Readings in Indian Sociology: Volume IX: Culture and Society [1 ed.] 9788132113904

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Culture and Society

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Readings in Indian Sociology Series Editor: Ishwar Modi Titles and Editors of the Volumes Volume 1 Towards Sociology of Dalits Editor: Paramjit S. Judge Volume 2 Sociological Probings in Rural Society Editor: K.L. Sharma Volume 3 Sociology of Childhood and Youth Editor: Bula Bhadra Volume 4 Sociology of Health Editor: Madhu Nagla Volume 5 Contributions to Sociological Theory Editor: Vinay Kumar Srivastava Volume 6 Sociology of Science and Technology in India Editor: Binay Kumar Pattnaik Volume 7 Sociology of Environment Editor: Sukant K. Chaudhury Volume 8 Political Sociology of India Editor: Anand Kumar Volume 9 Culture and Society Editor: Susan Visvanathan Volume 10 Pioneers of Sociology in India Editor: Ishwar Modi

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READINGS IN INDIAN SOCIOLOGY VOLUME 9

Culture and Society

Edited by Susan Visvanathan

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Copyright © Indian Sociological Society, 2013 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. First published in 2013 by Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd B 1/I 1, Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044, India www.sagepub.in Sage Publications Inc 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320, USA

Indian Sociological Society Institute of Social Sciences 8 Nelson Mandela Road Vasant Kunj New Delhi 110 070

Sage Publications Ltd 1 Oliver’s Yard 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP United Kingdom Sage Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd 3 Church Street #10-04 Samsung Hub Singapore 049483 Published by Vivek Mehra for SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd, typeset in 10.5/12.5 Adobe Garamond Pro by Boson ITech Pvt. Ltd., Kolkata and printed at Saurabh Printers Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Available

ISBN: 978-81-321-1390-4 (PB) The SAGE Team: Shambhu Sahu, Sushant Nailwal, Thomas Mathew, Asish Sahu, Vijaya Ramachandran and Dally Verghese Disclaimer: This volume largely comprises pre-published material which has been presented in its original form. The publisher shall not be responsible for any discrepancies in language or content in this volume.

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Leela Dube, with happy memories of a loving and intellectually radiant life

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Thank you for choosing a SAGE product! If you have any comment, observation or feedback, I would like to personally hear from you. Please write to me at [email protected] —Vivek Mehra, Managing Director and CEO, SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd, New Delhi

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Contents

List of Tables ix List of Figures xi Series Note xiii Preface xvii Acknowledgements xxi Introduction by Susan Visvanathan xxiii 1. G. S. Ghurye on Culture and Nation-Building 1 C.N. Venugopal 2. Cultural Pluralism and National Cohesion: Issues and Prospects 16 Sally Falk Moore 3. Outsiders as Insiders: The Phenomenon of Sandwich Culture 40 Yogesh Atal 4. Interrogating Tibetan Exilic Culture: Issues and Concerns 58 Sudeep Basu 5. The Significance of Culture in the Understanding of Social Change in Contemporary India 82 Yogendra Singh 6. Cultural Integration and Changing Values: A Study of Value System of Educated Youth 94 Yogendra Singh 7. Towards a More Meaningful Study of Ecology, Society and Culture 112 Indra Deva 8. Vosaad: The Socio-Cultural Force of Water: A Study from Goa 129 Bernadette Maria Gomes

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9. Traditional Institutions and Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Agrarian Mobilisation: The Case of Bhartiya Kisan Union 157 Gaurang R. Sahay 10. A Sociology for Happiness: Beyond Western versus Non-Western Perspectives 181 Kenji Kosaka 11. Leisure and Social Transformation 196 Ishwar Modi 12. Cultural Nationalism in a Multi-National Context: The Case of India 215 Subrat K. Nanda 13. Education, Social Structure and Culture 238 Asoke Basu 14. Towards a Cultural Policy in India: A Socio-Cultural Perspective253 Victor S. D’Souza 15. Understanding Popular Culture: The Satyashodhak and Ganesh Mela in Maharashtra 264 Sharmila Rege 16. Sociological Research on Films 283 Akalanka Jindal 17. The Return Migrant in Cinema: The Idealist and the Sceptic 301 Moutushi Mukherjee 18. Cultural Invasion from the Sky: Hinduisation of Indian Television? 327 Binod C. Agrawal 19. The Cartoon of a Bengali Lady Clerk: A Repertoire of Sociological Data 333 Dalia Chakrabarti 20. Race Relations, Ethnicity, Class and Culture: A Comparison of Indians in Trinidad and Malaysia 345 Ravindra K. Jain Index About the Editor and Contributors Appendix of Sources

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358 371 375

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List of Tables

Chapter 6 Table 1 Showing Students’ Responses to Values on Social Stratification (Structure) Table 2 Showing Values in Regard to Property Acquisition, etc.  Table 3 Showing Values on the Use of Machine and Industrialisation Table 4 Showing Values about Human Nature Table 5 Showing Values on Cosmogenesis  Table 6 Showing Values about Truths, Means and Ends Table 7 Showing the Various Patterns of Value-orientation of Youth

100 102 103 104 106

Chapter 10 Table 1 Hypothetical Typology of Views of Happiness

189

Chapter 17 Table 1 The List of Films Analysed

305

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98 99

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List of Figures

Chapter 19 Figure 1 The Lady Clerk Figure 2 Hideous Makeup Figure 3 Obtained First Class in BA—Then . . . Figure 4 Have I Fought Such a Big Battle in Their Interest! Figure 5 Women are Now Emancipated. Husbands Must Do Household Chores

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336 339 340 340 341

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Series Note

The Indian Sociological Society (ISS), established in December 1951 under the leadership of Professor G. S. Ghurye at the University of Bombay, celebrated its Diamond Jubilee in 2011. Soon after its foundation, the ISS launched its bi-annual journal Sociological Bulletin in March 1952. It has been published regularly since then. Taking cognizance of the growing aspirations of the community of sociologists in both India and abroad to publish their contributions in Sociological Bulletin, its frequency was raised to three issues a year in 2004. Its print order now exceeds 3,000 copies. It speaks volumes about the popularity of both the ISS and the Sociological Bulletin. The various issues of Sociological Bulletin are a treasure trove of the most profound and authentic sociological writings and research in India and elsewhere. As such, it is no surprise that it has acquired the status of an internationally acclaimed reputed journal of sociology. The very fact that several of its previous issues are no more available, being out of print, is indicative not only of its popularity among both sociologists and other social scientists but also of its high scholarly reputation, acceptance and relevance. Although two series of volumes have already been published by the ISS during 2001–05 and in 2011, having seven volumes each on a large number of themes, yet a very large number of themes remain untouched. Such a situation necessitated that a new series of thematic volumes be brought out. Realising this necessity and in order to continue to celebrate the Diamond Decade of the ISS, the Managing Committee of the ISS and a sub-committee constituted for this purpose decided to bring out a series of 10 more thematic volumes in such areas of importance and relevance both for the sociological and the academic community at large as sociological theory, untouchability and Dalits, rural society, science & technology, childhood and youth, health, environment, culture, politics, and the pioneers of sociology in India.

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Well-known scholars and experts in the areas of chosen themes were identified and requested to edit these thematic volumes under the series title Readings in Indian Sociology. Each one of them has put in a lot of effort in the shortest possible time not only in selecting and identifying the papers to be included in their respective volumes but also in arranging these in a relevant and meaningful manner. More than this, it was no easy task for them to write comprehensive Introductions of the respective volumes in the face of time constraints so that the volumes could be brought out in time on the occasion of the 39th All India Sociological Conference scheduled to take place in Mysore under the auspices of the Karnataka State Open University during 27–29 December, 2013. The editors enjoyed freedom not only to choose the papers of their choice from Sociological Bulletin published during 1952 to 2012 but were also free to request scholars of their choice to write Forewords for their particular volumes. The volumes covered under this series include: Towards Sociology of Dalits (Editor: Paramjit S. Judge); Sociological Probings in Rural Society (Editor: K. L. Sharma); Sociology of Childhood and Youth (Editor: Bula Bhadra); Sociology of Health (Editor: Madhu Nagla); Contributions to Sociological Theory (Editor: Vinay Kumar Srivastava); Sociology of Science & Technology in India (Editor: Binay Kumar Pattnaik); Sociology of Environment (Editor: Sukant K. Chaudhury); Political Sociology of India (Editor: Anand Kumar); Culture and Society (Editor: Susan Visvanathan) and Pioneers of Sociology in India (Editor: Ishwar Modi). Culture and Society (edited by Susan Visvanathan) is the ninth volume of the series titled Readings in Indian Sociology. This collection of essays, culled from the pages of the bulletin of the ISS shows us that the questions of the nation state must have precise emblems, or facts, by which it is studied. These motifs may be leisure, propaganda, film, theatre, cartoons, ideologies of race and caste, as well as the continuing production of a variety of materials, which inform lay readers as well as trained professionals how eclectic the subject matter of sociology is. Sociologists such as Yogendra Singh, R. K. Jain and many others, who will be remembered for their astute sense of the here and now, such as Ishwar Modi, Victor D’Souza, Yogesh Atal, Indra Deva, C. N. Venugopal, Asoke Basu, Subrat Nanda and the late Sharmila Rege bring to the volume its intense intellectual space of negotiating the cultural dynamics of India as it unfolds in the last decades of the 20th century, and the new landscape of the 21st century. The phalanx of sociologists, a catalytic new generation, who deal with the contexts of culture studies, with great ease, both empirically and theoretically, rework the familiar paradigm of ‘writing the nation’, by juxtaposing the relevance of tradition when it enters into dialectic with the modern. Bernadette Gomes, Sally Falk

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Moore, Dalia Chakrabarti, Binod Agrawal, Moutushi Mukherjee, Akalanka Jindal, Kenji Kosaka, Gaurang Sahay and Sudeep Basu show how volatile the craft of sociology becomes when the questions of ecology and politics are placed squarely with the understanding of the past in relation to the present. How do we think of agriculture, water, boundaries, refugeedom, bureaucracy, mass media and well-being? Across the age-set, the authors bring all these questions to the forefront in lucid and intelligent ways. It can hardly be overemphasised and can be said for sure that this volume as well as all the other volumes of the series Readings in Indian Sociology, as they pertain to the most important aspects of society and sociology in India, will be of immense importance and relevance to students, teachers and researchers of both sociology and other social sciences. It is also hoped that these volumes will be received well by the overseas scholars interested in the study of Indian society. Besides this, policy-makers, administrators, activists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and so on may also find these volumes of immense value. Having gone through these volumes, the students and researchers of sociology would probably be able to feel and say that now ‘[w]e will be able to look much farther away as we are standing on the shoulders of the giants’ (in the spirit of paraphrasing the famous quote of Isaac Newton). I would like to place on record my thanks to Shambhu Sahu, Sutapa Ghosh and R. Chandra Sekhar of SAGE Publications for all their efforts, support and patience to complete this huge project well in time against all the time constraints. I also express my gratefulness to the Managing Committee Members of the ISS and also to the members of the subcommittee constituted for this purpose. I am also thankful to all the editors and all the scholars who have written the Forewords. I would also like to thank Uday Singh, my assistant at the India International Institute of Social Sciences, Jaipur, for all his secretarial assistance and hard work put in by him towards the completion of these volumes. Ishwar Modi Series Editor Readings in Indian Sociology

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Preface

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his book consists of a collection of essays which look at Culture in relation to the concepts of Nation, State, Diaspora, Ethnicities and Communities. The idea of citizenship and local practice with its unique formulations has been the subject matter of its focussed concern. While the sociologist has always been concerned with patterns of events, the study of the present in a globalised context in the time of climate change is made more difficult. Indians are often diaspora in their own country, for every time you travel, you find yourself not understanding the script of the local community, or are a foreigner to their fund of oral traditions and of local wisdom. The sociologist has always been trained to be a bridge builder in this context. Indians travel freely at will, and do so equally, abroad, as workers or tourists, or members of the extended family. Diaspora communities ‘found’ themselves new habitats, with the assumption that duplication of lifestyles and rituals is possible in the new terrain. When they return ‘home’, to the countries of origin, they bring with them the customs and conventions of the cultures they are now participants of. Everyone returns ‘home’ for rituals of the life cycle, annual canonical feasts and secular celebrations and seasonal celebrations, with a sense of joyousness. I remember watching a TV programme on farmers in Punjab, as they danced around a Lohri fire, and when interviewed, they either spoke chaste Punjabi with correct inflexions, or Cockney in British accents. Orthodoxies often remain intact, since an entire generation in India has adhered to the traditional values of their grandparents. In Sociology this is called  ‘the merging of alternate generations.’ Odd though it may seem, young people are more influenced today by tradition than modernity, and technology enhances this. Parents remain  quiet witness to this, since  the entire film and advertising industry has  also endorsed tradition. The complementarity of contradiction is probably the most interesting thing; welldressed men in Western clothes, applying face-whitening creams, doing

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traditional things like watching their wives cook, or using their smartphones, carbon drinks with alcohol, or gifting artificially carbonised stones, or using after-shave lotions to lure traditional looking women into marriage and sex, not necessarily in that order, where women like the overladen table, wear kilos of jewellery to communicate their spouses’ success. What is Indian Culture, then becomes a significant question, and this collection of essays poses the problem very differently, than advertisment moguls do, in terms of basic human rights to language, religion, education and life chances. While face-whitening creams employ the idea of a Master Race, dividing up the Nation into the fair, and those unable to risk their melanin with chemicals for reasons of choice or income or politics, sociologists try to understand the more complex choices of citizens regarding their destiny as citizens when communities are divided over resources such as education and politics. Sociologists are also concerned with the present-day political conditions of freedom and citizenship, for the laws will define what are the rights of individuals. Authors in the collection foreground this with great concern. In reality, the family is changing rapidly, for new technologies and surveillance work to create new emotions with regard to passivity in emotional relations or volatility in sexual ones, and the responsibilities and privileges of men and women in this rapidly changing milieu will create new world views. Urban middle class men are comfortable with sharing  household chores with women and helping with their  wives’ or women friends’ careers. Upper-class men tend to see their wives as ornaments to their  own  careers, and if the women have significant careers too, it is because the men allow them. Usually this is with reference to Philanthropy or the Arts, but I don’t want to generalise, since there are always exceptions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Industry being a large space in itself. The unabated violence against women in India is a reference point which cultural analysts must focus on, and the reportage is available, because of the  Indian media’s success in being able to witness and report these incidents in society at great personal risk to themselves. There is increased reporting of  gender-based violence in particular. Subtle forms of violence such as neglect and verbal abuse go unreported because it is always presumed that this is mutual disrespect and cannot be quantified. Should women complain, they are always told that they are imagining it. Women can also be allegedly abusive by being deaf to men’s needs emotionally or sexually, and the new freedoms provided to women in the language of consent are very respected by society. The contract of marriage is now legally not necessary, since the culture of business process outsourcing (BPO)

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workers in the cities has evolved new modalities of how the net-friendly make alliances. Social norms are in conflict with one another, so young people have learnt to compartmentalise in acceptable ways as their grandparents’ generation did. They  have very clear demarcations about what peer group expects of them, what their families expect of them, what the law expects of them as citizens and what they expect of each other. ‘Rational and generous’ was presumably the self-proclaimed watchword of the generation of their male grandparents in the  upper middle class urbanised and secular domain, but it is doubtful that those old people  operated  with that idiom at home with their families, while they may have greatly respected their mothers, sisters and wives!  Women were definitely kept in their place. So also, this  new generation loves having a good time, but it is careful to maintain civility in contexts of difference. It is class contexts which allow this,  for the propertied rural masses have it (farmers with small acreage), and so do the educated, but when it comes to foeticide or wife beating , we would need to look at  the contradiction between ostensible good manners and the statistics for real cruelty in the same household, such as dowry demands and birth of male offspring represented as a spiritual requirement for carrying forward traditional rituals. Displaced and alienated young men and women are much more in danger than the two classes I have mentioned,  such as middle-class urban families or middle-class rural families who have stakes in land as well as professional occupations. Very rich and alienated and very poor and alienated can have similar vulnerabilities such as alcoholism, drug abuse and cruelty to men, women, children and animals. Novelists and lawyers have to handle the exigencies of the extreme case since this is their job, but generally people live ‘normal’ lives, where the average case is that of adapting and surviving. Support groups of family, clan and friends and neighbours are always evident. Yell for help, and they all arrive. The so-called alienated computer nerd is usually surrounded by family and friends who try to communicate with him or her. Given the shortage of housing, children tend to stay with parents for longer than when my generation was young in the  radical 1970s. We were really very young, but there was a lot of societal pressure to set up on one’s own, get a job, get married and set up neolocal residence. Now children are encouraged to stay with their parents longer, parents help with bringing up grandchildren, when parents voluntarily enter or leave old age homes because they are ancient and need to be institutionalised or protected in the family, the anchorage of the family is always available as an idea, if not in fact. The truth is that life expectancy

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has increased, and with it familiar bonds. Where there are cases of pathology, people always notice and bring it to the attention of others. People, including the elderly, keep in touch with mobile and through Internet, and the family is very much an enduring institution, though not in the familiar form of the struggling nuclear family of the 1970s. The new form of the family is that which uses electronic communication to its fullest to keep in touch, believing that emotional bonds are stronger than sexual or material bonds. Everyone adapts to the changes in the global template, and if communicating over long distances is not enough, well, quite possibly there will be some who might soon opt in a couple of decades for inter-galactic communication and still remain a family. Whether imposing industrialisation is a viable ideological choice in the face of the continuous protests of artisanal and farming communities, and the intelligentsia who value the mosaics of cultural autonomy, is yet to be seen. Clark Kerr’s standardisation principle is being questioned by activists and greens movement workers the world over. One only has to remember the case of the archipelago linking Sri Lanka and India, and the varieties of ways in which ecologists used tradition to embellish the cause of the right of existence to a given morphology when commerce and politics believed that it was alright to eradicate it for the cause of development. While these essays span over from 1960, handling all the most difficult questions of the variability and vitality of culture, and the grounding of conventions and norms, it is essentially concerned with the language of rights and of community. Sixty-six years after independence, we can only say that the minimalist task of the sociologist in observation, description, comparison, classification and analyses have been used here to provide a record of the Nation State as it represents itself through its peoples. Susan Visvanathan JNU, New Delhi

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Acknowledgements

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y grateful thanks to the Indian Sociological Society (ISS) for asking me to write the Introduction to this volume, the essays having been carefully chosen by them, for purposes of highlighting the contemporary significance of the thinking that spans more than five decades of the existence of the Sociological Bulletin. It was a great pleasure, and I wish to thank, especially, Professor Ishwar Modi for his trust in me (for after all, every act of reading is an act of interpretation), and the SAGE team for their immediate attention to all things that go into the making of a book. Susan Visvanathan JNU, New Delhi

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Introduction Susan Visvanathan

T

his collection of essays, culled from the pages of the bulletin of the Indian Sociological Society (ISS), shows us that the questions of the Nation State must have precise emblems, or facts, by which it is studied. These motifs may be leisure, propaganda, film, theatre, cartoons, ideologies of race and caste, as well as the continuing production of a variety of materials, which inform lay readers as well as trained professionals how eclectic the subject matter of Sociology is. Sociologists such as Yogendra Singh, R. K. Jain and many others who will be remembered for their astute sense of the here and now, such as Ishwar Modi, Victor D’Souza, Yogesh Atal, Indra Deva, C. N. Venugopal, Asoke Basu, Subrat Nanda and the late Sharmila Rege, bring to the volume its intense intellectual space of negotiating the cultural dynamics of India as it unfolds in the last decades of the 20th century, and the new landscape of the 21st century. The phalanx of sociologists, a catalytic new generation, and some elders among them, who deal with the contexts of culture studies, with great ease, both empirically and theoretically, rework the familiar paradigm of ‘writing the nation’, by juxtaposing the relevance of tradition when it enters into dialectic with the modern. Bernadette Gomes, Sally Falk Moore, Dalia Chakrabarti, Binod Agrawal, Moutushi Mukherjee, Akalanka Jindal, Kenji Kosaka, Gaurung Sahay and Sudeep Basu show how volatile the craft of Sociology becomes when the questions of ecology and politics are placed squarely with the understanding of the past in relation to the present. How do we think of agriculture, water, boundaries, refugeedom, bureaucracy, mass media and well-being? Across the age-set, the authors bring all these questions to the forefront in lucid and intelligent ways. All of them are sensitive to the concept of Nation and the web of ideas in which the State is embedded. C. N. Venugopal, in a comprehensive essay ‘G.S. Ghurye on Culture and Nation-Building’ (1993) suggests that the preoccupation with detailing

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and glorifying Hinduism may have led G. S. Ghurye to ignore the contributions of prominent Christians and Muslims in the process of Nation building. While describing the importance of Ghurye’s understanding of Hinduism, where the process of Hinduisation of castes and tribes meant that there was an osmosis of native myths and grand traditions, through kingship and scholarship, in its precolonial manifestations, Venugopal is quick to assert that historiography must not limit itself to the nonchalant biases of the upper castes. He describes Ghurye’s contribution as something which maps the large canvas of India, where journeys of monks, conquering of principalities, matrimonial alliances and scholarly debates and affiliations allowed India to represent itself as known to its diverse people. Yet, there is the call to the modern and secular citizenship, so it is very necessary to bring in the domains of the neglected, whatever these may be, at any given time, in the history of scholarship. The objectivity of Sociology is thus earmarked as the disciplinary incentive for the author. Sally Falk Moore in ‘Cultural Pluralism and National Cohesion: Issues and Prospects’ (1987) explains in a multidimensional way, the complex question of migration and statecraft which are always perplexing for the intelligentsia. She poses the problem, initially, as a social anthropological one, by presenting the case of two communities that migrated to the Netherlands after the Second World War. One comprises the people who are born from the union of Dutch men and local women in the colonies, who are assimilated into the Nation State without difficulty. The second community are descendants of Moluccans who find it essentially difficult to be integrated in European society. From this case, she proceeds to analyse the way in which the oppositional forms of assimilation and unity are pitted against diversity and ethnic variability. She draws from the existing literature to come to terms with the methodological dilemma that ethnography poses to the sociologist. Can we take a historical moment, pit it against the variability of other contexts, other situations, both topographically and culturally, and then work with the terms of a Comparative Sociology? For her, the discomfort of using the Nation State as a given is just this, that refugees are created where the State decides for its people what its destiny will be. Yogesh Atal, in a perceptive essay called ‘Outsiders as Insiders: The Phenomenon of Sandwich Culture’ (1989) looks at the varied ways in which migrants make sense of their lives, in the new cultures in which they become essential representatives of the labour force. By using a wide range of cultural examples, where differences are highlighted, Atal describes the cultural indexes which make people demarcate their identity: clothes, food, language, religion, gender-based modes of behaviour which are traditionally

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maintained. He uses these parameters to define how much adaptation takes place, and the manner of socialisation of the new entrants. He is essentially concerned with the idea of the ‘Marginal Man’ as representing the codes of assimilation by the Indian diaspora in different countries, where the inability to merge with the dominant culture allows individuals to create enclaves of their own, where community life is forged in terms of how people decide what they wish to represent as their own. So, communities that have stayed in a country for generations then represent their own culture as vehemently dominant, leading to antagonism from the indigenous communities that see these individuals as foreigners. ‘Sandwich culture’ uses the image of the man who carries a board on both sides of his being, where his identity becomes hyphenated by the country of origin, and the country of residence, where loyalties are reworked in new metaphors of longing and belonging. ‘Interrogating Tibetan Exilic Culture: Issues and Concerns’ by Sudeep Basu (2012) looks at the case of Tibetan refugees in India with a careful eye, juxtaposing both their traditions and their travails. He contrasts the ideological position of the Chinese State, which scoffs at independence as well as autonomy, communicating through its propaganda that the Tibetans have moved to a degree of modernity that they never had previously, and that the patronage of the Chinese State has meant that they have jumped from medievalism into the post-modern world. Tibetans themselves look at their fate in India as essentially complex. There is the propulsion to survival, and yet, with it fear, for the context of being outsiders is too blatant to ignore. Young Tibetans see the Dalai Lama’s middle path as being too vague for them in the face of Chinese oppression of their people. On the other hand, the ideological calm of refugee life has gone much beyond the boundaries of Dharamshala and Tibetan camps like Majnu ka Tila in Delhi. The Dalai Lama’s propagation of Buddhism, and the idea that the monk may be quiescent anywhere, is in strong contrast to the radical bent of mind exhibited by those young people who believe that autonomy in China is not a valid proposition for them. The sociologist’s task is to bring together the various empirical materials, and then locate the generalising principle. Basu does this with great sophistication by posing the problem of Nationalism as one which is defined not just by the needs of humans, but also by the boundaries and rhetoric of the implicated Nation states, particularly when they are in collusion. Yogendra Singh (1995) in ‘The Significance of Culture in the Understanding of Social Change in Contemporary India’ looks at modern systems of technology and communication, the new leisure industries such as tourism and handicraft ensembles, as cultural signifiers of tradition, and the way in which the resilience of caste, class and community are rendered

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vulnerable. While he is alert to the process of assimilation within global society, he cautions against rapid transformation, as he says this will lead to rapid disorganisation. He takes the example of Japan, where he says cultural policy is a steadfast response, where regulation is seen as necessary to bring about equilibrium in the face of quick change. He believes that India too should think about how culture and society, the lag between new forms of production and work worlds is to be understood in relation to traditional forms of the family, residence and ethnicity. In an earlier essay, ‘Cultural Integration and Changing Values’ (1964), Yogendra Singh draws from the 1960s reference material and the perspective of urban educated youth in the universities, and working with 288 university students, argues that they look forward to change, and believe that machines can make the difference to how the problem of development is viewed. Since urban educated youth have a specific vantage point in viewing modernism, it cannot be a statement for youth in general. Today, the greens movement has influenced thinking about the modernisation process, but Singh theoretically believes that dialectic and synthesis are the two watchwords. We must understand that the tension which exists between contrary world views is brought to a culminating moment by the dominant theologies. Eighty-eight per cent youth in Singh’s sample believe in a totalising truth, and this could very well be that dams are the temples of modernity. Yet, by focusing on the nature of variability in the sample, the author is well able to show how different opinions can be found, with regard to basic questions, posed to a young generation which looked to its future in the cities in professional occupations. Towards a ‘More Meaningful Study of Ecology, Society and Culture’ (1997) by Indra Deva begins by making the distinction, historically, between the so-called autonomous village, and the peasant societies which are interlinked with the industrialising ones, in global and metropolitan relationships. Indra Deva believes that whereas the early industries had to be located where coal was, leading to the depletion of the communities, and rendering villagers of tribal and peasant hamlets into cheap labour, ridding them simultaneously of a familiar environment, while beggaring them, it is now time to look at solar power and windmills as environment-friendly sources of energy. The essay suggests that so-called underdeveloped societies can take the lead in the greens movements so that humans can revitalise the earth, rather than plunder it for immediate hedonistic pleasures. In ‘Vosaad: The Socio-Cultural Force of Water (A Study from Goa)’ (2005), Bernadette Maria Gomes deals with the traditional water works which allow Goa its particular topography of lakes, which are a part of

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women’s identity, and an aspect of the therapeutic and regenerative cultural oeuvre of cures. In an unusual paper which looks at how ageing is perceived, where menopause and the loss of humours and salts is identified with agerelated distress, Gomes looks at women’s vocabulary of situating the body within an ecological framework. Traditionally, Goan women have soaked in the sea water, which percolates into local lakes, and have benefitted from salt water cure. Gomes also looks at how metaphors in the local community draw from the sea, and how people organise their lives with the assumption that formulaic speech can be the bases for warning those who are directionless or lacking motivation in some crucial aspect of their lives. This idea of using proverbs as a summation of culture is very useful for those attempting to create an archive of people’s knowledge. While topographies are abbreviated by tourism and mining, and entire cultures wiped out, the method that Gomes uses, in the understanding of local community culture and practice, will stand in good stead. Without access to local water ways and lakes, island communities are often denuded of that which comes to them as a legacy, the right to cope with biological or life cycle changes with the help of ritual and local customs. Gaurang Sahay, in his essay ‘Traditional Institutions and Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Agrarian Mobilisation: The Case of Bhartiya Kisan Union’ (2004), addresses the history of the farmers’ movement in India during the term of Prime Minister Chandrashekhar’s office, when Chaudhary Tikait and the BKU brought the difficulties of the Haryana farmers’ to Delhi’s doorstep. The basic premise of the paper is that when we wish to understand local communities, we should analyse their culture in terms of what they represent as significant to themselves. Khap panchayat, with their maledominated and yet seemingly participative politics; the hookah as a symbol transcending caste; the preoccupation of the BKU with secular issues, relating to Muslim needs even though experientially practising Hinduism as its greatest prong—are all discussed. Sahay looks at diet, clothes and specially the demands that were vociferously placed with regard to electricity consumption and fertiliser products by the farmer. Food becomes a symbol of the movement, not only in terms of what the small acreage of the farmers produces, but also the simplicity of Tikait’s diet: wheat, milk, gur. That is the telegraphic language of a people’s leader. The fading away of the BKU is not surprising. When it became assimilated within electoral politics, the farmers made their own choices, and drifted away. In the 1930s, the communists in the congress had a very substantial role to play, and the farmers’ movement became a strong force, highlighting under the socialists the role that the Kisan Sabhas must play. Today these are memories, significant

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ones, but sociologists are surely concerned with strong arm figures, such as the one-armed Ponty Singh who bought up land, and created vast housing empires, empty ghost towns which sprung up on fertile agricultural land in Haryana, based on the liquor permits owned by his family. Dalits, including Mayawati, were coopted as consumers and powerful patrons, and the liquor baron was able to change the very nature of the simple roti-and-dal-eating, milk-and-gur-drinking farmers. They now bought fast cars, and flew in on helicopters, rather than riding on white horses, for their baraat, while communicating that the women should be hidden away and son preference was a traditional preserve. Kenji Kosaka, in his essay on ‘A Sociology for Happiness: Beyond Western versus Non-Western Perspectives’ (2007), attempts to go beyond the specific ethnographic limits of analysing an index, which goes beyond wellbeing, to actually chart how individuals understand their own placement in society. Is happiness an active principle or can we integrate the passive aspects too, where contentment and security may be integrated into social analyses? He uses the idea of that space where there is no discordance, even that where nothing happens, within the frame of how people understand their placement in happiness. This deals with the complex notation of how one may be poor, but individuals understand health and high levels of integration in society as the bases of their joy. Similarly, the wealthy or the middle class might look at their own levels of comfort as representative of their enjoyment of security, which then connotes happiness. Kosaka is essentially trying to forge new indicators of measuring social reality, where the perceptions of sociologists must make sense of new indexes of human development which may not be coterminous with what has so far been seen as social development. Ishwar Modi argues in his essay ‘Leisure and Social Transformation’ (2012) for the understanding of leisure in a socio-historical framework which allows us to include not just the farmers and labourers in the countryside, who saw gossip and wandering in their fields as the epitome of leisure-time activities, but includes also the new blue collar cerebral workers in information society, who look to the malls, restaurants, film halls and week-end getaways as the new form of leisure activities. Between these two types, lie the pursuits of the middle class, who have replaced the transistor radio with TV, Internet and mobile which are electronic agents of change, where time can be whiled away without leaving home. Modi has a large canvas, with which he works deftly, bringing in aspects of Comparative Sociology, wherein we look at the dreams and desires of people from all walks of life. He is, in the truest sense of the term, non-judgemental and is

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interested in recording societal change, where the absorption of the largely rural population into cheap labour, which expands urbanism, is adequately understood. This is integrated with the assumption that a good working environment, coupled with leisure activities of one’s choice will be the trademark of a wholistic society. Subrat K. Nanda in a complex and layered article ‘Cultural Nationalism in a Multi-National Context: The Case of India’ (2007) attempts to show how communities view themselves in terms of linguistic, religious or other types of sectarian identities. These may gain momentum, when they have not received attention in the Nation State as valid modes of self-identification. By taking the movement in Punjab (for Khalistan) and Assam (for the extradition of Bengalis and other so-called outsiders) and further, elaborating the case of Oriya Nationalism and also that of Telangana, he shows that communities that think of themselves as neglected begin to push for autonomy. So long as it was within the Constitutional ratifications based on linguistic organisation, it was within its limits, and legally binding. He uses the idea of National consciousness as a basic human right, arguing that the tension that was set up between British India and traditional kingship-based State organisation, in terms of education and development, rear up at all times, especially since people feel they have been excluded from development, or have been exploited. Nanda shows us that these subnationalisms, which are a relic of varieties of colonialism, are very much part of present-day political struggles which the Nation State can iron away. ‘Education, Social Structure and Culture’ (1986) by Asoke Basu engages with the very significant problem of education, policy and existing social structure. He wishes that bureaucrats and scholars enter in dialogue, so that the questions of citizenship and equality are handled in consonance. He believes that the cultural maze in which administrators find themselves in can be made more negotiable by those who are the practitioners, for educationists know the real circumstances in which they live and work. Germany, in the 18th century, moved away from the elitism of the nobility, to actually working with the idea that scholarship liberated bureaucracy. It believed that a well-trained intelligentsia would be able to govern the country; unlike Britain, which used its university to further the cause of keeping privileges intact among a hereditary elite. In India, he says, that this dialogue between policy-makers and educationists is imperative, for the education of the masses requires new sorts of motivation but it cannot be at the cost of equality and freedom of expression, and must never be the manifestation of a hegemonic class which imposes its vision upon people without discussion and debate.

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‘Towards a Cultural Policy in India: A Socio-Cultural Perspective’ (1995) by Victor S. D’Souza works with idea of the Constitution and the manner in which individuals are assured of dignity and right to fraternity. How then, does the sociologist handle the problem of difference? For the author, the preoccupation is with arranging the sentiments of people through forms of socialisation where each is assured of their dignity, and in turn assures the other of basic human rights. Forms of socialisation which compound and synthesise people will assert that India is one country, and that its people are agreed on the questions of how they will assert the rights of citizenship. To this end, the sublimation of structural pluralism, which is the historic aspect of India’s difference will be a necessary end. The idea of human rights as a common denominator thus sways people towards giving up their primordial preoccupations. Sharmila Rege in ‘Understanding Popular Culture: The Satya-Shodhak and Ganesh Mela in Maharashtra’ (2000) looks at the history of popular festivals in Pune as moments by which we may translate the aspirations of people wishing to push their caste histories forward. By pitting Brahmans with their Ganapathy festival, and lower-caste communities with their dance drama and narratavisation of disability and enhancement of personal power, the stage was set for the synthesis of these dissonances in the Chatrapati festivals. Rege comprehensively puts together the history of culture studies, and the location of gender and caste studies in her essay, by pinpointing the historical moment when the elite bias of the National movement gives way to the spectacular domains of symbolic aggrandisement of the fundamentalists, who are intent on contributing to the domain of aggressive demarcation of hierarchies on their own terms. The content of power is, thus, in Rege’s analyses always volatile, and always being created. By bringing women into the framework of analyses, she provides us with extremely interesting notations on women as subjects, as audience and as plain matter for hegemonic manipulation. By moving the festivals along the grid of caste and class, she shows us the body politic and the manner of its social construction at specific moments of its creation. Akalanka Jindal in ‘Sociological Research on Films’ (1960) uses a broad canvas to discuss an array of subjects which, in 1960, and with reference to the Welfare State, was urgently in the focus of administrators and intellectuals. He promotes the idea that censorship is necessary, for the people tend to work with the assumption that pleasure and recreation, even in the  most flamboyant, morally negative aspects, is sufficient index of box office success. But just as ‘what the people want’ is not a sufficient tribute to the nature of democracy (what they may want is fascism), so also in the

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same way, censorship has to negate the morally deleterious, and offer to the consumers that which contributes to the idea of the Nation as a morally integrated whole. This kind of perspective works with the viability of fostering documentaries, and then working with script writers and actors to promote the cause of harmony and citizen rights. It uses the idea that more than two and a quarter million people watch films in the country a day (in 1960), but that it is a small percentage of the population. So taking into account the geographical location of film theatres, mobile theatres and open air theatres, Jindal enters into questions of physical safety for the film goer, and draws attention to questions of taxation, pricing and revenues for the State. Nation building is referred back in terms of the significance of moral codes, interactive forums, global and ambassadorial concerns, and the significant momentum given by the country’s then prime minister, Nehru, who said he did not believe in too much regulation, control and surveillance. Art and politics were in symbiosis, as Shri 420 conveyed, but there had to be some equilibrium in terms of the relationship between consumers and producers. Educating the viewer and the visibility of the Sociologist of Film as a consultant to the Government and to the Film Industry is something that the author strongly advocates. Moutushi Mukherjee in ‘The Return Migrant in Cinema: The Idealist and the Sceptic’ (2012) looks at films in the patriotic genre of the 1950s and the 1960s where the representation of the diaspora relation to its homeland was always in the penumbra of Nationalism. In the mid 1990s, the diaspora started to return to the homeland, and the films accordingly spoke of the complexities of their lives, particularly as they were still umbilically linked to the homeland, and fantasised about its tradition. The last and most recent phase sets the question of this nostalgia for a homeland in a more dramatic fashion, where the young question their traditions, acknowledge their bondedness and work with the idea that they are happy to live in an existential space where contradictions are normal, and handled with humour and unselfconsciousness. Biography, employment opportunities, search for an emotional partner and the carnival of human desires are all juxtaposed in a kaleidoscope of odd and ambiguous social relations, very different from the middle of the last century, when social roles were more clearly defined. Binod C. Agrawal deals with popular television in ‘Cultural Invasion from the Sky: Hinduisation of Indian Television?’ (1999), showing how the secular republic is transformed by the cult of serials which depict the legends and myths of India as a staple entertainment fare. He wishes to argue that there is State regulation and that the content of religious

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TV  is  programmed in such a way that Hinduism is not presented as a conversionary religion. The content of the religious dogmas is carefully controlled by the secular State. The forecasts and religious instruction provided on television is presented as something which is an option that viewers (60 million on State doordarshan TV, and 18 million facilitating cable) may have if they should choose. He says, ‘In India, the expansion of television in the nineties has taken a quantam jump from less than four million to over almost 60 million television households.’ Needless to say, the number of television watchers on mobile phones and ipods, ipads and computers will also have to be added today to glean a formidable statistic. However, he feels that the ideology of the secular State is such that even the Hindu content is presented as if it were not a religiously motivated screening, and the pictorialisation of the epics is valued by all. This traditionally recognised assimilative power of Hinduism to bypass discord and to appeal to all has been the most noticeable thing about it, for it is presented as a way of life, rather than an exclusive philosophy. Dalia Chakrabarti in her essay ‘The Cartoon of a Bengali Lady Clerk: A Repertoire of Sociological Data’ (2004) analyses the way in which men represented their anxieties about women’s freedom in the early years of the last century. They were shocked to find that educated women were more interested in reading than in household chores. Women’s emancipation implied that men could no longer control the time of women as they once did, where women provided cheap labour in the sustenance of the patriarchal household. Not only did they want to go out to work, they ignored their children, applied cosmetics, expected men to attend to household chores while they sat around and most offensively, they even smoked cigarettes and exposed their bodies. The cartoon was an aspect of social rebuttal, where men could express their anxiety of women’s modernisation and the unwarranted escape, as men saw it, from household routines. Providing cartoons which represent this politicising of the view men had, and projecting their revulsion in the public domain, they hoped to manipulate women into giving up these new preoccupations. R. K. Jain in his ‘Race Relations, Ethnicity, Class and Culture: A Comparison of Indians in Trinidad and Malaysia’ (1989) shows us that boxing the categories of caste and class, race and ethnicity in diaspora situations will muddle the empirical contexts of present-day communities. He argues that Creolisation of the indentured labour in the Caribbean, which was organised around a sugar cane economy, meant that caste in its pure sense did not emerge, as the living conditions of the workers and the liaisons and relationships that they entered into were historically determined

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by colonialism. Race, rather than ethnicity, became the defining term in social relationships, and matters of social interaction and mobility. To this he adds the complexity of class, which would transcend these ascriptive boundaries. In Malaysia, the economy shifted from sugar cane and coffee to rubber, in the Kangany system, where the relations between the foreman and the worker were established in terms of traditional relationships of caste hierarchy. It was a more stable system than contract labour, and so the workers were defined in a historical continuum with their own villages, and ethnicity would be the preferred term in use here. The essays collected in this volume from 1960 to 2013 well represent the idiom of accessibility in language and ideas which is the hallmark of the Sociological Bulletin. The work is representative of many different points of view, a variety of techniques, both statistical as well as ethnographic, and using symbolic and narrative analyses when required. In collating this volume, the significant denominator was culture, and how varied its use became depending upon the context. Both as an archival source as well as a tribute to authors and the serial editors of the Sociological Bulletin, the collection will communicate to readers the interest value and the lucidity of presentation, even as we are in the second decade of the 21st century.

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1 G. S. Ghurye on Culture and Nation-Building C.N. Venugopal

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he purpose of this paper is to discuss in some detail G. S. Ghurye’s perspective on the theme of nation-building. He started his academic career as an ethnographer. He had been trained in ethnography at Cambridge University where he studied for his Ph.D. (1919–1922). After he settled down as a teacher in the Department of Sociology, School of Economics, Bombay University (in the 1920s), he wrote a number of books and papers on such diverse themes as family and kinship, urban centres and Indian tribes. He also wrote a number of descriptive works on religion and culture and on political and social tensions in post-Independent India. As a historical-Indologist Ghurye wrote on vedic India, Indian costumes, dance and architecture. His early training in Sanskrit made him predisposed to view the classical literary and religious works as an important source of values and ideals. Although Ghurye was not a political scientist, he averred that culture and polity could not be separated. Today, often the two terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are used interchangeably. But these terms stand for different sets of meanings. The state is an entity with formal properties; it has explicit characteristics such as a constitution and territorial sovereignty, and judicial, administrative and coercive authority. In contrast, the nation is a constellation of mainly implicit meanings and

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subjectivist constructions. The abstruse theorist, Talcott Parsons, spoke of four core elements in the social system designated by the acronym AGIL (Adaptation, Goal Attainment, Integration and Latent Pattern Maintenance). The last named denotes an unmanifest state which is a repository of values, ideals and symbols (Mennell 1974: 152). The term ‘latent’ implies that the nation has the capacity not only to sustain itself but also achieve self-renewal in the event of crises. Ghurye’s use of cultural attainments as indicators of Indian nationalism was rooted in his perceptions which he shared with many other educated Hindus. For him, cultural output was the foundation on which the nation-state could be built in free India. Ghurye’s methodology may be broadly described as an exercise in the sociology of knowledge. In the West, the sociology of knowledge developed around the theories of Max Scheler, Karl Mannheim, George Lukacs and, in more recent times, Peter Berger, Michael Mulkay and H. Collins (Dant 1991; Mannheim 1952). In general, the sociology of knowledge rests on a critique of the positivistic epistemology which held sway over the English-speaking countries in the West. Deriving from Cartesian theory the positivists validated knowledge in terms of dichotomies, viz., true and false, subjective and objective, etic and emic. The critics of positivism pointed out that human life—in contrast to the natural world—is infinitely variable. It is characterized by reflexivity (ego’s introspection of or reflection on a cultural object), contingency (partial or complete variation due to historical and cultural factors), and collective subjectivist perceptions which modified the validation of knowledge leading to a relativist rather than an absolute certification of knowledge. In recent years relativism has been applied to the field of science as well. For instance, science is influenced by political or economic expediency and scientists are susceptible to personal influences (ethnocentricism, hostility towards new ideas, reluctance to admit error, plain jealousy, etc.). The certainty in the realm of natural science has been questioned by a noted philosopher of science, P. K. Feyerabend, who takes a relativist position (1981). Karl Mannheim wrote extensively on the neglect of culture which he described as a theoretical reality. The richness of human culture is glossed over as intangible or non-rational by positivistic epistemology. He proposed an alternative epistemology based on the recognition of a theoretical reality. He became a controversial figure in academic circles over his new epistemology (Walter 1967: 342–48). Combining

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the insights of the sociology of knowledge and phenomenology, Peter Berger has referred to the process in which knowledge is produced through shared objectivity or intersubjectivity (1967: 1–87). According to him, knowledge is able to transcend its particularistic properties through cultural objectification. He cited language as an objectified cultural product. I would like to make a few observations on the growth of knowledge in the Indian context. Unlike China where practical knowledge was emphasized, India showed a bent towards theoretical or speculative knowledge. The philosophical systems in India were diversified on account of their different approaches to the problem of validity of knowledge. Vedanta and Mahayana Buddhism followed an idealistic epistemology which held empirical knowledge as false or misleading; according to it true knowledge was mystical or spiritual. Lokayata, Samkhya, Vaisesika and Mimamsa followed an empirical epistemology in varying terms which affirmed knowledge gained through nature. The Jainas followed a relativist epistemology which led to the doctrine of partial truths. Chattopadhyaya (1964: 1–27) has remarked that many Indian philosophical systems have retained magico-religious ideas which were derived from primitive sources. He has also noted that ‘ethnological ferment’ or clash of ideas led to the emergence of new systems of thought such as Buddhism. Some of the philosophical works outlining these different approaches were incorporated into the vidyas (Indian systems of knowledge); these were Vedanta (which included a number of upanishads), Mimamsa, Vaisesika and Samkhya. The members of the ruling class were given instruction in the philosophies mentioned above; in turn, royal patronage was extended to the philosophers. Some of the rulers also held debates in their court in which the relative merits of different philosophies were assessed. Competition and rivalry marked the relations among different philosophies. These developments testify to the vibrancy of Indian philosophy which existed in conjunction with the vidyas. It is perhaps relevant to mention that in India a number of rulers or members of wealthy households chose to become monks, thereby giving up their worldly comforts. Idealist philosophy imparted through the vidyas probably contributed to this kind of voluntary asceticism. Ghurye wrote a number of essays on the sociology of knowledge, some of which are included in Anthropo-Sociological Papers (1963a). He had shown interest in the systems of knowledge developed by Aristotle,

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Bacon and Comte. He discussed the Indian systems of knowledge descriptively without going into epistemological or analytical quest. However, in my understanding, Ghurye’s writings in general—i.e., his paper on the vidyas, his works on caste, ethnicity, religion, culture and the like—can be placed within the sociology of knowledge. There are two reasons for this: (i) he viewed the growth of knowledge in India in relation to contingent (historical and cultural) factors; and (ii) he used the plural sources of knowledge (sacred texts, historical documents, folk beliefs and practices, etc.) as valid grounds for his sociological descriptions. In the rest of this paper, I have drawn heavily on some of his ideas expressed in his collection of essays (ibid.). It is my view that these essays reveal his nationalistic sentiments and that he perceived culture—which is the domain of feeling, emotions and spirit—through a subjectivistic angle. Two of his noted contemporaries, Benoy Kumar Sarkar and Nirmal Kumar Bose, seemed to share with him the nationalistic approach to the study of society in India.

Caste and Ethnicity Although Ghurye did not theorize on caste, he was interested in the description of caste in its various aspects. He meticulously presented data on the evolution of Indian castes and the processes of fission and fusion which characterized castes through the centuries. One of his main assumptions was that in the diachronic sense the caste system provided an integrative framework for the numerous ethnic groups which inhabited India. Derived from the caste system were two institutional units: gotra and charana which were more specific aggregates of people. Of these two, gotra was not confined to one caste, as people of many castes could claim descent from the same eponymous rishi. While Ghurye was convinced of the usefulness of caste in previous times he was upset over the proliferation of caste-sponsored associations. In his book, Caste and Race in India, he referred to the anti-Brahmin ferment which made a far-reaching impact on the Backward Class Movement in India (1969: 355–403). Further, Ghurye stated that India in the post-Independent phase was heading towards a kind of pluralism1 reminiscent of J.S. Furnivalls analysis of Burma and Indonesia (ibid.: 404–60). This pluralism had set in motion an aggressive competition among the castes for securing a larger share of the national pie.2

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Fragmentation of interests was giving a fillip to the process of cultural disintegration of India. The inter-caste rivalries and the rise of numerous caste blocks were undermining national unity. Ghurye’s ethnography of caste included both detailed and specific works. Writing on the Scheduled Tribes (1963b) in general, Ghurye referred to the process of Hinduization which was occurring in south-central India. The tribes of this region, such as the Bhils, Gonds, Mundas, Oraons and Santals, were in close interaction with Hindu society. He wrote: While sections of these tribes are properly integrated in the Hindu society, very large sections, in fact the bulk of them, are rather loosely integrated . . . only very small sections, living in the recesses of Hills and the depths of forests, have not been more than touched by Hinduism. Under the circumstances, the only proper description of these peoples is that they are the imperfectly integrated classes of Hindu society (1963b: 19).

In this region, it was not possible to treat caste and tribe as belonging to separate categories. He regarded the tribals as backward Hindus who had somehow missed assimilation into the mainstream Hindu society. He advocated a policy of assimilation of tribes into mainstream not only in economic terms but also in moral and cultural terms (Venugopal 1986: 305–14). Ghurye regretted the prevalence of certain vices such as drinking and loose sexual morals among the tribals. While he advocated a Hindu model for tribal integration, he omitted to mention the role of Christian missions in the ethical reform of tribals in this region. So far as the tribes inhabiting the north-east are concerned, Ghurye proposed a programme for their political assimilation into the national mainstream. He was not against political autonomy but desired a strong federal government at the centre which could be effective in containing tribal dissidence. He was alarmed by the intransigence of rebel groups among the tribes of the north-east. He was apprehensive that if separatism in the north-east was not curbed the political future of India would be in peril. In regard to other frontier regions like Punjab, Ghurye thought along similar lines (1977a). It may be observed here that his perspective on nationalism was wanting in two respects. First, he did not adequately appreciate the contribution of Buddhism and Jainism to cultural nationalism in India. Second, he did not document the contributions of Muslims and Christians to India’s nation-building.3

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Ghurye collected vast data on social tensions in free India (1968a). In his references to communal tensions, he seemed to single out the role of Muslims. It is in order to note a few relevant facts on the Muslims. Pre-conquest Islam entered India in two distant places: the northwest (Sind and Punjab) and the south-west (Kerala). This Islam was mainly of the Arabic variety and its followers lived in amity and goodwill with the local populace. In the north-west, Sufism paved the way for Hindu-Muslim interaction in religious and cultural spheres. In the south-west the Muslims built up effective trade networks linking India to the Middle East, West Asia and Africa. The frenzied or arbitrary acts of some north Indian Muslim rulers who were of Central Asian origin could be traced to their deviance from the basic tenets of Islam (Hussain 1978: 74–77). The communal tensions in the southern parts of India were less morbid than in north India in the pre-colonial era. Even in the north, prior to British rule, communalism did not take on the form of a holocaust. In sum, Indian Muslims are a heterogeneous lot, divided on ethnic, sectarian and regional lines but united only by their monotheistic faith. Ghurye resorted to a reductive approach in his assessment of social tensions. This assumes poignance in view of the fact that he was erudite and few Indians could match his intellectual acumen.

Indian Unity Ghurye showed his deep concern for the unity of India (1963a: 141–255). The two outstanding features which unified India were Brahmi script and Sanskrit language. The scripts of most Indian languages were derived from the Brahmi. Sanskrit became not only the language of sacred texts but also a medium for inter-regional contact. In this respect it provided an unbroken unity for India till the decline of Hindu polity. With the evolution of regional languages Sanskrit receded somewhat. Ghurye mentioned marriage as another unifying factor in India. Apart from its institutional role in relation to caste and kinship, it was a political instrument of much significance. He wrote: From a hoary past . . . royal families of the people of Northern India, have married into similar families from all parts of India. In their marital behaviour the royal families have demonstrated their unity from Gandhara (the NorthWest Frontier Province) and Sauvira (Northern Sindh) to Kamarupa (Assam)

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on the one hand and Vidharba (Berar) and Dravidadesa (Madura) on the other (1963a: 242).

He noted that these marital alliances were adversely affected following the decline of Hindu rule owing to Islamic conquest and British colonialism. Along with the marital relationship, there was the ritualistic unity provided by the asvamedha sacrifice in which a horse—as the symbol of monarchic power—wandered all over the country. These dynastic and ritualistic unities were influential in the emergence of cultural nationalism. A few inferences can be drawn on the basis of the foregoing statements made by Ghurye. In India there was no monolithic political hegemony in the proto-historical period. Marital alliances among the ruling families brought together not only bigger and smaller rulers but also cut across varna and jati lines through the practice of hypergamy.4 These alliances were mostly adapted by the rulers to contain seething political and social tensions. Besides, the sacrifice confirmed mainly the symbolic authortiy of the overlord. The monarch neither enslaved nor subordinated the ‘conquered’ rulers. According to Ghurye the evolution of India’s unity stemmed considerably from the acculturative process. The interactions between Aryans and non-Aryans, Aryans and Dravidians, and castes and tribes promoted religious and cultural efflorescence. The major deities of India—Shiva, Vishnu and Shakti—were symbols of ethnic groups which were incorporated into a single religious complex (1968b). The Aryanization of the south by Skanda (god) and Agastya (rishi)—gave a fillip to Tamil language which became an important literary vehicle (1977b). The acculturative process lost its favour after the decline of Hindu polity. Concluding his essay on Indian unity Ghurye noted that free India was facing many uncertainties. The linguistic division of states had become inevitable, but he hoped that unity could still be preserved in cultural and political terms. He wrote: To guard against the legitimate and healthy realization of linguistic separateness, militating against the overall homogeneity of political India, there must be comparable central organization for intellectual and cultural life. . . . On the political and administrative side we can trust to our political leadership to devise appropriate techniques to see that the various groups above referred to feel at home as one political unit, leaving enough scope to manage their own affairs without interference and yet subject to such wise supervision and even guidance as may keep the centre strong and respected (1963a: 249).

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A brief comment may be made here on Ghurye’s thinking on India’s unity. His scholarship notwithstanding, his view of Indian society was slanted in favour of Hinduism. The nationalist Muslims who participated in India’s struggle for freedom and the many Christians who devoted their time and energy for the expansion of medical welfare and education in India were also contributing to the process of nation-building. Existentially, just as Hindus are internally stratified, Muslims and Christians are also divided along sectarian, linguistic and regional lines. Nevertheless, all these three groups are mentally rooted in religio-cultural integrative systems of their own. Thus, Indian unity represents a unique case wherein integration has been carried on simultaneously by different groups. Ghurye fell short of his life-long ambition to arrive at a model of national integration because of his cognitive dissociation with non-Hindu cultural motifs. In free India, some pro-Hindu militant groups have upheld a model of nationalism which equates Hinduism with nationalism. This attempt made by them has ignored the truly outstanding characteristic of the Indian nation: its compositeness!

Indian Values In his treatment of values Ghurye (1963a: 256–78) mainly relied on the Hindu tradition which enjoined upon people to follow a given scheme. For instance, it was an obligation on the part of Hindus to pay debts to gods, ancestors and teachers. Emphasis was placed upon the pursuit of four ends called pumsarthas—dhanna, artha, kama and moksha5 the Hindu’s life was divided into four stages: student, householder, anchorite and renunciate. In the Indian domain of values there was an emphasis on the triads. Of the four ends the first three were regarded as more important, while among the four stages the last two, anchorite and renunciate, were practically merged into each other. He stated that the psychological, ethical and theological aspects of Indian values were expressed through triads.6 He wrote: On the mental side, the sacred lore is declared to be Trayi Vidya, that is, threefold knowledge comprised in the Rigveda, Yajurveda and Samaveda. Then we have the three categories of mana, buddhi, ahamkara and the three qualities of sattva, rajas, tamas. On the ethical side we have self-control (dama), charity (dana) and compassion (daya). The creation of these last

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three values is presented in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad as being the work of Prajapati, the creator, himself in relation to his pupils: gods, men and demons. Alternatively, as in the passage already quoted from the Chhandogya Upanishad, religious duty has three components or factors, namely sacrifice (yajna), study (adhyayana) and charity (dana). On the theological side, in the Vedic age we have three steps of Vishnu and, in the post-Vedic, the three mighty gods, Brahma, Vishnu and Mahesa (1963a: 261).

Ghurye noted two interludes in the evolution of Indian values: the upanishadic quest for inner perfection and the Ashokan policy of compassion and goodwill towards all sentient beings. Besides, there was a continuous interaction between folk and elite groups in India which gave rise to a syncretic culture. It is not only the elites who influenced the folk, but also vice versa. However, this interaction brought about a moral elevation among the folk. For instance, many of the Bhakti sects in India had a discernable folk origin but they invariably elevated folk beliefs and practices to a higher ethical plane. Hence, the Bhakti sects stood on an intermediate ground between Sanskritic culture on the one hand and folk culture on the other. To illustrate the moral aspect, he compared two Indo-European cultures: India and Greece. Just as Aryans interacted with the non-Aryans who were followers of the phallic cult, the Greeks too came in contact with the people of Crete who followed the same cult. The Greeks retained this cult with much of its coarseness, while in India the linga became a symbol of sanctity and faith. Ghurye concluded his discussion of Indian values by referring to jatras, gambling and drinking, which were popular among both folk and elite. Although there was a recreational element in these diversions, gambling and drinking claimed many victims among gentry and commoners alike. While the vices were denounced by the early law-givers such as Manu, Kautilya advised the rulers to regulate them in order to derive revenue from them. Thus, Ghurye viewed the elite-folk distinctions as fluid.

Indian Systems of Knowledge In the following preamble I have attempted to introduce the reader to the Indian systems of knowledge as I understand them. In common with the premodern West, Indian systems of knowledge called vidyas were designed to cater to the elite groups—most of whom belonged to the three upper

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varnas; the vidyas excluded from their purview artisans, peasants and the like. In India, knowledge was mostly imparted from guru to shishya. Even if the guru had several shishyas, the relationship between teacher and student was dyadic. The learning was acquired by students in hermitages which were scattered across the country in austere surroundings. In contrast to China, where imperial examinations were conducted on an impersonal basis, the Indian way of instruction was personalized. As previously noted, an individual’s life was focused on the clearance of debts to gods, ancestors and teachers. Hence, after learning the student remained indebted to the teacher in a personal as well as in a scholastic sense. The impetus to vidyas stemmed from the desire of members of the ruling class to acquire education. Besides, one significant reason was the absence of the divine right of the king in India. The ruler as a person was human and fallible; yet the rulership was divine. India and ancient Greece were among the few countries which encouraged the political aspirants to learn. Even when rulership was acquired, it did not confer on the Hindu ruler the authority to legislate. The consent of his councillors was taken by the ruler for decisions pertaining to the governance of his realm. By contrast, in the Western Divine Right theory, the ruler was infallible and he could legislate at will. Another factor which limited the ruler’s authority in India was the political autonomy of villages. There is no doubt that the Hindu ruler acquired de jure status through learning. Hence, royal patronage was extended to gurukulas all over India. A Marxist theory of recent years states that the dominant group has used education as an instrument of control over the people: the educational system reproduces the dominant values among the subordinate groups. This theory seems to have limited applicability to India (past or present), although it has been useful in the analysis of some colonies (Bacchus 1990: 93–114) ruled over by external powers. In a heterogeneous society like India there are different dominant groups and multiple hierarchies depending on contingent factors such as regional and cultural variations, etc. The gurukulas were not centralized under a common educational authority. Besides Hindu gurukulas, the Buddhist and Jaina centres of learning imparted education to pupils on their own terms. In pre-Independent India, in spite of British rule, missionary and nationalist schools and colleges offered different patterns of education. During India’s struggle for freedom, colleges and universities were founded by Indian nationalists often in defiance of the foreign rulers. Even in free India there are different orientations in education.

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The Indian vidyas appear to have arisen from pluralistic sources: economic, religious and literary. Sarkar, who wrote extensively on Hindu positivism (1937: 6), felt that much harm had been done in the Western assessment of India’s culture. Only certain aspects such as otherworldliness of Indians were emphasized. This was due to the application of ‘monistic’ methodology which measured everything in terms of Western standards. Sarkar’s ‘positivism’ opted for a synthetic approach in which the material and the spiritual could be balanced. His pluralistic methodology differed from any monistic interpretation of culture be it economic, political or mystico-religious (ibid.: 40). In vedic culture, the sacrifices and ceremonies were regarded as instrumental in helping a mortal acquire divine status. For instance, Indra was a divine functionary who acquired his position through ritualistic effort. Sarkar wrote: ‘The texts as a rule tell us in so many words that a person becomes divine through certain actions, ceremonial or otherwise, and that divinity is but [a] consequence and not the cause or antecedent’ (ibid.: 152). In Indian polity the acquisition of vidyas enabled the ruler to achieve divinity. The dominant theme of Indian culture is that the ruler sustains the earth and protects it because of his divine qualities. The acquisition of vidyas was similar to the performance of sacrifice as it conferred divinity on the ruler. But the educational process was profoundly linked to the guru’s role. Vidyas acquired without the gum were not valid. Also, the guru’s displeasure or curse was feared by all seekers of learning. The subjectivistic nature of Indian education is revealed through such beliefs. In the formulations of vidyas the personality of the system-builder left a discernable imprint on the selection of subjects. Besides, as there was a dyadic relationship between teacher and student, some part of the instruction remained esoteric or secretive. It is a wellknown fact that till recently the vedas were taught mostly through verbal communication. It was regarded as infra dig for a member of the elite group to read veda from a written text. Ghurye was keenly interested in the development of knowledge. Writing on Aristotle and Bacon (1963a: 289–302) he noted that these Occidental philosophers of the pre-Comtean era strove for establishing a hierarchy of knowledge system in which theology occupied a superordinate status. The present-day distinction between sacred and secular pursuits was not marked in this era. These early writers used the term ‘arts’ and ‘science’ more or less synonymously. The quest for knowledge was the common factor in these two spheres. Ghurye too used the two

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terms interchangeably. I will now refer briefly to his discussion of vidyas (ibid.: 303–51) which was an attempt to explore the speculative and the practical dimensions of knowledge. He wrote: The first enumeration of branches of knowledge or Vidyas occurs at about the end of the vedic period; the second much more incidental than the first, about the 2nd century B.C., the third, very purposeful, illustrating all viewpoints except perhaps the last, can be placed in the period, second to the fourth century A.D., the fourth, ascribed to the 9th century A.D. is almost unique in many ways; the fifth, of doubtful dating though a simple enumeration and an uninspiring one, is entirely unique. The sixth is from an acute philosopher and appears to have been entirely an analytical and intellectual activity. Its added interest, though a mere coincidence, is that the author, an ascetic living on the banks of the Ganga (Ganges) was a junior contemporary of Francis Bacon and lived only about a quarter of a century after him (1963a: 304).

In the formulation of vidyas such names as Yajnavalkya, Patanjali, Kautilya, Sukra, Rajasekara and Madhusudana Saraswati were associated. The last named author was the ‘acute philosopher’ mentioned above. The revision of vidyas six times implies that there were contingent factors in Hindu society which made it necessary. This also reveals that the cultural heritage was subjected to a kind of ‘self-criticism’. The vidyas, which totalled 32, were a compendium of different topics which included speculative, ritualistic, martial and practical sciences. To mention a few: vedas and allied sacred literature, systems of philosophy such as Mimamsa, Samkhya and Vaisesika, eighteen puranas, ayurveda, Arthasastra, dharmasastra, itihasa, political knowledge, archery and related martial arts. The accretion of knowledge-components from 16 to 32 indicated that the vidyas were responsive to changing needs. A common element in the vidyas was the inclusion of introspective or spiritual knowledge. The sacred and the secular, mundane and supernatural subjects were prescribed in different combinations under each revised scheme of learning. Ghurye credited Kautilya with devising a system of knowledge based on a dual purpose; (i) to instruct the ruler in arts and science; and (ii) to inculcate in the ruler a balance or equipoise which would help him in ruling over his subjects. In his vidyas Kautilya placed emphasis on non-idealistic philosophy such as Samkhya, Mimamsa and Tarka. He gave relatively less importance to dharmasastra which emphasized libational and sacrificial

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aspects. He placed a premium on varta (commerce) and dandaniti (policy of coercion) for these were required to make the ruler practical in his outlook and effective in his rule. It was clear that Kautilya desired that the ruler would wield coercive power rather than piously uphold dharma. The threat of foreign influx into India seemed to make him reorient the values. The patronage of rulers to learning stimulated cultural output in India in a variety of subjects. For instance, mathematics, logic, works in grammar and poetics, ayurveda and Silpasastra (architecture) attained a high level. Ghurye felt that the decline of Hindu polity in the Gupta Age (6th century AD) led to the eclipse of vidyas. But he noted that for a long time thereafter, i.e., up to the 10th or 11th century, the quest for knowledge continued at non-macro levels, especially regional centres. It is in these centres that subjects such as mathematics, logic and ayurveda developed. Sarkar (1937: 91) took a different position in regard to the effectiveness of Hindu polity. According to him, even after Islamic rule was founded in north India, Hindu polity thrived for nearly six to seven centuries in Rajputana, south India and other regions. Even if the political system declined in a formal sense, there were some cultural alternatives. In a recent paper (Venugopal 1990: 305–14) I have attempted to show that some of the reformist sects in India provided a political alternative in the regional settings. Ethnic turbulence and normative breakdown were brought under control by these sects. As such Ghurye’s view may be regarded as nostalgia for the classical Hindu polity.

Conclusion In today’s march toward globalization and apocalyptic developments in science and technology, when the nation has declined in importance, Ghurye’s perspective on nation-building may indeed seem out of place. But still the nation remains a powerful symbol of people all over the world. Toynbee remarked that nationalism is akin to a religious force. It can produce a collective impulse strong enough to mobilize people on a large scale. There is no doubt that Ghurye was disillusioned by the turn of events after the decline of Hindu polity. Of course, it is not possible to renew the Hindu nation as Ghurye desired it. Nevertheless, if a pluralistic nation is accepted as a programme for the future, it will be necessary to arrive at a new synthesis of Indian values: Hindu, Buddhist,

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Jaina, Christian, Muslim, Parsi, etc. The fact that the Indian nation has survived numerous economic and political crises has shown that the composite culture of India has a great tenacity. Not merely political will but cultural revitalization is the need of the nation.

Notes 1. There are at least three ways in which pluralism can be defined. First, there is the popular usage of the term which denotes heterogeneity of groups in a given country. Second, the Americans define it as indicating the presence of groups which are ‘equi-distant’ from the centre of power and authority. Third, Furnivall uses the term to characterize the coexistence of ethnic groups in a market economy ntihout cultural integration. 2. S.L. Sharma writes ‘Reduced to its essentials, casteism represents a curious compound of ethnic identity and modern interests, with ethnic collectivity using the ideology and technology of modernization to the furtherance of its economic and political interests’ (1990: 42). 3. T.K. Oommen writes ‘Although pre-conquest Islam and pre-colonial Christianity existed in India, hardly anybody seems to acknowledge it, not even the intellectuals. This is not to deny that the bulk of Muslim and Christian conversions took place after conquest and colonization. But to spotlight attention only on this is to castigate and stigmatise these religious collectivities and to thwart the authentic nature of Indian religious pluralism More importantly, an overwhelming majority are converts from local castes and tribes and hence natives of this country, only their religion is foreign’ (1986: 59). 4. S.C. Dube writes ‘According to legend Rukmini whom Krishna married, belonged to Arunachal Pradesh, Hidimba, whom Bhima married, was a Naga, and Arjuna was married to Chitrangada from Manipur and to Ulupi from Nagaland’ (1990: 15). 5. Moksha assumed importance mostly in the post-vedic period, the upanishads reacted against the prevailing ritualism and advocated the discovery of self Moksha refers to the release of a person from the cycle of births and deaths. 6. Structuralist methodology attempts to analyze society in terms of binary oppositions. Perhaps Ghurye’s insistence on triads indicates a different dimension of Indian reality.

References Bacchus, M.K. 1990 ‘A Critical Review and Analysis of Early Developments in Education in the British West Indian Colonies’, Sociological Bulletin, 39(1 & 2) 93–114. Berger, Peter L. 1967 Social Reality of Religion. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Chattopadhyaya, D. 1964 Indian Philosophy. New Delhi: People’s Publishing House. Dant, Tim 1991 Knowledge, Ideology and Discourse. London: Routledge. Dube, S.C. 1990 Indian Society. New Delhi: National Book Trust.

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Feyerabend, P.K. 1981 Problems of Empiricism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ghurye, G.S. 1963a Anthropo-Sociological Papers. Bombay: Popular. ——— 1963b Scheduled Tribes. Bombay: Popular. ——— 1968a Social Tensions in India. Bombay: Popular. ——— 1968b Gods and Men. Bombay: Popular. ——— 1969 Caste and Race in India, 5th Edition. Bombay: Popular. ——— 1977a Whither India. Bombay: Popular. ——— 1977b Agastya and Skanda A Study in Indian Acculturation. Bombay: Popular. Hussain, Abid S. 1978 The National Culture of India. Delhi: National Book Trust. Mannheim, Kail 1952 Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. Mennell, Stephen 1974 Sociological Theory Uses and Unities. New York: Praeger Publishers. Oommen, T.K. 1986 ‘Insiders and Outsiders in India Primordial Collectivism and Cultural Pluralism’ in Nation-building, International Sociology, 1(1) 53–74. Sarkar, B.K. 1937 The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology. Allahabad: Sacred Book of the Hindu Series. Sharma, S.L. 1990 ‘The Salience of Ethnicity in Modernization’, Sociological Bulletin, 39(1 & 2) 33–44. Venugopal, C.N. 1986 ‘G.S. Ghurye’s Ideology of Normative Hinduism An Appraisal, Contributions to Indian Sociology (n.s.), 20(2) 305–14. ——— 1990 ‘Reformist Sects and the Sociology of Religion in India, Sociological Analysis, 51(5) 77–88. Walter, Benjamin 1967 ‘The Sociology of Knowledge and the Problem of Objectivity’, in L. Gross (ed), Sociological Theory Inquiries and Paradigms, pp. 335–57. New York: Harper International.

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2 Cultural Pluralism and National Cohesion: Issues and Prospects Sally Falk Moore

Cultural Homogeneity and the Nation-State

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enuine cultural pluralism ceases to be viable under current conditions” (Gellner, 1983: 55). Is Ernest Gellner right that in the long run, cultural homogeneity must prevail within modern states? Gellner postulates that there are three crucial factors involved in the making of a modern society: (1) centralised control, with a distinction between the power-holders and the rest, (2) pervasive high culture (having standardised, literacy-and-education-based systems of communication), and (3) identity (as opposed to diversity) of culture (1983: 54, 89–97). Why should these conditions be both definitionally essential and be treated as almost historically inevitable? Gellner answers, “Industrialisation engenders a mobile and culturally homogeneous society” (1983: 73). He says, “The industrial order requires homogeneity within political units, at least sufficient to permit fairly smooth mobility, and precluding the ‘ethnic’ identification of either advantage or disadvantage, economic or political” (1983: 109). In his terms, in the modern world, “after the principle of nationalism had done much of its work . . . we see that an overwhelming part of political authority has been concentrated in the hands of one kind of institution,

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a reasonably large and well-centralised state. In general, each state presides over, maintains, and is identified with, one kind of culture, one style of communication which prevails within its borders and is dependent for its perpetuation on a centralised educational system supervised by and often actually run by the state in question, which monopolises legitimate culture almost as much as it does legitimate violence” (1983: 139–140). Industrial high culture must be secular and not attached to a religious faith. “Equal access to a scripturalist God paved the way to equal access to high culture. The equal access of believers to God eventually becomes equal access of unbelievers to education and culture” (1983: 142). But Gellner, always a careful constructor of arguments, takes care to insert a disclaimer as well, “It is not claimed that even in the modern world, nationalism is the only force operating, or an irresistible one. It is not. It is occasionally defeated by some other force or interest, or by inertia” (1983: 138). For Gellner, enduring cultural pluralism is the exception, not the rule. His evolutionary dynamic presumes that ordinarily there will be a historical replacement of one type of system by another. After industrialisation is under way a polity of multiple local cultures will be replaced by a culturally unitary one. Whatever its ideological rationale, the culture of nationalism means “that generalised diffusion of a school mediated, academy supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves” (Gellner, 1983: 57). He asserts confidently that the establishment of pervasive high culture is a process rapidly gathering pace throughout the world (Gellner: 54). What are we to make of such a thesis in a world in which most states are, in fact, culturally plural, containing within their boundaries a variety of culturally distinct groups and cultural styles, most of them vigorous in their efforts to maintain their distinctiveness? It is hard to see pluralism on the wane in some of the Arabian Gulf States where expatriates out-number indigenes and in countries which have numerically insignificant but politically cognizable minorities such as Sri Lanka (Birks and Sinclair, 1978; Tambiah, 1986). It takes no daring to say that in most parts of the world cultural pluralism shows no sign of

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disappearing in the immediately foreseeable future. A recent review of the literature on ethnicity concluded that, “The nation-state remains the exception and not the rule. Pluralism in one form or another will persist” (Despres, 1984: 19). What accounts for these contradictory interpretations, these very different views of what is going on? Is it possible that when Gellner says, “genuine cultural pluralism ceases to be viable under current conditions” the careful reader should assume that the key word is ‘genuine’ (Gellner, 1983: 55). Gellner is fairly clear about what he means by nationalism. He is less explicit about what he means by ‘genuine cultural pluralism’. Can his perspective be inferred from the context? Gellner’s idea of the pluralist real thing seems to be a pluralism out of the agrarian past, out of the time before ‘the concept of nationalism’. Let us grant this much to Gellner and to history: the cultural pluralism of this century is a different phenomenon from the cultural pluralism of the great pre-industrial empires. If that older form is what Gellner means by ‘genuine’ pluralism then all he is saying is that the past is not the present which is unarguable, but not very illuminating. Does the very existence of the discipline of anthropology intersect in some way with the process of depluralization? Anthropology has always defined itself as attempting to understand as much as possible about the great range of human cultural variability. In this century the basic mode has been to assemble cultural information on one ‘culture’ at a time, and then make comparisons. The study of societies containing a plurality of cultures and inquiry into the ways in which cultural pluralism is politically accommodated or destroyed is a more recent development in the discipline, now several decades old, generally postcolonial. Is anthropology itself and its form of knowledge not part of that ‘pervasive high culture’ that Gellner is talking about? And is the assembling of knowledge about the lived-in worlds of ‘others’, and then the broad communication of that knowledge part of the process by which a diminution of differences takes place? Anthropology publicizes cultural variation, ethnocentrism and cultural constructedness. By making that variation and its construction a banal piece of information, is anthropology contributing toward the long term depoliticization of cultural differences? Will that lead to a higher degree of homogenization and cultural commonality? It may in some very long run, but in the shorter term there is reason to doubt that mutual knowledge necessarily diminishes the use of cultural markers of distinctiveness for political and economic purposes. There are too many

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examples in which cultural identifiers have been aggressively retained or even manufactured for such reasons to warrant much optimism. I would contend that while Gellner’s essay on the march toward nationalism speaks to a certain historical reality, if what is of interest are the politico/cultural problems of the world as it is at present, his thesis is too past-oriented to be very useful. His ‘modern industrial society’ describes only a part of the world, and that too rather incompletely. His argument projects a historical phase of past European experience as a universal future. There is a serious question whether the conditions of that period are likely to repeat themselves as industrialization spreads. What is most visibly on the move is not simply a further f lorescence of national high cultures, but rather a strong tendency toward an international high culture of technology, organization and administration. The global economy and the world political arena are pressing realities. This means that trouble emerges ever more prominently as a set of supra-local issues. From that perspective nationalist attitudes look more and more like a form of large scale parochialism. Major supra-local issues include the growing international concern over the stability of the world economy, the increasing perception that the world environment is a shared totality, awareness that famine and plenty are not merely local events but are related to the world supply of food and its distribution, attention to the ever increasing world population and the ancillary movement of labour and refugees, the handling of world systems of communication, and other matters such as the movements of weapons, drugs and disease, and the worldwide division of knowledge. All of these and other matters are generating a substantial and growing field of supra-national activity. The long term outcome of that activity is bound to have an even more profound effect on the external political relations of states, to say nothing of their internal structures and ‘cultures’ than it has at present. To focus narrowly on nationalism to the exclusion of the international context is an unsatisfactory way of conceiving the issues. To the extent that nationalism is a force today, it is a force to be understood in a wider arena. It has been obvious for centuries that the state, however it is defined legally, is not an insulated nor fully autonomous entity in any practical sense. What is less obvious is the appropriate theoretical framework with which to address multilevel questions, questions that require attention to activities at the local, state and international levels at the same time. ‘Culture’ and ‘ethnicity’ are often such issues. A minority

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people in one state may be a majority people in a neighbouring polity. Local and regional history, the varied and transforming nature of states, and the international setting are all pertinent to the problem Gellner poses. It follows that an analytic framework such as his, that is focussed on a certain kind of internal nation-state formation is less than ideal for addressing issues that also have substantial connections with a world setting. That would be so even if one agreed with Gellner about the long term trend toward more national cultural homogenization. The fact remains that both within and between states, the matter of contemporary cultural pluralism cannot be easily written off. As Geertz remarked, “This view that things look more like flying apart than they do like coming together . . . opposes, of course, some of the leading doctrines in contemporary social science: that the world is growing more drearily modern. . . .” He is doubtful that, “post-capitalist infrastructure in the form of multinational corporations and computer technology will soon shape the minds of Tongans and Yemenis to a common pattern” (1983: 216). “Soon” is the operative word. The analytic issues are not well served by simply comparing nationalist and culturally pluralist states as two types. That mode of discussion has high definitional clarity and is not a bad way to start but it is not sufficiently dynamic to carry inquiry forward into the more difficult questions of causality and policy. Instead the underlying questions should be recast and posed in terms of processes. This forces all the issues into a time oriented reconception. Thus restated, two distinct kinds of processes can be seen to be working on the states of the world. They have opposite outcomes. But both processes are simultaneously in motion. One set are the processes of depluralization with which Gellner’s essay is preoccupied. There is no doubt that the homogenization that he has made the centrepiece of his argument is an active and ongoing process. But in the present and the foreseeable future, other, contrary processes are also strongly at work. The processes that maintain, exacerbate or even lead to new pluralization remain an active and important force in our world. In our time the political tensions between groups whose differences are overtly manifested as culturally or racially based are legion. They cannot be ignored. One country’s depluralization can result in the pluralization of another. As Zolberg has asserted, “there is no gainsaying that the adoption of the nation-state model by countries with ethnically mixed populations accounts for many refugee flows of the twentieth century, and perhaps even for most of them”

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(1983: 30). The countries that are neighbours of nation-state builders can find themselves involuntary hosts to large alien ethnic refugee populations. One nation-state’s ethnic homogeneity may be achieved at the cost of the future ethnic pluralization of contiguous states. Even were one to take the situation in Europe, the supposed ethnographic showpiece for Gellner’s argument, one can see that cultural pluralism has not utterly vanished as a political issue. To a great extent the nationalism Gellner extols was achieved in the 19th century through the political and cultural dominance of one locale over others. The culture of London was spread over England, the culture of Paris over France. The unification of Germany and Italy were parallel developments. Yet it is not difficult to see that even in those parts of the world where monoculturalism was politically most successful, there remain pockets of cultural dissidence and in some instances, lively signs of ethnic revival. From the Basques to the Welsh, from the Croatians to the Flemish, from the Georgians of the Soviet Union to the Scots, the political uses of ethnic distinctiveness seem unlikely to disappear. Obviously, this is not always a matter of an actual, fulsome continuity of cultural content. All that may be necessary may be just enough existing cultural distinctiveness or just enough past difference available for historical reference to ground current political activity. As Despres says referring to the work of Glazer and Moynihan and others on the industrialized world, “one of the oddities of our time is the increased saliency of ethnic distinctions while cultural differences between groups have been worn thin by the institutions of modern society” (1984: 14). But in the European context there is more than just the revival of old ethnic differences to inspect. There is a wave of new pluralization that has taken place since World War II. Both decolonization and major changes in the economy of Europe have had pluralizing consequences. The guest workers of Germany look as if they are staying. Turks are now a normal part of the German scene. In England, the Pakistanis and the West Indians are there to stay. Even in the putatively homogeneous Netherlands, the decolonization period brought a substantial number of residents from the excolonies. Some fitted themselves into Dutch society and ‘disappeared’ as ethnics. Others were enclaved and remained separate and distinct. This led the sociologist, Van Amersfoort, (thinking he would hold at least a few factors constant, the attitude of the Dutch and the historical period) to undertake a study of the conditions under which minorities are created

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(1974, Eng. tr. 1982). What Van Amersfoort sought to identify are the very varied factors which contribute to assimilation or minority formation. His work shows how immigration can cause the repluralization of a relatively homogeneous industrial society, but that in some instances in the self-same society immigration does not have that effect at all. So for example, the Indonesian Dutch, the largest post World War II immigrant group to arrive in Holland (180,000 to 250,000) spoke Dutch before they arrived and in general, compared with other immigrants, were well informed about Dutch society. They were petit bourgeois in the Dutch Indies (Van Amersfroot, 1982: 85). On arrival, according to government plan, they were boarded in geographically scattered private ‘pensions’. They had the good fortune to settle during a period of economic expansion and to find economic niches in which to fit. Though they were formally aggregated into a single legal category, they were in fact a heterogeneous assortment of individuals and families. Many were Dutch men married to Indonesian or Chinese women. Some were the offspring of such unions. The Dutch policy was to treat them all as legally Dutch and as repatriates. Efforts were made to hasten their absorption into ordinary Dutch society, and to help them financially and in other ways only during the initial period of transition. The Indonesian Dutch adapted and settled in and never became a coherent ‘minority group’. Thus the objective of government policy was realized. In direct contrast were certain Moluccans who did become a minority group, and for a time a very vociferous one. Yet compared with the Dutch Indonesians, they were few in number, 13,000 on entry in 1951, about 28,000 by 1968. Why did this happen? Why was the larger category integrated into Dutch society while the smaller one formed a group with clear boundaries? They entered Holland in roughly the same period. Van Amersfoort explains that the Moluccans were Ambonese ex-soldiers and their families, many of whom shared a common colonial experience. Initially, both the Moluccans and the Dutch thought their stay in Holland would be temporary. Many of the Moluccans were supporters of a movement for an Independent Republic of South Molucca, and lived for the realization of this political goal. They thought they would return to their homeland. They did not speak Dutch and knew little of Dutch society. Their own indigenous Ambonese social structure was very different from that of the Dutch, but by the time they arrived in Holland even that culture was anything but intact. It had been twice subjected to major transformations

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and disruptions, first during the colonial period and later through the experience of migration. Initially, when the Moluccans arrived in Holland they were housed in camps and later in highly localized housing projects. Eventually special residential housing districts were constructed for them. The relative isolation which they first experienced in Holland probably contributed toward aggravating a good deal of internal political factionalism, infighting and some aggressive external political activity. At the time of Van Amersfoort’s study two-thirds of the Moluccans had refused Dutch citizenship. Of the three generations of Moluccans studied by Van Amersfoort after many years in Holland, only the youngest was somewhat detached from Ambonese culture. But even this generation was poorly equipped for Dutch society. In fact, Van Amersfoort tells us that the young were not fully integrated into either culture. The Moluccans were discontented, ill assimilated, disliked and discriminated against by the Dutch. Their social isolation as a group continued. The dislike of them worsened. Both from their point of view and from the perspective of their place in the larger society, they formed a distinct minority group. The Indonesian Dutch and the Moluccans suffice to illustrate Van Amersfoort’s approach. (In fact, in addition to these two examples, he analysed the situation of a number of other categories of migrants to Holland in the same period, as well as the circumstances of ‘guest labour’). What is striking about his book is the way it addresses the problem of analysis. Van Amersfoort considers seriously but does not overemphasise the pre-migration culture of the immigrant group. He is not ‘primordialist’ in his aproach, but rather combines attention to the cultural givens with a remarkable amount of situational data. He takes a great range of particular circumstances into account, the social composition of the immigrant population, its occupational skills, the nature of the labour market and the condition of the Dutch economy at the time, the degree of group cohesion and social separation of the immigrants, the circumstances that engendered and maintained such separation, the shifts in government policy toward different immigrant groups and the like. He concludes not only that each of the groups studied was different to start with, but that the host society’s reaction differed in each instance. He says of his study, “the advantage offered by comparison within a relatively small homogeneous culture over a short period of time, was not too well founded. Society’s reaction to the immigrants was not in the least homogeneous” (1982: 209).

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By treating the issue as one of the formation of minority groups, Van Amersfoort takes a deliberately time-conscious stance. His is inherently a processual approach, though he does not call it that. The process of minority group formation and the process of assimilation involve not only fundamental economic and political issues, they plainly also involve substantial social and cultural questions. Van Amersfoort’s analysis is an interesting one, not just as a story of the experience of the Netherlands, but as an instructive lesson in the difference between the varied preconditions for the social assimilation of culturally distinct populations and the contrasting circumstances that precipitate an emphasis on social separation and cultural differences. The fact that pluralization is shown to be an ongoing process in the very countries which have already achieved the Gellnerian peak of modernity is a matter for serious reflection. Van Amersfoort has provided a significant contrast to Gellner’s emphasis on national cultural homogenization. Was this Dutch situation just a phenomenon of the decolonization period? Or is migration from the less industrialized to the more industrialized world likely to be a continuing stream to be reckoned with in the future? Does such continued migration portend continuing phases of repluralization? Are these to be temporary? Clearly, cultural pluralism is not just a non-Western issue. In the United States, the ongoing influx of enormous numbers of Mexican migrants, legal and illegal, to say nothing of the large number of persons belonging to other immigrant groups who have recently entered the United States, from Vietnamese to Cubans, does not betide an end to cultural pluralism (Kritz, 1983). Rather, it may be the harbinger of a worldwide repluralization of those nation-states that were recently identifiable as the apogee of Gellner’s model of nation-states. Is there any reason to believe that there will soon be a lessening of the pressure to migrate to those industrialized or industrializing parts of the world wherever an opportunity to settle seems to be a possibility? Zolberg estimates that the number of foreign workers worldwide is in the neighbourhood of forty million, the number of refugees between 12 and 16  million (Zolberg, 1983: 32–37) and that since World War I at least 70 million people have had to move as a result of political conditions. Great waves of labour migrants and substantial shifts of refugee populations axe currently active sources of repluralization. Will this continue? As for much of the ex-colonial world, full cultural standardization seems anything but proximate. When will Nigeria’s many dozens of

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languages and peoples be culturally homogenized? There, where bitter political disputation erupts over which dialect of Igbo is appropriate for a standard dictionary, it is hard to imagine a peaceful imposition of one African language on the whole country (Manfredi, 1986). What about the many other culturally plural countries of Africa? Gellner readily acknowledges that, “it is perhaps too soon to speculate whether these societies will reach the age of internal homogeneity, mobility and generalized education while continuing to use the colonial language, or whether at some point they will brave the ardors of cultural selftransformation involved in modernizing, adapting and imposing one of the indigenous languages” (Gellner, 1983: 83). In most African countries one dreads to think at what human cost the imposition of the indigenous language of any one people on the others would be achieved. The prospect makes one think of Zolberg’s thesis that the construction of the nation-state is a refugee-generating process (1981, 1983). And Africa is already a continent with a high number of refugees. For Gellner, African countries obviously do not fit his definition of the ‘modern state’. Thus, what we have in Gellner’s argument is a limited and closed category that has not too much to do with the varieties of political states in the world, but rather focusses only on one rather selectively described type. There appear to be two sets of criteria. The modern state is defined both in terms of certain internal social structural characteristics and by the prerequisite condition of a high level of cultural homogeneity. Those states that do not present a picture of the type of monoculturalism Gellner has in mind are by definition not only not culturally uniform, but therefore are also not fully ‘modern’. A vision of the natural path of the evolution of the state can be read as an apologetic for particular political actions to be taken at the time the vision is entertained. The temptation of governments is always to try to accelerate evolution through intervention. No government has time for the postulated direction of political evolution to take its slow ‘natural’ course. Evolutionary postulates provide the rationale for present political measures. That is why the conventional conception of the nation-state epitomized here by Gellner’s essay, can be said to have a certain practical force. Gellner is neither alone in his view, nor is that view mere talk. Gellner expresses a vision of the future that is widespread. And it is one which helps potentially dominant ethnic groups to rationalize their cultural seizure of power. Yet before considering this inevitable, it is worth

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pausing. Even if the implied predictions about ultimate homogeneity were correct, there would still be plenty of room for disagreement about how the present cultural pluralism in any particular state should be addressed politically or analysed anthropo-sociologically.

The Question of Pluralism: Orderly Models and Disorderly Circumstances How is pluralism to be addressed? Sometimes governments have little choice. When violence erupts a government has no option but to try to end violent ethnic conflicts and re-establish public order. Governments take action knowing that the use of force in such situations is always dangerous. Reading the newspapers these days one is reminded of Hannah Arendt’s argument that power and violence are opposites, that “violence appears where power is in jeopardy” (1969, reprinted 1986). For governments, ethnic, religious, racial, categorical and class pluralisms can be explosive divisions, and potentially destabilizing. Or they can be domesticated as part of the normal peaceful ferment of ongoing political competition. What can be done between hostile outbreaks to decrease the likelihood of recurrence? How is peaceful complementarity to be achieved. A practical answer to that question that has universal application may never emerge from the academy. Among other obstacles there are too many different phenomena subsumed under the single concept of cultural pluralism. The purpose here is to explore that conceptual problem, and some of the ramifications that branch from it. Despite the inevitable absence of universal solutions, specific goals have often been defined for particular places. For example, Tambiah sees hope for Sri Lanka in more forms of regional and local autonomy (1986: 127). Madan has argued in relation to India that “the best strategy to cope with ethnic diversity is to concentrate on its positive dimensions and to work toward a policy of cultural pluralism rather than on the suppression of diverse ethnic identities” (1984: 142). He characterizes official state policy in India as primarily one of “national integration” (Madan 1984: 141). Yet it also describes a situation in which though English is the official language of the union, 14 major languages are also given constitutional recognition (Madan, 1984: 138). In some respects then, in India there would appear to be a double policy to match the double reality. Integration and pluralism march on simultaneously.

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Not only in India, but elsewhere in the world, the practical problems associated with this contradictory dual thrust are urgent. A most pressing issue is how to think about these problems. The antagonisms accompanying pluralism are often conceived of in a circular form, as commitments determined by situation and situations determined by commitment. Many circumstances of religious, ethnic and racial hostility are seen in this way and thus seem to have no beginning and no end. Group oppositions come to have the appearance of fixed circumstances and seem unamenable to negotiation or deconstruction. Even when change is obviously necessary it often remains unfaceable and undiscussable for current political reasons. At issue are the questions regarding changes which will be made, who, if anyone, will choose them, and at what human cost they will be effected. One preliminary analytic problem to which the social sciences maybe equal is the attempt to recognize these rigid-appearing situations. Is it not possible to uncover alternative conditions of future possibility underneath the apparent impossibility of present adjustment? What can the social sciences offer? What they have to contribute is at best indirect. Instead of immediate policy prescriptions, what the social sciences have in stock are assorted ways of redefining the issues. This intellectualization of practical problems, as well as the multiplicity of approaches it generates often can be exasperating to those who must make policy decisions. But theoretical thinking has much to recommend once one gets used to the exaggerated claims that are part of the style and discounts their exclusivity. When it comes to pluralism, the very disparity of the interpretations that have been produced can be shown to be a resource. For one thing the complexity of the object that social theory is trying to analyse is clearer because the theoretical approaches are in conflict and inconsistent with each other. For another the self-critique that such disputations engender must eventually lead to the reconsideration of taken-for-granted concepts and models. It is not only the academics who disagree with each other. A ubiquitous problem surrounding academic interpretations of pluralism is that the ‘ethnics’ involved have also given a good deal of thought to their circumstances; so have the governments under whose dominion they live. Academics have no monopoly on interpretation. Interpretation then has a political burden for everyone. The definitions of the situation provided by the protagonists are likely to have built into their contentions a motivated impasse. Such ‘actors’ versions’ are evidence, not description, but they tend to overwhelm.

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What the participants say should not be rejected but heard, contextualized and decoded. But what is the paradigm for such decoding? A number of theoretical frameworks have serious claims. A few will be discussed here to show that the social sciences can add thought experiments and conceptual rearrangements to these politically volatile but interpretively rigid situations. If the social sciences can offer sufficient encouragement to those involved to move about in mental territory and to reconceive the situation in which they find themselves, that in itself may be a significant achievement. Rethinking is particularly needed in relation to pluralism because the issues are so often put in terms of simple bipolarities. When the alternatives are epitomized in such extreme terms as total national cultural integration versus unlimited ethnic diversity, one is in the presence of one of those misleadingly clear oppositions into which many political discussions fall. Encouraging this misreading are two polemical arguments, each of which carries its own high moral logic. As seen in Gellner, one syllogism runs as follows: Economic development is good. Accelerated economic development is even better, but only possible under those conditions of political unity and easy communication which are facilitated by cultural homogeneity. Ergo: general adaptation to a single dominant culture is necessary in any economically developed polity. Measures to force such adaptation are justified and will contribute to the long-term well-being of those who must conform. Another syllogism to the opposite effect runs this-way. A people has a moral and legal right to cultural self-determination. The right of a people to be culturally different from those in the dominant sector of the state is subsumed within the principle of the humane right to selfdetermination. Ergo: no state has the right to force its subject peoples to give up their cultures. The fervour with which these opposed arguments are made is well known (See Maybury-Lewis, 1984a and b). These are arguments about policy and about politics. As caricatured here they are cast as if the outcomes they support were necessarily mutually exclusive. But the great variety of situations implicitly addressed can hardly ever be dealt with so simply. Nor are the essential concepts involved as clear as these combative arguments suggest. As for the several academic approaches that will be discussed here, they have been chosen because they represent remarkably disparate ways of conceiving the construction and significance of cultural diversity. These contrasting views are placed together not ( pace Allan Bloom)

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because of some relativist sickness of mind in which an] opinion is to be regarded as being as good as any other (Bloom, 1987: 25–43). It is because collectively these approaches reflect on the special problems raised for anthropology by having to study culture as current history. In much of the recent past of the discipline a culture was conceived as a type, as a specimen of a species. The zest for classification has been replaced by a fascination with the historical process. What emerges for the discipline is clear: the concept of culture is due for radical review and reassessment. In a recent discussion on pluralism, Fredrik Barth also came to this conclusion but arrived through a somewhat different logical path (1984). Radcliffe-Brown once said that social anthropology was a form of comparative sociology (1961: 3). For him as for Durkheim before him and for Murdock and Goody more recently, comparison has meant classification and generalisation derived from correlation. When anthropologists compare cultures in this vein they juxtapose collective similarities and differences. This juxtaposition of cultures in comparative studies has produced certain habits of analysis. Particular kinds of cultural differences have come to be seen as typologically critical. ‘Key differences’ in this intellectual juxtaposition of cultures in the books are not necessarily keys to understanding the significance of juxtaposed cultural differences in the world. Pluralism is the juxtaposition in the world of group collective cultural differences.1 The most important large-scale issues regarding pluralism are less about cultural content than about when and why something is made of cultural difference in circumstances of juxtaposition. What matters in the analysis of pluralism is not just cultural differences, but the larger system of political and economic differences into which that cultural difference is fitted and given consequences. The subject is further complicated by the fact that ‘culture’ though often said to be the central concept in anthropology is by no means generally understood to have one agreed meaning. Some of the contradictory conceptions associated with the idea of culture bear directly on the issue of pluralism. The first of these is a contrasting pair: culture as system and culture as aggregate. In anthropology there has long been an oscillation between paradigms preoccupied with culture in its guise as a coherent, interconnected system, and paradigms in which culture is most interesting as an accidental historical product, an aggregate of separable parts. Even

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in the 19th century, in Tylor, as in Morgan, the tension between these two visions of culture/society permeates the work. When Tylor looks at ‘adhesions’ he is looking for system (1889). When he looks at a scatteration of parallel inventions over the world, he is looking at culture as a collection of items (1960/1881). In Morgan there are historic stages when there is systematic interconnection among the forms of marriage, family and kinship terminology (1963/1877). But also in Morgan particular inventions, discoveries and innovations can appear long before their pervasive effect is felt (1963: 89). The two perspectives, system/aggregate, continue to boil and roil through the discipline in this century, appearing and reappearing in many different forms, sometimes with one or the other dominant: culture areas/cultural diffusion, culture pattern/acculturation, social structure/social change, and so on. This duality resonates with controversies over pluralism, and reappears within the ‘pluralism question’. As long as culture is by definition considered a coherent whole, the intactness of a cultural system is an important political and historical issue. The intrusion of alien ways of doing things is seen as destructive of the essence of a totality. But if a culture is seen as always being an assemblage of separable parts, rearrangements and recompositions are assumed to be an inevitable and continuous process. Change, introduced into an assemblage, while it may be problematic for many other reasons, is not by definition destructive of a closed whole that should be preserved as such. Hidden in the system/aggregate contrast is a deeper question. There is no addressing the concept of culture without simultaneously asking questions about change and continuity. What starts as a question about coherence ends by being a question about history. The connections among these issues and the difficulties of dealing with them are evident in interesting ways in several of the writings of Fredrik Barth. In 1966 he attacked structural functionalism as static, and proposed a ‘generative’ model of cultural change. Yet, in 1969 when he edited a book on ethnic boundaries that work had implications that directly undermined his earlier argument, being preoccupied with continuities. In Models of Social Organization, Barth had argued that changes in cultural values were established through transactions (1966). His position was that if two or more individuals with disparate values entered a transaction, a sorting out of comparative values would take place. Ultimately, after many such transactions, new values would be integrated into the culture. There was a kind of marketplace,

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arriving-at-a-common-price conception of the way in which new values and new combinations of cultural ideas could emerge from repeated transactions.2 What then are we to make of the central point of Barth’s Ethnic Groups and Boundaries? The gist of that book was to show ethno-graphic instances in which, despite innumerable transactions across ethnic boundaries, the cultural barriers between groups were maintained. “First, it is clear that boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them. In other words, categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information. . . . Secondly, one finds that stable, persisting, and often vitally important social relations are maintained across such boundaries, and are frequently based precisely on the dichotomized ethnic statuses” (Barth, 1966: 9, 10). How did Barth escape the dilemma that ethnic boundaries posed for his transactional model of cultural generation? He eluded the problem by constructing an entirely subjective criterion for ethnicity. For Barth “ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves” (Barth, 1966: 10). Ethnic self-ascription and ascription by others is “the critical feature of ethnic groups” (Barth, 1966: 14). “The critical focus of investigation from this point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses” (Barth, 1966: 15). This definition of the problem obviated the need to examine any differences in ‘values’ that lay between the transactors across cultural boundaries. The questions about the transactional model did not have to be asked. The generative-transactional model is one of compromise and the achievement of common values through transactions. The ethnic boundaries model represents the maintenance of persisting differences in the presence of transactions. The two essays juxtaposed bring to the fore a second pair of contrasting concepts of social cohesion, the double idea of the binding effects of ‘culture as commonality’ and ‘culture as difference and complementarity’. Elements of this dichotomy have been with us in anthropology at least since Durkheim constructed his theories of mechanical and organic solidarity. Though certain of the specific Durkheimian formulations have been widely rejected, a preoccupation with the place of unity and division, sameness and difference in social cohesion remains, and is imbedded in questions about cultural pluralism. The Durkheimian view of the division of labour underscores the great diversity that exists within what are conventionally conceived of as integrated systems.

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Steven Lukes has pushed this reasoning further. Commenting on the role of political ritual in the social integration of modern societies he asserts that, “It is not only arguable that the neo-Durkheimians, and consensus theorists generally, greatly overstate the degree of shared value commitments in liberal democracies. There are other societies which are, arguably, integrated (in a number of respects) in the absence of value consensus” (1975: 298). At what point do we say that the density of differences of values, symbols or practices in any setting constitute ‘cultural’ differences? Why are there differences between a Japanese factory and a British factory producing the same objects (Dore: 1973)? Is there an American Air Force ‘culture’ that is different from an American Navy ‘culture’? Is the ‘culture’ of a physics laboratory different from the ‘culture’ of a machine shop? If it is reasonable to speak of the ethnicity of an administratively created district as Ahmed does of the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan, what is meant by culture and ethnicity (Ahmed, 1984: 104–105)? Ethnicity is generally used to characterize the heritable culture of a population of ancestors and descendants. The handing down of such a culture through the generations produces the attachments Geertz once characterized as primordial (1963). Yet occupational cultures, in the ‘culture of the physics laboratory’ sense obviously can be handed down to successor cohorts that do not have biological connections. In this sense are all modern societies multi-cultural while only some are multi-ethnic? A modern social anthropology is surely as concerned with the multiple forms of culture that are not ‘ethnic’ as it is with the multiple forms of nationality and ethnicity. Or is it? Is there a lingering preference, rooted in the history of the field, for ethnic groups as objects of study? That is not true of every project. Jack Goody, for example, has given substantial attention to the cultural differences associated with class from the giving of dowries to the invention of high cuisine (1976, 1980). Also Bourdieu’s work on class, though he is not formally an anthropologist, has found a substantial audience in anthropology. Bourdieu’s recent book, Distinction, is a very extended discussion of that old and generally accepted sociological contention dating at least from Veblen if not earlier, that “art and cultural consumption are predisposed, consciously and deliberately or not, to fulfill a social function of legitimating social differences” (1984: 7). Bourdieu’s analysis is a study of class-specific

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(or  what he contends are class-specific) matters of ‘taste’ based on a questionnaire-survey carried out in France in 1963 and 1967–68 (1984: 13). Since France is surely a modern industrial nation-state in Gellner’s terms, what does the existence of variegated class-culture imply for the Gellnerian contention that the nation state provides a pervasive high culture accessible to all through its educational system? Bourdieu contends that it is only in little-differentiated or undifferentiated societies that “the means of appropriation of the cultural heritage is fairly evenly distributed, so that culture is fairly equally mastered by all members of the group and cannot function as cultural capital, i.e., as an instrument of domination . . .” (1917: 228). In his Marxist nostalgia for the primitive, Bourdieu seems to forget the many instances in which in just such societies there is a differential distribution of cultural knowledge according to gender and sometimes in relation to age, and that this differential knowledge is sometimes quite specifically tied to legitimate forms of control. Whatever the shortcomings of Bourdieu’s Marxist rornanticization of ‘undifferentiated societies’ and of the working classes, Distinction, remains a forceful commentary on the elaboration of and multiplicity of class cultures within a modern industrial polity. Is that to say that cultural difference is always a marker of class difference? And if so, is that as pertinent to ethnicity as to those forms of cultural distinctiveness that distinguish ‘high culture’ from ‘popular culture?’ Is cultural difference necessarily associated with class in plural societies? M.G. Smith has sought to address the structure of plural societies without prejudging that question. His approach is organizational. In his model, to analyse a political system is to identify the ‘corporations’ (corporate groups and offices) of which the polity is composed (1969a, 1969b, 1984). Thus his central question about pluralism concerns the extent to which the cultural divisions in any society actually constitute corporate groups, and if so, how the culturally distinct corporate groups are constitutionally incorporated into the state. He argues that if there is one dominant cultural group and many subservient ones, it is possible that the subservient ethnic groups cannot all be readily ranked hierarchically. The culture/class question in a plural society is not always answerable with a neat single-rank-order hierarchy. Hence ethnic differences may not invariably imply class distinction. In many ex-colonial states there is an official legal pluralism that corresponds to cultural differences (Hooker, 1975). It is a case in which

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the state recognizes a multiplicity of culturally based legal systems within its borders. Different laws apply to different populations. Does the law treat each ethnic population as a category of individuals or does it deal with the population as an organized collectivity? Do the individuals concerned have any choice about which law is to govern their affairs? From South Africa to Sri Lanka, these are urgent political issues as well as technical legal ones. Smith also touches on these questions in his formal analysis of plural polities. Smith’s basic corporate model is an attempt to solve two problems at once. First, it provides a single criterion for making comparisons across the total range of political structures, from acephalous societies to modem industrial polities. Second, it provides an organizational framework for defining the political structure of modern societies as including but not being confined to the governmental.3 There are two subtle problems regarding pluralism concealed by the formal clarity of Smith’s corporate framework. He addresses both directly in his essays. But Smith’s awareness of these problems does not overcome the fact that they raise troublesome questions that reflect the limitations of an exclusively formal organizational approach. The first problem is that even if the corporate groups in a society do not correspond perfectly to its cultural/ethnic/racial/religious divisions, those categories may nevertheless have political importance. There are many parts of the world in which ethnicity and race are not the basis of officially recognized formal groupings but nevertheless constitute the markers of significant informal social categories. That circumstance is clearly distinguishable from formal corporate ethnicity. The question remains whether formal corporateness is always politically more important than existence as an informal categorical entity. The second difficult question is what criteria are adequate to define cultural distinctness when, as is usually the case today, all sub-units within a state are likely to share certain state-wide institutional systems. To put the question another way, how different does one population have to be from another in its ideas and practices to be considered a different ethnic group, and how does the question of corporateness illumine the matter? The disentangling of these issues is no simple matter. Smith proposes institutional criteria for examining kinds of collective cultural differences. The question he asks on this point is to what extent the group has distinctive (as opposed to nationally shared) institutional systems (law, religion, economy, education, kinship, politics) (1969a: 34–35).

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Of course, a difficulty here is that often institutions are partly distinct and partly shared. Another is that institutions are not always functionally separable. One returns also to Barth’s question about the subjective meaning attached to cultural differences by the actors. And, of course, there is also the problem that many of these matters are likely to be in flux, and changing. To be more precise about the varied political significance of cultural divisions, Smith proposes a three model typology of cultural politics. The first type he calls ‘cultural pluralism’. In this type there are institutionally diverse populations within the state, but these populations are not organized as corporate groups. The second type is ‘socialpluralism’ in which such populations are organized as corporate groups which enjoy equivalent standing in the polity as a whole. Switzerland and the old organization of Lebanon are given as examples. The third is ‘structural pluralism’ in which the conditions of social pluralism exist changed by one major constitutional feature: the corporate groups with different cultures are incorporated into the polity on unequal terms. South Africa is clearly the example of structural pluralism which Smith had most urgently in mind as this classification was constructed. Smith points out the myriad difficulties facing a state that wishes to give the culturally distinct collectivities within its boundaries equivalent access to resources and to political representation. If the numbers in the different ethnic groups are unequal, representation according to numbers will give the largest group dominance. If the resources controlled by the groups are unequal, the group with the greatest resources is likely to become dominant. Smith remarks that formal equivalence is seldom matched by substantive equivalence and has a rather pessimistic view of the instability often inherent in states that formally recognize and purport to be providing equivalent incorporation to the ethnic groups within their boundaries (1969b: 442). Of course, an alternative formal solution that has been offered in many parts of the world has been to incorporate all citizens into the state equally as individuals, disregarding their ethnic categories for purposes of formal political organization. The result is simply to leave ethnicity and its capacity for political mobilization to play itself out in informal, unofficial ways. Often, it is no less present for being officially ignored. Smith’s analysis proceeds from a formal political overview of the society as a whole. Ethnicity and race thus matter from the start to the extent that they have a formal place in the political arena. The organization of

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the state is the beginning point. He is as concerned with government policies as with social analysis. “The decisive conditions of pluralism are political and relate directly to the conditions of collective incorporation in the public domain” (Smith, 1984: 174). ‘Informal’ dimensions, the way the political system really works on the ground are brought in later as modifiers of the official framework. Smith’s recently restated view of how the large-scale corporate model of society can be applied to the question of pluralism is at the ether end of the analytic spectrum from Barth’s subjective, individual definition of ethnic boundaries (Smith, 1984: Barth, 1984). Barth, too, has reiterated a version of his earlier position, stating that what is needed is an understanding of “the conditions for the perpetuation of cultural traditions and ways of life. For this purpose we need concepts that allow us to inquire into the content and changing forms of these ways of life. Society-focussed concepts of ethnicity and pluralism provide only oblique and too narrow templates for such topics” (1984: 77). Barth adds that he wants to address the ‘stuff of cultures’, “the actual bodies of beliefs, values and practices that are distributed in a population” (1984: 80). As for Bourdieu, the only differences that matter are those that mark off the dominant from the dominated. “Each class condition is defined, simultaneously, by its intrinsic properties and by the relational properties which it derives from its position in the system of differences’ differential positions, i.e., by everything which distinguishes it from what it is not . . . social identity is defined and asserted through difference” (1984: 170–172). There is no reconciling these various perspectives. They give primacy to very different issues. They are constructed with different ethnographic materials in mind. Each uses the concept of culture somewhat differently. Each gives different answers to the question, “What is it that is most significant about juxtaposed cultural differences?” What these three perspectives do have in common is the definition of an enlarged project for anthropology. The central subject is no longer simply the content of discrete ‘cultures’ with which specimens may later be compared. The project is no longer the construction of the colourful butterfly collection that Leach complained of long ago (1961). The perturbing question is to understand in what larger processes any and all cultural differences play a significant part. In addressing cultural pluralism, anthropology has set itself a problem that stretches far beyond the scope of conventional methods of

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fieldwork. Fieldwork, anchored in immediate close contact with the members of a community, at what is often an arbitrarily chosen moment in their common history, remains an essential underpinning of a larger enterprise. Yet the location of the moment in larger historical and systemic analyses requires more than local study. The political meaning of cultural differences is seldom inherent in the cultural content of those differences. The place of intentionality in social life is a fundamental question which anthropological theory has yet to address adequately. The paradox is that though intention does not fully control the significance and consequence of an act, intention is by no means a culturally or sociologically insignificant datum.

Notes 1. See Marcus and Fischer (1986) on comparative juxtaposition to achieve defamiliarization as opposed to the juxtaposition in the comparative literature. 2. The transactional model has been cogently criticized on a number of grounds which need not be reviewed here (Paine, 1974). 3. Smith’s definition of corporate groups (or, as he first called them, ‘publics’) specifies six essential characteristics: (1) They are enduring, presumably perpetual groups, with (2) determinate boundaries and membership, having (3) an internal organization, (4) a unitary set of external relations, (5) an exclusive body of common affairs, (6) autonomy and procedures adequate to regulate them and (7) a structure such that some corporate groups (such as ‘the state’) contain others. Other corporate groups do not have inner sub-corporations. In this framework, government can be treated as one corporate entity among others. These definitional characteristics are not unproblematic. Each raises many difficult questions. All require considerable further discussion to be effectively applied. The general framework owes a good deal to the Weberian discussion of corporations, but Smith has elaborated, extended and re-thought the Weberian approach. In thrust the framework is an attempt to focus on the importance of formal organizations in social and political life.

References Ahmed, Akbar S., 1984 “Hazarawal: Formation and Structure of Distinct Ethnicity in Pakistan”, in David Maybury-Lewis (ed.) The Prospects for Plural Societies, Washington, D.C., American Ethnological Society. Arendt, Hannah, 1986 “Communicative Power”, in Steven Lukes (ed.), Power, New York, New York University Press.

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Barth, Fredrik, 1986 “Models of Social Organization”, Occasional Paper No. 23, Royal Anthropological Institute, London. Barth, Fredrik, 1969 Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, Boston, Little Brown. Barth, Fredrik, 1984 “Problems in Conceptualizing Cultural Pluralism, with Illustrations from Somar, Oman”, in David Maybury-Lewis (ed.), The Prospects for Plural Societies, Washington, D.C., American Ethnological Society. Birks, J.S. and C.A. Sinclair, 1978 Nature and Process of Labour Importing: The Arabian Gulf States of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, ILO Working Paper, Geneva. Bloom, Allan, 1987 The Closing of the American Mind, New York, Simon and Schuster. Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean-Claude Passeran, 1977 Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (tr. Richard Nice), Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications. Bourdieu, Pierre, 1984 Distinction, (tr. Richard Nice), Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. Despres, Leo A., 1984 “Ethnicity: What Data and Theory Portend for Plural Societies”, in David Maybury-Lewis (ed.), The Prospects for Plural Societies, Washington, D.C., American Ethnological Society. Core, Ronald, 1973 British Factory-Japanese Factory, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press. Geertz, Clifford (ed.), 1963 “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States’, in C. Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. Gellner, Ernest, 1983 Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca and Cornell University Press. Goody, Jack, 1976 Production and Reproduction, London, New York, Cambridge University Press. ———. 1982 Cooking Cuisine and Class: A Study in Comparative Sociology, London, New York, Cambridge University Press. Hooker, M.B. 1975 Legal Pluralism, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Kritz, Mary M. (ed.), 1983 U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy: Global and Domestic Issues, Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books (D.C. Heath and Co.). Leach, E.R. 1961 Rethinking Anthropology, London, University of London, The Athlone Press. Lukes, Steven, 1975 “Political Ritual and Social Integration”, Sociology, Vol. 9: 289–308. Madan, T.N., 1984 “Coping with Ethnic Diversity: A South Asian Perspective”, in D. Maybury-Lewis (ed.), The Prospects for Plural Societies, Washington, D.C., American Ethnological Society, 136–145. Manfredi, Victor, 1986 Personal Communication. Marcus, George E. and Michael M.J. Fisher, 1986 Anthropology as Cultural Critique, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Maybury-Lewis, David (ed.), 1984a The Prospects for Plural Societies, Washington, D.C., American Ethnological Society. ———, (ed.), 1984b “Ethnic Groups and the State” in D. Maybury-Lewis (ed.), The Prospects for Plural Societies, Washington, D.C., American Ethnological Society: 220–231. Moore, Sally Falk, 1986 Social Facts and Fabrications: Customary Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880–1980, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

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Morgan, Lewis Henry, 1963/1877 Ancient Society, Cleveland, Ohio, World Publishing Co. Paine, Robert, 1974 “Second Thoughts About Barth’s Models”, Occasional Paper No. 32, London, Royal Anthropological Institute. Radcliffe-Brown, A.R., 1961 Structure and Function in Primitive Society, London, Cohen and West. Smith, M.G., 1969a “Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism”, in L. Kuper and M.G. Smith (eds.) Pluralism in Africa: 27–65, Berkeley, University of California Press. Smith, M.G., 1969b “Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism” in L. Kuper and M.G. Smith (eds.), Pluralism in Africa, 415–458. Smith, M.G., 1984 “The Nature and Variety of Plural Unity”, in David Maybury-Lewis (ed.), The Prospects for Plural Societies, Washington, D.C., American Ethnological Society, 1984: 146–186. Tambiah, Star 1986. Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, Chicago, the University of Chicago Press. Tylor, Sir Edw 1889 “On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions”, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute: 245–269. Tylor, Sir Edward B., 1960/1881 Anthropology, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. Van Amersfoort, Hans, 1982 Immigration and the Formation of Minority Groups: The Dutch Experience 1945–1975 (tr. Robert Lyng), Cambridge, London, New York, Cambridge University Press. Zolberg, Aristide, 1983 “The Formation of New States as a Refugee Generating Process”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: 24–38, (May). ———. 1981 “International Migrations in Politicaltive”, in Kritz, Mary M., Charles B., Silvano M. Tomasi (eds.), Global Trendstion, New York, Center for Migration New York.

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3 Outsiders as Insiders: The Phenomenon of Sandwich Culture Yogesh Atal

T

he two most populous societies of the world—China and India— have contributed both men and elements of their civilization to almost all the cultures in Asia and beyond. Wherever one goes—the Pacific islands, Australia and New Zealand, Western and Eastern Europe, the Americas, and Africa—representatives of these two Asian cultures will come to one’s notice almost immediately. Their demographic and civilizational spread is so conspicuous that they have attracted attention of the scholars from a wide range of fields, and mostly from nationalities other than the Chinese and the Indian. In earlier accounts of non-Indian, or non-Chinese societies, the migrant Indian or Chinese remained neglected. Anthropological research, for example, focused on the ‘primitive’ and was carried out in isolated tribal pockets. Even in India, anthropologists regarded the 200 and odd tribal groups as their intellectual domain. Writing about Pacific Indians, Crocombe—the editor of the book with the same name—informs that “Indians sailed far and wide across the Pacific in the last century. They do not receive much mention in history books, partly because most worked in the less prestigious roles as cooks or seamen and partly because most of the histories have been written by and predominantly for Europeans” (Crocombe, 1981: 7). This book, Pacific Indians, provides profiles of

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Indians living in the 20 countries of Melanesia, Polynesia, Micronesia, and the countries of the Pacific rim (including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia). The presence of Indians in many small Pacific Island states is not known even to the Indians living in large congregations in some other Pacific countries. No Pacific Island nation contains as many members of a single language and cultural community” (Crocombe, 1981: 9). Field studies among Indians have also “been carried out in varying degrees of completeness in such geographically diverse areas as Mauritius, Guyana, Fiji, Trinidad, Surinam, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Natal, British Columbia, Jamaica, the Unites States . . .” (Schwartz, 1967: xv). The ubiquarian Indian has, of late, become the subject matter of intensive study and research. However, with only a few notable exceptions, such efforts are examples of “outsiders being studied by outsiders”—of different types. Indians settled abroad are identified as a distinct group of outsiders by the receiving country; and these have been mostly studied by people not belonging to their group—the expatriate researchers from Europe or North America, some Indians from India, and some scholars of the host-country who are ‘insiders’ as native inhabitants but outsiders for the in-group of Indian settlers. It is only recently that Indian sociologists and anthropologists have begun showing interest in studying ‘other’ societies, including the Indians abroad. The topics researched so far, to quote Schwartz again, include “marriage and the family, caste, ethnic interaction, legal systems, social control, magic and religion, social organization, social and cultural pluralism, population dynamics, differential fertility, migration, indenture systems, economic integration and exploitation, plantation systems, and socio-cultural perpetuation and differential adaptation” (Ibid: xv).

II Migrations from India have occurred in several waves. For example, “The first wave of Indians in the Pacific Islands . . . were sailors” (Crocombe, 1981: 8). The second wave consisted of the indentured labourers which began in 1864 with the arrival of Indians from Reunion to New Caledonia, but the massive f low was to Fiji from 1879 to 1916, under the well-known girrnit system—the Hindiized version of the Agreement

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that the migrants entered into with the British government to serve as indentured labourers on plantations for a period of 5 years and a promise of a free passage back home upon the completion of the Girrnit period. Then came the businessmen and traders, missionaries and preachers and politicians. In most recent years, individual migrations have occurred bringing to the Pacific Islands professionals and technicians on short-term assignments. The colonial era facilitated inter-colony migration. It also encouraged migration to the colonizer countries for education and for employment contributing both to the so-called brain drain and the dislocation of the labour-force. In the post-colonial era that began in the mid-1940s, migration from the countries of the Third World has taken on new forms. Migratory flows are now multidirectional, at times reciprocal, and are caused by a wide variety of factors—both socio-cultural and technological. Of late, it is the Middle East that has promoted many Asians—including Indians—to “jump from bullock carts to jumbo jets” (Atal, 1986: 3). The Migration to the Middle East (for short, MIME) appears in some ways similar to the Girmit (indenture) migration of the 19th century. But it is different from the indenture, and has added a new dimension to international migration. “Middle East has amassed enormous money but has limited manpower; its geology is wet with gasoline, but its geography is dry as sand; the restrictions that the religion imposes do not attract fun-loving tourists from affluent societies of the West. It is its geology that has shaped its economy which, in turn, is now prompting the development process. The sudden riches of the region offer attractive pulls to the poor of Asia . . .” (Atal, 1986: 4). MIME has contributed to the massive exodus of people from India, and the migrants have found opportunities to relocate themselves in congregations to develop community life to share their joys and sorrows away from the families left behind. I reproduce below the distinguishing features of MIME. 1. Unlike the migration of labour during the colonial period, this form of migration is neither coercive, nor conscribed, nor indentured. In other words, the role of the government of the country of the migrant, in this newer context, is indirect and mostly regulatory in character. Government intervention is noticeable in those cases where the government itself enters into a contract and sends its employees to carry out the task with the right to recall.

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5.

6.

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It is not governed by the old colonial ethos. It involves entry into a different administrative set-up. The migration is of a temporary character, creating dislocation in the status of the migrant and in the economy of his family. The migrant moves out of his family and the community only temporarily, without severing ties with them and thus becomes dislocated—enjoying the status of an absentee member. Since immigration is granted by the host government for a fixed period of time the migrant treats the stay abroad as a brief sojourn, an interlude, and comes psychologically prepared to ‘return’ rather than to ‘uproot’. The fact that generally the migrant is disallowed to bring his family contributes to this orientation. Demographically, he becomes a nonfamilial unit; this status influences his time-budgeting and his orientation towards the family left behind. Such an orientation poses special problems for adjustment and promotes distinctive patterns of interaction with people in similar status working on a common site. The “We—They” distinction gets continually reinforced. The colonial phenomenon of international migration, was related largely to the agricultural and mining sector requiring use of traditional skills. This new form of migration involves work in the modern sector of the economy. The demand for different skills made by the labour-importing countries shows a changing trend. In the initial phase, skills were needed to create infrastructures, involving a great deal of construction activity. Once such facilities are built—hotels, hospitals, airports, school and college buildings, premises for industrial and power generating plants, roads, etc.—the demand for skills required for their construction declines: in its place, the demand for people to man these establishments arises. This accounts for a massive turn over of people—return of migrants and arrival of fresh wave of migrants with different skills. Such relay migration may ultimately change the character of migration; people from urban areas with high literacy and specialized skills may replace the earlier type of migrants who came from the rural areas (Atal, 1986: 5).

III In the literature on migration different typologies of the migrant are proposed based on the method of migration, chronology of migration, source of migration, destination (within country or outside), proportion of migrants to non-migrants, duration, sequence, etc.

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In the earlier literature the theory of migrant behaviour was heavily influenced by Georg Simmel’s concept of ‘der Fremde’, or The Stranger. Elaborating the concept, Robert E. Park coined the term “marginal man” for the migrant who becomes a ‘stranger’ to both the worlds—his parent society and the host society (Park, 1928). In his Introduction to Stonequist’s book entitled The Marginal Man (1937), Park further refined his definition thus: “The marginal man . . . is one whom fate has condemned to live in two societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic, cultures”. Researching on the Chinese in America, Paul C. P. Siu introduced yet another term, The Sojourner, for a special type of migrant which could not be called a ‘marginal man’. “The essential characteristic of the sojourner is that he clings to the culture of his own ethnic group as in contrast to the bicultural complex of the marginal man. Psychologically, he is unwilling to organize himself as a permanent resident in the country of his sojourn. When he does, he becomes a marginal man” (Siu, 1952: 34). Siu finds it convenient to define “the ‘sojourner’ as a stranger who spends many years of his life time in a foreign country without being assimilated by it. The sojourner is par excellence an ethnocentrist” (Sou, 1952). The manner in which Siu has used the word ethnocentrism departs from its original sense in which Sumner first coined the term in 1907. Sumner regards ethnocentrism as a “view of things in which one’s own group is the centre of everything . . . each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders” (Sumner, 1907: 13). A migrant group, when it moves to a different society for improving its prospects, is more likely to be xenocentric, a term proposed by Kent and Burnight in 1951, which refers “to both basic and favourable orientations to groups other than one’s own” (Merton, 1972: 17). Since the migrant is an outsider his orientation to the host group could either be ethnocentric or xenocentric—the latter again being divided into “xenophilia” or “xenophobia” (Ibid). It is ethnocentrism combined with xenophobia of the receiving society that can explain the phenomenon of host hostility. On the other hand, hospitality implies presence of xenophilia (or, which is the same thing, absence of xenophobia). It may further be noted that xenophobia need not necessarily arise from the feeling of superiority: it may arise because of a certain sense of insecurity, of a fear of being engulfed by the other party. The concept of the sojourner appears, in my view, to be applicable to cases of individual migration, to transient or passenger migrations.

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Once a collectivity emerges out of a continued interaction among discrete sojourners originating from the same source, it requires a different nomenclature. Elsewhere, analysing the MIME phenomenon I have employed the term interlude (see Atal 1986: 5) for a prolonged period of sojourn by a migrating group that is destined to return to its homeland. Such interludial migration causes a dislocation, and not complete severance of ties with the homeland. It also encourages relay migration. “MIME does not become a factor in uprooting . . . ; his dislocation does not necessarily result in the dis lodging of the family from the place of his origin” (Atal, 1986: 7). In a similar fashion, the concept of marginal man has been further chiselled by Merton in the context of the reference group theory. Developing the concept of non-members in terms of their attitude towards membership, and the eligibility criteria imposed by the group of orientation, Merton provides the following Chart (1964: 290). The outsiders getting relocated in a receiving country would thus comprise of six possible categories, marginal being just one of them. In “a relatively closed social structure”, Merton posits, where a person “would not find acceptance by the group to which he aspires and would probably lose acceptance because of his out-group orientation, by the group to which he belongs. This latter type of case will be recognised as that of the marginal man, poised on the edge of several groups but fully accepted by none of them” (Merton, 1964: 265). Such conceptualization of marginal man would reject the definition given by Schermerhorn in A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Gould & Kolb, 1964: 406) where he says that a marginal man “may be defined in broadest terms as any individual who is simultaneously a member (by ascription, self-reference, or achievement) of two or more groups whose social definitions and cultural norms are distinct from each other”. Group-Defined Status of Non-Members Non-Members’ Attitude Toward Membership

Eligible for Membership

Ineligible

Aspire to Belong

Candidate for Membership

Marginal Man

Indifferent to affiliation

Potential member

Detached non-member

Motivated not to belong

Autonomous non-member

Antagonistic non-member (out-group)

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As against the concepts of the Stranger, the Sojourner, and the Marginal Man which mainly focus on the individual migrants, Edna Bonacich attempted to build “A Theory of Middlemen Minorities” (1973) which was further refined by her in collaboration with Jonathan H. Turner (1980). Granting that most racial and ethnic minorities “occupy the bottom strata in a society’s system of stratif ication”, Turner and Bonacich proceed to conceptualise and theorize on the phenomenon of minorities that occupy a middle rank. “Such minorities are ‘middlemen’ in two senses: (1) they are likely to occupy middle rank positions in the stratification system; and (2) they are likely to be economic middlemen, involved in the movement of goods and services in a society” (Turner & Bonacich, 1980: 144). These authors do acknowledge the relevance of the concept of the Sojourner, as developed by Siu and attribute the characteristic of return orientation to the Middlemen Minorities. They regard ‘liquidity’ as the essential general occupational characteristic of these groups. Bonacich says that such minorities “began as sojourners in the territories to which they move” (1973: 583). However, sojourning is not regarded as “ a sufficient condition of the middleman . . . but it is a necessary one . . .” because it “leads the individual to select occupations which do not tie him to the territory for long periods” (Bonacich, 1973: 585). The authors regard ethnic organization, host hostility and economic concentration as the key distinguishing features of the middlemen minorities. Around these three pegs, they have woven a set of propositions regarding prerequisites for, and consequences of, becoming a Middlemen Minority. An appraisal of all the conceptual frameworks suggests the need to distinguish between individual migrations and the group migrations, and between temporary dislocations (interludes) and migrations for permanent settlement elsewhere. There is, thus, a need for an umbrella concept which can be employed for the migrant communities of different types including the sojourners and the middlemen minorities. For example, how would one describe the Fiji Indians who are not a minority, and all of them are not in the middle reaches of the local hierarchy? The phenomenon of intercultural contact is common to all migrations. The increasing rate of migratory flows has significantly affected not only the demographic profiles of the societies but also changed their cultural contours. In one sense, all the countries of the world have become plural or multicultural societies and their capital cities

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and other metropolises have assumed a cosmopolitan character. For example, if one were to consult the yellow pages of the telephone directory of any major city in any country of the world one would locate a variegated world of restaurants representing different cultural cuisines. One is equally impressed by the resurgence of a concern for cultural and ethnic identities. In the face of enormous give-and-take, identities have not always blurred. Changes in the material culture occurring as a result of rapid advances in science and technology have created lookalike configurations of material culture, and yet there is some thing that distinguishes one metropolis from another. Cultures do receive outside traits and complexes but reinterpret them and endow them with new definitions through the provision of location to external traits in their cultural space. Movement of people, spread of ideas and diffusion of material culture highlight the phenomenon of coexistence of the processes of continuity and change that characterize all societies. Elements coming from outside—men, materials, and messages—are screened by a society’s gate keepers which permit or deny their entry. A society with powerful insulatory mechanism may thwart all entries and maintain its pristinity; a complete breakdown of the insulators would result in the society’s absorption into another bigger powerful social system. This dynamics of interplay of a society’s insulators and apertures determines its degree of integration. Complete insulation depends on the firm closure of all apertures resulting into a fully isolated society and culture—perhaps the ideal type of a primitive society. No real society corresponds to the model of complete in sularity, or a total absence of barriers (See Atal, 1981 for the explication of the concepts of Insulators and Apertures). Colonization era broke some of such barriers and opened out apertures thus providing opportunities for exposure to the outside world. This process did not only affect the societies of the Third World which were colonized; it also affected the colonizer cultures. It initiated a process of mass migrations and settlements of people in strange lands— both in colonizer countries and in other colonies of the empires. Despite the onslaught of colonization, it is striking that the societies and cultures have not lost their identities. The newly independent nations have retained their cultures while pursuing the path of modernization and development. Theories of social and cultural change, emanating from the West, have failed to adequately capture and explain this phenomenon.

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Equally, the literature on migration has not adequately dealt with the process through which the migrating groups have been able to demonstrate, to use Simmel’s phraseology, “distance and nearness, indifference and involvement” in the affairs of the host society alongside of retaining their parental identity. To explain the former phenomenon, Third world scholars have begun using the concept of Resilience, For the latter phenomenon, that of a stranger community in an alien land, I propose the concept of Sandwich Culture. Both these concepts—societal resilience and sandwich cultures— are in the making and are complementary. They are serious candidates for inclusion in the vocabulary of social sciences, and have enormous theoretical potential. Since the two concepts are complementary let me briefly allude to the concept of Resilience before expanding the concept of Sandwich cultures that I propose to nominate. I first used the concept of Sandwich as a metaphor while reviewing Ravindra K. Jain’s book entitled South Indians on the Plantation Frontier in Malaya (Atal, 1973). The word “resilience” is being used both as an ideology (advocating the desirability of resilience and suggesting strategies to inject and promote it in relatively rigid social structures) and as an analytical tool. Regarding resilience as an essential component of the ‘cultural envelop’, the concept has been tried to be defined in a variety of ways. In the opinion of some, resilience is the capsule word for the processes that prevent the core of culture from extraneous attack and thus account for the unchangeables; a typical formulation would be something like this: it is the resilience of the society that enabled it to withstand the shock of a culture contact, or of the external forces of change (see e.g. Atal, 1979: 231). It is viewed as identical to homeostasis which brings back the system to its normalcy after a pathological aberration or deviance. The forces that do not allow deformation, rupture or fracture of the social and cultural system are subsumed by some authors in the concept of resilience. Others have used it to envelop the processes of adaptability, plasticity, accommodation, and symbiosis. Resilience is likened to a bamboo which bends with the storm but does not break; it reasserts itself when the storm is gone. Clearly there is a need for proper conceptualization of the word resilience and formulation of a paradigm to analyse the processes that this concept seeks to encompass.

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In that exercise it will also be necessary to examine its role in the context of sandwich cultures—a concept that is also in need of elaboration. As the word implies, ‘sandwich’ refers to the process (as well as the product) of “laying or placing something between two layers”, or “to fit tight between two others of another kind” (see Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary). Interestingly enough, the Dictionary also defines a “sandwich man” as one “who perambulates the streets carrying two advertising boards hung over his shoulders so that one is in front, the other behind”. A migrant to a society with a longer period of stay fits the description of a sandwich man, carrying the two tags one representing the country of his origin and the other, the country of his migration. A Fiji Indian, for example, is a Fiji-citizen (I am deliberately not using the Fijian, as it is used for the indigenous population) and he is distinguished as a migrant Indian from the indigenous Fijians. But a Fiji Indian is not the same as the India-Indian (an awkward way of putting it but perhaps it makes the point). What one is impressed by visiting different countries is the fact that though derived from the same cultural stock. Indians in different lands share not only the “Indianness” in common but also have peculiar features of their own which distinguish them from Indian settlers in other countries because of different ‘mixes’ of host and parent cultures in their ways of life. Skinner (1958) has referred to this phenomenon as an assimilation trap while analysing the situation of “viable and visible” Chinese communities in the Southeast Asian region. It emerges that the migrating communities make efforts to adopt the practices of the host country with a view to assimilation. In this, they succeed only in degrees. To illustrate the point let me quote instances of Chinese communities in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia which are, incidentally, also the countries with substantial Indian population. Exhibit-A: In Indonesia, Chinese are divided into two categories: totoks and Peranakans. China-born Chinese are called Totoks and local born Chinese are referred to as Peranakans, In that country, “there has been considerable amount of intermarriage between Chinese and the indigenous people, and the adoption of Indonesian language and Indonesian names by the Chinese is not uncommon. But Chineseboth totoks and Peranakans-remain Chinese, almost 100 per cent identifiable though they may have lost much of the Chinese culture” (Ting Chew Peh, 1976: 27). But they “were stuck half-way in the assimilation”.

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Exhibit-B: In Thailand, there is no doubt a greater degree of assimilation of the Chinese into Thai society, as compared to the Indians. But Coughlin (1955: 312) has this to say about them: Judged by any material standard, the Chinese have made an unusually successful economic adjustment. . . . Yet the Chinese in Bangkok have not been assimilated. The Chinese population remains by and large distinct from the Thai people in occupations, in the formation of voluntary associations, in the use of educational facilities, and in political interests and activities.

At another place Coughlin further remarks: Culturally and socially, this minority in Thailand has learned to accept Thai ways without, however, losing its attachment to things Chinese [Coughlin, 1960: 11].

Exhibit-C: In Malaysia, the Chinese “still remain Chinese to all intents and purposes, and live quite apart from the Malays both emotionally and socially” (Ting Chew Peh, 1976: 29). Even the Straits Chinese, called Babas, who are regarded as “Malayized”, with a “Sinified” Malay dialect and “their culture a mixture of both Chinese and Malay cultures” are viewed as having “remained Chinese despite the fact that they know not a scrap of the high Chinese culture”. Though all the three exhibits of Chinese communities in three different countries refer to the problem of assimilation, they also exemplify the phenomenon of what Coughlin has called Double Identity (1960). Pressed between the twin forces of the parent and the host cultures these communities have assumed double identities through shedding off of some elements of their parent culture and adoption of host cultural elements with a view to assimilation. This dual process of pulls from two opposite directions, of orientations toward two cultures leads to accretions and attritions and develops a new pattern of interrelationship between different elements. Such an intercalation gives rise to sandwich cultures. Without employing the word sandwich culture, what several authors have said about overseas Indians also provides elements for a definition of this concept. Let me cite a few:

(i) “The essential character of an institution lies in the manner in which its component parts are combined to form a distinctive pattern. The pattern

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gets mangled in the process of emigration and resettlement . . . what persists is a thing of shreds and patches and the seamless web (that existed) in the ancestral society” (Jayawardene, 1971: 114–5). (ii) “Villagers look to India for cultural models and often draw upon Indian books, films, and popular music in trying to construct a sense of what it means to be ‘Indian’. Despite this borrowing, the social context of life in Fiji has been radically altered, and Indian themes, values and motifs take on new definitions in Fiji” (Brenneis, 1981: 224). (iii) “Fiji Indians, whether in their successes or failures, in their triumphs and tribulations, cannot be treated on their own divorced from their multicultural environment. . . . Fiji’s development is a consequence of the interplay of Fijian land, European capital and Indian labour” (Ali, 1981: 31). (iv) Writing about East Indians in Trinidad Nevadomsky observes: “The several well-kept temples and Jandi prayer flags, and the fields of rice, sugar cane and vegetable crops, convey the impression of a community that has successfully survived that trauma of emigration and the winds of change. Indian food, Bombay music, and the seemingly endless round of traditional wedding celebrations also suggest this. But this impression is misleading. Behind the remaining traditional ceremonial and cultural features of rural life, one sees the effects of a modernizing economy and the heavy influence of Western norms . . . on local social life” (1980: 44). (v) Philip Singer has this to say of the situation in Guyana: “The melting pot or creolization approach to Guyana would like to establish a dialectic between Indian and African social structure with a synthesis into a third or Guyanese culture. It seems to me that the Indian in Guyana is presently engaged in his own identity dialectic in the interplay between the Little (Guyanese) Tradition and the Great Tradition of Hinduism” (Singer, 1967: 113–14). (vi) For Guyana, Smith and Jayawardena in their article on “Caste and Social Status among the Indians of Guyana”, have this to say: “More than half the population of Guyana is descended from immigrants from India. . . . The East Indians . . . recognise themselves, and are recognised, as a differentiated group within the society of Guyana. They retain a considerable amount of Indian culture, including religious belief and practice, but absorption into a new social system marked by sharp ethnic differentiation has profoundly changed the meaning and content of ‘Indian culture’ in the new setting” (Smith & Jayawardene, 1967: 43–44).

Similar statements about other societies can be culled out, but it will suffice our purpose to indicate that while scholars differ in their assessment of the degree and extent to which institutions transplanted from

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India have retained their originality, they all seem to hint at the continued presence of ‘Indianness’ that seems to provide these migrant communities an identity distinct from other groups in the plural societies of their relocation. They have carried the “notions” and reactivated several structural and cultural features of their parent culture alongside of making adjustments and adoption of local customs, thus striking a new equation—a consequence of sandwiching. The different equations provide different profiles and distinguish them not only from the non-Indians of the host society but also from other overseas Indians and the Indians in India. Here, it must also be said that India itself is a plural society with a multitude of cultures, religions, languages and differing levels of socioeconomic development. No single group migration thus reflects a representative sample of the complex Indian society and civilization. It is also hazardous to equate Indian with Hindu; and even the word ‘Hindu’ admits of a large variety of subgroupings. It is, for example, important to note that in Malaysia and in Singapore the Indians use Tamil as their lingua franca which is used by people who came not only from Tamilnadu (Madras) but from Andhra, Kerala and Sri Lanka. In contrast to this, the Fiji Indians have evolved their own Hindi which has its own grammer (now systematized and available in a book form) and is spoken not only by those who came from northern India but also by Tamils and Gujaratis; even the native Fijians have picked up the words from the language of this numerically preponderant group. Moreover, all Indian immigrants in a given host culture do not constitute a single grouping. For the outsiders, they may all be clubbed together, but distinctions within remain; these derive from religious, provincial and time-of-arrival differences. Thus, in Fiji, the descendants of Indian indentured labour are different from the late comer groups, such as the Punjabis and the Gujaratis. If caste had diluted for the indentured people in the 19th century, it has surfaced again in terms of endogamy practised at the level of these different categories of migrants to Fiji. Thailand also offers a similar case. Among the settled Indians (with or without Thai nationality) there are two distinct groups— those who came from Uttar Pradesh and Orissa, and those who came from Punjab—the Sikhs and the non-Sikhs. No doubt, for certain purposes, the inner distinctions melt away, such as celebration of Indian independence day, or visit to Indian restaurants; but for other purposes, these remain different groups with different life-styles and different patterns of interaction with the members of the host community.

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It appears that the concept of sandwich culture is applicable at several levels: 1.

2.

At the country level: The culture of the entire country may be a result of the process of sandwiching between the powerful pressures from two or more civilizations. Thailand offers a good example of this type, which has emerged as a result of sandwiching between Indian (mainly Buddhist) and Chinese civilization. The language (vocabulary and the script) and the religion (including the institution of monarchy) represent the influence of Indian civilization (see Desai, 1980). Its food habits, some patterns of dress, and tonality in language as well as business ethic are derived from the Chinese. Within the country level: (i) Immigrant communities: the instances of Indians and of the Chinese in other countries. (ii) Autochtonous communities: those overwhelmed by the invading immigrants also develop sandwich cultures as a result of breakdown of their isolation. The modern Maori in New Zealand, the aboriginals in Australia, and the several tribal communities in India exemplify this type. (iii) Sandwich cultures created as a result of relay migration: for example, student groups from a foreign country, and migrant workers in the Middle East from a foreign country. In such situations, the actual demographic composition changes through gradual replacement but the new arrivals enter into an already created sandwich culture. The old inhabitants ‘socialize’ and ‘enculturate’ the newcomers and thus make their adjustment in a strange environment relatively smooth. These groups define their own areas of interaction, create aperture points for an interface with the host culture and set-up their membership boundaries.  (iv) Frontier groups: communities located on the frontiers of a given political system receive influences from the neighbouring country whose frontier is common. For example, the residents of Southern Thailand exhibit a mix of Thai and Malay cultures. (v) Refugee communities: these constitute another type with a potential for a sandwich culture.

Sandwich cultures that are of our immediate interest are the subcultures of the outside groups in an alien land; their analytical protocol will certainly be different from the one meant for a culture as a whole of a country resulting out of a process of sandwiching, such as

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that of Thailand. A sandwich culture, in the restricted sense, is thus a sub-culture of the outside group settled in a different country/setting and thus contributing to its heterogeneity. By definition, it cannot be completely insulated; of necessity, it has at least double apertures— one linking it to the parent culture and the other to the host culture. Through these apertures, among others, it receives the influences and responds to them. Closing of its apertures to the parent culture leads to its alienation; if it is associated with wide opening of the apertures towards the host society then it accelerates the process of absorption and assimilation with the total loss of independent identity. However, if the host society does not allow its aperture to open and tries to insulate it, the group may remain marginal and face hostility; its response to such a situation will be different: it may either attempt to convert the attitude of the host society or retaliate against it, or may even be ejected out (as happened in the case of Uganda Indians, and as the situation seems to be developing in Fiji recently). It seems that in the cases of conservative migration, where the migrants aim to preserve their way of life, the chances of creating a sandwich culture are greater, as against the cases of what is called “innovating” migration illustrative of renegade behaviour. Migrants who come with a view to settling down would show a more accommodative attitude towards the host culture (of course, this excludes the ‘invaders’, or the en bloc refugee resettlers). Such migrants would create a sandwich culture—and this will also be true of ‘invading’ conquerors, and the refugees who are not kept fully insulated by the receiving society. Those who come as sojourners, temporary settlers, with a view to returning to their parent societies, also create (perhaps unconsciously) a web of patterns to guide their behaviour during the sojourn and develop a distinctive sandwich culture which is passed on from the returnee migrants to the new arrivals in instances of chain or relay migration. Upon their return, in their parent society, such groups may succeed in carving out a different way of life that distinguishes them from their original group. It is necessary to outline the process of the formation of a sandwich culture. Perhaps the beginning is made as a response to ‘perceived’ or ‘real’ host ‘hostility’ or ‘hospitality’ by the migrants. This leads, on the one hand, to find ‘semblances’ and “functional equivalents” in each other’s cultures, and on the other to shed off some inconvenient practices (e.g. vegetarians becoming non-vegetarians).

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Pending research in this perspective, let me list the two sets of factors which operate to facilitate or hinder the process of formation of sandwich cultures. I.

Aperture Opening: Efforts made by the outsiders to become insiders so as to merge/blur their identity and gain certain degree of acceptance by the host society. Some of the possible apertures are:   1. Intermarriage (or breakdown of endogamy)   2. Adoption of names of the host society   3. Adoption (or use) of language of the host culture   4. Religious conversion   5. Adoption of food habits, and developing taste for host cuisine. II. Insulatory mechanisms: Efforts made by the in-coming group to conserve its identity and maintain some distance from the host culture. The possible insulatory mechanisms are:   1. Retention of mother tongue and use of the native script (the oft-quoted case of the Chinese Press in Malaysia is good example of this).   2. Concentration of living quarters to promote greater interaction with the members of the in-group.   3. Provision of separate educational facilities for the children, either by opening schools in the host country or sending children to the parent country for schooling.   4. Practice of endogamy.   5. Concentration in certain occupations.   6. Formation of voluntary organizations.   7. Pursuit of parental religion.   8. Continuation of food habits and taboos associated with eating.  9. Retention of cultural diacriticals particularly in the manner of dressing. This is more common with the womenfolk (such as wearing of Sari and application of Bindi on the forehead); but in men also this can be conspicuous such as among the Sikhs (who could be easily identified by their turban and the beard). The original U.P. migrants to Thailand still continue to wear Dhoti and Kurta in Bangkok. 10. Racial features. 11. Keeping apertures open to the parent culture, for example: (i) Frequent visits (ii) Schooling of children, either in parent society, or using the text­ books and reading material in separate schools. (iii) Affinal relations (iv) exposure to media: books, music, films, videos (v) postal- and telecommunication.

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It is thus obvious that using the concept of sandwich cultures, one will have to respond to different sets of questions rather than merely to address oneself to the query of “how much of parent culture is found in a migrant group”. The focus is on double orientation, dual apertures, linkages and interactions that a group, sandwiched between two cultures encounters. There is a need to develop the empirical profiles of these sandwich cultures with a view to (i) evolving a suitable typology, (ii) identifying the process of the creation and maintenance of these subcultures, and (iii) the role they play in the dynamics of nation building and in the promotion of intercultural understanding. This paper is only a prelude to such an exercise. It offers a framework, rather a scaffolding, to initiate work in this challenging and potentially fruitful area of research.

References Abella, M. and Yogesh Atal, (ed.) 1986 Middle East Interlude. Asian Workers Abroad. Bangkok: UNESCO. Ali, Ahmed 1977 “The Emergence of Muslim Separatism in Fiji”, Plural Societies, VIII, 57–69. Ali, Ahmed 1981 “Fiji The Fiji Indian Achievement”, in Crocombe (ed.), Pacific Indians. Atal, Yogesh 1973 Review of R.K. Jain’s book, South Indians on the Plantation Frontier in Malaya The Eastern Anthropologist, XXVI, 109–11. Atal, Yogesh 1979 Changing Frontiers of Caste. Delhi National Publishing House (second edition). Atal, Yogesh 1981 Building a Nation Essays on India. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications. Atal, Yogesh (ed.) 1984 Dynamics of Nation Building. Bangkok: UNESCO. Atal, Yogesh 1985 Dynamics of Nation Building. Bangkok: UNESCO. Atal, Yogesh 1986 “Asians in the Middle East A New Dimension to International Migration”, in Abella and Atal (ed.) Middle East Interlude. Atal, Yogesh and Luca Dall’Oglio (ed.) 1987 Migration of Talent Causes and Consequences of Brain Drain. Bangkok: UNESCO. Bharati, Agehanand 1967 “Ideology and Content of Caste among the Indians East Africa” in Schwartz (ed.) Caste in Overseas Indian Communities. Bonacich, Edna 1973 “A Theory of Middleman Minorities” American Sociological Review 38 (5): 583–594. Brenneis, Donald 1981 “A Comparative View of Overseas Indians” in Crocombe (ed.) Pacific Indians. Coughlin, R.J. 1915 “Chinese in Bangkok”. American Sociological Review 20 (3). Coughlin R.J. 1960 Double Identity The Chinese in Modern Thailand. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Crocombe, Ron (ed.) 1981 Pacific Indians Profiles from 20 Countries. Suva Institute of Pacific Studies. University of South Pacific. Dahlan, H.M. (ed.) The Nascent Malaysian Society Developments, Trends, and Problems. Kuala Lumpur: University Kebangsaan Malaysia.

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Desai, Santosh, N. 1980 Hinduism in Thai Life. Bombay: Popular Prakashan. Gould, Julius & William L. Kolb (ed.) 1964 A Dictionary of the Social Sciences. London: Tavistock Publications. Hiatt L.R. and Chandra Jayawardena 1971 Anthropology Oceania. Angus and Robertson. Hossain, Zakir 1982 The Silent Minority Indians in Thailand. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute. Jayawardena, Chandra 1971 “The Disintegration of Caste in Fiji Indian Rural Society” in Hiatt and Jayawardena (ed.) Anthropology Oceania. Kent, Donald P. and Robert G. Burnight 1951 “Group Centrism in Complex Societies”, American Journal of Sociology 57, 250–59. Kurian, George 1987 “Socio-Cultural Adaptation of South Asian Immigrants. The Canadian Experience”. The Journal of Sociological Studies 6, 47–62. Malik, Yogendra 1972 East Indians in Trinidad. Oxford University Press. Mayer, Adrian C. 1967 “Introduction” in Schwartz (ed) Caste in Overseas Indian-Communities. Merton, Robert K. 1964 Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe (ninth printing). Merton, Robert K. 1972 “Insiders and Outsiders A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge”. American Journal of Sociology 78(1) 9–47. Nevadomsky, Joseph, 1980 “Changes in Hindu Institutions in an Alien Environment”. The Eastern Anthropologist 33(1). Niehoff, Arthur 1958 “The Survival of Hindu Institution in an Alien Environment”. The Eastern Anthropologist 1(3). Park, Robert E. 1928 “Human Migration and the Marginal Man” American Journal of Sociology 33, 881–93. Peterson, W. 1958 “A General Typology of Migration”. American Sociological Review 23, 255–66. Schermerhorn, R.A. 1964 “Marginal Man” in Gould & Kolb (ed.), A Dictionary of Social Sciences 406–07. Schwartz, Barton M. (ed.), 1967 Caste in Overseas Indian Communities. Sanfrancisco: Chandler Publishing Co. Siddique, Sharon and Nirmala Purushottam 1982 Singapore’s Little India Past, Present, and Future. Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies. Singer, Philip 1967 “Caste and Identity in Guyana” in Schwartz (ed.), Caste in Overseas Indian Communities. Siu, Paul C.P. 1952 “The Sojourner” The American Journal of Sociology 58, 34–44. Skinner G.W. 1957 Chinese Society in Thailand Ithaca Cornell University Press. Skinner G.W. 1958 “The Chinese in Java”, in Fried, M.H. (ed.), Colloquium on Overseas Chinese. New York: Institute of Pacific Affairs. Smith, Raymond T. and Chandra Jayawardena 1967 “Caste and Social Status among the Indians of Guyana” in Schwartz (ed.), Caste in Overseas Indian Communities. Stonequist, Everett V. 1935 “The Problem of Marginal Man”, American Journal of Sociology 41, 1–12. Stonequist Everett V. 1937 The Marginal Man. New York: Charles Scribener’s Sons. Sumner, William Graham 1907 Folkways. Boston Ginn. Tingh, Chew Peh 1976 “Some Problems of Chinese Assimilation in Peninsular Malaysia” in Dahlan (ed.), The Nascent Malaysian Society. Turner, Jonathan H. and Edna Bonacich 1980 “Toward a Composite Theory of Middleman Minorities”, Ethnicity 7 (2): 144–158.

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4 Interrogating Tibetan Exilic Culture: Issues and Concerns Sudeep Basu

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ore than five decades have elapsed since the flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet, in March 1959, following the Chinese invasion of Tibet.1 The Tibetans who accompanied him in large numbers to India and its neighbouring countries have now lived a major part of their lives in exile. Their children have been born and educated in their adopted lands, depending solely on the memories of the older generation for their knowledge of the ‘Land of Snows’ (Nora 1989). John Conway, who wrote in the mid 1970s about the predicament of Tibetan refugees, stated the Tibetans like other refugees have been confronted with two mutually contradictory pressures. If the Tibetan exiles seek to keep alive the idea of return, they must somehow prevent their thorough dispersion, in the hope that political conditions change in their favour. On the other hand, if refugees willingly accept the generous contributions of relief agencies and by their own endeavours, succeed in rehabilitating themselves in their host countries, they would inevitably be subject to pressures to assimilate with their host populations (1975: 74).

The Dalai Lama, in the 1970s, had the hope and the belief that political circumstances would change in favour of the Tibetans and it would not be long before he and his exile followers would be able to return to

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Tibet. However, the political events in the succeeding decades belied this hope and the Tibetans had to face squarely with the prospect of a protracted exile that necessitated among other things, a reformulation of their strategy in exile centred on the idea of ‘return’ and the preservation of the ‘rich cultural heritage of Tibet’.2 While representing Tibet and Tibetanness, it would be important to exercise caution in ascribing one single or even one dominant orientation to enforced existence outside Tibet. Through the use of secondary texts and materials, this paper examines the interactive and representational dynamics of exile Tibetans’ emergent culture while taking account the plurality of practices and ideas of Tibet and the Tibetan diaspora that are continually being constructed by Tibetans and non-Tibetans alike.

Constructing the ‘Rich Cultural Heritage of Tibet’ Fleeing monks and laypeople alike collected together and brought with them materials during the mass exodus which began in 1959. These were assessed and efforts at translation were immediately undertaken in an effort to educate the world about Tibet and its heritage. The significant lack of information about Tibet’s historical and modern lay populations in Tibet and in the diaspora can be attributed to the overwhelming efforts at preserving texts, mainly of a religious nature and monastic practices in exile.3 Settlements or camps in India and Nepal had acquired a more stable character by the mid-1970s, since it became clear that the refugees were not likely to return to Tibet any time soon. After a decade of closed borders during the Cultural Revolution, the death of Mao Tse-tung in 1976 opened the way for handful of westerners to visit Tibet. The prevalent nostalgia for a pristine and timeless Tibet was revived. This encouraged publications about Tibetans that reveal ‘pure survivals’—native cultural elements that have not been ‘torn away by the roughness of modern society’ (Forbes 1989: 159). James Hilton’s classic Lost Horizon (1933), is the first western novel to be mainly located in Tibet.4 At that time, western fantasies about Tibet and its religion had achieved their most coherent form (Bishop 1989). It was imagined as a land outside the grid of regulated space and time that seemed to be engulfing the rest of the globe. Entering Tibet was imagined as an initiation, as going across a threshold into another world, as going backward in time. Tibet was imagined by many as a dream or fairy tale outside

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of history. Tibet seemed to offer wisdom, guidance, order, and archaic continuity to an increasingly disillusioned West. It is precisely within this stream of fantasy that Hilton’s ‘Shangri La’ belongs. This complex utopian fantasy was, however, overshadowed by a sense of loss, a belief that traditional Tibet was doomed. The main threat was imagined as coming from an unstoppable process of globalisation, producing a uniform, dreary materialism. In such an imaginative climate, the utopian spiritual could no longer be entrusted to the literal geographical place. The myth of ‘Shangri La’ was born, the hidden valley into which the essence of western fantasies about Tibet was alchemically concentrated and distilled. In a period of environmental and cultural anxiety, Tibet as ‘Shangri La’ was a fertile paradise in the midst of a global wilderness (ibid.). The ‘Shangri-La’ trope became deeply implicated in descriptions and studies on Tibet and in the self-conscious construction of personal and national identity by Tibetans themselves. As Keila Diehl notes, ‘Western and Tibetan accounts have together played an important role in the development of an ideal Tibet and by transference, of an ideal Tibetan refugee’ (2002: 20). These trends inform the multiple and interwoven contemporary discourses about identity and representation that are brought to bear on and produced by Tibetan refugees. The visible success in charting out a productive career in exile has been corroborated by social scientists who have studied the Tibetan refugees since 1966. Melvyn Goldstein, while doing fieldwork in Bylakuppe in January 1966, notes how the settlement became a ‘tremendous economic success’ (1978: 399) within five years since its inception in January 1960. He observed very little manifestation of the dysfunctional behaviour (Cohon 1981) commonly associated with the ‘refugee syndrome’. There was little incidence of mental and emotional disorders and no incidence of alcoholism (Goldstein 1978: 403). In the literature about Tibetan life in exile we find a pattern of description and analysis where the Tibetan refugee settlement is compared to the situation in Tibet prior to the exodus (see Palakshappa 1978). Girija Saklani (1984) did extensive fieldwork and research among Tibetan refugees living in Dharamsala, Delhi, and Dehradun and her findings are similarly positive. She writes that, Tibetans have, on the whole, ‘successfully emerged from a self-sufficient barter economy into a competitive economy and have adjusted to the new situation which is a tribute to the Tibetan community in exile’ (ibid.: 216). Most writings testify to the fact that Tibetans living in exile have successfully countered assimilative

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tendencies due to the continuity of Dalai Lama’s leadership in exile and to the remarkable amounts of united support from international aid agencies and individual sponsors (Harrell-Bond 1986).5 Since 1959, Dharamsala administration’s attention to the preservation of linguistic, religious, and artistic knowledge through both documentation and education (Nowak 1984) was prompted by two legitimate threats: the disappearance of Tibetan culture in the homeland under Chinese rule6 and the disappearance of exiled Tibetans into their host societies. A more conservative notion of preservation has informed innumerable official policy decisions by the Tibetan government-in-exile as well as individual choices regarding every aspect of daily life, including language use, habits of dress, marriage ceremonies, and food preparation. Keeping alive the possibility of returning7 to the homeland requires keeping alive the memory and lived experience of Tibetanness to perpetuate the felt sense of loss and victimisation. While refugee homes are a great transmitter of traditional knowledge, it is through expressive performances in the public sphere that the context and impression of continuity is maintained and preserved. In the exile community’s striving towards continuity in the midst of displacement, what gets ignored is the non-hegemonic, hybrid and popular foreign practices [which as] evidence of cultural decay does little to account for the complex mosaic of cultural practices that are continually being constructed in exile through the choices and circumstances of even the most traditional Tibetan refugees and that constitute their everyday reality (Diehl 2002: 67).

Generally, studies on Tibetan exiles capture their pride in their ethnicity. Diehl (2002) in her study observes how, owing to political pressure to maintain a unified force in the diaspora and/or out of desperation for community and continuity, the experience of extended displacement has, in fact, increased their acceptance of the status quo in Dharamsala and their dependence on official public representations, despite an increase in historical self-consciousness. One result of this pressure to present a unified image and to feel unified has been the development of not only a shared master narrative about Gelugpa history (events leading up to the Dalai Lama’s f light from Tibet in 1959), but also a widely shared aesthetic sensibility regarding the ‘authentic’ and the ‘traditional’. A shared understanding of what is essentially ‘Tibetan’ furnishes the means of discriminating what is meaningful or

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ideal for the community and what is not. Diehl writes how this process leads to a ‘notion of ethnicity imagined along a continuum between purity (ethnic integrity) and pollution (hybrid identity)’ (ibid.: 85). The older generation in exile, who escaped from central Tibet more than forty years ago, embody the old ways in their language, dances, religious practice, garments, and lifestyles. ‘They include the majority of individuals for whom personal experience and lived knowledge are in synch with the dominant memory selected and promoted within the official paradigm of preservation’ (ibid.). The chang ma singing at weddings, the goldsmith who drinks his everyday tea out of an elaborate silver and porcelain goblet worthy of the aristocrat in old Lhasa, the heavy felt boots and wool chuba worn right through Indian summers are the ways that are revered as fundamental to the ‘continual distillation and disciplining of . . . categorical purity’.8 Liisa Malkki’s observations concerning how displacement can become a ‘form of categorical purity’ (1992: 35) are also helpful in understanding how and why many Tibetan refugees assume the authority to imagine what a modern, free Tibet should look like in the future.9 In this connection, in an article comparing the performances and motivations of Tibetan drama troupes from Chinese-run Tibet and Tibetan-run Dharamsala, M.S. Calkowski (1991) articulates the grounds on which each group respectively bases its authority to represent Tibetan culture. Elsewhere, based on his research with Tibetan refugees, P. Christiaan Klieger argues, ‘it is the context of interaction, not the content, which in appearing to remain traditional, provides a perceived continuity with the past’ (1989: 366). The production and transformation of the mythicohistory10 of Tibetan refugees involves judgments and a degree of consensus regarding how the past should be articulated within the present.

Articulating Tibet: Juxtaposing the Old and New In the past, effective control over the production of historical narratives was generally held by governments that had the power to determine what version of history would be widely circulated and that controlled the means by which this information might be disseminated. However, in modern times, one of the hallmarks of conflicts between competing groups is an ideological battle over the production of historical ‘truth’ that often continues long after military subjugation has been achieved.

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A case in point is the conflict that is being waged between Tibetan exiles and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Powers 2004: 4). A central issue concerns the question of Tibetan history, and both sides clearly believe that this is integral to their respective claims of legitimate ownership of the Tibetan mainland. Questions of history and historical claims have profound implications for the lives and futures of Tibetans in exile, many of whom learn to ‘live the present historically’ (Malkki 1995: 106). Linked to the central issue is also the question related to political or cultural geography of Tibet. This has implications for the Tibetan exile, many of whom have not directly experienced their homeland, in shaping the contours of their imaginings about Tibet. The Chinese government generally limits Tibetan territory to the Tibet Autonomous Region, which consists of the central provinces of U and Tsang. The Tibetan government-in-exile, however, claims that Tibet includes these central provinces as well as ethnically Tibetan areas of eastern parts of the Tibetan plateau that have been made parts of other neighbouring Chinese provinces by PRC. Traditionally, the Tibetan government has claimed ownership of the ‘three Provinces’ (Cholkhasum): (i) U and Tsang, which extend from Ngari Corsum in the west to Sokla Gyao, (ii) Do Do, which extends from Sokla Gyao to the upper bend of the Machu river and includes Kham, and (iii) Do Me, which incorporates an area ranging from the Machu river to the traditional border with China marked with a monument called the ‘White Chorten.’ Over the centuries, ownership of border areas has shifted between the Tibetan central government and China. Although Kham and Amdo, for example, were claimed by modern Tibetan governments as part of their territory prior to the Chinese invasion in the 1950s, actual control was either in the Chinese hands or in those of the local hegemons (Powers 2004: 164).11 The notion of the ‘religious land’ is reflected in the Tibetan concepts of chos srid gnyis Idan, the dual religious and secular system of government and of chos rgyal, the king as protector and patron of religion. Chos rgyal is a Tibetan expression for the Buddhist conception of Dharma King. This conception of polity and political legitimacy has widespread canonical basis in Buddhism throughout Asia (see Tambaiah 1976). The Tibetan State continued the universal Buddhism paradigm of statehood but collapsed the two functions of patron of religion into one—role of the Dalai Lama (Schwartz 1994: 735). The Dalai Lama was understood as chos rgyal in the dual role of political leader and earthly manifestation

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of Tibet’s protector deity Chenrezig, the Buddha of Compassion. The clerical Buddhist traditions of Tibet draw on a vast array of oral and ceremonial as well as scriptural transmissions.12 In these ‘little traditions’ of popular beliefs, every community had its own sacred spots, mountain deity, stupa, shrine, or temple specific to the locality. These sacred centres defined the local communities, while Tibet in its entirety was defined by the sacred centre of Lhasa, where the Potala Hill was associated with the sacred mountain at the centre of the world (Kolas 1996: 53). Dawa Norbu (1992: 10) maintains that the distinction between Tibetan and non-Tibetan was a Buddhist differentiation between believers and nonbelievers, and that sub-national identity prevailed in Tibet before the Chinese invasion. Norbu, in his interviews with elderly exile Tibetans, discovered that foreigners such as Nepalis, Chinese, Hui, and Mongols were distinguished as separate groups, but so were Amdowa, Tsangpa, and other regional identities. There was no clear distinction between national and other identities based on place of origin. There is a growing corpus of work in western languages that explore the contested history and debates surrounding Tibet. Many western writers on Tibet advocate either the Chinese or the Tibetan position, and they often present the issue in absolute terms as conflict between truth and falsehood, good and evil, oppression and freedom (Powers 2004: 4).13 Both the Chinese and the Tibetan authors, Powers considers, view history as an independent voice of truth: All the Chinese works published in China accompany their assertions about the nature of Old Tibet and the improvements subsequent to the Chinese takeover with pictures that either claim to represent the brutal system of Old Tibet or the current happiness of its people. The covers of Great Changes in Tibet and Tibet: No Longer Medieval, for example, juxtapose these cheery titles with photographs of smiling Tibetan women; the implications appears to be that they are smiling because Tibet has leaped forward and because they are no longer medieval (ibid.: 15).

Western studies on Tibet, particularly those written by academics are more restrained in their language than are those of Chinese or Tibetan authors. Here too we find rhetoric and passionate advocacy for one side or the other. This is particularly true of pro-Tibet works, whose authors often persuade their target audience of the illegitimacy and barbarity of China’s occupation of Tibet. Many of them indicate that they have personal connections with Tibetan refugees and are deeply concerned

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about their plight, but they also state that their analyses are balanced and authoritative and that their conclusions are derived entirely from the facts of Tibetan history and not from bias or personal feelings. Some claim to possess authority to tell the truth of the situation because of direct contact with Tibet and their own eyewitness experiences; others have not visited Tibet or Tibetan refugee settlements, but assert authority on the basis of extensive study of available written sources on Tibetan history (ibid.). Hugh Richardson states in Tibet and its History (1962) that he decided to write an introduction to Tibetan history after listening to the debate on Tibet’s status during the fourteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1959: I was struck by the need for a guide to Tibetan history which had regard not only to its continuous development over thirteen centuries but also to the Tibetan background and character and to the Tibetan point of view. That is what I offer in this book (Richardson 1962: 1).

Richardson indicates that he is uniquely qualified to report on what really happened in Tibet because he lived there for a number of years prior to the Chinese takeover and had extensive contacts with Tibetans from all walks of life. It is also clear that he believes that he is telling a story that Tibetans themselves are unable to tell and that he perceives himself to be advocating on their behalf. He straightforwardly reports the main events of Tibetan history, but in a number of places he heaps contempt on what he characterises as Chinese fabrications and distortions. Western authors who mainly support the Chinese view of events, such as Tom Grunfeld (1988), are no less certain that their accounts are written to dispel misconceptions and reveal the truth of Tibetan history and the real nature of the Chinese takeover. Grunfeld indicates that he is aware of potential criticisms of his book, but he rejects them, stating that his analysis is balanced and authoritative: search for a middle ground . . . I have made every effort to use materials from the most if not all contending points of view. I therefore choose to call this book ‘disinterested and dispassionate’ history and I present it as an attempt at historical interpretation without political, religious, economic or emotional commitments to either side but rather with a commitment to furthering historical understanding and even truth (ibid.: 5).

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Despite these claims, Grunfeld’s book shows a clear pro-Chinese bias and it contains a number of historical inaccuracies and distortions. Powers (2004: 17), however, regards Melvyn Goldstein’s monumental and richly documented study, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951 (1989), to be neither pro-Chinese nor pro-Tibetan in the current sense of the terms. It attempts to explicate a dramatic historical event: the demise in 1951 of the de facto independent Lamaist State. It examines what happened and why, and it balances the traditional focus on international relations with an emphasis on the intricate web of internal affairs and events (Goldstein 1989: 20). The most vehement pro-China text is Tibet Transformed by Israel Epstein (a naturalised Chinese citizen of Polish descent) (1983), a lengthy book published by the New World Press in Beijing. This book uses the sort of rhetoric found in the works by Chinese authors on Tibet and reflects the Chinese government’s party line. Epstein asserts that his book is based on his own observations during three visits to Tibet and that it reports the ‘truth’ of what he saw and was told by ordinary Tibetans, ‘given largely in the words of hundreds of people who were there all along—mainly Tibetans within a frame of historical background from any sources’ (ibid.: 7). Powers (2004) notes some key words that occur repeatedly both in Chinese and in Tibetan sources. Chinese sources uniformly describe pre-1950s Tibet using the terms ‘feudal,’ ‘serfdom,’ ‘backward,’ ‘cruel,’ ‘brutal,’ and others. Tibetan sources refer to it as ‘peaceful,’ ‘happy,’ ‘religious,’ and so on. Chinese sources portray their takeover of Tibet as a ‘liberation’ that freed the ‘serfs’ from feudal oppression and that has resulted in dramatically increased prosperity for the Tibetan people. From a state of ‘Mediaeval backwardness’, Tibet has leaped forward in all significant areas, and its grateful people happily celebrate their full reintegration into the motherland now. Tom Grunfeld (1988) endorses the Chinese version of events and paints a picture of pre-exilic Tibet as brutal, exploitative, and primitive. In Grunfeld’s version, Old Tibet was a ‘rigid and ossified feudal society’ in which torture was widespread. He provides lurid descriptions of ‘brutal forms of punishment’ and states that ‘a British resident of two decades reported seeing countless eyegouging and mutilations’ (ibid.: 16, 24, 33, 129). In Grunfeld’s view, those westerners and Tibetans who reported positive impressions of Tibet were either blind to its squalid realities or deliberately obfuscating. Grunfeld’s book contains many harsh judgments about Old Tibet,

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but he gives no indication that he has ever visited the country nor that he has fieldwork experience among his subjects. Despite these apparent limitations, he indicates throughout the book that he is confident of having ascertained the reality of the conditions in Old Tibet. He achieves this mainly by rejecting accounts of Tibetans who lived in Tibet and of western travellers who paint a positive picture and by privileging western accounts that portray Tibet in a negative light. Unlike Grunfeld, Goldstein (1989) insists that, prior to the Chinese takeover in the 1950s, Tibet enjoyed de facto independence, but he asserts that it was feudal theocracy and, he portrays most of its rulers as corrupt, venal, and inept. In Goldstein’s view, ‘The Tibet Question is about control of territory—about who rules it, who lives there and who decides what goes on there’ (cited in Powers 2004: 21). Like Grunfeld and Epstein, he asserts that the Chinese pursued a ‘gradualist policy’ in Tibet and that they showed tremendous patience and moderation despite prevarication and menda-city of Tibetan officials who tried to hold on to their positions and privileges in an attempt to delay what he apparently views as an inevitable process of historical change. Vincanne Adams questioned contemporary Tibetans’ ‘authenticity’, describing many of them as ‘engaging in scripted simulations, becoming the sort of Tibetans desired by Chinese and Westerners by reproducing and enunciating the scripts of authentic Tibetanness produced by outsiders’ (Adams 1996: 511). The representations of Tibet that emerged in western discussions following the Dalai Lama’s speeches (Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre [TPPRC] 1998) in the late 1980s focused on the uniqueness and violation of Tibet. In some more recent cases, the violation is seen as a result of advancing modernity or commercialisation in general, a view that implicitly exonerates the state as a perpetrator of abuse. Usually, this violation is identified with acts of violence or desecration that have been carried out by the Chinese authorities. In many cases this idea of violation seems to be linked to a perception of the place or the people as previously unimpaired and now desecrated for the first time. The images ensuing from this idea tends to disempower its subjects by implying that they are either victims who are incapable of standing alone, or collaborators in the act of violation (Lopez 1999). Chinese representation views the barbarity of Tibet as requiring civilising. The paramount imagery in Chinese official and unofficial writing about Tibet’s relationship with China is found in its purest form

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in the frequently repeated accounts of the marriage of the 7th-century Tibetan ruler Songtsen Gampo with the Chinese princess Wencheng who brings with her to Tibet ink, music, agriculture, and other Tang dynasty technologies.14 ‘Overall purpose is to strive to construct a united, wealthy and civilized New Tibet!’ as the Chinese reformer Hu Yaobang put it in the 1980s (Barnett 2001: 274).15 In western depictions, terms such as peace, tolerance, and religion are reproduced in their adjectival forms in representations of Tibet or Tibetans to define them as peaceful, tolerant, or religious. In each of the various forms in which this theme of ‘violated specialness’ appears in western political texts can be found a number of internal contradictions that diminish over time the effectiveness of that representation as discourse in the political arena. The image of a non-violent Tibetan is problematic, since the history of recent Tibetan armed resistance and some accounts of internal political violence are now well known (see McGranahan 2005). Many of the assertions behind these presentations of the Tibetan situation are problematic, even in the restrained forms in which they appeared in most parliamentary resolutions and yet more so in governmental statements. Much of this language also came from the Dalai Lama’s own writing about a primordial Tibet, Prior to the Chinese invasion, Tibet was an unspoiled wilderness sanctuary in a unique natural environment. Sadly, in the past decades the wildlife and forests of Tibet have been totally destroyed by the Chinese. . . What little is left in Tibet must be protected and efforts must be made to restore the environment to its balanced state (Barnett 2001: 276).16

The environmental application of this model offers an insight into the basic character of the ‘specialness’ representation: it is a view of Tibetans as an endangered species or of Tibet as a threatened habitat. All the representations of Tibet as special share this sense of an unindividuated collectivity or zone that is unique and at risk. This is again important in a political analysis of these representations because it reproduces the colonising type of relation between the writer and the subject that can be seen in literary texts of the romanticising type and has disabling implications (ibid.: 277). The models presented by the Chinese and the western political texts are very similar: the phrase ‘Tibet’s unique natural environment’ is standard in Chinese official texts.17

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The models underlying this idea of “specialness” differ in the same ways as the choices of terminology and image—the Chinese official conception sees the uniqueness as backwardness that needs to be advanced or educated through the process of social evolution; the Western conception seems to view it as something special that needs to be preserved (ibid.).

Robert Barnett further makes the point that One of the difficulties in the Western representations of Tibet as a victim is that if there were ever actualized, the offer they hold for their adherents is the restoration of pride, support for a nationalist pride; since these are essentially symbolic or psychological conditions, the sustainers of these representations do not have the power to enforce or actualize their texts. The offer implicit in China’s representation of Tibet is that China will provide the material accouterments of what it defines as civilisation or modernity. Intellectually and politically this representation seems therefore to be more practicable and more coherent than the Western offer (ibid.).

The proposition that Chinese rule provides modernisation has now replaced liberation from feudal oppression as the central legitimation device for the Chinese state and the Communist Party in Tibet. This new theme recurs in almost all political texts that explain the Chinese role in Tibetan lives and futures. This means that there are two or more interpretations of the same modernisation; of the same fax machines, mobile phones, metalled roads, computer links that line the streets of Tibetan towns. To the Chinese state, these facets of modernisation represent progress, while to some foreign writers and the Tibetan exile members they represent modernisation as encroachment, depravity, or the erosion of distinctiveness and tradition. Some of these writers raised the question as to how modernisation should be considered and recognised that interpreting this process was problematic (ibid.: 295). The most pervasive threat to Tibetan culture comes from the immigrant entrepreneurs in the figure of Chinese men to the Tibetan towns including Lhasa and this view is appropriated by the Tibetan exile administration and widely disseminated. It is particularly important because it is often adopted by western governments as well as parliamentarians, albeit in more restrained terms. Modernisation is a theme that, like other representations, can be appropriated for almost any political need with very little change of language, even more readily than human rights discourse. Thus, the spectrum of foreign readings of modernisation is wide—it includes

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interpreting it as a Chinese extermination plot, as a development consequence of globalisation. It has the inherent ambiguity of an image, in that it can be proposed with one meaning while it is used politically in another, allowing a government to present a model of Tibet intended to be read by its domestic audience as concern for the threat to traditional culture and by Chinese diplomats as sympathy for the difficulties of bringing a backward society into the modern world (ibid.: 296–91). The modernisation theme is problematic for the Tibetan exile project. It neither accentuates the ‘specialness’ of Tibet nor provides a language that identifies the policy objectives of western governments and politicians if and when they take up this approach. According to Barnett, Like human rights discourse, representations developed around this theme can be evocative as rallying calls within the ‘public relations’ mode of political discourse (for example, by saying that the survival of Tibetan culture is threatened) but ambiguous and deceptive as builders of practical political positions and collective interests. It offers a shared linguistic framework within which Chinese and non-Chinese political forces can conceal their differences and by exploiting its ambiguities, find themselves within what is in effect an alliance in diminishing or neutralizing the claims of Tibetan nationalists (ibid.: 297).

Exilic Metaphors: Rangzen and Tibetan National Uprising Day (March 10) Understanding the concept of rangzen—self-determination, independence, or freedom is essential to understanding the framework of young Tibetan refugees’ lives and the choices they make in the process of creating a distinct Tibetan identity. In her study of Tibetan refugee youth, Margaret Nowak (1984) explores rangzen as the ‘root metaphor’ for Tibetan refugees. She maintains, the concept of rangzen fits well with and even enriches certain traditional Tibetan feelings and ideas nurtured in school: compassion (snying rje), respectful behaviour (ya rab cho zang), patriotism (gyal zhen), and avoiding shame (ngo tsa) (ibid.: 137–38). Striving to uphold all of them has led to a certain amount of frustration and ‘psychological anguish’ for many young Tibetans trying to integrate old traditions and ideology with new ways of thought derived from their own lived experiences. The Strasbourg proposal brought home the fact

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that there exists a lack of unity amongst Tibetans, which does not augur well for the Tibetan independence movement (Ardley 2002: 170). The predominance of the ‘Shangri La’ perspective has meant that all Tibetans agree with the Dalai Lama and believe that he acts in their best interests. Therefore, it is presumed that when the Dalai Lama took the decision at Strasbourg to aim for autonomy, this was the general wish of the Tibetan people. Jane Ardley (ibid.) points to several problems with this proposition. First, there are no indications from inside Tibet itself that the people who continually protest against Chinese rule are fighting for anything less than independence.18 Second, it is not uncommon for Tibetan people to state that, while they support the Middle Way position of the Dalai Lama, they also wish for an independent Tibet. In the Tibetan exile community no such formal channels exist for aspirations to be formulated into policy. It is clear that, while the Dalai Lama officially champions autonomy, many Tibetans such as those belonging to the Tibetan Youth Congress or the newly formed Rangzen Alliance disagree and still wish to fight for independence. The issue of Dalai Lama’s dual religious and political role is central to the Tibetan independence movement and, according to Ardley (ibid.: 170) constitutes one of the most profound obstacles to its progress. The Tibetan term for independence, rangzen, has only recently been introduced into the Tibetan lexicon. When the Chinese first began their attempts at indoctrinating the Tibetan population after 1949, the Tibetan vocabulary at the time was replete with hundreds of terms relevant to topics of metaphysics, philosophy, religion, and depth psychology. There were, however, no standard Tibetan words for such modern concepts as ‘independence’, ‘exploitation’, ‘socialism’, ‘capitalism’, and so on. According to Nowak, ‘The neologism rangzen, for example, was coined by compounding already existing Tibetan morphemes: rang meaning “self ” and btsan meaning “power” ’ (1984: 32). In this connection, the annual commemoration of the Lhasa uprising in March 1959 has become, for refugees, the archetype that sustains a recurrent but deeply meaningful new secular ritual. Many of the activities repeated annually by Tibetans on 10 March can be seen as a re-enactment or reaffirmation of key elements of the original drama that took place in Lhasa in March 1959. Present day 10 March commemorations are held all over the world wherever there is a sufficiently large Tibetan population. A crowd gathers in a central, public location; speeches are made and a

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vociferous demonstration takes place marked by conspicuous wearing of national dress, singing of the national anthem, ubiquitous display of the Tibetan f lag, pictures of the Dalai Lama as well as slogans, banners and placards proclaiming the Tibetan case against the Chinese. The Dalai Lama delivers an annual 10 March address in places other than Dharamsala, his prewritten speech is read out by a local Tibetan official and the theme of India, the host country, is played up by frequent mention of the long centuries of Indo-Tibetan historical ties and friendly relations. According to Nowak, With such a repertoire of symbolic elements, the March 10 commemoration can indeed be seen as a key scenario, that is, as a ritual that publicly dramatizes both an ideal goal (proudly affirmed national identity) and the strategy for achieving it (self-conscious proclamation of ‘Tibetanness’ to and in the midst of others who are not Tibetan) (1984: 35).

A further dimension to the Tibetan independence movement that was emphasised by the Strasbourg proposal is the lack of unity amongst Tibetans. In theory, and from the Shangri-laist perspective, all Tibetans agree with the Dalai Lama and believe that he acts in their best interests. Therefore, it is presumed that, when the Dalai Lama took the decision at Strasbourg to aim for autonomy, this was the general wish of the Tibetan people. Ardley points to several problems with this idea: First, there are no indications from inside Tibet itself that the people who continually protest against Chinese rule are fighting for anything less than independence. Second, it is not uncommon for Tibetan people to state that while they support the Middle Way position of the Dalai Lama, which essentially calls for compromise, they also wish for an independent Tibet. This problem could be linked to the lack of democracy in the Tibetan exile polity; if a truly representative government in exile existed then such confusion may not arise. In the Tibetan exile community no such formal channels exist for aspirations to be formulated into policy. While unity exists in theory, it is clear that while the Dalai Lama officially champions autonomy many Tibetans, such as the Tibetan Youth Congress or the newly formed Rangzen Alliance, disagree and still wish to fight for independence (Ardley 2002: 170).

It is evident that respect for the Dalai Lama’s religious position prevents a large-scale opposition organisation from being formed that could continue to insist upon independence.

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Articulating Tibetan Nationalism-in-Exile Since nationalism itself is a particularised discourse of collective identity, a discursive approach may be extended to a discussion of Tibet as a nation and Tibetanness as a narrative of national identity. A unified Tibetan nation currently exists only through the anticipated (re)construction of its parts: occupied country, dispersed communities, and globally networked politico-cultural support system (Tibetan support groups) (Venturino 1997: 103). The most common dialectic for categorising the theories of nationalism is to divide them into ‘primordialist’ and ‘instrumentalist’ camps, where the former believe nations are extensions of previously human communities and the latter believe nations are creations of modern conditions and elites.19 The instrumentalist scholars of nationalism are often accused of over-emphasising the capacity of nationalism as an ideology to engender nations. Dibyesh Anand suggests that a ‘better approach would be to retain skepticism about the primordiality of the past and situate oneself somewhere in-between the instrumentalist-primordialist debate, adopting a more diversified and inclusive understanding of nationalism which highlights rather than obscures its cross-cultural variants’ (2000: 274). At this stage, it would be prudent to consider the ethnic theory of nation, the one that has an illustrious history and one which would aid in understanding Tibetan nationalism-in-exile. Ethnic nationalism, according to Dawa Norbu is ‘that politicized social consciousness centred upon an ethnic identity born out of shared commonalities, seeking to achieve unity, autonomy and group interest by mobilizing ethnic based constituencies’ (1992: 181). Central to this definition is the notion of ethnic identity, which may be defined as an aggregation of ethnic variables—such as race, culture, language, society, and so on—by which the ethnic group differentiates itself from generalised others. Since the primary function of ethnic identity is differentiation vis-à-vis others who do not share that identity, the required differentiation may be achieved by emphasising that ethnic variable which uniquely distinguishes a particular ethnic group from others around it (ibid.). Historically, the political control of the Dalai Lama did not extend beyond U-Tsang (now the Tibetan Autonomous Region), while Kham and Amdo (now part of Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gangsu and Yunan) were ruled by various small principalities with often overlapping influence. What bound the people in the regions was not an allegiance to one temporal

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authority, but certain commonalities of culture and religion. These elements may be seen as forming the basis of Tibetan ‘ethnie’, the features which Anthony Smith (1986: 21) includes in this are a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, a shared memory of rich ethnohistory, differentiating elements of a common culture, an association with specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of population. The failure of Tibetans to develop nationalism prior to 1950, which has been noted by Goldstein (1989), does not mean that pre-exile Tibetans did not have any sense of themselves as belonging to a distinct country. The beginnings of a cultural movement such as nationalism are not easy to trace. In Tibet, perhaps the first relevant document is the Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s proclamation upon his return from exile in 1913. In this proclamation, one can see an awareness of Tibet as a distinct country, defined by its culture and history. The Dalai Lama starts his proclamation by explaining his claim to sovereignty on the basis of a connection with Avalokiteshvara, which goes back to the time of the religious kings (chos rgyal ). He also traces the history of the relation between China and Tibet from the Yuan dynasty to the present, concluding that Tibet is a separate country. He then moves to issue five prescriptions, several of them bearing little direct connection with nationalism: Buddhism should be preserved, its schools should live in good harmony and officials should be honest. He also makes two points that are more directly related to nationalism: Tibet should strengthen its defence and expand its economic basis by allowing people to cultivate vacant land (ibid.: 60). The 1913 proclamation is significant for it indicates the recognition of Tibet as a distinct country that is to be defended and developed. Another significant step was the formation in 1954 of People’s Committees (mi dmang tshogs ‘du) among low-ranking officials and traders. This movement of protest against the Chinese occupation was in part motivated by the realisation that the ruling elites had failed to confront the Chinese and by the desire to oppose Chinese occupation directly (Shakya 1999: 144–47). A second more significant step in the formation of Tibetan nationalism was the creation of the ‘Four Rivers, Six Ranges’ (chubzhi gang drug) movement against the Chinese occupation organised by some rebel leaders from Khams. Shaken by events taking place in Khams and the bad omen reported throughout Tibet, a group of traders from Khams living in Lhasa decided to collect funds from all over Tibet to

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offer a golden throne to the Dalai Lama. On 4 July 1957, at a ceremony that took place in the Norbulingka in Lhasa, a large number of people came together to express their allegiance to their leader and their defence of the Chinese (ibid.: 165–70). Offering a golden throne to the Dalai Lama was seen as a way to express and strengthen the bond between the Tibetans and their leader. It was an attempt to reaffirm the power of the Dalai Lama over the land of Tibet. Retrospectively, this date, 4th July 1957, can be seen as marking the birth of Tibetan nationalism, the awareness that Tibetans have of belonging to a single country. The particularity of the nationalism that emerged in Tibet in the 1950s is that it deploys traditional religious themes to define the nation. Instead of adopting the secular lingua usually associated with modern nationalism, this nationalism defines the Tibetan nation using traditional Buddhist values such as compassion, karma, and the bond between Tibetans and Avalokiteshvara. The nation thus defined is not, however, traditional Tibet with its diversity of local cultural, social, and political communities but a modern country united by its opposition to Chinese oppression. The religious nature of this nationalism is well captured by the anthems sung by Tibetans in exile to express their national aspirations such as the ‘Prayer of Truthful Words’ (bden tshig smon lam) and the National Anthem. The particularity of both these songs, which are still used by Tibetans in exile for celebrations, such as 10 March, is that that they are modelled after traditional religious prayers. They contain traditional Buddhist motives such as the prayer for the continuation of the Buddhist teaching and the request to the Buddhas and bodhisattavas to help beings who are tormented by the unbearable suffering of karma (Michael 1985). One way to understand Tibetan religious nationalism is to relate it to the ideological and practical organisation of Tibetan political life. The religious themes contained in the ‘prayer of Truthful Words’ reflect the arrangements of Tibetan political life over several centuries. During this time, one of the dominant features of Tibetan politics has been the political role of Buddhism and the monastic order. Such arrangements have been solidified in the ideology described as ‘the union of the religious and the political’ (chos srid zung ‘brel). Historically, this ideology is the result of a complex situation created by the fall of the empire, the inability of non-monastic groups to establish lasting kingdoms, and the increasing political role of monastic groups. The nature of nationalism was further inflected by the experiences undergone by the Tibetan people both inside and outside Tibet after 1959.

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Generating Meanings in Exile The Buddhist doctrine of reincarnation and the idea of ‘taking refuge’ furnish Tibetan refugees with the intellectual framework for making sense of their being in exile. Inspired by the Dalai Lama, many Tibetans work hard through focused spiritual practice to regard the predicament of exile as a source of inner strength, which Diehl sees as an approach reminiscent of what Edward Said calls the ‘redemptive view of exile’ (1984: 47–55). Formal Buddhist belief and practice are, however, inadequate to understand the ensemble of Tibetan refugee experience. As Diehl notes, Assuming a correspondence between the philosophical ideals of a culture’s religious paradigm and the attitudes of the general population is neither ethnographically accurate nor fair to lay Tibetans, as such expectations are virtually impossible to meet. Such assumptions which are not uncommon in contemporary accounts of Tibetans may well be an act of transference that says more about the desires of Western Tibetophiles than about Tibetans themselves (2002: 113).

While the Dalai Lama asserts that when you are a monk, any place that is habitable becomes your country, most lay Tibetans in exile, as Diehl observes, feel deeply out of place and often fearful in India.20 The Tibetan case is no exception to this tendency since the orientation towards homeland has dominated most scholarship and discourse about Tibetan refugees (ibid.: 110). With a focus on the host society, Diehl looks at some of the ways Dharamsala refugees oppose themselves to ‘otherness’ within the Tibetan population itself.21 She observes, While events like the annual spring opera festival in Dharamsala bring most members of the community together, the round dances and songs that always follow special religious events, mark holidays, bless weddings and welcome in new years more often reveal and confirm the camaraderie of smaller communities within the larger exile community. Indeed the hesitancy of most Tibetans to jump spontaneously into a dance during a public celebration may point to a general professionalisation of traditional Tibetan arts over time due to a learned sense that these forms of expression are so important, even sacred, that ordinary folk cannot be trusted to do them correctly (ibid.: 98).

Since 1959, Tibetan refugees have been engaged in an ongoing confrontation of representations with Chinese officials in which the two

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sides compete to legitimise their own representations of Tibetan history as well as current events in Tibet. In recent years, a new dimension to the confrontation has emerged with the display of culture becoming one of the most important means through which Tibetan and Chinese claims to legitimacy are contested. Tibet activists’ use of cultural and religious performances for political purposes reflects the global emergence of ‘culture’ as a favoured idiom of political mobilisation for indigenous, minority, and diasporic groups. The narrative of Tibetan culture put forward by Tibet House is congruent with this traditional Tibetan religiopolitical framework and with the diasporic self-consciousness about Tibetanness, which emerged after 1959. From the earliest years of exile, Tibetan refugees were aware of the need to preserve Tibetan Buddhism, not only as a valued set of practices, but also as the basis for reconstituting a collective Tibetan identity in exile. Marcia S. Calkowski voices a fear of unclear boundaries or undesirable influences typical of conservative preservation efforts: Contemporary tape recordings from Tibet, India, Switzerland and the United States offer conflicting examples of inscribed tradition and various stage performances in the West mixing Tibetan artistes who embody tradition with those who pursue Eurasian pop and with those reflecting their Chinese musical training, blur genres for uneducated Western and Tibetan audiences (1997: 57).

Early encounters with sympathetic aid workers in India and Nepal and with western travellers reinforced Tibetans’ awareness of their culture as an asset and as a potentially important resource in the struggle to gain independence.22 In particular, the encounter with Indian hosts was important in developing the commitment to democratic values expressed in the constitution promulgated by the Dalai Lama in 1963. This constitution, in turn, inspired activists within Tibet, particularly the young monks and nuns who demonstrated against the Chinese rule in 1987–88. As Ronald D. Schwartz (1994) has shown, these young people saw the Dalai Lama’s stance as reflecting a progressive political position through his articulation of key Buddhist concepts such as compassion and the prohibition of killing. These young activists based their democratic principles on Buddhism, which is depicted as a set of non-dogmatic religious and moral principles compatible with human rights and democracy.

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At issue here is the Dalai Lama’s dual religious and political role, which, according to Ardley (2002), constitutes a profound obstacle to the Tibetan independence movement. While religion does not have the potential to be as divisive in the Tibetan community, given there is only one major religion, the placing of political events in religious contexts is a hindrance for the Tibetans, as is evident that respect for the Dalai Lama’s religious position prevents a large-scale oppositional organisation from being formed that could continue to insist upon independence. In facing the predicament of exile, the Dalai Lama constantly emphasises the need for refugees to maintain their traditions, not only for their own sake, but for the sake of Tibetans living in Tibet. For him, the Tibet issue is not a political matter but a spiritual struggle. By equating the Tibet issue with the preservation of Tibet’s spiritual heritage, a particular construction of Tibetan religion and culture itself becomes the object of political action.

Notes I am grateful to the anonymous referee for her/his valuable suggestions and comments on the paper. 1. After the Dalai Lama’s flight, the first report of an uprising in Lhasa was broadcast by the Voice of America on 22 March 1959 (see Sen 1960: 26). 2. Soon after his arrival in exile, the Dalai Lama founded many institutions at several levels for the preservation and representation of Tibetan culture in the diaspora: The Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts (in 1959), the Norbulingka Institute and the Tibet House in Delhi (in 1965), Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies (in 1969), Library of Tibetan Works and Archives at Dharamsala (in 1971). 3. There is a growing literature on the religious practices in Tibetan refugee settlements in India which describes the role of religion as one that corresponds to the need for ‘interpretability’, the need to find something comprehensible in the face of our deepest problems (see Schrempf 1995; Strom 1995). 4. With its invention of the word and world of ‘Shangri La’, it quickly became both a bestseller and a Hollywood success. 5. de Voe (1981) discusses the historical roots and the mutually beneficial dynamics of contemporary western financial support of Tibetan refugees. In Christiaan Klieger’s analysis of Tibetan nationalism as a modern manifestation of ‘patron-dyad’ (1989), it is argued that the refugees have been able to retain their status by converting the whole exile community as belonging to client category. 6. For an insight into Tibetan government-in-exile’s perspective on contemporary Tibet see ‘Tibet under Communist China’, Department of Information and International Relations, Central Tibetan Administration, Dharamsala 2001.

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7. For more on the problem of ‘return’ see Zetter (1994) who argues that the ambiguous identity of the refugees as both insiders and outsiders and the protracted political uncertainty of their status give contradictory messages about the likely scale, processes, and success of their return. 8. This notion used by Malkki (1995: 223) in relation to the Hutu refugees in Tanzania is akin to Diehl’s notion of ‘perceived ethnic integrity’. 9. This is evident from the many booklets that come out from the Department of Information and Foreign Affairs, Planning Commission and the Department of Home, Tibetan Government-in-Exile and TPPRC. 10. The term ‘mythico-history’, Malkki explains, is not ‘mythical in the sense of being false but in the sense of being concerned with order in a fundamental, cosmological sense’ (1995: 55). 11. Boundaries between Tibet and China were first established by a treaty in the 8th century CE, when the forces of the Tibetan empire dominated the Silk Road lands and challenged the Chinese Tang rulers (Kolas 1996: 52). 12. Samuel (1993) makes a distinction between ‘clerical Buddhism’ and ‘Shamanic Tantric Buddhism’. 13. Till date there is no study comparing the works of these contemporary Tibetan and Chinese authors. This may be because of the obviously polemical and hyperbolic rhetoric used in most English works on Tibet by Tibetans and Chinese that cause many readers to dismiss as propaganda those with which they do not agree. 14. Here marriage is a metaphor for China’s civilising mission towards backward people; it is similar to the Chinese view of their modernisation project in Tibet in contemporary times. 15. Hu’s phrase about civilising Tibet is still one of the frequently used slogans of the local government in Tibet. 16. The fourth item in the Dalai Lama’s Five Point Peace Plan 1987 was ‘restoration and protection of Tibet’s natural environment’. 17. Chinese official discourse frequently refers to the uniqueness of Tibetan culture as well, but focuses on what are seen as its non-religious aspects, such as the medieval system or the Gesar epics. 18. Most of the protest inside Tibet against Chinese rule has been spearheaded by monks and nuns who, in large numbers, have taken to the streets of Lhasa several times in the past few decades. 19. In the rhetoric of nationalism, what is ignored is that the need to present one’s own community as a nation is a modern day phenomenon. More often than not, the proponents of nationalism take a primordialist view of nationalism. Nationalist movements in most places trace their genealogy to antiquity. 20. Diehl arrives at this conclusion despite the results of one of Saklani’s survey questions to which 75 per cent of the Tibetan refugees who responded chose ‘India Only’ as their choice of country of domicile (1984: 356). 21. The widespread evidence of this fact is the marginalisation of the newly arrived refugees in Dharmsala. 22. Among diasporic Tibetans, this awareness of ‘culture’ exists more strongly in Dharamsala than in any other Tibetan settlement in India. Several factors account for this. As Calkowski argues, ‘. . . Dharamsala’s economy has become inseparable from the presentation and promotion of Tibetan culture’ (1991: 645).

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References Adams, Vincanne. 1996. ‘Karaoke as modern Lhasa, Tibet: Western encounters with cultural politics’, Cultural anthropology, 11 (4): 510–46. Anand, Dibyesh. 2000. ‘(Re)imagining nationalism: Identity and representation in the Tibetan diaspora of South Asia’, Contemporary South Asia, 9 (3): 271–87. Ardley, Jane. 2002. The Tibetan independence movement: Political, religious and Gandhian perspectives. London/New York: Routledge Curzon. Barnett, Robert. 2001. ‘Violated specialness: Western political representations of Tibet’, in Thierry Dodin and Heinz Rather (eds.): Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projections, and Fantasies (269–316). Boston: Wisdom Publications. Bishop, Peter. 1989. The myth of Shangri La: Travel writing and the western creation of sacred landscape. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Calkowski, Marcia S. 1991. ‘A day at the Tibetan opera: Actualized performance and spectacular discourse’, American ethnologist, 18 (4): 643–57. ———. 1997. ‘The Tibetan diaspora and the politics of performance’, in Frank J. Korom (ed.): Tibetan culture in the diaspora (51–58). Vienna: Austrian Academy of Science Press. Cohon, Donald J. 1981. ‘Psychological adaptation and dysfunction among refugees’, International migration review, 15 (1–2): 255–75. Conway, John. 1975. ‘The Tibetan community in exile’, Pacific affairs, 48 (1): 74–86. de Voe, Dorsh M. 1981. ‘Framing refugees as clients’, International migration review, 15 (1–2): 88–94. Diehl, Keila. 2002. Echoes from Dharamsala: Music in the life of a refugee community. Berkeley, CA: California University Press. Epstein, Israel. 1983. Tibet transformed. Beijing: New World Press. Forbes, Ann. 1989. Settlements of hope: An account of Tibetan refugees in Nepal (Cultural Survival Report 31). Cambridge, MA: Cultural Survival Inc. Goldstein, Melvyn C. 1978. Ethnogenesis and resource competition among Tibetan refugees in South India: A new face to the Indo-Tibetan interface’, in J.F. Fisher (ed.): Himalayan anthropology: The Indo-Tibetan interface (395–420). Paris: Mouton. ———. 1989. A history of modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The demise of the Lamaist state. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Grunfeld, Tom. 1988. The making of modern Tibet. Bombay: Oxford University Press. Harrell-Bond, H.E. 1986. Imposing aid: Emergency assistance to refugees. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hilton, James. 1933. Lost horizon. London: Macmillan. Klieger, Christiaan. 1989. Accomplishing Tibetan identity: The constitution of a national consciousness. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawai’i. Kolas, Ashild. 1996. Tibetan nationalism: The politics of religion. Journal of peace research, 33 (1): 51–66. Lopez, Donald S. 1999. Prisoners of Shangri La: Tibetan Buddhism and the west. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Malkki, Liisa. 1992. ‘National geographic: The rooting of peoples and the territorialization of National identity among scholars and refugees’, Cultural anthropology, 7 (1): 24–44. ———. 1995. Purity and exile: Violence, memory and national cosmology among Hutu refugees in Tanzania. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

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McGranahan, Carole. 2005. ‘Truth, fear and lies: Exile politics and arrested histories of the Tibetan resistance. Cultural anthropology, 20 (4): 570–600. Michael, Franz. 1985. ‘Survival of a culture: Tibetan refugees in India’, Asian survey, 25 (7): 737–44. Nora, Pierre. 1989. ‘Between memory and history’, Representations, 26 (Special issue on ‘Memory and counter memory’): 7–24. Norbu, Dawa. 1992. Culture and politics of third world nationalism. London: Routledge. Nowak, Margaret. 1984. Tibetan refugees: Youth and the new generation of meaning. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Palakshappa, T.C. 1978. Tibetans in India: A case study of Mundgod Tibetans. New  Delhi: Sterling Publications. Powers, John. 2004. History as propaganda: Tibetan exiles versus the People’s Republic of China. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Richardson, Hugh. 1962. Tibet and its history. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Said, Edward. 1984. Mind of winter: Reflections on life in exile. Harper’s Magazine. Saklani, Girija. 1984. The uprooted Tibetans in India: A sociological study of continuity and change. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications. Samuel, G. 1993. Civilized shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan societies. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press. Schrempf, Mona. 1995. ‘From “devil dance” to “world healing”: Some representations, perspectives and innovations of contemporary Tibetan ritual dances’, in Frank J. Korom (ed.): Tibetan culture in the diaspora (33–50). Vienna: Austrian Academy of Science Press. Schwartz, Ronald D. 1994. Circle of protest: Political ritual in Tibetan uprising. London: Hurst and Co. Sen, Chanakya. 1960. Tibet disappears. Bombay: Asia Publishing House. Shakya, Tsering. 1999. Dragon in the land of snows: History of modern Tibet since 1947. New York: Columbia University Press. Smith, Anthony. 1986. The ethnic origins of nations. New York: Blackwell Publishers. Strom, Axel K. 1995. ‘Between Tibet and the west: On traditionality, modernity and the development of monastic institutions in the Tibetan diaspora’, in Frank J. Korom (ed.): Tibetan culture in the diaspora (33–50). Vienna: Austrian Academy of Science Press. Tambiah, Stanley J. 1976. World conqueror and world renouncer: A study of Buddhism and polity in Thailand against a historical background. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre (TPPRC). 1998. Political Philosophy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. New Delhi: TPPRC. Venturino, Steven. 1997. ‘Reading negotiations in the Tibetan diaspora’, in Frank J. Korom (ed.): Constructing Tibetan culture: Contemporary perspectives (98–121). Quebec: World Heritage Press. Zetter, Roger. 1994. ‘The Greek-Cypriot refugees: Perceptions of return under conditions of protracted exile’, International migration review, 28 (2): 307–22.

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5 The Significance of Culture in the Understanding of Social Change in Contemporary India Yogendra Singh

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ulture is a unique human reality. It emanates from the unity of humankind in nature, but it situates itself as a meta-natural reality. It is manifested in the technological, mental, moral, social, aesthetic and spiritual achievements of humankind. Culture gives meaning to our relationship with the other, as it also forms our subjective identity. Culture, therefore, enters into the processes of social change in many forms and at various levels. It defines the quality of social change as its indicator. By selective adaptations to outside cultural forces, it acquires a large measure of resilience. With all its institutional pervasiveness, it has a core which acts as a filter or a moderator of external forces of cultural contact and change. This also explains why in each mainstream culture one may discover the existence of sub-cultures and counter-cultures.

Paradigm Shifts Sociologists have been studying culture since the beginning of sociology in India, which roughly corresponds to the establishment of British rule and the rise of the national movement. The trauma of the colonial

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experience inspired the Indian sociologists to undertake a critical appraisal of indigenous cultural traditions, which, at the same time, made them conscious of the strong points of Western culture. The paradigm of cultural studies that evolved through this historicity led them to debate on how the Indian tradition in its essential form could be made to adapt with Western culture without a loss of its core values or cultural identity. A deeper analysis of the textual sources, the cross-cultural comparisons of dominant traits and themes, and a critical evaluation of the Western constructions of Indian culture and its evolution were the main preoccupations of this period. This trend came to be re-oriented to empiricalethnographic studies of cultures. One set of studies contributed richly to the understanding of tribal cultures and their linkages with other cultures, such as those of the peasants, castes and regions. Yet another set of studies, largely under the influence of American social anthropologists, focused upon the phenomenon of culture in the context of the Indian community and its folk tradition. A distinctive feature of this approach, however, was its sensitivity to the analysis of the interactions between culture and civilization (Unnithan, Deva and Singh 1965). The main indicator of the former, (i.e. culture) as used, was the spoken language or the oral tradition, and of the latter, the written or the textual-elite tradition. The folk-elite dimension of culture was, however, not treated as a static continuum but as a historical reality embedded at the respective levels. Studies which used this paradigm yielded rich insights into the structure and organization of the Indian cultural traditions. They also brought out in concrete terms the extent and direction of linkages that the local cultures maintained with the cosmopolitan culture. The folkelite and textual-contextual ties in cultural practices, beliefs and traditions were empirically mapped out. Community as a unit of cultural studies gave way to the concept of ‘systems’ which formed the basis of a new paradigm of cultural study through the notions of modernization. The focus of such studies shifted to studying the relationship that culture maintains with forces of technological, economic, political and institutional developments in a society. Largely a product of the EuroAmerican social sciences, the modernization paradigm of cultural studies was received in India with cautious criticism. Indian sociologists made their own conceptual and methodological innovations. A sharp distinction was drawn between Westernization and modernization, locating the latter process in the cultural-historical individuality of each society

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and its initial historical conditions (Singh 1973). The recognition of this factor was far-sighted; the existence of plural traditions or patterns of modernization are today widely acknowledged even by the earlier skeptics (Eisenstadt 1988). We encounter now several resurgent cultural responses to modernization, such as the Confucian, Islamic, Judaic and Hindu, in addition to the traditional Euro-Christian origin of this process in the past. The caution of the Indian sociologists has been amply vindicated. The system’s boundary in the theory of cultural modernization was based upon the assumption of its inherent and universal rationality. Its edifice soon fell as the backwash effects of technological and industrial growth such as ecological decay, decline in family values, sharpening edges of the disguised exploitations, feelings of alienation among individuals and the disintegration in the structure and values of community life took alarming forms. This disenchantment with modernization probably added to the rise of the post-modernist debate, and its paradigms for the study of culture. Its precursor, the cultural analysis paradigm, made innovations by studying culture in its symbolic depth; it focused upon exploration of its latent codes, structures of meanings and semiotic forms. It did not reject totally the notions of structure or system, but recognized the variations and multiplicity of themes in the cultural space within a single community or a regional group (Singh 1986). Post-modernism, on the other hand, rejects such assumptions in totality and seeks to explore culture by breaking down the idea of a system from inside-out as it were, and by the process of deconstruction of a culture’s linguistic (spoken written) text. The post-modernist response to the study of culture rests in its method as well as in its critique of the aberrations of the contemporary post-industrial civilization. Or is it itself a symptom of this aberration? However, Indian sociologists have just begun to evaluate its significance for the understanding of the cultural processes and its implications for social change. It is a measure of the resilience of Indian scholars that they have maintained an acute critical consciousness in the face of the newly emerging paradigms of cultural studies originating in the West. Their focus has been on historicity of the Indian culture and civilization, towards indigenization of methods and theories and upon constructive criticism of paradigms of Western origin. This approach is intrinsic to the evolution of methods and theories for culture studies, and it has

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proved viable as now the use of singular paradigms are being increasingly replaced by ‘paradigm mixes’ both in sociology and culturology (Erasov and Singh 1991).

Contemporary Cultural Changes Many visible and significant cultural changes have taken place in India since independence. The lifestyle and leisure time activities of the people have changed. This includes modes of consumption, dress, use of synthetic material or artefacts, modes of transport, among others. There also was a weakening of the traditional interdictions on the consumption of meat and poultry. The consumption of fruits, vegetables and milk products has consequently spread to a much wider base. The ‘green revolution’ that took place in the 1970s is now supplemented by a ‘white revolution’. Data provided by the Peoples of India (POI) survey and the National Sample Surveys to a large extent supports these observations. Whereas on the one hand ethnic and regional self-consciousness and a sense of identity of the castes, tribes, minorities and regional groups is increasing, on the other there is evidence of the prevalence of many integrative cultural processes within our society which contribute to the growth of a holistic consciousness. There is increased inter-regional migration which makes it possible for regional cultural traits, culinary products, cultural performances, ritual forms, styles of dress and ornamentation to intermix with other forms. The POI has identified 91 cultural regions within India. Almost each state has plural cultural patterns with the possible exception of Goa ‘which forms a cultural zone’ (see Singh 1992: 53). The consumption profile of 4,635 communities of India which emerges from the POI survey belies the stereotype image of India as being engrossed in ‘other-worldly asceticism’ (see Singh 1992). In matters of consumption the practice of non-vegetarianism is on the increase. Among some communities there is a parallel movement towards vegetarianism. The use of alcohol is in vogue in some form or the other among about 50 per cent of the total communities in India. Lately, a rise in its consumption in several of our states has become a matter of concern. The emerging consumption profile of our people indicates the cultural resilience of the past and the present aspects of our tradition. On the other hand it also suggests how susceptible our consumption

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behaviour is to temptations of gross and unmindful consumerism. Even though relatively small, a substantial section of the upwardly mobile population in our society may be a victim of temptations. A movement for balance and temperance is necessary. Notwithstanding this fact, the continuity of a high level of cultural resilience represented by a rising middle class, now more than 200 million in number, ensures product and market diversification, so necessary for rapid economic growth. Considering its sociological features in the agrarian, industrial and service sectors of the economy, this class may also discourage mindless consumerism and show more proclivity towards savings and investments. The fragile balance between values (of entrepreneurship) and disvalues (of mindless consumerism) should be the focus of vigilance through continued education. Integrative changes in our culture are also taking place in several other directions. An analysis of cultural values and practices of Indian communities in terms of culture traits indicates significant commonalities, particularly within ‘macro-regions’. Interestingly, these culture traits are shared, irrespective of differences in religion, caste and tribe. ‘There is very high correlation of traits between the SCs and STs, between STs and Hindus, between the Hindus and the Sikhs (and) the Hindus and Muslims (which is very high indeed)’, reports the POI survey. Many traits are shared by a large number of communities in India. In terms of language behaviour, there has been a phenomenal growth in bilingualism in India in the past two decades. The 1961 census estimated bi-lingualism to be 9.7 per cent; it grew to 13.4 per cent in 1971. The POI survey estimates the extent of bi-lingualism at about 64.2 per cent. This signifies expansive growth in cultural interactions among people of different linguistic regions through migration, trade, communication exposures and cultural and social mobility of the people.

Ethnicity, Cultural Identity and Change Major occupational and techno-cultural changes have taken place in our society due to political, social and economic developments. These changes have promoted linkages and interactions among castes, tribes, religious groups and cultural regions. We notice the magnitude of the spread effect of these cultural changes across regions and ethnic boundaries. These developments have, however, also reinforced people’s selfconsciousness and narrow cultural identities organized on principles of

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ethnicity, religion, caste, language and region. The process of cultural integration on a national scale has grown but with a simultaneous increase in the search for cultural autonomy. This process can be noticed among the tribes, not only as manifested in their political demands, but also in their movements, such as ‘return to tribal religion’ despite their religion of conversion. Among the Dalits there is a powerful movement for cultural autonomy. It reflects their longstanding disenchantment with Braha-manical caste-Hinduism (see, Gore 1993; Omvedt 1994; Singh 1993; Singh 2994: 11). The intensity of media exposure, political participation and the competitive outlook towards social mobility have added strength to these processes. Politicization of religion is reflected in conscious distortions of meaning and uses of religious symbols, artefacts and rituals. The traits common among various religions of India are suppressed and those articulating distinction and separation are highlighted. There is an increased tendency towards parochialization of culture or its symbolic forms. In the context of overall social change, it is essential to examine the relationship of the demands for cultural autonomy or ethnicity with the processes of cultural integration in Indian society as a whole. Sociological studies suggest the existence of a viable linkage between these two otherwise contradictory processes. The cultural integration of diverse entities in the pan-Indian society has had a long history in India. Its matrix was that of a civilization. This civilization was not subsumed in, but outcrossed religious, ethnic, linguistic and regional boundaries. It subsisted upon interdependence among diverse plural social entities established through technology, production processes, trade, market and circulation of products and of personnel engaged in the pursuit of crafts, art, aesthetics, knowledge and learning. It is coincidental that Hinduism, the mainstream religion, has contributed to the reinforcement of this civilization. As Louis Renou says: Hinduism is a way of life, a mode of thought, that becomes second nature. It is not so much its practices that are important, for they can be dispensed with; nor is it the Church, since it has no priesthood, or at least no sacerdotal hierarchy. The important thing is to accept certain fundamental conceptions, to acknowledge a certain ‘spirituality’, a term much abused in current parlance (1953: 56).

It was possible for this religio-cultural mainstream to sustain or even thrive upon pluralities of religious faiths, practices and social groupings such as

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tribe, caste or minority faiths. Thus, diverse forms of cultural and social identities flourished under the diffuse umbrella of the Indian civilization. No single identity or faith threatened the existence of the other. The dispensation of cultural coexistence was founded upon a typical equilibrium established by a pre-industrial technology, mode of production and its social and political institutions. The two revolutions, one industrial and the other republican, have totally altered this traditional equilibrium. Industrial revolution generates demand for nationbuilding; it is followed by a search for a world community or global civilization. In the process of evolution through these two phases, the local and regional cultural identities feel threatened. The political process of nation-building and its economic-industrial correlates sharpen inequalities, at least in the initial phases; there is pressure for conformity and standardization in institutional relationships, such as the economy, power structure, education, recreation, information and a whole range of services. The more pressure there is for giving legitimacy to these macro-institutions, the more sense of unease, often resentment, there is among localized cultural identities based on tribal, caste or religious groupings. Ironically, the fear of the over-arching national or global institutions has not subsided despite the growth in the economy and polity. The passage from the industrial to the post-industrial phase of social, economic and cultural development is not reassuring in several vital areas of human concerns, or the well being of the basic institutions, such as family and community, the protection of the identity of cultural minorities, the practice of voluntaristic consensus methods in place of the use of power or domination in cultural negotiations or decision making, and the preservation of the natural habitat of humankind and its quality. India holds a unique position in the process of this transition. Here, we witness a conjuncture of cultural institutions and values belonging to the pre-industrial agrarian society with those which coincide with the cultural values of industrial capitalism. In a narrow, as yet a nascent, form we may also witness the presence of symptoms of a post-industrial phase of cultural development in India. This makes the task of sociologists studying culture most exciting, as also most challenging. Happily, the social structures and institutions in our country have traditionally favoured the preservation of the cultural identities of minority groups; the rich interaction between the folk and elite cultures has ensured their success, and preserved cultural autonomy of plural identities in a loosely

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structured notion of a civilization. The cultural policies implemented after independence have in a large measure been sensitive to the need for preservation of such identities. But as we try to establish the national framework of an industrial society possessing the potential for a postindustrial phase of development, many pressures are generated which may clash with the local cultural identities. These may be perceived as a threat by various cultural levels in our society.

Communication, Culture and Economic Change An important dimension of such perceptions is located in the contemporary processes of culture change in relation to the national paradigm of social and economic development. The past orientalist pronouncement that Indian culture, being other-worldly and fractured by segmentary divisions into caste, tribe, and the like, would not help but rather hinder the growth of a modern economy and a democratic polity has been proved erroneous. Castes, tribes, family institutions and religions, as illustrated by sociological studies, have richly contributed to the growth in agricultural and industrial entrepreneurship, and to modern systems of professions, education, technology and science. The core values of the oral cultural tradition, which encouraged a culture of debates and articulation, and which encouraged creative interaction with the written culture, have proved helpful in the indigenization of democratic values and the integration of diversities. The absence of such cultural processes in the core values of a society may render the passage to democracy rather difficult. The oral tradition of the folk culture also reinforces the roots of cultural pluralism and preservation of local cultural identities. The core cultural values and institutions of India which are enshrined in its folk culture, have served to strengthen the foundations of Indian society, as they have interacted deeply with its literary or textual cultural traditions. This process integrates the micro-level of cultural institutions with those at the macro-level of institutionalization. There also exists a ‘dialectical relationship between the literary tradition of the folk, Dalit and insurgents and the mainstream literary tradition’ (see, Singh 1988: 45). As we slowly enter into the industrial phase of capitalist development, several new cultural challenges are bound to be encountered, and most of

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these merit formulation of far-sighted policies. The massive entry of the mass-media, the universalization of communication through radio and television, the proliferation in the number of English and vernacular language newspapers, journals, magazines and the technological availability of global information systems through satellites are bringing about a hitherto unknown degree of information-entertainment revolution. Mounted as this ‘revolution’ is on the chariot of market-capitalism with propensity for endless profit making, it may tend increasingly to convert culture into a commodity. The emphasis may shift from content to packaging of culture. Not assimilation or integration, but its marketing is an orientation which may usher culture into an unfamiliar domain, that of cutthroat competition with a market ethos. The revolution in information and communication technology, together with an increase in the means of transport, extended networking of markets of culture industries, such as tourism, inter-cultural meets and exchanges, institutionalized exchange of cultural objects and so on, contribute to a globalization of culture. The process is bound to increase and exert ever new pressures as we march from the industrial to the post-industrial phase of development. The new cultural challenges that these phenomena give rise to are many. They may augment the real as well as perceived threats to local and smaller cultural identities due to massification and marketization of culture. They may lead to non-institutionalized modes of intercultural contacts, such as through tourism, marketing of culture object, leisure-enterprises, such as hotels, and tourist resorts, which may be an imposition on local or regional communities. In this process the decontextualization and displacement of meanings and values of cultural objects may increase. Its impact upon values, cultural practices, ecology and mental and physical health and quality of life of the people may be disastrous. The consequent erosion of values and structures of folk culture, and the decay in its creative relationship with the mainstream cultural tradition may be directly related to the growth in new leisure and culture markets. If in the meantime the traditional family system and the community or neighbourhood bonds weaken, as has happened in many developed societies, the new cultural changes may portend major crises in our society. As of now our traditional social institutions, such as family, caste, tribe, community and neighbourhood are able to show resilience. The Indian people have also shown cultural resilience in the decodification of the symbols projected by the mass media. The people have largely behaved

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as an ‘active audience’ or as ‘producers of meanings’ (see, Schiller 1988) in respect of the messages received from the mass media. The long exposure of the Indian middle classes to Euro-American culture through the English language adds additional resilience to their exposure to Western cultural institutions. In the words of the Japanese social anthropologist, Chie Nakane, ‘If there is a meeting place of East and West, it is in India, not Japan’ (1988: 62). This may be a generous remark, but it has a basis in our history. However, despite our cultural resilience the quality and institutional organization of the mass-based, market and commodityoriented new cultural forces are most likely to cause dislocations. They may give rise to subcultures directly in conflict with the general cultural values or practices. Moreover, mass culture is backed by the faceless striking power of technology and the massive organization of market capitalism (see Disanayake 1988: 26–40). The relevance of a cultural policy assumes significance in this context. Indeed, it is valid that the core and the creative domains of the culture of a people are the product of the spontaneous and innovative responses, both individual and collective, and these cannot be planned or orchestrated by a cultural policy. Nevertheless, in the context of cultural challenges that are most likely to be generated by market-capitalism, information-technology and the pressures of the globalization of culture, a policy framework to meet the challenges becomes inevitable. In our country, such a cultural policy will have to be organically linked with the policies of our social and economic development. Probably the urgent needs at one level, say, the cultural level, would of necessity have to be reflected at the other, for example in the policy of economic globalization or liberalization. Broadly, such a policy framework must take into account the need to enrich and protect local and regional cultural values, practices and identities in the process of the cultural exposure to mega-institutions of mass communication and marketization. No doubt there is evidence to suggest that the expansion of electronic technologies such as computers and telecommunication cultural systems, with balanced level of economic growth and emphasis upon distributive processes for social mobility, resolves the problems of cultural identity, creates a sense of confidence or pride in people’s heart in respect of their situation and, correspondingly, the fear of cultural dependency comes down or withers away. The Japanese experience indicates that a strong economy and superior technology tend to resolve rather than cause cultural identity problem. Moreover, ‘the cultural

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identity problem is considered to occur when cultural change is so drastic as to destroy the sense of continuity’ (Youchi 1988: 196–201). Again the ‘lesson drawn from Japanese experience is that the cultural identity problem is more strongly influenced by the present than the past, its origin or its history’ (Ibid.). The temporariness of creating new cultural identities by myth-making is also self-evident in India, but the Japanese experience suggests the need for a strong link between cultural policy, economic policy and technology policy. In the process of creating this linkage, the involvement of people, the decentralization of the decision-making process, use of a multimedia approach to communication of culture and value-sensitization of the market oriented mega-cultural institutions and organizations would be necessary. The emphasis on plurality, identity and continuity is essential not only for a healthy direction and quality of cultural development in India, but also for its most effective role in bringing about social change in our society. A sudden discontinuity in culture can be politically destabilizing just as a lack of creative response to adapt and change can be stultifying and socially degenerative. A creative balance between continuity and change in cultural policy is, therefore, essential for us to achieve our future goal.

References Disanayake, Wimal. 1988. ‘Communication, Knowledge and a Post-Industrial Society: The Need for a Value-Centred Approach’, in Christian Academy (ed.), The World Community in Post-Industrial Society. Seoul: Wooseok Publishing Co. Erasov, B. and Y. Singh. 1991. The Sociology of Culture. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Eisenstadt, S. N. 1988. ‘How do Cultures of the East and the West Meet the Challenges of Acculturation in Global Industrialization? One or Several Modern Civilizations?’, in Christian Academy (ed.), Encounter Between the East and the West and the Creation of a Global Culture. Seoul: Wooseok Publishing Co. Gore, M. S. 1993. The Social Context of an Ideology. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Chie Nakane, 1988. ‘Distance Between Cultures’, in Christian Academy (ed.), Encounter Between the East and the West. Omvedt, Gail. 1994. Dalits and the Democratic Revolution: Dr Ambedkar and the Dalit Movement in Colonial India. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Renou, Louis. 1953. Religion of Ancient India. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal. Schiller, H. 1988. ‘Current Views of Information and Media Power’, in Christian Academy (ed.), Encounter Between the East and the West. Singh, S. K. 1992. People of India: An Introduction. Calcutta: Anthropological Survey of India. ———. 1994. The Scheduled Tribes. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

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Singh, Y. 1973. Modernization of Indian Tradition. New Delhi: Thompson Press. ———. 1986. Indian Sociology: Social Conditioning and Emerging Concerns. New Delhi: Vistaar Publishers. ———. 1993. Social Change in India: Crisis and Resilience. New Delhi: Har Anand Publications. ———. 1988. ‘Literature and Social Change: A Sociological Perspective’, Indian Horizons, 22 (3–4). Youchi Ito. 1988. ‘Beyond Cultural Dependency: A Japanese Case’, in Christian Academy (ed.), Continuity and Change in Communications in Post-Industrial Society. Seoul: Wooseok Publishing Co. Unnithan, T. K. Indra Deva and Yogendra Singh. 1965. Towards a Sociology of Culture. New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India.

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6 Cultural Integration and Changing Values: A Study of Value System of Educated Youth Yogendra Singh

I

n the present paper an attempt has been made to study the nature and pattern of value system of educated youth in India and its probable consequences in culture change and socio-cultural integration. The study is confined to 288 university students of post-graduate standard who commonly share the condition of selective exposure to university sub-culture, thinking and ideologies and professional milieu, who also suffer from the basic and uniform anxieties to which they are partners. Thus, partly due to their bio-psychological characteristics and its contingent responsibilities but mainly due to the insecurities and anomalies of the educational system, an extension of the insecurities of the social system itself, they may be said to be on quest of their destiny! Such a situation, from many points, offers a very sensitive and very potential area of investigation specially with reference to the problem of valueconsensus, and value integration and crisis. This paper seeks to analyse some of these problems. It is divided into four parts. The first part offers theoretical analysis of some broad problems of cultural integration in India; the second part explains the objective and plan of this study; the third part embodies the substantive portion of the study and part four is a qualitative analysis of the main trends of changing values of youth.

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I The process of cultural integration is increasingly becoming a key problem in the study of social change in contemporary Indian society. In course of the substantive and methodological development in social sciences, it has also become a point of confluence of many disciplines, e.g. philosophical anthropology, cultural anthropology, sociology, psycho-analysis and psychology.1 The convergence of these disciplines and growth of inter-disciplinary concepts and areas, has nevertheless, not altogether resolved the controversy regarding the functional versus philosophichistorical problems of cultural integration. The various approaches to the study of culture and value system as mentioned earlier have either an implicit or a systematically formulated theory of culture change deriving it from various levels of theoretical abstraction also called models.2 A closer scrutiny of these models such as the ‘symbolic’ the ‘aesthetic’, the ‘logical’, the ‘functional’, and that of ‘natural sciences’ as described by Lang bring adequately to bear upon us the fact that the phenomena of cultural integration from a dynamic view point still involve the problems of ‘basic polarity’ as regards the nature, direction and pattern of integration. Various theoretical developments which have syncreticised to enhance this polarity in the concepts of cultural integration are derived from two fundamentally different assumptions regarding the ontological basis of culture and its genesis. The one emphasises transcendental and divine basis of culture as Revelation which has to pass through progressive stages of cultural involution having a finalistic determinism of its course, and a hierarchical basis of its emanation. These thinkers assume firstly, that each culture has a ‘Geist’ the origin of which lies in spiritual forces beyond the ken of human power and once in the process of involution their restoration (the problem of integration, synthesis being logically ruled out) would depend upon Divine Will; secondly, that all modern cultures (more so industrial) are deviations from the standards of ‘normal’ society and industrial civilization is “neither human nor normal an anomaly not to say a monstrosity”3 thirdly, that the consequence of the encounter of various cultures and value—system would not result into cultural synthesis but their separate and mutual decay. The protagonists of this school of thought can be found both in the West, e.g. Schuon F., Rene Guenon, C. G. Jung Ariendt N. H., etc. as well as in

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the East such as Coomarswamy, Bhakwandas and Saran.4 The theoretical position of some of these Eastern thinkers too is, however, Westernderived and the overall nature of construct-abstractions of all of them oscillates between the logical and the theological foundations of analysis. The other view point of culture and values though it may be internally differentiated on the principles of integration between symboliclogical versus causal-functional modes, agree fundamentally on, firstly, that ‘culture’ is a bio-psycho-social reality which inspite of being a category sui genri has logico-empirical basis; secondly, that each culture is a configuration or pattern of meanings and symbols and values which are in dynamic inter-relationship and which have a functional (in some cases dysfunctional and non-functional) basis of integration, and thirdly, that culture at each stage of its configuration is a dynamic process of synthesis and change. This viewpoint is, however, commonly held by the sociologists and social anthropologists belonging to the functional or neo-function school of culture. Both of these theories of culture, it may be pointed out, have their own interpretation of value systems. To the former, values are transcendental, emanating from the Tradition and its ‘Principles’ whereas to the latter values arc normative constructs which though outcross into the sphere of ‘meaning’ and symbols, yet have vital linkage with the socio-cultural processes of ‘society’. They have also the dialectical quality of change, continuity and synthesis. The rather elaborate reference to these theoretical issues of cultural integration has been made because a crucial problem in the study of social change in contemporary India hinges at the possibility and desirability of cultural synthesis. The majority of thinkers, sociologists and social scientists have accepted the constantly synthesising and dialectical process of cultural change in India. They quote evidences from Indian philosophy, art, science, social structure, rituals and customs to substantiate this hypothesis. The nature of this synthesis has differed in different stages of India’s socio-cultural history. Until the emergence of the British empire the process was generally of cultural assimilation and radiation. With the establishment of the British rule it became a problem of cultural encounter and conflict, between two systems of values, and worldview, that of the East and the West. Cultural and political renaissance during the rule of the British and after their departure from this country did not minimise this conflict; it rather accentuated the rate of this conflict through measures, constitutional, legislative, institutional and structural. Some of these had only to be reinforced

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such as the educational system, bureaucratic elite, industrial and white collar profession and a national administration and army. Others were introduced for the first time, e.g., the adoption of the Constitution, the parliamentary democratic system, the legislative reforms for secular social organisation and culture; and heavy emphasis on industrialisation and growth of rationalistic-technological-worldview. Such a trend in the sphere of cultural choice has been conditioned on one hand by the growth of a substantial middle class.5 and on the other a type of politicocultural leadership imbued with Western ideology and worldview both to a great extent the fruit of the British rule. The instrumental significance of these two factors, is highest for India, which is aspiring for accelerated rate of social change.

II The objective of the present study is to attempt an empirical investigation of changing value system and the emerging pattern of this change. Its implication to qualitative direction and trend of social change also constitute a very significant though incidental part. The study is confined to only a limited sub-structure of our society, e.g. the postgraduate students of colleges’6 but the choice of this has been motivated by certain theoretical assumptions. Firstly, it has been assumed that a study of value integration and change should be studied at a level of social structure where it has relatively higher degree of situational and personal elements of culture—contact. Secondly, the various ramifications of value-integration would be more clearly delineated where the involvement to the situation is institutionally reinforced, because the exposure to non-traditional values are assumed to be highest among students. Moreover, their closeness to the search of employment after education renders this involvement further acute. In the first stage of enquiry four major aspects of value system were delineated. These include, (1) value entering into the foci of social organisation; (2) values regarding social motivation (incentives for progress, wealth, industrialisation, etc.); (3) values symbolising worldview. Each of these value dimensions were suitably split up into subcategories for which value-statements were prepared. These value statements constituted the questionnaire where the responses indicating agreement—disagreement were recorded on a five point scale.

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The sample fraction of enquiry after the rejection of some questionnaires consisted of 288 students. Underlying assumption in the whole study is that cultural synthesis has been constantly taking place in India, but never before the process was so deliberate, planned and sustained as at present. Hence greater need to analyse the problem today for the following reasons. Firstly, it is necessary to find out as to how far and to what extent, the traditional values and worldview etc. are being replaced by the modern technological, liberal and scientific values and worldview; secondly, within the various dimensions of value-orientation what is the differential rate of change and response to similar situational stimuli; thirdly, on the basis of the previous two aspects of change, with what stresses and strains will the Indian social structure be confronted in the times to come and what anticipatory planning should be undertaken. On some of these problems this study has a direct bearing whereas on others the analysis may be purely inferential.

III Social Structural Values Study of values related to the social structure and organisation have been made with the help of four value statements (Table No. 1). The first three of them constitute a continuum of ascription-achievement value Table 1 Showing Students’ Responses to Values on Social Stratification (Structure). (Percentages of Tolal Responses are in the Brackets) Value Statements 1

Strongly Agree 2

Agree 3

Do not Know 4

Disagree 5

Strongly Disagree 6

Total 7

Birth determines status

28 (9.7)

57 (19.8)

22 (7.6)

113 (39.3)

68 (23.6)

288 (100.0)

Both birth as well as achievement determine status

82 (28.6)

119 (42.5)

29 (10.7)

46 (13.9)

12 (4.3)

288 (100.0)

Only achievement determines status

21 (7.3)

95 (32.9)

39 (13.5)

81 (28.2)

51 (18.1)

288 (100.0)

The distinctions of caste and class be abolished

42 (14.6)

110 (38.2)

31 (10.8)

63 (21.9)

42 (14.5)

288 (100.0)

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orientations and the fourth refers to values regarding class and casteless society. The three value statements about status allocation principle are (1) birth determines status; (2) both birth and personal achievements determine status and (3) only personal achievement determines status. More than sixty percent students showed disagreement with the first value, more than 70 of them showed agreement with the second value statement and about the third one the agreement-disagreement responses are equally divided. This pattern of response clearly indicates the phenomena of value polarisation at the middle path with emphasis towards rejection of traditional ‘qualitative ascriptive’ theory of social stratification. The fourth statement has been “the distinctions on caste and class basis should be completely abolished from society.” On this value the opinion is also equally divided. The inclination, however, is towards abolition of such distinctions.

Property and Economic Values The values in regard to motivation towards property relations and mechanisation for large scale production consist of six value statements (Tables No. 2 and No. 3). The value in regard to property acquisition constitutes a continuum of individualistic-collectivistic value orientation. The statements are, (1) to acquire wealth and possess property is Table 2 Showing Values in Regard to Property Acquisition, etc. (Percentages are Shown in Brackets) Strongly Agree 2

Agree 3

Do Not Know 4

Disagree 5

Strongly Disagree 6

Total 7

To acquire wealth and property is innate in man

48 (16.7)

89 (31.1)

45 (15.3)

64 (22.3)

42 (14.6)

288 (100.0)

To acquire wealth and property both human nature and society are influential

69 (23.8)

117 (40.6)

29 (10.6)

56 (19.2)

17 (5.8)

288 (100.0)

To acquire wealth is a motive only determined by social institutions

13 (4.5)

39 (13.6)

92 (31.9)

72 (25.0)

72 (25.0)

288 (100.0)

Value Statements 1

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Table 3 Showing Values on the Use of Machine and Industrialisation (Percentages are Shown in Brackets) Strongly Agree 2

Agree 3

Do Not Know 4

Disagree 5

Strongly Disagree 6

Total 7

For progress heavy mechanisation only way out

68 (23.6)

114 (39.5)

33 (11.1)

43 (14.9)

31 (10.9)

288 (100.0)

For progress controlled use of machine and handicraft necessary

58 (20.2)

97 (33.7)

23 (8.1)

62 (21.2)

48 (16.8)

288 (100.0)

For progress abolition of heavy machines invitable

20 (6.9)

42 (14.6)

21 (7.3)

144 (50.0)

61 (21.2)

288 (100.0)

Value Statements 1

innate in the nature of man; (2) acquisition of wealth and possession of personal property is a function of both innate nature of man and social institutions; (3) the motive for personal wealth and its acquisition is only an institutional product and not a part of human nature. The distribution of responses regarding the first statement indicates an element of ambivalence and internal conflict. About 31 percent of students agree. If of students agree that motivation for acquisition of personal property is innate in man although a similar number of them express disagreement. On the second value statement there is highest degree of agreement, i.e. 64.52 and on the third disagreement is 50% and 31.9% remain indifferent. This indicates that the consensus is again in favour of a middle principle regarding the choice between individualism and collectivism as property motivations. This augurs well with the type of democratic socialistic pattern of society to which our nation is committed at present. The justification for the use of heavy machinery for production has occupied a place of central controversy in the Indian social and economic planning. The historic role of Mahatma Gandhi, on this issue, has rendered it further meaningful.

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In Table No. 3, three value statements are included in connection with use of machines vis a vis man for production activities. These three statements are also intended to measure the value of students on a continuous scale of use of machines versus abolition of machine as bipolar situations. The statements are (1) the rapid economic and all round progress in the country can be only achieved by heavy industrialisation and complete take over of ‘manufacture’ by ‘machinofacture,’ (2) Use of machines for better production is desirable, but machines should be for man and their welfare. Their use, therefore, should be controlled and balanced with scope for manual skill and handicraft; (3) machines used for production dwarfs the status of man, takes away his freedom and happiness. Use of machines in any form is undesirable. In regard to the feasibility of use of machines for production students in large numbers favour the proposal of complete mechanisation of production in the country. More than 62% of them agree to first statement. Similarly, about 71% also reject the idea of abolition of machines, (statement No. 3) which is logically compatible. The phenomenon, however, which assumes significance is that some 33% of the responses (state No. 2) indicate agreement to balanced use of machines to which more than 30% show disagreement. Unlike the value consensus about property system the values in regard to use of machines for production show extreme degree of polarisation in favour of use of heavy machinery. Here, there is less ambivalence and the scruple for the middle path not a very serious concern of the youth.

Values Regarding Nature of Man The nature of human nature is a basic value problem in each culture and tradition. Its changing conception can also provide social scientists a locus of the processes of social change. All major structural changes in society lead to or are followed by, a reformulation of the theory of human nature. Theoretically speaking, it is an interdisciplinary field where biology, anthropology, sociology, economics, psycho-analysis, and psychology, etc. meet and converge. A conception of human nature is always implicit in social policies and also the policies of social reconstruction. In this study, four concepts of human nature have been used for analysis of the problem, e.g. the biological, the psycho-analytical, the bio-social and the sociologistic (materialistic Marxist). The four value statements for

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these are (1) human nature is inherited biological potentiality, men are born unequal; (2) human nature is the transformation of libido (sex drive) through its sublimation, rationalisation and repression in society under various forms. The basic nature of man is savage and his sociality is merely a mask, a constant strain; (3) human nature is systematic transformation of man’s biological-potentiality into cultural and social through interaction with society. Society and culture give it form, biological potentiality renders it possible, (4) human nature is the mirror of culture and social system. All men are born equal, only society makes them unequal.” The distribution of responses (Table No. 4) to these various conceptions of human nature indicate that educated Indian youth rejects the sociologistic (Statement No. 4), the psychoanalytical (statement No. 2) and the biological (Statement No. 1) explanation of human nature. However, this rejection is not unmixed with a sense of uncertainty and doubt. In case of the biological conception, 40.0% students reject it and about 30.2% prefer to remain indifferent. Similarly, as regards the psycho-analytical and sociologistic, the situation is identical, viz. in case of former more than 40.0% disagree and 33.6% remain indifferent and in case of latter about 41.0% disagree and 23.42 indicate indifference. This skepticism regarding other conceptions of human nature is, however, more than compensated by the overwhelming agreement expressed Table 4 Showing Values about Human Nature (Percentages are Shown in Brackets) Strongly Agree 2

Agree 3

Do Not Know 4

Disagree 5

Strongly Disagree 6

Total 7

Biological deterministic

38 (13.2)

43 (14.9)

87 (30.2)

92 (31.9)

28 (9.8)

288 (100.0)

Psychoanalytical deterministic

33 (11.5)

39 (13.5)

97 (33.7)

81 (28.1)

38 (13.2)

288 (100.0)

Bio-sociological interactionist

80 (27.4)

122 (42.4)

20 (7.1)

43 (15.0)

23 (8.1)

288 (100.0)

Sociologistic deterministic

39 (13.5)

59 (20.5)

68 (23.4)

83 (30.7)

34 (11.9)

288 (100.0)

Type of Theories 1

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by students to the bio-social nature of human nature. It is significant to note that Indian youth on one hand is imbued with the scientific concept of human nature, without implying his knowledge about the modern theories of human nature and its scientific form he is on the other, aware of the limitations of the monistic explanations of the same, either through Freudian or Marxist or neo-Marxist explanations.

Values Indicating Worldview The values in regard to the worldview of the students have been studied with the help of value statements of two categories (Table No. 5 and No.  6 respectively), firstly, values on cosmogenesis, e.g. theological cosmic order, the naturalistic-super-naturalistic cosmic order, the naturalistic-scientific cosmic order, and finally agnostic attitude towards this order; secondly, in relation to values about the nature of truth, e.g. absolute versus relative and finally about means ends relationship, e.g. between pragmatic or expedient and the moral or tradition-sanctioned. The four value statements on cosmogenesis are (1) the cosmos has a Divine origin and a purpose after Divine Will; (2) the origin of cosmic order has a systematic basis which can be scientifically explained or even predicted, but there are still aspects of this order which are beyond human comprehension and indicate the role of some Supreme Creator; (3) the cosmic system is governed by natural laws which can be discovered Table 5 Showing Values on Cosmogenesis (Percentages are Shown in Brackets) Types of Intertations 1

Strongly Agree 2

Agree 3

Do Not Know 4

Disagree 5

Strongly Disagree 6

Total 7

Theological

24 (8.6)

93 (32.2)

77 (26.7)

67 (23.1)

27 (9.4)

288 (100.0)

Naturalisti-cumTheological

84 (29.1)

112 (38.9)

32 (11.1)

26 (9.3)

34 (11.6)

288 (100.0)

Agnostic

97 (33.7)

103 (35.8)

41 (14.2)

33 (11.4)

14 (4.9)

288 (100.0)

Naturalisticscientific

36 (12.5)

51 (17.7)

85 (29.5)

89 (30.9)

27 (9.4)

288 (100.0)

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Table 6 Showing Values about Truths, Means and Ends (Percentages are Shown in Brackets) Strongly Agree 2

Agree 3

Do Not Know 4

Disagree 5

Strongly Disagree 6

Total 7

Truth as Absolute

88 (30.6)

85 (29.6)

41 (14.2)

42 (14.5)

33 (11.1)

288 (100.0)

Truth as Relative

77 (26.7)

91 (31.6)

29 (10.2)

59 (20.4)

32 (11.1)

288 (100.0)

Means justify ends

49 (17.1)

74 (25.6)

53 (18.4)

61 (21.1)

51 (17.8)

288 (100.0)

Ends justify means

25 (8.7)

59 (20.5)

72 (25.1)

77 (26.7)

55 (19.0)

288 (100.0)

Value Statements 1

and predicted with the gradual development of man’s knowledge. There is nothing Divine or Supra-scientific about it; (4) one cannot be sure whether cosmic creation is a natural design or creation of Divine Will.” The responses of students to these four cosmogenic values show (Table No. 5) that on the issue of theological interpretation they are in two minds; with regard to scientific-cum-theological explanation as well as agnostic explanation, they show high agreement, and reject the scientifictechnological explanation of cosmogenesis. About the expressed disagreement with naturalistic theory of cosmic origin, it is significant to note that above 29.0% agree to it, 29.5% are indifferent and only 40.3% disagree. The measure of indifference is similar to theological as well as scientific explanation of cosmogenesis with about the same percentage of disagreement. It indicates that youth is in a state of value-conflict regarding the process of transition from the traditional worldview to the scientific. This transition is, however, still incomplete. The expressed agnosticism regarding the nature of universe and its creation may represent the acute emotional tention and skepticism in the cosmological perception of youth.

Nature of Truth: Means and Ends There are two statements about the nature of truth: (1) “Truth is absolute and irrespective of time, space and social situations it never changes. It is given; (2) the nature of truth and falsehood can only be defined

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under relevant time and situations, otherwise they are relative terms.” About means and ends relationship the two value statements read as (1) it is the nature of means employed to attain goals which matters in daily life. A goal, howsoever, legitimate, if achieved, by wrong means, prescribed by society is as good as unachieved. It is means which justify ends; (2) the relationship of means and ends is a matter of expediency than virtue. Ultimately it is the realisation of ends which counts not the nature of means. Ends justify means.” On the issue of the nature of truth the value orientation of youth is without a formal pattern or direction. They, however, seem to cherish more the value that truth is “absolute” rather than “relative.” But the distribution of responses (Table No. 6) would indicate that the choice between the two still remains unsystematised and shifting. About 60.0% agree that truth is absolute but at the same time about 58.3% also agree that its nature is relative. Should it mean, therefore, that modern educated youth is not seriously involved on the problem of truth and falsehood! This is rather unlikely, may be not overtly but covertly there is always a value image of truth entering into our daily behaviour and youth is no exception to this. It may only indicate a state of super-dynamism or state of ambivalence in the evaluative aspect of youth’s value orientation. It may further reflect modern Indian youth’s dilemma as well as agony on the crucial issue of choice between tradition and modernity. However, the situation is further complicated on the level of meansends relationship in his value system. The two value statements on this issue also symbolise two types of rationality in social action; the ‘sanctioned’ and the ‘expedient’ in the language of Becker, ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ according to Durkheim’s and ‘substantive’, versus ‘formal’ according to Weber. The pattern of responses reveals that youth by and large is indifferent to either of these values. Only 25.7% agree with the former (means justify ends), 18.4% remain indifferent and 38.9% express disagreement. Similarly on the second statement (ends justify means) 20.5% show agreement, 25.1% remain indifferent and 45.7% disagree. This phenomenon assumes a critical significance not only in the context of value orientation but also in relation to the problem of conformity and deviance in social action system.7 (Merton 1949). As a matter of value orientation it indicates that between pragmatism and traditionalism the modern Indian youth is again in a dilemma; may be he is at present somewhere in between the two. Its implication at social structural level, however, significant, cannot be generalised. Could we

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say this reflects youth’s—state of “retreatism” in choice of goals (sanctioned by society) and means (institutionalised) using Merton’s scheme of analysis? Within the limitations of the present study, however, the basis for any such conclusions would be presumptuous, at best inferential.

The Modes of Value-Orientation In order to analyse the mode of value-orientation of youth and its trend and patterning all the value statement have been rated into four modes of value orientation described by Parsons.8 The description of these four value-orientations respectively as given by Parsons are: “(1) Expectation of active achievement in actor with universalised standards and generalised rules relative to other actors; (2) Expectation of orientation of action to a universalistic norm defined either as an ideal state or as embodied in the status structure of the existing society; (3) expectation of active achievement relative to and/or on behalf of the particular relation context in which the actor is involved (4) expectation of orientation of action to an ascribed status within a given relational context.”9 These four modes of value orientation which also have significance in four typologies of social structure have been arrived at by reducing the various value statements into these four categories. The result (Table No. 7) is a condensed picture of various modes Table 7 Showing the Various Patterns of Value-orientation of Youth. (Percentages are Shown in Brackets) Value-orientation Patterns 1

Strongly Agree 2

Agree 3

Do Not Know 4

Disagree 5

Strongly Disagree 6

Total 7

UniversalisticAchievement

98 (13.7)

408 (28.3)

273 (18.9)

354 (24.5)

207 (14.6)

1440 (100.0)

UniversalisticAscription

505 (19.4)

803 (31.0)

443 (16.5)

512 (19.6)

329 (13.5)

2592 (1000.0)

ParticularisticAchievement

242 (21.0)

372 (32.1)

178 (15.4)

245 (20.1)

115 (11.4)

1152 (100.0)

Ascription particularistic

174 (15.1)

227 (19.7)

171 (14.8)

391 (33.8)

189 (16.6)

1152 (100.0)

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of value orientation of youth which throws light on the pattern of value system and its subsequent impact on the social sub-structure of youth and society. About the study of social structure through these four value orientations Prof. Parsons says “The present approach serves to accent lines of fundamental structural differentiation which are in some sense of “evolutionary” significance. They are above all the types which tend to emerge when major types of cultural developments in the literate cultures have occurred, the emergence of the religious systems, the development of the science and the like, and these developments have had a profound relation to changes in the structure of society itself.”10 The four types of these value orientation Prof. Parsons further correlates with similar typology of adaptive structures. The Universalistic-Achievement he says, conforms by and large to American social structure, UniversalisticAscription to Nazi German and present Soviet Russian social structure, the Particularistic Achievement to classical Chinese social structure and the Particularistic-Ascriptive to Spanish-American social structure. The figures in Table No. 7 reveal that the educated youth’s mode of value-orientation neither falls in the category of Universalistic Achievement pattern which conforms to the value system of a liberalcompetitive-secular society, nor to that of Particularistic-Ascriptive one, which refers to the value system of hierarchical, status-bound traditional society. Rather, their mode of value orientation oscillates between the Particularistic Achievement and Universalistic Ascription patterns of value orientation. The Universalistic ascription pattern of value orientation and its adaptive social structure comes second in preference as against the particularistic achievement pattern which is first. The particularistic achievement pattern conforms to a type of social structure where like “the classical Chinese Literati” the emphasis in value orientation is to adjust the relational kinship and territorial loyalties to build up an efficient quasi-bureaucratic type of organised society. The emphasis on familism and rational ties works as moderator to achievement orientation of collective nature; society remains hierarchical with high achievement value confined to a limited class. The universalistic ascriptive type on the other hand emphasises an ideal state (universalistic in nature) which with ascriptive emphasis demands full conformity, hence collectivistic authoritarian orientation in social structure. Achievement in this type of social structure is valued instrumentally and not in itself.

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The socialistic pattern of society with authoritarian political system would come closer to it. It is interesting to note that Indian youth is equally involved in these two types of value orientation (Particularistic Achievement and Universalistic Ascriptive) both of which deviate from the ideal typical pattern of traditional Indian social organisation, nearest proximation to which could be found in ‘particularistic ascriptive’ type of social structure. The former works towards a synthesis of the ascriptive elements of traditional structure with collective welfare ideal, through authoritarian means, again an interesting survival of Indian tradition; the latter wants to work out a mode of adjustment where many of the traditional structural and cultural foci (Kinship, caste, community, etc.) could be themselves so reformed and adjusted as to evolve a rationalistic progressive society with controlled spread of achievement values. Obviously, both of these represent modern youth’s synthesis in value orientations. So far these are encouraging but two points are worth deeper consideration, firstly, modern youth does not seem to have value orientation which would fit into liberal rationalistic value of western (U.K., U.S.A.) society, and secondly, he has wavering faith if any into democratic values. The politico-social implications of this pattern of value orientation can be many as well as dangerous, in view of our commitment to parliamentary democratic system of political organisation. Would this imply that the present political system is unsuited to our genius and be, therefore, replaced by a more pluralistic diffuse system, or that it is simply of the authoritarian influence of socialisation in Indian families of which the youth is product and hence also repository. Further study can be undertaken to analyse this problem.11

IV The setting of the problem of this paper lies at the issue of cultural integration and processes of social change. At the level of student substructure, the problem has occupied the attention of some scholars in India. Recently Margaret Cormack in her study used the symbolism of “Saraswati” and “Lakshmi” to represent the struggle between the values of enlightenment and knowledge and spiritualism versus wealth, worldliness and achievement which is going on in India today. She concludes “India is changing, as it always has, but it will remain India,”12 and

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thus posits faith in cultural synthesis. The findings of this study also substantiate the hypothesis of cultural integration. The value of youth governing the principle of social stratification and allocation of status lays emphasis on both achievements and ascriptive principles. Similarly, values of property polarize in favour of controlled property possession and reject extreme viewpoint of either individualistic laissez-faire doctrine or that of collectivism. In the use of technology in relation to man power and its dignity, there is a realistic consensus among youth in favour of ‘heavy mechanisation,’ with suitable checks and balances. The biologistic as well as the sociologistic explanation of human nature do not find favour with youth and he shows awareness of its bio-social nature. At the level of worldview, the picture is not clear. Youth equally rejects the theological as well as naturalistic interpretations of cosmogenesis, accepts a religio-naturalistic or agnostic view point; believes the nature of truth to be absolute, and has no clear choice between the pragmatic versus sanctioned-traditional values governing means-ends relationship in behaviour. By and large, his value system oscillates between Universalistic Ascription and Particularistic Achievement patterns. In the background of our national socio-economic and cultural aspiration the value system of youth is on the whole encouraging. But the direction of value integration and its implication in cultural synthesis (between traditional and modern) does not seem to indicate an even movement from “tradition directed” to “inner directed” characterological and cultural pattern. It shall be rather on over simplification of the process, which has complex ramifications. The emerging cultural and value system is a process of interaction of the modern and traditional element which are bringing about a unique synthesis. The nature of this synthesis, however, can hardly be predicted.13 Perhaps, it will be neither on the model of liberal-democratic-industrial culture of the West (U.S.A., U.K.) nor the authoritarian-socialistic industrial culture of U.S.S.R. It shall be somewhere in between the two, but primarily Indian.

Notes 1. Anthropology and sociology have come closer together both in methodology and areas of research. The closer relationship between psycho-analysis and sociology has since Freud’s works been strengthened, among many others by Giesa Roheim, Eric Fromm and Kardiner. Freud posed the problem of social origin in terms of the dualism of primordial father and revolutionary mass—a rather phylogenetic conception of

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Yogendra Singh culture; Roheim added to it the ‘child’ and his temporally recurrent infantile experiences, thus trying to explain culture as an ontogenetic phenomena deriving itself from a ‘human situation’ of child and the primal scene. (See ‘Riddle of the Sphinx’: Geisa Roheim, page 207, The Hogarth Press 1934). To both of these, however, culture is a result of repression of guilt—a constant strain, hence problematic. Kardiner brought to these a scientific sociological synthesis in terms of societal security systems and basic anxieties and its impact on primary institutions and basic personality structure (ego-structure), which represents the fundamental aspect of integration of culture. (See ‘Individual and His Society’: Kardiner Columbia University Press 1955. Specially Chapter III and Chapter IX). Kardiner defines culture as catalogue of institutions which are mechanisms responding to the anxiety patterns of society and have great impact on the personality system. He is critical of Freud, Reik and Roheim, for their ‘mystical hypothesis’ or ‘primal parricide’ and ‘autochthonous recurrence of a sense of guilt’ (Ibid page 393.) Eric Fromm substantially bridged the gap between classical psychoanalysis and sociology by acknowledging in his explanations of social phenomena (religious crisis, social organisation etc.) the role of social milieu and historical material forces. A synthetic view on culture, society and personality has recently developed in a systematic form in the works of Parsons (The Social System, Glencoe, Free Press 1951) and Parsons and Shils (Towards a General Theory of Action, Cambridge, Harvard University Press 1951). This could be treated as novel only in regard to its systematic formulations; the orientation towards a general theory of action, however, is one: (see Martindale: The Nature and Type of Sociological Theory: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, especially Chapter 15 and 16, pp. 376 to 437). Philosophical anthropology is a “philosophical analysis” of what is essential of the “nature” of human life, possibly in express comparison and contrast to that of the “higher animals” (Brock Werner: Existence and Being page 122. introductory note on Heidegger’s Being and Time—Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, Illinois 1949). It has been persistent in the works of all philosophers in one form or another. The prominent forms that it has taken are phenomenology and existentialism. Both can be viewed as anti-polar to sociologism (see Edward A Tiryakian Sociologism and Existentialism: two perspectives on Individual and Society: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962). However, phenomenological school in sociology is quite known as a branch of sociological formalism (Martindale, Ibid, pp. 267 to 281). Existential branch of philosophical anthropology does pose a number of contrasting situations, e.g. ontical versus ontological; formulations of Dasein and distinction between existential versus categorial existence of Being (Dasien) and entities (other than Dasien) respectively (see Heideggar Martin: Being and Time, SCM Press Ltd., Bloomsbury Street, London, 1962, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Chapter III, IV and V page 91 to 219). From Soren Kierkegaard to Jasper, both theistic and atheistic versions of existentialism have treated man as lonely, deracinated being, who can draw only from himself. Nevertheless, Tiryakian points out areas where existentialism can contribute to deeper knowledge of culture and society: ‘Transcedence’ of Jasper, ‘Being’ of Heideggar, come closer to collective representation of Durkheim as sources of relative reference. Deeper insight into the subjective nature of man offered by existentialism could enrich sociological theories of personality and culture. (Tiryalian, Ch. VIII, pp. 151 to 171).

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3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11.

2. 1 13.

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Nearest convergence of existential mode of analysis may be found in Reisman’s analysis of characterological types, especially “other directed type” (Reisman David: Lonely Crowd: University Press 1950). Redfield Robert: Relations of anthropology to the social sciences and the Humanities, in (‘Anthropology today’ edited by Kroeber, Chicago Univ. 1953) Langotto: Theoretical Methods and approaches to the understanding of Man, Anthropological Quarterly Vol. 32, No. 1, The Catholic Univ. of America, Washington. A. K. Coomaraswamy, The Bugbear of Literacy, London, Dennis Dobson, 17, D.C. 1949. Saran, A. K.: ‘Sociology in India’, in Contemporary Sociology, Edited by Roneck Philosophical Library 1958. Saran, A. K. The Natural Science and the study of Man, The Problem of their synthesis in Contemporary Culture, Eastern Anthropologist, Vol. XIV, No. 2, Lucknow. Misra, B. R.: Indian Middle Class, Oxford University Press, 1961. The field study was conducted at Agra during 1959–60 and students were selected from the major post-graduate institutions located in the town. Merton, R. K.: Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, Free Press, 1949 (Chapter IV). At the time of planning of the study there was no conscious effort to frame value statements to fit these modes of value orientation. Only at a later stage, it was thought feasible to classify various statements into these four classes. The model of Parsons and not of F. Kluckhohn or Howard Becker was taken because the statements approximated nearest to Parsons schema in a limited way. It includes only “types of values orientation standards (universalism ver sus Particularism) and choice between modalities of the social object (Achieve ment vs. Ascriptism) and excludes the element of interest in value orientation (specificity vs. diffuseness)”. (Parsons: Social System— Page 67, 1952). Parsons T. Ibid., page 102. Ibid., p. 182. Edward Shils and Lloyd Fallers, and Robert Levine have recently analysed this problem in the context of developing countries of Asia, and Africa (See Old Societies and New States edited by Clifford Geortz, Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). Cormack, M. She Who Rides a Peacock, Asia 1961, p. 225. How deeply rooted are these values among Indian students and how ambivalent and critical situations these give rise to when exposed to Western contacts has been analysed in a recent publication “Indian Students in Britain. A Survey of their adjustment and attitude” by Amar Kumar Singh, Asia, 1963, pp. 81–88.

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7 Towards a More Meaningful Study of Ecology, Society and Culture Indra Deva

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he quest for a meaningful study of ecology, society and culture inevitably leads one to consider in some detail the direction which our discipline should take. In trying to do so I shall speak plainly, without mincing matters or playing safe. For, I do think that our hesitation to bring into the ambit of academic discourse that which we really believe to be true, has been a major cause of the stunted growth of social sciences in India. Of course, I can be wrong on many points. But unless faults are brought out in the open, there is little chance of their being remedied. Concern for ecology is a good vantage point for examining the nature, direction and goals of development, and also the role that sociology and other social sciences are expected to play in this whole process. The way various forces of ‘development’ are damaging environment and threatening the very existence of humankind has once again shaken modern man’s self-righteous complacency. This is perhaps the second shock that has forced modern man to think about what is being done in the name of progress. The first shock was an aftermath of the First World War. The intensity of its jolt was made more severe by the Great Depression of the early 1930s. That first shock gave birth to powerful works like Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West, Arnold J. Toynbee’s A Study of History, and

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Pitrim A. Sorokin’s Social and Cultural Dynamics. Such works, each in its own way, forecast the doom of Western civilization. Before the First World War the elites of the West had an overbearing sense of confidence in themselves, their rationality, and their civilization. They were sure that their society was inexorably bound to traverse higher and higher echelons of progress. This was perhaps natural. Ever new victories over the forces of nature, and conquest of far-f lung lands in all parts of the globe had engendered in them an unquestioning belief in the incomparable superiority of their society and culture. Today, even though reckless pursuit of the current model of development has brought humankind almost to the brink of destruction of all life on this planet, there does not seem to be a commensurate seriousness in the search for alternatives. After all, this is not the only form of society that humankind can have. Man has known many types of societies and cultures. It may neither be desirable nor possible to revert to any one of these earlier forms but we can surely strive to explore better socio-cultural possibilities through intelligent use of the knowledge and techniques that humanity as a whole has accumulated.

Ecology and Worldview Man has lived on this earth for hundreds of thousands of years. But he has never threatened so perilously its environment as he has been doing during the two or three centuries of the modern era. It appears to me that this cataclysmic change has been brought about primarily by the critical transformation in man’s image of himself and in man’s view of the world around him. In all pre-modern cultures—be they tribal or peasant—man looked upon himself as a part of creation as a whole. He treated other animals, trees, and inanimate objects not only as equals but considered them even venerable. Thus in tribal societies particular clans have various animals, trees and inanimate objects as their totems, which are believed to be the ancestors of the clan and are considered sacred. In the peasant civilization too man has no attitude of disdain towards nature. India, of course, is a good example of a sustained and mature peasant civilization. As all of us know, not only the cow but the deadly serpent, nag, is worshipped throughout India. J. Ph. Vogel (1926) has given a comprehensive account of the startling similarities in all parts

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of India regarding beliefs and rituals connected with serpent worship. Tulsi, pipal, bargad (vat) and a large number of other trees are considered sacred, and cutting them down and unnecessarily chopping off their branches or even plucking their leaves is regarded as sinful. The saint poet Maluk Das enjoins us not to cut off any green branch. He says that a cut off branch turns into a sapless arrow. In Kerala, there has been a vigorous tradition of maintaining sacred groves. In Rajasthan there is a community whose members would prefer their own bodies to be slashed rather than allowing the cutting of trees or hunting of deer. Rivers and mountains too are sacred. Ganga is believed to be so sacred that not only a dip in it but even the uttering of its name from a hundred miles rids one of all sins. It has been common among the folk to take a vow in the name of Ganga to establish the authenticity of a statement. Atonement is sought even for the violence done to the earth in ploughing it or in digging it for providing foundation to a building. Appropriate worship of the earth has to be performed before these activities are started. The foundations of such attitude of reverence towards the elements and forces of nature lie deep in time. In the Rigveda, they are conceived as gods and goddesses. Apart from the sun which is looked upon as a god in many religious traditions, fire and wind too are gods, that is, Agni and Marut respectively. The beautiful rosy dawn is personified as the goddess Usha. Thus in peasant civilization both elite and folk traditions share a Weltanschauung which is imbued with such a deep reverence towards nature that it strongly precludes violence to the environment. This is no less true of the Weltanschauung of tribal cultures. The modern industrial era, however, is marked by a rupture of this tradition. Unprecedented advances in science and technology have made man too sure of himself. He has begun to adopt the supercilious attitude of thinking himself the master of the whole world and takes it for granted that nature is meant to be exploited by him. The cardinal motive force of unlimited acquisitiveness and the unchallenged ideal of an ever-rising standard of living (whatever that means) has inevitably led to incalculable damage to the environment. The insatiable hunger of a plethora of rapidly proliferating factories continues to devour more and more forests, and the outflow of pollutants from industries poisons the rivers and makes fields barren. It would be perilous to ignore the frightening consequences of the green house effect; and modern man has made a big hole even in the ozone layer that protects our planet.

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But the most disconcerting fact is that all this industrialization has failed to keep its promise of a happy life for man. It was once thought that when machines would do all the drudgery, man would be free to pursue the finer things of life, such as music and poetry. But to our utter discomfiture we find that the more industrialized a society becomes, the more are people prone to hurry and anxiety. Even when they have some time to spare, their state of mind hardly has the serenity to enjoy good music or literature. Man in the industrial societies tends to remain so bored that his boredom can be broken only by massive doses of excitement. This is why there is a surfeit of violence and sex in popular motion pictures and novels. When the food is insipid one needs some spicy achar (pickle) to gulp it down. Modern life has become so monotonous that it is unbearable without the kicks served through the media of mass culture. In short, the ‘development’ achieved at the cost of continuing devastation of environment seems hardly worth striving for. The fact that the Soviet experiment is in a shambles, does not by itself prove that all is well with Western industrial society. In fact, the weight of the accumulated evidence that has been marshalled by Western sociologists themselves presents a gloomy picture. Modern industrial society is marked by rising levels of alienation and anomie, and an increasing propensity to threaten the ecological balance.

The Challenge for Sociology It appears to me that the basic challenge for sociology today is to try to find a way out of this impasse. But sociology at its present level of development does not seem to be equal to this task. One important reason for the lopsided state of our discipline seems to be its excessive Western-ethnocentricism. Recently, the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences considered in some detail the parochial (Eurocentric) nature of social sciences notwithstanding its claim to universality—‘universal relevance, universal applicability, universal validity’. This commission consisted of distinguished scholars belonging to various countries. Six of them were from the social sciences, two from the natural sciences and two from the humanities. Its report was circulated in late 1995. This report does take note of the criticism of claims to universality with regard to the selection of topics

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of research and subjects studied; the narrow social base of recruitment of the researchers; and the epistemological underpinnings of the analyses. To my mind, however, this leaves out a very important element that undermines the universality of current social sciences, particularly sociology—its narrow and non-representative empiric base. Insofar as the social sciences, including sociology, claim to be sciences, their inferences must be based on the observation of some empirical reality in terms of which these are verified and validated. But what is the empiric al reality on which the bulk of the subject matter and inferences of sociology, as it exists today, are based? By and large this empirical reality pertains to modern industrial society. We must recognize that modern industrial society occupies a very small fraction of the time during which human societies have been in existence. Human beings, and consequently human societies, have been there for hundreds of thousands of years, while modern industrial society has been in existence only for a few centuries. And for better or for worse, modern industrial society is critically different from all other forms of human society. Thus, when generalizations are made or inferences drawn about human society as such, on the basis of the study of modern industrial society, these are based on a very small and very unrepresentative sample. I strongly feel that Indian sociologists are in a position of distinct advantage for correcting this bias and deficiency of current sociology. The sociologists in India know two kinds of sociocultural systems—the modern industrial and the traditional peasant. The first of these we know largely through books and to varying degrees from our own experience and the second because of our birth and socialization in this kind of system. In my view, knowing two sociocultural systems is more than double the advantage. For if one knows two systems one can think of a third and a fourth also. But those who know only one system tend to think of it as the only possibility.

Need for the Study of Peasant Civilization Unfortunately, adequate attention has not been given to the systematic study of peasant civilization. This leaves a wide gap in our understanding of socio-cultural phenomena and is a serious handicap in our quest for alternative socio-cultural systems. Robert Redfield did make a beginning through his Peasant Society and Culture (1956), but as he candidly

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recognized it was only a beginning—‘a very preliminary exploration’ as he put it. And not much headway has been made in this direction. It is somewhat disconcerting that while there has not been much serious effort to build upon the insights provided by this work, a large number of village studies continued to be carried out following the conceptual model given by his earlier book, The Little Community (1955), on which Redfield had raised serious doubts in this later work. The fact seems to be that no social science has made a systematic effort to study the social structure and culture of peasant civilizations. Sociologists have largely studied modern industrial societies, and social anthropologists have been traditionally concerned with tribal cultures. In this process peasant civilizations which have contained the bulk of human population since the dawn of history have been almost entirely neglected. Apart from the question of numbers, the important thing is that peasant civilization is a distinctive socio-cultural type. It is sui generis. It cannot be adequately understood merely as a point on some continuum. Peasant civilizations seem to share some distinctive socio-cultural characteristics across the globe. To take only one example, Sorokin, Zimmerman and Galpin have brought out in their Systematic Sourcebook in Rural Sociology (1931) some distinctive characteristics of the family in societies based on plough agriculture. They have also described the importance of the ‘gestalt of familism’ in such societies (1931, II: 41–48). These fit in so well with the basic features and functions of the Indian joint family that when I discuss the Indian joint family with my students, I can almost entirely depend upon their work for describing it. However, to my mind these great sociologists have made a mistake in referring to this type of family as ‘rural family’. The fact is that in peasant civilizations this type of family prevails in the urban centres also. On the other hand, in industrial societies this type of family is not found even in rural areas. Thus, this kind of family is the typical family of the peasant civilizations and not the ‘rural family’. Wide and systematic explorations are likely to reveal many more structural and cultural characteristics that are common to peasant civilizations. Systematic study of peasant civilization will not only deepen our understanding of Indian society, it will also enhance our knowledge about human society as such. During the course of thousands of years of their existence, many peasant civilizations have maintained remarkable continuity and stability. For instance, the society reflected in the Jatakas, which were composed some two thousand five hundred years ago, was

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not radically different from the society as it existed before the advent of the British rule in India. To be sure there were many socio-cultural changes during these millennia, but the basic structure and culture of the joint families, castes and village communities found in the Jatakas are not essentially different from those of these cardinal institutions in pre-British times, and to a certain extent even now. Such a long span of existence gave the institutional, valuational and attitudinal patterns of peasant civilizations enough time to crystallize, adjust and cohere. The relative stability of these patterns provides us a valuable opportunity to study how various elements of a socio-cultural system establish and sustain vibrant interrelationships with each other. In peasant civilizations, apart from modes of cooperation, even the frictions and conflicts tend to crystallize. There are not only joking relationships, there are quarrelling relationships also. I would have liked to use the term peasant society instead of peasant civilization. But I am not doing so to avoid a confusion. A peasant civilization has a dual structure. The two segments are variously referred to as ‘aristocratic and peasant’, ‘classical and folk’, ‘elite and folk’, ‘hierarchic and lay culture’, ‘great and little traditions’, and so on. Robert Redfield has employed the term ‘peasant society and culture’ to refer only to the latter of these two segments. Therefore, using ‘peasant society’ to designate peasant civilization as a whole could have caused confusion. I, however, prefer the term ‘folk’ for what Redfield calls peasant. George M. Foster too has used the term folk in the same sense (1953); and Redfield clearly recognizes that he is using peasant for what Foster called folk (Redfield, 1956: 85). In fact while quoting a passage from Foster, Redfield substitutes peasant for Foster’s folk (Ibid.: 41). When we use the term folk, we can refer to the other segment of society and culture as the elite; and the folk and the elite together constitute a peasant civilization.

Quest for Conceptual Model and Sources Village studies which were undertaken on a large scale after the Second World War are sometimes thought of as embodying the study of peasant society. Although these village studies have surely added to our knowledge about village life, to my mind they do not constitute the best way to understand the structure, processes and dynamics of peasant society or peasant civilization. They are based on a conceptual model that

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seems inadequate for the kind of socio-cultural reality that they seek to investigate. I must make it clear that I have no objection to the method called ‘participant observation’. Our knowledge of society and culture is so limited that we cannot afford to leave aside any method of investigation. All possible methods and techniques should be fully utilized and orchestrated. My doubt is about the appropriateness of the conceptual framework on which such studies are based. The village studies are based essentially on the conceptual model of the little community, which has been neatly spelled out in Robert Redfield’s book, The Little Community (1955). Of course, this is a conceptual construct and no concept or construct should be expected to be replicated in its pure form in real life. But a concept is surely intended to bring out the essential characteristics of the phenomenon which is sought to be studied through it. It seems fairly clear however that the concept of little community does not size up the essential nature of a peasant village. The little community is conceived basically as a socio-cultural whole. But essentially a village in a peasant civilization is not a socio-cultural whole. Detailed study of parts too is understandable But the details about the part become meaningful only if they are put in the perspective of the whole. One can become a specialist on the little finger, but one will be able to understand its movements, and even its internal processes, only when these are seen in their relation to the organism as a whole. As Redfield in his later and far more mature work, Peasant Society and Culture, amply demonstrates, peasant society is essentially a part society. Though this theme runs throughout this later work, the following passage merits reproduction at some length: The culture of a peasant community, on the other hand, is not autonomous. It is an aspect or dimension of the civilization of which it is a part. As the peasant society is a half-society, so the peasant culture is a half-culture. When we study such a culture we find two things to be true that are not true when we study an isolated primitive band or tribe. First, we discover that to maintain itself peasant culture requires continual communication to the local community of thought originating outside of it. The intellectual and often the religious and moral life of the peasant village is perpetually incomplete; the student needs also to know something of what goes on in the minds of remote teachers, priests, or philosophers whose thinking affects and perhaps is affected by the peasantry. Seen as a ‘synchronic’ system, the peasant culture cannot be fully understood from what goes on in the minds of the villagers alone. Second, the peasant village invites us to attend to the long course of interaction between that community and centers

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120Indra Deva of civilization. The peasant culture has an evident history; we are called upon to study that history; and the history is not local; it is a history of the civilization of which the village culture is one local expression (1956: 40–41).

This is in marked contrast to the four basic characteristics of the little community put forth by Redfield in his earlier book, The Little Community. Briefly, these defining qualities of the little community are: distinctiveness, smallness, homogeneity, and all pervasive self-sufficiency (1955: 4). Obviously, a village in a peasant civilization like that of India does not essentially fit in with this model. A peasant village is hardly distinctive in the sense that there are many other villages around it, and sometimes even connected with it, which are just like it in their social structure and culture. And this commonness is understood and recognized by everyone. As far as group consciousness is concerned, there surely is some consciousness of belonging to the village but there also is consciousness of belonging to a caste and a kinship network which go far beyond the confines of the village. And the consciousness of belonging to these latter groups may be much stronger than that of belonging to the village. Of course, some peasant villages can be small. But the methodological offshoot of this characteristic that it is ‘so small that either it itself is the unit of personal observation of else, being somewhat larger and homogenous, it provides a unit of personal observation fully representative of the whole’ (Ibid.: 4) it is hardly applicable to a peasant village like that of India. The society in these peasant villages is so differentiated and stratified that no unit is fully representative of the whole. The third defining quality of the little community is that it is homogeneous. I need not labour on the point that the typical peasant village is socially and culturally not homogenous. The fourth defining quality of the little community that it is pervasively self-sufficient also does not hold good for a peasant village. For example, most of the Indian villages are exogamous, and thus a boy or a girl cannot find a mate within the village. Many villages do not have all the essential occupational groups such as the iron-smith, the carpenter or the potter. They traditionally depend on other villages for such services. Undoubtedly most of the village studies based on the little community model do mention in their prefaces that the village is related to the outside world. Sometimes they also describe some of such relationships. But this is not enough. Relationship with other villages and towns is so intrinsic and essential to the peasant village that this must be built into the conceptual model for its study.

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Robert Redfield’s later work, Peasant Society and Culture, clearly shows that he had become acutely conscious of the fact that he had moved away from the conceptual model of the little community. In the very beginning of this book, in the ‘Acknowledgement’ itself, referring to his earlier work he says: ‘In that book (with the exception of one chapter) I thought of small communities as independent of things outside of them. In the present chapters there is a very preliminary exploration of one kind of dependent community, that of peasants, as a describable type.’ The reason for employing the conceptual model of little community, which conforms more to the attributes of isolated primitive tribes than to the character of peasant society, for the study of villages of peasant civilization seems to be that when the social scientists were called upon to study the society in countries having peasant civilizations, they did not have with them the conceptual and methodological tools appropriate for this task. There are examples in many fields, such as architecture, that when people start working on a new material they employ in the beginning the same models and tools which they used for the earlier material. It appears that after the Second World War when the enhanced economic and political importance of Asia and other such regions came home to world powers like the United States, there was a sudden realization of the need to study the society in the countries of these regions. But adequate conceptual and methodological tools for the study of peasant society were not available, and perhaps from that distance the peasant villages did not look so very different from primitive tribes. Consequently, the social anthropologists tried concepts and methods similar to those that they had developed over the years in their study of tribal society. Redfield’s own understanding of the matter is not much different. He observes: ‘Today it is usual for an anthropologist to study a community connected with or forming part of a civilization or national state. . . . Nevertheless, habits of work do not at once conform to a newly enlarged subject matter. . . . The isolated, self-contained community remains the abstract image around which social anthropology has formed itself (1956: 10–11). In view of the great scientific and practical importance of the study of peasant civilization, it is time that concerted effort is made to evolve appropriate concepts and methods. Obviously, this cannot be achieved at one stroke. We shall have to build bit by bit. For us in India, the first task of course is to study Indian civilization. This is no plea for building

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an ‘Indian sociology’. Friends would recall that in the 1960s when the talk of building an ‘Indian Sociology’ was much in vogue, I had tried to demolish systematically its possibility (Indra Deva, 1967: 71–83). However, I substantially agree with the strong formulation of the need to study Indian tradition and the indispensability of being rooted in Indian social reality put forth by my teacher, Professor D. P. Mukerji, in his address as the President of the First Indian Sociological Conference held at Dehradun in 1955, which I had the privilege to attend. Attempts at developing an adequate conceptual and methodological framework for the study of peasant civilization must go hand in hand with its substantive study. The task is so stupendous and our knowledge in this regard is so limited that light from all directions and from all kinds of sources is welcome. A peasant civilization is made up of the elite and the folk tradition The two are continually interacting, and shaping each other. There are many possible ways to study these two strata and traditions and the interaction between them. I have made an attempt to understand the culture of the folk through the analysis of their oral tradition (Indra Deva, 1956, 1974, 1989). In collaboration with a Sanskrit scholar, I have also tried to study the genesis, and the twists and turns of the elite tradition in Indian civilization through a close study of traditional texts from the Rigveda to the later Smritis (Indra Deva and Shrirama, 1980, 1986). In both these domains further refinement in the techniques of analysis and interpretation is called for. It is also clear that the data yielded by such sources have to be supplemented and corroborated by that derived through other methods and techniques. But I do think that a proper analysis of oral and written texts, in their appropriate sociocultural context, can give us many insights about subtle aspects and imponderables of society and culture which the prevailing formal techniques are unable to provide. It is necessary to study peasant civilization in a broad time perspective because the roots of many of the institutions, values and attitudes that exist today lie in the ancient past, and they have acquired their present form through the impact of various socio-cultural forces over the ages. It seems, for instance, that the foundations of the persistent attitude of disdain and suspicion towards women were laid in the early Vedic times (Shrirama and Indra Deva, 1966, 1976). Just as it is necessary to go into the past, it is important to think of the future also. I do not agree with the view that the task of sociology is merely to smoothen the transition. The sociologist must also consider

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the question, ‘Transition to what kind of society?’ If the sociologist does not make serious efforts to answer this question, who else would? Perhaps the politician and the bureaucrat? Generally speaking, the latter are so bogged down by day-to-day problems that they hardly have the time or inclination to take a long-range view of things. Nor do they have the necessary expertise. This in fact is the task of scholars and universities. They can step aside the stream and study and think about things in a broad perspective. Nevertheless, we do come across some laymen who are very sure of their prescriptions even though their knowledge of the basic structure and processes of society is quite limited. This brings to my mind the wayside medicine-vendor who promises certain cures for all ailments. While a physician or a surgeon who has undergone the grind of protracted medical education hesitates in making a diagnosis or prescribing a remedy, the wayside medicine-vendor or quack wastes no time in handing out a medicine or performing an operation even though he may not know even the elementary anatomy and physiology. The other alternative is to leave matters to take their own course. In the current vogue of liberalization, laissez-faire is once again ascendant. But I think the doctrine of the survival of the fittest is profoundly mistaken. Left to themselves weeds will always overrun the flowerbeds. I do not mean to say that we the sociologists know for sure the way to a good society. But I do think that it is a part of our job to make explorations in that direction. Some of us may believe that sociology being a science should be value free—it cannot and should not decide what is good or bad. To those among us I would say that as students of the science of society we should at least work out the likely implications of taking various paths of change and development. Even if the final choice is to be made by the people themselves, or by those who have the power to do so, we should bring out various alternatives so that intelligent choice can be made. Although it may not entirely be within the power of anyone to direct the course of change, conscious effort on the part of man can surely exert some influence in giving it a desirable turn.

Possibility of an Environment-Friendly Society and Culture It is true that the economic, technological and ideological forces that brought about the modernization and industrialization of the countries of Western Europe and North America have by and large made a

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devastating impact on the ecological balance of our planet. It also seems true that the character of the society and culture that have come into being as a result of the working of those forces continues to be damaging to the environment. However, the technological and ideological forces of today are not the same as they were in the 18th and 19th centuries. The nature of these forces seems to have undergone a basic change in many ways. At the same time the developing countries of today even now have vigorous folk traditions which possess enough vitality to imbibe new elements, and the peculiar cross-currents of contemporary social change have brought these traditions face to face with modern forces which have reached great maturity. Thus the stage is set for the ushering in of a new civilization which need not be a mere artificial synthesis but may possess emergent qualities. In the 18th and 19th centuries when coal was the only source of power, industries had to be inevitably concentrated around coal mines, because carrying coal is costly and cumbersome. This gave rise to gigantic industrial centres with monstrously large factories which emitted vast quantities of pollutants that poisoned the environment. The villages were reduced to suppliers of cheap uprooted labour and raw materials, and were turned into markets for insipid goods of mass production. This is not unavoidable now. New sources of power such as electricity, not to mention renewable energy sources like sun and wind, can be taken to villages and small-sized but efficient industries can be set up there itself. These industries need not employ outmoded technology. On the contrary they can make good use of the most sophisticated technological developments, like those in the field of electronics, which have made possible reduction in the size of machines to an unprecedented degree. In view of the scarcity of capital and abundance of labour, it will be far more economical to keep the machines labour-intensive. The technology that would make possible such dispersal of small and efficient machines may not exist at present but the accumulated fund of scientific and technological knowledge that humanity possesses today has brought it within our reach. However, it is countries like India which have to develop it. If a serious effort is made, this is not beyond our capabilities. We must give up the habit of importing finished technology in all spheres, considering ‘high technology’ or the ‘latest technology’ as a goal by itself. After all, technology belongs to the order of means ‘It cannot be an end in itself ’. Technology must suit our

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proportions of labour and capital, and it must be appropriate for the use to which we wish to put it. Thus it would no longer be necessary to uproot people from the countryside on a large scale to bring about industrialization. The settled life of the folk in which there is traditionally a balance between agriculture and industry can be given a new dimension by imaginative use of the most sophisticated technology for human ends. The ideological elements too are not so hostile now to the folk way of life as they were in the early phase of modernity. The limitations of rationalism are widely recognized. Numerous ideological movements emphasize the value of cooperation and security. This is not to say that the modern elite are returning to the values of the folk communities. They, however, do not harbour that self-righteous indignation which impelled their predecessors to combat and suppress traditional folk values. Under these changed material and ideological circumstances, it is not impossible that folk forms find certain new avenues of survival and growth. Of course, we cannot expect them to remain just as they have been traditionally. They will have to raise themselves to a new level by interacting with contemporary modern elements. The idea that when we talk about underdeveloped countries it should suffice to make use of the older concepts is specious. In fact some of the ‘underdeveloped’ societies of today may be more receptive to the end-of-the-twentieth-century valuational, institutional and technological patterns than they would be to those which arose in the 18th and 19th centuries. In matters of such receptivity they may show a higher propensity than those societies which broke away from medievalism fearlier. It may be pointed out, for instance, that even though today the limitations of individualism, activism and unlimited acquisitiveness are recognized by perceptive thinkers in the industrialized societies also, the countries of Western Europe and North America which have been able to build up a high level of prosperity on the basis of these, find it extremely difficult to give them up or even to restrict them within reasonable limits. These values, and the institutional and cultural elements based on them, have entrenched themselves so much that it is difficult to dislodge them. On the contrary, in the traditional societies these 18th and 19th century values have not yet found a strong foothold. They can, therefore, be more easily replaced by the institutional and attitudinal patterns based on ideas of cooperation, security and collective good.

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Besides the transformation of the forces of modernization, the pace and patterns of socio-cultural change in the developing countries also seem to strengthen the chances of emergence of new syntheses. The tremendous pace of change naturally leads to much overlapping. Long before one cultural era has declined or vanished, a number of successive forms enter the stage. The contemporaneity of cultural and valuational elements that are historically non-contemporaneous creates serious problems for groups as well as individuals. But it also seems to open up possibilities of unprecedented combinations and emergence of new patterns. In the light of the above analysis it is clear that we find today in the developing countries a constellation of forces which seems to be altogether new. The highly sophisticated and mellowed down forces of contemporary modernism are interacting with tribal and folk traditions which have vigour enough to combine with new elements and bring forth new forms. Only the future can tell whether the tribal and folk traditions will really be able to attain a new level by harnessing the technological, economic and ideological resources made available by the closing decades of the 20th century. A number of factors, however, exist which should deter us from rejecting such a possibility out of hand. The peculiar patterns of social change, with considerable overlapping of different cultural eras, have brought vigorous tribal and folk traditions in close proximity to modern forces which are no more so hostile but may even facilitate their growth relying on their own roots. These societies may, therefore, chart out a new course in their march towards socio-cultural forms which will be far more environment-friendly. It is not necessary for us to agree with the unilinear view that all cultures must necessarily pass through the same successive stages of evolution. The long strides of socio-economic change in the developing countries of today may permit the skipping of some of the earlier steps of large-scale industrialization. These countries face a unique challenge and it is not impossible that this may evoke a magnificient response and lead to the growth of a new socio-cultural pattern. Such a development appears to be desirable also. Large-scale industrialization based on individualistic acquisitiveness has led to various maladies such as alienation of work from life, schism between utility and beauty, commercialization of leisure and recreation, sapping of aesthetic sensibility from everyday life, uprootedness, and the creation of

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human ant-hills in the form of gigantic urban centres swarming with a variety of problems. Tribal and folk cultures on the contrary are marked by a balance between beauty and utility. For the folk craftsman, work is not alienated from life and the object produced by him has both utilitarian and aesthetic aspects. In tribal and folk society the artist is not a special kind of man; every man is a special kind of artist. Almost everyone sings (not merely listens) and artistic expressions like singing and poetry are not put on a separate niche. They accompany work and socially significant ritual. Though it would be impossible and also undesirable to try to preserve folk and tribal cultures just as they have been, it is necessary to work out the possibility of developing those of their aspects which are of abiding value to man. This would also make for cultural diversity; and cultural diversity is no less important than bio-diversity. If the developing countries of today succeed in building up such a pattern they may achieve an environment-friendly society which many sensitive thinkers in the most advanced countries earnestly cherish. In this sense, the countries which have lagged behind may be able to take a step which has been eluding the more advanced ones. This may look rather surprising but such turns in the course of social change are not unknown to history. In fact I have ventured to put forward elsewhere a general hypothesis to this effect (Indra Deva, 1966). This general hypothesis about the course of social change has received considerable attention from noted sociologists like Lazarsfeld (1970: 87) and it seems applicable also to the prospects of growth of an environment-friendly culture. I have been thinking about this possibility for the last twenty-five years and more; but how can I be sure that this would indeed materialize. I am no prophet to forecast the dawn of a new civilization. Yet I do think that our search for alternatives must continue. I do not believe that the task of sociology is confined to hastening the pace of transition to a type of society which has a self-generating propensity to attain higher and higher levels of alienation, anomie, insecurity, anxiety, conflict, crime, and devastation of environment. To some of us such ideas may look too romantic. I would only submit that many ideas tend to appear romantic till they are put into action. To some people the idea of having a democratic system of government could have appeared romantic before such governments came into being. To me even the idea of drawing carriages by the power of

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steam, just because steam could dislodge for a while the lid of a kettle, would have surely looked romantic if the railway trains run by steam had not come into being already. But even if some of us do not think that it is feasible to have such a society, I would still plead that the quest for new possibilities both for the society and for the social sciences, should not be given up. What is, and what has been, is of course very important to study. But this study should also help us to explore what will be and what can be. And for making such explorations, a broad perspective of time and space, is essential. There are infinite possibilities, out of which only a few materialize. As the great poet Ghalib said: Not all, only a few have found expression as poppies and roses, What may be the forms that lie concealed under the dust?

Let us strive to discover these dormant possibilities.

References Foster, George M. 1953. ‘What is Folk Culture?’. American Anthropologist, 55 (2): 159–73. Indra Deva 1956. ‘Modern Social Forces in Indian Folk-Songs’, Diogenes, (15): 48–64. ——— 1966. ‘The Course of Social Change A Hypothesis’, Diogenes, (56): 74–91. ——— 1967. ‘Possibility of an “Indian Sociology”’, in T.K.N. Unnithan, et al. (eds), Sociology for India, pp. 71–83. New Delhi. Prentice Hall of India. ——— 1974. ‘Oral Tradition and the Study of Peasant Society’, Diogenes, (85): 112–27. ——— 1989. Folk Culture and Peasant Society in India, Jaipur Rawat. Indra Deva and Shrirama 1980. Growth of Legal System in Indian Society. New Delhi, ICSSR/ Allied Publishers. ——— 1986. Traditional Values and Institutions in Indian Society. New Delhi, S. Chand. Lazarsfeld, Paul F. 1970. ‘Sociology’, in Main Trends of Research in Social and Human Sciences, I: 61–165. Paris/The Hague: Unesco/Mouton. Redfield, Robert. 1955. The Little Community. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ——— 1956. Peasant Society and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Shrirama Indradeva. 1966. ‘Correspondence between Women and Nature in Indian Thought’, Philosophy East and West, 26 (3–4): 161–68. ——— 1976. ‘Status of Women in Ancient India’, Diogenes, (93): 67–80. Sorokin. P. A., C. C. Zimmerman and C. J. Galpin. 1931. A Systematic Sourcebook in Rural Sociology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Vogel, J. Ph. 1926. Indian Serpent Lore. London.

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8 Vosaad:1 The Socio-Cultural Force of Water: A Study from Goa Bernadette Maria Gomes

Introduction

A

lthough by virtue of living together people create culture, it is always in relation to the environment that a community gets its cultural identity. We know that the human race evolved through effective use of resources in the environment. Human beings could not act upon nature in isolation. This necessitated certain labour patterns, which made the use of resources possible. Therefore, the process of resource use itself has a social character. The repeated use of resources would order people into definite structural units over time. Pierre Bourdieu (1990: 77) describes it as the ‘habitus’, the basis for regular modes of behaviour in society. Stephen Fuchs (1983: 74–90) and M. Gadgil and R. Guha (1992: 14) have echoed the same ideas: that social units are formed according to resource use and the economy. From popular knowledge, we know that in African countries like Zaire and Tanzania, where tree growth is dense, wood is used for all sculptures and figurines in the rituals. In the Arctic, which is a treeless region, the same is done with the bones of sea mammals. In desert biomes, the nomads organised themselves socially as caravans. The

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Eskimos organised themselves socially into hunting bands, as sea mammal hunting was the backbone of their economy. In the southern Indian states of Karnataka and Kerala, the abundance of granite has led to development of a community of stone-carvers called as the Shilpi. Thus, resources available locally have a bearing on the culture of the people living in the immediate environment. This paper seeks to illustrate how a resource that is abundantly available in the environment is drawn into the socio-cultural process of community formation. I have taken the case of Goa to show how water, as an abundantly available resource, has shaped many aspects of the social life of the local people.

Water: An Eco-Cultural Reality Water—‘the tasteless, colourless, odourless liquid’—is so commonplace to us in our day-to-day lives that we often overlook the fact that we use it more than just as a biological necessity. People, in the course of using water for their biological needs, have come to understand its importance and physical properties. The presence of water, says H. Raven (1986: 24–25), has been a prime factor in making our planet a suitable habitat for human beings. Not human beings alone, all species need water for their metabolism and growth. Life itself is said to have originated in the waters. This belief is not new. Holy Scriptures, creation myths and legends abound in narratives about water as the origin of all life. The following verse from the Rig Veda, cited by S. Radhakrishnan (1989: 100), makes it clear that water was believed to have preceded everything: Neither Non-Being nor Being existed, Neither air nor the firmament above them existed, What was moving with such force? Under whose care? Was it the deep and fathomless water?

In The Open Bible, the Old Testament book of Genesis (Chapter 1, Verse 2) begins likewise: The Earth was without form and darkness was on the face of the deep, and the Spirit of God was hovering over the face of the waters.

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Similarly, references from Al-Qur’an by A. Ali (1987: 188, 302–09), in his translation, read as: It is He who created the Heavens and the Earth, in six spans, and His control was on the waters of life.

It is stated further that man himself was created from water, as was every living being. In the same spirit, A.K. Warder (1970: 158) has recorded the Buddha as having said that before Beings, there was only a mass of water. It is not co-incidence that great civilisations evolved on the banks of rivers. Thus, it is clear that even before the advent of modern science, water was believed to have preceded all life. The sheer presence of water draws people into unique relationships. Water thus has a far wider significance for the people than as just a biological necessity. They convert the properties of water into cultural practices. While some practices primarily take care of the biological body, they satisfy some of the collective cultural needs as well. Water and water-related practices, as we shall see, become the context in which a strong sense of community is fostered. Furthermore, water becomes the text for the articulation of several relationships within society.

Scope and Method This paper examines water as an eco-cultural reality for the people of Goa. A number of popular water-related practices have been discussed. We find that, despite the absence of any written records, folk knowledge has thrived from generation to generation. Almost all villages in the coastal areas of Goa have seawater-bathing traditions, and almost all villages have access to saline or brackish waters. For a person who has grown in the Goan village community, the water-related traditions are a common knowledge. Within this given eco-cultural milieu, I have tried to explain how the community has evolved beliefs and practices from the collective use of water that is abundantly available in their immediate environment. The data for this paper were collected from the villages of Santa Cruz/Calapura (Tiswadi Taluka), Betul (Quepem Taluka), Candolim (Bardez Taluka), and the author’s native village of Santo Estevao (Tiswadi Taluka) (see Map 1). The data on water and the beliefs about it

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have been mostly obtained through conversations with elderly women and men from these villages. The data on folk gynaecological beliefs and the practice of seawater baths have been obtained from people who have been regular bathers for several years.

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This approach, no doubt, lends itself to some problems of interpretation. However, to retain the essence of the explanation, and to construct the meaning in the English language, I have taken advantage of the fact of having grown in the same socio-cultural milieu as the respondents. This can, therefore, also be seen as an attempt to document the living traditions. This paper seeks to explore how water as an ecological entity, that is so plentifully present, becomes a socio-cultural reality and the organising principle of community life. I begin with Goa’s ecology as the point of departure, tracing the emergence of khazans (reclaimed lands) and the indispensability of the waterways for social intercourse. This is followed by an analysis of the evolution of some functional groups based on the presence of water and water-related activities. Finally, I have attempted to show how, in this long-standing relationship, water ‘seeps’ into the linguistic idioms and folk traditions of the community.

Water, the Matrix of Goa’s Ecology The State of Goa is situated on the western coast of India. It is embedded in the Konkan region, which has been described as a strip of land running along the western side of the Sahayadris and the Western Ghats. Topographically, the coastline of the state, which is a little more than 100 km long, is a relatively shallow sloping plane area which is sandy coastline and is ideal for coastal fishing. The central portion is raised into elevated plateaus and the eastern half rises from the elevated plateaus into peaks which are fused with the Western Ghats. Sonsogad, Catlanchimauli, Wagheri, Karmalghat, and Dudsagar are some of Goa’s important peaks. They are the sources of many springs. The people living in their vicinity have a legend about each one of them as wealth given by the gods. From the eastern mountainous region the Western Ghats pour fresh water rivers into the state (see Map 2). The main rivers, beginning from north to south, are the Tiracol, Colvale, Mandovi, Zuari, Sal, Saleri, Talpona, Canacona, and Galgibag. They snake their way westwards, following the natural topography of the land. As they traverse from east to west, the nine rivers branch out into more than forty small tributaries that are spread across 3,701 sq. km of the state. Thus, almost every village is bordered by a river or a stream. At some points, the steep flow from the Ghats creates waterfalls, like the Dudhsagar Falls.

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The phenomenon of land reclamation has added to Goa’s unique ecology. The coastal silt plains had long been reclaimed from the sea by the aboriginal people like the Gavdes (Kunbi). They erected bunds to keep the lands from inundation by saline water, so they could be brought under cultivation. These special lands are called as khazans in  Goa.

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The people believe that these lands are protected by a local guardian spirit, the Khazanio. Land reclamation from the waters of the Arabian Sea as Goa’s unique eco-cultural feature is reflected in many works on pre-Portuguese history of Goa (see G.A. Pereira 1973: 13). A. Mascarenhas (1987: 20) has much discussion on the reclaimed lands of Goa. Any account on the aboriginal tribes of Goa always also finds reference to lands reclaimed by them from the sea. According to a graphic presentation by Cosme J. Costa (1992: 5), khazans are concentrated in the three low-lying coastal talukas of Tiswadi, Bardez and Salcete. The capital city Panaji itself gets its name from the Konkani term panaz, which means a place that gets waterlogged. Costa states that khazans are unique in the world. Only the Polders in Holland and the lands reclaimed along the banks of the Euphrates and the Tigris can be compared to them. They are used to cultivate paddy in Goa. According to the Goa Foundation’s environment report (2002: 100), the total length of the bunds is close to 2,000 km. This shows the elaborate and meticulous topographical engineering that was necessitated by the presence of water. If one were to go back in imagination, perhaps several thousand years ago, one would hardly find the present map of Goa, but a group of scattered isles in the midst of estuaries. Costa (1992: 3) opines that the sea had probably extended up to the point where red soils are encountered in Goa today. It was only through the efforts of the aboriginal people that large portions of land were reclaimed and the present contours were formed. Since ancient times, the inhabitants of this region have thus inherited a deep relationship with water.

Nautical Highways of Social Intercourse Another unique ecological feature of Goa is its numerous waterways. These were the main channels of transport for the people. Until the time of its Liberation in 1961, one could find many Goan villages where canoes could be hired like taxis of today. According to some local accounts, a family’s wealth and standing could be estimated by the number of boats they possessed. While boat was a necessity, having them in numbers was a status symbol.

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J.N. da Fonseca (1986: 2) states that the numerous waterways were like the highways of communication, which were the means of reaching all the distant areas in Goa. The importance of waterways can also be ascertained from F. Pyrard de Laval’s (2000: 47) travelogue. He reports that the river passages leading to the ‘City of Goa’ (the first capital of the Portuguese East India, the Old Goa today) were well guarded, and everyone was searched at certain gates along the rivers. This would be very much so as there was hardly any route where one did not have to cross a river. In Richard F. Burton’s (1991: 43) account of his travels in the mid-nineteenth century too, we see how indispensable the waterways were for transport. He mentions that to get to Old Goa from Panjim, it was a ‘couple of hours steady rowing’. The journey to Shiroda village (Ponda taluka) has been described as ‘an hour’s rowing along the coast and entering into a narrow channel formed by the sea and innumerable little streams’. It was a six-hour rowing journey to the village. In most early accounts of travels inside Goa, we find that terms like ‘rowing’, ‘channels’, ‘boats’, etc. are frequently used to describe movements from one place to another. This also indicates how the presence of water conditioned social life. Prior to Liberation, the gazoline or the motorised boat, had been introduced to ferry people across the rivers. The great number of rivulets and ferries necessitated a special River Navigation Department in Goa. This Department provides a ferry service link to many villages. In some parts of the state, canoes are still the main modes of transport from one village to another, across the rivers. This reveals that the waterways, and thereby water, were closely linked to the people’s life. They continue to be central to the social life of the people.

Water and the Evolution of the Occupational Structure Water has been the organising principle for many occupations among the people of Goa. Several special communities evolved in the Goan society as a result of their prolonged association with water. In the eastern half of the state, the many freshwater rivers, particularly the Madei in the Sattari taluka, leave the banks moist the whole year round. The people living close to these areas have evolved a form of paddy cultivation called

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as puran sheti. The moist banks are prepared and, wherever possible, mini damns are created to moisten dry low-lying areas. These banks are sown with paddy seedlings, and the flowing Madei takes care of the irrigation and nurturing. Thus, puran is a unique form of paddy cultivation in the winter, when no irrigation is done. The nature of puran and khazan cultivation is such that it requires the co-operation and the commitment of the community. There are days when the bunds breach suddenly. Work cannot wait for the ‘NOC’ (no objection certificate) from a panchayat. Nor can it wait for a cost estimate. In order to save the fields, the people simply have to stall the waters with their voluntary labour. The banks for puran have to be simultaneously prepared by the cultivators for the entire stretch that is demarcated. In the case of the khazans too, the embankments have to be taken care of along the entire riverbank beyond which the fields lie. Thus, water becomes a unifying factor, cutting across religion and caste, it compels people to act in unison and live as a community. Since ancient times, Goa has been known to produce a large quantity of salt. This is due to the presence of large shallow water areas close to the coast. The shallow silt plains have been effectively used to harvest salt from the saline waters of the Arabian Sea. Huge tracts of lands were impounded into agor (salt pans). The saline water was carefully kept in to a certain level so that evaporation could be quick. This occupation induced special communities among the people, whose identity evolved from the harvesting of salt from the seawater. They are called as the Agori and Mit Gavde. While the former community is a caste, the latter are a scheduled tribe, namely, the Gavda, who diversified from agriculture to salt extraction. They are identified as Mit Gavde in the talukas of Tiswadi and Bardez where the salt pans are located. The large areas under shallow water made Goa an important saltproducing region. Its salt trade was well known in the past. C. Pinto (1994: 219) says that salt was one of the chief local items of export from Goa. She reports that, in 1849, the salt production touched nearly 75,000 khandis (1 khandi = 100 kg). The quantity reflects the community spirit of the people, fashioned by the ecology of the land. Thus, by their very nature, some water-related activities could not be individual family practices, but they had to be essentially community practices. In both cases, that is, paddy cultivation and salt harvesting, we see that it is water that becomes the pretext for giving rise to a sense of community and maintaining the community spirit. In the former,

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collective effort is required to keep the water out; in the latter, collective effort is required to trap the water in. Freshwater- and seawater-fishing occupations also created two fishing communities in Goa. Those engaged in freshwater- and brackishwater fishing are called as the Pagi. This name has come from the characteristic disc-shaped net called as the pagel, used in the inland waters. Those engaged in seawater fishing are called as the Kharvi, a name derived from the term khar used to refer to the salty taste of water. There is yet another community that is identified as Gabit. Local traditions have it that they were originally warriors and good navigators, given to sea warfare. During peace times, they resorted to fishing. In the plains, the brackish waters snaking through the villages are also effectively impounded with bunds. Wherever possible khazans have been created, and the tidal flow of water is regulated through a system of sluice gates called as the manos. This is another unique ecological entity in the region. The periodic opening of the shutters is so designed as to allow saline water to come into the inland rivers only up to a certain level. Costa (1992: 6) explains that, where the land is above the lowtide level, the water is drained off through the gates into the sea. As the water goes out, the gates shut automatically in the direction of the flow of water. The gates then remain shut, due to the angular valve-like arrangement of the shutters, preventing the saline water from rushing in at high tide. The water flowing out is also not allowed to go below a certain level, as this would also drain out the fish. Besides keeping the lands dry for paddy cultivation, the manos serves as a mouth for catching fish and shrimp. The bounty from the water is tapped, its distribution regulated, and during the monsoon the fields are prevented from flooding. This system of maintaining the sluice gates too requires the co-operation of the villagers along the banks of the rivers. The community of people who maintain the manos shutters and repair the structure is called as the Manshekar. A separate community called as Bandkar evolved exclusively to take care of the bunds. The men of this community had mastered the art of collectively repairing bunds, filling up broken bunds even while the floodwaters were gushing in. At times, the gaonkaris (village associations) join hands to strengthen the embankments. In the past, when a village did not have Bandkars, it would borrow their services through the gaonkari of the neighbouring village.

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Boat services were indispensable to the people. The Vodekar or the boatmen are a special community of persons who provided ferry services to the people. They are also called as the Tari (from the term tar, which means a ferry service across water). Even today, some members of this community have retained their surname. Some were also enterprising enough to keep their vessels for hire. The Tandel were the oarsmen, employed for rowing boats. The local Chari, who were otherwise carpenters, were engaged by the European master craftsmen for building ships, as they had the expertise in woodcutting and carpentry. Long before them, it was already well known that the local carpenters were very knowledgeable about timber and shipbuilding. Thus, the Goan carpenter caste was further bifurcated into shipbuilders.

The Connection with the Sea and Maritime Traditions Goa’s maritime traditions have had a long history because of its location along the western coast of India. From historical records, we know that Goa had a booming maritime trade with the Middle East and the Mediterranean countries. According to A. Braganza (1964: 8), Alexandrian Ptolemy mentions Goa as ‘Kouba’ in his accounts, and that as far back as the seventh century CE Goa was known to the Arabs as ‘Kawa’. The fact that Goa was well known to the Arab world then shows that its contact with the Middle Eastern countries may have begun well from the ancient times. The relationships between the communities, as we shall see, came to be established once again, because of trading which was made possible through the medium of water. Tome Pires (1990: 54–58), who visited India in the early sixteenth century, had called Goa as the key to the first and second India, because of its strategic location along the western coast. B. Penrose’s (1960: 31) account also shows that, in the ancient world, Goa was well known to the Middle East. He mentions the strategic location of Goa with its good water, good soil and good shipbuilding timber. G.A. Pereira (1973: 82) holds the view that when the Muslims conquered the island of Goa their chief intention was to have access to the west coast, as Goa had a coveted position in sea trade. So much of trading activity went on from the ports of Goa that its income had been estimated by Pires (1990: 55) as 4 lakh pardaos per year (approximately Rs 2 lakhs in the sixteenth century).

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With so much seaborne trade and inland navigation, shipbuilding and canoe carving would be profitable businesses, as we can see from the works of F. de Vasconsellos (1938). Goa’s shipyards, reports K.M. Mathew (1988: 303), were the best organised and most admired by the Europeans. This is also affirmed by Pyrard de Laval’s (2000: 41) amazement at the vastness of ship repair and shipbuilding activity at the ‘City of Goa’. After the Portuguese introduced the Carriera (one round trip of carrying cargo from Goa to Portugal and back), Goa became an important entrepôt for western Europe as well. By the sixteenth century, Goa was already a busy port of call for trade along the western coast of India. Once again we have Pyrard de Laval (2000: 27) writing that it was a marvel to see a great multitude of people coming and going by sea everyday. Thus, it was the sea that prompted so much maritime activity and cross-cultural contact.

Water and Community Organisation: The Case of the Goulys In regions away from the coast, the brief seasonal scarcity of drinking water led the people living there to evolve myths, and prompted beliefs accordingly. Here I shall examine some beliefs among the Gouly tribe in Goa. The Goulys are a pastoral tribe living in the foothills of the Western Ghats in Goa. Traditionally, they have been buffalo and goat herders. They were semi-nomadic until recently. The state Forest Department’s restriction on their entry into the forests has imposed a settled lifestyle on them today. They are said to be a sub-group of the Dhangars in Maharashtra. R.E. Enthoven (1920: 311), in his work on castes and tribes of Bombay, has listed twenty-two endogamous and 108 exogamous groups of Dhangars. In Goa, they identify themselves as Gouly and live as a homogenous tribal group consisting of twenty-seven exogamous clans. Goulys moved in the elevated grasslands and the foothills of the Ghats, within the heavy rainfall areas, avoiding the arid regions, as the wet climate was most suited to the cattle. Unlike other populations, they established habitation wherever fodder was available for their herds. Many Gouly settlements were, thus, to be found away from water sources, but close to grazing grounds. Till today, Goulys live

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isolated from the rest of the state’s population. They are concentrated in the western half of the state, mainly in the plateau regions. In the monsoon months, they are surrounded by water. The rains create innumerable springs and streams which all flow towards the east. As winter approaches, the surface water dries up, save for a few ponds. The Goulys, who until recently were semi-nomadic, never dug wells, as they would shift residence once every five years. Potable water was scarce in summer, yet the Goulys were resourceful in using the limited water in the plateaus. The cattle, when taken to the grazing ground, drank their fill at a spring. The Goulys consumed very little milk, but they churned much of it into loni (butter) and the rest of it into tak (buttermilk), which was consumed as water. Even now, they consume at least 50 percent of their water requirements in the form of tak. Thus, the cattle become the surrogate water bearers in the dry months to provide drinking water to the people. This is the reason why tak itself is called as pandrem pani/udok (turbid water) among the Gouly. The water scarcity in the dry season has led to the belief that it is a taboo to step into water. The Goulys have to hold a gharanem (collective prayer) to ask for forgiveness from their goddess, Malchi Pander, if their feet accidentally even come into contact with the water in a spring. After attending to the call of nature, they wipe themselves clean with stones and leaves, and they are forbidden to use water for cleaning themselves. It was, in fact, considered unethical to use water for such cleaning. The few drinking water sources had to be kept pure, or else it would mean disease and death for the cattle as well as the people. Thus, the Goulys do not have a tradition of bathing at springs in the summer, unlike the rest of the population who throng to springs at that time. On the contrary, the ecological conditions (scarcity of drinking water in the summer months) in which they lived, because of their pastoral lifestyle, have been encoded into cultural practices specific to the Gouly community.

Water, Baths and Beliefs Every year, from March to May, many beaches in Goa are crowded with bathers. At first, they appear to be just holidaymakers trying to beat the heat. Only a closer look reveals that they are mostly women in their fifties and above, taking therapeutic baths. Where the sea is not

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so accessible or the womenfolk are not keen to spend the days under the hot sun, manos (the village sluice gate) is used for the purpose. A wooden plank is fitted across the gates a little below the low tide level. The bathers can perch themselves on it, and take the shower from the waters gushing through the gates. The seawater baths reveal the following characteristics: i. The bathers come in groups. Often entire families camp at the beaches renting a house or a part of it, for the duration of the baths. Sometimes the elderly men also accompany them. When they do not, the women and children of the neighbourhood get together, organise the food and lodge, for the time to be spent on the beach. ii. The bathers always proceed as a bathing party. Neighbours, rather than kinsfolk plan the dates and the camp. No person comes as an individual bather. The event is clearly a community activity. There is, therefore, as much chatting as there is bathing in the waters. iii. There is visible group interaction. Exchange of gossip, advice and sharing of problems is the dominant activity in the evenings. Once again water here forms the pretext for an as much social as therapeutic event. The social intercourse is built into the process of the bath. In fact, the baths appear to be just incidental to the interaction.

To understand the practice of seawater baths we have to begin with folk gynaecology. Among the people of Goa, particularly in the coastal areas, seawater baths are believed to have much to do with the physiology of a woman’s body. The practice is believed to stem from the special needs of a woman’s body. The following account from the elderly women in the villages of Goa explains the beliefs behind the seawater baths: To begin with, the body of a woman is believed to be different from that of a man. When a girl (chedum) begins to menstruate, she becomes a woman (bail ). The periodic flow of blood from the body lets out unwanted substances (mell ). When a woman enters menopause, two things are believed to happen to her: some women say that she begins to lose salt (mit) from the body, whereas all assert that menopause prevents the unwanted matter (mell ) from leaving the body, thus causing the blood to thicken (rogot atta or daat rogot) over a period. Thick blood (daat rogot) makes the joints painful and swollen, a great discomfort in day-to-day life. In order to dilute the blood to its previous consistency,

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and make it flow swiftly through the body, seawater baths (kharem udok) are believed to be beneficial. Only seawater can dilute the blood. The best results come from exposure to the strong waves that break at the beaches. The baths have to be taken in odd numbers only: beginning with one, and ending with seven baths. This means a woman may take just one bath for the whole year. Women who take just one bath remain in the water for almost the entire morning and noon, coming out only for snacking and drinking. Those taking more than one bath remain in the water till noon. They resume again the next morning. Once they begin, the same number of baths has to be repeated annually in summer. A break in the bathing cycle could cause their problems to aggravate. So, the seawater baths are an annual ritual till death or invalidity. Bathers should not take a freshwater bath till the required number of seawater baths are over. The salt (mit) has to seep as deep as it can into the body. The baths are timed when the salt content in the water is maximum, that is, in the summer months. Baths can also be taken during the high tides between October and November (the month of Kartik). The right days are when the water turns a muddy red along the coast. The waters themselves are called as rogtachem udok (blood water). They are especially sought as a remedy for painful joints.

Although the bathers say daat rogot can only be diluted (rogot patol zata) with seawater, these appear to be metaphorical explanations. Take, for instance, the phrase rogot atta, used as an expression for thick blood. Atta is a culinary term in Konkani, used to describe a curry that has become thick and viscous due to repeated cooking. The curry can only be diluted with water to bring it back to its original consistency. The same analogy is used to explain the dilution of blood with seawater. The fact that bathers do not take a freshwater bath till the seawater baths are over shows that the sea is sought for its salts. Therefore, rogot patol zata (which literally means ‘to dilute blood’) implies the revitalisation of blood with sea salts to get back the original composition. The beneficial substances believed to be lacking in the blood are taken from waters that already have salts in them, that is, kharem udok. This also conforms to the local belief that women lose salts from the body with age. Thus, people go to the sea to recover the salts (mit) lacking in the body. The sea is sought not only for trade and food, but also for the belief in its health restoring qualities. Here therapy is fused with group

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interaction. In fact, the interaction itself can be treated as part of the therapy, which contributes to the sense of well-being among the bathers. Besides the seashores, one would find bathers at the numerous springs too, in the summer months. S. Esteves (1966: 74) mentions that Goa has about forty well-known springs. In the elevated plateau regions and in many other villages we find seasonal springs which come up during the monsoon and flow till the month of December. Besides the well-known springs, there are several smaller ones which have been built into wells in private properties. If they are considered together, Goa can boast of thousands of springs. Goa’s springs and the sweet waters thereof had drawn the attention of early travelers and the Portuguese, too. G.A. Pereira (1973: 17) mentions that Ibn Batuta, on his visit to Goa in the fifteenth century, had described the island of Goa as surrounded by a gulf, and having sweet water. Pires (1990: 57) had said that the kingdom of Goa was the most important in India, having famous orchards and water. Pyrard de Laval (2000: 34) notes with interest that the great fort on the north side of Panjim (presently Fort Aguada) had a dual purpose, to keep the enemies from attacking and even from taking water from the famous spring over there. This indicates that the early foreign traders already had knowledge about Goa’s fine water resources. Springs have had a special significance for the local people. They were treated as properties of the gods and to which man was a mere intruder. Many springs are sacred sites in Goa. There are others where strict rules of consumption are followed, and breaking the established norms is considered a breach of taboo. Below I cite a few examples: i. In the village of Khordem in Quepem taluka of South Goa, the spring is believed to be the abode of the local guardian deity the Zolmi. No person can step into the main pool at the source. Drinking water may be collected from the stream flowing from it, and menstruating women cannot step anywhere near it. ii. In the picturesque seaside village of Betul in South Goa, there is a freshwater spring at the foot of the popular Baradi hill. This spring is known to be the abode of the local goddess Baradkarin. She is believed to bathe in the spring waters. Here too, water is collected from the flowing stream and it is a taboo to step into the source. On special occasions, women keep a lighted lamp for the goddess. iii. In the verdant village of Rivona in Quepem Taluka of South Goa, there are several springs, which the people believe were used by the ancient rishis

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and Buddhist monks who once inhabited the village. Next to a mutt, there is a well in an underground cave, which is believed to have been used by ancient rishis during their long periods of meditation. The three springs around the mutt are considered sacred by the local people. The water is believed to be energised. iv. In Old Goa (the old capital city of the Portuguese) in Tiswadi taluka of North Goa, the domed shrine of Saint Cajetan has a well right inside the Church, in front of the main altar. Another well at the ruins of the old St Paul’s College close by is associated with St Francis Xavier. He is believed to have bathed at the well everyday. Many Christians consider its water to have healing properties. v. In the village of Verna in Salcete taluka, there are many freshwater wells and springs. So numerous were the water sources in this village that the ancient name given to this village was Varunapuri. This also shows how closely related water was thought to be with beings divine.

Spring waters have also been associated with health restoring qualities. The Portuguese in the ‘City of Goa’, as it was known then, used the water of the famous Bainguenim spring for drinking. The spring, situated about 1 km away from the city centre, was known to have healing properties, and its sweet taste has been exalted by Pyrard de Laval (2000: 7, 70–72) in his travelogues. He mentions that, at the city hospital, Bainguenim water was specially brought in for the sick people. So well known was the water that it was sold by slaves in the city. Often, other well waters were also circulated as Bainguenim water. Some of the springs, like the sea, are popularly believed to give relief to certain ailments. The Orgaon village spring in Tiswadi is well known for clearing eyesight. One of the many springs in Rivona, called Takazor, with its sulphurous waters is well known for healing skin infections. Similarly, around Goa, F. Gracias (1994: 172) has reported the following springs to be popular among the people as a remedy to specific illnesses: i. ii. iii. iv. v.

Ambora spring (Salcete taluka)—beneficial against skin eruptions. Beloy spring (Salcete taluka)—remedy for nervous diseases and haemorrhoids. Assagaon lake (Bardez taluka)—remedy for lung infections. Maina-Batim (Tiswadi taluka)—beneficial for blood purification. St. Peter’s spring (Ponda taluka)—helpful in clearing eyesight.

One cannot fail to notice the gender dimension of spring water baths, too. Although there is no belief about the connection of freshwater and

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folk gynaecology, the bathers are largely women of all ages. Whether the spring waters really have the respective curative properties for specific diseases or not has neither been documented nor proven. The beliefs, however, are very deep-rooted among the people, based on cases of cures ‘reported’ from time to time. The most likely conclusion that one can draw is that water acts as a cohesive force and a pretext for social interaction. It contributes to a break in the monotony of domestic life for women. Thus, like the seawater baths, in a latent way, water becomes the matrix within which group interaction takes place. It is entirely the domain of women in the public sphere. The male members in the bathing parties are few, or in most cases conspicuously absent. The baths fulfil therapeutic as well as social requirements of the community.

Folklore Traditions The closeness to water and water-related activities would obviously find expression in folk traditions among the people of Goa. As Indra Deva (1989: 105) suggests, imagery for folklore in peasant society is drawn from rural life. J. Handoo and R. Kvideland (1999: 6) call it a living tradition, because it is based on life. The familiarity with the sea, streams, boats, rivers and the boatmen is thus reflected in many aspects of Goa’s folklore and folk performances. This can be seen further in some mythological traditions of Goa as well. A popular myth about the creation of Goa found in the Sahayadri Khand, and also recorded by A. Crawford (1987: 20–23) is that of Parashuram, one of the incarnations of Lord Vishnu. From a mountaintop in the Sahayadris, he hit an arrow in the ocean and commanded Samudra—the Lord of the ocean—to make it recede. At that point, the land of Goa rose up from the sea. Thus, as this myth has it, the land itself, so irrigated with freshwater and seawater, was believed to have had its origin in the waters itself. The Christian fishermen celebrate the feast of St Peter (who was a fisherman himself ) as the Sangodd (two boats tied together side by side). A sangodd is used to load goods on to, for transportation across the rivers. The boats are decorated colourfully and the statue of the Saint is paraded along the river. The Hindu fishermen also have similar sangodd

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celebrations where a local deity is paraded on the waters. It is the boat, which serves as an important means of communication and transport, which is the central focus of the festival. Today, there are boat-decoration competitions organised during the sangodd. The boatman (tarya/vodekar) was a much-respected person in the villages. He is addressed even today as mama, which in Konkani kinship terminology is the term of address for one’s mother’s brother. Thus, a boatman was always to be addressed as tarya mama (uncle boatman). Some folksongs and folk performances reveal this relationship with the boatman. Given below is a verse from the operetta called as the dekhni, which has been immortalised by hotels, tourist-boat operators and elite Christian parties. The performance opens to swaying belles who are trying to woo the boatman to take them across the river at night to the village of Shirodem, as they have to be in time for a wedding: Hanv saiba poltodi vetam, Damulea lagnak vetam, Makam saiba vaatu dakhai, Makam saiba vaatu kolona . . . Aagaa mujea tarya mama, Makam voron pavoi, Shirodeam, Hoi! Shirodeam! (I want to go across the river, for Damu’s wedding, but I do not know the way, Oh! Uncle boatman, Ferry me across, Take me to Shirodem Yes! Shirodem.)

A dulpod (folksong) sung at the end of the dekhni goes as follows: Voilea, voilea, dongrar, Udoku kongrem, udoku kongrem zalear, Nanv mujem Mogrem. (High up in the hills, the water comes curling down, if that is so, my name is Mogrem.)

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The vovios are songs in the form of couplets and verses. The themes are generally aspects of village life. Given below are some examples which illustrate how a vivid imagery is created with a close relationship with water: Tarya gelo poltodi, Volo urlo altodi . . . (The boatman has gone on the other side of the river, He has left his oar on this side of the river.) Dorian ailem larum, Ani larar ailem tarum, Tarvan ailo nevro, Bab . . . . . . re amcho! (From the sea came a wave, on the wave came a ship, from the ship came an eligible bachelor, Mr. So and so . . .) Vodekara, Vodekara . . . Makam voron pavoi Shoirdeam. (Boatman, boatman, ferry me to Shirodem.)

The network of maritime activity across the Arabian Sea is also reflected here, as in the case of the following dulpod: Africak eko tarum budolam ga, Dorya marun laru. (At Africa a ship has been sunk, By a wave from the sea.)

Yet another dulpod can be cited to show the indispensability of the numerous waterways for the people, for transport: Aare mujea Joao baba, Tum Mapxem vetolo zaleari, Maka vor tugelea vodheari. (Oh John! If you are going to Mapuca, Please take me too, in your boat.)

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Fish is the most important food item obtained from the waters. Popular literature has often rightfully termed fish as the soul of Goan cuisine. Even the socially powerful and ritually pure Saraswat Brahmins of Goa have traditionally been ‘fish-eating’ Brahmins. The most vivid example of the people’s maritime activity and their close connections with water and seafood can be illustrated from a folksong from the coastal villages of Salcete taluka. The song narrates a fish’s wedding celebration somewhere in the sea. We find the names of nineteen different fishes mentioned in the song (the local names of fishes have been emphasised). Tarleachea Matvant Tarleachea matvant gorvanto nacho, Ani gorvanteak polloun to buranto hanso, Shevteak tidok marun tacher marlo mocho, Achea ragan M.C. ravlo bankocho. Kazar komes zaina fudem twist korunk lagleo velleo, Pottar mutti marun bitor jevtaleo kurlleo, Are, Korkorian kusnan vochun sanvichi chorleo, Cake katrunk suri gheun bhonvtaleo korleo. Sangonk bhavano kallzak bosta re dhoko, To rock-n-roll nachonk topo sarko noko, Meuta tenem, yenem, tenem, alloitalo foko, Choryecheo sandvichi khavon korkoro vonko. Nachon, nachon sogli rat raumos zalem amot, Tantun modem saud korunk gusovtalem sangot, Are musigo matse tamsher asle, vazounk lagle romot, Nachon nachon shetke vokol fugon zali gumot. Kai bore nove nove dance te vazo, Shevtali, palvakodem nachtana lozo, Anik baba mojean nachoncheak nezo, Dista tum pollunk sarko kailintlo bozo. Kazar kabar zainam fudem gobrian kestanv kelem vodlem, Waggen tondko marun poilem gobriachem fodlem, Are zogdim adavunk sungot pasun modekat podlem, Churchurem, kallundur pasun, dukhannim rodlem.

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The people of Goa also classify water into several types as follows, their criteria for classification being drawn from the folkways of looking at water, depending upon its source and its physical properties: i. Kharem udok—Saline water; seawater. ii. Sayem udok—Brackish water, found in the rivers and ponds in the western part of the state. iii. Goad udok—Sweet water or potable water. iv. Pochok/Pochkem udok—Water that is insipid or acrid to taste. v. Khodpachem udok—Freshwater that gushes out from rocks. It also stands for a pond formed among rocks. The essential criterion is the presence of rocks in the water. vi. Zorichem udok—Stream or spring water; this is flowing freshwater. vii. Rogtachem udok—Saline water along the beaches, which sometimes turns a muddy red. This water appears in the months of October-November, and is used as a therapy against painful joints. viii. Pandrem udok—Buttermilk. It is called so because its appearance is turbid white, and is consumed by the Gouly as a substitute for drinking water in the summer months.

Water can also have sacred properties. Consecrated water is called as tirth by the Hindus, and the Portuguese term azmente is used by the Christians in Goa. We see from the classification that when water is believed to be a biological resource the term udok (water) is used as a suffix. Thus, the eight types of water are different types of udok. However, water believed to have sacred properties is understood as a different entity; it is called by a different name altogether and the term udok is never used. We can conclude that the folk conception of water as a physical substance is udok. As a spiritual entity, it is tirth or azmente having a character of its own. It rises above being a mere resource, and it is believed to have a power of its own.

Water in the Local Linguistic Idioms The local linguistic idioms show that water is often used to signify a shared sense of community, over and above caste and clan affiliations. In Goa, there are some common Konkani expressions which indicate the fact that the use of a common source of drinking water drew people together as a community. The idioms clearly suggest that the character

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of the people from a particular geographical area was attributed to the water that they consumed. The following are some Konkani idioms illustrative of the water-community nexus: i. Saat bainchem udok pita (Drinking water from seven wells): The phrase is used to describe a person who cannot keep loyalty to his own community. In other words, one is expected to use the water source used by the rest of the community. This signified a spirit of togetherness. Drinking water from different sources was equated to pledging loyalty to more than one community, which spoke of poor character. ii. Ekech koden udok piya (Let us drink water together): This phrase is used to say ‘let us live together and share our resources’, especially in the context of a daughter losing her spouse, or a son losing his source of livelihood. It can be read along with the first idiom, where drinking water from a common source signified togetherness. iii. Tanchem udokuch toslem (Their water itself is not good): The statement is used to say that if persons do not have a good character, or are not trustworthy, it is because the water that they consume is not good. By implication, good water gives good health and character. Bad water gives bad health and character. Thus, water is believed to shape even man’s mental faculties.

In Goa, many villagers travelling to other places in the past refused to drink water from strange sources, unless it was a well or spring known to be popular with travellers. The reason given was that one should use only the water sources used by one’s ancestors, as spirits tend to dwell in isolated wells and at other lonely water sources. If they are evil spirits, they may harm a person. The person harbouring evil spirits in him through the water may in turn harm the people from the community. Just as the concept of common blood draws people into a kinship, so is the belief that the water that people use from a common well also draws them together as a community. The people believe it establishes quasi-kinship through the consumption of water from a common source. Thus, water acts as a driving force to generate a strong sense of community. The Konkani language has several proverbs and sayings in which water, streams, rivers, sea salt and the boat are used as metaphors to convey meaning. The constant presence of these elements in the people’s lives has extended their use as semantic tools. Often their properties and functions are used metaphorically. Once again, this is a reflection of the

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people’s relationship with water and water-related activities. Given below are some instances of the way in which a single element—water and the activities related with it become the text for conveying diverse meanings. i. Udkache duddu udkant gele (Money from the water goes in the water): Whatever is ill-gotten never flourishes or nothing meaningful comes out of it. Usually it is lost. Whatever is gained unlawfully is often lost without hope of retrieving it. Like a thing dropped in running water is impossible to get back. ii. Kurddi udkak geli, ghagor foddun ghara aili (A blind woman went to fetch water, all she did was to break the pot and return): Only a person capable for a particular kind of job should be assigned to do it, else his labour will result in a greater loss. iii. Chodd uddta to buddta (He who jumps too much gets drowned): When in the water, one should not jump and show off, as this will surely lead to drowning. This saying is the equivalent of the English saying ‘pride goes before a fall’. iv. Dusreachea tondant udok pielear tan bhagona (You cannot quench your thirst by watching others drink water): Merely dreaming does not achieve anything; one has to act in order to get something done. v. Tollem rakhta to udok chakta (Those who guard the pond always taste water): If you keep your water source clean, you will never run short of water. This is also used to say if you use your resources sparingly, then you will never run short of necessities. vi. Addechea udkant bain borona (You cannot put water from outside to keep water in a well): If you try to show others what you are not, it will always be seen through. This is also used to say that you cannot fool everybody all the time. vii. Tan dhanvta udkak, udok dhanvona tanek (Thirst runs after water, and not vice versa): If you are in need of something, you have to work towards it; it will not come after you. Also, if you know that you are dependent on someone, you have to humble yourself. viii. Udkantlo shevto udkant motto (The mullet can show off only when it is in the water, not outside it): You cannot afford to show off anywhere and everywhere. One should never be over confident of one’s strength, and capabilities. Also, if one thinks that he/she is great, it does not mean that others will accept it. ix. Udkant asa maso mol korta piso (While the fish is still in the water, the fool fixes a price for it): Like counting one’s chickens before they are hatched. x. Udkar ghoddo ani zomnir voddem? (Can one sail a boat on the ground and make a horse gallop on water?): There is a right place and a right time for everything. This saying brings to the fore the principle of doing the right thing at the right time.

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xi. Udkarii nidta puddirii nidta (He can sleep soundly on dust as well as water): This is said of a person who can adjust to any kind of adversity and can work in any kind of situation. xii. Udka poros thond (Cooler than the waters): This is said of a very patient and tolerant person. xiii. Dudvanchem udok kelem (To make money flow like water): It means to spend a lot of money. The money spent on something important is compared to the endless flow of water from a river. xiv. Ghamancheo zori keleo (Made springs out of sweat, or sweat flowing like a spring): This is said for a person who works too hard. xv. Khavtem podlam (Breach in the bund): This statement is particularly used when a person loses his tooth, which shows a gaping hole when he smiles. xvi. To zaite desamchem udok piela (He has had water in many lands): Used for a person who has travelled extensively and has gathered a lot of wisdom from many lands.

Similarly, the boat appears in many Konkani sayings: i. Tarik duddu diun peun gelo (Inspite of paying the boat fare, he went across swimming): Used to say that a person’s efforts have all been in vain. ii. Duddu na tannem tarir poilo boscho (Those who do not have money try and make their way first in the boat): This is like saying that beggars are trying to be choosers. iii. Alexa tann re volo, hanv burgo muga, Alexa jev re, hanv manaim muga (Alex, row the boat, Oh! I am a child; Alex, come to eat, Oh! I am a man): Said when a person tries to shun work saying that he is too young for the job, and yet when it comes to eating he says he has to get a lion’s share, because he is a full-grown man. iv. Kumpar kumar ghorakoddem, duddu farik kor voddeakoddem (Godfather and Godmother—at home, pay your fare at the boat): Like saying do not mix business and friendship. This is also used to say that a person treats his relatives well, but when it comes to money, he forgets all relations. v. Kunviam soit tarum gillem (He ate the boat along with the sails): Said of a person who is unduly anxious for even a small job; one who worries too much and overworks himself. vi. Tarum bhorunk gelolo portolo, pott bhorunk gelolo portunk na (He who went to fill the cargo boat has returned, but he who went to fill the stomach has not yet returned): Used to say that though the boat is larger than a man’s stomach its capacity has limits, but a human stomach/greed has no limits. vii. Gabteank gorvam ani bhotank tarvam konnem sangleam? (Who has ever heard of Brahman’s sailing ships and fishermen tending cattle?): Some people are meant to do only particular types of jobs; they are not good at

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Sea salt too, appears in many Konkani sayings: i. Nirbagi veta thoim kharem udok pavta (Wherever an unlucky person goes, its like salty water reaching the wells there): In the summer months, water in some wells in Goa turns salty. This is compared to a luckless person, who would bring bad luck even to the place where he happens to go, just like the salt that reaches the wells. ii. Doriantlem mitt ani bailentlem vaitt yeta (The sea yields salt, and women yield evil): What comes from the sea, but salt; what comes from a woman, but evil. Women are believed to be the cause of many bad things, especially when they are menstruating. The comparison here is with salt’s tendency to constantly crystallise, as it is always present in seawater. In the same manner, evil is always there in a woman, so all she can yield is evil. iii. Mitt koso lok (The crowd gathered was like salt): This is used to describe a very large crowd, infinite numbers. iv. Dhoria konn dhuit ani marog konn pushit? (Who can wash away the salt from the sea, and who can wipe the dust from the roads?): This is used to describe some impossible tasks. v. Mitt khata to udok pietolo (He who eats salt will eventually drink water): This is used to say that those who commit misdeeds will some day pay the price. vi. Sheeta fudem mit khata (Eating salt before the rice): This is used for a foolish person who makes a statement beforehand. This is also used to describe a boastful person.

From this brief analysis of idioms, we can see that certain attributes are assigned to water, the boat and sea salts when used semantically: Water  - flows endlessly - can absorb anything - can harbour evil spirits - shapes character - shapes experience - becomes a source of justice - can teach a lesson to the boastful The boat compares with  - human greed - people’s opportunism - human anxiety - man’s lethargy for work - auspiciousness - wasted efforts

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Salt denotes  - infinity - lucklessness - tendency for evil - boastfulness - impossible tasks - punishment

Thus, a wide variety of meanings is conveyed using water, salt and sailing. For the people, these elements and activities form a part of their quotidian ethos. They are used analogically for linguistic construction.

Conclusion From the brief treatment of Goa’s ecology, maritime history and folklore, we can conclude that—‘the tasteless, colourless, odourless liquid’— is not just a biological resource for the people. Water has generated communities and fostered a sense of community, charted the course of history, evolved beliefs and rituals, contributed to oral traditions of proverbs and idioms, and it remains the matrix of social life for the Goan people.

Notes I am thankful to the anonymous referee for her/his encouraging comments and useful suggestions. 1. There is no literal translation in English for the Konkani term vosaad. It variously means the force with which water hits a surface, the push that one experiences when one is wading in water, and the energy of the water to carry objects away. It is also used in the Konkani language to refer to a domineering person who never fails to make his presence felt.

References Ali, A. 1987. Al-Qur’an: A contemporary translation. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. In other words: Essays towards a reflexive sociology. London: Polity Press. Braganza, A. 1964. The discovery of Goa. Bombay: Brooks Publications. Burton, Richard, F. 1991. Goa and the Blue Mountains or six months of sick leave (1851). New Delhi: Asian Educational Services.

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Costa, Cosme J. 1992. ‘Goa and her khazans’, Boletim do instituto Menezes Braganza, 47 (64): 1–16. Crawford, A. 1987. Legends of the Konkan. New Delhi: Asian Educational Services. Deva, Indra. 1989. Folk culture and peasant society in India. Jaipur: Rawat Publications. Enthoven, R.E. 1990. The tribes and castes of Bombay (Vol. 2). New Delhi: Asian Educational Services. Esteves, S. 1966. Goa and its future. Bombay: Manaktalas. Fonseca, J.N. da. 1986. An historical sketch of the city of Goa. New Delhi: Asian Educational Services. Fuchs, S. 1983. The origin of man and his culture. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal. Gadgil, M. and R. Guha. 1992. This fissured land: An ecological history of India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Goa Foundation. 2002. Fish curry and rice. Mapuca: Goa Foundation. Gracias, F. 1994. Health and hygiene in colonial Goa. New Delhi: Concept. Handoo, J. and R. Kvideland (eds.). 1999. Folklore: New perspectives. Mysore: Zooni Publications. Mascarenhas, A. 1987. Goa from pre-historic times. Vasco: Antonio Mascarenhas. Mathew, K.M. 1988. History of Portuguese navigation in India. Delhi: Mittal Publications. Penrose, B. 1960. Goa: O Rainha do Oriente (In English and Portuguese). Lisboa: (Publisher not mentioned). Pereira, A. 1985. Konkanni Oparinchem Bhandar (in Konkani). Panaji: Gulab Publishing. Pereira, G.A. 1973. An outline of pre-Portuguese history of Goa. Vasco-da-Gama: Antonio Pereira. Pinto, C. 1994. Trade and finance in Portuguese India, 1770–1840. New Delhi: Concept. Pires, T. 1990. The Suma oriental of Tome Pires (1512–1515). New Delhi: Asian Educational Services. Pyrard de Laval, F. 2000. The voyage of Francois Pyrard de Laval (trans. by Albert Gray [1619] for the Hakluyt Society London). New Delhi: Asian Educational Services. Radhakrishnan, S. 1989. Indian Philosophy (Vol. 1). New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Raven, H. 1986. Biology. Toronto: Mosby College Publishing. The open Bible (The new King James version). 1985. New York: Thomas Nelson Publishers. Vasconsellos, F. de. 1938. Armadas de Carreira da India de 1560–1590 (in Portuguese). Lisbon: O Livro do Mundo. Warder, A.K. 1970. Indian Buddhism. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

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9 Traditional Institutions and Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Agrarian Mobilisation: The Case of Bhartiya Kisan Union Gaurang R. Sahay

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n this paper, I have tried to delineate the relationship between traditional cultural practices and institutions of caste, clan and panchayat, on the one hand, and agrarian mobilisation, on the other, by making a case study of the Bhartiya Kisan Union (hereafter BKU). The BKU has been, from about 1986, the champion of the farmers or peasants of western Uttar Pradesh (hereafter UP). It is found that, during 1987–89, the BKU organised a number of highly successful movements or agitations against the state by successfully mobilising the farmers and effectively deploying the cultural practices and traditional institutions. In fact, its strategy of agrarian mobilisation was largely modelled upon the functioning of these practices and institutions.

Caste and Agrarian Mobilisation: A Review I have carried out this work against the background of a number of important empirical studies on the subject of caste and agrarian mobilisation. The nature and content of this scholarship is rich and heterogeneous,

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and it provides us at least two different and, to an extent, contradictory theoretical understanding of the subject. On the one hand, a set of studies (see, for example, Moore Jr. 1967; Singh 1974; Sarkar 1979; Omvedt 1981) strongly puts forward the view that the caste system has always obstructed the process of agrarian mobilisation for rural transformation in India. Barrington Moore Jr. (1967) argues that Indian peasants are deeply divided into castes, facing different life situations in the rural social formation. Hence, they cannot unite under the banner of a single leadership for agrarian or rural transformation. This apart, the institution of caste, through the process of ideological interpellation, makes subordinate or weaker castes docile and passive and generates primordial loyalties among them towards the dominant castes. That is why, he reasons, there have not been notable cases of peasant rebellion or movements in Indian history. Rajendra Singh (1974), in his study of the land-grab movement in eastern UP, observes that the caste system created many problems for the movement. The movement failed to realise its objectives mainly because the participants—peasants and workers—were differentiated into different groups based on their caste affiliation. During the movement, Singh writes: The sharp polarisation of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ could not take place as a large number of landless exterior castes like Chamars, Goriats and Bhataits kept intact their primordial loyalties to the bigger landholders on whose farms they have been working for generations. The traditional relation of these Goriats and Bhataits with the families of the landholders continued to exist and in most of the instances they leaked inside information of the plan and strategies of the movement (Ibid.: 61).

He further writes that the dominant castes in the villages ‘exploited all along what Alavi calls “primordial loyalties” . . . of Chamars, Goriats and Bhataits and of their kin and clan members who were in their opposite camp. Primordial loyalties and caste loyalties transcended the class situation. This enabled the big farmers to defeat the grabbers everywhere’ (Ibid.: 68). Omvedt (1981) also finds the caste system to be an impediment in the process of agrarian consolidation and mobilisation. She argues that in Indian rural society it is almost impossible to mobilise people in a

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movement from across caste lines for social change or transformation. To quote her: The existing class/caste complex also provides fertile ground for the capitalist farmers to use casteism to appeal their kin among the middle peasants and labourers, to divide the rural semi-proletariat, and to attack its dalit and adivasi sections (and their women) who are often the most militant. While ‘atrocities against Harijans’ are occurring throughout India, it is precisely in the more capitalistically developed areas, where the general class-caste structure described above is most fully present, that they are taking the most widespread forms with even poor and middle peasant caste Hindus sometimes participating in attacks on dalits on a mass basis . . . (Ibid.: A-157).

K.K. Sarkar (1979) also holds somewhat similar views. He argues that there was a lack of collective effort and unity among the peasants and workers who participated in the Kakdwip Tebhaga movement. This happened mainly because ‘the social system of Kakdwip itself had certain peculiarities unfavourable for the growth of organisation of the peasants at least in its initial stage’ (Ibid.: 473). On the other hand, some notable empirical contributions (see, for example, Shah 1974; Siddiqi 1978; Henningham 1982; Dhanagare 1983; Gupta 1997) demonstrate that there is no cognitive hiatus between caste and agrarian mobilisation. In fact, the institution of caste plays a significant role in organising and mobilising the farmers/peasants for agitation and movement. It provides a solid platform to the farmers/ peasants for coming together for the realisation of their common goal. Ghanshyam Shah (1974) observes that, during Kheda and Bardoli Satyagrahas, caste and its organisations were used to bring about unity within and among various castes. In his study of the agrarian unrest in north India during 1918–32, M.H. Siddiqi finds that ‘the existence of castes helped the peasant movement to proceed with greater cohesion and speed and that the supposed irreconcilability between class and caste did not exist in the rural society of Oudh’ (1978: 214). In his study of peasant movements during 1920–50, D.N. Dhanagare (1983) argues that in some of the movements the institution of caste was successfully used to bring people together. Stephen Henningham (1982) also holds somewhat similar views vis-à-vis caste in his study of peasant movements in north Bihar during the early twentieth century. Dipankar Gupta (1997) argues that the emergence and development of the BKU

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in western UP is intimately related to the culture and tradition of Jats, a dominant caste of the area. To quote him: The BKU draws its sustenance from certain aspects of Jat culture and tradition while ignoring others. In addition, the fact that these cultural aspects came to the forefront was because they were in harmony with, and thus encouraged by, actual social practices. The Jat ethos of equality plays a very important role in understanding the character of the BKU (Ibid.: 2).

The Data The data for this paper have been accumulated primarily by observing the functioning of BKU and its agitations and movements. Discussions with the BKU office-bearers as well as the farmers including its members, over various issues or themes of this paper also provided valuable insights. This apart, my erstwhile colleagues and students at the Janta Vedic (PG) college, most of whom hail from the villages of Baghpat, Meerut and Muzaffarnagar districts of western UP, provided me important information. They also sensitised me to some of the issues axial to this paper. The college where I worked till recently (the end of June 2004) is located in Baraut (Baghpat district) and surrounded by villages. I have visited some of the villages from time to time and spent time among the farmers for this study. My fieldwork in the villages of Baghpat district (Chhaprauli and Nirpada) and Muzaffarnagar district (Bhaju and Sisauli) started when Dipankar Gupta provided me an opportunity for assisting him in his work on the BKU and political life of the western UP farmers. Later on, I conducted fieldwork in association with Stig Toft Madsen. Both Gupta and Madsen have acknowledged these parts of my fieldwork in their respective works (see Gupta 1997; Lindberg and Madsen 2003).

Farmers/Peasants of Western Uttar Pradesh: An Introduction While dealing with the BKU-led agrarian mobilisation and movements in western UP, I have used the terms ‘peasant’ and ‘farmer’ interchangeably. This may be intriguing, as in most sociological/anthropological studies, including the recent ones, the term ‘peasant’ denotes the socio-cultural

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life of agrarian community, whereas the term ‘farmer’ denotes its economic life. Peasants have generally been conceptualised as sluggish, obstinate, traditional or parochial and backward-looking villagers who do not look beyond the ‘bamboo hedge’. Owing to these traits and their communitarian character, they are considered to be, more often than not, non-ideological and culturally indifferent to politics and the market economy. Theodor Shanin opines that The political impact of the peasantry has been generally marked by its sociopolitical weakness. The vertical segmentation of peasants into local communities, clans and groups and the differentiation of interests within these communities themselves has made for difficulties in crystallising nationwide aims and symbols and developing national leadership and organisation which, in turn, has made for what we have called low ‘classness’ (1971: 255; see also Wolf 1969; Shanin 1972).

On the other hand, farmers are viewed as performers of economic roles in agrarian social formation. It is supposed that they themselves participate physically in farming, hire labour for farm work, use available agricultural technologies, techniques and machines, including the modern ones, and perform supervisory work. On account of these roles, farmers interact with the market and participate in politics to better their lifesituations (see Gupta 1997: 25). Since the villagers who are involved in agriculture, particularly in western UP, act as both farmers and peasants, I think it is imperative to use the terms interchangeably in an inter-contextual way to make any headway in comprehending the BKU and its agrarian mobilisations and movements. It is peasant-farmers who form a union and launch movements against the state. Gupta rightly remarks, ‘The terms peasants and farmers should be recast and placed in relation to each other. It would perhaps be less useful to consider either the peasant or the farmer in isolation, but rather in terms of intercontextuality’ (Ibid.: 26). UP is a large state; it is the largest in population and the second largest in area. Like other states, UP has been divided into changing number of districts which have been grouped into four regions—western, central, eastern and Bundelkhand—for the purpose of administration. The western region is further divided into northwest and southwest. The BKU and its influence are traditionally and primarily located in the western region, particularly in the northwest districts: Baghpat,

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Bijnor, Bulandshahar, Ghaziabad, Meerut, Moradabad, Muzaffarnagar, Rampur and Saharanpur. The people of UP are largely dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. On the basis of census figures, J. Lerche and R. Jeffery write: ‘The state remains overwhelmingly agrarian: in 1992, 72 percent of the economically active population was engaged in agriculture. This core sector has done well, consistently registering growth rates in yields above all India rates between 1962–65 and 1992–95, at an apparently accelerating rate’ (2003: 18). However, there is a regional variation so far as the development in agriculture in the state is concerned. In the western region of the state, more so in its northwest districts, development in agriculture is by far the most. In this context, Zoya Hasan writes that western UP ‘experienced the largest increase in rural capital investment, processing and small-scale industries in the green revolution era. By virtually all indices of growth and modernisation, western UP achieved considerable progress, and by the early 1980s this region was substantially ahead of others in the state’ (1998: 88). There are many reasons for this: the durable arrangement of canal irrigation from the colonial times, less harsh taxation during the British rule, successful implementation of the post-Independence land-reforms programme (particularly, abolition of the zamindari system and consolidation of land-holdings), more equitable land-holdings or less landlord-dominated landowning pattern, early implementation and adoption of green revolution technologies, and more investment in the agriculture based industries (see Stokes 1978; Stone 1984; Lerche and Jeffery 2003). In western UP, most of the households which cultivate land or are engaged in agriculture belong to the class of small peasants ‘with an ownership average of about three acres of land’ (Gupta 1997: 27). This does not mean that the remaining households constitute the class of landlords. In fact, there is hardly a landlord in the villages of western UP (see Ibid.; Lerche and Jeffery 2003). In Bhaju (a village in Muzaffarnagar district), 526 households out of the total 1,019 own land; 219 (41.6 percent) of the total landowning households own not more than three acres of land; 248 households (47.4 percent) own more than three but not more than eight acres of land. In other words, 467 (89 percent) of the total landowning households own eight or less than eight acres of land in the village. There is no household in the village which owns more than nineteen acres of land. A good number of these landowning households are fairly large in size, consisting of more than one married

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couple (see Gupta 1997: Appendix IV). Gupta also writes that the biggest farmer in Chaprauli (the biggest block village in Baghpat district) ‘has eighteen acres of land, but has also two adult sons with their families living off the same plot’ (Ibid.: 27). In Sisauli, a village in Muzaffarnagar district and headquarters of the BKU, there is hardly a household which owns more than twenty acres of land. Mahendra Singh Tikait (president of the BKU) of Sisauli village, who heads a household of five married couples and many children, has about sixteen acres of land. The farmers of western UP mainly grow sugar cane and wheat. Many sugar mills in this area purchase sugar cane and pay the farmers through banks. Since most of the farmers own small size of land, they usually cultivate the crops themselves with their household labour. The farmers generally require less agricultural labour for the cultivation of sugar cane mainly because its harvesting period is about six months and they can harvest their crops themselves. The average farmer hires some labour to tie handfuls of sugar canes together so that they do not fall on the ground during the rainy season. This apart, some farmers require hired labour for sowing the sugar cane. However, the farmers require more agricultural labour for the cultivation of wheat, because wheat harvesting is intensive, labour-consuming work and its period is quite short, that is, about a week. Therefore, most small farmers also hire agricultural labour for harvesting wheat. Overall, the demand for agricultural labour in the villages of northwestern UP is quite less, irregular and periodic. That is why, most of the landless labourers work outside their villages in the nonagricultural sectors, particularly in brick-kilns. In Bhaju (an interior village in Muzaffarnagar district), as Gupta writes, 246 out of 362 landless households derive income only from non-agricultural manual work for their livelihood. Most of the adult male members of these households work outside the village. The remaining 116 landless households do not get enough work in the village agriculture for their livelihood (Ibid.: 28–29). Gupta rightly argues that in the villages which are easily accessible and situated besides major trunk routes, such as Nirpura and Chaprauli, ‘the tendency for the landless to seek work outside is far more pronounced’ (Ibid.: 29). The fact that the farmers generally do not require much agricultural labour in the villages of northwestern UP does not mean that the farmers outnumber landless agricultural labourers. To quote Gupta, ‘Both in Meerut and Muzaffarnagar districts, and indeed in all of western Uttar Pradesh, Harijans and Valmikis, who

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are overwhelmingly landless, outnumber Jats and Gurjars put together’ (Ibid.: 30).

Nature and Agenda of the BKU Against the background of such an agrarian situation, the BKU came to northwestern UP after a gap of about six years of the formation of a peasant organisation having same name in 1980 in Andhra Pradesh. In December 1980, Shri C. Narayanswami Naidu, a veteran farmer-leader of Andhra Pradesh, called a meeting of farmer leaders from different parts of the country in Hyderabad to discuss the burning issues facing the peasant society at large. The leaders decided to form a national level organisation of farmers to take care of their interests. They named the organisation as ‘Indian Farmers Association’ in English and ‘Bhartiya Kisan Union’ in Hindi. A peasant organisation having the same name was set up in Haryana in 1981 with Rao Harlal Singh of Kanjhawala village as its main leader. The BKU was set up in UP in 1986 with Mahendra Singh Tikait of Sisauli village (Muzaffarnagar district) as its sole leader, with no formal ties with any organisation bearing the same name (Ibid.: 31). The BKU in UP was registered as a trade union under the Trade Union Act (see Lindberg and Madsen 2003: 204). It adopted an elaborate constitution which clearly states that the union is a non-political and secular organisation of farmers, and its objective is to bring about socio-cultural and economic reform and development in rural community. According to this constitution, no person holding a post in a political party can hold a post in the managing committee of BKU; and none of its functionaries is allowed to hold a post in a political party. Though the constitution claims that the union represents the farmers of the country as a whole, it is largely a state-level association with its base in western UP, particularly in the districts of Muzaffarnagar, Baghpat, Meerut, Bijnor, Moradabad, Bulandshahar and Saharanpur. Mahendra Singh Tikait has been its President right from its inception. Ostensibly, a farmer is supposed to pay Rs 5 for ordinary membership or Rs 50 for life membership, Rs 1 for each acre of land owned, and a donation of one kg of grain (see Ibid.: 194). According to the constitution, the BKU is a five-tiered organisation. At the village level, its members elect up to fifteen office bearers to the Village Committee.

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The office bearers choose from among themselves a President, VicePresident, Secretary, Joint Secretary, and Treasurer. All these office holders have to be life members. The President of each Village Committee and one representative from each village of a block constitute the Block Committee. They choose from among themselves one President, two Vice-Presidents, one Chief Minister, three Ministers, and one Treasurer. The President of each Block Committee and thirty-one representatives chosen from the members of Block Committees of a district constitute the District Committee. It will have one President, four VicePresidents, one Chief Minister, three Ministers and one Treasurer. The State Committee consists of only District Committee Presidents. They choose from among themselves one President, four Vice-Presidents, two Chief Ministers, three Ministers, one Treasurer and one Propaganda Minister. State Presidents and representatives of each state constitute the National Committee. Altogether, there can be 101 members of the National Executive. From among them, there will be one President, four Vice-Presidents, four Chief Ministers, eight Ministers, one Treasurer and one Propaganda Minister (see Ibid.: 195–96). The BKU has hardly implemented the constitutional provisions to formalise itself through the creation of elected committees. It does not have any kind of records about the constitution of the committees and the election and selection of their members. The BKU President directly selects the office bearers. Even so, there rarely seems to be clarity and agreement among the people as to who have been selected or elected as the office bearers (see Ibid.: 205). As Gupta observes, the standard answer to ‘Who are the office bearers of the BKU?’ is: ‘ “There is of course Chaudhary Sahib (Tikait), then Harpal Singh is the general secretary, and then I . . .” As each one said “and then I (aur phir main)” it was impossible to figure out who were the office-bearers’ (1997: 71). Like a trade union or other contemporary farmers’ organisations in India, such as the Shetkari Sanghtan and Karnataka Rajya Royta Sangh, the main issues on which the BKU has mobilised the farmers and launched movements are always related to the economics and profitability of farming for agrarian community. The most important issue on the BKU agenda is related to the rate, supply and distribution of electricity in the villages. The BKU has continuously pressed the state government for lower electricity rate for the villagers, particularly for those who use pump-sets to irrigate their farming land. It has been asking the government for enough and regular supply of electricity, and for its

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easy availability in the villages, primarily for irrigation purpose. Another important demand of the BKU is a higher minimum support-price for major crops, which are grown in western UP. The BKU has always favoured the continued high subsidies on chemical fertilisers, and has included this issue prominently in its charter of demands from time to time. It has consistently demanded a moratorium on the repayment of institutional farming debt and on the payment of electricity dues for an indefinite period. This apart, the BKU has been opposing the globalisation of trade, particularly free global trading of agricultural produces; it has been trying to convince the government to dissociate itself from the World Trade Organisation. To quote the BKU President: ‘Dunkel Draft is like the East India Company and is set to grab the nation. . . . No person on earth could take away the freedom of farmers and break their movement’ (Indian Express, New Delhi, 3 October 1993).

Traditional Institutions, Cultural Practices and the BKU The BKU began its career in UP as an informal, loosely structured mass-movement organisation of the Jat farmers of northwestern region of the state. In September 1986, Chaudhary Sukhbir Singh, head of Desh Khap (a clan organisation of Tomar Jats), called a meeting of his khap farmers in Baraut (Baghpat district) to protest against the state government’s decision to hike the farm electricity rates for pump-sets from Rs 22.50 to Rs 30.00 per-horsepower-per-month. It was an informal meeting patterned over the traditional institution of panchayat. The panchayat culminated into a one-day dharna at the Baraut powerhouse. Chaudhary Mahendra Singh Tikait (hereafter Ch. Tikait), head of the Baliyan Khap and a close relative of Chaudhary Sukhbir Singh, was present in Baraut at that time. Ch. Tikait was quite impressed by the unity among the farmers and their determination to fight for their cause. He took up this issue and the method of protest to organise agitations and movements in his own khap area in Muzaffarnagar district. On 17 October 1986, Ch. Tikait called a panchayat of his khap farmers in his village Sisauli. The panchayat was attended by about 3,000 Baliyan Jat farmers (see Rana 1994: 20). Ch. Tikait, being the head of the khap, presided over the panchayat. The panchayat decided to set up a peasant organisation—and named it the BKU—to fight against the

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state for the just causes of the farmers. The farmers asked Ch. Tikait to lead the BKU; for all practical purposes, he has been its sole leader right from its inception. Although the BKU was registered as a union and a written constitution was adopted to legitimise it, Ch. Tikait ran the union on informal lines patterned on the traditional sarva khap panchayat (an umbrella institution constituting all khaps); in his view, the farmers in western UP or elsewhere are deeply attached to their traditions and culture. Also, as noted by Gupta, ‘. . . there is nobody in the union who has the competence to set a formal organisational structure. Those who could, and who were attracted to the BKU were, however, not fully trusted by Tikait’ (1997: 156). Ch. Tikait also holds a view that the formalisation of BKU would lead to the emergence of many self-centred leaders in it, and they would, like political leaders, struggle for power and utilise the community of farmers and their resources for their self-interest. In such a situation, maintaining the non-political character of BKU and sustaining its goal would become impossible. Thus, the BKU and its President decided to make the primordial institutions and cultural practices as the basis and method of agrarian mobilisation and organisation of protest and movement. The union used the institutions of caste, clan and panchayat to mobilise and organise the farmers in western UP. It used religious slogans, cultural figures, practices and rituals to generate consciousness, enthusiasm, and feeling of unity and equality among the farmers. In western UP, particularly in the districts of Muzaffarnagar, Meerut, Baghpat, Moradabad, Bijnor and Bulandshahar, where the BKU has a strong support base, the most numerous agricultural caste is Jat, followed by Gurjar. These are also the ‘dominant castes’ in this area. Both Jats and Gurjars belong to two different religious communities, namely, Hindu and Muslim: there are Hindu Jats and Muley Jats, and Hindu Gurjars and Muley Gurjars. They own most of the land in the villages. In his study of Bhaju (a village in Muzaffarnagar district), Gupta (Ibid.: 204–06) found that there are altogether 1,119 households of about fifteen different castes. Jat is the most numerous caste, consisting of 401 households in the village. All of them own land, whereas only 125 out of the remaining 718 households own land. More important, the Jats, who constituted only 35.8 percent of the total households in the village, owned 75 percent of the village land. Jats and Gurjars are internally divided into various clan-groups that are known as khaps with different names (Desh Khap, Baliyan Khap,

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Gathwala Khap, Chaugama Khap, etc.) in the native language. The eldest male member of a particular family of the clan heads his khap, and he is called as Chaudhary of his khap. Generally, after a Chaudhary’s demise, his eldest son (the eldest male member of his family, if he has no son) inherits his position. Khap members generally use the same title in their names. Villages constituting families of a khap are spatially situated close to each other. Jat khap villages are dominated by Jats of the same clan, and Gurjar khap villages, by Gurjars of the same clan. The two major clans of Jats, namely, Tomar and Baliyan, populate the area (Muzaffarnagar, Baghpat and Meerut districts) where the BKU is centred and has been the most influential. Tomar Jats and Baliyan Jats constitute Desh Khap and Baliyan Khap respectively; each of these khaps consists of eighty-four villages. Most of the Baliyan Khap villages are in Muzaffarnagar district, and Desh Khap villages, in Baghpat and Meerut districts. The third major Jat khap in this area is Gathwala Khap of Malik Jats that consists of fifty-four villages. All the khaps, small as well as big, enjoy equal position in the caste system, there being no internal hierarchy of any sort within the Jat or the Gurjar caste. Like the Hindu Jat or Hindu Gurjar villages, there are the Muley Jat and Muley Gurjar villages, which generally do not consist of Hindu Jat or Hindu Gurjar families. There is hardly a village in western UP where both the Hindu Jats and Muley Jats or the Hindu Gurjars and Muley Gurjars inhabit side by side. However, there are many sociocultural and economic similarities between the Hindu Jats and the Muley Jats and between the Hindu Gurjars and the Muley Gurjars. Ch. Tikait used the common features of both communities to make the union strong and popular among the farmers of western UP. Before the formation of the BKU in western UP, the institution of khap and its chaudhary had not been effective in controlling and directing the life and behaviour patterns of clan members. The BKU revived this institution and utilised it to propagate the nature and objectives of the union among the farmers of western UP. As the chaudhary of Baliyan Khap, Ch. Tikait had natural relations with chaudharys of other khaps. He tried his best to convince them that the BKU was determined to solve the problems of the farming community, particularly by opposing the unjust and unjustified decisions of the state. He urged them to make other farmers of their respective khaps realise the relevance of the BKU for their own welfare. When Ch. Tikait started receiving positive response from such meetings, he, in February 1987, called a general

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meeting of khap chaudharys in his own village, Sisauli. In that meeting, they decided to tour the villages of Muzaffarnagar, Meerut and Baghpat districts for propagating the nature and objectives of the BKU among the farmers. Ch. Tikait toured many Jat villages in western UP, met village pradhans (elected heads of village panchayat), local caste and community leaders and other prominent members of the villages, and urged them to associate themselves with the BKU. In the villages, he addressed a general panchayat of the farmers, appealed them to participate in the BKU programmes, and asked them to set up village committees in their villages. From May to July 1987, Ch. Tikait addressed about 230 kisan panchayats. The farmers in large numbers, ranging from 10,000 to 30,000, attended each panchayat (Rana 1994: 66). During the next three months the same year, he addressed another 60 kisan panchayats in different villages (Ibid.: 70). Ch. Tikait used the traditional institution of panchayat to organise and pattern the BKU meetings. There is a general belief that the institution of panchayat has religious sanctity; it is considered a gift of god to humankind for resolving the mundane affairs of human society. The person who presides over the panchayat is regarded as a person of high moral character endowed with the godly wisdom. He encourages the participants to voice their ideas and opinions, listens to them, respects their disagreements, and takes decisions by considering the ideas and opinions of other participants. His decisions are considered to be final and, therefore, binding on all and irrevocable. In the villages, Ch. Tikait always asks a local farmer to preside over the panchayat. The person who presides may belong to any agricultural caste or community. Many BKU panchayats have been presided over by Muslim farmers. Though any participant or farmer is free to present his views in the BKU panchayat, it is mainly addressed by khap chaudharys, local caste leaders and village pradhans. Lindberg and Madsen rightly observe that BKU meetings are patterned on the panchayat. All senior males of the farmers’ castes in the area deliberate on a loosely defined and ever-shifting agenda in an informal but often protracted manner, with a minimum of procedural rules. Disagreement is openly voiced, but consensual decisions are preferred to voting. The panchayats vary in size, and it is rarely clear what constitutes a quorum (2003: 206).

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Like the traditional panchayat, a BKU panchayat is structured in such a way that all the farmers participating in it feel at home and respected. They are given opportunity to speak and their views are taken into account. No difference is observed between the leaders and other participants as regards seating arrangement. Generally, a small stage is prepared using a tractor-trolley or wooden cot to address the panchayat. Invariably, three persons are seen on the stage: Ch. Tikait, the person conducting the panchayat, and the speaker. After making their speeches, the speakers sit among the farmers. It is noteworthy that, during the Inter-State Farmers’ Coordination meeting, which was held in Delhi on 2 September 1989, Ch. Tikait objected to the big rostrum set up for the meeting. He questioned the motives of Sharad Joshi, President of the Shetkari Sanghtan, by asking: ‘Why such a big stage? It looks more like a political battlefield of those engaged in power politics’ (The times of India, Delhi, 3 October 1989). Eventually, he dissociated himself from this meeting, and it was split into two opposing camps (Rana 1994: 132). Ch. Tikait used the traditional concept of khap-chaudhary to gain the confidence and faith of the farmers. He never presented himself as a leader of a formal registered union before the farmers, but as a chaudhary of his farming community. As he reasons, the farmers do not trust a neta (leader), whom they see as power mongering to realise his selfinterest, whereas a chaudhary is believed to be acting for the well-being of his community or khap. The traditions of clan-community make the farmers believe in the pristine sanctity of khap-chaudharyship. A khap chaudhary is held in high esteem because he is considered to be a person of high moral character. M.C. Pradhan quotes the following resolution passed by the Baliyan Jats in their khap panchayat on 12 May 1941: ‘We will work with our body, heart and soul under the leadership of our chaudhary for the good of our khap. Towards this end, the chaudhary has the right even to demand our lives’ (1966: 179). M.S. Rana also notes, ‘According to the khap panchayat system the chaudhary of a khap panchayat enjoys supreme powers. His fiat runs through all villages of the khap’ (1994: 41). Though a chaudhary is taken to be the unquestioned head of his khap and his decisions are viewed as binding on his community, he is supposed to follow the wishes of his clan members and the mandate granted to him by the conventions and traditions of the khap panchayat. Ch. Tikait used this time-tested concept of khap chaudhary to project his leadership of the BKU among the farmers. It proved to be

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extremely good for the BKU and brought wonderful results in terms of the mobilisation and organisation of farmers under the banner of the BKU. The farmers believe in the words of Ch. Tikait because he lives a life of a common western UP farmer. Like most of the farmers, he is not educated. He presents his views in the local dialect. He is always conscious of his culture and tradition. He wears homespun cotton clothes (knee-deep dhoti and kurta, and Gandhi topi) and locally made shoes. His food is very simple, and it is made up of roti (bread), dal (pulse), ghee (clarified butter), gud (jaggery) and milk. Like other villagers, he smokes hookah (a type of smoking-pipe). All this has generated a feeling among the farmers that the BKU President, Ch. Tikait is their chaudhary and is one among them. The BKU and Ch. Tikait used local cultural practices and symbols to arouse consciousness, enthusiasm, feeling of brotherhood and dedication among the farmers. The BKU farmers always shout religious chants like ‘Allah-O-Akbar’ and ‘Har Har Mahadev’ during the panchayats and agitations. The BKU meetings always conclude with these chants; all speeches end with these chants. Such a cultural practice, observed as a rule, generates a feeling of brotherhood among the farmers irrespective of their religious identity. The BKU uses cultural or religious figures to name the sites where it organises agitations or movements. During the Meerut agitation, the union named the sites as ‘Ram Garh’ and ‘Hanuman Garh’ to convey the message that they, like Ram and Hanuman, are fighting with full commitment and dedication against injustice and evil rule. Such chants and naming generate religiosity among the farmers towards the BKU agendas and programmes. This apart, Ch. Tikait always refers to the cultural or religious teachings in the course of his speech or discussion with the farmers. Some of his general comments are: ‘Have faith in the almighty. He would help us through the struggle. Since god is with us, we would emerge victorious. We are fighting a dharmyudh. God will take care of our problems’ (quoted in Rana 1994: 49). Ch. Tikait has all the reverence for the sacred ritual of yajna (sacrificial fire), quite popular in western UP. During the long agitations, such as the Meerut and Rajabpur agitations, the BKU performed yajnas every morning with all solemnity at the agitation site. Yagna is an old cultural practice meant to purify the environment and to have sanctifying effect upon human thought and action. It also symbolises truth. There is a popular belief that Sita came through the sacrificial fire to prove her fidelity and

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sexual purity. Following such a belief, Ch. Tikait told the newspaper correspondents during the Delhi Boat Club rally on 25 October 1988: ‘Let there be two pyres, place him [Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister] on one and I will sit on the other. Light the pyres. We believe that he who is truthful cannot be affected by fire’ (quoted in Gupta 1997: 59). For such cultural meanings and sanctifying effects, Ch. Tikait lights a ghee (clarified butter) flame before he goes for a serious thinking over a problem. Such a flame also burns continuously in the BKU office in Sisauli in memory of those who have lost their lives during the agitations (Ibid.). The BKU is so much guided by the culture and traditions of the local community that Ch. Tikait generally expresses his feelings in religious terms. He often claims that his inspiration to be active in the BKU is religious in character; he says that it is god ‘who told him to fight for the cause of cultivators. On many occasions he has said that his fight is a dharmyudh, or religious war, or even for a just moral order’ (Ibid.: 60). However, such religious expressions did not detract the secular character of BKU. The BKU agitation has been frequently presided over by Muslim farmers; Muslim religious leaders like Sayyad Ahmad Bukhari (the present Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid, Delhi) have addressed its big panchayats. Hookah is not just a traditional smoking instrument for the farmers in western UP, it is also a cultural instrument that symbolises bhaichara (brotherhood). The persons who share the same hookah are believed to be united with each other based on the idea of brotherhood. Generally, in the villages of western UP, the persons belonging to the same caste get together regularly and share a hookah. Gupta observes that members of a cultivating caste, such as the Jat, do not mind sharing a hookah with other cultivating castes like the Tyagi, Rawa or Gurjar. The villagers generally say that ‘to smoke a hookah alone is a sign of misfortune, but to smoke a hookah in a panchayat or gathering is a sign of good fortune’ (Ibid.: 47). The BKU used this cultural instrument in its panchayats or agitations to arouse the feeling of brotherhood among the farmers of different social classes. In the BKU panchayat, it is always possible to see the farmers in groups sharing the same hookah by turns. Many newspapers and magazines have published photographs of the BKU farmers and their chaudhary sharing a hookah during the panchayats and agitations. There is another cultural instrument in western UP, known as ranasingha, which is traditionally used to spread a message. The BKU blew it to spread messages and announcements during the panchayats and

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agitations. Thus, the BKU reiterates its sensitivity to the age-old tradition and culture of the local community.

The BKU and Agrarian Mobilisations and Movements The BKU strategy of using the primordial institutions of caste, clan and panchayat and the elements of traditional culture for agrarian mobilisation and movement has proved to be quite effective. It mobilised the farmers in large numbers and organised many massive movements during 1987–89. Its primary demand during this period related to the withdrawal of state government’s decision to hike the farm-electricity rate from Rs 22.50 to Rs 30 per-horsepower-per-month. Its demand to roll back the hike got a ring of urgency because the farmers in western UP were facing a drought situation in 1987–88. The BKU called a panchayat of the farmers on 3 January 1987 in Sisauli and passed a resolution to gherao Karmukhera (a township in Muzaffarnagar district) powerhouse for four days (from 27 January 1987) to press its demands. An estimated fifty thousand farmers/peasants participated in this agitation and staged a successful gherao at the powerhouse (Ibid.: 32). This successful protest was widely reported in the newspapers and it helped the BKU and Ch. Tikait achieve national prominence. On the concluding day, Ch. Tikait handed over a charter of demands to the Muzaffarnagar district magistrate with an ultimatum of one month. In the meantime, Ch. Tikait, being aware of the government’s apathy towards the farmers, asked the khap chaudharys to assemble in Sisauli for a discussion on the future course of action. The khap chaudharys jointly toured the villages of Muzaffarnagar, Baghpat and Meerut districts and appealed to the farmers to assemble again at Karmukhera powerhouse for a demonstration on 1 March 1987. During the period of ultimatum, the state government did not initiate any step to make the BKU rescind its decision. On the scheduled date, the farmers, in large numbers, started coming to the powerhouse. By noon, the number swelled up to one lakh (Rana 1994: 62). All arrangements made by the district administration to control and manage the situation were of no avail. To control the violent farmers the police opened fire, killing two persons and injuring many. In retaliation, the BKU farmers killed a police officer and set the powerhouse on fire.

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After this incident, the state government paid serious attention to the demands of BKU. It constituted a three-member cabinet committee to negotiate with the BKU. The Union told the committee that, if its charter of demands were not implemented without any precondition by the end of March, it would stage a demonstration in Shamli (an old and important town in Muzaffarnagar district) on 1 April 1987. Meanwhile, the state government accepted the main demand of the Union, that is, a total rollback of the hike in farm-electricity rate with certain conditions. The government’s decision brought about a needed confidence among the farmers, but the BKU did not suspend its plan to stage a demonstration, as the hike in the farm-electricity rate was not withdrawn unconditionally. This time more than a lakh farmers participated in the demonstration (Ibid.: 65). A meeting of the farmers held at the demonstration site was presided over by a local Muslim farmer and addressed by the chaudharys of various khaps and many non-political leaders, including the farmer leaders Sharad Joshi of Maharashtra and Balbir Singh of Punjab. In the evening, Ch. Tikait handed over a charter of demands to the district magistrate and called off the demonstration. After this successful demonstration of the BKU’s influence and popularity among the farmers of western UP, Ch. Tikait extensively toured the villages and appealed to the farmers to associate with the BKU and to constitute the ground-level committees in their own villages. The then Chief Minister of UP, Bir Bahadur Singh of the Congress party, also realised the growing influence of the BKU and Ch. Tikait among the farmers of western UP. To win over the trust and sentiments of the farmers in his favour, he came to Sisauli to address them on 11 August 1987. The BKU neither received nor welcomed the Chief Minister. He addressed a large gathering of farmers and promised them that his government would fulfil the reasonable demands of the BKU within a month. Ch. Tikait, in his address, asked the Chief Minister to take an extra month to implement the demands. He was not satisfied by the Chief Minister’s speech, and waited for his policy decisions for two months. In the meantime, he toured many villages and mobilised the farmers in BKU’s favour. In the monthly panchayat on 17 October 1987, the BKU advised the farmers to stop paying government dues. In retaliation, the government ordered the officials concerned to disconnect the power lines of defaulting farmers latest by 31 January 1988. Following this, the BKU called a panchayat to discuss this unanticipated decision of the government and, as a pre-emptive move, the panchayat

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unanimously decided to gherao the office of Meerut divisional commissioner on 27 January 1988. However, the gherao of the commissioner’s office was initially planned to be a four-day affair, but after seeing the enthusiasm of the farmers, Ch. Tikait decided to continue it for twenty-four days. From the very first day of the agitation, the farmers started arriving in Meerut. It was estimated that around two lakh farmers were always present in this agitation at the sit-in ground. Ch. Tikait asked a local Muslim farmer, Hafiz Khalil Ahmad, to preside over this massive panchayat. In this movement, the female members of farming families also participated in noticeable numbers. Along with men, they remained on the sit-in ground day and night, and shouted slogans and sang folk songs to express their sentiments and anger. The BKU arranged food for the farmers from the surrounding villages. Tractor was the main vehicle of transportation. The BKU named the sit-in grounds as ‘Hanuman Garh’ and ‘Ram Garh’. Many non-political leaders from different parts of the country, including Sharad Joshi, Swami Agnivesh and Sayyad Abdulah Bukhari (father of Sayyad Ahmad Bukhari) addressed the farmers. Ch. Tikait did not ask or allow political leaders, including Ajit Singh, the most prominent political leader of western UP, to address the farmers. As part of the agitation, Ch. Tikait called for a non-violent railand road-blockade programme, which, however, resulted in violence. The police force started arresting the farmers involved in the blockade activity. In the ensuing conflict, the police opened fire on the farmer in Rajabpur, killing five farmers and injuring 108 (Ibid.: 86). In view of the police firing and the dictatorial attitude of the state government, Ch. Tikait withdrew the agitation and appealed to the farmers to maintain peace and observe non-violence. Though this twenty-four day agitation was called off without any concrete achievement, it was quite significant in more senses than one. D.N. Dhanagare observes: The communication of commands and instructions from the top to the rank and file of the BKU was unfaltering. This would not have been possible without the farmers’ fraternal solidarity, commitment to a cause and above all without their unflinching loyalty to their new leader Mahendra Singh Tikait. Such a noticeable peaceful protest dharna, unruffled by minor provocation from either police or administration, has been a rather new phenomenon in the annals of the peasant struggle in India. [. . .] The efficient organisation of the agitation in Meerut by BKU was reminiscent of the organisation of the Bardoli Satyagraha by Sardar Patel sixty years ago in south Gujarat (1988: 25).

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On the concluding day of Meerut agitation, Ch. Tikait declared that, on 1 March 1988 the Union will observe Shahidi Diwas (martyrs day) in Rajabpur in memory of the farmers killed in police firing during the Meerut agitation. He appealed to the farmers to participate in the programme in large numbers, and promised them that on this occasion he would announce further programme of the BKU. Over a lakh farmers assembled in Rajabpur on the scheduled date (see Gupta 1997: 33). The farmers named the panchayat place ‘Tikait Nagar’. On sensing the enthusiasm and dedication of the farmers, Ch. Tikait converted this occasion into a satyagraha (non-violent protest). He declared that, from 6 March 1988, the satyagrahis would court arrest in groups and would not seek bail unless the government orders a judicial inquiry into the Rajabpur incident and releases all the farmers arrested during the agitation. The satyagraha continued unabated. Every day some farmers courted arrest and went to the jail. Many non-political leaders, including Sayyad Ahmad Bukhari, addressed the agitating farmers. On 8 June 1988, the government ordered a judicial inquiry into the incident and invited the BKU leaders for negotiations. After a series of negotiations, the BKU called a panchayat on 23 June 1988 and decided to withdraw their 110-day satyagraha. This satyagraha witnessed a massive mobilisation of the farmers: in all 9,507 farmers courted arrest, five lost their lives and the police booked 90 farmers under the National Security Act (Rana 1994: 100). A monthly panchayat of the BKU, held in Sisauli on 17 September 1988 decided to organise a rally of the farmers at New Delhi on 25 October 1988. The week-long rally at the Delhi Boat Club was a massive show of farmers’ unified strength. Farmers from fourteen states of the country participated in this rally; the largest number of them came from western UP. Many farmer leaders from different parts of the country, representing different peasant organisations, addressed the rally. The negotiation between the farmer leaders led by Ch. Tikait and the central government did not result in an agreement. The week-long rally was well organised and peaceful. The BKU had appointed volunteers to manage the situation and to bring food and other such necessary items from western UP villages. Ch. Tikait impressed the farmers and their leaders by his leadership quality. In honour of Ch. Tikait, the farmer leaders presented him a five-foot high hookah (to symbolise the idea of fraternity, equality and unity in the peasant community of western UP) and a big green pugree (turban)

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(to acknowledge him as their main leader). The farmer leaders reiterated the BKU position that the farmers would not recognise the government unless it accepts its charter of demands. The objective of the BKU rally was to demonstrate peacefully before the central government the massive power of unified farming community that it achieved quite successfully. After the Delhi Boat Club rally, the BKU farmers used to meet regularly in the monthly panchayat in Sisauli to take stock of the situation vis-à-vis the attitude and policy decisions of the government. In the meantime, on 2 May 1988, a Muslim girl by name Naiyma was abducted by some criminals in Sikri village under the jurisdiction of Bhopa police station in Muzaffarnagar district. For nearly two months, her mother requested the police repeatedly to trace Naiyma, but the police paid no attention to her request. She approached Ch. Tikait for help. The BKU discussed her case in its monthly panchayat on 17 July 1989 and decided to gherao the Bhopa police station until Naiyma was recovered. On 2 August 1989, the BKU farmers assembled in large numbers on the bank of Ganga canal near the Bhopa police station. The BKU organised a panchayat there and reiterated its demands for the recovery of Naiyma and the arrest of her kidnappers. Sensing danger to the police station, the police lathicharged the farmers and opened fire, killing two farmers and injuring many. To disrupt the BKU programme, the police also pushed three tractors of the farmers into the canal. Ch. Tikait called a panchayat and directed the farmers to maintain peace and continue the agitation. He asked the state government to suspend police officer who ordered the firing and to unconditionally release the arrested farmers. On 10 August 1989, the police managed to recover the dead body of Naiyma. The farmers wrapped the dead body in the BKU flag and buried it amidst chanting ‘Allah-O-Akbar’, ‘Har Har Mahadev’ and ‘Naiyma Bahan Amar Rahe’. The agitation continued unabated. The farmers started courting arrest when they realised that the government was not paying serious attention to their demands. On 26 August 1999, Ch. Tikait took some oaths to press the BKU demands: one of them was that he would not eat from a metal plate until the government accepts the BKU demands. The state government appointed two cabinet ministers, Hukum Singh and Narendra Singh, to negotiate with the BKU. After a serious negotiation between them and the BKU general secretary, Harpal Singh, the government agreed to accept most of the BKU’s main demands and released Rs 3 lakhs as relief fund to Naiyma’s mother. The BKU called off the 39-day agitation.

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Concluding Remarks I would like to conclude this paper by pointing out that, after the Naiyma Lao Andolan or Bhopa agitation, the BKU started sliding downwards in terms of its influence and appeal among the farmers. After this agitation, the Union has not been able to mobilise the farmers in large numbers for a movement or agitation. This is because the BKU brought about some drastic changes in its policy or strategy of agrarian mobilisation. It began to take interest in electoral politics and started mobilising the farmers on political lines. It entered into an agreement with the Janata Dal and decided to support that party in the 1989 Legislative Assembly elections. It appealed to the farmers to vote for the Janata Dal candidates. The Janata Dal was voted to form the government in UP, with Mulayam Singh Yadav as its Chief Minister. After the formation of the government, Ch. Tikait tried in vain to get the agreement implemented. Meanwhile, he started losing support among many caste segments of the farming community in western UP owing to his association with the Janata Dal. The Janata Dal president and the then state Chief Minister, Mulayam Singh Yadav, sensed the situation and started using it to establish himself as a leader of the farmers in western UP. He refused to fulfil the promised demands of the BKU and ordered the police to use force against the BKU functionaries when they agitate against the government. In order to control the BKU, the state police put its president, Ch. Tikait, behind the bar. This did not evoke a unified strong reaction from the farmers, which used to happen before the Naiyma Lao Andolan. When he was released from the jail, he met some national political leaders, invited the then Prime Minister (Chandrashekhar), Deputy Prime Minister (Devi Lal) and Chief Minister (Mulayam Singh Yadav) to address the farmers in Sisauli, and urged them to accept and implement the long-standing demands of the BKU. This decision of Ch. Tikait backfired and it was strongly opposed by the local political leaders. Ajit Singh, who has been, after the death of his father (Chaudhary Charan Singh), the undisputed leader of Jat farmers in western UP, toured the villages and vehemently opposed the politicisation of BKU. He criticised Ch. Tikait for his political act and ambition. He opined that Ch. Tikait has dishonoured the farmers of western UP by inviting the political leaders. The farmers responded positively to his remarks and many of them dissociated from the BKU.

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The BKU continued its own politicisation by openly supporting the Bhartiya Janata Party in 1991 elections. In 1996, the BKU formed its own political outfit known as the Bhartiya Kisan Kamgar Party and participated in the elections. It miserably failed in its attempt to secure votes for its own candidates. In the 2002 Legislative Assembly elections, Om Prakash Chautala, President of the National Lok Dal and Chief Minister of Haryana, tried to create a political space for himself and his party through the BKU support. Recently, the BKU launched a political party—the Bhartiya Kisan Dal—and fielded many candidates in the constituencies of western UP in the Parliamentary elections of 2004. However, none of its candidates was successful and most of them even forfeited their deposits in areas where the BKU had successfully mobilised farmers or peasants in huge numbers for movements or agitations in the past. Amidst all its politically oriented decisions and its interventions in national and state politics, the BKU lost its non-political and secular character and credibility among the farmers to a large extent. It lost the support of many segments of the farming community which are associated with different political parties and belong to different castes and religious communities. Its decision to support the Bhartiya Janata Party in the 1991 elections alienated the Muslim farmers (who constitute a major group in western UP) from its fold, and this alienation was reinforced after the demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhaya in 1992. The Muslim farmers lost faith in the leadership of Ch. Tikait and they totally dissociated themselves from the Union. Its decision to invite Mulayam Singh Yadav, Devi Lal and then Om Prakash Chautala to address the farmers created frustration and anger among the Jats of western UP who consider Ajit Singh—whose father Chaudhary Charan Singh, former Prime Minister of India, is traditionally revered—as their political leader and the only representative of their community. With all this, the BKU has almost become moribund.

Acknowledgements This is the revised version of a paper presented at the felicitation seminar on ‘Social dynamics of Indian society: Culture and politics’ in honour of Professor J.S. Gandhi, held at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2–3 April 2003. I thank the organisers for their hospitality, and

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the seminar participants for their comments. I am grateful to Dipankar Gupta and Stig Toft Madsen who provided me opportunities for doing fieldwork with them in some of the villages of Muzaffarnagar and Baghpat districts of western Uttar Pradesh. I am also thankful to Avijit Pathak and Patricia Uberoi for their encouragement and interest in this work.

References Dhanagare, D.N. 1983. Peasant movements in India 1920–50. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. ———. 1988. ‘An apoliticist populism: A case study of BKU’, Seminar, 352: 24–31. Gupta, Dipankar. 1997. Rivalry and brotherhood: Politics in the life of farmers in northern India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Hasan, Zoya. 1998. Quest for power: Oppositional movements and post-Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Henningham, Stephen. 1982. Peasant movements in colonial India, north Bihar 1897–1942. Canberra: Australian University Press. Lerche, J. and R. Jeffery. 2003. ‘Uttar Pradesh: Into the twenty-first century’, in R. Jeffery and J. Lerche (eds.): Social and political change in Uttar Pradesh: European perspectives (17–53). New Delhi: Manohar. Lindberg, S. and S.T. Madsen. 2003. ‘Modelling institutional fate: The case of a farmers’ movement in Uttar Pradesh’, in R. Jeffery and J. Lerche (eds.): Social and political change in Uttar Pradesh: European perspectives (199–223). New Delhi: Manohar. Moore Jr., Barrington. 1967. Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. London: Allen Lane. Omvedt, Gail. 1981. ‘Capitalist agriculture and rural classes in India’, Economic and political weekly, 16 (52): A 140–59. Pradhan, M.C. 1966. Political systems of the Jats in northern India. London: Oxford University Press. Rana, M.S. 1994. Bhartiya Kisan Union and Ch. Tikait. Meerut: Paragon Publications. Sarkar, K.K. 1979. ‘Kakdwip Tebhaga movement’, in A. R. Desai (ed.): Peasant struggles in India (469–85). New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Shah, Ghanshyam. 1974. ‘Traditional society and political mobilisation: The Experiences of Bardoli satyagraha 1920–1928’, Contributions to Indian sociology, 8: 89–107. Shanin, T. 1971. ‘Peasantry as a political factor’, in T. Shanin (ed.): Peasants and peasant society (238–63). Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books. ———. 1972. The awkward class. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Siddiqi, M.H. 1978. Agrarian unrest in north India: The United Provinces, 1918–32. New Delhi: Vikas. Singh, Rajendra. 1974. ‘Agrarian social structure and peasant unrest: A study of land-grab movement in district Basti, east UP’, Sociological bulletin, 23 (1): 44–70. Stokes, E. 1978. The peasant and the raj. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stone, I. 1984. Canal irrigation in British India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wolf, Eric. 1969. Peasant wars in twentieth century. New York: Harper and Row.

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10 A Sociology for Happiness: Beyond Western versus Non-Western Perspectives Kenji Kosaka

Introduction

W

e may recall that Emile Durkheim was arguing against Herbert Spencer and the utilitarians by maintaining ‘that society cannot be derived from the propensity of individuals to trade and barter in order to maximize their own happiness’ (Coser 1971: 135). Durkheim (1893) criticised Spencer by equating him with the utilitarians, and stated that they both lacked insights into the ‘noncontractual elements of contract’ which are prevalent as the implicit social norms among people. This problem, well-known as the Hobbesian problem, was later addressed by Talcott Parsons (1937), who saw it as the problem of social order. It is interesting to note that Spencer (1851) also sustained his criticism of utilitarianism by arguing that Jeremy Bentham’s idea of ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ was only a step away from mere egoism. Bentham failed to see the functions of the state which, Spencer expected, should be limited to prevention of injustice generated by egoism. One of the main writings of Spencer, Social Statics, was even subtitled The Conditions Essential to Human Happiness. Here then are two theoretical issues for sociology to tackle: social order and human happiness.

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However, as a result of history of sociological currents, the social order issue was explored rather in depth, whereas the issue of happiness was left behind. Indeed, we have quite a large body of writings in normative sociology (the Rawlsian approach, Libertarian-Communitarian disputes, the Habermasian theory of communication, to name only a few), but the keyword of happiness has remained intact to form a marginality of academic interest. In this paper, I want to shed light on the problem of human happiness or well-being, both from a theoretical and empirical point of view, mainly in the light of tasks of sociologists facing internalisation of sociology in a globalised world. Sociologists coming from every corner of the globe meet each other at international conferences and business meetings in an academic world more than ever before. Sociologists communicate with each other through the media of journals and publications more than ever before. As was stressed by Alfred Schutz (1996), social scientists are supposed to work with ‘constructs of constructs’. That is, scientists describe, analyse and explain, by way of constructs, those constructs and ‘interpretations of the social world which those acting within it have bestowed upon it’ (ibid.: 143). ‘The social scientist takes the attitude of a disinterested observer’ and ‘scientific constructs have to live up to the ideals of clarity, distinctness, consistency’ (ibid.). But it has remained fuzzy, even in Schutzian theory of knowledge, how a social science researcher can dissociate himself or herself from being a member of those ordinary actors living within a particular social world. Social scientists develop and are educated, in certain ways of manners, and experience social life, again, in certain ways, which are more or less determined by one’s socioeconomic familial background. In such a situation, can the sampling of constructs on the first level be unbiased? Social scientists cannot live on every corner of a society as part of their own direct experiences, although they might be able to empathise with others’ lives and trace others’ experience as if they and it were their own. Here then is one serious problem for social scientists of representing every social reality, singular or otherwise, which is lived by actors in the world. The possibility is that one single social scientist can cover only limited aspects of social realities in the world; hence the necessity of social division of labour among scientists in the world. The progressive internalisation of sociologists will assist this division of labour within an academic world.

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Another more serious problem exists in that some bias might be involved in the second level of constructs despite any and all efforts of scientists to be clear, distinct and consistent in formation of the second level of constructs. This bias may be obscured, twisted and hidden, which is hard to discover or ascertain. No scientist can claim universality of constructs on the second level unless he or she is unbiased. So, all in all, social scientists have to come to terms with two different orientations: individuation and universalisation. In the following parts of this paper, I wish to show how this goal is achieved in the study of human happiness through my own experience of projects.1

Two Basic Views of Happiness During the process of implementing a series of our projects in the Sociology and Social Work Faculty at Kwansei Gakuin University in Japan, we have made the assumption that there are two basic views of happiness: ‘the active view of happiness’ and ‘the passive view of happiness’. The active view of happiness holds that happiness can be obtained by actively searching for it and can be brought about by the satisfaction of obtaining it. In contrast, the passive view of happiness is based on the assumption that happiness is transient, and that life is full of misfortunes. Hence, happiness is procured unless we suffer some misfortunes. In the earlier studies of happiness, priority had been given to the active view, whether consciously or subconsciously, and, as a result of this focus, the passive view has not received due attention despite its real existence. This has been the case with the view of happiness of ordinary people as well as of the sociological studies. I will now elaborate on this situation. Human culture has created myriad forms of desire: a desire to be wealthier, a desire to live in security and comfort, a desire to lead a meaningful and joyous life, a desire to live a worthwhile life, and so on. These desires, however, come with the involvement of ‘others’ as René Girard (1961) has claimed, and these desires are never fully satisfied. This inability to satisfy one’s desires usually intensifies the ungratified desires further. The harder problem is that satisfaction of some people’s desires may result in the sacrifices—abandonment or delay to a greater or lesser extent—of other people’s desires.

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On the other hand, there is a fundamentally different view. It is a desire to pray for BUJI (a trouble-free existence or state of being), a word discovered by the Japanese folklore studies. For example, one would wish his or her family a safe journey abroad when seeing them off. A family would wish that its breadwinner would come home safely when seeing him or her off every morning to work. The modern world is so unpredictable and full of danger and insecurity that anyone can get trapped in some unexpected sort of incident or accident. This desire for BUJI emanates from a desire for security and comfort without sacrificing others or bothering others. Here is a description of the situation by Kunio Yanagita, a pioneering Japanese ethnographer: One is anxious to listen to as well as to talk about old topics and new events in a community mainly because there are few such stories. BUJI literally means that nothing new happens; everything is repeated from year to year as is expected, in agriculture, festivals and sociability. It goes on and on even over years, and people want it (1975: Vol. 21: 72).

BUJI means the absence of misfortunes or insecurities. Nothing spectacular happens, but nothing disastrous happens either: that is the true sense of the word. This may sound rather passive from the active view of happiness, but this passive state of being is regarded as the greatest happiness. The concept of BUJI involves concern not only for oneself or the people around. The concept is a spirally encompassing concept (Furukawa 2004) in the sense that for the BUJI of someone or someone’s family, the community where he or she lives has to be kept in BUJI, and for the BUJI of a community, a larger global society involving the community has to be kept in BUJI. Let me quickly mention two ideas that are seemingly related to the distinction between the active and passive view of happiness. Human Development Index (HDI), which was first proposed by Mahabubul Haq (1995) and then further developed by Amartya Sen (2003), and is now much used by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and among nations of the world. HDI is composed of three dimensions of human development: (i) life expectancy (a long and healthy life), (ii) literacy rate (knowledge), and (iii) a decent standard of living. Sen (ibid.) points out, however, that HDI focuses on progress and augmentation in its basic idea and is extremely expansionist in nature. It aims to cultivate and achieve new areas in order to improve

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human life. HDI, he says, has to be complemented by the notion of human security, which prevents us from risks of suffering disadvantages and difficulties such as pestilence and abrupt penury. HDI, in this sense, corresponds to the active view of happiness, while the idea of human security corresponds to the passive view of happiness. The Bhutanese view of Gross National Happiness (GNH) has been proposed as an idea which is alternative to Gross National Product (GNP). This idea, as is well known, also seems to address the passive view of happiness as it emphasises that genuine human happiness lies not in the economic development as such, but rather in the sustainable and just socioeconomic development, conservation of environment, protection and promotion of culture and good governability (Dorji 2005; Ura 2006). This view apparently is in tune with what I have called the passive view of happiness based on the absence of misfortunes. These ideas contrasting human development with human security, or GNP with GNH, may be understood as implying the dichotomous perspectives of western versus non-western (Said 1978) where the western idea is dominant over the non-western. A version of postcolonial theories, indeed, assumes that ‘the intellectual and cultural tradition developed outside the West constitute a body of knowledge that can be deployed to great effect against the political and cultural hegemony of the West’ (Young 2001: 65). It also addresses the ‘intellectual sovereignty and dominance of Europe’ and ‘limits of western ethnocentricity’ (ibid.). The dichotomous idea of the human well-being is easily conceptualised as western and non-western distinction, with the active view being linked to the western and the passive view linked to the non-western.2

Empirical Facts and Analysis The dichotomous idea of western versus non-western is, no matter how powerful and heuristic in elucidating aspects of knowledge which will remain unexplored otherwise, rather normative as well as descriptive and critical of the intellectual situation of dominance of the western. No less important are how the ideas of happiness are actually manifest in each society. We need to know the actuality. We conducted an exploratory study of happiness in Japan. Through an analysis of our dataset acquired during 12–14 October 2005 via an

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internet survey (N = 500), we identified four factors to determine the outlook of human well-being: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

Active happiness, BUJI-and-security, Passive happiness, and Secular type of needs.

Active happiness consists of life components of increasing new friends, enjoying conversation with friends, enjoying sports, seeking new knowledge, and making contributions to society. BUJI-and-security consists of one’s own health, security without being involved in crimes or disaster, health of family, sound sleep, and having a spouse or steady life-partner or companion. Passive happiness consists of activities such as watching TV, enjoying net surfing, spending one’s time idly on holidays, and gambling successfully. Secular needs consist of seeking status and fame, acquiring success opportunity and taking advantage of or at least having opportunities, and obtaining luxuries (Hamada and Kosaka 2006). We could reach different conclusions by identifying different sets of factors depending on different questions with varied wordings being used in a questionnaire. In our survey, we offered thirty-four brief statements as possible items people feel happy about (a 5-score indicating ‘I feel happy’ to 1-score indicating ‘I do not feel happy’) so that we could readily capture general tendencies. However, it was found that there are two sub-types within both the active and the passive ideas of happiness, respectively. The questionnaire was designed in tune with the Japanese societal scene and, hence, this finding holds true for types of societies like Japan which are highly industrialised and subject to the IT revolution, and with a mixture of Asian and western culture. Therefore, we are unable to generalise the findings extensively across the countries. In order to complement this restriction of scope conditions, we explored the general mechanism to produce subjective well-being by using the global data. We chose the subjective well-being data from the World Value Survey (WVS) as the variable to be explained. By doing so, we incorporated the indigenously local value system concerning happiness as given into our analysis. That is, we were unable to tell the background outlook or views of happiness of respondents, when they responded on the same scale of being happy or unhappy. Indeed, the data on happiness across the world do not succeed in paying due

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attention to all the differences of a particular value system. We should continue exploring the distinctive nature of subjective well-being. On the other hand, we chose several variables which might affect the level of subjective well-being, mostly taken from World Value Survey and Human Development Index of UNDP. We used the following variables as independent variables: Hi: health of individuals Hs: health of a society Wi: wealth of individuals Ws: wealth of a society Ci: knowledge and controllability Es: educational level of a society The first three variables address conditions relating to individuals, while the latter three refer to the societal level conditions. We used the Boolean approach (Ragin 1987) to determine the pattern where a set of independent variables has influence upon the dependent variable of subjective well-being, which will not be elucidated by the conventional statistical analysis. Here is one of the analytical results: minimised equation with a cut-off value 0.9 can be expressed as the following (Ishida, Kosaka and Hamada 2006): SWB (Subjective Well-Being) = ws{HiWi(hs + es) + HsWiCies} + Ws{hses(Hici + WiCi) + HiWiCiEs} In this equation, the capital letters denote the presence of the condition, while small letters denote the absence of the condition. Addition of variables implies ‘OR’, while multiplication of variables implies ‘AND’. The above formulation3 suggests that there are two types of configuration of conditions: (i) low GDP or poor countries, and (ii) middle or high GDP or affluent countries. The patterns of determinants are different from each other. In ‘poor countries’, there are two possible paths to feeling happy. One feels happy if one is individually healthy and wealthy when the society is disadvantageous in terms of societal health (that is, longevity or life expectancy in this case) or societal educational level. Secondly, in ‘poor countries’, one might feel happy if he or she is rather wealthy and is in control of life on individual basis, and simultaneously one’s country is enjoying societal health but is low in educational level. In ‘affluent countries’ also, there are two paths to achieve subjective wellbeing. One path is the case where societal health and educational level are both disadvantaged; then, in this case one is happy when he or she is

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healthy but not in control of life, or is in control of life and wealthy at the same time. A second path is the case where one is healthy, wealthy and in control with a high educational environment or surrounding. This interpretation is not necessarily straightforward, but it is intriguing to find distinctive patterns of determinants which are relevant to ‘poor countries’ and ‘affluent countries’, respectively. There still remains a large number of methodological problems we should solve in the future. Before discussing the required strategies of study and the methodological agenda, let us digress further toward a theoretical hypothesis concerning two basic types of views from the above discussion which obligates us to go back and forth between theory and data.

Types of Views of Happiness Reconsidered Even if we retain the dichotomous distinction between the passive and active view of happiness, another dimension might be introduced; that is, the distinction between inclusive view and exclusive one. Shin’ichi Nakazawa (2002), a Japanese scholar of religious studies, addresses, à la Shinobu Orikuchi (1931/1996), the meaning of SACHI, a word or concept in the Japanese language literally implying happiness, in line with his proposal of a reorientation to ‘thing’ and of a new interpretation of technology. According to Nakazawa, SACHI is used to mean technology and the ability of transforming and embodying souls into, say, animals such as bear for hunting and eating. In this view, successful hunting is happiness, which produces the modest amount of marginal profit incrementally to the hunter. The action is more than an equivalent 1–1 correspondent exchange between cost and benefit for the hunter, that is, a gift from nature since it brings additional benefit over cost. The successful hunter can live above the bare level of subsistence by obtaining an animal. But at the same time, the action is no more than a minimum level of happiness in that the hunter is never allowed to devour, waste, or exploit the quarry. This image of SACHI seems to be tuned to the active view of happiness, but is a type of modest activity and ability. SACHI brings happiness to those hunting, but only to the minimum level. Therefore, SACHI never destroys other hunters, animals, or environments. Ideally, then, we could envision two types of the active view of happiness: one is modestly active as is implied by the original meaning of SACHI, and the

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other is extravagantly active in that the action destroys the animals and other human beings and environments, as well. The latter is, perhaps, what was imaged by Sen—as ‘focusing on progress and augmentation in its basic idea and is extremely expansionist in nature’ (2003: 8)—in his criticism of the notion of HDI. The term security also has a double meaning. As long as it implies BUJI, it remains totally passive; that is, no one hurts anybody else while seeking security. Who can be particularly hurt when one thinks of his or her family members’ health, or when one spends holidays idly? As has been said earlier, the concept of BUJI is a spirally encompassing concept in that a larger society protects smaller social units within that larger society. In this way of thinking the question is how can a larger society protect smaller social units? Of course, there will be a variety of ways to do so from the very modest way to the very aggressive way. Haq (1995) explored the new emerging meaning of human security prior to Sen’s (2003) formulation by noting that the old meaning of human security was heavily intertwined with arms races among nation-states or the notion of state security, which implies that the second possible way of having security was to be replaced. The notion seems to be quite opposite to the notion of BUJI. It is characterised by both Binnenmoral and Außenmoral (Weber 1916): inner-moral of protecting people within and outer-moral of allowing exploitive and even aggressive behaviour. Both types may be covered by the term security but, where one is defensive, the other is offensive, and is far from being passive. SACHI forms the active view of happiness but modest in nature, while the notion of HDI, at least its some elements, forms the active view of happiness, but is expansionistic, hence, exclusive in nature. On the other hand, BUJI and the notion of human security is inclusive and modest, while the notion of state security is expansionistic and exclusive. This typology, when coupled with the empirical findings of different Table 1 Hypothetical Typology of Views of Happiness Inclusive/Modest

Expansionistic

Active

SACHI

HDI

Passive

BUJI Human Security

State Security

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paths to subjective well-being between poor countries and affluent countries, leads us to further speculation. Our hypothesis from speculation is as follows: the path for happiness for poor countries consists of the combination of active and passive but inclusive/modest type of views, while the path for happiness for affluent countries consists of the combination of active and passive but exclusive/modest type of views. We admit that there exists a large amount of variation among people within each country, and/or in some countries there exist terrible civil wars. To be succinct, one way of becoming happy may stand in the way of the other of becoming happy, although the Boolean formulation that we derived above does not say much about the contradictions or obstacles. The dichotomous idea of western versus non-western perspectives is sometimes appealing and heuristic. But it is likely to be ideological unless conditions, general and historical, are explicitly specified to note the difference in relation to the theoretical problem we face. In this sense, I believe that this dichotomous idea is the last resort we could rely on in the analysis.

Methodological Tasks Methodological tasks are three-fold. The first concerns strategies of investigation in general. The second concerns some technical, but not trivial, methods and data collection. The third concerns some intellectual apparatus to bridge and integrate individuation and universalisation.

Two Strategic Orientations of Study During the course of investigation of human well-being and its determinants, we encountered two different levels of tasks: one is to pursue indigenous culture rooted in local knowledge among local people and the other is to analyse social groups concerning the outlook of happiness. Not only may people from different regions have different outlooks on happiness, but also people in different age groups may have varied ways of thinking about and valuing happiness. People’s subjective well-being is determined by an array of objective elements and structurally different settings. This is an intellectual path for us to follow of being idiographic. There is another path to follow, which is the path of being nomothetic, to borrow the neo-Kantian terms, where we take a generalising, rather

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than historical, orientation to the phenomena we treat (Fararo and Kosaka 2003). In the generalising orientation, we are committed to a deductive rather than discursive form of theorising. In the least, we want to summarize the given data and reduce the findings not in a statistical way, but in a logical way by using general concepts and theories as we did in the Boolean analysis. I shall summarise the two strategies of being idiographic and nomothetic in relation to a study of happiness. Under the idiographic strategy, we explore detailed perception of happiness and objective factors which might determine the subjective well-being. These findings will hopefully reflect local knowledge among people and the local social structure. The dichotomous distinction of western versus non-western serves as a heuristic device in finding or discovering biased perceptions which would otherwise go undetected. But we eventually want to know the very local knowledge which may not be categorised simply as either western or non-western. Under the nomothetic strategy, we explore the underlying general mechanism to produce a link between subjective well-being (both the degree of feeling happy and the subjective views of happiness) and objective determinants.

Methods and Data Collection In the study of happiness, it is extremely difficult to go deeper into idiosyncratic investigation of subjective well-being and, at the same time, form a standardised set of variables for the purpose of a comparative analysis across nations, although both are indispensable. If we pick up all the subtleties which are relevant only to a given society, we never reach the standardised array of variables. If we adhere to some standardised set of variables, this will not be sufficient enough to cover cultural diversities. Another dilemma lies in the split between the subjective side of data and the objective side of the data. This is particularly the case with a large set of data which allows us a global comparison among nations. WVS is oriented toward subjective measures, while HDI is oriented toward objective measures. Once we combine those two sets of data, the number of equivalent variables is quite limited, since there are no one-to-one correspondences. Most of the data combining subjective variables and objective variables is confined to national (that is, not international or global) indicators.4

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Towards Socio-paedia We propose Socio-paedia as a possible project that the International Sociological Association could pursue jointly for many a year to come. Socio-paedia is an E-dictionary or E-encyclopaedia which makes itself available on a website in the field of, mainly, sociology. As such, entries will cover key sociological terms and concepts, theories, and sociologists similar to that which an ordinary dictionary or encyclopaedia of sociology does. However, we also want to include other terms related to instantiations, historical and empirical, as an ordinary encyclopaedia might do as long as these terms, concepts, theories, and biographical information on sociologists seem to be relevant from a sociological standpoint which will be delineated below. Since Socio-paedia is proposed specifically for social innovation and a better society on a global level, it anticipates a wide variety of readers such as researchers, NPO/ NGO oriented people, administrative staffs, journalists and ordinary citizens as well as sociologists and students of sociology. This is particularly relevant to a sociology for happiness. Through Socio-paedia we could accumulate detailed knowledge about well-being and ill-being, and about ‘missed opportunities’.5 Our project of Socio-paedia serves as a means to reflect upon the distribution of local knowledge and its contents, whether true or false, in both the past and the present, in the world. Here, local knowledge refers to knowledge accepted by one or another social group or society of people. In other words, it is knowledge shared by a limited number of people in terms of geographic location, culture, temporality, and other social categories. Socio-paedia aims at human well-being and social innovation as the ultimate goal and, therefore, we believe that Sociopaedia paves the way to a better world.

Conclusion We now arrive at our overall conclusion. What is the meaning of ‘internalisation of sociology’? How can it be achieved? From my own personal and professional experience of happiness studies to this point in my career I can conclude that internalisation of sociology is, firstly, a way and means that allows sociology capture all the subtleties and local knowledge through whatever the methodology may be required

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quantitative or qualitative, discursive or analytical. This strategy may be summarised as an idiographic one, to use the neo-Kantian terms to classify the nature of sciences. Secondly, internalisation of sociology is a way and means to let sociology capture general underlying mechanisms by employing for the most part a formal-theoretic approach (Fararo and Kosaka 2003). This strategy will be summarised as nomothetic strategy, again to use the neo-Kantian terms. Neo-Kantian philosophers used these terms as terms to classify nature of sciences, natural and social, but here I use these terms as strategies within sociology, which are simultaneously required. These two strategies can be achieved somehow beyond western versus non-western perspectives. Internalisation of sociology is, in this sense, to be realised in the endeavour to pay more attention to the relevance of local knowledge on the one hand, and universality of sociological knowledge on the other, and some following the project of forming an interactive type of sociological database, which I have here named Socio-paedia. This project will address and indicate the future direction and tasks of sociology in a globalised world.

Notes 1. I have been managing an important national programme called the 21st Century COE (Centre of Excellence) programme in Japan for the last four years. The program is fully supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, Government of Japan for five years. This programme in Sociology and Social Work at Kwansei Gakuin University focuses on the Study of Social Research for the Enhancement of Human Well-being. 2. A juxtaposition of positive view and negative view may be proposed independently of dichotomous cultural context. Edgar Morin (1975) mentions two different conceptions of happiness (bonheur) in mass culture, although some elements are supposedly shared by those two: projective and identifiable. The projective conception of happiness always forms a myth and, hence, makes an ideology since happiness will be hopefully fulfilled only after one has experienced hardships and adventures (‘happy-end’) but in reality is never fully realised. The more you achieve, the more you feel deprived. The projective conception of happiness, then, is active in nature. On the other hand, the identifiable conception of happiness is always based on one’s past experience of ‘used to be happy’. You may not be happy at present, but you surely used to be happy in the past which you readily remember, and which you can always tell what it was like. This conception of happiness is easily linked to a passive view of happiness in that everyone must have experienced the state of BUJI, or the state of, at least, having been in the womb of one’s mother, where nothing spectacular happens but where one can feel secure.

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3. Naturally, the Boolean approach allows us a number of minimisation, hence, a variety of formulations from which we choose a meaningful formulation for discussion depending on the context under study. 4. See ‘Guidelines for National Indicators of Subjective Well-Being and Ill-Being’, in Journal of Happiness Studies, 7 (1), 2006: v–xii. See also Social Indicators Research Series on Quality of Life (Kluwer Academic Publisher), which is informative of types of happiness studies. 5. Project ‘Missed Opportunities’ was named by Robert McNamara when he proposed the joint US-Vietnamese project on the Vietnam War in 1995. He assumed that misperceptions, misunderstandings, and misjudgements during the entire course of the Vietnam War on, perhaps, both sides drove the escalation of the war. McNamara, the former Secretary of Defence to US Presidents, and Nguen Co Thach, Vietnam’s former Foreign Minister, agreed to examine the validity of either their own views or those of their adversary to see if there were missed opportunities to avoid casualties and human misfortunes (see McNamara 1999).

References Coser, Lewis A. 1971. Masters of sociological thought. New York: Harcout Brace and Jovanovich. Dorji, Kinley. 2005. ‘Gross national happiness’, Kokusai Bunka Kaikan Kaiho, 16 (2): 14–33. Durkheim, Émile. 1893. De la division du travail social: Etude sur l’organisation des sociétés supérieures. Paris: P.U.F. Fararo, Thomas J. and Kenji Kosaka. 2003. Generating images of stratification: A formal theory. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press. Furukawa, Akira. 2004. Mura no seikatsu kankyoshi (Life environmental history of villages). Kyoto: Sekai Shisosha. Girard, René. 1961. Mensonage romantique et vérité romanesque. Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset. Hamada, Hiroshi and Kenji Kosaka. 2006. ‘Social research of subjective well-being’. Paper presented at the 41st Annual Meeting of the Japanese Association for Mathematical Sociology, University of Tokyo. Haq, Mahbubul. 1995. Reflections on human development. New York: Oxford University Press. Ishida, Atsushi, Kenji Kosaka, and Hiroshi Hamada. 2006. ‘A Boolean analysis of subjective well-being’. Paper presented at the International Conference on Comparative Social Sciences, Sophia University. McNamara, Robert S. 1999. Argument without end: In search of answers to the Vietnam war. Public Affairs. Morin, Edgar. 1975. L’esprit du temps 1. Névrose. Nakazawa, Shin’ichi. 2002. Midori no shihonron (Theory of green capital). Tokyo: Shueisha. Orikuchi, Shinobu. 1931/1996. Genshi Shinko (Primitive belief), Orikuchi Shinobu Zenshu, Vol.19: 9–22. Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha. Parsons, Talcott. 1937. The structure of social action. New York: McGraw-Hill Company.

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Ragin, Charles. 1987. Comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press. Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books. Schutz, Alfred. 1996. Collected papers (Vol. IV). Dortrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Sen, Amartya. 2003. Development, rights and human security: Commission on human security (Final report). Chapter 1. Box 1.3. Spencer, Herbert. 1851. Social statics or the conditions essential to human happiness specified and the first of them developed. London: John Chapman. Ura, Karma. 2006. ‘Quality of life indicators and gross national happiness’. Paper presented at the Workshop held at the Osaka University, Faculty of Human Sciences, 15 June 2006. Yanagita, Kunio. 1975. Collected papers. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobou Publishing. Young, Robert J.C. 2001. Postcolonialism: An historical introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. Weber, Max. 1916. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

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 hen I started working for my doctoral thesis in the mid1960s, people around me, not only the common person, but even academic colleagues in the university did not know the common dictionary meaning of the term leisure. Colleagues from the faculty of commerce would confuse ‘leisure’ with their ‘ledger’ books and ask me as to how a student of sociology is concerned with account books! Similarly, colleagues in the faculty of science would confuse leisure with ‘laser rays’ and would be surprised at what a student of sociology is doing with their scientific ‘laser’. If such was my predicament in an urban area and that too in the capital city of a state and in its premier university, one may well imagine the situation with regard to the understanding of leisure among the masses, particularly in the rural areas and the hinterland. Since more often than not my rural respondents told me that gossiping was their main leisure-time activity and that the word ‘gossiping’ would be repeated too often, the young rural boys who followed me wherever I went in the village, started calling me by the name ‘gupshup’, meaning a person who is always gossiping in leisure. In fact, for many of them, leisure and gossiping were synonyms. Yet I was happy that, in spite of this not-so-likable nickname attached to me, I was working on an all-pervasive phenomenon like leisure. I was keen to work on a theme which encompassed and was also deeply related to such other phenomena as mass media, sports, culture and the arts, religion and spirituality, education and literature, health and ageing, volunteerism,

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excursions and tourism, and also the deviance and other aspects of life. Since then, however, things have drastically changed and transformed. Leisure is now a household word. There is no newspaper in the country that now does not devote at least a page or two to leisure, and particularly so on Sundays. I am enamoured by leisure; in my view, leisure is life itself. It would be no exaggeration to say that leisure is synonymous with culture itself. According to Max Kaplan, ‘In our leisure we stand exposed. Through our leisure we provide the element for diagnosing our culture to the observer and through the facts of leisure we may see how deeply we are in an age of leisure’ (1960: 4). In a similar vein, Sebastian de Grazia claimed in his masterpiece Of Time, Work and Leisure (1964), that ‘You tell me your leisure, I shall tell your culture’ (cited in Modi 1985: 8). However, in Kaplan’s opinion, the problem is to establish a generalised analysis that relates leisure to the organisation of the particular culture and only by doing this can we arrive at a concept of leisure, for this is a term and phenomenon that eludes easy definition (Kaplan 1960: 19). As such, leisure, popularly referred to and understood as free time, is a complex phenomenon. The very meaning of the word has changed continually. At times is has referred to a state of freedom, an absence of obligations, a cluster of activities; at others, it has suggested a mood of contemplation. It has been acknowledged that ‘the time is not yet ripe to devise a sociological theory of leisure, despite the interest afforded by attempts at theorizing’ (Dumazedier 1974: 3). It has also been acknowledged that ‘sociologists have failed to reach agreement either on the dynamics, or on the specific properties of leisure as a phenomenon, or on its main implications’ (ibid.: 9). However, I would like to put forth four theoretical perspectives in regard to the development of leisure and to understand the concept of leisure (see Modi 1985: 3): (i) metaphysical, (ii) cultural, (iii) socio-psychological, and (iv) sociological. The metaphysical approach emphasises the contemplative and esoteric nature of leisure. Greek philosophers, particularly Plato and Aristotle, and more recently the German philosopher Pieper, have advocated this particular view (Lamb 1900; Piper 1958; de Grazia 1964). The cultural concept of leisure has two broad and specific dimensions: the religious dimension (Durkheim 1961) and the time dimension. While, on the one hand, it takes note of the fact that religious rites and traditions have always influenced leisure, on the other, it also draws attention to the existence of radical discrepancies in the conception of time among different cultures

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(Evans-Pritchard 1940; Brightbill and Meyer 1952; Bohannan 1953; Mead 1955; Hugses 1961; Riesman 1961; Linder 1970) and their role in determining attitudes towards leisure. The socio-psychological concept of leisure stresses the role of the individual and his personality in determining his leisure activities. Here, leisure is considered mainly as an individualistic phenomenon (Becker 1955; Havighurst 1957; Veblen 1957; Riesman 1961). Finally, from a sociological point of view, leisure is a structural aspect of any society and its nature is determined largely by the structure and nature of that society, as I believe. Social structure influences the nature and form of leisure and its activities. In a given society, at a particular time, it allows, dictates, or is conducive to a particular mode of leisure. Not only does it determine the form and nature of leisure, but also the extent and limit of participation. Who participates in what, with whom, when, where, and to what extent is determined by the structure of a society according to its nature and organisation. On the other hand, leisure itself helps in generating newer structures and social norms. The type of leisure enjoyed and pursued by a person or people reflects not only their status in a society, but also the general character, nature, organisation, and structure of that society. It is seen that, while the structures generated by participation in institutionalised leisure activities are functional and integrative for a society, the structures generated by participation in non-institutionalised leisure activities are dysfunctional and degenerative for a society. On the whole, changes either in the social structure or in the structure of leisure influence each other and there exists a kind of concomitance between the two. History abounds in examples to support this. Arguments such as that leisure existed in its truest sense only in ancient Greece during the time of great philosophers Plato and Aristotle, and neither before nor after (see de Grazia 1964) or that leisure is essentially the product only of the civilisations born from the industrial revolution (as repeatedly insisted upon by Dumazedier [1967]) are, in my view, erroneous. They stem from the desire to make leisure an ‘ideal’, something which is beyond the comprehension of the ordinary man (as in the case of de Grazia) or suffer from efforts to understand leisure in isolation from such other social phenomena as play and recreation and also religion (as in the case of Dumazedier). A sociological concept of leisure, in order to be fully understood, necessitates the use of a kind of sociological historiography. An analysis and comparison of some societies and groups which existed during

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different historical periods, both in the West and in India, amply reveals that a sociological concept of leisure is essentially associated with the nature of social organisation of that society. The leisure activities established in any society are shaped by its structural and cultural correlates. Therefore, contrary to assertions that attribute leisure either to the Greeks or to the industrialised societies, my position is that leisure exists universally and that it has a dynamic character. While it is structural in nature, it is cultural in orientation and operation. In India, leisure changed with the changes in her social structure during the different historical periods. Yet its uniqueness has been maintained by tradition, particularly before the beginning of modernisation. The value themes of hierarchy, holism, continuity, and transcendence, encompassing the social system of India prior to the beginning of modernisation (Singh 1973) were deeply interlocked with other elements of Indian social structure and greatly influenced its traditional leisure structure. The nature and form of traditional leisure, which we have characterised here broadly as hierarchical, group-institutionalised and group-participation oriented, normative, and rhythmic, more particularly in the case of the rural community, correspond to a significant extent to the major attributes of Indian tradition. Besides the influence of tradition, the nature and character of economic relations (which are a product of the existing socio-political structure) between the feudal and the peasant segments of the village community also determined and influenced the nature of leisure. It has been observed that, while economic disparities tend to segregate the groups, religion, or to be more precise, the festival cycle, offers numerous opportunities for integrated participation.

Social Structure and Leisure It can hardly be overemphasised that society has changed continually: from primitive to pastoral to agricultural, from agricultural to feudal, and from feudal to industrial. While it is difficult to assess and to say anything with certainty with regard to the leisure of the preliterate and the pastoral societies, since their social structure must have differed from each other notwithstanding a large number of common attributes, it may be said with certainty with regard to such ancient agrarian and later societies of which we have comparatively reliable information that the social

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structure of these societies influenced the nature and form of leisure and that leisure itself helped in generating new structures and social norms. Without going much into the details of the status and the patterns of leisure in the then Greek, Spartan, and Roman societies vis-à-vis their social structures, it may be said that there was a kind of concomitance between their social structures and the patterns of leisure (see 1985). The same may be said with regard to social structure and leisure during the middle ages. What was true in the West was also true in the case of India. Leisure in India also changed with the social structure of Indian society during the different historical periods, which I have mainly classified into: the Vedic Aryans: the Semi Nomadic Tribal Society; the Imperial-Monarchical Society; the Monarchical-Feudal Society; and the period through colonialism to independence and after until the implementation of the policy of liberalisation, privatisation, and globalisation (popularly referred to as LPG) during the early 1990s. However, while the pace of social change remained very slow throughout the long history of mankind, it got accelerated after Renaissance and Reformation, and particularly after the Industrial Revolution. In fact, social changes that took place after the Industrial Revolution totally transformed the patterns of leisure. While the demarcation between work and leisure had remained blurred almost throughout the history, it started getting defined with the advance of the Industrial Revolution. The farmers and the agriculturists who composed the largest single group in practically every country never had the kind of demarcation between work and leisure that emerged after the Industrial Revolution. The hours of work and leisure were so intertwined for the farmers that they could be required to work for any number of hours on their fields without any respite during certain periods of the year. But, at other times, they could be at complete ease and at leisure without any workrelated botheration. At some other times they could be seen pursuing one or the other leisure activity even while at work. The normative order of each traditional society coupled with other societal attributes determined to a great extent the activities called leisure in these societies. It may be said with some certainty that the leisure activities in most traditional societies, particularly in India, were ‘hierarchical, group institutionalised, group participation oriented, normative and rhythmic’ (ibid.: 262). In the traditional society subsumption of leisure in culture was integral to its worldview. Leisure was culture; the basis of culture was leisure.

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The emergence of industrial society altered this substantially. It brought into being technological transformations which changed the traditional work modes, social organisation of human activities, and the nature of social structure and culture. It, in course of its evolution, brought into being, new modes of communication, mass media, and mass culture. A qualitative transformation, both in communication and culture, has thus taken place. Mass media as harbingers of new mode of leisure interpose themselves between human beings and culture (Singh 1985). However, before we move to examine the interface between leisure and social transformation during the post-industrialisation period in detail, it would be appropriate to see what other major groups, other than the farmers and the agriculturists, existed so that a better picture may emerge with regard to the impact of social transformation on the leisure of these major groups. The second largest group in the population and workforce of every developed country around 1900 was composed of live-in-servants. They were considered as much a law of nature as farmers were (it is not surprising keeping in view the old Greco-Roman practice of having domestic slaves). Census categories of the time defined a ‘lower middle class’ household as one that employed fewer than three servants. As a percentage of the work force domestics grew steadily up to the First World War. A century later live-in domestic servants scarcely exist in developed countries. Few people born since the Second World War, that is, few people under sixty, even have seen any except on the stage or in old movies (Drucker 1994). As compared to the developed countries, even today a large population of the developing countries has a sizable population of domestic servants. Their patterns of leisure until the mid1950s, particularly before independence in India, hardly differed from that of the farmers mentioned above. Similarly, the farmer class has greatly shrunk in developed countries today and they constitute at most five per cent of the population and workforce—that is, one tenth of the proportion they were ninety years ago. Actually, productive farmers make up less than half of the farm population, or no more than two per cent of the workforce. The farmers as well as the live-in servants might have almost disappeared from the western developed world, and also in Japan, but both these groups still constitute a large part of the population of the developing countries, more so in India.

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Leisure of the Farming Class In contrast to the West, the farming class in India, which largely lives in rural areas, still constitutes a major part of the population. As per the Census of 2001, more than 72 per cent of the Indian people lived in villages, and agriculture was their main occupation. Until a few decades ago, the main leisure-time activities of this large farming class and other rural people were to a large extent confined to such ‘grouporiented’ activities as chatting and gossiping and smoking hukka at the chaupal (73.1%). The second most preferred leisure-time activity was also partly similar, as one-third (33.7%) of the rural people would like to spend their leisure in such ‘family-oriented’ activities as being with children and telling tales to them, taking care of the old, chit-chatting and gossiping with family members, etc., or else they (32.5%) would like to have a quiet leisure—sitting idle, or simply resting, or relaxing, or smoking a hukka. Games and sports also provided leisure outlets to 30.6 per cent of the rural people. Hunting of partridges, wrestling, kabaddi, and encouraging children to grapple and wrestle with each other were some of the favoured games and sports activities. Wherever a water body—a water tank, a river, or a dam was nearby, many of them indulged in swimming. A few young men would also like to play football and volleyball. Some others preferred playing cards (25.6%) and a few among them preferred shatranj (Chess) or chaupar. A little less than one-fifth (18.1%) would like to pursue some religious activity such as bhajan, kirtan, katha, or visiting temples. Some of them would also like to meet saints and sages during leisure. More than one-tenth of them (12.5%) preferred participating in some artistic or cultural activity such as visiting and participating in the melas (fairs) and enjoying all sorts of fun and frolic offered there, playing on musical instruments such as algoja (a wind instrument) dhap an tabla (drum instruments), and singing folk songs. Many of them would also not miss going to a drama or nautanki (a form of traditional theatre) even if they had to cover a long distance. What to talk of television, even radios were not available to more than 10 per cent of the rural people until a few decades ago. In the name of hobbies, they only roamed about in the village and in their own farms. Although there were hardly any villages which had a cinema hall, whenever opportunity came their way, about 10 per cent of them would not miss an opportunity to go for a movie may be on the occasion of a

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mela (fair) or on a mobile-van screen or during a visit to the town or city. Only less than 3 per cent rural people would like to read something in leisure. An equal number indulged in such deviant activities as visiting prostitutes and dancing and singing girls, drinking liquor or some drug in the form of opium, bhang, ganja, and charas (hemp/marijuana).

The Changing Rural Scenario The rural leisure scenario has completely changed during the last thirty to forty years. The rural people still spend time with their children and family members, and chit-chat with them. They still gossip and chitchat and spend time with their friends and colleagues, but now no more on the chaupals (central places) of the village, but in the tea stalls or on the newly emerging mechanic shops. They are still pursuing most of those leisure activities which they were pursuing then, though now to a lesser extent. Now, practically every rural household has a radio or transistor, and many of them even have television. Now, more people read newspapers and magazines, and some even novels. Many of them have learned new skills. They also more often go to towns and cities and the impact of urban areas is visible in their dress, fashion, and fads. Popular heroes and heroines of the Indian cinema as well as those of cricket are no more strangers to them. They now know much about them and can easily talk about them for hours. So is the case with politics. What is most striking is that now many of them possess not only mobiles but also motor-cycles. They are no more strangers to the city nor is the city stranger to them. Easy and more frequent visits to cities due to fast spreading infrastructural and transportation facilities have brought the cities in their easy ambit. However, what is still lacking is the availability of water for their farms and hence continued dependence on monsoon forcing them to commute or ultimately to migrate to the cities. While many of them are unemployed, others who have learned some skills are sought after in the cities, and this has its repercussions on their leisure lives. While some have abundance of forced leisure, others are feeling the pinch of its non-availability. It ranges from one hour to ten hours. However, on an average approximately four hours of leisure was available to the rural people predominated by the farming community, until a few decades ago.

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The Migrant Service-Providers The overall general scenario has drastically changed as a consequence of industrialisation and urbanisation. Large-scale migration from rural areas to the cities has added new dimensions both to the rural and the urban life. While a significantly large section of the migrant groups has become part of the industrial set-up, an equally large section of the migrants are providing services of various kinds—skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled. However, in spite of all their efforts to integrate themselves in the urban life, their links with their roots in the villages are still very strong. Even when they have settled in the cities, they very often go back to their villages. Interaction between them and their left behind colleagues in the villages is working as change-agent and transforming the rural scene in many ways. Not only new ideas but also new leisure practices are making inroads into the life of the rural people. Similarly, the lives of the rural migrants in the cities are undergoing new transformation. They now more often go to see movies or else watch more movies on television at home. When alone, they are at freedom to roam around the city on their newly acquired two wheelers made possible by easy loan facilities by the banks. They spend hours at paan (betel) shops or at tea-stalls gossiping with each other, or on passing comments on the passing by young women. They are also contributing to growing alcoholism and other intoxicants. However, they are also learning new skills in their leisure time in the hope of getting better jobs in order to improve the quality of their lives.

The Industrial or the Blue-Collar Workers While in many developed countries the number of industrial workers is shrinking, it is so far not the case in India, and may be in other developing countries as well. In fact the number of industrial workers is swelling with state governments vying with each other to attract as many industries as possible by providing new and unprecedented incentives. Their hours of work are not unlimited like that of the farmers or of the domestic servants. Under legal provisions, the industrial management is not in a position to force them to work more than the assigned work hours. This has resulted in the availability of many more hours of leisure to the industrial workers. Though there are innumerable possibilities of engaging this increased leisure in any urban setting, for want of resources

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and other structural constraints, their choices become limited. And yet they try to make full use of it in new and innovative leisure activities. It was difficult for them to take along their wives and children outside the four walls of their houses in the villages for reasons of traditional taboos and public ridicule. The anonymity of city and the consequent freedom allows them to move wherever they wish to, including the cinema halls and the restaurants without any fear. Shopping and, of course, windowshopping, together with members of family and at times with friends is both a pleasure and leisure for them. The crunch of resources either demands them to confine either to home-based leisure activities be it passing time with family or watching television or listening to radio, or choose such outside-home activities which could be undertaken without much financial expenditure such as going to temples. Specific days of the week are considered auspicious and more beneficial to visiting the temples of specific deities. Of late, one can witness a tremendous rise in the number of visitors to the temples. These visits are not only to propitiate and to seek blessings of the deities concerned in times of financial and other hardships, but also to visit a destination where many like them will also be there to convert the religious ambiance of the place into that of a mela (fair) like atmosphere where they can also eat chat-pakoris (ethnic fast food) with family and can also buy cheap goods and toys for their children. They cannot think of a less expensive leisure activity than this. The biggest gain of these farmers converted into the so called bluecollar workers or the industrial workers over the years has been their bargaining power through their unions. Even if they had not succeeded in getting their hours of work reduced from 48 hours per week spread over six days, they had also not allowed the management to extract more hours of work from them. As such, though industrial workers in India are still putting much more hours of work as compared to their counterparts in the West, they now have much more free time at their command then before when they were farm workers back home. In fact, at times, they are at a loss to understand as to what use they can put their leisure to. As compared to an average of 2 hours and 55 minutes of leisure available to the urban people as a whole, the leisure hours available to the industrial workers are the highest (more than 4 hours) as compared to such other classes of people as merchants, service class, and the elites who, by and large, are the largest sections of the urban population along with the industrial workers. However, it may not be as true in case of the elites when it comes to numbers. As a consequence of technological advancements and general development in society, including financial

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betterment, particularly of the ever enlarging middle class, the sphere of available leisure activities has widened multi-fold and yet the industrial workers can make use of very limited leisure options that are available.

The White-Collar Workers As compared to these blue-collar workers, the white-collar workers, whose size has tremendously grown over the years, have benefited the most. Their unions are as strong as that of the industrial workers, rather getting stronger every day. During the last Assembly elections in a state the party in power lost the elections due to the tirade of the babus (lower-level white-collar bureaucracy). It was again under the pressure of these babus that the government, which came to power because of their support, had to decide to appease them by implementing the five-day work week instead of the existing six-day work week. Since employees of the central government already have a five-day work week and now that state governments are also implementing it, the character of leisure at the weekends will undergo major transformation. Only one-day weekend had major limitations and constraints. But now that many government employees will have a two-day weekend, they will definitely like to make use of this newly gained leisure time by extending the scope of their leisure activities. What will be the shape of these activities is yet to be ascertained. As in the West, particularly in America, the emergence of the concept of long weekends, and the flurry associated with it is around the corner. Weekend tourism in all probability is going to get a good boost now that possessing a car, even though a small one, has already taken the shape of a phenomenon. Such a situation is likely to have repercussions both for leisure and social transformation.

Emergence of a New Class: The IT Workers and Other Professionals The most important phenomenon of the 21st century in globalising India is the emergence of an altogether new class—the class of IT (Information and Technology) workers. They are highly skilled and computer savvy. They have provided a new identity to the genius of India the world over. They are in heavy demand everywhere, both at home and in all corners of

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the world. Their competence, efficiency, and hard work are phenomenal. They have transformed the socio-economic scenario of the country. Their pay-packets are fairly high and ever increasing. Within few years of beginning their career they can afford to buy a car and can also have their own houses since they can repay their loans without much financial strain. They can afford to go anywhere; can buy expensive gadgets both for themselves as well as for other members of the family. This class can now also afford to dine out at regular intervals and can also afford to buy expensive tickets not only for cinema but also for other modern and contemporary stage shows of various kinds. However, the dilemma is that now they have more money but less leisure. Sunday alone is not sufficient to indulge in all this. As compared to the blue-collar industrial workers or the white-collar service class, which has enough leisure but limited resources, this young class of IT professionals and other technically skilled personnel, many of them having management degrees and such other qualifications is constantly under pressure of work. There is always a challenge to prove themselves. They have to prove their sincerity by not leaving the office before others working even after the prescribed office hours and sometimes until late into the night. It is because of the performance of these young people that India is heading towards becoming a knowledge society. Impressed by the performance of the very small-, small-, and medium-sized industrial sectors which provide jobs to forty million people in the country, the Government of India has recently announced that in order to have educational and skill developments, new institutions will be established right at the school level to create 500 million trained technicians by the year 2020. Right now India already has a 200-million strong middle class and with the addition of this trained humanpower, this middle class will further swell to many more millions. This will not only strengthen both the service sector and the IT sector, but will also have far-reaching consequences, both on leisure and the quality of life of the people, which is already undergoing tremendous transformation, both social and economic.

Leisure, Youth, and Social Transformation The analysis of the impact of social transformation on the leisure practices of contemporary urbanites is not complete without taking into cognisance the changes that have taken place in the leisure lives of the

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young people in India. Nearly half of the large Indian population is now that of the young. India may as well be considered one of the youngest countries in the world. The youth are the main targets of whatever is produced and marketed in the country. While, on the one hand, the market tries its best to determine their choice, on the other, it is they who influence what has to be produced for their consumption. It is in order to cater to the requirements of this large section that practically all urban centres—big, small, or middle-sized—are witnessing the boom of multipurpose complexes called malls. These malls provide almost everything these young people look for. These malls not only have movie halls but also good quality restaurants as well as fast food joints. All sorts of items, including those of the international brands, are available in these malls. What is most interesting is that, movies or no movies, shopping or no shopping, eating or no eating, these malls have turned out to be places for hanging around for one and all particularly, the young people. No sooner the evening sets in, hoards of these young people start flocking to the malls. They are just happy being there in the company of their friends and colleagues. The gender barriers, which were stringent until the last decade of the 20th century, are crumbling fast. Spending a few hours of leisure there is no big deal. As anybody can read on their faces and from their smiles, these hours are not only their leisure hours but also ‘happy hours’ when they seem to forget all the stresses and strains of the work place, may be also of the family. The emergence of the ‘mall culture’ has drastically transformed leisure and lifestyle of young people in urban India. It has also transformed their patterns of interaction. All through the 1980s and the 1990s it was a major concern of a very large number of ‘sane’ and ‘sensible’ people in the country as to what will happen to ‘person to person’ and ‘family to family’ interaction as a consequence of heavy television-viewing. People became so glued to television in the early decades of its arrival that a large section of fastgrowing television owners minimised visiting and meeting each other, which used to be the second most popular leisure activity of more than one-third of the urbanites. It was second only to such intellectual activities of leisure as reading of books, journals, magazines and newspapers, and other literary activities pursued by more than half (52.5%) of the urban population (Modi 1985: 121). But now it is no more the case, nor a cause of worry. The new emerging malls have restored meeting each other and that too in a big way.

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When these young people cannot make it to the mall, or do not want to, they would very often like to go on long drives with their friends, often of the opposite sex. It also provides them privacy. In most cases, this is also an expression of their freedom, freedom from the taboos of segregation. Technological transformations in the form of ready availability of scooters, motorcycles, and cars, which were until the last two decades had to be booked much in advance are now easily available and can be seen everywhere. A real transportation revolution has taken place. Until the beginning of the 21st century, nobody could imagine that within the next few years urban India was going to face traffic jams on its roads. Motorcycles have almost completely replaced bicycles not only in the cities but to a great extent even in rural areas. The milkman no more comes on bicycle. So is the case with most service providers. It saves them both time and energy and also gives them a chance to ride far and wide with whomsoever they want to. The impact of technological transformation on leisure is also visible in the form of cell phones. When you are not together, either at the mall or at the motorcycle, there has to be something to have the feeling of togetherness and being connected. The sharp marketing strategists have devised and offered such schemes whereby a group of friends can always remain connected to each other through cell-phone conferencing. What a nice idea, to chit-chat for hours! No problem of boredom, wherever you may be. And at home, when even the whispering conversation may draw the attention of other family members or else may disturb them, the Internet comes in handy to them. You can chat with anybody, anywhere, at any time. When there is nobody around to chat, the computer and the Internet is there to help you out with your remaining leisure. When all the above mentioned new developments—the emergence of the mall culture, transportation revolution, widespread penetration of cell phones and the Internet—threatened the all-pervasive television and its viewing TRPs (television rating points) started declining, the television magnets had to device something to bring back its viewers. They adopted a strong multi-directional strategy. Whatever was missing was brought in a big way in the form of reality programmes, and challenge and competition programmes related to music, dance, and even laughter. All these programmes not only have national celebrities from the respective fields as judges but also invoke participation of the masses in the form of voting in favour of their favourite contestants. Burdened by the heavy postal response to these programmes, the department of Posts and Telegraphs

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had to increase the rate of the postcard and introduced penalty for using ordinary postcards for the purpose of voting for television programmes. Introduction of new system of voting through SMS (Short Messaging Service) and phone lines for these television programmes at times choke the lines at the cost of genuine users. However, these new and ever-changing television programmes in newer and exotic formats have once again increased the TRPs of the channels concerned. Exclusive movie channels which used to screen good and popular new movies after long gaps now show these movies at short intervals, thus attracting large audiences. Contrary to expectations, screening of latest movies on television hardly seems to have adversely affected the revenues of the cinema halls. The number of movies produced in the country, both in Bollywood and in the regional language studios, is so large that the cinema halls are happy to exhibit movies week after week. Even the worst of movies make the money spent on them and even earn profit since a certain section of the large population is always there to help them out. As such, the cinema halls, which had to face crisis due to the onslaught of television in the form of reduced visitors, are once again becoming popular centres of entertainment and leisure.

Social Transformation An overall boom in the market is unmistakably visible. Factors like urbanisation, industrialisation, and the LPG policies have brought about unprecedented social transformation in India. While the processes of westernisation and modernisation were already at work in transforming the Indian society, the pace of social transformations has of late acquired speed and momentum. Like leisure, the concept of social transformation is a complex one. It has varied connotations. Sometimes it has been equated with the process by which an individual alters the socially ascribed social status of their parents into a socially achieved status for themselves. At others the focus is on how individuals can alter the class culture to which they feel aligned. However, for my own purpose, when I am trying to examine the interface between leisure and social transformation, social transformation may be defined as a multi-dimensional process of accelerated social change, as also the radical change in the mind-sets, lifestyles, ways of thinking and doing, and creating a desire to achieve an egalitarian social order with improved quality of life and happiness.

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Leisure and Social Transformation When examined from this definitional perspective it becomes possible to see that how social transformations taking place the world over, particularly in India, can be correlated to leisure. The earlier leisure practices are undergoing rapid changes. The mind-sets of people with regard to enjoying leisure have also changed dramatically. They are also trying to adopt a lifestyle which fulfils their leisure requirements. They now want to do things with an element of freedom and also want to pursue and indulge in whatever others are doing and enjoying. They also think it is their right to do the same things in the same manner and hope that it would not only improve the quality of their life and leisure, but would also make them happier. They may or may not have the matching resources, but the very fact that now they have the desire, a strong desire and the determination to do what they wish, is indicative enough that a major social transformation has already taken place.

Centrality of Leisure All the above discussed theoretical perspectives with regard to understanding the concept of leisure motivate us to think about the position of leisure vis-à-vis such other social phenomena as money and power. Both money and power have always been considered central in life. However, there are scholars who think that money and power are not the ultimate objectives of life. In my view also, whatever the strength of these two elements, they are only tools and means to achieve something more beautiful and higher in life. And all that is beautiful in life is essentially related to leisure. Leisure is the fountainhead of all creativity, which, in turn, is fundamental to the creation of anything beautiful. At the same time, most people have their own ideas, desires, and dreams as to how they would like to use their leisure. It may as well be said that each one of us has a ‘leisure dream’, which we strive for and try to accomplish. Whatever can help and assist us in accomplishing and fulfilling the leisure dreams is welcome. Seen from this perspective, while leisure becomes an objective and acquires a central place in life, both money and power become the tools and means. This is not to undermine the importance of money and power, but to emphasise the centrality of leisure in life. Let me give an example, whenever I asked my well-to-do American Indian friends what will be their wish if they

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earn more money, most often the response was that they would go for a more specious house with a swimming pool. And further to the same question, they would like to go for an estate, meaning by more and more space for badminton, tennis, gym, walk ways with lots of trees, etc. And on repeating the same question, the choices were a bigger luxury car for self, another for wife, and then for each one of their children. All this is indicative of enriching the leisure life. On the other hand, even the most powerful ones, either from industry or politics also desire and strive for a most beautiful and fulfilling leisure vacation. As such, leisure becomes more central in life than anything else. By the same logic, leisure is also the key to understand and reconstruct the social reality, since leisure also has the potential to explain various social phenomena. The use of leisure as a methodological tool has high potential in constructing social reality as compared to several existing research tools.

Leisure Society Acceptance of the centrality of leisure can also help in solving the riddle of a desired quality of life and a desired society. Can a ‘leisure society’ be the desired society? During the last few decades, leisure sociologists became hopeful that the world is moving towards attaining the goal of a desired society, which, in their view, would be a ‘leisure society’ wherein there would be abundance both of money and leisure. It is believed that it would be possible for the members of such a society to fulfil all their needs by putting in minimum hours of work per week and that the weekends will also be extending from two to three days or may be even four. The reduction of work week to four days in France and similar considerations in other countries (like in the Netherlands) gave further impetus to the realisation of the dream of a leisure society. Not only the strong economies of the developed countries, but also that of the fast-growing economies of the developing countries like Brazil, China, India, South Africa and that of East Asia aroused hopes of better standards of living and of quality of life including leisure. However, the recent recession in the economies of almost all the countries, mainly due to the rising prices of petrol and petroleum products along with the problems arising out of the international terrorist activities, have dampened the sprits. The prices of practically everything are rising, the fuel costs have increased and so also the expenses on health care. As a

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consequence, people all over the world are feeling compelled to earn more by putting in more hours of work to meet their necessities, which has led to a situation of more work and less money and consequently less leisure. However, all is not lost. Economic recession cannot continue for ever. The trends are different in different countries. If I take India as an example, the rise in the salaries in practically all the sectors, particularly in the IT sector or among the employees of the knowledge sector, has been unprecedented. Even the salaries of the public sector employees have risen a good deal. Not only that, their work week has also been reduced to five days and, as such, now these employees will have a weekend of two days instead of one day. It is hoped that, as soon as inflation goes down and recession recedes, everybody can look forward to better days with better earnings and more leisure. May be, the social transformations taking place in spite of all the hurdles, both economic and social, and also at times political, will enthuse people to demand not only better working conditions but also more leisure and better economic rewards leading ultimately towards the realisation of a ‘leisure society’.

Note * This article originated as an invited presentation at the Common Session 1: Social Changes and Social Problems, First ISA Forum of Sociology, Barcelona, Spain on 5 September 2008.

References Becker, Howard S. 1955. ‘Becoming a marihuana user’, in Arnold Rose (ed.): Mental health and mental disorder (420–33). New York: W.W. Norton. Bohannan, Paul. 1953. ‘Concept of time among the Tiv of Nigeria’, Southwestern journal of anthropology, 9 (3): 251–62. Brightbill, Charles K. and Harold D. Meyer. 1952. Recreation: Text and reading. New York: Prentice-Hall Inc. De Grazia, Sebastian. 1964. Of time, work, and leisure. Garden City: Anchor. Drucker, Peter F. 1994. ‘The age of social transformation’, The Atlantic monthly, 274: 53–56. Dumazedier, Joffre. 1967. Towards a society of leisure. New York: The Free Press. ———. 1974. Sociology of leisure. Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier. Durkheim, Emile. 1961. The elementary forms of the religious life. New York: Collier Books. Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1940. The Neur: A description of the modes of livelihood and political institutions of a Nilotic people. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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214Ishwar Modi Havighurst, Robert J. 1957. ‘The leisure activities of the middle-aged’, American journal of sociology, 62 (2): 152–62. Hugses, Charles C. 1961. ‘The concept and use of time in the middle years: The St Lawrence Island Eskimos’, in Roberts W. Kellmeier (ed.): Ageing and leisure (91–95). New York: Oxford University Press. Kaplan, Max. 1960. Leisure in America: A social inquiry. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Lamb, Charles. 1900. Essays of Elia. London: J.M. Dent & Co. Linder, Staffan Burenstam. 1970. The harried leisure class. New York: Columbia University Press. Mead, Margaret (ed.). 1955. Cultural patterns and technical change. New York: UNESCO Report, Mentor. Modi, Ishwar. 1985. Leisure, mass media and social structure. Jaipur: Rawat Publications. Piper, Joseph. 1958. Leisure, the basis of culture. London: Faber & Faber. Riesman, David. 1961. The lonely crowd. New Haven: Yale University Press. Singh, Yogendra. 1973. Modernisation of Indian tradition. Delhi: Thomson Press. ———. 1985. ‘Foreword’, in Ishwar Modi: Leisure, mass media and social structure (ix–xv). Jaipur: Rawat Publications. Veblen, Thorstein. 1957. The theory of the leisure class. London: Allen & Unwin.

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12 Cultural Nationalism in a Multi-National Context: The Case of India Subrat K. Nanda

I

t is popularly believed that nationalism, either as an ideology or as a movement, is necessarily linked with the concept of sovereignty. From this perspective, nationalism as a principle of political self-determination invariably tends to achieve a sovereign nation-state. However, empirical evidence in many culturally plural and/or multi-national countries reveals that the goal of nationalism may vary from different kinds of political autonomy to outright sovereignty/independence. For example, in several multinational countries it is seen that nationalistic sentiment was and continues to be invoked by people to protect their distinct cultural-linguistic identity within the provisions of provincial political autonomy under a common sovereign state. This variety of nationalism seeking provincial statehood in a multi-national set-up may be referred to as ‘cultural nationalism’. This paper proposes to bring into focus this phenomenon of cultural nationalism in the context of multi-national countries in general and in India in particular.

Nationalism in Multi-National Context: Conceptual Clarification A multi-national country consists of people belonging to culturally diverse nationality groups. Such countries all over the world experience differing levels of identity, which, in turn, create competing claims upon

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the loyalty of their people. Normally, in these countries, people’s loyalty to their overarching nation/state competes with the loyalty to their respective nationalities. Stated differently, people in such cases wish to cling to their civil-political identity without shedding or tampering their specific cultural identity and the notions of ancestral ‘homeland’. Edward Shills (1957) observes that people in such countries display both civil-political and cultural-primordial ties. If the framework is disturbed in any form, there would be predictable conflict, because one or another nationality may feel deprived objectively or subjectively. Incidentally, quite a large number of multi-national counties are located in the Third World, that is, in Africa, Asia and Latin America. For a greater part of their history, most of these countries remained under the rule of European colonial powers. European colonialism, however, could not obliterate the multi-cultural set-up of these countries. On the other hand, it provided effective grounds for the growth of nationalism there. It may be recalled here that, as a political doctrine, nationalism originated in modern Europe and then spread to other parts of the world in different periods (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1994). Nationalism was exported to the Third World countries during the colonial period. Significantly, while in Europe the emergence of nationalism aimed at establishing modern sovereign states along national lines following the one-nation-one-state dictum, in the multi-cultural colonial countries nationalism was conceived differently in different contexts. At the macro-level, nationalism was seen as an anti-colonial political consciousness striving to liberate the country from foreign rule and establish a sovereign state. At the regional-level, it was perceived as a form of cultural consciousness seeking to protect distinct cultural communities in their traditional homelands. Needless to say, the former represents the political sense of nationalism and the latter encapsulates the cultural expression of nationalism. There is no denying that the concept of nation—real or imaginary— is central to all forms of nationalism. However, in some cases, national consciousness arises from a pre-existent nation; in others, it may lead to the construction of a distinct national identity. By and large, in the typical European sense, nation meant a culture-congruent sovereign political entity. However, given the dual interpretation of nationalism, in the multi-cultural colonial world, nation acquired a double connotation: at the macro-level, it acquired a political form based on

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shared colonial experience and geo-political unity; at the micro-level, it assumed a cultural form based on cultural-linguistic-territorial identity. This dual notion of nation and nationalism persists in these countries even after independence. In the independent period, the macro-political unit is referred to as nation or even nation-state in the political sense and the constituent micro unit is viewed as nation in the cultural sense. In other words, in the multi-national states, nation emerged as a political entity at the common political level and as a cultural entity at the specific cultural level. The former is based on such political variables as sovereignty, common citizenship and common legal-administrative system. The latter is based on such socio-cultural criteria as cultural homogeneity, shared history and distinct language. Territory is common to both the understandings of nation. As mentioned earlier, in the ex-colonial countries, nationalism emerged as a response to colonialism. However, what is often overlooked is that in these countries the colonial rulers created provincial administrative boundaries which did not correspond to the cultural boundaries of different nationalities. This provincial arrangement not only gave rise to disjuncture between culture and territory, but also eventually led to the domination by one nationality over another in a given provincial unit. The dominated nationalities responded by asserting their distinct national identity in separatist terms. The political manifestation of such assertion varied from the demand for a culture-congruent provincial unit to a separate sovereign state. The situation exploded after independence. The arrival of freedom, introduction of self-governments, and establishment of democratic institutions and civil-political rights provided the requisite platform for arousal of national consciousness among the hitherto subdued and neglected nationalities. Considering the enormity of the problem, some ex-colonial multi-national countries undertook provincial reorganisation on primordial basis. The primordial basis, however, differed from one country to another—for example, region was the basis of reorganisation in Indonesia; tribe-cum-kinship, in Nigeria; sect and religion, in Lebanon; race, in Malaysia; language and tribe, in Pakistan (Geertz 1971). Provincial reorganisation was undertaken keeping the following goals in view: (a) establishing parallelism between politico-administrative unit and cultural unit; (b) maintaining the unity and integrity of the state; (c) accommodating the diverse population under a common civilpolitical authority; (d) promoting a ‘terminal’ civil loyalty to the state

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in place of multiple primordial loyalties; and (e) introducing large-scale state-sponsored modernisation so that all types of disaffection resulting from the ties of race, colour, language, religion, etc. would be displaced eventually. Unfortunately, in many ex-colonial countries neither the desired parallelism between administrative unit and cultural identity has been fully met, nor the highly expected ‘displacement syndrome’ and the much hoped—for singular loyalty to the state have emerged. What is emerging, on the contrary, is a set of multiple cultural nations co-existing under common sovereign political unit, thereby allowing two notions of identity, a dual level of loyalty, a dual conception of nationality and finally a double interpretation of nationalism. Given this scenario, it is quite likely that those nationalities whose language and territory are not protected will indulge in nationalistic mobilisation demanding recognition of identity and autonomy. It is well known that nationality problems grip the multi-national countries of the ex-colonial world; the older and well-integrated western countries remain relatively free from this malaise. However, these countries also experience stiff resistance from their people belonging to cultural backgrounds different from the mainstream nation/nationality. National movements, latent or avowed, now exist among the Scots, Welsh and Irish in the UK; French-Quebecois in Canada; German Swiss in Switzerland; Basques and Catalans in Spain; and Burgundies and Britons in France (Satyamurthy 1983). In fact, both ‘state-aspiring’ and ‘state-renouncing’ nationalisms are found in the contemporary western world (Oommen 1997). It follows that both the old and new multi-national states experience nationality problems. In such states, people, barring a few exceptions, want to survive through self-rule within a common sovereign state. Commenting on multi-national states A.D. Smith (1973) notes two polar perspectives: ‘statist’ and ‘ethnicist’. The statists perceive and define nationalism from the viewpoint of mainstream nation and culture and the unity and integrity of the state. The ethnicists, being desirous of maintaining cultural distinctiveness, insist on recognising specific cultural nation and nationalism in the multi-national set up. The statists advocate the assimilation of cultural nationalities into the mainstream mould, but the ethnicists incessantly resist assimilation with a view to retaining multiple identities. Moreover, for the ethnicists, subordination of specific cultural identity in favour of an overarching state identity and

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an alien mainstream nation and culture would mean many things: (a) it may run the risk of loss of identity and, hence, autonomy; (b) it may lead to unfettered hegemony of the mainstream nation; and (c) it may amount to loss of instrumental socioeconomic benefits and of equal opportunity.

Nationalism in India In India, the magnitude of nationality problems is stupendous. Being a new state and the largest multi-national country, she faces the uphill task of reconciling national integration efforts with accommodation of multiple nationalities within the framework of a single sovereign polity. The task becomes all the more difficult as free India has adopted a secular democratic political system. It is well known that India is a veritable labyrinth of cultural pluralism/diversity. Since time immemorial, India is home to numerous languages, religions, tribes, races, and castes and sub-castes. Of these elements of cultural pluralism in India, language, tribe and, to some extent, religion, happen to be crucial, as they not only serve as important markers of group identity, but also provide viable bases for nationality formation. The fact that linguistic and tribal identities in India are linked to a definite territory, that is, a concept of ‘homeland’ or ‘desh’, reinforces their salience. Moreover, the term desh implies not merely a territory, but also a people, language, style of life, and pattern of culture; in fact, a nation in the European sense of the term. Madhav N. Deshpande (1983) observes that the concept of ‘homeland’ is variously expressed in Indian vocabulary as ‘desh’, ‘nadu’, ‘rastra’, etc. In addition, several linguistic and tribal groups in India possess distinct history, culture, myths, symbols and values. All these elements go into the making of territorially rooted cultural nationalities in India and render her multi-national character. Given such a complex socio-cultural reality, any attempt to disturb the natural linkage between language, culture and homeland would cause disaffection among the affected people. As a matter of fact, this natural linkage between territory, language and culture was disturbed for the first time in India during the colonial period. India emerged as single political unit under British colonialism. The British, however, systematically divided the Indian territory into ‘British India’ and ‘Indian India’. Administrative provinces were created to rule ‘British India’ directly. ‘Indian India’, comprising 562 princely

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states, was ruled by native princes under British paramountcy. This colonial policy of keeping Indian states separate from ‘British India’ was perhaps designed to thwart the development of nationalism at the allIndia level. It did not, however, take long for nationalism to grow at the all-India level. However, unlike nationalism in Europe, nationalism in India did not emerge from industrialisation or bourgeois revolution to capture state power. It resulted primarily from the inevitable political framework of colonialism and the cultural framework of multi-national situation. Obviously, Indian nationalism assumed a liberal-political content and it evolved from a sense of pan-Indian geo-political unity and an anticolonial perception shared by people belonging to diverse cultural-nationality backgrounds. Needless to say, the all-India national consciousness was mainly articulated by the nationalist elite comprising various cross sections of the Indian middle class. Apart from the all-India level, nationalism in India was also seen at the regional-national level. Unlike the pan-Indian national consciousness, however, the regional national consciousness emerged as a form of cultural nationalism seeking to preserve identity and protect ‘homeland’ vis-à-vis other nationalities in the country. It is in this sense that the regional cultural nationalism differed from the pan-Indian political nationalism which aimed at India’s independence and the establishment of the Indian nation-state. Moreover, the regional national consciousness emanated from a cultural sense of ‘pre-existent nation’ defined in terms of a distinct culture, shared history, specific language and common territory. Thus, the origins of cultural nationalism in India date back to the colonial times. The rise of such cultural nationalism was mainly attributed to the existence of artificial provincial units in colonial India. Like colonial experience elsewhere, in India too, British colonialism carved out administrative provinces which did not match the physical distribution of nationalities and their socio-cultural affiliation. In some cases, several nationalities were juxtaposed in one provincial unit. For example, the Bengal presidency contained different nationalities like the Bengali, Oriya, Assamese, Maithili, Bhojpuri and a host of tribal communities. The Madras Presidency included the Tamils, Telugus, Malayalees and Kannadigas; while the Bombay Presidency comprised the Marathis, Gujaratis, Kannadigas and Konkanis. In some other instances, people of a particular nationality (for example, Oriyas, Kannadigas, etc.) were apportioned to two or more provincial units.

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Juxtaposition reduced the smaller nationalities into a minority position; apportionment led to cultural fragmentation and territorial dismemberment of some nationalities. The fragmentation of culture and territory created disjuncture among language, culture and territory. Thus, tension and conflict resulted in both the cases: in the case of juxtaposition, conflict resulted from domination of one nationality over another; in the case of apportionment, tension resulted from a fear of loss of ‘homeland’ and, hence, identity. The mainstream nationalities, whose culture and territory were not fragmented and who happened to be in majority, emerged as dominant nationality under favourable colonial conditions. While their culture and language flourished under colonial patronage, the language and culture of the dominated and peripheral nationalities faced serious threats. Furthermore, the deprived nationalities perceived the subordination of their cultural identity to the mainstream as the root-cause of their socio-economic and political deprivation. Thus, the fear of ‘culturocide’ and a sense of material deprivation motivated several neglected and dismembered nationalities to assert their national identity by invoking a sense of indigenous cultural defence and by demanding a separate province anchored to ‘homeland’. This very consciousness of protecting and preserving one’s cultural identity within a culture-congruent provincial unit gave rise to several cultural nationalisms in colonial India. The rise of national consciousness among the Oriyas, Sindhis, Assamese, Telugus, and Malayalees, and the assertion of tribal identity by the Jharkhand tribes are some cases in point. As mentioned earlier, these cultural nationalisms at the regional level were pursued simultaneously along with the anti-colonial national movement for liberation of India. Several studies have discussed this dual character of nationalism in the Indian context. A.R. Desai (1966: 368), for example, noted that from the standpoint of the united national movement for India’s independence, the movement of the nationalities for self-determination assumed decisive significance. Some recent articulations on national identity in India reiterated this thesis quite unequivocally. For example, M.N. Karna (2000: 94) observes that both language and region have shaped regional national identity in India and that pan-Indianness objectively co-exists with the regional national consciousness. G.  Aloysius (1997) argues that both political and cultural nationalisms contributed to the making of India.

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The Oriya National Movement in Colonial India Of the cultural nationalisms that flared up in colonial India, the Oriya national movement happens to be the most noteworthy for a variety of reasons. First, the Oriyas were among the few nationalities in India whose culture and territory were fragmented in colonial times. Second, Oriya language and culture faced serious threats on account of territorial dismemberment. Third, the Oriya movement was the first cultural nationalism in British India which demanded a separate province. Finally, the formation of separate Orissa province was the first linguistic province in British India. In colonial times, Oriya nationality was divided between British Orissa and Princely Orissa. Moreover, British Orissa was apportioned to different administrative units: the southern part was placed in the Madras Presidency, the coastal tract and the adjoining areas in the Bengal presidency, and the western part comprising the Sambalpur region was first placed in Chhotanagpur and then under the Central Provinces (CP). Princely Orissa comprised as many as twenty-six smaller principalities. The territorial dismemberment of Oriya land fragmented the Oriyas culturally and turned them into insignificant cultural minorities vis-à-vis the dominant Bengalis, Telugus and Hindi speakers in the Bengal and Madras Presidencies and in CP respectively. Because of their longer association with the British, the Bengalis in the Bengal Presidency enjoyed a pre-eminent position in matters of education, employment and administration. Obviously, therefore, the officials posted to the Orissa division of the Bengal Presidency turned out to be Bengali migrants who in turn occupied the important positions in administration, law, teaching and clerical services (Bailey 1959). In the same way, in the Madras Presidency and in CP, the Oriyas were economically dominated by the Telugus and Hindi-speakers respectively. Initially, the Oriyas reacted to their inferior socioeconomic position in every province they were appended to. When the ‘outsiders’ posed serious threats to Oriya language and culture, signs of nationalistic unity began to appear among the Oriyas. The cultural threat largely came from the Bengali chauvinists who tried hard to suppress Oriya language by denying its independent status and by urging the government to introduce Bengali as the medium of instruction and administration in the part of Orissa placed under the Bengal presidency (Patnaik 1968). This was followed by the replacement of Oriya by Hindi language in CP.

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Similar plans were also made to replace Oriya by Telugu in the Madras Presidency. Under British rule, thus, the Oriyas faced both material and cultural deprivation. To save their language from extinction and to preserve Oriya identity in British India, the articulate Oriya leadership launched a language agitation in the form of ‘save Oriya campaign’, which eventually crystallised into a well-organised national movement under the banner of Utkal Union Conference (UUC), the first Oriya national organisation (Mohanty 1984). The UUC vigorously pressed for a united Orissa. At first UUC leadership favoured unification of Oriya areas under a single administration. However, the perceived danger involved in maintaining cultural distinctiveness vis-à-vis any ‘alien’ nationality goaded them to call for the constitution of a separate Oriya province. The culmination of this aspiration came in 1936 when a separate Orissa province comprising six British-administered Oriya districts was formed on linguistic basis. The province, however, did not comprise princely Orissa. This part of Oriya homeland was integrated with Orissa province following the spread of national consciousness to the princely areas. There was no apparent external threat to Oriya language and culture in Princely Orissa. Here nationalism resulted because of extreme economic exploitation and political oppression caused by the feudal rulers. Nonetheless, there was an anticipated fear of loosing Oriya identity had these princely areas been integrated with any non-Oriya province. Subsequently, twenty-four Oriya princely states were merged with Orissa province in 1947–48 following the principles of linguistic unity, geographical contiguity and cultural homogeneity (Patra 1979). The Oriya experience brings out some serious sociological implications of nationalism in a multi-national context. It points out that when a nation/nationality is artificially divided and assigned to different administrative units, the national sentiment may crystallise into nationalism. This will aggravate if the administrative arrangement leads to economic exploitation and cultural stigmatisation of the victim-nationals. From the Oriya point of view, both the British and the Bengalis were perceived as enemies. Since the British were a common enemy at the all-India level, cooperation with the rest of the Indian nationalities was called for giving birth to political nationalism. On the other hand, the Bengalis were viewed as the internal colonisers sapping the vitality of Oriya nationalism and, therefore, cultural nationalism crystallised in the Oriya-speaking land. In the case of Orissa, the two nationalisms

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proceeded simultaneously calling for selective cooperation with the British in the context of Oriya nationalism, and necessary cooperation with the Bengalis in the context of Indian nationalism. The Oriya example further clarified that the disjuncture between the cultural boundary of nationality and administrative boundary may lead to nationalistic mobilisation by a deprived nationality. Admittedly, this mismatch persisted in India after independence and it continues to exist even today. Little wonder, then, that regional national movements demanding provincial states continue to emerge in India.

Cultural Nationalism and States Reorganisation After independence, the biggest challenge before the Indian government was the integration of princely states with the Union of India. Sardar Patel with his astute statesmanship made this task possible. However, after integration, the political map of India retained several bigger multilingual units such as the provinces of Bombay, Madras, Punjab, Assam and a few bigger princely states such as Hyderabad, Mysore, PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States Union), etc. It may be noted that the British through various constitutional measures had visualised India as a union of autonomous provinces. Independent India inherited the same political vision and hence cultural nationalism seeking provincial units proliferated in the post-independence period. With the arrival of freedom, the political climate in India had changed. The establishment of a federal polity, introduction of parliamentary democracy and the thrust on constitutionalism and self-rule not only laid the foundations of a new political era, but also contributed immensely to strengthening the forces of cultural pluralism and cultural nationalism in India. The Indian Constitution legitimised cultural pluralism by listing fourteen major languages in the Eighth Schedule under Articles 344 (1) and 351. Subsequently, Sindhi (in 1967), Manipuri, Konkani and Nepali (in 1992) and Maithili, Bodo, Dogri and Santhali (in 2003) were added to the Schedule, thereby raising the number of scheduled languages to twenty-two. In the changed atmosphere, thus, people increasingly became conscious of their linguistic-cultural-national identity. The struggle for a separate Telugu province was the first leading example of cultural nationalism in independent India. Telugu nationalism had its origin in the colonial period. The Telugus mainly protested

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against the economic and political domination of the Tamils in the erstwhile composite Madras province. The Telugu national struggle culminated in the formation of Andhra state in 1953 (Rao 1973). The formation of Andhra state, however, opened the floodgates of regional nationalist aspirations in India. The situation went to such an alarming height that the liberal-democratic leadership of India had to accept linguistic-cultural homogeneity as the basis of restructuring the provincial map of the Indian Union. The Indian leadership accommodated people’s demand primarily within the framework of the Indian Constitution. The significant step in this direction was the setting up of the States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) in 1953. With regard to reorganisation, the SRC broadly followed four major principles: (i) preservation and strengthening the unity and integrity of India; (ii) linguistic and cultural homogeneity; (iii) financial, administrative and economic considerations; and (iv) successful working of the national plan (SRC 1955). Although the SRC recommended the formation of sixteen states and three union territories (Ibid.), the country was eventually reorganised into fourteen states and six union territories following the States Reorganisation Act of 1956. The states reorganisation of 1956 was popularly referred to as ‘linguistic reorganisation’. It is true that the SRC largely followed the linguistic principle for states reorganisation and did not recommend the creation of any state on the basis of tribe or religion. However, on a closer look one finds that the 1956 reorganisation created only some linguistic provinces such as Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, while some other states like Orissa, Bihar, Bengal, Uttar Pradesh (UP), etc. preceded the reorganisation. In some instances, the princely states having linguistic affinity and geographical contiguity were merged with an erstwhile province such as Andhra, Bombay, etc. It may further be noted that the major Hindi-speaking North Indian states such as UP, Madhya Pradesh (MP), Bihar and Rajasthan were created following historical and geopolitical considerations. Again, going by the linguistic principle the entire Hindi-speaking region should have been constituted into either a single state or split up into many smaller states based on the distribution pattern of speech communities such as Maithili, Bhojpuri, Awadhi and Bundelkhandi in the Hindi belt. Even the administrative viability principle was not met in the case of the bigger states like UP, Bihar and MP. The retention of the two major bilingual states of Bombay and Punjab and the multilingual

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state of Assam further nullified the linguistic principle at that time. Hence, the goal of ensuring parallelism between administrative unit and linguistic group was not satisfactorily met by the reorganisation of 1956. Furthermore, the 1956 reorganisation was carried out on the basis of some constitutionally recognised scheduled languages. The 1961 and 1971 Census of India reported that as many as 1,652 languages and mother tongues are spoken in multi-lingual India; of these, 1,549 are native to India (Nigam 1971). The 1991 Census of India listed 1,576 languages and mother tongues which were further classified into 114 languages following appropriate linguistic methods. Of course, this does not mean that as many states should be created for as many languages spoken in India. Nevertheless, the people with a distinct language, sizeable strength and a specific homeland would stand a better chance for having a separate province. Besides, the identification of a constitutionally recognised language with a particular province in India has converted many languages into either dialects or minority languages. Numerous tribal languages were left outside the scope of the constitution even though they are spoken by a fairly large number of people. Hence, the race for inclusion of one’s language in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution escalated after the reorganisation of states. In a sense, the scheme of reorganisation mainly benefited the bigger and/or mainstream nationalities; the smaller and peripheral nationalities, by and large, remained in a state of dominationdeprivation within a multi-cultural administrative unit. Thus, the states reorganisation of 1956 created as many problems as it solved. As noted above, at the time of reorganisation, Bombay and Punjab were kept as bilingual provinces regardless of the people’s demand to bifurcate them. The discontented Marathi people launched the Samyukta Maharashtra movement in protest against the decision (Deshpande 1983). Consequently, as popular unrest rose to soaring heights, Bombay was bifurcated in 1960 and the provinces of Maharashtra and Gujarat were established to accommodate both Marathi and Gujarati national sentiments. The reorganisation of 1956 and the creation of Maharashtra and Gujarat in 1960 have brought into focus a crucial dimension of Indian polity, that is, legitimisation of cultural nationalism and the role of language in the creation of provinces. However, with passage of time, the central government has accepted some other bases of provincial reorganisation such as tribe, region and, to some extent, religion (for example, religious-cum-linguistic identity, religious-cum-tribal identity).

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Tribal Nationalism Tribe provides a viable basis of nationality formation in India. Tribal people constitute nearly 8 percent of India’s population and, as far as spatial distribution is concerned, they form an overwhelming majority in some pockets. The greatest concentration of tribes is seen in Central and North-East India. It is generally assumed that language-based cultural nationalism is absent among Indian tribes. This is because most of the tribal languages are not so well developed (in terms of script, standardisation and literary tradition) as to cause nationality formation on linguistic basis. Not only a large number of tribes in India are too small to constitute self-sustaining units, but some of them are utterly multilingual, too. Probably, this is the reason why the SRC did not recommend the creation of any state on the basis of tribal language. It, in fact, rejected the demand for Jharkhand state on the ground that the region lacked common culture and language. The fact of the matter is that several tribes have been able to define their nationality in terms of their language as well as tribal identity. For example, the Santhalis in Central India, more often than not, define their nationality in terms of a distinct Santhali language in addition to their tribal identity. The Santhali language is spoken by more than 3 million people, and it also possesses its own script called ‘Ol chiki’ (Mohapatra 1986). Like the Santhalis, the Mizos, the Khasis and the Garos also define their nationalities in terms of their distinct language and tribal identity. Importantly, Khasi, Garo and Mizo languages are used as the medium of instruction in schools in their respective regions. However, by and large, the articulation of tribal nationalism in India is based on common tribal identity, common culture and common territorial bonds (Singh 1984). Jharkhandi nationalism, for example, has developed on the basis of a common tribal identity comprising a group of disparate tribes such as Santhali, Munda, Oraon, and Ho. Anjan Ghosh and N. Sengupta (1982) observe that a nascent lingua franca, common cultural traits and a common tribal identity serve as the basis of Jharkhandi nationalism. Although, several languages such as Santhali, Mundari, Ho and Kurukh are spoken in the Jharkhand region, Sadri is considered as the lingua franca by both tribes and non-tribes inhabiting the region (Keshari 1982). In the case of the diverse Naga tribes, nationalism is articulated not on the basis of a distinct language, but on the basis of a common

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Naga identity, a Naga ‘homeland’ and a spoken link language called Nagamese. In Arunachal Pradesh, tribal nationalism is expressed in terms of common territory, tribal identity and the link language (that is, either Hindi or Assamese). In the Chhattisgarh region, cultural nationalism developed in terms of tribal identity, economic backwardness, dialectal variation and common historical experience. In North-East India, cultural nationalism among the Khasi, Garo and Jaintia tribes emerged in protest against the language policy of Assam and the imminent fear of Assamese cultural domination. The All Party Hill Leader’s Conference, which was formed to safeguard the interest of the hill tribes, opposed the introduction of Assam State Language Bill of 1960 and demanded the formation of a separate province comprising Khasi, Garo and Jaintia tribes. Later, the state of Meghalaya comprising the Khasi, Garo and Jaintia tribes was formed in 1972. Demands for creating provinces based on tribal identity have been made since independence: provinces like Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya, Himachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh were formed between 1960 and 1986 to accommodate tribal regionalnational sentiments. In 2000, three more states, namely, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttaranchal were carved out by reorganising the states of Bihar, MP and UP. Interestingly, in the formation of these three states the official Hindi language served as the factor of linguistic homogeneity. Tribal nationalism in India, barring a few exceptions, tends to accept the idea of self-determination within the provisions of provincial autonomy. However, the Nagas, Mizos and some Manipuri tribes have time and again developed secessionist orientation in their nationalist struggle. For example, the Mizo National Front under the leadership of Laldenga clamoured for an independent state for the Mizo tribe. Later, the trajectory of Mizo nationalism changed from secessionism to autonomy, as Mizo leadership accepted the Indian Constitution and preferred to exist as a cultural nationality in India. Subsequently, the state of Mizoram was created in 1986. The Nagas, however, have not been able to reconcile with the Indian political identity and the Indian nation-state (Ao 2002). The Naga national consciousness still persists with the concept of an independent Naga nation-state. Some tribes such as the Gorkhas, Bodos, Garos, Karbis, Kukis, Rabhas and Reangs still persist with their quest for cultural-national identity and homeland. Since the 1980s, the Gorkha National Liberation Front has been struggling for a separate province for the Gorkha-Nepali

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nationality located in the northern hill districts, particularly in Darjeeling (West Bengal). Similarly, the militant Bodos and the Karbis in Assam are fighting with the mainstream Assamese nationality for carving out a provincial homeland for their respective tribes. The Garo (A’chik) separatism in Meghalaya and the Reang separatism in Mizoram are some other instances of tribal nationalism for preservation of cultural-national identity. The case of Assamese cultural nationalism needs special mention here. In Assam, nationalism emerged in the context of anti-Bengali and anti-foreigner struggle. The Assamese national consciousness was not directed at achieving any separate province; it was rather aimed at protecting the Assamese nationality from the imminent danger posed by the Bengali migrants in the initial stages and the illegal foreign infiltrators in the later period. In the initial stage, Assamese nationalism was more cultural in orientation; later, it turned more economic in orientation. After the formation of Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh, the boundaries of Assam shrunk to the Assamesedominated Brahmaputra valley and the Bengali-dominated Surma or Barak valley. Like the Oriyas, the Assamese too faced both cultural and material deprivation because of Bengali domination. Anti-Bengali agitation broke out in Assam because the Bengalis, particularly in the Barak valley, offered stiff resistance when Assamese language was declared as the official language in 1960 and as medium of instruction in 1972. The Assamese perceived the Bengali resistance as a threat to ‘Assamiya’ national identity and culture. In the 1980s, however, the Assamese nationalism largely centred on nativism, that is, economic deprivation of the native Assamese by the outsiders, particularly the illegal Bengali infiltrators (Das 1983). Interestingly, the Assamese nationalism turned secessionist with the rise of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). The ULFA plays the ‘sons of the soil’ (‘Assam for Assamese’) card and it has been pressing for the idea of a sovereign Assam state.

Religion and Nationality Formation Like language, religion too plays an important role in growth of nationalism. Some scholars, however, dismiss religion as a basis of nationality formation because there is no necessary linkage between religion and territory (Oommen 1986). Moreover, a particular religion may comprise

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people belonging to diverse linguistic affiliations; a particular speech community may include people professing different faiths; and people having both religious and linguistic unities may differ on grounds of geography, history, culture and political ideology. There is no denying the fact that secularism is the hallmark of India’s polity and society. Given the secular fabric, the central political leadership in India does not entertain regional nationalistic aspiration based on religion. Nevertheless, instances of cultural nationalism using religious elements are available in India. For example, the Sikh-Punjabi nationalism, which led to the formation of Punjab state in 1966, very selectively used religious symbols in defining the identity of Punjabi nationality. Pre-partition Punjab was a multi-lingual and multi-religious province. After partition, the Indian part of Punjab comprised two major linguistic groups: the Punjabis and the Hindi-speaking people. In terms of religion, the Punjabis are further divided into the dominant Sikhs and Hindus and the minority Christians and Muslims. The Sikh-Punjabis, who were largely concentrated in the north-west part of erstwhile Punjab province, differentiated themselves from the Hindus and on that basis demanded a separate Sikh state. The Akali Dal, which spearheaded the movement for a Sikh-Punjabi state, exclusively used three prominent symbols to define Sikh-Punjabi national identity: (i) historical symbols drawn from the glorious Sikh kingdom; (ii) religious symbols, that is, the ‘five Ks’ (Kesh, Kachha, Kangi, Karha and Kirpan); and (iii) linguistic symbols, that is, Gurumukhi-Punjabi language (Brass 1974). As the central government did not consider the demand purely on the religious basis, the Sikh leadership changed their stand and demanded a Punjabi Suba on the secular basis of Punjabi language (Nayyar 1969). In granting Punjabi Suba, however, linguisticcum-religious identity was acknowledged to some extent. The supporters of the Khalistan movement have not accepted this limited version of Sikh homeland; they strongly clamour for a sovereign Sikh state. Religious element was present in Tamil nationalism, too. The proDravidian Tamil nationalism emerged by contrasting itself with the Aryan (Brahmanical) brand of Hinduism and the Indo-Aryan Hindi language and culture. The Tamil leaders systematically used these religious, cultural and linguistic symbols to define Tamil national boundary as against the Aryan-dominated North India (Hardgrave 1965; Barnett 1976). The national movements of various North-East Indian tribes, such as the Nagas, Mizos, Khasis and Garos, were and continue to be

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laced with religious overtones. These tribes define their national identity in both tribal and Christian terms. The movement for independent Kashmir is yet another notable example of religion-based nationalism. Despite the fact that Jammu and Kashmir comprises the Muslim dominated Kashmir valley, the Hindu majority Jammu region and the Buddhist dominated Ladakh region, the Muslim separatist nationalists identify the whole state exclusively with the Muslims. In recent times, the proposal for trifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir has been raised by several quarters. According to this argument, the state should be reorganised to form three separate provinces: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh. If this scheme is implemented, the proposed new states will surely be based on the factors of language, religion and tribe. What is, however, significant is that religion-based cultural nationalisms in India share one thing in common, and that is the tendency to develop a secessionist goal.

Regional Disparities and Cultural Nationalism The recent demand for a separate Koshal state in Orissa brings into limelight another variety of cultural nationalism. In this case, despite the linguistic unity nationalism crystallises due to tensions and conflict resulting from regional developmental disparities. As previously mentioned, the state of Orissa came into being following the rise of Oriya nationalism. However, this state contains two distinct regional units, namely, coastal belt and western region, which experienced differential rate of socioeconomic development and political mobility. These two regions also differ in terms of geographical, historical and socio-cultural features. Basically, the western region, which previously formed a part of princely Orissa, experienced relatively low level of development and continues to lag behind the coastal districts in matters of education, employment and occupation, irrigation, agricultural development, transport and communication, and rate of urbanisation. In the political sphere also the western region lags behind the coastal belt. Given these wide-ranging disparities and political inequality, regional discontent and disaffection began to grow in the relatively backward western region of Orissa, notwithstanding the overarching Oriya identity. This regional tension, in recent times, not only weakened the integrative forces of Oriya nationalism, but also caused to dissipate the

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extent of Oriya feeling among a section of people in the western region. This section now sees regional separatism in clear nationalistic terms. It emphasises that the people of western Orissa belong to a separate Koshali nationality which is different from the mainstream Oriya nationality. The leading role in articulating this concept of Koshali nationality is played by the Khosal party and ‘Khoshal Sammilani’. These separatists try to use selective historical, linguistic and cultural symbols to define the Koshali national boundary. It is maintained that western Orissa constituted the great Koshal Kingdom in ancient and medieval times, and that the people of the region speak Koshali (Sambalpuri) language, which can be distinguished from the mainstream Oriya speech. Also, leading cultural organisations like ‘Sambalpuri Lekhak Sangh’ and ‘Koshal Bhasa Sahitya Parisad’ have made serious efforts to develop a literary tradition in the Koshali language. Besides, the Koshali culture, which reflects a synthesis of tribal and Aryan elements, is highlighted to differentiate the western region from the rest of Orissa. Going by the foregoing logic, the protagonists of ‘Koshali nationalism’ claim that the existence of a separate Koshali nationality implies the right to self-determination in cultural and political terms within the framework of the Indian Union. Hence, they urged the central government to create a new Koshal state on the basis of the distinct Koshali language and culture (Koshal Sammilani Memorandum 1993). The projection of regional articulation as a national movement under the banner of ‘Koshali nationalism’ in western Orissa seems to have come for two reasons: (i) practical advantages involved in defining collective identity in linguistic-cultural terms; and (ii) linguistic identity and homeland happen to be the chief bases of formation of provinces in India. The articulation of Koshali nationalism shows that, within a linguistically homogenous province, developmental disparities between regions may lead to crystallisation of nationalism in the less developed region. The continuous demand for the separate states of Telangana and Vidarbha resemble this variety of regional nationalism. The people of the deprived region in such a situation attempt to reconstruct their identity in more objective cultural-linguistic terms. Once that happens, a regional consciousness turns into a national consciousness in the cultural sense. In India, cultural nationalism of the mainstream Hindus also operates overtly or covertly. The ideology of ‘Hindutva’ and the concept of ‘Hindu Rastra’ are to some extent articulations of Hindu cultural nationalism. However, this brand of Hindu cultural nationalism

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differs substantially from the type of cultural nationalism seeking provincial statehood in India. The appraisal of the Indian situation, thus, reveals that language, culture, tribe and, some extent, religion have been institutionalised as crucial bases of cultural nationalism and for granting of statehood. Given this socio-political reality, the drive to maintain cultural boundary within a provincial unit anchored to homeland is but natural. It may be recalled that in 1956 the political map of India comprised only fourteen states and six union territories. However, by the end of 2000 the number of states goes up to twenty-eight. Thus, between 1956 and 2000 the number of states has doubled and in the process as many as fourteen states, apart from seven union territories, are created. Again, looking at the present-day mobilisations it seems that the restructuring of the provincial map of the Indian Union is far from over. The demands for the creation of such states as Bodoland, Gorkhaland, Garoland, Karbi Anglong, Rabhaland, Vindhyachal, Bundelkhand, Harit Pradesh, Vidarbha, and Telangana, and the recent demand for trifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir bear testimony to this fact. Of course, not all of these ‘state’ demands are based on the concept of regional cultural nationality; some of them are articulated on the basis of regional identity, regional backwardness, and the rationale for the creation of smaller states in the Indian union. Most of these demands continue to persist because of (a) the dissonance between politico-administrative unit and cultural nationality, (b) the urge to become a recognisable entity, (c) the regional socio-economic backwardness, and (d) the socioeconomic advantages of asserting identity and autonomy. Cultural nationalism may assume a variety of forms such as irredentist, autonomist, separatist, and secessionist. The irredentist type aims at unifying the vivisected territories of a nationality under one provincial roof. The autonomist and separatist types also desire to protect cultural nationality in a provincial framework. However, the secessionist type seeks to obtain a sovereign state and turns into political nationalism.

Concluding Observations This paper has argued that people in multi-national countries invariably seek to express their national identity at two levels: political/civil and regional-cultural. The former is meant for their state/country as a whole

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and the latter is reserved for their respective regional national identity. Given this different contextualisation of national identity, the sole interpretation of nationalism as a sovereign-state-seeking political movement or a form of loyalty to the nation-sate (as in the case of most parts of Europe) do not hold good in a multi-national situation such as in India. In this context, nationalism, in addition to its nation-state meaning, also implies a consciousness for preservation of regional national identity within a denoted provincial homeland. Three key variables are important in the understanding of nationalism: (i) the concept of national identity, (ii) the potentiality for self-rule, and (iii) the parallelism between culture and polity. Significantly, the concept of national identity, which embodies a collective identity, can be expressed either in sovereign political or in specific linguistic-cultural terms. The consolidation of several multi-national states substantiates this point. The potentiality for self-rule can also be realised in independent or autonomous terms. Similarly, the parallelism between culture and polity can be obtained in independent or autonomous terms. In other words, nationalism may be directed at achieving a culturecongruent sovereign state or culture-congruent provincial state. Thus, in a multi-national context, two varieties of nationalism can be distinguished: political nationalism and cultural nationalism. While political nationalism is invariably associated with sovereignty, cultural nationalism mostly seeks to survive within the framework of autonomy inside a common sovereign polity. It follows that nationalism can be understood without sovereignty. In India, nationalism acquired a sovereign-political connotation at the macro national level and a primordial-cultural form at the regionalnational level. Unlike Europe, in India, many distinct nationalities did not tend to acquire their own states, but preferred to retain their distinct cultural identity under a sovereign federal polity. It is this urge to retain cultural identity which gives rise to several cultural nationalisms in India. Importantly, cultural nationalism in India operates mostly within the cultural framework of national identity and political framework of autonomy anchored to homeland. In India, the subjection of people to a common sovereign democratic state has not destroyed their cultural-national boundaries altogether. This is because adherence to the broader Indian identity has never been welcomed by the Indian people at the cost of dismantling

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their cultural-national identities and their motivation for self-rule. Undoubtedly, modernisation had an indelible impact on the premodern ascriptive values and institutions in India, but the anticipated ‘displacement syndrome’ did not occur. The pace of modernisation has not even curtailed the ‘quest for identity’ calling for separate politico-administrative units. Furthermore, instead of being completely neutralised, the primordial-cultural ties are getting revitalised and legitimised on a wider scale under the influence of modernisation, secularism and democracy. For one thing, in modern times, people all over India are increasingly getting conscious of the instrumental advantages involved in making language, tribe, region and religion as viable bases of collective self-definition in cultural terms. The burgeoning influence of globalisation in all its ramifications—economic, political and cultural—has failed to undermine this consciousness of the people. In multi-national countries such as India democracy is not seen just as an institution of voting or a form of governance, it is more associated with the systems of power-sharing, decentralisation, and the right to self-determination. Here, democracy plays a crucial role in shaping the politics of identity and autonomy; it sustains rather than weakens regional cultural-national identity. Here, democracy, culture and power are intertwined as far as identity politics and dynamics of socio-political mobilisations for autonomy are concerned. By and large, in India, all forms of cultural nationalism emerge in the context of equality and identity. In some cases, equality is demanded on the basis of a pre-existing cultural nationality; in others, a search for cultural nationality is made for equality. In either case, cultural nationalism results from a sense of cultural deprivation and domination of one nationality over another. However, cultural nationalism in India basically uses the autonomy card and hence it does not pose any serious threat to her overarching civil-political nationhood. The civil-political Indian national identity can harmoniously co-exist with the multiple cultural nations and nationalisms within its fold.

Acknowledgements I thank the anonymous referee for her/his comments and suggestions.

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References Aloysius, G. 1997. Nationalism without a nation in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London: Verso. Ao, A.L. 2002. From Phizo to Muivah: The Naga national question in northeast India. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. Bailey, F.G. 1959. ‘The Oriya movement’, Economic weekly, 26 September: 1331–33. Barnett, Ross M. 1976. The politics of cultural nationalism in south India. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Brass, Paul. 1974. Language, religion and politics in north India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Das, Amiya. 1983. Assam’s agony: A socio-economic and political analysis. New Delhi: Lancer. Desai, A.R. 1966. Social background of Indian nationalism. Bombay: Popular Prakashan. Deshpande, Madhav N. 1983. ‘Nation and region: A socio-linguistic perspective on Maharashtra’, in Milton. Geertz, Clifford. 1971. ‘The integrative revolution: Primordial sentiments and civil politics’, in Clifford Geertz (ed.): Old societies and new states (47–63). New Delhi: Amerind. Gellner, Ernest. 1994. Encounters with nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ghosh, Anjan and N. Sengupta. 1982. ‘The nationality question in India’, in N. Sengupta (ed.): Fourth world dynamics: Jharkhand (240–54). Delhi: Authors Guild. Hardgrave, R.L. 1965. The Dravidian movement. Bombay: Oxford University Press. Israel (ed.): National unity: The South Asian experience (75–87). New Delhi: Promilla. Karna, M.N. 2000. ‘Language, region and national identity’, in S.L. Sharma and T.K. Oommen (eds.): Nation and national identity in South Asia (75–96). New Delhi: Orient Longman. Keshari, B.P. 1982. ‘Problems and prospects of Jharkhandi languages’, in N. Sengupta (ed.): Fourth world dynamics: Jharkhand (137–53). Delhi: Authors Guild. Koshal Sammilani. 1993. Memorandum submitted to the President of India for formation of Koshal state. Sambalpur. Mohanty, N. 1984. Oriya nationalism: Quest for united Orissa, New Delhi: Manohar. Mohapatra, S.K. 1986. Modernisation and ritual, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Nayyar, B.R.1969. ‘Sikh separatism’, in D.E. Smith (ed.): South Asian politics and religion (93–102). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Nigam, R.C. 1971. Language handbook on mother tongues in census (Census centenary monograph). New Delhi: Office of Register General, Government of India. Oommen, T.K. 1986. ‘Social movements and nation-state in India’, Journal of economic and social studies, 3 (3): 115–23. ———. 1997. Citizenship, nationality and ethnicity: Reconciling competing identities. Cambridge: Polity Press. Patnaik, P. 1968. Odiya sahitya (in Oriya). Cuttack: Vidyapuri. Patra, K.M. 1979. Orissa state legislature and freedom struggle: 1912–47. New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research. Rao, K.V.N. 1973. The emergence of Andhra Pradesh. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.

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Satyamurthy, T.V.S. 1983. Nationalism in contemporary world. London: Frances Pinks. Shills, Edward. 1957. ‘Primordial, personal, sacred and civil ties’, British journal of sociology, 3 (2): 130–45. Singh, K.S. 1984. Tribal movements in India. New Delhi: Manohar. Smith, A.D. 1973. ‘Nationalism’, Current sociology, 21 (3): 5–185. States Reorganisation Commission, Government of India. 1955. Report of the states reorganisation commission. New Delhi.

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13 Education, Social Structure and Culture Asoke Basu

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f late, besieged educators from industrial, developing, and lowincome nations are attempting to rescue their house of learning from ideological attacks from Left and Right. They have learned three important lessons. First, they have learned that ideas tend to have sustaining qualities of their own, because the institution of education has endured many changes, and has seldom been repudiated. Educators now admit that despite the turbulent rhetoric of the last twenty years, knowledge and scholarship still remain the vital part of a cultural system. Nevertheless, beyond this traditional task of generating values, education has a significant impact on social structure. Officials governing educational systems have been made aware by the masses that the manner whereby education is distributed and the consequences of that distribution-providing entry into culture have significant implications for social mobility. A second lesson, which is counterpoised to the first, is that a seeming consensus is emerging among public officials that the house of learning cannot altogether be left in the hands of its traditional dwellers, educators. Government officials view education as a tool for designing social policies. This threat to educators’ autonomy and their independent integrity, which is undercut by so-called reference to political and economic efficiencies, is having a chilling effect on educators. The crux of the problem is as follows. Over the years, the educators’ independent claim

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to the creation and distribution of knowledge has been gradually eroding due to their loss of power to the state. Traditionally, the intellectual has been the gatekeeper of culture. His sole proprietorship included the creation, transmission, and distribution of knowledge, which sustained (or contradicted) social structure. He questioned authority and Absolute Truth, which so often is hidden under an impermeable moral dogma. His Learned Judgment approbated the legitimacy of the society. The general effect of the increased public intervention in academic matters has been to rekindle the historical tension between the classical understanding of intellect and creativity (which emphasized the organic idea of perfection as moral subjectivism), and modernism as the utilitarian mode of perception. Much of the educators’ insecurity in that his loss of guardianship and the sole exercise of authority is causing him to become a cultural pessimist. Both Karl Marx and Max Weber dwelt with the material consequences of the traditional cultural interpretation of education. Marx, though denying the political involvement of educators, called for material interest as distinguished from idealist values. He posited that a key task of teachers was the eradication of the bourgeois evils of the capitalist society. Neo Marxists whose claim is to permanently change the economic bases of ownership and the means of production today view the educational system as part and parcel of the superstructure. They view knowledge and teaching at best as a tool to sharpen the historical contradiction of class structure. Max Weber in contrast questioned Marx’s materialist conceptualization of historical events. To comprehend fully the emergence of rational legal society, Weber declared that the institutional significance between the creation and the distribution of value-ideas must remain essential. The chief aspect of: modern education, Weber hoped, would bring about the “rational calculation” of knowledge; nonetheless, unlike Marx, he believed that such a process as the rational adaptation of learning should not take the place of “educational ideals.” He argued that “primitive” man knew a great deal more than we do now about conditions under which he lived, used his tools, and consumed food (Lipset and Basu 1975: 444ft). The final and practical lesson is that educational policies within a comparative context cannot be neatly placed in the theoretical mould of either Marx (technological superstructure) or Weber (status groups).

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Education experts now openly admit that in both advanced and advancing nations, industrialization, economic conditions, and regime structures notwithstanding, primary, secondary, and higher learning institutions create a deculturalized view of education—meaning that education is separated from the nation’s primary cultural goals. The graduates of such a system of education (and some of their teachers) are readily equipped to deal with the ideological doctrine of the day, but are generally ill at ease when responding to the historical questions of the decade or of the century. While it is true that employment conditions do influence students’ academic disciplines, one would hope that their keen economic consciousness of the marketplace would be matched by their cultural awareness. Educational research needs to explore the system by which rational awareness of culture, or the non-economic, is being translated into material, or economic, terms. In order to fully grasp the meaning of education, nations might seek an understanding of the social convergence (or lack of it) of non-economic with politico-economic patterns in social structure. Giddens has termed such a process “structuration”; it “focuses” upon the modes in which ‘economic’ relationships become translated into ‘non-economic’ social structures (Giddens 1973: 105). Structuration may be defined as the process by which economic class (market situation) becomes social standing. While job proficiency is an economic form of power, Giddens argues, economic conditions cannot alone explain the general expectations of a system of social authority. Explicitly his theoretical concern deals with the “advanced societies,” but his implicit reference to a cultural value system is quite generalizable to the other less-advanced economies. Educational values set within cultural systems distribute authority and in turn evaluate social functions. Each culture in sui generis fashion through educational programs allocates the economic pie. It is most important to note that morphogenesis of an education system—the translation of the cultural goals of education to its functional means—is distinctively determined by each country’s historical-national experiences. What is generalizable (as we shall note in the following section) are cross-national structural units which produce common social attributes. Conventional educational research has yet to raise the question: how can the cultural goal of knowledge advance the functional distribution of education?

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Rethinking the Theory of Social Structure Cast in the pioneering works of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakobson, structural theory reached its zenith by the middle of the twentieth century. In psychology, Jean Piaget, in anthropology Claude Levi-Strauss, in psychoanalysis Jacques Lacan, in Marxist studies Louis Althusser, in epistemology and the history of ideas Michel Foucault, and in literature Jacques Derrida, and Roland Barthes are especially illuminary. Structuralists make a fundamental distinction between appearance and reality. They uncover conceptual infrastructures which are deeply embedded within the movement of ideas and knowledge. Once deep structures, unconscious motivations, and underlying patterns are accounted for, the meaning of human action and social attributes may be understood. (Rossi 1982). In Sociology. Theodore Geiger, Max Weber, Karl Mannheim (during the German days), and Georg Simmel; more recently in America, Reinhard Bendix, Seymour Martin Lipset, Talcott Parsons (early), Robert Merton and Edward Shills; in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Akinsda Akiwowo, Andre Beteille, Joseph Ben-David, S. C. Dube, S. N. Eisenstadt (and the Jerusalem School), Fernando H. Cardoso, Edmundo Flores, and Gino Germani; and in Europe, Raymond Aron, T. B. Bottomore, S. Andreski, Stefan Nowak, and Stanislaw Ossowski, have all directed their attention to the study of social structure. In basic terms, they have observed that the particular actions of an institution cannot be understood by merely exploring its historical genesis, but by underscoring the characteristic cultural distinctions of reality which are manifested through the formal properties of social relationships, e.g., authority, market allocation, elite maintenance and linkage, modernization and social development, sacred and secular narration, inter-organizational hierarchy, etc. In this sense, history objectifies social action. Needless to say, this is not a way of looking at history as a cosmic subjective force which is all-encompassing and can only be comprehended as a single universal system. On the contrary, socio-structural analysis, drawing from the data of history, searches for patterns. (Berlin 195–1: 14). Ironically, though, given the wide international adoption of structural theory, there is a gap in comparative education studies. Sociology of education researchers have a difficult time conceptualizing how specific “social facts” could have separate cultural significance among nations.

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Sociologists still avoid the pragmatic admission that culture is the generational unit of what Durkheim had called the “social fact.” Sociologists from both developed and developing countries have of late become concerned with the “Pragmatic Concept”—a concern with the ‘positive’ functions of institutions—and, moreover, to certain of the core sentiments adhering to it (Gouldner 1970: 133) which are characteristically assumed in “Western” sociology. Peterson has observed. [I]f one tries to analyse not the well-established, more or less discrete societies of the modern West, but the social world of the past or the underdeveloped countries, then [social system analysis] is even less useful as a [theory]. In such a case, to define one’s unit of study as “the social system”, which is made up of mutually interacting “subsystems”, begs the most important questions. Was there a ‘France’ in AD 1000, or a ‘China’ in 1700; is there a ‘Nigerian society’ or an ‘Indonesian society’ today? If one assumes that the answer to such questions is unambiguously yes, then one is tempted to explain away social phenomena that transgress these units or that fit into them. (Peterson 1965: 133).

Educators from the developing countries are increasingly being pushed to their parochial limits as they notice that the concepts of social development which they use to describe universal values of modernization are regarded by the students and the community at large as “borrowed knowledge”, not primarily based on their own cultures. Such a recognition is taking different forms. For example, an Iranian sociologist states “the sociological approach of Western societies introduces an element of ‘distance’ which favors self-evaluation, just as the ethnology of primitive peoples has helped Western countries to understand themselves.” (Cited in Lazarsfeld 1970: 124). In India, a tradition of “Indological” sociology is beginning to be addressed by some sociologists. Ahmad has noticed that “the adherents of this trend of thought had been attempting to provide an understanding of Indian society on the basis of researches into the Indian Scriptures and legal historical documents. Within the framework advocated by them, the explanation of modern Indian social institutions is sought in the facts culled from the ancient texts—the older the text, the more authoritative the explanation offered in it—and uncritical Victorian anthropology is used to reconstruct Indian social history.” (Ahmad 1966: 224). In Bangladesh and Pakistan similar concerns have been addressed (Afssaruddin 1963: 14; Jilani 1980: 369–399).

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Of late, cross-cultural survey trends among social scientists and educators in general, and the recognition of individual cultural distinctions have focused on efforts to advance “cross-societal” and “cross-national” studies. Rokkan suggested that “the term cross-societal . . . was introduced to cover comparisons over a broad range of territorially and culturally distinct collectivites, [whereas] the term cross-national is used to describe comparisons across legally and politically distinct populations or systems of interaction, typically developing or highly developed sovereign nation-states.” (Rokkan 1970: 645). Structural theory, as elaborated earlier, is best suited to linking the social bases of cultural values to its functional distribution. Culture, White observed, is a “self-contained” and “self-determined” system that is brought about by daily social processes through generations. In this sense, institutions such as a religion, family, economy, and polity have a dual function of mobilizing knowledge and mediating between the culture and the individual. The stronger the bond between the culture and the individual, the more consensual is the individual’s perception of social structure (White 1949: 84–87). On a daily basis, social structure could be seen as a mediating organization which influences the individual group as well as the on-going cultural framework so that it may effectively grasp reality and render it intelligible to us. White outlined the following formal properties of culture: (a) events are related to each other spatially through formal relationships; (b) “the tissue of time”—history generates the temporal aspect of social experiences. It coexists with culture. (c) spatial relationships between events are either constant or variable. Events or material objects whose mutual special relationships are regarded as constant constitute a structure. (d) when the spatial relationships uniting a number of events or material objects in time are viewed as a variable, we speak of function; (e) both time and space are simultaneously (as a product) significant in our understanding of cultural systems. (White 1949: 10–15).

Comparative sociology of education would gain much from being aware of a cultural context of education. At its core, it acknowledges that an educational system is both the product of cultural goals set forth by a society as well as the distribution of knowledge delivered by the politico-economic structure of the nation. It acknowledges also a

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spatial-cultural uniqueness (diachronic), empirically expressed through social structure at a concrete point in time (synchronic). This view provides us with a synthesis between macro- and micro-levels of education expectations and functional outcomes. At a general level, it recognizes the central non-economic attributes of knowledge (macro-level), which is operationally manifested through its day-to-day mode of translation of cultural goals of education (micro-level) to its functional means to an end. This operational mode is distinctively determined by each country’s national experiences. Once we are able to identify formal endogenous properties in a nation, coterminous conceptual units (e.g., class, labor, party, etc.) can be compared in an exogenous fashion across both time and space. For example, to assess the common structural properties of the role of education in the colonial experience at two different points in time, historical studies of the pre-Jacksonian origin and operation of educational systems in the U.S. can be comparatively analyzed with post-independence learning institutions in India. The social role of pedagogy in the maturing of each nation can now be underscored, present socio-economic differences notwithstanding. In addition, the allocation of socio-economic resources in these polities, specifically income distribution, labor market differentiation, and divisions of labor, particularly among women and ethnic and regional minorities, can be contrasted as consequences of the educational enterprise in each nation. Operationally, demographic patterns of primary, secondary, and college enrollment and its allocation and distribution of earnings as marginal efficiency of educational investment at various time periods may be scrutinized to determine agreement or differences with development processes. (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Stanislav 1964). The current concern in both the economically advanced and developing nations is how an educational system might be designed which would be fair in the sense that it would provide an equal opportunity to all, while at the same time appeal to the scholarship of the individual, which is the intrinsic character of intellectuality. This can also be undertaken in the case studies of America and India. In fashioning education policies which would effectively translate the cultural goal of knowledge to the socio-economic mobility aspirations of the respective citizens, the following structural distinctions might emerge: the American emphasis on individualism as opposed to India’s collective approach; Americans’ belief in work morally sanctioned by religious

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approbation, in contrast to the sacred denial of individual prosperity, also traditionally sanctioned by Eastern religious codes of fate, piety and material sin; America’s emphasis on achievement, rationalism, universal, and open (non-hierarchical) inter-personal relationships, compared to India’s ascriptive, traditional, particularistic, and hierarchical emphasis on social relationships. The phenomenon of education consumption for each nation should be understood not simply in terms of a market outcome—a rigid system of economic rules for the universal regulation of our social behaviour—but, on the contrary, in the context of historical and cultural values with contemporary social groups in America and India. In conclusion, now we are able to relate the culture goals of a system of education to its rational constraints on institutional development. The vigor of such an approach to the study of education is twofold: first, by viewing education as a whole bounded by a distinct culture, the historical cause of agreement, or tension embedded within the particular cultural system is underscored; and, second, this approach concretely manifests the normative outcome of learning—the consequences for social change.

Education and Social Change The cultural theory of educational development can be arrived at by two levels: synchronic and diachronic. At the synchronic level, educational values are determined structurally by a set of normative expectations governing non-economic as well as economic conditions. At the diachronic level, shifts in the grammar of normative outcomes of education can be explained. The state of education research in the modes by which the cultural goals of education are functionalized is both sparse and conceptually unclear, in large measure because education researchers have generally ignored the key institutional attribute—social change. Contrary to the customary approach among most education specialists who generally view knowledge and intellect as the prime mover of social order, I suggest that we turn the table around and instead examine the independent historical-cultural causes of social change affecting the system of education. The emphasis is on the distinctive institutional influences on education among various cultures. Specifically, we need to determine the particular cultural conditions

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influencing change within the social structures. Characteristically, we need to examine in what precise manner such social transformations contribute to the design and manifestation of each nation’s educational goals. This approach far from being deterministic, instead abrogates a monocausal explanation which in the past has too often directed our attention to limited educational ends. Most education theorists have favored a dualistic view—normative and categorical—on the genesis and the modus operandi of education systems. Under broad terms, education is said to have an “intrinsic value” which might produce “Budhi (intellect),” “pleasure (the Cyrenics),” “Happiness (Aristotle).” “Knowledge (Plato)?” “Virtue (the Stoics)” “a good will (Kant).” “the general welfare (the Utilitarians),” and so on. These axiological theories view the normative outcomes of an education as absolute ends—that is, what should or ought to be the ultimate values governing a society. The categorical approach, on the other hand, confines itself to the so-called canons of sociological positivism of objectivity and ethical neutrality. From this point of view, educational enterprise is nothing more than meeting the labor demands of a society. The means-to-an-end approach warns educators from the temptations of “recommending on matters of social policy” and being “interested not in what is right or wrong or good or evil, but only what is true or false.” Curiously, this view proclaiming to resolve the function of education on the basis of strictly technical considerations, also assumes an already settled end—this consumption view of education is understood strictly in terms of monetary outcome. Unfortunately, in the complex dynamics of motivation and social control, an education system and its increasing interdependence with other institutions, cannot be neatly set aside in two separate piles. The reason is threefold. First, in an intricate system of social organization, not all elements consistently produce similar expected patterns of behaviour; for that matter, even consistent ideals in one social period may produce conflict in the following generation. In this regard, the Structuralists and the NeoMarxists generally agree that the manner in which the cultural origin of education ideals are socially reproduced holds the greatest promise of explaining social change. Second, education thus set free from absolute actions can properly be understood to be a dynamic element of culture. Each culture in its distinctive manner, as Mary Douglas points out, “cuts its slices of moral reality in a different way and metes approval and disapproval to counterpoised virtues and

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vices according to local values.” (Douglas 1979: 26). This recognition of an education system suggests it to be an integral part of the social mechanism independently expressed by each nation. Third and last, from a cross-national perspective, the dualism between the ethic of intrinsic moral ends and the ethic of market consciousness disregards the universal goal of education for human biological survival (as in nourishment and shelter) and introducing youth to the common cultural denominators of all societies. The years of schooling completed by an individual or by a family are directly related to the economic development of a country. Characteristically, comparative educational research is urgently needed to locate common structural markers among nations which affect social stability (or the lack of it). There is no issue in our global context more important than the way in which the character of youth is shaped by educational institutions, and policies and there is no issue that has been more neglected by the social scientists. Unemployment and underemployment in industrial and developing nations alike are creating a vast reservoir of disenchanted and alienated youth today. By focusing on the degree of agreement (or lack of it) between the cultural objective of education and the mechanisms of social control independently articulated by the political and economic expectations of each nation, perhaps we will be able to develop a common structural framework of social attributes of living and learning respectively. (Basu forthcoming). Social change can be located within the culturally sanctioned social objectives of an educational system and in the social function of the manner in which the goals are understood. Durkheim’s study of the French education system is the clearest demonstration of the cultural objectification of education. His historical analysis was not only concerned with factors influencing education reforms, it also examined what social effects these changes had on the distribution of knowledge. He disclosed the cultural elements of social control affecting the French educational order. (Durkheim 1977). Within a historical framework, Ringer examined the evolution of German literacy. He observed that German higher education in the nineteenth century maintained a distinctive character of “status group,” generally through self-recruitment. He cited Helmuth Plessner’s edited volume to confirm that “non-economic” factors influenced the production of knowledge. Between 1860 and 1869, approximately 65 percent of academicians between habilitiert to lecturer, originated from the “non-economic” social stratum. (Ringer 1967: 123–138; Ringer 1969).

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In Europe, particularly in Germany between 1600 and 1800, the rate of thoroughness of success in the masses assimilating modern economic values and the “advantages of culture,” might have convinced the social elites of the virtues of also modernizing education. Raeff suggests that the character of state organization—Polizeistaat and cameralism— were influenced by corporate bodies, especially that of higher education. He notes that in understanding the dynamic polity of eighteenthcentury Germany as contrasted to the autocratic Russia of Peter I and later Catherine II, the roles of educated public officials were important. In Germany, higher education trained men and women who skillfully initiated and enacted social reform. In the absence of a bureaucracy and skilled public administrators, Peter’s autocratic reforms went unopposed. (Raeff 1983). Hans Eberhard Mueller has observed recently that educational reforms initiated by the elites had a quite different effect in the European nations. In Prussia, for example, Civil Service examinations were urged by a rapidly developing middle-class intelligentsia somewhat anxious to expand its influence into state bureaucracies and the rational-legal authority, while such reforms in England were targeted mainly for the well-educated traditional elite “bent on continuing monopoly of the Civil Service.” (Mueller 1983). In Japan by the end of the seventeenth century), Dore (1965) notes that education, and scholarship in general, had declined sharply. Only a handful of priests, Confucian scholars, doctors, calligraphers, and painters could read and write. Dore observes that the basic educational reform followed military lines. The House of Tokugawa had, by the 1800’s instituted an educational system by combining the classical arts (Bun) with those of the military (Bu). The introduction of such a system of learning which had been molded out of a hierarchical value system would have long-term social consequences for the Japanese society. Current discussion of Japanese economic proficiency and market rationalization must not fail to notice the importance of cultural conformity socially reproduced by an educational system, introduced by the Tokugawa military family. There are indeed precious few societies in the world today whose paths toward national development as influenced by the education system, have taken similar routes. Educational performances reflect different national experiences. To comprehend the acuteness of the conflict between a unique cultural system controlled by external activities and domestic values, we

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turn our attention to the developing nations. The rise and fall of various colonial countries manifested a fundamental contradiction advanced by the European nations: the incongruity of the practice of constitutional liberty at home and authoritarian rule abroad. In the African context, Foster (1965) has assessed structural consequences of Western-style education in Ghana. He concluded that an “assimilation” depended not only on the “nature, duration, and intensity” of Afro-European contact, but also “upon the characteristics of indigenous social structures.” According to Foster, the increasing socioeconomic differentiations, especially in the urban sectors initiated by the British system of education, had three unintended social consequences for the traditional Ghanian society: the emergence of an economic class, mass unemployment, and nationalist movements. In the other black African nations formerly under colonial rule, similar reviews of educational reforms are currently under way. In Nigeria, both Ukeje (1957) and Okeke, (1965) have separately argued for an educational policy designed within the traditional cultural framework of the country and which would foster democratic conditions of equality among the masses. Alleged socio-economic effects of an international division of labor is stimulating the most dramatic debate concerning the Third World nations’ designs in education systems. Against the backdrop of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a number of educators are calling for a re-examination of basic tenets of “comparative” education. (Shukla 1983: 246) Economists remain somewhat reluctant to recognize that the protection of the world economy is both a creditable business decision and also inexorably linked to domestic non-economic sectors, particularly politics and education. Market-oriented industrial economies, within both the Eastern and the Western blocs, have found themselves, since the 1960s, politically over-committed to full employment, to job security, to social welfare, and to defense expenditures. In other words, regime structures notwithstanding, these economically advanced nations have tried to deliver all things to all peoples. Also, in the low-income countries, a privileged class socially controls the destiny of the masses. Most of these regimes are undemocratic and a few families continue to prosper. Developing nations which are unable to cope with poverty, inflation, and a chronic unemployment are borrowing money from the World Bank to finance domestic consumption, rather than commodity investment which is much needed for

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capital development. The recent economic slump in these nations can be directly attributed to the flagging social institutions. (Naik 1965). The social merit of equality is in the distribution of income within a nation; this, in turn, poses as a formidable indicator of the country’s global share of the market. Unfortunately, relative comparisons of income range between Northern and Southern nations tend to hide the salient institutional differences in the social structure of opportunities between the industrial and developing societies; for example, the relative percentage of the share of the income of the top sixty percent of Bangladesh and United States citizens are almost the same, but socioeconomic opportunities available to the respective citizens are worlds apart. Social meaning of education and the institutional consequences of income are quite different. (Dubashi 1983: 46)

Conclusion Since my college days in post-independence Bengal I have been interested in examining the cultural convergence (or lack of it) of the domain of private values with public policies as they are expressed by the social structure. In such a convergence, the rights and privileges of individual citizens are understood. Quintessentially, public policy is the social production of cultural values which are held in common regard by private citizens. Its goal is twofold: to promote the liberal essentials of the individual as well as to provide the necessary public mechanisms for citizens to participate both widely and effectively in the socio-economic infrastructure. The smaller the gap between the private and the public, the more secure is the social system. Education is the central link between the private awareness of the cultural system and the public consciousness of the marketplace. Educational policy in this context cannot be solely determined either by the educator—the historical inhabitant of the house of learning—or by public officials. The two parties must work together. Just as surely, education programs cannot be designed merely on the basis of purely technical considerations which assume already settled ends; likewise, educators’ opposition to status quo and iconoclasm becomes a sacred activity. Their skepticism may be radical and revolutionary, but is more often liberal.

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Experts in the sociology of education can and should fashion programmatic agenda in cooperation with officials which combine noneconomic as well as economic approaches to traditional scholarship and social equity. *Presidential address delivered to the Research Committee of the Sociology of Education affiliated with the International Sociological Association. This conference was held at UNESCO, Paris from 14–17 August, 1984. Financial assistance by the School of Arts, Letters, and Social Sciences and the Research Foundation both located at the California State University of Hayward, is appreciated Wendy Claus verified and prepared the bibliography. Special thanks to Elizabeth Hendrickson for her assistance.

References Afsaruddin, M. (ed.) 1963 Sociology and Social Research in Pakistan, Dacca, The Pakistan Sociological Association. Ahmad, I. 1966 “Note on Sociology in India”, The American Sociologist, Vol. 1, No. 5. Basu, Asoke (ed.) Education for Learning and Living; Rights of the Third World, a report submitted to the Division of Human Rights and Peace, UNESCO, forthcoming. Berlin, I. 1951 Historical Inevitability, London, Oxford University Press. Dore, R. P. 1965 Education in Tokugawa Japan, Berkeley, University of California Press. Douglas, Mary & B. Isherwood 1979 The World of Goods, New York, Basic Books. Dubashi, Jay 1983 “Must the Poor Get Poorer”. World Press Review, July. Durkheim, Emile 1977 Evolution of Educational Thought; Lectures on the Formation and Development of Secondary Education in France, trans, by Peter Collins, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Foster, Philip 1965 Education and Social Change in Ghana, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. Giddens, Anthony 1973 The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies, New York, Barnes and Noble. Goulder, Alvin W. 1970 The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, New York, Avon. Jilani, M. S. 1980 Review of Sociology, Vol. 6. Lazarsfeld, Paul 1970 “Sociology”, Alain Trends of Research in the Social and Human Sciences, UNESCO, Paris, Mouton. Lipset, S. M, & A. Basu 1975 “Intellectual Types and Political Roles”, The Idea of Social Structure—Papers in Honor of Robert K. Merton, New York, Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich. Muller, Hans-Eberherd 1983 Bureaucracy, Education and Monopoly, Berkeley, University of California Press.

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Naik, J. P. 1965 Educational Planning in India, Bombay, Allied Publishers. Okeke, Uuaroh P. 1965 “Education for Use”, Okechukwu Ikefan (ed.), Education in Nigeria, New York, Praeger. Peterson, W. 1965 “Some Animadversions on the Americanization of World Sociology”, Mens en Maats-cappij, Vol. 40, No. 6. Przeworski, A. & Henry Tenne 1970 The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, New York, Wiley-Interscience. Raeff, M. 1983 The Well-Ordered Police State-Social and Institutional Change Through Law in the Germanics and Russia 1600–1800, New Haven, Yale University Press. Ringer, Fritz 1967 “Cultural Transmission in German Higher Education in the Nineteenth Century”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 2. ——— 1969 The Decline of the German Mandarins; The German Academic Community, 1890–1933 Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, Rokkan, Stein 1970 “Cross-Cultural, Cross-Societal, and Cross-National Research”, Main Trends of Research in the Social and Human Sciences,, Part 1, UNESCO, Paris, Mouton. Rossi, Ino (ed.) 1982 Structural Sociology, New York, Columbia University Press. Shukla, Sureshchandra 1983 Comparative Education: An Indian Perspective”, Comparative Education Review (U.S.A.), Vol. 27, No. 2. Stanislav, Andreski 1964 The Uses of Comparative Sociology, Berkeley, University of California Press. Ukeje, Nigerian O. 1957 Nigerian Needs and Nigerian Education, New York, Columbia University Press. White, Leslie A. 1949 The Science of Culture, New York, Grove Press.

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14 Towards a Cultural Policy in India: A Socio-Cultural Perspective Victor S. D’Souza

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here are innumerable considerations in the formulation of a cultural policy for India. But the most basic of them all is the question: what are the goals of a cultural policy? The goals themselves can be many and even contradictory. For the present purpose, I discuss the policy considerations which stem from the the basic objectives laid down in the preamble to the Indian Constitution. These objectives include: justice, liberty and equality for all citizens and the promotion of fraternity among them by ensuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation. I shall endeavour to show that the socio-cultural situation in India greatly inhibits the achievement of these constitutional objectives, suggesting thereby that the cultural policy should be aimed at neutralizing the cultural impediments to the attainment of cherished national goals. In order to understand the cultural impediments to nation-building and to work out a strategy for their removal, it is necessary to recognize the political significance of the relationship between the concepts of culture and society. The political ramifications of the relationship between culture and society have been amply clarified in various studies of the multi-cultural societies of Africa. M. G. Smith (Kuper and Smith 1971) has formulated a few theoretical propositions based on such studies. Accordingly a society may be defined as a self-sufficient, self-perpetuating

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and internally autonomous system of social relationships which characterize a population occupying a given territory. The characteristics of territorial base and sovereignty, which are applicable to a society, are also the prominent attributes of the concept of the state. Therefore, for all practical purposes a society may be regarded as coterminous with the state. However, the concept of a society is much broader than that of the state, the latter being an organ of the former. For present purposes culture may be defined as the standardized and transmitted patterns of thought and action which are common to a given population. It is important for us to bear in mind some of the significant features of culture. Culture is not merely a complex of symbols, norms, values and ideational systems, but also refers to the group to which the complex is linked. Culture gives a collective identity to the individuals linked with it, while group identity is transmitted intergenerationally. What is usually overlooked is the fact that the collective identity often outlasts the culture which gave rise to it. Therefore, the collective identity generated by culture is better conveyed by the term ethnicity (Glazer and Moynihan 1978). It is in terms of their ethnicity that groupings based on religious, linguistic, racial, tribal and caste distinctions have to be treated as units in cultural policy. Ethnic identity too is inter-generationally transmitted. For example, one cannot become an insider in a linguistic ethnic group merely by learning the language, nor does one cease to be a member even if one were to give up speaking the language. Language as a means of communication and language as a mark of identification are different matters. Therefore, as far as cultural policy is concerned, the focus should be more on ethnicity than on culture per se and it is important to keep in view the non-voluntary nature of membership of the cultural or ethnic group. Both society and culture have group aspects. But the group aspects of society and culture are derived from different criteria, the former deriving its group character from the territorial contiguity of its members and the latter from the allegiance of members to a common cultural pattern and their collective identity. Therefore, society and culture are not necessarily coterminous; there can be several cultural groups living in the same society, and the same cultural group can be distributed in different societies. It is mainly in the traditional, tribal setting that we find the correspondence between society and culture. Since groups influence the behaviour of members, in a multicultural society, both society and cultural groups influence the behaviour

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and self-identities of individuals through their respective institutional structures. But society has the over-riding authority and power over all the members because of its exclusive control over governmental institutions. Whereas the different cultural groups may have their separate sets of rules of conduct (customs and mores) for their respective members, all are subject to the laws of the state. Thus the behaviour of individuals can be divided into two broad categories; that coming under the societal or public sphere and that falling within cultural groups or in the private domain. Societies vary in terms of the relative degree of influence of the societal and cultural sphere. In premodern societies, in general, the cultural sphere is more influential over individuals than the societal sphere. In these societies the interests of the individual are linked with those of the cultural group, and individual identity is merged with the collectivecultural identity. Consequently it is groups and not individuals, who are incorporated into the society and polity as units. Some groups tend to acquire coercive power over others and dominate the weaker ones so that the state represents the more powerful groups and not the entire society. In modern societies on the other hand the societal sphere gains greater influence over the individual. In these societies the major interests of individuals, especially the economic interests, are linked more with the society at large; cultural ties become looser and the person becomes more and more individuated and autonomous. Accordingly the role of institutional structures of the cultural groups becomes more restricted and that of the societal institutions expands. Correspondingly, the individual’s societal identity tends to grow stronger at the expense of cultural identity. Therefore in modern societies the national state tends to command the primary loyalty of individuals whose loyalties to their cultural groups tend to assume secondary importance. In this way the cultural groups tend to lose their coercive control over their members and the dominant groups come under the power of the state which they controlled in the past. The cultural groups lose their unit character for purposes of incorporation into the society and polity and instead of groups, individuals are incorporated as units in the society and polity. This mode of incorporation is formalized in the democratic states which recognize not groups but individual citizens as units. The cultural policy in a national state has necessarily to come to grips with the idea of nationalism. Nationalism is a humanitarian concept developed during the Enlightenment period of 18th century Europe. Under the assumption of the unity of mankind and freedom

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and equality of man, it posits the sovereignty of a country in its people. There are, however, two different variants in its application which came in the wake of the American and the French Revolutions. According to one conception, termed political nationalism, all the people occupying a territorial unit constitute a nation. It is this idea which is enshrined first in the Constitution of the United States and subsequently in the Constitutions of some other countries including India. According to a second conception of nationalism which may be termed cultural or ethnic nationalism, it is only a people belonging to a given culture which constitutes a nationality, and so a nation state should include a culturally homogeneous people. This idea found acceptance in Europe at a time when European empires held together different culturally homogeneous regions by political force, and with the break-up of the empires the different cultural regions set up their separate national states—a well known phenomenon, referred to as the balkanization of Europe. The idea of cultural nationalism is predicated on the primacy of culture over society. It is therefore fraught with problematic consequences in multi-cultural societies. In such societies, if different cultural groups occupy mutually exclusive regions, the given situation may lead to demands for secession on the part of regional groups. If on the other hand the groups intermingle without any one having its exclusive regional spread, by taking undue advantage of the democratic principle of majority rule, the majority cultural group may claim sovereignty over the entire country to the exclusion of the minority groups. This becomes a negation of the idea of humanitarian nationalism. The idea of political nationalism is based on the growing importance of the society in a multi-cultural setting. It agrees with the modern individualistic society in which the members are becoming more and more individuated and autonomous, and are freeing themselves from the traditional hold of their cultural groups; their interests are more linked with the society at large than with their ethnic groups. Political nationalism is more in accord with humanitarian nationalism based on the principles of human rights and individual citizenship. Although the process of individuation is not sufficiently advanced for the smooth functioning of political nationalism in many societies, nevertheless it must be conceded that the concept of political nationalism is forwardlooking whereas that of cultural nationalism is backward-looking. It may be appropriate to point out in this context that most of the national

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states of Europe, which in the past strove for exclusivism on cultural basis, are now seeking a greater degree of interaction with each other within the larger European Union. The fact that political nationalism is based on the primacy of the society over culture should not be taken to imply that political nationalism inhibits cultural freedom and expression of individuals; in fact it is more supportive of these values. As already pointed out, in the context of nationalism we are not so much concerned with culture per se which is a product of spontaneous and creative activity and a matter of all human interaction and expression. What we are concerned with are collective identities or ethnic groups resulting from cultural diversity, and especially with the excessive control exercised by ethnic groups over their members. Here again it should be borne in mind that ethnic groups play an important role in the development of self-identity and in fulfilling some of the cherished goals of the individuals; and political nationalism supports whatever is important for the individual. What political nationalism opposes are the tendencies cultivated by cultural groups, which go counter to the values of freedom, justice and fellowfeeling in society, and which restrict the autonomy of the individual. Therefore, just as society has to adapt itself to the democratic polity, cultural groups too have to undergo a transformation not by sacrificing their legitimate cultural interests but by shedding their coercive control over their members. Ideally, a cultural group should wield influence but not exercise control over its members, which is possible if it were to confine itself to its legitimate sphere and were to fulfil its functions efficiently. But often, cultural groups are manipulated by vested interests for illegitimate purposes, which is the cause of much tension and conflict in a multi-cultural society. I may briefly refer to some of the structural features of cultural groups which are antithetical to humanitarian nationalism and which are usually found in tradition-bound multi-cultural societies. Ethnic and cultural groups in premodern societies provided total identities to individuals and therefore these groups serve as units of incorporation in the society and polity. In these societies, first, the cultural identities give rise to social exclusivism; second, economic and political power is channelled through such groups, rendering them unequal; and third, the groups are arranged in a dominant-subordinate relationship. In the nomenclature of Smith, the mere existence of cultural diversity with different collective identities in a society is referred to as cultural pluralsim; when the

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different cultural groups are socially exclusive, the resulting situation is termed social pluralism; and when the socially exclusive and economically unequal groups are differentially incorporated in dominant-subordinate relationships, the given situation is called structural pluralism. Structural pluralism based on differential incorporation of ethnic groups is further sustained by separate residential arrangements and institutional structures for different ethnic groups. Interaction between members of different groups takes place mainly on economic considerations and on the dimension of power. Communities are organized along ethnic lines and considerations of compassion and concern embrace members of one’s own group only. Thus the structurally plural society is based on ethnic solidarity and is lacking in human solidarity. Most of the multi-cultural societies in the past followed the structurally plural pattern which created the impression that one’s natural sympathies are only restricted to one’s own ethnic group. A culturally plural society is compatible with democracy and political nationalism, if the cultural groups do not come in the way of individual freedom and autonomy. The members of a group should be free to mix with members of other groups. Most of the societal institutions should be common to all the cultural groups, each group maintaining only a minimal institutional structure consistent with its limited cultural goals. In such a setting the natural sympathies of people transcend their ethnic groups. The group wields its influence over its members without exercising coercive control. In a socially plural society, the cultural groups put some restraint over their members by discouraging free interaction across groups. Political nationalism, however can accommodate social pluralism by a system of equivalent incorporation of groups so long as no group attempts to dominate others. With ideal democratic functioning of the society, a socially exclusive society is likely to resolve itself into the situation of cultural pluralism. But a structurally plural society is not at all compatible with democracy and political nationalism. If such a society adopts a democratic political system, it has to make concerted efforts to transform structural pluralism into more acceptable forms of social and cultural pluralism. In the meantime it would have to cope with the demands of cultural nationalism for domination or separation. The transformation of a structurally plural society into one that is compatible with political nationalism would imply, in the ultimate analysis, the promotion of inclusive human solidarity among people

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who are divided by exclusive ethnic solidarity. We can do this on the basis of our understanding of the spatial-cultural structures of social solidarity. Social solidarity is developed through social interaction, especially in community settings. There are two major factors, among others, which facilitate social interaction-cultural similarity and spatial propinquity. In traditional societies because of the overriding pull of the cultural factor, people belonging to different cultures are spatially segregated into separate cultural communities, giving rise to exclusive ethnic solidarity. On the other hand, modern forces inevitably draw together people of different cultures in spatial proximity. Such a situation runs the risk of disorienting people from their traditional community bearings, resulting in the atomization of individuals. But it also presents opportunities for people of different cultures to interact with one another and forge the bonds of human solidarity. The building of multi-cultural-territorial communities is also contingent upon the reduction of inequalities among groups. Thus the locality or territorially based communities provide the structure for inclusive human solidarity. Therefore, in operational terms, the process of transformation of a structurally plural society into one of cultural pluralism, would consist of building territorially based communities out of ethnic communities. It is in such territorial communities that people belonging to different ethnic identities can participate in the same institutional structures of the society and broaden their sympathies. The local community, in this manner, becomes an epitome of the larger society. The democratic society thrives on an effective functioning of local communities at the grassroots. With its continental dimensions and having a conglomeration of ethnic and cultural groups based on religious, linguistic, tribal and caste distinctions, Indian society is celebrated for its cultural pluralism. Indian society is not merely culturally plural, it is also socially and structurally plural. However, especially during the freedom struggle, for pragmatic reasons it is the unity-in-diversity aspect of pluralism which has been emphasized thereby sweeping under the carpet the feature of structural pluralism. On the other hand, in the past, no other multicultural society in the world has so successfully managed a structurally plural society as India. The major principle of structuralism in India is the caste (varna-jati) system which pervades all the larger linguistic and religious groupings. The basic element of the caste system is the division of people into

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hereditary groups which are socially exclusive. Different groups occupy different positions in the division of labour in society and the members of a caste follow the same occupation and different castes are assigned different occupations. Therefore, the different groups are socioeconomically unequal and form a hierarchy of dominant-subordinate relationships. The hierarchical organization, however, is lacking in the tribal society where each tribe occupies a separate territory and in which the economy is least developed. With the development of the economy the tribal groups too tend to be integrated in the caste system. The caste system is rendered more complex by the fact that the castes belonging to the same religion or language are relatively more intimately bound to each other than to those belonging to other religions and languages, although caste hierarchy is preserved within each religious and linguistic category. Since the caste composition of the different religious or linguistic categories living together in a region is not the same, such religious and linguistic categories which are socially exclusive, also tend to be economically and politically unequal, thereby forming a plural structure superimposed on the caste structure. Although the formal and legal provisions which had supported the ascribed inequalities in the Indian society have been dismantled by the democratic polity, the parochial socio-cultural structure of social solidarity tends to perpetuate them, resulting in the feeling of superiority and discrimination among different cultural and ethnic groupings. Such a state of affairs has given rise to demands of cultural nationalism of different kinds. The partition of Indian subcontinent at the time of independence is based on cultural nationalism. Even though India has adopted a secular and democratic Constitution with individual citizenship, the demands of cultural nationalism have not abated. First, there was the demand by different linguistic groupings for regional autonomy, which appeared quite legitimate as each linguistic group by and large occupied a contiguous geographical area, as during the British rule different linguistic groupings in contiguous areas were lumped together in single administrative units. But the real reason for the demand for linguistic states is deeper than the language issue. It is a fact that because of the plural structure of the Indian society, in each political unit combining different linguistic regions, usually one of the groupings dominated the political economy of the unit. Invariably the demand for separation has come from linguistic groupings which occupied subordinate positions. The validity of this deeper reason for demanding regional

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states on linguistic grounds is further underlined by the fact that even within the same linguistic state, such as Uttar Pradesh or Maharashtra, demands for regional states have surfaced from sub-regions sharing the same language, but having separate ethnic identities and a lesser share in the state’s resources. On the other hand, ethnic groups, territorially segregated along the periphery of the country easily succumb to the temptation of secession. Whereas territorial segregation of cultural groups leads to nativist and secessionist demands, territorial intermingling of cultural groups in a social climate of structuralism gives rise to the hegemonic claim on the part of the majority group, justifying it on the principle of majority rule in a democracy; the fact that in a democratic polity, the units are individuals and not groups is conveniently ignored. Efforts are also made to justify the priority claim of the majority group over the entire territory on other grounds also. Although regional autonomy based on cultural nationalism can be justified in a democracy on the principle of equivalent incorporation of groups, which reduces the chance of domination of one group over the others, the hegemonic rule of a cultural group is totally undemocratic. So also the tendencies growing in regional states for cultural hegemony are equally harmful. It is like a slave who, freed by his master, is using his freedom to acquire himself a slave. Apart from political demands of cultural nationalism, there have been demands on the part of the disadvantaged sections of the population for reservation for purposes of allocation of scarce resources and opportunities, which also flow from structural pluralism, and restrict the basic constitutional freedom of individuals for equal opportunity. Whereas the principle of reservation has been conceded on the ground of social discrimination in the past, there has been an endless debate on the question of the criterion of selection, whether it should be individual-based or group-related. However, the state has settled for the group-related criterion despite the fact that is contrary to the principle of individual citizenship, keeping in view the prevailing structural pluralism of the society. But the idea is not to perpetuate structural pluralism but to destroy it by the selective process of protective discrimination. The belief is that in course of time structural inequalities would be replaced by class inequalities which flow from differences in individual attributes. This brief analysis of the Indian society has shown that the fulfilment of the national objectives of securing to all the citizens justice, liberty

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and equality, and promoting among them fraternity by assuring the dignity of the individual and unity and integrity of the nation, is being frustrated, not because of the cultural pluralism for which this country is noted, but because of the fact that cultural pluralism for ages has assumed the form of structural pluralism. Therefore in order to secure the fundamental national objectives, what is necessary is not the homogenization of Indian culture or the restriction of cultural expression, but the dismantling of conditions responsible for the transformation of cultural pluralism into structural pluralism. In broader terms, the demolition of structural pluralism would involve, among other things, measures to curb the tendency for channelling of inequalities through cultural and ethnic groups and to reduce the existing inequalities between groups. The Indian state has already taken several measures in this direction, notably regional autonomy to territorially based cultural groups which were dominated by their regional neighbours, group-based reservations and a socialistic pattern of economy. The modern economic and political changes which contribute to the process of individuation of persons, also militate against structural pluralism. Whereas such measures and socio-economic forces have the potential for bringing about the desired change, they have also been used by vested interests to strengthen structural pluralism. The reason why such changes have actually turned out to be counterproductive is the fact that group inequality is ultimately based on social exclusivism between groups. Therefore unless steps are taken simultaneously to increase social inclusivism among groups, the fruits of development will get distributed according to the existing plural structure. The cultural policy, therefore, should also be concerned with the promotion of social inclusivism whereby peoples’ sympathies should transcend their ethnic groups and embrace the society as a whole. This can be done on the basis of our understanding about the intimate relationship between personality, culture, economy, society and state. In a structurally plural society, the individual has a dependent, authoritarian and socially exclusive personality. On the other hand the smooth functioning of modern democratic society is contingent on the person becoming autonomous, democratic and sociable. In the developing modern economy and society of India, the interests of individuals are increasingly delinked from their cultural groups and are linked with the society at large, which results in people becoming individuated and autonomous.

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Whereas autonomy is a necessary characteristic of a democratic person, it is not a sufficient one. In the absence of other supporting factors, an autonomous individual may degenerate into an egoistic and indifferent person. In a democratic society autonomous individuals who are weaned away from deeper attachment to their ethnic groups have to broaden their sympathies by involving themselves in more inclusive social networks of the society which would strengthen their societal identity. Among such networks the cross-cultural locality based communities would have to fill the void in the life of individuals, created by the weakening of ethnic communities. Thus the process of transforming a socially exclusive society into an inclusive one would call for a whole range of cultural policies directed at the grassroots.

Note A written version of the talk Towards Cultural Policy in India for the symposium held on the occasion of the XXI All India Sociological Conference, December 19–21, 1994, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

References Glazer, Nathan and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds). 1975. Ethnicity: Theory and Experience. Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press. Kuper, Leo and M.G. Smith (eds). 1971. Pluralism in Africa. Berkeley and London: University of California Press.

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15 Understanding Popular Culture: The Satyashodhak and Ganesh Mela in Maharashtra Sharmila Rege

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his paper emerges from an engagement in two projects; one a series of annual workshops on ‘Conceptualising Culture’ organised by the Vikas Adhyayan Kendra (VAK), Mumbai and the other a concern for developing politically engaged courses in Sociology of Culture and Gender. Courses in ‘Cultural Studies’ or Popular Culture’ are mushrooming, both in the humanities and the social sciences. Most of these courses are influenced by frames in American Cultural Studies and the focus has been on popular culture presented by the mass media. This paper is not a plea for some kind of an indigenisation of these frameworks. Rather, it is an effort to draw upon some of the politically engaged interdisciplinary practices developed in Cultural Studies to do region-based social histories of popular institutions and practices. The effort is to guard against an equation of the popular to mass-mediated culture; to integrate into our pedagogical practices the social histories of complex caste and region-based popular cultural forms. Such a study of the popular, facilitates an interrogation of the structures of caste, class and gender that are constitutive of and constituted by the popular. ‘Come to the city of contrasts, gracious Wadas (old mansions) . . . and neon lit shopping malls, to eleven days of village jatras, bullock-cart races, Lavani

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Mahatsovas (A festive gathering of the folk dancers of Maharashtra), ghazals, Motor Cross, Mushairas, food festivals, rangoli and flower shows . . . . . . a feast . . . to delight everyone The Pune Festival is now the most popular public happening in Pune City’. (Brochure, Pune Festival, 1998). ‘Dressed in lavish costumes, sometimes in the garb of Shivaji’s soldiers . . . and with other paraphernalia of Hinduism practised in dancing, fencing and drill, the mela presented a colourful and ceremonious unit of the people’s culture’ (Times of India, 2nd Sept. 1895). Ganesh Mela is ‘Play(ing) a prominent role in forming and spreading a popular Maharashtrian culture of religious and caste revolt . . .’ (quoted in Omvedt 1976: 213)1

Each of the three events described in the texts quoted above are at three different moments in history, seen as constituting the ‘popular culture of the people’. Yet, each one of these cultural practices differs so completely from the other, in its explicitly stated intent and content. In fact, it may be argued that each has to some extent incorporated, distorted, resisted and negotiated with the other. This only gives a hint of the problems associated with the conceptualisation of ‘popular culture’. This paper seeks to address at least some of these problems through a study of the Satyashodhak and Ganesh Melas of the late 19th century and the early 20th century.

Interrogating the ‘Popular’ in Popular Culture2 A mapping of the trajectories of the two terms ‘Popular Culture’ and ‘Mass Culture’ would outline how the study of the ‘popular’ had been discovered. The study of the ‘popular’ was discovered in Germany around the same time as industrial capitalism was being forged and related to the ideas of nationhood. The term was used to designate the uneducated and undifferentiated sections of European Society and ideological debates centred round the possibly corrupting influence of the popular forms of entertainment (Lewis 1978). The term ‘Mass Culture’ came up in the 1950s to describe the culture associated with the ‘lonely crowd’. Eventually, as the importance of the mass media increased not only as a major form of entertainment but also as ‘Ideological State Apparatus’ (Blundell et al. 1993), the term became synonymous with culture transmitted by the mass media. The study of the ‘popular’ came to be equated with descriptions of the folkways and mores. The tensions between the cultures of the ‘popular’ and the ‘elite’, the exchanges, albeit unequal, that redefine the content of the categories even as the

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categories themselves are kept (Bourdieu 1984) came to be overlooked. The institutional reproduction of the ‘distinctions’ between the ‘elite’ and the ‘popular’ have rarely been the concern of either those studying the folkways or those celebrating the ‘popular’ in the 1990s. There has been, since the last decade and a half, an unprecedented academic interest in the study of Popular Culture. The term ‘popular’ is in the present context of Cultural Studies synonymous with the ‘mass mediated’. Interestingly, at a time when ‘consumer capitalism’ is being forged, the ‘popular’ has been again rediscovered. The study of ‘popular’ culture has become central to the emergent discipline of Cultural Studies in the American Academy. The new theoretical insights in the social construction of the world of art and the equivalence of texts and privileging the audience over the creator were in part responsible for this heightened interest in the ‘popular’. However, the notion of the ‘popular’ therein had become distanced from Williams’ conception of the ‘popular’. The ‘popular’ in a capitalist society as conceived by Williams, never exists outside the relations of domination and imperatives of commodification and yet in these relations the masses are never only passive (Mulhern 1995). This dialectical conception of the ‘popular’ has taken a backseat and an underlining of the elements of participation and subversion by the audiences have marked the 1980s. This is in contrast to the earlier tradition of Kulturkritik which had sought to defend culture from the ills of modernity, industrialisation and commercialisation. By the 1990s, subversion had been replaced by ‘subversive pleasure’ in the study of popular culture, so much so that studies seemed to suggest that the ‘popular’ as a site of contestation was outside the capitalist logic. Even the cultures of resistance of the marginalised come to be most often conceived in their mass mediated forms. For instance, for many of those doing Cultural Studies, the alternative ways in which Black women conceive the issues of mothering, abortion or health are not the nodal issues of resistance of the communities but Reggae and Rap music are. This is, of course, not to undermine the significance of these forms of music but to caution against a self-fulfilling prophecy of ‘hypereality’. An earlier economic reductionism had seen culture only as a political instrument, a newly emergent cultural reductionism has now dissolved the possibility of politics. As Mulhern (1995) has commented, such a position of cultural reductionism paradoxically arrives at the same position as Kulturkritik. Both the positions arriving via different routes, tend to underline a complete submission to consumer capitalism. The

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political aspects, outside of cultural practice and political society beyond the particularities of cultural differences, come to be overlooked. Hence, as the study of the ‘popular’ became a viable discipline, it lost its significance as a left political enterprise. (Mcchesney 1996). The study of the ‘popular’ became what Mcguigan (1991) calls ‘cultural populism’; the experiences of common people came to be viewed as analytically and politically more important than culture with a capital C. The earlier distinction between ‘mass’ and ‘popular’ culture was eliminated and what followed was an uncritical endorsement of popular pleasure. The postmodern turn in the study of the ‘popular’ and Cultural Studies had arrived as the critical tension between ‘popular’ and ‘mass’ culture was lost in a celebration of popular cultural consumption and the spheres of production and consumption came to be conceived as if autonomous. The arrival of Cultural Studies in India and the place of the ‘popular’ therein needs some deliberation. As Ghosh (1996) has underlined, the arrival of Cultural Studies, largely outside the institutional folds, holds the potential of engaging in a critique of ‘naturalised ideologies, Universalist theories and of theorising fragmentary resistance’ (Ghosh 1996 p. 12). Cultural Studies in a post-colonial context, drawing upon post-structuralist methodologies, generated a critical examination of representations and their linkages with structures of power. However, such critiques have diverted attention away from the economic and political structures and have focused on the culture of modernity (Joseph 1998). Colonial discourse analysis is so central to doing Cultural Studies in India that it is possible to delineate the major trends in terms of their analyses of modernity. At least, three such trends can be outlined; the rejection of modernity (Nandy 1983; Chaterjee 1994), the interrogation of modernity (Niranjana et al. 1993) and the consumption of modernity (Appadurai 1997; Breckenbridge 1996)3. ‘The rejection of modernity’ school underlines the alien and dangerous nature of western modernity and the ‘popular’ is thus seen in terms of the pre-colonial, multiple, internal and authentic tradition and community. The pre-modern thus becomes the only possible means of resistance (Joseph 1998) and the ‘popular’ is assumed to be a homogeneous mass always resisting. ‘The interrogation of modernity’ school theorises culture as an integral part of a network of social and political relations and thus makes a significant contribution to the theorisation of the ‘popular’. This school states intent as that of going beyond the ‘the dominant social science frame in India

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which saw caste and community as embarrassing obstacles for the new nation to overcome . . . and in which culture was viewed as national culture and national identity’ (Brochure of the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society, 1998). Yet much of the work of this Centre has viewed the ‘popular’ in terms of the mass-mediated forms, no doubt contributing to the conceptualisations in the study of cinema and art. Nevertheless, the relative silence on caste-based cultural forms or forms that contested caste is surprising, since several of these forms had contested the claims of national culture and national identity. ‘The consumption of modernity’ school, explicitly rejects the adjective ‘popular’, since it is seen as having undergone a complicated set of shifts, expansions and critiques. The term ‘popular’ is replaced with the notion of ‘public culture’. The notion of public is delineated from its history of civil society in Europe and is seen as constituted by cricket, tourism, food and cinema, the contestations between the state and the middle classes. Consumption is thus viewed as a modality of social life, separating the spheres of consumption and production. Those who cannot enter this world of consumption do not obviously figure in this analysis. The present paper seeks to conceptualise the popular as those forms and practices which have roots in the social and material conditions of the dalits, bahujans and the working classes. A documentation, both historical and contemporary, of such regional and caste-based cultural practices suggests that there has been a marginalisation of these practices by bourgeois forms of art and entertainment (Srinivasan 1985; Banerjee 1989; Rege 1995). Yet following Hall (1981), it may be argued that popular practices are neither just traditions of resistance nor just forms on which the bourgeois forms are superimposed. They are at once emancipatory and imprisoning, containing and resisting and relatively more or less affected and unaffected (in different spheres) by capital. The ‘popular’ is appropriated by modernity and appropriates modernity, albeit unequally. To understand the popular cultural forms in history only in terms of ‘folk’ and as contrasting with formalism and the contemporary popular, which is understood already and always as only ‘mass-mediated’ is to commit both a historical and political distortion. The approach of ‘alternative modernities put forth by Bhargava4 has important clues for conceptualising the ‘popular’. He underlines the double rupture break from the pre-modern as well as from the western modernities, such that alternative modernities have no analogue either

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in the west or in the pre-modern. The word ‘alternative’ is no way suggestive of emancipatory and in fact Bhargava underlines the fact that like all modernities, alternative modernities are both emancipatory and imprisoning. Any social formation is seen as having at least three layerslayers of unaffected practice, western modernity and layer of alternative modernities. Such a conceptualisation has several clues for mapping popular culture; understood as cultural practices of the dalits, bahujans and the working classes. There is within any given ‘popular cultural practice’ a layer of relatively unaffected practice (a layer of ‘folk’), a layer that emerges in response to modernity and capital (a layer of appropriated folk) and a layer of re-invented alternative practices which are both emancipatory and imprisoning. The ‘popular’ is appropriated by modernity as also it appropriates modernity, thereby leading to reinvention of the ‘popular’ which is both emancipatory and imprisoning. This brings into focus the processes involved in the production of ‘popular’, the ways in which forms come to be produced as ‘popular’ at different points of time for different sections of people; this allows for the mapping of internal hierarchies within the popular cultural practices. Hence, though ‘popular’ as a category, persists, the focus is on the ways in which the everyday lives, labour and struggles of different castes, classes, communities and gender alter the content of this category. Hence, the ‘popular’, becomes a ground on which cultural and political struggles come to be worked out. With such a conceptualisation of the ‘popular’, we can return to the ‘popular events’ with which the paper began, the Jalsa, the Ganesha Mela and the Pune Festival. Each of these events marked as ‘popular’ at different periods by different groups needs to be interrogated. What are the significant moments in the discovery and re-invention of the Jalsas and the Ganesha Melas? How do the Satyashodhak Jalsas emerge as alternate popular forms distinct from the caste-based Tamashas. How does the Ganesha Mela in its emergence draw upon the popularity of the Satyashodhak Jalsas and how does its location in the public Ganesha festival (a re-invention of the Brahminical practice during Peshwai) create and reproduce class, caste and gender distinctions? The political use of the Ganesha Melas for Hindu nationalism (Cashman 1990) and that of the Satyashodhak Jalsa for the non-Brahmin movement in Maharashtra (Omvedt 1976) have been well documented. Our interest here is to focus rather on these popular forms as grounds on which the category of caste is mapped, re-mapped and contested.

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Moreover, we also seek to outline how these contestations considerably re-invent the popular forms. To the extent that we view gender and caste as inextricably linked, the paper also seeks to outline how gender is recast on the grounds of these popular forms and to a limited extent underline the ways in which gender recasts the popular forms. Thus, this paper seeks to present the Satyashodhak Jalsas and the Ganesha Melas as popular forms which in appropriating modernity presented contesting claims to the public sphere and their articulation in a national, cultural and political arena. It is possible to see, therefore, through these popular practices the varieties of alternative modernities. The paper focuses only on Pune city and historically limits itself to the ‘moment of discoveries and rediscoveries of these popular forms’. The intermediate period appears in this paper only as a background.

Claiming Equality in the Public: The Jalsa as Popular Culture The significance of the emergence of the Satyashodhak Samaj in 1873 and the invoking of the public festival of Ganesha in the tradition of the Peshwas needs to be seen against the backdrop of the structures of Brahminism that had emerged in the 18th century Maharashtra and the ways in which the colonial state built upon these under the Peshwa rule. Not only had the Brahmins consolidated their economic status but with the rise of Pandit Kavis in the Peshwa court, a new learned religious cultural ethos had emerged in sharp distinction with the more popular devotional tradition of Bhakti. As Ganesha became the patron god of the Peshwas, the region around Pune had seen a proliferation of the Ganapati culture. The erasure of the asura (non-Brahminical) origins and association of Ganapati is near complete (Chattopadhyaya 1959: Thapan 1998). The cult of Ganesha becomes one of the ways in which Brahminical traditions are consolidated and the functioning of the caste system tightened. Caste contestations under Peshwai (Wagle 1980) were expressed largely within the structure of the Brahminical order. (Chakravarti 1998) The continuation of a broad Varna-Varga (caste-class) congruence under the colonial rule formed the basis of Phule’s cogent critique of the caste system. A reinterpretation of the popular beliefs, symbols and practices that had been appropriated by Brahminical hegemony was central

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to this critique and in fact became a basis for identity for all lower castes. Employing popular literary forms such as the Powada (ballad), Phule put forth an explicitly stated non-Brahminical history of Maharashtra. The non-Aryan origins of middle and lower caste peasantry, their pre-Aryan prosperity and equality and their religious deception by the bhatshahi (Brahmin-Aryan rule) were underlined. Parallels are drawn between mystical king Bali and Shivaji and the social category of Kshatriya reinterpreted as khetriya i.e. all those living together on land before the Brahmin invasion. The Dashavatar of Vishnu is reinterpreted to reveal the story of conquest and deception by the bhatshahi and the Hindu religious calendar is reorganised around this struggle. The unity and educational and economic mobilisation of the Kunbi (the peasant), the artisans (Sali, Teli) and ati-sudras (Mahars, Mangs) castes is sought on this very material cultural base and to this end the Satyashodhak Samaj was founded in 1873. The message of the Samaj was conveyed to the masses through folk forms such as Powada (ballad), kirtan (devotional music) and abhangs (verses). The Satyashodhak Jalsa/Tamasha was an instructional theatre of the Samaj and came into prominence only in the 1890s. The period of 1873–90 has been noted as one in which the membership and reach of the Satyashodhak Samaj spread in and around Pune. The period of 1890–1910 is noted as of lull for the Samaj. Brahminical historiography has explained this in terms of loss of urban base of the Samaj with the death of Phule in 1890 and its revival becoming possible only with Shahu Maharaj and the Vedokata controversy (the controversy over Shahu Maharaj, the ruler of Kolhapur, seeking the practice of the Vedokata rites for non-Brahmins). It may be argued that this period of 1890–1910 is no doubt the period in which the urban base of Satyashodhak Samaj diminished but it was also a period in which it spread to Vidarbha and Kolhapur regions. This period thus saw the consolidation of the base for the all Maharashtra conferences of the Satyashodhak Samaj that came to be organised from 1911. The Satyashodhak Tamashas or Jalsa had reached the peak of popularity during this period and were central to the consolidation of the base of the Samaj. An interesting observation about this period may be noted in the report of a Satyashodhak meeting “. . . . . . . . Because of plague, cholera, locust attack on crops and famine, for five to ten years, the old Satyashodhak leaders had to go around in order to survive. Meanwhile the traitors began their campaign and started the Ganesha Mela . . . . . . . . and filled ignorant masses

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with artificial patriotism and a scheme to reinstate Peshwai (quoted in Omvedt 1976). There is thus reason to believe that the space and form of the Jalsas is appropriated by the Ganesha Melas. The content of the Satyashodhak Tamashas or Jalsas was drawn from the ballads, songs, abhangs and poems of the Satyashodhak leaders, especially Phule and was presented in a redefined form of the Tamasha of the time. The Tamasha (folk theatre) of the period began with gan (a devotional offering to Ganesha) this was retained in the Jalsa but Ganesha was invoked as Ganapati, the leader of the people, and the prayer thus was an invocation of the people as a source of rule. (Omvedt 1976). The gavlan (a comical act central to which was an effeminate male character and which was based on a dialogue between Krishna and the milkmaids) was replaced by a dialogue between a non-Brahmin hero Satyajirao and the Brahmin women of the village (enacted by males). The lavani/ mujra (erotic performance by the female performers) of the Tamasha was dropped and songs in praise of science and education and those protesting against dowry, enforced widowhood and oppression of peasantry were added in its place. The vag (the spontaneous theatre in the Tamasha) remained with themes now invariably centring on the tyranny of the shetji-bhatji (moneylenders and Brahmin). The Jalsas would often conclude with an address by the leaders of the Samaj. In redefining the form and the content, there is a significant gendering of the roles: the emancipatory and heroic non-Brahminism is represented by a male hero while the decadent oppressive Brahminism by women. Thus, not only are cross caste patriarchies and Brahminical patriarchies made invisible but so also the revolutionary potential of non-Brahmin women. By the 1910s, there were at least 29 Satyashodhak Jalsas in western Maharashtra. The organisers and performers came from lower and middle castes (Marathas, Sonar, Nhavi, Mahar and Mangs) and there seems to have been a rich textual give and take between the different Jalsa troupes. In Pune, at least upto 1920, the major base of the Jalsas was drawn from the Mali (gardener), Shimpi (tailor), Khatik (meatslaughterer) and Dhangar (shepherd) castes. Several mass meetings of these members had been called. The struggles towards establishing mass literacy as a basis of new civic life, social and spatial mobility as a new principle, and commonality of purpose as a base of public life (Aloysius 1998) were making an impact. The Jalsas with their explicit critique of Brahminism had emerged as a significant mode of claiming equality in the public sphere.

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It is within such a context of the 1890s that the organisation of the public Ganesha festival in 1893 and deployment of the mela (cultural troupes for conscientization) must be located. The success of the Jalsas in mobilising masses had been apparent. In a period that the Samaj and Jalsas were at a low ebb in Pune, Tilak and his followers sought to organise a mass base for Hindu nationalism through the re-invention of the public festival of Ganesha. In explicitly stating the aims of organising such a public festival; Tilak referred to its significance not only in contesting the muslims, British reformers and the ‘westernised reformers’ but in a long passage in his editorial of Kesari of the 18th September 1894, he commented thus: ‘It is important that the Vaishyas, the Sali (weaver), the Mali (gardener), the Rangari (painter), Sutar (carpenter), Kumbhar (potter), Sonar (goldsmith), Vani (trader) castes on whom the Maratha society rests have participated in the festival. Having worked the entire day, these people often while away time chitchatting, drinking and are found in gutters and Tamasha, thus neglecting their families. If at least on these days—they spend their leisure in worshipping Ganesh, a lot could be achieved. Brahmins have, no doubt contributed to the subscriptions but the grandeur we must remember could be added to this public festival because of our Maratha brethern’. The anti-Muslim intent in the organisation of the festival has often overshadowed the ‘caste factor’—as if the two could be completely separated. It must be underlined that several letters and debates in Kesari had expressed concern at the increasing participation of lower and artisan castes in the Muharram Peer and taboot gatherings and this had been seen as a danger to the grandeur of Hinduism. Thus, a pan-Hindu identity is sought to be forged; the importance of the Maratha-Brahmin unity for economic prosperity comes to be underlined and caste oppression is displaced as ‘mutual hatred and jealousies that can be overcome for the sake of pride in one’s religion’ (Tilak, 1894). The reinvention of Brahminism needs to be underlined here. The public installations of Ganesha idols had been a practice with the Peshwas and their sardars (Courtwright 1985). This practice was now reorganised through apparently more secular mandals (committees) which were formed mainly around geographical locality, occupational/ caste associations and talims (local gymnasiums and akhadas). The space for residence in Pune city was clearly marked out into caste-based quarters. Thus membership of these mandals came to be based on individual’s caste. From the very first year of the public festival, melas were

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introduced as a ‘mode of conscientizing the masses’ during the 11 days of the festival. The melas were composed of 20 to 100 boys (mostly students) who dressed generally in the garb of Shivaji’s lieutenants and sang, danced and performed disciplined drill. That the mela as a form drew upon the Jalsa, and yet in doing so retained its distinction as a more organised and disciplined form (higher/upper caste form) is apparent. The need of the mela ‘form’ is explicitly stated in caste terms as ‘the bahujans prefer such forms over lectures and kiritans’ (Kesari 1901). Almost every mandal had its own mela and since mandals themselves were caste-based, a clear-cut distinction arose between the Brahmin melas and the melas of the lower castes. The Sanmitra Samaj and the Bharat Mitra Samaj, both Brahmin mandals attained popularity and by claiming awards were underlined as ‘superior in discipline and drilling’ than the non-Brahmin melas (Kesari 1901). The Brahmin melas were viewed as overtly political and nationalist as against the ‘religious’ melas of the non-Brahmins. In the absence of adequate documentation of the non-Brahmin melas definite claims about whether ‘religious’ meant issues of caste oppression etc. cannot be made but can definitely be hypothesised. The increasing Hindu nationalist fervor of the Brahmin melas, however, is obvious from the Bombay Police abstracts of the period. So much so that in 1910, the Police Commissioner’s report refers to the melas as anti-government and in the same year censorship came to be imposed on all verses and scripts for the mela to be performed (Cashman 1990). This was severely opposed by the Tilak group. The censorship, however, had been diluted by the 1920s. In the Brahmin melas, like the Sanmitra Samaj mela, themes of Hindu unity, Shivaji as the protector of the cow, the Brahmin and the Hindus and Sant Ramdas as his Brahmin advisor, Home Rule and Swadeshi were common. A sharp critique of the moderate social reformers, of education for women and of the missionaries was launched through these verses and the importance of shuddhi and Hinduism underlined through popular verses such as Hamara Ram pyara hai. “Awake O Hindu, your religion has drowned . . . . . . . . . . take to the walk of shuddhi, Oh non-brahmans and marathas, this is a special request to you too, Curse the brahmin if you wish

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But atleast reconvert one immoral one back to Hinduism and your life’s mission would complete”

A verse in a dialogical form poses the potential convert as saying: I am going to become a Christian for I have nothing to eat or wear, I am my own master, Leave me alone

The Hindu replies if you convert you will get a woman as dark and distorted as an owl, twisted in seven places then you be king and she the queen” Don’t blame us then!

Education for women was sharply criticised in verses such as “There is an ethical and religious crisis, women too now follow men, she too prefers to learn numbers, she can no longer draw the rangoli, but serves it as saut that too on the kheer, and the rotis are burnt from below, but never mind! She now speaks English’.

The marching bands that performed practised drill would sing more militant verses like “Come out of your homes, O courageous ones of the Maharatta country, Where are the weapons that once came out against the muslims? Why do you not bring them out now against the gora? Have you lost your masculinity? Rise, be a true man pick up Your weapons And attack the enemy” (Karandikar 1953)

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These verses were generally set to tunes borrowed from the bourgeois Marathi theatre which had by then considerably displaced the Tamasha. (Rege 1995). To the extent that the ear is a product of history and reproduced by education, the adoption of these tunes underlined and reproduced the distinctions of classical Brahmin melas as against popular Jalsas. The compositions in the mela came to be legitimised in terms of taste, which becomes a marker of caste and class. In the 1930s, the songs in the mela were often set to the tunes of popular Marathi and Hindi film songs and later to the tunes of romantic Marathi songs, reproducing legitimacy through, and of, the middle class forms. The lectures organised as a part of the mela were broadly categorised as religious (Ram Bhakti or Rashtra Bhakti; which one first?), social (the virtues of women); scientific (Manu or Marx), industrial (Swadeshi, cow protection), political (Rashtra Bhakti). In the 1920s, the colonial state appointed mela samitis (committees) to impose restrictions on the melas. Representation of women in these committees was granted but the same was denied to castes and Muslims. This was not a resultant of the communal conflicts or of the inclusion of girls in the melas (as training grounds for the theatre and cinema) but because of the growing conflict between the Brahmin and non-Brahmin melas.

The Emergence of the Chhatrapati Mela Since 1911, the Satyashodhak conferences had gathered momentum and the urban base was once again being consolidated. NonBrahmin politics of the period was no doubt ridden with Maratha/ non-Maratha conflict and this had led to relatively greater social conservatism than the earlier radicalism of the Satyashodhak Samaj. By 1920s, Jedhe and Javalkar had assumed leadership and mass mobilisation was once again undertaken in the Satyashodhak frame (Omvedt 1976). The non-Brahmin tarun mandals (youth groups) had posed a challenge to the Brahmin leadership on the Patel Bill (1918). This Bill brought by Vithalbhai Patel in the Delhi Central Assembly sought to legalise inter-caste marriages. The Kesari newspaper oppposed the Bill and argued that while anuloma marriages could be allowed, pratiloma marriages should be strictly forbidden . This led to heightened activity among the non-Brahmin youth groups who began to disrupt meetings in the bastion of Brahminism. In 1920, when the Pune municipal

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government put forth the issue of free primary education, the conservatives argued for education for boys only. The young non-Brahmin activists drove Tilak off the stage when he suggested that for the lack of funds education be made free for boys only. This brought to centre the tensions between the Brahmin and non-Brahmin melas and the controversy about the entry of ‘untouchable melas’ in public pandals of the Brahmins. These were the immediate grounds on which a specifically non-Brahmin form of mela, the Chhatrapati Mela emerged at the Jedhe mansion in Pune in 1922. This Chhatrapati Mela was a combination of the Satyashodhak Jalsa and the Ganesha Mela and was performed by uneducated troupes. These melas reached the peak of popularity by 1924 and overshadowed the popularity of the Brahmin Ganesha Melas in Pune city. One of the most famous compositions in these melas was Naktanchya Bazar (the market of those with the distorted noses) which critiqued the Brahmins for spending Rs 15,000 on installing a statue of Tilak. This mela potrayed the Brahmins as usurpers of social and political power in the colonial society rather than what they posed to be, leaders of nationalism. The other popular composition was Shivaji amucha raja (Shivaji our King) which reappropriated Shivaji from the Hindu nationalists and mapped history as a struggle between Ramdas/ Shivaji, Vishnu/Bali/Tilak/Shahu Maharaj; between the Brahmin and the bahujans. There was considerable influence of pamphlets such as Deshache Dushman (enemies of the nation) published during this period and which posed Tilak as an enemy of the nation. This had led to large scale rioting and street-fights. The Brahmin melas proposed that rigorous state censorship be imposed and the Kesari now argued that the ‘melas were to be religious not political and communal’. It was argued that the Chhatrapati Melas were unsafe for Brahmin women and that obscene references were being made to the Brahmin widows and their children. The Chhatrapati Mela organisers countered this with argument that the Brahmin melas themselves had always ridiculed educated Brahmin women. The strong polemic of Chhatrapati Mela was influential in the Hindu Mahasabha’s decision to make the public festival only a religious one. Brahmin claims to political and moral leadership were thus contested on the terrain of the Chhatrapati Mela. By the late 1920s, the ‘political recruitment of ganapati’ had begun to diminish. The Chhatrapati Mela as a form had thus been discovered in a direct confrontation between the non-Brahmins and Ganesha Melas of the Brahmins.

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Popular Culture and Contesting Claims to the Public Sphere In western India, in the 19th century, voluntary associations had become major modes of defining social commitment and forging of social leadership for the emergent bourgeoise. The emergence of this bourgeois public sphere, the commercialisation of leisure and new culture of organised recreation have been well underlined (Banerjee 1989). In Pune, the Sarvajanik Sabha (1871) and the Deccan Sabha had been the major modes of associational life while the Satyashodhak Samaj as a base for the unity of shudras and anti-shudras had emerged in 1873. As Masselos (1974) has noted, by the late 1880s old style public associations in Maharashtra were losing their vitality and coming to an end. It may be argued that ‘popular culture’, during this period, became the major terrain on which contesting claims to the public and to cultural and political nationalism were made and that a discourse on caste was central to these claims. The Ganesh Melas in fact became popular ways of naturalising the divide of social versus political for it was grounded on the assumption that difference and conflict between castes were only cultural/social and not political. In the Jalsa and the Chhatrapati Mela, caste as a social unit is redefined in such a way in the radical restructuring of Brahminical order that it becomes political and national. These became grounds for democratisation of civil society and emergence of masses into a public sphere; issues were more explicitly spelt out and were apparent in the Ambedkari Jalsa and in the Communist Kalapathaks of Amar Shaikh and Annabhau Sathe in the 1940s and 50s. Recent studies on caste in colonial society have either overstated the case of caste as an invention of the 19th century colonial state (Dirks 1988) or overstated its continuities with the pre-colonial Brahminic social precepts (Bayly 1988). As O’Hanlon has argued, the relation between caste society and the colonial state constituted a profound departure from the pre-colonial era; in the pre-colonial period, the scriptural precepts, religious practices and political power had stood in tension (O’Hanlon 1997). It may be argued that the colonial state, by relegating caste to the purely religious sphere for its Hindu subjects, had sought to de-politicise caste. This had impelled the colonised, both the Brahmins and non-Brahmins, in differential ways; the former overtly suggesting erasure of caste differences and the latter overtly suggesting bonding along differences constituted by structures of Brahminism to promote caste identity for political organisation.

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Gender, as a social effect, comes to be employed as an opposition between the Brahmin/non-Brahmin cultures, thought, speech and even particular ways of constructing and performing the texts. Consider, for example, the most popular performances in the Brahmin Ganesha Melas, which were the kavayats or drills. These were the grounds on which versions of Hindu masculinities and femininities were recreated and remoulded. The images of the tolerant Hindu were replaced with an obsessive preoccupation with manliness and martial heroism (Gupta 1998). The Jalsa as a politically progressive version of the Tamasha can emerge as such only via exclusion of women performers: The Ganesha Melas seem to apparently redefine Brahmin patriarchies, by bringing upper caste women into the public as audiences for the melas but these melas were instruction grounds reinstating the ‘private’ as the only legitimate space for good women and this was inscribed through most of the verses. In the contestations between the Chhatrapati Melas and Ganesha Melas, gender became the major ground for the Brahmin melas justifying state censorship. The Brahmin melas complained that their women were being insulted by the Chhatrapati Melas. The Chhatrapati Melas justified their announcement of ‘Beware and move away O Brahmin women—the Chhatrapati Melas have come’ on the grounds that the Brahmin melas too had always ridiculed the educated Brahmin women. This recasting of gender on the interface of caste/class and communal boundaries becomes most apparent in moment of discovery or rediscovery of the popular cultural forms. One such moment of contemporary rediscovery in the popular cultural forms associated with the public Ganesha festival is the Pune Festival. This festival is being organised jointly by a committee of politicians, Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and the Maharashtra Tourism and Development Corporation, since 1988 in Pune. The Pune festival includes everything ranging from golf and trekking competetions to village Jatras and bullock-cart races; from lavani mahotsovs to Usha Uthup’s pop music shows and to Bharat Natyam, all in the name of revival of cultural heritage. The political recruitment for the traditional festivals seems to have been replaced by a recruitment by the culture industry. But to understand all this as just gross commercialisation is to overlook a series of complexities; some of which can be outlined; the elucidation of which will be another project in itself. To see the Pune festival in terms of ‘public culture’ or as a ‘sphere of consumption of the new middle classes’ would amount to cultural populism. The spheres of production, the changing technologies of communication, the

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unintended consequences and possibilities of these need further probing into. The ways in which public festivals came to give relatively less scope for direct political propaganda or political socialisation and more for display of power of political elite needs consideration. This brings forth the questions about the culture of politics and the of politics of culture. The complex interweaving and mediations between the different forms of media, the ways in which Marathi literature, theatre and cinema through the 70s and 80s and the cassette industry of devotional music in the 1980s and 90s, have reproduced the popularity of Ganesha all need to be outlined. This re-invention is contingent on recovering the ‘grandeur of Peshwa period’ through the popularisation of the Ashtavinayak (the eight Ganesha temples considered auspicious by the Peshwa). These have led to a profitable industry of devotional regional tourism, on which the global tourism of Pune Festival is being launched. The Hindutva forces have underlined the continued existence of festival as an assertion of an unchanging Indian reality amidst a world that is ceaselessly changing. Hence, the importance of doing politically engaged cultural studies.

Notes 1. A commentator of the period on the Jalsas; the instructional folk theatre of the Satyashodhak tradition initiated by Phule and his followers in the second half of the nineteenth century. 2. This section draws upon my earlier paper ‘Some Issues in Conceptualising Popular Culture: The Case of the Lavani and Powada in Maharashtra’. This paper was presented at a workshop organised by the VAK, at Vagamon in September 1998 and is under publication in a volume edited by Prof. K.N. Pannikar. 3. A more detailed discussion on the above mentioned three trends is attempted in Rege (forthcoming). Caste, Culture and Gender in Maharashtra. 4. This understanding of Dr. Rajeev Bhargava’s conception of alternative modernities is based on my interpretation of a series of lectures delivered by him at the Department of Political Science, University of Pune in 1998. I would therefore stand to be corrected on any misrepresentation of the position or ignorance about any further revision of the position by the author.

References Aloysius, G. 1998. Nationalism without a nation in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Appadurai, A. 1997. Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalisation. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

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Banerjee, S. 1989, The parlour and the street: Elite and popular culture in nineteenth century Bengal. Calcutta: Seagull. Bayly. 1998. Indian society and the making of the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blundell, V., Shepeherd, J. and Taylor, I. 1933. Relocating cultural studies: Developments in theory and research. London: Routledge. Bourdieu, P. 1984. Distinctions: A social critique of the judgement of taste. London: Routledge. Breckenbridge, C. (ed.), 1996. Consuming modernity: Public culture in contemporary India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Cashman, R. 1990. ‘The political recruitment of the God Ganapati’, in R, Jeffreys et al. (ed.), India: Rebellion to republic (Selected writings, 1875–90). New Delhi: Sterling. Centre For the Study of Culture and Society, Bangalore: Brochure, 1999. Chakravarti, U. 1998. Rewriting history: The life and times of Pandita Ramabai. New Delhi: Kali for Women. Chaterjee, P. 1994. The nation and its fragments and postcolonial history. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Chattopadhyaya, D. 1959, Lokayata: A study in ancient Indian materialism. New Delhi: People’s Publishing House. Courtright, P. 1985. Ganesa: Lord of obstacles. Lord of beginnings. New York: Oxford University Press. Dirks, N. 1988. The hollow crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian kingdom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ghosh, A. 1996. ‘The problem: A symposium on culture and power’. Seminar, 446. October, pp.12–15. Gupta, Charu. 1998, ‘Articulating Hindu masculinity and femininity “Shuddhi” and “Sanghatan” movements in United Provinces in 1920s’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 727–735. Hall, S. 1981. ‘Notes on deconstructing the popular’, in Samuel, R. (ed.), People’s history and socialist theory, pp. 227–240. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Joseph, S. 1998, Interrogating culture: Critical perspectives on contemporary social theory. New Delhi: Sage. Karandikar, J. (ed.), 1953. Shreeganeshotsavachi sath varshe. Pune: Kesari Publication (Marathi). Lewis, G. 1978. ‘The Sociology of popular culture’, Current Sociology, 26(3): 1–64. Masselos, J. 1974. Towards nationalism. Bombay: Popular Prakashan. Mc Chesney, R.W. 1996. ‘Is there any hope for cultural studies’, Monthly Review, 47, March: 10, pp. 1–18. Mcguigan, J. 1991. Cultural populism. New York: Routledge. Mulhern, F. 1995, ‘The politics of cultural studies’, Monthly Review, 47, July–Aug. pp. 31–40. Nandy, A. 1988. Science heagomony and violence. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Niranjana, T., Dhareshwar, V., and Sudhir, P. 1933. Interrogating modernity, culture and colonialism in India. Calcutta: Seagull Books. O’Hanlon, R. 1997. ‘Cultures of rule, communities of resistance: Gender discourse and tradition in recent South Asian historiographies’, in H.L. Seneviratne (ed.), Identity consciousness and the past. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

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282Sharmila Rege Omvedt, G. 1976. Cultural revolt in a colonial society. Bombay: Scientific Socialist Education Trust. Preston, L. 1980. ‘Subregional religious centres in the history of Maharashtra: The sites sacred to Ganesh’, in N.K. Wagle (ed.), Images of Mahrashtra: A regional profile of India, pp. 102–127. London: Curzon Press. Rege, S. 1995. ‘The hegemonic appropriation of sexuality: The case of Lavani performers of Maharashtra’, Contributions so Indian Sociology (n.s.) 29, 1&2. pp. 24–38. Srinivasn, A. 1985. ‘Reform and revival: The devdasi and her dance’. Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 20: 44, November 2, pp. 1869–1876. Thapan, A. 1997. Understanding Ganapali: Insights into the dynamic of a cult. New Delhi: Manohar. Wagle, N. (ed.), 1980. ‘A dispute between Pancal Devajna Sonars and the Brahmans of Pune. Regarding social rank and ritual privileges’, in N.K. Wagle (ed.), Images of Maharashtra: A regional profile of India, pp. 129–159, London: Curzon Press. Documents on the Satyashodhak Mela, Ganesh a Mela, Chhatrapati Mela & Pune Festival: Chhatrapati Mela Padyasangraha [Songs of the Chhatrapati Mela]. Poona: 1927. Jawalkar, D. 1925. Deshache dushman [Enemies of the Nation]. Pune: Keshavrao Jedhe. Jintikar, B. 1948. Shaiv samachar tamasha visheshank (Marathi). Pune: Ghorpadkar. Ghorpade, C. 1992. Ganeshotsavachi shambhar varshe [Hundred years of Ganesh festival]. Pune: Kesari Prakashan (Marathi). Kesari Ganeshotsav suchi, Tilak Smarak, Pune (1892–1930) [A bibliography of articles in newspaper Kesari on Ganesh Festival]. Kesari, 23rd August 1927, p. 9 ——— 13th September 1927, p. 9 ——— 14th August 1928, p. 2 ——— 21st August 1928, p. 10 ——— 28th August 1928, p. 15 ——— 4th September 1928, p. 8 ——— 3rd September 1929, p. 9 ——— 3rd September 1929, p. 10 (All the above articles are specifically on the Ganesha Mela and caste question) Pune festival brochures (1988–98), Pathik, Pune. Pune nagarsamstha shatabdi granth. 1960. Pune Municipal Corporation. [Pune Municipality 100th Anniversary Book]. Phadake, Y.D. (ed.), 1991. Mahatma Phule samagra vangmay (Marathi). Mumbai: Maharashtra Rajya Sahitya aani Sanskriti Mandal. Rao Bahadur janma shatabdi gaurav granth. 1969. Bombay. (Memorial Book of S.K. Bole). Shinde, V. 1996. Shahiri vangmayachya dhara (Marathi). Kolhapur: Pratima Prakashan. Satyashodhak Samaj hirak mohotsav granth. 1933. [60th Anniversary Book of the Satyashodhak Samaj]. Kothapur (Marathi).

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16 Sociological Research on Films Akalanka Jindal

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oday it is fully realised that film as a medium of mass communication is of overwhelming importance and is far more penetrating than the Radio and the Press, the other two major media of communication. The film is powerful and pervasive because of the audio-visual approach. Further, the presentation of facts emotionally in a film is more convincing than the strictly rational presentation. Dr. Alvin Johnson observes, “The Motion Picture represents potentially the greatest advance in human inter-communication since the invention of printing.” Motion picture today is regarded as a communication of “incalculable value”. It is the most powerful medium of expression which meets the recreational needs and is universally understandable. “The cinema entertains but that is the least. It educates without being didactic. It moulds without sermonising and it brings the word to our door without our having to move an inch from a comfortable chair. It sells the wares of the world without a salesman knocking at the door.” That the Indian Film has come of age and is going to stay is an established fact. At the same time the disruptive role of film is a controversial and even an explosive subject. In the past few years, it has become fashionable with groups and individuals specially the parliamentarians, women social workers, guardians, moralists, educationists and others to decry the Indian film as a monster. “They fear that film, in wrong hands, may become a dangerous influence and corrupt society. Such a prejudice is not in any way special misfortune of the film alone. When printing

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was invented, it was viewed with equal horror by some moralists of that age, who were depressed by the thought of the consequences that would follow if every one could read and thus gain access to all kinds of thoughts that found expression in writing. It is sometimes forgotten that what has been discovered and developed is primarily a means of communicating ideas. We have no sympathy with those who abhor the spread of ideas; in the world of today, the fruit of knowledge cannot be the privileged possession of a few.”1 Cinema is by far the greatest democratising force known in the realm of art and entertainment. An ‘Experience Survey’ based on ‘unstructured interviews’ conducted by the present writer revealed that some very responsible persons from different walks of life regard film producers as “Incorrigible”, “the Industry being in the wrong hands” and so on. Public opinion is crystallising towards stricter control over film through legislation and there is even suggestion of nationalisation of the Film Industry. While a majority of men who matter see no promise in films and have lost all faith in film producers, some celebrities like Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru (address at the Film Seminar, New Delhi, on 28-2-’55), the late Janab Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and Shri S. K. Patil, Chief Justice P. V. Rajamannar and Pt. Hriday Nath Kunzru have disclosed in personal interviews a very sympathetic and even enthusiastic outlook on films. They do not share these extraordinary prejudices. In a personal letter to the author Shri V. K. Krishna Menon expressed the view that, “we should really open up, however small, a department of Social Research so that the criticism and ignorance of approach by various persons and groups can be examined and met scientifically. These things do not yield results in one day. But if they are not done, things go from bad to worse till the disease becomes almost incurable.” One could not perhaps put the matter better. The recommendations of the Film Enquiry Committee (March 1951) for some reasons have not yet been implemented. One of the major recommendations of the F.E.C. was the establishment of a Research Department for conducting sociological and psychological research on films. Social and psychological research is a field of immense and immediate importance. According to UNESCO figures two millions (two and a quarter million according to the Motion Picture Alamanac of the Film Federation of India) attend cinema shows every day. Thus the colossal possibility of film as a medium of communication

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makes it imperative that scientific research should be carried out on the impact of film on society. For the formulation of policies and programmes of the welfare of society the scientific findings of sociological research on films can hardly be over emphasised. Some lines of enquiry may be detailed here: i) Film in relation to vice and crime. ii) Film and social disorganisation. iii) Film and Ethics. iv) Indiscipline and disobedience of authority ensuing from films. v) Propagation of false values and culture patterns from films. vi) Film and Fashion. vii) Film as a medium of escapism. viii) Film Censorship. ix) Public taste; whether public taste moulds what is presented to it or what is presented moulds public taste—action and reaction. x) Juvenile Delinquency and Film. xi) Effect of ‘socials’ and element of love and romance in films, specially on the adolescent population. xii) Film-art for Art sake or didactic nature of films.

Evidence on the following important aspects should also be examined: i) ii) iii) iv)

How film has fought social evils and helped in bringing about social reform. Social egalitarian movement and the film. Sustenance of religious values through mythologicals. Have people deterred from crime and vice after seeing the end of the screen villain and vamp, that crime does not pay? v) How far the Hindi films have helped the spread and understanding of Hindi in non-Hindi speaking areas (specially the South), thus developing the common language with correct phonetics. vi) Potential uses and educative values of films: substitute for travel, dissemination of knowledge, historical pageants, best works and classics of other languages and other countries, scientific romance etc. vii) Film as an aid to crystallising public opinion, specially on controversial social issues.

The impact of film on institutions constitutes an important field of research. It is to be assessed how film has reacted on the family, marriage, community, religious, social and educational institutions.

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At the present moment the industry generally caters for the box office and considers masses as the sole masters. Naturally this is not a very healthy sign. Some of the producers offer an excuse that they are obliged and even compelled to cater for the baser taste of the masses, because they refuse to receive something ennobling. This is not a correct representation of the picture. The production of cheap trash is only an excuse for perverting the public taste and squeezing the maximum revenue at the box office. It is idle to say that the public does not appreciate good films or ennobling themes. Generally speaking the public is extremely indulgent in its demand—in fact it makes no demand. It is content with what is served out to it. The intelligentsia certainly disapprove of the general run of pictures and avoid seeing them. In a democracy we have often to educate our masses, the demos. The masses generally do not know how to distinguish between the grand, the sublime and the vulgar. They do not really know what is real good art. It is here that the responsibility of the Government and the Industry come to the fore. If the public is decadent, its taste has to be improved and brought into line, by providing only what is the best. Surely the Indian population with its tradition, religious values and culture, cannot be dubbed as decadent. It knows and falls for a good thing when one is provided. A minimum standard of production must be insisted upon and there can be no serious difficulty in attaining a minimum denominator of morality. Government quarters have from time to time expressed their concern and given serious thought to the unwholesome influence of some of the recent films. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru says, “When they manifestly become a social menace and a social danger the Government must come in, and must come with a heavy hand, because we can not allow a social menace or a social danger to continue.” Speaking of horror comics he observes, “But the horror comics, to my mind, should be suppressed ruthlessly. These is no question of freedom of the individual or any body. It is bad, hundred per cent bad.” There is definite evidence to show that some films have had an undesirable influence on certain sections of society, specially on the adolescent population. Emotional hypertrophy and precocious tendencies among the adolescents and that love and romance is the ‘be-all’ and ‘end-all’ of life, are direct manifestation of the ‘socials’. In fact certain sections of society have imbibed false values and culture patterns from films. This is altogether bad and undesirable for the nation.

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Radha Kamal Mukerjee2 maintains that there is a definite relationship between deviant behaviour and the lurid and vulgar pictures. We may quote here with advantage Bedford3 who says, “Motion pictures containing vivid scenes of defiance of law and crimes of all degree may be an ending which shows the criminal brought to justice and victory of the right, carry moral to the intelligent adult, but that which impresses the mind of the mentally young and colour the imagination is the excitement and bravado accompanying the criminal act while the moral goes unheeded.” We do not propose to keep our men and women in a glass case or give them a cotton-wool-treatment. We have to educate them in the inculcation of proper values. Today there is need for restatement and clarification of the values of our culture so as to make them consonant with the dynamic social order. Taking a passive view and keeping young persons away from film influence is at best a half-hearted defensive measure. The T.V. is peeping round the corner and the writing on the wall is already there to which research, education and re-education along wholesome attitudes is the only solution. A new orientation at all hands has to be developed. This research is not going to end up merely in an academic pursuit but would make positive contribution to the formulation of practical schemes for the welfare of the society. In addition, it will focus and crystallise public opinion and direct it into wholesome and healthy attitudes instead of the present prejudice. Further, in the absence of any organised voice or cultural organisation of merit, to say nothing of academic or Government-sponsored research, there is no social control and restraint imposed on the producers and the industry. The research findings through proper agency can impose social expectancy and a minimum code of morality on the film industry. To many the very name of films spells an anathema while others have an enthusiastic outlook on films. It would be too sweeping and biased a view to decry the medium or the Indian Film outright. There is no denying that there are bad films as there are good films and it is to the bad ones and the consequent unhealthy influence that we have to give serious thought. This scheme is an endeavour to show how the National Film can be developed to make its positive contribution in the realisation of the ideal of a Welfare State. Objecive and Sociological Criteria for Censorship: Censorship is today one of the most vital problems that faces the society and the Industry. In view of prejudiced public opinion there is evidence for still stricter censorship to come. Censorship at best has a negative role to play.

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The Industry should have its own arrangements for pre-censorship by appointing sympathetic and impartial expert who has the requisite research experience. He should be a member of an unofficial Advisory Board for pre-censorship. Since censorship is a technical and specialised job, the Government should nominate a film sociologist on the panel of the Board of Censors. He may also be called upon to guide the industry in pre-censorship. The ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’ should be defined not arbitrarily but objectively. For this there should be restatement and clarification of values of our culture so as to make them consonant with the dynamic changes we are faced with. There are methods with the help of which values and morals can be defined precisely. After this is done there should be no serious difficulty in referring, matching and co-relating screen material on the objective value scale. In this direction the ‘cuts’ ordered in typical cases in the light of the ‘Directives’ of Central Board of Film Censors would also be studied. Public opinion on different aspects of morality could be examined. Further, evidence could be gathered by the Questionnaire method and by interviewing a stratified sample of population on random basis. After research is carried out successfully, censorship would no longer be purely subjective and arbitrary. There should be little scope for individual interpretations of screen material in terms of personal prejudices and preferences of members of Censorship panel. We can look forward to ‘Censorship minus Scissors’ or ‘Censorship without Tears’ for an intelligent and well meaning producer. This would consequently insure the welfare of society. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru maintains, “On the other hand, it is dangerous thing for a Government to become too much of a judge even of people’s morals, if I may say so I do not take kindly to too much regulation and regimentation to use the Government language—to too much of protocol and more specially in maters which obviously are things of the spirit, music, dance, literature and the like.” In the same context the Prime Minister cautions by saying that, “It is only when they manifestly become a social menace and a social danger that Government must come in, and must come in with a heavy hand, because we cannot allow a social menace or a social danger to continue.” Censorship although so vigilant, is at times caught napping and grossly undesirable features miss the censorial scissors. A typical case was brought to the notice of the Chairman of the Central Board of Film

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Censors, who had invited the present writer to Bombay for a discussion on sociological aspect of films. The Chairman agreed with his observations that ‘House of Wax’, a 3-D picture, is althrough a morbid and pathological representation of crime for crime sake. The research experience of the present writer reveals that individual, society and the State should all have their arrangements for discouraging the production and exhibition of undesirable films. Oddly enough, cinema is perhaps the only industry in which the patrons’ voice is unorganised and ineffective. Box office return is not necessarily the true verdict of people on the quality of a film. In order to organise public opinion, to exercise social control and to impose social expectancy and a minimum denominator of morality on the quality of films, there is no better answer than establishing Audience Clubs or Cinema Critics Clubs in the State on the lines of the West. Importance of Research to the Industry: The Indian Film Industry should take up the lead and in its own interest, set up a Research Wing attached to the film producers’ organisations. Comprehensive sociological research on the social and psychological impact of films on contemporary society should be conducted. The film phenomenon should be studied in its totality by studying attitudes and reactions of the audience. The study should be conducted in various regions and in important film centres. Evidence should be gathered from different socio-economic and age-groups as well as from the two sexes; as all social phenomena have a class structure. With the result of these studies practical policies would be formed and recommendations made. For this kind of specialised research, scientific and valid statistical tools have to be used. Throughout it should be kept uppermost in mind that the research has a practical bearing. Positive gains and advantages would thus accrue to the industry from research directed towards its specific problems. What would different socio-economic and age-groups like to see in a film? At present even the most seasoned producers do not precisely know the public taste so as to be able to design and plan their picture properly. Unfortunately, more often than not, production is merely speculative. For one item that is likely to be appreciated by the audience there are ten other items which are associated with a low attention value. There is unproductive waste of time and talent, which naturally boosts up the budget. In addition, the educated class find the product a “variety entertainment” without a sound theme and hence criticise such pictures vehemently. They hate to see a dance number, song or

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broad humour superimposed on the scene when not demanded by the dramatic situation. The “public taste” represents a dynamic phenomenon so that the same ‘formula’ which has succeeded once may no longer bring good returns. This is specially so in a vast sub-continent like ours with varying cultural outlooks, regional preferences and prejudices and different standards of morality and education. The “Experience Survey” by the author reveals that 39% of the sample interviewed had “favourable” reactions towards films, 18% objected to the “sameness of plot”, 13% observed the lack of realism, while another 9% objected to the invariable element of “romance and sex” in our films. This is a very significant appraisal of the potential clientele which could easily be made eager patrons of films. Predicting Popularity of Films: This is a highly specialised technique by which popularity of films can be predicted. In an outline the technique consists in Content Analysis of films and subsequent study of the contents (including sociological variables) in relation to audience preferences. The producers’ organisation is prone to believe that the box office is all that matters for the industry and if all the pictures were to be hits, the industry would turn the corner and even come to a sound footing. The investigations very clearly show that the present malaise is the lack of confidence of the people in the film-man and the industry. It may be argued by the producers that the intelligentsia do not contribute so much to the box office and hence could be safely ignored. Since the educated class who are an important section of society and are also the repositories of culture and values, fail to see eye to eye with the policies of the film producers, there is potential formidable danger for the industry. By a more careful, intelligent and imaginative approach the educated classes could even become a good source of revenue and the best friends of the industry. Careful study of public taste would further lead to fewer ‘flops’ and the little trouble taken would attract larger audiences. Of course it must be borne in mind that research is not intended to perform miracles or work wonders in a day. More than any other medium for the dissemination of knowledge the motion picture is international, and developments in one nation are of immediate use to the rest of the world. Today the world is divided into power camps with mutual distrust, war neurosis and feverish stock piling of atomic weapons that threaten the total annihilation of

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mankind. At this juncture the film can do a yeoman service to mankind. We should carefully plan and produce pictures that will explain to the people of world the aspirations and problems of free India, its silent revolution through planning, the Gandhian philosophy of Sarvodaya, that war as a means of solving international problems is an anachronism and that principles of Panchshila are the solution for a lasting peace. Dr. H. N. Kunzru contributes to this viewpoint in saying, “I am sure, this will do more to raise India in the estimation of the people abroad than any number of speeches.” Friendly international relations and enhancement of India’s prestige, though very important, are only one side of the picture. For the successful implementation of our Five Year Plans, we are seeking foreign aid and exploring all possible avenues to increase our resources and wealth. But the film, the potential earner of foreign exchange remains altogether unexploited. Mr. Justice P. V. Rajamannar, Chief Justice of Madras very clearly expressed his faith, “I see a great future, a glorious future, for Indian films. Before long, I expect Indian films to be exhibited to crowded houses all over the world and they will not only earn money for our country, but also reputation for beauty, goodness and truth.” There have been overtures from foreign producers for launching co-production with the Indian industry and some of our producers have given serious thought to exploring foreign market for our films. This is a healthy sign but we who are in the throes of transition cannot afford to leave this delicate and important task altogether in the hands of private enterprise, with whom profit motive is the foremost. A film sociologist with adequate research experience and knowledge of our culture and films in relation to foreign trends, market and demand, should represent the Government in such ventures in guiding the industry. It becomes necessary here to mention that though certain films were very popular in Russia, U.K., U.S.A. and the Middle East and earned for us considerable money, they did not depict India’s true culture, costume, music and mores. This has to be avoided specially for the foreign market. The film has a distinct role and responsibility towards Planning and Community Development. There is no agency more powerful than the film for uniting the people of this country and making them conscious of the process of a silent revolution through planning. Pt. Hriday Nath Kunzru has charged the film with responsibility of delivering the goods in the present age of planning. He observes, “Now in order to create a new atmosphere in the country, in order to alter the psychology of

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the people, to give them hope and make them feel their responsibility for one another, it is of the utmost importance that the cinema industry should give the greatest assistance at its hands and I make bold to say again that no agency can help more powerfully in this matter than this cinema.” It would not be out of place to make a reference to ‘Shri 420’, produced and directed by Raj Kapoor. This picture was awarded a Certificate of Merit by the Prime Minister for its progressive theme. The story and scenario very subtly and effectively bring home the underlying principles of Planning. He has successfully presented the Community Approach and the film engenders the ‘we feeling’ and group solidarity among the masses. This picture certainly makes a land mark for its purposeful theme. Until we can really take entertainment into the rural India and be able to understand response of the villagers, the progress of development work will be slow, incomplete and unreal. A vast majority of our people are rural inhabitants and until we entertain them and integrate them into the community, we cannot interest them in the Community Projects. The Community Projects are not intended to be a Government Department. Government Departments are simply to promote their work. But it is envisaged that these Development Projects will ultimately function as the Administrative-cum-Revenue units in the countryside. There will be increased leisure as a result of multipurpose schemes and improved techniques. At this juncture, therefore, it becomes important that we should carefully plan for the leisure, recreation and wholesome entertainment of our rural masses. At the present moment life in villages is dull and humdrum and the villager does not experience a joy and zest for living. Further, we have to establish contact and reach our masses through the expressioncommunication-response link. While we reach rural masses through films and entertain them, we should portray constructive endeavours to make them conscious of the orientation that is taking place. People’s participation cannot be better won over than through simple and straightforward themes dealing with village life, their problems and aspirations. Purposeful themes dealing with Village Defence Society, Cooperative Enterprise, Shramdan, Panchayat, Soil Conservation, Poultry farming, Sanitation and Hygiene, Social Education and Literacy Campaign, Rural Youth & Child Welfare, Pre & Ante Natal Care can be shown with advantage in Community Halls.

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It is to be clearly borne in mind that the didactic presentation of a documentary may not be so useful because of its obvious limitation. A full length feature film is to be carefully planned to meet the needs of our rural population. In the initial stages, such production may have to be subsidised but the revenue accruing as Entertainment Tax would at least compensate the expenses of a subsidised production. In the long run, when films became popular in the countryside and the industry is no longer shy and we have more and more Community Halls, the increased Entertainment Tax will become a permanent asset to the State exchequer. With a modest start, our slogan should be: A Community Hall within a radius of five miles. The Entertainment Tax is again a controversial subject with divergent views expressed by the State and industry while the Film Enquiry Committee recommends rationalisation of the tariffs. It says, “We have already suggested that upto 10 per cent of the returns from the entertainment duty should be made available to the proposed Film Council in order to enable it to finance its different activities. We feel that this is reasonable proportion which it is incumbent on the State Governments to divert from general purposes to the specific purpose of the industry and we earnestly hope that they will not grudge this sacrifice. After all healthy leisure and entertainment are as much assets to the State as they are exhilarating to the individual; in the long run the State benefits indirectly from the healthy individual which a healthy leisure makes. We feel that the sacrifice asked for of the State Governments is in no sense disproportionate to the benefits which would indirectly accrue to them.” It also says, “We have also suggested that part of the initial capital for the Film Finance Corporation should be made up by contributions from States to the extent of 5 per cent of their revenue from Entertainment Tax. This contribution would, however, be of the nature of a dividend bearing investment, and would further be needed only for one year or two.” Film Enquiry Committee further recommends rationalisation and fixation of ad valorem tarrifs for all seats. In addition the 15% of gross intake of Entertainment Tax is to be diverted to the Film Council and Finance Corporation. This will naturally result in a loss of 15% of revenue to the State. At this juncture it becomes of utmost importance that suitable measures be devised after studying taxation structure, incidence and methods of realization in foreign countries, so that when this scheme is enforced, the State is at least able to make good this 15% of Entertainment Tax.

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The administrative aspect relating to cinema halls and exhibition of films, as provided in the India Cinematograph Act should be strictly followed so as to encourage more and more people to see films. It is therefore necessary that rules of safety and health, floor area, exits, passage and corridors, gangways, aisle spacing, ventilation, sanitary arrangements, fire-precautions, facilities for parking vehicles, cleanliness in auditorium, hawkers and vendors, smoking in auditorium, structural soundness of building and its acoustics, clear vision, projection booths, ‘A’ & ‘U’ regulations are properly observed. If carefully exploited film is capable of contributing substantially towards the state revenue besides earning foreign exchange. Finance and taxation experts are now of the opinion that along side of exploring new avenues for Indirect Taxation, taxation on existing sources should be intensified to yield greater and fuller revenue. It is estimated that there is definite evasion and leakage of entertainment tax also. By taking the cinema to the countryside by improving the existing ones and encouraging the building of new ones in the urban areas the revenues of the State can be enhanced. The machinery of realisation of tax has to be smoothened and bottlenecks removed. There is need for the establishment of a separate administrative machinery with a new orientation so that State revenue can be substantially increased and the life of the people made richer and fuller through decent films. Specific Suggestions: In the following lines some specific suggestions and recommendations are made, on how films can become popular for all sections of society by providing healthy entertainment and yield rich dividends to the State and the Industry.

(A) Educating and Organising Public Opinion People have to be educated about the role, responsibility and potentiality of films. The prevailing criticism, prejudice and ignorance of approach has to be met and examined scientifically. Wrong and biased notions about films have to be corrected, and new and wholesome attitudes developed. This can be accomplished effectively by setting up cultural forums like Film Clubs, Cinema Societies, Audience Clubs and Film Library. Here people can be informed about the place of film in society.

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These forums can also inculcate among the people the art of seeing and appreciating films—that of discussing and criticising them so as to replace the existing subjective and passive approach. Talks and reading of papers on cultural subjects and the role of film in society, suggesting means of improving films and cinema halls, communicating their views and suggestions to the industry and the Government, can make these clubs a living organisation. The clubs can create the right type of atmosphere for films. These film clubs can serve as centres for impartial criticism of latest films being exhibited in the town. Further these clubs are to function as Information cum Publicity Centre for films showing in the town as envisaged by Sri Seshadri, I.C.S. (Rtd.), a Distributor of South India. People are to be educated to rely upon and refer to these clubs for any matter relating to films. In the initial stages it may be necessary to establish a few clubs with the sponsorship of the Entertainment Department. Such a venture is bound to be a success and subsequently cultural organisations in important towns can set up such clubs under the supervision and guidance of the Entertainment Commissioner or other suitable department or organisation. Such clubs exist in Western countries and their working should be studied closely.

(B) Improving the Standard of Films Effective public opinion organised and expressed through Film Forums, can help a great deal in the matter of improving the standard of films. These forums can impose a restraint on the industry and demand what they consider best for the society. The patrons’ verdict as expressed through these clubs, is bound to carry weight with producers, although these club may not have any statutory sanction behind them. Social and psychological research on the impact of film on society would prove of value to the State in guiding the industry and informing the public. It has to be clearly assessed how far film has contributed towards progress of society and where it has had an undesirable influence and under what conditions. The findings of research can be used with advantage in checking this unwholesome influence. A scientific study of the controversial issues in relation to films should be made

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so that after they are thrashed out the Government, film industry and society have faith and goodwill towards each other. Research should also be carried out to develop objective and sociological criteria for censorship so that the prestige of films is enhanced and the welfare of society insured. It would be necessary to undertake a first-hand study of social impact of films on society and the censorship machinery of foreign countries. A study of the problems of other countries is strongly indicated to help us solve our own problems with natural assimilation of the desirable features of the industry elsewhere and rejection of schemes that have failed or not yielded good result under similar conditions. A natural outcome of research will be that it will help in counteracting the low attention value of films for the intelligentsia. After studying the attitude and reactions of the intelligentsia suitable measures can be adopted to attract them towards films and make them also eager patrons. This potential section of the population would naturally contribute towards revenues of the State and the Industry. The direct outcome of research, objective censorship, audience research, organising public opinion through film forums and catering to the taste of the intelligentsia would be that the prestige of films will be established and more and more people will benefit from the healthy entertainment. After successful research has been carried out on films, a State can move the Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting for the nomination of its representative on the panel of Central Board of Film Censors. It would also be worthwhile to consider the establishment of a State Advisory Board for matters relating to films.

(C) Entertainment of the People and Rural Community Halls As has already been discussed earlier, it would be desirable to reach the masses through films and provide them wholesome entertainment. The theme of such films should be simple, straightforward and those depicting creative endeavours so that Community Development is able to catch the imagination of the rural masses and become living reality for them. The rural cinema is bound to be a success. It is expected that with the establishment of rural cinemas the expanding demand for films will augment the revenues of the Government and the Industry.

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We have to devise inexpensive means of exhibiting films in the countryside. It would obviously be futile to erect luxurious cinema halls in villages. It has to be seen whether the Community Hall, Open Air Auditoria, touring or mobile cinemas will be suitable. In states where rains are confined to a few months only, an open air cinema would be suitable for rural exhibition. This, it appears, would be the least expensive proposition. The annual attendance figures for India as compared with other countries show that a pitifully small number of people in our country see films and to that extent the revenue of the Government and the Industry are limited. As compared to United States of America our annual production is about 50% but the annual attendance is about 22% only. This hiatus is alarming both for the Government and the Industry. We have therefore to devise suitable ways of popularising cinema. A study of conditions prevalent in U.S.A., U.K., and U.S.S.R. would be useful in this direction.

(D) New Cinema Houses and Improving Existing Ones Our film industry stands second in the world but the number of cinema halls is again pitifully small. Unless we have more cinema halls, the progress and prosperity of the industry will be limited, people will not receive the entertainment they need. More cinema houses have to be built with a new orientation. In addition to conforming to the standards of security, hygiene and comfort of the public, the theatres themselves have to serve as cultural centres for providing useful information on filmic art and the place of film in society. On the pattern of U.S.S.R., there should be a spacious and well appointed lounge, and library attached to each cinema hall. This library and cultural centre will generate a creative and cultural bias in favour of films in place of the present passive and indifferent approach. There should be correct siting of new cinema halls to avoid their proximity to educational institutions or delinquent slums. As for the existing cinemas every effort should be made to improve their condition, seating arrangement, projection and the overall atmosphere so as to attract more people to see films. A minimum standard of convenience and comfort of audience has to be insisted upon by the

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licensing authorities. In this direction the Cinema Clubs can render great help to the Government. A survey reveals that certain sections of society would not see the best film exhibited outside Hazratganj area in Lucknow because of the unwholesome surroundings, lack of parking place for vehicles, indifferent auditorium and the quality of projection.

(E) Research New orientation—Expansion of the activities of Department concerned with films—Establishment of Research Units in Universities and Producers’ organisations and foreign study tour. Collection figures of Entertainment Tax reveal that in relation to the population of this country and number of films produced, cinema does not contribute proportionately. In order that the study of the economics of a Welfare State in relation to entertainment be a comprehensive one, taxation on entertainment, amusement, betting, gambling, theatres, dramatic performances, cinemas and sports should be critically examined. A scientific study of the incidence, structure and methods of realisation of tax should be conducted in India and abroad. Whether we should adopt Ad Valorem, Slab System or Flat Rate is to be decided here and now, before we are called upon to ratify the F.E.C. recommendations. We have to devise such a taxation policy as to bring maximum revenue to the State and at the same time provide incentive and encouragement to well meaning and promising producers. We have to consider whether we will be in a position to grant tax relief, if not altogether waive the tax, for exhibition of films depicting creative endeavour and ennobling themes. For accomplishing the programme that has been outlined above it would be essential to have a separate staff with a new orientation, adequate training and experience. It may perhaps be correct to say that Entertainment Departments in the states at present are merely concerned with the realisation of Entertainment Tax and inspection of an essentially routine nature. Similarly the Central Board of Film Censors and Films Division under the Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting have given little importance to the aspect mentioned before. We have envisaged an altogether different role for the Entertainment Department, Censors and the Films Division, with added responsibility and scope of activity. For accomplishing this intensive programme

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it would be desirable to have a film-sociologist at the head of the new organisation for carrying out research and implementing the policies and new schemes. The work of this specialist requires that he should have necessary scientific background, research experience and maturity of years without too much weight of them. He should preferably have experience of sociological research on films and be acquainted with the industry, its personalities and Government departments connected with films. The specialist should have the necessary background and study of Sociology, Psychology, methods of Social Research and Statistics. He should be at home with Economics in its broader aspects affecting the industry. He should have a bias of social welfare because welfare of society and films is so intimately connected. Under such a film sociologist who will be called upon to work with the Entertainment Department in the States and with the Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (specially the Central Board of Film censors and the Films Division), requisite research staff should be placed. A direct outcome of research cum dynamic public relations organisation would be that it would help the Industry in regaining its prestige in the eyes of the Government and the people. The Government would then waste no time in implementing the recommendations of the Film Enquiry Committee by setting up Film Finance Corporation, Film Institute and National Film Board. Today, oddly enough, this industry has the unique distinction of having failed to receive the attention it deserves in the Five Year Plans. At this juncture it would be in the fitness of things if the Planning Commission were to include the film too in its orbit. It would be desirable for the Planning Commission to sponsor the research programmes in collaboration with Universities and other seats of specialised training and research. Such a research programme will also be of value to the State Planning Department, Information Department, Social Welfare Department, Education Department and Health Department in addition to the Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting including the Central Board of Film Censors and the Union Ministry of Education, Scientific Research and Culture. In addition, this study and programme will also be valuable to the Central Social Welfare Board, Indian Conference of Social Work, Indian Council of Child Welfare, the Indian Council for World Affairs and the Sangeet Natak Akadami. Needless to mention that this study would be of immense value to UNESCO. The UNESCO, there is little doubt, would welcome

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undertaking this programme as a part of Audio-visual Section and the Section on Press, Radio and Film.

Notes 1. Film Enquiry Committee Report (1951), p. 41, para 126. 2. Radha Kamal Mukerjee—Social Disorganisation in India. 3. Bedford—Readings in Sociology, p. 650.

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17 The Return Migrant in Cinema: The Idealist and the Sceptic Moutushi Mukherjee

T

he interest in return migration among members of the Indian diaspora is recent. It is not, therefore, surprising that the returnee has taken a long time to make herself/himself visible in any form of media, be it cinema or literature. While there are countless films relating the experiences of the emigrant after s/he leaves home, there is very little representation of her/his return and while her/his trials and her/ his successes as an emigrant are keenly observed in many films, there is very little portrayal of her/his notion of coming back home. Yet, undoubtedly, much of such return is symbolic of the many struggles of returnees, and these returnees have their own stories to tell, but their suppressed voices have mostly been lost in translation and are almost impossible to obtain without adequate sources of data. The necessity of representation of the returnee in any form of media coexists with the concurrent obstacles of such representation that are inherent in the dynamic nature of her/his identity. It was Stuart Hall who identified that ‘diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference’ (cited in Woodward: 65). Thus, the diaspora identity is both ‘created’ through shared history and ‘transformed’ through history as a result of the ‘ruptures’ and ‘discontinuities’ in history (ibid.: 225). Following Hall, we argue that, since diaspora identity is not an ‘accomplished fact’, rather a ‘production’ which is never complete, there occur

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several problems in representation of this fluid identity. This paper, focusing specifically on the identity of the return migrant, attempts to outline the problems of such representation. At the outset it can be established that the returnee, by virtue of being a sub-set of the largely ‘heterogeneous’ (Jayaram 2011) and continually evolving diaspora community, would also share its characteristic fluidity. Naturally, this poses a problem when we try to represent the return migrant. Due to lack of reliable data on the causes and experiences of her/his return, such representations have been essentially narrow and singular. In most cases, such return was captured in more individualistic studies or abstract economic models of push-pull factors. In other words, they were focused on macro-level experiences and larger economic consequences (King 1986). Devesh Kapur (2010) also points out the fallacy in viewing the returnees as ‘those who did not make it’, or, in other words, ‘negatively selected’. He clarifies that the propensity to return is found to be higher among ‘elites’ than ‘those lower down in the social and income hierarchies’ and we must dispel these conventional notions of return due to failure (ibid.: 38). In fact, return could be for a number of reasons: For some, it may just be a preference to be big fish in a small pond rather than smaller fish in a big pond. For others, it may be forward expectations, as seen in the increase in return migration when countries as diverse as South Korea, Taiwan, Ireland, China and India began to grow rapidly. A smaller subset of those who return are those who may be more intensely nationalist and more committed to national building—exemplified by the leaderships of anticolonial nationalist movements, virtually all of whom had studied and lived abroad (ibid.).

However, despite the multiplicity of perspectives through which return can be envisaged, we persist in using conventional lens with which to understand it. As a result, in our effort to highlight the economic implications which underlie return, the voices of the returnee are silenced and suppressed. Viewed thus, this paper suggests the role played by cinema as an appropriate tool of representation of voices of return, on the one hand, and exposition of the problems inherent in such representation, on the other. The vital role played by cinema with regard to the diaspora has been realised by sociologists and anthropologists, but its authenticity as a tool for representation has been a matter of academic debate. Patricia

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Uberoi (1998) identifies the role that Indian films play in tapping into the concerns of everyday life and also how they use strategies in resolving many conflicts therein. She also identifies the role of cinema as a social text that serves to highlight features of social life. Particularly for the diaspora, Uberoi points out, films have provided ‘an idealised moral universe’ which reflects the values, beliefs, and ideas that go into the making of a nation (ibid.: 306). This is reflected in the themes recurrent in diaspora related cinema such as marriage, love, relationships, and family. The notion of nationhood seems to be closely linked to loyalty towards upholding the true ‘Indian identity’, and cinema may have invoked the traditional notions of ‘Indian-ness’ to appeal to the Indian diaspora. It has, therefore, been a means to create and perpetuate their sense of morality. Uberoi’s critical analysis of two Indian films, Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge and Pardes and the way these films have shown how to ‘discipline desire’ brings forth multiple arguments about Indian social reality. Her essay thereby shows the significant role played by cinema in representing the diaspora. However, when it comes to the power of cinema as a tool for narration of experiences, few filmmakers have realised or been able to give a platform to the return migrant in order for her/him to tell us what it means and what it feels to come back home. Partly, as discussed before, due to the absence of data, and partly due to the fluid and evolving nature of the emigrant identity, they have resorted to stereotypical categorisations of the return migrant. In this paper, we shall outline the ways in which return migration to India has been presented in cinema: identify the recurrent themes in cinema that revolve around the process of emigrants coming back home, delineate what these films project about the return migrant and her/his experiences, and analyse the nuances within these representations. Broadly, there are two ways in which the Indian films have chosen to look at the process of coming back home. The first is largely concentrated upon stressing on the need to return to homeland. This is largely characteristic of the films which talk about the greatness of the homeland, uphold patriotism, and urge the emigrant to return home. Sometimes they highlight the plight of emigrants abroad and the social and cultural problems that are incumbent upon anyone who chooses to leave home. In other words, they glorify the phenomenon of ‘return’ as opposed to the trials of living away from home. The trend of observing

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the diaspora as a homogeneous community living vicariously through the myths of their homeland was mostly seen in the cinematic attempts of the 1960s and 1970s. The second is a minority, albeit significant films, which have looked at the experiences after the return. They seek to ask questions on the actual ‘lived’ experience of return in terms of lifestyle changes and ideological changes. They seek to elucidate the implications of this return for not only the emigrant but also her/his family and her/his surroundings. In other words, they try to present the voices of the people within these situations. In this context, this paper will attempt to critically look at six films covering four decades of mainstream Hindi cinema. Beginning with the popular films made in India in the 1970s and 1980s, namely, (i) Des Pardes and (ii) Purab aur Paschim, moving on to the 1990s’ blockbusters, namely, (iii) Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge and (iv) Pardes, and completing with films made in the late 1990s and early 2000, namely, (v) Swades—We the People and (vi) Hyderabad Blues. It must be pointed out that, barring Hyderabad Blues, all the films would be classified as commercial and specifically ‘Bombay’1 cinema.2 It is necessary to explain the common thread that binds these films rendering them suitable for selection. First and foremost, they constitute that small group of films made in India that has attempted to look at the aspect of return and return migrants, and the dynamics and consequences of such return for the individual returnee. The films relate stories of a variety of emigrants from different social, economic, regional, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds corresponding to both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ diaspora.3 What links them is the immense levels of popularity they achieved not only in terms of commercial success, in India and abroad, but also the extent to which they influenced Indian audience (Singh 2010). This influence was driven by the unique position Bollywood has among Indian audience and the extent of its popularity among Indians all over the world. Much studied and debated, the commercial nature of Bollywood cinema has denied it the tag of authenticity and realism, but this has not in any way diminished its popularity. Sameer Kamat (2012), Bollywood commentator and journalist, quotes cultural anthropologist Tejaswini Ganti of the University of New York, who states that Indian filmmakers, despite criticism, ‘didn’t stop . . . from making their films’. According to her, Bollywood cinema is a unique example by itself. In her interview with Kamat, she

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speaks of how Bollywood has emerged as an interesting case study, not only for fans across the world, but also for business people. It has transgressed varied cultures and overcome obstacles to become an immensely successful industry. I think what is quite remarkable is how despite years of hostile or indifferent government policies, high rates of taxation, complete disinterest by much of the organised sector, scarcity of capital, and a very decentralised structure, the Hindi film industry managed to survive and continue to make films that were successful, touched people’s hearts, and were seen by millions of people all over the world. The example of the Hindi film industry counters all of those theories trotted about by neoliberal economists and Republican politicians in the US about how excessive taxation and regulation kills entrepreneurship—it definitely did not do that for the Hindi film industry! Filmmakers complained and continue to complain about the Indian government’s economic policies that affect them negatively but it didn’t stop them from making their films. The second feature that I also find unique is that Hindi films have circulated all across the world since the 1950s—Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Israel, Tanzania, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Poland, Indonesia, Soviet Union, Peru, China, and many more countries without any significant diasporic community (Ganti, cited in Kamat ibid.).

The Bollywood films discussed in this paper are listed in Table 1. The first four films created or aimed to create ‘idealism’ about homeland by idealising return, while the last two films focussed on the experiences of the returnee. This distinction in the choice of the subject matter and their tone—that is, the emphasis on idealism in the first four films and the emphasis on return in the last two—is contextual to the larger sociopolitical factors operating at the time the respective films were made. Table 1 The List of Films Analysed Name of the Film 1. Des Pardes 2. Purab aur Paschim 3. Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge 4. Pardes 5. Hyderabad Blues 6. Swades—We the People

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Year of Release

Name of the Director

1970 1978 1995 1997 1998 2004

Dev Anand Manoj Kumar Aditya Chopra Subhash Ghai Nagesh Kukunoor Ashutosh Gowariker

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State policy towards the Indian diaspora post-Independence underwent a sharp change between the 1970s and 1990s. Indeed, the diaspora, particularly the more successful ones, were regarded with disdain and apathy by the intensely nationalistic post-Independent Nehruvian government. In an effort to consolidate a new nation, focus had shifted from the Indians abroad and no effort was made towards their protection in times of conflict or subjugation, as for instance in Uganda. This change was noted by Latha Vardarajan in The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in International Relations, where she states, From the 1920s onward, the Indian nationalist movement had acknowledged and lauded the contribution of the overseas Indians to the struggle for freedom. After all, the ‘Father of the Nation’, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi had been prominent in the diaspora and had begun his experiments with civil disobedience movements while in South Africa. . . . [N]evertheless, after Independence the Indian government refused to assume such responsibility for the diaspora. Prime Minister Nehru made it clear that either overseas Indians should accept Indian citizenship and accept nothing other than ‘favourable alien treatment’ abroad, or they should accept the nationality of the countries they lived in and avoid looking to the Indian government for preservation of their position and rights. Thus when the Indians faced discriminatory treatment and expropriation in places like Burma and Sri Lanka, New Delhi refused to take up cudgels on their behalf (cited in Raghavan 2012: 67).

However, the climate changed around the 1990s, particularly in the wake of economic crises. In this context, Vardarajan states, Things began to change with the global economic disruption of the 1970s. The oil shocks of that decade presented the India government with a series of foreign exchange and balance of payments crises. To cope with these, the government began easing the restrictions on the inflow of foreign capital particularly from Indians residing abroad. This would culminate, in the aftermath of the 1991 economic crisis, in policies that would actively court and ‘valorize’ the diaspora (cited in ibid.).

As a result of the change in governmental policy and outlook towards the diaspora, post the 1990s era, there occurred an ideological change in the attitude of the people towards them, affecting thereby, their representation in the media. The returnee, by the 21st century, became a visible and attractive entity, both economically and socially. Perception about her/him as a source of human and social capital had already grown, to be followed by her/his representation in the commercial cinema.

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The Idealism of Return: Glorification and Nostalgia meri desh ki dharti sona ugley ugley heerey moti mere desh ki dharti . . .

The soil of my land reaps gold and diamonds and pearls.

hai pareet jahan ki reet sada, main geet wahan ka gaata hoon, bharat ka rehene waala hoon, bharat ki baat sunata hoon.

I sing a song of the land of natural beauty and love, I am an Indian and so I sing about India.

Upkar (1968)

Purab aur Paschim (1970)

In the earliest films with the Indian diaspora as the subject, patriotic themes were the most common. Time has not been able to dilute the importance of this theme and it continues to occur in rapid frequency in films today. However, the 1960s and 1970s personified this theme. It was spearheaded by prominent Indian actors and filmmakers such as Dev Anand and Manoj Kumar in such films like Des Pardes and Purab aur Paschim respectively. It was around this time that Bollywood cinema particularly showed interest in the condition of Indian emigrants abroad. The early representations, beginning in the 1960s, portrayed the West negatively. This negative representation was never overt, but was indicated through comparisons with homeland. In an effort to reflect the conditions of emigrants, these films drew largely on comparisons between the West and India, highlighting the glory of the Motherland and denouncing the western life. They deliberately perpetuated an idealistic view towards living at home and contributing to one’s own country and this ideal was epitomised in the characters and songs of the films. Their central protagonist (in both Des Pardes and Purab aur Paschim) was almost always in a reformative mode; he was often a simple Indian youth, caught in the trials and travails of living in an alien and hostile land. In Purab aur Paschim, this protagonist (played by Manoj Kumar), aptly named Bharat, personified the ideal Indian youth, typically disinterested in all things ‘foreign’ and full of patriotism. His love for his country was highlighted by comparison to contemporary British born and educated youngsters who were shown to be difficult, disrespectful towards parents, indulgent and ignorant (such as the female protagonist played by Saira Banu). Similarly, in Des Pardes, popular and leading

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film actor Dev Anand tries to help his immigrant brother in England to overcome his fear of being extradited for having a fake passport, but also urging him to return to India. The film focuses on the dreams and aspirations among young Indians in the late 1960s and 1970s which led them to seek new opportunities in new lands. It begins with a montage of the life of these emigrant Indians living in England and a song which talks of their hopes of settling there, but it quickly contrasts these imageries with harsh realities such as ghettoised living and hand-to-mouth existence. khushiyan yehi pe milengi humein re, yeh des pardes akela nahin hoon main tere bina, sang mere sang teri aas hai milkar khile phool har rang ke, bas yehi meri aas hai yeh pardes.

Perhaps we will find happiness here This country which is actually a foreign land I am not alone here without you, for with me is your breath Together we may help many flowers bloom here, this is my only wish In this foreign land. Des Pardes (1970)

Although commercial, the film subliminally, but cleverly, based its storyline on the issue of isolation and marginalisation of emigrants in England at that time. It also voiced prevalent problems and concerns of the diaspora community, such as fear of extradition due to large-scale illegal migration with false passports, abysmal working conditions with less than minimum wages, and illegal routes of entry into England and America among others, which were prominent during the 1970s and 1980s. The popularity of these themes have consequently led to several remakes of Purab aur Paschim, the most recent one being Namastey London (2007), which follows the same reformative format of the anglicised immigrant (in the shape of the female lead played by Katrina Kaif ) by the patriotic and conventional Indian hero (played by Akshay Kumar). Despite the gap of a quarter of a century, it was found that the formula still guaranteed immense commercial success as was evident in the popularity of Namastey London. Nostalgia among the diaspora has been a continual source of inspiration for all filmmakers as it stems from the obvious feeling of isolation and the longing for home that is pre-eminent in an emigrant’s life. By invoking this sense of nostalgia for one’s ‘lost home’ through

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comparisons and through the ideology of characters like Bharat, the films created an idealism of the whole process of returning home. As a result, we find through the next decade, many repetitions of the ‘ideal’ of returning to homeland, repeated in later films of the 1990s and even after the turn of the century. This poses two questions about: (i) the soundness of such films in truly representing all aspects of the emigrant existence, and (ii) the necessity for repetition of this idealism for so long. Essentially, the perpetuation of the theme of glorification of homeland was an outcome of the anxiety and growing concern over the large-scale emigration of Indians to developed nations of the West. This outflow, which had started after 1947, had reached such high levels that it caused concern in the sending countries. Emigration also carried horror stories of racial abuse and marginalisation. Thus, popular Indian cinema (unequivocally Bollywood cinema), which catered to an ‘active’ (Altheide 1996) Indian audience who determined what they wanted to see and how they wanted their concerns represented, played to the galleries by voicing such concerns. This explains the absence of any kind of positive representation of western countries in most films of this period. It also explains the insistence of representing institutional ideal types of family, marriage, and religious activities in such films (as mentioned by Uberoi [1998]). For instance, in films like Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge (1995), and many others after it, the extent of scale of presentation was noticeable in elaborate songs, enormous sets, larger-than-life imageries and locations. Based on the story of a conservative Sikh family in London, the patriarch Baldev Singh (played by Amrish Puri) is resolute about his daughter (played by Kajol) marrying and settling in his native home in Punjab, but she rebels and falls in love with a fellow Indian immigrant while on a trip through Europe. Through Baldev Singh’s character the film explores the fear of many Indians living abroad about the loss of their culture to the predatory lifestyle of the West. Evidently, many Punjabi emigrants were able to identify with Baldev Singh’s angst and shared his dream of going back home one day. The theme of return is consistent throughout the film’s dialogues and songs. haathon mein pooja ki thali aayi raat suhagon waali . . . har aaj pardesi tera des bulaye re

We are holding our ceremonial trays, as the auspicious night approaches . . . Come back home, for your country calls you. Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge (1995)

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To emphasise on the importance of maintaining a ‘traditional Indian way of life’, the film repeatedly juxtaposes it with the alleged irreverence of the western lifestyle. The film idealises Indian culture and values through its central protagonists, who were, incidentally, both shown to be British citizens! Thus, the eldest daughter, born and bred in England, was equally comfortable in traditional Indian clothes and could express her childish dreams in songs and poetry, written and sung in Hindi. In an early comic scene, the hero (played by Shah Rukh Khan) attempts to con the conservative Baldev Singh so as to buy a bottle of alcohol from his shop. This leads to the latter reacting violently and commenting on the depravity of the younger immigrant generation and their love for the hedonistic pleasures of the foreign lifestyle. He fears that this is gradually eroding their roots. He shouts out to the insolent youth: ‘Besharam! apne aap ko Hindustani kehte ho? Hindustan ka naam bandaam karte ho! (Shameless! You call yourself an Indian? You create a bad name for Indians!). Thus, systematically, the film emphasized and built on the dream of going back home. As a result, it was able to strike a chord among the non-resident Indians all over the world not only due to its theme of glorification, but, more importantly, due to the nostalgia that it evoked among them everywhere. In the wake of changing economic environments across the world, and the transformation of the Indian government’s attitude towards its diaspora, Indian cinema of the 1990s had already begun to cater largely to an NRI (non-resident Indian) audience; there was definite emphasis on showing large flamboyant weddings and brides from India sought by enterprising young men overseas. There was also repeated use of traditional motifs such as celebrating Indian festivals like Diwali in cities like London and New York, of immigrant wives and young girls upholding the traditional Hindu customs like Karva Chauth,4 and of themes of ‘reforming’ the ‘anglicised and improper western youngsters’ into becoming ‘proper’ Indians. Eventually, the popularity of films like Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge 5 only reiterates how universally these motifs appealed to the diaspora audience. Uberoi states . . . writers of Indian popular cinema have proposed that these films tap into, play on and ultimately resolve through, a variety of narratival strategies the concerns, anxieties and moral dilemmas of everyday life of Indian citizens . . . focused particularly on the relations of the sexes, relations within the family, and the relations between social classes, popular cinema constructs an ‘ideal moral universe’

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that is intrinsically—if not always explicitly—connected with ideas about tradition and nation [sic] (ibid.: 306).

As a result of the popularity of films catering to the diaspora, the 1990s era witnessed the emergence of ‘NRI films’ among Indian filmmakers such as Yash Chopra and Karan Johar who, it is suggested, make films mainly catering to the aforementioned audience. Similarly, Pardes (1997), for instance, reveals a female protagonist, quintessentially Indian, called Ganga (played by Mahima Chaudhuri), who is sent by her family from a small village in Punjab to America, so that she may get better acquainted with her prospective groom, an anglicised second generation Indian. The film tries to portray the culture shock that she experiences in a foreign land; she is symbolic of many other women whom she represents. In this, Pardes raises questions on fundamental problems faced by many naïve, young women in India who are ritually married off to emigrant men in foreign lands. It also speaks of the vast differences in our cultural patterns and life choices and the inability of such women to accept and compromise themselves to these differences. Ganga exemplifies the eternal struggle of choice—between one’s inherent sense of morality and the new morality that they are faced with. Uberoi observes that, through the character of Ganga, the film revealed the preoccupation of the diaspora with feminine virtues of chastity and modesty. She argues that Pardes was significant because it showcased rejection of patriarchal authority by the female which ended with Ganga returning home to her parents in India. Although technically still a love story, Pardes, unlike Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge, was perhaps able to address gender and other socio-cultural issues, and most importantly, repeated the theme of return to India. It glorified home by setting it off against the difficulties of living away from home—invoking the lack of warmth and the detachment and atomised nature of the western way of life. During her stay in America, Ganga was dismal and lonely, reviving only when her parents called her occasionally from Punjab. She expressed her opinion of the western life when asked whether she likes America Mother: dil lag gaya tumhara pardes main? Ganga: maloom nahin. Sab kuch hain. Kuch bhi nahin.

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Mother: Do you like living abroad? Ganga: I don’t know. There is everything and there is nothing. Pardes (1997)

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However, Pardes was also different from Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge due to the moral stand it seemed to take about the diaspora. Thus, where DDLJ [Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge] proposes that Indian identity can survive translocation, albeit requiring renewal and replenishment through periodic returns to the homeland, Pardes discloses a deep ambivalence with respect to the diaspora—deglamourising its material benefits and enabling possibilities, while condemning its moral consequences (ibid.: 301).

But the importance of the 1990s era cannot be overlooked due to emergence of films such as Pardes and Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge and the enormous visibility they provided to the diaspora community. At the same time, one can question this sudden interest by Indian filmmakers and the film industry about the diaspora. As mentioned earlier, this was directly linked to the larger eco-politico atmosphere in India. The Indian government did little to press for better treatment of the diaspora when it faced discrimination or expulsion (as in Uganda). Following Independence, India’s fears of the outside world were reflected in not only its policies towards international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) but also an apathy bordering on resentment toward its more successful diaspora. In the 1990s the transformation of the ideological climate in India and success of the diaspora, especially in the United States, instilled much greater selfconfidence in both leading to a strengthening of bonds that have transformed relations between the two (Kapur 2010: 15).

It is also significant that, since the mid-1990s, the diaspora emerged as significant contributor to the Indian economy through worker remittances (Kadekar et al. 2009). The economic motivation of catering to this large market was therefore, inevitable. Thus, when we attempt to understand the evolution of Indian cinema’s representations of the diaspora, we must keep in mind its context and process. This is particularly evident when we see the growing emphasis on the return factor and returnee—a transformation from representation of idealised (and glorified) return to an actual one in cinema towards the latter half of the 1990s and post 2000.

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Coming Back Home: The Role of the Returnee yeh jo des hai tera, swades hai tera isse hai pukaara. mitti ki hai jo khushboo, tu kaise bhulaega? tu chahe rehe jaye tu laut ke aayega. nayee nayee raahon main dabi dabi aahon main khoye khoye dil se tere koi yeh kahega yeh jo des hai tera, swades hai tera.

This is your land, this is home It calls you How will you be able to forget the smell of the earth? Even if you want to stay on, You will return From your new paths and journeys In your breath and in the depths of your heart Somebody will tell you That this is your land, this is your home. Swades—We the People (2004)

The few films which focussed almost exclusively on the returnee seemed to emphasise on the experience of an individual returnee. Specific in their subject matter and set on more micro-level canvases, these films posed the same question differently. What happens to the return migrant after s/he comes back home? Is s/he able to bring to life her/his image of her/his past and comfortably settle into the home that s/he left behind, or is there a disharmony or discord between her/him and her/his surroundings? Two such films are noted here, namely, Hyderabad Blues, which recorded the experiences of a young software consultant who returned to his native home in Hyderabad after many years in America, and Swades, which is a story of an Indian scientist living in America, who inadvertently recovers his forgotten roots in India. What is significant is the pattern of characterisation of the return migrant in such films. They seem to follow a predictable trajectory which is almost universally predominant in films on return. The fundamental characteristic of the returnee is his perplexity over his surroundings. The initial stage of adjustment is difficult and he is perhaps a little overwhelmed by the change. His character trajectory then moves in a predictable manner. It starts with a discord, an inability to be in sync with his homeland after return and sometimes, even disgust towards the very same odours and sounds of his past. This is, however, only preliminary, for it is only a matter of time until the returnee is able to resume his ‘real’ roots and fall in love with his homeland all over again.

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In films on the return migrant, we therefore see either of the two features of the returnee’s persona: (i) s/he may be a sceptic, critically viewing his environment (such as in Hyderabad Blues), or (ii) s/he may be an optimist, who assumes the role of benefactor or innovator after her/his return. The latter representation is in tune with the ‘idealist’ projections noted in earlier films on the return. In the former case, the returnee is more like a sounding board of perhaps all the things that we are unhappy about in our country. Thus, s/he may comment on the inconsistencies in our social, political, economic, and cultural set-up. In the latter case, the returnee also points out all that is inherently good in us—s/he highlights our strengths and our uniqueness. S/he is the hero who returns home to initiate a positive change in our lives; one that will help people and liberate us (such as in Swades). In the process, s/he may also assume the role of benefactor altruistically sacrificing the lure of the West for the soil of her/his forefathers. S/he may also be a more pragmatic voice of reason and rationality trying to break through the ritualistic and hierarchical social and customary order of the traditional Indian society. In most cases, the films that focus on the role of the return migrant show her/him as both—a cynic and an optimist; s/he brings to light our failures and reminds us of our successes. What is interesting, however, is the changing projection of the returnee in film. It is a far cry from the blanket ‘nostalgia’ view with which we have persistently viewed the diaspora, and which was common in earlier films. As the diaspora changes, so does its representation in cinema. Newer representations of themes such as return can be attributed to changing perceptions about the diaspora identity, and by this I mean the new diaspora, which has become an increasingly important source of inspiration for Indian filmmakers. As Hall (cited in Woodward 1997) says, the production and reproduction of new identities implies the fading of traditional perceptions about return. Nostalgia now becomes relegated to an older generation of diaspora and its perception has changed not just for the Indian immigrant today, but immigrants in general. In a globalised world of merging economies and technological advancements, nostalgia as a blanket term has little relevance and application for the modern emigrant. As a result, continuation of the nostalgia theme, which strictly applies to an older diaspora, is supplemented with other themes. By the turn of the century, conceptions about return as indicative of failure of those who ‘did not make it’,6 were also slowly changing and

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being replaced by a more realistic conception based on socio-economic trends. As mentioned earlier, cinema proved to be able to provide a different lens with which to view return now. It caught on to changing perceptions about emigrants due to larger socio-economic events. Awareness of international economic conditions (such as economic downturns and its impact) was growing among Indians. Thus, new themes emerged in cinema which catered to these new perceptions. These perceptions were based on the return due to philanthropic reasons (where the returnee desired to give something to his country), or due to business process outsourcing, or due to better career opportunities available at home (Sahay 2011: 139–43). In the first case, returnees came back because they felt that their country ‘called to them’. ‘Jagdish Shukla, a professor of climate dynamics at George Mason University in Virginia, said during the first Pravasi Bharatiya Divas meet in New Delhi in January 2003 that he was returning to start a school in his village in eastern Uttar Pradesh’ (ibid.: 139). In the second case, the liberalisation of the Indian economy post 1991 allowed foreign direct investment and outsourcing, which, in turn, forced many NRI entrepreneurs and engineers to return to India. This was closely connected to the third and final case where the gradual but definite economic growth of India helped many such entrepreneurs to set up their own enterprises and allowed for more opportunities in fields which were earlier unheard of (Anirban Sengupta 2009). In these changing socio-economic circumstances, Indian cinema found new inspiration. It became aware of a large, closely connected, and highly successful community overseas for whom earlier conceptions of myths about their homeland did not seem to apply. They were perceived as economically, socially, and politically sources of soft power with tremendous negotiating abilities. ‘A demographic analysis of South Asians in the US from the 2010 census shows the Indian American population, including multiple ethnicities, grew 68 per cent over the 2000–2010 decade from 1.9 million to 3.19 million’ and ‘IndianAmericans are now the third largest Asian-American group in the US after Chinese-Americans and Filipino-Americans’ (Rajghatta 2012: 6). Propelled by demand, Bollywood cinema seemed to be inspired by this new target audience. Although storylines remained much the same (they were mostly romances and family dramas), what is interesting is the frequency with which these films were made and the amount of popularity they gained not just among the diaspora, but also in India. Glorification of return was replaced by narratives of actual return replete

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with specific characterisations of the returnee. Following the predictable trajectories of characterisations, they implied all return in an essential positivity. Affected as they were, by larger socio-economic factors, they focused on certain categories of migrants, namely, the highlyskilled category, and overlooked others. Thus, we have Mohan Bhargav (Swades—We the People), or Varun Naidu (Hyderabad Blues) who are the quintessential returnees, both representing highly skilled, highly educated, and professional class of people and both emerging as ‘heroic’ because of their decision to come back home. In Swades, Mohan, a suave and successful Indian scientist working with NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) in USA is disturbed when he cannot seem to get the memories and images of India out of his mind after he leaves his native village. Essentially, the film deals with nostalgia. Mohan has lived alone for many years in America, but he cannot seem to forget his old ayah (nanny) Kaveri in India and returns to take her away with him, only to get absorbed in his homeland, his people, and his kin, until, finally, he finds that he cannot stay on in America anymore. It is his nostalgia for all the things that he has lost along the path of his obvious success that drives him back to his swades (homeland). The trajectory of the character is clear. When Mohan returns to India, he does not have any plans of staying on. Instead, he merely wants to take his old ayah Kaveri back to America with him. The reason for this return is, thus, purely to satisfy a selfish need of companionship in a lonely house. The film seems to imply, through Mohan’s petulant insistence that she accompany him, a reflection of the individualistic self-centred nature of western life. Mohan tries hard to convince Kaveri that there is nothing left for her at her old village home and that he will be able to provide for her a bigger and better world in America. It takes some simple village folk and an idealistic and opinionated school teacher to reform Mohan’s thinking. His initial role is that of a critic—he understands that there are many problems in his homeland and he refuses to accept the possibility of change. ‘Yahaan kuch nahin badlega’ [nothing will ever change here], says Mohan, but again, it is through him, that the film provides us with a voice which questions unabashedly the problems inherent in India as a nation. Although Mohan is unapologetically American, he begins to change when he lives in close proximity with the real India. The small village where he comes to visit his nurse is replete with stereotypical characters: there is an idealist teacher, a bodybuilder, craftsmen, and the village Brahmins and dalits, among others. As an outsider, Mohan gets a

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different view of the Indian village. He is able to confidently point out the flaws in the traditional web of social hierarchy and, without really trying, becomes the voice of reason. Inadvertently, he finds himself trying to fight against caste oppressions still prevalent in his village and he speaks on behalf of the downtrodden community of the ‘untouchables’, the poor, and the outcastes. Naturally, his outspokenness creates for him a few critics and enemies, most prominently the village Sarpanch (headman) who questions him about his loyalty towards America. Mohan points out, ‘wahan par aam logon ke liye sarkar ke taraf se bahut saari suvidhay hai’ [The American government has provided quite a few civic facilities for the general public such as sanitation and health]. The Sarpanch replies, lekin humre paas kuch aisa hai jo unke paas na ha aur na kabhi hoega. jaise ki sanskar aur parampara. jab tak yeh hamare paas hain tab tak hamara koi kuch nahin bigaar sakta. hamara desh duniya ka sab se mahaan desh hai. [But we have something that they have never had and will never have either: custom and tradition. As long as we have these with us, no one can do any damage to us. Our nation is the greatest nation in the world.]

But Mohan does not agree: main nahin manta hamara desh duniya ka sab se mahaan desh hain. lekin yeh zaroor manta hoon ki hum main taakat hai, kabiliyat hain apn edesh ko mahaan banane ka . . . jab bhi hum mukabley main dabne lagte hain toh hum ek hi cheez ka aadhar lete hai—sanskar, parampara. America ne apne balbute par tarakki ki hain, unke apne sankar hain, apni parampara aur yeh kehna ki unke soch vichaar, unka rehen sehen kharab hain, yeh galat hai [I  don’t believe our nation is the greatest in the world. But I do believe that we have the strength and the ability to become the greatest. Every time we begin to lose at anything, we take recourse to the same thing—custom and tradition. America has achieved on its own strength and they have their own customs. To say that their ways of life and their thinking is bad is wrong.]

The Sarpanch is livid when Mohan questions the rigidity of the caste system prevalent in the village and he tells him, jo kabhi nahin jaati usi ko jaati kehte hai [that which never goes away is called jaati (caste)]. Taking cues from previous reformist formats, in Mohan we have a voice that is able to express doubt and criticism of our social and political structure. Mohan observes: hum log sirf aapas main ladte rehte hai jab ki humein ladna chahiye ashiksha ke khilaf, badti aabadi, bhrashtachar ke khilaf. hum main se har koi har roz galiyon

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main, sadkon main bolta rehete hai ki iss desh ka kuch nahin honewala . . . agar hum sirf yehi kehte rahe toh phir sachmuch yeh desh barbaad ho jayega. aur iss ke hum sab ko kuch karna chahiye, sirf panchon ko nahin, sab ko. aap apne samasyon ke liye panchon ko doshi thehrate hain lekin inke jagah par aakar, ap bhi wahi karenge. aur yeh baat mujh par bhi laghu hoti hai. dalit bharman par dosh dete hai. brahman kehte hai ki dalit unke jaati ko bhrasht kar rahi hai. lohar aur kumaar lala ki karz ko dosh dete hai, zamindar kisaan ko dosh dete hai lekin unka haq nahin dete. to phir hum mahaan kaise huye? Samasya hum khud hi hai. [We (Indians) are always fighting amongst ourselves, when we should actually be fighting real problems such as lack of proper education, or overpopulation or corruption. All of us at some point of time, on every street have told each other that nothing good can ever happen to this nation. If we keep on saying this over and over again, then one day, this nation will be destroyed for real. We should do something about this. Not just the Panchas, but everybody. You always blame the Panchas for every problem, but when you come to their position, then you too, make the same mistakes. This is true of everyone, even me. The Dalit blames the Brahmin; the Brahmin blames the Dalit for polluting their caste purity. The blacksmith and the potter blame the moneylender; the Zamindar blames the peasant but doesn’t want to give him his rights. So how are we in anyway a great nation? We ourselves are the problem.]

Mohan is the typification of the educated and modern Indian immigrant; he is at once self-centred and empathetic, but his views undergo transformation to such an extent that he chooses to leave his work and his life in America to settle for a substantially smaller job and simpler life in India. This change is gradual. For instance, at first he refuses to sleep anywhere except in his own vehicle, which he hires from a friend in Delhi. Gradually, there comes a day when, after being forced to take a nap in a charpoy, he proclaims to his old ayah, ‘kyun jagah rahi ho Kaveri amma. kitni dino baad itni acchi neend so raha tha’ [why are you waking me Kaveri amma? I was sleeping so well after such a long time]. His transformation from being a sceptic to a believer through the progression of the film points out the way in which the return migrant is commonly perceived and projected in a film. It must be pointed out though that even the critic in Mohan cannot resist the charms of his homeland and in all such films about return, the initial scepticism of the return migrant is almost always replaced by a positive emotion—a revived sense of belonging and love for one’s motherland. The audience likes to believe that, despite the fact that he is or may be a sceptic at the beginning he will always be transformed by the end of the film. Herein the heroic representations may have overridden several other nuances

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of return migrants in general and which need to be further explored. However, for now, the popularity of this typification is such that it is repeated in many other similar characters of return migrants. However, endeavours such as the idealistic Swades are important for the contribution they have made to the cinematic discourse on the Indian diaspora. The patriotism element is subtle in the film; it is present without being overwhelming. It reveals itself in humour and is given a new dimension in the dialogues that effectively capture the essence of homeland. On a trip to America, Mohan calls on his friend Melaram, a simple village bumpkin, to accompany him, but is left surprised when Melaram refuses him, saying hum yehi thik hai. Sir, apne aangan ke phool doosre ke ghar main phule, toh ghar ke armaan maati main mil jahte hai . . . it’s like apne chaukhat ka diya giving light to neighbour’s house. All the best Sir [I am fine here. Sir, when the flowers of our soil bloom in another’s piece of land, then the dreams of our homes are destroyed. It is like our own lights brightening our neighbours’ homes. All the best Sir.]

It is here that the film outlines its message of patriotism clearly—the audience is educated, just as Mohan, about the meaning of love for one’s country. Varun Naidu, the main protagonist of Hyderabad Blues (1998), is a young software engineer who returns to India after twelve years abroad and faces an overwhelming cultural disconnect with his homeland, his native city, and even his old friends from school. Hyderabad Blues explores an important facet of the common dilemma of the return migrant, but in a comical manner, as Varun tries to create a balance between the Indian system of arranged marriage and his growing affection for an Indian doctor. It is through Varun’s eyes that we get to understand the perceptions of a return migrant after he arrives home. At the beginning of the film, as Varun’s train trudges into a station in Hyderabad, he tries to analyse his feelings objectively. He thinks to himself: Twelve years! Seems like a lifetime. Seems like only yesterday. But I am finally home. Well, almost. Thanks to a disgruntled college senior, I had to take a train from Bombay to Hyderabad. As a result, it’s taken me two days. About the same time to fly half way around the world. Still, I am home. I am scared as any traveller in a foreign land. But this is my home, I mean these are my people. I’m home’ [sic.].

The initial reaction to returning home is more of an emotional roller coaster—he is chided for not touching his grandmother’s feet,

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welcomed by blessings to have a ‘brood of children’ very fast, and his favourite meal of mutton curry and tamarind rice all at the same time. A little overwhelmed, Varun finds no time to breathe as his family, which has gathered around his living room to welcome him, immediately hounds him with advice: ‘Varun, I tell you, this country if going to the dogs. Yes dogs. Not an ounce of respect left. The Raj was a great time!’ When he tries to escape the stifling family get-together, his father scolds him by saying ‘Don’t insult your elders’. Varun: ‘But I don’t even know him [his uncle]’. Father: ‘They are all your family.’ The onslaught of countless relatives, friends, friends of friends leaves him exasperated. He is keenly aware that there are quiet whispers doing the rounds about his eligibility as a suitor and the BMW that he drove in America. Imposing mothers thrust their daughters onto him wherever he goes. He finds the food cooked at home much too fattening; saying to his mother ‘you don’t feed your body with hundred per cent body fat’ and upsetting her. He also revolts against his parents’ insistence to meet his all relatives and all the temples around his house. He laughs at the fact that his mother gives one hundred coconuts to the temple priest to pray and thank god for his safe arrival. When he asks why she insisted on hundred and did not give him smaller change, such as twenty, she says ‘this [hundred] is a good number’. Suddenly, Varun finds that he seems to be fighting all his traditional rituals with his own sense of logic and concludes to his friends that ‘actually, nothing’s changed ’. Incidentally, the film is autobiographical, as its director Nagesh Kukunoor shares his own experience as a return migrant through this film. Varun’s experiences are perhaps a representation of the filmmaker’s own experiences. Like him, Varun too is initially critical of his old life in Hyderabad, and the ways of life in India in general; but he eventually grows to admire and respect that life, and to find that, after all, there is no place quite like home. An independent, small film, made on a tight budget, Hyderabad Blues received accolades from both the diaspora and the Indian audience. But, as Nagesh Kukunoor himself confessed, his fellow Indians seem more enthralled with his exotic appeal as the NRI-returned to India, while his emigrant friends seemed content with virtually sharing his experiences (Hindol Sengupta 2004). The film’s success was important by virtue of the fact that it was a small film addressing, for the first time, the actual ‘lived’ experience of return and what it meant to the returnee himself. However, it remained largely a personal film, about

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personal experiences, ending in a preordained format, wherein Varun finally grew to love his country despite the flaws he perceived in it. In this, he was no different from Mohan in Swades. Despite the film’s success after its release in 1998, Hyderabad Blues continues to be one of the few films made in India which concern themselves with the voices of people, and one of the few attempts at realistic portrayals of stories untold. Although there have been a number of attempts at presenting diaspora experiences, there have been no subsequent representations of voices of return in cinema. Given the shortage of representing return, we must hark back to previously prescribed personifications of return migrants in cinema: the transformed disbelievers or innovators who want to bring about a change in their native land. Swades as an archetype has generated few other similar films with such characterisations, such as the Bengali film The Bong Connection.7 The return migrant is also miraculously able to strike a fine balance between the two worlds that they have inhabited, one western and the other is the world that they were born into and have conceded to make their home in. This is found in Varun and Jasmeet (the protagonist played by Katrina Kaif ) in Namastey London. They accept the conditions of their homeland as they are, but do not refrain from pointing out its failures. They are at times bemused and at times active participants bent on bringing about a change in the system. Unequivocally, in no film on coming back, the returnee rejects her/his homeland. Despite initial struggle, they embrace it whole heartedly, occasionally look upon it askance, weighing its pros and cons until, finally, coming to the conclusion, that life in India has its own rhythm and one has to be open to accepting this rhythm to be able to appreciate the harmony within the chaos.

Conclusion The power of cinema on the Indian diaspora is in its ability to act as a connecting agent between two groups of Indians (those in India and those abroad), similar but geographically apart. It is through films which idealise nostalgia that we are able to observe the ways in which the diaspora has systematically attempted to relive their nostalgic vision of their home. When Benedict Anderson (1999) theorised on nostalgia as the feeling of belonging to an ‘imagined community’,8 he acknowledged

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that, while the imagined community may not exist theoretically when applied to an immigrant community, it has a very real meaning. For the diaspora, who hold on to this imagined version of their community, the feeling of nostalgia is essential for their sustenance. The films discussed in this paper attempt to show how Indian cinema has therefore, capitalised on the feeling of ‘longing’ among the diaspora. This longing is a constant factor—a continued despair over their loss. This loss is not only of ‘home’, but also of things associated with home, which are perpetuated visually. Such visuals can include trivial things like a colourful array of spices—red, green, and yellow—soaking up the sun on a tiled brick terrace (Brick Lane), the smell and feel of early dawn in one’s locality (The Namesake), or the touch of cool water from the village pond lapping at one’s tired feet (Swades)—these are the strange imageries that sometimes haunt the emigrant. Through the visual media, these become living memories. Cinema has played an important role in bridging the distance between lived reality and imagined reality. Since it bridges the physical distance between the ‘real’ homeland and their current place of stay, the viewer, during the course of the two odd hours that the film plays, is mentally transported to their native village or town. The audience loves those cinemas which tell their own stories. These films may be made by fellow emigrants or they be made in India, but they serve as a means to relive the notion of home. The problem, however, lies in contextualising this nostalgia in a widely global-local world, where traditional perceptions of a disconnected diaspora are becoming increasingly difficult to operationalise. An inevitable result of the transformation and evolution of the emigrant identity is the disintegration of the model of the ‘nostalgia driven diaspora’. Cinema, therefore, needs to address the ‘new’ diaspora in a multicultural West for whom nostalgia no longer holds the same meaning as it did for the earlier generations. The shift of perspectives from conceptions of a ‘distant’ diaspora to discussion of ‘transnational migrants’ living in a borderless world renders the need for new representations in text, in cinema, and in all other forms of cultural media. So far, most representation has been guided by political manoeuvring and strategies, by demands of market and the audience. In other words, it has not captured fully, and richly, the voices of the people whose stories are being told. It is important, however, for representations to change along with changes in perceptions.

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As return migration takes on new dimensions with this new category of emigrant—one who is closely connected and attuned both culturally and politically to her/his homeland, the traditional notion of the nostalgia-driven diaspora does not hold anymore. Unlike the old diaspora, for whom an imagined community still exists and is a reason for them to return, for the new returnee, this imagined community no longer is an important factor behind return. Unfortunately, this transformation in the nature of the diaspora has not been captured fully in cinema till date. Although it cannot be denied that an evolution has taken place in terms of the issues and themes being discussed, personal narratives remain underemphasised. And so, we continue to oscillate between viewing the returnee as either an idealist or as a sceptic who will finally turn patriotic. What cinema has been able to establish though are the class distinctions among the diaspora, clearly revealed through its characters, themes, and stories. It may be noted that the initial representations (of the 1970s and 1980s) of the immigrant were mostly representations of working class people. A reflection of the wave of emigration of semiskilled and unskilled labour occurring in India at that time (to the Gulf countries in particular), the protagonists of the films also belonged to this working class and the films thereby addressed issues relevant to this class, such as issues of illegal entry, racial abuse and deportation. This explains the recurrence of nationalistic themes in films like Des Pardes and Purab aur Paschim.9 Similarly, post-industrial representations in an era after economic liberalisation, economic crises, and the success of the Indian diaspora abroad revealed an emphasis on a new class of emigrants—one belonging to the middle and upper-middle class of highly skilled and educated Indians. It was at this time that the Indian diaspora gained considerable prominence in Indian films.10 As a result, their representation as returnees also gained importance in cinema. This is reflected in the evolution of the returnee in film from the idealistic working-class Bharat to the urban and upper class Varun or Jasmeet. Inadvertently perhaps, the regional dynamics inherent in emigration were also captured by cinema. This is found, for instance, in the way that linguistic differences, which are a basic feature of Indian diversity, have been captured within the cinematic realm effectively. Thus, in Hyderabad Blues, we find the essence of the Andhra (and Teluguspeaking) cultural traits, in the visuals of food, dialect peculiarities, and styles of dressing. Similarly, films like Bong Connection (a Bengali film)

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capture their own characteristic regional flavour in the music and styling. Secondly, representations of the emigrant are also determined by where they originate from. Thus, Mohan is shown to have become urbane and sophisticated due to his stay in America, but he is ultimately the simple Indian at heart who returns to his humble roots in a village, driven largely by philanthropic needs. The characterisation of Varun is different, for he has always been a city boy and is shown to possess a different sensibility, as he comes back to his native city Hyderabad to work. These are in sharp contrast to Bharat from the idealistic films of the 1970s era who was portrayed often (but not always) as simple and rural. This distinction between the urban and rural emigrant is very clearly formed in most diaspora cinema and, as a result, stereotypical projections continue to persist of the ‘urban’ returnee and the ‘rural’ returnee. Further, much of the narratives and representations, convincing as they are, primarily revolve around male experiences. Central protagonists like Ganga (in Pardes) or Chand (in Videsh—Heaven on Earth) are few and far between. This brings up further questions about gaps in cinematic representations of the diaspora. There remains a need for cinema to explore voices of such women to outline the specificity of their experiences vis-à-vis the male perspectives. However, the problems notwithstanding, we may invoke Hall’s faith in the role of cultural media as a means of social text and believe that cinema can use its greatest strength, that is, the power of visual appeal, to address these transformations in the identity of the emigrant and the changing identity of the returnee. It may be able to capture fully the layered history from which the returnee emerges and to contextualise her/his identity through such history in an effort to create a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of coming back home.

Notes I would like to offer my sincere gratitude to the anonymous referee whose insights have proved to be of immense value to me, and added richly to the structure and content of this paper. 1. Indian cinema can be broadly divided into (a) regional cinema and (b) the larger industry in Mumbai that is colloquially referred to as ‘Bollywood’. 2. Although there exists adequate literature on the emigration of the indentured labour from India as a colonial phenomenon, this paper limits itself to the cinematic representation of return migration of post-colonial emigration.

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3. Sudesh Mishra in Diaspora Criticism (2006) and Vijay Mishra in Literature of the Indian Diaspora: Theorizing the Diasporic Imaginary (2007) mention Arthur Helweg’s distinction between the old diaspora or the ‘ancient Indian diaspora’, which was primarily a ‘plantation’ diaspora, from the new or ‘postcolonial’ diaspora. Thus, the diaspora seen in ‘V.S. Naipaul’s West Indian novels, and the novels and films of Haneif Kureishi, Gurinder Chaddha and Srinivas Krishna . . . may be explained with reference to the politics and history of the old and new diasporas’ (Sudesh Mishra 2006: 235–36). 4. Karva Chauth is an annual one-day festival celebrated by Indian/Hindu and Sikh women, particularly in northern India, wherein the women fast from sunrise to moonrise for their husband’s long life and health. 5. This films plays in a cinema house in Mumbai to this day since its first release in 1995. 6. The concept of return of failure, first mentioned by F.P. Cerase in 1970, talked about those emigrants for whom the shift was too difficult to cope with, economically and culturally, and who were forced to come back (cited in King 1986). 7. The Bong Connection (2006) is a Bengali/English film which contrasts the lives of two men: one a Bengali immigrant in the United States who is returning to India, and the other, a middle-class Calcuttan, leaving India to pursue his dreams in America. It was produced by Joy Ganguly and directed by Anjan Dutt. 8. Anderson (1999) introduced this concept to determine the nature of national identity in modern societies. He claimed that nationality can exist over territorial boundaries and can be symbolic of a ‘people’. These people would live in an imagined community with a sense of belonging to a home which may or may not exist. 9. Of the different waves of international migration, the movement of unskilled and semi-skilled workers from India occurred first to the Gulf countries and then to the United States of America and Europe. Some of this migration was also illegal and an effect of dwindling home economies (see Kapur 2010). 10. The 20th century mass emigration of highly skilled labour, commonly referred to as ‘brain drain’ was primarily a result of relaxation of immigration laws in developed nations. Subsequently, the brain drain discourse have given way to the ‘brain gain’ discourse which aims to look at migration beyond the lens of a one-way movement (see Sahay 2011).

References Altheide, D.L. 1996. Qualitative media analysis. Thousand Oaks. CA: SAGE Publications. Anderson, Benedict. 1999. Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Jayaram N. (ed.). 2011. Diversities in the Indian diaspora: Nature, implications, responses. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Kadekar, L.N. et al. (eds.). 2009: The Indian diaspora: Historical and contemporary context. New Delhi: Rawat Publications. Kamat, Sameer. 2012. ‘Indian film industry: Perspectives and Outlook’, http://www.mbacrystalball.com/blog (accessed on 23 June 2012). Kapur, Devesh. 2010. Diaspora, development and democracy: The domestic impact of inter­ national migration from India. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

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King, Russell. 1986. Return migration and regional economic problems. London: Croom Helm. Mishra Sudesh. 2006. Diaspora criticism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Mishra, Vijay. 2007. Literature of the Indian diaspora: Theorizing the diasporic imaginary. London: Routledge. Raghavan, Srinath. 2012. ‘Review essay: The diaspora in India’, India Review, 11 (1): 65–72. Rajghatta, Chidanand. 2012: ‘PIOs cross 3m mark in US, 1m have voting rights’, The Times of India (Mumbai), 10 March. Sahay, Anjali. 2009. Indian diaspora in the United States: Brain drain or gain? New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan. Sengupta, Anirban. 2009. Social capital and business venture: Entrepreneurship in the ICT industry. PhD thesis in Social Sciences, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai. Sengupta, Hindol. 2004. ‘Hyderbad Blues is about me growing up—Nagesh Kukunoor’, www.indiaglitz.com, (accessed on 29 June 2012). Singh, Shradha. 2010. ‘Diaspora cinema: The road less travelled’, Pravasi today, www. pravasitoday.com (accessed on 29 June 2012). Uberoi, Patricia. 1998. ‘The diaspora comes home: Disciplining desire in DDLJ’, Contri­ butions to Sociology, 32 (2): 305–36. Woodward, Kathryn (ed.). 1997. Identity and difference: Culture, media and identities. London: SAGE Publications.

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18 Cultural Invasion from the Sky: Hinduisation of Indian Television? Binod C. Agrawal

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he aim of this paper is three-fold: (a) to examine the sociotechnological scenario of communications in the post-liberation period in India (after 1990), (b) to analyse the likely impact of communications in various aspects of social life, and (c) to present a case study of the likely directions of change in the secular ethos of Indian society as a result of the expansion of television by using the case of a religious telecast. This paper is based on the research studies carried out in the last ten years. The main hypothesis is that expansion of television is likely to have little or no adverse effects on the cultural and secular domains of Indian society.

Socio-Political Scenario in the Closing Decade The closing decade of the 20th century heralds the opening of historic communication interventions in a fifty-year old democracy. This decade has witnessed enormous and unprecedented changes in every aspect of communication technology, policies, infrastructure development and services. It has also begun abandoning centuries old, archaic government controls over information and communication. Communication

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lately has moved from the government to the people. Air waves and electronic signals have also liberated themselves from centuries old bondage to reach out and connect people. International and national private players have taken a dominant role in redefining, reshaping and providing telecommunications, broadcasting and information services. This has initiated an era of partnership of public and private entrepreneurial skills and abilities to bring about unlimited connectivity, both within the country and across nations. The convergence of technology has emerged as a new force to bring about multiple services through a single channel. This has already started happening in India. Privatisation and globalisation have become buzz words in the corridors of political power and in the boardrooms of business houses. Regulatory bodies have replaced bureaucratic controls to evolve fair competition, rational tariffs and equitable participation of national and international technology suppliers and service providers. The challenges of digital technology must be viewed in this new and changed environment in India.

Sociological Issues How should communications be used to effectively respond to sustainable development and to inculcate democratic values? What should be the vision and direction of the future Indian society in the wake of these unprecedented changes? Will these changes lead to improved quality of life in India? Other important issues relate to ‘cultural Invasion from the sky’ and cultural homogenisation. Television: Transformation of analogue television broadcasting to digital broadcasting from ‘free to air’ to ‘pay television’ through the direct-to-home concept has serious socio-economic implications in bringing about a structural change from the prevalent ‘familial’ towards ‘individual’ lifestyles in India. This has raised the basic issue of separating an individual from the family-web to push him into the mechanistic technology-web, which essentially isolates an individual from the larger human, social, interactive world and makes his/her life an automised life of the self. In India, the expansion of television in the nineties has taken a quantum jump from less than 4 million to over almost 60 million television households. Studies of remote rural communities have indicated

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the arrival of television in areas without schools, medical facilities and other basic amenities. Communication has become distance-neutral, no longer distinguishing between the remote rural folk and the privileged urban dwellers. It has also helped cross the literacy barrier. Popular brand names and products are being demanded by rural illiterate viewers. A new ethos of consumerism and individualism has emerged. Telecommunications: The remarkable expansion of telecommunication services in an until recently highly regimented and controlled regulatory regime has opened up the floodgates of telecommunications’ basic services, like the satellite-based mobile and cellular telephone, VSAT, teleconferencing and paging services. Many more new services are expected to open up under the guidance of the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority of India. Both, quantitative and qualitative telecommunications expansion is expected which would lead to serious competition in the market place. The telecommunications network, fax and internet are getting quickly entrenched in the outdated bureaucratic ethos of India. Should this new ethos be countered by a new information and communication technology in order to reduce paper consumption and evolve a more environment friendly approach is a challenge that must be squarely addressed. The expansion of telecommunications, especially telephone services, through small, privately owned ‘neighbourhood’ exchanges, popularly called PCOs (Public Call Offices) have brought about a silent communication revolution in India. Following the introduction of a new information technology policy in 1998, neighbourhood telephone exchanges are being expanded so that they can provided facilities for cyber-cafes (locally called ‘cyber dhabas’) and ‘Information Communication Centres’. These new initiatives have brought about three major social transformations—first, to some extent a demand for individual telephone ownership has come down. Access to telephones is preferred over ownership. Second, illiteracy has not been found to be a barrier in the use of complex telecommunications. Third, the telecommunications sector has opened up as a major commercial venture for small entrepreneurs. Should these cultural aspects of the use of telecommunications be a major concern for future digital communication technologies? Should the technology be modified to meet the social and cultural needs of several countries like India or should the existing technology be adopted by them?

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It is felt that there is limited and uncritical appreciation and understanding of the future communication needs, and its thrust in India thereby lacks a vision for the future. There is need for a sociological in-depth analysis, keeping in view the global cultural forces of the West and the internal cultural forces trying to create an unicultural ethos in Indian society.

Hinduisation of Indian Television The year 1922 heralded the introduction of private foreign satellite television which coincided with economic liberalisation. In the absence of any media policy, private satellite television began to mushroom. In less than five years, a choice of more than 50 channels has been made available to satellite cable viewers in India today. Now there are two kinds of television viewers: 60 million homes watch Doordarshan (the official network), and among them some 18 million households watch cable television. Commercial considerations, more than anything else, have shaped television programming. While none of the private foreign television channels telecast anything remotely described as religious or related to the Hindu religion, the Indian private satellite channels like Zee TV Network have introduced Hindu religious programmes, followed by other private satellite channels like Sony, Asianet, and Yes. Broadly, three types of religious programmes, though limited in quantity, are being telecast-religious discourse/prayer, mythological epics and fortune-telling. Doordarshan in the past had followed a somewhat democratic approach in telecasting discourse/prayer. Typically, hymns with various musical accompaniments were sung by various religious priests. But private satellite television channels mainly telecast Hindu discourses or prayer. Invariably they are telecast in the morning which is the time for religious discourse/prayer and worship across the country. These discourses discuss morale and ethical issues within the specific religious context and provide an interpretation of religious thought in order to help achieve the ultimate goal of salvation from human bondage. Saints, sages and religious leaders are asked to appear on the television screen to give these discourses. None of these discourses make any comparative presentation of religion. Given Hinduism’s multiple philosophical

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and religious tradition, each preacher makes his/her viewpoint in the discourse. However, the basic tenets of Hinduism remain omnipresent in these discourses. Mythological epics have been the most popular television programmes. In the last decade the most watched TV shows were the Sunday morning telecasts of mythological epics like Ramayan, and Mahabharat. Both these programmes were originally produced and serialised over several years by Doordarshan and are now being telecast by private satellite channels. What television has provided is a common experience of the same images to a large number of literate and illiterate men, women and children, regardless of their religious background. Several TV studies carried out during this period have given the highest viewership ratings for these programmes. Some private satellite channels have also started spending a few minutes of their telecast time to forecast the fortunes of the viewers, on a daily or weekly basis using the Hindu calendar system. This can have the adverse effect of encouraging fatalism and superstition among the viewers. Television, being a family medium in India, is watched by the entire family. In a typical viewing situation, family members from 4 to 84 years and friends and neighbours view television together. It must be mentioned that India has an ancient civilisation and hence every little act and activity has some connection with myth, legends, and history which ultimately connect with the hundreds and thousands of Hindu gods and goddesses. In this respect there is nothing that cannot have religious overtones. This is so ingrained in the Indian life-style that it is not even noticed as ‘Hindu’ or ‘religious’ by the viewers. Hinduism as a religion is considered by many philosophers as a way of life. It is extremely difficult to point out television programmes on any of the 50 odd channels that can be regarded as propagating Hinduism or even tilting the viewers’ belief towards Hinduism. There seems to be no attempt, overt or covert, to use television to propagate Hindu ideology, religion, philosophy or Hindi nationalism. A secular political ideology has governed Indian television. It is carefully regulated through a television code which provides a series of negative sanctions against any attempt to Hinduise Doordarshan, even to the extent of controlling the verbalisation of caste and religious names in any telecast. Other private satellite channels have also followed a similar approach in their telecasting policies.

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Hindu nationalism, as seen elsewhere in the world, has been playing a very limited role in the emancipation of modem India. This is due to the fact that the plural culture of India has been further fractionalised into a number of linguistic and kin-groups. This kind of fractionalisation of Indian society within Hindu religion cannot provide unitary, centralised religious control and leadership to the people. Hence, Hindu nationalism would have to first organise political or social groups for their emancipation and empowerment, in order to prevent the social and economic exploitation of the poor by the rich. It is because of these inherent social contradictions that Hindu nationalists cannot harness the energy of the Hindu masses for any form of Hindu nationalism. The present religious television programmes are least equipped to do so, even if there were to be a state fiat. More than television, a number of organised movements have had far-reaching impact on the masses through face-to-face dialogues and persuasion. Television is perceived more as a medium of entertainment and recreation than anything else. It is often forgotten that India has the world’s second-largest Muslim population. The Christian population in India is larger than that of many European countries. India also has the largest Sikh and Jain populations of the world today. In such a religious mosaic, with the existence of the freedom of the press, even a minor slip in depicting some historical event gets highlighted. In such a socio-political situation, it would be difficult to maintain that Indian television can contribute to the process of Hinduisation. Indian television currently does not seem to provide any evidence to show that the process of Hinduisation of Indian television has begun. To the contrary, there are ample instances of television planners and producers promoting a scientific and secular outlook, although this has made very limited contribution to creating a secular and scientific temper in India. The responsibility for this may lie in the inbuilt contradiction of a duality of thinking within the Indian ethos.

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19 The Cartoon of a Bengali Lady Clerk: A Repertoire of Sociological Data Dalia Chakrabarti

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 hen the cartoon is not meant for simple humour, when, as a visual representation of social reality, it acquires a dialectical relation with social practices and forces, when people to whom it has been addressed realise the meaning conveyed by the cartoonist and start thinking and acting based on it—then the cartoon ceases to be only a form of visual art meant for fun. It concerns sociologists as well; it offers them a social text to reflect upon. Generally, we are inclined to take for granted the pre-eminence of written text in most areas of knowledge, and to regard any accompanying visual material as at best secondary to it. However, the verbal/visual hierarchy is reversed in the case of visual art. We may recall Roland Barthes’ analysis of the relation between text (written) and image: the image no longer illustrates [author’s italics] the words; it is now the words which, structurally are parasitic on the image. . . . It is not the image [in our case, the cartoon], which comes to elucidate or ‘realise’ the text, but the latter which comes to sublimate, patheticise or rationalise the image (1977: 25–26).

In the cartoon, very often, supportive captions are non-existent.

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Status of Visual In the history of human cultures the dominant form of communication has not always been verbal. Both Michel Foucault (Gutting 1989) and Svetlana Alpers (1983) discuss times and places when visual cultures predominated (for example, seventeenth century Holland, or emphasis on drawing of characters in the Chinese or Japanese languages, or modern photography culture of the West). J. Berger (1972), on the front cover of Ways of seeing, asserts that ‘Seeing comes before words’. Even the making of twentieth century western society, which constituted sociology’s subject matter, and at the same time gave birth to the discipline, has had a distinctively visual dimension. Both photography and sociology emerged in the same year, in 1839 (Chaplin 1994: 198). However, until very recently the visual has been marginalised in sociology. Since the 1970s some sociologists began reckonable use of visual depictions in their works (see for example, Goffman 1979). In late the 1980s and the early 1990s there was a greater awareness of the visual potential (Chaplin 1994: 277). This was possible due to a commensurate development at the methodological level. The postmodern position is that sociology of the topic should be replaced by a sociology, which reduces the distance between itself and its object of investigation. It asks the researcher continuously to reflect upon her/his social location and find out its bearing on research process. Also, the distinction between verbal analysis and visual representation as data, it believes, should become less clear-cut. Taking a cue, this paper intends to present the cartoon, a form of visual representation, as a specific sociological text and a repertoire of qualitative data.

The Cartoon’s Potential for Sociology Any cartoon has two elements: a drawing and an idea. It is a complete construction. A good cartoon does not need a caption. In a single frame, using only black and white, the whole argument is expressed. The cartoon is predominantly critical by nature, though funny in form, and despite its narrow range, it records significant changes in society. It is usually a popular item in any newspaper or a magazine. It makes the readers smile, often gives words to the deprived, and even suggests the way out.

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The cartoon reveals moral standpoints of a given historical society as it criticises social practices in the form of ridicule or banter. The whole of society may not share a cartoonist’s position. But that a cartoon is made and becomes popular indicates the presence of a particular political or ethical position. Often there is a conscious attempt by a cartoonist to create public awareness about an issue and to form public opinion in tune with his own. Related to this is the question of power. To banter is not merely a moral act; it is political, as well, as the object of banter often becomes an object of domination. However, the need for this display of power arises when the entrenched section of a society perceives a threat to it. Hence, the cartoon often reflects a sense of misgiving or fear on the part of the subject. Its potential for sociology lies in the facts that the cartoon articulates culture, particularly various moral positions and norms; that it represents politics, particularly pathology of power; and that it even acts as a stimulus for critical reflection on events and eventualities. In support of my argument, I would cite Benoy Bosu’s famous cartoon of a first generation lady clerk of early twentieth century Bengali society (see Figure 1). This is also to draw attention of fellow sociologists to the possibility of a visual sociology of Indian society. There is an evident lack of use of visual representations in Indian sociology; G.S. Ghurye’s anthropological writings are an exception (1951).

Meanings Underlying the Lady Clerk Cartoon Figure 1 presents the cartoon of a lady clerk walking fast clutching her umbrella firmly. She seems to be in great hurry. It reflects a new sense of time—the male (worker’s/employee’s) time—imperatively acquired by the new generation of working women in Bengal. Her posture is very much different from the feminine ‘laid off ’ posture typical of the category of women not engaged in productive labour outside household. The masculinisation of lady clerk’s movement is reflected in her long male strides. She is looking straight compared with feminine shyness inculcated by gender-specific socialisation, which discourages looking up. She has a big, black umbrella—again not the lady’s type, that is, small, light, and colourful. There is a long association between large black umbrella and clerkship in both England and Bengal. Her attire facilitates rapid movement at public place. Sari is tightly wrapped around her waist—neither flowing in feminine grace, nor used to cover

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Figure 1. The Lady Clerk Source: Bosu (1927).

head or face. Typical male-covered shoes, and not feminine slippers, adorn her feet. Her accessories such as jacket, petticoat, umbrella, shoes and stockings reflect the typical westernised outfit of the smart educated working woman of early twentieth century Bengal (Tarlo 1996: 12). She has put up her hair neatly in a tight bun. There is little trace of jewellery on her body. Last, her spectacles signify her engagement in mental work, traditionally considered an exclusively male domain. Here, contemporary lady clerk was obviously perceived from the point of view of nineteenth and early twentieth century urban educated Bengali men. Their resort to cartoons indicates their westernisation, because the cartoon itself is western in origin. In India, it first appeared taking inspiration directly from London punch1 (Lahiri 1995: 122). Ironically, the lady clerk, their object of ‘attack’ was a product of the same process. The practice of making fun of working women started in Europe approximately during World War II. To relieve the tension and

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anxiety of army men many magazines, full of humorous cartoons, came up. These became popular as ‘army cartoons’. During the War many women worked in various military offices. So, there were cartoons on girls in uniform. These magazines—The frontier, Men only, Army news, etc.—were found abundantly in the footpaths of Calcutta (particularly in Chowringhee). So, Calcutta men got a taste of it very easily. Apart from this indirect inspiration, the War brought change directly in the very private domain of Bengali society—its home. For the first time then educated Bengali women started coming out of their home and domestic life, hitherto known as the only sphere of activity for women. The root of this transition can be traced to the nineteenth century movement for women’s education. The aim of this meninitiated movement was to improve women’s position within the familial framework, that is, to make them more capable wives and mothers. The reformers believed that though men’s education had direct relation to employment, women’s education had nothing to do for the public sphere. However, in the twentieth century, when educated women took up leadership of this movement, they redefined goals of female education. Abala Bose, Kamini Roy, Begum Rokeya Sakhayat Hossain— all fought hard to establish inherent ‘natural’ equality between men and women and they perceived education as a necessary tool to secure equality (Bharati Ray 1990: 47). The dramatic changes that swept the Bengali society, economy, polity and culture during and after the two World Wars, and later during partition of Bengal, compelled Bengali women to seek paid work out of financial necessity.2 During the War there were plenty of jobs for them as well as the moral support of the colonial British rulers. True, they never went to the front, but played a very crucial role in supply line. Then onwards, Bengali girls never looked back. Before the War the only profession open to them was teaching in school. During the War various new opportunities opened. As working women they had to stay out of home for five to six hours everyday rubbing shoulders with non-kin men. Naturally mothers-in-law and other members of the family did not appreciate it. Sometimes there were attempts to resist it. But, ultimately this initiated a stable pattern of change in Bengali life. Many a cartoon flourished out of this fertile soil of social transition. The cartoon under investigation is one example. The nineteenth century Bengali society had a very rigid gendered division of labour. A severely binary division of every aspect of social and

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moral life, and of family life, into masculine and feminine was evident. This binary social organisation is a complex of structural relations and the ground for female (or male) subjectivities and agencies (Bannerji 2002: 191). This segregation—which continued—of the public and the private, the world and the home, indicating separate spheres of activities for men and women is explained by subaltern historians, such as Partha Chatterjee (1994, see also 1986), as a nationalist ‘resolution’ of the nationalist male elite’s coming to terms with colonialism. For this school, compartmentalisation was a mechanism to create a protected space which colonialism could not intrude. This unconquered and thus uncontaminated private world of home remained the nationalist males’ sphere of rule. Although this explanation is debatable, we have located a loud social uproar in the then Bengali society after the collapse of these two distinct domains due to the imperatives of colonialism and capitalism. This collapse marked a simultaneous inversion of the normative and the power structures of Bengali society. Bengali males, who had already lost ground at the public level, being economically dominated and politically subjugated by the colonial system, apprehended a similar defeat at home, their last bastion. Nirad Chandra Chaudhuri (1968: 152) also noted this paradox: the conservatism of urban educated ‘modern’ Bengali men of colonial times. He explained it in terms of their intense patriotic feeling. The nationalist temper stimulated them to be completely dedicated to traditional Hindu way of life and highly critical of any deviance from the ideal typical Hindu normative structure.3 Women stepping out of their home to join the workforce was one such deviance. Since men could not prevent it, they often tried to make fun of such women. Hence, the cartoon.

Other Representations with Same Meanings The idea reflected in this cartoon is not an isolated one. Dev Sen notes that ‘women figure very prominently as victims of satire, as the ones laughed at. They are the butts of more than 50 percent of all male humour’ (1990: 68). That it pervaded a sizeable section of contemporary Bengali society can be established citing the presence of similar representations, both visual and verbal. For example, there were popular cartoons portraying (a) a mother combing her hair with full

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concentration in front of a mirror, totally oblivious of the crying child on her lap (see Figure 2) (Lahiri 1995: 9)—signifying a serious deviation from the traditional duty of the mother, that is, child rearing, and (b) a highly educated mother reading a book on child rearing while the unattended child was crying desperately (see Figure 3) (Ibid.: 13). It reflected the contemporary male conviction that modern formal education failed to equip women to fulfil her basic domestic obligations. Similar cartoons bantering women’s liberation appeared in other countries as well. For example, there was one where an army man on his way back home from the battle front was taken aback by the appearance of modern western women, who just acquired voting right after World War I (see Figure 4) (Ibid.: 10). In this cartoon, the typical liberated woman wore very short hair and an equally short skirt, and had a

Figures 2. Hideous Makeup Rearing up of children is the only purpose of women’s life. The traditional ideal was that a woman should not spend time on beautifying herself—dressing hair, making up face—but rather should take care of her husband and his elder brothers—arranging their sumptuous meals—even while she herself remains half-fed [author’s translation from the original in Bengali]. Source: Monthly Bangasree, reproduced in Lahiri (1995: 9).

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Figure 3. Obtained First Class in BA—Then . . . Educated women neglect their children. This idea has become redundant now. But, before World War II, women’s higher education was frowned upon [author’s translation from the original in Bengali]. Source: Monthly Bangasree, reproduced in Lahiri (1995: 13).

Figures 4. Have I Fought Such a Big Battle in Their Interest! Women obtained their voting rights after the first world war. Her skirt became shorter, she started smoking and wearing a very short hair. The soldier, on his return from war, was amazed by such liberation [author’s translation from the original in Bengali]. Source: Strube 1927, reproduced in Lahiri (1995: 10).

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lighted cigarette on her lips. The man sighed and questioned whether he risked his life in battle field for all these. A Japanese cartoon showed the liberated wife sitting idle while the husband was busy with household chores (see Figure 5) (Ibid.: 105). Plenty of similar verbal representations, bantering sharply women’s alleged lack of religious sentiment, distaste for domestic work, love of luxury, selfishness and westernisation, etc. are found in contemporary Bengali literature. A few poems are referred here as examples. ‘Kolir haat’, by Atul Krishna Mitra (1857–1912), portrayed modern educated degree-holding Bengali women publicly celebrating their victory over men and dreaming about bossing over them in various modern professions like law and medicine (Mitra 1892). ‘Pash kora mag’, by Radha Binod Halder, depicted how modern women used to dismiss their husband and inclined to develop extramarital relations without any feeling of shame and fear (Halder 1888). Poet Iswar Gupta (1811–1859) lamented the moral degradation of modern women, and held

Figure 5. Women are Now Emancipated. Husbands Must Do Household Chores [author’s translation from the original in Bengali] Source: National review, Japan, 1927, reproduced in Lahiri (1995: 105).

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colonial education policy responsible for it (Dasgupta and Mukhoti 1978: 444–45). In the closing years of the nineteenth century, Amritalal Bosu composed a song portraying modern women enjoying their liberation from household chores and their newly acquired power to boss over their husbands (Bagchi 1988: 76). D.L. Ray, through his parody of a Tagore song (‘Ke aase dhire’), ridiculed new food habits, changed style of dressing and mannerisms of blindly westernised modern Bengali women (Adhikari 2001: 59). An essay in a Bengali magazine (Bangabidya prakasika patrika, 1876, 13th issue) dismissed women’s empowerment as irrational. It refuted the argument that qualified and educated women would be as responsible as men in public activities.

Conclusion In this paper I have presented the cartoon as a representation, which through visual language conveys to other people ideas and feelings of the cartoonist. Thus, meanings are produced and eventually exchanged. Meanings are not merely for one’s understanding; they organise and regulate social practices. My analysis primarily follows the discursive approach, which, unlike the semiotic approach (where focus is on the general role of signs, here the cartoon, as vehicles of meanings in culture), takes into account the broader role of a discourse in culture. While semiotic approach throws light on ‘poetics’ of representation, that is, how it produces meaning, discursive approach primarily deals with its politics, that is, its consequences (Hall 1997: 6). Hence, the historical specificity of the cartoon of a lady clerk—its form and purpose at a specific historical time and space—has been thoroughly examined. It is definitely an interpretative work without any modernist claim to establish a single, authentic, stable meaning. Each viewer of a cartoon has his or her own understanding of it. This ‘taking of meaning’ is as much a signifying practice as the ‘putting into meaning’ (Ibid.: 10). Nevertheless, deciphering meaning presupposes existence of a shared culture, which sustains the dialogic exchange between the viewer and the creator of the visual object. Thus, this work goes beyond both the positivists’ attempt to present their accounts as objective, definitive and true, and the post-positivist belief in plurality and variability of social science accounts.

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Notes 1. In India, the cartoon appeared first in Delhi sketch book. It was published from Delhi Gazette Press, Delhi by some Englishmen, virtually imitating the London punch. P. Windham, an American, started publication of Indian charivari (15 November 1872) from Calcutta. However, the first purely Indian cartoon appeared in a Bengali news daily, Amrita bazar patrika (turned into English language newspaper since1878). 2. Pushpamayee Basu, an ex-school teacher, reminisced in a personal interview that, since the 1940s, girl students started planning in terms of gainful employment, possibly as an impact of World War II (Prasanta Ray 1990: 49). 3. Chaudhuri established his claim citing the novel Gora (1910) by Tagore.

References Adhikari, Pabitra. 2001. Tinsho bachharer Bangla parody (Bengali parody of 300 years) (in Bengali). Kolkata: Karuna Prakasani. Alpers, Svetlana. 1983. The art of describing: Dutch art in the seventeenth century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bagchi, Adhir. 1988. Bangla gan egaroso baroso satak (Bengali songs of eleventh and twelfth century of Bengali Years) (in Bengali). Kolkata: Ananda Publishers. Bannerji, Himani. 2002. ‘Re-generation: Mothers and daughters in Bengal’s literary space’, in S. Chaudhuri and S. Mukherji (eds.): Literature and gender (185–215). Delhi: Orient Longman. Barthes, Roland. 1977. Image-music—text (Essays selected and translated by Stephen Heath). London: Fontana Press. Berger, J. 1972. Ways of seeing. London: BBC, and Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books. Bosu, Benoy Kumar. 1927. Meyemahal (in Bengali). Calcutta. Chaplin, Elizabath. 1994. Sociology and visual representation. London and New York: Routledge. Chatterjee, Partha. 1986. Nationalist thought and the colonial world: A derivative discourse? London: United Nations University. ———. 1994. The nation and its fragments: Colonial and post-colonial histories. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Chaudhuri, Nirad Chandra. 1968. Bangali jivane ramoni (Women in Bengali life) (in Bengali). Calcutta: Mitra and Ghosh. Dasgupta, Santi Kumar and Haribandhu Mukhoti (eds.). 1978. Iswar Gupta rachanabali (Collection of Iswar Gupta’s works)—Vol. 2 (in Bengali). Calcutta: Dutta Chowdhury and Sons. Dev Sen, Nabaneeta. 1990. ‘The literary muse: Humour—Where women writers fear to tread’, in Tilottama Tharoor (ed.): Naari: A tribute to the women of Calcutta 1690–1990 (67–71). Calcutta: Ladies Study Group. Ghurye, G.S. 1951. Indian costume. Bombay: Popular Prakashan. Goffman, Erving. 1979. Gender advertisements. London: Macmillan.

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Gutting, G. 1989. Michel Foucault’s archaeology of scientific reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Halder, Radha Binod. 1888. ‘Pash kora mag’ (Degree-holder lady), reproduced in Ashok Kr. Misra (1988): Bangla prohosoner itihas (History of Bengali farce) (in Bengali) (231). Kolkata: Modern Book Agency. Hall, Stuart. 1997. ‘Introduction’, in Stuart Hall (ed.): Representations: Cultural representations and signifying practices (1–11). London: Sage Publications. Lahiri, Chandi. 1995. Cartooner itibritta (History of the cartoon) (in Bengali). Calcutta: Ganomadyam, Government of West Bengal. Mitra, Atul Krishna. 1892. ‘Kolir haat’ (Market of Kaliyuga), reproduced in Jayanto Goswami (ed.) (1974): Samaj chitre unobingso satabdir Bangla prohoson (Images of society in nineteenth century Bengali farce) (in Bengali) (1172). Kolkata: Sahityasree. Ray, Bharati. 1990. ‘Advances of education: From mortar and pestle to mortar-board and scroll’, in Tilottama Tharoor (ed.) Naari: A tribute to the women of Calcutta 1690–1990 (43–51). Calcutta: Ladies Study Group. Ray, Prasanta. 1990. ‘Laughter and politics’, Autumn annual, Presidency College Alumni Association, 18 (Calcutta Tercentenary No.): 49–52. Tarlo, Emma. 1996. ‘The empires’ new clothes’, The India magazine: Of her people and culture, 16 (6): 12–13.

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20 Race Relations, Ethnicity, Class and Culture: A Comparison of Indians in Trinidad and Malaysia Ravindra K. Jain

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he purpose of this paper is two-fold: (i) to provide a comparative analysis of the situation of Indians in two widely different national settings, namely, Malaysia and Trinidad; and (ii) to explore the interplay and the relative significance of such factors as race relations, ethnicity, class and culture in defining the varying identity of the Indians in the two countries. In particular, the paper seeks to answer the following questions: (a) Why is it that a race relations framework is utilizable in Trinidad whereas ethnicity defines and locates the situation of Indians in Malaysia? (b) What are the factors which enable the Indian identity to be retained and activated in Trinidad and Malaysia? How may one juxtapose the variables of race, ethnicity and culture to arrive at the definition of Indian identity in ‘plural’ contexts? (c) What is the substantive status of defining the Indian community as a ‘middle class’ in Trinidadian towns and as ‘proletarians’ on Malaysian plantations? Does the class structure prove to be the determining framework of Indian identity overseas or do the variables of race relations and ethnicity take priority?

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Race Relations We agree with Rex (1973) that there were three elements which were necessary and sufficient to characterize a situation as a race relations situation: (i) a situation of abnormally harsh exploitation, coercion or competition between groups, (ii) an individual in these groups could not simply choose to move himself or his children from one group to another, and

(iii) that the system should be justified in terms of some sort of deterministic theory, usually of a biological sort.

The construction of a race relations situation in Trinidad necessitates our viewing the racial system there from a dual perspective: (a) from the Indian (i.e., East Indian in the context of the West Indies) perspective, and (b) from the Creole point of view. West Indies scholars are agreed that from the Indian point of view, a category distinction is made between ‘Kirwal’ (a Bhojpuri corruption of ‘Creole’) and ‘coolie’. The former is used by the East Indians to refer to all African and African-descent influenced population in Trinidad. The latter, in turn, are recognized by the former through pejorative category term ‘coolie’. This category distinction refers to the history of population settlement in Trinidad: the import of African slaves from 1777 onwards and their emancipation in 1833 and the import of indentured labourers from India from 1848 onwards, and their constituting nearly half the population of the island by the 1980s. This category distinction has had all the attributes of racial antipathy and bitterness and has been the main obstacle in the struggle for Afro-Indian solidarity in Trinidad and Tobago (cf. Ryan, S.D., 1966; Samaoo, B., 1985). However, the Indian perspective has been distinct from as well as subsumed into a more powerful and enduring West Indian racial framework based on the socio-cultural evaluation of gradations of colour according to the polar contrast as well as intermixture between ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’. In the West Indies perspective, the term Creole has the connotation of the original Spanish term Criollo as “born in, native to, committed to the area of living” and it is used in relation to both white and black, free and slave. In a structural-historical framework such as that provided by Rex, the category-term Creole in this perspective refers

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particularly to freed slaves, the offspring of mixed marriages and ‘poor whites’, viz., a “group in colonial society (which) is the germ of a new society developing in the womb of the old” (Rex, 1978: 24). There are two characteristics of the Creole model which should be noted at the outset. The East Indian group is not accommodated in this model; they are aliens and in an almost literal sense ‘outcaste’ from the model. The consciousness and summation of history of the people of the West Indies severely excludes people of the Indian origin from this model. Since this is ideologically the more powerful, transnational (Caribbean) model in Trinidad and Tobago it explains why all Creole and White authors (cf. Williams, 1964; Braithwaite, 1975; Brereton, 1981, etc.) have given such short shrift to the demographically dominant East Indian group in the population of Trinidad and Tobago and of Guyana (cf. remarks to this effect by M.G, Smith, 1984: Ch. 7). A second characteristic of this model is that it answers to the imperatives of acculturation as contrasted with interculturation (on this see later), viz., it provided to the Creoles what has been called the ‘Afro-Saxon’ model of mobility. If during the Black Power movement of the 1970s, Eric Williams was criticized and an (abortive) effort made to somehow seek alliance between the African and the East Indian groups what was being run down was this “white-mask” aspect of the Creole model.

The East Indians of Trinidad and the Relevance of Race Strictly speaking, then, the identity of the East Indian group in Trinidad is not expressed in terms of the racially-grounded framework of the Creole model. To recapitulate, the Indian model expresses the distinction and antipathy between the Africans and East Indians while the Creole model, which is expressive of the truly colour-based status distinctions in Trinidadian society, should be seen primarily in terms of the WhiteBlack antipathy from which the East Indians are excluded. However, the demographic and historical coexistence of Africans and East Indians in Trinidad society for more than two generations has given rise to a process of “interculturation” (cf. Jain, 1986) between the Indian and the Creole models. That, primarily, is the reason why the East Indian-Creole relations in this society may be seen as a corollary of ‘race relations’

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rather than merely of ‘ethnicity’, i.e., the non-antagonistic coexistence of two structurally disparate cultural groups. The caste system of the East Indian group, is strictly speaking ideologically a hierarchical system contrasted with systems of individualism and equality such as the Western class system (Dumont, 1970: 239–58). However, through contamination with the Creole model, the hierarchical ‘caste’ ideology of the Indian model has been transformed into a ‘racist’ ideology. This transformation has come about through a process of interculturation and is manifest concretely in the ‘racial’ endogamy of the East Indian group: “caste having ‘passed’ into race” (cf. Jain, 1988: 137). To be sure, this has happened largely due to the segmentary potential of the caste system itself having interpenetrated the ‘racial’ system without its colour connotation. But in this process the biological and ancestry aspects of East Indian identity are emphasized and the progeny of mixed African and East Indian unions are designated as ‘dougla’ which literally means ‘bastard’ in Hindi. In other words, we can say that in the macro-framework of Trinidadian (or even Caribbean) society the identity of the East Indian group shows an alignment between culture and race, viz., the Indian derived culture of hierarchy and the West Indian model of a racial system. In that sense there is a straddling between race and ethnicity in the identity formation of the East Indian group. In postulating this we disagree with Van den Berghe’s distinction (1967) between ‘race’ and ‘ethnic group’ where the former refers to “a group that is socially defined on the basis of physical criteria” and the latter as “socially defined . . . on the basis of cultural criteria”. It seems, on the other hand, more reasonable to go along with M.G. Smith: “It is always necessary to distinguish first the biological stocks within a population on the basis of the relevant objective physical criteria; and then, secondly, to record and analyse the folk classification and criteria that relate to race, to ethnicity, and the other biological conditions, paying special attention to their relationship” (Smith, 1984: 28). The former distinctions may or may not be emically significant; hence everything depends on the people’s folk classification. This, as we have seen, yields the two models: (a) Indian, and (b) Creole, in Trinidad. Secondly, whether or not the importance of ethnicity or race is paramount will depend on whether or not the three indicators of race-relations enunciated by Rex obtain in a particular situation. Of crucial relevance is criterion (1) viz., the existence of antagonistic relationships. By this test we are justified in locating the

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East Indian group in Trinidad within the framework of race relations rather than ethnicity perse.

Ethnicity in Malaysia Despite the fact that, in a manner or speaking, both Trinidad and Malaysia are ‘plural societies’, there are crucial differences between the macro-structures of the two countries having a remarkable bearing on the identity of the Indian group in them. Let us first note some of the factual contrasts as a necessary input for discerning structural differences. The situation of overseas Indians in Trinidad is, in many crucial respects, different from that of Indians in Malaysia. The obvious difference of geographical distance in the case of the former and of proximity from India in the case of the latter may be noted at the outset. Secondly, whereas Indians in Malaysia constitute a mere 10 per cent of the population, they are as much as half of the total population of Trinidad and Tobago. Thirdly, whereas the majority of the recruits for Trinidad came from North India, the Malayan recruits were largely South Indians, mainly Tamils. Fourthly, immigrant Indians were introduced in Trinidad to work on the seasonal crop of sugarcane as indentured labourers whereas in Malaysia after initial experimentation with large-scale sugarcane and coffee planting with indentured Indian labour (1840–1910), the bulk of Indian labourers were recruited to work for the perennial crop of rubber under the ‘Kangany system’ from 1910 to 1938. The latter was markedly different from the former system in many respects: indenture implied an individual contract for a period of 3 to 5 years but the Kangany system was essentially geared to indefinite employment at the rubber estate sector on the basis of a gang member’s loyalty to and supervision under a recruiter-foreman (Kangany) usually from the same village or region in India as the labourer himself. Family, kin and caste ties were preserved and respected much more in the Kangany system than under indenture. Similarly, patron-client ties between the Kangany and his recruits—even when they left one estate and took up employment on another under pressure of ‘crimping’ during periods of high demand for labour—were an enduring feature of the latter system. In broad terms, therefore, the system of recruitment and settlement of immigrant Indian labour as it obtained in Trinidad and as was eventually established in Malaya could be distinguished as

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‘individualistic’ in the former and ‘communal’ in the latter. Paradoxical as it may seem, in socio-cultural rather than politico-economic terms the indentured recruit in Trinidad had greater occupational freedom than his Kangany-recruited counterpart in Malaya. Combined with the facts that in Malaya there was an indigenous peasantry (the rural Malays) while the remaining Crown Lands were progressively cornered by the large European-owned plantations under the highly profitable perennial crop of rubber, Indians in Malaya did not become peasants (for exceptions, cf. Jain, 1966, 1969). In Trinidad, on the other hand, the lack of an indigenous peasantry in a “settlement society” (Jain, 1986), the exigencies of seasonal rather than perennial crop of sugarcane and the imperative to cut costs following an early depression in sugar prices (1884)—all conspired to create favourable conditions for the contract—expired or ‘free’ Indian recruits to take up peasantry. In terms of the macro-structure of Malaysia, the location of the Indian group and its identity maintenance is clearly influenced by the lack of a ‘colour-caste’ system. Secondly, in particular reference to Indians in Malaysia two of the three indicators of race relations are absent, namely, (a) there isn’t a situation of abnormally harsh exploitation, coercion or competition between groups, and (b) the system is not justified in terms of a deterministic theory of a biological sort. I realize that there is room for disagreement here. Authors like Stenson (1980) have isolated race, class and colonialism as forming the trinity of a framework within which the historical experience of Malaysian Indians should be interpreted and a similar argument is bound to be advanced by proponents of a ‘plantation mode of production’ thesis (cf. Beckford, 1972). However, we wish to counter these latter perspectives by appeal to methodological arguments. Firstly, a comparative analysis shows the cultural system of race relations such as found in Trinidad to be absent in Malaysia. For example, even though M. Freedman (1960) went on to speak of the emergence of Malays, Indians and Chinese as “structural blocks” in post-independence Malaysia, he was careful to note that the plural society in Malaysia does not consist of ‘ethnic blocks’, as Furnivall seemed to imply, but consists of “ethnic categories within which small groups emerged to form social ties inside and across ethnic boundaries” (cf. also Husin Ali, 1984: 14). Secondly, and positively, the Indians’ plantation experience in Malaysia has been characterized by an ‘enclave’ situation of their life-chances and expectations (Jain, 1988). Unlike in Trinidad, they have looked upon themselves as an appendage to South

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India and on Malaysian plantations have been effectively isolated and insulated from the wider currents of society. Finally, the variable of culture, as we shall see in a later section, has taken predominance over that of class and therefore emically we are not justified in positing “a class for itself ” emerging out of what is ostensibly and clearly a “class in itself ” on Malaysian plantations (Jain, 1984).

Caste as Culture I begin with the vicissitudes experienced by Indians in Malaysia and Trinidad as regards the traditional institution of social distinction and inequality in India, the caste system. To be able to appreciate the Indian caste system in dynamic terms it is useful to view it as a segmentary structure, i.e., recognizing its potential for fission and fusion in ascribing identities and positions to individuals, categories and groups according to context. Among South Indians residents on rubber plantations in Malaysia Jati exists as a framework for ascribed identity and distinction on various levels of the segmentary scale. For carrying out traditionally ascribed functions of those of priests, drummers, washermen, etc., for example, a distinction and hierarchy is maintained between the nonBrahman and Adi Dravida (roughly, ritually ‘clean’ and ‘unclean’ castes, respectively). It is a fact, for Malaysia as a whole, that Brahmans did not migrate to work as estate labourers and are, therefore, conspicuous by their absence in labour-lines. Marital ties, increasingly but yet thinly, are formed right across the board of the caste structure (for example, there are reported cases of marriages between Adi-Dravida men and non-Brahman women, cf. Rajoo, 1985), but there are two especially dense points of distribution: the Vanniar as a sub-category of the nonBrahman but in itself a ‘fusion’ of several endogamous non-Brahman jati of Tamilnadu and the ‘kindred-around-Kangany’ or ‘micro-caste’ given the traditional preference for cross-cousin marriage among South Indians. The Vanniar level is located in the middle ranges of the segmentary caste structure and the ‘micro-caste’ at the lower end. This system of caste stratification is cut across by the common status of labour-line residents as wage labourers on the plantation, but only imperfectly. The system of Kangany recruitment and supervision and the formation of ‘kindreds-around-Kanganies’ among both the non-Brahman and the Adi-Dravida had led to the marginal retention of caste, by and large, in

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marriage, in the distribution of informal power and social control and even in the settlement pattern of a typical large European-owned rubber estate in Malaysia. It is significant to note that the particular articulation of the labourline residents’ caste identities and their common identity as a ‘plantation proletariat’ found cultural expression in the 1950s and 60s in and through collective mobilization as “Tamilians”, i.e., a sub-ethnic categorization. I am not here concerned with the historical origins, manifestations and organizational vehicles in South India and Malaysia of this populist ideology but its salient features were: (a) that it cuts across castes without being specifically anti-caste but by being anti-Brahman; thus its target of attack conveniently were the Brahmans who were existentially not part of the ‘lived in’ experience of estate workers; (b) that it was derived from India, hearkened back to another mythical target for Malaysian Indians, the southern Indians’ rebellion against the dominant north Indians; and

(c) that it marginally reflected the knowledge and the overall structural significance of sub-ethnicity in this population of Malaysian Indians. It was a ‘false consciousness’ (i.e., counter-factual to their potential ‘class’ consciousness as plantation proletariat) which functioned to legitimize symbolically their particular station in life as an Indian plantation proletariat in Malaysia.

Unlike in Malaysia, the recruitment and settlement of Indian immigrants to Trinidad from 1845 to 1917 as individual labourers struck a death-blow to caste as the traditional functional system of social stratification in the new setting. Neither the recruitment procedures, nor the long journey and least of all the patterns of life and labour on the sugar estates, were favourable to the recreation of mutually interdependent and clearly hierarchized functioning groups to which the immigrants belonged in rural north India. The historical delineation of this change has been done ad nauseum in Caribbean scholarship; the anthropological contributors to this topic also usually sketch in the historical background before reporting their field-data of the 1950s and 60s. By comparing various anthropological reports on caste among overseas Indian communities (including those from the Caribbean areas) and placing them in relation to research on caste in South Asia, Adrian Mayer draws out an empirical generalization: “. . . within the pan-Indian sphere, there is

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a continuum of situations: at one end may be placed the Pathan pattern, in which the ideological elements of Hindu caste are at a minimum; and at the other end are overseas Indian communities, in which caste’s structural characteristics are of less importance than is a caste ideology which is then applied to relations within the new society” (Mayer, 1967: 18). With some theoretical reservations about being able to distinguish sharply between “structural characteristics” (for which better read ‘structural’ functional) and “ideology”, I take this view to be a succinct statement of the nature of significance of Hindu caste in the Caribbean. It can serve as a point of departure for our exploration of the culture of caste in shaping the experiences of stratification and mobility for the East Indian population in Trinidad. Let me note at the outset that the ‘disintegration’ thesis for caste in overseas Indian communities to which I subscribe for Trinidad is sometimes associated with an effort to mark out historically specific phases of ‘deinstitutionalization’ and ‘reinstitutionalization’ (Sharma, n.d.). I believe such a view to be theoretically mistaken since destructuration and restructuration are coeval social processes. Mayer’s conclusion about the endurance of a caste ideology in overseas Indian populations provides a corrective. In following up the implications of caste ideology for the case at hand we shall also explore a phenomenon to which the Malaysian case has already alerted us, namely, that this ideology and its fragmented structured manifestations can bear an altogether different practical relationship with Hinduism than reported for India. In a situation like that of Indians in Trinidad what obtains of caste as a segmentary structure? It is worth emphasizing that a conceptualization of caste in segmentary terms does not predispose us to a sociology of groups but is geared more to a relational perspective among individual, categorical and also, potentially, group or quasi-group identities, as well as coalitions of agents. Where, as in the case of Trinidad Indians, the functions of caste groups-internal cohesion (e.g., largely through endogamy), interdependence (e.g., through jajmani relationships) and hierarchy (through a precise attribution of ritual purity and pollution)—are largely removed, caste ideology of inclusion and exclusion operates at a high level of segmentation, incorporating the similarly—circumstanced non-Indian population, namely, the Creole. Following the implications of the segmentary caste model for the internal structure of the East Indian population in Trinidad it may fairly

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accurately be said that there are no distinct levels above the jati of the individual. The north Indian hierarchical classification between the dwija (the twice-born) and the rest is not operational, nor for that matter, the four-fold varna scheme. Although attempts have been made by scholars to provide statistical models of endogamous and exogamous marriages in East Indian communities using the criteria of jati and varna which identities, with varying frequencies, the investigators claim are known to individual agents, none of these is anywhere near being mechanical models. The distinction between these two types of models closely follows Levi-Strauss (1963: 277–345) including the proposition that models of frequency-distribution in class societies practising homogamy and hypergamy remain statistical rather than mechanical ones. There remains a ‘bonus of esteem’ for members of the highest caste, i.e., the Brahman, and a corresponding heritage of social obloquy for those of the lowest caste, i.e., the Chamar. The former is centrally associated with the Brahmans’ continuing role as high priests of Hinduism in Trinidad representing a structural transformation over their corresponding status in North India. As to the latter, when a person is abused as being ‘Chamar’, the reference is to his or her ‘nation’, a Caribbean designation more ethnic and racist than caste, and certainly not translatable directly as jati. There is a lingering folk form of earth-worship among the Chamar (personal communication from Steven Vertovec), but that seems to me related to a particular sectarian symbolization of land possession by families who call themselves Chamar rather than a symbolic representation of jati identity. That hierarchical distinctions of relative purity and impurity between the Chamar and the higher castes— including the Brahman—are completely obliterated is more than amply borne out by free exchange of labour and of food and drinks among members of teams for agricultural operations (guayap groups) reported for rural Trinidad as early as 1890s (Johnson, 1972: 57) and, again, as recently as the 1960s. Klass (1961) gives the name hur for this arrangement and Schwartz (1967: 130–37) provides details. It is noteworthy that such mutual cooperation in manual labour tasks—especially for house construction—still takes place irrespective of caste even among largely urban and suburban East Indians. The disintegration of caste as a functional system and the attempted transformation and incorporation of race at the higher margins of its segmentary structure were two conditions-internal and external respectively— for the East Indian population in Trinidad delimiting the social space for

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positions defining stratification and mobility in the new setting. In the initial stages, the repository of symbolic capital for this population was Indian culture. The bases for economic and social capital presented themselves in the material or embodied forms of owning land and house and the diversification of occupations, on the one hand, and opportunities for education on the other. Profits in the form of institutionalized relative socioeconomic positions were to be derived through symbolic struggles.

Class Variables We have portrayed the institution of caste among Indians in Malaysia and Trinidad as a cultural variable. The reason for so doing, and not discussing caste as an aspect of social stratification, is that in the overseas Indian situation the ideological rather than the structural functional dimension of caste takes precedence (see, e.g., the quote from A.C. Mayer in the previous section). Furthermore caste ‘passes’ into ethnicity in Malaysia and into race in Trinidad. And, again, precisely due to the function of caste as a cultural variable in the context of ethnicity and race relations cutting across socio-economic strata in Malaysia and Trinidad, respectively, we are alerted to the possibility that social stratification—comprising the dimensions of class, status, and power—may not be the determinant framework of Indian identity in the overseas context. More specifically, through a socio-historical sketch of the Indian community in Trinidad and Malaysia (see, Jain, 1988) we have shown that the typification of the Indian community as a ‘middle class’ in Trinidad towns and as ‘proletarians’ on Malaysian estates is sociologically inaccurate. Nor, for that matter, in a context of change can the Trinidad Indians be regarded as proletarians and the Malaysian Indians (contrary to rhetoric) present themselves as a burgeoning middle class. As M.G. Smith (1984) has shown in his extended review ‘Culture, Race and Class in the Commonwealth Caribbean’ neither the dichotomous class distinctions nor the trichotomous class-cum-colour divisions of these plural societies provide a sound analytical framework of their structure and dynamics. To be sure, the class structure of these societies deserves to be taken into account as an important variable, but in so doing we shall have to reckon with the historical colonial situation and end up with a long list of strata (cf. Rex 1978: 29–30) which are not based solely on the relations of these groups to the means of production. As Rex has recently recognised with regard to

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racially divided societies, “. . . the sociology of stratification in colonial societies is as yet far from subtle enough to be able to distinguish the differences in class and status which coincide with the colour distinction. One point worth noting is that this distinction on colour lines occurs between groups of men who have something like the same economic position and cannot therefore be derivative from relation to the means of production” (Rex, 1982, 208). What is true of class and colour based societies is undoubtedly true for societies based on ethnic distinctions also.

Conclusion In an important article comparing culture and ethnicity in Guyana and Fiji, Chandra Jayawardena stated, “I have explored three main factors in the production of ethnicity: class, social status and power. Political processes arising from these fields of action transform ethnic identity into that self conscious phenomenon one may term ‘ethnicity’ ” (Jayawardena, 1980: 448). What Jayawardena never discusses is why in Guyana the collective interests of class, status and power should generate or be associated with ‘ethnic identity’ in the first place, since in his argument ‘ethnicity’ evidently presupposes the former in order to exist. The answer to this conundrum lies in the obvious fact that identity is closely related to culture. The mutual dependence of race and culture in Trinidad and of ethnicity and culture in Malaysia is crucial in defining the collective identity of Indians in the two countries. This correlation also explains why religion is a strong diacritic of identity maintenance among Indians in Trinidad and language the prime indicator of ethnic and sub-ethnic identities among Indians in Malaysia.

References Beckford, George L. 1972 Persistent Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press. Braithwaite, L. 1975 Social Stratification in Trinidad. Jamaica: University of the West Indies. Brereton, B. 1981 A History of Modern Trinidad, 1783–1962. London: Heinemann. Dumont, Louis 1970 Homo Hierarcfucus The Caste System and Its Implications. London: Weidcnfeld & Nicolson. Freedman, M. 1960 “The Growth of Plural Society in Malaya”, Pacific Affairs 33, 158–68. Husin All (ed) 1984 Ethnicity, Class and Development in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia.

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Jam, R.K. 1966 Ramnathpuram Experiment Paradigm of an Estate Farm-Factory Community in Malaya. Maitland: Australia Mercury Press. ——— 1969 “Kampong Padre A Tamil Settlement near Bagan Serai, Perak.” Journal of the Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society 36 (Part I) May 1963. ——— 1984 “Caste, Estate and Class The Dynamics of Social Stratification among Indian Malaysians.” South East Asian Perspectives 1(1): 153–64. ——— 1986 “The East Indian Culture in a Caribbean Context.” India International Centre Quarterly 13(2): 153–64. ——— 1988 “Overseas Indians in Malaysia and the Caribbean Comparative Notes. Immigrants and Minorities 7(1): 123–43. Jayawardena, C. 1980 “Culture and Ethnicity in Guyana and Fiji”, Man (ns) 15, 430–50. Johnson, Howard 1972 “The Origins and Early Development of Cane Farming in Trinidad, 1881–1906”, The Journal of Caribbean History, November, 5 46–74. Klass, Morton 1961 East Indians in Trinidad A Study of Cultural Persistence. New York: Columbia University Press. Levi-Strauss 1963 Structural Anthropology New York and London Basic Books. Mayer, A.C. 1967 “Introduction” in B.M. Schwartz (ed), Caste in Overseas Indian Com­ munities, San Francisco, Chandler 1–20. Rajoo, Rengasamy 1985 Politics, Ethnicity and Strategies of Adaptation in an Urban Indian Squatter Settlement in Peninsular Malaysia Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Indian Studies, University of Malaysia. Rex, John 1973 Race, Colonialism and the City. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ——— 1978 “Introduction” in Race and Class in Post Colonial Societies. Paris: UNESCO 11–52. ——— 1982 “Conclusion Racism and the Structure of Colonial Societies” in Ross R. (ed), Racism and Colonialism. The Hague: Martins Nijhoff 199–218. Ryan, Selwyn 1966 “The Struggle for Afro-Indian Solidarity in Trinidad and Tobago.” Trinidad and Tobago Index I (4): 3–28. Samaroo, B. 1985 “Politics and Afro-Indian Relations in Tnnidad” in J. La Guerre (ed), Calcutta to Carom. Tnnidad: University of the West Indies 77–94. Schwartz, B.M. 1967 “The Failure of Caste in Tnnidad.” in B.M. Schwartz (ed), Caste in Overseas Indian Communities. San Francisco: Chandler 117–48. Sharma, K.N. (n.d) Changing Forms of East Indian Marriage and Family in the Caribbean (mimeographed) 64. Smith, M.G. 1984 Culture, Race and Class in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Jamaica: University of the West Indies. Stenson, Michael 1980 Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia The Indian Case. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press. Van den Berghe, Pierre 1967 Race and Racism Comparative Perspective. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Williams, E.E. 1964 History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago. London: Andre Deutsch.

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Index

Adams, Vincanne, 67 ‘Afro-Saxon’ model of mobility, 347 agricultural labour, demand for, 163 agriculture based industries, 162 Akali Dal, 230 All Party Hill Leader’s Conference, 228 Aloysius, G., 221 Alpers, Svetlana, 334 Ambedkari Jalsa, 278 American Cultural Studies, 264 American Revolution, 256 Anand, Dev, 307, 308 Anand, Dibyesh, 73 Anderson, Benedict, 321, 325n8 anthropology, discipline of, 18 social anthropology, 29 Anthropo-Sociological Papers (1963), 3 anti-Bengali agitation, 229 apertures, concept of, 47 Ardley, Jane, 71, 72, 78 Arendt, Hannah, 26 Aryanization of the south, 7 Ashokan policy, of compassion and goodwill, 9 Assamese language, 229 Assamese nationalism, 229 anti-Bengali agitation and, 229 Assam State Language Bill (1960), 228 assimilation trap, phenomenon of, 49–50

Index.indd 358

asvamedha sacrifice, 7 Audience Clubs, 289, 294 Außenmoral, concept of, 189 babus, 206 Backward Class Movement in India, 4 bahujans, 268, 269, 274, 277 balkanization of Europe, 256 Barnett, Robert, 69–70 Barthes, Roland, 241, 333 Barth, Fredrik Ethnic Groups and Boundaries?, 31 Models of Social Organization, 30 transactional model of cultural generation, 31 Bengali film, 321, 323 Berger, Peter, 2–3 Bhakti sects in India, 9 Bharat Mitra Samaj, 274 Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU) agrarian mobilisations and movements, 173–177 agricultural labour, demand for, 163 Bhopa agitation, 178 caste and agrarian mobilisation, 157–160 data for studying functioning of, 160 Delhi Boat Club rally, 176–177 Kakdwip Tebhaga movement, 159

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index land-grab movement, 158 managing committee, 164 Meerut agitation, 171, 176 Naiyma Lao Andolan, 178 nature and agenda of, 164–166 opposition to globalisation of trade, 166 Shahidi Diwas (martyrs day), 176 Tikait, Mahendra Singh, 163, 164, 169–170, 172, 175 Trade Union Act, 164 traditional institutions, cultural practices and, 166–173 Binnenmoral, concept of, 189 Black Power movement, 347 Bollywood films, 305, 315 Bonacich, Edna, 46 Bong Connection, The (film), 321, 323, 325n7 Bourdieu, Pierre, 36, 129 analysis of cultural differences, 33 Distinction, 32–33 bourgeois revolution, 220 Braganza, A., 139 Brahminical order, structure of, 270, 278 Brahmi script, 6 brain drain, phenomenon of, 42, 325n10 Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, 9 British colonialism, 7, 219, 220 British India, xxix, 219, 220, 222, 223 British rule in India, 118 Buddhism, 3, 5 Buddha of Compassion, 64 Buddhist conception of Dharma King, 63 doctrine of reincarnation, 76 Tibetan, 77 BUJI, concept of, 184, 186, 189, 193n2 Bukhari, Sayyad Ahmad, 172, 175–176 Burton, Richard F., 136

Index.indd 359

359 Calkowski, Marcia S., 62, 77 capitalist development, industrial phase of, 89–90 cartoons bantering women’s liberation, 339 ‘Kolir haat’, 341 lady clerk cartoon. See lady clerk cartoon moral degradation of modern women, 341–342 Pash kora mag, 341 potential for sociology, 334–335 verbal representations, 341 visuals, status of, 334 caste and ethnicity, theory of, 4–6 caste (varna-jati) system, 158, 259–260 principle of reservation and, 261 censorship Central Board of Film Censors, 288, 296, 298–299 objecive and sociological criteria for, 287–289 charana, 4 Chatterjee, Partha, 338 Chaudhuri, Nirad Chandra, 338 chaupals, 202, 203 Chhandogya Upanishad, 9 Chhatrapati Mela, emergence of, 276–277, 279 China, 63 Cultural Revolution, 59 occupation of Tibet, 64, 74 Tibet’s relationship with, 67–68 Chopra, Yash, 311 Christianity, 5, 8, 14, 147, 150, 230–231, 332 cinema. See Indian films Cinema Critics Clubs, 289 civil-political nationhood, 235 coexistence, phenomenon of, 47 collective identity, discourse of, 73, 232, 234, 254, 257, 356 Constitution of the United States, 256

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360 consumer capitalism, 266 Conway, John, 58 Cormack, Margaret, 108 corporate groups, essential characteristics of, 37n3 Costa, Cosme J., 135 Coughlin, R. J., 50 Crawford, A., 146 cultural change in India, dialectical process of, 96 cultural coexistence, 88 cultural development in India phases of, 88 quality of, 92 cultural differences, 32–37, 267 depoliticization of, 18 between groups, 21 kinds of, 29 social separation and, 24 cultural disintegration of India, 5 cultural diversity, significance of, 28, 127, 191, 257 cultural divisions, significance of, 33, 35 cultural envelop, concept of, 48 cultural groups, territorial segregation of, 261 cultural homogeneity and nation-state, 16–26 orderly models and disorderly circumstances of, 26–37 and pluralism, 26–37 cultural identity, 83, 86–89, 91–92, 129, 218, 221, 234, 255 cultural integration functional vs. philosophic-historical problems of, 95 process of, 87, 95 theoretical issues of, 96 cultural involution, stages of, 95 cultural-linguistic identity, 215 cultural modernization, theory of, 84 cultural nationalism in India, 227–228, 256 demands of, 260

Index.indd 360

Culture and Society origins of, 220 political demands of, 261 regional autonomy based on, 261 regional disparities and, 231–233 religion and, 230 states reorganisation and, 224–226 cultural pluralism, 224, 257–258, 262 policy of, 26 cultural policy for India formulation of, 253 objectives of, 253 for promotion of social inclusivism, 262 relevance of, 91 cultural populism, 267, 279 Cultural Revolution, China, 59 cultural self-determination, 28 cultural studies in India, 267 cultural values, 30 advantages of, 248 culture, significance of, 254 communication, culture and economic change, 89–92 and contemporary cultural changes, 85–86 cross-cultural comparisons, 83 ethnicity, cultural identity and change, 86–89 formal properties and, 243 in Indian communities, 86 indigenous cultural traditions, 83 modes of value-orientation and, 106–108 nature of truth and, 104–106 other-worldly asceticism and, 85 paradigm shifts in, 82–85 values indicating worldview, 103–104 values regarding nature of man, 101–103 cyber-cafes, 329 Dalai Lama, 58, 61, 63–64, 76, 77 demand for autonomy of Tibet, 71–72

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index dual religious and political role, 71, 78 writing about primordial Tibet, 68 Dalits, 87, 89, 159, 268, 269, 316, 318 dandaniti (policy of coercion), 13 Dashavatar of Vishnu, 271 Deccan Sabha, 278 de Grazia, Sebastian, 197–198 deities of India, 7 Desai, A. R., 221 Deshpande, Madhav N., 219 Des Pardes (film), 304, 307, 323 Dhanagare, D. N., 159, 175 dharmasastra, 12 Dictionary of the Social Sciences, A (Schermerhorn), 45 digital broadcasting, 328 Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge (film), 303, 304, 309–312 displacement syndrome, 218, 235 distribution of income, 250 Divine Will, 95, 103–104 division of labour, 31, 182, 249, 260, 337 Doordarshan, 330–331 Double Identity (1960), 50 Douglas, Mary, 246 Dutch Indonesians, 22 dwija, 354 East Indians of Trinidad, 347–349 ecology concern for, 112 and worldview, 113–115 economic development, 28, 52, 86, 89, 91, 185, 231, 247 recession, 213 educational systems, 238 British, 249 comparative sociology of, 243, 249 culture goals of, 245 functional distribution of, 240 German literacy, evolution of, 247

Index.indd 361

361 in Ghana, 249 insecurities and anomalies of, 94 and learning institutions in India, 244 modus operandi of, 246 and social change, 245–250 structural properties of, 244 Third World nations’ designs in, 249 education consumption, phenomenon of, 245 environment-friendly society and culture, 123–128 Epstein, Israel, 66, 67 Esteves, S., 144 ethnic boundaries, 30–31, 36, 86, 350 ethnic conflicts, 26 ethnic distinctiveness, political uses of, 21 Ethnic Groups and Boundaries? (Barth), 31 ethnic homogeneity, 21 ethnic identities, 14n2, 16, 26, 47, 73, 254, 259, 261, 356 ethnicity in Malaysia, 349–351 caste as culture, 351–355 ideological elements of Hindu caste, 353 Indian community, 355 Malaysia Jati, 351 salient features of, 352 ethnic nationalism, 73, 256 ethnocentrism concept of, 44 Western, 115 European Union, 257 farmers/peasants, of western Uttar Pradesh, 160–164 Film Enquiry Committee, 284, 293, 299 Film Finance Corporation, 293, 299 films. See Indian films folk beliefs and practices, 4, 9 folk communities, values of, 125

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362 Foster, George M., 118, 249 Foucault, Michel, 241, 334 Freedman, M., 350 French Revolution, 256 Ganapathy festival, Maharashtra, xxx, 269, 270–277, 279 Ashtavinayak temples, 280 public installations of Ganesha idols, 273 Ganga, River, 114 Gellner, Ernest, 16–28 definition of the ‘modern state’, 25 model of nation-states, 24 Ghurye, G. S. academic career, 1 Anthropo-Sociological Papers (1963), 3 Caste and Race in India, 4 ethnography of caste and ethnicity, 4–6 on Indian systems of knowledge, 9–13 on Indian unity, 6–8 on Indian values, 8–9 literary and religious works, 1 use of cultural attainments, 2 views on Indian systems of knowledge, 4 girrnit system, 41–42 Goa’s ecology folklore traditions, 146–150 freshwater- and seawater-fishing occupations, 138 gaonkaris (village associations), 138 Gouly tribe, case of, 140–141 and importance of waterways, 136 khazans (reclaimed lands), 133–135, 137 manos, 138 nautical highways, of social intercourse, 135–136 pagel, 138 puran sheti, 137

Index.indd 362

Culture and Society salt production, 137 sea and maritime traditions, 139–140 seafood, 149 seawater baths, characteristics of, 142–143 spring water baths, 145 water and community organisation, 140–141 water and the evolution of the occupational structure, 136–139 water as matrix of, 133–135 water, baths and beliefs, 141–146 water, classification of, 150 water, in local linguistic idioms, 150–155 Goldstein, Melvyn, 60, 66, 67, 74 Goody, Jack, 29, 32 gotra, 4 Gracias, F., 145 Great Depression, 112 green revolution, 85, 162 Gross National Happiness (GNH), 185 Gross National Product (GNP), 185 group migrations, 46 Grunfeld, Tom, 65–67 Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences, 115 Gupta, Iswar, 341 guru, 10–11 gurukulas, 10 Gurumukhi (Punjabi language), 230 Habermasian theory of communication, 182 Halder, Radha Binod, 341 happiness. See also leisure basic views of, 183–185 Empirical Facts and Analysis, 185–188

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index Gross National Happiness (GNH), 185 hypothetical typology of views of, 189 methodological tasks for investigating, 190–192 passive, 186 quality of life and, 210 SACHI, 188–189 types of views of, 188–190 western vs. non-western perspectives of, 190 Haq, Mahabubul, 184, 189 Harijans, 159, 163 Hilton, James, 59–60 Hindi cinema, 304 Hindi film industry, 305 Hinduism, 8 Aryan (Brahmanical) brand of, 230 shuddhi, importance of, 274 Hinduization of castes and tribes, xxiv of Indian television, 330–332 process of, 5 Hindu Mahasabha, 277 Hindu–Muslim interaction, in religious and cultural spheres, 6 Hindu Rastra, concept of, 232 Hindu’s life, stages of, 8 Hindutva, ideology of, 232 History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951, A (1989), 66 homeland, concept of, 219 homogamy, 354 hookah, 171–172, 176, 202 host hostility, phenomenon of, 44, 46 human culture, 2, 18, 183, 334 Human Development Index (HDI), 184, 187, 189, 191 humanitarian nationalism, idea of, 256, 257 human nature, 109 bio-social nature of, 103 theory of, 101–103

Index.indd 363

363 human rights, xxx, 69, 70, 77, 256 human security, meaning of, 185, 189 human well-being, 185, 190, 192, 193n1 factors influencing, 186 Hyderabad Blues (film), 304, 313, 314, 319–321, 323 hypergamy, practice of, 7, 354 imagined community, 321–323 Imperial-Monarchical Society, 200 India Cinematograph Act, 294 Indian Farmers Association. See Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU) Indian Film Industry, 289 Indian films, 283 administrative aspect, relating to cinema halls, 294 Audience Clubs, 289 Bengali film. See Bengali film Bollywood films. See Bollywood films Bong Connection, The (film), 321, 323 censorship, objective and sociological criteria for, 287–289 Central Board of Film Censors, 296 characterisation of the return migrant in, 313 Cinema Critics Clubs, 289, 298 content analysis of, 290 Des Pardes (film), 304, 307, 323 Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge (film), 303, 304, 309–312 educating and organising public opinion, 294–295 for entertainment of the people, 296–297 Entertainment Tax, 293, 298 glorification and nostalgia, 307–312 Hindi cinema. See Hindi cinema Hyderabad Blues (film), 304, 313, 314, 319–321, 323

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364 Indian films (Contd.) improving the standard of, 295–296 mobile cinemas, 297 Namastey London (film), 308, 321 new cinema houses and improving existing ones, 297–298 non-resident Indian (NRI) audience, 310 Pardes (film), 303, 304, 311–312 popularity of, 311 power of, as a tool for narration of experiences, 303 predicting popularity of, 290–294 public taste, 290 Purab aur Paschim (film), 304, 307, 308, 323 representations of the diaspora, 312, 321 research, 298–300 role of the returnee and, 313–321 rural community halls, 296–297 Shri 420 (film), xxxi, 292 social impact of, 296 sociological aspect of, 289 State Advisory Board, 296 Swades—We the People (film), 304, 314, 316–319 theme of glorification of homeland, 309 Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 296, 299 Indian joint family, features and functions of, 117 Indian philosophical systems, 3 Indian Sociological Society (ISS), xxiii Indian sociology, 122 Indian values, evolution of, 8–9 individual citizenship, principle of, 250, 255–256, 260, 261 Indo-Aryan Hindi language, 230 “Indological” sociology, 242 industrial revolution, 88, 198, 200, 220 industrial society, emergence of, 201

Index.indd 364

Culture and Society Information Communication Centres, 329 information-technology, 91 “innovating” migration, 54 insulators, concept of, 47 inter-caste marriages, legalisation of, 276 inter-caste rivalries, 5 intercultural contact, phenomenon of, 46, 90 International Sociological Association, 192, 251 Jainism, 5 Jain, Ravindra K., 48 jajmani relationships, 353 jalsa, 269 Ambedkari, 278 as popular culture, 270–276 Satyashodhak Jalsas, 269–271, 277 Janata Dal, 178 jatakas, 117–118 jati, 7, 351, 354 Jayawardena, Chandra, 51, 356 Jharkhandi nationalism, 227 Johar, Karan, 311 Johnson, Alvin, 283 kabaddi, 202 Kakdwip Tebhaga movement, 159 Kalapathaks, 278 Kamat, Sameer, 304 Kangany system, 349 Kapoor, Raj, 292 Kapur, Devesh, 302 karma, 75 Karnataka Rajya Royta Sangh, 165 Karva Chauth (festival), 310, 325n4 Kautilya, 9, 12–13 khap chaudharys, 169, 170, 173 khap farmers, 166, 168 Khap panchayat, xxvii, 167–168, 170 Khoshal Sammilani, 232 kiritans, 274

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index kisan panchayats, 169 Kisan Sabhas, xxvii knowledge. See also educational systems borrowed, 242 growth of, 3 Indian systems of, 4, 9–13 Kautilya’s system of, 12 “non-economic” factors, influence of, 247 rational calculation of, 239 sociology of, 3 Western Divine Right theory, 10 Koshal Bhasa Sahitya Parisad, 232 Koshali nationality, 232 Kulturkritik, tradition of, 266 Kunzru, H. N., 284, 291 lady clerk cartoon meanings underlying, 335–338 other representations with same meanings, 338–342 laissez-faire doctrine, 109, 123 lavani/mujra, 272 learning institutions in India, 244 leisure. See also happiness centrality of, 211–212 cultural concept of, 197 of farming class, 202–203 impact of technological transformation on, 209 of industrial or blue-collar workers, 204–206 of IT workers and other professionals, 206–207 leisure society, 212–213 leisure, youth, and social transformation, 207–210 migrant service-providers, 204 patterns of, 200, 201 rural scenario, 203 social structure and, 199–201 social transformation, 201, 207–211

Index.indd 365

365 sociological concept of, 198 socio-psychological concept of, 198 white-collar workers, 206 linga, 9 lingua franca, 52, 227 linguistics Assam State Language Bill (1960), 228 cultural nationalism and states reorganisation, 224–226 division of Indian states on basis of, 7 and tribal identities in India, 219 tribal language, 227 Little Community, The (1955), 117, 119–121 Lost Horizon (1933), 59 Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation, 279 Maharashtra Tourism and Development Corporation, 279 Malaysia, ethnicity in. See ethnicity in Malaysia Malkki, Liisa, 62 mandals (committees), 273–274, 276 Mannheim, Karl, 2, 241 Mao, Tse-tung, 59 marginal man, concept of, xxv, 44–45 Marginal Man, The (1937), 44 marital alliances, 7 market capitalism, 90–91 marriages anuloma, 276 inter-caste, 276 pratiloma, 276 Marx, Karl, 239 mass culture, 91, 115, 201, 265, 267 melas (fairs), 202–203, 205, 272–274, 276–279 mela samitis (committees), 276 Middle East, 6, 42, 139, 291

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366 migrations from India, 41 girrnit system, 41–42 Migration to the Middle East (MIME), 42–43, 45 and theory of migrant behaviour, 44 Migration to the Middle East (MIME), 42, 45 distinguishing features of, 42–43 minorities, phenomenon of, 46 minority groups, formation of, 22–24, 88, 256 ‘Missed Opportunities’ Project, 194n5 Mitra, Atul Krishna, 341 Mizo National Front, 228 Mizo nationalism, 228 Models of Social Organization, 30 modernization, notions of, 83 Monarchical-Feudal Society, 200 Moore, Barrington, Jr., 158 Motion pictures, 115, 283, 284, 287, 290 Mukerjee, Radha Kamal, 287 multi-cultural societies, 253, 256–258 Nakane, Chie, 91 Nakazawa, Shin’ichi, 188 Naktanchya Bazar, 277 Namastey London (film), 308, 321 national cultural integration vs. ethnic diversity, 28 national identity, concept of, 234 national integration, concept of, 8, 26, 219 nationalism cultural, 224–226, 230, 234 dual conception of, 218, 221 in Europe, 216, 220 humanitarian concept of, 255–256 in India, 219–221 in multi-national context, 215–219 Oriya National Movement, in colonial India, 222–224 political, 223, 234, 256, 258

Index.indd 366

Culture and Society principle of, 16 religion and formation of, 229–231 ‘state-aspiring’ and ‘staterenouncing’, 218 tribal, 227–229 nation, concept of, 216–217 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 284, 286, 288, 306 New International Economic Order (NIEO), 249 Nowak, Margaret, 70–72 official language of India, 26 Of Time, Work and Leisure (1964), 197 Oriya nationalism, xxix, 223–224, 231 Oriya National Movement, in colonial India, 222–224 Pacific Indians (Crocombe), 40–41 Panchshila, principles of, 291 Pandit Kavis, 270 Pardes (film), 303, 304, 311–312 Park, Robert E., 44 partial truths, doctrine of, 3 Patel Bill (1918), 276 Patel, Vithalbhai, 276 peasant civilization character of, 121 conceptual model and sources, 118–123 culture of, 119 religious and moral life of, 119 study of, 116–118 Peasant Society and Culture (1956), 116–117, 119, 121 Peranakans, 49 Pires, Tome, 139 political evolution, of nation state, 25 political nationalism, 220, 223, 234, 256–258, 278 popular culture, 265–270 and contesting claims to the public sphere, 278–280

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index Powers, John, 66 Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, 315 pre-migration culture, of immigrant group, 23 Public Call Offices (PCOs), 329 public culture, notion of, 268 pumsarthas, 8 Pune Festival, 265, 269, 279–280 Punjabi nationality, 230 Purab aur Paschim (film), 304, 307, 308, 323 puran sheti, 137 quality of life and happiness, 210 race relations caste as culture, 351–355 class variables and, 355–356 ‘colour-caste’ system, 350 construction of, 346 Creole model, characteristics of, 347 East Indians of Trinidad, 347–349 elements of, 346–347 ethnicity in Malaysia, 349–351 Radhakrishnan, S., 130 rangzen, concept of, 70–71 Raven, H., 130 Redfield, Robert, 116–121 refugee syndrome, 60 regional languages, evolution of, 6 religion politicization of, 87 role in growth of nationalism, 229–231 religious land, notion of, 63 Renou, Louis, 87 reservation, principle of, 261 group-based, 262 resilience, concept of, 48 Richardson, Hugh, 65 Rigyeda, 8, 114, 122, 130 rishi, 4, 7, 144–145 rural family, 117

Index.indd 367

367 Sahayadri Khand, 146 Said, Edward, 76 Samaveda, 8 Sambalpuri Lekhak Sangh, 232 sandwich cultures concept of, 48–50, 53 factors effecting formation of, 55 Sanmitra Samaj, 274 Sanskrit language, 6 Santhali language, 227 Sarkar, K. K., 159 Sarvajanik Sabha, 278 sarva khap panchayat, 167 sarvodaya, Gandhian philosophy of, 291 satyagraha (non-violent protest), 159, 176 Satyashodhak Jalsas/Tamashas, 269–272, 277 Satyashodhak Samaj, 270–271, 276, 278 ‘save Oriya campaign’, 223 scheduled languages in India, 224 Scheduled Tribes, 5, 137 Schutz, Alfred, 182 Schwartz, Ronald D., 77 seawater baths, characteristics of, 142–143 secular needs, 186 self-identity, development of, 257 Semi Nomadic Tribal Society, 200 Sen, Amartya, 184 Sen, Dev, 338 settlement society, 350 Shah, Ghanshyam, 159 Shahidi Diwas (martyrs day), 176 ‘Shangri La’, myth of, 60, 71–72 Shanin, Theodor, 161 Shetkari Sanghtan, 165, 170 Shills, Edward, 216, 241 shishya, 10 Short Messaging Service (SMS), 210 Shri 420 (film), xxxi, 292 Sikh-Punjabi nationalism, 230

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368 Silpasastra (architecture), 13 Simmel, Georg, concept of ‘der Fremde’, 44 Singh, Rajendra, 158 Siu, Paul C. P., 44, 46 Smith, A. D., 218 Smith, M. G., 33, 253, 348, 355 corporate model, 34 definition of corporate groups, 37n3 typology of cultural politics, 35 social anthropology, 29, 32, 83, 91, 96, 117, 121 social development, concept of, 241–242 social integration, of modern societies, 32 social isolation, 23 social organisation, of human activities, 97, 108, 199, 201, 338 social pluralism, 35, 258 social relationships, 245, 254 properties of, 241 social solidarity, spatial-cultural structures of, 259 social structure and organisation leisure, 199–201 principle of, 109 property and economic values, 99–101 ‘qualitative ascriptive’ theory of, 99 students’ responses to, 98 theory of, 241–245 values related to, 98–99 value statements about status allocation principle, 99 social system of India, 199 blue-collar workers, 204–206 classification of, 200 IT workers and other professionals, 206–207 leisure of the farming class, 202–203

Index.indd 368

Culture and Society migrant service-providers, 204 rural leisure scenario, 203 white-collar workers, 206 social tensions, in free India, 1, 6–7 social transformation, concept of, 201, 207–211 societal identity, 255, 263 sociology basic structure and processes, 123 cartoon’s potential for, 334–335 challenge for, 115–116 Indian, 122 internalisation of, 193 modern industrial society, 116 and peasant civilization, 116–118 Socio-paedia, 192, 193 sojourner, essential characteristic of, 44, 46 South Indians on the Plantation Frontier in Malaya (Jain), 48 States Reorganisation Act (1956), 225 States Reorganisation Commission (SRC), 225, 227 structuralism in India, principle of, 259 structural pluralism, 35, 258–259, 261 demolition of, 262 Sufism, 6 Swades—We the People (film), 304, 313, 314, 316–319 Systematic Sourcebook in Rural Sociology (1931), 117 tamasha (folk theatre), 271–273, 276, 279 Tamashas, 269 tarun mandals (youth groups), 276 Telangana, xxix, 232–233 Telecommunication Regulatory Authority of India, 329 telecommunication services cultural aspects of the use of, 329 expansion of, 329–330

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index telephone exchanges, 329 television, expansion of digital broadcasting, 328 Doordarshan channel, 330 Hinduisation and, 330–332 private satellite channels, 330–331 religious programmes, 331 sociological issues, 328–330 socio-political scenario, 327–328 television rating points (TRPs), 209–210 Telugu nationalism, 224–225, 230 “A Theory of Middlemen Minorities” (1973), 46 Third World countries, 42, 47–48, 216, 249 Tibetan Buddhism, 77 Tibet and its History (1962), 65 Tibetan refugees in India, xxv articulating Tibet and, 62–70 and China’s occupation of Tibet, 64 generating meanings in exile, 76–78 and myth of ‘Shangri La’, 60, 71–72 national identity, 60 nationalism-in-exile, 73–75 notion of ethnicity, 62 politico-cultural support system, 73 ‘Prayer of Truthful Words’, 75 predicament of, 58 refugee settlements and camps, 59, 65 refugee syndrome, 60 religious nationalism, 75 and ‘rich cultural heritage of Tibet’, 59–62 ‘White Chorten’, 63 Tibetan Youth Congress, 71–72 Tibet Autonomous Region, 63 Rangzen and Tibetan National Uprising Day (March 10), 70–72 Western representations of, 69 Tibet Transformed (1983), 66

Index.indd 369

369 Tikait, Mahendra Singh, 163, 164, 169–170, 172, 175 Totoks, 49 trade union, 164, 165 Trade Union Act, 164 transnational migrants, 322 Trayi Vidya, 8 tribal language, 226–227 tribal nationalism, 227–229 Trinidad and Tobago, 347, 350 caste as culture, 351–355 East Indians of, 347–349, 353–355 significance of Hindu caste in, 353 truth, nature of, 104–106 Uberoi, Patricia, 180, 302–303, 309–311 Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 296, 298–299 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), 229 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 184, 187 unity of India, 6–8 Utkal Union Conference (UUC), 223 Valmikis, 163 value system, of educated youth in India, 94–95 four major aspects of, 97 interpretation of, 96 Particularistic Achievement pattern, 107–109 regarding nature of man, 101–103 in regard to property acquisition, 99 social stratification and, 98 Universalistic Achievement pattern, 107–109 on use of machine and industrialisation, 100 value-orientation, mode of, 106–108 worldview on, 103–104

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370

Index.indd 370

Culture and Society

Van Amersfoort, Hans, 21–24 Vardarajan, Latha, 306 varnas, 7, 10, 354 Varna-Varga (caste-class) congruence, under the colonial rule, 270 varta (commerce), 13 Vedic Aryans, 200 Vedokata controversy, 271 vidyas. See knowledge Vikas Adhyayan Kendra (VAK), Mumbai, 264 village pradhans, 169 visuals, status of, 334 Vogel, J. Ph., 113

as matrix of Goa’s ecology, 133–135 scope and method for examining, 131–133 Weber, Max, 105, 239, 241 Weltanschauung of tribal cultures, 114 Western Divine Right theory, 10 white revolution, 85 Williams, Eric, 266, 347 World Bank, 249 World Trade Organisation, 166 World Value Survey (WVS), 186, 187 World War first, 112–113, 201 second, 118, 121, 201

Warder, A. K., 131 water, as origin of all life and community organisation, 140–141 eco-cultural aspects of, 130–131 and evolution of occupational structure, 136–139 in local linguistic idioms, 150–155

xenocentrism, concept of, 44 xenophobia, 44 Yadav, Mulayam Singh, 178, 179 Yajurveda, 8 Yanagita, Kunio, 184 zamindari system, abolition of, 162

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About the Editor and Cont ributors

The Editor Susan Visvanathan has taught Classical Theory in Sociology for three decades. She started her teaching career at Hindu College, Delhi University, in 1983, and was Teacher-in-Charge at the Sociology Department of the Hindu College from 1992 to 1997. She then joined the Centre for the Study of Social Systems, JNU, where she taught Methodology of the Social Sciences, including Historical Method in Sociology, Modes of Cultural Sciences, and Comparitive Theories in Gender Studies. She has also taught courses on Religion, Culture and Symbols as well as Classical Thinkers at JNU since 1997. She was Chairperson of Centre for the Study of Social Systems, JNU, from 2009 to 2011. She is on the Board of ‘Contributions to Indian Sociology’, Delhi, and of ‘Paragana’, Freie University, Berlin. Susan Visvanathan is the author of sociological works such as The Christians of Kerala (1993, OUP, Madras), An Ethnography of Mysticism (1998, IIAS, Shimla), Structure and Transformation (ed, Susan Visvanathan, 2001, OUP, Delhi), Friendship, Interiority and Mysticism (2007, Orient Blackswan, Delhi), The Children of Nature: The Life and Legacy of Ramana Maharshi (2010, Roli, Delhi). Her novels are Something Barely Remembered (2000, Flamingo and Roli Indiaink), The Visiting Moon (2002, Indiaink), Phosphorus and Stone (2007, Zubaan and Penguin), The Seine at Noon (2007) and Nelycinda and Other Stories (2012, Roli).

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She has recently published a handbook of Sociology called Reading Marx Weber and Durkheim Today (2012, Palmleaf Books). Her new book The Wisdom of Community, which is a collection of previously published essays on the Freedom Movement and its contemporary implications, is in press (Forthcoming, Palm Leaf Publications). Prof essor Visvanathan has been a member of the Board of Studies of School of Arts and Aesthetics, JNU, and also at the Centres of Linguistics and English, French and Francophone Studies, JNU, and at Spanish, Portuguese and Latin American Studies at JNU, and at the Comparitive Study of World Religions at Jamia Millia Islamia. She has been a Fellow at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Delhi, and at Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Shimla. She was Visiting Professor to the Maison Des Sciences de l’homme, Paris (2004) and Visiting Professor to Université Paris 13 (2011) and to Free University, Berlin (2011). She was Charles Wallace Fellow to Queen’s University in Belfast, 1997. She has been co-editor with Geeti Sen for India International Centre Quarterly in 1995 and 1997, for the issue on Kerala and Women and the Family. Professor Susan Visvanathan was convenor of the Association of Social Anthropologists UK (ASA) Conference on Arts And Aesthetics in a Globalising World with Professor Parul Dev Mukherjee, held at JNU, New Delhi in April 2012.

The Contributors Yogendra Singh is the Founder of the Centre for the Study of Social Systems, JNU, who is a well-known author of books on Modernisation in India. He is currently Professor Emeritus in School of Social Sciences, JNU. Asoke Basu was co-author with S. M. Lipset on ‘Intellectual Types and Political Roles’ in The Idea of Social Structure: Essays in Honour of Thomas Merton (1976). The essay published here is a Presidential Address delivered to the Research Committee of the Sociology of Education, affiliated to the International Sociological Association in 1984. Indra Deva gave the Presidential Address published here at the proceedings of the Indian Sociological Association in Kohlapur in 1996. He is Professor Emeritus at Pandit Ravishankar Shukla University, Raipur, Chattisgarh.

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Bernadette Maria Gomes is Lecturer in Sociology at Government College of Arts, Science and Commerce in Quepem, Goa. C.N. Venugopal retired from Centre for the Study of Social Systems as Professor of Sociology, and now lives in Bangalore, collating his materials on Temple Culture in South India. Sally Falk Moore is a legal anthropologist and Professor Emeritus from Harvard, USA, who had worked on the Nuremberg trials, as an enquiry committee member specialising in the I. G. Farben case, before moving to academics. Subrat K. Nanda is Lecturer in Sociology at Department of Rural Development and Agricultural Production in NEHU, Tura Campus, Meghalaya. Ravindra K. Jain was Professor of Sociology at Centre for the Study of Social Systems, and has occupied the Distinguished Professor Chair on retirement at JNU. He is India’s best known Diaspora analyst. Gaurang R. Sahay is Reader, Unit for Rural Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai. Sudeep Basu is Assistant Professor at Gujarat Institute of Development Research, Goa. Victor S. D’Souza is a well-known urban theorist and retired as Professor of Sociology from Chandigarh. Yogesh Atal was advisor to the UNESCO. Ishwar Modi is President of the Indian Sociological Society (2012–13) and is the Director of the India International Institute of Social Sciences, Jaipur. Kenji Kosaka is Professor of Sociology at the School of Sociology and Social Work at Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan. Sharmila Rege was a well-known activist and intellectual and based in the Women’s Study Centre in the University of Pune.

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Akalanka Jindal was a pioneer in Film Studies, and was a member of the Film Enquiry Committee of 1951. Moutushi Mukherjee is a Research Scholar at the Tata Institute of Social Work, Mumbai. Binod C. Agrawal is Director, Taleem Research Foundation, Ahmedabad. Dalia Chakrabarti is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Presidency College, Ahmedabad.

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Appendix of Sources

All articles and chapters have been reproduced exactly as they were first published. All cross-references can be found in the original source of publication. Grateful acknowledgement is made to the following sources for permission to reproduce material for this volume. 1. “G.S. Ghurye on Culture and Nation-Building,” C.N. Venugopal

Vol. 42, No. 1&2 (March and September), 1993: 1–14.

2. “Cultural Pluralism and National Cohesion: Issues and Prospects,” Sally Falk Moore

Vol. 36, No. 2 (September), 1987: 35–60.

3. “Outsiders as Insiders: The Phenomenon of Sandwich Culture,” Yogesh Atal

Vol. 38, No. 1 (March), 1989: 22–41.

4. “Interrogating Tibetan Exilic Culture: Issues and Concerns,” Sudeep Basu

Vol. 61, No. 2 (May–August), 2012: 232–254.

5. “The Significance of Culture in the Understanding of Social Change in Contemporary India,” Yogendra Singh

Vol. 44, No. 1 (March), 1995: 1–10.

6. “Cultural Integration and Changing Values: A Study of Value System of Educated Youth,” Yogendra Singh

Vol. 13, No. 2 (September), 1964: 49–66.

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7. “Towards a More Meaningful Study of Ecology, Society and Culture,” Indra Deva

Vol. 46, No. 1 (March), 1997: 1–20.

8. “Vosaad: The Socio-Cultural Force of Water: A Study from Goa,” Bernadette Maria Gomes

Vol. 54, No. 2 (May–August), 2005: 250–276.

9. “Traditional Institutions and Cultural Practices vis-à-vis Agrarian Mobilisation: The Case of Bharatiya Kisan Union,” Gaurang R. Sahay

Vol. 53, No. 3 (September–December), 2004: 396–418.

10. “A Sociology for Happiness: Beyond Western versus Non-Western Perspectives,” Kenji Kosaka

Vol. 56, No. 3 (September–December), 2007: 369–382.

11. “Leisure and Social Transformation,” Ishwar Modi

Vol. 61, No. 3 (September–December), 2012: 386–403.

12. “Cultural Nationalism in a Multi-National Context: The Case of India,” Subrat K. Nanda

Vol. 55, No. 1 (January–April), 2007: 24–44.

13. “Education, Social Structure and Culture,” Asoke Basu

Vol. 35, No. 2 (September), 1986: 55–71.

14. “Towards a Cultural Policy in India: A Socio-Cultural Perspective,” Victor S. D’Souza

Vol. 44, No. 2 (September), 1995: 159–168.

15. “Understanding Popular Culture: The Satyashodhak and Ganesh Mela in Maharashtra,” Sharmila Rege

Vol. 49, No. 2 (September), 2000: 193–210.

16. “Sociological Research on Films,” Akalanka Jindal

Vol. 9, No. 2 (September), 1960: 56–72.

17. “The Return Migrant in Cinema: The Idealist and the Sceptic,” Moutushi Mukherjee

Vol. 61, No. 3 (September–December), 2012: 404–428.

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18. “Cultural Invasion from the Sky: Hinduisation of Indian Television?” Binod C. Agrawal

Vol. 48, No. 1&2 (March and September), 1999: 269–274.

19. “The Cartoon of a Bengali Lady Clerk: A Repertoire of Sociological Data,” Dalia Chakrabarti

Vol. 53, No. 2 (May–August), 2004: 251–262.

20. “Race Relations, Ethnicity, Class and Culture: A Comparison of Indians in Trinidad and Malaysia,” Ravindra K. Jain

Vol. 38, No. 1 (March), 1989: 57–69.

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