empedocles repeatedly encourages his disciple to use his sense organs in his enquiry into the physical world. By virtue of that, it is more likely that Empedocles here is not reproaching people because they use sense organs in their attempts to know, but rather because they use them either exclusively or wrongly. As Bollack (1969: vol. 3, 7) has already shown, ‘the means of perception available to human beings are limited, but this notion itself is not pejorative. This is not (as Sextus suggests) a critique of sensory perception, but of its application.’ See PStrasb. a(i) 9–a(ii) 1–2 (= EMP D 73.270–72 Laks-Most), B 21.12 (= EMP D 77a Laks-Most) and B 23.6–8 (= EMP D 60.6–8 Laks-Most). See δαίμονες described as οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο in B 115.4 (= EMP D 10.4 Laks-Most). On the identification of ‘long-lived gods’ and their divine status, see Chapter 4.5.

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will open up. For this reason, the notion of insufficient human cognitive tools is traditional in early Greek poetry and philosophy. As we have seen, in the proem to his Theogony, 161 Hesiod makes the Muses address him with pejorative words, defining his kin as the race of field-dwelling shepherds, ignoble disgraces and mere bellies. Such dismissive words are meant to mark the cognitive distance between the divine Muses, who are the source of knowledge, and ordinary people who, knowing just what they hear, cannot even distinguish true from false tales. However, the Muses’ words also serve to place Hesiod – the poet chosen by the gods – on a higher cognitive ground than ordinary people and thus to emphasize that he can be trusted as the poet of a reliable Theogony.162 Analogously and by using the same metaphor domain employed by Empedocles – that is, journey metaphors to illustrate aspects of the conceptual domain of knowledge (see e.g., πάντοσ᾽ ἐλαυνόμενοι, ‘being driven in all directions’, at B 2.6 [= EMP D 42.6 Laks-Most]163) – Parmenides describes ordinary mortals as people who, because they know nothing, wander around, ‘for helplessness in their breasts directs their wandering mind’. Moreover, they are depicted as ‘undiscriminating hordes’, who are borne along, ‘deaf and blind at once, bedazzled’ (DK 28 B 6.4–7 [= PARM D 7.4–7 Laks-Most]). In contrast, Parmenides is nothing like that. Though being human, he presents himself in the proem as a ‘man who knows’ (B 1.3 [= PARM D 4.3 Laks-Most]), carried by divine guides (B 1.5 [= PARM D 4.5 Laks-Most]) along a precise pathway with a clear destination, while the ordinary human path ‘turns back on itself’ (B 6.9 [= PARM D 7.9 Laks-Most]). Thus, by focusing on human insufficient understanding, Parmenides introduces a way through which he acquires knowledge: ‘the path of many songs of the god’ (B 1.2–3 [= PARM D 4.2–3 Laks-Most]). Analogously, after having declared that humans are by nature impeded to know, Empedocles adds his promise to Pausanias that he among all other people will know: σὺ δ᾽ οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ᾽ ἐλιάσθης, πεύσεαι· οὐ πλεῖόν γε βροτείη μῆτις ὄρωρεν.

(B 2.8–9 [= EMP D 42.8–9 Laks-Most])

161 162 163

Theog. 26 with my interpretation above. A further typical example in this respect is Heraclitus DK 22 B 1 (= HER D 1 Laks-Most) and B 2 (= HER D 2 Laks-Most). On journey-metaphor depicting knowledge in Parmenides and Empedocles (as well as in Heraclitus), see Ferella (2018b).

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As we can appreciate, the knowledge promised to Pausanias can only be gained by turning aside from the straight path – that is, by renouncing traditional beliefs and worldviews – and following Empedocles. B 2.9 (= EMP D 42.9 Laks-Most) presents some textual uncertainties that need to be addressed. Specifically, in Diels-Kranz the line is printed as follows: πεύσεαι οὐ πλέον ἠὲ βροτείη μῆτις ὄρωρεν. Their text accepts the emendation by Stein (following Karsten), οὐ πλέον ἠὲ, of the reading transmitted by Sextus’ manuscripts: οὐ πλεῖον γε. The line reconstructed in this way emphasizes the antithesis between human means and divine knowledge. According to this reconstruction, in other words, Empedocles is saying that Pausanias will know nothing more than human intelligence can know.164 Wright was of the same opinion: E(mpedocles)’s attitude is more modest here . . .. Men generally do not grasp the truth of things, but this does not mean that it is unattainable. If Pausanias under E(mpedocles)’s guidance, makes careful use of the evidence provided by his senses and brings in nous to supplement their deficiencies, then, within the given limitations, it is possible to achieve genuine understanding.165

In contrast, I believe that Empedocles’ attitude is bold here: in closing these verses, he intends to reiterate his promise that the disciple, unlike ordinary people, will attain divine knowledge. For this reason, I reject Karsten’s emendation and Diels-Kranz’s reconstruction of line 9 and, instead, accept the transmitted version οὐ πλεῖόν γε, putting a comma after πεύσεαι. In this way, my text renders Empedocles’ claim that his ‘philosophical path’ will convey to Pausanias, who chose to follow him, an extraordinary wisdom beyond human epistemic potential.166 My textual reconstruction is supported by Empedocles’ equally audacious promise to his disciple of control of the forces of nature given at B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most), as already examined above. In line with this 164 165 166

See the translation of these two lines by Diels-Kranz: ‘Du aber sollst nun . . . erfahren – nicht mehr als sterbliche Klugkeit sich regt und erhebt’. Wright (1995: 157); the emphasis is mine. My reconstruction and interpretation of this line follow the reading by Calzolari (1984: 76 n.17): The otherness (‘l’alterità’) that the fragment establishes between the impotent mortals before the force of things and the subject who has withdrawn, so to speak, out of the fray . . . appears much more evident if it implies an equally marked antithesis between non-knowledge and knowledge, to whose acquisition is preliminary (as in Parmenides 1, 9) the estrangement from the footsteps of ordinary people (‘l’orma del volgo’).

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fragment, Empedocles restates the idea that his philosophy is more than just knowledge of the physical world; it is the way to obtain godlike understanding of, and powers over, the forces of nature. Moreover, Empedocles’ poetic strategy of presenting his philosophy as an initiation, as we have seen above, establishes a dichotomy between ordinary people and the wisdom reserved for the initiates. This also supports my reconstruction of B 2.9 as a line intended to emphasize that Pausanias will gain knowledge beyond mere human potential. According to my interpretation, in other words, while no human being can boast of finding the whole (B 2.6 [= EMP D 42.6]), as the human cognitive tools are ineffective without divine disclosure, Pausanias, who will be initiated into true philosophy, will not only reach the apex of mortal understanding, but with the assistance of Empedocles will be able to go even further.167 In conclusion, what B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) and B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most) emphasize is that Empedocles’ natural philosophy is the way to bridge the gap between humans and gods, as it will enable Pausanias not only to understand the nature of things, but more importantly to transcend his mortal nature, overcoming the limits of human cognition and faculties. In short, Empedocles’ teaching on the physical world carries with it the promise that the disciple will become a god. Whereas I shall return to a thorough analysis of this concluding statement in Chapter 6.3 and 6.4, for now I shall continue with the reconstruction of the proem to On Nature, turning to the analysis of those fragments I have assembled as Group 3.

2.6 Human Madness and Ritual Sacrifice The next section of the proem is the one referred to above as Group 3 and includes fragments B 136 (= EMP D 28 Laks-Most) and B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most), which deal with the rejection of ritual sacrifice as it is considered a form of crime. In order to argue for the allocation of these two fragments in the proem to On Nature, in contrast to their standard apportionment in the Purifications, we need first to introduce fragment B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most) and Empedocles’ prayer to the gods and the Muse for divine inspiration (Group 4). Because of this content, it is indeed rather safe to consider this fragment as part of the proem of On Nature. 167

See Trépanier (2004: 54).

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In contrast, the different collocation I advocate for B 136 (= EMP D 28 Laks-Most) and B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) is prompted by B 3.1 (= EMP D 44.1 Laks-Most), which opens with Empedocles’ prayer to the gods in order that they turn from his tongue τῶν μὲν μανίην, ‘the madness of those (or of those things)’.168 Whose madness is Empedocles talking about? Sextus Empiricus, author of the citation, reads the line as Empedocles’ criticism of ‘those who announce that they know more’, very likely referring to those who boast they found the whole in B 2.6 (= EMP D 42.6 Laks-Most).169 Although Sextus’ interpretation cannot be discarded in principle, other elements can be gathered from the fragments of Empedocles that might more precisely define μανίη in B 3.1 (= EMP D 44.1 Laks-Most). In this respect, by following a suggestion made by Sedley, we can look at the proem to Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura to identify, in Empedocles’ extant fragments, topics that were presumably part of the proem to his physical poem. Specifically, having demonstrated that the proem to Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura ‘is, and is meant to be recognised as, an imitation of the proem to Empedocles’ Περὶ φύσεως’,170 Sedley argued that, for that reason, we can reconstruct Empedocles’ proemial themes by following the topics touched upon in Lucretius’ prologue. These cover a number of themes also found in those Empedoclean fragments that are usually considered as introductory in modern editions: for instance, the programmatic address to the dedicatee, the uncritical belief in common concepts and tales and the magnitude of the philosophical task. Additionally, Sedley identified a further topic in the proem to Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura that is covered in Empedocles’ verses too: the theme of the evils of ritual sacrifice. Compared to the other themes mentioned earlier, however, Empedocles’ verses dealing with ritual sacrifice are not usually considered in editions of Empedocles’ fragments either as introductory verses or as part of the physical poem. It is worth noting, moreover, that in the proem of De Rerum Natura the theme of ritual sacrifice is linked to the crimes that people commit in the 168

169

The pronoun τῶν could be interpreted both as a masculine plural, following Sextus’ reading in Adv. math. 7.124–25, and as a neuter plural. Both interpretations have found their advocates. Besides Sextus, a reading of τῶν as a masculine plural is advocated by Diels-Kranz, who refer it to the ‘Nichtempiriker wie Parmenides’. Similarly, Bignone (1916: 391) argues that Empedocles referred to the Eleatics in general. Cerri (2004: 88) assumes a general reference to those ‘who claim and boast of knowing more’. In contrast, Bollack (1969: vol. 3, 27) interprets τῶν as a neuter plural and argues that it ‘rather refers to words of madness, which . . . the poet himself uttered’, with reference to B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most). Sextus Adv. math. 7.124–25. 170 Sedley (1989: 287; 1998: 22). The emphasis is Sedley’s.

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name of their adherence to traditional religio.171 As an example of this, Lucretius narrates the mythical story of the infanticide of Iphigeneia, sacrificed by her own father Agamemnon on the eve of the Trojan war (DRN 1.80–101). Similarly, there are some Empedocles’ lines (B 137 [= EMP D 29 Laks-Most]) that describe ritual sacrifice as a series of crimes: infanticides, patricides and matricides. Lucretius’ lines are reminiscent of Empedocles’ verses; indeed, as Sedley emphasizes, ‘the close functional parallelism of the two pathetic scenes of sacrifice should leave little doubt that the one passage is written with the other in mind’.172 Following Sedley’s standard for reconstructing Empedocles’ proem, it can be concluded that the striking similarities between Lucretius’ verses on the sacrifice of Iphigenia and Empedocles’ lines on the crimes resulting from ritual sacrifices indicate that Lucretius read B 137 within the proem of Empedocles’ poem. In this way, placed within the introductory themes of On Nature, B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) can be taken as exemplifying a prominent aspect of that human madness mentioned in B 3.1 (= EMP D 44.1 Laks-Most). Finally, as for the placement of B 136 (= EMP D 28 Laks-Most) before B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most), it is assured by our source, Sextus Empiricus, who quotes the former immediately before citing the latter.173 Looking into these two fragments in more detail, B 136 (= EMP D 28 LaksMost) and B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) read as follows: οὐ παύσεσθε φόνοιο δυσηχέος; οὐκ ἐσορᾶτε ἀλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκηδείηισι νόοιο;

(B 136 [= EMP D 28 Laks-Most])

Will you not desist from harsh-sounding slaughter? Do you not see that you are devouring each other in the carelessness of your mind? μορφὴν δ᾽ ἀλλάξαντα πατὴρ φίλον υἱὸν ἀείρας σφάζει ἐπευχόμενος μέγα νήπιος· οἱ δ᾽ ἀπορεῦνται 171 172

173

See DRN 1.81–82: impia . . . elementa viamque / indugredi sceleris. See also scelerosa atque impia facta at 1.84. Sedley (1989: 293; 1998: 30). Furthermore, as Sedley has highlighted, immediately after his account of the myth of Iphigeneia, Lucretius refers to his rejection of the doctrine of rebirth (DRN 1.116–23), but his depiction of this mythical sacrifice does not relate it to the reincarnations of the soul. Although his rejection of the doctrine of rebirth could be explained as another instance of those impia facta justified by religion, the numerous parallels with the Empedoclean lines suggest that the verses of B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) were meant to be evoked as a model for Lucretius’ story. In fact, rebirth is the reason why Empedocles considers ritual sacrifices impious and, above all, chiefly exemplary of human madness. Specifically, B 136 (= EMP D 28 Laks-Most) is quoted in Adv. math. 9.122 and B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) in Adv. math. 9.129.

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λισσόμενον θύοντες· ὁ δ᾽ αὖ νήκουστος ὁμοκλέων σφάξας ἐν μεγάροισι κακὴν ἀλεγύνατο δαῖτα. ὡς δ᾽ αὔτως πατέρ᾽ υἱὸς ἑλὼν καὶ μητέρα παῖδες θυμὸν ἀπορραίσαντε φίλας κατὰ σάρκας ἔδουσιν.

5

(B 137 [= EMP D 29 Laks-Most])

The father lifts up his dear son in a changed form and, fool, prays and slays him. And they hesitate while they sacrifice the victim that implores them. But he, deaf to his cries slays him in his house and prepares an evil feast. In the same way a son seizes his father and the children their mother 5 and tearing out their life devour the flesh of those they love.

Reading these two fragments in sequence allows us to understand the accusation Empedocles makes in B 136 (= EMP D 28 Laks-Most) of people being guilty of slaughter (φόνος) and cannibalism without even realizing it. It is by pervasively practising ritual sacrifice that individuals kill and devour each other, constantly but unconsciously, as B 137 (= EMP D 29 LaksMost) brings into focus. The reason why ritual sacrifice is compared to criminal actions resides in the fact that, as Empedocles explains, the sacrificial victim is a person who has changed form (μορφὴν δ᾽ ἀλλάξαντα at B 137.1 [=EMP D 29.1 Laks-Most]) and is reborn as an animal. Indeed, it may even happen that the animal victim is the son, father or mother of the priest officiating the sacrifice. Citing B 136 (= EMP D 28 Laks-Most), Sextus Empiricus explained Empedocles’ notion of ritual sacrifice as a form of φόνος by referring to the concept of a common cosmic spirit shared by both humans and animals which, in virtue of that, shared the same kinship.174 According to Sextus, Empedocles drew on this concept when in B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) he described executioners and victims as blood relatives: father and son; son and father; and children and mother. More plausibly, however, the cases presented in B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) are intended to describe borderline examples of rebirths, with the aim of representing the evil nature of sacrifice as vividly as possible. In particular, the verses of B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) are meant to illustrate the extreme consequences 174

Sextus’ whole passage runs as follows (in DK’s edition): οὖν περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν καὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν Ἰταλῶν πλῆθός φασι μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναί τινα κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώιων. ἓν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου διῆκον ψυχῆς τρόπον τὸ καὶ ἑνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. διόπερ καὶ κτείνοντες αὐτὰ καὶ ταῖς σαρξὶν αὐτῶν τρεφόμενοι ἀδικήσομέν τε καὶ ἀσεβήσομεν ὡς συγγενεῖς ἀναιροῦντες. ἔνθεν καὶ παρήινουν οὗτοι οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἐμψύχων καὶ ἀσεβεῖν ἔφασκον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ‘βωμὸν ἐρεύθοντας μακάρων θερμοῖσι φόνοισιν’, καὶ Ἐ. πού φησιν ‘ οὐ παύσεσθε φόνοιο δυσηχέος; οὐκ ἐσορᾶτε /ἀλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκηδείηισι νόοιο.

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of ritual sacrifice in order to clarify that the respect owed to the sacrificial victims is because animals are truly human beings that have changed their form. Accordingly, the diverse kinship relations between the victim and its executioner are not instantiations of the belief in the communion of all living beings (animals included), which share the same cosmic spirit, but are introduced for dramatic effect, in order to present the extreme, quite exceptional yet possible, case of rebirth. In other words, Empedocles’ rejection of ritual sacrifice is firmly anchored in his doctrine of rebirth. Clearly, Empedocles’ aim is to provide a paradigm that amplifies, almost exaggerates, the impious nature of ritual sacrifice, which is de facto identified with crimes of infanticide, patricide and matricide. In this respect it is worth noting that B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) recalls famous mythological crimes. For instance, the priest/father officiating the sacrifice in the opening of the Empedoclean lines is reminiscent of Tantalus killing his son Pelops, with the sacrifice itself being depicted as a feast for the gods along the lines of Tantalus’ banquet serving the flesh of his own son.175 Alternatively, the reference to the father killing his son and eating his flesh recalls the famous sage of mythical crimes related to the House of Atreus, which notoriously begins with Atreus murdering the sons of his twin brother Thyestes and feeding him their flesh.176 Additionally, the unintentional patricide177 mentioned at line 5 parallels the myth of Oedipus, victim par excellence of his own unawareness when he unknowingly killed his father and then married his mother. Furthermore, Empedocles’ reference to children who slaughter their own mother is comparable to the story of Electra and Orestes killing their mother Clytemnestra.178 It is worth noting, moreover, that Orestes’ murder is a consequence of a chain of crimes started by Agamemnon’s sacrifice of his own daughter Iphigenia; a sacrifice that is also murder.179 In this respect, it could be argued that Lucretius’ above-mentioned narration of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia as the exemplification of the madness of 175 176 177 178

179

Pind. O. 1.46–51 rejects this version of the myth. See moreover Ovid. Met. 6.406. It is worth noting that Ovid Met. 15.462 explicitly refers to this episode in the context of Pythagoras’ prohibition of animal sacrifice, which is full of Empedoclean echoes: see Hardie (1995: 209). For patricide as the most terrible crime, see Ar. Nub. 1325–34, Ran. 273–74, Av. 1337–73, Lys. 10.8. In this regard, it is worth noting that ἀπορραίσαντε is a dual form which could be an allusion to Clytemnestra’s two children, although the use of the dual for the plural occasionally recurs in the epic tradition. DRN 1.84–101. Aeschylus’ Oresteia, which was probably staged around 458 BCE, shows the remarkable fame that this mythical saga enjoyed in Empedocles’ time. Aeschylus’ account of Agamemnon’s sacrifice of Iphigenia is performed by the chorus at Ag. 218–47.

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traditional religio did not merely recall the notion of impious sacrifices depicted by Empedocles, but even spells out an episode related to them, which was already evoked by Empedocles’ own verses.

2.7 Invocation to the Gods and the Muse Having argued for a very appropriate reference to the human madness mentioned in B 3.1, namely the madness of those who practise ritual sacrifice, we have thereby also established a link to our next fragment, B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most), which runs as follows: ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης, ἐκ δ᾽ ὁσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγήν· καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα, ἄντομαι· ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν, πέμπε παρ᾽ Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ᾽ εὐήνιον ἅρμα. μηδέ σέ γ᾽ εὐδόξοιο βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς πρὸς θνητῶν ἀνελέσθαι, ἐφ᾽ ὧι θ᾽ ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν. θάρσει καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ᾽ ἄκροισι θοάζειν.180 ἀλλ᾽ ἄγ᾽ ἄθρει πάσηι παλάμηι, πῆι δῆλον ἕκαστον, μήτε τιν᾽ ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ᾽ ἀκουήν ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης, μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσηι πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι, γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ᾽ ἧι δῆλον ἕκαστον.

5

10

But turn from my tongue, o gods, the madness of those,181 and from holy lips let a pure stream flow. And you, virgin Muse, white-armed, much-desired, I entreat you: send what is right for creatures of a day to hear, driving the well-reined chariot from Piety. And do not strive to take the flowers of glory and honour from mortals, on condition that you say more than is holy. Feel confident then that you will sit on the peaks of wisdom! But now consider with every power how each thing is clear without holding any seeing as more reliable than what you hear, nor echoing ear above piercings of the tongue and do not in any way curb the reliability 180

181

Following Kingsley (1995: 367 n.24), ‘θάρσει must be understood as the verbal imperative and not made . . . into a dative’. Accordingly, I accept Diels-Kranz’s and Primavesi’s neat emendation θοάζειν (against Karsten’s proposal θοάσσεις) for θοάζει, the reading transmitted by the manuscripts. Based on the reconstruction given above, I understand the line as referring to the madness of those who participate in ritual sacrifices. However, one cannot exclude that τῶν is a neuter plural and means something like ‘the madness of those things’, namely the criminal consequences of ritual sacrifices.

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of the other limbs by which there is a passage for understanding but understand each thing in the way in which it is clear.

Through these lines Empedocles now covers the topic of the invocation to the gods and the Muse. As invocations of this sort are customary in ancient Greek poetic compositions, Empedocles thereby abides by tradition but inserts several original elements. For instance, the Muse is invoked in a conventional way, through the personal pronoun σε at the outset of line 3, a series of epithets in asyndeton and the mention of her abode at line 4. However, one of her epithets corresponds to the adjective πολυμνήστη, which in Homer is never said of the Muse, but is the common epithet applied to Penelope,182 a queen wooed by many suitors. As the adjective is an unusual epithet for the Muse, its use in Empedocles stands out and, in fact, has raised various interpretations, which range from ‘much-wooed’ (Burnet and Guthrie), recently accepted by Laks-Most, to the related ‘molto contesa’ (Bignone) and the less literal ‘vielgefeierte’ (Diels-Kranz). Moreover, the adjective has been related to the conceptual domain of μιμνήσκομαι, producing translations such as ‘memor’ (Karsten) and ‘much-remembering’ or ‘mindful’ (LSJ’s translation, putting forward the Empedoclean locus) – in this sense it is understood by Wright, who translates it as ‘of long memory’, and Inwood, who in his translation has ‘much-remembering’. On the contrary, I would contend that, although ‘memory belongs to the Muses’,183 the adjective should be understood as a plain Homeric reminiscence, which is able to evoke in the audience’s mind the whole scene of Penelope being desired by her suitors.184 This confers to the term the sense of ‘much-wooed’ or ‘much-desired’ and suggests that Empedocles is presenting himself as the lover, rather than the pupil, of the goddess. Moreover, the content of the Empedoclean prayer presents novel elements too. For instance, the first part of his request does not involve inspiration. Rather, Empedocles wishes the gods could remove the madness of those who, as I have just reconstructed, kill and eat each other by participating in ritual sacrifice. Since human unawareness has made the most atrocious forms of crimes (murder and cannibalism) the most popular and pervasive form of ritual (sacrifice), Empedocles formulates his prayer to the gods with a language that wards off the risk of contamination. At line 1 the focus is on the word μανίη, which Empedocles asks the gods to 182 183 184

See, e.g., Od. 4.770, 14.64 and 23.149. ‘La mémoire appartient aux Muses’: Bollack (1969: vol. 3, 29). Similarly, Gheerbrandt (2017: 115–20).

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remove from his tongue as if he were afraid that the sole mention of impious sacrifices could be a source of contamination. He then insists, at line 2, on the notion of purity with the gods being prayed to in order to ensure that a pure stream (καθαρὴν . . . πηγήν) could flow from his holy lips (ἐκ δ᾽ ὁσίων στομάτων). Similarly, at lines 3–4, the Muse is asked to send what is right for ordinary humans to hear, by driving her chariot from Piety. It is worth noting that, although in traditional invocations it is conventional to refer to the Muse’s abode, the identification of this with Εὐσεβίη is very unusual. The notion of εὐσεβία or εὐσέβεια expresses the sentiment of reverence and respect that is owed to the gods. The fact that the chariot of the Muse, a famous metaphor indicating poetry,185 will proceed from Εὐσεβίη means that Empedocles’ philosophy aims at presenting itself as pious and respectful of the gods. In fact, it will just reveal what people have the right to know.186 This claim narrows the field of things that humans are allowed to know and may seem to be at odds with Empedocles’ promise made elsewhere to reveal to Pausanias even a type of knowledge that belongs only to the gods, namely how to control the forces of nature (B 111 [= EMP D 43 Laks-Most]). I would contend that Empedocles’ appeal to the gods, the focus, in his invocation, on the notions of contamination and, above all, his prayer to a holy and pure poetry can be read as his strategy to endear himself to the gods after a series of what could be considered severe acts of hubris, such as his declaration of divine nature, his ability to master (and to teach how to master) the forces of nature and, finally, his rejection of sacrifice, the core of Greek εὐσεβία. In this respect, Empedocles’ prayer to the gods is his way to express his respectful tribute to tradition. However, his appeal to the Muse may seem to undermine his declaration of divine authority. Why should a god ask another god for assistance?187 I would argue that Empedocles’ invocation to the gods and the Muse abides by a literary convention and, as such, is traditional in character. However, the novel elements it presents, which have been analyzed above, aim at 185 186

187

This metaphor recalls the analogous metaphor in Parmenides DK 28 B 1.1–5 (= PARM D 4.1–5 Laks-Most), discussed above. Taken in this way, the line seems to allude to the fact that Empedocles, like the Muse, knows things humans are not allowed to know – another hint at his divine wisdom and nature in contrast to ordinary human ken. Tor (2017: 334 ff.) raises the question and engages in a thought-provoking proposal on how to reconcile Empedocles’ claim to divine wisdom and authority with his appeal to the Muse. Although I agree, for the most part, with Tor’s idea of demonic wisdom, I attempt here to suggest a different approach to the issue.

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redefining the relationship between the poet and his Muse. These elements find significant analogies with the poetic strategy put forward by lyric poets of the sixth and fifth century BCE. In fact, the traditional notion of the poet as an instrument of divine song had developed around the fifth century BCE into new images presenting the poet boasting of his own authority and expertise surpassing ordinary human knowledge. As A. Morrison suggests,188 this development can be observed alongside a chronological line from Homer to Hellenistic poetry. Whereas in epic poetry, both Homeric and Hesiodic, the narrator is explicitly subordinated to the Muse,189 the poems of later lyric poets, like Solon, Theognis and Anacreon, show that the narrator is rarely portrayed as dependent on the Muses when the subject matter is non-mythic.190 In parallel, lyric poets drew growing attention to the role of the narrator in composing the song. For instance, Simonides characterized his Muse as his ἐπίκουρος, and portrayed the poem he is composing as their joint enterprise.191 This tendency is emphasized by Pindar’s general strategy of remarking upon the importance of the narrator over the Muse and focusing on the poet’s personal abilities over his reliance on divine aid. Indeed, Pindar often represents himself riding in the chariot of the Muse;192 yet, in his poems we sometimes find a reformulation of this image according to which Pindar himself leads the chariot while the Muse stands beside his hetairos, merely encouraging him.193 To give one example, in the opening to the third Olympian Ode, the Muse is said to stand by the poet, but it is Pindar who ‘found a newly shining way to join to Dorian measure a voice of splendid celebration (l. 4)’. In this respect, it is noteworthy that Pindar constructs a further variation of the image of the chariot of poetry when depicting the Muse driving the chariot but following Pindar’s instructions on where to drive it.194 The comparison with the lyric poets and, especially, with Pindar shows that in the fifth century BCE the invocation to the Muse had developed from a traditional source of wisdom to a conventional homage to

188 192 193 194

Morrison (2007: 73–90). 189 Ibid. 73. 190 Ibid. 78–80. 191 Ibid. 83. E.g., O. 9.81, I. 5.38 and I. 8.61. P. 4.247–48: Pindar holds the rein of the chariot. In O. 6.22–24, the Muse yokes the mules while the chariot is driven by both the Muse and Pindar (‘we may drive the chariot’). See also P. 10.64–65. I. 5.38, P. 10.58–59, I. 6.57–58 and P. 11.41–42. See Mackie (2003: 66–67 with n.69): ‘the poet’s control over memory – the Muses – is also expressed when he represents himself in the role of Apollo, “leading” a chorus of Muses (N. 9.1; O. 11.16–19). In a similar way, the Graces are sometimes represented accompanying the poet on his journey to the victor’s homeland (P. 9.1–4; N. 9.53–54; I. 5. 21)’.

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tradition. More specifically, a poet still recurs to the goddesses, who were traditionally taken as the source of poetry, but does not simultaneously renounce a claim on personal wisdom and authority in their poetic composition. In Pindar, the standard representation of a poet being subordinated to the divine aid is rare, while we more frequently find statements of his importance over the Muse. Even in those representations where the relationship between poet and gods is unequal, the Muse is portrayed in a way that in Greek ‘indicates impatience, familiarity or lack of reserve and demonstrates that the poet is treating the Muses as “his own familiar friends”’.195 This is an indication that the Muses have long lost their traditional role as the source of wisdom in favour of the poet’s own authority on the song. Close familiarity and lack of reticence are also particularly prominent in Empedocles’ own prayer to the Muse. Above all, the way in which Empedocles characterizes the Muse as πολυμνήστη, ‘muchdesired’, indicates his intention to redefine the relationship between the poet and his Muse: Empedocles is no longer her pupil but rather her suitor.196 Moreover, by asking the Muse to send what is right for mortals to hear and to drive ‘the well-reined chariot from Piety’, Empedocles instructs the Muse where she is to drive the chariot of poetry from. Along with Pindar’s similar instructions to his Muse, this can be taken as a signal of the importance of the poet over the god when narrating the song. An analogous strategy can also be observed in Empedocles’ second invocation to the Muse in B 131 (= EMP D 7 Laks-Most),197 which runs as follows: εἰ γὰρ ἐφημερίων ἕνεκέν τινος, ἄμβροτε Μοῦσα, ἡμετέρας μελέτας διὰ φροντίδος ἐλθεῖν, εὐχομένωι νῦν αὖτε παρίστασο, Καλλιόπεια, ἀμφὶ θεῶν μακάρων ἀγαθὸν λόγον ἀμφαίνοντι. If ever for the sake of any creature of a day, immortal Muse, it has pleased you to let our concerns pass through your thought now again, as I pray, stand by me, Calliopeia as I reveal a good account of the blessed gods.

195 196 197

See above all N. 3 in the interpretation by Morrison (2007: 85). See Willi (2008: 232): ‘He (Empedocles) claims the teaching authority (Lehrautorität) for himself and is a suitor not a student of the Muse.’ Quoted by Hipp. Ref. 7.30.4. For the collocation of this fragment within the physical poem see Chapter 1.3.2 n.46.

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Besides the construction of this invocation around traditional elements,198 it is worth noting that, similarly to Empedocles’ first appeal to the Muse in B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most), here Calliope is asked to stand by the poet, while he reveals a valid account of the gods. As for Pindar, also for Empedocles ‘we may say that it is the poet who issues the commands to the Muse and not vice versa’.199 Additionally, the mention of mortals at the outset of B 131 (= EMP D 7 Laks-Most) (ἐφημερίων at l. 1) and the indication in B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most) of the things that are right for them to hear (ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν at l. 4) invites the reading that Empedocles, like Pindar, asks the Muse for neither wisdom nor expertise, but rather requests the appropriate means ‘to make possible the full expression of his own expertise’.200 Returning to the analysis of B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most), the reference of the pronoun σε at line 6 is debated. It can refer to the Muse in parallel with καὶ σέ . . . Μοῦσα at line 3, or it can refer to Pausanias, in line with Empedocles’ appeal to the disciple from line 9 onwards. On the one hand, a reference to the Muse avoids a sudden change of addressee.201 Moreover, Empedocles’ recommendations about what should or should not be said to avoid uttering more than is holy seems out of place with reference to Pausanias: the disciple is the recipient of the revelation, not its source. Additionally, Empedocles’ concerns about saying just what is holy parallels his previous request to the Muse that she should send words people are allowed to hear. On the other hand, Empedocles’ instructions in order not to pursue bold complacency or mere glory from human beings may seem inappropriate if referred to the Muse, the traditional source of poetic wisdom. Commonly, the Muses receive honour and glory from humans, and above all from poets, without striving to obtain them. Yet, as we have just seen, Empedocles’ prayer to the gods and the Muse diverges from traditional, epic patterns to divine invocations. Therefore, as the comparison with Pindar suggests, we cannot exclude that, at lines 6–8, 198

199 201

For instance, the phrase ‘if ever in the past . . . comes now’ is a common way to appeal to the Muse and resembles for instance Sappho’s famous Ode of Aphrodite fr. 1.5–7. See Wright (1995: 159) and already Lloyd-Jones (1963: 83–84). Mackie (2003: 66–67). 200 Morrison (2007: 85); my emphasis. The sudden change of addressee can be explained with Lucretius DRN 1.50, where the poet, who has been addressing Venus thus far, suddenly turns to Memmius in a way that is comparable to that of Empedocles in these lines. Lucretius’ passage suggests that there is no need to postulate a lacuna intervening between lines 5 and 6 as, for example, Wright (1995) suggested. Recently, MansfeldPrimavesi (2021: 442 [F 43]) print the fragment with line spaces between 2–3 and 5–6. This graphical layout suggests the possibility that some lines could have intervened there where the editors print a space.

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Empedocles is being intentionally un-traditional by issuing commands to the Muse as to what she should or should not say. In this respect, the reference to the Muse’s desire for human glory and honour as well as Empedocles’ recommendation not to say anything un-holy strongly emphasize his authority on the song and his superiority over any external aid. This is perfectly in line with his claim to divine nature and wisdom. In fact, being a god, Empedocles can portray himself as an equal, rather than a subordinate, of the Muse. Thus, as the divine leader of his own chariot of poetry, he may well indicate to the Muse, and not merely to Pausanias, how to reach ‘the peaks of wisdom’. The promise to sit on the peaks of wisdom parallels the analogous promises in B 111 (= EMP D 43 Laks-Most) to gain superhuman powers over the forces of nature and in B 2.8–9 (= EMP D 42.8–9 Laks-Most) to obtain a knowledge that no human being can reach. Yet the metaphor of the peaks of wisdom suggests more than just this. By seeing the ‘enquirer of the truth’ as gradually ascending a mountain, this image suggests the notion that wisdom is achieved at the end of a hard, ascending path, while underlying this there is the conceptualization of knowledge as a (strenuous) journey.202 Moreover, it triggers a mental representation of philosophical wisdom not merely as the conquest of the mountain’s peak, but also as the ‘aesthetic, visual thrill of an overview, encompassing the whole area below, from horizon to horizon, and seeing at a glance the way the details of the landscape below fit together in one meaningful picture’.203 Thus, being seated on the peaks of wisdom suggests the effort to comprehend, by ascending steps in the knowing process, the universe as a whole.204 By building upon the notion of ‘peaks of wisdom’ – hence upon the implied notion of knowledge as a hard process through ascending steps – throughout lines 9–13 Empedocles turns to Pausanias in order that he approaches the revelation he is about to receive in the best possible way. Specifically, these lines focus on perception as a means to obtain knowledge, as every sense organ is said to be ‘a passage for understanding’ – a further metaphor that is related to the underlying notion of knowledge as

202

203 204

For the metaphoric conceptualization of knowledge in terms of journey see Ferella (2018a). Ferella (2018b) analyzes instantiations of this particular metaphor in three pre-Socratic philosophers: Heraclitus, Parmenides and Empedocles. See also Ferella (2017). The quotation is by Holton (1995: 279–80). It is worth noting that this metaphor has a very long history, as Holton (1995: 279–80) has pointed out.

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a process and, as such, also a journey.205 Empedocles expresses the need to sharpen any sensation Pausanias has at his disposal, without preferring any in particular, in order to comprehend the nature of the physical world.206 Indeed, Pausanias is urged to improve the way in which he understands ‘each thing in the way in which it is evident’, before Empedocles can begin the exposition of his natural philosophy.

2.8

The Physical Principles

This conclusion brings us to the last section of Empedocles’ proem, which consists of the fragments I have reconstructed as Groups 5 and 6, programmatically introducing the rudiments and components of his physical system. These are, first of all, the fundamental principles of the physical world: the four elements of fire, air, water and earth, and the forces of Love and Strife. The presentation of the four elements can be read through B 6 (= EMP D 57 Laks-Most): τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε· Ζεὺς ἀργὴς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἠδ’ Ἀϊδωνεύς Νῆστίς θ’, ἣ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον. Hear first of all the four roots of all things: Zeus the gleaming, Hera who gives life, Aidoneus, and Nestis, who moistens with her tears the mortal fountain.

The four elements are called roots of all things and are personified as gods: Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis. The plant metaphor could illustrate the fact that, as we will see in Chapter 4.1 and 5.1, the four elements are, like the roots of a plant, entities enabling and sustaining the existence of everything, since they are the ingredients forming all that there is in the world. In our fragment, the association of the names of traditional gods with each element is controversial. Apart from Nestis, who is clearly associated with water (as she moistens with tears the mortal fountain), ancient sources did not agree about which element each god personifies. In fact, according to two different interpretations, Zeus corresponds to fire, whereas either Hera 205 206

B 3.9–13 (= EMP D 44.9–13 Laks-Most) will be analyzed thoroughly in Chapter 6.3.2 in relation to Empedocles’ theories of perception and knowledge acquisition. Scholars maintain that here Empedocles is articulating his refusal to choose either perception or reason to gain knowledge. See Wright (1995: 162): ‘Empedocles is picking up the Eleatic distinction between perception and reason and contradicting it.’ Similarly, Trépanier (2004: 56) argues that ‘the two fragments [B 2 = EMP D 42 Laks-Most and B 3 = EMP D 43 Laks-Most] articulate E[mpedocles]’s refusal to choose either the senses or reason, nous, to the exclusion of the other’. On Empedocles’ sense organs and their role in knowledge acquisition, see Chapter 6.3.

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corresponds to air and Aidoneus to earth (ps.-Plutarch) or, vice versa, Hera represents earth and Aidoneus air (Stobaeus). A further reading, additionally, first advanced in the nineteenth century, envisages Zeus representing the element of ether or air, Hera personifying the element of earth and Aidoneus that of fire.207 It is difficult to side with one or the other interpretation, as good arguments are put forward in support of each of them. What can be observed, however, is that Empedocles presents the roots as two pairs of male and female gods, who are traditionally married couples. As such, Nestis has been identified with Persephone,208 Aidoneus’ (or Hades’) wife. Given that Nestis personifies water, Aidoneus may well be the divine representation of fire and their being a couple could illustrate their physical contrast on a scale of opposites, with fire being bright and hot and water dark and cold, as Empedocles points out elsewhere.209 On the same standard, the couple of Zeus and Hera may represent heaven and earth210 as a pair of cosmic opposites and, in Empedocles’ system, they stay for the opposing principles of air/ether and earth (taking heaven as the cosmic instantiation of the element of air/ether). This agrees with the traditional representation of Zeus211 and also fits the adjective φερέσβιος, ‘life-bearing’ or ‘life-giving’, which in Empedocles characterizes Hera, but is traditionally attributed to γαῖα.212 After having introduced the four roots of everything, Empedocles also presented the other two major principles of his cosmic system: the opposite forces of Love and Strife (B 16 [= EMP D 63 Laks-Most]): ἧι γὰρ καὶ πάρος ἔσκε(?), καὶ ἔσσεται, οὐδέ ποτ’, οἴω, τούτων ἀμφοτέρων κενεώσεται ἄσπετος αἰών. For certainly, they [scil. Love or Strife] were before and will be, and never, I suppose, will the innumerable length of time be empty of these two.

207

This interpretation was first given by Knatz (1891: 2), who was followed by Burnet (1930: 229 n.3), Thiele (1897: 97) and Bodrero (1904: 78–92). More recently it has been advocated by Kingsley (1995: part 1). 208 See Kingsley (1995: 348–56) and Picot (2008). 209 In B 21.3 (= EMP D 77a.3 Laks-Most), sun/fire is defined as bright and hot (λευκὸν ὁρᾶν καὶ θερμὸν ἁπάντηι), whereas in B 21.5 (= EMP D 77a.5 Laks-Most) rain/water is said to be dark and cold (ὄμβρον δ’ ἐν πᾶσι δνοφόεντά τε ῥιγαλέον τε). For an analogous opposition between fire and water, see the Hippocratic treatise On Regimen 3.1–4 where fire is said to be hot and dry whereas water has the cold and wet. 210 For the identification of Hera with a regional earth goddess whose myth and cult transform over time and among diverse places, see the comprehensive study by J. V. O’Brien (1993). 211 See above all Kingsley (1995: part 1). 212 See Hymn. in Ap. 341; Hes. Th. 693.

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By saying that they are, as they were before and will be in the future, Empedocles makes Love and Strife eternal.213 As B. Inwood has pointed out, ‘Strife and Love seem to differ from the other elements in that at least part of each stays pure, totally unmixed, throughout the eternity of history. That alone would justify their special status.’214 Additionally, Inwood correctly indicates aspects in Empedocles’ depiction of Love and Strife that are meant to illustrate them as antipodal principles: on the one hand, Love is usually associated with mixture, whereas Strife is an agent of division; on the other hand, Love is always portrayed as feminine, whereas Strife is either masculine or neuter.215 Whereas Love and Strife and the characteristic antinomy between them will be investigated more thoroughly in Chapter 4.2, for now another element can be added; namely, the fact that Empedocles consistently associates Love with the positive principle and Strife with the negative force.

2.9 A Central Tenet of the Physical System After having programmatically introduced the principles of the physical world – the four elements and the two forces of Love and Strife – Empedocles likely wanted to premise his cosmological exposition with one of the central tenets of his physical system; that is, his rejection of the common notions of birth and death on the basis that every existing thing in the world is formed by mixture of the four elements and is destroyed by their separation. Empedocles embarks on such a theme through fragments B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most), B 12 (= EMP D 48 LaksMost), B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most), B 11 (= EMP D 51 Laks-Most) and B 15 (= EMP D 52 Laks-Most). Let us begin our analysis with B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most) and B 12 (= EMP D 48 Laks-Most), which run as follows: ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω· φύσις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἁπάντων θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτοιο τελευτή, ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων ἔστι, φύσις δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν. 213

214 215

(B 8 [= EMP D 53 Laks-Most])

It has been noted, from Hippolytus onwards, that whereas Empedocles makes Love and Strife eternal qua ingenerated and immortal, the four elements, despite their divine status and their being fundamental entities of the universe, undergo birth and death. On the eternal nature of Love and Strife, above all in contrast to the changeable nature of the elements and their compounds, see Chapter 4.2. Inwood (2001: 30). Ibid. On the contrasting depiction of Love and Strife, see Chapter 4.2; for its function in the cycle, see Chapter 7.3.

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The Proem to On Nature I will tell you something else: of mortal beings, none has birth, nor any end in wretched death, but there are only mixing and exchange of mixed things, ‘birth’ is the name given to these by humans. ἔκ τε γὰρ οὐδάμ’ ἐόντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι τό τ’ ἐὸν ἐξαπολέσθαι ἀνήνυστον καὶ ἄπυστον· αἰεὶ γὰρ τῇ γ’ ἔσται ὅπῃ κέ τις αἰὲν ἐρείδῃ.

(B 12 [= EMP D 48 Laks-Most])

For from what is not at all, it is impossible that something comes about, and that what is be completely destroyed is unfeasible and unheard of. For, wherever one presses each time, each time it will be there.

B 8.1–2 (= EMP D 53.1–2 Laks-Most) clearly states that no mortal beings have ever experienced birth and death. What this apparently peculiar claim really means is clarified in the ensuing two lines: birth and death are rejected because the real nature of these phenomena lies in the fact that they are produced by ‘mixing and exchange of mixed things’. Thus, what people call ‘birth’ is in truth this constant process of mixing and exchange. B 12 (= EMP D 48 Laks-Most) elaborates on the concept of Empedocles’ rejection of birth and death. The initial claim, according to which it is impossible that something comes about from what is not at all, sheds some light on the fact the ordinary notions of birth and death are rejected because they imply generation ex nihilo. In this respect, B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most) and B 11 (= EMP D 51 LaksMost) are even clearer: οἱ δ’ ὅτε μὲν κατὰ φῶτα μιγέντ’ εἰς αἰθέρ’ ἵ216 ἢ κατὰ θηρῶν ἀγροτέρων γένος ἢ κατὰ θάμνων ἠὲ κατ᾽ οἰωνῶν, τό γε μὲν 217 γενέσθαι. εὖτε δ᾽ ἀποκρινθῶσι, τὸ δ᾽ αὖ δυσδαίμονα πότμον. ἣ θέμις καλέουσι· νόμωι δ᾽ ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός.

(B 9 [= EMP D 54 Laks-Most])

And when (the elements?) come to ether mixed in the form of a human being or as the race of wild animals, or of plants or of birds, this they call ‘coming to be’. And when they are separated, this again [they call] ‘miserable fate’. They do not name them rightly, but I myself assent to their convention. 216 217

The phrase μιγέντ’ εἰς αἰθέρ’ ἵ is Diels’s emendation of the version μιγὲν φῶς αἰθέρι (plus a lacuna of six to eight letters) transmitted by the manuscripts. τό γε μὲν is Primavesi’s emendation while the indirect tradition has τότε μὲν τὸν and a lacuna of seven or eight letters.

2.9 A Central Tenet of the Physical System νήπιοι· οὐ γάρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι, οἳ δὴ γίγνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν ἤ τι καταθνήισκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἁπάντηι.

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(B 11 [= EMP D 51 Laks-Most])

Fools – for their solicitudes are not far-reaching thoughts – are those who expected that what formerly is not comes into being or that something dies and is utterly destroyed.

In these two sets of verses Empedocles clarifies that people call ‘birth’ the phenomenon of the coming into being of a human being, an animal or a plant, in the conviction that they formerly were not. In parallel, what they call ‘death’ is what appears to be an utter disappearance of these mortal forms. However, Empedocles explains that nothing arises from what was previously nothing or disappears completely. For this reason, the real nature of the phenomena of birth and death is connected, respectively, with the notion of ‘mixture’ (μιγέν at B 9.1 [= EMP D 54.1 Laks-Most]) and ‘separation’ (ἀποκρινθῶσι at B 9.4 [= EMP D 54.4 Laks-Most]) of pre-existing materials. In B 11 (= EMP D 51 Laks-Most) Empedocles reiterates the idea expressed in B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most) by calling ‘fools’, νήπιοι, those who, having thoughts that do not reach far (οὐ γάρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι) ‘expected that what formerly did not exist comes into existence, or that something dies and is utterly destroyed’. It is worth noting that the idea of having thoughts that do not reach far links to fragment B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most), analyzed above, in which humans are depicted as short-lived and swift-dying and, for this reason, not able to know the whole.218 Thus, traditional notions of birth and death are misleading as they derive from human’s erroneous understanding of phenomena. To ordinary people, who do not have far-reaching thoughts and know just what they happen to encounter in a brief lifetime, birth and death coincide, as B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most) clarifies, with the phenomenal appearance of a certain being that previously was not and with its utter disappearance. This is just a superficial understanding of phenomena, however, while the coming into being of a new form of a living being is the result of complex processes involving

218

The verbal parallelisms among these lines and the verses of B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most) are noteworthy: the expression δολιχόφρονες . . . μέριμναι in B 11.1 (= EMP D 51.1 Laks-Most), recalls people’s dull thoughts, ἀμβλύνουσι μέριμνας, in B 2.2 (= EMP D 42.2 Laks-Most).

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mixtures, separations and exchanges of mixed things.219 It follows that an unambiguous comprehension of the concepts of ‘coming to be’ and ‘perishing’ implicate seeing them as material processes involving pre-existent elements – the four elements, as Empedocles will explain in the course of his poem – that persist once they are separated again.220 It is worth noting that, whereas on a physical standard every existing thing in the world can be described as a compound of elements, including inorganic and inanimate things, B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most) and B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most) specifically focus on the impossibility of coming to be and perishing of living beings: θνητά in B 8.2 (= EMP D 53.2 Laks-Most) is clarified in B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most) as human beings, all kinds of animals and plants. This suggests Empedocles developed his physical tenet with his more religious belief in rebirth in mind, which professes that no living being utterly perishes but continues a disembodied existence before being reborn as another form of mortal. In parallel, rebirth also entails that every living being that comes to be already had a certain form of pre-existence.221 This reconstruction gains force if we consider that Plutarch adds to B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most) and B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most) the quotation of B 15 (= EMP D 52 Laks-Most),222 which runs as follows: οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιτο, ὡς ὄφρα μέν τε βιῶσι, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι, τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἰσίν, καί σφιν πάρα δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά, πρὶν δὲ πάγεν τε βροτοὶ καὶ λύθεν, οὐδὲν ἄρ’ εἰσίν. A wise person would not surmise such things in his mind: that so long as they live what they call a life, for so long they are, and good and evil things befall them, but before they are formed as mortals and once they are dissolved, they are nothing.

According to Plutarch, just like B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most) and B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most), this fragment represents Empedocles’ claim that there is something of the individual that pre-exists the birth and endures the death of the body. As Plutarch puts it, ‘those who are not born, and the already dead, are in some way’.223 What these lines add to the information 219 220 221 223

On the meaning of διάλλαξις in Empedocles, see Palmer (2009: 287) and my discussion in Chapter 5.1. On this set of fragments and the relationship between the central tenet of Empedocles’ physics and his doctrine of rebirth, see Chapter 5.1. This point was already made by Palmer (2009: e.g., 261–62). 222 Adv. Col. 12.1113c–d. Transl. Wright (1995: 269). The emphasis is by Wright.

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already collected from the previous fragments is that what pre-exists birth and endures beyond death is subjected, beyond the life of the body, to suffer and rejoice. Indeed, a wise person knows that there is individual existence and evil and good things that come with it, both before and after the life of the body. To put it another way, Empedocles connects the notion of individual existence before the birth and after the death of the body with his physical theory of mortals being formed by combinations of prior material, and for this reason Plutarch quotes B 15 (= EMP D 52 LaksMost) together with B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most) and B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most). However, B 15 (= EMP D 52 Laks-Most) differs from the other two fragments in that it does not focus on the basic, elemental composition of any living form. Rather, the mention of the good and evil things that befall individuals before and after their life as mortals leaves no doubt that Empedocles is here referring to the more religious belief in disembodied existence. As we will see more extensively in Chapter 5.1, this conclusion invites the reading that the physical principle governing all areas of the universe (the four elements mixing and separating to form every existing entity) is presented precisely with the aim to explain that living beings and, above all, human beings do not ever come to be and perish altogether but join a form of individual existence beyond the body – a notion that is tightly linked to Empedocles’ belief in rebirth.

2.10 Conclusions Empedocles’ On Nature opens with an oracle of Necessity and an ancient and eternal decree of the gods, sealed by broad oaths. This establishes that, whenever a god commits a crime of slaughter and/or perjury, it will be punished through exile on earth and rebirths as all kinds of mortal beings. We are told that Empedocles is one of these gods and, because of his trust in Strife, has been compelled to wander as an exile in our world and to work through rebirths. In fact, he was already a bush, bird, fish, girl and boy, before taking his current form. Then, in the footsteps of legendary and semi-legendary wisdom-heroes and sages, such as Orpheus, Epimenides and, above all, Pythagoras, Empedocles narrates the most extraordinary leg of his journey of exile: his katabasis to the underworld. Being guided into the realm of the dead by his δαίμων ψυχοπομπός Pythagoras, who had entered (and exited) Hades while alive, Empedocles acquired exceptional knowledge of the fate of the dead. In particular, he experienced their judgement, the punishment or reward that followed that judgement and their ‘dressing’ with a new body.

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As has been shown, Empedocles’ narration of his katabasis in the opening to the physical poem has the purpose of authorial validation on matters beyond ordinary human knowledge. As the proems to Hesiod’s Theogony and Parmenides’ poem show, the practice of self-legitimation has a well-attested tradition in epic-didactic poems. Thereby, authors could claim that the source of their wisdom is divine and their poetry, consequently, true. Moreover, katabaseis were a recognized way to obtain the truth and belong to a traditional motif accounting for the sage’s divine wisdom. Indeed, journeys to the underworld are straightforwardly connected with access to an extraordinary knowledge. Clearly, Empedocles was recalling a well-attested wisdom tradition, while blatantly imitating his master Pythagoras, when he depicts himself as a sage who went in and out of Hades, indeed as a god who was born many times and has knowledge otherwise concealed from ordinary mortals. After the narration of his katabasis, in the rest of his prologue to On Nature, Empedocles continues intertwining his religious concerns on rebirth with his physical theories. Thus, after his dedication to Pausanias and the promise of divine knowledge at the end of his training, Empedocles lingers on depicting the miserable inanity of ordinary human beings. In contrast to Pausanias, they are unable to genuinely know and, for this reason, they have only a partial understanding of the physical world and of their own destiny. Indeed, being unaware of the process of rebirth that befalls all living beings, they participate in ritual sacrifice, making themselves responsible for the most terrible crimes. In contrast, Empedocles proposes a new world order, which is intended to provide such an explanation of individual existence that, taking into account the notion of rebirth, goes beyond the conventional concepts of life and death. The traditional concepts of life and death are in fact discredited through a twofold argument. In addition to (and in line with) the pre-Socratic axiom of nihil ex nihilo fit, according to which everything is to be traced back to more basic constituents, Empedocles also argues that there is something of the individual that precedes birth and endures after the death of the body; in other words, there is life beyond the body. From this perspective, we can appreciate the way in which Empedocles urges us to consider the physical principles governing the coming into being and ending of all things in light of his doctrine of rebirth. Most significantly, we have seen the ways in which Empedocles’ religious concerns on rebirth programmatically inform the whole proemial section, from the ‘mythical’ narration of his katabasis and his rejection of ritual sacrifice to the rudiments of his physics with the refusal of birth and

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death and the notion of mixtures and separations of elements. The constant reference to the concept of rebirth in the introductory verses of On Nature suggests that this is not just one of the many themes touched upon in Empedocles’ philosophy; rather it is central to his physical system. This conclusion has crucial implications for the comprehension of Empedocles’ thought as a whole: knowledge of natural philosophy is not an end in itself; rather, a deep knowledge of the physical system will provide Pausanias with not merely understanding of, but also control over, the forces of nature. In other words, Empedocles’ On Nature teaches the way to escape mortal nature and become divine. Against this background, my main task in the following chapters will be to explore the interplay between religious concerns about rebirth and physical principles that the new proemial text established here has so manifestly introduced.

chapter 3

Daimones between Plato and Pythagoras

The focus of Chapters 1 and 2 has been on the textual restoration of the proem to Empedocles’ On Nature; that is, on what fragments go where and the ways their topics intertwine. My proposal restores a long opening section, in which verses and themes dealing with fault, punishment, and, above all, rebirth are programmatically interwoven with more strictly physical fragments. To expand on this outcome, the next two chapters will focus on an exploration and clarification of pivotal concepts, mostly introduced by the proemial fragments, which are vehicles of important meanings both with reference to Empedocles’ notion of godhood and, related to this, with his concept of rebirth. This investigation aims to provide the linguistic and conceptual instruments in order to work out a reconciliation between the details of Empedocles’ belief in rebirth and the principles and theories of his physics, thereby demonstrating that the former is a positive doctrine within his wider, unified philosophical system. As an essential premise and at the same time a step towards assessing the significance of Empedocles’ doctrinal unity, which will be explored in greater depth in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the present chapter zooms in on the concept of δαίμων (daimon) introduced in B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost). The consideration of the notion of δαίμων offered here is made through a careful analysis of the demonological fragments, and thus focuses on the story of the guilty and exiled gods that work through rebirths and to whom Empedocles claims to belong. A major issue concerning the demonological fragments – and one of the central questions of the present chapter – is the role the story of the guilty δαίμων plays in Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth. Specifically, it is generally agreed that B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and all other fragments related to it are somewhat of an aetiological myth that underpins Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth. On this reading, the doctrine of rebirth is thought just to concern the δαίμων as its proper agent, while the story of Empedocles is taken as exemplary of the fate of every human 138

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being: like Empedocles, we all are ‘fallen’ δαίμονες, working through rebirths. A direct implication of this interpretation is the view that δαίμων in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) is a term to describe the individual person or soul. However, as the first two chapters have demonstrated, the story of Empedocles’ fault, exile and rebirths is ultimately a declaration of his divine epiphany and therewith his claim to authorial legitimation on matters beyond ordinary human ken; in other words, Empedocles offers his own godhood as evidence of his superiority over ordinary humans. Against this background, this chapter will first discuss and challenge the standard reading that Empedocles’ story is exemplary of the fate of all people or is in any other way foundational to his doctrine of rebirth. Second, it shall explore the concept of δαίμων in Greek narratives associated with the belief in rebirth, such as in Plato’s myths about the soul’s journeys to the afterlife and in Pythagoras’ demonology. Before delving into the main subject of this chapter, however, in Section 3.1 an important background issue will be addressed, which must be clarified if we are to rehabilitate Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth as a positive doctrine within his philosophical system. The issue concerns the way in which the structural correspondences displayed by the demonic and the cosmic cycle are to be explained. In this regard, I will first look at previous scholarship on this issue, before arguing that the correspondences provide evidence of an analogical relationship between macrocosm and microcosm. With this established, in Section 3.2 I will move on to discuss and reject the standard interpretation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). First, I will consider and reject the reading that by calling himself a δαίμων Empedocles speaks on behalf of his soul as the true agent of exile and rebirths. Although this reading can be traced back to Plutarch, it will be demonstrated that in pre-Empedoclean literature the term δαίμων never occurs with the meaning of soul; in particular, in Empedocles’ literary models, such as Homer and Hesiod, as well as in Parmenides, δαίμων is a synonymous term for θεός. Second, Plutarch demonstrably binds Empedocles’ verses to his own purposes, while his interpretation of δαίμων in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) as the personal ψυχή (psyche) of every individual is heavily influenced by Plato’s myths on the soul’s wanderings in the afterlife. Having rejected as anachronistic the standard reading according to which B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) founds Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth, in Section 3.3 I will examine the Platonic myths in order to gather

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elements for a more comprehensive definition of the traditional concept of δαίμων that Empedocles may have had in mind when composing the story narrated in the demonological fragments. On the one hand, the extended discussion on the Platonic dialogues will show that Plato works on a notion of δαίμονες (daimones) which is greatly indebted to tradition, depicting them as gods who are guides and protectors of the individual in this life and beyond. On the other hand, I will argue that the ancient Platonizing reading of Empedocles comparing, and even equating, δαίμων with ψυχή owes much to some fundamentally Platonic speculations on human personal responsibility in this life and beyond. My standpoint is, specifically, that such speculations underlie the development of the notion of δαίμων in terms of divine guidance within the person, which then led to assimilation with the notion of ψυχή. After the discussion of Plato’s texts, in Section 3.4 I will return to a relevant source for Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth, Pythagoras, and focus on the Pythagorean notion of δαίμων and its role within the doctrine of rebirth. Thereby, I will consider and reject the claim, first made by M. Detienne in 1963, that there is an allegedly ancient notion of demonic soul (‘âme démonique’) that resonates in the earliest Pythagorean sources.1 Pace Detienne, a close analysis of those sources shows that Pythagoras has a general doctrine of rebirth, according to which a ψυχή, not a δαίμων, dwells in every living being and leaves the body at death to be reborn as other forms of mortals. On the other hand, the Pythagoreans also conceived what we may call a ‘demonology’, which gravitates around the idea of Pythagoras as a reincarnated δαίμων, linking it to their doctrine of general rebirth, but never overlapping with it. Given Pythagoras is one of the most important models of Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth, the investigation pursued in this section will bring us to a position where we can finally re-evaluate the notion and function of Empedocles’ δαίμονες in the wider context of his concept of rebirth. Thus, in Section 3.5, the argument will be set out that Empedocles’ demonology (that is, his story of reincarnated deity) coexists (and implies) but does not overlap with his doctrine of rebirth. In fact, whereas Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth presupposes that every living being is eo ipso a reincarnated being, only a few extraordinary individuals are reincarnated gods. Moreover, it will be shown that by exploiting the Hesiodic specification of δαίμων as a protector and guiding god, while drawing on the Pythagorean belief in guiding δαίμονες that may enter the cycle of 1

See e.g., p. 23.

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rebirths, Empedocles aims to portray himself as a δαίμων φύλαξ (daimon phylax) who watches over and guides individuals during their journey in this world and beyond. In Section 3.6, given for the sake of completeness, I address the issue of what has been interpreted as an alternative use of δαίμων in fragment B 59 (= EMP D 149 Laks-Most). Despite some of the most notorious readings of this fragment, it will be argued that there is no tension between the meaning of δαίμων in the zoogonic context of B 59 (= EMP D 149 LaksMost) and the occurrence in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). Showing that the notion of δαίμων is a chiefly predicative notion, it will be argued that, in both occurrences, it is still intimately connected to the traditional, Homeric sense of ‘god’. The chapter then closes with a summary of my investigation into the notion of δαίμων in Greek authors attesting beliefs in rebirth. Here I conclude that those authors who came after Empedocles, from Plato through to Xenocrates and on to Plutarch, have offered a reading of his concept skewed to their own ends, a reading that has often uncritically been followed by most of Empedocles’ modern interpreters. In turn, Empedocles offered his own version of Pythagoras’ doctrine, using it for his own ends in the proem to On Nature, asserting his authorial weight as a δαίμων φύλαξ, but also employing it in a way that fitted his doctrine of rebirth.

3.1 The Cycle of the daimon within the Cosmic Cycle As I have argued in Chapters 1 and 2, B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and the other demonological fragments related to it recount the story of Empedocles as a god at fault for some crimes and, for this reason, banished from the divine community and compelled to wander for a very long time through the realm of the dead and in this world, where he works through rebirths. Evaluated on a more general level, the story of the guilty and exiled gods can be reconstructed as a cycle. From a blissful abode and condition, guilty gods ‘fall’ into this world and work for a certain time through rebirths until, being finally released by the chain of punishment, they return to their original, blissful abode. Because of its structure, the cycle of the δαίμων (also called the demonic or daimonic cycle) has often been compared to the cosmic cycle, in which the elements, previously within the perfect unity of the Sphairos, are then separated to form the world until they are then restored again in the Sphairos. The comparison of the two cycles has ensured that scholars,

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since an influential contribution by F. M. Cornford in 1926, have highlighted striking correspondences between the ‘fall’, rebirths and release of the δαίμων and the way in which the elements work in the cosmic cycle. Moreover, the investigation of these correspondences has given rise to a series of conjectures about Empedocles’ conception of the relationship between rebirth and physics, which ended up depriving the former of its status of positive doctrine in his physics. Therefore, in order for Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth to be fully rehabilitated within his physical system, it is important to first address the question of the relationship between the cosmic cycle and the demonic cycle, as it affects the role that the concept of rebirth played in Empedocles’ philosophy. For instance, Cornford saw the demonic and cosmic cycles as counterparts of one and the same doctrine, which according to his reading can be accounted for from a mythical and a physical perspective.2 Although scholars have gradually abandoned Cornford’s neat parallelism in favour of an interpretation of the analogies between the two cycles in a loose unity, their readings have nonetheless ensured, despite slight interpretative nuances, that Empedocles’ story of the guilty gods and, more importantly, his concept of rebirth were not considered part of an effective theoretical teaching but were relegated to a level of mere mythical and metaphorical exposition.3 Looking more closely at Cornford’s pioneering study, we see that, by attempting to interpret Empedocles’ religious doctrines and physical theories into a unitary system of thought, he showed that the analogies between the two cycles regard not only their general structure of loss and restoration, but also many relevant details, most importantly the reciprocal exchange of powers between Love and Strife. While this exchange shapes the recurring oscillation of One and Many in the cosmic cycle, it also influences the destiny of the gods. In fact, since the gods’ fall is at the hands of Strife, as B 115.14 (= EMP D 10.14 Laks-Most) tells us, it can be inferred that, in contrast, the release from punishment and rebirths, hence the gods’ return to the divine abode, is due to the opposite principle of Love. Following this line of thought, Cornford showed that both cycles present a state of perfect bliss linked to Love’s power: for the gods this 2

3

See e.g., the description of the Sphairos by Cornford (1926: 566): ‘Now the condition of the universe before the evolution of our world [that is, the Sphairos] is the physical counterpart of the moral condition above described [namely the original condition of gods before their guilt and exile].’ Similarly, at 567 it is said that the return of the gods (which Cornford interprets as ‘souls’) to their original divine state ‘corresponds, in the physical system’ to the return of the Sphairos. See e.g., Laks (2004 and 2005: 32–49) and Primavesi (2008b: 265–66, 2013: esp. 713–21) and Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021: 411–13).

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corresponds to a ‘primeval state of innocence’ when ‘Aphrodite held an undivided reign’.4 It consists, as Cornford argued, in ‘a golden age’ that ‘knew nothing of war or bloodshed, animal sacrifice or flesh-eating’.5 The ‘physical counterpart’6 of this state of bliss is represented by the Sphairos, which is ‘a complete mixture of the bodily elements, penetrated throughout and united by Love. Strife was excluded from the mass.’7 Second, the gods’ loss of their primeval state of innocence (which Cornford interprets as the ‘fall of man’) and hence their exile from the reign of Aphrodite was caused by a violation of the universal law of loving kindness, by bloodshed, the killing of animals and eating flesh . . . Physically, the fall of the universe from the state of complete union animated by Love is caused by the incursion of Strife, which begins to pour into the Sphere and break it up by separating the elements.8

Third, the wanderings of the gods end when they are purified and return to the community of the Blessed, which, according to Cornford, is thought to be identical or very similar to the undivided reign of Aphrodite the guilty gods had to leave in the first place. This returning to, as it were, the original state ‘corresponds, in the physical system’9 to a period in which ‘Love gains on Strife’ and ‘will end in the reign of Love and the perfect unity of the Sphere’, at which point ‘the cycle begins again’.10 However, Cornford did not restrict himself to merely highlighting points of correspondence between the two cycles; rather, he went so far as to infer that Empedocles modelled his physical cycle upon ‘the fate of soul in the wheel of birth’ as alternative versions of one and the same doctrine.11 In such a reconstruction, the two cycles can be associated not merely on the basis of an analogical relationship, but because they are thought to correspond on different levels:12 the more religious episode of the fall of the guilty gods from a previous state of bliss is taken as corresponding on the level of Empedocles’ physics to the disruption of 4 10

11 12

5 6 7 8 9 Cornford (1926: 566). Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 566–67. Ibid. 567. Ibid. It is worth noting that the transition from the work of Love to the work of Strife is sealed, both in the case of the reincarnated gods and in the cosmic cycle, by broad oath(s). See B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and B 30 (= EMP D 94 Laks-Most). Simplicius Phys. 1183.21–1184.18 connects the broad oaths of B 115 with the oath of B 30 (= EMP D 94 Laks-Most), on which see my discussion in Chapter 1.3.3. At p. 569, Cornford calls Empedocles’ blend of portions of Love within the Sphairos as ‘the physical transcript of the spiritual reunion of the soul within god’ (my emphasis). It is worth noting that Cornford works under the assumption that demonic and cosmic cycles, albeit similar, belong to distinct areas of thought and poems. This assumption was so ingrained in the first half of the 20th century that it is never really challenged by Cornford, although he is relatively innovative in showing how the two areas of thought resemble each other in many ways.

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the blissful Sphairos, whereas the idea of gods expiating their guilt and purifying themselves in view of the final re-unification in the divine community is thought to correspond, on the level of Empedocles’ physics, to an increase of unification that culminates in Love’s One. Moreover, Love’s Sphairos in Empedocles’ physical system is taken to be the counterpart of the past reign of Aphrodite, which is attested in fragment B 128 (= EMP D 25 Laks-Most) and is generally reconstructed within the Purifications. However, despite the undeniable analogies between the two cycles, a neat parallel is not found in the fragments and Cornford’s interpretation gives rise to several difficulties. For instance, Kahn has pointed out that ‘neither the common hearths and feasting of the daimons nor the possibility that they may be guilty of perjury and bloodshed is compatible with the view that they are to be fused into a single Deity, as the elements seem to be fused within the cosmic Sphere’.13 Moreover, while the Sphairos regularly disappears within the cosmic alternation of One and Many, the community of the Blessed coexists with our world. As Primavesi explains, ‘the communion of the blessed ones does not seem to disappear when some of its members are sent into exile: the exiled daimon, during his wanderings, is “far away from the blessed ones”, which implies that the blessed ones are still “somewhere”’.14 Furthermore, the fault of the gods is voluntarily committed. This means that, at least in principle, it could be avoided, whereas the disruption of the Sphairos by Strife is a necessary and inevitable event, which regularly recurs in due time.15 To solve these difficulties, scholars from Kahn onwards16 have proposed to read the analogies between the two cycles in a loose unity, without imposing a systematic pattern. In this respect, one of the most recent interpretations of the echoes and structural correspondences between the two cycles has been offered by Primavesi, who restricts Empedocles’ story of the guilty gods and his talk on rebirth more generally to a purely mythical level of expression. Primavesi argues that, if taken as a positive doctrine, the story of the guilty god and the account on rebirth imply a kind of personal continuity through several rebirths that ‘cannot easily be 13 15

16

Kahn (1960: 25–26). 14 Primavesi (2006a: 65). As Laks (2005: 272) pointed out, ‘whereas the cosmic cycle is regulated by an absolute necessity, a necessity no matter what, the demonic cycle is regulated by a hypothetical necessity of the form: whenever . . . then . . .’. See also Ibid. 273 where Laks argues that for the story of the guilty gods, ‘there is, at least in principle, a possibility of avoiding the punishment’. Kahn (1960: 25). See the last version of this reading in Primavesi (2013: 674 and esp. 717–21) and Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021: 411–13).

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accounted for in terms of Empedocles’ physical theory, according to which living beings are just temporary compounds of the four elements’, and thus, he argues, ‘it seems more prudent not to press the concept of reincarnation into a physical system that is obviously not suited to accommodate it’.17 In contrast to Primavesi’s interpretation, however, Chapters 1 and 2 have already demonstrated that Empedocles’ physical poem is a very suitable place for Empedocles’ guilty gods and their rebirths, and, consequently, so too is his physical system, as I will show in the rest of this book.18 As for the structural correspondences between the demonic and cosmic cycles, the alternative explanation to Cornford’s, Kahn’s and Primavesi’s hypotheses assumes the vicissitudes of the guilty and exiled gods are to be interpreted as occurring within the events of the universe and thus the cycle(s) of the gods take(s) part, as does everything else, within the cosmic cycle.19 On this reading, B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) describes the ‘fall’ and rebirths of divine beings inhabiting our cosmos (and thus partaking in the regular turns of the cosmic cycle) who, at some point in their lives, trust in Strife, commit a crime and are therefore exiled from the blissful community of the gods. However, as B. Inwood has pointed out, we still need to decide whether B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) is a description of the original exile of a god – that is, the first incarnation of a δαίμων in the cosmic cycle – or whether it describes events within the ‘life span’ of the δαίμων. According to Inwood, if it is the former, ‘then the blessed ones from whom the δαίμων is exiled will be the divine elements as blended perfectly in the sphere. If the latter, then they will be long-lived gods’20 who rule in and inhabit a place far away from, and much happier than, our earth.21 According to the interpretation of the whole story of the guilty god’s exile I offered in Chapters 1 and 2, whereby the demonological fragments depict the very personal experience of Empedocles, B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) can only describe events within the lifespan of gods and, therefore, their exile from a blissful condition and abode to a state and world more under the control of Strife. As we will see more thoroughly in later chapters,22 this hypothesis agrees with Empedocles’ 17 18 19 20 22

Primavesi (2008b: 266). In particular, Chapter 5 will deal with the issue of personal continuity and proposes a reading according to which it can be accommodated with Empedocles’ physical theory. See, e.g., Inwood (2001: 58), who argues that the exile of the δαίμονες is from the Sphairos. 21 Ibid. On the origin and place of long-lived gods within the cosmic cycle, see Chapter 7.2. Above all in Chapter 4.5 and Chapter 7.2.2.

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concept of long-lived gods being born as compounds of elements just like every other living being in the cosmos.23 As integrated beings, they are subjected to the cosmic cycle and, even though they are equipped with a much longer life than any other living being, they will nonetheless succumb to the cosmic events and eventually die – in the Sphere at the latest – just like any other compounds of elements. On this reading, the structural correspondences that the demonic and the cosmic cycle display can be taken as evidence of an analogical relationship between macrocosm and microcosm. In other words, they show that portions of the cosmos that vary in size (in this case, the elements and the gods made out of them), exhibit similarities in structures and processes, indicating that the cycle of the gods abides by the same rules and powers that govern the cosmic cycle. Thus, paraphrasing a concept expressed by J. Palmer, we can say that the cycle of the gods is just ‘a manifestation of the cyclical and reciprocal changes Empedocles saw operating at both the microcosmic and macrocosmic levels’; indeed, ‘these ideas function in Empedocles’ system as fundamental principles of explanation for all manner of phenomena, from the lives of plants and animals right up to the life of the cosmos itself’.24 Above all, both cycles are a manifestation of the fact that Love and Strife work in the same way in different realms of reality. Following Palmer, in conclusion, I argue that the vicissitudes of the guilty δαίμονες should be interpreted by assuming they are integrated into the physical system, as gods are part of, and have a role in, the world we inhabit.25 As living beings of this cosmos, moreover, they have their own cycle which, just like the more common cycles of any ordinary mortal, is embraced into the wider perspective and vicissitudes of the cycle of the universe. Their cycle, in fact, follows the same laws that govern the rest of the universe and is shaped by the same forces of Love and Strife that operate similarly in other regions of the physical system. According to my line of interpretation, therefore, the story of the guilty gods is not merely a mythical variant of a more relevant cosmological theory; rather, it has a proper function in the structure of Empedocles’ physical poem, as we have seen in the previous chapters, and 23

24 25

See PStrasb. a(1) 9–a(ii) 1–2 (= EMP D 73.270–72 Laks-Most); B 21.7–12 (= EMP D 77a.7–12 LaksMost) and B 23.6–8 (= EMP D 60.6–8 Laks-Most): θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες are described as compounds of the four elements, as are all other living beings, see Chapter 4.5. Moreover, I agree with Sedley (2007: 50) that the long-lived gods include the δαίμονες with a share in long life depicted in B 115.5 (= EMP D 10.5 Laks-Most). See also Inwood (2001: 54) and Curd (2005: 143). Contra Primavesi (2013: 708–9). Palmer (2009: 261). Correctly in my view, Palmer speaks of the metempsychosis as a manifestation of the cyclical microcosmic/macrocosmic changes. On this, see Chapter 7.2 for further details.

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also in his physical system, as we will see in later chapters. In these terms it offers a standpoint from which the story of the guilty δαίμονες, closely connected to the doctrine of rebirth, can fully be rehabilitated as a positive doctrine within Empedocles’ physics.

3.2 Plutarch’s Reading of B 115 and Modern Interpretations Having addressed the issue of the structural correspondences of the demonic and the cosmic cycle in a way that allows for a rehabilitated doctrine of rebirth, I will now turn to the central work of this chapter; that is, offering a fresh and detailed investigation of Empedocles’ concept of δαίμων. In what follows I will therefore discuss and reject the standard interpretation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) as a kind of aetiological myth that accounts for the notion of rebirth. Despite the fact this reading dates to the most ancient interpretation of the demonological verses offered by Plutarch, I will demonstrate that Plutarch bends Empedocles’ verses to his own purposes, while reading B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) with Plato in mind. Let us start, then, by reconsidering Plutarch’s exegesis of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). As we have seen in Chapter 1.3.1, this is offered in several of his works, where he quotes or alludes to lines of this fragment. For my analysis in this chapter, however, the most helpful interpretation of the Empedoclean verses is the one Plutarch gives in his De exilio, where he quotes five of the thirteen verses belonging to B 115,26 and explains them as follows: [Empedocles] reveals that not just he himself but all of us, from himself on, are wanderers here, strangers and exiles . . . The profoundest truth is that the soul is in exile and wanders, being driven by divine decrees and laws. Then, as on an island pounded by a powerful swell, imprisoned within the body ‘like an oyster’, in Plato’s word,27 because it cannot remember or recall ‘from what honour and how great a height of bliss’28 it has departed; not exchanging Sardis for Athens nor Corinth for Lemnos or Scyros but exchanging heaven and the moon for earth and life on earth, if it moves a short distance here from one place to another, it finds it hard to bear and feels like a foreigner, withering away like an ignoble plant.29

Plutarch’s initial claim that the story of Empedocles’ exile reveals the destiny of us all as wanderers in this world, on the basis that our soul is 26 28 29

Specifically, lines 1, 3, 5, 6 and 13: see Chapter 1.3.1. 27 Plato, Phaedrus 250c 6. DK 31 B 119 (= EMP D 15 Laks-Most). Plut. De ex. 17.607c–d (transl. Inwood [2001], slightly modified).

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in exile and wanders, clearly indicates that he takes the word δαίμων as meaning ‘soul’ and B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) as the exemplary place accounting for the destiny of the reincarnated human soul. Yet Plutarch’s reading also raises the general question of the genesis of his Empedoclean interpretation; in particular, it can be asked whether Empedocles himself intended δαίμων as soul or whether Plutarch is rather superimposing his own personal idea and interpretation on Empedocles’ lines. A first step towards answering this question is to look at Empedocles’ literary models and see whether they attest to the concept of δαίμων with the meaning of soul. When we look at Homeric epics, we find that the concept of δαίμων is more or less employed as a synonym of θεός.30 In fact, the preference accorded to either term seems often to be directed by the metrical scheme.31 Alternatively, the word δαίμων seems to occur in situations where the poet refers to an unspecified deity or where the identity of the deity involved cannot be determined. Nevertheless, it is often used to refer to specific deities of the Greek pantheon. For example, in Il. 3.420 we read ἦρχε δὲ δαίμων and the reference is to Aphrodite, mentioned earlier. At Od. 6.172 Odysseus’ way of accounting is intentionally vague when he says νῦν δ’ ἐνθάδε κάββαλε δαίμων; yet as it emerges from the context, the δαίμων is Poseidon. Similarly, the word θεός can sometimes be used for unspecified deities, as at Od. 12.169: κοίμησε δὲ κύματα δαίμων. Here the δαίμων is the same god (θεός) announced by Circe at lines 37–38: μνήσει δέ σε καὶ θεὸς αὐτός.32 Never in the Homeric verses is the term used to indicate the soul. Analogous considerations can be made to the Hesiodic occurrences of the term δαίμων, although, in the Works and Days, Hesiod seems to use this concept with some specificity. In the famous myth of the five races, it is narrated that the first human beings, those of the golden race, had a very special, godlike life, without sorrows, toil, grief and the pain of old age, being in ease and peace for all the time. They had all sorts of good things, as the earth at that time produced fruit ‘abundantly and without stint’. Moreover, their death was as extraordinary as their life: they were just overcome with sleep. Even more extraordinary was, third, their reward after death: they obtained from Zeus the gift of divinity, and became δαίμονες ἁγνοί and ἐσθλοί, who dwell on earth (ἐπιχθόνιοι), are free 30 31 32

Bassett (1919: 134–36), Untersteiner (1939: 93–134), Patroni (1940: 104) Brunius Nilsson (1955: 133) and Rexine (1985: 29–51). See also Primavesi (2008b: 259–60). Patroni (1940: 99–104). Patroni (Ibid.), in response to Untersteiner (1939), has shown that there are many passages in which Homer employs the term δαίμων to refer to specific gods or goddesses of the Greek pantheon.

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from harm (ἀλεξίκακοι) and are guardians of mortal beings (φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων).33 Thus, the people of the Hesiodic golden race who, while still alive already ‘lived like gods’ (l. 112), were made δαίμονες upon death with the particular task of being favourable guardians of mortals. It seems fair to conclude that, according to this myth, δαίμονες are gods, though ἐπιχθόνιοι, and thus in this sense Hesiod’s use of the term is still intimately connected to the general, Homeric meaning. Yet in contrast to celestial or Olympian gods, the place and sphere of action of Hesiod’s δαίμονες seem to be confined to the world of human beings. One may suppose that the Hesiodic use created a precedent upon which the meaning of δαίμων gradually narrowed into the notion of a lessened deity and this then favoured its assimilation to the notion of soul which conversely has gradually been considered immortal and therefore nearly divine. Leaving aside the fact that Empedocles has a notion of the soul that is not immortal, as we shall see in more detail in Chapter 5.3, it is worth noting that a further model of Empedocles, Parmenides, employs the term δαίμων twice in his fragments and always to refer to gods: at DK 28 B 1.2–3 (= PARM D 4.2–3 Laks-Most) the ὁδός . . . δαίμονος is, very plausibly, the path of the Sun,34 whereas in B 12.3 (= PARM D 14.3 Laks-Most) the female δαίμων who, from the centre of the universe, steers and governs everything, is a central goddess in his system and can probably be identified with Aphrodite.35 In other words, Parmenides uses δαίμων in the traditional, Homeric sense and without particular specifications, by meaning ‘god’, indeed, celestial and very important gods such as Helios and Aphrodite. Thus, the literary and philosophical models of Empedocles recommend we take the word δαίμων as ‘god’ rather than ‘soul’. Admittedly, however, the use of the word δαίμων with reference to the soul may have arisen in Empedocles independently from his models or simply from their usage. Alternatively, as G. B. Kerferd has proposed, ‘it may be due to [a] new Greek word from outside’,36 or it may simply entail Empedocles’ conception of the divine character of the soul ‘by the application to it of a word for something divine’.37 These hypotheses deserve to be examined and evaluated carefully; however, before approaching such an investigation it is necessary to ask whether the notion of the δαίμων as soul could derive from a particular, later reading of Empedocles’ verses by one of his interpreters. In fact, to fully understand the Empedoclean conception of 33 36

Erga 109–25. 34 See my discussion in Chapter 2.4.2. 37 Kerferd (1965: 77–78). Ibid. 78–79.

35

See Ferrari (2010: 81–114).

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the soul and, consequently, its role in a doctrine of rebirth, it is necessary to premise any discussion of his verses with an investigation that discerns what is properly Empedoclean from what could instead be the legacy of ancient and modern readings. For this reason, we need now to return to Plutarch’s exegesis of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). From the passage of De Exilio I quoted above, what prominently stands out is that Plutarch reads Empedocles with Plato in mind. As we can appreciate, his comments on Empedocles’ lines are embellished with Platonic quotations. Furthermore, the passage quoted above is the closing part of the final section of De exilio, which is highly Platonic in character, as it contains numerous hints at the Phaedrus, Timaeus and Phaedo. If we take this further, it can be said that Plutarch’s Platonic reminiscences in our passage serve to construct a rhetorically solid conclusion that aims to strengthen the main message of Plutarch’s whole treatise: an exhortation to a rational attitude towards exile. By providing a refutation of common objections people usually have against exile (606b–607 f), Plutarch concludes that the evil of exile lies in opinion only (559d), since the original condition of us all, as Plato showed in his dialogues, consists in that we are all souls exiled to this world. Thus, Empedocles’ B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) offers the basis for Plutarch’s identification of the exiled δαίμων with the exiled soul of every living being, an identification that exploits Plato’s image of the wandering ψυχή. However, the historically great influence exercised by Plato’s myths on the soul and Plutarch’s Platonizing interpretation whereby B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) serves his concluding claim about exile as the common destiny of humankind, raise the question whether Plutarch’s identification of the δαίμων in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) with the individual ψυχή mirrored Empedocles’ beliefs or rather was an overinterpretation of his text based on an anachronistic perspective that reads Empedocles through Plato.38 Clearly these are good reasons to take Plutarch’s interpretation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) with caution, as he might intentionally be bending Empedocles to his own purposes by projecting onto him Plato’s influential ideas on the soul. Nonetheless, all ancient interpreters after Plutarch follow him in reading Empedocles’ wandering δαίμων as a pre-Platonic instance of 38

Note that, as Trépanier (2014: 175 n.7) has shown, Plutarch’s ‘Platonist position appears to have been a minority view’ in Plutarch’s treatises. For instance, in Def. or. 420a, a Stoic doctrine of mortal gods is evoked to confirm the Empedoclean position on mortal δαίμονες. At 420d, moreover, ‘Plutarch relates an Epicurean critique of Empedocles’ δαίμονες, one which faults him for combining in them two incompatible attributes on Epicurean criteria, moral imperfection and (mortal) longevity.’

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Plato’s wandering soul.39 For instance, Proclus advocated this reading in his commentary on Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides, and so did Hermias in his commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus and Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima.40 Being aware of the overinterpretation that a Platonizing reading of Empedocles’ text may cause, in 1929 U. v. Wilamowitz pointed out that the occurrences of δαίμων and ψυχή in Greek literature before Empedocles run against their assimilation to one single concept. Wilamowitz concluded that Empedocles never referred to the ψυχή in human beings,41 but rather developed a doctrine of rebirth according to which a δαίμων, namely a god and not merely a soul, inhabits Empedocles as well as all living beings including plants. According to Wilamowitz, in other words, Empedocles’ concept of δαίμων cannot be taken as identical to the traditional notion of ψυχή; nevertheless, even though he challenges the assimilation of δαίμων with ψυχή, Wilamowitz ultimately understood δαίμων as that essence of every individual which survives the death of the body and works through rebirths – essentially an alter ego of the ordinary ψυχή, perhaps only more divine. Wilamowitz’s conclusions have meant that, in the study of Empedocles, nearly every subsequent scholar indiscriminately assumed that Empedocles had no notion of soul other than δαίμων. Accordingly, E. Dodds maintained that ‘the occult self which persisted through successive incarnations’ – a rather lengthy periphrasis to designate what we might more simply term the soul – was called ‘not “psyche”, but “daemon”’ by Empedocles.42 Analogously, H. S. Long, in his study on Greek metempsychosis, argued that in Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth the soul is thought to be divine. Indeed, Empedocles ‘presents his doctrine so vividly that he never refers to the soul as ψυχή, but always as δαίμων’.43 Similarly, W. K. C. Guthrie argued that Empedocles’ doctrine about the guilt and 39

40

41 42

An extensive discussion of the Platonizing reading of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) by ancient interpreters can be found in O’Brien (1981). Calcidius (in Tim. cap. 136 [= 177.1–2. ed. Waszink 1962]; see also 176.15–177.12) seems to be the only ancient reader of Empedocles who offers a different reading. See Proclus in Tim. 175c–d = II 116.24–25, in Parm. 723.22–724.13; Hermias, in Phaedr. 248B (= 160.16); Philoponus, De An. 73.32–33. See O’Brien (1981: 78) and Index Fontium at 113–14. The majority of ancient interpreters assume that the wandering δαίμων coincides more or less with the wandering soul that inhabits all of us. It is possible that Plutarch’s great work on Empedocles (in ten books according to Lamprias’ catalogue) influenced (either directly or indirectly) all later interpretations. According to Wilamowitz, in Empedocles’ extant fragments the word ψυχή recurs just once (see DK 31 B 138 [not in Laks-Most]) with the Homeric sense of ‘life force’. Dodds (1951: 153). 43 H. S. Long (1948: 54).

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punishment of the δαίμων derived from the religious and mysterious beliefs of the Orphic and Pythagorean doctrines. Empedocles, nevertheless, replaced the concept ‘soul’ with the word δαίμων which is, so argues Guthrie, ‘the divine spark in us which is alien to the body’.44 This translates as ‘spirit’, he argues, ‘because that makes it easier to comprehend as something incarnated in mortal bodies, [that] could without confusion be rendered “god”’.45 According to Wright, Empedocles talks here περὶ ψυχῆς, as also agreed by the main sources for B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost). ‘The purport is – Wright argues – that the thinking soul [. . .] is spoken of in terms of a δαίμων who, because of the inevitable workings of necessity, is cut off from his origin.’46 More recently, P. Curd, contends that ‘[w]hatever else is true about the δαίμονες, Empedocles treats them as the seat of personality for an individual’, and thus, ‘[w]hen we speak of a doctrine of transmigration in Empedocles, it is the reappearance of a δαίμων in a different guise that we mean’.47 It seems clear then that nearly all Empedoclean scholars agree that δαίμων in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) is that personal entity in us that outlasts the death of our body and is reborn as several other mortal beings; that is, essentially, what our soul is supposed to do according to doctrines of rebirth. However, while most of the above-mentioned scholars express the idea that δαίμων is more or less equal to the soul in Empedocles, in 1963 Detienne went even further and argued that Empedocles drew on an entrenched concept of ‘demonic soul’,48 which was already developed within the earliest Pythagorean doctrine of rebirth. Detienne defended his thesis on the basis of ancient sources; however, these all come from the end of Plato’s lifetime or later and, therefore, require careful handling when reconstructing a much earlier notion.49 An exception is constituted 44 45

46 47 48 49

Guthrie (1965: 263). Ibid. 253. Furthermore, the diverse speculations about the nature of the δαίμων as a quantum of Love, or as manifestation of the φρὴν ἱερή ‘Holy Mind’ (B 134 [= EMP D 93 Laks-Most]) rest on the idea that δαίμων corresponds to the soul. The erroneous nature of these hypotheses shall be shown below. Wright (1995: 272). Curd (2005: 142). See also 156 n.17 where she explicitly equates δαίμων with ψυχή. ‘L’âme démonique’, e.g., at p. 23. For a synthetic but detailed criticism of Detienne’s reconstruction of a Pythagorean notion of the soul as δαίμων see the review of Detienne’s book by Kerferd (1965). Kerferd, at p. 78, criticized Detienne’s use of ancient sources, emphasizing that, among all sources used by Detienne, the strongest piece of evidence, Aristotle fr. 192 Rose, certainly places Pythagoras himself in a special position between god and man, but it does not actually call him a δαίμων. If it does in fact suppose he is a δαίμων, as it well may, it does not support the view that the souls of all men are δαίμονες since it places Pythagoras in a unique position.

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by Empedocles’ B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most),50 which Detienne uncritically regarded as the most ancient item in which the term δαίμων is used where Plato would have had ψυχή. Moreover, in a previous study dedicated to Empedocles’ notion of δαίμων, Detienne had already proposed that its occurrence in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) is self-explanatory and does not need to be extensively discussed:51 it means nothing other than ψυχή.52 On a few occasions, however, scholars have shown caution when comparing δαίμων and ψυχή. For instance, Inwood admits that it is difficult to determine the meaning of this word in Empedocles, as its occurrences in earlier poetry indicate gods, both Olympian and otherwise, and divinities, which seem to modern readers more like personified powers and forces. Yet he concludes that ‘because of its role here in a theory of reincarnation, it is hard not to connect the daimōn to what Plato and others called a “soul”’ and thus he states that he will assume ‘this is more or less right and that the daimōn is the bearer of the moral and intellectual continuity for each person’.53 Analogously, S. Trépanier acknowledges that ‘the identification of the transmigrating δαίμων with an immortal soul is not historically sound, but a later Platonizing distortion’. Nevertheless, he argues that ‘Empedocles’ account of the fall from the blessed gods of transmigrating souls is given in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most)’.54 Moreover, while maintaining that the Empedoclean δαίμων-soul differs from the Platonic ψυχή, he argues that, as this δαίμων-soul commits perjury or bloodshed and can be punished through rebirths or rewarded after death, it anticipates the story of Plato’s souls.55 50 51 52

53 54 55

A further exception is Philolaus DK 44 B 11 (= PHILOL D 12 Laks-Most). Detienne (1959: 3). Ibid. In this paper, Detienne argued that the word δαίμων in Empedocles translates not only the notion of the transmigrating soul, but also those of a god ψυχοπομπός and an indeterminate, divine and occult power. He failed, however, to explore the meaning of this polysemy and the implication it has for Empedocles’ notion of δαίμων and its occurrence in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). Inwood (2001: 53). See, moreover, at 56: ‘The mortal δαίμων is the bearer of personal identity; it is the “I” which speaks of birth and death and of experiences beyond this life’. Trépanier (2014: respectively at 175 with n.7 and 207). Trépanier (2004: 129): Empedocles’ conception of the δαίμων is more an adumbration of Plato’s account of the soul, at least in certain specific regards, than an unreflective acceptance of traditional lore. As does the soul for Plato, the δαίμων for Empedocles allows for the extension of reward and retribution beyond this life, and mutatis mutandis provides the basis for the possibility of super-human knowledge. However, in his 2014 article, Trépanier revises his position, pointing out that the identification of the transmigrating δαίμων with an immortal soul is not historically sound, as we have seen. Nonetheless, he speaks of δαίμων-soul with reference to B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) e.g., at 201–6.

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In contrast to this mainstream view, Primavesi, by following an idea of K. Kerényi,56 understands the δαίμων’s vicissitudes in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) as the account of Empedocles’ personal experience,57 suggesting indirectly that Empedocles’ self-claim to be a δαίμων stresses his exceptional nature. In particular, Primavesi maintains, correctly in my view, that Empedocles’ claim to divine nature hardly conforms to the assumption that it is meant to be exemplary of the fate of the human soul.58 This interpretation may open up for an elitist reading of Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth as a destiny that pertains not to all living beings, but only to a few exceptional individuals who are reincarnations of deities. However, other Empedoclean fragments I discussed in Chapter 2 seem to counter this hypothesis. In particular, verses thematizing his rejection of ritual sacrifices (B 136 [= EMP D 28 Laks-Most] and B 137 [= EMP D 29 Laks-Most]), which is closely related to his belief in rebirth, show that he professed a doctrine of rebirth as concerning all ordinary mortals. In fact, whereas the reincarnation of a god must be regarded as something being ‘statistically speaking, a highly improbable coincidence’,59 Empedocles’ heartfelt plea to stop slaughtering and devouring one another (B 136 [= EMP D 28 Laks-Most]), as well as his warning not to sacrifice animals on the altar because of the risk of killing loved ones who have changed form (B 137 [= EMP D 29 Laks-Most]), most likely highlight that the destiny of rebirth involves anyone. To this it can be added that the idea expressed in B 15 (= EMP D 52 Laks-Most) of people called ‘fool’ as they do not consider the good and evil things befalling them during their disembodied existence – which in Chapter 2 has been connected to Empedocles’ belief in rebirth – quite clearly indicates that Empedocles envisages rebirth as a common human destiny.

56

57 58 59

Kerényi (1940: 16): It has rightly been emphasized that Empedocles never speaks of the transmigration of souls, but always of the fate of the daimon. The fundamental error of the ancient interpreters of Empedocles remained nonetheless unshaken even in the more recent interpreters. They still believe that the philosopher is basically presenting a doctrine of the migration of souls based on the principle of the equality of all souls; nevertheless, instead of the ‘soul’ they now speak of something divine, the daimon, which resides in all living beings without distinction. As far as we know of his works, there is no mention of this in Empedocles himself (my emphasis). See above all Primavesi (2013: 713–17). Primavesi (2013: 716) defines the reincarnation of a god ‘statistically speaking, a highly improbable coincidence (ein statistich höchst unwahrscheinlicher Zufall)’. See the previous note.

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Therefore, since Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth concerns all of us, while, as I argued in the previous chapter, B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost) and the other demonological fragments serve to legitimize Empedocles’ extra-ordinary nature and authority on matters beyond ordinary human perceptions, I side with Primavesi and argue that Empedocles’ story as the reincarnation of an exiled god places him in a unique position, portraying him as an extraordinary individual in contrast to the rest of humans. For the same reason, I tend to exclude Kerferd’s hypothesis mentioned above, according to which the identification of the guilty δαίμων with the individual soul may be derived from the epic usage or may be due to a new Greek word from the outside. Similarly, I exclude that it may entail Empedocles’ conception of the divine character of the soul by the application to it of a word for something divine.60 Instead, my view is that, by virtue of his intention to distance himself from ordinary mortals, Empedocles’ notion of δαίμων is essentially used to mark this distance by representing him as a god. This strongly suggests that his notion of δαίμων is basically different from his concept of the soul, to which I will return in Chapter 5.3. In summary, the investigation of the pre-Empedoclean uses of the term δαίμων and the analysis of Plutarch’s Platonizing interpretation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) I conducted here cast doubts on the traditional reading of this fragment. In particular, I have shown that the interpretation that in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) Empedocles speaks on behalf of his soul by calling it δαίμων, which then represents the soul of every living being, is fundamentally flawed. Consequently, the traditional and enduring idea that the story of the guilty gods is the basis for the Empedoclean doctrine of rebirth is also mistaken. On the one hand, the uses of δαίμων in Empedocles’ literary models of Homer, Hesiod and Parmenides indicate that the term means ‘god’ and never ‘soul’; on the other hand, Plutarch’s interpretation of δαίμων as the individual soul in B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost) is not only heavily influenced by Plato’s myths on the soul in the underworld but is also pursued in order to bend Empedocles to Plutarch’s own purposes. Finally, the hypothesis following this conclusion that Plutarch’s Empedoclean reading does not stand, gained force by the interpretation of the demonological fragments I provided in Chapter 2, according to which they serve as Empedocles’ authorial legitimation and therefore mark the distance between Empedocles the god and the rest of 60

Kerferd (1965: 77–78). As a matter of fact, Kerferd just mentioned them as possible options and did not embrace one or the other interpretation.

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ordinary humans. With all this considered, I shall argue in conclusion that the vicissitudes of the exiled god concern Empedocles not only first of all, but exclusively. It follows that only Empedocles is a reincarnated god,61 and δαίμων is the term that in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) defines this unique nature.

3.3

Plato’s daimones

Having refuted the standard interpretation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost) that the story of the guilty god represents the place that founds Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth, showing instead that δαίμων is intended to define Empedocles’ exceptional nature in contrast to the rest of ordinary humans, the groundwork has been laid for a re-evaluation of the concept of δαίμων. In what follows, I will raise the question of what Empedocles had in mind in terms of divine status when he called himself a δαίμων and how his use of this term may or may not have induced shifts in meaning and specifications of the traditional concept of δαίμων. To answer these questions, I will turn to those authors who spoke of δαίμονες in contexts in which beliefs in rebirth also played a role. Thus, I will first look at Plato’s myths about the otherworld journeys of the soul and then at what we might call a Pythagorean demonology. Beginning with an analysis of Plato’s notions of δαίμων, I will offer a close reading of several Platonic texts in Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. Thereby it will be demonstrated that Plato depicted δαίμονες in a traditional way as guides of individuals and fulfillers of their destiny, but also played a significant role in the gradual downgrading of δαίμων to a minor deity and thus its assimilation with ψυχή. This investigation will provide a better understanding of the divine status of the δαίμονες and its relationship with other gods and human beings in the context of a doctrine of rebirth, identifying aspects that Empedocles may have had in mind while composing his demonological verses. This will therefore provide us with a more solid basis for rethinking the role of the δαίμονες and individual souls in Empedocles’ concept of rebirth.

61

The unique nature and experience of Empedocles is asserted in opposition to the rest of humanity (i.e., Empedocles is one god compared to the multitude of ordinary humans) and therefore does not intend to exclude the possibility that other reincarnated δαίμονες may exist – certainly, given the plural in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). However, reincarnated δαίμονες are much more the exception than the rule, as opposed to the common fate of reincarnated ordinary human beings.

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3.3.1 Guides of Souls: Plato’s Myths on the Afterlife In the present section I am going to explore the role Plato assigns to δαίμονες in his myths on the afterlife journeys of the soul in the Phaedo and in the tenth book of the Republic. Their analysis will show that δαίμονες, in line with a consolidated Greek tradition, function as guides or companions of the individuals during their life on earth. However, from the Phaedo to the Republic there is an important shift in meaning regarding how they perform this role. Specifically, in the Republic, their role as tutelary deities who fulfil the person’s lot is subordinated to the moral responsibility people carry for their own destiny of punishment or reward. As will be shown, this Platonic innovation concerning personal responsibility has crucial implications in the later developments of the notion of δαίμων. Nevertheless, δαίμονες are presented in a more traditional guise in the myth of the Phaedo (107d–108c). Here Plato opens by depicting the personal δαίμων who, after having accompanied the individual during their whole lifetime, once they have passed away, brings their soul to a place where the dead are gathered together. From there, after judgement has been given, the souls pass into the world below, following their δαίμωνguide (ἡγεμών), ‘who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other’. After receiving their fate and staying in Hades for the appointed time, the souls are brought back to our world by another δαίμων-guide. Plato adds that the moderate and wise soul follows its guide and does not ignore its present fate. In contrast, the unrighteous soul, which is possessed by bodily passions and is at fault for evil deeds, is eschewed by all and finds no δαίμων willing to be its companion and guide. However, after a certain time, even the worst soul will get its δαίμων, who will guide it to its own abode. A slightly different tale is narrated in the story of Er’s journey to the afterlife, in the tenth book of the Republic (614b–621d). Here Plato recounts, through Er, that the souls of the dead, once in Hades, find themselves in a certain divine place (daimonios topos), a meadow with several openings (chasmata) from which numerous souls continuously arrive and depart. Judges sitting in the middle of these χάσματα indicate which pathway each soul has to follow in its journey.62 Then, moving forwards from the meadow, the souls reach a place where, in the presence of Necessity and her 62

Judgement of the souls is a recurrent topic in Plato’s myths of the afterlife. As we have seen above, a version of this topic is in the Phaedo’s excursus (107d; 113d). See also Ap. 41a.2–5; Gorgias 524a: two judges called Minos and Radamanthys pass sentence ‘in the meadow at the crossroads of the road, where are two ways leading, one to the Isle of the Blest and the other to Tartarus’.

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daughters, ‘a certain prophet’, the spokesperson of the god, on behalf of Lachesis, makes an announcement that roughly goes as follows: before beginning another cycle of mortal generation, ‘where birth is the beacon of death’, no δαίμων shall cast lots for the souls, but these should choose their own δαίμων. Then, after having made their choice – a choice based, as Plato says, ‘on their experience of a previous life’ – the souls go to Lachesis, who assigns to each ‘the δαίμων the soul had chosen, as a guardian of the life and a fulfiller of its choice’ (φύλακα συμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἱρεθέντων). Lastly, the δαίμων guides the soul through the underworld to the Plain of Oblivion, where it is ready to be reborn. From both the Phaedo’s passage and the story of Er, the role that Plato assigns to δαίμονες is clear enough: being watchers, companions and guides of living beings, they accompany souls during their life on earth and beyond. Indeed, they preside over and guarantee that souls fulfil their destiny. Whereas in the Phaedo destinies and δαίμονες who govern over them are appointed to souls, in the Republic the δαίμονες are not responsible for the life and destiny allotted to a soul, as these are personally chosen by the individual soul.63 Nevertheless, the δαίμων stays with the soul from the time in which it is given, or it chooses, its lot in Hades, during the whole period of its embodied life until the soul returns to Hades. Therefore, the soul is thought of as always having a δαίμων by its side, who guides it during the whole parabola of life from (re)birth to death. This is connected to the widespread traditional belief in a personal deity, genius or spirit, who can be tutelary or vengeful.64 Moreover, the detail in Plato’s myths that a soul is assigned different δαίμονες from one rebirth to another – hence it is not the same δαίμων who always stays beside the same soul – is significant. It can be read as the 63 64

See esp. Rep. 617e where it is said that the souls, rather than the gods are to be blamed when they choose a bad life. In the Erga 109–23, as we have seen above, Hesiod narrates that the very first human beings, the people of the golden age, became at death δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι τελέθουσιν / ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων (at l.123). Analogously, in Erga 252–62 Hesiod speaks of immortal φύλακες who are guardians of mortal beings and watch over judgements and crimes. Given the analogies with the δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι of the golden race, these immortal φύλακες may well be taken as equivalent to personal δαίμονες. The belief in personal δαίμονες is also found in ancient lyrics, e.g., Phocyl. F 16: ἀλλ’ ἄρα δαίμονές εἰσιν ἐπ’ ἀνδράσιν ἄλλοτε ἄλλοι· οἳ μὲν ἐπερχομένου κακοῦ ἀνέρας ἐκλύσασθαι. According to Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 5.14.127 p. 4.5), Phocylides opposed to benevolent δαίμονες vengeful δαίμονες who Clement compared to the rebellious angels of the Judeo-Christian tradition. See also Theogn. 161–66: πολλοί τοι χρῶνται δειλαῖς φρεσί, δαίμονι δ’ ἐσθλῶι, / οἷς τὸ κακὸν δοκέον γίνεται εἰς ἀγαθόν. / εἰσὶν δ’ οἳ βουλῆι τ’ ἀγαθῆι καὶ δαίμονι δειλῶι / μοχθίζουσι, τέλος δ’ ἔργμασιν οὐχ ἕπεται. / Οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων οὔτ’ ὄλβιος οὔτε πενιχρός / οὔτε κακὸς νόσφιν δαίμονος οὔτ’ ἀγαθός. According to Pindar, the δαίμων γενέθλιος (O. 13.105), assigned to every person, is able to influence the course of human affairs. The

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Platonic reformulation of the traditional belief of a personal δαίμων who determines and brings to fulfilment the person’s destined lot in life. As in Plato’s doctrine souls can be re-born as different human beings and have, therefore, different lots and lives, Plato makes the soul that receives a new lot and a new life receive a new δαίμων as well. The notion that a soul, once in Hades, can choose its δαίμων is Plato’s innovation. It is developed from the idea that the fate of each person does not depend on the gods’ whim but is one’s own responsibility and Plato clearly states that ‘the blame is on the one who chooses: god is blameless’.65 This is related to Plato’s ethical doctrines and to his belief in the role of virtue and wisdom, and ultimately of philosophy, in human moral agency and for the liberation of the soul from the body. In the Phaedo, for example, the account of souls’ journeys to the afterlife is proposed to demonstrate that the immortal nature of the soul has considerable consequences for moral behaviour. Indeed, since our soul operates through rebirths, the judgement it receives in the afterlife and the consequent fate we are assigned follow the degree of wisdom and virtue we were able to achieve during our previous life on earth. Thus, in the afterlife, the soul of a person who did well in life will receive a reward in Hades. Conversely, the soul of one who lived unjustly will receive terrible punishment.66 It is worth noting that, in the story of Er, souls are still judged in Hades for their behaviour in their previous life on earth and upon judgement they are sent to opposite underworld pathways. However, for the souls that have

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notion of tutelary δαίμονες, whom one needs to honour to obtain merit, is also pointed out in P. 3.107–9: σμικρὸς ἐν σμικροῖς, μέγας ἐν μεγάλοις / ἔσσομαι, τὸν δ’ ἀμφέποντ’ αἰεὶ φρασίν / δαίμον’ ἀσκήσω κατ’ ἐμὰν θεραπεύων μαχανάν. The notion of a personal δαίμων is clearly expressed by Men. FF. 550–1.1–3 Kock, ἅπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίσταται εὐθὺς γενομένῳ, μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου ἀγαθός. See moreover the idea of tutelary and vengeful δαίμονες in tragedy; e.g., Aesch. Pers. 158 attests to a δαίμων παλαιός who assigned one’s lot. The notion of a tutelary or hostile deity who judges and intervenes in human affairs is implied in Pers. 515 and Ag. 1175. Moreover, see Soph. OT 1299ff. and 1311; see also OT 1478–79: ἀλλ’ εὐτυχοίης, καί σε τῆσδε τῆς ὁδοῦ / δαίμων ἄμεινον ἢ ’μὲ φρουρήσας τύχοι; Antig. 1345ff. As for the vengeful deity or δαίμων ἀλάστωρ, see, e.g., Aesch. Ag. 1501, Pers. 354, Suppl. 415, Eurip. Med. 1059 and Ipp. 820. The δαίμων ἀλάστωρ often coincides with the Erinyes, also called δαίμονες: e.g., in Aesch. Ag. 1475ff, where the δαίμων γέννης τῆσδε is the Erinyes who looms over Agamemnon’s house. It is worth noting that the first columns of the Derveni papyrus (dated at the end of the fourth century BCE) attest to δαίμονες who have some role in the afterlife punishment of souls (col. iii 4–5), are mentioned in connection to Justice (col. iv 10– 12) and the Erinyes (col. iii 5–6) and are also seen as ‘impeding δαίμονες’ who hinder the souls from receiving sacrifices (col. vi 2–3). On the role of δαίμονες in the Derveni papyrus, see Piano (2016: 253–74). Rep. 617e. This is a belief Plato picked up from older doctrines professing faith in rebirth and, above all, from Orphic circles: see Casadio (1991: 130–32) and Bernabé (2002b: 416–18; 2004). Graf-Johnston (2013: 104) proposes that Plato adapted an older system of beliefs about the nature of the underworld, which is found in the gold tablets.

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reached the meadow it is explicitly said that ‘no divinity shall cast lots for you’;67 instead they shall choose by themselves their new life and lot. Nevertheless, the way in which they behaved in their previous life helps or impedes their post-mortem choice. As Plato tells us, the souls’ choice of a new life rests on what they have learned through their previous experience on earth. For instance, those souls who did not experience and learn what a truly good life is wrongly believe that this coincides with being a tyrant and are therefore inclined to make the wrong choice in Hades. On the contrary, those who learned wisdom and virtue in life know what a good life really is and may be able to choose a better life than the one they lost. For this reason, people need first to gain knowledge in this life of how to distinguish a good from a bad existence. In this way, they can everywhere and always choose, among those that are available, a better life than the one they had. Second, people must learn how to hold up their choice for the good life in Hades. Then, after that choice, they receive from Lachesis their personal δαίμων φύλαξ and ἡγεμών according to the nature of the life and lot they chose. In conclusion, in his myths on the afterlife journeys of the soul Plato draws on the traditional idea of δαίμονες as tutelary divinities, which watch over and guide the person to the fulfilment of their destinies. However, while in the Phaedo, δαίμονες seem to be able to influence human destinies and lives, according to the myth of Er in the Republic, they just have the function of accompanying the soul on its journey. They can watch over the person and even guarantee they will fulfil their chosen life and lot, but they seem to have no influence upon the person’s destiny, which is exclusively in the hands of a ψυχή’s own choice in Hades. This remarkable detail brings the responsibility for one’s own destiny back from an external cause, such as the gods, into the person’s own hands. In the next section, we will see that this Platonic formulation of personal responsibility has crucial implications in the later developments of the notion of δαίμων, especially for its assimilation to the concept of ψυχή. 3.3.2 Personal daimon: The Timaeus In order to complete our analysis of Plato’s notions of δαίμων, I will now explore a famous Platonic passage in the Timaeus, where we can appreciate the notion of δαίμων developing from the more traditional idea of an external deity, watching over and guiding the person, towards the concept 67

Rep. 617e.

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of an internal divine power coinciding with the most sovereign part of our soul.68 The Timaeus’ passage runs as follows: As concerning the most sovereign form of soul in us (τὸ δὲ δὴ περὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου παρ’ ἡμῖν ψυχῆς), we must conceive that god has given it to each person as a guiding δαίμων – that part which we say dwells in the summit of our body (ἡμῶν ἐπ’ ἄκρῳ τῷ σώματι) and lifts us from earth towards our celestial affinity [. . . I]f a man is engrossed in appetites and ambitions and spends all his pains upon these, all his thoughts must be mortal and, so far as that is possible, he cannot fall short of becoming mortal altogether, since he has nourished the growth of mortality. But if his heart has been set on the love of learning and true wisdom and he has exercised that part of himself above all, he is surely bound to have immortal and divine thoughts, if he shall lay hold upon truth, nor can he fail to possess immortality in the fullest measure that human nature admits. And because he is always devoutly cherishing the divine part and maintaining the guardian δαίμων that dwells within him (τὸν δαίμονα σύνοικον ἑαυτῷ) in good estate, he must be happy (εὐδαίμων) above all.69

What is relevant for our analysis on δαίμων in this passage of the Timaeus is what Plato says at its outset and end. First, he compares the most sovereign form of soul in us (that is, our rational soul) with a gift god has given to us as a guiding δαίμων. Second, by working on the notion that the rational soul in us is our δαίμων, Plato concludes that we will be immortal, godlike and happy if we keep the guardian δαίμων that dwells within us in good estate. It is worth noting that this conclusion is grounded on a play-onwords Plato makes upon the term ‘happy’, which in Greek is said εὐδαίμων. By etymologizing it as εὐ+δαίμων, Plato can make his point that those who are happy are those who have the most sovereign part of their soul or δαίμων ‘in good estate’. Returning to the assimilation between the most sovereign part of the soul and the guiding δαίμων, we may argue that it results from Plato’s conception of the divine character of the rational soul, which is consequently called by the word for something divine. Yet there seems to be more behind the use of the term δαίμων in reference to the rational soul. In particular, it seems to draw on the traditional conception of the δαίμονες as tutelary deities, and to result from the idea, explored in the myth of Er, that a soul is not appointed to a δαίμων but chooses one 68

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Plato develops a tripartite structure of the soul in the fourth book of the Republic: two mortal parts fulfilling mortal needs and ends, and one rational, immortal and divine part (see also Timaeus 69d– 70d, 73d, 87a, 89e–90a). Timaeus 90a–c; transl. Cornford, slightly modified.

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itself.70 More specifically, the idea that the rational soul is our δαίμων might be derived from a chain of ideas that is reconstructed as follows. Traditionally, the δαίμων sent by the gods to a given human being watches over them and guarantees they fulfil their appointed destiny. However, in the Republic Plato expresses the view that humans themselves – more correctly, their souls in Hades – are responsible for their own destiny, choosing their own δαίμων. In addition, since decisionmaking skills pertain to the rational part of the soul, it follows that the rational, divine part of our soul, as the one in charge of human destiny, can well be considered to be a δαίμων. Thus, we can appreciate that Plato’ s notion of δαίμων as the rational part of the soul can be elucidated on a coherent line of reasoning derived from Platonic speculations on the individual’s destiny after death and human moral responsibility. Having drawn on a traditional idea of the δαίμονες in the Phaedo, where they are allotted to souls as guardian spirits and fulfillers of their destinies, in the Republic Plato already downgraded them to mere companions of humans, that accompany them watching over their decisions without any influence on what they choose. Finally, since the ability to make decisions concerning one’s destiny is not in the hands of any divine power, but rather resides completely in people’s hands and in the power of their rational soul, in the Timaeus we see the notion of δαίμων developing from an external guiding deity into what we may call ‘the mind’s eye’, the very leader of one’s own life. The conclusion is that the notion of a δαίμων-within and, therefore, of a δαίμων-(rational part of the)-soul seems to be the novel, Platonic implication of his speculations on the individual’s post-mortem destiny and his moral doctrines on personal responsibility. 3.3.3

Cratylus: Knowledge and Divinity

Having seen how Platonic speculations on moral responsibility and the fate of the individual after death played a key role in the development of the concept of δαίμων, I will now analyze a passage from the Cratylus that has often been proposed to support the assumption of an ancient, Pythagorean belief in δαίμων as the individual’s soul, on which Plato would later elaborate. On the contrary, it will be shown that even in this passage the 70

This point has already been highlighted by Taylor (1928), who writes that Timaeus ‘is expressing the view that a man’s attendant δαίμων is his “rational self”’, further noting that ‘Socrates means the same thing when he says in the myth of Er that the souls about to be reborn are not “allotted” to a δαίμων but chose one for themselves.’

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concept of δαίμων is in line with both the popular-traditional conception as guiding deity and the Platonic developments we have seen so far. The Cratylus’ passage runs as follows: [Socrates] What shall we consider next? [Hermogenes] δαίμονες obviously. [Socrates] Hermogenes, what does the name δαίμονες really mean? See if you think there is anything in what I am going to say. [Hermogenes] Go on and say it. [So] Do you remember who Hesiod says the δαίμονες are? [He] I do not recall it. [So] Nor that he says a golden race was the first race of men to be born? [He] Yes, I do know that. [So] Well, he says of it: But since Fate has covered up this race, they are called holy daimones who live on the earth, noble, averters of evil, guardians of mortal people. [He] What of that? [So] Why, I think he means that the golden race was not made of gold, but was good and beautiful. And I regard it as a proof of this that he further says we are the iron race. [He] True. [So] Don’t you suppose that if anyone of our day is good, Hesiod would say he was of that golden race? [He] Quite likely. [So] But the good are the wise, are they not? [He] Yes, they are the wise. [So] This, then, I think, is what he certainly means to say of the δαίμονες: because they were wise and knowing (δαήμονες) he called them δαίμονες and in our older Attic dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and all the other poets are right, who say that when a good man dies he has a great portion and honour among the dead, and becomes a δαίμων, a name which is in accordance with the other name of wisdom. And so I assert that every good man, whether living or dead, is more than human (δαιμόνιον), and is rightly called a δαίμων.71

This passage is part of a section in which Socrates, after having explained the meaning of the term θεός by rudimentary etymology, explains by the same standard the meaning of δαίμονες, ἥρωες and ἄνθρωποι. It is worth noting that the order in which these terms are explained follows a precise ranking of rational beings, from the more to the less rational. When Socrates comes to the explanation of the term δαίμονες, he first recurs to Hesiod’s account of the people of the golden race becoming δαίμονες after death. The element of the Hesiodic account that most interests Plato is the ancient belief that ‘good and beautiful’ people, under special circumstances, can become gods upon death. As we have seen in Section 3.2, according to the Hesiodic myth of the races, the human beings of the golden race, who are the most good and beautiful, become,

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after death, δαίμονες. By this standard – Plato infers – every person who is good could be said to be a golden person. Socrates continues to explain that being good really means being wise, and being wise justifies, on Plato’s reading, the fact that the golden people become δαίμονες. In fact, the term δαίμονες is explained through a rudimentary etymological analysis as δαήμονες, meaning ‘knowing’ or ‘being wise’.72 From this, Socrates can draw his conclusion: as being good and ‘golden’ really means being wise, when a wise person dies, they are rightly called δαίμονες and receive divine honours. Indeed, wise persons, since they are more than humans in life and death, are rightly called δαίμονες whether living or dead. As we can appreciate, the rudimentary etymology of δαίμονες as δαήμονες intends to bring together the traditional Hesiodic belief that good and beautiful people will receive divine rewards after death and the novel Platonic view that a non-mythical golden race is composed of truly wise people; that is, of philosophers, who deserve therefore to be called divine. In 1963, Detienne argued that implicit in Plato’s exegesis of Hesiod’s myth of the golden race, and especially in his conclusion that every good person is rightly called δαίμων, is the notion that the souls of the dead are δαίμονες. According to Detienne, Plato picked up this concept from certain Pythagorean beliefs in rebirth, attested in Empedocles’ philosophy.73 However, there are two elements in Plato’s exegesis that challenge Detienne’s conclusion. First, Plato’s explanation of the divine terms shows that, in his classification of rational beings, δαίμονες are paired with gods, as heroes are paired with human beings. Just as in other dialogues, this shows that his notion of δαίμων is still intimately connected to the traditional notion of δαίμων as a divine being. Incidentally, in his clarification of the word ἄνθρωπος, Plato refers to body and soul as the most distinctive elements of human beings. By doing so, he does not make any hint at the possibility that ψυχαί could be linked with δαίμονες. Secondly, Plato’s explanation of δαίμονες deliberately focuses on the connection between wisdom and divine nature, a connection we have already touched upon in the analysis of the Timaeus above. There, Plato points out that those who devote themselves to the love of learning and true wisdom and exercise above all the most supreme part of their soul, will have immortal and divine thoughts and will be god-like to the fullest extent that human nature admits. In other words, Plato argues that wisdom is closely related to divine nature; indeed, it is the way to become divine. 72 73

ὅτι φρόνιμοι καὶ δαήμονες ἦσαν, ‘δαίμονας’ αὐτοὺς ὠνόμασεν. On this, see my discussion below.

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Following the same standard, in the Cratylus Plato makes an analogous point, by meticulously selecting those who can rightly be called δαίμονες: wise human beings; that is, philosophers. This strongly indicates that Plato’s exegesis is not drawing on a general notion of soul as δαίμων, but rather is strategically bending to his own target the traditional belief attested by Hesiod that exceptional human beings could obtain divine rewards after death. According to Plato, truly exceptional human beings are wise persons and truly wise persons are the philosophers, who are therefore truly divine, whether living or dead.74 In conclusion, we can fairly say that in the passage of the Cratylus, there is hardly any evidence to support Detienne’s assumption of Plato’s use of an alleged Pythagorean (and Empedoclean) notion of δαίμων-soul. Instead, the association between philosophers and δαίμονες has very likely a different genesis. The exegesis of the term δαίμονες in Plato’s Cratylus rests, on the one hand, upon Hesiod’s notion of divine rewards for extraordinary human beings; on the other hand, upon a rudimentary etymology that, as we have seen, connects godhood to wisdom. From Hesiod onwards, great and powerful individuals were more commonly honoured after death as gods. Plato then associated the concept of exceptional cases of divinization with his own personal belief that philosophy is a major pathway to divine rewards. In the wake of an already established tradition, in other words, Plato bent the promise of divine reward to his own target, the philosophers,75 the 74

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Whereas Plato makes philosophers δαίμονες, in his time other prominent figures of exceptional human beings were known who, once dead, were honoured as δαίμονες. As Burkert (1985: 181) has shown, ‘on the basis of Hesiod’s myth . . . what did gain currency was for great and powerful figures to be honoured after death as a δαίμων. Thus, in Aeschylus’ Persians, the dead king Darius is conjured up as a δαίμων, and in Euripides, the chorus consoles Admetus over the death of Alcestis with the words “now she is a blessed δαίμων”’. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the gift of divine honours after death became the promise of mystery circles professing doctrines of rebirth. Within these circles, the divine reward of Hesiod’s golden race became the post-mortem destiny assured to initiates, who were taught the way to become gods after death. It is worth noting that, as Zovko (2017: 313–28) highlights, some of these circles worked in South Italy and Sicily, not far from Pythagoras’ Croton and Empedocles’ Acragas, and it is possible that Plato was in contact with them when travelling through Sicily and Southern Italy. Elsewhere, Plato maintains that philosophers’ lives are the highest form of birth and can therefore ensure the quickest release from the chain of rebirths: see, e.g., Phaedrus 248e–249a, where we are told that the soul of a genuine philosopher, who chooses to live as a philosopher three times in a row, obtains liberation from rebirths more quickly than ordinary souls; that is, after only three thousand years. A very similar idea is expressed by Empedocles, who maintains that exceptional people, such as poets, seers, physicians and political leaders (see B 146–47 [= EMP D 39 and D 40 Laks-Most]), find themselves in their last reincarnation and near, therefore, to becoming gods. Pindar too, in a fragment quoted by Plato, Meno 81b–c (fr. 133 Snell-Maehler) affirms that the souls of the righteous people are born ‘proud kings’ and as men ‘who are swift in strength and greatest in wisdom’. These are called sacred heroes by mortals (ἥροες/ἁγνοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλέονται). For Empedocles’ and Pindaric divine rewards at the end of the cycle of rebirths, see Chapter 2.2.4. It is worth noting that

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truly ‘golden’, wise and divine individuals and, therefore, worth of the name δαίμονες.76

3.4

Pythagoras on Rebirth and Demonology

Having investigated the concept of δαίμων as a guiding deity, especially in the narratives dealing with rebirth, and having expounded on the way this notion develops in the Timaeus from an external deity to the rational soul, whereas in the Cratylus we find the idea that divinity is connected with knowledge, I will now turn to the analysis of a major source for Empedocles’ notion of rebirth: Pythagoras. As has been mentioned, Pythagoras is thought to develop a concept of rebirth in which the individual soul is in fact a δαίμων. In contrast, my claim in this section is that Pythagoras’ doctrine seems to have exploited the notion of both δαίμων and ψυχή without assimilating them. This conclusion will finally offer us a basis from which to rethink the role of δαίμονες and individual souls in the Empedoclean doctrine of rebirth. Let us first examine our evidence with regard to Pythagoras’ notion of δαίμων. In a passage of Iamblichus’ On the Pythagorean Life,77 whose

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the reason why Plato grants a quicker liberation from rebirths to philosophers has to do with knowledge of the Forms. Thus, knowledge is the way to become like gods, and philosophers are therefore wise because they know truly. Plato’s ideas on δαίμων, soul and personal responsibility set the basis for later elaborations and expansions of the concept of δαίμων in relation to ψυχή and later speculations within the Academy began to question the full divine status of the δαίμονες, starting to represent their nature as composite and semi-divine. As per Schibli (1993: 147–48), Plato’s disciple Xenocrates argued that the nature and role of the δαίμονες mirror their intermediary place between gods and souls, becoming beings with a composite nature: their divine part relates them to the gods, but they partake in the ψυχή’s sensory affections and, consequently, in the experience of mortals. As Schibli further noted at pp. 154–55, moreover, Xenocrates’ speculations on the composite nature of δαίμονες result from Plato’s ideas on the personal δαίμων: ‘what is important for us to note is the peculiar twist Xenocrates gives to the notion of the personal daemon, since the inner daemon was not usually identified with the soul. If then, according to Xenocrates, a man’s soul is his daemon while he lives in a body, it would follow that when he is divested of his body his soul remains a daemon, only more starkly revealed as such.’ Additionally, Schibli (Ibid. n.51) also points out that the identification of the personal δαίμων with the soul in toto is a step forward with respect to Plato’s identification, in the Timaeus, of the δαίμων with the rational part of the soul. As a result, Xenocrates’ ‘peculiar twist’ laid the groundwork for Plutarch’s (and later authors’) assumption that any soul is a δαίμων after death, and that there are δαίμονες that were once souls of human beings: see Def. or. 417b with Schibli (1993: 155). Plutarch’s demonological theories have been strongly influenced by Xenocrates: see Schibli (1993). On Plutarch’s demonology see, moreover, Soury (1942), Brenk (1973), Dillon (1977) and Santaniello (1996). However, it is noteworthy that Plutarch also knows traditional types of δαίμονες who are not souls, as Dillon (1977: 223–24) pointed out. Iambl. VP 6.30 = Fr. 192 Rose: καὶ μετὰ τῶν θεῶν τὸν Πυθαγόραν λοιπὸν κατηρίθμουν ὡς ἀγαθόν τινα δαίμονα καὶ φιλανθρωπότατον, οἱ μὲν τὸν Πύθιον, οἱ δὲ τὸν ἐξ Ὑπερβορέων Ἀπόλλωνα, οἱ δὲ τὸν Παιᾶνα, οἱ δὲ τῶν τὴν σελήνην κατοικούντων δαιμόνων ἕνα.

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source can be traced back to Aristotle’s lost works on the Pythagoreans, Pythagoras is said to have been numbered among the gods as a good δαίμων and a great friend of human beings. Indeed, some disciples ‘identified him with the Pythian, some with the Hyperborean, some with the Paean Apollo’. Analogously, in another passage of the same section, Iamblichus reports that Pythagoras was regarded as a δαίμων who dwells on the moon.78 Iamblichus’ passage can be compared to a similar report by Aelian, according to which Aristotle attested that the people of Croton called Pythagoras the Hyperborean Apollo.79 This relates to another passage in Aelian reporting that Pythagoras used to tell people that he was born of a better nature than the mortal one.80 Finally, Aristotle also attested that the Pythagoreans preserved as one of their greatest secrets a particular division of rational living beings into three categories: gods, human beings and those like Pythagoras.81 Iamblichus’ attestation of Pythagoras as a δαίμων associates this notion with θεός. Not only is Pythagoras included among the gods, μετὰ τῶν θεῶν, he is also identified with Apollo, while the identification of Pythagoras with the Hyperborean Apollo is also attested in Aelian, who just like Iamblichus presumably had as his source Aristotle’s lost works on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans.82 Moreover, the indication that Pythagoras was born of a better seed than an ordinary human being could be taken as a further hint at his divine nature. Finally, the Pythagorean classification of rational beings into three groups could be taken to support the idea that Pythagoras’ extraordinary nature consisted of being a god in mortal form. The same idea could be referred to by the designation by the citizens of Croton of Pythagoras as a ‘divine man’.83 Furthermore, the fame of Pythagoras as an extraordinary, divine being is confirmed by other Aristotelian fragments that connect Pythagoras to extravagant anecdotes, miraculous deeds and fanciful stories, such as his 78 79 80 81

82

83

Iambl. VP 6.30 = Fr. 192 Rose: ἕνα τῶν δαιμόνων τὴν σελήνην κατοικούντων. Ael. VH. 2.26 = Fr. 191 Rose: Ἀριστοτέλης λέγει ὑπὸ τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν τὸν Πυθαγόραν Ἀπόλλωνα Ὑπερβόρειον προσαγορεύεσθαι. Ael. VH 4.17 = Fr. 191 Rose: Ἐδίδασκε Πυθαγόρας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὅτι κρειττόνων γεγένηται σπερμάτων ἢ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν τὴν θνητήν. Iambl. V.P. 6. 31 = Arist. Fr. 192 Rose: ἱστορεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τοῖς Πυθαγορικῆς φιλοσοφίας διαίρεσίν τινα τοιάνδε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν τοῖς πάνυ ἀπορρήτοις διαφυλάττεσθαι· τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου τὸ μέν ἐστι θεός, τὸ δ’ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ οἷον Πυθαγόρας. See Kerényi (1940: 11–12), Burkert (1972: 141–44), Riedweg (2002: 97–99) and Primavesi (2013: 715). It is worth noting that Diogenes Laertius (8.5) reports Pythagoras’ previous lives as Aethalides and Euphorbus. Whereas the former relates Pythagoras to Hermes, the latter connects him to Apollo. On Diogenes’ passage, see Chapter 2.3. θεῖος ἀνήρ. See Detienne (1963: 133–34).

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gift of ubiquity and his ability to kill a poisonous snake with a bite as well as to talk to beasts and rivers.84 Additionally, Aristotle knew the legend of Pythagoras’ golden thigh,85 a sign of him being more than an ordinary human. With all this considered, we can conclude that early Pythagoreans spread the belief in the exceptional nature of their master, who was considered as a divine being in human form. Thus, we can appreciate that the concept of δαίμων is one of the ways used by our sources to emphasize the exceptional, divine nature of Pythagoras. Because the term serves to distinguish Pythagoras as a being superior to ordinary mortals, it seems unlikely that it also conveys the sense of soul working through rebirths. Unless we assume that Pythagoras envisaged rebirth as the exceptional fate of very few extraordinary beings. However, if we consider the sources attesting to Pythagoras’ doctrine of rebirth, the most likely inference is that the fate of death and rebirth is believed to be everyone’s destiny. Moreover, our sources seem to indicate that Pythagoras believed that everyone’s ψυχή, and not δαίμων, is reborn each time as a different form of a living being. In this respect, one of our earliest pieces of evidence, a fragment of Xenophanes (sixth century BCE), runs as follows: καί ποτέ μιν στυφελιζομένου σκύλακος παριόντα φασὶν ἐποικτῖραι καὶ τόδε φάσθαι ἔπος· ‘παῦσαι μηδὲ ῤάπιζ’, ἐπεὶ ἦ φίλου ἀνέρος ἐστίν ψυχή, τὴν ἔγνων φθεγξαμένης ἀίων

(DK 21 B 7 [= XEN D 64 Laks-Most])

They say that once when a puppy was being beaten as he was passing, he pitied it and spoke the following words: ‘stop and do not keep hitting since it is certainly the soul of a friend, which I recognized when I heard it yelp’.

By illustrating Pythagoras86 pitying a beaten puppy because he thought it was a friend reborn as a dog,87 Xenophanes’ lines are evidence of a Pythagorean doctrine of rebirth according to which the ψυχή of an ordinary human being – here an unspecified friend of Pythagoras – can be reborn as an animal. Besides attesting to rebirth as mortals’ common fate, the 84 86 87

85 Fr. 191 Rose. Ibid. That the person who recognized the soul of a friend in a yelping puppy is to be identified with Pythagoras is attested by Diogenes Laertius 8.36, who is also the source of the quotation. There is a consensus that Xenophanes’ lines contain a large element of mockery and ridicule, and the target of this mockery was specifically Pythagoras and his boasted ability, rather than the doctrine of metempsychosis per se. See Lesher (1992: 79–80).

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fragment also reveals that Pythagoras was able to recognize his friend – more correctly, the soul of his friend – through the puppy’s voice. This detail highlights not only the preeminent role of ψυχή in Pythagoras’ doctrine of rebirth, but also his conception of personal survival, having singled out the soul as the bearer of certain personal characteristics that enable the identification of a particular individual.88 If we look at additional sources attesting to Pythagoras’ doctrine of rebirth, we find Ion of Chios (fifth century BCE), who, in a few lines of praise to Pherecydes of Syros (sixth century BCE), confirms that Pythagoras was considered the authority on such a doctrine: ὣς ὁ μὲν ἠνορέηι τε κεκασμένος ἠδὲ καὶ αἰδοῖ καὶ φθίμενος ψυχῆι τερπνὸν ἔχει βίοτον, εἴπερ Πυθαγόρης ἐτύμως ὁ σοφὸς περὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων γνώμας εἶδε καὶ ἐξέμαθεν . . .

(DK 36 B 4 [= PYTH a P 29 Laks-Most])

Thus he, for his manhood and dignity his soul is enjoying a pleasant life even after his death if Pythagoras is truly a sage and more than any other human beings knew and understood the doctrines . . .

Ion of Chios connects the faith in Pherecydes’ blissful life after death, a post-mortem reward for his extraordinary virtues, to Pythagoras’ name and doctrine. What is relevant for the present investigation is that Ion specifies that it is Pherecydes’ ψυχή which is enjoying a blissful life after death, thus connecting Pythagoras’ doctrine with the concept of soul. Similarly, a debated passage of Herodotus can be connected with Pythagoras’ teaching on rebirth. In the second book of his Histories,89 Herodotus argued that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and its reincarnations originated in Egypt, but was picked up by some Greeks too, whom Herodotus decided, for unspecified reasons,90 to leave unnamed: Πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι, τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος ἐς ἄλλο ζῷον αἰεὶ γινόμενον ἐσδύεται· ἐπεὰν δὲ πάντα περιέλθῃ τὰ χερσαῖα καὶ τὰ θαλάσσια καὶ τὰ πετεινά, αὖτις ἐς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα γινόμενον ἐσδύνειν· τὴν περιήλυσιν δὲ αὐτῇ γίνεσθαι ἐν τρισχιλίοισι ἔτεσι. Τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ 88 89

On Empedocles’ analogous concepts of individual identity and personal survival upon many deaths and lives, see Chapter 5.4. 2.123. 90 See Goedde (2007).

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Several possible referents have been proposed for the anonymous Greeks who, ‘some earlier and some later’, believed in the soul’s rebirths. Scholars have suggested identifying οἱ μὲν πρότερον with Pythagoras and οἱ δὲ ὕστερον with Empedocles,91 or, respectively, with Orphic circles and the Pythagoreans.92 Either way, we see that doctrines of rebirth in Greece, in addition to being commonly linked to the name of Pythagoras, employ the notion of ψυχή. Further evidence from the fourth century BCE confirms this picture. For instance, in a passage of De Anima (407b 21), Aristotle complains that the Pythagoreans, in their theories on the soul, do not have an adequate explanation of the way ψυχή enters the body, but allege chance as the cause for that: ὥσπερ ἐνδεχόμενον κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς μύθους τὴν τυχοῦσαν ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ἐνδύεσθαι σῶμα. As it were possible, according to the Pythagorean myths, that each soul enters each body by chance.

Here again, we see the Pythagorean concept of rebirth exploiting the notion of ψυχή. There is, moreover, a Pythagorean symbolon,93 attested by 91

92

93

See H. S. Long (1948: 22), Timpanaro Cardini (1958: I, 21–22), Guthrie (1962: 160, 173 n.4), KirkRaven-Schofield (1983: 210f.) and West (1983: 8 n.11). More cautiously, Seaford (1986: 11–12) and Burkert (1972: 126 n.38). According to Bernabé (2004: 79), Herodotus refers to Pythagoras and Empedocles, but did not distinguish between Pythagoreans and Orphics. See Maddalena (1954: 346–47), Nilsson (1967: 701) and Casadio (1991: 128–29). According to Rathmann (1933: 55) the reference is to Orphics and Empedocles, but he does not exclude a reference to the Pythagoreans as well. With the term symbola various authors refer to collections of sayings or maxims that are part of a large body of traditional Pythagorean wisdom. They embrace a broad and diverse range of topics including cosmology, ethics, ritual and cult, dietary matters (probably related to ritual) and everyday behaviour. Most of the symbola are rules concerning what to do or not to do in particular situations or with reference to specific things. The Pythagoreans considered them the most important and most characteristic of the master’s teachings. See Boehm (1905), Delatte (1915: 271–312), Burkert (1972: 188–90), Thom (1994; 2013), Hüffmeier (2001), Riedweg (2002: 61–62), Berra (2006), Huffman (2008: esp. 40–42) and Gemelli Marciano (2002; 2007b: 120–31; 2014). See also Vítek (2009).

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Iamblichus, Protr. 21, which prescribes that we should abstain from all that is ensouled: ἐμ-ψύχων ἀπέχεσθαι. This prescription, by warning about eating or using anything that has a ψυχή, could be connected to Pythagoras’ doctrine of rebirth and thereby may be hinting at the individuals’ ψυχή involved in it. In conclusion, our earliest sources are a strong indication that Pythagoras professed a doctrine according to which ordinary mortals are reborn as different forms of living beings, including animals. Additionally, Pythagoras’ doctrine of rebirth exploits the notion of ψυχή as the bearer of individual identity and personal survival upon several deaths and diverse forms of life. However, as we have seen at the beginning of this section, when looking at the tales on Pythagoras’ own rebirths, it is a δαίμων that is said to have been reborn as diverse human beings. How can we interpret this apparent substitution of δαίμων for ψυχή? My claim is that the Pythagorean circles, while professing a doctrine according to which the soul (ψυχή) of ordinary mortals undergoes processes of rebirth, also cared to spread the belief that their master was not an ordinary human. Nevertheless, the fact that he was of flesh and blood and looked like a normal human required the explanation that he also was a reincarnated individual. Thus, his nature being considered superior to that of ordinary people but his shape closely resembling that of a normal person were explained by resorting to the concept of divine reincarnation: Pythagoras’ true nature is that of a reborn god, specifically, the reincarnation of Apollo. Related to this, the Pythagorean circles spread the belief that their master, as someone who was more than human, was in fact a favourable δαίμων and a divine friend of human beings. In virtue of his exceptional nature and also of his extraordinary wisdom regarding in a special way the souls and their destiny, as attested by our sources – a knowledge that he very likely acquired by going in and out of Hades94 – Pythagoras was regarded as a δαίμων φύλαξ who watches over and guides human beings to their destiny in this life and beyond.95 In this sense, the Pythagorean demonology reflects the notion of δαίμων in Plato’s myths. As we have seen above, Plato made extensive use of the idea of δαίμονες φύλακες (and also of δαίμονες ψυχοπομποί) that watch over and guide the individuals through the

94 95

See Chapter 2.3 on this. In Chapter 2.2.2 I argued that, in his katabasis to the underworld, Empedocles has Pythagoras as a guide.

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whole parabola of their lives. However, we could also appreciate that an analogous concept was already attested in Hesiod. In conclusion, the early Pythagorean circles developed a special demonology, with the aim of explaining their master’s exceptional personality as coming from the gods. Moreover, they closely linked such demonology to the doctrine of rebirth they professed.96 As the example of Pythagoras shows, a god could enter the cycle of rebirths designed primarily for the ψυχαί of ordinary mortals and be reborn as an extraordinary individual, who guides people to a better destiny. My final claim, moreover, is that this particular bond between δαίμονες and ψυχαί within the concept of rebirth is an innovation of Pythagoras (or early Pythagorean circles) and his special legacy to Empedocles.

3.5

Empedocles, daimon phylax

As we have seen, by returning to the texts themselves, the assumptions that scholars have offered around the meaning and role of δαίμων as soul, which has implications for our reading of Empedocles’ own notion, have fallen short. Specifically in the section above, I have shown that Pythagoras, Empedocles’ doctrinal model, did not develop a concept of rebirth in which the individual soul is a δαίμων, but rather exploits the notion of ψυχή as the agent of ordinary humans’ reincarnations. In addition, we have seen that Pythagorean circles professed the belief in gods who can be reborn as (very few) exceptional individuals like Pythagoras himself. This indicates that Pythagoras developed a demonology that was bound to his doctrine of general rebirth, but never overlapped with it. Given Pythagoras’ role as a doctrinal model for Empedocles’ belief in rebirth, as we have seen in Chapters 2.2.3 and 2.3, I will now argue that B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and the other demonological fragments are also intended to develop Empedocles’ own ‘demonology’; that is, his portrayal not merely as a god, but more specifically as a δαίμων φύλαξ, a divine protector and guide for human beings. As we have seen in Chapter 2.2, the demonological fragments account for Empedocles’ extraordinary nature as a god who experienced an exceptional katabasis-journey to the reign of the dead. As I have repeatedly argued, this 96

Admittedly, it is not at all certain whether this particular portrayal of Pythagoras as a divine being is the result of an attempt, within the first Pythagorean circles, to praise the figure of the founder or whether Pythagoras himself had already shown the intention to create his own legend, just like Empedocles.

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places him in a unique position compared to the rest of human beings. This conclusion is perfectly in line with an interpretation of his concept of δαίμων that accords with that found in epic poetry,97 in Plato’s myths of the underworldly journeys of the soul and, above all, in our sources for Pythagoras’ demonology. However, the idea that a god could be reborn as different forms of living beings and finally as an individual of exceptional ability and knowledge, who teaches people their place in this world and beyond, is Pythagoras’ special legacy to Empedocles. As we have just seen, the Pythagoreans construct their claim to the superior nature and wisdom of his master around the concept of δαίμων. Moreover, Pythagoras is the reincarnation of Apollo and, as such, the δαίμων φύλαξ par excellence. Further, by tying their demonology to their doctrine of rebirth, the early Pythagoreans paved the way for the notion that a god could enter the cycle of reincarnations designed primarily for ordinary mortals. The accumulation of elements just provided suggests that, following the example of his doctrinal model, Empedocles developed his own demonology. The story of his being a δαίμων going in and out of Hades, understood primarily as authorial validation, provides him with wisdom and, therefore, a role vis-à-vis his fellow humans: through his philosophy he will guide people in this world and beyond. In other words, just like Pythagoras, Empedocles depicts himself as a δαίμων φύλαξ. In Chapter 6.2.1, we will see that Empedocles’ didactic attitude towards Pausanias highlights the special role Empedocles ascribes to himself as a δαίμων φύλαξ who, through his philosophy, guides his disciple along the way to godhood. Yet, while only Empedocles – or, more precisely, only very few exceptional individuals like Pythagoras and Empedocles – are reincarnated δαίμονες, born of a better seed than humans, the rest of ordinary mortals are eo ipso reincarnated beings.

3.6

‘Physical’ daimones

For the sake of completeness, there is a last issue that needs to be addressed before bringing this chapter to a close. It concerns a further occurrence of the term δαίμων within the chiefly physical context of Empedocles’ zoogony.98 For this reason, it is generally considered a ‘physical’ use of the term δαίμων (in contrast to the more ‘religious’ occurrence in 97

98

See my analysis in Section 3.2 above. See already Primavesi (2006a: 55): ‘since Empedocles is using the epic poetry, it seems prima facie far more likely that his use of “daimōn” is guided either by Hesiod . . . or by Homer’. Simpl. De caelo, 587.18–20 (DK 31 B 59 [= EMP D 149 Laks-Most]).

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B 115 [= EMP D 10 Laks-Most]) and, as such, it has been given a different referent and meaning than the occurrence in B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost); indeed, a meaning that is thought to be more pertinent to zoogonic speculations and, more generally, to On Nature. Simplicius’ passage runs as follows: ἐν ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ καταστάσει ‘μουνομελῆ’ ἔτι τὰ γυῖα ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Νείκους διακρίσεως ὄντα ἐπλανᾶτο τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα μίξεως ἐφιέμενα. ‘αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ, φησί, κατὰ μεῖζον ἐμίσγετο δαίμονι δαίμων’, ὅτε τοῦ Νείκους ἐπεκράτει λοιπὸν ἡ Φιλότης, ‘ταῦτά τε συμπίπτεσκον, ὅπῃ συνέκυρσεν ἕκαστα, ἄλλα τε πρὸς τοῖς πολλὰ διηνεκῆ ἐξεγένοντο’. ἐπὶ τῆς Φιλότητος οὖν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐκεῖνα εἶπεν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπικρατούσης ἤδη τῆς Φιλότητος, ἀλλ’ ὡς μελλούσης ἐπικρατεῖν, ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἄμικτα καὶ μονόγυια δηλούσης.

(DK 31 B 59 [= EMP D 149 Laks-Most])

So in this state (of the world), the limbs which were still isolated members because of the separation of Strife wandered about desiring mixture with each other. ‘But when δαίμων mixed more with δαίμων’, when Love was then achieving predominance over Strife, ‘these things were falling together, as each happened to meet and many other things in addition to these were continually arising’. So Empedocles said these things happened in the period of Love, not in the sense that she was about to predominate, but in the period when Love has been revealing things still unmixed and single-limbed.

Simplicius quotes and comments upon some Empedoclean verses whose topic deals with the generation of living beings by mixtures of single limbs (or single-limbed organisms); that is, the second zoogonic stage. Empedocles’ ideas on zoogony are known to us thanks to a concise report by Aëtius attesting to four stages in the generations of living beings: first, the birth of single limbs or single-limbed organisms; second, the casual aggregations of single limbs in imperfectly integrated beings and monsters; third, the formation of well-integrated beings; and fourth, the birth of sexed animals.99 The passage quoted above is part of a section100 in which Simplicius dealt with the beginning of zoogony by Love. Because of Strife’s overwhelming contrast, Love initially succeeded just in the formation of single-limbed

99 100

Aëtius 5.19.5 = DK 31 A 72 (= EMP D 151 Laks-Most). On this passage and, more generally, on Empedocles’ zoogony, see Ferella (2021) and here Chapters 7.1.3 and 7.1.4. De Caelo 586.29–587.20.

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organisms (that is, single limbs without a whole animal body).101 Then, when she gained more and more power over Strife and gradually achieved predominance, as Simplicius tells us, the single-limbed organisms began to come together as they happened to meet. The mention in Simplicius’ passage of separated limbs that desire mixture with each other suggests a reference to the transition from the first to the second zoogonic stage, namely from single limbs to imperfectly integrated beings and monsters arisen from casual mixtures of these single limbs. On first reading, the ‘physical’ occurrence of the term δαίμων seems to have nothing in common with the exiled god punished through rebirths of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). On second thought, however, we will see that there is an underlying conceptual unity among the diverse uses of this term. Be that as it may, scholars have observed that, considering the context provided by Simplicius, the referent of δαίμων in B 59 (= EMP D 149 Laks-Most) can be narrowed down to three things: (1) the four elements, (2) limbs or (3) Love and Strife. Primavesi excludes that δαίμων means ‘limbs’, since ‘if the daimones were the isolated limbs, the process described in the first line of B 59 would be the same as the process described in the second line’ and ‘[t]hus, there would be no material difference between the protasis and the first part of the apodosis, which seems quite unlikely’.102 Primavesi therefore argues that δαίμων here means the four elements103 referred to as ‘blurred’ gods – that is, downgraded or lessened deities.104 Primavesi’s argument is that the elements are generally regarded as divine in Empedocles, but are called by the names of significant θεοί.105 So if here they are referred to as δαίμονες rather than θεοί it must be because – so argues Primavesi – Empedocles wanted to highlight their lessened and deficient (to use Primavesi’s word) status as a result of them being involved in mixtures.106 Be that as it may, on this interpretation, Empedocles’ fragment explains that a growing mixture of δαίμονες-elements produces an increase in encounters among single limbs (or single-limbed organisms).

101 102 104 105 106

See B 57 (= EMP D 154 Laks-Most): ᾗ πολλαὶ μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν, / γυμνοὶ δ’ ἐπλάζοντο βραχίονες εὔνιδες ὤμων, / ὄμματά τ’ οἶ’ ἐπλανᾶτο πενητεύοντα μετώπων. Primavesi (2008b: 260). 103 Ibid. So also Wright (1995: 212). Primavesi seems to draw on the widely accepted notion of δαίμων as a downgraded deity. See, e.g., B 6 (= EMP D 57 Laks-Most), quoted and translated in Chapter 2.7. Specifically, Primavesi (2008b: 260) argues that the elements ‘seem to be addressed as daimones as long as their divinity is blurred’; that is, when they are mixed. Instead, when they are no longer involved in mixtures their divine status is fully regained and in fact ‘they form long lived gods’ (Primavesi’s emphasis).

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To this, Trépanier replies that, if δαίμονες are the elements, the change of subject between protasis and apodosis, though possible, is slightly bizarre. In particular, [w]hy do we need to be told that the elements were mixing more, if the real point of the passage, given in line 3, is not to describe the emergence of mixture or compounds from non mixture, as for example in B 35, but the true novelty of the situation, the emergence of the monsters from previously separated compound limbs?107

On account of this issue, Trépanier resolves to read δαίμων as ‘limb’. In fact, in his reading, an identity between protasis and apodosis is not only possible, it even allows him [that is, Empedocles] to underline the dual agency of Love and Strife in zoogony. In line 1, κατὰ μεῖζον ἐμίσγετο denotes the increased relative power of Love over Strife . . . But in line 2, to avert any expectations of complete control by Love in this environment, Empedocles uses συμπίπτεσκον to denote frequent and violent collisions. Both it and διηνεκῆ are his way of insisting that though Love was on the rise, Strife was still very much in play.108

In other words, Trépanier argues that δαίμων in Empedocles’ line ought to mean ‘limb’ to emphasize the dual agency of Love and Strife in zoogony, namely the fact that, in the generation of living beings, both forces are ‘very much in play’.109 However, if the Empedoclean lines are to emphasize the dual agency of Love and Strife in zoogony, hence their dual influence over the single limbs, then the expression δαίμονι δαίμων is better translated as referring to Love and Strife. It is worth noting that this is precisely the way in which Simplicius – who could read these lines within their original context110 – interpreted the Empedoclean quotation. Nevertheless, that δαίμονι δαίμων refers to Love and Strife has been excluded by both Primavesi and Trépanier. Both scholars contend that if δαίμονι δαίμων means Love and Strife, then the whole line would indicate that the two forces ‘mix more’ (κατὰ μεῖζον ἐμίσγετο). But this is unlikely – so they argue – since there is never mixture between Love and Strife, but only conflict. Admittedly, Primavesi acknowledges that the Greek verb μείγνυμι or μίγνυμι can have both a positive and a hostile sense, meaning 107 110

Trépanier (2014: 179–80). 108 Ibid. 180. The emphasis is by the author. 109 Ibid. Simplicius was followed by Diels (1901: 129) and Diels-Kranz at p. 333 (‘die Liebe mit dem Streite’).

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both ‘to bring into connection with’ or ‘make acquainted with’, and ‘to mix in battle’. The positive and hostile sense are both well attested in Homer, where the passive form of the verb can mean both ‘to be brought into contact’, hence ‘to be mixed’, and ‘to be mixed in fight’. However, Primavesi excludes that Empedocles employed μείγνυμι and its derivatives in the hostile sense as their occurrences in the extant fragments indicate a mixture that produces union and not struggle.111 However, the occurrences of μείγνυμι in Empedocles’ poetry are admittedly too scanty to be regarded as representative of an Empedoclean usus. Therefore, any analysis aiming at establishing the meaning of terms whose occurrences in a single author are per se insufficient, as in the case we are analyzing here, must take into account their occurrences in the author’s literary models; that is, for Empedocles, first and foremost Homer’s epic language. As the Homeric occurrences show, the positive and the hostile sense are fused in the epic use of μείγνυμι. Thus, in the absence of any genuine reason to assume the contrary, we are obliged on balance to accept the fact that the positive and hostile sense are fused in Empedocles’ occurrences of μείγνυμι too. This means that there is an ambiguity in Empedocles’ use of μείγνυμι as there is in the process of mixing when it involves Love and Strife. In other words, we cannot exclude in principle that they may mix in love within the metaphor domain of a sexual relationship,112 as Ares and Aphrodite do in a famous Homeric passage.113 Surely, they may mix in conflict, as Empedocles’ use of the military metaphor domain in his cosmological representation114 invites us to think. Thus, κατὰ μεῖζον ἐμίσγετο δαίμονι δαίμων in Simplicius’ passage may well mean a hostile relation between the two δαίμονες; that is, between Love and Strife. Yet Primavesi (at 260) and Trépanier (at 179) argue further that, even though we retain the hostile sense in the Empedoclean occurrences of μείγνυμι and its derivatives, it is nevertheless odd (Trépanier) and even implausible (Primavesi), to deduce from a growing conflict between Love and Strife an increase in unification. However, as we have seen above, Simplicius tells us that the two Empedoclean zoogonic stages he is dealing 111 112 113 114

Primavesi (2008b: 260). As Sedley (1989), for instance, implies in his reconstruction of the proem to Empedocles’ On Nature. Od. 8. 266–366. That Empedocles uses a military metaphor in his cosmological representation is acknowledged by the majority of scholars. On Empedocles’ use of this metaphor, see Graham (2005), Ferella (2020) and Chapter 7.3.

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with occur in a phase of the world in which Strife is still very powerful, whereas Love has just begun regaining power over her rival. This ensures that Love’s increase of power over Strife entails in parallel an increase in conflict between the two forces, for Love must intensify its unifying power to counter the separating force of Strife. It follows that, pace Primavesi and Trépanier, processes of mixtures and generations, which can bring about increasing unification, do derive from an increasing conflict between the two forces. In conclusion, Simplicius’ interpretation of this Empedoclean passage stands. The expression δαίμονι δαίμων refers here to Love and Strife, whereas κατὰ μεῖζον ἐμίσγετο indicates their battle, which increases as Love intensifies her power over her enemy. It is this increase of conflict that brings about encounters and unions of single limbs as well as further zoogonic generations. With all this given, let us return to the question of whether δαίμων in B 59 (= EMP D 149 Laks-Most) could be in any way related to the occurrence of δαίμων in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). It is worth observing that although, over the years, scholars have shown diverse methodological approaches to explore this issue, all take the term δαίμων in Empedocles as a vehicle of equivalences in different contexts. One approach, for instance, assumes that the two δαίμονες, the ‘religious’ one of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and the ‘physical’ one of B 59 (= EMP D 149 Laks-Most), relate by virtue of the fact that their physical composition ultimately shares some elements. In this respect, Cornford hypothesized that δαίμων in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and δαίμων in B 59 (= EMP D 149 Laks-Most), though indicating different things, relate because both have a share in Love. Cornford argues that, in the case of δαίμων in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), ‘it is possible, by an effort of imagination, to picture the soul as a portion of Love, contaminated, in the impure embodied state, with a portion of Strife’.115 On the other hand, Cornford assumes that the δαίμων mixing more with δαίμων in B 59 (= EMP D 149 Laks-Most) indicates increasing mixtures of (quanta of) 115

Cornford (1926: 59). Cornford’s hypothesis gained some followers, such as Kahn (1960), O’Brien (1969: 325–36) and Martin-Primavesi (1999). An analogous approach is taken by Darcus (1977), who assumes that δαίμων is a manifestation of the φρὴν ἱερή, ‘Holy Mind’ (B 134 [= EMP D 93 LaksMost]), which can both love and hate: ‘Empedocles refers to the movement of daimōnes. They wander . . . and mingle with one another (B 59.1). . . . In B 59 then Empedocles describes the result of one daimōn, able to love and hate, meeting with another, which also loves and hates’ (at 189). Although B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) shows that δαίμων does love and hate (by being able to trust both Love and Strife), Darcus’ hypothesis that δαίμων is a manifestation of the φρὴν ἱερή, just like Cornford’s hypothesis, has no textual basis.

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Love. In this respect, by describing Love’s increasing power over Strife, Cornford’s reading also partially makes sense of Simplicius’ explanation of the Empedoclean line. However, as scholars have not failed to point out, Cornford’s hypothesis that δαίμων is (a quantum of) Love has no textual evidence, either in Empedocles’ own words or in their sources. Moreover, from the perspective of Empedocles’ antinomy of forces,116 saying that Love could be ‘stained’ with Strife (as is the δαίμων in B 115 [= EMP D 10 Laks-Most]) seems quite unconvincing. A different approach to the issue has been put forward by Primavesi from 2001 onwards. According to his reading, Empedocles did not mean to underline elements the two δαίμονες have in common; rather, δαίμων in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) and δαίμων in B 59 (= EMP D 149 LaksMost) mean utterly different things. However, by using the same word, Empedocles aims at emphasizing a strong connection between the religious and physical δαίμονες and, therefore, between the religious and physical poems.117 Specifically, Primavesi interprets the story of the transmigrating god (the religious δαίμων) of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) as a mythological counterpart (or mirror, to use a metaphor employed by Primavesi) of Empedocles’ physics. On this basis, he suggests that Empedocles’ poems reflect complementary perspectives on the cosmic cycle. On the one hand, δαίμων in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) conveys the internal perspective of guilty individual beings (Primavesi calls this perspective theologia fabulosa). On the other hand, in On Nature, we have a proto-scientific external perspective (labelled by Primavesi as theologia naturalis), in which δαίμων in B 59.1 (= EMP D 149.1 Laks-Most]) is taken as shifting the perspective from the level of the isolated individual beings (that is, the perspective expressed by δαίμονες in B 115 [= EMP D 10 LaksMost]) to that of the four elements, roots of all things. As a result, according to Primavesi, the process of becoming a transmigrating δαίμων on the mythical level corresponds, in the physics, to the process involving the four elements in mixtures within the cosmic cycle.118 116 117

118

See Chapter 4.2. Either by allegory, as in 2006a – ‘this myth [i.e., of the wandering gods in B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost)] is an allegorical mirror . . . of the physical system’ (e.g., p. 74). Or by analogy, as in 2008b – e.g., p. 252, ‘mythological mirror . . . of Empedocles’ physical theory’ – and in 2013, e.g., p. 674 (‘strukturell analog’) und 717 (‘Analogieverhältnis’). According to Primavesi (2008b), the elements ‘fall’ as δαίμονες when they are impure; that is, mixed with each other to form compounds in the world. For this reason, they can be called by the same name as the impure gods of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most): δαίμονες. However, they regain divine rewards and become gods (see B 6 [= EMP D 57 Laks-Most]) when they are pure and homogeneous masses of elements due to Strife’s action.

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In his interpretation Trépanier applies what seems to be a mixed approach, situated somewhere between Primavesi’s and Cornford’s. Specifically, in line with Primavesi’s hypothesis, Trépanier argues that δαίμων in B 59 (= EMP D 149 Laks-Most) and δαίμων in B 115 (= EMP D 149 Laks-Most) mean different things, precisely, limbs and souls respectively. However, in line with Cornford, Trépanier maintains that the two occurrences have some elements in common; that is, they relate by virtue of their being ‘material compounds, naturally occurring and enduring entities’.119 However, their differences are responsible for different positions in Empedocles’ ranking of life forms.120 Whereas the δαίμονες-souls of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) occupy a middle position in this ranking, ‘inferior to gods in duration, but more long-lasting than [animal] organs’, the δαίμονες-limbs of B 59 (= EMP D 149 Laks-Most) are to be placed at the bottom of this scale.121 Although different from one another, all these approaches encounter the same major objection. They rest upon the erroneous assumption that Empedocles’ terminology has semantic and referential stability. In fact, only by assuming semantic and referential stability are we legitimated to describe a certain term in each context in which it occurs (in our case the term δαίμων) as referring to the same thing or as being a vehicle of equivalences among the respective contexts; that is, essentially, to take that term as something like a technical notion in Empedocles’ thought. However, in a seminal 2001 contribution, M. L. Gemelli Marciano emphasized that, as it is profoundly reminiscent of the epic language and metre, Empedocles’ poetry displays a vocabulary of a highly polysemous nature, which lacks semantic stability. This means that ‘different names can have the same referent and, vice versa, identical words or expressions can have, in diverse contexts, different characteristics and denotations’.122 Consequently, when dealing with languages of this kind, ‘we cannot always establish automatic and generalising correlations 119 120

121

122

Trépanier (2014: 191). Ibid. esp. 194: ‘This ranking is important, I think, because it offers us an obvious way of thinking together all Empedoclean substances, from limbs to gods, into a single unified scheme: they are all to be ranked within an Empedoclean scala naturae based on mixture or degrees of integration under Love.’ As I am going to explain below, my approach to the question of the relation of the two δαίμονες (in B 115 [= EMP D 10 Laks-Most] and B 59 [= EMP D 149 Laks-Most]) is essentially different from that of Trépanier. However, I agree with his idea of δαίμονες as integrated beings, on which see Chapter 4.5. Moreover, I am extremely sympathetic to the main claim of his proposal which is, in his words, ‘to insist that the entire furniture of the world, from trees, birds, men and women, to gods, are all of them, elemental products or, to be exactingly correct, products of all 6 first principles’ (2014: 194–95). At 109: ‘Una caratteristica dei poemi e della lingua empedoclea . . . è infatti una grossa instabilità semantica: denominazioni diverse possono avere lo stesso referente e viceversa, parole o espressioni uguali possono assumere in contesti diversi connotazioni e denotazioni diverse’ (p. 209).

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on the basis of lexical coincidences without taking into account, each time, each specific context’ in which a given term occurs.123 Semantic instability in Empedocles’ language is prominent concerning terms that indicate the divine sphere. This has to do with the nature of such terms, which are traditionally predicative notions, according to the definition of G. M. A. Grube (not ‘God is love’, but ‘Love is god’). In fact, ‘any power, any force that we see in the world, which is not born with us and will continue after we are gone, could thus be called a god, and most of them were’.124 By this standard, we find that, in Empedocles’ verses, the term θεός is a chiefly predicative concept. As such, it is used to indicate different beings, specifically: Empedocles himself;125 (traditional) gods, either as a group126 or individually mentioned by the names of Ares, Zeus, Kronos, Poseidon and Kypris;127 the long-lived gods;128 the Muse;129 the elements;130 the Sphairos and the Holy Mind;131 Love and Strife;132 and those who escape rebirths.133 Given that, as we have seen in Section 3.5 above, the term δαίμων seems to be used by Empedocles interchangeably as a synonym for θεός, the inference is that δαίμων too is a predicative notion. Indeed, it is used to indicate very different beings: guilty and exiled gods,134 and hence Empedocles himself;135 a deity who guides the souls in the underworld;136

123

124 125 126 127 128 129

130 131 132

133 135 136

At 212: ‘Risulta chiaro che, essendo l’oscillazione semantica e referenziale un tratto costante del lessico empedocleo, non si possono stabilire correlazioni automatiche e generalizzanti sulla base di coincidenze lessicali senza tener conto ogni volta del contesto specifico.’ Grube (1935: 50). B 112.4 (= EMP D 4.4 Laks-Most) and B 23.11 (= EMP D 60.11 Laks-Most), with my discussion in Chapter 1.4. B 3.1 (= EMP D 44.1 Laks-Most), B 115.1 (= EMP D 10.1 Laks-Most), B 131.4 (= EMP D 7.4 LaksMost) and B 132 (= EMP D 8 Laks-Most). B 128 (= EMP D 25 Laks-Most) and B 3.1 (= EMP D 44.1 Laks-Most). B 21.12 (= EMP D 77a.12 Laks-Most), B 23.8 (= EMP D 60.8 Laks-Most), PStrasb. a(ii) 2 (= EMP D 73. 273 Laks-Most). On the identification of the long-lived gods, see Chapter 4.5. In B 131 (= EMP D 7 Laks-Most), the Muse is called ‘immortal’, an epithet that in epic poetry defines deities. In B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most), the Muse can be considered one of the θεοί that Empedocles invokes immediately before. Called by the name of gods: Zeus, Hera, Aidonaeus and Nestis, in B 6 (= EMP D 57 Laks-Most). B 29 (= EMP D 92 Laks-Most), B 31 (= EMP D 95 Laks-Most) and B 134 (= EMP D 93 Laks-Most). Called by the name of deities, such as Aphrodite or Kypris (B 17.24 [= EMP D 73.254 Laks-Most], B 66 [= EMP D 159 Laks-Most]; B 71.4 [= EMP D 61.4 Laks-Most], B 73.1 [= EMP D 199.1 LaksMost]) and Kotos or Eris (B 21.7 [= EMP D 77a.7 Laks-Most]; B 20.4 [= EMP D 73.4 LaksMost]). B 146–47 (= EMP D 39 and D 40 Laks-Most). 134 B 115.5 (= EMP D 10.5 Laks-Most). B 115.13 (= EMP D 10.13 Laks-Most). Porphyry’s commentary upon B 120 (= EMP D 16 Laks-Most). For the identification with Pythagoras, see Chapter 2.2.3.

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a goddess in the underworld who dresses souls with a body;137 and Love and Strife.138 It is methodologically unsound mechanically to try to correlate all the occurrences of this term in Empedocles’ poems. It follows that, just like θεός, δαίμων can be used in different contexts to indicate different divine entities, without being vehicles of any equivalences. By way of concluding, my reading of the ‘physical’ δαίμων as Love and Strife and, more generally, of δαίμων as a predicative notion, is very much in line with the interpretation of the notion of δαίμων given thus far, namely as a concept for god or deity more broadly, while respecting the polysemous and instable nature of Empedocles’ language. On my interpretation, therefore, there is no tension between the meaning of δαίμων in the zoogonic context of B 59 (= EMP D 149 Laks-Most) and the occurrence in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most). As Love and Strife can be called δαίμονες because they are gods, δαίμων in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) analogously indicates a divine being, whose qualities of being guilty, exiled and reborn as many mortal forms are idiosyncratic to the specific context of Empedocles’ vicissitude and of his own presentation. Yet, despite all possible specifications, occurrences of the term δαίμων within Empedocles’ texts, just like in Hesiod’s, Pythagoras’ and Plato’s, are still intimately connected to the traditional, Homeric sense of ‘god’.

3.7 Conclusions The present chapter has focused on an exploration and clarification of one of the most pivotal concepts introduced by the proemial fragments, that of δαίμων. As it occurs in the context of Empedocles’ story of exile and rebirths, the main goal of this exploration has been to provide the linguistic and conceptual equipment for a more comprehensive understanding of Empedocles’ concept of rebirth and, consequently, to work out a way to reconcile it with the principles and theories of his natural philosophy. An analogous analysis will be pursued in the next chapter, where the linguistic and conceptual notions under discussion are those associated with the Empedoclean conception of godhood. This and the following chapter are then to be considered as an essential premise to the consideration of Empedocles’ intertwining of religion and physics, which will then be pursued more extensively in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 137

B 126 (= EMP D 19 Laks-Most).

138

B 59 (= EMP D 149 Laks-Most).

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The deepening of Empedocles’ key-concept of δαίμων has also concerned the role the story of the guilty god plays in his doctrine of rebirth and has resulted in the rejection of the standard reading that B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) is meant to ground Empedocles’ concept of rebirth. In contrast, I have shown that the account presented in the demonological fragment is meant to give prominence to Empedocles’ almost unique condition of a reincarnated god in opposition to all other ordinary mortals. Thus, in order to investigate which notion of godhood Empedocles may have had in mind when depicting himself as a δαίμων, I have embarked on a detailed investigation of the concept of δαίμων in Greek authors attesting beliefs in rebirth, especially Plato and Pythagoras, besides Empedocles. Above all, the extended treatment of Plato in the central part of this chapter has revealed that Plato keeps δαίμονες and ψυχαί distinct in nature and role, conceiving of the former in very traditional terms as gods guiding and protecting souls in this life and beyond. This picture of the concept of δαίμων has then been confirmed and expanded by the investigation of Pythagoras’ own notion and its role in rebirth. By looking at our earliest and most reliable sources for early Pythagorenism, it has been shown that the Pythagoreans developed the innovative idea that a god could exceptionally enter the cycle of rebirths, which is primarily reserved for ordinary ψυχαί. As Pythagoras’ own story attests, he is truly a god, indeed Hyperborean Apollo, reborn in human form. As has been argued, this original notion that few extraordinary individuals are truly the reincarnation of gods was picked up by Empedocles who, by following Pythagoras’ ‘demonology’, depicts himself as a god in human form, a δαίμων φύλαξ who guides people in this life and beyond. Yet, while only a very few exceptional individuals like Pythagoras and Empedocles are reincarnated δαίμονες, the rest of ordinary mortals are eo ipso reincarnated beings. It is to them that Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth is addressed. In conclusion, having examined in great detail the notion of δαίμων in B 115 and the other demonological fragments related to it, as well as having considered its use by those authors before and after Empedocles, who also profess their belief in rebirth, we can assert that in the proem to On Nature, Empedocles does not construct a story that is aimed to represent, in mythical terms, the post-mortem destiny of our own soul. Rather, these verses are meant to construct Empedocles’ own demonology which, just like that of his master Pythagoras, is bound to, but does not overlap, with

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his doctrine of rebirth. In establishing this intention, and correcting previous misinterpretations, the necessary groundwork has been laid for the reconstruction of Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth, taking another step towards demonstrating the ways in which his physical system can accommodate his concept of rebirth as a positive doctrine within his wider and unified philosophical programme.

chapter 4

Divine Beings

Having dealt in Chapter 3 with the concept of δαίμων introduced in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), its divine status and its relation to Empedocles’ belief in rebirth, in this chapter I will look into further concepts, most of them introduced in the proemial fragments, which translate the Empedoclean notion of godhood. This investigation is important for at least two reasons. On the one hand, it is a very controversial question of Empedocles studies as to who (or what) can be considered as true gods in his physical system and which entities can be assumed to be truly divine: are the six principles (the four elements and the two forces of Love and Strife), in virtue of their being fundamental entities of reality, the only truly physical gods? Or can the Sphairos, the ‘most perfect’ form of the universe under Love’s unification, be considered not only as divine as well, but also as the major deity in Empedocles’ system? What about the Muse and the other gods he invokes in fragment B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most)? And if the principles, the Sphairos and the Muse can rightly be considered gods, what makes then different entities equally divine? On the other hand, since Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth includes the final promise of a divine reward, as has been established in Chapter 2, it is crucial to understand what is meant by ‘divine’. In other words, a definition of the divine in Empedocles’ thought is essential to fully understand his notion of rebirth. The exploration of the key terms in relation to the notion of the divine therefore forms a fundamental basis for the coming chapters, the aim of which is to further define the details of Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth in order to reconcile them with the principles of his natural philosophy. In what follows, I will analyze those entities Empedocles refers to explicitly as gods, that is, attributing to them terms such as θεός (theos) or δαίμων1 (daimon) or calling them by the names of traditional deities. 1

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Empedocles employs the terms θεός and δαίμων as synonymous with the meaning of ‘god’.

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These include different divine beings ranging from the four elements and Love and Strife, to the ideal form of the universe formed by Love at the height of her dominion, namely the Sphairos and, closely related to it, the Holy Mind (not presented in the proem). However, as we have already seen in Chapter 2, Empedocles envisaged the existence of other divine beings, not only the Muse (B 3 [= EMP D 44 Laks-Most]) but also for instance the underworld goddess who dresses the souls with a new body (B 126 [= EMP D 19 Laks-Most]) or the so-called ‘long-lived gods’ (B 21.8 [= EMP D 77a.8 Laks-Most] and B 23.8 [= EMP D 60.8 Laks-Most]). Moreover, as we have seen, a novel aspect of his philosophy is that he ascribes to himself divine nature and wisdom, while divine knowledge and powers are also promised to those who rigorously follow his teachings, purify themselves and are released from rebirths. Below, I will identify what makes these diverse beings all equally divine, aiming at defining more precisely the Empedoclean idea of ‘godhood’. To this end, this chapter embarks on an in-depth analysis of all those concepts to which divine qualities are ascribed and is therefore structured according to these concepts, so that I will consider the elements in Section 4.1,2 Love and Strife in Section 4.2,3 the Sphairos in Section 4.3,4 the Holy Mind in Section 4.45 and, finally, the so-called long-lived gods in Section 4.5.6 Within this last group, I would argue we include (traditional) gods, either referred to as a group7 or those individually mentioned by the names Zeus, Kronos and Poseidon;8 the Muse and more specifically Calliope;9 deities who guide souls in the underworld, among whom we

2 3

4 6 7 8

9

Called by the names of gods: Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis, in B 6 (= EMP D 57 Laks-Most). B 59.1 (= EMP D 149.1 Laks-Most). Love and Strife are also called by the name of deities: Love is also called Aphrodite, Cypris and Harmonia (B 17.24 [= EMP D 73.254 Laks-Most], B 66 [= EMP D 159 Laks-Most]; B 71.4 [= EMP D 61.4 Laks-Most], B 73.1 [= EMP D 199.1 Laks-Most], etc.), whereas Strife coincides with Kotos or Eris (B 21.7 [= EMP D 77a.7], B 20.4 [= EMP D 73.305]). See also Ares and Kydoimos in B 128 (= EMP D 25 Laks-Most), on which see n.8 below. 5 B 31 (= EMP D 95 Laks-Most). See also Simpl. Phys. 1124.1. B 134 (= EMP D 93 Laks-Most). B 21.12 (= EMP D 77a.12 Laks-Most), B 23.8 (= EMP D 60.8 Laks-Most), PStrasb. a(ii) 2 (= EMP D 73.273 Laks-Most). B 3.1 (= EMP D 44.1 Laks-Most), B 115.1 (= EMP D 10.1 Laks-Most), B 131.4 (= EMP D 7.4 LaksMost) and B 132 (= EMP D 8 Laks-Most). B 128 (= EMP D 25 Laks-Most). It is worth noting that in this fragment further gods, such as Ares and Kydoimos are mentioned alongside Zeus, Kronos and Poseidon. I would argue, however, that Ares and possibly Kydoimos are two names to indicate Strife, just like Cypris or Aphrodite are names for Love. In B 131 (= EMP D 7 Laks-Most), the Muse is called ‘immortal’, an epithet that defines deities in epic poetry. In B 3 (= EMP D 44 Laks-Most), the Muse can be considered as one of the θεοί that Empedocles invokes immediately before.

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may number Pythagoras;10 a goddess in the underworld who dresses souls with new bodies;11 guilty and exiled gods12 and thus Empedocles’ himself;13 and, finally, those who escape rebirths.14 We will see that although, in a general sense, all members of the five groups are divine, each of them is divine for different reasons; yet members across several groups also share common qualities. Thus, my methodological strategy here is to pinpoint those particular aspects that make the divine nature of each group different from the other, while indicating in parallel the common aspects they share as gods, in order to more precisely delineate an Empedoclean notion of the divine. In this respect, the main result of this investigation is that, with regard to living beings, we can confidently say that for them to be (or become) gods means to have a divine status that is modelled upon the divine characteristics of the Sphairos, the perfect form of the universe. These characteristics are associated with Love in contrast to Strife and comprehend purity, stability (continuity), symmetry and beauty, blissfulness and perfect knowledge. In this sense, the divine nature of the Sphairos represents the ideal form of godhood in Empedocles’ cosmos to which all integrated beings aspire. As we will see in Chapter 7, the achievement of this kind of godhood by the individual has remarkable repercussions on the cosmic level. Thus, in conclusion, the result worked out here will not only provide us with a definition of the divine in Empedocles that helps us better understand his doctrine of rebirth; it will also represent necessary groundwork to the central argument of this book.

4.1

The Four Elements

The first type of entity I will consider is the four elements, because it is here that we can most easily see the way in which Empedocles refers to aspects of his physical system with divine terms. As we have seen in Chapter 2.7, in fragment B 6 (= EMP D 57 Laks-Most) Empedocles introduces the 10 11 13 14

Gods who guide the souls are identified with the subject of B 120 (= EMP D 16 Laks-Most) by Porphyry, De antro nymph. 8.61.19. For his identification with Pythagoras, see Chapter 2.2.2. 12 B 126 (= EMP D 19 Laks-Most). B 115.5 (= EMP D 10.5 Laks-Most). B 115.13 (= EMP D 10.13 Laks-Most), B 112.4 (= EMP D 4.4 Laks-Most) and B 23.11 (= EMP D 60.11 Laks-Most), with my discussion in Chapter 1.4. B 146–47 (= EMP D 39 and D 40 Laks-Most). It is worth noting that Empedocles’ sources talk of Empedoclean personified powers inhabiting the underworld as δαίμονες, see B 121 (= EMP D 24 Laks-Most) and B 122–23 (= EMP D 21 and D 22 Laks-Most), with my discussion in Chapter 2.2.3. As we do not have any other clues to explore the divine nature of these personified powers, they will not be investigated as relevant items of Empedocles’ concept of godhood in this chapter.

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elements as four divine roots corresponding to two pairs of gods and goddesses: Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis.15 While the plant metaphor in this fragment already suggests some essential qualities of the four elements – the elements like the roots of a plant are what sustains and nourishes life – in order to understand why fire, air, water and earth are equated to important gods of the Greek pantheon (and, thereby, to explore what makes their godhood) we need to focus on their working in the cycle. This working is presented for the first time not in the proem, but rather within the cosmological exposition beginning with fragment B 17 (= EMP D 73.233–66 Laks-Most). Precisely at lines 16–18 (= EMP D 73.247–49 Laks-Most) and 27–35 (= EMP D 73.258–66) we read: δίπλ’ ἐρέω· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ηὐξήθη μόνον εἶναι ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ’ αὖ διέφυ πλέον’ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἠέρος ἄπλετον ὕψος ... ταῦτα γὰρ ἶσά τε πάντα καὶ ἥλικα γένναν ἔασι, τιμῆς δ’ ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδει, πάρα δ’ ἦθος ἑκάστωι, ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο. καὶ πρὸς τοῖς οὔτ’ ἄρ τι ἐπιγίνεται οὐδ’ ἀπολήγει· εἴτε γὰρ ἐφθείροντο διαμπερές, οὐκέτ’ ἂν ἦσαν· τοῦτο δ’ ἐπαυξήσειε τὸ πᾶν τί κε; καὶ πόθεν ἐλθόν; πῆι δέ κε κἠξαπόλοιτο, ἐπεὶ τῶνδ’ οὐδὲν ἔρημον; ἀλλ’ αὐτ(ὰ) ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι’ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ ἠνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα.

16

30

35

A twofold tale I shall tell: at one time they [i.e., the elements] grew to be only one 16 out of many, at another time again they grew apart to be many out of one: fire and water and earth and the immense height of air ... For these are all equal and identical in birth, but each one presides over a different honour, according to its own character, and by turns they dominate while the time revolves. And besides these, nothing at all is added nor is lacking; 30 for if they perished entirely, they would no longer be. And this whole here, what could increase it, and coming from where? And how could it be completely destroyed, since nothing is empty of these? But these things alone are; yet running through each other they become now this, now that, and each time are continually the same. 35

15

For the correspondence of each god with a specific element and for a general interpretation of the fragment, see Chapter 2.7.

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The lines of B 17.16–18 (= EMP D 73.247–49 Laks-Most)16 tell us that the elements of ‘fire and water and earth and the immense height of air’ work in a cosmic cycle in which they are alternately and regularly united into one thing alone and are separated into many things again. Moreover, lines 30–33 (= EMP D 73.261–64 Laks-Most) point out that they comprise the total quantity of matter in the world. In fact, nothing can be added to the whole that is made out of them, nor can any one of the elements be lacking in any way. Indeed, Empedocles rejects the possibility that any of the elements could utterly dissolve or that anything else outside the totality could increase it on the basis of three arguments, lucidly reconstructed by Inwood:17 (1) If there were or had been a steady and progressive destruction of one or more of the basic entities, then they would have disappeared completely by now – assuming the passage of an indefinitely long period of time. (2) Nothing outside the totality could be a source for additional growth – since ex hypothesi the totality is all that there is. (3) And there is no way that the totality could be destroyed, since nothing is now empty of these entities. Only this third argument requires elaboration: to be destroyed would have to mean . . . getting rid of what is by moving it to some other place – but that is impossible, since all possible places are already full of what is, in some form or another.

These three basic arguments represent Empedocles’ version of the principle of the conservation of matter, namely the fact that the elements are quantitatively invariable. By virtue of this invariability and the fact that they are the ingredients of cyclic changes from one to many and from many to one (B 17.16–17 [= EMP D 73.247–48 Laks-Most]), they are also the foundations of the physical world. Furthermore, (1) establishes that they are indestructible, which entails that they will forever be. However, this does not entail that they will forever have the same shape. In fact, by running through each other, the four elements become different at different times (δι’ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα / γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα: B 17.35 [= EMP D 73.266 Laks-Most]). Thus, by mixing with each other, they become the immense variety of animate and inanimate things we can see in the world. However, although mixture and exchange among mixed things (B 8.2 [= EMP D 53.2 Laks-Most]) produce an infinite number of new things, each of them is ultimately to be traced back to the four elements as its basic ingredients. This explains quite well 16 17

Lines 16–17 repeat verbatim Empedocles’ initial claim at B 17.1–2 (= EMP D 73.233–34 Laks-Most). Inwood (2001: 25–26).

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the plant metaphor we saw above: the elements can be compared to ‘roots’ because, being the basic components of all living beings we can see in the world, they enable and sustain life. Moreover, in B 17.27 (= EMP D 73.258 Laks-Most) we find the claim that the elements are all identical in birth. This idea is expressed in a context in which Empedocles aims to dispel any doubts about the fact that all four elements are equally fundamental. In this respect, he first describes the elements as all equal (ταῦτα γὰρ ἶσά τε πάντα), thereby suggesting that none is greater in size than the others. Second, they are said to be all identical in birth, which indicates that none of them is temporally or ontologically prior to the others.18 Third, the elements are said to dominate in turn in the cosmic cycle. While I shall return to the analysis of this third claim soon, it is worth observing that the characteristic of being fundamental entities may well accord with the idea of their dominion at some point in the cycle. This idea can be taken as comparable (indeed, it could derive from) the notion we find in traditional theogonies, in which regal power and dominion are usually accorded to gods who are temporally and/or ontologically prior to their fellow divine beings. It follows that both the characteristic of being fundamental entities and that of their dominion at some point in the cycle can be taken as aspects of their divine nature. The elements’ characteristic of being fundamental entities of the physical system and, consequently, their divine nature has generally been taken as Empedocles’ reply to Parmenides’ monism.19 According to this standard reading, the four elements are divine entities – indeed, they are often taken as being the most divine (sometimes even the only truly divine) entities in Empedocles’ universe – because they are thought individually to replicate the attributes of Parmenides’ what-is. More precisely, they are thought to be ingenerated, indestructible and qualitatively unalterable. In light of this standard reading, the aforementioned notion of identical elements in birth (ἥλικα γένναν) – more generally the idea of fundamental principles coming into being – is surprising, to say the least. However, Rowett, in an influential 1987 article, highlighted that Aristotle, by discussing Empedocles’ elements at the end of his On 18

19

Although being all equally fundamental, each has distinct prerogatives and characteristics. The line is very likely a reference to the individual qualities of each element; the fact, in other words, that fire is connected with heat and brightness, water with cold and darkness, air is said to have a warm, bright and moist nature, whereas earth is associated with heavy and solid things. See B 21.3–6 (= EMP D 77a.3–6 Laks-Most). Guthrie (1965: 138–47) exemplifies this approach.

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Generation and Corruption 1.1, states that they lose their properties when they are united in the Sphairos and are genuinely reborn from it when cosmology begins again. More recently, Palmer has shown that, in contrast to the standard interpretation, ‘the Empedoclean roots have their own life cycles and undergo their own transformations like virtually everything else in his system’.20 In this respect, as we will see below, Empedocles relates the fact that the elements mix with each other and transform themselves into integrated beings to their unsteadfast lifetime21 and even to their death in the cycle, which at first reading may be an astonishing notion given that the elements are already declared to be indestructible, as we have seen above. On second reading, however, it agrees with the Empedoclean conception that processes of birth and death, hence life cycles, do not entail any creation (from nothing) or disruption (into nothing) strictly speaking, but really are mixture, interchange of mixed things and separation of elements.22 Moreover, the idea that the elements have their own life cycles does not contradict the notion that they are eternal. In fact, it can be said that being eternal requires the quantitative invariance of the elements – namely, the fact that they comprise the fixed and total quantity of matter in the universe – but is also compatible with their qualitative mutability.23 In other words, because the elements persist in the same amount in the cosmic cycle, they are eternal, although, in contrast to Parmenides’ what-is, they do not endure endlessly as one and the same form or, simply put, they are not eternally unchangeable. This means that the divine character of the elements accords first with their (quantitative) persistence in the cycle and second with their having a life cycle. The quantitative persistence of the elements in the cosmos, however, does not exhaust the issue of what it means for them to be eternal. In particular, the fact that elements have a life cycle raises further questions about their being immortal – a problematic notion, as already recognized by A. Long. Exploring the Empedoclean representations of immortal entities, Long concluded that Empedocles worked out a novel notion of immortality, which does not entail endless duration, but the ability of a given entity to continue, as one and the same organism, over a long but finite period.24 20 21 22 23

Rowett’s hypothesis has recently been taken up and developed by Palmer (2009: 260–317). See B 17.11 (= EMP D 73.242 Laks-Most): τῆι μὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὔ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰών. See also B 26.10 (= EMP D 77b.10 Laks-Most). See B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most) and 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most) in Chapter 2.8. Palmer (2009: 296). 24 A. Long (2017; 2019: 22–27).

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The equivocal character of Empedocles’ notion of immortality is highlighted by the lines of B 35 (= EMP D 75 Laks-Most), in which Empedocles argues that the elements can be seen as both mortal and immortal entities. Specifically, B 35 (= EMP D 75 Laks-Most) describes the moment in the cosmic cycle when Love begins expanding her influence among the elements after Strife’s disruption of the Sphairos. ‘When Strife has reached the deepest depth of the vortex, and Love has come to be in the centre of the whirl’ under her influence, the elements start coming together. Love’s intervention among the elements causes these to come together willingly. ‘And while they were mixing, myriad tribes of mortals spread out.’ Empedocles adds: αἶψα δὲ θνήτ’ ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ’ εἶναι, ζωρά θ’ἃ πρὶν, κερόωντο,25 διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους. τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ’ ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν, παντοίαις ἰδέῃσιν ἀρηρότα, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι.

(B 35.14–17 [= EMP D 75.14–17 Laks-Most])

And immediately were born as mortals those things [i.e., the elements] that earlier had learned to be immortals, and those that earlier had been unblended were mixing, interchanging their paths. And while they were mixing, myriad tribes of mortals spread out, joined together in forms of all kinds, a wonder to see.

Under the influence of Love, the elements, which until then have been (indeed, have learned to be) immortal und unblended, grew mortal and 25

The line in Diels-Kranz reads ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα, διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους, but both their text and sense are doubtful. The phrase τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα is the version transmitted by Plutarch’s and Athenaeus’ manuscripts, whereas Simplicius has τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκριτα. Aristotle, moreover, transmits the line as ζῷα τε τὰ πρὶν κεκρῆτο. Aristotle’s version presents two problems: ζῷα is very likely a banalization of ζωρά, derived from the context speaking about the myriads of mortals arisen by elemental mixtures. Moreover, the perfect κεκρῆτο is difficult to explain in light of the imperfect ἐφύοντο in the previous line. Given the whole context of the fragment and, above all, the preceding line establishing an opposition between θνήτα and ἀθάνατα, this line is expected to provide an analogous opposition between ‘blended’ and ‘unblended’. Yet, despite a passage of Philum. Ven. 2.3, 4.2, in which ζωρότερος is opposed to ἄκρατος οἶνος, ζωρά and ἄκρητα are attested with the same meaning of ‘unblended’. My correction ζωρά θ’ἃ πρὶν, κερόωντο restores both a grammatically sound text, with κερόωντο as a good counterpart to the previous ἐφύοντο, and the opposition expected in the line between things unblended that were gradually blending. It is worth noting, moreover, that the imperfect tense κερόωντο is attested in Od. 8.470, where the thing that is mixed is wine. This invites the reading that, by alluding to the domain of wine-mixing through both the Homeric reminiscence κερόωντο and the adjective ζωρός, generally used to describe pure wine (i.e., wine without water), Empedocles could indirectly be suggesting that his elemental mixtures are comparable to the mixing of liquid substances.

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mixed. As Empedocles tells us in the last two lines of the fragment, elemental mixtures give rise to ‘myriad tribes of mortals’. The inference is that the elements are said to be born as mortals when they are mixed as all kinds of mortal beings through the renewed power of Love,26 which in turn implies that they are immortal when they stay unblended under Strife’s influence.27 Some lines of fragment B 26 (= EMP D 77b Laks-Most) add further information to this picture. ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο κύκλοιο, καὶ φθίνει εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ αὔξεται ἐν μέρει αἴσης. αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι᾽ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα γίνοντ(αι) ἄνθρωποί τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα θηρῶν ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν᾽ εἰς ἕνα κόσμον, ἄλλοτε δ᾽ αὖ δίχ᾽ ἕκαστα φορούμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει, εἰσόκεν ἓν συμφύντα τὸ πᾶν ὑπένερθε γένηται. οὕτως ᾗ μὲν ἓν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι, ἠδὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἑνὸς πλέον’ ἐκτελέθουσι, τῇ μὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὔ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰών· ᾗ δὲ τάδ’ ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει, ταύτῃ δ’ αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον. 26

5

10

A. Long (2017: 9–12) argues that, whereas the four elements seem to be the only possible referent for things being first immortal and then growing mortal, given that their mortality is connected to mixture, the reference here may well be to the portions of the same element that compose a singleelement body. These single-element bodies include vast masses, such as the sun, moon, sea and sky . . . The contrast between ‘immortal’ and ‘mortal’ in B 35.14 is between the contrasting conditions of one and the same portion of an element. First, together with other portions of the same element, it belonged, as an ‘immortal’, to a single-element body; then, under the influence of Love, it is mixed and becomes a constituent of a ‘mortal’ . . . ‘Immortality’ thus marks the condition of the portion when it belonged to a specific, single-element body, by contrast with a sequence of mortal compounds (at p. 11).

27

I tend to agree with Long that the contrast in B 35.14 (= EMP D 75.14 Laks-Most) between ‘immortal’ and ‘mortal’ refers to what he calls a single-element body (e.g., the sky) in contrast to portions of the same elements mixed in compounds (e.g., air mixed in bones). It is worth noting that Empedocles takes single-element bodies, such as the sky, rain, sun and the like, as visible witnesses of the four elements. B 35.8–9 (= EMP D 75.8–9 Laks-Most) states that, in the first stages of Love’s increase, Strife still has a great power over the elements, being able to hold things unmixed and suspended. ‘For not yet blamelessly, / had it withdrawn completely to the farthest limits of the cycle.’ This is a clear indication that the elements stay unblended in our world as well. It follows that, in our world too, portions of the elements that are not mixed in compounds are to be considered as immortal. In this respect, I would argue that the immortal nature of the elements in our world is related to their status as vast cosmic masses, such as the sky, sun, sea and the like. This invites the reading that, in line with a well attested tradition, Empedocles considered not only the more abstract notion of the elements, but also their concrete form of cosmic masses, as gods.

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And by turns they [i.e., the elements] dominate while the cycle revolves, and they perish and grow into one another in their decreed turns. For in themselves they are the same, but in running through each other they become human beings and the tribes of other beasts, sometimes when coming together because of Love into one order, 5 sometimes when being severally borne apart again because of Strife’s hostility, until growing together to be one, the totality, they are subdued. Thus, insofar as they have learned to grow as one out of many and inversely, when the one grows apart, they become many, to that extent they come to be, and they do not have a steadfast lifetime; 10 but insofar as they do not cease to alternate continually, to that extent they always are unchangeable in their circle.

Through these lines, Empedocles depicts the working of the elements in the cosmic cycle as an alternation between their dominance and growth on the one hand and their subjection and death on the other.28 As we learn, the elements become all kinds of living beings by running through each other, while they are subdued when they come together as one, being thoroughly compounded in the Sphairos by Love’s power. Elsewhere we are told that in the Sphairos ‘neither the swift limbs of the sun can be distinguished’ (B 27.1 [= EMP D 89 Laks-Most]). By understanding the ‘limbs of the sun’ as representing the element of fire (see B 21.3 [= EMP D 77a Laks-Most]) and by assuming that what pertains to fire pertains to the other elements, it follows that the subordination of the elements in the Sphairos (B 26.7 [= EMP D 77b.7]) coincides with the loss of their distinct characteristics when they are united into the One. In other words, the elements are said to be subdued and die when they lose their specific properties. In parallel, they can be said to be born and dominate when they are distinguished as four separate elements, each with its characteristics. B 26 (= EMP D 77b Laks-Most) tells us that this occurs due to Strife’s disruption of the Sphairos. By adding the information we gained from B 35 (= EMP D 75 Laks-Most), quoted above, we can fairly conclude that, because of Strife’s influence, the elements remaining unmixed have their part of dominion in the cycle and, as inasmuch as they do not undergo mixtures and changes, they also stay immortal. To wrap up my investigation to this point, Empedocles is explicit both about the fact that the elements are quantitatively stable and that they are 28

On this fragment and Empedocles’ cosmic cycle more generally see Chapter 7.1. On the meaning of φθίνω (or φθίω) as ‘to decay’, ‘to wane’, ‘to pass away’ and ‘to perish’, in contrast to the translation ‘to grow smaller’ proposed by Verdenius (1948: 12–13) and defended by Guthrie (1965: 147), see Palmer (2009: 284). Laks-Most (2016: 435) translate φθίνει as ‘they decrease’.

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not eternally unchangeable, but are born, perish and undergo myriad qualitative changes. As we have seen, Empedocles leaves little doubt that the four roots have their own life cycles, as they periodically die and lose their identity and properties when they grow together as one in the Sphairos, while they are (re)born as elements when they are separated from the One due to Strife. Moreover, as they also lose their specific properties when they are mixed as myriad different things, each with qualities of its own, the elements can be taken as dying when they are born as compounded living beings (in fact, they are called ‘mortal’ when they mix to form living beings in B 35.14 [= EMP D 75.14 Laks-Most]).29 Although we can conclude with Palmer that ‘the clear and cumulative impression of these various statements is that the roots are . . . subject to generation and destruction’, Empedocles does not withhold immortality from them. In fact, when they stay unmixed and persist as fire, air, water and earth under Strife’s influence, they are called ‘immortal’ and are even said to dominate in the cosmic cycle. Moreover, although they are transformed by mixture into myriad compounds, at B 17.13 (= EMP D 73.244 Laks-Most) and again in B 26.12 (= EMP D 77b.12 Laks-Most) they are nonetheless defined as ‘always unchanged in their cycle’, αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον. Scholars generally interpret ἀκίνητοι (akinetoi) with reference to the regularity of the elements’ changes. Accordingly, the elements are always immutable in the cycle because they alternately and regularly come together and are separated in an endless alternation. In Empedocles studies, the elements’ characterization as ἀκίνητοι is usually taken as further evidence that they exist in the strong Parmenidean sense.30 The claim to be αἰὲν ἔασιν 29

30

As we will see more thoroughly in the next chapter, processes of birth and death are described as transformations produced by mixtures of elements and exchanges of mixtures (see B 8.3 [= EMP D 53.3 Laks-Most]: μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων). Moreover, as Empedocles puts it in B 21.13–14 (= EMP D 77a.13–14 Laks-Most), ‘by running through each other, they [i.e., the elements] become different in their shape, for mixture changes them’, τὰ γὰρ διὰ κρᾶσις ἀμείβει. It must be said, however, that this half-line, in the form in which it is written here, is the result of an emendation of the corrupted text in the manuscript tradition of Simplicius. Specifically, whereas ἀμείβει is certain, what precedes it in Simplicius’ manuscripts is not and Diels-Kranz’s critical apparatus accounts for the variant readings as follows: τογον διάκρισις D: τόγον διάκραισις E: lac. F. Diels’ conjectural correction is τόσον διά κρῆσις, accepted by the majority of editors and commentators. However, Wright pointed out that there is no parallel in Empedocles’ fragments for a similar use of τόσον without a corresponding relative. In her critical apparatus, moreover, Wright proposed as a possible conjecture τὰ γὰρ διά κρῆσις, although she did not print it in the text (see Wright 1995: 101). From Laks-Most’s critical apparatus, moreover, we apprehend that the Aldine edition read τὰ γάρ which, together with the expression διὰ κρᾶσις, can make good sense of the line. This reconstruction of the text was already proposed by Palmer (2009: 293). See, e.g., Inwood (2001: 30).

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ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον in B 17.13 (= EMP D 73.244 Laks-Most) is slightly modified in the conclusion of the fragment (B 17.35 [= EMP D 73.266 LaksMost]), in which the elements, despite all various changes they undergo by running through each other (that is, by mixture) and becoming all living beings, are said to be ‘always continually the same’, ἠνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα. Wright comments upon the phrase, noting that ‘the Eleatic argument for selfconsistency . . . is applied to the individual roots, completing the point made in line 28 – each root has its own τιμῆς and ἦθος, which are preserved inviolate through the various arrangements and rearrangements of parts in the formation of θνητά’.31 As we have seen above, however, the interpretation of Empedocles’ elements replicating Parmenides’ what-is is untenable in light of his own verses, which rather foreground the elements’ qualitative mutability, as they do not endure endlessly as one and the same form. In light of this finding, I would question Wright’s notion of elements preserving their τιμῆς and ἦθος inviolate through their various arrangements and rearrangements as living compounds. As we have seen above, Empedocles is clear enough about elements dying – that is, losing their specific and identifying qualities – when they are mixed as mortal forms. Rather, I would argue that by the idea of elements being unchanged kata kyklon and being therefore always continually the same, Empedocles aims to emphasize the particular nature of their life cycles, upon which their special status as fundamental entities and their divine nature rest. According to this reading, kata kyklon in B 17.13 (= EMP D 73.244 LaksMost) and B 26.12 (= EMP D 77b.12 Laks-Most) does not refer to the cosmic cycle in general, but rather to the elements’ particular life cycle: they are ‘unchanged in their cycle’. Moreover, the variation of the otherwise analogous B 17.35 (= EMP D 73.266), ταύτῃ δ’ αἰὲν ἔασιν ἠνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα, suggests that, despite their continuous transformations into all kinds of living compounds, these being forms of mortals or of the One/Sphairos, the elements are always ultimately and regularly reborn as the same four kinds of fundamental principles. In this way, they regain the τιμῆς and ἦθος that characterize each of them and, by means of these, they are every time reborn as ‘themselves’. Thus, I would contend that in B 17.13 (= EMP D 73.244 Laks-Most), B 26.12 (= EMP D 77b.12 Laks-Most) and B 17.35 (= EMP D 73.266 LaksMost), Empedocles typifies the elemental life cycles in contrast to the life cycles and transformations ordinary mortals undergo. Whereas the latter 31

Wright (1995: 172).

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take on a new form of body each time they are reborn, the former are always reborn as themselves again. As Palmer points out: Although both fire, water, earth, and air as well as their compounds [. . .] all experience generation and destruction, nevertheless fire, water, earth, and air, unlike their compounds, will upon the dissolution of those compounds regain the identities previously lost when they perished in the compounds’ formation. . . . fire, water, earth, and air are regenerated once again as what they were before, that is, as fire, water, earth, and air. This is the manner of persistence Empedocles appears to have in mind when he specifies the respect in which the roots are changeless.32

In other words, although the elements have a life cycle just like the compounds formed out of them, in contrast to those compounds, the elements will every time be reborn as themselves again, no matter how often they interchange, lose their identities and die by mixtures. It is in this respect that they can be said to persist unchanged. In doing so, they can be considered immortal, according to Long’s definition, and are more ontologically basic within Empedocles’ physical system than the compounds formed from them. This finally assures that they are divine. To sum up, the divine nature of the four elements essentially consists in their being ontologically fundamental entities of Empedocles’ physical system. Moreover, Empedocles assures that the total amount of each of them never decreases or increases in the cosmic cycle, but persists unaffected. Indeed, the elements comprise the fixed and total quantity of matter in the universe. Furthermore, they are the basic components of every existing thing. Thus, everything in the cosmos, as it comes to be from and always dissolves into the four elements, can be traced back to them. It follows that they are prior to, and more ontologically basic, than the compounds formed from them. However, despite their quantitative invariance, the four elements are qualitatively mutable: by running through and mixing with each other, they lose their characteristics and transform themselves into integrated beings with new qualities of their own. More precisely, each of the elements has its own life cycle. This determines that they die when, by being united in compounds, they lose their identities and are genuinely born again as ‘themselves’ from the Sphairos, when the cosmological process begins anew. As we have seen, their qualitative variability is such that despite their life cycles and the myriad transformations in all kinds of compounds they undergo, they still persist unchanged in their cycle. 32

Palmer (2016: 51).

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Which means that they are reborn every time as fire, air, water and earth, with those same qualities they had before undergoing changes. For this reason, they can be said to be immortal, as each is able to persist as one and the same entity over a long period. In conclusion, Empedocles’ conception of godhood with reference to the four elements foregrounds the idea of their persistence, which characterizes them as fundamental entities of his physical system. Their persistence is quantitative, in that they comprise the fixed and total amount of matter in the universe. But it is also qualitative, in that their cycle ensures that, despite their innumerable transformations into all kinds of mortal forms, they are always reborn each time as each of the same four elements. Incidentally, it is worth noting that their being divine agrees with the notion of elements having a life cycle like virtually everything else in the cosmos. It follows that godhood is not denied, in principle, to those beings, such as men and women, who have their own life cycle, provided, however, that their cycle entails the possibility that they remain unchanged for a certain (rather long) period. By virtue of this conclusion, my goal in this chapter is thus precisely to understand what divinity entails in reference to human beings striving to become gods.

4.2 Love and Strife Having established the correlation between the status of the elements as fundamental principles of the physical world and their divine nature, and having identified this in the way they persist in the cosmic cycle, I will now turn to the second kind of entity that Empedocles explicitly refers to as gods or calls by the names of traditional deities: Love and Strife. Here I will look at those verses that delve into their action upon the four elements and their function in the cosmic cycle. This will allow me to define their godhood in contrast to that of fire, air, water and earth and to show that their divine nature is more in line with the traditional notion of gods as immortal (and eternally unchanged) beings. As we have seen in Chapter 2.7, Empedocles introduces the principles of Love and Strife for the first time through the lines of B 16 (= EMP D 63 Laks-Most) as two entities that persist through the history of time. While I will return to this fundamental characteristic later in this section, where we will see that it reflects a quality that is ascribed to traditional gods, it is first necessary to draw attention to the dichotomy that guides the Empedoclean description of these two principles in his physical exposition. In fact, Love and Strife are made antithetical principles that act on the

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elements and influence their functioning in opposite ways. Empedocles links Love with a positive principle working on the elements and striving to bring all things to one form alone, the Sphairos. In contrast, Strife is made the negative principle that destroys the Sphairos, tearing the elements apart and producing the Many.33 Because of their impact on the elements and the cycle, Love and Strife have also been considered cosmic forces or powers. Related to this, continuing along the lines of the antithetical description of the two principles, Love is usually associated with a unifying power in contrast to the separating force of Strife, as for instance in B 17.7–8 (= EMP D 73.239–40 Laks-Most): . . . Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα, / . . . δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει.34 Additionally, Love’s unifying action is emphasized through verbs with the prefix συν-, such as συνέρχομαι (B 17.7 [= EMP D 73.239 Laks-Most], B 20.2 [= EMP D 73.303 Laks-Most], B 26.5 [= EMP D 77b.5 Laks-Most], B 35.5 [= EMP D 75.5 Laks-Most]), συν-βαίνω (B 21.8 [= EMP D 77a.8 Laks-Most]), συν-φύομαι (B 26.7 [= EMP D 77b.7 Laks-Most]) and συν-ίστημι (B 35.6 [= EMP D 75.6 Laks-Most]). Moreover, Love is usually associated with the notion of ‘one’ (thing, cosmos, etc.),35 whereas Strife is typically connected with the concept of ‘many’ or plurality.36 The prefix δια- seems to be particularly linked to the notion of plurality and change: see δι-έφυ (B 17.2 = B 17.10 [= EMP D 73.234 = 73.241 Laks-Most]), δια-φύντος (B 26.9 [= EMP D 77b.9 Laks-Most]), δι-αλλάσσοντα; δι-αλλάξαντα (B 17.12 [= EMP D 73.243 Laks-Most], B 35.16 [= EMP D 75.16 Laks-Most]), διατμηθέντα (B 20.4 [= EMP D 73.305 Laks-Most]), διά-μορφα (B 21.7 [= EMP D 77a.7 Laks-Most]) and δι-έχουσι (B 22.6 [= EMP D 101.6 LaksMost]). Nevertheless, Aristotle noted that the ability to unify things also pertains to Strife, while Love too can separate. Specifically, Aristotle observes that Strife separates the One, but unifies each element with its homologous portions, thereby forming four homogeneous elemental masses. In parallel, 33 34 35

36

In Chapter 7.1 I will delve into the opposition of these principles with reference to their effects on the cosmic cycle. See analogously B 20.2–5 (= EMP D 73.303–6 Laks-Most), B 22.5–8 (= EMP D 101.5–8 Laks-Most), B 26.5–7 (= EMP D 77b.5–7 Laks-Most) and B 35.5 (= EMP D 75.5 Laks-Most) (Love only). See B 17.7 (= EMP D 73.239 Laks-Most), B 20.2 (= EMP D 73.303 Laks-Most), B 26.5 (= EMP D 77b.5 Laks-Most), B 35.5 (= EMP D 75.5 Laks-Most), PStrasb. a(ii) 17 (= EMP D 73.287 LaksMost), PStrasb. a(ii) 20 (= EMP D 73.290 Laks-Most). See B 17.8 (= EMP D 73.240 Laks-Most), B 20.4–5 (= EMP D 73.305–6 Laks-Most), B 21.7 (= EMP D 77a.7 Laks-Most), B 22.6–8 (= EMP D 101.6–8 Laks-Most) and B 26.6 (= EMP D 77b.6 LaksMost).

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Love unifies the four heterogeneous elements into the One, but separates each element from its homologous portions (that is, she separates and dissolves the elemental masses).37 As a clarification to Aristotle’s report, however, it can be said that Strife’s unions and Love’s separations result incidentally from their main action in the cycle. In fact, Strife always works in the cosmic cycle by separating Love’s compounds and, in doing so, brings about a gradual increase of parts. Therefore, although its action may incidentally cause heterogeneous elements to come together,38 Strife can nonetheless be said to be the cause of separation. Analogously, Love, by unifying separate parts, forms wholes and gradually reduces the number of things until her re-composition of only one whole thing, the Sphairos. This makes Love the cause of union, although her activity incidentally causes the elements to separate from their homologous portions and to combine in heterogeneous mixtures. As a result, Love can be defined as the principle of unity (and One) whereas Strife tries to impede Love’s mixtures and, by separating her compounds, is the principle not only of division, but also of the Many. With reference to the divine nature of the two powers, scholars generally argue that we only have straightforward evidence for the divine nature of Love,39 who is frequently called by the names of traditional goddesses such as Aphrodite, Cypris and Harmonia.40 Strife, on the other hand, is not explicitly mentioned as a deity in our extant fragments. Moreover, the gender of Strife’s name in Greek (Νεῖκος) is neuter, which, as V. Hladký points out, ‘already on the level of grammar, makes it distinct from the other, more personal, masculine or feminine gods that appear in Empedocles’.41 Nonetheless, we do have some Empedoclean verses in

37

38 39 40 41

See Metaph. 985a 23–29. See also De gen. et corr. 333b 19–22 where Aristotle argues that the movement initiated by Strife leads each element to converge to its homologous parts (hence according to the socalled principle of like to like). In contrast, compounds result from Love’s ability to unite different, heterogeneous elements. Additionally, in her unifications of the elements into the One, Love destroys the world and all things in it: Arist. Metaph. 1000a 25ff. For the sake of completeness, however, it must be said that Love unifies not only heterogeneous elements into compounds, as Aristotle put it, but also already compounded things into more and more complex integrated entities. Analogously, not every separation of compounds by Strife causes homogeneous elements to come together. Strife’s working can result in less integrated entities, as it occurs in the formation of men and women from whole-natured beings (on which, see Chapter 7.1.1). More precisely, it can be said that, by separating compounds, Strife sets the elements free to move according to their natural motion, hence each towards its homologous parts. See Rangos (2012: 319) and Hladký (2017: 3). It is worth noting, moreover, that Love’s rush is defined as ἄμβροτος in B 35.13 (= EMP D 75.13 LaksMost), an adjective that in Greek literature is used for gods. Hladký (2017: 4), following Rowett (2016: 95–97).

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which Strife is referred to by the names Kotos and Eris (B 21.7 [= EMP D 77a.7 Laks-Most] and B 20.4 [= EMP D 73.305 Laks-Most]). Additionally, traditional gods such as Ares and Kydoimos (see B 128.1 [= EMP D 25.1 Laks-Most] with n.8 above) may also be taken as two names to indicate Strife, just like Cypris and Aphrodite are names for Love or, assuming they are rather ‘manifestations of the cosmic super-god Strife’,42 they can still be interpreted as signs of Strife’s divine nature. Be that as it may, Love’s and Strife’s divinity is emphasized in B 59.1 (= EMP D 149.1 Laks-Most) where, as we have seen in Chapter 3.6, they are both referred to as δαίμονες.43 Moreover, since, as we have seen above, Empedocles connects mortality to mixture,44 Love’s and Strife’s divine status is also determined by the fact that at least a part of them stays unmixed during all phases of a cosmic cycle. In fact, in contrast to the four elements, Love and Strife are introduced in the proem (see B 16 [= EMP D 63 Laks-Most]) in a way that emphasizes their persistence over time: ἧι γὰρ καὶ πάρος ἔσκε(?), καὶ ἔσσεται, οὐδέ ποτ’, οἴω, τούτων ἀμφοτέρων κενεώσεται ἄσπετος αἰών. For certainly, they were before and will be, and never, I suppose, will the innumerable length of time be empty of these two.

Looking at this fragment, we can see that the first line is reminiscent of Il. 1.70, ὃς ᾔδη τά τ’ ἐόντα τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα, a line referring to Calchas’ perfect knowledge of all present, past and future events, through an epic formula indicating the eternity of time and history. Similarly, Hesiod (Theog. 39) employs the same formula with an analogous meaning to depict the Muses’ ability to master a song comprising past, present and future. By echoing the epic formula, therefore, Empedocles indicates that the two forces persist in the cosmic cycle eternally unchanged: Love and Strife are now as they were before and will be in the future. The contrast between the persistence of the two forces and the four elements undergoing generations and destructions is plain and well

42 43 44

Rowett (2016: 96). αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἐμίσγετο δαίμονι δαίμων. Contra Hladký (2017: 12) who argues against Strife having a divine nature. In the case of the elements, as we have seen, they were said to be born as mortals when mixed in the myriad integrated living beings (see B 35.14–17 [= EMP D 75.14–17 Laks-Most]).

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received by Hippolytus, who commented upon the lines quoted above in the following way: They [i.e., Love and Strife] never began to come into being, but they preexisted and will always exist, being unable to endure destruction because of their unborn quality. But fire and earth and air are dying and returning to life. For when the things that come to be by Strife’s agency die, Love receives them and draws them towards, puts them with, and assimilates them to the universe, so that the universe might remain one, always being organized by Love in one manner and form. And when Love makes the one out of many and assimilates the separated things to one, Strife again tears them from the one and makes many, i.e. fire, water, earth and air, the animals and plants created from these and all the parts of the cosmos which we conceive of.45 (transl. Inwood 2001)

Later on, Hippolytus connects Love’s and Strife’s stable natures with their immortality. Indeed, he calls the four elements ‘mortal gods’, whereas Love and Strife are ‘immortal, unborn and hostile to each other always’.46 To sum up, the analysis of the godlike nature of Love and Strife highlights that the they are divine because they are, like the elements, fundamental principles of Empedocles’ physical system – indeed, they are forces acting upon the four elements and influencing their workings in the cosmic cycle. Moreover, Love’s and Strife’s divine nature also resides in their immortality; indeed in their eternal persistence as one and the same form – a characteristic that more than any other is traditionally connected to godhood. In fact, the Homeric gods are nothing if not ἄμβροτοι. Thus, Love’s and Strife’s immortality requires not only that they are endless – indeed, they are eternal – but also that at least a part of them stays unmixed and, consequently, unchanged during all phases of the cosmic cycle. This characteristic makes their immortal and divine nature slightly different from that of the elements. Indeed, as we have seen above, the four elements are born and die when they transform themselves into living compounds and have a life cycle like everything else in Empedocles’ system. Because they undergo qualitative changes, the elements can only be said to be unchanged in their cycle, while they are immortal just in that part of the cosmic cycle when they are kept unmixed by the influence of Strife. In contrast, Love’s and Strife’s immortality and divinity entails that they stay unborn and imperishable; that is, perfectly unchanged through the eternity of time.

45

Hipp. Ref. 7.29.10–12.

46

Ibid. 7.29.23.

4.3 The Sphairos

4.3

203

The Sphairos

Turning to the next of those concepts to which Empedocles explicitly ascribes divine nature in his fragments, we see that the Sphairos (or the One) – that is, the form of the universe resulting from the perfect unification of all things into one whole entity – is called θεός in B 31 (= EMP D 95 Laks-Most). Moreover, Hippolytus in his Refutatio omnium heresium tells us that the Sphairos is ‘the most beautiful form’ of the universe because it emerges from Love’s dominion over Strife.47 This characterization agrees with the fact that, as we are going to see, Empedocles conceptualizes the Sphairos as his ideal of perfection. In this regard, let us examine B 27 (= EMP D 89 Laks-Most): ἔνθ’ οὔτ’ ἠελίοιο διείδεται ὠκέα γυῖα . . .48 οὕτως Ἁρμονίης πυκινῶι κρύφωι ἐστήρικται Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονίηι περιγηθέι49 γαίων. There neither the swift limbs of the sun can be distinguished ... So much remains riveted in the dense hiding place of Harmony round Sphairos, exulting in his joyous solitude.

As we have seen in Section 4.1 above, B 27.1 (= EMP D 89.1 Laks-Most) indicates that the Sphairos is a blend in which the four elements no longer stand out as four distinct entities. Taking this concept to the extreme, we conclude that, as already argued, the four elements no longer exist when united to form the One, or, as Empedocles puts it, they are subdued in the Sphairos.50 The impossibility of distinguishing between its ingredients may well point to a representation of the Sphairos as a thorough blend, with an emphasis to its overall balance and symmetry.

47 48

49 50

Hipp. Ref. 7.29.14. Diels-Kranz reconstructs line 2 as follows: οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδ’ αἴης λάσιον μένος οὐδὲ θάλασσα. In the text quoted by Simpl. Phys. 1183.28, our source for the Empedoclean citation, this line is missing. Diels inserted it based on a quotation by Plutarch, De fac. 12 p. 926d, which he considered to coincide with Simplicius’ quotation. However, as Bignone (1916) demonstrated, although B 27.1 (= EMP D 89.1 Laks-Most) is identical to the first line of the verses quoted by Plutarch, Plutarch’s comment shows that his Empedoclean quotation comes from a context that does not deal with the Sphairos. Diels-Kranz printed in the text the form περιηγέι (‘encircling’), which is attested by Achilles Tatius and Proclus. The form περιγηθέι is instead transmitted by Simplicius and should be preferred. See also Palmer (2009: esp. 285–98).

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This conclusion accords with what we can read in fragment B 28 (= EMP D 90 Laks-Most): ἀλλ’ ὅ γε πάντοθεν ἶσος καὶ πάμπαν ἀπείρων Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονίηι περιγηθέι51 γαίων. But he is everywhere equal and completely boundless round Sphairos, rejoicing in his joyous solitude.

The Sphairos’ shape is here again presented in a way that stresses its overall balance, as the Sphairos is said to be everywhere equal to itself. This relates well to the representation in B 27 (= EMP D 89 Laks-Most) of the One as a blend in which its ingredients cannot be distinguished. Additionally, the specification that the Sphairos is everywhere always identical to itself indicates that the thorough blend of B 27 corresponds to a perfectly symmetrical and balanced shape. The One’s quality of multidimensional symmetry, highlighted by the notion of the Sphairos being everywhere equal to itself, is repeated almost verbatim in another fragment, B 29 (= EMP D 92 Laks-Most): οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ νώτοιο δύο κλάδοι ἀίσσονται, οὐ πόδες, οὐ θοὰ γοῦν(α), οὐ μήδεα γεννήεντα, ἀλλὰ σφαῖρος ἔην καὶ ἶσος ἑαυτῶι. For from his back two branches do not shoot forth, no feet, no swift knees, no generative organs, but he was Sphairos, and equal to himself.

As we can see, the concluding claim according to which the Sphairos is from all sides equal to itself is presented here as the result of its being a nonanthropomorphic god: it has neither arms nor feet, nor knees, nor genital organs. Looking at the reception of this description, scholars agree that lines 1 and 2 are Empedocles’ criticism of the anthropomorphic representation of the divine, which can be traced back to Xenophanes. By emphasizing that different societies represent their deities with physical characteristics that are typical of those societies, Xenophanes pointed out the subjective 51

Diels-Kranz printed here the term περιηγέι (‘encircling’), which according to them also appears in the comparable line of B 27 (= EMP D 89 Laks-Most) but see n.49 above. The manuscripts of Stobeus (Egl. I 15, 2ab = I 144, 20 W.), our sources for these lines, have περιτεθῆ or περιτείθη, which can be taken as corrupted forms for περιγηθέι.

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character of the anthropomorphic approach. For instance, the Aethiops represent their gods as snub nosed and dark skinned, whereas Thracian gods have blue eyes and blond hair.52 From this observation, Xenophanes arrives at a rather radical deduction, namely that just as people from different societies create different and self-resembling representations of the divine, so too would horses and oxen, if only they had the ability to represent their deities, make them similar to themselves.53 While recalling Xenophanes, Empedocles’ rejection of anthropomorphism and especially the Sphairos’ lack of genitals contrasts the specific paradigm of epic theogony with personified gods that reproduce themselves sexually, and points out instead that the Sphairos has no need of reproduction and does not procreate. Thus, instead of an anthropomorphic shape, what is proposed is a symmetrical and spherical form: ἀλλὰ σφαῖρος ἔην. The spherical form of the Sphairos is made explicit through both the adjective κυκλοτερής (B 27.3 [= EMP D 89.3 Laks-Most] and B 28.2 [= EMP D 90.2 Laks-Most]) and the name Σφαῖρος itself, the masculine form derived from the Greek σφαῖρα (‘sphere’). This is reminiscent of Parmenides’ what-is being like a well-rounded sphere,54 while later philosophical tradition will concur that roundness is a perfect shape.55 In fact, any point on the surface of a sphere is equidistant from its centre and this is considered a sign of ideal symmetry. Thus, the Sphairos’ roundness contributes to constructing the ideal of balance of the ‘most beautiful form’ of the universe, which is ultimately functional to portraying Empedocles’ ideal of perfection. Returning to the description of the Sphairos in B 27 (= EMP D 89 LaksMost) and 28 (= EMP D 90 Laks-Most), we will now see further qualities ascribed to the One that contribute to depicting Empedocles’ ideal of perfection. First, the perfect nature of the Sphairos is also constructed 52 53

54 55

DK 21 B 16 (= XEN D 13 Laks-Most): Αἰθίοπές τε σιμοὺς μέλανάς τε / Θρῆικές τε γλαυκοὺς καὶ πυρρούς . DK 21 B 15 (= XEN D 14 Laks-Most): ἀλλ’ εἰ χεῖρας ἔχον βόες ἠὲ λέοντες / ἢ γράψαι χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες, / ἵπποι μέν θ’ ἵπποισι βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοίας / καί θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ’ ἐποίουν / τοιαῦθ’ οἷόν περ καὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον . DK 28 B 8.42–49 (= PARM D 8.47–53 Laks-Most). For further Parmenidean reminiscences in Empedocles’ depiction of the Sphairos, see Palmer (2009: 314). In this respect, the depiction of the spherical form of the world in Plato’s Timaeus 33b is noteworthy: And for the shape he [i.e., the Demiurge] gave it [i.e., the world] that which is fitting and akin to its nature. For the living creature that was to embrace all living creatures within itself, the fitting shape would be the figure that comprehends in itself all the figures there are; accordingly he turned its shape rounded and spherical, equidistant every way from centre to extremity – a figure the most perfect and uniform of all; for he judged uniformity to be immeasurably better than the opposite.

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through the verb ἐστήρικται (‘to stand still’) at B 27.2 (= EMP D 89.2 LaksMost). As movement is conceptually related to the idea of a process that is not yet completed, perfection requires in contrast completion of motion and therefore rest. We already find this idea in Parmenides (DK 28 B 8.30–38 [= PARM D 8.35–43 Laks-Most]), who connects the lack of motion of his what-is to the fact that it is not allowed to be incomplete (οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θέμις εἶναι). Thus, any entity is perfect iff it is complete, and it is complete iff it does not move. Moreover, the Sphairos’ state of rest is a consequence of Love’s perfect dominion over Strife. In fact, whereas Empedocles makes it quite clear that Strife is the principle of struggle and movement (Νεῖκος starts motion by separating the Sphairos), Love results in peace and rest. Indeed, although Love can also initiate and influence movement (for instance, of heterogeneous things that come together in mixture), D. O’Brien has cogently demonstrated that ‘the movement which Love initiates is movement towards rest, and when Love is successful there is no longer any movement’.56 Thus, when she forms the Sphairos, Love achieves a universe of absolute rest. Second, since, as we can appreciate, the Sphairos’ qualities that make up its perfect shape are the result of the work of Love, it is to be assumed that the property of being one (or oneness) is also a sign of perfection in contrast to Strife’s multiplicity. The quality of solitude, stressed in B 27.3 (= EMP D 89.3 Laks-Most) and B 28.2 (= EMP D 90.2 Laks-Most) by the word μονίηι, might emphasize the notion of oneness57 and indirectly relate to the idea that Love has made the elements into a one, unique, whole being. However, the meaning of μονίη is debated.58 The word can derive from μένειν, indicating that the Sphairos is at rest, or it can stem from μόνος and so defines the Sphairos as alone.59 Wright is surely correct when emphasizing that ‘the unusual word was probably deliberately chosen for its ambiguity’, which nonetheless displays that Love is in charge, as the concepts of both one and rest can be associated with her.60 56 57

58 59 60

O’Brien (1969: 103). Whereas this is generally taken as meaning that the Sphairos is an amorphous and perfect blend of the four elements, Sedley (2016) and Hladký (2017) argued in contrast that the Sphairos is not just a monolithic lump, but an organism (a ‘superorganism’ according to Sedley) composed of functioning parts. See the discussion in Guthrie (1965: 169 n.3); Bollack (1969: vol. 3 137); O’Brien (1969: 22–24), Wright (1995: 188); and Ferella (2019a: 72). Moreover, μονίη stemming from μόνος could also be described as Empedocles’ hint at the Orphic Zeus-μοῦνος and Parmenides’ what-is-μουνογενές: see Ferella (2019a). Wright (1995: 188).

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However, since the absence of movement in the Sphairos is pointed out, as we have already seen, through the verb ἐστήρικται at B 27.2 (= EMP D 89.2 Laks-Most), the option for μονίη stemming from μόνος seems to be preferable: alongside the notion of rest, Empedocles might have wanted to stress the fact that Love has now reduced multiplicity to one single thing. Third, the close of both B 27 (= EMP D 89 Laks-Most) and B 28 (= EMP D 90 Laks-Most) emphasizes a further characteristic of the Sphairos, namely, its being blissful. This agrees with the conception of the Sphairos as Love’s product, and in virtue of this it is to be assumed that blissfulness is conceived as a further sign of perfection. In this regard, it is worth noting that in B 17.24 (= EMP D 73.255 Laks-Most), Empedocles claims not only that Love is the principle whereby people think friendly thoughts and accomplish deeds of concordance, but for this reason, she is also called Joy: Γηθοσύνη.61 Since this appellation is etymologically related to the word περιγηθέι, which in 28.2 (= EMP D 89.2 Laks-Most) expresses the Sphairos’ emotional state, it follows that not only are certain emotions connected to Love’s influence, but Love is the true source of joy. To sum up, the fragments on the Sphairos construct an ideal of perfection, which is more specifically characterized as utter symmetry, therefore as a quintessential balance, physically represented by the spherical form. Moreover, the Sphairos’ perfection also consists in rest, oneness and blissfulness. As we have seen, all these qualities are connected to the principle of Love and in fact, in B 27.2 (= EMP D 89.2 Laks-Most), Empedocles makes it clear that the Sphairos is riveted ‘in the dense hiding place of Harmony’.62 By displaying that the Sphairos arises by Love’s influence, and indeed upon Strife’s defeat, this line reveals that Love is the source of ideal perfection. Strife’s complete absence from the Sphairos not only causes this to be perfectly blended and so perfectly balanced throughout, but also endows it with perfect knowledge. As we will see more thoroughly in Chapter 6.3, according to Empedocles, the ability to know is strictly related to the blend of elements in the body. More precisely, the ability to know depends on the blood surrounding the heart and, in particular, its extremely symmetrical krasis of elements.63 Indeed, the mixture of the four elements in blood is according to the ratio 1:1:1:1 and this makes it able to think and know best, as Theophrastus tells us.64 As we can see, the blood’s elemental ratio 61 62 63

B 17.24 (= EMP D 73.255 Laks-Most): Γηθοσύνην καλέοντες ἐπώνυμον ἠδ’ Ἀφροδίτην. As we have seen above, Harmonia, just like Aphrodite and Cypris, is another name for Φιλότης. See B 98 (= EMP D 190 Laks-Most) and B 105 (= EMP D 240 Laks-Most). 64 Sens. 10.

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reproduces, on a microcosmic level, the elemental ratio of the Sphairos, made out of the four elements in the same proportions.65 By this standard, it is possible to think that, by virtue of this elemental ratio, the Sphairos is a cosmic mind and can produce thoughts and gain knowledge – like blood does on a minor scale. Indeed, the notion of the Sphairos as a cosmic mind invites the reading that the One has outstanding knowing potential. However, an ancient reader of Empedocles, such as Aristotle, would have disagreed with this conclusion, believing rather that the Sphairos is, because of the lack of Strife in its elemental composition, a god that cannot genuinely know. In a passage of his Metaphysics, Aristotle attributes to Empedocles the view that knowing occurs by like66 and supports his claim by quoting B 109 (= EMP D 207 Laks-Most), a fragment in which, as we will see in more detail in Chapter 6.3.1, Empedocles states that each element (presumably in the object of knowledge) is known by its homologous principle (presumably in the knowing subject): fire is known by fire, air by air, water by water, earth by earth, Love by Love and Strife by Strife.67 In a passage of De Anima, moreover, Aristotle reiterates his criticism of Empedocles’ theory of knowledge and, again citing B 109 (= EMP D 207 Laks-Most), deduces that the Sphairos must be the least intelligent of all beings.68 In fact, by focusing on Strife as a principle by which we know (portions of) the world (namely those that are made of Strife, in the same way that we know portions of the world made of fire by fire), Aristotle must conclude that the absence of Strife from the Sphairos’ mixture makes the One incapable of attaining perfect knowledge. As I will extensively discuss in Chapter 6.3, nevertheless, one of our most important sources for Empedocles’ theories of perceiving, thinking and knowing, Theophrastus, makes it clear that the acquisition of knowledge according to Empedocles does not rest upon each single principle in the knowing agent that knows its homologous principle in the object of knowledge, so much as upon the fact that perception and understanding 65

66 67 68

As we have seen in Section 4.1, according to B 17. 27 (= EMP D 73.258 Laks-Most), the four elements are all equal, thereby suggesting that none is greater in size than the others. Therefore, in the Sphairos their proportion is equal. Metaph. 1000b 5: ἡ δὲ γνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμοίῳ. γαίηι μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ᾽ ὕδωρ, / αἰθέρι δ᾽ αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀίδηλον, / στοργὴν δὲ στοργῆι, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῶι. See Arist. An. 410b 5–8: ‘Empedocles at any rate must conclude that his God is the least intelligent of all beings, for of him alone is it true that there is one thing, Strife, which he does not know, while there is nothing which mortal beings do not know, for there is nothing which does not enter into their composition’.

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rest above all upon the krasis of elements in the organs of perception and knowledge being symmetrical to epistemic inputs from the outside (from the objects of knowledge).69 The more harmonious the elemental kraseis in body organs are, the more symmetrical they are with respect to external effluvia emanated by things in the world, the more the external epistemic inputs adapt to our organ of knowledge, giving us the possibility of knowing more and better. Thus, it is the symmetry between organs and objects of knowledge (more precisely, between the elemental blend within the body and the effluvia emanated by external things) that enables perception, thought and knowledge. This is the reason why, as we have seen above, the knowing organ in humans is blood around the heart. Its harmonious krasis makes pericardial blood apt to produce thoughts and gain knowledge to the highest degree. Since not only are harmony and symmetry qualities associated with Love, but it is Love that forms harmonious and symmetrical mixtures, it follows that the ability to perceive, think and know is always related to Love’s power. This invites the reading that Strife is an impediment to rather than a principle for knowing. Indeed, since Strife always works to impede the integral and well-ordered compounds of Love, an elemental mixture affected by Strife would lack the balance and symmetry that ensures rational thought and knowledge. Consequently, the Sphairos, whose composition lacks Strife and is for this specific reason utterly symmetrical (and therefore harmonious to the highest degree), must be, by virtue of this, also the most rational and wisest of all beings. In conclusion, the divine nature of the Sphairos is conveyed through making it Empedocles’ ideal of perfection, which is constructed around outstanding physical characteristics, such as utter balance and symmetry, and therefore sphericity, rest and oneness, as well as a blissful nature and exceptional epistemic ability. Because it embodies Empedocles’ ideal of perfection, the Sphairos can be taken as the major god in his system. However, in contrast to the four principles and the two forces of Love and Strife, the Sphairos is a compound of elements – indeed, the perfect blend of the four elements. Its characteristic of being compounded means that its divine nature rests on the fact that it is a thorough blend. This makes 69

Theophrastus talks about Empedocles’ theories on perception and knowledge acquisition in Sens. 7–24. In Sens. 15, moreover, Theophrastus admits that in his theories on sensation, thinking and knowing, Empedocles is silent about the compositional likeness between the object and organ of perception/knowledge. Moreover, although Theophrastus introduces Empedocles as a likeness theorist, he recounts his views solely in terms of effluences being symmetrical and thus fitting into the elemental krasis of our organs. See also Sedley (1992: 27–31) and Kamtekar (2009: 217).

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the Sphairos not only the most beautiful form of the universe, as Hippolytus tells us, but also the form of ‘compound’ divinity at its perfect degree, to which, as I will argue below, all other forms of integrated beings – that is, above all, human beings – should approach.

4.4

Holy Mind

The non-anthropomorphic shape of the Sphairos and his having an outstanding knowing ability are closely associated with another divine entity in Empedocles’ system: the Holy Mind. This is presented in fragment B 134 (= EMP D 93 Laks-Most), within a context that, according to our sources,70 deals with the divine, τὸ θεῖον (to theion): οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρομέηι κεφαλῆι κατὰ γυῖα κέκασται, οὐ μὲν ἀπαὶ νώτοιο δύο κλάδοι ἀίσσονται, οὐ πόδες, οὐ θοὰ γοῦν(α), οὐ μήδεα λαχνήεντα, ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μοῦνον, φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταΐσσουσα θοῆισιν.

5

For his limbs are not furnished with the head of a man either, from his back two branches do not shoot forth, no feet, no swift knees, no shaggy organs, but he is nothing but mind, holy and vast,71 darting forth across the whole cosmos by swift thoughts.

5

As we can see, the first three lines of the fragment are nearly identical to the first lines of B 29 (= EMP D 92 Laks-Most), although B 134.5–6 (= EMP D 93.5–6 Laks-Most) presents the divine as a holy and vast mind, whose swift thoughts move across the whole cosmos. Analogously, as mentioned above, the Sphairos displays, to a macrocosmic scale, the same elemental ratio of the human mind and can therefore be said to be, by virtue of this, a vast, cosmic mind. On the basis of these similarities, can we conclude that the Holy Mind and the Sphairos are one and the same form of the divine and of the universe in Empedocles’ physical system? Scholars are divided on this issue. For instance, Guthrie pointed out that the indication of the Holy Mind darting its thoughts across the cosmos constitutes an objection to this identification. According to Guthrie, ‘the Sphere exists only at a certain stage of the cycle’ and ‘during its perfection there is no cosmos in the 70 71

Ammon. De Interpr. CIAG 4.5, 249.1–11 and Tzetz. Chil. 7.143, 522–23 Kiessling, who also attests that B 134 (= EMP D 93 Laks-Most) comes from the third book of On Nature. This translation of ἀθέσφατος is according to Picot (2012: 21–23).

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ordinary sense’.72 Guthrie seems to refer the word κόσμον in B 134.5 (= EMP D 93.5 Laks-Most) to our world, which in Empedocles’ cosmic cycle is opposed to the Sphairos (being Many instead of One). However, his interpretation encounters some obstacles when compared to other occurrences of the term κόσμος in the Empedoclean fragments. In fact, these rather indicate that κόσμος means a well-integrated, harmonious form that is one and united with respect to its parts,73 whereas in PStrasb. a(i) 6 (= EMP D 73.267 Laks-Most) κόσμος seems to coincide with the Sphairos.74 Nevertheless, other scholars have noted that the thinking activity of the Holy Mind, described by Empedocles as swift thoughts moving across the cosmos, contrasts with the fact that the Sphairos is at rest. In contrast, it can be argued that the verb καταΐσσουσα is here used figuratively to conceptualize the quick and pervasive production of thoughts by the Holy Mind. This could be an indication that the verb does not denote a real motion, least of all the spatial movement Empedocles denies the Sphairos. Rather, it could be argued that Empedocles, as elsewhere, used vivid and concrete images to illustrate an abstract and more elusive mental faculty. In this sense, ‘darting forth across the whole cosmos by swift thoughts’ could express the concept of a deity whose thoughts can extremely rapidly concern every aspect of what exists and, in this sense, they can be said to ‘dart and reach’ every existing things in the cosmos. Moreover, by assuming that the Holy Mind coincides with the Sphairos and therefore with the whole universe, thoughts reaching what exists in all its parts could denote an entity that is entirely and ubiquitously perceptive and knowing, just like the ‘one god’ of Xenophanes, who ‘sees as a whole, thinks as a whole and hears as a whole’.75 Returning to a characteristic of the Holy Mind I have mentioned at the outset of this section, our sources for B 134 (= EMP D 93 Laks-Most) refer it to Empedocles’ representation of the divine in general. Specifically, Ammonius76 told us that Empedocles, when speaking of the Holy Mind, was referring ‘primarily to Apollo who was the immediately relevant topic of his discourse’ but, in the same way, he was also referring ‘to the totality 72 74

75 76

Guthrie (1965: 258–59). 73 See, e.g., B 26.5 (= EMP D 77b.5 Laks-Most). It is worth noting that Rangos (2012: 323) interprets the activity of the Holy Mind ‘as an extroverted mental and emotional care . . . which implies the existence of an entire ordered structure (κόσμοs ἅπας) as something distinct from the holy mind itself’ (Rangos’ emphasis). On the term κόσμοs in B 134 (= EMP D 93 Laks-Most) indicating the Sphairos, see Hladký (2017: 18). DK 21 B 24 (= XEN D 17 Laks-Most): οὖλος ὁρᾶι, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δέ τ’ ἀκούει. De Interpr. CIAG 4.5, 249.1–11.

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of the divine in general’. Similarly, Tzetzes reported that Empedocles was showing through this fragment ‘what the substance of a god is’.77 This specification may suggest the notion that being divine is straightforwardly connected to being a Holy Mind, resulting in the assumption that any god, indeed any divine entity, in Empedocles’ system is a Holy Mind.78 In contrast, I understand our sources’ indication that the description of the Holy Mind shows the substance of a god as a further reference to the assimilation between the Holy Mind and the Sphairos. Specifically, as we have seen in the previous section, the Sphairos is both the ideal form of a compounded being and, as such, the god par excellence in Empedocles’ system. From this it can be inferred that it also is the prototype and the ideal of a perfection to which all compounded divine entities aspire. By assuming that the Sphairos and the Holy Mind coincide, the indication that the Holy Mind represents the very substance of godhood for Empedocles might refer to the fact that it represents the ideal and model upon which he conceptualized the divine nature of integrated beings. Thus, while the Sphairos/Holy Mind’s godhood principally coincides with perfect shape (perfect wholeness, perfect balance and perfect beauty), perfect knowledge and perfect blissfulness – hence, complete association with Love against Strife – so too does the divine nature for all integrated beings who populate the cosmos. Their godhood must therefore entail that they are well-ordered and harmonious, wise and utterly happy because of their association with Love, as we will now see.

4.5 Long-Lived Gods Turning to the next and last of those entities that Empedocles explicitly refers to as gods in his fragments, long-lived gods, ‘the greatest in honour’, are listed by Empedocles, together with plants, animals and human beings, among the myriad mortal forms that arise from the combination of the four elements. Let us consider B 21.7–12 (= EMP D 77a.7–12 Laks-Most):79 ἐν δὲ Κότῳ διάμορφα καὶ ἄνδιχα πάντα πέλονται, σὺν δ’ ἔβη ἐν Φιλότητι καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται. ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάνθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἦν ὅσα τ’ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται, δένδρεά τ’ ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες, 77 78 79

10

Chil. 7.143, 522–23 Kiessling. As argued by Rangos (2012: 325), according to whom long-lived gods were ‘essentially minds whose caring thoughts extended to the entire structured universe’. See PStrasb. a(1) 9–a(ii) 1–2 (= EMP D 73. 270–72 Laks-Most) and B 23.6–8 (= EMP D 60.6–8 LaksMost).

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θῆρές τ’ οἰωνοί τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονες ἰχθῦς, καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιμῇσι φέριστοι. Under Rancour, they are all distinct in form and are separated, and they come together in Love and are desired by each other. For out of these all things that were, that are and that will be in the future, have sprung: trees and men and women, 10 and beasts and birds and water-nourished fish, and long-lived gods, the greatest in honours.

Through these lines, Empedocles tells us that his physical system envisages the existence of some gods who are made out of the four elements, as is every other living being. The quality ‘long-lived’ attributed to these gods appears as a novel notion in contrast to the traditional representation of gods being ambrotoi, immortal. It can be explained, however, with reference to Empedocles’ ontology, according to which, what is made out of compounded elements must abide by the cosmic cycle; hence, long-lived gods, since they are integrated beings, were born at some point in the history of the world and will also ultimately die, just like any other compounds, when things come together to be just one whole being, the Sphairos. In the introduction to this chapter, I listed diverse divine entities under the definition of long-lived gods. These include (traditional) gods recalled as a group or individually mentioned by the names of Ares, Kydoimos, Zeus, Kronos and Poseidon; the Muse and more specifically Calliope; deities who guide the souls in the underworld, among whom we may number Pythagoras; a goddess in the underworld who dresses souls with new bodies; guilty and exiled gods and thus Empedocles’ himself; and, finally, those who escape rebirths. The heterogeneous character of this group of gods implies that, on my interpretation, any god that is not a principle (that is, either one of the four elements or Love and Strife) can be taken as a long-lived god.80 Because they are mortal deities, made of the four elements just like any other living being, long-lived gods belong on the scale of rational beings that also includes plants, animals and humans. In this respect, it should be safe to argue that gods, probably because they are the most rational beings, represent the top of the scale, whose bottom is occupied by plants, with 80

Even the Sphairos can be regarded as a long-lived god, as it lives as long as Love has complete dominion of the elements, but perishes once Strife regains power, separates the elements and forms our cosmos (see Chapter 7.1). However, as the present analysis concentrates on long-lived gods in our world, it does not include the Sphairos.

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animals and human beings in between. Furthermore, although gods share with animals and plants an analogous elemental structure and, ultimately, even mortal nature, their being long-lived refers to the fact that they are among the most stable elemental structures of the cosmos, while human beings are swift to die (B 2.4 [= EMP D 42.4 Laks-Most]), have just a small portion of life (B 2.3 [= EMP D 42.3 Laks-Most]) and are many-timesdying (B 113.2 [= EMP D 5.2 Laks-Most]). Thus, while the mortal nature of humans consists in them being frail and having a fragmented existence, it is assumed that gods have a firm and unbroken nature and are, therefore, able to live much longer than any other living beings. It is worth observing that the adjective δολιχαίωνες, which characterizes the gods ‘greatest in honour’, recalls the definition of δαίμονες as οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο, ‘gods who have won long-lasting life’ in B 115.5 (= EMP D 10.5 Laks-Most). I agree with Sedley that θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες include the δαίμονες with a share in long life.81 Consequently, all those who escape rebirths and become gods become longlasting or long-lived gods. As B 146–47 (= EMP D 39 and 40 Laks-Most) tells us, their godhood primarily consists in them ‘having no parts in human sorrows’ and being ‘indestructible’; additionally they partake in divine feasts and banquets. We have already come upon the characteristic of having a blissful existence with respect to the nature of the Sphairos, which ‘rejoices’ in its solitude. Moreover, this quality of the Sphairos has been linked to the power of Love and the defeat of Strife. In a more general sense, we can say that divine nature and blissfulness are associated with Love. In parallel, mortality and misery are connected to Strife. Furthermore, long-lived gods do not have a fragmented existence that is subjected to many deaths; rather, they have just one death (which may coincide with the end of the world and which in any case makes their lives extremely long), unless they abide by Strife and commit a crime. In that case, they are condemned to become ordinary mortals and so to die and be born again many times. This particular aspect once more relates the divine nature of this group of gods to Love in opposition to Strife. Analogously, as we have seen, the dialectic of divine nature in Empedocles’ system that can be reconstructed through the demonological fragments is based upon the antithesis between a blissful state (and abode) that the guilty δαίμονες lose 81

Sedley (2007: 50). See already Barnes (1982: 499): ‘the daimones and the long-lived gods . . . have much in common: parsimony suggests their identification’. See also Inwood (2001: 54) and Curd (2005: 143). Contra Primavesi (2013: 708–9), who identifies the long-lived gods with both the Sphairos and the four elements.

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and the miserable place and life they are compelled to embrace in our world because of their trust in Strife. This conclusion links the godhood of this group to an aspect of ethical import: their being pure and behaving justly. We already know that gods can lose their divine nature because of certain crimes they commit at some point in their life. Moreover, in Chapter 6.4 we will see that Pausanias, in order to escape rebirths and become a god, must learn to ‘fast from evil’, hence to behave justly, purifying himself from Strife and its works. This is a further sign that, with relation to integrated beings, like human beings, divinity is linked to purity and therefore to Love, as much as mortality is connected with ‘pollution’, crime and Strife.

4.6 Conclusions The investigation put forward in this chapter has shown that, in Empedocles’ system, the divine nature of the elements is different from the divine nature of Love and Strife, just as this is different from the divine nature of the Sphairos and the Holy Mind, or from that of long-lived gods, greatest in honours. However, at least with regard to compounds and integrated beings, like living beings, we can confidently say that their divine nature presents some common traits that closely recall, indeed are modelled upon, the characteristics of the Sphairos, the prototype of all integrated entities and the ideal of godhood. Thus, as the Sphairos shows, being divine for integrated individuals, such as men and women, is associated with Love in contrast to Strife, indeed it is essentially connected with the absence of Strife. Therefore, integrated individuals’ godhood is linked with blissfulness in contrast to misery, purity in contrast to pollution, stability (continuity) in contrast to fragmentation, symmetry in contrast to unbalance and perfect knowledge in contrast to the ignorance of ordinary mortals who have a short lifespan and know just what they happen to experience. In other words, what is promised to those who escape rebirths and become gods is a long and stable life consisting of quintessential happiness and perfect knowledge. In conclusion, this chapter completes, along with Chapter 3, the definition of key terms and concepts in Empedocles’ thought that are significant for a more fully comprehensive account of his doctrine of rebirth. While the previous chapter concentrated on the notion of δαίμων, the focus here is on further terms translating the Empedoclean notion of divinity. Such an analysis has proven important not only because it has clarified a controversial issue of Empedocles studies – namely, what can be

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considered as divine in his physical system and why – but also because it lays the necessary groundwork for the major argument of this book, by enabling us to define in more detail Empedocles’ belief in rebirth. This groundwork will finally allow me to work out, beginning with the next chapter, the ways in which this belief can be reconciled with the principles and theories of his natural philosophy.

chapter 5

Changes of Form, Personal Survival and Rebirth

In the process of delving into Empedocles’ belief in rebirth, it was necessary to first consider and clarify the pivotal concepts related to his notions of godhood and their relationship and function within his doctrine of rebirth. While this analysis provided the linguistic and conceptual tools that allowed me to dig deeper into some of the details of this doctrine, in the present chapter I will expand my scope to incorporate the rest of the proemial section, in which, as we saw in Chapter 2, themes and motifs related to the doctrine of rebirth are programmatically intertwined with more strictly physical principles. In this way, I will be able to reconstruct further details of Empedocles’ concept of rebirth, addressing more specifically questions on disembodied existence and personal survival through different forms of life. In the previous chapters, I could already reconstruct several details concerning Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth. In Chapter 4, for instance, I have shown that the divine reward obtained by those who escape rebirth involves a divine existence associated with the principle of Love, free from the evil power of Strife. Love’s influence results in a blissful, pure, stable and unfragmented life, further blessed with perfect knowledge in contrast to the general ignorance of ordinary men and women. Moreover, in Chapter 3 I established that Empedocles, by following Pythagoras, postulated a doctrine of ‘general’ rebirth, according to which every mortal being is eo ipso a reincarnated individual who, in this world, works through rebirths as different living forms. Further details concerning this doctrine have also been explored in Chapter 2.2 where, by reconstructing Empedocles’ katabasis within the demonological fragments, we have seen that in his journey through the underworld he learned about the judgement of the dead in the afterlife for things committed during embodied life, their punishment or reward according to that judgement and their final appointment to a new body and life. 217

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In further pursuing the in-depth investigation of the details of Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth, in this chapter I will slightly change the focus of my analysis and seek to find answers to several questions more closely related to the way in which Empedocles’ religious concerns about rebirth coexist and function within his chiefly materialistic physical system. These include asking: what is behind Empedocles’ rejection of birth and death? What does his doctrine of rebirth entail on the level of his physical tenets in terms of personal survival upon death? Here I shall present a twofold argument. On the one hand, it will be shown that Empedocles’ physical tenet which explains birth and death as mixtures and separations of basic elements, is motivated by his concept of rebirth. On the other hand, it will be argued that key concerns revolving around the belief in rebirth, such as instances of individual identity and personal survival1 are central elements of Empedocles’ physical system.2 The chapter begins with a group of fragments constituting the final part of Empedocles’ proem to On Nature, in which Empedocles calibrates upon the Presocratic axiom nihil ex nihilo fit (literally the principle that nothing is from nothing) his rejection of the ordinary notions of birth and death. According to Empedocles, nothing is born or dies altogether, but everything results from the mixing, exchanging of mixed things and separating of the four basic and pre-existing elements. Section 5.2 will show that Empedocles uses analogous terms to speak of both the mixtures and changes elements undergo when they are compounded in mortal beings and the changes of bodies individuals endure in their cycle of rebirths. Indeed, by drawing on the domain of metamorphosis, Empedocles ends up conceptualizing rebirth as a series of body transformations, in analogy with those transformations the elements go through when mixed in mortal bodies. In Section 5.4, then, my analysis will concentrate on the central question of whether and in which way personal identity can be carried after death 1

2

In what follows, I will use notions such as ‘individual’, ‘person’ and ‘self’ as more or less synonymous concepts. Thus, when I speak of ‘individual identity’ (or ‘personal identity’), I am referring to the essence of the person, the self or that which characterizes a certain person – a person who lives a certain life, has a certain character, way of thinking, lifestyle and worldview – and makes them therefore identifiable and recognizable. Similarly, in saying ‘personal survival’ (or ‘individual survival’ or ‘survival/continuity of the self’), the reference is to the possibility that the person – a particular embodied person with all that essentially characterizes and identifies them – may survive the death of their body. The centrality of concerns for personal identity and human responsibility in Empedocles’ philosophy have been highlighted by Inwood (2007). The present chapter owes much to Inwood’s study and builds upon his conclusions.

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from a body to the next. In this respect, we will first see that Empedocles’ fragments quite clearly establish personal survival upon the death of the body and, indeed, upon several deaths of several bodies. Second, although claims to individual identity and personal survival are usually thought not to fit with Empedocles’ considerations on psychological and mental functions, and for this reason scholars generally refute the idea that rebirth could be a positive doctrine within his physics, here I will suggest a different explanation. My argument is that the particular way in which Empedocles conceived of rebirth, with its focus on body changes, led him to marginalize the soul; that is, to fail a reflection in terms of physical principles on the relationship between personal survival and the self, and the role of the soul in it. However, this does not mean that he had no notion of the soul. As Section 5.3 shows, he speaks of ψυχαί in his verses. My conclusion then is that Empedocles is at ease with a traditional, Homeric concept of ψυχή, which can not only sustain the notion of disembodied existence, as it stands for personal survival upon the death of the body; it can also be adapted to the principles of his physics.

5.1

Birth and Death

To return to the proem to On Nature, in Chapter 2.9 I allocated a group of fragments to its final section, in which Empedocles, by introducing one of the main tenets of his physical system, deals with a revision of the ordinary notions of birth and death. His aim is to challenge the common conception that something can be formed from nothing or end completely in order to offer his own understanding of these phenomena: namely, that birth and death involve basic elements that are mixed and separated into different forms of living beings. In what follows, I will look more closely at these fragments in terms of the argument contained therein, including giving a more comprehensive understanding of his novel concepts of birth and death. Then, by showing that Empedocles’ physical tenet is grounded in his concept of rebirth, I will also show that the changes the elements undergo through mixing and the changes of bodies during a person’s rebirths appear to be, both linguistically and conceptually, deeply interrelated. In the final group of proemial fragments discussed in Chapter 2.9, Empedocles rejects the standard meaning attributed to the notions of birth and death, as we can read through the lines of B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most): ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω· φύσις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἁπάντων θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτοιο τελευτή,

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Changes of Form, Personal Survival and Rebirth ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων ἔστι, φύσις δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν. I will tell you something else: of mortal beings, none has birth, nor any end in wretched death, but there are only mixing and exchange of mixed things, ‘birth’ is the name given to these by humans.

The assumption that no mortal thing has neither birth nor death, but that everything that exists is the result of the ‘mixing and exchange of mixed things’ rests on the implicit idea that the ordinary notions of ‘birth’ and ‘death’ are misleading concepts based on a faulty understanding of natural phenomena. As Empedocles explains in the last line, ‘birth’ (but a similar line of reasoning must arguably hold true also for the notion of ‘death’) is a name humans erroneously gave to the natural processes of μίξις (mixis) and διάλλαξις (diallaxis) of things. While we will return to the notions of μίξις and, above all, διάλλαξις below, the lines of B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most) help clarify where the error of mortals lies with respect to their understanding of birth and death: οἱ δ’ ὅτε μὲν κατὰ φῶτα μιγέντ’ εἰς αἰθέρ’ ἵ ἢ κατὰ θηρῶν ἀγροτέρων γένος ἢ κατὰ θάμνων ἠὲ κατ᾽ οἰωνῶν, τό γε μὲν γενέσθαι. εὖτε δ᾽ ἀποκρινθῶσι, τὸ δ᾽ αὖ δυσδαίμονα πότμον. ἣ θέμις, καλέουσι· νόμωι δ᾽ ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός.3 And when (the elements?) come to ether mixed in the form of a human being or as the race of wild animals, or of plants or of birds, this they call ‘coming to be’. And when they are separated, this again [they call] ‘miserable fate’. They do not name them rightly, but I myself assent to their convention.

Ordinary people mistakenly conceptualize ‘birth’ as the phenomenon whereby a certain form of a living being comes into being from nothing. Instead, the birth of a living being results from mixtures of pre-existing elements. Similarly, ‘death’ does not coincide with the phenomenon whereby a living being decays into nothingness, but instead refers to the process of separation of its component elements (which presumably continue to exist as such). The broader inference contained in these lines is that the common concepts of birth and death are erroneous because, by grasping the superficial aspect of these phenomena, they lead them back 3

For a textual reconstruction of this fragment, see Chapter 2.9.

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to the notion of ‘nothingness’, which is untenable in light of the invisible natural processes involving pre-existing and perennial matter: the four elements. Thus, in order to correctly illustrate how things in fact come to pass, notions belonging to the domain of mixing and separation – or as stated in B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most), μίξις and διάλλαξις – are more appropriate than the customary names of birth and death.4 Nonetheless, as claimed in the last line of B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most), Empedocles will abide by convention and continue using the ordinary, faulty terms of ‘birth’ and ‘death’. However, Empedocles understands them to be deprived of their conventional meaning and charged instead with a more genuine sense which is more in keeping with the actual process of coming to be and perishing. In another fragment belonging to the same context (also discussed in Chapter 2.9), Empedocles calls ‘fools’ those who take the concepts of birth and death in the traditional sense: νήπιοι· οὐ γάρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι, οἳ δὴ γίγνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν ἤ τι καταθνήισκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἁπάντηι.

(B 11 [= EMP D 51 Laks-Most])

Fools – for their solicitudes are not far-reaching thoughts – are those who expected that what formerly is not comes into being or that something dies and is utterly destroyed.

The expression δολιχόφρονες μέριμναι at line 1 is reminiscent of Empedocles’ criticism, expressed in B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most), against ordinary people who, with their narrow cognitive tools, their thoughts dulled by worthless solicitudes and their small portion of life, have just a superficial understanding of things, knowing only what they happen to experience. Indeed, being driven by their perceptions, they are unable to achieve an in-depth comprehension of ‘the whole’.5 In B 11 (= EMP D 51 Laks-Most), people are similarly called fools because they lack far-reaching thoughts and this prevents them from understanding (and consequently caring about) the real nature of processes of birth and death. So they end up expecting that something could come from what formerly was not and that it could also utterly dissolve. 4

5

An analogous way of arguing can be found in Anaxagoras’ DK 59 B 17 (= ANAXAG D 15 Laks-Most): ‘the Greeks do not employ (the words) “coming to be” and “perishing” correctly, for nothing comes into being or is even destroyed; rather, of (pre)existing things there is combination and breaking up. They would, therefore, be correct to call coming-to-be “combining” and perishing “breaking up”’ (transl. Sider 2005: 155). B 2 (= EMP D 42 Laks-Most) is quoted and discussed in detail in Chapter 2.5.

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Wrapping up, the problem with the standard notions of birth and death ultimately rests on an incorrect, indeed superficial, way of looking at phenomena and understanding the way things come to pass. Human superficial understanding results in concepts and names that crystallize superficial perceptions and give rise to erroneous but standardized meanings. Thus, ‘birth’ and ‘death’ turn out to crystallize the notion of ‘nonbeing’ or ‘nothingness’, from or into which a given being emerges or disappears. Yet their standardized meanings betray a superficial perception, instead of illustrating (or evoking) the underlying natural process, and for this reason they are flawed. As we have seen above, in B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most) Empedocles defines the process underlying the birth (φύσις) of a living being by the expression μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων. When commenting on these lines, Plutarch clarifies that Empedocles does not negate the concept of life or the notion of existence, rather he redefines it in terms of combinations and separations of pre-existing things, such that ‘“coming-to-be” is just a name applied to the combination with one another of some pre-existing things, whereas “death” is analogously a name applied to their separation from one another (διαλύσει δ’ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τὸν θάνατον ἐπονομάζεσθαι)’. While Empedocles speaks of the process underlying the generation of a living being as μίξις and διάλλαξις, Plutarch explains the Empedoclean notion of φύσις and θάνατος in terms of mixture and separation, that is, διάλυσις. The idea that birth is a form of mixing while death coincides with separation has a parallel in B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most), where Empedocles straightforwardly connects birth with mixture (μιγέντα at l. 1) and death with separation (ἀποκρινθῶσι at l. 4). Yet Plutarch is here commenting on B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most) and this invites the reading that he understands Empedocles’ word διάλλαξις as more or less equivalent to διάλυσις. We find the same equivalence in Aristotle’s reading of Empedocles in On Generation and Corruption.6 τοῖς δὲ τὰ γένη πλείω ποιοῦσι διαφέρειν τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν τῆς γενέσεως· συνιόντων γὰρ καὶ διαλυομένων ἡ γένεσις συμβαίνει καὶ ἡ φθορά. διὸ λέγει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ὅτι ‘φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων’. Those who make the kinds of things more than one must hold that alteration differs from coming-to-be, for coming-to-be and passing-away occur when 6

314b 4–8 (see also 333b 12–15).

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things come together and are dissolved. This is the reason why Empedocles also is speaking to this effect, when he says that ‘there is no origin of anything, but only a mixing and διάλλαξις of things which have been mingled’.

Aristotle’s partial quotation of B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most) is made in order to corroborate his assumption that those earlier thinkers who, like Empedocles, postulated more than one basic element also maintained that coming-to-be coincides with a σύνεσις of these elements, whereas passingaway is their διάλυσις. In other words, Aristotle bends Empedocles’ interpretation to his own explanation of the nature of natural processes and, in doing so, equates διάλλαξις with διάλυσις. However, as Palmer has correctly observed,7 Aristotle’s understanding of διάλλαξις in terms of separation is problematic, as it stems from his assumption, stated just before the Empedoclean quotation, that those who have posited a plurality of material principles must argue for generation and destruction in terms of their combination and separation. The term διάλλαξις, however, does not seem to mean anything like separation. By discussing the sense of this unusual word,8 along with other terms related to its root, such as the more common διαλλαγή (diallage), Palmer emphasizes that they express the notion of ‘interchange’ and ‘change’, as well as ‘change from enmity to friendship’ and, hence, ‘reconciliation’. They never mean ‘separation’. Indeed, the verb διαλλάσσω (diallasso), from which διάλλαξις and διαλλαγή are derived, is attested with the sense of ‘give and take in exchange’ or simply ‘exchange’, ‘interchange’ or, in some contexts, with the sense of ‘reconcile with one another’. It is never attested with the meaning of ‘separate’. Even more relevantly, when διαλλάσσω recurs in Empedocles’ fragments, it depicts the elements interchanging with one another or exchanging their paths when forming compounds.9 With all this given, a cognate term such as διάλλαξις, just like διαλλαγή, would be expected to have, analogously, the sense of ‘exchange’ or ‘interchange’, rather than that of ‘separation’. Thus, Palmer concludes that

7 8 9

Palmer (2009: 287). Its sole occurrences are in: Plato Ep. 7.350d 6, where the term, in the plural, means something like ‘reconciliations’; Hp. Salubr. 1.10; Iambl. Theol. Arith. P. 5.9; and schol. in Nic. Ther. 7a 1. See B 17.12 (= EMP D 73.243 Laks-Most), διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει; B 17.6 (= EMP D 73.238 Laks-Most) ταῦτ᾿ ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει, ‘they never cease from constantly interchanging’; and B 35.15, ζωρά θ’ἃ πρὶν, κερόωντο, διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους, ‘and things previously unblended, were mixing interchanging their paths’ (on the text of this line, see n.25 in Chapter 4.1). See, moreover, the comparable μεταλλάσσον̣[τα in PStrasb. a(ii) 12 (= EMPD D 73.282 Laks-Most). In all these cases, the verb ἀλλάσσω and its cognates διαλλάσσω and μεταλλάσσω have the meaning ‘to interchange’.

224

Changes of Form, Personal Survival and Rebirth [c]orrectly understanding μίξις and διάλλαξις in fr. 8 as mixture and interchange suggests that Empedocles conceived of elemental mixture as producing a reciprocal interaction, wherein the roots as they mix are qualitatively affected by one another in an interactive interchange that produces compounds with new qualities of their own.10

Palmer dismisses the idea that ‘exchange’ or ‘interchange’ in this context may indicate the ‘remixing’ of elements to form other products, which occurs when a living compound dies.11 Rather, the term διάλλαξις specifies a process of transformation: as they mix, the elements give to and take in exchange from one another their own specific properties and, in doing so, are qualitatively affected by one another. The result is a new compound with its own new qualities. Wrapping up, according to B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most) the origin of living beings is governed by the interaction of pre-existing materials – the four elements – that continuously mix and reciprocally interchange, transforming themselves into the multitude of living beings we can now see. Following B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most), moreover, death implies a separation of elements. Indeed, death can intuitively be taken as involving the final departure of breath or utter dispersion of heat from the living body; that is, in Empedoclean terms, the separation of air and fire from the other compounded elements. It is worth considering that Empedocles’ way of arguing for birth and death is a result of his tacit assumption of the physical principle nihil ex nihilo fit, which Aristotle identifies as a common axiom of Presocratic cosmology.12 Indeed, Empedocles’ physical theory establishes that every visible and invisible thing in the universe, thus including both organic and inorganic matter, is brought about by the interchange of pre-existing elements mixing with, and separating from, each other. In this respect, nothing in the universe ever comes to be out of nothing or is utterly ended. However, the focus on θνητά in B 8.2 (= EMP D 53.2 Laks-Most), with its specification in B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most) as human beings, wild animals, plants and birds, betrays the impression that the Presocratic axiom governing all areas and things of the universe is enunciated by Empedocles specifically to explain that living beings do not ever come to be and perish altogether. Empedocles’ unconditional refutation of birth and death, in other words, seems to be tailored to 10 11 12

Palmer (2009: 288–89); The emphasis is Palmer’s. See Ibid. 288 with n.73, where Palmer criticizes this view held by Rowett (1987a: 41) and Barnes (1982: 439). Arist. Phys. 187a 27–29. See also Metaph. 1062b 24–26. For this principle informing Empedocles’ system and, more generally, pre-Socratic philosophy, see Palmer (2016: 33–34).

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his more religious belief that there is something of the individual that preexists the birth and outlasts the death of their present mortal form. Indeed, Empedocles seems to be articulating his central physical theory with his doctrine of rebirth in mind.13 This impression gains force when we consider further lines belonging to the same proemial section of the fragments quoted above, namely B 15 (= EMP D 52 Laks-Most): οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιτο, ὡς ὄφρα μέν τε βιῶσι, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι, τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἰσίν, καί σφιν πάρα δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά, πρὶν δὲ πάγεν τε βροτοὶ καὶ λύθεν, οὐδὲν ἄρ’ εἰσιν A wise person would not surmise such things in his mind: that so long as they live what they call a life, for so long they are, and good and evil things befall them, but before they are formed as mortals and once they are dissolved, they are nothing.

Here Empedocles tells us that whereas those who believe that what formerly is not could come into being or that something could utterly end are ‘fools’ and ‘not-far-reaching’ thinkers (B 11.1 [= EMP D 51.1 Laks-Most]), a wise person knows that there is individual existence, as well as evil and good things that come with it, beyond embodied life. As we have seen in Chapter 2.9, the reference in B 15 (= EMP D 52 Laks-Most) to good and evil things that men and women experience before their birth and after their death as mortals strongly indicates that Empedocles hints here at his doctrine of rebirth. To sum up, in the fragments I have considered up to this point – B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most), B 9 (= EMP D 54 Laks-Most), B 11 (= EMP D 51 Laks-Most) and B 15 (= EMP D 52 Laks-Most) which all belong to the same context of the proemial section – Empedocles formulates the idea of pre-existing elements forming, through their continuous combinations and interchanges, all kinds of living beings, bearing in mind his belief in disembodied existence and rebirth. This reading shows that the concept of mixing and exchange of elements, so central to Empedocles’ physics, is not only in line with more religious concerns, but seems to be prompted by them and premised upon them. Indeed, Empedocles’ refutation of the usual concepts of ‘coming to be’ and ‘perishing’ goes hand in hand with a rethinking of the notion of individual existence, now disentangled from birth and death. 13

Palmer (2009: 261–62).

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5.2 Rebirth as Transformation Having now established that one of Empedocles’ main physical tenets – his unconditional refutation of the ordinary concepts of birth and death – is in fact formulated with his doctrine of rebirth in mind, I can begin to investigate the relationship between the two in more detail, especially by looking at his word choice in terms of metaphor domains. In what follows, I will first outline the way that the concept of rebirth draws on the metaphor domain of journey before I clarify its use in B 115 (= EMP D 51 Laks-Most) in relation to the gods’ exile. By looking at Empedocles’ metaphor use in a number of fragments related to the theme of rebirth, it will be argued that his conception of the bodily transformations individuals undergo during their reincarnations is analogous to the changes of the elements into mortal bodies. Thus, despite the modern conception of metempsychosis, Empedocles’ concept of rebirth is illustrated through notions that are closer to the domain of metamorphosis. To begin, let us consider what a basic doctrine of rebirth entails. From a modern point of view, doctrines of rebirth are commonly taken to convey the idea that the personal soul of the individual transmigrates from one body to another. They are therefore usually indifferently referred to as doctrines of transmigration or metempsychosis. In his comprehensive study on metempsychosis in archaic and classical Greece, H. S. Long defined it as ‘the belief that at the death the soul passes into another body’.14 The concept of ‘transmigration’ similarly entails the notion that there is something, usually the soul, that migrates from one body to another. The term metempsychosis, formed from the verb ἐμψυχόω (empsychoô), ‘to animate’, and the prefix μετά (meta, lat. trans), signifies the re-insufflation of a soul in a new body and draws attention to the movement of the eternal or at least long-lasting soul which, like a breath (πνεῦμα, in Greek), enters the body. As we can see from even this short explanation, this concept is constructed around metaphors belonging to the domain of journey. The focus on the movement or journey of the soul in and out of the body and from one body to another displays Plato’s influential legacy (in its Christian adaptation, which has spread and made Plato’s thought familiar to us) to our understanding of ancient (and modern) doctrines of rebirth.15 As we 14 15

H. S. Long (1948: 2); the emphasis is mine. Admittedly, with reference to the doctrine of rebirth Plato usually employs the expression πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ‘to be born again’. However, in his myths about the soul in the afterlife, Plato pervasively draws on the idea of the journeys of the soul.

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have seen in Chapter 3.3, in Plato’s writings we find the assumption that the soul is the eternal and semi-divine personal element in human beings, which will outlive the death of the body; indeed it will persist through many deaths and journey through many bodies. From a perspective that analyzes metaphor concepts, the metaphor domain of the wandering or journeying of the soul draws attention to the notion of an eternal or at least persisting entity in us that migrates intact through diverse places – these being either places in the cosmos (such as the underworld, heaven, the moon, our earth, etc.) or the same as mortal bodies. Nevertheless, it should be asked to what extent this Platonizing way of speaking about the soul and its transmigrations fairly renders Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth. By focusing on the lines of B 115 (= EMP D 10 LaksMost), which, as we saw in Chapters 1.2 and 3.2, scholars have taken as the standard fragment on rebirth, Empedocles appears to use the conceptual domain of a journeying entity as the main agent of rebirths. Although in Chapter 3 I put forward more than one reason to reject the standard reading of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) representing the aetiological myth for the soul’s rebirths, it is nevertheless true that the guilty δαίμων, who is going to be born as diverse forms of mortals, is said to ‘wander (ἀλάλησθαι) away from the blessed gods’ and to ‘exchange the hard paths of life’ (βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους). However, the notion of the wanderings of the δαίμων in the context of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) might not be used as a metaphor to talk about rebirths but might instead convey, in allegorical terms,16 the state of exile into which the guilty gods are sent after they are banished from the divine abode. On the other hand, the expression βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους in B 115.7 (= EMP D 10.7 Laks-Most) illustrates the punishment inflicted on guilty gods once they are compelled to leave their original abode. They must be born over time as diverse forms of mortals (φυόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἴδεα θνητῶν). The wording βιότοιο . . . κελεύθους 16

Crisp (2005, 117) defines allegory as a ‘superextended metaphor’, namely a metaphor ‘extended to the point where all direct target reference is eliminated’. See, moreover, at p. 129: ‘The result of their “superextension”, however, is to remove all language relating directly to [the] metaphorical target. What remains is language that refers to and describes the metaphorical source, both literally and non-literally’. Accordingly, we can describe the story of the guilty gods as an allegory in the sense Crisp (2005: 115–16) points out: ‘Allegory in literary contexts refers to fictions that are given a continuously metaphorical interpretation . . . What all allegories . . . have in common is that they never refer directly to their metaphorical target. Direct reference is only to the metaphorical source constructed as a fictional situation.’ At p. 127, Crisp clarifies this conclusion: ‘The language of allegory simply refers to and describes the metaphorical source. It thus consists of a set of possible references and predications, or, to speak less literally, the source is construed as a possible, fictional, situation’.

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exploits the metaphor of the paths of life, conceptually related to the domain of journey, to talk about the drastic changes (μεταλλάσσοντα) in existential conditions the guilty gods will undergo. These changes certainly refer to the gods’ rebirths as all forms of mortals. However, the metaphor of the paths of life, which belongs to the conceptual domain of life as a journey, is pervasive in Greek language,17 as it is in everyday English too.18 In other words, the domain of journey may not be meant specifically to illustrate the notion of rebirth, but may rather be exploited to conceptualize and talk about life. Moreover, the context of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) suggests that the many paths of life guilty gods must exchange are conceptually related to their new condition as exiles and wanderers. This is an indication, in conclusion, that the notion of the paths of life is idiosyncratic to the depiction of the gods’ journey of exile. Furthermore, when we look at other Empedoclean verses that hint at rebirth but do not refer to the exile of the guilty gods, we notice a use of different conceptual metaphors than those related to the domain of paths and journeys. Let us closely consider B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most): μορφὴν δ᾽ ἀλλάξαντα πατὴρ φίλον υἱὸν ἀείρας σφάζει ἐπευχόμενος μέγα νήπιος· οἱ δ᾽ ἀπορεῦνται λισσόμενον θύοντες· ὁ δ᾽ αὖ νήκουστος ὁμοκλέων σφάξας ἐν μεγάροισι κακὴν ἀλεγύνατο δαῖτα. ὡς δ᾽ αὔτως πατέρ᾽ υἱὸς ἑλὼν καὶ μητέρα παῖδες θυμὸν ἀπορραίσαντε φίλας κατὰ σάρκας ἔδουσιν.

5

The father lifts up his dear son in a changed form and, fool, prays and slays him. And they hesitate while they sacrifice the victim that implores them. But he, deaf to his cries slays him in his house and prepares an evil feast. In the same way a son seizes his father and the children their mother 5 and tearing out their life devour the flesh of those they love.

As we saw in Chapter 2.6, this fragment represents Empedocles’ condemnation of the impious practice of ritual sacrifice, which, against the 17

18

Most of the imagery studied by Becker (1937) can be attributed to the conceptualization of life as a journey in early Greek literature. In Ferella (2017: 112–14), I argued that conceptualizations of the sort studied by Becker can be considered entrenched in the fifth century BCE. For the same metaphor use in modern English, see Lakoff and Turner (1989: 60–61) and Kövecses (2002: e.g., 3). The pervasive nature of this conceptualization in English as well as in many other languages, both ancient and modern, can be explained by the fact that it rests on the fundamental ‘Source-PathsGoal’ schema that is a recurring pattern of thought and a structure by which we have meaningful, connected experiences that we comprehend and reason about. See Lakoff (1987: 275) and Johnson (1987: 79). For supportive experimental research, see Katz and Taylor (2008) and Ritchie (2008). For an analysis of the same schema in Greco-Roman sources see Ferella (2018a).

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backdrop of the doctrine of rebirth, can be seen as the killing of a human being, temporarily reborn with the body of the sacrificial animal on the altar. From the lines quoted above it plainly emerges that rebirth is conceptualized as a change of form. Indeed, the phrase μορφὴν δ᾽ ἀλλάξαντα emphasizes the body and its transformations. Furthermore, this expression closely resembles a passage of Euripides’ Bacchae, in which Dionysus explains that he has come to Thebes to demonstrate to King Pentheus that he is a god and, as such, deserves proper honours. However, if Pentheus continues obstructing him, Dionysus will meet him in battle at the head of an army of maenads. Then the god concludes, ‘that is why, having taken in exchange a mortal appearance I changed my form to that of a man (ὧν οὕνεκ’ εἶδος θνητὸν ἀλλάξας ἔχω / μορφήν τ’ ἐμὴν μετέβαλον εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν)’.19 In Euripides’ passage, the Empedoclean reminiscence of ἀλλάξας . . . μορφήν highlights the temporary metamorphosis of the god into a human being. Analogously, in Empedocles, the focus is on the bodily transformation the new birth brings about. In other words, the metaphor used in these verses with reference to Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth highlights the notion of the body and its transformations, while being silent about the soul and its wanderings. In B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) the verb ἀλλάσσοντα, in conjunction with the object μορφήν, indirectly recalls the concept of elements interchanging with one another to shape the new mortal body. As we have seen above, in B 8 (= EMP D 53 Laks-Most), by refuting the common notion of birth and death as coming to be from, and dissolving into, nothingness, Empedocles claims that φύσις entails an underlying process of mixture and interchange of mixed things, a διάλλαξις. As has been argued in Section 5.1, the word δι-άλλαξις and its cognate terms such as ἀλλάσσω and διαλλάσσω occur in Empedocles to depict the elements interchanging with one another and producing a reciprocal interaction, in which the elements as they mix are qualitatively affected by one another. This process produces transformations of the mixed elements into new compounds with new qualities of their own. Analogously, in B 17.6 (= EMP D 73.238 LaksMost) the elements are said constantly to change, ἀλλάσσοντα, when they come together into one thing due to Love or are borne apart separately by Strife. At B 17.12 (= EMP D 73.243 Laks-Most) Empedocles rephrases the same idea by saying that the elements, having learned to grow as one out of many and many out of one, have no steadfast life, but constantly change 19

Eur. Bacch. 53–54.

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(διαλλάσσοντα).20 Thus, within six lines, Empedocles uses the verb ἀλλάσσω and its cognate διαλλάσσω to express the notion of continuous elemental transformations – in other words, the elements, by interchanging with one another, transform themselves into diverse and multifarious compounds of living beings. While the verb ἀλλάσσω and its cognates διαλλάσσω and διάλλαξις represent the concepts that illustrate the cycles of the elements and their transformations into living beings, the same notions are also employed to convey the cycle of rebirth of the individual persons. Above we have seen that rebirth is illustrated through the phrase μορφὴν δ᾽ ἀλλάξαντα in B 137.1 (= EMP D 29.1 Laks-Most); yet the importance of the use of ἀλλάσσω and its cognates to convey the concept of rebirth extends beyond B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most). A further example is represented by the expression μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους in B 115.7 (= EMP D 10.7 LaksMost), which, as we have seen above, illustrates the gods’ rebirths. A parallel with Isocrates in which Heracles is said to μετήλλαξε τὸν βίον, to have changed his life, becoming a god from a mortal, θεὸς ἐκ θνητοῦ γενόμενος,21 shows that the Empedoclean expression analogously conveys the meaning of a radical change of life, indeed a transformation into a new kind of living being each time a guilty god is reborn. To sum up, we can say that Empedocles depicts the cycle of rebirths of the individual persons in analogy with the cycles of the elements and their transformations into living beings, employing the verb ἀλλάσσω (with its cognates) as the key concept to convey both cycles. In this respect, it is worth noting that the above-quoted expression μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους which, as we have just seen, refers to the gods’ multiple rebirths into mortal beings, closely resembles the phrase διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους employed in B 35.14–15 (= EMP D 75.14–15 LaksMost). There, it illustrates the interchange of paths among the four elements that, having hitherto been immortal and unmixed, now mingle and through this interchange give rise to mortal and integrated beings. As has been argued in the previous chapter, these two lines are part of a passage explaining the mixing of the elements due to Love’s increasing influence, which brings about a multitude of living beings. Thus, the wording ‘interchange of paths’ precisely refers to the elements’ transformations into living beings and, consequently, to their birth. In this respect it is 20 21

B 17.9–13 (= EMP D 73.240–44 Laks-Most) are repeated identically at B 26.8–13 (= EMP D 77b.8–13 Laks-Most). Isocr. Archidam. 6, 17.1.

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worth noting that the line depicting the coming into being of living beings due to elemental mixtures in B 35.16 (= EMP D 75.16 Laks-Most) – τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ’ ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν – closely recalls the continuous changes of life a guilty god undergoes by ‘being born throughout time as all kinds of mortal forms’ – B 115.6 (= EMP D 10.6 Laks-Most): φυομένους παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἴδεα θνητῶν. This is further evidence that the cycle of rebirths of the guilty gods is conceptualized in analogy with the elements’ transformations into mortal compounds. Returning to the analysis of the metaphors illustrating the process of rebirth, in B 126 (= EMP D 19 Laks-Most) the focus is still on the notion of bodies that change during rebirths, although here Empedocles uses a different image. The body is described as a ‘tunic of flesh’, σαρκῶν . . . χιτῶνι, that is ἀλλογνώς. The word ἀλλογνώς is unique. Guthrie put forward a parallel with a Herodotean passage22 where a form of the cognate verb ἀλλογνοέω means ‘failing to recognize’.23 In the Empedoclean context, therefore, the word ἀλλογνώς could illustrate the new body received at birth as ‘alien’ or ‘unknown’ (to the person who is going to be reborn), but it could also suggest the idea that the new body makes the person unrecognizable. Either way, the fragment conveys the image of the body as a brand-new dress the person is about to wear and clearly draws attention to the novel form of body obtained at birth. Furthermore, in other fragments belonging to the context of rebirth, Empedocles employs a terminology that could also be related to the conceptual domain of body change or transformation I have reconstructed thus far. In B 127 (= EMP D 36 Laks-Most), to say that the same individual can be reborn as a lion among animals and as a laurel among plants – the best lives in both cases – Empedocles says that individuals γίγνονται, ‘become’ or ‘are born’ as lions and laurels. Analogously, in the fragment depicting the final leg of the cycle of rebirths (B 146–47 [= EMP D 39 and D 40 Laks-Most]), individuals πέλονται, ‘become’ or ‘are born’, as seers, poets, doctors and political leaders before they ‘blossom’ (ἀναβλαστοῦσι) as gods of greatest honours.24 What is more significant about this terminological use, however, is that while being opaque about body transformations, it conceals the role of the soul in rebirths. In fact, rather than talking about the wanderings of the soul into the bodies of a laurel, lion, doctor, leader, poet, etc., Empedocles describes these rebirths in a way that is reminiscent of Proteus’ transformations in the Odyssey. As the Homeric poet tells us, ‘Proteus of Egypt, the 22

1.85.

23

Guthrie (1965: 254 with n.1).

24

For both fragments, see Chapter 2.2.4.

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immortal old man of the sea who never lies, who plays the deep in all its depths and is servant of Poseidon’ used to come out of the sea at noon to lie down and doze in the shade of the rocks. Thus, whoever wished to know their fate, had to approach him at that time to catch him in his sleep. However, strength was needed to hold him back, because Proteus was a shape-shifter and therefore able to ‘assume (γινόμενος) all manner of shapes of all things that move upon the earth, and of water, and of wondrous blazing fire’.25 After returning from the Trojan War and having captured him, Menelaus saw him turn himself (γένετο/γίνετο) into a lion, a snake, a leopard, a pig, even into simple water, and again into a tree, before resuming his human form and telling him his future.26 Thus, while Proteus became (γένετο/γίνετο) all these forms, so too do the individual persons who do not pass through different mortal bodies, but rather turn into or become (γίγνονται/πέλονται) a lion, laurel, political leader, poet, physician and seer upon death. In conclusion, both Empedocles’ metaphor of bodily change employed to depict rebirth and the reminiscences of Proteus’ transformations in some verses referring to rebirth suggest that, rather than the most common Platonic metaphor of a journeying or wandering soul, Empedocles exploits the image of the body transformations individuals undergo through rebirths. To put it another way, if we consider that two poles are involved in rebirths – continuity (of soul or self) and changes (of bodies) – Plato pushes towards continuity whereas Empedocles stresses change. Empedocles’ idea of rebirth, in other words, is illustrated through concepts that are closer to the domain of metamorphosis than to that of metempsychosis.27

5.3

De Anima

Having established that Empedocles’ concept of rebirth is linked with the domain of metamorphosis, I would now like to combine this with my analysis in Chapter 3 to consider the implications that this conception has on the soul in Empedocles’ verses. Specifically, in what follows, I will argue 25 26 27

Od. 4.417–18: πάντα δὲ γινόμενος πειρήσεται, ὅσσ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν / ἑρπετὰ γίνονται καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ θεσπιδαὲς πῦρ. Od. 4.456–58: ἀλλ’ ἦ τοι πρώτιστα λέων γένετ’ ἠϋγένειος, / αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα δράκων καὶ πάρδαλις ἠδὲ μέγας σῦς· / γίνετο δ’ ὑγρὸν ὕδωρ καὶ δένδρεον ὑψιπέτηλον. In this respect, the incipit of Ovid’s Metamorphosis I, 1–2 is meaningful: in nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas corpora, ‘my mind is bent to tell of bodies changed into new forms’ (the emphasis is mine).

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that the conceptualization of rebirth as a chain of metamorphoses led to the marginalization of the soul. However, moving beyond the extant fragments considered above, including returning to B 126 (= EMP D 19 LaksMost) in light of Porphyry and Plato, I will also challenge scholars’ common opinion and argue that Empedocles has a notion of soul and in fact spoke of ψυχή (psyche) in his physical poem. As I have just shown, Empedocles draws on a metaphor domain that highlights the bodies and their transformations in rebirths, while concealing the role of a continuing entity such as the soul. Moreover, judging from the extant fragments, Empedocles does not seem to have a special attachment to the word ψυχή when dealing with rebirth. Indeed, it is absent from verses where we would expect it most, for instance in B 111.9 (= EMP D 43.9 LaksMost). To express the promise that Pausanias will raise the dead to life, Empedocles says that he will be able to bring out of Hades the μένος (menos) – not the ψυχή – of a dead person. Similarly, in other contexts that are chiefly religious, Empedocles is silent about the ψυχή, while putting emphasis on the θυμός (thymos) that can never rest from dreadful sufferings (B 145.2 [= EMP D 30.2 Laks-Most]) or, even more remarkably, on the θυμός that priests unwittingly ‘rip out’ from their relatives when officiating a ritual sacrifice (B 137.6 [= EMP D 29.6 Laks-Most]).28 In light of this, scholars have advocated the view that Empedocles has no notion of soul as ψυχή. In fact, the term occurs in just one fragment, B 138 (not in Laks-Most), whose attribution to Empedocles has been questioned.29 In this context, additionally, ψυχή is not explicitly associated with the 28

29

This range of words to describe what we could refer to as the domain of the soul has generally been taken as a sign of Empedocles’ lack of accuracy when dealing with the mental and emotional experience. However, a comparison with modern English indicates that the reverse is true, since we vary our terminology to express thoughts and feelings. We may say ‘I think’ or ‘I feel’, but also ‘I have this in my mind’, ‘in my head’, ‘in my heart’ or even ‘in my gut’. In fact, as aspects of emotional and mental experiences are not localizable in the way body limbs are, a relatively wide range of terms to talk about them does not reveal inaccuracy, but rather suggests the effort to be as thorough and comprehensive as possible when illustrating such abstract concepts. It is worth noting, moreover, that, as A. Long (2019: 21) highlights, Pindar, just like Empedocles, does not seem to have a special attachment to the Greek word ψυχή when dealing with rebirth. Whereas in fr. 133 Snell-Maehler (quoted by Plato, Meno 81b–c; for the Pindaric fragment, see Chapter 2.2.3), Pindar does talk about ψυχαί that Persephone sent back to life, in another passage prominently dealing with rebirth, namely O. 2.55–86 (see Chapter 2.2.2), he speaks of φρένες (l. 57), literally ‘minds’ being punished or rewarded in the underworld, before being sent again to our world. B 138 (not in Laks-Most) comes from Aristotle’s quotation in the Poetics, 1457b 7–9 and 13–16: μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. . . . ἀπ’ εἴδους δὲ ἐπὶ εἶδος οἷον ‘χαλκῶι ἀπὸ ψυχὴν ἀρύσας’ καὶ ‘ταμὼν ἀτειρέι χαλκῶι’ ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀρύσαι ‘ταμεῖν’, τὸ δὲ ταμεῖν ‘ἀρύσαι’ εἴρηκεν· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀφελεῖν τί ἐστιν.

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doctrine of rebirth and is usually interpreted as meaning ‘life’, rather than ‘soul’.30 Furthermore, it is general opinion that the Empedoclean term translating the notion of (transmigrating) soul is δαίμων rather than ψυχή. However, in Chapter 3, beside showing that the term δαίμων in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), in line with its occurrences in epic poetry, in Pythagoras and Plato is a synonymous term for ‘god’, I argued that the story of Empedocles as a wandering δαίμων, which emphasizes his extraordinary nature and special wisdom, challenges the view that the souls of all human beings are called δαίμονες. Since Empedocles’ claim places him in a unique position in contrast to ordinary people, δαίμων can hardly be taken as a term for soul or as the subject of a general doctrine presenting rebirth as the destiny of each living being. Rather, as I argued in Chapter 3.5, this concept emphasizes the role of δαίμων φύλαξ that Empedocles chooses to impersonate: through his philosophy, he teaches people their place in this world and beyond, while guiding his disciple along the way to godhood. On the other hand, the term ψυχή in Empedocles cannot be dismissed so easily. In fact, although, as we have just seen, Empedocles shows no particular attachment to this word, J. Barnes correctly points out that ‘the view that Empedocles had no soul . . . was not held in antiquity: the doxographers are ready enough to use psyche in Empedoclean contexts, and their sunny acceptance of Empedoclean souls suggests that the absence of the term psyche from the fragments should be ascribed to chance’.31 An easy objection to Barnes may run as follows: since the majority of ancient doxographers are not exempt from the Platonizing interpretation that, as we saw in Chapter 3.2, assimilates the Empedoclean concept of δαίμων to the notion of ψυχή, it is possible that they read the word δαίμων in the Empedoclean text and rephrased it in their commentaries as ψυχή.32

30 31 32

Although Aristotle does not explicitly attribute this quotation to Empedocles, it is usually considered Empedoclean on the basis of Theon of Smyrna (Expositio Rerum Mathematicarum, p. 21 de Gelder) who quotes part of it, attributing it to Empedocles. However, Picot (2004; 2006) denied the attribution of the Aristotelian quotation to Empedocles and, on the basis of Picot’s results, B 138 is not included in Laks-Most’s 2016 edition of the Empedoclean fragments, although it is included in the Mansfeld-Primavesi’s 2011 edition as fragment 34 (at pp. 438–39) and also in 2021 reprint of that edition. Contra Barnes (1982: 488) who argues that ‘in B 138 . . . the word psyche does mean “soul”’. Ibid. See Santaniello (2009: 346): ‘When we talk of “soul” and “demon” in Empedocles, . . . many sources, especially later sources (Plutarch, Clemens of Alexandria, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Plotin and Porphyry), usually call the demon ψυχή . . . However, the above-mentioned sources refer the Empedoclean doctrine about the transition of the demon from a body to another to a language that is characteristic of a later time.’

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However, Empedocles’ story of his katabasis to the realm of the dead strengthens Barnes’ hypothesis that the absence of ψυχή in the Empedoclean fragments is to be ascribed to chance. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that, just like Odysseus before and Er and Aeneas after him, Empedocles encountered many ψυχαί populating Hades. Second, a fragment belonging to the narration of Empedocles’ katabasis might represent an occurrence of the term ψυχή in Empedocles’ poem. The above-analyzed B 126 (= EMP D 19 Laks-Most) is quoted by Porphyry and Plutarch33 in connection with Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth.34 In particular, the passage in Porphyry runs as follows: αὐτῆς γὰρ τῆς μετακοσμήσεως35 εἱμαρμένη καὶ φύσις ὑπὸ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δαίμων ἀνηγόρευται σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι καὶ μεταμπίσχουσα τὰς ψυχάς. For the destiny and nature of that change is spoken of by Empedocles in terms of a ‘goddess’ (δαίμων), ‘who dresses the souls with an alien garment of flesh’ and gives them a different cloth.

Editors of Empedocles rightly take the phrase σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι as Empedocles’ own words. The standard interpretation maintains that Porphyry’s use of the term ψυχάς (psychas) is a usual way to rephrase the Empedoclean concept of δαίμων.36 However, it is worth noting that, if this were the case, we would need to assume that in Empedocles’ text either δαίμων is both the subject and the object of dressing, or it is the object of dressing but Porphyry misunderstood it for the subject. Whereas both alternatives are unattractive, an object like ψυχάς is exactly what we expect in the context of Empedocles’ katabasis into a traditional underworld, traditionally populated by ψυχαί. Moreover, Mansfeld and Primavesi in their 2011 edition of Presocratic fragments (and now in their 2021 reprint) considered, correctly in my view, that the word δαίμων is also part of the Empedoclean quotation.37 In his commentary on the line, Porphyry makes it clear that a female δαίμων 33 34 35

36 37

Porphyry F 282f 24–25, p. 463 Smith and Plutarch, De esu carn. 2.3 p. 998c. On this fragment see also Chapter 2.2.4. Whereas Porphyry uses the more elusive term μετακοσμήσεως, Plutarch’s use of παλιγγενεσίαις leaves no doubt that the Empedoclean fragment is to be read in the context of his doctrine of rebirth. The word μετακοσμήσις, which means ‘change of order’, ‘change of condition’ and therefore ‘new arrangement’, indicates in Porphyry’s passage the process of rebirth. It is worth noting that this notion is well in line with my interpretation of rebirths as bodily transformations. See, e.g., Bignone (1916: 498), Wright (1995: 277), Inwood (2001: 55–56), who seems to understand the object of clothing as the δαίμων and, more explicitly, Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021: 430 [= F 22]). See Mansfeld-Primavesi (2021: 430 [= F 22], with translation at p. 431: ‘Die Göttin mit fremdartigem Fleishhemd [den schuldigen Gott] umkleidend’).

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called εἱμαρμένη καὶ φύσις, is the subject of the feminine participle περιστέλλουσα. According to Porphyry’s report, in other words, Empedocles speaks here of a goddess who is responsible for the souls’ new bodies.38 Thus, besides accepting Mansfeld and Primavesi’s interpretation of this fragment, I would also argue that not only the subject (δαίμων) but also the object of περιστέλλουσα, namely ψυχάς in Porphyry’s text, is to be considered Empedocles’ own word. My conclusion, therefore, is that Empedocles wrote of a female δαίμων in Hades who dresses with a new body ψυχαί that are about to be reborn. Furthermore, as Inwood has pointed out, in a passage of Plato’s Phaedo (86e–88b), the Pythagorean Cebes refers to the ψυχή by using a metaphor that is reminiscent of Empedocles’ B 126 (= EMP D 19 Laks-Most).39 In order to object not only to Plato’s notion of the immortality of the soul, but also to Simmias’ hypothesis that the soul is weaker and more short-lived than the body, Cebes compares the soul to a weaver who, during his life, can wear diverse cloaks. Thus, as the weaver lives longer than a cloak, but not eternally, the soul, analogously, lives longer than the body even though it is going to perish at some point. Given the parallel with Empedocles’ metaphor of the body as clothing, it is not unlikely that the metaphor and, presumably, also the whole theory explained by Cebes was inspired by Empedocles.40 In fact, Cebes uses the image of the body as a cloak in order to make a point – rebirth does not require an immortal soul – which Empedocles would have advocated.41 It is possible, in conclusion, that Plato’s passage constitutes external evidence for a reading of B 126 (= EMP D 19 Laks-Most) in the sense I am suggesting – with ψυχαί being reborn as new forms of mortal beings. Furthermore, the Phaedo’s passage invites the reading that Empedocles talked about ψυχαί in his verses and even in reference to his doctrine of rebirth. In summary, despite scholars’ standard view, we have seen that Empedocles most likely spoke of ψυχαί inhabiting Hades that he met in his journey to the underworld, where he learned by first-hand experience 38

39 40 41

Empedocles is reminiscent of the Parmenidean (female) δαίμων who steers everything in DK 28 B 12.3 (= PARM D 14.3 Laks-Most) ἐν δὲ μέσωι τούτων δαίμων ἣ πάντα κυβερνᾶι. According to Simpl. Phys. 9.39.19–21 (= Coxon 2009, Testim. 207), Parmenides talks of a female δαίμων who ‘conveys the souls (τὰς ψυχάς) now from the visible to the invisible and then back again’. This is a hint at rebirth according to Ferrari (2010: 92–102) and Tor (2017: e.g., 233). For a possible identification of this goddess see Chapter 2.2.4. See Inwood (2001: 55). For allusions to Empedocles in the Phaedo see Ibid. 53 n.122 and Gallop (1975: 140). Empedocles’ ontology and his theory of the cosmic cycle require that souls, like every other thing in the world, including gods, perish at latest when the world ends in the Sphairos. On Empedocles’ cosmic cycle and the places of gods and humans in it, see Chapter 7.

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about the individual’s cycle of rebirths. In what follows we will see that Empedocles’ conceptualization of rebirth entails a traditional notion of ψυχή that he could already find in two of his models, Homer and Pythagoras. This notion implies that ψυχή is not conceptualized as the centre of the person, yet, just like in epic poetry, it stands for personal survival upon the death of the body.

5.4

Personal Survival

Having shown that Empedocles has a notion of soul, indeed that he talks of ψυχαί which, in line with epic tradition, populate Hades, I must now note that the hypothesis of Empedocles’ use of ψυχή in contexts of rebirth raises more questions than it answers. First of all, what is the nature of ψυχή and what sort of entity is it? Empedocles’ fragments do not offer much to help us to define ψυχή more clearly. On the one hand, given Empedocles’ ontology, it seems necessary to assume that ψυχή consists of one or more of the four elements.42 On the other hand, it is not at all clear that Empedocles ever explicated it in this way. In any case, since ψυχαί survive death, it must be conceded that, whichever type of entity the soul is, as a minimum requirement it must live longer than the body. Therefore, if we assume it to be a compound of elements like anything else existing in Empedocles’ cosmos, we must concede that it is a longer-lived compound than other elemental compounds making up our bodies. In this way, ψυχή can separate from the body at the moment of death and ‘fly away’ into the underworld, just as souls do in the Homeric epics. However, the central issue at stake here does not so much concern the nature of ψυχή, as the question whether it is the seat of the person, and/or such that it ensures personal survival at the death of the body. Put differently, at a more general level, the issue concerns whether and in which way individual identity can be carried both within the body and after the death of the body, indeed, upon many deaths and through different bodies. To answer this, in what follows, I will first place Empedocles’ philosophical thought in context, as this allows us to appreciate that issues of disembodied existence and, to a certain extent, also personal survival were familiar to him through Homer and Pythagoras. I will then consider the scholarly interpretations regarding the coherence of Empedocles’ view of the soul, arguing that the acknowledged fact that Empedocles does not have a concept of soul as the seat of the person is no reason to reject the possibility that his physical 42

See, e.g., the hypothesis by Trépanier (2014; 2020), who makes the ψυχή a compound of fire and air.

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system accommodates his doctrine of rebirth. This inference will finally lead us to conclude that doctrines of rebirth do not require that the soul is the true seat of the person, but more simply that it stands as the bearer of disembodied individual existence – a conception that Empedocles took up from the epic tradition. Returning to the suggestion made by Inwood, referred to at the chapter’s outset,43 we can then appreciate that Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth entails personal survival upon several deaths of several bodies. This essentially means that the same individual could, in principle, be recognized and identified despite their changed bodies. This claim can be made on the basis of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), which contains Empedocles’ declaration to be an exiled god, undergoing several changes of mortal bodies. Beyond Inwood’s suggestion, G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and M. Schofield also agree that in regard to B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most), ‘what is clear is the force of Empedocles’ conviction that there is an “I” which survives such changes . . . “I” is ineliminable’.44 However, given that my interpretation of B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) excludes that it deals with the fate of rebirth of all people, it can be objected that the emphasis on the ‘I’ in B 115 (= EMP D 10 Laks-Most) is idiosyncratic to Empedocles’ self-presentation as an exceptional being with a special authority. Nevertheless, an analogous emphasis on the survival of the same individual despite their changed form is put forward in B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most). As we have seen above, here Empedocles claims that, because sacrificial animals are truly human beings reborn in a different mortal form, ritual sacrifice turns out to be the same as murder and cannibalism. Clearly, the dramatic power of the message of B 137 (= EMP D 29 Laks-Most) is entirely conveyed only if the self is preserved despite the changed body. In other words, the impious nature of ritual sacrifice is fully communicated by assuming that the priest’s son can still be identified as the priest’s son even though he now looks like the sacrificial victim. The same holds true for the father seized by his son and the mother killed by her children in the last two lines of the same fragment. Thus, we can conclude that, the person – that is, someone in particular, someone who has already lived a particular embodied life – survives death and a new rebirth and maintains their identity despite their new mortal form. Where did Empedocles draw his belief in personal survival through diverse bodies and forms of life from? In search of an answer, I will first 43

See n.2.

44

Kirk-Raven-Schofield (1983: 321); their emphasis.

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consider Pythagoras and then look at Homer. As we have seen in Chapter 2.2.2, Heraclides of Pontus reported that Pythagoras could recollect his previous lives, and precisely his lives as Aethalides, son of Hermes, Euphorbus, Hermotimus and Pyrrhus, a fisherman of Delos.45 In Pythagoras’ own cycle of rebirths, the personal identity continuing from one life to another – indeed, from a specific embodied person to another – goes hand in hand with memory of previous lives, thereby suggesting that the continuing individual possesses some kind of consciousness of previous rebirths. However, despite the significance of recollection in Pythagoras’ doctrine, continuity of consciousness seems to be no necessary criterion to establish personal survival from a body to another in his doctrine of rebirth. When, according to Xenophanes, Pythagoras claims to recognize the soul of his dear friend in a puppy,46 he is basically asserting the belief in the survival of a specific individual – his friend – even in a different animal species. Moreover, it seems that the personal identity of Pythagoras’ friend persists in the mortal body of a dog without consciousness: the puppy is not said to be aware either that it had been Pythagoras’ friend in a previous life or that it possesses the same soul as Pythagoras’ friend. Admittedly, this is not negated, but it seems difficult to imagine that the mental faculties of a dog could enable it to have such a high degree of consciousness as to know that it was a human being in a previous life. Be that as it may, what is clear is that the dog’s consciousness of its rebirths is not needed as a criterion to postulate its individual identity among different bodies, if a third someone, in this case Pythagoras, could declare that the puppy and his friend are clearly the same. As Inwood emphasizes, ‘Pythagoras was able to detect the sameness of the recycled soul, so there seems to be a considerable degree of continuity.’47 Accordingly, it is safe to assume that Empedocles too, like Pythagoras, maintained that personal identity is disentangled from consciousness, awareness or reminiscence of previous lives. In fact, in light of Empedocles’ theories of sensation and knowledge acquisition, according to which, as we will see in the next chapter, the ability to perceive and know is proportionate to the structure of one’s own body organs, it is difficult to imagine how the sacrificial victim, reduced to the limited mental faculties of an animal, could have such a high degree of consciousness as to be aware of their previous life as a human.

45 47

Diog. Laert. 8.5. 46 Xenoph. DK 21 B 7 (= EMP D 64 Laks-Most): see Chapter 3.4. Inwood (2007: 235).

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Beyond the example set by Pythagoras, some degree of continuity upon death and the notion of a person’s disembodied existence are also already found in epic poetry. In Homer, living human beings are essentially embodied. Their ψυχή is that which we may call life-breath or life-force, which leaves a living being permanently at death to continue existence as nothing more than a ghost or a shade in Hades. Or as A. A. Long puts it, ‘all that remains of persons once they have breathed their last is a ghostly replica of the previously embodied person, a mere phantom or lifeless shade’.48 Consequently, the ψυχαί in Hades are mindless. When Circe describes the ψυχή of Tiresias as exceptionally holding φρένες (phrenes) and νόος (noos), she indirectly indicates two things that all other souls are no longer supposed to possess.49 Similarly, the souls of the dead in Homer cannot speak in a normal manner, but shrill like terrified birds flying around (as the multitude of souls do when accompanying the eidolon of Heracles50) or squeak like bats (as the souls of the suitors do when Hermes guided them to the Underworld51). This has been taken as a sign that the ψυχαί in Hades are mere departed spirits that do not have an existence of their own. Yet we will see that several other elements in the Homeric depiction of departed ψυχαί do not agree with this picture. In Odysseus’ Nekyia in the eleventh book of the Odyssey (ll. 36ff.), the ψυχή is depicted as a bodiless ghost (εἴδωλον) and is compared to a dream (ὄνειρος) and a shadow (σκιή). For instance, when Odysseus unsuccessfully tries three times to embrace his mother Anticlea, she clarifies that this is how life is after the death of the body: while the sinews no longer bind flesh and bones, consumed by fire on the pyre, and the θυμός flees from the body, the ψυχή flutters and flies away like a dream. Then, Anticlea explains why she is in Hades rather than Ithaca, where the absence of her beloved son and the dreadful political situation became unbearable for her. Thus, we can infer Anticlea lacks bodily consistency but appears to retain her distinctive shape – she must look like the embodied, living Anticlea if Odysseus can recognize her among many other souls – as well as her distinctive character and mental faculties – indeed, she is perfectly able to explain to her son how things were in Ithaca for Penelope and Telemachus, and to recount the way she is now experiencing things in Hades.

48 49 50

A. A. Long (2015: 51). This agrees with the dead in the Underworld also being defined as ἀφραδέες, ‘senseless’ (Od. 11.476). Od. 11.605–6. 51 Od. 24.9.

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Analogously, Agamemnon’s ψυχή is said to lack both strength, κῖκυς (kikys), and vigour, ἴς (is), and, for this reason, he cannot embrace Odysseus.52 Yet, except for the lack of bodily consistency, Agamemnon’s ψυχή speaks, remembers and looks exactly like embodied Agamemnon. Indeed, he can recount what happens to him and his companions once he came back to his country and wife. Finally, in yet another example, the ψυχή of Achilles, the ruler of the dead, points out the horrifying nature of his actual condition. He wishes he could be alive on earth and serve as a poor peasant without land, rather than live eternally as the lord of the lifeless dead. Moreover, the ψυχαί of Agamemnon and Achilles are still able to care about their own beloveds and feel sad for or proud of them. All this shows that the ψυχαί of Anticlea, Agamemnon and Achilles in Hades are a perfect replica of the embodied individuals who have already lived a particular embodied life. Memories, interests, concerns and emotions expressed by disembodied Anticlea, Agamemnon and Achilles come from the fact that they are still the same person they were in their embodied lives.53 Rather than merely being lifeless phantoms, therefore, their ψυχαί are the bearers of Anticlea’s, Agamemnon’s and Achilles’ post-mortem existence. Yet, we may still wonder what the Homeric ψυχή does for the persons when they are alive. However, as A. A. Long observed, this question is probably ill framed, as it projects later thinkers’ ideas on the soul as the vital centre of the entire person and as incorporating all of the individual’s mental and emotional life. In the Homeric poems there is no notion of soul as a mental or emotional seat of the living person similar to that which Plato theorized several centuries later. Nonetheless, the ψυχή in Homer had already signified the whole of a person’s life . . . Once the idea of an afterlife took hold, the original usage of psyche to mean an entire life made it the most appropriate word to also designate a person’s post-mortem existence.54

Thus, the corpse a ψυχή leaves behind shows that the embodied life a particular individual has lived is finished. Yet disembodied life and personal identity persist in the soul’s post-mortem existence in Hades. Returning to Empedocles, having placed his philosophical interests in context, we can now appreciate that issues of personal survival upon death 52

53

Od. 11.393: οὐ γάρ οἱ ἔτ᾽ ἦν ἲς ἔμπεδος οὐδέ τι κῖκυς. The word κῖκυς occurs only here and in Aristophanes Ran. 230 (σοὶ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔνεστι κῖκυς. οὐδ᾽ αἱμόρρυτοι φλέβες), where it is connected to the absence of dripping blood in the vein. The term ἴς is the muscular vigour. This point follows a suggestion by Inwood (2007: 235). 54 A. A. Long (2015: 74–75).

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and therefore of disembodied existence in Hades were almost certainly familiar to him from two of his models: Pythagoras and Homer.55 Nevertheless, it is generally maintained that in doctrines of rebirth, to satisfy the idea of a continuing personal identity, the soul (or whatever entity we may assume as the subject of rebirths) must represent the personal element in every living being.56 That is, it must play a role in the person’s mental and emotional functioning and then preserve their mental and emotional life through various deaths and bodies.57 In the next chapter we will see that Empedocles argues for psychological and mental functions in terms of bodily processes that rest upon the elemental composition of body organs and tissues, which dissolve upon death. But if the body’s organs die, how can those psychic and mental functions that characterize the individual person and make up one’s own self be preserved during diverse rebirths? Additionally, how does the soul that outlives the mortal body have a share of the personality of the living embodied individual? If we look first to the scholarly reception, we can see that various modern interpreters recognize that, in the physical poem, Empedocles does not have a theory of soul as the seat of the person and this is considered a reason to reject the possibility that his physical system accommodates his doctrine of rebirth. For instance, E. Zeller concluded that the idea of a reincarnated soul, and more generally any doctrine of rebirth, ultimately collides with Empedocles’ physical system. If mental life in all its aspects, including sensations, emotions, thoughts and knowledge acquisition is explained in terms of mixtures of the four elements, the existence of a soul carrying distinctive aspects of the human individual beyond the life of the body is simply impossible.58 Analogously, G. Vlastos has highlighted that since mental processes in Empedocles are always a function of the ratio of fire, air, water and earth, 55

56

57

58

It is worth noting that notions of post-mortem existence and rebirth have recently been attributed to Heraclitus and Parmenides as well: see Finkelberg (2013) on Heraclitus and Tor (2020) on Parmenides. According to H. S. Long (1948: 2), we need to presuppose the belief that the soul is the personal element in living beings, when considering metempsychosis in Greece. Other beliefs to be presupposed are that the soul can exist apart from the body, either before birth or after death or both and that it can also inhabit a non-human body. The specification of Huffmann (2009: 37) is in order: To satisfy the idea of the transmigration of the same individual soul from one body to another, clearly the personality must remain in some sense intact. It is not required, however, that all aspects of human psychic functioning be preserved in each incarnation; it is hard to see how they could be, given that the soul in some cases is the soul of an animal rather than of a human being. Zeller (1844–1852: vol.1, 1005).

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these seem to be irreconcilable with the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul.59 Siding with Vlastos, A. A. Long concluded that ‘between these two conceptions of consciousness on the one hand and a spiritual existence on the other’, he could find ‘no clear connection’.60 More recently, Primavesi affirms that ‘within the attested fragments of Empedoclean poetry . . . the notion of individual transmigratory “soul” is entirely absent’.61 Admittedly, however, some scholars have tried to smooth the issue of the relationship between Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth and his physics by emphasizing that, in order to satisfy the idea of transmigration of the individual soul through different bodies, not every aspect of human psychological and mental functioning must be preserved in each incarnation.62 Yet it remains unclear in which way the preserved aspects defining personal identity could be preserved at all. Siding with the majority of scholars, I recognize that Empedocles failed to develop a coherent view of the soul that could address the problems raised above. Indeed, he seems to have never felt the need to clarify the relationship between personal survival and the mortal bodies a given person is from time to time. In other words, despite attempts of scholars who have tried to ascribe to Empedocles a more complex theory of the soul that could be integrated in his physics, in all fairness there is nothing in his fragments that could explain personal survival on the elemental level. On the contrary, it is possible that because of his particular conceptualization of rebirth, issues such as those just mentioned may simply not have occurred to him. As we have seen above in Section 5.2, Empedocles’ fragments dealing with rebirth exploit a metaphoric scenario that draws particular attention to the corporeal changes and transformations individuals undergo during their cycles of rebirths. For these corporeal changes Empedocles did develop a complex physical theory, which explains the origin of the myriad living beings we can now see in the world as interactions of the four elements. That is, as we have seen above, Empedocles takes care to use the same language related to the conceptual domain of transformation both when he has to explain the phenomenon of birth at the level of the physical processes involving the elements and when he talks about rebirth, thus suggesting that he sees the two processes as deeply interrelated. However, while emphasizing changes of bodies, Empedocles’ metaphor for rebirth conceals the notion of the persisting entity or soul working 59 61

Vlastos (1952: 119–21). Primavesi (2008b: 251).

60 62

A. A. Long (1966: 275). The emphasis is by Long. Huffmann (2009: 37).

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through many bodies and lives. Therefore, his accent on the transformation of the same individual into diverse forms of mortal bodies – a notion that relates to the great mythological tradition of metamorphosis tales – could indirectly have led to a marginalization in his physical system of the role of the soul in the notion of personal identity (both embodied and disembodied). Yet the fact that Empedocles does not seem to have felt the need to develop a complex theory of the soul as the seat of the person does not mean that in his physics there is no room for a positive theory of rebirth. More specifically, I challenge the standard view that doctrines of rebirth require a complex notion of the soul as the true seat of the person similar to what we find later in Plato. In contrast, for a doctrine of rebirth to be sound, what is needed is the conception that the individual could survive and preserve their identity after death – a conception that developed from the epic tradition where, as we have seen, we can already find traces of the notion of personal disembodied existence in Hades. In other words, doctrines of rebirth could work with the Homeric traditional notion of post-mortem individual existence, by exploiting it in terms of the personal survival through many deaths of many bodies. In this respect, Empedocles seems to be at ease with a notion of ψυχή that is essentially traditional: a departed spirit that signifies the person beyond the body (and in this sense it could be said to stand for the person’s disembodied survival). Then, in line with Pythagoras’ doctrine, Empedocles’ contribution to tradition is the idea that (embodied and disembodied) existence and personal identity are not confined to one single death and body. Indeed, they straddle numerous lifetimes and numerous life forms.

5.5

Conclusions

The focus of this chapter has been on the concept of rebirth and the argument that, despite its allegedly religious aspect, it can be reconciled with Empedocles’ physical system. Indeed, not only does it function within this system, but Empedocles conceived one of the main tenets of his physics, namely the rejection of the ordinary concepts of birth and death, with the notion of rebirth in mind. Moreover, his key physical theory of the four elements mixing and transforming into living beings is argued in analogy to the changes a person undergoes through rebirths. Indeed, both processes are represented as changes of form, with rebirth conceptualized as a metamorphosis rather than a metempsychosis. More importantly, traditional readings that assert that Empedocles, in his physics, had no notion of the soul, are inherently wrong. Instead, this

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chapter has shown that Empedocles, while speaking of ψυχαί inhabiting Hades, have a (traditional) notion of the soul which accords with his natural philosophy. Above all, it has been demonstrated that concerns on personal identity and survival upon death are central to his physical system.63 This is a strong indication that, despite the general view, rebirth is a positive, indeed a pivotal, doctrine within his physical system. 63

Equally central are his concerns about moral responsibility carried from one life to another, as we shall see in Chapter 7.3.

chapter 6

Knowing Nature as a God

In proposing a way toward a unified interpretation of Empedocles’ thought, the last chapter explored the centrality in Empedocles’ physical system of pivotal notions related to the concept of rebirth, such as claims about individual identity and personal survival upon death. With the same aim of making religion and physics converge, this chapter will focus on the interconnection between true knowledge of the physical world and release from rebirths, the main argument being that knowing the nature of things is a major pathway to change one’s being, transcend mortal nature and become divine. In parallel, it will be shown that purification processes play a central role in the deep understanding of the nature of things and, thereby, in the attainment of genuine knowledge. As has been established in Chapter 2, Empedocles programmatically presents the teachings he is going to impart as the way not merely to know the principles of the physical world and thus the true nature of things, but, after his philosophical training, his disciple Pausanias will be able to raise his intelligence higher than any ordinary human (B 2 [=EMP D 42 LaksMost]) and control the forces of nature just like a god (B 111 [=EMP D 43 Laks-Most]). In exploring this topic further, this chapter will answer a series of questions that arise from Empedocles’ programmatic presentation of his philosophy as a training method to achieve divine nature, superhuman wisdom and godlike power. It will therefore ask: what defines knowledge as divine? What epistemic effort is demanded of Pausanias for him to attain divine knowledge? Finally, how does knowledge of the physical world relate to a person’s transcendence from human to divine nature, hence to their release from rebirth? To characterize what Empedocles might have regarded as divine wisdom, I will begin by discussing some of the most relevant epistemic reflections developed in the sixth and fifth century BCE. As we will see, divine knowledge is traditionally regarded not merely as knowledge of ‘divine’ matters – that is, knowledge of things that are beyond ordinary 246

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human ken – but also as the ability to ascertain them (that is, to be sure that they are true). This particular aspect entails that on certain types of matters, especially those that are spatially and/or temporally distant, humans lack assurance that they describe things as they really are, whereas gods can relate to those things in a different way and truly know them. After placing Empedocles in this ideological context, I will examine what degree of knowledge the most ‘enlightened’ people can aspire to achieve according to Empedocles and, secondly, what is required of them in order to access it. It will be shown that, on the one hand, Empedocles presents himself as the divine source of a revelation that claims to speak the authentic truth about the nature of things; on the other hand, he also attaches significant weight to a type of investigation that involves personal observation of natural phenomena. However, the phenomena that Empedocles proposes for Pausanias to observe prove ineffective in demonstrating with due clarity the soundness of the revealed physical principles. Moreover, textual evidence indicates that Empedocles’ revelation is seen as superior and therefore indispensable to any type of human enquiry if we were to understand the true nature of things. This suggests that neither mere passive listening to revelation nor personal research is enough, but Pausanias is required to actively participate in his learning process and so undergo initiation into Empedocles’ philosophy. Turning to the question of how knowledge of the physical world relates to a person’s transcendence of mortal nature and, consequently, to one’s liberation from rebirth, in Section 6.3 it will be shown that Pausanias’ change of being into divine nature is explained in physical terms, that is, at the level of the elements. More precisely, transcendence of mortal nature is tightly connected to Empedocles’ theories on perception and knowledge acquisition. As I will reconstruct in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, perceiving and knowing are conceptualized as physiological processes, in which elements from the outside and elements in the body interact to produce perception, thought and knowledge. As elements coming from outside the body can modify the blend of fire, air, water and earth in the body, it follows that putting oneself in a position to receive the ‘right’ epistemic inputs can modify the elemental composition of the human mind for the better. Thus, genuine knowledge of the physical world – that is, Empedocles’ revelation – can transform our mind to the point that it will perceive, think and know like a divine mind. This claim is evidence that knowledge of the nature of things and transcendence of mortal to divine nature – that is, physics and doctrine of rebirth – are tightly intertwined and mutually implicated in Empedocles’ thought: indeed, what we are looking at is a clear instance of doctrinal unity.

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In parallel, and third, the possibility to change one’s own being by understanding the physical world goes hand in hand with the training the human mind must undergo in order to be properly predisposed towards it. In Section 6.4 I will show that Pausanias is encouraged to undergo a process of purification in order to direct his attention and scrutiny almost exclusively towards things that really matter and in this way acquire the ‘wealth of a divine mind’,1 capable not only of understanding, but also of controlling the forces of nature just like a god. At the same time, Empedocles also provides us with a physiological explanation of the way in which purification processes enable the elemental structure of our mind to advance to a level attuned to divine knowledge. However, purifications are primarily a means to a more religious end, such as the liberation of the individual from the chain of rebirths. Their role in the processes of perception and knowledge acquisition thus shows once again the deep interconnection between Empedocles’ physics and his doctrine of rebirth. Indeed, it is a life of purity and knowledge of the physical principles that will enable the disciple to free himself from rebirths and become a god.

6.1

Divine and Human Knowledge

If we are to understand what Empedocles may have regarded as divine knowledge, we must turn to traditional Greek ideas on the possible human and divine ways to gain knowledge. In this first section, I will therefore contextualize Empedocles within the most relevant epistemic reflections of both his predecessors and his own time. In Section 6.1.1, the focus will be on human epistemic potential with regard to topics of natural philosophy broadly conceived, by exploring ideas that were first developed in the sixth and fifth century BCE, more specifically those of Xenophanes, Alcmaeon and the Hippocratic author of Ancient Medicine. In Section 6.1.2, I will then turn to the epic tradition of Homer and Hesiod for a definition of true knowledge which provided a basis from which Empedocles could work. Section 6.1.3 will focus on Parmenides, demonstrating the weight of his methodological approach on Empedocles. More specifically, it will be argued that while Parmenides resorts to a goddess to provide his physical system with the mantle of truth, so too does Empedocles, who composes a divine revelation, of which he is the source, to establish that his physics describes things as they in fact come to pass. 1

See DK 31 B 132 (= EMP D 8 Laks-Most): ὄλβιος, ὃς θείων πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον, / δειλὸς δ’, ὧι σκοτόεσσα θεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν. ‘Happy is the person who has gained the wealth of a divine mind, / wretched the individual who cherishes an obfuscated opinion about the gods.’

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The Earliest Reflections on Divine and Human Epistemic Potential

To look at the earliest epistemic reflections in Greek language and literature, I will now examine two of Empedocles’ precursors, Xenophanes and Alcmaeon, as well as his contemporary, the Hippocratic author of Ancient Medicine. As we shall see, they all expressed a clear and similar view on the kind of knowledge people can expect to gain about things that cannot be directly experienced, such as most of the topics concerning what we may define as natural philosophy in the sixth to fifth century BCE. Moreover, all three distinguished between divine and human potential to gain understanding; yet although acknowledging that only gods can know truly what is far beyond our experiential domain, they did not entirely deny people the possibility of having some kind of understanding of ‘divine’ matters, remaining open to the prospect of humans’ valid knowledge. Let us first look at Xenophanes of Colophon (sixth century BCE). In his most extended fragment on knowledge, Xenophanes is concerned with divine matters and further themes he very likely explored in one of his works, such as topics related to cosmology, anthropology, biology and all those themes pertaining, more generally, to natural philosophy. In some remarkable verses, Xenophanes affirms the following: καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν2 οὐδέ τις ἔσται εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών, αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

(DK 21 B 34 [= XEN D 49 Laks-Most])

And indeed the clear and certain truth no man has seen3 nor would anyone who knows about the gods and what I say about all things.4 For even if, in the best case, one happened to speak in compliance with what has been brought to pass, still he himself would not know. But an opinion is allotted to all.

2

3

4

Plutarch has γένετ᾿. However, the reading ἴδεν, attested three times by Sextus and once by Diogenes Laertius, is difficilior: see Lesher (1992: 157–58). Plutarch’s reading is defended by Hussey (1990: 18 n.21) and accepted in the 2016 edition of Xenophanes’ fragments by Laks-Most (= XEN D 49). For a correct understating of this verb and the subsequent εἰδώς in l. 2 see Lesher (1992: 158): ‘Already in Homer ἰδεῖν can mean something other than “seeing with one’s eyes” . . . Thus, even if ἴδεν meant “saw” or “has seen” and εἰδώς meant “having seen”, there is no reason to suppose that such “seeing” must have been a form of sense perception’; the emphasis is Lesher’s. This line is unlikely to mean all of Xenophanes’ statements in an unqualified way. More likely it indicates hypotheses concerning topics on natural philosophy. As Barnes (1982: 139) proposes, ‘Xenophanes means to say that knowledge about things divine and knowledge about natural science lie beyond our human grasp.’ See also Lesher (1992: 167–68), Mogyoródi (2006: 132–33) and Tor (2017: 130).

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Xenophanes claims that only gods are able to gain ‘the clear and certain truth’, τὸ σαφές (to saphes), whereas human beings can only have a δόκος (dokos), an ‘opinion’ or ‘conjecture’.5 Whereas we will return to the meaning of δόκος, J. Lesher has cogently pointed out that, in epic poetry, ‘σάφα knowing (the form σαφές does not occur in Homer) is a matter of knowing the precise facts or the exact truth’.6 Thus, according to Xenophanes, concerning things or phenomena that cannot be experienced first-hand,7 divine and human cognitive potential is clearly distinguished: whereas gods know things as they truly are, human beings can only conjecture. Human opinions could still happen to coincide with things as they are and thus describe what has in fact been brought to pass; nonetheless, human knowledge would still be un-σαφές, as people have no assurance that their δόκος coincides with truth. It follows that σαφές knowledge must not only describe things as they truly are but also, at the same time, bring assurance of that. In other words, to attain genuine knowledge of the kind coinciding with τὸ σαφές, things must be known truly and be established as true. Xenophanes’ comment finds an echo in the work of Alcmaeon of Croton (early fifth century BCE): περὶ τῶν ἀφανέων περὶ τῶν θνητῶν8 σαφήνειαν μὲν θεοὶ ἔχοντι, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώποις τεκμαίρεσθαι. (DK 24 B 1 [= ALCM D 10 Laks-Most]) About invisible things about mortal beings, only gods know the plain truth, whereas human beings can infer from signs.9

5

6 7 8

9

δόκος means ‘what is admitted = valid opinion’. See the analysis of the ‘positive sense’ of so-called δοκ-words in Mourelatos (2008: 194–205). See also Lesher (1992: 169): ‘such dokos is neither inherently erroneous . . . nor fated to be only approximately correct . . . but it is the best anyone can do “about the gods and what I say about all things”, since the direct observation necessary for a clear and certain knowledge of the truth about such matters is not possible’. Lesher (1992: 156) with his emphasis. Lesher (1991: 236; 2013: 85). See Tor (2017: 130): ‘Xenophanes is concerned in particular with mortal statements about non-everyday, non-pedestrian, non-experienced matters’ (Tor’s emphasis). Modern editors, after Diels, put a comma after ἀφανέων and interpret the following sentence in parataxis, understanding Alcmaeon’s claim as referring both to invisible things and to human things that are not specified further. In contrast, Gemelli Marciano (2007a: 19) points out that the asyndeton is difficult, as it renders the relation between invisible and mortal things ambiguous. Additionally, if it is clear why only gods can gain knowledge about invisible things, it is difficult to understand why human beings have no clear knowledge about undefined human things. For this reason, Gemelli Marciano interprets θνητῶν as a masculine plural with the meaning of ‘on the invisible things about mortals’, namely with reference to medical knowledge of the human body and of its inner (and therefore invisible) physiological processes. Note that the related word τεκμήριον means ‘sure sign’, ‘proof’.

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The distinction Alcmaeon establishes between divine and human knowledge rests upon two key words: σαφήνεια (saphêneia), defining gods’ wisdom, and τεκμαίρεσθαι (tekmairesthai), which delimits the human sphere of cognitive action. Like Xenophanes’ τὸ σαφές, Alcmaeon’s σαφήνεια indicates knowledge that corresponds to plain and certain truth. Concerning unseen things (ἀφανῆ) like bodily processes, plain truth remains a prerogative of the gods, whilst human beings can observe and evaluate (visible, knowable) signs, and infer from them more general theories about processes in the body they cannot see. The opposition between human inferences and god’s σαφήνεια suggests that the former cannot reach the same level of certainty belonging to divine knowledge; even though human theories may happen to be exact, they cannot ever be known to be true. Similarly to Xenophanes’ and Alcmaeon’s ideas on human cognitive potential, the Hippocratic author of Ancient Medicine (fifth century BCE) voices the opinion that those disciplines exploring things ‘that there are on the sky or under the earth’ handle topics that ultimately are about ‘obscure and dubious matters’. In fact, they require a-priori assumptions (ὑποθέσεις) that cannot be definitively assessed as right or wrong, ‘for there is nothing to which one can refer to obtain clear and certain knowledge (εἰδέναι τὸ σαφές)’. In contrast, medicine is a techne with a long history that has accomplished many valid discoveries due to clear principles and a method that has been refined over the course of time. The Hippocratic author seems thereby to suggest that, whereas medicine can follow a clear methodology, which has been proven valid through extensive experience, natural philosophy only rests upon random assumptions which cannot be proven and thus cannot be known to be valid.10 Thus, Xenophanes, Alcmaeon and the Hippocratic author share the traditional belief that things that escape ordinary human perceptions are known with certainty only by the gods. What kind of knowledge can humans hope to attain then with regard to these things? As we will now see, the three authors ascribe people the ability to formulate valid opinions and conjectures about them or, according to Xenophanes, δόκος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.11 As Lesher has pointed out, Xenophanes’ allocation of human awareness to the category of ‘opinion’ or ‘conjecture’ (δόκος) is not an intrinsically dismissive characterization. Rather, Lesher explains that ‘δόκος 10

11

It is worth noting that in Chapter 20 of the same treatise, the Hippocratic author contrasts the medical arts with the most uncertain method of those thinkers who have written on natural philosophy, among whom Empedocles is explicitly mentioned. See Lloyd (1963) and Vegetti (1998). DK 21 B 34.4 (= XEN D 49 Laks-Most).

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is neither inherently erroneous . . . nor fated to be only approximately correct’; on the contrary, ‘it is the best anyone can do “about the gods and what I say about all things”, since the direct observation necessary for a clear and certain knowledge of the truth about such matters is not possible’.12 Thus, although truth cannot be attained, Xenophanes believes nonetheless that people could come to obtain valid knowledge if they embark on a personal enquiry: οὔτοι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ’ ὑπέδειξαν, ἀλλὰ χρόνωι ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.

(DK 21 B 18 [= XEN D 53 Laks-Most])

From the beginning gods did not intimate13 all things to mortals, but as they search in time they discover in a better way.14

Despite the ‘large number of alternative possible readings’ of these two lines,15 it seems safe to argue that the fragment establishes a dichotomy between knowledge acquired through things gods may intimate (ὑπέδειξαν) to mortals,16 and knowledge discovered (ἐφευρίσκουσιν) through human personal enquiry (ζητοῦντες). The word ἄμεινον in the final position in the verse suggests Xenophanes’ preference for personal enquiry,17 with his own research method probably intended to provide the 12

13 14

15

16

17

See Lesher (1992: 169; 2008: 469). See also B 35 (= XEN D 50 Laks-Most) with Lesher (1992: 170–76) and Bryan (2012: 16–57). The fragment displays a use of the verb δοκάζω, etymologically associated with δόκος, in a context connected with ἔτυμα, things that are true. Here Xenophanes seems to encourage us ‘to believe his teachings to be potentially true’, while warning ‘that we can do no more than believe them to be so’ (Bryan 2012: 56). According to the reading of Lesher (1992: 149). On the meaning of ὑπέδειξαν, see Tor (2017: 117–19). ‘Since the neuter accusative singular of the comparative form of an adjective also serves as the comparative of the adverb, ἄμεινον is ambiguous between “find a better (thing)” and “find out better”’ (Lesher 1992: 150). Lesher (1992: esp. 151–52). Briefly, we can say that the opinions of scholars follow two major directions. Most take it that Xenophanes rejects all kinds of divine disclosure: see Gomperz (1906: 162), Lesher (1983; 1991; 1992), Curd (2002: 129), Bryan (2012: 52–55) and Granger (2013: 262). There is a minority of scholars, however, who argue that Xenophanes allows that sometimes gods did reveal some good things: see Verdenius (1955), Barnes (1982: 140) and Robinson (2008: 489). Recently, Tor (2017: 118–19) submitted the view that Xenophanes rejects only a particular notion of divine disclosure, namely the one which is seen as ‘an indirect, secretive and cryptic affair’. Furthermore, in this manner the gods disclosed everything (πάντα) from the beginning (ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς), since the markers ‘from the beginning’ and ‘all things’ qualify ‘the particular notion of indirect, cryptic disclosure, which Xenophanes rejects’. See Lesher (1991; 1992: 149ff.). It is a traditional idea, for example, that human individuals advance thanks to the gods, who sometimes decide to reveal precious secrets to humanity. See, e.g., Hes. Erga 42–44. Lesher (1999: 231). See also Lesher (1992: 155): the fragment may have been ‘the rejection of an older, inadequate approach to the understanding of natural marvels through myth, legend or simple superstition – and a call, in so many words, to natural science’. According to Tor (2017: 127), the verb ζητοῦντες does not explicitly contrast with divine revelation. The term ζήτησις can indicate a mortal

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best exemplification of his claim. Indeed, Xenophanes’ knowledge is based on collecting all kinds of information from far off places, as is illustrated by his knowledge of different conceptions of divinity in Thrace and Ethiopia (B 16 [= XEN D 13 Laks-Most], A 13 [= XEN P 17]) and of natural phenomena typical of areas relatively distant from the place he lived (e.g., B 37 [= XEN D 44 Laks-Most], A 41 [= XEN D 34 Laks-Most], A 41a [= XEN D 35 Laks-Most], A 48 [= XEN D 45 Laks-Most]). Moreover, it is attested that he used personal observation of fossils of shells and fish in Syracuse, Paros and Malta to formulate a theory of cyclical cosmic destruction and regeneration.18 Like Xenophanes, Alcmaeon seems also to have practised personal observation concerning human anatomy, as his discovery of the optic nerve through dissection could indicate.19 With regard to the Hippocratic author of Ancient Medicine, moreover, the criterion according to which he distinguishes medical topics from other ‘obscure and dubious matters’ seems to rest upon the level of conviction one can reach through empirical enquiry over time, hence upon the fact that the hypotheses one formulates can or cannot be observed and verified.20 Furthermore, since, as we have seen above, the medical arts are a techne with a long history, observation and personal verification have long been conducted on similar case studies. This has contributed to forming a consolidated practice and body of knowledge that has finally developed into a tradition. By wrapping up the investigation developed thus far, Xenophanes, Alcmaeon and the Hippocratic author of Ancient Medicine maintain that concerning non-experienced things, such as divine things or natural phenomena that cannot be directly observed, only gods know truly how things have come to pass. People in contrast can embark on serious enquiry of the physical world and even formulate valid conjectures about it. However, they remain unable to know if those conjectures are correct, as people have no σῆμα, evidence or proof, that they are accounting for things as they truly are. Thus, whereas divine knowledge is certainly and genuinely true, human knowledge, though valid, will always lack the assurance of truth.

18 19 20

enquiry which is facilitated through divine disclosure, for instance by divination. Indeed, as Tor highlights, the verb δίζημαι is a standard technical term in the oracular responses in Delphi, expressing the act of consulting Apollo. Hipp. Ref. 1.14.5 with the interpretation by Lesher (1992: 155). The source is Calcidius in his commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (p. 279 Wrobel). According to Hussey (1990: 16), knowledge gained ‘from a mass of mutually overlapping and confiming experiences of human beings’ does not admits room for scepticism.

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The Epic Tradition on True Knowledge

Having looked at Xenophanes’, Alcmaeon’s and the Hippocratic author’s views on cognitive potential when approaching topics that are beyond the reach of human perceptions, we can now better evaluate the difference between human and divine knowledge that provided a basis from which Empedocles could work. However, within this context, it remains to clarify what makes knowledge saphes; or, in other words, what makes an opinion a clear, certain and persuading truth? Thus, to uncover the early Greek notion of true knowledge, we now need to turn to the epic tradition. In the Homeric poems, people know sapha when they know a certain thing by direct experience.21 For instance, Menelaus says to Antilochus that, since the latter has observed it for himself (αὐτὸν . . . εἰσορόωντα), he knows sapha that a god decided upon destruction for the Danaans and victory to the Trojans.22 Additionally, a person knows sapha a general truth – for instance, that cowards shrink from battle.23 Moreover, knowledge handed down by reliable witnesses and/or developed into a tradition is generally regarded as valid. In the Iliad 20.203–5, Aeneas says to Achilles that, despite neither having directly seen (opsei, ‘by sight’) or met each other’s parents, they nonetheless know about them, ‘having heard words of mortal beings handed down by tradition’.24 It is worth noting that Homer seems to connect even gods’ sapha knowledge to ultimate, direct experience. Notably, in the famous appeal to the Muses to help the poet remember the immense Achaean naval forces involved in the Trojan battle in the second book of the Iliad, the Muses are said to know all because they saw all, as they were present when things happened: ‘you are goddesses, you are present and know everything’ (Il. 21

22 24

See Lesher (1994: 23 n.43; 2008: 460). On the importance in the Homeric poems of observation for attaining knowledge and, especially, of ‘much-seeing’, i.e., observing a wide range of different things, as Odysseus was able to do, for instance, during his twenty-year journey through many different places and peoples, see Lesher (1981: 12–13). Il. 17.687–88. 23 E.g., Il. 11.408–9. See Lesher (2008: 460). Notably, analogous ideas are also shared by Herodotus in his historical enquiries (fifth century BCE). To provide just two examples, Herodotus claims that true and persuading knowledge can be obtained through personal enquiry and direct experience, as in the case described in 2.44 and concerning the ancient cult of Heracles: ‘wishing to know it clearly (σαφές τι εἰδέναι) . . . I took a ship to Tyre in Phoenicia where I heard there was a very holy temple of Heracles. There I saw it . . . Therefore, the things I have discovered through enquiry clearly show (τὰ ἱστορημένα δηλοῖ σαφέως) that Heracles is an ancient god’ (my emphasis). In a second passage, moreover, Herodotus argues that clear and certain knowledge can be achieved from a reliable source. In 9.7, for instance, the Spartans can be sure that the Athenians will never betray Greece, but will fight the Persians, because the Athenian ambassadors (that is, a very reliable source in this case) declared their intention to do so. See also 3.122 and 7.228 with Lesher (1992: 156–57).

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2.485: ὑμεῖς γὰρ θεαί ἐστε πάρεστέ τε ἴστέ τε πάντα). Similarly, in the first book of the Odyssey, Homer tells us that the gods took advantage of Poseidon’s temporary absence from Mount Olympus (he was in Ethiopia to attend a hecatomb) to decide about Odysseus’ return to Ithaca. Clearly, Poseidon’s absence emphasizes his unawareness: he has no knowledge of things he does not directly see and listen to, although he is a god.25 Moreover, whereas sapha knowledge – even when attributed to gods – is connected to direct experience,26 in the same famous passage of the Iliad’s second book mentioned above, ordinary human beings are contrasted to the Muses in that the former only know by hearing a report and, for this reason, they cannot be said to know anything: ‘we hear but a rumour and know nothing’, ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν (Il. 2.486).The phrase οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν indicates, on the one hand, that knowledge of the past is limited to what people hear from the gods. On the other hand, it also emphasizes that the knowledge humans obtain ultimately lacks certainty: since what they know is exclusively what they hear and without any assurance that the divine report speaks the truth, they do not really know anything truly. Moreover, since human knowledge depends on reports, the reliability and hence the truth of what they know rests solely upon the trustworthiness of the report’s source. As a consequence, knowledge derived from those who claim a share in divine wisdom, such as poets – but also seers and prophets, since they speak on behalf of the gods – is generally taken as particularly reliable.27 However, as we have seen in Chapter 2.4.1, in his Hymn to the Muse at the beginning of the Theogony Hesiod points out that a divine source is no 25

26 27

Od. 1.22–27. It is worth noting that even the god who is said to know all, Apollo, can be unaware of hidden deeds, which need then to be disclosed by someone (or something) else: see Hesiod fr. 60.2–3 Merkelbach-West (where the hidden deeds are revealed to Apollo by a raven). This point was already made by Hussey (1990: 12 n.5), who listed several passages where gods are deceived by other gods, know by direct experience, or do not know because they lack it. Homer provided seers and prophets with clear and certain knowledge: Chalcas, the seer of Apollo, knows ‘the things that are, that will be and were before’ at Il. 1.69–70. Achilles calls him the mantis εὖ εἰδώς at Il. 1.384–85. Sophocles’ chorus in OT 298–99 speaks of Tiresias as ‘the mantis in whom alone of mortals truth is implanted’. As for Homeric poets, see the example of Demodocus, ‘the divine poet; for to him above all others has the god granted skill in song, to give delight in whatever way his spirit prompts him to sing’ (Od. 8. 44–45). In another passage Homer adds: ‘For among all men that are upon the earth minstrels win honour and reverence, for that the Muse has taught them the paths of song, and loves the tribe of minstrels’ (Od. 8.478–81). Moreover, after having heard Demodocus accurately recounting events of the Trojan war, Odysseus praises him with these words: ‘Demodocus, verily above all mortal men do I praise thee, whether it was the Muse, the daughter of Zeus, that taught thee, or Apollo; for well and truly dost thou sing of the fate of the Achaeans, all that they wrought and suffered, and all the toils they endured, as though thou hadst been present, or hadst heard the tale from another. [scil. who was present]’ (Od. 8.486–91).

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guarantee of truth per se, since gods can deliberately deceive. Indeed, the Muses tell Hesiod that they can utter not only true things but also false stories that resemble the truth. This indicates that knowledge and communication of the truth is an exclusively divine prerogative, whereas seers, prophets and poets – to say nothing of ordinary people – are unaware of the trustworthy or deceptive nature of their source and are therefore unable to distinguish true from false things.28 This suggests that the ability to verify information is a powerful instrument of knowledge. Homer attests that clear and convincing knowledge pertains to things that have been proven true through a test or trial. The most famous example is the episode in which Penelope, to be sure that the stranger she has before her eyes is in fact her beloved husband, subjects him to a trial (Od. 23.181–204). When the stranger is found to know that which only Odysseus could know, namely that the marital bed is fixed and cannot be moved as has been suggested, Penelope has ultimate and unequivocal evidence (sêma) that the stranger is her husband and can finally know clearly. Wrapping up, according to the epic tradition, true knowledge generally pertains to things that are known through direct experience. For this reason, when it refers to that which people cannot directly know, such as divine matters, events of the distant past or things that are spatially remote, true knowledge generally belongs to gods who are able to experience things that are beyond ordinary human perception. However, according to the Homeric epic, people can gain valid knowledge on these things by trusting a reliable witness, such as a divine source. Yet Hesiod clarifies that the recipient of a report, even of a divine revelation, always lacks ultimate certainty that their source is telling the truth – unless the source can be put to a trial and the report proven true. In short, a consolidated tradition, whose legacy can already be found in Homer, sharply distinguishes between divine and human epistemic abilities on matters that, because they are either temporally or spatially remote, escape human direct experience. Whereas gods know these things truly, human beings lack any assurance that what they are observing or listening to corresponds to what has come to pass. For this reason, human beings do not know anything clearly. 28

Not only the Muses’ declaration of uttering plausible lies in Hesiod’s proem to his Theogony, as we have just seen, but also Sophocles’ chorus in OT 501ff. can say of wise Tiresias that, while Zeus and Apollo have (true) knowledge, no sure criterion (κρίσις . . . ἀληθής) can determine whether the words spoken by a mantis carries more weight than those uttered by any other mortal. Moreover, in Homer, gods frequently and successfully deceive human beings: see Hussey (1990: 11 with n.2).

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As we have seen, the epic tradition and Empedocles’ precursors and fellow thinkers provide a glimpse of what can be considered as truth or truthful, genuine knowledge. For knowledge to be true, it must not only describe things as they have come to pass; it must also bring with it the conviction or assurance that things are in fact the way they are described. In this respect, the ability to verify the valid nature of a given assertion represents a powerful means to assess the truth of that assertion. In conclusion, true knowledge always regards things that are known to be true. Nevertheless, about things that cannot directly be experienced or for which no proof or evidence assuring their validity can be provided – that is, when we have no possibility to know that something is true29 – central questions remain open, such as, what can persuade us of their truth? More precisely, what can convince us of the valid and genuine character of a certain explanation of the nature of things? In what follows I will consider Parmenides’ strategy to deal with these issues. 6.1.3

The Route of Parmenides

Having seen the way in which Xenophanes, Alcmaeon and the Hippocratic author of Ancient Medicine extended the epic notion of sapha knowledge to find a pathway to gain valid understanding of things beyond human ordinary experience, I will now look at how Parmenides found a workaround to the concept of clear and certain knowledge established at that time. Whereas the three authors analyzed in Section 6.1.1 acknowledged the limited human potential to know things that are temporally and spatially remote, but at the same time allowed people the faculty to achieve some most valuable, yet unproven conjectures, Parmenides proposed a twofold strategy to overcome the difficulty of an ‘un-certain’ knowledge of topics concerning natural philosophy. On the one hand, he offered apodictic criteria to judge the content of his philosophical exposition; on the other hand, he entrusts this exposition to the revelation of a goddess, thereby providing his philosophy with the mantle of truth. In Chapter 2.4.2 we have already seen that the exposition of Parmenides’ philosophy is offered to us through the mouth of a goddess he met at the end of an extraordinary initiatory katabasis to the House of Night.30 As has been established, the narration of this superhuman experience is in service of Parmenides’ authorial and philosophical investiture. His journey to the 29 30

See already Bryan (2012: e.g., 44). See DK 28 B 1 (= PARM D 4 Laks-Most) with my discussion in Chapter 2.4.2.

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source of wisdom ensures that his philosophy, received at the end of that journey and presented as a divine disclosure, is a genuine and truthful account of the nature of things. However, the goddess, in two notorious passages introducing the main topics of her revelation, seems to characterize some of her propositions in a conceivably pejorative way. The first passage (B 1.28–32 [= PARM D 4.28–32]) reads as follows: χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι ἠμὲν ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεκὲς31 ἦτορ ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. ἀλλ’ ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περ ὄντα.32

30

You must learn everything, both the exact heart of well-rounded reality 30 and the beliefs of mortals, in which there is no assurance of truth;33 and yet you shall learn these also: how things that appear and are accepted were [or would have been] right to be genuinely considered, all and altogether, as things that are.34

Closing the proemial lines, these verses programmatically summarize the main topics of Parmenides’ philosophy: the goddess will first reveal ‘the heart of truth’, ἀληθείης . . . ἦτορ (l. 29), including the account of the two pathways of enquiry (B 2 [= PARM D 6 Laks-Most] and B6 [= PARM D 7 Laks-Most]), the criteria for what really is and the complete rejection of whatis-not (B 8 [= PARM D 8 Laks-Most]). The characterization of this major 31

32

33

34

The word ἀτρεκές is the variant reading of some of Sextus’ manuscripts and of Plut. Col. 1114d, whereas Simplicius has the variant reading ἀτρεμές, generally accepted by scholars, but see Ferrari (2010: 50 and n.19). The wording περ ὄντα is the variant reading of the manuscripts DEF of Simplicius, while A reports περῶντα, which is generally accepted by scholars. But see Mourelatos (2008: 214). See moreover Reale-Ruggiu (2003: 201–9), Cerri (1999: 185–86) and Ferrari (2010: 43). Parmenides’ πίστις is often translated as ‘conviction’: see Coxon (2009: 204), according to whom πίστις is ‘the certainty resulting from the persuasion which reality exercises on the mind by causing it to reason deductively’. Palmer (2009: 92) emphasizes that πίστις in subjective uses conveys the sense of ‘trustworthiness’; in its objective sense it means ‘trust’, ‘faith’, ‘confidence’ or ‘assurance’. Then he argues: ‘Confidence, trust and assurance are “true” when they are the kind that will not be disappointed, are reliable and are worthy of the name – in short, when they are real or genuine.’ What this idea amounts to in Parmenides’ philosophy will be clearer in due course. According to Heidel (1912–1913: 718), however, the term has a juridical connotation and means ‘such evidence or proof as may be adduced in court, a meaning which the word quite regularly bore in legal argumentation’. For the forensic terminology in Parmenides’ fragments see Bryan (2012: 80–93, for πίστις, see esp. 90–93). On the tentative and uncertain nature of this text and translation, see Tor (2017: 209): ‘What is the referent of “these things too” (καὶ ταῦτα)? How exactly should we interpret and translate the cognate words τὰ δοκοῦντα and δοκίμως [. . .]? Should we construe χρῆν as a past obligation (“how it was right”) or a past counterfactual (“how it would have been right”)?’

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thematic area is conveyed by the adjective ἀτρεκές at line 28 which qualifies it as ‘true’ or ‘exact’, namely as an account that is in compliance with things as they truly are.35 On the contrary, the second major thematic area the goddess is going to reveal, e.g., the opinions of mortals (l. 30), which basically concern topics about natural philosophy broadly intended, are qualified as something that has no assurance of truth, although these too have the goddess’s authority. Analogously, the second passage restating the main themes Parmenides must learn (B 8.50–61 [= PARM D 8.65–66]) runs as follows: ἐν τῶι σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων. [. . .] τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω, ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμῃ παρελάσσηι. At this point I cease for you the trustworthy account and understanding about the truth. Henceforward learn mortal opinions hearing the deceitful order of my words. [. . .] To you I reveal this arrangement, accurate in its entirety, so that no mortals may ever overcome you36 with their opinion.

50

60 50

60

The language employed in these lines constructs a similar dichotomy as that presented at the end of B 1 (= PARM D 4 Laks-Most). The discourse about the truth is defined as a trustworthy account and understanding, πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα, whereas the mortal opinions are introduced as a deceitful account, κόσμον . . . ἐπέων ἀπατηλόν.37 However, at lines 35

36

37

Occurrences of the term ἀτρεκές in Greek literature suggests that it means ‘true’, ‘exact’: see Il. 5. 208 ἀτρεκὲς αἶμα, ‘true blood’; Pind. N. 5. 17, ἀλαθει’ ἀτρεκής, ‘exact truth’; Herodot. 5.9.1. and 7.60.1, φράσαι or εἰπεῖν τὸ ἀτρεκές, ‘to tell the exact truth’ or ‘to tell with exactness’; Herodot. 7.187.1, ἀτρεκέα ἀριθμόν, ‘the exact number’. On the meaning of παρελάσσηι see Tor (2017: 202), who writes that the term ‘derives from the Homeric vocabulary for chariot races. It signifies, not merely the notion of passing by, but of driving past one in a race. The goddess promises the kouros that no mortal judgment will “outstrip” him after he learns the cosmology which follows’. As Thanassas (2006) has pointed out, the word ‘deceitful’ is hardly reconcilable with the status of the goddess of truth, who promises Parmenides comprehensive knowledge: see B 1.27 (= PARM D 4.27 Laks-Most), πάντα πυθέσθαι; B 10.1 (= PARM D 12.1 Laks-Most), εἴσηι δ’ αἰθερίαν φύσιν; B 10.4 (= PARM D 12.4 Laks-Most), ἔργα . . . πεύσηι . . . σελήνης; and B 10.5 (= PARM D 12.5 Laks-Most), εἰδήσεις οὐρανόν. I would argue that the qualification of mortal opinions as deceitful can be understood within the epistemological frame encompassing mortal opinions; the fact, in other words, that, as I will show, these are a genuine description of the way things have come to pass, but nonetheless lack conviction or assurance that they are as such.

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60–61 (= PARM D 8.65–66 Laks-Most) the goddess claims a revelation that is a διάκοσμος . . . πάντα ἐοικώς, an entirely appropriate and accurate arrangement as well as an explanation that accords with what has come to pass. In virtue of this, it will not be surpassed by any other mortal cosmology.38 To understand the meaning of this last claim, we need to ask why Parmenides characterizes the goddess’s revelation concerning mortal opinions – that is, concerning topics of natural philosophy – in such a peculiar way and why they are so sharply contrasted with the first part of her account.39 In what follows I am going to argue that Parmenides, through his distinction between truth and mortal opinions, wanted to convey his own conception of human cognitive potential and thus offer people a pathway through which they could be persuaded about topics regarding the nature of the physical world. If we zoom in on the vocabulary Parmenides employed to depict the two major thematic areas of his philosophy, then we see that the goddess never characterizes topics of natural philosophy in a pejorative way or undermines them as imperfect, incorrect, incomplete or even false themes.40 Rather, Parmenides’ language reflects ‘the assumption that accounts pertaining to such things can describe them correctly or incorrectly and, furthermore, that the accounts advanced in the Doxa do so correctly’.41 On the one hand, the notion that no πίστις ἀληθής pertains to the βροτῶν δόξας (B 1.30 [= PARM D 4.30 Laks-Most]) and that these therefore cannot have a trustworthy account and understanding (πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα at B 8.50 [= PARM D 8.55 Laks-Most]) does not mean, as Palmer clarifies, that they are incorrect or even false in contrast to the first part of the goddess’s revelation.42 Rather, expressions of this sort indicate that ‘there is no genuine trustworthiness or conviction in the portion of her [i.e., of the goddess] account that will follow after her account of true

38 39

40

See line 61, ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσηι, with its discussion in Palmer (2009: 162): ‘[t]hese words mark the goddess’s cosmology as superior to any Parmenides might encounter’. In Parmenides studies of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, mortal opinions have generally been taken as a false account, indeed as an account of a false, apparent world rejected by the true arguments of the first part of the divine revelation about the aletheia. See Owen (1960: 84–102), Guthrie (1965: esp. 50–52), Reinhardt (1974: 296), Mourelatos (2008: 259–60) and Coxon (2009: 183 and 221). More recently scholars have displayed a more positive approach in evaluating Parmenides’ mortal opinions – that is, Parmenides’ natural philosophy – which is now generally regarded as a plausible, though imperfect, explanation of the physical world and is considered able to include both positive and negative elements. See Tor (2017: 163–69) with extensive references to recent opinions on the topic. This point is clearly made by Tor (2017: e.g., 200–1). 41 Ibid. 201. 42 Palmer (2009: 92).

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reality’.43 In other words, the goddess does not say that her account in the Doxa lacks truth, but only that it lacks the certainty of truth. On the other hand, at B 1.31–32 (= PARM D 4.31–32 Laks-Most) the goddess clarifies that Parmenides is going to learn how things that mortals resolved and accepted as valid (δοκοῦντα)44 were (or would have been) rightly considered as a genuine account of things that are (ὄντα).45 Palmer has pointed out that, like the adjective δόκιμος,46 ‘the corresponding adverb δοκίμως, although rare, preserves the positive connotation and has the sense of “really”, “genuinely”, or “actually”’.47 With this given, we can therefore assume that the goddess’s account of mortal opinions, which will follow after her discourse about the two pathways of enquiry and what-is, will be entirely trustworthy because, as the goddess herself says, it is a genuine account of things as they truly are. An analogous conclusion could be reached from B 8.60–61 (= PARM D 8.65–66 Laks-Most), where we are told that the goddess’s διάκοσμος, or ‘arrangement’48 is πάντα ἐοικώς, meaning entirely appropriate and accurate; that is, it complies with what has come to pass and, in virtue of this, it will not be surpassed by any other mortal cosmology.49 However, how can 43 44

Ibid. For the meaning of the so-called δοκ-words see n.4 above. For the meaning of δοκοῦντα and the figura etymologica δοκοῦντα . . . δοκίμως in Parmenides see Palmer (2009: 177): Not a few interpreters have taken the designation of the things to be described in the cosmology as τὰ δοκεῦντα to be evidence of the illusory character of the things so designated, understanding τὰ δοκεῦντα as ‘things that are (merely) believed to be’. Elsewhere, however, the phrase τὰ δοκοῦντα often has the sense of what someone thinks, believes, supposes, or resolves with nothing like the implication of irreality some have wrongly detected in Parmenides’ use of the phrase . . . It should thus be clear that Parmenides employs neither τὰ δοκεῦντα (fr. 1.31) nor δόξας (fr. 1.30a, fr. 8.51) in the sense of ‘fancies’ or ‘mere opinions’: τὰ δοκεῦντα or ‘what they resolved’ will be seen in retrospect to refer to the principles of the cosmology, light and night. (Palmer’s emphasis).

45

46 47 48

49

See also Lesher (1984: 19; 1999: 240), Curd (1998: 21–22), Mourelatos (2008: 200 and 204) and, more recently, Tor (2017: 211–14). See already Reale-Ruggiu (2003: 199): The Goddess promises to complete the revelation of the truth by adding a ‘yet’ (eppure) in the sense of ‘further’ (inoltre), as a completion not of the denied error, but of the truth of which at first the solid heart was revealed. Therefore, the expression introduces a distinct moment with respect to the heart of the Truth, but certainly other than the error. The word δόκιμος (